,,iv #aafth ,,congress #b;d ,session ,h4 ,,res4 #hbg ,,in ,,the ,,house ,,of ,,representatives ,february #c1 #bjbj,mr4 ,mc,caul 7for himself1 ,ms4 ,cheney1 ,mr4 ,turner1 ,mr4 ,gallagher1 and ,mr4 ,yoho7 submitted the following resolution2 which was referred to the ,committee on ,foreign ,affairs ,,resolution ,affirming that all ,chinese companies1 private and state-owned1 are under the effective control of the ,chinese ,communist ,party4 ,whereas the ,united ,states and the ,united ,kingdom have a special relationship and shared history of fighting totalitarianism and communism regardless of cost2 ,whereas the decision by the ,british ,national ,security ,council to allow ,huawei into its fifth-generation 7#e;,g7 telecommunication network is deeply concerning to the ,united ,states2 ,whereas banning ,huawei from sensitive parts of the network1 known as the core1 and capping ,huawei's market share at #ce percent is not enough to ensure the security and fidelity of the ,united ,kingdom's #e;,g network2 ,whereas in order to realize the full potential of #e;,g1 there will be no means to isolate one part of the network from other components2 therefore1 granting an untrusted provider access to any portion of the network inevitably risks opening access to the entire network1 including the ability to take the entire network offline and deny the ,united ,kingdom strategically important services2 ,whereas the ,united ,kingdom's ,telecom ,supply ,chain ,review requires the ,united ,kingdom to consider1 with respect to a high-risk vendor such as ,huawei1 the domestic security laws in the jurisdiction where the vendor is based4 '''2 ,whereas the political economy and laws and regulations of the ,people's ,republic of ,china 7,,prc7 are an affront to the democratic values shared by the ,united ,states and the ,united ,kingdom2 ,whereas under the leadership of ,general ,secretary ,xi ,jinping1 the unelected ,chinese ,communist ,party 7,,ccp7 leads everything2 ,whereas1 according to the ,fourth ,plenum ,decision ,document1 the ,,ccp aims to perfect the ,party leadership over the ,national ,people's ,congress1 government1 supervision organs1 trial organs1 inspection organs1 armed forces1 people groups1 companies and institutions1 grass roots organizations1 and social groups42 ,whereas the ,,ccp oversees the economic and technology policies of the ,people's ,republic of ,china1 directs all legal and regulatory authorities1 and exerts direct and indirect influence over all companies in the ,,prc--state-owned and private2 ,whereas the ,,ccp has codified into law its authority to interfere in and influence the operations of companies operating within and outside of the ,,prc and demand access to any data stored in or transiting through its network equipment2 ,whereas ,article #cj of the ,,ccp ,constitution requires a ,,ccp cell to be formed in any company where there are three of more ,,ccp members2 ,whereas ,article #ae of ,regulations of the ,,ccp on the ,work of ,grassroots ,organizations in ,state ,owned ,enterprise requires all important operating and management issues to be discussed by the ,party ,committee1 and only after be decided on by the board of directors or management2 ,whereas ,article #ai of ,china's ,company ,law requires every company to establish a ,,ccp cell and carry out ,,ccp activities and to provide necessary conditions for ,,ccp cell activities2 ,whereas ,article #bf of the ,guideline on ,improving ,business ,conditions for ,private ,enterprises calls on private businesses to support ,party construction2 ,whereas1 in addition to inserting itself directly into company operations through ,,ccp cells and ownership stakes1 the ,,ccp is erecting a legal and regulatory system that in effect gives it direct influence over a company's operations and access to all its personal and business information1 thereby turning nominally private companies into resources for and tools of the ,,ccp2 ,whereas the ,,prc's ,national ,security ,law declares nearly any issue--from the economy to technology and information to ideology--a matter of national security and intelligence work2 ,whereas the ,,prc's ,cybersecurity ,law gives the ,,ccp expansive powers over how information technology products are approved and where data and information are stored1 including-- 7#a7 ,articles #bb and #bc which require network products and services to adhere to mandatory national standards and obtain certain certifications1 many of which require the disclosure of proprietary information1 such as source code1 and the use of indigenously innovated ,chinese intellectual property2 7#b7 ,article #bh which mandates any network operator to provide technical support and assistance to public security and national security organs2 and 7#c7 ,article #cg which sets forth broad requirements for data and information to be stored within the boundaries of the ,,prc2 ,whereas the ,national ,intelligence ,law gives ,chinese intelligence agencies authority to compel private companies to support intelligence operations1 including ,article #g1 which requires an organization or citizen to support1 assist1 and cooperate with state intelligence work1 and ,article #ad1 which demands that organizations provide support1 assistance1 and cooperation to intelligence organs2 ,whereas ,article #bb of ,china's ,counterespionage ,law states that when agencies are investigating espionage activities and collecting evidence1 organizations and individuals must not refuse to provide it information2 ,whereas ,article #ah of the ,anti-,terrorism ,law states that telecommunications business operators and internet service providers shall provide technical interfaces1 decryption1 and other technical support and assistance for public security organs and state security organs to prevent and investigate terrorist activities in accordance with the law2 ,whereas ,article #ca of the ,encryption ,law provides for government inspections of commercial encryption that1 when used in concert with other laws and regulations1 could result in full access of encrypted servers and decryption keys by the ,,ccp2 ,whereas several provisions in the ,ministry of ,public ,security ,regulation on ,internet ,security ,supervision and ,inspection give security organs the right to conduct onsite and remote inspections of company networks--including technical aspects of its operations and the data and information stored on its servers--and allows authorities to copy any information on corporate servers2 ,whereas these and other laws1 regulations1 and standards combined with the ,internet initiative1 the social credit system for individuals and companies1 and other industrial and sector-specific plans form the foundation for the ,,prc's authoritarian digital governance model that it is aggressively exporting around the world2 ,whereas the ,,prc's authoritarian model puts absolute control of the digital economy1 including its hardware1 software1 algorithms1 encryption1 data1 and other proprietary information1 into the hands of the ,,ccp1 removing any semblance of privacy2 and ,whereas ,general ,secretary ,xi ,jinping has said high-end technology is the weapon of a modern country and the ,,ccp has clearly demonstrated its ambition to attack global markets with its products and services to make the world safe for its authoritarian model and dependent on its technologies3 ,now1 therefore1 be it ,that it is the sense of the ,house of ,representatives that-- 7#a7 the ,parliament of the ,united ,kingdom of ,great ,britain and ,northern ,ireland is encouraged to reject or amend the ,national ,security ,council's decision on telecommunications security in a manner that excludes high-risk vendors1 such as ,huawei1 from the country's #e;,g infrastructure2 7#b7 ,huawei's track-record of illegal and corrupt behavior is endemic to their operations2 7#c7 whether state-owned or nominally private1 all ,chinese companies1 including ,huawei1 operate within a political and regulatory environment that removes their ability to act independently from or to refuse requests by the ,,ccp2 7#d7 this distinct state-led economy and communist political system removes independent corporate governance and obscures the true nature of ,chinese corporate entities1 harming the transparency needed to maintain the international rules-based system2 7#e7 fifth-generation telecommunications networks that incorporate products and services developed by ,chinese companies face significant technological1 political1 ethical1 and geopolitical risk2 and 7#f7 the ,united ,states ,government and its allies and partners must work expeditiously to develop and implement a concerted strategy1 using all tools available1 to combat what amounts to legal warfare by the ,chinese government to weaponize its companies when needed4