,,iii #aahth ,,congress #b;d ,session ,s4 ,,res4 #gah ,,in ,,the ,,senate ,,of ,,the ,,united ,,states ,june #d1 #bjbd,mr4 ,marshall 7for himself1 ,mr4 ,braun1 and ,mr4 ,lee7 submitted the following resolution2 which was referred to the ,committee on ,health1 ,education1 ,labor1 and ,pensions ,,resolution ,expressing the sense of the ,senate that the ,united ,states ,government should immediately place a moratorium on all federally funded gain-of-function research given the increased safety concerns4 ,whereas the ,obama ,administration defined gain-of-function studies as research that aims to increase the ability of infectious agents to cause disease by enhancing its pathogenicity or by increasing its transmissibility2 ,whereas the ,obama ,administration1 on ,october #ag1 #bjad1 mandated a ,federal ,government pause on new gain-of-function research1 citing recent concerns regarding biosafety and biosecurity2 ,whereas the ,obama ,administration1 on ,october #ag1 #bjad1 stated that new ,federal funding will not be released for gain-of-function research projects that may be reasonably anticipated to confer attributes to the influenza1 ,middle ,east respiratory syndrome 7referred to in this preamble as ,,mers71 or severe acute respiratory syndrome 7referred to in this preamble as ,,sars7 viruses such that such a virus would have enhanced pathogenicity or transmissibility in mammals via the respiratory route2 ,whereas in the lead up to the ,obama ,administration pausing new gain-of-function research1 the ,centers for ,disease ,control and ,prevention noted an increase in accidents involving leaks1 spills1 or other releases of infectious material inside the laboratories receiving ,federal funding2 ,whereas the ,cambridge ,working ,group1 a consortium of some of the leading international researchers and scientists1 released a #bjad open letter stating experiments involving the creation of potential pandemic pathogens should be curtailed until there has been a quantitative1 objective and credible assessment of the risks1 potential benefits1 and opportunities for risk mitigation1 as well as comparison against safer experimental approaches42 ,whereas in #bjad1 after the ,obama ,administration mandated a pause on gain-of-function research1 the ,national ,institutes of ,health 7referred to in this preamble as ,,nih71 led by ,francis ,collins1 including the ,national ,institute of ,allergy and ,infectious ,diseases 7referred to in this preamble as ,,niaid71 led by ,anthony ,fauci1 continued to authorize grants and research awards to organizations that study the spread of viruses from animals to humans2 ,whereas some such awards went to ,eco,health ,alliance and its ,president1 ,peter ,daszak1 who then disbursed research money to the ,wuhan ,institute of ,virology 7referred to in this preamble as the ,,wiv7 and ,east ,china ,normal ,university2 ,whereas experiments advanced by ,eco,health ,alliance during the pause included1 among other projects1 combining genetic material from a parent coronavirus1 known as ,,wiv#a1 with other viruses2 ,whereas the results of such experiments demonstrated varying pathogenicity of ,,sars-,co,v-#b with different spike proteins in humanized mice2 ,whereas a majority of scientists and researchers1 including ,dr4 ,lawrence ,tabak and ,dr4 ,ralph ,baric1 an ,eco,health ,alliance collaborator and top coronavirus expert1 when made aware of such experiment1 admitted that ,eco,health ,alliance's coronavirus research appeared to meet the standard criteria for gain-of-function research2 ,whereas ,,nih and ,,niaid continued to support ,eco,health ,alliance and other organizations conducting gain-of-function research1 according to the ,obama ,administration's definition1 through #bjag1 even though the pause remained in effect2 ,whereas on ,july #g1 #bjaf1 ,,niaid identified possible gain-of-function research concerns in an experiment proposed by ,eco,health and conducted by the ,,wiv2 ,whereas in ,may #bjba1 ,anthony ,fauci conceded that during the period between #bjad and #bjag that it is impossible to guarantee that researchers at the ,wuhan ,institute of ,virology did not use ,american funds to perform gain-of-function research on coronaviruses42 ,whereas ,anthony ,fauci and ,,niaid did not alert senior ,white ,house officials before lifting a ban on gain-of-function research in #bjag2 ,whereas in ,november #bjai1 #c researchers from the ,,wiv became sick enough to receive hospital care1 and according to ,united ,states officials1 those sick researchers were involved in coronavirus research2 ,whereas the ,chinese government deliberately delayed notifying the ,world ,health organization that it had detected ,,sars-like infections from an unknown1 novel pathogen well before it sent official notification in ,december #bjai2 ,whereas on ,april #bd1 #bjbj1 ,,nih instructed ,eco,health to terminate all funding to the ,,wiv1 and ,,nih terminated the ,,wiv's entire sub-grant award2 ,whereas in ,july #bjbj1 ,,nih1 having procedurally erred in its ,april #bjbj termination of ,eco,health's grant1 reinstated and then immediately suspended ,eco,health's grant while requiring ,eco,health to meet certain conditions1 such as obtaining a sample of the ,,sars-,co,v-#b virus that the ,wuhan lab used to determine its genetic sequence and arranging for an independent team to examine the ,wuhan lab and determine whether it had possession of the ,,sars-,co,v-#b virus prior to ,december #bjai2 ,whereas ,peter ,daszak reacted to those conditions by calling them preposterous2 ,whereas based on tips from the scientific community that suspected ,eco,health's science research at the ,,wiv may have caused the ,,covid-#ai pandemic outbreak1 ,,nih investigated ,eco,health's compliance with its grant agreement terms1 including the gain-of-function provisions in ,june #bjaf and again from ,april #bjbj to ,april #bjbc and concluded that ,eco,health was noncompliant2 ,whereas in ,october #bjba1 ,,nih acknowledged to ,congress that ,eco,health ,alliance did not have access to laboratory notebooks or other records supporting its research1 even though keeping such records was a requirement of the ,,nih grant2 ,whereas although ,eco,health's ,year #e ,research ,performance ,progress ,report for its research activities was due to ,,nih in ,september #bjai1 ,eco,health did not submit the report until ,august #c1 #bjba2 ,whereas on ,october #bj1 #bjba1 it was revealed than an experiment in ,eco,health's ,year #e ,progress ,report 7for research between ,june #bjah and ,may #bjai7 exhibited virus growth greater than one log1 thus constituting gain-of-function research1 which should have triggered immediate suspension and reporting to ,,niaid according to contract agreements2 ,whereas instead of ,eco,health taking either action1 ,eco,health used language in its report that obfuscated the severity and timing of the gain-of-function experiments1 which contradicted the ,obama-era pause on gain-of-function research and the additional terms of agreement ,,nih added to ,eco,health's grant in ,june #bjaf2 ,whereas in ,october #bjba1 ,,nih updated the definition of gain-of-function research to focus more on enhanced pandemic potential pathogens 7referred to in this preamble as e,p,p,p71 which meant that because the majority of gain-of-function research does not include e,p,p,ps1 once considered gain-of-function research now fell outside the scope of the stricter oversight required for e,p,p,p studies2 ,whereas ,,nih determined that no evidence existed to support the testimony ,peter ,daszak gave to ,congress on ,november #ad1 #bjbc1 that ,eco,health was prevented from submitting its ,year #e ,research ,performance ,progress ,report to ,,nih due to a technical problem in ,,nih's system2 ,whereas in ,april #bjbc1 when ,,nih reinstated ,eco,health's suspended grant and imposed new conditions1 ,,nih stated that it was executing a corrective action plan to ,eco,health that satisfied ,,nih's compliance efforts regarding gain-of-function research2 ,whereas as part of the ,april #bjbc reinstatement1 ,eco,health pledged it would not perform work in1 or with1 ,chinese-affiliated institutions2 ,whereas the prime reasoning for ,eco,health's reinstatement was ,eco,health's representation to ,,niaid that ,eco,health had access to sequences and samples that were required to be supplied to the ,federal ,government as a condition of receiving ,federal grants1 which still needed analysis2 ,whereas ,eco,health was not forthcoming and failed to disclose to ,,niaid that those samples were stored in ,china at the ,,wiv1 which was ,eco,health's subcontractor that conducted the coronavirus gain-of-function research that could have caused the ,,covid-#ai pandemic2 ,whereas as of new guidance issued in ,may #bjbd1 the ,biden ,administration removed avian influenza and current forms of ,,sars-,co,v-#b1 the virus that causes ,covid-#ai1 from the category of pathogens of pandemic potential1 thus excluding them from updated rules governing gain-of-function research2 ,whereas effective ,may #ad1 #bjbd1 the ,department of ,health and ,human ,services 7referred to in this preamble as ,,hhs7 announced it would commence official debarment proceedings against ,eco,health ,alliance and implement a government-wide suspension of ,united ,states taxpayer funds to include a hold on all active grants2 ,whereas on ,may #ba1 #bjbd1 ,,hhs1 in an effort to protect public interest1 suspended and recommended debarment of ,peter ,daszak's individual ability to receive any ,federal funds2 ,whereas both the ,federal ,bureau of ,investigation and the ,department of ,energy have assessed that the ,,covid-#ai pandemic was a result of a lab leak from the ,,wiv2 ,whereas the majority members of the ,select ,subcommittee on the ,coronavirus ,pandemic of the ,committee on ,oversight and ,accountability of the ,house of ,representatives 7referred to in this preamble as the ,subcommittee7 reported that ,eco,health's actions were often enabled by ,,nih and ,,niaid and the failures of ,,nih and ,,niaid to properly oversee ,eco,health's research projects2 ,whereas the majority members of the ,subcommittee found that ,eco,health's actions were often enabled by the lack of grant management and oversight by ,,nih and ,,niaid2 and ,whereas the majority members of the ,subcommittee believe that such ,,nih and ,,niaid grant management oversight failures necessitate both ,congressional and ,executive action to increase transparency and grantee oversight3 ,now1 therefore1 be it ,that it is the sense of the ,senate that ,congress should immediately consider the ,viral ,gain-of-,function ,research ,moratorium ,act 7,s4 #ha1 #aahth ,congress1 as introduced on ,january #be1 #bjbc71 which would-- 7#a7 define gain-of-function research as any research that-- 7,a7 could confer attributes to the influenza1 ,middle ,east respiratory syndrome1 or severe acute respiratory syndrome viruses such that such a virus would have enhanced pathogenicity or transmissibility in any organism2 or 7,b7 involves methods that could enhance potential pandemic pathogens or related risky research with potentially dangerous pathogens2 and 7#b7 prohibit1 notwithstanding any other provision of law1 research grants supported by ,federal funds from being awarded to institutions of higher education1 or other research organizations1 that are conducting gain-of-function research4