,,ii  #aaeth ,,congress  #b;d ,session  
,s4 #caga  ,,in ,,the ,,senate ,,of     
,,the ,,united ,,states  ,june #bh1     
#bjah ,mr4 ,rubio 7for himself1 ,ms4    
,cortez ,masto1 ,mr4 ,cornyn1 ,mr4      
,cruz1 ,mr4 ,cotton1 ,mr4 ,gardner1 and 
,mr4 ,markey7 introduced the following  
bill2 which was read twice and referred 
to the ,committee on ,foreign ,relations
  ,a ,,bill  ,to require an unclassified
 interagency report on the political    
influence operations of the ,government 
of ,china and the ,communist ,party of  
,china with respect to the ,united      
,states1 and for other purposes4  #a4   
,short title  ,this ,act may be cited as
 the ,countering the ,chinese           
,government and ,communist ,party's     
,political ,influence ,operations ,act4 
#b4 ,definitions ,in this ,act3 7#a7    
,appropriate congressional committees   
,the term appropriate congressional     
committees means--  7,a7 the ,committee 
on ,appropriations of the ,senate2  7,b7
 the ,committee on ,armed ,services of  

the ,senate2  7,c7 the ,committee on    
,foreign ,relations of the ,senate2     
7,d7 the ,committee on ,health1         
,education1 ,labor1 and ,pensions of the
 ,senate2  7,e7 the ,committee on the   
,judiciary of the ,senate2  7,f7 the    
,select ,committee on ,intelligence of  
the ,senate2  7,g7 the ,committee on    
,banking1 ,housing1 and ,urban ,affairs 
of the ,senate2  7,h7 the ,committee on 
,appropriations of the ,house of        
,representatives2  7,i7 the ,committee  
on ,armed ,services of the ,house of    
,representatives2  7,j7 the ,committee  
on ,education and the ,workforce of the 
,house of ,representatives2  7,k7 the   
,committee on ,foreign ,affairs of the  
,house of ,representatives2  7,l7 the   
,committee on the ,judiciary of the     
,house of ,representatives2  7,m7 the   
,permanent ,select ,committee on        
,intelligence of the ,house of          
,representatives2 and  7,n7 the         
,committee on ,financial ,services of   
the ,house of ,representatives4  7#b7   

,political influence operations ,the    
term political influence operations     
means the coordinated and often         
concealed application of disinformation1
 press manipulation1 economic coercion1 
targeted investments1 corruption1 or    
academic censorship4 ,such efforts are  
often intended--  7,a7 to coerce and    
corrupt ,united ,states interests1      
institutions1 or individuals2 and  7,b7 
to foster attitudes1 behavior1          
decisions1 or outcomes in the ,united   
,states that support the interests of   
the ,government of the ,people's        
,republic of ,china or the ,communist   
,party of ,china4  #c4 ,statement of    
policy  7a7 ,findings ,congress finds   
the following3 7#a7 ,the ,government of 
,china and the ,communist ,party of     
,china employ a wide range of political1
 informational1 and economic measures to
 influence1 coerce1 intimidate1 or      
undermine the ,united ,states interests 
or the interests of ,united ,states     
partners and allies4  7#b7 ,the         

,december #bjag ,national ,security     
,strategy of the ,united ,states of     
,america states1 ,although the ,united  
,states seeks to continue to cooperate  
with ,china1 ,china is using economic   
inducements and penalties1 influence    
operations1 and implied military threats
 to persuade other states to heed its   
political and security agenda4  7#c7    
,the political influence operations     
efforts of the ,government of ,china and
 the ,communist ,party of ,china have   
received less scrutiny than the efforts 
of the ,government of the ,russian      
,federation1 but given ,china's economic
 strength and the growing apparatus     
being used to spread its influence      
globally1 efforts to promote its        
authoritarian ideal pose significant and
 consequential long-term challenges to  
,united ,states interests and values4   
7#d7 ,the ,government of ,china and the 
,communist ,party of ,china use both    
overt and covert means to target the    
political and economic elite1 the media 

and public opinion1 civil society and   
academia1 and members of the ,chinese   
diaspora4  7#e7 ,the ,government of     
,china and the ,communist ,party of     
,china employ an array of government    
entities1 friendship and exchange       
organizations1 and government-funded    
foundations1 think tanks1 educational   
and other projects to carry out         
political influence operations1 which is
 often referred to as united front work4
  7#f7 ,these political influence       
operations violate national sovereignty1
 and as such1 are fundamentally         
different from traditional efforts by   
states to shape international policy    
debates and improve their public image  
through public diplomacy and strategic  
communications campaigns4  7#g7 ,the    
aims of the political influence         
operations of the ,government of ,china 
and the ,communist ,party of ,china     
are--  7,a7 to secure the political     
stability of the regime within ,china2  
and  7,b7 to globally promote the idea  

that the ,chinese political and economic
 model is superior to the governments of
 ,western democracies4  7#h7 ,the       
political influence operations of the   
,government of ,china and the ,communist
 ,party of ,china take advantage of the 
open and democratic nature of the       
,united ,states1 including--  7,a7      
constitutional protections for free     
speech and a free press2 and  7,b7 the  
desire of some individuals or           
institutions to attract ,chinese        
investment1 gain access to ,chinese     
markets1 or attain greater global       
influence4  7b7 ,sense of ,congress ,it 
is the sense of ,congress that-- 7#a7   
the political influence operations of   
the ,government of ,china and the       
,communist ,party of ,china are not soft
 power intended to persuade1 but sharp  
power intended--  7,a7 to penetrate or  
corrupt democratic countries2  7,b7 to  
foster attitudes1 behavior1 laws1 and   
policies favorable to the ,government of
 ,china's interest through              

disinformation1 coercion1 and other     
means2  7,c7 to widen the scope of      
,chinese authoritarian influence around 
the world1 including to suppress        
political dissent and internationally   
recognized human and civil rights of    
their citizens in nations around the    
world2 and  7,d7 to undermine the       
strength of ,american alliances around  
the world2 and  7#b7 the ,american      
people need reliable and current        
information--  7,a7 to understand the   
malign goals of these political         
influence operations2  7,b7 to identify 
the key institutions1 individuals1      
entities1 and ministries that carry out 
such operations2 and  7,c7 to           
distinguish the entities referred to in 
subparagraph 7,b7 from the cultural1    
educational1 and people-to-people       
exchanges that benefit the ,united      
,states and ,china4  7c7 ,statement of  
policy ,it is the policy of the ,united 
,states-- 7#a7 to clearly differentiate 
between the ,chinese people and culture 

and the ,government of ,china and the   
,communist ,party of ,china in official 
statements1 media1 and messaging2  7#b7 
to clearly differentiate between legal1 
internationally accepted public         
diplomacy and strategic communications  
campaigns and illicit activities to     
undermine democratic institutions or    
freedoms2  7#c7 to ensure that efforts  
to curtail the political influence      
operations of the ,government of ,china 
and the ,communist ,party of ,china do  
not lead to the targeting of ,chinese   
,americans or members of the ,chinese   
diaspora1 who are often the victims and 
primary targets of such political       
influence operations2  7#d7 to take     
steps to ensure that ,chinese nationals 
who are legally studying1 living1 or    
working temporarily in the ,united      
,states know that intimidation or       
surveillance by the ,government of      
,china and the ,communist ,party of     
,china is an unacceptable invasion of   
their rights while they reside in the   

,united ,states2  7#e7 to enhance       
cooperation and coordination with       
,australia1 ,canada1 ,new ,zealand1 and 
,taiwan 7officially known as the        
,republic of ,china71 whose governments 
and institutions have faced acute       
pressure from the political influence   
operations of the ,government of ,china 
and the ,communist ,party of ,china1 and
 with other allies throughout the       
world--  7,a7 to counter such political 
influence operations2  7,b7 to curtail  
the advancement of authoritarian ideals 
that challenge democratic values and    
international human rights norms2  7,c7 
to create strategies to ensure that     
countries in ,africa1 the ,western      
,hemisphere1 ,southeast ,asia1 and      
elsewhere are aware of ,china's sharp   
power2 and  7,d7 to work collaboratively
 to counter coercive1 covert1 and       
corrupting elements2  7#f7 to develop a 
strategic assessment and long-term      
strategy to counter the political       
influence operations of the ,government 

of ,china and the ,communist ,party of  
,china that--  7,a7 undermine democratic
 institutions2  7,b7 target ,united     
,states citizens or nationals or        
intimidates their families in ,china2   
and  7,c7 use economic tools1 market    
access1 cyberattacks1 or other          
capabilities to undermine the freedoms  
of speech1 expression1 the press1       
association1 assembly1 religion1 or     
academic thought2  7#g7 to implement    
more advanced transparency requirements 
concerning collaboration with ,chinese  
actors for media agencies1 universities1
 think tanks1 and government officials2 
7#h7 to use various forums to raise     
awareness about-- 7,a7 the goals and    
methods of the political influence      
operations of the ,government of ,china 
and the ,communist ,party of ,china2 and
  7,b7 common patterns and approaches   
used by ,chinese intelligence agencies  
or related actors2  7#i7 to require     
greater transparency for ,confucius     
,institutes1 think tanks1 academic      

programs1 and nongovernmental           
organizations funded primarily by the   
,government of ,china or by individuals 
or public or private organizations with 
a demonstrable affiliation with the     
,government of ,china that are operating
 in the ,united ,states to register     
through the ,foreign ,agents            
,registration ,act of #aich 7#bb        
,u4,s4,c4 #fab7 or a comparable         
mechanism2  7#aj7 to seek ways to       
increase ,chinese language proficiency  
among mid-career professionals2  7#aa7  
to ensure that existing tools are       
sufficiently screening for the risk of  
,chinese influence operations2 and      
7#ab7 to create more flexible tools1 as 
needed1 with the goals of-- 7,a7        
screening investments from the          
,government of ,china or sources backed 
by the ,government of ,china to protect 
against the takeover of ,united ,states 
companies by ,chinese state-owned or    
state-driven entities2 and  7,b7        
protecting institutions or business     

sectors critically important to ,united 
,states national security and the       
viability of democratic institutions4   
#d4 ,report on the political influence  
operations of the ,government of ,china 
and the ,communist ,party of ,china  7a7
 ,in general ,not later than #bgj days  
after the date of the enactment of this 
,act1 the ,secretary of ,state1 in      
coordination with the ,director of      
,national ,intelligence1 and in         
consultation with the heads of relevant 
,federal departments and agencies1 shall
 submit an unclassified report to the   
appropriate congressional committees    
that describes the political influence  
operations of the ,government of ,china 
and the ,communist ,party of ,china     
affecting the ,united ,states and not   
more than #e allies and partners most   
impacted by the ,government of ,china's 
influence operations in their countries1
 as defined by the ,director of         
,national ,intelligence1 including      
efforts--  7#a7 to exert undue influence

 over ,united ,states governmental or   
nongovernmental institutions or         
individuals1 or government officials    
among ,united ,states allies and        
partners2  7#b7 to coerce or threaten   
,united ,states citizens or legal       
permanent residents or their families or
 relatives living in ,china2  7#c7 to   
undermine democratic institutions and   
the freedoms of speech1 expression1 the 
press1 association1 assembly1 religion1 
or academic thought2  7#d7 to otherwise 
suppress information in public fora1 in 
the ,united ,states and abroad2 or  7#e7
 to develop or obtain property1         
facilities1 infrastructure1 business    
entities1 or other assets for use in    
facilitating the activities described in
 paragraphs 7#a7 through 7#d74  7b7     
,contents ,the report required under    
subsection 7a7 shall also include       
recommendations for the ,president and  
,congress relating to--  7#a7 the need  
for additional resources or authorities 
to counter political influence          

operations in the ,united ,states       
directed by the ,government of ,china or
 the ,communist ,party of ,china1       
including operations carried out in     
concert with allies2  7#b7 ways to use  
existing resources to develop core      
competencies among ,federal agencies and
 the ,armed ,forces in the subject area 
of ,chinese political influence         
operations2  7#c7 whether a permanent   
office to monitor and respond to        
political influence operations of the   
,government of ,china and the ,communist
 ,party of ,china should be established 
within the ,department of ,state or the 
,office of the ,director of ,national   
,intelligence2 and  7#d7 whether regular
 public reports on the political        
influence operations of the ,government 
of ,china and the ,communist ,party of  
,china are needed to inform ,congress   
and the ,american people of the scale   
and scope of such operations4