,,ii #aacth ,,congress #b;d ,session ,s4 #baeh ,,in ,,the ,,senate ,,of ,,the ,,united ,,states ,march #bf1 #bjad ,mr4 ,markey introduced the following bill2 which was read twice and referred to the ,committee on ,energy and ,natural ,resources ,a ,,bill ,to amend the ,federal ,power ,act to protect the bulk-power system and electric infrastructure critical to the defense of the ,united ,states against cybersecurity and physical and other threats and vulnerabilities4 #a4 ,short title ,this ,act may be cited as the ,grid ,reliability and ,infrastructure ,defense ,act or the ,,grid ,act4 #b4 ,critical electric infrastructure security 7a7 ,in general ,part ,,ii of the ,federal ,power ,act is amended by inserting after section #bae 7#af ,u4,s4,c4 #hbdo7 the following3 #bae;,a4 ,critical electric infrastructure security 7a7 ,definitions ,in this section3 7#a7 ,bulk-power system2 ,electric ,reliability ,organization2 ,regional ,entity ,the terms bulk-power system1 ,electric ,reliability ,organization1 and regional entity have the meanings given those terms in section #bae7;a74 7#b7 ,defense critical electric infrastructure ,the term defense critical electric infrastructure means any infrastructure located in the ,united ,states 7including the territories7 used for the generation1 transmission1 or distribution of electric energy that-- 7,a7 is not part of the bulk-power system2 and 7,b7 serves a facility designated by the ,president pursuant to subsection 7d77#a71 but is not owned or operated by the owner or operator of the facility4 7#c7 ,defense critical electric infrastructure vulnerability ,the term defense critical electric infrastructure vulnerability means a weakness in defense critical electric infrastructure that1 in the event of-- 7,a7 a malicious act using electronic communication or an electromagnetic pulse1 would pose a substantial risk of disruption of those electronic devices or communications networks1 including hardware1 software1 and data1 that are essential to the reliability of defense critical electric infrastructure2 or 7,b7 a direct physical attack on the defense critical electric infrastructure1 would pose a substantial risk of significant adverse effects on the reliability of defense critical electric infrastructure4 7#d7 ,electromagnetic pulse ,the term electromagnetic pulse means #a or more pulses of electromagnetic energy emitted by any device or weapon capable of generating a pulse that would pose a substantial risk of disruption to the operation of those electronic devices or communications networks1 including hardware1 software1 and data1 that are essential to the reliability of systems necessary for the generation1 transmission1 and distribution of electric energy4 7#e7 ,geomagnetic storm ,the term geomagnetic storm means a temporary disturbance of the magnetic field of the ,earth resulting from solar activity4 7#f7 ,grid security threat ,the term grid security threat means a substantial likelihood of-- 7,a7 7i7 a malicious act using electronic communication or an electromagnetic pulse1 or a geomagnetic storm event1 that could disrupt the operation of those electronic devices or communications networks1 including hardware1 software1 and data1 that are essential to the reliability of the bulk-power system or of defense critical electric infrastructure2 and 7ii7 disruption of the operation of those devices or networks1 with significant adverse effects on the reliability of the bulk-power system or of defense critical electric infrastructure1 as a result of the act or event2 or 7,b7 7i7 a direct physical attack on the bulk-power system or on defense critical electric infrastructure2 and 7ii7 significant adverse effects on the reliability of the bulk-power system or of defense critical electric infrastructure as a result of the physical attack4 7#g7 ,grid security vulnerability ,the term grid security vulnerability means a weakness in the bulk power system that1 in the event of-- 7,a7 a malicious act using electronic communication or an electromagnetic pulse1 would pose a substantial risk of disruption to the operation of those electronic devices or communications networks1 including hardware1 software1 and data1 that are essential to the reliability of the bulk-power system2 or 7,b7 a direct physical attack on the bulk-power system1 would pose a substantial risk of significant adverse effects on the reliability of the bulk-power system4 7#h7 ,large transformer ,the term large transformer means an electric transformer that is part of the bulk-power system4 7#i7 ,protected information ,the term protected information means information1 other than classified national security information1 designated as protected information by the ,commission under subsection 7e77#b7-- 7,a7 that was developed or submitted in connection with the implementation of this section2 7,b7 that specifically discusses grid security threats1 grid security vulnerabilities1 defense critical electric infrastructure vulnerabilities1 or plans1 procedures1 or measures to address the threats or vulnerabilities2 and 7,c7 the unauthorized disclosure of which could be used in a malicious manner to impair the reliability of the bulk-power system or of defense critical electric infrastructure4 7#aj7 ,secretary ,the term ,secretary means the ,secretary of ,energy4 7#aa7 ,security ,the term security does not have the definition of the term provided in section #c4 7b7 ,emergency response measures 7#a7 ,authority to address grid security threats 7,a7 ,in general ,if the ,president issues and provides to the ,commission 7either directly or through the ,secretary7 a written directive or determination identifying an imminent grid security threat1 the ,commission may1 with or without notice1 hearing1 or report1 issue such orders for emergency measures as are necessary in the judgment of the ,commission to protect the reliability of the bulk-power system or of defense critical electric infrastructure against the threat4 7,b7 ,rules of procedure ,as soon as practicable but not later than #ahj days after the date of enactment of this section1 the ,commission shall1 after notice and opportunity for comment1 establish rules of procedure that ensure that the authority described in subparagraph 7,a7 can be exercised expeditiously4 7#b7 ,notification of ,congress ,if the ,president issues and provides to the ,commission 7either directly or through the ,secretary7 a written directive or determination under paragraph 7#a71 the ,president 7or the ,secretary1 as the case may be7 shall promptly notify congressional committees of relevant jurisdiction1 including the ,committee on ,energy and ,commerce of the ,house of ,representatives and the ,committee on ,energy and ,natural ,resources of the ,senate1 of the contents of1 and justification for1 the directive or determination4 7#c7 ,consultation ,before issuing an order for emergency measures under paragraph 7#a71 the ,commission shall1 to the extent practicable in light of the nature of the grid security threat and the urgency of the need for the emergency measures1 consult with appropriate governmental authorities in ,canada and ,mexico1 entities described in paragraph 7#d71 the ,secretary1 and other appropriate ,federal agencies regarding implementation of the emergency measures4 7#d7 ,application ,an order for emergency measures under this subsection may apply to-- 7,a7 the ,electric ,reliability ,organization2 7,b7 a regional entity2 or 7,c7 any owner1 user1 or operator of the bulk-power system or of defense critical electric infrastructure within the ,united ,states4 7#e7 ,discontinuance ,the ,commission shall issue an order discontinuing any emergency measures ordered under this subsection1 effective not later than #cj days after the earliest of the following3 7,a7 ,the date on which the ,president issues and provides to the ,commission 7either directly or through the ,secretary7 a written directive or determination that the grid security threat identified under paragraph 7#a7 no longer exists4 7,b7 ,the date on which the ,commission issues a written determination that the emergency measures are no longer needed to address the grid security threat identified under paragraph 7#a71 including by means of ,commission approval of a reliability standard under section #bae that the ,commission determines adequately addresses the threat4 7,c7 ,the date that is #a year after the issuance of an order under paragraph 7#a74 7#f7 ,cost recovery ,if the ,commission determines that owners1 operators1 or users of the bulk-power system or of defense critical electric infrastructure have incurred substantial costs to comply with an order under this subsection and that the costs were prudently incurred and cannot reasonably be recovered through regulated rates or market prices for the electric energy or services sold by the owners1 operators1 or users1 the ,commission shall1 after notice and an opportunity for comment1 establish a mechanism that permits the owners1 operators1 or users to recover the costs4 7c7 ,measures ,to address grid security vulnerabilities 7#a7 ,commission authority 7,a7 ,in general ,if the ,commission1 in consultation with appropriate ,federal agencies1 identifies a grid security vulnerability that the ,commission determines has not adequately been addressed through a reliability standard developed and approved under section #bae1 the ,commission shall1 after notice and opportunity for comment and after consultation with the ,secretary1 other appropriate ,federal agencies1 and appropriate governmental authorities in ,canada and ,mexico1 promulgate a rule or issue an order requiring implementation1 by any owner1 operator1 or user of the bulk-power system in the ,united ,states1 of measures to protect the bulk-power system against such vulnerability4 7,b7 ,recommendations 7i7 ,in general ,before promulgating a rule or issuing an order under this paragraph1 the ,commission shall1 to the extent practicable in light of the urgency of the need for action to address the grid security vulnerability1 request and consider recommendations from the ,electric ,reliability ,organization regarding the rule or order4 7ii7 ,deadline ,the ,commission may establish an appropriate deadline for the submission of the recommendations4 7#b7 ,certain existing cybersecurity vulnerabilities ,not later than #ahj days after the date of enactment of this section1 the ,commission shall1 after notice and opportunity for comment and after consultation with the ,secretary1 other appropriate ,federal agencies1 and appropriate governmental authorities in ,canada and ,mexico1 promulgate a rule or issue an order requiring the implementation1 by any owner1 user1 or operator of the bulk-power system in the ,united ,states1 of such measures as are necessary to protect the bulk-power system against the vulnerabilities identified in the communication entitled #8,electricity ,sector ,owners and ,operators'1 dated ,june #ba1 #bjjg1 of the ,north ,american ,electric ,reliability ,corporation1 acting in the capacity of the ,corporation as the ,electricity ,sector ,information and ,analysis ,center4 7#c7 ,rescission 7,a7 ,in general ,the ,commission shall approve a reliability standard developed under section #bae that addresses a grid security vulnerability that is the subject of a rule or order under paragraph 7#a7 or 7#b71 unless the ,commission determines that the reliability standard does not adequately protect against the vulnerability or otherwise does not satisfy the requirements of section #bae4 7,b7 ,rescission ,on such approval1 the ,commission shall rescind the rule promulgated or order issued under paragraph 7#a7 or 7#b7 addressing the vulnerability1 effective on the effective date of the newly approved reliability standard4 7#d7 ,large transformer availability 7,a7 ,in general ,not later than #a year after the date of enactment of this section1 the ,commission shall1 after notice and an opportunity for comment and after consultation with the ,secretary and other appropriate ,federal agencies1 issue an order directing the ,electric ,reliability ,organization to submit to the ,commission for approval under section #bae1 not later than #a year after the issuance of the order1 reliability standards addressing availability of large transformers4 7,b7 ,restoration of bulk-power system ,the standards shall require entities that own or operate large transformers to ensure1 individually or jointly1 adequate availability of large transformers to promptly restore the reliable operation of the bulk-power system in the event that any such transformer is destroyed or disabled as a result of a reasonably foreseeable physical or other attack or geomagnetic storm event4 7,c7 ,basis for standards ,the order of the ,commission shall specify the nature and magnitude of the reasonably foreseeable attacks or events that shall provide the basis for the standards4 7,d7 ,standards ,the standards shall-- 7i7 provide entities subject to the standards with the option of meeting the standards individually or jointly2 and 7ii7 appropriately balance the risks associated with a reasonably foreseeable attack or event1 including-- 7,i7 any regional variation in the risks2 and 7,,ii7 the costs of ensuring adequate availability of spare transformers4 7d7 ,critical defense facilities 7#a7 ,designation 7,a7 ,in general ,not later than #ahj days after the date of enactment of this section1 the ,president shall designate1 in a written directive or determination provided to the ,commission1 facilities located in the ,united ,states 7including the territories7 that are-- 7i7 critical to the defense of the ,united ,states2 and 7ii7 vulnerable to a disruption of the supply of electric energy provided to such facility by an external provider4 7,b7 ,maximum number ,the number of facilities designated by the directive or determination shall not exceed #ajj4 7,c7 ,revision ,the ,president may periodically revise the list of designated facilities through a subsequent written directive or determination provided to the ,commission1 except that the total number of designated facilities at any time shall not exceed #ajj4 7#b7 ,commission authority 7,a7 ,in general ,if the ,commission identifies a defense critical electric infrastructure vulnerability that the ,commission1 in consultation with owners and operators of any #a or more facilities designated by the ,president pursuant to paragraph 7#a71 determines has not adequately been addressed through measures undertaken by owners or operators of defense critical electric infrastructure1 the ,commission shall1 after notice and an opportunity for comment and after consultation with the ,secretary and other appropriate ,federal agencies1 promulgate a rule or issue an order requiring implementation1 by any owner or operator of defense critical electric infrastructure1 of measures to protect the defense critical electric infrastructure against the vulnerability4 7,b7 ,exemptions 7i7 ,in general ,the ,commission shall exempt from any rule or order promulgated under subparagraph 7,a7 any specific defense critical electric infrastructure that the ,commission determines already has been adequately protected against the identified vulnerability4 7ii7 ,consultation ,the ,commission shall make any determination under clause 7i7 in consultation with the owner or operator of the facility designated by the ,president pursuant to paragraph 7#a7 that relies on the defense critical electric infrastructure4 7#c7 ,cost recovery ,an owner or operator of defense critical electric infrastructure shall be required to take measures under paragraph 7#b7 only to the extent that the owners or operators of #a or more facilities designated by the ,president pursuant to paragraph 7#a7 that rely on the infrastructure agree to bear the full incremental costs of compliance with a rule promulgated or order issued under paragraph 7#b74 7e7 ,protection of information 7#a7 ,prohibition of public disclosure of protected information ,protected information-- 7,a7 shall be exempt from disclosure under section #eeb7;b77#c7 of title #e1 ,united ,states ,code2 and 7,b7 shall not be made available pursuant to any ,state1 local1 or tribal law requiring disclosure of information or records4 7#b7 ,information sharing 7,a7 ,in general ,consistent with the ,controlled ,unclassified ,information framework established by the ,president1 the ,commission shall promulgate such regulations and issue such orders as necessary to designate protected information and to prohibit the unauthorized disclosure of the protected information4 7,b7 ,sharing of protected information 7i7 ,in general ,the regulations promulgated and orders issued pursuant to subparagraph 7,a7 shall provide standards for and facilitate the appropriate sharing of protected information with1 between1 and by ,federal1 ,state1 local1 and tribal authorities1 the ,electric ,reliability ,organization1 regional entities1 and owners1 operators1 and users of the bulk-power system in the ,united ,states and of defense critical electric infrastructure4 7ii7 ,state commissions ,in promulgating the regulations and issuing the orders1 the ,commission shall take account of the role of ,state commissions in reviewing the prudence and cost of investments within the respective jurisdictions of the ,state commissions4 7iii7 ,canada and ,mexico ,the ,commission shall consult with appropriate ,canadian and ,mexican authorities to develop protocols for the sharing of protected information with1 between1 and by appropriate ,canadian and ,mexican authorities and owners1 operators1 and users of the bulk-power system outside the ,united ,states4 7#c7 ,submission of information to ,congress ,nothing in this section permits or authorizes the withholding of information from ,congress1 any committee or subcommittee of ,congress1 or the ,comptroller ,general of the ,united ,states4 7#d7 ,disclosure of nonprotected information 7,a7 ,in general ,in implementing this section1 the ,commission shall protect from disclosure only the minimum quantity of information necessary to protect the reliability of the bulk-power system and of defense critical electric infrastructure4 7,b7 ,segregation of protected information ,the ,commission shall segregate protected information within documents and electronic communications1 whenever feasible1 to facilitate disclosure of information that is not designated as protected information4 7#e7 ,duration of designation ,information may not be designated as protected information for longer than #e years1 unless specifically redesignated by the ,commission4 7#f7 ,removal of designation ,the ,commission may remove the designation of protected information1 in whole or in part1 from a document or electronic communication if the unauthorized disclosure of the information could no longer be used to impair the reliability of the bulk-power system or of defense critical electric infrastructure4 7#g7 ,judicial review of designations 7,a7 ,in general ,notwithstanding subsection 7f7 or section #cac1 a person or entity may seek judicial review of a determination by the ,commission concerning the designation of protected information under this subsection exclusively in the district court of the ,united ,states in the district in which the complainant resides1 or has a principal place of business1 or in the ,district of ,columbia4 7,b7 ,procedure ,in a case described in subparagraph 7,a71 the court-- 7i7 shall determine the matter de novo2 and 7ii7 may examine the contents of documents or electronic communications designated as protected information in camera to determine whether the documents or any part of the documents were improperly designated as protected information4 7,c7 ,burden of proof ,the burden shall be on the ,commission to sustain the designation of the ,commission4 7f7 ,judicial review 7#a7 ,in general ,the ,commission shall act expeditiously to resolve all applications for rehearing of orders issued pursuant to this section that are filed under section #cac7;a74 7#b7 ,jurisdiction ,any party seeking judicial review pursuant to section #cac of an order issued under this section may obtain the review only in the ,united ,states ,court of ,appeals for the ,district of ,columbia ,circuit4 7g7 ,provision of assistance to industry in meeting grid security protection needs 7#a7 ,expertise and resources 7,a7 ,in general ,the ,secretary shall establish a program1 in consultation with other appropriate ,federal agencies1 to develop technical expertise in the protection of systems for the generation1 transmission1 and distribution of electric energy against geomagnetic storms or malicious acts using electronic communications or electromagnetic pulse that would pose a substantial risk of disruption to the operation of those electronic devices or communications networks1 including hardware1 software1 and data1 that are essential to the reliability of the systems4 7,b7 ,resources ,the program shall include the identification and development of appropriate technical and electronic resources1 including hardware1 software1 and system equipment4 7#b7 ,sharing expertise 7,a7 ,in general ,as appropriate1 the ,secretary shall offer to share technical expertise developed under the program under paragraph 7#a71 through consultation and assistance1 with owners1 operators1 or users of systems for the generation1 transmission1 or distribution of electric energy located in the ,united ,states and with ,state commissions4 7,b7 ,priority ,in offering the support1 the ,secretary shall assign higher priority to systems serving facilities designated by the ,president pursuant to subsection 7d77#a7 and other critical-infrastructure facilities1 which the ,secretary shall identify in consultation with the ,commission and other appropriate ,federal agencies4 7#c7 ,security clearances and communication 7,a7 ,in general ,the ,secretary shall facilitate and1 to the extent practicable1 expedite the acquisition of adequate security clearances by key personnel of any entity subject to the requirements of this section to enable optimum communication with ,federal agencies regarding grid security threats1 grid security vulnerabilities1 and defense critical electric infrastructure vulnerabilities4 7,b7 ,actionable information ,the ,secretary1 the ,commission1 and other appropriate ,federal agencies shall1 to the extent practicable and consistent with their obligations to protect classified and protected information1 share timely actionable information regarding grid security threats1 grid security vulnerabilities1 and defense critical electric infrastructure vulnerabilities with appropriate key personnel of owners1 operators1 and users of the bulk-power system and of defense critical electric infrastructure4 7h7 ,certain ,federal entities ,during the #aa-year period beginning on the date of enactment of this section1 the ,tennessee ,valley ,authority and the ,bonneville ,power ,administration shall be exempt from any requirement under subsection 7b7 or 7c7 7except for any requirement addressing a malicious act using electronic communication74 4 7b7 ,conforming amendments 7#a7 ,jurisdiction ,section #bja7;b77#b7 of the ,federal ,power ,act 7#af ,u4,s4,c4 #hbd7;b77#b77 is amended by inserting #bae;,a1 after #bae1 each place it appears4 7#b7 ,public utility ,section #bja7;e7 of the ,federal ,power ,act 7#af ,u4,s4,c4 #hbd7;e77 is amended by inserting #bae;,a1 after #bae14