,,aesthetic ,,as ,,science ,,of         
,,expression  ,,and ,,general           
,,linguistic   ,,translated ,,from ,,the
 ,,italian ,,of ,,benedetto ,,croce     
,,by  ,,douglas ,,ainslie ,b4,a4        
7,,oxon47   #aiji   ,,the ,,aesthetic   
,,is ,,dedicated ,,by ,,the ,,author    
,,to ,,the ,,memory ,,of ,,his ,,parents
 ,,pasquale ,,and ,,luisa ,,sipari ,,and
 ,,of ,,his ,,sister ,,maria   ,,note   
,i give here a close translation of the 
complete ,theory of ,aesthetic1 and in  
the ,historical ,summary1 with the      
consent of the author1 an abbreviation  
of the historical portion of the        
original work4     ,,contents           
,,introduction  ,,theory  ,i ,,intuition
 ,,and ,,expression  ,intuitive         
knowledge--,its independence in respect 
to the intellect-- ,intuition and       
perception--,intuition and the concepts 
of space and time--,intuition and       
sensation--,intuition and               
association--,intuition and             
representation--,intuition and          

expression--,illusions as to their      
difference--,identity of intuition and  
expression4  ,,ii ,,intuition ,,and     
,,art  ,corollaries and                 
explanations--,identity of art and of   
intuitive knowledge-- ,no specific      
difference--,no difference of           
intensity--,difference extensive and    
empirical--,artistic genius--,content   
and form in ,aesthetic--,critique of the
 imitation of nature and of the artistic
 illusion--,critique of art conceived as
 a sentimental1 not a theoretic         
fact--,the origin of ,aesthetic1 and    
sentiment--,critique of the theory of   
,aesthetic senses--,unity and           
indivisibility of the work of art--,art 
as deliverer4  ,,iii ,,art ,,and        
,,philosophy  ,indissolubility of       
intellective and of intuitive           
knowledge--,critique of the negations of
 this thesis--,art and science--,content
 and form3 another meaning4 ,prose and  
poetry--,the relation of first and      
second degree--,inexistence of other    

cognoscitive                            
forms--,historicity--,identity and      
difference in respect of                
art--,historical criticism--,historical 
scepticism--,philosophy as perfect      
science4 ,the so-called natural         
sciences1 and their limits--,the        
phenomenon and the noumenon4  ,,iv      
,,historicism ,,and ,,intellectualism   
,,in ,,aesthetic  ,critique of the      
verisimilar and of naturalism--,critique
 of ideas in art1 of art as thesis1 and 
of the typical--,critique of the symbol 
and of the allegory--,critique of the   
theory of artistic and literary         
categories--,errors derived from this   
theory in judgments on art-- ,empirical 
meaning of the divisions of the         
categories4  ,v ,,analogous ,,errors    
,,in ,,history ,,and ,,in ,,logic       
,critique of the philosophy of          
,history--,aesthetic invasions of       
,logic-- ,logic in its                  
essence--,distinction between logical   
and non-logical judgments--,the         

syllogism--,false ,logic and true       
,aesthetic--,logic reformed4  ,,vi      
,,theoretic ,,and ,,practical ,,activity
  ,the will--,the will as ulterior grade
 in respect of knowledge--,objections   
and explanations--,critique of practical
 judgments or judgments of              
value--,exclusion of the practical from 
the aesthetic--,critique of the theory  
of the end of art and of the choice of  
content--,practical innocence of        
art--,independence of art--,critique of 
the saying3 the style is the            
man--,critique of the concept of        
sincerity in art4  ,,vii ,,analogy      
,,between ,,the ,,theoretic ,,and ,,the 
,,practical  ,the two forms of practical
 activity--,the economically useful--   
,distinction between the useful and the 
technical--,distinction between the     
useful and the egoistic--,economic and  
moral volition--,pure economicity--,the 
economic side of morality--,the merely  
economical and the error of the morally 
indifferent--,critique of utilitarianism

 and the reform of ,ethic and of        
,economic--,phenomenon and noumenon in  
practical activity4  ,,viii ,,exclusion 
,,of ,,other ,,spiritual ,,forms  ,the  
system of the spirit--,the forms of     
genius--,inexistence of a fifth form of 
activity--,law2                         
sociality--,religiosity--,metaphysic--,m
ental imagination and the intuitive     
intellect--,mystical                    
,aesthetic--,mortality and immortality  
of art4  ,,ix ,,indivisibility ,,of     
,,expression ,,into ,,modes ,,or        
,,grades ,,and ,,critique ,,of          
,,rhetoric  ,the characteristics of     
art--,inexistence of modes of           
expression-- ,impossibility of          
translations--,critique of rhetorical   
categories-- ,empirical meaning of      
rhetorical categories--,their use as    
synonyms of the aesthetic fact--,their  
use as indicating various aesthetic     
imperfections--,their use as            
transcending the aesthetic fact1 and in 
the service of science--,rhetoric in    

schools--,similarities of               
expressions--,relative possibility of   
translations4  ,x ,,aesthetic           
,,sentiments ,,and ,,the ,,distinction  
,,between ,,the ,,beautiful ,,and ,,the 
,,ugly  ,various meanings of the word   
sentiment--,sentiment as activity--     
,identification of sentiment with       
economic activity--,critique of         
hedonism--,sentiment as concomitant of  
every form of activity--,meaning of     
certain ordinary distinctions of        
sentiments--,value and disvalue3 the    
contraries and their union--,the        
beautiful as the value of expression1 or
 expression without adjunct--,the ugly  
and the elements of beauty that         
constitute it--,illusion that there     
exist expressions neither beautiful nor 
ugly--,proper aesthetic sentiments and  
concomitant and accidental              
sentiments--,critique of apparent       
sentiments4  ,,xi ,,critique ,,of       
,,aesthetic ,,hedonism  ,critique of the
 beautiful as what pleases the superior 

senses--,critique of the theory of      
play--,critique of the theory of        
sexuality and of the triumph--,critique 
of the ,aesthetic of the                
sympathetic--,meaning in it of content  
and of form--,aesthetic hedonism and    
moralism--,the rigoristic negation1 and 
the pedagogic negation of art--,critique
 of pure beauty4  ,,xii ,,the           
,,aesthetic ,,of ,,the ,,sympathetic    
,,and ,,pseudo-,,aesthetic ,,concepts   
,pseudo-aesthetic concepts1 and the     
,aesthetic of the sympathetic--         
,critique of the theory of the ugly in  
art and of its surmounting--            
,pseudo-aesthetic concepts appertain to 
,psychology--,impossibility of rigorous 
definitions of these--,examples3        
definitions of the sublime1 of the      
comic1 of the humorous--,relation       
between those concepts and aesthetic    
concepts4  ,,xiii ,,the ,,so-,,called   
,,physically ,,beautiful ,,in ,,nature  
,,and ,,in ,,art  ,aesthetic activity   
and physical concepts--,expression in   

the aesthetic sense1 and expression in  
the naturalistic sense--,intuitions and 
memory--,the production of aids to      
memory--,the physically beautiful--     
,content and form3 another              
meaning--,natural beauty and artificial 
beauty--,mixed beauty--,writings--,the  
beautiful that is free and that which is
 not free--,critique of the beautiful   
that is not free-- ,stimulants of       
production4  ,,xiv ,,errors ,,arising   
,,from ,,the ,,confusion ,,between      
,,physic ,,and ,,aesthetic  ,critique of
 aesthetic associationism--,critique of 
aesthetic physic-- ,critique of the     
theory of the beauty of the human       
body--,critique of the beauty of        
geometrical figures--,critique of       
another aspect of the imitation of      
nature--,critique of the theory of the  
elementary forms of the                 
beautiful--,critique of the search for  
the objective conditions of the         
beautiful--,the astrology of ,aesthetic4
  ,,xv ,,the ,,activity ,,of            

,,externalization4 ,,technique ,,and    
,,the ,,theory ,,of ,,the ,,arts  ,the  
practical activity of                   
externalization--,the technique of      
externalization--,technical theories of 
single arts--,critique of the           
classifications of the arts--,relation  
of the activity of externalization with 
utility and morality4  ,,xvi ,,taste    
,,and ,,the ,,reproduction ,,of ,,art   
,aesthetic judgment4 ,its identity with 
aesthetic reproduction-- ,impossibility 
of divergences--,identity of taste and  
genius--,analogy with the other         
activities--,critique of absolutism     
7intellectualism7 and of aesthetic      
relativism--,critique of relative       
relativism--,objections founded on the  
variation of the stimulus and of the    
psychic disposition-- ,critique of the  
distinction of signs as natural and     
conventional--,the surmounting of       
variety--,restorations and historical   
interpretation4  ,,xvii ,,the ,,history 
,,of ,,literature ,,and ,,of ,,art      

,historical criticism in literature and 
art4 ,its importance--,artistic and     
literary history4 ,its distinction from 
historical criticism and from the       
aesthetic judgment--,the method of      
artistic and literary history--,critique
 of the problem of the origin of        
art--,the criterion of progress and     
history--,inexistence of a single line  
of progress in artistic and literary    
history--,errors in respect of this     
law--,other meanings of the word        
progress in relation to ,aesthetic4     
,,xviii ,,conclusion3 ,,identity ,,of   
,,linguistic ,,and ,,aesthetic  ,summary
 of the inquiry--,identity of           
,linguistic with ,aesthetic-- ,aesthetic
 formulation of linguistic problems4    
,nature of language-- ,origin of        
language and its development--,relation 
between ,grammatic and                  
,logic--,grammatical categories or parts
 of speech--,individuality of speech and
 the classification of                  
languages--,impossibility of a normative

 ,grammatic--,didactic                  
organisms--,elementary linguistic       
elements1 or roots--,the aesthetic      
judgment and the model language--       
,conclusion4  ,,historical ,,summary    
,aesthetic ideas in ,graeco-,roman      
antiquity--,in the ,middle ,age and  at 
the ,renaissance--,fermentation of      
thought in the seventeenth              
century--,aesthetic ideas in            
,cartesianism1 ,leibnitzianism1 and in  
the ,aesthetic of ,baumgarten--,g4,b4   
,vico--,aesthetic doctrines in the      
eighteenth century--,emmanuel           
,kant--,the ,aesthetic of ,idealism with
 ,schiller and ,hegel--,schopenhauer and
 ,herbart--,friedrich                   
,schleiermacher--,the philosophy of     
language with ,humboldt and             
,steinthal--,aesthetic in ,france1      
,england1 and ,italy during the first   
half of the nineteenth                  
century--,francesco de ,sanctis--,the   
,aesthetic of the epigoni--,positivism  
and aesthetic naturalism--,aesthetic    

psychologism and other recent           
tendencies--,glance at the history of   
certain particular                      
doctrines--,conclusion4  ,,appendix     
,translation of the lecture on ,pure    
,intuition and the lyrical nature of    
art1 delivered by ,benedetto ,croce     
before the ,international ,congress of  
,philosophy at ,heidelberg4             
,,introduction   ,there are always      
,americas to be discovered3 the most    
interesting in ,europe4  ,i can lay no  
claim to having discovered an ,america1 
but ,i do claim to have discovered a    
,columbus4 ,his name is ,benedetto      
,croce1 and he dwells on the shores of  
the ,mediterranean1 at ,naples1 city of 
the antique ,parthenope4  ,croce's      
,america cannot be expressed in         
geographical terms4 ,it is more         
important than any space of mountain and
 river1 of forest and dale4 ,it belongs 
to the kingdom of the spirit1 and has   
many provinces4 ,that province which    
most interests me1 ,i have striven in   

the following pages to annex to the     
possessions of the ,anglo-,saxon race2  
an act which cannot be blamed as        
predatory1 since it may be said of      
philosophy more truly than of love1 that
 to divide is not to take away4  ,the   
,historical ,summary will show how many 
a brave adventurer has navigated the    
perilous seas of speculation upon ,art1 
how ,aristotle's marvellous insight gave
 him glimpses of its beauty1 how ,plato 
threw away its golden fruit1 how        
,baumgarten sounded the depth of its    
waters1 ,kant sailed along its coast    
without landing1 and ,vico hoisted the  
,italian flag upon its shore4  ,but     
,benedetto ,croce has been the first    
thoroughly to explore it1 cutting his   
way inland through the tangled          
undergrowth of imperfect thought4 ,he   
has measured its length and breadth1    
marked out and described its spiritual  
features with minute accuracy4 ,the     
country thus won to philosophy will     
always bear his name1 ,estetica di      

,croce1 a new ,america4  ,it was at     
,naples1 in the winter of #aijg1 that ,i
 first saw the ,philosopher of          
,aesthetic4 ,benedetto ,croce1 although 
born in the ,abruzzi1 ,province of      
,aquila 7#ahff71 is essentially a       
,neapolitan1 and rarely remains long    
absent from the city1 on the shore of   
that magical sea1 where once ,ulysses   
sailed1 and where sometimes yet 7near   
,amalfi7 we may hear the ,syrens sing   
their song4 ,but more wonderful than the
 song of any ,syren seems to me the     
,theory of ,aesthetic as the ,science of
 ,expression1 and that is why ,i have   
overcome the obstacles that stood       
between me and the giving of this       
theory1 which in my belief is the truth1
 to the ,english-speaking world4  ,no   
one could have been further removed than
 myself1 as ,i turned over at ,naples   
the pages of ,la ,critica1 from any idea
 that ,i was nearing the solution of the
 problem of ,art4 ,all my youth it had  
haunted me4 ,as an undergraduate at     

,oxford ,i had caught the exquisite     
cadence of ,walter ,pater's speech1 as  
it came from his very lips1 or rose like
 the perfume of some exotic flower from 
the ribbed pages of the ,renaissance4   
,seeming to solve the riddle of the     
,sphinx1 he solved it not--only         
delighted with pure pleasure of poetry  
and of subtle thought as he led one     
along the pathways of his ,enchanted    
,garden1 where ,i shall always love to  
tread4  ,oscar ,wilde1 too1 ,i had often
 heard at his best1 the most brilliant  
talker of our time1 his wit flashing in 
the spring sunlight of ,oxford          
luncheon-parties as now in his beautiful
 writings1 like the jewelled rapier of  
,mercutio4 ,but his works1 too1 will be 
searched in vain by the seeker after    
definite aesthetic truth4  ,with ,a4,c4 
,swinburne ,i had sat and watched the   
lava that yet flowed from those lips    
that were kissed in youth by all the    
,muses4 ,neither from him nor from      
,j4,m4 ,whistler's brilliant aphorisms  

on art could be gathered anything more  
than the exquisite pleasure of the      
moment3 the monochronos haedonae4 ,of   
the great pedagogues1 ,i had known1 but 
never sat at the feet of ,jowett1 whom  
,i found far less inspiring than any of 
the great men above mentioned4 ,among   
the dead1 ,i had studied ,herbert       
,spencer and ,matthew ,arnold1          
,schopenhauer1 ,nietzsche and ,guyau3 ,i
 had conversed with that living         
,neo-,latin1 ,anatole ,france1 the      
modern ,rousseau1 and had enjoyed the   
marvellous irony and eloquence of his   
writings1 which1 while they delight the 
society in which he lives1 may well be  
one of the causes that lead to its      
eventual destruction4  ,the solution of 
the problem of ,aesthetic is not in the 
gift of the ,muses4  ,to return to      
,naples4 ,as ,i looked over those pages 
of the bound volumes of ,la ,critica4 ,i
 soon became aware that ,i was in the   
presence of a mind far above the        
ordinary level of literary criticism4   

,the profound studies of ,carducci1 of  
d',annunzio1 and of ,pascoli 7to name   
but three71 in which those writers      
passed before me in all their strength  
and in all their weakness1 led me to    
devote several days to the ,critica4 ,at
 the end of that time ,i was convinced  
that ,i had made a discovery1 and wrote 
to the philosopher1 who owns and edits  
that journal4  ,in response to his      
invitation1 ,i made my way1 on a sunny  
day in ,november1 past the little shops 
of the coral-vendors that surround1 like
 a necklace1 the ,rione de la ,bellezza1
 and wound zigzag along the over-crowded
 ,toledo4 ,i knew that ,signor ,croce   
lived in the old part of the town1 but  
had hardly anticipated so remarkable a  
change as ,i experienced on passing     
beneath the great archway and finding   
myself in old ,naples4 ,this has already
 been described elsewhere1 and ,i will  
not here dilate upon this world within a
 world1 having so much of greater       
interest to tell in a brief space4 ,i   

will merely say that the costumes here  
seemed more picturesque1 the dark eyes  
flashed more dangerously than elsewhere1
 there was a quaint life1 an animation  
about the streets1 different from       
anything ,i had known before4 ,as ,i    
climbed the lofty stone steps of the    
,palazzo to the floor where dwells the  
philosopher of ,aesthetic ,i felt as    
though ,i had stumbled into the         
eighteenth century and were calling on  
,giambattista ,vico4 ,after a brief     
inspection by a young man with the      
appearance of a secretary1 ,i was told  
that ,i was expected1 and admitted into 
a small room opening out of the hall4   
,thence1 after a few moments' waiting1  
,i was led into a much larger room4 ,the
 walls were lined all round with        
bookcases1 barred and numbered1 filled  
with volumes forming part of the        
philosopher's great library4 ,i had not 
long to wait4 ,a door opened behind me  
on my left1 and a rather short1         
thick-set man advanced to greet me1 and 

pronouncing my name at the same time    
with a slight foreign accent1 asked me  
to be seated beside him4 ,after the     
interchange of a few brief formulae of  
politeness in ,french1 our conversation 
was carried on in ,italian1 and ,i had a
 better opportunity of studying my      
host's air and manner4 ,his hands he    
held clasped before him1 but frequently 
released them1 to make those vivid      
gestures with which ,neapolitans        
frequently clinch their phrase4 ,his    
most remarkable feature was his eyes1 of
 a greenish grey3 extraordinary eyes1   
not for beauty1 but for their fathomless
 depth1 and for the sympathy which one  
felt welling up in them from the soul   
beneath4 ,this was especially noticeable
 as our conversation fell upon the      
question of ,art and upon the many      
problems bound up with it4 ,i do not    
know how long that first interview      
lasted1 but it seemed a few minutes     
only1 during which was displayed before 
me a vast panorama of unknown height and

 headland1 of league upon league of     
forest1 with its bright-winged birds of 
thought flying from tree to tree down   
the long avenues into the dim blue      
vistas of the unknown4  ,i returned with
 my brain awhirl1 as though ,i had been 
in fairyland1 and when ,i looked at the 
second edition of the ,estetica1 with   
his inscription1 ,i was sure of it4     
,these lines will suffice to show how   
the translation of the ,estetica        
originated from the acquaintance thus   
formed1 which has developed into        
friendship4 ,i will now make brief      
mention of ,benedetto ,croce's other    
work1 especially in so far as it throws 
light upon the ,aesthetic4 ,for this    
purpose1 besides articles in ,italian   
and ,german reviews1 ,i have made use of
 the excellent monograph on the         
philosopher1 by ,g4 ,prezzolini4#a      
,first1 then1 it will be well to point  
out that the ,aesthetic forms part of a 
complete philosophical system1 to which 
the author gives the general title of   

,philosophy of the ,spirit4 ,the        
,aesthetic is the first of the three    
volumes4 ,the second is the ,logic1 the 
third the ,philosophy of the ,practical4
  ,in the ,logic1 as elsewhere in the   
system1 ,croce combats that false       
conception1 by which natural science1 in
 the shape of psychology1 makes claim to
 philosophy1 and formal logic to        
absolute value4 ,the thesis of the pure 
concept cannot be discussed here4 ,it is
 connected with the logic of evolution  
as discovered by ,hegel1 and is the only
 logic which contains in itself the     
interpretation and the continuity of    
reality4 ,bergson in his ,l',evolution  
,cratrice deals with logic in a somewhat
 similar manner4 ,i recently heard him  
lecture on the distinction between      
spirit and matter at the ,collge de     
,france1 and those who read ,french and 
,italian will find that both ,croce's   
,logic and the book above mentioned by  
the ,french philosopher will amply repay
 their labour4 ,the conception of nature

 as something lying outside the spirit  
which informs it1 as the non-being which
 aspires to being1 underlies all        
,croce's thought1 and we find constant  
reference to it throughout his          
philosophical system4  ,with regard to  
the third volume1 the ,philosophy of the
 ,practical1 it is impossible here to   
give more than a hint of its treasures4 
,i merely refer in passing to the       
treatment of the will1 which is posited 
as a unity inseparable from the         
volitional act4 ,for ,croce there is no 
difference between action and intention1
 means and end3 they are one thing1     
inseparable as the intuition-expression 
of ,aesthetic4 ,the ,philosophy of the  
,practical is a logic and science of the
 will1 not a normative science4 ,just as
 in ,aesthetic the individuality of     
expression made models and rules        
impossible1 so in practical life the    
individuality of action removes the     
possibility of catalogues of virtues1 of
 the exact application of laws1 of the  

existence of practical judgments and    
judgments of value previous to action4  
,the reader will probably ask here3 ,but
 what1 then1 becomes of morality8 ,the  
question will be found answered in the  
,theory of ,aesthetic1 and ,i will      
merely say here that ,croce's thesis of 
the double degree of the practical      
activity1 economic and moral1 is one of 
the greatest contributions to modern    
thought4 ,just as it is proved in the   
,theory of ,aesthetic that the concept  
depends upon the intuition1 which is the
 first degree1 the primary and          
indispensable thing1 so it is proved in 
the ,philosophy of the ,practical that  
,morality or ,ethic depends upon        
,economic1 which is the first degree of 
the practical activity4 ,the volitional 
act is always economic1 but true freedom
 of the will exists and consists in     
conforming not merely to economic1 but  
to moral conditions1 to the human       
spirit1 which is greater than any       
individual4 ,here we are face to face   

with the ethics of ,christianity1 to    
which ,croce accords all honour4  ,this 
,philosophy of the ,spirit is           
symptomatic of the happy reaction of the
 twentieth century against the crude    
materialism of the second half of the   
nineteenth4 ,it is the spirit which     
gives to the work of art its value1 not 
this or that method of arrangement1 this
 or that tint or cadence1 which can     
always be copied by skilful plagiarists3
 not so the spirit of the creator4 ,in  
,england we hear too much of 7natural7  
science1 which has usurped the very name
 of ,philosophy4 ,the natural sciences  
are very well in their place1 but       
discoveries such as aviation are of     
infinitely less importance to the race  
than the smallest addition to the       
philosophy of the spirit4 ,empirical    
science1 with the collusion of          
positivism1 has stolen the cloak of     
philosophy and must be made to give it  
back4  ,among ,croce's other important  
contributions to thought must be        

mentioned his definition of ,history as 
being aesthetic and differing from ,art 
solely in that history represents the   
real1 art the possible4 ,in connection  
with this definition and its proof1 the 
philosopher recounts how he used to hold
 an opposite view4 ,doing everything    
thoroughly1 he had prepared and written 
out a long disquisition on this thesis1 
which was already in type1 when         
suddenly1 from the midst of his         
meditations1 the truth flashed upon him4
 ,he saw for the first time clearly that
 history cannot be a science1 since1    
like art1 it always deals with the      
particular4 ,without a moment's         
hesitation he hastened to the printers  
and bade them break up the type4  ,this 
incident is illustrative of the         
sincerity and good faith of ,benedetto  
,croce4 ,one knows him to be severe for 
the faults and weaknesses of others1    
merciless for his own4  ,yet though     
severe1 the editor of ,la ,critica is   
uncompromisingly just1 and would never  

allow personal dislike or jealousy1 or  
any extrinsic consideration1 to stand in
 the way of fair treatment to the writer
 concerned4 ,many superficial ,english  
critics might benefit considerably by   
attention to this quality in one who is 
in other respects also so immeasurably  
their superior4 ,a good instance of this
 impartiality is his critique of        
,schopenhauer1 with whose system he is  
in complete disagreement1 yet affords   
him full credit for what of truth is    
contained in his voluminous writings4#b 
,croce's education was largely completed
 in ,germany1 and on account of their   
thoroughness he has always been an      
upholder of ,german methods4 ,one of his
 complaints against the ,italian        
,positivists is that they only read     
second-rate works in ,french or at the  
most the dilettante booklets published  
in such profusion by the ,anglo-,saxon  
press4 ,this tendency towards ,german   
thought1 especially in philosophy1      
depends upon the fact of the former     

undoubted supremacy of ,germany in that 
field1 but ,croce does not for a moment 
admit the inferiority of the ,neo-,latin
 races1 and adds with homely humour in  
reference to ,germany1 that we must not 
throw away the baby with the bath-water6
 ,close1 arduous study and clear thought
 are the only key to scientific         
7philosophical7 truth1 and ,croce never 
begins an article for a newspaper       
without the complete collection of the  
works of the author to be criticized1   
and his own elaborate notes on the table
 before him4 ,schopenhauer said there   
were three kinds of writers--those who  
write without thinking1 the great       
majority2 those who think while they    
write1 not very numerous2 those who     
write after they have thought1 very     
rare4 ,croce certainly belongs to the   
last division1 and1 as ,i have said1    
always feeds his thought upon complete  
erudition4 ,the bibliography of the     
works consulted for the ,estetica alone1
 as printed at the end of the ,italian  

edition1 extends to many pages and      
contains references to works in any way 
dealing with the subject in all the     
,european languages4 ,for instance1     
,croce has studied ,mr4 ,b4 ,bosanquet's
 eclectic works on ,aesthetic1 largely  
based upon ,german sources and by no    
means without value4 ,but he takes      
exception to ,mr4 ,bosanquet's statement
 that he has consulted all works of     
importance on the subject of ,aesthetic4
 ,as a matter of fact1 ,mr4 ,bosanquet  
reveals his ignorance of the greater    
part of the contribution to ,aesthetic  
made by the ,neo-,latin races1 which the
 reader of this book will recognize as  
of first-rate importance4  ,this        
thoroughness it is which gives such     
importance to the literary and          
philosophical criticisms of ,la         
,critica4 ,croce's method is always     
historical1 and his object in           
approaching any work of art is to       
classify the spirit of its author1 as   
expressed in that work4 ,there are1 he  

maintains1 but two things to be         
considered in criticizing a book4 ,these
 are1 firstly1 what is its peculiarity1 
in what way is it singular1 how is it   
differentiated from other works8        
,secondly1 what is its degree of        
purity8--,that is1 to what extent has   
its author kept himself free from all   
considerations alien to the perfection  
of the work as an expression1 as a      
lyrical intuition8 ,with the answering  
of these questions ,croce is satisfied4 
,he does not care to know if the author 
keep a motor-car1 like ,maeterlinck2 or 
prefer to walk on ,putney ,heath1 like  
,swinburne4 ,this amounts to saying that
 all works of art must be judged by     
their own standard4 ,how far has the    
author succeeded in doing what he       
intended8  ,croce is far above any      
personal animus1 although the same      
cannot be said of those he criticizes4  
,these1 like d',annunzio1 whose         
limitations he points out--his egoism1  
his lack of human sympathy--are often   

very bitter1 and accuse the penetrating 
critic of want of courtesy4 ,this       
seriousness of purpose runs like a      
golden thread through all ,croce's work4
 ,the flimsy superficial remarks on     
poetry and fiction which too often pass 
for criticism in ,england 7,scotland is 
a good deal more thorough7 are put to   
shame by ,la ,critica1 the study of     
which ,i commend to all readers who read
 or wish to read ,italian4#c ,they will 
find in its back numbers a complete     
picture of a century of ,italian        
literature1 besides a store-house of    
philosophical criticism4 ,the ,quarterly
 and ,edinburgh ,reviews are our only   
journals which can be compared to ,the  
,critica1 and they are less exhaustive  
on the philosophical side4 ,we should   
have to add to these ,mind and the      
,hibbert ,journal to get even an        
approximation to the scope of the       
,italian review4  ,as regards ,croce's  
general philosophical position1 it is   
important to understand that he is not a

 ,hegelian1 in the sense of being a     
close follower of that philosopher4 ,one
 of his last works is that in which he  
deals in a masterly manner with the     
philosophy of ,hegel4 ,the title may be 
translated1 ,what is living and what is 
dead of the philosophy of ,hegel4 ,here 
he explains to us the ,hegelian system  
more clearly than that wondrous edifice 
was ever before explained1 and we       
realize at the same time that ,croce is 
quite as independent of ,hegel as of    
,kant1 of ,vico as of ,spinoza4 ,of     
course he has made use of the best of   
,hegel1 just as every thinker makes use 
of his predecessors and is in his turn  
made use of by those that follow him4   
,but it is incorrect to accuse of       
,hegelianism the author of an           
anti-hegelian ,aesthetic1 of a ,logic   
where ,hegel is only half accepted1 and 
of a ,philosophy of the ,practical1     
which contains hardly a trace of ,hegel4
 ,i give an instance4 ,if the great     
conquest of ,hegel be the dialectic of  

opposites1 his great mistake lies in the
 confusion of opposites with things     
which are distinct but not opposite4    
,if1 says ,croce1 we take as an example 
the application of the ,hegelian triad  
that formulates becoming 7affirmation1  
negation and synthesis71 we find it     
applicable for those opposites which are
 true and false1 good and evil1 being   
and not-being1 but not applicable to    
things which are distinct but not       
opposite1 such as art and philosophy1   
beauty and truth1 the useful and the    
moral4 ,these confusions led ,hegel to  
talk of the death of art1 to conceive as
 possible a ,philosophy of ,history1 and
 to the application of the natural      
sciences to the absurd task of          
constructing a ,philosophy of ,nature4  
,croce has cleared away these           
difficulties by shewing that if from the
 meeting of opposites must arise a      
superior synthesis1 such a synthesis    
cannot arise from things which are      
distinct but not opposite1 since the    

former are connected together as        
superior and inferior1 and the inferior 
can exist without the superior1 but not 
vice versa4 ,thus we see how philosophy 
cannot exist without art1 while art1    
occupying the lower place1 can and does 
exist without philosophy4 ,this brief   
example reveals ,croce's independence in
 dealing with ,hegelian problems4  ,i   
know of no philosopher more generous    
than ,croce in praise and elucidation of
 other workers in the same field1 past  
and present4 ,for instance1 and apart   
from ,hegel1 ,kant has to thank him for 
drawing attention to the marvellous     
excellence of the ,critique of          
,judgment1 generally neglected in favour
 of the ,critiques of ,pure ,reason and 
of ,practical ,judgment2 ,baumgarten for
 drawing the attention of the world to  
his obscure name and for reprinting his 
,latin thesis in which the word         
,aesthetic occurs for the first time2   
and ,schleiermacher for the tributes    
paid to his neglected genius in the     

,history of ,aesthetic4 ,la ,critica1   
too1 is full of generous appreciation of
 contemporaries by ,croce and by that   
profound thinker1 ,gentile4  ,but it is 
not only philosophers who have reason to
 be grateful to ,croce for his untiring 
zeal and diligence4 ,historians1        
economists1 poets1 actors1 and writers  
of fiction have been rescued from their 
undeserved limbo by this valiant ,red   
,cross knight1 and now shine with due   
brilliance in the circle of their peers4
 ,it must also be admitted that a large 
number of false lights1 popular will o' 
the wisps1 have been ruthlessly         
extinguished with the same breath4 ,for 
instance1 ,karl ,marx1 the socialist    
theorist and agitator1 finds in ,croce  
an exponent of his views1 in so far as  
they are based upon the truth1 but where
 he blunders1 his critic immediately    
reveals the origin and nature of his    
mistakes4 ,croce's studies in ,economic 
are chiefly represented by his work1 the
 title of which may be translated       

,historical ,materialism and ,marxist   
,economic4  ,to indicate the breadth and
 variety of ,croce's work ,i will       
mention the further monograph on the    
sixteenth century ,neapolitan           
,pulcinella 7the original of our        
,punch71 and the personage of the       
,neapolitan in comedy1 a monument of    
erudition and of acute and of lively    
dramatic criticism1 that would alone    
have occupied an ordinary man's activity
 for half a lifetime4 ,one must         
remember1 however1 that ,croce's average
 working day is of ten hours4 ,his      
interest is concentrated on things of   
the mind1 and although he sits on       
several ,royal ,commissions1 such as    
those of the ,archives of all ,italy and
 of the monument to ,king ,victor       
,emmanuel1 he has taken no university   
degree1 and much dislikes any           
affectation of academic superiority4 ,he
 is ready to meet any one on equal terms
 and try with them to get at the truth  
on any subject1 be it historical1       

literary1 or philosophical4 ,truth1 he  
says1 is democratic1 and ,i can testify 
that the search for it1 in his company1 
is very stimulating4 ,as is well said by
 ,prezzolini1 ,he has a new word for    
all4  ,there can be no doubt of the     
great value of ,croce's work as an      
educative influence1 and if we are to   
judge of a philosophical system by its  
action on others1 then we must place the
 ,philosophy of the ,spirit very high4  
,it may be said with perfect truth that 
since the death of the poet ,carducci   
there has been no influence in ,italy to
 compare with that of ,benedetto ,croce4
  ,his dislike of ,academies and of all 
forms of prejudice runs parallel with   
his breadth and sympathy with all forms 
of thought4 ,his activity in the present
 is only equalled by his reverence for  
the past4 ,naples he loves with the     
blind love of the child for its parent1 
and he has been of notable assistance to
 such ,neapolitan talent as is          
manifested in the works of ,salvatore di

 ,giacomo1 whose best poems are written 
in the dialect of ,naples1 or rather in 
a dialect of his own1 which ,croce had  
difficulty in persuading the author     
always to retain4 ,the original jet of  
inspiration having been in dialect1 it  
is clear that to amend this inspiration 
at the suggestion of wiseacres at the   
,caf would have been to ruin it         
altogether4  ,of the popularity that his
 system and teaching have already       
attained we may judge by the fact that  
the ,aesthetic#d1 despite the difficulty
 of the subject1 is already in its third
 edition in ,italy1 where1 owing to its 
influence1 philosophy sells better than 
fiction2 while the ,french and ,germans1
 not to mention the ,czechs1 have long  
had translations of the earlier         
editions4 ,his ,logic is on the point of
 appearing in its second edition1 and ,i
 have no doubt that the ,philosophy of  
the ,practical will eventually equal    
these works in popularity4 ,the         
importance and value of ,italian thought

 have been too long neglected in ,great 
,britain4 ,where1 as in ,benedetto      
,croce1 we get the clarity of vision of 
the ,latin1 joined to the thoroughness  
and erudition of the best ,german       
tradition1 we have a combination of rare
 power and effectiveness1 which can by  
no means be neglected4  ,the philosopher
 feels that he has a great mission1     
which is nothing less than the leading  
back of thought to belief in the spirit1
 deserted by so many for crude          
empiricism and positivism4 ,his view of 
philosophy is that it sums up all the   
higher human activities1 including      
religion1 and that in proper hands it is
 able to solve any problem4 ,but there  
is no finality about problems3 the      
solution of one leads to the posing of  
another1 and so on4 ,man is the maker of
 life1 and his spirit ever proceeds from
 a lower to a higher perfection4        
,connected with this view of life is    
,croce's dislike of ,modernism4 ,when   
once a problem has been correctly       

solved1 it is absurd to return to the   
same problem4 ,roman ,catholicism cannot
 march with the times4 ,it can only     
exist by being conservative--its only   
,logic is to be illogical4 ,therefore1  
,croce is opposed to ,loisy and         
,neo-,catholicism1 and supports the     
,encyclical against ,modernism4 ,the    
,catholic religion1 with its great      
stores of myth and morality1 which for  
many centuries was the best thing in the
 world1 is still there for those who are
 unable to assimilate other food4       
,another instance of his dislike for    
,modernism is his criticism of ,pascoli1
 whose attempts to reveal enigmas in the
 writings of ,dante he looks upon as    
useless4 ,we do not1 he says1 read      
,dante in the twentieth century for his 
hidden meanings1 but for his revealed   
poetry4  ,i believe that ,croce will one
 day be recognized as one of the very   
few great teachers of humanity4 ,at     
present he is not appreciated at nearly 
his full value4 ,one rises from a study 

of his philosophy with a sense of having
 been all the time as it were in        
personal touch with the truth1 which is 
very far from the case after the perusal
 of certain other philosophies4  ,croce 
has been called the philosopher-poet1   
and if we take philosophy as ,novalis   
understood it1 certainly ,croce does    
belong to the poets1 though not to the  
formal category of those who write in   
verse4 ,croce is at any rate a born     
philosopher1 and as every trade tends to
 make its object prosaic1 so does every 
vocation tend to make it poetic4 ,yet no
 one has toiled more earnestly than     
,croce4 ,thorough might well be his     
motto1 and if to-day he is admitted to  
be a classic without the stiffness one  
connects with that term1 be sure he has 
well merited the designation4 ,his name 
stands for the best that ,italy has to  
give the world of serious1 stimulating  
thought4 ,i know nothing to equal it    
elsewhere4  ,secure in his strength1    
,croce will often introduce a joke or   

some amusing illustration from          
contemporary life1 in the midst of a    
most profound and serious argument4     
,this spirit of mirth is a sign of      
superiority4 ,he who is not sure of     
himself can spare no energy for the     
making of mirth4 ,croce loves to laugh  
at his enemies and with his friends4 ,so
 the philosopher of ,naples sits by the 
blue gulf and explains the universe to  
those who have ears to hear4 ,one can   
philosophize anywhere1 he says--but he  
remains significantly at ,naples4  ,thus
 ,i conclude these brief remarks upon   
the author of the ,aesthetic1 confident 
that those who give time and attention  
to its study will be grateful for having
 placed in their hands this pearl of    
great price from the diadem of the      
antique ,parthenope4  ,,douglas         
,,ainslie4  ,,the ,,athenaeum1 ,,pall   
,,mall1 ,may #aiji4  #a ,napoli1        
,riccardo ,ricciardi1 #aiji4  #b ,the   
reader will find this critique          
summarized in the historical     portion

 of this volume4  #c ,la ,critica is    
published every other month by ,laterza 
of ,bari4  #d ,this translation is made 
from the third ,italian edition 7,bari1 
#aiji71 enlarged and corrected by the   
author4 ,the ,theory of     ,aesthetic  
first appeared in #aijj in the form of a
 communication     to the ,accademia    
,pontiana of ,naples1 vol4 xxx4 ,the    
first edition     is dated #aijb1 the   
second #aijd 7,palermo74     ,i         
,,intuition ,,and ,,expression          
,sidenote ,intuitive knowledge4  ,human 
knowledge has two forms3 it is either   
intuitive knowledge or logical          
knowledge2 knowledge obtained through   
the imagination or knowledge obtained   
through the intellect2 knowledge of the 
individual or knowledge of the          
universal2 of individual things or of   
the relations between them3 it is1 in   
fact1 productive either of images or of 
concepts4  ,in ordinary life1 constant  
appeal is made to intuitive knowledge4  
,it is said to be impossible to give    

expression to certain truths2 that they 
are not demonstrable by syllogisms2 that
 they must be learnt intuitively4 ,the  
politician finds fault with the abstract
 reasoner1 who is without a lively      
knowledge of actual conditions2 the     
pedagogue insists upon the necessity of 
developing the intuitive faculty in the 
pupil before everything else2 the critic
 in judging a work of art makes it a    
point of honour to set aside theory and 
abstractions1 and to judge it by direct 
intuition2 the practical man professes  
to live rather by intuition than by     
reason4  ,but this ample acknowledgment1
 granted to intuitive knowledge in      
ordinary life1 does not meet with an    
equal and adequate acknowledgment in the
 field of theory and of philosophy4     
,there exists a very ancient science of 
intellective knowledge1 admitted by all 
without discussion1 namely1 ,logic2 but 
a science of intuitive knowledge is     
timidly and with difficulty admitted by 
but a few4 ,logical knowledge has       

appropriated the lion's share2 and if   
she does not quite slay and devour her  
companion1 yet yields to her with       
difficulty the humble little place of   
maidservant or doorkeeper4 ,what1 it    
says1 is intuitive knowledge without the
 light of intellective knowledge8 ,it is
 a servant without a master2 and though 
a master find a servant useful1 the     
master is a necessity to the servant1   
since he enables him to gain his        
livelihood4 ,intuition is blind2        
,intellect lends her eyes4              
,sidenote ,its independence in respect  
to intellective knowledge4  ,now1 the   
first point to be firmly fixed in the   
mind is that intuitive knowledge has no 
need of a master1 nor to lean upon any  
one2 she does not need to borrow the    
eyes of others1 for she has most        
excellent eyes of her own4 ,doubtless it
 is possible to find concepts mingled   
with intuitions4 ,but in many other     
intuitions there is no trace of such a  
mixture1 which proves that it is not    

necessary4 ,the impression of a         
moonlight scene by a painter2 the       
outline of a country drawn by a         
cartographer2 a musical motive1 tender  
or energetic2 the words of a sighing    
lyric1 or those with which we ask1      
command and lament in ordinary life1 may
 well all be intuitive facts without a  
shadow of intellective relation4 ,but1  
think what one may of these instances1  
and admitting further that one may      
maintain that the greater part of the   
intuitions of civilized man are         
impregnated with concepts1 there yet    
remains to be observed something more   
important and more conclusive4 ,those   
concepts which are found mingled and    
fused with the intuitions1 are no longer
 concepts1 in so far as they are really 
mingled and fused1 for they have lost   
all independence and autonomy4 ,they    
have been concepts1 but they have now   
become simple elements of intuition4    
,the philosophical maxims placed in the 
mouth of a personage of tragedy or of   

comedy1 perform there the function1 not 
of concepts1 but of characteristics of  
such personage2 in the same way as the  
red in a painted figure does not there  
represent the red colour of the         
physicists1 but is a characteristic     
element of the portrait4 ,the whole it  
is that determines the quality of the   
parts4 ,a work of art may be full of    
philosophical concepts2 it may contain  
them in greater abundance and they may  
be there even more profound than in a   
philosophical dissertation1 which in its
 turn may be rich to overflowing with   
descriptions and intuitions4 ,but1      
notwithstanding all these concepts it   
may contain1 the result of the work of  
art is an intuition2 and notwithstanding
 all those intuitions1 the result of the
 philosophical dissertation is a        
concept4 ,the ,promessi ,sposi contains 
copious ethical observations and        
distinctions1 but it does not for that  
reason lose in its total effect its     
character of simple story1 of intuition4

 ,in like manner the anecdotes and      
satirical effusions which may be found  
in the works of a philosopher like      
,schopenhauer1 do not remove from those 
works their character of intellective   
treatises4 ,the difference between a    
scientific work and a work of art1 that 
is1 between an intellective fact and an 
intuitive fact lies in the result1 in   
the diverse effect aimed at by their    
respective authors4 ,this it is that    
determines and rules over the several   
parts of each4      ,sidenote ,intuition
 and perception4  ,but to admit the     
independence of intuition as regards    
concept does not suffice to give a true 
and precise idea of intuition4 ,another 
error arises among those who recognize  
this1 or who1 at any rate1 do not make  
intuition explicitly dependent upon the 
intellect4 ,this error obscures and     
confounds the real nature of intuition4 
,by intuition is frequently understood  
the perception or knowledge of actual   
reality1 the apprehension of something  

as real4  ,certainly perception is      
intuition3 the perception of the room in
 which ,i am writing1 of the ink-bottle 
and paper that are before me1 of the pen
 ,i am using1 of the objects that ,i    
touch and make use of as instruments of 
my person1 which1 if it write1 therefore
 exists2--these are all intuitions4 ,but
 the image that is now passing through  
my brain of a me writing in another     
room1 in another town1 with different   
paper1 pen and ink1 is also an          
intuition4 ,this means that the         
distinction between reality and         
non-reality is extraneous1 secondary1 to
 the true nature of intuition4 ,if we   
assume the existence of a human mind    
which should have intuitions for the    
first time1 it would seem that it could 
have intuitions of effective reality    
only1 that is to say1 that it could have
 perceptions of nothing but the real4   
,but if the knowledge of reality be     
based upon the distinction between real 
images and unreal images1 and if this   

distinction does not originally exist1  
these intuitions would in truth not be  
intuitions either of the real or of the 
unreal1 but pure intuitions4 ,where all 
is real1 nothing is real4 ,the child1   
with its difficulty of distinguishing   
true from false1 history from fable1    
which are all one to childhood1 can     
furnish us with a sort of very vague and
 only remotely approximate idea of this 
ingenuous state4 ,intuition is the      
indifferentiated unity of the perception
 of the real and of the simple image of 
the possible4 ,in our intuitions we do  
not oppose ourselves to external reality
 as empirical beings1 but we simply     
objectify our impressions1 whatever they
 be4      ,sidenote ,intuition and the  
concepts of space and time4  ,those1    
therefore1 who look upon intuition as   
sensation formed and arranged simply    
according to the categories of space and
 time1 would seem to approximate more   
nearly to the truth4 ,space and time    
7they say7 are the forms of intuition2  

to have intuitions is to place in space 
and in temporal sequence4 ,intuitive    
activity would then consist in this     
double and concurrent function of       
spatiality and temporality4 ,but for    
these two categories must be repeated   
what was said of intellectual           
distinctions1 found mingled with        
intuitions4 ,we have intuitions without 
space and without time3 a tint of sky   
and a tint of sentiment1 an ,ah6 of pain
 and an effort of will1 objectified in  
consciousness4 ,these are intuitions1   
which we possess1 and with their making1
 space and time have nothing to do4 ,in 
some intuitions1 spatiality may be found
 without temporality1 in others1 this   
without that2 and even where both are   
found1 they are perceived by posterior  
reflexion3 they can be fused with the   
intuition in like manner with all its   
other elements3 that is1 they are in it 
materialiter and not formaliter1 as     
ingredients and not as essentials4 ,who1
 without a similar act of interruptive  

reflexion1 is conscious of temporal     
sequence while listening to a story or a
 piece of music8 ,that which intuition  
reveals in a work of art is not space   
and time1 but character1 individual     
physiognomy4 ,several attempts may be   
noted in modern philosophy1 which       
confirm the view here exposed4 ,space   
and time1 far from being very simple and
 primitive functions1 are shown to be   
intellectual constructions of great     
complexity4 ,and further1 even in some  
of those who do not altogether deny to  
space and time the quality of forming or
 of categories and functions1 one may   
observe the attempt to unify and to     
understand them in a different manner   
from that generally maintained in       
respect of these categories4 ,some      
reduce intuition to the unique category 
of spatiality1 maintaining that time    
also can only be conceived in terms of  
space4 ,others abandon the three        
dimensions of space as not              
philosophically necessary1 and conceive 

the function of spatiality as void of   
every particular spatial determination4 
,but what could such a spatial function 
be1 that should control even time8 ,may 
it not be a residuum of criticisms and  
of negations from which arises merely   
the necessity to posit a generic        
intuitive activity8 ,and is not this    
last truly determined1 when one unique  
function is attributed to it1 not       
spatializing nor temporalizing1 but     
characterizing8 ,or1 better1 when this  
is conceived as itself a category or    
function1 which gives knowledge of      
things in their concretion and          
individuality8      ,sidenote ,intuition
 and sensation4  ,having thus freed     
intuitive knowledge from any suggestion 
of intellectualism and from every       
posterior and external adjunct1 we must 
now make clear and determine its limits 
from another side and from a different  
kind of invasion and confusion4 ,on the 
other side1 and before the inferior     
boundary1 is sensation1 formless matter1

 which the spirit can never apprehend in
 itself1 in so far as it is mere matter4
 ,this it can only possess with form and
 in form1 but postulates its concept as1
 precisely1 a limit4 ,matter1 in its    
abstraction1 is mechanism1 passivity2 it
 is what the spirit of man experiences1 
but does not produce4 ,without it no    
human knowledge and activity is         
possible2 but mere matter produces      
animality1 whatever is brutal and       
impulsive in man1 not the spiritual     
dominion1 which is humanity4 ,how often 
do we strive to understand clearly what 
is passing within us8 ,we do catch a    
glimpse of something1 but this does not 
appear to the mind as objectified and   
formed4 ,in such moments it is1 that we 
best perceive the profound difference   
between matter and form4 ,these are not 
two acts of ours1 face to face with one 
another2 but we assault and carry off   
the one that is outside us1 while that  
within us tends to absorb and make its  
own that without4 ,matter1 attacked and 

conquered by form1 gives place to       
concrete form4 ,it is the matter1 the   
content1 that differentiates one of our 
intuitions from another3 form is        
constant3 it is spiritual activity1     
while matter is changeable4 ,without    
matter1 however1 our spiritual activity 
would not leave its abstraction to      
become concrete and real1 this or that  
spiritual content1 this or that definite
 intuition4  ,it is a curious fact1     
characteristic of our times1 that this  
very form1 this very activity of the    
spirit1 which is essentially ourselves1 
is so easily ignored or denied4 ,some   
confound the spiritual activity of man  
with the metaphorical and mythological  
activity of so-called nature1 which is  
mechanism and has no resemblance to     
human activity1 save when we imagine1   
with ,aesop1 that arbores loquuntur non 
tantum ferae4 ,some even affirm that    
they have never observed in themselves  
this miraculous activity1 as though     
there were no difference1 or only one of

 quantity1 between sweating and         
thinking1 feeling cold and the energy of
 the will4 ,others1 certainly with      
greater reason1 desire to unify activity
 and mechanism in a more general        
concept1 though admitting that they are 
specifically distinct4 ,let us1 however1
 refrain for the moment from examining  
if such a unification be possible1 and  
in what sense1 but admitting that the   
attempt may be made1 it is clear that to
 unify two concepts in a third implies a
 difference between the two first4 ,and 
here it is this difference that is of   
importance and we set it in relief4     
,sidenote ,intuition and association4   
,intuition has often been confounded    
with simple sensation4 ,but1 since this 
confusion is too shocking to good sense1
 it has more frequently been attenuated 
or concealed with a phraseology which   
seems to wish to confuse and to         
distinguish them at the same time4      
,thus1 it has been asserted that        
intuition is sensation1 but not so much 

simple sensation as association of      
sensations4 ,the equivoque arises       
precisely from the word association4    
,association is understood1 either as   
memory1 mnemonic association1 conscious 
recollection1 and in that case is       
evident the absurdity of wishing to join
 together in memory elements which are  
not intuified1 distinguished1 possessed 
in some way by the spirit and produced  
by consciousness3 or it is understood as
 association of unconscious elements4   
,in this case we remain in the world of 
sensation and of nature4 ,further1 if   
with certain associationists we speak of
 an association which is neither memory 
nor flux of sensations1 but is a        
productive association 7formative1      
constructive1 distinguishing72 then we  
admit the thing itself and deny only its
 name4 ,in truth1 productive association
 is no longer association in the sense  
of the sensualists1 but synthesis1 that 
is to say1 spiritual activity4          
,synthesis may be called association2   

but with the concept of productivity is 
already posited the distinction between 
passivity and activity1 between         
sensation and intuition4      ,sidenote 
,intuition and representation4  ,other  
psychologists are disposed to           
distinguish from sensation something    
which is sensation no longer1 but is not
 yet intellective concept3 the          
representation or image4 ,what is the   
difference between their representation 
or image1 and our intuitive knowledge8  
,the greatest1 and none at all4         
,representation1 too1 is a very         
equivocal word4 ,if by representation be
 understood something detached and      
standing out from the psychic base of   
the sensations1 then representation is  
intuition4 ,if1 on the other hand1 it be
 conceived as a complex sensation1 a    
return is made to simple sensation1     
which does not change its quality       
according to its richness or poverty1   
operating alike in a rudimentary or in a
 developed organism full of traces of   

past sensations4 ,nor is the equivoque  
remedied by defining representation as a
 psychic product of secondary order in  
relation to sensation1 which should     
occupy the first place4 ,what does      
secondary order mean here8 ,does it mean
 a qualitative1 a formal difference8 ,if
 so1 we agree3 representation is        
elaboration of sensation1 it is         
intuition4 ,or does it mean greater     
complexity and complication1 a          
quantitative1 material difference8 ,in  
that case intuition would be again      
confused with simple sensation4         
,sidenote ,intuition and expression4    
,and yet there is a sure method of      
distinguishing true intuition1 true     
representation1 from that which is      
inferior to it3 the spiritual fact from 
the mechanical1 passive1 natural fact4  
,every true intuition or representation 
is1 also1 expression4 ,that which does  
not objectify itself in expression is   
not intuition or representation1 but    
sensation and naturality4 ,the spirit   

does not obtain intuitions1 otherwise   
than by making1 forming1 expressing4 ,he
 who separates intuition from expression
 never succeeds in reuniting them4      
,intuitive activity possesses intuitions
 to the extent that it expresses        
them4--,should this expression seem at  
first paradoxical1 that is chiefly      
because1 as a general rule1 a too       
restricted meaning is given to the word 
expression4 ,it is generally thought of 
as restricted to verbal expression4 ,but
 there exist also non-verbal            
expressions1 such as those of line1     
colour1 and sound2 to all of these must 
be extended our affirmation4 ,the       
intuition and expression together of a  
painter are pictorial2 those of a poet  
are verbal4 ,but be it pictorial1 or    
verbal1 or musical1 or whatever else it 
be called1 to no intuition can          
expression be wanting1 because it is an 
inseparable part of intuition4 ,how can 
we possess a true intuition of a        
geometrical figure1 unless we possess so

 accurate an image of it as to be able  
to trace it immediately upon paper or on
 a slate8 ,how can we have an intuition 
of the contour of a region1 for example1
 of the island of ,sicily1 if we are not
 able to draw it as it is in all its    
meanderings8 ,every one can experience  
the internal illumination which follows 
upon his success in formulating to      
himself his impressions and sentiments1 
but only so far as he is able to        
formulate them4 ,sentiments or          
impressions1 then1 pass by means of     
words from the obscure region of the    
soul into the clarity of the            
contemplative spirit4 ,in this cognitive
 process it is impossible to distinguish
 intuition from expression4 ,the one is 
produced with the other at the same     
instant1 because they are not two1 but  
one4      ,sidenote ,illusions as to    
their difference4  ,the principal reason
 which makes our theme appear           
paradoxical as we maintain it1 is the   
illusion or prejudice that we possess a 

more complete intuition of reality than 
we really do4 ,one often hears people   
say that they have in their minds many  
important thoughts1 but that they are   
not able to express them4 ,in truth1 if 
they really had them1 they would have   
coined them into beautiful1 ringing     
words1 and thus expressed them4 ,if     
these thoughts seem to vanish or to     
become scarce and poor in the act of    
expressing them1 either they did not    
exist or they really were scarce and    
poor4 ,people think that all of us      
ordinary men imagine and have intuitions
 of countries1 figures and scenes1 like 
painters2 of bodies1 like sculptors2    
save that painters and sculptors know   
how to paint and to sculpture those     
images1 while we possess them only      
within our souls4 ,they believe that    
anyone could have imagined a ,madonna of
 ,raphael2 but that ,raphael was        
,raphael owing to his technical ability 
in putting the ,madonna upon the canvas4
 ,nothing can be more false than this   

view4 ,the world of which as a rule we  
have intuitions1 is a small thing4 ,it  
consists of little expressions which    
gradually become greater and more ample 
with the increasing spiritual           
concentration of certain moments4 ,these
 are the sort of words which we speak   
within ourselves1 the judgments that we 
tacitly express3 ,here is a man1 here is
 a horse1 this is heavy1 this is hard1  
this pleases me1 etc4 ,it is a medley of
 light and colour1 which could not      
pictorially attain to any more sincere  
expression than a haphazard splash of   
colours1 from among which would with    
difficulty stand out a few special1     
distinctive traits4 ,this and nothing   
else is what we possess in our ordinary 
life2 this is the basis of our ordinary 
action4 ,it is the index of a book4 ,the
 labels tied to things take the place of
 the things themselves4 ,this index and 
labels 7which are themselves            
expressions7 suffice for our small needs
 and small actions4 ,from time to time  

we pass from the index to the book1 from
 the label to the thing1 or from the    
slight to the greater intuitions1 and   
from these to the greatest and most     
lofty4 ,this passage is sometimes far   
from being easy4 ,it has been observed  
by those who have best studied the      
psychology of artists1 that when1 after 
having given a rapid glance at anyone1  
they attempt to obtain a true intuition 
of him1 in order1 for example1 to paint 
his portrait1 then this ordinary vision1
 that seemed so precise1 so lively1     
reveals itself as little better than    
nothing4 ,what remains is found to be at
 the most some superficial trait1 which 
would not even suffice for a caricature4
 ,the person to be painted stands before
 the artist like a world to discover4   
,michael ,angelo said1 one paints1 not  
with one's hands1 but with one's brain4 
,leonardo shocked the prior of the      
convent delle ,grazie by standing for   
days together opposite the ,last ,supper
 without touching it with the brush4 ,he

 remarked of this attitude that men of  
the most lofty genius1 when they are    
doing the least work1 are then the most 
active1 seeking invention with their    
minds4 ,the painter is a painter1       
because he sees what others only feel or
 catch a glimpse of1 but do not see4 ,we
 think we see a smile1 but in reality we
 have only a vague impression of it1 we 
do not perceive all the characteristic  
traits from which it results1 as the    
painter perceives them after his        
internal meditations1 which thus enable 
him to fix them on the canvas4 ,even in 
the case of our intimate friend1 who is 
with us every day and at all hours1 we  
do not possess intuitively more than1 at
 the most1 certain traits of his        
physiognomy1 which enable us to         
distinguish him from others4 ,the       
illusion is less easy as regards musical
 expression2 because it would seem      
strange to everyone to say that the     
composer had added or attached notes to 
the motive1 which is already in the mind

 of him who is not the composer4 ,as if 
,beethoven's ,ninth ,symphony were not  
his own intuition and his own intuition 
the ,ninth ,symphony4 ,thus1 just as he 
who is deceived as to his material      
wealth is confuted by arithmetic1 which 
states its exact amount1 so is he       
confuted who nourishes delusions as to  
the wealth of his own thoughts and      
images4 ,he is brought back to reality1 
when he is obliged to cross the ,bridge 
of ,asses of expression4 ,we say to the 
former1 count2 to the latter1 speak1    
here is a pencil1 draw1 express         
yourself4  ,we have each of us1 as a    
matter of fact1 a little of the poet1 of
 the sculptor1 of the musician1 of the  
painter1 of the prose writer3 but how   
little1 as compared with those who are  
so called1 precisely because of the     
lofty degree in which they possess the  
most universal dispositions and energies
 of human nature6 ,how little does a    
painter possess of the intuitions of a  
poet6 ,how little does one painter      

possess those of another painter6       
,nevertheless1 that little is all our   
actual patrimony of intuitions or       
representations4 ,beyond these are only 
impressions1 sensations1 feelings1      
impulses1 emotions1 or whatever else one
 may term what is outside the spirit1   
not assimilated by man1 postulated for  
the convenience of exposition1 but      
effectively inexistent1 if existence be 
also a spiritual fact4      ,sidenote   
,identity of intuition and expression4  
,we may then add this to the verbal     
variants descriptive of intuition1 noted
 at the beginning3 intuitive knowledge  
is expressive knowledge1 independent and
 autonomous in respect to intellectual  
function2 indifferent to                
discriminations1 posterior and          
empirical1 to reality and to unreality1 
to formations and perceptions of space  
and time1 even when posterior3 intuition
 or representation is distinguished as  
form from what is felt and suffered1    
from the flux or wave of sensation1 or  

from psychic material2 and this form    
this taking possession of1 is           
expression4 ,to have an intuition is to 
express4 ,it is nothing else6 7nothing  
more1 but nothing less7 than to express4
     ,,ii  ,,intuition ,,and ,,art      
,sidenote ,corollaries and explanations4
  ,before proceeding further1 it seems  
opportune to draw certain consequences  
from what has been established and to   
add some explanation4      ,sidenote    
,identity of art and intuitive          
knowledge4  ,we have frankly identified 
intuitive or expressive knowledge with  
the aesthetic or artistic fact1 taking  
works of art as examples of intuitive   
knowledge and attributing to them the   
characteristics of intuition1 and vice  
versa4 ,but our identification is       
combated by the view1 held even by many 
philosophers1 who consider art to be an 
intuition of an altogether special sort4
 ,let us admit 7they say7 that art is   
intuition2 but intuition is not always  
art3 artistic intuition is of a distinct

 species differing from intuition in    
general by something more4              
,sidenote ,no specific difference4  ,but
 no one has ever been able to indicate  
of what this something more consists4   
,it has sometimes been thought that art 
is not a simple intuition1 but an       
intuition of an intuition1 in the same  
way as the concept of science has been  
defined1 not as the ordinary concept1   
but as the concept of a concept4 ,thus  
man should attain to art1 by            
objectifying1 not his sensations1 as    
happens with ordinary intuition1 but    
intuition itself4 ,but this process of  
raising to a second power does not      
exist2 and the comparison of it with the
 ordinary and scientific concept does   
not imply what is wished1 for the good  
reason that it is not true that the     
scientific concept is the concept of a  
concept4 ,if this comparison imply      
anything1 it implies just the opposite4 
,the ordinary concept1 if it be really a
 concept and not a simple               

representation1 is a perfect concept1   
however poor and limited4 ,science      
substitutes concepts for                
representations2 it adds and substitutes
 other concepts larger and more         
comprehensive for those that are poor   
and limited4 ,it is ever discovering new
 relations4 ,but its method does not    
differ from that by which is formed the 
smallest universal in the brain of the  
humblest of men4 ,what is generally     
called art1 by antonomasia1 collects    
intuitions that are wider and more      
complex than those which we generally   
experience1 but these intuitions are    
always of sensations and impressions4   
,art is the expression of impressions1  
not the expression of expressions4      
,sidenote ,no difference of intensity4  
,for the same reason1 it cannot be      
admitted that intuition1 which is       
generally called artistic1 differs from 
ordinary intuition as to intensity4     
,this would be the case if it were to   
operate differently on the same matter4 

,but since artistic function is more    
widely distributed in different fields1 
but yet does not differ in method from  
ordinary intuition1 the difference      
between the one and the other is not    
intensive but extensive4 ,the intuition 
of the simplest popular love-song1 which
 says the same thing1 or very nearly1 as
 a declaration of love such as issues at
 every moment from the lips of thousands
 of ordinary men1 may be intensively    
perfect in its poor simplicity1 although
 it be extensively so much more limited 
than the complex intuition of a         
love-song by ,leopardi4      ,sidenote  
,the difference is extensive and        
empirical4  ,the whole difference1 then1
 is quantitative1 and as such1          
indifferent to philosophy1 scientia     
qualitatum4 ,certain men have a greater 
aptitude1 a more frequent inclination   
fully to express certain complex states 
of the soul4 ,these men are known in    
ordinary language as artists4 ,some very
 complicated and difficult expressions  

are more rarely achieved and these are  
called works of art4 ,the limits of the 
expressions and intuitions that are     
called art1 as opposed to those that are
 vulgarly called not-art1 are empirical 
and impossible to define4 ,if an epigram
 be art1 why not a single word8 ,if a   
story2 why not the occasional note of   
the journalist8 ,if a landscape1 why not
 a topographical sketch8 ,the teacher of
 philosophy in ,molire's comedy was     
right3 whenever we speak we create      
prose4 ,but there will always be        
scholars like ,monsieur ,jourdain1      
astonished at having created prose for  
forty years without knowing it1 and who 
will have difficulty in persuading      
themselves that when they call their    
servant ,john to bring their slippers1  
they have spoken nothing less           
than--prose4  ,we must hold firmly to   
our identification1 because among the   
principal reasons which have prevented  
,aesthetic1 the science of art1 from    
revealing the true nature of art1 its   

real roots in human nature1 has been its
 separation from the general spiritual  
life1 the having made of it a sort of   
special function or aristocratic circle4
 ,no one is astonished when he learns   
from physiology that every cellule is an
 organism and every organism a cellule  
or synthesis of cellules4 ,no one is    
astonished at finding in a lofty        
mountain the same chemical elements that
 compose a small stone or fragment4     
,there is not one physiology of small   
animals and one of large animals2 nor is
 there a special chemical theory of     
stones as distinct from mountains4 ,in  
the same way1 there is not a science of 
lesser intuition distinct from a science
 of greater intuition1 nor one of       
ordinary intuition distinct from        
artistic intuition4 ,there is but one   
,aesthetic1 the science of intuitive or 
expressive knowledge1 which is the      
aesthetic or artistic fact4 ,and this   
,aesthetic is the true analogy of       
,logic4 ,logic includes1 as facts of the

 same nature1 the formation of the      
smallest and most ordinary concept and  
the most complicated scientific and     
philosophical system4      ,sidenote    
,artistic genius4  ,nor can we admit    
that the word genius or artistic genius1
 as distinct from the non-genius of the 
ordinary man1 possesses more than a     
quantitative signification4 ,great      
artists are said to reveal us to        
ourselves4 ,but how could this be       
possible1 unless there be identity of   
nature between their imagination and    
ours1 and unless the difference be only 
one of quantity8 ,it were well to change
 poeta nascitur into homo nascitur      
poeta3 some men are born great poets1   
some small4 ,the cult and superstition  
of the genius has arisen from this      
quantitative difference having been     
taken as a difference of quality4 ,it   
has been forgotten that genius is not   
something that has fallen from heaven1  
but humanity itself4 ,the man of genius1
 who poses or is represented as distant 

from humanity1 finds his punishment in  
becoming or appearing somewhat          
ridiculous4 ,examples of this are the   
genius of the romantic period and the   
superman of our time4  ,but it is well  
to note here1 that those who claim      
unconsciousness as the chief quality of 
an artistic genius1 hurl him from an    
eminence far above humanity to a        
position far below it4 ,intuitive or    
artistic genius1 like every form of     
human activity1 is always conscious2    
otherwise it would be blind mechanism4  
,the only thing that may be wanting to  
the artistic genius is the reflective   
consciousness1 the superadded           
consciousness of the historian or       
critic1 which is not essential to       
artistic genius4      ,sidenote ,content
 and form in ,aesthetic4  ,the relation 
between matter and form1 or between     
content and form1 as it is generally    
called1 is one of the most disputed     
questions in ,aesthetic4 ,does the      
aesthetic fact consist of content alone1

 or of form alone1 or of both together8 
,this question has taken on various     
meanings1 which we shall mention1 each  
in its place4 ,but when these words are 
taken as signifying what we have above  
defined1 and matter is understood as    
emotivity not aesthetically elaborated1 
that is to say1 impressions1 and form   
elaboration1 intellectual activity and  
expression1 then our meaning cannot be  
doubtful4 ,we must1 therefore1 reject   
the thesis that makes the aesthetic fact
 to consist of the content alone 7that  
is1 of the simple impressions71 in like 
manner with that other thesis1 which    
makes it to consist of a junction       
between form and content1 that is1 of   
impressions plus expressions4 ,in the   
aesthetic fact1 the aesthetic activity  
is not added to the fact of the         
impressions1 but these latter are formed
 and elaborated by it4 ,the impressions 
reappear as it were in expression1 like 
water put into a filter1 which reappears
 the same and yet different on the other

 side4 ,the aesthetic fact1 therefore1  
is form1 and nothing but form4  ,from   
this it results1 not that the content is
 something superfluous 7it is1 on the   
contrary1 the necessary point of        
departure for the expressive fact72 but 
that there is no passage between the    
quality of the content and that of the  
form4 ,it has sometimes been thought    
that the content1 in order to be        
aesthetic1 that is to say1 transformable
 into form1 should possess some         
determinate or determinable quality4    
,but were that so1 then form and        
content1 expression and impression1     
would be the same thing4 ,it is true    
that the content is that which is       
convertible into form1 but it has no    
determinable qualities until this       
transformation takes place4 ,we know    
nothing of its nature4 ,it does not     
become aesthetic content at once1 but   
only when it has been effectively       
transformed4 ,aesthetic content has also
 been defined as what is interesting4   

,that is not an untrue statement2 it is 
merely void of meaning4 ,what1 then1 is 
interesting8 ,expressive activity8      
,certainly the expressive activity would
 not have raised the content to the     
dignity of form1 had it not been        
interested4 ,the fact of its having been
 interested is precisely the fact of its
 raising the content to the dignity of  
form4 ,but the word interesting has also
 been employed in another not           
illegitimate sense1 which we shall      
explain further on4      ,sidenote      
,critique of the imitation of nature and
 of the artistic                        
illusion4  ,the proposition that art is 
imitation of nature has also several    
meanings4 ,now truth has been maintained
 or at least shadowed with these words1 
now error4 ,more frequently1 nothing    
definite has been thought4 ,one of the  
legitimate scientific meanings occurs   
when imitation is understood as         
representation or intuition of nature1 a
 form of knowledge4 ,and when this      

meaning has been understood1 by placing 
in greater relief the spiritual         
character of the process1 the other     
proposition becomes also legitimate3    
namely1 that art is the idealization or 
idealizing imitation of nature4 ,but if 
by imitation of nature be understood    
that art gives mechanical reproductions1
 more or less perfect duplicates of     
natural objects1 before which the same  
tumult of impressions caused by natural 
objects begins over again1 then the     
proposition is evidently false4 ,the    
painted wax figures that seem to be     
alive1 and before which we stand        
astonished in the museums where such    
things are shown1 do not give aesthetic 
intuitions4 ,illusion and hallucination 
have nothing to do with the calm domain 
of artistic intuition4 ,if an artist    
paint the interior of a wax-work museum1
 or if an actor give a burlesque        
portrait of a man-statue on the stage1  
we again have spiritual labour and      
artistic intuition4 ,finally1 if        

photography have anything in it of      
artistic1 it will be to the extent that 
it transmits the intuition of the       
photographer1 his point of view1 the    
pose and the grouping which he has      
striven to attain4 ,and if it be not    
altogether art1 that is precisely       
because the element of nature in it     
remains more or less insubordinate and  
ineradicable4 ,do we ever1 indeed1 feel 
complete satisfaction before even the   
best of photographs8 ,would not an      
artist vary and touch up much or little1
 remove or add something to any of them8
      ,sidenote ,critique of art        
conceived as a sentimental not a        
theoretical fact4 ,aesthetic appearance 
and feeling4  ,the statements repeated  
so often1 with others similar1 that art 
is not knowledge1 that it does not tell 
the truth1 that it does not belong to   
the world of theory1 but to the world of
 feeling1 arise from the failure to     
realize exactly the theoretic character 
of the simple intuition4 ,this simple   

intuition is quite distinct from        
intellectual knowledge1 as it is        
distinct from the perception of the     
real4 ,the belief that only the         
intellective is knowledge1 or at the    
most also the perception of the real1   
also arises from the failure to grasp   
the theoretic character of the simple   
intuition4 ,we have seen that intuition 
is knowledge1 free of concepts and more 
simple than the so-called perception of 
the real4 ,since art is knowledge and   
form1 it does not belong to the world of
 feeling and of psychic material4 ,the  
reason why so many aestheticians have so
 often insisted that art is appearance  
7,schein71 is precisely because they    
have felt the necessity of              
distinguishing it from the more complex 
fact of perception by maintaining its   
pure intuitivity4 ,for the same reason  
it has been claimed that art is         
sentiment4 ,in fact1 if the concept as  
content of art1 and historical reality  
as such1 be excluded1 there remains no  

other content than reality apprehended  
in all its ingenuousness and            
immediateness in the vital effort1 in   
sentiment1 that is to say1 pure         
intuition4      ,sidenote ,critique of  
theory of aesthetic senses4  ,the theory
 of the aesthetic senses has also arisen
 from the failure to establish1 or from 
having lost to view the character of the
 expression as distinct from the        
impression1 of the form as distinct from
 the matter4  ,as has just been pointed 
out1 this reduces itself to the error of
 wishing to seek a passage from the     
quality of the content to that of the   
form4 ,to ask1 in fact1 what the        
aesthetic senses may be1 implies asking 
what sensible impressions may be able to
 enter into aesthetic expressions1 and  
what must of necessity do so4 ,to this  
we must at once reply1 that all         
impressions can enter into aesthetic    
expressions or formations1 but that none
 are bound to do so4 ,dante raised to   
the dignity of form not only the sweet  

colour of the oriental sapphire 7visual 
impression71 but also tactile or thermic
 impressions1 such as the thick air and 
the fresh rivulets which parch all the  
more the throat of the thirsty4 ,the    
belief that a picture yields only visual
 impressions is a curious illusion4 ,the
 bloom of a cheek1 the warmth of a      
youthful body1 the sweetness and        
freshness of a fruit1 the cutting of a  
sharpened blade1 are not these1 also1   
impressions that we have from a picture8
 ,maybe they are visual8 ,what would a  
picture be for a hypothetical man1      
deprived of all or many of his senses1  
who should in an instant acquire the    
sole organ of sight8 ,the picture we are
 standing opposite and believe we see   
only with our eyes1 would appear to his 
eyes as little more than the            
paint-smeared palette of a painter4     
,some who hold firmly to the aesthetic  
character of given groups of impressions
 7for example1 the visual1 the          
auditive71 and exclude others1 admit1   

however1 that if visual and auditive    
impressions enter directly into the     
aesthetic fact1 those of the other      
senses also enter into it1 but only as  
associated4 ,but this distinction is    
altogether arbitrary4 ,aesthetic        
expression is a synthesis1 in which it  
is impossible to distinguish direct and 
indirect4 ,all impressions are by it    
placed on a level1 in so far as they are
 aestheticised4 ,he who takes into      
himself the image of a picture or of a  
poem does not experience1 as it were1 a 
series of impressions as to this image1 
some of which have a prerogative or     
precedence over others4 ,and nothing is 
known of what happens prior to having   
received it1 for the distinctions made  
after reflexion have nothing to do with 
art4  ,the theory of the aesthetic      
senses has also been presented in       
another way2 that is to say1 as the     
attempt to establish what physiological 
organs are necessary for the aesthetic  
fact4 ,the physiological organ or       

apparatus is nothing but a complex of   
cellules1 thus and thus constituted1    
thus and thus disposed2 that is to say1 
it is merely physical and natural fact  
or concept4 ,but expression does not    
recognize physiological facts4          
,expression has its point of departure  
in the impressions1 and the             
physiological path by which these have  
found their way to the mind is to it    
altogether indifferent4 ,one way or     
another amounts to the same thing3 it   
suffices that they are impressions4  ,it
 is true that the want of given organs1 
that is1 of given complexes of cells1   
produces an absence of given impressions
 7when these are not obtained by another
 path by a kind of organic              
compensation74 ,the man born blind      
cannot express or have the intuition of 
light4 ,but the impressions are not     
conditioned solely by the organ1 but    
also by the stimuli which operate upon  
the organ4 ,thus1 he who has never had  
the impression of the sea will never be 

able to express it1 in the same way as  
he who has never had the impression of  
the great world or of the political     
conflict will never express the one or  
the other4 ,this1 however1 does not     
establish a dependence of the expressive
 function on the stimulus or on the     
organ4 ,it is the repetition of what we 
know already3 expression presupposes    
impression4 ,therefore1 given           
expressions imply given impressions4    
,besides1 every impression excludes     
other impressions during the moment in  
which it dominates2 and so does every   
expression4      ,sidenote ,unity and   
indivisibility of the work of art4      
,another corollary of the conception of 
expression as activity is the           
indivisibility of the work of art4      
,every expression is a unique           
expression4 ,activity is a fusion of the
 impressions in an organic whole4 ,a    
desire to express this has always       
prompted the affirmation that the world 
of art should have unity1 or1 what      

amounts to the same thing1 unity in     
variety4 ,expression is a synthesis of  
the various1 the multiple1 in the one4  
,the fact that we divide a work of art  
into parts1 as a poem into scenes1      
episodes1 similes1 sentences1 or a      
picture into single figures and objects1
 background1 foreground1 etc41 may seem 
to be an objection to this affirmation4 
,but such division annihilates the work1
 as dividing the organism into heart1   
brain1 nerves1 muscles and so on1 turns 
the living being into a corpse4 ,it is  
true that there exist organisms in which
 the division gives place to more living
 things1 but in such a case1 and if we  
transfer the analogy to the aesthetic   
fact1 we must conclude for a            
multiplicity of germs of life1 that is  
to say1 for a speedy re-elaboration of  
the single parts into new single        
expressions4  ,it will be observed that 
expression is sometimes based on other  
expressions4 ,there are simple and there
 are compound expressions4 ,one must    

admit some difference between the       
eureka1 with which ,archimedes expressed
 all his joy after his discovery1 and   
the expressive act 7indeed all the five 
acts7 of a regular tragedy4 ,not in the 
least3 expression is always directly    
based on impressions4 ,he who conceives 
a tragedy puts into a crucible a great  
quantity1 so to say1 of impressions3 the
 expressions themselves1 conceived on   
other occasions1 are fused together with
 the new in a single mass1 in the same  
way as we can cast into a smelting      
furnace formless pieces of bronze and   
most precious statuettes4 ,those most   
precious statuettes must be melted in   
the same way as the formless bits of    
bronze1 before there can be a new       
statue4 ,the old expressions must       
descend again to the level of           
impressions1 in order to be synthetized 
in a new single expression4             
,sidenote ,art as the deliverer4  ,by   
elaborating his impressions1 man frees  
himself from them4 ,by objectifying     

them1 he removes them from him and makes
 himself their superior4 ,the liberating
 and purifying function of art is       
another aspect and another formula of   
its character of activity4 ,activity is 
the deliverer1 just because it drives   
away passivity4  ,this also explains why
 it is customary to attribute to artists
 alike the maximum of sensibility or    
passion1 and the maximum insensibility  
or ,olympic serenity4 ,both             
qualifications agree1 for they do not   
refer to the same object4 ,the          
sensibility or passion relates to the   
rich material which the artist absorbs  
into his psychic organism2 the          
insensibility or serenity to the form   
with which he subjugates and dominates  
the tumult of the feelings and of the   
passions4     ,,iii  ,,art ,,and        
,,philosophy       ,sidenote            
,indissolubility of intellective from   
intuitive knowledge4  ,the two forms of 
knowledge1 aesthetic and intellectual or
 conceptual1 are indeed diverse1 but    

this does not amount altogether to      
separation and disjunction1 as we find  
with two forces going each its own way4 
,if we have shown that the aesthetic    
form is altogether independent of the   
intellectual and suffices to itself     
without external support1 we have not   
said that the intellectual can stand    
without the aesthetic4 ,this reciprocity
 would not be true4  ,what is knowledge 
by concepts8 ,it is knowledge of        
relations of things1 and those things   
are intuitions4 ,concepts are not       
possible without intuitions1 just as    
intuition is itself impossible without  
the material of impressions4 ,intuitions
 are3 this river1 this lake1 this brook1
 this rain1 this glass of water2 the    
concept is3 water1 not this or that     
appearance and particular example of    
water1 but water in general1 in whatever
 time or place it be realized2 the      
material of infinite intuitions1 but of 
one single and constant concept4        
,however1 the concept1 the universal1 if

 it be no longer intuition in one       
respect1 is in another respect          
intuition1 and cannot fail of being     
intuition4 ,for the man who thinks has  
impressions and emotions1 in so far as  
he thinks4 ,his impression and emotion  
will not be love or hate1 but the effort
 of his thought itself1 with the pain   
and the joy1 the love and the hate      
joined to it4 ,this effort cannot but   
become intuitive in form1 in becoming   
objective to the mind4 ,to speak1 is not
 to think logically2 but to think       
logically is1 at the same time1 to      
speak4      ,sidenote ,critique of the  
negations of this thesis4  ,that thought
 cannot exist without speech1 is a truth
 generally admitted4 ,the negations of  
this thesis are all founded on          
equivoques and errors4  ,the first of   
the equivoques is implied by those who  
observe that one can likewise think with
 geometrical figures1 algebraical       
numbers1 ideographic signs1 without a   
single word1 even pronounced silently   

and almost insensibly within one4 ,they 
also affirm that there are languages in 
which the word1 the phonetic sign1      
expresses nothing1 unless the written   
sign also be looked at4 ,but when we    
said speech1 we intended to employ a    
synecdoche1 and that expression         
generically1 should be understood1 for  
expression is not only so-called verbal 
expression1 as we have already noted4   
,it may be admitted that certain        
concepts may be thought without phonetic
 manifestations4 ,but the very examples 
adduced to show this also prove that    
those concepts never exist without      
expressions4  ,others maintain that     
animals1 or certain animals1 think or   
reason without speaking4 ,now as to how1
 whether1 and what animals think1       
whether they be rudimentary1 half-savage
 men resisting civilization1 rather than
 physiological machines1 as the old     
spiritualists would have it1 are        
questions that do not concern us here4  
,when the philosopher talks of animal1  

brutal1 impulsive1 instinctive nature   
and the like1 he does not base himself  
on conjectures as to these facts        
concerning dogs or cats1 lions or ants2 
but upon observations of what is called 
animal and brutal in man3 of the        
boundary or animal basis of what we feel
 in ourselves4 ,if individual animals1  
dogs or cats1 lions or ants1 possess    
something of the activity of man1 so    
much the better1 or so much the worse   
for them4 ,this means that as regards   
them also we must talk1 not of their    
nature as a whole1 but of its animal    
basis1 as being perhaps larger and more 
strong than the animal basis of man4    
,and if we suppose that animals think1  
and form concepts1 what is there in the 
line of conjecture to justify the       
admission that they do so without       
corresponding expressions8 ,the analogy 
with man1 the knowledge of the spirit1  
human psychology1 which is the          
instrument of all our conjectures as to 
animal psychology1 would oblige us to   

suppose that if they think in any way1  
they also have some sort of speech4  ,it
 is from human psychology1 that is1     
literary psychology1 that comes the     
other objection1 to the effect that the 
concept can exist without the word1     
because it is true that we all know     
books that are well thought and badly   
written3 that is to say1 a thought which
 remains thought beyond the expression1 
notwithstanding the imperfect           
expression4 ,but when we talk of books  
well thought and badly written1 we      
cannot mean other than that in those    
books are parts1 pages1 periods or      
propositions well thought out and well  
written1 and other parts 7perhaps the   
least important7 ill thought out and    
badly written1 not truly thought out and
 therefore not truly expressed4 ,where  
,vico's ,scienza nuova is really ill    
written1 it is also ill thought out4 ,if
 we pass from the consideration of big  
books to a short proposition1 the error 
or the imprecision of this statement    

will be recognized at once4 ,how could a
 proposition be clearly thought and     
confusedly written out8  ,all that can  
be admitted is that sometimes we possess
 thoughts 7concepts7 in an intuitive    
form1 or in an abbreviated or1 better1  
peculiar expression1 sufficient for us1 
but not sufficient to communicate it    
with ease to another or other definite  
individuals4 ,hence people say          
inaccurately1 that we have the thought  
without the expression2 whereas it      
should properly be said that we have1   
indeed1 the expression1 but in a form   
that is not easy of social              
communication4 ,this1 however1 is a very
 variable and altogether relative fact4 
,there are always people who catch our  
thought on the wing1 and prefer it in   
this abbreviated form1 and would be     
displeased with the greater development 
of it1 necessary for other people4 ,in  
other words1 the thought considered     
abstractly and logically will be the    
same2 but aesthetically we are dealing  

with two different                      
intuition-expressions1 into both of     
which enter different psychological     
elements4 ,the same argument suffices to
 destroy1 that is1 to interpret         
correctly1 the altogether empirical     
distinction between an internal and an  
external language4      ,sidenote ,art  
and science4  ,the most lofty           
manifestations1 the summits of          
intellectual and of intuitive knowledge 
shining from afar1 are called1 as we    
know1 ,art and ,science4 ,art and       
,science1 then1 are different and yet   
linked together2 they meet on one side1 
which is the aesthetic side4 ,every     
scientific work is also a work of art4  
,the aesthetic side may remain little   
noticed1 when our mind is altogether    
taken up with the effort to understand  
the thought of the man of science1 and  
to examine its truth4 ,but it is no     
longer concealed1 when we pass from the 
activity of understanding to that of    
contemplation1 and behold that thought  

either developed before us1 limpid1     
exact1 well-shaped1 without superfluous 
words1 without lack of words1 with      
appropriate rhythm and intonation2 or   
confused1 broken1 embarrassed1          
tentative4 ,great thinkers are sometimes
 termed great writers1 while other      
equally great thinkers remain more or   
less fragmentary writers1 if indeed     
their fragments are scientifically to be
 compared with harmonious1 coherent1 and
 perfect works4      ,sidenote ,content 
and form3 another meaning4 ,prose and   
poetry4  ,we pardon thinkers and men of 
science their literary mediocrity4 ,the 
fragments console us for the failure of 
the whole1 for it is far more easy to   
recover the well-arranged composition   
from the fragmentary work of genius than
 to achieve the discovery of genius4    
,but how can we pardon mediocre         
expression in pure artists8 ,mediocribus
 esse poetis non di1 non homines1 non   
concessere columnae4 ,the poet or       
painter who lacks form1 lacks           

everything1 because he lacks himself4   
,poetical material permeates the ,soul  
of all3 the expression alone1 that is to
 say1 the form1 makes the poet4 ,and    
here appears the truth of the thesis    
which denies to art all content1 as     
content being understood just the       
intellectual concept4 ,in this sense1   
when we take content as equal to concept
 it is most true1 not only that art does
 not consist of content1 but also that  
it has no content4  ,in the same way the
 distinction between poetry and prose   
cannot be justified1 save in that of art
 and science4 ,it was seen in antiquity 
that such distinction could not be      
founded on external elements1 such as   
rhythm and metre1 or on the freedom or  
the limitation of the form2 that it was1
 on the contrary1 altogether internal4  
,poetry is the language of sentiment2   
prose of the intellect2 but since the   
intellect is also sentiment1 in its     
concretion and reality1 so all prose has
 a poetical side4      ,sidenote ,the   

relation of first and second degree4    
,the relation between intuitive         
knowledge or expression1 and            
intellectual knowledge or concept1      
between art and science1 poetry and     
prose1 cannot be otherwise defined than 
by saying that it is one of double      
degree4 ,the first degree is the        
expression1 the second the concept3 the 
first can exist without the second1 but 
the second cannot exist without the     
first4 ,there exists poetry without     
prose1 but not prose without poetry4    
,expression1 indeed1 is the first       
affirmation of human activity4 ,poetry  
is the maternal language of the human   
race2 the first men were by nature      
sublime poets4 ,we also admit this in   
another way1 when we observe that the   
passage from soul to mind1 from animal  
to human activity1 is effected by means 
of language4 ,and this should be said of
 intuition or expression in general4    
,but to us it appears somewhat          
inaccurate to define language or        

expression as an intermediate link      
between nature and humanity1 as though  
it were a mixture of the one and of the 
other4 ,where humanity appears1 the rest
 has already disappeared2 the man who   
expresses himself1 certainly emerges    
from the state of nature1 but he really 
does emerge3 he does not stand half     
within and half without1 as the use of  
the phrase intermediate link would      
imply4      ,sidenote ,inexistence of   
other forms of knowledge4  ,the         
cognitive intellect has no form other   
than these two4 ,expression and concept 
exhaust it completely4 ,the whole       
speculative life of man is spent in     
passing from one to the other and back  
again4      ,sidenote ,history4 ,its    
identity with and difference from art4  
,historicity is incorrectly held to be a
 third theoretical form4 ,history is not
 form1 but content3 as form1 it is      
nothing but intuition or aesthetic fact4
 ,history does not seek for laws nor    
form concepts2 it employs neither       

induction nor deduction2 it is directed 
ad narrandum1 non ad demonstrandum2 it  
does not construct universals and       
abstractions1 but posits intuitions4    
,the this1 the that1 the individuum omni
 modo determinatum1 is its kingdom1 as  
it is the kingdom of art4 ,history1     
therefore1 is included under the        
universal concept of art4  ,faced with  
this proposition and with the           
impossibility of conceiving a third mode
 of knowledge1 objections have been     
brought forward which would lead to the 
affiliation of history to intellective  
or scientific knowledge4 ,the greater   
portion of these objections is dominated
 by the prejudice that in refusing to   
history the character of conceptual     
science1 something of its value and     
dignity has been taken from it4 ,this   
really arises from a false idea of art1 
conceived1 not as an essential theoretic
 function1 but as an amusement1 a       
superfluity1 a frivolity4 ,without      
reopening a long debate1 which so far as

 we are concerned1 is finally closed1 we
 will mention here one sophism which has
 been and still is widely repeated4 ,it 
is intended to show the logical and     
scientific nature of history4 ,the      
sophism consists in admitting that      
historical knowledge has for its object 
the individual2 but not the             
representation1 it is added1 so much as 
the concept of the individual4 ,from    
this it is argued that history is also a
 logical or scientific form of          
knowledge4 ,history1 in fact1 should    
elaborate the concept of a personage    
such as ,charlemagne or ,napoleon2 of an
 epoch1 like the ,renaissance or the    
,reformation2 of an event1 such as the  
,french ,revolution and the ,unification
 of ,italy4 ,this it is held to do in   
the same way as ,geometry elaborates the
 concepts of spatial form1 or ,aesthetic
 those of expression4 ,but all this is  
untrue4 ,history cannot do otherwise    
than represent ,napoleon and            
,charlemagne1 the ,renaissance and the  

,reformation1 the ,french ,revolution   
and the ,unification of ,italy as       
individual facts with their individual  
physiognomy3 that is1 in the same way as
 logicians state1 that one cannot have a
 concept of an individual1 but only a   
representation4 ,the so-called concept  
of the individual is always a universal 
or general concept1 full of details1    
very rich1 if you will1 but however rich
 it be1 yet incapable of attaining to   
that individuality1 to which historical 
knowledge1 as aesthetic knowledge1 alone
 attains4  ,let us rather show how the  
content of history comes to be          
distinguished from that of art4 ,the    
distinction is secondary4 ,its origin   
will be found in what has already been  
observed as to the ideal character of   
the intuition or first perception1 in   
which all is real and therefore nothing 
is real4 ,the mind forms the concepts of
 external and internal at a later stage1
 as it does those of what has happened  
and of what is desired1 of object and   

subject1 and the like4 ,thus it         
distinguishes historical from           
non-historical intuition1 the real from 
the unreal1 real fancy from pure fancy4 
,even internal facts1 what is desired   
and imagined1 castles in the air1 and   
countries of ,cockagne1 have their      
reality4 ,the soul1 too1 has its        
history4 ,his illusions form part of the
 biography of every individual4 ,but the
 history of an individual soul is       
history1 because in it is always active 
the distinction between the real and the
 unreal1 even when the real is the      
illusions themselves4 ,but these        
distinctive concepts do not appear in   
history as do scientific concepts1 but  
rather like those that we have seen     
dissolved and melted in the aesthetic   
intuitions1 although they stand out in  
history in an altogether new relief4    
,history does not construct the concepts
 of the real and unreal1 but makes use  
of them4 ,history1 in fact1 is not the  
theory of history4 ,mere conceptual     

analysis is of no use in realizing      
whether an event in our lives were real 
or imaginary4 ,it is necessary to       
reproduce the intuitions in the mind in 
the most complete form1 as they were at 
the moment of production1 in order to   
recognize the content4 ,historicity is  
distinguished in the concrete from pure 
imagination only as one intuition is    
distinguished from another3 in the      
memory4      ,sidenote ,historical      
criticism4     ,sidenote ,historical    
scepticism4  ,where this is not         
possible1 owing to the delicate and     
fleeting shades between the real and    
unreal intuitions1 which confuse the one
 with the other1 we must either         
renounce1 for the time at least1 the    
knowledge of what really happened 7and  
this we often do71 or we must fall back 
upon conjecture1 verisimilitude1        
probability4 ,the principle of          
verisimilitude and of probability       
dominates in fact all historical        
criticism4 ,examination of the sources  

and of authority is directed toward     
establishing the most credible evidence4
 ,and what is the most credible         
evidence1 save that of the best         
observers1 that is1 of those who best   
remember and 7be it understood7 have not
 desired to falsify1 nor had interest in
 falsifying the truth of things8 ,from  
this it follows that intellectual       
scepticism finds it easy to deny the    
certainty of any history1 for the       
certainty of history is never that of   
science4 ,historical certainty is       
composed of memory and of authority1 not
 of analyses and of demonstration4 ,to  
speak of historical induction or        
demonstration1 is to make a metaphorical
 use of these expressions1 which bear   
quite a different meaning in history to 
that which they bear in science4 ,the   
conviction of the historian is the      
undemonstrable conviction of the        
juryman1 who has heard the witnesses1   
listened attentively to the case1 and   
prayed ,heaven to inspire him4          

,sometimes1 without doubt1 he is        
mistaken1 but the mistakes are in a     
negligible minority compared with the   
occasions when he gets hold of the      
truth4 ,that is why good sense is right 
against the intellectualists1 in        
believing in history1 which is not a    
fable agreed upon1 but that which the   
individual and humanity remember of     
their past4 ,we strive to enlarge and to
 render as precise as possible this     
record1 which in some places is dim1 in 
others very clear4 ,we cannot do without
 it1 such as it is1 and taken as a      
whole1 it is rich in truth4 ,in a spirit
 of paradox only1 can one doubt if there
 ever were a ,greece or a ,rome1 an     
,alexander or a ,caesar1 a feudal       
,europe overthrown by a series of       
revolutions1 that on the #ast of        
,november #aeag the theses of ,luther   
were seen fixed to the door of the      
church of ,wittenberg1 or that the      
,bastile was taken by the people of     
,paris on the #adth of ,july #aghi4     

,what proof givest thou of all this8    
asks the sophist1 ironically4 ,humanity 
replies ,i remember4      ,sidenote     
,philosophy as perfect science4 ,the    
so-called natural                       
sciences1 and their limits4  ,the world 
of what has happened1 of the concrete1  
of history1 is the world that is called 
real1 natural1 including in this        
definition the reality that is called   
physical1 as well as that which is      
called spiritual and human4 ,all this   
world is intuition2 historical          
intuition1 if it be realistically shown 
as it is1 or imaginary intuition1       
artistic in the strict sense1 if shown  
under the aspect of the possible1 that  
is to say1 of the imaginable4  ,science1
 true science1 which is not intuition   
but concept1 not individuality but      
universality1 cannot be anything but a  
science of the spirit1 that is1 of what 
is universal in reality3 ,philosophy4   
,if natural sciences be spoken of1 apart
 from philosophy1 it is necessary to    

observe that these are not perfect      
sciences3 they are complexes of         
knowledge1 arbitrarily abstracted and   
fixed4 ,the so-called natural sciences  
themselves recognize1 in fact1 that they
 are surrounded by limitations4 ,these  
limitations are nothing more than       
historical and intuitive data4 ,they    
calculate1 measure1 establish           
equalities1 regularity1 create classes  
and types1 formulate laws1 show in their
 own way how one fact arises out of     
other facts2 but in their progress they 
are always met with facts which are     
known intuitively and historically4     
,even geometry now states that it rests 
altogether on hypotheses1 since space is
 not three-dimensional or ,euclidean1   
but this assumption is made use of by   
preference1 because it is more          
convenient4 ,what there is of truth in  
the natural sciences1 is either         
philosophy or historical fact4 ,what    
they contain proper to themselves is    
abstract and arbitrary4 ,when the       

natural sciences wish to form themselves
 into perfect sciences1 they must issue 
from their circle and enter the         
philosophical circle4 ,this they do when
 they posit concepts which are anything 
but natural1 such as those of the atom  
without extension in space1 of ether or 
vibrating matter1 of vital force1 of    
space beyond the reach of intuition1 and
 the like4 ,these are true and proper   
philosophical efforts1 when they are not
 mere words void of meaning4 ,the       
concepts of natural science are1 without
 doubt1 most useful2 but one cannot     
obtain from them that system1 which     
belongs only to the spirit4  ,these     
historical and intuitive assumptions1   
which cannot be separated from the      
natural sciences1 furthermore explain1  
not only how1 in the progress of        
knowledge1 that which was once          
considered to be truth descends         
gradually to the grade of mythological  
beliefs and imaginary illusions1 but    
also how1 among natural scientists1     

there are some who term all that serves 
as basis of argument in their teaching  
mythical facts1 verbal expedients1 or   
conventions4 ,the naturalists and       
mathematicians who approach the study of
 the energies of the spirit without     
preparation1 are apt to carry thither   
these mental habits and to speak1 in    
philosophy1 of such and such conventions
 as arranged by man4 ,they make         
conventions of truth and morality1 and  
their supreme convention is the ,spirit 
itself6 ,however1 if there are to be    
conventions1 something must exist about 
which there is no convention to be made1
 but which is itself the agent of the   
convention4 ,this is the spiritual      
activity of man4 ,the limitation of the 
natural sciences postulates the         
illimitation of philosophy4             
,sidenote ,the phenomenon and the       
noumenon4  ,these explications have     
firmly established that the pure or     
fundamental forms of knowledge are two3 
the intuition and the concept--,art1 and

 ,science or ,philosophy4 ,with these   
are to be included ,history1 which is1  
as it were1 the product of intuition    
placed in contact with the concept1 that
 is1 of art receiving in itself         
philosophic distinctions1 while         
remaining concrete and individual4 ,all 
the other forms 7natural sciences and   
mathematics7 are impure1 being mingled  
with extraneous elements of practical   
origin4 ,the intuition gives the world1 
the phenomenon2 the concept gives the   
noumenon1 the ,spirit4     ,,iv         
,,historicism ,,and ,,intellectualism   
,,in ,,aesthetic   ,these relations     
between intuitive or aesthetic knowledge
 and the other fundamental or derivative
 forms of knowledge having been         
definitely established1 we are now in a 
position to reveal the errors of a      
series of theories which have been1 or  
are1 presented1 as theories of          
,aesthetic4      ,sidenote ,critique of 
verisimilitude and of naturalism4  ,from
 the confusion between the exigencies of

 art in general and the particular      
exigencies of history has arisen the    
theory 7which has lost ground to-day1   
but used to dominate in the past7 of    
verisimilitude as the object of art4 ,as
 is generally the case with erroneous   
propositions1 the intention of those who
 employed and employ the concept of     
verisimilitude has no doubt often been  
much more reasonable than the definition
 given of the word4 ,by verisimilitude  
used to be meant the artistic coherence 
of the representation1 that is to say1  
its completeness and effectiveness4 ,if 
verisimilar be translated by coherent1 a
 most exact meaning will often be found 
in the discussions1 examples1 and       
judgments of the critics4 ,an improbable
 personage1 an improbable ending to a   
comedy1 are really badly-drawn          
personages1 badly-arranged endings1     
happenings without artistic motive4 ,it 
has been said with reason that even     
fairies and sprites must have           
verisimilitude1 that is to say1 be      

really sprites and fairies1 coherent    
artistic intuitions4 ,sometimes the word
 possible has been used instead of      
verisimilar4 ,as we have already        
remarked in passing1 this word possible 
is synonymous with that which is        
imaginable or may be known intuitively4 
,everything which is really1 that is to 
say1 coherently1 imagined1 is possible4 
,but formerly1 and especially by the    
theoreticians1 by verisimilar was       
understood historical credibility1 or   
that historical truth which is not      
demonstrable1 but conjecturable1 not    
true1 but verisimilar4 ,it has been     
sought to impose a like character upon  
art4 ,who does not recall the great part
 played in literary history by the      
criticism of the verisimilar8 ,for      
example1 the fault found with the       
,jerusalem ,delivered1 based upon the   
history of the ,crusades1 or of the     
,homeric poems1 upon that of the        
verisimilitude of the costume of the    
emperors and kings8  ,at other times has

 been imposed upon art the duty of the  
aesthetic reproduction of historical    
reality4 ,this is another of the        
erroneous significations assumed by the 
theory concerning the imitation of      
nature4 ,verism and naturalism have     
since afforded the spectacle of a       
confusion of the aesthetic fact with the
 processes of the natural sciences1 by  
aiming at some sort of experimental     
drama or romance4      ,sidenote        
,critique of ideas in art1 of theses in 
art1 and of the                typical4 
,the confusions between the methods of  
art and those of the philosophical      
sciences have been far more frequent4   
,thus it has often been held to be      
within the competence of art to develop 
concepts1 to unite the intelligible with
 the sensible1 to represent ideas or    
universals1 putting art in the place of 
science1 that is1 confusing the artistic
 function in general with the particular
 case in which it becomes               
aesthetico-logical4  ,the theory of art 

as supporting theses can be reduced to  
the same error1 as can be the theory of 
art considered as individual            
representation1 exemplifying scientific 
laws4 ,the example1 in so far as it is  
an example1 stands for the thing        
exemplified1 and is thus an exposition  
of the universal1 that is to say1 a form
 of science1 more or less popular or    
vulgarized4  ,the same may be said of   
the aesthetic theory of the typical1    
when by type is understood1 as it       
frequently is1 just the abstraction or  
the concept1 and it is affirmed that art
 should make the species shine in the   
individual4 ,if by typical be here      
understood the individual1 here1 too1 we
 have a merely verbal variation4 ,to    
typify would signify1 in this case1 to  
characterize2 that is1 to determine and 
to represent the individual4 ,don       
,quixote is a type2 but of whom is he a 
type1 if not of all ,don ,quixotes8 ,a  
type1 that is to say1 of himself4       
,certainly he is not a type of abstract 

concepts1 such as the loss of the sense 
of reality1 or of the love of glory4 ,an
 infinite number of personages can be   
thought of under these concepts1 who are
 not ,don ,quixote4 ,in other words1 we 
find our own impressions fully          
determined and verified in the          
expression of a poet 7for example in a  
poetical personage74 ,we call that      
expression typical1 which we might call 
simply aesthetic4 ,poetical or artistic 
universals have been spoken of in like  
manner1 in order to show that the       
artistic product is altogether spiritual
 and ideal in itself4      ,sidenote    
,critique of the symbol and of the      
allegory4  ,continuing to correct these 
errors1 or to make clear equivoques1 we 
will note that the symbol has sometimes 
been given as essence of art4 ,now1 if  
the symbol be given as inseparable from 
the artistic intuition1 it is the       
synonym of the intuition itself1 which  
always has an ideal character4 ,there is
 no double-bottom to art1 but one only2 

in art all is symbolical1 because all is
 ideal4 ,but if the symbol be looked    
upon as separable--if on the one side   
can be expressed the symbol1 and on the 
other the thing symbolized1 we fall back
 again into the intellectualist error3  
that pretended symbol is the exposition 
of an abstract concept1 it is an        
allegory1 it is science1 or art that    
apes science4 ,but we must be just      
toward the allegorical also4 ,in some   
cases1 it is altogether harmless4 ,given
 the ,gerusalemme liberata1 the allegory
 was imagined afterwards2 given the     
,adone of ,marino1 the poet of the      
lascivious insinuated afterwards that it
 was written to show how immoderate     
indulgence ends in pain2 given a statue 
of a beautiful woman1 the sculptor can  
write on a card that the statue         
represents ,clemency or ,goodness4 ,this
 allegory linked to a finished work post
 festum does not change the work of art4
 ,what is it1 then8 ,it is an expression
 externally added to another expression4

 ,a little page of prose is added to the
 ,gerusalemme1 expressing another       
thought of the poet2 a verse or a       
strophe is added to the ,adone1         
expressing what the poet would like to  
make a part of his public swallow2 while
 to the statue nothing more than the    
single word is added3 ,clemency or      
,goodness4      ,sidenote ,critique of  
the theory of artistic and literary     
classes4  ,but the greatest triumph of  
the intellectualist error lies in the   
theory of artistic and literary classes1
 which still has vogue in literary      
treatises1 and disturbs the critics and 
the historians of art4 ,let us observe  
its genesis4  ,the human mind can pass  
from the aesthetic to the logical1 just 
because the former is a first step1 in  
respect to the latter4 ,it can destroy  
the expressions1 that is1 the thought of
 the individual with the thought of the 
universal4 ,it can reduce expressive    
facts to logical relations4 ,we have    
already shown that this operation in its

 turn becomes concrete in an expression1
 but this does not mean that the first  
expressions have not been destroyed4    
,they have yielded their place to the   
new aesthetico-logical expressions4     
,when we are on the second step1 we have
 left the first4  ,he who enters a      
picture-gallery1 or who reads a series  
of poems1 may1 after he has looked and  
read1 go further3 he may seek out the   
relations of the things there expressed4
 ,thus those pictures and compositions1 
each of which is an individual          
inexpressible by logic1 are resolved    
into universals and abstractions1 such  
as costumes1 landscapes1 portraits1     
domestic life1 battles1 animals1        
flowers1 fruit1 seascapes1 lakes1       
deserts1 tragic1 comic1 piteous1 cruel1 
lyrical1 epic1 dramatic1 knightly1      
idyllic facts1 and the like4 ,they are  
often also resolved into merely         
quantitative categories1 such as little 
picture1 picture1 statuette1 group1     
madrigal1 song1 sonnet1 garland of      

sonnets1 poetry1 poem1 story1 romance1  
and the like4  ,when we think the       
concept domestic life1 or knighthood1 or
 idyll1 or cruelty1 or any other        
quantitative concept1 the individual    
expressive fact from which we started is
 abandoned4 ,from aesthetes that we     
were1 we have been changed into         
logicians2 from contemplators of        
expression1 into reasoners4 ,certainly  
no objection can be made to such a      
process4 ,in what other way could       
science be born1 which1 if aesthetic    
expressions be assumed in it1 yet has   
for function to go beyond them8 ,the    
logical or scientific form1 as such1    
excludes the aesthetic form4 ,he who    
begins to think scientifically has      
already ceased to contemplate           
aesthetically2 although his thought will
 assume of necessity in its turn an     
aesthetic form1 as has already been     
said1 and as it would be superfluous to 
repeat4  ,the error begins when we try  
to deduce the expression from the       

concept1 and to find in the thing       
substituting the laws of the thing      
substituted2 when the difference between
 the second and the first step has not  
been observed1 and when1 in consequence1
 we declare that we are standing on the 
first step1 when we are really standing 
on the second4 ,this error is known as  
the theory of artistic and literary     
classes4  ,what is the aesthetic form of
 domestic life1 of knighthood1 of the   
idyll1 of cruelty1 and so forth8 ,how   
should these contents be represented8   
,such is the absurd problem implied in  
the theory of artistic and literary     
classes4 ,it is in this that consists   
all search after laws or rules of       
styles4 ,domestic life1 knighthood1     
idyll1 cruelty1 and the like1 are not   
impressions1 but concepts4 ,they are not
 contents1 but logico-aesthetic forms4  
,you cannot express the form1 for it is 
already itself expression4 ,and what are
 the words cruelty1 idyll1 knighthood1  
domestic life1 and so on1 but the       

expression of those concepts8  ,even the
 most refined of these distinctions1    
those that have the most philosophic    
appearance1 do not resist criticism2 as1
 for instance1 when works of art are    
divided into the subjective and the     
objective styles1 into lyric and epic1  
into works of feeling and works of      
design4 ,it is impossible to separate in
 aesthetic analysis1 the subjective from
 the objective side1 the lyric from the 
epic1 the image of feeling from that of 
things4      ,sidenote ,errors derived  
from this theory appearing in judgments 
on art4  ,from the theory of the        
artistic and literary classes derive    
those erroneous modes of judgment and of
 criticism1 thanks to which1 instead of 
asking before a work of art if it be    
expressive1 and what it expresses1      
whether it speak or stammer1 or be      
silent altogether1 it is asked if it be 
obedient to the laws of the epic poem1  
or to those of tragedy1 to those of     
historical portraiture1 or to those of  

landscape painting4 ,artists1 however1  
while making a verbal pretence of       
agreeing1 or yielding a feigned         
obedience to them1 have really always   
disregarded these laws of styles4 ,every
 true work of art has violated some     
established class and upset the ideas of
 the critics1 who have thus been obliged
 to enlarge the number of classes1 until
 finally even this enlargement has      
proved too narrow1 owing to the         
appearance of new works of art1 which   
are naturally followed by new scandals1 
new upsettings1 and-new enlargements4   
,from the same theory come the          
prejudices1 owing to which at one time  
7and is it really passed87 people used  
to lament that ,italy had no tragedy    
7until a poet arose who gave to ,italy  
that wreath which was the only thing    
wanting to her glorious hair71 nor      
,france the epic poem 7until the        
,henriade1 which slaked the thirsty     
throats of the critics74 ,eulogies      
accorded to the inventors of new styles 

are connected with these prejudices1 so 
much so1 that in the seventeenth century
 the invention of the mock-heroic poem  
seemed an important event1 and the      
honour of it was disputed1 as though it 
were the discovery of ,america4 ,but the
 works adorned with this name 7the      
,secchia rapita and the ,scherno degli  
,dei7 were still-born1 because their    
authors 7a slight draw-back7 had nothing
 new or original to say4 ,mediocrities  
racked their brains to invent1          
artificially1 new styles4 ,the          
piscatorial eclogue was added to the    
pastoral1 and then1 finally1 the        
military eclogue4 ,the ,aminta was      
bathed and became the ,alceo4 ,finally1 
there have been historians of art and   
literature1 so much fascinated with     
these ideas of classes1 that they       
claimed to write the history1 not of    
single and effective literary and       
artistic works1 but of their classes1   
those empty phantoms4 ,they have claimed
 to portray1 not the evolution of the   

artistic spirit1 but the evolution of   
classes4  ,the philosophical            
condemnation of artistic and literary   
classes is found in the formulation and 
demonstration of what artistic activity 
has ever sought and good taste ever     
recognized4 ,what is to be done if good 
taste and the real fact1 put into       
formulas1 sometimes assume the air of   
paradoxes8      ,sidenote ,empirical    
sense of the divisions of classes4  ,now
 if we talk of tragedies1 comedies1     
dramas1 romances1 pictures of everyday  
life1 battle-pieces1 landscapes1        
seascapes1 poems1 versicles1 lyrics1 and
 the like1 if it be only with a view to 
be understood1 and to draw attention in 
general and approximatively to certain  
groups of works1 to which1 for one      
reason or another1 it is desired to draw
 attention1 in that case1 no scientific 
error has been committed4 ,we employ    
vocables and phrases2 we do not         
establish laws and definitions4 ,the    
mistake arises when the weight of a     

scientific definition is given to a     
word1 when we ingenuously let ourselves 
be caught in the meshes of that         
phraseology4 ,pray permit me a          
comparison4 ,it is necessary to arrange 
the books in a library in one way or    
another4 ,this used generally to be done
 by means of a rough classification by  
subjects 7among which the categories of 
miscellaneous and eccentric were not    
wanting72 they are now generally        
arranged by sizes or by publishers4 ,who
 can deny the necessity and the utility 
of these groupings8 ,but what should we 
say if some one began seriously to seek 
out the literary laws of miscellanies   
and of eccentricities from the ,aldine  
or ,bodonian collection1 from size ,a or
 size ,b1 that is to say1 from these    
altogether arbitrary groupings whose    
sole object has been their practical    
use8 ,well1 whoever should undertake an 
enterprise such as this1 would be doing 
neither more nor less than those who    
seek out the aesthetic laws of literary 

and artistic classes4     ,v            
,,analogous ,,errors ,,in ,,historic    
,,and ,,logic   ,the better to confirm  
these criticisms1 it will be opportune  
to cast a rapid glance over analogous   
and opposite errors1 born of ignorance  
as to the true nature of art1 and of its
 relation to history and to science4    
,these errors have injured alike the    
theory of history and of science1 of    
,historic 7or ,historiology7 and of     
,logic4      ,sidenote ,critique of the 
philosophy of history4  ,historical     
intellectualism has been the cause of   
the many researches which have been     
made1 especially during the last two    
centuries1 researches which continue    
to-day1 for a philosophy of history1 for
 an ideal history1 for a sociology1 for 
a historical psychology1 or however may 
be otherwise entitled or described a    
science whose object is to extract from 
history1 universal laws and concepts4   
,of what kind must be these laws1 these 
universals8 ,historical laws and        

historical concepts8 ,in that case1 an  
elementary criticism of knowledge       
suffices to make clear the absurdity of 
the attempt4 ,when such expressions as a
 historical law1 a historical concept   
are not simply metaphors colloquially   
employed1 they are true contradictions  
in terms3 the adjective is as unsuitable
 to the substantive as in the           
expressions qualitative quantity or     
pluralistic monism4 ,history means      
concretion and individuality1 law and   
concept mean abstraction and            
universality4 ,if1 on the other hand1   
the attempt to draw from history        
historical laws and concepts be         
abandoned1 and it be merely desired to  
draw from it laws and concepts1 the     
attempt is certainly not frivolous2 but 
the science thus obtained will be1 not a
 philosophy of history1 but rather1     
according to the case1 either philosophy
 in its various specifications of       
,ethic1 ,logic1 etc41 or empirical      
science in its infinite divisions and   

subdivisions4 ,thus are sought out      
either those philosophical concepts     
which are1 as has already been observed1
 at the bottom of every historical      
construction and separate perception    
from intuition1 historical intuition    
from pure intuition1 history from art2  
or already formed historical intuitions 
are collected and reduced to types and  
classes1 which is exactly the method of 
the natural sciences4 ,great thinkers   
have sometimes donned the unsuitable    
cloak of the philosophy of history1 and 
notwithstanding the covering1 they have 
conquered philosophical truths of the   
greatest magnitude4 ,the cloak has been 
dropped1 the truth has remained4 ,modern
 sociologists are rather to be blamed1  
not so much for the illusion in which   
they are involved when they talk of an  
impossible science of sociology1 as for 
the infecundity which almost always     
accompanies their illusion4 ,it is but a
 small evil that ,aesthetic should be   
termed sociological ,aesthetic1 or      

,logic1 social ,logic4 ,the grave evil  
is that their ,aesthetic is an          
old-fashioned expression of sensualism1 
their ,logic verbal and incoherent4 ,the
 philosophical movement1 to which we    
have referred1 has borne two good fruits
 in relation to history4 ,first of all  
has been felt the desire to construct a 
theory of historiography1 that is1 to   
understand the nature and the limits of 
history1 a theory which1 in conformity  
with the analyses made above1 cannot    
obtain satisfaction1 save in a general  
science of intuition1 in an ,aesthetic1 
from which ,historic would be separated 
under a special head by means of the    
intervention of the universals4         
,furthermore1 concrete truths relating  
to historical events have often been    
expressed beneath the false and         
presumptuous cloak of a philosophy of   
history2 canons and empirical advice    
have been formulated by no means        
superfluous to students and critics4 ,it
 does not seem possible to deny this    

utility to the most recent of           
philosophies of history1 to so-called   
historical materialism1 which has thrown
 a very vivid light upon many sides of  
social life1 formerly neglected or ill  
understood4      ,sidenote ,aesthetic   
invasions into ,logic4  ,the principle  
of authority1 of the ipse dixit1 is an  
invasion of historicity into the domains
 of science and philosophy which has    
raged in the schools4 ,this substitutes 
for introspection and philosophical     
analyses1 this or that evidence1        
document1 or authoritative statement1   
with which history certainly cannot     
dispense4 ,but ,logic1 the science of   
thought and of intellectual knowledge1  
has suffered the most grave and         
destructive disturbances and errors of  
all1 through the imperfect understanding
 of the aesthetic fact4 ,how1 indeed1   
could it be otherwise1 if logical       
activity come after and contain in      
itself aesthetic activity8 ,an inexact  
,aesthetic must of necessity drag after 

it an inexact ,logic4  ,whoever opens   
logical treatises1 from the ,organum of 
,aristotle to the moderns1 must admit   
that they all contain a haphazard       
mixture of verbal facts and facts of    
thought1 of grammatical forms and of    
conceptual forms1 of ,aesthetic and of  
,logic4 ,not that attempts have been    
wanting to escape from verbal expression
 and to seize thought in its effective  
nature4 ,aristotelian logic itself did  
not become mere syllogistic and         
verbalism1 without some stumbling and   
oscillation4 ,the especially logical    
problem was often touched upon in the   
,middle ,ages1 by the nominalists1      
realists1 and conceptualists1 in their  
disputes4 ,with ,galileo and with       
,bacon1 the natural sciences gave an    
honourable place to induction4 ,vico    
combated formalist and mathematical     
logic in favour of inventive methods4   
,kant called attention to a priori      
syntheses4 ,the absolute idealists      
despised the ,aristotelian logic4 ,the  

followers of ,herbart1 bound to         
,aristotle1 on the other hand1 set in   
relief those judgments which they called
 narrative1 which are of a character    
altogether different from other logical 
judgments4 ,finally1 the linguists      
insisted upon the irrationality of the  
word1 in relation to the concept4 ,but a
 conscious1 sure1 and radical movement  
of reform can find no base or           
starting-point1 save in the science of  
,aesthetic4      ,sidenote ,logic in its
 essence4  ,in a ,logic suitably        
reformed on this basis1 it will be      
fitting to proclaim before all things   
this truth1 and to draw from it all its 
consequences3 the logical fact1 the only
 logical fact1 is the concept1 the      
universal1 the spirit that forms1 and in
 so far as it forms1 the universal4 ,and
 if be understood by induction1 as has  
sometimes been understood1 the formation
 of universals1 and by deduction the    
verbal development of these1 then it is 
clear that true ,logic can be nothing   

but inductive ,logic4 ,but since by the 
word deduction has been more frequently 
understood the special processes of     
mathematics1 and by the word induction  
those of the natural sciences1 it will  
be advisable to avoid the one and the   
other denomination1 and to say that true
 ,logic is the ,logic of the concept4   
,the ,logic of the concept1 adopting a  
method which is at once induction and   
deduction1 will adopt neither the one   
nor the other exclusively1 that is1 will
 adopt the 7speculative7 method1 which  
is intrinsic to it4  ,the concept1 the  
universal1 is in itself1 abstractly     
considered1 inexpressible4 ,no word is  
proper to it4 ,so true is this1 that the
 logical concept remains always the     
same1 notwithstanding the variation of  
verbal forms4 ,in respect to the        
concept1 expression is a simple sign or 
indication4 ,there must be an           
expression1 it cannot fail2 but what it 
is to be1 this or that1 is determined by
 the historical and psychological       

conditions of the individual who is     
speaking4 ,the quality of the expression
 is not deducible from the nature of the
 concept4 ,there does not exist a true  
7logical7 sense of words4 ,he who forms 
a concept bestows on each occasion their
 true meaning on the words4             
,sidenote ,distinction between logical  
and non-logical judgements4  ,this being
 established1 the only truly logical    
7that is1 aesthetico-logical7           
propositions1 the only rigorously       
logical judgments1 can be nothing but   
those whose proper and exclusive content
 is the determination of a concept4     
,these propositions or judgments are the
 definitions4 ,science itself is nothing
 but a complex of definitions1 unified  
in a supreme definition2 a system of    
concepts1 or chief concept4  ,it is     
therefore necessary to exclude from     
,logic all those propositions which do  
not affirm universals4 ,narrative       
judgments1 not less than those termed   
non-enunciative by ,aristotle1 such as  

the expression of desires1 are not      
properly logical judgments4 ,they are   
either purely aesthetic propositions or 
historical propositions4 ,peter is      
passing2 it is raining to-day2 ,i am    
sleepy2 ,i want to read3 these and an   
infinity of propositions of the same    
kind1 are nothing but either a mere     
enclosing1 in words the impression of   
the fact that ,peter is passing1 of the 
falling rain1 of my organism inclining  
to sleep1 and of my will directed to    
reading1 or they are existential        
affirmation concerning those facts4     
,they are expressions of the real or of 
the unreal1 of historical or of pure    
imagination2 they are certainly not     
definitions of universals4              
,sidenote ,syllogistic4  ,this exclusion
 cannot meet with great difficulties4   
,it is already almost an accomplished   
fact1 and the only thing required is to 
render it explicit1 decisive1 and       
coherent4 ,but what is to be done with  
all that part of human experience which 

is called syllogistic1 consisting of    
judgments and reasonings which are based
 on concepts4 ,what is syllogistic8 ,is 
it to be looked down upon from above    
with contempt1 as something useless1 as 
has so often been done in the reaction  
of the humanists against scholasticism1 
in absolute idealism1 in the            
enthusiastic admiration of our times for
 the methods of observation and         
experiment of the natural sciences8     
,syllogistic1 reasoning in forma1 is not
 a discovery of truth2 it is the art of 
exposing1 debating1 disputing with      
oneself and others4 ,proceeding from    
concepts already formed1 from facts     
already observed and making appeal to   
the persistence of the true or of       
thought 7such is the meaning of the     
principle of identity and               
contradiction71 it infers consequences  
from these data1 that is1 it represents 
what has already been discovered4       
,therefore1 if it be an idem per idem   
from the point of view of invention1 it 

is most efficacious as a teaching and an
 exposition4 ,to reduce affirmations to 
the syllogistic scheme is a way of      
controlling one's own thought and of    
criticizing that of others4 ,it is easy 
to laugh at syllogisers1 but1 if        
syllogistic has been born and retains   
its place1 it must have good roots of   
its own4 ,satire applied to it can      
concern only its abuses1 such as the    
attempt to prove syllogistically        
questions of fact1 observation1 and     
intuition1 or the neglect of profound   
meditation and unprejudiced             
investigation of problems1 for          
syllogistic formality4 ,and if so-called
 mathematical ,logic can sometimes aid  
us in our attempt to remember with ease1
 to manipulate the results of our own   
thought1 let us welcome this form of the
 syllogism also1 long prophesied by     
,leibnitz and essayed by many1 even in  
our days4  ,but precisely because       
syllogistic is the art of exposing and  
of debating1 its theory cannot hold the 

first place in a philosophical ,logic1  
usurping that belonging to the doctrine 
of the concept1 which is the central and
 dominating doctrine1 to which is       
reduced everything logical in           
syllogistic1 without leaving a residuum 
7relations of concepts1 subordination1  
co-ordination1 identification1 and so   
on74 ,nor must it ever be forgotten that
 the concept1 the 7logical7 judgment1   
and the syllogism do not occupy the same
 position4 ,the first alone is the      
logical fact1 the second and third are  
the forms in which the first manifests  
itself4 ,these1 in so far as they are   
forms1 cannot be examined save          
aesthetically 7grammatically72 in so far
 as they possess logical content1 only  
by neglecting the forms themselves and  
passing to the doctrine of the concept4 
,sidenote ,false ,logic and true        
,aesthetic4  ,this shows the truth of   
the ordinary remark to the effect that  
he who reasons ill1 also speaks and     
writes ill1 that exact logical analysis 

is the basis of good expression4 ,this  
truth is a tautology1 for to reason well
 is in fact to express oneself well1    
because the expression is the intuitive 
possession of one's own logical thought4
 ,the principle of contradiction1       
itself1 is at bottom nothing but the    
aesthetic principle of coherence4 ,it   
will be said that starting from         
erroneous concepts it is possible to    
write and to speak exceedingly well1 as 
it is also possible to reason well2 that
 some who are dull at research may yet  
be most limpid writers4 ,that is        
precisely because to write well depends 
upon having a clear intuition of one's  
own thought1 even if it be erroneous2   
that is to say1 not of its scientific1  
but of its aesthetic truth1 since it is 
this truth itself4 ,a philosopher like  
,schopenhauer can imagine that art is a 
representation of the ,platonic ideas4  
,this doctrine is absolutely false      
scientifically1 yet he may develop this 
false knowledge in excellent prose1     

aesthetically most true4 ,but we have   
already replied to these objections1    
when we observed that at that precise   
point where a speaker or a writer       
enunciates an ill-thought concept1 he is
 at the same time speaking ill and      
writing ill4 ,he may1 however1          
afterwards recover himself in the many  
other parts of his thought1 which       
consist of true propositions1 not       
connected with the preceding errors1 and
 lucid expressions may with him follow  
upon turbid expressions4      ,sidenote 
,logic reformed4  ,all enquiries as to  
the forms of judgments and of           
syllogisms1 on their conversion and on  
their various relations1 which still    
encumber treatises on ,logic1 are       
therefore destined to become less1 to be
 transformed1 to be reduced to something
 else4  ,the doctrine of the concept and
 of the organism of the concepts1 of    
definition1 of system1 of philosophy1   
and of the various sciences1 and the    
like1 will fill the place of these and  

will constitute the only true and proper
 ,logic4  ,those who first had some     
suspicion of the intimate connexion     
between ,aesthetic and ,logic and       
conceived ,aesthetic as a ,logic of     
sensible knowledge1 were strangely      
addicted to applying logical categories 
to the new knowledge1 talking of        
aesthetic concepts1 aesthetic judgments1
 aesthetic syllogisms1 and so on4 ,we   
are less superstitious as regards the   
solidity of the traditional ,logic of   
the schools1 and better informed as to  
the nature of ,aesthetic4 ,we do not    
recommend the application of ,logic to  
,aesthetic1 but the liberation of ,logic
 from aesthetic forms4 ,these have given
 rise to non-existent forms or          
categories of ,logic1 due to the        
following of altogether arbitrary and   
crude distinctions4  ,logic thus        
reformed will always be formal ,logic2  
it will study the true form or activity 
of thought1 the concept1 excluding      
single and particular concepts4 ,the old

 ,logic is ill called formal2 it were   
better to call it verbal or formalistic4
 ,formal ,logic will drive out          
formalistic ,logic4 ,to attain this     
object1 it will not be necessary to have
 recourse1 as some have done1 to a real 
or material ,logic1 which is not a      
science of thought1 but thought itself  
in the act2 not only a ,logic1 but the  
complex of ,philosophy1 in which ,logic 
also is included4 ,the science of       
thought 7,logic7 is that of the concept1
 as that of fancy 7,aesthetic7 is the   
science of expression4 ,the well-being  
of both sciences lies in exactly        
following in every particular the       
distinction between the two domains4    
,,vi  ,,theoretic ,,and ,,practical     
,,activity   ,the intuitive and         
intellective forms exhaust1 as we have  
said1 all the theoretic form of the     
spirit4 ,but it is not possible to know 
them thoroughly1 nor to criticize       
another series of erroneous aesthetic   
theories1 without first establishing    

clearly their relations with another    
form of the spirit1 which is the        
practical form4      ,sidenote ,the     
will4  ,this form or practical activity 
is the will4 ,we do not employ this word
 here in the sense of any philosophical 
system1 in which the will is the        
foundation of the universe1 the         
principle of things and the true        
reality4 ,nor do we employ it in the    
ample sense of other systems1 which     
understand by will the energy of the    
spirit1 the spirit or activity in       
general1 making of every act of the     
human spirit an act of will4 ,neither   
such metaphysical nor such metaphorical 
meaning is ours4 ,for us1 the will is1  
as generally accepted1 that activity of 
the spirit1 which differs from the mere 
theoretical contemplation of things1 and
 is productive1 not of knowledge1 but of
 actions4 ,action is really action1 in  
so far as it is voluntary4 ,it is not   
necessary to remark that in the will to 
do1 is included1 in the scientific      

sense1 also what is vulgarly called     
not-doing3 the will to resist1 to       
reject1 the prometheutic will1 is also  
action4      ,sidenote ,the will as an  
ulterior stage in respect to knowledge4 
,man understands things with the        
theoretical form1 with the practical    
form he changes them2 with the one he   
appropriates the universe1 with the     
other he creates it4 ,but the first form
 is the basis of the second2 and the    
relation of double degree1 which we have
 already found existing between         
aesthetic and logical activity1 is      
repeated between these two on a larger  
scale4 ,knowledge independent of the    
will is thinkable2 will independent of  
knowledge is unthinkable4 ,blind will is
 not will2 true will has eyes4  ,how can
 we will1 without having before us      
historical intuitions 7perceptions7 of  
objects1 and knowledge of 7logical7     
relations1 which enlighten us as to the 
nature of those objects8 ,how can we    
really will1 if we do not know the world

 which surrounds us1 and the manner of  
changing things by acting upon them8    
,sidenote ,objections and elucidations4 
,it has been objected that men of       
action1 practical men in the eminent    
sense1 are the least disposed to        
contemplate and to theorize3 their      
energy is not delayed in contemplation1 
it rushes at once into will4 ,and       
conversely1 that contemplative men1     
philosophers1 are often very mediocre in
 practical matters1 weak willed1 and    
therefore neglected and thrust aside in 
the tumult of life4 ,it is easy to see  
that these distinctions are merely      
empirical and quantitative4 ,certainly1 
the practical man has no need of a      
philosophical system in order to act1   
but in the spheres where he does act1 he
 starts from intuitions and concepts    
which are most clear to him4 ,otherwise 
he could not will the most ordinary     
actions4 ,it would not be possible to   
will to feed oneself1 for instance1     
without knowledge of the food1 and of   

the link of cause and effect between    
certain movements and certain organic   
sensations4 ,rising gradually to the    
more complex forms of action1 for       
example to the political1 how could we  
will anything politically good or bad1  
without knowing the real conditions of  
society1 and consequently the means and 
expedients to be adopted8 ,when the     
practical man feels himself in the dark 
about one or more of these points1 or   
when he is seized with doubt1 action    
either does not begin or stops4 ,it is  
then that the theoretical moment1 which 
in the rapid succession of human actions
 is hardly noticed and rapidly          
forgotten1 becomes important and        
occupies consciousness for a longer     
time4 ,and if this moment be prolonged1 
then the practical man may become       
,hamlet1 divided between desire for     
action and his small amount of          
theoretical clarity as regards the      
situation and the means to be employed4 
,and if he develop a taste for          

contemplation and discovery1 and leave  
willing and acting1 to a more or less   
great extent1 to others1 there is formed
 in him the calm disposition of the     
artist1 of the man of science1 or of the
 philosopher1 who are sometimes         
unpractical or altogether blameworthy4  
,these observations are all obvious4    
,their exactitude cannot be denied4 ,let
 us1 however1 repeat that they are      
founded on quantitative distinctions and
 do not disprove1 but confirm the fact  
that an action1 however slight it be1   
cannot really be an action1 that is1 an 
action that is willed1 unless it be     
preceded by cognoscitive activity4      
,sidenote ,critique of practical        
judgments or judgments of value4  ,some 
psychologists1 on the other hand1 place 
before practical action an altogether   
special class of judgments1 which they  
call practical judgments or judgments of
 value4 ,they say that in order to      
resolve to perform an action1 it is     
necessary to have judged3 this action is

 useful1 this action is good4 ,and at   
first sight this seems to have the      
testimony of consciousness on its side4 
,but he who observes better and analyses
 with greater subtlety1 discovers that  
such judgments follow instead of        
preceding the affirmation of the will2  
they are nothing but the expression of  
the already exercised volition4 ,a good 
or useful action is an action that is   
willed4 ,it will always be impossible to
 distil from the objective study of     
things a single drop of usefulness or   
goodness4 ,we do not desire things      
because we know them to be good or      
useful2 but we know them to be good and 
useful1 because we desire them4 ,here   
too1 the rapidity1 with which the facts 
of consciousness follow one another has 
given rise to an illusion4 ,practical   
action is preceded by knowledge1 but not
 by practical knowledge1 or better by   
the practical3 to obtain this1 it is    
first necessary to have practical       
action4 ,the third moment1 therefore1 of

 practical judgments1 or judgments of   
value1 is altogether imaginary4 ,it does
 not come between the two moments or    
degrees of theory and practice4 ,that is
 why there exist no normative sciences  
in general1 which regulate or command1  
discover and indicate values to the     
practical activity2 because there is    
none for any other activity1 assuming   
every science already realized and that 
activity developed1 which it afterwards 
takes as its object4      ,sidenote     
,exclusion of the practical from the    
aesthetic4  ,these distinctions         
established1 we must condemn as         
erroneous every theory which confuses   
aesthetic with practical activity1 or   
introduces the laws of the second into  
the first4 ,that science is theory and  
art practice has been many times        
affirmed4 ,those who make this          
statement1 and look upon the aesthetic  
fact as a practical fact1 do not do so  
capriciously or because they are groping
 in the void2 but because they have     

their eye on something which is really  
practical4 ,but the practical which they
 are looking at is not ,aesthetic1 nor  
within ,aesthetic2 it is outside and    
beside it2 and although they are often  
found united1 they are not necessarily  
united1 that is to say1 by the bond of  
identity of nature4  ,the aesthetic fact
 is altogether completed in the         
expressive elaboration of the           
impressions4 ,when we have conquered the
 word within us1 conceived definitely   
and vividly a figure or a statue1 or    
found a musical motive1 expression is   
born and is complete2 there is no need  
for anything else4 ,if after this we    
should open our mouths and will to open 
them1 to speak1 or our throats to sing1 
and declare in a loud voice and with    
extended throat what we have completely 
said or sung to ourselves2 or if we     
should stretch out and will to stretch  
out our hands to touch the notes of the 
piano1 or to take up the brushes and the
 chisel1 making thus in detail those    

movements which we have already done    
rapidly1 and doing so in such a way as  
to leave more or less durable traces2   
this is all an addition1 a fact which   
obeys quite different laws to the first1
 and with these laws we have not to     
occupy ourselves for the moment4 ,let   
us1 however1 here recognize that this   
second movement is a production of      
things1 a practical fact1 or a fact of  
will4 ,it is customary to distinguish   
the internal from the external work of  
art3 the terminology seems here to be   
infelicitous1 for the work of art 7the  
aesthetic work7 is always internal2 and 
that which is called external is no     
longer a work of art4 ,others           
distinguish between aesthetic fact and  
artistic fact1 meaning by the second the
 external or practical stage1 which may 
and generally does follow the first4    
,but in this case1 it is simply a case  
of linguistic usage1 doubtless          
permissible1 although perhaps not       
opportune4      ,sidenote ,critique of  

the theory of the end of art and of the 
choice of the content4  ,for the same   
reasons the search for the end of art is
 ridiculous1 when it is understood of   
art as art4 ,and since to fix an end is 
to choose1 the theory that the content  
of art must be selected is another form 
of the same error4 ,a selection from    
among impressions and sensations implies
 that these are already expressions1    
otherwise1 how can a selection be made  
among what is continuous and indistinct8
 ,to choose is to will3 to will this and
 not to will that3 and this and that    
must be before us1 they must be         
expressed4 ,practice follows1 it does   
not precede theory2 expression is free  
inspiration4  ,the true artist1 in fact1
 finds himself big with his theme1 he   
knows not how2 he feels the moment of   
birth drawing near1 but he cannot will  
it or not will it4 ,if he were to wish  
to act in opposition to his inspiration1
 to make an arbitrary choice1 if1 born  
,anacreon1 he were to wish to sing of   

,atreus and of ,alcides1 his lyre would 
warn him of his mistake1 echoing only of
 ,venus and of ,love1 notwithstanding   
his efforts to the contrary4            
,sidenote ,practical innocence of art4  
,the theme or content cannot1 therefore1
 be practically or morally charged with 
epithets of praise or of blame4 ,when   
critics of art remark that a theme is   
badly selected1 in cases where that     
observation has a just foundation1 it is
 a question of blaming1 not the         
selection of the theme 7which would be  
absurd71 but the manner in which the    
artist has treated it4 ,the expression  
has failed1 owing to the contradictions 
which it contains4 ,and when the same   
critics rebel against the theme or the  
content as being unworthy of art and    
blameworthy1 in respect to works which  
they proclaim to be artistically        
perfect2 if these expressions really are
 perfect1 there is nothing to be done   
but to advise the critics to leave the  
artists in peace1 for they cannot get   

inspiration1 save from what has made an 
impression upon them4 ,the critics      
should think rather of how they can     
effect changes in nature and in society1
 in order that those impressions may not
 exist4 ,if ugliness were to vanish from
 the world1 if universal virtue and     
felicity were established there1 perhaps
 artists would no longer represent      
perverse or pessimistic sentiments1 but 
sentiments that are calm1 innocent1 and 
joyous1 like ,arcadians of a real       
,arcady4 ,but so long as ugliness and   
turpitude exist in nature and impose    
themselves on the artist1 it is not     
possible to prevent the expression of   
these things also2 and when it has      
arisen1 factum infectum fieri nequit4   
,we speak thus entirely from the        
aesthetic point of view1 and from that  
of pure aesthetic criticism4  ,we do not
 delay to pass here in review the damage
 which the criticism of choice does to  
artistic production1 with the prejudices
 which it produces or maintains among   

the artists themselves1 and with the    
contrast which it occasions between     
artistic impulse and critical           
exigencies4 ,it is true that sometimes  
it seems to do some good also1 by       
assisting the artists to discover       
themselves1 that is1 their own          
impressions and their own inspiration1  
and to acquire consciousness of the task
 which is1 as it were1 imposed upon them
 by the historical moment in which they 
live1 and by their individual           
temperament4 ,in these cases1 criticism 
of choice merely recognizes and aids the
 expressions which are already being    
formed4 ,it believes itself to be the   
mother1 where1 at most1 it is only the  
midwife4      ,sidenote ,the            
independence of art4  ,the impossibility
 of choice of content completes the     
theorem of the independence of art1 and 
is also the only legitimate meaning of  
the expression3 art for art's sake4 ,art
 is thus independent of science1 as it  
is of the useful and the moral4 ,let it 

not be feared that thus may be justified
 art that is frivolous or cold1 since   
that which is truly frivolous or cold is
 so because it has not been raised to   
expression2 or in other words1 frivolity
 and frigidity come always from the form
 of the aesthetic elaboration1 from the 
lack of a content1 not from the material
 qualities of the content4              
,sidenote ,critique of the saying3 the  
style is the man4  ,the saying3 the     
style is the man1 can also not be       
completely criticized1 save by starting 
from the distinction between the        
theoretic and the practical1 and from   
the theoretic character of the aesthetic
 activity4 ,man is not simply knowledge 
and contemplation3 he is also will1     
which contains in it the cognoscitive   
moment4 ,now the saying is either       
altogether void1 as when it is          
understood that the man is the style1 in
 so far as he is style1 that is to say1 
the man1 but only in so far as he is an 
expression of activity2 or it is        

erroneous1 when the attempt is made to  
deduce from what a man has seen and     
expressed1 that which he has done and   
willed1 inferring thereby that there is 
a necessary link between knowing and    
willing4 ,many legends in the           
biographies of artists have sprung from 
this erroneous identification1 since it 
seemed impossible that a man who gives  
expression to generous sentiments should
 not be a noble and generous man in     
practical life2 or that the dramatist   
who gives a great many stabs in his     
plays1 should not himself have given a  
few at least in real life4 ,vainly do   
the artists protest3 lasciva est nobis  
pagina1 vita proba4 ,they are merely    
taxed in addition with lying and        
hypocrisy4 ,o you poor women of ,verona1
 how far more subtle you were1 when you 
founded your belief that ,dante had     
really descended to hell1 upon his dusky
 countenance6 ,yours was at any rate a  
historical conjecture4      ,sidenote   
,critique of the concept of sincerity in

 art4  ,finally1 sincerity imposed upon 
the artist as a duty 7this law of ethics
 which1 they say1 is also a law of      
aesthetic7 arises from another equivoke4
 ,for by sincerity is meant either the  
moral duty not to deceive one's         
neighbour2 and in that case ,is foreign 
to the artist4 ,for he1 in fact1        
deceives no one1 since he gives form to 
what is already in his mind4 ,he would  
deceive1 only if he were to betray his  
duty as an artist by a lesser devotion  
to the intrinsic necessity of his task4 
,if lies and deceit are in his mind1    
then the form which he gives to these   
things cannot be deceit or lies1        
precisely because it is aesthetic4 ,the 
artist1 if he be a charlatan1 a liar1 or
 a miscreant1 purifies his other self by
 reflecting it in art4 ,or by sincerity 
is meant1 fulness and truth of          
expression1 and it is clear that this   
second sense has nothing to do with the 
ethical concept4 ,the law1 which is at  
once ethical and aesthetic1 reveals     

itself in this case in a word employed  
alike by ,ethic and ,aesthetic4         
,,vii  ,,analogy ,,between ,,the        
,,theoretic ,,and ,,the ,,practical     
,sidenote ,the two forms of practical   
activity4  ,the twofold grade of the    
theoretical activity1 aesthetic and     
logical1 has an important parallel in   
the practical activity1 which has not   
yet been placed in due relief4 ,the     
practical activity is also divided into 
a first and second degree1 the second   
implying the first4 ,the first practical
 degree is the simply useful or         
economical activity2 the second the     
moral activity4  ,economy is1 as it     
were1 the ,aesthetic of practical life2 
,morality its ,logic4      ,sidenote    
,the economically useful4  ,if this has 
not been clearly seen by philosophers2  
if its suitable place in the system of  
the mind has not been given to the      
economic activity1 and it has been left 
to wander in the prolegomena to         
treatises on political economy1 often   

uncertain and but slightly elaborated1  
this is due1 among other reasons1 to the
 fact that the useful or economic has   
been confused1 now with the concept of  
technique1 now with that of the         
egoistic4      ,sidenote ,distinction   
between the useful and the technical4   
,technique is certainly not a special   
activity of the spirit4 ,technique is   
knowledge2 or better1 it is knowledge   
itself1 in general1 that takes this     
name1 as we have seen1 in so far as it  
serves as basis for practical action4   
,knowledge which is not followed1 or is 
presumed to be not easily followed by   
practical action1 is called pure3 the   
same knowledge1 if effectively followed 
by action1 is called applied2 if it is  
presumed that it can be easily followed 
by the same action1 it is called        
technical or applied4 ,this word1 then1 
indicates a situation in which knowledge
 already is1 or easily can be found1 not
 a special form of knowledge4 ,so true  
is this1 that it would be altogether    

impossible to establish whether a given 
order of knowledge were1 intrinsically1 
pure or applied4 ,all knowledge1 however
 abstract and philosophical one may     
imagine it to be1 can be a guide to     
practical acts2 a theoretical error in  
the ultimate principles of morals can be
 reflected and always is reflected in   
some way1 in practical life4 ,one can   
only speak roughly and unscientifically 
of truths that are pure and of others   
that are applied4  ,the same knowledge  
which is called technical1 can also be  
called useful4 ,but the word useful1 in 
conformity with the criticism of        
judgments of value made above1 is to be 
understood as used here in a linguistic 
or metaphorical sense4 ,when we say that
 water is useful for putting out fire1  
the word useful is used in a            
non-scientific sense4 ,water thrown on  
the fire is the cause of its going out3 
this is the knowledge that serves for   
basis to the action1 let us say1 of     
firemen4 ,there is a link1 not of       

nature1 but of simple succession1       
between the useful action of the person 
who extinguishes the conflagration1 and 
this knowledge4 ,the technique of the   
effects of the water is the theoretical 
activity which precedes2 the action of  
him who extinguishes the fire is alone  
useful4      ,sidenote ,distinction     
between the useful and the egoistic4    
,some economists identify utility with  
egosm1 that is to say1 with merely      
economical action or desire1 with that  
which is profitable to the individual1  
in so far as individual1 without regard 
to and indeed in complete opposition to 
the moral law4 ,the egoistic is the     
immoral4 ,in this case ,economy would be
 a very strange science1 standing1 not  
beside1 but facing ,ethic1 like the     
devil facing ,god1 or at least like the 
advocatus diaboli in the processes of   
canonization4 ,such a conception of it  
is altogether inadmissible3 the science 
of immorality is implied in that of     
morality1 as the science of the false is

 implied in ,logic1 the science of the  
true1 and a science of ineffectual      
expression in ,aesthetic1 the science of
 successful expression4 ,if1 then1      
,economy were the scientific treatment  
of egoism1 it would be a chapter of     
,ethic1 or ,ethic itself2 because every 
moral determination implies1 at the same
 time1 a negation of its contrary4      
,further1 conscience tells us that to   
conduct oneself economically is not to  
conduct oneself egoistically2 that even 
the most morally scrupulous man must    
conduct himself usefully 7economically71
 if he does not wish to be inconclusive 
and1 therefore1 not truly moral4 ,if    
utility were egoism1 how could it be the
 duty of the altruist to behave like an 
egoist8      ,sidenote ,economic will   
and moral will4  ,if we are not         
mistaken1 the difficulty is solved in a 
manner perfectly analogous to that in   
which is solved the problem of the      
relations between the expression and the
 concept1 between ,aesthetic and ,logic4

  ,to will economically is to will an   
end2 to will morally is to will the     
rational end4 ,but whoever wills and    
acts morally1 cannot but will and act   
usefully 7economically74 ,how could he  
will the rational1 unless he willed it  
also as his particular end8             
,sidenote ,pure economicity4  ,the      
reciprocal is not true2 as it is not    
true in aesthetic science that the      
expressive fact must of necessity be    
linked with the logical fact4 ,it is    
possible to will economically without   
willing morally2 and it is possible to  
conduct oneself with perfect economic   
coherence1 while pursuing an end which  
is objectively irrational 7immoral71 or1
 better1 an end which would be so judged
 in a superior grade of consciousness4  
,examples of the economic1 without the  
moral character1 are the ,prince of     
,machiavelli1 ,caesar ,borgia1 or the   
,iago of ,shakespeare4 ,who can help    
admiring their strength of will1        
although their activity is only         

economic1 and is opposed to what we hold
 moral8 ,who can help admiring the ser  
,ciappelletto of ,boccaccio1 who1 even  
on his death-bed1 pursues and realizes  
his ideal of the perfect rascal1 making 
the small and timid little thieves who  
are present at his burlesque confession 
exclaim3 ,what manner of man is this1   
whose perversity1 neither age1 nor      
infirmity1 nor the fear of death1 which 
he sees at hand1 nor the fear of ,god1  
before whose judgment-seat he must stand
 in a little while1 have been able to   
remove1 nor to cause that he should not 
wish to die as he has lived8            
,sidenote ,the economic side of         
morality4  ,the moral man unites with   
the pertinacity and fearlessness of a   
,caesar ,borgia1 of an ,iago1 or of a   
ser ,ciappelletto1 the good will of the 
saint or of the hero4 ,or1 better1 good 
will would not be will1 and consequently
 not good1 if it did not possess1 in    
addition to the side which makes it     
good1 also that which makes it will4    

,thus a logical thought1 which does not 
succeed in expressing itself1 is not    
thought1 but at the most1 a confused    
presentiment of a thought yet to come4  
,it is not correct1 then1 to conceive of
 the amoral man as also the             
anti-economical man1 or to make of      
morality an element of coherence in the 
acts of life1 and therefore of          
economicity4 ,nothing prevents us from  
conceiving 7an hypothesis which is      
verified at least during certain periods
 and moments1 if not during whole       
lifetimes7 a man altogether without     
moral conscience4 ,in a man thus        
organized1 what for us is immorality is 
not so for him1 because it is not so    
felt4 ,the consciousness of the         
contradiction between what is desired as
 a rational end and what is pursued     
egoistically cannot be born in him4     
,this contradiction is anti-economicity4
 ,immoral conduct becomes also          
anti-economical only in the man who     
possesses moral conscience4 ,the moral  

remorse which is the proof of this1 is  
also economical remorse2 that is to say1
 pain at not having known how to will   
completely and to attain to that moral  
ideal which was willed at the first     
moment1 but was afterwards perverted by 
the passions4 ,video meliora proboque1  
deteriora sequor4 ,the video and the    
probo are here an initial will          
immediately contradicted and passed     
over4 ,in the man deprived of moral     
sense1 we must admit a remorse which is 
merely economic2 like that of a thief or
 of an assassin who should be attacked  
when on the point of robbing or of      
assassinating1 and should abstain from  
doing so1 not owing to a conversion of  
his being1 but owing to his             
impressionability and bewilderment1 or  
even owing to a momentary awakening of  
the moral consciousness4 ,when he has   
come back to himself1 that thief or     
assassin will regret and be ashamed of  
his inconsequence2 his remorse will not 
be due to having done wrong1 but to not 

having done it2 his remorse is1         
therefore1 economic1 not moral1 since   
the latter is excluded by hypothesis4   
,however1 a lively moral conscience is  
generally found among the majority of   
men1 and its total absence is a rare and
 perhaps non-existent monstrosity4 ,it  
may1 therefore1 be admitted1 that       
morality coincides with economicity in  
the conduct of life4      ,sidenote ,the
 merely economic and the error of the   
morally                indifferent4     
,there need be no fear lest the         
parallelism affirmed by us should       
introduce afresh into the category of   
the morally indifferent1 of that which  
is in truth action and volition1 but is 
neither moral nor immoral2 the category 
in sum of the licit and of the          
permissible1 which has always been the  
cause or mirror of ethical corruption1  
as is the case with ,jesuitical morality
 in which it dominated4 ,it remains     
quite certain that indifferent moral    
actions do not exist1 because moral     

activity pervades and must pervade every
 least volitional movement of man4 ,but 
this1 far from upsetting the            
parallelism1 confirms it4 ,do there     
exist intuitions which science and the  
intellect do not pervade and analyse1   
resolving them into universal concepts1 
or changing them into historical        
affirmations8 ,we have already seen that
 true science1 philosophy1 knows no     
external limits which bar its way1 as   
happens with the so-called natural      
sciences4 ,science and morality entirely
 dominate1 the one the aesthetic        
intuitions1 the other the economic      
volitions of man1 although neither of   
them can appear in the concrete1 save in
 the intuitive form as regards the one1 
in the economic as regards the other4   
,sidenote ,critique of utilitarianism   
and the reform of ,ethic and            
of ,economic4  ,this combined identity  
and difference of the useful and of the 
moral1 of the economic and of the ethic1
 explains the fortune enjoyed now and   

formerly by the utilitarian theory of   
,ethic4 ,it is in fact easy to discover 
and to show a utilitarian side in every 
moral action2 as it is easy to show an  
aesthetic side of every logical         
proposition4 ,the criticism of ethical  
utilitarianism cannot escape by denying 
this truth and seeking out absurd and   
inexistent examples of useless moral    
actions4 ,it must admit the utilitarian 
side and explain it as the concrete form
 of morality1 which consists of what is 
within this form4 ,utilitarians do not  
see this within4 ,this is not the place 
for a more ample development of such    
ideas4 ,ethic and ,economic cannot but  
be gainers1 as we have said of ,logic   
and ,aesthetic1 by a more exact         
determination of the relations that     
exist between them4 ,economic science is
 now rising to the animating concept of 
the useful1 as it strives to pass beyond
 the mathematical phase1 in which it is 
still entangled2 a phase which1 when it 
superseded historicism1 was in its turn 

a progress1 destroying a series of      
arbitrary distinctions and false        
theories of ,economic1 implied in the   
confusion of the theoretical with the   
historical4 ,with this conception1 it   
will be easy on the one hand to absorb  
and to verify the semi-philosophical    
theories of so-called pure economy1 and 
on the other1 by the introduction of    
successive complications and additions1 
and by passing from the philosophical to
 the empirical or naturalistic method1  
to include the particular theories of   
the political or national economy of the
 schools4      ,sidenote ,phenomenon and
 noumenon in practical activity4  ,as   
aesthetic intuition knows the phenomenon
 or nature1 and philosophic intuition   
the noumenon or spirit2 so economic     
activity wills the phenomenon or nature1
 and moral activity the noumenon or     
spirit4 ,the spirit which desires       
itself1 its true self1 the universal    
which is in the empirical and finite    
spirit3 that is the formula which       

perhaps defines the essence of morality 
with the least impropriety4 ,this will  
for the true self is absolute liberty4  
,,viii  ,,exclusion ,,of ,,other        
,,spiritual ,,forms       ,sidenote ,the
 system of the spirit4  ,in this summary
 sketch that we have given1 of the      
entire philosophy of the spirit in its  
fundamental moments1 the spirit is      
conceived as consisting of four moments 
or grades1 disposed in such a way that  
the theoretical activity is to the      
practical as is the first theoretical   
grade to the second theoretical1 and the
 first practical grade to the second    
practical4 ,the four moments imply one  
another regressively by their           
concretion4 ,the concept cannot be      
without expression1 the useful without  
the one and the other1 and morality     
without the three preceding grades4 ,if 
the aesthetic fact is alone independent1
 and the others more or less dependent1 
then the logical is the least so and the
 moral will the most4 ,moral intention  

operates on given theoretic bases1 which
 cannot be dispensed with1 save by that 
absurd practice1 the jesuitical         
direction of intention4 ,here people    
pretend to themselves not to know what  
at bottom they know perfectly well4     
,sidenote ,the forms of genius4  ,if the
 forms of human activity are four1 four 
also are the forms of genius4 ,geniuses 
in art1 in science1 in moral will or    
heroes1 have certainly always been      
recognized4 ,but the genius of pure     
,economic has met with opposition4 ,it  
is not altogether without reason that a 
category of bad geniuses or of geniuses 
of evil has been created4 ,the          
practical1 merely economic genius1 which
 is not directed to a rational end1     
cannot but excite an admiration mingled 
with alarm4 ,it would be a mere question
 of words1 were we to discuss whether   
the word genius should be applied only  
to creators of aesthetic expression1 or 
also to men of scientific research and  
of action4 ,to observe1 on the other    

hand1 that genius1 of whatever kind it  
be1 is always a quantitative conception 
and an empirical distinction1 would be  
to repeat what has already been         
explained as regards artistic genius4   
,sidenote ,non-existence of a fifth form
 of activity4 ,law2                     
sociality4  ,a fifth form of spiritual  
activity does not exist4 ,it would be   
easy to demonstrate how all the other   
forms1 either do not possess the        
character of activity1 or are verbal    
variants of the activities already      
examined1 or are complex and derived    
facts1 in which the various activities  
are mingled1 or are filled with special 
contents and contingent data4  ,the     
judicial fact1 for example1 considered  
as what is called objective law1 is     
derived both from the economic and from 
the logical activities4 ,law is a rule1 
a formula 7whether oral or written      
matters little here7 in which is        
contained an economic relation willed by
 an individual or by a collectivity4    

,this economic side at once unites it   
with and distinguishes it from moral    
activity4 ,take another example4        
,sociology 7among the many meanings the 
word bears in our times7 is sometimes   
conceived as the study of an original   
element1 which is called sociality4 ,now
 what is it that distinguishes          
sociality1 or the relations which are   
developed in a meeting of men1 not of   
subhuman beings1 if it be not just the  
various spiritual activities which exist
 among the former and which are supposed
 not to exist1 or to exist only in a    
rudimentary degree1 among the latter8   
,sociality1 then1 far from being an     
original1 simple1 irreducible           
conception1 is very complex and         
complicated4 ,this could be proved by   
the impossibility1 generally recognized1
 of enunciating a single sociological   
law1 properly so-called4 ,those that are
 improperly called by that name are     
revealed as either empirical historical 
observations1 or spiritual laws1 that is

 to say judgments1 into which are       
translated the conceptions of the       
spiritual activities2 when they are not 
simply empty and indeterminate          
generalizations1 like the so-called law 
of evolution4 ,sometimes1 too1 nothing  
more is understood by sociality than    
social rule1 and so law2 and thus       
sociology is confounded with the science
 or theory of law itself4 ,law1         
sociality1 and like terms1 are to be    
dealt with in a mode analogous to that  
employed by us in the consideration of  
historicity and technique4              
,sidenote ,religiosity4  ,it may seem   
fitting to form a different judgment as 
to religious activity4 ,but religion is 
nothing but knowledge1 and does not     
differ from its other forms and         
subforms4 ,for it is in truth and in    
turn either the expression of practical 
and ideal aspirations 7religious        
ideals71 or historical narrative        
7legend71 or conceptual science 7dogma74
  ,it can therefore be maintained with  

equal truth1 both that religion is      
destroyed by the progress of human      
knowledge1 and that it is always present
 there4 ,their religion was the whole   
patrimony of knowledge of primitive     
peoples3 our patrimony of knowledge is  
our religion4 ,the content has been     
changed1 bettered1 refined1 and it will 
change and become better and more       
refined in the future also2 but its     
function is always the same4 ,we do not 
know what use could be made of religion 
by those who wish to preserve it side by
 side with the theoretic activity of    
man1 with his art1 with his criticism1  
and with his philosophy4 ,it is         
impossible to preserve an imperfect and 
inferior kind of knowledge1 like        
religion1 side by side with what has    
surpassed and disproved it4             
,catholicism1 which is always coherent1 
will not tolerate a ,science1 a         
,history1 an ,ethic1 in contradiction to
 its views and doctrines4 ,the          
rationalists are less coherent4 ,they   

are disposed to allow a little space in 
their souls for a religion which is in  
contradiction with their whole theoretic
 world4  ,these affectations and        
religious susceptibilities of the       
rationalists of our times have their    
origin in the superstitious cult of the 
natural sciences4 ,these1 as we know and
 as is confessed by the mouth of their  
chief adepts1 are all surrounded by     
limits4 ,science having been wrongly    
identified with the so-called natural   
sciences1 it could be foreseen that the 
remainder would be asked of religion2   
that remainder with which the human     
spirit cannot dispense4 ,we are         
therefore indebted to materialism1 to   
positivism1 to naturalism for this      
unhealthy and often disingenuous        
reflowering of religious exaltation4    
,such things are the business of the    
hospital1 when they are not the business
 of the politician4      ,sidenote      
,metaphysic4  ,philosophy withdraws from
 religion all reason for existing1      

because it substitutes itself for       
religion4 ,as the science of the spirit1
 it looks upon religion as a phenomenon1
 a transitory historical fact1 a psychic
 condition that can be surpassed4       
,philosophy shares the domain of        
knowledge with the natural disciplines1 
with history and with art4 ,it leaves to
 the first1 narration1 measurement and  
classification2 to the second1 the      
chronicling of what has individually    
happened2 to the third1 the individually
 possible4 ,there is nothing left to    
share with religion4 ,for the same      
reason1 philosophy1 as the science of   
the spirit1 cannot be philosophy of the 
intuitive datum2 nor1 as has been seen1 
,philosophy of ,history1 nor ,philosophy
 of ,nature2 and therefore there cannot 
be a philosophic science of what is not 
form and universal1 but material and    
particular4 ,this amounts to affirming  
the impossibility of metaphysic4  ,the  
,method or ,logic of history followed   
the ,philosophy of history2 a gnoseology

 of the conceptions which are employed  
in the natural sciences succeeded       
natural philosophy4 ,what philosophy can
 study of the one is its mode of        
construction 7intuition1 perception1    
document1 probability1 etc472 of the    
others she can study the forms of the   
conceptions which appear in them 7space1
 time1 motion1 number1 types1 classes1  
etc474 ,philosophy1 which should become 
metaphysical in the sense above         
described1 would1 on the other hand1    
claim to compete with narrative history1
 and with the natural sciences1 which in
 their field are alone legitimate and   
effective4 ,such a competition becomes  
in fact a labour spoiling labour4 ,we   
are antimetaphysical in this sense1     
while yet declaring ourselves           
ultrametaphysical1 if by that word it be
 desired to claim and to affirm the     
function of philosophy as the           
autoconsciousness of the spirit1 as     
opposed to the merely empirical and     
classificatory function of the natural  

sciences4      ,sidenote ,mental        
imagination and the intuitive intellect4
  ,in order to maintain itself side by  
side with the sciences of the spirit1   
metaphysic has been obliged to assert   
the existence of a specific spiritual   
activity1 of which it would be the      
product4 ,this activity1 which in       
antiquity was called mental or superior 
imagination1 and in modern times more   
often intuitive intellect or            
intellectual intuition1 would unite in  
an altogether special form the          
characters of imagination and of        
intellect4 ,it would provide the method 
of passing1 by deduction or             
dialectically1 from the infinite to the 
finite1 from form to matter1 from the   
concept to the intuition1 from science  
to history1 operating by a method which 
should be at once unity and             
compenetration of the universal and the 
particular1 of the abstract and the     
concrete1 of intuition and of intellect4
 ,a faculty marvellous indeed and       

delightful to possess2 but we1 who do   
not possess it1 have no means of proving
 its existence4      ,sidenote ,mystical
 aesthetic4  ,intellectual intuition has
 sometimes been considered as the true  
aesthetic activity4 ,at others a not    
less marvellous aesthetic activity has  
been placed beside1 below1 or above it1 
a faculty altogether different from     
simple intuition4 ,the glories of this  
faculty have been sung1 and to it have  
been attributed the fact of art1 or at  
the least certain groups of artistic    
production1 arbitrarily chosen4 ,art1   
religion1 and philosophy have seemed in 
turn one only1 or three distinct        
faculties of the spirit1 now one1 now   
another of these being superior in the  
dignity assigned to each4  ,it is       
impossible to enumerate all the various 
attitudes assumed by this conception of 
,aesthetic1 which we will call mystical4
 ,we are here in the kingdom1 not of the
 science of imagination1 but of         
imagination itself1 which creates its   

world with the varying elements of the  
impressions and of the feelings4 ,let it
 suffice to mention that this mysterious
 faculty has been conceived1 now as     
practical1 now as a mean between the    
theoretic and the practical1 at others  
again as a theoretic grade together with
 philosophy and religion4      ,sidenote
 ,mortality and immortality of art4     
,the immortality of art has sometimes   
been deduced from this last conception  
as belonging with its sisters to the    
sphere of absolute spirit4 ,at other    
times1 on the other hand1 when religion 
has been looked upon as mortal and as   
dissolved in philosophy1 then the       
mortality1 even the actual death1 or at 
least the agony of art has been         
proclaimed4 ,these questions have no    
meaning for us1 because1 seeing that the
 function of art is a necessary grade of
 the spirit1 to ask if art can be       
eliminated is the same thing as asking  
if sensation or intelligence can be     
eliminated4 ,but metaphysic1 in the     

above sense1 since it transplants itself
 to an arbitrary world1 is not to be    
criticized in detail1 any more than one 
can criticize the botany of the garden  
of ,alcina or the navigation of the     
voyage of ,astolfo4 ,criticism can only 
be made by refusing to join the game2   
that is to say1 by rejecting the very   
possibility of metaphysic1 always in the
 sense above indicated4  ,as we do not  
admit intellectual intuition in         
philosophy1 we can also not admit its   
shadow or equivalent1 aesthetic         
intellectual intuition1 or any other    
mode by which this imaginary function   
may be called and represented4 ,we      
repeat again that we do not know of a   
fifth grade beyond the four grades of   
spirit which consciousness reveals to   
us4     ,,ix  ,,indivisibility ,,of     
,,expression ,,into ,,modes ,,or        
,,grades ,,and ,,critique ,,of          
,,rhetoric       ,sidenote ,the         
characteristics of art4  ,it is         
customary to give long enumerations of  

the characteristics of art4 ,having     
reached this point of the treatise1     
having studied the artistic function as 
spiritual activity1 as theoretic        
activity1 and as special theoretic      
activity 7intuitive71 we are able to    
discern that those various and copious  
descriptions mean1 when they mean       
anything at all1 nothing but a          
repetition of what may be called the    
qualities of the aesthetic function1    
generic1 specific1 and characteristic4  
,to the first of these are referred1 as 
we have already observed1 the           
characters1 or better1 the verbal       
variants of unity1 and of unity in      
variety1 those also of simplicity1 of   
originality1 and so on2 to the second of
 these1 the characteristics of truth1 of
 sincerity1 and the like2 to the third1 
the characteristics of life1 of         
vivacity1 of animation1 of concretion1  
of individuality1 of                    
characteristicality4 ,the words may vary
 yet more1 but they will not contribute 

anything scientifically new4 ,the       
results which we have shown have        
altogether exhausted the analysis of    
expression as such4      ,sidenote      
,inexistence of modes of expression4    
,but at this point1 the question as to  
whether there be various modes or grades
 of expression is still perfectly       
legitimate4 ,we have distinguished two  
grades of activity1 each of which is    
subdivided into two other grades1 and   
there is certainly1 so far1 no visible  
logical reason why there should not     
exist two or more modes of the          
aesthetic1 that is of expression4--,the 
only objection is that these modes do   
not exist4  ,for the present at least1  
it is a question of simple internal     
observation and of self consciousness4  
,one may scrutinize aesthetic facts as  
much as one will3 no formal differences 
will ever be found among them1 nor will 
the aesthetic fact be divisible into a  
first and a second degree4  ,this       
signifies that a philosophical          

classification of expressions is not    
possible4 ,single expressive facts are  
so many individuals1 of which the one   
cannot be compared with the other1 save 
generically1 in so far as each is       
expression4 ,to use the language of the 
schools1 expression is a species which  
cannot in its turn perform the functions
 of genus4 ,impressions1 that is to say 
contents1 vary2 every content differs   
from every other content1 because       
nothing in life repeats itself2 and the 
continuous variation of contents follows
 the irreducible variety of expressive  
facts1 the aesthetic syntheses of the   
impressions4      ,sidenote             
,impossibility of translations4  ,a     
corollary of this is the impossibility  
of translations1 in so far as they      
pretend to effect the transference of   
one expression into another1 like a     
liquid poured from a vase of a certain  
shape into a vase of another shape4 ,we 
can elaborate logically what we have    
already elaborated in aesthetic form    

only2 but we cannot reduce that which   
has already possessed its aesthetic form
 to another form also aesthetic4 ,in    
truth1 every translation either         
diminishes and spoils2 or it creates a  
new expression1 by putting the former   
back into the crucible and mixing it    
with other impressions belonging to the 
pretended translator4 ,in the former    
case1 the expression always remains one1
 that of the original1 the translation  
being more or less deficient1 that is to
 say1 not properly expression3 in the   
other case1 there would certainly be two
 expressions1 but with two different    
contents4 ,ugly faithful ones or        
faithless beauties is a proverb that    
well expresses the dilemma with which   
every translator is faced4 ,in aesthetic
 translations1 such as those which are  
word for word or interlinear1 or        
paraphrastic translations1 are to be    
looked upon as simple commentaries on   
the original4      ,sidenote ,critique  
of rhetorical categories4  ,the division

 of expressions into various classes is 
known in literature by the name of      
theory of ornament or of rhetorical     
categories4 ,but similar attempts at    
classification in the other forms of art
 are not wanting3 suffice it to mention 
the realistic and symbolic forms1 spoken
 of in painting and sculpture4  ,the    
scientific value to be attached in      
,aesthetic and in aesthetic criticism to
 these distinctions of realistic and    
symbolic1 of style and absence of style1
 of objective and subjective1 of classic
 and romantic1 of simple and ornate1 of 
proper and metaphorical1 of the fourteen
 forms of metaphor1 of the figures of   
word and of sentence1 and further of    
pleonasm1 of ellipse1 of inversion1 of  
repetition1 of synonyms and homonyms1   
and so on2 is nil or altogether         
negative4 ,to none of these terms and   
distinctions can be given a satisfactory
 aesthetic definition4 ,those that have 
been attempted1 when they are not       
obviously erroneous1 are words devoid of

 sense4 ,a typical example of this is   
the very common definition of metaphor  
as of another word used in place of the 
word itself4 ,now why give oneself this 
trouble8 ,why take the worse and longer 
road when you know the shorter and      
better road8 ,perhaps1 as is generally  
said1 because the correct word is in    
certain cases not so expressive as the  
so-called incorrect word or metaphor8   
,but in that case the metaphor becomes  
exactly the right word1 and the         
so-called right word1 if it were used1  
would be but little expressive and      
therefore most improper4 ,similar       
observations of elementary good sense   
can be made regarding the other         
categories1 as1 for example1 the generic
 one of the ornate4 ,one can ask oneself
 how an ornament can be joined to       
expression4 ,externally8 ,in that case  
it must always remain separate4         
,internally8 ,in that case1 either it   
does not assist expression and mars it2 
or it does form part of it and is not   

ornament1 but a constituent element of  
expression1 indistinguishable from the  
whole4  ,it is not necessary to dwell   
upon the harm done by these             
distinctions4 ,rhetoric has often been  
declaimed against1 but although there   
has been rebellion against its          
consequences1 its principles have been  
carefully preserved1 perhaps in order to
 show proof of philosophic coherence4   
,rhetoric has contributed1 if not to    
make dominant in literary production1 at
 least to justify theoretically1 that   
particular mode of writing ill which is 
called fine writing or writing according
 to rhetoric4      ,sidenote ,empirical 
sense of the rhetorical categories4     
,the terms above mentioned would never  
have gone beyond the schools1 where we  
all of us learned them 7certain of never
 finding the opportunity of using them  
in strictly aesthetic discussions1 or   
even of doing so jocosely and with a    
comic intention71 save when occasionally
 employed in one of the following       

significations3 as verbal variants of   
the aesthetic concept2 as indications of
 the anti-aesthetic1 or1 finally 7and   
this is their most important use71 in a 
sense which is no longer aesthetic and  
literary1 but merely logical4           
,sidenote ,use of these categories as   
synonyms of the aesthetic               
fact4  ,expressions are not divisible   
into classes1 but some are successful1  
others half-successful1 others failures4
 ,there are perfect and imperfect1      
complete and deficient expressions4 ,the
 terms already cited1 then1 sometimes   
indicate the successful expression1     
sometimes the various forms of the      
failures4 ,but they are employed in the 
most inconstant and capricious manner1  
for it often happens that the same word 
serves1 now to proclaim the perfect1 now
 to condemn the imperfect4  ,an instance
 of this is found when someone1         
criticizing two pictures--the one       
without inspiration1 in which the author
 has copied natural objects without     

intelligence2 the other inspired1 but   
without obvious likeness to existing    
objects--calls the first realistic1 the 
second symbolic4 ,others1 on the        
contrary1 pronounce the word realistic  
about a strongly felt picture           
representing a scene of ordinary life1  
while they talk of symbolic in reference
 to another picture representing but a  
cold allegory4 ,it is evident that in   
the first case symbolic means artistic1 
and realistic inartistic1 while in the  
second1 realistic is synonymous with    
artistic and symbolic with inartistic4  
,how1 then1 can we be astonished when   
some hotly maintain that the true art   
form is the symbolic1 and that the      
realistic is inartistic2 others1 that   
the realistic is the artistic1 and the  
symbolic the inartistic8 ,we cannot but 
grant that both are right1 since each   
makes use of the same words in senses so
 diverse4  ,the great disputes about the
 classic and the romantic are frequently
 based upon such equivokes4 ,sometimes  

the former was understood as the        
artistically perfect1 and the second as 
lacking balance and imperfect2 at       
others1 the classic was cold and        
artificial1 the romantic sincere1 warm1 
efficacious1 and truly expressive4 ,thus
 it was always possible to take the side
 of the classic against the romantic1 or
 of the romantic against the classic4   
,the same thing happens as regards the  
word style4 ,sometimes it is affirmed   
that every writer should have style4    
,here style is synonymous with form or  
expression4 ,sometimes the form of a    
code of laws or of a mathematical work  
is said to be devoid of style4 ,here the
 error of admitting diverse modes of    
expression is again committed1 of       
admitting an ornate and a naked form of 
expression1 because1 since style is     
form1 the code and the mathematical     
treatise must also1 strictly speaking1  
have each its style4 ,at other times1   
one hears the critics blaming someone   
for having too much style or for writing

 a style4 ,here it is clear that style  
signifies1 not the form1 nor a mode of  
it1 but improper and pretentious        
expression1 which is one form of the    
inartistic4      ,sidenote ,their use to
 indicate various aesthetic             
imperfections4  ,passing to the second1 
not altogether insignificant1 use of    
these words and distinctions1 we        
sometimes find in the examination of a  
literary composition such remarks as    
follow3 here is a pleonasm1 here an     
ellipse1 there a metaphor1 here again a 
synonym or an equivoke4 ,this means that
 in one place is an error consisting of 
using a larger number of words than is  
necessary 7pleonasm72 that in another   
the error arises from too few having    
been used 7ellipse71 elsewhere from the 
use of an unsuitable word 7metaphor71 or
 from the use of two words which seem to
 express two different things1 where    
they really express the same thing      
7synonym72 or that1 on the contrary1 it 
arises from having employed one which   

seems to express the same thing where it
 expresses two different things         
7equivoke74 ,this pejorative and        
pathological use of the terms is1       
however1 more uncommon than the         
preceding4      ,sidenote ,their use in 
a sense transcending aesthetic1 in the  
service of science4  ,finally1 when     
rhetorical terminology possesses no     
aesthetic signification similar or      
analogous to those passed in review1 and
 yet one is aware that it is not void of
 meaning and designates something that  
deserves to be noted1 it is then used in
 the service of logic and of science4   
,if it be granted that a concept used in
 a scientific sense by a given writer is
 expressed with a definite term1 it is  
natural that other words formed by that 
writer as used to signify the same      
concept1 or incidentally made use of by 
him1 become1 in respect to the          
vocabulary fixed upon by him as true1   
metaphors1 synecdoches1 synonyms1       
elliptic forms1 and the like4 ,we1 too1 

in the course of this treatise1 have    
several times made use of1 and intend   
again to make use of such terms1 in     
order to make clear the sense of the    
words we employ1 or may find employed4  
,but this proceeding1 which is of value 
in the disquisitions of scientific and  
intellectual criticism1 has none        
whatever in aesthetic criticism4 ,for   
science there exist appropriate words   
and metaphors4 ,the same concept may be 
psychologically formed in various       
circumstances and therefore be expressed
 with various intuitions4 ,when the     
scientific terminology of a given writer
 has been established1 and one of these 
modes has been fixed as correct1 then   
all other uses of it become improper or 
tropical4 ,but in the aesthetic fact    
exist only appropriate words4 ,the same 
intuition can only be expressed in one  
way1 precisely because it is an         
intuition and not a concept4            
,sidenote ,rhetoric in the schools4     
,some1 while they admit the aesthetic   

insufficiency of the rhetorical         
categories1 yet make a reserve as       
regards their utility and the service   
they are supposed to render1 especially 
in schools of literature4 ,we confess   
that we fail to understand how error and
 confusion can educate the mind to      
logical clearness1 or aid the teaching  
of a science which they disturb and     
obscure4 ,perhaps it may be desired to  
say that they can aid memory and        
learning as empirical classes1 as was   
admitted above for literary and artistic
 styles4 ,but there is another purpose  
for which the rhetorical categories     
should certainly continue to be admitted
 to the schools3 to be criticized there4
 ,we cannot simply forget the errors of 
the past1 and truth cannot be kept      
alive1 save by making it fight against  
error4 ,unless a notion of the          
rhetorical categories be given1         
accompanied by a suitable criticism of  
these1 there is a risk of their         
springing up again4 ,for they are       

already springing up with certain       
philologists1 disguised as most recent  
psychological discoveries4              
,sidenote ,the resemblances of          
expressions4  ,it would seem as though  
we wished to deny all bond of likeness  
among themselves between expressions and
 works of art4 ,the likenesses exist1   
and owing to them1 works of art can be  
arranged in this or that group4 ,but    
they are likenesses such as are observed
 among individuals1 and can never be    
rendered with abstract definitions4     
,that is to say1 these likenesses have  
nothing to do with identification1      
subordination1 co-ordination1 and the   
other relations of concepts4 ,they      
consist wholly in what is called a      
family likeness1 and are connected with 
those historical conditions existing at 
the birth of the various works1 or in an
 affinity of soul between the artists4  
,sidenote ,the relative possibility of  
translations4  ,it is in these          
resemblances that lies the relative     

possibility of translations4 ,this does 
not consist of the reproduction of the  
same original expressions 7which it     
would be vain to attempt71 but in the   
measure that expressions are given1 more
 or less nearly resembling those4 ,the  
translation that passes for good is an  
approximation which has original value  
as a work of art and can stand by       
itself4     ,x  ,,aesthetic ,,feelings  
,,and ,,the ,,distinction ,,between     
,,the ,,ugly ,,and ,,the ,,beautiful    
,passing on to the study of more complex
 concepts1 where the aesthetic activity 
is found in conjunction with other      
orders of facts1 and showing the mode of
 this union or complication1 we find    
ourselves at once face to face with the 
concept of feeling and with the feelings
 which are called aesthetic4            
,sidenote ,various significances of the 
word feeling4  ,the word feeling is one 
of the richest in meanings4 ,we have    
already had occasion to meet with it    
once1 among those used to designate the 

spirit in its passivity1 the matter or  
content of art1 and also as synonym of  
impressions4 ,once again 7and then the  
meaning was altogether different71 we   
have met with it as designating the     
non-logical and non-historical character
 of the aesthetic fact1 that is to say  
pure intuition1 a form of truth which   
defines no concept and states no fact4  
,sidenote ,feeling as activity4  ,but   
feeling is not here understood in either
 of these two senses1 nor in the others 
in which it has nevertheless been used  
to designate other cognoscitive forms of
 spirit4 ,its meaning here is that of a 
special activity1 of non-cognoscitive   
nature1 but possessing its two poles1   
positive and negative1 in pleasure and  
pain4 ,this activity has always greatly 
embarrassed philosophers1 who have      
attempted either to deny it as an       
activity1 or to attribute it to nature  
and to exclude it from spirit4 ,both    
solutions bristle with difficulties1 and
 these are of such a kind that the      

solutions prove themselves finally      
unacceptable to anyone who examines them
 with care4 ,for of what could a        
non-spiritual activity consist1 an      
activity of nature1 when we have no     
other knowledge of activity save as     
spiritual1 and of spirituality save as  
activity8 ,nature is1 in this case1 by  
definition1 the merely passive1 inert1  
mechanical and material4 ,on the other  
hand1 the negation of the character of  
activity to feeling is energetically    
disproved by those very poles of        
pleasure and of pain which appear in it 
and manifest activity in its            
concreteness1 and1 we will say1 all     
aquiver4      ,sidenote ,identification 
of feeling with economic activity4      
,this critical conclusion ought to place
 us in the greatest embarrassment1 for  
in the sketch of the system of the      
spirit given above1 we have left no room
 for the new activity1 of which we are  
now obliged to recognize the existence4 
,but activity of feeling1 if it be      

activity1 is not specially new4 ,it has 
already had its place assigned to it in 
the system which we have sketched1      
where1 however1 it has been indicated   
under another name1 as economic         
activity4 ,what is called the activity  
of feeling is nothing but that more     
elementary and fundamental practical    
activity1 which we have distinguished   
from ethical activity1 and made to      
consist of the appetite and desire for  
some individual end1 without any moral  
determination4      ,sidenote ,critique 
of hedonism4  ,if feeling has been      
sometimes considered as organic or      
natural activity1 this has happened     
precisely because it does not coincide  
either with logical1 aesthetic1 or      
ethical activity4 ,looked at from the   
standpoint of these three 7which were   
the only ones admitted71 it has seemed  
to lie outside the true and real spirit1
 the spirit in its aristocracy1 and to  
be almost a determination of nature and 
of the soul1 in so far as it is nature4 

,thus the thesis1 several times         
maintained1 that the aesthetic activity1
 like the ethical and intellectual      
activities1 is not feeling1 becomes at  
once completely proved4 ,this thesis was
 inexpugnable1 when sensation had       
already been reduced confusedly and     
implicitly to economic volition4 ,the   
view which has been refuted is known by 
the name of hedonism4 ,for hedonism1 all
 the various forms of the spirit are    
reduced to one1 which thus itself also  
loses its own distinctive character and 
becomes something turbid and mysterious1
 like the shades in which all cows are  
black4 ,having effected this reduction  
and mutilation1 the hedonists naturally 
do not succeed in seeing anything else  
in any activity but pleasure and pain4  
,they find no substantial difference    
between the pleasure of art and that of 
an easy digestion1 between the pleasure 
of a good action and that of breathing  
the fresh air with wide-expanded lungs4 
,sidenote ,feeling as a concomitant to  

every form of activity4  ,but if the    
activity of feeling in the sense here   
defined must not be substituted for all 
the other forms of spiritual activity1  
we have not said that it cannot         
accompany them4 ,indeed it accompanies  
them of necessity1 because they are all 
in close relation1 both with one another
 and with the elementary volitional     
form4 ,therefore each of them has for   
concomitants individual volitions and   
volitional pleasures and pains which are
 known as feeling4 ,but we must not     
confound what is concomitant1 with the  
principal fact1 and take the one for the
 other4 ,the discovery of the truth1 or 
the satisfaction of a moral duty        
fulfilled1 produces in us a joy which   
makes our whole being vibrate1 for1 by  
attaining to those forms of spiritual   
activity1 it attains at the same time   
that to which it was practically        
tending1 as to its end1 during the      
effort4 ,nevertheless1 economic or      
hedonistic satisfaction1 ethical        

satisfaction1 aesthetic satisfaction1   
intellectual satisfaction1 remain always
 distinct1 even when in union4  ,thus is
 solved at the same time the            
much-debated question1 which has seemed1
 not wrongly1 a matter of life or death 
for aesthetic science1 namely1 whether  
the feeling and the pleasure precede or 
follow1 are cause or effect of the      
aesthetic fact4 ,we must enlarge this   
question1 to include the relation       
between the various spiritual forms1 and
 solve it in the sense that in the unity
 of the spirit one cannot talk of cause 
and effect and of what comes first and  
what follows it in time4  ,and once the 
relation above exposed is established1  
the statements1 which it is customary to
 make1 as to the nature of aesthetic1   
moral1 intellectual1 and even1 as is    
sometimes said1 economic feelings1 must 
also fall4 ,in this last case1 it is    
clear that it is a question1 not of two 
terms1 but of one1 and the quest of     
economic feeling can be but that same   

one concerning the economic activity4   
,but in the other cases also1 the search
 can never be directed to the           
substantive1 but to the adjective3      
aesthetic1 morality1 logic1 explain the 
colouring of the feelings as aesthetic1 
moral1 and intellectual1 while feeling1 
studied alone1 will never explain those 
refractions4      ,sidenote ,meaning of 
certain ordinary distinctions of        
feelings4  ,a further consequence is1   
that we can free ourselves from the     
distinction between values or feelings  
of value1 and feelings that are merely  
hedonistic and without value2 also from 
other similar distinctions1 like those  
between disinterested feelings and      
interested feelings1 between objective  
feelings and the others that are not    
objective but simply subjective1 between
 feelings of approval and others of mere
 pleasure 7,gefallen and ,vergngen of   
the ,germans74 ,those distinctions      
strove hard to save the three spiritual 
forms1 which have been recognised as the

 triad of the ,true1 the ,good1 and the 
,beautiful1 from confusion with the     
fourth form1 still unknown1 yet         
insidious through its indeterminateness1
 and mother of scandals4 ,for us this   
triad has finished its task1 because we 
are capable of reaching the distinction 
far more directly1 by welcoming even the
 selfish1 subjective1 merely pleasurable
 feelings1 among the respectable forms  
of the spirit2 and where formerly       
antitheses were conceived of by         
ourselves and others1 between value and 
feelings1 as between spirituality and   
naturality1 henceforth we see nothing   
but difference between value and value4 
,sidenote ,value and disvalue3 the      
contraries and their union4  ,as has    
already been said1 the economic feeling 
or activity reveals itself as divided   
into two poles1 positive and negative1  
pleasure and pain1 which we can now     
translate into useful1 and useless or   
hurtful4 ,this bipartition has already  
been noted above1 as a mark of the      

active character of feeling1 precisely  
because the same bipartition is found in
 all forms of activity4 ,if each of     
these is a value1 each has opposed to it
 antivalue or disvalue4 ,absence of     
value is not sufficient to cause        
disvalue1 but activity and passivity    
must be struggling between themselves1  
without the one getting the better of   
the other2 hence the contradiction1 and 
the disvalue of the activity that is    
embarrassed1 contested1 or interrupted4 
,value is activity that unfolds itself  
freely3 disvalue is its contrary4  ,we  
will content ourselves with this        
definition of the two terms1 without    
entering into the problem of the        
relation between value and disvalue1    
that is1 between the problem of         
contraries4 7,are these to be thought of
 dualistically1 as two beings or two    
orders of beings1 like ,ormuzd and      
,ahriman1 angels and devils1 enemies to 
one another2 or as a unity1 which is    
also contrariety87 ,this definition of  

the two terms will be sufficient for our
 purpose1 which is to make clear        
aesthetic activity in particular1 and   
one of the most obscure and disputed    
concepts of ,aesthetic which arises at  
this point3 the concept of the          
,beautiful4      ,sidenote ,the         
,beautiful as the value of expression1  
or expression                and nothing
 more4  ,aesthetic1 intellectual1       
economic1 and ethical values and        
disvalues are variously denominated in  
current speech3 beautiful1 true1 good1  
useful1 just1 and so on--these words    
designate the free development of       
spiritual activity1 action1 scientific  
research1 artistic production1 when they
 are successful2 ugly1 false1 bad1      
useless1 unbecoming1 unjust1 inexact    
designate embarrassed activity1 the     
product of which is a failure4 ,in      
linguistic usage1 these denominations   
are being continually shifted from one  
order of facts to another1 and from this
 to that4 ,beautiful1 for instance1 is  

said not only of a successful           
expression1 but also of a scientific    
truth1 of an action successfully        
achieved1 and of a moral action3 thus we
 talk of an intellectual beauty1 of a   
beautiful action1 of a moral beauty4    
,many philosophers1 especially          
aestheticians1 have lost their heads in 
their pursuit of these most varied uses3
 they have entered an inextricable and  
impervious verbal labyrinth4 ,for this  
reason it has hitherto seemed convenient
 studiously to avoid the use of the word
 beautiful to indicate successful       
expression4 ,but after all the          
explanations that have been given1 and  
all danger of misunderstanding being now
 dissipated1 and since1 on the other    
hand1 we cannot fail to recognize that  
the prevailing tendency1 alike in       
current speech and in philosophy1 is to 
limit the meaning of the vocable        
beautiful altogether to the aesthetic   
value1 we may define beauty as          
successful expression1 or better1 as    

expression and nothing more1 because    
expression1 when it is not successful1  
is not expression4      ,sidenote ,the  
ugly1 and the elements of beauty which  
compose it4  ,consequently1 the ugly is 
unsuccessful expression4 ,the paradox is
 true1 that1 in works of art that are   
failures1 the beautiful is present as   
unity and the ugly as multiplicity4     
,thus1 with regard to works of art that 
are more or less failures1 we talk of   
qualities1 that is to say of those parts
 of them that are beautiful4 ,we do not 
talk thus of perfect works4 ,it is in   
fact impossible to enumerate their      
qualities or to designate those parts of
 them that are beautiful4 ,in them there
 is complete fusion3 they have but one  
quality4 ,life circulates in the whole  
organism3 it is not withdrawn into      
certain parts4  ,the qualities of works 
that are failures may be of various     
degrees4 ,they may even be very great4  
,the beautiful does not possess degrees1
 for there is no conceiving a more      

beautiful1 that is1 an expressive that  
is more expressive1 an adequate that is 
more than adequate4 ,ugliness1 on the   
other hand1 does possess degrees1 from  
the rather ugly 7or almost beautiful7 to
 the extremely ugly4 ,but if the ugly   
were complete1 that is to say1 without  
any element of beauty1 it would for that
 very reason cease to be ugly1 because  
in it would be absent the contradiction 
which is the reason of its existence4   
,the disvalue would become nonvalue2    
activity would give place to passivity1 
with which it is not at war1 save when  
there effectively is war4      ,sidenote
 ,illusions that there exist expressions
 which are neither                      
beautiful nor ugly4  ,and because the   
distinctive consciousness of the        
beautiful and of the ugly is based on   
the contrasts and contradictions in     
which aesthetic activity is developed1  
it is evident that this consciousness   
becomes attenuated to the point of      
disappearing altogether1 as we descend  

from the more complicated to the more   
simple and to the simplest cases of     
expression4 ,from this arises the       
illusion that there are expressions     
which are neither beautiful nor ugly1   
those which are obtained without        
sensible effort and appear easy and     
natural being so considered4            
,sidenote ,true aesthetic feelings and  
concomitant or accidental               
feelings4  ,the whole mystery of the    
beautiful and the ugly is reduced to    
these henceforth most easy definitions4 
,should any one object that there exist 
perfect aesthetic expressions before    
which no pleasure is felt1 and others1  
perhaps even failures1 which give him   
the greatest pleasure1 it is necessary  
to advise him to pay great attention1 as
 regards the aesthetic fact1 to that    
only which is truly aesthetic pleasure4 
,aesthetic pleasure is sometimes        
reinforced by pleasures arising from    
extraneous facts1 which are only        
casually found united with it4 ,the poet

 or any other artist affords an instance
 of purely aesthetic pleasure1 during   
the moment in which he sees 7or has the 
intuition of7 his work for the first    
time2 that is to say1 when his          
impressions take form and his           
countenance is irradiated with the      
divine joy of the creator4 ,on the other
 hand1 a mixed pleasure is experienced  
by any one who goes to the theatre1     
after a day's work1 to witness a comedy3
 when the pleasure of rest and          
amusement1 and that of laughingly       
snatching a nail from the gaping coffin1
 is accompanied at a certain moment by  
real aesthetic pleasure1 obtained from  
the art of the dramatist and of the     
actors4 ,the same may be said of the    
artist who looks upon his labour with   
pleasure1 when it is finished1          
experiencing1 in addition to the        
aesthetic pleasure1 that very different 
one which arises from the thought of    
self-love satisfied1 or of the economic 
gain which will come to him from his    

work4 ,examples could be multiplied4    
,sidenote ,critique of apparent         
feelings4  ,a category of apparent      
aesthetic feelings has been formed in   
modern ,aesthetic4 ,these have nothing  
to do with the aesthetic sensations of  
pleasure arising from the form1 that is 
to say from the work of art4 ,on the    
contrary1 they arise from the content of
 the work of art4 ,it has been observed 
that artistic representations arouse    
pleasure and pain in their infinite     
variety and gradations4 ,we tremble with
 anxiety1 we rejoice1 we fear1 we laugh1
 we weep1 we desire1 with the personages
 of a drama or of a romance1 with the   
figures in a picture1 or with the melody
 of music4 ,but these feelings are not  
those that would give occasion to the   
real fact outside art2 that is to say1  
they are the same in quality1 but they  
are quantitively an attenuation4        
,aesthetic and apparent pleasure and    
pain are slight1 of little depth1 and   
changeable4 ,we have no need to treat of

 these apparent feelings1 for the good  
reason that we have already amply       
discussed them2 indeed1 we have treated 
of them alone4 ,what are ever feelings  
that become apparent or manifest1 but   
feelings objectified1 intensified1      
expressed8 ,and it is natural that they 
do not trouble and agitate us           
passionately1 as do those of real life1 
because those were matter1 these are    
form and activity2 those true and proper
 feelings1 these intuitions and         
expressions4 ,the formula1 then1 of     
apparent feelings is nothing but a      
tautology4 ,the best that can be done is
 to run the pen through it4     ,,xi    
,,critique ,,of ,,aesthetic ,,hedonism  
,as we are opposed to hedonism in       
general1 that is to say1 to the theory  
which is based on the pleasure and pain 
intrinsic to ,economy and accompanies   
every other form of activity1           
confounding the content and that which  
contains it1 and fails to recognize any 
process but the hedonistic2 so we are   

opposed to aesthetic hedonism in        
particular1 which looks upon the        
aesthetic at any rate1 if not also upon 
all other activities1 as a simple fact  
of feeling1 and confounds the           
pleasurable of expression1 which is the 
beautiful1 with the pleasurable and     
nothing more1 and with the pleasurable  
of all sorts4      ,sidenote ,critique  
of the beautiful as that which pleases  
the                higher senses4  ,the 
aesthetic-hedonistic point of view has  
been presented in several forms4 ,one of
 the most ancient conceives the         
beautiful as that which pleases the     
sight and hearing1 that is to say1 the  
so-called superior senses4 ,when        
analysis of aesthetic facts first began1
 it was1 in fact1 difficult to avoid the
 mistake of thinking that a picture and 
a piece of music are impressions of     
sight or of hearing3 it was and is an   
indisputable fact that the blind man    
does not enjoy the picture1 nor the deaf
 man the music4 ,to show1 as we have    

shown1 that the aesthetic fact does not 
depend upon the nature of the           
impressions1 but that all sensible      
impressions can be raised to aesthetic  
expression and that none need of        
necessity be so raised1 is an idea which
 presents itself only when all the other
 ways out of the difficulty have been   
tried4 ,but whoso imagines that the     
aesthetic fact is something pleasing to 
the eyes or to the hearing1 has no line 
of defence against him who proceeds     
logically to identify the beautiful with
 the pleasurable in general1 and        
includes cooking in ,aesthetic1 or1 as  
some positivist has done1 the viscerally
 beautiful4      ,sidenote ,critique of 
the theory of play4  ,the theory of play
 is another form of aesthetic hedonism4 
,the conception of play has sometimes   
helped towards the realization of the   
actifying character of the expressive   
fact3 man 7it has been said7 is not     
really man1 save when he begins to play2
 that is to say1 when he frees himself  

from natural and mechanical causality   
and operates spiritually2 and his first 
game is art4 ,but since the word play   
also means that pleasure which arises   
from the expenditure of the exuberant   
energy of the organism 7that is to say1 
from a practical act71 the consequence  
of this theory has been1 that every game
 has been called an aesthetic fact1 and 
that the aesthetic function has been    
called a game1 in so far as it is       
possible to play with it1 for1 like     
science and every other thing1          
,aesthetic can be made part of a game4  
,but morality cannot be provoked at the 
intention of playing1 on the ground that
 it does not consent2 on the contrary1  
it dominates and regulates the act of   
playing itself4      ,sidenote ,critique
 of the theories of sexuality and of the
 triumph4  ,finally1 there have been    
some who have tried to deduce the       
pleasure of art from the reaction of the
 sexual organs4 ,there are some very    
modern aestheticians who place the      

genesis of the aesthetic fact in the    
pleasure of conquering1 of triumphing1  
or1 as others add1 in the desire of the 
male1 who wishes to conquer the female4 
,this theory is seasoned with much      
anecdotal erudition1 ,heaven knows of   
what degree of credibility6 on the      
customs of savage peoples4 ,but in very 
truth there was no necessity for such   
important aid1 for one often meets in   
ordinary life poets who adorn themselves
 with their poetry1 like cocks that     
raise their crests1 or turkeys that     
spread their tails4 ,but he who does    
such things1 in so far as he does them1 
is not a poet1 but a poor devil of a    
cock or turkey4 ,the conquest of woman  
does not suffice to explain the art     
fact4 ,it would be just as correct to   
term poetry economic1 because there have
 been aulic and stipendiary poets1 and  
there are poets the sale of whose verses
 helps them to gain their livelihood1 if
 it does not altogether provide it4     
,however1 this definition has not failed

 to win over some zealous neophytes of  
historical materialism4      ,sidenote  
,critique of the ,aesthetic of the      
sympathetic4 ,meaning in                
it of content and form4  ,another less  
vulgar current of thought considers     
,aesthetic to be the science of the     
sympathetic1 of that with which we      
sympathize1 which attracts1 rejoices1   
gives us pleasure and excites           
admiration4 ,but the sympathetic is     
nothing but the image or representation 
of what pleases4 ,and1 as such1 it is a 
complex fact1 resulting from a constant 
element1 the aesthetic element of       
representation1 and from a variable     
element1 the pleasing in its infinite   
forms1 arising from all the various     
classes of values4  ,in ordinary        
language1 there is sometimes a feeling  
of repugnance at calling an expression  
beautiful1 which is not an expression of
 the sympathetic4 ,hence the continual  
contrast between the point of view of   
the aesthetician or of the art critic   

and that of the ordinary person1 who    
cannot succeed in persuading himself    
that the image of pain and of turpitude 
can be beautiful1 or1 at least1 can be  
beautiful with as much right as the     
pleasing and the good4  ,the opposition 
could be solved by distinguishing two   
different sciences1 one of expression   
and the other of the sympathetic1 if the
 latter could be the object of a special
 science2 that is to say1 if it were    
not1 as has been shown1 a complex fact4 
,if predominance be given to the        
expressive fact1 it becomes a part of   
,aesthetic as science of expression2 if 
to the pleasurable content1 we fall back
 to the study of facts which are        
essentially hedonistic 7utilitarian71   
however complicated they may appear4    
,the origin1 also1 of the connexion     
between content and form is to be sought
 for in the ,aesthetic of the           
sympathetic1 when this is conceived as  
the sum of two values4      ,sidenote   
,aesthetic hedonism and moralism4  ,in  

all the doctrines just now discussed1   
the art fact is posited as merely       
hedonistic4 ,but this view cannot be    
maintained1 save by uniting it with a   
philosophic hedonism that is complete   
and not partial1 that is to say1 with a 
hedonism which does not admit any other 
form of value4 ,hardly has this         
hedonistic conception of art been       
received by philosophers1 who admit one 
or more spiritual values1 of truth or of
 morality1 than the following question  
must necessarily be asked3 ,what should 
be done with art8 ,to what use should it
 be put8 ,should a free course be       
allowed to its pleasures8 ,and if so1 to
 what extent8 ,the question of the end  
of art1 which in the ,aesthetic of      
expression would be a contradiction of  
terms1 here appears in place1 and       
altogether logical4      ,sidenote ,the 
rigoristic negation1 and the pedagogic  
justification                of art4    
,now it is evident that1 admitting the  
premisses1 but two solutions of such a  

question can be given1 the one          
altogether negative1 the other          
restrictive4 ,the first1 which we shall 
call rigoristic or ascetic1 appears     
several times1 although not frequently1 
in the history of ideas4 ,it looks upon 
art as an inebriation of the senses1 and
 therefore1 not only useless1 but       
harmful4 ,according to this theory1     
then1 it is necessary to drive it with  
all our strength from the human soul1   
which it troubles4 ,the other solution1 
which we shall call pedagogic or        
moralistico-utilitarian1 admits art1 but
 only in so far as it concurs with the  
end of morality2 in so far as it assists
 with innocent pleasure the work of him 
who leads to the true and the good2 in  
so far as it sprinkles with dulcet balm 
the sides of the vase of wisdom and of  
morality4  ,it is well to observe that  
it would be an error to divide this     
second view into intellectualist and    
moralistico-utilitarian1 according to   
whether the end of leading to the true  

or to what is practically good1 be      
assigned to art4 ,the task of           
instructing1 which is imposed upon it1  
precisely because it is an end which is 
sought after and advised1 is no longer  
merely a theoretical fact1 but a        
theoretical fact become the material for
 practical action2 it is not1 therefore1
 intellectualism1 but pedagogism and    
practicism4 ,nor would it be more exact 
to subdivide the pedagogic view into the
 pure utilitarian and the               
moralistico-utilitarian2 because those  
who admit only the individually useful  
7the desire of the individual71         
precisely because they are absolute     
hedonists1 have no motive for seeking an
 ulterior justification for art4  ,but  
to enunciate these theories at the point
 to which we have attained is to confute
 them4 ,we therefore restrict ourselves 
to observing that in the pedagogic      
theory of art is to be found another of 
the reasons why it has been erroneously 
claimed that the content of art should  

be chosen with a view to certain        
practical effects4      ,sidenote       
,critique of pure beauty4  ,the thesis1 
re-echoed by the artists1 that art      
consists of pure beauty1 has often been 
brought forward against hedonistic and  
pedagogic ,aesthetic3 ,heaven places    
,all our joy in pure beauty1 and the    
,verse is everything4 ,if it is wished  
that this should be understood in the   
sense that art is not to be confounded  
with sensual pleasure1 that is1 in fact1
 with utilitarian practicism1 nor with  
moralism1 then our ,aesthetic also must 
be permitted to adorn itself with the   
title of ,aesthetic of pure beauty4 ,but
 if 7as is often the case7 something    
mystical and transcendental be meant by 
this1 something that is unknown to our  
poor human world1 or something spiritual
 and beatific1 but not expressive1 we   
must reply that while applauding the    
conception of a beauty1 free of all that
 is not the spiritual form of           
expression1 we are yet unable to        

conceive a beauty altogether purified of
 expression1 that is to say1 separated  
from itself4     ,,xii  ,,the           
,,aesthetic ,,of ,,the ,,sympathetic    
,,and ,,pseudo-,,aesthetic ,,concepts   
,sidenote ,pseudo-aesthetic concepts1   
and the aesthetic of the                
sympathetic4  ,the doctrine of the      
sympathetic 7very often animated and    
seconded in this by the capricious      
metaphysical and mystical ,aesthetic1   
and by that blind tradition which       
assumes an intimate connection between  
things by chance treated of together by 
the same authors and in the same books71
 has introduced and rendered familiar in
 systems of ,aesthetic1 a series of     
concepts1 of which one example suffices 
to justify our resolute expulsion of    
them from our own treatise4  ,their     
catalogue is long1 not to say           
interminable3 tragic1 comic1 sublime1   
pathetic1 moving1 sad1 ridiculous1      
melancholy1 tragi-comic1 humoristic1    
majestic1 dignified1 serious1 grave1    

imposing1 noble1 decorous1 graceful1    
attractive1 piquant1 coquettish1        
idyllic1 elegiac1 cheerful1 violent1    
ingenuous1 cruel1 base1 horrible1       
disgusting1 dreadful1 nauseating2 the   
list can be increased at will4  ,since  
that doctrine took as its special object
 the sympathetic1 it was naturally      
unable to neglect any of the varieties  
of this1 or any of the combinations or  
gradations which lead at last from the  
sympathetic to the antipathetic4 ,and   
seeing that the sympathetic content was 
held to be the beautiful and the        
antipathetic the ugly1 the varieties    
7tragic1 comic1 sublime1 pathetic1 etc47
 constituted for it the shades and      
gradations intervening between the      
beautiful and the ugly4      ,sidenote  
,critique of the theory of the ugly in  
art and of the                ugly      
surmounted4  ,having enumerated and     
defined1 as well as it could1 the chief 
among these varieties1 the ,aesthetic of
 the sympathetic set itself the problem 

of the place to be assigned to the ugly 
in art4 ,this problem is without meaning
 for us1 who do not recognize any       
ugliness save the anti-aesthetic or     
inexpressive1 which can never form part 
of the aesthetic fact1 being1 on the    
contrary1 its antithesis4 ,but the      
question for the doctrine which we are  
here criticizing was to reconcile in    
some way the false and defective idea of
 art from which it started1 reduced to  
the representation of the agreeable1    
with effective art1 which occupies a far
 wider field4 ,hence the artificial     
attempt to settle what examples of the  
ugly 7antipathetic7 could be admitted in
 artistic representation1 and for what  
reasons1 and in what ways4  ,the answer 
was3 that the ugly is admissible1 only  
when it can be overcome1 an             
unconquerable ugliness1 such as the     
disgusting or the nauseating1 being     
altogether excluded4 ,further1 that the 
duty of the ugly1 when admitted in art1 
is to contribute towards heightening the

 effect of the beautiful 7sympathetic71 
by producing a series of contrasts1 from
 which the pleasurable shall issue more 
efficacious and pleasure-giving4 ,it is1
 in fact1 a common observation that     
pleasure is more vividly felt when ,it  
has been preceded by abstinence or by   
suffering4 ,thus the ugly in art was    
looked upon as the servant of the       
beautiful1 its stimulant and condiment4 
,that special theory of hedonistic      
refinement1 which used to be pompously  
called the surmounting of the ugly1     
falls with the general theory of the    
sympathetic2 and with it the enumeration
 and the definition of the concepts     
mentioned above remain completely       
excluded from ,aesthetic4 ,for          
,aesthetic does not recognize the       
sympathetic or the antipathetic ,in     
their varieties1 but only the spiritual 
activity of the representation4         
,sidenote ,pseudo-aesthetic concepts    
belong to ,psychology4  ,however1 the   
large space which1 as we have said1     

those concepts have hitherto occupied in
 aesthetic treatises makes opportune a  
rather more copious explanation of what 
they are4 ,what will be their lot8 ,as  
they are excluded from ,aesthetic1 in   
what other part of ,philosophy will they
 be received8  ,truly1 in none4 ,all    
those concepts are without philosophical
 value4 ,they are nothing but a series  
of classes1 which can be bent in the    
most various ways and multiplied at     
pleasure1 to which it is sought to      
reduce the infinite complications and   
shadings of the values and disvalues of 
life4 ,of those classes1 there are some 
that have an especially positive        
significance1 like the beautiful1 the   
sublime1 the majestic1 the solemn1 the  
serious1 the weighty1 the noble1 the    
elevated2 others have a significance    
especially negative1 like the ugly1 the 
horrible1 the dreadful1 the tremendous1 
the monstrous1 the foolish1 the         
extravagant2 in others prevails a mixed 
significance1 as is the case with the   

comic1 the tender1 the melancholy1 the  
humorous1 the tragi-comic4 ,the         
complications are infinite1 because the 
individuations are infinite2 hence it is
 not possible to construct the concepts1
 save in the arbitrary and approximate  
manner of the natural sciences1 whose   
duty it is to make as good a plan as    
possible of that reality which they     
cannot exhaust by enumeration1 nor      
understand and surpass speculatively4   
,and since ,psychology is the           
naturalistic discipline1 which          
undertakes to construct types and plans 
of the spiritual processes of man 7of   
which1 in fact1 it is always            
accentuating in our day the merely      
empirical and descriptive character71   
these concepts do not appertain to      
,aesthetic1 nor1 in general1 to         
,philosophy4 ,they must simply be handed
 over to ,psychology4      ,sidenote    
,impossibility of rigoristic definitions
 of them4  ,as is the case with all     
other psychological constructions1 so is

 it with those concepts3 no rigorous    
definitions are possible2 and           
consequently the one cannot be deduced  
from the other and they cannot be       
connected in a system1 as has1          
nevertheless1 often been attempted1 at  
great waste of time and without result4 
,but it can be claimed as possible to   
obtain1 apart from philosophical        
definitions recognised as impossible1   
empirical definitions1 universally      
acceptable as true4 ,since there does   
not exist a unique definition of a given
 fact1 but innumerable definitions can  
be given of it1 according to the cases  
and the objects for which they are made1
 so it is clear that if there were only 
one1 and that the true one1 this would  
no longer be an empirical1 but a        
rigorous and philosophical definition4  
,speaking exactly1 every time that one  
of the terms to which we have referred  
has been employed1 or any other of the  
innumerable series1 a definition of it  
has at the same time been given1        

expressed or understood4 ,and each one  
of these definitions has differed       
somewhat from the others1 in some       
particular1 perhaps of very small       
importance1 such as tacit reference to  
some individual fact or other1 which    
thus became especially an object of     
attention and was raised to the position
 of a general type4 ,so it happens that 
not one of such definitions satisfies   
him who hears it1 nor does it satisfy   
even him who constructs it4 ,for1 the   
moment after1 this same individual finds
 himself face to face with a new case1  
for which he recognizes that his        
definition is more or less insufficient1
 ill-adapted1 and in need of            
remodelling4 ,it is necessary1          
therefore1 to leave writers and speakers
 free to define the sublime or the      
comic1 the tragic or the humoristic1 on 
every occasion1 as they please and as   
may seem suitable to their purpose4 ,and
 if you insist upon obtaining an        
empirical definition of universal       

validity1 we can but submit this        
one3--,the sublime 7comic1 tragic1      
humoristic1 etc47 is everything that is 
or will be so called by those who have  
employed or shall employ this word4     
,sidenote ,examples3 definitions of the 
sublime1 the comic1 and                 
the humoristic4  ,what is the sublime8  
,the unexpected affirmation of an       
ultra-powerful moral force3 that is one 
definition4 ,but that other definition  
is equally good1 which also recognizes  
the sublime where the force which       
declares itself is an ultra-powerful1   
but immoral and destructive will4 ,both 
remain vague and assume no precise form1
 until they are applied to a concrete   
case1 which makes clear what is here    
meant by ultra-powerful1 and what by    
unexpected4 ,they are quantitative      
concepts1 but falsely quantitative1     
since there is no way of measuring them2
 they are1 at bottom1 metaphors1        
emphatic phrases1 or logical            
tautologies4 ,the humorous will be      

laughter mingled with tears1 bitter     
laughter1 the sudden passage from the   
comic to the tragic1 and from the tragic
 to the comic1 the comic romantic1 the  
inverted sublime1 war declared against  
every attempt at insincerity1 compassion
 which is ashamed to lament1 the mockery
 not of the fact1 but of the ideal      
itself2 and whatever else may better    
please1 according as it is desired to   
get a view of the physiognomy of this or
 that poet1 of this or that poem1 which 
is1 in its uniqueness1 its own          
definition1 and though momentary and    
circumscribed1 yet the sole adequate4   
,the comic has been defined as the      
displeasure arising from the perception 
of a deformity immediately followed by a
 greater pleasure arising from the      
relaxation of our psychical forces1     
which were strained in anticipation of a
 perception whose importance was        
foreseen4 ,while listening to a         
narrative1 which1 for example1 should   
describe the magnificent and heroic     

purpose of a definite person1 we        
anticipate in imagination the occurrence
 of an action both heroic and           
magnificent1 and we prepare ourselves to
 receive it1 by straining our psychic   
forces4 ,if1 however1 in a moment1      
instead of the magnificent and heroic   
action1 which the premises and the tone 
of the narrative had led us to expect1  
by an unexpected change there occur a   
slight1 mean1 foolish action1 unequal to
 our expectation1 we have been deceived1
 and the recognition of the deceit      
brings with it an instant of            
displeasure4 ,but this instant is as it 
were overcome by the one immediately    
following1 in which we are able to      
discard our strained attention1 to free 
ourselves from the provision of psychic 
energy accumulated and1 henceforth      
superfluous1 to feel ourselves          
reasonable and relieved of a burden4    
,this is the pleasure of the comic1 with
 its physiological equivalent1 laughter4
 ,if the unpleasant fact that has       

occurred should painfully affect our    
interests1 pleasure would not arise1    
laughter would be at once choked1 the   
psychic energy would be strained and    
overstrained by other more serious      
perceptions4 ,if1 on the other hand1    
such more serious perceptions do not    
arise1 if the whole loss be limited to a
 slight deception of our foresight1 then
 the supervening feeling of our psychic 
wealth affords ample compensation for   
this very slight displeasure4--,this1   
stated in a few words1 is one of the    
most accurate modern definitions of the 
comic4 ,it boasts of containing1        
justified or corrected1 the manifold    
attempts to define the comic1 from      
,hellenic antiquity to our own day4 ,it 
includes ,plato's dictum in the         
,philebus1 and ,aristotle's1 which is   
more explicit4 ,the latter looks upon   
the comic as an ugliness without pain4  
,it contains the theory of ,hobbes1 who 
placed it in the feeling of individual  
superiority2 of ,kant1 who saw in it a  

relaxation of tension2 and those of     
other thinkers1 for whom it was the     
contrast between great and small1       
between the finite and the infinite4    
,but on close observation1 the analysis 
and definition above given1 although    
most elaborate and rigorous in          
appearance1 yet enunciates              
characteristics which are applicable1   
not only to the comic1 but to every     
spiritual process2 such as the          
succession of painful and agreeable     
moments and the satisfaction arising    
from the consciousness of force and of  
its free development4 ,the              
differentiation here given is that of   
quantitative determinations1 to which   
limits cannot be assigned4 ,they remain 
vague phrases1 attaining to some meaning
 from their reference to this or that   
single comic fact4 ,if such definitions 
be taken too seriously1 there happens to
 them what ,jean ,paul ,richter said of 
all the definitions of the comic3       
namely1 that their sole merit is to be  

themselves comic and to produce1 in     
reality1 the fact1 which they vainly try
 to define logically4 ,and who will ever
 determine logically the dividing line  
between the comic and the non-comic1    
between smiles and laughter1 between    
smiling and gravity2 who will cut into  
clearly divided parts that ever-varying 
continuity into which life melts8       
,sidenote ,relations between those      
concepts and aesthetic concepts4  ,the  
facts1 classified as well as possible in
 the above-quoted psychological         
concepts1 bear no relation to the       
artistic fact1 beyond the generic that  
all of them1 in so far as they designate
 the material of life1 can be           
represented by art2 and the other       
accidental relation1 that aesthetic     
facts also may sometimes enter into the 
processes described1 as in the          
impression of the sublime that the work 
of a ,titanic artist such as ,dante or  
,shakespeare may produce1 and that of   
the comic produced by the effort of a   

dauber or of a scribbler4  ,the process 
is external to the aesthetic fact ,in   
this case also2 for the only feeling    
linked with that is the feeling of      
aesthetic value and disvalue1 of the    
beautiful and of the ugly4 ,the         
,dantesque ,farinata is aesthetically   
beautiful1 and nothing but beautiful3   
if1 in addition1 the force of will of   
this personage appear sublime1 or the   
expression that ,dante gives him1 by    
reason of his great genius1 seem sublime
 by comparison with that of a less      
energetic poet1 all this is not a matter
 for aesthetic consideration4 ,this     
consists always and only in adequation  
to truth2 that is1 in beauty4     ,,xiii
  ,,the ,,so-,,called ,,physically      
,,beautiful ,,in ,,nature ,,and ,,art   
,sidenote ,aesthetic activity and       
physical concepts4  ,aesthetic activity 
is distinct from practical activity but 
when it expresses itself is always      
physical accompanied by practical       
activity4 ,hence its utilitarian or     

hedonistic side1 and the pleasure and   
pain1 which are1 as it were1 the        
practical echo of aesthetic values and  
disvalues1 of the beautiful and of the  
ugly4 ,but this practical side of the   
aesthetic activity has also1 in its     
turn1 a physical or psychophysical      
accompaniment1 which consists of sounds1
 tones1 movements1 combinations of lines
 and colours1 and so on4  ,does it      
really possess this side1 or does it    
only seem to possess it1 as the result  
of the construction which we raise in   
physical science1 and of the useful and 
arbitrary methods1 which we have shown  
to be proper to the empirical and       
abstract sciences8 ,our reply cannot be 
doubtful1 that is1 it cannot be         
affirmative as to the first of the two  
hypotheses4  ,however1 it will be better
 to leave it at this point in suspense1 
for it is not at present necessary to   
prosecute this line of inquiry any      
further4 ,the mention already made must 
suffice to prevent our having spoken of 

the physical element as of something    
objective and existing1 for reasons of  
simplicity and adhesion to ordinary     
language1 from leading to hasty         
conclusions as to the concepts and the  
connexion between spirit and nature4    
,sidenote ,expression in the aesthetic  
sense1 and expression in                
the naturalistic sense4  ,it is         
important to make clear that as the     
existence of the hedonistic side in     
every spiritual activity has given rise 
to the confusion between the aesthetic  
activity and the useful or pleasurable1 
so the existence1 or1 better1 the       
possibility of constructing this        
physical side1 has generated the        
confusion between aesthetic expression  
and expression in the naturalistic      
sense2 between a spiritual fact1 that is
 to say1 and a mechanical and passive   
fact 7not to say1 between a concrete    
reality and an abstraction or fiction74 
,in common speech1 sometimes it is the  
words of the poet that are called       

expressions1 the notes of the musician1 
or the figures of the painter2 sometimes
 the blush which is wont to accompany   
the feeling of shame1 the pallor        
resulting from fear1 the grinding of the
 teeth proper to violent anger1 the     
glittering of the eyes1 and certain     
movements of the muscles of the mouth1  
which reveal cheerfulness4 ,a certain   
degree of heat is also said to be the   
expression of fever1 as the falling of  
the barometer is of rain1 and even that 
the height of the rate of exchange      
expresses the discredit of the          
paper-money of a ,state1 or social      
discontent the approach of a revolution4
 ,one can well imagine what sort of     
scientific results would be attained by 
allowing oneself to be governed by      
linguistic usage and placing in one     
sheaf facts so widely different4 ,but   
there is1 in fact1 an abyss between a   
man who is the prey of anger with all   
its natural manifestations1 and another 
man who expresses it aesthetically2     

between the aspect1 the cries1 and the  
contortions of one who is tortured with 
sorrow at the loss of a dear one1 and   
the words or song with which the same   
individual portrays his torture at      
another moment2 between the distortion  
of emotion and the gesture of the actor4
 ,darwin's book on the expression of the
 feelings in man and animals does not   
belong to ,aesthetic2 because there is  
nothing in common between the science of
 spiritual expression and a ,semiotic1  
whether it be medical1 meteorological1  
political1 physiognomic1 or chiromantic4
  ,expression in the naturalistic sense 
simply lacks expression in the spiritual
 sense1 that is to say1 the             
characteristic itself of activity and of
 spirituality1 and therefore the        
bipartition into poles of beauty and of 
ugliness4 ,it is nothing more than a    
relation between cause and effect1 fixed
 by the abstract intellect4 ,the        
complete process of aesthetic production
 can be symbolized in four steps1 which 

are3 a1 impressions2 b1 expression or   
spiritual aesthetic synthesis2 c1       
hedonistic accompaniment1 or pleasure of
 the beautiful 7aesthetic pleasure72 d1 
translation of the aesthetic fact into  
physical phenomena 7sounds1 tones1      
movements1 combinations of lines and    
colours1 etc474 ,anyone can see that the
 capital point1 the only one that is    
properly speaking aesthetic and truly   
real1 is in that b1 which is lacking to 
the mere manifestation or naturalistic  
construction1 metaphorically also called
 expression4  ,the expressive process is
 exhausted when those four steps have   
been taken4 ,it begins again with new   
impressions1 a new aesthetic synthesis1 
and relative accompaniments4            
,sidenote ,intuitions and memory4       
,expressions or representations follow  
and expel one another4 ,certainly1 this 
passing away1 this disassociation1 is   
not perishing1 it is not total          
elimination3 nothing of what is born    
dies with that complete death which     

would be identical with never having    
been born4 ,though all things pass away1
 yet none can die4 ,the representations 
which we have forgotten1 also persist in
 some way in our spirit1 for without    
them we could not explain acquired      
habits and capacities4 ,thus1 the       
strength of life lies in this apparent  
forgetting3 one forgets what has been   
absorbed and what life has superseded4  
,but many other things1 many other      
representations1 are still efficacious  
elements in the actual processes of our 
spirit2 and it is incumbent on us not to
 forget them1 or to be capable of       
recalling them when necessity demands   
them4 ,the will is always vigilant in   
this work of preservation1 for it aims  
at preserving 7so to say7 the greater   
and more fundamental part of all our    
riches4 ,certainly its vigilance is not 
always sufficient4 ,memory1 we know1    
leaves or betrays us in various ways4   
,for this very reason1 the vigilant will
 excogitates expedients1 which help     

memory in its weakness1 and are its     
aids4      ,sidenote ,the production of 
aids to memory4  ,we have already       
explained how these aids are possible4  
,expressions or representations are1 at 
the same time1 practical facts1 which   
are also called physical facts1 in so   
far as to the physical belongs the task 
of classifying them and reducing them to
 types4 ,now it is clear1 that if we can
 succeed in making those facts in some  
way permanent1 it will always be        
possible 7other conditions remaining    
equal7 to reproduce in us1 by perceiving
 it1 the already produced expression or 
intuition4  ,if that in which the       
practical concomitant acts1 or 7to use  
physical terms7 the movements have been 
isolated and made in some sort          
permanent1 be called the object or      
physical stimulus1 and if it be         
designated by the letter e2 then the    
process of reproduction will take place 
in the following order3 e1 the physical 
stimulus2 d-b1 perceptions of physical  

facts 7sounds1 tones1 mimic1            
combinations of lines and colours1      
etc471 which form together the aesthetic
 synthesis1 already produced2 c1 the    
hedonistic accompaniment1 which is also 
reproduced4  ,and what are those        
combinations of words which are called  
poetry1 prose1 poems1 novels1 romances1 
tragedies or comedies1 but physical     
stimulants of reproduction 7the e       
stage72 what are those combinations of  
sound which are called operas1          
symphonies1 sonatas2 and what those of  
lines and of colours1 which are called  
pictures1 statues1 architecture8 ,the   
spiritual energy of memory1 with the    
assistance of those physical facts above
 mentioned1 makes possible the          
preservation and the reproduction of the
 intuitions produced1 often so          
laboriously1 by ourselves and by others4
 ,if the physiological organism1 and    
with it memory1 become weakened2 if the 
monuments of art be destroyed2 then all 
the aesthetic wealth1 the fruit of the  

labours of many generations1 becomes    
lessened and rapidly disappears4        
,sidenote ,the physically beautiful4    
,monuments of art1 which are the        
stimulants of aesthetic reproduction1   
are called beautiful things or the      
physically beautiful4 ,this combination 
of words constitutes a verbal paradox1  
because the beautiful is not a physical 
fact2 it does not belong to things1 but 
to the activity of man1 to spiritual    
energy4 ,but henceforth it is clear     
through what wanderings and what        
abbreviations1 physical things and      
facts1 which are simply aids to the     
reproduction of the beautiful1 end by   
being called1 elliptically1 beautiful   
things and physically beautiful4 ,and   
now that we have made the existence of  
this ellipse clear1 we shall ourselves  
make use of it without hesitation4      
,sidenote ,content and form3 another    
meaning4  ,the intervention of the      
physically beautiful serves to explain  
another meaning of the words content and

 form1 as employed by aestheticians4    
,some call content the internal fact or 
expression 7which is for us already     
form71 and they call form the marble1   
the colours1 the rhythm1 the sounds 7for
 us form no longer72 thus they look upon
 the physical fact as the form1 which   
may or may not be joined to the content4
 ,this serves to explain another aspect 
of what is called aesthetic ugliness4   
,he who has nothing definite to express 
may try to hide his internal emptiness  
with a flood of words1 with sounding    
verse1 with deafening polyphony1 with   
painting that dazzles the eye1 or by    
collocating great architectonic masses1 
which arrest and disturb1 although1 at  
bottom1 they convey nothing4 ,ugliness1 
then1 is the arbitrary1 the             
charlatanesque2 and1 in reality1 if the 
practical will do not intervene in the  
theoretic function1 there may be absence
 of beauty1 but never effective presence
 of the ugly4      ,sidenote ,natural   
and artificial beauty4  ,physical beauty

 is wont to be divided into natural and 
artificial beauty4 ,thus we reach one of
 the facts1 which has given great labour
 to thinkers3 the beautiful in nature4  
,these words often designate simply     
facts of practical pleasure4 ,he alludes
 to nothing aesthetic who calls a       
landscape beautiful where the eye rests 
upon verdure1 where bodily motion is    
easy1 and where the warm sun-ray        
envelops and caresses the limbs4 ,but it
 is nevertheless indubitable1 that on   
other occasions the adjective beautiful1
 applied to objects and scenes existing 
in nature1 has a completely aesthetic   
signification4  ,it has been observed1  
that in order to enjoy natural objects  
aesthetically1 we should withdraw them  
from their external and historical      
reality1 and separate their simple      
appearance or origin from existence2    
that if we contemplate a landscape with 
our head between our legs1 in such a way
 as to remove ourselves from our wonted 
relations with it1 the landscape appears

 as an ideal spectacle2 that nature is  
beautiful only for him who contemplates 
her with the eye of the artist2 that    
zoologists and botanists do not         
recognize beautiful animals and flowers2
 that natural beauty is discovered 7and 
examples of discovery are the points of 
view1 pointed out by men of taste and   
imagination1 and to which more or less  
aesthetic travellers and excursionists  
afterwards have recourse in pilgrimage1 
whence a more or less collective        
suggestion72 that1 without the aid of   
the imagination1 no part of nature is   
beautiful1 and that with such aid the   
same natural object or fact is now      
expressive1 according to the disposition
 of the soul1 now insignificant1 now    
expressive of one definite thing1 now of
 another1 sad or glad1 sublime or       
ridiculous1 sweet or laughable2 finally1
 that natural beauty1 which an artist   
would not to some extent correct1 does  
not exist4  ,all these observations are 
most just1 and confirm the fact that    

natural beauty is simply a stimulus to  
aesthetic reproduction1 which           
presupposes previous production4        
,without preceding aesthetic intuitions 
of the imagination1 nature cannot arouse
 any at all4 ,as regards natural beauty1
 man is like the mythical ,narcissus at 
the fountain4 ,they show further that   
since this stimulus is accidental1 it   
is1 for the most part1 imperfect or     
equivocal4 ,leopardi said that natural  
beauty is rare1 scattered1 and fugitive4
 ,every one refers the natural fact to  
the expression which is in his mind4    
,one artist is1 as it were1 carried away
 by a laughing landscape1 another by a  
rag-shop1 another by the pretty face of 
a young girl1 another by the squalid    
countenance of an old ruffian4 ,perhaps 
the first will say that the rag-shop and
 the ugly face of the old ruffian are   
disgusting2 the second1 that the        
laughing landscape and the face of the  
young girl are insipid4 ,they may       
dispute for ever2 but they will never   

agree1 save when they have supplied     
themselves with a sufficient dose of    
aesthetic knowledge1 which will enable  
them to recognize that they are both    
right4 ,artificial beauty1 created by   
man1 is a much more ductile and         
efficacious aid to reproduction4        
,sidenote ,mixed beauty4  ,in addition  
to these two classes1 aestheticians also
 sometimes talk in their treatises of a 
mixed beauty4 ,of what is it a mixture8 
,just of natural and artificial4 ,whoso 
fixes and externalizes1 operates with   
natural materials1 which he does not    
create1 but combines and transforms4 ,in
 this sense1 every artificial product is
 a mixture of nature and artifice2 and  
there would be no occasion to speak of a
 mixed beauty1 as of a special category4
 ,but it happens that1 in certain cases1
 combinations already given in nature   
can be used a great deal more than in   
others2 as1 for instance1 when we design
 a beautiful garden and include in our  
design groups of trees or ponds which   

are already there4 ,on other occasions  
externalization is limited by the       
impossibility of producing certain      
effects artificially4 ,thus we may mix  
the colouring matters1 but we cannot    
create a powerful voice or a personage  
and an appearance appropriate to this or
 that personage of a drama4 ,we must    
therefore seek for them among things    
already existing1 and make use of them  
when we find them4 ,when1 therefore1 we 
adopt a great number of combinations    
already existing in nature1 such as we  
should not be able to produce           
artificially if they did not exist1 the 
result is called mixed beauty4          
,sidenote ,writings4  ,we must          
distinguish from artificial beauty those
 instruments of reproduction called     
writings1 such as alphabets1 musical    
notes1 hieroglyphics1 and all           
pseudo-languages1 from the language of  
flowers and flags1 to the language of   
patches 7so much the vogue in the       
society of the eighteenth century74     

,writings are not physical facts which  
arouse directly impressions answering to
 aesthetic expressions2 they are simple 
indications of what must be done in     
order to produce such physical facts4 ,a
 series of graphic signs serves to      
remind us of the movements which we must
 execute with our vocal apparatus in    
order to emit certain definite sounds4  
,if1 through practice1 we become able to
 hear the words without opening our     
mouths and 7what is much more difficult7
 to hear the sounds by running the eye  
down the page of the music1 all this    
does not alter anything of the nature of
 the writings1 which are altogether     
different from direct physical beauty4  
,no one calls the book which contains   
the ,divine ,comedy1 or the portfolio   
which contains ,don ,giovanni1 beautiful
 in the same sense as the block of      
marble which contains ,michael ,angelo's
 ,moses1 or the piece of coloured wood  
which contains the ,transfiguration are 
metaphorically called beautiful4 ,both  

serve for the reproduction of the       
beautiful1 but the former by a far      
longer and far more indirect route than 
the latter4      ,sidenote ,the         
beautiful as free and not free4         
,another division of the beautiful1     
which is still found in treatises1 is   
that into free and not free4 ,by        
beauties that are not free1 are         
understood those objects which have to  
serve a double purpose1 extra-aesthetic 
and aesthetic 7stimulants of            
intuitions72 and since it appears that  
the first purpose limits and impedes the
 second1 the beautiful object resulting 
therefrom has been considered as a      
beauty that is not free4  ,architectural
 works are especially cited2 and        
precisely for this reason1 has          
architecture often been excluded from   
the number of the so-called fine arts4  
,a temple must be above all things      
adapted to the use of a cult2 a house   
must contain all the rooms requisite for
 commodity of living1 and they must be  

arranged with a view to this commodity2 
a fortress must be a construction       
capable of resisting the attacks of     
certain armies and the blows of certain 
instruments of war4 ,it is therefore    
held that the architect's field is      
limited3 he may be able to embellish to 
some extent the temple1 the house1 the  
fortress2 but his hands are bound by the
 object of these buildings1 and he can  
only manifest that part of his vision of
 beauty in their construction which does
 not impair their extrinsic1 but        
fundamental1 objects4  ,other examples  
are taken from what is called art       
applied to industry4 ,plates1 glasses1  
knives1 guns1 and combs can be made     
beautiful2 but it is held that their    
beauty must not so far exceed as to     
prevent our eating from the plate1      
drinking from the glass1 cutting with   
the knife1 firing off the gun1 or       
combing one's hair with the comb4 ,the  
same is said of the art of printing3 a  
book should be beautiful1 but not to the

 extent of its being difficult or       
impossible to read it4      ,sidenote   
,critique of the beautiful that is not  
free4  ,in respect to all this1 we must 
observe1 in the first place1 that the   
external purpose1 precisely because it  
is such1 does not of necessity limit or 
trammel the other purpose of being a    
stimulus to aesthetic reproduction4     
,nothing1 therefore1 can be more        
erroneous than the thesis that          
architecture1 for example1 is by its    
nature not free and imperfect1 since it 
must also fulfil other practical        
objects4 ,beautiful architectural works1
 however1 themselves undertake to deny  
this by their simple presence4  ,in the 
second place1 not only are the two      
objects not necessarily in opposition2  
but1 we must add1 the artist always has 
the means of preventing this            
contradiction from taking place4 ,in    
what way8 ,by taking1 as the material of
 his intuition and aesthetic            
externalization1 precisely the          

destination of the object1 which serves 
a practical end4 ,he will not need to   
add anything to the object1 in order to 
make it the instrument of aesthetic     
intuitions3 it will be so1 if perfectly 
adapted to its practical purpose4       
,rustic dwellings and palaces1 churches 
and barracks1 swords and ploughs1 are   
beautiful1 not in so far as they are    
embellished and adorned1 but in so far  
as they express the purpose for which   
they were made4 ,a garment is only      
beautiful because it is quite suitable  
to a given person in given conditions4  
,the sword bound to the side of the     
warrior ,rinaldo by the amorous ,armida 
was not beautiful3 so adorned that it   
seemed a useless ornament1 not the      
warlike instrument of a warrior4 ,it was
 beautiful1 if you will1 in the eyes and
 imagination of the sorceress1 who loved
 her lover in this effeminate way4 ,the 
aesthetic fact can always accompany the 
practical fact1 because expression is   
truth4  ,it cannot1 however1 be denied  

that aesthetic contemplation sometimes  
hinders practical use4 ,for instance1 it
 is a quite common experience to find   
certain new things so well adapted to   
their purpose1 and yet so beautiful1    
that people occasionally feel scruples  
in maltreating them by using after      
contemplating them1 which amounts to    
consuming them4 ,it was for this reason 
that ,king ,frederick ,william of       
,prussia evinced repugnance to ordering 
his magnificent grenadiers1 so well     
suited for war1 to endure the strain of 
battle2 but his less aesthetic son1     
,frederick the ,great1 obtained from    
them excellent services4      ,sidenote 
,the stimulants of production4  ,it     
might be objected to the explanation of 
the physically beautiful as a simple    
adjunct for the reproduction of the     
internally beautiful1 that is to say1 of
 expressions1 that the artist creates   
his expressions by painting or by       
sculpturing1 by writing or by composing1
 and that therefore the physically      

beautiful1 instead of following1        
sometimes precedes the aesthetically    
beautiful4 ,this would be a somewhat    
superficial mode of understanding the   
procedure of the artist1 who never makes
 a stroke with his brush without having 
previously seen it with his imagination2
 and if he has not yet seen it1 he will 
make the stroke1 not in order to        
externalize his expression 7which does  
not yet exist71 but as though to have a 
rallying point for ulterior meditation  
and for internal concentration4 ,the    
physical point on which he leans is not 
the physically beautiful1 instrument of 
reproduction1 but what may be called a  
pedagogic means1 similar to retiring    
into solitude1 or to the many other     
expedients1 frequently very strange1    
adopted by artists and philosophers1 who
 vary in these according to their       
various idiosyncrasies4 ,the old        
aesthetician ,baumgarten advised poets  
to ride on horseback1 as a means of     
inspiration1 to drink wine in           

moderation1 and 7provided they were     
chaste7 to look at beautiful women4     
,,xiv  ,,mistakes ,,arising ,,from ,,the
 ,,confusion ,,between ,,physic ,,and   
,,aesthetic   ,it is necessary to       
mention a series of scientific mistakes 
which have arisen from the failure to   
understand the purely external relation 
between the aesthetic fact or artistic  
vision1 and the physical fact or        
instrument1 which serves as an aid to   
reproduce it4 ,we must here indicate the
 proper criticism1 which derives from   
what has already been said4             
,sidenote ,critique of aesthetic        
associationism  ,that form of           
associationism which identifies the     
aesthetic fact with the association of  
two images finds a place among these    
errors4 ,by what path has it been       
possible to arrive at such a mistake1   
against which our aesthetic             
consciousness1 which is a consciousness 
of perfect unity1 never of duality1     
rebels8 ,just because the physical and  

the aesthetic facts have been considered
 separately1 as two distinct images1    
which enter the spirit1 the one drawn   
forth from the other1 the one first and 
the other afterwards4 ,a picture is     
divided into the image of the picture   
and the image of the meaning of the     
picture2 a poem1 into the image of the  
words and the image of the meaning of   
the words4 ,but this dualism of images  
is non-existent3 the physical fact does 
not enter the spirit as an image1 but   
causes the reproduction of the image    
7the only image1 which is the aesthetic 
fact71 in so far as it blindly          
stimulates the psychic organism and     
produces an impression answering to the 
aesthetic expression already produced4  
,the efforts of the associationists 7the
 usurpers of to-day in the field of     
,aesthetic7 to emerge from the          
difficulty1 and to reaffirm in some way 
the unity which has been destroyed by   
their principle of associationism1 are  
highly instructive4 ,some maintain that 

the image called back again is          
unconscious2 others1 leaving            
unconsciousness alone1 hold that1 on the
 contrary1 it is vague1 vaporous1       
confused1 thus reducing the force of the
 aesthetic fact to the weakness of bad  
memory4 ,but the dilemma is inexorable3 
either keep association and give up     
unity1 or keep unity and give up        
association4 ,no third way out of the   
difficulty exists4      ,sidenote       
,critique of aesthetic physic4  ,from   
the failure to analyze so-called natural
 beauty thoroughly1 and to recognize    
that it is simply an incident of        
aesthetic reproduction1 and from having1
 on the contrary1 looked upon it as     
given in nature1 is derived all that    
portion of treatises upon ,aesthetic    
which is entitled ,the ,beautiful in    
,nature or ,aesthetic ,physic2 sometimes
 even subdivided1 save the mark6 into   
,aesthetic ,mineralogy1 ,botany1 and    
,zoology4 ,we do not wish to deny that  
such treatises contain many just        

remarks1 and are sometimes themselves   
works of art1 in so far as they         
represent beautifully the imaginings and
 fantasies1 that is the impressions1 of 
their authors4 ,but we must state that  
it is scientifically false to ask       
oneself if the dog be beautiful1 and the
 ornithorhynchus ugly2 if the lily be   
beautiful1 and the artichoke ugly4      
,indeed1 the error is here double4 ,on  
one hand1 aesthetic ,physic falls back  
into the equivoke of the theory of      
artistic and literary classes1 by       
attempting to determine aesthetically   
the abstractions of our intellect2 on   
the other1 fails to recognize1 as we    
said1 the true formation of so-called   
natural beauty2 for which the question  
as to whether some given individual     
animal1 flower1 or man be beautiful or  
ugly1 is altogether excluded4 ,what is  
not produced by the aesthetic spirit1 or
 cannot be referred to it1 is neither   
beautiful nor ugly4 ,the aesthetic      
process arises from the ideal relations 

in which natural objects are arranged4  
,sidenote ,critique of the theory of the
 beauty of the human body4  ,the double 
error can be exemplified by the         
question1 upon which whole volumes have 
been written1 as to the ,beauty of the  
human body4 ,here it is necessary1 above
 all things1 to urge those who discuss  
this subject from the abstract toward   
the concrete1 by asking3 ,what do you   
mean by the human body1 that of the     
male1 of the female1 or of the          
androgyne8 ,let us assume that they     
reply by dividing the inquiry into two  
distinct inquiries1 as to the virile and
 feminine beauty 7there really are      
writers who seriously discuss whether   
man or woman is the more beautiful72 and
 let us continue3 ,masculine or feminine
 beauty2 but of what race of men--the   
white1 the yellow1 or the black1 and    
whatever others there may be1 according 
to the division of races8 ,let us assume
 that they limit themselves to the white
 race1 and let us continue3 ,what       

sub-species of the white race8 ,and when
 we have restricted them gradually to   
one section of the white world1 that is 
to say1 to the ,italian1 ,tuscan1       
,siennese1 or ,porta ,camollia section1 
we will continue3 ,very good2 but at    
what age of the human body1 and in what 
condition and state of development--that
 of the new-born babe1 of the child1 of 
the boy1 of the adolescent1 of the man  
of middle age1 and so on8 and is the man
 at rest or at work1 or is he occupied  
as is ,paul ,potter's cow1 or the       
,ganymede of ,rembrandt8  ,having thus  
arrived1 by successive reductions1 at   
the individual omnimode determinatum1   
or1 better1 at the man pointed out with 
the finger1 it will be easy to expose   
the other error1 by recalling what has  
been said about the natural fact1 which 
is now beautiful1 now ugly1 according to
 the point of view1 according to what is
 passing in the mind of the artist4     
,finally1 if the ,gulf of ,naples have  
its detractors1 and if there be artists 

who declare it inexpressive1 preferring 
the gloomy firs1 the clouds and         
perpetual north winds1 of the northern  
seas2 let it be believed1 if possible1  
that such relativity does not exist for 
the human body1 source of the most      
various suggestions6      ,sidenote     
,critique of the beauty of geometric    
figures4  ,the question of the beauty of
 geometrical figures is connected with  
aesthetic ,physic4 ,but if by           
geometrical figures be understood the   
concepts of geometry1 the concept of the
 triangle1 the square1 the cone1 these  
are neither beautiful nor ugly3 they are
 concepts4 ,if1 on the other hand1 by   
such figures be understood bodies which 
possess definite geometrical forms1     
these will be ugly or beautiful1 like   
every natural fact1 according to the    
ideal connexions in which they are      
placed4 ,some hold that those           
geometrical figures are beautiful which 
point upwards1 since they give the      
suggestion of firmness and of force4 ,it

 is not denied that such may be the     
case4 ,but neither must it be denied    
that those also which give the          
impression of instability and of being  
crushed down may possess their beauty1  
where they represent just the ill-formed
 and the crushed2 and that in these last
 cases the firmness of the straight line
 and the lightness of the cone or of the
 equilateral triangle would1 on the     
contrary1 seem elements of ugliness4    
,certainly1 such questions as to the    
beauty of nature and the beauty of      
geometry1 like the others analogous of  
the historically beautiful and of human 
beauty1 seem less absurd in the         
,aesthetic of the sympathetic1 which    
means1 at bottom1 by the words aesthetic
 beauty the representation of what is   
pleasing4 ,but the pretension to        
determine scientifically what are the   
sympathetic contents1 and what are the  
irremediably antipathetic1 is none the  
less erroneous1 even in the sphere of   
that doctrine and after the laying down 

of those premises4 ,one can only answer 
such questions by repeating with an     
infinitely long postscript the ,sunt    
quos of the first ode of the first book 
of ,horace1 and the ,havvi chi of       
,leopardi's letter to ,carlo ,pepoli4   
,to each man his beautiful 7            
sympathetic71 as to each man his fair   
one4 ,philography is not a science4     
,sidenote ,critique of another aspect of
 the imitation of nature4  ,the artist  
sometimes has naturally existing facts  
before him1 in producing the artificial 
instrument1 or physically beautiful4    
,these are called his models3 bodies1   
stuffs1 flowers1 and so on4 ,let us run 
over the sketches1 the studies1 and the 
notes of the artists3 ,leonardo noted   
down in his pocket-book1 when he was    
working on the ,last ,supper3           
,giovannina1 fantastic appearance1 is at
 ,st4 ,catherine's1 at the ,hospital2   
,cristofano di ,castiglione is at the   
,piet1 he has a fine head2 ,christ1     
,giovan ,conte1 is of the suite of      

,cardinal ,mortaro4 ,and so on4 ,from   
this comes the illusion that the artist 
imitates nature2 when it would perhaps  
be more exact to say that nature        
imitates the artist1 and obeys him4 ,the
 theory that art imitates nature has    
sometimes been grounded upon and found  
sustenance in this illusion1 as also its
 variant1 more easily to be defended1   
which makes art the idealizer of nature4
 ,this last theory presents the process 
in a disorderly manner1 indeed inversely
 to the true order2 for the artist does 
not proceed from extrinsic reality1 in  
order to modify it by approaching it to 
the ideal2 but he proceeds from the     
impression of external nature to        
expression1 that is to say1 to his      
ideal1 and from this he passes to the   
natural fact1 which he employs as the   
instrument of reproduction of the ideal 
fact4      ,sidenote ,critique of the   
theory of the elementary forms of the   
beautiful4  ,another consequence of the 
confusion between the aesthetic and the 

physical fact is the theory of the      
elementary forms of the beautiful4 ,if  
expression1 if the beautiful1 be        
indivisible1 the physical fact1 in which
 it externalizes itself1 can well be    
divided and subdivided2 for example1 a  
painted surface1 into lines and colours1
 groups and curves of lines1 kinds of   
colours1 and so on2 a poem1 into        
strophes1 verses1 feet1 syllables2 a    
piece of prose1 into chapters1          
paragraphs1 headings1 periods1 phrases1 
words1 and so on4 ,the parts thus       
obtained are not aesthetic facts1 but   
smaller physical facts1 cut up in an    
arbitrary manner4 ,if this path were    
followed1 and the confusion persisted   
in1 we should end by concluding that the
 true forms of the beautiful are atoms4 
,the aesthetic law1 several times       
promulgated1 that beauty must have bulk1
 could be invoked against the atoms4 ,it
 cannot be the imperceptibility of the  
too small1 nor the unapprehensibility of
 the too large4 ,but a bigness which    

depends upon perceptibility1 not        
measurement1 derives from a concept     
widely different from the mathematical4 
,for what is called imperceptible and   
incomprehensible does not produce an    
impression1 because it is not a real    
fact1 but a concept3 the requisite of   
bulk in the beautiful is thus reduced to
 the effective reality of the physical  
fact1 which serves for the reproduction 
of the beautiful4      ,sidenote        
,critique of the search for the         
objective conditions of                 
the beautiful4  ,continuing the search  
for the physical laws or for the        
objective conditions of the beautiful1  
it has been asked3 ,to what physical    
facts does the beautiful correspond8 ,to
 what the ugly8 ,to what unions of      
tones1 colours1 sizes1 mathematically   
determinable8 ,such inquiries are as if 
in ,political ,economy one were to seek 
for the laws of exchange in the physical
 nature of the objects exchanged4 ,the  
constant infecundity of the attempt     

should have at once given rise to some  
suspicion as to its vanity4 ,in our     
times1 especially1 has the necessity for
 an inductive ,aesthetic been often     
proclaimed1 of an ,aesthetic starting   
from below1 which should proceed like   
natural science and not hasten its      
conclusions4 ,inductive8 ,but ,aesthetic
 has always been both inductive and     
deductive1 like every philosophical     
science2 induction and deduction cannot 
be separated1 nor can they separately   
avail to characterize a true science4   
,but the word inductive was not here    
pronounced accidentally and without     
special intention4 ,it was wished to    
imply by its use that the aesthetic fact
 is nothing1 at bottom1 but a physical  
fact1 which should be studied by        
applying to it the methods proper to the
 physical and natural sciences4 ,with   
such a presupposition and in such a     
faith did inductive ,aesthetic or       
,aesthetic of the inferior 7what pride  
in this modesty67 begin its labours4 ,it

 has conscientiously begun by making a  
collection of beautiful things1 for     
example of a great number of envelopes  
of various shapes and sizes1 and has    
asked which of these give the impression
 of the beautiful and which of the ugly4
 ,as was to be expected1 the inductive  
aestheticians speedily found themselves 
in a difficulty1 for the same objects   
that appeared ugly in one aspect would  
appear beautiful in another4 ,a yellow1 
coarse envelope1 which would be         
extremely ugly for the purpose of       
enclosing a love-letter1 is1 however1   
just what is wanted for a writ served by
 process on stamped paper4 ,this in its 
turn would look very bad1 or seem at any
 rate an irony1 if enclosed in a square 
,english envelope4 ,such considerations 
of simple common sense should have      
sufficed to convince inductive          
aestheticians1 that the beautiful has no
 physical existence1 and cause them to  
remit their vain and ridiculous quest4  
,but no3 they have had recourse to an   

expedient1 as to which we would find it 
difficult to say how far it belongs to  
natural science4 ,they have sent their  
envelopes round from one to the other   
and opened a referendum1 thus striving  
to decide by the votes of the majority  
in what consists the beautiful and the  
ugly4  ,we will not waste time over this
 argument1 because we should seem to be 
turning ourselves into narrators of     
comic anecdotes rather than expositors  
of aesthetic science and of its         
problems4 ,it is an actual fact1 that   
the inductive aestheticians have not yet
 discovered one single law4             
,sidenote ,astrology of ,aesthetic4  ,he
 who dispenses with doctors is prone to 
abandon himself to charlatans4 ,thus it 
has befallen those who have believed in 
the natural laws of the beautiful4      
,artists sometimes adopt empirical      
canons1 such as that of the proportions 
of the human body1 or of the golden     
section1 that is to say1 of a line      
divided into two parts in such a manner 

that the less is to the greater as is   
the greater to the whole line 7bc3 acac3
 ab74 ,such canons easily become their  
superstitions1 and they attribute to    
such the success of their works4 ,thus  
,michael ,angelo left as a precept to   
his disciple ,marco del ,pino of ,siena 
that he should always make a pyramidal  
serpentine figure multiplied by one1    
two1 three1 a precept which did not     
enable ,marco di ,siena to emerge from  
that mediocrity which we can yet observe
 in his many works1 here in ,naples4    
,others extracted from the sayings of   
,michael ,angelo the precept that       
serpentine undulating lines were the    
true lines of beauty4 ,whole volumes    
have been composed on these laws of     
beauty1 on the golden section and on the
 undulating and serpentine lines4 ,these
 should in our opinion be looked upon as
 the astrology of ,aesthetic4     ,,xv  
,,the ,,activity ,,of ,,externalization1
 ,,technique ,,and ,,the ,,theory ,,of  
,,the ,,arts       ,sidenote ,the       

practical activity of externalization4  
,the fact of the production of the      
physically beautiful implies1 as has    
already been remarked1 a vigilant will1 
which persists in not allowing certain  
visions1 intuitions1 or representations1
 to be lost4 ,such a will must be able  
to act with the utmost rapidity1 and as 
it were instinctively1 and also be      
capable of long and laborious           
deliberations4 ,thus and only thus does 
the practical activity enter into       
relations with the aesthetic1 that is to
 say1 in effecting the production of    
physical objects1 which are aids to     
memory4 ,here it is not merely a        
concomitant1 but really a distinct      
moment of the aesthetic activity4 ,we   
cannot will or not will our aesthetic   
vision3 we can1 however1 will or not    
will to externalize it1 or better1 to   
preserve and communicate1 or not1 to    
others1 the externalization produced4   
,sidenote ,the technique of             
externalization4  ,this volitional fact 

of externalization is preceded by a     
complex of various kinds of knowledge4  
,these are known as techniques1 like all
 knowledge which precedes the practical 
activity4 ,thus we talk of an artistic  
technique in the same metaphorical and  
elliptic manner that we talk of the     
physically beautiful1 that is to say 7in
 more precise language71 knowledge      
employed by the practical activity      
engaged in producing stimuli to         
aesthetic reproduction4 ,in place of    
employing so lengthy a phrase1 we shall 
here avail ourselves of the vulgar      
terminology1 since we are henceforward  
aware of its true meaning4  ,the        
possibility of this technical knowledge1
 at the service of artistic             
reproduction1 has caused people to      
imagine the existence of an aesthetic   
technique of internal expression1 which 
is tantamount to saying1 a doctrine of  
the means of internal expression1 which 
is altogether inconceivable4 ,and we    
know well the reason why it is          

inconceivable2 expression1 considered in
 itself1 is primary theoretic activity1 
and1 in so far as it is this1 it        
precedes the practical activity and the 
intellectual knowledge which illumines  
the practical activity1 and is thus     
independent alike of the one and of the 
other4 ,it also helps to illumine the   
practical activity1 but is not          
illuminated by it4 ,expression does not 
employ means1 because it has not an end2
 it has intuitions of things1 but does  
not will them1 and is thus indivisible  
into means and end4 ,thus if it be said1
 as sometimes is the case1 that a       
certain writer has invented a new       
technique of fiction or of drama1 or    
that a painter has discovered a new mode
 of distribution of light1 the word is  
used in a false sense2 because the      
so-called new technique is really that  
romance itself1 or that new picture     
itself4 ,the distribution of light      
belongs to the vision itself of the     
picture2 as the technique of a dramatist

 is his dramatic conception itself4 ,on 
other occasions1 the word technique is  
used to designate certain merits or     
defects in a work which is a failure2   
and it is said1 euphemistically1 that   
the conception is bad1 but the technique
 good1 or that the conception is good1  
and the technique bad4  ,on the other   
hand1 when the different ways of        
painting in oils1 or of etching1 or of  
sculpturing in alabaster1 are discussed1
 then the word technique is in its      
place2 but in such a case the adjective 
artistic is used metaphorically4 ,and if
 a dramatic technique in the artistic   
sense be impossible1 a theatrical       
technique is not impossible1 that is to 
say1 processes of externalization of    
certain given aesthetic works4 ,when1   
for instance1 women were introduced on  
the stage in ,italy in the second half  
of the sixteenth century1 in place of   
men dressed as women1 this was a true   
and real discovery in theatrical        
technique2 such too was the perfecting  

in the following century by the         
impresarios of ,venice1 of machines for 
the rapid changing of the scenes4       
,sidenote ,the theoretic techniques of  
the individual arts4  ,the collection of
 technical knowledge at the service of  
artists desirous of externalizing their 
expressions1 can be divided into groups1
 which may be entitled theories of the  
arts4 ,thus is born a theory of         
,architecture1 comprising mechanical    
laws1 information relating to the weight
 or to the resistance of the materials  
of construction or of fortification1    
manuals relating to the method of mixing
 chalk or stucco2 a theory of           
,sculpture1 containing advice as to the 
instruments to be used for sculpturing  
the various sorts of stone1 for         
obtaining a successful fusion of bronze1
 for working with the chisel1 for the   
exact copying of the model in chalk or  
plaster1 for keeping chalk damp2 a      
theory of ,painting1 on the various     
techniques of tempera1 of oil-painting1 

of water-colour1 of pastel1 on the      
proportions of the human body1 on the   
laws of perspective2 a theory of        
,oratory1 with precepts as to the method
 of producing1 of exercising and of     
strengthening the voice1 of mimic and   
gesture2 a theory of ,music1 on the     
combinations and fusions of tones and   
sounds2 and so on4 ,such collections of 
precepts abound in all literatures4 ,and
 since it soon becomes impossible to say
 what is useful and what useless to     
know1 books of this sort become very    
often a sort of encyclopaedias or       
catalogues of desiderata4 ,vitruvius1 in
 his treatise on ,architecture1 claims  
for the architect a knowledge of        
letters1 of drawing1 of geometry1 of    
arithmetic1 of optic1 of history1 of    
natural and moral philosophy1 of        
jurisprudence1 of medicine1 of          
astrology1 of music1 and so on4         
,everything is worth knowing3 learn the 
art and lay it aside4  ,it should be    
evident that such empirical collections 

are not reducible to a science4 ,they   
are composed of notions1 taken from     
various sciences and teachings1 and     
their philosophical and scientific      
principles are to be found in them4 ,to 
undertake the construction of a         
scientific theory of the different arts1
 would be to wish to reduce to the      
single and homogeneous what is by nature
 multiple and heterogeneous2 to wish to 
destroy the existence as a collection of
 what was put together precisely to form
 a collection4 ,were we to give a       
scientific form to the manuals of the   
architect1 the painter1 or the musician1
 it is clear that nothing would remain  
in our hands but the general principles 
of ,mechanic1 ,optic1 or ,acoustic4 ,or 
if the especially artistic observations 
disseminated through it be extracted and
 isolated1 and a science be made of     
them1 then the sphere of the individual 
art is deserted and that of ,aesthetic  
entered upon1 for ,aesthetic is always  
general ,aesthetic1 or better1 it cannot

 be divided into general and special4   
,this last case 7that is1 the attempt to
 furnish a technique of ,aesthetic7 is  
found1 when men possessing strong       
scientific instincts and a natural      
tendency to philosophy1 set themselves  
to work to produce such theories and    
technical manuals4      ,sidenote       
,critique of the aesthetic theories of  
the individual                arts4     
,but the confusion between ,physic and  
,aesthetic has attained to its highest  
degree1 when aesthetic theories of the  
different arts are imagined1 to answer  
such questions as3 ,what are the limits 
of each art8 ,what can be represented   
with colours1 and what with sounds8     
,what with simple monochromatic lines1  
and what with touches of various        
colours8 ,what with notes1 and what with
 metres and rhymes8 ,what are the limits
 between the figurative and the         
auditional arts1 between painting and   
sculpture1 poetry and music8  ,this1    
translated into scientific language1 is 

tantamount to asking3 ,what is the      
connexion between ,acoustic and         
aesthetic expression8 ,what between the 
latter and ,optic8--and the like4 ,now1 
if there is no passage from the physical
 fact to the aesthetic1 how could there 
be from the aesthetic to particular     
groups of aesthetic facts1 such as the  
phenomena of ,optic or of ,acoustic8    
,sidenote ,critique of the              
classifications of the arts4  ,the      
things called ,arts have no aesthetic   
limits1 because1 in order to have them1 
they would need to have also aesthetic  
existence2 and we have demonstrated the 
altogether empirical genesis of those   
divisions4 ,consequently1 any attempt at
 an aesthetic classification of the arts
 is absurd4 ,if they be without limits1 
they are not exactly determinable1 and  
consequently cannot be philosophically  
classified4 ,all the books dealing with 
classifications and systems of the arts 
could be burned without any loss        
whatever4 7,we say this with the utmost 

respect to the writers who have expended
 their labours upon them47  ,the        
impossibility of such classifications   
finds1 as it were1 its proof in the     
strange methods to which recourse has   
been had to carry them out4 ,the first  
and most common classification is that  
into arts of hearing1 sight1 and        
imagination2 as if eyes1 ears1 and      
imagination were on the same level1 and 
could be deduced from the same logical  
variable1 as foundation of the division4
 ,others have proposed the division into
 arts of space and time1 and arts of    
rest and motion2 as if the concepts of  
space1 time1 rest1 and motion could     
determine special aesthetic forms1 or   
have anything in common with art as     
such4 ,finally1 others have amused      
themselves by dividing them into classic
 and romantic1 or into oriental1        
classic1 and romantic1 thereby          
conferring the value of scientific      
concepts on simple historical           
denominations1 or adopting those        

pretended partitions of expressive      
forms1 already criticized above2 or by  
talking of arts that can only be seen   
from one side1 like painting1 and of    
arts that can be seen from all sides1   
like sculpture--and similar             
extravagances1 which exist neither in   
heaven nor on the earth4  ,the theory of
 the limits of the arts was1 perhaps1 at
 the time when it was put forward1 a    
beneficial critical reaction against    
those who believed in the possibility of
 the flowing of one expression into     
another1 as of the ,iliad or of         
,paradise ,lost into a series of        
paintings1 and thus held a poem to be of
 greater or lesser value1 according as  
it could or could not be translated into
 pictures by a painter4 ,but if the     
rebellion were reasonable and           
victorious1 this does not mean that the 
arguments adopted and the theories made 
as required were sound4      ,sidenote  
,critique of the theory of the union of 
the arts4  ,another theory which is a   

corollary to that of the limits of the  
arts1 falls with them2 that of the union
 of the arts4 ,granted different arts1  
distinct and limited1 the questions were
 asked3 ,which is the most powerful8 ,do
 we not obtain more powerful effects by 
uniting several8 ,we know nothing of    
this3 we know only1 in each individual  
case1 that certain given artistic       
intuitions have need of definite        
physical means for their reproduction1  
and that other artistic intuitions have 
need of other physical means4 ,we can   
obtain the effect of certain dramas by  
simply reading them2 others need        
declamation and scenic display3 some    
artistic intuitions1 for their full     
extrinsication1 need words1 song1       
musical instruments1 colours1 statuary1 
architecture1 actors2 while others are  
beautiful and complete in a single      
delicate sweep of the pen1 or with a few
 strokes of the pencil4 ,but it is false
 to suppose that declamation and scenic 
effects1 and all the other things we    

have mentioned together1 are more       
powerful than simply reading1 or than   
the simple stroke with the pen and with 
the pencil2 because each of these facts 
or groups of facts has1 so to say1 a    
different object1 and the power of the  
different means employed cannot be      
compared when the objects are different4
      ,sidenote ,connexion of the       
activity of externalization with utility
                and morality4  ,finally1
 it is only from the point of view of a 
clear and rigorous distinction between  
the true and proper aesthetic activity1 
and the practical activity of           
externalization1 that we can solve the  
involved and confused questions as to   
the relations between art and utility1  
and art and morality4  ,that art as art 
is independent alike of utility and of  
morality1 as also of every volitional   
form1 we have above demonstrated4       
,without this independence1 it would not
 be possible to speak of an intrinsic   
value of art1 nor indeed to conceive an 

aesthetic science1 which demands the    
autonomy of the aesthetic fact as a     
necessity of its existence4  ,but it    
would be erroneous to maintain that this
 independence of the vision or intuition
 or internal expression of the artist   
should be at once extended to the       
practical activity of externalization   
and of communication1 which may or may  
not follow the aesthetic fact4 ,if art  
be understood as the externalization of 
art1 then utility and morality have a   
perfect right to deal with it2 that is  
to say1 the right one possesses to deal 
with one's own household4  ,we do not1  
as a matter of fact1 externalize and fix
 all of the many expressions and        
intuitions which we form in our mind2 we
 do not declare our every thought in a  
loud voice1 or write down1 or print1 or 
draw1 or colour1 or expose it to the    
public gaze4 ,we select from the crowd  
of intuitions which are formed or at    
least sketched within us2 and the       
selection is governed by selection of   

the economic conditions of life and of  
its moral direction4 ,therefore1 when we
 have formed an intuition1 it remains to
 decide whether or no we should         
communicate it to others1 and to whom1  
and when1 and how2 all of which         
considerations fall equally under the   
utilitarian and ethical criterion4      
,thus we find the concepts of selection1
 of the interesting1 of morality1 of an 
educational end1 of popularity1 etc41 to
 some extent justified1 although these  
can in no wise be justified as imposed  
upon art as art1 and we have ourselves  
denounced them in pure ,aesthetic4      
,error always contains an element of    
truth4 ,he who formulated those         
erroneous aesthetic propositions had his
 eye on practical facts1 which attach   
themselves externally to the aesthetic  
fact in economic and moral life4  ,by   
all means1 be partisans of a yet greater
 liberty in the vulgarization of the    
means of aesthetic reproduction2 we are 
of the same opinion1 and let us leave   

the proposals for legislative measures1 
and for actions to be instigated against
 immoral art1 to hypocrites1 to the     
ingenuous1 and to idlers4 ,but the      
proclamation of this liberty1 and the   
fixation of its limits1 how wide soever 
they be1 is always the affair of        
morality4 ,and it would in any case be  
out of place to invoke that highest     
principle1 that fundamentum             
,aesthetices1 which is the independence 
of art1 in order to deduce from it the  
guiltlessness of the artist1 who1 in the
 externalization of his imaginings1     
should calculate upon the unhealthy     
tastes of his readers2 or that licenses 
should be granted to the hawkers who    
sell obscene statuettes in the streets4 
,this last case is the affair of the    
police2 the first must be brought before
 the tribunal of the moral conscience4  
,the aesthetic judgment on the work of  
art has nothing to do with the morality 
of the artist1 in so far as he is a     
practical man1 nor with the precautions 

to be taken that art may not be employed
 for evil purposes alien to its essence1
 which is pure theoretic contemplation4 
,,xvi  ,,taste ,,and ,,the              
,,reproduction ,,of ,,art               
,sidenote ,aesthetic judgment4 ,its     
identity with aesthetic                 
reproduction4  ,when the entire         
aesthetic and externalizing process has 
been completed1 when a beautiful        
expression has been produced and fixed  
in a definite physical material1 what is
 meant by judging it8 ,to reproduce it  
in oneself1 answer the critics of art1  
almost with one voice4 ,very good4 ,let 
us try thoroughly to understand this    
fact1 and with that object in view1 let 
us represent it schematically4  ,the    
individual ,a is seeking the expression 
of an impression1 which he feels or has 
a presentiment of1 but has not yet      
expressed4 ,behold him trying various   
words and phrases1 which may give the   
sought-for expression1 which must exist1
 but which he does not know4 ,he tries  

the combination m1 but rejects it as    
unsuitable1 inexpressive1 incomplete1   
ugly3 he tries the combination n1 with a
 like result4 ,he does not see anything1
 or he does not see clearly4 ,the       
expression still flies from him4 ,after 
other vain attempts1 during which he    
sometimes approaches1 sometimes leaves  
the sign that offers itself1 all of a   
sudden 7almost as though formed         
spontaneously of itself7 he creates the 
sought-for expression1 and lux facta    
est4 ,he enjoys for an instant aesthetic
 pleasure or the pleasure of the        
beautiful4 ,the ugly1 with its          
correlative displeasure1 was the        
aesthetic activity1 which had not       
succeeded in conquering the obstacle2   
the beautiful is the expressive         
activity1 which now displays itself     
triumphant4  ,we have taken this example
 from the domain of speech1 as being    
nearer and more accessible1 and because 
we all talk1 though we do not all draw  
or paint4 ,now if another individual1   

whom we shall term ,b1 desire to judge  
this expression and decide whether it be
 beautiful or ugly1 he must of necessity
 place himself at ,a's point of view1   
and go through the whole process again1 
with the help of the physical sign1     
supplied to him by ,a4 ,if ,a has seen  
clearly1 then ,b 7who has placed himself
 at ,a's point of view7 will also see   
clearly and will find this expression   
beautiful4 ,if ,a has not seen clearly1 
then ,b also will not see clearly1 and  
will find the expression more or less   
ugly1 just as ,a did4      ,sidenote    
,impossibility of divergences4  ,it may 
be observed that we have not taken into 
consideration two other cases3 that of  
,a having a clear and ,b an obscure     
vision2 and that of ,a having an obscure
 and ,b a clear vision4 ,philosophically
 speaking1 these two cases are          
impossible4  ,spiritual activity1       
precisely because it is activity1 is not
 a caprice1 but a spiritual necessity2  
and it cannot solve a definite aesthetic

 problem1 save in one way1 which is the 
right way4 ,doubtless certain facts may 
be adduced1 which appear to contradict  
this deduction4 ,thus works which seem  
beautiful to artists1 are judged to be  
ugly by the critics2 while works with   
which the artists were displeased and   
judged imperfect or failures1 are held  
to be beautiful and perfect by the      
critics4 ,but this does not mean        
anything1 save that one of the two is   
wrong3 either the critics or the        
artists1 or in one case the artist and  
in another the critic4 ,in fact1 the    
producer of an expression does not      
always fully realize what has happened  
in his soul4 ,haste1 vanity1 want of    
reflexion1 theoretic prejudices1 make   
people say1 and sometimes others almost 
believe1 that works of ours are         
beautiful1 which1 if we were truly to   
turn inwards upon ourselves1 we should  
see ugly1 as they really are4 ,thus poor
 ,don ,quixote1 when he had mended his  
helmet as well as he could with         

cardboard--the helmet that had showed   
itself to possess but the feeblest force
 of resistance at the first             
encounter1--took good care not to test  
it again with a well-delivered          
sword-thrust1 but simply declared and   
maintained it to be 7says the author7   
por celada finisima de encaxe4 ,and in  
other cases1 the same reasons1 or       
opposite but analogous ones1 trouble the
 consciousness of the artist1 and cause 
him to disapprove of what he has        
successfully produced1 or to strive to  
undo and do again worse1 what he has    
done well1 in his artistic spontaneity4 
,an example of this is the ,gerusalemme 
conquistata4 ,in the same way1 haste1   
laziness1 want of reflexion1 theoretic  
prejudices1 personal sympathies1 or     
animosities1 and other motives of a     
similar sort1 sometimes cause the       
critics to proclaim beautiful what is   
ugly1 and ugly what is beautiful4 ,were 
they to eliminate such disturbing       
elements1 they would feel the work of   

art as it really is1 and would not leave
 to posterity1 that more diligent and   
more dispassionate judge1 to award the  
palm1 or to do that justice1 which they 
have refused4      ,sidenote ,identity  
of taste and genius4  ,it is clear from 
the preceding theorem1 that the judicial
 activity1 which criticizes and         
recognizes the beautiful1 is identical  
with that which produces it4 ,the only  
difference lies in the diversity of     
circumstances1 since in the one case it 
is a question of aesthetic production1  
in the other of reproduction4 ,the      
judicial activity is called taste2 the  
productive activity is called genius3   
genius and taste are therefore          
substantially identical4  ,the common   
remark1 that the critic should possess  
some of the genius of the artist and    
that the artist should possess taste1   
reveals a glimpse of this identity2 or  
that there exists an active 7productive7
 taste and a passive 7reproductive7     
taste4 ,but a denial of this is         

contained in other equally common       
remarks1 as when people speak of taste  
without genius1 or of genius without    
taste4 ,these last observations are     
meaningless1 unless they be taken as    
alluding to quantitative differences4   
,in this case1 those would be called    
geniuses without taste who produce works
 of art1 inspired in their culminating  
parts and neglected and defective in    
their secondary parts1 and those men of 
taste without genius1 who succeed in    
obtaining certain isolated or secondary 
effects1 but do not possess the power   
necessary for a vast artistic synthesis4
 ,analogous explanations can easily be  
given of other similar propositions4    
,but to posit a substantial difference  
between genius and taste1 between       
artistic production and reproduction1   
would render communication and judgment 
alike inconceivable4 ,how could we judge
 what remained extraneous to us8 ,how   
could that which is produced by a given 
activity be judged by a different       

activity8 ,the critic will be a small   
genius1 the artist a great genius2 the  
one will have the strength of ten1 the  
other of a hundred2 the former1 in order
 to raise himself to the altitude of the
 latter1 will have need of his          
assistance2 but the nature of both must 
be the same4 ,in order to judge ,dante1 
we must raise ourselves to his level3   
let it be well understood that          
empirically we are not ,dante1 nor      
,dante we2 but in that moment of        
judgment and contemplation1 our spirit  
is one with that of the poet1 and in    
that moment we and he are one single    
thing4 ,in this identity alone resides  
the possibility that our little souls   
can unite with the great souls1 and     
become great with them1 in the          
universality of the spirit4             
,sidenote ,analogy with the other       
activities4  ,let us remark in passing  
that what has been said of the aesthetic
 judgment holds good equally for every  
other activity and for every other      

judgment2 and that scientific1 economic1
 and ethical criticism is effected in a 
like manner4 ,to limit ourselves to this
 last1 it is only if we place ourselves 
ideally in the same conditions in which 
he who took a given resolution found    
himself1 that we can form a judgment as 
to whether his resolution were moral or 
immoral4 ,an action would otherwise     
remain incomprehensible1 and therefore  
impossible to judge4 ,a homicide may be 
a rascal or a hero3 if this be1 within  
limits1 indifferent as regards the      
safety of society1 which condemns both  
to the same punishment1 it is not       
indifferent to him who wishes to        
distinguish and to judge from the moral 
point of view1 and we cannot dispense   
with studying again the individual      
psychology of the homicide1 in order to 
determine the true nature of his deed1  
not merely in its judicial1 but also in 
its moral aspect4 ,in ,ethic1 a moral   
taste or tact is sometimes referred to1 
which answers to what is generally      

called moral conscience1 that is to say1
 to the activity itself of good-will4   
,sidenote ,critique of absolutism       
7intellectualism7 and of aesthetic      
relativism4  ,the explanation above     
given of aesthetic judgment or          
reproduction at once affirms and denies 
the position of the absolutists and     
relativists1 of those1 that is to say1  
who affirm and of those who deny the    
existence of an absolute taste4  ,the   
absolutists1 who affirm that they can   
judge of the beautiful1 are right2 but  
the theory on which they found their    
affirmation is not maintainable4 ,they  
conceive of the beautiful1 that is1 of  
aesthetic value1 as of something placed 
outside the aesthetic activity2 as if it
 were a model or a concept which an     
artist realizes in his work1 and of     
which the critic avails himself         
afterwards in order to judge the work   
itself4 ,concepts and models alike have 
no existence in art1 for by proclaiming 
that every art can be judged only in    

itself1 and has its own model in itself1
 they have attained to the denial of the
 existence of objective models of       
beauty1 whether they be intellectual    
concepts1 or ideas suspended in the     
metaphysical sky4  ,in proclaiming this1
 the adversaries1 the relativists1 are  
perfectly right1 and accomplish a       
progress4 ,however1 the initial         
rationality of their thesis becomes in  
its turn a false theory4 ,repeating the 
old adage that there is no accounting   
for tastes1 they believe that aesthetic 
expression is of the same nature as the 
pleasant and the unpleasant1 which every
 one feels in his own way1 and as to    
which there is no disputing4 ,but we    
know that the pleasant and the          
unpleasant are utilitarian and practical
 facts4 ,thus the relativists deny the  
peculiarity of the aesthetic fact1 again
 confounding expression with impression1
 the theoretic with the practical4  ,the
 true solution lies in rejecting alike  
relativism or psychologism1 and false   

absolutism2 and in recognizing that the 
criterion of taste is absolute1 but     
absolute in a different way from that of
 the intellect1 which is developed by   
reason4 ,the criterion of taste is      
absolute1 with the intuitive            
absoluteness of the imagination4 ,thus  
every act of expressive activity1 which 
is so really1 will be recognized as     
beautiful1 and every fact in which      
expressive activity and passivity are   
found engaged with one another in an    
unfinished struggle1 will be recognized 
as ugly4      ,sidenote ,critique of    
relative relativism4  ,there lies1      
between absolutists and relativists1 a  
third class1 which may be called that of
 the relative relativists4 ,these affirm
 the existence of absolute values in    
other fields1 such as ,logic and ,ethic1
 but deny their existence in the field  
of ,aesthetic4 ,to them it appears      
natural and justifiable to dispute about
 science and morality2 because science  
rests on the universal1 common to all   

men1 and morality on duty1 which is also
 a law of human nature2 but how1 they   
say1 can one dispute about art1 which   
rests on imagination8 ,not only1        
however1 is the imaginative activity    
universal and belongs to human nature1  
like the logical concept and practical  
duty2 but we must oppose a capital      
objection to this intermediary thesis4  
,if the absolute nature of the          
imagination were denied1 we should be   
obliged to deny also that of            
intellectual or conceptual truth1 and1  
implicitly1 of morality4 ,does not      
morality presuppose logical             
distinctions8 ,how could these be known1
 otherwise than by expressions and      
words1 that is to say1 in imaginative   
form8 ,if the absoluteness of the       
imagination were removed1 spiritual life
 would tremble to its base4 ,one        
individual would no longer understand   
another1 nor indeed his own self of a   
moment before1 which1 when considered a 
moment after1 is already another        

individual4      ,sidenote ,objection   
founded on the variation of the stimulus
 and                on the psychic      
disposition4  ,nevertheless1 variety of 
judgments is an indisputable fact4 ,men 
are at variance in their logical1       
ethical1 and economical appreciations2  
and they are equally1 or even more at   
variance in their aesthetic             
appreciations4 ,if certain reasons      
detailed by us1 above1 such as haste1   
prejudices1 passions1 etc41 may be held 
to lessen the importance of this        
disagreement1 they do not thereby annul 
it4 ,we have been cautious1 when        
speaking of the stimuli of reproduction1
 for we said that reproduction takes    
place1 if all the other conditions      
remain equal4 ,do they remain equal8    
,does the hypothesis correspond to      
reality8  ,it would appear not4 ,in     
order to reproduce several times an     
impression by employing a suitable      
physical stimulus1 it is necessary that 
this stimulus be not changed1 and that  

the organism remain in the same         
psychical conditions as those in which  
was experienced the impression that it  
is desired to reproduce4 ,now it is a   
fact1 that the physical stimulus is     
continually changing1 and in like manner
 the psychological conditions4  ,oil    
paintings grow dark1 frescoes pale1     
statues lose noses1 hands1 and legs1    
architecture becomes totally or         
partially a ruin1 the tradition of the  
execution of a piece of music is lost1  
the text of a poem is corrupted by bad  
copyists or bad printing4 ,these are    
obvious instances of the changes which  
daily occur in objects or physical      
stimuli4 ,as regards psychological      
conditions1 we will not dwell upon the  
cases of deafness or blindness1 that is 
to say1 upon the loss of entire orders  
of psychical impressions2 these cases   
are secondary and of less importance    
compared with the fundamental1 daily1   
inevitable1 and perpetual changes of the
 society around us1 and of the internal 

conditions of our individual life4 ,the 
phonic manifestations1 that is1 the     
words and verses of the ,dantesque      
,commedia1 must produce a very different
 impression on a citizen engaged in the 
politics of the third ,rome1 to that    
experienced by a well-informed and      
intimate contemporary of the poet4 ,the 
,madonna of ,cimabue is still in the    
,church of ,santa ,maria ,novella2 but  
does she speak to the visitor of to-day 
as she spoke to the ,florentines of the 
thirteenth century8 ,even though she    
were not also darkened by time1 would   
not the impression be altogether        
different8 ,and finally1 how can a poem 
composed in youth make the same         
impression on the same individual poet  
when he re-reads it in his old age1 with
 his psychic dispositions altogether    
changed8      ,sidenote ,critique of the
 division of signs into natural and     
conventional4  ,it is true1 that certain
 aestheticians have attempted a         
distinction between stimuli and stimuli1

 between natural and conventional signs4
 ,they would grant to the former a      
constant effect on all2 to the latter1  
only on a limited circle4 ,in their     
belief1 signs employed in painting are  
natural1 while the words of poetry are  
conventional4 ,but the difference       
between the one and the other is only of
 degree4 ,it has often been affirmed    
that painting is a language which all   
understand1 while with poetry it is     
otherwise4 ,here1 for example1 ,leonardo
 placed one of the prerogatives of his  
art1 which hath not need of interpreters
 of different languages as have letters1
 and in it man and brute find           
satisfaction4 ,he relates the anecdote  
of that portrait of the father of a     
family1 which the little grandchildren  
were wont to caress while they were     
still in swaddling-clothes1 and the dogs
 and cats of the house in like manner4  
,but other anecdotes1 such as those of  
the savages who took the portrait of a  
soldier for a boat1 or considered the   

portrait of a man on horseback as       
furnished with only one leg1 are apt to 
shake one's faith in the understanding  
of painting by sucklings1 dogs1 and     
cats4 ,fortunately1 no arduous          
researches are necessary to convince    
oneself that pictures1 poetry1 and every
 work of art1 produce no effects save on
 souls prepared to receive them4        
,natural signs do not exist2 because    
they are all conventional in a like     
manner1 or1 to speak with greater       
exactitude1 all are historically        
conditioned4      ,sidenote ,the        
surmounting of variety4  ,this being so1
 how are we to succeed in causing the   
expression to be reproduced by means of 
the physical object8 ,how obtain the    
same effect1 when the conditions are no 
longer the same8 ,would it not1 rather1 
seem necessary to conclude that         
expressions cannot be reproduced1       
despite the physical instruments made by
 man for the purpose1 and that what is  
called reproduction consists in ever new

 expressions8 ,such would indeed be the 
conclusion1 if the variety of physical  
and psychic conditions were             
intrinsically unsurmountable4 ,but since
 the insuperability has none of the     
characteristics of necessity1 we must1  
on the contrary1 conclude3 that the     
reproduction always occurs1 when we can 
replace ourselves in the conditions in  
which the stimulus 7physical beauty7 was
 produced4  ,not only can we replace    
ourselves in these conditions1 as an    
abstract possibility1 but as a matter of
 fact we do so continually4 ,individual 
life1 which is communion with ourselves 
7with our past71 and social life1 which 
is communion with our like1 would not   
otherwise be possible4      ,sidenote   
,restorations and historical            
interpretation4  ,as regards the        
physical object1 paleographers and      
philologists1 who restore to texts their
 original physiognomy1 restorers of     
pictures and of statues1 and similar    
categories of workers1 exert themselves 

to preserve or to give back to the      
physical object all its primitive       
energy4 ,these efforts certainly do not 
always succeed1 or are not completely   
successful1 for never1 or hardly ever1  
is it possible to obtain a restoration  
complete in its smallest details4 ,but  
the unsurmountable is only accidentally 
present1 and cannot cause us to fail to 
recognize the favourable results which  
are nevertheless obtained4  ,historical 
interpretation likewise labours to      
reintegrate in us historical conditions 
which have been altered in the course of
 history4 ,it revives the dead1         
completes the fragmentary1 and affords  
us the opportunity of seeing a work of  
art 7a physical object7 as its author   
saw it1 at the moment of production4  ,a
 condition of this historical labour is 
tradition1 with the help of which it is 
possible to collect the scattered rays  
and cause them to converge on one       
centre4 ,with the help of memory1 we    
surround the physical stimulus with all 

the facts among which it arose2 and thus
 we make it possible for it to react    
upon us1 as it acted upon him who       
produced it4  ,when the tradition is    
broken1 interpretation is arrested2 in  
this case1 the products of the past     
remain silent for us4 ,thus the         
expressions contained in the ,etruscan  
or ,messapian inscriptions are          
unattainable2 thus we still hear        
discussions among ethnographers as to   
certain products of the art of savages1 
whether they be pictures or writings2   
thus archaeologists and prehistorians   
are not always able to establish with   
certainty1 whether the figures found on 
the ceramic of a certain region1 and on 
other instruments employed1 be of a     
religious or of a profane nature4 ,but  
the arrest of interpretation1 as that of
 restoration1 is never a definitely     
unsurmountable barrier2 and the daily   
discoveries of historical sources and of
 new methods of better exploiting       
antiquity1 which we may hope to see ever

 improving1 link up broken tradition4   
,we do not wish to deny that erroneous  
historical interpretation produces at   
times what we may term palimpsests1 new 
expressions imposed upon the antique1   
artistic imaginings instead of          
historical reproductions4 ,the so-called
 fascination of the past depends in part
 upon these expressions of ours1 which  
we weave into historical expressions4   
,thus in hellenic plastic art has been  
discovered the calm and serene intuition
 of life of those peoples1 who feel1    
nevertheless1 so poignantly1 the        
universality of sorrow2 thus has        
recently been discerned on the faces of 
the ,byzantine saints the terror of the 
millennium1 a terror which is an        
equivoke1 or an artificial legend       
invented by modern scholars4 ,but       
historical criticism tends precisely to 
circumscribe vain imaginings and to     
establish with exactitude the point of  
view from which we must look4  ,thus we 
live in communication with other men of 

the present and of the past2 and we must
 not conclude1 because sometimes1 and   
indeed often1 we find ourselves face to 
face with the unknown or the badly      
known1 that when we believe we are      
engaged in a dialogue1 we are always    
speaking a monologue2 nor that we are   
unable even to repeat the monologue     
which1 in the past1 we held with        
ourselves4     ,,xvii  ,,the ,,history  
,,of ,,literature ,,and ,,art           
,sidenote ,historical criticism in      
literature and art4 ,its                
importance4  ,this brief exposition of  
the method by which is obtained         
reintegration of the original conditions
 in which the work of art was produced1 
and by which reproduction and judgment  
are made possible1 shows how important  
is the function fulfilled by historical 
research concerning artistic and        
literary works2 that is to say1 by what 
is usually called historical criticism1 
or method1 in literature and art4       
,without tradition and historical       

criticism1 the enjoyment of all or      
nearly all works of art produced by     
humanity1 would be irrevocably lost3 we 
should be little more than animals1     
immersed in the present alone1 or in the
 most recent past4 ,only fools despise  
and laugh at him who reconstitutes an   
authentic text1 explains the sense of   
words and customs1 investigates the     
conditions in which an artist lived1 and
 accomplishes all those labours which   
revive the qualities and the original   
colouring of works of art4  ,sometimes  
the depreciatory or negative judgment   
refers to the presumed or proved        
uselessness of many researches1 made to 
recover the correct meaning of artistic 
works4 ,but1 it must be observed1 in the
 first place1 that historical research  
does not only fulfil the task of helping
 to reproduce and judge artistic works3 
the biography of a writer or of an      
artist1 for example1 and the study of   
the costume of a period1 also possess   
their own interest1 foreign to the      

history of art1 but not foreign to other
 forms of history4 ,if allusion be made 
to those researches which do not appear 
to have interest of any kind1 nor to    
fulfil any purpose1 it must be replied  
that the historical student must often  
reconcile himself to the useful1 but    
little glorious1 office of a cataloguer 
of facts4 ,these facts remain for the   
time being formless1 incoherent1 and    
insignificant1 but they are preserves1  
or mines1 for the historian of the      
future and for whomsoever may afterwards
 want them for any purpose4 ,in the same
 way1 books which nobody asks for are   
placed on the shelves and are noted in  
the catalogues1 because they may be     
asked for at some time or other4        
,certainly1 in the same way that an     
intelligent librarian gives the         
preference to the acquisition and to the
 cataloguing of those books which he    
foresees may be of more or better       
service1 so do intelligent students     
possess the instinct as to what is or   

may more probably be useful from among  
the mass of facts which they are        
investigating4 ,others1 on the other    
hand1 less well-endowed1 less           
intelligent1 or more hasty in producing1
 accumulate useless selections1         
rejections and erasures1 and lose       
themselves in refinements and gossipy   
discussions4 ,but this appertains to the
 economy of research1 and is not our    
affair4 ,at the most1 it is the affair  
of the master who selects the subjects1 
of the publisher who pays for the       
printing1 and of the critic who is      
called upon to praise or to blame the   
students for their researches4  ,on the 
other hand1 it is evident1 that         
historical research1 directed to        
illuminate a work of art by placing us  
in a position to judge it1 does not     
alone suffice to bring it to birth in   
our spirit3 taste1 and an imagination   
trained and awakened1 are likewise      
presupposed4 ,the greatest historical   
erudition may accompany a taste in part 

gross or defective1 a lumbering         
imagination1 or1 as it is generally     
phrased1 a cold1 hard heart1 closed to  
art4 ,which is the lesser evil8--great  
erudition and defective taste1 or       
natural good taste and great ignorance8 
,the question has often been asked1 and 
perhaps it will be best to deny its     
possibility1 because one cannot tell    
which of two evils is the less1 or what 
exactly that means4 ,the merely learned 
man never succeeds in entering into     
communication with the great spirits1   
and keeps wandering for ever about the  
outer courts1 the staircases1 and the   
antechambers of their palaces2 but the  
gifted ignoramus either passes by       
masterpieces which are to him           
inaccessible1 or instead of             
understanding the works of art1 as they 
really are1 he invents others1 with his 
imagination4 ,now1 the labour of the    
former may at least serve to enlighten  
others2 but the ingenuity of the latter 
remains altogether sterile4 ,how1 then1 

can we fail to prefer the conscientious 
learned man to the inconclusive man of  
talent1 who is not really talented1 if  
he resign himself1 and in so far as he  
resigns himself1 to come to no          
conclusion8      ,sidenote ,literary and
 artistic history4 ,its distinction from
                historical criticism and
 from artistic judgement4  ,it is       
necessary to distinguish accurately the 
history1 of art and literature from     
those historical labours which make use 
of works of art1 but for extraneous     
purposes 7such as biography1 civil1     
religious1 and political history1 etc471
 and also from historical erudition1    
whose object is preparation for the     
,aesthetic synthesis of reproduction4   
,the difference between the first of    
these is obvious4 ,the history of art   
and literature has the works of art     
themselves for principal subject2 the   
other branches of study call upon and   
interrogate works of art1 but only as   
witnesses1 from which to discover the   

truth of facts which are not aesthetic4 
,the second difference to which we have 
referred may seem less profound4        
,however1 it is very great4 ,erudition  
devoted to rendering clear again the    
understanding of works of art1 aims     
simply at making appear a certain       
internal fact1 an aesthetic             
reproduction4 ,artistic and literary    
history1 on the other hand1 does not    
appear until such reproduction has been 
obtained4 ,it demands1 therefore1       
further labour4 ,like all other history1
 its object is to record precisely such 
facts as have really taken place1 that  
is1 artistic and literary facts4 ,a man 
who1 after having acquired the requisite
 historical erudition1 reproduces in    
himself and tastes a work of art1 may   
remain simply a man of taste1 or express
 at the most his own feeling1 with an   
exclamation of beautiful or ugly4 ,this 
does not suffice for the making of a    
historian of literature and art4 ,there 
is further need that the simple act of  

reproduction be followed in him by a    
second internal operation4 ,what is this
 new operation8 ,it is1 in its turn1 an 
expression3 the expression of the       
reproduction2 the historical            
description1 exposition1 or             
representation4 ,there is this          
difference1 then1 between the man of    
taste and the historian3 the first      
merely reproduces in his spirit the work
 of art2 the second1 after having       
reproduced it1 represents it            
historically1 thus applying to it those 
categories by which1 as we know1 history
 is differentiated from pure art4       
,artistic and literary history is1      
therefore1 a historical work of art     
founded upon one or more works of art4  
,the denomination of artistic or        
literary critic is used in various      
senses3 sometimes it is applied to the  
student who devotes his services to     
literature2 sometimes to the historian  
who reveals the works of art of the past
 in their reality2 more often to both4  

,by critic is sometimes understood1 in a
 more restricted sense1 he who judges   
and describes contemporary literary     
works2 and by historian1 he who is      
occupied with less recent works4 ,these 
are but linguistic usages and empirical 
distinctions1 which may be neglected2   
because the true difference lies between
 the learned man1 the man of taste1 and 
the historian of art4 ,these words      
designate1 as it were1 three successive 
stages of work1 of which each is        
relatively independent of the one that  
follows1 but not of that which precedes4
 ,as we have seen1 a man may be simply  
learned1 yet possess little capacity for
 understanding works of art2 he may     
indeed be both learned and possess      
taste1 yet be unable to write a page of 
artistic and literary history4 ,but the 
true and complete historian1 while      
containing in himself1 as necessary     
pre-requisites1 both the learned man and
 the man of taste1 must add to their    
qualities the gift of historical        

comprehension and representation4       
,sidenote ,the method of artistic and   
literary history4  ,the method of       
artistic and literary history presents  
problems and difficulties1 some common  
to all historical method1 others        
peculiar to it1 because they derive from
 the concept of art itself4             
,sidenote ,critique of the problem of   
the origin of art4  ,history is wont to 
be divided into the history of man1 the 
history or nature1 and the mixed history
 of both the preceding4 ,without        
examining here the question of the      
solidity of this division1 it is clear  
that artistic and literary history      
belongs in any case to the first1 since 
it concerns a spiritual activity1 that  
is to say1 an activity proper to man4   
,and since this activity is its subject1
 the absurdity of propounding the       
historical problem of the origin of art 
becomes at once evident4 ,we should note
 that by this formula many different    
things have in turn been included on    

many different occasions4 ,origin has   
often meant nature or disposition of the
 artistic fact1 and here was a real     
scientific or philosophic problem1 the  
very problem1 in fact1 which our        
treatise has tried to solve4 ,at other  
times1 by origin has been understood the
 ideal genesis1 the search for the      
reason of art1 the deduction of the     
artistic fact from a first principle    
containing in itself both spirit and    
nature4 ,this is also a philosophical   
problem1 and it is complementary to the 
preceding1 indeed it coincides with it1 
though it has sometimes been strangely  
interpreted and solved by means of an   
arbitrary and semi-fantastic metaphysic4
 ,but when it has been sought to        
discover further exactly in what way the
 artistic function was historically     
formed1 this has resulted in the        
absurdity to which we have referred4 ,if
 expression be the first form of        
consciousness1 how can the historical   
origin be sought of what is presupposed 

not to be a product of nature and of    
human history8 ,how can we find the     
historical genesis of that which is a   
category1 by means of which every       
historical genesis and fact are         
understood8 ,the absurdity has arisen   
from the comparison with human          
institutions1 which have1 in fact1 been 
formed in the course of history1 and    
which have disappeared or may disappear 
in its course4 ,there exists between the
 aesthetic fact and a human institution 
7such as monogamic marriage or the fief7
 a difference to some extent comparable 
with that between simple and compound   
bodies in chemistry4 ,it is impossible  
to indicate the formation of the former1
 otherwise they would not be simple1 and
 if this be discovered1 they cease to be
 simple and become compound4  ,the      
problem of the origin of art1           
historically understood1 is only        
justified when it is proposed to seek1  
not for the formation of the function1  
but where and when art has appeared for 

the first time 7appeared1 that is to    
say1 in a striking manner71 at what     
point or in what region of the globe1   
and at what point or epoch of its       
history2 when1 that is to say1 not the  
origin of art1 but its most antique or  
primitive history1 is the object of     
research4 ,this problem forms one with  
that of the appearance of human         
civilization on the earth4 ,data for its
 solution are certainly wanting1 but    
there yet remains the abstract          
possibility1 and certainly attempts and 
hypotheses for its solution abound4     
,sidenote ,history and the criterion of 
progress4  ,every form of human history 
has the concept of progress for         
foundation4 ,but by progress must not be
 understood the imaginary and           
metaphysical law of progress1 which     
should lead the generations of man with 
irresistible force to some unknown      
destiny1 according to a providential    
plan which we can logically divine and  
understand4 ,a supposed law of this sort

 is the negation of history itself1 of  
that accidentality1 that empiricity1    
that contingency1 which distinguish the 
concrete fact from the abstraction4 ,and
 for the same reason1 progress has      
nothing to do with the so-called law of 
evolution4 ,if evolution mean the       
concrete fact of reality which evolves  
7that is1 which is reality71 it is not a
 law4 ,if1 on the other hand1 it be a   
law1 it becomes confounded with the law 
of progress in the sense just described4
 ,the progress of which we speak here1  
is nothing but the concept of human     
activity itself1 which1 working upon the
 material supplied to it by nature1     
conquers obstacles and bends nature to  
its own ends4  ,such conception of      
progress1 that is to say1 of human      
activity applied to a given material1 is
 the point of view of the historian of  
humanity4 ,no one but a mere collector  
of stray facts1 a simple seeker1 or an  
incoherent chronicler1 can put together 
the smallest narrative of human deeds1  

unless he have a definite point of view1
 that is to say1 an intimate personal   
conviction regarding the conception of  
the facts which he has undertaken to    
relate4 ,the historical work of art     
cannot be achieved among the confused   
and discordant mass of crude facts1 save
 by means of this point of view1 which  
makes it possible to carve a definite   
figure from that rough and incoherent   
mass4 ,the historian of a practical     
action should know what is economy and  
what morality2 the historian of         
mathematics1 what are mathematics2 the  
historian of botany1 what is botany2 the
 historian of philosophy1 what is       
philosophy4 ,but if he do not really    
know these things1 he must at least have
 the illusion of knowing them2 otherwise
 he will never be able to delude himself
 that he is writing history4  ,we cannot
 delay here to demonstrate the necessity
 and the inevitability of this          
subjective criterion in every narrative 
of human affairs4 ,we will merely say   

that this criterion is compatible with  
the utmost objectivity1 impartiality1   
and scrupulosity in dealing with data1  
and indeed forms a constitutive element 
of such subjective criterion4 ,it       
suffices to read any book of history to 
discover at once the point of view of   
the author1 if he be a historian worthy 
of the name and know his own business4  
,there exist liberal and reactionary1   
rationalist and catholic historians1 who
 deal with political or social history2 
for the history of philosophy there are 
metaphysical1 empirical1 sceptical1     
idealist1 and spiritualist historians4  
,absolutely historical historians do not
 and cannot exist4 ,can it be said that 
,thucydides and ,polybius1 ,livy and    
,tacitus1 ,machiavelli and              
,guicciardini1 ,giannone and ,voltaire1 
were without moral and political views2 
and1 in our time1 ,guizot or ,thiers1   
,macaulay or ,balbo1 ,ranke or ,mommsen8
 ,and in the history of philosophy1 from
 ,hegel1 who was the first to raise it  

to a great elevation1 to ,ritter1       
,zeller1 ,cousin1 ,lewes1 and our       
,spaventa1 was there one who did not    
possess his conception of progress and  
criterion of judgment8 ,is there one    
single work of any value in the history 
of ,aesthetic1 which has not been       
written from this or that point of view1
 with this or that bias 7,hegelian or   
,herbartian71 from a sensualist or from 
an eclectic point of view1 and so on8   
,if the historian is to escape from the 
inevitable necessity of taking a side1  
he must become a political and          
scientific eunuch2 and history is not   
the business of eunuchs4 ,they would at 
most be of use in compiling those great 
tomes of not useless erudition1 elumbis 
atque fracta1 which are called1 not     
without reason1 monkish4  ,if1 then1 the
 concept of progress1 the point of view1
 the criterion1 be inevitable1 the best 
to be done is not to try and escape from
 them1 but to obtain the best possible4 
,everyone strives for this end1 when he 

forms his own convictions1 seriously and
 laboriously4 ,historians who profess to
 wish to interrogate the facts1 without 
adding anything of their own to them1   
are not to be believed4 ,this1 at the   
most1 is the result of ingenuousness and
 illusion on their part3 they will      
always add what they have of personal1  
if they be truly historians1 though it  
be without knowing it1 or they will     
believe that they have escaped doing so1
 only because they have referred to it  
by innuendo1 which is the most          
insinuating and penetrative of methods4 
,sidenote ,non-existence of a unique    
line of progress in artistic            
and literary history4  ,artistic and    
literary history cannot dispense with   
the criterion of progress any more      
easily than other history4 ,we cannot   
show what a given work of art is1 save  
by proceeding from a conception of art1 
in order to fix the artistic problem    
which the author of such work of art had
 to solve1 and by determining whether or

 no he have solved it1 or by how much   
and in what way he has failed to do so4 
,but it is important to note that the   
criterion of progress assumes a         
different form in artistic and literary 
history to that which it assumes 7or is 
believed to assume7 in the history of   
science4  ,the whole history of         
knowledge can be represented by one     
single line of progress and regress4    
,science is the universal1 and its      
problems are arranged in one single vast
 system1 or complex problem4 ,all       
thinkers weary themselves over the same 
problem as to the nature of reality and 
of knowledge3 contemplative ,indians and
 ,greek philosophers1 ,christians and   
,mohammedans1 bare heads and heads with 
turbans1 wigged heads and heads with the
 black berretta 7as ,heine said72 and   
future generations will weary themselves
 with it1 as ours has done4 ,it would   
take too long to inquire here if this be
 true or not of science4 ,but it is     
certainly not true of art2 art is       

intuition1 and intuition is             
individuality1 and individuality is     
never repeated4 ,to conceive of the     
history of the artistic production of   
the human race as developed along a     
single line of progress and regress1    
would therefore be altogether erroneous4
  ,at the most1 and working to some     
extent with generalizations and         
abstractions1 it may be admitted that   
the history of aesthetic products shows 
progressive cycles1 but each cycle has  
its own problem1 and is progressive only
 in respect to that problem4 ,when many 
are at work on the same subject1 without
 succeeding in giving to it the suitable
 form1 yet drawing always more nearly to
 it1 there is said to be progress4 ,when
 he who gives to it definite form       
appears1 the cycle is said to be        
complete1 progress ended4 ,a typical    
example of this would be the progress in
 the elaboration of the mode of using   
the subject-matter of chivalry1 during  
the ,italian ,renaissance1 from ,pulci  

to ,ariosto4 7,if this instance be made 
use of1 excessive simplification of it  
must be excused47 ,nothing but          
repetition and imitation could be the   
result of employing that same material  
after ,ariosto4 ,the result was         
repetition or imitation1 diminution or  
exaggeration1 a spoiling of what had    
already been achieved2 in sum1          
decadence4 ,the ,ariostesque epigoni    
prove this4 ,progress begins with the   
commencement of a new cycle4 ,cervantes1
 with his more open and conscious irony1
 is an instance of this4 ,in what did   
the general decadence of ,italian       
literature at the end of the sixteenth  
century consist8 ,simply in having      
nothing more to say1 and in repeating   
and exaggerating motives already found4 
,if the ,italians of this period had    
even been able to express their own     
decadence1 they would not have been     
altogether failures1 but have           
anticipated the literary movement of the
 ,renaissance4 ,where the subject-matter

 is not the same1 a progressive cycle   
does not exist4 ,shakespeare does not   
represent a progress as regards ,dante1 
nor ,goethe as regards ,shakespeare4    
,dante1 however1 represents a progress  
in respect to the visionaries of the    
,middle ,ages1 ,shakespeare to the      
,elizabethan dramatists1 ,goethe1 with  
,werther and the first part of ,faust1  
in respect to the writers of the ,sturm 
und ,drang4 ,this mode of presenting the
 history of poetry and art contains1    
however1 as we have remarked1 something 
of abstract1 of merely practical1 and is
 without rigorous philosophical value4  
,not only is the art of savages not     
inferior1 as art1 to that of civilized  
peoples1 provided it be correlative to  
the impressions of the savage2 but every
 individual1 indeed every moment of the 
spiritual life of an individual1 has its
 artistic world2 and all those worlds   
are1 artistically1 incomparable with one
 another4      ,sidenote ,errors        
committed in respect to this law4  ,many

 have sinned and continue to sin against
 this special form of the criterion of  
progress in artistic and literary       
history4 ,some1 for instance1 talk of   
the infancy of ,italian art in ,giotto1 
and of its maturity in ,raphael or in   
,titian2 as though ,giotto were not     
quite perfect and complete1 in respect  
to his psychic material4 ,he was        
certainly incapable of drawing a figure 
like ,raphael1 or of colouring it like  
,titian2 but was ,raphael or ,titian by 
any chance capable of creating the      
,matrimonio di ,san ,francesco con la   
,povert1 or the ,morte di ,san          
,francesco8 ,the spirit of ,giotto had  
not felt the attraction of the body     
beautiful1 which the ,renaissance       
studied and raised to a place of honour2
 but the spirits of ,raphael and of     
,titian were no longer curious of       
certain movements of ardour and of      
tenderness1 which attracted the man of  
the fourteenth century4 ,how1 then1 can 
a comparison be made1 where there is no 

comparative term8  ,the celebrated      
divisions of the history of art suffer  
from the same defect4 ,they are as      
follows3 an oriental period1            
representing a disequilibrium between   
idea and form1 with prevalence of the   
second2 a classical1 representing an    
equilibrium between idea and form2 a    
romantic1 representing a new            
disequilibrium between idea and form1   
with prevalence of the idea4 ,there are 
also the divisions into oriental art1   
representing imperfection of form2      
classical1 perfection of form2 romantic 
or modern1 perfection of content and of 
form4 ,thus classic and romantic have   
also received1 among their many other   
meanings1 that of progressive or        
regressive periods1 in respect to the   
realization of some indefinite artistic 
ideal of humanity4      ,sidenote ,other
 meanings of the word progress in       
respect to                ,aesthetic4   
,there is no such thing1 then1 as an    
aesthetic progress of humanity4         

,however1 by aesthetic progress is      
sometimes meant1 not what the two words 
coupled together really signify1 but the
 ever-increasing accumulation of our    
historical knowledge1 which makes us    
able to sympathize with all the artistic
 products of all peoples and of all     
times1 or1 as is said1 to make our taste
 more catholic4 ,the difference appears 
very great1 if the eighteenth century1  
so incapable of escaping from itself1 be
 compared with our own time1 which      
enjoys alike ,hellenic and ,roman art1  
now better understood1 ,byzantine1      
mediaeval1 ,arabic1 and ,renaissance    
art1 the art of the ,cinque ,cento1     
baroque art1 and the art of the         
seventeenth century4 ,egyptian1         
,babylonian1 ,etruscan1 and even        
prehistoric art1 are more profoundly    
studied every day4 ,certainly1 the      
difference between the savage and       
civilized man does not lie in the human 
faculties4 ,the savage has speech1      
intellect1 religion1 and morality1 in   

common with civilized man1 and he is a  
complete man4 ,the only difference lies 
in that civilized man penetrates and    
dominates a larger portion of the       
universe with his theoretic and         
practical activity4 ,we cannot claim to 
be more spiritually alert than1 for     
example1 the contemporaries of          
,pericles2 but no one can deny that we  
are richer than they--rich with their   
riches and with those of how many other 
peoples and generations besides our own8
  ,by aesthetic progress is also meant1 
in another sense1 which is also         
improper1 the greater abundance of      
artistic intuitions and the smaller     
number of imperfect or decadent works   
which one epoch produces in respect to  
another4 ,thus it may be said that there
 was aesthetic progress1 an artistic    
awakening1 at the end of the thirteenth 
or of the fifteenth centuries4          
,finally1 aesthetic progress is talked  
of1 with an eye to the refinement and to
 the psychical complications exhibited  

in the works of art of the most         
civilized peoples1 as compared with     
those of less civilized peoples1        
barbarians and savages4 ,but in this    
case1 the progress is that of the       
complex conditions of society1 not of   
the artistic activity1 to which the     
material is indifferent4  ,these are the
 most important points concerning the   
method of artistic and literary history4
     ,,xviii  ,,conclusion3  ,,identity 
,,of ,,linguistic ,,and ,,aesthetic     
,sidenote ,summary of the inquiry4  ,a  
glance over the path traversed will show
 that we have completed the entire      
programme of our treatise4 ,we have     
studied the nature of intuitive or      
expressive knowledge1 which is the      
aesthetic or artistic fact 7,i4 and     
,,ii471 and we have described the other 
form of knowledge1 namely1 the          
intellectual1 with the secondary        
complications of its forms 7,,iii474    
,having done this1 it became possible to
 criticize all erroneous theories of    

art1 which arise from the confusion     
between the various forms1 and from the 
undue transference of the               
characteristics of one form to those of 
another 7,,iv471 and in so doing to     
indicate the inverse errors which are   
found in the theory of intellectual     
knowledge and of historiography 7,v474  
,passing on to examine the relations    
between the aesthetic activity and the  
other spiritual activities1 no longer   
theoretic but practical1 we have        
indicated the true character of the     
practical activity and the place which  
it occupies in respect to the theoretic 
activity1 which it follows3 hence the   
critique of the invasion of aesthetic   
theory by practical concepts 7,,vi474   
,we have also distinguished the two     
forms of the practical activity1 as     
economic and ethic 7,,vii471 adding to  
this the statement that there are no    
other forms of the spirit beyond the    
four which we have analyzed2 hence      
7,,viii47 the critique of every         

metaphysical ,aesthetic4 ,and1 seeing   
that there exist no other spiritual     
forms of equal degree1 therefore there  
are no original subdivisions of the four
 established1 and in particular of      
,aesthetic4 ,from this arises the       
impossibility of classes of expressions 
and the critique of ,rhetoric1 that is1 
of the partition of expressions into    
simple and ornate1 and of their         
subclasses 7,,ix474 ,but1 by the law of 
the unity of the spirit1 the aesthetic  
fact is also a practical fact1 and as   
such1 occasions pleasure and pain4 ,this
 led us to study the feelings of value  
in general1 and those of aesthetic      
value1 or of the beautiful1 in          
particular 7,x471 to criticize aesthetic
 hedonism in all its various            
manifestations and complications        
7,,xi471 and to expel from the system of
 ,aesthetic the long series of          
pseudo-aesthetic concepts1 which had    
been introduced into it 7,,xii474       
,proceeding from aesthetic production to

 the facts of reproduction1 we began by 
investigating the mode of fixing        
externally the aesthetic expression1    
with the view of reproduction4 ,this is 
the so-called physically beautiful1     
whether it be natural or artificial     
7,,xiii474 ,we then derived from this   
distinction the critique of the errors  
which arise from confounding the        
physical with the aesthetic side of     
things 7,,xiv474 ,we indicated the      
meaning of artistic technique1 that     
which is the technique serving for      
reproduction1 thus criticizing the      
divisions1 limits1 and classifications  
of the individual arts1 and establishing
 the connections between art1 economy1  
and morality 7,,xv474 ,because the      
existence of the physical objects does  
not suffice to stimulate to the full    
aesthetic reproduction1 and because1 in 
order to obtain this result1 it is      
necessary to recall the conditions in   
which the stimulus first operated1 we   
have also studied the function of       

historical erudition1 directed toward   
the end of re-establishing our          
communication with the works of the     
past1 and toward the creation of a base 
for aesthetic judgment 7,,xvi474 ,we    
have closed our treatise by showing how 
the reproduction thus obtained is       
afterwards elaborated by the            
intellectual categories1 that is to say1
 by an excursus on the method of        
literary and artistic history 7,,xvii474
  ,the aesthetic fact has thus been     
considered both in itself and in its    
relations with the other spiritual      
activities1 with the feelings of        
pleasure and of pain1 with the facts    
that are called physical1 with memory1  
and with historical elaboration4 ,it has
 passed from the position of subject to 
that of object1 that is to say1 from the
 moment of its birth1 until gradually it
 becomes changed for the spirit into    
historical argument4  ,our treatise may 
appear to be somewhat meagre1 when      
compared with the great volumes usually 

consecrated to ,aesthetic4 ,but it will 
not seem so1 when it is observed that   
these volumes1 as regards nine-tenths of
 their contents1 are full of matter     
which does not appertain to ,aesthetic1 
such as definitions1 either psychical or
 metaphysical1 of pseudo-aesthetic      
concepts 7of the sublime1 the comic1 the
 tragic1 the humorous1 etc471 or of the 
exposition of the supposed ,zoology1    
,botany1 and ,mineralogy of ,aesthetic1 
and of universal history judged from the
 aesthetic standpoint4 ,the whole       
history of concrete art and literature  
has also been dragged into those        
,aesthetics and generally mangled2 they 
contain judgments upon ,homer and       
,dante1 upon ,ariosto and ,shakespeare1 
upon ,beethoven and ,rossini1           
,michelangelo and ,raphael4 ,when all   
this has been deducted from them1 our   
treatise will no longer be held to be   
too meagre1 but1 on the contrary1 far   
more copious than ordinary treatises1   
for these either omit altogether1 or    

hardly touch at all1 the greater part of
 the difficult problems proper to       
,aesthetic1 which we have felt it to be 
our duty to study4      ,sidenote       
,identity of ,linguistic and ,aesthetic4
  ,aesthetic1 then1 as the science of   
expression1 has been here studied by us 
from every point of view4 ,but there yet
 remains to justify the sub-title1 which
 we have joined to the title of our     
book1 ,general ,linguistic1 and to state
 and make clear the thesis that the     
science of art is that of language4     
,aesthetic and ,linguistic1 in so far as
 they are true sciences1 are not two    
different sciences1 but one single      
science4 ,not that there is a special   
,linguistic2 but the linguistic science 
sought for1 general ,linguistic1 in so  
far as what it contains is reducible to 
philosophy1 is nothing but ,aesthetic4  
,whoever studies general ,linguistic1   
that is to say1 philosophical           
,linguistic1 studies aesthetic problems1
 and vice versa4 ,philosophy of language

 and philosophy of art are the same     
thing4  ,were ,linguistic a different   
science from ,aesthetic1 it should not  
have expression1 which is the           
essentially aesthetic fact1 for its     
object4 ,this amounts to saying that it 
must be denied that language is         
expression4 ,but an emission of sounds1 
which expresses nothing1 is not         
language4 ,language is articulate1      
limited1 organized sound1 employed in   
expression4 ,if1 on the other hand1     
language were a special science in      
respect to ,aesthetic1 it would         
necessarily have for its object a       
special class of expressions4 ,but the  
inexistence of classes of expression is 
a point which we have already           
demonstrated4      ,sidenote ,aesthetic 
formulization of linguistic problems4   
,nature                of language4     
,the problems which ,linguistic serves  
to solve1 and the errors with which     
,linguistic strives and has striven1 are
 the same that occupy and complicate    

,aesthetic4 ,if it be not always easy1  
it is1 on the other hand1 always        
possible1 to reduce the philosophic     
questions of ,linguistic to their       
aesthetic formula4  ,the disputes as to 
the nature of the one find their        
parallel in those as to the nature of   
the other4 ,thus it has been disputed1  
whether ,linguistic be a scientific or a
 historical discipline1 and the         
scientific having been distinguished    
from the historical1 it has been asked  
whether it belong to the order of the   
natural or of the psychological         
sciences1 by the latter being understood
 empirical ,psychology1 as much as the  
science of the spirit4 ,the same has    
happened with ,aesthetic1 which some    
have looked upon as a natural science1  
confounding aesthetic expression with   
physical expression4 ,others have looked
 upon it as a psychological science1    
confounding expression in its           
universality1 with the empirical        
classification of expressions4 ,others  

again1 denying the very possibility of a
 science of such a subject1 have looked 
upon it as a collection of historical   
facts4 ,finally1 it has been realized   
that it belongs to the sciences of      
activity or of values1 which are the    
spiritual sciences4  ,linguistic        
expression1 or speech1 has often seemed 
to be a fact of interjection1 which     
belongs to the so-called physical       
expressions of the feelings1 common     
alike to men and animals4 ,but it was   
soon admitted that an abyss yawns       
between the ,ah6 which is a physical    
reflex of pain1 and a word2 as also     
between that ,ah6 of pain and the ,ah6  
employed as a word4 ,the theory of the  
interjection being abandoned 7jocosely  
termed the ,ah6 ,ah6 theory by ,german  
linguists71 the theory of association or
 convention appeared4 ,this theory was  
refuted by the same objection which     
destroyed aesthetic associationism in   
general3 speech is unity1 not           
multiplicity of images1 and multiplicity

 does not explain1 but presupposes the  
existence of the expression to explain4 
,a variant of linguistic associationism 
is the imitative1 that is to say1 the   
theory of the onomatopoeia1 which the   
same philologists deride under the name 
of the bow-wow theory1 after the        
imitation of the dog's bark1 which1     
according to the onomatopoeists1 gives  
its name to the dog4  ,the most usual   
theory of our times as regards language 
7apart from mere crass naturalism7      
consists of a sort of eclecticism or    
mixture of the various theories to which
 we have referred4 ,it is assumed that  
language is in part the product of      
interjections and in part of onomatopes 
and conventions4 ,this doctrine is      
altogether worthy of the scientific and 
philosophic decadence of the second half
 of the nineteenth century4             
,sidenote ,origin of language and its   
development4  ,we must here note a      
mistake into which have fallen those    
very philologists who have best         

penetrated the active nature of         
language4 ,these1 although they admit   
that language was originally a spiritual
 creation1 yet maintain that it was     
largely increased later by association4 
,but the distinction does not prevail1  
for origin in this case cannot mean     
anything but nature or essence4 ,if1    
therefore1 language be a spiritual      
creation1 it will always be a creation2 
if it be association1 it will have been 
so from the beginning4 ,the mistake has 
arisen from not having grasped the      
general principle of ,aesthetic1 which  
we have noted3 namely1 that expressions 
already produced must redescend to the  
rank of impressions before they can give
 rise to new impressions4 ,when we utter
 new words1 we generally transform the  
old ones1 varying or enlarging their    
meaning2 but this process is not        
associative4 ,it is creative1 although  
the creation has for material the       
impressions1 not of the hypothetical    
primitive man1 but of man who has lived 

long ages in society1 and who has1 so to
 say1 stored so many things in his      
psychic organism1 and among them so much
 language4      ,sidenote ,relation     
between ,grammar and ,logic4  ,the      
question of the distinction between the 
aesthetic and the intellectual fact has 
appeared in ,linguistic as that of the  
relations between ,grammar and ,logic4  
,this question has found two solutions1 
which are partially true3 that of the   
indissolubility of ,logic and ,grammar1 
and that of their dissolubility4 ,the   
complete solution is this3 if the       
logical form be indissoluble from the   
grammatical 7aesthetic71 the grammatical
 is dissoluble from the logical4        
,sidenote ,grammatical classes or parts 
of speech4  ,if we look at a picture    
which1 for example1 portrays a man      
walking on a country road1 we can say3  
,this picture represents a fact of      
movement1 which1 if conceived as        
volitional1 is called action4 ,and      
because every movement implies matter1  

and every action a being that acts1 this
 picture also represents either matter  
or a being4 ,but this movement takes    
place in a definite place1 which is a   
part of a given star 7the ,earth71 and  
precisely in that part of it which is   
called terra-firma1 and more properly in
 a part of it that is wooded and covered
 with grass1 which is called country1   
cut naturally or artificially1 in a     
manner which is called road4 ,now1 there
 is only one example of that given star1
 which is called ,earth3 ,earth is an   
individual4 ,but terra-firma1 country1  
road1 are classes or universals1 because
 there are other terra-firmas1 other    
countries1 other roads4 ,and it would be
 possible to continue for a while with  
similar considerations4 ,by substituting
 a phrase for the picture that we have  
imagined1 for example1 one to this      
effect1 ,peter is walking on a country  
road1 and by making the same remarks1 we
 obtain the concepts of verb 7motion or 
action71 of noun 7matter or agent71 of  

proper noun1 of common nouns2 and so on4
  ,what have we done in both cases8     
,neither more nor less than to submit to
 logical elaboration what was first     
elaborated only aesthetically2 that is  
to say1 we have destroyed the           
aesthetical by the logical4 ,but1 as in 
general ,aesthetic1 error begins when   
,it is wished to return from the logical
 to the aesthetical1 and it is asked    
what is the expression of movement1     
action1 matter1 being1 of the general1  
of the individual1 etc42 thus in like   
manner with language1 error begins when 
motion or action are called verb1 being1
 or matter1 noun or substantive1 and    
when linguistic categories1 or parts of 
speech1 are made of all these1 noun and 
verb and so on4 ,the theory of parts of 
speech is at bottom altogether the same 
as that of artistic and literary        
classes1 already criticized in the      
,aesthetic4  ,it is false to say that   
the verb or the noun is expressed in    
definite words1 truly distinguishable   

from others4 ,expression is an          
indivisible whole4 ,noun and verb do not
 exist in themselves1 but are           
abstractions made by our destroying the 
sole linguistic reality1 which is the   
proposition4 ,this last is to be        
understood1 not in the usual mode of    
grammarians1 but as an organism         
expressive of a complete meaning1 from  
an exclamation to a poem4 ,this sounds  
paradoxical1 but is nevertheless a most 
simple truth4  ,and as in ,aesthetic1   
the artistic productions of certain     
peoples have been looked upon as        
imperfect1 owing to the error above     
mentioned1 because the supposed kinds   
have seemed still to be indiscriminate  
or absent with them2 so1 in ,linguistic1
 the theory of the parts of speech has  
caused the analogous error of dividing  
languages into formed and unformed1     
according to whether there appear in    
them or not some of those supposed parts
 of speech2 for example1 the verb4      
,sidenote ,the individuality of speech  

and the classification of               
languages4  ,linguistic also discovered 
the irreducible individuality of the    
aesthetic fact1 when it affirmed that   
the word is what is really spoken1 and  
that two truly identical words do not   
exist4 ,thus were synonyms and homonyms 
destroyed1 and thus was shown the       
impossibility of really translating one 
word into another1 from so-called       
dialect into so-called language1 and    
from a so-called mother-tongue into a   
so-called foreign tongue4  ,but the     
attempt to classify languages agrees ill
 with this correct view4 ,languages have
 no reality beyond the propositions and 
complexes of propositions really written
 and pronounced by given peoples for    
definite periods4 ,that is to say1 they 
have no existence outside the works of  
art1 in which they exist concretely4    
,what is the art of a given people but  
the complex of all its artistic         
products8 ,what is the character of an  
art 7say1 ,hellenic art or ,provenal    

literature71 but the complex physiognomy
 of those products8 ,and how can such a 
question be answered1 save by giving the
 history of their art 7of their         
literature1 that is to say1 of their    
language in action78  ,it will seem that
 this argument1 although possessing     
value as against many of the wonted     
classifications of languages1 yet is    
without any as regards that queen of    
classifications1 the                    
historico-genealogical1 that glory of   
comparative philology4 ,and this is     
certainly true4 ,but why8 ,precisely    
because the historico-genealogical      
method is not a classification4 ,he who 
writes history does not classify1 and   
the philologists themselves have        
hastened to say that the languages which
 can be arranged in a historical series 
7those whose series have been traced7   
are1 not distinct and definite species1 
but a complex of facts in the various   
phases of its development4              
,sidenote ,impossibility of a normative 

grammar4  ,language has sometimes been  
looked upon as an act of volition or of 
choice4 ,but others have discovered the 
impossibility of creating language      
artificially1 by an act of will4 ,tu1   
,caesar1 civitatem dare potes homini1   
verbo non poles6 was once said to the   
,roman ,emperor4  ,the aesthetic 7and   
therefore theoretic7 nature of          
expression supplies the method of       
correcting the scientific error which   
lies in the conception of a 7normative7 
,grammar1 containing the rules of       
speaking well4 ,good sense has always   
rebelled against this error4 ,an example
 of such rebellion is the ,so much the  
worse for grammar of ,voltaire4 ,but the
 impossibility of a normative grammar is
 also recognized by those who teach it1 
when they confess that to write well    
cannot be learned by rules1 that there  
are no rules without exceptions1 and    
that the study of ,grammar should be    
conducted practically1 by reading and by
 examples1 which form the literary      

taste4 ,the scientific reason of this   
impossibility lies in what we have      
already proved3 that a technique of the 
theoretical amounts to a contradiction  
in terms4 ,and what could a 7normative7 
grammar be1 but just a technique of     
linguistic expression1 that is to say1  
of a theoretic fact8      ,sidenote     
,didactic purposes4  ,the case in which 
,grammar is understood merely as an     
empirical discipline1 that is to say1 as
 a collection of groups useful for      
learning languages1 without any claim   
whatever to philosophic truth1 is quite 
different4 ,even the abstractions of the
 parts of speech are in this case both  
admissible and of assistance4  ,many    
books entitled treatises of ,linguistic 
have a merely didactic purpose2 they are
 simply scholastic manuals4 ,we find in 
them1 in truth1 a little of everything1 
from the description of the vocal       
apparatus and of the artificial machines
 7phonographs7 which can imitate it1 to 
summaries of the most important results 

obtained by ,indo-,european1 ,semitic1  
,coptic1 ,chinese1 or other philologies2
 from philosophic generalizations on the
 origin or nature of language1 to advice
 on calligraphy1 and the arrangement of 
schedules for philological spoils4 ,but 
this mass of notions1 which is here     
taught in a fragmentary and incomplete  
manner as regards the language in its   
essence1 the language as expression1    
resolves itself into notions of         
,aesthetic4 ,nothing exists outside     
,aesthetic1 which gives knowledge of the
 nature of language1 and empirical      
,grammar1 which is a pedagogic          
expedient1 save the ,history of         
languages in their living reality1 that 
is1 the history of concrete literary    
productions1 which is substantially     
identical with the ,history of          
literature4      ,sidenote ,elementary  
linguistic facts or roots4  ,the same   
mistake of confusing the physical with  
the aesthetic1 from which the elementary
 forms of the beautiful originate1 is   

made by those who seek for elementary   
aesthetic facts1 decorating with that   
name the divisions of the longer series 
of physical sounds into shorter series4 
,syllables1 vowels1 and consonants1 and 
the series of syllables called words    
which give no definite sense when taken 
alone1 are not facts of language1 but   
simple physical concepts of sounds4     
,another mistake of the same sort is    
that of roots1 to which the most able   
philologists now accord but a very      
limited value4 ,having confused physical
 with linguistic or expressive facts1   
and observing that1 in the order of     
ideas1 the simple precedes the complex1 
they necessarily ended by thinking that 
the smaller physical facts were the more
 simple4 ,hence the imaginary necessity 
that the most antique1 primitive        
languages1 had been monosyllabic1 and   
that the progress of historical research
 must lead to the discovery of          
monosyllabic roots4 ,but 7to follow up  
the imaginary hypothesis7 the first     

expression that the first man conceived 
may also have had a mimetic1 not a      
phonic reflex3 it may have been         
exteriorised1 not in a sound but in a   
gesture4 ,and assuming that it was      
exteriorised in a sound1 there is no    
reason to suppose that sound to have    
been monosyllabic rather than           
plurisyllabic4 ,philologists frequently 
blame their own ignorance and impotence1
 if they do not always succeed in       
reducing plurisyllabism to              
monosyllabism1 and they trust in the    
future4 ,but their faith is without     
foundation1 as their blame of themselves
 is an act of humility arising from an  
erroneous presumption4  ,furthermore1   
the limits of syllables1 as those of    
words1 are altogether arbitrary1 and    
distinguished1 as well as may be1 by    
empirical use4 ,primitive speech1 or the
 speech of the uncultured man1 is       
continuous1 unaccompanied by any reflex 
consciousness of the divisions of the   
word and of the syllables1 which are    

taught at school4 ,no true law of       
,linguistic can be founded on such      
divisions4 ,proof of this is to be found
 in the confession of linguists1 that   
there are no truly phonetic laws of the 
hiatus1 of cacophony1 of diaeresis1 of  
synaeresis1 but merely laws of taste and
 convenience2 that is to say1 aesthetic 
laws4 ,and what are the laws of words   
which are not at the same time laws of  
style8      ,sidenote ,aesthetic        
judgment and the model language4  ,the  
search for a model language1 or for a   
method of reducing linguistic usage to  
unity1 arises from the misconception of 
a rationalistic measurement of the      
beautiful1 from the concept which we    
have termed that of false aesthetic     
absoluteness4 ,in ,italy1 we call this  
question that of the unity of the       
language4  ,language is perpetual       
creation4 ,what has been linguistically 
expressed cannot be repeated1 save by   
the reproduction of what has already    
been produced4 ,the ever-new impressions

 give rise to continuous changes of     
sounds and of meanings1 that is1 to     
ever-new expressions4 ,to seek the model
 language1 then1 is to seek the         
immobility of motion4 ,every one speaks1
 and should speak1 according to the     
echoes which things arouse in his soul1 
that is1 according to his impressions4  
,it is not without reason that the most 
convinced supporter of any one of the   
solutions of the problem of the unity of
 language 7be it by the use of ,latin1  
of fourteenth-century ,italian1 or of   
,florentine7 feels a repugnance in      
applying his theory1 when he is speaking
 in order to communicate his thoughts   
and to make himself understood4 ,the    
reason for this is that he feels that   
were he to substitute ,latin1           
fourteenth-century ,italian1 or         
,florentine speech for that of a        
different origin1 but which answers to  
his impressions1 he would be falsifying 
the latter4 ,he would become a vain     
listener to himself1 instead of a       

speaker1 a pedant in place of a serious 
man1 a histrion instead of a sincere    
person4 ,to write according to a theory 
is not really to write3 at the most1 it 
is making literature4  ,the question of 
the unity of language is always         
reappearing1 because1 put as it is1     
there can be no solution to it1 owing to
 its being based upon a false conception
 of what language is4 ,language is not  
an arsenal of ready-made arms1 and it is
 not vocabulary1 which1 in so far as it 
is thought of as progressive and in     
living use1 is always a cemetery1       
containing corpses more or less well    
embalmed1 that is to say1 a collection  
of abstractions4  ,our mode of settling 
the question of the model language1 or  
of the unity of the language1 may seem  
somewhat abrupt1 and yet we would not   
wish to appear otherwise than respectful
 towards the long line of literary men  
who have debated this question in ,italy
 for centuries4 ,but those ardent       
debates were1 at bottom1 debates upon   

aestheticity1 not upon aesthetic        
science1 upon literature rather than    
upon literary theory1 upon effective    
speaking and writing1 not upon          
linguistic science4 ,their error        
consisted in transforming the           
manifestation of a want into a          
scientific thesis1 the need of          
understanding one another more easily   
among a people dialectically divided1 in
 the philosophic search for a language1 
which should be one or ideal4 ,such a   
search was as absurd as that other      
search for a universal language1 with   
the immobility of the concept and of the
 abstraction4 ,the social need for a    
better understanding of one another     
cannot be satisfied save by universal   
culture1 by the increase of             
communications1 and by the interchange  
of thought among men4      ,sidenote    
,conclusion4  ,these observations must  
suffice to show that all the scientific 
problems of ,linguistic are the same as 
those of ,aesthetic1 and that the truths

 and errors of the one are the truths   
and errors of the other4 ,if ,linguistic
 and ,aesthetic appear to be two        
different sciences1 this arises from the
 fact that people think of the former as
 grammar1 or as a mixture between       
philosophy and grammar1 that is1 an     
arbitrary mnemonic scheme4 ,they do not 
think of it as a rational science and as
 a pure philosophy of speech4 ,grammar1 
or something grammatical1 also causes   
the prejudice in people's minds1 that   
the reality of language lies in isolated
 and combinable words1 not in living    
discourse among expressive organisms1   
rationally indivisible4  ,those         
linguists1 or glottologists with        
philosophical endowments1 who have best 
fathomed questions of language1 resemble
 7to employ a worn but efficacious      
figure7 workmen piercing a tunnel3 at a 
certain point they must hear the voices 
of their companions1 the philosophers of
 ,aesthetic1 who have been piercing it  
from the other side4 ,at a certain stage

 of scientific elaboration1 ,linguistic1
 in so far as it is philosophy1 must be 
merged in ,aesthetic2 and indeed it is  
merged in it1 without leaving a residue4
     ,,historical ,,summary  ,i         
,,aesthetic ,,ideas ,,in                
,,graeco-,,roman ,,antiquity   ,the     
question1 as to whether ,aesthetic      
should be looked upon as ancient or     
modern1 has often been discussed4 ,the  
answer will depend upon the view taken  
of the nature of ,aesthetic4  ,benedetto
 ,croce has proved that ,aesthetic is   
the science of expressive activity4 ,but
 this knowledge cannot be reached1 until
 has been defined the nature of         
imagination1 of representation1 of      
expression1 or whatever we may term that
 faculty which is theoretic1 but not    
intellectual1 which gives knowledge of  
the individual1 but not of the          
universal4  ,now the deviations from    
this1 the correct theory1 may arise in  
two ways3 by defect or by excess4       
,negation of the special aesthetic      

activity1 or of its autonomy1 is an     
instance of the former4 ,this amounts to
 a mutilation of the reality of the     
spirit4 ,of the latter1 the substitution
 or superposition of another mysterious 
and non-existent activity is an example4
  ,these errors each take several forms4
 ,that which errs by defect may be3 7a7 
pure hedonism1 which looks upon art as  
merely sensual pleasure2 7b7 rigoristic 
hedonism1 agreeing with 7a71 but adding 
that art is irreconcilable with the     
loftiest activities of man2 7c7         
moralistic or pedagogic hedonism1 which 
admits1 with the two former1 that art is
 mere sensuality1 but believes that it  
may not only be harmless1 but of some   
service to morals1 if kept in proper    
subjection and obedience4  ,the error by
 excess also assumes several forms1 but 
these are indeterminable a priori4 ,this
 view is fully dealt with under the name
 of mystic1 in the ,theory and in the   
,appendix4  ,graeco-,roman antiquity was
 occupied with the problem in all these 

forms4 ,in ,greece1 the problem of art  
and of the artistic faculty arose for   
the first time after the sophistic      
movement1 as a result of the ,socratic  
polemic4  ,with the appearance of the   
word mimesis or mimetic1 we have a first
 attempt at grouping the arts1 and the  
expression1 allegoric1 or its           
equivalent1 used in defence of ,homer's 
poetry1 reminds us of what ,plato called
 the old quarrel between philosophy and 
poetry4  ,but when internal facts were  
all looked upon as mere phenomena of    
opinion or feeling1 of pleasure or of   
pain1 of illusion or of arbitrary       
caprice1 there could be no question of  
beautiful or ugly1 of difference between
 the true and the beautiful1 or between 
the beautiful and the good4  ,the       
problem of the nature of art assumes as 
solved those problems concerning the    
difference between rational and         
irrational1 material and spiritual1 bare
 fact and value1 etc4 ,this was first   
done in the ,socratic period1 and       

therefore the aesthetic problem could   
only arise after ,socrates4  ,and in    
fact it does arise1 with ,plato1 the    
author of the only great negation of art
 which appears in the history of ideas4 
,is art rational or irrational8 ,does it
 belong to the noble region of the soul1
 where dwell philosophy and virtue1 or  
does it cohabit with sensuality and with
 crude passion in the lower regions8    
,this was the question that ,plato      
asked1 and thus was the aesthetic       
problem stated for the first time4  ,his
 ,gorgias remarks with sceptical acumen1
 that tragedy is a deception1 which     
brings honour alike to deceived and to  
deceiver1 and therefore it is           
blameworthy not to know how to deceive  
and not to allow oneself to be deceived4
 ,this suffices for ,gorgias1 but       
,plato1 the philosopher1 must resolve   
the doubt4 ,if it be in fact deception1 
down with tragedy and the other arts6   
,if it be not deception1 then what is   
the place of tragedy in philosophy and  

in the righteous life8 ,his answer was  
that art or mimetic does not realize the
 ideas1 or the truth of things1 but     
merely reproduces natural or artificial 
things1 which are themselves mere       
shadows of the ideas4 ,art1 then1 is but
 a shadow of a shadow1 a thing of       
third-rate degree4 ,the artificer       
fashions the object which the painter   
paints4 ,the artificer copies the divine
 idea and the painter copies him4 ,art  
therefore does not belong to the        
rational1 but to the irrational1 sensual
 sphere of the soul4 ,it can serve but  
for sensual pleasure1 which disturbs and
 obscures4 ,therefore must mimetic1     
poetry1 and poets be excluded from the  
perfect ,republic4  ,plato observed with
 truth1 that imitation does not rise to 
the logical or conceptual sphere1 of    
which poets and painters1 as such1 are1 
in fact1 ignorant4 ,but he failed to    
realize that there could be any form of 
knowledge other than the intellectual4  
,we now know that ,intuition lies on    

this side or outside the ,intellect1    
from which it differs as much as it does
 from passion and sensuality4  ,plato1  
with his fine aesthetic sense1 would    
have been grateful to anyone who could  
have shown him how to place art1 which  
he loved and practised so supremely     
himself1 among the lofty activities of  
the spirit4 ,but in his day1 no one     
could give him such assistance4 ,his    
conscience and his reason saw that art  
makes the false seem the true1 and      
therefore he resolutely banished it to  
the lower regions of the spirit4  ,the  
tendency among those who followed ,plato
 in time was to find some means of      
retaining art and of depriving it of the
 baleful influence which it was believed
 to exercise4 ,life without art was to  
the beauty-loving ,greek an             
impossibility1 although he was equally  
conscious of the demands of reason and  
of morality4 ,thus it happened that art1
 which1 on the purely hedonistic        
hypothesis1 had been treated as a       

beautiful courtezan1 became in the hands
 of the moralist1 a pedagogue4          
,aristophanes and ,strabo1 and above all
 ,aristotle1 dwell upon the didactic and
 moralistic possibility of poetry4 ,for 
,plutarch1 poetry seems to have been a  
sort of preparation for philosophy1 a   
twilight to which the eyes should grow  
accustomed1 before emerging into the    
full light of day4  ,among the ,romans1 
we find ,lucretius comparing the        
beauties of his great poem to the sweet 
yellow honey1 with which doctors are    
wont to anoint the rim of the cup       
containing their bitter drugs4 ,horace1 
as so frequently1 takes his inspiration 
from the ,greek1 when he offers the     
double view of art3 as courtezan and as 
pedagogue4 ,in his ,ad ,pisones occur   
the passages1 in which we find mingled  
with the poetic function1 that of the   
orator--the practical and the aesthetic4
 ,was ,virgil a poet or an orator8 ,the 
triple duty of pleasing1 moving1 and    
teaching1 was imposed upon the poet4    

,then1 with a thought for the supposed  
meretricious nature of their art1 the   
ingenious ,horace remarks that both must
 employ the seductions of form4  ,the   
mystic view of art appeared only in late
 antiquity1 with ,plotinus4 ,the curious
 error of looking upon ,plato as the    
head of this school and as the ,father  
of ,aesthetic assumes that he who felt  
obliged to banish art altogether from   
the domain of the higher functions of   
the spirit1 was yet ready to yield to it
 the highest place there4 ,the mystical 
view of ,aesthetic accords a lofty place
 indeed to ,aesthetic1 placing it even  
above philosophy4 ,the enthusiastic     
praise of the beautiful1 to be found in 
the ,gorgias1 ,philebus1 ,phaedrus1 and 
,symposium is responsible for this      
misunderstanding1 but it is well to make
 perfectly clear that the beautiful1 of 
which ,plato discourses in those        
dialogues1 has nothing to do with the   
artistically beautiful1 nor with the    
mysticism of the neo-,platonicians4     

,yet the thinkers of antiquity were     
aware that a problem lay in the         
direction of ,aesthetic1 and ,xenophon  
records the sayings of ,socrates that   
the beautiful is that which is fitting  
and answers to the end required4        
,elsewhere he says it is that which is  
loved4 ,plato likewise vibrates between 
various views and offers several        
solutions4 ,sometimes he appears almost 
to confound the beautiful with the true1
 the good and the divine2 at others he  
leans toward the utilitarian view of    
,socrates2 at others he distinguishes   
between what is beautiful ,in itself and
 what possesses but a relative beauty4  
,at other times again1 he is a hedonist1
 and makes it to consist of pure        
pleasure1 that is1 of pleasure with no  
shadow of pain2 or he finds it in       
measure and proportion1 or in the very  
sound1 the very colour itself4 ,the     
reason for all this vacillation of      
definition lay in ,plato's exclusion of 
the artistic or mimetic fact from the   

domain of the higher spiritual          
activities4 ,the ,hippias major         
expresses this uncertainty more         
completely than any of the other        
dialogues4 ,what is the beautiful8 ,that
 is the question asked at the beginning1
 and left unanswered at the end4 ,the   
,platonic ,socrates and ,hippias propose
 the most various solutions1 one after  
another1 but always come out by the gate
 by which they entered in4 ,is the      
beautiful to be found in ornament8 ,no1 
for gold embellishes only where it is in
 keeping4 ,is the beautiful that which  
seems ugly to no man8 ,but it is a      
question of being1 not of seeming4 ,is  
it their fitness which makes things seem
 beautiful8 ,but in that case1 the      
fitness which makes them appear         
beautiful is one thing1 the beautiful   
another4 ,if the beautiful be the useful
 or that which leads to an end1 then    
evil would also be beautiful1 because   
the useful may also end evilly4 ,is the 
beautiful the helpful1 that which leads 

to the good8 ,no1 for in that case the  
good would not be beautiful1 nor the    
beautiful good1 because cause and effect
 are different4  ,thus they argued in   
the ,platonic dialogues1 and when we    
turn to the pages of ,aristotle1 we find
 him also uncertain and inclined to vary
 his definitions4#e ,sometimes for him  
the good and pleasurable are the        
beautiful1 sometimes it lies in actions1
 at others in things motionless1 or in  
bulk and order1 or is altogether        
undefinable4 ,antiquity also established
 canons of the beautiful1 and the famous
 canon of ,polycleitus1 on the          
proportions of the human body1 fitly    
compares with that of later times on the
 golden line1 and with the ,ciceronian  
phrase from the ,tusculan ,disputations4
 ,but these are all of them mere        
empirical observations1 mere happy      
remarks and verbal substitutions1 which 
lead to unsurmountable difficulties when
 put to philosophical test4  ,one       
important identification is absent in   

all those early attempts at truth4 ,the 
beautiful is never identified with art1 
and the artistic fact is always clearly 
distinguished from beauty1 mimetic from 
its content4 ,plotinus first identified 
the two1 and with him the beautiful and 
art are dissolved together in a passion 
and mystic elevation of the spirit4 ,the
 beauty of natural objects is the       
archetype existing in the soul1 which is
 the fountain of all natural beauty4    
,thus was ,plato 7he said7 in error1    
when he despised the arts for imitating 
nature1 for nature herself imitates the 
idea1 and art also seeks her inspiration
 directly from those ideas whence nature
 proceeds4 ,we have here1 with ,plotinus
 and with ,neoplatonism1 the first      
appearance in the world of mystical     
,aesthetic1 destined to play so         
important a part in later aesthetic     
theory4  ,aristotle was far more happy  
in his attempts at defining ,aesthetic  
as the science of representation and of 
expression than in his definitions of   

the beautiful4 ,he felt that some       
element of the problem had been         
overlooked1 and in attempting in his    
turn a solution1 he had the advantage   
over ,plato of looking upon the ideas as
 simple concepts1 not as hypostases of  
concepts or of abstractions4 ,thus      
reality was more vivid for ,aristotle3  
it was the synthesis of matter and form4
 ,he saw that art1 or mimetic1 was a    
theoretic fact1 or a mode of            
contemplation4 ,but if ,poetry be a     
theoretic fact1 in what way is it to be 
distinguished from science and from     
historical knowledge8 ,thus             
magnificently does the great philosopher
 pose the problem at the commencement of
 his ,poetics1 and thus alone can it be 
posed successfully4 ,we ask the same    
question in the same words to-day4 ,but 
the problem is difficult1 and the       
masterly statement of it was not        
equalled by the method of solution then 
available4 ,he made an excellent start  
on his voyage of discovery1 but stopped 

half way1 irresolute and perplexed4     
,poetry1 he says1 differs from history1 
by portraying the possible1 while       
history deals with what has really      
happened4 ,poetry1 like philosophy1 aims
 at the universal1 but in a different   
way1 which the philosopher indicates as 
something more 7mallon tha katholon7    
which differentiates poetry from        
history1 occupied with the particular   
7malon tha kath ekaston74 ,what1 then1  
is the possible1 the something more1 and
 the particular of poetry8 ,aristotle   
immediately falls into error and        
confusion1 when he attempts to define   
these words4 ,since art has to deal with
 the absurd and with the impossible1 it 
cannot be anything rational1 but a mere 
imitation of reality1 in accordance with
 the ,platonic theory--a fact of sensual
 pleasure4 ,aristotle does not1 however1
 attain to so precise a definition as   
,plato1 whose erroneous definition he   
does not succeed in supplanting4 ,the   
truth is that he failed of his          

self-imposed task2 he failed to discern 
the true nature of ,aesthetic1 although 
he restated and re-examined the problem 
with such marvellous acumen4  ,after    
,aristotle1 there comes a lull in the   
discussion1 until ,plotinus4 ,the       
,poetics were generally little studied1 
and the admirable statement of the      
problem generally neglected by later    
writers4 ,antique psychology knew the   
fancy or imagination1 as preserving or  
reproducing sensuous impressions1 or as 
an intermediary between the concepts and
 feeling3 its autonomous productive     
activity was not yet understood4 ,in the
 ,life of ,apollonius of ,tyana1        
,philostratus is said to have been the  
first to make clear the difference      
between mimetic and creative            
imagination4 ,but this does not in      
reality differ from the ,aristotelian   
mimetic1 which is concerned1 not only   
with the real1 but also with the        
possible4 ,cicero too1 before           
,philostratus1 speaks of a kind of      

exquisite beauty lying hidden in the    
soul of the artist1 which guides his    
hand and art4 ,antiquity seems generally
 to have been entrammelled in the meshes
 of the belief in mimetic1 or the       
duplication of natural objects by the   
artist ,philostratus and the other      
protagonists of the imagination may have
 meant to combat this error1 but the    
shadows lie heavy until we reach        
,plotinus4  ,we find already astir among
 the sophists the question as to the    
nature of language4 ,admitting that     
language is a sign1 are we to take that 
as signifying a spiritual necessity     
7phusis7 or as a psychological          
convention 7nomos78 ,aristotle made a   
valuable contribution to this difficult 
question1 when he spoke of a kind of    
proposition other than those which      
predicate truth or falsehood1 that is1  
logic4 ,with him euchae is the term     
proper to designate desires and         
aspirations1 which are the vehicle of   
poetry and of oratory4 7,it must be     

remembered that for ,aristotle words1   
like poetry1 belonged to mimetic47 ,the 
profound remark about the third mode of 
proposition would1 one would have       
thought1 have led naturally to the      
separation of linguistic from logic1 and
 to its classification with poetry and  
art4 ,but the ,aristotelian logic       
assumed a verbal and formal character1  
which set back the attainment of this   
position by many hundred years4 ,yet the
 genius of ,epicurus had an intuition of
 the truth1 when he remarked that the   
diversity of names for the same things  
arose1 not from arbitrary caprice1 but  
from the diverse impression derived from
 the same object4 ,the ,stoics1 too1    
seem to have had an inkling of the      
non-logical nature of speech1 but their 
use of the word lekton leaves it        
doubtful whether they distinguished by  
it the linguistic representation from   
the abstract concept1 or rather1        
generically1 the meaning from the sound4
  #e ,in the ,appendix will be found    

further striking quotations from     and
 references to ,aristotle4--7,d4,a47    
,,ii  ,,aesthetic ,,ideas ,,in ,,the    
,,middle ,,age ,,and ,,in ,,the         
,,renaissance   ,well-nigh all the      
theories of antique ,aesthetic reappear 
in the ,middle ,ages1 as it were by     
spontaneous generation4 ,duns ,scotus   
,erigena translated the ,neoplatonic    
mysticism of the pseudo-,dionysus4 ,the 
,christian ,god took the place of the   
chief ,good or ,idea3 ,god1 wisdom1     
goodness1 supreme beauty are the        
fountains of natural beauty1 and these  
are steps in the stair of contemplation 
of the ,creator4 ,in this manner        
speculation began to be diverted from   
the art fact1 which had been so         
prominent with ,plotinus4 ,thomas       
,aquinas followed ,aristotle in         
distinguishing the beautiful from the   
good1 and applied his doctrine of       
imitation to the beauty of the second   
person of the ,trinity 7in quantum est  
imago expressa ,patris74 ,with the      

troubadours1 we may find traces of the  
hedonistic view of art1 and the         
rigoristic hypothesis finds in          
,tertullian and in certain ,fathers of  
the ,church staunch upholders4 ,the     
retrograde ,savonarola occupied the same
 position at a later period4 ,but the   
narcotic1 moralistic1 or pedagogic view 
mostly prevailed1 for it best suited an 
epoch of relative decadence in culture4 
,it suited admirably the ,middle ,age1  
offering at once an excuse for the      
new-born ,christian art1 and for those  
works of classical or pagan art which   
yet survived4 ,specimens of this view   
abound all through the ,middle ,age4 ,we
 find it1 for instance1 in the criticism
 of ,virgil1 to whose work were         
attributed four distinct meanings3      
literal1 allegorical1 moral1 and        
anagogic4 ,for ,dante poetry was nihil  
aliud quam fictio rhetorica in musicaque
 posita4 ,if the vulgar be incapable of 
appreciating my inner meaning1 then they
 shall at least incline their minds to  

the perfection of my beauty4 ,if from me
 ye cannot gather wisdom1 at the least  
shall ye enjoy me as a pleasant thing4  
,thus spoke the ,muse of ,dante1 whose  
,convivio is an attempt to aid the      
understanding in its effort to grasp the
 moral and pedagogic elements of verse4 
,poetry was the gaia scienza1 a fiction 
containing many useful things covered or
 veiled4  ,it would be inexact to       
identify art in the ,middle ,age with   
philosophy and theology4 ,its pleasing  
falsity could be adapted to useful ends1
 much in the same way as matrimony      
excuses love and sexual union4 ,this1   
however1 implies that for the ,middle   
,age the ideal state was celibacy2 that 
is1 pure knowledge1 divorced from art4  
,the only line of explanation that was  
altogether neglected in the ,middle ,age
 was the right one4  ,the ,poetics of   
,aristotle were badly rendered into     
,latin1 from the faulty paraphrase of   
,averroes1 by one ,hermann 7#abef74 ,the
 nominalist and realist dispute brought 

again into the arena the relations      
between thought and speech1 and we find 
,duns ,scotus occupied with the problem 
in his ,de modis significandi seu       
grammatica speculativa4 ,abelard had    
defined sensation as confusa conceptio1 
and with the importance given to        
intuitive knowledge1 to the perception  
of the individual1 of the species       
specialissima in ,duns ,scotus1 together
 with the denomination of the forms of  
knowledge as confusae1 indistinctae1 and
 distinctae1 we enter upon a            
terminology1 which we shall see         
appearing again1 big with results1 at   
the commencement of modern ,aesthetic4  
,the doctrine of the ,middle ,age1 in   
respect to art and letters1 may thus be 
regarded as of interest rather to the   
history of culture than to that of      
general knowledge4 ,a like remark holds 
good of the ,renaissance4 ,theories of  
antiquity are studied1 countless        
treatises in many forms are written upon
 them1 but no really new ,ideas as      

regards aesthetic science appear on the 
horizon4  ,we find among the spokesmen  
of mystical ,aesthetic in the thirteenth
 century such names as ,marsilio ,ficino
 and ,pico della ,mirandola4 ,bembo and 
many others wrote on the ,beautiful and 
on ,love in the century that followed4  
,the ,dialogi di ,amore1 written in     
,italian by a ,spanish ,jew named ,leone
 and published in #aece1 had a ,european
 success1 being translated into many    
languages4 ,he talks of the universality
 of love and of its origin1 of beauty   
that is grace1 which delights the soul  
and impels it to love4 ,knowledge of    
lesser beauties leads to loftier        
spiritual beauties4 ,leone called these 
remarks ,philographia4  ,petrarch's     
followers versified similar intuitions1 
while others wrote parodies and         
burlesques of this style2 ,luca         
,paciolo1 the friend of ,leonardo1 made 
the 7false7 discovery of the golden     
section1 basing his speculating upon    
mathematics2 ,michael ,angelo           

established an empirical canon for      
painting1 attempting to give rules for  
imparting grace and movement to figures1
 by means of certain arithmetical       
proportions2 others found special       
meanings in colours2 while the          
,platonicians placed the seat of beauty 
in the soul1 the ,aristotelians in      
physical qualities4 ,agostino ,nifo1 the
 ,averroist1 after some inconclusive    
remarks1 is at last fortunate enough to 
discover where natural beauty really    
dwells3 its abode is the body of        
,giovanna d',aragona1 ,princess of      
,tagliacozzo1 to whom he dedicates his  
book4 ,tasso mingled the speculations of
 the ,hippias major with those of       
,plotinus4  ,tommaso ,campanella1 in his
 ,poetica1 looks upon the beautiful as  
signum boni1 the ugly as signum mali4   
,by goodness1 he means ,power1 ,wisdom1 
and ,love4 ,campanella was still under  
the influence of the erroneous ,platonic
 conception of the beautiful1 but the   
use of the word sign in this place      

represents progress4 ,it enabled him to 
see that things in themselves are       
neither beautiful nor ugly4  ,nothing   
proves more clearly that the            
,renaissance did not overstep the limits
 of aesthetic theory reached in         
antiquity1 than the fact that the       
pedagogic theory of art continued to    
prevail1 in the face of translations of 
the ,poetics of ,aristotle and of the   
diffuse labours expended upon that work4
 ,this theory was even grafted upon the 
,poetics1 where one is surprised to find
 it4 ,there are a few hedonists standing
 out from the general trend of opinion4 
,the restatement of the pedagogic       
position1 reinforced with examples taken
 from antiquity1 was disseminated       
throughout ,europe by the ,italians of  
the ,renaissance4 ,france1 ,spain1      
,england1 and ,germany felt its         
influence1 and we find the writers of   
the period of ,louis ,,xiv4 either      
frankly didactic1 like ,le ,bossu       
7#afge71 for whom the first object of   

the poet is to instruct1 or with ,la    
,mnardire 7#afdj7 speaking of poetry as 
cette science agrable qui mle la gravit 
des prceptes avec la douceur du langage4
 ,for the former of these critics1      
,homer was the author of two didactic   
manuals relating to military and        
political matters3 the ,iliad and the   
,odyssey4  ,didacticism has always been 
looked upon as the ,poetic of the       
,renaissance1 although the didactic is  
not mentioned among the kinds of poetry 
of that period4 ,the reason of this lies
 in the fact that for the ,renaissance  
all poetry was didactic1 in addition to 
any other qualities which it might      
possess4 ,the active discussion of      
poetic theory1 the criticism of         
,aristotle and of ,plato's exclusion of 
poetry1 of the possible and of the      
verisimilar1 if it did not contribute   
much original material to the theory of 
art1 yet at any rate sowed the seeds    
which afterwards germinated and bore    
fruit4 ,why1 they asked with ,aristotle1

 at the ,renaissance1 does poetry deal  
with the universal1 history with the    
particular8 ,what is the reason for     
poetry being obliged to seek            
verisimilitude8 ,what does ,raphael mean
 by the certain idea1 which he follows  
in his painting8  ,these themes and     
others cognate were dealt with by       
,italian and by ,spanish writers1 who   
occasionally reveal wonderful acumen1 as
 when ,francesco ,patrizio1 criticizing 
,aristotle's theory of imitation1       
remarks3 ,all languages and all         
philosophic writings and all other      
writings would be poetry1 because they  
are made of words1 and words are        
imitations4 ,but as yet no one dared    
follow such a clue to the labyrinth1 and
 the ,renaissance closes with the sense 
of a mystery yet to be revealed4        
,,iii  ,,seventeenth ,,and ,,eighteenth 
,,centuries   ,the seventeenth century  
is remarkable for the ferment of thought
 upon this difficult problem4 ,such     
words as genius1 taste1 imagination or  

fancy1 and feeling1 appear in this      
literature1 and deserve a passing       
notice4 ,as regards the word genius1 we 
find the ,italian ingegno opposed to the
 intellect1 and ,dialectic adorned with 
the attributes of the latter1 while     
,rhetoric has the advantage of ingegno  
in all its forms1 such as concetti and  
acutezze4 ,with these the ,english word 
ingenious has an obvious connection1    
especially in its earlier use as applied
 to men of letters4 ,the ,french worked 
upon the word ingegno and evolved from  
it in various associations the          
expressions esprit1 beaux ,esprits4 ,the
 manual of the ,spanish ,jesuit1        
,baltasar ,gracian1 became celebrated   
throughout ,europe1 and here we find    
ingegno described as the truly inventive
 faculty1 and from it the ,english word 
genius1 the ,italian genio1 the ,french 
gnie1 first enter into general use4     
,the word gusto or taste1 good taste1 in
 its modern sense1 also sprang into use 
about this time4 ,taste was held to be a

 judicial faculty1 directed to the      
beautiful1 and thus to some extent      
distinct from the intellectual judgment4
 ,it was further bisected into active   
and passive2 but the former ran into the
 definition of ingegno1 the latter      
described sterility4 ,the word gusto1 or
 taste as judgment1 was in use in ,italy
 at a very early period2 and in ,spain  
we find ,lope di ,vega and his          
contemporaries declaring that their     
object is to delight the taste of their 
public4 ,these uses of the word are not 
of significance as regards the problem  
of art1 and we must return to ,baltasar 
,gracian 7#afdb7 for a definition of    
taste as a special faculty or attitude  
of the soul4 ,italian writers of the    
period echo the praises of this laconic 
moralist1 who1 when he spoke of a man of
 taste1 meant to describe what we call  
to-day a man of tact in the conduct of  
life4  ,the first use of the word in a  
strictly aesthetic sense occurs in      
,france in the last quarter of the      

seventeenth century4 ,la ,bruyre writes 
in his ,caractres 7#afhh73 ,il y a dans 
l'art un point de perfection1 comme de  
bont ou de maturit dans la nature3 celui
 qui le sent et qui l'aime1 a le got    
parfait2 celui qui ne le sent pas1 et   
qui aime au de ou au del1 a le got      
dfectueux4 ,il y a donc un bon et un    
mauvais got1 et l'on dispute des gots   
avec fondement4 ,delicacy and           
variability or variety were appended as 
attributes of taste4 ,this ,french      
definition of the ,italian word was     
speedily adopted in ,england1 where it  
became good taste1 and we find it used  
in this sense in ,italian and ,german   
writers of about this period4  ,the     
words imagination and fancy were also   
passed through the crucible in this     
century4 ,we find the ,cardinal         
,sforza-,pallavicino 7#afdd7 blaming    
those who look for truth or falsehood1  
for the verisimilar or for historical   
truth1 in poetry4 ,poetry1 he holds1 has
 to do with the primary apprehensions1  

which give neither truth nor falsehood4 
,thus the fancy takes the place of the  
verisimilar of certain students of      
,aristotle4 ,the ,cardinal continues his
 eloquence with the clinching remark    
that if the intention of poetry were to 
be believed true1 then its real end     
would be falsehood1 which is absolutely 
condemned by the law of nature and by   
,god4 ,the sole object of poetic fables 
is1 he says1 to adorn our intellect with
 sumptuous1 new1 marvellous1 and        
splendid imaginings1 and so great has   
been the benefits accruing from this to 
the human race1 that poets have been    
rewarded with a glory superior to any   
other1 and their names have been crowned
 with divine honours4 ,this1 he says in 
his treatise1 ,del ,bene1 has been the  
just reward of poets1 albeit they have  
not been bearers of knowledge1 nor have 
they manifested truth4  ,this throwing  
of the bridle on the neck of ,pegasus   
seemed to ,muratori sixty years later to
 be altogether too risky a              

proceeding--although advocated by a     
,prince of the ,church6 ,he reinserts   
the bit of the verisimilar1 though he   
talks with admiration of the fancy1 that
 inferior apprehensive faculty1 which is
 content to represent things1 without   
seeking to know if they be true or      
false1 a task which it leaves to the    
superior apprehensive faculty of the    
intellect4 ,the severe ,gravina1 too1   
finds his heart touched by the beauty of
 poetry1 when he calls it a witch1 but  
wholesome4  ,as early as #aegh1 ,huarte 
had maintained that eloquence is the    
work of the imagination1 not of the     
intellect2 in ,england1 ,bacon 7#afje7  
attributed knowledge to the intellect1  
history to memory1 and poetry to the    
imagination or fancy2 ,hobbes described 
the manifestations of the latter2 and   
,addison devoted several numbers of the 
,spectator to the analysis of the       
pleasures of the imagination4  ,during  
the same period1 the division between   
those who are accustomed  juger par le  

sentiment and those who raisonnent par  
les principes became marked in ,france1 
,du ,bos 7#agai7 is an interesting      
example of the upholder of the feelings 
as regards the production of art4       
,indeed1 there is in his view no other  
criterion1 and the feeling for art is a 
sixth sense1 against which intellectual 
argument is useless4 ,this ,french      
school of thought found a reflex in     
,england with the position assigned     
there to emotion in artistic work4 ,but 
the confusion of such words as          
imagination1 taste1 feeling1 wit1 shows 
that at this time there was a suspicion 
that these words were all applicable to 
the same fact4 ,alexander ,pope thus    
distinguished wit and judgment3    ,for 
wit and judgment often are at strife1   
,though meant each other's aid like man 
and wife4  ,but there was a divergence  
of opinion as to whether the latter     
should be looked upon as part of the    
intellect or not4  ,there was the same  
divergence of opinion as to taste and   

intellectual judgment4 ,as regards the  
former1 the opposition to the           
intellectual principle was reinforced in
 the eighteenth century by ,kant in his 
,kritik der ,urtheilskraft4 ,but        
,voltaire and writers anterior to him   
frequently fell back into               
intellectualist definitions of a word   
invented precisely to avoid them4       
,dacier 7#afhd7 writes of taste as ,une 
harmonie1 un accord de l'esprit et de la
 raison4 ,the difficulties surrounding a
 true definition led to the creation of 
the expression non so che1 or je ne sais
 quoi1 or no se qu1 which throws into   
clear relief the confusion between taste
 and intellectual judgment4  ,as regards
 imagination and feeling1 or sentiment1 
there was a strong tendency to          
sensualism4 ,the ,cardinal              
,sforza-,pallavicino talks of poetry as 
ignoring alike truth or falsehood and   
yet delighting the senses4 ,he approves 
of the remark that poetry should make us
 raise our eyebrows1 but in later life  

this keen-eyed prince seems to have     
fallen back from the brilliant intuition
 of his earlier years into the pedagogic
 theory4 ,muratori was convinced that   
fancy was entirely sensual1 and         
therefore he posted the intellect beside
 it1 to refrain its wild courses1 like a
 friend having authority4 ,gravina      
practically coincides in this view of   
poetic fancy1 as a subordinate faculty1 
incapable of knowledge1 fit only to be  
used by moral philosophy for the        
introduction into the mind of the true1 
by means of novelty and the marvellous4 
,in ,england1 also1 ,bacon held poetry  
to belong to the fancy1 and assigned to 
it a place between history and science4 
,epic poetry he awarded to the former1  
parabolic poetry to the latter4         
,elsewhere he talks of poetry as a      
dream1 and affirms that it is to be held
 rather as an amusement of the          
intelligence than as a science4 ,for him
 music1 painting1 sculpture1 and the    
other arts are merely pleasure-giving4  

,addison reduced the pleasures of the   
imagination to those caused by visible  
objects1 or by ideas taken from them4   
,these pleasures he held to be inferior 
to those of the senses and less refined 
than those of the intellect4 ,he looked 
upon imaginative pleasure as consisting 
in resemblances discovered between      
imitations and things imitated1 between 
copies and originals1 an exercise       
adapted to sharpen the spirit of        
observation4  ,the sensualism of the    
writers headed by ,du ,bos1 who looked  
upon art as a mere pastime1 like a      
tournament or a bull-fight1 shows that  
the truth about ,aesthetic had not yet  
succeeded in emerging from the other    
spiritual activities4 ,yet the new words
 and the new views of the seventeenth   
century have great importance for the   
origins of ,aesthetic2 they were the    
direct result of the restatement of the 
problem by the writers of the           
,renaissance1 who themselves took it up 
where ,antiquity had left it4 ,these new

 words1 and the discussions which arose 
from them1 were the demands of          
,aesthetic for its theoretical          
justification4 ,but they were not able  
to provide this justification1 and it   
could not come from elsewhere4  ,with   
,descartes1 we are not likely to find   
much sympathy for such studies as relate
 to wit1 taste1 fancy1 or feelings4 ,he 
ignored the famous non so che2 he       
abhorred the imagination1 which he      
believed to result from the agitation of
 the animal spirits4 ,he did not        
altogether condemn poetry1 but certainly
 looked upon it as the folle du logis1  
which must be strictly supervised by the
 reason4 ,boileau is the aesthetic      
equivalent of ,cartesian                
intellectualism1 ,boileau que la raison 
ses rgles engage1 ,boileau the          
enthusiast for allegory4 ,france was    
infected with the mathematical spirit of
 ,cartesianism and all possibility of a 
serious consideration of poetry and of  
art was thus removed4 ,witness the      

diatribes of ,malebranche against the   
imagination1 and listen to the ,italian1
 ,antonio ,conti1 writing from ,france  
in #agef on the theme of the literary   
disputes that were raging at the time3  
,they have introduced the method of ,m4 
,descartes into belles-lettres2 they    
judge poetry and eloquence independently
 of their sensible qualities4 ,thus they
 also confound the progress of          
philosophy with that of the arts4 ,the  
,abb ,terrasson says that the moderns   
are greater geometricians than the      
ancients2 therefore they are greater    
orators and greater poets4 ,la ,motte1  
,fontenelle1 ,boileau1 and ,malebranche 
carried on this battle1 which was taken 
up by the ,encyclopaedists1 and when ,du
 ,bos published his daring book1 ,jean  
,jacques le ,bel published a reply to it
 7#agbf71 in which he denied to         
sentiment its claim to judge of art4    
,thus ,cartesianism could not possess an
 ,aesthetic of the imagination4 ,the    
,cartesian ,j4,p4 de ,crousaz 7#agae7   

found the beautiful to consist in what  
is approved of1 and thereby reduced it  
to ideas1 ignoring the pleasing and     
sentiment4  ,locke was as               
intellectualist in the ,england of this 
period as was ,descartes in ,france4 ,he
 speaks of wit as combining ideas in an 
agreeable variety1 which strikes the    
imagination1 while the intellect or     
judgment seeks for differences according
 to truth4 ,the wit1 then1 consists of  
something which is not at all in        
accordance with truth and reason4 ,for  
,shaftesbury1 taste is a sense or       
instinct of the beautiful1 of order and 
proportion1 identical with the moral    
sense and with its preconceptions       
anticipating the recognition of reason4 
,body1 spirit1 and ,god are the three   
degrees of beauty4 ,francis ,hutcheson  
proceeded from ,shaftesbury and made    
popular the internal sense of beauty1   
which lies somewhere between sensuality 
and rationality and is occupied with    
discussing unity in variety1 concord in 

multiplicity1 and the true1 the good1   
and the beautiful in their substantial  
identity4 ,hutcheson allied the pleasure
 of art with this sense1 that is1 with  
the pleasure of imitation and of the    
likeness of the copy to the original4   
,this he looked upon as relative beauty1
 to be distinguished from absolute      
beauty4 ,the same view dominates the    
,english writers of the eighteenth      
century1 among whom may be mentioned    
,reid1 the head of the ,scottish school1
 and ,adam ,smith4  ,with far greater   
philosophical vigour1 ,leibnitz in      
,germany opened the door to that crowd  
of psychic facts which ,cartesian       
intellectualism had rejected with       
horror4 ,his conception of reality as   
continuous 7natura non facit saltus7    
left room for imagination1 taste1 and   
their congeners4 ,leibnitz believed that
 the scale of being ascended from the   
lowliest to ,god4 ,what we now term     
aesthetic facts were then identified    
with what ,descartes and ,leibnitz had  

called confused knowledge1 which might  
become clear1 but not distinct4 ,it     
might seem that when he applied this    
terminology to aesthetic facts1         
,leibnitz had recognized their peculiar 
essence1 as being neither sensual nor   
intellectual4 ,they are not sensual for 
him1 because they have their own        
clarity1 differing from pleasure and    
sensual emotion1 and from intellectual  
distinctio4 ,but the ,leibnitzian law of
 continuity and intellectualism did not 
permit of such an interpretation4       
,obscurity and clarity are here to be   
understood as quantitative grades of a  
single form of knowledge1 the distinct  
or intellectual1 toward which they both 
tend and reach at a superior grade4     
,though artists judge with confused     
perceptions1 which are clear but not    
distinct1 these may yet be corrected and
 proved true by intellective knowledge4 
,the intellect clearly and distinctly   
knows the thing which the imagination   
knows confusedly but clearly4 ,this view

 of ,leibnitz amounts to saying that the
 realization of a work of art can be    
perfected by intellectually determining 
its concept4 ,thus ,leibnitz held that  
there was only one true form of         
knowledge1 and that all other forms     
could only reach perfection in that4    
,his clarity is not a specific          
difference2 it is merely a partial      
anticipation of his intellective        
distinction4 ,to have posited this grade
 is an important achievement1 but the   
view of ,leibnitz is not fundamentally  
different from that of the creators of  
the words and intuitions already        
studied4 ,all contributed to attract    
attention to the peculiarity of         
aesthetic facts4  ,speculation on       
language at this period revealed an     
equally determined intellectualist      
attitude4 ,grammar was held to be an    
exact science1 and grammatical          
variations to be explainable by the     
ellipse1 by abbreviation1 and by failure
 to grasp the typical logical form4 ,in 

,france1 with ,arnauld 7#affj71 we have 
the rigorous ,cartesian intellectualism2
 ,leibnitz and ,locke both1 speculated  
upon this subject1 and the former all   
his life nourished the thought of a     
universal language4 ,the absurdity of   
this is proved in this volume4  ,a      
complete change of the ,cartesian       
system1 upon which ,leibnitz based his  
own1 was necessary1 if speculation were 
ever to surpass the ,leibnitzian        
aesthetic4 ,but ,wolff and the other    
,german pupils of ,leibnitz were as     
unable to shake themselves free of the  
all-pervading intellectualism as were   
the ,french pupils of ,descartes4       
,meanwhile a young student of ,berlin1  
named ,alexander ,amedeus ,baumgarten1  
was studying the ,wolffian philosophy1  
and at the same time lecturing in poetry
 and ,latin rhetoric4 ,while so doing1  
he was led to rethink and pose afresh   
the problem of how to reduce the        
precepts of rhetoric to a rigorous      
philosophical system4 ,thus it came     

about that ,baumgarten published in     
,september #agce1 at the age of         
twenty-one1 as the thesis for his degree
 of ,doctor1 an opuscule entitled1      
,meditationes philosophicae de nonnullis
 ad poma pertinentibus1 and in it we    
find written for the first time the word
 ,aesthetic1 as the name of a special   
science4 ,baumgarten ever afterwards    
attached great importance to his        
juvenile discovery1 and lectured upon it
 by request in #agdb1 at                
,frankfort-on-the-,oder1 and again in   
#agdi4 ,it is interesting to know that  
in this way ,emmanuel ,kant first became
 acquainted with the theory of          
,aesthetic1 which he greatly altered    
when he came to treat of it in his      
philosophy4 ,in #agej1 ,baumgarten      
published the first volume of a more    
ample treatise1 and a second part in    
#agfb4 ,but illness1 and death in #agfb1
 prevented his completing his work4     
,what is ,aesthetic for ,baumgarten8 ,it
 is the science of sensible knowledge4  

,its objects are the sensible facts     
7aisthaeta71 which the ,greeks were     
always careful to distinguish from the  
mental facts 7noaeta74 ,it is therefore 
scientia cognitionis sensitivae1 theoria
 liberalium artium1 gnoseologia         
inferior1 ars pulcre cogitandi1 ars     
analogi rationis4 ,rhetoric and ,poetic 
are for him special cases of ,aesthetic1
 which is a general science1 embracing  
both4 ,its laws are diffused among all  
the arts1 like the mariner's star       
7cynosura quaedam71 and they must be    
always referred to in all cases1 for    
they are universal1 not empirical or    
merely inductive 7falsa regula pejor est
 quam nulla74 ,aesthetic must not be    
confounded with ,psychology1 which      
supplies only suppositions4 ,aesthetic  
is an independent science1 which gives  
the rules for knowing sensibly1 and is  
occupied with the perfection of sensible
 knowledge1 which is beauty4 ,its       
contrary is ugliness4 ,the beauty of    
objects and of matter must be excluded  

from the beauty of sensible knowledge1  
because beautiful objects can be badly  
thought and ugly objects beautifully    
thought4 ,poetic representations are    
those which are confused or imaginative4
 ,distinction and intellectuality are   
not poetic4 ,the greater the            
determination1 the greater the poetry2  
individuals absolutely determined       
7omnimodo determinata7 are very         
poetical1 as are images or fancies1 and 
everything which refers to feeling4 ,the
 judgment of sensible and imaginative   
representations is taste4  ,such are1 in
 brief1 the truths which ,baumgarten    
stated in his ,meditationes1 and further
 developed and exemplified in his       
,aesthetica4 ,close study of the two    
works above-mentioned leads to the      
conviction that ,baumgarten did not     
succeed in freeing himself from the     
unity of the ,leibnitzian monadology4   
,he obtained from ,leibnitz his         
conception of the poetic as consisting  
of the confused1 but ,german critics are

 wrong in believing that he attributed  
to it a positive1 not a negative        
quality4 ,had he really done this1 he   
would have broken at a blow the unity of
 the ,leibnitzian monad1 and conquered  
the science of ,aesthetic4  ,this       
giant's step he did not take3 he failed 
to banish the contradictions of         
,leibnitz and of the other              
intellectualists4 ,to posit a perfection
 did not suffice4 ,it was necessary to  
maintain it against the lex continui of 
,leibnitz and to proclaim its           
independence of all intellectualism4    
,aesthetic truths for ,baumgarten were  
those which did not seem altogether     
false or altogether true3 in fact1 the  
verisimilar4 ,if it were objected to    
,baumgarten that one should not occupy  
oneself with what1 like poetry1 he      
defines as confused and obscure1 he     
would reply that confusion is a         
condition of finding the truth1 that we 
do not pass at once from night to dawn4 
,thus he did not surpass the thought of 

,leibnitz in this respect4 ,poor        
,baumgarten was always in suspense lest 
he should be held to occupy himself with
 things unworthy of a philosopher6 ,how 
can you1 a professor of philosophy1 dare
 to praise lying and the mixture of     
truth and falsehood8 ,he imagined that  
some such reproach might be addressed to
 him on account of his purely           
philosophical speculations1 and true    
enough he actually received a criticism 
of his theory1 in which it was argued1  
that if poetry consisted of sensual     
perfection1 then it was a bad thing for 
mankind4 ,baumgarten contemptuously     
replied that he had not the time to     
argue with those capable of confounding 
his oratio perfecta sensitiva with an   
oratio perfecte 7omnino67 sensitiva4    
,the fact about ,baumgarten is that     
apart from baptizing the new science    
,aesthetic1 and apart from his first    
definitions1 he does not stray far from 
the old ruts of scholastic thought4 ,the
 excellent ,baumgarten1 with all his    

ardour and all his convictions1 is a    
sympathetic and interesting figure in   
the history of ,aesthetic not yet       
formed1 but in process of formation4    
,the revolutionary who set aside the old
 definitions of ,aesthetic1 and for the 
first time revealed the true nature of  
art and poetry1 is the ,italian1        
,giambattista ,vico4  ,what were the    
ideas developed by ,vico in his ,scienza
 nuova 7#agbe78 ,they were neither more 
nor less than the solution of the       
problem1 posed by ,plato1 attempted in  
vain by ,aristotle1 again posed and     
again unsolved at the ,renaissance4  ,is
 poetry a rational or an irrational     
thing8 ,is it spiritual or animal8 ,if  
it be spiritual1 what is its true       
nature1 and in what way does it differ  
from art and science8  ,plato1 we know1 
banished poetry to the inferior region  
of the soul1 among the animal spirits4  
,vico on the contrary raises up poetry1 
and makes of it a period in the history 
of humanity4 ,and since ,vico's is an   

ideal history1 whose periods are not    
concerned with contingent facts1 but    
with spiritual forms1 he makes of it a  
moment of the ideal history of the      
spirit1 a form of knowledge4 ,poetry    
comes before the intellect1 but after   
feeling4 ,plato had confused it with    
feeling1 and for that reason banished it
 from his ,republic4 ,men feel1 says    
,vico1 before observing1 then they      
observe with perturbation of the soul1  
finally they reflect with the pure      
intellect1 ,he goes on to say1 that     
poetry being composed of passion and of 
feeling1 the nearer it approaches to the
 particular1 the more true it is1 while 
exactly the reverse is true of          
philosophy4  ,imagination is independent
 and autonomous as regards the          
intellect4 ,not only does the intellect 
fail of perfection1 but all it can do is
 to destroy it4 ,the studies of ,poetry 
and ,metaphysic are naturally opposed4  
,poets are the feeling1 philosophers the
 intellect of the human race4 ,the      

weaker the reason1 the stronger the     
imagination4 ,philosophy1 he says1 deals
 with abstract thought or universals1   
poetry with the particular4 ,painters   
and poets differ only in their material4
 ,homer and the great poets appear in   
barbaric times4 ,dante1 for instance1   
appeared in the renewed barbarism of    
,italy4 ,the poetic ages preceded the   
philosophical1 and poetry is the father 
of prose1 by necessity of nature1 not by
 the caprice of pleasure4 ,fables or    
imaginary universals were conceived     
before reasoned or philosophical        
universals4 ,to ,homer1 says ,vico1     
belongs wisdom1 but only poetic wisdom4 
,his beauties are not those of a spirit 
softened and civilized by any           
philosophy4  ,if any one make poetry in 
epochs of reflexion1 he becomes a child 
again2 he does not reflect with his     
intellect1 but follows his fancy and    
dwells upon particulars4 ,if the true   
poet make use of philosophic ideas1 he  
only does so that he may change logic   

into imagination4  ,here we have a      
profound statement of the line of       
demarcation between science and art4    
,they cannot be confused again4  ,his   
statement of the difference between     
poetry and history is a trifle less     
clear4 ,he explains why to ,aristotle   
poetry seemed more philosophical than   
history1 and at the same time he refutes
 ,aristotle's error that poetry deals   
with the universal1 history with the    
particular4 ,poetry equals science1 not 
because it is occupied with the         
intellectual concept1 but because1 like 
science1 it is ideal4 ,a good poetical  
fable must be all ideal3 ,with the idea 
the poet gives their being to things    
which are without it4 ,poetry is all    
fantastic1 as being the art of painting 
the idea1 not icastic1 like the art of  
painting portraits4 ,that is why poets1 
like painters1 are called divine1       
because in that respect they resemble   
,god the ,creator4 ,vico ends by        
identifying poetry and history4 ,the    

difference between them is posterior and
 accidental4 ,but1 as it is impossible  
to impart false ideas1 because the false
 consists of a vicious combination of   
ideas1 so it is impossible to impart a  
tradition1 which1 though it be false1   
has not at first contained some element 
of truth4 ,thus mythology appears for   
the first time1 not as the invention of 
an individual1 but as the spontaneous   
vision of the truth as it appears to    
primitive man4  ,poetry and language are
 for ,vico substantially identical4 ,he 
finds in the origins of poetry the      
origins of languages and letters4 ,he   
believed that the first languages       
consisted in mute acts or acts          
accompanied by bodies which had natural 
relations to the ideas that it was      
desired to signify4 ,with great         
cleverness he compared these pictured   
languages to heraldic arms and devices1 
and to hieroglyphs4 ,he observed that   
during the barbarism of the ,middle     
,age1 the mute language of signs must   

return1 and we find it in the heraldry  
and blazonry of that epoch4 ,hence come 
three kinds of languages3 divine silent 
languages1 heroic emblematic languages1 
and speech languages4  ,formal logic    
could never satisfy a man with such     
revolutionary ideas upon poetry and     
language4 ,he describes the             
,aristotelian syllogism as a method     
which explains universals ,in their     
particulars1 rather than unites         
particulars to obtain universals1 looks 
upon ,zeno and the sorites as a means of
 subtilizing rather than sharpening the 
intelligence1 and concludes that ,bacon 
is a great philosopher1 when he         
advocates and illustrates induction1    
which has been followed by the ,english 
to the great advantage of experimental  
philosophy4 ,hence he proceeds to       
criticize mathematics1 which1 had       
hitherto always been looked upon as the 
type of the perfect science4  ,vico is  
indeed a revolutionary1 a pioneer4 ,he  
knows very well that he is in direct    

opposition to all that has been thought 
before about poetry4 ,my new principles 
of poetry upset all that first ,plato   
and then ,aristotle have said about the 
origin of poetry1 all that has been said
 by the ,patrizzi1 by the ,scaligers1   
and by the ,castelvetri4 ,i have        
discovered that ,it was through lack of 
human reason that poetry was born so    
sublime that neither the ,arts1 nor the 
,poetics1 nor the ,critiques could cause
 another equal to it to be born1 ,i say 
equal1 and not superior4 ,he goes as far
 as to express shame at having to report
 the stupidities of great philosophers  
upon the origin of song and verse4 ,he  
shows his dislike for the ,cartesian    
philosophy and its tendency to dry up   
the imagination by denying all the      
faculties of the soul which come to it  
from the body1 and talks of his own time
 as of one which freezes all the        
generous quality of the best poetry and 
thus precludes it from being understood4
  ,as regards grammatical forms1 ,vico  

may be described as an adherent of the  
great reaction of the ,renaissance      
against scholastic verbalism and        
formalism4 ,this reaction brought back  
as a value the experience of feeling1   
and afterwards with ,romanticism gave   
its right place to the imagination4     
,vico1 in his ,scienza nuova1 may be    
said to have been the first to draw     
attention to the imagination4 ,although 
he makes many luminous remarks on       
history and the development of poetry   
among the ,greeks1 his work is not      
really a history1 but a science of the  
spirit or of the ideal4 ,it is not the  
ethical1 logical1 or economic moment of 
humanity which interests him1 but the   
imaginative moment4 ,he discovered the  
creative imagination1 and it may almost 
be said of the ,scienza nuova of ,vico  
that it is ,aesthetic1 the discovery of 
a new world1 of a new mode of knowledge4
  ,this was the contribution of the     
genius of ,vico to the progress of      
humanity3 he showed ,aesthetic to be an 

autonomous activity4 ,it remained to    
distinguish the science of the spirit   
from history1 the modifications of the  
human spirit from the historic          
vicissitudes of peoples1 ,aesthetic from
 ,homeric civilization4  ,but although  
,goethe1 ,herder1 and ,wolf were        
acquainted with the ,scienza nuova1 the 
importance of this wonderful book did   
not at first dawn upon the world4 ,wolf1
 in his prolegomena to ,homer1 thought  
that he was dealing merely with an      
ingenious speculator on ,homeric themes4
 ,he did not realize that the           
intellectual stature of ,vico far       
surpassed that of the most able         
philologists4  ,the fortunes of         
,aesthetic after ,vico were very        
various1 and the list of aestheticians  
who fell back into the old pedagogic    
definition1 or elaborated the mistakes  
of ,baumgarten1 is very long4 ,yet with 
,c4,h4 ,heydenreich in ,germany and     
,sulzer in ,switzerland we find that the
 truths contained in ,baumgarten have   

begun to bear fruit4 ,j4,j4 ,herder     
7#agfi7 was more important than these1  
and he placed ,baumgarten upon a        
pedestal1 though criticizing his        
pretension of creating an ars pulchre   
cogitandi instead of a simple scientia  
de pulchro et pulchris philosophice     
cogitans4 ,herder admitted ,baumgarten's
 definition of poetry as oratio         
sensitiva perfecta1 perfect sensitived  
speech1 and this is probably the best   
definition of poetry that has ever been 
given4 ,it touches the real essence of  
poetry and opens to thought the whole of
 the philosophy of the beautiful4       
,herder1 although he does not cite ,vico
 upon aesthetic questions1 yet praises  
him as a philosopher4 ,his remarks about
 poetry as the maternal language of     
humanity1 as the garden is more ancient 
than the cultivated field1 painting than
 writing1 song than declamation1        
exchange than commerce1 are replete with
 the spirit of the ,italian philosopher4
  ,but despite similar happy phrases1   

,herder is philosophically the inferior 
of the great ,italian4 ,he is a firm    
believer in the ,leibnitzian law of     
continuity1 and does not surpass the    
conclusions of ,baumgarten4  ,herder and
 his friend ,hamann did good service as 
regards the philosophy of language4 ,the
 ,french encyclopaedists1 ,j4,j4        
,rousseau1 d',alembert1 and many others 
of this period1 were none of them able  
to get free of the idea that a word is  
either a natural1 mechanical fact1 or a 
sign attached to a thought4 ,the only   
way out of this difficulty is to look   
upon the imagination as itself active   
and expressive in verbal imagination1   
and language as the language of         
intuition1 not of the intelligence4     
,herder talks of language as an         
understanding of the soul with itself4  
,thus language begins to appear1 not as 
an arbitrary invention or a mechanical  
fact1 but as a primitive affirmation of 
human activity1 as a creation4  ,but all
 unconscious of the discoveries of      

,vico1 the great mass of eighteenth     
century writers try their hands at every
 sort of solution4 ,the ,abb ,batteux   
published in #agdf ,les ,beaux-arts     
rduits a un seul principe1 which is a   
perfect little bouquet of               
contradictions4 ,the ,abb finds himself 
confronted with difficulties at every   
turn1 but with un peu d'esprit on se    
tire de tout1 and when for instance he  
has to explain artistic enjoyment of    
things displeasing1 he remarks that the 
imitation never being perfect like      
reality1 the horror caused by reality   
disappears4  ,but the ,french were      
equalled and indeed surpassed by the    
,english in their amateur ,aesthetics4  
,the painter ,hogarth was one day       
reading in ,italian a speech about the  
beauty of certain figures1 attributed to
 ,michael ,angelo4 ,this led him to     
imagine that the figurative arts depend 
upon a principle which consists of      
conforming to a given line4 ,in #agde he
 produced a serpentine line as          

frontispiece of his collection of       
engravings1 which he described as the   
line of beauty4 ,thus he succeeded in   
exciting universal curiosity1 which he  
proceeded to satisfy with his ,analysis 
of ,beauty4 ,here he begins by rightly  
combating the error of judging paintings
 by their subject and by the degree of  
their imitation1 instead of by their    
form1 which is the essential in art4 ,he
 gives his definition of form1 and      
afterwards proceeds to describe the     
waving lines which are beautiful and    
those which are not1 and maintains that 
among them all there is but one that is 
really worthy to be called the line of  
beauty1 and one definite serpentine line
 the line of grace4 ,the pig1 the bear1 
the spider1 and the frog are ugly1      
because they do not possess serpentine  
lines4 ,e4 ,burke1 with a like assurance
 in his examples1 was equally devoid of 
certainty in his general principles4 ,he
 declares that the natural properties of
 an object cause pleasure or pain to the

 imagination1 but that the latter also  
procures pleasure from their resemblance
 to the original4 ,he does not speak    
further of the second of these1 but     
gives a long list of the natural        
properties of the sensible1 beautiful   
object4 ,having concluded his list1 he  
remarks that these are in his opinion   
the qualities upon which beauty depends 
and which are the least liable to       
caprice and confusion4 ,but comparative 
smallness1 delicate structure1 colouring
 vivid but not too much so1 are all mere
 empirical observations of no more value
 than those of ,hogarth1 with whom      
,burke must be classed as an            
aesthetician4 ,their works are spoken of
 as classics4 ,classics indeed they are1
 but of the sort that arrive at no      
conclusion4  ,henry ,home 7,lord        
,kaimes7 is on a level a trifle above   
the two just mentioned4 ,he seeks the   
true principles of the beaux-arts1 in   
order to transform criticism into a     
rational science4 ,he selects facts and 

experience for this purpose1 but in his 
definition of beauty1 which he divides  
into two parts1 relative and intrinsic1 
he is unable to explain the latter1 save
 by a final cause1 which he finds in the
 ,almighty4  ,such theories as the three
 above mentioned defy classification1   
because they are not composed by any    
scientific method4 ,their authors pass  
from physiological sensualism to        
moralism1 from imitation of nature to   
finalism1 and to transcendental         
mysticism1 without consciousness of the 
incongruity of their theses1 at variance
 each with itself4  ,the ,german1       
,ernest ,platner1 at any rate did not   
suffer from a like confusion of thought4
 ,he developed his researches on the    
lines of ,hogarth1 but was only able to 
discover a prolongation of sexual       
pleasure in aesthetic facts4 ,where1 he 
exclaims1 is there any beauty that does 
not come from the feminine figure1 the  
centre of all beauty8 ,the undulating   
line is beautiful1 because it is found  

in the body of woman2 essentially       
feminine movements are beautiful2 the   
notes of music are beautiful1 when they 
melt into one another2 a poem is        
beautiful1 when one thought embraces    
another with lightness and facility4    
,french sensualism shows itself quite   
incapable of understanding aesthetic    
production1 and the associationism of   
,david ,hume is not more fortunate in   
this respect4  ,the ,dutchman           
,hemsterhuis 7#agfi7 developed an       
ingenious theory1 mingling mystical and 
sensualist theory with some just        
remarks1 which afterwards1 in the hands 
of ,jacobi1 became sentimentalism4      
,hemsterhuis believed beauty to be a    
phenomenon arising from the meeting by  
the sentimentalism1 which gives         
multiplicity1 with the internal sense1  
which tends to unity4 ,consequently the 
beautiful will be that which presents   
the greatest number of ideas in the     
shortest space of time4 ,to man is      
denied supreme unity1 but here he finds 

approximative unity4 ,hence the joy     
arising from the beautiful1 which has   
some analogy with the joy of love4      
,with ,winckelmann 7#agfd7 ,platonism or
 ,neo-platonism was vigorously renewed4 
,the creator of the history of the      
figurative arts saw in the divine       
indifference and more than human        
elevation of the works of ,greek        
sculpture a beauty which had descended  
from the seventh heaven and become      
incarnate in them4 ,mendelssohn1 the    
follower of ,baumgarten1 had denied     
beauty to ,god3 ,winckelmann1 the       
,neoplatonician1 gave it back to ,him4  
,he holds that perfect beauty is to be  
found only in ,god4 ,the conception of  
human beauty becomes the more perfect in
 proportion as it can be thought as in  
agreement with the ,supreme ,being1 who 
is distinguished from matter by ,his    
unity and indivisibility4 ,to the other 
characteristics of supreme beauty1      
,winckelmann adds the absence of any    
sort of signification 7,unbezeichnung74 

,lines and dots cannot explain beauty1  
for it is not they alone which form it4 
,its form is not proper to any definite 
person1 it expresses no sentiment1 no   
feeling of passion1 for these break up  
unity and diminish or obscure beauty4   
,according to ,winckelmann1 beauty must 
be like a drop of pure water taken from 
the spring1 which is the more healthy   
the less it has of taste1 because it is 
purified of all foreign elements4  ,a   
special faculty is required to          
appreciate this beauty1 which           
,winckelmann is inclined to call        
intelligence1 or a delicate internal    
sense1 free of all instinctive passions1
 of pleasure1 and of friendship4 ,since 
it becomes a question of perceiving     
something immaterial1 ,winckelmann      
banishes colour to a secondary place4   
,true beauty1 he says1 is that of form1 
a word which describes lines and        
contours1 as though lines and contours  
could not also be perceived by the      
senses1 or could appear to the eye      

without any colour4  ,it is the destiny 
of error to be obliged to contradict    
itself1 when it does not decide to dwell
 in a brief aphorism1 in order to live  
as well as may be with facts and        
concrete problems4 ,the ,history of     
,winckelmann dealt with historic        
concrete facts1 with which it was       
necessary to reconcile the idea of a    
supreme beauty4 ,his admission of the   
contours of lines and his secondary     
admission of colours is a compromise4   
,he makes another with regard to the    
principle of expression4 ,since there is
 no intermediary between pain and       
pleasure in human nature1 and since a   
human being without these feelings is   
inconceivable1 we must place the human  
figure in a moment of action and of     
passion1 which is what is termed        
expression in art4 ,so ,winckelmann     
studied expression after beauty4 ,he    
makes a third compromise between his    
one1 indivisible1 supreme1 and constant 
beauty and individual beauties4         

,winckelmann preferred the male to the  
female body as the most complete        
incarnation of supreme beauty1 but he   
was not able to shut his eyes to the    
indisputable fact that there also exist 
beautiful bodies of women and even of   
animals4  ,raphael ,mengs1 the painter1 
was an intimate friend of ,winckelmann  
and associated himself with him in his  
search for a true definition of the     
beautiful4 ,his ideas were generally in 
accordance with those of ,winckelmann4  
,he defines beauty as the visible idea  
of perfection1 which is to perfection   
what the visible is to the mathematical 
point4 ,he falls under the influence of 
the argument from design4 ,the ,creator 
has ordained the multiplicity of        
beauties4 ,things are beautiful         
according to our ideas of them1 and     
these ideas come from the ,creator4     
,thus each beautiful thing has its own  
type1 and a child would appear ugly if  
it resembled a man4 ,he adds to his     
remarks in this sense3 ,as the diamond  

is alone perfect among stones1 gold     
among metals1 and man among living      
creatures1 so there is distinction in   
each species1 and but little is perfect4
 ,in his ,dreams of ,beauty1 he looks   
upon beauty as an intermediate          
disposition1 which contains a part of   
perfection and a part of the agreeable1 
and forms a tertium quid1 which differs 
from the other two and deserves a       
special name4 ,he names four sources of 
the art of painting3 beauty1 significant
 or expressive character1 harmony1 and  
colouring4 ,the first of these he finds 
among the ancients1 the second with     
,raphael1 the third with ,correggio1 the
 fourth with ,titian4 ,mengs does not   
succeed in rising above this empiricism 
of the studio1 save to declaim about the
 beauty of nature1 virtue1 forms1 and   
proportions1 and indeed everything1     
including the ,first ,cause1 which is   
the most beautiful of all4  ,the name of
 ,g4,e4 ,lessing 7#agff7 is well known  
to all concerned with art problems4 ,the

 ideas of ,winckelmann reappear in      
,lessing1 with less of a metaphysical   
tinge4 ,for ,lessing1 the end of art is 
the pleasing1 and since this is a       
superfluous thing1 he thought that the  
legislator should not allow to art the  
liberty indispensable to science1 which 
seeks the truth1 necessary to the soul4 
,for the ,greeks painting was1 as it    
should always be1 imitation of beautiful
 bodies4 ,everything disagreeable or    
ill-formed should be excluded from      
painting4 ,painting1 as clever          
imitation1 may imitate deformity4       
,painting1 as a fine art1 does not      
permit this4 ,he was more inclined to   
admit deformity in poetry1 as there it  
is less shocking1 and the poet can make 
use of it to produce in us certain      
feelings1 such as the ridiculous or the 
terrible4 ,in his ,dramaturgie 7#agfg71 
,lessing followed the ,peripatetics1 and
 believed that the rules of ,aristotle  
were as absolute as the theorems of     
,euclid4 ,his polemic against the       

,french school is chiefly directed to   
claiming a place in poetry for the      
verisimilar1 as against absolute        
historical exactitude4 ,he held the     
universal to be a sort of mean of what  
appears in the individual1 the catharsis
 was in his view a transformation of the
 passions into virtuous dispositions1   
and he held the duty of poetry to be    
inspiration of the love of virtue4 ,he  
followed ,winckelmann in believing that 
the expression of physical beauty was   
the supreme object of painting4 ,this   
beauty exists only as an ideal1 which   
finds its highest expression in man4    
,animals possess it to a slighter       
extent1 vegetable and inanimate nature  
not at all4 ,those mistaken enough to   
occupy themselves with depicting the    
latter are imitating beauties deprived  
of all ideal4 ,they work only with eye  
and hand2 genius has little if any share
 in their productions4 ,lessing found   
the physical ideal to reside chiefly in 
form1 but also in the ideal of colour1  

and in permanent expression4 ,mere      
colouring and transitory expression were
 for him without ideal1 because nature  
has not imposed upon herself anything   
definite as regards them4 ,at bottom he 
does not care for colouring1 finding in 
the pen drawings of artists a life1 a   
liberty1 a delicacy1 lacking to their   
pictures4 ,he asks whether even the most
 wonderful colouring can make up for    
such a loss1 and whether it be not      
desirable that the art of oil-painting  
had never been invented4  ,this ideal   
beauty1 wonderfully constructed from    
divine quintessence and subtle pen and  
brush strokes1 this academic mystery1   
had great success4 ,in ,italy it was    
much discussed in the environment of    
,mengs and of ,winckelmann1 who were    
working there4  ,the first counterblast 
to their aesthetic ,neo-platonism came  
from an ,italian named ,spalletti1 and  
took the form of a letter addressed to  
,mengs4 ,he represents the              
characteristic as the true principle of 

art4 ,the pleasure obtained from beauty 
is intellectual1 and truth is its       
object4 ,when the soul meets with what  
is characteristic1 and what really suits
 the object to be represented1 the work 
is held to be beautiful4 ,a well-made   
man with a woman's face is ugly4        
,harmony1 order1 variety1 proportion1   
etc4--these are elements of beauty1 and 
man enjoys the widening of his knowledge
 before disagreeable things             
characteristically represented4         
,spalletti defines beauty as that       
modification inherent to the object     
observed1 which presents it1 as it      
should appear1 with an infallible       
characteristic4  ,thus the ,aristotelian
 thesis found a supporter in ,italy1    
some years before any protestation was  
heard in ,germany4 ,louis ,hirt1 the    
historian of art 7#agig7 observed that  
ancient monuments represented all sorts 
of forms1 from the most beautiful and   
sublime to the most ugly and most       
common4 ,he therefore denied that ideal 

beauty was the principle of art1 and for
 it substituted the characteristic1     
applicable equally to gods1 heroes1 and 
animals4  ,wolfgang ,goethe1 in #agih1  
forgetting the juvenile period1 during  
which he had dared to raise a hymn to   
,gothic architecture1 now began         
seriously to seek a middle term between 
beauty and expression4 ,he believed that
 he had found it1 in certain            
characteristic contents presenting to   
the artist beautiful shapes1 which the  
artist would then develop and reduce to 
perfect beauty4 ,thus for ,goethe at    
this period1 the characteristic was     
simply the starting-point1 or framework1
 from which the beautiful arose1 through
 the power of the artist4  ,but these   
writers mentioned after ,j4,b4 ,vico are
 not true philosophers4 ,winckelmann1   
,mengs1 ,hogarth1 ,lessing1 and ,goethe 
are great in other ways4 ,meier called  
himself a historian of art1 but he was  
inferior both to ,herder and to ,hamann4
 ,from ,j4,b4 ,vico to ,emmanuel ,kant1 

,european thought is without a name of  
great importance as regards this        
subject4  ,kant took up the problem1    
where ,vico had left it1 not in the     
historical1 but in the ideal sense4 ,he 
resembled the ,italian philosopher1 in  
the gravity and the tenacity of his     
studies in ,aesthetic1 but he was far   
less happy in his solutions1 which did  
not attain to the truth1 and to which he
 did not succeed in giving the necessary
 unity and systematization4 ,the reader 
must bear in mind that ,kant is here    
criticized solely as an aesthetician3   
his other conclusions do not enter      
directly into the discussion4  ,what was
 ,kant's idea of art8 ,the answer is3   
the same in substance as ,baumgarten's4 
,this may seem strange to those who     
remember his sustained polemic against  
,wolf and the conception of beauty as   
confused perception4 ,but ,kant always  
thought highly of ,baumgarten4 ,he calls
 him that excellent analyst in the      
,critique of ,pure ,reason1 and he used 

,baumgarten's text for his ,university  
lectures on ,metaphysic4 ,kant looked   
upon ,logic and ,aesthetic as cognate   
studies1 and in his scheme of studies   
for #agfe1 and in the ,critique of ,pure
 ,reason1 he proposes to cast a glance  
at the ,critique of ,taste1 that is to  
say1 ,aesthetic1 since the study of the 
one is useful for the other and they are
 mutually illuminative4 ,he followed    
,meier in his distinctions between      
logical and aesthetic truth4 ,he even   
quoted the ,instance of the young girl1 
whose face when distinctly seen1 i4e4   
with a microscope1 is no longer         
beautiful4 ,it is true1 aesthetically1  
he said1 that when a man is dead he     
cannot come to life1 although this be   
opposed both to logical and to moral    
truth4 ,it is aesthetically true that   
the sun plunges into the sea1 although  
that is not true logically or           
objectively4  ,no one1 even among the   
greatest1 can yet tell to what extent   
logical truth should mingle with        

aesthetic truth4 ,kant believed that    
logical truth must wear the habit of    
,aesthetic1 in order to become          
accessible4 ,this habit1 he thought1 was
 discarded only by the rational         
sciences1 which tend to depth4          
,aesthetic certainly is subjective4 ,it 
is satisfied with authority or with an  
appeal to great men4 ,we are so feeble  
that ,aesthetic must eke out our        
thoughts4 ,aesthetic is a vehicle of    
,logic4 ,but there are logical truths   
which are not aesthetic4 ,we must       
exclude from philosophy exclamations and
 other emotions1 which belong to        
aesthetic truth4 ,for ,kant1 poetry is  
the harmonious play of thought and      
sensation1 differing from eloquence1    
because in poetry thoughts are fitted to
 suggestions1 in eloquence the reverse  
is true4 ,poetry should make virtue and 
intellect visible1 as was done by ,pope 
in his ,essay on ,man4 ,elsewhere1 he   
says frankly that logical perfection is 
the foundation of all the rest4  ,the   

confirmation of this is found in his    
,critique of ,judgment1 which ,schelling
 looked upon as the most important of   
the three ,critiques1 and which ,hegel  
and other metaphysical idealists always 
especially esteemed4  ,for ,kant art was
 always a sensible and imaged covering  
for an intellectual concept4 ,he did not
 look upon art as pure beauty without a 
concept4 ,he looked upon it as a beauty 
adherent and fixed about a concept4 ,the
 work of genius contains two elements3  
imagination and intelligence4 ,to these 
must be added taste1 which combines the 
two4 ,art may even represent the ugly in
 nature1 for artistic beauty is not a   
beautiful thing but a beautiful         
representation of a thing4 ,but this    
representation of the ugly has its      
limits in the arts 7here ,kant remembers
 ,lessing and ,winckelmann71 and an     
absolute limit in the disgusting and the
 repugnant1 which kills the             
representation itself4 ,he believes that
 there may be artistic productions      

without a concept1 such as are flowers  
in nature1 and these would be ornaments 
to frameworks1 music without words1     
etc41 etc41 but since they represent    
nothing reducible to a definite concept1
 they must be classed1 like flowers1    
with free beauties4 ,this would         
certainly seem to exclude them from     
,aesthetic1 which1 according to ,kant1  
should combine imagination and          
intelligence4  ,kant is shut in with    
intellectualist barriers4 ,a complete   
definition of the imagination is wanting
 to his system4 ,he does not admit that 
the imagination belongs to the powers of
 the mind4 ,he relegates it to the facts
 of sensation4 ,he is aware of the      
reproductive and combinative            
imagination1 but he does not recognize  
fancy 7fantasia71 which is the true     
productive imagination4  ,yet ,kant was 
aware that there exists an activity     
other than the intellective4 ,intuition 
is referred to by him as preceding      
intellective activity and differing from

 sensation4 ,he does not speak of it1   
however1 in his critique of art1 but in 
the first section of the ,critique of   
,pure ,reason4 ,sensations do not enter 
the mind1 until it has given them form4 
,this is neither sensation nor          
intelligence4 ,it is pure intuition1 the
 sum of the a priori principles of      
sensibility4 ,he speaks thus3 ,there    
must1 then1 exist a science that forms  
the first part of the transcendental    
doctrine of the elements1 distinct from 
that which contains the principles of   
pure thought and is called              
transcendental ,logic4  ,what does he   
call this new science8 ,he calls it     
,transcendental ,aesthetic1 and refuses 
to allow the term to be used for the    
,critique of ,taste1 which could never  
become a science4  ,but although he thus
 states so clearly the necessity of a   
science of the form of the sensations1  
that is of pure intuition1 ,kant here   
appears to fall into grave error4 ,this 
arises from his inexact idea of the     

essence of the aesthetic faculty or of  
art1 which1 as we now know1 is pure     
intuition4 ,he conceives the form of    
sensibility to be reducible to the two  
categories of space and time4           
,benedetto ,croce has shown that space  
and time are far from being categories  
or functions3 they are complex posterior
 formations4 ,kant1 however1 looked upon
 density1 colour1 etc41 as material for 
sensations2 but the mind only observes  
colour or hardness when it has already  
given a form to its sensations4         
,sensations1 in so far as they are crude
 matter1 are outside the mind3 they are 
a limit4 ,colour1 hardness1 density1    
etc41 are already intuitions4 ,they are 
the aesthetic activity in its           
rudimentary manifestation4              
,characterizing or qualifying           
imagination1 that is1 aesthetic         
activity1 should therefore take the     
place occupied by the study of space and
 time in the ,critique of ,pure ,reason1
 and constitute the true ,transcendental

 ,aesthetic1 prologue to ,logic4  ,had  
,kant done this1 he would have surpassed
 ,leibnitz and ,baumgarten2 he would    
have equalled ,vico4  ,kant did not     
identify the ,beautiful with art4 ,he   
established what he called the four     
moments of ,beauty1 amounting to a      
definition of it4 ,the two negative     
moments are1 ,that is beautiful which   
pleases without interest2 this thesis   
was directed against the sensualist     
school of ,english writers1 with whom   
,kant had for a time agreed2 and ,that  
is beautiful which pleases without a    
concept1 directed against the           
intellectualists4 ,thus he affirmed the 
existence of a spiritual domain1        
distinct from that of organic pleasure1 
of the useful1 the good1 and the true4  
,the two other moments are1 ,that is    
beautiful which has the form of finality
 without the representation of an end1  
and ,that is beautiful which is the     
object of universal pleasure4 ,what is  
this disinterested pleasure that we     

experience before pure colours1 pure    
sounds1 and flowers8 ,benedetto ,croce  
replies that this mysterious domain has 
no existence2 that the instances cited  
represent1 either instances of organic  
pleasure1 or are artistic facts of      
expression4  ,kant was less severe with 
the ,neoplatonicians than with the two  
schools of thought above mentioned4 ,his
 ,critique of ,judgment contains some   
curious passages1 in one of which he    
gives his distinction of form from      
matter3 ,in music1 the melody is the    
matter1 harmony the form3 in a flower1  
the scent is the matter1 the shape or   
configuration the form4 ,in the other   
arts1 he found that the design was the  
essential4 ,not what pleases in         
sensation1 but what is approved for its 
form1 is the foundation of taste4  ,in  
his pursuit of the phantom of a beauty1 
which is neither that of art nor of     
sensual pleasure1 exempt alike from     
expression and from enjoyment1 he became
 enveloped in inextricable              

contradictions4 ,little disposed as he  
was to let himself be carried away by   
the imagination1 he expressed his       
contempt for philosopher-poets like     
,herder1 and kept saying and unsaying1  
affirming and then immediately          
criticizing his own affirmations as to  
this mysterious beauty4 ,the truth is   
that this mystery is simply his own     
individual uncertainty before a problem 
which he could not solve1 owing to his  
having no clear idea of an activity of  
sentiment4 ,such an activity represented
 for him a logical contradiction4 ,such 
expressions as necessary universal      
pleasure1 finality without the idea of  
end1 are verbal proofs of his           
uncertainty4  ,how was he to emerge from
 this uncertainty1 this contradiction8  
,he fell back upon the concept of a base
 of subjective finality as the base of  
the judgment of taste1 that is of the   
subjective finality of nature by the    
judgment4 ,but nothing can be known or  
disclosed to the object by means of this

 concept1 which is indeterminate in     
itself and not adapted for knowledge4   
,its determining reason is perhaps      
situated in the suprasensible substratum
 of humanity4 ,thus beauty becomes a    
symbol of morality4 ,the subjective     
principle alone1 that is1 the           
indeterminate idea of the suprasensible 
in us1 can be indicated as the sole key 
to reveal this faculty1 which remains   
unknown to us in its origin4 ,nothing   
but this principle can make that hidden 
faculty comprehensible4  ,kant had a    
tendency to mysticism1 which this       
statement does not serve to conceal1 but
 it was a mysticism without enthusiasm1 
a mysticism almost against the grain4   
,his failure to penetrate thoroughly the
 nature of the aesthetic activity led   
him to see double and even triple1 on   
several occasions4 ,art being unknown to
 him in its essential nature1 he invents
 the functions of space and time and    
terms this transcendental aesthetic2 he 
develops the theory of the imaginative  

beautifying of the intellectual concept 
by genius2 he is finally forced to admit
 a mysterious power of feeling1         
intermediate between the theoretic and  
the practical activity4 ,this power is  
cognoscitive and non-cognoscitive1 moral
 and indifferent to morality1 agreeable 
and yet detached from the pleasure of   
the senses4 ,his successors hastened to 
make use of this mysterious power1 for  
they were glad to be able to find some  
sort of justification for their bold    
speculations in the severe philosopher  
of ,knigsberg4  ,in addition to         
,schelling and ,hegel1 for whom1 as has 
been said1 the ,critique of ,judgment   
seemed the most important of the three  
,critiques1 we must now mention the name
 of a poet who showed himself as great  
in philosophical as in aesthetic        
achievement4  ,friedrich ,schiller first
 elaborated that portion of the ,kantian
 thought contained in the ,critique of  
,judgment4 ,before any professional     
philosopher1 ,schiller studied that     

sphere of activity which unites feeling 
with reason4 ,hegel talks with          
admiration of this artistic genius1 who 
was also so profoundly philosophical and
 first announced the principle of       
reconciliation between life as duty and 
reason on the one hand1 and the life of 
the senses and feeling on the other4    
,to ,schiller belongs the great merit of
 having opposed the subjective idealism 
of ,kant and of having made the attempt 
to surpass it4  ,the exact relations    
between ,kant and ,schiller1 and the    
extent to which the latter may have been
 influenced by ,leibnitz and ,herder1   
are of less importance to the history of
 ,aesthetic than the fact that ,schiller
 unified once for all art and beauty1   
which had been separated by ,kant1 with 
his distinctions between adherent and   
pure beauty4 ,schiller's artistic sense 
must doubtless have stood him here in   
good stead4  ,schiller found a very     
unfortunate and misleading term to apply
 to the aesthetic sphere4 ,he called it 

the sphere of play 7,spiel74 ,he strove 
to explain that by this he did not mean 
ordinary games1 nor material amusement4 
,for ,schiller1 this sphere of play lay 
intermediate between thought and        
feeling4 ,necessity in art gives place  
to a free disposition of forces2 mind   
and nature1 matter and form are here    
reconciled4 ,the beautiful is life1 but 
not physiological life4 ,a beautiful    
statue may have life1 and a living man  
be without it4 ,art conquers nature with
 form4 ,the great artist effaces matter 
with form4 ,the less we are sensible of 
the material in a work of art1 the      
greater the triumph of the artist4 ,the 
soul of the spectator should leave the  
magic sphere of art as pure and as      
perfect as when it left the hands of the
 ,creator4 ,the most frivolous theme    
should be so treated that we can pass at
 once from it to the most rigorous1 and 
vice versa4 ,only when man has placed   
himself outside the world and           
contemplates it aesthetically1 can he   

know the world4 ,while he is merely the 
passive receiver of sensations1 he is   
one with the world1 and therefore cannot
 realize it4 ,art is indeterminism4     
,with the help of art1 man delivers     
himself from the yoke of the senses1 and
 is at the same time free of any        
rational or moral duty3 he may enjoy for
 a moment the luxury of serene          
contemplation4  ,schiller was well aware
 that the moment art is employed to     
teach morals directly1 it ceases to be  
art4 ,all other teachings give to the   
soul a special imprint4 ,art alone is   
favourable to all without prejudice4    
,owing to this indifference of art1 it  
possesses a great educative power1 by   
opening the path to morality without    
preaching or persuasion2 without        
determining1 it produces                
determinability4 ,this was the main     
theme of the celebrated ,letters on the 
,aesthetic ,education of ,man1 which    
,schiller wrote to his patron the ,duke 
of ,holstein-,augustenburg4 ,here1 and  

in his lectures at the ,university of   
,jena1 it is clear that ,schiller       
addresses himself to a popular audience4
 ,he began a work1 on scientific        
,aesthetic1 which he intended to entitle
 ,kallias1 but unfortunately died       
without completing it4 ,we possess only 
a few fragments1 contained in his       
correspondence with his friend ,krner4  
,krner did not feel satisfied with the  
formula of ,schiller1 and asks for some 
more precise and objective mark of the  
beautiful4 ,schiller tells him that he  
has found it1 but what he had found we  
shall never know1 as there is no        
document to inform us4  ,the fault of   
,schiller's aesthetic theory was its    
lack of precision4 ,his artistic faculty
 enabled him to give unsurpassable      
descriptions of the catharsis and of    
other effects of art1 but he fails to   
give a precise definition of the        
aesthetic function4 ,true1 he           
disassociates it from morality1 yet     
admits that it may in a measure be      

associated with it4 ,the only formal    
activities that he recognizes are the   
moral and the intellectual1 and he      
denies altogether 7against the          
sensualists7 that art can have anything 
to do with passion or sensuality4 ,his  
intellectual world consisted only of the
 logical and the intellectual1 leaving  
out the imaginative activity4  ,what is 
art for ,schiller8 ,he admits four modes
 of relation between man and external   
things4 ,they are the physical1 the     
logical1 the moral1 and the aesthetic4  
,he describes this latter as a mode by  
which things affect the whole of our    
different forces1 without being a       
definite object for any one in          
particular4 ,thus a man may be said to  
please aesthetically1 when he does so   
without appealing to any one of the     
senses directly1 and without any law or 
end being thought of in connection with 
him4 ,schiller cannot be made to say    
anything more definite than this4 ,his  
general position was probably much like 

,kant's 7save in the case above         
mentioned1 where he made a happy        
correction71 and he probably looked upon
 ,aesthetic as a mingling of several    
faculties1 as a play of sentiment4      
,schiller was faithful to ,kant's       
teaching in its main lines1 and his     
uncertainty was largely due to this4    
,the existence of a third sphere uniting
 form and matter was for ,schiller      
rather an ideal conformable to reason   
than a definite activity2 it was        
supposititious1 rather than effective4  
,but the ,romantic movement in          
literature1 which was at that time      
gaining ground1 with its belief in a    
superhuman faculty called imagination1  
in genius breaker of rules1 found no    
such need for restraint4 ,schiller's    
modest reserve was set aside1 and with  
,j4,p4 ,richter we approach a mythology 
of the imagination4 ,many of his        
observations are1 however1 just1 and his
 distinction between productive and     
reproductive imagination is excellent4  

,how could humanity appreciate works of 
genius1 he asks1 were it without some   
common measure8 ,all men who can go as  
far as saying this is beautiful before a
 beautiful thing1 are capable of the    
latter4 ,he then proceeds to establish  
to his own satisfaction categories of   
the imagination1 leading from simple    
talent to the supreme form of male      
genius in which all faculties flourish  
together3 a faculty of faculties4  ,the 
,romantic conception of art is1 in      
substance1 that of idealist ,german     
philosophy1 where we find it in a more  
coherent and systematic form4 ,it is the
 conception of ,schelling1 ,solger1 and 
,hegel4  ,fichte1 ,kant's first great   
pupil1 cannot be included with these1   
for his view of ,aesthetic1 largely     
influenced by ,schiller1 is transformed 
in the ,fichtian system to a moral      
activity1 to a representation of the    
ethical ideal4 ,the subjective idealism 
of ,fichte1 however1 generated an       
,aesthetic3 that of irony as the base of

 art4 ,the ,i that has created the      
universe can also destroy it4 ,the      
universe is a vain appearance1 smiled at
 by the ,ego its creator1 who surveys it
 as an artist his work1 from without and
 from above4 ,for ,friedrich ,schlegel1 
art was a perpetual farce1 a parody of  
itself2 and ,tieck defined irony as a   
force which allows the poet to dominate 
his material4  ,novalis1 that ,romantic 
,fichtian1 dreamed of a magical         
idealism1 an art of creating by an      
instantaneous act of the ,ego4 ,but     
,schelling's system of transcendental   
idealism was the first great            
philosophical affirmation of            
,romanticism and of conscious           
,neo-platonism reborn in ,aesthetic4    
,schelling has obviously studied        
,schiller1 but he brings to the problem 
a mind more purely philosophical and a  
method more exactly scientific4 ,he even
 takes ,kant to task for faultiness of  
method4 ,his remarks as to ,plato's     
position are curious1 if not conclusive4

 ,he says that ,plato condemned the art 
of his time1 because it was realistic   
and naturalistic3 like all antique art1 
it exhibited a finite character4        
,plato's judgment would have been quite 
different had he known ,christian art1  
of which the character is infinity4     
,schelling held firm to the fusion of   
art and beauty effected by ,schiller1   
but he combated ,winckelmann's theory of
 abstract beauty with its negative      
conception of the characteristic1       
assigning to art the limits of the      
individual4 ,art is characteristic      
beauty2 it is not the individual1 but   
the living conception of the individual4
 ,when the artist recognizes the eternal
 idea in an individual1 and expresses it
 outwardly1 he transforms the individual
 into a world apart1 into a species1    
into an eternal idea4 ,characteristic   
beauty is the fulness of form which     
slays form3 it does not silence passion1
 but restrains it as the banks of a     
river the waters that flow between them1

 but do not overflow4  ,schelling's     
starting-point is the criticism of      
teleological judgment1 as stated by     
,kant in his third ,critique4 ,teleology
 is the union of theoretic with         
practical philosophy4 ,but the system   
would not be complete1 unless we could  
show the identity of the two worlds1    
theoretic and practical1 in the subject 
itself4 ,he must demonstrate the        
existence of an activity1 which is at   
once unconscious as nature and conscious
 as spirit4 ,this activity we find in   
,aesthetic1 which is therefore the      
general organ of philosophy1 the        
keystone of the whole building4  ,poetry
 and philosophy alone possess the world 
of the ideal1 in which the real world   
vanishes4 ,true art is not the          
impression of the moment1 but the       
representation of infinite life3 it is  
transcendental intuition objectified4   
,the time will come when philosophy will
 return to poetry1 which was its source1
 and on the new philosophy will arise a 

new mythology4 ,philosophy does not     
depict real things1 but their ideas2 so 
too1 art4 ,those same ideas1 of which   
real things are1 as philosophy shows1   
the imperfect copies1 reappear in art   
objectified as ideas1 and therefore in  
their perfection4 ,art stands nearest to
 philosophy1 which itself stands nearest
 to the ,idea1 and therefore nearest to 
perfection4 ,art differs from philosophy
 only by its specialization3 in all     
other ways it is the ideal world in its 
most complete expression4 ,the three    
,ideas of ,truth1 ,goodness1 and ,beauty
 correspond to the three powers of the  
ideal and of the real world4 ,beauty is 
not the universal whole1 which is truth1
 nor is it the only reality1 which is   
action3 it is the perfect mingling of   
the two4 ,beauty exists where the real  
or particular is so adequate to its     
concept that this infinite thing enters 
into the finite1 and is contemplated in 
the concrete4 ,philosophy unites truth1 
morality1 and beauty1 in what they      

possess in common1 and deduces them from
 their unique ,source1 which is ,god4   
,if philosophy assume the character of  
science and of truth1 although it be    
superior to truth1 the reason for this  
lies in the fact that science and truth 
are simply the formal determination of  
philosophy4  ,schelling looked upon     
mythology as a necessity for every art4 
,ideas are ,gods1 considered from the   
point of view of reality2 for the       
essence of each is equal to ,god in a   
particular form4 ,the characteristics of
 all ,gods1 including the ,christian1   
are pure limitation and absolute        
indivisibility4 ,minerva has wisdom and 
strength1 but lacks womanly tenderness2 
,juno has power and wisdom1 but is      
without amorous charm1 which she borrows
 with the girdle of ,venus1 who in her  
turn is without the wisdom of ,minerva4 
,what would these ,gods become without  
their limitations8 ,they would cease to 
be the objects of ,fancy4 ,fancy is a   
faculty1 apart from the pure intellect  

and from the reason4 ,distinct from     
imagination1 which develops the products
 of art1 ,fancy has intuitions of them1 
grasps them herself1 and herself        
represents them4 ,fancy is to           
imagination as intellectual intuition is
 to reason4 ,fancy1 then1 is            
intellectual intuition in art4 ,in the  
thought of ,schelling1 fancy1 the new or
 artistic intuition1 sister of          
intellectual intuition1 came to dominate
 alike the intellect and the old        
conception of the fancy and the         
imagination1 in a system for which      
reason alone did not suffice4  ,c4,g4   
,solger followed ,schelling and agreed  
with him in finding but little truth in 
the theories of ,kant1 and especially of
 ,fichte4 ,he held that their dialectic 
had failed to solve the difficulty of   
intellectual intuition4 ,he too         
conceived of fancy as distinct from     
imagination1 and divided the former into
 three degrees4 ,imagination he held to 
appertain to ordinary knowledge1 which  

re-establishes the original intuition to
 infinity4 ,fancy originates from the   
original antithesis in the idea1 and so 
operates that the opposing elements     
which are separated from the idea become
 perfectly united in reality4 ,by means 
of fancy1 we are able to understand     
things more lofty than those of common  
knowledge1 and in them we recognize the 
idea itself as real4 ,in art1 fancy is  
the faculty of transforming the idea    
into reality4  ,for ,solger as for      
,schelling1 beauty belongs to the region
 of ,ideas1 which are inaccessible to   
common knowledge4 ,art is nearly allied 
to religion1 for as religion is the     
abyss of the idea1 into which our       
consciousness plunges1 that it may      
become essential1 so ,art and the       
,beautiful resolve1 in their way1 the   
world of distinctions1 the universal and
 the particular4 ,artistic activity is  
more than theoretical3 it is practical1 
realized and perfect1 and therefore     
belongs to practical1 not to theoretic  

philosophy1 as ,kant wrongly believed4  
,since art must touch infinity on one   
side1 it cannot have ordinary nature for
 its object4 ,art therefore ceases in   
the portrait1 and this explains why the 
ancients generally chose ,gods or       
,heroes as models for sculpture4 ,every 
deity1 even in a limited and particular 
form1 expresses a definite modification 
of the ,idea4  ,g4,g4,f4 ,hegel gives   
the same definition of art as ,solger   
and ,schelling1 ,all three were mystical
 aestheticians1 and the various shades  
of mystical ,aesthetic1 presented by    
these three writers1 are not of great   
interest4 ,schelling forced upon art the
 abstract ,platonic ideas1 while ,hegel 
reduced it to the concrete idea4 ,this  
concrete idea was for ,hegel the first  
and lowest of the three forms of the    
liberty of the spirit4 ,it represented  
immediate1 sensible1 objectified        
knowledge2 while ,religion filled the   
second place1 as representative         
consciousness with adoration1 which is  

an element foreign to art alone4 ,the   
third place was of course occupied by   
,philosophy1 the free thought of the    
absolute spirit4 ,beauty and ,truth are 
one for ,hegel2 they are united in the  
,idea4 ,the beautiful he defined as the 
sensible appearance of the ,idea4  ,some
 writers have erroneously believed that 
the views of the three philosophers     
above mentioned lead back to those of   
,baumgarten4 ,but that is not correct4  
,they well understood that art cannot be
 made a medium for the expression of    
philosophic concepts4 ,not only are they
 opposed to the moralistic and          
intellectualistic view1 but they are its
 active opponents4 ,schelling says that 
aesthetic production is in its essence  
absolutely free1 and ,hegel that art    
does not contain the universal as such4 
,hegel accentuated the cognoscitive     
character of art1 more than any of his  
predecessors4 ,we have seen that he     
placed it with ,philosophy and ,religion
 in the sphere of the absolute ,spirit4 

,but he does not allow either to ,art or
 to ,religion any difference of function
 from that of ,philosophy1 which        
occupies the highest place in his       
system4 ,they are therefore inferior1   
necessary1 grades of the ,spirit4 ,of   
what use are they8 ,of none whatever1 or
 at best1 they merely represent         
transitory and historical phases of     
human life4  ,thus we see that the      
tendency of ,hegelianism is             
anti-artistic1 as it is rationalistic   
and anti-religious4  ,this result of    
thought was a strange and a sad thing   
for one who loved art so fervently as   
,hegel4 ,our memories conjure up ,plato1
 who also loved art well1 and yet found 
himself logically obliged to banish the 
poet from his ideal ,republic1 after    
crowning him with roses4 ,but the       
,german philosopher was as staunch to   
the 7supposed7 command of reason as the 
,greek1 and felt himself obliged to     
announce the death of art4 ,art1 he     
says1 occupies a lofty place in the     

human spirit1 but not the most lofty1   
for it is limited to a restricted       
content and only a certain grade of     
truth can be expressed in art4 ,such are
 the ,hellenic ,gods1 who can be        
transfused in the sensible and appear in
 it adequately4 ,the ,christian         
conception of truth is among those which
 cannot be so expressed4 ,the spirit of 
the modern world1 and more precisely the
 spirit of our religion and rational    
development1 seem to have gone beyond   
the point at which art is the chief way 
of apprehending the ,absolute4 ,the     
peculiarity of artistic production no   
longer satisfies our highest needs4     
,thought and reflexion have surpassed   
art1 the beautiful4 ,he goes on to say  
that the reason generally given for this
 is the prevalence of material and      
political interests4 ,but the true      
reason is the inferiority in degree of  
art as compared with pure thought4 ,art 
is dead1 and ,philosophy can therefore  
supply its complete biography4  ,hegel's

 ,vorlesungen ber ,aesthetik amounts    
therefore to a funeral oration upon     
,art4  ,romanticism and metaphysical    
idealism had placed art1 sometimes above
 the clouds1 sometimes within them1 and 
believing that it was no good there to  
anyone1 ,hegel provided a decent burial4
  ,nothing perhaps better shows how well
 this fantastic conception of art suited
 the spirit of the time1 than the fact  
that even the adversaries of ,schelling1
 ,solger1 and ,hegel either admit       
agreement with that conception1 or find 
themselves involuntarily in agreement   
with it1 while believing themselves to  
be very remote4 ,they too are mystical  
aestheticians4  ,we all know with what  
virulence ,arthur ,schopenhauer attacked
 and combated ,schelling1 ,hegel1 and   
all the charlatans and professors who   
had divided among them the inheritance  
of ,kant4  ,well1 ,schopenhauer's theory
 of art starts1 just like ,hegel's1 from
 the difference between the abstract and
 the concrete concept1 which is the     

,idea4 ,schopenhauer's ideas are the    
,platonic ideas1 although in the form   
which he gives to them1 they have a     
nearer resemblance to the ,ideas of     
,schelling than to the ,idea of ,hegel4 
,schopenhauer takes much trouble to     
differentiate his ideas from            
intellectual concepts4 ,he calls the    
idea unity which has become plurality by
 means of space and time4 ,it is the    
form of our intuitive apperception4 ,the
 concept is1 on the contrary1 unity     
extracted from plurality by means of    
abstraction1 which is an act of our     
intellect4 ,the concept may be called   
unitas post rem1 the idea unitas ante   
rem4  ,the origin of this psychological 
illusion of the ideas or types of things
 is always to be found in the changing  
of the empirical classifications created
 for their own purposes by the natural  
sciences1 into living realities4  ,thus 
each art has for its sphere a special   
category of ideas4 ,architecture and its
 derivatives1 gardening 7and strange to 

say landscape-painting is included with 
it71 sculpture and animal-painting1     
historical painting and the higher forms
 of sculpture1 etc41 all possess their  
special ideas4 ,poetry's chief object is
 man as idea4 ,music1 on the contrary1  
does not belong to the hierarchy of the 
other arts4 ,schelling had looked upon  
music as expressing the rhythm of the   
universe itself4 ,for ,schopenhauer1    
music does not express ideas1 but the   
,will itself4  ,the analogies between   
music and the world1 between fundamental
 notes and crude matter1 between the    
scale and the scale of species1 between 
melody and conscious will1 lead         
,schopenhauer to the conclusion that    
music is not only an arithmetic1 as it  
appeared to ,leibnitz1 but indeed a     
metaphysic3 the occult metaphysical     
exercise of a soul not knowing that it  
philosophizes4  ,for ,schopenhauer1 as  
for his idealist predecessors1 art is   
beatific4 ,it is the flower of life2 he 
who is plunged in artistic contemplation

 ceases to be an individual2 he is the  
conscious subject1 pure1 freed from     
will1 from pain1 and from time4  ,yet in
 ,schopenhauer's system exist elements  
for a better and a more profound        
treatment of the problem of art4 ,he    
could sometimes show himself to be a    
lucid and acute analyst4 ,for instance1 
he continually remarks that the         
categories of space and time are not    
applicable to art1 but only the general 
form of representation4 ,he might have  
deduced from this that art is the most  
immediate1 not the most lofty grade of  
consciousness1 since it precedes even   
the ordinary perceptions of space and   
time4 ,vico had already observed that   
this freeing oneself from ordinary      
perception1 this dwelling in            
imagination1 does not really mean an    
ascent to the level of the ,platonic    
,ideas1 but1 on the contrary1 a         
redescending to the sphere of immediate 
intuition1 a return to childhood4  ,on  
the other hand1 ,schopenhauer had begun 

to submit the ,kantian categories to    
impartial criticism1 and finding the two
 forms of intuition insufficient1 added 
a third1 causality4  ,he also drew      
comparisons between art and history1 and
 was more successful here than the      
idealist excogitators of a philosophy of
 history4 ,schopenhauer rightly saw that
 history was irreducible to concepts1   
that it is the contemplation of the     
individual1 and therefore not a science4
 ,having proceeded thus far1 he might   
have gone further1 and realized that the
 material of history is always the      
particular in its particularity1 that of
 art what is and always is identical4   
,but he preferred to execute a variation
 on the general motive that was in      
fashion at this time4  ,the fashion of  
the day6 ,it rules in philosophy as     
elsewhere1 and we are now about to see  
the most rigid and arid of analysts1 the
 leader of the so-called realist school1
 or school of exact science in ,germany 
in the nineteenth century1 plunge       

headlong into aesthetic mysticism4      
,g4,f4 ,herbart 7#ahac7 begins his      
,aesthetic by freeing it from the       
discredit attaching to ,metaphysic and  
to ,psychology4 ,he declares that the   
only true way of understanding art is to
 study particular examples of the       
beautiful and to note what they reveal  
as to its essence4  ,we shall now see   
what came of ,herbart's analysis of     
these examples of beauty1 and how far he
 succeeded in remaining free of         
,metaphysic4  ,for ,herbart1 beauty     
consists of relations4 ,the science of  
,aesthetic consists of an enumeration of
 all the fundamental relations between  
colours1 lines1 tones1 thoughts1 and    
will4 ,but for him these relations are  
not empirical or physiological4 ,they   
cannot therefore be studied in a        
laboratory1 because thought and the will
 form part of them1 and these belong as 
much to ,ethics as to the external      
world4 ,but ,herbart explicitly states  
that no true beauty is sensible1        

although sensation may and does often   
precede and follow the intuition of     
beauty4 ,there is a profound distinction
 between the beautiful and the agreeable
 or pleasant3 the latter does not       
require a representation1 while the     
former consists in representations of   
relations1 which are immediately        
followed by a judgment expressing       
unconditioned approval4 ,thus the merely
 pleasurable becomes more and more      
indifferent1 but the beautiful appears  
always as of more and more permanent    
value4 ,the judgment of taste is        
universal1 eternal1 immutable4 ,the     
complete representation of the same     
relations always carries with it the    
same judgment4 ,for ,herbart1 aesthetic 
judgments are the general class         
containing the sub-class of ethical     
judgments4 ,the five ethical ideas1 of  
internal liberty1 of perfection1 of     
benevolence1 of equity1 and of justice1 
are five aesthetic ideas2 or better1    
they are aesthetic concepts applied to  

the will in its relations4  ,herbart    
looked upon art as a complex fact1      
composed of an external element         
possessing logical or psychological     
value1 the content1 and of a true       
aesthetic element1 which is the form4   
,entertainment1 instruction1 and        
pleasure of all sorts are mingled with  
the beautiful1 in order to obtain favour
 for the work in question4 ,the         
aesthetic judgment1 calm and serene in  
itself1 may be accompanied by all sorts 
of psychic emotions1 foreign to it4 ,but
 the content is always transitory1      
relative1 subject to moral laws1 and    
judged by them4 ,the form alone is      
perennial1 absolute1 and free4 ,the true
 catharsis can only be effected by      
separating the form from the content4   
,concrete art may be the sum of two     
values1 but the aesthetic fact is form  
alone4  ,for those capable of           
penetrating beneath appearances1 the    
aesthetic doctrines of ,herbart and of  
,kant will appear very similar4 ,herbart

 is notable as insisting1 in the manner 
of ,kant1 on the distinction between    
free and adherent beauty 7or adornment  
as sensuous stimulant71 on the existence
 of pure beauty1 object of necessary and
 universal judgments1 and on a certain  
mingling of ethical with his aesthetic  
theory4 ,herbart1 indeed1 called himself
 a ,kantian1 but of the year #ahbh4     
,kant's aesthetic theory1 though it be  
full of errors1 yet is rich in fruitful 
suggestions4 ,kant belongs to a period  
when philosophy is still young and      
pliant4 ,herbart came later1 and is dry 
and one-sided4 ,the romantics and the   
metaphysical idealists had unified the  
theory of the beautiful and of art4     
,herbart restored the old duality and   
mechanism1 and gave us an absurd1       
unfruitful form of mysticism1 void of   
all artistic inspiration4  ,herbart may 
be said to have taken all there was of  
false in the thought of ,kant and to    
have made it into a system4  ,the       
beginning of the nineteenth century in  

,germany is notable for the great number
 of philosophical theories and of       
counter-theories1 broached and rapidly  
discussed1 before being discarded4 ,none
 of the most prominent names in the     
period belong to philosophers of        
first-rate importance1 though they made 
so much stir in their day4  ,the thought
 of ,friedrich ,schleiermacher was      
obscured and misunderstood amid those   
crowding mediocrities2 yet it is perhaps
 the most interesting and the most      
noteworthy of the period4               
,schleiermacher looked upon ,aesthetic  
as an altogether modern form of thought4
 ,he perceived a profound difference    
between the ,poetics of ,aristotle1 not 
yet freed from empirical precepts1 and  
the tentative of ,baumgarten in the     
eighteenth century4 ,he praised ,kant as
 having been the first to include       
,aesthetic among the philosophical      
disciplines4 ,he admitted that with     
,hegel it had attained to the highest   
pinnacle1 being connected with religion 

and with philosophy1 and almost placed  
upon their level4  ,but he was          
dissatisfied with the absurdity of the  
attempt made by the followers of        
,baumgarten to construct a science or   
theory of sensuous pleasure4 ,he        
disapproved of ,kant's view of taste as 
being the principle of ,aesthetic1 of   
,fichte's art as moral teaching1 and of 
the vague conception of the beautiful as
 the centre of ,aesthetic4  ,he approved
 of ,schiller's marking of the moment of
 spontaneity in productive art1 and he  
praised ,schelling for having drawn     
attention to the figurative arts1 as    
being less liable than poetry to be     
diverted to false and illusory          
moralistic ends4 ,before he begins the  
study of the place due to the artistic  
activity in ,ethic1 he carefully        
excludes from the study of ,aesthetic   
all practical rules 7which1 being       
empirical1 are incapable of scientific  
demonstration74  ,for ,schleiermacher1  
the sphere of ,ethic included the whole 

,philosophy of the ,spirit1 in addition 
to morality4 ,these are the two forms of
 human activity--that which1 like       
,logic1 is the same in all men1 and is  
called activity of identity1 and the    
activity of difference or individuality4
 ,there are activities which1 like art1 
are internal or immanent and individual1
 and others which are external or       
practical4 ,the true work of art is the 
internal picture4 ,measure is what      
differentiates the artist's portrayal of
 anger on the stage and the anger of a  
really angry man4 ,truth is not sought  
in poetry1 or if it be sought there1 it 
is truth of an altogether different     
kind4 ,the truth of poetry lies in      
coherent presentation4 ,likeness to a   
model does not compose the merit of a   
picture4 ,not the smallest amount of    
knowledge comes from art1 which         
expresses only the truth of a particular
 consciousness4 ,art has for its field  
the immediate consciousness of self1    
which must be carefully distinguished   

from the thought of the ,ego4 ,this last
 is the consciousness of identity in the
 diversity of moments as they pass2 the 
immediate consciousness of self is the  
diversity itself of the moments1 of     
which we should be aware1 for life is   
nothing but the development of          
consciousness4 ,in this field1 art has  
sometimes been confused with two facts  
which accompany it there3 these are     
sentient consciousness 7that is1 the    
feelings of pleasure and of pain7 and   
religion4 ,schleiermacher here alludes  
to the sensualistic aestheticians of the
 eighteenth century1 and to ,hegel1 who 
had almost identified art and religion4 
,he refutes both points of view by      
pointing out that sentient pleasure and 
religious sentiment1 however different  
they may be from other points of view1  
are yet both determined by an objective 
fact2 while art1 on the contrary1 is    
free productivity4  ,dream is the best  
parallel and proof of this free         
productivity4 ,all the essential        

elements of art are found in dream1     
which is the result of free thoughts and
 of sensible intuitions1 consisting     
simply of images4 ,but dream1 as        
compared with art1 is chaotic3 when     
measure and order is established in     
dream1 it becomes art4 ,thoughts and    
images are alike essential to art1 and  
to both is necessary ponderation1       
reflexion1 measure1 and unity1 because  
otherwise every image would be confused 
with every other image4 ,thus the       
moments of inspiration and of           
ponderation are both necessary to art4  
,schleiermacher's thought1 so firm and  
lucid up to this point1 begins to become
 less secure1 with the discussion of    
typicity and of the extent to which the 
artist should follow ,nature4 ,he says  
that ideal figures1 which ,nature would 
give1 were she not impeded by external  
obstacles1 are the products of art4 ,he 
notes that when the artist represents   
something really given1 such as a       
portrait or a landscape1 he renounces   

freedom of production and adheres to the
 real4 ,in the artist is a double       
tendency1 toward the perfection of the  
type and toward the representation of   
natural reality4 ,he should not fall    
into the abstraction of the type1 nor   
into the insignificance of empirical    
reality4 ,schleiermacher feels all the  
difficulty of such a problem as whether 
there be one or several ideals of the   
human figure4 ,this problem may be      
transferred to the sphere of art1 and we
 may ask whether the poet is to         
represent only the ideal1 or whether he 
should also deal with those obstacles to
 it that impede ,nature in her efforts  
to attain4 ,both views contain half the 
truth4 ,to art belongs the              
representation of the ideal as of the   
real1 of the subjective and of the      
objective alike4 ,the representation of 
the comic1 that is of the anti-ideal and
 of the imperfect ideal1 belongs to the 
domain of art4 ,for the human form1 both
 morally and physically1 oscillates     

between the ideal and caricature4  ,he  
arrives at a most important definition  
as to the independence of art in respect
 to morality4 ,the nature of art1 as of 
philosophic speculation1 excludes moral 
and practical effects4 ,therefore1 there
 is no other difference between works of
 art than their respective artistic     
perfection 7,vollkommenheit in der      
,kunst74 ,if we could correctly         
predicate volitional acts in respect of 
works of art1 then we should find       
ourselves admiring only those works     
which stimulated the will1 and there    
would thus be established a difference  
of valuation1 independent of artistic   
perfection4 ,the true work of art       
depends upon the degree of perfection   
with which the external in it agrees    
with the internal4  ,schleiermacher     
rightly combats ,schiller's view that   
art is in any sense a game4 ,that1 he   
says1 is the view held by mere men of   
business1 to whom business alone is     
serious4 ,but artistic activity is      

universal1 and a man completely deprived
 of it unthinkable1 although the        
difference here between man and man1 is 
gigantic1 ranging from the simple desire
 to taste of art to the effective       
tasting of it1 and from this1 by        
infinite gradations1 to productive      
genius4  ,the regrettable fact that     
,schleiermacher's thought has reached us
 only in an imperfect form1 may account 
for certain of its defects1 such as his 
failure to eliminate aesthetic classes  
and types1 his retention of a certain   
residue of abstract formalism1 his      
definition of art as the activity of    
difference4 ,had he better defined the  
moment of artistic reproduction1        
realized the possibility of tasting the 
art of various times and of other       
nations1 and examined the true relation 
of art to science1 he would have seen   
that this difference is merely empirical
 and to be surmounted4 ,he failed also  
to recognize the identity of the        
aesthetic activity1 with language as the

 base of all other theoretic activity4  
,but ,schleiermacher's merits far       
outweigh these defects4 ,he removed from
 ,aesthetic its imperativistic          
character2 he distinguished a form of   
thought different from logical thought4 
,he attributed to our science a         
non-metaphysical1 anthropological       
character4 ,he denied the concept of the
 beautiful1 substituting for it artistic
 perfection1 and maintaining the        
aesthetic equality of a small with a    
great work of art1 he looked upon the   
aesthetic fact as an exclusively human  
productivity4  ,thus ,schleiermacher1   
the theologian1 in this period of       
metaphysical orgy1 of rapidly           
constructed and as rapidly destroyed    
systems1 perceived1 with the greatest   
philosophical acumen1 what is really    
characteristic of art1 and distinguished
 its properties and relations4 ,even    
where he fails to see clearly his way1  
he never abandons analysis for mere     
guess-work4  ,schleiermacher1 thus      

exploring the obscure region of the     
immediate consciousness1 or of the      
aesthetic fact1 can almost be heard     
crying out to his straying              
contemporaries3 ,hic ,rhodus1 hi salta6 
,speculation upon the origin and nature 
of language was rife at this time in    
,germany4 ,many theories were put       
forward1 among the most curious being   
that of ,schelling1 who held language   
and mythology to be the product of a    
pre-human consciousness1 allegorically  
expressed as the diabolic suggestions   
which had precipitated the ,ego from the
 infinite to the finite4  ,even ,wilhelm
 von ,humboldt was unable to free       
himself altogether from the             
intellectualistic prejudice of the      
substantial identity and the merely     
historical and accidental diversity of  
logical thought and language4 ,he speaks
 of a perfect language1 broken up and   
diminished with the lesser capacities of
 lesser peoples4 ,he believed that      
language is something standing outside  

the individual1 independent of him1 and 
capable of being revived by use4 ,but   
there were two men in ,humboldt1 an old 
man and a young one4 ,the latter was    
always suggesting that language should  
be looked upon as a living1 not as a    
dead thing1 as an activity1 not as a    
word4 ,this duality of thought sometimes
 makes his writing difficult and        
obscure4 ,although he speaks of an      
internal form of speech1 he fails to    
identify this with art as expression4   
,the reason is that he looks upon the   
word in too unilateral a manner1 as a   
means of developing logical thought1 and
 his ideas of ,aesthetic are too vague  
and too inexact to enable him to        
discover their identity4 ,despite his   
perception of the profound truth that   
poetry precedes prose1 ,humboldt gives  
grounds for doubt as to whether he had  
clearly recognized and firmly grasped   
the fact that language is always poetry1
 and that prose 7science7 is a          
distinction1 not of aesthetic form1 but 

of content1 that is1 of logical form4   
,steinthal1 the greatest follower of    
,humboldt1 solved his master's          
contradictions1 and in #ahee sustained  
successfully against the ,hegelian      
,becker the thesis that words are       
necessary for thought4 ,he pointed to   
the deaf-mute with his signs1 to the    
mathematician with his formulae1 to the 
,chinese language1 where the figurative 
portion is an essential of speech1 and  
declared that ,becker was wrong in      
believing that the ,sanskrit language   
was derived from twelve cardinal        
concepts4 ,he showed effectively that   
the concept and the word1 the logical   
judgment and the proposition1 are not   
comparable4 ,the proposition is not a   
judgment1 but the representation of a   
judgment2 and all propositions do not   
represent logical judgments4 ,several   
judgments can be expressed with one     
proposition4 ,the logical divisions of  
judgments 7the relations of concepts7   
have no correspondence in the           

grammatical division of propositions4   
,if we speak of a logical form of the   
proposition1 we fall into a             
contradiction in terms not less complete
 than his who should speak of the angle 
of a circle1 or of the periphery of a   
triangle4 ,he who speaks1 in so far as  
he speaks1 has not thoughts1 but        
language4  ,when ,steinthal had several 
times solemnly proclaimed the           
independence of language as regards     
,logic1 and that it produces its forms  
in complete autonomy1 he proceeded to   
seek the origin of language1 recognizing
 with ,humboldt that the question of    
,its origin is the same as that of its  
nature4 ,language1 he said1 belongs to  
the great class of reflex movements1 but
 this only shows one side of it1 not its
 true nature4 ,animals1 like men1 have  
reflex actions and sensations1 though   
nature enters the animal by force1 takes
 it by assault1 conquers and enslaves   
it4 ,with man is born language1 because 
he is resistance to nature1 governance  

of his own body1 and liberty4 ,language 
is liberation2 even to-day we feel that 
our soul becomes lighter1 and frees     
itself from a weight1 when we speak4    
,man1 before he attains to speech1 must 
be conceived of as accompanying all his 
sensations with bodily movements1       
mimetic attitudes1 gestures1 and        
particularly with articulate sounds4    
,what is still lacking to him1 that he  
may attain to speech8 ,the connexion    
between the reflex movements of the body
 and the state of the soul4 ,if his     
sentient consciousness be already       
consciousness1 then he lacks the        
consciousness of consciousness2 if it be
 already intuition1 then he lacks the   
intuition of intuition4 ,in sum1 he     
lacks the internal form of language4    
,with this comes speech1 which forms the
 connexion4 ,man does not choose the    
sound of his speech4 ,this is given to  
him and he adopts it instinctively4     
,when we have accorded to ,steinthal the
 great merit of having rendered coherent

 the ideas of ,humboldt1 and of having  
clearly separated linguistic from       
logical thought1 we must note that he   
too failed to perceive the identity of  
the internal form of language1 or       
intuition of the intuition1 as he called
 it1 with the aesthetic imagination4    
,herbart's psychology1 to which         
,steinthal adhered1 did not afford him  
any means for this identification4      
,herbart separated logic from           
psychology1 calling it a normative      
science2 he failed to discern the exact 
limits between feeling and spiritual    
formation1 psyche or soul1 and spirit1  
and to see that one of these spiritual  
formations is logical thought or        
activity1 which is not a code of laws   
imposed from without4 ,for ,herbart1    
,aesthetic1 as we know1 was a code of   
beautiful formal relations4 ,thus       
,steinthal1 following ,herbart in       
psychology1 was bound to look upon ,art 
as a beautifying of thought1 ,linguistic
 as the science of speech1 ,rhetoric and

 ,aesthetic as the science of beautiful 
speech4  ,steinthal never realized that 
to speak is to speak well or            
beautifully1 under penalty of not       
speaking1 and that the revolution which 
he and ,humboldt had effected in the    
conception of language must inevitably  
react upon and transform ,poetic1       
,rhetoric1 and ,aesthetic4  ,thus1      
despite so many efforts of conscientious
 analysis on the part of ,humboldt and  
of ,steinthal1 the unity of language and
 of poetry1 and the identification of   
the science of language and the science 
of poetry still found its least         
imperfect expression in the prophetic   
aphorisms of ,vico4  ,the philosophical 
movement in ,germany from the last      
quarter of the eighteenth century to the
 first half of the nineteenth1          
notwithstanding its many errors1 is yet 
so notable and so imposing with the     
philosophers already considered1 as to  
merit the first place in the ,european  
thought of that period4 ,this is even   

more the case as regards ,aesthetic than
 as regards philosophy in general4      
,france was the prey of ,condillac's    
sensualism1 and therefore incapable of  
duly appreciating the spiritual activity
 of art4 ,we hardly get a glimpse of    
,winckelmann's transcendental           
spiritualism in ,quatremre de ,quincy1  
and the frigid academics of ,victor     
,cousin were easily surpassed by        
,theodore ,jouffroy1 though he too      
failed of isolating the aesthetic fact4 
,french ,romanticism defined literature 
as the expression of society1 admired   
under ,german influence the grotesque   
and the characteristic1 declared the    
independence of art in the formula of   
art for art's sake1 but did not succeed 
in surpassing philosophically the old   
doctrine of the imitation of nature4 ,f4
 ,schlegel and ,solger indeed were      
largely responsible for the ,romantic   
movement in ,france--,schlegel with his 
belief in the characteristic or         
interesting as the principle of modern  

art1 which led him to admire the cruel  
and the ugly2 ,solger with his dialectic
 arrangement1 whereby the finite or     
terrestrial element is absorbed and     
annihilated in the divine and thus      
becomes the tragic1 or vice versa1 and  
the result is the comic4 ,rosenkranz    
published in ,knigsberg an ,aesthetic of
 the ,ugly1 and the works of ,vischer   
and ,zeising abound in subtleties       
relating to the ,idea and to its        
expression in the beautiful and sublime4
 ,these writers conceived of the ,idea  
as the ,knight ,purebeautiful1          
constrained to abandon his tranquil ease
 through the machinations of the ,ugly2 
the ,ugly leads him into all sorts of   
disagreeable adventures1 from all of    
which he eventually emerges victorious4 
,the ,sublime1 the ,comic1 the          
,humorous1 and so on1 are his ,marengo1 
,austerlitz1 and ,jena4 ,another version
 of their knight's adventures might be  
described as his conquest by his        
enemies1 but at the moment of conquest  

he transforms and irradiates his        
conquerors4 ,to such a mediocre and     
artificial mythology led the            
much-elaborated theory of the           
,modifications of the ,beautiful4  ,in  
,england1 the associationist psychology 
continued to hold sway1 and showed1 with
 ,dugald ,stewart's miserable attempt at
 establishing two forms of association1 
its incapacity to rise to the conception
 of the imagination4 ,with the poet     
,coleridge1 ,england also showed the    
influence of ,german thought1 and       
,coleridge elaborated with ,wordsworth a
 more correct conception of poetry and  
of its difference from science4 ,but the
 most notable contribution in ,english  
at that period came from another poet1  
,p4,b4 ,shelley1 whose ,defence of      
,poetry contains profound1 though       
unsystematic views1 as to the           
distinction between reason and          
imagination1 prose and poetry1 on       
primitive language1 and on the poetic   
power of objectification4  ,in ,italy1  

,francesco de ,sanctis gave magnificent 
expression to the independence of art4  
,he taught literature in ,naples from   
#ahch to #ahdh1 in ,turin and ,zurich   
from #ahej to #ahfj1 and after #ahgj he 
was a professor in the ,university of   
,naples4 ,his ,storia della letteratura 
italiana is a classic1 and in it and in 
monographs on individual writers he     
exposed his doctrines4  ,prompted by a  
natural love of speculation1 he began to
 examine the old grammarians and        
rhetoricians1 with a view to systematize
 them4 ,but very soon he proceeded to   
criticize and to surpass their theories4
 ,the cold rules of reason did not find 
favour with him1 and he advised young   
men to go direct to the original works4 
,the philosophy of ,hegel began to      
penetrate ,italy1 and the study of ,vico
 was again taken up4 ,de ,sanctis       
translated the ,logic of ,hegel in      
prison1 where the ,bourbon ,government  
had thrown him for his liberalism4      
,benard had begun his translation of the

 ,aesthetic of ,hegel1 and so completely
 in harmony was ,de ,sanctis with the   
thought of this master1 that he is said 
to have guessed from a study of the     
first volume what the unpublished       
volumes must contain1 and to have       
lectured upon them to his pupils4       
,traces of mystical idealism and of     
,hegelianism persist even in his later  
works1 and the distinction1 which he    
always maintained1 between imagination  
and fancy certainly came to him from    
,hegel and ,schelling4 ,he held fancy   
alone to be the true poetic faculty4    
,de ,sanctis absorbed all the juice of  
,hegel1 but rejected the husks of his   
pedantry1 of his formalism1 of his      
apriority4  ,fancy for ,de ,sanctis was 
not the mystical transcendental         
apperception of the ,german             
philosophers1 but simply the faculty of 
poetic synthesis and creation1 opposed  
to the imagination1 which reunites      
details and always has something        
mechanical about it4 ,faith and poetry1 

he used to say1 are not dead1 but       
transformed4 ,his criticism of ,hegel   
amounted in many places to the          
correction of ,hegel2 and as regards    
,vico1 he is careful to point out1 that 
when1 in dealing with the ,homeric      
poems1 ,vico talks of generic types1 he 
is no longer the critic of art1 but the 
historian of civilization4 ,de ,sanctis 
saw that1 artistically1 ,achilles must  
always be ,achilles1 never a force or an
 abstraction4  ,thus ,de ,sanctis       
succeeded in keeping himself free from  
the ,hegelian domination1 at a moment   
when ,hegel was the acknowledged master 
of speculation4  ,but his criticism     
extended also to other ,german          
aestheticians4 ,by a curious accident1  
he found himself at ,zurich in the      
company of ,theodore ,vischer1 that     
ponderous ,hegelian1 who laughed        
disdainfully at the mention of poetry1  
of music1 and of the decadent ,italian  
race4 ,de ,sanctis laughed at ,vischer's
 laughter4 ,wagner appeared to him a    

corrupter of music1 and nothing in the  
world more unaesthetic than the         
,aesthetic of ,theodore ,vischer4 ,his  
lectures on ,ariosto and ,petrarch1     
before an international public at       
,zurich1 were delivered with the desire 
of correcting the errors of these and of
 other ,german philosophers and learned 
men4 ,he gave his celebrated definitions
 of ,french and ,german critics4 ,the   
,french critic does not indulge in      
theories3 one feels warmth of impression
 and sagacity of observation in his     
argument4 ,he never leaves the concrete2
 he divines the quality of the writer's 
genius and the quality of his work1 and 
studies the man1 in order to understand 
the writer4 ,his great fault is shown in
 substituting for criticism of the      
actual art work a historical criticism  
of the author and of his time4 ,for the 
,german1 on the other hand1 there is    
nothing so simple that he does not      
contrive to distort and to confuse it4  
,he collects shadows around him1 from   

which shoot vivid rays4 ,he laboriously 
brings to birth that morsel of truth    
which he has within him4 ,he would seize
 and define what is most fugitive and   
impalpable in a work of art4 ,although  
nobody talks so much of life as he does1
 yet no one so much delights in         
decomposing and generalizing it4 ,having
 thus destroyed the particular1 he is   
able to show you as the result of this  
process1 final in appearance1 but in    
reality preconceived and apriorist1 one 
measurement for all feet1 one garment   
for all bodies4  ,about this time he    
studied ,schopenhauer1 who was then     
becoming the fashion4 ,schopenhauer said
 of this criticism of ,de ,sanctis3     
,that ,italian has absorbed me in succum
 et sanguinem4 ,what weight did he      
attach to ,schopenhauer's much-vaunted  
writings on art8 ,having exposed the    
theory of ,ideas1 he barely refers to   
the third volume1 which contains an     
exaggerated theory of ,aesthetic4  ,in  
his criticism of ,petrarch1 ,de ,sanctis

 finally broke with metaphysical        
,aesthetic1 saying of ,hegel's school   
that it believed the beautiful to become
 art when it surpassed form and revealed
 the concept or pure idea4 ,this theory 
and the subtleties derived from it1 far 
from characterizing art1 represent its  
contrary3 the impotent velleity for art1
 which cannot slay abstractions and come
 in contact with life4  ,de ,sanctis    
held that outside the domain of art all 
,is shapeless4 ,the ugly is of the      
domain of art1 if art give it form4 ,is 
there anything more beautiful than      
,iago8 ,if he be looked upon merely as a
 contrast to ,othello1 then we are in   
the position of those who looked upon   
the stars as placed where they are to   
serve as candles for the earth4  ,form  
was for ,de ,sanctis the word which     
should be inscribed over the entrance to
 the ,temple of ,art4 ,in the work of   
art are form and content1 but the latter
 is no longer chaotic3 the artist has   
given to it a new value1 has enriched it

 with the gift of his own personality4  
,but if the content has not been        
assimilated and made his own by the     
artist1 then the work lacks generative  
power3 it is of no value as art or      
literature1 though as history or        
scientific document its value may be    
great4 ,the ,gods of ,homer's ,iliad are
 dead1 but the ,iliad remains4 ,guelf   
and ,ghibelline have disappeared from   
,italy3 not so the ,divine ,comedy1     
which is as vigorous to-day as when     
,dante first took pen in hand4 ,thus ,de
 ,sanctis held firmly to the            
independence of art1 but he did not     
accept the formula of art for art's     
sake1 in so far as it meant separation  
of the artist from life1 mutilation of  
the content1 art reduced to mere        
dexterity4  ,for ,de ,sanctis1 form was 
identical with imagination1 with the    
artist's power of expressing or         
representing his artistic vision4 ,this 
much must be admitted by his critics4   
,but he never attained to a clear       

definition of art4 ,his theory of       
,aesthetic always remained a sketch3    
wonderful indeed1 but not clearly       
developed and deduced4 ,the reason for  
this was ,de ,sanctis' love of the      
concrete4 ,no sooner had he attained    
from general ideas a sufficient clarity 
of vision for his own purposes1 than he 
plunged again into the concrete and     
particular4 ,he did not confine his     
activity to literature1 but was active  
also in politics and in the prosecution 
and encouragement of historical studies4
  ,as a critic of literature1 ,de       
,sanctis is far superior to             
,sainte-,beuve1 ,lessing1 ,macaulay1 or 
,taine4 ,flaubert's genial intuition    
adumbrated what ,de ,sanctis achieved4  
,in one of his letters to ,georges      
,sand1 ,flaubert speaks of the lack of  
an artistic critic4 ,in ,laharpe's time1
 criticism was grammatical2 in the time 
of ,sainte-,beuve and of ,taine1 it is  
historical4 ,they analyse with great    
subtlety the historical environment in  

which the work appeared and the causes  
which have produced it4 ,but the        
unconscious element ,in poetry8 ,whence 
does ,it come8 ,and composition8 ,and   
style8 ,and the point of view of the    
author8 ,of all that they never speak4  
,for such a critic1 great imagination   
and great goodness are necessary4 ,i    
mean an ever-ready faculty of           
enthusiasm1 and then taste1 a quality so
 rare1 even among the best1 that it is  
never mentioned4  ,de ,sanctis alone    
fulfilled the conditions of ,flaubert1  
and ,italy has in his writings a        
looking-glass for her literature        
unequalled by any other country4  ,but  
with ,de ,sanctis1 the philosopher of   
art1 the aesthetician1 is not so great  
as the critic of literature4 ,the one is
 accessory to the other1 and his use of 
aesthetic terminology is so inconstant  
that a lack of clearness of thought     
might be found in his work by anyone who
 had not studied it with care4 ,but his 
want of system is more than compensated 

by his vitality1 by his constant        
citation of actual works1 and by his    
intuition of the truth1 which never     
abandoned him4 ,his writings bear the   
further charm of suggesting new kingdoms
 to conquer1 new mines of richness to   
explore4  ,while the cry of ,down with  
,metaphysic was resounding in ,germany1 
and a furious reaction had set in       
against the sort of ,walpurgisnacht to  
which the later ,hegelians had reduced  
science and history1 the pupils of      
,herbart came forward and with an       
insinuating air they seemed to say3     
,what is this8 ,why1 it is a rebellion  
against ,metaphysic1 the very thing our 
master wished for and tried to achieve1 
half a century ago6 ,but here we are1   
his heirs and successors1 and we want to
 be your allies6 ,an understanding      
between us will be easy4 ,our           
,metaphysic is in agreement with the    
atomic theory1 our ,psychology with     
mechanicism1 our ,ethic and ,aesthetic  
with hedonism4 ,herbart1 who died in    

#ahda1 would probably have disdained and
 rejected his followers1 who thus       
courted popularity and cheapened        
,metaphysic1 putting a literal          
interpretation on his realities1 his    
ideas and representations1 and upon all 
his most lofty excogitations4  ,the     
protagonist of these neo-,herbartians   
was ,robert ,zimmermann4 ,he constructed
 his system of ,aesthetic out of        
,herbart1 whom he perverted to his own  
uses1 and even employed the much-abused 
,hegelian dialectic in order to         
introduce modifications of the beautiful
 into pure beauty4 ,the beautiful1 he   
said1 is a model which possesses        
greatness1 fulness1 order1 correction1  
and definite compensation4 ,beauty      
appears to us in a characteristic form1 
as a copy of this model4  ,vischer1     
against whom was directed this work of  
,zimmermann1 found it easy to reply4 ,he
 ridiculed ,zimmermann's meaning of the 
symbol as the object around which are   
clustered beautiful forms4 ,does an     

artist paint a fox1 simply that he may  
depict an object of animal nature4 ,no1 
no1 my dear sir1 far from it4 ,this fox 
is a symbol1 because the painter here   
employs lines and colours1 in order to  
express something different from lines  
and colours4 ',you think ,i am a fox1'  
cries the painted animal4 ',you are     
mightily mistaken2 ,i am1 on the        
contrary1 a portmanteau1 an exhibition  
by the painter of red1 white1 grey1 and 
yellow tints4' ,vischer also made fun of
 ,zimmermann's enthusiasm for the       
aesthetic value of the sense of touch4  
,what joy it must be to touch the back  
of the bust of ,hercules in repose6 ,to 
stroke the sinuous limbs of the ,venus  
of ,milo or of the ,faun of ,barberini  
must give a pleasure to the hand equal  
to that of the ear as it listens to the 
puissant fugues of ,bach or to the suave
 melodies of ,mozart4 ,vischer defined  
the formal ,aesthetic of ,zimmermann as 
a queer mixture of mysticism and        
mathematic4  ,lotze1 in common with the 

great majority of thinkers1 was         
dissatisfied with ,zimmermann1 but could
 only oppose his formalism with a       
variety of the old mystical ,aesthetic4 
,who1 he asked1 could believe that the  
human form pleases only by its external 
proportions1 regardless of the spirit   
within4 ,art1 like beauty1 should       
enclose the world of values in the world
 of forms4 ,this struggle between the   
,aesthetic of the content and the       
,aesthetic of the form attained its     
greatest height in ,germany between     
#ahfj and #ahgj1 with ,zimmermann1      
,vischer1 and ,lotze as protagonists4   
,these writers were followed by ,j4     
,schmidt1 who in #ahge ventured to say  
that both ,lotze and ,zimmermann had    
failed to see that the problem of       
,aesthetic concerned1 not the beauty or 
ugliness of the content or of the form  
as mathematical relations1 but their    
representation2 ,kstlin1 who erected an 
immense artificial structure with the   
materials of his predecessors modified2 

,schasler1 who is interesting as having 
converted the old ,vischer to his thesis
 of the importance of the ,ugly1 as     
introducing modifications into the      
beautiful and being the principle of    
movement there4 ,vischer confesses that 
at one time he had followed the         
,hegelian method and believed that in   
the essence of beauty is born a         
disquietude1 a fermentation1 a struggle3
 the ,idea conquers1 hurls the image    
into the unlimited1 and the ,sublime is 
born2 but the image1 offended in its    
finitude1 declares war upon the ,idea1  
and the ,comic appears4 ,thus the fight 
is finished and the ,beautiful returns  
to itself1 as the result of these       
struggles4 ,but now1 he says1 ,schasler 
has persuaded him that the ,ugly is the 
leaven which is necessary to all the    
special forms of the ,beautiful4  ,e4   
von ,hartmann is in close relation with 
,schasler4 ,his ,aesthetic 7#ahij7 also 
makes great use of the ,ugly4 ,since he 
insists upon appearance as a necessary  

characteristic of the beautiful1 he     
considers himself justified in calling  
his theory concrete idealism4 ,hartmann 
considers himself in opposition to the  
formalism of ,herbart1 inasmuch as he   
insists upon the idea as an             
indispensable and determining element of
 beauty4 ,beauty1 he says1 is truth1 but
 it is not historical truth1 nor        
scientific nor reflective truth3 it is  
metaphysical and ideal4 ,beauty is the  
prophet of idealistic truth in an age   
without faith1 hating ,metaphysic1 and  
acknowledging only realistic truth4     
,aesthetic truth is without method and  
without control3 it leaps at once from  
the subjective appearance to the essence
 of the ideal4 ,but in compensation for 
this1 it possesses the fascination of   
conviction1 which immediate intuition   
alone possesses4 ,the higher ,philosophy
 rises1 the less need has she of passing
 through the world of the senses and of 
science3 she approaches ever more nearly
 to art4 ,thus ,philosophy starts on the

 voyage to the ideal1 like ,baedeker's  
traveller1 without too much baggage4 ,in
 the ,beautiful is immanent logicity1   
the microcosmic idea1 the unconscious4  
,by means of the unconscious1 the       
process of intellectual intuition takes 
place in it4 ,the ,beautiful is a       
mystery1 because its root is in the     
,unconscious4  ,no philosopher has ever 
made so great a use of the ,ugly as     
,hartmann4 ,he divides ,beauty into     
grades1 of which the one below is ugly  
as compared with that above it4 ,he     
begins with the mathematical1 superior  
to the sensibly agreeable1 which is     
unconscious4 ,thence to formal beauty of
 the second order1 the dynamically      
agreeable1 to formal beauty of the third
 order1 the passive teleological2 to    
this degree belong utensils1 and        
language1 which in ,hartmann's view is a
 dead thing1 inspired with seeming life1
 only at the moment of use4 ,such things
 did the philosopher of the ,unconscious
 dare to print in the country of a      

,humboldt during the lifetime of a      
,steinthal6 ,he proceeds in his list of 
things beautiful1 with formal beauty of 
the fourth degree1 which is the active  
or living teleological1 with the fifth1 
which is that of species4 ,finally he   
reaches concrete beauty1 or the         
individual microcosm1 the highest of    
all1 because the individual idea is     
superior to the specific1 and is beauty1
 no longer formal1 but of content4  ,all
 these degrees of beauty are1 as has    
been said1 connected with one another by
 means of the ugly1 and even in the     
highest degree1 which has nothing       
superior to it1 the ugly continues its  
office of beneficent titillation4 ,the  
outcome of this ultimate phase is the   
famous theory of the ,modifications of  
the ,beautiful4 ,none of these          
modifications can occur without a       
struggle1 save the sublime and the      
graceful1 which appear without conflict 
at the side of supreme beauty4 ,hartmann
 gives four instances3 the solution is  

either immanent1 logical1               
transcendental1 or combined4 ,the       
idyllic1 the melancholy1 the sad1 the   
glad1 the elegiac1 are instances of the 
immanent solution2 the comic in all its 
forms is the logical solution2 the      
tragic is the transcendental solution2  
the combined form is found in the       
humorous1 the tragi-comic4 ,when none of
 these solutions is possible1 we have   
the ugly2 and when an ugliness of       
content is expressed by a formal        
ugliness1 we have the maximum of        
ugliness1 the true aesthetic devil4     
,hartmann is the last noteworthy        
representative of the ,german           
metaphysical school4 ,his works are     
gigantic in size and appear formidable4 
,but if one be not afraid of giants and 
venture to approach near1 one finds     
nothing but a big ,morgante1 full of the
 most commonplace prejudices1 quite     
easily killed with the bite of a crab6  
,during this period1 ,aesthetic had few 
representatives in other countries4 ,the

 famous conference of the ,academy of   
,moral and ,political ,sciences1 held in
 ,paris in #aheg1 gave to the world the 
,science du ,beau of ,lvque4 ,no one is 
interested in it now1 but it is amusing 
to note that ,lvque announced himself to
 be a disciple of ,plato1 and went on to
 attribute eight characteristics to the 
beautiful4 ,these he discovered by      
closely examining the lily6 ,no wonder  
he was crowned with laurels6 ,he proved 
his wonderful theory by instancing a    
child playing with its mother1 a        
symphony of ,beethoven1 and the life of 
,socrates6 ,one of his colleagues1 who  
could not resist making fun of his      
learned friend1 remarked that he would  
be glad to know what part was played in 
the life of a philosopher by the normal 
vivacity of colour6  ,thus ,german      
theory made no way in ,france1 and      
,england proved even more refractory4   
,j4 ,ruskin showed a poverty1 an        
incoherence1 and a lack of system in    
respect to ,aesthetic1 which puts him   

almost out of court4 ,his was the very  
reverse of the philosophic temperament4 
,his pages of brilliant prose contain   
his own dreams and caprices4 ,they are  
the work of an artist and should be     
enjoyed as such1 being without any value
 for philosophy4 ,his theoretic faculty 
of the beautiful1 which he held to be   
distinct alike from the intelligence and
 from feeling1 is connected with his    
belief in beauty as a revelation of the 
divine intentions1 the seal which ,god  
sets upon his works4 ,thus the natural  
beauty1 which is perceived by the pure  
heart1 when contemplating some object   
untouched by the hand of man1 is far    
superior to the work of the artist4     
,ruskin was too little capable of       
analysis to understand the complicated  
psychologico-aesthetic process taking   
place within him1 as he contemplated    
some streamlet1 or the nest of some     
small bird4  ,at ,naples flourished     
between #ahfa and #ahhd ,antonio ,tari1 
who kept himself in touch with the      

movement of ,german thought1 and        
followed the ,german idealists in       
placing ,aesthetic in a sort of middle  
kingdom1 a temperate zone1 between the  
glacial1 inhabited by the ,esquimaux of 
thought1 and the torrid1 dwelt in by the
 giants of action4 ,he dethroned the    
,beautiful1 and put ,aesthetic in its   
place1 for the ,beautiful is but the    
first moment2 the later ones are the    
,comic1 the ,humorous1 and the          
,dramatic4 ,his fertile imagination     
found metaphors and similes in          
everything3 for instance1 he called the 
goat the ,devil1 opposed to the lamb1   
,jesus4 ,his remarks on men and women   
are full of quaint fancies4 ,he granted 
to women grace1 but not beauty1 which   
resides in equilibrium4 ,this is proved 
by her falling down so easily when she  
walks2 by her bow legs1 which have to   
support her wide hips1 made for         
gestation2 by her narrow shoulders1 and 
her opulent breast4 ,she is therefore a 
creature altogether devoid of           

equilibrium6  ,i wish that it were      
possible to record more of the sayings  
of the excellent ,tari1 the last joyous 
priest of an arbitrary ,aesthetic1      
source of confusion4  ,the ground lost  
to the ,german school of metaphysicians 
was occupied during the second half of  
the nineteenth century by the           
evolutionary and positivist             
metaphysicians1 of whom ,herbert        
,spencer is the most notable            
representative4 ,the peculiarity of this
 school lies in repeating at second or  
third hand certain idealist views1      
deprived of the element of pure         
philosophy1 given to them by a          
,schelling or a ,hegel1 and in          
substituting a quantity of minute facts 
and anecdotes1 with a view to providing 
the positivist varnish4 ,these theories 
are dear to vulgar minds1 because they  
correspond to inveterate religious      
beliefs1 and the lustre of the varnish  
explains the good fortune of ,spencerian
 positivism in our time4 ,another       

notable trait of this school is its     
barbaric contempt for history1          
especially for the history of           
philosophy1 and its consequent lack of  
all link with the series composed of the
 secular efforts of so many thinkers4   
,without this link1 there can be no     
fruitful labour and no possibility of   
progress4  ,spencer is colossal in his  
ignorance of all that has been written  
or thought on the subject of ,aesthetic 
7to limit ourselves to this branch      
alone74 ,he actually begins his work on 
the ,philosophy of ,style with these    
words3 ,no one1 ,i believe1 has ever    
produced a complete theory of the art of
 writing4 ,this in #aheb6 ,he begins his
 chapter on aesthetic feelings in the   
,principles of ,psychology by admitting 
that he has heard of the observation    
made by a ,german author1 whose name he 
forgets 7,schiller671 on the connexion  
between art and play4 ,had ,spencer's   
remarks on ,aesthetic been written in   
the eighteenth century1 they might have 

occupied a humble place among the first 
rude attempts at aesthetic speculation1 
but appearing in the nineteenth century1
 they are without value1 as the little  
of value they contain had been long said
 by others4  ,in his ,principles of     
,psychology ,spencer looks upon         
aesthetic feelings as arising from the  
discharge of the exuberant energy of the
 organism4 ,this he divides into        
degrees1 and believes that we attain    
complete enjoyment when these degrees   
are all working satisfactorily each on  
its own plane1 and when what is painful 
in excessive activity has been avoided4 
,his degrees are sensation1 sensation   
accompanied by representative elements1 
perception accompanied by more complex  
elements of representation1 then        
emotion1 and that state of consciousness
 which surpasses sensations and         
perceptions4 ,but ,spencer has no       
suspicion of what art really is4 ,his   
views oscillate between sensualism and  
moralism1 and he sees little in the     

whole art of antiquity1 of the ,middle  
,ages1 or of modern times1 which can be 
looked upon as otherwise than imperfect6
  ,the ,physiology of ,aesthetics has   
also had its votaries in ,great         
,britain1 among whom may be mentioned   
,j4 ,sully1 ,a4 ,bain1 and ,allen4      
,these at any rate show some knowledge  
of the concrete fact of art4 ,allen     
harks back to the old distinction       
between necessary and vital activities  
and superfluous activities1 and gives a 
physiological definition1 which may be  
read in his ,physiological ,aesthetics4 
,more recent writers also look upon the 
physiological fact as the cause of the  
pleasure of art2 but for them it does   
not alone depend upon the visual organ1 
and the muscular phenomena associated   
with it1 but also on the participation  
of some of the most important bodily    
functions1 such as respiration1         
circulation1 equilibrium1 intimate      
muscular accommodation4 ,they believe   
that art owes its origin to the pleasure

 that some prehistoric man must have    
experienced in breathing regularly1     
without having to re-adapt his organs1  
when he traced for the first time on a  
bone or on clay regular lines separated 
by regular intervals4  ,a similar order 
of physico-aesthetic researches has been
 made in ,germany1 under the auspices of
 ,helmholtz1 ,brcke1 and ,stumpf4 ,but  
these writers have succeeded better than
 the above-mentioned1 by restricting    
themselves to the fields of optic and   
acoustic1 and have supplied information 
as to the physical processes of artistic
 technique and as to the pleasure of    
visual and auditive impressions1 without
 attempting to melt ,aesthetic into     
,physic1 or to deprive the former of its
 spiritual character4 ,they have even   
occasionally indicated the difference   
between the two kinds of research4 ,even
 the degenerate ,herbartians1 converting
 the metaphysical forms of their master 
into physiological phenomena1 made soft 
eyes at the new sensualists and         

aesthetico-physiologists4  ,the ,natural
 ,sciences have become in our day a sort
 of superstition1 allied to a certain1  
perhaps unconscious1 hypocrisy4 ,not    
only have chemical1 physical1 and       
physiological laboratories become a sort
 of ,sibylline grots1 where resound the 
most extraordinary questions about      
everything that can interest the spirit 
of man1 but even those who really do    
prosecute their researches with the old 
inevitable method of internal           
observation1 have been unable to free   
themselves from the illusion that they  
are1 on the contrary1 employing the     
method of the natural sciences4         
,hippolyte ,taine's ,philosophy of ,art 
represents such an illusion4 ,he        
declares that when we have studied the  
diverse manifestations of art in all    
peoples and at all epochs1 we shall then
 possess a complete ,aesthetic4 ,such an
 ,aesthetic would be a sort of ,botany  
applied to the works of man4 ,this mode 
of study would provide moral science    

with a basis equally as sure as that    
which the natural sciences already      
possess4 ,taine then proceeds to define 
art without regard to the natural       
sciences1 by analysing1 like a simple   
mortal1 what passes in the human soul   
when brought face to face with a work of
 art4 ,but what analysis and what       
definitions6  ,art1 he says1 is         
imitation1 but of a sort that tries to  
express an essential characteristic4    
,thus the principal characteristic of a 
lion is to be a great carnivore1 and we 
observe this characteristic in all its  
limbs4 ,holland has for essential       
characteristic that of being a land     
formed of alluvial soil4  ,now without  
staying to consider these two remarkable
 instances1 let us ask1 what is this    
essential characteristic of ,taine8 ,it 
is the same as the ideas1 types1 or     
concepts that the old aesthetic teaching
 assigned to art as its object4 ,taine  
himself removes all doubt as to this1 by
 saying that this characteristic is what

 philosophers call the essence of       
things1 and for that reason they declare
 that the purpose of art is to manifest 
things4 ,he declares that he will not   
employ the word essence1 which is       
technical4 ,but he accepts and employs  
the thought that the word expresses4 ,he
 believes that there are two routes by  
which man can attain to the superior    
life3 science and art4 ,by the first1 he
 apprehends fundamental laws and causes1
 and expresses them in abstract terms2  
by the second1 he expresses these same  
laws and causes in a manner             
comprehensible to all1 by appealing to  
the heart and feeling1 as well as to the
 reason of man4 ,art is both superior   
and popular2 it makes manifest what is  
highest1 and makes it manifest to all4  
,that ,taine here falls into the old    
pedagogic theory of ,aesthetic is       
evident4 ,works of art are arranged for 
him in a scale of values1 as for the    
aesthetic metaphysicians4 ,he began by  
declaring the absurdity of all judgment 

of taste1  chacun son got1 but he ends  
by declaring that personal taste is     
without value1 that we must establish a 
common measure before proceeding to     
praise or blame4 ,his scale of values is
 double or triple4 ,we must first fix   
the degree of importance of the         
characteristic1 that is1 the greater or 
less generality of the idea1 and the    
degree of good in it1 that is to say1   
its greater or lesser moral value4      
,these1 he says1 are two degrees of the 
same thing1 strength1 seen from         
different sides4 ,we must also establish
 the degree of convergence of the       
effects1 that is1 the fulness of        
expression1 the harmony between the idea
 and the form4  ,this half-moral1       
half-metaphysical exposition is         
accompanied with the usual              
protestations1 that the matter in hand  
is to be studied methodically1          
analytically1 as the naturalist would   
study it1 that he will try to reach a   
law1 not a hymn4 ,as if these           

protestations could abolish the true    
nature of his thought6 ,taine actually  
went so far as to attempt dialectic     
solutions of works of art6 ,in the      
primitive period of ,italian art1 we    
find the soul without the body3 ,giotto4
 ,at the ,renaissance1 with ,verrocchio 
and his school1 we find the body without
 the soul4 ,with ,raphael1 in the       
sixteenth century1 we find expression   
and anatomy in harmony3 body and soul4  
,thesis1 antithesis1 synthesis6  ,with  
,g4,t4 ,fechner we find the like        
protestations and the like procedure4   
,he will study ,aesthetic inductively1  
from beneath4 ,he seeks clarity1 not    
loftiness4 ,proceeding thus inductively1
 he discovers a long series of laws or  
principles of ,aesthetic1 such as unity 
in variety1 association and contrast1   
change and persistence1 the golden mean1
 etc4 ,he exhibits this chaos with      
delight at showing himself so much of a 
physiologist1 and so inconclusive4 ,then
 he proceeds to describe his experiments

 in ,aesthetics4 ,these consist of      
attempts to decide1 for instance1 by    
methods of choice1 which of certain     
rectangles of cardboard is the most     
agreeable1 and which the most           
disagreeable1 to a large number of      
people arbitrarily chosen4 ,naturally1  
these results do not agree with others  
obtained on other occasions1 but        
,fechner knows that errors correct      
themselves1 and triumphantly publishes  
long lists of these valuable            
experiments4 ,he also communicates to us
 the shapes and measurements of a large 
number of pictures in museums1 as       
compared with their respective subjects6
 ,such are the experiments of           
physiological aestheticians4  ,but      
,fechner1 when he comes to define what  
beauty and what art really are1 is1 like
 everyone else1 obliged to fall back    
upon introspection4 ,but his definition 
is trivial1 and his comparison of his   
three degrees of beauty to a family is  
simply grotesque in its navet4 ,he terms

 this theory the eudemonistic theory1   
and we are left wondering why1 when he  
had this theory all cut and dried in his
 mind1 he should all the same give      
himself the immense trouble of compiling
 his tables and of enumerating his laws 
and principles1 which do not agree with 
his theory4 ,perhaps it was all a       
pastime for him1 like playing at        
patience1 or collecting postage-stamps8 
,another example of superstition in     
respect to the natural sciences is      
afforded by ,ernest ,grosse4 ,grosse    
abounds in contempt for what he calls   
speculative ,aesthetic4 ,yet he desires 
a ,science of ,art 7,kunstwissenschaft71
 which shall formulate its laws from    
those historical facts which have       
hitherto been collected4  ,but ,grosse  
wishes us to complete the collection of 
historical evidence with ethnographical 
and prehistoric materials1 for we cannot
 obtain really general laws of art from 
the exclusive study of cultivated       
peoples1 just as a theory of            

reproduction exclusively based upon the 
form it takes with mammifers1 must      
necessarily be imperfect6  ,he is1      
however1 aware that the results of      
experiences among savages and           
prehistoric races do not alone suffice  
to furnish us with an equipment for such
 investigations as that concerning the  
nature of ,art1 and1 like any ordinary  
mortal1 he feels obliged to interrogate1
 before starting1 the spirit of man4 ,he
 therefore proceeds to define ,aesthetic
 on apriorist principles1 which1 he     
remarks1 can be discarded when we shall 
have obtained the complete theory1 in   
like manner with the scaffolding that   
has served for the erection of a house4 
,words6 ,words6 ,vain words6 ,he        
proceeds to define ,aesthetic as the    
activity which in its development and   
result has the immediate value of       
feeling1 and is1 therefore1 an end in   
itself4 ,art is the opposite of         
practice2 the activity of games stands  
intermediate between the two1 having    

also its end in its own activity4  ,the 
,aesthetics of ,taine and of ,grosse    
have been called sociological4 ,seeing  
that any true definition of sociology as
 a science is impossible1 for it is     
composed of psychological elements1     
which are for ever varying1 we do not   
delay to criticize the futile attempts  
at definition1 but pass at once to the  
objective results attained by the       
sociologists4 ,this superstition1 like  
the naturalistic1 takes various forms in
 practical life4 ,we have1 for instance1
 ,proudhon 7#ahge71 who would hark back 
to ,platonic ,aesthetic1 class the      
aesthetic activity among the merely     
sensual1 and command the arts to further
 the cause of virtue1 on pain of        
judicial proceedings in case of         
contumacy4  ,but ,m4 ,guyau is the most 
important of sociological aestheticians4
 ,his works1 published in ,paris toward 
the end of last century1 and his        
posthumous work1 entitled ,les problmes 
de l',esthtique contemporaine1          

substitute for the theory of play1 that 
of life1 and the posthumous work        
above-mentioned makes it evident that by
 life he means social life4 ,art is the 
development of social sympathy1 but the 
whole of art does not enter into        
sociology4 ,art has two objects2 the    
production of agreeable sensations      
7colours1 sounds1 etc47 and of phenomena
 of psychological induction1 which      
include ideas and feelings of a more    
complex nature than the foregoing1 such 
as sympathy for the personages          
represented1 interest1 piety1           
indignation1 etc4 ,thus art becomes the 
expression of life4 ,hence arise two    
tendencies3 one for harmony1 consonance1
 for all that delights the ear and eye2 
the other transforming life1 under the  
dominion of art4 ,true genius is        
destined to balance these two           
tendencies2 but the decadent and the    
unbalanced deprive art of its           
sympathetic end1 setting aesthetic      
sympathy against human sympathy4 ,if we 

translate this language into that with  
which we are by this time quite         
familiar1 we shall see that ,guyau      
admits an art that is merely hedonistic1
 and places above it another art1 also  
hedonistic1 but serving the ends of     
morality4  ,m4 ,nordau wages war against
 the decadent and unbalanced1 in much   
the same manner as ,guyau4 ,he assigns  
to art the function of re-establishing  
the integrity of life1 so much broken up
 and specialized in our industrial      
civilization4 ,he remarks that there is 
such a thing as art for art's sake1 the 
simple expression of the internal states
 of the individual1 but it is the art of
 the cave-dweller4  ,c4 ,lombroso's     
theory of genius as degeneration may be 
grouped with the naturalistic theories4 
,his argument is in essence the         
following4 ,great mental efforts1 and   
total absorption in one dominant        
thought1 often produce physiological    
disorders or atrophy of important vital 
functions4 ,now these disorders often   

lead to madness2 therefore1 genius may  
be identified with madness4 ,this proof1
 from the particular to the general1    
does not follow that of traditional     
,logic4 ,but with ,lombroso1 ,bchner1   
,nordau1 and the like we have come to   
the boundary between specious and vulgar
 error4 ,they confuse scientific        
analysis with historical research4 ,such
 inquiries may have value for history1  
but they have none for ,aesthetic4      
,thus1 too1 ,a4 ,lang maintains that the
 doctrine of the origin of art as       
disinterested expression of the mimetic 
faculty is not confirmed in what we know
 of primitive art1 which is rather      
decorative than expressive4 ,but        
primitive art1 which is a given fact to 
be interpreted1 cannot ever become its  
own criterion of interpretation4  ,the  
naturalistic misunderstanding has had a 
bad effect on linguistic researches1    
which have not been carried out on the  
lofty plane to which ,humboldt and      
,steinthal had brought them4  ,max      

,mller is popular and exaggerated4 ,he  
fails clearly to distinguish thought    
from logical thought1 although in one   
place he remarks that the formation of  
names has a more intimate connexion with
 wit than with judgment4 ,he holds that 
the science of language is not          
historical1 but natural1 because        
language is not the invention of man1   
altogether ignoring the science of the  
spirit1 philosophy1 of which language is
 a part4 ,for ,max ,mller1 the natural  
sciences were the only sciences4 ,the   
consciousness of the science of the     
spirit becomes ever more obscured1 and  
we find the philologist ,w4,d4 ,whitney 
combating ,max ,mller's miracles and    
maintaining the separability of thought 
and speech4  ,with ,hermann ,paul       
7#ahhj7 we have an awakening of         
,humboldt's spirit4 ,paul maintains that
 the origin of language is the speech of
 the individual man1 and that a language
 has its origin every time it is spoken4
 ,paul also showed the fallacies        

contained in the ,vlkerpsychologie of   
,steinthal and ,lazarus1 demonstrating  
that there is no such thing as a        
collective soul1 and that there is no   
language save that of the individual4   
,w4 ,wundt 7#ahhf71 on the other hand1  
commits the error of connecting language
 with ,ethnopsychology and other        
non-existent sciences1 and actually     
terms the glorious doctrine of ,herder  
and of ,humboldt ,wundertheorie1 or     
theory of miracle1 accusing them of     
mystical obscurity4 ,wundt confuses the 
question of the historical appearance of
 language with that of its internal     
nature and genesis4 ,he looks upon the  
theory of evolution as having attained  
to its complete triumph1 in its         
application to organic nature in        
general1 and especially to man4 ,he has 
no suspicion whatever of the function of
 fancy1 and of the true relation between
 thought and expression1 between        
expression in the naturalistic1 and     
expression in the spiritual and         

linguistic sense4 ,he looks upon speech 
as a specially developed form of        
psycho-physical vital manifestations1 of
 expressive animal movements4 ,language 
is developed continuously from such     
facts1 and thus is explained how1 beyond
 the general concept of expressive      
movement1 there is no specific quality  
which delimits language in a            
non-arbitrary manner4  ,thus the        
philosophy of ,wundt reveals its weak   
side1 showing itself incapable of       
understanding the spiritual nature of   
language and of art4 ,in the ,ethic of  
the same author1 aesthetic facts are    
presented as a mixture of logical and   
ethical elements1 a special normative   
aesthetic science is denied1 and        
,aesthetic is merged in ,logic and      
,ethic4  ,the neo-critical and          
neo-,kantian movement in thought was not
 able to maintain the concept of the    
spirit against the hedonistic1          
moralistic1 and psychological views of  
,aesthetic1 in vogue from about the     

middle of last century4 ,neo-criticism  
inherited from ,kant his view as to the 
slight importance of the creative       
imagination1 and appears indeed to have 
been ignorant of any form of knowledge1 
other than the intellective4  ,kirchmann
 7#ahfh7 was one of the early adherents 
to psychological ,aesthetic1 defining   
the beautiful as the idealized image of 
pleasure1 the ugly as that of pain4 ,for
 him the aesthetic fact is the idealized
 image of the real4 ,failing to         
apprehend the true nature of the        
aesthetic fact1 ,kirchmann invented a   
new psychological category of ideal or  
apparent feelings1 which he thought were
 attenuated images from those of real   
life4  ,the aged ,theodore ,fischer     
describes ,aesthetic in his             
auto-criticism as the union of mimetic  
and harmony1 and the beautiful as the   
harmony of the universe1 which is never 
realized in fact1 because it is         
infinite4 ,when we think to grasp the   
beautiful1 we experience that exquisite 

illusion1 which is the aesthetic fact4  
,robert ,fischer1 son of the foregoing1 
introduced the word ,einfhlung1 to      
express the vitality which he believed  
that man inspired into things with the  
help of the aesthetic process4  ,e4     
,siebeck and ,m4 ,diez1 the former      
writing in #ahge1 the latter in #ahib1  
unite a certain amount of idealistic    
influence1 derived from ,kant and       
,herbart1 with the merely empirical and 
psychological views that have of late   
been the fashion4 ,diez1 for instance1  
would explain the artistic function as  
the ideal of feeling1 placing it        
parallel to science2 the ideal of       
thought1 morality2 the ideal of will and
 religion1 the ideal of the personality4
 ,but this ideal of feeling escapes     
definition1 and we see that these       
writers have not had the courage of     
their ideas3 they have not dared to push
 their thought to its logical           
conclusion4  ,the merely psychological  
and associationist view finds in        

,theodore ,lipps its chief exponent4 ,he
 criticizes and rejects a series of     
aesthetic theories1 such as those of    
play1 of pleasure1 of art as recognition
 of real life1 even if disagreeable1 of 
emotionality1 of syncretism1 which      
attaches to art a number of other ends1 
in addition to those of play and of     
pleasure4  ,the theory of ,lipps does   
not differ very greatly from that of    
,jouffroy1 for he assumes that artistic 
beauty is the sympathetic4 ,our ego1    
transplanted1 objectified1 and          
recognized in others1 is the object of  
sympathy4 ,we feel ourselves in others1 
and others in us4 ,thus the aesthetic   
pleasure is entirely composed of        
sympathy4 ,this extends even to the     
pleasure derived from architecture1     
geometrical forms1 etc4 ,whenever we    
meet with the positive element of human 
personality1 we experience this feeling 
of beatitude1 which is the aesthetic    
emotion4 ,but the value of the          
personality is an ethical value3 the    

whole sphere of ethic is included in it4
 ,therefore all artistic or aesthetic   
pleasure is the enjoyment of something  
which has ethical value1 but this value 
is not an element of a compound1 but the
 object of aesthetic intuition4 ,thus is
 aesthetic activity deprived of all     
autonomous existence and reduced to a   
mere retainer of ,ethic4  ,c4 ,groos    
7#ahie7 shows some signs of recognizing 
aesthetic activity as a theoretic value4
 ,feeling and intellect1 he says1 are   
the two poles of knowledge1 and he      
recognizes the aesthetic fact as        
internal imitation4 ,everything         
beautiful belongs to aestheticity1 but  
not every aesthetic fact is beautiful4  
,the beautiful is the representation of 
sensible pleasure1 and the ugly of      
sensible displeasure4 ,the sublime is   
the representation of something         
powerful1 in a simple form4 ,the comic  
is the representation of an inferiority1
 which provokes in us the pleasurable   
feeling of superiority4 ,groos very     

wisely makes mock of the supposed       
function of the ,ugly1 which ,hartmann  
and ,schasler had inherited and         
developed from a long tradition4 ,lipps 
and ,groos agree in denying aesthetic   
value to the comic1 but ,lipps1 although
 he gives an excellent analysis of the  
comic1 is nevertheless in the trammels  
of his moralistic thesis1 and ends by   
sketching out something resembling the  
doctrine of the overcoming of the ugly1 
by means of which may be attained a     
higher aesthetic and 7sympathetic7      
value4  ,labours such as those of ,lipps
 have been of value1 since they have    
cleared away a number of errors that    
blocked the way1 and restrained         
speculation to the field of the internal
 consciousness4 ,similar is the merit of
 ,e4 ,vron's treatise 7#ahhc7 on the    
double form of ,aesthetic1 in which he  
combats the academic view of the        
absolute beauty1 and shows that ,taine  
confuses ,art and ,science1 ,aesthetic  
and ,logic4 ,he acutely remarks that if 

the object of art were to reveal the    
essence of things1 the greatest artists 
would be those who best succeeded in    
doing this1 and the greatest works would
 all be identical2 whereas we know that 
the very opposite is the case4 ,vron was
 a precursor of ,guyau1 and we seek for 
scientific system in vain in his book4  
,vron looks upon art as two things3 the 
one decorative1 pleasing eye and ear1   
the other expressive1 l'expression mue  
de la personalit humaine4 ,he thought   
that decorative art prevailed in        
antiquity1 expressive art in modern     
times4  ,we cannot here dwell upon the  
aesthetic theories of men of letters1   
such as that of ,e4 ,zola1 developing   
his thesis of natural science and       
history mixed1 which is known as that of
 the human document or as the           
experimental theory1 or of ,ibsen and   
the moralization of the art problem1 as 
presented by him and by the             
,scandinavian school4 ,perhaps no       
,french writer has written more         

profoundly upon art than ,gustave       
,flaubert4 ,his views are contained in  
his ,correspondence1 which has been     
published4 ,l4 ,tolsto wrote his book on
 art while under the influence of ,vron 
and his hatred of the concept of the    
beautiful4 ,art1 he says1 communicates  
the feelings1 as the word communicates  
the thoughts4 ,but his way of           
understanding this may be judged from   
the comparison which he institutes      
between ,art and ,science4 ,according to
 this1 ,art has for its mission to make 
assimilable and sensible what may not   
have been assimilated in the form of    
argument4 ,there is no science for      
science's sake1 no art for art's sake4  
,every human effort should be directed  
toward increasing morality and          
suppressing violence4 ,this amounts to  
saying that well-nigh all the art that  
the world has hitherto seen is false4   
,aeschylus1 ,sophocles1 ,euripides1     
,aristophanes1 ,dante1 ,tasso1 ,milton1 
,shakespeare1 ,raphael1 ,michael        

,angelo1 ,bach1 ,beethoven1 are all1    
according to ,tolsto1 false reputations1
 made by the critics4  ,we must also    
class ,f4 ,nietzsche with the artists1  
rather than with the philosophers4 ,we  
should do him an injustice 7as with ,j4 
,ruskin7 were we to express in          
intellectual terminology his aesthetic  
affirmations4 ,the criticism which they 
provoke would be too facile4 ,nowhere   
has ,nietzsche given a complete theory  
of art1 not even in his first book1 ,die
 ,geburt der ,tragdie oder ,griechentum 
und ,pessimismus4 ,what seems to be     
theory there1 is really the confession  
of the feelings and aspirations of the  
writer4 ,nietzsche was the last1        
splendid representative of the romantic 
period4 ,he was1 therefore1 deeply      
preoccupied with the art problem and    
with the relation of art to natural     
science and to philosophy1 though he    
never succeeded in definitely fixing    
those relations4 ,from ,romanticism1    
rather than from ,schopenhauer1 he      

gathered those elements of thought out  
of which he wove his conception of the  
two forms of art3 the ,apollonian1 all  
serene contemplation1 as expressed in   
the epic and in sculpture2 the          
,dionysac1 all tumult and agitation1 as 
expressed in music and the drama4 ,these
 doctrines are not rigorously proved1   
and their power of resistance to        
criticism is therefore but slender1 but 
they serve to transport the mind to a   
more lofty spiritual level than any     
others of the second half of the        
nineteenth century4  ,the most          
noteworthy thought on aesthetic of this 
period is perhaps to be found among the 
aestheticians of special branches of the
 arts1 and since we know that laws      
relating only to special branches are   
not conceivable1 this thought may be    
considered as bearing upon the general  
theory of ,aesthetic4  ,the ,bohemian   
critic ,e4 ,hanslick 7#ahed7 is perhaps 
the most important of these writers4    
,his work ,on ,musical ,beauty has been 

translated into several languages4 ,his 
polemic is chiefly directed against ,r4 
,wagner and the pretension of finding in
 music a determined content of ideas and
 feelings4 ,he expresses equal contempt 
for those sentimentalists who derive    
from music merely pathological effects1 
passionate excitement1 or stimulus for  
practical activity1 in place of enjoying
 the musical works4 ,if a few ,phrygian 
notes sufficed to instil courage into   
the soldier facing the enemy1 or a      
,doric melody to assure the fidelity of 
a wife whose husband was absent1 then   
the loss of ,greek music may cause pain 
to generals and to husbands1 but        
aestheticians and composers will have no
 reason to deplore it4 ,if every        
,requiem1 every lamenting ,adagio1      
possessed the power to make us sad1 who 
would be able to support existence in   
such conditions8 ,but if a true musical 
work look upon us with the clear and    
brilliant eyes of beauty1 we feel       
ourselves bound by its invincible       

fascination1 though its theme be all the
 sorrows of the century4  ,for          
,hanslick1 the only end of music was    
form1 or musical beauty4 ,the followers 
of ,herbart showed themselves very      
tender towards this unexpected and      
vigorous ally1 and ,hanslick1 not to be 
behindhand in politeness1 returned their
 compliments1 by referring to ,herbart  
and to ,r4 ,zimmermann1 in the later    
editions of his work1 as having         
completely developed the great aesthetic
 principle of form4 ,unfortunately      
,hanslick meant something altogether    
different from the ,herbartians by his  
use of the word form4 ,symmetry1 merely 
acoustic relations1 and the pleasure of 
the ear1 did not constitute the         
musically beautiful for him4            
,mathematics were in his view useless in
 the ,aesthetic of music4 ,sonorous     
forms are not empty1 but perfectly full2
 they cannot be compared to simple lines
 enclosing a space2 they are the spirit1
 which takes form1 making its own bodily

 configuration4 ,music is more of a     
picture than is an arabesque2 but it is 
a picture of which the subject is       
inexpressible in words1 nor is it to be 
enclosed in a precise concept4 ,in      
music1 there is a meaning and a         
connexion1 but of a specially musical   
nature3 it is a language which we speak 
and understand1 but which it is         
impossible to translate4 ,hanslick      
admits that music1 if it do not render  
the quality of sentiments1 renders their
 tone or dynamic side2 it renders       
adjectives1 if it fail to render        
substantives2 if not murmuring          
tenderness or impetuous courage1 at any 
rate the murmuring and the impetuous4   
,the essence of his book is contained in
 the negation that it is possible to    
separate form and content in music4     
,take any motive you will1 and say where
 form begins and content ends4 ,are we  
to call the sounds content8 ,very good1 
but they have already received form4    
,what are we to call form8 ,sounds      

again8 ,but they are already form       
filled1 that is to say1 possessing a    
content4 ,these observations testify to 
an acute penetration of the nature of   
art4 ,hanslick's belief that they were  
characteristics peculiar to music1 not  
common to every form of art1 alone      
prevented him from seeing further4  ,c4 
,fiedler1 published in ,german 7in      
#ahhg7 an extremely luminous work on the
 origin of artistic activity4 ,he       
describes eloquently how the passive    
spectator seems to himself to grasp all 
reality1 as the shows of life pass      
before him2 but at the moment that he   
tries to realize this artistically1 all 
disappears1 and leaves him with the     
emptiness of his own thoughts4 ,yet by  
concentration alone do we attain to     
expression2 art is a language that we   
gradually learn to speak4 ,artistic     
activity is only to be attained by      
limiting ourselves2 it must consist of  
forms precisely determined1 tangible1   
sensibly demonstrable1 precisely because

 it is spiritual4 ,art does not imitate 
nature1 for what is nature1 but that    
vast confusion of perceptions and       
representations that were referred to   
above8 ,yet in a sense art does imitate 
nature2 it uses nature to produce values
 of a kind peculiar to itself4 ,those   
values are true visibility4  ,fiedler's 
views correspond with those of his      
predecessor1 ,hanslick1 but are more    
rigorously and philosophically          
developed4 ,the sculptor ,a4 ,hildebrand
 may be mentioned with these1 as having 
drawn attention to the nature of art as 
architectonic rather than imitative1    
with special application to the art of  
sculpture4  ,what we miss with these and
 with other specialists1 is a broad view
 of art and language1 as one and the    
same thing1 the inheritance of all      
humanity1 not of a few persons1         
specially endowed4 ,h4 ,bergson in his  
book on laughter 7#aijj7 falls under the
 same criticism4 ,he develops his theory
 of art in a manner analogous to        

,fiedler1 and errs like him in looking  
upon it as something different and      
exceptional in respect to the language  
of every moment4 ,he declares that in   
life the individuality of things escapes
 us3 we see only as much as suffices for
 our practical ends4 ,the influence of  
language aids this rude simplification3 
all but proper names are abstractions4  
,artists arise from time to time1 who   
recover the riches hidden beneath the   
labels of ordinary life4  ,amid the ruin
 of idealist metaphysics1 is to be      
desired a healthy return to the doctrine
 of ,baumgarten1 corrected and enriched 
with the discoveries that have been made
 since his time1 especially by          
romanticism and psychology4 ,c4 ,hermann
 7#ahgf7 announced this return1 but his 
book is a hopeless mixture of empirical 
precepts and of metaphysical beliefs    
regarding ,logic and ,aesthetic1 both of
 which1 he believes1 deal not with the  
empirical thought and experience of the 
soul1 but with the pure and absolute4   

,b4 ,bosanquet 7#ahib7 gives the        
following definition of the beautiful1  
as that which has a characteristic or   
individual expressivity for the sensible
 perception1 or for the imagination1    
subject to the conditions of general or 
abstract expressivity for the same      
means4 ,the problem as posed by this    
writer by the antithesis of the two     
,german schools of form and content1    
appears to us insoluble4  ,though ,de   
,sanctis left no school in ,italy1 his  
teaching has been cleared of the        
obscurities that had gathered round it  
during the last ten years2 and the      
thesis of the true nature of history1   
and of its nature1 altogether different 
from natural science1 has been also     
dealt with in ,germany1 although its    
precise relation to the aesthetic       
problem has not been made clear4 ,such  
labours and such discussions constitute 
a more favourable ground for the        
scientific development of ,aesthetic    
than the stars of mystical metaphysic or

 the stables of positivism and of       
sensualism4  ,we have now reached the   
end of the inquiry into the history of  
aesthetic speculation1 and we are struck
 with the smallness of the number of    
those who have seen clearly the nature  
of the problem4 ,no doubt1 amid the     
crowd of artists1 critics1 and writers  
on other subjects1 many have            
incidentally made very just remarks1 and
 if all these were added to the few     
philosophers1 they would form a gallant 
company4 ,but if1 as ,schiller truly    
observed1 the rhythm of philosophy      
consist in a withdrawal from public     
opinion1 in order to return to it with  
renewed vigour1 it is evident that this 
withdrawal is essential1 and indeed that
 in it lies the whole progress of       
philosophy4  ,during our long journey1  
we have witnessed grave aberrations from
 the truth1 which were at the same time 
attempts to reach it2 such were the     
hedonism of the sophists and            
rhetoricians of antiquity1 of the       

sensualists of the eighteenth and second
 half of the nineteenth centuries2 the  
moralistic hedonism of ,aristophanes and
 the ,stoics1 of the ,roman eclectics1  
of the writers of the ,middle ,age and  
of the ,renaissance2 the ascetic and    
logical hedonism of ,plato and the      
,fathers of the ,church2 the aesthetic  
mysticism of ,plotinus1 reborn to its   
greatest triumphs1 during the classic   
period of ,german thought4  ,through the
 midst of these variously erroneous     
theories1 that traverse the field of    
thought in all directions1 runs a tiny  
rivulet of golden truth4 ,starting from 
the subtle empiricism of ,aristotle1 it 
flows in the profound penetration of    
,vico to the nineteenth century1 where  
it appears again in the masterly        
analyses of ,schleiermacher1 ,humboldt1 
and ,de ,sanctis4  ,this brief list     
shows that the science of ,aesthetic is 
no longer to be discovered1 but it also 
shows that it is only at its beginning4 
,the birth of a science is like the     

birth of a human being4 ,in order to    
live1 a science1 like a man1 has to     
withstand a thousand attacks of all     
sorts4 ,these appear in the form of     
errors1 which must be extirpated1 if the
 science is not to perish4 ,and when one
 set has been weeded1 another crops up2 
when these have been dealt with1 the    
former errors often return4 ,therefore  
scientific criticism is always          
necessary4 ,no science can repose on its
 laurels1 complete1 unchallenged4 ,like 
a human being1 it must maintain its     
position by constant efforts1 constant  
victories over error4 ,the general      
errors which reveal a negation of the   
very concept of art have already been   
dealt with in the ,historical ,summary4 
,the particular errors have been exposed
 in the ,theory4 ,they may be divided   
under three heads3 7i47 ,errors as to   
the characteristic quality of the       
aesthetic fact1 or 7ii47 as to its      
specific quality1 or 7iii47 as to its   
generic quality4 ,these are             

contradictions of the characteristics of
 intuition1 of theoretic contemplation1 
and of spiritual activity1 which        
constitute the aesthetic fact4  ,the    
principal bar to a proper understanding 
of the true nature of language has been 
and still is ,rhetoric1 with the modern 
form it has assumed1 as style4 ,the     
rhetorical categories are still         
mentioned in treatises and often        
referred to1 as having definite         
existence among the parts of speech4    
,side by side with such phrases goes    
that of the double form1 or metaphor1   
which implies that there are two ways of
 saying the same thing1 the one simple1 
the other ornate4  ,kant1 ,herbart1     
,hegel1 and many minor personages1 have 
been shown to be victims of the         
rhetorical categories1 and in our own   
day we have writers in ,italy and in    
,germany who devote much attention to   
them1 such as ,r4 ,bonghi and ,g4       
,grber2 the latter employs a phraseology
 which he borrows from the modern       

schools of psychology1 but this does not
 alter the true nature of his argument4 
,de ,sanctis gave perhaps the clearest  
and most stimulating advice in his      
lectures on ,rhetoric1 which he termed  
,anti-rhetoric4  ,but even he failed to 
systematize his thought1 and we may say 
that the true critique of ,rhetoric can 
only be made from the point of view of  
the aesthetic activity1 which is1 as we 
know1 one1 and therefore does not give  
rise to divisions1 and cannot express   
the same content now in one form1 now in
 another4 ,thus only can we drive away  
the double monster of naked form        
deprived of imagination1 and of         
decorated form1 which would represent   
something more than imagination4 ,the   
same remarks apply to artistic and      
literary styles1 and to their various   
laws or rules4 ,in modern times they    
have generally been comprised with      
rhetoric1 and although now discredited1 
they cannot be said to have altogether  
disappeared4  ,j4,c4 ,scaliger may be   

entitled the protagonist of the unities 
in comparatively modern times3 he it was
 who laid the foundations of the        
classical ,bastille1 and supplied       
tyrants of literature1 like ,boileau1   
with some of their best weapons4        
,lessing opposed the ,french rules and  
restrictions with ,german rules and     
restrictions1 giving as his opinion that
 ,corneille and others had wrongly      
interpreted ,aristotle1 whose rules did 
not really prevent ,shakespeare from    
being included among correct writers6   
,lessing undoubtedly believed in        
intellectual rules for poetry4          
,aristotle was the tyrant1 father of    
tyrants1 and we find ,corneille saying  
qu'il est ais de s'accommoder avec      
,aristote1 much in the same way as      
,tartuffe makes his accommodements avec 
le ciel4 ,in the next century1 several  
additions were made to the admitted     
styles1 as for instance the tragdie     
bourgeoise4  ,but these battles of the  
rules with one another are less         

interesting than the rebellion against  
all the rules1 which began with ,pietro 
,aretino in the sixteenth century1 who  
makes mock of them in the prologues to  
his comedies4 ,giordano ,bruno took     
sides against the makers of rules1      
saying that the rules came from the     
poetry1 and therefore there are as many 
genuses and species of true rules as    
there are genuses and species of true   
poets4 ,when asked how the true poets   
are to be known1 he replies1 by         
repeating their verses1 which either    
cause delight1 or profit1 or both4      
,guarini1 too1 said that the world      
judges poetry1 and its sentence is      
without appeal4  ,strangely enough1 it  
was priest-ridden ,spain that all       
through the sixteenth and seventeenth   
centuries led the van of revolt against 
the rules and precepts of the           
grammarians4 ,while ,torquato ,tasso    
remained the miserable slave of         
grammarians unworthy to lick the dust   
from his feet1 ,lope de ,vega slyly     

remarked that when he wrote his         
comedies1 he locked up the givers of    
precepts with six keys1 that they might 
not reproach him4 ,j4,b4 ,marino        
declared that he knew the rules better  
than all the pedants in the world2 but  
the true rule is to know when to break  
the rules1 in accordance with the       
manners of the day and the taste of the 
age4 ,among the most acute writers of   
the end of the seventeenth century is to
 be mentioned ,gravina1 who well        
understood that a work of art must be   
its own criterion1 and said so clearly  
when praising a contemporary for a work 
which did not enter any one of the      
admitted categories4 ,unfortunately     
,gravina did not clearly formulate his  
views4  ,france of the eighteenth       
century produced several writers like   
,du ,bos1 who declared that men will    
always prefer the poems that move them1 
to those composed according to rule4 ,la
 ,motte combated the unities of place   
and time1 and ,batteux showed himself   

liberal in respect to rules4 ,voltaire1 
although he opposed ,la ,motte and      
described the three unities as the three
 great laws of good sense1 was also     
capable of declaring that all styles but
 the tiresome are good1 and that the    
best style is that which is best used4  
,in ,england we find ,home in his       
,elements of ,criticism deriding the    
critics for asserting that there must be
 a precise criterion for distinguishing 
epic poetry from all other forms of     
composition4 ,literary compositions1 he 
held1 melt into one another1 just like  
colours4  ,the literary movement of the 
end of the eighteenth and the beginning 
of the nineteenth centuries attacked    
rules of all sorts4 ,we will not dwell  
upon the many encounters of these       
periods1 nor record the names of those  
that conquered gloriously1 or their     
excesses4 ,in ,france the preface to the
 ,cromwell of ,v4 ,hugo 7#ahbg71 in     
,italy the ,lettera semiseria di        
,grisostomo1 were clarions of rebellion4

 ,the principle first laid down by      
,a4,w4 ,schlegel1 that the form of      
compositions must be organic and not    
mechanic1 resulting from the nature of  
the subject1 from its internal          
development not from an external stamp1 
was enunciated in ,italy4 ,art is always
 a whole1 a synthesis4  ,but it would be
 altogether wrong to believe that this  
empirical defeat of the styles and rules
 implied their final defeat in          
philosophy4 ,even writers who were      
capable of dispensing with prejudice    
when judging works of art1 once they    
spoke as philosophers1 were apt to      
reassume their belief in those          
categories which1 empirically1 they had 
discarded4 ,the spectacle of these      
literary or rhetorical categories1      
raised by ,german philosophers to the   
honours of philosophical deduction1 is  
even more amusing than that which       
afforded amusement to ,home4 ,the truth 
is that they were unable to free their  
aesthetic systems of intellectualism1   

although they proclaimed the empire of  
the mystic idea4 ,schelling 7#ahjc7 at  
the beginning1 ,hartmann 7#ahij7 at the 
end of the century1 furnish a good      
example of this head and tail4          
,schelling1 in his ,philosophy of ,art1 
declares that1 historically speaking1   
the first place in the styles of poetry 
is due to ,epic1 but1 scientifically    
speaking1 it falls to ,lyric4 ,in truth1
 if poetry be the representation of the 
infinite in the finite1 then lyric      
poetry1 in which prevails the finite1   
must be its first moment4 ,lyric poetry 
corresponds to the first of the ideal   
series1 to reflection1 to knowledge2    
epic poetry corresponds to the second   
power1 to action4 ,this philosopher     
finally proceeds to the unification of  
epic and lyric poetry1 and from their   
union he deduces the dramatic form1     
which is in his view the supreme        
incarnation of the essence and of the   
in-se of every art4  ,with ,hartmann1   
poetry is divided into poetry of        

declamation and poetry for reading4 ,the
 first is subdivided into ,epic1 ,lyric1
 and ,dramatic2 the ,epic is divided    
into plastic epic1 proper epic1         
pictorial epic1 and lyrical epic2 ,lyric
 is divided into epical lyric1 lyrical  
lyric1 and dramatic lyric2 ,dramatic is 
divided into lyrical dramatic1 epical   
dramatic1 and dramatical dramatic4 ,the 
second 7readable poetry7 is divided into
 poetry which is chiefly epical1        
lyrical1 and dramatic1 with the tertiary
 division of moving1 comic1 tragic1 and 
humoristic2 and poetry which can all be 
read at once1 like a short story1 or    
that requires several sittings1 like a  
romance4  ,these brief extracts show of 
what dialectic pirouettes and sublime   
trivialities even philosophers are      
capable1 when they begin to treat of the
 ,aesthetic of the tragic1 comic1 and   
humorous4 ,such false distinctions are  
still taught in the schools of ,france  
and ,germany1 and we find a ,french     
critic like ,ferdinand ,brunetire       

devoting a whole volume to the evolution
 of literary styles or classes1 which he
 really believes to constitute literary 
history4 ,this prejudice1 less frankly  
stated1 still infests many histories of 
literature1 even in ,italy4  ,we believe
 that the falsity of these rules of     
classes should be scientifically        
demonstrated4 ,in our ,theory of        
,aesthetic we have shown how we believe 
that it should be demonstrated4  ,the   
proof of the theory of the limits of the
 arts has been credited to ,lessing1 but
 his merit should rather be limited to  
having been the first to draw attention 
to the problem4 ,his solution was false1
 but his achievement nevertheless great1
 in having posed the question clearly4  
,no one before him1 in antiquity1 in the
 ,middle ,age1 or in modern times1 had  
seriously asked3 ,what is the value of  
the distinctions between the arts8      
,which of them comes first8 ,which      
second8 ,leonardo da ,vinci had declared
 his personal predilection for painting1

 ,michael ,angelo for sculpture1 but the
 question had not been philosophically  
treated before ,lessing4  ,lessing's    
attention was drawn to the problem1     
through his desire to disprove the      
assertions of ,spence and of the ,comte 
de ,caylus1 the former in respect to the
 close union between poetry and painting
 in antiquity1 the latter as believing  
that a poem was good according to the   
number of subjects which it should      
afford the painter4 ,lessing argued     
thus3 ,painting manifests itself in     
space1 poetry in time3 the mode of      
manifestation of painting is through    
objects which coexist1 that of poetry   
through objects which are consecutive4  
,the objects which coexist1 or whose    
parts are coexistent1 are called bodies4
 ,bodies1 then1 owing to their          
visibility1 are the true objects of     
painting4 ,objects which are            
consecutive1 or whose parts are         
consecutive1 are called1 in general1    
actions4 ,actions1 then1 are the        

suitable object of poetry4 ,he admitted 
that painting might represent an action1
 but only by means of bodies which make 
allusion to it2 that poetry can         
represent bodies1 but only by means of  
actions4 ,returning to this theme1 he   
explained the action or movement in     
painting as added by our imagination4   
,lessing was greatly preoccupied with   
the naturalness and the unnaturalness of
 signs1 which is tantamount to saying   
that he believed each art to be strictly
 limited to certain modes of expression1
 which are only overstepped at the cost 
of coherency4 ,in the appendix to his   
,laocon1 he quotes ,plutarch as saying  
that one should not chop wood with a    
key1 or open the door with an axe4 ,he  
who should do so would not only be      
spoiling both those utensils1 but would 
also be depriving himself of the utility
 of both4 ,he believed that this applied
 to the arts4  ,the number of           
philosophers and writers who have       
attempted empirical classifications of  

the arts is enormous3 it ranges in      
comparatively recent times from         
,lessing1 by way of ,schasler1 ,solger1 
and ,hartmann1 to ,richard ,wagner1     
whose theory of the combination of the  
arts was first mooted in the eighteenth 
century4  ,lotze1 while reflecting upon 
the futility of these attempts1 himself 
adopts a method1 which he says is the   
most convenient1 and thereby incurs the 
censure of ,schasler4 ,this method is in
 fact suitable for his studies in botany
 and in zoology1 but useless for the    
philosophy of the spirit4 ,thus both    
these thinkers maintained ,lessing's    
wrong principle as to the constancy1 the
 limits1 and the peculiar nature of each
 art4  ,who among aestheticians has     
criticized this principle8 ,aristotle   
had a glimpse of the truth1 when he     
refused to admit that the distinction   
between prose and poetry lay in an      
external fact1 the metre4               
,schleiermacher seems to have been the  
only one who was thoroughly aware of the

 difficulty of the problem4 ,in         
analysis1 indeed1 he goes so far as to  
say that what the arts have in common is
 not the external fact1 which is an     
element of diversity2 and connecting    
such an observation as this with his    
clear distinction between art and what  
is called technique1 we might argue that
 ,schleiermacher looked upon the        
divisions between the arts as           
non-existent4 ,but he does not make this
 logical inference1 and his thought upon
 the problem continues to be wavering   
and undecided4 ,nebulous1 uncertain1 and
 contradictory as is this portion of    
,schleiermacher's theory1 he has yet the
 great merit of having doubted          
,lessing's theory1 and of having asked  
himself by what right are special arts  
held to be distinct in art4             
,schleiermacher absolutely denied the   
existence of a beautiful in nature1 and 
praised ,hegel for having sustained this
 negation4 ,hegel did not really deserve
 this praise1 as his negation was rather

 verbal than effective2 but the         
importance of this thesis as stated by  
,schleiermacher is very great1 in so far
 as he denied the existence of an       
objective natural beauty not produced by
 the spirit of man4 ,this theory of the 
beautiful in nature1 when taken in a    
metaphysical sense1 does not constitute 
an error peculiar to aesthetic science4 
,it forms part of a fallacious general  
theory1 which can be criticized together
 with its metaphysic4  ,the theory of   
aesthetic senses1 that is1 of certain   
superior senses1 such as sight and      
hearing1 being the only ones for which  
aesthetic impressions exist1 was debated
 as early as ,plato4 ,the ,hippias major
 contains a discussion upon this theme1 
which ,socrates leads to the conclusion 
that there exist beautiful things1 which
 do not reach us through impressions of 
eye or ear4 ,but further than this1     
there exist things which please the eye1
 but not the ear1 and vice versa2       
therefore the reason of beauty cannot be

 visibility or audibility1 but something
 different from1 yet common to both4    
,perhaps this question has never been so
 acutely and so seriously dealt with as 
in this ,platonic dialogue4 ,home1      
,herder1 ,hegel1 ,diderot1 ,rousseau1   
,berkeley1 all dealt with the problem1  
but in a more or less arbitrary manner4 
,herder1 for instance1 includes touch   
with the higher aesthetic senses1 but   
,hegel removes it1 as having immediate  
contact with matter as such1 and with   
its immediate sensible qualities4       
,schleiermacher1 with his wonted        
penetration1 saw that the problem was   
not to be solved so easily4 ,he refuted 
the distinction between clear and       
confused senses4 ,he held that the      
superiority of sight and hearing over   
the other senses lay in their free      
activity1 in their capacity of an       
activity proceeding from within1 and    
able to create forms and sounds without 
receiving external impressions4 ,the eye
 and the ear are not merely means of    

perception1 for in that case there could
 be no visual and no auditive arts4     
,they are also functions of voluntary   
movements1 which fill the domain of the 
senses4 ,schleiermacher1 however1       
considered that the difference was      
rather one of quantity1 and that we     
should allow to the other senses a      
minimum of independence4  ,the          
sensualists1 as we know1 maintain that  
all the senses are aesthetic4 ,that is  
the hedonistic hypothesis1 which has    
been dealt with and disproved in this   
book4 ,we have shown the embarrassment  
in which the hedonists find themselves1 
when they have dubbed all the senses    
aesthetic1 or have been obliged to      
differentiate in an absurd manner some  
of the senses from the others4 ,the only
 way out of the difficulty lies in      
abandoning the attempt to unite orders  
of facts so diverse as the              
representative form of the spirit and   
the conception of given physical organs 
or of a given material of impressions4  

,the origin of classes of speech and of 
grammatical forms is to be found in     
antiquity1 and as regards the latter1   
the disputes among the ,alexandrian     
philosophers1 the analogists1 and the   
anomalists1 resulted in logic being     
identified with grammar4 ,anything which
 did not seem logical was excluded from 
grammar as a deviation4 ,the analogists1
 however1 did not have it all their own 
way1 and grammar in the modern sense of 
the word is a compromise between these  
extreme views1 that is1 it contains     
something of the thought of ,chrysippus1
 who composed a treatise to show that   
the same thing can be expressed with    
different sounds1 and of ,apollonius    
,discolus1 who attempted to explain what
 the rigorous analogists refused to     
admit into their schemes and            
classifications4 ,it is only of late    
years that we have begun to emerge from 
the superstitious reverence for grammar1
 inherited from the ,middle ,age4 ,such 
writers as ,pott1 in his introduction to

 ,humboldt1 and ,paul in his ,principien
 d4 ,sprachgeschichte1 have done good   
service in throwing doubt upon the      
absolute validity of the parts of       
speech4 ,if the old superstitions still 
survive tenaciously1 we must attribute  
this partly to empirical and poetical   
grammar1 partly to the venerable        
antiquity of grammar itself1 which has  
led the world to forget its illegitimate
 and turbid origin4  ,the theory of the 
relativity of taste is likewise ancient1
 and it would be interesting to know    
whether the saying there's no accounting
 for tastes could be traced to a merely 
gustatory origin4 ,in this sense1 the   
saying would be quite correct1 as it is 
quite wrong when applied to aesthetic   
facts4 ,the eighteenth century writers  
exhibit a piteous perplexity of thought 
on this subject4 ,home1 for instance1   
after much debate1 decides upon a common
 standard of taste1 which he deduces    
from the necessity of social life and   
from what he calls a final cause4 ,of   

course it will not be an easy matter to 
fix this standard of taste4 ,as regards 
moral conduct1 we do not seek our models
 among savages1 so with regard to taste1
 we must have recourse to those few     
whose taste has not been corrupted nor  
spoilt by pleasure1 who have received   
good taste from nature1 and have        
perfected it by education and by the    
practice of life4 ,if after this has    
been done1 there should yet arise       
disputes1 it will be necessary to refer 
to the principles of criticism1 as laid 
down in his book by the said ,home4  ,we
 find similar contradictions and vicious
 circles in the ,discourse on ,taste of 
,david ,hume4 ,we search his writings in
 vain for the distinctive               
characteristics of the man of taste1    
whose judgments should be final4        
,although he asserts that the general   
principles of taste are universal in    
human nature1 and admits that no notice 
should be accorded to perversions and   
ignorance1 yet there exist diversities  

of taste that are irreconcilable1       
insuperable1 and blameless4  ,but the   
criticism of the sensualist and         
relativist positions cannot be made from
 the point of view of those who proclaim
 the absolute nature of taste and yet   
place it among the intellectual         
concepts4 ,it has been shown to be      
impossible to escape from sensualism and
 relativity save by falling into the    
intellectualist error4 ,muratori in the 
eighteenth century is an instance of    
this4 ,he was one of the first to       
maintain the existence of a rule of     
taste and of universal beauty4 ,andr    
also spoke of what appears beautiful in 
a work of art as being not that which   
pleases at once1 owing to certain       
particular dispositions of the faculties
 of the soul and of the organs of the   
body1 but that which has the right of   
pleasing the reason and reflection      
through its own excellence4 ,voltaire   
admitted an universal taste1 which was  
intellectual1 as did many others4 ,kant 

appeared1 and condemned alike the       
intellectualist and the sensualistic    
error2 but placing the beautiful in a   
symbol of morality1 he failed to        
discover the imaginative absoluteness of
 taste4 ,later speculative philosophy   
did not attach importance to the        
question4  ,the correct solution was    
slow in making its way4 ,it lies1 as we 
know1 in the fact that to judge a work  
of art we must place ourselves in the   
position of the artist at the time of   
production1 and that to judge is to     
reproduce4 ,alexander ,pope1 in his     
,essay on ,criticism1 was among the     
first to state this truth3    ,a perfect
 judge will read each work of wit       
,with the same spirit that its author   
writ4  ,remarks equally luminous were   
made by ,antonio ,conti1 ,terrasson1 and
 ,heydenreich in the eighteenth century1
 the latter with considerable           
philosophical development4 ,de ,sanctis 
gave in his adhesion to this formula1   
but a true theory of aesthetic criticism

 had not yet been given1 because for    
such was necessary1 not only an exact   
conception of nature in art1 but also of
 the relations between the aesthetic    
fact and its historical conditions4 ,in 
more recent times has been denied the   
possibility of aesthetic criticism2 it  
has been looked upon as merely          
individual and capricious1 and          
historical criticism has been set up in 
its place4 ,this would be better called 
a criticism of extrinsic erudition and  
of bad philosophical                    
inspiration--positivist and materialist4
 ,the true history of literature will   
always require the reconstruction and   
then the judgment of the work of art4   
,those who have wished to react against 
such emasculated erudition have often   
thrown themselves into the opposite     
extreme1 that is1 into a dogmatic1      
abstract1 intellectualistic1 or         
moralistic form of criticism4  ,this    
mention of the history of certain       
doctrines relating to ,aesthetic        

suffices to show the range of error     
possible in the theory4 ,aesthetic has  
need to be surrounded by a vigilant and 
vigorous critical literature which shall
 derive from it and be at once its      
safeguard and its source of strength4   
,,appendix  ,i here add as an appendix1 
at the request of the author1 a         
translation of his lecture which he     
delivered before the ,third             
,international ,congress of ,philosophy1
 at ,heidelberg1 on #bnd ,september     
#aijh4  ,the reader will find that it   
throws a vivid light upon ,benedetto    
,croce's general theory of ,aesthetic4  
,,pure ,,intuition ,,and ,,the ,,lyrical
 ,,character ,,of ,,art4  ,a ,lecture   
delivered at ,heidelberg at the second  
general session of the ,third           
,international ,congress of ,philosophy4
  ,there exists an empirical ,aesthetic1
 which although it admits the existence 
of facts1 called aesthetic or artistic1 
yet holds that they are irreducible to a
 single principle1 to a rigorous        

philosophical concept4 ,it wishes to    
limit itself to collecting as many of   
those facts as possible1 and in the     
greatest possible variety1 thence1 at   
the most1 proceeding to group them      
together in classes and types4 ,the     
logical ideal of this school1 as        
declared on many occasions1 is zoology  
or botany4 ,this ,aesthetic1 when asked 
what art is1 replies by indicating      
successively single facts1 and by       
saying3 ,art is this1 and this1 and this
 too is art1 and so on1 indefinitely4   
,zoology and botany renew the           
representatives of fauna and of flora in
 the same way4 ,they calculate that the 
species renewed amount to some thousand1
 but believe that they might easily be  
increased to twenty or a hundred        
thousand1 or even to a million1 or to   
infinity4  ,there is another ,aesthetic1
 which has been called hedonistic1      
utilitarian1 moralistic1 and so on1     
according to its various manifestations4
 ,its complex denomination should1      

however1 be practicism1 because that is 
precisely what constitutes its essential
 character4 ,this ,aesthetic differs    
from the preceding1 in the belief that  
aesthetic or artistic facts are not a   
merely empirical or nominalistic        
grouping together1 but that all of them 
possess a common foundation4 ,its       
foundation is placed in the practical   
form of human activity4 ,those facts are
 therefore considered1 either           
generically1 as manifestations of       
pleasure and pain1 and therefore rather 
as economic facts2 or1 more             
particularly1 as a special class of     
those manifestations2 or again1 as      
instruments and products of the ethical 
spirit1 which subdues and turns to its  
own ends individual hedonistic and      
economic tendencies4  ,there is a third 
,aesthetic1 the intellectualist1 which1 
while also recognizing the reducibility 
of aesthetic facts to philosophical     
treatment1 explains them as particular  
cases of logical thought1 identifying   

beauty with intellectual truth2 art1 now
 with the natural sciences1 now with    
philosophy4 ,for this ,aesthetic1 what  
is prized in art is what is learned from
 it4 ,the only distinction that it      
admits between art and science1 or art  
and philosophy1 is at the most that of  
more or less1 or of perfection and      
imperfection4 ,according to this        
,aesthetic1 art would be the whole mass 
of easy and popular truths2 or it would 
be a transitory form of science1 a      
semi-science and a semi-philosophy1     
preparatory to the superior and perfect 
form of science and of philosophy4  ,a  
fourth ,aesthetic there is1 which may be
 called agnostic4 ,it springs from the  
criticism of the positions just now     
indicated1 and being guided by a        
powerful consciousness of the truth1    
rejects them all1 because it finds them 
too evidently false1 and because it is  
too loth to admit that art is a simple  
fact of pleasure or pain1 an exercise of
 virtue1 or a fragmentary sketch of     

science and philosophy4 ,and while      
rejecting them1 it discovers1 at the    
same time1 that art is not now this and 
now that of those things1 or of other   
things1 indefinitely1 but that it has   
its own principle and origin4 ,however1 
it is not able to say what this         
principle may be1 and believes that it  
is impossible to do so4 ,this ,aesthetic
 knows that art cannot be resolved into 
an empirical concept2 knows that        
pleasure and pain are united with the   
aesthetic activity only in an indirect  
manner2 that morality has nothing to do 
with art2 that it is impossible to      
rationalize art1 as is the case with    
science and philosophy1 and to prove it 
beautiful or ugly with the aid of       
reason4 ,here this ,aesthetic is content
 to stop1 satisfied with a knowledge    
consisting entirely of negative terms4  
,finally1 there is an ,aesthetic which  
,i have elsewhere proposed to call      
mystic4 ,this ,aesthetic avails itself  
of those negative terms1 to define art  

as a spiritual form without a practical 
character1 because it is theoretic1 and 
without a logical or intellective form1 
because it is a theoretic form1         
differing alike from those of science   
and of philosophy1 and superior to both4
 ,according to this view1 art would be  
the highest pinnacle of knowledge1      
whence what is seen from other points   
seems narrow and partial2 art would     
alone reveal the whole horizon or all   
the abysses of ,reality4  ,now1 the five
 ,aesthetics so far mentioned are not   
referable to contingent facts and       
historical epochs1 as are1 on the other 
hand1 the denominations of ,greek and   
,mediaeval ,aesthetic1 of ,renaissance  
and eighteenth-century ,aesthetic1 the  
,aesthetic of ,wolff and of ,herbart1 of
 ,vico and of ,hegel4 ,these five are1  
on the contrary1 mental attitudes1 which
 are found in all periods1 although they
 have not always conspicuous            
representatives of the kind that are    
said to become historical4 ,empirical   

,aesthetic is1 for example1 called      
,burke in the eighteenth1 ,fechner in   
the nineteenth century2 moralistic      
,aesthetic is ,horace or ,plutarch in   
antiquity1 ,campanella in modern times2 
intellectualist or logical ,aesthetic is
 ,cartesian in the seventeenth1         
,leibnitzian in the eighteenth1 and     
,hegelian in the nineteenth century2    
agnostic ,aesthetic is ,francesco       
,patrizio at the ,renaissance1 ,kant in 
the eighteenth century2 mystic          
,aesthetic is called ,neoplatonism at   
the end of the antique world1           
,romanticism at the beginning of the    
nineteenth century1 and if it be adorned
 during the former period with the name 
of ,plotinus1 in the latter it will bear
 the name of ,schelling or of ,solger1  
,and not only are those attitudes and   
mental tendencies common to all epochs1 
but they are also all found to some     
extent developed or indicated in every  
thinker1 and even in every man4 ,thus it
 is somewhat difficult to classify      

philosophers of ,aesthetic according to 
one or the other category1 because each 
philosopher also enters more or less    
into some other1 or into all the other  
categories4  ,nor can these five        
conceptions and points of view be looked
 upon as increasable to ten or twenty1  
or to as many as desired1 or that ,i    
have placed them in a certain order1 but
 that they could be capriciously placed 
in another order4 ,if this were so1 they
 would be altogether heterogeneous and  
disconnected among themselves1 and the  
attempt to examine and criticize them   
would seem altogether desperate1 as also
 would be that of comparing one with the
 other1 or of stating a new one1 which  
should dominate them all4 ,it is        
precisely thus that ordinary sceptics   
look upon various and contrasting       
scientific views4 ,they group them all  
in the same plane1 and believing that   
they can increase them at will1 conclude
 that one is as good as another1 and    
that therefore every one is free to     

select that which he prefers from a     
bundle of falsehoods4 ,the conceptions  
of which we speak are definite in       
number1 and appear in a necessary order1
 which is either that here stated by me1
 or another which might be proposed1    
better than mine4 ,this would be the    
necessary order1 which ,i should have   
failed to realize effectively4 ,they are
 connected one with the other1 and in   
such a way that the view which follows  
includes in itself that which precedes  
it4  ,thus1 if the last of the five     
doctrines indicated be taken1 which may 
be summed up as the proposition that art
 is a form of the theoretic spirit1     
superior to the scientific and          
philosophic form--and if it be submitted
 to analysis1 it will be seen that in it
 is included1 in the first place1 the   
proposition affirming the existence of a
 group of facts1 which are called       
aesthetic or artistic4 ,if such facts   
did not exist1 it is evident that no    
question would arise concerning them1   

and that no systematization would be    
attempted4 ,and this is the truth of    
empirical ,aesthetic4 ,but there is also
 contained in it the proposition3 that  
the facts examined are reducible to a   
definite principle or category of the   
spirit4 ,this amounts to saying1 that   
they belong either to the practical     
spirit1 or to the theoretical1 or to one
 of their subforms4 ,and this is the    
truth of practicist ,aesthetic1 which is
 occupied with the enquiry as to whether
 these ever are practical facts1 and    
affirms that in every case they are a   
special category of the spirit4         
,thirdly1 there is contained in it the  
proposition3 that they are not practical
 facts1 but facts which should rather be
 placed near the facts of logic or of   
thought4 ,this is the truth of          
intellectualistic ,aesthetic4 ,in the   
fourth place1 we find also the          
proposition2 that aesthetic facts are   
neither practical1 nor of that theoretic
 form which is called logical and       

intellective4 ,they are something which 
cannot be identified with the categories
 of pleasure1 nor of the useful1 nor    
with those of ethic1 nor with those of  
logical truth4 ,they are something of   
which it is necessary to find a further 
definition4 ,this is the truth of that  
,aesthetic which is termed agnostic or  
negative4  ,when these various          
propositions are severed from their     
connection2 when1 that is to say1 the   
first is taken without the second1 the  
second without the third1 and so        
on1--and when each1 thus mutilated1 is  
confined in itself and the enquiry which
 awaits prosecution is arbitrarily      
arrested1 then each one of these gives  
itself out as the whole of them1 that   
is1 as the completion of the enquiry4   
,in this way1 each becomes error1 and   
the truths contained in empiricism1 in  
practicism1 in intellectualism1 in      
agnostic and in mystical ,aesthetic1    
become1 respectively1 falsity1 and these
 tendencies of speculation are indicated

 with names of a definitely depreciative
 colouring4 ,empiria becomes empiricism1
 the heuristic comparison of the        
aesthetic activity with the practical   
and logical1 becomes a conclusion1 and  
therefore practicism and                
intellectualism4 ,the criticism which   
rejects false definitions1 and is itself
 negative1 affirms itself as positive   
and definite1 becoming agnosticism2 and 
so on4  ,but the attempt to close a     
mental process in an arbitrary manner is
 vain1 and of necessity causes remorse  
and self-criticism4 ,thus it comes      
about1 that each one of those unilateral
 and erroneous doctrines continually    
tends to surpass itself and to enter the
 stage which follows it4 ,thus          
empiricism1 for example1 assumes that it
 can dispense with any philosophical    
conception of art2 but1 since it severs 
art from non-art--and1 however empirical
 it be1 it will not identify a          
pen-and-ink sketch and a table of       
logarithms1 as if they were just the    

same thing1 or a painting and milk or   
blood 7although milk and blood both     
possess colour7--thus empiricism too    
must at last resort to some kind of     
philosophical concept4 ,therefore1 we   
see the empiricists becoming1 turn and  
turn about1 hedonists1 moralists1       
intellectualists1 agnostics1 mystics1   
and sometimes they are even better than 
mystics1 upholding an excellent         
conception of art1 which can only be    
found fault with because introduced     
surreptitiously and without             
justification4 ,if they do not make that
 progress1 it is impossible for them to 
speak in any way of aesthetic facts4    
,they must return1 as regards such      
facts1 to that indifference and to that 
silence from which they had emerged when
 they affirmed the existence of these   
facts and began to consider them in     
their variety4 ,the same may be said of 
all other unilateral doctrines4 ,they   
are all reduced to the alternative of   
advancing or of going back1 and in so   

far as they do not wish to do either1   
they live amid contradictions and in    
anguish4 ,but they do free themselves   
from these1 more or less slowly1 and    
thus are compelled to advance1 more or  
less slowly4 ,and here we discover why  
it is so difficult1 and indeed          
impossible1 exactly to identify         
thinkers1 philosophers1 and writers with
 one or the other of the doctrines which
 we have enunciated1 because each one of
 them rebels when he finds himself      
limited to one of those categories1 and 
it seems to him that he is shut up in   
prison4 ,it is precisely because those  
thinkers try to shut themselves up in a 
unilateral doctrine1 that they do not   
succeed1 and that they take a step1 now 
in one direction1 now in another1 and   
are conscious of being now on this side1
 now on the other1 of the criticisms    
which are addressed to them4 ,but the   
critics fulfil their duty by putting    
them in prison1 thus throwing into      
relief the absurdity into which they are

 led by their irresolution1 or their    
resolution not to resolve4  ,and from   
this necessary connection and           
progressive order of the various        
propositions indicated arise also the   
resolve1 the counsel1 the exhortation1  
to return1 as they say1 to this or that 
thinker1 to this or that philosophical  
school of the past4 ,certainly1 such    
returns are impossible1 understood      
literally2 they are also a little       
ridiculous1 like all impossible         
attempts4 ,we can never return to the   
past1 precisely because it is the past4 
,no one is permitted to free himself    
from the problems which are put by the  
present1 and which he must solve with   
all the means of the present 7which     
includes in it the means of the past74  
,nevertheless1 it is a fact that the    
history of philosophy everywhere        
resounds with cries of return4 ,those   
very people who in our day deride the   
return to ,hume or the return to ,kant1 
proceed to advise the return to         

,schelling1 or the return to ,hegel4    
,this means that we must not understand 
those returns literally and in a        
material way4 ,in truth1 they do not    
express anything but the necessity and  
the ineliminability of the logical      
process explained above1 for which the  
affirmations contained in philosophical 
problems appear connected with one      
another in such a way that the one      
follows the other1 surpasses it1 and    
includes it in itself4 ,empiricism1     
practicism1 intellectualism1            
agnosticism1 mysticism1 are eternal     
stages of the search for truth4 ,they   
are eternally relived and rethought in  
the truth which each contains4 ,thus it 
would be necessary for him who had not  
yet turned his attention to aesthetic   
facts1 to begin by passing them before  
his eyes1 that is to say1 he must first 
traverse the empirical stage 7about     
equivalent to that occupied by mere men 
of letters and mere amateurs of art72   
and while he is at this stage1 he must  

be aroused to feel the want of a        
principle of explanation1 by making him 
compare his present knowledge with the  
facts1 and see if they are explained by 
it1 that is to say1 if they be          
utilitarian and moral1 or logical and   
intellective4 ,then we should drive him 
who has made this examination to the    
conclusion1 that the aesthetic activity 
is something different from all known   
forms1 a form of the spirit1 which it   
yet remains to characterize4 ,for the   
empiricists of ,aesthetic1              
intellectualism and moralism represent  
progress2 for the intellectualists1     
hedonistic and moralistic alike1        
agnosticism is progress and may be      
called ,kant4 ,but for ,kantians1 who   
are real ,kantians 7and not             
neo-,kantians71 progress is represented 
by the mystical and romantic point of   
view2 not because this comes after the  
doctrine of ,kant chronologically1 but  
because it surpasses it ideally4 ,in    
this sense1 and in this sense alone1 we 

should now return to the romantic       
,aesthetic4 ,we should return to it1    
because it is ideally superior to all   
the researches in ,aesthetic made in the
 studies of psychologists1 of           
physio-psychologists1 and of            
psycho-physiologists of the universities
 of ,europe and of ,america4 ,it is     
ideally superior to the sociological1   
comparative1 prehistoric ,aesthetic1    
which studies especially the art of     
savages1 of children1 of madmen1 and of 
idiots4 ,it is ideally superior also to 
that other ,aesthetic1 which has        
recourse to the conceptions of the      
genetic pleasure1 of games1 of illusion1
 of self-illusion1 of association1 of   
hereditary habit1 of sympathy1 of social
 efficiency1 and so on4 ,it is ideally  
superior to the attempts at logical     
explanation1 which have not altogether  
ceased1 even to-day1 although they are  
somewhat rare1 because1 to tell the     
truth1 fanaticism for ,logic cannot be  
called the failing of our times4        

,finally1 it is ideally superior to that
 ,aesthetic which repeats with ,kant1   
that the beautiful is finality without  
the idea of end1 disinterested pleasure1
 necessary and universal1 which is      
neither theoretical nor practical1 but  
participates in both forms1 or combines 
them in itself in an original and       
ineffable manner4 ,but we should return 
to it1 bringing with us the experience  
of a century of thought1 the new facts  
collected1 the new problems that have   
arisen1 the new ideas that have matured4
 ,thus we shall return again to the     
stage of mystical and romantic          
,aesthetic1 but not to the personal and 
historical stage of its representatives4
 ,for in this matter1 at least1 they are
 certainly inferior to us3 they lived a 
century ago and therefore inherited so  
much the less of the problems and of the
 results of thought which day by day    
mankind laboriously accumulates4  ,they 
should return1 but not to remain there2 
because1 if a return to the romantic    

,aesthetic be advisable for the         
,kantians 7while the idealists should   
not be advised to return to ,kant1 that 
is to say1 to a lower stage1 which      
represents a recession71 so those who   
come over1 or already find themselves on
 the ground of mystical ,aesthetic1     
should1 on the other hand be advised to 
proceed yet further1 in order to attain 
to a doctrine which represents a stage  
above it4 ,this doctrine is that of the 
pure intuition 7or1 what amounts to the 
same thing1 of pure expression72 a      
doctrine which also numbers             
representatives in all times1 and which 
may be said to be immanent alike in all 
the discourses that are held and in all 
the judgments that are passed upon art1 
as in all the best criticism and        
artistic and literary history4  ,this   
doctrine arises logically from the      
contradictions of mystical ,aesthetic2  
,i say1 logically1 because it contains  
in itself those contradictions and their
 solution2 although historically 7and   

this point does not at present concern  
us7 that critical process be not always 
comprehensible1 explicit1 and apparent4 
,mystical ,aesthetic1 which makes of art
 the supreme function of the theoretic  
spirit1 or1 at least1 a function        
superior to that of philosophy1 becomes 
involved in inextricable difficulties4  
,how could art ever be superior to      
philosophy1 if philosophy make of art   
its object1 that is to say1 if it place 
art beneath itself1 in order to analyse 
and define it8 ,and what could this new 
knowledge be1 supplied by art and by the
 aesthetic activity1 appearing when the 
human spirit has come full circle1 after
 it has imagined1 perceived1 thought1   
abstracted1 calculated1 and constructed 
the whole world of thought and history8 
,as the result of those difficulties and
 contradictions1 mystical ,aesthetic    
itself also exhibits the tendency1      
either to surpass its boundary1 or to   
sink below its proper level4 ,the       
descent takes place when it falls back  

into agnosticism1 affirming that art is 
art1 that is1 a spiritual form1         
altogether different from the others and
 ineffable2 or worse1 where it conceives
 art as a sort of repose or as a game2  
as though diversion could ever be a     
category and the spirit know repose6 ,we
 find an attempt at overpassing its     
proper limit1 when art is placed below  
philosophy1 as inferior to it2 but this 
overpassing remains a simple attempt1   
because the conception of art as        
instrument of universal truth is always 
firmly held2 save that this instrument  
is declared less perfect and less       
efficacious than the philosophical      
instrument4 ,thus they fall back again  
into intellectualism from another side4 
,these mistakes of mystical ,aesthetic  
were manifested during the ,romantic    
period in some celebrated paradoxes1    
such as those of art as irony and of the
 death of art4 ,they seemed calculated  
to drive philosophers to desperation as 
to the possibility of solving the       

problem of the nature of art1 since     
every path of solution appeared closed4 
,indeed1 whoever reads the aestheticians
 of the romantic period1 feels strongly 
inclined to believe himself at the heart
 of the enquiry and to nourish a        
confident hope of immediate discovery of
 the truth4 ,above all1 the affirmation 
of the theoretic nature of art1 and of  
the difference between its cognitive    
method and that of science and of logic1
 is felt as a definite conquest1 which  
can indeed be combined with other       
elements1 but which must not in any case
 be allowed to slip between the fingers4
 ,and further1 it is not true that all  
ways of solution are closed1 or that all
 have been attempted4 ,there is at least
 one still open that can be tried2 and  
it is precisely that for which we       
resolutely declare ourselves3 the       
,aesthetic of the pure intuition4  ,this
 ,aesthetic reasons as                  
follows3--,hitherto1 in all attempts to 
define the place of art1 it has been    

sought1 either at the summit of the     
theoretic spirit1 above philosophy1 or1 
at least1 in the circle of philosophy   
itself4 ,but is not the loftiness of the
 search the reason why no satisfactory  
result has hitherto been obtained8 ,why 
not invert the attempt1 and instead of  
forming the hypothesis that art is one  
of the summits or the highest grade of  
the theoretic spirit1 form the very     
opposite hypothesis1 namely1 that it is 
one of the lower grades1 or the lowest  
of all8 ,perhaps such epithets as lower 
and lowest are irreconcilable with the  
dignity and with the splendid beauty of 
art8 ,but in the philosophy of the      
spirit1 such words as lowest1 weak1     
simple1 elementary1 possess only the    
value of a scientific terminology4 ,all 
the forms of the spirit are necessary1  
and the higher is so only because there 
is the lower1 and the lower is as much  
to be despised or less to be valued to  
the same extent as the first step of a  
stair is despicable1 or of less value in

 respect to the topmost step4  ,let us  
compare art with the various forms of   
the theoretic spirit1 and let us begin  
with the sciences which are called      
natural or positive4 ,the ,aesthetic of 
pure intuition makes it clear that the  
said sciences are more complex than     
,history1 because they presuppose       
historical material1 that is1           
collections of things that have happened
 7to men or animals1 to the earth or to 
the stars74 ,they submit this material  
to a further treatment1 which consists  
in the abstraction and systematization  
of the historical facts4 ,history1 then1
 is less complex than the natural       
sciences4 ,history further presupposes  
the world of the imagination and the    
pure philosophical concepts or          
categories1 and produces its judgments  
or historical propositions1 by means of 
the synthesis of the imagination with   
the concept4 ,and ,philosophy may be    
said to be even less complex than       
,history1 in so far as it is            

distinguished from the former as an     
activity whose special function it is to
 make clear the categories or pure      
concepts1 neglecting1 in a certain sense
 at any rate1 the world of phenomena4   
,if we compare ,art with the three forms
 above mentioned1 it must be declared   
inferior1 that is to say1 less complex  
than the natural ,sciences1 in so far as
 it is altogether without abstractions4 
,in so far as it is without conceptual  
determinations and does not distinguish 
between the real and the unreal1 what   
has really happened and what has been   
dreamed1 it must be declared inferior to
 ,history4 ,in so far as it fails       
altogether to surpass the phenomenal    
world1 and does not attain to the       
definitions of the pure concepts1 it is 
inferior to ,philosophy itself4 ,it is  
also inferior to ,religion1 assuming    
that religion is 7as it is7 a form of   
speculative truth1 standing between     
thought and imagination4 ,art is        
governed entirely by imagination2 its   

only riches are images4 ,art does not   
classify objects1 nor pronounce them    
real or imaginary1 nor qualify them1 nor
 define them4 ,art feels and represents 
them4 ,nothing more4 ,art therefore is  
intuition1 in so far as it is a mode of 
knowledge1 not abstract1 but concrete1  
and in so far as it uses the real1      
without changing or falsifying it4 ,in  
so far as it apprehends it immediately1 
before it is modified and made clear by 
the concept1 it must be called pure     
intuition4  ,the strength of art lies in
 being thus simple1 nude1 and poor4 ,its
 strength 7as often happens in life7    
arises from its very weakness4 ,hence   
its fascination4 ,if 7to employ an image
 much used by philosophers for various  
ends7 we think of man1 in the first     
moment that he becomes aware of         
theoretical life1 with mind still clear 
of every abstraction and of every       
reflexion1 in that first purely         
intuitive instant he must be a poet4 ,he
 contemplates the world with ingenuous  

and admiring eyes2 he sinks and loses   
himself altogether in that              
contemplation4 ,by creating the first   
representations and by thus inaugurating
 the life of knowledge1 art continually 
renews within our spirit the aspects of 
things1 which thought has submitted to  
reflexion1 and the intellect to         
abstraction4 ,thus art perpetually makes
 us poets again4 ,without art1 thought  
would lack the stimulus1 the very       
material1 for its hermeneutic and       
critical labour4 ,art is the root of all
 our theoretic life4 ,to be the root1   
not the flower or the fruit1 is the     
function of art4 ,and without a root1   
there can be no flower and no fruit4    
,,ii   ,such is the theory of art as    
pure intuition1 in its fundamental      
conception4 ,this theory1 then1 takes   
its origin from the criticism of the    
loftiest of all the other doctrines of  
,aesthetic1 from the criticism of       
mystical or romantic ,aesthetic1 and    
contains in itself the criticism and the

 truth of all the other ,aesthetics4 ,it
 is not here possible to allow ourselves
 to illustrate its other aspects1 such  
as would be those of the identity1 which
 it lays down1 between intuition and    
expression1 between art and language4   
,suffice it to say1 as regards the      
former1 that he alone who divides the   
unity of the spirit into soul and body  
can have faith in a pure act of the     
soul1 and therefore in an intuition1    
which should exist as an intuition1 and 
yet be without its body1 expression4    
,expression is the actuality of         
intuition1 as action is of will2 and in 
the same way as will not exercised in   
action is not will1 so an intuition     
unexpressed is not an intuition4 ,as    
regards the second point1 ,i will       
mention in passing that1 in order to    
recognize the identity of art and       
language1 it is needful to study        
language1 not in its abstraction and in 
grammatical detail1 but in its immediate
 reality1 and in all its manifestations1

 spoken and sung1 phonic and graphic4   
,and we should not take at hazard any   
proposition1 and declare it to be       
aesthetic2 because1 if all propositions 
have an aesthetic side 7precisely       
because intuition is the elementary form
 of knowledge and is1 as it were1 the   
garment of the superior and more complex
 forms71 all are not purely aesthetic1  
but some are philosophical1 historical1 
scientific1 or mathematical2 some1 in   
fact1 of these are more than aesthetic  
or logical2 they are aestheticological4 
,aristotle1 in his time1 distinguished  
between semantic and apophantic         
propositions1 and noted1 that if all    
propositions be semantic1 not all are   
apophantic4 ,language is art1 not in so 
far as it is apophantic1 but in so far  
as it is1 generically1 semantic4 ,it is 
necessary to note in it the side by     
which it is expressive1 and nothing but 
expressive4 ,it is also well to observe 
7though this may seem superfluous7 that 
it is not necessary to reduce the theory

 of pure intuition1 as has been         
sometimes done1 to a historical fact or 
to a psychological concept4 ,because we 
recognize in poetry1 as it were1 the    
ingenuousness1 the freshness1 the       
barbarity of the spirit1 it is not      
therefore necessary to limit poetry to  
youth and to barbarian peoples4 ,though 
we recognize language as the first act  
of taking possession of the world       
achieved by man1 we must not imagine    
that language is born ex nihilo1 once   
only in the course of the ages1 and that
 later generations merely adopt the     
ancient instrument1 applying it to a new
 order of things while lamenting its    
slight adaptability to the usage of     
civilized times4 ,art1 poetry1          
intuition1 and immediate expression are 
the moment of barbarity and of          
ingenuousness1 which perpetually recur  
in the life of the spirit2 they are     
youth1 that is1 not chronological1 but  
ideal4 ,there exist very prosaic        
barbarians and very prosaic youths1 as  

there exist poetical spirits of the     
utmost refinement and civilization4 ,the
 mythology of those proud1 gigantic     
,patagonians1 of whom our ,vico was wont
 to discourse1 or of those bons ,hurons1
 who were lately a theme of             
conversation1 must be looked upon as for
 ever superseded4  ,but there arises an 
apparently very serious objection to the
 ,aesthetic of pure intuition1 giving   
occasion to doubt whether this doctrine1
 if it represent progress in respect to 
the doctrines which have preceded it1   
yet is also a complete and definite     
doctrine as regards the fundamental     
concept of art4 ,should it be submitted 
to a dialectic1 by means of which it    
must be surpassed and dissolved into a  
more lofty point of view8 ,the doctrine 
of pure intuition makes the value of art
 to consist of its power of intuition2  
in such a manner that just in so far as 
pure and concrete intuitions are        
achieved will art and beauty be         
achieved4 ,but if attention be paid to  

judgments of people of good taste and of
 critics1 and to what we all say when we
 are warmly discussing works of art and 
manifesting our praise or blame of them1
 it would seem that what we seek in art 
is something quite different1 or at     
least something more than simple force  
and intuitive and expressive purity4    
,what pleases and what is sought in art1
 what makes beat the heart and          
enraptures the admiration1 is life1     
movement1 emotion1 warmth1 the feeling  
of the artist4 ,this alone affords the  
supreme criterion for distinguishing    
true from false works of art1 those with
 insight from the failures4 ,where there
 are emotion and feeling1 much is       
forgiven2 where they are wanting1       
nothing can make up for them4 ,not only 
are the most profound thoughts and the  
most exquisite culture incapable of     
saving a work of art which is looked    
upon as cold1 but richness of imagery1  
ability and certainty in the            
reproduction of the real1 in            

description1 characterization and       
composition1 and all other knowledge1   
only serve to arouse the regret that so 
great a price has been paid and such    
labours endured1 in vain4 ,we do not ask
 of an artist instruction as to real    
facts and thoughts1 nor that he should  
astonish us with the richness of his    
imagination1 but that he should have a  
personality1 in contact with which the  
soul of the hearer or spectator may be  
heated4 ,a personality of any sort is   
asked for in this case2 its moral       
significance is excluded3 let it be sad 
or glad1 enthusiastic or distrustful1   
sentimental or sarcastic1 benignant or  
malign1 but it must be a soul4 ,art     
criticism would seem to consist         
altogether in determining if there be a 
personality in the work of art1 and of  
what sort4 ,a work that is a failure is 
an incoherent work2 that is to say1 a   
work in which no single personality     
appears1 but a number of disaggregated  
and jostling personalities1 that is1    

really1 none4 ,there is no further      
correct significance than this in the   
researches that are made as to the      
verisimilitude1 the truth1 the logic1   
the necessity1 of a work of art4  ,it is
 true that many protests have been made 
by artists1 critics1 and philosophers by
 profession1 against the characteristic 
of personality4 ,it has been maintained 
that the bad artist leaves traces of his
 personality in the work of art1 whereas
 the great artist cancels them all4 ,it 
has been further maintained that the    
artist should portray the reality of    
life1 and that he should not disturb it 
with the opinions1 judgments1 and       
personal feelings of the author1 and    
that the artist should give the tears of
 things and not his own tears4 ,hence   
impersonality1 not personality1 has been
 proclaimed to be the characteristic of 
art1 that is to say1 the very opposite4 
,however1 it will not be difficult to   
show that what is really meant by this  
opposing formula is the same as in the  

first case4 ,the theory of impersonality
 really coincides with that of          
personality in every point4 ,the        
opposition of the artists1 critics1 and 
philosophers above mentioned1 was       
directed against the invasion by the    
empirical and volitional personality of 
the artist of the spontaneous and ideal 
personality which constitutes the       
subject of the work of art4 ,for        
instance1 artists who do not succeed in 
representing the force of piety or of   
love of country1 add to their colourless
 imaginings declamation or theatrical   
effects1 thinking thus to arouse such   
feelings4 ,in like manner certain       
orators and actors introduce into a work
 of art an emotion extraneous to the    
work of art itself4 ,within these       
limits1 the opposition of the upholders 
of the theory of impersonality was most 
reasonable4 ,on the other hand1 there   
has also been exhibited an altogether   
irrational opposition to personality in 
the work of art4 ,such is the lack of   

comprehension and intolerance evinced by
 certain souls for others differently   
constituted 7of calm for agitated souls1
 for example74  ,here we find at bottom 
the claim of one sort of personality to 
deny that of another4 ,finally1 it has  
been possible to demonstrate from among 
the examples given of impersonal art1 in
 the romances and dramas called         
naturalistic1 that in so far and to the 
extent that these are complete artistic 
works1 they possess personality4 ,this  
holds good even when this personality   
lies in a wandering or perplexity of    
thought regarding the value to be given 
to life1 or in blind faith in the       
natural sciences and in modern          
sociology4  ,where every trace of       
personality was really absent1 and its  
place taken by the pedantic quest for   
human documents1 the description of     
certain social classes and the generic  
or individual process of certain        
maladies1 there the work of art was     
absent4 ,a work of science of more or   

less superficiality1 and without the    
necessary proofs and control1 filled its
 place4 ,there is no upholder of        
impersonality but experiences a feeling 
of fatigue for a work of the utmost     
exactitude in the reproduction of       
reality in its empirical sequence1 or of
 industrious and apathetic combination  
of images4 ,he asks himself why such a  
work was executed1 and recommends the   
author to adopt some other profession1  
since that of artist was not intended   
for him4  ,thus it is without doubt that
 if pure intuition 7and pure expression1
 which is the same thing7 are           
indispensable in the work of art1 the   
personality of the artist is equally    
indispensable4 ,if 7to quote the        
celebrated words in our own way7 the    
classic moment of perfect representation
 or expression be necessary for the work
 of art1 the romantic moment of feeling 
is not less necessary4 ,poetry1 or art  
in general1 cannot be exclusively       
ingenuous or sentimental2 it must be    

both ingenuous and sentimental4 ,and if 
the first or representative moment be   
termed epic1 and the second1 which is   
sentimental1 passionate1 and personal1  
be termed lyric1 then poetry and art    
must be at once epic and lyric1 or1 if  
it please you better1 dramatic4 ,we use 
these words here1 not at all in their   
empirical and intellectualist sense1 as 
employed to designate special classes of
 works of art1 exclusive of other       
classes2 but in that of elements or     
moments1 which must of necessity be     
found united in every work of art1 how  
diverse soever it may be in other       
respects4  ,now this irrefutable        
conclusion seems to constitute exactly  
that above-mentioned apparently serious 
objection to the doctrine which defines 
art as pure intuition4 ,but if the      
essence of art be merely theoretic--and 
it is intuibility--can it1 on the other 
hand1 be practical1 that is to say1     
feeling1 personality1 and passionality8 
,or1 if it be practical1 how can it be  

theoretic8 ,it will be answered that    
feeling is the content1 intuibility the 
form2 but form and content do not in    
philosophy constitute a duality1 like   
water and its recipient2 in philosophy  
content is form1 and form is content4   
,here1 on the other hand1 form and      
content appear to be different from one 
another2 the content is of one quality1 
the form of another4 ,thus art appears  
to be the sum of two qualities1 or1 as  
,herbart used to say in his time1 of two
 values4 ,accordingly we have an        
altogether unmaintainable ,aesthetic1 as
 is clear from recent largely vulgarized
 doctrines of ,aesthetic as operating   
with the concept of the infused         
personality4 ,here we find1 on the one  
hand1 things intuible lying dead and    
soulless2 on the other1 the artist's    
feeling and personality4 ,the artist is 
then supposed to put himself into       
things1 by an act of magic1 to make them
 live and palpitate1 love and adore4    
,but if we start with the distinction1  

we can never again reach unity3 the     
distinction requires an intellectual    
act1 and what the intellect has divided 
intellect or reason alone1 not art or   
imagination1 can reunite and synthetize4
 ,thus the ,aesthetic of infusion or    
transfusion--when it does not fall into 
the antiquated hedonistic doctrines of  
agreeable illusion1 of games1 and       
generally of what affords a pleasurable 
emotion2 or of moral doctrines1 where   
art is a symbol and an allegory of the  
good and the true2--is yet not able1    
despite its airs of modernity and its   
psychology1 to escape the fate of the   
doctrine which makes of art a           
semi-imaginative conception of the      
world1 like religion4 ,the process that 
it describes is mythological1 not       
aesthetic2 it is a making of gods or of 
idols4 ,to make one's gods is an unhappy
 art1 said an old ,italian poet2 but if 
it be not unhappy1 certainly it is not  
poetic and not aesthetic4 ,the artist   
does not make the gods1 because he has  

other things to do4 ,another reason is  
that1 to tell the truth1 he is so       
ingenuous and so absorbed in the image  
that attracts him1 that he cannot       
perform that act of abstraction and     
conception1 wherein the image must be   
surpassed and made the allegory of a    
universal1 though it be of the crudest  
description4  ,this recent theory1 then1
 is of no use4 ,it leads back to the    
difficulties arising from the admission 
of two characteristics of art1          
intuibility and lyricism1 not unified4  
,we must recognize1 either that the     
duality must be destroyed and proved    
illusory1 or that we must proceed to a  
more ample conception of art1 in which  
that of pure intuibility would remain   
merely secondary or particular4 ,and to 
destroy and prove it illusory must      
consist in showing that here too form is
 content1 and that pure intuition is    
itself lyricism4  ,now1 the truth is    
precisely this3 pure intuition is       
essentially lyricism4 ,all the          

difficulties concerning this question   
arise from not having thoroughly        
understood that concept1 from having    
failed to penetrate its true nature and 
to explore its multiple relations4 ,when
 we consider the one attentively1 we see
 the other bursting from its bosom1 or  
better1 the one and the other reveal    
themselves as one and the same1 and we  
escape from the desperate trilemma1 of  
either denying the lyrical and personal 
character of art1 or of asserting that  
it is adjunctive1 external and          
accidental1 or of excogitating a new    
doctrine of ,aesthetic1 which we do not 
know where to find4 ,in fact1 as has    
already been remarked1 what can pure    
intuition mean1 but intuition pure of   
every abstraction1 of every conceptual  
element1 and1 for this reason1 neither  
science1 history1 nor philosophy8 ,this 
means that the content of the pure      
intuition cannot be either an abstract  
concept1 or a speculative concept or    
idea1 or a conceptualized1 that is      

historicized1 representation4 ,nor can  
it be a so-called perception1 which is a
 representation intellectually1 and so  
historically1 discriminated4 ,but       
outside logic in its various forms and  
blendings1 no other psychic content     
remains1 save that which is called      
appetites1 tendencies1 feelings1 and    
will4 ,these things are all the same and
 constitute the practical form of the   
spirit1 in its infinite gradations and  
in its dialectic 7pleasure and pain74   
,pure intuition1 then1 since it does not
 produce concepts1 must represent the   
will in its manifestations1 that is to  
say1 it can represent nothing but states
 of the soul4 ,and states of the soul   
are passionality1 feeling1 personality1 
which are found in every art and        
determine its lyrical character4 ,where 
this is absent1 art is absent1 precisely
 because pure intuition is absent1 and  
we have at the most1 in exchange for it1
 that reflex1 philosophical1 historical1
 or scientific4 ,in the last of these1  

passion is represented1 not immediately1
 but mediately1 or1 to speak exactly1 it
 is no longer represented1 but thought4 
,thus the origin of language1 that is1  
its true nature1 has several times been 
placed in interjection4 ,thus1 too1     
,aristotle1 when he wished to give an   
example of those propositions which were
 not apophantic1 but generically        
semantic 7we should say1 not logical1   
but purely ,aesthetic71 and did not     
predicate the logically true and false1 
but nevertheless said something1 gave as
 example invocation or prayer1 hae      
enchae4 ,he added that these            
propositions do not appertain to ,logic1
 but to ,rhetoric and ,poetic4 ,a       
landscape is a state of the soul2 a     
great poem may all be contained in an   
exclamation of joy1 of sorrow1 of       
admiration1 or of lament4 ,the more     
objective is a work of art1 by so much  
the more is it poetically suggestive4   
,if this deduction of lyricism from the 
intimate essence of pure intuition do   

not appear easily acceptable1 the reason
 is to be sought in two very deep-rooted
 prejudices1 of which it is useful to   
indicate here the genesis4 ,the first   
concerns the nature of the imagination1 
and its likenesses to and differences   
from fancy4 ,imagination and fancy have 
been clearly distinguished thus by      
certain aestheticians 7and among them1  
,de ,sanctis71 as also in discussions   
relating to concrete art3 they have held
 fancy1 not imagination1 to be the      
special faculty of the poet and the     
artist4 ,not only does a new and bizarre
 combination of images1 which is        
vulgarly called invention1 not          
constitute the artist1 but ne fait rien 
l'affaire1 as ,alceste remarked with    
reference to the length of time expended
 upon writing a sonnet4 ,great artists  
have often preferred to treat groups of 
images1 which had already been many     
times used as material for works of art4
 ,the novelty of these new works has    
been solely that of art or form1 that is

 to say1 of the new accent which they   
have known how to give to the old       
material1 of the new way in which they  
have felt and therefore intuified it1   
thus creating new images upon the old   
ones4 ,these remarks are all obvious and
 universally recognized as true4 ,but if
 mere imagination as such has been      
excluded from art1 it has not therefore 
been excluded from the theoretic spirit4
 ,hence the disinclination to admit that
 a pure intuition must of necessity     
express a state of the soul1 whereas it 
may also consist1 as they believe1 of a 
pure image1 without a content of        
feeling4 ,if we form an arbitrary image 
of any sort1 stans pede in uno1 say of a
 bullock's head on a horse's body1 would
 not this be an intuition1 a pure       
intuition1 certainly quite without any  
content of reflexion8 ,would one not    
attain to a work of art in this way1 or 
at any rate to an artistic motive8      
,certainly not4 ,for the image given as 
an instance1 and every other image that 

may be produced by the imagination1 not 
only is not a pure intuition1 but it is 
not a theoretic product of any sort4 ,it
 is a product of choice1 as was observed
 in the formula used by our opponents2  
and choice is external to the world of  
thought and contemplation4 ,it may be   
said that imagination is a practical    
artifice or game1 played upon that      
patrimony of images possessed by the    
soul2 whereas the fancy1 the translation
 of practical into theoretical values1  
of states of the soul into images1 is   
the creation of that patrimony itself4  
,from this we learn that an image1 which
 is not the expression of a state of the
 soul1 is not an image1 since it is     
without any theoretical value2 and      
therefore it cannot be an obstacle to   
the identification of lyricism and      
intuition4 ,but the other prejudice is  
more difficult to eradicate1 because it 
is bound up with the metaphysical       
problem itself1 on the various solutions
 of which depend the various solutions  

of the aesthetic problem1 and vice      
versa4 ,if art be intuition1 would it   
therefore be any intuition that one     
might have of a physical object1        
appertaining to external nature8 ,if ,i 
open my eyes and look at the first      
object that they fall upon1 a chair or a
 table1 a mountain or a river1 shall ,i 
have performed by so doing an aesthetic 
act8 ,if so1 what becomes of the lyrical
 character1 of which we have asserted   
the necessity8 ,if not1 what becomes of 
the intuitive character1 of which we    
have affirmed the equal necessity and   
also its identity with the former8      
,without doubt1 the perception of a     
physical object1 as such1 does not      
constitute an artistic fact2 but        
precisely for the reason that it is not 
a pure intuition1 but a judgment of     
perception1 and implies the application 
of an abstract concept1 which in this   
case is physical or belonging to        
external nature4 ,and with this         
reflexion and perception1 we find       

ourselves at once outside the domain of 
pure intuition4 ,we could have a pure   
perception of a physical object in one  
way only2 that is to say1 if physical or
 external nature were a metaphysical    
reality1 a truly real reality1 and not1 
as it is1 a construction or abstraction 
of the intellect4 ,if such were the     
case1 man would have an immediate       
intuition1 in his first theoretical     
moment1 both of himself and of external 
nature1 of the spiritual and of the     
physical1 in an equal degree4 ,this     
represents the dualistic hypothesis4    
,but just as dualism is incapable of    
providing a coherent system of          
philosophy1 so is it incapable of       
providing a coherent ,aesthetic4 ,if we 
admit dualism1 we must certainly abandon
 the doctrine of art as pure intuition2 
but we must at the same time abandon all
 philosophy4 ,but art on its side       
tacitly protests against metaphysical   
dualism4 ,it does so1 because1 being the
 most immediate form of knowledge1 it is

 in contact with activity1 not with     
passivity2 with interiority1 not        
exteriority2 with spirit1 not with      
matter1 and never with a double order of
 reality4 ,those who affirm the         
existence of two forms of intuition--the
 one external or physical1 the other    
subjective or aesthetic2 the one cold   
and inanimate1 the other warm and       
lively2 the one imposed from without1   
the other coming from the inner         
soul--attain without doubt to the       
distinctions and oppositions of the     
vulgar 7or dualistic7 consciousness1 but
 their ,aesthetic is vulgar4  ,the      
lyrical essence of pure intuition1 and  
of art1 helps to make clear what we have
 already observed concerning the        
persistence of the intuition and of the 
fancy in the higher grades of the       
theoretical spirit1 why philosophy1     
history1 and science have always an     
artistic side1 and why their expression 
is subject to aesthetic valuation4 ,the 
man who ascends from art to thought does

 not by so doing abandon his volitional 
and practical base1 and therefore he too
 finds himself in a particular state of 
the soul1 the representation of which is
 intuitive and lyrical1 and accompanies 
of necessity the development of his     
ideas4 ,hence the various styles of     
thinkers1 solemn or jocose1 troubled or 
gladsome1 mysterious and involved1 or   
level and expansive4 ,but it would not  
be correct to divide intuition          
immediately into two classes1 the one of
 aesthetic1 the other of intellectual or
 logical intuitions1 owing to the       
persistence of the artistic element in  
logical thought1 because the relation of
 degrees is not the relation of classes1
 and copper is copper1 whether it be    
found alone1 or in combination as       
bronze4  ,further1 this close connection
 of feeling and intuition in pure       
intuition throws much light on the      
reasons which have so often caused art  
to be separated from the theoretic and  
confounded with the practical activity4 

,the most celebrated of these confusions
 are those formulated about the         
relativity of tastes and of the         
impossibility of reproducing1 tasting1  
and correctly judging the art of the    
past1 and in general the art of others4 
,a life lived1 a feeling felt1 a        
volition willed1 are certainly          
impossible to reproduce1 because nothing
 happens more than once1 and my         
situation at the present moment is not  
that of any other being1 nor is it mine 
of the moment before1 nor will be of the
 moment to follow4 ,but art remakes     
ideally1 and ideally expresses my       
momentary situation4 ,its image1        
produced by art1 becomes separated from 
time and space1 and can be again made   
and again contemplated in its           
ideal-reality from every point of time  
and space4 ,it belongs not to the world1
 but to the superworld2 not to the      
flying moment1 but to eternity4 ,thus   
life passes1 but art endures4  ,finally1
 we obtain from this relation between   

the intuition and the state of the soul 
the criterion of exact definition of the
 sincerity required of artists1 which is
 itself also an essential request4 ,it  
is essential1 precisely because it means
 that the artist must have a state of   
the soul to express1 which really       
amounts to saying1 that he must be an   
artist4 ,his must be a state of the soul
 really experienced1 not merely         
imagined1 because imagination1 as we    
know1 is not a work of truth4 ,but1 on  
the other hand1 the demand for sincerity
 does not go beyond asking for a state  
of the soul1 and that the state of soul 
expressed in the work of art be a desire
 or an action4 ,it is altogether        
indifferent to ,aesthetic whether the   
artist have had only an aspiration1 or  
have realized that aspiration in his    
empirical life4 ,all that is quite      
indifferent in the sphere of art4 ,here 
we also find the confutation of that    
false conception of sincerity1 which    
maintains that the artist1 in his       

volitional or practical life1 should be 
at one with his dream1 or with his      
incubus4 ,whether or no he have been so1
 is a matter that interests his         
biographer1 not his critic2 it belongs  
to history1 which separates and         
qualifies that which art does not       
discriminate1 but represents4     ,,iii 
,this attitude of indiscrimination and  
indifference1 observed by art in respect
 to history and philosophy1 is also     
foreshadowed at that place of the ,de   
interpretatione 7c4 #d71 to which we    
have already referred1 to obtain thence 
the confirmation of the thesis of the   
identity of art and language1 and       
another confirmation1 that of the       
identity of lyric and pure intuition4   
,it is a really admirable passage1      
containing many profound truths in a few
 short1 simple words1 although1 as is   
natural1 without full consciousness of  
their richness4 ,aristotle1 then1 is    
still discussing the said rhetorical and
 poetical propositions1 semantic and not

 apophantic1 and he remarks that in them
 there rules no distinction between true
 and false3 to alaetheueion hae         
pseudeothai ouk hyparchei4 ,art1 in     
fact1 is in contact with palpitating    
reality1 but does not know that it is so
 in contact1 and therefore is not truly 
in contact4 ,art does not allow itself  
to be troubled with the abstractions of 
the intellect1 and therefore does not   
make mistakes2 but it does not know that
 it does not make mistakes4 ,if art1    
then 7to return to what we said at the  
beginning71 be the first and most       
ingenuous form of knowledge1 it cannot  
give complete satisfaction to man's need
 to know1 and therefore cannot be the   
ultimate end of the theoretic spirit4   
,art is the dream of the life of        
knowledge4 ,its complement is waking1   
lyricism no longer1 but the concept2 no 
longer the dream1 but the judgment4     
,thought could not be without fancy2 but
 thought surpasses and contains in      
itself the fancy1 transforms the image  

into perception1 and gives to the world 
of dream the clear distinctions and the 
firm contours of reality4 ,art cannot   
achieve this2 and however great be our  
love of art1 that cannot raise it in    
rank1 any more than the love one may    
have for a beautiful child can convert  
it into an adult4 ,we must accept the   
child as a child1 the adult as an adult4
  ,therefore1 the ,aesthetic of pure    
intuition1 while it proclaims           
energetically the autonomy of art and of
 the aesthetic activity1 is at the same 
time averse to all aestheticism1 that   
is1 to every attempt at lowering the    
life of thought1 in order to elevate    
that of fancy4 ,the origin of           
aestheticism is the same as that of     
mysticism4 ,both proceed from a         
rebellion against the predominance of   
the abstract sciences and against the   
undue abuse of the principle of         
causation in metaphysic4 ,when we pass  
from the stuffed animals of the         
zoological museums1 from anatomical     

reconstructions1 from tables of figures1
 from classes and sub-classes           
constituted by means of abstract        
characters1 or from the fixation and    
mechanization of life for the ends of   
naturalistic science1 to the pages of   
the poets1 to the pictures of the       
painters1 to the melodies of the        
composers1 when in fact we look upon    
life with the eye of the artist1 we have
 the impression that we are passing from
 death to life1 from the abstract to the
 concrete1 from fiction to reality4 ,we 
are inclined to proclaim that only in   
art and in aesthetic contemplation is   
truth1 and that science is either       
charlatanesque pedantry1 or a modest    
practical expedient4 ,and certainly art 
has the superiority of its own truth2   
simple1 small1 and elementary though it 
be1 over the abstract1 which1 as such1  
is altogether without truth4 ,but in    
violently rejecting science and         
frantically embracing art1 that very    
form of the theoretic spirit is         

forgotten1 by means of which we can     
criticize science and recognize the     
nature of art4 ,now this theoretic      
spirit1 since it criticizes science1 is 
not science1 and1 as reflective         
consciousness of art1 is not art4       
,philosophy1 the supreme fact of the    
theoretic world1 is forgotten4 ,this    
error has been renewed in our day1      
because the consciousness of the limits 
of the natural sciences and of the value
 of the truth which belongs to intuition
 and to art1 have been renewed4 ,but    
just as1 a century ago1 during the      
idealistic and romantic period1 there   
were some who reminded the fanatics for 
art1 and the artists who were           
transforming philosophy1 that art was   
not the most lofty form of apprehending 
the ,absolute2 so1 in our day1 it is    
necessary to awaken the consciousness of
 ,thought4 ,and one of the means for    
attaining this end is an exact          
understanding of the limits of art1 that
 is1 the construction of a solid        

,aesthetic4   ,,the ,,end