,i #aadth ,,congress #ast ,session ,h4 ,r4 #abaf ,,in ,,the ,,house ,,of ,,representatives ,march #c1 #bjae ,mr4 ,lynch 7for himself1 ,mr4 ,capuano1 ,mr4 ,ellison1 and ,mr4 ,hinojosa7 introduced the following bill2 which was referred to the ,committee on ,financial ,services ,a ,,bill ,to require the ,securities and ,exchange ,commission to carry out a pilot program to examine maker-taker pricing1 and for other purposes4 #a4 ,short title ,this ,act may be cited as the ,maker-,taker ,conflict of ,interest ,reform ,act of #bjae4 #b4 ,pilot program to examine maker-taker pricing 7a7 ,in general ,not later than #ij days after the date of the enactment of this ,act1 the ,securities and ,exchange ,commission shall begin a #f-month pilot program to examine of maker-taker pricing1 under which the ,commission shall-- 7#a7 identify a random sample of #ej issuers 7the sample group7 out of the #ajj issuers with the most frequently-traded securities2 7#b7 during such #f-month period1 prohibit the payment of rebates 7or comparable inducements7 on any trade of securities of the issuers in the sample group2 and 7#c7 compare the effects of such prohibition on the issuers in the sample group compared to the #ej issuers not so chosen 7the control group74 7b7 ,report 7#a7 ,in general ,not later than #f months after the end of the program required under subsection 7a71 the ,commission shall issue a report to the ,congress containing all of the findings and determinations made in carrying out such program1 along with any legislative or regulatory recommendations the ,commission may have4 7#b7 ,factors to consider ,in preparing the report required under paragraph 7#a71 the ,commission shall consider factors relevant to the impact of rebates 7or comparable inducements7 on equity markets1 including-- 7,a7 whether maker-taker pricing creates a potential conflict of interest between brokers and their clients by incentivizing brokers to use routing that may be cost-effective for them1 but which may not be the best method of execution for their clients2 7,b7 whether maker-taker pricing reduces1 or potentially reduces1 market transparency and distorts price discovery insofar as rebates and fees are not disclosed in displayed quotes1 thereby causing displayed spreads to be narrower or wider than actual spreads2 and 7,c7 whether maker-taker pricing compromises1 or potentially compromises1 efficiency and liquidity by-- 7i7 contributing to increased length in exchange queues2 7ii7 causing passive market participants to trade more aggressively to access liquidity2 7iii7 contributing to a reduction in liquidity in times of market stress1 particularly for less liquid securities2 7iv7 incentivizing a proliferation of order types1 rebates1 and fees1 thereby resulting in increased fragmentation of order flow2 and 7v7 fostering excessive intermediation by certain market participants that trade in part or in whole to capture rebates 7or comparable inducements7 or avoid fees4 7c7 ,commission authority ,the ,commission may make such adjustments to the pilot program under this section as the ,commission considers necessary or appropriate to ensure that such program can provide statistically meaningful or reliable results4 7d7 ,definitions ,for purposes of this section3 7#a7 ,maker-taker pricing ,the term maker-taker pricing means any pricing model by any trading venue that provides rebates 7or comparable inducements7 or fees to market participants to either provide liquidity to1 or to take liquidity from1 that trading venue4 7#b7 ,rebates ,the term rebates means funds provided by a trading venue to certain participants in a transaction on that venue4 7#c7 ,comparable inducements ,the term comparable inducements means items or services of value 7other than rebates7 provided by a trading venue to certain participants in a transaction on that venue1 including free or reduced-cost market data1 connectivity ports1 co-location space1 and technology services4