,i #aahth ,,congress #b;d ,session ,h4 ,r4 #igff ,,in ,,the ,,house ,,of ,,representatives ,september #bc1 #bjbd,mr4 ,pfluger introduced the following bill2 which was referred to the ,committee on ,energy and ,commerce1 and in addition to the ,committees on ,homeland ,security1 and ,foreign ,affairs1 for a period to be subsequently determined by the ,speaker1 in each case for consideration of such provisions as fall within the jurisdiction of the committee concerned ,a ,,bill ,to establish an interagency working group to ensure the security1 resiliency1 and integrity of undersea cables1 and for other purposes4 #a4 ,short title ,this ,act may be cited as the ,undersea ,cable ,security and ,protection ,act4 #b4 ,interagency working group and report on ensuring the security1 resiliency1 and integrity of undersea cables 7a7 ,interagency working group 7#a7 ,preparation of report ,not later than #fj days after the date of the enactment of this ,act1 the ,secretary of ,homeland ,security1 in consultation with the ,chairperson of the ,federal ,communications ,commission1 shall convene an interagency working group 7in this section referred to as the working group7 to prepare the report under subsection 7b7 and provide the briefing under subsection 7c74 7#b7 ,chairperson ,the ,secretary of ,homeland ,security shall serve as the chairperson of the working group4 7#c7 ,membership ,the working group shall be composed of participants with relevant background or expertise1 as determined by the ,security of ,homeland ,security1 with the approval of the head of the relevant ,federal department1 agency1 or component1 as appropriate1 from each of the following3 7,a7 ,the ,department of ,homeland ,security4 7,b7 ,the ,cybersecurity and ,infrastructure ,security ,agency of the ,department4 7,c7 ,the ,united ,states ,coast ,guard4 7,d7 ,the ,department of ,justice4 7,e7 ,the ,department of ,defense4 7,f7 ,the ,federal ,communications ,commission4 7,g7 ,the ,department of ,commerce4 7,h7 ,any other component of the ,united ,states ,government1 regardless of whether such component is an element of the intelligence community1 that the ,secretary1 in consultation with the head of such component1 determines would materially assist in the activities of the interagency working group4 7b7 ,report 7#a7 ,requirement ,not later than one year after the date of the enactment of this ,act1 the ,secretary of ,homeland ,security1 in consultation with the ,chairperson of the ,federal ,communications ,commission1 shall submit to the appropriate congressional committees a report-- 7,a7 assessing the challenges of protecting commercial undersea telecommunications cables landing in the ,united ,states 7in this section referred to as undersea cables7 and cable landing stations in the ,united ,states from security threats posed by the ,people's ,republic of ,china1 the ,russian ,federation1 the ,islamic ,republic of ,iran1 and any foreign entity of concern2 and 7,b7 examining the roles and responsibilities of the ,united ,states ,government and the private sector to ensure the security1 resiliency1 and integrity of such undersea cables and cable landing stations4 7#b7 ,matters to be included ,the report under paragraph 7#a7 shall include a description of each of the following3 7,a7 ,past1 ongoing1 or planned efforts by the ,department of ,homeland ,security1 pursuant to its role and responsibilities as the ,sector ,risk ,management ,agency for the communications sector in accordance with ,national ,security ,memorandum-#bb1 issued ,april #cj1 #bjbd 7relating to critical infrastructure security and resilience71 and the ,federal ,communications ,commission1 to protect undersea cables and cable landing stations in the ,united ,states from acts of espionage1 cybersecurity threats1 and from physical damage or disruption1 including the cutting of such cables1 and efforts to protect cable landing stations in the ,united ,states from vandalism1 sabotage1 and related terrorism threats4 7,b7 ,the capabilities of the ,people's ,republic of ,china1 the ,russian ,federation1 the ,islamic ,republic of ,iran1 and any foreign entity of concern to target and compromise undersea cables1 or to intercept data transmissions or sensitive information originating from such cables4 7,c7 ,the potential for espionage or malicious cyber activity by repair vessels that are owned1 controlled1 or operated by state-owned entities of the ,people's ,republic of ,china and involved in the construction1 maintenance1 or repair of undersea cables4 7,d7 ,the risks1 including an associated assessment1 posed to undersea cables by natural causes1 the lack of geographic undersea diversity of cable landing stations in the ,united ,states1 and accidental damage1 and the extent to which ,united ,states cable operators and telecommunications companies rely on repair vessels that are owned1 controlled1 or operated by state-owned entities of the ,people's ,republic of ,china4 7,e7 ,past1 ongoing1 or planned actions of the ,department and the ,commission to conduct outreach to allies and partners of the ,united ,states relating to countering the security threats posed to commercial undersea telecommunications cables of such allies and partners by the ,people's ,republic of ,china1 the ,russian ,federation1 the ,islamic ,republic of ,iran1 and any foreign entity of concern4 7,f7 ,current mechanisms in place within the ,department1 the ,commission1 and the private sector to detect1 prevent1 suppress1 investigate1 mitigate1 and respond to any acts or threats referred to in subparagraph 7,a7 affecting undersea cables or at cable landing stations in the ,united ,states4 7,g7 ,the resources required for the ,department and ,commission to initiate new1 or expand existing1 operations to protect undersea cables from acts of espionage1 cybersecurity threats1 or physical damage or disruption1 including the cutting of undersea cables1 and to protect cable landing stations in the ,united ,states from vandalism1 sabotage1 or related terrorism threats4 7,h7 ,recommendations for expanding operations by the ,department and the ,commission to protect undersea cables from acts of espionage1 cybersecurity threats1 or physical damage or disruption1 including the cutting of undersea cables1 and to protect cable landing stations in the ,united ,states from vandalism1 sabotage1 or related terrorism threats1 including an assessment of the feasibility of the following3 7i7 ,establishing an interagency and public-private coordination and incident and threat reporting mechanism to ensure the security1 resiliency1 and integrity of undersea cables and the protection of cable landing stations in the ,united ,states4 7ii7 ,training a dedicated intelligence officer or analyst cadre of the ,department composed of undersea cable experts to ensure the security1 resiliency1 and integrity of undersea cables and the protection of cable landing stations in the ,united ,states4 7,i7 ,recommendations for the ,department1 the ,commission1 private sector partners1 and ,federal1 ,state1 local1 ,tribal1 and territorial partners to jointly develop and establish standards1 guidelines1 best practices1 methodologies1 procedures1 or processes to ensure the security1 resiliency1 and integrity of undersea cables and the protection of cable landing stations in the ,united ,states4 7,j7 ,the benefits and drawbacks1 and associated analysis1 of designating the ,department of ,homeland ,security as the lead ,federal entity responsible for ensuring the security1 resiliency1 and integrity of undersea cables and the protection of cable landing stations in the ,united ,states4 7#c7 ,form ,the report under paragraph 7#a7 shall be submitted in classified form1 but may include an unclassified annex4 7c7 ,briefing ,not later than #cj days after the submission of the report under paragraph 7#a71 the working group shall provide to the appropriate congressional committees a briefing on the findings and recommendations contained in such report4 7d7 ,definitions ,in this section3 7#a7 ,appropriate congressional committees ,the term appropriate congressional committees means-- 7,a7 the ,committee on ,homeland ,security and the ,committee on ,energy and ,commerce of the ,house of ,representatives2 and 7,b7 the ,committee on ,homeland ,security and ,governmental ,affairs and the ,committee on ,commerce1 ,science1 and ,transportation of the ,senate4 7#b7 ,cybersecurity threat ,the term cybersecurity threat has the meaning given such term in section #bbjj of the ,homeland ,security ,act of #bjjb 7#f ,u4,s4,c4 #fej74 7#c7 ,foreign entity of concern ,the term foreign entity of concern has the meaning given such term in section #iija of the ,william ,m4 7,mac7 ,thornberry ,national ,defense ,authorization ,act for ,fiscal ,year #bjba 7#ae ,u4,s4,c4 #dfea74 7#d7 ,intelligence community ,the term intelligence community has the meaning given such term in section #c7d7 of the ,national ,security ,act of #aidg 7#ej ,u4,s4,c4 #cjjc7d774 7#e7 ,malicious cyber activity ,the term malicious cyber activity means activities1 other than those authorized by or in accordance with ,united ,states law1 that seek to compromise or impair the confidentiality1 integrity1 or availability of computers1 information or communications systems1 networks1 physical or virtual infrastructure controlled by computers or information systems 7as such term is defined in section #bbjj of the ,homeland ,security ,act of #bjjb 7#f ,u4,s4,c4 #fej771 or information resident thereon4 7#f7 ,sector risk management agency ,the term ,sector ,risk ,management ,agency has the meaning given such term in section #bbjj of the ,homeland ,security ,act of #bjjb 7#f ,u4,s4,c4 #fej74