,,ii #aaeth ,,congress #b;d ,session ,s4 #cjdi ,,in ,,the ,,senate ,,of ,,the ,,united ,,states ,june #ab1 #bjah,mr4 ,wyden 7for himself1 ,mrs4 ,gillibrand1 ,ms4 ,warren1 ,mrs4 ,murray1 ,mr4 ,markey1 and ,mr4 ,merkley7 introduced the following bill2 which was read twice and referred to the ,committee on ,rules and ,administration ,a ,,bill ,to amend the ,help ,america ,vote ,act of #bjjb to require paper ballots and risk-limiting audits in all ,federal elections1 and for other purposes4 #a4 ,short title ,this ,act may be cited as the ,protecting ,american ,votes and ,elections ,act of #bjah 4 #b4 ,findings ,congress makes the following findings3 7#a7 ,access to the ballot1 free and fair elections1 and a trustworthy election process are at the core of ,american ,democracy4 ,just as the ,founding ,fathers signed their names to paper supporting their views for a government by and for the people1 access to the paper ballot is the best way to ensure elections stay by and for the ,american people4 ,using paper provides an easily auditable1 tamper proof1 and simple way for citizens to access their ballot4 ,it is for these reasons and more that using paper ballots to ensure resilient and fair elections should be the priority of this ,nation4 7#b7 ,risk-limiting audits will help to protect our elections from cyberattacks1 by ensuring that if the electoral outcome is incorrect1 for instance because someone tampered with the electronic counts or reporting1 the audit has a large1 known probability of correcting the outcome by requiring a full hand count4 ,paper ballots are vital to the audit process since1 other than through manual inspection of a sample of paper ballots1 there is currently no reliable way to determine whether an election was hacked or the outcome was miscalculated4 7#c7 ,risk-limiting audits are a cost effective way of auditing election results4 ,they generally require inspecting only a small percentage of the ballots cast in an election1 and proceed to a full hand count only when sampling does not provide strong evidence that the reported outcome is correct4 ,this will ensure that ,americans have confidence in their election results1 without the cost of a full recount of every ballot in the country4 #c4 ,paper ballot and manual counting requirements 7a7 ,in general ,section #cja7;a77#b7 of the ,help ,america ,vote ,act of #bjjb 7#eb ,u4,s4,c4 #bajha7;a77#b77 is amended to read as follows3 7#b7 ,paper ballot requirement 7,a7 ,voter-verified paper ballots 7i7 ,paper ballot requirement 7,i7 ,the voting system shall require the use of an individual1 durable1 voter-verified1 paper ballot of the voter's vote that shall be marked and made available for inspection and verification by the voter before the voter's vote is cast and counted1 and which shall be counted by hand or read by an optical character recognition device or other counting device4 ,for purposes of this subclause1 the term individual1 durable1 voter-verified1 paper ballot means a paper ballot marked by the voter by hand or a paper ballot marked through the use of a nontabulating ballot marking device or system1 so long as the voter shall have the option to mark his or her ballot by hand4 7,,ii7 ,the voting system shall provide the voter with an opportunity to correct any error on the paper ballot before the permanent voter-verified paper ballot is preserved in accordance with clause 7ii74 7,,iii7 ,the voting system shall not preserve the voter-verified paper ballots in any manner that makes it possible1 at any time after the ballot has been cast1 to associate a voter with the record of the voter's vote without the voter's consent4 7ii7 ,preservation as official record ,the individual1 durable1 voter-verified1 paper ballot used in accordance with clause 7i7 shall constitute the official ballot and shall be preserved and used as the official ballot for purposes of any recount or audit conducted with respect to any election for ,federal office in which the voting system is used4 7iii7 ,manual counting requirements for recounts and audits 7,i7 ,each paper ballot used pursuant to clause 7i7 shall be suitable for a manual audit1 and shall be counted by hand in any recount or audit conducted with respect to any election for ,federal office4 7,,ii7 ,in the event of any inconsistencies or irregularities between any electronic vote tallies and the vote tallies determined by counting by hand the individual1 durable1 voter-verified1 paper ballots used pursuant to clause 7i71 and subject to subparagraph 7,b71 the individual1 durable1 voter-verified1 paper ballots shall be the true and correct record of the votes cast4 7iv7 ,application to all ballots ,the requirements of this subparagraph shall apply to all ballots cast in elections for ,federal office1 including ballots cast by absent uniformed services voters and overseas voters under the ,uniformed and ,overseas ,citizens ,absentee ,voting ,act and other absentee voters4 7,b7 ,special rule for treatment of disputes when paper ballots have been shown to be compromised 7i7 ,in general ,in the event that-- 7,i7 there is any inconsistency between any electronic vote tallies and the vote tallies determined by counting by hand the individual1 durable1 voter-verified1 paper ballots used pursuant to subparagraph 7,a77i7 with respect to any election for ,federal office2 and 7,,ii7 it is demonstrated by clear and convincing evidence 7as determined in accordance with the applicable standards in the jurisdiction involved7 in any recount1 audit1 or contest of the result of the election that the paper ballots have been compromised 7by damage or mischief or otherwise7 and that a sufficient number of the ballots have been so compromised that the result of the election could be changed1 the determination of the appropriate remedy with respect to the election shall be made in accordance with applicable ,state law1 except that the electronic tally shall not be used as the exclusive basis for determining the official certified result4 7ii7 ,rule for consideration of ballots associated with each voting machine ,for purposes of clause 7i71 only the paper ballots deemed compromised1 if any1 shall be considered in the calculation of whether or not the result of the election could be changed due to the compromised paper ballots4 4 7b7 ,conforming amendment clarifying applicability of alternative language accessibility ,section #cja7;a77#d7 of such ,act 7#eb ,u4,s4,c4 #bajha7;a77#d77 is amended by inserting 7including the paper ballots required to be used under paragraph 7#b77 after voting system4 7c7 ,other conforming amendments ,section #cja7;a77#a7 of such ,act 7#eb ,u4,s4,c4 #bajha7;a77#a77 is amended-- 7#a7 in subparagraph 7,a77i71 by striking counted and inserting counted1 in accordance with paragraphs 7#b7 and 7#c72 7#b7 in subparagraph 7,a77ii71 by striking counted and inserting counted1 in accordance with paragraphs 7#b7 and 7#c72 7#c7 in subparagraph 7,a77iii71 by striking counted each place it appears and inserting counted1 in accordance with paragraphs 7#b7 and 7#c72 and 7#d7 in subparagraph 7,b77ii71 by striking counted and inserting counted1 in accordance with paragraphs 7#b7 and 7#c74 7d7 ,effective date ,notwithstanding section #cja7;d7 of the ,help ,america ,vote ,act of #bjjb 7#eb ,u4,s4,c4 #bajha7;d771 each ,state and jurisdiction shall be required to comply with the amendments made by this section for the regularly scheduled election for ,federal office in ,november #bjbj1 and for each subsequent election for ,federal office4 #d4 ,accessibility and ballot verification for individuals with disabilities 7a7 ,in general ,section #cja7;a77#c77;,b7 of the ,help ,america ,vote ,act of #bjjb 7#eb ,u4,s4,c4 #bajha7;a77#c77;,b77 is amended to read as follows3 7,b7 7i7 satisfy the requirement of subparagraph 7,a7 through the use of at least #a voting system equipped for individuals with disabilities1 including nonvisual and enhanced visual accessibility for the blind and visually impaired1 and nonmanual and enhanced manual accessibility for the mobility and dexterity impaired1 at each polling place2 and 7ii7 meet the requirements of subparagraph 7,a7 and paragraph 7#b77;,a7 by using a system that-- 7,i7 allows the voter to privately and independently verify the permanent paper ballot through the presentation1 in accessible form1 of the printed or marked vote selections from the same printed or marked information that would be used for any vote counting or auditing2 and 7,,ii7 allows the voter to privately and independently verify and cast the permanent paper ballot without requiring the voter to manually handle the paper ballot2 and 4 7b7 ,specific requirement of study1 testing1 and development of accessible paper ballot verification mechanisms 7#a7 ,study and reporting ,subtitle ,c of title ,,ii of such ,act 7#eb ,u4,s4,c4 #bajha et seq47 is amended by inserting after section #bdf the following new section3 #bdf;,a4 ,study and report on accessible paper ballot verification mechanisms 7a7 ,study and ,report ,the ,director of the ,national ,science ,foundation shall make grants to not fewer than #c eligible entities to study1 test1 and develop accessible paper ballot voting1 verification1 and casting mechanisms and devices and best practices to enhance the accessibility of paper ballot voting and verification mechanisms for individuals with disabilities1 for voters whose primary language is not ,english1 and for voters with difficulties in literacy1 including best practices for the mechanisms themselves and the processes through which the mechanisms are used4 7b7 ,eligibility ,an entity is eligible to receive a grant under this part if it submits to the ,director 7at such time and in such form as the ,director may require7 an application containing-- 7#a7 certifications that the entity shall specifically investigate enhanced methods or devices1 including non-electronic devices1 that will assist such individuals and voters in marking voter-verified paper ballots and presenting or transmitting the information printed or marked on such ballots back to such individuals and voters1 and casting such ballots2 7#b7 a certification that the entity shall complete the activities carried out with the grant not later than ,december #ca1 #bjbj2 and 7#c7 such other information and certifications as the ,director may require4 7c7 ,availability of ,technology ,any technology developed with the grants made under this section shall be treated as non-proprietary and shall be made available to the public1 including to manufacturers of voting systems4 7d7 ,coordination ,with ,grants for ,technology ,improvements ,the ,director shall carry out this section so that the activities carried out with the grants made under subsection 7a7 are coordinated with the research conducted under the grant program carried out by the ,commission under section #bga1 to the extent that the ,director and ,commission determine necessary to provide for the advancement of accessible voting technology4 7e7 ,authorization of ,appropriations ,there is authorized to be appropriated to carry out subsection 7a7 #aj1jjj1jjj1 to remain available until expended4 4 7#b7 ,clerical amendment ,the table of contents of such ,act is amended by inserting after the item relating to section #bdf the following new item3 ,sec4 #bdf;,a4 ,study and report on accessible paper ballot verification mechanisms4 4 #e4 ,risk-limiting audits 7a7 ,in general ,title ,,iii of the ,help ,america ,vote ,act of #bjjb 7#eb ,u4,s4,c4 #bajha et seq47 is amended by inserting after section #cjc the following new section3 #cjc;,a4 ,risk-limiting audits 7a7 ,definitions ,in this section3 7#a7 ,risk-limiting audit 7,a7 ,in general ,the term risk-limiting audit means a post-election process such that1 if the reported outcome of the contest is incorrect1 there is at least a #ie percent chance that the audit will replace the incorrect outcome with the correct outcome as determined by a full1 hand-to-eye tabulation of all votes validly cast in that election contest that ascertains voter intent manually and directly from voter-verifiable paper records4 7,b7 ,reported outcome ,the term reported outcome means the outcome of an election contest which is determined according to the canvass and which will become the official1 certified outcome unless it is revised by an audit1 recount1 or other legal process4 7,c7 ,incorrect outcome ,the term incorrect outcome means an outcome that differs from the outcome that would be determined by a full tabulation of all votes validly cast in that election contest1 determining voter intent manually1 directly from voter-verifiable paper records4 7,d7 ,outcome ,the term outcome means the winner or set of winners of an election contest1 which might be candidates or positions4 7#b7 ,ballot manifest ,the term ballot manifest means a record maintained by each county that-- 7,a7 is created without reliance on any part of the voting system used to tabulate votes2 7,b7 functions as a sampling frame for conducting a risk-limiting audit2 and 7,c7 contains the following information about ballots cast and counted3 7i7 ,the total number of ballots cast and counted in the election 7including undervotes1 overvotes1 and other invalid votes74 7ii7 ,the total number of ballots cast in each contest in the election 7including undervotes1 overvotes1 and other invalid votes74 7iii7 ,a precise description of the manner in which the ballots are physically stored1 including the total number of physical groups of ballots1 the numbering system for each group1 a unique label for each group1 and the number of ballots in each such group4 7b7 ,requirement 7#a7 ,in general 7,a7 ,audits ,each ,state and jurisdiction shall administer risk-limiting audits of the results of all elections for ,federal office held in the ,state in accordance with the requirements of paragraph 7#b74 7,b7 ,full manual tally ,if a risk-limiting audit conducted under subparagraph 7,a7 leads to a full manual tally of an election contest1 the ,state or jurisdiction shall use the results of the full manual tally as the official results of the election contest4 7#b7 ,audit requirements 7,a7 ,rules and procedures 7i7 ,in general ,risk-limiting audits shall be conducted in accordance with the rules and procedures established by the chief ,state election official of the ,state not later than #a year after the date of the enactment of this section4 7ii7 ,matters included ,the rules and procedures established under clause 7i7 may include the following3 7,i7 ,rules for ensuring the security of ballots and documenting that prescribed procedures were followed4 7,,ii7 ,rules and procedures for ensuring the accuracy of ballot manifests produced by jurisdictions4 7,,iii7 ,rules and procedures for governing the format of ballot manifests1 cast vote records1 and other data involved in risk-limiting audits4 7,,iv7 ,methods to ensure that any cast vote records used in a risk-limiting audit are those used by the voting system to tally the election results sent to the ,secretary of ,state and made public4 7,v7 ,procedures for the random selection of ballots to be inspected manually during each audit4 7,,vi7 ,rules for the calculations and other methods to be used in the audit and to determine whether and when the audit of each contest is complete4 7,,vii7 ,procedures and requirements for testing any software used to conduct risk-limiting audits4 7,b7 ,timing ,the risk-limiting audit shall be completed not later than the date that the result of the election is certified by the ,state4 7,c7 ,public report ,after the completion of the risk-limiting audit1 the ,state shall publish a report on the results of the audit1 together with such information as necessary to confirm that the audit was conducted properly4 7c7 ,effective date ,each ,state and jurisdiction shall be required to comply with the requirements of this section for the regularly scheduled election for ,federal office in ,november #bjbj1 and for each subsequent election for ,federal office4 4 7b7 ,conforming amendments related to enforcement ,section #dja of such ,act 7#eb ,u4,s4,c4 #baaaa7 is amended by striking and #cjc and inserting #cjc1 and #cjc;,a4 7c7 ,clerical ,amendment ,the table of contents for such ,act is amended by inserting after the item relating to section #cjc the following new item3 ,sec4 #cjc;,a4 ,risk-limiting audits4 4