Library / Laws / 113th / s / S. 214 / Introduced in Senate
II
113th CONGRESS
1st Session
S. 214
IN THE SENATE OF THE UNITED STATES
February 4, 2013
Ms. Klobuchar (for
herself, Mr. Grassley,
Mr. Durbin, Mr.
Franken, and Mr. Johnson of South
Dakota) introduced the following bill; which was read twice and
referred to the Committee on the
Judiciary
A BILL
To prohibit brand name drug companies from compensating
generic drug companies to delay the entry of a generic drug into the
market.
1.
Short title
This Act may be cited as the
Preserve Access to Affordable Generics
Act.
2.
Congressional
findings and declaration of purposes
(a)
Findings
Congress
finds the following:
(1) In 1984, the Drug
Price Competition and Patent Term Restoration Act (Public Law 98–417) (referred
to in this Act as the 1984 Act), was enacted with the intent of
facilitating the early entry of generic drugs while preserving incentives for
innovation.
(2) Prescription
drugs make up 10 percent of the national health care spending but for the past
decade have been one of the fastest growing segments of health care
expenditures.
(3) Until recently,
the 1984 Act was successful in facilitating generic competition to the benefit
of consumers and health care payers—although 67 percent of all prescriptions
dispensed in the United States are generic drugs, they account for only 20
percent of all expenditures.
(4) Generic drugs
cost substantially less than brand name drugs, with discounts off the brand
price sometimes exceeding 90 percent.
(5) Federal dollars
currently account for an estimated 35 percent of the $263,000,000,000 spent on
prescription drugs, and this share is expected to rise to 42 percent by
2021.
(6)
(A) In recent years, the
intent of the 1984 Act has been subverted by certain settlement agreements
between brand companies and their potential generic competitors that make
reverse payments which are payments by the brand company to the
generic company.
(B) These settlement agreements have
unduly delayed the marketing of low-cost generic drugs contrary to free
competition, the interests of consumers, and the principles underlying
antitrust law.
(C) Because of the price disparity between
brand name and generic drugs, such agreements are more profitable for both the
brand and generic manufacturers than competition, and will become increasingly
common unless prohibited.
(D) These agreements result in consumers
losing the benefits that the 1984 Act was intended to provide.
(b)
Purposes
The
purposes of this Act are—
(1) to enhance
competition in the pharmaceutical market by stopping anticompetitive agreements
between brand name and generic drug manufacturers that limit, delay, or
otherwise prevent competition from generic drugs; and
(2) to support the
purpose and intent of antitrust law by prohibiting anticompetitive practices in
the pharmaceutical industry that harm consumers.
3.
Unlawful
compensation for delay
The
Federal Trade Commission Act (15 U.S.C. 44 et seq.) is amended by—
(1) redesignating
section 28 as section 29; and
(2) inserting before
section 29, as redesignated, the following:
28.
Preserving
access to affordable generics
(a)
In
general
(1)
Enforcement
proceeding
The Federal Trade Commission may initiate a proceeding
to enforce the provisions of this section against the parties to any agreement
resolving or settling, on a final or interim basis, a patent infringement
claim, in connection with the sale of a drug product.
(2)
Presumption
(A)
In
general
Subject to subparagraph (B), in such a proceeding, an
agreement shall be presumed to have anticompetitive effects and be unlawful
if—
(i) an ANDA filer
receives anything of value; and
(ii) the ANDA filer
agrees to limit or forego research, development, manufacturing, marketing, or
sales of the ANDA product for any period of time.
(B)
Exception
The
presumption in subparagraph (A) shall not apply if the parties to such
agreement demonstrate by clear and convincing evidence that the procompetitive
benefits of the agreement outweigh the anticompetitive effects of the
agreement.
(b)
Competitive
factors
In determining whether the settling parties have met
their burden under subsection (a)(2)(B), the fact finder shall consider—
(1) the length of
time remaining until the end of the life of the relevant patent, compared with
the agreed upon entry date for the ANDA product;
(2) the value to
consumers of the competition from the ANDA product allowed under the
agreement;
(3) the form and
amount of consideration received by the ANDA filer in the agreement resolving
or settling the patent infringement claim;
(4) the revenue the
ANDA filer would have received by winning the patent litigation;
(5) the reduction in
the NDA holder's revenues if it had lost the patent litigation;
(6) the time period
between the date of the agreement conveying value to the ANDA filer and the
date of the settlement of the patent infringement claim; and
(7) any other factor
that the fact finder, in its discretion, deems relevant to its determination of
competitive effects under this subsection.
(c)
Limitations
In
determining whether the settling parties have met their burden under subsection
(a)(2)(B), the fact finder shall not presume—
(1) that entry would
not have occurred until the expiration of the relevant patent or statutory
exclusivity; or
(2) that the
agreement's provision for entry of the ANDA product prior to the expiration of
the relevant patent or statutory exclusivity means that the agreement is
pro-competitive, although such evidence may be relevant to the fact finder's
determination under this section.
(d)
Exclusions
Nothing
in this section shall prohibit a resolution or settlement of a patent
infringement claim in which the consideration granted by the NDA holder to the
ANDA filer as part of the resolution or settlement includes only one or more of
the following:
(1) The right to
market the ANDA product in the United States prior to the expiration of—
(A) any patent that
is the basis for the patent infringement claim; or
(B) any patent right
or other statutory exclusivity that would prevent the marketing of such
drug.
(2) A payment for
reasonable litigation expenses not to exceed $7,500,000.
(3) A covenant not to
sue on any claim that the ANDA product infringes a United States patent.
(e)
Regulations and
enforcement
(1)
Regulations
The
Federal Trade Commission may issue, in accordance with section 553 of title 5,
United States Code, regulations implementing and interpreting this section.
These regulations may exempt certain types of agreements described in
subsection (a) if the Commission determines such agreements will further market
competition and benefit consumers. Judicial review of any such regulation shall
be in the United States District Court for the District of Columbia pursuant to
section 706 of title 5, United States Code.
(2)
Enforcement
A
violation of this section shall be treated as a violation of section 5.
(3)
Judicial
review
Any person, partnership or corporation that is subject to
a final order of the Commission, issued in an administrative adjudicative
proceeding under the authority of subsection (a)(1), may, within 30 days of the
issuance of such order, petition for review of such order in the United States
Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit or the United States
Court of Appeals for the circuit in which the ultimate parent entity, as
defined at 16 CFR 801.1(a)(3), of the NDA holder is incorporated as of the date
that the NDA is filed with the Secretary of the Food and Drug Administration,
or the United States Court of Appeals for the circuit in which the ultimate
parent entity of the ANDA filer is incorporated as of the date that the ANDA is
filed with the Secretary of the Food and Drug Administration. In such a review
proceeding, the findings of the Commission as to the facts, if supported by
evidence, shall be conclusive.
(f)
Antitrust
laws
Nothing in this section shall be construed to modify, impair
or supersede the applicability of the antitrust laws as defined in subsection
(a) of the 1st section of the Clayton Act (15 U.S.C. 12(a)) and of section 5 of
this Act to the extent that section 5 applies to unfair methods of competition.
Nothing in this section shall modify, impair, limit or supersede the right of
an ANDA filer to assert claims or counterclaims against any person, under the
antitrust laws or other laws relating to unfair competition.
(g)
Penalties
(1)
Forfeiture
Each
person, partnership or corporation that violates or assists in the violation of
this section shall forfeit and pay to the United States a civil penalty
sufficient to deter violations of this section, but in no event greater than 3
times the value received by the party that is reasonably attributable to a
violation of this section. If no such value has been received by the NDA
holder, the penalty to the NDA holder shall be sufficient to deter violations,
but in no event greater than 3 times the value given to the ANDA filer
reasonably attributable to the violation of this section. Such penalty shall
accrue to the United States and may be recovered in a civil action brought by
the Federal Trade Commission, in its own name by any of its attorneys
designated by it for such purpose, in a district court of the United States
against any person, partnership or corporation that violates this section. In
such actions, the United States district courts are empowered to grant
mandatory injunctions and such other and further equitable relief as they deem
appropriate.
(2)
Cease and
desist
(A)
In
general
If the Commission has issued a cease and desist order
with respect to a person, partnership or corporation in an administrative
adjudicative proceeding under the authority of subsection (a)(1), an action
brought pursuant to paragraph (1) may be commenced against such person,
partnership or corporation at any time before the expiration of one year after
such order becomes final pursuant to section 5(g).
(B)
Exception
In
an action under subparagraph (A), the findings of the Commission as to the
material facts in the administrative adjudicative proceeding with respect to
such person's, partnership's or corporation's violation of this section shall
be conclusive unless—
(i) the terms of such
cease and desist order expressly provide that the Commission's findings shall
not be conclusive; or
(ii) the order became
final by reason of section 5(g)(1), in which case such finding shall be
conclusive if supported by evidence.
(3)
Civil
penalty
In determining the amount of the civil penalty described
in this section, the court shall take into account—
(A) the nature,
circumstances, extent, and gravity of the violation;
(B) with respect to
the violator, the degree of culpability, any history of violations, the ability
to pay, any effect on the ability to continue doing business, profits earned by
the NDA holder, compensation received by the ANDA filer, and the amount of
commerce affected; and
(C) other matters
that justice requires.
(4)
Remedies in
addition
Remedies provided in this subsection are in addition to,
and not in lieu of, any other remedy provided by Federal law. Nothing in this
paragraph shall be construed to affect any authority of the Commission under
any other provision of law.
(h)
Definitions
In this section:
(1)
Agreement
The
term agreement means anything that would constitute an agreement
under section 1 of the Sherman Act (15 U.S.C. 1) or section 5 of this
Act.
(2)
Agreement
resolving or settling a patent infringement claim
The term
agreement resolving or settling a patent infringement claim
includes any agreement that is entered into within 30 days of the resolution or
the settlement of the claim, or any other agreement that is contingent upon,
provides a contingent condition for, or is otherwise related to the resolution
or settlement of the claim.
(3)
ANDA
The
term ANDA means an abbreviated new drug application, as defined
under section 505(j) of the Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act (21 U.S.C.
355(j)).
(4)
ANDA
filer
The term ANDA filer means a party who has
filed an ANDA with the Food and Drug Administration.
(5)
ANDA
product
The term ANDA product means the product to
be manufactured under the ANDA that is the subject of the patent infringement
claim.
(6)
Drug
product
The term drug product means a finished
dosage form (e.g., tablet, capsule, or solution) that contains a drug
substance, generally, but not necessarily, in association with 1 or more other
ingredients, as defined in section 314.3(b) of title 21, Code of Federal
Regulations.
(7)
NDA
The
term NDA means a new drug application, as defined under section
505(b) of the Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act (21 U.S.C. 355(b)).
(8)
NDA
holder
The term NDA holder means—
(A) the party that
received FDA approval to market a drug product pursuant to an NDA;
(B) a party owning or
controlling enforcement of the patent listed in the Approved Drug Products With
Therapeutic Equivalence Evaluations (commonly known as the FDA Orange
Book) in connection with the NDA; or
(C) the predecessors,
subsidiaries, divisions, groups, and affiliates controlled by, controlling, or
under common control with any of the entities described in subparagraphs (A)
and (B) (such control to be presumed by direct or indirect share ownership of
50 percent or greater), as well as the licensees, licensors, successors, and
assigns of each of the entities.
(9)
Patent
infringement
The term patent infringement means
infringement of any patent or of any filed patent application, extension,
reissue, renewal, division, continuation, continuation in part, reexamination,
patent term restoration, patents of addition and extensions thereof.
(10)
Patent
infringement claim
The term patent infringement
claim means any allegation made to an ANDA filer, whether or not
included in a complaint filed with a court of law, that its ANDA or ANDA
product may infringe any patent held by, or exclusively licensed to, the NDA
holder of the drug product.
(11)
Statutory
exclusivity
The term statutory exclusivity means
those prohibitions on the approval of drug applications under clauses (ii)
through (iv) of section 505(c)(3)(E) (5- and 3-year data exclusivity), section
527 (orphan drug exclusivity), or section 505A (pediatric exclusivity) of the
Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic
Act.
.
4.
Notice and
certification of agreements
(a)
Notice of all
agreements
Section 1112(c)(2) of the Medicare Prescription Drug,
Improvement, and Modernization Act of 2003 (21 U.S.C. 355 note) is amended
by—
(1) striking
the Commission the and inserting the following: “the
Commission—
(1) the
;
(2) striking the
period and inserting ; and; and
(3) inserting at the
end the following:
(2) any other
agreement the parties enter into within 30 days of entering into an agreement
covered by subsection (a) or
(b).
.
(b)
Certification
of agreements
Section 1112 of such Act is amended by adding at
the end the following:
(d)
Certification
The
Chief Executive Officer or the company official responsible for negotiating any
agreement required to be filed under subsection (a), (b), or (c) shall execute
and file with the Assistant Attorney General and the Commission a certification
as follows: I declare that the following is true, correct, and complete
to the best of my knowledge: The materials filed with the Federal Trade
Commission and the Department of Justice under section 1112 of subtitle B of
title XI of the Medicare Prescription Drug, Improvement, and Modernization Act
of 2003, with respect to the agreement referenced in this certification: (1)
represent the complete, final, and exclusive agreement between the parties; (2)
include any ancillary agreements that are contingent upon, provide a contingent
condition for, or are otherwise related to, the referenced agreement; and (3)
include written descriptions of any oral agreements, representations,
commitments, or promises between the parties that are responsive to subsection
(a) or (b) of such section 1112 and have not been reduced to
writing..
.
5.
Forfeiture of
180-day exclusivity period
Section 505(j)(5)(D)(i)(V) of the Federal
Food, Drug and Cosmetic Act (21 U.S.C. 355(j)(5)(D)(i)(V)) is amended by
inserting section 28 of the Federal Trade Commission Act or
after that the agreement has violated.
6.
Commission
litigation authority
Section
16(a)(2) of the Federal Trade Commission Act (15 U.S.C. 56(a)(2)) is
amended—
(1) in subparagraph (D), by striking
or after the semicolon;
(2) in subparagraph (E), by inserting
or after the semicolon; and
(3) inserting after subparagraph (E) the
following:
(F) under section
28;
.
7.
Statute of
limitations
The Commission
shall commence any enforcement proceeding described in section 28 of the
Federal Trade Commission Act, as added by section 3, except for an action
described in section 28(g)(2) of the Federal Trade Commission Act, not later
than 3 years after the date on which the parties to the agreement file the
Notice of Agreement as provided by sections 1112(c)(2) and (d) of the Medicare
Prescription Drug Improvement and Modernization Act of 2003 (21 U.S.C. 355
note).
8.
Severability
If any provision of this Act, an amendment
made by this Act, or the application of such provision or amendment to any
person or circumstance is held to be unconstitutional, the remainder of this
Act, the amendments made by this Act, and the application of the provisions of
such Act or amendments to any person or circumstance shall not be affected
thereby.