,benedict de ,spinoza1 ,,the ,,ethics 7,ethica ,ordine ,geometrico ,demonstrata7 ,translated from the ,latin by ,r4 ,h4 ,m4 ,elwes ,,part ,,iii3 ,,on ,,the ,,origin ,,and ,,nature ,,of ,,the ,,emotions ,most writers on the emotions and on human conduct seem to be treating rather of matters outside nature than of natural phenomena following nature's general laws4 ,they appear to conceive man to be situated in nature as a kingdom within a kingdom3 for they believe that he disturbs rather than follows nature's order1 that he has absolute control over his actions1 and that he is determined solely by himself4 ,they attribute human infirmities and fickleness1 not to the power of nature in general1 but to some mysterious flaw in the nature of man1 which accordingly they bemoan1 deride1 despise1 or1 as usually happens1 abuse3 he1 who succeeds in hitting off the weakness of the human mind more eloquently or more acutely than his fellows1 is looked upon as a seer4 ,still there has been no lack of very excellent men 7to whose toil and industry ,i confess myself much indebted71 who have written many noteworthy things concerning the right way of life1 and have given much sage advice to mankind4 ,but no one1 so far as ,i know1 has defined the nature and strength of the emotions1 and the power of the mind against them for their restraint4 ,i do not forget1 that the illustrious ,descartes1 though he believed1 that the mind has absolute power over its actions1 strove to explain human emotions by their primary causes1 and1 at the same time1 to point out a way1 by which the mind might attain to absolute dominion over them4 ,however1 in my opinion1 he accomplishes nothing beyond a display of the acuteness of his own great intellect1 as ,i will show in the proper place4 ,for the present ,i wish to revert to those1 who would rather abuse or deride human emotions than understand them4 ,such persons will1 doubtless think it strange that ,i should attempt to treat of human vice and folly geometrically1 and should wish to set forth with rigid reasoning those matters which they cry out against as repugnant to reason1 frivolous1 absurd1 and dreadful4 ,however1 such is my plan4 ,nothing comes to pass in nature1 which can be set down to a flaw therein2 for nature is always the same1 and everywhere one and the same in her efficacy and power of action2 that is1 nature's laws and ordinances1 whereby all things come to pass and change from one form to another1 are everywhere and always the same2 so that there should be one and the same method of understanding the nature of all things whatsoever1 namely1 through nature's universal laws and rules4 ,thus the passions of hatred1 anger1 envy1 and so on1 considered in themselves1 follow from this same necessity and efficacy of nature2 they answer to certain definite causes1 through which they are understood1 and possess certain properties as worthy of being known as the properties of anything else1 whereof the contemplation in itself affords us delight4 ,i shall1 therefore1 treat of the nature and strength of the emotions according to the same method1 as ,i employed heretofore in my investigations concerning ,god and the mind4 ,i shall consider human actions and desires in exactly the same manner1 as though ,i were concerned with lines1 planes1 and solids4 ,,definitions ,i4 ,by an 'adequate' cause1 ,i mean a cause through which its effect can be clearly and distinctly perceived4 ,by an 'inadequate' or partial cause1 ,i mean a cause through which1 by itself1 its effect cannot be understood4 ,,ii4 ,i say that we 'act' when anything takes place1 either within us or externally to us1 whereof we are the adequate cause2 that is 7by the foregoing definition7 when through our nature something takes place within us or externally to us1 which can through our nature alone be clearly and distinctly understood4 ,on the other hand1 ,i say that we are passive as regards something when that something takes place within us1 or follows from our nature externally1 we being only the partial cause4 ,,iii4 ,by 'emotion' ,i mean the modifications of the body1 whereby the active power of the said body is increased or diminished1 aided or constrained1 and also the ideas of such modifications4 ,n4,b4 ,if we can be the adequate cause of any of these modifications1 ,i then call the emotion an activity1 otherwise ,i call it a passion1 or state wherein the mind is passive4 ,,postulates ,i4 ,the human body can be affected in many ways1 whereby its power of activity is increased or diminished1 and also in other ways which do not render its power of activity either greater or less4 ,n4,b4 ,this postulate or axiom rests on ,postulate i4 and ,lemmas v4 and vii41 which see after ,,ii4 xiii4 ,,ii4 ,the human body can undergo many changes1 and1 nevertheless1 retain the impressions or traces of objects 7cf4 ,,ii4 ,post4 v471 and1 consequently1 the same images of things 7see note ,,ii4 xvii474 ,,propositions ,i4 ,our mind is in certain cases active1 and in certain cases passive4 ,in so far as it has adequate ideas it is necessarily active1 and in so far as it has inadequate ideas1 it is necessarily passive4 ,proof--,in every human mind there are some adequate ideas1 and some ideas that are fragmentary and confused 7,,ii4 xl4 note74 ,those ideas which are adequate in the mind are adequate also in ,god1 inasmuch as he constitutes the essence of the mind 7,,ii4 xl4 ,cor471 and those which are inadequate in the mind are likewise 7by the same ,cor47 adequate in ,god1 not inasmuch as he contains in himself the essence of the given mind alone1 but as he1 at the same time1 contains the minds of other things4 ,again1 from any given idea some effect must necessarily follow 7,i4 xxxvi472 of this effect ,god is the adequate cause 7,,iii4 ,def4 i471 not inasmuch as he is infinite1 but inasmuch as he is conceived as affected by the given idea 7,,ii4 ix474 ,but of that effect whereof ,god is the cause1 inasmuch as he is affected by an idea which is adequate in a given mind1 of that effect1 ,i repeat1 the mind in question is the adequate cause 7,,ii4 xi4 ,cor474 ,therefore our mind1 in so far as it has adequate ideas 7,,iii4 ,def4 ii471 is in certain cases necessarily active2 this was our first point4 ,again1 whatsoever necessarily follows from the idea which is adequate in ,god1 not by virtue of his possessing in himself the mind of one man only1 but by virtue of his containing1 together with the mind of that one man1 the minds of other things also1 of such an effect 7,,ii4 xi4 ,cor47 the mind of the given man is not an adequate1 but only a partial cause2 thus 7,,iii4 ,def4 ii47 the mind1 inasmuch as it has inadequate ideas1 is in certain cases necessarily passive2 this was our second point4 ,therefore our mind1 c4 ,q4,e4,d4 ,corollary--,hence it follows that the mind is more or less liable to be acted upon1 in proportion as it possesses inadequate ideas1 and1 contrariwise1 is more or less active in proportion as it possesses adequate ideas4 ,,ii4 ,body cannot determine mind to think1 neither can mind determine body to motion or rest or any state different from these1 if such there be4 ,proof--,all modes of thinking have for their cause ,god1 by virtue of his being a thinking thing1 and not by virtue of his being displayed under any other attribute 7,,ii4 vi474 ,that1 therefore1 which determines the mind to thought is a mode of thought1 and not a mode of extension2 that is 7,,ii4 ,def4 i471 it is not body4 ,this was our first point4 ,again1 the motion and rest of a body must arise from another body1 which has also been determined to a state of motion or rest by a third body1 and absolutely everything which takes place in a body must spring from ,god1 in so far as he is regarded as affected by some mode of extension1 and not by some mode of thought 7,,ii4 vi472 that is1 it cannot spring from the mind1 which is a mode of thought4 ,this was our second point4 ,therefore body cannot determine mind1 c4 ,q4,e4,d4 9999999999,note--,this is made more clear by what was said in the note to ,,ii4 vii41 namely1 that mind and body are one and the same thing1 conceived first under the attribute of thought1 secondly1 under the attribute of extension4 ,thus it follows that the order or concatenation of things is identical1 whether nature be conceived under the one attribute or the other2 consequently the order of states of activity and passivity in our body is simultaneous in nature with the order of states of activity and passivity in the mind4 ,the same conclusion is evident from the manner in which we proved ,,ii4 xii4 ,nevertheless1 though such is the case1 and though there be no further room for doubt1 ,i can scarcely believe1 until the fact is proved by experience1 that men can be induced to consider the question calmly and fairly1 so firmly are they convinced that it is merely at the bidding of the mind1 that the body is set in motion or at rest1 or performs a variety of actions depending solely on the mind's will or the exercise of thought4 ,however1 no one has hitherto laid down the limits to the powers of the body1 that is1 no one has as yet been taught by experience what the body can accomplish solely by the laws of nature1 in so far as she is regarded as extension4 ,no one hitherto has gained such an accurate knowledge of the bodily mechanism1 that he can explain all its functions2 nor need ,i call attention to the fact that many actions are observed in the lower animals1 which far transcend human sagacity1 and that somnambulists do many things in their sleep1 which they would not venture to do when awake3 these instances are enough to show1 that the body can by the sole laws of its nature do many things which the mind wonders at4 ,again1 no one knows how or by what means the mind moves the body1 nor how many various degrees of motion it can impart to the body1 nor how quickly it can move it4 ,thus1 when men say that this or that physical action has its origin in the mind1 which latter has dominion over the body1 they are using words without meaning1 or are confessing in specious phraseology that they are ignorant of the cause of the said action1 and do not wonder at it4 ,but1 they will say1 whether we know or do not know the means whereby the mind acts on the body1 we have1 at any rate1 experience of the fact that unless the human mind is in a fit state to think1 the body remains inert4 ,moreover1 we have experience1 that the mind alone can determine whether we speak or are silent1 and a variety of similar states which1 accordingly1 we say depend on the mind's decree4 ,but1 as to the first point1 ,i ask such objectors1 whether experience does not also teach1 that if the body be inactive the mind is simultaneously unfitted for thinking8 ,for when the body is at rest in sleep1 the mind simultaneously is in a state of torpor also1 and has no power of thinking1 such as it possesses when the body is awake4 ,again1 ,i think everyone's experience will confirm the statement1 that the mind is not at all times equally fit for thinking on a given subject1 but according as the body is more or less fitted for being stimulated by the image of this or that object1 so also is the mind more or less fitted for contemplating the said object4 ,but1 it will be urged1 it is impossible that solely from the laws of nature considered as extended substance1 we should be able to deduce the causes of buildings1 pictures1 and things of that kind1 which are produced only by human art2 nor would the human body1 unless it were determined and led by the mind1 be capable of building a single temple4 ,however1 ,i have just pointed out that the objectors cannot fix the limits of the body's power1 or say what can be concluded from a consideration of its sole nature1 whereas they have experience of many things being accomplished solely by the laws of nature1 which they would never have believed possible except under the direction of mind3 such are the actions performed by somnambulists while asleep1 and wondered at by their performers when awake4 ,i would further call attention to the mechanism of the human body1 which far surpasses in complexity all that has been put together by human art1 not to repeat what ,i have already shown1 namely1 that from nature1 under whatever attribute she be considered1 infinite results follow4 ,as for the second objection1 ,i submit that the world would be much happier1 if men were as fully able to keep silence as they are to speak4 ,experience abundantly shows that men can govern anything more easily than their tongues1 and restrain anything more easily than their appetites2 when it comes about that many believe1 that we are only free in respect to objects which we moderately desire1 because our desire for such can easily be controlled by the thought of something else frequently remembered1 but that we are by no means free in respect to what we seek with violent emotion1 for our desire cannot then be allayed with the remembrance of anything else4 ,however1 unless such persons had proved by experience that we do many things which we afterwards repent of1 and again that we often1 when assailed by contrary emotions1 see the better and follow the worse1 there would be nothing to prevent their believing that we are free in all things4 ,thus an infant believes that of its own free will it desires milk1 an angry child believes that it freely desires to run away2 further1 a drunken man believes that he utters from the free decision of his mind words which1 when he is sober1 he would willingly have withheld3 thus1 too1 a delirious man1 a garrulous woman1 a child1 and others of like complexion1 believe that they speak from the free decision of their mind1 when they are in reality unable to restrain their impulse to talk4 ,experience teaches us no less clearly than reason1 that men believe themselves to be free1 simply because they are conscious of their actions1 and unconscious of the causes whereby those actions are determined2 and1 further1 it is plain that the dictates of the mind are but another name for the appetites1 and therefore vary according to the varying state of the body4 ,everyone shapes his actions according to his emotion1 those who are assailed by conflicting emotions know not what they wish2 those who are not attacked by any emotion are readily swayed this way or that4 ,all these considerations clearly show that a mental decision and a bodily appetite1 or determined state1 are simultaneous1 or rather are one and the same thing1 which we call decision1 when it is regarded under and explained through the attribute of thought1 and a conditioned state1 when it is regarded under the attribute of extension1 and deduced from the laws of motion and rest4 ,this will appear yet more plainly in the sequel4 ,for the present ,i wish to call attention to another point1 namely1 that we cannot act by the decision of the mind1 unless we have a remembrance of having done so4 ,for instance1 we cannot say a word without remembering that we have done so4 ,again1 it is not within the free power of the mind to remember or forget a thing at will4 ,therefore the freedom of the mind must in any case be limited to the power of uttering or not uttering something which it remembers4 ,but when we dream that we speak1 we believe that we speak from a free decision of the mind1 yet we do not speak1 or1 if we do1 it is by a spontaneous motion of the body4 ,again1 we dream that we are concealing something1 and we seem to act from the same decision of the mind as that1 whereby we keep silence when awake concerning something we know4 ,lastly1 we dream that from the free decision of our mind we do something1 which we should not dare to do when awake4 ,now ,i should like to know whether there be in the mind two sorts of decisions1 one sort illusive1 and the other sort free8 ,if our folly does not carry us so far as this1 we must necessarily admit1 that the decision of the mind1 which is believed to be free1 is not distinguishable from the imagination or memory1 and is nothing more than the affirmation1 which an idea1 by virtue of being an idea1 necessarily involves 7,,ii4 xlix474 ,wherefore these decisions of the mind arise in the mind by the same necessity1 as the ideas of things actually existing4 ,therefore those who believe1 that they speak or keep silence or act in any way from the free decision of their mind1 do but dream with their eyes open4 ,,iii4 ,the activities of the mind arise solely from adequate ideas2 the passive states of the mind depend solely on inadequate ideas4 ,proof--,the first element1 which constitutes the essence of the mind1 is nothing else but the idea of the actually existent body 7,,ii4 xi4 and xiii471 which 7,,ii4 xv47 is compounded of many other ideas1 whereof some are adequate and some inadequate 7,,ii4 xxix4 ,cor41 ,,ii4 xxxviii4 ,cor474 ,whatsoever therefore follows from the nature of mind1 and has mind for its proximate cause1 through which it must be understood1 must necessarily follow either from an adequate or from an inadequate idea4 ,but in so far as the mind 7,,iii4 i47 has inadequate ideas1 it is necessarily passive3 wherefore the activities of the mind follow solely from adequate ideas1 and accordingly the mind is only passive in so far as it has inadequate ideas4 ,q4,e4,d4 9999999999,note--,thus we see1 that passive states are not attributed to the mind1 except in so far as it contains something involving negation1 or in so far as it is regarded as a part of nature1 which cannot be clearly and distinctly perceived through itself without other parts3 ,i could thus show1 that passive states are attributed to individual things in the same way that they are attributed to the mind1 and that they cannot otherwise be perceived1 but my purpose is solely to treat of the human mind4 ,,iv4 ,nothing can be destroyed1 except by a cause external to itself4 ,proof--,this proposition is self-evident1 for the definition of anything affirms the essence of that thing1 but does not negative it2 in other words1 it postulates the essence of the thing1 but does not take it away4 ,so long therefore as we regard only the thing itself1 without taking into account external causes1 we shall not be able to find in it anything which could destroy it4 ,q4,e4,d4 ,v4 ,things are naturally contrary1 that is1 cannot exist in the same object1 in so far as one is capable of destroying the other4 ,proof--,if they could agree together or co-exist in the same object1 there would then be in the said object something which could destroy it2 but this1 by the foregoing proposition1 is absurd1 therefore things1 c4 ,q4,e4,d4 ,,vi4 ,everything1 in so far as it is in itself1 endeavours to persist in its own being4 ,proof--,individual things are modes whereby the attributes of ,god are expressed in a given determinate manner 7,i4 xxv4,cor472 that is1 7,i4 xxxiv471 they are things which express in a given determinate manner the power of ,god1 whereby ,god is and acts2 now no thing contains in itself anything whereby it can be destroyed1 or which can take away its existence 7,,iii4 iv472 but contrariwise it is opposed to all that could take away its existence 7,,iii4 v474 ,therefore1 in so far as it can1 and in so far as it is in itself1 it endeavours to persist in its own being4 ,q4,e4,d4 ,,vii4 ,the endeavour1 wherewith everything endeavours to persist in its own being1 is nothing else but the actual essence of the thing in question4 ,proof--,from the given essence of any thing certain consequences necessarily follow 7,i4 xxxvi471 nor have things any power save such as necessarily follows from their nature as determined 7,i4 xxix472 wherefore the power of any given thing1 or the endeavour whereby1 either alone or with other things1 it acts1 or endeavours to act1 that is 7,,iii4 vi471 the power or endeavour1 wherewith it endeavours to persist in its own being1 is nothing else but the given or actual essence of the thing in question4 ,q4,e4,d4 ,,viii4 ,the endeavour1 whereby a thing endeavours to persist in its own being1 involves no finite time1 but an indefinite time4 ,proof--,if it involved a limited time1 which should determine the duration of the thing1 it would then follow solely from that power whereby the thing exists1 that the thing could not exist beyond the limits of that time1 but that it must be destroyed2 but this 7,,iii4 iv47 is absurd4 ,wherefore the endeavour wherewith a thing exists involves no definite time2 but1 contrariwise1 since 7,,iii4 iv47 it will by the same power whereby it already exists always continue to exist1 unless it be destroyed by some external cause1 this endeavour involves an indefinite time4 ,,ix4 ,the mind1 both in so far as it has clear and distinct ideas1 and also in so far as it has confused ideas1 endeavours to persist in its being for an indefinite period1 and of this endeavour it is conscious4 ,proof--,the essence of the mind is constituted by adequate and inadequate ideas 7,,iii4 iii471 therefore 7,,iii4 vii471 both in so far as it possesses the former1 and in so far as it possesses the latter1 it endeavours to persist in its own being1 and that for an indefinite time 7,,iii4 viii474 ,now as the mind 7,,ii4 xxiii47 is necessarily conscious of itself through the ideas of the modifications of the body1 the mind is therefore 7,,iii4 vii47 conscious of its own endeavour4 9999999999,note--,this endeavour1 when referred solely to the mind1 is called will1 when referred to the mind and body in conjunction it is called appetite2 it is1 in fact1 nothing else but man's essence1 from the nature of which necessarily follow all those results which tend to its preservation2 and which man has thus been determined to perform4 ,further1 between appetite and desire there is no difference1 except that the term desire is generally applied to men1 in so far as they are conscious of their appetite1 and may accordingly be thus defined3 ,desire is appetite with consciousness thereof4 ,it is thus plain from what has been said1 that in no case do we strive for1 wish for1 long for1 or desire anything1 because we deem it to be good1 but on the other hand we deem a thing to be good1 because we strive for it1 wish for it1 long for it1 or desire it4 ,x4 ,an idea1 which excludes the existence of our body1 cannot be postulated in our mind1 but is contrary thereto4 ,proof--,whatsoever can destroy our body1 cannot be postulated therein 7,,iii4 v474 ,therefore neither can the idea of such a thing occur in ,god1 in so far as he has the idea of our body 7,,ii4 ix4 ,cor472 that is 7,,ii4 xi41 xiii471 the idea of that thing cannot be postulated as in our mind1 but contrariwise1 since 7,,ii4 xi41 xiii47 the first element1 that constitutes the essence of the mind1 is the idea of the human body as actually existing1 it follows that the first and chief endeavour of our mind is the endeavour to affirm the existence of our body3 thus1 an idea1 which negatives the existence of our body1 is contrary to our mind1 c4 ,q4,e4,d4 ,,xi4 ,whatsoever increases or diminishes1 helps or hinders the power of activity in our body1 the idea thereof increases or diminishes1 helps or hinders the power of thought in our mind4 ,proof--,this proposition is evident from ,,ii4 vii4 or from ,,ii4 xiv4 9999999999,note--,thus we see1 that the mind can undergo many changes1 and can pass sometimes to a state of greater perfection1 sometimes to a state of lesser perfection4 ,these passive states of transition explain to us the emotions of pleasure and pain4 ,by pleasure therefore in the following propositions ,i shall signify a passive state wherein the mind passes to a greater perfection4 ,by pain ,i shall signify a passive state wherein the mind passes to a lesser perfection4 ,further1 the emotion of pleasure in reference to the body and mind together ,i shall call stimulation 7titillatio7 or merriment 7hilaritas71 the emotion of pain in the same relation ,i shall call suffering or melancholy4 ,but we must bear in mind1 that stimulation and suffering are attributed to man1 when one part of his nature is more affected than the rest1 merriment and melancholy1 when all parts are alike affected4 ,what ,i mean by desire ,i have explained in the note to ,prop4 ix4 of this part2 beyond these three ,i recognize no other primary emotion2 ,i will show as ,i proceed1 that all other emotions arise from these three4 ,but1 before ,i go further1 ,i should like here to explain at greater length ,prop4 x4 of this part1 in order that we may clearly understand how one idea is contrary to another4 ,in the note to ,,ii4 xvii4 we showed that the idea1 which constitutes the essence of mind1 involves the existence of body1 so long as the body itself exists4 ,again1 it follows from what we pointed out in the ,corollary to ,,ii4 viii41 that the present existence of our mind depends solely on the fact1 that the mind involves the actual existence of the body4 ,lastly1 we showed 7,,ii4 xvii41 xviii4 and ,note7 that the power of the mind1 whereby it imagines and remembers things1 also depends on the fact1 that it involves the actual existence of the body4 ,whence it follows1 that the present existence of the mind and its power of imagining are removed1 as soon as the mind ceases to affirm the present existence of the body4 ,now the cause1 why the mind ceases to affirm this existence of the body1 cannot be the mind itself 7,,iii4 iv471 nor again the fact that the body ceases to exist4 ,for 7by ,,ii4 vi47 the cause1 why the mind affirms the existence of the body1 is not that the body began to exist2 therefore1 for the same reason1 it does not cease to affirm the existence of the body1 because the body ceases to exist2 but 7,,ii4 xvii47 this result follows from another idea1 which excludes the present existence of our body and1 consequently1 of our mind1 and which is therefore contrary to the idea constituting the essence of our mind4 ,,xii4 ,the mind1 as far as it can1 endeavours to conceive those things1 which increase or help the power of activity in the body4 ,proof--,so long as the human body is affected in a mode1 which involves the nature of any external body1 the human mind will regard that external body as present 7,,ii4 xvii471 and consequently 7,,ii4 vii471 so long as the human mind regards an external body as present1 that is 7,,ii4 xvii4 ,note71 conceives it1 the human body is affected in a mode1 which involves the nature of the said external body2 thus so long as the mind conceives things1 which increase or help the power of activity in our body1 the body is affected in modes which increase or help its power of activity 7,,iii4 ,post4 i472 consequently 7,,iii4 xi47 the mind's power of thinking is for that period increased or helped4 ,thus 7,,iii4 vi41 ix47 the mind1 as far as it can1 endeavours to imagine such things4 ,q4,e4,d4 ,,xiii4 ,when the mind conceives things which diminish or hinder the body's power of activity1 it endeavours1 as far as possible1 to remember things which exclude the existence of the first-named things4 ,proof--,so long as the mind conceives anything of the kind alluded to1 the power of the mind and body is diminished or constrained 7cf4 ,,iii4 xii4 ,proof72 nevertheless it will continue to conceive it1 until the mind conceives something else1 which excludes the present existence thereof 7,,ii4 xvii472 that is 7as ,i have just shown71 the power of the mind and of the body is diminished1 or constrained1 until the mind conceives something else1 which excludes the existence of the former thing conceived3 therefore the mind 7,,iii4 ix471 as far as it can1 will endeavour to conceive or remember the latter4 ,q4,e4,d4 ,corollary--,hence it follows that the mind shrinks from conceiving those things1 which diminish or constrain the power of itself and of the body4 9999999999,note--,from what has been said we may clearly understand the nature of ,love and ,hate4 ,love is nothing else but pleasure accompanied by the idea of an external cause4 ,we further see1 that he who loves necessarily endeavours to have1 and to keep present to him1 the object of his love2 while he who hates endeavours to remove and destroy the object of his hatred4 ,but ,i will treat of these matters at more length hereafter4 ,,xiv4 ,if the mind has once been affected by two emotions at the same time1 it will1 whenever it is afterwards affected by one of these two1 be also affected by the other4 ,proof--,if the human body has once been affected by two bodies at once1 whenever afterwards the mind conceives one of them1 it will straightway remember the other also 7,,ii4 xviii474 ,but the mind's conceptions indicate rather the emotions of our body than the nature of external bodies 7,,ii4 xvi4 ,cor4 ii472 therefore1 if the body1 and consequently the mind 7,,iii4 ,def4 iii47 has been once affected by two emotions at the same time1 it will1 whenever it is afterwards affected by one of the two1 be also affected by the other4 ,,xv4 ,anything can1 accidentally1 be the cause of pleasure1 pain1 or desire4 ,proof--,let it be granted that the mind is simultaneously affected by two emotions1 of which one neither increases nor diminishes its power of activity1 and the other does either increase or diminish the said power 7,,iii4 ,post4 i474 ,from the foregoing proposition it is evident that1 whenever the mind is afterwards affected by the former1 through its true cause1 which 7by hypothesis7 neither increases nor diminishes its power of action1 it will be at the same time affected by the latter1 which does increase or diminish its power of activity1 that is 7,,iii4 xi4 note7 it will be affected with pleasure or pain4 ,thus the former of the two emotions will1 not through itself1 but accidentally1 be the cause of pleasure or pain4 ,in the same way also it can be easily shown1 that a thing may be accidentally the cause of desire4 ,q4,e4,d4 ,corollary--,simply from the fact that we have regarded a thing with the emotion of pleasure or pain1 though that thing be not the efficient cause of the emotion1 we can either love or hate it4 ,proof--,for from this fact alone it arises 7,,iii4 xiv471 that the mind afterwards conceiving the said thing is affected with the emotion of pleasure or pain1 that is 7,,iii4 xi4 note71 according as the power of the mind and body may be increased or diminished1 c42 and consequently 7,,iii4 xii471 according as the mind may desire or shrink from the conception of it 7,,iii4 xiii4 ,cor471 in other words 7,,iii4 xiii4 note71 according as it may love or hate the same4 ,q4,e4,d4 9999999999,note--,hence we understand how it may happen1 that we love or hate a thing without any cause for our emotion being known to us2 merely1 as a phrase is1 from sympathy or antipathy4 ,we should refer to the same category those objects1 which affect us pleasurably or painfully1 simply because they resemble other objects which affect us in the same way4 ,this ,i will show in the next ,prop4 ,i am aware that certain authors1 who were the first to introduce these terms sympathy and antipathy1 wished to signify thereby some occult qualities in things2 nevertheless ,i think we may be permitted to use the same terms to indicate known or manifest qualities4 ,,xvi4 ,simply from the fact that we conceive1 that a given object has some point of resemblance with another object which is wont to affect the mind pleasurably or painfully1 although the point of resemblance be not the efficient cause of the said emotions1 we shall still regard the first-named object with love or hate4 ,proof--,the point of resemblance was in the object 7by hypothesis71 when we regarded it with pleasure or pain1 thus 7,,iii4 xiv471 when the mind is affected by the image thereof1 it will straightway be affected by one or the other emotion1 and consequently the thing1 which we perceive to have the same point of resemblance1 will be accidentally 7,,iii4 xv47 a cause of pleasure or pain4 ,thus 7by the foregoing ,corollary71 although the point in which the two objects resemble one another be not the efficient cause of the emotion1 we shall still regard the first-named object with love or hate4 ,q4,e4,d4 ,,xvii4 ,if we conceive that a thing1 which is wont to affect us painfully1 has any point of resemblance with another thing which is wont to affect us with an equally strong emotion of pleasure1 we shall hate the first-named thing1 and at the same time we shall love it4 ,proof--,the given thing is 7by hypothesis7 in itself a cause of pain1 and 7,,iii4 xiii4 note71 in so far as we imagine it with this emotion1 we shall hate it3 further1 inasmuch as we conceive that it has some point of resemblance to something else1 which is wont to affect us with an equally strong emotion of pleasure1 we shall with an equally strong impulse of pleasure love it 7,,iii4 xvi472 thus we shall both hate and love the same thing4 ,q4,e4,d4 9999999999,note--,this disposition of the mind1 which arises from two contrary emotions1 is called vacillation2 it stands to the emotions in the same relation as doubt does to the imagination 7,,ii4 xliv4 note72 vacillation and doubt do not differ one from the other1 except as greater differs from less4 ,but we must bear in mind that ,i have deduced this vacillation from causes1 which give rise through themselves to one of the emotions1 and to the other accidentally4 ,i have done this1 in order that they might be more easily deduced from what went before2 but ,i do not deny that vacillation of the disposition generally arises from an object1 which is the efficient cause of both emotions4 ,the human body is composed 7,,ii4 ,post4 i47 of a variety of individual parts of different nature1 and may therefore 7,ax4 i4 after ,lemma iii4 after ,,ii4 xiii47 be affected in a variety of different ways by one and the same body2 and contrariwise1 as one and the same thing can be affected in many ways1 it can also in many different ways affect one and the same part of the body4 ,hence we can easily conceive1 that one and the same object may be the cause of many and conflicting emotions4 ,,xviii4 ,a man is as much affected pleasurably or painfully by the image of a thing past or future as by the image of a thing present4 ,proof--,so long as a man is affected by the image of anything1 he will regard that thing as present1 even though it be non-existent 7,,ii4 xvii4 and ,cor471 he will not conceive it as past or future1 except in so far as its image is joined to the image of time past or future 7,,ii4 xliv4 note74 ,wherefore the image of a thing1 regarded in itself alone1 is identical1 whether it be referred to time past1 time future1 or time present2 that is 7,,ii4 xvi4 ,cor471 the disposition or emotion of the body is identical1 whether the image be of a thing past or future4 ,q4,e4,d4 9999999999,note ,i4--,i call a thing past or future1 according as we either have been or shall be affected thereby4 ,for instance1 according as we have seen it1 or are about to see it1 according as it has recreated us1 or will recreate us1 according as it has harmed us1 or will harm us4 ,for1 as we thus conceive it1 we affirm its existence2 that is1 the body is affected by no emotion which excludes the existence of the thing1 and therefore 7,,ii4 xvii47 the body is affected by the image of the thing1 in the same way as if the thing were actually present4 ,however1 as it generally happens that those1 who have had many experiences1 vacillate1 so long as they regard a thing as future or past1 and are usually in doubt about its issue 7,,ii4 xliv4 note72 it follows that the emotions which arise from similar images of things are not so constant1 but are generally disturbed by the images of other things1 until men become assured of the issue4 9999999999,note ,,ii4--,from what has just been said1 we understand what is meant by the terms ,hope1 ,fear1 ,confidence1 ,despair1 ,joy1 and ,disappointment4 ,hope is nothing else but an inconstant pleasure1 arising from the image of something future or past1 whereof we do not yet know the issue4 ,fear1 on the other hand1 is an inconstant pain also arising from the image of something concerning which we are in doubt4 ,if the element of doubt be removed from these emotions1 hope becomes ,confidence and fear becomes ,despair4 ,in other words1 ,pleasure or ,pain arising from the image of something concerning which we have hoped or feared4 ,again1 ,joy is ,pleasure arising from the image of something past whereof we have doubted the issue4 ,disappointment is the ,pain opposed to ,joy4 ,,xix4 ,he who conceives that the object of his love is destroyed will feel pain2 if he conceives that it is preserved he will feel pleasure4 ,proof--,the mind1 as far as possible1 endeavours to conceive those things which increase or help the body's power of activity 7,,iii4 xii472 in other words 7,,iii4 xii4 note71 those things which it loves4 ,but conception is helped by those things which postulate the existence of a thing1 and contrariwise is hindered by those which exclude the existence of a thing 7,,ii4 xvii472 therefore the images of things1 which postulate the existence of an object of love1 help the mind's endeavour to conceive the object of love1 in other words 7,,iii4 xi4 note71 affect the mind pleasurably2 contrariwise those things1 which exclude the existence of an object of love1 hinder the aforesaid mental endeavour2 in other words1 affect the mind painfully4 ,he1 therefore1 who conceives that the object of his love is destroyed will feel pain1 c4 ,q4,e4,d4 ,,xx4 ,he who conceives that the object of his hate is destroyed will also feel pleasure4 ,proof--,the mind 7,,iii4 xiii47 endeavours to conceive those things1 which exclude the existence of things whereby the body's power of activity is diminished or constrained2 that is 7,,iii4 xiii4 note71 it endeavours to conceive such things as exclude the existence of what it hates2 therefore the image of a thing1 which excludes the existence of what the mind hates1 helps the aforesaid mental effort1 in other words 7,,iii4 xi4 note71 affects the mind pleasurably4 ,thus he who conceives that the object of his hate is destroyed will feel pleasure4 ,q4,e4,d4 ,,xxi4 ,he who conceives1 that the object of his love is affected pleasurably or painfully1 will himself be affected pleasurably or painfully2 and the one or the other emotion will be greater or less in the lover according as it is greater or less in the thing loved4 ,proof--,the images of things 7as we showed in ,,iii4 xix47 which postulate the existence of the object of love1 help the mind's endeavour to conceive the said object4 ,but pleasure postulates the existence of something feeling pleasure1 so much the more in proportion as the emotion of pleasure is greater2 for it is 7,,iii4 xi4 note7 a transition to a greater perfection2 therefore the image of pleasure in the object of love helps the mental endeavour of the lover2 that is1 it affects the lover pleasurably1 and so much the more1 in proportion as this emotion may have been greater in the object of love4 ,this was our first point4 ,further1 in so far as a thing is affected with pain1 it is to that extent destroyed1 the extent being in proportion to the amount of pain 7,,iii4 xi4 note72 therefore 7,,iii4 xix47 he who conceives1 that the object of his love is affected painfully1 will himself be affected painfully1 in proportion as the said emotion is greater or less in the object of love4 ,q4,e4,d4 ,,xxii4 ,if we conceive that anything pleasurably affects some object of our love1 we shall be affected with love towards that thing4 ,contrariwise1 if we conceive that it affects an object of our love painfully1 we shall be affected with hatred towards it4 ,proof--,he1 who affects pleasurably or painfully the object of our love1 affects us also pleasurably or painfully--that is1 if we conceive the loved object as affected with the said pleasure or pain 7,,iii4 xxi474 ,but this pleasure or pain is postulated to come to us accompanied by the idea of an external cause2 therefore 7,,iii4 xiii4 note71 if we conceive that anyone affects an object of our love pleasurably or painfully1 we shall be affected with love or hatred towards him4 ,q4,e4,d4 9999999999,note--,prop4 xxi4 explains to us the nature of ',pity1' which we may define as 'pain arising from another's hurt4' ,what term we can use for pleasure arising from another's gain1 ,i know not4 ,we will call the 'love towards him who confers a benefit on another1' ',approval2' and the 'hatred towards him who injures another1' we will call ',indignation4' ,we must further remark1 that we not only feel pity for a thing which we have loved 7as shown in ,,iii4 xxi471 but also for a thing which we have hitherto regarded without emotion1 provided that we deem that it resembles ourselves 7as ,i will show presently74 ,thus1 we bestow approval on one who has benefited anything resembling ourselves1 and1 contrariwise1 are indignant with him who has done it an injury4 ,,xxiii4 ,he who conceives1 that an object of his hatred is painfully affected1 will feel pleasure4 ,contrariwise1 if he thinks that the said object is pleasurably affected1 he will feel pain4 ,each of these emotions will be greater or less1 according as its contrary is greater or less in the object of hatred4 ,proof--,in so far as an object of hatred is painfully affected1 it is destroyed1 to an extent proportioned to the strength of the pain 7,,iii4 xi4 note74 ,therefore1 he 7,,iii4 xx47 who conceives1 that some object of his hatred is painfully affected1 will feel pleasure1 to an extent proportioned to the amount of pain he conceives in the object of his hatred4 ,this was our first point4 ,again1 pleasure postulates the existence of the pleasurably affected thing 7,,iii4 xi4 note71 in proportion as the pleasure is greater or less4 ,if anyone imagines that an object of his hatred is pleasurably affected1 this conception 7,,iii4 xiii47 will hinder his own endeavour to persist2 in other words 7,,iii4 xi4 note71 he who hates will be painfully affected4 ,q4,e4,d4 9999999999,note--,this pleasure can scarcely be felt unalloyed1 and without any mental conflict4 ,for 7as ,i am about to show in ,prop4 xxvii471 in so far as a man conceives that something similar to himself is affected by pain1 he will himself be affected in like manner2 and he will have the contrary emotion in contrary circumstances4 ,but here we are regarding hatred only4 ,,xxiv4 ,if we conceive that anyone pleasurably affects an object of our hate1 we shall feel hatred towards him also4 ,if we conceive that he painfully affects that said object1 we shall feel love towards him4 ,proof--,this proposition is proved in the same way as ,,iii4 xxii41 which see4 9999999999,note--,these and similar emotions of hatred are attributable to 'envy1' which1 accordingly1 is nothing else but 'hatred1 in so far as it is regarded as disposing a man to rejoice in another's hurt1 and to grieve at another's advantage4' ,,xxv4 ,we endeavour to affirm1 concerning ourselves1 and concerning what we love1 everything that we can conceive to affect pleasurably ourselves1 or the loved object4 ,contrariwise1 we endeavour to negative everything1 which we conceive to affect painfully ourselves or the loved object4 ,proof--,that1 which we conceive to affect an object of our love pleasurably or painfully1 affects us also pleasurably or painfully 7,,iii4 xxi474 ,but the mind 7,,iii4 xii47 endeavours1 as far as possible1 to conceive those things which affect us pleasurably2 in other words 7,,ii4 xvii4 and ,cor471 it endeavours to regard them as present4 ,and1 contrariwise 7,,iii4 xiii471 it endeavours to exclude the existence of such things as affect us painfully2 therefore1 we endeavour to affirm concerning ourselves1 and concerning the loved object1 whatever we conceive to affect ourselves1 or the love object pleasurably4 ,q4,e4,d4 ,,xxvi4 ,we endeavour to affirm1 concerning that which we hate1 everything which we conceive to affect it painfully2 and1 contrariwise1 we endeavour to deny1 concerning it1 everything which we conceive to affect it pleasurably4 ,proof--,this proposition follows from ,,iii4 xxiii41 as the foregoing proposition followed from ,,iii4 xxi4 9999999999,note--,thus we see that it may readily happen1 that a man may easily think too highly of himself1 or a loved object1 and1 contrariwise1 too meanly of a hated object4 ,this feeling is called 'pride1' in reference to the man who thinks too highly of himself1 and is a species of madness1 wherein a man dreams with his eyes open1 thinking that he can accomplish all things that fall within the scope of his conception1 and thereupon accounting them real1 and exulting in them1 so long as he is unable to conceive anything which excludes their existence1 and determines his own power of action4 ',pride1' therefore1 is 'pleasure springing from a man thinking too highly of himself4' ,again1 the 'pleasure which arises from a man thinking too highly of another' is called 'over-esteem4' ,whereas the 'pleasure which arises from thinking too little of a man' is called 'disdain4' ,,xxvii4 ,by the very fact that we conceive a thing1 which is like ourselves1 and which we have not regarded with any emotion1 to be affected with any emotion1 we are ourselves affected with a like emotion 7affectus74 ,proof--,the images of things are modifications of the human body1 whereof the ideas represent external bodies as present to us 7,,ii4 xvii472 in other words 7,,ii4 x471 whereof the ideas involve the nature of our body1 and1 at the same time1 the nature of the external bodies as present4 ,if1 therefore1 the nature of the external body be similar to the nature of our body1 then the idea which we form of the external body will involve a modification of our own body similar to the modification of the external body4 ,consequently1 if we conceive anyone similar to ourselves as affected by any emotion1 this conception will express a modification of our body similar to that emotion4 ,thus1 from the fact of conceiving a thing like ourselves to be affected with any emotion1 we are ourselves affected with a like emotion4 ,if1 however1 we hate the said thing like ourselves1 we shall1 to that extent1 be affected by a contrary1 and not similar1 emotion4 ,q4,e4,d4 9999999999,note ,i--,this imitation of emotions1 when it is referred to pain1 is called compassion 7cf4 ,,iii4 xxii4 note72 when it is referred to desire1 it is called emulation1 which is nothing else but the desire of anything1 engendered in us by the fact that we conceive that others have the like desire4 ,corollary ,i--,if we conceive that anyone1 whom we have hitherto regarded with no emotion1 pleasurably affects something similar to ourselves1 we shall be affected with love towards him4 ,if1 on the other hand1 we conceive that he painfully affects the same1 we shall be affected with hatred towards him4 ,proof--,this is proved from the last proposition in the same manner as ,,iii4 xxii4 is proved from ,,iii4 xxi4 ,corollary ,,ii--,we cannot hate a thing which we pity1 because its misery affects us painfully4 ,proof--,if we could hate it for this reason1 we should rejoice in its pain1 which is contrary to the hypothesis4 ,corollary ,,iii--,we seek to free from misery1 as far as we can1 a thing which we pity4 ,proof--,that1 which painfully affects the object of our pity1 affects us also with similar pain 7by the foregoing proposition72 therefore1 we shall endeavour to recall everything which removes its existence1 or which destroys it 7cf4 ,,iii4 xiii472 in other words 7,,iii4 ix4 note71 we shall desire to destroy it1 or we shall be determined for its destruction2 thus1 we shall endeavour to free from misery a thing which we pity4 ,q4,e4,d4 9999999999,note ,,ii--,this will or appetite for doing good1 which arises from pity of the thing whereon we would confer a benefit1 is called benevolence1 and is nothing else but desire arising from compassion4 ,concerning love or hate towards him who has done good or harm to something1 which we conceive to be like ourselves1 see ,,iii4 xxii4 note4 ,,xxviii4 ,we endeavour to bring about whatsoever we conceive to conduce to pleasure2 but we endeavour to remove or destroy whatsoever we conceive to be truly repugnant thereto1 or to conduce to pain4 ,proof--,we endeavour1 as far as possible1 to conceive that which we imagine to conduce to pleasure 7,,iii4 xii472 in other words 7,,ii4 xvii47 we shall endeavour to conceive it as far as possible as present or actually existing4 ,but the endeavour of the mind1 or the mind's power of thought1 is equal to1 and simultaneous with1 the endeavour of the body1 or the body's power of action4 7,this is clear from ,,ii4 vii4 ,cor4 and ,,ii4 xi4 ,cor474 ,therefore we make an absolute endeavour for its existence1 in other words 7which by ,,iii4 ix41 note1 come to the same thing7 we desire and strive for it2 this was our first point4 ,again1 if we conceive that something1 which we believed to be the cause of pain1 that is 7,,iii4 xiii4 note71 which we hate1 is destroyed1 we shall rejoice 7,,iii4 xx474 ,we shall1 therefore 7by the first part of this proof71 endeavour to destroy the same1 or 7,,iii4 xiii47 to remove it from us1 so that we may not regard it as present2 this was our second point4 ,wherefore whatsoever conduces to pleasure1 c4 ,q4,e4,d4 ,,xxix4 ,we shall also endeavour to do whatsoever we conceive men99 to regard with pleasure1 and contrariwise we shall shrink from doing that which we conceive men to shrink from4 99,n4,b4 ,by men in this and the following propositions1 ,i mean men whom we regard without any particular emotion4 ,proof--,from the fact of imagining1 that men love or hate anything1 we shall love or hate the same thing 7,,iii4 xxvii474 ,that is 7,,iii4 xiii4 note71 from this mere fact we shall feel pleasure or pain at the thing's presence4 ,and so we shall endeavour to do whatsoever we conceive men to love or regard with pleasure1 etc4 ,q4,e4,d4 9999999999,note--,this endeavour to do a thing or leave it undone1 solely in order to please men1 we call ambition1 especially when we so eagerly endeavour to please the vulgar1 that we do or omit certain things to our own or another's hurt3 in other cases it is generally called kindliness4 ,furthermore ,i give the name of praise to the pleasure1 with which we conceive the action of another1 whereby he has endeavoured to please us2 but of blame to the pain wherewith we feel aversion to his action4 ,,xxx4 ,if anyone has done something which he conceives as affecting other men pleasurably1 he will be affected by pleasure1 accompanied by the idea of himself as cause2 in other words1 he will regard himself with pleasure4 ,on the other hand1 if he has done anything which he conceives as affecting others painfully1 he will regard himself with pain4 ,proof--,he who conceives1 that he affects others with pleasure or pain1 will1 by that very fact1 himself be affected with pleasure or pain 7,,iii4 xxvii471 but1 as a man 7,,ii4 xix4 and xxiii47 is conscious of himself through the modifications whereby he is determined to action1 it follows that he who conceives1 that he affects others pleasurably1 will be affected with pleasure accompanied by the idea of himself as cause2 in other words1 he will regard himself with pleasure4 ,and so mutatis mutandis in the case of pain4 ,q4,e4,d4 9999999999,note--,as love 7,,iii4 xiii47 is pleasure accompanied by the idea of an external cause1 and hatred is pain accompanied by the idea of an external cause2 the pleasure and pain in question will be a species of love and hatred4 ,but1 as the terms love and hatred are used in reference to external objects1 we will employ other names for the emotions now under discussion3 pleasure accompanied by the idea of an external cause we will style ,honour1 and the emotion contrary thereto we will style ,shame3 ,i mean in such cases as where pleasure or pain arises from a man's belief1 that he is being praised or blamed3 otherwise pleasure accompanied by the idea of an external cause is called self-complacency1 and its contrary pain is called repentance4 ,again1 as it may happen 7,,ii4 xvii4 ,cor47 that the pleasure1 wherewith a man conceives that he affects others1 may exist solely in his own imagination1 and as 7,,iii4 xxv47 everyone endeavours to conceive concerning himself that which he conceives will affect him with pleasure1 it may easily come to pass that a vain man may be proud and may imagine that he is pleasing to all1 when in reality he may be an annoyance to all4 ,,xxxi4 ,if we conceive that anyone loves1 desires1 or hates anything which we ourselves love1 desire1 or hate1 we shall thereupon regard the thing in question with more steadfast love1 c4 ,on the contrary1 if we think that anyone shrinks from something that we love1 we shall undergo vacillations of soul4 ,proof--,from the mere fact of conceiving that anyone loves anything we shall ourselves love that thing 7,,iii4 xxvii473 but we are assumed to love it already2 there is1 therefore1 a new cause of love1 whereby our former emotion is fostered2 hence we shall thereupon love it more steadfastly4 ,again1 from the mere fact of conceiving that anyone shrinks from anything1 we shall ourselves shrink from that thing 7,,iii4 xxvii474 ,if we assume that we at the same time love it1 we shall then simultaneously love it and shrink from it2 in other words1 we shall be subject to vacillation 7,,iii4 xvii4 note74 ,q4,e4,d4 ,corollary--,from the foregoing1 and also from ,,iii4 xxviii4 it follows that everyone endeavours1 as far as possible1 to cause others to love what he himself loves1 and to hate what he himself hates3 as the poet99 says3 ,as lover let us share every hope and every fear3 ironhearted were he who should love what the other leaves49999 99 ,ovid1 ,amores1 ,,ii4 xix4 #d1e 9999 ,spinoza transposes the verses3 ,speremus pariter1 pariter metuamus amantes2 ,ferreus est1 si quis1 quod sinit alter1 amat4 9999999999,note--,this endeavour to bring it about1 that our own likes and dislikes should meet with universal approval1 is really ambition 7see ,,iii4 xxix4 note72 wherefore we see that everyone by nature desires 7appetere71 that the rest of mankind should live according to his own individual disposition3 when such a desire is equally present in all1 everyone stands in everyone else's way1 and in wishing to be loved or praised by all1 all become mutually hateful4 ,,xxxii4 ,if we conceive that anyone takes delight in something1 which only one person can possess1 we shall endeavour to bring it about that the man in question shall not gain possession thereof4 ,proof--,from the mere fact of our conceiving that another person takes delight in a thing 7,,iii4 xxvii4 and ,cor47 we shall ourselves love that thing and desire to take delight therein4 ,but we assumed that the pleasure in question would be prevented by another's delight in its object2 we shall1 therefore1 endeavour to prevent his possession thereof 7,,iii4 xxviii474 ,q4,e4,d4 9999999999,note--,we thus see that man's nature is generally so constituted1 that he takes pity on those who fare ill1 and envies those who fare well with an amount of hatred proportioned to his own love for the goods in their possession4 ,further1 we see that from the same property of human nature1 whence it follows that men are merciful1 it follows also that they are envious and ambitious4 ,lastly1 if we make appeal to ,experience1 we shall find that she entirely confirms what we have said2 more especially if we turn our attention to the first years of our life4 ,we find that children1 whose body is continually1 as it were1 in equilibrium1 laugh or cry simply because they see others laughing or crying2 moreover1 they desire forthwith to imitate whatever they see others doing1 and to possess themselves of whatever they conceive as delighting others3 inasmuch as the images of things are1 as we have said1 modifications of the human body1 or modes wherein the human body is affected and disposed by external causes to act in this or that manner4 ,,xxxiii4 ,when we love a thing similar to ourselves we endeavour1 as far as we can1 to bring about that it should love us in return4 ,proof--,that which we love we endeavour1 as far as we can1 to conceive in preference to anything else 7,,iii4 xii474 ,if the thing be similar to ourselves1 we shall endeavour to affect it pleasurably in preference to anything else 7,,iii4 xxix474 ,in other words1 we shall endeavour1 as far as we can1 to bring it about1 that the thing should be affected with pleasure accompanied by the idea of ourselves1 that is 7,,iii4 xiii4 note71 that it should love us in return4 ,q4,e4,d4 ,,xxxiv4 ,the greater the emotion with which we conceive a loved object to be affected towards us1 the greater will be our complacency4 ,proof--,we endeavour 7,,iii4 xxxiii471 as far as we can1 to bring about1 that what we love should love us in return3 in other words1 that what we love should be affected with pleasure accompanied by the idea of ourself as cause4 ,therefore1 in proportion as the loved object is more pleasurably affected because of us1 our endeavour will be assisted4 --that is 7,,iii4 xi4 and note7 the greater will be our pleasure4 ,but when we take pleasure in the fact1 that we pleasurably affect something similar to ourselves1 we regard ourselves with pleasure 7,,iii4 xxx72 therefore the greater the emotion with which we conceive a loved object to be affected1 c4 ,q4,e4,d4 ,,xxxv4 ,if anyone conceives1 that an object of his love joins itself to another with closer bonds of friendship than he himself has attained to1 he will be affected with hatred towards the loved object and with envy towards his rival4 ,proof--,in proportion as a man thinks1 that a loved object is well affected towards him1 will be the strength of his self-approval 7by the last ,prop471 that is 7,,iii4 xxx4 note71 of his pleasure2 he will1 therefore 7,,iii4 xxviii471 endeavour1 as far as he can1 to imagine the loved object as most closely bound to him3 this endeavour or desire will be increased1 if he thinks that someone else has a similar desire 7,,iii4 xxxi474 ,but this endeavour or desire is assumed to be checked by the image of the loved object in conjunction with the image of him whom the loved object has joined to itself2 therefore 7,,iii4 xi4 note7 he will for that reason be affected with pain1 accompanied by the idea of the loved object as a cause in conjunction with the image of his rival2 that is1 he will be 7,,iii4 xiii47 affected with hatred towards the loved object and also towards his rival 7,,iii4 xv4 ,cor471 which latter he will envy as enjoying the beloved object4 ,q4,e4,d4 9999999999,note--,this hatred towards an object of love joined with envy is called ,jealousy1 which accordingly is nothing else but a wavering of the disposition arising from combined love and hatred1 accompanied by the idea of some rival who is envied4 ,further1 this hatred towards the object of love will be greater1 in proportion to the pleasure which the jealous man had been wont to derive from the reciprocated love of the said object2 and also in proportion to the feelings he had previously entertained towards his rival4 ,if he had hated him1 he will forthwith hate the object of his love1 because he conceives it is pleasurably affected by one whom he himself hates3 and also because he is compelled to associate the image of his loved one with the image of him whom he hates4 ,this condition generally comes into play in the case of love for a woman3 for he who thinks1 that a woman whom he loves prostitutes herself to another1 will feel pain1 not only because his own desire is restrained1 but also because1 being compelled to associate the image of her he loves with the parts of shame and the excreta of another1 he therefore shrinks from her4 ,we must add1 that a jealous man is not greeted by his beloved with the same joyful countenance as before1 and this also gives him pain as a lover1 as ,i will now show4 ,,xxxvi4 ,he who remembers a thing1 in which he has once taken delight1 desires to possess it under the same circumstances as when he first took delight therein4 ,proof--,everything1 which a man has seen in conjunction with the object of his love1 will be to him accidentally a cause of pleasure 7,,iii4 xv472 he will1 therefore1 desire to possess it1 in conjunction with that wherein he has taken delight2 in other words1 he will desire to possess the object of his love under the same circumstances as when he first took delight therein4 ,q4,e4,d4 ,corollary--,a lover will1 therefore1 feel pain if one of the aforesaid attendant circumstances be missing4 ,proof--,for1 in so far as he finds some circumstance to be missing1 he conceives something which excludes its existence4 ,as he is assumed to be desirous for love's sake of that thing or circumstance 7by the last ,prop471 he will1 in so far as he conceives it to be missing1 feel pain 7,,iii4 xix474 ,q4,e4,d4 9999999999,this pain1 in so far as it has reference to the absence of the object of love1 is called ,regret4 ,,xxxvii4 ,desire arising through pain or pleasure1 hatred or love1 is greater in proportion as the emotion is greater4 ,proof--,pain diminishes or constrains a man's power of activity 7,,iii4 xi4 note71 in other words 7,,iii4 vii471 diminishes or constrains the effort1 wherewith he endeavours to persist in his own being2 therefore 7,,iii4 v47 it is contrary to the said endeavour3 thus all the endeavours of a man affected by pain are directed to removing that pain4 ,but 7by the definition of pain71 in proportion as the pain is greater1 so also is it necessarily opposed to a greater part of man's power of activity2 therefore the greater the pain1 the greater the power of activity employed to remove it2 that is1 the greater will be the desire or appetite in endeavouring to remove it4 ,again1 since pleasure 7,,iii4 xi4 note7 increases or aids a man's power of activity1 it may easily be shown in like manner1 that a man affected by pleasure has no desire further than to preserve it1 and his desire will be in proportion to the magnitude of the pleasure4 ,lastly1 since hatred and love are themselves emotions of pain and pleasure1 it follows in like manner that the endeavour1 appetite1 or desire1 which arises through hatred or love1 will be greater in proportion to the hatred or love4 ,q4,e4,d4 ,,xxxviii4 ,if a man has begun to hate an object of his love1 so that love is thoroughly destroyed1 he will1 causes being equal1 regard it with more hatred than if he had never loved it1 and his hatred will be in proportion to the strength of his former love4 ,proof--,if a man begins to hate that which he had loved1 more of his appetites are put under restraint than if he had never loved it4 ,for love is a pleasure 7,,iii4 xiii4 note7 which a man endeavours as far as he can to render permanent 7,,iii4 xxviii472 he does so by regarding the object of his love as present1 and by affecting it as far as he can pleasurably2 this endeavour is greater in proportion as the love is greater1 and so also is the endeavour to bring about that the beloved should return his affection 7,,iii4 xxxiii474 ,now these endeavours are constrained by hatred towards the object of love 7,,iii4 xiii4 ,cor4 and ,,iii4 xxiii472 wherefore the love 7,,iii4 xi4 note7 will for this cause also be affected with pain1 the more so in proportion as his love has been greater2 that is1 in addition to the pain caused by hatred1 there is a pain caused by the fact that he has loved the object2 wherefore the lover will regard the beloved with greater pain1 or in other words1 will hate it more than if he had never loved it1 and with the more intensity in proportion as his former love was greater4 ,q4,e4,d4 ,,xxxix4 ,he who hates anyone will endeavour to do him an injury1 unless he fears that a greater injury will thereby accrue to himself2 on the other hand1 he who loves anyone will1 by the same law1 seek to benefit him4 ,proof--,to hate a man is 7,,iii4 xiii4 note7 to conceive him as a cause of pain2 therefore he who hates a man will endeavour to remove or destroy him4 ,but if anything more painful1 or1 in other words1 a greater evil1 should accrue to the hater thereby --and if the hater thinks he can avoid such evil by not carrying out the injury1 which he planned against the object of his hatred --he will desire to abstain from inflicting that injury 7,,iii4 xxviii471 and the strength of his endeavour 7,,iii4 xxxvii47 will be greater than his former endeavour to do injury1 and will therefore prevail over it1 as we asserted4 ,the second part of this proof proceeds in the same manner4 ,wherefore he who hates another1 etc4 ,q4,e4,d4 9999999999,note--,by good ,i here mean every kind of pleasure1 and all that conduces thereto1 especially that which satisfies our longings1 whatsoever they may be4 ,by evil1 ,i mean every kind of pain1 especially that which frustrates our longings4 ,for ,i have shown 7,,iii4 ix4 note7 that we in no case desire a thing because we deem it good1 but1 contrariwise1 we deem a thing good because we desire it3 consequently we deem evil that which we shrink from2 everyone1 therefore1 according to his particular emotions1 judges or estimates what is good1 what is bad1 what is better1 what is worse1 lastly1 what is best1 and what is worst4 ,thus a miser thinks that abundance of money is the best1 and want of money the worst2 an ambitious man desires nothing so much as glory1 and fears nothing so much as shame4 ,to an envious man nothing is more delightful than another's misfortune1 and nothing more painful than another's success4 ,so every man1 according to his emotions1 judges a thing to be good or bad1 useful or useless4 ,the emotion1 which induces a man to turn from that which he wishes1 or to wish for that which he turns from1 is called timidity1 which may accordingly be defined as the fear whereby a man is induced to avoid an evil which he regards as future by encountering a lesser evil 7,,iii4 xxviii474 ,but if the evil which he fears be shame1 timidity becomes bashfulness4 ,lastly1 if the desire to avoid a future evil be checked by the fear of another evil1 so that the man knows not which to choose1 fear becomes consternation1 especially if both the evils feared be very great4 ,,xl4 ,he1 who conceives himself to be hated by another1 and believes that he has given him no cause for hatred1 will hate that other in return4 ,proof--,he who conceives another as affected with hatred1 will thereupon be affected himself with hatred 7,,iii4 xxvii471 that is1 with pain1 accompanied by the idea of an external cause4 ,but1 by the hypothesis1 he conceives no cause for this pain except him who is his enemy2 therefore1 from conceiving that he is hated by some one1 he will be affected with pain1 accompanied by the idea of his enemy2 in other words1 he will hate his enemy in return4 ,q4,e4,d4 9999999999,note--,he who thinks that he has given just cause for hatred will 7,,iii4 xxx4 and note7 be affected with shame2 but this case 7,,iii4 xxv47 rarely happens4 ,this reciprocation of hatred may also arise from the hatred1 which follows an endeavour to injure the object of our hate 7,,iii4 xxxix474 ,he therefore who conceives that he is hated by another will conceive his enemy as the cause of some evil or pain2 thus he will be affected with pain or fear1 accompanied by the idea of his enemy as cause2 in other words1 he will be affected with hatred towards his enemy1 as ,i said above4 ,corollary ,i--,he who conceives1 that one whom he loves hates him1 will be a prey to conflicting hatred and love4 ,for1 in so far as he conceives that he is an object of hatred1 he is determined to hate his enemy in return4 ,but1 by the hypothesis1 he nevertheless loves him3 wherefore he will be a prey to conflicting hatred and love4 ,corollary ,,ii--,if a man conceives that one1 whom he has hitherto regarded without emotion1 has done him any injury from motives of hatred1 he will forthwith seek to repay the injury in kind4 ,proof--,he who conceives1 that another hates him1 will 7by the last proposition7 hate his enemy in return1 and 7,,iii4 xxvi47 will endeavour to recall everything which can affect him painfully2 he will moreover endeavour to do him an injury 7,,iii4 xxxix474 ,now the first thing of this sort which he conceives is the injury done to himself2 he will1 therefore1 forthwith endeavour to repay it in kind4 ,q4,e4,d4 9999999999,note--,the endeavour to injure one whom we hate is called ,anger2 the endeavour to repay in kind injury done to ourselves is called ,revenge4 ,,xli4 ,if anyone conceives that he is loved by another1 and believes that he has given no cause for such love1 he will love that other in return4 7,cf4 ,,xiii4 xv4 ,cor41 and ,,iii4 xvi47 ,proof--,this proposition is proved in the same way as the preceding one4 ,see also the note appended thereto4 9999999999,note--,if he believes that he has given just cause for the love1 he will take pride therein 7,,iii4 xxx4 and note72 this is what most often happens 7,,iii4 xxv471 and we said that its contrary took place whenever a man conceives himself to be hated by another4 7,see note to preceding proposition47 ,this reciprocal love1 and consequently the desire of benefiting him who loves us 7,,iii4 xxxix471 and who endeavours to benefit us1 is called gratitude or thankfulness4 ,it thus appears that men are much more prone to take vengeance than to return benefits4 ,corollary--,he who imagines that he is loved by one whom he hates1 will be a prey to conflicting hatred and love4 ,this is proved in the same way as the first corollary of the preceding proposition4 9999999999,note--,if hatred be the prevailing emotion1 he will endeavour to injure him who loves him2 this emotion is called cruelty1 especially if the victim be believed to have given no ordinary cause for hatred4 ,,xlii4 ,he who has conferred a benefit on anyone from motives of love or honour will feel pain1 if he sees that the benefit is received without gratitude4 ,proof--,when a man loves something similar to himself1 he endeavours1 as far as he can1 to bring it about that he should be loved thereby in return 7,,iii4 xxxiii474 ,therefore he who has conferred a benefit confers it in obedience to the desire1 which he feels of being loved in return2 that is 7,,iii4 xxxiv47 from the hope of honour or 7,,iii4 xxx4 note7 pleasure2 hence he will endeavour1 as far as he can1 to conceive this cause of honour1 or to regard it as actually existing4 ,but1 by the hypothesis1 he conceives something else1 which excludes the existence of the said cause of honour3 wherefore he will thereat feel pain 7,,iii4 xix474 ,q4,e4,d4 ,,xliii4 ,hatred is increased by being reciprocated1 and can on the other hand be destroyed by love4 ,proof--,he who conceives1 that an object of his hatred hates him in return1 will thereupon feel a new hatred1 while the former hatred 7by hypothesis7 still remains 7,,iii4 xl474 ,but if1 on the other hand1 he conceives that the object of hate loves him1 he will to this extent 7,,iii4 xxxviii47 regard himself with pleasure1 and 7,,iii4 xxix47 will endeavour to please the cause of his emotion4 ,in other words1 he will endeavour not to hate him 7,,iii4 xli471 and not to affect him painfully2 this endeavour 7,,iii4 xxxvii47 will be greater or less in proportion to the emotion from which it arises4 ,therefore1 if it be greater than that which arises from hatred1 and through which the man endeavours to affect painfully the thing which he hates1 it will get the better of it and banish the hatred from his mind4 ,q4,e4,d4 ,,xliv4 ,hatred which is completely vanquished by love passes into love3 and love is thereupon greater than if hatred had not preceded it4 ,proof--,the proof proceeds in the same way as ,prop4 xxxviii4 of this ,part3 for he who begins to love a thing1 which he was wont to hate or regard with pain1 from the very fact of loving feels pleasure4 ,to this pleasure involved in love is added the pleasure arising from aid given to the endeavour to remove the pain involved in hatred 7,,iii4 xxxvii471 accompanied by the idea of the former object of hatred as cause4 9999999999,note--,though this be so1 no one will endeavour to hate anything1 or to be affected with pain1 for the sake of enjoying this greater pleasure2 that is1 no one will desire that he should be injured1 in the hope of recovering from the injury1 nor long to be ill for the sake of getting well4 ,for everyone will always endeavour to persist in his being1 and to ward off pain as far as he can4 ,if the contrary is conceivable1 namely1 that a man should desire to hate someone1 in order that he might love him the more thereafter1 he will always desire to hate him4 ,for the strength of love is in proportion to the strength of the hatred1 wherefore the man would desire1 that the hatred be continually increased more and more1 and1 for a similar reason1 he would desire to become more and more ill1 in order that he might take a greater pleasure in being restored to health3 in such a case he would always endeavour to be ill1 which 7,,iii4 vi47 is absurd4 ,,xlv4 ,if a man conceives1 that anyone similar to himself hates anything also similar to himself1 which he loves1 he will hate that person4 ,proof--,the beloved object feels reciprocal hatred towards him who hates it 7,,iii4 xl472 therefore the lover1 in conceiving that anyone hates the beloved object1 conceives the beloved thing as affected by hatred1 in other words 7,,iii4 xiii471 by pain2 consequently he is himself affected by pain accompanied by the idea of the hater of the beloved thing as cause2 that is1 he will hate him who hates anything which he himself loves 7,,iii4 xiii4 note74 ,q4,e4,d4 ,,xlvi4 ,if a man has been affected pleasurably or painfully by anyone1 of a class or nation different from his own1 and if the pleasure or pain has been accompanied by the idea of the said stranger as cause1 under the general category of the class or nation3 the man will feel love or hatred1 not only to the individual stranger1 but also to the whole class or nation whereto he belongs4 ,proof--,this is evident from ,,iii4 xvi4 ,,xlvii4 ,joy arising from the fact1 that anything we hate is destroyed1 or suffers other injury1 is never unaccompanied by a certain pain in us4 ,proof--,this is evident from ,,iii4 xxvii4 ,for in so far as we conceive a thing similar to ourselves to be affected with pain1 we ourselves feel pain4 9999999999,note--,this proposition can also be proved from the ,corollary to ,,ii4 xvii4 ,whenever we remember anything1 even if it does not actually exist1 we regard it only as present1 and the body is affected in the same manner2 wherefore1 in so far as the remembrance of the thing is strong1 a man is determined to regard it with pain2 this determination1 while the image of the thing in question lasts1 is indeed checked by the remembrance of other things excluding the existence of the aforesaid thing1 but is not destroyed3 hence1 a man only feels pleasure in so far as the said determination is checked3 for this reason the joy arising from the injury done to what we hate is repeated1 every time we remember that object of hatred4 ,for1 as we have said1 when the image of the thing in question1 is aroused1 inasmuch as it involves the thing's existence1 it determines the man to regard the thing with the same pain as he was wont to do1 when it actually did exist4 ,however1 since he has joined to the image of the thing other images1 which exclude its existence1 this determination to pain is forthwith checked1 and the man rejoices afresh as often as the repetition takes place4 ,this is the cause of men's pleasure in recalling past evils1 and delight in narrating dangers from which they have escaped4 ,for when men conceive a danger1 they conceive it as still future1 and are determined to fear it2 this determination is checked afresh by the idea of freedom1 which became associated with the idea of the danger when they escaped therefrom3 this renders them secure afresh3 therefore they rejoice afresh4 ,,xlviii4 ,love or hatred towards1 for instance1 ,peter is destroyed1 if the pleasure involved in the former1 or the pain involved in the latter emotion1 be associated with the idea of another cause3 and will be diminished in proportion as we conceive ,peter not to have been the sole cause of either emotion4 ,proof--,this ,prop4 is evident from the mere definition of love and hatred 7,,iii4 xiii4 note74 ,for pleasure is called love towards ,peter1 and pain is called hatred towards ,peter1 simply in so far as ,peter is regarded as the cause of one emotion or the other4 ,when this condition of causality is either wholly or partly removed1 the emotion towards ,peter also wholly or in part vanishes4 ,q4,e4,d4 ,,xlix4 ,love or hatred towards a thing1 which we conceive to be free1 must1 other conditions being similar1 be greater than if it were felt towards a thing acting by necessity4 ,proof--,a thing which we conceive as free must 7,i4 ,def4 vii47 be perceived through itself without anything else4 ,if1 therefore1 we conceive it as the cause of pleasure or pain1 we shall therefore 7,,iii4 xiii4 note7 love it or hate it1 and shall do so with the utmost love or hatred that can arise from the given emotion4 ,but if the thing which causes the emotion be conceived as acting by necessity1 we shall then 7by the same ,def4 vii4 ,part ,i47 conceive it not as the sole cause1 but as one of the causes of the emotion1 and therefore our love or hatred towards it will be less4 ,q4,e4,d4 9999999999,note--,hence it follows1 that men1 thinking themselves to be free1 feel more love or hatred towards one another than towards anything else3 to this consideration we must add the imitation of emotions treated of in ,,iii4 xxvii41 xxxiv41 xl4 and xliii4 ,l4 ,anything whatever can be1 accidentally1 a cause of hope or fear4 ,proof--,this proposition is proved in the same way as ,,iii4 xv41 which see1 together with the note to ,,iii4 xviii4 9999999999,note--,things which are accidentally the causes of hope or fear are called good or evil omens4 ,now1 in so far as such omens are the cause of hope or fear1 they are 7by the definitions of hope and fear given in ,,iii4 xviii4 note7 the causes also of pleasure and pain2 consequently we1 to this extent1 regard them with love or hatred1 and endeavour either to invoke them as means towards that which we hope for1 or to remove them as obstacles1 or causes of that which we fear4 ,it follows1 further1 from ,,iii4 xxv41 that we are naturally so constituted as to believe readily in that which we hope for1 and with difficulty in that which we fear2 moreover1 we are apt to estimate such objects above or below their true value4 ,hence there have arisen superstitions1 whereby men are everywhere assailed4 ,however1 ,i do not think it worth while to point out here the vacillations springing from hope and fear2 it follows from the definition of these emotions1 that there can be no hope without fear1 and no fear without hope1 as ,i will duly explain in the proper place4 ,further1 in so far as we hope for or fear anything1 we regard it with love or hatred2 thus everyone can apply by himself to hope and fear what we have said concerning love and hatred4 ,,li4 ,different men may be differently affected by the same object1 and the same man may be differently affected at different times by the same object4 ,proof--,the human body is affected by external bodies in a variety of ways 7,,ii4 ,post4 iii474 ,two men may therefore be differently affected at the same time1 and therefore 7by ,ax4 i4 after ,lemma iii4 after ,,ii4 xiii47 may be differently affected by one and the same object4 ,further 7by the same ,post47 the human body can be affected sometimes in one way1 sometimes in another2 consequently 7by the same ,axiom7 it may be differently affected at different times by one and the same object4 ,q4,e4,d4 9999999999,note--,we thus see that it is possible1 that what one man loves another may hate1 and that what one man fears another may not fear2 or1 again1 that one and the same man may love what he once hated1 or may be bold where he once was timid1 and so on4 ,again1 as everyone judges according to his emotions what is good1 what bad1 what better1 and what worse 7,,iii4 xxxix4 note71 it follows that men's judgments may vary no less than their emotions991 hence when we compare some with others1 we distinguish them solely by the diversity of their emotions1 and style some intrepid1 others timid1 others by some other epithet4 ,for instance1 ,i shall call a man intrepid1 if he despises an evil which ,i am accustomed to fear2 if ,i further take into consideration1 that1 in his desire to injure his enemies and to benefit those whom he loves1 he is not restrained by the fear of an evil which is sufficient to restrain me1 ,i shall call him daring4 ,again1 a man will appear timid to me1 if he fears an evil which ,i am accustomed to despise2 and if ,i further take into consideration that his desire is restrained by the fear of an evil1 which is not sufficient to restrain me1 ,i shall say that he is cowardly2 and in like manner will everyone pass judgment4 99,this is possible1 though the human mind is part of the divine intellect1 as ,i have shown in ,,ii4 xiii4 note4 ,lastly1 from this inconstancy in the nature of human judgment1 inasmuch as a man often judges things solely by his emotions1 and inasmuch as the things which he believes cause pleasure or pain1 and therefore endeavours to promote or prevent1 are often purely imaginary1 not to speak of the uncertainty of things alluded to in ,,iii4 xxviii42 we may readily conceive that a man may be at one time affected with pleasure1 and at another with pain1 accompanied by the idea of himself as cause4 ,thus we can easily understand what are ,repentance and ,self-complacency4 ,repentance is pain1 accompanied by the idea of one's self as cause2 ,self-complacency is pleasure1 accompanied by the idea of one's self as cause1 and these emotions are most intense because men believe themselves to be free 7,,iii4 xlix474 ,,lii4 ,an object which we have formerly seen in conjunction with others1 and which we do not conceive to have any property that is not common to many1 will not be regarded by us for so long1 as an object which we conceive to have some property peculiar to itself4 ,proof--,as soon as we conceive an object which we have seen in conjunction with others1 we at once remember those others 7,,ii4 xviii4 and note71 and thus we pass forthwith from the contemplation of one object to the contemplation of another object4 ,and this is the case with the object1 which we conceive to have no property that is not common to many4 ,for we thereupon assume that we are regarding therein nothing1 which we have not before seen in conjunction with other objects4 ,but when we suppose that we conceive an object something special1 which we have never seen before1 we must needs say that the mind1 while regarding that object1 has in itself nothing which it can fall to regarding instead thereof2 therefore it is determined to the contemplation of that object only4 ,therefore an object1 c4 ,q4,e4,d4 9999999999,note--,this mental modification1 or imagination of a particular thing1 in so far as it is alone in the mind1 is called ,wonder2 but if it be excited by an object of fear1 it is called ,consternation1 because wonder at an evil keeps a man so engrossed in the simple contemplation thereof1 that he has no power to think of anything else whereby he might avoid the evil4 ,if1 however1 the object of wonder be a man's prudence1 industry1 or anything of that sort1 inasmuch as the said man1 is thereby regarded as far surpassing ourselves1 wonder is called ,veneration2 otherwise1 if a man's anger1 envy1 c41 be what we wonder at1 the emotion is called ,horror4 ,again1 if it be the prudence1 industry1 or what not1 of a man we love1 that we wonder at1 our love will on this account be the greater 7,,iii4 xii471 and when joined to wonder or veneration is called ,devotion4 ,we may in like manner conceive hatred1 hope1 confidence1 and the other emotions1 as associated with wonder2 and we should thus be able to deduce more emotions than those which have obtained names in ordinary speech4 ,whence it is evident1 that the names of the emotions have been applied in accordance rather with their ordinary manifestations than with an accurate knowledge of their nature4 ,to wonder is opposed ,contempt1 which generally arises from the fact that1 because we see someone wondering at1 loving1 or fearing something1 or because something1 at first sight1 appears to be like things1 which we ourselves wonder at1 love1 fear1 c41 we are1 in consequence 7,,iii4 xv4 ,cor4 and ,,iii4 xxvii471 determined to wonder at1 love1 or fear that thing4 ,but if from the presence1 or more accurate contemplation of the said thing1 we are compelled to deny concerning it all that can be the cause of wonder1 love1 fear1 c41 the mind then1 by the presence of the thing1 remains determined to think rather of those qualities which are not in it1 than of those which are in it2 whereas1 on the other hand1 the presence of the object would cause it more particularly to regard that which is therein4 ,as devotion springs from wonder at a thing which we love1 so does ,derision spring from contempt of a thing which we hate or fear1 and ,scorn from contempt of folly1 as veneration from wonder at prudence4 ,lastly1 we can conceive the emotions of love1 hope1 honour1 c41 in association with contempt1 and can thence deduce other emotions1 which are not distinguished one from another by any recognized name4 ,,liii4 ,when the mind regards itself and its own power of activity1 it feels pleasure3 and that pleasure is greater in proportion to the distinctness wherewith it conceives itself and its own power of activity4 ,proof--,a man does not know himself except through the modifications of his body1 and the ideas thereof 7,,ii4 xix4 and xxiii474 ,when1 therefore1 the mind is able to contemplate itself1 it is thereby assumed to pass to a greater perfection1 or 7,,iii4 xi4 note7 to feel pleasure2 and the pleasure will be greater in proportion to the distinctness1 wherewith it is able to conceive itself and its own power of activity4 ,q4,e4,d4 ,corollary--,this pleasure is fostered more and more1 in proportion as a man conceives himself to be praised by others4 ,for the more he conceives himself as praised by others1 the more he will imagine them to be affected with pleasure1 accompanied by the idea of himself 7,,iii4 xxix4 note72 thus he is 7,,iii4 xxvii47 himself affected with greater pleasure1 accompanied by the idea of himself4 ,q4,e4,d4 ,,liv4 ,the mind endeavours to conceive only such things as assert its power of activity4 ,proof--,the endeavour or power of the mind is the actual essence thereof 7,,iii4 vii472 but the essence of the mind obviously only affirms that which the mind is and can do2 not that which it neither is nor can do2 therefore the mind endeavours to conceive only such things as assert or affirm its power of activity4 ,q4,e4,d4 ,,lv4 ,when the mind contemplates its own weakness1 it feels pain thereat4 ,proof--,the essence of the mind only affirms that which the mind is1 or can do2 in other words1 it is the mind's nature to conceive only such things as assert its power of activity 7last ,prop474 ,thus1 when we say that the mind contemplates its own weakness1 we are merely saying that while the mind is attempting to conceive something which asserts its power of activity1 it is checked in its endeavour -- in other words 7,,iii4 xi4 note71 it feels pain4 ,q4,e4,d4 ,corollary--,this pain is more and more fostered1 if a man conceives that he is blamed by others2 this may be proved in the same way as the corollary to ,,iii4 liii4 9999999999,note--,this pain1 accompanied by the idea of our own weakness1 is called humility2 the pleasure1 which springs from the contemplation of ourselves1 is called self-love or self- complacency4 ,and inasmuch as this feeling is renewed as often as a man contemplates his own virtues1 or his own power of activity1 it follows that everyone is fond of narrating his own exploits1 and displaying the force both of his body and mind1 and also that1 for this reason1 men are troublesome to one another4 ,again1 it follows that men are naturally envious 7,,iii4 xxiv4 note1 and ,,iii4 xxxii4 note71 rejoicing in the shortcomings of their equals1 and feeling pain at their virtues4 ,for whenever a man conceives his own actions1 he is affected with pleasure 7,,iii4 liii471 in proportion as his actions display more perfection1 and he conceives them more distinctly -- that is 7,,ii4 xl4 note71 in proportion as he can distinguish them from others1 and regard them as something special4 ,therefore1 a man will take most pleasure in contemplating himself1 when he contemplates some quality which he denies to others4 ,but1 if that which he affirms of himself be attributable to the idea of man or animals in general1 he will not be so greatly pleased3 he will1 on the contrary1 feel pain1 if he conceives that his own actions fall short when compared with those of others4 ,this pain 7,,iii4 xxviii47 he will endeavour to remove1 by putting a wrong construction on the actions of his equals1 or by1 as far as he can1 embellishing his own4 ,it is thus apparent that men are naturally prone to hatred and envy1 which latter is fostered by their education4 ,for parents are accustomed to incite their children to virtue solely by the spur of honour and envy4 ,but1 perhaps1 some will scruple to assent to what ,i have said1 because we not seldom admire men's virtues1 and venerate their possessors4 ,in order to remove such doubts1 ,i append the following corollary4 ,corollary--,no one envies the virtue of anyone who is not his equal4 ,proof--,envy is a species of hatred 7,,iii4 xxiv4 note7 or 7,,iii4 xiii4 note7 pain1 that is 7,,iii4 xi4 note71 a modification whereby a man's power of activity1 or endeavour towards activity1 is checked4 ,but a man does not endeavour or desire to do anything1 which cannot follow from his nature as it is given2 therefore a man will not desire any power of activity or virtue 7which is the same thing7 to be attributed to him1 that is appropriate to another's nature and foreign to his own2 hence his desire cannot be checked1 nor he himself pained by the contemplation of virtue in some one unlike himself1 consequently he cannot envy such an one4 ,but he can envy his equal1 who is assumed to have the same nature as himself4 ,q4,e4,d4 9999999999,note--,when1 therefore1 as we said in the note to ,,iii4 lii41 we venerate a man1 through wonder at his prudence1 fortitude1 c41 we do so1 because we conceive those qualities to be peculiar to him1 and not as common to our nature2 we1 therefore1 no more envy their possessor1 than we envy trees for being tall1 or lions for being courageous4 ,,lvi4 ,there are as many kinds of pleasure1 of pain1 of desire1 and of every emotion compounded of these1 such as vacillations of spirit1 or derived from these1 such as love1 hatred1 hope1 fear1 c41 as there are kinds of objects whereby we are affected4 ,proof--,pleasure and pain1 and consequently the emotions compounded thereof1 or derived therefrom1 are passions1 or passive states 7,,iii4 xi4 note72 now we are necessarily passive 7,,iii4 i471 in so far as we have inadequate ideas2 and only in so far as we have such ideas are we passive 7,,iii4 iii472 that is1 we are only necessarily passive 7,,ii4 xl4 note71 in so far as we conceive1 or 7,,ii4 xvii4 and note7 in so far as we are affected by an emotion1 which involves the nature of our own body1 and the nature of an external body4 ,wherefore the nature of every passive state must necessarily be so explained1 that the nature of the object whereby we are affected be expressed4 ,namely1 the pleasure1 which arises from1 say1 the object ,a1 involves the nature of that object ,a1 and the pleasure1 which arises from the object ,b1 involves the nature of the object ,b2 different1 inasmuch as the causes whence they arise are by nature different4 ,so again the emotion of pain1 which arises from one object1 is by nature different from the pain arising from another object1 and1 similarly1 in the case of love1 hatred1 hope1 fear1 vacillation1 c4 ,thus1 there are necessarily as many kinds of pleasure1 pain1 love1 hatred1 c41 as there are kinds of objects whereby we are affected4 ,now desire is each man's essence or nature1 in so far as it is conceived as determined to a particular action by any given modification of itself 7,,iii4 ix4 note72 therefore1 according as a man is affected through external causes by this or that kind of pleasure1 pain1 love1 hatred1 c41 in other words1 according as his nature is disposed in this or that manner1 so will his desire be of one kind or another1 and the nature of one desire must necessarily differ from the nature of another desire1 as widely as the emotions differ1 wherefrom each desire arose4 ,thus there are as many kinds of desire1 as there are kinds of pleasure1 pain1 love1 c41 consequently 7by what has been shown7 there are as many kinds of desire1 as there are kinds of objects whereby we are affected4 ,q4,e4,d4 9999999999,note--,among the kinds of emotions1 which1 by the last proposition1 must be very numerous1 the chief are luxury1 drunkenness1 lust1 avarice1 and ambition1 being merely species of love or desire1 displaying the nature of those emotions in a manner varying according to the object1 with which they are concerned4 ,for by luxury1 drunkenness1 lust1 avarice1 ambition1 c41 we simply mean the immoderate love of feasting1 drinking1 venery1 riches1 and fame4 ,furthermore1 these emotions1 in so far as we distinguish them from others merely by the objects wherewith they are concerned1 have no contraries4 ,for temperance1 sobriety1 and chastity1 which we are wont to oppose to luxury1 drunkenness1 and lust1 are not emotions or passive states1 but indicate a power of the mind which moderates the last-named emotions4 ,however1 ,i cannot here explain the remaining kinds of emotions 7seeing that they are as numerous as the kinds of objects71 nor1 if ,i could1 would it be necessary4 ,it is sufficient for our purpose1 namely1 to determine the strength of the emotions1 and the mind's power over them1 to have a general definition of each emotion4 ,it is sufficient1 ,i repeat1 to understand the general properties of the emotions and the mind1 to enable us to determine the quality and extent of the mind's power in moderating and checking the emotions4 ,thus1 though there is a great difference between various emotions of love1 hatred1 or desire1 for instance between love felt towards children1 and love felt towards a wife1 there is no need for us to take cognizance of such differences1 or to track out further the nature and origin of the emotions4 ,,lvii4 ,any emotion of a given individual differs from the emotion of another individual1 only in so far as the essence of the one individual differs from the essence of the other4 ,proof--,this proposition is evident from ,ax4 i4 7which see after ,lemma iii4 ,prop4 xiii41 ,part ,,ii474 ,nevertheless1 we will prove it from the nature of the three primary emotions4 ,all emotions are attributable to desire1 pleasure1 or pain1 as their definitions above given show4 ,but desire is each man's nature or essence 7,,iii4 ix4 note72 therefore desire in one individual differs from desire in another individual1 only in so far as the nature or essence of the one differs from the nature or essence of the other4 ,again1 pleasure and pain are passive states or passions1 whereby every man's power or endeavour to persist in his being is increased or diminished1 helped or hindered 7,,iii4 xi4 and note74 ,but by the endeavour to persist in its being1 in so far as it is attributable to mind and body in conjunction1 we mean appetite and desire 7,,iii4 ix4 note72 therefore pleasure and pain are identical with desire or appetite1 in so far as by external causes they are increased or diminished1 helped or hindered1 in other words1 they are every man's nature2 wherefore the pleasure and pain felt by one man differ from the pleasure and pain felt by another man1 only in so far as the nature or essence of the one man differs from the essence of the other2 consequently1 any emotion of one individual only differs1 c4 ,q4,e4,d4 9999999999,note--,hence it follows1 that the emotions of the animals which are called irrational 7for after learning the origin of mind we cannot doubt that brutes feel7 only differ from man's emotions1 to the extent that brute nature differs from human nature4 ,horse and man are alike carried away by the desire of procreation2 but the desire of the former is equine1 the desire of the latter is human4 ,so also the lusts and appetites of insects1 fishes1 and birds must needs very according to the several natures4 ,thus1 although each individual lives content and rejoices in that nature belonging to him wherein he has his being1 yet the life1 wherein each is content and rejoices1 is nothing else but the idea1 or soul1 of the said individual1 and hence the joy of one only differs in nature from the joy of another1 to the extent that the essence of one differs from the essence of another4 ,lastly1 it follows from the foregoing proposition1 that there is no small difference between the joy which actuates1 say1 a drunkard1 and the joy possessed by a philosopher1 as ,i just mention here by the way4 ,thus far ,i have treated of the emotions attributable to man1 in so far as he is passive4 ,it remains to add a few words on those attributable to him in so far as he is active4 ,,lviii4 ,besides pleasure and desire1 which are passivities or passions1 there are other emotions derived from pleasure and desire1 which are attributable to us in so far as we are active4 ,proof--,when the mind conceives itself and its power of activity1 it feels pleasure 7,,iii4 liii473 now the mind necessarily contemplates itself1 when it conceives a true or adequate idea 7,,ii4 xliii74 ,but the mind does conceive certain adequate ideas 7,,ii4 xl4 note ii474 ,therefore it feels pleasure in so far as it is active 7,,iii4 i474 ,again1 the mind1 both in so far as it has clear and distinct ideas1 and in so far as it has confused ideas1 endeavours to persist in its own being 7,,iii4 ix472 but by such an endeavour we mean desire 7by the note to the same ,prop472 therefore1 desire is also attributable to us1 in so far as we understand1 or 7,,iii4 i47 in so far as we are active4 ,q4,e4,d4 ,,lix4 ,among all the emotions attributable to the mind as active1 there are none which cannot be referred to pleasure or desire4 ,proof--,all emotions can be referred to desire1 pleasure1 or pain1 as their definitions1 already given1 show4 ,now by pain we mean that the mind's power of thinking is diminished or checked 7,,iii4 xi4 and note72 therefore1 in so far as the mind feels pain1 its power of understanding1 that is1 of activity1 is diminished or checked 7,,iii4 i472 therefore1 no painful emotions can be attributed to the mind in virtue of its being active1 but only emotions of pleasure and desire1 which 7by the last ,prop47 are attributable to the mind in that condition4 ,q4,e4,d4 9999999999,note--,all actions following from emotion1 which are attributable to the mind in virtue of its understanding1 ,i set down to strength of character 7fortitudo71 which ,i divide into courage 7animositas7 and highmindedness 7generositas74 ,by courage ,i mean the desire whereby every man strives to preserve his own being in accordance solely with the dictates of reason4 ,by highmindedness ,i mean the desire whereby every man endeavours1 solely under the dictates of reason1 to aid other men and to unite them to himself in friendship4 ,those actions1 therefore1 which have regard solely to the good of the agent ,i set down to courage1 those which aim at the good of others ,i set down to highmindedness4 ,thus temperance1 sobriety1 and presence of mind in danger1 c41 are varieties of courage2 courtesy1 mercy1 c41 are varieties of highmindedness4 ,i think ,i have thus explained1 and displayed through their primary causes the principal emotions and vacillations of spirit1 which arise from the combination of the three primary emotions1 to wit1 desire1 pleasure1 and pain4 ,it is evident from what ,i have said1 that we are in many ways driven about by external causes1 and that like waves of the sea driven by contrary winds we toss to and fro unwitting of the issue and of our fate4 ,but ,i have said1 that ,i have only set forth the chief conflicting emotions1 not all that might be given4 ,for1 by proceeding in the same way as above1 we can easily show that love is united to repentance1 scorn1 shame1 c4 ,i think everyone will agree from what has been said1 that the emotions may be compounded one with another in so many ways1 and so many variations may arise therefrom1 as to exceed all possibility of computation4 ,however1 for my purpose1 it is enough to have enumerated the most important2 to reckon up the rest which ,i have omitted would be more curious than profitable4 ,it remains to remark concerning love1 that it very often happens that while we are enjoying a thing which we longed for1 the body1 from the act of enjoyment1 acquires a new disposition1 whereby it is determined in another way1 other images of things are aroused in it1 and the mind begins to conceive and desire something fresh4 ,for example1 when we conceive something which generally delights us with its flavour1 we desire to enjoy1 that is1 to eat it4 ,but whilst we are thus enjoying it1 the stomach is filled and the body is otherwise disposed4 ,if1 therefore1 when the body is thus otherwise disposed1 the image of the food which is present be stimulated1 and consequently the endeavour or desire to eat it be stimulated also1 the new disposition of the body will feel repugnance to the desire or attempt1 and consequently the presence of the food which we formerly longed for will become odious4 ,this revulsion of feeling is called satiety or weariness4 ,for the rest1 ,i have neglected the outward modifications of the body observable in emotions1 such1 for instance1 as trembling1 pallor1 sobbing1 laughter1 c41 for these are attributable to the body only1 without any reference to the mind4 ,lastly1 the definitions of the emotions require to be supplemented in a few points2 ,i will therefore repeat them1 interpolating such observations as ,i think should here and there be added4 ,,definitions ,,of ,,the ,,emotions ,i4 ,desire is the actual essence of man1 in so far as it is conceived1 as determined to a particular activity by some given modification of itself4 ,explanation--,we have said above1 in the note to ,prop4 ix4 of this part1 that desire is appetite1 with consciousness thereof2 further1 that appetite is the essence of man1 in so far as it is determined to act in a way tending to promote its own persistence4 ,but1 in the same note1 ,i also remarked that1 strictly speaking1 ,i recognize no distinction between appetite and desire4 ,for whether a man be conscious of his appetite or not1 it remains one and the same appetite4 ,thus1 in order to avoid the appearance of tautology1 ,i have refrained from explaining desire by appetite2 but ,i have taken care to define it in such a manner1 as to comprehend1 under one head1 all those endeavours of human nature1 which we distinguish by the terms appetite1 will1 desire1 or impulse4 ,i might1 indeed1 have said1 that desire is the essence of man1 in so far as it is conceived as determined to a particular activity2 but from such a definition 7cf4 ,,ii4 xxiii47 it would not follow that the mind can be conscious of its desire or appetite4 ,therefore1 in order to imply the cause of such consciousness1 it was necessary to add1 in so far as it is determined by some given modification1 c4 ,for1 by a modification of man's essence1 we understand every disposition of the said essence1 whether such disposition be innate1 or whether it be conceived solely under the attribute of thought1 or solely under the attribute of extension1 or whether1 lastly1 it be referred simultaneously to both these attributes4 ,by the term desire1 then1 ,i here mean all man's endeavours1 impulses1 appetites1 and volitions1 which vary according to each man's disposition1 and are1 therefore1 not seldom opposed one to another1 according as a man is drawn in different directions1 and knows not where to turn4 ,,ii4 ,pleasure is the transition of a man from a less to a greater perfection4 ,,iii4 ,pain is the transition of a man from a greater to a less perfection4 ,explanation--,i say transition3 for pleasure is not perfection itself4 ,for1 if man were born with the perfection to which he passes1 he would possess the same1 without the emotion of pleasure4 ,this appears more clearly from the consideration of the contrary emotion1 pain4 ,no one can deny1 that pain consists in the transition to a less perfection1 and not in the less perfection itself3 for a man cannot be pained1 in so far as he partakes of perfection of any degree4 ,neither can we say1 that pain consists in the absence of a greater perfection4 ,for absence is nothing1 whereas the emotion of pain is an activity2 wherefore this activity can only be the activity of transition from a greater to a less perfection--in other words1 it is an activity whereby a man's power of action is lessened or constrained 7cf4 ,,iii4 xi4 note74 ,i pass over the definitions of merriment1 stimulation1 melancholy1 and grief1 because these terms are generally used in reference to the body1 and are merely kinds of pleasure or pain4 ,,iv4 ,wonder is the conception 7imaginatio7 of anything1 wherein the mind comes to a stand1 because the particular concept in question has no connection with other concepts 7cf4 ,,iii4 lii4 and note74 ,explanation--,in the note to ,,ii4 xviii4 we showed the reason1 why the mind1 from the contemplation of one thing1 straightway falls to the contemplation of another thing1 namely1 because the images of the two things are so associated and arranged1 that one follows the other4 ,this state of association is impossible1 if the image of the thing be new2 the mind will then be at a stand in the contemplation thereof1 until it is determined by other causes to think of something else4 ,thus the conception of a new object1 considered in itself1 is of the same nature as other conceptions2 hence1 ,i do not include wonder among the emotions1 nor do ,i see why ,i should so include it1 inasmuch as this distraction of the mind arises from no positive cause drawing away the mind from other objects1 but merely from the absence of a cause1 which should determine the mind to pass from the contemplation of one object to the contemplation of another4 ,i1 therefore1 recognize only three primitive or primary emotions 7as ,i said in the note to ,,iii4 xi471 namely1 pleasure1 pain1 and desire4 ,i have spoken of wonder simply because it is customary to speak of certain emotions springing from the three primitive ones by different names1 when they are referred to the objects of our wonder4 ,i am led by the same motive to add a definition of contempt4 ,v4 ,contempt is the conception of anything which touches the mind so little1 that its presence leads the mind to imagine those qualities which are not in it rather than such as are in it 7cf4 ,,iii4 lii4 note74 ,the definitions of veneration and scorn ,i here pass over1 for ,i am not aware that any emotions are named after them4 ,,vi4 ,love is pleasure1 accompanied by the idea of an external cause4 ,explanation--,this definition explains sufficiently clearly the essence of love2 the definition given by those authors who say that love is the lover's wish to unite himself to the loved object expresses a property1 but not the essence of love2 and1 as such authors have not sufficiently discerned love's essence1 they have been unable to acquire a true conception of its properties1 accordingly their definition is on all hands admitted to be very obscure4 ,it must1 however1 be noted1 that when ,i say that it is a property of love1 that the lover should wish to unite himself to the beloved object1 ,i do not here mean by wish consent1 or conclusion1 or a free decision of the mind 7for ,i have shown such1 in ,,ii4 xlviii41 to be fictitious72 neither do ,i mean a desire of being united to the loved object when it is absent1 or of continuing in its presence when it is at hand2 for love can be conceived without either of these desires2 but by wish ,i mean the contentment1 which is in the lover1 on account of the presence of the beloved object1 whereby the pleasure of the lover is strengthened1 or at least maintained4 ,,vii4 ,hatred is pain1 accompanied by the idea of an external cause4 ,explanation--,these observations are easily grasped after what has been said in the explanation of the preceding definition 7cf4 also ,,iii4 xiii4 note74 ,,viii4 ,inclination is pleasure1 accompanied by the idea of something which is accidentally a cause of pleasure4 ,,ix4 ,aversion is pain1 accompanied by the idea of something which is accidentally the cause of pain 7cf4 ,,iii4 xv4 note74 ,x4 ,devotion is love towards one whom we admire4 ,explanation--,wonder 7admiratio7 arises 7as we have shown1 ,,iii4 lii47 from the novelty of a thing4 ,if1 therefore1 it happens that the object of our wonder is often conceived by us1 we shall cease to wonder at it2 thus we see1 that the emotion of devotion readily degenerates into simple love4 ,,xi4 ,derision is pleasure arising from our conceiving the presence of a quality1 which we despise1 in an object which we hate4 ,explanation--,in so far as we despise a thing which we hate1 we deny existence thereof 7,,iii4 lii4 note71 and to that extent rejoice 7,,iii4 xx474 ,but since we assume that man hates that which he derides1 it follows that the pleasure in question is not without alloy 7cf4 ,,iii4 xlvii4 note74 ,,xii4 ,hope is an inconstant pleasure1 arising from the idea of something past or future1 whereof we to a certain extent doubt the issue4 ,,xiii4 ,fear is an inconstant pain arising from the idea of something past or future1 whereof we to a certain extent doubt the issue 7cf4 ,,iii4 xviii4 note74 ,explanation--,from these definitions it follows1 that there is no hope unmingled with fear1 and no fear unmingled with hope4 ,for he1 who depends on hope and doubts concerning the issue of anything1 is assumed to conceive something1 which excludes the existence of the said thing in the future2 therefore he1 to this extent1 feels pain 7cf4 ,,iii4 xix472 consequently1 while dependent on hope1 he fears for the issue4 ,contrariwise he1 who fears1 in other words doubts1 concerning the issue of something which he hates1 also conceives something which excludes the existence of the thing in question2 to this extent he feels pleasure1 and consequently to this extent he hopes that it will turn out as he desires 7,,iii4 xx474 ,,xiv4 ,confidence is pleasure arising from the idea of something past or future1 wherefrom all cause of doubt has been removed4 ,,xv4 ,despair is pain arising from the idea of something past or future1 wherefrom all cause of doubt has been removed4 ,explanation--,thus confidence springs from hope1 and despair from fear1 when all cause for doubt as to the issue of an event has been removed3 this comes to pass1 because man conceives something past or future as present and regards it as such1 or else because he conceives other things1 which exclude the existence of the causes of his doubt4 ,for1 although we can never be absolutely certain of the issue of any particular event 7,,ii4 xxxi4 ,cor471 it may nevertheless happen that we feel no doubt concerning it4 ,for we have shown1 that to feel no doubt concerning a thing is not the same as to be quite certain of it 7,,ii4 xlix4 note74 ,thus it may happen that we are affected by the same emotion of pleasure or pain concerning a thing past or future1 as concerning the conception of a thing present2 this ,i have already shown in ,,iii4 xviii41 to which1 with its note1 ,i refer the reader4 ,,xvi4 ,joy is pleasure accompanied by the idea of something past1 which has had an issue beyond our hope4 ,,xvii4 ,disappointment is pain accompanied by the idea of something past1 which has had an issue contrary to our hope4 ,,xviii4 ,pity is pain accompanied by the idea of evil1 which has befallen someone else whom we conceive to be like ourselves 7cf4 ,,iii4 xxii4 note1 and ,,iii4 xxvii4 note74 ,explanation--,between pity and sympathy 7misericordia7 there seems to be no difference1 unless perhaps that the former term is used in reference to a particular action1 and the latter in reference to a disposition4 ,,xix4 ,approval is love towards one who has done good to another4 ,,xx4 ,indignation is hatred towards one who has done evil to another4 ,explanation--,i am aware that these terms are employed in senses somewhat different from those usually assigned4 ,but my purpose is to explain1 not the meaning of words1 but the nature of things4 ,i therefore make use of such terms1 as may convey my meaning without any violent departure from their ordinary signification4 ,one statement of my method will suffice4 ,as for the cause of the above-named emotions see ,,iii4 xxvii4 ,cor4 i41 and ,,iii4 xxii4 note4 ,,xxi4 ,partiality is thinking too highly of anyone because of the love we bear him4 ,explanation--,thus partiality is an effect of love1 and disparagement an effect of hatred3 so that partiality may also be defined as love1 in so far as it induces a man to think too highly of a beloved object4 ,contrariwise1 disparagement may be defined as hatred1 in so far as it induces a man to think too meanly of a hated object4 ,cf4 ,,iii4 xxvi4 note4 ,,xxiii4 ,envy is hatred1 in so far as it induces a man to be pained by another's good fortune1 and to rejoice in another's evil fortune4 ,explanation--,envy is generally opposed to sympathy1 which1 by doing some violence to the meaning of the word1 may therefore be thus defined3 ,,xxiv4 ,sympathy 7misericordia7 is love1 in so far as it induces a man to feel pleasure at another's good fortune1 and pain at another's evil fortune4 ,explanation--,concerning envy see the notes to ,,ii4 xxiv4 and xxxii4 ,these emotions also arise from pleasure or pain accompanied by the idea of something external1 as cause either in itself or accidentally4 ,i now pass on to other emotions1 which are accompanied by the idea of something within as a cause4 ,,xxv4 ,self-approval is pleasure arising from a man's contemplation of himself and his own power of action4 ,,xxvi4 ,humility is pain arising from a man's contemplation of his own weakness of body or mind4 ,explanation--,self-complacency is opposed to humility1 in so far as we thereby mean pleasure arising from a contemplation of our own power of action2 but1 in so far as we mean thereby pleasure accompanied by the idea of any action which we believe we have performed by the free decision of our mind1 it is opposed to repentance1 which we may thus define3 ,,xxvii4 ,repentance is pain accompanied by the idea of some action1 which we believe we have performed by the free decision of our mind4 ,explanation--,the causes of these emotions we have set forth in ,,iii4 li4 note1 and in ,,iii4 liii41 liv41 lv4 and note4 ,concerning the free decision of the mind see ,,ii4 xxxv4 note4 ,this is perhaps the place to call attention to the fact1 that it is nothing wonderful that all those actions1 which are commonly called wrong1 are followed by pain1 and all those1 which are called right1 are followed by pleasure4 ,we can easily gather from what has been said1 that this depends in great measure on education4 ,parents1 by reprobating the former class of actions1 and by frequently chiding their children because of them1 and also by persuading to and praising the latter class1 have brought it about1 that the former should be associated with pain and the latter with pleasure4 ,this is confirmed by experience4 ,for custom and religion are not the same among all men1 but that which some consider sacred others consider profane1 and what some consider honourable others consider disgraceful4 ,according as each man has been educated1 he feels repentance for a given action or glories therein4 ,,xxviii4 ,pride is thinking too highly of one's self from self-love4 ,explanation--,thus pride is different from partiality1 for the latter term is used in reference to an external object1 but pride is used of a man thinking too highly of himself4 ,however1 as partiality is the effect of love1 so is pride the effect or property of self-love1 which may therefore be thus defined1 love of self or self-approval1 in so far as it leads a man to think too highly of himself4 ,to this emotion there is no contrary4 ,for no one thinks too meanly of himself because of self-hatred2 ,i say that no one thinks too meanly of himself1 in so far as he conceives that he is incapable of doing this or that4 ,for whatsoever a man imagines that he is incapable of doing1 he imagines this of necessity1 and by that notion he is so disposed1 that he really cannot do that which he conceives that he cannot do4 ,for1 so long as he conceives that he cannot do it1 so long is he not determined to do it1 and consequently so long is it impossible for him to do it4 ,however1 if we consider such matters as only depend on opinion1 we shall find it conceivable that a man may think too meanly of himself2 for it may happen1 that a man1 sorrowfully regarding his own weakness1 should imagine that he is despised by all men1 while the rest of the world are thinking of nothing less than of despising him4 ,again1 a man may think too meanly of himself1 if he deny of himself in the present something in relation to a future time of which he is uncertain4 ,as1 for instance1 if he should say that he is unable to form any clear conceptions1 or that he can desire and do nothing but what is wicked and base1 c4 ,we may also say1 that a man thinks too meanly of himself1 when we see him from excessive fear of shame refusing to do things which others1 his equals1 venture4 ,we can1 therefore1 set down as a contrary to pride an emotion which ,i will call self-abasement1 for as from self-complacency springs pride1 so from humility springs self-abasement1 which ,i will accordingly thus define3 ,,xxix4 ,self-abasement is thinking too meanly of one's self by reason of pain4 ,explanation--,we are nevertheless generally accustomed to oppose pride to humility1 but in that case we pay more attention to the effect of either emotion than to its nature4 ,we are wont to call proud the man who boasts too much 7,,iii4 xxx4 note71 who talks of nothing but his own virtues and other people's faults1 who wishes to be first2 and lastly who goes through life with a style and pomp suitable to those far above him in station4 ,on the other hand1 we call humble the man who too often blushes1 who confesses his faults1 who sets forth other men's virtues1 and who1 lastly1 walks with bent head and is negligent of his attire4 ,however1 these emotions1 humility and self-abasement1 are extremely rare4 ,for human nature1 considered in itself1 strives against them as much as it can 7see ,,iii4 xiii41 liv472 hence those1 who are believed to be most self-abased and humble1 are generally in reality the most ambitious and envious4 ,,xxx4 ,honour 7gloria7 is pleasure accompanied by the idea of some action of our own1 which we believe to be praised by others4 ,,xxxi4 ,shame is pain accompanied by the idea of some action of our own1 which we believe to be blamed by others4 ,explanation--,on this subject see the note to ,,iii4 xxx4 ,but we should here remark the difference which exists between shame and modesty4 ,shame is the pain following the deed whereof we are ashamed4 ,modesty is the fear or dread of shame1 which restrains a man from committing a base action4 ,modesty is usually opposed to shamelessness1 but the latter is not an emotion1 as ,i will duly show2 however1 the names of the emotions 7as ,i have remarked already7 have regard rather to their exercise than to their nature4 ,i have now fulfilled the task of explaining the emotions arising from pleasure and pain4 ,i therefore proceed to treat of those which ,i refer to desire4 ,,xxxii4 ,regret is the desire or appetite to possess something1 kept alive by the remembrance of the said thing1 and at the same time constrained by the remembrance of other things which exclude the existence of it4 ,explanation--,when we remember a thing1 we are by that very fact1 as ,i have already said more than once1 disposed to contemplate it with the same emotion as if it were something present2 but this disposition or endeavour1 while we are awake1 is generally checked by the images of things which exclude the existence of that which we remember4 ,thus when we remember something which affected us with a certain pleasure1 we by that very fact endeavour to regard it with the same emotion of pleasure as though it were present1 but this endeavour is at once checked by the remembrance of things which exclude the existence of the thing in question4 ,wherefore regret is1 strictly speaking1 a pain opposed to that of pleasure1 which arises from the absence of something we hate 7cf4 ,,iii4 xlvii4 note74 ,but1 as the name regret seems to refer to desire1 ,i set this emotion down1 among the emotions springing from desire4 ,,xxxiii4 ,emulation is the desire of something1 engendered in us by our conception that others have the same desire4 ,explanation--,he who runs away1 because he sees others running away1 or he who fears1 because he sees others in fear2 or again1 he who1 on seeing that another man has burnt his hand1 draws towards him his own hand1 and moves his body as though his own were burnt2 such an one can be said to imitate another's emotion1 but not to emulate him2 not because the causes of emulation and imitation are different1 but because it has become customary to speak of emulation only in him1 who imitates that which we deem to be honourable1 useful1 or pleasant4 ,as to the cause of emulation1 cf4 ,,iii4 xxvii4 and note4 ,the reason why this emotion is generally coupled with envy may be seen from ,,iii4 xxxii4 and note4 ,,xxxiv4 ,thankfulness or ,gratitude is the desire or zeal springing from love1 whereby we endeavour to benefit him1 who with similar feelings of love has conferred a benefit on us4 ,cf4 ,,iii4 xxxix4 note and xl4 ,,xxxv4 ,benevolence is the desire of benefiting one whom we pity4 ,cf4 ,,iii4 xxvii4 note4 ,,xxxvi4 ,anger is the desire1 whereby through hatred we are induced to injure one whom we hate1 ,,iii4 xxxix4 ,,xxxvii4 ,revenge is the desire whereby we are induced1 through mutual hatred1 to injure one who1 with similar feelings1 has injured us4 7,see ,,iii4 xl4 ,cor4 ii4 and note47 ,,xxxviii4 ,cruelty or savageness is the desire1 whereby a man is impelled to injure one whom we love or pity4 ,explanation--,to cruelty is opposed clemency1 which is not a passive state of the mind1 but a power whereby man restrains his anger and revenge4 ,,xxxix4 ,timidity is the desire to avoid a greater evil1 which we dread1 by undergoing a lesser evil4 ,cf4 ,,iii4 xxxix4 note4 ,,xl4 ,daring is the desire1 whereby a man is set on to do something dangerous which his equals fear to attempt4 ,,xli4 ,cowardice is attributed to one1 whose desire is checked by the fear of some danger which his equals dare to encounter4 ,explanation--,cowardice is1 therefore1 nothing else but the fear of some evil1 which most men are wont not to fear2 hence ,i do not reckon it among the emotions springing from desire4 ,nevertheless1 ,i have chosen to explain it here1 because1 in so far as we look to the desire1 it is truly opposed to the emotion of daring4 ,,xlii4 ,consternation is attributed to one1 whose desire of avoiding evil is checked by amazement at the evil which he fears4 ,explanation--,consternation is1 therefore1 a species of cowardice4 ,but1 inasmuch as consternation arises from a double fear1 it may be more conveniently defined as a fear which keeps a man so bewildered and wavering1 that he is not able to remove the evil4 ,i say bewildered1 in so far as we understand his desire of removing the evil to be constrained by his amazement4 ,i say wavering1 in so far as we understand the said desire to be constrained by the fear of another evil1 which equally torments him3 whence it comes to pass that he knows not1 which he may avert of the two4 ,on this subject1 see ,,iii4 xxxix4 note1 and ,,iii4 lii4 note4 ,concerning cowardice and daring1 see ,,iii4 li4 note4 ,,xliii4 ,courtesy1 or deference 7,humanitas seu modestia71 is the desire of acting in a way that should please men1 and refraining from that which should displease them4 ,,xliv4 ,ambition is the immoderate desire of power4 ,explanation--,ambition is the desire1 whereby all the emotions 7cf4 ,,iii4 xxvii4 and xxxi47 are fostered and strengthened2 therefore this emotion can with difficulty be overcome4 ,for1 so long as a man is bound by any desire1 he is at the same time necessarily bound by this4 ,the best men1 says ,cicero1 are especially led by honour4 ,even philosophers1 when they write a book contemning honour1 sign their names thereto1 and so on4 ,,xlv4 ,luxury is excessive desire1 or even love of living sumptuously4 ,,xlvi4 ,intemperance is the excessive desire and love of drinking4 ,,xlvii4 ,avarice is the excessive desire and love of riches4 ,,xlviii4 ,lust is desire and love in the matter of sexual intercourse4 ,explanation--,whether this desire be excessive or not1 it is still called lust4 ,these last five emotions 7as ,i have shown in ,,iii4 lvi47 have on contraries4 ,for deference is a species of ambition4 ,cf4 ,,iii4 xxix4 note4 ,again1 ,i have already pointed out1 that temperance1 sobriety1 and chastity indicate rather a power than a passivity of the mind4 ,it may1 nevertheless1 happen1 that an avaricious1 an ambitious1 or a timid man may abstain from excess in eating1 drinking1 or sexual indulgence1 yet avarice1 ambition1 and fear are not contraries to luxury1 drunkenness1 and debauchery4 ,for an avaricious man often is glad to gorge himself with food and drink at another man's expense4 ,an ambitious man will restrain himself in nothing1 so long as he thinks his indulgences are secret2 and if he lives among drunkards and debauchees1 he will1 from the mere fact of being ambitious1 be more prone to those vices4 ,lastly1 a timid man does that which he would not4 ,for though an avaricious man should1 for the sake of avoiding death1 cast his riches into the sea1 he will none the less remain avaricious2 so1 also1 if a lustful man is downcast1 because he cannot follow his bent1 he does not1 on the ground of abstention1 cease to be lustful4 ,in fact1 these emotions are not so much concerned with the actual feasting1 drinking1 c41 as with the appetite and love of such4 ,nothing1 therefore1 can be opposed to these emotions1 but high-mindedness and valour1 whereof ,i will speak presently4 ,the definitions of jealousy and other waverings of the mind ,i pass over in silence1 first1 because they arise from the compounding of the emotions already described2 secondly1 because many of them have no distinctive names1 which shows that it is sufficient for practical purposes to have merely a general knowledge of them4 ,however1 it is established from the definitions of the emotions1 which we have set forth1 that they all spring from desire1 pleasure1 or pain1 or1 rather1 that there is nothing besides these three2 wherefore each is wont to be called by a variety of names in accordance with its various relations and extrinsic tokens4 ,if we now direct our attention to these primitive emotions1 and to what has been said concerning the nature of the mind1 we shall be able thus to define the emotions1 in so far as they are referred to the mind only4 ,,general ,,definition ,,of ,,the ,,emotions ,emotion1 which is called a passivity of the soul1 is a confused idea1 whereby the mind affirms concerning its body1 or any part thereof1 a force for existence 7existendi vis7 greater or less than before1 and by the presence of which the mind is determined to think of one thing rather than another4 ,explanation--,i say1 first1 that emotion or passion of the soul is a confused idea4 ,for we have shown that the mind is only passive1 in so far as it has inadequate or confused ideas4 7,,iii4 iii47 ,i say1 further1 whereby the mind affirms concerning its body or any part thereof a force for existence greater than before4 ,for all the ideas of bodies1 which we possess1 denote rather the actual disposition of our own body 7,,ii4 xvi4 ,cor4 ii47 than the nature of an external body4 ,but the idea which constitutes the reality of an emotion must denote or express the disposition of the body1 or of some part thereof1 because its power of action or force for existence is increased or diminished1 helped or hindered4 ,but it must be noted that1 when ,i say a greater or less force for existence than before1 ,i do not mean that the mind compares the present with the past disposition of the body1 but that the idea which constitutes the reality of an emotion affirms something of the body1 which1 in fact1 involves more or less of reality than before4 ,and inasmuch as the essence of mind consists in the fact 7,,ii4 xi41 xiii471 that it affirms the actual existence of its own body1 and inasmuch as we understand by perfection the very essence of a thing1 it follows that the mind passes to greater or less perfection1 when it happens to affirm concerning its own body1 or any part thereof1 something involving more or less reality than before4 ,when1 therefore1 ,i said above that the power of the mind is increased or diminished1 ,i merely meant that the mind had formed of its own body1 or of some part thereof1 an idea involving more or less of reality1 than it had already affirmed concerning its own body4 ,for the excellence of ideas1 and the actual power of thinking are measured by the excellence of the object4 ,lastly1 ,i have added by the presence of which the mind is determined to think of one thing rather than another1 so that1 besides the nature of pleasure and pain1 which the first part of the definition explains1 ,i might also express the nature of desire4 ,,end ,,of ,,part ,,iii