,,ii #aagth ,,congress #ast ,session ,s4 #bfjf ,,in ,,the ,,senate ,,of ,,the ,,united ,,states ,august #d1 #bjba,mr4 ,rubio 7for himself and ,ms4 ,cortez ,masto7 introduced the following bill2 which was read twice and referred to the ,committee on ,foreign ,relations ,a ,,bill ,to require an unclassified interagency report on the political influence operations of the ,government of the ,people's ,republic of ,china and the ,chinese ,communist ,party with respect to the ,united ,states1 and for other purposes4 #a4 ,short title ,this ,act may be cited as the ,countering the ,chinese ,government and ,communist ,party's ,political ,influence ,operations ,act4 #b4 ,definitions ,in this ,act3 7#a7 ,appropriate congressional committees ,the term appropriate congressional committees means-- 7,a7 the ,committee on ,appropriations of the ,senate2 7,b7 the ,committee on ,armed ,services of the ,senate2 7,c7 the ,committee on ,foreign ,relations of the ,senate2 7,d7 the ,committee on ,health1 ,education1 ,labor1 and ,pensions of the ,senate2 7,e7 the ,committee on the ,judiciary of the ,senate2 7,f7 the ,select ,committee on ,intelligence of the ,senate2 7,g7 the ,committee on ,banking1 ,housing1 and ,urban ,affairs of the ,senate2 7,h7 the ,committee on ,appropriations of the ,house of ,representatives2 7,i7 the ,committee on ,armed ,services of the ,house of ,representatives2 7,j7 the ,committee on ,education and ,labor of the ,house of ,representatives2 7,k7 the ,committee on ,foreign ,affairs of the ,house of ,representatives2 7,l7 the ,committee on the ,judiciary of the ,house of ,representatives2 7,m7 the ,permanent ,select ,committee on ,intelligence of the ,house of ,representatives2 and 7,n7 the ,committee on ,financial ,services of the ,house of ,representatives4 7#b7 ,political influence operations ,the term political influence operations means the coordinated and often concealed application of disinformation1 press manipulation1 economic coercion1 targeted investments1 corruption1 or academic censorship1 which are often intended-- 7,a7 to coerce and corrupt ,united ,states interests1 values1 institutions1 or individuals2 and 7,b7 to foster attitudes1 behavior1 decisions1 or outcomes in the ,united ,states that support the interests of the ,government of the ,people's ,republic of ,china or the ,chinese ,communist ,party4 #c4 ,statement of policy 7a7 ,findings ,congress finds the following3 7#a7 ,the ,government of the ,people's ,republic of ,china and the ,chinese ,communist ,party employ a wide range of political1 informational1 and economic measures to influence1 coerce1 intimidate1 and undermine the ,united ,states interests and the interests of ,united ,states partners and allies4 7#b7 ,the ,december #bjag ,national ,security ,strategy of the ,united ,states of ,america states1 ,although the ,united ,states seeks to continue to cooperate with ,china1 ,china is using economic inducements and penalties1 influence operations1 and implied military threats to persuade other states to heed its political and security agenda4 7#c7 ,given the economic strength of the ,people's ,republic of ,china and the growing apparatus being used to spread its influence globally1 efforts to promote its authoritarian ideal pose significant and consequential long-term challenges to ,united ,states interests and values4 7#d7 ,the ,government of the ,people's ,republic of ,china and the ,chinese ,communist ,party use overt and covert means to target the political and economic elite1 the media and public opinion1 civil society and academia1 and members of the ,chinese diaspora4 7#e7 ,the ,government of the ,people's ,republic of ,china and the ,chinese ,communist ,party employ an array of government entities1 friendship and exchange organizations1 private entities and businesspeople1 and government-funded foundations1 think tanks1 educational and other projects to carry out political influence operations1 which is often referred to as ,united ,front work4 7#f7 ,according to the ,u4,s4-,china ,economic and ,security ,review ,commission1 ,china uses what it calls ,united ,front work to co-opt and neutralize sources of potential opposition to the policies and authority of its ruling ,chinese ,communist ,party''' ,to carry out its influence activities abroad1 the ,united ,front ,work ,department directs overseas ,chinese work1 which seeks to co-opt ethnic ,chinese individuals and communities living outside ,china1 while a number of other key affiliated organizations guided by ,china's broader ,united ,front strategy conduct influence operations targeting foreign actors and states4 7#g7 ,these political influence operations violate national sovereignty1 and as such1 are fundamentally different from traditional efforts by countries to shape international policy debates and improve their public image through public diplomacy and strategic communications campaigns4 7#h7 ,the aims of the political influence operations of the ,government of the ,people's ,republic of ,china and the ,chinese ,communist ,party are-- 7,a7 to protect the political security of the ,chinese ,communist ,party1 or its ability to exercise an absolute monopoly on political power within the ,people's ,republic of ,china and to increasingly to dominate international politics regarding issues that the ,chinese ,communist ,party deems important2 7,b7 to domestically and globally promote the idea that the ,chinese ,communist ,party's political and economic model is superior to that of democracies2 7,c7 to spread its governance model to other countries and to undermine democracy and free-market economies2 7,d7 to promote the interests of the regime globally2 7,e7 to weaken ,american alliances and partnerships by creating new divisions between them1 or by exacerbating existing ones2 and 7,f7 to foment domestic social and political divisions1 and to exacerbate existing ones1 within democratic countries1 including by undermining popular confidence in democracy and its essential institutions4 7#i7 ,the political influence operations of the ,government of the ,people's ,republic of ,china and the ,chinese ,communist ,party take advantage of the open and democratic nature of the ,united ,states1 including-- 7,a7 constitutional protections for free speech and a free press2 and 7,b7 the desire of some companies or institutions to attract ,chinese investment1 gain access to ,chinese markets1 or attain greater global influence4 7b7 ,sense of ,congress ,it is the sense of ,congress that-- 7#a7 the political influence operations of the ,government of the ,people's ,republic of ,china and the ,chinese ,communist ,party are not soft power intended to persuade1 but sharp power intended-- 7,a7 to penetrate or corrupt democratic countries and undermine democratic institutions and freedoms2 7,b7 to foster attitudes1 behavior1 laws1 and policies favorable to the ,government of the ,people's ,republic of ,china's interest through disinformation1 coercion1 corruption1 and other means2 7,c7 to widen the scope of ,chinese authoritarian influence around the world1 including-- 7i7 to suppress political opposition to the ,chinese ,communist ,party2 and 7ii7 to violate the internationally recognized human and civil rights of both ,chinese and foreign citizens living in countries around the world2 and 7,d7 to undermine the strength of ,american alliances around the world2 and 7#b7 the people of the ,united ,states need reliable and current information-- 7,a7 to identify the key institutions1 individuals1 entities1 and ministries that carry out such operations2 and 7,b7 to distinguish between malign political influence operations intended to undermine core ,american freedoms and democratic institutions1 as opposed to legitimate cultural1 educational1 business1 and people-to-people exchanges that may benefit the ,united ,states and ,china4 7c7 ,statement of policy ,it is the policy of the ,united ,states-- 7#a7 to clearly differentiate between the ,chinese people and culture and the ,government of the ,people's ,republic of ,china and the ,chinese ,communist ,party in official statements1 media messaging1 and policy2 7#b7 to clearly differentiate between legal1 internationally accepted public diplomacy and strategic communications campaigns and illicit activities to undermine democratic institutions or freedoms2 7#c7 to protect ,united ,states citizens and legal residents from malign or coercive political influence operations2 7#d7 to enhance cooperation and coordination with the ,united ,kingdom1 ,australia1 ,canada1 ,new ,zealand1 ,japan1 ,taiwan1 ,singapore1 and the members of the ,european ,union1 whose governments and institutions have faced acute pressure from the political influence operations of the ,government of the ,people's ,republic of ,china and the ,chinese ,communist ,party1 and with other allies throughout the world2 7#e7 to create strategies to ensure that countries in ,africa1 the ,western ,hemisphere1 ,southeast ,asia1 and elsewhere are aware of the ,people's ,republic of ,china's sharp power tactics1 including the ,chinese ,communist ,party's party-to-party training program1 which is designed to instill admiration and emulation of ,beijing's governance model and weaken democracy in these regions1 and provide needed capacity to counter them effectively2 7#f7 to implement more advanced transparency requirements concerning collaboration with ,chinese actors for media agencies1 universities1 think tanks1 and government officials2 7#g7 to use various forums to raise awareness about-- 7,a7 the goals and methods of the political influence operations of the ,government of the ,people's ,republic of ,china and the ,chinese ,communist ,party2 and 7,b7 common patterns and approaches used by ,chinese intelligence agencies or related actors2 7#h7 to require greater transparency for ,confucius ,institutes1 think tanks1 academic programs1 and nongovernmental organizations funded primarily by the ,government of the ,people's ,republic of ,china and the ,chinese ,communist ,party1 or by individuals or public or private organizations with a demonstrable affiliation with the ,government of the ,people's ,republic of ,china and the ,chinese ,communist ,party that are operating in the ,united ,states to register through the ,foreign ,agents ,registration ,act of #aich 7#bb ,u4,s4,c4 #faa et seq47 or a comparable mechanism2 7#i7 to seek ways to increase ,chinese language proficiency among mid-career professionals that do not rely on funding linked to the ,government of the ,people's ,republic of ,china2 7#aj7 to ensure that existing tools are sufficiently screening for the risk of ,chinese influence operations2 and 7#aa7 to create more flexible tools1 as needed1 with the goals of-- 7,a7 screening investments from the ,government of the ,people's ,republic of ,china or sources backed by such government to protect against the takeover of ,united ,states companies by ,chinese state-owned or state-driven entities2 and 7,b7 protecting institutions or business sectors critically important to ,united ,states national security and the viability of democratic institutions4 #d4 ,strategy to counter 8sharp power0 political influence operations and ,to protect ,united ,states citizens 7a7 ,in general ,the ,secretary of ,state and the ,secretary of ,homeland ,security1 in coordination with all relevant ,federal agencies1 shall develop a long-term strategy-- 7#a7 to carry out the policy set forth in section #c7;c72 7#b7 to effectively counter the sharp power political influence operations of the ,chinese ,communist ,party globally and in the ,united ,states2 7#c7 to ensure that ,united ,states citizens1 particularly ,chinese ,americans and members of the ,chinese1 ,uyghur1 ,mongolian1 ,korean1 ,taiwanese1 and ,tibetan diaspora who are often the victims and primary targets of malign political influence operations1 are protected2 7#d7 to ensure that-- 7,a7 the ,united ,states ,government strategy to protect the communities described in paragraph 7#c7 is clearly communicated by relevant ,federal officials2 and 7,b7 secure outlets are created for reporting on intimidation and surveillance2 7#e7 to ensure that ,chinese nationals who are legally studying1 living1 or working temporarily in the ,united ,states know that intimidation or surveillance by the ,government of the ,people's ,republic of ,china and the ,chinese ,communist ,party is an unacceptable invasion of their rights while they reside in the ,united ,states2 7#f7 to provide secure outlets for reporting on intimidation and surveillance2 and 7#g7 to identify new tools or authorities necessary to implement this strategy4 7b7 ,report ,not later than #ahj days after the date of the enactment of this ,act1 and annually thereafter1 the ,secretary of ,state1 or an appropriate high-ranking official1 shall-- 7#a7 submit an unclassified report1 which may include a classified annex1 containing the strategy required under subsection 7a7 to the appropriate congressional committees2 or 7#b7 describe the strategy required under subsection 7a7 through unclassified testimony before the ,committee on ,foreign ,relations of the ,senate or the ,committee on ,foreign ,affairs of the ,house of ,representatives4 #e4 ,report on the political influence operations of the ,government of ,china and the ,communist ,party of ,china 7a7 ,in general ,because it is important for ,united ,states policymakers and the ,american people to be informed about the influence operations described in section #c1 not later than #bgj days after the date of the enactment of this ,act1 and annually thereafter1 the ,secretary of ,state1 in coordination with the ,director of ,national ,intelligence1 and in consultation with the heads of relevant ,federal departments and agencies1 shall submit an unclassified report1 which may include a classified annex1 to the appropriate congressional committees that describes the political influence operations of the ,government of the ,people's ,republic of ,china and the ,chinese ,communist ,party affecting the ,united ,states and select allies and partners1 including the ,united ,kingdom1 ,canada1 ,australia1 ,new ,zealand1 ,taiwan1 and ,japan1 including efforts-- 7#a7 to exert influence over ,united ,states governmental or nongovernmental institutions or individuals1 or government officials among ,united ,states allies and partners2 7#b7 to coerce or threaten ,united ,states citizens or legal permanent residents or their families and associates living in ,china or elsewhere2 7#c7 to undermine democratic institutions and the freedoms of speech1 expression1 the press1 association1 assembly1 religion1 or academic thought2 7#d7 to otherwise suppress information in public fora1 in the ,united ,states and abroad2 or 7#e7 to develop or obtain property1 facilities1 infrastructure1 business entities1 or other assets for use in facilitating the activities described in paragraphs 7#a7 through 7#d74 7b7 ,contents ,the report required under subsection 7a7 shall include recommendations for the ,president and ,congress relating to-- 7#a7 the need for additional resources or authorities to counter political influence operations in the ,united ,states directed by the ,government of the ,people's ,republic of ,china and the ,chinese ,communist ,party1 including operations carried out in concert with allies2 7#b7 whether a permanent office to monitor and respond to political influence operations of the ,government of the ,people's ,republic of ,china and the ,chinese ,communist ,party should be established within the ,department of ,state or within the ,office of the ,director of ,national ,intelligence2 and 7#c7 whether regular public reports on the political influence operations of the ,government of the ,people's ,republic of ,china and the ,chinese ,communist ,party are needed to inform ,congress and the ,american people of the scale and scope of such operations4