,,ii #aagth ,,congress #ast ,session ,s4 #fjd ,,in ,,the ,,senate ,,of ,,the ,,united ,,states ,march #d1 #bjba,mr4 ,warner 7for himself1 ,mr4 ,menendez1 ,mr4 ,schumer1 ,mr4 ,young1 ,mr4 ,cornyn1 ,mr4 ,sasse1 ,mr4 ,rubio1 and ,mr4 ,bennet7 introduced the following bill2 which was read twice and referred to the ,committee on ,foreign ,relations ,a ,,bill ,to authorize the establishment of a ,technology ,partnership among democratic countries1 and for other purposes4 #a4 ,short title ,this ,act may be cited as the ,democracy ,technology ,partnership ,act4 #b4 ,findings ,congress finds the following3 7#a7 ,the #bast century will increasingly be defined by economic competition rooted in technological advances4 ,leaders in adopting emerging technologies1 such as artificial intelligence1 quantum computing1 biotechnology1 and next-generation telecommunications1 and those who shape the use of such technologies1 will garner economic1 military1 and political strength for decades4 7#b7 ,these technologies offer opportunities for the empowerment of citizens1 but also and challenges to basic norms of democratic governance and internationally recognized human rights4 ,the collection and analysis of data from individuals allows governments to know more about their residents' behaviors1 preferences1 interests1 and activities than was possible years ago4 ,the concentration of this data in key technologies1 such as smart phones1 search databases1 and facial recognition databases1 along with the sharing of data among governments1 creates pressing concerns about individuals' scope to exercise their fundamental political and social rights4 7#c7 ,this challenge arises as the integrity and efficacy of post-,world ,war ,,ii international institutions are increasingly challenged4 ,new approaches to multilateral cooperation and arrangements are needed to tackle the challenges ahead to ensure that the ,united ,states continues to lead in critical technologies4 7#d7 ,as information and communications technologies have matured and increasingly mediate large swathes of social1 political and economic activity1 it is incumbent on democratic governments to address the ways in which these technologies have undermined democratic values1 consumer protections1 and social cohesion4 ,moreover1 as authoritarian regimes increasingly shape and deploy technologies to bolster repression1 stifle free expression1 and interfere with free and fair elections in other countries1 the world's advanced democracies will need to shape technology standards so that emerging and critical technologies reflect democratic values1 including freedom of expression and privacy4 7#e7 ,technological leadership by the world's major liberal-democratic nations collectively will be essential to safeguarding democratic institutions1 norms1 and values1 and contributing to global peace and prosperity1 especially as authoritarian governments seek to promote closed information systems and technology that is not interoperable1 often through trade and investment practices that are incompatible with global norms4 ,a unified approach by like-minded nations is needed to counteract growing investments in1 and deployments of1 emerging technologies by authoritarian powers4 7#f7 ,in addition to the development of emerging technologies1 democratic nations must lead in shaping expectations for the responsible use of such technologies and push back against laissez faire approaches and authoritarian interests on internet governance advanced in multilateral forums by-- 7,a7 advocating against efforts to criminalize or limit political dissent and freedom of speech online1 such as those spearheaded by the ,russian ,federation1 which seek to undermine the ,council of ,europe's ,convention on ,cybercrime1 done at ,budapest ,november #bc1 #bjja1 in favor of a statist alternative2 and 7,b7 prioritizing protections for elections1 and other processes essential for healthy democracies1 from cyber-attack4 7#g7 ,the world's leading democracies must also confront new challenges to their market-driven economic systems to ensure their continued leadership in technology and innovation4 ,the ,people's ,republic of ,china 7referred to in this ,act as the ,,prc7 is pursuing an industrial policy to achieve dominance in key technologies1 including #e;,g1 artificial intelligence 7referred to in this section as ,,ai71 quantum computing1 hypersonics1 biotechnology1 space capabilities1 and autonomous vehicles4 7#h7 ,the ,,prc seeks to use technological superiority for national security1 military-civil fusion1 and economic gains1 according to its strategic plans1 including-- 7,a7 the ,made in ,china #bjbe strategy2 7,b7 the ,five-,year ,plan for ,standardization and ,china ,standards #bjce2 7,c7 the #bjjf ,medium-to-,long ,term ,s,t ,plan2 7,d7 the #bjaj ,state ,council ,decision on ,accelerating the ,development of ,strategic ,emerging ,industries2 and 7,e7 the #acth ,five-,year ,plan for the ,development of ,strategic ,emerging ,industries4 7#i7 ,the ,,prc seeks to advance in areas in which democratic countries currently have a technological advantage and move ahead in emerging technologies where ,china seeks a unique opportunity to overtake such countries4 7#aj7 ,for many years1 the ,,prc has pursued industrial policies and discriminatory trade practices that include-- 7,a7 heavily subsidizing ,chinese companies1 restricting foreign competition1 conducting forced technology transfers1 and using both licit and illicit means to access research and development around technologies in order to advantage ,chinese companies in specific technology fields2 7,b7 providing significant government funding for research and development in the ,,prc in specific technologies to build future competitiveness2 7,c7 seeking to ensure global adoption of ,chinese technologies1 and the success of ,chinese firms1 especially in emerging and strategic markets1 through significant foreign direct investment1 low-cost financing and comprehensive services for foreign development projects1 through initiatives such as the ,belt and ,road ,initiative1 which includes the ,digital ,silk ,road and the ,health ,silk ,road1 as well as the ,smart ,city ,initiative1 efforts centered on promoting the use of ,chinese exports by offering far cheaper rates and bundling these deals into larger development and aid packages2 7,d7 aiding the adoption of ,chinese-led standards for digital technologies and products through compensating ,chinese firms that submit standards and flooding forums with technical experts2 and 7,e7 leveraging the international standard setting bodies to advance the vision of the ,,prc regarding standards and technologies4 7#aa7 ,as a result of these practices in support of ,chinese companies1 the ,,prc is increasing its influence in ,,ai1 #e;,g1 and a wide range of other science and technology disciplines that constitute long-term economic and security threats to the ,united ,states1 its allies1 and like-minded partners4 ,according to market research firm ,dell',oro ,group1 ,huawei's share of worldwide telecommunications revenue equipment grew from #bj percent in #bjad to #ca percent in #bjbj4 7#ab7 ,while the ,united ,states semiconductor industry is the worldwide industry leader with approximately #ej percent of global market share and sales of #aic1jjj1jjj1jjj in #bjai1 the situation may be changing4 ,in #bjai1 all #f of the new semiconductor fabrication plants that opened worldwide were located outside of the ,united ,states1 with #d of these plants built in ,china4 ,the ,government of the ,,prc plans to spend #aej1jjj1jjj1jjj on its computer chip industry during the next #aj years4 7#ac7 ,the ,,prc uses technologies1 such as ,,ai1 facial recognition1 and biometrics1 to increase control over its population1 facilitating mass surveillance1 scalable censorship1 and technology-enabled social control1 including against ethnic and religious minorities including ,tibetans1 ,uyghurs1 ethnic ,kazakhs1 ,kyrgyz1 and members of other ,muslim minority groups4 7#ad7 ,the ,,prc uses its economic power to coerce and censor companies1 individuals1 and countries4 7#ae7 ,in the past decade1 the ,government of the ,,prc-- 7,a7 blocked exports of rare earth elements to ,japan2 7,b7 threatened to curtail domestic sales of ,german cars2 7,c7 cut off tourism to ,south ,korea2 7,d7 restricted banana imports from the ,philippines2 and 7,e7 imposed large tariffs on ,australian barley exports4 7#af7 ,the ,government of the ,,prc-- 7,a7 has banned ,united ,states technology companies1 including ,facebook1 ,google1 and ,twitter2 7,b7 has pressured movie studios based in the ,united ,states to alter content in movies that it deemed objectionable2 and 7,c7 has retaliated against a range of ,american companies for actual or perceived support for a range of political positions1 including recognizing territorial claims of countries in border disputes with ,china1 recognizing ,tibet1 and more4 7#ag7 ,third countries have become particular targets of ,chinese investments in technology4 ,these third-country investments provide access to innovation1 data that allows ,chinese companies to refine their own systems1 and influence over the policies of these governments4 ,the terms on which ,chinese investments are made often are attractive in the short-term but create conditions for ,chinese ownership of1 or influence over1 major industries in those countries4 7#ah7 ,after decades of being the world leader in key technologies1 the ,united ,states is at risk of falling behind the ,,prc in key technologies of the future4 ,while private-sector research and development investments have steadily increased in the ,united ,states1 ,federal ,government spending has declined as a percentage of ,gross ,domestic ,product from approximately #a4b percent in #aigf to approximately #j4g percent in #bjah4 ,the decline has been even steeper in the physical sciences4 ,the ,federal ,government plays a unique and critical role in ,america's innovation ecosystem4 ,government research and development spending spurs private-sector investments1 and the ,united ,states ,government remains the largest source of basic research funding1 which is foundational to game-changing technological achievements4 7#ai7 ,during the past several years1 the ,,prc has quadrupled its research and development spending and is on the brink of surpassing the ,united ,states in total investments in key technologies1 with its growth in research and development spending doubling the ,united ,states ,government's spending increase in this area4 ,chinese patent publications have surged in the fields of artificial intelligence1 machine learning1 and deep learning4 7#bj7 ,the ,united ,states is highly dependent on ,china for key components of critical technologies in its supply chains1 such as rare earths4 7#ba7 ,the ,united ,states remains a leader in the science and technology areas of engineering and biology as well as key components1 including telecommunications equipment and semiconductors4 ,the ,united ,states does not have a domestic manufacturer of radio access network equipment for #e;,g networks1 but is well-positioned to lead in #f;,g telecommunications1 which depend on software and semiconductors1 areas of ,united ,states strength4 7#bb7 ,other countries have unique knowledge1 expertise1 and capabilities in numerous cutting edge technologies1 including semiconductor manufacturing equipment1 such as extreme ultraviolet lithography machines for semiconductor fabrication and machine tools for fabrication of custom components4 ,in order to successfully compete against the ,,prc1 the ,united ,states must partner with such countries4 7#bc7 ,the private sector in the ,united ,states and partner countries1 including ,japan1 ,korea1 ,australia1 ,new ,zealand1 the ,united ,kingdom1 and the ,european ,union has considerable expertise in both technology and in standard setting1 given the role of the private sector in international standard setting bodies1 but this expertise can be better leveraged in shaping ,united ,states technology policy4 #c4 ,sense of ,congress ,it is the sense of ,congress that-- 7#a7 emerging technology governance regimes driven by undemocratic governments that do not reflect democratic values are gaining traction internationally through coercive1 diplomatic1 and unfair economic1 trade1 and development practices2 7#b7 the ,united ,states is failing to lead international efforts or prioritize multilateral coordination1 institutions1 and legal compatibility in the area of technology governance1 ceding leadership to authoritarian regimes and risking the growth of anti-democratic norms and standards around technologies2 and 7#c7 promoting greater coordination1 common functional problem-solving institutional mechanisms1 and more compatible legal regimes among democratic nations is essential to create an international technology governance architecture that benefits all nations and effectively counters and contains nondemocratic governance regimes4 #d4 ,statement of policy ,it shall be the policy of the ,united ,states to lead in the creation of a new multilateral diplomatic architecture for technology policy composed of the world's tech-leading democracies4 #e4 ,international ,technology ,partnership ,office at the ,department of ,state 7a7 ,establishment ,the ,secretary of ,state shall establish an interagency-staffed ,international ,technology ,partnership ,office 7referred to in this section as the ,office71 which shall be housed in the ,department of ,state4 7b7 ,leadership 7#a7 ,special ambassador ,the ,office shall be headed by the ,special ,ambassador for ,technology1 who shall-- 7,a7 be appointed by the ,president1 by and with the advice and consent of the ,senate2 7,b7 have the rank and status of ambassador2 and 7,c7 report to the ,secretary of ,state1 unless otherwise directed by the ,secretary of ,state4 7#b7 ,directors ,the ,secretary of ,commerce and the ,secretary of the ,treasury shall each appoint1 from within their respective departments1 directors for ,international ,technology ,partnership1 who also shall serve as liaisons between the ,office and the ,department of ,commerce or the ,department of the ,treasury1 as applicable4 7c7 ,membership ,in addition to the leaders referred to in subsection 7b71 the ,office shall include a representative or expert detailee from key ,federal agencies1 as determined by the ,special ,ambassador for ,technology4 7d7 ,purposes ,the purposes of the ,office shall include-- 7#a7 creating an international technology partnership of democratic countries to develop harmonized technology governance regimes and to fill gaps where ,united ,states capabilities are currently insufficient1 with a specific focus on key technologies1 including-- 7,a7 artificial intelligence and machine learning2 7,b7 #e;,g telecommunications and other advanced wireless networking technologies2 7,c7 semiconductor chip manufacturing2 7,d7 biotechnology2 7,e7 quantum computing2 7,f7 surveillance technologies1 including facial recognition technologies and censorship software2 and 7,g7 fiber optic cables2 7#b7 vigorously identifying existing and1 as needed1 new multilateral mechanisms to advance the objectives of the ,international ,technology ,partnership around technology governance that advances democratic values2 7#c7 coordinating with such countries regarding shared technology strategies1 including technology controls and standards1 as informed by the reports required under section #h2 and 7#d7 developing strategies with partner countries for coordinated1 development and financial support for the acquisition by key countries of the technologies listed in paragraph 7#a71 or comparable technologies1 in order to provide alternatives for those countries to systems supported by authoritarian regimes4 7e7 ,special hiring authorities ,the ,secretary of ,state may-- 7#a7 hire support staff for the ,office1 in accordance with section #cjc of the ,foreign ,service ,act of #aihj 7#bb ,u4,s4,c4 #cidc72 and 7#b7 hire individuals to serve as experts or consultants for the ,office1 in accordance with section #caji of title #e1 ,united ,states ,code4 #f4 ,international ,technology ,partnership 7a7 ,partnership criteria ,the ,special ,ambassador for ,technology 7referred to in this section as the ,special ,ambassador7 shall seek to establish an ,international ,technology ,partnership with foreign countries that have-- 7#a7 democratic national government and a strong commitment to democratic values1 including an adherence to the rule of law1 freedom of speech1 and respect for and promotion of human rights1 including the right to privacy2 7#b7 an economy with advanced technology sectors2 and 7#c7 a demonstrated record of trust or an expressed interest in international cooperation and coordination with the ,united ,states on important defense and intelligence issues4 7b7 ,political and economic unions ,the ,international ,technology ,partnership may include relevant political and economic unions4 7c7 ,objectives ,the ,special ,ambassador1 in cooperation with ,international ,technology ,partnership participants1 shall pursue1 as appropriate1 through memoranda of understanding1 executive agreements1 free trade agreements1 and existing multilateral channels-- 7#a7 coordination of technology policies and standards among ,international ,technology ,partnership countries through participation in international standard setting bodies1 such as the ,united ,nations ,group of ,governmental ,experts1 ,world ,trade ,organization1 the #crd ,generation ,partnership ,project1 and the ,international ,telecommunications ,union1 including pre-attendance meetings1 education1 and panels to report on issues2 7#b7 coordination of policies with the private sector to ensure private sector led1 politically neutral1 standards processes2 7#c7 the adoption of shared data privacy1 data sharing1 and data archiving standards among the ,united ,states and partner countries and relevant economic and political unions1 including harmonized data protection regulations2 7#d7 the creation of coordinated policies for the use and control of emerging and foundational technologies through-- 7,a7 use restrictions and export controls2 7,b7 investment screening coordination1 including the harmonization of technology-transfer laws1 regulations1 policies1 and practices2 and 7,c7 the development of other arrangements to regulate and control technology transfer2 7#e7 coordination around the resiliency of supply chains in critical technology areas1 with possible diversification of supply chain components among the group1 while-- 7,a7 abiding by transparency obligations related to subsidies and product origin2 7,b7 conducting risk analyses of products manufactured in third party nations that fail to meet established standards similarly2 7,c7 coordinating subsidy policies2 and 7,d7 limiting preferential trade agreements between member countries2 7#f7 the coordination of supply chains regarding semiconductor fabrication through a fabrication research consortium for the semiconductor industry2 7#g7 the facilitation of partnerships and cooperation among and between research universities1 start-up companies1 and other businesses in member countries regarding key technologies1 including the creation of memoranda of understanding regarding science and technology collaboration with member countries and coordinated incentives and subsidies2 7#h7 the coordination of investments and co-financing in targeted countries with the goal of-- 7,a7 promoting secure and resilient digital infrastructure and privacy-enhancing technologies that protect democratic values and create a clear contrast and alternative to the ,,prc through the ,united ,states ,international ,development ,finance ,corporation1 the ,export-,import ,bank of the ,united ,states1 foreign development finance institutions 7including the ,world ,bank and the ,international ,monetary ,fund71 the ,european ,bank for ,reconstruction and ,development1 the ,european ,investment ,bank1 partner country development institutions1 regional banks1 other lending institutions1 or new investment mechanisms2 and 7,b7 seeking to ensure that all funding provided by those institutions1 for any purpose1 should be conditioned upon the protection of democratic values1 and that financing is forbidden to companies involved in the international investment programs of authoritarian or illiberal governments2 and 7#i7 information sharing among partner countries to raise awareness of-- 7,a7 the technology transfer threat posed by authoritarian governments2 and 7,b7 ways in which autocratic regimes are utilizing technology to erode democracies4 7d7 ,working groups ,in carrying out the objectives described in subsection 7c7 with respect to particular technology areas1 the ,special ,ambassador may establish working groups within the ,international ,technology ,partnership1 composed of representatives from partner countries1 including relevant political and economic unions1 to coordinate on discrete strategies and policies related to specific technologies4 #g4 ,international ,technology ,partnership ,fund 7a7 ,establishment ,there is established in the ,treasury of the ,united ,states a trust fund1 which shall be known as the ,international ,technology ,partnership ,fund 7referred to in this section as the ,fund74 7b7 ,deposits 7#a7 ,federal appropriations ,there is authorized to be appropriated #e1jjj1jjj1jjj for the ,fund4 7#b7 ,donations ,in addition to amounts appropriated for the ,fund pursuant to paragraph 7#a71 the ,secretary of the ,treasury may accept donations from ,international ,technology ,partnership member countries4 7c7 ,use of funds ,subject to subsection 7d71 amounts deposited into the ,fund may be used by the ,secretary of ,state1 in consultation with the ,international ,technology ,partnership and other relevant ,federal agencies1 to support-- 7#a7 joint research projects between government research agencies1 universities1 technology companies1 and other businesses from ,international ,technology ,partnership member countries2 and 7#b7 technology investments in third-country markets4 7d7 ,notification requirement ,the obligation of funds under subsection 7c7 is subject to the notification requirement set forth in section #fcd;,a of the ,foreign ,assistance ,act of #aifa 7#bb ,u4,s4,c4 #bcid-a74 7e7 ,public-,private board 7#a7 ,establishment ,there is hereby established an ,international ,technology ,partnership ,advisory ,board 7referred to in this subsection as the ,board71 which shall provide the ,international ,technology ,partnership ,office with advice and recommendations concerning the implementation of this ,act4 7#b7 ,membership ,the ,board shall be composed of individuals-- 7,a7 with demonstrated expertise in the fields of emerging technologies and international trade2 and 7,b7 come from the private sector1 academic institutions1 national and international human rights organizations1 and technology research institutions4 #h4 ,department of ,state reporting requirements 7a7 ,national strategy for technology and national security ,not later than #a year after the date of the enactment of this ,act1 the ,secretary of ,state1 in consultation with other relevant ,federal agencies1 shall submit an unclassified report to the ,committee on ,foreign ,relations of the ,senate and the ,committee on ,foreign ,affairs of the ,house of ,representatives1 with a classified index1 if necessary1 that outlines a national strategy for technology and national security1 which-- 7#a7 assesses the emerging and foundational technologies of the future2 7#b7 identifies the current capabilities of the ,united ,states in critical technologies and its components1 including any gaps in such capabilities2 7#c7 identifies the technology capabilities 7horizon scanning and technology forecasting7 among allied and partner countries2 7#d7 identifies governance models for emerging and foundational technologies being adopted by other countries and other areas of global policy convergence where the ,united ,states should better pursue multilateralism or coordination2 7#e7 identifies a preliminary set of priority technology areas on which the ,international ,technology ,partnership should be focused2 7#f7 analyzes the current capabilities of the ,,prc in critical technologies and components1 including any gaps in such capabilities2 and 7#g7 includes a set of recommendations for-- 7,a7 rapidly enhancing ,united ,states technological capabilities2 7,b7 how the ,united ,states should collaborate with allied or like-minded countries1 identifying existing and1 as needed1 new multilateral mechanisms to fill capability gaps and areas for the ,united ,states to advance democratic values2 and 7,c7 the criteria for determining which countries should be included in the ,international ,technology ,partnership1 including a strong commitment to democratic values and a history of working closely with the ,united ,states1 as reflected in ,department of ,state reports regarding human rights and media freedom4 7b7 ,standards and governance regimes ,not later than #a year after the date of the enactment of this ,act1 the ,secretary of ,state shall submit a report to the ,committee on ,foreign ,relations of the ,senate and the ,committee on ,foreign ,affairs of the ,house of ,representatives that assesses other countries' standards and governance regimes for privacy1 human rights1 consumer protection1 and free expression to supplement the criteria recommended pursuant to subsection 7a77#g77;,c74