Library / Laws / 113th / sres / S.Res. 132 / Introduced in Senate
III
113th CONGRESS
1st Session
S. RES. 132
IN THE SENATE OF THE UNITED STATES
May 8, 2013
Mr. Begich (for himself,
Mr. Tester, and Mr. Baucus) submitted the following resolution;
which was referred to the Committee on
Armed Services
RESOLUTION
Expressing the sense of the Senate that the
Department of Defense request for domestic Base Realignment and Closure
authority in 2015 and 2017 is neither affordable nor feasible as of the date of
agreement to this resolution and that the Department of Defense must further
analyze the capability to consolidate excess overseas infrastructure and
increase efficiencies by relocating missions from overseas to domestic
installations prior to requesting domestic Base Realignment and Closure
authority.
Whereas the Department of Defense claims a 24-percent
surplus in domestic military infrastructure and has requested domestic Base
Realignment and Closure (BRAC) rounds in 2015 and 2017;
Whereas Congress rejected a request for 2 BRAC rounds made
by the Department of Defense in fiscal year 2013;
Whereas the Senate Armed Services Committee noted in title
XXIV of Senate Report 112–173 to accompany S. 3254 of the 112th Congress, that
a request by the Department of Defense for authority to conduct a domestic BRAC
round must be preceded by a comprehensive evaluation of opportunities to obtain
efficiencies through the consolidation of the overseas operations of defense
agencies and possible relocation back to the United States;
Whereas the Base Structure Report for fiscal year 2012 of
the Office of the Deputy Under Secretary of Defense, Installations and
Environment, found that the Department of Defense has 666 military sites in
foreign countries, including 232 in Germany, 109 in Japan, and 85 in South
Korea;
Whereas the United States has developed an increased
capacity to rapidly deploy around the globe, thereby reducing the strategic
value of an overseas footprint based largely on Cold War geopolitics and an
obsolete National Security Strategy;
Whereas the Government Accountability Office concluded in
a 2007 study that the 2005 BRAC round was the most complex and costliest
ever;
Whereas the Government Accountability Office found in a
2012 report entitled Military Base Realignments and Closures: Updated
Costs and Savings Estimates from BRAC 2005 that the 2005 BRAC round far
exceeded estimated implementation costs, growing from $21,000,000,000 to
$35,100,000,000, a 67-percent increase;
Whereas the Government Accountability Office found in the
2012 report that the estimated 20-year savings for the 2005 BRAC round
decreased by 72 percent from $35,600,000,000 to $9,900,000,000;
Whereas the Government Accountability Office estimates
that it will take until 2017 for the Department of Defense to recoup upfront
implementation costs of BRAC 2005, 4 years longer than the BRAC Commission
estimates and 12 years after the date of execution and initial
investment;
Whereas the Department of Defense would spend
$2,400,000,000 in a time of fiscal austerity to execute the proposed BRAC round
in 2015;
Whereas the financial crisis in the United States
continues to challenge local economies and a BRAC round would create more
uncertainty and economic hardship for impacted communities still in the
recovery process;
Whereas Federal budget uncertainty and the fiscal
challenges a domestic BRAC round would bring to communities renders the
significant $2,400,000,000 in up-front costs neither affordable nor feasible as
of the date of agreement to this resolution; and
Whereas the lack of potential return on the significant
investment required for a BRAC round may result in an inefficient use of
taxpayer funds: Now, therefore, be it
That it is the sense of the Senate
that—
(1) as of the date of
agreement to this resolution, the Department of Defense should not be granted
authority for the requested 2015 and 2017 Base Realignment and Closure
rounds;
(2) before granting
the authority for the requested 2015 and 2017 BRAC rounds, the Department of
Defense should achieve economic efficiencies by—
(A) closing and
consolidating excess infrastructure and facilities in overseas locations;
and
(B) reexamining
relocation opportunities of overseas missions to United States military
installations; and
(3) the Department of
Defense is unwise to request a BRAC round when the economy of the United States
is struggling to recover and negatively impacted communities are fighting to
put citizens back to work.