,,ii #aafth ,,congress #b;d ,session ,s4 #chdc ,,in ,,the ,,senate ,,of ,,the ,,united ,,states ,may #ba1 #bjbj,mr4 ,menendez introduced the following bill2 which was read twice and referred to the ,committee on ,foreign ,relations ,a ,,bill ,to establish a positive agenda and framework for the future of arms control with the ,russian ,federation and the ,people's ,republic of ,china4 #a4 ,short title ,this ,act may be cited as the ,future of ,arms ,control ,act4 #b4 ,definitions ,in this ,act3 7#a7 ,appropriate congressional committees ,the term appropriate congressional committees means-- 7,a7 the ,committee on ,foreign ,relations1 the ,committee on ,armed ,services1 and the ,select ,committee on ,intelligence of the ,senate2 and 7,b7 the ,committee on ,foreign ,affairs1 the ,committee on ,armed ,services1 and the ,permanent ,select ,committee on ,intelligence of the ,house of ,representatives4 7#b7 ,new ,,start ,the term ,new ,,start means the ,treaty between the ,united ,states and the ,russian ,federation on ,measures for the ,further ,reduction and ,limitation of ,strategic ,offensive ,arms1 signed ,april #h1 #bjaj1 and entered into force ,february #e1 #bjaa 7commonly known as the ,new ,,start ,treaty74 #c4 ,findings ,congress makes the following findings3 7#a7 ,since the end of ,world ,war ,,ii1 the ,united ,states has relied on a robust and effective nuclear deterrent as part of its national defense1 particularly against the ,soviet ,union and its successor state1 the ,russian ,federation4 7#b7 ,in tandem with its nuclear deterrent1 the ,united ,states pursued a number of arms control1 disarmament1 and nonproliferation agreements with the ,soviet ,union as a means of ensuring strategic stability1 providing transparency into the ,soviet ,union's nuclear forces1 reducing ,united ,states nuclear expenditures1 and defending the ,united ,states1 including the ,strategic ,arms ,limitation ,treaty and the ,strategic ,arms ,reduction ,treaty4 7#c7 ,after the dissolution of the ,soviet ,union1 the ,united ,states continued to pursue arms control with the ,russian ,federation along with a credible nuclear deterrent as a means of ensuring ,united ,states security from nuclear attack4 7#d7 ,the ,new ,,start ,treaty1 ratified with bipartisan support on ,december #bb1 #bjaj1 remains an important tool for limiting and verifying the ,russian ,federation's strategic nuclear arsenal4 7#e7 ,the ,new ,,start ,treaty1 which expires in ,february #bjba1 can be extended until ,february #bjbf if both parties agree to such an extension4 7#f7 ,the ,united ,states engages in robust1 verifiable arms control because it fundamentally protects ,united ,states and allied security interests4 7#g7 ,on ,april #ag1 #bjbj1 ,secretary of ,state ,mike ,pompeo met with ,russian ,foreign ,minister ,sergey ,lavrov1 and in those talks asserted that any future arms control talks must include the ,people's ,republic of ,china4 7#h7 ,the ,government of the ,people's ,republic of ,china has signaled that it has no intention of engaging in trilateral arms control talks with the ,united ,states and the ,russian ,federation4 7#i7 ,since #aifd1 the ,people's ,republic of ,china has been a nuclear weapons state and has developed strategic and tactical systems capable of threatening the ,united ,states1 ,united ,states allies and partners1 and ,united ,states and alliance assets in the ,indo-,pacific region4 7#aj7 ,today1 the ,people's ,republic of ,china retains a limited but survivable nuclear deterrent with an extensive modernization program which1 according to the ,defense ,intelligence ,agency's #bjai ,china ,military ,power ,report1 will make its arsenal more mobile1 responsive1 and accurate4 7#aa7 ,it is in the security interests of the ,united ,states to engage with the ,people's ,republic of ,china on relevant arms control issues1 whether in a bilateral or multilateral format1 through a coherent1 coordinated strategy4 #d4 ,statement of policy ,it is the policy of the ,united ,states that-- 7#a7 unless the ,president determines and so informs ,congress that the ,russian ,federation is not in material compliance with ,new ,,start such that the object and purpose of the ,treaty is significantly undermined1 and that efforts to resolve any such material noncompliance have been undertaken and not resolved such noncompliance1 the ,united ,states shall extend ,new ,,start from its initial termination date in ,february #bjba to ,february #bjbf1 as permitted under ,article ,,xiv of the ,treaty2 7#b7 if the ,president has not extended ,new ,,start by ,november #c1 #bjbj1 the ,united ,states ,government should encourage the ,government of the ,russian ,federation not to exceed or prepare to exceed the limitations of the ,new ,,start ,treaty prior to the expiration of the ,treaty on ,february #e1 #bjba1 providing an opportunity from ,january #bj1 #bjba1 until ,february #e1 #bjba1 for the ,united ,states and the ,russian ,federation to negotiate an extension to and continued implementation of the treaty2 7#c7 if the ,president does not extend the ,new ,,start ,treaty by ,november #c1 #bjbj1 no action or activity should be taken by any ,united ,states official1 agency1 or department that would violate or lead to the violation of the treaty while the treaty remains in force2 7#d7 the ,united ,states must maintain a credible nuclear deterrent capable of defending the homeland and ,united ,states allies covered under extended deterrence2 7#e7 the ,united ,states1 in conjunction with ,new ,,start's extension1 should pursue additional arms control frameworks with the ,russian ,federation that limit the possibility of purposeful or accidental nuclear war and advance ,united ,states security1 including-- 7,a7 further reductions to the ,russian ,federation's strategic nuclear arsenal1 including the number of its warheads and deployed delivery systems2 7,b7 limitations or elimination of the ,russian ,federation's tactical and intermediate range systems that directly threaten ,united ,states allies and partners in ,europe and the ,indo-,pacific2 7,c7 control1 limitation1 or elimination of the ,russian ,federation's novel nuclear weapons1 such as hypersonic weapons1 undersea nuclear weapons1 or other delivery systems2 7,d7 transparency and confidence-building measures to avoid1 manage1 or control nuclear1 conventional1 and unconventional military escalation between the ,united ,states and the ,russian ,federation2 7,e7 areas of potential dialogue between the governments of the ,united ,states and the ,russian ,federation on space1 cyberspace1 and conventional forces1 as well as other strategic domains1 which could reduce the likelihood of war1 limit escalation if a conflict were to occur1 and constrain a destabilizing arms race2 and 7,f7 rigorous inspection and monitoring mechanisms to verify compliance with any future arms control framework2 and 7#f7 the ,united ,states ,government should formulate a coherent strategy to engage the ,government of the ,people's ,republic of ,china on relevant bilateral issues that lays the groundwork for bringing the ,people's ,republic of ,china into an arms control framework1 including-- 7,a7 fostering bilateral dialogue on arms control leading to the convening of bilateral strategic stability talks2 7,b7 negotiating norms for outer space2 7,c7 developing pre-launch notification regimes aimed at reducing nuclear miscalculation2 and 7,d7 expanding lines of communication between both governments for the purposes of reducing the risks of conventional war and increasing transparency4 #e4 ,restriction on nuclear weapons policy 7a7 ,in general ,if the ,president does not extend the ,new ,,start ,treaty by ,november #c1 #bjbj1 no action or activity may be taken by any ,united ,states official1 agency1 or department that would violate or lead to the violation of the treaty until ,march #a1 #bjba4 7b7 ,waiver 7#a7 ,in general ,the ,president may waive the restriction in subsection 7a7 #ae days after certifying to the appropriate congressional committees that the ,government of the ,russian ,federation has materially violated the ,new ,,start ,treaty such that the security of the ,united ,states has been gravely threatened4 ,the certification shall include the reasons for making such determination4 ,the certification shall be unclassified to the maximum extent possible1 but may include a classified annex4 7#b7 ,effectiveness 7,a7 ,in general ,a waiver under subsection 7a7 shall take effect if1 at the end of #ae days after the ,president makes the certification described under such subsection1 ,congress has not enacted a joint resolution of disapproval4 7,b7 ,consideration of joint resolution of disapproval ,a joint resolution introduced pursuant to subparagraph 7,a7 shall be considered in the ,senate in accordance with the provisions of section #fja7;b7 of the ,international ,security ,assistance and ,arms ,export ,control ,act of #aigf 7,public ,law #id-cbi2 #ij ,stat4 #gfe74 #f4 ,reports 7a7 ,implementation of ,united ,states policy ,not later than #ij days after the date of the enactment of this ,act1 the ,secretary of ,state1 in coordination with the ,secretary of ,defense1 shall submit to the appropriate congressional committees a report1 and a separate classified annex1 detailing the ,united ,states ,government's plans for implementing the policy of the ,united ,states stated in section #d with respect to the ,russian ,federation4 7b7 ,arms control talks with the ,russian ,federation and the ,people's ,republic of ,china ,not later than #ahj days after the date of the enactment of this ,act1 the ,secretary of ,state1 in consultation with the ,secretary of ,defense1 shall submit to the appropriate congressional committees a report that describes-- 7#a7 a concrete plan for arms control talks that includes both the ,people's ,republic of ,china and the ,russian ,federation2 7#b7 if trilateral arms control dialogue does not arise1 what alternative plans the ,department of ,state envisages for ensuring ,united ,states security from ,russian and ,chinese nuclear weapons2 7#c7 efforts at engaging the ,people's ,republic of ,china to join arms control talks1 whether on a bilateral or multilateral basis2 and 7#d7 the interest level of the ,government of the ,people's ,republic of ,china in joining arms control talks1 whether on a bilateral or multilateral basis4 7c7 ,extension of ,new ,,start ,not later than #ij days after the date of the enactment of this ,act1 the ,secretary of ,state1 in coordination with the ,secretary of ,defense and the ,director of ,national ,intelligence1 shall submit to the appropriate congressional committees a report1 and a separate classified annex1 that includes the following elements3 7#a7 ,the strategy behind the decision to extend or not extend ,new ,,start4 7#b7 ,if ,new ,,start is set to expire1 an assessment whether such an expiration is in the national security interests of the ,united ,states1 including the specific reasons for such conclusion4 7#c7 ,an examination of the effects of the expiration of ,new ,,start on-- 7,a7 strategic stability with the ,russian ,federation2 7,b7 the ,united ,states nuclear budget2 7,c7 spending on ,united ,states conventional forces as a result of increased nuclear spending2 and 7,d7 international nuclear nonproliferation efforts4 7#d7 ,an assessment of how the ,government of the ,russian ,federation will modify its nuclear forces in an unconstrained environment and how the ,united ,states ,government will respond if the ,government of the ,russian ,federation expands its arsenal4 7#e7 ,an assessment of how the ,united ,states ,government will need to alter intelligence capabilities and spending to regain1 if possible1 the knowledge of the ,russian ,federation's arsenal that is currently provided by the inspection and verification mechanisms inherent to ,new ,,start4