,,ii #aahth ,,congress #ast ,session ,s4 #afgd ,,in ,,the ,,senate ,,of ,,the ,,united ,,states ,may #ah1 #bjbc,mr4 ,cotton 7for himself1 ,mr4 ,risch1 ,mr4 ,rubio1 ,mr4 ,cramer1 ,mr4 ,scott of ,florida1 ,mr4 ,barrasso1 ,mr4 ,budd1 ,mr4 ,ricketts1 ,mr4 ,hagerty1 ,mr4 ,rounds1 and ,mr4 ,cruz7 introduced the following bill2 which was read twice and referred to the ,committee on ,foreign ,relations ,a ,,bill ,to provide for better security and accountability with respect to the strategic and non-strategic nuclear arsenals of the ,russian ,federation and the ,people's ,republic of ,china1 and for other purposes4 #a4 ,short title ,this ,act may be cited as the ,no ,,start ,treaty ,act4 #b4 ,findings ,congress makes the following findings3 7#a7 ,the ,united ,states and the ,russian ,federation signed the ,new ,,start ,treaty in ,april #bjaj1 and the treaty entered into force in ,february #bjaa4 7#b7 ,the central limits of the ,new ,,start ,treaty prohibit the ,united ,states and the ,russian ,federation from possessing any more than #gjj deployed strategic nuclear launchers1 #hjj deployed and non-deployed strategic nuclear launchers1 and #a1eej nuclear warheads attributed to those deployed launchers4 7#c7 ,the ,new ,,start ,treaty includes an inspection and verification regime that includes #ah on-site inspections per year1 data exchanges and notifications1 and a ,bilateral ,consultative ,commission as a compliance and implementation convening body4 7#d7 ,the ,new ,,start ,treaty allows each party the right to withdraw if it decides that extraordinary events related to the subject matter of the treaty jeopardize its supreme interests4 7#e7 ,the ,new ,,start ,treaty placed no constraints on ,russia's estimated #b1jjj non-strategic nuclear weapons1 which can be delivered by a variety of ground-based1 air-based1 and sea-based platforms4 ,in contrast1 the ,united ,states possesses only a small inventory of aircraft-deliverable non-strategic nuclear gravity bombs4 7#f7 ,the ,new ,,start ,treaty did not constrain the arsenal of the ,people's ,republic of ,china1 which is now engaged in a strategic breakout of its nuclear forces4 ,the ,department of ,defense estimates that ,china will have about #a1jjj operational nuclear warheads by #bjcj and about #a1ejj warheads by #bjce if it continues at its current pace4 7#g7 ,the ,department of ,defense acknowledged in its #bjbb ,report on ,military and ,security ,developments ,involving the ,people's ,republic of ,china that ,china took only two years to double its nuclear arsenal1 far sooner than the ,department's #bjbj estimate that it would take ,china until #bjcj to double its nuclear arsenal4 7#h7 ,even when the ,russian ,federation was found compliant with the ,new ,,start ,treaty1 it developed multiple strategic nuclear-armed systems that circumvented the spirit and intent of the treaty1 such as a nuclear-powered cruise missile and nuclear-powered torpedo4 7#i7 ,in ,march #bjbj1 the ,united ,states and the ,russian ,federation mutually agreed to suspend ,new ,,start ,treaty inspections due to the ,,covid-#ai pandemic4 7#aj7 ,on ,february #c1 #bjba1 ,secretary of ,state ,antony ,blinken announced the unconditional extension of the ,new ,,start ,treaty for an additional five years1 until ,february #e1 #bjbf1 the maximum extension allowed by the treaty4 7#aa7 ,the ,russian ,federation refused ,united ,states requests in ,august #bjbb to resume ,new ,,start inspections and refused to engage in the ,bilateral ,consultative ,commission with the ,united ,states in ,november #bjbb to work towards resuming inspections4 7#ab7 ,given ,russia's refusal to resume mandatory inspections and refusal to participate in the ,bilateral ,consultative ,commission as required by the treaty1 the ,department of ,state declared in ,january #bjbc that ,russia was noncompliant with the ,new ,,start ,treaty4 7#ac7 ,in ,february #bjbc1 ,president of the ,russian ,federation ,vladimir ,putin announced that ,russia would suspend its participation in the ,new ,,start ,treaty4 ,the ,new ,,start ,treaty has no provision for suspension4 ,russia shortly thereafter ceased providing to the ,united ,states the data on its nuclear arsenal that is required under the treaty4 7#ad7 ,the ,united ,states remains in compliance with the central limits of the ,new ,,start ,treaty and attempted in good faith to resume mutual inspections under the treaty4 7#ae7 ,the ,united ,states has not deployed a new nuclear-capable delivery system in over #cj years1 while the ,russian ,federation has in that same time deployed over a dozen new nuclear-capable delivery systems4 ,russia also has active nuclear production facilities that enable it to produce large numbers of new warheads4 7#af7 ,the ,united ,states nuclear modernization program of record does not expand the ,united ,states nuclear arsenal from current levels1 while the ,people's ,republic of ,china is growing its nuclear arsenal as part of what former ,commander of the ,united ,states ,strategic ,command1 ,admiral ,richard1 has labeled 8breathtaking04 ,china's deployed forces will achieve effective parity with the ,united ,states arsenal deployed under the ,new ,,start ,treaty by #bjce1 if not sooner4 7#ag7 ,in its resolution of advice and consent to ratification of the ,new ,,start ,treaty in #bjaj1 the ,senate stated that if1 during the time the ,new ,,start ,treaty remains in force1 the ,president determines that there has been an expansion of the strategic arsenal of any country not party to the ,new ,,start ,treaty so as to jeopardize the supreme interests of the ,united ,states1 then the ,president should consult on an urgent basis with the ,senate to determine whether adherence to the ,new ,,start ,treaty remains in the national interest of the ,united ,states4 ,to date1 the ,president has taken no action to consult with the ,senate on this issue1 even though ,china's actions clearly meet this standard4 7#ah7 ,for deterrence to be effective1 ,united ,states ,strategic ,command needs to be confident it can hold at risk what an adversary values most1 including its nuclear forces4 ,therefore1 the expansion of the nuclear arsenals of the ,russian ,federation and the ,people's ,republic of ,china directly impact ,united ,states deterrence requirements4 #c4 ,sense of ,congress ,it is the sense of ,congress that-- 7#a7 arms control is not an end in and of itself1 and is only useful if it strengthens the security of the ,united ,states and its allies2 7#b7 the extension of the ,new ,,start ,treaty in #bjba with no conditions attached and no attempts to resolve the numerous shortcomings of the original treaty harmed ,united ,states national security and emboldened ,america's adversaries2 7#c7 the ,russian ,federation is in material breach of its commitments under the ,new ,,start ,treaty1 and ,russia's suspension of the treaty represents a de facto withdrawal from the treaty2 7#d7 ,russia's de facto withdrawal from the ,new ,,start ,treaty removes the treaty's value to the national security interest of the ,united ,states and its allies of limiting strategic nuclear weapons1 as the ,united ,states is now unable to confirm ,russia is adhering to the central limits of the treaty2 7#e7 ,china's nuclear buildup meets the ,senate criterion of an expansion of the strategic arsenal of a country not party to the ,new ,,start ,treaty that jeopardizes the supreme interests of the ,united ,states2 7#f7 ,due to ,russia's de facto withdrawal from the ,new ,,start ,treaty and ,china's nuclear expansion1 the ,new ,,start ,treaty is no longer in the ,united ,states national interest and the ,united ,states should withdraw2 7#g7 after the ,new ,,start ,treaty expires or becomes defunct1 any new arms control agreement or treaty that sets numerical limits on nuclear arsenals should limit the ,russian ,federation's nuclear arsenal--strategic and non-strategic--and should also restrict the nuclear arsenal of the ,people's ,republic of ,china without allowing ,china to increase its arsenal to reach treaty limits2 7#h7 the ,united ,states should not divest itself of1 or slow or halt the development or procurement of1 any nuclear-capable strategic or non-strategic delivery systems unless a new nuclear arms control treaty is ratified that similarly constrains the nuclear arsenals of both the ,russian ,federation and the ,people's ,republic of ,china2 and 7#i7 the ,united ,states should strengthen its nuclear forces1 to include growing the size of its nuclear arsenal1 strengthening its force posture1 and acquiring additional capabilities1 to account for the growth in deterrence requirements caused by the expansion of the nuclear arsenals of the ,people's ,republic of ,china and the ,russian ,federation since the ,new ,,start ,treaty was signed1 as well as to hedge against a ,russian breakout from ,new ,,start ,treaty limits4 #d4 ,assessment and implementation plan for nuclear force structure improvements required 7a7 ,in general ,not later than #ij days after the date of the enactment of this ,act1 the ,secretary of ,defense1 in coordination with the ,secretary of ,state1 shall submit to the appropriate congressional committees a report on ,united ,states nuclear deterrence4 7b7 ,elements ,the report required under subsection 7a7 shall include the following elements3 7#a7 ,an assessment of the adequacy of the current and planned nuclear arsenal of the ,united ,states for purposes of facing its adversaries1 with a focus on the new dynamics associated with facing two major nuclear powers simultaneously in both peacetime and in conflict4 ,the assessment shall describe-- 7,a7 the sufficiency of the size and structure of the current and planned arsenal to maintain deterrence with respect to two nuclear-peers without reduced levels of risk or redundancy2 7,b7 the sufficiency of the size and structure of the current and planned arsenal to maintain deterrence of two nuclear-peers without reduced levels of risk or redundancy should the ,russian ,federation grow its nuclear forces beyond the levels allowed under the central limits of the ,new ,,start ,treaty and should the ,people's ,republic of ,china continue to grow its nuclear forces after reaching parity with the currently deployed ,united ,states nuclear arsenal under the ,new ,,start ,treaty2 7,c7 the impact of emerging technology1 such as nuclear-armed hypersonic weapons and fractional orbital bombardment systems1 on ,united ,states nuclear posture and planning2 and 7,d7 the current and planned sufficiency of nuclear command1 control1 and communications capabilities in crisis or conflict scenarios4 7#b7 ,a proposed implementation plan to address any deficiencies found in the assessment described in paragraph 7#a74 ,the plan shall include-- 7,a7 needed changes to the planned nuclear force structure and force posture based on any gaps in deterrence and assurance capabilities2 7,b7 a proposal and timeline to improve the survivability of the strategic bomber force2 7,c7 a proposal and timeline detailing the steps necessary to return a portion of the strategic bomber force to heightened alert status2 7,d7 a proposal and timeline detailing the steps necessary to reduce the time necessary to upload nuclear weapons to the bomber force2 7,e7 a proposal and timeline detailing the steps necessary-- 7i7 to upload additional warheads to the ,minuteman ,,iii ,,icbm fleet to its full capacity2 and 7ii7 to deploy ,sentinel missiles as they come online with the maximum number of warheads that can be deployed on each missile2 and 7,f7 a proposal and timeline detailing the steps necessary to restore submarine-launched ballistic missile tubes on ,ohio-class submarines that were rendered inoperable to comply with the terms of the ,new ,,start ,treaty4 7#c7 ,the national security implications of-- 7,a7 any unilateral reductions of the ,united ,states nuclear arsenal without corresponding reductions in ,russia and ,china's nuclear arsenal2 and 7,b7 any unilateral reductions in the ,united ,states' national and theater missile defense without corresponding reductions in ,russia and ,china's missile defense4 #e4 ,requirements for future nuclear arms agreements 7a7 ,requirements ,the ,president and any representative of the ,president shall not negotiate1 sign1 or otherwise agree to any treaty with the ,russian ,federation pertaining to nuclear weapons where the number of nuclear warheads or nuclear-capable delivery systems possessed by the ,russian ,federation would be numerically equal in size to1 or greater than1 the nuclear arsenal of the ,united ,states1 unless such treaty or agreement-- 7#a7 also restricts the size of the nuclear arsenal of the ,people's ,republic of ,china without allowing ,china to build up to treaty limits2 7#b7 includes an inspection regime and other verification measures to ensure with high confidence that the ,russian ,federation and the ,people's ,republic of ,china are compliant with the terms of the treaty or agreement2 7#c7 includes an inspection regime of the relevant nuclear facilities of the ,people's ,republic of ,china that is comparable to the treaty's or agreement's inspection regime of the relevant nuclear facilities of the ,russian ,federation2 7#d7 includes current and future ,russian strategic nuclear systems of a strategic character that are not currently limited by the ,new ,,start ,treaty1 including-- 7,a7 non-ballistic missiles of intercontinental ranges2 7,b7 underwater unmanned systems of intercontinental ranges2 and 7,c7 hypersonic glide vehicles that can be delivered by systems of intercontinental ranges2 and 7#e7 includes current and future non-strategic nuclear weapons and delivery systems4 7b7 ,prohibition on unilateral reductions 7#a7 ,in general ,except as provided in paragraph 7#b71 the ,president shall not reduce the size of the ,united ,states nuclear arsenal without a nuclear arms treaty approved with the advice and consent of the ,senate1 pursuant to article ,,ii1 section #b1 clause #b of the ,constitution of the ,united ,states that satisfies the requirements described in subsection 7a74 7#b7 ,exception ,the prohibition in paragraph 7#a7 does not apply to the following activities3 7,a7 ,the maintenance or sustainment of ,united ,states nuclear systems4 7,b7 ,ensuring the safety1 security1 or reliability of ,united ,states nuclear systems4 7,c7 ,facilitating the transition of existing legacy systems to modern delivery systems4 7c7 ,prohibition on bargaining with missile defense ,the ,president shall not negotiate1 sign1 or otherwise agree to any agreement or treaty with the ,russian ,federation or the ,people's ,republic of ,china that would limit or reduce the ,united ,states national or theater missile defenses unless the ,united ,states has already ratified a treaty that satisfies the requirements described in subsection 7a74 7d7 ,withholding of funds ,beginning on the date that is one year after the date of the enactment of this ,act1 no funds shall be expended to implement the ,new ,,start ,treaty1 any successor agreement to the ,new ,,start ,treaty1 or any other new or newly amended nuclear arms control treaty or agreement with the ,russian ,federation that limits the numbers of nuclear warheads or nuclear-capable delivery systems possessed by the ,united ,states unless-- 7#a7 such treaties or agreements satisfy the requirements described in subsection 7a72 or 7#b7 a different treaty or agreement is already in effect that satisfies the requirements described in subsection 7a74 7e7 ,waiver ,the ,president may waive the prohibition in subsection 7d7 with respect to a particular new or newly amended agreement or treaty if-- 7#a7 two-thirds of the ,senate first agrees to a joint resolution of approval in support of the new or newly amended agreement or treaty2 and 7#b7 the ,president certifies to the appropriate congressional committees that the agreement or treaty is in the national security interests of the ,united ,states and does not harm the deterrent capability of the ,united ,states4 #f4 ,definitions ,in this ,act3 7#a7 ,appropriate congressional committees ,the term appropriate congressional committees means-- 7,a7 the ,committee on ,armed ,services1 the ,committee on ,foreign ,relations1 and the ,committee on ,appropriations of the ,senate2 and 7,b7 the ,committee on ,armed ,services1 the ,committee on ,foreign ,affairs1 and the ,committee on ,appropriations of the ,house of ,representatives4 7#b7 ,new ,,start ,treaty the term ,new ,,start ,treaty means the ,treaty between the ,united ,states of ,america and the ,russian ,federation on ,measures for the ,further ,reduction and ,limitation of ,strategic ,offensive ,arms1 signed ,april #h1 #bjaj1 and entered into force ,february #e1 #bjaa4