,,ii #aaeth ,,congress #b;d ,session ,s4 #bcia ,,in ,,the ,,senate ,,of ,,the ,,united ,,states ,february #g1 #bjah,mr4 ,cotton 7for himself1 ,mr4 ,cornyn1 and ,mr4 ,rubio7 introduced the following bill2 which was read twice and referred to the ,committee on ,homeland ,security and ,governmental ,affairs ,a ,,bill ,to prohibit the ,united ,states ,government from using or contracting with an entity that uses certain telecommunications services or equipment1 and for other purposes4 #a4 ,short title ,this ,act may be cited as the ,defending ,u4,s4 ,government ,communications ,act4 #b4 ,findings ,congress makes the following findings3 7#a7 ,in its #bjaa ,annual ,report to ,congress on ,military and ,security ,developments ,involving the ,people's ,republic of ,china1 the ,department of ,defense stated1 ,china's defense industry has benefited from integration with a rapidly expanding civilian economy and science and technology sector1 particularly elements that have access to foreign technology4 ,progress within individual defense sectors appears linked to the relative integration of each1 through ,china's civilian economy1 into the global production and ,r,d chain ''' ,information technology companies in particular1 including ,huawei1 ,datang1 and ,zhongxing1 maintain close ties to the ,,pla44 7#b7 ,in a #bjaa report titled ,the ,national ,security ,implications of ,investments and ,products from the ,people's ,republic of ,china in the ,telecommunications ,sector1 the ,united ,states ,china ,commission stated that national security concerns have accompanied the dramatic growth of ,china's telecom sector4 ''' ,additionally1 large ,chinese companies--particularly those national champions prominent in ,china's going out strategy of overseas expansion--are directly subject to direction by the ,chinese ,communist ,party1 to include support for ,,prc state policies and goals44 7#c7 ,the ,commission further stated in its report that from this point of view1 the clear economic benefits of foreign investment in the ,u4,s4 must be weighed against the potential security concerns related to infrastructure components coming under the control of foreign entities4 ,this seems particularly applicable in the telecommunications industry1 as ,chinese companies continue systematically to acquire significant holdings in prominent global and ,u4,s4 telecommunications and information technology companies44 7#d7 ,in its #bjaa ,annual ,report to ,congress1 the ,united ,states ,china ,commission stated that the extent of the state's control of the ,chinese economy is difficult to quantify ''' ,there is also a category of companies that1 though claiming to be private1 are subject to state influence4 ,such companies are often in new markets with no established ,,soe leaders and enjoy favorable government policies that support their development while posing obstacles to foreign competition4 ,examples include ,chinese telecoms giant ,huawei and such automotive companies as battery maker ,,byd and vehicle manufacturers ,geely and ,chery44 7#e7 ,general ,michael ,hayden1 who served as ,director of the ,central ,intelligence ,agency and ,director of the ,national ,security ,agency1 stated in ,july #bjac that ,huawei had shared with the ,chinese state intimate and extensive knowledge of foreign telecommunications systems it is involved with4 7#f7 ,the ,federal ,bureau of ,investigation1 in a ,february #bjae ,counterintelligence ,strategy ,partnership ,intelligence ,note stated that1 with the expanded use of ,huawei ,technologies ,inc4 equipment and services in ,u4,s4 telecommunications service provider networks1 the ,chinese ,government's potential access to ,u4,s4 business communications is dramatically increasing4 ,chinese ,government-supported telecommunications equipment on ,u4,s4 networks may be exploited through ,chinese cyber activity1 with ,china's intelligence services operating as an advanced persistent threat to ,u4,s4 networks44 7#g7 ,the ,,fbi further stated in its ,february #bjae counterintelligence note that ,china makes no secret that its cyber warfare strategy is predicated on controlling global communications network infrastructure4 7#h7 ,at a hearing before the ,committee on ,armed ,services of the ,house of ,representatives on ,september #cj1 #bjae1 ,deputy ,secretary of ,defense ,robert ,work1 responding to a question about the use of ,huawei telecommunications equipment1 stated1 ,in the ,office of the ,secretary of ,defense1 absolutely not4 ,and ,i know of no other--,i don't believe we operate in the ,pentagon1 any ,huawei systems in the ,pentagon44 7#i7 ,at that hearing1 the ,commander of the ,united ,states ,cyber ,command1 ,admiral ,mike ,rogers1 responding to a question about why such ,huawei telecommunications equipment is not used1 stated1 ,as we look at supply chain and we look at potential vulnerabilities within the system1 that it is a risk we felt was unacceptable44 7#aj7 ,in ,march #bjag1 ,,zte ,corporation pled guilty to conspiring to violate the ,international ,emergency ,economic ,powers ,act by illegally shipping ,u4,s4-origin items to ,iran1 paying the ,united ,states ,government a penalty of #hib1cfj1jfd for activity between ,january #bjaj and ,january #bjaf4 7#aa7 ,the ,department of the ,treasury's ,office of ,foreign ,assets ,control issued a subpoena to ,huawei as part of a ,federal investigation of alleged violations of trade restrictions on ,cuba1 ,iran1 ,sudan1 and ,syria4 7#ab7 ,in the bipartisan ,investigative ,report on the ,united ,states ,national ,security ,issues ,posed by ,chinese ,telecommunication ,companies ,huawei and ,,zte released in #bjab by the ,permanent ,select ,committee on ,intelligence of the ,house of ,representatives1 it was recommended that ,u4,s4 government systems1 particularly sensitive systems1 should not include ,huawei or ,,zte equipment1 including in component parts4 ,similarly1 government contractors--particularly those working on contracts for sensitive ,u4,s4 programs--should exclude ,,zte or ,huawei equipment in their systems44 #c4 ,prohibition on certain telecommunications services or equipment 7a7 ,prohibition on agency use or procurement ,the head of an agency may not procure or obtain1 may not extend or renew a contract to procure or obtain1 and may not enter into a contract 7or extend or renew a contract7 with an entity that uses any equipment1 system1 or service that uses covered telecommunications equipment or services as a substantial or essential component of any system1 or as critical technology as part of any system4 7b7 ,definitions ,in this section3 7#a7 ,agency ,the term agency has the meaning given that term in section #eea of title #e1 ,united ,states ,code4 7#b7 ,covered foreign country ,the term covered foreign country means the ,people's ,republic of ,china4 7#c7 ,covered telecommunications equipment or services ,the term covered telecommunications equipment or services means any of the following3 7,a7 ,telecommunications equipment produced by ,huawei ,technologies ,company or ,,zte ,corporation 7or any subsidiary or affiliate of such entities74 7,b7 ,telecommunications services provided by such entities or using such equipment4 7,c7 ,telecommunications equipment or services produced or provided by an entity that the head of the relevant agency reasonably believes to be an entity owned or controlled by1 or otherwise connected to1 the government of a covered foreign country4