,,ii #aafth ,,congress #ast ,session ,s4 #afij ,,in ,,the ,,senate ,,of ,,the ,,united ,,states ,may #bc 7legislative day1 ,may #bb71 #bjai,mr4 ,sullivan 7for himself and ,mr4 ,manchin7 introduced the following bill2 which was read twice and referred to the ,committee on ,armed ,services ,a ,,bill ,to improve ,united ,states missile defense1 and for other purposes4 #a4 ,short title ,this ,act may be cited as the ,modernizing ,america's ,missile ,defense ,act of #bjai4 #b4 ,expansion of national missile defense policy and program redesignation 7a7 ,findings ,congress finds that the #bjai ,missile ,defense ,review-- 7#a7 is fully aligned with the #bjag ,national ,security ,strategy 7,,nss71 the #bjah ,national ,defense ,strategy 7,,nds71 and the #bjah ,nuclear ,posture ,review 7,,npr72 7#b7 establishes a policy framework for ,united ,states missile defense that is responsive to new threats and exploits new approaches to the defensive mission2 7#c7 adopts a balanced and integrated approach to countering missile threats through a combination of deterrence1 active and passive missile defenses1 and attack operations2 7#d7 is entitled the ,missile ,defense ,review 7,,mdr7 because of the expanding offensive missile threat includes nonballistic systems1 such as advanced cruise missiles and hypersonic weapons2 7#e7 states that the ,united ,states1 allies1 and partners will pursue a comprehensive missile defense strategy that will deliver integrated and effective capabilities to counter ballistic1 cruise1 and hypersonic missile threats2 and 7#f7 hedges against future unanticipated offensive missile threats and pledges to develop and field innovative and advanced missile defense capabilities to counter future threats4 7b7 ,sense of the ,senate ,it is the ,sense of the ,senate that-- 7#a7 the ,united ,states must continue to pursue a comprehensive missile defense strategy that will deliver integrated and effective capabilities to counter ballistic1 cruise1 and hypersonic missile threats2 7#b7 adversaries are quickly expanding the capabilities of their existing missile systems1 adding new and unprecedented types of missile capabilities to their arsenals1 and further integrating offensive missiles into their coercive threats1 military exercises1 and war planning2 7#c7 both ,russia and ,china are rapidly enhancing their existing offensive missile systems and developing advanced sea-1 ground-1 and air-launched cruise missiles as well as hypersonic capabilities2 7#d7 due to the proliferation of offensive ballistic and cruise missiles and the emergence of game-changing hypersonic weapons technologies1 all of which threaten regional balances1 our allies and partners1 ,united ,states deployed armed forces1 and the ,united ,states homeland1 missile defenses become an even more critical element of ,united ,states strategy2 and 7#e7 the ,united ,states must outpace adversary offensive missile capabilities4 7c7 ,expansion of policy ,section #afha7;a7 of the ,national ,defense ,authorization ,act for ,fiscal ,year #bjag 7,public ,law #aad-cbh2 #aj ,u4,s4,c4 #bdca note7 is amended by striking ballistic missile threat and inserting ballistic1 cruise1 and hypersonic missile threats4 7d7 ,redesignation requirement ,not later than the date on which the ,president submits to ,congress pursuant to section #aaje of title #ca1 ,united ,states ,code1 the annual budget request of the ,president for fiscal year #bjba1 the ,secretary of ,defense shall1 as the ,secretary considers appropriate1 redesignate all strategies1 policies1 programs1 and systems under the jurisdiction of the ,secretary to reflect that missile defense programs of the ,united ,states defend against ballistic1 cruise1 and hypersonic missiles in all phases of flight4 #c4 ,acceleration of the deployment of persistent space-based sensor architecture 7a7 ,findings ,congress makes the following findings3 7#a7 ,the ,missile ,defense ,agency currently operates the ,space ,tracking and ,surveillance ,system-,demonstration 7,,stss-,d71 a two-satellite constellation for testing purposes1 which uses sensors capable of detecting visible and infrared light and serves as an experimental space tracker for the ballistic missile defense system4 7#b7 ,conceptually developed in #bjji1 the ,precision ,tracking ,space ,system 7,,ptss7 would have provided the persistent space-based tracking of ballistic missiles1 including object characterization and discrimination1 and would have also supported homeland1 regional1 and theater missile defense4 7#c7 ,projected to enter orbit in #bjah1 the ,missile ,defense ,agency and the ,applied ,physics ,laboratory of ,johns ,hopkins ,university is currently conducting a ,space-,based ,kill ,assessment 7,,ska7 experiment1 a network of small sensors hosted on commercial satellites1 used to collect the energy signature of the impact between a ballistic missile threat and an interceptor from the ballistic missile defense system4 7#d7 ,section #bcf of the ,national ,defense ,authorization ,act for ,fiscal ,year #bjad 7#abg ,stat4 #gae2 ,public ,law #aac-ff7 required the ,secretary of ,defense to conduct an evaluation of options and alternatives for future sensor architectures for ballistic missile defense in order to enhance the ballistic missile defense capabilities of the ,united ,states4 7#e7 ,general ,john ,hyten1 ,commander of the ,united ,states ,strategic ,command1 has argued for the deployment of a global space-based sensor system with discrimination capability as a critical component to improving the effectiveness of our deployed interceptors to conduct both the characterization of these new threats ''' as well as discriminate better and earlier the mid-course element of the threat that exists today1 and finally to target against ''' hypersonic capabilities and other capabilities in the boost phase44 7#f7 ,general ,o',shaughnessy1 ,commander of the ,united ,states ,northern ,command1 stated that-- 7,a7 ,a space-based sensor network will provide far greater coverage1 survivability1 and persistence--all of which are necessary to maintaining confidence in our ability to deter1 detect1 and defeat missile threats to the homeland42 7,b7 ,we must take prudent steps now to ensure our next generation defensive capabilities to include a space-based sensing layer are not late to need42 and 7,c7 ,the space-based sensing layer ''' is of the highest urgency and that we gain that capability as soon as possible because our adversaries are actively developing these weapons as we speak44 7#g7 ,general ,samuel ,greaves1 a former ,director of the ,missile ,defense ,agency1 has stated that-- 7,a7 space provides the critical vantage point necessary to address rapidly advancing threats across multiple regions of interest and the only vantage point for global persistence to address warfighter requirements2 7,b7 a space-based sensor layer consisting of two separate constellations1 one for tracking and discriminating ballistic missiles and one for tracking dim ballistic targets and hypersonic missiles1 would enable the ,united ,states to use interceptor inventory more efficiently and effectively to counter a broad array of threats2 and 7,c7 space-based sensors are absolutely critical for the real threat that we see in front of us1 the hypersonic threat4 7#h7 ,admiral ,james ,syring1 a former ,director of the ,missile ,defense ,agency1 has stated1 ,from a missile defense perspective1 we have to develop a future operational space layer4 ,given where the threat is going with hypersonics and more ,i,c,b,ms and so forth this persistent tracking and discrimination capability from space is a must44 7#i7 ,the ,department of ,defense's #bjai ,missile ,defense ,review states that-- 7,a7 the exploitation of space provides a missile defense posture that is more effective1 resilient1 and adaptable to known and unanticipated threats2 7,b7 space-based sensors1 for example1 can monitor1 detect1 and track missile launches from locations almost anywhere on the globe--they enjoy a measure of flexibility of movement that is unimpeded by the constraints that geographic limitations impose on terrestrial sensors2 and 7,c7 unlike land-based sensors1 space sensors do not require basing rights or agreements with foreign states enabling them to be placed where necessary to achieve the ideal viewing geometry for launch detection1 missile tracking1 threat discrimination1 and intercept detection_/kill assessment of missile threats to the ,united ,states homeland1 our forces abroad1 and to our allies and partners4 7b7 ,sense of ,congress ,it is the sense of ,congress that-- 7#a7 the two most recently enacted ,national ,defense ,authorization ,acts have expressed support for a space-based missile defense sensor program2 7#b7 the ,secretary of ,defense should rapidly develop and deploy a persistent1 space-based sensor architecture to ensure missile defenses of the ,united ,states are more effective against ballistic missile threats and more responsive to emergent threats from hypersonic and cruise missiles2 7#c7 the responsibility for developing and deploying a hypersonic and ballistic tracking space sensor should remain within the ,director of the ,missile ,defense ,agency2 and 7#d7 the ,director of the ,missile ,defense ,agency should deploy a hypersonic and ballistic tracking space sensor constellation as soon as technically feasible4 7c7 ,assignment of primary responsibility for development and deployment of the hypersonic and ballistic tracking space sensor ,not later than #cj days after the date of the enactment of this ,act1 the ,secretary shall-- 7#a7 assign the ,director of the ,missile ,defense ,agency with the principal responsibility for the development and deployment of a hypersonic and ballistic tracking space sensor2 and 7#b7 submit to the congressional defense committees certification of such assignment4 7d7 ,certification regarding funding of hypersonic and ballistic tracking space sensor program ,at the same time that the ,president submits to ,congress pursuant to section #aaje of title #ca1 ,united ,states ,code1 the annual budget request of the ,president for fiscal year #bjba1 the ,under ,secretary of ,defense ,comptroller and the ,director for ,cost ,assessment and ,program ,evaluation shall jointly certify to the congressional defense committees whether the hypersonic and ballistic tracking space sensor program is sufficiently funded in the ,future-,years ,defense ,program for the ,missile ,defense ,agency4 7e7 ,deployment deadline ,section #afhc7;a7 of the ,national ,defense ,authorization ,act for ,fiscal ,year #bjah 7,public ,law #aae-ia2 #aj ,u4,s4,c4 #bdca note7 is amended-- 7#a7 by striking 7a7 ,in general4-- and inserting the following3 7a7 ,development1 testing1 and deployment 7#a7 ,development 2 and 7#b7 by adding at the end the following new paragraphs3 7#b7 ,testing and deployment ,the ,director shall begin on-orbit testing of a hypersonic and ballistic tracking space sensor no later than ,december #ca1 #bjba1 with full operational deployment as soon as technically feasible thereafter4 7#c7 ,waiver ,the ,secretary of ,defense may waive the deadline for testing specified in paragraph 7#b7 if the ,secretary submits to the congressional defense committees a report containing-- 7,a7 the explanation why the ,secretary cannot meet such deadline2 7,b7 the technical risks and estimated cost of accelerating the program to attempt to meet such deadline2 7,c7 an assessment of threat systems that could not be detected or tracked persistently due to waiving such deadline2 and 7,d7 a plan1 including a timeline1 for beginning the required testing4 4 7f7 ,report on progress 7#a7 ,in general ,not later than #ij days after the date of the enactment of this ,act1 the ,secretary of ,defense shall submit to the congressional defense committees a report on the progress of all efforts being made by the ,missile ,defense ,agency1 the ,defense ,advanced ,research ,projects ,agency1 the ,air ,force1 and the ,space ,development ,agency relating to space-based sensing and tracking capabilities for missile defense and how each of such organizations will work together to avoid duplication of efforts4 7#b7 ,form ,the report required by paragraph 7#a7 shall be submitted in unclassified form1 but may include a classified annex4 #d4 ,nonstandard acquisition processes of ,missile ,defense ,agency 7a7 ,findings ,congress makes the following findings3 7#a7 ,in #bjjb1 four years prior to ,north ,korea's ,taepodong-#b ,,icbm_/,,slv test in #bjjf1 the ,department of ,defense directed the ,missile ,defense ,agency to utilize flexible acquisition approaches to quickly develop missile defense capabilities1 which led to the fielding of an initial operational homeland missile defense system by the fall of #bjjd4 7#b7 ,the ,department of ,defense's #bjah ,national ,defense ,strategy states that the ,department of ,defense must deliver performance at the speed of relevance and to prioritize speed of delivery1 continuous adaptation1 and frequent modular upgrades44 7#c7 ,the ,department of ,defense's #bjai ,missile ,defense ,review states that-- 7,a7 the ,department must adopt processes and cultures that enable the ,missile ,defense ,agency and the military departments to deliver missile defense capabilities faster1 learn from failure and rapidly adjust1 and swiftly adapt systems once fielded2 7,b7 the ,department cannot meet this goal by returning the ,missile ,defense ,agency to the standard acquisition and requirements generation processes2 and 7,c7 the ,department must instead continue to streamline and refine acquisition processes and ensure flexibility in the development1 testing1 and fielding of missile defenses4 7#d7 ,general ,greaves1 the former ,director of the ,missile ,defense ,agency1 stated that-- 7,a7 the ,missile ,defense ,agency understands the importance of innovating1 developing1 and delivering new missile defense capabilities quickly1 accelerating where possible missile defense acquisition timelines while adhering to sound acquisition principles2 and 7,b7 ,united ,states missile defenses must be responsive to existing and new threats and leverage new approaches to the homeland and regional defensive missions by delivering capabilities faster1 learning from failures to make rapid adjustments1 and swiftly adapting our systems once they are fielded4 7b7 ,sense of ,congress ,it is the sense ,congress that-- 7#a7 in order for the ,department of ,defense to provide more lethal capabilities at the speed of relevance1 the ,department needs to ensure its acquisition processes continue to fulfill the needs of members of the ,armed ,forces now and in the future2 7#b7 significant defense acquisition reforms enacted over the past three ,national ,defense ,authorization ,acts have improved access to nontraditional and commercial innovation and to expanded flexible acquisition authorities in the development of alternative acquisition pathways to acquire critical national security capabilities2 7#c7 the ,department appropriately recognized the ,missile ,defense ,agency for its acquisition success by presenting it with the #bjah ,david ,packard ,excellence in ,acquisition ,award for the development of the ,space-,based ,kill ,assessment 7,,ska7 program and the ,missile ,defense ,agency should be commended for its numerous and rapid acquisition successes2 7#d7 the recently completed ,missile ,defense ,review explicitly highlights1 in stark terms1 the threat posed to the ,united ,states by ballistic and hypersonic missile threats2 and 7#e7 the ,missile ,defense ,agency should maintain its nonstandard acquisition authorities in order to continue to rapidly design1 test1 and deliver critically needed defensive capabilities to the warfighter4 7c7 ,changes to nonstandard acquisition processes and responsibilities 7#a7 ,limitation ,none of the funds authorized to be appropriated by this ,act may be obligated or expended to change the nonstandard acquisition processes and responsibilities described in paragraph 7#b7 until the ,secretary-- 7,a7 has consulted with the ,under ,secretary of ,defense for ,engineering and ,policy1 the secretaries of the military departments1 the ,chairman of the ,joint ,chiefs of ,staff1 the ,commander of ,united ,states ,strategic ,command 7,,usstratcom71 the ,commander of ,united ,states ,northern ,command 7,,us,,northcom71 and the ,director of the ,missile ,defense ,agency2 7,b7 certifies to the congressional defense committees that the ,secretary has coordinated the changes with and received the views of the individuals referred to in subparagraph 7,a72 7,c7 submits to the congressional defense committees a report describing the changes1 the rationale for the changes1 and the views of the individuals referred to in subparagraph 7,a7 with respect to such changes2 and 7,d7 a period of #bgj days has elapsed since submittal of the report under subparagraph 7,c74 7#b7 ,nonstandard acquisition processes and responsibilities described ,the nonstandard acquisition processes and responsibilities described in this paragraph are such processes and responsibilities described in-- 7,a7 the memorandum of the ,secretary of ,defense titled ,missile ,defense ,program ,direction signed on ,january #b1 #bjjb2 and 7,b7 ,department of ,defense ,directive #eacd4ji1 as in effect on the date of the enactment of this ,act4 #e4 ,plan for the redesigned kill vehicle 7a7 ,sense of ,congress ,it is the sense of ,congress that-- 7#a7 the ground-based midcourse defense system is the only system capable of defending the ,united ,states from long-range ballistic missile threats and is critical to our national security2 7#b7 the redesigned kill vehicle for the ground-based interceptor is a top priority for the ,missile ,defense ,agency and a critical element to increasing system reliability to build warfighter confidence2 7#c7 the ,missile ,defense ,agency must continue to leverage mature technologies from proven fielded components in a modular design to reduce the number of production processes and improve reliability1 producibility1 and maintainability of the redesigned kill vehicle2 7#d7 the consensus among senior ,department of ,defense experts on missile defense1 including ,general ,terrance ,o',shaughnessy1 ,commander of the ,united ,states ,northern ,command1 and ,lieutenant ,general ,greaves1 the ,director the ,missile ,defense ,agency1 is that the redesigned kill vehicle will make homeland defenses much more robust and will improve our ability to defend the homeland of the ,united ,states2 7#e7 the ,redesigned ,kill ,vehicle ,program is vital to providing the warfighter with a more reliable and effective capability to defend the homeland from long-rage ballistic missile threats2 and 7#f7 the ,missile ,defense ,agency should be commended for its rigorous and disciplined acquisition and engineering processes it has applied to the ,redesigned ,kill ,vehicle ,program4 7b7 ,report required ,the ,director of the ,missile ,defense ,agency shall submit to the congressional defense committees a report on the delay in the ,redesigned ,kill ,vehicle ,program4 7c7 ,elements ,the report required by subsection 7b7 shall include the following3 7#a7 ,a description of the reason for the delay4 7#b7 ,an overview of the revised program schedule including a revised test plan and revised acquisition strategy4 7#c7 ,a detailed description of any recommendations that could be utilized to accelerate the scheduled fielding including modifications to the acquisition strategy or the procurement and assembly of long-lead materials unaffected by the reason for the delay4 7#d7 ,a timeline associated with such recommendations4 7#e7 ,additional funding required to carry out such recommendations4 7#f7 ,an assessment of risk associated with such recommendations4 7#g7 ,a description of any recommendations that were submitted to the ,director by contractors that the ,director considers reasonable but were not adopted4 7#h7 ,an explanation as to why the recommendations described in paragraph 7#g7 were not adopted4 7d7 ,form of report ,the report required under subsection 7b7 shall be submitted in unclassified form1 but may contain a classified annex4 #f4 ,report on improving ground-based midcourse defense element of ballistic missile defense system 7a7 ,findings ,congress makes the following findings3 7#a7 ,a report from ,johns ,hopkins ,university1 published in #bjae1 and entitled ,north ,korea's ,nuclear ,futures3 ,technology and ,strategy1 concluded that1 by #bjbj1 ,north ,korea could have as many as #ajj nuclear weapons4 7#b7 ,currently1 the ,united ,states will have #dd operational ground-based interceptors distributed between ,fort ,greely1 ,alaska1 and ,vandenberg ,air ,force ,base1 ,california4 7#c7 ,section #afhf of the ,national ,defense ,authorization ,act for ,fiscal ,year #bjah 7,public ,law #aae-ia2 #aj ,u4,s4,c4 #bdca note7 authorizes up #bh additional ground-based interceptors 7,g,b,is7 and begins the deployment of #bj additional ground-based interceptors to ,fort ,greely4 7#d7 ,in ,september #bjag1 ,congress approved a ,department of ,defense reprogramming of fiscal year #bjag funding of more than #djj1jjj1jjj to counter the ,north ,korean missile threat4 7#e7 ,in ,november #bjag1 the ,president submitted an amendment to his fiscal year #bjah budget request1 which ,congress subsequently approved1 for #d1jjj1jjj1jjj for missile defeat and defense1 including funding to begin the construction of a new missile field at ,fort ,greely1 ,alaska1 and additional procurement funding necessary for #bj new ground-based interceptors4 7#f7 ,the #bjjj ,final ,environmental ,impact ,statement for ,fort ,greely included the authorization for up to #ajj ground-based interceptors to ensure that growth would not incur any unexpected environmental delays4 7#g7 ,the current maximum potential capacity for ground-based interceptors is #ajd1 with up to #ajj at ,fort ,greely1 and #d at ,vandenberg ,air ,force ,base4 7b7 ,report required ,not later than #ij days after the date of the enactment of this ,act1 the ,director of the ,missile ,defense ,agency shall submit to the congressional defense committees a report on-- 7#a7 the options to increase the capability1 capacity1 and reliability of the ground-based midcourse defense element of the ,united ,states ballistic missile defense system2 and 7#b7 the infrastructure requirements for increasing the number of ground-based interceptors as part of such element4 7c7 ,contents ,the report required by subsection 7b7 shall include the following3 7#a7 ,an assessment of the requirements of the ground-based midcourse defense element of the ,united ,states ballistic missile defense system to meet threats outlined in the #bjah ,national ,defense ,strategy and the #bjai ,missile ,defense ,review4 7#b7 ,an assessment of the feasibility of fielding up to #ajd ground-based interceptors as part of such element1 including a description of the additional infrastructure and components needed to further outfit missile fields at ,fort ,greely1 ,alaska4 7#c7 ,a cost estimate of such infrastructure and components4 7#d7 ,an estimated schedule for completing such construction as may be required for such infrastructure and components4 7#e7 ,an identification of any environmental assessments or impact studies that would need to be conducted to expand missile fields at ,fort ,greely beyond current capacity4 7#f7 ,a determination of the appropriate fleet mix of ground-based interceptor kill vehicles and boosters to maximize overall system effectiveness and increase its capacity and capability1 including the costs and benefits of continued inclusion of capability enhancement ,,ii block #a interceptors after the fielding of the redesigned kill vehicle4 7#g7 ,the modernization requirements for the ground-based midcourse system1 including all command and control1 ground systems1 sensors and sensor interfaces1 boosters and kill vehicles1 and integration of known future systems and components4 7#h7 ,a discussion of the obsolescence of such systems and components4 7#i7 ,the industrial base requirements relating to the ground-based midcourse system1 as determined by the ,director of the ,missile ,defense ,agency4 7#aj7 ,such other matters as the ,director considers appropriate4 7d7 ,form ,the report submitted under subsection 7b7 shall be submitted in unclassified form1 but may include a classified annex4 #g4 ,sense of ,congress on recent ,missile ,defense ,agency tests ,it is the sense of ,congress that the ,office of the ,under ,secretary of ,defense for ,research and ,engineering1 the ,missile ,defense ,agency1 the ,office of the ,director for ,operational ,test and ,evaluation1 the operational test agencies1 the military departments1 and warfighters should-- 7#a7 be strongly commended for a highly successful #bjah flight test campaign1 which consisted of #ac total flight test events including-- 7,a7 ,,ftx-#ce1 which successfully proved interoperability between ,terminal ,high ,altitude ,area ,defense 7,,thaad7 and the ,phased ,array ,tracking ,radar to ,intercept on ,target 7,,patriot7 to detect and track a simulated engagement with a short-range ballistic missile2 7,b7 ,pacific ,dragon #bjah1 which successfully demonstrated joint ballistic missile defense interoperability with ,japan and ,korea to engage a short-range ballistic missile with a ,standard ,missile #c 7,,sm-#c7 ,block ,,ib by a ,japanese ship and an ,aegis ,ashore site2 7,c7 ,,jftm-#e1 which successfully demonstrated the intercept of a short-range ballistic missile with a ,standard ,missile #c ,block ,,ib threat upgrade from a ,japanese ship2 7,d7 ,,ftm-#de1 which successfully demonstrated the intercept of a medium-range ballistic missile with a ,standard ,missile #c ,block ,,iia from a ,united ,states ship2 and 7,e7 ,,fti-#jc1 which as a part of the operational test of the ,european ,phased ,adaptive ,approach 7,,epaa7 ,phase #c architecture1 successfully demonstrated the intercept of an intermediate-range ballistic missile using the ,aegis ,weapon ,system's ,engage-on-,remote capability2 7#b7 be especially recognized for the success of ,,ftg-#aa1 the first salvo test of the ,united ,states ,ground-based ,midcourse ,defense system1 during which two ground-based interceptors were launched nearly simultaneously from the same location and successfully intercepted a threat-representative intercontinental ballistic missile target1 and then the next most lethal object2 7#c7 continue to pursue an increasingly rigorous testing regime for all elements of the ,ballistic ,missile ,defense ,system1 in coordination with the ,office of the ,director1 ,operational ,test and ,evaluation1 to more rapidly deliver capabilities to the warfighter as the threat evolves2 7#d7 not consider tests which do not achieve an intercept or the main objective as failures2 and 7#e7 recognize1 in an effort to deliver capabilities at the speed of relevance1 the learning value of individual advancements made by all test events1 rather than viewing any total outcome as an indication of the reliability of entire missile defense systems4 #h4 ,sense of ,congress on missile defense technology development priorities ,it is the sense of ,congress that-- 7#a7 the #bjai ,missile ,defense ,review articulates a comprehensive approach to preventing and defeating the rapidly expanding offensive missile threat through a combination of deterrence1 active and passive missile defense1 and attack operations2 7#b7 to counter the expanding offense missile capabilities of potential adversaries and hedge against unanticipated missile threats1 the ,secretary of ,defense should aggressively pursue new missile defense capabilities and examine concepts and technologies for advanced missile defense systems2 7#c7 the ,secretary should fully implement the #bjai ,missile ,defense ,review's focus on increasing investments in and deploying new technologies and concepts1 including-- 7,a7 the redesigned kill vehicle2 7,b7 a hypersonic and ballistic tracking space sensor2 7,c7 hypersonic glide vehicle defense2 7,d7 directed energy for missile defense to include laser scaling2 7,e7 the multi-object kill vehicle2 7,f7 a space-based missile intercept layer2 7,g7 improved ,standard ,missile #c 7,,sm-#c7 ballistic missile interceptors2 7,h7 ,f-#ce sensor suite missile defense integration2 7,i7 neutral particle beam2 and 7,j7 missile defense capabilities from ,missile ,defense ,agency-configured airborne platforms1 including the discrimination sensor demonstrator2 and 7#d7 the ,secretary should work to ensure that all missile defense systems are more survivable1 including through-- 7,a7 more distributed air and missile defense operations2 and 7,b7 improved camouflage1 concealment1 and deception1 including emission control4