,,iv #aahth ,,congress #ast ,session ,h4 ,,res4 #cb ,,in ,,the ,,house ,,of ,,representatives ,january #ab1 #bjbc,mr4 ,joyce of ,ohio 7for himself1 ,mr4 ,steil1 ,mr4 ,stewart1 ,mr4 ,johnson of ,south ,dakota1 ,mr4 ,duncan1 and ,mr4 ,grothman7 submitted the following resolution2 which was referred to the ,committee on ,financial ,services ,,resolution ,supporting the current definition of materiality in the securities laws and opposing new disclosure requirements outside the core mission of the ,securities and ,exchange ,commission4 ,whereas certain policymakers have demonstrated increased interest in evaluating companies based on environmental1 social1 and governance or ,,esg performance metrics2 ,whereas certain policymakers have called for ,federal agencies1 including the ,securities and ,exchange ,commission 7,,sec71 to require public companies to disclose more ,,esg-related information2 ,whereas the securities disclosure regime of the ,,sec has for decades been guided by a standard of materiality first established by the ,securities ,act of #aicc and affirmed several times by the ,supreme ,court1 including the decision ,,tsc ,industries ,inc4 v4 ,northway ,inc4 7#dbf ,u4,s4 #dch 7#aigf771 which held that information is material 7and subject to disclosure7 if there is a substantial likelihood that a reasonable shareholder would consider it important in deciding how to vote2 ,whereas materiality depends upon whether information is important to an investor at any time1 making it a durable standard which provides a framework for addressing new issues and ignoring issues which have lost importance2 ,whereas the materiality standard has been the bedrock principle governing ,federal securities disclosure law for over eight decades2 ,whereas the materiality standard fosters strong capital markets that create a competitive advantage for the ,united ,states by enabling the efficient flow of capital and labor2 ,whereas the materiality standard is critical for maintaining efficient disclosure regimes that limit burdensome requirements1 filter unimportant information1 and prevent confusing information overload for investors2 ,whereas1 in #aigf1 ,justice ,thurgood ,marshall writing for the majority in the ,,tsc ,industries ,inc4 v4 ,northway ,inc4 decision noted that some information is of such dubious significance that insistence on its disclosure may accomplish more harm than good2 ,whereas certain policymakers intend to reorient the securities disclosure regime to require disclosure of immaterial information to achieve social and political goals2 ,whereas the ,,sec is not tasked with or capable of formulating environmental or social policy2 its core mission is to protect investors2 maintain fair1 orderly1 and efficient markets2 and facilitate capital formation2 ,whereas to the extent that climate risks become material for a particular public company1 disclosure of those risks is already required2 ,whereas ,,sec rules currently make explicitly clear that material effects of climate change to the business must be disclosed 7#ag ,c4,f4,r4 #baa1 #bca1 and #bda72 ,whereas additional ,,sec climate disclosure regulations threaten to impose expensive compliance costs and lessen investor enthusiasm for ,american energy companies2 and ,whereas capital markets regulations should not discourage investments which would further ,united ,states energy independence3 ,now1 therefore1 be it ,that the ,house of ,representatives-- 7#a7 supports current law that defines materiality and has guided the securities disclosure regime for decades2 and 7#b7 opposes new disclosure requirements outside the core mission of the ,securities and ,exchange ,commission1 which burden ,united ,states businesses and harm investors with information overload4