,proofreaders ,,initiation ,,into ,,philosophy ,by ,emile ,faguet ,of the ,french ,academy ,author of ,the ,cult ,of ,incompetence1 ,initiation ,into ,literature1 etc4 ,translated from the ,french by ,sir ,homer ,gordon1 ,bart4 #aiad ,,preface ,this volume1 as indicated by the title1 is designed to show the way to the beginner1 to satisfy and more especially to excite his initial curiosity4 ,it affords an adequate idea of the march of facts and of ideas4 ,the reader is led1 somewhat rapidly1 from the remote origins to the most recent efforts of the human mind4 ,it should be a convenient repertory to which the mind may revert in order to see broadly the general opinion of an epoch--and what connected it with those that followed or preceded it4 ,it aims above all at being a frame in which can conveniently be inscribed1 in the course of further studies1 new conceptions more detailed and more thoroughly examined4 ,it will have fulfilled its design should it incite to research and meditation1 and if it prepares for them correctly4 ,e4 ,,faguet4 ,,contents ,,part ,i ,,antiquity ,,chapter ,i ,,before ,,socrates ,philosophical ,interpreters of the ,universe1 of the ,creation and ,constitution of the ,world4 ,,chapter ,,ii ,,the ,,sophists ,logicians and ,professors of ,logic1 and of the ,analysis of ,ideas1 and of ,discussion4 ,,chapter ,,iii ,,socrates ,philosophy ,entirely ,reduced to ,morality1 and ,morality ,considered as the ,end of all ,intellectual ,activity4 ,,chapter ,,iv ,,plato ,plato1 like ,socrates1 is ,pre-eminently a ,moralist1 but he ,reverts to ,general ,consideration of the ,universe1 and ,deals with ,politics and ,legislation4 ,,chapter ,v ,,aristotle ,a ,man of ,encyclopaedic ,learning2 as ,philosopher1 more especially ,moralist and ,logician4 ,,chapter ,,vi ,,various ,,schools ,the ,development in ,various ,schools of the ,general ,ideas of ,socrates1 ,plato1 and ,aristotle4 ,,chapter ,,vii ,,epicureanism ,epicureanism ,believes that the ,duty of ,man is to seek ,happiness1 and that ,happiness ,consists in ,wisdom4 ,,chapter ,,viii ,,stoicism ,the ,passions are ,diseases which can and must be ,extirpated4 ,,chapter ,,ix ,,eclectics ,,and ,,sceptics ,philosophers who ,wished to ,belong to ,no ,school4 ,philosophers who ,decried ,all ,schools and ,all ,doctrines4 ,,chapter ,x ,,neoplatonism ,reversion to ,metaphysics4 ,imaginative ,metaphysicians after the ,manner of ,plato1 but in ,excess4 ,,chapter ,,xi ,,christianity ,philosophic ,ideas which ,christianity ,welcomed1 ,adopted1 or ,created2 ,how it must ,give a ,fresh ,aspect to ,all ,philosophy1 even that ,foreign to ,itself4 ,,part ,,ii ,,in ,,the ,,middle ,,ages ,,chapter ,i ,,from ,,the ,,fifth ,,century ,,to ,,the ,,thirteenth ,philosophy is only an ,interpreter of ,dogma4 ,when it is ,declared ,contrary to ,dogma by the ,authority of ,religion1 it is a ,heresy4 ,orthodox and ,heterodox ,interpretations4 ,some ,independent ,philosophers4 ,,chapter ,,ii ,,the ,,thirteenth ,,century ,influence of ,aristotle4 ,his ,adoption by the ,church4 ,religious ,philosophy of ,st4 ,thomas ,aquinas4 ,,chapter ,,iii ,,the ,,fourteenth ,,and ,,fifteenth ,,centuries ,decadence of ,scholasticism4 ,forebodings of the ,coming ,era4 ,great ,moralists4 ,the ,kabbala4 ,sorcery4 ,,chapter ,,iv ,,the ,,sixteenth ,,century ,it ,is ,fairly ,accurate to ,consider that from the ,point of ,view of ,philosophy1 the ,middle ,ages ,lasted until ,descartes4 ,free-thinkers ,more or ,less ,disguised4 ,partisans of ,reason ,apart from ,faith1 of ,observation1 and of ,experiment4 ,,part ,,iii ,,modern ,,times ,,chapter ,i ,,the ,,seventeenth ,,century ,descartes4 ,cartesianism4 ,,chapter ,,ii ,,cartesians ,all the ,seventeenth ,century was under the ,influence of ,descartes4 ,port-,royal1 ,bossuet1 ,fenelon1 ,malebranche1 ,spinoza1 ,leibnitz4 ,,chapter ,,iii ,,the ,,english ,,philosophers ,,of ,,the ,,seventeenth ,,century4 ,locke3 ,his ,ideas on ,human ,liberty1 ,morality1 ,general ,politics1 and ,religious ,politics4 ,,chapter ,,iv ,,the ,,english ,,philosophers ,,of ,,the ,,eighteenth ,,century ,berkeley3 ,a ,highly ,idealist ,philosophy which ,regarded ,matter as ,non-existent4 ,david ,hume3 ,sceptical ,philosophy4 ,the ,scottish ,school3 ,philosophy of ,common ,sense4 ,,chapter ,v ,,the ,,french ,,philosophers ,,of ,,the ,,eighteenth ,,century ,voltaire a ,disciple of ,locke4 ,rousseau a ,free-thinking ,christian1 but deeply ,imbued with ,religious ,sentiments4 ,diderot a ,capricious ,materialist4 ,d',holbach and ,helvetius ,avowed ,materialists4 ,condillac a ,philosopher of ,sensations4 ,,chapter ,,vi ,,kant ,kant ,reconstructed all ,philosophy by ,supporting it on ,morality4 ,,chapter ,,vii ,,the ,,nineteenth ,,century3 ,,germany ,the ,great ,reconstructors of the ,world1 ,analogous to the ,first ,philosophers of ,antiquity4 ,great ,general ,systems1 ,fichte1 ,schelling1 ,hegel1 etc4 ,,chapter ,,viii ,,the ,,nineteenth ,,century3 ,,england ,the ,doctrines of ,evolution and of ,transformism3 ,lamarck 7,french71 ,darwin1 ,spencer4 ,,chapter ,,ix ,,the ,,nineteenth ,,century3 ,,france ,the ,eclectic ,school3 ,victor ,cousin4 ,the ,positivist ,school3 ,auguste ,comte4 ,the ,kantist ,school3 ,renouvier4 ,independent and ,complex ,positivists3 ,taine1 ,renan4 ,,index ,,initiation ,,into ,,philosophy ,,part ,i ,,antiquity ,,chapter ,i ,,before ,,socrates ,philosophical ,interpreters of the ,universe1 of the ,creation and ,constitution of the ,world4 ,,philosophy4--,the aim of philosophy is to seek the explanation of all things3 the quest is for the first causes of everything1 and also how all things are1 and finally why1 with what design1 with a view to what1 things are4 ,that is why1 taking principle in all the senses of the word1 it has been called the science of first principles4 ,philosophy has always existed4 ,religions--all religions--are philosophies4 ,they are indeed the most complete4 ,but1 apart from religions1 men have sought the causes and principles of everything and endeavoured to acquire general ideas4 ,these researches apart from religious dogmas in pagan antiquity are the only ones with which we are here to be concerned4 ,,the ,,ionian ,,school3 ,,thales4--,the ,ionian ,school is the most ancient school of philosophy known4 ,it dates back to the seventh century before ,christ4 ,thales of ,miletus1 a natural philosopher and astronomer1 as we should describe him1 believed matter--namely1 that of which all things and all beings are made--to be in perpetual transformation1 and that these transformations are produced by powerful beings attached to every portion of matter4 ,these powerful beings were gods4 ,everything1 therefore1 was full of gods4 ,his philosophy was a mythology4 ,he also thought that the essential element of matter was water1 and that it was water1 under the influence of the gods1 which transformed itself into earth1 air1 and fire1 whilst from water1 earth1 air1 and fire came everything that is in nature4 ,,anaximander2 ,,heraclitus4--,anaximander of ,miletus1 an astronomer also1 and a geographer1 believed that the principle of all things is indeterminate--a kind of chaos wherein nothing has form or shape2 that from chaos come things and beings1 and that they return thither in order to emerge again4 ,one of his particular theories was that fish were the most ancient of animals1 and that all animals had issued from them through successive transformations4 ,this theory was revived for a while about fifty years ago4 ,heraclitus of ,ephesus 7very obscure1 and with this epithet attached permanently to his name7 saw all things as a perpetual growth--in an indefinite state of becoming4 ,nothing is2 all things grow and are destined to eternal growth4 ,behind them1 nevertheless1 there is an eternal master who does not change4 ,it is our duty to resemble him as much as we can2 that is to say1 as much as an ape can resemble a man4 ,calmness is imperative3 to be as motionless as transient beings can4 ,the popular legend runs that ,heraclitus always wept2 what is known of him only tends to prove that he was grave1 and did not favour emotionalism4 ,,anaxagoras2 ,,empedocles4--,anaxagoras of ,clazomenae1 above all else a natural philosopher1 settled at ,athens about #dgj ,b4,c42 was the master and friend of ,pericles2 was on the point of being put to death1 as ,socrates was later on1 for the crime of indifference towards the religion of the ,athenians1 and had to take refuge at ,lampsacus1 where he died4 ,like ,anaximander1 he believed that everything emerged from something indeterminate and confused2 but he added that what caused the emergence from that state was the organizing intelligence1 the ,mind1 just as in man1 it is the intelligence which draws thought from cerebral undulations1 and forms a clear idea out of a confused idea4 ,anaxagoras exerted an almost incomparable influence over ,greek philosophy of the classical times4 ,empedocles of ,agrigentum1 a sort of magician and high-priest1 almost a deity1 whose life and death are but little known1 appears to have possessed an encyclopaedic brain4 ,from him is derived the doctrine of the four elements1 for whereas the philosophers who preceded him gave as the sole source of things--some water1 others air1 others fire1 others the earth1 he regarded them all four equally as the primal elements of everything4 ,he believed that the world is swayed by two contrary forces--love and hate1 the one desiring eternally to unite1 the other eternally to disintegrate4 ,amid this struggle goes on a movement of organization1 incessantly retarded by hate1 perpetually facilitated by love2 and from this movement have issued--first1 vegetation1 then the lower animals1 then the higher animals1 then men4 ,in ,empedocles can be found either evident traces of the religion of ,zoroaster of ,persia 7the perpetual antagonism of two great gods1 that of good and that of evil71 or else a curious coincidence with this doctrine1 which will appear again later among the ,manicheans4 ,,pythagoras4--,pythagoras appears to have been born about ,b4,c4 #ejj on the ,isle of ,elea1 to have travelled much1 and to have finally settled in ,greater ,greece 7southern ,italy74 ,pythagoras1 like ,empedocles1 was a sort of magician or god4 ,his doctrine was a religion1 the respect with which he was surrounded was a cult1 the observances he imposed on his family and on his disciples were rites4 ,what he taught was that the true realities1 which do not change1 were numbers4 ,the fundamental and supreme reality is one2 the being who is one is ,god2 from this number1 which is one1 are derived all the other numbers which are the foundation of beings1 their inward cause1 their essence2 we are all more or less perfect numbers2 each created thing is a more or less perfect number4 ,the world1 governed thus by combinations of numbers1 has always existed and will always exist4 ,it develops itself1 however1 according to a numerical series of which we do not possess the key1 but which we can guess4 ,as for human destiny it is this3 we have been animated beings1 human or animal2 according as we have lived well or ill we shall be reincarnated either as superior men or as animals more or less inferior4 ,this is the doctrine of metempsychosis1 which had many adherents in ancient days1 and also in a more or less fanciful fashion in modern times4 ,to ,pythagoras have been attributed a certain number of maxims which are called the ,golden ,verses4 ,,xenophanes2 ,,parmenides4--,xenophanes of ,colophon is also a unitarian4 ,he accepts only one ,god1 and of all the ancient philosophers appears to be the most opposed to mythology1 to belief in a multiplicity of gods resembling men1 a doctrine which he despises as being immoral4 ,there is one ,god1 eternal1 immutable1 immovable1 who has no need to transfer ,himself from one locality to another1 who is without place1 and who governs all things by ,his thought alone4 ,advancing further1 ,parmenides told himself that if ,he alone really exists who is one and eternal and unchangeable1 all else is not only inferior to ,him1 but is only a semblance1 and that mankind1 earth1 sky1 plants1 and animals are only a vast illusion--phantoms1 a mirage1 which would disappear1 which would no longer exist1 and would never have existed if we could perceive the ,self-existent4 ,,zeno2 ,,democritus4--,zeno of ,elea1 who must be mentioned more especially because he was the master of that ,gorgias of whom ,socrates was the adversary1 was pre-eminently a subtle dialectician in whom the sophist already made his appearance1 and who embarrassed the ,athenians by captious arguments1 at the bottom of which always could be found this fundamental principle3 apart from the ,eternal ,being all is only semblance2 apart from ,him who is all1 all is nothing4 ,democritus of ,abdera1 disciple of ,leucippus of ,abdera 7about whom nothing is known71 is the inventor of the theory of atoms4 ,matter is composed of an infinite number of tiny indivisible bodies which are called atoms2 these atoms from all eternity1 or at least since the commencement of matter1 have been endued with certain movements by which they attach themselves to one another1 and agglomerate or separate1 and thence is caused the formation of all things1 and the destruction1 which is only the disintegration1 of all things4 ,the soul itself is only an aggregation of specially tenuous and subtle atoms4 ,it is probable that when a certain number of these atoms quit the body1 sleep ensues2 that when nearly all depart1 it causes the appearance of death 7lethargy1 catalepsy72 that when they all depart1 death occurs4 ,we are brought into relation with the external world by the advent in us of extremely subtle atoms--reflections of things1 semblances of things--which enter and mingle with the constituent atoms of our souls4 ,there is nothing in our intelligence which has not been brought there by our senses1 and our intelligence is only the combination of the atoms composing our souls with the atoms that external matter sends1 so to speak1 into our souls4 ,the doctrines of ,democritus will be found again in those of ,epicurus and ,lucretius4 ,,chapter ,,ii ,,the ,,sophists ,logicians and ,professors of ,logic1 and of the ,analysis of ,ideas1 and of ,discussion4 ,,doctrines ,,of ,,the ,,sophists4--,the ,sophists descend from ,parmenides and ,zeno of ,elea2 ,gorgias was the disciple of the latter4 ,by dint of thinking that all is semblance save the ,supreme ,being1 who alone is real1 it is very easy to arrive at belief in all being semblance1 including that ,being2 or at least what is almost tantamount1 that all is semblance1 inclusive of any idea we can possibly conceive of the ,supreme ,being4 ,to believe nothing1 and to demonstrate that there is no reason to believe in anything1 is the cardinal principle of all the ,sophists4 ,then1 it may be suggested1 there is nothing for it but to be silent4 ,no1 there is the cultivation of one's mind 7the only thing of the existence of which we are sure71 so as to give it ability1 readiness1 and strength4 ,with what object8 ,to become a dexterous thinker1 which in itself is a fine thing2 to be also a man of consideration1 listened to in one's city1 and to arrive at its government4 ,the ,sophists accordingly gave lessons1 especially in psychology1 dialectics1 and eloquence4 ,they further taught philosophy1 but in order to demonstrate that all philosophy is false2 and1 as ,pascal observed later1 that to ridicule philosophy is truly philosophical4 ,they seem to have been extremely intellectual1 very learned1 and most serious despite their scepticism1 and to have rendered ,greece the very great service of making a penetrating analysis--the first recorded--of our faculty of knowledge and of the limitations1 real1 possible1 or probable1 of that faculty4 ,,protagoras2 ,,gorgias2 ,,prodicus4--,they were very numerous1 the taste for their art1 which might be called philosophical criticism1 being widespread in ,attica4 ,it may be believed1 as ,plato maintains1 that some were of very mediocre capacity1 and this is natural2 but there were also some who clearly were eminent authorities4 ,the most illustrious were ,protagoras1 ,gorgias1 and ,prodicus of ,ceos4 ,protagoras seems to have been the most philosophical of them all1 ,gorgias the best orator and the chief professor of rhetoric1 ,prodicus the most eminent moralist and poet4 ,protagoras rejected all metaphysics--that is1 all investigation of first causes and of the universe--and reduced all philosophy to the science of self-control with a view to happiness1 and control of others with a view to their happiness4 ,like ,anaxagoras1 he was banished from the city under the charge of impiety1 and his books were publicly burnt4 ,gorgias appears to have maintained the same ideas with more moderation and also with less profundity4 ,he claimed1 above all1 to be able to make a good orator4 ,according to ,plato1 it was he whom ,socrates most persistently made the butt of his sarcasms4 ,prodicus1 whom ,plato himself esteemed1 appears to have been principally preoccupied with the moral problem4 ,he was the author of the famous apologue which represented ,hercules having to choose between two paths1 the one being that of virtue1 the other of pleasure4 ,like ,socrates later on1 he too was subject to the terrible accusation of impiety1 and underwent capital punishment4 ,the ,sophists furnish the most important epoch in the history of ancient philosophy2 until their advent the philosophic systems were great poems on the total of all things1 known and unknown4 ,the ,sophists opposed these ambitious and precipitate generalizations1 in which imagination had the larger share1 and their discovery was to bring philosophy back to its true starting point by affirming that the first thing to do1 and that before all else1 was to know our own mind and its mechanism4 ,their error possibly was1 while saying that it was the first thing to do1 too often to affirm that it was the only thing to do2 still the fact remains that they were perfectly accurate in their assurance that it was primary4 ,,chapter ,,iii ,,socrates ,philosophy ,entirely ,reduced to ,morality1 and ,morality ,considered as the ,end of all ,intellectual ,activity4 ,,the ,,philosophy ,,of ,,socrates4--,of ,socrates nothing is known except that he was born at ,athens1 that he held many public discussions with all and sundry in the streets of ,athens1 and that he died under the ,thirty ,tyrants4 ,of his ideas we know nothing1 because he wrote nothing1 and because his disciples were far too intelligent2 in consequence of which it is impossible to know if what they said was thought by him1 had really been his ideas or theirs4 ,what seems certain is that neither ,aristophanes nor the judges at the trial of ,socrates were completely deceived in considering him a ,sophist2 for he proceeded from them4 ,it is true he proceeded from them by reaction1 because evidently their universal scepticism had terrified him2 but nevertheless he was their direct outcome1 for like them he was extremely mistrustful of the old vast systems of philosophy1 and to those men who pretended to know everything he opposed a phrase which is probably authentic3 ,i know that ,i know nothing2 for1 like the ,sophists1 he wished to recall philosophy to earth from heaven1 namely from metaphysics to the study of man1 and nothing else2 for1 like the ,sophists1 he confined and limited the field with a kind of severe and imperious modesty which was none the less contemptuous of the audacious2 for1 finally1 like the ,sophists1 but in this highly analogous to many philosophers preceding the ,sophists1 he had but a very moderate and mitigated respect for the religion of his fellow-citizens4 ,according to what we know of ,socrates from ,xenophon1 unquestionably the least imaginative of his disciples1 ,socrates1 like the ,sophists1 reduced philosophy to the study of man2 but his great and incomparable originality lay in the fact that whereas the ,sophists wished man to study himself in order to be happy1 ,socrates wished him to study himself in order to be moral1 honest1 and just1 without any regard to happiness4 ,for ,socrates1 everything had to tend towards morality1 to contribute to it1 and to be subordinated to it as the goal and as the final aim4 ,he applied himself unceasingly1 relates ,xenophon1 to examine and to determine what is good and evil1 just and unjust1 wise and foolish1 brave and cowardly1 etc4 ,he incessantly applied himself1 relates ,aristotle--and therein he was as much a true professor of rhetoric as of morality--thoroughly to define and carefully to specify the meaning of words in order not to be put off with vague terms which are illusions of thought1 and in order to discipline his mind rigorously so as to make it an organ for the ascertainment of truth4 ,,his ,,method4--,he had dialectical methods1 the art of conferring1 as ,montaigne called it1 more or less happy1 which he had probably borrowed from the ,sophists1 that contributed to cause him to be considered one of them1 and exercised a wide vogue long after him4 ,he delivered men's minds1 as he himself said--that is1 he believed1 or affected to believe1 that the verities are in a latent state in all minds1 and that it needed only patience1 dexterity1 and skillful investigation to bring them to light4 ,elsewhere1 he interrogated in a captious fashion in order to set the interlocutor in contradiction to himself and to make him confess that he had said what he had not thought he had said1 agreed to what he had not believed he had agreed to2 and he triumphed maliciously over such confusions4 ,in short1 he seems to have been a witty and teasing ,franklin1 and to have taught true wisdom by laughing at everyone4 ,folk never like to be ridiculed1 and no doubt the recollection of these ironies had much to do with the iniquitous judgment which condemned him1 and which he seems to have challenged up to the last4 ,,his ,,influence4--,his influence was infinite4 ,it is from him that morality became the end itself1 the last and supreme end of all philosophy--the reason of philosophy2 and1 as was observed by ,nietzsche1 the ,circe of philosophers1 who enchants them1 who dictates to them beforehand1 or who modifies their systems in advance by terrifying them as to what their systems may contain irreverent towards itself or dangerous in relation to it4 ,from ,socrates to ,kant and thence onward1 morality has been the ,circe of philosophers1 and morality is1 as it were1 the spiritual daughter of ,socrates4 ,on the other hand1 his influence was terrible for the religion of antiquity because it directed the mind towards the idea that morality is the sole object worthy of knowledge1 and that the ancient religions were immoral1 or of such a dubious morality as to deserve the desertion and scorn of honest men4 ,christianity fought paganism with the arguments of the disciples of ,socrates--with ,socratic arguments2 modern philosophies and creeds are all impregnated with ,socraticism4 ,when it was observed that the ,sophists form the most important epoch in the history of ancient philosophy1 it was because they taught ,socrates to seek a philosophy which was entirely human and preoccupied solely with the happiness of man4 ,this led a great mind1 and in his track other very great minds1 to direct all philosophy1 and even all human science1 towards the investigation of goodness1 goodness being regarded as the condition of happiness4 ,,chapter ,,iv ,,plato ,plato1 like ,socrates1 is ,pre-eminently a ,moralist1 but he reverts to ,general ,consideration of the ,universe and ,deals with ,politics and ,legislation4 ,,plato ,a ,,disciple ,,of ,,socrates4--,plato1 like ,xenophon1 was a pupil of ,socrates1 but ,xenophon only wanted to be the clerk of ,socrates2 and ,plato1 as an enthusiastic disciple1 was at the same time very faithful and very unfaithful to ,socrates4 ,he was a faithful disciple to ,socrates in never failing to place morality in the foremost rank of all philosophical considerations2 in that he never varied4 ,he was an unfaithful disciple to ,socrates in that1 imaginative and an admirable poet1 he bore back philosophy from earth to heaven2 he did not forbid himself--quite the contrary--to pile up great systems about all things and to envelop the universe in his vast and daring conceptions4 ,he invincibly established morality1 the science of virtue1 as the final goal of human knowledge1 in his brilliant and charming ,socratic ,dialogues2 he formed great systems in all the works in which he introduces himself as speaking in his own name4 ,he was very learned1 and acquainted with everything that had been written by all the philosophers before ,socrates1 particularly ,heraclitus1 ,pythagoras1 ,parmenides1 and ,anaxagoras4 ,he reconsidered all their teaching1 and he himself brought to consideration a force and a wealth of mind such as appear to have had no parallel in the world4 ,,the ,,ideas4--,seeking1 in his turn1 what are the first causes of all and what is eternally real behind the simulations of this transient world1 he believed in a single ,god1 as had many before him2 but in the bosom of this ,god1 so to speak1 he placed1 he seemed to see1 ,ideas--that is to say1 eternal types of all things which in this world are variable1 transient1 and perishable4 ,what he effected by such novel1 original1 and powerful imagination is clear4 ,he replaced the ,olympus of the populace by a spiritual ,olympus2 the material mythology by an idealistic mythology2 polytheism by polyideism1 if it may be so expressed--the gods by types4 ,behind every phenomenon1 stream1 forest1 mountain1 the ,greeks perceived a deity1 a material being like themselves1 more powerful than themselves4 ,behind every phenomenon1 behind every thought as well1 every feeling1 every institution--behind everything1 no matter what it be1 ,plato perceived an idea1 immortal1 eternal1 indestructible1 and incorruptible1 which existed in the bosom of the ,eternal1 and of which all that comes under our observation is only the vacillating and troubled reflection1 and which supports1 animates1 and for a time preserves everything that we can perceive4 ,hence1 all philosophy consists in having some knowledge of these ,ideas4 ,how is it possible to attain such knowledge8 ,by raising the mind from the particular to the general2 by distinguishing in each thing what is its permanent foundation1 what it contains that is least changing1 least variable1 least circumstantial4 ,for example1 a man is a very complex being2 he has countless feelings1 countless diversified ideas1 countless methods of conduct and existence4 ,what is his permanent foundation8 ,it is his conscience1 which does not vary1 undergoes no transformation1 always obstinately repeats the same thing2 the foundation of man1 the eternal idea of which every man on earth is here the reflection1 is the consciousness of good2 man is an incarnation on earth of that part of ,god which is the will for good2 according as he diverges from or approaches more nearly to this will1 is he less or more man4 ,,the ,,platonic ,,dialectic ,,and ,,morality4--,this method of raising oneself to the ideas is what ,plato termed dialectic--that is to say1 the art of discernment4 ,dialectic differentiates between the fundamental and the superficial1 the permanent and the transient1 the indestructible and the destructible4 ,this is the supreme philosophic method which contains all the others and to which all the others are reduced4 ,upon this metaphysic and by the aid of this dialectic1 ,plato constructed an extremely pure system of morality which was simply an ,imitation of ,god 7as1 later on1 came the ,imitation of ,jesus ,christ74 ,the whole duty of man was to be as like ,god as he could4 ,in ,god exist the ideas of truth1 goodness1 beauty1 greatness1 power1 etc42 man ought to aim at relatively realizing those ideas which ,god absolutely realizes4 ,god is just1 or justice lies in the bosom of ,god1 which is the same thing2 man cannot be the just one1 but he can be a just man1 and there is the whole matter2 for justice comprises everything1 or1 to express it differently1 is the characteristic common to all which is valuable4 ,justice is goodness1 justice is beautiful1 justice is true2 justice is great1 because it reduces all particular cases to one general principle2 justice is powerful1 being the force which maintains1 opposed to the force which destroys2 justice is eternal and invariable4 ,to be just in all the meanings of the word is the duty of man and his proper goal4 ,,the ,,immortality ,,of ,,the ,,soul4--,plato shows marked reserve as to the immortality of the soul and as to rewards and penalties beyond the grave4 ,he is neither in opposition nor formally favourable4 ,we feel that he wishes to believe in it rather than that he is sure about it4 ,he says that it is a fine wager to make2 which means that even should we lose1 it is better to believe in this possible gain than to disbelieve4 ,further1 it is legitimate to conclude--both from certain passages in the ,laws and from the beautiful theory of ,plato on the punishment which is an expiation1 and on the expiation which is medicinal to the soul and consequently highly desirable--that ,plato often inclined strongly towards the doctrine of posthumous penalties and rewards1 which presupposes the immortality of the soul4 ,,platonic ,,love4--,platonic love1 about which there has been so much talk and on which1 consequently1 we must say a word1 at least to define it1 is one of the applications of his moral system4 ,as in the case of all other things1 the idea of love is in ,god4 ,there it exists in absolute purity1 without any mixture of the idea of pleasure1 since pleasure is essentially ephemeral and perishable4 ,love in ,god consists simply in the impassioned contemplation of beauty 7physical and moral72 we shall resemble ,god if we love beauty precisely in this way1 without excitement or agitation of the senses4 ,,politics4--,one of the originalities in ,plato is that he busies himself with politics--that is1 that he makes politics a part of philosophy1 which had barely been thought of before him 7,i say barely1 because ,pythagoras was a legislator71 but which has ever since been taken into consideration4 ,plato is aristocratic1 no doubt because his thought is generally such1 independently of circumstances1 also1 perhaps1 because he attributed the great misfortunes of his country which he witnessed to the ,athenian democracy2 then yet again1 perhaps1 because that ,athenian democracy had been violently hostile and sometimes cruel to philosophers1 and more especially to his own master4 ,according to ,plato1 just as man has three souls1 or if it be preferred1 three centres of activity1 which govern him--intelligence in the head1 courage in the heart1 and appetite in the bowels--even so the city is composed of three classes3 wise and learned men at the top1 the warriors below1 and the artisans and slaves lower still4 ,the wise men will govern3 accordingly the nations will never be happy save when philosophers are kings1 or when kings are philosophers4 ,the warriors will fight to defend the city1 never as aggressors4 ,they will form a caste--poor1 stern to itself1 and redoubtable4 ,they will have no individual possessions2 everything will be in common1 houses1 furniture1 weapons1 wives even1 and children4 ,the people1 finally1 living in strict equality1 either by equal partition of land1 or on land cultivated in common1 will be strictly maintained in probity1 honesty1 austerity1 morality1 sobriety1 and submissiveness4 ,all arts1 except military music and war dances1 will be eliminated from the city4 ,she needs neither poets nor painters not yet musicians1 who corrupt morals by softening them1 and by making all feel the secret pang of voluptuousness4 ,all theories1 whether aristocratic or tending more or less to communism1 are derived from the politics of ,plato either by being evolved from them or by harking back to them4 ,,the ,,master ,,of ,,the ,,idealistic ,,philosophy4--,plato is for all thinkers1 even for his opponents1 the greatest name in human philosophy4 ,he is the supreme authority of the idealistic philosophy--that is1 of all philosophy which believes that ideas govern the world1 and that the world is progressing towards a perfection which is somewhere and which directs and attracts it4 ,for those even who are not of his school1 ,plato is the most prodigious of all the thinkers who have united psychological wisdom1 dialectical strength1 the power of abstraction and creative imagination1 which last in him attains to the marvellous4 ,,chapter ,v ,,aristotle ,a ,man of ,encyclopedic ,learning2 as ,philosopher1 more especially ,moralist and ,logician4 ,,aristotle1 ,,pupil ,,of ,,plato4--,aristotle of ,stagira was a pupil of ,plato1 and he remembered it1 as the best pupils do as a rule1 in order to oppose him4 ,for some years he was tutor to ,alexander1 son of ,philip1 the future ,alexander the ,great4 ,he taught long at ,athens4 ,after the death of ,alexander1 being the target in his turn of the eternal accusation of impiety1 he was forced to retire to ,chalcis1 where he died4 ,aristotle is1 before all else1 a learned man4 ,he desired to embrace the whole of the knowledge of his time1 which was then possible by dint of prodigious effort1 and he succeeded4 ,his works1 countless in number1 are the record of his knowledge4 ,they are the summa of all the sciences of his epoch4 ,here we have only to occupy ourselves with his more especially philosophical ideas4 ,to ,aristotle1 as to ,plato1 but more precisely1 man is composed of soul and body4 ,the body is composed of organs1 a well-made piece of mechanism2 the soul is its final purpose2 the body1 so to speak1 results in the soul1 but1 in turn1 the soul acts on the body1 and is in it not its end but its means of acting upon things1 and the whole forms a full and continuous harmony4 ,the faculties of the soul are its divers aspects1 and its divers methods of acting2 for the soul is one and indivisible4 ,reason is the soul considered as being able to conceive what is most general1 and in consequence it forms within us an intermediary between ourselves and ,god4 ,god is unique2 ,he is eternal2 from all eternity ,he has given motion to matter4 ,he is purely spiritual1 but all is material save ,him1 and ,he has not1 as ,plato would have it1 ideas--immaterial living personifications--residing in ,his bosom4 ,here may be perceived1 in a certain sense1 progress1 from ,plato to ,aristotle1 towards monotheism2 the ,olympus of ideas in ,plato was still a polytheism1 a spiritual polytheism certainly1 yet none the less a polytheism2 there is no longer any polytheism at all in ,aristotle4 ,,his ,,theories ,,of ,,morals ,,and ,,politics4--,the moral system of ,aristotle sometimes approaches that of ,plato1 as when he deems that the supreme happiness is the supreme good1 and that the supreme good is the contemplation of thought by thought--thought being self-sufficing2 which is approximately the imitation of ,god which ,plato recommended4 ,sometimes1 on the contrary1 it is very practical and almost mediocre1 as when he makes it consist of a mean between the extremes1 a just measure1 a certain tact1 art rather than science1 and practical science rather than conscience1 which will know how to distinguish which are the practices suitable for an honest and a well-born man4 ,it is only just to add that in detail and when after all deductions he describes the just man1 he invites us to contemplate virtues which if not sublime are none the less remarkably lofty4 ,his very confused political philosophy 7the volume containing it1 according to all appearance1 having been composed1 after his death1 of passages and fragments and different portions of his lectures7 is specially a review of the divergent political constitutions which existed throughout the ,greek world4 ,the tendencies1 for there are no conclusions1 are still very aristocratic1 but less radically aristocratic than those of ,plato4 ,,the ,,authority ,,of ,,aristotle4--,aristotle1 by reason of his universality1 also because he is clearer than his master1 and again because he dogmatises--not always1 but very frequently--instead of discussing and collating1 had throughout both antiquity and the ,middle ,ages an authority greater than that of ,plato1 an authority which became 7except on matters of faith7 despotic and well-nigh sacrosanct4 ,since the sixteenth century he has been relegated to his due rank--one which is still very distinguished1 and he has been regarded as among the geniuses of the widest range1 if not of the greatest power1 that have appeared among men2 even now he is very far from having lost his importance4 ,for some he is a transition between the ,greek genius--extremely subtle1 but always poetic and always somewhat oriental--and the ,roman genius3 more positive1 more bald1 more practical1 more attached to reality and to pure science4 ,,chapter ,,vi ,,various ,,schools ,the ,development in ,various ,schools of the ,general ,ideas of ,socrates1 ,plato1 and ,aristotle4 ,,the ,,school ,,of ,,plato2 ,,theophrastus4--,the school of ,plato 7not regarding ,aristotle as belonging entirely to that school7 was continued by ,speusippus1 ,polemo1 ,xenocrates1 ,crates1 and ,crantor4 ,owing to a retrograde movement1 widely different from that of ,aristotle1 it dabbled in the ,pythagorean ideas1 with which ,plato was acquainted and which he often appreciated1 but not blindly1 and to which he never confined himself4 ,the most brilliant pupil of ,aristotle was ,theophrastus1 naturalist1 botanist1 and moralist4 ,his great claim to fame among posterity1 which knows nothing of him but this1 is the small volume of ,characters1 which served as a model for ,la ,bruyere1 and before him to the comic poets of antiquity1 and which is full of wit and flavour1 and--to make use of a modern word exactly applicable to this ancient work--humour4 ,,schools ,,of ,,megara ,,and ,,of ,,elis4--,we may just mention the very celebrated schools which1 owing to lack of texts1 are unknown to us--that of ,megara1 which was called the ,eristic or wrangling school1 so marked was its predilection for polemics2 and that of ,elis1 which appears to have been well versed in the sophistic methods of ,zeno of ,elea and of ,gorgias4 ,,the ,,cynic ,,school2 ,,antisthenes2 ,,diogenes4--,much more important is the ,cynic school1 because a school1 which was nothing less than ,stoicism itself1 emanated or appeared to emanate from it4 ,as often happens1 the vague commencements of ,stoicism bore a close resemblance to its end4 ,the ,stoics of the last centuries of antiquity were a sort of mendicant friars1 ill-clothed1 ill-fed1 of neglected appearance1 despising all the comforts of life2 the ,cynics at the time of ,alexander were much the same1 professing that happiness is the possession of all good things1 and that the only way to possess all things is to know how to do without them4 ,it was ,antisthenes who founded this school1 or rather this order4 ,he had been the pupil of ,socrates1 and there can be no doubt that his sole idea was to imitate ,socrates by exaggeration4 ,socrates had been poor1 had scorned wealth1 had derided pleasure1 and poured contempt on science4 ,the cult of poverty1 the contempt for pleasures1 for honours1 for riches1 and the perfect conviction that any knowledge is perfectly useless to man--that is all the teaching of ,antisthenes4 ,that can lead far1 at least in systematic minds4 ,if all is contemptible except individual virtue1 it is reversion to savage and solitary existence which is preached3 there is no more civilization or society or patriotism4 ,antisthenes in these ideas was surpassed by his disciples and successors2 they were cosmopolitans and anarchists4 ,the most illustrious of this school--illustrious especially through his eccentricity--was ,diogenes1 who rolled on the ramparts of ,corinth the tub which served him as a house1 lighted his lantern in broad daylight on the pretext of searching for a man1 called himself a citizen of the world1 was accused of being banished from ,sinope by his fellow-countrymen and replied1 ,it was ,i who condemned them to remain1 and said to ,alexander1 who asked him what he could do for him3 ,get out of my sunshine2 you are putting me in the shade4 ,,crates2 ,,menippus2 ,,aristippus4--,crates of ,thebes is also mentioned1 less insolent and better-mannered1 yet also a despiser of the goods of this world2 and ,menippus1 the maker of satires1 whom ,lucian1 much later1 made the most diverting interlocutor of his amusing dialogues4 ,in an opposite direction1 at the same epoch1 ,aristippus1 a pupil of ,socrates1 like ,antisthenes1 founded the school of pleasure1 and maintained that the sole search worthy of man was that of happiness1 and that it was his duty to make himself happy2 that in consequence1 it having been sufficiently proved and being even self-evident1 that happiness cannot come to us from without1 but must be sought within ourselves1 it is necessary to study to know ourselves thoroughly 7and this was from ,socrates7 in order to decide what are the states of the mind which give us a durable1 substantial1 and1 if possible1 a permanent happiness4 ,now the seeker and the finder of substantial happiness is wisdom1 or rather1 there is no other wisdom than the art of distinguishing between pleasure and choosing1 with a very refined discrimination1 those which are genuine4 ,wisdom further consists in dominating misfortunes by the mastery of self so as not to be affected by them1 and in dominating also pleasures even whilst enjoying them1 so that they may not obtain dominion over us2 possessing without being possessed was one of his mottoes which ,horace thus translated3 ,i strive to subject things to myself1 not myself to things4 ,this eminently practical wisdom1 which is only a highly-developed egoism1 is that of ,horace and ,montaigne1 and was expressed by ,voltaire in verses that were sometimes felicitous4 ,,the ,,school ,,of ,,cyrene4--,aristippus had for successor in the direction of his school1 first his daughter ,arete1 then his grandson4 ,the ,aristippists1 or ,cyrenaics 7the school being established in ,cyrene71 frankly despised the gods1 regarding them as inventions to frighten women and little children4 ,one of them1 ,euhemerus1 invented the theory1 which in part is false and in part accurate1 that the gods are simply heroes1 kings1 great men deified after their death by the gratitude or terror of the populace4 ,as often happens1 philosophic theories being essentially plastic and taking the form of the temperament which receives them1 a certain ,cyrenaic 7,hegesias7 enunciated the doctrine that the supreme happiness of man was suicide4 ,in fact1 if the object of man is happiness1 since life affords far fewer joys than sorrows1 the philosophy of happiness is to get rid of life1 and the sole wisdom lies in suicide4 ,it does not appear that ,hegesias gave the only proof of sincere belief in this doctrine which can be given by anyone professing it4 ,,chapter ,,vii ,,epicureanism ,epicureanism ,believes that the ,duty of ,man is to ,seek ,happiness1 and that ,happiness ,consists in ,wisdom4 ,,moral ,,philosophy4--,continuing to feel the strong impulse which it had received from ,socrates1 philosophy was now for a long while to be almost exclusively moral philosophy4 ,only it divided very sharply in two directions4 ,antisthenes and ,aristippus were both pupils of ,socrates4 ,from ,antisthenes came the ,cynics2 from ,aristippus the philosophers of pleasure4 ,the ,cynics gave birth to the ,stoics1 the philosophers of pleasure to the ,epicureans1 and these two great schools practically divided all antiquity between them4 ,we will take the ,epicureans first because1 chronologically1 they slightly preceded the ,stoics4 ,,epicurus4--,epicurus1 born at ,athens a little after the death of ,plato1 brought up at ,samos by his parents who had been forced to expatriate themselves owing to reverses of fortune1 returned to ,athens about #cje ,b4,c41 and there founded a school4 ,personally he was a true wise man1 sober1 scrupulous1 a despiser of pleasure1 severe to himself1 in practice a ,stoic4 ,as his general view of the universe1 he taught approximately the doctrine of ,democritus3 the world is composed of a multitude of atoms1 endowed with certain movements1 which attach themselves to one another and combine together1 and there is nothing else in the world4 ,is there not a first cause1 a being who set all these atoms in motion--in short1 a ,god8 ,epicurus did not think so4 ,are there gods1 as the vulgar believe8 ,epicurus believed so2 but he considered that the gods are brilliant1 superior1 happy creatures1 who do not trouble about this world1 do not interfere with it1 and are even less occupied1 were it possible1 with mankind4 ,also they did not create the world1 for why should they have created it8 ,from goodness1 said ,plato2 but there is so much evil in the world that if they created it from goodness1 they were mistaken and must be fools2 and if they willingly permitted evil1 they are wicked2 and therefore it is charitable towards them to believe that they did not create it4 ,,epicurean ,,morality4--,from the ethical point of view1 ,epicurus certainly attaches himself to ,aristippus2 but with the difference that lies between pleasure and happiness4 ,aristippus taught that the aim of life was intelligent pleasure1 ,epicurus declared that the aim of life was happiness4 ,now1 does happiness consist in pleasures1 or does it exclude them8 ,epicurus was quite convinced that it excluded them4 ,like ,lord ,beaconsfield1 he would say1 ,life would be almost bearable1 were it not for its pleasures4 ,happiness for ,epicurus lay in phlegm1 as ,philinte would put it2 it lay in the calm of the mind that has rendered itself inaccessible to every emotion of passion1 which is never irritated1 never moved1 never annoyed1 never desires1 and never fears4 ,why1 for instance1 should we dread death8 ,so long as we fear it1 it is not here2 when it arrives1 we shall no longer fear it2 then1 why is it an evil8--,but1 during life itself1 how about sufferings8--,we greatly increase our sufferings by complaints and by self-commiseration4 ,if we acted in the reverse way1 if when we were tortured by them we recalled past pleasures and thought of pleasures to come1 they would be infinitely mitigated4--,but1 of what pleasures can a man speak who makes happiness consist in the exclusion of pleasures8 ,the pleasures of the wise man are the satisfaction he feels in assuring himself of his own happiness4 ,he finds pleasure when he controls a passion in order to revert to calmness2 he feels pleasure when he converses with his friends about the nature of true happiness2 he feels pleasure when he has diverted a youth from passionate follies or from despair1 and brought him back to peace of mind1 etc4--,but what about sufferings after death8 ,they do not exist4 ,there is no hell because there is no immortality of the soul4 ,the soul is as material as the body1 and dies with it4 ,you will say1 perhaps1 that this very severe and austere morality more nearly approaches to ,stoicism than to the teaching of ,aristippus4 ,this is so true that when ,horace confessed with a smile that he returned to the morality of pleasure1 he did not say1 as we should1 ,i feel that ,i am becoming an ,epicurean1 he said1 ,i fall back on the precepts of ,aristippus2 and ,seneca1 a professed ,stoic1 cites ,epicurus almost as often as ,zeno in his lessons4 ,it may not be quite accurate to state1 but there would not be much exaggeration in affirming1 that ,epicureanism is a smiling ,stoicism and ,stoicism a gloomy ,epicureanism4 ,in the current use of the word we have changed the meaning of ,epicurean to make it mean addicted to pleasure4 ,the warning must be given that there is no more grievous error4 ,,the ,,vogue ,,of ,,epicureanism4--,epicureanism had an immense vogue in antiquity4 ,the principal professors of it at ,athens were ,metrodorus1 ,hermarchus1 ,polystratus1 and ,apollodorus4 ,penetrating to ,italy ,epicureanism found its most brilliant representative in ,lucretius1 who of the system made a poem--the admirable ,de ,natura ,rerum2 there were also ,atticus1 ,horace1 ,pliny the younger1 and many more4 ,it even became a political opinion3 the ,caesarians were ,epicureans1 the ,republicans ,stoics4 ,on the appearance of ,christianity ,epicureanism came into direct opposition with it1 and so did ,stoicism also2 but in a far less degree4 ,in modern times1 as will be seen1 ,epicureanism has enjoyed a revival4 ,,chapter ,,viii ,,stoicism ,the ,passions are ,diseases which can and must be ,extirpated4 ,,the ,,logic ,,of ,,stoicism4--,stoicism existed as a germ in the ,cynic philosophy 7and also in ,socrates7 as did ,epicureanism in ,aristippus4 ,zeno was the pupil of ,crates4 ,in extreme youth he opened a school at ,athens in the ,poecile4 ,the ,poecile was a portico2 portico in ,greek is stoa1 hence the name of ,stoic4 ,zeno taught for about thirty years2 then1 on the approach of age1 he died by his own hand4 ,zeno thought1 as did ,epicurus and ,socrates1 that philosophy should only be the science of life and that the science of life lay in wisdom4 ,wisdom consists in thinking justly and acting rightly2 but to think justly only in order to act rightly--which is quite in the spirit of ,socrates1 and eliminates all the science of research1 all consideration of the constitution of the world as well as the total and even the details of matter4 ,therein is ,stoicism more narrow than ,epicureanism4 ,in consequence1 man needs clear1 precise1 and severe logic 7the ,stoics were the first to use this word74 ,armed with this weapon1 and only employing it for self-knowledge and self-control1 man makes himself wise4 ,the wise man of the ,stoic is a kind of saint--a superman1 as it has since been called--very analogous to his ,god4 ,all his efforts are concentrated on safeguarding1 conquering1 and suppressing his passions1 which are nothing save diseases of the soul4 ,in the external world he disregards all the things of chance--everything1 that is1 that does not depend on human will--and considers them as non-existent3 the ailments of the body1 pangs1 sufferings1 misfortunes1 and humiliations are not evils1 they are things indifferent4 ,on the contrary1 crimes and errors are such evils that they are equally execrable1 and the wise man should reproach himself as severely for the slightest fault as for the greatest crime--a paradoxical doctrine which has aroused the warmth of even respectful opponents of ,stoicism1 notably ,cicero4 ,,maxims ,,of ,,the ,,stoics4--,their most frequently repeated maxim is abstain and endure2 abstain from all evil1 suffer all aggression and so-called misfortune without rebelling or complaining4 ,another precept widely propagated among them and by them1 ,live according to nature1 remarkably resembles an ,epicurean maxim4 ,this must be made clear4 ,this precept as they interpreted it meant3 adhere freely and respectfully to the laws of the universe4 ,the world is a ,god who lives according to the laws ,he ,himself made1 and of which we are not judges4 ,these laws surround us and compel us2 sometimes they wound us4 ,we must respect and obey them1 have a sort of pious desire that they should operate even against ourselves1 and live in reverent conformity with them4 ,thus understood1 the life in conformity with nature is nothing else than an aspect of the maxim1 ,endure4 ,,principal ,,stoics4--,the principal adepts and masters of ,stoicism with and after ,zeno were ,cleanthes1 ,chrysippus1 ,aristo1 and ,herillus in ,greece2 at ,rome1 ,cato1 ,brutus1 ,cicero to a certain degree1 ,thrasea1 ,epictetus 7withal a ,greek1 who wrote in ,greek71 ,seneca1 and finally the ,emperor ,marcus ,aurelius4 ,stoicism rapidly developed into a religion1 having its rites1 obediences1 ascetic practices1 directors of conscience1 examination of conscience1 and its adepts with a traditional dress1 long cloak1 and long beard4 ,it exerted considerable influence1 comparable 7comparable only7 to ,christianity1 but it penetrated only the upper and middle classes of society in antiquity without descending1 or barely descending1 to the masses4 ,like ,epicureanism1 ,stoicism had a renaissance in modern times in opposition to ,christianity2 this will be dealt with later4 ,,chapter ,,ix ,,eclectics ,,and ,,sceptics ,philosophers who ,wished to ,belong to ,no ,school ,philosophers who ,decried ,all ,schools and ,all ,doctrines4 ,,the ,,two ,,tendencies4--,as might be expected to happen1 and as always happens1 the multiplicity of sects brought about two tendencies1 one consisting in selecting somewhat arbitrarily from each sect what one found best in it1 which is called eclecticism1 the other in thinking that no school grasped the truth1 that the truth is not to be grasped1 which is called scepticism4 ,,the ,,eclectics3 ,,plutarch4--,the ,eclectics1 who did not form a school1 which would have been difficult in the spirit in which they acted1 had only this in common1 that they venerated the great thinkers of ancient ,greece1 and that they felt or endeavoured to feel respect and toleration for all religions4 ,they venerated ,socrates1 ,plato1 ,aristotle1 ,epicurus1 ,zeno1 ,moses1 ,jesus1 ,st4 ,paul1 and loved to imagine that they were each a partial revelation of the great divine thought1 and they endeavoured to reconcile these divergent revelations by proceeding on broad lines and general considerations4 ,among them were ,moderatus1 ,nicomachus1 ,nemesius1 etc4 ,the most illustrious1 without being the most profound--though his literary talent has always kept him prominent--was ,plutarch4 ,his chief effort1 since then often renewed1 was to reconcile reason and faith 7,i am writing of the polytheistic faith74 ,perceiving in mythology ingenious allegories1 he showed that under the name of allegories covering and containing profound ideas1 all polytheism could be accepted by the reason of a ,platonist1 an ,aristotelian1 or a ,stoic4 ,the ,eclectics had not much influence1 and only pleased two sorts of minds3 those who preferred knowledge rather than conviction1 and found in ,eclecticism an agreeable variety of points of view2 and those who liked to believe a little in everything1 and possessing receptive but not steadfast minds were not far from sceptics and who might be called affirmative sceptics in opposition to the negative sceptics3 sceptics who say1 ,heavens1 yes1 as opposed to sceptics who always say1 ,presumably1 no4 ,,the ,,sceptics3 ,,pyrrho4--,the ,sceptics proper were chronologically more ancient4 ,the first famous ,sceptic was a contemporary of ,aristotle2 he followed ,alexander on his great expedition into ,asia4 ,this was ,pyrrho4 ,he taught1 as it appears1 somewhat obscurely at ,athens1 and for successor had ,timon4 ,these philosophers1 like so many others1 sought happiness and affirmed that it lay in abstention from decision1 in the mind remaining in abeyance1 in aphasia4 ,pyrrho being accustomed to say that he was indifferent whether he was alive or dead1 on being asked1 ,then why do you live8 answered3 ,just because it is indifferent whether one lives or is dead4 ,as may be imagined1 their favourite sport was to draw the various schools into mutual opposition1 to rout some by the rest1 to show that all were strong in what they negatived1 but weak in what they affirmed1 and so to dismiss them in different directions4 ,,the ,,new ,,academy4--,scepticism1 albeit attenuated1 softened1 and less aggressive1 reappeared in a school calling itself the ,new ,academy4 ,it claimed to adhere to ,socrates--not without some show of reason1 since ,socrates had declared that the only thing he knew was that he knew nothing--and the essential tenet of this school was to affirm nothing4 ,only the ,academicians believed that certain things were probable1 more probable than others1 and they are the founders of probabilism1 which is nothing more than conviction accompanied with modesty4 ,they were more or less moderate1 according to personal temperament4 ,arcesilaus was emphatically moderate1 and limited himself to the development of the critical faculties of his pupil4 ,carneades was more negative1 and arrived at or reverted to scepticism and sophistry pure and simple4 ,cicero1 with a certain foundation of ,stoicism1 was a pupil1 and one of the most moderate1 of the ,new ,academy4 ,,aenesidemus2 ,,agrippa2 ,,empiricus4--,others built on experience itself1 on the incertitude of our sensations and observations1 on everything that can cheat us and cause us illusion in order to display how relative and how miserably partial is human knowledge4 ,such was ,aenesidemus1 whom it might be thought ,pascal had read1 so much does the latter give the reasons of the former when he is not absorbed in faith1 and when he assumes the position of a sceptic precisely in order to prove the necessity of taking refuge in faith4 ,such was ,agrippa2 such1 too1 was ,sextus ,empiricus1 so often critical of science1 who demonstrates 7as to a slight extent ,m4 ,henri ,poincare does in our own day7 that all sciences1 even those which1 like mathematics and geometry1 are proudest of their certainty1 rest upon conventions and intellectual conveniences4 ,,chapter ,x ,,neoplatonism ,reversion to ,metaphysics4 ,imaginative ,metaphysicians after the ,manner of ,plato1 but in ,excess4 ,,alexandrinism4--,amid all this1 metaphysics--namely1 the effort to comprehend the universe--appears somewhat at a discount4 ,it enjoyed a renaissance in the third century of our era among some teachers from ,alexandria 7hence the name of the ,alexandrine school7 who came to lecture at ,rome with great success4 ,alexandrinism is a ,neoplatonism--that is1 a renewed ,platonism and1 as considered by its authors1 an augmented one4 ,,plotinus4--,plotinus taught this3 ,god and matter exist4 ,god is one1 matter is multiple and divisible4 ,god in ,himself is incomprehensible1 and is only to be apprehended in his manifestations4 ,man rises not to comprehension of ,him but to the perception of ,him by a series of degrees which are1 as it were1 the progressive purification of faith1 and which lead us to a kind of union with ,him resembling that of one being with another whom he could never see1 but of whose presence he could have no doubt4 ,matter1 that is1 the universe1 is an emanation from ,god1 as perfume comes from a flower4 ,all is not ,god1 and only ,god can be ,god1 but all is divine and all participates in ,god1 just as each of our thoughts participates of our soul4 ,now1 if all emanates from ,god1 all also tends to return to ,him1 as bodies born of earth1 nourished by earth1 invigorated by the forces proceeding from the earth1 tend to return to the earth4 ,this is what makes the harmony of the world4 ,the law of laws is1 that every fragment of the universe derived from ,god returns to ,him and desires to return to ,him4 ,the universe is an emanation from the perfect1 and an effort towards perfection4 ,the universe is a ,god in exile who has nostalgia for himself4 ,the universe is a progressive descent from ,god with a tendency towards reintegration with ,him4 ,how does this emanation from ,god becoming matter take place8 ,that is a mystery2 but it may be supposed to take place by successive stages4 ,from ,god emanates spirit1 impersonal spirit which is not spirit of this or that1 but universal spirit spread through the whole world and animating it4 ,from spirit emanates the soul1 which can unite itself to a body and form an individual4 ,the soul is less divine than spirit1 which in turn is less divine than ,god1 but yet retains divinity4 ,from the soul emanates the body to which it unites itself4 ,the body is less divine than the soul1 which was less divine than spirit1 which was less divine than ,god2 but it still possesses divinity for it has a form1 a figure1 a design marked and impressed with divine spirit4 ,finally1 matter without form is the most distant of the emanations from ,god1 and the lowest of the descending stages of ,god4 ,god is in ,himself2 ,he thinks in pure thought in spirit2 ,he thinks in mixed and confused thought in the soul2 ,he feels in the body2 ,he sleeps in unformed matter4 ,the object of unformed matter is to acquire form1 that is a body2 and the object of a body is to have a soul2 and the aim of a soul is to be united in spirit1 and the aim of spirit is to be absorbed into ,god4 ,souls not united to bodies contemplate spirit and enjoy absolute happiness4 ,other souls not united to bodies1 but solicited by a certain instinct to unite themselves to bodies1 are of ambiguous but still very exalted nature4 ,souls united to bodies 7our own7 have descended far1 but can raise themselves and be purified by contemplation of the eternal intelligence1 and by relative union with it4 ,this contemplation has several degrees1 so to speak1 of intensity1 degrees which ,plotinus termed hypostases4 ,by perception we obtain a glimpse of ideas1 by dialectics we penetrate them2 by a final hypostasis1 which is ecstasy1 we can sometimes unite ourselves directly to ,god and live in ,him4 ,,the ,,pupils ,,of ,,plotinus4--,plotinus had as pupils and successors1 amongst others1 ,porphyry and ,iamblichus4 ,porphyry achieves little except the exposition of the doctrine of his master1 and shows originality only as a logician4 ,iamblichus and his school made a most interesting effort to revive exhausted and expiring paganism and to constitute a philosophic paganism4 ,the philosophers of the school of ,iamblichus are1 by the way1 magicians1 charlatans1 miracle-mongers1 men as antipositivist as possible4 ,iamblichus himself sought to reconcile polytheism with ,neoplatonism by putting in the centre of all a supreme deity1 an essential deity from whom he made a crowd of secondary1 tertiary1 and quaternary deities to emanate1 ranging from those purely immaterial to those inherent in matter4 ,the subtle wanderings of ,neoplatonism were continued obscurely in the school of ,athens until it was closed for ever in #ebi by the ,emperor ,justinian as being hostile to the religion of the ,empire1 which at that epoch was ,christianity4 ,,chapter ,,xi ,,christianity ,philosophic ,ideas which ,christianity ,welcomed1 ,adopted1 or ,created ,how it must ,give a ,fresh ,aspect to ,all ,philosophy1 even that ,foreign to ,itself4 ,,christian ,,philosophy ,,and ,,morality4--,christianity spread through the ,empire by the propaganda of the ,apostles1 and more especially ,st4 ,paul1 from about the year #dj4 ,its success was extremely rapid1 especially among the populace1 and little by little it won over the upper classes4 ,as a general philosophy1 primitive ,christianity did not absolutely bring more than the ,hebrew dogmas3 the unity of ,god1 a providential ,deity1 that is1 one directly interfering in human affairs2 immortality of the soul with rewards and penalties beyond the grave 7a recent theory among the ,jews1 yet one anterior to ,christianity74 ,as a moral system1 ,christianity brought something so novel and so beautiful that it is not very probable that humanity will ever surpass it1 which may be imperfectly and incompletely summed up thus3 love of ,god2 ,he must not only be feared as ,he was by the pagans and the ancient ,jews2 ,he must be loved passionately as a son loves his father1 and all things must be done for this love and in consideration of this love2 all men are brethren as sons of ,god1 and they should love one another as brothers2 love your neighbour as yourself1 love him who does not love you2 love your enemies2 be not greedy for the goods of this world1 nor ambitious1 nor proud2 for ,god loves the lowly1 the humble1 the suffering1 and the miserable1 and ,he will exalt the lowly and put down the mighty from their seats4 ,nothing like this had been said in all antiquity1 and it needs extraordinary ingenuity 7of a highly interesting character1 by the way71 to find in ancient wisdom even a few traces of this doctrine4 ,finally1 into politics1 so to speak1 ,christianity brought this novelty3 there are two empires1 the empire of ,god and the empire of man2 you do not owe everything to the earthly empire2 you are bound to give it faithfully only what is needed for it to be strong and to preserve society2 apart from that1 and that done1 you are the subject of ,god and have only to answer to ,god for your thoughts1 your belief1 your conscience2 and over that portion of yourself the ,state has neither right nor authority unless it be usurped and tyrannical4 ,and therein lay the charter of individual liberty like the charter of the rights of man4 ,as appeal to the feelings1 ,christianity brought the story of a young ,god1 infinitely good and gentle1 who had never cursed1 who had been infinitely loved1 who had been persecuted and betrayed1 who had forgiven his executioners1 and who died in great sufferings and who was to be imitated 7whence came the thirst for martyrdom74 ,this story in itself is not more affecting than that of ,socrates1 but it is that of a young martyr and not of an old one1 and therein lies a marked difference for the imagination and emotions of the multitude4 ,,the ,,success ,,of ,,christianity4--,the prodigious rapidity of the success of ,christianity is easily explicable4 ,polytheism had no longer a great hold on the masses1 and no philosophic doctrine had found or had even sought the path to the crowd2 ,christianity1 essentially democratic1 loved the weak and humble1 had a tendency to prefer them to the great ones of this world1 and to regard them as being more the children of ,god1 and was therefore received by the masses as the only doctrine which could replace the worm-eaten polytheism4 ,and in ,christianity they saw the religion for which they were waiting1 and in the heads of ,christianity their own protectors and defenders4 ,,its ,,evolution4--,the evolution of ,christianity was very rapid1 and from a great moral doctrine with a minimum of rudimentary metaphysics it became1 perchance mistakenly1 a philosophy giving account1 or desirous of giving account of everything2 it so to speak incorporated a metaphysic1 borrowed in great part from ,greek philosophy1 in great part from the ,hebrew traditions4 ,it possessed ideas on the origin of matter1 and whilst maintaining that ,god was eternal1 denied that matter was1 and asserted that ,god created it out of nothing4 ,it had theories on the essence of ,god1 and saw ,him in three ,persons1 or hypostases1 one aspect of ,god as power1 another as love1 and the other as intelligence4 ,it presented theories on the incarnation and humanisation of ,god1 ,god being made man in ,jesus ,christ without ceasing to be ,god4 ,it conceived new relationships of man to ,god1 man having in himself powers of purgation and perfection1 but always needing divine help for self-perfection 7theory of grace74 ,and this he must believe2 if not he would feel insolent pride in his freedom4 ,it had ideas about the existence of evil1 declaring in justification of ,god for having permitted evil on earth1 that the world was a place of trial1 and that evil was only a way of putting man to the test and discovering what were his merits4 ,it had its notions on the rewards and penalties beyond the grave1 hell for the wicked and heaven for the good1 as had been known to antiquity1 but added purgatory1 a place for both punishment and purification by punishment1 an entirely ,platonic theory1 which ,plato may have inspired but did not himself entertain4 ,finally1 it was a complete philosophy answering1 and that in a manner often admirable1 all the questions that mankind put or could ever put4 ,and1 as so often happens1 that has proved a weakness and a strength to it3 a weakness because embarrassed with subtle1 complicated1 insoluble questions wherein mankind will always be involved1 it was forced to engage in endless discussions wherein the bad or feeble reasons advanced by this or that votary compromised the whole work2 a strength because whoever brings a rule of life is practically compelled to support it by general ideas bearing on the relations of things and to give it a place in a general survey of the world2 otherwise he appears impotent1 weak1 disqualified to give that very rule of life1 incapable of replying to the interrogations raised by that rule of life2 and finally1 lacking in authority4 ,,schisms ,,and ,,heresies4--,right or wrong1 and it is difficult and highly hazardous to decide the question1 ,christianity was a complete philosophy1 which was why it had its schisms and heresies1 a certain number of sincere ,christians not resolving the metaphysical questions in the way of the majority4 ,heresies were innumerable2 only the two shall be cited which are deeply interesting in the history of philosophy4 ,manes1 an ,arab 7and ,arabia was then a ,persian province71 revived the old ,zoroastrian doctrine of two principles of good and evil1 and saw in the world two contending gods1 the ,god of perfection and the god of sin1 and laid upon man the duty of assisting the ,god of goodness so that ,his kingdom should come and cause the destruction of evil in the world4 ,from him proceeded the ,manicheans1 who exerted great influence and were condemned by many ,councils until their sect died out1 only to reappear or seem to reappear fairly often in the ,middle ,ages and in modern times4 ,arius denied the ,trinity1 believing only in one ,god1 not only unique1 but in one ,person1 and in consequence denied the divinity of ,jesus ,christ4 ,he was perpetually involved in controversies and polemics1 supported by some ,bishops1 opposed by the majority4 ,after his death his doctrine spread strangely4 ,it was stifled in the ,east by ,theodosius1 but was widely adopted by the barbarians of the ,west 7,goths1 ,vandals1 ,burgundians1 ,lombards74 ,it was revived1 more or less exactly1 after the ,reformation1 among the ,socinians4 ,,rome ,,and ,,christianity4--,the relations of ,christianity with the ,roman government were in the highest degree tragic1 as is common knowledge4 ,there were ten sanguinary persecutions1 some being atrocious4 ,it has often been asked what was the cause of this animosity against the ,christians on the part of a government which tolerated all religions and all philosophies4 ,persecutions were natural at ,athens where a democracy1 obstinately attached to the local deities1 treated as enemies of the country those who did not take these gods into consideration2 persecutions were natural on the part of a ,calvin or a ,louis ,,xiv who combined in themselves the two authorities and would not admit that anyone in the ,state had the right to think differently from its head2 but it has been argued that they were incomprehensible on the part of a government which admitted all cults and all doctrines4 ,the explanation perhaps primarily lies in the fact that ,christianity was essentially popular1 and that the government saw in it not only plebeianism1 which was disquieting1 but an organisation of plebeianism1 which was still more so4 ,the administration of religion had always been in the hands of the aristocracy2 the ,roman pontiffs were patricians1 the ,emperor was the sovereign pontiff2 to yield obedience1 even were it only spiritually1 to private men as priests was to be disobedient to the ,roman aristocracy1 to the ,emperor himself1 and was properly speaking a revolt4 ,a further explanation1 perhaps1 is that each new religion that was introduced at ,rome did not oppose and did not contradict polytheism1 the principle of polytheism being precisely that there are many gods2 whereas ,christianity denying all those gods and affirming that there is only one1 and that all others must be despised as non-existent1 inveighed against1 denied1 and ruined or threatened to destroy the very essence of polytheism4 ,it was not a variation1 it was a heresy2 it was more than heretical1 it was anarchical2 it did not only condemn this or that religion1 but even the very tolerance with which the ,roman government accepted all religions4 ,hence it is natural enough that it should have been combated to the utmost by practically all the ,emperors1 from the most execrable1 such as ,nero1 to the best1 such as ,marcus ,aurelius4 ,,christianity ,,and ,,the ,,philosophers4--,the relations of ,christianity with philosophy were confused4 ,the immense majority of philosophers rejected it1 considering their own views superior to it1 and moreover1 feeling it to be formidable1 made use against it of all that could be found beautiful1 specious1 or expedient in ancient philosophy2 and the ardour of ,neoplatonism1 which we have considered1 in part arose from precisely this instinct of rivalry and of struggle4 ,at that epoch there was a throng of men like ,ernest ,havet presenting ,hellenism in opposition to ,christianity1 and ,ernest ,havet is only a ,neoplatonist of the nineteenth century4 ,a certain number of philosophers1 nevertheless1 either on the ,jewish-,christian side or on the ,hellenic1 tried some reconciliation either as ,jews making advances to ,hellenism or as ,greeks admitting there was something acceptable on the part of ,sion4 ,aristobulus1 a ,jew 7prior to ,jesus ,christ71 seems to have endeavoured to bring ,moses into agreement with ,plato2 ,philo 7a ,jew contemporary with and surviving ,jesus ,christ and a non-,christian71 about whom there is more information1 throughout his life pursued the plan of demonstrating all the resemblances he could discover between ,plato and the ,old ,testament1 much in the same way as in our time some have striven to point out the surprising agreement of the ,darwinian theory with ,genesis4 ,he was called the ,jewish ,plato1 and at ,alexandria it was said3 ,philo imitates ,plato or ,plato imitates ,philo4 ,on their side1 later on1 certain eclectic ,greeks already cited1 ,moderatus1 ,nicomachus1 ,nemesius1 extended goodwill so far as to take into account1 if not ,jesus1 at least ,moses1 and to admit ,israelitish thought into the history of philosophy and of human wisdom4 ,but1 in general it was by the schools of philosophy and by the ever dwindling section of society priding itself upon its philosophy that ,christianity was most decisively repulsed1 thrust on one side and misunderstood4 ,,christian ,,philosophers4--,without dealing with many others who belong more especially to the history of the ,church rather than to that of philosophy1 the ,christians did not lack two very illustrious philosophers who must receive attention--,origen and ,st4 ,augustine4 ,,origen4--,origen was a native of ,alexandria at the close of the second century1 and a pupil of ,st4 ,clement of ,alexandria4 ,a ,christian and a ,platonist1 in order to give himself permission and excuse for reconciling the two doctrines1 he alleged that the ,apostles had given only so much of the ,christian teaching as the multitude could comprehend1 and that the learned could interpret it in a manner more subtle1 more profound1 and more complete4 ,having observed this precaution1 he revealed his system1 which was this3 ,god is a pure spirit4 ,he already has descended one step in spirits which are emanations from ,him4 ,these spirits are capable of good and evil4 ,when addicted to evil1 they clothe themselves with matter and become souls in bodies2--which is what we are4 ,there are others lower than ourselves4 ,there are impure spirits which have clothed themselves with unclean bodies2 these are demons4 ,now1 as the fallen brethren of angels1 we are free1 less free than they1 but still free4 ,through this freedom we can in our present existence either raise or lower ourselves4 ,but this freedom does not suffice us2 a little help is essential4 ,this help comes to us from the spirits which have remained pure4 ,the help they afford us is opposed by the efforts of the utterly fallen spirits who are lower in the scale than ourselves4 ,to combat these fallen spirits1 to help the pure spirits who help us1 and to help them to help us1 such is our duty in this life1 which is a medicine1 the medicine of ,plato1 namely a punishment2 sterile when it is not accepted by us1 salutary when gratefully accepted by us1 it then becomes expiation and in consequence purification4 ,the part of the ,redeemer in all this is the same as that of the spirits1 but on a grander and more decisive plane4 ,king of spirits1 ,spirit of spirits1 by revelation ,he illumines our confused intelligence and fortifies our weak will against temptation4 ,,st4 ,,augustine4--,st4 ,augustine of ,tagaste 7in ,africa71 long a pagan exercising the profession of professor of rhetoric1 became a ,christian and was ,bishop of ,hippo4 ,it is he who fixed the ,christian doctrine in the way most suitable to and most acceptable to ,western intelligence4 ,instead of confusing it1 more or less intentionally1 more or less inadvertently1 with philosophy1 he exerted all his great talents to make the most precise distinction from it4 ,philosophers 7he says7 have always regarded the world as an emanation from ,god4 ,then all is ,god4 ,such is not the way to reason4 ,there is no emanation1 but creation2 ,god created the world and has remained distinct from it4 ,he lives in it in such a way that we live in ,him2 in ,him we live and move and have our being2 ,he dwells throughout the world1 but ,he is not the world2 ,he is everywhere but ,he is not all4 ,god created the world4 ,then1 can it be said that before the world was created ,god remained doing nothing during an immense space of time8 ,certainly not1 because time only began at the creation of the world4 ,god is outside time4 ,the eternal is the absence of time4 ,god1 therefore1 was not an instant before ,he created the world4 ,or1 if it be preferred1 there was an eternity before the birth of the world4 ,but it is the same thing2 for eternity is the non-existence of time4 ,some understand ,god in three ,persons as three ,gods4 ,this polytheism1 this paganism must be rejected4 ,but how to understand8 ,how8 ,you feel in yourself several souls8 ,no4 ,and yet there are several faculties of the soul4 ,the three ,persons of ,god are the three divine faculties4 ,man has body and soul4 ,no one ought to have doubts about the soul1 for to have doubts presupposes thought1 and to think is to be2 above all things we are thinking beings4 ,but what is the soul8 ,something immaterial1 assuredly1 since it can conceive immaterial things1 such as a line1 a point1 surface1 space4 ,it is as necessary for the soul to be immaterial in order to be able to grasp the immaterial1 as it is necessary for the hand to be material in order that it can grasp a stone4 ,whence comes the soul8 ,from the souls of ancestors by transmission8 ,this is not probable1 for this would be to regard it as material4 ,from ,god by emanation8 ,this is inadmissible2 it is the same error as believing that the world emanates from ,god4 ,here1 too1 there is no emanation1 but creation4 ,god creates the souls in destination for bodies themselves born from heredity4 ,once the body is destroyed1 what becomes of the soul8 ,it cannot perish2 for thought not being dependent upon the senses1 there is no reason for its disappearance on the disappearance of the senses4 ,human liberty is an assured fact2 we are free to do good or evil4 ,but then ,god has not been able to know in advance what ,i shall do to-day1 and in consequence ,god1 at least in ,his knowledge1 has limitations1 is not omnipotent4 ,st4 ,augustine replies confusedly 7for the question is undoubtedly insoluble7 that we have an illusion of liberty1 an illusion that we are free1 which suffices for us to acquire merit if we do right and demerit if we do wrong1 and that this illusion of liberty is a relative liberty1 which leaves the prescience of ,god1 and therefore ,his omnipotence1 absolute4 ,man is also extremely weak1 debilitated1 and incapable of good on account of original sin1 the sin of our first parents1 which is transmitted to us through heredity and paralyses us4 ,but ,god helps us1 and this is what is termed grace4 ,he helps us gratuitously1 as is indicated by the word grace--if ,he wishes and when ,he wishes and in the measure that ,he wishes4 ,from this arises the doctrine of predestination1 by which it is preordained whether a man is to be saved or lost4 ,,part ,,ii ,,in ,,the ,,middle ,,ages ,,chapter ,i ,,from ,,the ,,fifth ,,century ,,to ,,the ,,thirteenth ,philosophy is only an ,interpreter of ,dogma4 ,when it is ,declared ,contrary to ,dogma by the ,authority of ,religion1 it is a ,heresy4 ,orthodox and ,heterodox ,interpretations4 ,some ,independent ,philosophers4 ,,dogma4--,after the invasion of the barbarians1 philosophy1 like literature1 sought refuge in monasteries and in the schools which prelates instituted and maintained near them4 ,but the ,church does not permit the free search for truth4 ,the truth has been established by the ,fathers of the ,church and fixed by the ,councils4 ,thenceforth the philosophic life1 so to speak1 which had never been interrupted1 assumed a fresh character4 ,within the ,church it sheltered--,i will not say disguised--itself under the interpretation of dogma2 it became a sort of respectful auxiliary of theology1 and was accordingly called the handmaid of theology1 ancilla theologiae4 ,when emancipated1 when departing from dogma1 it is a heresy1 and all the great heresies are nothing else than schools of philosophy1 which is why heresies must come into a history of philosophy4 ,and at last1 but only towards the close of the ,middle ,ages1 lay thought without disturbing itself about dogma and no longer thinking about its interpretation1 created philosophic doctrines exactly as the philosophers of antiquity invented them apart from religion1 to which they were either hostile or indifferent4 ,,scholasticism3 ,,scotus ,,erigena4--,the orthodox philosophy of the ,middle ,ages was the scholastic4 ,scholasticism consisted in amassing and in making known scientific facts and matters of knowledge of which it was useful for a well-bred man not to be ignorant and for this purpose encyclopaedias were constructed2 on the other hand1 it consisted not precisely in the reconciliation of faith with reason1 not precisely and far less in the submission of faith to the criticism of reason1 but in making faith sensible to reason1 as had been the office of the ,fathers of the ,church1 more especially ,st4 ,augustine4 ,scotus ,erigena1 a ,scotsman attached to the ,palatine ,academy of ,charles the ,bald1 lived in the eleventh century4 ,he was extremely learned4 ,his philosophy was ,platonic1 or rather the bent of his mind was ,platonic4 ,god is the absolute ,being2 ,he is unnamable1 since any name is a delimitation of the being2 ,he is absolutely and infinitely4 ,as the creator of all and uncreated1 ,he is the cause per se2 as the goal to which all things tend1 ,he is the supreme end4 ,the human soul is of impenetrable essence like ,god ,himself2 accordingly1 it is ,god in us4 ,we have fallen through the body and1 whilst in the flesh1 we can1 by virtue and more especially by the virtue of penitence1 raise ourselves to the height of the angels4 ,the world is the continuous creation of ,god4 ,it must not be said that ,god created the world1 but that ,he creates it2 for if ,he ceased from sustaining it1 the world would no longer exist4 ,god is perpetual creation and perpetual attraction4 ,he draws all beings to ,himself1 and in the end ,he will have them all in ,himself4 ,there is predestination to perfection in everything4 ,these theories1 some of which1 as has been seen1 go beyond dogma and form at least the beginning of heresy1 are all impregnated with ,platonism1 especially with ,neoplatonism1 and lead to the supposition that ,scotus ,erigena possessed very wide ,greek learning4 ,,arabian ,,science4--,a great literary and philosophical fact in the eighth century was the invasion of the ,arabs4 ,mahometans successively invaded ,syria1 ,persia1 ,africa1 and ,spain1 forming a crescent1 the two points of which touched the two extremities of ,europe4 ,inquisitive and sagacious pupils of the ,greeks in ,africa and ,asia1 they founded everywhere brilliant universities which rapidly acquired renown 7,bagdad1 ,bassorah1 ,cordova1 ,granada1 ,seville1 ,murcia7 and brought to ,europe a new quota of science2 for instance1 all the works of ,aristotle1 of which ,western ,europe possessed practically nothing4 ,students greedy for knowledge came to learn from them in ,spain2 for instance1 ,gerbert1 who developed into a man of great learning1 who taught at ,rheims and became ,pope4 ,individually the ,arabs were often great philosophers1 and at least the names must be mentioned of ,avicenna 7a ,neoplatonist of the tenth century7 and ,averroes 7an ,aristotelian of the twelfth century who betrayed tendencies towards admitting the eternity of nature1 and its evolution through its own initiative during the course of time74 ,their doctrines were propagated1 and the ancient books which they made known became widely diffused4 ,from them dates the sway of ,aristotle throughout the middle ages4 ,,st4 ,,anselm4--,st4 ,anselm1 in the eleventh century1 a ,savoyard1 who was long ,abbot of ,bec in ,normandy and died ,archbishop of ,canterbury1 is one of the most illustrious doctors of philosophy in the service of theology that ever lived4 ,a new ,st4 ,augustine 7as he has been called71 he starts from faith to arrive at faith after it has been rendered sensible to reason4 ,like ,st4 ,augustine he says3 ,i believe in order to understand 7well persuaded that if ,i never believed ,i should never understand71 and he adds what had been in the thought of ,st4 ,augustine3 ,i understand in order to believe4 ,st4 ,anselm proved the existence of ,god by the most abstract arguments4 ,for example1 ,it is necessary to have a cause1 one or multiple2 one is ,god2 multiple1 it can be derived from one single cause1 and that one cause is ,god2 it can be a particular cause in each thing caused2 but then it is necessary to suppose a personal force which must itself have a cause and thus we work back to a common cause1 that is to say to a single one4 ,he proved ,god again by the proof which has remained famous under the name of the argument of ,st4 ,anselm3 ,to conceive ,god is to prove that ,he is2 the conception of ,god is proof of ,his existence2 for every idea has its object2 above all1 an idea which has infinity for object takes for granted the existence of infinity2 for all being finite here below1 what would give the idea of infinity to the human mind8 ,therefore1 if the human brain has the idea of infinity it is because of the existence of infinity4 ,the argument is perhaps open to difference of opinion1 but as proof of a singular vigour of mind on the part of its author1 it is indisputable4 ,highly intellectual also is his explanation of the necessity of redemption4 ,cur ,deus ,homo8 7the title of one of his works7 asked ,st4 ,anselm4 ,because sin in relation to an infinite ,god is an infinite crime4 ,man1 finite and limited in capacity1 could therefore never expiate it4 ,then what could ,god do to avenge ,his honour and to have satisfaction rendered to ,him8 ,he could only make ,himself man without ceasing to be ,god1 in order that as man ,he should offer to ,god a reparation to which as ,god ,he would give the character of infinitude4 ,it was therefore absolutely necessary that at a given moment man should become ,god1 which could only be done upon the condition that ,god made ,himself man4 ,,realists2 ,,nominalists2 ,,conceptualists4--,it was in the time of ,st4 ,anselm that there arose the celebrated philosophic quarrel between the realists1 nominalists1 and conceptualists4 ,it is here essential to employ these technical terms or else not to allude to the dispute at all1 because the strife is above all a war of words4 ,the realists 7of whom ,st4 ,anselm was one71 said3 ,the ideas 7idea of virtue1 idea of sin1 idea of greatness1 idea of littleness7 are realities2 they exist1 in a spiritual manner of course1 but they really exist2 they are3 there is a virtue1 a sin1 a greatness1 a littleness1 a reason1 etc4 7and this was an exact reminiscence of the ideas of ,plato74 ,it is indeed only the idea1 the general1 the universal1 which is real1 and the particular has only the appearance of reality4 ,men do not exist1 the individual man does not exist2 what exists is 'man' in general1 and individual men are only the appearance of--the coloured reflections of--the universal man4 ,the nominalists 7,roscelin the ,canon of ,compiegne1 for instance7 answered3 ,no2 the general ideas1 the universals as you say1 are only names1 are only words1 emissions of the voice1 labels1 if you like1 which we place on such and such categories of facts observed by us2 there is no greatness2 there are a certain number of great things1 and when we think of them we inscribe this word 'greatness' on the general idea which we conceive4 ',man' does not exist2 there are men and the word humanity is only a word which to us represents a collective idea4 ,why did the realists cling so to their universals1 held to be realities and the sole realities8 ,for many reasons4 ,if the individual alone be real1 there are not three ,persons in the ,godhead1 there are three ,gods and the unity of ,god is not real1 it is only a word1 and ,god is not real1 ,he is only an utterance of the voice4 ,if the individual is not real1 the ,church is not real2 she does not exist1 there only exist ,christians who possess freedom of thought and of faith4 ,now the ,church is real and it is not only desirable that she should be real1 but even that she alone should possess reality and that the individuals constituting her should exist by her and not by themselves4 7,this is precisely the doctrine with regard to society now current among certain philosophers3 society exists independently of its members2 it has laws of its own independently of its members2 it is a reality on its own basis2 and its members are by it1 not it by them1 and therefore they should obey it2 ,m4 ,durckheim is a realist47 ,,abelard of ,nantes1 pupil of the nominalist1 ,william of ,champeaux1 learned man1 artist1 man of letters1 an incomparable orator1 tried to effect a conciliation4 ,he said3 ,the universal is not a reality1 certainly2 but it is something more than a simple word2 it is a conception of the mind1 which is something more than an utterance of the voice4 ,as conception of the mind1 in fact1 it lives with a life which goes beyond the individual1 because it can be common to several individuals to many individuals1 and because in fact it is common to them4 ,the general idea that ,i have and which ,i have communicated to my hearers1 and which returns to me from my hearers1 is more than a word since it is a link between my hearers and myself1 and an atmosphere in which ,i and my hearers live4 ,is the ,church only to be a word8 ,god forbid that ,i should say so4 ,she is a bond between all ,christians2 she is a general idea common to them all1 so that in her each individual feels himself several1 feels himself many2 although it is true that were she not believed in by anyone she would be nothing4 ,at bottom he was a nominalist1 but more subtle1 also more profound and more precise1 having a better grasp of what ,william of ,champeaux had desired to say4 ,he shared in his condemnation4 ,apart from the great dispute1 his ideas were singularly broad and bold4 ,half knowing1 half guessing at ancient philosophy1 he held it in high esteem2 he found there1 because he delighted in finding there1 all the ,christian ideas3 the one ,god1 the ,trinity1 the ,incarnation1 the imputation of the merits of the saints1 original sin2 and he found less of a gulf between ancient philosophy and ,christianity than between the ,old and the ,new ,testament 7this is because the only ,christianity known to ,abelard1 not the primitive but that constituted in the fourth century1 was profoundly impregnated with ,hellenism74 ,he believed the ,holy ,ghost to have revealed ,himself to the wise men of antiquity as well as to the ,jews and the ,christians1 and that virtuous pagans may have been saved4 ,the moral philosophy of ,abelard is very elevated and pure4 ,our acts proceed from ,god2 for it is impossible that they should not2 but ,he permits us the faculty of disobedience in order that virtue may exist1 to which it tends2 for if the tendency to evil did not exist1 there would be no possibility of effort against evil1 and if no efforts1 then no virtue2 ,god1 who cannot be virtuous since ,he cannot be tempted by evil1 can be virtuous in man1 which is why ,he leaves him the tendency to evil for him to triumph over it and be virtuous so that virtue may exist2 even if ,he were ,himself to lead us into temptation1 the tendency would still be the same2 ,he would only lead us into it to give us the opportunity for struggle and victory1 and therefore in order that virtue might exist2 the possibility of sin is the condition of virtue1 and in consequence1 even in the admission of this possibility and above all by its admission1 ,god is virtuous4 ,the bad deed1 furthermore1 is not the most considerable from the point of view of guilt2 as merit or demerit the intention is worth as much as the deed and he is criminal who has had the intention to be so 7which is clearly according to the ,gospel74 ,,hugo ,,de ,,saint-,,victor2 ,,richard4--,abelard possessed perhaps the broadest and greatest mind of the whole of the ,middle ,ages4 ,after these famous names must be mentioned ,hugo de ,saint-,victor1 a somewhat obscure mystic of ,german origin2 and the not less mystical ,richard1 who1 thoroughly persuaded that ,god is not attained by reason but by feeling1 taught exaltation to ,him by detachment from self and by six degrees3 renunciation1 elevation1 impulsion1 precipitation1 ecstasy1 and absorption4 ,,chapter ,,ii ,,the ,,thirteenth ,,century ,influence of ,aristotle ,his ,adoption by the ,church4 ,religious ,philosophy of ,st4 ,thomas ,aquinas4 ,,aristotle ,,and ,,the ,,church4--,from the thirteenth century1 ,aristotle1 completely known and translated into ,latin1 was adopted by the ,church and became in some sort its lay vicar4 ,he was regarded1 and ,i think rightly1 as of all the ,greek thinkers the least dangerous to her and as the one to whom could be left all the scientific instruction whilst she reserved to herself all the religious teaching4 ,aristotle1 in fact1 defended her from ,plato1 in whom were always found some germs of adoration of this world1 or some tendencies in this direction1 in whom was also found a certain polytheism much disguised1 or rather much purified1 but actual and dangerous2 therefore1 from the moment when it became necessary to select1 ,aristotle was tolerated and finally invested with office4 ,,st4 ,,thomas ,,aquinas4--,as ,aristotelian theologians must be cited ,william of ,auvergne1 ,vincent of ,beauvais1 ,albertus ,magnus2 but the sovereign name of this period of the history of philosophy is ,st4 ,thomas ,aquinas4 ,st4 ,thomas ,aquinas wrote several small works but1 surpassing them all1 the ,summa 7encyclopaedia7 which bears his name4 ,in general philosophy ,st4 ,thomas ,aquinas is an ,aristotelian1 bending but not distorting the ideas of ,aristotle to ,christian conceptions4 ,like ,aristotle1 he demonstrated ,god by the existence of motion and the necessity of a first motive power2 he further demonstrated it by the contingent1 relative1 and imperfect character of all here below3 ,there is in things more or less goodness1 more or less truth4 ,but we only affirm the more or less of a thing by comparing it with something absolute and as it approaches more or less to this absolute2 there is therefore an absolute being1 namely ,god--and this argument appeared to him better than that of ,st4 ,anselm1 which he refuted4 ,,his ,,conception ,,of ,,nature4--,he showed the whole of nature as a great hierarchy1 proceeding from the least perfect and the most shapeless to the most complete and determinate2 from another aspect1 as separated into two great kingdoms1 that of necessity 7mineral1 vegetable1 animal71 and that of grace 7humanity74 ,he displayed it willed by ,god1 projected by ,god1 created by ,god2 governed by ,god according to antecedent and consequent wills1 that is1 by general wills 7,god desires man to be saved7 and by particular wills 7,god wishes the sinner to be punished71 and the union of the general wills is the creation1 and the result of all the particular wills is ,providence4 ,nature and man with it are the work not only of the power but of the goodness of ,god1 and it is by love that ,he created us and we must render ,him love for love1 which is involuntarily done by ,nature herself in her obedience to ,his laws1 and which we must do voluntarily by obedience to ,his commandments4 ,,the ,,soul4--,our soul is immaterial and more complete than that of animals1 for ,st4 ,thomas does not formally deny that animals have souls2 the instinct of animals is the sensitive soul according to ,aristotle1 which is capable of four faculties3 sensibility1 imagination1 memory1 and estimation1 that is elementary intelligence3 ,the bird picks up straw1 not because it gratifies her feelings not by a movement of sensibility1 but because it serves to make her nest4 ,it is therefore necessary that an animal should perceive those intuitions which do not come within the scope of the senses4 ,it is by opinion or estimation that it perceives these intuitions1 these distant ends4 ,we1 mankind1 possess a soul which is sensibility1 imagination1 memory1 and reason4 ,reason is the faculty not only of having ideas1 but of establishing connections and chains of connection between the ideas and of conceiving general ideas4 ,reason pauses before reaching ,god because the idea of ,god precisely is the only one which cannot be brought to the mind by the interrelation of ideas1 for ,god surpasses all ideas2 the idea of ,god is given by faith1 which can be subsequently helped by reason1 for the latter can work to make faith perceptible to reason4 ,our soul is full of passions1 divisible into two great categories1 the passions of desire and those of anger4 ,the passions of desire are rapid or violent movements towards some object which seems to us a good2 the passions of anger are movements of revolt against something which opposes our movement towards a good4 ,the common root of all the passions is love1 for it is obvious that from it are derived the passions of desire2 and as for the passions of wrath they would not exist if we had no love of anything1 in which case our desire not coming into collision would not turn into revolt against the obstacle4 ,we are free to do good or evil1 to master our evil passions and to follow those of which reason approves4 ,here reappears the objection of the knowledge ,god must have beforehand of our actions3 if ,god foresees our actions we are not free2 if free1 we act contrary to his previsions1 then ,he is not all-powerful4 ,st4 ,thomas makes answer thus3 ,there is not prevision1 there is vision1 because we are in time whereas ,god is in eternity4 ,he sees at one glance and instantaneously all the past1 present1 and future4 ,therefore1 ,he does not foresee but see1 and this vision does not hinder human freedom any more than being seen acting prevents one from acting4 ,because ,god knows our deeds after they are done1 no one can plead that that prevents our full liberty to do them2 if ,he knew them before it is the same as knowing them after1 because for ,him past1 present1 and future are all the same moment4 ,this appears subtle but is not1 for it only amounts to the statement that in speaking of ,god time must not be mentioned1 for ,god is as much outside time as outside space4 ,,the ,,moral ,,system ,,of ,,st4 ,,thomas4--,the very detailed and circumstantial moral system of ,st4 ,thomas may thus be summarized3 there is in conscience1 first1 an intellectual act which is the distinction between good and evil2 secondly1 an act of will which leads us to the good4 ,this power for good urges the practice of virtue4 ,there are human virtues1 well known to the ancient philosophers1 temperance1 courage1 wisdom1 justice1 which lead to happiness on earth2 there are divine virtues1 inspired in man by ,god1 which are faith1 hope1 and charity1 and they lead to eternal happiness4 ,we practise the virtues1 when we are well-disposed1 because we are free2 but our liberty and our will do not suffice2 it is necessary for ,god to help us1 and that is grace4 ,,faith ,,and ,,reason4--,on the question of the relation of reason to faith1 ,st4 ,thomas ,aquinas recognizes1 or rather proclaims1 that reason will never demonstrate faith1 that the revealed truths1 the ,trinity1 original sin1 grace1 etc41 are above reason and infinitely exceed it4 ,how1 then1 can one believe8 ,by will1 aided by the grace of ,god4 ,then henceforth must no appeal be made to reason8 ,yes1 indeed6 ,reason serves to refute the errors of the adversaries of the faith1 and by this refutation to confirm itself in belief4 ,the famous ,credo ut intelligam--,i believe in order to understand--is therefore true4 ,comprehension is only possible on condition of belief2 but subsequently comprehension helps to believe1 if not more1 at least with a greater precision and in a more abundant light4 ,st4 ,thomas ,aquinas here is in exactly the position which ,pascal seems to have taken up3 ,believe and you will understand2 understand and you will believe more exactly4 ,therefore an act of will3 ,i wish to believe--a grace of ,god fortifying this will3 faith exists--studies and reasoning3 faith is the clearer4 ,,st4 ,,bonaventura2 ,,raymond ,,lulle4--,beside these men of the highest brain-power there are found in the thirteenth century mystics1 that is1 poets and eccentrics1 both by the way most interesting4 ,it was ,st4 ,bonaventura who1 being persuaded1 almost like an ,alexandrine1 that one rises to ,god by synthetic feeling and not by series of arguments1 and that one journeys towards ,him by successive states of the soul each more pure and more passionate--wrote ,the ,journey of the ,soul to ,god1 which is1 so to speak1 a manual of mysticism4 ,learned as he was1 whilst pursuing his own purpose1 he digressed in agreeable and instructive fashion into the realms of real knowledge4 ,widely different from him1 ,raymond ,lulle or de ,lulle1 an unbridled schoolman1 in his ,ars magna invented a reasoning machine1 analogous to an arithmetical machine1 in which ideas were automatically deduced from one another as the figures inscribe themselves on a counter4 ,as often happens1 the excess of the method was its own criticism1 and an enemy of scholasticism could not have more ingeniously demonstrated that it was a kind of mechanism4 ,raymond de ,lulle was at once a learned man and a well-informed and most enquiring naturalist for whom ,arabian science held no secrets4 ,with that he was poet1 troubadour1 orator1 as well as very eccentric and attractive4 ,he was beloved and persecuted in his lifetime1 and long after his death still found enthusiastic disciples4 ,,bacon4--,contemporaneously lived the man whom it is generally the custom to regard as the distant precursor of experimental science1 ,roger ,bacon 7who must not be confused with ,francis ,bacon1 another learned man who lived much nearer to our own time74 ,roger ,bacon1 a ,franciscan friar1 occupied himself almost exclusively with physical and natural science4 ,he passed the greater portion of his life in prison by reason of alleged sorcery and1 more especially1 perhaps1 because he had denounced the evil lives of his brethren4 ,he had at least a presentiment of almost all modern inventions3 gunpowder1 magnifying glass1 telescope1 air-pump2 he was distinctly an inventor in optics4 ,in philosophy1 properly speaking1 he denounced what was hollow and empty in scholasticism1 detesting that preference should be given to the straw of words rather than to the grain of fact1 and proclaiming that reasoning is good to conclude but not to establish4 ,without discovering the law of progress1 as has too often been alleged1 he arrived at the conclusion that antiquity being the youth of the world1 the moderns are the adults1 which only meant that it would be at our school that the ancients would learn were they to return to earth and that we ought not to believe blindly in the ancients2 and this was an insurrection against the principle of authority and against the idolatry of ,aristotle4 ,he preached the direct study of nature1 observation1 and experiment with the subsequent application of deduction1 and especially of mathematical deduction1 to experiment and observation4 ,with all that1 he believed in astrology2 for those who are in advance of their time none the less belong to it3 but he was a very great man4 ,,chapter ,,iii ,,the ,,fourteenth ,,and ,,fifteenth ,,centuries ,decadence of ,scholasticism4 ,forebodings of the ,coming ,era4 ,great ,moralists4 ,the ,kabbala4 ,sorcery4 ,,decadence ,,of ,,scholasticism4--,the fourteenth century dated the decadence of scholasticism1 but saw little new4 ,realism was generally abandoned1 and the field was swept by nominalism1 which was the theory that ideas only have existence in the brains which conceive them4 ,thus ,durand de ,saint-,pourcain remains famous for having said1 ,to exist is to be individually1 which at that epoch was very audacious4 ,william of ,ockham repeated the phrase with emphasis2 there is nothing real except the individual4 ,that went so far as to cast suspicion on all metaphysics1 and somewhat on theology4 ,in fact1 although a devout believer1 ,ockham rejected theology1 implored the ,church not to be learned1 because her science proved nothing1 and to content herself with faith3 ,science belongs to ,god1 faith to men4 ,but1 or rather in addition1 if the ministers of ,god were no longer imposing because of their ambitious science1 it was necessary for them to regain their sway over souls by other and better means4 ,it was incumbent on them to be saintly1 to revert to the purity1 the simplicity1 and the divine childishness of the primitive ,church2 and here he was virtually a forerunner of the ,reformation4 ,ockham was indeed one of the auxiliaries of ,philip the ,fair in his struggle with the ,holy ,see1 suffered excommunication1 and sought refuge with the ,duke of ,bavaria1 the foe of the ,pope4 ,,buridan3 ,,the ,,liberty ,,of ,,indifference4--,realists and nominalists continued their mutual strife1 sometimes physically even1 until the middle of the fifteenth century4 ,but nominalism always gained ground1 having among other celebrated champions1 ,peter d',ailly and ,buridan2 the one succeeded in becoming ,chancellor of the ,university of ,paris1 the other in becoming its ,rector4 ,buridan has remained famous through his death and his donkey1 both alike legendary4 ,according to a ballad by ,villon1 ,buridan having been too tenderly loved by ,joan of ,navarre1 wife of ,philip the ,fair1 was by his order thrown in a sack into the ,seine4 ,by comparison of dates1 the fact seems impossible4 ,according to tradition1 either in order to show the freedom of indifference1 or that animals are mere machines1 ,buridan declared that an ass with two baskets full of corn placed one on each side of him and at equal distance from him1 would never decide from which he should feed and would die of starvation4 ,nothing of the kind is to be found in his works1 but he may have said so in a lecture and his pupils remembering it have handed it down as a proverb4 ,,peter ,d',,ailly2 ,,gerson4--,peter d',ailly1 a highly important ecclesiastic1 head of the ,college of ,navarre1 chevalier of the ,university of ,paris1 ,cardinal1 a leader in the discussions at the ,councils at ,pisa and ,constance1 a drastic reformer of the morals and customs of the ,church1 did not evince any marked originality as a philosopher1 but maintained the already known doctrines of nominalism with extraordinary dialectical skill4 ,among his pupils he numbered ,gerson1 who was also ,chancellor of the ,university of ,paris1 another highly zealous and energetic reformer1 a more avowed enemy of scholasticism and mysticism1 of exaggerated austerity and astrology1 eminently modern in the best sense of the word1 whose political and religious enemies are his title of respect4 ,he was the author of many small books devoted to the popularization of science1 religion1 and morality4 ,to him was long attributed the ,imitation of ,jesus ,christ1 which on the whole bears no resemblance to his writings1 but which he might very well have written in old age in his retreat in the peaceful silence of the ,celestines of ,lyons4 ,,the ,,kabbala4--,from the beginning of the fifteenth century the ,renaissance was heralded by a revival of ,platonism1 both in philosophy and literature4 ,but it was a ,platonism strangely understood1 a quaint medley of ,pythagoreanism and ,alexandrinism1 the source of which is not very clear 7the period not having been much studied74 ,then arose an incredible infatuation for the ,kabbala--a doctrine which was for a long while the secret of the ,jews1 brooded over by them so to speak during the darkness of the ,middle ,ages1 in which are to be found traces of the most sublime speculations and of the basest superstitions of antiquity4 ,it contained a kind of pantheistic theology closely analogous to those of ,porphyry and ,iamblichus1 as well as processes of magic mingled with astrology4 ,the ,kabbalists believe that the sage1 who by his astrological knowledge is brought into relation with the celestial powers1 can affect nature1 alter the course of phenomena1 and work miracles4 ,the ,kabbala forms part of the history of the marvelous and of occult science rather than of the history of philosophy4 ,nevertheless men of real learning were initiated and were infatuated1 among them the marvelous ,pico della ,mirandola1 ,reuchlin1 not less remarkable as humanist and ,hebraist1 who would have run grave risk at the hands of the ,inquisition at ,cologne if he had not been saved by ,leo ,x4 ,cardan1 a mathematician and physician1 was one of the learned men of the day most impregnated with ,kabbalism4 ,he believed in a kind of infallibility of the inner sense1 of the intuition1 and regarded as futile all sciences that proceeded by slow rational operations4 ,he believed himself a mage and magician4 ,from vanity he spoke of himself in the highest terms and from cynicism in the lowest4 ,doubt has been cast on his sincerity and also on his sanity4 ,,magic4--,there were also ,paracelsus and ,agrippa4 ,paracelsus1 like ,cardan1 believed in an intense light infinitely superior to bestial reasoning and calls to mind certain philosophy of intuition of the present day4 ,he too believed himself a magician and physician1 and effected cures by the application of astrology to therapeutics4 ,agrippa did the same with yet stranger phantasies1 passing from absolute scepticism through mysticism to magi and demonology2 in his own time and in subsequent centuries enjoying the reputation of a devil incarnate as man4 ,,chapter ,,iv ,,the ,,sixteenth ,,century ,it ,is ,fairly ,accurate to ,consider that from the ,point of ,view of ,philosophy1 the ,middle ,ages ,lasted until ,descartes4 ,free-thinkers ,more or ,less ,disguised4 ,partisans of ,reason ,apart from ,faith1 of ,observation1 and ,of ,experiment4 ,,the ,,freedom ,,of ,,philosophy3 ,,pomponazzo4--,the freedom and even the audacity of philosophy rapidly increased4 ,learned and convinced ,aristotelians were bent1 either from sheer love of truth or from a more secret purpose1 on demonstrating to what extent ,aristotle1 accurately read1 was opposed to the teaching of the ,church4 ,for instance1 ,pomponazzo revealed that nothing could be drawn from ,aristotle in favour of the immortality of the soul1 in which he himself believed fervently1 but in which ,aristotle did not believe1 hence it was necessary to choose between the ,church and ,aristotle2 that without the immortality of the soul there could be no rewards beyond the grave1 which was entirely his own opinion1 but whoever should desire to offer excuses for ,aristotle could say it was precisely the existence of punishments and rewards which deprived virtue of existence1 which did away with virtue1 since the good that is done for the sake of reward or from fear of punishment is no longer good2 that1 still according to ,aristotle1 there could never be miracles2 that he1 ,pomponazzo1 believed in all the miracles recorded in the ,scriptures2 but that ,aristotle would not have believed in them1 and could not have believed in them1 a fact which demanded consideration1 not assuredly in order to reject belief in miracles1 but in order not to bestow on ,aristotle that confidence which for so long had been too readily placed in him4 ,in the same way1 he took up again the eternal question of the prescience of ,god and of human liberty1 and showed that no matter what had been said it was necessary to choose3 either we are free and ,god is not omnipotent1 or ,god is omnipotent and we are not free4 ,to regard as true this latter hypothesis1 towards which the philosopher evidently leans1 would cause ,god to be the author of evil and of sin4 ,it would not be impossible for ,god to be the author of evil as an essential condition of good1 for if evil were not to exist then there could not be good2 nor would it be impossible that ,he should be the author1 not of sin1 but of the possibility of sin in order that virtue might be possible1 there being no virtue where it is impossible to commit sin2 but therein lies a mystery which faith alone can solve1 and which ,aristotle at any rate has not solved1 therefore let us not place reliance on ,aristotle4 ,this disguised freethinker1 for he does not appear to me to be anything else1 was one of the most original thinkers of the period intermediate between the ,middle ,ages and ,descartes4 ,,michael ,,servetus2 ,,vanini4--,such instances of temerity were sometimes fatal to their authors4 ,michael ,servetus1 a very learned ,spanish physician who perhaps discovered the circulation of the blood before ,harvey1 disbelieved in the ,trinity and in the divinity of ,jesus1 and1 as he was a ,platonist1 perceived no intermediaries between ,god and man save ideas4 ,persecuted by the ,catholics1 he sought refuge at ,geneva1 believing ,calvin to be more merciful than the ,inquisitors1 and ,calvin burned him alive4 ,vanini1 half a century later1 that is at the commencement of the seventeenth1 a restless1 vain1 and insolent man1 after a life full of sudden changes of fortune1 and yet distinguished1 was burnt alive at ,toulouse for certain passages in his ,de admirandis 444 arcanis1 and for having said that he would not express his opinion on the immortality of the soul until he was old1 a ,jew1 and a ,german4 ,,bruno2 ,,campanella4--,giordano ,bruno1 an astronomer and one of the first to affirm that the sun was the centre of the world1 professed1 despite certain precautions1 a doctrine which confused ,god with the world and denied or excluded creation4 ,giordano ,bruno was arrested at ,venice in #aeic1 kept seven years in prison1 and finally burnt at ,rome in #afjj4 ,campanella1 likewise an ,italian1 who spent twenty-seven years in a dungeon for having conspired against the ,spanish masters of his country1 and who died in exile in ,paris in #afci1 was a sceptic in philosophy1 or rather an anti-metaphysician1 and1 as would be said nowadays1 a positivist4 ,there are only two sources of knowledge1 observation and reasoning4 ,observation makes us know things--is this true8 ,may not the sensations of things which we have be a simple phantasmagoria8 ,no2 for we have an internal sense1 a sense of our own1 which cannot deceive us1 which affirms our existence 7here is the ,cogito of ,descartes anticipated7 and which1 at the same time1 affirms that there are things which are not ourselves1 so that coincidently the ego and the non-ego are established4 ,yes1 but is this non-ego really what it seems8 ,it is2 granted2 but what is it and can we know what it is8 ,not without doubt1 and here scepticism is unshakable2 but in that there is certitude of the existence of the non-ego1 the presumption is that we can know it1 partially1 relatively1 very relatively1 while we remain infinitely distant from an absolute knowledge1 which would be divine4 ,therefore let us observe and experiment2 let us make the history of nature as historians make the history of the human race4 ,and this is the simple and solid philosophy of experiment4 ,but ,campanella1 like so many more1 was a metaphysician possessed by the devil of metaphysics1 and after having imperiously recommended the writing of only the history of nature1 he himself wrote its romance as well4 ,every being1 he said 7and the thought was a very fine one71 exists on condition of being able to exist1 and on condition that there be an idea of which it is the realization1 and again on condition that nature is willing to create it4 ,in other words1 nature can1 knows what she wishes1 and wishes4 ,now all beings1 in a greater or less degree according to their perfection or imperfection1 feel this triple condition of being able1 knowing1 and wishing4 ,every being can1 knows1 and wishes1 even inorganic matter 7here already is the world as will and representation of ,schopenhauer71 and ,god is only absolute power1 absolute knowledge1 and absolute will4 ,this is why all creative things gravitate to ,god and desire to return to ,him as to their origin1 and as the perfection of what they are3 the universe has nostalgia for ,god4 ,campanella was also1 as we should say nowadays1 a sociologist4 ,he made his ,republic as ,plato had made his4 ,the ,republic of ,campanella was called the ,city of the ,sun4 ,it was a community republic1 leavened with aristocracy with spiritual power and temporal power somewhat after the manner of ,auguste ,comte4 ,campanella was a great sower of ideas4 ,,francis ,,bacon4--,francis ,bacon1 lawyer1 member of ,parliament1 ,lord ,chancellor of ,england1 personal friend of ,james ,i1 friend1 protector1 and perhaps collaborator with ,shakespeare1 overthrown as the result of political animosity and relegated to private life1 was a very learned man with a marvellous mind4 ,like his namesake1 ,roger ,bacon1 but in an age more favourable to intellectual reform1 he attempted a sort of renewal of the human mind 7,instauratio ,magna7 or at least a radical revolution in the methods and workings of the human mind4 ,although ,francis ,bacon professed admiration for many of the thinkers of antiquity1 he urged that it was wrong to rely on them because they had not sufficiently observed2 one must not1 like the schoolmen1 have ideas a priori1 which are idols1 and there are idols of tribe1 of party1 of school1 of eras2 intentions must not be perceived everywhere in nature1 and we must not1 because the sun warms1 believe it was created to warm1 or because the earth yields nourishment believe her creation was for the purpose of feeding us1 and that all things converge to man and are put at his service4 ,it is necessary to proceed by observation1 by experiment1 and then by induction1 but with prodigious mistrust of induction4 ,induction consists in drawing conclusions from the particular to the general1 from a certain number of facts to a law4 ,this is legitimate on condition that the conclusion is not drawn from a few facts to a law1 which is precipitate induction1 fruitful in errors2 but from a very large number of facts to a law1 which even then is considered as provisional4 ,as for metaphysics1 as for the investigation of universal law1 that should be entirely separated from philosophy itself1 from the primary philosophy which does not lead to it2 it has its own field1 which is that of faith3 ,give to faith what belongeth to faith4 ,in the main he is uninterested in metaphysics1 believing them always to revolve in a circle and1 ,i do not say1 only believes in science and in method1 but has hope only from knowledge and method1 an enthusiast in this respect just as another might be about the super-sensible world or about ideas1 saying human knowledge and human power are really coincident1 and believing that knowledge will support humanity in all calamities1 will prolong human life1 will establish a new golden age1 etc4 ,moreover1 let there be none of that eternal and unfounded fear that knowledge will cause the disappearance of the religious feeling4 ,with profound conviction and judging by himself1 ,bacon said3 ,a little philosophy inclineth a man's mind to atheism1 but depth in philosophy bringeth a man's mind about to religion4 ,such is true philosophy1 subordinate to the object1 attentive to the object1 listening to the voices of the world and only anxious to translate them into human language3 that is true philosophy which renders the voices of the world the most accurately possible1 like an echo1 which writes as if at the dictation of the world itself1 adding nothing of its own1 only repeating and resounding4 ,and1 as a man is always of his time1 he believed in alchemy and in the possibility of transmuting base metals into gold4 ,but note how he understood it3 ,to create a new nature in a given body or to produce new natures and to introduce them 444 he who is acquainted with the forms and modes of super-inducing yellowness1 weight1 ductility1 fixity1 fluidity1 solution1 and the rest1 with their gradations and methods1 will see and take care that these properties be united in some body1 whence its transformation into gold may follow4 ,modern chemistry1 with scientific methods highly analogous to those which ,bacon indicated or foresaw1 has not made gold1 which is not a very useful thing to do1 but has done better4 ,,thomas ,,hobbes4--,at the end of the sixteenth century1 another ,englishman1 ,thomas ,hobbes1 began to think4 ,he was1 above all else1 a literary man and a sociologist2 he translated ,thucydides and ,homer1 he wrote ,leviathan1 or the ,matter1 ,form1 and ,power of a ,commonwealth1 which is a manual of despotism1 demonstrating that all men in a natural state were beasts of prey with regard to one another1 but that they escaped this unpleasant fate by submission to a prince who has all rights because he is perpetually saving his subjects from death1 and who can therefore impose on them whatever he pleases1 even scientific dogma or religious beliefs4 ,merely regarded as a philosopher1 properly so called1 ,hobbes has an important position in the history of ideas4 ,like ,francis ,bacon1 but more rigorously and authoritatively1 he began by separating metaphysics and theology from philosophy4 ,philosophy is the art of thinking4 ,that which is not sensible--mind1 soul1 ,god--cannot be thought3 can only be believed2 philosophy does not deny all that2 merely it does not concern itself therewith4 ,here is the whole of positivism established in principle4 ,what we can think is what we feel4 ,things are known to us only through sensations2 a thought is a sensation1 the human mind is a compound of sensations4 ,no2 for ,i can think of a thing without hearing1 seeing1 feeling it1 etc4 ,this is because we have memory1 which is itself a sensation2 it is a sensation which prolongs itself2 to remember is to feel that one has felt2 it is to feel a former sensation which the brain is able to preserve4 ,we think only by combining current sensations with other current sensations1 or much more often indeed1 thanks to memory1 by combining current sensations with older ones1 or former sensations with each other4 ,this is but a fragile basis for knowledge and thought1 for sensation is only a modification of ourselves caused by an external object1 and consequently gives us nothing at all of the external object1 and of itself the external world is eternally unknown to us2 but we combine with each other the illusions that the external world deposits in us through the delusive or doubtful intermediary of our senses4 ,when the sensation thus combined with other sensations has become thought1 then ideas begin to exist4 ,they are products of sensation detached from sensation4 ,they are interassociated by laws that are obscure1 yet which can be vaguely perceived4 ,they awake1 so to speak1 and call to one another2 every time an idea previously acquired reappears1 it is followed by the thought which accompanied it when it was acquired4 ,in a conversation a traitor is spoken of4 ,someone asks what was the value of a piece of silver in ancient times4 ,this appears incoherent2 really it is a natural and simple association of ideas in which there are few intermediate steps4 ,the person who listened as the traitor was mentioned thought of ,judas1 who was the first traitor of whom he had heard1 and of the thirty pieces of silver1 the price of the betrayal by ,judas4 ,the association of ideas is more or less close1 more or less loose2 it is disconnected in dreams1 irregular in musing1 close directly it is dominated and in consequence directed by an end pursued1 by a goal sought2 for then there is a desire to attain which associates nothing of itself1 but which1 eliminating all ideas that are not pertinent to the end pursued1 permits only the association of those which have relation to it4 ,seeing in the human soul only successive impulses arising from those first impulses which are the sensations1 ,hobbes does not believe we are free to do what we wish2 we are carried away by the strongest impulse of our internal impulses1 desire1 fear1 aversion1 love1 etc4 ,nevertheless we deliberate1 we consider different courses to pursue and we decide on the one we desire to choose4 ,no2 we do not deliberate1 we only imagine we deliberate4 ,deliberation is only a succession of different feelings1 and to the one that gains the day we give the name of volition4 ,in the so-called deliberation1 the final desire or the final fear is called will4 ,therefore liberty has no more existence among men than among animals2 will and desire are only one and the same thing considered under different aspects4 ,,utilitarian ,,morality4--,henceforth there is no morality2 without the power to will this and not to will that1 there is no possible morality4 ,hobbes retorts with utilitarian morality3 ,what man should seek is pleasure1 as ,aristippus thought2 but true pleasure--that which is permanent and that which is useful to him4 ,now it is useful to be a good citizen1 a loyal subject1 sociable1 serviceable to others1 careful to obtain their esteem by good conduct1 etc4 ,morality is interest rightly understood1 and interest rightly understood is absolutely blended with the morality of duty4 ,the criminal is not a criminal but an idiot2 the honest man is not an honest man but an intelligent one4 ,observe that a man is hardly convinced when preached to in the name of duty1 but always convinced when addressed in the name of his own interest4 ,all this is fairly sensible2 but from the time that freedom ceases there can be no morality1 not even utilitarian2 for it is useless even from the point of view of his own interests1 to preach to a man who is only a machine moved by the strongest force2 and1 if he be only that1 to lay down a moral code for him either from the point of view of his own interests1 or from that of morality1 or from that of the love of ,god are things which are the same and which are as absurd the one as the other4 ,all philosophy1 which does not believe in human liberty1 yet which enunciates a system of morality1 is in perpetual contradiction4 ,,part ,,iii ,,modern ,,times ,,chapter ,i ,,the ,,seventeenth ,,century ,descartes4 ,cartesianism4 ,,descartes4--,the seventeenth century1 which was the greatest philosophic century of modern times and perhaps of any time1 began with ,rene ,descartes4 ,descartes1 born at ,la ,haye in ,touraine in #aeif1 of noble family 7his real name was des ,quartes71 was educated by the ,jesuits of the college of ,la ,fleche1 followed the military profession for several years1 then gave himself up to mathematics and became one of the greatest mathematicians of ,europe1 traveled all over ,europe for his own amusement and instruction1 wrote scientific and philosophical works1 of which the most famous are the ,discourse on ,,method1 the ,meditations1 and the ,rules for the ,control of the ,mind1 resided sometimes in ,paris1 sometimes in ,holland1 and finally1 at fifty-four years of age1 unhappily attracted by the flattering invitations of ,queen ,christina of ,sweden1 proceeded to ,stockholm1 where he succumbed in four months to the severity of the climate4 ,he died in ,february1 #afej4 ,,the ,,system ,,of ,,descartes4--,in the works of ,descartes there are a general system of philosophy1 a psychology1 and a method4 ,this order is here adopted because of the three1 in ,descartes2 it is the third which is the most important1 and which has left the most profound traces4 ,the foundation of the system of ,descartes is belief in ,god and in the goodness of ,god4 ,i say the foundation and not the starting-point4 ,the starting-point is another matter2 but it will be clearly seen that the foundation is what has just been stated4 ,the starting-point is this3 ,i do not believe1 provisionally1 in anything1 not wishing to take into account what ,i have been taught4 ,i doubt everything4 ,is there anything ,i cannot doubt8 ,it seems to me there is3 ,i cannot doubt that ,i doubt4 ,now if ,i doubt1 ,i think2 if ,i think1 ,i am4 ,there is one certainty1 ,i am4 ,and having arrived there1 ,descartes is at a dead stop1 for from the certitude of one's own existence nothing can be deduced save the certitude of one's existence4 ,for instance1 shall ,i believe in the existence of everything that is not myself8 ,there is no reason why ,i should believe in it4 ,the world may be a dream4 ,but if ,i believe in ,god and in a ,god of perfect goodness1 ,i can then believe in something outside of myself1 for ,god not being able to deceive ,himself or me1 if ,he permits me to see the external world1 it is because this external world exists4 ,there are already1 therefore1 three things in which ,i believe3 my own existence1 that of ,god1 and that of the universe4 ,which of these beliefs is the fundamental one8 ,evidently1 the one not demonstrated2 the axiom is that upon which one rests to demonstrate everything except itself4 ,now of the three things in which ,descartes believed1 his own existence is demonstrated by the impossibility of thinking or feeling1 without feeling his own existence2 the other is demonstrated by the existence of a good ,god2 the existence of a good ,god is demonstrated by nothing4 ,it is believed4 ,hence belief in a good ,god is ,descartes' foundation4 ,this has not been introduced in order that he may escape from the ,i am at which he came to a stop2 that belief certainly existed previously1 and if he had recourse to it1 it was because it existed first4 ,without that1 he had too much intellectual honesty to invent it for a particular need4 ,he had it1 and he found it as it were in reserve when he asked himself if he could go beyond ,i am4 ,here was his foundation2 all the rest would complete the proof4 ,,the ,,existence ,,of ,,god4--,although ,descartes rests on ,god as being his first principle1 he does not fail to prove ,his existence1 and that is begging the question1 something proved by what has to be proved4 ,for if ,descartes believed only in something outside himself because of a good ,god1 that ,being outside himself1 ,god1 he can prove only because of the existence of a good ,god1 who cannot deceive us1 and thus is ,god proved by the belief in ,him4 ,that is begging the question4 ,descartes does not fail to prove the existence of ,god by superabundance as it were2 and this1 too1 in itself indicates clearly that faith in ,god is the very foundation of the philosophy of ,descartes4 ,after having taken it as the basis of reasoning1 he takes it as the goal of reasoning1 which indicates that the idea of ,god1 so to speak1 encircled his mind and that he found it at every ultimate point of thought4 ,he proves it1 therefore1 first by an argument analogous to that of ,st4 ,anselm1 which is this3 we1 imperfect and finite1 have the idea of a perfect and infinite ,being2 we are not capable of this idea4 ,therefore it must have come to us from a ,being really perfect and infinite1 and hence this perfect ,being exists4 ,another proof1 that of ,god regarded as cause4 ,first3 ,i exist4 ,who made me8 ,was it myself8 ,no1 if it had been myself ,i should have endowed myself with all the perfections of which ,i can conceive and in which ,i am singularly deficient4 ,therefore it must be some other being who created me4 ,it was my parents4 ,no doubt1 but who created my parents and the parents of my parents8 ,one cannot go back indefinitely from cause to cause1 and there must have been a first one4 ,secondly3 even my own actual existence1 my existence at this very moment1 is it the result of my existence yesterday8 ,nothing proves it1 and there is no necessity because ,i existed just now that ,i should exist at present4 ,there must therefore be a cause at each moment and a continuous cause4 ,that continuous cause is ,god1 and the whole world is a creation perpetually continued1 and is only comprehensible as continuous creation and is only explicable by a ,creator4 ,,the ,,world4--,thus sure of himself1 of ,god1 and of the world1 ,descartes studies the world and himself4 ,in the world he sees souls and matter2 matter is substance in extensions1 souls are substance not in extension1 spiritual substance4 ,the extended substance is endowed with impulse4 ,is the impulse self-generated1 are the bodies self-impelled8 ,no1 they are moved4 ,what is the primary motive force8 ,it is ,god4 ,souls are substances without extension and motive forces4 ,in this respect they are analogous to ,god4 ,they are united to bodies and act on them4 ,how8 ,this is an impenetrable mystery1 but they are closely and substantially united to the bodies1 which is proved by physical pains depressing the soul and moral sufferings depressing the body2 and they act on them1 not by creating movements1 for the quantity of movements is always the same1 but by directing the movements after this fashion or that4 ,souls being spiritual1 there is no reason for their disaggregation1 that is1 their demise1 and in fact they do not die4 ,it is for this reason that ,descartes lays such stress on animals not having souls4 ,if they had souls1 the souls would be spiritual1 they would not be susceptible to disaggregation and would be immortal4 ,save atheism1 there is no doctrine more dangerous and detestable than that1 but animals are soulless and purely mechanism2 ,descartes exerts himself to prove this in great detail1 and he thus escapes avowing the immortality of the souls of animals1 which is repugnant to him1 or by allowing that they perish with the bodies to be exposed to the objection3 ,will it not be the same with the souls of men8 ,,the ,,freedom ,,of ,,the ,,soul4--,the human soul is endowed with freedom to do good or evil4 ,what proof is there of this freedom8 ,first1 the inward feeling that we have4 ,every evident idea is true4 ,now1 not only have we the idea of this freedom1 but it would be impossible for us not to have it4 ,freedom is known without proofs1 merely by the experience we have of it4 ,it is by the feeling of our freedom1 of our free-will that we understand that we exist as a being1 as a thing which is not merely a thing4 ,the true ego is the will4 ,even more than an intelligent being1 man is a free individual1 and only feels himself to be a man when feeling himself free1 so that he might not believe himself to be intelligent1 nor think himself sensible1 etc41 but not to think himself free would for him be moral suicide2 and in fact he actually never does anything which he does not believe himself to be free to do--that is1 which he does not believe that he might avoid doing1 if he so wished4 ,those who say1 ,it is simply the feeling that it is better for ourselves which tends to make us do this instead of doing that1 are deeply in error4 ,they forget that we often prefer the worst for ourselves in order to prove to ourselves that we are free and therefore have no other motive power than our own freedom4 7,and this is exactly what contemporaneous philosophy has thus formulated3 ,will is neither determinate nor indeterminate1 it is determinative47 ,even when a very obvious reason leads us to a thing1 although morally speaking it is difficult for us to do the opposite1 nevertheless1 speaking absolutely1 we can1 for we are always free to prevent ourselves from pursuing a good thing clearly known 444 provided only that we think it is beneficial thereby to give evidence of the truth of our free-will4 ,it is the pure and simple wish to be free which creates an action2 it is the all-powerful liberty4 ,as has been happily observed1 in relation to the universe the philosophy of ,descartes is a mechanical philosophy2 in relation to man the philosophy of ,descartes is a philosophy of will4 ,as has also been remarked1 there are very striking analogies between ,corneille and ,descartes from the point of view of the apotheosis of the will1 and the ,meditations having appeared after the great works of ,corneille1 it is not so much that ,corneille was a ,cartesian1 as that ,descartes was a follower of ,corneille4 ,,psychology ,,of ,,descartes4--,descartes has almost written a psychology1 what with his ,treatise on the ,passions and his letters and1 besides1 certain passages in his ,meditations4 ,the soul thinks and has passions4 ,there are three kinds of ideas1 the factitious1 the adventitious1 and the innate2 the factitious ideas are those which the imagination forms2 the adventitious ideas are those suggested by the external world through the intermediary of the senses2 the innate ideas are those constituting the mind itself1 the conditions under which it thinks and apart from which it cannot think3 we cannot conceive an object not extended1 nor an object apart from time1 nor anything without a cause2 the ideas of time1 space1 and cause are innate ideas2 we cannot conceive ourselves as other than free2 the idea of liberty is an innate idea4 ,the soul has passions2 it is therein that1 without dependence on the body1 it has intimate relations with and is modified by it1 not radically1 but in its daily life4 ,there are operations of the soul which cannot strictly be termed passions1 and yet which are directed or at least influenced by the body4 ,memory is passive1 and consequently memory is a species of passion4 ,the lively sensations which the body transmits to the brain leave impressions 7,malebranche would say traces71 and according to these impressions the soul is moved a second or a third time1 and that is what is called memory4 ,the impressions of the brain render it suitable to stir the soul in the same way as it has been stirred before1 and also to make it recollect something1 just as the folds in a piece of paper or linen make it more suitable to be folded anew as it was before than if it had never been thus folded4 ,similarly1 the association of ideas is passive1 and in consequence is a kind of passion4 ,the association of ideas is the fact that thought passes along the same path it has already traversed1 and follows in its labyrinth the thread which interlinks its thoughts1 and this thread is the traces which thoughts have left in the brain4 ,in abandoning ourselves to the association of ideas1 we are passive and we yield ourselves freely to a passion4 ,that is so true that current speech itself recognizes this3 musing is a passion1 it is possible to have a passion for musing1 and musing is nothing else than the association of ideas in which the will does not intervene4 ,,the ,,passions4--,coming to the passions strictly speaking1 there are some which are of the soul and only of the soul2 the passion for ,god is a passion of the soul1 the passion for liberty is a passion of the soul2 but there are many more which are the effects of the union of the soul with the body4 ,these passions are excited in the soul by a state of the body or a movement of the body or of some part of the body2 they are emotions of the soul corresponding to movements of the machine4 ,all passions have relation to the desire for pleasure and the fear of pain1 and according as they relate to the former or the latter are they expansive or oppressive4 ,there are six principal passions1 of which all the rest are only modifications3 admiration1 love1 desire1 joy1 having relation to the appetite of happiness2 hatred1 sadness1 having relation to the fear of pain4 ,all the passions are good and may become bad 7,descartes in this deviates emphatically from ,stoicism for which the passions are simply maladies of the soul74 ,all passions are good in themselves4 ,they are destined 7this is a remarkable theory7 to cause the duration of thoughts which would otherwise pass and be rapidly effaced2 by reason of this1 they cause man to act2 if he were only directed by his thoughts1 unaccompanied by his passions1 he would never act1 and if it be recognized that man is born for action1 it will at the same time be recognized that it is necessary he should have passions4 ,but1 you will say1 there can be good passions 7of a nature to give force to just ideas7 and evil passions4 ,no1 they are all good1 but all also have their bad side1 their deviation1 rather1 which enables them to become bad4 ,therefore1 in each passion no matter what it be1 it is always possible to distinguish between the passion itself1 which is always good1 and the excess1 the deviation1 the degradation or corruption of this passion which constitutes1 if it be desired to call it so1 an evil passion1 and this is what ,descartes demonstrates1 passion by passion1 in the fullest detail1 in his ,treatise on the ,passions4 ,,the ,,part ,,of ,,the ,,soul4--,if it is thus1 what will be the part of the soul 7the soul is the will78 ,it will be to abandon itself to good passions1 or more accurately to the good that is in all passions1 and to reduce the passions to be nothing more than themselves4 ,in courage1 for example1 there is courage and temerity4 ,the action of the will1 enlightened by the judgment1 will consist in reducing courage to be nothing but courage4 ,in fear1 there is cowardice and there is the feeling of self-preservation which1 according to ,descartes1 is the foundation of fear and which is a very good passion4 ,the action of the soul is to reduce fear to simple prudence4 ,but how will the will effect these metamorphoses or at least these departures1 these separations1 these reductions to the due proportion8 ,directly it can effect nothing upon the passions2 it cannot remove them2 it cannot even remove the baser portions of them2 but it can exercise influence over them by the intermediary of reasoning2 it can lead them to the attentive consideration of the thought that they carry with them1 and by this consideration modify them4 ,for instance1 if it is a question of fear1 the soul forces fear to consider that the peril is much less than was imagined1 and thus little by little brings it back to simple prudence4 ,note that this method1 although indirect1 is very potent2 for it ends by really transforming the passions into their opposites4 ,persuade fear that there is less peril in marching forward than in flight and that the most salutary flight is the flight forward and you have changed fear to courage4--,but such an influence of the will over the passions is extraordinarily unlikely3 it will never take place4--,yes1 by habit6 ,habit too is a passion1 or1 if you will1 a passive state1 like that of memory or the association of ideas1 and there are men possessed only of that passion4 ,but the will1 by the means which have been described1 by imposing an act1 a first act1 creates a commencement of habit1 by imposing a second confirms that habit1 by imposing a third strengthens it1 and so on4 ,in plain words1 the will1 by reasoning with the passions and reasoning with them incessantly1 brings them back to what is good in them and ends by bringing them back there permanently1 so that it arrives at having only the passions it desires1 or1 if you prefer it1 for it is the same thing1 at having only the passion for good4 ,morality consists in loving noble passions1 as was later observed by ,vauvenargues1 and that means to love all the passions1 each for what is good in it1 that is to reduce each passion to what real goodness is inherent in it1 and that is to gather all the passions into one1 which is the passion of duty4 ,,the ,,method ,,of ,,descartes4--,as has been observed1 not only had ,descartes influence through all that he wrote1 but it was by his method that he has exerted the greatest and most durable sway1 and that is why we conclude with the examination of his method4 ,it is all contained in this3 to accept nothing as true except what is evident2 to accept as true all that is evident4 ,descartes therefore made evidence the touchstone of certainty4 ,but mark well the profound meaning of this method3 what is it that gives me the assurance of the evidence of such or such an idea8 ,how shall ,i know that such an idea is really evident to me8 ,because ,i see it in perfect clearness8 ,no1 that does not suffice3 the evidence may be deceptive2 there can be false evidence2 all the wrong ideas of the philosophers of antiquity1 save when they were sophists1 had for them the character of being evident4 ,why8 ,why should error be presented to the mind as an evident truth8 ,because in truth1 in profound truthfulness1 it must be admitted that judgment does not depend upon the intelligence4 ,and on what does it depend8 ,on will1 on free-will4 ,this is how4 ,no doubt1 error depends on our judgment1 but our judgment depends on our will in the sense that it depends on us whether we adhere to our judgment without it being sufficiently precise or do not adhere to it because it is not sufficiently precise3 ,if ,i abstain from giving my judgment on a subject when ,i do not conceive it with sufficient clearness and distinction1 it is evident that ,i shall not be deceived4 ,evidence is therefore not only a matter of judgment1 of understanding1 of intelligence1 it is a matter of energetic will and of freedom courageously acquired4 ,we are confronted with evidence when1 with a clear brain1 we are capable1 in order to accept or refuse what it lays before us1 of acting after such a fashion1 of having put ourselves in such a state of the soul that we feel that no external force can constrain us to think in such or such a way4 ,these external forces are authority1 prejudices1 personal interest1 or that of party4 ,the faculty of perceiving evidence is therefore the triumph both of sound judgment in itself and of a freedom of mind which1 supposing probity1 scrupulousness1 and courage1 and perhaps the most difficult of all courage1 supposes a profound and vigorous morality4 ,evidence is given only to men who are first highly intelligent and next1 or rather before all else1 are profoundly honest4 ,evidence is not a consequence of morality2 but morality is the condition of evidence4 ,there is the foundation of the method of ,descartes2 add to it his advice on the art of reasoning1 which even in his time was not at all novel1 but which with him is very precise2 not to generalize too hastily1 not to be put off with words1 but to have a clear definition of every word1 etc41 and thus a sufficient idea of it will be obtained4 ,now first1 to this method ,descartes was unfaithful1 as always happens1 and often accepted the suggestions of his magnificent imagination as the evidences of his reason2 secondly1 the touchstone of evidence is certainly the best1 but is far from being infallible 7and ,vico has ridiculed it with as much sense as wit7 and the freest mind can still find false things evident2 yet1 thirdly1 favouring freedom of research self-controlled1 individual and scornful of all authority1 the method of ,descartes has become a banner1 a motto1 and a flag for all modern philosophy4 ,,descartes ,,the ,,father ,,of ,,modern ,,philosophy4--,and from all that the result has been that all modern philosophy1 with few exceptions1 has recognised ,descartes as its parent--that individual evidence1 if it may be thus expressed1 favouring temerity and each believing himself closer to the truth the more he differed from others1 and consequently was unable to suspect himself of being subject to influences1 individual evidence has provided a fresh opportunity for self-deception2 finally1 that ,descartes1 by a not uncommon metamorphosis1 by means of his system which he did not follow1 has become the head or the venerated ancestor of doctrines which he would have detested and which he already did detest more than all others4 ,because he said that evidence alone and the free investigation of evidence led to truth1 he has become the ancestor of the sceptics who are persuaded that surrender must be made only to evidence and that evidence cannot be found2 and he has become the ancestor of the positivists who believe that evidence certainly exists somewhere1 but not in metaphysics or in theodicy1 or in knowledge of the soul1 of immortality1 and of ,god1 branches of knowledge which surpass our means of knowing1 which are in fact outside knowledge4 ,so that this man who conceived more than any man1 this man who so often constructed without a sure foundation1 and this man1 yet again1 as has been aptly said1 who always thought by innate ideas1 by his formula has become the master and above all the guarantor of those who are the most reserved and most distrustful as to philosophic construction1 innate ideas1 and imagination4 ,this does not in the least diminish his brilliant merit2 it is only one of those changes of direction in which the history of ideas abounds4 ,,chapter ,,ii ,,cartesians ,all the ,seventeenth ,century was under the ,influence of ,descartes4 ,port-,royal1 ,bossuet1 ,fenelon1 ,malebranche1 ,spinoza1 ,leibnitz4 ,,cartesian ,,influence4--,nearly all the seventeenth century was ,cartesian1 and in the general sense of the word1 not only as supporters of the method of evidence1 but as adherents of the general philosophy of ,descartes4 ,gassendi 7a ,provencal1 and not an ,italian71 professor of philosophy at ,aix1 subsequently in ,paris1 was not precisely a faithful disciple of ,descartes1 and he opposed him several times2 he had leanings towards ,epicurus and the doctrine of atoms2 he drew towards ,hobbes1 but he was also a fervent admirer of ,bacon1 and so approached ,descartes1 who thought very highly of him1 though impatiently galled by his criticisms4 ,after the example of ,epicurus he was the most sober and austere of men1 and of the two it was ,descartes rather than he who was ,epicurean in the common use of the word4 ,according to a tradition1 which to my mind rests on insufficient proof1 he was an instructor of ,moliere4 ,all the thinkers of the seventeenth century came more or less profoundly under the ,cartesian influence3 ,pascal1 ,bossuet1 ,fenelon1 ,arnauld1 and all ,port-,royal4 ,this influence was to diminish only in the eighteenth century1 though kept up by the impenitent ,fontenelle1 but outweighed by that of ,locke1 to reappear very vigorously in the nineteenth century in ,france in the school of ,maine de ,biran and of ,cousin4 ,,malebranche4--,a separate niche must be made for the ,cartesians1 almost as great as ,descartes1 who filled the seventeenth century with their renown1--the ,frenchman ,malebranche1 the ,dutchman ,spinoza1 and the ,german ,leibnitz4 ,pushing the theories of ,descartes further than ,descartes would himself in all probability have desired to1 from what ,descartes had said that it was only through ,god that we perceived accurately1 ,malebranche declared that it was only in ,god that we perceived accurately1 and fundamentally this is the same idea2 it can only be deemed that ,malebranche is the more precise3 ,god alone is known by ,himself is believed in without uncertainty2 there is only ,he that we can see in immediate and direct perspective4 ,all the rest we see in ,him1 in ,his light1 in the light ,he creates in our minds4 ,when we see1 it is that we are in ,him4 ,evidence is divine light4 ,he is the link of ideas4 7,and thus ,malebranche brought ,plato near to ,descartes and showed that1 without the latter being aware of it1 they both said the same thing47 ,god is always the cause and as ,he is the cause of all real things1 ,he is cause also of all truths1 and as ,he is everywhere in real objects1 ,he is also everywhere in the true ideas which we can have1 or rather in which we can participate4 ,when we seek a truth we pray without thinking we do so2 attention is a prayer4 ,in the same way1 from the saying of ,descartes that the universe is a continuous creation1 ,malebranche deduced or rather concluded that our thoughts and actions are acts of ,god4 ,there can be no action of the body on the soul to produce ideas2 that would be inconceivable2 but on the occasion1 for instance1 of our eyes resting on an object1 ,god gives us an idea of that object1 whether in conformity or not we cannot tell2 but at any rate ,he gives us that idea of the object which ,he wishes us to have4 ,there is no action of our soul on our body2 that would be inconceivable4 ,but ,god to our will adds a force having a tendency towards goodness as a rule1 and to each of our volitions adds a force tending to its execution and capable of executing it4 ,then1 when our will is evil and we execute it1 does ,god sin in our name8 ,certainly not2 because sin is not an act2 it consists in doing nothing2 it consists precisely in the soul not acting on the body2 therefore it is not a force but a weakness4 ,sin is that ,god has withdrawn ,himself from us4 ,the sinner is only a being who is without strength because he is lacking in grace4 ,the principle of morality is the respect for order and the love of order4 ,that makes two degrees1 the first of which is regularity and the second virtue4 ,to conform to order is highly rational but without merit 7e4g41 to give money to the poor from habit or possibly from vanity74 ,to love order and to desire that it should be greater1 more complete1 and nearer to the will of ,god1 is to adhere to ,god1 to live in ,god1 just as to see rightly is to see in ,god4 ,all morality1 into the details of which we will not enter1 evolves from the love of order4 ,the universe is a vast mechanism1 as was stated by ,descartes1 set in motion and directed by ,god--that is to say1 by the laws established by ,god2 for ,god acts only by general dispositions 7which are laws7 and not by particular dispositions4 ,in other words1 there exists a will1 but there are no volitions4 ,,miracles4--,but then you will say there are no miracles2 for miracle is precisely a particular will traversing and interrupting the general will4 ,to begin with1 there are very few miracles1 which therefore permits order to subsist2 it would be only if there were incessant miracles that order would be non-existent4 ,next1 a miracle is a warning ,god gives to men because of their weakness1 to remind them that behind the laws there is a ,lawgiver1 behind the general dispositions a ,being who disposes4 ,because of their intellectual weakness1 if they never saw any derogation from the general laws they would take them to be fatalities4 ,a miracle is a grace intervening in things1 just as grace properly so-called intervenes in human actions4 ,and it is not contradictory to the general design of ,god1 since by bringing human minds back to the truth that there is a ,being who wills1 it accustoms them to consider all general laws as permanent acts1 but also as the acts of the ,being who wills4 ,the miracle has the virtue of making everything in the world miraculous1 which is true4 ,hence the miracle confirms the idea of order4 ,therein1 perhaps alone1 the exception proves the rule4 ,,spinoza4--,spinoza1 who during his life was a pure ,stoic and the purest of ,stoics1 polishing the lenses of astronomical telescopes in order to gain his living1 refusing all pensions and all the professorial positions offered to him1 and living well-nigh on nothing1 had read ,descartes and1 to conform to the principle of evidence1 had begun by renouncing his religion1 which was that of the ,jews4 ,his general outlook on the world was this3 ,there is only one ,god4 ,god is all4 ,only ,he has ,his attributes--that is to say1 ,his manners of being and ,his modes1 that is ,his modifications1 as the sun 7merely a comparison7 has as its manners of being1 its roundness1 colour1 and heat1 as modifications its rays1 terrestrial heat1 direct and diffused light1 etc4 ,now ,god has two attributes1 thought and extension1 as had already been observed by ,descartes2 and for modifications ,he has exactly all we can see1 touch1 or feel1 etc4 ,the human soul is an attribute of ,god1 as is everything else2 it is an attribute of ,god in ,his power4 ,it is not free1 for all that comes from ,god1 all that is of ,god1 is a regular and necessary development of ,god ,himself4 ,there is nothing contingent nothing which may either happen or not happen4 ,all things are determined1 by the necessity of the divine nature1 to exist and to act in a given manner4 ,there is therefore no free-will in the soul1 the soul is determined to will this or that by a cause which is itself determined by another and that by another1 and so on to infinity4 ,nevertheless we believe ourselves to be free and according to the principle of evidence we are2 for nothing is more evident to us than our liberty4 ,we are as intimately convinced of our liberty as of our existence and we all affirm1 ,i am free1--with the same emphasis that ,descartes affirms3 ,i am4 ,i am and ,i am free are the two things it is impossible for man to doubt1 no matter what effort he makes4 ,no doubt1 but it is an illusion4 ,it is the illusion of a being who feels himself as cause1 but does not feel himself as effect4 ,try to imagine a billiard ball which feels it moves others1 but which does not feel that it is moved4 ,what we call decision is an idea which decides us because it exercises more power over us than the others do2 what we term deliberation is a hesitancy between two or three ideas which at the moment have equal force2 what we name volition is an idea1 and what we call will is our understanding applied to facts4 ,we do not want to fight2 we conceive the idea of fighting and the idea carries us away2 we do not want to hang ourselves2 we have the obsessing idea of hanging ourselves and this thought runs away with us4 ,,his ,,moral ,,system4--,spinoza wrote a system of morality4 ,is it not radically impossible to write a system of morality when the author does not believe in free-will8 ,the admirable originality of ,spinoza1 even though his idea can be contested1 is precisely that morality depends on belief in the necessity of all things--that is1 the more one is convinced of this necessity so much the more does one attain high morality--that is1 the more one believes oneself free the more one is immoral4 ,the man who believes himself free claims to run counter to the universal order1 and morality precisely is adherence to it2 the man who believes himself free seeks for an individual good just as if there could be an individual good1 just as if the best for each one were not to submit to the necessary laws of everything1 laws which constitute what is good2 the man who thinks himself free sets himself against ,god1 believes himself ,god since he believes himself to be creator of what he does1 and since he believes himself capable of deranging something in the mechanism and of introducing a certain amount of movement4 ,as a matter of fact1 he does nothing of the kind2 but he believes that he does it1 and this mere thought1 false and low as it is1 keeps him in the most miserable condition of life2 to sum up1 a man who believes himself free may not perhaps be an atheist1 but he is ungodly4 ,on the contrary1 the man who does not believe himself free believes he is in the hands of ,god1 and that is the beginning of wisdom and the beginning of virtue4 ,we are in the hands of ,god as the clay is in those of the potter2 the mad vase would be the one which reproached the potter for having made it small instead of big1 common instead of decorative4 ,it is the beginning of wisdom to believe oneself in the hands of ,god2 to see ,him1 to see ,him the least indistinctly that we can1 therein lies the highest wisdom2 we must see ,his designs1 or at least ,his great design and associate ourselves with it1 thus becoming not only part of ,him1 which we always are1 but a conscient part of ,him4 ,this is the love of ,god1 and the love of ,god is virtue itself4 ,we ought to love ,god without consideration of the good ,he can do us and of the penalties ,he can inflict upon us2 for to love ,god from love of a beneficent ,god or from fear of a punitive ,god is not to love ,god but to love oneself4 ,,the ,,passions4--,we have our passions as enemies and as obstacles to our elevation to this semi-perfection4 ,it is they which cause us to do immoral acts4 ,immoral1 has that a meaning from the moment that we do nothing which we are not obliged to do8 ,yes1 just as when led by our deceitful mind we have arrived necessarily at a false idea1 the fact of this thought being necessary does not prevent it from being false2 we may have been led by necessity to commit a villainous action1 but that does not prevent its being immoral4 ,the passions are our imperfections1 omissions1 gaps in a soul which is not full of the idea of ,god and of universal order and the love of ,god and of universal order1 and which1 in consequence1 lives individually--that is1 separated from the universe4 ,the passions are infinite in number and ,spinoza1 in a bulky volume1 furnished a minute and singularly profound description of the principal ones alone1 into the details of which we regret that we cannot enter4 ,the ,ethics of ,spinoza is an incomparable masterpiece4 ,the study of the passions is very salutary1 because in studying them one gets so detached from them that one can perceive their emptiness1 their meanness1 and their puerile1 nay1 even bestial character4 ,it might even be added that the mere thought of studying them is already an act of detachment in reference to them4 ,thou wouldst not seek ,me1 hadst thou not already found ,me1 said ,god to ,pascal4 ,thou wouldst not make investigations about us1 hadst thou not already quitted us1 the passions might say to the philosopher4 ,,sanctions ,,of ,,morality4--,what are the sanctions of morality8 ,they are necessary sanctions2 just as everything is necessary and may even be said to be mechanical4 ,there is neither merit nor demerit and the criminal is not culpable2 only he is outside order1 and everything must be in order4 ,he who is maddened by the bite of a mad dog is certainly innocent2 yet anyone has the right to suffocate him4 ,in the same way1 the man who cannot govern his passions by fear of the law is a very excusable invalid2 yet he cannot enjoy peace of mind1 or the knowledge of ,god1 or even the love of ,god1 and it is necessary that he perish4 ,through death he has re-entered within order4 ,but does the sanction of beyond-the-grave exist1 and is the soul immortal1 and are we to be rewarded therein in another life8 ,the conclusion of ,spinoza on this matter is hesitating1 but at the risk of misrepresenting it1 which ,i fear to do1 it seems to me that it can be thus summed up--,the soul makes itself immortal1 in proportion as by the knowledge and love of ,god it participates more in ,god4 ,in proportion it makes itself divine2 and approaching perfection1 by the same progress it also approaches immortality4 ,it is conceivable that by error and sin it kills itself1 and by virtue renders itself imperishable4 ,this immortality is not or does not seem to be personal1 it is literally a definite re-entry into the bosom of ,god2 ,spinozian immortality would therefore be a prolongation of the same effort which we make in this life to adhere to universal order2 the recompense for having adhered to it here below is to be absorbed in it there1 and in that lies true beatitude4 ,here below we ought to see everything from the point of view of eternity 7sub specie aeternitatis71 and this is a way of being eternal2 elsewhere we shall be in eternity itself4 ,,leibnitz4--,leibnitz possessed a universal mind1 being historian1 naturalist1 politician1 diplomatist1 scholar1 theologian1 mathematician2 here we will regard him only as philosopher4 ,for ,leibnitz the basis1 the substance of all beings is not either thought or extension as with ,descartes1 but is force1 productive of action4 ,what does not act does not exist4 ,everything that exists is a force1 either action or tendency to action4 ,and force1 all force has two characteristics3 it desires to do1 it wishes to think4 ,the world is the graduated compound of all these forces4 ,above all there is the supreme force1 ,god1 who is infinite force1 infinite thought2 by successive descents those base and obscure forces are reached which seem to have neither power nor thought1 and yet have a minimum of power and even of thought1 so to speak1 latent4 ,god thinks and acts infinitely2 man thinks and acts powerfully1 thanks to reason1 which distinguishes him from the rest of creation2 the animal acts and thinks dimly1 but it does act and think1 for it has a soul composed of memory and of the results and consequences of memory1 and by parenthesis three-fourths of our own actions are governed by memory1 and most frequently we act like animals2 plants act1 and if they do not think1 at least feel 7which is still thought71 though more dimly than animals2 and finally in the mineral kingdom the power of action and thought slumber1 but are not non-existent since they can be transformed into plants1 animals1 and men1 into living matter which feels and thinks4 ,therefore1 as was later on to be maintained by ,schopenhauer1 everything is full of souls1 and of souls which are forces as well as intelligences4 ,the human soul is a force too1 like the body4 ,between these two forces1 which seem to act on one another and which certainly act in concert in such fashion that the movement desired by the soul is executed by the body or that the soul obviously assents to a movement desired by the body1 what can be the affinity and the relation1 in what consists their concurrence and concord8 ,leibnitz 7and there was already something of the same nature suggested by ,descartes7 believes that all the forces of the world act1 each spontaneously2 but that among all the actions they perform there exists an agreement imposed by ,god1 a concord establishing universal order1 a preestablished harmony causing them all to co-operate in the same design4 ,well1 then1 between the soul1 this force1 and the body1 this force also1 this harmony reigns as between any force whatever in nature and one and all of the others2 and that is the explanation of the union and concord between the soul and the body4 ,imagine two well-constructed clocks wound up by the same maker2 they indicate the same hour1 and it might appear that this one directs the other1 or that the other directs the first4 ,all the forces of the world are clocks which agree with each other1 because they have been regulated in advance by the divine clockmaker1 and they all indicate the eternal hour4 ,,the ,,radical ,,optimism ,,of ,,leibnitz4--,from all these general views on matter1 on mind and on the mind1 ,leibnitz arrived at a radical optimism which is the thing for which he has since been most ridiculed1 and by which1 at any rate1 he has remained famous4 ,he believes that all is good1 despite the evil of which no one can dispute the existence2 and he believes that all is the best possible in the best of possible worlds4 ,in fact1 ,god is supreme wisdom and supreme goodness2 that was quite evident to ,descartes1 who in the matter of evidence was not easily satisfied4 ,this perfect wisdom and perfect goodness could choose only what is best4--,but yet evil exists6 ,diminish it as much as you choose1 it still exists4--,it exists by a necessity inherent in what is created4 ,everything created is imperfect4 ,god alone is perfect2 what is imperfect is by its definition evil mingled with good4 ,evil is only the boundary of good1 where ,god was compelled to stop in creating beings and things other than ,himself1 and if ,he had created only according to absolute goodness1 ,he could have created only ,himself4 ,and that is the precise meaning of this phrase the best of possible worlds2 the world is perfect so far as that which is created1 and therefore imperfect1 can be perfect2 so far as what is not ,god can be divine2 the world is ,god ,himself as far as ,he can remain ,himself whilst being anything else than ,himself4 ,,the ,,three ,,evils4--,let us distinguish in order to comprehend better4 ,there are three evils3 the metaphysical1 the physical1 and the moral4 ,metaphysical evil is this very fact of not being perfection2 it is natural enough that what emanates only from perfection should not be perfection4 ,physical evil is suffering2 ,god cannot will suffering1 desire it1 or cherish it2 but ,he can permit it as a means of good1 as a condition of good2 for there would be no moral good if there were not occasion for struggle1 and there would be no occasion for struggling if physical evil did not exist2 imagine a paradise2 all the inhabitants merely exist and never have cause to show the slightest endurance1 the least courage1 the smallest virtue4 ,and finally1 as to moral evil1 which is sin1 ,god can even less desire that it should exist1 but ,he can admit its existence1 allow it to be1 to afford men occasion for merit or demerit4 ,nothing is more easy than to criticize ,god whilst considering only a portion of ,his work and not considering it as a whole4 ,he must have created it to be a whole and it is as a whole that it must be judged4 ,and precisely because the whole cannot be comprehended by anyone1 hold thy peace1 foolish reason1 as ,pascal said1 and judge not or judge a priori1 since here it is not possible to judge by experience2 and declare that the ,perfect can have willed only the most perfect that is possible4 ,,the ,,possible ,,and ,,the ,,impossible4--,there still remains the fundamental objection3 to reduce ,god to the conditions of the possible is to limit ,him1 and it is useless to say that ,god is justified if ,he has done all the good possible4 ,he is not2 the words possible and impossible having no meaning to ,him who is omnipotent1 and by definition infinite power could effect the impossible4 ,yes1 ,leibnitz replies1 there is a metaphysical impossibility1 there is an impossibility in the infinite2 this impossibility is absurdity1 is contradiction4 ,could ,god make the whole smaller than the part or any line shorter than a straight one8 ,reason replies in the negative4 ,is ,god therefore limited8 ,he is limited by the absurd and that means ,he is unlimited2 for the absurd is a falling away4 ,it is therefore credible that the mixture of evil and good is a metaphysical necessity to which ,i will not say ,god submits1 but in which ,he acts naturally1 and that the absence of evil is a metaphysical contradiction1 an absurdity in itself1 which ,god cannot commit precisely because ,he is perfect2 and no doubt1 instead of drawing this conclusion1 we should actually see it1 were the totality of things1 of their relations1 of their concordance1 and of their harmony known to us4 ,the optimism of ,leibnitz was ridiculed specially in the ,candide of ,voltaire1 ingeniously defended by ,rousseau1 magnificently defended by ,victor ,hugo in the following verses1 well worthy of ,leibnitz3 ,oui peut-etre au dela de la sphere des nues1 ,au sein de cet azur immobile et dormant1 ,peut-etre faites-vous des choses inconnues ,ou la douleur de l'homme entre comme element4 ,,chapter ,,iii ,,the ,,english ,,philosophers ,,of ,,the ,,seventeenth ,,century ,locke3 ,his ,ideas on ,human ,liberty1 ,morality1 ,general ,politics1 and ,religious ,politics4 ,,locke4--,locke1 very learned in various sciences--physics1 chemistry1 medicine1 often associated with politics1 receiving enlightenment from life1 from frequent travels1 from friendships with interesting and illustrious men1 always studying and reflecting until an advanced old age1 wrote only carefully premeditated works3 his ,treatise of ,government and ,essay on the ,human ,understanding4 ,locke appears to have written on the understanding only in order to refute the innate ideas of ,descartes4 ,for ,locke innate ideas have no existence4 ,the mind before it comes into contact with the external world is a blank sheet1 and there is nothing in the mind which has not first come through the senses4 ,what1 then1 are ideas8 ,they are sensations registered by the brain1 and they are also sensations elaborated and modified by reflection4 ,these ideas then commingle in such a manner as to form an enormous mass of combinations4 ,they are commingled either in a natural or an artificial manner4 ,in a natural manner1 that is in a way conforming to the great primary ideas given us by reflection1 the idea of cause1 the idea of end1 the idea of means to an end1 the idea of order1 etc41 and it is the harmony of these ideas which is commonly termed reason2 they become associated by accident1 by the effects of emotion1 by the effect of custom1 etc41 and then they give birth to prejudices1 errors1 and superstitions4 ,the passions of the soul are aspects of pleasure and pain4 ,the idea of a possible pleasure gives birth in us to a desire which is called ambition1 love1 covetousness1 gluttony2 the idea of a possible pain gives birth in us to fear and horror1 and this fear and horror is called hatred1 jealousy1 rage1 aversion1 disgust1 scorn4 ,at bottom we have only two passions1 the desire of enjoyment1 and the fear of suffering4 ,,the ,,freedom ,,of ,,man4--,is man free8 ,appealing to experience and making use only of it and not of intimate feeling1 ,locke declares in the negative4 ,a will always seems to him determined by another will1 and this other by another to infinity1 or by a motive1 a weight1 a motive power which causes a leaning to right or left4 ,will certainly exists--that is to say1 an exact and lively desire to perform an action1 or to continue an action1 or to interrupt an action1 but this will is not free1 for to represent it as free is to represent it as capable of wishing what it does not wish4 ,the will is an anxiety to act in such or such a fashion1 and this anxiety1 on account of its character of anxiety1 of strong emotion1 of tension of the soul1 appears to us free1 appears to us an internal force which is self-governed and independent2 we feel consciousness of will in the effort4 ,this tension must not be denied1 but it must be recognised as the effect of a potent desire which the obstacle excites2 this tension1 therefore1 is an indication of nothing except the potency of the desire and the existence of an obstacle4 ,now this desire1 so potent that it is irritated by the obstacle1 and1 so to speak1 unites us against it1 is a passion dominating and filling our being2 so that we are never more swayed by passion than when we believe ourselves to be exercising our will1 and in consequence the more we desire the less are we free4 ,it is not essential formally and absolutely to confound will with desire4 ,overpowered by heat1 we desire to drink cold water1 and because we know that that would do us harm we have the will not to drink2 but although this is an important distinction it is not a fundamental one2 what incites us to drink is a passion1 what prevents us is another passion1 one more general and stronger1 the desire not to die1 and because this passion by meeting with and fighting another produces in all our being a powerful tension1 it is none the less a passion1 even if we ought not to say that it is a still more impassioned passion4 ,,locke',s ,,theory ,,of ,,politics4--,in politics ,locke was the adversary of ,hobbes1 whose theories of absolutism have already been noticed4 ,he did not believe that the natural state was the war of all against all4 ,he believed men formed societies not to escape cannibalism1 but more easily to guarantee and protect their natural rights3 ownership1 personal liberty1 legitimate defence4 ,society exists only to protect these rights1 and the reason of its existence lies in this duty to defend them4 ,the sovereign therefore is not the saviour of the nation1 he is its law-maker and magistrate4 ,if he violates the rights of man1 he acts so directly contrary to his mission and his mandate that insurrection against him is legitimate4 ,the wise ,locke1 as ,voltaire always called him1 was the inventor of the ,rights of ,man4 ,in religious politics he was equally liberal and advocated the separation of ,church and ,state2 the ,state1 according to him1 should not have any religion of its own1 its province being only to protect equally the liberty of all denominations4 ,locke was discussed minutely by ,leibnitz1 who1 without accepting the innate ideas of ,descartes1 did not accept the ideas through sensation of ,locke1 and said3 ,there is nothing in the intelligence which has not first been in the senses1 granted 444 except the intelligence itself4 ,the intelligence has not innate ideas born ready made2 but it possesses forms of its own in which the ideas arrange themselves and take shape1 and this is the due province of the intelligence4 ,and it was these forms which later on ,kant was to call the categories of the intellect1 and at bottom ,descartes meant nothing else by his innate ideas4 ,locke exerted a prodigious and even imperious influence over the ,french philosophers of the eighteenth century4 ,,chapter ,,iv ,,the ,,english ,,philosophers ,,of ,,the ,,eighteenth ,,century ,berkeley3 ,highly ,idealist ,philosophy which ,regarded ,matter as ,non-existent4 ,david ,hume3 ,sceptical ,philosophy4 ,the ,scottish ,school3 ,common ,sense ,philosophy4 ,,berkeley4--,to the sensualist ,locke succeeded ,berkeley1 the unrestrained idealist1 like him an ,englishman4 ,he began to write when very young1 continued to write until he was sixty1 and died at sixty-eight4 ,he believed neither in matter nor in the external world4 ,there was the whole of his philosophy4 ,why did he not believe in them8 ,because all thinkers are agreed that we cannot know whether we see the external world as it is4 ,then1 if we do not know it1 why do we affirm that it exists8 ,we know nothing about it4 ,now we ought to build up the world only with what we know of it1 and to do otherwise is not philosophy but yielding to imagination4 ,what is it that we know of the world8 ,our ideas1 and nothing but our ideas4 ,very well then1 let us say3 there are only ideas4 ,but whence do these ideas come to us8 ,to explain them as coming from the external world which we have never seen is to explain obscurity by denser darkness4 ,they are spiritual1 they come to us without doubt from a spirit1 from ,god4 ,this is possible1 it is not illogical1 and ,berkeley believes it4 ,this doctrine regarded by the eyes of common sense may appear a mere phantasy2 but ,berkeley saw in it many things of high importance and great use4 ,if you believe in matter1 you can believe in matter only1 and that is materialism with its moral consequences1 which are immoral2 if you believe in matter and in ,god1 you are so hampered by this dualism that you do not know how to separate nature from ,god1 and it therefore comes to pass that you see ,god in matter1 which is called pantheism4 ,in a word1 between us and ,god ,berkeley has suppressed matter in order that we should come1 as it were1 into direct contact with ,god4 ,he derives much from ,malebranche1 and it may be said he only pushes his theories to their extreme4 ,although a bishop1 he was not checked1 like ,descartes1 by the idea of ,god not being able to deceive us1 and he answered that ,god does not deceive us1 that ,he gives us ideas and that it is we who deceive ourselves by attributing them to any other origin than to ,him2 nor was he checked1 like ,malebranche1 by the authority of ,scripture1 which in ,genesis portrays ,god creating matter4 ,he saw there1 no doubt1 only a symbolical sense1 a simple way of speaking according to the comprehension of the multitude4 ,,david ,,hume4--,david ,hume1 a ,scotsman1 better known1 at least in his own times1 as the historian of ,england than as a philosopher1 nevertheless well merits consideration in the latter category4 ,david ,hume believes in nothing1 and1 in consequence1 it may be said that he is not a philosopher2 he has no philosophic system4 ,he has no philosophic system1 it is true2 but he is a critic of philosophy1 and therefore he philosophizes4 ,matter has no existence2 as we know nothing about it1 we should not say it exists4 ,but we ourselves1 we exist4 ,all that we can know about that is that in us there is a succession of ideas1 of representations2 but we1 but ,i1 what is that8 ,of that we know nothing4 ,we are present at a series of pictures1 and we may call their totality the ego2 but we do not grasp ourselves as a thing of unity1 as an individual4 ,we are the spectators of an inward dramatic piece behind which we can see no author4 ,there is no more reason to believe in oneself than in the external world4 ,,innate ,,ideas4--,as for innate ideas1 they are simply general ideas1 which are general delusions4 ,we believe1 for instance1 that every effect has a cause1 or1 to express it more correctly1 that everything has a cause4 ,what do we know about it8 ,what do we see8 ,that one thing follows another1 succeeds to another4 ,what tells us that the latter proceeds from the former1 that the thing ,b must necessarily come1 owing to the thing ,a existing8 ,we believe it because every time the thing ,a has been1 the thing ,b has come4 ,well1 let us say that every time ,a has been 7thus far7 ,b has come2 and say no more4 ,there are regular successions1 but we are completely ignorant whether there are causes for them4 ,,the ,,liberty ,,and ,,morality ,,of ,,hume4--,it results from this that for ,hume there is no liberty4 ,very obviously2 for when we believe ourselves free1 it is because we believe we can fix upon ourselves as a cause4 ,now the word cause means nothing4 ,we are a succession of phenomena very absolutely determined4 ,the proof is that we foresee and nearly always accurately 7and we could always foresee accurately if we completely knew the character of the persons and the influences acting on them7 what people we know will do1 which would be impossible if they did as they wished4 ,and ,i1 at the very moment when ,i am absolutely sure ,i am doing such and such a thing because ,i desired to1 ,i see my friend smile as he says3 ,i was sure you would do that4 ,see1 ,i wrote it down on this piece of paper4 ,he understood me as a necessity1 when ,i felt myself to be free4 ,and he1 reciprocally1 will believe himself free in doing a thing ,i would have wagered to a certainty that he would not fail to do4 ,what system of morality can ,hume have with these principles8 ,first of all1 he protests against those who should deduce from his principles the immorality of his system4 ,take care1 said he wittily 7just like ,spinoza1 by the way71 it is the partisans of free-will who are immoral4 ,no doubt6 ,it is when there is liberty that there is no responsibility4 ,i am not responsible for my actions if they have no connection in me with anything durable or constant4 ,i have committed murder4 ,truly it is by chance1 if it was by an entirely isolated determination1 entirely detached from the rest of my character1 and momentary2 and ,i am only infinitesimally responsible4 ,but if all my actions are linked together1 are conditional upon one another1 dependent on one another1 if ,i have committed murder it is because ,i am an assassin at every moment of my life or nearly so1 and then1 oh6 how responsible ,i am6 ,note that this is the line taken up by judges1 since they make careful investigation of the antecedents of the accused4 ,they find him all the more culpable if he has always shown bad instincts4--,therefore they find him the more responsible1 the more he has been compelled by necessity4--,yes4 ,hume then does not believe himself foreclosed in morality2 he does not believe he is forbidden by his principles to have a system of morality and he has one4 ,it is a morality of sentiment4 ,we have in us the instinct of happiness and we seek happiness2 but we have also in us an instinct of goodwill which tends to make us seek the general happiness1 and reason tells us that there is conciliation or rather concordance between these two instincts1 because it is only in the general happiness that we find our particular happiness4 ,,the ,,scottish ,,school3 ,,reid2 ,,stewart4--,the ,scottish ,school 7end of the eighteenth century7 was pre-eminently a school of men who attached themselves to common sense and were excellent moralists4 ,we must at any rate mention ,thomas ,reid and ,dugald ,stewart4 ,they were bent especially on opposing the transcendent idealism of ,berkeley and the scepticism of ,david ,hume1 also in some measure ,locke's doctrine of the blank sheet4 ,they reconstituted the human mind and even the world 7which had been so to speak driven off in vapour by their predecessors71 much as they were in the time of ,descartes4 ,let us believe1 they said1 in the reality of the external world2 let us believe that there are causes and effects2 let us believe there is an ego1 a human person whom we directly apprehend1 and who is a cause2 let us believe that we are free and that we are responsible because we are free1 etc4 ,they were1 pre-eminently1 excellent describers of states of the soul1 admirable psychological moralists and they were the ancestors of the highly remarkable pleiad of ,english psychologists of the nineteenth century4 ,,chapter ,v ,,french ,,philosophers ,,of ,,the ,,eighteenth ,,century ,voltaire a ,disciple of ,locke4 ,rousseau a ,freethinking ,christian1 but deeply ,imbued with ,religious ,sentiments4 ,diderot a ,capricious ,materialist4 ,d',holbach and ,helvetius ,avowed ,materialists4 ,condillac a ,philosopher of ,sensations4 ,,voltaire2 ,,rousseau4--,the ,french philosophy of the eighteenth century1 fairly feeble it must be avowed1 seemed as if dominated by the ,english philosophy1 excepting ,berkeley1 but especially by ,locke and ,david ,hume1 more particularly ,locke1 who was the intellectual deity of those ,frenchmen of that epoch who were interested in philosophy4 ,whenever ,voltaire dealt with philosophy1 he was only the echo of ,locke whose depths he failed to fathom1 and to whom he has done some injury1 for reading ,locke only through ,voltaire has led to the belief that ,locke was superficial4 ,rousseau was both the disciple and adversary of ,hobbes1 as often occurs1 and dealt out to the public the doctrines of ,hobbes in an inverted form1 making the state of nature angelic instead of infernal1 and putting the government of all by all in the place of government by one1 invariably reaching the same point with a simple difference of form2 for if ,hobbes argued for despotism exercised by one over all1 ,rousseau argued for the despotism of all over each4 ,in ,emile1 he was incontestably inspired by the ideas of ,locke on education in some degree1 but in my opinion less than has been asserted4 ,on nearly all sides it has been asserted that ,rousseau exercised great influence over ,kant4 ,i know that ,kant felt infinite admiration for ,rousseau1 but of the influence of ,rousseau upon ,kant ,i have never been able to discover a trace4 ,,diderot2 ,,helvetius2 ,d',,holbach4--,it was particularly on ,david ,hume that ,diderot depended4 ,the difference1 which is great1 is that ,david ,hume in his scepticism remained a grave1 reserved man1 well-bred and discreet1 and was only a sceptic1 whilst ,diderot was violent in denial and a man of paradoxes and jests1 both impertinent and cynical4 ,it is almost ridiculous in a summary history of philosophy to name as sub-,diderots1 if one may so express it1 ,helvetius and ,d',holbach1 who were merely wits believing themselves philosophers1 and who were not always wits4 ,,condillac4--,condillac belongs to another category4 ,he was a very serious philosopher and a vigorous thinker4 ,an exaggerated disciple of ,locke1 while the latter admitted sensation and reflection as the origin of ideas1 ,condillac admitted only pure sensation and transformed sensation--that is to say1 sensation transforming itself4 ,the definition of man that he deduces from these principles is very celebrated and it is interesting3 ,the ego of each man is only the collection of the sensations that he feels and of those his memory recalls2 it is the consciousness of what he is combined with the recollection of what he has been4 ,to ,condillac1 the idea is a sensation which has fixed itself and which has been renewed and vivified by others2 desire is a sensation which wishes to be repeated and seeks what opportunity offers for its renewal1 and the will itself is only the most potent of desires4 ,condillac was voluntarily and systematically limited1 but his system is well knit and presented in admirably clear and precise language4 ,,chapter ,,vi ,,kant ,kant ,reconstructed all ,philosophy by ,supporting it on ,morality4 ,,knowledge4--,kant1 born at ,koenigsberg in #agbd1 was professor there all his life and died there in #ahjd4 ,nothing happened to him except the possession of genius4 ,he had commenced with the theological philosophy in use in his country1 that of ,wolf1 which on broad lines was that of ,leibnitz4 ,but he early read ,david ,hume1 and the train of thought of the sceptical ,scotsman at least gave him the idea of submitting all philosophic ideas to a severe and close criticism4 ,he first of all asked himself what the true value is of our knowledge and what knowledge is4 ,we believe generally that it is the things which give us the knowledge that we have of them4 ,but1 rather1 is it not we who impose on things the forms of our mind and is not the knowledge that we believe we have of things only the knowledge which we take of the laws of our mind by applying it to things8 ,this is what is most probable4 ,we perceive the things by moulds1 so to speak1 which are in ourselves and which give them their shapes and they would be shapeless and chaotic were it otherwise4 ,consequently1 it is necessary to distinguish the matter and the form of our knowledge3 the matter of the knowledge is the things themselves4 ,the form of our knowledge is ourselves3 ,our experimental knowledge is a compound of what we receive from impressions and of what our individual faculty of knowing draws from itself on the occasion of these impressions4 ,,sensibility2 ,,understanding2 ,,reason4--,those who believe that all we think proceeds from the senses are therefore wrong2 so too are those wrong who believe that all we think proceeds from ourselves4 ,to say1 ,matter is an appearance1 and to say1 ,ideas are appearances1 are equally false doctrines4 ,now we know by sensibility1 by understanding1 and by reason4 ,by sensibility we receive the impression of phenomena2 by the understanding we impose on these impressions their forms1 and link them up together2 by reason we give ourselves general ideas of things--universal ones1 going beyond or believing they go beyond the data1 even when linked up and systematized4 ,let us analyse sensibility1 understanding1 and reason4 ,sensibility already has the forms it imposes on things4 ,these forms are time and space4 ,time and space are not given us by matter like colour1 smell1 taste1 or sound2 they are not perceived by the senses2 they are therefore the forms of our sensibility3 we can feel only according to time and space1 by lodging what we feel in space and time2 these are the conditions of sensibility4 ,phenomena are thus perceived by us under the laws of space and of time4 ,what do they become in us8 ,they are seized by the understanding1 which also has its forms1 its powers of classification1 of arrangement1 and of connection4 ,its forms or powers1 or1 putting it more exactly1 its active forms are1 for example1 the conception of quantity being always equal3 through all phenomena the quantity of substance remains always the same2 the conception of causality3 everything has a cause and every cause has an effect and it is ever thus4 ,those are the conditions of our understanding1 those without which we do not understand and the forms which within us we impose on all things in order to understand them4 ,it is thus that we know the world2 which is tantamount to stating that the world exists1 so far as we are concerned1 only so long as we think so4 ,reason would go further3 it would seize the most general1 the universal1 beyond experience1 beyond the limited and restricted systematizations established by the understanding2 to know1 for instance1 the first cause of all causes1 the last and collective end1 so to speak1 of all purposes2 to know why is there something8 and in view of what end is there something8 in fact1 to answer all the questions of infinity and eternity4 ,be sure that it cannot4 ,how could it8 ,it only operates1 can only operate1 on the data of experience and the systematizations of the understanding1 which classify experience but do not go beyond it4 ,only operating upon that1 having nothing except that as matter1 how could it itself go beyond experience8 ,it cannot4 ,it is only 7a highly important fact1 and one which must on no account be forgotten7--it is only a sign1 merely a witness4 ,it is the sign that the human spirit has need of the absolute2 it is itself that need2 without that it would not exist2 it is the witness of our invincible insistence on knowing and of our tendency to estimate that we know nothing if we only know something2 it is itself that insistence and that tendency3 without that it would not exist4 ,let us pause there for the moment4 ,man knows of nature only those impressions which he receives from it1 co-ordinated by the forms of sensibility1 and further the ideas of it which he preserves co-ordinated by the forms of his understanding4 ,this is very little4 ,it is all1 if we consider only pure reason4 ,,practical ,,reason4--,but there is perhaps another reason1 or another aspect of reason--to wit1 practical reason4 ,what is practical reason8 ,something in us tells us3 you should act1 and you should act in such a way2 you should act rightly2 this is not right1 so do not do it2 that is right1 do it4 ,as a fact this is uncontestable4 ,what is the explanation8 ,from what data of experience1 from what systematization of the understanding has our mind borrowed this8 ,where has it got it8 ,does nature yield obedience to a you ought8 ,not at all4 ,it exists1 and it develops and it goes its way1 according to our way of seeing it in time and space1 and that is all4 ,does the understanding furnish the idea of you ought8 ,by no means2 it gives us ideas of quantity1 of quality1 of cause and effect1 etc41 and that is all2 there is no you ought in all that4 ,therefore this you ought is purely human2 it is the only principle which comes exactly from ourselves only4 ,it might therefore well be the very foundation of us4--,it may be an illusion4--,no doubt1 but it is highly remarkable that it exists1 though nothing gives it birth or is of a nature to give it birth4 ,an illusion is a weakness of the senses or an error of logic and is thus explained2 but an illusion in itself and by itself and only proceeding from itself is most singular and not to be explained as an illusion4 ,hence it remains that it is a reality1 a reality of our nature1 and given the coercive force of its voice and act1 it is the most real reality there is in us4 ,,the ,,categorical ,,imperative4--,thus1 at least1 thought ,kant1 and he said3 ,there is a practical reason which does not go beyond experience and does not seek to go beyond it2 but which does not depend on it1 is absolutely separated from it1 and is its own 7human7 experience by itself4 ,this practical reason says to us3 you ought to do good4 ,the crowd call it conscience2 ,i call it in a general way practical reason1 and ,i call it the categorical imperative when ,i take it in its principle1 without taking into account the applications which ,i foresee4 ,why this name8 ,to distinguish it clearly2 for we feel ourselves commanded by other things than it1 but not in the same way4 ,we feel ourselves commanded by prudence1 for instance1 which tells us3 do not run down that staircase if you do not wish to break your neck2 we feel ourselves commanded by the conventions which say3 be polite if you do not wish men to leave you severely alone1 etc4 ,but conscience does not say if to us3 it says bluntly you ought without consideration of what may or may not happen1 and it is even part of its character to scorn all consideration of consequences4 ,it would tell us3 run down that staircase to save that child even at the risk of breaking your neck4 ,because of that ,i call all the other commandments made to us hypothetical imperatives and that of conscience1 alone1 the categorical or absolute imperative4 ,here is a definite result4 ,,morality1 ,,the ,,law ,,of ,,man4--,yet reflect3 if the foregoing be true1 morality is the very law of man1 his especial law1 as the law of the tree is to spread in roots and branches4 ,well4 ,but for man to be able to obey his law he must be free1 must be able to do what he wishes4 ,that is certain4 ,then it must be believed that we are free1 for were we not1 we could not obey our law2 and the moral law would be absurd4 ,the moral law is the sign that we are free4 ,compared to this1 all the other proofs of freedom are worthless or weak4 ,we are free because we must be so in order to do the good which our law commands us to do4 ,let us examine further4 ,i do what is right in order to obey the law2 but1 when ,i have done it1 ,i have the idea that it would be unjust that ,i should be punished for it1 or that ,i should not be rewarded for it1 that it would be unjust were there not concordance between right and happiness4 ,as it happens1 virtue is seldom rewarded in this world and often is even punished2 it draws misfortune or evil on him who practises it4 ,would not that be the sign that there are two worlds of which we see only one8 ,would not that be the sign that virtue unrewarded here will be rewarded elsewhere in order that there should not be injustice8 ,it is highly probable that this is so4 ,but for that it is necessary that the soul be immortal4 ,it is so1 since it is necessary that it should be4 ,the moral law is accomplished and consummated in rewards or penalties beyond the grave1 which pre-suppose the immortality of the soul4 ,all the other proofs of the immortality of the soul are worthless or feeble beside this one which demonstrates that were there no immortality of the soul there would be no morality4 ,,god4--,and1 finally1 if justice is one day to be done1 this supposes a ,judge4 ,it is neither ourselves who in another life will do justice to ourselves nor yet some force of circumstances which will do it to us4 ,it is necessary to have an intelligence conceiving justice and a will to realise it4 ,god is this intelligence and this will4 ,all the other proofs of ,god are weak or worthless beside this one4 ,the existence of ,god has been deduced from the idea of ,god3 if we have the idea of ,god1 it is necessary that ,he should exist4 ,a weak proof1 for we can have an idea which does not correspond with an object4 ,the existence of ,god has been deduced from the idea of causality2 for all that is1 a cause is necessary1 this cause is ,god4 ,a weak proof1 for things being as they are1 there is necessity for 444 cause2 but a cause and a single cause1 why8 ,there could be a series of causes to infinity and thus the cause of the world could be the world itself4 ,the existence of ,god has been deduced from the idea of design well carried out4 ,the composition1 the ordering of this world is admired2 this world is well made2 it is like a clock4 ,the clock supposes a clock-maker2 the fine composition of the world supposes an intelligence which conceived a work to be made and which made it4 ,perhaps2 but this consideration only leads to the idea of a manipulation of matter1 of a demiurge1 as the ,greeks said1 of an architect1 but not to the idea of a ,creator2 it may even lead only to the idea of several architects and the ,greeks perfectly possessed the idea of a fine artistic order existing in the world when they believed in a great number of deities4 ,this proof also is therefore weak1 although ,kant always treats it with respect4 ,the sole convincing proof is the existence of the moral law in the heart of man4 ,for the moral law to be accomplished1 for it not to be merely a tyrant over man1 for it to be realised in all its fullness1 weighing on man here but rewarding him infinitely elsewhere1 which means there is justice in all that1 it is necessary that somewhere there should be an absolute realizer of justice4 ,god must exist for the world to be moral4 ,why is it necessary for the world to be moral8 ,because an immoral world with even a single moral being in it would be a very strange thing4 ,thus1 whilst the majority of philosophers deduced human liberty from ,god1 and the spirituality of the soul from human liberty1 the immortality of the soul from human spirituality1 and morality from human immortality1 ,kant starts from morality as from the incontestable fact1 and from morality deduces liberty1 and from liberty spirituality1 and ,god from the immortality of the soul with the consequent realization of justice4 ,he has effected an extraordinarily powerful reversal of the argument generally employed4 ,,the ,,influence ,,of ,,kant4--,the influence of ,kant has been incomparable or1 if you will1 comparable only to those of ,plato1 ,zeno1 and ,epicurus4 ,half at least of the ,european philosophy of the nineteenth century has proceeded from him and is closely connected with him4 ,even in our own day1 pragmatism1 as it is called--that is1 the doctrine which lays down that morality is the measure of truth and that an idea is true only if it be morally useful--is perhaps an alteration of ,kantism1 a ,kantian heresy1 but entirely penetrated with and1 as it were1 excited by the spirit of ,kant4 ,,chapter ,,vii ,,the ,,nineteenth ,,century3 ,,germany ,the great reconstructors of the world1 analogous to the first philosophers of antiquity4 ,great general systems3 ,fichte1 ,schelling1 ,hegel1 etc4 ,,fichte4--,fichte1 embarrassed by what remained of experience in the ideas of ,kant1 by the part1 restricted though it was1 which ,kant left to things in the external world1 completely suppressed the external world1 like ,berkeley1 and affirmed the existence of the human ego alone4 ,kant said that the world furnished us with the matter of the idea and that we furnished the form4 ,according to ,fichte1 form and matter alike came from us4 ,what then is sensation8 ,it is nothing except the pause of the ego encountering what is not self1 the impact of the ego against what limits it4--,but then the external world does exist1 for how could our mind be encountered by nothing and there be an impact of our mind against nothing8--,but this non-self that encounters self is precisely a product of self1 a product of the imagination which creates an object1 which projects outside us an appearance before which we pause as before something real which should be outside us4 ,this theory is very difficult to understand1 but indicates a very fine effort of the mind4 ,yet outside ourselves is there anything8 ,there is pure spirit1 ,god4 ,what is ,god8 ,for ,fichte ,he is moral order 7a very evident recollection of ,kant74 ,morality is ,god and ,god is morality4 ,we are in ,god1 and it is the whole of religion1 when we do our duty without any regard to the consequences of our actions2 we are outside ,god1 and it is atheism1 when we act in view of what results our actions may have4 ,and thus morality and religion run into one another1 and religion is only morality in its plenitude and complete morality is the whole of religion4 ,the holy1 the beautiful1 and the good are the immediate apparition if it could be in us of the essence of ,god4 ,,schelling4--,schelling desired to correct what1 according to him1 was too radical in the idealism of ,fichte4 ,he restored the external world2 for him the non-ego and the ego both exist and the two are nature1 nature which is the object in the world regarded by man1 the subject when it regards man1 subject and object according to the case2 in itself and in its totality neither subject nor object1 but absolute1 unlimited1 indeterminate4 ,confronting this world 7that is nature and man7 there is another world which is ,god4 ,god is the infinite and the perfect1 and particularly the perfect and infinite will4 ,the world that we know is a debasement from that without our being able to conceive how the perfect can be degraded1 and how an emanation of the perfect can be imperfect and how the non-being can come out of being1 since relatively to the infinite1 the finite has no existence1 and relatively to perfection1 the imperfect is nothing4 ,it appears however that it is thus1 and that the world is an emanation of ,god in which ,he degrades ,himself and a degradation of ,god such that it opposes itself to ,him as nothing to everything4 ,it is a fall4 ,the fall of man in the ,scriptures may give an idea1 however distant1 of that4 ,,hegel4--,hegel1 a contemporary of ,schelling1 and often in contradiction to him1 is the philosopher of becoming and of the idea which always becomes something4 ,the essence of all is the idea1 but the idea in progress2 the idea makes itself a thing according to a rational law which is inherent in it1 and the thing makes itself an idea in the sense that the idea contemplating the thing it has become thinks it and fills itself with it in order to become yet another thing1 always following the rational law2 and this very evolution1 all this evolution1 all this becoming1 is that absolute for which we are always searching behind things1 at the root of things1 and which is in the things themselves4 ,the rationally active is everything2 and activity and reality are synonyms1 and all reality is active1 and what is not active is not real1 and what is not active has no existence4 ,let not this activity be regarded as always advancing forward2 the becoming is not a river which flows2 activity is activity and retro-activity4 ,the cause is cause of the effect1 but also the effect is cause of its cause4 ,in fact the cause would not be cause if it had no effect2 it is therefore1 thanks to its effect1 because of its effect1 that the cause is cause2 and therefore the effect is the cause of the cause as much as the cause is cause of the effect4 ,a government is the effect of the character of a people1 and the character of a people is the effect also of its government2 my son proceeds from me1 but he reacts on me1 and because ,i am his father ,i have the character which ,i gave him1 more pronounced than before1 etc4 ,hence1 all effect is cause as all cause is effect1 which everybody has recognized1 but in addition all effect is cause of its cause and in consequence1 to speak in common language1 all effect is cause forward and backward1 and the line of causes and effects is not a straight line but a circle4 ,,the ,,deism ,,of ,,hegel4--,god disappears from all that4 ,no1 ,hegel is very formally a deist1 but he sees ,god in the total of things and not outside things1 yet distinct4 ,in what way distinct8 ,in this1 that ,god is the totality of things considered not in themselves but in the spirit that animates them and the force that urges them1 and because the soul is of necessity in the body1 united to the body1 that is no reason why it should not be distinct from it4 ,and having taken up this position1 ,hegel is a deist and even accepts proofs of the existence of ,god which are regarded by some as hackneyed4 ,he accepts them1 only holding them not exactly as proofs1 but as reasons for belief1 and as highly faithful descriptions of the necessary elevation of the soul to ,god4 ,for example1 the ancient philosophers proved the existence of ,god by the contemplation of the marvels of the universe3 ,that is not a 'proof1' said ,hegel1 that is not a proof1 but it is a great reason for belief2 for it is an exposition1 a very exact although incomplete account rendered of the fact that by contemplation of the world the human mind rises to ,god4 ,now this fact is of singular importance3 it indicates that it is impossible to think strongly without thinking of ,god4 ,when the passage although insufficiently logical from the finite to the infinite does not take place1 it may be said that there is no thought4 ,now this is a reason for belief4' ,after the same fashion1 the philosophers have said from the moment that we imagine ,god1 the reason is that ,he is4 ,kant ridiculed this proof4 ,granted1 it is not an invincible proof1 but this fact alone that we cannot imagine ,god without affirming ,his existence indicates a tendency of our mind which is to relate finite thought to infinite thought and not to admit an imperfect thought which should not have its source in a perfect thought2 and that is rather an invincible belief than a proof1 but that this belief is invincible and necessary in itself is an extremely commanding proof1 although a relative one4 ,,his ,,political ,,philosophy4--,the philosophy of the human mind and political philosophy according to ,hegel are these4 ,primitive man is mind1 reason1 conscience1 but he is so only potentially1 as the philosophers express it2 that is to say1 he is so only in that he is capable of becoming so4 ,really1 practically1 he is only instincts3 he is egoist like the animals it should be said like the greater part of the animals1 and follows his egoistical appetites4 ,society1 in whatever manner it has managed to constitute itself1 transforms him and his becoming commences4 ,from the sexual instinct it makes marriage1 from capture it forms regulated proprietorship1 out of defence against violence it makes legal punishment1 etc4 ,hence-forth1 and all his evolution tends to that1 man proceeds to substitute in himself the general will for the particular will2 he tends to disindividualize himself4 ,the general will1 founded upon general utility1 is that the man be married1 father1 head of a family1 good husband1 good father1 good relative1 good citizen4 ,all that man ought to be in consideration of the general will which he has put in the place of his own1 and which he has made his own will4 ,that is the first advance4 ,it is realized 7always imperfectly7 in the smallest societies1 in the cities1 in the little ,greek republics1 for example4 ,here is the second advance4 ,by war1 by conquest1 by annexations1 by more gentle means when possible1 the stronger cities subdue the weaker1 and the great ,state is created4 ,the great ,state has a more important part than the city2 it continues to substitute the general will for the particular wills2 but1 in addition1 it is an idea1 a great civilizing idea1 benevolent1 elevating1 aggrandizing1 to which private interests must and should be sacrificed4 ,such were the ,romans who considered themselves1 not without reason1 as the legislators and civilizers of the world4 ,,the ,,ideal ,,form ,,of ,,state4--,putting aside for a while the continuation of this subject1 what political form should the great ,state take to conform to its destiny8 ,assuredly the monarchical form2 for the republican form is always too individualist4 ,to ,hegel1 the ,greeks and even the ,romans seem to have conceded too much to individual liberty or to the interests of class1 of caste2 they possessed an imperfect idea of the rights and functions of the ,state4 ,the ideal form of the ,state is monarchy4 ,it is necessary for the ,state to be contracted1 gathered up1 and personified in a prince who can be personally loved1 who can be reverenced1 which is precisely what is needed4 ,these great ,states are only really great if they possess strong cohesion2 it is therefore necessary that they should be nationalities1 as it is called--that is1 that they should be inwardly very united and highly homogeneous by community of race1 religion1 customs1 language1 etc4 ,the idea to be realized by a ,state can only be accomplished if there be a sufficient community of ideas in the people constituting it4 ,however the great ,state will be able to1 and even ought to1 conquer and annex the small ones in order to become stronger and more capable1 being stronger1 of realizing its idea4 ,only this should be done merely when it is certain or clearly apparent that it represents an idea as against a people which does not1 or that it presents a better1 greater1 and nobler idea than that represented by the people it attacks4 ,,war4--,but1 as each people will always find its own idea finer than that of another1 how is this to be recognized8--,by victory itself4 ,it is victory which proves that a people 444 was stronger than another6--,not only stronger materially but representing a greater1 more practical1 more fruitful idea than the other2 for it is precisely the idea which supports a people and renders it strong4 ,thus1 victory is the sign of the moral superiority of a people1 and in consequence force indicates where right is and is indistinguishable from right itself1 and we must not say as may already perhaps have been said3 ,might excels right1 but ,might is right or ,right is might4 ,for example ,hegel might have said1 ,france was apparently within her rights in endeavouring to conquer ,europe from #agib to #ahae2 for she represented an idea1 the revolutionary idea1 which she might consider1 and which many besides the ,french did consider1 an advance and a civilizing idea2 but she was beaten1 which proves that the idea was false2 and before this demonstration by events is it not true that the republican or ,caesarian idea is inferior to that of traditional monarchy8 ,hegel would certainly have reasoned thus on this point4 ,therefore war is eternal and must be so4 ,it is history itself1 being the condition of history2 it is even the evolution of humanity1 being the condition of that evolution2 there-fore1 it is divine4 ,only it is purifying itself2 formerly men only fought1 or practically always1 from ambition2 now wars are waged for principles1 to effect the triumph of an idea which has a future1 and which contains the future1 over one that is out of date and decayed4 ,the future will see a succession of the triumphs of might which1 by definition1 will be triumphs of right and which will be triumphs of increasingly fine ideas over ideas that are barbarous and justly condemned to perish4 ,hegel has exercised great influence on the ideas of the ,german people both in internal and external politics4 ,,art1 ,,science1 ,,and ,,religion4--,the ideas of ,hegel on art1 science1 and religion are the following3 ,under the shelter of the ,state which is necessary for their peaceful development in security and liberty1 science1 literature1 art1 and religion pursue aims not superior to but other than those of the ,state4 ,they seek1 without detaching the individual from the society1 to unite him to the whole world4 ,science makes him know all it can of nature and its laws2 literature1 by studying man in himself and in his relations with the world1 imbues him with the sentiment of the possible concordance of the individual with the universe2 the arts make him love creation by unravelling and bringing into the light and into relief all that is beautiful in it relatively to man1 and all that in consequence should render it lovely1 respected1 and dear to him2 religion1 finally1 seeks to be a bond between all men and a bond between all men and ,god2 it sketches the plan of universal brotherhood which is ideally the last state of humanity1 a state which no doubt it will never attain1 but which it is essential it should imagine and believe to be possible1 without which it always would be drawn towards animality more and much more than it is4 ,the ,hegelian philosophy has exercised an immense influence throughout ,europe not only on philosophic studies1 but on history1 art1 and literature4 ,it may be regarded as the last universal system and as the most daring that has been attempted by the human mind4 ,,schopenhauer4--,schopenhauer was the philosopher of the will4 ,persuaded1 like ,leibnitz1 that man is an epitome and a picture of the world1 and that the world resembles us 7which is hypothetical71 he takes up the thought of ,leibnitz1 changing and transforming it thus3 ,all the universe is not thought1 but all the universe is will2 thought is only an accident of the will which appears in the superior animals2 but the will1 which is the foundation of man1 is the foundation of all2 the universe is a compound of wills that act4 ,all beings are wills which possess organs conformed to their purpose4 ,it is the will to be which gave claws to the lion1 tusks to the boar1 and intelligence to man1 because he was the most unarmed of animals1 just as to one who becomes blind it gives extraordinarily sensitive and powerful sense of hearing1 smell1 and touch4 ,plants strive towards light by their tops and towards moisture by their roots2 the seed turns itself in the earth to send forth its stalk upwards and its rootlet downward4 ,in minerals there are constant tendencies which are nothing but obscure wills2 what we currently term weight1 fluidity1 impenetrability1 electricity1 chemical affinities1 are nothing but natural wills or inconscient wills4 ,because of this1 the diverse wills opposing and clashing with one another1 the world is a war of all against all and of everything literally against everything2 and the world is a scene of carnage4 ,the truth is that will is an evil and is the evil4 ,what is needed for happiness is to kill the will1 to destroy the wish to be4--,but this would be the end of existence8--,and in fact to be no more or not to be at all is the true happiness and it would be necessary to blow up the whole world in an explosion for it to escape unhappiness4 ,at least1 as ,buddhism desired and1 in some degree1 though less1 ,christianity also1 it is necessary to make an approach to death by a kind of reduction to the absolute minimum of will1 by detachment and renunciation pushed as far as can be4 ,,nietzsche4--,a very respectful but highly independent and untractable pupil of ,schopenhauer1 ,nietzsche turns ,schopenhauer inside out as it were1 saying3 ,yes1 assuredly the will to be is everything2 but precisely because of that it is essential not to oppose but to follow it and to follow it as far as it will lead us4 ,but is it not true that it will lead to suffering8 ,be sure of that1 but in suffering there is an intoxication of pain which is quite comprehensible2 for it is the intoxication of the will in action2 and this intoxication is an enjoyment too and in any case a good thing2 for it is the end to which we are urged by our nature composed of will and of hunger for existence4 ,now wisdom1 like happiness1 is to follow our nature4 ,the happiness and wisdom of man is to obey his will for power1 as the wisdom and happiness of water is to flow towards the sea4 ,from these ideas is derived a morality of violence which can be legitimately regarded as immoral and which1 in any case1 is neither ,buddhist nor ,christian1 but which is susceptible of several interpretations1 all the more so because ,nietzsche1 who was a poet1 never fails1 whilst always artistically very fine1 to fall into plenty of contradictions4 ,,chapter ,,viii ,,the ,,nineteenth ,,century3 ,,england ,the ,doctrines of ,evolution and of ,transformism3 ,lamarck 7,french71 ,darwin1 ,spencer4 ,,transformism ,,and ,,evolution4--,the great philosophic invention of the ,english of the nineteenth century has been the idea1 based on a wide knowledge of natural history1 that there never was creation4 ,the animal species had been considered by all the philosophers 7except ,epicurus and the ,epicureans7 as being created once and for all and remaining invariable4 ,nothing of the kind4 ,matter1 eternally fruitful1 has transformed itself first into plants1 then into lower animals1 then into higher animals1 then into man2 our ancestor is the fish2 tracing back yet more remotely1 our ancestor is the plant4 ,transformation 7hence the name transformism71 discrimination and separation of species1 the strongest individuals of each kind alone surviving and creating descendants in their image which constitute a species2 evolution 7hence the name evolutionism7 of living nature thus operating from the lowest types to the highest and therefore the most complicated2 there is nothing but that in the world4 ,,lamarck2 ,,darwin2 ,,spencer4--,the ,frenchman ,lamarck in the eighteenth century had already conceived this idea2 ,darwin1 purely a naturalist1 set it forth clearly1 ,spencer again stated it and drew from it consequences of general philosophy4 ,thus1 to ,spencer1 the evolutionist theory contains no immorality4 ,on the contrary1 the progressive transformation of the human species is an ascent towards morality2 from egoism is born altruism because the species1 seeking its best law and its best condition of happiness1 perceives a greater happiness in altruism2 seeking its best law and its best condition of happiness1 perceives that a greater happiness lies in order1 regular life1 social life1 etc42 so that humanity raises itself to a higher and yet higher morality by the mere fact of adapting itself better to the conditions of the life of humanity4 ,morality develops physiologically as the germ becomes the stem and the bud becomes the flower4 ,as for religion it is the domain of the unknowable4 ,that is not to assert that it is nothing4 ,on the contrary it is something formidable and immense4 ,it is the feeling that something1 apart from all that we know1 surpasses us and that we shall never know it4 ,now this feeling at the same time maintains us in a humility highly favourable to the health of the soul and also in a serene confidence in the mysterious being who presides over universal evolution and who1 no doubt1 is the all-powerful and eternal soul of it4 ,,chapter ,,ix ,,the ,,nineteenth ,,century3 ,,france ,the ,eclectic ,school3 ,victor ,cousin4 ,the ,positivist ,school3 ,auguste ,comte4 ,the ,kantist ,school3 ,renouvier4 ,independent and ,complex ,positivists3 ,taine1 ,renan4 ,,laromiguiere3 ,,royer-,,collard4--,emerging from the school of ,condillac1 ,france saw ,laromiguiere who was a sort of softened ,condillac1 less trenchant1 and not insensible to the influence of ,rousseau2 but he was little more than a clear and elegant professor of philosophy4 ,royer-,collard introduced into ,france the ,scottish philosophy 7,thomas ,reid1 ,dugald ,stewart7 and did not depart from it or go beyond it2 but he set it forth with magnificent authority and with a remarkable invention of clear and magisterial formulae4 ,,maine ,,de ,,biran4--,maine de ,biran was a renovator4 ,he attached himself to ,descartes linking the chain anew that had for so long been interrupted4 ,he devoted his attention to the notion of ego4 ,in full reaction from the sensualism of ,condillac1 he restored a due activity to the ego2 he made it a force not restricted to the reception of sensations1 which transform themselves1 but one which seized upon1 elaborated1 linked together1 and combined them4 ,for him then1 as for ,descartes1 but from a fresh point of view1 the voluntary deed is the primitive deed of the soul and the will is the foundation of man4 ,also1 the will is not all man2 man has1 so to say1 three lives superimposed but very closely inter-united and which cannot do without one another3 the life of sensation1 the life of will1 and the life of love4 ,the life of sensation is almost passive1 with a commencement of activity which consists in classifying and organizing the sensations2 the life of will is properly speaking the human life2 the life of love is the life of activity and yet again of will1 but which unites the human with the divine life4 ,by the ingenious and profound subtlety of his analyses1 ,maine de ,biran has placed himself in the front rank of ,french thinkers and1 in any case1 he is one of the most original4 ,,victor ,,cousin ,,and ,,his ,,disciples4--,victor ,cousin1 who appears to have been influenced almost concurrently by ,maine de ,biran1 ,royer-,collard1 and the ,german philosophy1 yielded rapidly to a tendency which is characteristically ,french and is also1 perhaps1 good1 and which consists in seeing some good in all the opinions1 and he was eclectic1 that is1 a borrower4 ,his maxim1 which he had no doubt read in ,leibnitz1 was that the systems are true in what they affirm and false in what they deny4 ,starting thence1 he rested upon both the ,english and ,german philosophy1 correcting one by the other4 ,personally his tendency was to make metaphysics come from philosophy and to prove ,god by the human soul and the relations of ,god with the world by the relations of man with matter4 ,to him ,god is always an augmented human soul4 ,all philosophies1 not to mention all religions1 have rather an inclination to consider things thus3 but this tendency is particularly marked in ,cousin4 ,in the course of his career1 which was diversified1 for he was at one time a professor and at another a statesman1 he varied somewhat1 because before #ahcj he became very ,hegelian1 and after #ahcj he harked back towards ,descartes1 endeavouring especially to make philosophic instruction a moral priesthood2 highly cautious1 very well-balanced1 feeling great distrust of the unassailable temerities of the one and in sympathetic relations with the other4 ,what has remained of this eclecticism is an excellent thing1 the great regard for the history of philosophy1 which had never been held in honour in ,france and which1 since ,cousin1 has never ceased to be so4 ,the principal disciples of ,cousin were ,jouffroy1 ,damiron1 ,emile ,saisset1 and the great moralist ,jules ,simon1 well-known because of the important political part he played4 ,,lamennais4--,lamennais1 long celebrated for his great book1 ,essay on ,indifference in the ,matter of ,religion1 then1 when he had severed himself from ,rome1 by his ,words of a ,believer and other works of revolutionary spirit1 was above all a publicist2 but he was a philosopher1 properly speaking1 in his ,sketch of a ,philosophy4 ,to him1 ,god is neither the ,creator1 as understood by the early ,christians1 nor the ,being from whom the world emanates1 as others have thought4 ,he has not created the world from nothing2 but ,he has created it2 ,he created it from ,himself1 ,he made it issue from ,his substance2 and ,he made it issue by a purely voluntary act4 ,he created it in ,his own image2 it is not man alone who is in the image of ,god1 but the whole world4 ,the three ,persons of ,god1 that is1 the three characteristics1 power1 intelligence1 and love are found--diminished and disfigured indeed1 but yet are to be found--in every being in the universe4 ,they are especially our own three powers1 under the form of will1 reason1 sympathy2 they are also the three powers of society1 under the forms of executive power1 deliberation1 and fraternity4 ,every being1 individual or collective1 has in it a principle of death if it cannot reproduce however imperfectly all the three terms of this trinity without the loss of one4 ,,auguste ,,comte4--,auguste ,comte1 a mathematician1 versed also in all sciences1 constructed a pre-eminently negative philosophy in spite of his great pretension to replace the negations of the eighteenth century by a positive doctrine2 above all else he denied all authority and denied to metaphysics the right of existence4 ,metaphysics ought not to exist1 do not exist1 are a mere nothing4 ,we know nothing1 we can know nothing1 about the commencement or the end of things1 or yet their essence or their object2 philosophy has always laid down as its task a general explanation of the universe2 it is precisely this general explanation1 all general explanation of the aggregate of things1 which is impossible4 ,this is the negative part of positivism4 ,it is the only one which has endured and which is the credo or rather the non credo of a fairly large number of minds4 ,the affirmative part of the ideas of ,comte was this3 what can be done is to make a classification of sciences and a philosophy of history4 ,the classification of sciences according to ,comte1 proceeding from the most simple to the most complex--that is1 from mathematics to astronomy1 physics1 chemistry1 biology to end at sociology1 is generally considered by the learned as interesting but arbitrary4 ,the philosophy of history1 according to ,comte1 is this3 humanity passes through three states3 theological1 metaphysical1 positive4 ,the theological state 7antiquity7 consists in man explaining everything by continual miracles2 the metaphysical state 7modern times7 consists in man explaining everything by ideas1 which he still continues to consider somewhat as beings1 by abstractions1 entities1 vital principle1 attraction1 gravitation1 soul1 faculty of the soul1 etc4 ,the positive state consists in that man explains and will explain all things1 or rather limits himself and will limit himself to verifying them1 by the links that he will see they have with one another1 links he will content himself with observing and subsequently with controlling by experiment4 ,also there is always something of the succeeding state in the preceding state and the ancients did not ignore observation1 and there is always something of the preceding state in the succeeding state and we have still theological and metaphysical habits of mind1 theological and metaphysical residues1 and perhaps it will be always thus2 but for theology to decline before metaphysics and metaphysics before science is progress4 ,over and above this1 ,comte in the last portion of his life--as if to prove his doctrine of residues and to furnish an example--founded a sort of religion1 a pseudo-religion1 the religion of humanity4 ,humanity must be worshipped in its slow ascent towards intellectual and moral perfection 7and1 in consequence1 we should specially worship humanity to come2 but ,comte might reply that humanity past and present is venerable because it bears in its womb the humanity of the future74 ,the worship of this new religion is the commemoration and veneration of the dead4 ,these last conceptions1 fruits of the sensibility and of the imagination of ,auguste ,comte1 have no relation with the basis of his doctrine4 ,,renouvier4--,after him1 by a vigorous reaction1 ,renouvier restored the philosophy of ,kant1 depriving it of its too symmetrical1 too minutely systematic1 too scholastic character and bringing it nearer to facts2 from him was to come the doctrine already mentioned1 pragmatism1 which measures the truth of every idea by the moral consequence that it contains4 ,,taine4--,very different and attaching himself to the general ideas of ,comte1 ,hippolyte ,taine believed only in what has been observed1 experimented1 and demonstrated2 but being also as familiar with ,hegel as with ,comte1 with ,spencer as with ,condillac1 he never doubted that the need of going beyond and escaping from oneself was also a fact1 a human fact eternal among humanity1 and of this fact he took account as of a fact observed and proved1 saying if man is on one side a fierce and lascivious gorilla1 on the other side he is a mystic animal1 and that in a double nature1 mysterious hymen1 as ,hugo wrote1 lay the explanation of all the baseness in ideas and actions as well as all the sublimity in ideas and actions of humanity4 ,personally he was a ,stoic and his practice was the continuous development of the intelligence regarded as the condition and guarantee of morality4 ,,renan4--,renan1 destined for the ecclesiastical profession and always preserving profound traces of his clerical education1 was1 nevertheless1 a ,positivist and believed only in science1 hoping everything from it in youth and continuing to venerate it at least during his mature years4 ,thus formed1 a ,christian ,positivist1 as has been said1 as well as a poet above all else1 he could not proscribe metaphysics and had a weakness for them with which perhaps he reproached himself4 ,he extricated himself from this difficulty by declaring all metaphysical conceptions to be only dreams1 but sheltered1 so to say1 by this concession he had made and this precaution he had taken1 he threw himself into the dream with all his heart and reconstituted ,god1 the immortal soul1 the future existence1 eternity and creation1 giving them new1 unforeseen1 and fascinating names4 ,it was only the idea of ,providence--that is1 of the particular and circumstantial intervention of ,god in human affairs1 which was intolerable to him and against which he always protested1 quoting the phrase of ,malebranche1 ,god does not act by particular wills4 ,and yet he paid a compliment1 which seems sincere1 to the idea of grace1 and if there be a particular and circumstantial intervention by ,god in human affairs1 it is certainly grace according to all appearances4 ,he was above all an amateur of ideas1 a dilettante in ideas1 toying with them with infinite pleasure1 like a superior ,greek sophist1 and in all ,french philosophy no one calls ,plato to mind more than he does4 ,he possessed a charming mind1 a very lofty character1 and was a marvellous writer4 ,,to-,,day4--,the living ,french philosophers whom we shall content ourselves with naming because they are living and receive contemporary criticism rather than that of history1 are ,,mm4 ,fouillee1 ,theodule ,ribot1 ,liard1 ,durckheim1 ,izoulet1 and ,bergson4 ,,the ,,future ,,of ,,philosophy4--,it is impossible to forecast in what direction philosophy will move4 ,the summary history we have been able to trace sufficiently shows1 as it seems to us1 that it has no regular advance such that by seeing how it has progressed one can conjecture what path it will pursue4 ,it seems in no sense to depend1 or at all events1 to depend remarkably little1 at any period1 on the general state of civilization around it1 and even for those who believe in a philosophy of history there is not1 as it appears to me1 a philosophy of the history of philosophy4 ,the only thing that can be affirmed is that philosophy will always exist in response to a need of the human mind1 and that it will always be both an effort to gather scientific discoveries into some great general ideas and an effort to go beyond science and to seek as it can the meaning of the universal enigma2 so that neither philosophy1 properly speaking1 nor even metaphysics will ever disappear4 ,nietzsche has said that life is valuable only as the instrument of knowledge4 ,however eager humanity may be and become for branches of knowledge1 it will be always passionately and indefatigably anxious about complete knowledge4 ,,index ,,of ,,names ,a ,aelard ,aenesidemus ,agrippa ,agrippa1 ,cornelius ,ailly1 ,peter d' ,albertus ,magnus ,alexander the ,great ,anaxagoras ,anaximander ,anselm1 ,st4 ,antisthenes ,apollodorus ,arcesilaus ,arete ,aristippus ,aristo ,aristobulus ,aristophanes ,aristotle ,arius ,arnauld ,atticus ,augustine1 ,st4 ,averroes ,avicenna ,b ,bacon1 ,francis ,bacon1 ,roger ,beaconsfield ,bergson ,berkeley ,bonaventura1 ,st4 ,bossuet ,bruno1 ,giordano ,brutus ,buridan ,c ,calvin ,campanella ,cardan ,carneades ,cato ,champeaux1 ,william of ,charles the ,bald ,christina of ,sweden ,chrysippus ,cicero ,cleanthes ,clement1 ,st41 of ,alexandria ,comte1 ,auguste ,cnodillac ,corneille ,cousin1 ,victor ,crantor ,crates ,d ,damiron ,darwin ,democritus ,descartes ,diderot ,diogenes ,durand de ,saint-,pourcain ,durckheim ,e ,empedocles ,epictetus ,epicurus ,euhemerus ,f ,fenelon ,fichte ,fontenelle ,fouillee ,franklin ,g ,gassendi ,gerbert ,gerson ,gorgias ,h ,harvey ,havet1 ,ernest ,hegel ,hegesias ,helvetius ,heraclitus ,herillus ,hermarchus ,hobbes1 ,thomas ,holbach1 d' ,horace ,hugo1 ,victor ,hugo de ,saint-,victor ,hume1 ,david ,i ,iamblichus ,izoulet ,j ,james ,i ,jesus ,christ ,joan of ,navarre ,jouffroy ,justinian ,k ,kant ,l ,la ,bruyere ,lamarck ,lamennais ,laromiguiere ,leibnitz ,leo ,x ,leucippus ,liard ,locke ,louis ,,xiv ,lucian ,lucretius ,lulle1 ,raymond ,m ,maine de ,biran ,malebranche ,manes ,marcus ,aurelius ,menippus ,metrodorus ,moderatus ,moliere ,montaigne ,moses ,n ,nemesius ,nero ,nicomachus ,nietzsche ,o ,ockham1 ,william of ,origen ,p ,paracelsus ,parmenides ,pascal ,paul1 ,st4 ,pericles ,philips the ,fair ,philo ,pico della ,mirandola ,plato ,pliny the ,younger ,plotinus ,plutarch ,poincare1 ,henri ,polemo ,polystratus ,pomponazzo ,porphyry ,prodicus ,protagoras ,pyrrho ,pythagoras ,r ,reid1 ,thomas ,renan ,renouvier ,reuchlin ,ribot1 ,theodule ,richard de ,saint-,victor ,roscelin ,rousseau1 ,j4 ,j4 ,royer-,collard ,s ,saisset1 ,emile ,schelling ,schopenhauer ,scotus ,erigena ,seneca ,servetus1 ,michael ,sextus ,empiricus ,shakespeare ,simon1 ,jules ,socrates ,spencer1 ,herbert ,speusippus ,spinoza ,stewart1 ,dugald ,t ,taine1 ,hippolyte ,thales ,theodosius ,theophrastus ,thomas ,aquinas1 ,st4 ,thrasea ,timon ,v ,vanini ,vauvenargues ,vico ,villon ,vincent of ,beauvais ,voltaire ,w ,william of ,auvergne ,wolf ,x ,xenocrates ,xenophanes ,xenophon ,z ,zeno 7of ,citium7 ,zeno 7of ,elea7 ,zoroaster