,,iii #aacth ,,congress #ast ,session ,s4 ,,con4 ,,res4 #g ,,in ,,the ,,senate ,,of ,,the ,,united ,,states ,march #ac1 #bjac ,mr4 ,moran 7for himself1 ,mr4 ,alexander1 ,ms4 ,ayotte1 ,mr4 ,barrasso1 ,mr4 ,boozman1 ,mr4 ,burr1 ,mr4 ,chambliss1 ,mr4 ,coburn1 ,mr4 ,cornyn1 ,mr4 ,crapo1 ,mr4 ,cruz1 ,mr4 ,enzi1 ,mr4 ,flake1 ,mr4 ,grassley1 ,mr4 ,hatch1 ,mr4 ,heller1 ,mr4 ,hoeven1 ,mr4 ,inhofe1 ,mr4 ,isakson1 ,mr4 ,johanns1 ,mr4 ,paul1 ,mr4 ,portman1 ,mr4 ,risch1 ,mr4 ,roberts1 ,mr4 ,rubio1 ,mr4 ,thune1 ,mr4 ,toomey1 ,mr4 ,vitter1 and ,mr4 ,wicker7 submitted the following concurrent resolution2 which was referred to the ,committee on ,foreign ,relations ,,concurrent ,,resolution ,expressing the sense of ,congress regarding the conditions for the ,united ,states becoming a signatory to the ,united ,nations ,arms ,trade ,treaty1 or to any similar agreement on the arms trade4 ,whereas in ,october #bjji1 the ,united ,states voted in the ,united ,nations ,general ,assembly to participate in the negotiation of the ,united ,nations ,arms ,trade ,treaty2 ,whereas in ,july #bjab1 the ,united ,nations ,conference on the ,arms ,trade ,treaty convened to negotiate the text of the ,arms ,trade ,treaty2 ,whereas in ,december #bjab1 the ,united ,nations ,general ,assembly voted to hold a final negotiating conference on the ,arms ,trade ,treaty in ,march #bjac1 on the basis of the text of ,july #bjab2 ,whereas the ,arms ,trade ,treaty poses significant risks to the national security1 foreign policy1 and economic interests of the ,united ,states as well as to the constitutional rights of ,united ,states citizens and ,united ,states sovereignty2 ,whereas the ,arms ,trade ,treaty fails to expressly recognize the fundamental1 individual right to keep and to bear arms and the individual right of personal self-defense1 as well as the legitimacy of hunting1 sports shooting1 and other lawful activities pertaining to the private ownership of firearms and related materials1 and thus risks infringing on freedoms protected by the ,second ,amendment2 ,whereas the ,arms ,trade ,treaty places free democracies and totalitarian regimes on a basis of equality1 recognizing their equal right to transfer arms1 and is thereby dangerous to the security of the ,united ,states2 ,whereas the ,arms ,trade ,treaty's criteria for assessing the potential consequences of arms transfers are vague1 easily politicized1 and readily manipulated2 ,whereas the ,arms ,trade ,treaty's model for using these criteria is incompatible with the decisionmaking model for arms transfers employed by the ,united ,states under ,presidential ,decision ,directive #cd1 which dates from #aiie2 ,whereas the ,arms ,trade ,treaty will create opportunities to engage in lawfare against the ,united ,states via the misuse of the treaty's criteria in foreign tribunals and international fora2 ,whereas the ,arms ,trade ,treaty could hinder the ,united ,states from fulfilling its strategic1 legal1 and moral commitments to provide arms to allies such as the ,republic of ,china 7,taiwan7 and the ,state of ,israel2 ,whereas the creation of an international secretariat to administer and assist in the implementation of the ,arms ,trade ,treaty risks the delegation of authority to a bureaucracy that is not accountable to the people of the ,united ,states2 ,whereas the ,arms ,trade ,treaty urges the provision of capacity building assistance from signatory nations to implement the ,arms ,trade ,treaty1 which could create a source of permanent funding to a new international organization that would be susceptible to waste1 fraud1 and abuse2 ,whereas the ,arms ,trade ,treaty risks imposing costly regulatory burdens on ,united ,states businesses1 for example1 by creating onerous reporting requirements that could damage the domestic defense manufacturing base and related firms2 ,whereas an ,arms ,trade ,treaty that has not been signed by the ,president and received the advice and consent of the ,senate should not bind the ,united ,states in any respect as customary international law1 jus cogens1 or any other principle of international law that bypasses the treaty power in article ,,ii1 section #b1 clause #b of the ,constitution2 ,whereas an ,arms ,trade ,treaty that has merely been signed by the ,president but has not received the advice and consent of the ,senate should not bind the ,united ,states in any respect1 including any obligation to refrain from defeating the object and purpose of the ,arms ,trade ,treaty1 under any provision of the ,vienna ,convention on the ,law of ,treaties1 to which the ,united ,states is not a party2 ,whereas an ,arms ,trade ,treaty that has merely been signed by the ,president but has not received the advice and consent of the ,senate should not bind the ,united ,states in any respect1 as an international agreement other than a treaty1 as a sole executive agreement1 or in any other way2 and ,whereas an ,arms ,trade ,treaty that has been signed by the ,president and has received the advice and consent of the ,senate1 is a non-self-executing treaty that has no domestic legal effect within the ,united ,states1 unless and until it has been adopted by the enactment of implementing legislation by the ,congress3 ,now1 therefore1 be it ,that it is the sense of ,congress that-- 7#a7 the ,president should not sign the ,arms ,trade ,treaty1 and that1 if he transmits the treaty with his signature to the ,senate1 the ,senate should not ratify the ,arms ,trade ,treaty2 and 7#b7 until the ,arms ,trade ,treaty has been signed by the ,president1 received the advice and consent of the ,senate1 and has been the subject of implementing legislation by ,congress1 no ,federal funds should be appropriated or authorized to implement the ,arms ,trade ,treaty1 or any similar agreement1 or to conduct activities relevant to the ,arms ,trade ,treaty1 or any similar agreement4