,benedict de ,spinoza1 ,,the ,,ethics 7,ethica ,ordine ,geometrico ,demonstrata7 ,translated by ,r4 ,h4 ,m4 ,elwes ,,part ,,iv3 ,of ,human ,bondage1 or the ,strength of the ,emotions ,,preface ,human infirmity in moderating and checking the emotions ,i name bondage3 for1 when a man is a prey to his emotions1 he is not his own master1 but lies at the mercy of fortune3 so much so1 that he is often compelled1 while seeing that which is better for him1 to follow that which is worse4 ,why this is so1 and what is good or evil in the emotions1 ,i propose to show in this part of my treatise4 ,but1 before ,i begin1 it would be well to make a few prefatory observations on perfection and imperfection1 good and evil4 ,when a man has purposed to make a given thing1 and has brought it to perfection1 his work will be pronounced perfect1 not only by himself1 but by everyone who rightly knows1 or thinks that he knows1 the intention and aim of its author4 ,for instance1 suppose anyone sees a work 7which ,i assume to be not yet completed71 and knows that the aim of the author of that work is to build a house1 he will call the work imperfect2 he will1 on the other hand1 call it perfect1 as soon as he sees that it is carried through to the end1 which its author had purposed for it4 ,but if a man sees a work1 the like whereof he has never seen before1 and if he knows not the intention of the artificer1 he plainly cannot know1 whether that work be perfect or imperfect4 ,such seems to be the primary meaning of these terms4 ,but1 after men began to form general ideas1 to think out types of houses1 buildings1 towers1 c41 and to prefer certain types to others1 it came about1 that each man called perfect that which he saw agree with the general idea he had formed of the thing in question1 and called imperfect that which he saw agree less with his own preconceived type1 even though it had evidently been completed in accordance with the idea of its artificer4 ,this seems to be the only reason for calling natural phenomena1 which1 indeed1 are not made with human hands1 perfect or imperfect3 for men are wont to form general ideas of things natural1 no less than of things artificial1 and such ideas they hold as types1 believing that ,nature 7who they think does nothing without an object7 has them in view1 and has set them as types before herself4 ,therefore1 when they behold something in ,nature1 which does not wholly conform to the preconceived type which they have formed of the thing in question1 they say that ,nature has fallen short or has blundered1 and has left her work incomplete4 ,thus we see that men are wont to style natural phenomena perfect or imperfect rather from their own prejudices1 than from true knowledge of what they pronounce upon4 ,now we showed in the ,appendix to ,part ,i41 that ,nature does not work with an end in view4 ,for the eternal and infinite ,being1 which we call ,god or ,nature1 acts by the same necessity as that whereby it exists4 ,for we have shown1 that by the same necessity of its nature1 whereby it exists1 it likewise works 7,i3xvi474 ,the reason or cause why ,god or ,nature exists1 and the reason why he acts1 are one and the same4 ,therefore1 as he does not exist for the sake of an end1 so neither does he act for the sake of an end2 of his existence and of his action there is neither origin nor end4 ,wherefore1 a cause which is called final is nothing else but human desire1 in so far as it is considered as the origin or cause of anything4 ,for example1 when we say that to be inhabited is the final cause of this or that house1 we mean nothing more than that a man1 conceiving the conveniences of household life1 had a desire to build a house4 ,wherefore1 the being inhabited1 in so far as it is regarded as a final cause1 is nothing else but this particular desire1 which is really the efficient cause2 it is regarded as the primary cause1 because men are generally ignorant of the causes of their desires4 ,they are1 as ,i have often said already1 conscious of their own actions and appetites1 but ignorant of the causes whereby they are determined to any particular desire4 ,therefore1 the common saying that ,nature sometimes falls short1 or blunders1 and produces things which are imperfect1 ,i set down among the glosses treated of in the ,appendix to ,part #a4 ,perfection and imperfection1 then1 are in reality merely modes of thinking1 or notions which we form from a comparison among one another of individuals of the same species2 hence ,i said above 7,,ii3,def4vi471 that by reality and perfection ,i mean the same thing4 ,for we are wont to refer all the individual things in nature to one genus1 which is called the highest genus1 namely1 to the category of ,being1 whereto absolutely all individuals in nature belong4 ,thus1 in so far as we refer the individuals in nature to this category1 and comparing them one with another1 find that some possess more of being or reality than others1 we1 to this extent1 say that some are more perfect than others4 ,again1 in so far as we attribute to them anything implying negation - as term1 end1 infirmity1 etc41 we1 to this extent1 call them imperfect1 because they do not affect our mind so much as the things which we call perfect1 not because they have any intrinsic deficiency1 or because ,nature has blundered4 ,for nothing lies within the scope of a thing's nature1 save that which follows from the necessity of the nature of its efficient cause1 and whatsoever follows from the necessity of the nature of its efficient cause necessarily comes to pass4 ,as for the terms good and bad1 they indicate no positive quality in things regarded in themselves1 but are merely modes of thinking1 or notions which we form from the comparison of things one with another4 ,thus one and the same thing can be at the same time good1 bad1 and indifferent4 ,for instance1 music is good for him that is melancholy1 bad for him that mourns2 for him that is deaf1 it is neither good nor bad4 ,nevertheless1 though this be so1 the terms should still be retained4 ,for1 inasmuch as we desire to form an idea of man as a type of human nature which we may hold in view1 it will be useful for us to retain the terms in question1 in the sense ,i have indicated4 ,in what follows1 then1 ,i shall mean by1 good that1 which we certainly know to be a means of approaching more nearly to the type of human nature1 which we have set before ourselves2 by bad1 that which we certainly know to be a hindrance to us in approaching the said type4 ,again1 we shall that men are more perfect1 or more imperfect1 in proportion as they approach more or less nearly to the said type4 ,for it must be specially remarked that1 when ,i say that a man passes from a lesser to a greater perfection1 or vice versa1 ,i do not mean that he is changed from one essence or reality to another2 for instance1 a horse would be as completely destroyed by being changed into a man1 as by being changed into an insect4 ,what ,i mean is1 that we conceive the thing's power of action1 in so far as this is understood by its nature1 to be increased or diminished4 ,lastly1 by perfection in general ,i shall1 as ,i have said1 mean reality in other words1 each thing's essence1 in so far as it exists1 and operates in a particular manner1 and without paying any regard to its duration4 ,for no given thing can be said to be more perfect1 because it has passed a longer time in existence4 ,the duration of things cannot be determined by their essence1 for the essence of things involves no fixed and definite period of existence2 but everything1 whether it be more perfect or less perfect1 will always be able to persist in existence with the same force wherewith it began to exist2 wherefore1 in this respect1 all things are equal4 ,,definitions4 ,i4 ,by good ,i mean that which we certainly know to be useful to us4 ,,ii4 ,by evil ,i mean that which we certainly know to be a hindrance to us in the attainment of any good4 7,concerning these terms see the foregoing preface towards the end47 ,,iii4 ,particular things ,i call contingent in so far as1 while regarding their essence only1 we find nothing therein1 which necessarily asserts their existence or excludes it4 ,,iv4 ,particular things ,i call possible in so far as1 while regarding the causes whereby they must be produced1 we know not1 whether such causes be determined for producing them4 7,in ,i3xxxiii4note4i41 ,i drew no distinction between possible and contingent1 because there was in that place no need to distinguish them accurately47 ,v4 ,by conflicting emotions ,i mean those which draw a man in different directions1 though they are of the same kind1 such as luxury and avarice1 which are both species of love1 and are contraries1 not by nature1 but by accident4 ,,vi4 ,what ,i mean by emotion felt towards a thing1 future1 present1 and past1 ,i explained in ,,iii3xviii41notes4i41ii41 which see4 7,but ,i should here also remark1 that we can only distinctly conceive distance of space or time up to a certain definite limit2 that is1 all objects distant from us more than two hundred feet1 or whose distance from the place where we are exceeds that which we can distinctly conceive1 seem to be an equal distance from us1 and all in the same plane2 so also objects1 whose time of existing is conceived as removed from the present by a longer interval than we can distinctly conceive1 seem to be all equally distant from the present1 and are set down1 as it were1 to the same moment of time47 ,,vii4 ,by an end1 for the sake of which we do something1 ,i mean a desire4 ,,viii4 ,by virtue 7virtus7 and power ,i mean the same thing2 that is 7,,iii3vii471 virtue1 in so far as it is referred to man1 is a man's nature or essence1 in so far as it has the power of effecting what can only be understood by the laws of that nature4 ,,axiom4 ,there is no individual thing in nature1 than which there is not another more powerful and strong4 ,whatsoever thing be given1 there is something stronger whereby it can be destroyed4 ,,propositions4 ,prop4 ,i4 ,no positive quality possessed by a false idea is removed by the presence of what is true1 in virtue of its being true4 ,proof4- ,falsity consists solely in the privation of knowledge which inadequate ideas involve 7,,ii3xxxv471 nor have they any positive quality on account of which they are called false 7,,ii3xxxiii472 contrariwise1 in so far as they are referred to ,god1 they are true 7,,ii3xxxii474 ,wherefore1 if the positive quality possessed by a false idea were removed by the presence of what is true1 in virtue of its being true1 a true idea would then be removed by itself1 which 7,,iv3iii47 is absurd4 ,therefore1 no positive quality possessed by a false idea1 c4 ,q4,e4,d4 ,note4- ,this proposition is more clearly understood from ,,ii3xvi4,coroll4ii4 ,for imagination is an idea1 which indicates rather the present disposition of the human body than the nature of the external body2 not indeed distinctly1 but confusedly2 whence it comes to pass1 that the mind is said to err4 ,for instance1 when we look at the sun1 we conceive that it is distant from us about two hundred feet2 in this judgment we err1 so long as we are in ignorance of its true distance2 when its true distance is known1 the error is removed1 but not the imagination2 or1 in other words1 the idea of the sun1 which only explains tho nature of that luminary1 in so far as the body is affected thereby3 wherefore1 though we know the real distance1 we shall still nevertheless imagine the sun to be near us4 ,for1 as we said in ,,iii3xxxv4note1 we do not imagine the sun to be so near us1 because we are ignorant of its true distance1 but because the mind conceives the magnitude of the sun to the extent that the body is affected thereby4 ,thus1 when the rays of the sun falling on the surface of water are reflected into our eyes1 we imagine the sun as if it were in the water1 though we are aware of its real position2 and similarly other imaginations1 wherein the mind is deceived whether they indicate the natural disposition of the body1 or that its power of activity is increased or diminished1 are not contrary to the truth1 and do not vanish at its presence4 ,it happens indeed that1 when we mistakenly fear an evil1 the fear vanishes when we hear the true tidings2 but the contrary also happens1 namely1 that we fear an evil which will certainly come1 and our fear vanishes when we hear false tidings2 thus imaginations do not vanish at the presence of the truth1 in virtue of its being true1 but because other imaginations1 stronger than the first1 supervene and exclude the present existence of that which we imagined1 as ,i have shown in ,,ii34xvii4 ,prop4 ,,ii4 ,we are only passive1 in so far as we are apart of ,nature1 which cannot be conceived by itself without other parts4 ,proof4- ,we are said to be passive1 when something arises in us1 whereof we are only a partial cause 7,,iii3,def4ii471 that is 7,,iii3,def4i471 something which cannot be deduced solely from the laws of our nature4 ,we are passive therefore in so far as we are a part of ,nature1 which cannot be conceived by itself without other parts4 ,q4,e4,d4 ,prop4 ,,iii4 ,the force whereby a man persists in existing is limited1 and is infinitely surpassed by the power of external causes4 ,proof4-,this is evident from the axiom of this part4 ,for1 when man is given1 there is something else - say ,a - more powerful2 when ,a is given1 there is something else - say ,b - more powerful than ,a1 and so on to infinity2 thus the power of man is limited by the power of some other thing1 and is infinitely surpassed by the power of external causes4 ,q4,e4,d4 ,prop4 ,,iv4 ,it is impossible1 that man should not be a part of ,nature1 or that he should be capable of undergoing no changes1 save such as can be understood through his nature only as their adequate cause4 ,proof4- ,the power1 whereby each particular thing1 and consequently man1 preserves his being1 is the power of ,god or of ,nature 7,i3xxiv4,coroll472 not in so far as it is infinite1 but in so far as it can be explained by the actual human essence 7,,iii3vii474 ,thus the power of man1 in so far as it is explained through his own actual essence1 is a part of the infinite power of ,god or ,nature1 in other words1 of the essence thereof 7,i3xxxiv474 ,this was our first point4 ,again1 if it were possible1 that man should undergo no changes save such as can be understood solely through the nature of man1 it would follow that he would not be able to die1 but would always necessarily exist2 this would be the necessary consequence of a cause whose power was either finite or infinite2 namely1 either of man's power only1 inasmuch as he would be capable of removing from himself all changes which could spring from external causes2 or of the infinite power of ,nature1 whereby all individual things would be so ordered1 that man should be incapable of undergoing any changes save such as tended towards his own preservation4 ,but the first alternative is absurd 7by the last ,prop41 the proof of which is universal1 and can be applied to all individual things74 ,therefore1 if it be possible1 that man should not be capable of undergoing any changes1 save such as can be explained solely through his own nature1 and consequently that he must always 7as we have shown7 necessarily exist2 such a result must follow from the infinite power of ,god1 and consequently 7,i3xvi47 from the necessity of the divine nature1 in so far as it is regarded as affected by the idea of any given man1 the whole order of nature as conceived under the attributes of extension and thought must be deducible4 ,it would therefore follow 7,i3xxi47 that man is infinite1 which 7by the first part of this proof7 is absurd4 ,it is1 therefore1 impossible1 that man should not undergo any changes save those whereof he is the adequate cause4 ,q4,e4,d4 ,corollary4- ,hence it follows1 that man is necessarily always a prey to his passions1 that he follows and obeys the general order of nature1 and that he accommodates himself thereto1 as much as the nature of things demands4 ,prop4 ,v4 ,the power and increase of every passion1 and its persistence in existing are not defined by the power1 whereby we ourselves endeavour to persist in existing1 but by the power of an external cause compared with our own4 ,proof4- ,the essence of a passion cannot be explained through our essence alone 7,,iii3,def4i44ii471 that is 7,,iii3vii471 the power of a passion cannot be defined by the power1 whereby we ourselves endeavour to persist in existing1 but 7as is shown in ,,ii3xvi47 must necessarily be defined by the power of an external cause compared with our own4 ,q4,e4,d4 ,prop4 ,,vi4 ,the force of any passion or emotion can overcome the rest of a man's activities or power1 so that the emotion becomes obstinately fixed to him4 ,proof4- ,the force and increase of any passion and its persistence in existing are defined by the power of an external cause compared with our own 7by the foregoing ,prop472 therefore 7,,iv3iii47 it can overcome a man's power1 e4 ,q4,e4,d4 ,prop4 ,,vii4 ,an emotion can only be controlled or destroyed by another emotion contrary thereto1 and with more power for controlling emotion4 ,proof4- ,emotion1 in so far as it is referred to the mind1 is an idea1 whereby the mind affirms of its body a greater or less force of existence than before 7cf4 the general ,definition of the ,emotions at the end of ,part ,,iii47 ,when1 therefore1 the mind is assailed by any emotion1 the body is at the same time affected with a modification whereby its power of activity is increased or diminished4 ,now this modification of the body 7,,iv3v47 receives from its cause the force for persistence in its being2 which force can only be checked or destroyed by a bodily cause 7,,ii3vi471 in virtue of the body being affected with a modification contrary to 7,,iii3v47 and stronger than itself 7,,iv4,ax472 wherefore 7,,ii3xii47 the mind is affected by the idea of a modification contrary to1 and stronger than the former modification1 in other words1 7by the general definition of the emotions7 the mind will be affected by an emotion contrary to and stronger than the former emotion1 which will exclude or destroy the existence of the former emotion2 thus an emotion cannot be destroyed nor controlled except by a contrary and stronger emotion4 ,q4,e4,d4 ,corollary4- ,an emotion1 in so far as it is referred to the mind1 can only be controlled or destroyed through an idea of a modification of the body contrary to1 and stronger than1 that which we are undergoing4 ,for the emotion which we undergo can only be checked or destroyed by an emotion contrary to1 and stronger than1 itself1 in other words1 7by the general ,definition of the ,emotions7 only by an idea of a modification of the body contrary to1 and stronger than1 the modification which we undergo4 ,prop4 ,,viii4 ,the knowledge of good and evil is nothing else but the emotions of pleasure or pain1 in so far as we are conscious thereof4 ,proof4- ,we call a thing good or evil1 when it is of service or the reverse in preserving our being 7,,iv3,def4i44ii471 that is 7,,iii3vii471 when it increases or diminishes1 helps or hinders1 our power of activity4 ,thus1 in so far as we perceive that a thing affects us with pleasure or pain1 we call it good or evil2 wherefore the knowledge of good and evil is nothing else but the idea of the pleasure or pain1 which necessarily follows from that pleasurable or painful emotion 7,,ii3xxii474 ,but this idea is united to the emotion in the same way as mind is united to body 7,,ii3xxi472 that is1 there is no real distinction between this idea and the emotion or idea of the modification of the body1 save in conception only4 ,therefore the knowledge of good and evil is nothing else but the emotion1 in so far as we are conscious thereof4 ,q4,e4,d4 ,prop4 ,,ix4 ,an emotion1 whereof we conceive the cause to be with us at the present time1 is stronger than if we did not conceive the cause to be with us4 ,proof4- ,imagination or conception is the idea1 by which the mind regards a thing as present 7,,ii3xvii4note71 but which indicates the disposition of the mind rather than the nature of the external thing 7,,ii3xvi4,coroll4ii74 ,an emotion is therefore a conception1 in so far as it indicates the disposition of the body4 ,but a conception 7by ,,ii3xvii47 is stronger1 so long as we conceive nothing which excludes the present existence of the external object2 wherefore an emotion is also stronger or more intense1 when we conceive the cause to be with us at the present time1 than when we do not conceive the cause to be with us4 ,q4,e4,d4 ,note4- ,when ,i said above in ,,iii3xviii4 that we are affected by the image of what is past or future with the same emotion as if the thing conceived were present1 ,i expressly stated1 that this is only true in so far as we look solely to the image of the thing in question itself 2 for the thing's nature is unchanged1 whether we have conceived it or not2 ,i did not deny that the image becomes weaker1 when we regard as present to us other things which exclude the present existence of the future object3 ,i did not expressly call attention to the fact1 because ,i purposed to treat of the strength of the emotions in this part of my work4 ,corollary4- ,the image of something past or future1 that is1 of a thing which we regard as in relation to time past or time future1 to the exclusion of time present1 is1 when other conditions are equal1 weaker than the image of something present2 consequently an emotion felt towards what is past or future is less intense1 other conditions being equal1 than an emotion felt towards something present4 ,prop4 ,x4 ,towards something future1 which we conceive as close at hand1 we are affected more intensely1 than if we conceive that its time for existence is separated from the present by a longer interval2 so too by the remembrance of what we conceive to have not long passed away we are affected more intensely1 than if we conceive that it has long passed away4 ,proof4- ,in so far as we conceive a thing as close at hand1 or not long passed away1 we conceive that which excludes the presence of the object less1 than if its period of future existence were more distant from the present1 or if it had long passed away 7this is obvious7 therefore 7by the foregoing ,prop47 we are1 so far1 more intensely affected towards it4 ,q4,e4,d4 ,corollary4- ,from the remarks made in ,,iv3,def4vi4 of this part it follows that1 if objects are separated from the present by a longer period than we can define in conception1 though their dates of occurrence be widely separated one from the other1 they all affect us equally faintly4 ,prop4 ,,xi4 ,an emotion towards that which we conceive as necessary is1 when other conditions are equal1 more intense than an emotion towards that which impossible1 or contingent1 or non-necessary4 ,proof4- ,in so far as we conceive a thing to be necessary1 we1 to that extent1 affirm its existence2 on the other hand we deny a thing's existence1 in so far as we conceive it not to be necessary 3xxxiii4note4i472 wherefore 7,,iv4ix47 an emotion towards that which is necessary is1 other conditions being equal1 more intense than an emotion that which is non-necessary4 ,q4,e4,d4 ,prop4 ,,xii4 ,an emotion towards a thing1 which we know not to exist at the present time1 and which we conceive as possible1 is more intense1 other conditions being equal1 than an emotion towards a thing contingent4 ,proof4- ,in so far as we conceive a thing as contingent1 we are affected by the conception of some further thing1 which would assert the existence of the former 7,,iv3,def4iii472 but1 on the other hand1 we 7by hypothesis7 conceive certain things1 which exclude its present existence4 ,but1 in so far as we conceive a thing to be possible in the future1 we there by conceive things which assert its existence 7,,iv3iv471 that is 7,,iii3xviii471 things which promote hope or fear3 wherefore an emotion towards something possible is more vehement4 ,q4,e4,d4 ,corollary4- ,an emotion towards a thing1 which we know not to exist in the present1 and which we conceive as contingent1 is far fainter1 than if we conceive the thing to be present with us4 ,proof4- ,emotion towards a thing1 which we conceive to exist1 is more intense than it would be1 if we conceived the thing as future ,v3ix4,coroll471 and is much more vehement1 than if the future time be conceived as far distant from the present 7,,iv3x474 ,therefore an emotion towards a thing1 whose period of existence we conceive to be far distant from the present1 is far fainter1 than if we conceive the thing as present2 it is1 nevertheless1 more intense1 than if we conceived the thing as contingent1 wherefore an emotion towards a thing1 which we regard as contingent1 will be far fainter1 than if we conceived the thing to be present with us4 ,q4,e4,d4 ,prop4 ,,xiii4 ,emotion towards a thing contingent1 which we know not to exist in the present1 is1 other conditions being equal1 fainter than an emotion towards a thing past4 ,proof4- ,in so far as we conceive a thing as contingent1 we are not affected by the image of any other thing1 which asserts the existence of the said thing 7,,iv3,def4iii471 but1 on the other hand 7by hypothesis71 we conceive certain things excluding its present existence4 ,but1 in so far as we conceive it in relation to time past1 we are assumed to conceive something1 which recalls the thing to memory1 or excites the image thereof 7,,ii3xviii4,note71 which is so far the same as regarding it as present 7,,ii3xvii4,coroll474 ,therefore 7,,iv3ix47 an emotion towards a thing contingent1 which we know does not exist in the present1 is fainter1 other conditions being equal1 than an emotion towards a thing past4 ,q4,e4,d4 ,prop4 ,,xiv4 ,a true knowledge of good and evil cannot check any emotion by virtue of being true1 but only in so far as it is considered as an emotion4 ,proof4- ,an emotion is an idea1 whereby the mind affirms of its body a greater or less force of existing than before 7by the general ,definition of the ,emotions72 therefore it has no positive quality1 which can be destroyed by the presence of what is true2 consequently the knowledge of good and evil cannot1 by virtue oi being true1 restrain any emotion4 ,but1 in so far as such knowledge is an emotion 7,,iv3viii47 if it have more strength for restraining emotion1 it will to that extent be able to restrain the given emotion4 ,q4,e4,d4 ,prop4 ,,xv4 ,desire arising from the knowledge of good and bad can be quenched or checked by many of the other desires arising from the emotions whereby we are assailed4 ,proof4- ,from the true knowledge of good and evil1 in so far as it is an emotion1 necessarily arises desire 7,def4 of the ,emotions1 i471 the strength of which is proportioned to the strength of the emotion wherefrom it arises 7,,iii3xxxvii474 ,but1 inasmuch as this desire arises 7by hypothesis7 from the fact of our truly understanding anything1 it follows that it is also present with us1 in so far as we are active 7,,iii3i471 and must therefore be understood through our essence only 7,,iii3,def4ii472 consequently 7,,iii3vii47 its force and increase can be defined solely by human power4 ,again1 the desires arising from the emotions whereby we are assailed are stronger1 in proportion as the said emotions are more vehement2 wherefore their force and increase must be defined solely by the power of external causes1 which1 when compared with our own power1 indefinitely surpass it 7,,iv3iii472 hence the desires arising from like emotions may be more vehement1 than the desire which arises from a true knowledge of good and evil1 and may1 consequently1 control or quench it4 ,q4,e4,d4 ,prop4 ,,xvi4 ,desire arising from the knowledge of good and evil1 in so far as such knowledge regards what is future1 may be more easily controlled or quenched1 than the desire for what is agreeable at the present moment4 ,proof4- ,emotion towards a thing1 which we conceive as future1 is fainter than emotion towards a thing that is present 7,,iv3ix4,coroll474 ,but desire1 which arises from the true knowledge of good and evil1 though it be concerned with things which are good at the moment1 can be quenched or controlled by any headstrong desire 7by the last ,prop41 the proof whereof is of universal application74 ,wherefore desire arising from such knowledge1 when concerned with the future1 can be more easily controlled or quenched1 c4 ,q4,e4,d4 ,prop4 ,,xvii4 ,desire arising from the true knowledge of good and evil1 in so far as such knowledge is concerned with what is contingent1 can be controlled far more easily still1 than desire for things that are present4 ,proof4- ,this ,prop4 is proved in the same way as the last ,prop4 from ,,iv3xii4,coroll4 ,note4- ,i think ,i have now shown the reason1 why men are moved by opinion more readily than by true reason1 why it is that the true knowledge of good and evil stirs up conflicts in the soul1 and often yields to every kind of passion4 ,this state of things gave rise to the exclamation of the poet3 7,ov4 ,met4 vii4#bj1 ,video meliora proboque1 ,deteriora sequor47 ,the better path ,i gaze at and approve1 ,the worse - ,i follow4 ,ecclesiastes seems to have had the same thought in his mind1 when he says1 ,he who increaseth knowledge increaseth sorrow4 ,i have not written the above with the object of drawing the conclusion1 that ignorance is more excellent than knowledge1 or that a wise man is on a par with a fool in controlling his emotions1 but because it is necessary to know the power and the infirmity of our nature1 before we can determine what reason can do in restraining the emotions1 and what is beyond her power4 ,i have said1 that in the present part ,i shall merely treat of human infirmity4 ,the power of reason over the emotions ,i have settled to treat separately4 ,prop4 ,,xviii4 ,desire arising from pleasure is1 other conditions being equal1 stronger than desire arising from pain4 ,proof4- ,desire is the essence of a man 7,def4 of the ,emotions1 i471 that is1 the endeavour whereby a man endeavours to persist in his own being4 ,wherefore desire arising from pleasure is1 by the fact of pleasure being felt1 increased or helped2 on the contrary1 desire arising from pain is1 by the fact of pain being felt1 diminished or hindered2 hence the force of desire arising from pleasure must be defined by human power together with the power of an external cause1 whereas desire arising from pain must be defined by human power only4 ,thus the former is the stronger of the two4 ,q4,e4,d4 ,note4- ,in these few remarks ,i have explained the causes of human infirmity and inconstancy1 and shown why men do not abide by the precepts of reason4 ,it now remains for me to show what course is marked out for us by reason1 which of the emotions are in harmony with the rules of human reason1 and which of them are contrary thereto4 ,but1 before ,i begin to prove my ,propositions in detailed geometrical fashion1 it is advisable to sketch them briefly in advance1 so that everyone may more readily grasp my meaning4 ,as reason makes no demands contrary to nature1 it demands1 that every man should love himself1 should seek that which is useful to him - ,i mean1 that which is really useful to him1 should desire everything which really brings man to greater perfection1 and should1 each for himself1 endeavour as far as he can to preserve his own being4 ,this is as necessarily true1 as that a whole is greater than its part4 7,cf4 ,,iii3iv47 ,again1 as virtue is nothing else but action in accordance with the laws of one's own nature 7,,iv3,def4viii471 and as no one endeavours to preserve his own being1 except in accordance with the laws of his own nature1 it follows1 first1 that the foundation of virtue is the endeavour to preserve one's own being1 and that happiness consists in man's power of preserving1 his own being2 secondly1 that virtue is to be desired for its own sake1 and that there is nothing more excellent or more useful to us1 for the sake of which we should desire it2 thirdly and lastly that suicides are weak-minded1 and are overcome by external causes repugnant to their nature4 ,further1 it follows from ,postulate iv4 ,part4,,ii41 that we can never arrive at doing without all external things for the preservation of our being or living1 so as to have no relations with things which are outside ourselves4 ,again1 if we consider our mind1 we see that our intellect would be more imperfect1 if mind were alone1 and could understand nothing besides itself4 ,there are1 then1 many things outside ourselves1 which are useful to us1 and are1 therefore1 to be desired4 ,of such none can be discerned more excellent1 than those which are in entire agreement with our nature4 ,for if1 for example1 two individuals of entirely the same nature are united1 they form a combination twice as powerful as either of them singly4 ,therefore1 to man there is nothing more useful than man - nothing1 ,i repeat1 more excellent for preserving their being can be wished for by men1 than that all should so in all points agree1 that the minds and bodies of all should form1 as it were1 one single mind and one single body1 and that all should1 with one consent1 as far as they are able1 endeavour to preserve their being1 and all with one consent seek what is useful to them all4 ,hence1 men who are governed by reason - that is1 who seek what is useful to them in accordance with reason1 desire for themselves nothing1 which they do not also desire for the rest of mankind1 and1 consequently1 are just1 faithful1 and honourable in their conduct4 ,such are the dictates of reason1 which ,i purposed thus briefly to indicate1 before beginning to prove them in greater detail4 ,i have taken this course1 in order1 if possible1 to gain the attention of those who believe1 that the principle that every man is bound to seek what is useful for himself is the foundation of impiety1 rather than of piety and virtue4 ,therefore1 after briefly showing that the contrary is the case1 ,i go on to prove it by1 the same method1 as that whereby ,i have hitherto proceeded4 ,prop4 ,,xix4 ,every man1 by the laws of his nature1 necessarily desires or shrinks from that which he deems to be good or bad4 ,proof4- ,the knowledge of good and evil is 7,,iv3viii47 the emotion of pleasure or pain1 in so far as we are conscious thereof2 therefore1 every man necessarily desires what he thinks good1 and shrinks from what he thinks bad4 ,now this appetite is nothing else but man's nature or essence 7,cf4 the ,definition of ,appetite1 ,,iii4ix4note1 and ,def4 of the ,emotions1 i474 ,therefore1 every man1 solely by the laws of his nature1 desires the one1 and shrinks from the other1 c4 ,q4,e4,d4 ,prop4 ,,xx4 ,the more every man endeavours1 and is able to seek what is useful to him - in other words1 to preserve his own being - the more is he endowed with virtue2 on the contrary1 in proportion as a man neglects to seek what is useful to him1 that is1 to preserve his own being1 he is wanting in power4 ,proof4- ,virtue is human power1 which is defined solely by man's essence 7,,iv3,def4viii471 that is1 which is defined solely by the endeavour made by man to persist in his own being4 ,wherefore1 the more a man endeavours1 and is able to preserve his own being1 the more is he endowed with virtue1 and1 consequently 7,,iii3iv41vi471 in so far as a man neglects to preserve his own being1 he is wanting in power4 ,q4,e4,d4 ,note4- ,no one1 therefore1 neglects seeking his own good1 or preserving his own being1 unless he be overcome by causes external and foreign to his nature4 ,no one1 ,i say1 from the necessity of his own nature1 or otherwise than under compulsion from external causes1 shrinks from food1 or kills himself3 which latter may be done in a variety of ways4 ,a man1 for instance1 kills himself under the compulsion of another man1 who twists round his right hand1 wherewith he happened to have taken up a sword1 and forces him to turn the blade against his own heart2 or1 again1 he may be compelled1 like ,seneca1 by a tyrant's command1 to open his own veins - that is1 to escape a greater evil by incurring1 a lesser2 or1 lastly1 latent external causes may so disorder his imagination1 and so affect his body1 that it may assume a nature contrary to its former one1 and whereof the idea cannot exist in the mind 7,,iii3x47 ,but that a man1 from the necessity of his own nature1 should endeavour to become non-existent1 is as impossible as that something should be made out of nothing1 as everyone will see for himself1 after a little reflection4 ,prop4 ,,xxi4 ,no one can desire to be blessed1 to act rightly1 and to live rightly1 without at the same time wishing to be1 act1 and to live - in other words1 to actually exist4 ,proof4- ,the proof of this proposition1 or rather the proposition itself1 is self-evident1 and is also plain from the definition of desire4 ,for the desire of living1 acting1 ,c41 blessedly or rightly1 is 7,def4 of the ,emotions1 i47 the essence of man - that is 7,,iii3vii471 the endeavour made by everyone to preserve his own being4 ,therefore1 no one can desire1 c4 ,q4,e4,d4 ,prop4 ,,xxii4 ,no virtue can be conceived as prior to this endeavour to preserve one's own being4 ,proof4- ,the effort for self-preservation is the essence of a thing 7,,iii3vii472 therefore1 if any virtue could be conceived as prior thereto1 the essence of a thing would have to be conceived as prior to itself1 which is obviously absurd4 ,therefore no virtue1 c4 ,q4,e4,d4 ,corollary4- ,the effort for self-preservation is the first and only foundation of virtue4 ,for prior to this principle nothing can be conceived1 and without it no virtue can be conceived4 ,prop4 ,,xxiii4 ,man1 in so far as he is determined to a particular action because he has inadequate ideas1 cannot be absolutely said to act in obedience to virtue2 he can only be so described1 in so far as he is determined for the action because he understands4 ,proof4- ,in so far as a man is determined to an action through having inadequate ideas1 he is passive 7,,iii3i471 that is 7,,iii3,def4i41 iii471 he does something1 which cannot be perceived solely through his essence1 that is 7by ,,iv3,def4viii471 which does not follow from his virtue4 ,but1 in so far as he is determined for an action because he understands1 he is active2 that is1 he does something1 which is perceived through his essence alone1 or which adequately follows from his virtue4 ,q4,e4,d4 ,prop4 ,,xxiv4 ,to act absolutely in obedience to virtue is in us the same thing as to act1 to live1 or to preserve one's being 7these three terms are identical in meaning7 in accordance with the dictates of reason on the basis of seeking what is useful to one's self4 ,proof4- ,to act absolutely in obedience to virtue is nothing else but to act according to the laws of one's own nature4 ,but we only act1 in so far as we understand 7,,iii3iii47 3 therefore to act in obedience to virtue is in us nothing else but to act1 to live1 or to preserve one's being in obedience to reason1 and that on the basis of seeking what is useful for us 7,,iv3xxii4,coroll474 ,q4,e4,d4 ,prop4 ,,xxv4 ,no one wishes to preserve his being for the sake of anything else4 ,proof4- ,the endeavour1 wherewith everything endeavours to persist in its being1 is defined solely by the essence of the thing itself 7,,iii3vii472 from this alone1 and not from the essence of anything else1 it necessarily follows 7,,iii3vi47 that everyone endeavours to preserve his being4 ,moreover1 this proposition is plain from ,,iv3xxii4,coroll41 for if a man should endeavour to preserve his being for the sake of anything else1 the last-named thing would obviously be the basis of virtue1 which1 by the foregoing corollary1 is absurd4 ,therefore no one1 c4 ,q4,e4,d4 ,prop4 ,,xxvi4 ,whatsoever we endeavour in obedience to reason is nothing further than to understand2 neither does the mind1 in so far as it makes use of reason1 judge anything to be useful to it1 save such things as are conducive to understanding4 ,proof4- ,the effort for self-preservation is nothing else but the essence of the thing in question 7,,iii3vii471 which1 in so far as it exists such as it is1 is conceived to have force for continuing in existence 7,,iii3vi47 and doing such things as necessarily follow from its given nature 7see the ,def4 of ,appetite1 ,,ii3ix4,note74 ,but the essence of reason is nought else but our mind1 in so far as it clearly and distinctly understands 7see the definition in ,,ii3xl4,note3ii47 2 therefore 7,,iii3xl47 whatsoever we endeavour in obedience to reason is nothing else but to understand4 ,again1 since this effort of the mind wherewith the mind endeavours1 in so far as it reasons1 to preserve its own being is nothing else but understanding2 this effort at understanding is 7,,iv3xxii4,coroll47 the first and single basis of virtue1 nor shall we endeavour to understand things for the sake of any ulterior object 7,,iv3xxv472 on the other hand1 the mind1 in so far as it reasons1 will not be able to conceive any good for itself1 save such things as are conducive to understanding4 ,prop4 ,,xxvii4 ,we know nothing to be certainly good or evil1 save such things as really conduce to understanding1 or such as are able to hinder us from understanding4 ,proof4- ,the mind1 in so far as it reasons1 desires nothing beyond understanding1 and judges nothing to be useful to itself1 save such things as conduce to understanding 7by the foregoing ,prop474 ,but the mind 7,,ii3xli4,note7 cannot possess certainty concerning anything1 except in so far as it has adequate ideas1 or 7what by ,,ii3xl4,note1 is the same thing7 in so far as it reasons4 ,therefore we know nothing to be good or evil save such things as really conduce1 c4 ,q4,e4,d4 ,prop4 ,,xxviii4 ,the mind's highest good is the knowledge of ,god1 and the mind's highest virtue is to know ,god4 ,proof4- ,the mind is not capable of understanding anything higher than ,god1 that is 7,i3,def4vi471 than a ,being absolutely infinite1 and without which 7,i3xv47 nothing can either be or be conceived2 therefore 7,,iv3xxvi41 xxvii471 the mind's highest utility or 7,,iv3,def4i47 good is the knowledge of ,god4 ,again1 the mind is active1 only in so far as it understands1 and only to the same extent can it be said absolutely to act virtuously4 ,the mind's absolute virtue is therefore to understand4 ,now1 as we have already shown1 the highest that the mind can understand is ,god2 therefore the highest virtue of the mind is to understand or to know ,god4 ,q4,e4,d4 ,prop4 ,,xxix4 ,no individual thing1 which is entirely different from our own nature1 can help or check our power of activity1 and absolutely nothing can do us good or harm1 unless it has something in common with our nature4 ,proof4- ,the power of every individual thing1 and consequently the power of man1 whereby he exists and operates1 can only be determined by an individual thing 7,i3xxviii471 whose nature 7,,ii3vi47 must be understood through the same nature as that1 through which human nature is conceived4 ,therefore our power of activity1 however it be conceived1 can be determined and consequently helped or hindered by the power of any other individual thing1 which has something in common with us1 but not by the power of anything1 of which the nature is entirely different from our own2 and since we call good or evil that which is the cause of pleasure or pain 7,,iv3viii471 that is 7,,iii3xi4,note71 which increases or diminishes1 helps or hinders1 our power of activity2 therefore1 that which is entirely1 different from our nature can neither be to us good nor bad4 ,q4,e4,d4 ,prop4 ,,xxx4 ,a thing cannot be bad for us through the quality which it has in common with our nature1 but it is bad for us in so far as it is contrary to our nature4 ,proof4- ,we call a thing bad when it is the cause of pain 7,,iv3viii471 that is 7by the ,def41 which see in ,,iii3xi4,note71 when it diminishes or checks our power of action4 ,therefore1 if anything were bad for us through that quality which it has in common with our nature1 it would be able itself to diminish or check that which it has in common with our nature1 which 7,,iii3iv47 is absurd4 ,wherefore nothing can be bad for us through that quality which it has in common with us1 but1 on the other hand1 in so far as it is bad for us1 that is 7as we have just shown71 in so far as it can diminish or check our power of action1 it is contrary to our nature4 ,q4,e4,d4 ,prop4 ,,xxxi4 ,in so far as a thing is in harmony with our nature1 it is necessarily good4 ,proof4- ,in so far as a thing is in harmony with our nature1 it cannot be bad for it4 ,it will therefore necessarily be either good or indifferent4 ,if it be assumed that it be neither good nor bad1 nothing will follow from its nature 7,,iv3,def4i471 which tends to the preservation of our nature1 that is 7by the hypothesis71 which tends to the preservation of the thing itself2 but this 7,,iii3vi47 is absurd2 therefore1 in so far as a thing is in harmony with our nature1 it is necessarily good4 ,q4,e4,d4 ,corollary4- ,hence it follows1 that1 in proportion as a thing is in harmony with our nature1 so is it more useful or better for us1 and vice versa1 in proportion as a thing is more useful for us1 so is it more in harmony with our nature4 ,for1 in so far as it is not in harmony with our nature1 it will necessarily be different therefrom or contrary thereto4 ,if different1 it can neither be good nor bad 7,,iv3xxix472 if contrary1 it will be contrary to that which is in harmony with our nature1 that is1 contrary to what is good - in short1 bad4 ,nothing1 therefore1 can be good1 except in so far as it is in harmony with our nature2 and hence a thing is useful1 in proportion as it is in harmony with our nature1 and vice versa4 ,q4,e4,d4 ,prop4 ,,xxxii4 ,in so far as men are a prey to passion1 they cannot1 in that respect1 be said to be naturally in harmony4 ,proof4 ,things1 which are said to be in harmony naturally1 are understood to agree in power 7,,iii3vii471 not in want of power or negation1 and consequently not in passion 7,,iii3iii4,note72 wherefore men1 in so far as they are a prey to their passions1 cannot be said to be naturally in harmony4 ,q4,e4,d4 ,note4- ,this is also self-evident2 for1 if we say that white and black only agree in the fact that neither is red1 we absolutely affirm that the do not agree in any respect4 ,so1 if we say that a man and a stone only agree in the fact that both are finite - wanting in power1 not existing by the necessity of their own nature1 or1 lastly1 indefinitely surpassed by the power of external causes - we should certainly affirm that a man and a stone are in no respect alike2 therefore1 things which agree only in negation1 or in qualities which neither possess1 really agree in no respect4 ,prop4 ,,xxxiii4 ,men can differ in nature1 in so far as they are assailed by those emotions1 which are passions1 or passive states2 and to this extent one and the same man is variable and inconstant4 ,proof4- ,the nature or essence of the emotions cannot be explained solely through our essence or nature 7,,iii3,def4i4ii471 but it must be defined by the power1 that is 7,,iii3vii471 by the nature of external causes in comparison with our own2 hence it follows1 that there are as many kinds of each emotion as there are external objects whereby we are affected 7,,iii3lvi471 and that men may be differently affected by one and the same object 7,,iii3li71 and to this extent differ in nature2 lastly1 that one and the same man may be differently affected towards the same object1 and may therefore be variable and inconstant4 ,q4,e4,d4 ,prop4 ,,xxxiv4 ,in so far as men are assailed by emotions which are passions1 they can be contrary one to another4 ,proof4- ,a man1 for instance ,peter1 can be the cause of ,paul's feeling pain1 because he 7,peter7 possesses something similar to that which ,paul hates 7,,iii3xvi471 or because ,peter has sole possession of a thing which ,paul also loves 7,,iii3xxxii4,note71 or for other causes 7of which the chief are enumerated in ,,iii3lv4,note7 2 it may therefore happen that ,paul should hate ,peter 7,def4 of ,emotions3 vii471 consequently it may easily happen also1 that ,peter should hate ,paul in return1 and that each should endeavour to do the other an injury1 7,,iii3xxxix471 that is 7,,iv3xxx471 that they should be contrary one to another4 ,but the emotion of pain is always a passion or passive state 7,,iii3lix472 hence men1 in so far as they are assailed by emotions which are passions1 can be contrary one to another4 ,q4,e4,d4 ,note4- ,i said that ,paul may hate ,peter1 because he conceives that ,peter possesses something which he 7,paul7 also loves2 from this it seems1 at first sight1 to follow1 that these two men1 through both loving the same thing1 and1 consequently1 through agreement of their respective natures1 stand in one another's way2 if this were so1 ,,ii3xxx4 and ,,ii3xxxi4 would be untrue4 ,but if we give the matter our unbiased attention1 we shall see that the discrepancy vanishes4 ,for the two men are not in one another's way in virtue of the agreement of their natures1 that is1 through both loving the same thing1 but in virtue of one differing from the other4 ,for1 in so far as each loves the same thing1 the love of each is fostered thereby 7,,iii3xxxi471 that is 7,def4 of the ,emotions3 vi47 the pleasure of each is fostered thereby4 ,wherefore it is far from being the case1 that they are at variance through both loving the same thing1 and through the agreement in their natures4 ,the cause for their opposition lies1 as ,i have said1 solely in the fact that they are assumed to differ4 ,for we assume that ,peter has the idea of the loved object as already in his possession1 while ,paul has the idea of the loved object as lost4 ,hence the one man will be affected with pleasure1 the other will be affected with pain1 and thus they will be at variance one with another4 ,we can easily show in like manner1 that all other causes of hatred depend solely on differences1 and not on the agreement between men's natures4 ,prop4 ,,xxxv4 ,in so far only as men live in obedience to reason1 do they always necessarily agree in nature4 ,proof4- ,in so far as men are assailed by emotions that are passions1 they can be different in nature 7,,iv3xxxiii471 and at variance one with another4 ,but men are only said to be active1 in so far as they act in obedience to reason 7,,iii3iii472 therefore1 what so ever follows from human nature in so far as it is defined by reason must 7,,iii3,def4ii47 be understood solely through human nature as its proximate cause4 ,but1 since every man by the laws of his nature desires that which he deems good1 and endeavours to remove that which he deems bad 7,,iv3xix472 and further1 since that which we1 in accordance with reason1 deem good or bad1 necessarily is good or bad 7,,ii3xli472 it follows that men1 in so far as they live in obedience to reason1 necessarily do only such things as are necessarily good for human nature1 and consequently for each individual man 7,,iv3xxxi4,coroll472 in other words1 such things as are in harmony with each man's nature4 ,therefore1 men in so far as they live in obedience to reason1 necessarily live always in harmony one with another4 ,q4,e4,d4 ,corollary ,i - ,there is no individual thing in nature1 which is more useful to man1 than a man who lives in obedience to reason4 ,for that thing is to man most useful1 which is most in harmony with his nature 7,,iv3xxxi4,coroll472 that is1 obviously1 man4 ,but man acts absolutely according to the laws of his nature1 when he lives in obedience to reason 7,,iii3,def4ii471 and to this extent only is always necessarily in harmony with the nature of another man 7by the last ,prop472 wherefore among individual things nothing is more useful to man1 than a man who lives in obedience to reason4 ,q4,e4,d4 ,corollary ,,ii4- ,as every man seeks most that which is useful to him1 so are men most useful one to another4 ,for the more a man seeks what is useful to him and endeavours to preserve himself1 the more is he endowed with virtue 7,,iv3xx471 or1 what is the same thing 7,,iv3,def4viii471 the more is he endowed with power to act according to the laws of his own nature1 that is to live in obedience to reason4 ,but men are most in natural harmony1 when they live in obedience to reason 7by the last ,prop472 therefore 7by the foregoing ,coroll47 men will be most useful one to another1 when each seeks most that which is useful to him4 ,q4,e4,d4 ,note4- ,what we have just shown is attested by experience so conspicuously1 that it is in the mouth of nearly everyone3 ,man is to man a ,god4 ,yet it rarely happens that men live in obedience to reason1 for things are so ordered among them1 that they are generally envious and troublesome one to another4 ,nevertheless they are scarcely able to lead a solitary life1 so that the definition of man as a social animal has met with general assent2 in fact1 men do derive from social life much more convenience than injury4 ,let satirists then laugh their fill at human affairs1 let theologians rail1 and let misanthropes praise to their utmost the life of untutored rusticity1 let them heap contempt on men and praises on beasts2 when all is said1 they will find that men can provide for their wants much more easily by mutual help1 and that only by uniting their forces can they escape from the dangers that on every side beset them3 not to say how much more excellent and worthy of our knowledge it is1 to study the actions of men than the actions of beasts4 ,but ,i will treat of this more at length elsewhere4 ,prop4 ,,xxxvi4 ,the highest good of those who follow virtue is common to all1 and therefore all can equally rejoice therein4 ,proof4- ,to act virtuously is to act in obedience with reason 7,,iv3xxiv471 and whatsoever we endeavour to do in obedience to reason is to understand 7,,iv3xxvi472 therefore 7,,iv3xxviii47 the highest good for those who follow after virtue is to know ,god2 that is 7,,ii3xlvii4,note7 a good which is common to all and can be possessed4 by all men equally1 in so far as they are of the same nature4 ,q4,e4,d4 ,note4- ,someone may ask how it would be1 if the highest good of those who follow after virtue were not common to all8 ,would it not then follow1 as above 7,,iv3xxxiv471 that men living in obedience to reason1 that is 7,,iv3xxxv471 men in so far as they agree in nature1 would be at variance one with another8 ,to such an inquiry1 ,i make answer1 that it follows not accidentally but from the very nature of reason1 that main's highest good is common to all1 inasmuch as it is deduced from the very essence of man1 in so far as defined by reason2 and that a man could neither be1 nor be conceived without the power of taking pleasure in this highest good4 ,for it belongs to the essence of the human mind 7,,ii3xlvii471 to have an adequate knowledge of the eternal and infinite essence of ,god4 ,prop4 ,,xxxvii4 ,the good which every man1 who follows after virtue1 desires for himself he will also desire for other men1 and so much the more1 in proportion as he has a greater knowledge of ,god4 ,proof4- ,men1 in so far as they live in obedience to reason1 are most useful to their fellow men 7,,iv3xxxv2,coroll4i472 therefore 7,,iv3xix471 we shall in obedience to reason necessarily endeavour to bring about that men should live in obedience to reason4 ,but the good which every man1 in so far as he is guided by reason1 or1 in other words1 follows after virtue1 desires for himself1 is to understand 7,,iv3xxvi472 wherefore the good1 which each follower of virtue seeks for himself1 he will desire also for others4 ,again1 desire1 in so far as it is referred to the mind1 is the very essence of the mind 7,def4 of the ,emotions1 i472 now the essence of the mind consists in knowledge 7,,iii3xi471 which involves the knowledge of ,god 7,,ii3xlvii471 and without it 7,i3xv471 can neither be1 nor be conceived2 therefore1 in proportion as the mind's essence involves a greater knowledge of ,god1 so also will be greater the desire of the follower of virtue1 that other men should possess that which he seeks as good for himself4 ,q4,e4,d4 ,another ,proof4- ,the good1 which a man desires for himself and loves1 he will love more constantly1 if he sees that others love it also 7,,iii3xxxi472 he will therefore endeavour that others should love it also2 and as the good in question is common to all1 and therefore all can rejoice therein1 he will endeavour1 for the same reason1 to bring about that all should rejoice therein1 and this he will do the more 7,,iii3xxxvii471 in proportion as his own enjoyment of the good is greater4 ,note #a- ,he who1 guided by emotion only1 endeavours to cause others to love what he loves himself1 and to make the rest of the world live according to his own fancy1 acts solely by impulse1 and is1 therefore1 hateful1 especially1 to those who take delight in something different1 and accordingly study and1 by similar impulse1 endeavour1 to make men live in accordance with what pleases themselves4 ,again1 as the highest good sought by men under the guidance of emotion is often such1 that it can only be possessed by a single individual1 it follows that those who love it are not consistent in their intentions1 but1 while they delight to sing its praises1 fear to be believed4 ,but he1 who endeavours to lead men by reason1 does not act by impulse but courteously and kindly1 and his intention is always consistent4 ,again1 whatsoever we desire and do1 whereof we are the cause in so far as we possess the idea of ,god1 or know ,god1 ,i set down to ,religion4 ,the desire of well-doing1 which is engendered by a life according to reason1 ,i call piety4 ,further1 the desire1 whereby a man living according to reason is bound to associate others with himself in friendship1 ,i call honour 7,honestas72 by honourable ,i mean that which is praised by men living according to reason1 and by base ,i mean that which is repugnant to the gaining of friendship4 ,i have also shown in addition what are the foundations of a state2 and the difference between true 1virtue and infirmity may be readily gathered from what ,i have said2 namely1 that true virtue is nothing else but living in accordance with reason2 while infirmity is nothing else but man's allowing himself to be led by things which are external to himself1 and to be by them determined to act in a manner demanded by the general disposition of things rather than by his own nature considered solely in itself4 ,such are the matters which ,i engaged to prove in ,,iv3xviii41 whereby it is plain that the law against the slaughtering of animals is founded rather on vain superstition and womanish pity than on sound reason4 ,the rational quest of what is useful to us further teaches us the necessity of associating ourselves with our fellow men1 but - not with beasts1 or things1 whose nature is different from our own2 we have the same rights in respect to them as they have in respect to us4 ,nay1 as everyone's right is defined by his virtue1 or power1 men have far greater rights over beasts than beasts have over men4 ,still ,i do not deny that beasts feel3 what ,i deny is1 that we may not consult our own advantage and use them as we please1 treating them in the way which best suits us2 for their nature is not like ours1 and their emotions are naturally different from human emotions 7,,iii3,ivii4,note74 ,it remains for me to explain what ,i mean by1 just and unjust1 sin and merit4 ,on these points see the following note4 ,note ,,ii4- ,in the ,appendix to ,part ,i4 ,i undertook to explain praise and blame1 merit and sin1 justice and injustice4 ,concerning praise and blame ,i have spoken in ,,iii3xxix4,note3 the time has now come to treat of the remaining terms4 ,but ,i must first say a few words concerning man in the state of nature and in society4 ,every man exists by sovereign natural right1 and1 consequently1 by sovereign natural right performs those actions which follow from the necessity of his own nature2 therefore by sovereign natural right every man judges what is good and what is bad1 takes care of his own advantage according to his own disposition 7,,iv3xix4 and ,,iv3xx471 avenges the wrongs done to him 7,,iii3xl4,coroll4 ii471 and endeavours to preserve that which he loves and to destroy - that which he hates 7,,iii3xxviii474 ,now1 if men lived under the guidance of reason1 everyone would remain in possession of this his right1 without any injury being done to his neighbour ,v3xxxv4,coroll4i474 ,but seeing that they are a prey to their emotions1 which far surpass human power or virtue 7,,iv3vi471 they are often drawn in different directions1 and being at variance one with another 7,,iv3xxxiii41 xxxiv471 stand in need of mutual help 7,,iv3xxxv4,note74 ,wherefore1 in order that men may live together in harmony1 and may aid one another1 it is necessary that they should forego their natural right1 and1 for the sake of security1 refrain from all actions which can injure their fellow-men4 ,the way in which this end can be obtained1 so that men who are necessarily a prey to their emotions 7,,iv3iv4,coroll471 inconstant1 and diverse1 should be able to render each other mutually secure1 and feel mutual trust1 is evident from ,,iv3vii4 and ,,iii3xxxix4 ,it is there shown1 that an emotion can only be restrained by an emotion stronger than1 and contrary to itself1 and that men avoid inflicting injury through fear of incurring a greater injury themselves4 ,on this law society can be established1 so long as it keeps in its own hand the right1 possessed by everyone1 of avenging injury1 and pronouncing on good and evil2 and provided it also possesses the power to lay down a general rule of conduct1 and to pass laws sanctioned1 not by reason1 which is powerless in restraining emotion1 but by threats 7,,iv3xvii4,note74 ,such a society established with laws and the power of preserving itself is called a ,state1 while those who live under its protection are called citizens4 ,we may readily understand that there is in the state of nature nothing1 which by universal consent is pronounced good or bad2 for in the state of nature everyone thinks solely of his own advantage1 and according to his disposition1 with reference only to his individual advantage1 decides what is good or bad1 being bound by no law to anyone besides himself4 ,in the state of nature1 therefore1 sin is inconceivable2 it can only exist in a state1 where good and evil are pronounced on by common consent1 and where everyone is bound to obey the ,state authority4 ,sin1 then1 is nothing else but disobedience1 which is therefore punished by the right of the ,state only4 ,obedience1 on the other hand1 is set down as merit1 inasmuch as a man is thought worthy of merit1 if he takes delight in the advantages which a ,state provides4 ,again1 in the state of nature1 no one is by common consent master of anything1 nor is there anything in nature1 which can be said to belong to one man rather than another3 all things are common to all4 ,hence1 in the state of nature1 we can conceive no wish to render to every man his own1 or to deprive a man of that which belongs to him2 in other words1 there is nothing in the state of nature answering to justice and injustice4 ,such ideas are only possible in a social state1 when it is decreed by common consent what belongs to one man and what to another4 ,from all these considerations it is evident1 that justice and injustice1 sin and merit1 are extrinsic ideas1 and not attributes which display the nature of the mind4 ,but ,i have said enough4 ,prop4 ,,xxxviii4 ,whatsoever disposes the human body1 so as to render it capable of being affected in an increased number of ways1 or of affecting external bodies in an increased number of ways1 is useful to man 2 and is so1 in proportion as the body is thereby rendered more capable of being affected or affecting other bodies in an increased number of ways2 contrariwise1 whatsoever renders the body less capable in this respect is hurtful to man4 ,proof4- ,whatsoever thus increases the capabilities of the body increases also the mind's capability of perception 7,,ii3xiv472 therefore1 whatsoever thus disposes the body and thus renders it capable1 is necessarily good or useful 7,,iv3xxvi41 ,,iv3xxvii472 and is so in proportion to the extent to which it can render the body capable2 contrariwise 7,,ii3xiv41 ,,iv3xxvi41 ,,iv3xxvii471 it is hurtful1 if it renders the body in this respect less capable4 ,q4,e4,d4 ,prop4 ,,xxxix4 ,whatsoever brings about the preservation of the proportion of motion and rest1 which the parts of the human body mutually possess1 is good2 contrariwise1 whatsoever causes a change in such proportion is bad4 ,proof4- ,the human body needs many other bodies for its preservation 7,,ii3,post4iv474 ,but that which constitutes the specific reality 7forma7 of a human body is1 that its parts communicate their several motions one to another in a certain fixed proportion 7,def4 before ,lemma iv4 after ,,ii3xiii474 ,therefore1 whatsoever brings about the preservation of the proportion between motion and rest1 which the parts of the human body mutually possess1 preserves the specific reality of the human body1 and consequently renders the human body capable of being affected in many ways and of affecting external bodies in many ways2 consequently it is good 7by the last ,prop474 ,again1 whatsoever brings about a change in the aforesaid proportion causes the human body to assume another specific character1 in other words 7see ,preface to this ,part towards the end1 though the point is indeed self-evident71 to be destroyed1 and consequently totally incapable of being affected in an increased numbers of ways2 therefore it is bad4 ,q4,e4,d4 ,note4- ,the extent to which such causes can injure or be of service to the mind will be explained in the ,fifth ,part4 ,but ,i would here remark that ,i consider that a body undergoes death1 when the proportion of motion and rest which obtained mutually among its several parts is changed4 ,for ,i do not venture to deny that a human body1 while keeping the circulation of the blood and other properties1 wherein the life of a body is thought to consist1 may none the less be changed into another nature totally different from its own4 ,there is no reason1 which compels me to maintain that a body does not die1 unless it becomes a corpse2 nay1 experience would seem to point to the opposite conclusion4 ,it sometimes happens1 that a man undergoes such changes1 that ,i should hardly call him the same4 ,as ,i have heard tell of a certain ,spanish poet1 who had been seized with sickness1 and though he recovered therefrom yet remained so oblivious of his past life1 that he would not believe the plays and tragedies he had written to be his own3 indeed1 he might have been taken for a grown-up child1 if he had also forgotten his native tongue4 ,if this instance seems incredible1 what shall we say of infants8 ,a man of ripe age deems their nature so unlike his own1 that he can only be persuaded that he too has been an infant by the analogy of other men4 ,however1 ,i prefer to leave such questions undiscussed1 lest ,i should give ground to the superstitious for raising new issues4 ,prop4 ,,xl4 ,whatsoever conduces to man's social life1 or causes men to live together in harmony1 is useful1 whereas whatsoever brings discord into a ,state is bad4 ,proof4- ,for whatsoever causes men to live together in harmony also causes them to live according to reason 7,,iv3xxxv471 and is therefore 7,,iv3xxvi4 and ,,iv3xxvii47 good1 and 7for the same reason7 whatsoever brings about discord is bad4 ,q4,e4,d4 ,prop4 ,,xli4 ,pleasure in itself is not bad but good3 contrariwise1 pain in itself is bad4 ,proof4- ,pleasure 7,,iii3xi4,note7 is emotion1 whereby the body's power of activity is increased or helped2 pain is emotion1 whereby the body's power of activity is diminished or checked2 therefore 7,,iv3xxxviii47 pleasure in itself is good1 c4 ,q4,e4,d4 ,prop4 ,,xlii4 ,mirth cannot be excessive1 but is always good2 contrariwise1 ,melancholy is always bad4 ,proof4- ,mirth 7see its ,def4 in ,,iii3xi4,note7 is pleasure4 which1 in so far as it is referred to the body1 consists in all parts of the body being affected equally3 that is 7,,iii3xi471 the body's power of activity is increased or aided in such a manner1 that the several parts maintain their former proportion of motion and rest2 therefore ,mirth is always good 7,,iv4 xxxix471 and cannot be excessive4 ,but ,melancholy 7see its ,def4 in the same note to ,,iii3xi4,note7 is pain1 which1 in so far as it is referred to the body1 consists in the absolute decrease or hindrance of the body's power of activity2 therefore 7,,iv3xxxviii47 it is always bad4 ,q4,e4,d4 ,prop4 ,,xliii4 ,stimulation may be excessive and bad2 on the other hand1 grief may be good1 in so far as stimulation or pleasure is bad4 ,proof4- ,localized pleasure or stimulation 7titillatio7 is pleasure1 which1 in so far as it is referred to the body1 consists in one or some of its parts being affected more than the rest 7see its ,definition1 ,,iii3xi4,note72 the power of this emotion may be sufficient to overcome other actions of the body 7,,iv3vi471 and may remain obstinately fixed therein1 thus rendering it incapable of being affected in a variety of other ways3 therefore 7,,iv3xxxviii47 it may be bad4 ,again1 grief1 which is pain1 cannot as such be good 7,,iv3xli474 ,but1 as its force and increase is defined by the power of an external cause compared with our own 7,,iv3v471 we can conceive infinite degrees and modes of strength in this emotion 7,,iv3iii472 we can1 therefore1 conceive it as capable of restraining stimulation1 and preventing its becoming excessive1 and hindering the body's capabilities2 thus1 to this extent1 it will be good4 ,q4,e4,d4 ,prop4 ,,xliv4 ,love and desire may be excessive4 ,proof4- ,love is pleasure1 accompanied by the idea of an external cause 7,defof,emotions3vi472 therefore stimulation1 accompanied by the idea of an external cause is love 7,,iii3xi4,note72 hence love maybe excessive4 ,again1 the strength of desire varies in proportion to the emotion from which it arises 7,,iii3xxxvii474 ,now emotion may overcome all the rest of men's actions 7,,iv3vi472 so1 therefore1 can desire1 which arises from the same emotion1 overcome all other desires1 and become excessive1 as we showed in the last proposition concerning stimulation4 ,note4- ,mirth1 which ,i have stated to be good1 can be conceived more easily than it can be observed4 ,for the emotions1 whereby we are daily assailed1 are generally referred to some part of the body which is affected more than the rest2 hence the emotions are generally excessive1 and so fix the mind in the contemplation of one object1 that it is unable to think of others2 and although men1 as a rule1 are a prey to many emotions - and very few are found who are always assailed by one and the same - yet there are cases1 where one and the same emotion remains obstinately fixed4 ,we sometimes see men so absorbed in one object1 that1 although it be not present1 they think they have it before them2 when this is the case with a man who is not asleep1 we say he is delirious or mad2 nor are those persons who are inflamed with love1 and who dream all night and all day about nothing but their mistress1 or some woman1 considered as less mad1 for they are made objects of ridicule4 ,but when a miser thinks of nothing but gain or money1 or when an ambitious man thinks of nothing but glory1 they are not reckoned to be mad1 because they are generally harmful1 and are thought worthy of being hated4 ,but1 in reality1 ,avarice1 ,ambition1 ,lust1 c41 are species of madness1 though they may not be reckoned among diseases4 ,prop4 ,,xlv4 ,hatred can never be good4 ,proof4- ,when we hate a man1 we endeavour to destroy him 7,,iii4xxxix471 that is 7,,iv3xxxvii471 we endeavour to do something that is bad4 ,therefore1 c4 ,q4,e4,d4 ,n4,b4 ,here1 and in what follows1 ,i mean by hatred only hatred towards men4 ,corollary ,i4- ,envy1 derision1 contempt1 anger1 revenge1 and other emotions attributable to hatred1 or arising therefrom1 are bad2 this is evident from ,,iii3xxxix4 and ,,iv3xxxvii4 ,corollary ,,ii4- ,whatsoever we desire from motives of hatred is base1 and in a ,state unjust4 ,this also is evident from ,,iii3xxxix41 and from the definitions of baseness and injustice in ,,iv3xxxvii4,note4 ,note4- ,between derision 7which ,i have in ,coroll4 ,i4 stated to be bad7 and laughter ,i recognize a great difference4 ,for laughter1 as also jocularity1 is merely pleasure2 therefore1 so long as it be not excessive1 it is in itself good 7,,iv3xli474 ,assuredly nothing forbids man to enjoy himself1 save grim and gloomy superstition4 ,for why is it more lawful to satiate one's hunger and thirst than to drive away one's melancholy8 ,i reason1 and have convinced myself as follows3 ,no deity1 nor anyone else1 save the envious1 takes pleasure in my infirmity and discomfort1 nor sets down to my virtue the tears1 sobs1 fear1 and the like1 which axe signs of infirmity of spirit2 on the contrary1 the greater the pleasure wherewith we are affected1 the greater the perfection whereto we pass2 in other words1 the more must we necessarily partake of the divine nature4 ,therefore1 to make use of what comes in our way1 and to enjoy it as much as possible 7not to the point of satiety1 for that would not be enjoyment7 is the part of a wise man4 ,i say it is the part of a wise man to refresh and recreate himself with moderate and pleasant food and drink1 and also with perfumes1 with the soft beauty of growing plants1 with dress1 with music1 with many sports1 with theatres1 and the like1 such as every man may make use of without injury to his neighbour4 ,for the human body is composed of very numerous parts1 of diverse nature1 which continually stand in need of fresh and varied nourishment1 so that the whole body may be equally capable of performing all the actions1 which follow from the necessity of its own nature2 and1 consequently1 so that the mind may also be equally capable of - understanding many things simultaneously4 ,this way of life1 then1 agrees best with our principles1 and also with general practice2 therefore1 if there be any question of another plan1 the plan we have mentioned is the best1 and in every way to be commended4 ,there is no need for me to set forth the matter more clearly or in more detail4 ,prop4 ,,xlvi4 ,he1 who lives under the guidance of reason1 endeavours1 as far as possible1 to render back love1 or kindness1 for other men's hatred1 anger1 contempt1 c41 towards him4 ,proof4- ,all emotions of hatred are bad 7,,iv3xlv4,coroll4i472 therefore he who lives under the guidance of reason will endeavour1 as far as possible1 to avoid being assailed by1 such emotions 7,,iv3xix472 consequently1 he will also endeavour to prevent others being so aspect 7,,iv3xxxvii474 ,but hatred is increased by being reciprocated1 and can be quenched by love ,,iii3xliii471 so that hatred may pass into love 7,,iii3xliv472 therefore he who lives under the guidance of reason will endeavour to repay hatred with love1 that is1 with kindness4 ,q4,e4,d4 ,note4- ,he who chooses to avenge wrongs with hatred is assuredly1 wretched4 ,but he1 who strives to conquer hatred with love1 fights his battle in joy and confidence2 he withstands many as easily as one1 and has very little need of fortune's aid4 ,those whom he vanquishes yield joyfully1 not through failure1 but through increase in their powers2 all these consequences follow so plainly from the mere definitions of love and understanding1 that ,i have no need to prove them in detail4 ,prop4 ,,xlvii4 ,emotions of hope and fear cannot be in themselves good4 ,proof4- ,emotions of hope and fear cannot exist without pain4 ,for fear is pain 7,def4 of the ,emotions3xiii471 and hope 7,def4 of the ,emotions1 ,explanation xii4 and xiii47 cannot exist without fear2 therefore 7,,iv4 xli47 these emotions cannot be good in themselves1 but only in so far as they can restrain excessive pleasure 7,,iv3xliii474 ,q4,e4,d4 ,note4- ,we may add1 that these emotions show defective knowledge and an absence of power in the mind2 for the same reason confidence1 despair1 joy1 and disappointment are signs of a want of mental power4 ,for although confidence and joy are pleasurable emotions1 they1 nevertheless imply a preceding1 pain1 namely1 hope and fear4 ,wherefore the more we endeavour to be guided by reason1 the less do we depend on hope2 we endeavour to free ourselves from fear1 and1 as far as we can1 to dominate fortune1 directing our actions by the sure counsels of wisdom4 ,prop4 ,,xlviii4 ,the emotions of over-esteem and disparagement are always bad4 ,proof4- ,these emotions 7see ,def4 of the ,emotions1 xxi41 xxii47 are repugnant to reason2 and are therefore 7,,iv4 xxvi41 ,,iv3xxvii47 bad4 ,q4,e4,d4 ,prop4 ,,xlix4 ,over-esteem is apt to render its object proud4 ,proof4- ,if we see that any one rates us too highly1 for love's sake1 we are apt to become elated 7,,iii3xli471 or to be pleasurably affected ,def4 of the ,emotions3xxx472 the good which we hear of ourselves we readily believe 7,,iii3xxv472 and therefore1 for love's sake1 rate ourselves too highly2 in other words1 we are apt to become proud4 ,q4,e4,d4 ,prop4 ,l4 ,pity1 in a man who lives under the guidance of reason1 is in itself bad and useless4 ,proof4- ,pity 7,def4 of the ,emotions3xviii47 is a pain1 and therefore 7,,iv3xli47 is in itself bad4 ,the good effect which follows1 namely1 our endeavour to free the object of our pity from misery1 is an action which we desire to do solely at the dictation of reason 7,,iv3xxxvii472 only at the dictation of reason are we able to perform any action1 which we know for certain to be good 7,,iv3xxvii472 thus1 in a man who lives under the guidance of reason1 pity in itself is useless and bad4 ,q4,e4,d4 ,note4- ,he who rightly realizes1 that all things follow from the necessity of the divine nature1 and come to pass in accordance with the eternal laws and rules of nature1 will not find anything worthy of hatred1 derision1 or contempt1 nor will he bestow pity on anything1 but to the utmost extent of human virtue he will endeavour to do well1 as the saying is1 and to rejoice4 ,we may add1 that he1 who is easily touched with compassion1 and is moved by another's sorrow or tears1 often does something which he afterwards regrets2 partly because we can never be sure that an action caused by emotion is good1 partly because we are easily deceived by false tears4 ,i am in this place expressly speaking of a man living under the guidance of reason4 ,he who is moved to help others neither by reason nor by compassion1 is rightly styled inhuman1 for 7,,iii3 xxvii47 he seems unlike a man4 ,prop4 ,,li4 ,approval is not repugnant to reason1 but can agree therewith and arise therefrom4 ,proof4- ,approval is love towards one who has done good to another 7,def4 of the ,emotions3xix472 therefore it may be referred to the mind1 in so far as the latter is active 7,,iii3lix471 that is 7,,iii3iii471 in so far as it - understands2 therefore1 it is in agreement with reason1 c4 ,q4,e4,d4 ,another ,proof4- ,he1 who lives under the guidance of reason1 desires for others the good which he seeks for himself 7,,iv3xxxvii472 wherefore from seeing someone doing good to his fellow his own endeavour to do good is aided2 in other words1 he will feel pleasure 7,,iii3xi4,note7 accompanied by the idea of the benefactor4 ,therefore he approves of him4 ,q4,e4,d4 ,note4- ,indignation as we defined it 7,def4 of the ,emotions3xx47 is necessarily evil 7,,iv3xlv472 we may1 however1 remark that1 when the sovereign power for the sake of preserving peace punishes a citizen who has injured another1 it should not be said to be indignant with the criminal1 for it is not incited by hatred to ruin him1 it is led by a sense of duty to punish him4 ,prop4 ,,lii4 ,self-approval may arise from reason1 and that which arises from reason is the highest possible4 ,proof4- ,self-approval is pleasure arising from a man's contemplation of himself and his own power of action 7,def4 of the ,emotions3xxv474 ,but a man's true power of action - or virtue is reason herself 7,,iii3iii471 as the said man clearly and distinctly contemplates her 7,,ii3xl41 ,,ii3xliii472 therefore self-approval arises from reason4 ,again1 when a man is contemplating himself1 he only perceived clearly and distinctly or adequately1 such things as follow from his power of action 7,,iii3,def4ii471 that is 7,,iii3iii471 from his power of understanding2 therefore in such contemplation alone does the highest possible self-approval arise4 ,q4,e4,d4 ,note4- ,self-approval is in reality the highest object for which we can hope4 ,for 7as we showed in ,,iv3xxv47 no one endeavours to preserve his being for the sake of any ulterior object1 and1 as this approval is more and more fostered and strengthened by praise 7,,iii3liii4,coroll471 and on the contrary 7,,iii3lv4,coroll47 is more and more disturbed by blame1 fame becomes the most powerful of incitements to action1 and life under disgrace is almost unendurable4 ,prop4 ,,liii4 ,humility is not a virtue1 or does not arise from reason4 ,proof4- ,humility is pain arising from a man's contemplation of his own infirmities 7,def4 of the ,emotions3xxvi474 ,but1 in so far as a man knows himself by true reason1 he is assumed to understand his essence1 that is1 his power 7,,iii3vii474 ,wherefore1 if a man in self-contemplation perceives any infirmity in himself1 it is not by virtue of his understanding himself1 but 7,,iii3lv47 by virtue of his power of activity being checked4 ,but1 if we assume that a man perceives his own infirmity by virtue of understanding something stronger than himself1 by the knowledge of which he determines his own power of activity1 this is the same as saying that we conceive that a man understands himself distinctly 7,,iv3xxvi471 because 7,land reads3 ,quod ipsius agendi potentia juvatur- which ,i have translated above4 ,he - suggests as alternative readings to quod'1 'quo' 7 whereby7 and 'quodque' 7 and that747 his power of activity is aided4 ,wherefore humility1 or the pain which arises from a man's contemplation of his own infirmity1 does not arise from the contemplation or reason1 and is not a virtue but a passion4 ,q4,e4,d4 ,prop4 ,,liv4 ,repentance is not a virtue1 or does not arise from reason 2 but he who repents of an action is doubly wretched or infirm4 ,proof4- ,the first part of this proposition is proved like the foregoing one4 ,the second part is proved from the mere definition of the emotion in question 7,def4 of the ,emotions3xxvii474 ,for the man allows himself to be overcome1 first1 by evil desires2 secondly1 by pain4 ,note4- ,as men seldom live under the guidance of reason1 these two emotions1 namely1 ,humility and ,repentance1 as also ,hope and ,fear1 bring more good than harm2 hence1 as we must sin1 we had better sin in that direction4 ,for1 if all men who are a prey to emotion were all equally proud1 they would shrink from nothing1 and would fear nothing2 how then could they be joined and linked together in bonds of union8 ,the crowd plays the tyrant1 when it is not in fear2 hence we need not wonder that the prophets1 who consulted the good1 not of a few1 but of all1 so strenuously commended ,humility1 ,repentance1 and ,reverence4 ,indeed those who are a prey to these emotions may be led much more easily than others to live under the guidance of reason1 that is1 to become free and to enjoy the life of the blessed4 ,prop4 ,,lv4 ,extreme pride or dejection indicates extreme ignorance of self4 ,proof4- ,this is evident from ,def4 of the ,emotions3xxviii4 and xxix4 ,prop4 ,,lvi4 ,extreme pride or dejection indicates extreme infirmity of spirit4 ,proof4- ,the first foundation of virtue is self-preservation 7,,iv3xxii4,coroll47 under the guidance of reason 7,,iv3xxiv474 ,he1 therefore1 who is ignorant of himself1 is ignorant of the foundation of all virtues1 and consequently of all virtues4 ,again1 to act virtuously is merely to act under the guidance of reason 7,,iv3xxiv473 now he1 that acts under the guidance of reason1 must necessarily know that he so acts 7,,iii3xliii474 ,therefore he who is in extreme ignorance of himself1 and consequently of all virtues1 acts least in obedience to virtue2 in other words 7,,iv3,def4viii471 is most infirm of spirit4 ,thus extreme pride or dejection indicates extreme infirmity of spirit4 ,q4,e4,d4 ,corollary4- ,hence it most clearly follows1 that the proud and the dejected specially fall a prey to the emotions4 ,note4- ,yet dejection can be more easily corrected than pride2 for the latter being a pleasurable emotion1 and the former a painful emotion1 the pleasurable is stronger than the painful 7,,iv3xviii474 ,prop4 ,,lvii4 ,the proud man delights in the company of flatterers and parasites1 but hates the company of the high-minded4 ,proof4- ,pride is pleasure arising from a man's over estimation of himself 7,def4 of the ,emotions3xxviii4 and vi472 this estimation the proud man will endeavour to foster by all the means in his power 7,,iii3xiii4,note72 he will therefore delight in the company of flatterers and parasites 7whose character is too well known to need definition here71 and will avoid the company of high-minded men1 who value him according to his deserts4 ,q4,e4,d4 ,note4- ,it would be too long a task to enumerate here all the evil results of pride1 inasmuch as the proud are a1 prey to all the emotions1 though to none of them less than to love and pity4 ,i cannot1 however1 pass over in silence the fact1 that a man may be called proud from his underestimation of other people2 and1 therefore1 pride in this sense may be defined as pleasure arising from the false opinion1 whereby a man may consider himself superior to his fellows4 ,the dejection1 which is the opposite quality to this sort of pride1 may be defined as pain arising from the false opinion1 whereby a man may think himself inferior to his fellows4 ,such being the ease1 we can easily see that a proud man is necessarily envious 7,,iii3xli4,note71 and only takes pleasure in the company1 who fool his weak mind to the top of his bent1 and make him insane instead of merely foolish4 ,though dejection is the emotion contrary to pride1 yet is the dejected man very near akin to the proud man4 ,for1 inasmuch as his pain arises from a comparison between his own infirmity and other men's power or virtue1 it will be removed1 or1 in other words1 he will feel pleasure1 if his imagination be occupied in contemplating other men's faults2 whence arises the proverb1 ,the unhappy are comforted by finding fellow-sufferers4 ,contrariwise1 he will be the more pained in proportion as he thinks himself inferior to others2 hence none are so prone to envy as the dejected1 they are specially keen in observing men's actions1 with a view to fault-finding rather than correction1 in order to reserve their praises for dejection1 and to glory therein1 though all the time with a dejected air4 ,these effects follow as necessarily from the said emotion1 as it follows from the nature of a triangle1 that the three angles are equal to two right angles4 ,i have already said that ,i call these and similar emotions bad1 solely in respect to what is useful to man4 ,the laws of nature have regard to nature's general order1 whereof man is but a part4 ,i mention this1 in passing1 lest any should think that ,i have wished to set forth the faults and irrational deeds of men rather than the nature and properties of things4 ,for1 as ,i said in the preface to the third ,part1 ,i regard human emotions and their properties as on the same footing with other natural phenomena4 ,assuredly human emotions indicate the power and ingenuity1 of nature1 if not of human nature1 quite as fully1 as other things which we admire1 and which we delight to contemplate4 ,but ,i pass on to note those qualities in the emotions1 which bring advantage to man1 or inflict injury upon him4 ,prop4 ,,lviii4 ,honour 7gloria7 is not repugnant to reason1 but may arise therefrom4 ,proof4-,this is evident from ,def4 of the ,emotions3xxx41 and also from the definition of an honourable man 7,,iv3xxxvii4,note4i474 ,note4- ,empty honour1 as it is styled1 is self- approval1 fostered only by the good opinion of the populace2 when this good opinion ceases there ceases also the self-approval1 in other words1 the highest object of each man's love 7,,iv3lii4,note72 consequently1 he whose honour is rooted in popular approval must1 day by day1 anxiously strive1 act1 and scheme in order to retain his reputation4 ,for the populace is variable and inconstant1 so that1 if a reputation be not kept up1 it quickly withers away4 ,everyone wishes to catch popular applause for himself1 and readily represses the fame of others4 ,the object of the strife being estimated as the greatest of all goods1 each combatant is seized with a fierce desire to put down his rivals in every possible way1 till he who at last comes out victorious is more proud of having done harm to others than of having done good to himself4 ,this sort of honour1 then1 is really empty1 being nothing4 ,the points to note concerning shame 7pudor7 may easily be inferred from what was said on the subject of mercy and repentance4 ,i will only add that shame1 like compassion1 though not a virtue1 is yet good1 in so far as it shows1 that the feeler of shame is really imbued with the desire to live honourably2 in the same way as suffering is good1 as showing that the injured part is not mortified4 ,therefore1 though a man who feels shame is sorrowful1 he is yet more perfect than he1 who is shameless1 and has no desire to live honourably4 ,such are the points which ,i undertook to remark upon concerning the emotions of pleasure and pain2 as for the desires1 they are good or bad according as they spring from good or evil emotions4 ,but all1 in so far as they are engendered in us by1 emotions wherein the mind is passive1 are blind 7as is evident from what was said in ,,iv3xliv4,note71 and would be useless1 if men could easily1 be induced to live by the guidance of reason only1 as ,i will now briefly1 show4 ,prop4 ,,lix4 ,to all the actions1 whereto we are determined by emotion wherein the mind is passive2 we can be determined without emotion by reason4 ,proof4- ,to act rationally1 is nothing else 7,,iii3iii4 and ,,iii3,def4ii47 but to perform those actions1 which follow from the necessity1 of our nature to persist considered in itself alone4 ,but pain is bad1 in so far as it diminishes or checks the power of action 7,,iv3xli472 wherefore we cannot by pain be determined to any action1 which we should be unable to perform under the guidance of reason4 ,again1 pleasure is bad only in so far as it hinders a man's capability for action 7,,iv3xli41 ,,iv3xliii472 therefore to this extent we could not be determined by1 it to any action1 which we could not perform under the guidance of reason4 ,lastly1 pleasure1 in so far as it is good1 is in harmony with reason 7for it consists in the fact that a man's capability for action is increased or aided72 nor is the mind passive therein1 except in so far as a man's power of action is not increased to the extent of affording him an adequate conception of himself and his actions 7,,iii3iii41 ,note74 ,wherefore1 if a man who is pleasurably affected be brought to such a state of perfection1 that he gains an adequate conception of himself and his own actions1 he will be equally1 nay more1 capable of those actions1 to which he is determined by emotion wherein the mind is passive4 ,but all emotions are attributable to pleasure1 to pain1 or to desire 7,def4 of the ,emotions3iv4 explanation72 and desire 7,def4 of the ,emotions3i47 is nothing else but the attempt to act2 therefore1 to all actions1 c4 ,q4,e4,d4 ,another ,proof4- ,a given action is called bad1 in so far as it arises from one being affected by hatred or any evil emotion4 ,but no action1 considered in itself alone1 is either good or bad 7as we pointed out in the preface to ,pt4 ,,iv471 one and the same action being sometimes good1 sometimes bad2 wherefore to the action which is sometimes bad1 or arises from some evil emotion1 we may be led by reason 7,,iv3xix474 ,q4,e4,d4 ,note4- ,an example will put this point in a clearer light4 ,the action of striking1 in so far as it is considered physically1 and in so far as we merely look to the fact that a man raises his arm1 clenches his fist1 and moves his whole arm violently downwards1 is a virtue or excellence which is conceived as proper to the structure of the human body4 ,if1 then1 a man1 moved by anger or hatred1 is led to clench his fist or to move his arm1 this result takes place 7as we showed in ,pt4,,ii471 because one and the same action can be associated with various mental images of things2 therefore we may be determined to the performance of one and the same action by confused ideas1 or by clear and distinct ideas4 ,hence it is evident that every desire which springs from emotion1 wherein the mind is passive1 would become useless1 if men could be guided by reason4 ,let us now see why desire which arises from emotion1 wherein the mind is passive1 is called by us blind4 ,prop4 ,,lx4 ,desire arising from a pleasure or pain1 that is not attributable1 to the whole body1 but only to one or certain parts thereof1 is without utility in respect to a man as a whole4 ,proof4- ,let it be assumed1 for instance1 that ,a1 a part of a body1 is so strengthened by some external cause1 that it prevails over the remaining parts 7,,iv3vi474 ,this part will not endeavour to do away with its own powers1 in order that the other parts of the body may perform its office2 for this it would be necessary for it to have a force or power of doing away with its own powers1 which 7,,iii3vi47 is absurd4 ,the said part1 and1 consequently1 the mind also1 will endeavour to preserve its condition4 ,wherefore desire arising from a pleasure of the kind aforesaid has no utility in reference to a man as a whole4 ,if it be assumed1 on the other hand1 that the part1 ,a1 be checked so that the remaining parts prevail1 it may be proved in the same manner that desire arising from pain has no utility in respect to a man as a whole4 ,q4,e4,d4 ,note4- ,as pleasure is generally 7,,iv3xliv4,note7 attributed to one part of the body1 we generally desire to preserve our being with out taking into consideration our health as a whole3 to which it may be added1 that the desires which have most hold over us 7,,iv3ix47 take account of the present and not of the future4 ,prop4 ,,lxi4 ,desire which springs from reason cannot be excessive4 ,proof4- ,desire 7,def4 of the ,emotions3i47 considered absolutely is the actual essence of man1 in so far as it is conceived as in any way determined to a particular activity by some given modification of itself4 ,hence desire1 which arises from reason1 that is 7,,iii3iii471 which is engendered in us in so far as we act1 is the actual essence or nature of man1 in so far as it is conceived as determined to such activities as are adequately conceived through man's essence only 7,,iii3,def4ii474 ,now1 if such desire could be excessive1 human nature considered in itself alone would be able to exceed itself1 or would be able to do more than it can1 a manifest contradiction4 ,therefore1 such desire cannot be excessive4 ,q4,e4,d4 ,prop4 ,,lxii4 ,in so far as the mind conceives a thing under the dictates of reason1 it is affected equally1 whether the idea be of a thing future1 past1 or present4 ,proof4- ,whatsoever the mind conceives under the guidance of reason1 it conceives under the form of eternity or necessity 7,,ii3xliv4,coroll4ii471 and is therefore affected with the same certitude 7,,ii3xliii4,note74 ,wherefore1 whether the thing be present1 past1 or future1 the mind conceives it under the same necessity and is affected with the same certitude2 and whether the idea be of something present1 past1 or future1 it will in all cases be equally true 7,,ii3xli472 that is1 it will always possess the same properties of an adequate idea 7,,ii3,def4iv472 therefore1 in so far as the mind conceives things under the dictates of reason1 it is affected in the same manner1 whether the idea be of a thing future1 past1 or present4 ,q4,e4,d4 ,note4- ,if we could possess an adequate knowledge of the duration of things1 and could determine by reason their periods of existence1 we should contemplate things future with the same emotion as things present2 and the mind would desire as though it were present the good which it conceived as future2 consequently it would necessarily neglect a lesser good in the present for the sake of a greater good in the future1 and would in no wise desire that which is good in the present but a source of evil in the future1 as we shall presently show4 ,however1 we can have but a very inadequate knowledge of the duration of things 7,,ii3xxxi47 and the periods of their existence 7,,ii3xliv4,note7 we can only determine by imagination1 which is not so powerfully affected by the future as by the present4 ,hence such true knowledge of good and evil as we possess is merely abstract or general1 and the judgment which we pass on the order of things and the connection of causes1 with a view to determining what is good or bad for us in the1 present1 is rather imaginary than real4 ,therefore it is nothing wonderful1 if the desire arising from such knowledge of good and evil1 in so far as it looks on into the future1 be more readily checked than the desire of things which are agreeable at the present time4 7,cf4 ,,iv3xvi47 ,prop4 ,,lxiii4 ,he who is led by fear1 and does good in order to escape evil1 is not led by reason4 ,proof4- ,all the emotions which are attributable to the mind as active1 or in other words to reason1 are emotions of pleasure and desire 7,,iii3lix472 therefore1 he who is led by fear1 and does good in order to escape evil1 is not led by reason4 ,note4- ,superstitions persons1 who know better how to rail at vice than how to teach virtue1 and who strive not to guide men by reason1 but so to restrain them that they would rather escape evil than love virtue1 have no other aim but to make others as wretched as themselves2 wherefore it is nothing wonderful1 if they be generally troublesome and odious to their fellow-men4 ,corollary4- ,under desire which springs from reason1 we seek good directly1 and shun evil indirectly4 ,proof4- ,desire which springs from reason can only spring from a pleasurable emotion1 wherein the mind is not passive 7,,iii3lix471 in other words1 from a pleasure which cannot be excessive 7,,iv3lxi471 and not from pain2 wherefore this desire springs from the knowledge of good1 not of evil 7,,iv3viii472 hence under the guidance of reason we seek good directly and only by implication shun evil4 ,q4,e4,d4 ,note4- ,this ,corollary may be illustrated by the example of a sick and a healthy man4 ,the sick man through fear of death eats what he naturally shrinks from1 but the healthy man takes pleasure in his food1 and thus gets a better enjoyment out of life1 than if he were in fear of death1 and desired directly to avoid it4 ,so a judge1 who condemns a criminal to death1 not from hatred or anger but from love of the public well-being1 is guided solely by reason4 ,prop4 ,,lxiv4 ,the knowledge of evil is an inadequate knowledge4 ,proof4- ,the knowledge of evil 7,,iv3viii47 is pain1 in so far as we are conscious thereof4 ,now pain is the transition to a lesser perfection 7,def4 of the ,emotions3iii47 and therefore cannot be understood through man's nature 7,,iii3vi41 ,,ii3vii472 therefore it is a passive state 7,,iii4,def4ii47 which 7,,iii3iii47 depends on inadequate ideas2 consequently the knowledge thereof 7,,ii3xxix471 namely1 the knowledge of evil1 is inadequate4 ,q4,e4,d4 ,corollary4- ,hence it follows that1 if the human mind possessed only adequate ideas1 it would form no conception of evil4 ,prop4 ,,lxv4 ,under the guidance of reason we should pursue the greater of two goods and the lesser of two evils4 ,proof4- ,a good which prevents our enjoyment of a greater good is in reality an evil2 for we apply the terms good and bad to things1 in so far as we compare them one with another 7see preface to this ,part72 therefore1 evil is in reality a lesser good2 hence under the guidance of reason we seek or pursue only the greater good and the lesser evil4 ,q4,e4,d4 ,corollary4- ,we may1 under the guidance of reason1 pursue the lesser evil as though it were the greater good1 and we may shun the lesser good1 which would be the cause of the greater evil4 ,for the evil1 which is here called the lesser1 is really good1 and the lesser good is really evil1 wherefore we may seek the former and shun the latter4 ,q4,e4,d4 ,prop4 ,,lxvi4 ,we may1 under the guidance of reason1 seek a greater good in the future in preference to a lesser good in the present1 and we may seek a lesser evil in the present in preference to a greater evil in the future4 ,maltim praesens minus prae majori futuro4 7,van ,vloten74 ,bruder reads3 ,malum praesens minus1 quod causa est faturi alicujus mali4 ,the last word of the latter is an obvious misprint1 and is corrected by the ,dutch translator into majoris boni4 7,pollock1 p4 #bfh1 note47 ,proof4- ,if the mind could have an adequate knowledge of things future1 it would be affected towards what is future in the same way as towards what is present 7,,iv3lxii472 wherefore1 looking merely to reason1 as in this proposition we are assumed to do1 there is no difference1 whether the greater good or evil be assumed as present1 or assumed as future2 hence 7,,iv3lxv47 we may seek a greater good in the future in preference to a lesser good in the present1 c4 ,q4,e4,d4 ,corollary4- ,we may1 under the guidance of reason1 seek a lesser evil in the present1 because it is the cause of a greater good in the future1 and we may shun a lesser good in the present1 because it is the cause of a greater evil in the future4 ,this ,corollary is related to the foregoing ,proposition as the ,corollary to ,,iv3lxv4 is related to the said ,,iv3lxv4 ,note4- ,if these statements be compared with what we have pointed out concerning the strength of the emotions in this ,part up to ,prop4 xviii41 we shall readily see the difference between a man1 who is led solely by emotion or opinion1 and a man1 who is led by reason4 ,the former1 whether will or no1 performs actions whereof he is utterly ignorant2 the latter is his own master and only performs such actions1 as he knows are of primary importance in life1 and therefore chiefly1 desires2 wherefore ,i call the former a slave1 and the latter a free man1 concerning whose disposition and manner of life it will be well to make a few observations4 ,prop4 ,,lxvii4 ,a free man thinks of death least of all things2 and his wisdom is a meditation not of death but of life4 ,proof4- ,a free man is one who lives under the guidance of reason1 who is not led by fear 7,,iv3lxiii471 but who directly desires that which is good 7,,iv3lxiii4,coroll471 in other words 7,,iv3xxiv471 who strives to act1 to live1 and to preserve his being on the basis of seeking his own true advantage2 wherefore such an one thinks of nothing less than of death1 but his wisdom is a meditation of life4 ,q4,e4,d ,prop4 ,,lxviii4 ,if men were born free1 they would1 so long as they remained free1 form no conception of good and evil4 ,proof4- ,i call free him who is led solely by reason2 he1 therefore1 who is born free1 and who remains free1 has only adequate ideas2 therefore 7,,iv3lxiv4,coroll47 he has no conception of evil1 or consequently 7good and evil being correlative7 of good4 ,q4,e4,d4 ,note4- ,it is evident1 from ,,iv3iv41 that the hypothesis of this ,proposition is false and inconceivable1 except in so far as we look solely to the nature of man1 or rather to ,god2 not in so far as the latter is infinite1 but only in so far as he is the cause of man's existence4 ,this1 and other matters which we have already proved1 seem to have been signifieded by ,moses in the history of the first man4 ,for in that narrative no other power of ,god is conceived1 save that whereby he created man1 that is the power wherewith he provided solely for man's advantage2 it is stated that ,god forbade man1 being free1 to eat of the tree of the knowledge of good and evil1 and that1 as soon as man should have eaten of it1 he would straightway fear death rather than desire to live4 ,further1 it is written that when man had found a wife1 who was in entire harmony with his nature1 he knew that there could be nothing in nature which could be more useful to him2 but that after he believed the beasts to be like himself1 he straightway began to imitate their emotions 7,,iii3xxvii471 and to lose his freedom2 this freedom was afterwards recovered by the patriarchs1 led by the spirit of ,christ2 that is1 by the idea of ,god1 whereon alone it depends1 that man may be free1 and desire for others the good which he desires for himself1 as we have shown above 7,,iv3xxxii474 ,prop4 ,,lxix4 ,the virtue of a free man is seen to be as great1 when it declines dangers1 as when it overcomes them4 ,proof4- ,emotion can only be checked or removed by an emotion contrary to itself1 and possessing more power in restraining emotion 7,,iv3vii474 ,but blind daring and fear are emotions1 which can be conceived as equally great 7,,iv3v4 and ,,iv3iii473 hence1 no less virtue or firmness is required in checking daring than in checking fear 7,,iii3lix4,note72 in other words 7,def4 of the ,emotions3xl4 and xli471 the free man shows as much virtue1 when he declines dangers1 as when he strives to overcome them4 ,q4,e4,d4 ,corollary4- ,the free man is as courageous in timely retreat as in combat2 or1 a free man shows equal courage or presence of mind1 whether he elect to give battle or to retreat4 ,note4- ,what courage 7animositas7 is1 and what ,i mean thereby1 ,i explained in ,,iii3lix4,note4 ,by danger ,i mean everything1 which can give rise to any evil1 such as pain1 hatred1 discord1 c4 ,prop4 ,,lxx4 ,the free man1 who lives among the ignorant1 strives1 as far as he can1 to avoid receiving favours from them4 ,proof4- ,everyone judges what is good according to his disposition 7,,iii3xxxix4,note72 wherefore an ignorant man1 who has conferred a benefit on another1 puts his own estimate upon it1 and1 if it appears to be estimated less highly by the receiver1 will feel pain 7,,iii3xlii474 ,but the free man only desires to join other men to him in friendship 7,,iv3xxxvii471 not repaying their benefits with others reckoned as of like value1 but guiding himself and others by the free decision of reason1 and doing only such things as he knows to be of primary importance4 ,therefore the free man1 lest be should become hateful to the ignorant1 or follow their desires rather than reason1 will endeavour1 as far as he can1 to avoid receiving their favours4 ,note4- ,i say1 as far as he can4 ,for though men be ignorant1 yet are they men1 and in cases of necessity could afford us human aid1 the most excellent of all things3 therefore it is often necessary to accept favours from them1 and consequently to repay such favours in kind2 we must1 therefore1 exercise caution in declining favours1 lest we should have the appearance of despising those who bestow them1 or of being1 from avaricious motives1 unwilling to requite them1 and so give ground for offence by the very fact of striving to avoid it4 ,thus1 in declining favours1 we must look to the requirements of utility and courtesy4 ,prop4 ,,lxxi4 ,only free men are thoroughly grateful one to another4 ,proof4- ,only free men are thoroughly useful one to another1 and associated among themselves by the closest necessity of friendship 7,,iv3xxxv41,coroll4i471 only such men endeavour1 with mutual zeal of love1 to confer benefits on each other 7,,iv3xxxvii471 and1 therefore1 only they are thoroughly grateful one to another4 ,q4,e4,d4 ,note4- ,the goodwill1 which men who are led by blind desire have for one another1 is generally a bargaining or enticement1 rather than pure goodwill4 ,moreover1 ingratitude is not an emotion4 ,yet it is base1 inasmuch as it generally shows1 that a man is affected by excessive hatred1 anger1 pride1 avarice1 c4 ,he who1 by reason of his folly1 knows not how to return benefits1 is not ungrateful1 much less he who is not gained over by the gifts of a courtesan to serve her lust1 or by a thief to conceal his thefts1 or by any similar persons4 ,contrariwise1 such an one shows a constant mind1 inasmuch as he cannot by an gifts be corrupted1 to his own or the general hurt4 ,prop4 ,,lxxii4 ,the free man never acts fraudulently1 but always in good faith4 ,proof4- ,if it be asked3 ,what should a man's conduct be in a case where he could by breaking faith free himself from the danger of present death8 ,would not his plan of self-preservation completely persuade him to deceive8 ,this may be answered by pointing out that1 if reason persuaded him to act thus1 it would persuade all men to act in a similar manner1 in which case reason would persuade men not to agree in good faith to unite their forces1 or to have laws in common1 that is1 not to4 have any general laws1 which is absurd4 ,prop4 ,,lxxiii4 ,the man1 who is guided by reason1 is more free in a ,state1 where he lives under a general system of law1 than in solitude1 where he is independent4 ,proof4- ,the man1 who is guided by reason1 does not obey through fear 7,,iv3,ixiii473 but1 in so far as he endeavours to preserve his being according to the dictates of reason1 that is 7,,iv3lxvi4,note71 in so far as he endeavours to live in freedom1 he desires to order his life according to the general good 7,,iv3xxxvii471 and1 consequently 7as we showed in ,,iv3xxxvii4,note4ii471 to live according to the laws of his country4 ,therefore the free man1 in order to enjoy greater freedom1 desires to possess the general rights of citizenship4 ,q4,e4,d4 ,note4- ,these and similar observations1 which we have made on man's true freedom1 may be referred to strength1 that is1 to courage and nobility of character 7,,iii3lix4,note74 ,i do not think it worth while to prove separately all the properties of strength2 much less need ,i show1 that he that is strong hates no man1 is angry with no man1 envies no man1 is indignant with no man1 despises no man1 and least of all things is proud4 ,these propositions1 and all that relate to the true way of life and religion1 are easily proved from ,,iv3xxxvii4 and ,,iv3xlvi42 namely1 that hatred should be overcome with love1 and that every man should desire for others the good which he seeks for himself4 ,we may also repeat what we drew attention to in the note to ,,iv3,i41 and in other places2 namely1 that the strong man has ever first in his thoughts1 that all things follow from the necessity of the divine nature2 so that whatsoever he deems to be hurtful and evil1 and whatsoever1 accordingly1 seems to him impious1 horrible1 unjust1 and base1 assumes that appearance owing to his own disordered1 fragmentary1 and confused view of the universe4 ,wherefore he strives before all things to conceive things as they really are1 and to remove the hindrances to true knowledge1 such as are hatred1 anger1 envy1 derision1 pride1 and similar emotions1 which ,i have mentioned above4 ,thus he endeavours1 as we said before1 as far as in him lies1 to do good1 and to go on his way rejoicing4 ,how far human virtue is capable of attaining to such a condition1 and what its powers may be1 ,i will prove in the following ,part4 ,,appendix4 ,what have said in this ,part concerning the right way of life has not been arranged1 so as to admit of being seen at one view1 but has been set forth piece-meal1 according as ,i thought each ,proposition could most readily be deduced from what preceded it4 ,i propose1 therefore1 to rearrange my remarks and to bring them under leading heads4 ,i4 ,all our endeavours or desires so follow from the necessity of our nature1 that they can be understood either through it alone1 as their proximate cause1 or by virtue of our being a part of nature1 which cannot be adequately conceived through itself without other individuals4 ,,ii4 ,desires1 which follow from our nature in such a manner1 that they can be understood through it alone1 are those which are referred to the mind1 in so far as the latter is conceived to consist of adequate ideas3 the remaining desires are only referred to the mind1 in so far as it conceives things inadequately1 and their force and increase are generally defined not by the power of man1 but by the power of things external to us3 wherefore the former are rightly called actions1 the latter passions1 for the former always indicate our power1 the latter1 on the other hand1 show our infirmity and fragmentary knowledge4 ,,iii4 ,our actions1 that is1 those desires which are defined by man's power or reason1 are always good4 ,the rest maybe either good or bad4 ,,iv4 ,thus in life it is before all things useful to perfect the understanding or reason1 as far as we can1 and in this alone man's highest happiness or blessedness consists1 indeed blessedness is nothing else but the contentment of spirit1 which arises from the intuitive knowledge of ,god3 now1 to perfect the understanding is nothing else but to understand ,god1 ,god's attributes1 and the actions which follow from the necessity of his nature4 ,wherefore of a man1 who is led by reason1 the ultimate aim or highest desire1 whereby he seeks to govern all his fellows1 is that whereby he is brought to the adequate conception of himself and of all things within the scope of his intelligence4 ,v4 ,therefore1 without intelligence there is not rational life3 and things are only good1 in so far as they aid man in his enjoyment of the intellectual life1 which is defined by intelligence4 ,contrariwise1 whatsoever things hinder man's perfecting of his reason1 and capability to enjoy the rational life1 are alone called evil4 ,,vi4 ,as all things whereof man is the efficient cause are necessarily good1 no evil can befall man except through external causes2 namely1 by virtue of man being a part of universal nature1 whose laws human nature is compelled to1 obey1 and to conform to in almost infinite ways4 ,,vii4 ,it is impossible1 that man should not be a part of nature1 or that he should not follow her general order2 but if he be thrown among individuals whose nature is in harmony with his own1 his power of action will thereby be aided and fostered1 whereas1 if he be thrown among such as are but very little in harmony with his nature1 he will hardly be able to accommodate himself to them without undergoing a great change himself4 ,,viii4 ,whatsoever in nature we deem to be evil1 or to be capable of injuring our faculty for existing and enjoying the rational life1 we may endeavour to remove in whatever way seems safest to us2 on the other hand1 whatsoever we deem to be good or useful for preserving our being1 and enabling us to enjoy the rational life1 we may appropriate to our use and employ as we think best4 ,everyone without exception may1 by sovereign right of nature1 do whatsoever he thinks will advance his own interest4 ,,ix4 ,nothing can be in more harmony with the nature of any given thing than other individuals of the same species2 therefore 7cf4 vii47 for man in the preservation of his being and the enjoyment of the rational life there is nothing more useful than his fellow-man who is led by reason4 ,further1 as we know not anything among individual things which is more excellent than a man led by reason1 no man can better display the power of his skill and disposition1 than in so training men1 that they come at last to live under the dominion of their own reason4 ,x4 ,in so far as men are influenced by envy or any kind of hatred1 one towards another1 they are at variance1 and are therefore to be feared in proportion1 as they are more powerful than their fellows4 ,,xi4 ,yet minds are not conquered by force1 but by love and high-mindedness4 ,,xii4 ,it is before all things useful to men to associate their ways of life1 to bind themselves together with such bonds as they think most fitted to gather them all into unity1 and generally to do whatsoever serves to strengthen friendship4 ,,xiii4 ,but for this there is need of skill and watchfulness4 ,for men are diverse 7seeing that those who live under the guidance of reason are few71 yet are they generally envious and more prone to revenge than to sympathy4 ,no small force of character is therefore required to take everyone as he is1 and to restrain one's self from imitating the emotions of others4 ,but those who carp at mankind1 and are more skilled in railing at vice than in instilling virtue1 and who break rather than strengthen men's dispositions1 are hurtful both to themselves and others4 ,thus many from too great impatience of spirit1 or from misguided religious zeal1 have preferred to live among brutes rather than among men2 as boys or youths1 who cannot peaceably endure the chidings of their parents1 will enlist as soldiers and choose the hardships of war and the despotic discipline in preference to the comforts of home and the admonitions of their father3 suffering any burden to be put upon them1 so long as they may spite their parents4 ,,xiv4 ,therefore1 although men are generally governed in everything by their own lusts1 yet their association in common brings many more advantages than drawbacks4 ,wherefore it is better to bear patiently the wrongs they may do us1 and to strive to promote whatsoever serves to bring about harmony and friendship4 ,,xv4 ,those things1 which beget harmony1 are such as are attributable to justice1 equity1 and honourable living4 ,for men brook ill not only what is unjust or iniquitous1 but also what is reckoned disgraceful1 or that a man should slight the received customs of their society4 ,for winning love those qualities are especially necessary which have regard to religion and piety 7cf4 ,,iv3xxxvii4,notes4i41 4ii42 ,,iv3xlvi4,note2 and ,,iv3lxxiii4,note74 ,,xvi4 ,further1 harmony is often the result of fear3 but such harmony is insecure4 ,further1 fear arises from infirmity of spirit and moreover belongs not to the exercise of reason3 the same is true of compassion1 though this latter seems to bear a certain resemblance to piety4 ,,xvii4 ,men are also gained over by liberality1 especially such as have not the means to buy what is necessary to sustain life4 ,however1 to give aid to every poor man is far beyond the power and the advantage of any private person4 ,for the riches of any private person are wholly inadequate to meet such a call4 ,again1 an individual man's resources of character are too limited for him to be able to make all men his friends4 ,hence providing for the poor is a duty1 which falls on the ,state as a whole1 and has regard only to the general advantage4 ,,xviii4 ,in accepting favours1 and in returning gratitude our duty must be wholly different 7cf4 ,,iv3lxx4,note2 ,,iv3lxxi4 ,note74 ,,xix4 ,again1 meretricious love1 that is1 the lust of generation arising from bodily beauty1 and generally every sort of love1 which owns anything save freedom of soul as its cause1 readily passes into hate2 unless indeed1 what is worse1 it is a species of madness2 and then it promotes discord rather than harmony 7cf4 ,,iii3xxxi4,coroll474 ,,xx4 ,as concerning marriage1 it is certain that this is in harmony with reason1 if the desire for physical union be not engendered solely by bodily beauty1 but also by the desire to beget children and to train them up wisely2 and moreover1 if the love of both1 to wit1 of the man and of the woman1 is not caused by bodily beauty only1 but also by freedom of soul4 ,,xxi4 ,furthermore1 flattery begets harmony2 but only by means of the vile offence of slavishness or treachery4 ,none are more readily taken with flattery than the proud1 who wish to be first1 but are not4 ,,xxii4 ,there is in abasement a spurious appearance of piety and religion4 ,although abasement is the opposite to pride1 yet is he that abases himself most akin to the proud 7,,iv3lvii4,note74 ,,xxiii4 ,shame also brings about harmony1 but only in such matters as cannot be hid4 ,further1 as shame is a species of pain1 it does not concern the exercise of reason4 ,,xxiv4 ,the remaining emotions of pain towards men are directly opposed to justice1 equity1 honour1 piety1 and religion2 and1 although indignation seems to bear a certain resemblance to equity1 yet is life but lawless1 where every man may pass judgment on another's deeds1 and vindicate his own or other men's rights4 ,,xxv4 ,correctness of conduct 7modestia71 that is1 the desire of pleasing men which is determined by reason1 is attributable to piety 7as we said in ,,iv3xxxvii4,note4i474 ,but1 if it spring from emotion1 it is ambition1 or the desire whereby1 men1 under the false cloak of piety1 generally stir up discords and seditions4 ,for he who desires to aid his fellows4 either in word or in deed1 so that they may together enjoy the highest good1 he1 ,i say1 will before all things strive to1 win them over with love3 not to draw them into admiration1 so that a system may be called after his name1 nor to give any cause for envy4 ,further1 in his conversation he will shrink from talking of men's faults1 and will be careful to speak but sparingly of human infirmity3 but he will dwell at length on human virtue or power1 and the way whereby it may be perfected4 ,thus will men be stirred not by fear1 nor by aversion1 but only by the emotion of joy1 to endeavour1 so far as in them lies1 to live in obedience to reason4 ,,xxvi4 ,besides men1 we know of no particular thing in nature in whose mind we may rejoice1 and whom we can associate with ourselves in friendship or any sort of fellowship2 therefore1 whatsoever there be in nature besides man1 a regard for our advantage does not call on us to preserve1 but to preserve or destroy according to its various capabilities1 and to adapt to our use as best we may4 ,,xxvii4 ,the advantage which we derive from things external to us1 besides the experience and knowledge which we acquire from observing them1 and from recombining their elements in different forms1 is principally the preservation of the body2 from this point of view1 those things are most useful which can so feed and nourish the body1 that all its parts may rightly fulfil their functions4 ,for1 in proportion as the body is capable of being affected in a greater variety of ways1 and of affecting external bodies in a great number of ways1 so much the more is the mind capable of thinking 7,,iv3xxxviii41 ,,iv3xxxix474 ,but there seem to be very few things of this kind in nature2 wherefore for the due nourishment of the body we must use many foods of diverse nature4 ,for the human body is composed of very many parts of different nature1 which stand in continual need of varied nourishment1 so that the whole body may be equally capable of doing everything that can follow from its own nature1 and consequently that the mind also may be equally capable of forming many perceptions4 ,,xxviii4 ,now for providing these nourishments the strength of each individual would hardly suffice1 if men did not lend one another mutual aid4 ,but money has furnished us with a token for everything3 hence it is with the notion of money1 that the mind of the multitude is chiefly engrossed3 nay1 it can hardly conceive any kind of pleasure1 which is not accompanied with the idea of money as cause4 ,,xxix4 ,this result is the fault only of those1 who seek money1 not from poverty or to supply their necessary1 wants1 but because they1 have learned the arts of gain1 wherewith they bring themselves to great splendour4 ,certainly they nourish their bodies1 according to custom1 but scantily1 believing that they lose as much of their wealth as they spend on the preservation of their body4 ,but they who know the true use of money1 and who fix the measure of wealth solely with regard to their actual needs1 live content with little4 ,,xxx4 ,as1 therefore1 those things are good which assist the various parts of the body1 and enable them to perform their functions2 and as pleasure consists in an increase of1 or aid to1 man's power1 in so far as he is composed of mind and body2 it follows that all those things which bring pleasure are good4 ,but seeing that things do not work with the object of giving us pleasure1 and that their power of action is not tempered to suit our advantage1 and1 lastly1 that pleasure is generally referred to one part of the body more than to the other parts2 therefore most emotions of pleasure 7unless reason and watchfulness be at hand71 and consequently the desires arising therefrom1 may become excessive4 ,moreover we may add that emotion leads us to pay most regard to what is agreeable in the present1 nor can we estimate what is future with emotions equally vivid4 7,,iv3xliv4,note1 and ,,iv3lx4,note47 ,,xxxi4 ,superstition1 on the other hand1 seems to account as good all that brings pain1 and as bad all that brings pleasure4 ,however1 as we said above 7,,iv3xlv4,note71 none but the envious take delight in my infirmity and trouble4 ,for the greater the pleasure whereby we are affected1 the greater is the perfection whereto we pass1 and consequently the more do we partake of the divine nature3 no pleasure can ever be evil1 which is regulated by a true regard for our advantage4 ,but contrariwise he1 who is led by fear and does good only to avoid evil1 is not guided by reason4 ,ap4,,xxxii4 7#a7 ,but human power is extremely limited1 and is infinitely surpassed by the power of external causes2 we have not1 therefore1 an absolute power of shaping to our use those things which are without us4 ,nevertheless1 we shall bear with an equal mind all that happens to us in contravention to the claims of our own advantage1 so long as we are conscious1 that we have done our duty1 and that the power which we possess is not sufficient to enable us to protect ourselves completely2 remembering that we are a part of universal nature1 and that we follow her order4 ,if we have a clear and distinct understanding of this1 that part of our nature which is defined by intelligence1 in other words the better part of ourselves1 will assuredly acquiesce in what befalls us1 and in such acquiescence will endeavour to persist4 ,for1 in so far as we are intelligent beings1 we cannot desire anything save that which is necessary1 nor yield absolute acquiescence to anything1 save to that which is true3 wherefore1 in so far as we have a right understanding of these things1 the endeavour of the better part of ourselves is in harmony with the order of nature as a whole4 ,end of ,part ,,iv