,,ii  #aagth ,,congress  #ast ,session  
,s4 #caib  ,,in ,,the ,,senate ,,of     
,,the ,,united ,,states  ,november #d1  
#bjba,mr4 ,risch 7for himself1 ,mr4     
,crapo1 ,mr4 ,hagerty1 ,mr4 ,cornyn1    
,mr4 ,rubio1 and ,mr4 ,romney7          
introduced the following bill2 which was
 read twice and referred to the         
,committee on ,foreign ,relations  ,a   
,,bill  ,to advance a policy to ensure  
peace and security across the ,taiwan   
,strait4  #a4 ,short title2 table of    
contents  7a7 ,short title ,this ,act   
may be cited as the ,taiwan ,deterrence 
,act4  7b7 ,table of contents ,the table
 of contents for this ,act is as        
follows3 ,sec4 #a4 ,short title2 table  
of contents4,sec4 #b4                   
,definitions4,,title ,i--,deterrence    
policy regarding ,taiwan,sec4 #aja4     
,findings4,sec4 #ajb4 ,statement of     
policy4,,title ,,ii--,bolstering ,united
 ,states and ,taiwan defense and        
security,sec4 #bja4 ,report on          
capability development by ,taiwan4,sec4 

#bjb4 ,authorization of appropriations  
for ,foreign ,military ,financing grant 
assistance to ,taiwan4,sec4 #bjc4       
,eligibility of ,taiwan for ,foreign    
,military ,sales and export status under
 the ,arms ,export ,control ,act4,sec4  
#bjd4 ,report on advancing the defense  
of ,taiwan4  #b4 ,definitions ,in this  
,act3 7#a7 ,appropriate congressional   
committees ,the term appropriate        
congressional committees means-- 7,a7   
the ,committee on ,foreign ,relations of
 the ,senate2 and  7,b7 the ,committee  
on ,foreign ,affairs of the ,house of   
,representatives4  7#b7 ,people's       
,liberation ,army2 ,,pla ,the terms     
,people's ,liberation ,army and ,,pla   
mean the armed forces of the ,people's  
,republic of ,china4  7#c7 ,,prc2 ,china
 ,the terms ,,prc and ,china mean the   
,people's ,republic of ,china4  ,i      
,deterrence policy regarding ,taiwan    
#aja4 ,findings ,congress makes the     
following findings3 7#a7 ,taiwan is a   
model democracy in the ,indo-,pacific1  

with open and fair elections1 strong    
market-led economic growth1 and high    
levels of individual freedoms4  7#b7    
,the ,united ,states and ,taiwan share a
 robust unofficial relationship with    
close cooperation on a wide range of    
issues1 including global health1        
economic issues1 military and defense1  
development1 and people-to-people       
exchanges4  7#c7 ,taiwan is a key       
economic partner of the ,united ,states1
 serving as the #ajth largest trading   
partner of the ,united ,states as of    
,october #bjba and home to critical     
high-tech supply chains4  7#d7 ,the     
,people's ,republic of ,china has       
greatly increased its political1        
diplomatic1 economic1 and military      
coercion campaigns across the ,taiwan   
,strait1 especially since #bjaf4  7#e7  
,the ,,prc seeks to annex ,taiwan       
through whatever means may ultimately be
 required4 ,the insistence by the       
,chinese ,communist ,party that         
so-called reunification is ,taiwan's    

only option makes that goal inherently  
coercive4 ,in ,january #bjai1 ,president
 ,xi stated that the ,,prc makes no     
promise to renounce the use of force and
 reserves the option of taking all      
necessary means4 ,taiwan's embodiment of
 democratic values and economic         
liberalism challenges ,president ,xi's  
goal of achieving national rejuvenation4
 ,the ,,prc plans to exploit ,taiwan's  
dominant strategic position in the      
,first ,island ,chain and to project    
power into the ,second ,island ,chain   
and beyond4  7#f7 ,the ,people's        
,liberation ,army has exponentially     
increased its military activity in the  
,taiwan ,strait4 ,as of ,october #bjba1 
the ,ministry of ,national ,defense of  
,taiwan recorded that more than #fjj    
,chinese military sorties have flown    
into the ,air ,defense ,identification  
,zone of ,taiwan in #bjba alone4 ,that  
is an increase of #ej percent compared  
to #bjbj4 ,that same month1 the ,,pla   
made its largest ever air incursion into

 the ,air ,defense ,identification ,zone
 of ,taiwan1 sending almost #aej planes 
in total over a number of days4  7#g7   
,in response1 on ,october #c1 #bjba1 the
 ,department of ,state said it was very 
concerned by the ,people's ,republic of 
,china's provocative military activity  
near ,taiwan1 which is destabilizing1   
risks miscalculations1 and undermines   
regional peace and stability and urged  
,beijing to cease its military1         
diplomatic1 and economic pressure and   
coercion against ,taiwan4  7#h7 ,the    
,,prc has increased the frequency and   
scope of its exercises and operations   
targeting ,taiwan1 such as amphibious   
assault and live-fire exercises in the  
,taiwan ,strait1 ,,pla ,air ,force      
flights that encircle ,taiwan1 and      
flights across the unofficial median    
line in the ,taiwan ,strait4 ,the       
destruction of ,hong ,kong's autonomy by
 the ,government of the ,,prc           
potentially accelerates the timeline of 
a ,taiwan scenario and makes the defense

 of ,taiwan an even more urgent         
priority4  7#i7 ,in ,october #bjba1 the 
,,prc adopted export controls on        
,chinese goods to ,taiwan in an attempt 
to put more economic pressure on        
,taiwan4 ,that follows an increase in   
,,prc tactics to squeeze the economy of 
,taiwan1 including banning certain      
exports and adopting the #ca measures   
policy to induce brain drain on the     
island by providing government-sponsored
 incentives for ,taiwanese talent and   
businesses to move to the mainland4     
7#aj7 ,the ,,prc launches massive cyber 
campaigns against ,taiwan4 ,the         
,department of ,cyber ,security of      
,taiwan estimates that there are        
approximately #bj1jjj1jjj to #dj1jjj1jjj
 cyberattacks every month1 most of which
 are suspected to be by the ,,prc4 ,in  
,july #bjba1 head of the ,department of 
,cyber ,security of ,taiwan ,chien      
,hung-wei told ,united ,states media    
that there was a rather high degree of  
confidence that many attacks originated 

from our neighbor the ,,prc and warned  
that ,taiwan's critical infrastructure1 
such as gas1 water1 and electricity are 
highly digitized1 so ,taiwan can easily 
fall victim4  7#aa7 ,the ,,prc continues
 to isolate ,taiwan diplomatically4 ,the
 ,,prc has refused to allow ,taiwan to  
attend annual summits of international  
organizations such as the ,international
 ,civil ,aviation ,organization1 the    
,international ,criminal ,police        
,organization 7,,interpol71 and the     
,world ,health ,organization4  7#ab7    
,the ,,prc also uses its economic might 
to punish countries who seek closer ties
 with ,taiwan4 ,most recently1 in       
,september #bjba1 the ,,prc denied      
,lithuania certain export licenses after
 ,lithuania and ,taiwan announced their 
intent to establish a ,taiwan           
representative office in the city of    
,vilnius4  7#ac7 ,the ,,prc uses        
economic incentives such as massive     
investment promises to try to formalize 
relations with ,taiwan's remaining      

allies4 ,since #bjaf1 seven             
countries--the ,republic of ,kiribati1  
the ,solomon ,islands1 the ,dominican   
,republic1 ,burkina ,faso1 the ,republic
 of ,el ,salvador1 the ,republic of     
,panama1 and the ,democratic ,republic  
of ,sao ,tome and ,principe--have       
shifted diplomatic recognition from     
,taipei to ,beijing4  7#ad7 ,the ,,prc  
aims to use its growing military might  
in concert with other instruments of its
 national power to displace the ,united 
,states in the ,indo-,pacific and       
establish hegemony over the region4     
,achieving the annexation of ,taiwan is 
a key step for the ,,prc to achieve     
those ambitions4  7#ae7 ,the defense of 
,taiwan is critical to-- 7,a7 retaining 
the credibility of the ,united ,states  
as a defender of the democratic values  
and free-market principles embodied by  
the people and government of ,taiwan2   
7,b7 limiting the ability of the ,,pla  
to project power beyond the ,first      
,island ,chain1 including to ,united    

,states territory1 such as ,guam and    
,hawaii2  7,c7 defending the territorial
 integrity of ,japan2 and  7,d7         
preventing the ,,pla from diverting     
military planning1 resources1 and       
personnel to broader military ambitions4
  #ajb4 ,statement of policy  7a7       
,objectives ,it is the policy of the    
,united ,states1 in ensuring security in
 the ,taiwan ,strait1 to pursue the     
following objectives3 7#a7 ,the balance 
of power in the ,indo-,pacific remains  
favorable to the ,united ,states and its
 allies and partners4 ,the ,united      
,states and its allies and partners     
maintain unfettered access to the region
 and the ,,prc neither dominates the    
region nor coerces its neighbors1       
including ,taiwan4  7#b7 ,the allies and
 partners of the ,united ,states1       
including ,taiwan-- 7,a7 maintain       
confidence in ,united ,states leadership
 and its commitment to the              
,indo-,pacific region2  7,b7 can        
withstand and combat subversion and     

undue influence by the ,,prc2 and  7,c7 
work with the ,united ,states to promote
 shared interests and values in the     
region4  7#c7 ,the combined influence of
 the ,united ,states and its allies and 
partners is strong enough to demonstrate
 to the ,,prc that the risks of attempts
 to annex ,taiwan by coercion or force  
outweigh the potential benefits4  7#d7  
,the ,united ,states deters the ,,prc   
from seeking military or other          
aggressive unilateral action to change  
the status quo on ,taiwan or in the     
,taiwan ,strait4  7b7 ,policy ,it is the
 policy of the ,united ,states1 in      
pursuit of the objectives set forth in  
subsection 7a7-- 7#a7 to prioritize the 
,indo-,pacific region as the most       
important political-military theater for
 ,united ,states foreign policy2  7#b7  
to prioritize resources for achieving   
,united ,states political and military  
objectives in that most critical region2
  7#c7 to sustain the ,taiwan ,relations
 ,act 7#bb ,u4,s4,c4 #ccja et seq47 and 

the ,six ,assurances provided by the    
,united ,states to ,taiwan in ,july     
#aihb as the foundations for ,united    
,states-,taiwan relations2  7#d7 to     
deepen1 to the fullest extent possible1 
the extensive1 close1 and friendly      
relations of the ,united ,states and    
,taiwan1 including cooperation to       
support the development of capable1     
ready1 and modern forces necessary for  
the defense of ,taiwan2  7#e7 to        
encourage and facilitate ,taiwan's      
accelerated acquisition of asymmetric   
defense capabilities1 which are crucial 
to defending the islands of ,taiwan from
 invasion1 including long-range         
precision fires1 anti-ship missiles1    
coastal defense1 anti-armor1 air        
defense1 undersea warfare1 advanced     
command1 control1 communications1       
computers1 intelligence1 surveillance   
and reconnaissance 7,c#d;,,isr71 and    
resilient command and control           
capabilities2  7#f7 to increase the     
conduct of relevant and practical       

training and exercises with the defense 
forces of ,taiwan1 including1 as        
appropriate1 the ,rim of the ,pacific   
exercise1 combined training at ,united  
,states ,army combat training centers   
and the ,united ,states ,marine ,corps  
,air ,ground ,combat ,center1 ,united   
,states ,air ,force ,red ,flag and      
,green ,flag exercises1 and bilateral   
naval exercises and training2  7#g7 to  
use1 in service of the policy described 
in paragraphs 7#e7 and 7#f71 existing   
tools such as foreign military sales and
 direct commercial sales1 identify new  
tools1 including foreign military       
financing for ,taiwan under certain     
conditions1 and explore greater         
industrial cooperation and co-production
 or co-development opportunities2  7#h7 
to prioritize the timely review of and  
response to requests from ,taiwan for   
defense articles and services within the
 ,united ,states acquisition system1 and
 to ensure that such prioritization is  
the top priority of relevant ,cabinet   

officials1 including the ,secretary of  
,state and the ,secretary of ,defense2  
7#i7 to prioritize building the capacity
 of ,taiwan to protect ,united ,states  
defense technology2  7#aj7 to design    
major defense capabilities for export2  
7#aa7 to encourage ,taiwan's domestic   
production of certain defense           
capabilities2  7#ab7 to expand          
professional military education and     
technical training opportunities in the 
,united ,states for military personnel  
of ,taiwan2  7#ac7 to pursue a strategy 
of military engagement with ,taiwan that
 fully integrates exchanges at the      
strategic1 policy1 and functional       
levels2  7#ad7 to increase exchanges    
between senior defense officials and    
general officers of the ,united ,states 
and ,taiwan consistent with the ,taiwan 
,travel ,act 7,public ,law #aae-ace2    
#acb ,stat4 #cda71 especially for the   
purpose of enhancing cooperation on     
defense planning and improving the      
interoperability of the military forces 

of the ,united ,states and ,taiwan2     
7#ae7 to conduct exchanges with ,taiwan 
specifically focused on improving the   
reserve force of ,taiwan and to ensure  
the effectiveness of the ,all-,out      
,defense ,mobilization ,agency2  7#af7  
to deter acts of aggression or coercion 
by the ,,prc against the interests of   
the ,united ,states and its allies1     
especially regarding ,taiwan1 by showing
 ,,prc leaders that the ,united ,states 
can and is willing to deny them the     
ability to achieve their objectives1    
including by-- 7,a7 consistently        
demonstrating the political will of the 
,united ,states to deepening existing   
treaty alliances and growing new        
partnerships as a durable1 asymmetric1  
and unmatched strategic advantage to the
 growing military capabilities and reach
 of the ,,prc2  7,b7 maintaining a      
system of forward-deployed bases in the 
,indo-,pacific region as the most       
visible sign of ,united ,states resolve 
and commitment to the region and as     

platforms to ensure ,united ,states     
operational readiness and advance       
interoperability with allies and        
partners2  7,c7 adopting a more         
dispersed force posture throughout the  
region1 particularly the ,western       
,pacific1 and pursuing maximum access   
for ,united ,states mobile and          
relocatable launchers for long-range    
cruise1 ballistic1 and hypersonic       
weapons throughout the ,indo-,pacific   
region2  7,d7 fielding long-range1      
precision-strike networks to ,united    
,states and allied forces1 including    
ground-launched cruise missiles1        
undersea and naval capabilities1 and    
integrated air and missile defense in   
the ,first ,island ,chain and the       
,second ,island ,chain1 in order to     
impose high risks on the ,,prc for      
operating in those zones and maximize   
the ability of the ,united ,states to   
operate2  7,e7 strengthening extended   
deterrence to demonstrate that          
escalation against key ,united ,states  

interests would be costly1 risky1 and   
self-defeating2 and  7,f7 collaborating 
with allies and partners to accelerate  
their roles in more equitably sharing   
the burdens of mutual defense1 including
 through the acquisition and fielding of
 advanced capabilities and training that
 will better enable them to repel ,,prc 
aggression or coercion2  7#ag7 to       
strengthen and deepen ,united ,states   
alliances and partnerships1 prioritizing
 the ,indo-,pacific region1 by pursuing 
greater bilateral and multilateral      
cooperative initiatives that ensure     
peace and stability in the ,taiwan      
,strait1 advance shared interests1 and  
bolster partner countries' confidence   
that the ,united ,states is and will    
remain a strong1 committed1 and constant
 partner2  7#ah7 to encourage and aid   
,taiwan to boost its own capabilities   
and resiliency to avoid and deter ,,prc 
military pressure in the ,taiwan        
,strait2  7#ai7 to maintain ,united     
,states access to the ,western ,pacific1

 including by-- 7,a7 increasing the     
qualitative advantage of ,united ,states
 forward-deployed forces in the         
,indo-,pacific region2  7,b7 modernizing
 the ,united ,states military through   
investments in existing and new major   
platforms1 emerging technologies1       
critical in-theater force structure and 
enabling capabilities1 operational      
concepts1 and access agreements2 and    
7,c7 operating and conducting exercises 
with allies and partners-- 7i7 to       
prevent the ,,pla from gaining the      
ability to project power and establish  
contested zones within the ,first       
,island ,chain and the ,second ,island  
,chain2  7ii7 to diminish the ability of
 the ,,pla to coerce its neighbors2 and 
7iii7 to maintain open sea and air      
lanes1 particularly in the ,taiwan      
,strait1 the ,east ,china ,sea1 and the 
,south ,china ,sea2  7#bj7 to deter the 
,,prc from-- 7,a7 coercing ,taiwan1     
including by developing more            
combat-credible forces that are         

integrated with ,indo-,pacific allies   
and partners of the ,united ,states in  
contact1 blunt1 and surge layers and    
able to defeat any ,,prc theory of      
victory in the ,first ,island ,chain or 
,second ,island ,chain and beyond1 as   
called for in the #bjah ,national       
,defense ,strategy2  7,b7 using         
gray-zone tactics below the level of    
armed conflict2 or  7,c7 initiating     
armed conflict2 and  7#ba7 to convey to 
the ,,prc that1 in the event that       
deterrence by denial fails1 the ,united 
,states1 if necessary-- 7,a7 will impose
 prohibitive diplomatic1 economic1      
financial1 reputational1 and military   
costs on the ,,prc for its aggression2  
and  7,b7 will defend itself and its    
allies regardless of the point of origin
 of attacks against them4  ,,ii         
,bolstering ,united ,states and ,taiwan 
defense and security  #bja4 ,report on  
capability development by ,taiwan  7a7  
,sense of ,congress ,it is the sense of 
,congress that-- 7#a7 the ,secretary of 

,state should expand and strengthen     
existing measures under the ,united     
,states ,conventional ,arms ,transfer   
,policy to provide capabilities to      
,taiwan1 prioritizing ,taiwan in        
accordance with ,united ,states         
strategic imperatives2  7#b7 the ,united
 ,states should design for export to    
,taiwan capabilities critical to        
maintaining a favorable military balance
 in the region1 including long-range    
precision fires1 air and missile defense
 systems1 anti-ship cruise missiles1    
land attack cruise missiles1            
conventional hypersonic systems1        
intelligence1 surveillance1 and         
reconnaissance capabilities1 and command
 and control systems2  7#c7 the ,united 
,states should pursue1 to the maximum   
extent possible1 anticipatory technology
 security and foreign disclosure policy 
on the systems described in paragraph   
7#b72 and  7#d7 the ,secretary of ,state
 should-- 7,a7 urge ,taiwan to invest in
 sufficient quantities of munitions to  

meet contingency requirements and avoid 
the need for accessing ,united ,states  
stocks in wartime2 and  7,b7 cooperate  
with ,taiwan to deliver such munitions1 
or when necessary1 to increase the      
capacity of ,taiwan to produce such     
munitions4  7b7 ,report  7#a7 ,in       
general ,not later than #ij days after  
the date of the enactment of this ,act1 
the ,secretary of ,state1 in            
coordination with the ,secretary of     
,defense1 shall submit to the           
appropriate congressional committees a  
report that-- 7,a7 describes ,united    
,states priorities for building more    
capable ,taiwan security forces and     
organizations2 and  7,b7 identifies     
statutory1 regulatory1 or other         
obstacles to advancing such priorities4 
7#b7 ,matters to be included ,the report
 required by paragraph 7#a7 shall-- 7,a7
 provide a priority list of defense and 
military capabilities that ,taiwan must 
possess for the ,united ,states to be   
able to achieve its military objectives 

in the ,indo-,pacific region2  7,b7     
identify1 from the list referred to in  
subparagraph 7,a71 the capabilities that
 are best provided1 or can only be      
provided1 by the ,united ,states2  7,c7 
identify-- 7i7 actions required to      
prioritize ,united ,states ,government  
resources and personnel to expedite     
fielding the capabilities identified    
under subparagraph 7,b72 and  7ii7 steps
 needed to fully account for and a plan 
to integrate all means of ,united       
,states foreign military sales1 direct  
commercial sales1 security assistance1  
and all applicable authorities of the   
,department of ,state and the           
,department of ,defense2  7,d7 assess   
the major obstacles to fulfilling       
requirements for ,united ,states        
security assistance for ,taiwan1        
including resources and personnel       
limits1 legislative and policy barriers1
 and factors related to specific partner
 countries2  7,e7 identify limitations  
on the ability of the ,united ,states to

 provide the capabilities described in  
paragraph 7,a71 including the           
capabilities identified under           
subparagraph 7,b71 because of existing  
,united ,states treaty obligations or   
,united ,states statutes1 regulations1  
or other policies2  7,f7 recommend      
changes to existing statutes1           
regulations1 or other policies that     
would reduce or eliminate limitations on
 providing critical capabilities to     
,taiwan2  7,g7 identify requirements to 
streamline the ,international ,traffic  
in ,arms ,regulations under subchapter  
,m of chapter ,i of title #bb1 ,code of 
,federal ,regulations1 that would enable
 more effective delivery of capabilities
 to ,taiwan2  7,h7 recommend            
improvements to the process for         
developing requirements for ,taiwan's   
capabilities2 and  7,i7 recommend other 
statutory1 regulatory1 or policy changes
 that would improve delivery timelines4 
7#c7 ,form ,the report required by      
paragraph 7#a7 shall be submitted in    

unclassified form1 but may include a    
classified annex4  #bjb4 ,authorization 
of appropriations for ,foreign ,military
 ,financing grant assistance to ,taiwan 
7a7 ,taiwan security programs ,in       
addition to amounts otherwise authorized
 to be appropriated for ,foreign        
,military ,financing1 there is          
authorized to be appropriated to the    
,department of ,state for ,taiwan       
,foreign ,military ,finance grant       
assistance programs #b1jjj1jjj1jjj for  
each of fiscal years #bjbc to #bjcb4    
7b7 ,restrictions on ,taiwan ,foreign   
,military ,financing ,amounts authorized
 to be appropriated under subsection 7a7
 shall be available only if-- 7#a7      
,taiwan commits to match spending on a  
dollar-for-dollar basis2 and  7#b7 the  
,united ,states and ,taiwan formally    
agree-- 7,a7 to conduct joint long-range
 planning for capability development2   
and  7,b7 on the expenditure of such    
amounts4  #bjc4 ,eligibility of ,taiwan 
for ,foreign ,military ,sales and export

 status under the ,arms ,export ,control
 ,act ,the ,arms ,export ,control ,act  
7#bb ,u4,s4,c4 #bgea et seq47 is        
amended-- 7#a7 in sections              
#c7;d77#b77;,b71 #c7;d77#c77;,a77i71    
7#c77;d77#e71 #ba7;e77#b77;,a71         
#cf7;b77#a71 #cf7;b77#b71 #cf7;b77#f71  
#cf7;c77#b77;,a71 #cf7;d77#b77;,a71     
#fb7;c77#a71 and #fc7;a77#b71 by        
inserting ,taiwan1 before or ,new       
,zealand each place it appears2  7#b7 in
 section #c7;b77#b71 by inserting the   
,government of ,taiwan1 before or the   
,government of ,new ,zealand2 and  7#c7 
in sections #ba7;h77#a77;,a7 and        
#ba7;h77#b71 by inserting ,taiwan1      
before or ,israel each place it appears4
  #bjd4 ,report on advancing the defense
 of ,taiwan  7a7 ,in general ,not later 
than #ahj days after the date of the    
enactment of this ,act1 and annually    
thereafter for a period of seven years1 
the ,secretary of ,state and the        
,secretary of ,defense shall jointly    
submit to the appropriate congressional 

committees a report on ,taiwan's        
enhancement of its self-defense         
capabilities4  7b7 ,matters ,to be      
included ,each report required by       
subsection 7a7 shall include the        
following3 7#a7 ,an assessment of the   
commitment of ,taiwan to implementing   
the tenets of the ,overall ,defense     
,concept1 and what steps ,taiwan has and
 has not taken to implement those       
tenets4  7#b7 ,an assessment of the     
efforts of ,taiwan to acquire and employ
 within its forces asymmetric           
capabilities1 including-- 7,a7          
long-range precision fires2  7,b7 air   
and missile defense systems2  7,c7      
anti-ship cruise missiles2  7,d7 land   
attack cruise missiles2  7,e7           
conventional hypersonic systems2  7,f7  
mining and countermining capabilities2  
7,g7 intelligence1 surveillance1 and    
reconnaissance capabilities2  7,h7      
command and control systems2 and  7,i7  
any other defense capabilities the      
,secretary of ,state and the ,secretary 

of ,defense jointly determine are       
crucial to the defense of ,taiwan4  7#c7
 ,an evaluation of the balance between  
conventional and asymmetric capabilities
 in the defense force of ,taiwan as of  
the date on which the report is         
submitted4  7#d7 ,an assessment of steps
 by ,taiwan to enhance the overall      
readiness of its defense forces1        
including-- 7,a7 the extent to which    
,taiwan is requiring and providing      
regular training to such forces2  7,b7  
the extent to which such training is    
realistic to the security environment   
,taiwan faces2 and  7,c7 the sufficiency
 of the financial and budgetary         
resources ,taiwan is putting toward     
readiness of such forces4  7#e7 ,an     
assessment of steps by ,taiwan to ensure
 that the ,taiwan ,reserve ,command can 
recruit1 train1 and equip its forces4   
7#f7 ,an evaluation of-- 7,a7 the       
severity of manpower shortages in the   
military of ,taiwan1 including in the   
reserve forces2  7,b7 the impact of such

 shortages in the event of a conflict   
scenario2 and  7,c7 ,taiwan's efforts to
 address such shortages4  7#g7 ,an      
assessment of efforts by ,taiwan to     
boost its civilian defenses1 including  
any informational campaigns to make     
aware the risks of ,taiwan's security   
environment to the population of        
,taiwan4  7#h7 ,an assessment of efforts
 by ,taiwan to secure its critical      
infrastructure1 including in            
transportation1 telecommunications      
networks1 and energy4  7#i7 ,an         
assessment of efforts by ,taiwan to     
enhance its cybersecurity1 including the
 security of civilian government and    
military networks4  7#aj7 ,an assessment
 of any significant gaps in any of the  
matters described in paragraphs 7#a7    
through 7#i7 with respect to which the  
,united ,states assesses that additional
 action is needed4  7#aa7 ,a description
 of cooperative efforts between the     
,united ,states and ,taiwan on the      
matters described in paragraphs 7#a7    

through 7#aj74  7#ab7 ,a description of 
resistance within the ,government of    
,taiwan to implementing the matters     
described in paragraphs 7#a7 through    
7#i7 or to ,united ,states support or   
engagement with regard to those matters4
  7c7 ,form ,the report required by     
subsection 7a7 shall be submitted in    
classified form1 but may include an     
unclassified summary4