,,ii ,calendar ,no4 #cbg #aaith ,,congress #b;d ,session ,s4 #cbdi ,,in ,,the ,,senate ,,of ,,the ,,united ,,states ,november #bj1 #bjbe,mrs4 ,shaheen 7for herself and ,mr4 ,barrasso7 introduced the following bill2 which was read twice and referred to the ,committee on ,foreign ,relations ,february #aj1 #bjbf,reported by ,mr4 ,risch1 with an amendment,strike out all after the enacting clause and insert the part printed in italic ,a ,,bill ,to enhance ,united ,states ,government strategic coordination of the security1 installation1 maintenance1 and repair of international subsea fiber-optic cables4 #a4 ,short title ,this ,act may be cited as the ,strategic ,subsea ,cables ,act of #bjbe4 #b4 ,table of contents ,the table of contents for this ,act is as follows3 ,sec4 #a4 ,short title4,sec4 #b4 ,table of contents4,sec4 #c4 ,definitions4,,title ,i--,international coordination and engagement on subsea fiber-optic cables,sec4 #aja4 ,findings4,sec4 #ajb4 ,sense of ,congress4,sec4 #ajc4 ,enhancing ,united ,states ,government engagement at the ,international ,cable ,protection ,committee to safeguard ,united ,states interests4,sec4 #ajd4 ,imposition of sanctions with respect to damage to subsea fiber-optic cables4,sec4 #aje4 ,report on subsea fiber-optic cable activities by the ,people's ,republic of ,china and the ,russian ,federation4,sec4 #ajf4 ,engaging foreign partners to strengthen subsea fiber-optic cable security4,,title ,,ii--,department of ,state subsea fiber-optic expertise,sec4 #bja4 ,expanding subsea fiber-optic cable expertise at the ,department of ,state4,,title ,,iii--,subsea fiber-optic cable coordination1 construction1 and repair,sec4 #cja4 ,improving ,united ,states ,government coordination of subsea fiber-optic cables4,sec4 #cjb4 ,strengthening information sharing between ,united ,states ,government and private sector actors on subsea fiber-optic cables4 #c4 ,definitions ,in this ,act3 7#a7 ,agency ,the term agency has the meaning given the term in section #cejb of title #dd1 ,united ,states ,code4 7#b7 ,appropriate congressional committees ,the term appropriate congressional committees means-- 7,a7 the ,committee on ,foreign ,relations and the ,committee on ,appropriations of the ,senate2 and 7,b7 the ,committee on ,foreign ,affairs and the ,committee on ,appropriations of the ,house of ,representatives4 7#c7 ,appropriate ,federal agencies ,the term appropriate ,federal agencies means the following3 7,a7 ,the ,department of ,commerce4 7,b7 ,the ,department of ,defense4 7,c7 ,the ,department of ,homeland ,security4 7,d7 ,the ,office of the ,director of ,national ,intelligence4 7,e7 ,the ,department of ,state4 7,f7 ,the ,federal ,communications ,commission4 7,g7 ,the ,department of the ,treasury4 7,h7 ,the ,department of the ,judiciary4 7,i7 ,any additional ,federal agencies1 as determined by the ,president4 7#d7 ,interagency committee ,the term interagency committee means the entity established under section #cja7;b7 of this ,act4 7#e7 ,non-,federal entity ,the term non-,federal entity means any nongovernmental entity that is an individual1 organization1 or business involved in the operation1 maintenance1 repair1 or construction of subsea fiber-optic cables1 including subsea cable owners4 7#f7 ,subsea fiber-optic cable threat ,the term subsea fiber-optic cable threat means an action or likely future action1 in particular1 actions taken with malicious intent1 on or through a subsea fiber-optic cable network that may result in an unauthorized effort to adversely impact the privacy1 efficacy1 security1 or integrity of a subsea fiber-optic cable network4 ,i ,international coordination and engagement on subsea fiber-optic cables #aja4 ,findings ,congress makes the following findings3 7#a7 ,following subsea fiber-optic cable cuts in the ,baltic ,sea in ,december #bjbd1 the ,north ,atlantic ,treaty ,organization 7,,nato7 established the ,critical ,undersea ,infrastructure ,network to conduct information and threat intelligence sharing among private and public sector actors to protect subsea cables4 7#b7 ,on ,february #ba1 #bjbe1 the ,european ,union published an ,,eu ,action ,plan on ,cable ,security to include the development and deployment of an ,integrated ,surveillance ,mechanism for ,submarine cables work to establish a dedicated regional hub in the ,baltic ,sea to serve as a test bed of the integrated surveillance approach4 7#c7 ,the ,association of ,southeast ,asian ,states 7,,asean7 published guidelines for ,strengthening ,resilience and ,repair of ,submarine ,cables and most recently announced plans to build a secure1 diverse and resilient submarine cable network and to facilitate the expeditious deployment1 repair1 maintenance1 removal1 and protection of submarine cables1 between ,,asean ,member ,states4 7#d7 ,on ,july #a1 #bjbe1 the ,quad1 represented by the ,united ,states1 ,india1 ,japan1 and ,australia1 met to reaffirm its commitment to the ,quad ,partnership on ,cable ,connectivity and ,resilience4 ,in the meeting1 the ,quad underscored the need for digital infrastructure collaboration1 organizing a subsea cables forum to be hosted by the ,united ,states and ,india and encouraging regulatory harmonization between ,quad partners4 ,through this initiative1 the ,quad seeks to defend and promote resilient1 secure1 and transparent digital infrastructure across the ,indo-,pacific region4 #ajb4 ,sense of ,congress ,it is the sense of ,congress that-- 7#a7 subsea fiber-optic cables constitute the backbone of the global internet and therefore should be treated as a global public good2 7#b7 the ,united ,states ,government has an important role to play in advancing the ,united ,states interests in international bodies that oversee subsea fiber-optic cable protection1 promote network resilience and redundancy1 and advance regulations in support of these goals2 7#c7 the ,united ,states ,government should play a more active role in the ,international ,cable ,protection ,committee 7,,icpc7 in order to advance the ,united ,states national security and economic interests2 7#d7 the ,united ,states should lead efforts to promote the deployment of resilient subsea fiber-optic cable networks1 enhance situational awareness1 strengthen preparedness1 and formalize collective responses among allies and partners through enhanced information sharing and coordination2 and 7#e7 while the ,united ,states and allied foreign governments have a role to play in the protection of subsea fiber-optic cables1 cable owners and other associated private sector stakeholders carry significant responsibility in safeguarding subsea cables4 #ajc4 ,enhancing ,united ,states ,government engagement at the ,international ,cable ,protection ,committee to safeguard ,united ,states interests 7a7 ,in general ,the ,secretary of ,state1 in coordination with the interagency committee1 shall seek to increase ,united ,states ,government engagement in the ,international ,cable ,protection ,committee 7,,icpc7 to advance ,united ,states national security and economic interests4 7b7 ,report ,not later than one year after the date of the enactment of this ,act1 and annually thereafter for #e years1 the ,secretary of ,state shall submit a report to the appropriate congressional committees that includes the following3 7#a7 ,a description of how increased the ,united ,states ,government engagement within the ,,icpc could support ,united ,states national security objectives as it relates to the protection of subsea fiber-optic cables4 7#b7 ,a description of key objectives for promoting and protecting ,united ,states national security interests within the ,,icpc4 7#c7 ,a description of how ,people's ,republic of ,china entities leverage their engagement within the ,,icpc to further their strategic interests4 7#d7 ,a description of how encouraging other countries and regional bodies to join the ,,icpc can better ensure coordinated1 consistent global subsea fiber-optic cable policies4 #ajd4 ,imposition of sanctions with respect to damage to subsea fiber-optic cables 7a7 ,in general ,the ,president1 in coordination with the ,secretary of ,state and the ,secretary of the ,treasury1 shall impose sanctions described in subsection 7c7 with respect to any foreign person that the ,president determines1 on or after the date of the enactment of this ,act1 is responsible for or complicit in damaging subsea fiber-optic cables in a manner that undermines the national security interests of the ,united ,states4 7b7 ,report required ,not later than #ae days after imposing sanctions with respect to a foreign person under subsection 7a71 the ,president shall submit to the appropriate congressional committees1 the ,committee on ,banking1 ,housing1 and ,urban ,affairs of the ,senate1 and the ,committee on ,financial ,services of the ,house of ,representatives1 a report that includes a detailed justification for the imposition of the sanctions4 7c7 ,sanctions described ,the sanctions described in this subsection are the following3 7#a7 ,blocking of property ,the ,president shall exercise all of the powers granted by the ,international ,emergency ,economic ,powers ,act 7#ej ,u4,s4,c4 #agja et seq47 to the extent necessary to block and prohibit all transactions in all property and interests in property of a foreign person described in subsection 7a71 if such property and interests in property are in the ,united ,states1 come within the ,united ,states1 or are or come within the possession or control of a ,united ,states person4 7#b7 ,ineligibility for visas1 admission1 or parole 7,a7 ,visas1 admission1 or parole ,an alien described in subsection 7a7 shall be-- 7i7 inadmissible to the ,united ,states2 7ii7 ineligible to receive a visa or other documentation to enter the ,united ,states2 and 7iii7 otherwise ineligible to be admitted or paroled into the ,united ,states or to receive any other benefit under the ,immigration and ,nationality ,act 7#h ,u4,s4,c4 #aaja et seq474 7,b7 ,current visas revoked 7i7 ,in general ,the visa or other entry documentation of an alien described in subsection 7a7 shall be revoked1 regardless of when such visa or other entry documentation is or was issued4 7ii7 ,immediate effect ,a revocation under clause 7i7 shall-- 7,i7 take effect immediately2 and 7,,ii7 automatically cancel any other valid visa or entry documentation that is in the possession of the alien4 7d7 ,implementation2 penalties 7#a7 ,implementation ,the ,president may exercise all authorities provided under sections #bjc and #bje of the ,international ,emergency ,economic ,powers ,act 7#ej ,u4,s4,c4 #agjb and #agjd7 to carry out this section4 7#b7 ,penalties ,a person that violates1 attempts to violate1 conspires to violate1 or causes a violation of this section or any regulation1 license1 or order issued to carry out this section shall be subject to the penalties set forth in subsections 7b7 and 7c7 of section #bjf of the ,international ,emergency ,economic ,powers ,act 7#ej ,u4,s4,c4 #agje7 to the same extent as a person that commits an unlawful act described in subsection 7a7 of that section4 7e7 ,exceptions 7#a7 ,exception to comply with united nations headquarters agreement and law enforcement activities ,sanctions under this section shall not apply with respect to the admission or parole of an alien to the ,united ,states if admitting or paroling the alien is necessary-- 7,a7 to permit the ,united ,states to comply with the ,agreement regarding the ,headquarters of the ,united ,nations1 signed at ,lake ,success ,june #bf1 #aidg1 and entered into force ,november #ba1 #aidg1 between the ,united ,nations and the ,united ,states1 or other applicable international obligations of the ,united ,states2 or 7,b7 to carry out or assist authorized law enforcement activity in the ,united ,states4 7#b7 ,exception to comply with intelligence activities ,sanctions under this section shall not apply to any activity subject to the reporting requirements under title ,v of the ,national ,security ,act of #aidg 7#ej ,u4,s4,c4 #cjia et seq47 or any authorized intelligence activities of the ,united ,states4 7#c7 ,exception relating to importation of goods 7,a7 ,in general ,a requirement to block and prohibit all transactions in all property and interests in property under this section shall not include the authority or requirement to impose sanctions on the importation of goods4 7,b7 ,good defined ,in this paragraph1 the term good means any article1 natural or manmade substance1 material1 supply or manufactured product1 including inspection and test equipment1 and excluding technical data4 7f7 ,definitions ,in this section3 7#a7 ,admission2 admitted2 alien ,the terms admission1 admitted1 and alien have the meanings given those terms in section #aja of the ,immigration and ,nationality ,act 7#h ,u4,s4,c4 #aaja74 7#b7 ,foreign person ,the term foreign person means an individual or entity that is not a ,united ,states person4 7#c7 ,united states person ,the term ,united ,states person means-- 7,a7 any ,united ,states citizen or an alien lawfully admitted for permanent residence to the ,united ,states2 7,b7 an entity organized under the laws of the ,united ,states or of any jurisdiction within the ,united ,states1 including any foreign branch of such an entity2 or 7,c7 any person in the ,united ,states4 #aje4 ,report on subsea fiber-optic cable activities by the ,people's ,republic of ,china and the ,russian ,federation 7a7 ,report ,not later than #ahj days after the date of the enactment of this ,act1 and annually thereafter for #e years1 the ,secretary of ,state1 in coordination with the heads of other relevant ,federal agencies1 shall submit a report to the appropriate congressional committees that includes the following3 7#a7 ,a description1 with respect to the applicable reporting period1 of ,people's ,republic of ,china and ,russian subsea fiber-optic cable manufacturing1 installation1 and maintenance capabilities4 7#b7 ,a description of any ongoing ,people's ,republic of ,china and ,russian efforts to produce vessels capable of severing or damaging subsea fiber-optic cables at sea depths of #d1jjj meters or greater4 7#c7 ,a list of instances during the previous calendar year in which the ,united ,states1 or allies and partners of the ,united ,states1 documented anomalous behavior from vessels1 either flagged1 crewed1 or operated by the ,people's ,republic of ,china or ,russia1 around subsea fiber-optic cable networks1 including-- 7,a7 any official ,united ,states ,government response to counter the anomalous behavior2 and 7,b7 any coordinated diplomatic action with allies and partners4 7b7 ,classification ,the report required under subsection 7a7 shall be submitted in unclassified form but may include a classified annex4 #ajf4 ,engaging foreign partners to strengthen subsea fiber-optic cable security 7a7 ,sense of ,congress ,it is the sense of ,congress that-- 7#a7 as international subsea fiber-optic cable networks expand1 there are increasing challenges to the proper maintenance1 repair1 and protection of international subsea fiber-optic cables that have the potential to undermine ,united ,states and foreign partner national security interests2 7#b7 the ,united ,states is uniquely positioned to provide technical1 material1 and other forms of support to international partners to enhance the resilience of international subsea fiber-optic cables2 and 7#c7 the ,united ,states ,government should enhance its diplomatic efforts to work with foreign governments to improve efforts to quickly and effectively maintain1 repair1 and protect international subsea fiber-optic cables4 7b7 ,commitment of personnel and resources ,the ,secretary of ,state shall devote sufficient personnel and resources towards engaging with foreign countries to improve security and reduce barriers to the maintenance and repair of subsea fiber-optic cables4 7c7 ,report ,not later than #ahj days after the date of the enactment of this ,act1 and annually thereafter for the next #e years1 the ,secretary of ,state shall submit to the appropriate congressional committees a report that outlines efforts by the ,united ,states ,government in the prior calendar year to work with international allies and partners to strengthen the security of and reduce barriers to the maintenance1 repair1 and protection of international subsea fiber-optic cable networks1 including-- 7#a7 a list of current foreign policies or laws that create barriers to ,united ,states-led efforts to maintain1 repair1 and protect international subsea fiber-optic cable networks2 and 7#b7 progress made in the previous calendar year as a result of ,united ,states engagement with allies and partners4 ,,ii ,department of ,state subsea fiber-optic expertise #bja4 ,expanding subsea fiber-optic cable expertise at the ,department of ,state 7a7 ,in general ,the ,secretary of ,state shall assign not fewer than two full-time equivalent individuals1 to be located in the ,bureau for ,cyberspace and ,digital ,policy1 in order to support the ,department of ,state's interagency engagement on matters related to subsea cables1 including-- 7#a7 protection and resilience2 7#b7 coordination with ,united ,states allies and partners2 and 7#c7 ,united ,states engagement in international bodies that cover subsea cables4 7b7 ,assignment ,the ,bureau for ,cyberspace and ,digital ,policy may not dual-hat currently employed personnel in meeting the minimum hiring requirement outlined in subsection 7a74 7c7 ,notification ,not later than #ae days after fulfilling the hiring requirement in subsection 7a71 the ,secretary of ,state shall notify the ,committee on ,foreign ,relations of the ,senate and the ,committee on ,foreign ,affairs of the ,house of ,representatives4 7d7 ,international cooperation on subsea cables ,not later than #ij days after the date of the enactment of this ,act1 the ,secretary of ,state shall submit to the appropriate congressional committees a report on how the ,united ,states ,government plans to prioritize diplomatic engagement within relevant international bodies to spur increased information-sharing between allied and partner governments and relevant private sector companies on subsea fiber-optic cables4 ,,iii ,subsea fiber-optic cable coordination1 construction1 and repair #cja4 ,improving ,united ,states ,government coordination of subsea fiber-optic cables 7a7 ,findings ,congress makes the following findings3 7#a7 ,according to a ,december #bjbd ,department of ,homeland ,security white paper1 ,there currently exists no forum in which the full scope of the subsea cable industry can effectively collaborate with the ,u4,s4 government to identify and address shared challenges44 7#b7 ,united ,states ,federal ,government responsibilities for the protection of subsea fiber-optic cables1 damage reporting1 information and intelligence sharing1 and emergency response are overseen by various government actors through a multitude of mechanisms spanning several ,federal departments and agencies4 7#c7 ,in order for the subsea fiber-optic cable industry to align with ,united ,states economic and security interests1 the ,united ,states ,government must provide the industry a clearer concept of operations1 assessed risks to cable supply chain and infrastructure1 and defined lines of effort in cases of emergency4 7b7 ,establishment ,not later than one year after the date of the enactment of this ,act1 the ,president shall establish an interagency committee 7referred to in this ,act as the interagency committee7 comprised of the heads of the appropriate ,federal agencies1 to lead ,united ,states ,government efforts to-- 7#a7 protect and improve the resilience of subsea fiber-optic cable networks2 7#b7 facilitate subsea fiber-optic cable permitting2 and 7#c7 address other matters related to subsea fiber-optic cables deemed appropriate and necessary by the ,president4 7c7 ,coordination ,the ,president shall direct the interagency committee to conduct an overview of the ,united ,states ,federal ,government's operational authorities for subsea fiber-optic cable security and resilience4 ,the overview shall include-- 7#a7 an interagency concept of operations for partnering with non-,federal entities1 including subsea fiber-optic cable owners and operators1 to secure and repair subsea fiber-optic cable systems in a variety of crisis scenarios2 and 7#b7 an interagency review and action plan to streamline subsea fiber-optic cable permitting processes in order to promote ,united ,states international leadership in cable connectivity and deployments and risk-based prioritization and standardization of additional security and resilience assessments4 7d7 ,analysis of subsea fiber-,optic cable cuts and outages 7#a7 ,in general ,the ,president shall direct the heads of the relevant ,federal agencies to develop strategies to coordinate closely within the interagency process and with subsea fiber-optic cable industry stakeholders to review subsea fiber-optic cable cuts and outages1 including by leveraging analysis from industry-wide data1 to-- 7,a7 identify trends2 7,b7 refine attributions1 particularly in cases where subsea fiber-optic cables have been intentionally damaged by malicious actors2 7,c7 identify high-risk geographic areas for subsea fiber-optic cable construction2 and 7,d7 inform future risk mitigation efforts to reduce damage to subsea fiber-optic cable systems4 7#b7 ,strategy elements ,the strategies required under paragraph 7#a7 shall include-- 7,a7 resourcing requirements2 7,b7 coordination with ,united ,states allies and partners2 and 7,c7 the necessary technical expertise to make attributions for intentional subsea fiber-optic cable cuts by malicious actors4 7e7 ,report ,not later than #cj days after establishing the required interagency committee under subsection 7b71 the ,president shall submit to ,congress a report that includes the following elements3 7#a7 ,any resources required to sufficiently staff the interagency committee and ,united ,states ,federal agencies overseeing the objectives outlined in subsection 7b74 7#b7 ,a detailed plan for how the interagency committee will advance the objectives outlined in subsection 7b74 #cjb4 ,strengthening information sharing between ,united ,states ,government and private sector actors on subsea fiber-optic cables 7a7 ,public-,private sector information sharing ,consistent with the necessary protections of classified information1 the sourcing of relevant intelligence material1 and privacy and civil liberties1 all appropriate agencies shall1 with the approval of the interagency committee1 issue procedures to establish and promote-- 7#a7 the timely sharing of classified subsea fiber-optic cable threats and any indications of potential threats held by members of the interagency committee with non-,federal entities that possess the necessary security clearances2 7#b7 the timely sharing between the interagency committee and non-,federal entities of subsea fiber-optic cable threats1 information relating to indications of potential threats1 or authorized uses under this ,act1 in the possession of the interagency committee that may be declassified and shared at an unclassified level2 7#c7 the timely sharing between the interagency committee and non-,federal entities of unclassified1 including controlled unclassified1 subsea fiber-optic cable threats and indications of potential threats held by members of the interagency committee or non-,federal entities2 and 7#d7 the timely sharing between the interagency committee and non-,federal entities1 when and if appropriate1 of information relating to indications of potential subsea fiber-optic cable threats or authorized uses under this title1 held by the interagency committee or non-,federal entities about subsea fiber-optic cable threats1 in order to prevent breaches to the security1 integrity1 or efficacy of the subsea fiber-optic cable network and to mitigate any other potential adverse effects from such subsea fiber-optic cable threats4 7b7 ,development of procedures ,the procedures developed under subsection 7b7 shall-- 7#a7 ensure the interagency committee has and maintains the capacity to identify and inform subsea fiber-optic cable threats and indications of potential subsea fiber-optic cable threats in real time to the appropriate ,federal agencies or non-,federal entities consistent with the protection of classified information2 7#b7 incorporate1 whenever possible1 existing processes1 roles1 and responsibilities of members of the interagency committee and non-,federal entities for information sharing1 including subsea fiber-optic cable-specific information sharing and analysis entities2 and 7#c7 require members of the interagency committee and other appropriate ,federal agencies which are sharing subsea fiber-optic cable threat indicators or defensive measures to employ any applicable security controls to defend against unauthorized access to or acquisition of such information4 7c7 ,submittal to ,congress ,not later than #fj days after the date of the enactment of this ,act1 the ,director of ,national ,intelligence1 in consultation with the members of the interagency committee1 shall submit to ,congress the procedures required under subsection 7b74 #a4 ,short title ,this ,act may be cited as the ,strategic ,subsea ,cables ,act of #bjbf4 #b4 ,table of contents ,the table of contents for this ,act is as follows3 ,sec4 #a4 ,short title4,sec4 #b4 ,table of contents4,sec4 #c4 ,definitions4,,title ,i-- ,international coordination and engagement on critical undersea infrastructure,sec4 #aja4 ,findings4,sec4 #ajb4 ,sense of ,congress4,sec4 #ajc4 ,enhancing ,united ,states ,government engagement at the ,international ,cable ,protection ,committee and other relevant international bodies to safeguard ,united ,states interests4,sec4 #ajd4 ,imposition of sanctions with respect to critical undersea infrastructure sabotage4,sec4 #aje4 ,report on activities by the ,people's ,republic of ,china and the ,russian ,federation4,sec4 #ajf4 ,report on potential sabotage of critical undersea infrastructure4,sec4 #ajg4 ,engaging foreign partners to strengthen the security of critical undersea infrastructure4,,title ,,ii--,department of ,state critical undersea infrastructure expertise,sec4 #bja4 ,expanding critical undersea infrastructure-related expertise at the ,department of ,state4,,title ,,iii--,subsea telecommunications infrastructure coordination1 construction1 and repair,sec4 #cja4 ,improving ,united ,states ,government coordination of subsea telecommunications infrastructure4,sec4 #cjb4 ,strengthening information sharing between ,united ,states ,government and private sector actors on subsea telecommunications infrastructure4 #c4 ,definitions ,in this ,act3 7#a7 ,agency ,the term agency has the meaning given the term in section #cejb of title #dd1 ,united ,states ,code4 7#b7 ,appropriate congressional committees ,the term appropriate congressional committees means-- 7,a7 the ,committee on ,foreign ,relations and the ,committee on ,appropriations of the ,senate2 and 7,b7 the ,committee on ,foreign ,affairs and the ,committee on ,appropriations of the ,house of ,representatives4 7#c7 ,appropriate ,federal agencies ,the term appropriate ,federal agencies means the following3 7,a7 ,the ,department of ,commerce4 7,b7 ,the ,department of ,defense4 7,c7 ,the ,department of ,homeland ,security4 7,d7 ,the ,office of the ,director of ,national ,intelligence4 7,e7 ,the ,department of ,state4 7,f7 ,the ,federal ,communications ,commission4 7,g7 ,the ,department of the ,treasury4 7,h7 ,the ,department of the ,judiciary4 7,i7 ,any additional ,federal agencies1 as determined by the ,president4 7#d7 ,critical undersea infrastructure ,the term critical undersea infrastructure refers to both subsea telecommunications infrastructure and subsea energy infrastructure4 7#e7 ,interagency committee ,the term interagency committee means the entity established under section #cja7;b7 of this ,act4 7#f7 ,non-,federal entity ,the term non-,federal entity means any nongovernmental entity that is an individual1 organization1 or business involved in the operation1 maintenance1 repair1 or construction of critical subsea infrastructure1 including critical undersea infrastructure owners4 7#g7 ,sabotage ,the term sabotage means actions1 or preparations for future actions1 taken with the intent to cause defective production1 operation1 or damage to critical underseas infrastructure1 including the integrity of data transmitted via subsea telecommunications infrastructure4 7#h7 ,subsea energy infrastructure ,the term subsea energy infrastructure means a subsea cable1 pipeline1 or other equipment installed on1 beneath1 or within the seabed1 including-- 7,a7 to transmit electricity1 including via subsea electricity cables1 subsea electricity transformers1 or equipment related to the support of offshore energy production installations2 7,b7 to transport natural gas1 oil1 or hydrogen between land-based or off-shore infrastructure2 and 7,c7 associated landing stations and facilities4 7#i7 ,subsea telecommunications infrastructure ,the term subsea telecommunications infrastructure means subsea fiber-optic cables and related equipment installed on1 beneath1 or within the seabed1 and used to transmit communications1 data1 voice1 video1 or other electronic signals1 as well as associated landing stations and facilities4 ,i ,international coordination and engagement on critical undersea infrastructure #aja4 ,findings ,congress makes the following findings3 7#a7 ,sabotage of critical undersea infrastructure poses a growing threat to ,united ,states and allied security and economic prosperity4 7#b7 ,in recent years1 numerous critical undersea infrastructure sites were destroyed or damaged1 including-- 7,a7 in ,january #bjbb1 the reported damage to subsea telecommunications cables connecting the ,norwegian mainland with the ,norwegian archipelago of ,svalbard1 home of ,sval,s,a,t1 the largest commercial satellite ground station on ,earth2 7,b7 in ,september #bjbb1 the reported damage to #c of the #d trunklines of the ,nord ,stream #a and ,nord ,stream #b natural gas pipelines1 at sites northeast and southeast of the ,danish island of ,bornholm in the ,western ,baltic ,sea2 7,c7 in ,february #bjbc1 the reported damage to subsea telecommunications infrastructure connecting the main island of ,taiwan to the ,matsu ,islands in the ,taiwan ,strait2 7,d7 in ,october #bjbc1 the reported damage to the ,finland-to-,estonia ,balticconnector natural gas pipeline spanning the ,gulf of ,finland1 in addition to the reported damage to subsea telecommunications cables connecting ,estonia and ,sweden and ,finland and ,estonia2 7,e7 in ,november #bjbd1 the reported damage to the ,finland-to-,germany ,c-,lion#a subsea telecommunications cables and the ,lithuania-to-,sweden ,,bcs subsea telecommunications cable in the central ,baltic ,sea2 7,f7 in ,december #bjbd1 the reported damage to the ,finland-to-,estonia ,est,link#b subsea electricity interconnection cable and nearby subsea telecommunications cables in the ,gulf of ,finland 2 7,g7 in ,january #bjbe1 the reported damage to the ,trans-,pacific ,express subsea telecommunications cable connecting ,taiwan to the ,united ,states1 the ,republic of ,korea1 and ,japan1 among other global democracies2 7,h7 in ,february #bjbe1 the reported damage to a subsea telecommunications cable connecting the main island of ,taiwan with the ,penghu ,islands in the ,taiwan ,strait2 7,i7 in ,january #bjbf1 the reported damage to subsea telecommunications cables from ,latvia in the ,central ,baltic ,sea linking ,liepja and ventoji2 and 7,j7 in ,january #bjbf1 the reported damage to the ,elisa cable connecting ,finland and ,estonia involving a vessel named the ,fitburg4 7#c7 ,following subsea fiber-optic cable cuts in the ,baltic ,sea in ,december #bjbd1 the ,north ,atlantic ,treaty ,organization 7,,nato7 established the ,critical ,undersea ,infrastructure ,network to conduct information and threat intelligence sharing among private and public sector actors to protect subsea cables4 7#d7 ,on ,february #ba1 #bjbe1 the ,european ,union published an ,,eu ,action ,plan on ,cable ,security to include the development and deployment of an ,integrated ,surveillance ,mechanism for ,submarine cables work to establish a dedicated regional hub in the ,baltic ,sea to serve as a test bed of the integrated surveillance approach4 7#e7 ,the ,association of ,southeast ,asian ,states 7,,asean7 published guidelines for ,strengthening ,resilience and ,repair of ,submarine ,cables and most recently announced plans to build a secure1 diverse and resilient submarine cable network and to facilitate the expeditious deployment1 repair1 maintenance1 removal1 and protection of submarine cables1 between ,,asean ,member ,states4 7#f7 ,on ,july #a1 #bjbe1 the ,quad1 represented by the ,united ,states1 ,india1 ,japan1 and ,australia1 met to reaffirm its commitment to the ,quad ,partnership on ,cable ,connectivity and ,resilience4 ,in the meeting1 the ,quad underscored the need for digital infrastructure collaboration1 organizing a subsea cables forum to be hosted by the ,united ,states and ,india and encouraging regulatory harmonization between ,quad partners4 ,through this initiative1 the ,quad seeks to defend and promote resilient1 secure1 and transparent digital infrastructure across the ,indo-,pacific region4 #ajb4 ,sense of ,congress ,it is the sense of ,congress that-- 7#a7 critical undersea infrastructure represents vital strategic and economic links between the ,united ,states and its partners and allies2 7#b7 according to ,,nato1 undersea cables carry an estimated #aj trillion in transfers every day2 two-thirds of the world's oil and gas is either extracted at sea or transported by sea2 and around #ie percent of global data flows are transmitted via undersea cables2 7#c7 since ,russia's full-scale invasion of ,ukraine in #bjbb1 there has been a marked increase in high-profile suspected sabotage incidents resulting in damage to critical undersea infrastructure1 especially across ,northern ,europe and ,east ,asia2 7#d7 the ,united ,states ,government has an important role to play in advancing ,united ,states interests in international bodies that oversee the protection of critical undersea infrastructure1 including promoting network resilience and redundancy1 and advancing regulations in support of these goals2 7#e7 the ,united ,states ,government should play a more active role in ,,nato initiatives such as the ,,nato ,maritime ,centre for the ,security of ,critical ,undersea ,infrastructure1 the ,critical ,undersea ,infrastructure ,coordination ,call1 the ,critical ,undersea ,infrastructure ,network1 and the ,,nato-,,eu ,task ,force on the ,resilience of ,critical ,infrastructure1 allied maritime security efforts such as the ,joint ,expeditionary ,force1 ,indo-,pacific initiatives1 including the ,quad ,partnership for ,cable ,connectivity and ,resilience1 and international organizations such as the ,international ,cable ,protection ,committee 7,,icpc71 in order to advance ,united ,states national security and economic interests2 7#f7 the ,united ,states should lead efforts to promote the deployment of resilient critical undersea infrastructure networks1 enhance situational awareness1 strengthen preparedness1 and formalize collective responses among allies and partners through enhanced information sharing and coordination2 and 7#g7 while critical undersea infrastructure owners and other associated private sector stakeholders carry significant responsibility in safeguarding this infrastructure1 the ,united ,states ,government and allied foreign governments need to play a greater role4 #ajc4 ,enhancing ,united ,states ,government engagement at the ,international ,cable ,protection ,committee and other relevant international bodies to safeguard ,united ,states interests 7a7 ,in general ,the ,secretary of ,state1 in coordination with the interagency committee1 shall seek to increase ,united ,states ,government engagement in international bodies1 including the ,international ,cable ,protection ,committee 7,,icpc71 to advance ,united ,states national security and economic interests as it relates to critical undersea infrastructure4 7b7 ,report ,not later than one year after the date of the enactment of this ,act1 and annually thereafter for #e years1 the ,secretary of ,state shall submit a report to the appropriate congressional committees that includes the following3 7#a7 ,a description of how increased ,united ,states ,government engagement within the ,,icpc could support ,united ,states national security objectives as it relates to the protection of critical undersea infrastructure4 7#b7 ,a description of key objectives for promoting and protecting ,united ,states national security interests within the ,,icpc4 7#c7 ,a description of how the ,people's ,republic of ,china entities leverage their engagement within the ,,icpc to further their strategic interests4 7#d7 ,a description of how encouraging other countries and regional bodies to join the ,,icpc can better ensure coordinated1 consistent global undersea subsea telecommunications infrastructure policies4 7#e7 ,a description of other international bodies relevant for critical undersea infrastructure where the ,united ,states should increase its diplomatic engagement4 #ajd4 ,imposition of sanctions with respect to critical undersea infrastructure sabotage 7a7 ,in general ,the ,president1 in coordination with the ,secretary of ,state and the ,secretary of the ,treasury1 shall impose the sanctions described in subsection 7c7 with respect to any foreign person that the ,president determines1 on or after the date of the enactment of this ,act1 is responsible for acts of sabotage or facilitates acts of sabotage against critical undersea infrastructure1 including-- 7#a7 any foreign vessel or entity the owner or operator of which knowingly-- 7,a7 commits acts of sabotage2 or 7,b7 conducts preparatory surveillance1 logistical support1 security1 or other services that facilitate or enable an act of sabotage2 and 7#b7 any foreign person that the ,president determines knowingly-- 7,a7 owns1 operates1 or manages the vessel or entity described in paragraph 7#a72 7,b7 provides underwriting services or insurance or reinsurance necessary for such a vessel or entity2 7,c7 facilitates deceptive or structured transactions to support a vessel or entity described in paragraph 7#a72 7,d7 provides port or logistics services or facilities for technology upgrades or installation of equipment for1 or retrofitting or tethering of1 a vessel described in paragraph 7#a7 for the purpose of evading sanctions2 7,e7 provided documentation1 registration1 or flagging services for a vessel described in paragraph 7#a7 for the purpose of evading sanctions2 or 7,f7 serves as a captain1 principal officer1 or senior leadership of such a vessel or entity4 7b7 ,report required ,not later than #ae days after imposing sanctions with respect to a foreign person under subsection 7a71 the ,president shall submit to the appropriate congressional committees1 the ,committee on ,banking1 ,housing1 and ,urban ,affairs of the ,senate1 and the ,committee on ,financial ,services of the ,house of ,representatives1 a report that includes a detailed justification for the imposition of the sanctions4 7c7 ,sanctions described ,the sanctions described in this subsection are the following3 7#a7 ,blocking of property ,the ,president shall exercise all of the powers granted by the ,international ,emergency ,economic ,powers ,act 7#ej ,u4,s4,c4 #agja et seq47 to the extent necessary to block and prohibit all transactions in all property and interests in property of a foreign person described in subsection 7a71 if such property and interests in property are in the ,united ,states1 come within the ,united ,states1 or are or come within the possession or control of a ,united ,states person4 7#b7 ,ineligibility for visas1 admission1 or parole 7,a7 ,visas1 admission1 or parole ,an alien described in subsection 7a7 shall be-- 7i7 inadmissible to the ,united ,states2 7ii7 ineligible to receive a visa or other documentation to enter the ,united ,states2 and 7iii7 otherwise ineligible to be admitted or paroled into the ,united ,states or to receive any other benefit under the ,immigration and ,nationality ,act 7#h ,u4,s4,c4 #aaja et seq474 7,b7 ,current visas revoked 7i7 ,in general ,the visa or other entry documentation of an alien described in subsection 7a7 shall be revoked1 regardless of when such visa or other entry documentation is or was issued4 7ii7 ,immediate effect ,a revocation under clause 7i7 shall-- 7,i7 take effect immediately2 and 7,,ii7 automatically cancel any other valid visa or entry documentation that is in the possession of the alien4 7d7 ,implementation2 penalties 7#a7 ,implementation ,the ,president may exercise all authorities provided under sections #bjc and #bje of the ,international ,emergency ,economic ,powers ,act 7#ej ,u4,s4,c4 #agjb and #agjd7 to carry out this section4 7#b7 ,penalties ,a person that violates1 attempts to violate1 conspires to violate1 or causes a violation of this section or any regulation1 license1 or order issued to carry out this section shall be subject to the penalties set forth in subsections 7b7 and 7c7 of section #bjf of the ,international ,emergency ,economic ,powers ,act 7#ej ,u4,s4,c4 #agje7 to the same extent as a person that commits an unlawful act described in subsection 7a7 of that section4 7e7 ,exceptions 7#a7 ,exception to comply with ,united ,nations ,headquarters ,agreement and law enforcement activities ,sanctions under this section shall not apply with respect to the admission or parole of an alien to the ,united ,states if admitting or paroling the alien is necessary-- 7,a7 to permit the ,united ,states to comply with the ,agreement regarding the ,headquarters of the ,united ,nations1 signed at ,lake ,success ,june #bf1 #aidg1 and entered into force ,november #ba1 #aidg1 between the ,united ,nations and the ,united ,states1 or other applicable international obligations of the ,united ,states2 or 7,b7 to carry out or assist authorized law enforcement activity in the ,united ,states4 7#b7 ,exception to comply with intelligence activities ,sanctions under this section shall not apply to any activity subject to the reporting requirements under title ,v of the ,national ,security ,act of #aidg 7#ej ,u4,s4,c4 #cjia et seq47 or any authorized intelligence activities of the ,united ,states4 7#c7 ,exception relating to importation of goods 7,a7 ,in general ,a requirement to block and prohibit all transactions in all property and interests in property under this section shall not include the authority or requirement to impose sanctions on the importation of goods4 7,b7 ,good defined ,in this paragraph1 the term good means any article1 natural or manmade substance1 material1 supply or manufactured product1 including inspection and test equipment1 and excluding technical data4 7f7 ,definitions ,in this section3 7#a7 ,admission2 admitted2 alien ,the terms admission1 admitted1 and alien have the meanings given those terms in section #aja of the ,immigration and ,nationality ,act 7#h ,u4,s4,c4 #aaja74 7#b7 ,foreign person ,the term foreign person means an individual or entity that is not a ,united ,states person4 7#c7 ,united ,states person ,the term ,united ,states person means-- 7,a7 any ,united ,states citizen or an alien lawfully admitted for permanent residence to the ,united ,states2 7,b7 an entity organized under the laws of the ,united ,states or of any jurisdiction within the ,united ,states1 including any foreign branch of such an entity2 or 7,c7 any person in the ,united ,states4 7g7 ,national security interests waiver ,the ,president may waive the application of sanctions under this section if1 before issuing the waiver1 the ,president submits to the appropriate congressional committees-- 7#a7 a certification in writing that the issuance of the waiver is in the national security interests of the ,united ,states2 and 7#b7 a report explaining the basis for the certification4 #aje4 ,report on activities by the ,people's ,republic of ,china and the ,russian ,federation 7a7 ,report ,not later than #ahj days after the date of the enactment of this ,act1 and annually thereafter for #e years1 the ,secretary of ,state1 in coordination with the heads of other relevant ,federal agencies1 shall submit a report to the appropriate congressional committees that includes the following3 7#a7 ,a description1 with respect to the applicable reporting period1 of the subsea cable manufacturing1 installation1 and maintenance capabilities of the ,people's ,republic of ,china 7,,prc7 and the ,russian ,federation4 7#b7 ,an analysis of the mission1 capabilities1 and activities of the ,main ,directorate of ,deep-,sea ,research 7,,gugi7 of the ,armed ,forces of the ,russian ,federation1 including-- 7,a7 a description of ,,gugi operations and capabilities in deep water and littoral infrastructure surveillance1 seabed warfare1 and sabotage1 including recent activity trends and development of new weapons systems2 7,b7 a description of ,,gugi's use of ostensibly civilian research vessels to conduct critical undersea infrastructure surveillance1 seabed warfare1 and potential sabotage2 7,c7 an assessment of the impact of sanctions on the ability of ,,gugi to procure advanced technologies and equipment1 as well as its efforts to circumvent those sanctions2 and 7,d7 a list of suspected ,,gugi research or scientific vessels1 including vessel names and ,international ,maritime ,organization and ,maritime ,mobile ,service ,identity numbers1 and related equipment that are suspected of engaging in dual-use operations and probing of critical undersea infrastructure4 7#c7 ,an analysis of the missions1 capabilities1 and activities of the ,main ,directorate of the ,general ,staff of the ,armed ,forces of the ,russian ,federation 7,,gru71 including-- 7,a7 a description of ,,gru operations and capabilities related to physical1 electronic1 and cyber surveillance1 monitoring1 and sabotage of critical undersea infrastructure and maritime logistics2 7,b7 a description of the use of ,russian civilian merchant and fishing vessels by the ,,gru1 including a list of fishing and merchant vessel names and ,international ,maritime ,organization and ,maritime ,mobile ,service ,identity ,numbers believed to be involved in surveillance or sabotage activities2 and 7,c7 an assessment of the impact of sanctions on the ability of ,,gugi to procure advanced technologies and equipment1 as well as its efforts to circumvent those sanctions4 7#d7 ,an analysis of the missions1 capabilities1 and activities of the ,people's ,liberation ,army1 the ,,prc ,coast ,guard1 the ,china ,ship ,scientific ,research ,center1 ,,hmn ,technologies1 and other ,,prc-based entities1 including unmarked or dual-use maritime militia or commercial vessels related to surveillance1 monitoring1 and sabotage of critical undersea infrastructure1 including-- 7,a7 a description of recent capability developments related to surveilling or sabotaging critical undersea infrastructure1 including for both deep-sea and littoral purposes2 and 7,b7 a description of the ,,prc's use of ostensibly civilian fishing1 merchant1 and research vessels for sabotage or surveillance of critical undersea infrastructure1 including in the ,indo-,pacific1 ,africa1 ,latin ,america1 ,europe1 and the ,western ,hemisphere4 7#e7 ,an assessment of cooperation between the ,russian ,federation and the ,,prc on surveillance or sabotage of critical undersea infrastructure1 including-- 7,a7 any current or planned operational coordination against ,united ,states or allied and partner nation targets2 7,b7 any joint research1 development1 testing1 or evaluation of critical undersea infrastructure surveillance1 sabotage1 or seabed warfare capabilities2 7,c7 any technology transfers or joint training related to critical undersea infrastructure surveillance1 sabotage1 or seabed warfare2 and 7,d7 any coordination in procurement of advanced technologies related to critical undersea infrastructure1 surveillance1 sabotage1 or seabed warfare1 or circumvention of sanctions against the ,russian ,federation4 7#f7 ,a list of instances during the previous calendar year in which the ,united ,states1 or allies and partners of the ,united ,states1 documented anomalous behavior from vessels1 either flagged1 crewed1 or operated by the ,,prc or ,russia1 around critical undersea infrastructure1 including-- 7,a7 any official ,united ,states ,government response to counter the anomalous behavior2 and 7,b7 any coordinated diplomatic action with allies and partners4 7#g7 ,an assessment of the extent to which ,,prc-based entities are involved in laying1 maintaining1 and repairing ,united ,states-invested cables4 7b7 ,initial and subsequent reports ,the initial report required under subsection 7a7 shall cover the period between ,january #a1 #bjbb1 through the date of the enactment of this ,act4 ,subsequent reports required by subsection 7a7 shall cover the previous calendar year for the reporting period4 7c7 ,classification ,the report required under subsection 7a7 shall be submitted in unclassified form but may include a classified annex4 #ajf4 ,report on potential sabotage of critical undersea infrastructure ,not later than #ahj days after the date of the enactment of this ,act1 the ,director of ,national ,intelligence1 in coordination with the ,secretary of ,state and the heads of other relevant ,federal agencies1 shall submit to the ,select ,committee on ,intelligence of the ,senate1 the ,permanent ,select ,committee on ,intelligence of the ,house of ,representatives1 and the appropriate congressional committees a report that includes the assessment of the intelligence community1 including dissents from individual agencies1 of the likely cause and1 if applicable1 the attribution of the following instances of reported sabotage of critical undersea infrastructure3 7#a7 ,in ,january #bjbb1 the reported damage to the subsea telecommunications infrastructure connecting the ,norwegian mainland with the ,norwegian archipelago of ,svalbard4 7#b7 ,the ,september #bjbb sabotage of three of the four trunklines of the ,nord ,stream #a and ,nord ,stream #b natural gas pipelines1 at sites northeast and southeast of the ,danish island of ,bornholm in the ,western ,baltic ,sea1 including-- 7,a7 an assessment of the activities of ,russian military vessels1 including those with undersea warfare capabilities1 at any of the ,nord ,stream blast sites in the months leading up to the incident2 7,b7 a description of any ,russian civilian or military vessels intercepted or diverted from the blast sites in the aftermath of the sabotage or vessels or underwater unmanned vehicles that gained access to the blast sites2 7,c7 an assessment of the technical feasibility of a small group of divers conducting the ,nord ,stream sabotage using the rental boat ,andromeda in the weather and sea conditions present at the time2 7,d7 an assessment of whether the ,russian ,federation's documented practice of recruiting or coercing ,ukrainians or other third country nationals to conduct sabotage operations on land targets is applicable to a maritime context2 7,e7 an assessment of the fees and penalties for failure to honor gas delivery contracts that ,gazprom or other ,russian entities potentially faced due to the throttling of gas deliveries via the ,nord ,stream #a pipeline in #bjba2 7,f7 an assessment of the insurance implications for ,nord ,stream #a and #b1 as well as its insurers and ,western financiers1 depending on the identity of the perpetrator2 7,g7 a description of the law enforcement investigations by regional governments1 the scope of their investigations1 and their outcomes2 7,h7 an assessment of whether any ,russian vessels documented in close proximity to the ,nord ,stream blast sites in the months leading up to or immediately after the incident1 including those with undersea surveillance or warfare capabilities1 were present at other suspected sabotage sites either before or after the incident in question2 and 7,i7 any information on potential attribution received from allied or partner nation communications through diplomatic or intelligence channels4 7#c7 ,in ,february #bjbc1 the reported damage to subsea telecommunications infrastructure connecting the main island of ,taiwan to the ,matsu ,islands in the ,taiwan ,strait4 7#d7 ,in ,october #bjbc1 the reported damage to the ,finland-to-,estonia ,baltic connector natural gas pipeline1 in addition to subsea telecommunications infrastructure connecting ,estonia and ,sweden and ,finland and ,estonia4 7#e7 ,in ,november #bjbd1 the reported damage to the ,finland-to-,germany ,c-,lion#a subsea telecommunications cable and the ,lithuania-to-,sweden ,,bcs subsea telecommunications cable in the central ,baltic ,sea4 7#f7 ,in ,december #bjbd1 the reported damage to the ,finland-to-,estonia ,est,link#b subsea electricity interconnection cable and nearby subsea telecommunications cables in the ,gulf of ,finland4 7#g7 ,in ,january #bjbe1 the reported damage to the ,trans-,pacific ,express subsea telecommunications infrastructure connecting ,taiwan to the ,united ,states1 the ,republic of ,korea1 and ,japan1 among other global democracies4 7#h7 ,in ,february #bjbe1 the reported damage to a subsea telecommunications cable connecting the main island of ,taiwan with the ,penghu ,islands in the ,taiwan ,strait4 7#i7 ,in ,january #bjbf1 the reported damage to subsea telecommunications cables from ,latvia in the ,central ,baltic ,sea connecting ,liepja and ventoji4 7#aj7 ,in ,january #bjbf1 the reported damage to the ,elisa cable connecting ,finland and ,estonia involving a vessel called the ,fitburg4 #ajg4 ,engaging foreign partners to strengthen the security of critical undersea infrastructure 7a7 ,sense of ,congress ,it is the sense of ,congress that-- 7#a7 as international critical undersea infrastructure expands1 there are increasing challenges to the proper installation1 maintenance1 repair1 and protection of international subsea cables that have the potential to undermine ,united ,states and foreign partner national security interests2 7#b7 the ,united ,states is uniquely positioned to provide technical1 material1 and other forms of support to international partners to enhance the resilience of international critical undersea infrastructure2 7#c7 the ,united ,states ,government should enhance its diplomatic efforts to work alongside trusted allies to help foreign governments improve efforts to quickly and effectively install1 maintain1 repair1 and protect international critical undersea infrastructure2 and 7#d7 given the importance of critical undersea infrastructure to ,united ,states and allied energy security and prosperity1 adversaries are increasingly prioritizing capabilities designed to target ,united ,states and allied subsea energy infrastructure4 7b7 ,commitment of personnel and resources ,the ,secretary of ,state shall devote sufficient personnel and resources towards-- 7#a7 engaging with foreign countries to improve security and reduce barriers to the installation1 monitoring1 maintenance1 and repair of critical undersea infrastructure2 and 7#b7 working with allies and partners to support the development of a multinational fleet of cable repair ships to respond rapidly to incidents of sabotage4 7c7 ,report ,not later than #ahj days after the date of the enactment of this ,act1 and annually thereafter for the next #e years1 the ,secretary of ,state shall submit to the appropriate congressional committees a report that outlines efforts by the ,united ,states ,government in the prior calendar year to work with international allies and partners to strengthen the security of and reduce barriers to the monitoring1 maintenance1 repair1 and protection of international critical undersea infrastructure networks1 including-- 7#a7 a list of current foreign policies or laws that create barriers to ,united ,states-led efforts to install1 maintain1 repair1 and protect international critical undersea infrastructure networks2 and 7#b7 progress made in the previous calendar year as a result of ,united ,states engagement with allies and partners4 ,,ii ,department of ,state critical undersea infrastructure expertise #bja4 ,expanding critical undersea infrastructure-related expertise at the ,department of ,state 7a7 ,in general ,the ,secretary of ,state shall assign not fewer than #aj full-time equivalent individuals1 of which not fewer than #e individuals shall be assigned to the ,bureau for ,cyberspace and ,digital ,policy to cover subsea telecommunications infrastructure1 in order to support the ,department of ,state's interagency engagement on matters related to critical undersea infrastructure protection1 including-- 7#a7 protection and resilience2 7#b7 coordination with ,united ,states allies and partners2 and 7#c7 ,united ,states engagement in international bodies that cover critical undersea infrastructure4 7b7 ,assignment ,the ,bureau for ,cyberspace and ,digital ,policy may not dual-hat currently employed personnel in meeting the minimum hiring requirement outlined in subsection 7a74 7c7 ,notification ,not later than #ae days after fulfilling the hiring requirement in subsection 7a71 the ,secretary of ,state shall notify the ,committee on ,foreign ,relations of the ,senate and the ,committee on ,foreign ,affairs of the ,house of ,representatives4 7d7 ,international cooperation on critical undersea infrastructure sabotage ,not later than #ij days after the date of the enactment of this ,act1 the ,secretary of ,state shall submit to the appropriate congressional committees a report on how the ,united ,states ,government plans to prioritize diplomatic engagement within relevant international bodies to spur increased information sharing between allied and partner governments and relevant private sector companies on critical undersea infrastructure sabotage4 ,,iii ,subsea telecommunications infrastructure coordination1 construction1 and repair #cja4 ,improving ,united ,states ,government coordination of subsea telecommunications infrastructure 7a7 ,findings ,congress makes the following findings3 7#a7 ,according to a ,december #bjbd ,department of ,homeland ,security white paper1 ,there currently exists no forum in which the full scope of the subsea cable industry can effectively collaborate with the ,u4,s4 government to identify and address shared challenges44 7#b7 ,united ,states ,federal ,government responsibilities for the protection of subsea telecommunications infrastructure1 damage reporting1 information and intelligence sharing1 and emergency response are overseen by various government actors through a multitude of mechanisms spanning several ,federal departments and agencies4 7#c7 ,in order for the subsea cable industry to align with ,united ,states economic and security interests and help industry prepare security risk mitigation measures1 the ,united ,states ,government must provide the industry a clearer concept of operations1 assessed risks to cable supply chain and infrastructure1 enhanced and standardized security measures1 defined lines of effort in cases of emergency1 and definitive cost analysis4 7b7 ,establishment ,not later than one year after the date of the enactment of this ,act1 the ,president shall establish an interagency committee 7referred to in this ,act as the 8interagency committee07 comprised of the heads of the appropriate ,federal agencies1 to lead ,united ,states ,government efforts to-- 7#a7 protect and improve the resilience of subsea telecommunications infrastructure2 7#b7 facilitate subsea telecommunications cable licensing and permitting2 and 7#c7 address other matters related to subsea telecommunications infrastructure deemed appropriate and necessary by the ,president4 7c7 ,coordination ,the ,president shall direct the interagency committee to conduct an overview of the ,united ,states ,federal ,government's operational authorities for subsea telecommunications infrastructure security and resilience4 ,the overview shall include-- 7#a7 an interagency concept of operations for partnering with non-,federal entities1 including subsea telecommunications infrastructure owners and operators1 to secure and repair subsea telecommunications infrastructure systems in a variety of crisis scenarios2 and 7#b7 an interagency review and action plan to streamline subsea telecommunications infrastructure licensing1 funding1 and permitting processes in order to promote ,united ,states international leadership in cable connectivity and deployments and risk-based prioritization and standardization of additional security and resilience assessments4 7d7 ,analysis of subsea telecommunications infrastructure sabotage 7#a7 ,in general ,the ,president shall direct the heads of the relevant ,federal agencies to develop strategies to coordinate closely within the interagency process and with subsea telecommunications infrastructure industry stakeholders to review subsea telecommunications infrastructure sabotage1 including by leveraging analysis from industry-wide data1 to-- 7,a7 identify trends2 7,b7 refine attributions1 particularly in cases where subsea telecommunications infrastructure has been intentionally damaged by malicious actors2 7,c7 identify high-risk geographic areas for subsea telecommunications infrastructure construction2 7,d7 identify ,federal ,government functions and private sector engagement methods to support the security of subsea telecommunications infrastructure2 and 7,e7 inform future risk mitigation efforts to reduce damage to subsea telecommunications infrastructure systems4 7#b7 ,strategy elements ,the strategies required under paragraph 7#a7 shall include-- 7,a7 resourcing requirements2 7,b7 coordination with ,united ,states allies and partners and relevant subsea telecommunications infrastructure industry stakeholders2 and 7,c7 the necessary technical expertise to make attributions for subsea telecommunications infrastructure sabotage4 7e7 ,report ,not later than #cj days after establishing the required interagency committee under subsection 7b71 the ,president shall submit to ,congress a report that includes the following elements3 7#a7 ,any resources required to sufficiently staff the interagency committee and ,united ,states ,federal agencies overseeing the objectives outlined in subsection 7b74 7#b7 ,a detailed plan for how the interagency committee will advance the objectives outlined in subsection 7b74 #cjb4 ,strengthening information sharing between ,united ,states ,government and private sector actors on subsea telecommunications infrastructure 7a7 ,public-,private sector information sharing ,consistent with the necessary protections of classified information1 the sourcing of relevant intelligence material1 and privacy and civil liberties1 all appropriate agencies shall1 with the approval of the interagency committee and in coordination1 as appropriate1 with intelligence sharing partnerships with trusted allies1 in support of the maintenance1 repair1 and protection of subsea telecommunications infrastructure1 issue procedures to establish and promote-- 7#a7 the timely sharing of classified information regarding subsea telecommunications infrastructure sabotage and any indications of potential sabotage held by members of the interagency committee with non-,federal entities that possess the necessary security clearances2 7#b7 the timely sharing between the interagency committee and non-,federal entities of information related to subsea telecommunications infrastructure sabotage1 information relating to indications of potential sabotage1 or authorized uses under this ,act1 in the possession of the interagency committee that may be declassified and shared at an unclassified level2 7#c7 the timely sharing between the interagency committee and non-,federal entities of unclassified1 including controlled unclassified1 information regarding subsea telecommunications infrastructure sabotage and indications of potential sabotage held by members of the interagency committee or non-,federal entities2 7#d7 the timely sharing between the interagency committee and non-,federal entities1 when and if appropriate1 of information relating to indications of potential subsea telecommunications infrastructure sabotage or authorized uses under this title1 held by the interagency committee or non-,federal entities about subsea telecommunications infrastructure sabotage1 in order to prevent or mitigate any potential adverse effects from such sabotage2 and 7#e7 the timely release of funds to meet cost1 schedule1 and performance metrics4 7b7 ,development of procedures ,the procedures developed under subsection 7b7 shall-- 7#a7 ensure the interagency committee has and maintains the capacity to identify and inform subsea telecommunications infrastructure sabotage and indications of potential subsea telecommunications infrastructure sabotage in real time to the appropriate ,federal agencies or non-,federal entities consistent with the protection of classified information2 7#b7 incorporate1 whenever possible1 existing processes1 roles1 and responsibilities of members of the interagency committee and non-,federal entities for information sharing1 including subsea telecommunications infrastructure-specific information sharing and analysis entities2 and 7#c7 require members of the interagency committee and other appropriate ,federal agencies which are sharing subsea telecommunications infrastructure sabotage indicators or defensive measures to employ any applicable security controls to defend against unauthorized access to or acquisition of such information4 7c7 ,submittal to ,congress ,the ,director of ,national ,intelligence1 in consultation with the members of the interagency committee1 shall-- 7#a7 not later than #fj days after the date of the enactment of this ,act1 submit to ,congress the procedures required under subsection 7b72 and 7#b7 not later than one year after submitting such procedures1 and annually thereafter for #e years1 submit to ,congress a report on the implementation and execution of information sharing with private sector actors in the previous year pursuant to subsection 7a74 ,february #aj1 #bjbf,reported with an amendment