,,iv #aaith ,,congress #b;d ,session ,h4 ,,res4 #adci ,,in ,,the ,,house ,,of ,,representatives ,july #bj1 #bjbf,mr4 ,cloud submitted the following resolution2 which was referred to the ,committee on ,rules ,,resolution ,expressing the sense of the ,house of ,representatives that the ,united ,states ,senate's current cloture and filibuster rules are contrary to the constitutional design of two co-equal majoritarian legislative bodies1 are non-deliberative in practice1 disenfranchise ,members of the ,house of ,representatives and their constituents1 and disrupt the proper balance of powers between the two chambers of ,congress1 and for other purposes4 #a4 ,findings with respect to the ,senate filibuster 7a7 ,founders' intent regarding two majoritarian deliberative bodies of equal weight ,the ,house of ,representatives finds the following3 7#a7 ,the ,framers of the ,constitution deliberately designed the ,united ,states ,congress as a bicameral legislature composed of two co-equal chambers1 each intended to operate on the principle of majority rule4 ,as ,james ,madison wrote in ,federalist ,no4 #eh3 ,in all cases where justice or the general good might require new laws to be passed1 or active measures to be pursued1 the fundamental principle of free government would be reversed if a minority faction could defeat the wishes of the majority4 7#b7 ,alexander ,hamilton1 in ,federalist ,no4 #bb1 explicitly condemned supermajority requirements as fundamentally anti-republican in nature1 writing3 ,its real operation is to embarrass the administration1 to destroy the energy of the government1 and to substitute the pleasure1 caprice1 or artifices of an insignificant1 turbulent1 or corrupt junto1 to the regular deliberations and decisions of a respectable majority44 ,hamilton warned that requiring more than a majority to act tends to subject the sense of the greater number to that of the lesser44 7#c7 ,the ,constitutional ,convention of #aghg specifically and deliberately rejected supermajority requirements as the default rule for ordinary legislation4 ,the ,constitution enumerates only six circumstances in which a supermajority is required 7and ordinary legislation is conspicuously absent from this list of enumerated circumstances71 as follows3 7,a7 ,conviction on ,impeachment 7,article ,i1 ,section #c74 7,b7 ,expelling a ,member of ,congress 7,article ,i1 ,section #e74 7,c7 ,overriding a ,presidential ,veto 7,article ,i1 ,section #g74 7,d7 ,ratifying treaties 7,article ,,ii1 ,section #b74 7,e7 ,proposing ,constitutional ,amendments 7,article ,v74 7,f7 ,ratification of the ,constitution by the ,states 7,article ,,vii74 7b7 ,the current ,senate filibuster is not deliberative ,the ,house finds the following3 7#a7 ,the original ,senate filibuster1 whatever its historical justification1 required ,senators to maintain continuous floor debate as a mechanism to delay rather than permanently defeat legislation1 thereby preserving at least a nominal form of deliberation4 ,the modern filibuster1 as reformed in #aige and subsequently1 requires only that forty-one ,senators signal their intent to object--without requiring any ,senator to be present on the floor1 to speak1 or to engage in debate of any kind4 7#b7 ,the ,senate's two-track system implemented in the #aigjs1 transformed the filibuster from an act of extended deliberation into a procedural veto exercisable by a minority without any requirement for sustained engagement with the legislation at issue4 ,under current ,senate practice1 a minority of ,senators may prevent a bill passed by the ,house from receiving a vote by simply refusing to invoke cloture--without ever setting foot on the ,senate floor to debate the merits of the legislation4 7#c7 ,the ,supreme ,court of the ,united ,states1 in ,,ins v4 ,chadha1 #dfb ,u4,s4 #iai 7#aihc71 reaffirmed that the ,constitution's explicit procedural requirements for legislation reflect careful and deliberate choices by the ,framers4 ,justice ,burger1 writing for the ,court1 emphasized that the procedures of bicameralism and presentment are integral parts of the constitutional design for the separation of powers4 7#d7 ,a procedure that permits forty-one ,senators1 potentially representing as little as eleven percent of the ,american population1 to prevent the ,senate from voting on legislation passed by a majority of the ,house of ,representatives and supported by a majority of the ,senate cannot be characterized as deliberation2 it is1 rather1 a procedural mechanism for the exercise of minority veto power antithetical to the republican form of government guaranteed to the states by ,article ,,iv1 ,section #d of the ,constitution4 7c7 ,the current ,senate filibuster is counter to the intent of two co-,equal majoritarian bodies ,the ,house finds the following3 7#a7 ,the ,constitution vests all legislative powers in a ,congress composed of two chambers1 each of which was designed to reflect1 through different mechanisms1 the will of the ,american people4 ,article ,i1 ,section #a states plainly3 ,all legislative ,powers herein granted shall be vested in a ,congress of the ,united ,states1 which shall consist of a ,senate and ,house of ,representatives4 ,the use of the conjunctive reflects the ,framers' design that both chambers act--not that one chamber's minority may indefinitely prevent the other chamber's majority-passed legislation from receiving a vote4 7#b7 ,the ,senate was never designed to be a chamber in which forty-one members could permanently and without deliberation defeat legislation desired by a majority of both chambers4 ,the ,framers' intent1 as reflected in the constitutional text and in the ,federalist ,papers1 was that legislation supported by a majority of each chamber1 and signed by the ,president1 would become law--with the check on majority excess supplied not by minority veto but by the structural features of bicameralism1 the presidential veto1 and judicial review4 7#c7 ,in ,united ,states v4 ,ballin1 #add ,u4,s4 #a 7#ahib71 the ,supreme ,court held that each ,house of ,congress has broad authority to establish its own rules of proceeding1 but that such rules must not ignore constitutional restraints or violate fundamental rights4 ,a ,senate rule that effectively nullifies the deliberative and majoritarian function of the ,house of ,representatives1 as an institution co-equal under ,article ,i1 raises serious questions about whether such a rule operates within constitutional limits4 7#d7 ,the ,senate filibuster1 as currently practiced1 produces a structural asymmetry between the two chambers wholly foreign to the constitutional design3 the ,house of ,representatives1 which must pass legislation by majority vote1 has its deliberative output systematically negated not by a ,senate majority's considered rejection1 but by a ,senate minority's procedural objection--leaving the ,house majority without any meaningful legislative recourse and rendering ,house passage of legislation an exercise without practical consequence whenever ,senate minority opposition exists4 7d7 ,the ,senate filibuster prevents legislation passed by the ,house from receiving proper consideration in the senate ,the ,house finds the following3 7#a7 ,the ,constitution's bicameral design contemplates that legislation passed by one chamber will be considered by the other chamber on its merits and ultimately accepted1 rejected1 or amended by majority action in that chamber4 ,the current ,senate filibuster permits legislation passed by the ,house of ,representatives to be tabled indefinitely without a floor vote1 without committee action1 and without any substantive consideration of its merits by the ,senate as a body4 7#b7 ,the ,supreme ,court in ,chadha noted that the procedures of ,article ,i1 ,section #g1 requiring passage by both ,houses1 were designed to ensure that legislation reflects considered deliberation by both chambers4 ,when one chamber's output is systematically blocked from consideration by the other chamber's procedural rules1 the bicameral design is subverted3 one of the two constitutionally required steps in the legislative process is made effectively optional by minority fiat4 7#c7 ,the constitutional design of the ,senate as a deliberative body capable of amending1 improving1 and checking legislation passed by the ,house is not served1 but rather undermined1 by procedural rules that prevent the ,senate as a body from ever deliberating on ,house-passed legislation4 ,deliberation requires engagement with the substance of legislation2 a procedural block imposed before ,senate floor consideration begins forecloses rather than fulfills the deliberative function4 7e7 ,the ,senate filibuster unconstitutionally disenfranchises the ,house1 its ,members1 and the people they represent ,the ,house finds the following3 7#a7 ,the ,house of ,representatives was designed by the ,framers as the chamber most directly accountable to the people of the ,united ,states4 ,as ,madison wrote in ,federalist ,no4 #eb1 the ,house was to have an immediate dependence on1 and an intimate sympathy with1 the people--a design reflected in two-year terms1 proportional representation1 and direct popular election4 ,when ,senate procedural rules systemically prevent ,house-passed legislation from receiving a ,senate vote1 the political accountability that justifies the ,house's representative function is undermined4 7#b7 ,the equal dignity and constitutional standing of the ,house of ,representatives as a co-equal branch of ,congress is impaired when ,senate rules are deployed to ensure that legislation passed by a majority of the ,house is never considered on the merits by the ,senate4 ,the constitutional design places both chambers on equal footing as necessary participants in the legislative process2 a ,senate procedural rule that renders one chamber's majority action a nullity disrupts the constitutional balance between the two ,houses4 7#c7 ,the voters who elect ,members of the ,house of ,representatives do so with the reasonable and constitutionally grounded expectation that their representative1 if part of a legislative majority1 can pass legislation that will be considered1 and accepted or rejected on the merits1 by the ,senate4 ,when the ,senate filibuster prevents that consideration1 the votes of ,house members' constituents are effectively nullified not by a ,senate majority's substantive disagreement1 but by a ,senate minority's procedural refusal to permit a vote4 7#d7 ,the ,supreme ,court has consistently held that the right to vote includes the right to have one's vote counted and to have it carry its constitutionally intended weight4 ,in ,reynolds v4 ,sims1 #cgg ,u4,s4 #ecc 7#aifd71 ,chief ,justice ,warren wrote that the right of suffrage can be denied by a debasement or dilution of the weight of a citizen's vote just as effectively as by wholly prohibiting the free exercise of the franchise4 ,while ,reynolds addressed apportionment1 its core principle1 that procedural mechanisms that systematically diminish the effective weight of votes are constitutionally suspect1 applies with force to ,senate rules that render the legislative output of popularly elected ,house majorities meaningless4 #b4 ,additional findings and sense of the ,house of ,representatives with respect to the filibuster 7a7 ,findings ,the ,house of ,representatives finds the following3 7#a7 ,the ,framers of the ,constitution intended both the ,house of ,representatives and the ,united ,states ,senate to operate as majoritarian deliberative bodies of equal constitutional standing4 7#b7 ,the current ,senate filibuster1 as practiced under the two-track system established in the #aigjs1 is not a deliberative mechanism but a procedural veto device enabling a minority of ,senators to prevent floor votes without engaging in any form of substantive debate4 7#c7 ,the current ,senate filibuster is contrary to the ,framers' intent that ordinary legislation be subject to majority rule in each chamber1 as demonstrated by the text of the ,constitution1 the ,federalist ,papers1 and the records of the ,constitutional ,convention4 7#d7 ,the ,senate filibuster prevents legislation passed by the ,house of ,representatives from receiving proper deliberative consideration in the ,senate1 subverting the bicameral design of ,article ,i of the ,constitution4 7#e7 ,the ,senate filibuster unconstitutionally disenfranchises ,members of the ,house of ,representatives and the constituents they represent by rendering ,house majority action without meaningful legislative consequence4 7#f7 ,the ,senate filibuster1 as currently practiced1 disrupts the proper constitutional balance between the two co-equal chambers of ,congress4 7b7 ,sense of the ,house ,it is the sense of the ,house of ,representatives that-- 7#a7 the ,united ,states ,senate should reform or abolish its cloture and filibuster rules to restore the principle of majority rule to ,senate proceedings on legislation2 7#b7 the ,senate should establish procedures ensuring that legislation passed by a majority of the ,house of ,representatives receives a timely floor vote in the ,senate1 with final disposition determined by a majority of ,senators present and voting2 7#c7 ,senate rules should preserve the minority's right to be heard and to offer amendments1 while ensuring that the minority cannot permanently prevent a majority from acting2 7#d7 the constitutional design of two co-equal majoritarian chambers requires that both the ,house and the ,senate operate on the fundamental principle that1 after adequate deliberation1 a majority determines the outcome2 and 7#e7 ,congress as a whole is best served by procedural rules in both chambers that facilitate deliberation1 accountability1 and majority governance1 consistent with the constitutional vision articulated by the ,framers of the ,constitution4 #c4 ,transmission ,the ,clerk of the ,house of ,representatives shall transmit a copy of this resolution to the ,president pro tempore of the ,united ,states ,senate1 the ,majority ,leader of the ,senate1 the ,minority ,leader of the ,senate1 and to each ,member of the ,senate4