,,ii #aagth ,,congress #ast ,session ,s4 #biab ,,in ,,the ,,senate ,,of ,,the ,,united ,,states ,september #cj1 #bjba ,mr4 ,risch introduced the following bill2 which was read twice and referred to the ,committee on ,foreign ,relations ,a ,,bill ,to strengthen ,united ,states oversight of the ,biological ,weapons ,convention and to advance non-proliferation objectives related to biological weapons1 dual-use technologies1 and life sciences research1 and for other purposes4 #a4 ,short title ,this ,act may be cited as the ,biological ,weapons ,policy ,act of #bjba4 #b4 ,definitions ,in this ,act3 7#a7 ,appropriate congressional committees ,the term appropriate congressional committees means-- 7,a7 the ,committee on ,foreign ,relations and the ,committee on ,appropriations of the ,senate2 and 7,b7 the ,committee on ,foreign ,affairs and the ,committee on ,appropriations ,armed ,services of the ,house of ,representatives4 7#b7 ,biological ,weapons ,convention ,the term ,biological ,weapons ,convention means the ,convention on the ,prohibition of the ,development1 ,production and ,stockpiling of ,bacteriological and ,toxin ,weapons and on their ,destruction1 done at ,washington1 ,london1 and ,moscow1 ,april #aj1 #aigb4 7#c7 ,life sciences research ,the term life sciences research-- 7,a7 means research that pertains to living organisms1 including microbes1 human beings1 animals1 and plants1 and their products1 including all disciplines and methodologies of biology such as aerobiology1 agricultural science1 plant science1 animal science1 bioinformatics1 genomics1 proteomics1 synthetic biology1 environmental science1 public health1 modeling1 engineering of living systems1 and all applications of the biological sciences2 and 7,b7 is meant to encompass the diverse approaches for understanding life at the level of ecosystems1 organisms1 organs1 tissues1 cells1 and molecules4 #c4 ,findings ,congress makes the following findings3 7#a7 ,according to the ,department of ,state1 promoting global health security is a core tenant of the ,u4,s4 biodefense strategy because infectious disease threats1 whether naturally occurring1 deliberate1 or accidental1 have the potential to spread globally and affect the ,american people and interests4 7#b7 ,several countries around the world have known or suspected chemical and biological weapons capability or are undertaking research that poses concerns about such nations' compliance with the ,biological ,weapons ,convention1 as documented by the ,united ,states ,department of ,state and the ,united ,nations4 7#c7 ,with respect to the ,russian ,federation1 the ,department of ,state1 in its #bjba report on ,adherence to and ,compliance ,with ,arms ,control1 ,nonproliferation1 and ,disarmament ,agreements and ,commitments1 assessed that the ,russian ,federation 7,russia7 maintains an offensive ,,bw biological weapons program and is in violation of its obligation under ,articles ,i and ,,ii of the ,,bwc ,biological ,weapons ,convention4 7#d7 ,with respect to the ,people's ,republic of ,china1 the ,department of ,state1 also in its #bjba report on ,adherence to and ,compliance ,with ,arms ,control1 ,nonproliferation1 and ,disarmament ,agreements and ,commitments1 assessed that it engaged in activities with dual-use applications1 which raise concerns regarding its compliance with ,article ,i of the ,,bwc4 ,in addition1 the ,united ,states does not have sufficient information to determine whether ,china eliminated its assessed historical biological warfare 7,,bw7 program1 as required under ,article ,,ii of the ,convention4 7#e7 ,the ,people's ,republic of ,china's engagement in biological research that presents dual use concerns1 its professed prioritization of biotechnology and synthetic biology in relevant national strategies1 and evidence that emerged in the midst of the ,,covid-#ai pandemic of collaboration between ostensibly civilian research laboratories in the ,people's ,republic of ,china and the ,people's ,liberation ,army1 has highlighted the imperative of the ,united ,states to monitor closely and conduct diligent oversight of biological research collaboration with the ,people's ,republic of ,china4 7#f7 ,another consideration in the imperative for closer oversight is the ,people's ,republic of ,china's prioritization of military-civil fusion1 which systematically harnesses all civil and commercial research and technology for potential weapons use4 7#g7 ,a potential bioweapons attack or accidental leak of biological research1 especially biological research that could be militarized1 would have devastating human health1 economic1 and geopolitical consequences4 ,while the origins of ,,covid-#ai remain under investigation1 the current pandemic serves as a sobering example of vulnerability and could inspire malign actors4 7#h7 ,the ,department of ,state1 particularly the ,under ,secretary of ,state for ,arms ,control and ,international ,security1 is responsible for developing measures to prevent misuse of advances in the life sciences 7#a ,,fam #deg4c74 ,these challenges require that the ,department of ,state have the lead role in preventing the proliferation of bioweapons and in strengthening relevant oversight mechanisms to mitigate the potential risk of a deliberate or accidental bioweapons event4 #d4 ,statement of policy ,it shall be the policy of the ,united ,states to-- 7#a7 conduct rigorous oversight of public health research and innovation that could be weaponized or serve a dual-use function1 and incorporate national security and nonproliferation considerations and country-specific conditions into decisions regarding international biological1 bacteriological1 virological1 and other relevant research collaboration2 7#b7 ensure that ,united ,states ,government support for public health research and other actions are not inadvertently contributing to the proliferation of biological weapons and dual use technologies in the search for solutions to pressing global health challenges2 and 7#c7 declassify1 to the maximum extent possible1 all intelligence relevant to the ,people's ,republic of ,china's 7,,prc7 compliance or lack of compliance with its obligations under the ,biological ,weapons ,convention 7,,bwc71 and other national security concerns regarding ,,prc life sciences research that falls outside the scope of the ,,bwc4 #e4 ,amendments to ,secretary of ,state authorities 7a7 ,research1 development1 and other studies ,section #cja7;a7 of the ,arms ,control and ,disarmament ,act 7#bb ,u4,s4,c4 #bega7;a77 is amended by inserting biological1 virological1 after bacteriological4 7b7 ,oversight of dual-,use research ,title ,,iii of the ,arms ,control and ,disarmament ,act 7#bb ,u4,s4,c4 #bega et seq47 is amended by inserting after section #cja 7#bb ,u4,s4,c4 #bega7 the following new section3 #cja;,a4 ,authorities with respect to biological dual-use research of concern 7a7 ,oversight of dual-,use research 7#a7 ,in general ,the ,secretary of ,state1 working through ,chiefs of ,mission in each country listed in paragraph 7#b71 as applicable1 shall lead the conduct and completion of a ,country ,team ,assessment to evaluate and determine whether1 for each discrete proposed research project or other collaboration funded or otherwise supported by the ,united ,states ,government that involves life sciences dual-use research of concern1 including research related to biological agents1 toxins1 and pathogens1 aligns with the national interests of the ,united ,states4 ,the ,country ,team ,assessment shall be submitted to the ,secretary of ,state and the head of the ,federal department or agency sponsoring the proposed research or collaboration4 7#b7 ,list of countries specified ,the countries for which a ,country ,team ,assessment1 as described in paragraph 7#a71 must be completed are as follows3 7,a7 ,the ,people's ,republic of ,china4 7,b7 ,the ,russian ,federation4 7,c7 ,the ,islamic ,republic of ,iran4 7,d7 ,the ,democratic ,people's ,republic of ,korea4 7,e7 ,the ,syrian ,arab ,republic4 7,f7 ,any other country specified in the report assessing compliance with the ,biological ,weapons ,convention1 as required by section #djc7;a7 of the ,arms ,control and ,disarmament ,act 7#bb ,u4,s4,c4 #beic;a7a77 in the relevant calendar year4 7b7 ,report on approvals of collaboration ,not later than ,september #cj1 #bjbb1 and annually thereafter for a period of three years1 the ,secretary of ,state1 in consultation with the heads of other relevant ,federal departments and agencies as appropriate1 shall submit to the appropriate committees of ,congress a report describing any research or collaboration described in subsection 7a7 that was approved and the justification for such approval4 7c7 ,report on efficacy of country team assessment ,not later than ,september #cj1 #bjbe1 the ,secretary of ,state1 in coordination with the heads of other relevant ,federal departments and agencies1 shall submit to the appropriate committees of ,congress a report that includes the following elements3 7#a7 ,a summary of the work of the relevant country teams over the previous three years4 7#b7 ,an assessment of whether the country team assessment process described in subsection 7a7 is effective in advancing relevant national interests of the ,united ,states1 and any associated recommendations4 7#c7 ,any other key findings and recommendations1 including for conducting oversight of and improving interagency coordination on the review and monitoring of collaboration with other countries on life sciences research4 7d7 ,definitions ,in this section3 7#a7 ,appropriate committees of ,congress the term appropriate committees of ,congress means-- 7,a7 the ,committee on ,foreign ,relations and the ,committee on ,health1 ,education1 ,labor1 and ,pensions of the ,senate2 and 7,b7 the ,committee on ,foreign ,affairs and the ,committee on ,energy and ,commerce of the ,house of ,representatives4 7#b7 ,life sciences dual-use research of concern defined ,the term life sciences dual-use research of concern means life sciences research that can be reasonably anticipated to provide knowledge1 information1 products1 or technologies that could be directly misapplied to pose a significant threat with broad potential consequences to public health and safety1 national security1 or agricultural crops and other plants1 animals1 the environment1 or materiel4 4 7c7 ,enhancements to the annual compliance report ,section #djc7;a7 of the ,arms ,control and ,disarmament ,act 7#bb ,u4,s4,c4 #beic;a7a77 is amended-- 7#a7 in paragraph 7#e7-- 7,a7 by inserting or the conduct of life sciences research of dual-use concern 7as defined in section #cja;,a71 before including--2 and 7,b7 in subparagraph 7,c71 by striking 2 and and inserting a semicolon2 7#b7 by redesignating paragraph 7#f7 as paragraph 7#g72 and 7#c7 by inserting after paragraph 7#e7 the following new paragraph3 7#f7 a detailed assessment of the national security and proliferation risk of life science research of dual-use concern conducted by the other nations including-- 7,a7 a review of major issues the ,department of ,state is prioritizing with respect to the misuse or potential misuse of life sciences research2 7,b7 a description of all efforts by the ,department of ,state and other relevant departments and agencies to develop and promote measures to prevent misuse or proliferation of advances in the life sciences2 7,c7 an assessment of national level policies1 research initiatives1 or other relevant efforts focused on increasing the pathogenicity1 contagiousness1 or transmissibility of viruses or bacteria1 including initiatives involving or anticipated to involve enhanced potential pandemic pathogens of other nations1 including-- 7i7 the ,people's ,republic of ,china2 7ii7 the ,russian ,federation2 7iii7 the ,islamic ,republic of ,iran2 7iv7 the ,democratic ,people's ,republic of ,korea2 7v7 the ,syrian ,arab ,republic2 7vi7 any other nation identified in paragraphs 7#d7 and 7#e72 and 7vii7 any terrorist group or malign non-state actor2 7,d7 an assessment of whether any of the activities described in subparagraph 7,c7 constitute violations of ,biological ,weapons ,convention or pose related national security concerns2 7,e7 a description of collaboration between ostensibly civilian entities1 including research laboratories1 and military entities on life sciences research2 7,f7 a description of the confidence-building measures or other attempts by the countries described in subparagraph 7,c7 to justify1 clarify1 or explain the activities described in such subparagraph2 7,g7 an assessment of risks to ,united ,states national security and proliferation risks presented by the initiatives described in subparagraph 7,c72 7,h7 a description of all involvement by the ,department of ,state to review ,united ,states ,government funding or other support1 including subgrants1 for life sciences research in other countries that qualifies as dual-use research of concern1 including research related to biological agents1 toxins1 and pathogens2 and 7,i7 a description of all participation in any other ,united ,states ,government and international groups on biosecurity and dual-use research2 2 7#d7 in paragraph 7#g71 as redesignated by paragraph 7#b7 of this subsection1 by striking the period at the end and inserting 2 and2 and 7#e7 by adding at the end the following new paragraph3 7#h7 a description of any obstacles or challenges to the ability of ,united ,states ,government to address the requirements specified in this section1 including a description of gaps in authorities1 intelligence collection and analysis1 organizational responsibilities1 and resources4 4 #f4 ,report on ,united ,states funding for life science research in the ,people's ,republic of ,china 7a7 ,in general ,not later than #ahj days after the date of the enactment of this ,act1 the ,president shall conduct a formal review1 and produce a written report1 of all ,united ,states ,government grants or funding awarded in the past ten years for research collaboration with the ,people's ,republic of ,china related to life sciences1 gain-of-function1 synthetic biology1 biotechnology1 or other research areas that pose potential biological weapons proliferation or dual-use concerns4 7b7 ,elements ,the review required under subsection 7a7 shall analyze-- 7#a7 all such grants and funding requests that were awarded and a detailed project description1 the awardee1 the amount awarded1 any resulting sub-grants to entities under the jurisdiction of the ,people's ,republic of ,china1 and the criteria met for granting approval of funding2 7#b7 the exact procedures used to approve or deny such grants or other funding1 including coordination1 if any1 between agencies responsible for public health preparedness and biomedical research1 including the ,department of ,health and ,human ,services1 and national security agencies1 including the ,department of ,state2 7#c7 an assessment of any gaps in ,united ,states ,government procedures and safeguards to prevent any such research intended for civilian purposes from being diverted for military research in the ,people's ,republic of ,china2 7#d7 an assessment of how to best address any such gaps in procedures and safeguards1 especially regarding greater interagency input from national security agencies1 particularly the ,department of ,state2 7#e7 how the research conducted with the grants and funding requests listed pursuant to paragraph 7#a7 may have contributed to the development of biological weapons in the ,people's ,republic of ,china2 7#f7 how the ,united ,states ,government's understanding of the ,people's ,republic of ,china's military-civil fusion national strategy informed and impacted funding decisions1 and how it will inform future funding decisions in research related to gain-of-function1 synthetic biology1 biotechnology1 or other research areas that pose biological weapons proliferation or dual-use concerns2 7#g7 whether any ,united ,states ,government funding1 including subgrants1 was used to support gain-of-function research in the ,people's ,republic of ,china during the ,united ,states moratorium on such research from #bjad to #bjag2 7#h7 steps taken the by ,united ,states ,government1 if any1 to apply additional scrutiny to ,united ,states ,government funding1 including subgrants1 to support gain-of-function research in the ,people's ,republic of ,china after the ,united ,states ,government lifted the moratorium on gain-of-function research in #bjag2 and 7#i7 any other relevant matter discovered during the course of the review4 7c7 ,report submission ,within #ae days of the completion of the report required under subsection 7a71 the ,president shall submit the report to-- 7#a7 the ,committee on ,foreign ,relations of the ,senate2 7#b7 the ,committee on ,health1 ,education1 ,labor1 and ,pensions of the ,senate2 7#c7 the ,committee on ,armed ,services of the ,senate2 7#d7 the ,committee on ,foreign ,affairs of the ,house of ,representatives2 7#e7 the ,committee on ,energy and ,commerce of the ,house of ,representatives2 and 7#f7 the ,committee on ,armed ,services of the ,house of ,representatives4 7d7 ,form of report ,the report shall be unclassified1 but may include a classified annex4 #g4 ,government accountability office report on oversight of international life sciences research collaboration 7a7 ,in general ,not later than one year after the date of the enactment of this ,act1 the ,comptroller ,general of the ,united ,states shall submit a report to the appropriate congressional committees on the following matters3 7#a7 ,an audit of ,united ,states ,government authorities1 policies1 and processes governing cooperation with other nations as relates to life sciences research that could be weaponized or pose dual-use concerns1 such as pathogens or toxins1 synthetic biology1 and related emerging technologies1 and the degree to which these authorities1 policies1 and processes account for national security1 proliferation1 and country-specific considerations in decisions on whether to pursue such collaboration4 7#b7 ,an assessment of the degree of coordination between ,federal departments and agencies responsible for public health preparedness and the governance of biomedical research and ,federal departments and agencies responsible for national security1 especially the ,united ,states ,department of ,state1 to assess and account for security implications of cooperation with other nations on life sciences research4 7b7 ,elements ,the review required under subsection 7a7 shall address the following elements3 7#a7 ,the ,federal department or agencies or other governmental entities that provide funding or other material support for life sciences research1 especially biological research1 with other nations4 7#b7 ,the authorities1 policies1 and processes that currently exist for reviewing1 approving1 and monitoring grant funding or other material support for biological research with other nations1 including a description of all the steps involved reviewing1 approving1 and monitoring such funding or other support4 7#c7 ,which ,federal departments and agencies1 including specific bureaus and offices1 are involved in the authorities1 policies1 and processes described in paragraph 7#b74 7#d7 ,the circumstances under which ,federal departments and agencies apply enhanced review1 monitoring1 and coordination to proposed collaboration1 as well as an analysis of the extent to which and how national security1 proliferation1 or country-specific considerations1 such as a nation's adherence to the ,biological ,weapons ,convention1 are among the circumstances that trigger enhanced scrutiny of whether the ,united ,states ,government should fund a particular research program4 7#e7 ,the information required to be included in an application for ,united ,states ,government funding of life sciences research to address potential national security1 proliferation1 or country-specific concerns1 and whether the information required varies across departments and agencies4 7#f7 ,the extent to which ,federal departments and agencies with national security responsibilities have visibility into the information described in paragraph 7#e7 prior to an award being made1 even if grantees are applying to funding from another ,federal department or agency4 7#g7 ,the processes and timeline by which funds are issued to the awardee or awardees after a grant or other funding award is made1 and to what extent these funds are monitored for national security implications thereafter1 including how ,federal departments and agencies with national security responsibilities are involved in monitoring such research after funds are awarded4 7c7 ,report submission ,within #ae days of the completion of the report required under subsection 7a71 the ,president shall submit the report to-- 7#a7 the ,committee on ,foreign ,relations1 the ,committee on ,health1 ,education1 ,labor1 and ,pensions1 and the ,committee on ,armed ,services of the ,senate2 and 7#b7 the ,committee on ,foreign ,affairs1 the ,committee on ,energy and ,commerce1 and the ,committee on ,armed ,services of the ,house of ,representatives4 7d7 ,form of report ,the report required under subsection 7a7 shall be submitted in unclassified form1 but may include a classified annex4 #h4 ,prohibition with respect to certain types of life sciences research ,no ,federal funds may be obligated or expended for the purpose of conducting research that increases the pathogenicity1 contagiousness1 or transmissibility of viruses or bacteria1 including any research anticipated to involve enhanced potential pandemic pathogens1 if such research involves a foreign entity that is subject to the jurisdiction of any of the following countries3 7#a7 ,the ,people's ,republic of ,china4 7#b7 ,the ,russian ,federation4 7#c7 ,the ,islamic ,republic of ,iran4 7#d7 ,the ,democratic ,people's ,republic of ,korea4 7#e7 ,the ,syrian ,arab ,republic4 7#f7 ,any other country specified in the report assessing compliance with the ,biological ,weapons ,convention1 as required by section #djc7;a7 of the ,arms ,control and ,disarmament ,act 7#bb ,u4,s4,c4 #beic;a7a77 in the relevant calendar year4 #i4 ,biological and ,toxin ,weapons ,review ,conference 7a7 ,statement of policy ,in order to promote international peace1 and security1 it is the policy of the ,united ,states to pursue adherence to the ,biological ,weapons ,convention and accountability for violations thereof1 including as described in subsections 7b7 and 7c74 7b7 ,activities in advance of the ,ninth ,review ,conference of the ,biological ,weapons ,convention ,before the ,ninth ,review ,conference of the #aigb ,convention on the ,prohibition of the ,development1 ,production and ,stockpiling of ,bacteriological 7,biological7 and ,toxin ,weapons and on their ,destruction 7in this subsection referred to as the ,conference71 the ,president shall carry out the following activities3 7#a7 ,demand greater transparency from the ,government of the ,people's ,republic of ,china regarding the dual-use applications of its life science research1 which raise concerns regarding its compliance with ,article ,i of the ,biological ,weapons ,convention4 7#b7 ,engage with other governments1 the private sector 7including in relevant life sciences and technology fields71 and other stakeholders1 as appropriate1 on ,united ,states concerns about the ,people's ,republic of ,china's compliance with the ,biological ,weapons ,convention1 and the national security1 public health1 and non-proliferation implications of these concerns4 7#c7 ,emphasize that the ,people's ,republic of ,china's national strategy of military-civil fusion undermines the underlying utility1 purposes1 and enforceability of the ,biological ,weapons ,convention1 which may not adequately capture the full range of dual-use biotechnologies being pursued by the ,people's ,republic of ,china4 7c7 ,security ,council complaint ,if the questions and concerns raised in subsection 7b7 are not adequately addressed1 the ,president should consider lodging a complaint to the ,security ,council pursuant to ,article ,,vi of the ,convention4 #aj4 ,annual report by the ,united ,states ,agency for ,international ,development 7a7 ,in general ,not later than #ahj days after the date of enactment of this ,act1 and annually thereafter for seven years1 the ,administrator of the ,united ,states ,international ,development shall submit to the appropriate congressional committees a report describing all engagements and funding1 including subgrants1 for life sciences research involving or related to the study of pathogens1 viruses1 and toxins provided to entities subject to the jurisdiction of countries listed in subsection 7b71 to include a national security justification for such engagements and funding4 7b7 ,list of countries specified ,the countries to be covered by the report required in subsection 7a7 are as follows3 7#a7 ,the ,people's ,republic of ,china4 7#b7 ,the ,russian ,federation4 7#c7 ,the ,islamic ,republic of ,iran4 7#d7 ,the ,democratic ,people's ,republic of ,korea4 7#e7 ,the ,syrian ,arab ,republic4 7#f7 ,any other country specified in the report assessing compliance with the ,biological ,weapons ,convention1 as required by section #djc7;a7 of the ,arms ,control and ,disarmament ,act 7#bb ,u4,s4,c4 #beic;a7a77 in the relevant calendar year4 7c7 ,form ,the report required under subsection 7a7 shall be submitted in unclassified form1 but may include a classified annex4 #aa4 ,united ,nations agencies1 programs1 and funds 7a7 ,prohibition ,the ,permanent ,representative of the ,united ,states to the ,united ,nations1 in coordination with the ,united ,states ,representative to the ,world ,health ,assembly1 shall use the voice1 vote1 and influence of the ,united ,states at the ,united ,nations to bar representatives from countries listed in subsection 7b7 from serving in leadership positions within any ,united ,nations specialized agency1 program1 fund1 or treaty organization with a nexus to global health 7including animal health71 biosecurity1 atomic1 biological or chemical weapons1 or food security and agricultural development4 7b7 ,list of countries specified ,the countries to be covered by the report required in subsection 7a7 are as follows3 7#a7 ,the ,people's ,republic of ,china4 7#b7 ,the ,russian ,federation4 7#c7 ,the ,islamic ,republic of ,iran4 7#d7 ,the ,democratic ,people's ,republic of ,korea4 7#e7 ,the ,syrian ,arab ,republic4 7#f7 ,any other country specified in the report assessing compliance with the ,biological ,weapons ,convention1 as required by section #djc7;a7 of the ,arms ,control and ,disarmament ,act 7#bb ,u4,s4,c4 #beic;a7a77 in the relevant calendar year4