,,iii #aadth ,,congress #b;d ,session ,s4 ,,res4 #dad ,,in ,,the ,,senate ,,of ,,the ,,united ,,states ,april #f1 #bjaf ,mr4 ,lankford submitted the following resolution2 which was referred to the ,committee on ,foreign ,relations ,,resolution ,expressing the sense of the ,senate on the actions1 including the reapplication of waived nuclear-related sanctions1 that the ,united ,states should undertake in the event of an ,iranian violation of the ,joint ,comprehensive ,plan of ,action4 ,whereas national security is a fundamental and primary responsibility of both ,congress and the ,president2 ,whereas1 on ,july #ad1 #bjae1 ,president ,barack ,obama reached an agreement with ,iran known as the ,joint ,comprehensive ,plan of ,action1 a political agreement among the ,united ,states1 ,france1 the ,russian ,federation1 the ,people's ,republic of ,china1 the ,united ,kingdom1 and ,germany 7commonly referred to as the ,p#ea countries7 and ,iran that does not carry the force or effect of ,united ,states law2 ,whereas ,president ,obama lifted nuclear-related sanctions imposed by the ,united ,states with respect to ,iran on ,january #af1 #bjaf2 ,whereas1 on ,july #ad1 #bjae1 ,president ,obama stated1 ,if ,iran violates the deal1 all of these sanctions will snap back into place42 ,whereas ,congress intends to work with the ,president to ensure that the ,president's commitment to snapping back sanctions in response to any violation by ,iran of the ,joint ,comprehensive ,plan of ,action is fully enforced2 ,whereas ,iran has been the beneficiary of financial assets and international engagement while its commitment to fulfilling its obligations under the ,joint ,comprehensive ,plan of ,action has yet to be proven2 and ,whereas1 given the historic and dramatic shift in longstanding ,united ,states foreign policy represented by the ,joint ,comprehensive ,plan of ,action1 the obligations and commitments ,iran agreed to as part of the ,joint ,comprehensive ,plan of ,action must be clarified by the ,senate3 ,now1 therefore1 be it #a4 ,sense of the ,senate on ,iranian violations of the ,joint ,comprehensive ,plan of ,action 7a7 ,in general ,it is the sense of the ,senate-- 7#a7 that the ,united ,states should take the actions specified in subsection 7b7 if-- 7,a7 ,iran ever seeks1 develops1 manufactures1 or acquires nuclear weapons2 7,b7 ,iran ever engages in plutonium reprocessing or plutonium-related research and development2 7,c7 ,iran violates-- 7i7 the ,treaty on the ,non-,proliferation of ,nuclear ,weapons1 done at ,washington1 ,london1 and ,moscow ,july #a1 #aifh 7#ba ,,ust #dhc7 7commonly referred to as the ,nuclear ,nonproliferation ,treaty or the ,,npt72 7ii7 the ,agreement between ,iran and the ,international ,atomic ,energy ,agency for the ,application of ,safeguards in ,connection with the ,treaty on the ,non-,proliferation of ,nuclear ,weapons1 done at ,vienna ,june #ai1 #aigc 7commonly referred to as the ,comprehensive ,safeguards ,agreement72 7iii7 its commitment to ratify by ,october #ah1 #bjbc1 the ,additional ,protocol to the ,comprehensive ,safeguards ,agreement2 or 7iv7 the ,iranian-ratified ,additional ,protocol to the ,comprehensive ,safeguards ,agreement and modified ,code #c4a of the ,subsidiary ,arrangements to the ,comprehensive ,safeguards ,agreement2 7,d7 ,iran installs a new natural uranium core or the original core in the ,arak reactor2 7,e7 the power of ,iran's redesigned heavy water reactor exceeds #bj ,m,wth2 7,f7 ,iran produces any amount of weapons grade uranium or plutonium2 7,g7 ,iran pursues construction at the existing unfinished ,arak heavy water reactor based on its original design2 7,h7 ,iran produces or tests natural uranium pellets1 fuel pins1 or fuel assemblies that are specifically designed for the support of the originally designed ,arak heavy water reactor1 designated by the ,international ,atomic ,energy ,agency as ,,ir-#dj2 7,i7 ,iran does not store all existing natural uranium pellets and ,,ir-#dj fuel assemblies under the continuous monitoring of the ,international ,atomic ,energy ,agency until the modernized ,arak reactor becomes operable2 7,j7 once the ,arak reactor becomes operable1 ,iran does not take the ,,ir-#dj fuel assemblies and natural uranium pellets and convert them to uranyl nitrate or exchange them with an equivalent quantity of natural uranium2 7,k7 ,iran does not make the necessary technical modifications to the natural uranium fuel production process line that was intended to supply fuel for the ,,ir-#dj reactor design1 such that it can be used for the fabrication of the fuel reloads for the modernized ,arak reactor2 7,l7 all spent fuel from the redesigned ,arak reactor1 regardless of its origin1 for the lifetime of the reactor1 is not shipped out of ,iran2 7,m7 ,iran operates the ,fuel ,manufacturing ,plant to produce anything other than fuel assemblies for light water reactors or reloads for the modernized ,arak reactor2 7,n7 ,iran does not inform the ,international ,atomic ,energy ,agency about the inventory and production of the ,heavy ,water ,production ,plant or does not allow the ,international ,atomic ,energy ,agency to monitor the quantities of the heavy water stocks and the amount of heavy water produced1 including through visits by the ,international ,atomic ,energy ,agency1 as requested1 to the ,heavy ,water ,production ,plant2 7,o7 ,iran does not ship out all spent fuel for all future and present nuclear power and research reactors2 7,p7 ,iran does not remove and keep stored at ,natanz in ,hall ,b of the fuel enrichment plant under continuous monitoring by the ,international ,atomic ,energy ,agency-- 7i7 all excess centrifuge machines1 including ,,ir-#bm centrifuges 7during the #aj-year prohibition period under the ,joint ,comprehensive ,plan of ,action72 and 7ii7 ,,uf#f pipework including sub headers1 valves and pressure transducers at cascade level1 and frequency inverters1 and ,,uf#f withdrawal equipment from one of the withdrawal stations1 which is currently not in service1 including its vacuum pumps and chemical traps 7during the #aj-year prohibition period under the ,joint ,comprehensive ,plan of ,action72 7,q7 the #afd-machine ,,ir-#bm cascade does not remain stored at ,natanz in ,hall ,b of the fuel enrichment plan under the continuous monitoring of the ,international ,atomic ,energy ,agency2 7,r7 the #afd-machine ,,ir-#d cascade does not remain stored at ,natanz in ,hall ,b of the fuel enrichment plan under the continuous monitoring of the ,international ,atomic ,energy ,agency2 7,s7 ,iran enriches1 obtains1 or otherwise stockpiles any uranium1 including in oxide form1 enriched to greater than #c4fg percent2 7,t7 all future uranium oxide1 scrap oxide1 or other material not in fuel plates enriched to between #e and #bj percent is not transferred out of ,iran or diluted to a level of #c4fg percent or less within #f months of production2 7,u7 ,iran does not abide by its voluntary commitments as expressed in its own long-term enrichment and enrichment research and development plan submitted as part of the initial declaration described in ,article #b of the ,additional ,protocol to the ,comprehensive ,safeguards ,agreement2 7,v7 ,iran engages in production of centrifuges1 including centrifuge rotors suitable for isotope separation or any other centrifuge components1 which exceeds the enrichment and enrichment research and development requirements outlined in ,annex ,i of the ,joint ,comprehensive ,plan of ,action2 7,w7 ,iran does not permit the ,international ,atomic ,energy ,agency the use of online enrichment measurement and electronic seals1 as well as other ,international ,atomic ,energy ,agency-approved and certified modern technologies in line with internationally accepted practices of the ,international ,atomic ,energy ,agency2 7,x7 ,iran does not facilitate automated collection of ,international ,atomic ,energy ,agency measurement recordings registered by installed measurement devices and sent to the ,international ,atomic ,energy ,agency working space at individual nuclear sites2 7,y7 ,iran does not make the necessary arrangements to allow for a long-term presence of the ,international ,atomic ,energy ,agency1 including issuing long-term visas1 as well as providing proper working space at nuclear sites and1 to the best of its effort1 at locations near nuclear sites in ,iran for the designated ,international ,atomic ,energy ,agency inspectors for working and keeping necessary equipment2 7,z7 ,iran does not increase the number of designated ,international ,atomic ,energy ,agency inspectors to at least #acj by ,october #af1 #bjaf1 which is the date that is #i months after implementation day1 or does not allow the designation of inspectors from countries that have diplomatic relations with ,iran2 7,,aa7 ,iran does not apply nuclear export policies and practices in line with the internationally established standards for the export of nuclear material1 equipment1 and technology2 7,,bb7 ,iran does not permit the ,international ,atomic ,energy ,agency access to verify that uranium isotope separation production and research and development activities are consistent with ,annex ,i of the ,joint ,comprehensive ,plan of ,action2 7,,cc7 ,iran engages in-- 7i7 designing1 developing1 acquiring1 or using computer models to simulate nuclear explosive devices2 7ii7 designing1 developing1 fabricating1 acquiring1 or using multi-point explosive detonation systems suitable for a nuclear explosive device1 unless approved by the ,joint ,commission for non-nuclear purposes and subject to monitoring2 7iii7 designing1 developing1 fabricating1 acquiring1 or using explosive diagnostic systems 7streak cameras1 framing cameras and flash x-ray cameras7 suitable for the development of a nuclear explosive device1 unless approved by the ,joint ,commission for non-nuclear purposes and subject to monitoring2 or 7iv7 designing1 developing1 fabricating1 acquiring1 or using explosively driven neutron sources or specialized materials for explosively driven neutron sources2 7,,dd7 during the #aj-year period beginning on implementation day and ending on ,january #af1 #bjbf-- 7i7 ,iran operates1 for the purpose of enriching uranium1 more than #e1jfj ,,ir-#a centrifuges2 7ii7 ,iran's enrichment capacity exceeds #e1jfj ,,ir-#a centrifuge machines in #cj cascades in their current configurations in currently operating units at the ,natanz ,fuel ,enrichment ,plant2 7iii7 consistent with ,iran's enrichment research and development plan1 ,iran's enrichment research and development with uranium includes any centrifuges other than ,,ir-#d1 ,,ir-#e1 ,,ir-#f1 and ,,ir-#h centrifuges2 7iv7 ,iran conducts testing of more than a single ,,ir-#d centrifuge machine and ,,ir-#d centrifuge cascade of up to #aj centrifuge machines2 7v7 ,iran tests more than a single ,,ir-#e centrifuge machine2 7vi7 ,iran does not recombine the enriched and depleted streams from the ,,ir-#f and ,,ir-#h cascades through the use of welded pipework on withdrawal main headers in a manner that precludes the withdrawal of enriched and depleted uranium materials and verified by the ,international ,atomic ,energy ,agency2 7vii7 research and development with uranium is not strictly limited to ,,ir-#d1 ,,ir-#e1 ,,ir-#f1 and ,,ir-#h centrifuges2 7viii7 ,iran's uranium isotope separation-related research and development or production activities are not exclusively based on gaseous centrifuge technology2 7ix7 ,iran engages in nuclear direct-use or nuclear dual-use procurements of commodities without using the procurement channel mandated by the ,united ,nations under ,united ,nations ,security ,council ,resolution #bbca 7#bjae72 7x7 research and development is carried out in the ,,ir-#d1 ,,ir-#e1 ,,ir-#f1 or ,,ir-#h centrifuges in a manner that accumulates enriched uranium1 or ,iran installs or tests those centrifuges beyond the enrichment and enrichment research and development requirements outlined in ,annex ,i of the ,joint ,comprehensive ,plan of ,action2 7xi7 except as otherwise provided in subparagraph 7,,ll71 mechanical testing on up to #b single centrifuges for each type is carried out on any centrifuge other than the ,,ir-#bm1 ,,ir-#d1 ,,ir-#e1 ,,ir-#f1 ,,ir-#fs1 ,,ir-#g1 or ,,ir-#h2 or 7xii7 ,iran builds or tests any new centrifuge without approval of the ,joint ,commission2 7,,ee7 during the #ae-year period beginning on implementation day and ending on ,january #af1 #bjca-- 7i7 ,iran conducts uranium enrichment-related activities at ,fordow2 7ii7 ,iran's stockpile of enriched uranium hexafluoride1 or the equivalent in other chemical forms1 exceeds #cjj kg enriched to #c4fg percent2 7iii7 ,iran reprocesses spent fuel except for irradiated enriched uranium targets for production of radioisotopes for medical and peaceful industrial purposes2 7iv7 ,iran develops1 acquires1 or builds facilities capable of separation of plutonium1 uranium1 or neptunium from spent fuel or from fertile targets1 other than for production of radioisotopes for medical and peaceful industrial purposes2 7v7 ,iran develops1 acquires1 builds1 or operates hot cells 7containing a cell or interconnected cells71 shielded cells1 or shielded glove boxes with dimensions not less than #f cubic meters in volume compatible with the specifications set out in ,annex ,i of the ,additional ,protocol to the ,comprehensive ,safeguards ,agreement1 unless approved by the ,joint ,commission established by the ,joint ,comprehensive ,plan of ,action2 7vi7 ,iran undertakes destructive post irradiation examination of fuel pins1 fuel assembly prototypes1 and structural materials1 unless the ,p#ea countries make available their facilities to conduct destructive testing with ,iranian specialists1 as agreed pursuant to the ,joint ,comprehensive ,plan of ,action2 7vii7 ,iran engages in producing or acquiring plutonium or uranium metals or their alloys1 or conducts research and development on plutonium or uranium 7or their alloys7 metallurgy1 or casting1 forming1 or machining plutonium or uranium metal2 7viii7 ,iran produces1 seeks1 or acquires separated plutonium1 highly enriched uranium1 uranium-#bcc1 or neptunium-#bcg 7except for use for laboratory standards or in instruments using neptunium-#bcg72 7ix7 ,iran installs gas centrifuge machines1 or enrichment-related infrastructure1 whether suitable for uranium enrichment1 research and development1 or stable isotope enrichment1 at any location other than a location exclusively specified under the ,joint ,comprehensive ,plan of ,action2 7x7 ,iran conducts all testing of centrifuges with uranium anywhere other than at the ,pilot ,fuel ,enrichment ,plant or ,iran conducts mechanical testing of centrifuges anywhere other than at the ,pilot ,fuel ,enrichment ,plant and the ,tehran ,research ,centre2 7xi7 ,iran maintains more than #ajdd ,,ir-#a centrifuge machines at one wing of the ,fordow ,fuel ,enrichment ,plant2 7xii7 ,iran does not limit its stable isotope production activities with gas centrifuges to the ,fordow ,fuel ,enrichment ,plant or uses more than #cdh ,,ir-#a centrifuges for such activities2 7xiii7 ,iran exceeds the limitations on its activities at the ,fordow ,fuel ,enrichment ,plant as described in ,annex ,i of the ,joint ,comprehensive ,plan of ,action2 7xiv7 ,iran does not permit the ,international ,atomic ,energy ,agency regular access1 including daily as requested by the ,international ,atomic ,energy ,agency1 access to the ,fordow ,fuel ,enrichment ,plant2 7xv7 ,iran builds or has a heavy water reactor2 7xvi7 ,iran does not permit the ,international ,atomic ,energy ,agency to implement continuous monitoring1 including through containment and surveillance measures1 as necessary1 to verify that stored centrifuges and infrastructure remain in storage2 7xvii7 ,iran does not permit the ,international ,atomic ,energy ,agency regular access1 including daily access as requested by the ,international ,atomic ,energy ,agency1 to relevant buildings at ,natanz1 including parts of the fuel enrichment plan and the ,pilot ,fuel ,enrichment ,plant2 7xviii7 any uranium enrichment activity in ,iran1 including safeguarded research and development1 occurs anywhere but the ,natanz enrichment site2 7xix7 ,iran engages1 including through export of any enrichment or enrichment related equipment and technology1 with any other country1 or with any foreign entity in enrichment or enrichment related activities1 including related research and development activities1 without approval by the ,joint ,commission2 7xx7 the ,fordow ,fuel ,enrichment ,plant does not remain strictly a research facility1 ,iran conducts enrichment or research and development-related activities1 or ,iran holds nuclear material at that ,plant2 7xxi7 excess heavy water that is beyond ,iran's needs for the modernized ,arak research reactor or the zero power heavy water reactor1 quantities needed for medical research and production of the deuterated solutions1 and chemical compounds including1 where appropriate1 contingency stocks1 is not made available for export to the international market based on international prices and delivered to an international buyer2 7xxii7 all enriched uranium hexafluoride in excess of #cjj kg of up to #c4eg percent enriched ,,uf#f 7or the equivalent in different chemical forms7 is not immediately down-blended to natural uranium level or sold on the international market and delivered to an international buyer2 7xxiii7 ,iran does not rely on only light water for its future nuclear power and research reactors2 7xxiv7 ,iran conducts enrichment research and development in a manner that accumulates enriched uranium2 or 7xxv7 ,iran enriches uranium to a level exceeding #c4fg percent2 7,,ff7 during the #be-year period beginning on implementation day and ending on ,january #af1 #bjda-- 7i7 ,iran does not permit the ,international ,atomic ,energy ,agency to monitor that all uranium ore concentrate produced in ,iran or obtained from any other source is transferred to the uranium conversion facility in ,esfahan or to any other future uranium conversion facility that ,iran might decide to build in ,iran within this period2 or 7ii7 ,iran does not provide the ,international ,atomic ,energy ,agency with all necessary information so that the ,international ,atomic ,energy ,agency will be able to verify the production of the uranium ore concentrate and the inventory of uranium ore concentrate produced in ,iran or obtained from any other source2 7,,gg7 on or after ,january #af1 #bjbd1 which is the date that is #h years after implementation day1 ,iran commences manufacturing ,,ir-#f and ,,ir-#h centrifuges with rotors1 or commences manufacturing ,,ir-#f and ,,ir-#h centrifuges without rotors at a rate of more than #bjj centrifuges per year for each type2 7,,hh7 on or after ,january #af1 #bjbf1 which is the date that is #aj years after implementation day1 ,iran commences manufacturing on more than #bjj complete centrifuges per year for each type2 7,,ii7 ,iran does not present its plan to1 and seek approval by1 the ,joint ,commission if ,iran seeks to initiate research and development on a uranium metal-based fuel for the ,tehran ,research ,reactor in small agreed quantities after ,january #af1 #bjbf1 and before ,january #ae1 #bjca1 which are #aj and #ae years after implementation day1 respectively2 or 7,,jj7 during the #h year period beginning on implementation day and ending on ,july #af1 #bjbd-- 7i7 ,iran conducts testing on more than a single ,,ir-#f centrifuge machine and intermediate cascades for such machines and commences testing on more than #cj centrifuge machines2 or 7ii7 ,iran conducts testing on more than a single ,,ir-#h centrifuge machine and intermediate cascades for such machines or commences testing on more than #cj centrifuge machines2 and 7#b7 that-- 7,a7 ,iran's uranium enrichment and research and development plans should be made public2 7,b7 the reports of the ,joint ,commission and procurement requests made to the ,united ,nations ,security ,council and to the ,joint ,commission1 and whether or not such requests were approved1 should be made available to the public2 and 7,c7 countries should verify the end-use of items1 materials1 equipment1 goods1 and technologies that require import authorization by the ,joint ,commission but are not verified by the ,international ,atomic ,energy ,agency4 7b7 ,actions specified ,the actions specified in this subsection are the following3 7#a7 ,seeking immediate reinstitution and application of ,united ,nations ,security ,council ,resolutions #afif 7#bjjf71 #agcg 7#bjjf71 #agdg 7#bjjg71 #ahjc 7#bjjh71 #ahce 7#bjjh71 #aibi 7#bjaj71 and #bbbd 7#bjae74 7#b7 ,seeking the immediate adoption of a ,united ,nations ,security ,council resolution that directs all ,united ,nations member states to prevent the direct or indirect supply1 sale1 or transfer to ,iran of all items listed in subsection 7a77i7 of ,united ,nations ,security ,council ,resolution #agah 7#bjjf7 in order to prevent ,iran from arming itself while its commitment to international law is still in question4 7#c7 ,working with international partners of the ,united ,states to seek the immediate reapplication of the regulations of the ,council of the ,european ,union concerning restrictive measures against ,iran1 as in effect on ,october #ag1 #bjae4 7#d7 ,the immediate reapplication of the nuclear-related sanctions waived by the ,united ,states4 7#e7 ,seeking the imposition of additional punitive sanctions with respect to ,iran4 7c7 ,definitions ,in this section3 7#a7 ,highly enriched uranium ,the term highly enriched uranium means uranium with a #bj percent or higher concentration of the isotope uranium-#bce4 7#b7 ,implementation day ,the term implementation day means ,january #af1 #bjaf4 7#c7 ,joint comprehensive plan of action ,the term ,joint ,comprehensive ,plan of ,action means the ,joint ,comprehensive ,plan of ,action1 agreed to at ,vienna on ,july #ad1 #bjae1 by ,iran and by the ,people's ,republic of ,china1 ,france1 ,germany1 the ,russian ,federation1 the ,united ,kingdom1 and the ,united ,states1 with the ,high ,representative of the ,european ,union for ,foreign ,affairs and ,security ,policy1 and all implementing materials and agreements related to the ,joint ,comprehensive ,plan of ,action4 7#d7 ,p#ea countries ,the term ,p#ea countries means the ,united ,states1 ,france1 the ,russian ,federation1 the ,people's ,republic of ,china1 the ,united ,kingdom1 and ,germany4 7#e7 ,spent fuel ,the term spent fuel includes all types of irradiated fuel4