,,ii  #aafth ,,congress  #b;d ,session  
,s4 #cicf  ,,in ,,the ,,senate ,,of     
,,the ,,united ,,states  ,june #aj1     
#bjbj,mr4 ,hawley introduced the        
following bill2 which was read twice and
 referred to the ,committee on ,armed   
,services  ,a ,,bill  ,to maintain the  
ability of the ,united ,states ,armed   
,forces to deny a fait accompli by the  
,people's ,republic of ,china against   
,taiwan1 and for other purposes4  #a4   
,short title ,this ,act may be cited as 
the ,taiwan ,defense ,act4  #b4         
,definitions ,in this ,act3 7#a7 ,deny  
,the term deny means to use combined    
joint operations to delay1 degrade1 and 
ultimately defeat an attempt by the     
,people's ,republic of ,china to execute
 a fait accompli against ,taiwan1       
resulting in-- 7,a7 the termination of  
hostilities or1 at a minimum1 the       
termination of the attempted fait       
accompli2 or  7,b7 the neutralization of
 the ability of the ,people's ,republic 
of ,china to execute a fait accompli    

against ,taiwan4  7#b7 ,fait accompli   
,the term fait accompli means the       
strategy of the ,people's ,republic of  
,china designed to allow the ,people's  
,republic of ,china to use military     
force to seize control of ,taiwan before
 the ,united ,states ,armed ,forces are 
able to respond effectively1 while      
simultaneously deterring an effective   
combined joint response by the ,united  
,states ,armed ,forces by convincing the
 ,united ,states that mounting such a   
response would be prohibitively         
difficult or costly4  #c4 ,findings     
,congress makes the following findings3 
7#a7 ,taiwan is-- 7,a7 a beacon of      
democracy in ,asia2 and  7,b7 a         
steadfast partner of the ,united ,states
 in the common pursuit of a free and    
open ,indo-,pacific region in which--   
7i7 all societies enjoy sovereign       
autonomy2  7ii7 people live securely1   
prosperously1 and with dignity2 and     
7iii7 the societies of the region rise  
and fall not by coercion but on the     

basis of peaceful competition4  7#b7 ,if
 the ,government of the ,people's       
,republic of ,china were to use military
 force to compel the unification of     
,taiwan with the ,people's ,republic of 
,china-- 7,a7 the world would lose one  
of the great champions of freedom and   
democracy2  7,b7 the ,united ,states and
 allies and partners of the ,united     
,states would face severe difficulty in 
maintaining favorable balances of power 
relative to the ,people's ,republic of  
,china in ,northeast and ,southeast     
,asia2 and  7,c7 as the balance of power
 in the ,indo-,pacific region shifted in
 favor of the ,people's ,republic of    
,china1 the ,government of the ,people's
 ,republic of ,china would possess an   
increasing ability-- 7i7 to impose its  
will throughout the ,indo-,pacific      
region2 and  7ii7 to prevent ,united    
,states access to key trade routes and  
markets in the ,indo-,pacific region1   
thereby imposing severe economic        
hardship on middle-class and            

working-class people of the ,united     
,states and undermining the ,american   
way of life4  7#c7 ,in ,january #bjai1  
the ,defense ,intelligence ,agency      
assessed that the longstanding intent of
 the ,government of the ,people's       
,republic of ,china to compel the       
unification of ,taiwan with the         
,people's ,republic of ,china1 and deter
 any attempt by ,taiwan to declare      
independence1 was the primary driver for
 ,china's military modernization4  7#d7 
,the ,department of ,defense            
,indo-,pacific ,strategy ,report        
released in ,june #bjai1 states that the
 ,government of the ,people's ,republic 
of ,china is preparing for a contingency
 to unify ,taiwan with the mainland by  
force1 while simultaneously deterring1  
delaying1 or denying any third-party    
intervention on ,taiwan's behalf4  7#e7 
,department of ,defense statements and  
publications indicate that the          
,government of the ,people's ,republic  
of ,china is developing the plans and   

capabilities required to employ the fait
 accompli strategy to compel the        
unification of ,taiwan with the         
,people's ,republic of ,china1          
including-- 7,a7 the assessment by the  
,defense ,science ,board in #bjag that  
the ,government of the ,people's        
,republic of ,china had adopted a theory
 of victory whereby once conflict with  
the ,united ,states appeared inevitable1
 as might be the case if the ,government
 of the ,people's ,republic of ,china   
attempted to use military force to      
compel the unification of ,taiwan with  
the ,people's ,republic of ,china1 then 
the ,government of the ,people's        
,republic of ,china will attempt to     
achieve a decisive outcome very quickly1
 presenting the ,united ,states and its 
allies with a fait accompli and then    
seek to demonstrate that the ,united    
,states and its allies will incur       
significant costs in seeking to reverse 
that outcome2  7,b7 the assessment in   
the ,indo-,pacific ,strategy ,report    

that1 if the ,government of the         
,people's ,republic of ,china or another
 competitor in the ,indo-,pacific region
 decides to advance their interests     
through force1 they are likely to enjoy 
a local military advantage at the onset 
of conflict4 ,in a fait accompli        
scenario1 competitors would seek to     
employ their capabilities quickly to    
achieve limited objectives and forestall
 a response from the ,united ,states and
 its allies and partners2  7,c7         
testimony by then ,acting ,secretary of 
,defense ,patrick ,shanahan in ,march   
#bjai that-- 7i7 the ,government of the 
,people's ,republic of ,china has made  
investments specifically intended to    
offset ,u4,s4 advantages2 and  7ii7 if  
deployed in the initial stages of a     
conflict1 these capabilities could seek 
to achieve a fait accompli that would   
make reversing ,chinese gains more      
difficult1 militarily and politically2  
and  7,d7 testimony by then ,commanding 
,general of ,marine ,corps ,combat      

,development ,command ,lieutenant       
,general ,david ,berger in ,april #bjai 
that peer adversaries of the ,united    
,states seek to create strategic        
dilemmas through fait accompli          
scenarios4  7#f7 ,in ,march #bjai1 then 
,acting ,secretary of ,defense ,patrick 
,shanahan testified that the            
implementation of the #bjah ,national   
,defense ,strategy would ensure the     
,united ,states has the capabilities1   
posture1 and employment of forces       
required to prevent a fait accompli by  
the ,people's ,republic of ,china4  7#g7
 ,according to the ,indo-,pacific       
,strategy ,report1 the ,national        
,defense ,strategy implicitly           
acknowledges the most stressing         
potential scenarios will occur along our
 competitors' peripheries4 ,an attempted
 fait accompli by the ,people's         
,republic of ,china against ,taiwan     
should therefore be expected to         
constitute a most stressing potential   
scenario for the ,united ,states ,armed 

,forces4  7#h7 ,the ,national ,defense  
,strategy ,commission found that the    
,united ,states ,armed ,forces must be  
postured to deter and prevent a fait    
accompli by an agile opportunistic      
adversary in order to compete           
effectively in the ,indo-,pacific region
 and stated that the ,united ,states    
must develop new operational concepts to
 achieve strategic advantage1 including 
by addressing the ability of aggressive 
regimes to achieve a fait accompli      
against states on their periphery1 in   
recognition of-- 7,a7 the unique        
challenges to the ,united ,states ,armed
 ,forces posed by the employment of the 
fait accompli strategy by the           
,government of the ,people's ,republic  
of ,china or another strategic          
competitor2 and  7,b7 the consequent    
urgent need for new thinking and steady 
focus by the ,department of ,defense on 
ensuring the ability of the ,united     
,states ,armed ,forces to prevent an    
adversary from using the fait accompli  

strategy to advance its interests at the
 expense of those of the ,united        
,states4  7#i7 ,department of ,defense  
strategic guidance and official         
statements underscore the essential role
 that denial operations will play in    
preventing a fait accompli by the       
,people's ,republic of ,china against   
,taiwan1 including-- 7,a7 the           
incorporation in the ,national ,defense 
,strategy of the ,global ,operating     
,model that includes a blunt layer of   
combat-credible forward forces postured 
and employed to delay1 degrade1 or deny 
adversary aggression2  7,b7 the         
conclusion by the ,national ,defense    
,strategy ,commission that the          
,department of ,defense must position   
substantial capability forward in the   
form of the blunt layer included in the 
,global ,operating ,model to deter and  
prevent a fait accompli2  7,c7 the      
statement for the record by the         
,commander of the ,united ,states       
,indo-,pacific ,command1 ,admiral ,phil 

,davidson1 in ,april #bjah in which he  
concludes1 due to the distances involved
 in the ,indo-,pacific1 we cannot rely  
solely on surge forces from the         
continental ,united ,states to deter    
,chinese aggression or prevent a fait   
accompli4 ,,pacom must maintain a robust
 blunt layer that effectively deters    
,chinese aggression in the              
,indo-,pacific2  7,d7 the ,joint        
,operating ,concept for ,deterrence     
,operations1 which states that          
forward-deployed forces1 such as those  
included in the blunt layer of the      
,global ,operating ,model and referenced
 by the ,national ,defense ,strategy    
,commission and the ,commander of the   
,united ,states ,indo-,pacific ,command1
 contribute to denying benefits and     
thereby reduce the likelihood of an     
adversary achieving strategic or        
tactical surprise1 thus helping to      
prevent adversary decisionmakers from   
concluding they might achieve a military
 fait accompli that could be extremely  

costly for the ,united ,states to       
reverse by force2  7,e7 the ,united     
,states ,army ,multi-,domain ,operations
 concept document1 which states that the
 ,armed ,forces must demonstrate the    
capability to immediately deny a fait   
accompli attack in order to deter a     
near-peer adversary2 and  7,f7 the      
,marine ,corps ,force ,design #bjcj     
report1 which states that               
forward-deployed forces that can        
continue to operate inside an           
adversary's long-range precision-fire   
weapons engagement zone 7,,wez7 are more
 operationally relevant than forces     
which must rapidly maneuver to positions
 outside the ,,wez in order to remain   
survivable1 and that such stand-in      
forces possess the capability to attrite
 adversary forces1 enable joint force   
access requirements1 complicate         
targeting and consume adversary         
intelligence1 surveillance1 and         
reconnaissance resources1 and prevent   
fait accompli scenarios4  #d4 ,sense of 

,congress ,it is the sense of ,congress 
that-- 7#a7 the ability of the ,united  
,states to uphold a free and open       
,indo-,pacific region would be severely 
compromised if the ,government of the   
,people's ,republic of ,china were able 
to compel the unification of ,taiwan    
with the ,people's ,republic of ,china1 
particularly if the ,people's ,republic 
of ,china were able to do so by military
 force2  7#b7 the loss by the ,united   
,states of the ability to maintain a    
free and open ,indo-,pacific region     
would result in the significantly       
increased vulnerability of the          
middle-class and working-class people of
 the ,united ,states and the allies and 
partners of the ,united ,states to      
economic coercion by the ,government of 
the ,people's ,republic of ,china2  7#c7
 the fate of ,taiwan is therefore       
crucially linked to the fates of all    
countries in the ,indo-,pacific region1 
including to the fate of the ,united    
,states2  7#d7 under the ,taiwan        

,relations ,act 7#bb ,u4,s4,c4 #ccja et 
seq471 it is the policy of the ,united  
,states to consider any effort to       
determine the future of ,taiwan by other
 than peaceful means to be of grave     
concern to the ,united ,states2  7#e7   
since #aigi1 the ,united ,states        
,government has consistently upheld the 
commitments of the ,united ,states under
 the ,taiwan ,relations ,act 7#bb       
,u4,s4,c4 #ccja et seq472  7#f7 the     
,national ,defense ,authorization ,act  
for ,fiscal ,year #bjbj 7,public ,law   
#aaf-ib7 reaffirms that the ,taiwan     
,relations ,act 7#bb ,u4,s4,c4 #ccja et 
seq47 and the ,six ,assurances are the  
cornerstones of ,united ,states         
relations with ,taiwan2  7#g7 the       
,taiwan ,relations ,act 7#bb ,u4,s4,c4  
#ccja et seq47 further establishes the  
policy of the ,united ,states to        
maintain the capacity of the ,united    
,states to resist any resort to force or
 other forms of coercion that would     
jeopardize the security1 or the social  

or economic system1 of the people on    
,taiwan2  7#h7 the ,government of the   
,people's ,republic of ,china appears to
 be developing the plans and            
capabilities required to use the fait   
accompli strategy to compel the         
unification of ,taiwan with the         
,people's ,republic of ,china1 thereby  
jeopardizing the security and the social
 and economic system of the people of   
,taiwan2  7#i7 denial operations will   
have an essential role in any strategy  
to prevent a fait accompli by the       
,people's ,republic of ,china against   
,taiwan2 and  7#aj7 implementation of   
the ,taiwan ,relations ,act 7#bb        
,u4,s4,c4 #ccja et seq47 therefore      
requires the ,united ,states to maintain
 the ability to defeat a fait accompli  
by the ,people's ,republic of ,china    
against ,taiwan1 especially by denial   
operations4  #e4 ,statement of policy   
,it shall be the policy of the ,united  
,states to maintain the ability of the  
,united ,states ,armed ,forces to deny a

 fait accompli by the ,people's         
,republic of ,china against ,taiwan4    
#f4 ,report on progress of the          
,department of ,defense with respect to 
denying a fait accompli by the ,people's
 ,republic of ,china against ,taiwan    
7a7 ,in general ,not later than ,april  
#cj each year1 beginning in #bjba and   
ending in #bjbf1 the ,secretary of      
,defense shall submit to the            
congressional defense committees a      
report on the progress of the           
,department of ,defense with respect to 
improving the ability of the ,united    
,states ,armed ,forces to conduct       
combined joint operations to deny the   
ability of the ,people's ,republic of   
,china to execute a fait accompli       
against ,taiwan4  7b7 ,matters ,to be   
included ,each report under subsection  
7a7 shall include the following3 7#a7   
,an explanation of the objectives for   
the ,united ,states ,armed ,forces that 
would be necessary to deny the fait     
accompli by the ,people's ,republic of  

,china against ,taiwan4  7#b7 ,an       
identification of joint warfighting     
capabilities and current efforts to     
organize1 train1 and equip the ,united  
,states ,armed ,forces in support of the
 objectives referred to in paragraph    
7#a71 including-- 7,a7 an assessment of 
whether the programs included in the    
most recent future-years defense program
 submitted to ,congress under section   
#bba of title #aj1 ,united ,states      
,code1 are sufficient to enable the     
,united ,states ,armed ,forces to       
conduct joint combined operations to    
achieve such objectives2  7,b7 a        
description of additional investments or
 force posture adjustments required to  
maintain or improve the ability of the  
,united ,states ,armed ,forces to       
conduct joint combined operations to    
achieve such objectives2  7,c7 a        
description of the manner in which the  
,secretary of ,defense intends to       
develop and integrate ,army1 ,navy1 ,air
 ,force1 ,marine ,corps1 and ,space     

,force operational concepts to maintain 
or improve the ability of the ,united   
,states ,armed ,forces to conduct joint 
combined operations to achieve such     
objectives2 and  7,d7 an assessment of  
the manner in which different options   
for pre-delegating authorities1         
including authorities relating to       
kinetic strikes against targets on the  
mainland of the ,people's ,republic of  
,china1 may improve the ability of the  
,united ,states ,armed ,forces to       
conduct joint combined operations to    
achieve such objectives4  7#c7 ,an      
assessment of the role of the nuclear   
forces of the ,united ,states in        
deterring or defeating a fait accompli  
by the ,people's ,republic of ,china    
against ,taiwan1 including concepts     
for-- 7,a7 deterring limited use of     
nuclear weapons by the ,people's        
,republic of ,china in the              
,indo-,pacific region without           
undermining the ability of the ,united  
,states ,armed ,forces to maintain      

nuclear deterrence at the strategic and 
theater levels against the ,russian     
,federation and the ,democratic         
,people's ,republic of ,korea2 and  7,b7
 ensuring the ,united ,states ,armed    
,forces are able to continue combined   
joint operations to defend ,taiwan in a 
nuclear environment following nuclear   
weapons use by the ,people's ,republic  
of ,china or the ,united ,states4  7c7  
,form ,each report required by          
subsection 7a7 shall be submitted in    
classified form but may include an      
unclassified executive summary4  7d7    
,congressional defense committees       
defined ,in this section1 the term      
congressional defense committees has the
 meaning given the term in section      
#aja7;a77#af7 of title #aj1 ,united     
,states ,code4