,i #aaeth ,,congress #b;d ,session ,h4 ,r4 #fjaj ,,in ,,the ,,house ,,of ,,representatives ,june #e1 #bjah,mr4 ,smith of ,new ,jersey 7for himself1 ,ms4 ,kaptur1 ,mr4 ,meadows1 ,mr4 ,perry1 ,mr4 ,hultgren1 ,mr4 ,pittenger1 and ,ms4 ,ros-,lehtinen7 introduced the following bill2 which was referred to the ,committee on ,foreign ,affairs1 and in addition to the ,committee on the ,judiciary1 for a period to be subsequently determined by the ,speaker1 in each case for consideration of such provisions as fall within the jurisdiction of the committee concerned ,a ,,bill ,to require an unclassified interagency report on the political influence operations of the ,chinese ,government and ,communist ,party with respect to the ,united ,states1 and for other purposes4 #a4 ,short title ,this ,act may be referred to as the ,countering the ,chinese ,government and ,communist ,party's ,political ,influence ,operations ,act4 #b4 ,definitions ,in this ,act3 7#a7 ,appropriate congressional committees ,unless otherwise specified1 the term appropriate congressional committees means-- 7,a7 in the ,house of ,representatives-- 7i7 the ,committee on ,foreign ,affairs2 7ii7 the ,committee on ,armed ,services2 7iii7 the ,committee on ,appropriations2 7iv7 the ,committee on the ,judiciary2 7v7 the ,committee on ,education and the ,workforce2 and 7vi7 the ,permanent ,select ,committee on ,intelligence2 and 7,b7 in the ,senate-- 7i7 the ,committee on ,foreign ,relations2 7ii7 the ,committee on ,armed ,services2 7iii7 the ,committee on ,appropriations2 7iv7 the ,committee on the ,judiciary2 7v7 the ,committee on ,health1 ,education1 ,labor1 and ,pensions2 and 7vi7 the ,select ,committee on ,intelligence4 7#b7 ,political influence operations ,unless otherwise specified1 the term political influence operations means efforts to coerce and corrupt ,united ,states interests1 institutions1 or individuals and foster in the ,united ,states attitudes1 behavior1 decisions1 or outcomes favorable to the ,chinese ,government or ,communist ,party through coordinated and often concealed application of disinformation1 press manipulation1 economic coercion1 targeted investments1 corruption1 or academic censorship4 #c4 ,statement of policy 7a7 ,findings ,congress finds the following3 7#a7 ,the ,chinese ,government and ,communist ,party employ a wide range of political1 informational1 and economic measures to influence1 coerce1 intimidate1 or undermine ,united ,states interests or the interests of ,united ,states partners and allies4 7#b7 ,according to the ,december #bjag ,national ,security ,strategy of the ,united ,states of ,america1 ,although the ,united ,states seeks to continue to cooperate with ,china1 ,china is using economic inducements and penalties1 influence operations1 and implied military threats to persuade other states to heed its political and security agenda44 7#c7 ,the political influence operations efforts of the ,chinese ,government and ,communist ,party have received less scrutiny than the efforts of the ,russian ,government1 but given ,china's economic strength and the growing apparatus being used to spread its influence globally1 efforts to promote its authoritarian ideal pose significant and consequential long-term challenges to ,united ,states interests and values4 7#d7 ,the ,chinese ,government and ,communist ,party use both overt and covert means to target the political and economic elite1 the media and public opinion1 civil society and academia1 and members of the ,chinese diaspora4 7#e7 ,the ,chinese ,government and ,communist ,party employs an array of government entities1 friendship and exchange organizations1 and government funded foundations1 think-tanks1 educational and other projects to carry out political influence operations1 often called united front work4 7#f7 ,the ,chinese ,government and ,communist ,party's political influence operations aim is to secure the regime's political stability domestically and spread globally its political and economic model as superior to those of ,western democracies4 7#g7 ,the ,chinese ,government and ,communist ,party's political influence operations take advantage of the open and democratic nature of the ,united ,states1 including constitutional protections for free speech and a free press1 and the desire by some individuals or institutions to attract ,chinese investment1 gain access to ,chinese markets1 or attain greater global influence4 7b7 ,sense of ,congress ,it is the sense of ,congress that the ,chinese ,government and ,communist ,party's political influence operations are not soft power intended to persuade1 but sharp power intended to penetrate or corrupt democratic countries1 foster attitudes and behavior favorable to the ,chinese ,government's interest through disinformation1 coercion1 and other means1 and to widen the scope of authoritarian influence globally4 ,it is further the sense of ,congress that ,congress and the ,american public need reliable and current information to understand the malign goals of these political influence operations1 identify the key institutions1 individuals1 entities1 and ministries that carry out such operations1 and distinguish them from the cultural1 educational1 and people-to-people exchanges which benefit both the ,united ,states and ,china4 7c7 ,statement of policy ,it is the policy of the ,united ,states to-- 7#a7 clearly differentiate between the ,chinese people and culture and the ,chinese ,government and ,communist ,party in official statements1 media1 and messaging1 and to ensure that efforts to curtail ,beijing's political influence operations do not lead to the targeting of ,chinese-,americans or the ,chinese diaspora1 as they are most often the victims and primary targets of political influence operations2 7#b7 take steps to ensure that ,chinese nationals who are legally studying1 living1 or working temporarily in the ,united ,states know that intimidation or surveillance by the ,chinese ,government and ,communist ,party is an unacceptable invasion of their rights while they reside in the ,united ,states2 7#c7 enhance cooperation and coordination with ,australia1 ,canada1 and ,taiwan 7,republic of ,china71 whose governments and institutions have faced acute pressure from the ,chinese ,government and ,communist ,party's political influence operations1 and with other allies globally1 to counter such operations1 curtail advances of authoritarian ideals that challenge democratic values and international human rights norms1 and create strategies to ensure countries in ,africa1 the ,western ,hemisphere1 ,southeast ,asia1 and elsewhere are aware of ,china's sharp power and work collaboratively to counter coercive1 covert1 and corrupting elements2 7#d7 develop a strategic assessment and long-term strategy to counter the ,chinese ,government and ,communist ,party's political influence operations1 censorship1 propaganda1 and disinformation that undermines democratic institutions1 targets ,united ,states citizens or nationals or intimidates their families in ,china2 and uses economic tools1 market access1 cyberattacks1 or other capabilities to undermine the freedoms of speech1 expression1 press1 association1 assembly1 religion1 or academic thought2 7#e7 implement more advanced transparency requirements concerning collaboration with ,chinese actors for media agencies1 universities1 think tanks1 and government officials1 among others1 and raise awareness1 through various forums about the goals and methods of the ,chinese ,government and ,communist ,party's political influence operations and common patterns and approaches used by ,chinese intelligence agencies or related actors2 7#f7 require ,confucius ,institutes1 and any other think tanks1 academic programs1 or nongovernmental organizations funded primarily by the ,chinese ,government or ,chinese ,government-affiliated entities and operating in the ,united ,states1 to register under section #b of the ,foreign ,agents ,registration ,act of #aich 7#bb ,u4,s4,c4 #fab72 7#g7 seek ways to increase ,chinese language proficiency among mid-career professionals2 and 7#h7 create more flexible tools to screen investments from ,chinese ,government or ,chinese ,government-backed sources to protect against the takeover of ,united ,states companies by ,chinese state-owned or state-driven entities1 and to protect institutions or business sectors critically important to ,united ,states national security and the viability of democratic institutions4 #d4 ,report on the ,chinese ,government and ,communist ,party's political influence operations 7a7 ,in general ,not later than one year after the date of the enactment of this ,act1 the ,secretary of ,state1 in consultation with the heads of relevant ,federal departments and agencies1 shall submit to the appropriate congressional committees an unclassified report on ,chinese ,government and ,communist ,party political influence operations with respect to the ,united ,states1 including efforts to corrupt ,united ,states governmental or nongovernmental institutions or individuals1 efforts to coerce or threaten ,united ,states citizens or legal permanent residents or their families or relatives living in ,china1 and efforts to undermine democratic institutions and the freedoms of speech1 expression1 press1 association1 assembly1 religion1 or academic thought4 7b7 ,contents ,the report required under subsection 7a7 shall also include recommendations for the ,president and ,congress relating to the following3 7#a7 ,whether additional resources or authorities are needed to counter ,chinese ,government and ,communist ,party's political influence operations in the ,united ,states1 including in concert with allies4 7#b7 ,ways to use existing resources to develop core competencies among ,federal agencies and the ,armed ,forces in the subject area of ,chinese political influence operations4 7#c7 ,the advisability of establishing1 within the ,department of ,state1 a permanent office relating to ,chinese ,government and ,communist ,party's political influence operations4 7#d7 ,whether regular public reports on the ,chinese ,government and ,communist ,party's political influence operations are needed to inform ,congress and the ,american public of the scale and scope of such operations4