,benedict de ,spinoza1 ,,the ,,ethics 7,ethica ,ordine ,geometrico ,demonstrata7 ,translated by ,r4 ,h4 ,m4 ,elwes ,,part ,v3 ,of the ,power of the ,understanding1 or of ,human ,freedom ,,preface ,at length ,i pass to the remaining portion of my ,ethics1 which is concerned with the way leading to freedom4 ,i shall therefore treat therein of the power of the reason1 showing how far the reason can control the emotions1 and what is the nature of ,mental ,freedom or ,blessedness2 we shall then be able to see1 how much more powerful the wise man is than the ignorant4 ,it is no part of my design to point out the method and means whereby the understanding may be perfected1 nor to show the skill whereby the body may be so tended1 as to be capable of the due performance of its functions4 ,the latter question lies in the province of ,medicine1 the former in the province of ,logic4 ,here1 therefore1 ,i repeat1 ,i shall treat only of the power of the mind1 or of reason2 and ,i shall mainly show the extent and nature of its dominion over the emotions1 for their control and moderation4 ,that we do not possess absolute dominion over them1 ,i have already shown4 ,yet the ,stoics have thought1 that the emotions depended absolutely on our will1 and that we could absolutely govern them4 ,but these philosophers were compelled1 by the protest of experience1 not from their own principles1 to confess1 that no slight practice and zeal is needed to control and moderate them3 and this someone endeavoured to illustrate by the example 7if ,i remember rightly7 of two dogs1 the one a house-dog and the other a hunting-dog4 ,for by long training it could be brought about1 that the house-dog should become accustomed to hunt1 and the hunting-dog to cease from running after hares4 ,to this opinion ,descartes not a little inclines4 ,for he maintained1 that the soul or mind is specially united to a particular part of the brain1 namely1 to that part called the pineal gland1 by the aid of which the mind is enabled to feel all the movements which are set going in the body1 and also external objects1 and which the mind by a simple act of volition can put in motion in various ways4 ,he asserted1 that this gland is so suspended in the midst of the brain1 that it could be moved by the slightest motion of the animal spirits3 further1 that this gland is suspended in the midst of the brain in as many different manners1 as the animal spirits can impinge thereon2 and1 again1 that as many different marks are impressed on the said gland1 as there are different external objects which impel the animal spirits towards it2 whence it follows1 that if the will of the soul suspends the gland in a position1 wherein it has already been suspended once before by the animal spirits driven in one way or another1 the gland in its turn reacts on the said spirits1 driving and determining them to the condition wherein they were1 when repulsed before by a similar position of the gland4 ,he further asserted1 that every act of mental volition is united in nature to a certain given motion of the gland4 ,for instance1 whenever anyone desires to look at a remote object1 the act of volition causes the pupil of the eye to dilate1 whereas1 if the person in question had only thought of the dilatation of the pupil1 the mere wish to dilate it would not have brought about the result1 inasmuch as the motion of the gland1 which serves to impel the animal spirits towards the optic nerve in a way which would dilate or contract the pupil1 is not associated in nature with the wish to dilate or contract the pupil1 but with the wish to look at remote or very near objects4 ,lastly1 he maintained that1 although every motion of the aforesaid gland seems to have been united by nature to one particular thought out of the whole number of our thoughts from the very beginning of our life1 yet it can nevertheless become through habituation associated with other thoughts2 this he endeavours to prove in the ,passions de l'ame1 ,i4 #ej4 ,he thence concludes1 that there is no soul so weak1 that it cannot1 under proper direction1 acquire absolute power over its passions4 ,for passions as defined by him are perceptions1 or feelings1 or disturbances of the soul1 which are referred to the soul as species1 and which 7mark the expression7 are produced1 preserved1 and strengthened through some movement of the spirits4 7,passion del l'ame1,i4#bg47 ,but1 seeing that we can join any motion of the gland1 or consequently of the spirits1 to any volition1 the determination of the will depends entirely on our own powers2 if1 therefore1 we determine our will with sure and firm decisions in the direction to which we wish our actions to tend1 and associate the motions of the passions which we wish to acquire with the said decisions1 we shall acquire an absolute dominion over our passions4 ,such is the doctrine of this illustrious philosopher 7in so far as ,i gather it from his own words72 it is one which1 had it been less ingenious1 ,i could hardly believe to have proceeded from so great a man4 ,indeed1 ,i am lost in wonder1 that a philosopher1 who had stoutly asserted1 that he would draw no conclusions which do not follow from self-evident premisses1 and would affirm nothing which he did not clearly and distinctly perceive1 and who had so often taken to task the scholastics for wishing to explain obscurities through occult qualities1 could maintain a hypothesis1 beside which occult qualities are commonplace4 ,what does he understand1 ,i ask1 by the union of the mind and the body8 ,what clear and distinct conception has he got of thought in most intimate union with a certain particle of extended matter8 ,truly ,i should like him to explain this union through its proximate cause4 ,what clear and distinct conception has he got of thought in most intimate union with a certain particle of extended matter8 ,what clear and distinct conception has he got of thought in most intimate union with a certain particle of extended matter8 ,but he had so distinct a conception of mind being distinct from body1 that he could not assign any particular cause of the union between the two1 or of the mind itself1 but was obliged to have recourse to the cause of the whole universe1 that is to ,god4 ,further1 ,i should much like to know1 what degree of motion the mind can impart to this pineal gland1 and with what force can it hold it suspended8 ,for ,i am in ignorance1 whether this gland can be agitated more slowly or more quickly by the mind than by the animal spirits1 and whether the motions of the passions1 which we have closely united with firm decisions1 cannot be again disjoined therefrom by physical causes2 in which case it would follow that1 although the mind firmly intended to face a given danger1 and had united to this decision the motions of boldness1 yet at the sight of the danger the gland might become suspended in a way1 which would preclude the mind thinking of anything except running away4 ,in truth1 as there is no common standard of volition and motion1 so is there no comparison possible between the powers of the mind and the power or strength of the body2 consequently the strength of one cannot in any wise be determined by the strength of the other4 ,we may also add1 that there is no gland discoverable in the midst of the brain1 so placed that it can thus easily be set in motion in so many ways1 and also that all the nerves are not prolonged so far as the cavities of the brain4 ,lastly1 ,i omit all the assertions which he makes concerning the will and its freedom1 inasmuch as ,i have abundantly proved that his premisses are false4 ,therefore1 since the power of the mind1 as ,i have shown above1 is defined by the understanding only1 we shall determine solely by the knowledge of the mind the remedies against the emotions1 which ,i believe all have had experience of1 but do not accurately observe or distinctly see1 and from the same basis we shall deduce all those conclusions1 which have regard to the mind's blessedness4 ,,axioms4 ,i4 ,if two contrary actions be started in the same subject1 a change must necessarily take place1 either in both1 or in one of the two1 and continue until they cease to be contrary4 ,,ii4 ,the power of an effect is defined by the power of its cause1 in so far as its essence is explained or defined by the essence of its cause4 7,this axiom is evident from ,,iii4vii47 ,,propositions4 ,prop4,i4 ,even as thoughts and the ideas of things are arranged and associated in the mind1 so are the modifications of body or the images of things precisely in the same way arranged and associated in the body4 ,proof4- ,the order and connection of ideas is the same 7,,ii3vii47 as the order and connection of things1 and vice versa the order and connection of things is the same 7,,ii3vi4,coroll4 and ,,ii3vii47 as the order and connection of ideas4 ,wherefore1 even as the order and connection of ideas in the mind takes place according to the order and association of modifications of the body 7,,ii3xviii471 so vice versa 7,,iii3ii47 the order and connection of modifications of the body takes place in accordance with the manner1 in which thoughts and the ideas of things are arranged and associated in the mind4 ,q4,e4,d4 ,,prop4,,ii4 ,if we remove a disturbance of the spirit1 or emotion1 from the thought of an external cause1 and unite it to other thoughts1 then will the love or hatred towards that external cause1 and also the vacillations of spirit which arise from these emotions1 be destroyed4 ,proof4- ,that1 which constitutes the reality of love or hatred1 is pleasure or pain1 accompanied by the idea of an external cause 7,def4 of the ,emotions3vi41vii472 wherefore1 when this cause is removed1 the reality of love or hatred is removed with it2 therefore these emotions and those which arise therefrom are destroyed4 ,q4,e4,d4 ,prop4,,iii4 ,an emotion1 which is a passion1 ceases to be a passion1 as soon as we form a clear and distinct idea thereof4 ,proof4- ,an emotion1 which is a passion1 is a confused idea 7by the general ,def4 of the ,emotions74 ,if1 therefore1 we form a clear and distinct idea of a given emotion1 that idea will only be distinguished from the emotion1 in so far as it is referred to the mind only1 by reason 7,,ii3xxi41,note72 therefore 7,,iii3iii471 the emotion will cease to be a passion4 ,q4,e4,d4 ,corollary4- ,an emotion therefore becomes more under our control1 and the mind is less passive in respect to it1 in proportion as it is more known to us4 ,prop4,,iv4 ,there is no modification of the body1 whereof we cannot form some clear and distinct conception4 ,proof4- ,properties which are common to all things can only be conceived adequately 7,,ii3xxxviii472 therefore 7,,ii3xii4and ,lemma4 ii4 after ,,ii3xiii47 there is no modification of the body1 whereof we cannot form some clear and distinct conception4 ,q4,e4,d4 ,corollary4- ,hence it follows that there is no emotion1 whereof we cannot form some clear and distinct conception4 ,for an emotion is the idea of a modification of the body 7by the general ,def4 of the ,emotions71 and must therefore 7by the preceding ,prop47 involve some clear and distinct conception4 ,note4- ,seeing that there is nothing which is not followed by an effect 7,i3xxxvi471 and that we clearly and distinctly understand whatever follows from an idea1 which in us is adequate 7,,ii3xl471 it follows that everyone has the power of clearly and distinctly understanding himself and his emotions1 if not absolutely1 at any rate in part1 and consequently of bringing it about1 that he should become less subject to them4 ,to attain this result1 therefore1 we must chiefly direct our efforts to acquiring1 as far as possible1 a clear and distinct knowledge of every emotion1 in order that the mind may thus1 through emotion1 be determined to think of those things which it clearly and distinctly perceives1 and wherein it fully acquiesces3 and thus that the emotion itself may be separated from the thought of an external cause1 and may be associated with true thoughts2 whence it will come to pass1 not only that love1 hatred1 c4 will be destroyed 7,v3ii471 but also that the appetites or desires1 which are wont to arise from such emotion1 will become incapable of being excessive 7,,iv3lxi474 ,for it must be especially remarked1 that the appetite through which a man is said to be active1 and that through which he is said to be passive is one and the same4 ,for instance1 we have shown that human nature is so constituted1 that everyone desires his fellow-men to live after his own fashion 7,,iii3xxxi4,note72 in a man1 who is not guided by reason1 this appetite is a passion which is called ambition1 and does not greatly differ from pride2 whereas in a man1 who lives by the dictates of reason1 it is an activity or virtue which is called piety 7,,iv3xxxvii4,note4i4 and second proof74 ,in like manner all appetites or desires are only passions1 in so far as they spring from inadequate ideas2 the same results are accredited to virtue1 when they are aroused or generated by adequate ideas4 ,for all desires1 whereby we are determined to any given action1 may arise as much from adequate as from inadequate ideas 7,,iv3lix474 ,than this remedy for the emotions 7to return to the point from which ,i started71 which consists in a true knowledge thereof1 nothing more excellent1 being within our power1 can be devised4 ,for the mind has no other power save that of thinking and of forming1 adequate ideas1 as we have shown above 7,,iii3iii474 ,prop4,v4 ,an emotion towards a thing1 which we conceive simply1 and not as necessary1 or as contingent1 or as possible1 is1 other conditions being equal1 greater than any other emotion4 ,proof4- ,an emotion towards a thing1 which we conceive to be free1 is greater than one towards what we conceive to be necessary 7,,iii3xlix471 and1 consequently1 still greater than one towards what we conceive as possible1 or contingent 7,,iv3xi474 ,but to conceive a thing as free can be nothing else than to conceive it simply1 while we are in ignorance of the causes whereby it has been determined to action 7,,ii3xxxv4,note72 therefore1 an emotion towards a thing which we conceive simply is1 other conditions being equal1 greater than one1 which we feel towards what is necessary1 possible1 or contingent1 and1 consequently1 it is the greatest of all4 ,q4,e4,d4 ,prop4,,vi4 ,the mind has greater power over the emotions and is less subject thereto1 in so far as it understands all things as necessary4 ,proof4- ,the mind understands all things to be necessary 7,i3xxix47 and to be determined to existence and operation by an infinite chain of causes2 therefore 7by the foregoing ,proposition71 it thus far brings it about1 that it is less subject to the emotions arising therefrom1 and 7,,iii3xlviii47 feels less emotion towards the things themselves4 ,q4,e4,d4 ,note4- ,the more this knowledge1 that things are necessary1 is applied to particular things1 which we conceive more distinctly and vividly1 the greater is the power of the mind over the emotions1 as experience also testifies4 ,for we see1 that the pain arising from the loss of any good is mitigated1 as soon as the man who has lost it perceives1 that it could not by any means have been preserved4 ,so also we see that no one pities an infant1 because it cannot speak1 walk1 or reason1 or lastly1 because it passes so many years1 as it were1 in unconsciousness4 ,whereas1 if most people were born full-grown and only one here and there as an infant1 everyone would pity the infants2 because infancy would not then be looked on as a state natural and necessary1 but as a fault or delinquency in ,nature2 and we may note several other instances of the same sort4 ,prop4,,vii4 ,emotions which are aroused or spring from reason1 if we take account of time1 are stronger than those1 which are attributable to particular objects that we regard as absent4 ,proof4- ,we do not regard a thing as absent1 by reason of the emotion wherewith we conceive it1 but by reason of the body1 being affected by another emotion excluding the existence of the said thing 7,,ii3xvii474 ,wherefore1 the emotion1 which is referred to the thing which we regard as absent1 is not of a nature to overcome the rest of a man's activities and power 7,,iv3vi471 but is1 on the contrary1 of a nature to be in some sort controlled by the emotions1 which exclude the existence of its external cause 7,,iv3ix474 ,but an emotion which springs from reason is necessarily referred to the common properties of things 7see the def4 of reason in ,,ii3xl4,note4ii471 which we always regard as present 7for there can be nothing to exclude their present existence71 and which we always conceive in the same manner 7,,ii3xxxviii474 ,wherefore an emotion of this kind always remains the same2 and consequently 7,v3,ax4i47 emotions1 which are contrary thereto and are not kept going by their external causes1 will be obliged to adapt themselves to it more and more1 until they are no longer contrary to it2 to this extent the emotion which springs from reason is more powerful4 ,q4,e4,d4 ,prop4,,viii4 ,an emotion is stronger in proportion to the number of simultaneous concurrent causes whereby it is aroused4 ,proof4- ,many simultaneous causes are more powerful than a few 7,,iii3vii473 therefore 7,,iv3v471 in proportion to the increased number of simultaneous causes whereby it is aroused1 an emotion becomes stronger4 ,q4,e4,d4 ,note4- ,this proposition is also evident from ,v3,ax4ii4 ,prop4,,ix4 ,an emotion1 which is attributable to many and diverse causes which the mind regards as simultaneous with the emotion itself1 is less hurtful1 and we are less subject thereto and less affected towards each of its causes1 than if it were a different and equally powerful emotion attributable to fewer causes or to a single cause4 ,proof-4 ,an emotion is only bad or hurtful1 in so far as it hinders the mind from being able to think 7,,iv3xxvi41 ,,iv3xxvii472 therefore1 an emotion1 whereby the mind is determined to the contemplation of several things at once1 is less hurtful than another equally powerful emotion1 which so engrosses the mind in the single contemplation of a few objects or of one1 that it is unable to think of anything else2 this was our first point4 ,again1 as the mind's essence1 in other words1 its power 7,,iii3vii471 consists solely in thought 7,,ii3xi471 the mind is less passive in respect to an emotion1 which causes it to think of several things at once1 than in regard to an equally strong emotion1 which keeps it engrossed in the contemplation of a few or of a single object3 this was our second point4 ,lastly1 this emotion 7,,iii3xlviii471 in so far as it is attributable to several causes1 is less powerful in regard to each of them4 ,q4,e4,d4 ,prop4,x4 ,so long as we are not assailed by emotions contrary to our nature1 we have the power of arranging and associating the modifications of our body according to the intellectual order4 ,proof4- ,the emotions1 which are contrary to our nature1 that is 7,,iv3xxx471 which are bad1 are bad in so far as they impede the mind from understanding 7,,iv3xxvii474 ,so long1 therefore1 as we are not assailed by emotions contrary to our nature1 the mind's power1 whereby it endeavours to understand things 7,,iv3xxvi471 is not impeded1 and therefore it is able to form clear and distinct ideas and to deduce them one from another 7,,ii3xl4,note4ii4 and ,,ii3xlvii4,note72 consequently we have in such cases the power of arranging and associating the modifications of the body according to the intellectual order4 ,q4,e4,d4 ,note4- ,by this power of rightly arranging and associating the bodily modifications we can guard ourselves from being easily affected by evil emotions4 ,for 7,v3vii47 a greater force is needed for controlling the emotions1 when they are arranged and associated according to the intellectual order1 than when they1 are uncertain and unsettled4 ,the best we can do1 therefore1 so long as we do not possess a perfect knowledge of our emotions1 is to frame a system of right conduct1 or fixed practical precepts1 to commit it to memory1 and to apply it forthwith to the particular circumstances which now and again meet us in life1 so that our imagination may become fully imbued therewith1 and that it may be always ready to our hand4 ,for instance1 we have laid down among the rules of life 7,,iv3xlvi41 ,note71 that hatred should be overcome with love or high- mindedness1 and not required with hatred in return4 ,now1 that this precept of reason may be always ready to our hand in time of need1 we should often think over and reflect upon the wrongs generally committed by men1 and in what manner and way they may be best warded off by high-mindedness3 we shall thus associate the idea of wrong with the idea of this precept1 which accordingly will always be ready for use when a wrong is done to us 7,,ii3xviii474 ,if we keep also in readiness the notion of our true advantage1 and of the good which follows from mutual friendships1 and common fellowships2 further1 if we remember that complete acquiescence is the result of the right way of life 7,,iv3lii471 and that men1 no less than everything else1 act by the necessity of their nature3 in such case ,i say the wrong1 or the hatred1 which commonly arises therefrom1 will engross a very small part of our imagination and will be easily overcome2 or1 if the anger which springs from a grievous wrong be not overcome easily1 it will nevertheless be overcome1 though not without a spiritual conflict1 far sooner than if we had not thus reflected on the subject beforehand4 ,as is indeed evident from ,v3vi41,v3vii41,v3viii4 ,we should1 in the same way1 reflect on courage as a means of overcoming fear2 the ordinary dangers of life should frequently be brought to mind and imagined1 together with the means whereby through readiness of resource and strength of mind we can avoid and overcome them4 ,but we must note1 that in arranging our thoughts and conceptions we should always bear in mind that which is good in every individual thing 7,,iv3lxiii4,coroll4 and ,,iii3lix471 in order that we may always be determined to action by an emotion of pleasure4 ,for instance1 if a man sees that he is too keen in the pursuit of honour1 let him think over its right use1 the end for which it should be pursued1 and the means whereby he may attain it4 ,let him not think of its misuse1 and its emptiness1 and the fickleness of mankind1 and the like1 whereof no man thinks except through a morbidness of disposition2 with thoughts like these do the most ambitious most torment themselves1 when they despair of gaining the distinctions they hanker after1 and in thus giving vent to their anger would fain appear wise4 ,wherefore it is certain that those1 who cry out the loudest against the misuse of honour and the vanity of the world1 are those who most greedily covet it4 ,this is not peculiar to the ambitious1 but is common to all who are ill-used by fortune1 and who are infirm in spirit4 ,for a poor man also1 who is miserly1 will talk incessantly of the misuse of wealth and of the vices of the rich2 whereby he merely torments himself1 and shows the world that he is intolerant1 not only of his own poverty1 but also of other people's riches4 ,so1 again1 those who have been ill received by a woman they love think of nothing but the inconstancy1 treachery1 and other stock faults of the fair sex2 all of which they consign to oblivion1 directly they are again taken into favour by their sweetheart4 ,thus he who would govern his emotions and appetite solely by the love of freedom strives1 as far as he can1 to gain a knowledge of the virtues and their causes1 and to fill his spirit with the joy which arises from the true knowledge of them3 he will in no wise desire to dwell on men's faults1 or to carp at his fellows1 or to revel in a false show of freedom4 ,whosoever will diligently observe and practise these precepts 7which indeed are not difficult7 will verily1 in a short space of time1 be able1 for the most part1 to direct his actions according to the commandments of reason4 ,prop4,,xi4 ,in proportion as a mental image is referred to more objects1 so is it more frequent1 or more often vivid1 and occupies the mind more4 ,proof4- ,in proportion as a mental image or an emotion is referred to more objects1 so are there more causes whereby it can be aroused and fostered1 all of which 7by hypothesis7 the mind contemplates simultaneously in association with the given emotion2 therefore the emotion is more frequent1 or is more often in full vigour1 and 7,v3viii47 occupies the mind more4 ,q4,e4,d4 ,prop4,,xii4 ,the mental images of things are more easily associated with the images referred to things which we clearly and distinctly understand1 than with others4 ,proof4- ,things1 which we clearly and distinctly understand1 are either the common properties of things or deductions therefrom 7see definition of ,reason1 ,,ii34xl4,note ii471 and are consequently 7by the last ,prop47 more often aroused in us4 ,wherefore it may more readily happen1 that we should contemplate other things in conjunction with these than in conjunction with something else1 and consequently 7,,ii3xviii47 that the images of the said things should be more often associated with the images of these than with the images of something else4 ,q4,e4,d4 ,prop4 ,,xiii4 ,a mental image is more often vivid1 in proportion as it is associated with a greater number of other images4 ,proof4- ,in proportion as an image is associated with a greater number of other images1 so 7,,ii3xviii47 are there more causes whereby it can be aroused4 ,q4,e4,d4 ,prop4 ,,xiv4 ,the mind can bring it about1 that all bodily modifications or images of things may be referred to the idea of ,god4 ,proof4- ,there is no modification of the body1 whereof the mind may not form some clear and distinct conception 7,v3iv472 wherefore it can bring it about1 that they should all be referred to the idea of ,god 7,i3xv474 ,q4,e4,d4 ,prop4 ,,xv4 ,he who clearly and distinctly understands himself and his emotions loves ,god1 and so much the more in proportion as he more understands himself and his emotions4 ,proof4- ,he who clearly and distinctly understands himself and his emotions feels pleasure 7,,iii3liii471 and this pleasure is 7by the last ,prop47 accompanied by the idea of ,god2 therefore 7,def4 of the ,emotions3vi47 such an one loves ,god1 and 7for the same reason7 so much the more in proportion as he more understands himself and his emotions4 ,q4,e4,d4 ,prop4 ,,xvi4 ,this love towards ,god must hold the chief place in the mind4 ,proof4- ,for this love is associated with all the modifications of the body 7,v3xiv47 and is fostered by them all 7,v3v472 therefore 7,v3xi471 it must hold the chief place in the mind4 ,q4,e4,d4 ,prop4 ,,xvii4 ,god is without passions1 neither is he affected by any emotion of pleasure or pain4 ,proof4- ,all ideas1 in so far as they are referred to ,god1 are true 7,,ii3xxxii471 that is 7,,ii3,def4iv47 adequate2 and therefore 7by the general ,def4 of the ,emotions7 ,god is without passions4 ,again1 ,god cannot pass either to a greater or to a lesser perfection 7,i3xx4,coroll4ii472 therefore 7by ,def4 of the ,emotions3ii41 iii47 he is not affected by any emotion of pleasure or pain4 ,corollary4 ,strictly speaking1 ,god does not love or hate anyone4 ,for ,god 7by the foregoing ,prop47 is not affected by any emotion of pleasure or pain1 consequently 7,def4 of the ,emotions3vi41 vii47 he does not love or hate anyone4 ,prop4,,xviii4 ,no one can hate ,god4 ,proof4- ,the idea of ,god which is in us is adequate and perfect 7,,ii3xlvi41 ,,ii3xlvii472 wherefore1 in so far as we contemplate ,god1 we are active 7,,iii3iii47 2 consequently 7,,iii3lix47 there can be no pain accompanied by the idea of ,god1 in other words 7,def4 of the ,emotions3vii471 no one can hate ,god4 ,q4,e4,d4 ,corollary4- ,love towards ,god cannot be turned into hate4 ,note4- ,it may be objected that1 as we understand ,god as the cause of all things1 we by that very fact regard ,god as the cause of pain4 ,but ,i make answer1 that1 in so far as we understand the causes of pain1 it to that extent 7,v3iii47 ceases to be a passion1 that is1 it ceases to be pain 7,,iii3lix472 therefore1 in so far as we understand ,god to be the cause of pain1 we to that extent feel pleasure4 ,prop4 ,,xix4 ,he1 who loves ,god1 cannot endeavour that ,god should love him in return4 ,proof4- ,for1 if a man should so endeavour1 he would desire 7,v3xvii4,coroll47 that ,god1 whom he loves1 should not be ,god1 and consequently he would desire to feel pain 7,,iii3xix472 which is absurd 7,,iii3xxviii474 ,therefore1 he who loves ,god1 c4 ,q4,e4,d4 ,prop4 ,,xx4 ,this love towards ,god cannot be stained by the emotion of envy or jealousy3 contrariwise1 it is the more fostered1 in proportion as we conceive a greater number of men to be joined to ,god by the same bond of love4 ,proof4- ,this love towards ,god is the highest good which we can seek for under the guidance of reason 7,,iv3xxviii471 it is common to all men 7,,iv3xxxvi71and we desire that all should rejoice therein 7,,iv3xxxvii472 therefore 7,def4 of the ,emotions3xxiii71 it cannot be stained by the emotion envy nor by1 the emotion of jealousy1 7,v3xviii4 see definition of ,jealousy1 7,,iii3xxxv4 ,note72 but1 contrariwise1 it must needs be the more fostered1 in proportion as we conceive a greater number of men to rejoice therein4 ,q4,e4,d4 ,note4- ,we can in the same way1 show1 that there is no emotion directly contrary to this love1 whereby this love can be destroyed2 therefore we may conclude1 that this love towards ,god is the most constant of all the emotions1 and that1 in so far as it is referred to the body1 it cannot be destroyed1 unless the body be destroyed also4 ,as to its nature1 in so far as it is referred to the mind only1 we shall presently inquire4 ,i have now gone through all the remedies against the emotions1 or all that the mind1 considered in itself alone1 can do against them4 ,whence it appears that the mind's power over the emotions consists3- ,i4 ,in the actual knowledge of the emotions 7,v3iv4,note74 ,,ii4 ,in the fact that it separates the emotions from the thought of an external cause1 which we conceive confusedly 7,v3ii4 and ,v3iv4,note74 ,,iii4 ,in the fact1 that1 in respect to time1 the emotions referred to things1 which we distinctly understand1 surpass those referred to what we conceive in a confused and fragmentary manner 7,v3vii474 ,,iv4 ,in the number of causes whereby those modifications 7,affectiones4 ,camerer reads affectus - emotions71 are fostered1 which have regard to the common properties of things or to ,god 7,v3ix41 ,v3xi474 ,v4 ,lastly1 in the order wherein the mind can arrange and associate1 one with another1 its own emotions 7,v3x4,note and ,v3xii41 ,v3xiii41 ,v3xiv474 ,but1 in order that this power of the mind over the emotions may be better understood1 it should be specially observed that the emotions are called by us strong1 when we compare the emotion of one man with the emotion of another1 and see that one man is more troubled than another by the same emotion2 or when we are comparing the various emotions of the same man one with another1 and find that he is more affected or stirred by one emotion than by another4 ,for the strength of every emotion is defined by a comparison of our own power with the power of an external cause4 ,now the power of the mind is defined by knowledge only1 and its infirmity or passion is defined by the privation of knowledge only3 it therefore follows1 that that mind is most passive1 whose greatest part is made up of inadequate ideas1 so that it may be characterized more readily by its passive states than by its activities3 on the other hand1 that mind is most active1 whose greatest part is made up of adequate ideas1 so that1 although it may contain as many inadequate ideas as the former mind1 it may yet be more easily characterized by ideas attributable to human virtue1 than by ideas which tell of human infirmity4 ,again1 it must be observed1 that spiritual unhealthiness2 and misfortunes can generally be traced to excessive love for something which is subject to many variations1 and which we can never become masters of4 ,for no one is solicitous or anxious about anything1 unless he loves it2 neither do wrongs1 suspicions1 enmities1 c4 arise1 except in regard to things whereof no one can be really master4 ,we may thus readily conceive the power which clear and distinct knowledge1 and especially that third kind of knowledge 7,,ii3xlvii4,note71 founded on the actual knowledge of ,god1 possesses over the emotions3 if it does not absolutely destroy them1 in so far as they are passions 7,v3iii4 and ,v3iv4,note72 at any rate1 it causes them to occupy a very small part of the mind 7,v3xiv474 ,further1 it begets a love towards a thing immutable and eternal 7,v3xv471 whereof we may really enter into possession 7,,ii3xlv472 neither can it be defiled with those faults which are inherent in ordinary love2 but it may grow from strength to strength1 and may engross the greater part of the mind1 and deeply penetrate it4 ,and now ,i have finished with all that concerns this present life3 for1 as ,i said in the beginning of this note1 ,i have briefly described all the remedies against the emotions4 ,and this everyone may readily have seen for himself1 if he has attended to what is advanced in the present note1 and also to the definitions of the mind and its emotions1 and1 lastly1 to ,propositions ,,iii3i4 and ,,iii3iii4 ,it is now1 therefore1 time to pass on to those matters1 which appertain to the duration of the mind1 without relation to the body4 ,prop4 ,,xxi4 ,the mind can only imagine anything1 or remember what is past1 while the body endures4 ,proof4- ,the mind does not express the actual existence of its body1 nor does it imagine the modifications of the body as actual1 except while the body endures 7,,ii3viii4,coroll472 and1 consequently 7,,ii3xxvi471 it does not imagine any body as actually existing1 except while its own body endures4 ,thus it cannot imagine anything 7for definition of ,imagination1 see ,,ii3xvii4,note71 or remember things past1 except while the body endures 7see definition of ,memory1 ,,ii3xviii4,note74 ,q4,e4,d4 ,prop4 ,,xxii4 ,nevertheless in ,god there is necessarily an idea1 which expresses the essence of this or that human body under the form of eternity4 ,proof4- ,god is the cause1 not only of the existence of this or that human body1 but also of its essence 7,i3xxv474 ,this essence1 therefore1 must necessarily be conceived through the very essence of ,god 7,i3,ax4iv471 and be thus conceived by a certain eternal necessity 7,i3xvi472 and this conception4 must necessarily exist in ,god 7,,ii3iii474 ,q4,e4,d4 ,prop4 ,,xxiii4 ,the human mind cannot be absolutely destroyed with the body1 but there remains of it something which is eternal4 ,proof4- ,there is necessarily in ,god a concept or idea1 which expresses the essence of the human body 7last ,prop471 which1 therefore1 is necessarily something appertaining to the essence of the human mind 7,,ii3xiii474 ,but we have not assigned to the human mind any1 duration1 definable by time1 except in so far as it expresses the actual existence of the body1 which is explained through duration1 and may be defined by time - that is 7,,ii3viii4,coroll471 we do not assign to it duration1 except while the body endures4 ,yet1 as there is something1 notwithstanding1 which is conceived by a certain eternal necessity through the very essence of ,god 7last ,prop472 this something1 which appertains to the essence of the mind1 will necessarily be eternal4 ,q4,e4,d4 ,note4- ,this idea1 which expresses the essence of the body under the form of eternity1 is1 as we have said1 a certain mode of thinking1 which belongs to the essence of the mind1 and is necessarily eternal4 ,yet it is not possible that we should remember that we existed before our body1 for our body can bear no trace of such existence1 neither can eternity be defined in terms of time1 or have any relation to time4 ,but1 notwithstanding1 we feel and know that we are eternal4 ,for the mind feels those things that it conceives by understanding1 no less than those things that it remembers4 ,for the eyes of the mind1 whereby it sees and observes things1 are none other than proofs4 ,thus1 although we do not remember that we existed before the body1 yet we feel that our mind1 in so far as it involves the essence of the body1 under the form of eternity1 is eternal1 and that thus its existence cannot be defined in terms of time1 or explained through duration4 ,thus our mind can only be said to endure1 and its existence can only be defined by a fixed time1 in so far as it involves the actual existence of the body4 ,thus far only has it the power of determining the existence of things by time1 and conceiving them under the category of duration4 ,prop4 ,,xxiv4 ,the more we understand particular things1 the more do we understand ,god4 ,proof4- ,this is evident from ,i3xxv4,coroll4 ,prop4 ,,xxv4 ,the highest endeavour of the mind1 and the highest virtue is to understand things by the third kind of knowledge4 ,proof4- ,the third kind of knowledge proceeds from an adequate idea of certain attributes of ,god to an adequate knowledge of the essence of things 7see its definition ,,iii3xl4,note4ii472 and1 in proportion as we understand things more in this way1 we better understand ,god 7by the last ,prop472 therefore 7,,iv3xxviii47 the highest virtue of the mind1 that is ,,iv3,def4viii47 the power1 or nature1 or 7,,iii3vii47 highest endeavour of the mind1 is to understand things by the third kind of knowledge4 ,q4,e4,d4 ,prop4 ,,xxvi4 ,in proportion as the mind is more capable of understanding things by the third kind of knowledge1 it desires more to understand things by that kind4 ,proof4- ,this is evident4 ,for1 in so far as we conceive the mind to be capable of conceiving things by this kind of knowledge1 we1 to that extent1 conceive it as determined thus to conceive things2 and consequently 7,def4 of the ,emotions3i471 the mind desires so to do1 in proportion as it is more capable thereof4 ,q4,e4,d4 ,prop4 ,,xxvii4 ,from this third kind of knowledge arises the highest possible mental acquiescence4 ,proof4- ,the highest virtue of the mind is to know ,god 7,,iv3xxviii471 or to understand things by the third kind of knowledge 7,v3xxv471 and this virtue is greater in proportion as the mind knows things more by the said kind of knowledge 7,v3xxiv473 consequently1 he who knows things by this kind of knowledge passes to the summit of human perfection1 and is therefore 7,def4 of the ,emotions3ii47 affected by the highest pleasure1 such pleasure being accompanied by the idea of himself and his own virtue2 thus 7,def4 of the ,emotions3xxv471 from this kind of knowledge arises the highest possible acquiescence4 ,q4,e4,d4 ,prop4 ,,xxviii4 ,the endeavour or desire to know things by the third kind of knowledge cannot arise from the first1 but from the second kind of knowledge4 ,proof4- ,this proposition is self-evident4 ,for whatsoever we understand clearly and distinct we understand either through itself1 or through that which is conceived through itself2 that is1 ideas which are clear and distinct in us1 or which are referred to the third kind of knowledge 7,,ii3xl4,note4ii47 cannot follow from ideas that are fragmentary1 and confused1 and are referred to knowledge of the first kind1 but must follow from adequate ideas1 or ideas of the second and third kind of knowledge2 therefore 7,def4 of the ,emotions3i471 the desire of knowing things by the third kind of knowledge cannot arise from the first1 but from the second kind4 ,q4,e4,d4 ,prop4 ,,xxix4 ,whatsoever the mind understands under the form of eternity1 it does not understand by virtue of conceiving the present actual existence of the body1 but by virtue of conceiving the essence of the body under the form of eternity4 ,proof4- ,in so far as the mind conceives the present existence of its body1 it to that extent conceives duration which can be determined by time1 and to that extent only1 has it the power of conceiving things in relation to time 7,v3xxi41 ,,ii3xxvi474 ,but eternity cannot be explained in terms of duration 7,i3,def4viii4 and explanation74 ,therefore to this extent the mind has not the power of conceiving things under the form of eternity1 but it possesses such power1 because it is of the nature of reason to conceive things under the form of eternity 7,,ii3xliv4,coroll4ii471 and also because it is of the nature of the mind to conceive the essence of the body under the form of eternity 7,v3xxiii471 for besides these two there is nothing which belongs to the essence of mind 7,,ii3xiii474 ,therefore this power of conceiving things under the form of eternity only belongs to the mind in virtue of the mind's conceiving the essence of the body under the form of eternity4 ,q4,e4,d4 ,note4- ,things are conceived by us as actual in two ways2 either as existing in relation to a given time and place1 or as contained in ,god and following from the necessity of the divine nature4 ,whatsoever we conceive in this second way as true or real1 we conceive under the form of eternity1 and their ideas involve the eternal and infinite essence of ,god1 as we showed in ,,ii3xlv4,note1 which see4 ,prop4 ,,xxx4 ,our mind1 in so far as it knows itself and the body under the form of eternity1 has to that extent necessarily a knowledge of ,god1 and knows that it is in ,god1 and is conceived through ,god4 ,proof4- ,eternity is the very essence of ,god1 in so far as this involves necessary existence 7,i3,def4viii474 ,therefore to conceive things under the form of eternity1 is to conceive things in so far as they are conceived through thp essence of ,god as real entities1 or in so far as they involve existence through the essence of ,god2 wherefore our mind1 in so far as it conceives itself and the body under the form of eternity1 has to that extent necessarily a knowledge of ,god1 and knows1 c4 ,q4,e4,d4 ,prop4 ,,xxxi4 ,the third kind of knowledge depends on the mind1 as its formal cause1 in so far as the mind itself is eternal4 ,proof4- ,the mind does not conceive anything under the form of eternity1 except in so far as it conceives its own body under the form of eternity 7,v3xxix472 that is1 except in so far as it is eternal 7,v3xxi41 ,v3xxiii472 therefore 7by the last ,prop471 in so far as it is eternal1 it possesses the knowledge of ,god1 which knowledge is necessarily adequate 7,,ii3xlvi472 hence the mind1 in so far as it is eternal1 is capable of knowing everything which can follow from this given knowledge of ,god 7,,ii3xl471 in other words1 of knowing things by the third kind of knowledge 7see ,def4 in ,,ii3xl4,note4ii471 whereof accordingly the mind 7,,iii3,def4i471 in so far as it is eternal1 is the adequate or formal cause of such knowledge4 ,q4,e4,d4 ,note4- ,in proportion1 therefore1 as a man is more potent in this kind of knowledge1 he will be more completely conscious of himself and of ,god2 in other words1 he will be more perfect and blessed1 as will appear more clearly in the sequel4 ,but we must here observe that1 although we are already certain that the mind is eternal1 in so far as it conceives things under the form of eternity1 yet1 in order that what we wish to show may be more readily explained and better understood1 we will consider the mind itself1 as though it had just begun to exist and to understand things under the form of eternity1 as indeed we have done hitherto2 this we may do without any danger of error1 so long as we are careful not to draw any conclusion1 unless our premisses are plain4 ,prop4 ,,xxxii4 ,whatsoever we understand by the third kind of knowledge1 we take delight in1 and our delight is accompanied by the idea of ,god as cause4 ,proof4- ,from this kind of knowledge arises the highest possible mental acquiescence1 that is 7,def of the ,emotions3xxv471 pleasure1 and this acquiescence is accompanied by the idea of the mind itself 7,v4 xxvii471 and consequently 7,v3xxx47 the idea also of ,god as cause4 ,q4,e4,d4 ,corollary4- ,from the third kind of knowledge necessarily arises the intellectual love of ,god4 ,from this kind of knowledge arises pleasure accompanied by the idea of ,god as cause1 that is 7,def4 of the ,emotions3vi471 the love of ,god2 not in so far as we imagine him as present 7,v3xxix471 but in so far as we understand him to be eternal2 this is what ,i call the intellectual love of ,god4 ,prop4 ,,xxxiii4 ,the intellectual love of ,god1 which arises from the third kind of knowledge1 is eternal4 ,proof4- ,the third kind of knowledge is eternal 7,v3xxxi41 ,i3,ax4iii472 therefore 7by the same ,axiom7 the love which arises therefrom is also necessarily eternal4 ,q4,e4,d4 ,note4- ,although this love towards ,god has 7by the foregoing ,prop47 no beginning1 it yet possesses all the perfections of love1 just as though it had arisen as we feigned in the ,coroll4 of the last ,prop4 ,nor is there here any difference1 except that the mind possesses as eternal those same perfections which we feigned to accrue to it1 and they are accompanied by the idea of ,god as eternal cause4 ,if pleasure consists in the transition to a greater perfection1 assuredly blessedness must consist in the mind being endowed with perfection itself4 ,prop4 ,,xxx4,,iv4 ,the mind is1 only while the body endures1 subject to those emotions which are attributable to passions4 ,proof4 ,imagination is the idea wherewith the mind contemplates a thing as present 7,,ii3xvii4,note72 yet this idea indicates rather the present disposition of the human body than the nature of the external thing 7,,ii3xvi4,coroll4ii474 ,therefore emotion 7see general ,def4 of ,emotions7 is imagination1 in so far as it indicates the present disposition of the body2 therefore 7,v3xxi47 the mind is1 only while the body endures1 subject to emotions which are attributable to passions4 ,q4,e4,d4 ,corollary4- ,hence it follows that no love save intellectual love is eternal4 ,note4- ,if we look to men's general opinion1 we shall see that they are indeed conscious of the eternity of their mind1 but that they confuse eternity with duration1 and ascribe it to the imagination or the memory which they believe to remain after death4 ,prop4 ,,xxxv4 ,god loves himself with an infinite intellectual love4 ,proof4- ,god is absolutely infinite 7,i3,def4vi471 that is 7,,ii3,def4vi471 the nature of ,god rejoices in infinite perfection2 and such rejoicing is 7,,ii3iii47 accompanied by the idea of himself1 that is 7,i3xi4 and ,i3,def4i471 the idea of his own cause3 now this is what we have 7in ,v3xxxii4,coroll47 described as intellectual love4 ,prop4 ,,xxxvi4 ,the intellectual love of the mind towards ,god is that very love of ,god whereby ,god loves himself1 not in so far as he is infinite1 but in so far as he can be explained through the essence of the human mind regarded under the form of eternity2 in other words1 the intellectual love of the mind towards ,god is part of the infinite love wherewith ,god loves himself4 ,proof4- 7#a7 ,this love of the mind must be referred to the activities of the mind 7,v3xxxii4,coroll4 and ,,iii3iii472 it is itself1 indeed1 an activity whereby the mind regards itself accompanied by the idea of ,god as cause 7,v3xxxii4,coroll472 that is 7,i3xxv4,coroll4 and ,,ii3xi4,coroll471 an activity whereby ,god1 in so far as he can be explained through the human mind1 regards himself accompanied by the idea of himself2 therefore 7by the last ,prop471 this love of the mind is part of the infinite love wherewith ,god loves himself4 ,q4,e4,d4 ,corollary4- ,hence it follows that ,god1 in so far as he loves himself1 loves man1 and1 consequently1 that the love of ,god towards men1 and the intellectual love of the mind towards ,god are identical4 ,note4- ,from what has been said we clearly understand1 wherein our salvation1 or blessedness1 or freedom1 consists3 namely1 in the constant and eternal love towards ,god1 or in ,god's love towards men4 ,this love or blessedness is1 in the ,bible1 called ,glory and not undeservedly4 ,for whether this love be referred to ,god or to the mind1 it may rightly be called acquiescence of spirit1 which 7,def4 of the ,emotions3xxv41 and xxx47 is not really distinguished from glory4 ,in so far as it is referred to ,god1 it is 7,v3xxxv47 pleasure1 if we may still use that term1 accompanied by the idea of itself1 and1 in so far as it is referred to the mind1 it is the same 7,v3xxvii474 ,again1 since the essence of our mind consists solely in knowledge1 whereof the beginning and the foundation is ,god 7,i3xv41 ,,ii3xlvii4,note71 it becomes clear to us1 in what manner and way our mind1 as to its essence and existence1 follows from the divine nature and constantly depends on ,god4 ,i have thought it worth while here to call attention to this1 in order to show by this example how the knowledge of particular things1 which ,i have called intuitive or of the third kind 7,,ii3xl4,note4ii471 is potent1 and more powerful than the universal knowledge1 which ,i have styled knowledge of the second kind4 ,for1 although in ,part ,i showed in general terms1 that all things 7and consequently1 also1 the human mind7 depend as to their essence and existence on ,god1 yet that demonstration1 though legitimate and placed beyond the chances of doubt1 does not affect our mind so much1 as when the same conclusion is derived from the actual essence of some particular thing1 which we say depends on ,god4 ,prop4 ,,xxxvii4 ,there is nothing in nature1 which is contrary to this intellectual love1 or which can take it away4 ,proof4- ,this intellectual love follows necessarily from the nature of the mind1 in so far as the latter is regarded through the nature of ,god as an eternal truth 7,v3xxxiii4 and ,v3xxix474 ,if1 therefore1 there should be anything which would be contrary to this love1 that thing would be contrary to that which is true2 consequently1 that1 which should be able to take away this love1 would cause that which is true to be false2 an obvious absurdity4 ,therefore there is nothing in nature which1 c4 ,q4,e4,d4 ,note4- ,the ,axiom of ,part ,,iv4 has reference to particular things1 in so far as they are regarded in relation to a given time and place3 of this1 ,i think1 no one can doubt4 ,prop4 ,,xxxviii4 ,in proportion as the mind understands more things by the second and third kind of knowledge1 it is less subject to those emotions which are evil1 and stands in less fear of death4 ,proof4- ,the mind's essence consists in knowledge 7,,ii3xi472 therefore1 in proportion as the mind understands more things by the second and third kinds of knowledge1 the greater will be the part of it that endures 7,v3xxix4 and ,v3xxiii471 and1 consequently 7by the last ,prop471 the greater will be the part that is not touched by the emotions1 which are contrary to our nature1 or in other words1 evil 7,,iv3xxx474 ,thus1 in proportion as the mind understands more things by the second and third kinds of knowledge1 the greater will be the part of it1 that remains unimpaired1 and1 consequently1 less subject to emotions1 c4 ,q4,e4,d4 ,note4- ,hence we understand that point which ,i touched on in ,,iv3xxxix4,note1 and which ,i promised to explain in this ,part2 namely1 that death becomes less hurtful1 in proportion as the mind's clear and distinct knowledge is greater1 and1 consequently1 in proportion as the mind loves ,god more4 ,again1 since from the third kind of knowledge arises the highest possible acquiescence 7,v3xxvii471 it follows that the human mind can attain to being of such a nature1 that the part thereof which we have shown to perish with the body 7,v3xxi47 should be of little importance when compared with the part which endures4 ,but ,i will soon treat of the subject at greater length4 ,prop4 ,,xxxix4 ,he1 who possesses a body capable of the greatest number of activities1 possesses a mind whereof the greatest part is eternal4 ,proof4- ,he1 who possesses a body capable of the greatest number of activities1 is least agitated by those emotions which are evil 7,,iv3xxxviii47 that is 7,,iv3xxx471 by those emotions which are contrary to our nature2 therefore 7,v3x471 he possesses the power of arranging and associating the modifications of the body according to the intellectual order1 and1 consequently1 of bringing it about1 that all the modifications of the body should be referred to the idea of ,god2 whence it will come to pass that 7,v3xv47 he will be affected with love towards ,god1 which 7,v3xvi7 must occupy or constitute the chief part of the mind2 therefore 7,v3xxxiii471 such a man will possess a mind whereof the chief part is eternal4 ,q4,e4,d4 ,note4- ,since human bodies are capable of the greatest number of activities1 there is no doubt but that they may be of such a nature1 that they may be referred to minds possessing a great knowledge of themselves and of ,god1 and whereof the greatest or chief part is eternal1 and1 therefore1 that they should scarcely fear death4 ,but1 in order that this may be understood more clearly1 we must here call to mind1 that we live in a state of perpetual variation1 and1 according as we are changed for the better or the worse1 we are called happy or unhappy4 ,for he1 who1 from being an infant or a child1 becomes a corpse1 is called unhappy2 whereas it is set down to happiness1 if we have been able to live through the whole period of life with a sound mind in a sound body4 ,and1 in reality1 he1 who1 as in the case of an infant or a child1 has a body capable of very few activities1 and depending1 for the most part1 on external causes1 has a mind which1 considered in itself alone1 is scarcely conscious of itself1 or of ,god1 or of things2 whereas1 he1 who has a body capable of very many activities1 has a mind which1 considered in itself alone1 is highly conscious of itself1 of ,god1 and of things4 ,in this life1 therefore1 we primarily endeavour to bring it about1 that the body of a child1 in so far as its nature allows and conduces thereto1 may be changed into something else capable of very many activities1 and referable to a mind which is highly conscious of itself1 of ,god1 and of things2 and we desire so to change it1 that what is referred to its imagination and memory may become insignificant1 in comparison with its intellect1 as ,i have already said in the note to the last ,proposition4 ,prop4 ,,xl4 ,in proportion as each thing possesses more of perfection1 so is it more active1 and less passive2 and1 vice versa1 in proportion as it is more active1 so is it more perfect4 ,proof4- ,in proportion as each thing is more perfect1 it possesses more of reality 7,,ii3,def4vi471 and1 consequently 7,,iii3iii4and ,note71 it is to that extent more active and less passive4 ,this demonstration may be reversed1 and thus prove that1 in proportion as a thing is more active1 so is it more perfect4 ,q4,e4,d4 ,corollary4- ,hence it follows that the part of the mind which endures1 be it great or small1 is more perfect than the rest4 ,for the eternal part of the mind 7,v3xiii4 and ,v3xxix47 the understanding1 through which alone we are said to act 7,,iii3iii472 the part which we have shown to perish is the imagination 7,v3xxi471 through which only we are said to be passive 7,,iii3iii4 and general ,def4 of the ,emotions72 therefore1 the former1 be it great or small1 is more perfect than the latter4 ,q4,e4,d4 ,note4- ,such are the doctrines which ,i had purposed to set forth concerning the mind1 in so far as it is regarded without relation to the body2 whence1 as also from ,i3xxi4 and other places1 it is plain that our mind1 in so far as it understands1 is an eternal mode of thinking1 which is determined by another eternal mode of thinking1 and this other by a third1 and so on to infinity2 so that all taken together at once constitute the eternal and infinite intellect of ,god4 ,prop4 ,,xli4 ,even if we did not know that our mind is eternal1 we should still consider as of primary importance piety and religion1 and generally all things which1 in ,part ,,iv41 we showed to be attributable to courage and high-mindedness4 ,proof4- ,the first and only1 foundation of virtue1 or the rule of right living is 7,,iv3xxii4,coroll4 and ,,iv3xxiv47 seeking one's own true interest4 ,now1 while we determined what reason prescribes as useful1 we took no account of the mind's eternity1 which has only become known to us in this ,fifth ,part4 ,although we were ignorant at that time that the mind is eternal1 we nevertheless stated that the qualities attributable to courage and high- mindedness are of primary importance4 ,therefore1 even if we were still ignorant of this doctrine1 we should yet put the aforesaid precepts of reason in the first place4 ,q4,e4,d4 ,note4- ,the general belief of the multitude seems to be different4 ,most people seem to believe that they are free1 in so far as they may obey their lusts1 and that they cede their rights1 in so far as they are bound to live according to the commandments of the divine law4 ,they therefore believe that piety1 religion1 and1 generally1 all things attributable to firmness of mind1 are burdens1 which1 after death1 they hope to lay aside1 and to receive the reward for their bondage1 that is1 for their piety1 and religion2 it is not only by this hope1 but also1 and chiefly1 by the fear of being horribly punished after death1 that they are induced to live according to the divine commandments1 so far as their feeble and infirm spirit will carry them4 ,if men had not this hope and this fear1 but believed that the mind perishes with the body1 and that no hope of prolonged life remains for the wretches who are broken down with the burden of piety1 they would return to their own inclinations1 controlling everything in accordance with their lusts1 and desiring to obey fortune rather than themselves4 ,such a course appears to me not less absurd than if a man1 because he does not believe that he can by wholesome food sustain his body for ever1 should wish to cram himself with poisons and deadly fare2 or if1 because he sees that the mind is not eternal or immortal1 he should prefer to be out of his mind altogether1 and to live without the use of reason2 these ideas are so absurd as to be scarcely worth refuting4 ,prop4 ,,xlii4 ,blessedness is not the reward of virtue1 but virtue itself 2 neither do we rejoice therein1 because we control our lusts1 but1 contrariwise1 because we rejoice therein1 we are able to control our lusts4 ,proof4- ,blessedness consists in love towards ,god 7,v3xxxvi4 and ,note71 which love springs from the third kind of knowledge 7,v3xxxii4,coroll472 therefore this love 7,,iii3iii4 and ,,iii3lix47 must be referred to the mind1 in so far as the latter is active2 therefore 7,,iv3,def4viii47 it is virtue itself4 ,this was our first point4 ,again1 in proportion as the mind rejoices more in this divine love or blessedness1 so does it the more understand 7,v3xxxii472 that is 7,v3iii4,coroll471 so much the more power has it over the emotions1 and 7,v3xxxviii47 so much the less is it subject to those emotions which are evil2 therefore1 in proportion as the mind rejoices in this divine love or blessedness1 so has it the power of controlling lusts4 ,and1 since human power in controlling the emotions consists solely in the understanding1 it follows that no one rejoices in blessedness1 because he has controlled his lusts1 but1 contrariwise1 his power of controlling his lusts arises from this blessedness itself4 ,q4,e4,d4 ,note4- ,i have thus completed all ,i wished to set forth touching the mind's power over the emotions and the mind's freedom4 ,whence it appears1 how potent is the wise man1 and how much he surpasses the ignorant man1 who is driven only by his lusts4 ,for the ignorant man is not only distracted in various ways by external causes without ever gaining1 the true acquiescence of his spirit1 but moreover lives1 as it were unwitting of himself1 and of ,god1 and of things1 and as soon as he ceases to suffer1 ceases also to be4 ,whereas the wise man1 in so far as he is regarded as such1 is scarcely at all disturbed in spirit1 but1 being conscious of himself1 and of ,god1 and of things1 by a certain eternal necessity1 never ceases to be1 but always possesses true acquiescence of his spirit4 ,if the way which ,i have pointed out as leading to this result seems exceedingly hard1 it may nevertheless be discovered4 ,needs must it be hard1 since it is so seldom found4 ,how would it be possible1 if salvation were ready to our hand1 and could without great labour be found1 that it should be by almost all men neglected8 ,but all things excellent are as difficult as they are rare4 ,end of ,part ,v4