,,an ,,enquiry ,,concerning ,,human ,,understanding4 ,,by ,,david ,,hume ,extracted from3 ,enquiries ,concerning the ,human ,understanding1 and ,concerning the ,principles of ,morals1 ,by ,david ,hume4 ,reprinted from ,the ,posthumous ,edition of #aggg1 and ,edited with ,introduction1 ,comparative ,tables of ,contents1 and ,analytical ,index by ,l4,a4 ,selby-,bigge1 ,m4,a41 ,late ,fellow of ,university ,college1 ,oxford4 ,second ,edition1 #aijb ,,contents ,i4 ,of the different ,species of ,philosophy ,,ii4 ,of the ,origin of ,ideas ,,iii4 ,of the ,association of ,ideas ,,iv4 ,sceptical ,doubts concerning the ,operations of the ,understanding ,v4 ,sceptical ,solution of these ,doubts ,,vi4 ,of ,probability ,,vii4 ,of the ,idea of necessary ,connexion ,,viii4 ,of ,liberty and ,necessity ,,ix4 ,of the ,reason of ,animals ,x4 ,of ,miracles ,,xi4 ,of a particular ,providence and of a future ,state ,,xii4 ,of the academical or sceptical ,philosophy ,,index ,,section ,i4 ,,of ,,the ,,different ,,species ,,of ,,philosophy4 #a4 ,moral philosophy1 or the science of human nature1 may be treated after two different manners2 each of which has its peculiar merit1 and may contribute to the entertainment1 instruction1 and reformation of mankind4 ,the one considers man chiefly as born for action2 and as influenced in his measures by taste and sentiment2 pursuing one object1 and avoiding another1 according to the value which these objects seem to possess1 and according to the light in which they present themselves4 ,as virtue1 of all objects1 is allowed to be the most valuable1 this species of philosophers paint her in the most amiable colours2 borrowing all helps from poetry and eloquence1 and treating their subject in an easy and obvious manner1 and such as is best fitted to please the imagination1 and engage the affections4 ,they select the most striking observations and instances from common life2 place opposite characters in a proper contrast2 and alluring us into the paths of virtue by the views of glory and happiness1 direct our steps in these paths by the soundest precepts and most illustrious examples4 ,they make us feel the difference between vice and virtue2 they excite and regulate our sentiments2 and so they can but bend our hearts to the love of probity and true honour1 they think1 that they have fully attained the end of all their labours4 #b4 ,the other species of philosophers consider man in the light of a reasonable rather than an active being1 and endeavour to form his understanding more than cultivate his manners4 ,they regard human nature as a subject of speculation2 and with a narrow scrutiny examine it1 in order to find those principles1 which regulate our understanding1 excite our sentiments1 and make us approve or blame any particular object1 action1 or behaviour4 ,they think it a reproach to all literature1 that philosophy should not yet have fixed1 beyond controversy1 the foundation of morals1 reasoning1 and criticism2 and should for ever talk of truth and falsehood1 vice and virtue1 beauty and deformity1 without being able to determine the source of these distinctions4 ,while they attempt this arduous task1 they are deterred by no difficulties2 but proceeding from particular instances to general principles1 they still push on their enquiries to principles more general1 and rest not satisfied till they arrive at those original principles1 by which1 in every science1 all human curiosity must be bounded4 ,though their speculations seem abstract1 and even unintelligible to common readers1 they aim at the approbation of the learned and the wise2 and think themselves sufficiently compensated for the labour of their whole lives1 if they can discover some hidden truths1 which may contribute to the instruction of posterity4 #c4 ,it is certain that the easy and obvious philosophy will always1 with the generality of mankind1 have the preference above the accurate and abstruse2 and by many will be recommended1 not only as more agreeable1 but more useful than the other4 ,it enters more into common life2 moulds the heart and affections2 and1 by touching those principles which actuate men1 reforms their conduct1 and brings them nearer to that model of perfection which it describes4 ,on the contrary1 the abstruse philosophy1 being founded on a turn of mind1 which cannot enter into business and action1 vanishes when the philosopher leaves the shade1 and comes into open day2 nor can its principles easily retain any influence over our conduct and behaviour4 ,the feelings of our heart1 the agitation of our passions1 the vehemence of our affections1 dissipate all its conclusions1 and reduce the profound philosopher to a mere plebeian4 #d4 ,this also must be confessed1 that the most durable1 as well as justest fame1 has been acquired by the easy philosophy1 and that abstract reasoners seem hitherto to have enjoyed only a momentary reputation1 from the caprice or ignorance of their own age1 but have not been able to support their renown with more equitable posterity4 ,it is easy for a profound philosopher to commit a mistake in his subtile reasonings2 and one mistake is the necessary parent of another1 while he pushes on his consequences1 and is not deterred from embracing any conclusion1 by its unusual appearance1 or its contradiction to popular opinion4 ,but a philosopher1 who purposes only to represent the common sense of mankind in more beautiful and more engaging colours1 if by accident he falls into error1 goes no farther2 but renewing his appeal to common sense1 and the natural sentiments of the mind1 returns into the right path1 and secures himself from any dangerous illusions4 ,the fame of ,cicero flourishes at present2 but that of ,aristotle is utterly decayed4 ,la ,bruyere passes the seas1 and still maintains his reputation3 ,but the glory of ,malebranche is confined to his own nation1 and to his own age4 ,and ,addison1 perhaps1 will be read with pleasure1 when ,locke shall be entirely forgotten4 ,the mere philosopher is a character1 which is commonly but little acceptable in the world1 as being supposed to contribute nothing either to the advantage or pleasure of society2 while he lives remote from communication with mankind1 and is wrapped up in principles and notions equally remote from their comprehension4 ,on the other hand1 the mere ignorant is still more despised2 nor is any thing deemed a surer sign of an illiberal genius in an age and nation where the sciences flourish1 than to be entirely destitute of all relish for those noble entertainments4 ,the most perfect character is supposed to lie between those extremes2 retaining an equal ability and taste for books1 company1 and business2 preserving in conversation that discernment and delicacy which arise from polite letters2 and in business1 that probity and accuracy which are the natural result of a just philosophy4 ,in order to diffuse and cultivate so accomplished a character1 nothing can be more useful than compositions of the easy style and manner1 which draw not too much from life1 require no deep application or retreat to be comprehended1 and send back the student among mankind full of noble sentiments and wise precepts1 applicable to every exigence of human life4 ,by means of such compositions1 virtue becomes amiable1 science agreeable1 company instructive1 and retirement entertaining4 ,man is a reasonable being2 and as such1 receives from science his proper food and nourishment3 ,but so narrow are the bounds of human understanding1 that little satisfaction can be hoped for in this particular1 either from the extent of security or his acquisitions4 ,man is a sociable1 no less than a reasonable being3 ,but neither can he always enjoy company agreeable and amusing1 or preserve the proper relish for them4 ,man is also an active being2 and from that disposition1 as well as from the various necessities of human life1 must submit to business and occupation3 ,but the mind requires some relaxation1 and cannot always support its bent to care and industry4 ,it seems1 then1 that nature has pointed out a mixed kind of life as most suitable to the human race1 and secretly admonished them to allow none of these biasses to draw too much1 so as to incapacitate them for other occupations and entertainments4 ,indulge your passion for science1 says she1 but let your science be human1 and such as may have a direct reference to action and society4 ,abstruse thought and profound researches ,i prohibit1 and will severely punish1 by the pensive melancholy which they introduce1 by the endless uncertainty in which they involve you1 and by the cold reception which your pretended discoveries shall meet with1 when communicated4 ,be a philosopher2 but1 amidst all your philosophy1 be still a man4 #e4 ,were the generality of mankind contented to prefer the easy philosophy to the abstract and profound1 without throwing any blame or contempt on the latter1 it might not be improper1 perhaps1 to comply with this general opinion1 and allow every man to enjoy1 without opposition1 his own taste and sentiment4 ,but as the matter is often carried farther1 even to the absolute rejecting of all profound reasonings1 or what is commonly called metaphysics1 we shall now proceed to consider what can reasonably be pleaded in their behalf4 ,we may begin with observing1 that one considerable advantage1 which results from the accurate and abstract philosophy1 is1 its subserviency to the easy and humane2 which1 without the former1 can never attain a sufficient degree of exactness in its sentiments1 precepts1 or reasonings4 ,all polite letters are nothing but pictures of human life in various attitudes and situations2 and inspire us with different sentiments1 of praise or blame1 admiration or ridicule1 according to the qualities of the object1 which they set before us4 ,an artist must be better qualified to succeed in this undertaking1 who1 besides a delicate taste and a quick apprehension1 possesses an accurate knowledge of the internal fabric1 the operations of the understanding1 the workings of the passions1 and the various species of sentiment which discriminate vice and virtue4 ,how painful soever this inward search or enquiry may appear1 it becomes1 in some measure1 requisite to those1 who would describe with success the obvious and outward appearances of life and manners4 ,the anatomist presents to the eye the most hideous and disagreeable objects2 but his science is useful to the painter in delineating even a ,venus or an ,helen4 ,while the latter employs all the richest colours of his art1 and gives his figures the most graceful and engaging airs2 he must still carry his attention to the inward structure of the human body1 the position of the muscles1 the fabric of the bones1 and the use and figure of every part or organ4 ,accuracy is1 in every case1 advantageous to beauty1 and just reasoning to delicate sentiment4 ,in vain would we exalt the one by depreciating the other4 ,besides1 we may observe1 in every art or profession1 even those which most concern life or action1 that a spirit of accuracy1 however acquired1 carries all of them nearer their perfection1 and renders them more subservient to the interests of society4 ,and though a philosopher may live remote from business1 the genius of philosophy1 if carefully cultivated by several1 must gradually diffuse itself throughout the whole society1 and bestow a similar correctness on every art and calling4 ,the politician will acquire greater foresight and subtility1 in the subdividing and balancing of power2 the lawyer more method and finer principles in his reasonings2 and the general more regularity in his discipline1 and more caution in his plans and operations4 ,the stability of modern governments above the ancient1 and the accuracy of modern philosophy1 have improved1 and probably will still improve1 by similar gradations4 #f4 ,were there no advantage to be reaped from these studies1 beyond the gratification of an innocent curiosity1 yet ought not even this to be despised2 as being one accession to those few safe and harmless pleasures1 which are bestowed on human race4 ,the sweetest and most inoffensive path of life leads through the avenues of science and learning2 and whoever can either remove any obstructions in this way1 or open up any new prospect1 ought so far to be esteemed a benefactor to mankind4 ,and though these researches may appear painful and fatiguing1 it is with some minds as with some bodies1 which being endowed with vigorous and florid health1 require severe exercise1 and reap a pleasure from what1 to the generality of mankind1 may seem burdensome and laborious4 ,obscurity1 indeed1 is painful to the mind as well as to the eye2 but to bring light from obscurity1 by whatever labour1 must needs be delightful and rejoicing4 ,but this obscurity in the profound and abstract philosophy1 is objected to1 not only as painful and fatiguing1 but as the inevitable source of uncertainty and error4 ,here indeed lies the justest and most plausible objection against a considerable part of metaphysics1 that they are not properly a science2 but arise either from the fruitless efforts of human vanity1 which would penetrate into subjects utterly inaccessible to the understanding1 or from the craft of popular superstitions1 which1 being unable to defend themselves on fair ground1 raise these intangling brambles to cover and protect their weakness4 ,chaced from the open country1 these robbers fly into the forest1 and lie in wait to break in upon every unguarded avenue of the mind1 and overwhelm it with religious fears and prejudices4 ,the stoutest antagonist1 if he remit his watch a moment1 is oppressed4 ,and many1 through cowardice and folly1 open the gates to the enemies1 and willingly receive them with reverence and submission1 as their legal sovereigns4 #g4 ,but is this a sufficient reason1 why philosophers should desist from such researches1 and leave superstition still in possession of her retreat8 ,is it not proper to draw an opposite conclusion1 and perceive the necessity of carrying the war into the most secret recesses of the enemy8 ,in vain do we hope1 that men1 from frequent disappointment1 will at last abandon such airy sciences1 and discover the proper province of human reason4 ,for1 besides1 that many persons find too sensible an interest in perpetually recalling such topics2 besides this1 ,i say1 the motive of blind despair can never reasonably have place in the sciences2 since1 however unsuccessful former attempts may have proved1 there is still room to hope1 that the industry1 good fortune1 or improved sagacity of succeeding generations may reach discoveries unknown to former ages4 ,each adventurous genius will still leap at the arduous prize1 and find himself stimulated1 rather that discouraged1 by the failures of his predecessors2 while he hopes that the glory of achieving so hard an adventure is reserved for him alone4 ,the only method of freeing learning1 at once1 from these abstruse questions1 is to enquire seriously into the nature of human understanding1 and show1 from an exact analysis of its powers and capacity1 that it is by no means fitted for such remote and abstruse subjects4 ,we must submit to this fatigue1 in order to live at ease ever after3 ,and must cultivate true metaphysics with some care1 in order to destroy the false and adulterate4 ,indolence1 which1 to some persons1 affords a safeguard against this deceitful philosophy1 is1 with others1 overbalanced by curiosity2 and despair1 which1 at some moments1 prevails1 may give place afterwards to sanguine hopes and expectations4 ,accurate and just reasoning is the only catholic remedy1 fitted for all persons and all dispositions2 and is alone able to subvert that abstruse philosophy and metaphysical jargon1 which1 being mixed up with popular superstition1 renders it in a manner impenetrable to careless reasoners1 and gives it the air of science and wisdom4 #h4 ,besides this advantage of rejecting1 after deliberate enquiry1 the most uncertain and disagreeable part of learning1 there are many positive advantages1 which result from an accurate scrutiny into the powers and faculties of human nature4 ,it is remarkable concerning the operations of the mind1 that1 though most intimately present to us1 yet1 whenever they become the object of reflexion1 they seem involved in obscurity2 nor can the eye readily find those lines and boundaries1 which discriminate and distinguish them4 ,the objects are too fine to remain long in the same aspect or situation2 and must be apprehended in an instant1 by a superior penetration1 derived from nature1 and improved by habit and reflexion4 ,it becomes1 therefore1 no inconsiderable part of science barely to know the different operations of the mind1 to separate them from each other1 to class them under their proper heads1 and to correct all that seeming disorder1 in which they lie involved1 when made the object of reflexion and enquiry4 ,this talk of ordering and distinguishing1 which has no merit1 when performed with regard to external bodies1 the objects of our senses1 rises in its value1 when directed towards the operations of the mind1 in proportion to the difficulty and labour1 which we meet with in performing it4 ,and if we can go no farther than this mental geography1 or delineation of the distinct parts and powers of the mind1 it is at least a satisfaction to go so far2 and the more obvious this science may appear 7and it is by no means obvious7 the more contemptible still must the ignorance of it be esteemed1 in all pretenders to learning and philosophy4 ,nor can there remain any suspicion1 that this science is uncertain and chimerical2 unless we should entertain such a scepticism as is entirely subversive of all speculation1 and even action4 ,it cannot be doubted1 that the mind is endowed with several powers and faculties1 that these powers are distinct from each other1 that what is really distinct to the immediate perception may be distinguished by reflexion2 and consequently1 that there is a truth and falsehood in all propositions on this subject1 and a truth and falsehood1 which lie not beyond the compass of human understanding4 ,there are many obvious distinctions of this kind1 such as those between the will and understanding1 the imagination and passions1 which fall within the comprehension of every human creature2 and the finer and more philosophical distinctions are no less real and certain1 though more difficult to be comprehended4 ,some instances1 especially late ones1 of success in these enquiries1 may give us a juster notion of the certainty and solidity of this branch of learning4 ,and shall we esteem it worthy the labour of a philosopher to give us a true system of the planets1 and adjust the position and order of those remote bodies2 while we affect to overlook those1 who1 with so much success1 delineate the parts of the mind1 in which we are so intimately concerned8 #i4 ,but may we not hope1 that philosophy1 if cultivated with care1 and encouraged by the attention of the public1 may carry its researches still farther1 and discover1 at least in some degree1 the secret springs and principles1 by which the human mind is actuated in its operations8 ,astronomers had long contented themselves with proving1 from the phaenomena1 the true motions1 order1 and magnitude of the heavenly bodies3 ,till a philosopher1 at last1 arose1 who seems1 from the happiest reasoning1 to have also determined the laws and forces1 by which the revolutions of the planets are governed and directed4 ,the like has been performed with regard to other parts of nature4 ,and there is no reason to despair of equal success in our enquiries concerning the mental powers and economy1 if prosecuted with equal capacity and caution4 ,it is probable1 that one operation and principle of the mind depends on another2 which1 again1 may be resolved into one more general and universal3 ,and how far these researches may possibly be carried1 it will be difficult for us1 before1 or even after1 a careful trial1 exactly to determine4 ,this is certain1 that attempts of this kind are every day made even by those who philosophize the most negligently3 ,and nothing can be more requisite than to enter upon the enterprize with thorough care and attention2 that1 if it lie within the compass of human understanding1 it may at last be happily achieved2 if not1 it may1 however1 be rejected with some confidence and security4 ,this last conclusion1 surely1 is not desirable2 nor ought it to be embraced too rashly4 ,for how much must we diminish from the beauty and value of this species of philosophy1 upon such a supposition8 ,moralists have hitherto been accustomed1 when they considered the vast multitude and diversity of those actions that excite our approbation or dislike1 to search for some common principle1 on which this variety of sentiments might depend4 ,and though they have sometimes carried the matter too far1 by their passion for some one general principle2 it must1 however1 be confessed1 that they are excusable in expecting to find some general principles1 into which all the vices and virtues were justly to be resolved4 ,the like has been the endeavour of critics1 logicians1 and even politicians3 ,nor have their attempts been wholly unsuccessful2 though perhaps longer time1 greater accuracy1 and more ardent application may bring these sciences still nearer their perfection4 ,to throw up at once all pretensions of this kind may justly be deemed more rash1 precipitate1 and dogmatical1 than even the boldest and most affirmative philosophy1 that has ever attempted to impose its crude dictates and principles on mankind4 #aj4 ,what though these reasonings concerning human nature seem abstract1 and of difficult comprehension8 ,this affords no presumption of their falsehood4 ,on the contrary1 it seems impossible1 that what has hitherto escaped so many wise and profound philosophers can be very obvious and easy4 ,and whatever pains these researches may cost us1 we may think ourselves sufficiently rewarded1 not only in point of profit but of pleasure1 if1 by that means1 we can make any addition to our stock of knowledge1 in subjects of such unspeakable importance4 ,but as1 after all1 the abstractedness of these speculations is no recommendation1 but rather a disadvantage to them1 and as this difficulty may perhaps be surmounted by care and art1 and the avoiding of all unnecessary detail1 we have1 in the following enquiry1 attempted to throw some light upon subjects1 from which uncertainty has hitherto deterred the wise1 and obscurity the ignorant4 ,happy1 if we can unite the boundaries of the different species of philosophy1 by reconciling profound enquiry with clearness1 and truth with novelty6 ,and still more happy1 if1 reasoning in this easy manner1 we can undermine the foundations of an abstruse philosophy1 which seems to have hitherto served only as a shelter to superstition1 and a cover to absurdity and error6 ,,section ,,ii4 ,,of ,,the ,,origin ,,of ,,ideas4 #aa4 ,every one will readily allow1 that there is a considerable difference between the perceptions of the mind1 when a man feels the pain of excessive heat1 or the pleasure of moderate warmth1 and when he afterwards recalls to his memory this sensation1 or anticipates it by his imagination4 ,these faculties may mimic or copy the perceptions of the senses2 but they never can entirely reach the force and vivacity of the original sentiment4 ,the utmost we say of them1 even when they operate with greatest vigour1 is1 that they represent their object in so lively a manner1 that we could almost say we feel or see it3 ,but1 except the mind be disordered by disease or madness1 they never can arrive at such a pitch of vivacity1 as to render these perceptions altogether undistinguishable4 ,all the colours of poetry1 however splendid1 can never paint natural objects in such a manner as to make the description be taken for a real landskip4 ,the most lively thought is still inferior to the dullest sensation4 ,we may observe a like distinction to run through all the other perceptions of the mind4 ,a man in a fit of anger1 is actuated in a very different manner from one who only thinks of that emotion4 ,if you tell me1 that any person is in love1 ,i easily understand your meaning1 and form a just conception of his situation2 but never can mistake that conception for the real disorders and agitations of the passion4 ,when we reflect on our past sentiments and affections1 our thought is a faithful mirror1 and copies its objects truly2 but the colours which it employs are faint and dull1 in comparison of those in which our original perceptions were clothed4 ,it requires no nice discernment or metaphysical head to mark the distinction between them4 #ab4 ,here therefore we may divide all the perceptions of the mind into two classes or species1 which are distinguished by their different degrees of force and vivacity4 ,the less forcible and lively are commonly denominated ,thoughts or ,ideas4 ,the other species want a name in our language1 and in most others2 ,i suppose1 because it was not requisite for any1 but philosophical purposes1 to rank them under a general term or appellation4 ,let us1 therefore1 use a little freedom1 and call them ,impressions2 employing that word in a sense somewhat different from the usual4 ,by the term impression1 then1 ,i mean all our more lively perceptions1 when we hear1 or see1 or feel1 or love1 or hate1 or desire1 or will4 ,and impressions are distinguished from ideas1 which are the less lively perceptions1 of which we are conscious1 when we reflect on any of those sensations or movements above mentioned4 #ac4 ,nothing1 at first view1 may seem more unbounded than the thought of man1 which not only escapes all human power and authority1 but is not even restrained within the limits of nature and reality4 ,to form monsters1 and join incongruous shapes and appearances1 costs the imagination no more trouble than to conceive the most natural and familiar objects4 ,and while the body is confined to one planet1 along which it creeps with pain and difficulty2 the thought can in an instant transport us into the most distant regions of the universe2 or even beyond the universe1 into the unbounded chaos1 where nature is supposed to lie in total confusion4 ,what never was seen1 or heard of1 may yet be conceived2 nor is any thing beyond the power of thought1 except what implies an absolute contradiction4 ,but though our thought seems to possess this unbounded liberty1 we shall find1 upon a nearer examination1 that it is really confined within very narrow limits1 and that all this creative power of the mind amounts to no more than the faculty of compounding1 transposing1 augmenting1 or diminishing the materials afforded us by the senses and experience4 ,when we think of a golden mountain1 we only join two consistent ideas1 gold1 and mountain1 with which we were formerly acquainted4 ,a virtuous horse we can conceive2 because1 from our own feeling1 we can conceive virtue2 and this we may unite to the figure and shape of a horse1 which is an animal familiar to us4 ,in short1 all the materials of thinking are derived either from our outward or inward sentiment3 the mixture and composition of these belongs alone to the mind and will4 ,or1 to express myself in philosophical language1 all our ideas or more feeble perceptions are copies of our impressions or more lively ones4 #ad4 ,to prove this1 the two following arguments will1 ,i hope1 be sufficient4 ,first1 when we analyze our thoughts or ideas1 however compounded or sublime1 we always find that they resolve themselves into such simple ideas as were copied from a precedent feeling or sentiment4 ,even those ideas1 which1 at first view1 seem the most wide of this origin1 are found1 upon a nearer scrutiny1 to be derived from it4 ,the idea of ,god1 as meaning an infinitely intelligent1 wise1 and good ,being1 arises from reflecting on the operations of our own mind1 and augmenting1 without limit1 those qualities of goodness and wisdom4 ,we may prosecute this enquiry to what length we please2 where we shall always find1 that every idea which we examine is copied from a similar impression4 ,those who would assert that this position is not universally true nor without exception1 have only one1 and that an easy method of refuting it2 by producing that idea1 which1 in their opinion1 is not derived from this source4 ,it will then be incumbent on us1 if we would maintain our doctrine1 to produce the impression1 or lively perception1 which corresponds to it4 #ae4 ,secondly4 ,if it happen1 from a defect of the organ1 that a man is not susceptible of any species of sensation1 we always find that he is as little susceptible of the correspondent ideas4 ,a blind man can form no notion of colours2 a deaf man of sounds4 ,restore either of them that sense in which he is deficient2 by opening this new inlet for his sensations1 you also open an inlet for the ideas2 and he finds no difficulty in conceiving these objects4 ,the case is the same1 if the object1 proper for exciting any sensation1 has never been applied to the organ4 ,a ,laplander or ,negro has no notion of the relish of wine4 ,and though there are few or no instances of a like deficiency in the mind1 where a person has never felt or is wholly incapable of a sentiment or passion that belongs to his species2 yet we find the same observation to take place in a less degree4 ,a man of mild manners can form no idea of inveterate revenge or cruelty2 nor can a selfish heart easily conceive the heights of friendship and generosity4 ,it is readily allowed1 that other beings may possess many senses of which we can have no conception2 because the ideas of them have never been introduced to us in the only manner by which an idea can have access to the mind1 to wit1 by the actual feeling and sensation4 #af4 ,there is1 however1 one contradictory phenomenon1 which may prove that it is not absolutely impossible for ideas to arise1 independent of their correspondent impressions4 ,i believe it will readily be allowed1 that the several distinct ideas of colour1 which enter by the eye1 or those of sound1 which are conveyed by the ear1 are really different from each other2 though1 at the same time1 resembling4 ,now if this be true of different colours1 it must be no less so of the different shades of the same colour2 and each shade produces a distinct idea1 independent of the rest4 ,for if this should be denied1 it is possible1 by the continual gradation of shades1 to run a colour insensibly into what is most remote from it2 and if you will not allow any of the means to be different1 you cannot1 without absurdity1 deny the extremes to be the same4 ,suppose1 therefore1 a person to have enjoyed his sight for thirty years1 and to have become perfectly acquainted with colours of all kinds except one particular shade of blue1 for instance1 which it never has been his fortune to meet with4 ,let all the different shades of that colour1 except that single one1 be placed before him1 descending gradually from the deepest to the lightest2 it is plain that he will perceive a blank1 where that shade is wanting1 and will be sensible that there is a greater distance in that place between the contiguous colours than in any other4 ,now ,i ask1 whether it be possible for him1 from his own imagination1 to supply this deficiency1 and raise up to himself the idea of that particular shade1 though it had never been conveyed to him by his senses8 ,i believe there are few but will be of opinion that he can3 and this may serve as a proof that the simple ideas are not always1 in every instance1 derived from the correspondent impressions2 though this instance is so singular1 that it is scarcely worth our observing1 and does not merit that for it alone we should alter our general maxim4 #ag4 ,here1 therefore1 is a proposition1 which not only seems1 in itself1 simple and intelligible2 but1 if a proper use were made of it1 might render every dispute equally intelligible1 and banish all that jargon1 which has so long taken possession of metaphysical reasonings1 and drawn disgrace upon them4 ,all ideas1 especially abstract ones1 are naturally faint and obscure3 the mind has but a slender hold of them3 they are apt to be confounded with other resembling ideas2 and when we have often employed any term1 though without a distinct meaning1 we are apt to imagine it has a determinate idea annexed to it4 ,on the contrary1 all impressions1 that is1 all sensations1 either outward or inward1 are strong and vivid3 the limits between them are more exactly determined3 nor is it easy to fall into any error or mistake with regard to them4 ,when we entertain1 therefore1 any suspicion that a philosophical term is employed without any meaning or idea 7as is but too frequent71 we need but enquire1 from what impression is that supposed idea derived8 ,and if it be impossible to assign any1 this will serve to confirm our suspicion4 ,by bringing ideas into so clear a light we may reasonably hope to remove all dispute1 which may arise1 concerning their nature and reality4#a #a ,it is probable that no more was meant by those1 who denied innate ideas1 than that all ideas were copies of our impressions2 though it must be confessed1 that the terms1 which they employed1 were not chosen with such caution1 nor so exactly defined1 as to prevent all mistakes about their doctrine4 ,for what is meant by innate8 ,if innate be equivalent to natural1 then all the perceptions and ideas of the mind must be allowed to be innate or natural1 in whatever sense we take the latter word1 whether in opposition to what is uncommon1 artificial1 or miraculous4 ,if by innate be meant1 contemporary to our birth1 the dispute seems to be frivolous2 nor is it worth while to enquire at what time thinking begins1 whether before1 at1 or after our birth4 ,again1 the word idea1 seems to be commonly taken in a very loose sense1 by ,,locke and others2 as standing for any of our perceptions1 our sensations and passions1 as well as thoughts4 ,now in this sense1 ,i should desire to know1 what can be meant by asserting1 that self-love1 or resentment of injuries1 or the passion between the sexes is not innate8 ,but admitting these terms1 impressions and ideas1 in the sense above explained1 and understanding by innate1 what is original or copied from no precedent perception1 then may we assert that all our impressions are innate1 and our ideas not innate4 ,to be ingenuous1 ,i must own it to be my opinion1 that ,,locke was betrayed into this question by the schoolmen1 who1 making use of undefined terms1 draw out their disputes to a tedious length1 without ever touching the point in question4 ,a like ambiguity and circumlocution seem to run through that philosopher's reasonings on this as well as most other subjects4 ,,section ,,iii4 ,,of ,,the ,,association ,,of ,,ideas4 #ah4 ,it is evident that there is a principle of connexion between the different thoughts or ideas of the mind1 and that1 in their appearance to the memory or imagination1 they introduce each other with a certain degree of method and regularity4 ,in our more serious thinking or discourse this is so observable that any particular thought1 which breaks in upon the regular tract or chain of ideas1 is immediately remarked and rejected4 ,and even in our wildest and most wandering reveries1 nay in our very dreams1 we shall find1 if we reflect1 that the imagination ran not altogether at adventures1 but that there was still a connexion upheld among the different ideas1 which succeeded each other4 ,were the loosest and freest conversation to be transcribed1 there would immediately be observed something which connected it in all its transitions4 ,or where this is wanting1 the person who broke the thread of discourse might still inform you1 that there had secretly revolved in his mind a succession of thought1 which had gradually led him from the subject of conversation4 ,among different languages1 even where we cannot suspect the least connexion or communication1 it is found1 that the words1 expressive of ideas1 the most compounded1 do yet nearly correspond to each other3 a certain proof that the simple ideas1 comprehended in the compound ones1 were bound together by some universal principle1 which had an equal influence on all mankind4 #ai4 ,though it be too obvious to escape observation1 that different ideas are connected together2 ,i do not find that any philosopher has attempted to enumerate or class all the principles of association2 a subject1 however1 that seems worthy of curiosity4 ,to me1 there appear to be only three principles of connexion among ideas1 namely1 ,resemblance1 ,contiguity in time or place1 and ,cause or ,effect4 ,that these principles serve to connect ideas will not1 ,i believe1 be much doubted4 ,a picture naturally leads our thoughts to the original#b3 the mention of one apartment in a building naturally introduces an enquiry or discourse concerning the others#c3 and if we think of a wound1 we can scarcely forbear reflecting on the pain which follows it#d4 ,but that this enumeration is complete1 and that there are no other principles of association except these1 may be difficult to prove to the satisfaction of the reader1 or even to a man's own satisfaction4 ,all we can do1 in such cases1 is to run over several instances1 and examine carefully the principle which binds the different thoughts to each other1 never stopping till we render the principle as general as possible#e4 ,the more instances we examine1 and the more care we employ1 the more assurance shall we acquire1 that the enumeration1 which we form from the whole1 is complete and entire4 #b ,resemblance4 #c ,contiguity4 #d ,cause and effect4 #e ,for instance1 ,contrast or ,contrariety is also a connexion among ,ideas3 but it may1 perhaps1 be considered as a mixture of ,causation and ,resemblance4 ,where two objects are contrary1 the one destroys the other2 that is1 the cause of its annihilation1 and the idea of the annihilation of an object1 implies the idea of its former existence4 ,,section ,,iv4 ,,sceptical ,,doubts ,,concerning ,,the ,,operations ,,of ,,the ,,understanding4 ,,part ,i4 #bj4 ,all the objects of human reason or enquiry may naturally be divided into two kinds1 to wit1 ,relations of ,ideas1 and ,matters of ,fact4 ,of the first kind are the sciences of ,geometry1 ,algebra1 and ,arithmetic2 and in short1 every affirmation which is either intuitively or demonstratively certain4 ,that the square of the hypothenuse is equal to the square of the two sides1 is a proposition which expresses a relation between these figures4 ,that three times five is equal to the half of thirty1 expresses a relation between these numbers4 ,propositions of this kind are discoverable by the mere operation of thought1 without dependence on what is anywhere existent in the universe4 ,though there never were a circle or triangle in nature1 the truths demonstrated by ,euclid would for ever retain their certainty and evidence4 #ba4 ,matters of fact1 which are the second objects of human reason1 are not ascertained in the same manner2 nor is our evidence of their truth1 however great1 of a like nature with the foregoing4 ,the contrary of every matter of fact is still possible2 because it can never imply a contradiction1 and is conceived by the mind with the same facility and distinctness1 as if ever so conformable to reality4 ,that the sun will not rise to-morrow is no less intelligible a proposition1 and implies no more contradiction than the affirmation1 that it will rise4 ,we should in vain1 therefore1 attempt to demonstrate its falsehood4 ,were it demonstratively false1 it would imply a contradiction1 and could never be distinctly conceived by the mind4 ,it may1 therefore1 be a subject worthy of curiosity1 to enquire what is the nature of that evidence which assures us of any real existence and matter of fact1 beyond the present testimony of our senses1 or the records of our memory4 ,this part of philosophy1 it is observable1 has been little cultivated1 either by the ancients or moderns2 and therefore our doubts and errors1 in the prosecution of so important an enquiry1 may be the more excusable2 while we march through such difficult paths without any guide or direction4 ,they may even prove useful1 by exciting curiosity1 and destroying that implicit faith and security1 which is the bane of all reasoning and free enquiry4 ,the discovery of defects in the common philosophy1 if any such there be1 will not1 ,i presume1 be a discouragement1 but rather an incitement1 as is usual1 to attempt something more full and satisfactory than has yet been proposed to the public4 #bb4 ,all reasonings concerning matter of fact seem to be founded on the relation of ,cause and ,effect4 ,by means of that relation alone we can go beyond the evidence of our memory and senses4 ,if you were to ask a man1 why he believes any matter of fact1 which is absent2 for instance1 that his friend is in the country1 or in ,france2 he would give you a reason2 and this reason would be some other fact2 as a letter received from him1 or the knowledge of his former resolutions and promises4 ,a man finding a watch or any other machine in a desert island1 would conclude that there had once been men in that island4 ,all our reasonings concerning fact are of the same nature4 ,and here it is constantly supposed that there is a connexion between the present fact and that which is inferred from it4 ,were there nothing to bind them together1 the inference would be entirely precarious4 ,the hearing of an articulate voice and rational discourse in the dark assures us of the presence of some person3 ,why8 because these are the effects of the human make and fabric1 and closely connected with it4 ,if we anatomize all the other reasonings of this nature1 we shall find that they are founded on the relation of cause and effect1 and that this relation is either near or remote1 direct or collateral4 ,heat and light are collateral effects of fire1 and the one effect may justly be inferred from the other4 #bc4 ,if we would satisfy ourselves1 therefore1 concerning the nature of that evidence1 which assures us of matters of fact1 we must enquire how we arrive at the knowledge of cause and effect4 ,i shall venture to affirm1 as a general proposition1 which admits of no exception1 that the knowledge of this relation is not1 in any instance1 attained by reasonings a priori2 but arises entirely from experience1 when we find that any particular objects are constantly conjoined with each other4 ,let an object be presented to a man of ever so strong natural reason and abilities2 if that object be entirely new to him1 he will not be able1 by the most accurate examination of its sensible qualities1 to discover any of its causes or effects4 ,adam1 though his rational faculties be supposed1 at the very first1 entirely perfect1 could not have inferred from the fluidity and transparency of water that it would suffocate him1 or from the light and warmth of fire that it would consume him4 ,no object ever discovers1 by the qualities which appear to the senses1 either the causes which produced it1 or the effects which will arise from it2 nor can our reason1 unassisted by experience1 ever draw any inference concerning real existence and matter of fact4 #bd4 ,this proposition1 that causes and effects are discoverable1 not by reason but by experience1 will readily be admitted with regard to such objects1 as we remember to have once been altogether unknown to us2 since we must be conscious of the utter inability1 which we then lay under1 of foretelling what would arise from them4 ,present two smooth pieces of marble to a man who has no tincture of natural philosophy2 he will never discover that they will adhere together in such a manner as to require great force to separate them in a direct line1 while they make so small a resistance to a lateral pressure4 ,such events1 as bear little analogy to the common course of nature1 are also readily confessed to be known only by experience2 nor does any man imagine that the explosion of gunpowder1 or the attraction of a loadstone1 could ever be discovered by arguments a priori4 ,in like manner1 when an effect is supposed to depend upon an intricate machinery or secret structure of parts1 we make no difficulty in attributing all our knowledge of it to experience4 ,who will assert that he can give the ultimate reason1 why milk or bread is proper nourishment for a man1 not for a lion or a tiger8 ,but the same truth may not appear1 at first sight1 to have the same evidence with regard to events1 which have become familiar to us from our first appearance in the world1 which bear a close analogy to the whole course of nature1 and which are supposed to depend on the simple qualities of objects1 without any secret structure of parts4 ,we are apt to imagine that we could discover these effects by the mere operation of our reason1 without experience4 ,we fancy1 that were we brought on a sudden into this world1 we could at first have inferred that one ,billiard-ball would communicate motion to another upon impulse2 and that we needed not to have waited for the event1 in order to pronounce with certainty concerning it4 ,such is the influence of custom1 that1 where it is strongest1 it not only covers our natural ignorance1 but even conceals itself1 and seems not to take place1 merely because it is found in the highest degree4 #be4 ,but to convince us that all the laws of nature1 and all the operations of bodies without exception1 are known only by experience1 the following reflections may1 perhaps1 suffice4 ,were any object presented to us1 and were we required to pronounce concerning the effect1 which will result from it1 without consulting past observation2 after what manner1 ,i beseech you1 must the mind proceed in this operation8 ,it must invent or imagine some event1 which it ascribes to the object as its effect2 and it is plain that this invention must be entirely arbitrary4 ,the mind can never possibly find the effect in the supposed cause1 by the most accurate scrutiny and examination4 ,for the effect is totally different from the cause1 and consequently can never be discovered in it4 ,motion in the second ,billiard-ball is a quite distinct event from motion in the first2 nor is there anything in the one to suggest the smallest hint of the other4 ,a stone or piece of metal raised into the air1 and left without any support1 immediately falls3 but to consider the matter a priori1 is there anything we discover in this situation which can beget the idea of a downward1 rather than an upward1 or any other motion1 in the stone or metal8 ,and as the first imagination or invention of a particular effect1 in all natural operations1 is arbitrary1 where we consult not experience2 so must we also esteem the supposed tie or connexion between the cause and effect1 which binds them together1 and renders it impossible that any other effect could result from the operation of that cause4 ,when ,i see1 for instance1 a ,billiard-ball moving in a straight line towards another2 even suppose motion in the second ball should by accident be suggested to me1 as the result of their contact or impulse2 may ,i not conceive1 that a hundred different events might as well follow from that cause8 ,may not both these balls remain at absolute rest8 ,may not the first ball return in a straight line1 or leap off from the second in any line or direction8 ,all these suppositions are consistent and conceivable4 ,why then should we give the preference to one1 which is no more consistent or conceivable than the rest8 ,all our reasonings a priori will never be able to show us any foundation for this preference4 ,in a word1 then1 every effect is a distinct event from its cause4 ,it could not1 therefore1 be discovered in the cause1 and the first invention or conception of it1 a priori1 must be entirely arbitrary4 ,and even after it is suggested1 the conjunction of it with the cause must appear equally arbitrary2 since there are always many other effects1 which1 to reason1 must seem fully as consistent and natural4 ,in vain1 therefore1 should we pretend to determine any single event1 or infer any cause or effect1 without the assistance of observation and experience4 #bf4 ,hence we may discover the reason why no philosopher1 who is rational and modest1 has ever pretended to assign the ultimate cause of any natural operation1 or to show distinctly the action of that power1 which produces any single effect in the universe4 ,it is confessed1 that the utmost effort of human reason is to reduce the principles1 productive of natural phenomena1 to a greater simplicity1 and to resolve the many particular effects into a few general causes1 by means of reasonings from analogy1 experience1 and observation4 ,but as to the causes of these general causes1 we should in vain attempt their discovery2 nor shall we ever be able to satisfy ourselves1 by any particular explication of them4 ,these ultimate springs and principles are totally shut up from human curiosity and enquiry4 ,elasticity1 gravity1 cohesion of parts1 communication of motion by impulse2 these are probably the ultimate causes and principles which we shall ever discover in nature2 and we may esteem ourselves sufficiently happy1 if1 by accurate enquiry and reasoning1 we can trace up the particular phenomena to1 or near to1 these general principles4 ,the most perfect philosophy of the natural kind only staves off our ignorance a little longer3 as perhaps the most perfect philosophy of the moral or metaphysical kind serves only to discover larger portions of it4 ,thus the observation of human blindness and weakness is the result of all philosophy1 and meets us at every turn1 in spite of our endeavours to elude or avoid it4 #bg4 ,nor is geometry1 when taken into the assistance of natural philosophy1 ever able to remedy this defect1 or lead us into the knowledge of ultimate causes1 by all that accuracy of reasoning for which it is so justly celebrated4 ,every part of mixed mathematics proceeds upon the supposition that certain laws are established by nature in her operations2 and abstract reasonings are employed1 either to assist experience in the discovery of these laws1 or to determine their influence in particular instances1 where it depends upon any precise degree of distance and quantity4 ,thus1 it is a law of motion1 discovered by experience1 that the moment or force of any body in motion is in the compound ratio or proportion of its solid contents and its velocity2 and consequently1 that a small force may remove the greatest obstacle or raise the greatest weight1 if1 by any contrivance or machinery1 we can increase the velocity of that force1 so as to make it an overmatch for its antagonist4 ,geometry assists us in the application of this law1 by giving us the just dimensions of all the parts and figures which can enter into any species of machine2 but still the discovery of the law itself is owing merely to experience1 and all the abstract reasonings in the world could never lead us one step towards the knowledge of it4 ,when we reason a priori1 and consider merely any object or cause1 as it appears to the mind1 independent of all observation1 it never could suggest to us the notion of any distinct object1 such as its effect2 much less1 show us the inseparable and inviolable connexion between them4 ,a man must be very sagacious who could discover by reasoning that crystal is the effect of heat1 and ice of cold1 without being previously acquainted with the operation of these qualities4 ,,part ,,ii4 #bh4 ,but we have not yet attained any tolerable satisfaction with regard to the question first proposed4 ,each solution still gives rise to a new question as difficult as the foregoing1 and leads us on to farther enquiries4 ,when it is asked1 ,what is the nature of all our reasonings concerning matter of fact8 the proper answer seems to be1 that they are founded on the relation of cause and effect4 ,when again it is asked1 ,what is the foundation of all our reasonings and conclusions concerning that relation8 it may be replied in one word1 ,experience4 ,but if we still carry on our sifting humour1 and ask1 ,what is the foundation of all conclusions from experience8 this implies a new question1 which may be of more difficult solution and explication4 ,philosophers1 that give themselves airs of superior wisdom and sufficiency1 have a hard task when they encounter persons of inquisitive dispositions1 who push them from every corner to which they retreat1 and who are sure at last to bring them to some dangerous dilemma4 ,the best expedient to prevent this confusion1 is to be modest in our pretensions2 and even to discover the difficulty ourselves before it is objected to us4 ,by this means1 we may make a kind of merit of our very ignorance4 ,i shall content myself1 in this section1 with an easy task1 and shall pretend only to give a negative answer to the question here proposed4 ,i say then1 that1 even after we have experience of the operations of cause and effect1 our conclusions from that experience are not founded on reasoning1 or any process of the understanding4 ,this answer we must endeavour both to explain and to defend4 #bi4 ,it must certainly be allowed1 that nature has kept us at a great distance from all her secrets1 and has afforded us only the knowledge of a few superficial qualities of objects2 while she conceals from us those powers and principles on which the influence of those objects entirely depends4 ,our senses inform us of the colour1 weight1 and consistence of bread2 but neither sense nor reason can ever inform us of those qualities which fit it for the nourishment and support of a human body4 ,sight or feeling conveys an idea of the actual motion of bodies2 but as to that wonderful force or power1 which would carry on a moving body for ever in a continued change of place1 and which bodies never lose but by communicating it to others2 of this we cannot form the most distant conception4 ,but notwithstanding this ignorance of natural powers#f and principles1 we always presume1 when we see like sensible qualities1 that they have like secret powers1 and expect that effects1 similar to those which we have experienced1 will follow from them4 ,if a body of like colour and consistence with that bread1 which we have formerly eat1 be presented to us1 we make no scruple of repeating the experiment1 and foresee1 with certainty1 like nourishment and support4 ,now this is a process of the mind or thought1 of which ,i would willingly know the foundation4 ,it is allowed on all hands that there is no known connexion between the sensible qualities and the secret powers2 and consequently1 that the mind is not led to form such a conclusion concerning their constant and regular conjunction1 by anything which it knows of their nature4 ,as to past ,experience1 it can be allowed to give direct and certain information of those precise objects only1 and that precise period of time1 which fell under its cognizance3 but why this experience should be extended to future times1 and to other objects1 which for aught we know1 may be only in appearance similar2 this is the main question on which ,i would insist4 ,the bread1 which ,i formerly eat1 nourished me2 that is1 a body of such sensible qualities was1 at that time1 endued with such secret powers3 but does it follow1 that other bread must also nourish me at another time1 and that like sensible qualities must always be attended with like secret powers8 ,the consequence seems nowise necessary4 ,at least1 it must be acknowledged that there is here a consequence drawn by the mind2 that there is a certain step taken2 a process of thought1 and an inference1 which wants to be explained4 ,these two propositions are far from being the same1 ,i have found that such an object has always been attended with such an effect1 and ,i foresee1 that other objects1 which are1 in appearance1 similar1 will be attended with similar effects4 ,i shall allow1 if you please1 that the one proposition may justly be inferred from the other3 ,i know1 in fact1 that it always is inferred4 ,but if you insist that the inference is made by a chain of reasoning1 ,i desire you to produce that reasoning4 ,the connexion between these propositions is not intuitive4 ,there is required a medium1 which may enable the mind to draw such an inference1 if indeed it be drawn by reasoning and argument4 ,what that medium is1 ,i must confess1 passes my comprehension2 and it is incumbent on those to produce it1 who assert that it really exists1 and is the origin of all our conclusions concerning matter of fact4 #f ,the word1 ,power1 is here used in a loose and popular sense4 ,the more accurate explication of it would give additional evidence to this argument4 ,see ,sect4 #g4 #cj4 ,this negative argument must certainly1 in process of time1 become altogether convincing1 if many penetrating and able philosophers shall turn their enquiries this way and no one be ever able to discover any connecting proposition or intermediate step1 which supports the understanding in this conclusion4 ,but as the question is yet new1 every reader may not trust so far to his own penetration1 as to conclude1 because an argument escapes his enquiry1 that therefore it does not really exist4 ,for this reason it may be requisite to venture upon a more difficult task2 and enumerating all the branches of human knowledge1 endeavour to show that none of them can afford such an argument4 ,all reasonings may be divided into two kinds1 namely1 demonstrative reasoning1 or that concerning relations of ideas1 and moral reasoning1 or that concerning matter of fact and existence4 ,that there are no demonstrative arguments in the case seems evident2 since it implies no contradiction that the course of nature may change1 and that an object1 seemingly like those which we have experienced1 may be attended with different or contrary effects4 ,may ,i not clearly and distinctly conceive that a body1 falling from the clouds1 and which1 in all other respects1 resembles snow1 has yet the taste of salt or feeling of fire8 ,is there any more intelligible proposition than to affirm1 that all the trees will flourish in ,december and ,january1 and decay in ,may and ,june8 ,now whatever is intelligible1 and can be distinctly conceived1 implies no contradiction1 and can never be proved false by any demonstrative argument or abstract reasoning priori4 ,if we be1 therefore1 engaged by arguments to put trust in past experience1 and make it the standard of our future judgement1 these arguments must be probable only1 or such as regard matter of fact and real existence1 according to the division above mentioned4 ,but that there is no argument of this kind1 must appear1 if our explication of that species of reasoning be admitted as solid and satisfactory4 ,we have said that all arguments concerning existence are founded on the relation of cause and effect2 that our knowledge of that relation is derived entirely from experience2 and that all our experimental conclusions proceed upon the supposition that the future will be conformable to the past4 ,to endeavour1 therefore1 the proof of this last supposition by probable arguments1 or arguments regarding existence1 must be evidently going in a circle1 and taking that for granted1 which is the very point in question4 #ca4 ,in reality1 all arguments from experience are founded on the similarity which we discover among natural objects1 and by which we are induced to expect effects similar to those which we have found to follow from such objects4 ,and though none but a fool or madman will ever pretend to dispute the authority of experience1 or to reject that great guide of human life1 it may surely be allowed a philosopher to have so much curiosity at least as to examine the principle of human nature1 which gives this mighty authority to experience1 and makes us draw advantage from that similarity which nature has placed among different objects4 ,from causes which appear similar we expect similar effects4 ,this is the sum of all our experimental conclusions4 ,now it seems evident that1 if this conclusion were formed by reason1 it would be as perfect at first1 and upon one instance1 as after ever so long a course of experience4 ,but the case is far otherwise4 ,nothing so like as eggs2 yet no one1 on account of this appearing similarity1 expects the same taste and relish in all of them4 ,it is only after a long course of uniform experiments in any kind1 that we attain a firm reliance and security with regard to a particular event4 ,now where is that process of reasoning which1 from one instance1 draws a conclusion1 so different from that which it infers from a hundred instances that are nowise different from that single one8 ,this question ,i propose as much for the sake of information1 as with an intention of raising difficulties4 ,i cannot find1 ,i cannot imagine any such reasoning4 ,but ,i keep my mind still open to instruction1 if any one will vouchsafe to bestow it on me4 #cb4 ,should it be said that1 from a number of uniform experiments1 we infer a connexion between the sensible qualities and the secret powers2 this1 ,i must confess1 seems the same difficulty1 couched in different terms4 ,the question still recurs1 on what process of argument this inference is founded8 ,where is the medium1 the interposing ideas1 which join propositions so very wide of each other8 ,it is confessed that the colour1 consistence1 and other sensible qualities of bread appear not1 of themselves1 to have any connexion with the secret powers of nourishment and support4 ,for otherwise we could infer these secret powers from the first appearance of these sensible qualities1 without the aid of experience2 contrary to the sentiment of all philosophers1 and contrary to plain matter of fact4 ,here1 then1 is our natural state of ignorance with regard to the powers and influence of all objects4 ,how is this remedied by experience8 ,it only shows us a number of uniform effects1 resulting from certain objects1 and teaches us that those particular objects1 at that particular time1 were endowed with such powers and forces4 ,when a new object1 endowed with similar sensible qualities1 is produced1 we expect similar powers and forces1 and look for a like effect4 ,from a body of like colour and consistence with bread we expect like nourishment and support4 ,but this surely is a step or progress of the mind1 which wants to be explained4 ,when a man says1 ,i have found1 in all past instances1 such sensible qualities conjoined with such secret powers3 ,and when he says1 ,similar sensible qualities will always be conjoined with similar secret powers1 he is not guilty of a tautology1 nor are these propositions in any respect the same4 ,you say that the one proposition is an inference from the other4 ,but you must confess that the inference is not intuitive2 neither is it demonstrative3 ,of what nature is it1 then8 ,to say it is experimental1 is begging the question4 ,for all inferences from experience suppose1 as their foundation1 that the future will resemble the past1 and that similar powers will be conjoined with similar sensible qualities4 ,if there be any suspicion that the course of nature may change1 and that the past may be no rule for the future1 all experience becomes useless1 and can give rise to no inference or conclusion4 ,it is impossible1 therefore1 that any arguments from experience can prove this resemblance of the past to the future2 since all these arguments are founded on the supposition of that resemblance4 ,let the course of things be allowed hitherto ever so regular2 that alone1 without some new argument or inference1 proves not that1 for the future1 it will continue so4 ,in vain do you pretend to have learned the nature of bodies from your past experience4 ,their secret nature1 and consequently all their effects and influence1 may change1 without any change in their sensible qualities4 ,this happens sometimes1 and with regard to some objects3 ,why may it not happen always1 and with regard to all objects8 ,what logic1 what process of argument secures you against this supposition8 ,my practice1 you say1 refutes my doubts4 ,but you mistake the purport of my question4 ,as an agent1 ,i am quite satisfied in the point2 but as a philosopher1 who has some share of curiosity1 ,i will not say scepticism1 ,i want to learn the foundation of this inference4 ,no reading1 no enquiry has yet been able to remove my difficulty1 or give me satisfaction in a matter of such importance4 ,can ,i do better than propose the difficulty to the public1 even though1 perhaps1 ,i have small hopes of obtaining a solution8 ,we shall at least1 by this means1 be sensible of our ignorance1 if we do not augment our knowledge4 #cc4 ,i must confess that a man is guilty of unpardonable arrogance who concludes1 because an argument has escaped his own investigation1 that therefore it does not really exist4 ,i must also confess that1 though all the learned1 for several ages1 should have employed themselves in fruitless search upon any subject1 it may still1 perhaps1 be rash to conclude positively that the subject must1 therefore1 pass all human comprehension4 ,even though we examine all the sources of our knowledge1 and conclude them unfit for such a subject1 there may still remain a suspicion1 that the enumeration is not complete1 or the examination not accurate4 ,but with regard to the present subject1 there are some considerations which seem to remove all this accusation of arrogance or suspicion of mistake4 ,it is certain that the most ignorant and stupid peasants--nay infants1 nay even brute beasts--improve by experience1 and learn the qualities of natural objects1 by observing the effects which result from them4 ,when a child has felt the sensation of pain from touching the flame of a candle1 he will be careful not to put his hand near any candle2 but will expect a similar effect from a cause which is similar in its sensible qualities and appearance4 ,if you assert1 therefore1 that the understanding of the child is led into this conclusion by any process of argument or ratiocination1 ,i may justly require you to produce that argument2 nor have you any pretence to refuse so equitable a demand4 ,you cannot say that the argument is abstruse1 and may possibly escape your enquiry2 since you confess that it is obvious to the capacity of a mere infant4 ,if you hesitate1 therefore1 a moment1 or if1 after reflection1 you produce any intricate or profound argument1 you1 in a manner1 give up the question1 and confess that it is not reasoning which engages us to suppose the past resembling the future1 and to expect similar effects from causes which are1 to appearance1 similar4 ,this is the proposition which ,i intended to enforce in the present section4 ,if ,i be right1 ,i pretend not to have made any mighty discovery4 ,and if ,i be wrong1 ,i must acknowledge myself to be indeed a very backward scholar2 since ,i cannot now discover an argument which1 it seems1 was perfectly familiar to me long before ,i was out of my cradle4 ,,section ,v4 ,,sceptical ,,solution ,,of ,,these ,,doubts4 ,,part ,i4 #cd4 ,the passion for philosophy1 like that for religion1 seems liable to this inconvenience1 that1 though it aims at the correction of our manners1 and extirpation of our vices1 it may only serve1 by imprudent management1 to foster a predominant inclination1 and push the mind1 with more determined resolution1 towards that side which already draws too much1 by the bias and propensity of the natural temper4 ,it is certain that1 while we aspire to the magnanimous firmness of the philosophic sage1 and endeavour to confine our pleasures altogether within our own minds1 we may1 at last1 render our philosophy like that of ,epictetus1 and other ,stoics1 only a more refined system of selfishness1 and reason ourselves out of all virtue as well as social enjoyment4 ,while we study with attention the vanity of human life1 and turn all our thoughts towards the empty and transitory nature of riches and honours1 we are1 perhaps1 all the while flattering our natural indolence1 which1 hating the bustle of the world1 and drudgery of business1 seeks a pretence of reason to give itself a full and uncontrolled indulgence4 ,there is1 however1 one species of philosophy which seems little liable to this inconvenience1 and that because it strikes in with no disorderly passion of the human mind1 nor can mingle itself with any natural affection or propensity2 and that is the ,academic or ,sceptical philosophy4 ,the academics always talk of doubt and suspense of judgement1 of danger in hasty determinations1 of confining to very narrow bounds the enquiries of the understanding1 and of renouncing all speculations which lie not within the limits of common life and practice4 ,nothing1 therefore1 can be more contrary than such a philosophy to the supine indolence of the mind1 its rash arrogance1 its lofty pretensions1 and its superstitious credulity4 ,every passion is mortified by it1 except the love of truth2 and that passion never is1 nor can be1 carried to too high a degree4 ,it is surprising1 therefore1 that this philosophy1 which1 in almost every instance1 must be harmless and innocent1 should be the subject of so much groundless reproach and obloquy4 ,but1 perhaps1 the very circumstance which renders it so innocent is what chiefly exposes it to the public hatred and resentment4 ,by flattering no irregular passion1 it gains few partizans3 ,by opposing so many vices and follies1 it raises to itself abundance of enemies1 who stigmatize it as libertine profane1 and irreligious4 ,nor need we fear that this philosophy1 while it endeavours to limit our enquiries to common life1 should ever undermine the reasonings of common life1 and carry its doubts so far as to destroy all action1 as well as speculation4 ,nature will always maintain her rights1 and prevail in the end over any abstract reasoning whatsoever4 ,though we should conclude1 for instance1 as in the foregoing section1 that1 in all reasonings from experience1 there is a step taken by the mind which is not supported by any argument or process of the understanding2 there is no danger that these reasonings1 on which almost all knowledge depends1 will ever be affected by such a discovery4 ,if the mind be not engaged by argument to make this step1 it must be induced by some other principle of equal weight and authority2 and that principle will preserve its influence as long as human nature remains the same4 ,what that principle is may well be worth the pains of enquiry4 #ce4 ,suppose a person1 though endowed with the strongest faculties of reason and reflection1 to be brought on a sudden into this world2 he would1 indeed1 immediately observe a continual succession of objects1 and one event following another2 but he would not be able to discover anything farther4 ,he would not1 at first1 by any reasoning1 be able to reach the idea of cause and effect2 since the particular powers1 by which all natural operations are performed1 never appear to the senses2 nor is it reasonable to conclude1 merely because one event1 in one instance1 precedes another1 that therefore the one is the cause1 the other the effect4 ,their conjunction may be arbitrary and casual4 ,there may be no reason to infer the existence of one from the appearance of the other4 ,and in a word1 such a person1 without more experience1 could never employ his conjecture or reasoning concerning any matter of fact1 or be assured of anything beyond what was immediately present to his memory and senses4 ,suppose1 again1 that he has acquired more experience1 and has lived so long in the world as to have observed familiar objects or events to be constantly conjoined together2 what is the consequence of this experience8 ,he immediately infers the existence of one object from the appearance of the other4 ,yet he has not1 by all his experience1 acquired any idea or knowledge of the secret power by which the one object produces the other2 nor is it1 by any process of reasoning1 he is engaged to draw this inference4 ,but still he finds himself determined to draw it3 ,and though he should be convinced that his understanding has no part in the operation1 he would nevertheless continue in the same course of thinking4 ,there is some other principle which determines him to form such a conclusion4 #cf4 ,this principle is ,custom or ,habit4 ,for wherever the repetition of any particular act or operation produces a propensity to renew the same act or operation1 without being impelled by any reasoning or process of the understanding1 we always say1 that this propensity is the effect of ,custom4 ,by employing that word1 we pretend not to have given the ultimate reason of such a propensity4 ,we only point out a principle of human nature1 which is universally acknowledged1 and which is well known by its effects4 ,perhaps we can push our enquiries no farther1 or pretend to give the cause of this cause2 but must rest contented with it as the ultimate principle1 which we can assign1 of all our conclusions from experience4 ,it is sufficient satisfaction1 that we can go so far1 without repining at the narrowness of our faculties because they will carry us no farther4 ,and it is certain we here advance a very intelligible proposition at least1 if not a true one1 when we assert that1 after the constant conjunction of two objects--heat and flame1 for instance1 weight and solidity--we are determined by custom alone to expect the one from the appearance of the other4 ,this hypothesis seems even the only one which explains the difficulty1 why we draw1 from a thousand instances1 an inference which we are not able to draw from one instance1 that is1 in no respect1 different from them4 ,reason is incapable of any such variation4 ,the conclusions which it draws from considering one circle are the same which it would form upon surveying all the circles in the universe4 ,but no man1 having seen only one body move after being impelled by another1 could infer that every other body will move after a like impulse4 ,all inferences from experience1 therefore1 are effects of custom1 not of reasoning#g4 #g ,nothing is more useful than for writers1 even1 on moral1 political1 or physical subjects1 to distinguish between reason and experience1 and to suppose1 that these species of argumentation are entirely different from each other4 ,the former are taken for the mere result of our intellectual faculties1 which1 by considering priori the nature of things1 and examining the effects1 that must follow from their operation1 establish particular principles of science and philosophy4 ,the latter are supposed to be derived entirely from sense and observation1 by which we learn what has actually resulted from the operation of particular objects1 and are thence able to infer1 what will1 for the future1 result from them4 ,thus1 for instance1 the limitations and restraints of civil government1 and a legal constitution1 may be defended1 either from reason1 which reflecting on the great frailty and corruption of human nature1 teaches1 that no man can safely be trusted with unlimited authority2 or from experience and history1 which inform us of the enormous abuses1 that ambition1 in every age and country1 has been found to make of so imprudent a confidence4 ,the same distinction between reason and experience is maintained in all our deliberations concerning the conduct of life2 while the experienced statesman1 general1 physician1 or merchant is trusted and followed2 and the unpractised novice1 with whatever natural talents endowed1 neglected and despised4 ,though it be allowed1 that reason may form very plausible conjectures with regard to the consequences of such a particular conduct in such particular circumstances2 it is still supposed imperfect1 without the assistance of experience1 which is alone able to give stability and certainty to the maxims1 derived from study and reflection4 ,but notwithstanding that this distinction be thus universally received1 both in the active speculative scenes of life1 ,i shall not scruple to pronounce1 that it is1 at bottom1 erroneous1 at least1 superficial4 ,if we examine those arguments1 which1 in any of the sciences above mentioned1 are supposed to be the mere effects of reasoning and reflection1 they will be found to terminate1 at last1 in some general principle or conclusion1 for which we can assign no reason but observation and experience4 ,the only difference between them and those maxims1 which are vulgarly esteemed the result of pure experience1 is1 that the former cannot be established without some process of thought1 and some reflection on what we have observed1 in order to distinguish its circumstances1 and trace its consequences3 ,whereas in the latter1 the experienced event is exactly and fully familiar to that which we infer as the result of any particular situation4 ,the history of a ,,tiberius or a ,,nero makes us dread a like tyranny1 were our monarchs freed from the restraints of laws and senates3 ,but the observation of any fraud or cruelty in private life is sufficient1 with the aid of a little thought1 to give us the same apprehension2 while it serves as an instance of the general corruption of human nature1 and shows us the danger which we must incur by reposing an entire confidence in mankind4 ,in both cases1 it is experience which is ultimately the foundation of our inference and conclusion4 ,there is no man so young and unexperienced1 as not to have formed1 from observation1 many general and just maxims concerning human affairs and the conduct of life2 but it must be confessed1 that1 when a man comes to put these in practice1 he will be extremely liable to error1 till time and farther experience both enlarge these maxims1 and teach him their proper use and application4 ,in every situation or incident1 there are many particular and seemingly minute circumstances1 which the man of greatest talent is1 at first1 apt to overlook1 though on them the justness of his conclusions1 and consequently the prudence of his conduct1 entirely depend4 ,not to mention1 that1 to a young beginner1 the general observations and maxims occur not always on the proper occasions1 nor can be immediately applied with due calmness and distinction4 ,the truth is1 an unexperienced reasoner could be no reasoner at all1 were he absolutely unexperienced2 and when we assign that character to any one1 we mean it only in a comparative sense1 and suppose him possessed of experience1 in a smaller and more imperfect degree4 ,custom1 then1 is the great guide of human life4 ,it is that principle alone which renders our experience useful to us1 and makes us expect1 for the future1 a similar train of events with those which have appeared in the past4 ,without the influence of custom1 we should be entirely ignorant of every matter of fact beyond what is immediately present to the memory and senses4 ,we should never know how to adjust means to ends1 or to employ our natural powers in the production of any effect4 ,there would be an end at once of all action1 as well as of the chief part of speculation4 #cg4 ,but here it may be proper to remark1 that though our conclusions from experience carry us beyond our memory and senses1 and assure us of matters of fact which happened in the most distant places and most remote ages1 yet some fact must always be present to the senses or memory1 from which we may first proceed in drawing these conclusions4 ,a man1 who should find in a desert country the remains of pompous buildings1 would conclude that the country had1 in ancient times1 been cultivated by civilized inhabitants2 but did nothing of this nature occur to him1 he could never form such an inference4 ,we learn the events of former ages from history2 but then we must peruse the volumes in which this instruction is contained1 and thence carry up our inferences from one testimony to another1 till we arrive at the eyewitnesses and spectators of these distant events4 ,in a word1 if we proceed not upon some fact1 present to the memory or senses1 our reasonings would be merely hypothetical2 and however the particular links might be connected with each other1 the whole chain of inferences would have nothing to support it1 nor could we ever1 by its means1 arrive at the knowledge of any real existence4 ,if ,i ask why you believe any particular matter of fact1 which you relate1 you must tell me some reason2 and this reason will be some other fact1 connected with it4 ,but as you cannot proceed after this manner1 in infinitum1 you must at last terminate in some fact1 which is present to your memory or senses2 or must allow that your belief is entirely without foundation4 #ch4 ,what1 then1 is the conclusion of the whole matter8 ,a simple one2 though1 it must be confessed1 pretty remote from the common theories of philosophy4 ,all belief of matter of fact or real existence is derived merely from some object1 present to the memory or senses1 and a customary conjunction between that and some other object4 ,or in other words2 having found1 in many instances1 that any two kinds of objects--flame and heat1 snow and cold--have always been conjoined together2 if flame or snow be presented anew to the senses1 the mind is carried by custom to expect heat or cold1 and to believe that such a quality does exist1 and will discover itself upon a nearer approach4 ,this belief is the necessary result of placing the mind in such circumstances4 ,it is an operation of the soul1 when we are so situated1 as unavoidable as to feel the passion of love1 when we receive benefits2 or hatred1 when we meet with injuries4 ,all these operations are a species of natural instincts1 which no reasoning or process of the thought and understanding is able either to produce or to prevent4 ,at this point1 it would be very allowable for us to stop our philosophical researches4 ,in most questions we can never make a single step farther2 and in all questions we must terminate here at last1 after our most restless and curious enquiries4 ,but still our curiosity will be pardonable1 perhaps commendable1 if it carry us on to still farther researches1 and make us examine more accurately the nature of this belief1 and of the customary conjunction1 whence it is derived4 ,by this means we may meet with some explications and analogies that will give satisfaction2 at least to such as love the abstract sciences1 and can be entertained with speculations1 which1 however accurate1 may still retain a degree of doubt and uncertainty4 ,as to readers of a different taste2 the remaining part of this section is not calculated for them1 and the following enquiries may well be understood1 though it be neglected4 ,,part ,,ii4 #ci4 ,nothing is more free than the imagination of man2 and though it cannot exceed that original stock of ideas furnished by the internal and external senses1 it has unlimited power of mixing1 compounding1 separating1 and dividing these ideas1 in all the varieties of fiction and vision4 ,it can feign a train of events1 with all the appearance of reality1 ascribe to them a particular time and place1 conceive them as existent1 and paint them out to itself with every circumstance1 that belongs to any historical fact1 which it believes with the greatest certainty4 ,wherein1 therefore1 consists the difference between such a fiction and belief8 ,it lies not merely in any peculiar idea1 which is annexed to such a conception as commands our assent1 and which is wanting to every known fiction4 ,for as the mind has authority over all its ideas1 it could voluntarily annex this particular idea to any fiction1 and consequently be able to believe whatever it pleases2 contrary to what we find by daily experience4 ,we can1 in our conception1 join the head of a man to the body of a horse2 but it is not in our power to believe that such an animal has ever really existed4 ,it follows1 therefore1 that the difference between fiction and belief lies in some sentiment or feeling1 which is annexed to the latter1 not to the former1 and which depends not on the will1 nor can be commanded at pleasure4 ,it must be excited by nature1 like all other sentiments2 and must arise from the particular situation1 in which the mind is placed at any particular juncture4 ,whenever any object is presented to the memory or senses1 it immediately1 by the force of custom1 carries the imagination to conceive that object1 which is usually conjoined to it2 and this conception is attended with a feeling or sentiment1 different from the loose reveries of the fancy4 ,in this consists the whole nature of belief4 ,for as there is no matter of fact which we believe so firmly that we cannot conceive the contrary1 there would be no difference between the conception assented to and that which is rejected1 were it not for some sentiment which distinguishes the one from the other4 ,if ,i see a billiard-ball moving towards another1 on a smooth table1 ,i can easily conceive it to stop upon contact4 ,this conception implies no contradiction2 but still it feels very differently from that conception by which ,i represent to myself the impulse and the communication of motion from one ball to another4 #dj4 ,were we to attempt a definition of this sentiment1 we should1 perhaps1 find it a very difficult1 if not an impossible task2 in the same manner as if we should endeavour to define the feeling of cold or passion of anger1 to a creature who never had any experience of these sentiments4 ,belief is the true and proper name of this feeling2 and no one is ever at a loss to know the meaning of that term2 because every man is every moment conscious of the sentiment represented by it4 ,it may not1 however1 be improper to attempt a description of this sentiment2 in hopes we may1 by that means1 arrive at some analogies1 which may afford a more perfect explication of it4 ,i say1 then1 that belief is nothing but a more vivid1 lively1 forcible1 firm1 steady conception of an object1 than what the imagination alone is ever able to attain4 ,this variety of terms1 which may seem so unphilosophical1 is intended only to express that act of the mind1 which renders realities1 or what is taken for such1 more present to us than fictions1 causes them to weigh more in the thought1 and gives them a superior influence on the passions and imagination4 ,provided we agree about the thing1 it is needless to dispute about the terms4 ,the imagination has the command over all its ideas1 and can join and mix and vary them1 in all the ways possible4 ,it may conceive fictitious objects with all the circumstances of place and time4 ,it may set them1 in a manner1 before our eyes1 in their true colours1 just as they might have existed4 ,but as it is impossible that this faculty of imagination can ever1 of itself1 reach belief1 it is evident that belief consists not in the peculiar nature or order of ideas1 but in the manner of their conception1 and in their feeling to the mind4 ,i confess1 that it is impossible perfectly to explain this feeling or manner of conception4 ,we may make use of words which express something near it4 ,but its true and proper name1 as we observed before1 is belief2 which is a term that every one sufficiently understands in common life4 ,and in philosophy1 we can go no farther than assert1 that belief is something felt by the mind1 which distinguishes the ideas of the judgement from the fictions of the imagination4 ,it gives them more weight and influence2 makes them appear of greater importance2 enforces them in the mind2 and renders them the governing principle of our actions4 ,i hear at present1 for instance1 a person's voice1 with whom ,i am acquainted2 and the sound comes as from the next room4 ,this impression of my senses immediately conveys my thought to the person1 together with all the surrounding objects4 ,i paint them out to myself as existing at present1 with the same qualities and relations1 of which ,i formerly knew them possessed4 ,these ideas take faster hold of my mind than ideas of an enchanted castle4 ,they are very different to the feeling1 and have a much greater influence of every kind1 either to give pleasure or pain1 joy or sorrow4 ,let us1 then1 take in the whole compass of this doctrine1 and allow1 that the sentiment of belief is nothing but a conception more intense and steady than what attends the mere fictions of the imagination1 and that this manner of conception arises from a customary conjunction of the object with something present to the memory or senses3 ,i believe that it will not be difficult1 upon these suppositions1 to find other operations of the mind analogous to it1 and to trace up these phenomena to principles still more general4 #da4 ,we have already observed that nature has established connexions among particular ideas1 and that no sooner one idea occurs to our thoughts than it introduces its correlative1 and carries our attention towards it1 by a gentle and insensible movement4 ,these principles of connexion or association we have reduced to three1 namely1 ,resemblance1 ,contiguity and ,causation2 which are the only bonds that unite our thoughts together1 and beget that regular train of reflection or discourse1 which1 in a greater or less degree1 takes place among all mankind4 ,now here arises a question1 on which the solution of the present difficulty will depend4 ,does it happen1 in all these relations1 that1 when one of the objects is presented to the senses or memory1 the mind is not only carried to the conception of the correlative1 but reaches a steadier and stronger conception of it than what otherwise it would have been able to attain8 ,this seems to be the case with that belief which arises from the relation of cause and effect4 ,and if the case be the same with the other relations or principles of associations1 this may be established as a general law1 which takes place in all the operations of the mind4 ,we may1 therefore1 observe1 as the first experiment to our present purpose1 that1 upon the appearance of the picture of an absent friend1 our idea of him is evidently enlivened by the resemblance1 and that every passion1 which that idea occasions1 whether of joy or sorrow1 acquires new force and vigour4 ,in producing this effect1 there concur both a relation and a present impression4 ,where the picture bears him no resemblance1 at least was not intended for him1 it never so much as conveys our thought to him3 ,and where it is absent1 as well as the person1 though the mind may pass from the thought of the one to that of the other1 it feels its idea to be rather weakened than enlivened by that transition4 ,we take a pleasure in viewing the picture of a friend1 when it is set before us2 but when it is removed1 rather choose to consider him directly than by reflection in an image1 which is equally distant and obscure4 ,the ceremonies of the ,roman ,catholic religion may be considered as instances of the same nature4 ,the devotees of that superstition usually plead in excuse for the mummeries1 with which they are upbraided1 that they feel the good effect of those external motions1 and postures1 and actions1 in enlivening their devotion and quickening their fervour1 which otherwise would decay1 if directed entirely to distant and immaterial objects4 ,we shadow out the objects of our faith1 say they1 in sensible types and images1 and render them more present to us by the immediate presence of these types1 than it is possible for us to do merely by an intellectual view and contemplation4 ,sensible objects have always a greater influence on the fancy than any other2 and this influence they readily convey to those ideas to which they are related1 and which they resemble4 ,i shall only infer from these practices1 and this reasoning1 that the effect of resemblance in enlivening the ideas is very common2 and as in every case a resemblance and a present impression must concur1 we are abundantly supplied with experiments to prove the reality of the foregoing principle4 #db4 ,we may add force to these experiments by others of a different kind1 in considering the effects of contiguity as well as of resemblance4 ,it is certain that distance diminishes the force of every idea1 and that1 upon our approach to any object2 though it does not discover itself to our senses2 it operates upon the mind with an influence1 which imitates an immediate impression4 ,the thinking on any object readily transports the mind to what is contiguous2 but it is only the actual presence of an object1 that transports it with a superior vivacity4 ,when ,i am a few miles from home1 whatever relates to it touches me more nearly than when ,i am two hundred leagues distant2 though even at that distance the reflecting on any thing in the neighbourhood of my friends or family naturally produces an idea of them4 ,but as in this latter case1 both the objects of the mind are ideas2 notwithstanding there is an easy transition between them2 that transition alone is not able to give a superior vivacity to any of the ideas1 for want of some immediate impression#h4 #h ',naturane nobis1 inquit1 datum dicam1 an errore quodam1 ut1 cum ea loca videamus1 in quibus memoria dignos viros acceperimus multum esse versatos1 magis moveamur1 quam siquando eorum ipsorum aut facta audiamus aut scriptum aliquod legamus8 ,velut ego nunc moveor4 ,venit enim mihi ,plato in mentem1 quera accepimus primum hic disputare solitum3 cuius etiam illi hortuli propinqui non memoriam solum mihi afferunt1 sed ipsum videntur in conspectu meo hic ponere4 ,hic ,speusippus1 hic ,xenocrates1 hic eius auditor ,polemo2 cuius ipsa illa sessio fuit1 quam videmus4 ,equidem etiam curiam nostram1 ,hostiliam dico1 non hanc novam1 quae mihi minor esse videtur postquam est maior1 solebam intuens1 ,scipionem1 ,catonem1 ,laelium1 nostrum vero in primis avum cogitare4 ,tanta vis admonitionis est in locis2 ut non sine causa ex his memoriae deducta sit disciplina4' ,cicero de ,finibus4 ,lib4 v4 #dc4 ,no one can doubt but causation has the same influence as the other two relations of resemblance and contiguity4 ,superstitious people are fond of the reliques of saints and holy men1 for the same reason1 that they seek after types or images1 in order to enliven their devotion1 and give them a more intimate and strong conception of those exemplary lives1 which they desire to imitate4 ,now it is evident1 that one of the best reliques1 which a devotee could procure1 would be the handywork of a saint2 and if his cloaths and furniture are ever to be considered in this light1 it is because they were once at his disposal1 and were moved and affected by him2 in which respect they are to be considered as imperfect effects1 and as connected with him by a shorter chain of consequences than any of those1 by which we learn the reality of his existence4 ,suppose1 that the son of a friend1 who had been long dead or absent1 were presented to us2 it is evident1 that this object would instantly revive its correlative idea1 and recal to our thoughts all past intimacies and familiarities1 in more lively colours than they would otherwise have appeared to us4 ,this is another phaenomenon1 which seems to prove the principle above mentioned4 #dd4 ,we may observe1 that1 in these phaenomena1 the belief of the correlative object is always presupposed2 without which the relation could have no effect4 ,the influence of the picture supposes1 that we believe our friend to have once existed4 ,contiguity to home can never excite our ideas of home1 unless we believe that it really exists4 ,now ,i assert1 that this belief1 where it reaches beyond the memory or senses1 is of a similar nature1 and arises from similar causes1 with the transition of thought and vivacity of conception here explained4 ,when ,i throw a piece of dry wood into a fire1 my mind is immediately carried to conceive1 that it augments1 not extinguishes the flame4 ,this transition of thought from the cause to the effect proceeds not from reason4 ,it derives its origin altogether from custom and experience4 ,and as it first begins from an object1 present to the senses1 it renders the idea or conception of flame more strong and lively than any loose1 floating reverie of the imagination4 ,that idea arises immediately4 ,the thought moves instantly towards it1 and conveys to it all that force of conception1 which is derived from the impression present to the senses4 ,when a sword is levelled at my breast1 does not the idea of wound and pain strike me more strongly1 than when a glass of wine is presented to me1 even though by accident this idea should occur after the appearance of the latter object8 ,but what is there in this whole matter to cause such a strong conception1 except only a present object and a customary transition to the idea of another object1 which we have been accustomed to conjoin with the former8 ,this is the whole operation of the mind1 in all our conclusions concerning matter of fact and existence2 and it is a satisfaction to find some analogies1 by which it may be explained4 ,the transition from a present object does in all cases give strength and solidity to the related idea4 ,here1 then1 is a kind of pre-established harmony between the course of nature and the succession of our ideas2 and though the powers and forces1 by which the former is governed1 be wholly unknown to us2 yet our thoughts and conceptions have still1 we find1 gone on in the same train with the other works of nature4 ,custom is that principle1 by which this correspondence has been effected2 so necessary to the subsistence of our species1 and the regulation of our conduct1 in every circumstance and occurrence of human life4 ,had not the presence of an object1 instantly excited the idea of those objects1 commonly conjoined with it1 all our knowledge must have been limited to the narrow sphere of our memory and senses2 and we should never have been able to adjust means to ends1 or employ our natural powers1 either to the producing of good1 or avoiding of evil4 ,those1 who delight in the discovery and contemplation of final causes1 have here ample subject to employ their wonder and admiration4 #de4 ,i shall add1 for a further confirmation of the foregoing theory1 that1 as this operation of the mind1 by which we infer like effects from like causes1 and vice versa1 is so essential to the subsistence of all human creatures1 it is not probable1 that it could be trusted to the fallacious deductions of our reason1 which is slow in its operations2 appears not1 in any degree1 during the first years of infancy2 and at best is1 in every age and period of human life1 extremely liable to error and mistake4 ,it is more conformable to the ordinary wisdom of nature to secure so necessary an act of the mind1 by some instinct or mechanical tendency1 which may be infallible in its operations1 may discover itself at the first appearance of life and thought1 and may be independent of all the laboured deductions of the understanding4 ,as nature has taught us the use of our limbs1 without giving us the knowledge of the muscles and nerves1 by which they are actuated2 so has she implanted in us an instinct1 which carries forward the thought in a correspondent course to that which she has established among external objects2 though we are ignorant of those powers and forces1 on which this regular course and succession of objects totally depends4 ,,section ,,vi4 ,,of ,,probability#i4 #i ,mr4 ,locke divides all arguments into demonstrative and probable4 ,in this view1 we must say1 that it is only probable all men must die1 or that the sun will rise to-morrow4 ,but to conform our language more to common use1 we ought to divide arguments into demonstrations1 proofs1 and probabilities4 ,by proofs meaning such arguments from experience as leave no room for doubt or opposition4 #df4 ,though there be no such thing as ,chance in the world2 our ignorance of the real cause of any event has the same influence on the understanding1 and begets a like species of belief or opinion4 ,there is certainly a probability1 which arises from a superiority of chances on any side2 and according as this superiority encreases1 and surpasses the opposite chances1 the probability receives a proportionable encrease1 and begets still a higher degree of belief or assent to that side1 in which we discover the superiority4 ,if a dye were marked with one figure or number of spots on four sides1 and with another figure or number of spots on the two remaining sides1 it would be more probable1 that the former would turn up than the latter2 though1 if it had a thousand sides marked in the same manner1 and only one side different1 the probability would be much higher1 and our belief or expectation of the event more steady and secure4 ,this process of the thought or reasoning may seem trivial and obvious2 but to those who consider it more narrowly1 it may1 perhaps1 afford matter for curious speculation4 ,it seems evident1 that1 when the mind looks forward to discover the event1 which may result from the throw of such a dye1 it considers the turning up of each particular side as alike probable2 and this is the very nature of chance1 to render all the particular events1 comprehended in it1 entirely equal4 ,but finding a greater number of sides concur in the one event than in the other1 the mind is carried more frequently to that event1 and meets it oftener1 in revolving the various possibilities or chances1 on which the ultimate result depends4 ,this concurrence of several views in one particular event begets immediately1 by an inexplicable contrivance of nature1 the sentiment of belief1 and gives that event the advantage over its antagonist1 which is supported by a smaller number of views1 and recurs less frequently to the mind4 ,if we allow1 that belief is nothing but a firmer and stronger conception of an object than what attends the mere fictions of the imagination1 this operation may1 perhaps1 in some measure1 be accounted for4 ,the concurrence of these several views or glimpses imprints the idea more strongly on the imagination2 gives it superior force and vigour2 renders its influence on the passions and affections more sensible2 and in a word1 begets that reliance or security1 which constitutes the nature of belief and opinion4 #dg4 ,the case is the same with the probability of causes1 as with that of chance4 ,there are some causes1 which are entirely uniform and constant in producing a particular effect2 and no instance has ever yet been found of any failure or irregularity in their operation4 ,fire has always burned1 and water suffocated every human creature3 ,the production of motion by impulse and gravity is an universal law1 which has hitherto admitted of no exception4 ,but there are other causes1 which have been found more irregular and uncertain2 nor has rhubarb always proved a purge1 or opium a soporific to every one1 who has taken these medicines4 ,it is true1 when any cause fails of producing its usual effect1 philosophers ascribe not this to any irregularity in nature2 but suppose1 that some secret causes1 in the particular structure of parts1 have prevented the operation4 ,our reasonings1 however1 and conclusions concerning the event are the same as if this principle had no place4 ,being determined by custom to transfer the past to the future1 in all our inferences2 where the past has been entirely regular and uniform1 we expect the event with the greatest assurance1 and leave no room for any contrary supposition4 ,but where different effects have been found to follow from causes1 which are to appearance exactly similar1 all these various effects must occur to the mind in transferring the past to the future1 and enter into our consideration1 when we determine the probability of the event4 ,though we give the preference to that which has been found most usual1 and believe that this effect will exist1 we must not overlook the other effects1 but must assign to each of them a particular weight and authority1 in proportion as we have found it to be more or less frequent4 ,it is more probable1 in almost every country of ,europe1 that there will be frost sometime in ,january1 than that the weather will continue open throughout that whole month2 though this probability varies according to the different climates1 and approaches to a certainty in the more northern kingdoms4 ,here then it seems evident1 that1 when we transfer the past to the future1 in order to determine the effect1 which will result from any cause1 we transfer all the different events1 in the same proportion as they have appeared in the past1 and conceive one to have existed a hundred times1 for instance1 another ten times1 and another once4 ,as a great number of views do here concur in one event1 they fortify and confirm it to the imagination1 beget that sentiment which we call belief1 and give its object the preference above the contrary event1 which is not supported by an equal number of experiments1 and recurs not so frequently to the thought in transferring the past to the future4 ,let any one try to account for this operation of the mind upon any of the received systems of philosophy1 and he will be sensible of the difficulty4 ,for my part1 ,i shall think it sufficient1 if the present hints excite the curiosity of philosophers1 and make them sensible how defective all common theories are in treating of such curious and such sublime subjects4 ,,section ,,vii4 ,,of ,,the ,,idea ,,of ,,necessary ,,connexion4 ,,part ,i4 #dh4 ,the great advantage of the mathematical sciences above the moral consists in this1 that the ideas of the former1 being sensible1 are always clear and determinate1 the smallest distinction between them is immediately perceptible1 and the same terms are still expressive of the same ideas1 without ambiguity or variation4 ,an oval is never mistaken for a circle1 nor an hyperbola for an ellipsis4 ,the isosceles and scalenum are distinguished by boundaries more exact than vice and virtue1 right and wrong4 ,if any term be defined in geometry1 the mind readily1 of itself1 substitutes1 on all occasions1 the definition for the term defined3 ,or even when no definition is employed1 the object itself may be presented to the senses1 and by that means be steadily and clearly apprehended4 ,but the finer sentiments of the mind1 the operations of the understanding1 the various agitations of the passions1 though really in themselves distinct1 easily escape us1 when surveyed by reflection2 nor is it in our power to recal the original object1 as often as we have occasion to contemplate it4 ,ambiguity1 by this means1 is gradually introduced into our reasonings3 ,similar objects are readily taken to be the same3 ,and the conclusion becomes at last very wide of the premises4 ,one may safely1 however1 affirm1 that1 if we consider these sciences in a proper light1 their advantages and disadvantages nearly compensate each other1 and reduce both of them to a state of equality4 ,if the mind1 with greater facility1 retains the ideas of geometry clear and determinate1 it must carry on a much longer and more intricate chain of reasoning1 and compare ideas much wider of each other1 in order to reach the abstruser truths of that science4 ,and if moral ideas are apt1 without extreme care1 to fall into obscurity and confusion1 the inferences are always much shorter in these disquisitions1 and the intermediate steps1 which lead to the conclusion1 much fewer than in the sciences which treat of quantity and number4 ,in reality1 there is scarcely a proposition in ,euclid so simple1 as not to consist of more parts1 than are to be found in any moral reasoning which runs not into chimera and conceit4 ,where we trace the principles of the human mind through a few steps1 we may be very well satisfied with our progress2 considering how soon nature throws a bar to all our enquiries concerning causes1 and reduces us to an acknowledgment of our ignorance4 ,the chief obstacle1 therefore1 to our improvement in the moral or metaphysical sciences is the obscurity of the ideas1 and ambiguity of the terms4 ,the principal difficulty in the mathematics is the length of inferences and compass of thought1 requisite to the forming of any conclusion4 ,and1 perhaps1 our progress in natural philosophy is chiefly retarded by the want of proper experiments and phaenomena1 which are often discovered by chance1 and cannot always be found1 when requisite1 even by the most diligent and prudent enquiry4 ,as moral philosophy seems hitherto to have received less improvement than either geometry or physics1 we may conclude1 that1 if there be any difference in this respect among these sciences1 the difficulties1 which obstruct the progress of the former1 require superior care and capacity to be surmounted4 #di4 ,there are no ideas1 which occur in metaphysics1 more obscure and uncertain1 than those of power1 force1 energy or necessary connexion1 of which it is every moment necessary for us to treat in all our disquisitions4 ,we shall1 therefore1 endeavour1 in this section1 to fix1 if possible1 the precise meaning of these terms1 and thereby remove some part of that obscurity1 which is so much complained of in this species of philosophy4 ,it seems a proposition1 which will not admit of much dispute1 that all our ideas are nothing but copies of our impressions1 or1 in other words1 that it is impossible for us to think of any thing1 which we have not antecedently felt1 either by our external or internal senses4 ,i have endeavoured#aj to explain and prove this proposition1 and have expressed my hopes1 that1 by a proper application of it1 men may reach a greater clearness and precision in philosophical reasonings1 than what they have hitherto been able to attain4 ,complex ideas may1 perhaps1 be well known by definition1 which is nothing but an enumeration of those parts or simple ideas1 that compose them4 ,but when we have pushed up definitions to the most simple ideas1 and find still some ambiguity and obscurity2 what resource are we then possessed of8 ,by what invention can we throw light upon these ideas1 and render them altogether precise and determinate to our intellectual view8 ,produce the impressions or original sentiments1 from which the ideas are copied4 ,these impressions are all strong and sensible4 ,they admit not of ambiguity4 ,they are not only placed in a full light themselves1 but may throw light on their correspondent ideas1 which lie in obscurity4 ,and by this means1 we may1 perhaps1 attain a new microscope or species of optics1 by which1 in the moral sciences1 the most minute1 and most simple ideas may be so enlarged as to fall readily under our apprehension1 and be equally known with the grossest and most sensible ideas1 that can be the object of our enquiry4 #aj ,section ,,ii4 #ej4 ,to be fully acquainted1 therefore1 with the idea of power or necessary connexion1 let us examine its impression2 and in order to find the impression with greater certainty1 let us search for it in all the sources1 from which it may possibly be derived4 ,when we look about us towards external objects1 and consider the operation of causes1 we are never able1 in a single instance1 to discover any power or necessary connexion2 any quality1 which binds the effect to the cause1 and renders the one an infallible consequence of the other4 ,we only find1 that the one does actually1 in fact1 follow the other4 ,the impulse of one billiard-ball is attended with motion in the second4 ,this is the whole that appears to the outward senses4 ,the mind feels no sentiment or inward impression from this succession of objects3 ,consequently1 there is not1 in any single1 particular instance of cause and effect1 any thing which can suggest the idea of power or necessary connexion4 ,from the first appearance of an object1 we never can conjecture what effect will result from it4 ,but were the power or energy of any cause discoverable by the mind1 we could foresee the effect1 even without experience2 and might1 at first1 pronounce with certainty concerning it1 by mere dint of thought and reasoning4 ,in reality1 there is no part of matter1 that does ever1 by its sensible qualities1 discover any power or energy1 or give us ground to imagine1 that it could produce any thing1 or be followed by any other object1 which we could denominate its effect4 ,solidity1 extension1 motion2 these qualities are all complete in themselves1 and never point out any other event which may result from them4 ,the scenes of the universe are continually shifting1 and one object follows another in an uninterrupted succession2 but the power of force1 which actuates the whole machine1 is entirely concealed from us1 and never discovers itself in any of the sensible qualities of body4 ,we know1 that1 in fact1 heat is a constant attendant of flame2 but what is the connexion between them1 we have no room so much as to conjecture or imagine4 ,it is impossible1 therefore1 that the idea of power can be derived from the contemplation of bodies1 in single instances of their operation2 because no bodies ever discover any power1 which can be the original of this idea4#aa #aa ,mr4 ,locke1 in his chapter of power1 says that1 finding from experience1 that there are several new productions in nature1 and concluding that there must somewhere be a power capable of producing them1 we arrive at last by this reasoning at the idea of power4 ,but no reasoning can ever give us a new1 original1 simple idea2 as this philosopher himself confesses4 ,this1 therefore1 can never be the origin of that idea4 #ea4 ,since1 therefore1 external objects as they appear to the senses1 give us no idea of power or necessary connexion1 by their operation in particular instances1 let us see1 whether this idea be derived from reflection on the operations of our own minds1 and be copied from any internal impression4 ,it may be said1 that we are every moment conscious of internal power2 while we feel1 that1 by the simple command of our will1 we can move the organs of our body1 or direct the faculties of our mind4 ,an act of volition produces motion in our limbs1 or raises a new idea in our imagination4 ,this influence of the will we know by consciousness4 ,hence we acquire the idea of power or energy2 and are certain1 that we ourselves and all other intelligent beings are possessed of power4 ,this idea1 then1 is an idea of reflection1 since it arises from reflecting on the operations of our own mind1 and on the command which is exercised by will1 both over the organs of the body and faculties of the soul4 #eb4 ,we shall proceed to examine this pretension2 and first with regard to the influence of volition over the organs of the body4 ,this influence1 we may observe1 is a fact1 which1 like all other natural events1 can be known only by experience1 and can never be foreseen from any apparent energy or power in the cause1 which connects it with the effect1 and renders the one an infallible consequence of the other4 ,the motion of our body follows upon the command of our will4 ,of this we are every moment conscious4 ,but the means1 by which this is effected2 the energy1 by which the will performs so extraordinary an operation2 of this we are so far from being immediately conscious1 that it must for ever escape our most diligent enquiry4 ,for first2 is there any principle in all nature more mysterious than the union of soul with body2 by which a supposed spiritual substance acquires such an influence over a material one1 that the most refined thought is able to actuate the grossest matter8 ,were we empowered1 by a secret wish1 to remove mountains1 or control the planets in their orbit2 this extensive authority would not be more extraordinary1 nor more beyond our comprehension4 ,but if by consciousness we perceived any power or energy in the will1 we must know this power2 we must know its connexion with the effect2 we must know the secret union of soul and body1 and the nature of both these substances2 by which the one is able to operate1 in so many instances1 upon the other4 ,secondly1 ,we are not able to move all the organs of the body with a like authority2 though we cannot assign any reason besides experience1 for so remarkable a difference between one and the other4 ,why has the will an influence over the tongue and fingers1 not over the heart or liver8 ,this question would never embarrass us1 were we conscious of a power in the former case1 not in the latter4 ,we should then perceive1 independent of experience1 why the authority of will over the organs of the body is circumscribed within such particular limits4 ,being in that case fully acquainted with the power or force1 by which it operates1 we should also know1 why its influence reaches precisely to such boundaries1 and no farther4 ,a man1 suddenly struck with palsy in the leg or arm1 or who had newly lost those members1 frequently endeavours1 at first to move them1 and employ them in their usual offices4 ,here he is as much conscious of power to command such limbs1 as a man in perfect health is conscious of power to actuate any member which remains in its natural state and condition4 ,but consciousness never deceives4 ,consequently1 neither in the one case nor in the other1 are we ever conscious of any power4 ,we learn the influence of our will from experience alone4 ,and experience only teaches us1 how one event constantly follows another2 without instructing us in the secret connexion1 which binds them together1 and renders them inseparable4 ,thirdly1 ,we learn from anatomy1 that the immediate object of power in voluntary motion1 is not the member itself which is moved1 but certain muscles1 and nerves1 and animal spirits1 and1 perhaps1 something still more minute and more unknown1 through which the motion is successively propagated1 ere it reach the member itself whose motion is the immediate object of volition4 ,can there be a more certain proof1 that the power1 by which this whole operation is performed1 so far from being directly and fully known by an inward sentiment or consciousness1 is1 to the last degree mysterious and unintelligible8 ,here the mind wills a certain event3 ,immediately another event1 unknown to ourselves1 and totally different from the one intended1 is produced3 ,this event produces another1 equally unknown3 ,till at last1 through a long succession1 the desired event is produced4 ,but if the original power were felt1 it must be known3 ,were it known1 its effect also must be known2 since all power is relative to its effect4 ,and vice versa1 if the effect be not known1 the power cannot be known nor felt4 ,how indeed can we be conscious of a power to move our limbs1 when we have no such power2 but only that to move certain animal spirits1 which1 though they produce at last the motion of our limbs1 yet operate in such a manner as is wholly beyond our comprehension8 ,we may1 therefore1 conclude from the whole1 ,i hope1 without any temerity1 though with assurance2 that our idea of power is not copied from any sentiment or consciousness of power within ourselves1 when we give rise to animal motion1 or apply our limbs to their proper use and office4 ,that their motion follows the command of the will is a matter of common experience1 like other natural events3 ,but the power or energy by which this is effected1 like that in other natural events1 is unknown and inconceivable4#ab #ab ,it may be pretended1 that the resistance which we meet with in bodies1 obliging us frequently to exert our force1 and call up all our power1 this gives us the idea of force and power4 ,it is this nisus1 or strong endeavour1 of which we are conscious1 that is the original impression from which this idea is copied4 ,but1 first1 we attribute power to a vast number of objects1 where we never can suppose this resistance or exertion of force to take place2 to the ,supreme ,being1 who never meets with any resistance2 to the mind in its command over its ideas and limbs1 in common thinking and motion1 where the effect follows immediately upon the will1 without any exertion or summoning up of force2 to inanimate matter1 which is not capable of this sentiment4 ,secondly1 ,this sentiment of an endeavour to overcome resistance has no known connexion with any event3 ,what follows it1 we know by experience2 but could not know it priori4 ,it must1 however1 be confessed1 that the animal nisus1 which we experience1 though it can afford no accurate precise idea of power1 enters very much into that vulgar1 inaccurate idea1 which is formed of it4 #ec4 ,shall we then assert1 that we are conscious of a power or energy in our own minds1 when1 by an act or command of our will1 we raise up a new idea1 fix the mind to the contemplation of it1 turn it on all sides1 and at last dismiss it for some other idea1 when we think that we have surveyed it with sufficient accuracy8 ,i believe the same arguments will prove1 that even this command of the will gives us no real idea of force or energy4 ,first1 ,it must be allowed1 that1 when we know a power1 we know that very circumstance in the cause1 by which it is enabled to produce the effect3 ,for these are supposed to be synonimous4 ,we must1 therefore1 know both the cause and effect1 and the relation between them4 ,but do we pretend to be acquainted with the nature of the human soul and the nature of an idea1 or the aptitude of the one to produce the other8 ,this is a real creation2 a production of something out of nothing3 ,which implies a power so great1 that it may seem1 at first sight1 beyond the reach of any being1 less than infinite4 ,at least it must be owned1 that such a power is not felt1 nor known1 nor even conceivable by the mind4 ,we only feel the event1 namely1 the existence of an idea1 consequent to a command of the will3 ,but the manner1 in which this operation is performed1 the power by which it is produced1 is entirely beyond our comprehension4 ,secondly1 ,the command of the mind over itself is limited1 as well as its command over the body2 and these limits are not known by reason1 or any acquaintance with the nature of cause and effect1 but only by experience and observation1 as in all other natural events and in the operation of external objects4 ,our authority over our sentiments and passions is much weaker than that over our ideas2 and even the latter authority is circumscribed within very narrow boundaries4 ,will any one pretend to assign the ultimate reason of these boundaries1 or show why the power is deficient in one case1 not in another4 ,thirdly1 ,this self-command is very different at different times4 ,a man in health possesses more of it than one languishing with sickness4 ,we are more master of our thoughts in the morning than in the evening3 ,fasting1 than after a full meal4 ,can we give any reason for these variations1 except experience8 ,where then is the power1 of which we pretend to be conscious8 ,is there not here1 either in a spiritual or material substance1 or both1 some secret mechanism or structure of parts1 upon which the effect depends1 and which1 being entirely unknown to us1 renders the power or energy of the will equally unknown and incomprehensible8 ,volition is surely an act of the mind1 with which we are sufficiently acquainted4 ,reflect upon it4 ,consider it on all sides4 ,do you find anything in it like this creative power1 by which it raises from nothing a new idea1 and with a kind of ,fiat1 imitates the omnipotence of its ,maker1 if ,i may be allowed so to speak1 who called forth into existence all the various scenes of nature8 ,so far from being conscious of this energy in the will1 it requires as certain experience as that of which we are possessed1 to convince us that such extraordinary effects do ever result from a simple act of volition4 #ed4 ,the generality of mankind never find any difficulty in accounting for the more common and familiar operations of nature--such as the descent of heavy bodies1 the growth of plants1 the generation of animals1 or the nourishment of bodies by food3 ,but suppose that1 in all these cases1 they perceive the very force or energy of the cause1 by which it is connected with its effect1 and is for ever infallible in its operation4 ,they acquire1 by long habit1 such a turn of mind1 that1 upon the appearance of the cause1 they immediately expect with assurance its usual attendant1 and hardly conceive it possible that any other event could result from it4 ,it is only on the discovery of extraordinary phaenomena1 such as earthquakes1 pestilence1 and prodigies of any kind1 that they find themselves at a loss to assign a proper cause1 and to explain the manner in which the effect is produced by it4 ,it is usual for men1 in such difficulties1 to have recourse to some invisible intelligent principle#ac as the immediate cause of that event which surprises them1 and which1 they think1 cannot be accounted for from the common powers of nature4 ,but philosophers1 who carry their scrutiny a little farther1 immediately perceive that1 even in the most familiar events1 the energy of the cause is as unintelligible as in the most unusual1 and that we only learn by experience the frequent ,conjunction of objects1 without being ever able to comprehend anything like ,connexion between them4 #ac ,greek3 theos apo maechanaes4 #ee4 ,here1 then1 many philosophers think themselves obliged by reason to have recourse1 on all occasions1 to the same principle1 which the vulgar never appeal to but in cases that appear miraculous and supernatural4 ,they acknowledge mind and intelligence to be1 not only the ultimate and original cause of all things1 but the immediate and sole cause of every event which appears in nature4 ,they pretend that those objects which are commonly denominated causes1 are in reality nothing but occasions2 and that the true and direct principle of every effect is not any power or force in nature1 but a volition of the ,supreme ,being1 who wills that such particular objects should for ever be conjoined with each other4 ,instead of saying that one billiard-ball moves another by a force which it has derived from the author of nature1 it is the ,deity himself1 they say1 who1 by a particular volition1 moves the second ball1 being determined to this operation by the impulse of the first ball1 in consequence of those general laws which he has laid down to himself in the government of the universe4 ,but philosophers advancing still in their inquiries1 discover that1 as we are totally ignorant of the power on which depends the mutual operation of bodies1 we are no less ignorant of that power on which depends the operation of mind on body1 or of body on mind2 nor are we able1 either from our senses or consciousness1 to assign the ultimate principle in one case more than in the other4 ,the same ignorance1 therefore1 reduces them to the same conclusion4 ,they assert that the ,deity is the immediate cause of the union between soul and body2 and that they are not the organs of sense1 which1 being agitated by external objects1 produce sensations in the mind2 but that it is a particular volition of our omnipotent ,maker1 which excites such a sensation1 in consequence of such a motion in the organ4 ,in like manner1 it is not any energy in the will that produces local motion in our members3 ,it is ,god himself1 who is pleased to second our will1 in itself impotent1 and to command that motion which we erroneously attribute to our own power and efficacy4 ,nor do philosophers stop at this conclusion4 ,they sometimes extend the same inference to the mind itself1 in its internal operations4 ,our mental vision or conception of ideas is nothing but a revelation made to us by our ,maker4 ,when we voluntarily turn our thoughts to any object1 and raise up its image in the fancy1 it is not the will which creates that idea3 ,it is the universal ,creator1 who discovers it to the mind1 and renders it present to us4 #ef4 ,thus1 according to these philosophers1 every thing is full of ,god4 ,not content with the principle1 that nothing exists but by his will1 that nothing possesses any power but by his concession3 ,they rob nature1 and all created beings1 of every power1 in order to render their dependence on the ,deity still more sensible and immediate4 ,they consider not that1 by this theory1 they diminish1 instead of magnifying1 the grandeur of those attributes1 which they affect so much to celebrate4 ,it argues surely more power in the ,deity to delegate a certain degree of power to inferior creatures than to produce every thing by his own immediate volition4 ,it argues more wisdom to contrive at first the fabric of the world with such perfect foresight that1 of itself1 and by its proper operation1 it may serve all the purposes of providence1 than if the great ,creator were obliged every moment to adjust its parts1 and animate by his breath all the wheels of that stupendous machine4 ,but if we would have a more philosophical confutation of this theory1 perhaps the two following reflections may suffice4 #eg4 ,first1 it seems to me that this theory of the universal energy and operation of the ,supreme ,being is too bold ever to carry conviction with it to a man1 sufficiently apprized of the weakness of human reason1 and the narrow limits to which it is confined in all its operations4 ,though the chain of arguments which conduct to it were ever so logical1 there must arise a strong suspicion1 if not an absolute assurance1 that it has carried us quite beyond the reach of our faculties1 when it leads to conclusions so extraordinary1 and so remote from common life and experience4 ,we are got into fairy land1 long ere we have reached the last steps of our theory2 and there we have no reason to trust our common methods of argument1 or to think that our usual analogies and probabilities have any authority4 ,our line is too short to fathom such immense abysses4 ,and however we may flatter ourselves that we are guided1 in every step which we take1 by a kind of verisimilitude and experience1 we may be assured that this fancied experience has no authority when we thus apply it to subjects that lie entirely out of the sphere of experience4 ,but on this we shall have occasion to touch afterwards4#ad #ad ,section ,,xii4 ,secondly1 ,i cannot perceive any force in the arguments on which this theory is founded4 ,we are ignorant1 it is true1 of the manner in which bodies operate on each other3 ,their force or energy is entirely incomprehensible3 ,but are we not equally ignorant of the manner or force by which a mind1 even the supreme mind1 operates either on itself or on body8 ,whence1 ,i beseech you1 do we acquire any idea of it8 ,we have no sentiment or consciousness of this power in ourselves4 ,we have no idea of the ,supreme ,being but what we learn from reflection on our own faculties4 ,were our ignorance1 therefore1 a good reason for rejecting any thing1 we should be led into that principle of denying all energy in the ,supreme ,being as much as in the grossest matter4 ,we surely comprehend as little the operations of one as of the other4 ,is it more difficult to conceive that motion may arise from impulse than that it may arise from volition8 ,all we know is our profound ignorance in both cases#ae4 #ae ,i need not examine at length the vis inertiae which is so much talked of in the new philosophy1 and which is ascribed to matter4 ,we find by experience1 that a body at rest or in motion continues for ever in its present state1 till put from it by some new cause2 and that a body impelled takes as much motion from the impelling body as it acquires itself4 ,these are facts4 ,when we call this a vis inertiae1 we only mark these facts1 without pretending to have any idea of the inert power2 in the same manner as1 when we talk of gravity1 we mean certain effects1 without comprehending that active power4 ,it was never the meaning of ,sir ,,isaac ,,newton to rob second causes of all force or energy2 though some of his followers have endeavoured to establish that theory upon his authority4 ,on the contrary1 that great philosopher had recourse to an etherial active fluid to explain his universal attraction2 though he was so cautious and modest as to allow1 that it was a mere hypothesis1 not to be insisted on1 without more experiments4 ,i must confess1 that there is something in the fate of opinions a little extraordinary4 ,,des ,,cartes insinuated that doctrine of the universal and sole efficacy of the ,deity1 without insisting on it4 ,,malebranche and other ,,cartesians made it the foundation of all their philosophy4 ,it had1 however1 no authority in ,england4 ,,locke1 ,,clarke1 and ,,cudworth1 never so much as take notice of it1 but suppose all along1 that matter has a real1 though subordinate and derived power4 ,by what means has it become so prevalent among our modern metaphysicians8 ,,part ,,ii4 #eh4 ,but to hasten to a conclusion of this argument1 which is already drawn out to too great a length3 ,we have sought in vain for an idea of power or necessary connexion in all the sources from which we could suppose it to be derived4 ,it appears that1 in single instances of the operation of bodies1 we never can1 by our utmost scrutiny1 discover any thing but one event following another1 without being able to comprehend any force or power by which the cause operates1 or any connexion between it and its supposed effect4 ,the same difficulty occurs in contemplating the operations of mind on body--where we observe the motion of the latter to follow upon the volition of the former1 but are not able to observe or conceive the tie which binds together the motion and volition1 or the energy by which the mind produces this effect4 ,the authority of the will over its own faculties and ideas is not a whit more comprehensible3 ,so that1 upon the whole1 there appears not1 throughout all nature1 any one instance of connexion which is conceivable by us4 ,all events seem entirely loose and separate4 ,one event follows another2 but we never can observe any tie between them4 ,they seem conjoined1 but never connected4 ,and as we can have no idea of any thing which never appeared to our outward sense or inward sentiment1 the necessary conclusion seems to be that we have no idea of connexion or power at all1 and that these words are absolutely without any meaning1 when employed either in philosophical reasonings or common life4 #ei4 ,but there still remains one method of avoiding this conclusion1 and one source which we have not yet examined4 ,when any natural object or event is presented1 it is impossible for us1 by any sagacity or penetration1 to discover1 or even conjecture1 without experience1 what event will result from it1 or to carry our foresight beyond that object which is immediately present to the memory and senses4 ,even after one instance or experiment where we have observed a particular event to follow upon another1 we are not entitled to form a general rule1 or foretell what will happen in like cases2 it being justly esteemed an unpardonable temerity to judge of the whole course of nature from one single experiment1 however accurate or certain4 ,but when one particular species of event has always1 in all instances1 been conjoined with another1 we make no longer any scruple of foretelling one upon the appearance of the other1 and of employing that reasoning1 which can alone assure us of any matter of fact or existence4 ,we then call the one object1 ,cause2 the other1 ,effect4 ,we suppose that there is some connexion between them2 some power in the one1 by which it infallibly produces the other1 and operates with the greatest certainty and strongest necessity4 ,it appears1 then1 that this idea of a necessary connexion among events arises from a number of similar instances which occur of the constant conjunction of these events2 nor can that idea ever be suggested by any one of these instances1 surveyed in all possible lights and positions4 ,but there is nothing in a number of instances1 different from every single instance1 which is supposed to be exactly similar2 except only1 that after a repetition of similar instances1 the mind is carried by habit1 upon the appearance of one event1 to expect its usual attendant1 and to believe that it will exist4 ,this connexion1 therefore1 which we feel in the mind1 this customary transition of the imagination from one object to its usual attendant1 is the sentiment or impression from which we form the idea of power or necessary connexion4 ,nothing farther is in the case4 ,contemplate the subject on all sides2 you will never find any other origin of that idea4 ,this is the sole difference between one instance1 from which we can never receive the idea of connexion1 and a number of similar instances1 by which it is suggested4 ,the first time a man saw the communication of motion by impulse1 as by the shock of two billiard balls1 he could not pronounce that the one event was connected3 but only that it was conjoined with the other4 ,after he has observed several instances of this nature1 he then pronounces them to be connected4 ,what alteration has happened to give rise to this new idea of connexion8 ,nothing but that he now feels these events to be connected in his imagination1 and can readily foretell the existence of one from the appearance of the other4 ,when we say1 therefore1 that one object is connected with another1 we mean only that they have acquired a connexion in our thought1 and give rise to this inference1 by which they become proofs of each other's existence3 ,a conclusion which is somewhat extraordinary1 but which seems founded on sufficient evidence4 ,nor will its evidence be weakened by any general diffidence of the understanding1 or sceptical suspicion concerning every conclusion which is new and extraordinary4 ,no conclusions can be more agreeable to scepticism than such as make discoveries concerning the weakness and narrow limits of human reason and capacity4 #fj4 ,and what stronger instance can be produced of the surprising ignorance and weakness of the understanding than the present8 ,for surely1 if there be any relation among objects which it imports to us to know perfectly1 it is that of cause and effect4 ,on this are founded all our reasonings concerning matter of fact or existence4 ,by means of it alone we attain any assurance concerning objects which are removed from the present testimony of our memory and senses4 ,the only immediate utility of all sciences1 is to teach us1 how to control and regulate future events by their causes4 ,our thoughts and enquiries are1 therefore1 every moment1 employed about this relation3 ,yet so imperfect are the ideas which we form concerning it1 that it is impossible to give any just definition of cause1 except what is drawn from something extraneous and foreign to it4 ,similar objects are always conjoined with similar4 ,of this we have experience4 ,suitably to this experience1 therefore1 we may define a cause to be an object1 followed by another1 and where all the objects similar to the first are followed by objects similar to the second4 ,or in other words where1 if the first object had not been1 the second never had existed4 ,the appearance of a cause always conveys the mind1 by a customary transition1 to the idea of the effect4 ,of this also we have experience4 ,we may1 therefore1 suitably to this experience1 form another definition of cause1 and call it1 an object followed by another1 and whose appearance always conveys the thought to that other4 ,but though both these definitions be drawn from circumstances foreign to the cause1 we cannot remedy this inconvenience1 or attain any more perfect definition1 which may point out that circumstance in the cause1 which gives it a connexion with its effect4 ,we have no idea of this connexion1 nor even any distinct notion what it is we desire to know1 when we endeavour at a conception of it4 ,we say1 for instance1 that the vibration of this string is the cause of this particular sound4 ,but what do we mean by that affirmation8 ,we either mean that this vibration is followed by this sound1 and that all similar vibrations have been followed by similar sounds3 ,or1 that this vibration is followed by this sound1 and that upon the appearance of one the mind anticipates the senses1 and forms immediately an idea of the other4 ,we may consider the relation of cause and effect in either of these two lights2 but beyond these1 we have no idea of it4#af #af ,according to these explications and definitions1 the idea of power is relative as much as that of cause2 and both have a reference to an effect1 or some other event constantly conjoined with the former4 ,when we consider the unknown circumstance of an object1 by which the degree or quantity of its effect is fixed and determined1 we call that its power3 ,and accordingly1 it is allowed by all philosophers1 that the effect is the measure of the power4 ,but if they had any idea of power1 as it is in itself1 why could not they ,measure it in itself8 ,the dispute whether the force of a body in motion be as its velocity1 or the square of its velocity2 this dispute1 ,i say1 need not be decided by comparing its effects in equal or unequal times2 but by a direct mensuration and comparison4 ,as to the frequent use of the words1 ,force1 ,power1 ,energy1 c41 which every where occur in common conversation1 as well as in philosophy2 that is no proof1 that we are acquainted1 in any instance1 with the connecting principle between cause and effect1 or can account ultimately for the production of one thing to another4 ,these words1 as commonly used1 have very loose meanings annexed to them2 and their ideas are very uncertain and confused4 ,no animal can put external bodies in motion without the sentiment of a nisus or endeavour2 and every animal has a sentiment or feeling from the stroke or blow of an external object1 that is in motion4 ,these sensations1 which are merely animal1 and from which we can priori draw no inference1 we are apt to transfer to inanimate objects1 and to suppose1 that they have some such feelings1 whenever they transfer or receive motion4 ,with regard to energies1 which are exerted1 without our annexing to them any idea of communicated motion1 we consider only the constant experienced conjunction of the events2 and as we feel a customary connexion between the ideas1 we transfer that feeling to the objects2 as nothing is more usual than to apply to external bodies every internal sensation1 which they occasion4 #fa4 ,to recapitulate1 therefore1 the reasonings of this section3 ,every idea is copied from some preceding impression or sentiment2 and where we cannot find any impression1 we may be certain that there is no idea4 ,in all single instances of the operation of bodies or minds1 there is nothing that produces any impression1 nor consequently can suggest any idea of power or necessary connexion4 ,but when many uniform instances appear1 and the same object is always followed by the same event2 we then begin to entertain the notion of cause and connexion4 ,we then feel a new sentiment or impression1 to wit1 a customary connexion in the thought or imagination between one object and its usual attendant2 and this sentiment is the original of that idea which we seek for4 ,for as this idea arises from a number of similar instances1 and not from any single instance1 it must arise from that circumstance1 in which the number of instances differ from every individual instance4 ,but this customary connexion or transition of the imagination is the only circumstance in which they differ4 ,in every other particular they are alike4 ,the first instance which we saw of motion communicated by the shock of two billiard balls 7to return to this obvious illustration7 is exactly similar to any instance that may1 at present1 occur to us2 except only1 that we could not1 at first1 infer one event from the other2 which we are enabled to do at present1 after so long a course of uniform experience4 ,i know not whether the reader will readily apprehend this reasoning4 ,i am afraid that1 should ,i multiply words about it1 or throw it into a greater variety of lights1 it would only become more obscure and intricate4 ,in all abstract reasonings there is one point of view which1 if we can happily hit1 we shall go farther towards illustrating the subject than by all the eloquence and copious expression in the world4 ,this point of view we should endeavour to reach1 and reserve the flowers of rhetoric for subjects which are more adapted to them4 ,,section ,,viii4 ,,of ,,liberty ,,and ,,necessity4 ,,part ,i4 #fb4 ,it might reasonably be expected in questions which have been canvassed and disputed with great eagerness1 since the first origin of science and philosophy1 that the meaning of all the terms1 at least1 should have been agreed upon among the disputants2 and our enquiries1 in the course of two thousand years1 been able to pass from words to the true and real subject of the controversy4 ,for how easy may it seem to give exact definitions of the terms employed in reasoning1 and make these definitions1 not the mere sound of words1 the object of future scrutiny and examination8 ,but if we consider the matter more narrowly1 we shall be apt to draw a quite opposite conclusion4 ,from this circumstance alone1 that a controversy has been long kept on foot1 and remains still undecided1 we may presume that there is some ambiguity in the expression1 and that the disputants affix different ideas to the terms employed in the controversy4 ,for as the faculties of the mind are supposed to be naturally alike in every individual2 otherwise nothing could be more fruitless than to reason or dispute together2 it were impossible1 if men affix the same ideas to their terms1 that they could so long form different opinions of the same subject2 especially when they communicate their views1 and each party turn themselves on all sides1 in search of arguments which may give them the victory over their antagonists4 ,it is true1 if men attempt the discussion of questions which lie entirely beyond the reach of human capacity1 such as those concerning the origin of worlds1 or the economy of the intellectual system or region of spirits1 they may long beat the air in their fruitless contests1 and never arrive at any determinate conclusion4 ,but if the question regard any subject of common life and experience1 nothing1 one would think1 could preserve the dispute so long undecided but some ambiguous expressions1 which keep the antagonists still at a distance1 and hinder them from grappling with each other4 #fc4 ,this has been the case in the long disputed question concerning liberty and necessity2 and to so remarkable a degree that1 if ,i be not much mistaken1 we shall find1 that all mankind1 both learned and ignorant1 have always been of the same opinion with regard to this subject1 and that a few intelligible definitions would immediately have put an end to the whole controversy4 ,i own that this dispute has been so much canvassed on all hands1 and has led philosophers into such a labyrinth of obscure sophistry1 that it is no wonder1 if a sensible reader indulge his ease so far as to turn a deaf ear to the proposal of such a question1 from which he can expect neither instruction or entertainment4 ,but the state of the argument here proposed may1 perhaps1 serve to renew his attention2 as it has more novelty1 promises at least some decision of the controversy1 and will not much disturb his ease by any intricate or obscure reasoning4 ,i hope1 therefore1 to make it appear that all men have ever agreed in the doctrine both of necessity and of liberty1 according to any reasonable sense1 which can be put on these terms2 and that the whole controversy has hitherto turned merely upon words4 ,we shall begin with examining the doctrine of necessity4 #fd4 ,it is universally allowed that matter1 in all its operations1 is actuated by a necessary force1 and that every natural effect is so precisely determined by the energy of its cause that no other effect1 in such particular circumstances1 could possibly have resulted from it4 ,the degree and direction of every motion is1 by the laws of nature1 prescribed with such exactness that a living creature may as soon arise from the shock of two bodies as motion in any other degree or direction than what is actually produced by it4 ,would we1 therefore1 form a just and precise idea of necessity1 we must consider whence that idea arises when we apply it to the operation of bodies4 ,it seems evident that1 if all the scenes of nature were continually shifted in such a manner that no two events bore any resemblance to each other1 but every object was entirely new1 without any similitude to whatever had been seen before1 we should never1 in that case1 have attained the least idea of necessity1 or of a connexion among these objects4 ,we might say1 upon such a supposition1 that one object or event has followed another2 not that one was produced by the other4 ,the relation of cause and effect must be utterly unknown to mankind4 ,inference and reasoning concerning the operations of nature would1 from that moment1 be at an end2 and the memory and senses remain the only canals1 by which the knowledge of any real existence could possibly have access to the mind4 ,our idea1 therefore1 of necessity and causation arises entirely from the uniformity observable in the operations of nature1 where similar objects are constantly conjoined together1 and the mind is determined by custom to infer the one from the appearance of the other4 ,these two circumstances form the whole of that necessity1 which we ascribe to matter4 ,beyond the constant conjunction of similar objects1 and the consequent inference from one to the other1 we have no notion of any necessity or connexion4 ,if it appear1 therefore1 that all mankind have ever allowed1 without any doubt or hesitation1 that these two circumstances take place in the voluntary actions of men1 and in the operations of mind2 it must follow1 that all mankind have ever agreed in the doctrine of necessity1 and that they have hitherto disputed1 merely for not understanding each other4 #fe4 ,as to the first circumstance1 the constant and regular conjunction of similar events1 we may possibly satisfy ourselves by the following considerations4 ,it is universally acknowledged that there is a great uniformity among the actions of men1 in all nations and ages1 and that human nature remains still the same1 in its principles and operations4 ,the same motives always produce the same actions4 ,the same events follow from the same causes4 ,ambition1 avarice1 self-love1 vanity1 friendship1 generosity1 public spirit3 these passions1 mixed in various degrees1 and distributed through society1 have been1 from the beginning of the world1 and still are1 the source of all the actions and enterprises1 which have ever been observed among mankind4 ,would you know the sentiments1 inclinations1 and course of life of the ,greeks and ,romans8 ,study well the temper and actions of the ,french and ,english3 ,you cannot be much mistaken in transferring to the former most of the observations which you have made with regard to the latter4 ,mankind are so much the same1 in all times and places1 that history informs us of nothing new or strange in this particular4 ,its chief use is only to discover the constant and universal principles of human nature1 by showing men in all varieties of circumstances and situations1 and furnishing us with materials from which we may form our observations and become acquainted with the regular springs of human action and behaviour4 ,these records of wars1 intrigues1 factions1 and revolutions1 are so many collections of experiments1 by which the politician or moral philosopher fixes the principles of his science1 in the same manner as the physician or natural philosopher becomes acquainted with the nature of plants1 minerals1 and other external objects1 by the experiments which he forms concerning them4 ,nor are the earth1 water1 and other elements1 examined by ,aristotle1 and ,hippocrates1 more like to those which at present lie under our observation than the men described by ,polybius and ,tacitus are to those who now govern the world4 ,should a traveller1 returning from a far country1 bring us an account of men1 wholly different from any with whom we were ever acquainted2 men1 who were entirely divested of avarice1 ambition1 or revenge2 who knew no pleasure but friendship1 generosity1 and public spirit2 we should immediately1 from these circumstances1 detect the falsehood1 and prove him a liar1 with the same certainty as if he had stuffed his narration with stories of centaurs and dragons1 miracles and prodigies4 ,and if we would explode any forgery in history1 we cannot make use of a more convincing argument1 than to prove1 that the actions ascribed to any person are directly contrary to the course of nature1 and that no human motives1 in such circumstances1 could ever induce him to such a conduct4 ,the veracity of ,quintus ,curtius is as much to be suspected1 when he describes the supernatural courage of ,alexander1 by which he was hurried on singly to attack multitudes1 as when he describes his supernatural force and activity1 by which he was able to resist them4 ,so readily and universally do we acknowledge a uniformity in human motives and actions as well as in the operations of body4 ,hence likewise the benefit of that experience1 acquired by long life and a variety of business and company1 in order to instruct us in the principles of human nature1 and regulate our future conduct1 as well as speculation4 ,by means of this guide1 we mount up to the knowledge of men's inclinations and motives1 from their actions1 expressions1 and even gestures2 and again descend to the interpretation of their actions from our knowledge of their motives and inclinations4 ,the general observations treasured up by a course of experience1 give us the clue of human nature1 and teach us to unravel all its intricacies4 ,pretexts and appearances no longer deceive us4 ,public declarations pass for the specious colouring of a cause4 ,and though virtue and honour be allowed their proper weight and authority1 that perfect disinterestedness1 so often pretended to1 is never expected in multitudes and parties2 seldom in their leaders2 and scarcely even in individuals of any rank or station4 ,but were there no uniformity in human actions1 and were every experiment which we could form of this kind irregular and anomalous1 it were impossible to collect any general observations concerning mankind2 and no experience1 however accurately digested by reflection1 would ever serve to any purpose4 ,why is the aged husbandman more skilful in his calling than the young beginner but because there is a certain uniformity in the operation of the sun1 rain1 and earth towards the production of vegetables2 and experience teaches the old practitioner the rules by which this operation is governed and directed4 #ff4 ,we must not1 however1 expect that this uniformity of human actions should be carried to such a length as that all men1 in the same circumstances1 will always act precisely in the same manner1 without making any allowance for the diversity of characters1 prejudices1 and opinions4 ,such a uniformity in every particular1 is found in no part of nature4 ,on the contrary1 from observing the variety of conduct in different men1 we are enabled to form a greater variety of maxims1 which still suppose a degree of uniformity and regularity4 ,are the manners of men different in different ages and countries8 ,we learn thence the great force of custom and education1 which mould the human mind from its infancy and form it into a fixed and established character4 ,is the behaviour and conduct of the one sex very unlike that of the other8 ,is it thence we become acquainted with the different characters which nature has impressed upon the sexes1 and which she preserves with constancy and regularity8 ,are the actions of the same person much diversified in the different periods of his life1 from infancy to old age8 ,this affords room for many general observations concerning the gradual change of our sentiments and inclinations1 and the different maxims which prevail in the different ages of human creatures4 ,even the characters1 which are peculiar to each individual1 have a uniformity in their influence2 otherwise our acquaintance with the persons and our observation of their conduct could never teach us their dispositions1 or serve to direct our behaviour with regard to them4 #fg4 ,i grant it possible to find some actions1 which seem to have no regular connexion with any known motives1 and are exceptions to all the measures of conduct which have ever been established for the government of men4 ,but if we would willingly know what judgement should be formed of such irregular and extraordinary actions1 we may consider the sentiments commonly entertained with regard to those irregular events which appear in the course of nature1 and the operations of external objects4 ,all causes are not conjoined to their usual effects with like uniformity4 ,an artificer1 who handles only dead matter1 may be disappointed of his aim1 as well as the politician1 who directs the conduct of sensible and intelligent agents4 ,the vulgar1 who take things according to their first appearance1 attribute the uncertainty of events to such an uncertainty in the causes as makes the latter often fail of their usual influence2 though they meet with no impediment in their operation4 ,but philosophers1 observing that1 almost in every part of nature1 there is contained a vast variety of springs and principles1 which are hid1 by reason of their minuteness or remoteness1 find1 that it is at least possible the contrariety of events may not proceed from any contingency in the cause1 but from the secret operation of contrary causes4 ,this possibility is converted into certainty by farther observation1 when they remark that1 upon an exact scrutiny1 a contrariety of effects always betrays a contrariety of causes1 and proceeds from their mutual opposition4 ,a peasant can give no better reason for the stopping of any clock or watch than to say that it does not commonly go right3 ,but an artist easily perceives that the same force in the spring or pendulum has always the same influence on the wheels2 but fails of its usual effect1 perhaps by reason of a grain of dust1 which puts a stop to the whole movement4 ,from the observation of several parallel instances1 philosophers form a maxim that the connexion between all causes and effects is equally necessary1 and that its seeming uncertainty in some instances proceeds from the secret opposition of contrary causes4 ,thus1 for instance1 in the human body1 when the usual symptoms of health or sickness disappoint our expectation2 when medicines operate not with their wonted powers2 when irregular events follow from any particular cause2 the philosopher and physician are not surprised at the matter1 nor are ever tempted to deny1 in general1 the necessity and uniformity of those principles by which the animal economy is conducted4 ,they know that a human body is a mighty complicated machine3 ,that many secret powers lurk in it1 which are altogether beyond our comprehension3 ,that to us it must often appear very uncertain in its operations3 ,and that therefore the irregular events1 which outwardly discover themselves1 can be no proof that the laws of nature are not observed with the greatest regularity in its internal operations and government4 #fh4 ,the philosopher1 if he be consistent1 must apply the same reasoning to the actions and volitions of intelligent agents4 ,the most irregular and unexpected resolutions of men may frequently be accounted for by those who know every particular circumstance of their character and situation4 ,a person of an obliging disposition gives a peevish answer3 ,but he has the toothache1 or has not dined4 ,a stupid fellow discovers an uncommon alacrity in his carriage3 ,but he has met with a sudden piece of good fortune4 ,or even when an action1 as sometimes happens1 cannot be particularly accounted for1 either by the person himself or by others2 we know1 in general1 that the characters of men are1 to a certain degree1 inconstant and irregular4 ,this is1 in a manner1 the constant character of human nature2 though it be applicable1 in a more particular manner1 to some persons who have no fixed rule for their conduct1 but proceed in a continued course of caprice and inconstancy4 ,the internal principles and motives may operate in a uniform manner1 notwithstanding these seeming irregularities2 in the same manner as the winds1 rain1 clouds1 and other variations of the weather are supposed to be governed by steady principles2 though not easily discoverable by human sagacity and enquiry4 #fi4 ,thus it appears1 not only that the conjunction between motives and voluntary actions is as regular and uniform as that between the cause and effect in any part of nature2 but also that this regular conjunction has been universally acknowledged among mankind1 and has never been the subject of dispute1 either in philosophy or common life4 ,now1 as it is from past experience that we draw all inferences concerning the future1 and as we conclude that objects will always be conjoined together which we find to have always been conjoined2 it may seem superfluous to prove that this experienced uniformity in human actions is a source whence we draw inferences concerning them4 ,but in order to throw the argument into a greater variety of lights we shall also insist1 though briefly1 on this latter topic4 ,the mutual dependence of men is so great in all societies that scarce any human action is entirely complete in itself1 or is performed without some reference to the actions of others1 which are requisite to make it answer fully the intention of the agent4 ,the poorest artificer1 who labours alone1 expects at least the protection of the magistrate1 to ensure him the enjoyment of the fruits of his labour4 ,he also expects that1 when he carries his goods to market1 and offers them at a reasonable price1 he shall find purchasers1 and shall be able1 by the money he acquires1 to engage others to supply him with those commodities which are requisite for his subsistence4 ,in proportion as men extend their dealings1 and render their intercourse with others more complicated1 they always comprehend1 in their schemes of life1 a greater variety of voluntary actions1 which they expect1 from the proper motives1 to co-operate with their own4 ,in all these conclusions they take their measures from past experience1 in the same manner as in their reasonings concerning external objects2 and firmly believe that men1 as well as all the elements1 are to continue1 in their operations1 the same that they have ever found them4 ,a manufacturer reckons upon the labour of his servants for the execution of any work as much as upon the tools which he employs1 and would be equally surprised were his expectations disappointed4 ,in short1 this experimental inference and reasoning concerning the actions of others enters so much into human life that no man1 while awake1 is ever a moment without employing it4 ,have we not reason1 therefore1 to affirm that all mankind have always agreed in the doctrine of necessity according to the foregoing definition and explication of it8 #gj4 ,nor have philosophers ever entertained a different opinion from the people in this particular4 ,for1 not to mention that almost every action of their life supposes that opinion1 there are even few of the speculative parts of learning to which it is not essential4 ,what would become of history1 had we not a dependence on the veracity of the historian according to the experience which we have had of mankind8 ,how could politics be a science1 if laws and forms of goverment had not a uniform influence upon society8 ,where would be the foundation of morals1 if particular characters had no certain or determinate power to produce particular sentiments1 and if these sentiments had no constant operation on actions8 ,and with what pretence could we employ our criticism upon any poet or polite author1 if we could not pronounce the conduct and sentiments of his actors either natural or unnatural to such characters1 and in such circumstances8 ,it seems almost impossible1 therefore1 to engage either in science or action of any kind without acknowledging the doctrine of necessity1 and this inference from motive to voluntary actions1 from characters to conduct4 ,and indeed1 when we consider how aptly natural and moral evidence link together1 and form only one chain of argument1 we shall make no scruple to allow that they are of the same nature1 and derived from the same principles4 ,a prisoner who has neither money nor interest1 discovers the impossibility of his escape1 as well when he considers the obstinacy of the gaoler1 as the walls and bars with which he is surrounded2 and1 in all attempts for his freedom1 chooses rather to work upon the stone and iron of the one1 than upon the inflexible nature of the other4 ,the same prisoner1 when conducted to the scaffold1 foresees his death as certainly from the constancy and fidelity of his guards1 as from the operation of the axe or wheel4 ,his mind runs along a certain train of ideas3 ,the refusal of the soldiers to consent to his escape2 the action of the executioner2 the separation of the head and body2 bleeding1 convulsive motions1 and death4 ,here is a connected chain of natural causes and voluntary actions2 but the mind feels no difference between them in passing from one link to another3 ,nor is less certain of the future event than if it were connected with the objects present to the memory or senses1 by a train of causes1 cemented together by what we are pleased to call a physical necessity4 ,the same experienced union has the same effect on the mind1 whether the united objects be motives1 volition1 and actions2 or figure and motion4 ,we may change the name of things2 but their nature and their operation on the understanding never change4 ,were a man1 whom ,i know to be honest and opulent1 and with whom ,i live in intimate friendship1 to come into my house1 where ,i am surrounded with my servants1 ,i rest assured that he is not to stab me before he leaves it in order to rob me of my silver standish2 and ,i no more suspect this event than the falling of the house itself1 which is new1 and solidly built and founded4--,but he may have been seized with a sudden and unknown frenzy4--,so may a sudden earthquake arise1 and shake and tumble my house about my ears4 ,i shall therefore change the suppositions4 ,i shall say that ,i know with certainty that he is not to put his hand into the fire and hold it there till it be consumed3 ,and this event1 ,i think ,i can foretell with the same assurance1 as that1 if he throw himself out at the window1 and meet with no obstruction1 he will not remain a moment suspended in the air4 ,no suspicion of an unknown frenzy can give the least possibility to the former event1 which is so contrary to all the known principles of human nature4 ,a man who at noon leaves his purse full of gold on the pavement at ,charing-,cross1 may as well expect that it will fly away like a feather1 as that he will find it untouched an hour after4 ,above one half of human reasonings contain inferences of a similar nature1 attended with more or less degrees of certainty proportioned to our experience of the usual conduct of mankind in such particular situations4 #ga4 ,i have frequently considered1 what could possibly be the reason why all mankind1 though they have ever1 without hesitation1 acknowledged the doctrine of necessity in their whole practice and reasoning1 have yet discovered such a reluctance to acknowledge it in words1 and have rather shown a propensity1 in all ages1 to profess the contrary opinion4 ,the matter1 ,i think1 may be accounted for after the following manner4 ,if we examine the operations of body1 and the production of effects from their causes1 we shall find that all our faculties can never carry us farther in our knowledge of this relation than barely to observe that particular objects are constantly conjoined together1 and that the mind is carried1 by a customary transition1 from the appearance of one to the belief of the other4 ,but though this conclusion concerning human ignorance be the result of the strictest scrutiny of this subject1 men still entertain a strong propensity to believe that they penetrate farther into the powers of nature1 and perceive something like a necessary connexion between the cause and the effect4 ,when again they turn their reflections towards the operations of their own minds1 and feel no such connexion of the motive and the action2 they are thence apt to suppose1 that there is a difference between the effects which result from material force1 and those which arise from thought and intelligence4 ,but being once convinced that we know nothing farther of causation of any kind than merely the constant conjunction of objects1 and the consequent inference of the mind from one to another1 and finding that these two circumstances are universally allowed to have place in voluntary actions2 we may be more easily led to own the same necessity common to all causes4 ,and though this reasoning may contradict the systems of many philosophers1 in ascribing necessity to the determinations of the will1 we shall find1 upon reflection1 that they dissent from it in words only1 not in their real sentiment4 ,necessity1 according to the sense in which it is here taken1 has never yet been rejected1 nor can ever1 ,i think1 be rejected by any philosopher4 ,it may only1 perhaps1 be pretended that the mind can perceive1 in the operations of matter1 some farther connexion between the cause and effect2 and connexion that has not place in voluntary actions of intelligent beings4 ,now whether it be so or not1 can only appear upon examination2 and it is incumbent on these philosophers to make good their assertion1 by defining or describing that necessity1 and pointing it out to us in the operations of material causes4 #gb4 ,it would seem1 indeed1 that men begin at the wrong end of this question concerning liberty and necessity1 when they enter upon it by examining the faculties of the soul1 the influence of the understanding1 and the operations of the will4 ,let them first discuss a more simple question1 namely1 the operations of body and of brute unintelligent matter2 and try whether they can there form any idea of causation and necessity1 except that of a constant conjunction of objects1 and subsequent inference of the mind from one to another4 ,if these circumstances form1 in reality1 the whole of that necessity1 which we conceive in matter1 and if these circumstances be also universally acknowledged to take place in the operations of the mind1 the dispute is at an end2 at least1 must be owned to be thenceforth merely verbal4 ,but as long as we will rashly suppose1 that we have some farther idea of necessity and causation in the operations of external objects2 at the same time1 that we can find nothing farther in the voluntary actions of the mind2 there is no possibility of bringing the question to any determinate issue1 while we proceed upon so erroneous a supposition4 ,the only method of undeceiving us is to mount up higher2 to examine the narrow extent of science when applied to material causes2 and to convince ourselves that all we know of them is the constant conjunction and inference above mentioned4 ,we may1 perhaps1 find that it is with difficulty we are induced to fix such narrow limits to human understanding3 ,but we can afterwards find no difficulty when we come to apply this doctrine to the actions of the will4 ,for as it is evident that these have a regular conjunction with motives and circumstances and characters1 and as we always draw inferences from one to the other1 we must be obliged to acknowledge in words that necessity1 which we have already avowed1 in every deliberation of our lives1 and in every step of our conduct and behaviour4#ag #ag ,the prevalence of the doctrine of liberty may be accounted for1 from another cause1 viz4 a false sensation or seeming experience which we have1 or may have1 of liberty or indifference1 in many of our actions4 ,the necessity of any action1 whether of matter or of mind1 is not1 properly speaking1 a quality in the agent1 but in any thinking or intelligent being1 who may consider the action2 and it consists chiefly in the determination of his thoughts to infer the existence of that action from some preceding objects2 as liberty1 when opposed to necessity1 is nothing but the want of that determination1 and a certain looseness or indifference1 which we feel1 in passing1 or not passing1 from the idea of one object to that of any succeeding one4 ,now we may observe1 that1 though1 in reflecting on human actions1 we seldom feel such a looseness1 or indifference1 but are commonly able to infer them with considerable certainty from their motives1 and from the dispositions of the agent2 yet it frequently happens1 that1 in performing the actions themselves1 we are sensible of something like it3 ,and as all resembling objects are readily taken for each other1 this has been employed as a demonstrative and even intuitive proof of human liberty4 ,we feel1 that our actions are subject to our will1 on most occasions2 and imagine we feel1 that the will itself is subject to nothing1 because1 when by a denial of it we are provoked to try1 we feel1 that it moves easily every way1 and produces an image of itself 7or a ,vellety1 as it is called in the schools7 even on that side1 on which it did not settle4 ,this image1 or faint motion1 we persuade ourselves1 could1 at that time1 have been compleated into the thing itself2 because1 should that be denied1 we find1 upon a second trial1 that1 at present1 it can4 ,we consider not1 that the fantastical desire of shewing liberty1 is here the motive of our actions4 ,and it seems certain1 that1 however we may imagine we feel a liberty within ourselves1 a spectator can commonly infer our actions from our motives and character2 and even where he cannot1 he concludes in general1 that he might1 were he perfectly acquainted with every circumstance of our situation and temper1 and the most secret springs of our complexion and disposition4 ,now this is the very essence of necessity1 according to the foregoing doctrine4 #gc4 ,but to proceed in this reconciling project with regard to the question of liberty and necessity2 the most contentious question of metaphysics1 the most contentious science2 it will not require many words to prove1 that all mankind have ever agreed in the doctrine of liberty as well as in that of necessity1 and that the whole dispute1 in this respect also1 has been hitherto merely verbal4 ,for what is meant by liberty1 when applied to voluntary actions8 ,we cannot surely mean that actions have so little connexion with motives1 inclinations1 and circumstances1 that one does not follow with a certain degree of uniformity from the other1 and that one affords no inference by which we can conclude the existence of the other4 ,for these are plain and acknowledged matters of fact4 ,by liberty1 then1 we can only mean a power of acting or not acting1 according to the determinations of the will2 that is1 if we choose to remain at rest1 we may2 if we choose to move1 we also may4 ,now this hypothetical liberty is universally allowed to belong to every one who is not a prisoner and in chains4 ,here1 then1 is no subject of dispute4 #gd4 ,whatever definition we may give of liberty1 we should be careful to observe two requisite circumstances2 first1 that it be consistent with plain matter of fact2 secondly1 that it be consistent with itself4 ,if we observe these circumstances1 and render our definition intelligible1 ,i am persuaded that all mankind will be found of one opinion with regard to it4 ,it is universally allowed that nothing exists without a cause of its existence1 and that chance1 when strictly examined1 is a mere negative word1 and means not any real power which has anywhere a being in nature4 ,but it is pretended that some causes are necessary1 some not necessary4 ,here then is the advantage of definitions4 ,let any one define a cause1 without comprehending1 as a part of the definition1 a necessary connexion with its effect2 and let him show distinctly the origin of the idea1 expressed by the definition2 and ,i shall readily give up the whole controversy4 ,but if the foregoing explication of the matter be received1 this must be absolutely impracticable4 ,had not objects a regular conjunction with each other1 we should never have entertained any notion of cause and effect2 and this regular conjunction produces that inference of the understanding1 which is the only connexion1 that we can have any comprehension of4 ,whoever attempts a definition of cause1 exclusive of these circumstances1 will be obliged either to employ unintelligible terms or such as are synonymous to the term which he endeavours to define4#ah ,and if the definition above mentioned be admitted2 liberty1 when opposed to necessity1 not to constraint1 is the same thing with chance2 which is universally allowed to have no existence4 #ah ,thus1 if a cause be defined1 that which produces any thing2 it is easy to observe1 that producing is synonymous to causing4 ,in like manner1 if a cause be defined1 that by which any thing exists2 this is liable to the same objection4 ,for what is meant by these words1 by which8 ,had it been said1 that a cause is that after which any thing constantly exists2 we should have understood the terms4 ,for this is1 indeed1 all we know of the matter4 ,and this constancy forms the very essence of necessity1 nor have we any other idea of it4 ,,part ,,ii4 #ge4 ,there is no method of reasoning more common1 and yet none more blameable1 than1 in philosophical disputes1 to endeavour the refutation of any hypothesis1 by a pretence of its dangerous consequences to religion and morality4 ,when any opinion leads to absurdities1 it is certainly false2 but it is not certain that an opinion is false1 because it is of dangerous consequence4 ,such topics1 therefore1 ought entirely to be forborne2 as serving nothing to the discovery of truth1 but only to make the person of an antagonist odious4 ,this ,i observe in general1 without pretending to draw any advantage from it4 ,i frankly submit to an examination of this kind1 and shall venture to affirm that the doctrines1 both of necessity and of liberty1 as above explained1 are not only consistent with morality1 but are absolutely essential to its support4 ,necessity may be defined two ways1 conformably to the two definitions of cause1 of which it makes an essential part4 ,it consists either in the constant conjunction of like objects1 or in the inference of the understanding from one object to another4 ,now necessity1 in both these senses1 7which1 indeed1 are at bottom the same7 has universally1 though tacitly1 in the schools1 in the pulpit1 and in common life1 been allowed to belong to the will of man2 and no one has ever pretended to deny that we can draw inferences concerning human actions1 and that those inferences are founded on the experienced union of like actions1 with like motives1 inclinations1 and circumstances4 ,the only particular in which any one can differ1 is1 that either1 perhaps1 he will refuse to give the name of necessity to this property of human actions3 ,but as long as the meaning is understood1 ,i hope the word can do no harm3 ,or that he will maintain it possible to discover something farther in the operations of matter4 ,but this1 it must be acknowledged1 can be of no consequence to morality or religion1 whatever it may be to natural philosophy or metaphysics4 ,we may here be mistaken in asserting that there is no idea of any other necessity or connexion in the actions of body3 ,but surely we ascribe nothing to the actions of the mind1 but what everyone does1 and must readily allow of4 ,we change no circumstance in the received orthodox system with regard to the will1 but only in that with regard to material objects and causes4 ,nothing1 therefore1 can be more innocent1 at least1 than this doctrine4 #gf4 ,all laws being founded on rewards and punishments1 it is supposed as a fundamental principle1 that these motives have a regular and uniform influence on the mind1 and both produce the good and prevent the evil actions4 ,we may give to this influence what name we please2 but1 as it is usually conjoined with the action1 it must be esteemed a cause1 and be looked upon as an instance of that necessity1 which we would here establish4 ,the only proper object of hatred or vengeance is a person or creature1 endowed with thought and consciousness2 and when any criminal or injurious actions excite that passion1 it is only by their relation to the person1 or connexion with him4 ,actions are1 by their very nature1 temporary and perishing2 and where they proceed not from some cause in the character and disposition of the person who performed them1 they can neither redound to his honour1 if good2 nor infamy1 if evil4 ,the actions themselves may be blameable2 they may be contrary to all the rules of morality and religion3 ,but the person is not answerable for them2 and as they proceeded from nothing in him that is durable and constant1 and leave nothing of that nature behind them1 it is impossible he can1 upon their account1 become the object of punishment or vengeance4 ,according to the principle1 therefore1 which denies necessity1 and consequently causes1 a man is as pure and untainted1 after having committed the most horrid crime1 as at the first moment of his birth1 nor is his character anywise concerned in his actions1 since they are not derived from it1 and the wickedness of the one can never be used as a proof of the depravity of the other4 ,men are not blamed for such actions as they perform ignorantly and casually1 whatever may be the consequences4 ,why8 but because the principles of these actions are only momentary1 and terminate in them alone4 ,men are less blamed for such actions as they perform hastily and unpremeditately than for such as proceed from deliberation4 ,for what reason8 but because a hasty temper1 though a constant cause or principle in the mind1 operates only by intervals1 and infects not the whole character4 ,again1 repentance wipes off every crime1 if attended with a reformation of life and manners4 ,how is this to be accounted for8 but by asserting that actions render a person criminal merely as they are proofs of criminal principles in the mind2 and when1 by an alteration of these principles1 they cease to be just proofs1 they likewise cease to be criminal4 ,but1 except upon the doctrine of necessity1 they never were just proofs1 and consequently never were criminal4 #gg4 ,it will be equally easy to prove1 and from the same arguments1 that liberty1 according to that definition above mentioned1 in which all men agree1 is also essential to morality1 and that no human actions1 where it is wanting1 are susceptible of any moral qualities1 or can be the objects either of approbation or dislike4 ,for as actions are objects of our moral sentiment1 so far only as they are indications of the internal character1 passions1 and affections2 it is impossible that they can give rise either to praise or blame1 where they proceed not from these principles1 but are derived altogether from external violence4 #gh4 ,i pretend not to have obviated or removed all objections to this theory1 with regard to necessity and liberty4 ,i can foresee other objections1 derived from topics which have not here been treated of4 ,it may be said1 for instance1 that1 if voluntary actions be subjected to the same laws of necessity with the operations of matter1 there is a continued chain of necessary causes1 pre-ordained and pre-determined1 reaching from the original cause of all to every single volition of every human creature4 ,no contingency anywhere in the universe2 no indifference2 no liberty4 ,while we act1 we are1 at the same time1 acted upon4 ,the ultimate ,author of all our volitions is the ,creator of the world1 who first bestowed motion on this immense machine1 and placed all beings in that particular position1 whence every subsequent event1 by an inevitable necessity1 must result4 ,human actions1 therefore1 either can have no moral turpitude at all1 as proceeding from so good a cause2 or if they have any turpitude1 they must involve our ,creator in the same guilt1 while he is acknowledged to be their ultimate cause and author4 ,for as a man1 who fired a mine1 is answerable for all the consequences whether the train he employed be long or short2 so wherever a continued chain of necessary causes is fixed1 that ,being1 either finite or infinite1 who produces the first1 is likewise the author of all the rest1 and must both bear the blame and acquire the praise which belong to them4 ,our clear and unalterable ideas of morality establish this rule1 upon unquestionable reasons1 when we examine the consequences of any human action2 and these reasons must still have greater force when applied to the volitions and intentions of a ,being infinitely wise and powerful4 ,ignorance or impotence may be pleaded for so limited a creature as man2 but those imperfections have no place in our ,creator4 ,he foresaw1 he ordained1 he intended all those actions of men1 which we so rashly pronounce criminal4 ,and we must therefore conclude1 either that they are not criminal1 or that the ,deity1 not man1 is accountable for them4 ,but as either of these positions is absurd and impious1 it follows1 that the doctrine from which they are deduced cannot possibly be true1 as being liable to all the same objections4 ,an absurd consequence1 if necessary1 proves the original doctrine to be absurd2 in the same manner as criminal actions render criminal the original cause1 if the connexion between them be necessary and evitable4 ,this objection consists of two parts1 which we shall examine separately2 ,first1 that1 if human actions can be traced up1 by a necessary chain1 to the ,deity1 they can never be criminal2 on account of the infinite perfection of that ,being from whom they are derived1 and who can intend nothing but what is altogether good and laudable4 ,or1 ,secondly1 if they be criminal1 we must retract the attribute of perfection1 which we ascribe to the ,deity1 and must acknowledge him to be the ultimate author of guilt and moral turpitude in all his creatures4 #gi4 ,the answer to the first objection seems obvious and convincing4 ,there are many philosophers who1 after an exact scrutiny of all the phenomena of nature1 conclude1 that the ,,whole1 considered as one system1 is1 in every period of its existence1 ordered with perfect benevolence2 and that the utmost possible happiness will1 in the end1 result to all created beings1 without any mixture of positive or absolute ill or misery4 ,every physical ill1 say they1 makes an essential part of this benevolent system1 and could not possibly be removed1 even by the ,deity himself1 considered as a wise agent1 without giving entrance to greater ill1 or excluding greater good1 which will result from it4 ,from this theory1 some philosophers1 and the ancient ,stoics among the rest1 derived a topic of consolation under all afflictions1 while they taught their pupils that those ills under which they laboured were1 in reality1 goods to the universe2 and that to an enlarged view1 which could comprehend the whole system of nature1 every event became an object of joy and exultation4 ,but though this topic be specious and sublime1 it was soon found in practice weak and ineffectual4 ,you would surely more irritate than appease a man lying under the racking pains of the gout by preaching up to him the rectitude of those general laws1 which produced the malignant humours in his body1 and led them through the proper canals1 to the sinews and nerves1 where they now excite such acute torments4 ,these enlarged views may1 for a moment1 please the imagination of a speculative man1 who is placed in ease and security2 but neither can they dwell with constancy on his mind1 even though undisturbed by the emotions of pain or passion2 much less can they maintain their ground when attacked by such powerful antagonists4 ,the affections take a narrower and more natural survey of their object2 and by an economy1 more suitable to the infirmity of human minds1 regard alone the beings around us1 and are actuated by such events as appear good or ill to the private system4 #hj4 ,the case is the same with moral as with physical ill4 ,it cannot reasonably be supposed1 that those remote considerations1 which are found of so little efficacy with regard to one1 will have a more powerful influence with regard to the other4 ,the mind of man is so formed by nature that1 upon the appearance of certain characters1 dispositions1 and actions1 it immediately feels the sentiment of approbation or blame2 nor are there any emotions more essential to its frame and constitution4 ,the characters which engage our approbation are chiefly such as contribute to the peace and security of human society2 as the characters which excite blame are chiefly such as tend to public detriment and disturbance3 ,whence it may reasonably be presumed1 that the moral sentiments arise1 either mediately or immediately1 from a reflection of these opposite interests4 ,what though philosophical meditations establish a different opinion or conjecture2 that everything is right with regard to the ,,whole1 and that the qualities1 which disturb society1 are1 in the main1 as beneficial1 and are as suitable to the primary intention of nature as those which more directly promote its happiness and welfare8 ,are such remote and uncertain speculations able to counterbalance the sentiments which arise from the natural and immediate view of the objects8 ,a man who is robbed of a considerable sum2 does he find his vexation for the loss anywise diminished by these sublime reflections8 ,why then should his moral resentment against the crime be supposed incompatible with them8 ,or why should not the acknowledgment of a real distinction between vice and virtue be reconcileable to all speculative systems of philosophy1 as well as that of a real distinction between personal beauty and deformity8 ,both these distinctions are founded in the natural sentiments of the human mind3 ,and these sentiments are not to be controuled or altered by any philosophical theory or speculation whatsoever4 #ha4 ,the second objection admits not of so easy and satisfactory an answer2 nor is it possible to explain distinctly1 how the ,deity can be the mediate cause of all the actions of men1 without being the author of sin and moral turpitude4 ,these are mysteries1 which mere natural and unassisted reason is very unfit to handle2 and whatever system she embraces1 she must find herself involved in inextricable difficulties1 and even contradictions1 at every step which she takes with regard to such subjects4 ,to reconcile the indifference and contingency of human actions with prescience2 or to defend absolute decrees1 and yet free the ,deity from being the author of sin1 has been found hitherto to exceed all the power of philosophy4 ,happy1 if she be thence sensible of her temerity1 when she pries into these sublime mysteries2 and leaving a scene so full of obscurities and perplexities1 return1 with suitable modesty1 to her true and proper province1 the examination of common life2 where she will find difficulties enough to employ her enquiries1 without launching into so boundless an ocean of doubt1 uncertainty1 and contradiction6 ,,section ,,ix4 ,,of ,,the ,,reason ,,of ,,animals4 #hb4 ,all our reasonings concerning matter of fact are founded on a species of ,analogy1 which leads us to expect from any cause the same events1 which we have observed to result from similar causes4 ,where the causes are entirely similar1 the analogy is perfect1 and the inference1 drawn from it1 is regarded as certain and conclusive3 nor does any man ever entertain a doubt1 where he sees a piece of iron1 that it will have weight and cohesion of parts2 as in all other instances1 which have ever fallen under his observation4 ,but where the objects have not so exact a similarity1 the analogy is less perfect1 and the inference is less conclusive2 though still it has some force1 in proportion to the degree of similarity and resemblance4 ,the anatomical observations1 formed upon one animal1 are1 by this species of reasoning1 extended to all animals2 and it is certain1 that when the circulation of the blood1 for instance1 is clearly proved to have place in one creature1 as a frog1 or fish1 it forms a strong presumption1 that the same principle has place in all4 ,these analogical observations may be carried farther1 even to this science1 of which we are now treating2 and any theory1 by which we explain the operations of the understanding1 or the origin and connexion of the passions in man1 will acquire additional authority1 if we find1 that the same theory is requisite to explain the same phenomena in all other animals4 ,we shall make trial of this1 with regard to the hypothesis1 by which we have1 in the foregoing discourse1 endeavoured to account for all experimental reasonings2 and it is hoped1 that this new point of view will serve to confirm all our former observations4 #hc4 ,first1 ,it seems evident1 that animals as well as men learn many things from experience1 and infer1 that the same events will always follow from the same causes4 ,by this principle they become acquainted with the more obvious properties of external objects1 and gradually1 from their birth1 treasure up a knowledge of the nature of fire1 water1 earth1 stones1 heights1 depths1 c41 and of the effects which result from their operation4 ,the ignorance and inexperience of the young are here plainly distinguishable from the cunning and sagacity of the old1 who have learned1 by long observation1 to avoid what hurt them1 and to pursue what gave ease or pleasure4 ,a horse1 that has been accustomed to the field1 becomes acquainted with the proper height which he can leap1 and will never attempt what exceeds his force and ability4 ,an old greyhound will trust the more fatiguing part of the chace to the younger1 and will place himself so as to meet the hare in her doubles2 nor are the conjectures1 which he forms on this occasion1 founded in any thing but his observation and experience4 ,this is still more evident from the effects of discipline and education on animals1 who1 by the proper application of rewards and punishments1 may be taught any course of action1 and most contrary to their natural instincts and propensities4 ,is it not experience1 which renders a dog apprehensive of pain1 when you menace him1 or lift up the whip to beat him8 ,is it not even experience1 which makes him answer to his name1 and infer1 from such an arbitrary sound1 that you mean him rather than any of his fellows1 and intend to call him1 when you pronounce it in a certain manner1 and with a certain tone and accent8 ,in all these cases1 we may observe1 that the animal infers some fact beyond what immediately strikes his senses2 and that this inference is altogether founded on past experience1 while the creature expects from the present object the same consequences1 which it has always found in its observation to result from similar objects4 #hd4 ,secondly1 ,it is impossible1 that this inference of the animal can be founded on any process of argument or reasoning1 by which he concludes1 that like events must follow like objects1 and that the course of nature will always be regular in its operations4 ,for if there be in reality any arguments of this nature1 they surely lie too abstruse for the observation of such imperfect understandings2 since it may well employ the utmost care and attention of a philosophic genius to discover and observe them4 ,animals1 therefore1 are not guided in these inferences by reasoning3 ,neither are children3 ,neither are the generality of mankind1 in their ordinary actions and conclusions3 ,neither are philosophers themselves1 who1 in all the active parts of life1 are1 in the main1 the same with the vulgar1 and are governed by the same maxims4 ,nature must have provided some other principle1 of more ready1 and more general use and application2 nor can an operation of such immense consequence in life1 as that of inferring effects from causes1 be trusted to the uncertain process of reasoning and argumentation4 ,were this doubtful with regard to men1 it seems to admit of no question with regard to the brute creation2 and the conclusion being once firmly established in the one1 we have a strong presumption1 from all the rules of analogy1 that it ought to be universally admitted1 without any exception or reserve4 ,it is custom alone1 which engages animals1 from every object1 that strikes their senses1 to infer its usual attendant1 and carries their imagination1 from the appearance of the one1 to conceive the other1 in that particular manner1 which we denominate belief4 ,no other explication can be given of this operation1 in all the higher1 as well as lower classes of sensitive beings1 which fall under our notice and observation #ai4 #ai ,since all reasonings concerning facts or causes is derived merely from custom1 it may be asked how it happens1 that men so much surpass animals in reasoning1 and one man so much surpasses another8 ,has not the same custom the same influence on all8 ,we shall here endeavour briefly to explain the great difference in human understandings3 ,after which the reason of the difference between men and animals will easily be comprehended4 #a4 ,when we have lived any time1 and have been accustomed to the uniformity of nature1 we acquire a general habit1 by which we always transfer the known to the unknown1 and conceive the latter to resemble the former4 ,by means of this general habitual principle1 we regard even one experiment as the foundation of reasoning1 and expect a similar event with some degree of certainty1 where the experiment has been made accurately1 and free from all foreign circumstances4 ,it is therefore considered as a matter of great importance to observe the consequences of things2 and as one man may very much surpass another in attention and memory and observation1 this will make a very great difference in their reasoning4 #b4 ,where there is a complication of causes to produce any effect1 one mind may be much larger than another1 and better able to comprehend the whole system of objects1 and to infer justly their consequences4 #c4 ,one man is able to carry on a chain of consequences to a greater length than another4 #d4 ,few men can think long without running into a confusion of ideas1 and mistaking one for another2 and there are various degrees of this infirmity4 #e4 ,the circumstance1 on which the effect depends1 is frequently involved in other circumstances1 which are foreign and extrinsic4 ,the separation of it often requires great attention1 accuracy1 and subtilty4 #f4 ,the forming of general maxims from particular observation is a very nice operation2 and nothing is more usual1 from haste or a narrowness of mind1 which sees not on all sides1 than to commit mistakes in this particular4 #g4 ,when we reason from analogies1 the man1 who has the greater experience or the greater promptitude of suggesting analogies1 will be the better reasoner4 #h4 ,byasses from prejudice1 education1 passion1 party1 c4 hang more upon one mind than another4 #i4 ,after we have acquired a confidence in human testimony1 books and conversation enlarge much more the sphere of one man's experience and thought than those of another4 ,it would be easy to discover many other circumstances that make a difference in the understandings of men4 #he4 ,but though animals learn many parts of their knowledge from observation1 there are also many parts of it1 which they derive from the original hand of nature2 which much exceed the share of capacity they possess on ordinary occasions2 and in which they improve1 little or nothing1 by the longest practice and experience4 ,these we denominate ,instincts1 and are so apt to admire as something very extraordinary1 and inexplicable by all the disquisitions of human understanding4 ,but our wonder will1 perhaps1 cease or diminish1 when we consider1 that the experimental reasoning itself1 which we possess in common with beasts1 and on which the whole conduct of life depends1 is nothing but a species of instinct or mechanical power1 that acts in us unknown to ourselves2 and in its chief operations1 is not directed by any such relations or comparisons of ideas1 as are the proper objects of our intellectual faculties4 ,though the instinct be different1 yet still it is an instinct1 which teaches a man to avoid the fire2 as much as that1 which teaches a bird1 with such exactness1 the art of incubation1 and the whole economy and order of its nursery4 ,,section ,x4 ,,of ,,miracles4 ,,part ,i4 #hf4 ,there is1 in ,dr4 ,tillotson's writings1 an argument against the real presence1 which is as concise1 and elegant1 and strong as any argument can possibly be supposed against a doctrine1 so little worthy of a serious refutation4 ,it is acknowledged on all hands1 says that learned prelate1 that the authority1 either of the scripture or of tradition1 is founded merely in the testimony of the apostles1 who were eye-witnesses to those miracles of our ,saviour1 by which he proved his divine mission4 ,our evidence1 then1 for the truth of the ,christian religion is less than the evidence for the truth of our senses2 because1 even in the first authors of our religion1 it was no greater2 and it is evident it must diminish in passing from them to their disciples2 nor can any one rest such confidence in their testimony1 as in the immediate object of his senses4 ,but a weaker evidence can never destroy a stronger2 and therefore1 were the doctrine of the real presence ever so clearly revealed in scripture1 it were directly contrary to the rules of just reasoning to give our assent to it4 ,it contradicts sense1 though both the scripture and tradition1 on which it is supposed to be built1 carry not such evidence with them as sense2 when they are considered merely as external evidences1 and are not brought home to every one's breast1 by the immediate operation of the ,holy ,spirit4 ,nothing is so convenient as a decisive argument of this kind1 which must at least silence the most arrogant bigotry and superstition1 and free us from their impertinent solicitations4 ,i flatter myself1 that ,i have discovered an argument of a like nature1 which1 if just1 will1 with the wise and learned1 be an everlasting check to all kinds of superstitious delusion1 and consequently1 will be useful as long as the world endures4 ,for so long1 ,i presume1 will the accounts of miracles and prodigies be found in all history1 sacred and profane4 #hg4 ,though experience be our only guide in reasoning concerning matters of fact2 it must be acknowledged1 that this guide is not altogether infallible1 but in some cases is apt to lead us into errors4 ,one1 who in our climate1 should expect better weather in any week of ,june than in one of ,december1 would reason justly1 and conformably to experience2 but it is certain1 that he may happen1 in the event1 to find himself mistaken4 ,however1 we may observe1 that1 in such a case1 he would have no cause to complain of experience2 because it commonly informs us beforehand of the uncertainty1 by that contrariety of events1 which we may learn from a diligent observation4 ,all effects follow not with like certainty from their supposed causes4 ,some events are found1 in all countries and all ages1 to have been constantly conjoined together3 ,others are found to have been more variable1 and sometimes to disappoint our expectations2 so that1 in our reasonings concerning matter of fact1 there are all imaginable degrees of assurance1 from the highest certainty to the lowest species of moral evidence4 ,a wise man1 therefore1 proportions his belief to the evidence4 ,in such conclusions as are founded on an infallible experience1 he expects the event with the last degree of assurance1 and regards his past experience as a full proof of the future existence of that event4 ,in other cases1 he proceeds with more caution3 ,he weighs the opposite experiments3 ,he considers which side is supported by the greater number of experiments3 to that side he inclines1 with doubt and hesitation2 and when at last he fixes his judgement1 the evidence exceeds not what we properly call probability4 ,all probability1 then1 supposes an opposition of experiments and observations1 where the one side is found to overbalance the other1 and to produce a degree of evidence1 proportioned to the superiority4 ,a hundred instances or experiments on one side1 and fifty on another1 afford a doubtful expectation of any event2 though a hundred uniform experiments1 with only one that is contradictory1 reasonably beget a pretty strong degree of assurance4 ,in all cases1 we must balance the opposite experiments1 where they are opposite1 and deduct the smaller number from the greater1 in order to know the exact force of the superior evidence4 #hh4 ,to apply these principles to a particular instance2 we may observe1 that there is no species of reasoning more common1 more useful1 and even necessary to human life1 than that which is derived from the testimony of men1 and the reports of eye-witnesses and spectators4 ,this species of reasoning1 perhaps1 one may deny to be founded on the relation of cause and effect4 ,i shall not dispute about a word4 ,it will be sufficient to observe that our assurance in any argument of this kind is derived from no other principle than our observation of the veracity of human testimony1 and of the usual conformity of facts to the reports of witnesses4 ,it being a general maxim1 that no objects have any discoverable connexion together1 and that all the inferences1 which we can draw from one to another1 are founded merely on our experience of their constant and regular conjunction2 it is evident1 that we ought not to make an exception to this maxim in favour of human testimony1 whose connexion with any event seems1 in itself1 as little necessary as any other4 ,were not the memory tenacious to a certain degree1 had not men commonly an inclination to truth and a principle of probity2 were they not sensible to shame1 when detected in a falsehood3 ,were not these1 ,i say1 discovered by experience to be qualities1 inherent in human nature1 we should never repose the least confidence in human testimony4 ,a man delirious1 or noted for falsehood and villany1 has no manner of authority with us4 ,and as the evidence1 derived from witnesses and human testimony1 is founded on past experience1 so it varies with the experience1 and is regarded either as a proof or a probability1 according as the conjunction between any particular kind of report and any kind of object has been found to be constant or variable4 ,there are a number of circumstances to be taken into consideration in all judgements of this kind2 and the ultimate standard1 by which we determine all disputes1 that may arise concerning them1 is always derived from experience and observation4 ,where this experience is not entirely uniform on any side1 it is attended with an unavoidable contrariety in our judgements1 and with the same opposition and mutual destruction of argument as in every other kind of evidence4 ,we frequently hesitate concerning the reports of others4 ,we balance the opposite circumstances1 which cause any doubt or uncertainty2 and when we discover a superiority on any side1 we incline to it2 but still with a diminution of assurance1 in proportion to the force of its antagonist4 #hi4 ,this contrariety of evidence1 in the present case1 may be derived from several different causes2 from the opposition of contrary testimony2 from the character or number of the witnesses2 from the manner of their delivering their testimony2 or from the union of all these circumstances4 ,we entertain a suspicion concerning any matter of fact1 when the witnesses contradict each other2 when they are but few1 or of a doubtful character2 when they have an interest in what they affirm2 when they deliver their testimony with hesitation1 or on the contrary1 with too violent asseverations4 ,there are many other particulars of the same kind1 which may diminish or destroy the force of any argument1 derived from human testimony4 ,suppose1 for instance1 that the fact1 which the testimony endeavours to establish1 partakes of the extraordinary and the marvellous2 in that case1 the evidence1 resulting from the testimony1 admits of a diminution1 greater or less1 in proportion as the fact is more or less unusual4 ,the reason why we place any credit in witnesses and historians1 is not derived from any connexion1 which we perceive a priori1 between testimony and reality1 but because we are accustomed to find a conformity between them4 ,but when the fact attested is such a one as has seldom fallen under our observation1 here is a contest of two opposite experiences2 of which the one destroys the other1 as far as its force goes1 and the superior can only operate on the mind by the force1 which remains4 ,the very same principle of experience1 which gives us a certain degree of assurance in the testimony of witnesses1 gives us also1 in this case1 another degree of assurance against the fact1 which they endeavour to establish2 from which contradition there necessarily arises a counterpoize1 and mutual destruction of belief and authority4 ,i should not believe such a story were it told me by ,cato1 was a proverbial saying in ,rome1 even during the lifetime of that philosophical patriot4#bj ,the incredibility of a fact1 it was allowed1 might invalidate so great an authority4 #bj ,plutarch1 in vita ,catonis4 ,the ,indian prince1 who refused to believe the first relations concerning the effects of frost1 reasoned justly2 and it naturally required very strong testimony to engage his assent to facts1 that arose from a state of nature1 with which he was unacquainted1 and which bore so little analogy to those events1 of which he had had constant and uniform experience4 ,though they were not contrary to his experience1 they were not conformable to it4#ba #ba ,no ,indian1 it is evident1 could have experience that water did not freeze in cold climates4 ,this is placing nature in a situation quite unknown to him2 and it is impossible for him to tell a priori what will result from it4 ,it is making a new experiment1 the consequence of which is always uncertain4 ,one may sometimes conjecture from analogy what will follow2 but still this is but conjecture4 ,and it must be confessed1 that1 in the present case of freezing1 the event follows contrary to the rules of analogy1 and is such as a rational ,indian would not look for4 ,the operations of cold upon water are not gradual1 according to the degrees of cold2 but whenever it comes to the freezing point1 the water passes in a moment1 from the utmost liquidity to perfect hardness4 ,such an event1 therefore1 may be denominated extraordinary1 and requires a pretty strong testimony1 to render it credible to people in a warm climate3 ,but still it is not miraculous1 nor contrary to uniform experience of the course of nature in cases where all the circumstances are the same4 ,the inhabitants of ,sumatra have always seen water fluid in their own climate1 and the freezing of their rivers ought to be deemed a prodigy3 ,but they never saw water in ,muscovy during the winter2 and therefore they cannot reasonably be positive what would there be the consequence4 #ij4 ,but in order to encrease the probability against the testimony of witnesses1 let us suppose1 that the fact1 which they affirm1 instead of being only marvellous1 is really miraculous2 and suppose also1 that the testimony considered apart and in itself1 amounts to an entire proof2 in that case1 there is proof against proof1 of which the strongest must prevail1 but still with a diminution of its force1 in proportion to that of its antagonist4 ,a miracle is a violation of the laws of nature2 and as a firm and unalterable experience has established these laws1 the proof against a miracle1 from the very nature of the fact1 is as entire as any argument from experience can possibly be imagined4 ,why is it more than probable1 that all men must die2 that lead cannot1 of itself1 remain suspended in the air2 that fire consumes wood1 and is extinguished by water2 unless it be1 that these events are found agreeable to the laws of nature1 and there is required a violation of these laws1 or in other words1 a miracle to prevent them8 ,nothing is esteemed a miracle1 if it ever happen in the common course of nature4 ,it is no miracle that a man1 seemingly in good health1 should die on a sudden3 because such a kind of death1 though more unusual than any other1 has yet been frequently observed to happen4 ,but it is a miracle1 that a dead man should come to life2 because that has never been observed in any age or country4 ,there must1 therefore1 be a uniform experience against every miraculous event1 otherwise the event would not merit that appellation4 ,and as a uniform experience amounts to a proof1 there is here a direct and full proof1 from the nature of the fact1 against the existence of any miracle2 nor can such a proof be destroyed1 or the miracle rendered credible1 but by an opposite proof1 which is superior4#bb #bb ,sometimes an event may not1 in itself1 seem to be contrary to the laws of nature1 and yet1 if it were real1 it might1 by reason of some circumstances1 be denominated a miracle2 because1 in fact1 it is contrary to these laws4 ,thus if a person1 claiming a divine authority1 should command a sick person to be well1 a healthful man to fall down dead1 the clouds to pour rain1 the winds to blow1 in short1 should order many natural events1 which immediately follow upon his command2 these might justly be esteemed miracles1 because they are really1 in this case1 contrary to the laws of nature4 ,for if any suspicion remain1 that the event and command concurred by accident1 there is no miracle and no transgression of the laws of nature4 ,if this suspicion be removed1 there is evidently a miracle1 and a transgression of these laws2 because nothing can be more contrary to nature than that the voice or command of a man should have such an influence4 ,a miracle may be accurately defined1 a transgression of a law of nature by a particular volition of the ,deity1 or by the interposition of some invisible agent4 ,a miracle may either be discoverable by men or not4 ,this alters not its nature and essence4 ,the raising of a house or ship into the air is a visible miracle4 ,the raising of a feather1 when the wind wants ever so little of a force requisite for that purpose1 is as real a miracle1 though not so sensible with regard to us4 #ia4 ,the plain consequence is 7and it is a general maxim worthy of our attention71 ',that no testimony is sufficient to establish a miracle1 unless the testimony be of such a kind1 that its falsehood would be more miraculous1 than the fact1 which it endeavours to establish2 and even in that case there is a mutual destruction of arguments1 and the superior only gives us an assurance suitable to that degree of force1 which remains1 after deducting the inferior4' ,when anyone tells me1 that he saw a dead man restored to life1 ,i immediately consider with myself1 whether it be more probable1 that this person should either deceive or be deceived1 or that the fact1 which he relates1 should really have happened4 ,i weigh the one miracle against the other2 and according to the superiority1 which ,i discover1 ,i pronounce my decision1 and always reject the greater miracle4 ,if the falsehood of his testimony would be more miraculous1 than the event which he relates2 then1 and not till then1 can he pretend to command my belief or opinion4 ,,part ,,ii4 #ib4 ,in the foregoing reasoning we have supposed1 that the testimony1 upon which a miracle is founded1 may possibly amount to an entire proof1 and that the falsehood of that testimony would be a real prodigy3 ,but it is easy to shew1 that we have been a great deal too liberal in our concession1 and that there never was a miraculous event established on so full an evidence4 ,for first1 there is not to be found1 in all history1 any miracle attested by a sufficient number of men1 of such unquestioned good-sense1 education1 and learning1 as to secure us against all delusion in themselves2 of such undoubted integrity1 as to place them beyond all suspicion of any design to deceive others2 of such credit and reputation in the eyes of mankind1 as to have a great deal to lose in case of their being detected in any falsehood2 and at the same time1 attesting facts performed in such a public manner and in so celebrated a part of the world1 as to render the detection unavoidable3 ,all which circumstances are requisite to give us a full assurance in the testimony of men4 #ic4 ,secondly4 ,we may observe in human nature a principle which1 if strictly examined1 will be found to diminish extremely the assurance1 which we might1 from human testimony1 have1 in any kind of prodigy4 ,the maxim1 by which we commonly conduct ourselves in our reasonings1 is1 that the objects1 of which we have no experience1 resembles those1 of which we have2 that what we have found to be most usual is always most probable2 and that where there is an opposition of arguments1 we ought to give the preference to such as are founded on the greatest number of past observations4 ,but though1 in proceeding by this rule1 we readily reject any fact which is unusual and incredible in an ordinary degree2 yet in advancing farther1 the mind observes not always the same rule2 but when anything is affirmed utterly absurd and miraculous1 it rather the more readily admits of such a fact1 upon account of that very circumstance1 which ought to destroy all its authority4 ,the passion of surprise and wonder1 arising from miracles1 being an agreeable emotion1 gives a sensible tendency towards the belief of those events1 from which it is derived4 ,and this goes so far1 that even those who cannot enjoy this pleasure immediately1 nor can believe those miraculous events1 of which they are informed1 yet love to partake of the satisfaction at second-hand or by rebound1 and place a pride and delight in exciting the admiration of others4 ,with what greediness are the miraculous accounts of travellers received1 their descriptions of sea and land monsters1 their relations of wonderful adventures1 strange men1 and uncouth manners8 ,but if the spirit of religion join itself to the love of wonder1 there is an end of common sense2 and human testimony1 in these circumstances1 loses all pretensions to authority4 ,a religionist may be an enthusiast1 and imagine he sees what has no reality3 he may know his narrative to be false1 and yet persevere in it1 with the best intentions in the world1 for the sake of promoting so holy a cause3 or even where this delusion has not place1 vanity1 excited by so strong a temptation1 operates on him more powerfully than on the rest of mankind in any other circumstances2 and self-interest with equal force4 ,his auditors may not have1 and commonly have not1 sufficient judgement to canvass his evidence3 what judgement they have1 they renounce by principle1 in these sublime and mysterious subjects3 or if they were ever so willing to employ it1 passion and a heated imagination disturb the regularity of its operations4 ,their credulity increases his impudence3 and his impudence overpowers their credulity4 ,eloquence1 when at its highest pitch1 leaves little room for reason or reflection2 but addressing itself entirely to the fancy or the affections1 captivates the willing hearers1 and subdues their understanding4 ,happily1 this pitch it seldom attains4 ,but what a ,tully or a ,demosthenes could scarcely effect over a ,roman or ,athenian audience1 every ,capuchin1 every itinerant or stationary teacher can perform over the generality of mankind1 and in a higher degree1 by touching such gross and vulgar passions4 ,the many instances of forged miracles1 and prophecies1 and supernatural events1 which1 in all ages1 have either been detected by contrary evidence1 or which detect themselves by their absurdity1 prove sufficiently the strong propensity of mankind to the extraordinary and the marvellous1 and ought reasonably to beget a suspicion against all relations of this kind4 ,this is our natural way of thinking1 even with regard to the most common and most credible events4 ,for instance3 ,there is no kind of report which rises so easily1 and spreads so quickly1 especially in country places and provincial towns1 as those concerning marriages2 insomuch that two young persons of equal condition never see each other twice1 but the whole neighbourhood immediately join them together4 ,the pleasure of telling a piece of news so interesting1 of propagating it1 and of being the first reporters of it1 spreads the intelligence4 ,and this is so well known1 that no man of sense gives attention to these reports1 till he find them confirmed by some greater evidence4 ,do not the same passions1 and others still stronger1 incline the generality of mankind to believe and report1 with the greatest vehemence and assurance1 all religious miracles8 #id4 ,thirdly4 ,it forms a strong presumption against all supernatural and miraculous relations1 that they are observed chiefly to abound among ignorant and barbarous nations2 or if a civilized people has ever given admission to any of them1 that people will be found to have received them from ignorant and barbarous ancestors1 who transmitted them with that inviolable sanction and authority1 which always attend received opinions4 ,when we peruse the first histories of all nations1 we are apt to imagine ourselves transported into some new world2 where the whole frame of nature is disjointed1 and every element performs its operations in a different manner1 from what it does at present4 ,battles1 revolutions1 pestilence1 famine and death1 are never the effect of those natural causes1 which we experience4 ,prodigies1 omens1 oracles1 judgements1 quite obscure the few natural events1 that are intermingled with them4 ,but as the former grow thinner every page1 in proportion as we advance nearer the enlightened ages1 we soon learn1 that there is nothing mysterious or supernatural in the case1 but that all proceeds from the usual propensity of mankind towards the marvellous1 and that1 though this inclination may at intervals receive a check from sense and learning1 it can never be thoroughly extirpated from human nature4 ,it is strange1 a judicious reader is apt to say1 upon the perusal of these wonderful historians1 that such prodigious events never happen in our days4 ,but it is nothing strange1 ,i hope1 that men should lie in all ages4 ,you must surely have seen instances enough of that frailty4 ,you have yourself heard many such marvellous relations started1 which1 being treated with scorn by all the wise and judicious1 have at last been abandoned even by the vulgar4 ,be assured1 that those renowned lies1 which have spread and flourished to such a monstrous height1 arose from like beginnings2 but being sown in a more proper soil1 shot up at last into prodigies almost equal to those which they relate4 ,it was a wise policy in that false prophet1 ,alexander1 who though now forgotten1 was once so famous1 to lay the first scene of his impostures in ,paphlagonia1 where1 as ,lucian tells us1 the people were extremely ignorant and stupid1 and ready to swallow even the grossest delusion4 ,people at a distance1 who are weak enough to think the matter at all worth enquiry1 have no opportunity of receiving better information4 ,the stories come magnified to them by a hundred circumstances4 ,fools are industrious in propagating the imposture2 while the wise and learned are contented1 in general1 to deride its absurdity1 without informing themselves of the particular facts1 by which it may be distinctly refuted4 ,and thus the impostor above mentioned was enabled to proceed1 from his ignorant ,paphlagonians1 to the enlisting of votaries1 even among the ,grecian philosophers1 and men of the most eminent rank and distinction in ,rome3 nay1 could engage the attention of that sage emperor ,marcus ,aurelius2 so far as to make him trust the success of a military expedition to his delusive prophecies4 ,the advantages are so great1 of starting an imposture among an ignorant people1 that1 even though the delusion should be too gross to impose on the generality of them 7which1 though seldom1 is sometimes the case7 it has a much better chance for succeeding in remote countries1 than if the first scene had been laid in a city renowned for arts and knowledge4 ,the most ignorant and barbarous of these barbarians carry the report abroad4 ,none of their countrymen have a large correspondence1 or sufficient credit and authority to contradict and beat down the delusion4 ,men's inclination to the marvellous has full opportunity to display itself4 ,and thus a story1 which is universally exploded in the place where it was first started1 shall pass for certain at a thousand miles distance4 ,but had ,alexander fixed his residence at ,athens1 the philosophers of that renowned mart of learning had immediately spread1 throughout the whole ,roman empire1 their sense of the matter2 which1 being supported by so great authority1 and displayed by all the force of reason and eloquence1 had entirely opened the eyes of mankind4 ,it is true2 ,lucian1 passing by chance through ,paphlagonia1 had an opportunity of performing this good office4 ,but1 though much to be wished1 it does not always happen1 that every ,alexander meets with a ,lucian1 ready to expose and detect his impostures4 #ie4 ,i may add as a fourth reason1 which diminishes the authority of prodigies1 that there is no testimony for any1 even those which have not been expressly detected1 that is not opposed by an infinite number of witnesses2 so that not only the miracle destroys the credit of testimony1 but the testimony destroys itself4 ,to make this the better understood1 let us consider1 that1 in matters of religion1 whatever is different is contrary2 and that it is impossible the religions of ancient ,rome1 of ,turkey1 of ,siam1 and of ,china should1 all of them1 be established on any solid foundation4 ,every miracle1 therefore1 pretended to have been wrought in any of these religions 7and all of them abound in miracles71 as its direct scope is to establish the particular system to which it is attributed2 so has it the same force1 though more indirectly1 to overthrow every other system4 ,in destroying a rival system1 it likewise destroys the credit of those miracles1 on which that system was established2 so that all the prodigies of different religions are to be regarded as contrary facts1 and the evidences of these prodigies1 whether weak or strong1 as opposite to each other4 ,according to this method of reasoning1 when we believe any miracle of ,mahomet or his successors1 we have for our warrant the testimony of a few barbarous ,arabians3 ,and on the other hand1 we are to regard the authority of ,titus ,livius1 ,plutarch1 ,tacitus1 and1 in short1 of all the authors and witnesses1 ,grecian1 ,chinese1 and ,roman ,catholic1 who have related any miracle in their particular religion2 ,i say1 we are to regard their testimony in the same light as if they had mentioned that ,mahometan miracle1 and had in express terms contradicted it1 with the same certainty as they have for the miracle they relate4 ,this argument may appear over subtile and refined2 but is not in reality different from the reasoning of a judge1 who supposes1 that the credit of two witnesses1 maintaining a crime against any one1 is destroyed by the testimony of two others1 who affirm him to have been two hundred leagues distant1 at the same instant when the crime is said to have been committed4 #if4 ,one of the best attested miracles in all profane history1 is that which ,tacitus reports of ,vespasian1 who cured a blind man in ,alexandria1 by means of his spittle1 and a lame man by the mere touch of his foot2 in obedience to a vision of the god ,serapis1 who had enjoined them to have recourse to the ,emperor1 for these miraculous cures4 ,the story may be seen in that fine historian#bc2 where every circumstance seems to add weight to the testimony1 and might be displayed at large with all the force of argument and eloquence1 if any one were now concerned to enforce the evidence of that exploded and idolatrous superstition4 ,the gravity1 solidity1 age1 and probity of so great an emperor1 who1 through the whole course of his life1 conversed in a familiar manner with his friends and courtiers1 and never affected those extraordinary airs of divinity assumed by ,alexander and ,demetrius4 ,the historian1 a cotemporary writer1 noted for candour and veracity1 and withal1 the greatest and most penetrating genius1 perhaps1 of all antiquity2 and so free from any tendency to credulity1 that he even lies under the contrary imputation1 of atheism and profaneness3 ,the persons1 from whose authority he related the miracle1 of established character for judgement and veracity1 as we may well presume2 eye-witnesses of the fact1 and confirming their testimony1 after the ,flavian family was despoiled of the empire1 and could no longer give any reward1 as the price of a lie4 ,utrumque1 qui interfuere1 nunc quoque memorant1 postquam nullum mendacio pretium4 ,to which if we add the public nature of the facts1 as related1 it will appear1 that no evidence can well be supposed stronger for so gross and so palpable a falsehood4 #bc ,hist4 lib4 iv4 cap4 #ha4 ,suetonius gives nearly the same account in vita ,vesp4 ,there is also a memorable story related by ,cardinal de ,retz1 which may well deserve our consideration4 ,when that intriguing politician fled into ,spain1 to avoid the persecution of his enemies1 he passed through ,saragossa1 the capital of ,arragon1 where he was shewn1 in the cathedral1 a man1 who had served seven years as a door-keeper1 and was well known to every body in town1 that had ever paid his devotions at that church4 ,he had been seen1 for so long a time1 wanting a leg2 but recovered that limb by the rubbing of holy oil upon the stump2 and the cardinal assures us that he saw him with two legs4 ,this miracle was vouched by all the canons of the church2 and the whole company in town were appealed to for a confirmation of the fact2 whom the cardinal found1 by their zealous devotion1 to be thorough believers of the miracle4 ,here the relater was also cotemporary to the supposed prodigy1 of an incredulous and libertine character1 as well as of great genius2 the miracle of so singular a nature as could scarcely admit of a counterfeit1 and the witnesses very numerous1 and all of them1 in a manner1 spectators of the fact1 to which they gave their testimony4 ,and what adds mightily to the force of the evidence1 and may double our surprise on this occasion1 is1 that the cardinal himself1 who relates the story1 seems not to give any credit to it1 and consequently cannot be suspected of any concurrence in the holy fraud4 ,he considered justly1 that it was not requisite1 in order to reject a fact of this nature1 to be able accurately to disprove the testimony1 and to trace its falsehood1 through all the circumstances of knavery and credulity which produced it4 ,he knew1 that1 as this was commonly altogether impossible at any small distance of time and place2 so was it extremely difficult1 even where one was immediately present1 by reason of the bigotry1 ignorance1 cunning1 and roguery of a great part of mankind4 ,he therefore concluded1 like a just reasoner1 that such an evidence carried falsehood upon the very face of it1 and that a miracle1 supported by any human testimony1 was more properly a subject of derision than of argument4 ,there surely never was a greater number of miracles ascribed to one person1 than those1 which were lately said to have been wrought in ,france upon the tomb of ,abb ,paris1 the famous ,jansenist1 with whose sanctity the people were so long deluded4 ,the curing of the sick1 giving hearing to the deaf1 and sight to the blind1 were every where talked of as the usual effects of that holy sepulchre4 ,but what is more extraordinary2 many of the miracles were immediately proved upon the spot1 before judges of unquestioned integrity1 attested by witnesses of credit and distinction1 in a learned age1 and on the most eminent theatre that is now in the world4 ,nor is this all3 a relation of them was published and dispersed every where2 nor were the ,jesuits1 though a learned body1 supported by the civil magistrate1 and determined enemies to those opinions1 in whose favour the miracles were said to have been wrought1 ever able distinctly to refute or detect them#bd4 ,where shall we find such a number of circumstances1 agreeing to the corroboration of one fact8 ,and what have we to oppose to such a cloud of witnesses1 but the absolute impossibility or miraculous nature of the events1 which they relate8 ,and this surely1 in the eyes of all reasonable people1 will alone be regarded as a sufficient refutation4 #bd ,this book was writ by ,mons4 ,montgeron1 counsellor or judge of the parliament of ,paris1 a man of figure and character1 who was also a martyr to the cause1 and is now said to be somewhere in a dungeon on account of his book4 ,there is another book in three volumes 7called ,recueil des ,miracles de l',abb ,paris7 giving an account of many of these miracles1 and accompanied with prefatory discourses1 which are very well written4 ,there runs1 however1 through the whole of these a ridiculous comparison between the miracles of our ,saviour and those of the ,abb2 wherein it is asserted1 that the evidence for the latter is equal to that for the former3 ,as if the testimony of men could ever be put in the balance with that of ,god himself1 who conducted the pen of the inspired writers4 ,if these writers1 indeed1 were to be considered merely as human testimony1 the ,french author is very moderate in his comparison2 since he might1 with some appearance of reason1 pretend1 that the ,jansenist miracles much surpass the other in evidence and authority4 ,the following circumstances are drawn from authentic papers1 inserted in the above-mentioned book4 ,many of the miracles of ,abb ,paris were proved immediately by witnesses before the officiality or bishop's court at ,paris1 under the eye of cardinal ,noailles1 whose character for integrity and capacity was never contested even by his enemies4 ,his successor in the archbishopric was an enemy to the ,jansenists1 and for that reason promoted to the see by the court4 ,yet #bb rectors or curs of ,paris1 with infinite earnestness1 press him to examine those miracles1 which they assert to be known to the whole world1 and undisputably certain3 ,but he wisely forbore4 ,the ,molinist party had tried to discredit these miracles in one instance1 that of ,mademoiselle le ,franc4 ,but1 besides that their proceedings were in many respects the most irregular in the world1 particularly in citing only a few of the ,jansenist witnesses1 whom they tampered with3 ,besides this1 ,i say1 they soon found themselves overwhelmed by a cloud of new witnesses1 one hundred and twenty in number1 most of them persons of credit and substance in ,paris1 who gave oath for the miracle4 ,this was accompanied with a solemn and earnest appeal to the parliament4 ,but the parliament were forbidden by authority to meddle in the affair4 ,it was at last observed1 that where men are heated by zeal and enthusiasm1 there is no degree of human testimony so strong as may not be procured for the greatest absurdity3 ,and those who will be so silly as to examine the affair by that medium1 and seek particular flaws in the testimony1 are almost sure to be confounded4 ,it must be a miserable imposture1 indeed1 that does not prevail in that contest4 ,all who have been in ,france about that time have heard of the reputation of ,mons4 ,heraut1 the lieutenant de ,police1 whose vigilance1 penetration1 activity1 and extensive intelligence have been much talked of4 ,this magistrate1 who by the nature of his office is almost absolute1 was vested with full powers1 on purpose to suppress or discredit these miracles2 and he frequently seized immediately1 and examined the witnesses and subjects of them3 ,but never could reach any thing satisfactory against them4 ,in the case of ,mademoiselle ,thibaut he sent the famous ,de ,sylva to examine her2 whose evidence is very curious4 ,the physician declares1 that it was impossible she could have been so ill as was proved by witnesses2 because it was impossible she could1 in so short a time1 have recovered so perfectly as he found her4 ,he reasoned1 like a man of sense1 from natural causes2 but the opposite party told him1 that the whole was a miracle1 and that his evidence was the very best proof of it4 ,the ,molinists were in a sad dilemma4 ,they durst not assert the absolute insufficiency of human evidence1 to prove a miracle4 ,they were obliged to say1 that these miracles were wrought by witchcraft and the devil4 ,but they were told1 that this was the resource of the ,jews of old4 ,no ,jansenist was ever embarrassed to account for the cessation of the miracles1 when the church-yard was shut up by the king's edict4 ,it was the touch of the tomb1 which produced these extraordinary effects2 and when no one could approach the tomb1 no effects could be expected4 ,god1 indeed1 could have thrown down the walls in a moment2 but he is master of his own graces and works1 and it belongs not to us to account for them4 ,he did not throw down the walls of every city like those of ,jericho1 on the sounding of the rams horns1 nor break up the prison of every apostle1 like that of ,st4 ,paul4 ,no less a man1 than the ,due de ,chatillon1 a duke and peer of ,france1 of the highest rank and family1 gives evidence of a miraculous cure1 performed upon a servant of his1 who had lived several years in his house with a visible and palpable infirmity4 ,i shall conclude with observing1 that no clergy are more celebrated for strictness of life and manners than the secular clergy of ,france1 particularly the rectors or curs of ,paris1 who bear testimony to these impostures4 ,the learning1 genius1 and probity of the gentlemen1 and the austerity of the nuns of ,port-,royal1 have been much celebrated all over ,europe4 ,yet they all give evidence for a miracle1 wrought on the niece of the famous ,pascal1 whose sanctity of life1 as well as extraordinary capacity1 is well known4 ,the famous ,racine gives an account of this miracle in his famous history of ,port-,royal1 and fortifies it with all the proofs1 which a multitude of nuns1 priests1 physicians1 and men of the world1 all of them of undoubted credit1 could bestow upon it4 ,several men of letters1 particularly the bishop of ,tournay1 thought this miracle so certain1 as to employ it in the refutation of atheists and free-thinkers4 ,the queen-regent of ,france1 who was extremely prejudiced against the ,port-,royal1 sent her own physician to examine the miracle1 who returned an absolute convert4 ,in short1 the supernatural cure was so uncontestable1 that it saved1 for a time1 that famous monastery from the ruin with which it was threatened by the ,jesuits4 ,had it been a cheat1 it had certainly been detected by such sagacious and powerful antagonists1 and must have hastened the ruin of the contrivers4 ,our divines1 who can build up a formidable castle from such despicable materials2 what a prodigious fabric could they have reared from these and many other circumstances1 which ,i have not mentioned6 ,how often would the great names of ,pascal1 ,racine1 ,amaud1 ,nicole1 have resounded in our ears8 ,but if they be wise1 they had better adopt the miracle1 as being more worth1 a thousand times1 than all the rest of the collection4 ,besides1 it may serve very much to their purpose4 ,for that miracle was really performed by the touch of an authentic holy prickle of the holy thorn1 which composed the holy crown1 which1 c4 #ig4 ,is the consequence just1 because some human testimony has the utmost force and authority in some cases1 when it relates the battle of ,philippi or ,pharsalia for instance2 that therefore all kinds of testimony must1 in all cases1 have equal force and authority8 ,suppose that the ,caesarean and ,pompeian factions had1 each of them1 claimed the victory in these battles1 and that the historians of each party had uniformly ascribed the advantage to their own side2 how could mankind1 at this distance1 have been able to determine between them8 ,the contrariety is equally strong between the miracles related by ,herodotus or ,plutarch1 and those delivered by ,mariana1 ,bede1 or any monkish historian4 ,the wise lend a very academic faith to every report which favours the passion of the reporter2 whether it magnifies his country1 his family1 or himself1 or in any other way strikes in with his natural inclinations and propensities4 ,but what greater temptation than to appear a missionary1 a prophet1 an ambassador from heaven8 ,who would not encounter many dangers and difficulties1 in order to attain so sublime a character8 ,or if1 by the help of vanity and a heated imagination1 a man has first made a convert of himself1 and entered seriously into the delusion2 who ever scruples to make use of pious frauds1 in support of so holy and meritorious a cause8 ,the smallest spark may here kindle into the greatest flame2 because the materials are always prepared for it4 ,the avidum genus auricularum#be1 the gazing populace1 receive greedily1 without examination1 whatever sooths superstition1 and promotes wonder4 #be ,lucret4 ,how many stories of this nature have1 in all ages1 been detected and exploded in their infancy8 ,how many more have been celebrated for a time1 and have afterwards sunk into neglect and oblivion8 ,where such reports1 therefore1 fly about1 the solution of the phenomenon is obvious2 and we judge in conformity to regular experience and observation1 when we account for it by the known and natural principles of credulity and delusion4 ,and shall we1 rather than have a recourse to so natural a solution1 allow of a miraculous violation of the most established laws of nature8 ,i need not mention the difficulty of detecting a falsehood in any private or even public history1 at the place1 where it is said to happen2 much more when the scene is removed to ever so small a distance4 ,even a court of judicature1 with all the authority1 accuracy1 and judgement1 which they can employ1 find themselves often at a loss to distinguish between truth and falsehood in the most recent actions4 ,but the matter never comes to any issue1 if trusted to the common method of altercations and debate and flying rumours2 especially when men's passions have taken part on either side4 ,in the infancy of new religions1 the wise and learned commonly esteem the matter too inconsiderable to deserve their attention or regard4 ,and when afterwards they would willingly detect the cheat1 in order to undeceive the deluded multitude1 the season is now past1 and the records and witnesses1 which might clear up the matter1 have perished beyond recovery4 ,no means of detection remain1 but those which must be drawn from the very testimony itself of the reporters3 and these1 though always sufficient with the judicious and knowing1 are commonly too fine to fall under the comprehension of the vulgar4 #ih4 ,upon the whole1 then1 it appears1 that no testimony for any kind of miracle has ever amounted to a probability1 much less to a proof2 and that1 even supposing it amounted to a proof1 it would be opposed by another proof2 derived from the very nature of the fact1 which it would endeavour to establish4 ,it is experience only1 which gives authority to human testimony2 and it is the same experience1 which assures us of the laws of nature4 ,when1 therefore1 these two kinds of experience are contrary1 we have nothing to do but substract the one from the other1 and embrace an opinion1 either on one side or the other1 with that assurance which arises from the remainder4 ,but according to the principle here explained1 this substraction1 with regard to all popular religions1 amounts to an entire annihilation2 and therefore we may establish it as a maxim1 that no human testimony can have such force as to prove a miracle1 and make it a just foundation for any such system of religion4 #ii4 ,i beg the limitations here made may be remarked1 when ,i say1 that a miracle can never be proved1 so as to be the foundation of a system of religion4 ,for ,i own1 that otherwise1 there may possibly be miracles1 or violations of the usual course of nature1 of such a kind as to admit of proof from human testimony2 though1 perhaps1 it will be impossible to find any such in all the records of history4 ,thus1 suppose1 all authors1 in all languages1 agree1 that1 from the first of ,january #afjj1 there was a total darkness over the whole earth for eight days3 suppose that the tradition of this extraordinary event is still strong and lively among the people3 that all travellers1 who return from foreign countries1 bring us accounts of the same tradition1 without the least variation or contradiction3 it is evident1 that our present philosophers1 instead of doubting the fact1 ought to receive it as certain1 and ought to search for the causes whence it might be derived4 ,the decay1 corruption1 and dissolution of nature1 is an event rendered probable by so many analogies1 that any phenomenon1 which seems to have a tendency towards that catastrophe1 comes within the reach of human testimony1 if that testimony be very extensive and uniform4 ,but suppose1 that all the historians who treat of ,england1 should agree1 that1 on the first of ,january #afjj1 ,queen ,elizabeth died2 that both before and after her death she was seen by her physicians and the whole court1 as is usual with persons of her rank2 that her successor was acknowledged and proclaimed by the parliament2 and that1 after being interred a month1 she again appeared1 resumed the throne1 and governed ,england for three years3 ,i must confess that ,i should be surprised at the concurrence of so many odd circumstances1 but should not have the least inclination to believe so miraculous an event4 ,i should not doubt of her pretended death1 and of those other public circumstances that followed it3 ,i should only assert it to have been pretended1 and that it neither was1 nor possibly could be real4 ,you would in vain object to me the difficulty1 and almost impossibility of deceiving the world in an affair of such consequence2 the wisdom and solid judgement of that renowned queen2 with the little or no advantage which she could reap from so poor an artifice3 ,all this might astonish me2 but ,i would still reply1 that the knavery and folly of men are such common phenomena1 that ,i should rather believe the most extraordinary events to arise from their concurrence1 than admit of so signal a violation of the laws of nature4 ,but should this miracle be ascribed to any new system of religion2 men1 in all ages1 have been so much imposed on by ridiculous stories of that kind1 that this very circumstance would be a full proof of a cheat1 and sufficient1 with all men of sense1 not only to make them reject the fact1 but even reject it without farther examination4 ,though the ,being to whom the miracle is ascribed1 be1 in this case1 ,almighty1 it does not1 upon that account1 become a whit more probable2 since it is impossible for us to know the attributes or actions of such a ,being1 otherwise than from the experience which we have of his productions1 in the usual course of nature4 ,this still reduces us to past observation1 and obliges us to compare the instances of the violation of truth in the testimony of men1 with those of the violation of the laws of nature by miracles1 in order to judge which of them is most likely and probable4 ,as the violations of truth are more common in the testimony concerning religious miracles1 than in that concerning any other matter of fact2 this must diminish very much the authority of the former testimony1 and make us form a general resolution1 never to lend any attention to it1 with whatever specious pretence it may be covered4 ,lord ,bacon seems to have embraced the same principles of reasoning4 ',we ought1' says he1 'to make a collection or particular history of all monsters and prodigious births or productions1 and in a word of every thing new1 rare1 and extraordinary in nature4 ,but this must be done with the most severe scrutiny1 lest we depart from truth4 ,above all1 every relation must be considered as suspicious1 which depends in any degree upon religion1 as the prodigies of ,livy3 ,and no less so1 every thing that is to be found in the writers of natural magic or alchimy1 or such authors1 who seem1 all of them1 to have an unconquerable appetite for falsehood and fable#bf4' #bf ,nov4 ,org4 lib4 ii4 aph4 #bi4 #ajj4 ,i am the better pleased with the method of reasoning here delivered1 as ,i think it may serve to confound those dangerous friends or disguised enemies to the ,christian ,religion1 who have undertaken to defend it by the principles of human reason4 ,our most holy religion is founded on ,faith1 not on reason2 and it is a sure method of exposing it to put it to such a trial as it is1 by no means1 fitted to endure4 ,to make this more evident1 let us examine those miracles1 related in scripture2 and not to lose ourselves in too wide a field1 let us confine ourselves to such as we find in the ,pentateuch1 which we shall examine1 according to the principles of these pretended ,christians1 not as the word or testimony of ,god himself1 but as the production of a mere human writer and historian4 ,here then we are first to consider a book1 presented to us by a barbarous and ignorant people1 written in an age when they were still more barbarous1 and in all probability long after the facts which it relates1 corroborated by no concurring testimony1 and resembling those fabulous accounts1 which every nation gives of its origin4 ,upon reading this book1 we find it full of prodigies and miracles4 ,it gives an account of a state of the world and of human nature entirely different from the present3 ,of our fall from that state3 ,of the age of man1 extended to near a thousand years3 ,of the destruction of the world by a deluge3 ,of the arbitrary choice of one people1 as the favourites of heaven2 and that people the countrymen of the author3 ,of their deliverance from bondage by prodigies the most astonishing imaginable3 ,i desire any one to lay his hand upon his heart1 and after a serious consideration declare1 whether he thinks that the falsehood of such a book1 supported by such a testimony1 would be more extraordinary and miraculous than all the miracles it relates2 which is1 however1 necessary to make it be received1 according to the measures of probability above established4 #aja4 ,what we have said of miracles may be applied1 without any variation1 to prophecies2 and indeed1 all prophecies are real miracles1 and as such only1 can be admitted as proofs of any revelation4 ,if it did not exceed the capacity of human nature to foretell future events1 it would be absurd to employ any prophecy as an argument for a divine mission or authority from heaven4 ,so that1 upon the whole1 we may conclude1 that the ,christian ,religion not only was at first attended with miracles1 but even at this day cannot be believed by any reasonable person without one4 ,mere reason is insufficient to convince us of its veracity3 ,and whoever is moved by ,faith to assent to it1 is conscious of a continued miracle in his own person1 which subverts all the principles of his understanding1 and gives him a determination to believe what is most contrary to custom and experience4 ,,section ,,xi4 ,,of ,a ,,particular ,,providence ,,and ,,of ,a ,,future ,,state4 #ajb4 ,i was lately engaged in conversation with a friend who loves sceptical paradoxes2 where1 though he advanced many principles1 of which ,i can by no means approve1 yet as they seem to be curious1 and to bear some relation to the chain of reasoning carried on throughout this enquiry1 ,i shall here copy them from my memory as accurately as ,i can1 in order to submit them to the judgement of the reader4 ,our conversation began with my admiring the singular good fortune of philosophy1 which1 as it requires entire liberty above all other privileges1 and chiefly flourishes from the free opposition of sentiments and argumentation1 received its first birth in an age and country of freedom and toleration1 and was never cramped1 even in its most extravagant principles1 by any creeds1 concessions1 or penal statutes4 ,for1 except the banishment of ,protagoras1 and the death of ,socrates1 which last event proceeded partly from other motives1 there are scarcely any instances to be met with1 in ancient history1 of this bigotted jealousy1 with which the present age is so much infested4 ,epicurus lived at ,athens to an advanced age1 in peace and tranquillity3 ,epicureans#bg were even admitted to receive the sacerdotal character1 and to officiate at the altar1 in the most sacred rites of the established religion3 ,and the public encouragement#bh of pensions and salaries was afforded equally1 by the wisest of all the ,roman emperors#bi1 to the professors of every sect of philosophy4 ,how requisite such kind of treatment was to philosophy1 in her early youth1 will easily be conceived1 if we reflect1 that1 even at present1 when she may be supposed more hardy and robust1 she bears with much difficulty the inclemency of the seasons1 and those harsh winds of calumny and persecution1 which blow upon her4 #bg ,luciani ,greek3 symp4 ae ,lapithai4 #bh ,luciani ,greek3 eunouchos4 #bi ,luciani and ,dio4 ,you admire1 says my friend1 as the singular good fortune of philosophy1 what seems to result from the natural course of things1 and to be unavoidable in every age and nation4 ,this pertinacious bigotry1 of which you complain1 as so fatal to philosophy1 is really her offspring1 who1 after allying with superstition1 separates himself entirely from the interest of his parent1 and becomes her most inveterate enemy and persecutor4 ,speculative dogmas of religion1 the present occasions of such furious dispute1 could not possibly be conceived or admitted in the early ages of the world2 when mankind1 being wholly illiterate1 formed an idea of religion more suitable to their weak apprehension1 and composed their sacred tenets of such tales chiefly as were the objects of traditional belief1 more than of argument or disputation4 ,after the first alarm1 therefore1 was over1 which arose from the new paradoxes and principles of the philosophers2 these teachers seem ever after1 during the ages of antiquity1 to have lived in great harmony with the established superstition1 and to have made a fair partition of mankind between them2 the former claiming all the learned and wise1 the latter possessing all the vulgar and illiterate4 #ajc4 ,it seems then1 say ,i1 that you leave politics entirely out of the question1 and never suppose1 that a wise magistrate can justly be jealous of certain tenets of philosophy1 such as those of ,epicurus1 which1 denying a divine existence1 and consequently a providence and a future state1 seem to loosen1 in a great measure1 the ties of morality1 and may be supposed1 for that reason1 pernicious to the peace of civil society4 ,i know1 replied he1 that in fact these persecutions never1 in any age1 proceeded from calm reason1 or from experience of the pernicious consequences of philosophy2 but arose entirely from passion and prejudice4 ,but what if ,i should advance farther1 and assert1 that if ,epicurus had been accused before the people1 by any of the sycophants or informers of those days1 he could easily have defended his cause1 and proved his principles of philosophy to be as salutary as those of his adversaries1 who endeavoured1 with such zeal1 to expose him to the public hatred and jealousy8 ,i wish1 said ,i1 you would try your eloquence upon so extraordinary a topic1 and make a speech for ,epicurus1 which might satisfy1 not the mob of ,athens1 if you will allow that ancient and polite city to have contained any mob1 but the more philosophical part of his audience1 such as might be supposed capable of comprehending his arguments4 ,the matter would not be difficult1 upon such conditions1 replied he3 ,and if you please1 ,i shall suppose myself ,epicurus for a moment1 and make you stand for the ,athenian people1 and shall deliver you such an harangue as will fill all the urn with white beans1 and leave not a black one to gratify the malice of my adversaries4 ,very well3 ,pray proceed upon these suppositions4 #ajd4 ,i come hither1 ,o ye ,athenians1 to justify in your assembly what ,i maintained in my school1 and ,i find myself impeached by furious antagonists1 instead of reasoning with calm and dispassionate enquirers4 ,your deliberations1 which of right should be directed to questions of public good1 and the interest of the commonwealth1 are diverted to the disquisitions of speculative philosophy2 and these magnificent1 but perhaps fruitless enquiries1 take place of your more familiar but more useful occupations4 ,but so far as in me lies1 ,i will prevent this abuse4 ,we shall not here dispute concerning the origin and government of worlds4 ,we shall only enquire how far such questions concern the public interest4 ,and if ,i can persuade you1 that they are entirely indifferent to the peace of society and security of government1 ,i hope that you will presently send us back to our schools1 there to examine1 at leisure1 the question the most sublime1 but at the same time1 the most speculative of all philosophy4 ,the religious philosophers1 not satisfied with the tradition of your forefathers1 and doctrine of your priests 7in which ,i willingly acquiesce71 indulge a rash curiosity1 in trying how far they can establish religion upon the principles of reason2 and they thereby excite1 instead of satisfying1 the doubts1 which naturally arise from a diligent and scrutinous enquiry4 ,they paint1 in the most magnificent colours1 the order1 beauty1 and wise arrangement of the universe2 and then ask1 if such a glorious display of intelligence could proceed from the fortuitous concourse of atoms1 or if chance could produce what the greatest genius can never sufficiently admire4 ,i shall not examine the justness of this argument4 ,i shall allow it to be as solid as my antagonists and accusers can desire4 ,it is sufficient1 if ,i can prove1 from this very reasoning1 that the question is entirely speculative1 and that1 when1 in my philosophical disquisitions1 ,i deny a providence and a future state1 ,i undermine not the foundations of society1 but advance principles1 which they themselves1 upon their own topics1 if they argue consistently1 must allow to be solid and satisfactory4 #aje4 ,you then1 who are my accusers1 have acknowledged1 that the chief or sole argument for a divine existence 7which ,i never questioned7 is derived from the order of nature2 where there appear such marks of intelligence and design1 that you think it extravagant to assign for its cause1 either chance1 or the blind and unguided force of matter4 ,you allow1 that this is an argument drawn from effects to causes4 ,from the order of the work1 you infer1 that there must have been project and forethought in the workman4 ,if you cannot make out this point1 you allow1 that your conclusion fails2 and you pretend not to establish the conclusion in a greater latitude than the phenomena of nature will justify4 ,these are your concessions4 ,i desire you to mark the consequences4 ,when we infer any particular cause from an effect1 we must proportion the one to the other1 and can never be allowed to ascribe to the cause any qualities1 but what are exactly sufficient to produce the effect4 ,a body of ten ounces raised in any scale may serve as a proof1 that the counterbalancing weight exceeds ten ounces2 but can never afford a reason that it exceeds a hundred4 ,if the cause1 assigned for any effect1 be not sufficient to produce it1 we must either reject that cause1 or add to it such qualities as will give it a just proportion to the effect4 ,but if we ascribe to it farther qualities1 or affirm it capable of producing other effects1 we can only indulge the licence of conjecture1 and arbitrarily suppose the existence of qualities and energies1 without reason or authority4 ,the same rule holds1 whether the cause assigned be brute unconscious matter1 or a rational intelligent being4 ,if the cause be known only by the effect1 we never ought to ascribe to it any qualities1 beyond what are precisely requisite to produce the effect3 ,nor can we1 by any rules of just reasoning1 return back from the cause1 and infer other effects from it1 beyond those by which alone it is known to us4 ,no one1 merely from the sight of one of ,zeuxis's pictures1 could know1 that he was also a statuary or architect1 and was an artist no less skilful in stone and marble than in colours4 ,the talents and taste1 displayed in the particular work before us2 these we may safely conclude the workman to be possessed of4 ,the cause must be proportioned to the effect2 and if we exactly and precisely proportion it1 we shall never find in it any qualities1 that point farther1 or afford an inference concerning any other design or performance4 ,such qualities must be somewhat beyond what is merely requisite for producing the effect1 which we examine4 #ajf4 ,allowing1 therefore1 the gods to be the authors of the existence or order of the universe2 it follows1 that they possess that precise degree of power1 intelligence1 and benevolence1 which appears in their workmanship2 but nothing farther can ever be proved1 except we call in the assistance of exaggeration and flattery to supply the defects of argument and reasoning4 ,so far as the traces of any attributes1 at present1 appear1 so far may we conclude these attributes to exist4 ,the supposition of farther attributes is mere hypothesis2 much more the supposition1 that1 in distant regions of space or periods of time1 there has been1 or will be1 a more magnificent display of these attributes1 and a scheme of administration more suitable to such imaginary virtues4 ,we can never be allowed to mount up from the universe1 the effect1 to ,jupiter1 the cause2 and then descend downwards1 to infer any new effect from that cause2 as if the present effects alone were not entirely worthy of the glorious attributes1 which we ascribe to that deity4 ,the knowledge of the cause being derived solely from the effect1 they must be exactly adjusted to each other2 and the one can never refer to anything farther1 or be the foundation of any new inference and conclusion4 ,you find certain phenomena in nature4 ,you seek a cause or author4 ,you imagine that you have found him4 ,you afterwards become so enamoured of this offspring of your brain1 that you imagine it impossible1 but he must produce something greater and more perfect than the present scene of things1 which is so full of ill and disorder4 ,you forget1 that this superlative intelligence and benevolence are entirely imaginary1 or1 at least1 without any foundation in reason2 and that you have no ground to ascribe to him any qualities1 but what you see he has actually exerted and displayed in his productions4 ,let your gods1 therefore1 ,o philosophers1 be suited to the present appearances of nature3 and presume not to alter these appearances by arbitrary suppositions1 in order to suit them to the attributes1 which you so fondly ascribe to your deities4 #ajg4 ,when priests and poets1 supported by your authority1 ,o ,athenians1 talk of a golden or silver age1 which preceded the present state of vice and misery1 ,i hear them with attention and with reverence4 ,but when philosophers1 who pretend to neglect authority1 and to cultivate reason1 hold the same discourse1 ,i pay them not1 ,i own1 the same obsequious submission and pious deference4 ,i ask2 who carried them into the celestial regions1 who admitted them into the councils of the gods1 who opened to them the book of fate1 that they thus rashly affirm1 that their deities have executed1 or will execute1 any purpose beyond what has actually appeared8 ,if they tell me1 that they have mounted on the steps or by the gradual ascent of reason1 and by drawing inferences from effects to causes1 ,i still insist1 that they have aided the ascent of reason by the wings of imagination2 otherwise they could not thus change their manner of inference1 and argue from causes to effects2 presuming1 that a more perfect production than the present world would be more suitable to such perfect beings as the gods1 and forgetting that they have no reason to ascribe to these celestial beings any perfection or any attribute1 but what can be found in the present world4 ,hence all the fruitless industry to account for the ill appearances of nature1 and save the honour of the gods2 while we must acknowledge the reality of that evil and disorder1 with which the world so much abounds4 ,the obstinate and intractable qualities of matter1 we are told1 or the observance of general laws1 or some such reason1 is the sole cause1 which controlled the power and benevolence of ,jupiter1 and obliged him to create mankind and every sensible creature so imperfect and so unhappy4 ,these attributes then1 are1 it seems1 beforehand1 taken for granted1 in their greatest latitude4 ,and upon that supposition1 ,i own that such conjectures may1 perhaps1 be admitted as plausible solutions of the ill phenomena4 ,but still ,i ask2 ,why take these attributes for granted1 or why ascribe to the cause any qualities but what actually appear in the effect8 ,why torture your brain to justify the course of nature upon suppositions1 which1 for aught you know1 may be entirely imaginary1 and of which there are to be found no traces in the course of nature8 ,the religious hypothesis1 therefore1 must be considered only as a particular method of accounting for the visible phenomena of the universe3 but no just reasoner will ever presume to infer from it any single fact1 and alter or add to the phenomena1 in any single particular4 ,if you think1 that the appearances of things prove such causes1 it is allowable for you to draw an inference concerning the existence of these causes4 ,in such complicated and sublime subjects1 every one should be indulged in the liberty of conjecture and argument4 ,but here you ought to rest4 ,if you come backward1 and arguing from your inferred causes1 conclude1 that any other fact has existed1 or will exist1 in the course of nature1 which may serve as a fuller display of particular attributes2 ,i must admonish you1 that you have departed from the method of reasoning1 attached to the present subject1 and have certainly added something to the attributes of the cause1 beyond what appears in the effect2 otherwise you could never1 with tolerable sense or propriety1 add anything to the effect1 in order to render it more worthy of the cause4 #ajh4 ,where1 then1 is the odiousness of that doctrine1 which ,i teach in my school1 or rather1 which ,i examine in my gardens8 ,or what do you find in this whole question1 wherein the security of good morals1 or the peace and order of society1 is in the least concerned8 ,i deny a providence1 you say1 and supreme governor of the world1 who guides the course of events1 and punishes the vicious with infamy and disappointment1 and rewards the virtuous with honour and success1 in all their undertakings4 ,but surely1 ,i deny not the course itself of events1 which lies open to every one's inquiry and examination4 ,i acknowledge1 that1 in the present order of things1 virtue is attended with more peace of mind than vice1 and meets with a more favourable reception from the world4 ,i am sensible1 that1 according to the past experience of mankind1 friendship is the chief joy of human life1 and moderation the only source of tranquillity and happiness4 ,i never balance between the virtuous and the vicious course of life2 but am sensible1 that1 to a well-disposed mind1 every advantage is on the side of the former4 ,and what can you say more1 allowing all your suppositions and reasonings8 ,you tell me1 indeed1 that this disposition of things proceeds from intelligence and design4 ,but whatever it proceeds from1 the disposition itself1 on which depends our happiness or misery1 and consequently our conduct and deportment in life is still the same4 ,it is still open for me1 as well as you1 to regulate my behaviour1 by my experience of past events4 ,and if you affirm1 that1 while a divine providence is allowed1 and a supreme distributive justice in the universe1 ,i ought to expect some more particular reward of the good1 and punishment of the bad1 beyond the ordinary course of events2 ,i here find the same fallacy1 which ,i have before endeavoured to detect4 ,you persist in imagining1 that1 if we grant that divine existence1 for which you so earnestly contend1 you may safely infer consequences from it1 and add something to the experienced order of nature1 by arguing from the attributes which you ascribe to your gods4 ,you seem not to remember1 that all your reasonings on this subject can only be drawn from effects to causes2 and that every argument1 deducted from causes to effects1 must of necessity be a gross sophism2 since it is impossible for you to know anything of the cause1 but what you have antecedently1 not inferred1 but discovered to the full1 in the effect4 #aji4 ,but what must a philosopher think of those vain reasoners1 who1 instead of regarding the present scene of things as the sole object of their contemplation1 so far reverse the whole course of nature1 as to render this life merely a passage to something farther2 a porch1 which leads to a greater1 and vastly different building2 a prologue1 which serves only to introduce the piece1 and give it more grace and propriety8 ,whence1 do you think1 can such philosophers derive their idea of the gods8 ,from their own conceit and imagination surely4 ,for if they derived it from the present phenomena1 it would never point to anything farther1 but must be exactly adjusted to them4 ,that the divinity may possibly be endowed with attributes1 which we have never seen exerted2 may be governed by principles of action1 which we cannot discover to be satisfied3 all this will freely be allowed4 ,but still this is mere possibility and hypothesis4 ,we never can have reason to infer any attributes1 or any principles of action in him1 but so far as we know them to have been exerted and satisfied4 ,are there any marks of a distributive justice in the world8 ,if you answer in the affirmative1 ,i conclude1 that1 since justice here exerts itself1 it is satisfied4 ,if you reply in the negative1 ,i conclude1 that you have then no reason to ascribe justice1 in our sense of it1 to the gods4 ,if you hold a medium between affirmation and negation1 by saying1 that the justice of the gods1 at present1 exerts itself in part1 but not in its full extent2 ,i answer1 that you have no reason to give it any particular extent1 but only so far as you see it1 at present1 exert itself4 #aaj4 ,thus ,i bring the dispute1 ,o ,athenians1 to a short issue with my antagonists4 ,the course of nature lies open to my contemplation as well as to theirs4 ,the experienced train of events is the great standard1 by which we all regulate our conduct4 ,nothing else can be appealed to in the field1 or in the senate4 ,nothing else ought ever to be heard of in the school1 or in the closet4 ,in vain would our limited understanding break through those boundaries1 which are too narrow for our fond imagination4 ,while we argue from the course of nature1 and infer a particular intelligent cause1 which first bestowed1 and still preserves order in the universe1 we embrace a principle1 which is both uncertain and useless4 ,it is uncertain2 because the subject lies entirely beyond the reach of human experience4 ,it is useless2 because our knowledge of this cause being derived entirely from the course of nature1 we can never1 according to the rules of just reasoning1 return back from the cause with any new inference1 or making additions to the common and experienced course of nature1 establish any new principles of conduct and behaviour4 #aaa4 ,i observe 7said ,i1 finding he had finished his harangue7 that you neglect not the artifice of the demagogues of old2 and as you were pleased to make me stand for the people1 you insinuate yourself into my favour by embracing those principles1 to which1 you know1 ,i have always expressed a particular attachment4 ,but allowing you to make experience 7as indeed ,i think you ought7 the only standard of our judgement concerning this1 and all other questions of fact2 ,i doubt not but1 from the very same experience1 to which you appeal1 it may be possible to refute this reasoning1 which you have put into the mouth of ,epicurus4 ,if you saw1 for instance1 a half-finished building1 surrounded with heaps of brick and stone and mortar1 and all the instruments of masonry2 could you not infer from the effect1 that it was a work of design and contrivance8 ,and could you not return again1 from this inferred cause1 to infer new additions to the effect1 and conclude1 that the building would soon be finished1 and receive all the further improvements1 which art could bestow upon it8 ,if you saw upon the sea-shore the print of one human foot1 you would conclude1 that a man had passed that way1 and that he had also left the traces of the other foot1 though effaced by the rolling of the sands or inundation of the waters4 ,why then do you refuse to admit the same method of reasoning with regard to the order of nature8 ,consider the world and the present life only as an imperfect building1 from which you can infer a superior intelligence2 and arguing from that superior intelligence1 which can leave nothing imperfect2 why may you not infer a more finished scheme or plan1 which will receive its completion in some distant point of space or time8 ,are not these methods of reasoning exactly similar8 ,and under what pretence can you embrace the one1 while you reject the other8 #aab4 ,the infinite difference of the subjects1 replied he1 is a sufficient foundation for this difference in my conclusions4 ,in works of human art and contrivance1 it is allowable to advance from the effect to the cause1 and returning back from the cause1 to form new inferences concerning the effect1 and examine the alterations1 which it has probably undergone1 or may still undergo4 ,but what is the foundation of this method of reasoning8 ,plainly this2 that man is a being1 whom we know by experience1 whose motives and designs we are acquainted with1 and whose projects and inclinations have a certain connexion and coherence1 according to the laws which nature has established for the government of such a creature4 ,when1 therefore1 we find1 that any work has proceeded from the skill and industry of man2 as we are otherwise acquainted with the nature of the animal1 we can draw a hundred inferences concerning what may be expected from him2 and these inferences will all be founded in experience and observation4 ,but did we know man only from the single work or production which we examine1 it were impossible for us to argue in this manner2 because our knowledge of all the qualities1 which we ascribe to him1 being in that case derived from the production1 it is impossible they could point to anything farther1 or be the foundation of any new inference4 ,the print of a foot in the sand can only prove1 when considered alone1 that there was some figure adapted to it1 by which it was produced3 but the print of a human foot proves likewise1 from our other experience1 that there was probably another foot1 which also left its impression1 though effaced by time or other accidents4 ,here we mount from the effect to the cause2 and descending again from the cause1 infer alterations in the effect2 but this is not a continuation of the same simple chain of reasoning4 ,we comprehend in this case a hundred other experiences and observations1 concerning the usual figure and members of that species of animal1 without which this method of argument must be considered as fallacious and sophistical4 #aac4 ,the case is not the same with our reasonings from the works of nature4 ,the ,deity is known to us only by his productions1 and is a single being in the universe1 not comprehended under any species or genus1 from whose experienced attributes or qualities1 we can1 by analogy1 infer any attribute or quality in him4 ,as the universe shews wisdom and goodness1 we infer wisdom and goodness4 ,as it shews a particular degree of these perfections1 we infer a particular degree of them1 precisely adapted to the effect which we examine4 ,but farther attributes or farther degrees of the same attributes1 we can never be authorised to infer or suppose1 by any rules of just reasoning4 ,now1 without some such licence of supposition1 it is impossible for us to argue from the cause1 or infer any alteration in the effect1 beyond what has immediately fallen under our observation4 ,greater good produced by this ,being must still prove a greater degree of goodness3 a more impartial distribution of rewards and punishments must proceed from a greater regard to justice and equity4 ,every supposed addition to the works of nature makes an addition to the attributes of the ,author of nature2 and consequently1 being entirely unsupported by any reason or argument1 can never be admitted but as mere conjecture and hypothesis#cj4 #cj ,in general1 it may1 ,i think1 be established as a maxim1 that where any cause is known only by its particular effects1 it must be impossible to infer any new effects from that cause2 since the qualities1 which are requisite to produce these new effects along with the former1 must either be different1 or superior1 or of more extensive operation1 than those which simply produced the effect1 whence alone the cause is supposed to be known to us4 ,we can never1 therefore1 have any reason to suppose the existence of these qualities4 ,to say1 that the new effects proceed only from a continuation of the same energy1 which is already known from the first effects1 will not remove the difficulty4 ,for even granting this to be the case 7which can seldom be supposed71 the very continuation and exertion of a like energy 7for it is impossible it can be absolutely the same71 ,i say1 this exertion of a like energy1 in a different period of space and time1 is a very arbitrary supposition1 and what there cannot possibly be any traces of in the effects1 from which all our knowledge of the cause is originally derived4 ,let the inferred cause be exactly proportioned 7as it should be7 to the known effect2 and it is impossible that it can possess any qualities1 from which new or different effects can be inferred4 ,the great source of our mistake in this subject1 and of the unbounded licence of conjecture1 which we indulge1 is1 that we tacitly consider ourselves1 as in the place of the ,supreme ,being1 and conclude1 that he will1 on every occasion1 observe the same conduct1 which we ourselves1 in his situation1 would have embraced as reasonable and eligible4 ,but1 besides that the ordinary course of nature may convince us1 that almost everything is regulated by principles and maxims very different from ours2 besides this1 ,i say1 it must evidently appear contrary to all rules of analogy to reason1 from the intentions and projects of men1 to those of a ,being so different1 and so much superior4 ,in human nature1 there is a certain experienced coherence of designs and inclinations2 so that when1 from any fact1 we have discovered one intention of any man1 it may often be reasonable1 from experience1 to infer another1 and draw a long chain of conclusions concerning his past or future conduct4 ,but this method of reasoning can never have place with regard to a ,being1 so remote and incomprehensible1 who bears much less analogy to any other being in the universe than the sun to a waxen taper1 and who discovers himself only by some faint traces or outlines1 beyond which we have no authority to ascribe to him any attribute or perfection4 ,what we imagine to be a superior perfection1 may really be a defect4 ,or were it ever so much a perfection1 the ascribing of it to the ,supreme ,being1 where it appears not to have been really exerted1 to the full1 in his works1 savours more of flattery and panegyric1 than of just reasoning and sound philosophy4 ,all the philosophy1 therefore1 in the world1 and all the religion1 which is nothing but a species of philosophy1 will never be able to carry us beyond the usual course of experience1 or give us measures of conduct and behaviour different from those which are furnished by reflections on common life4 ,no new fact can ever be inferred from the religious hypothesis2 no event foreseen or foretold2 no reward or punishment expected or dreaded1 beyond what is already known by practice and observation4 ,so that my apology for ,epicurus will still appear solid and satisfactory2 nor have the political interests of society any connexion with the philosophical disputes concerning metaphysics and religion4 #aad4 ,there is still one circumstance1 replied ,i1 which you seem to have overlooked4 ,though ,i should allow your premises1 ,i must deny your conclusion4 ,you conclude1 that religious doctrines and reasonings can have no influence on life1 because they ought to have no influence2 never considering1 that men reason not in the same manner you do1 but draw many consequences from the belief of a divine ,existence1 and suppose that the ,deity will inflict punishments on vice1 and bestow rewards on virtue1 beyond what appear in the ordinary course of nature4 ,whether this reasoning of theirs be just or not1 is no matter4 ,its influence on their life and conduct must still be the same4 ,and1 those1 who attempt to disabuse them of such prejudices1 may1 for aught ,i know1 be good reasoners1 but ,i cannot allow them to be good citizens and politicians2 since they free men from one restraint upon their passions1 and make the infringement of the laws of society1 in one respect1 more easy and secure4 ,after all1 ,i may1 perhaps1 agree to your general conclusion in favour of liberty1 though upon different premises from those1 on which you endeavour to found it4 ,i think1 that the state ought to tolerate every principle of philosophy2 nor is there an instance1 that any government has suffered in its political interests by such indulgence4 ,there is no enthusiasm among philosophers2 their doctrines are not very alluring to the people2 and no restraint can be put upon their reasonings1 but what must be of dangerous consequence to the sciences1 and even to the state1 by paving the way for persecution and oppression in points1 where the generality of mankind are more deeply interested and concerned4 #aae4 ,but there occurs to me 7continued ,i7 with regard to your main topic1 a difficulty1 which ,i shall just propose to you without insisting on it2 lest it lead into reasonings of too nice and delicate a nature4 ,in a word1 ,i much doubt whether it be possible for a cause to be known only by its effect 7as you have all along supposed7 or to be of so singular and particular a nature as to have no parallel and no similarity with any other cause or object1 that has ever fallen under our observation4 ,it is only when two species of objects are found to be constantly conjoined1 that we can infer the one from the other2 and were an effect presented1 which was entirely singular1 and could not be comprehended under any known species1 ,i do not see1 that we could form any conjecture or inference at all concerning its cause4 ,if experience and observation and analogy be1 indeed1 the only guides which we can reasonably follow in inferences of this nature2 both the effect and cause must bear a similarity and resemblance to other effects and causes1 which we know1 and which we have found1 in many instances1 to be conjoined with each other4 ,i leave it to your own reflection to pursue the consequences of this principle4 ,i shall just observe1 that1 as the antagonists of ,epicurus always suppose the universe1 an effect quite singular and unparalleled1 to be the proof of a ,deity1 a cause no less singular and unparalleled2 your reasonings1 upon that supposition1 seem1 at least1 to merit our attention4 ,there is1 ,i own1 some difficulty1 how we can ever return from the cause to the effect1 and1 reasoning from our ideas of the former1 infer any alteration on the latter1 or any addition to it4 ,,section ,,xii4 ,,of ,,the ,,academical ,,or ,,sceptical ,,philosophy4 ,,part ,i4 #aaf4 ,there is not a greater number of philosophical reasonings1 displayed upon any subject1 than those1 which prove the existence of a ,deity1 and refute the fallacies of ,atheists2 and yet the most religious philosophers still dispute whether any man can be so blinded as to be a speculative atheist4 ,how shall we reconcile these contradictions8 ,the knights-errant1 who wandered about to clear the world of dragons and giants1 never entertained the least doubt with regard to the existence of these monsters4 ,the ,sceptic is another enemy of religion1 who naturally provokes the indignation of all divines and graver philosophers2 though it is certain1 that no man ever met with any such absurd creature1 or conversed with a man1 who had no opinion or principle concerning any subject1 either of action or speculation4 ,this begets a very natural question2 ,what is meant by a sceptic8 ,and how far it is possible to push these philosophical principles of doubt and uncertainty8 ,there is a species of scepticism1 antecedent to all study and philosophy1 which is much inculcated by ,des ,cartes and others1 as a sovereign preservative against error and precipitate judgement4 ,it recommends an universal doubt1 not only of all our former opinions and principles1 but also of our very faculties2 of whose veracity1 say they1 we must assure ourselves1 by a chain of reasoning1 deduced from some original principle1 which cannot possibly be fallacious or deceitful4 ,but neither is there any such original principle1 which has a prerogative above others1 that are self-evident and convincing3 or if there were1 could we advance a step beyond it1 but by the use of those very faculties1 of which we are supposed to be already diffident4 ,the ,cartesian doubt1 therefore1 were it ever possible to be attained by any human creature 7as it plainly is not7 would be entirely incurable2 and no reasoning could ever bring us to a state of assurance and conviction upon any subject4 ,it must1 however1 be confessed1 that this species of scepticism1 when more moderate1 may be understood in a very reasonable sense1 and is a necessary preparative to the study of philosophy1 by preserving a proper impartiality in our judgements1 and weaning our mind from all those prejudices1 which we may have imbibed from education or rash opinion4 ,to begin with clear and self-evident principles1 to advance by timorous and sure steps1 to review frequently our conclusions1 and examine accurately all their consequences2 though by these means we shall make both a slow and a short progress in our systems2 are the only methods1 by which we can ever hope to reach truth1 and attain a proper stability and certainty in our determinations4 #aag4 ,there is another species of scepticism1 consequent to science and enquiry1 when men are supposed to have discovered1 either the absolute fallaciousness of their mental faculties1 or their unfitness to reach any fixed determination in all those curious subjects of speculation1 about which they are commonly employed4 ,even our very senses are brought into dispute1 by a certain species of philosophers2 and the maxims of common life are subjected to the same doubt as the most profound principles or conclusions of metaphysics and theology4 ,as these paradoxical tenets 7if they may be called tenets7 are to be met with in some philosophers1 and the refutation of them in several1 they naturally excite our curiosity1 and make us enquire into the arguments1 on which they may be founded4 ,i need not insist upon the more trite topics1 employed by the sceptics in all ages1 against the evidence of sense2 such as those which are derived from the imperfection and fallaciousness of our organs1 on numberless occasions2 the crooked appearance of an oar in water2 the various aspects of objects1 according to their different distances2 the double images which arise from the pressing one eye2 with many other appearances of a like nature4 ,these sceptical topics1 indeed1 are only sufficient to prove1 that the senses alone are not implicitly to be depended on2 but that we must correct their evidence by reason1 and by considerations1 derived from the nature of the medium1 the distance of the object1 and the disposition of the organ1 in order to render them1 within their sphere1 the proper criteria of truth and falsehood4 ,there are other more profound arguments against the senses1 which admit not of so easy a solution4 #aah4 ,it seems evident1 that men are carried1 by a natural instinct or prepossession1 to repose faith in their senses2 and that1 without any reasoning1 or even almost before the use of reason1 we always suppose an external universe1 which depends not on our perception1 but would exist1 though we and every sensible creature were absent or annihilated4 ,even the animal creation are governed by a like opinion1 and preserve this belief of external objects1 in all their thoughts1 designs1 and actions4 ,it seems also evident1 that1 when men follow this blind and powerful instinct of nature1 they always suppose the very images1 presented by the senses1 to be the external objects1 and never entertain any suspicion1 that the one are nothing but representations of the other4 ,this very table1 which we see white1 and which we feel hard1 is believed to exist1 independent of our perception1 and to be something external to our mind1 which perceives it4 ,our presence bestows not being on it3 our absence does not annihilate it4 ,it preserves its existence uniform and entire1 independent of the situation of intelligent beings1 who perceive or contemplate it4 ,but this universal and primary opinion of all men is soon destroyed by the slightest philosophy1 which teaches us1 that nothing can ever be present to the mind but an image or perception1 and that the senses are only the inlets1 through which these images are conveyed1 without being able to produce any immediate intercourse between the mind and the object4 ,the table1 which we see1 seems to diminish1 as we remove farther from it3 but the real table1 which exists independent of us1 suffers no alteration3 it was1 therefore1 nothing but its image1 which was present to the mind4 ,these are the obvious dictates of reason2 and no man1 who reflects1 ever doubted1 that the existences1 which we consider1 when we say1 this house and that tree1 are nothing but perceptions in the mind1 and fleeting copies or representations of other existences1 which remain uniform and independent4 #aai4 ,so far1 then1 are we necessitated by reasoning to contradict or depart from the primary instincts of nature1 and to embrace a new system with regard to the evidence of our senses4 ,but here philosophy finds herself extremely embarrassed1 when she would justify this new system1 and obviate the cavils and objections of the sceptics4 ,she can no longer plead the infallible and irresistible instinct of nature3 for that led us to a quite different system1 which is acknowledged fallible and even erroneous4 ,and to justify this pretended philosophical system1 by a chain of clear and convincing argument1 or even any appearance of argument1 exceeds the power of all human capacity4 ,by what argument can it be proved1 that the perceptions of the mind must be caused by external objects1 entirely different from them1 though resembling them 7if that be possible7 and could not arise either from the energy of the mind itself1 or from the suggestion of some invisible and unknown spirit1 or from some other cause still more unknown to us8 ,it is acknowledged1 that1 in fact1 many of these perceptions arise not from anything external1 as in dreams1 madness1 and other diseases4 ,and nothing can be more inexplicable than the manner1 in which body should so operate upon mind as ever to convey an image of itself to a substance1 supposed of so different1 and even contrary a nature4 ,it is a question of fact1 whether the perceptions of the senses be produced by external objects1 resembling them3 how shall this question be determined8 ,by experience surely2 as all other questions of a like nature4 ,but here experience is1 and must be entirely silent4 ,the mind has never anything present to it but the perceptions1 and cannot possibly reach any experience of their connexion with objects4 ,the supposition of such a connexion is1 therefore1 without any foundation in reasoning4 #abj4 ,to have recourse to the veracity of the supreme ,being1 in order to prove the veracity of our senses1 is surely making a very unexpected circuit4 ,if his veracity were at all concerned in this matter1 our senses would be entirely infallible2 because it is not possible that he can ever deceive4 ,not to mention1 that1 if the external world be once called in question1 we shall be at a loss to find arguments1 by which we may prove the existence of that ,being or any of his attributes4 #aba4 ,this is a topic1 therefore1 in which the profounder and more philosophical sceptics will always triumph1 when they endeavour to introduce an universal doubt into all subjects of human knowledge and enquiry4 ,do you follow the instincts and propensities of nature1 may they say1 in assenting to the veracity of sense8 ,but these lead you to believe that the very perception or sensible image is the external object4 ,do you disclaim this principle1 in order to embrace a more rational opinion1 that the perceptions are only representations of something external8 ,you here depart from your natural propensities and more obvious sentiments2 and yet are not able to satisfy your reason1 which can never find any convincing argument from experience to prove1 that the perceptions are connected with any external objects4 #abb4 ,there is another sceptical topic of a like nature1 derived from the most profound philosophy2 which might merit our attention1 were it requisite to dive so deep1 in order to discover arguments and reasonings1 which can so little serve to any serious purpose4 ,it is universally allowed by modern enquirers1 that all the sensible qualities of objects1 such as hard1 soft1 hot1 cold1 white1 black1 c4 are merely secondary1 and exist not in the objects themselves1 but are perceptions of the mind1 without any external archetype or model1 which they represent4 ,if this be allowed1 with regard to secondary qualities1 it must also follow1 with regard to the supposed primary qualities of extension and solidity2 nor can the latter be any more entitled to that denomination than the former4 ,the idea of extension is entirely acquired from the senses of sight and feeling2 and if all the qualities1 perceived by the senses1 be in the mind1 not in the object1 the same conclusion must reach the idea of extension1 which is wholly dependent on the sensible ideas or the ideas of secondary qualities4 ,nothing can save us from this conclusion1 but the asserting1 that the ideas of those primary qualities are attained by ,abstraction1 an opinion1 which1 if we examine it accurately1 we shall find to be unintelligible1 and even absurd4 ,an extension1 that is neither tangible nor visible1 cannot possibly be conceived3 and a tangible or visible extension1 which is neither hard nor soft1 black nor white1 is equally beyond the reach of human conception4 ,let any man try to conceive a triangle in general1 which is neither ,isosceles nor ,scalenum1 nor has any particular length or proportion of sides2 and he will soon perceive the absurdity of all the scholastic notions with regard to abstraction and general ideas4#ca #ca ,this argument is drawn from ,dr4 ,berkeley2 and indeed most of the writings of that very ingenious author form the best lessons of scepticism1 which are to be found either among the ancient or modern philosopher1 ,bayle not excepted4 ,he professes1 however1 in his title-page 7and undoubtedly with great truth7 to have composed his book against the sceptics as well as against the atheists and free-thinkers4 ,but that all his arguments1 though otherwise intended1 are1 in reality1 merely sceptical1 appears from this1 that they admit of no answer and produce no conviction4 ,their only effect is to cause that momentary amazement and irresolution and confusion1 which is the result of scepticism4 #abc4 ,thus the first philosophical objection to the evidence of sense or to the opinion of external existence consists in this1 that such an opinion1 if rested on natural instinct1 is contrary to reason1 and if referred to reason1 is contrary to natural instinct1 and at the same time carries no rational evidence with it1 to convince an impartial enquirer4 ,the second objection goes farther1 and represents this opinion as contrary to reason3 at least1 if it be a principle of reason1 that all sensible qualities are in the mind1 not in the object4 ,bereave matter of all its intelligible qualities1 both primary and secondary1 you in a manner annihilate it1 and leave only a certain unknown1 inexplicable something1 as the cause of our perceptions2 a notion so imperfect1 that no sceptic will think it worth while to contend against it4 ,,part ,,ii4 #abd4 ,it may seem a very extravagant attempt of the sceptics to destroy reason by argument and ratiocination2 yet is this the grand scope of all their enquiries and disputes4 ,they endeavour to find objections1 both to our abstract reasonings1 and to those which regard matter of fact and existence4 ,the chief objection against all abstract reasonings is derived from the ideas of space and time2 ideas1 which1 in common life and to a careless view1 are very clear and intelligible1 but when they pass through the scrutiny of the profound sciences 7and they are the chief object of these sciences7 afford principles1 which seem full of absurdity and contradiction4 ,no priestly dogmas1 invented on purpose to tame and subdue the rebellious reason of mankind1 ever shocked common sense more than the doctrine of the infinitive divisibility of extension1 with its consequences2 as they are pompously displayed by all geometricians and metaphysicians1 with a kind of triumph and exultation4 ,a real quantity1 infinitely less than any finite quantity1 containing quantities infinitely less than itself1 and so on in infinitum2 this is an edifice so bold and prodigious1 that it is too weighty for any pretended demonstration to support1 because it shocks the clearest and most natural principles of human reason4#cb ,but what renders the matter more extraordinary1 is1 that these seemingly absurd opinions are supported by a chain of reasoning1 the clearest and most natural2 nor is it possible for us to allow the premises without admitting the consequences4 ,nothing can be more convincing and satisfactory than all the conclusions concerning the properties of circles and triangles2 and yet1 when these are once received1 how can we deny1 that the angle of contact between a circle and its tangent is infinitely less than any rectilineal angle1 that as you may increase the diameter of the circle in infinitum1 this angle of contact becomes still less1 even in infinitum1 and that the angle of contact between other curves and their tangents may be infinitely less than those between any circle and its tangent1 and so on1 in infinitum8 ,the demonstration of these principles seems as unexceptionable as that which proves the three angles of a triangle to be equal to two right ones1 though the latter opinion be natural and easy1 and the former big with contradiction and absurdity4 ,reason here seems to be thrown into a kind of amazement and suspence1 which1 without the suggestions of any sceptic1 gives her a diffidence of herself1 and of the ground on which she treads4 ,she sees a full light1 which illuminates certain places2 but that light borders upon the most profound darkness4 ,and between these she is so dazzled and confounded1 that she scarcely can pronounce with certainty and assurance concerning any one object4 #cb ,whatever disputes there may be about mathematical points1 we must allow that there are physical points2 that is1 parts of extension1 which cannot be divided or lessened1 either by the eye or imagination4 ,these images1 then1 which are present to the fancy or senses1 are absolutely indivisible1 and consequently must be allowed by mathematicians to be infinitely less than any real part of extension2 and yet nothing appears more certain to reason1 than that an infinite number of them composes an infinite extension4 ,how much more an infinite number of those infinitely small parts of extension1 which are still supposed infinitely divisible4 #abe4 ,the absurdity of these bold determinations of the abstract sciences seems to become1 if possible1 still more palpable with regard to time than extension4 ,an infinite number of real parts of time1 passing in succession1 and exhausted one after another1 appears so evident a contradiction1 that no man1 one should think1 whose judgement is not corrupted1 instead of being improved1 by the sciences1 would ever be able to admit of it4 ,yet still reason must remain restless1 and unquiet1 even with regard to that scepticism1 to which she is driven by these seeming absurdities and contradictions4 ,how any clear1 distinct idea can contain circumstances1 contradictory to itself1 or to any other clear1 distinct idea1 is absolutely incomprehensible2 and is1 perhaps1 as absurd as any proposition1 which can be formed4 ,so that nothing can be more sceptical1 or more full of doubt and hesitation1 than this scepticism itself1 which arises from some of the paradoxical conclusions of geometry or the science of quantity4#cc #cc ,it seems to me not impossible to avoid these absurdities and contradictions1 if it be admitted1 that there is no such thing as abstract or general ideas1 properly speaking2 but that all general ideas are1 in reality1 particular ones1 attached to a general term1 which recalls1 upon occasion1 other particular ones1 that resemble1 in certain circumstances1 the idea1 present to the mind4 ,thus when the term ,horse is pronounced1 we immediately figure to ourselves the idea of a black or a white animal1 of a particular size or figure3 ,but as that term is also usually applied to animals of other colours1 figures and sizes1 these ideas1 though not actually present to the imagination1 are easily recalled2 and our reasoning and conclusion proceed in the same way1 as if they were actually present4 ,if this be admitted 7as seems reasonable7 it follows that all the ideas of quantity1 upon which mathematicians reason1 are nothing but particular1 and such as are suggested by the senses and imagination1 and consequently1 cannot be infinitely divisible4 ,it is sufficient to have dropped this hint at present1 without prosecuting it any farther4 ,it certainly concerns all lovers of science not to expose themselves to the ridicule and contempt of the ignorant by their conclusions2 and this seems the readiest solution of these difficulties4 #abf4 ,the sceptical objections to moral evidence1 or to the reasonings concerning matter of fact1 are either popular or philosophical4 ,the popular objections are derived from the natural weakness of human understanding2 the contradictory opinions1 which have been entertained in different ages and nations2 the variations of our judgement in sickness and health1 youth and old age1 prosperity and adversity2 the perpetual contradiction of each particular man's opinions and sentiments2 with many other topics of that kind4 ,it is needless to insist farther on this head4 ,these objections are but weak4 ,for as1 in common life1 we reason every moment concerning fact and existence1 and cannot possibly subsist1 without continually employing this species of argument1 any popular objections1 derived from thence1 must be insufficient to destroy that evidence4 ,the great subverter of ,pyrrhonism or the excessive principles of scepticism is action1 and employment1 and the occupations of common life4 ,these principles may flourish and triumph in the schools2 where it is1 indeed1 difficult1 if not impossible1 to refute them4 ,but as soon as they leave the shade1 and by the presence of the real objects1 which actuate our passions and sentiments1 are put in opposition to the more powerful principles of our nature1 they vanish like smoke1 and leave the most determined sceptic in the same condition as other mortals4 #abg4 ,the sceptic1 therefore1 had better keep within his proper sphere1 and display those philosophical objections1 which arise from more profound researches4 ,here he seems to have ample matter of triumph2 while he justly insists1 that all our evidence for any matter of fact1 which lies beyond the testimony of sense or memory1 is derived entirely from the relation of cause and effect2 that we have no other idea of this relation than that of two objects1 which have been frequently conjoined together2 that we have no argument to convince us1 that objects1 which have1 in our experience1 been frequently conjoined1 will likewise1 in other instances1 be conjoined in the same manner2 and that nothing leads us to this inference but custom or a certain instinct of our nature2 which it is indeed difficult to resist1 but which1 like other instincts1 may be fallacious and deceitful4 ,while the sceptic insists upon these topics1 he shows his force1 or rather1 indeed1 his own and our weakness2 and seems1 for the time at least1 to destroy all assurance and conviction4 ,these arguments might be displayed at greater length1 if any durable good or benefit to society could ever be expected to result from them4 #abh4 ,for here is the chief and most confounding objection to excessive scepticism1 that no durable good can ever result from it2 while it remains in its full force and vigour4 ,we need only ask such a sceptic1 ,what his meaning is8 ,and what he proposes by all these curious researches8 ,he is immediately at a loss1 and knows not what to answer4 ,a ,copernican or ,ptolemaic1 who supports each his different system of astronomy1 may hope to produce a conviction1 which will remain constant and durable1 with his audience4 ,a ,stoic or ,epicurean displays principles1 which may not be durable1 but which have an effect on conduct and behaviour4 ,but a ,pyrrhonian cannot expect1 that his philosophy will have any constant influence on the mind3 or if it had1 that its influence would be beneficial to society4 ,on the contrary1 he must acknowledge1 if he will acknowledge anything1 that all human life must perish1 were his principles universally and steadily to prevail4 ,all discourse1 all action would immediately cease2 and men remain in a total lethargy1 till the necessities of nature1 unsatisfied1 put an end to their miserable existence4 ,it is true2 so fatal an event is very little to be dreaded4 ,nature is always too strong for principle4 ,and though a ,pyrrhonian may throw himself or others into a momentary amazement and confusion by his profound reasonings2 the first and most trivial event in life will put to flight all his doubts and scruples1 and leave him the same1 in every point of action and speculation1 with the philosophers of every other sect1 or with those who never concerned themselves in any philosophical researches4 ,when he awakes from his dream1 he will be the first to join in the laugh against himself1 and to confess1 that all his objections are mere amusement1 and can have no other tendency than to show the whimsical condition of mankind1 who must act and reason and believe2 though they are not able1 by their most diligent enquiry1 to satisfy themselves concerning the foundation of these operations1 or to remove the objections1 which may be raised against them4 ,,part ,,iii4 #abi4 ,there is1 indeed1 a more mitigated scepticism or academical philosophy1 which may be both durable and useful1 and which may1 in part1 be the result of this ,pyrrhonism1 or excessive scepticism1 when its undistinguished doubts are1 in some measure1 corrected by common sense and reflection4 ,the greater part of mankind are naturally apt to be affirmative and dogmatical in their opinions2 and while they see objects only on one side1 and have no idea of any counterpoising argument1 they throw themselves precipitately into the principles1 to which they are inclined2 nor have they any indulgence for those who entertain opposite sentiments4 ,to hesitate or balance perplexes their understanding1 checks their passion1 and suspends their action4 ,they are1 therefore1 impatient till they escape from a state1 which to them is so uneasy3 and they think1 that they could never remove themselves far enough from it1 by the violence of their affirmations and obstinacy of their belief4 ,but could such dogmatical reasoners become sensible of the strange infirmities of human understanding1 even in its most perfect state1 and when most accurate and cautious in its determinations2 such a reflection would naturally inspire them with more modesty and reserve1 and diminish their fond opinion of themselves1 and their prejudice against antagonists4 ,the illiterate may reflect on the disposition of the learned1 who1 amidst all the advantages of study and reflection1 are commonly still diffident in their determinations3 and if any of the learned be inclined1 from their natural temper1 to haughtiness and obstinacy1 a small tincture of ,pyrrhonism might abate their pride1 by showing them1 that the few advantages1 which they may have attained over their fellows1 are but inconsiderable1 if compared with the universal perplexity and confusion1 which is inherent in human nature4 ,in general1 there is a degree of doubt1 and caution1 and modesty1 which1 in all kinds of scrutiny and decision1 ought for ever to accompany a just reasoner4 #acj4 ,another species of mitigated scepticism which may be of advantage to mankind1 and which may be the natural result of the ,pyrrhonian doubts and scruples1 is the limitation of our enquiries to such subjects as are best adapted to the narrow capacity of human understanding4 ,the imagination of man is naturally sublime1 delighted with whatever is remote and extraordinary1 and running1 without control1 into the most distant parts of space and time in order to avoid the objects1 which custom has rendered too familiar to it4 ,a correct ,judgement observes a contrary method1 and avoiding all distant and high enquiries1 confines itself to common life1 and to such subjects as fall under daily practice and experience2 leaving the more sublime topics to the embellishment of poets and orators1 or to the arts of priests and politicians4 ,to bring us to so salutary a determination1 nothing can be more serviceable1 than to be once thoroughly convinced of the force of the ,pyrrhonian doubt1 and of the impossibility1 that anything1 but the strong power of natural instinct1 could free us from it4 ,those who have a propensity to philosophy1 will still continue their researches2 because they reflect1 that1 besides the immediate pleasure1 attending such an occupation1 philosophical decisions are nothing but the reflections of common life1 methodized and corrected4 ,but they will never be tempted to go beyond common life1 so long as they consider the imperfection of those faculties which they employ1 their narrow reach1 and their inaccurate operations4 ,while we cannot give a satisfactory reason1 why we believe1 after a thousand experiments1 that a stone will fall1 or fire burn2 can we ever satisfy ourselves concerning any determination1 which we may form1 with regard to the origin of worlds1 and the situation of nature1 from1 and to eternity8 ,this narrow limitation1 indeed1 of our enquiries1 is1 in every respect1 so reasonable1 that it suffices to make the slightest examination into the natural powers of the human mind and to compare them with their objects1 in order to recommend it to us4 ,we shall then find what are the proper subjects of science and enquiry4 #aca4 ,it seems to me1 that the only objects of the abstract science or of demonstration are quantity and number1 and that all attempts to extend this more perfect species of knowledge beyond these bounds are mere sophistry and illusion4 ,as the component parts of quantity and number are entirely similar1 their relations become intricate and involved2 and nothing can be more curious1 as well as useful1 than to trace1 by a variety of mediums1 their equality or inequality1 through their different appearances4 ,but as all other ideas are clearly distinct and different from each other1 we can never advance farther1 by our utmost scrutiny1 than to observe this diversity1 and1 by an obvious reflection1 pronounce one thing not to be another4 ,or if there be any difficulty in these decisions1 it proceeds entirely from the undeterminate meaning of words1 which is corrected by juster definitions4 ,that the square of the hypothenuse is equal to the squares of the other two sides1 cannot be known1 let the terms be ever so exactly defined1 without a train of reasoning and enquiry4 ,but to convince us of this proposition1 that where there is no property1 there can be no injustice1 it is only necessary to define the terms1 and explain injustice to be a violation of property4 ,this proposition is1 indeed1 nothing but a more imperfect definition4 ,it is the same case with all those pretended syllogistical reasonings1 which may be found in every other branch of learning1 except the sciences of quantity and number2 and these may safely1 ,i think1 be pronounced the only proper objects of knowledge and demonstration4 #acb4 ,all other enquiries of men regard only matter of fact and existence2 and these are evidently incapable of demonstration4 ,whatever is may not be4 ,no negation of a fact can involve a contradiction4 ,the non-existence of any being1 without exception1 is as clear and distinct an idea as its existence4 ,the proposition1 which affirms it not to be1 however false1 is no less conceivable and intelligible1 than that which affirms it to be4 ,the case is different with the sciences1 properly so called4 ,every proposition1 which is not true1 is there confused and unintelligible4 ,that the cube root of #fd is equal to the half of #aj1 is a false proposition1 and can never be distinctly conceived4 ,but that ,caesar1 or the angel ,gabriel1 or any being never existed1 may be a false proposition1 but still is perfectly conceivable1 and implies no contradiction4 ,the existence1 therefore1 of any being can only be proved by arguments from its cause or its effect2 and these arguments are founded entirely on experience4 ,if we reason a priori1 anything may appear able to produce anything4 ,the falling of a pebble may1 for aught we know1 extinguish the sun2 or the wish of a man control the planets in their orbits4 ,it is only experience1 which teaches us the nature and bounds of cause and effect1 and enables us to infer the existence of one object from that of another#cd4 ,such is the foundation of moral reasoning1 which forms the greater part of human knowledge1 and is the source of all human action and behaviour4 #cd ,that impious maxim of the ancient philosophy1 ,ex nihilo1 nihil fit1 by which the creation of matter was excluded1 ceases to be a maxim1 according to this philosophy4 ,not only the will of the supreme ,being may create matter2 but1 for aught we know a priori1 the will of any other being might create it1 or any other cause1 that the most whimsical imagination can assign4 ,moral reasonings are either concerning particular or general facts4 ,all deliberations in life regard the former2 as also all disquisitions in history1 chronology1 geography1 and astronomy4 ,the sciences1 which treat of general facts1 are politics1 natural philosophy1 physic1 chemistry1 c4 where the qualities1 causes and effects of a whole species of objects are enquired into4 ,divinity or ,theology1 as it proves the existence of a ,deity1 and the immortality of souls1 is composed partly of reasonings concerning particular1 partly concerning general facts4 ,it has a foundation in reason1 so far as it is supported by experience4 ,but its best and most solid foundation is faith and divine revelation4 ,morals and criticism are not so properly objects of the understanding as of taste and sentiment4 ,beauty1 whether moral or natural1 is felt1 more properly than perceived4 ,or if we reason concerning it1 and endeavour to fix its standard1 we regard a new fact1 to wit1 the general tastes of mankind1 or some such fact1 which may be the object of reasoning and enquiry4 ,when we run over libraries1 persuaded of these principles1 what havoc must we make8 ,if we take in our hand any volume2 of divinity or school metaphysics1 for instance2 let us ask1 ,does it contain any abstract reasoning concerning quantity or number8 ,no4 ,does it contain any experimental reasoning concerning matter of fact and existence8 ,no4 ,commit it then to the flames3 for it can contain nothing but sophistry and illusion4 ,,index ,abstraction not source of ideas of primary qualities1 #abb4 ,academic philosophy1 #cd4 ,action and philosophy1 #a1 #d1 #cd1 #abh2 ,addition #d4 ,analogy a species of1 the foundation of all reasoning about matter of fact1 #hb2 ,animals the reason of1 #hc-he2 learn from experience and draw inferences1 #hc2 which can only be founded on custom1 #hd2 cause of difference between men and animals1 #hd n4 ,antiquity #fb4 ,appearances to senses must be corrected by reason1 #aag4 ,a priori #be1 #cf n1 #hi n1 #acb1 #acb n4 ,aristotle #d4 ,association of ideas1 three principles of1 #ah-ai1 #da-dd 7v4 ,cause ,c74 ,atheism #aaf4 ,bacon #ii4 ,belief 7v4 ,cause ,c1 #ci-de72 and chance1 #df4 ,berkeley really a sceptic1 #abb n4 ,bigotry #ajb4 ,body and soul1 mystery of union of1 #eb2 volition and movements of1 #eb4 ,real existence of 7v4 ,scepticism1 ,b1 #aah-abc74 ,cause first 7v4 ,god1 ,necessity1 #gh-ha2 ,providence1 #ajb-aae1 #acb n74 a principle of association of ideas1 #ai1 #dc2 sole foundation of reasonings about matter of fact or real existence1 #bb4 ,a4 ,knowledge of ,causes arises from experience not from ,reason1 #bc-cc4 ,reasonings a priori give no knowledge of cause and effect1 #bc f42 impossible to see the effect in the cause since they are totally different1 #be2 natural philosophy never pretends to assign ultimate causes1 but only to reduce causes to a few general causes1 e4g4 gravity1 #bf2 geometry applies laws obtained by experience1 #bg4 ,conclusions from experience not based on any process of the understanding1 #bh2 yet we infer in the future a similar connexion between known qualities of things and their secret powers1 to that which we assumed in the past4 ,on what is this inference based8 #bi2 demonstrative reasoning has no place here1 and all experimental reasoning assumes the resemblance of the future to the past1 and so cannot prove it without being circular1 #cj1 #cb2 if reasoning were the basis of this belief1 there would be no need for the multiplication of instances or of long experience1 #ca2 yet conclusions about matter of fact are affected by experience even in beasts and children1 so that they cannot be founded on abstruse reasoning1 #cc2 to explain our inferences from experience a principle is required of equal weight and authority with reason1 #cd4 ,b4 ,custom enables us to infer existence of one object from the appearance of another1 #ce-ch4 ,experience enables us to ascribe a more than arbitrary connexion to objects1 #ce2 we are determined to this by custom or habit which is the great guide of human life1 #cf2 but our inference must be based on some fact present to the senses or memory1 #cg2 the customary conjunction between such an object and some other object produces an operation of the soul which is as unavoidable as love1 #ch2 animals also infer one event from another by custom1 #hb-hd2 and in man as in animals experimental reasoning depends on a species of instinct or mechanical power that acts in us unknown to ourselves1 #he4 ,c4 ,belief1 #ci-de4 ,belief differs from fiction or the loose reveries of the fancy by some feeling annexed to it1 #ci2 belief cannot be defined1 but may be described as a more lively1 forcible1 firm1 steady conception of an object than can be attained by the imagination alone1 #dj2 it is produced by the principles of association1 viz4 resemblance1 #da2 contiguity1 #db2 causation1 #dc2 by a kind of pre-established harmony between the course of nature and our ideas1 #dd2 this operation of our minds necessary to our subsistence and so entrusted by nature to instinct rather than to reasoning1 #de4 ,probability1 #df-g4 ,belief produced by a majority of chances by an inexplicable contrivance of ,nature1 #df 7cf4 #hg-h72 probability of causes3 the failure of a cause ascribed to a secret counteracting cause1 #dg 7cf4 #fg72 it is universally allowed that chance when strictly examined is a mere negative word1 #gd4 ,d4 ,power1 #di-eg4 ,power1 force1 energy1 necessary connexion must either be defined by analysis or explained by production of the impression from which they are copied1 #di2 from the first appearance of an object we cannot foretell its effect3 we cannot see the power of a single body3 we only see sequence1 #ej4 ,is the idea of power derived from an internal impression and is it an idea of reflection8 #ea2 it is not derived1 as ,locke said1 from reasoning about power of production in nature1 #ej n2 nor from consciousness of influence of will over bodily organs1 #eb2 nor from effort to overcome resistance1 #eb n 7cf4 #fj n72 nor from influence of will over mind1 #ec2 many philosophers appeal to an invisible intelligent principle1 to a volition of the supreme being1 and regard causes as only occasions and our mental conceptions as revelations1 #ed-e2 thus diminishing the grandeur of ,god1 #ef2 this theory too bold and beyond verification by our faculties1 and is no explanation1 #eg2 vis inertiae1 #eg n4 ,in single instances we only see sequence of loose events which are conjoined and never connected1 #eh2 the idea of necessary connexion only arises from a number of similar instances1 and the only difference between such a number and a single instance is that the former produces a habit of expecting the usual attendant1 #ei1 #fa4 ,this customary transition is the impression from which we form the idea of necessary connexion4 ,e4 ,reasoning from effect to cause and conversely1 #aje-aae 7v4 ,providence74 ,in arguing from effect to cause we must not infer more qualities in the cause than are required to produce the effect1 nor reason backwards from an inferred cause to new effects1 #aje-h2 we can reason back from cause to new effects in the case of human acts by analogy which rests on previous knowledge1 #aaa-b2 when the effect is entirely singular and does not belong to any species we cannot infer its cause at all1 #aae4 ,f4 ,definitions of ,cause1 #fj 7cf4 #gd n74 ,ceremonies #da4 ,chance ignorance of causes1 #df2 has no existence1 #gd 7v4 ,cause ,b74 ,cicero #d4 ,circle in reasoning1 #cj4 ,clarke #cg n4 ,colour peculiarity of ideas of1 #af4 ,contiguity #ai1 #db4 ,contradiction the test of demonstration1 #acb4 ,contrariety #ai n4 ,contrary of matter of fact always possible1 #ba1 #acb4 ,creation #acb n4 ,criticism #acb4 ,cudworth #eg n1 #aeh n4 ,custom when strongest conceals itself1 #bd2 an ultimate principle of all conclusions from experience1 #cf1 #abg2 and belief1 #ci-de2 gives rise to inferences of animals1 #hd4 ,definition only applicable to complex ideas1 #di2 need of1 #aca2 of cause1 #fj4 ,demonstrative opp4 intuitive1 #bj2 reasoning1 #cj2 confined to quantity and number1 #aca2 impossible to demonstrate a fact since no negation of a fact can involve a contradiction1 #acb4 ,descartes #eg n42 his universal doubt antecedent to study if strictly taken is incurable1 since even from an indubitable first principle no advance can be made except by the faculties which we doubt1 #aaf2 his appeal to the veracity of ,god is useless1 #abj 7v4 ,scepticism1 #aaf-acb74 ,design argument from1 #aje f4 7v4 ,providence74 ,divisibility of mathematical and physical points1 #abd4 ,doubt ,cartesian1 #aaf1 #abj 7v4 ,scepticism ,a74 ,epictetus #cd4 ,epicurean philosophy1 defence of1 #ajb-ae2 denial of providence and future state is harmless1 #ajd 7v4 ,providence74 ,euclid truths in1 do not depend on existence of circles or triangles1 #bj4 ,evidence moral and natural1 #gj2 value of human1 #hb-i 7v4 ,miracles74 ,evil doctrine of necessity either makes ,god the cause of evil or denies existence of evil as regards the whole1 #gh-ha4 ,existence external and perception1 #aah-i 7v4 ,scepticism1 ,b1 #aaf-cb74 ,ex nihilo nihil #acb n4 ,experience 7v4 ,cause ,a1 #bc-cc72 opposition of reason and experience usual1 but really erroneous and superficial1 #cf n4 ,infallible1 may be regarded as proof1 #hg 7v4 ,miracles72 all the philosophy and religion in the world cannot carry us beyond the usual course of experience1 #aac4 ,extension #ej2 a supposed primary quality1 #abb4 ,faith #aja1 #acb4 ,fiction and fact 7v4 ,cause ,c71 #ci f4 ,future inference to1 from past1 #bi 7v4 ,cause ,a74 ,general ideas1 do not really exist1 but only particular ideas attached to a general term1 #abe n4 ,geography mental1 #h4 ,geometry propositions of certain1 as depending only on relations of ideas not on existence of objects1 #bj2 gives no knowledge of ultimate causes3 only applies laws discovered by experience1 #bg4 ,god idea of1 #ad2 no idea of except what we learn from reflection on our own faculties1 #eg2 theory that ,god is cause of all motion and thought1 causes being only occasions of his volition1 #ed-eg2 by doctrine of necessity either there are no bad actions or ,god is the cause of evil1 #gh-ha4 ,veracity of1 appealed to1 #abj4 ,and creation of matter1 #acb n4 v4 ,providence1 #ajb-aae2 ,scepticism1 #aaf-acb4 ,golden age1 #ajg4 ,gravity #bf4 ,habit 7v4 ,custom1 ,cause ,b74 ,history use of1 #fe4 ,human nature1 inconstancy a constant character of1 #fh4 ,ideas ,a4 ,origin of1 #aa-ag4 ,perceptions divided into impressions and ideas1 #aa-ab2 the mind can only compound the materials derived from outward or inward sentiment1 #ac 7cf4 #ec72 all ideas resolvable into simple ideas copied from precedent feelings1 #ad2 deficiency in an organ of sensation produces deficiency in corresponding idea1 #ae-af2 suspected ideas to be tested by asking for the impression from which it is derived1 #ag 7cf4 #di72 idea of reflection1 #ea2 general ideas1 #ace n2 innate ideas1 #ai n2 power of will over ideas1 #ec4 ,b4 ,association of1 #ah-ai4 ,ideas introduce each other with a certain degree of method and regularity1 #ah2 only three principles of association1 viz4 ,resemblance1 ,contiguity1 and ,cause or ,effect1 #ai2 contrariety1 #ai n2 production of belief by these principles1 #da-dc4 ,c4 ,correspondence of ideas and course of nature1 #dd2 relations of ideas one of two possible objects of enquiry1 #bj2 such relations discoverable by the mere operation of thought1 #bj1 #aca2 no demonstration possible except in case of ideas of quantity or number1 #aca4 ,imagination #aa1 #ci2 and belief1 #dj4 ,impressions all our more lively perceptions1 #ab2 the test of ideas1 #ag1 #di4 ,incest peculiar turpitude of explained1 #ab4 ,inconceivability of the negative1 #acb 7cf4 #bj74 ,inertia #eg n4 ,inference and similarity1 #cj1 #aae 7v4 ,cause74 ,infinite divisibility1 #abd f4 ,instances multiplication of not required by reason1 #ca4 ,instinct more trustworthy than reasoning1 #de2 the basis of all experimental reasoning1 #he2 the basis of realism1 #aah1 #aba4 ,intuitive opp4 mediate reasoning1 #b4 ,la ,bruyere #d4 ,liberty 7v4 ,necessity1 #fb-ig74 ,definition of hypothetical liberty1 #gc4 ,necessary to morality1 #gg4 ,locke #d1 #dj n1 #ej n1 #eg n4 ,his loose use of 'ideas1' #ai n2 betrayed into frivolous disputes about innate ideas by the ,school-men1 #ai n2 distinction of primary and secondary qualities1 #abb4 ,malebranche #d1 #eg n44 ,man a reasonable and active being1 #d4 ,marriage rules of1 based on and vary with utility1 #aah4 ,mathematics ideas of1 clear and determinate1 hence their superiority to moral and metaphysical sciences1 #dh2 their difficulty1 #dh4 ,mathematical and physical points1 #abd n4 ,matter necessity of1 #fd2 creation of1 #acb n 7v4 ,scepticism ,a74 ,matter-of-fact contrary of1 always possible1 #ba2 arguments to new1 based only on cause and effect1 #bb4 ,metaphysics not a science1 #e-f2 how inferior and superior to mathematics1 #dh4 ,mind mental geography1 #h2 secret springs and principles of1 #i2 can only mix and compound materials given by inward and outward sentiment1 #ac2 power of will over1 #ec4 ,miracles4 #hf-aja4 ,belief in human evidence diminishes according as the event witnessed is unusual or extraordinary1 #hi2 difference between extraordinary and miraculous1 #hi n2 if the evidence for a miracle amounted to proof we should have one proof opposed by another proof1 for the proof against a miracle is as complete as possible2 an event is not miraculous unless there is a uniform experience1 that is a proof1 against it1 #ij2 definition of miracle1 #ij n2 hence no testimony is sufficient to establish a miracle unless its falsehood would be more miraculous than the event it establishes1 #ia2 as a fact the evidence for a miracle has never amounted to proof1 #ib2 the passion for the wonderful in human nature1 #ic2 prevalence of miracles in savage and early periods and their diminution with civilization1 #id2 the evidence for miracles in matters of religion opposed by the almost infinite number of witnesses for rival religions1 #ie2 value of human testimony diminished by temptation to pose as a prophet or apostle1 #ig2 no testimony for a miracle has ever amounted to a probability1 much less to a proof1 and if it did amount to a proof it would be opposed by another perfect proof1 #ih2 so a miracle can never be proved so as to be the foundation of a system of religion1 #ii2 a conclusion which confounds those who base the ,christian religion on reason1 not on faith1 #ajj2 the ,christian religion cannot be believed without a miracle which will subvert the principle of a man's understanding and give him a determination to believe what is most contrary to custom and experience1 #aja4 ,moral evil 7q4v47 #hj4 ,moral science #cj2 inferior to mathematics1 #dh2 sceptical objections to1 #abf-g4 ,moral evidence easily combined with natural1 #gj4 ,motion #ej4 ,nature design in1 #aje f4 7v4 ,providence71 and the course of our ideas1 #dd4 ,state of1 a philosophical fiction1 #aea1 #aea n4 ,necessary connexion 7v4 ,cause74 ,necessity two definitions of1 #ge4 ,a4 and ,liberty1 #fb-ha2 the controversy is based on ambiguity1 and all mankind have always been of the same opinion on this subject1 #fc2 our idea of the necessity of matter arises solely from observed uniformity and consequent inference1 circumstances which are allowed by all men to exist in respect of human action1 #fd2 history and knowledge of human nature assume such uniformity1 #fe1 which does not exclude variety due to education and progress1 #ff2 irregular actions to be explained by secret operation of contrary causes1 #fg2 the inconstancy of human action1 its constant character1 as of winds and weather1 #fh2 we all acknowledge and draw inferences from the regular conjunction of motives and actions1 #fi2 history1 politics1 and morals show this1 and the possibility of combining moral and natural evidence shows that they have a common origin1 #gj2 the reluctance to acknowledge the necessity of actions due to a lingering belief that we can see real connexion behind mere conjunction1 #ga2 we should begin with the examination not of the soul and will but of brute matter1 #gb2 the prevalence of the liberty doctrine due to a false sensation of liberty and a false experiment1 #gb n2 though this question is the most contentious of all1 mankind has always agreed in the doctrine of liberty1 if we mean by it that hypothetical liberty which consists in a power of acting or not acting according to the determinations of our will1 and which can be ascribed to every one who is not a prisoner1 #gc2 liberty when opposed to necessity1 and not merely to constraint1 is the same as chance1 #gd4 ,b4 ,both necessity and liberty are necessary to morality1 this doctrine of necessity only alters our view of matter and so is at least innocent1 #ge2 rewards and punishments imply the uniform influence of motives1 and connexion of character and action3 if necessity be denied1 a man may commit any crime and be no worse for it1 #gf2 liberty also essential to morality1 #gg4 ,objection that doctrine of necessity and of a regular chain of causes either makes ,god the cause of evil1 or abolishes evil in actions1 #gh2 ,stoic answer1 that the whole system is good1 is specious but ineffectual in practice1 #gi2 no speculative argument can counteract the impulse of our natural sentiments to blame certain actions1 #hj2 how ,god can be the cause of all actions without being the author of moral evil is a mystery with which philosophy cannot deal1 #ha4 ,negative inconceivability of1 #acb4 ,newton #eg n4 ,nisus #eb n1 #fj n4 ,number the object of demonstration1 #aca4 ,occasional causes theory of1 #ee4 ,parallelism between thought and course of nature1 #dd-e4 ,perception and external objects1 #aai f4 7v4 ,scepticism1 ,impression1 ,idea74 ,philosophy moral1 two branches of1 abstruse and practical1 #a-e2 gratifies innocent curiosity1 #f2 metaphysics tries to deal with matters inaccessible to human understanding1 #f4 ,true1 must lay down limits of understanding1 #g 7cf4 #aac72 a large part of1 consists in mental geography1 #h2 may hope to resolve principles of mind into still more general principles1 #i4 ,natural1 only staves off our ignorance a little longer1 as moral or metaphysical philosophy serves only to discover larger portions of it1 #bf2 academical1 or sceptical1 flatters no bias or passion except love of truth1 and so has few partisans1 #cd2 though it destroy speculation1 cannot destroy action1 for nature steps in and asserts her rights1 #cd2 moral1 inferior to mathematics in clearness of ideas1 superior in shortness of arguments1 #dh4 ,controversies in1 due to ambiguity of terms1 #fb4 ,disputes in1 not be settled by appeal to dangerous consequences of a doctrine1 #ge4 ,speculative1 entirely indifferent to the peace of society and security of government1 #ajd 7cf4 #aad74 ,all the philosophy in the world1 and all the religion in the world1 which is nothing but a species of philosophy1 can never carry us beyond the usual course of experience1 #aac4 ,happiness of1 to have originated in an age and country of freedom and toleration1 #ajb4 ,points physical1 indivisible1 #abd n4 ,power #ej f1 #fj n4 7v4 ,cause ,d74 ,probability #df f4 7v4 ,cause1 ,b74 ,probable arguments1 #ch1 #df n4 ,production #ej n4 ,promises not the foundation of justice1 #beg4 ,proof #df n1 #hf-aja 7v4 ,miracles1 ,demonstrative74 ,providence #ajb-aae 7v4 ,god74 ,the sole argument for a divine existence is from the marks of design in nature2 must not infer greater power in the cause than is necessary to produce the observed effects1 nor argue from such an inferred cause to any new effects which have not been observed1 #aje2 so must not infer in ,god more power1 wisdom1 and benevolence than appears in nature1 #ajf2 so it is unnecessary to try and save the honour of the ,gods by assuming the intractability of matter or the observance of general laws1 #ajg2 to argue from effects to unknown causes1 and then from these causes to unknown effects1 is a gross sophism1 #ajh4 ,from imperfect exercise of justice in this world we cannot infer its perfect exercise in a future world1 #aji2 we must regulate our conduct solely by the experienced train of events1 #aaj2 in case of human works of art we can infer the perfect from the imperfect1 but that is because we know man by experience and also know other instances of his art1 #aaa-aab2 but in the case of ,god we only know him by his productions1 and do not know any class of beings to which he belongs1 #aac2 and the universe1 his production1 is entirely singular and does not belong to a known species of things1 #aae4 ,punishment requires doctrines of necessity and liberty1 #gf 7v4 ,necessity74 ,pyrrhonism #abf4 ,qualities primary and secondary1 #abb4 ,quantity and number1 the only objects of demonstration1 the parts of them being entirely similar1 #aca4 ,real presence1 #hf4 ,reality and thought1 #dd4 ,realism of the vulgar1 #aah4 ,reason 7a7 opp4 intuition1 #bi2 opp4 experience1 #bh1 #cf n4 7b7 ,corrects sympathy and senses1 #aag4 ,no match for nature1 #cd4 ,fallacious1 compared with instinct1 #de4 ,of men and animals1 #hd n4 7c7 attempts to destroy1 by reasoning1 #abd2 objections to abstract reasoning1 #abd f4 7v4 ,scepticism74 7d7 ,reasoning4 ,two kinds of1 demonstrative and moral1 #cj1 #df n1 #acb2 moral1 divided into general and particular1 #acb2 produces demonstrations1 proofs1 and probabilities1 #df n4 ,probable 7v4 ,cause1 #bh-cb74 ,relations of ideas1 discoverable by the mere operation of thought1 independently of the existence of any object1 #bj4 ,religion a kind of philosophy1 #aac 7v4 ,miracles1 ,providence74 ,resemblance #ai1 #da 7v4 ,similarity74 ,resistance and idea of power1 #ec n4 ,scepticism ,a4 antecedent to study and philosophy1 such as ,descartes' universal doubt of our faculties1 would be incurable3 in a more moderate sense it is useful1 #aaf 7cf4 #abi-cj72 extravagant attempts of1 to destroy reason by reasoning1 #abd4 ,no such absurd creature as a man who has no opinion about anything at all1 #aaf2 admits of no answer and produces no conviction1 #abb n4 7cf4 #cd1 #abf1 #abh74 ,b4 ,as to the ,senses1 #aag-abc4 ,the ordinary criticisms of our senses only show that they have to be corrected by ,reason1 #aag2 more profound arguments show that the vulgar belief in external objects is baseless1 and that the objects we see are nothing but perceptions which are fleeting copies of other existences1 #aah2 even this philosophy is hard to justify2 it appeals neither to natural instinct1 nor to experience1 for experience tells nothing of objects which perceptions resemble1 #aai2 the appeal to the veracity of ,god is useless1 #abj2 and scepticism is here triumphant1 #aba4 ,the distinction between primary and secondary qualities is useless1 for the supposed primary qualities are only perceptions1 #abb2 and ,berkeley's theory that ideas of primary qualities are obtained by abstraction is impossible1 #abb1 #abb n2 if matter is deprived of both primary and secondary qualities there is nothing left except a mere something which is not worth arguing about1 #abc4 ,c4 ,as to ,reason1 #abd-acj4 ,attempt to destroy ,reason by reasoning extravagant1 #abd2 objection to abstract reasoning because it asserts infinite divisibility of extension which is shocking to common sense1 #abd1 and infinite divisibility of time1 #abe2 yet the ideas attacked are so clear and distinct that scepticism becomes sceptical about itself1 #abe4 ,popular objections to moral reasoning about matter of fact1 based on weakness of understanding1 variation of judgement1 and disagreement among men1 confuted by action1 #abf2 philosophical objections1 that we only experience conjunction and that inference is based on custom1 #abg2 excessive scepticism refuted by its uselessness and put to flight by the most trivial event in life1 #abh4 ,mitigated scepticism or academical philosophy useful as a corrective and as producing caution and modesty1 #abi2 and as limiting understanding to proper objects1 #acj2 all reasoning which is not either abstract1 about quantity and number1 or experimental1 about matters of fact1 is sophistry and illusion1 #acb4 ,d4 ,in ,religion 7v4 ,miracles1 ,providence74 ,sciences #acb 7v4 ,reason1 7d72 ,scepticism1 ,c74 ,secret powers1 #ci2 counteracting causes1 #dg1 #fg4 ,senses outward and inward sensation supplies all the materials of thinking--must be corrected by reason1 #aag4 ,scepticism concerning1 #aag 7v4 ,scepticism1 ,b74 ,similarity basis of all arguments from experience1 #ca 7cf4 #aae74 ,solidity #ej2 a supposed primary quality1 #abb4 ,soul and body1 #eb4 ,space and time1 #abd f4 ,species an effect which belongs to no species does not admit of inference to its cause1 #aae 7cf4 #aac74 ,stoics #cd1 #gi4 ,superstition #f 7v4 ,providence74 ,theology science of1 #acb 7v4 ,god1 ,providence74 ,tillotson argument against real presence1 #hf4 ,time and space1 #abd f4 ,truth #h1 #ag 7v4 ,scepticism74 ,understanding limits of human1 #g2 operations of1 to be classified1 #h2 opp4 experience1 #bh2 weakness of1 #abf 7v4 ,reason1 ,scepticism74 ,voluntariness as ground of distinction between virtues and talents1 #acj4 ,whole theory that everything is good as regards 'the whole1' #gi1 #hj4 ,will compounds materials given by senses1 #ac2 influence of over organs of body can never give us the idea of power2 for we are not conscious of any power in our will1 only of sequence of motions on will1 #eb2 so with power of will over our minds in raising up new ideas1 #ec4 ,of ,god1 cannot be used to explain motion1 #eg4 ,freedom of 7v4 ,necessity74