H.Res. 503 — Introduced in House

IV 113th CONGRESS 2d Session H. RES. 503 IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES March 5, 2014 Mr. Smith of New Jersey (for himself, Ms. Bass, Mr. McCaul, Mr. Wolf, and Mr. Weber of Texas) submitted the following resolution; which was referred to the Committee on Foreign Affairs RESOLUTION Expressing the sense of the House of Representatives regarding the need to bring the South Sudan conflict to a sustainable and lasting end and to promote reconciliation of longstanding and recent grievances to allow for a peaceful society with good governance. Whereas the long civil war between the Government of Sudan and its southern region (1983 to 2005) was ended with the Comprehensive Peace Agreement; Whereas citizens in the then-semi-autonomous region of South Sudan voted on January 9, 2011, through January 15, 2011, to secede from Sudan and became the world’s newest nation on July 9, 2011; Whereas leaders of the ruling Sudan People’s Liberation Movement (SPLM) put aside longstanding ethnic and personal animosities in the last few years in order to facilitate the independence effort; Whereas political, social, and economic conflict between the Dinka and Nuer, the largest and second largest ethnic groups respectively, as well as among other smaller ethnic groups, have nevertheless occurred during the period of apparent peace since the signing of the 2005 Comprehensive Peace Agreement; Whereas there have been persistent questions raised in recent years concerning an alleged lack of broad political and ethnic inclusion in building the Government of South Sudan; Whereas South Sudan President Salva Kiir (a Dinka) dismissed his entire cabinet on July 23, 2013, including his main rival, then-Vice President Riek Machar (a Nuer), which necessitated radio broadcasts calling for calm in the wake of that action; Whereas in mid-December, tensions erupted over the handling of an SPLM party conference preparing for 2015 national elections, with the spark for violence reportedly being an attempt by Dinka presidential guards to disarm their Nuer counterparts; Whereas in the wake of the initial violence, the Government of South Sudan arrested 11 senior political figures, including former Finance Minister Kosti Manibe, former Minister of Cabinet Affairs Deng Alor, and SPLM Secretary General Pagan Amum, accusing them of being involved in a failed coup and holding them in virtual house arrest; Whereas government forces, led by President Kiir, and a rebel force led by former Vice President Machar have engaged in combat and have been joined in the fighting by some militia leaders, forming, along with defectors from the ruling party and national army, the nucleus of an Army in Opposition; Whereas fighting quickly spread to several provinces and as of February 11, 2014, more than 723,000 people were displaced within South Sudan and more than 145,000 had fled to nearby countries, mostly to Ethiopia; Whereas untold thousands of South Sudanese have been killed in the fighting, including, according to the United Nations, those targeted for their ethnicity; and Whereas United States commitment to fully implementing the Comprehensive Peace Agreement and ongoing United States Department of State engagement in achieving an enduring peace remain essential: Now, therefore, be it That it is the sense of the House of Representatives that it should be the policy of the United States Government to encourage and facilitate as feasible— (1) the full implementation of the January 23, 2014, cessation of hostilities agreement between the Government of South Sudan and the Sudan People’s Liberation Movement/Army in Opposition, with a commitment to ensuring that the multilateral Joint Monitoring and Verification Team has unimpeded access to all parts of the country; (2) the expansion of existing efforts to disarm militia and other armed groups in South Sudan, demobilize combatants and reintegrate them into civilian society, and curtail supplies of foreign arms beyond that necessary for national security or law and order, raising the possibility of an arms embargo in the event of further violations of the cessation of hostilities agreement; (3) the elevation of the United States Government’s existing presence at the Addis Ababa-based peace negotiations, building on Special Envoy Donald Booth’s efforts and with a focus on high-level engagement around the broader political negotiations necessary to broker a durable peace in conjunction with neighboring countries, including Kenya, Ethiopia, Uganda, and the broader international community, to increase leverage in the discussions; (4) the observance of due process and rule of law leading to either the lawful prosecution or unconditional release of all arrested political leaders in line with the constitution and all relevant laws; (5) the relaunching of an inclusive process of consultations on South Sudan’s permanent constitution, drawing on the National Constitutional Review Commission’s work around the existing transitional constitution, while recognizing the need for reforms in light of the current circumstances; (6) the negotiation of an inclusive political framework for governance in the time remaining until the next general elections that provides political actors and civil society roles in ensuring that good governance prevails in South Sudan as a part of the ongoing negotiations in Addis Ababa, with a strong emphasis on the need for direct participation of civil society actors in the process and creation of a credible feedback process allowing stakeholders and constituencies within South Sudan to remain informed about the ongoing negotiations and have their input respected; (7) support for South Sudan’s National Election Commission as it lays out a conflict-sensitive roadmap to prepare for and conduct the next South Sudanese general elections with an agreed-upon timetable for a census, constitutional adoption, and the return of displaced people, establishing measurable benchmarks to ensure to the fullest extent possible a free, fair, and transparent process; (8) the creation of a framework for security sector reform by engaging with the Sudan People’s Liberation Army (SPLA) and South Sudan Police Service (SPSS) with a focus on transforming the fractured security forces into a professional and accountable national army and police force, providing for the integration of rebel militias into the national army where appropriate and politically engaging respected officers and civil society representatives; (9) technical, logistical, and expert support to the African Union Commission of Inquiry into atrocities and human rights abuses committed during the current conflict in South Sudan, while independently weighing targeted sanctions against perpetrators of human rights abuses and those obstructing the peace process and encouraging the Commission of Inquiry to report publicly on its findings and recommendations and adhere to the reporting timeline of three months from its establishment in accordance with the African Union Peace and Security Council Communiqué of December 30, 2013; (10) support for a South Sudan version of a Truth and Reconciliation Commission to provide a platform for grievances to be aired and addressed to lessen the temptation for revenge; (11) financial and technical assistance to support a grassroots program of social reconciliation, utilizing the good offices of the South Sudan faith-based community and other elements of civil society to mitigate conflict and encourage social cohesion across the country building on successful effort to work with local communities and traditional authorities; (12) encouragement of the creation of a hybrid or mixed court for South Sudan to hold perpetrators of grave human rights abuses accountable while respecting South Sudanese sovereign legal authority and building indigenous capacity in the justice sector and establishing a documentation clearinghouse modeled on the multi-donor Syrian Justice and Accountability Center to collect testimony and forensic evidence or any eventual trial; (13) the resumption of United States Agency for International Development programming, focusing on famine prevention and resilience, especially in hard-hit areas; and (14) United States financial support to meet humanitarian needs and capacity building support to meet the goals in previously listed recommendations.