,benedict de ,spinoza1 ,,the ,,ethics 7,ethica ,ordine ,geometrico ,demonstrata7 ,translated by ,r4 ,h4 ,m4 ,elwes ,part ,,ii3 ,,on ,,the ,,nature ,,and ,,origin ,,of ,,the ,,mind ,,preface ,i now pass on to explaining the results1 which must necessarily follow from the essence of ,god1 or of the eternal and infinite being2 not1 indeed1 all of them 7for we proved in ,part i41 ,prop4 xvi41 that an infinite number must follow in an infinite number of ways71 but only those which are able to lead us1 as it were by the hand1 to the knowledge of the human mind and its highest blessedness4 ,,definitions ,i4 ,by 'body' ,i mean a mode which expresses in a certain determinate manner the essence of ,god1 in so far as he is considered as an extended thing4 7,see ,pt4 i41 ,prop4 xxv4 ,cor47 ,,ii4 ,i consider as belonging to the essence of a thing that1 which being given1 the thing is necessarily given also1 and1 which being removed1 the thing is necessarily removed also2 in other words1 that without which the thing1 and which itself without the thing1 can neither be nor be conceived4 ,,iii4 ,by 'idea1' ,i mean the mental conception which is formed by the mind as a thinking thing4 ,explanation--,i say 'conception' rather than perception1 because the word perception seems to imply that the mind is passive in respect to the object2 whereas conception seems to express an activity of the mind4 ,,iv4 ,by 'an adequate idea1' ,i mean an idea which1 in so far as it is considered in itself1 without relation to the object1 has all the properties or intrinsic marks of a true idea4 ,explanation--,i say 'intrinsic1' in order to exclude that mark which is extrinsic1 namely1 the agreement between the idea and its object 7ideatum74 ,v4 ',duration' is the indefinite continuance of existing4 ,explanation--,i say 'indefinite1' because it cannot be determined through the existence itself of the existing thing1 or by its efficient cause1 which necessarily gives the existence of the thing1 but does not take it away4 ,,vi4 ',reality' and 'perfection' ,i use as synonymous terms4 ,,vii4 ,by 'particular things1' ,i mean things which are finite and have a conditioned existence2 but if several individual things concur in one action1 so as to be all simultaneously the effect of one cause1 ,i consider them all1 so far1 as one particular thing4 ,,axioms ,i4 ,the essence of man does not involve necessary existence1 that is1 it may1 in the order of nature1 come to pass that this or that man does or does not exist4 ,,ii4 ,man thinks4 ,,iii4 ,modes of thinking1 such as love1 desire1 or any other of the passions1 do not take place1 unless there be in the same individual an idea of the thing loved1 desired1 c4 ,but the idea can exist without the presence of any other mode of thinking4 ,,iv4 ,we perceive that a certain body is affected in many ways4 ,v4 ,we feel and perceive no particular things1 save bodies and modes of thought4 ,n4,b4 ,the ,postulates are given after the conclusion of ,prop4 xiii4 ,,propositions ,i4 ,thought is an attribute of ,god1 or ,god is a thinking thing4 ,proof--,particular thoughts1 or this and that thought1 are modes which1 in a certain conditioned manner1 express the nature of ,god 7,pt4 i41 ,prop4 xxv41 ,cor474 ,god therefore possesses the attribute 7,pt4 i41 ,def4 v47 of which the concept is involved in all particular thoughts1 which latter are conceived thereby4 ,thought1 therefore1 is one of the infinite attributes of ,god1 which express ,god's eternal and infinite essence 7,pt4 i41 ,def4 vi474 ,in other words1 ,god is a thinking thing4 ,q4,e4,d4 9999999999,note--,this proposition is also evident from the fact1 that we are able to conceive an infinite thinking being4 ,for1 in proportion as a thinking being is conceived as thinking more thoughts1 so is it conceived as containing more reality or perfection4 ,therefore a being1 which can think an infinite number of things in an infinite number of ways1 is1 necessarily1 in respect of thinking1 infinite4 ,as1 therefore1 from the consideration of thought alone1 we conceive an infinite being1 thought is necessarily 7,pt4 i41 ,deff4 iv4 and vi47 one of the infinite attributes of ,god1 as we were desirous of showing4 ,,ii4 ,extension is an attribute of ,god1 or ,god is an extended thing4 ,proof--,the proof of this proposition is similar to that of the last4 ,,iii4 ,in ,god there is necessarily the idea not only of his essence1 but also of all things which necessarily follow from his essence4 ,proof--,god 7by the first ,prop4 of this ,part7 can think an infinite number of things in infinite ways1 or 7what is the same thing1 by ,prop4 xvi41 ,part i47 can form the idea of his essence1 and of all things which necessarily follow therefrom4 ,now all that is in the power of ,god necessarily is 7,pt4 i41 ,prop4 xxxv474 ,therefore1 such an idea as we are considering necessarily is1 and in ,god alone4 ,q4,e4,d4 7,part i41 ,prop4 xv47 9999999999,note--,the multitude understand by the power of ,god the free will of ,god1 and the right over all things that exist1 which latter are accordingly generally considered as contingent4 ,for it is said that ,god has the power to destroy all things1 and to reduce them to nothing4 ,further1 the power of ,god is very often likened to the power of kings4 ,but this doctrine we have refuted 7,pt4 i41 ,prop4 xxxii41 ,cors4 i4 and ii471 and we have shown 7,part i41 ,prop4 xvi47 that ,god acts by the same necessity1 as that by which he understands himself2 in other words1 as it follows from the necessity of the divine nature 7as all admit71 that ,god understands himself1 so also does it follow by the same necessity1 that ,god performs infinite acts in infinite ways4 ,we further showed 7,part i41 ,prop4 xxxiv471 that ,god's power is identical with ,god's essence in action2 therefore it is as impossible for us to conceive ,god as not acting1 as to conceive him as non-existent4 ,if we might pursue the subject further1 ,i could point out1 that the power which is commonly attributed to ,god is not only human 7as showing that ,god is conceived by the multitude as a man1 or in the likeness of a man71 but involves a negation of power4 ,however1 ,i am unwilling to go over the same ground so often4 ,i would only beg the reader again and again1 to turn over frequently in his mind what ,i have said in ,part i4 from ,prop4 xvi4 to the end4 ,no one will be able to follow my meaning1 unless he is scrupulously careful not to confound the power of ,god with the human power and right of kings4 ,,iv4 ,the idea of ,god1 from which an infinite number of things follow in infinite ways1 can only be one4 ,proof--,infinite intellect comprehends nothing save the attributes of ,god and his modifications 7,part i41 ,prop4 xxx474 ,now ,god is one 7,part i41 ,prop4 xiv41 ,cor474 ,therefore the idea of ,god1 wherefrom an infinite number of things follow in infinite ways1 can only be one4 ,q4,e4,d4 ,v4 ,the actual being of ideas owns ,god as its cause1 only in so far as he is considered as a thinking thing1 not in so far as he is unfolded in any other attribute2 that is1 the ideas both of the attributes of ,god and of particular things do not own as their efficient cause their objects 7ideata7 or the things perceived1 but ,god himself in so far as he is a thinking thing4 ,proof--,this proposition is evident from ,prop4 iii4 of this ,part4 ,we there drew the conclusion1 that ,god can form the idea of his essence1 and of all things which follow necessarily therefrom1 solely because he is a thinking thing1 and not because he is the object of his own idea4 ,wherefore the actual being of ideas owns for cause ,god1 in so far as he is a thinking thing4 ,it may be differently proved as follows3 the actual being of ideas is 7obviously7 a mode of thought1 that is 7,part i41 ,prop4 xxv41 ,cor47 a mode which expresses in a certain manner the nature of ,god1 in so far as he is a thinking thing1 and therefore 7,part i41 ,prop4 x47 involves the conception of no other attribute of ,god1 and consequently 7by ,part i41 ,ax4 iv47 is not the effect of any attribute save thought4 ,therefore the actual being of ideas owns ,god as its cause1 in so far as he is considered as a thinking thing1 c4 ,q4,e4,d4 ,,vi4 ,the modes of any given attribute are caused by ,god1 in so far as he is considered through the attribute of which they are modes1 and not in so far as he is considered through any other attribute4 ,proof--,each attribute is conceived through itself1 without any other part 7,part i41 ,prop4 x472 wherefore the modes of each attribute involve the conception of that attribute1 but not of any other4 ,thus 7,part i41 ,ax4 iv47 they are caused by ,god1 only in so far as he is considered through the attribute whose modes they are1 and not in so far as he is considered through any other4 ,q4,e4,d4 ,corollary--,hence the actual being of things1 which are not modes of thought1 does not follow from the divine nature1 because that nature has prior knowledge of the things4 ,things represented in ideas follow1 and are derived from their particular attribute1 in the same manner1 and with the same necessity as ideas follow 7according to what we have shown7 from the attribute of thought4 ,,vii4 ,the order and connection of ideas is the same as the order and connection of things4 ,proof--,this proposition is evident from ,part i41 ,ax4 iv4 ,for the idea of everything that is caused depends on a knowledge of the cause1 whereof it is an effect4 ,corollary--,hence ,god's power of thinking is equal to his realized power of action-- that is1 whatsoever follows from the infinite nature of ,god in the world of extension 7formaliter71 follows without exception in the same order and connection from the idea of ,god in the world of thought 7objective74 9999999999,note--,before going any further1 ,i wish to recall to mind what has been pointed out above--namely1 that whatsoever can be perceived by the infinite intellect as constituting the essence of substance1 belongs altogether only to one substance3 consequently1 substance thinking and substance extended are one and the same substance1 comprehended now through one attribute1 now through the other4 ,so1 also1 a mode of extension and the idea of that mode are one and the same thing1 though expressed in two ways4 ,this truth seems to have been dimly recognized by those ,jews who maintained that ,god1 ,god's intellect1 and the things understood by ,god are identical4 ,for instance1 a circle existing in nature1 and the idea of a circle existing1 which is also in ,god1 are one and the same thing displayed through different attributes4 ,thus1 whether we conceive nature under the attribute of extension1 or under the attribute of thought1 or under any other attribute1 we shall find the same order1 or one and the same chain of causes--that is1 the same things following in either case4 ,i said that ,god is the cause of an idea--for instance1 of the idea of a circle1--in so far as he is a thinking thing2 and of a circle1 in so far as he is an extended thing1 simply because the actual being of the idea of a circle can only be perceived as a proximate cause through another mode of thinking1 and that again through another1 and so on to infinity2 so that1 so long as we consider things as modes of thinking1 we must explain the order of the whole of nature1 or the whole chain of causes1 through the attribute of thought only4 ,and1 in so far as we consider things as modes of extension1 we must explain the order of the whole of nature through the attributes of extension only2 and so on1 in the case of the other attributes4 ,wherefore of things as they are in themselves ,god is really the cause1 inasmuch as he consists of infinite attributes4 ,i cannot for the present explain my meaning more clearly4 ,,viii4 ,the ideas of particular things1 or of modes1 that do not exist1 must be comprehended in the infinite idea of ,god1 in the same way as the formal essences of particular things or modes are contained in the attributes of ,god4 ,proof--,this proposition is evident from the last2 it is understood more clearly from the preceding note4 ,corollary--,hence1 so long as particular things do not exist1 except in so far as they are comprehended in the attributes of ,god1 their representations in thought or ideas do not exist1 except in so far as the infinite idea of ,god exists2 and when the particular things are said to exist1 not only in so far as they are involved in the attributes of ,god1 but also in so far as they are said to continue1 their ideas will also involve existence1 through which they are said to continue4 9999999999,note--,if anyone desires an example to throw more light on this question1 ,i shall1 ,i fear1 not be able to give him any1 which adequately explains the thing of which ,i here speak1 inasmuch as it is unique2 however1 ,i will endeavour to illustrate it as far as possible4 ,the nature of a circle is such that if any number of straight lines intersect within it1 the rectangles formed by their segments will be equal to one another2 thus1 infinite equal rectangles are contained in a circle4 ,yet none of these rectangles can be said to exist1 except in so far as the circle exists2 nor can the idea of any of these rectangles be said to exist1 except in so far as they are comprehended in the idea of the circle4 ,let us grant that1 from this infinite number of rectangles1 two only exist4 ,the ideas of these two not only exist1 in so far as they are contained in the idea of the circle1 but also as they involve the existence of those rectangles2 wherefore they are distinguished from the remaining ideas of the remaining rectangles4 ,,ix4 ,the idea of an individual thing actually existing is caused by ,god1 not in so far as he is infinite1 but in so far as he is considered as affected by another idea of a thing actually existing1 of which he is the cause1 in so far as he is affected by a third idea1 and so on to infinity4 ,proof--,the idea of an individual thing actually existing is an individual mode of thinking1 and is distinct from other modes 7by the ,cor4 and ,note to ,prop4 viii4 of this part72 thus 7by ,prop4 vi4 of this part7 it is caused by ,god1 in so far only as he is a thinking thing4 ,but not 7by ,prop4 xxviii4 of ,part i47 in so far as he is a thing thinking absolutely1 only in so far as he is considered as affected by another mode of thinking2 and he is the cause of this latter1 as being affected by a third1 and so on to infinity4 ,now1 the order and connection of ideas is 7by ,prop4 vii4 of this book7 the same as the order and connection of causes4 ,therefore of a given individual idea another individual idea1 or ,god1 in so far as he is considered as modified by that idea1 is the cause2 and of this second idea ,god is the cause1 in so far as he is affected by another idea1 and so on to infinity4 ,q4,e4,d4 ,corollary--,whatsoever takes place in the individual object of any idea1 the knowledge thereof is in ,god1 in so far only as he has the idea of the object4 ,proof--,whatsoever takes place in the object of any idea1 its idea is in ,god 7by ,prop4 iii4 of this part71 not in so far as he is infinite1 but in so far as he is considered as affected by another idea of an individual thing 7by the last ,prop472 but 7by ,prop4 vii4 of this part7 the order and connection of ideas is the same as the order and connection of things4 ,the knowledge1 therefore1 of that which takes place in any individual object will be in ,god1 in so far only as he has the idea of that object4 ,q4,e4,d4 ,x4 ,the being of substance does not appertain to the essence of man--in other words1 substance does not constitute the actual being 7forma7 of man4 ,proof--,the being of substance involves necessary existence 7,part i41 ,prop4 vii474 ,if1 therefore1 the being of substance appertains to the essence of man1 substance being granted1 man would necessarily be granted also 7,,ii4 ,def4 ii471 and1 consequently1 man would necessarily exist1 which is absurd 7,,ii4 ,ax4 i474 ,therefore c4 ,q4,e4,d4 9999999999,note--,this proposition may also be proved from ,i4v41 in which it is shown that there cannot be two substances of the same nature2 for as there may be many men1 the being of substance is not that which constitutes the actual being of man4 ,again1 the proposition is evident from the other properties of substance--namely1 that substance is in its nature infinite1 immutable1 indivisible1 c41 as anyone may see for himself4 ,corollary--,hence it follows1 that the essence of man is constituted by certain modifications of the attributes of ,god4 ,for 7by the last ,prop47 the being of substance does not belong to the essence of man4 ,that essence therefore 7by ,i4 xv47 is something which is in ,god1 and which without ,god can neither be nor be conceived1 whether it be a modification 7,i4 xxv4 ,cor471 or a mode which expresses ,god's nature in a certain conditioned manner4 9999999999,note--,everyone must surely admit1 that nothing can be or be conceived without ,god4 ,all men agree that ,god is the one and only cause of all things1 both of their essence and of their existence2 that is1 ,god is not only the cause of things in respect to their being made 7secundum fieri71 but also in respect to their being 7secundum esse74 ,at the same time many assert1 that that1 without which a thing cannot be nor be conceived1 belongs to the essence of that thing2 wherefore they believe that either the nature of ,god appertains to the essence of created things1 or else that created things can be or be conceived without ,god2 or else1 as is more probably the case1 they hold inconsistent doctrines4 ,i think the cause for such confusion is mainly1 that they do not keep to the proper order of philosophic thinking4 ,the nature of ,god1 which should be reflected on first1 inasmuch as it is prior both in the order of knowledge and the order of nature1 they have taken to be last in the order of knowledge1 and have put into the first place what they call the objects of sensation2 hence1 while they are considering natural phenomena1 they give no attention at all to the divine nature1 and1 when afterwards they apply their mind to the study of the divine nature1 they are quite unable to bear in mind the first hypotheses1 with which they have overlaid the knowledge of natural phenomena1 inasmuch as such hypotheses are no help towards understanding the divine nature4 ,so that it is hardly to be wondered at1 that these persons contradict themselves freely4 ,however1 ,i pass over this point4 ,my intention her was only to give a reason for not saying1 that that1 without which a thing cannot be or be conceived1 belongs to the essence of that thing3 individual things cannot be or be conceived without ,god1 yet ,god does not appertain to their essence4 ,i said that ,i considered as belonging to the essence of a thing that1 which being given1 the thing is necessarily given also1 and which being removed1 the thing is necessarily removed also2 or that without which the thing1 and which itself without the thing can neither be nor be conceived4 7,,ii4 ,def4 ii47 ,,xi4 ,the first element1 which constitutes the actual being of the human mind1 is the idea of some particular thing actually existing4 ,proof--,the essence of man 7by the ,cor4 of the last ,prop47 is constituted by certain modes of the attributes of ,god1 namely 7by ,,ii4 ,ax4 ii471 by the modes of thinking1 of all which 7by ,,ii4 ,ax4 iii47 the idea is prior in nature1 and1 when the idea is given1 the other modes 7namely1 those of which the idea is prior in nature7 must be in the same individual 7by the same ,axiom74 ,therefore an idea is the first element constituting the human mind4 ,but not the idea of a non-existent thing1 for then 7,,ii4 viii4 ,cor47 the idea itself cannot be said to exist2 it must therefore be the idea of something actually existing4 ,but not of an infinite thing4 ,for an infinite thing 7,i4 xxi41 xxii471 must always necessarily exist2 this would 7by ,,ii4 ,ax4 i47 involve an absurdity4 ,therefore the first element1 which constitutes the actual being of the human mind1 is the idea of something actually existing4 ,q4,e4,d4 ,corollary--,hence it follows1 that the human mind is part of the infinite intellect of ,god2 thus when we say1 that the human mind perceives this or that1 we make the assertion1 that ,god has this or that idea1 not in so far as he is infinite1 but in so far as he is displayed through the nature of the human mind1 or in so far as he constitutes the essence of the human mind2 and when we say that ,god has this or that idea1 not only in so far as he constitutes the essence of the human mind1 but also in so far as he1 simultaneously with the human mind1 has the further idea of another thing1 we assert that the human mind perceives a thing in part or inadequately4 9999999999,note--,here1 ,i doubt not1 readers will come to a stand1 and will call to mind many things which will cause them to hesitate2 ,i therefore beg them to accompany me slowly1 step by step1 and not to pronounce on my statements1 till they have read to the end4 ,,xii4 ,whatsoever comes to pass in the object of the idea1 which constitutes the human mind1 must be perceived by the human mind1 or there will necessarily be an idea in the human mind of the said occurrence4 ,that is1 if the object of the idea constituting the human mind be a body1 nothing can take place in that body without being perceived by the mind4 ,proof--,whatsoever comes to pass in the object of any idea1 the knowledge thereof is necessarily in ,god 7,,ii4 ix4 ,cor471 in so far as he is considered as affected by the idea of the said object1 that is 7,,ii4 xi471 in so far as he constitutes the mind of anything4 ,therefore1 whatsoever takes place in the object constituting the idea of the human mind1 the knowledge thereof is necessarily in ,god1 in so far as he constitutes the essence of the human mind2 that is 7by ,,ii4 xi4 ,cor47 the knowledge of the said thing will necessarily be in the mind1 in other words the mind perceives it4 9999999999,note--,this proposition is also evident1 and is more clearly to be understood from ,,ii4 vii41 which see4 ,,xiii4 ,the object of the idea constituting the human mind is the body1 in other words a certain mode of extension which actually exists1 and nothing else4 ,proof--,if indeed the body were not the object of the human mind1 the ideas of the modifications of the body would not be in ,god 7,,ii4 ix4 ,cor47 in virtue of his constituting our mind1 but in virtue of his constituting the mind of something else2 that is 7,,ii4 xi4 ,cor47 the ideas of the modifications of the body would not be in our mind3 now 7by ,,ii4 ,ax4 iv47 we do possess the idea of the modifications of the body4 ,therefore the object of the idea constituting the human mind is the body1 and the body as it actually exists 7,,ii4 xi474 ,further1 if there were any other object of the idea constituting the mind besides body1 then1 as nothing can exist from which some effect does not follow 7,i4 xxxvi47 there would necessarily have to be in our mind an idea1 which would be the effect of that other object 7,,ii4 xi472 but 7,i4 ,ax4 v47 there is no such idea4 ,wherefore the object of our mind is the body as it exists1 and nothing else4 ,q4,e4,d4 9999999999,note--,we thus comprehend1 not only that the human mind is united to the body1 but also the nature of the union between mind and body4 ,however1 no one will be able to grasp this adequately or distinctly1 unless he first has adequate knowledge of the nature of our body4 ,the propositions we have advanced hitherto have been entirely general1 applying not more to men than to other individual things1 all of which1 though in different degrees1 are animated 7animata74 ,for of everything there is necessarily an idea in ,god1 of which ,god is the cause1 in the same way as there is an idea of the human body2 thus whatever we have asserted of the idea of the human body must necessarily also be asserted of the idea of everything else4 ,still1 on the other hand1 we cannot deny that ideas1 like objects1 differ one from the other1 one being more excellent than another and containing more reality1 just as the object of one idea is more excellent than the object of another idea1 and contains more reality4 ,wherefore1 in order to determine1 wherein the human mind differs from other things1 and wherein it surpasses them1 it is necessary for us to know the nature of its object1 that is1 of the human body4 ,what this nature is1 ,i am not able here to explain1 nor is it necessary for the proof of what ,i advance1 that ,i should do so4 ,i will only say generally1 that in proportion as any given body is more fitted than others for doing many actions or receiving many impressions at once1 so also is the mind1 of which it is the object1 more fitted than others for forming many simultaneous perceptions2 and the more the actions of the body depend on itself alone1 and the fewer other bodies concur with it in action1 the more fitted is the mind of which it is the object for distinct comprehension4 ,we may thus recognize the superiority of one mind over others1 and may further see the cause1 why we have only a very confused knowledge of our body1 and also many kindred questions1 which ,i will1 in the following propositions1 deduce from what has been advanced4 ,wherefore ,i have thought it worth while to explain and prove more strictly my present statements4 ,in order to do so1 ,i must premise a few propositions concerning the nature of bodies4 ---,axiom ,i4 ,all bodies are either in motion or at rest4 ---,axiom ,,ii4 ,every body is moved sometimes more slowly1 sometimes more quickly4 ,lemma ,i4 ,bodies are distinguished from one another in respect of motion and rest1 quickness and slowness1 and not in respect of substance4 ,proof--,the first part of this proposition is1 ,i take it1 self-evident4 ,that bodies are not distinguished in respect of substance1 is plain both from ,i4 v4 and ,i4 viii4 ,it is brought out still more clearly from ,i4 xv41 ,note4 ,lemma ,,ii4 ,all bodies agree in certain respects4 ,proof--,all bodies agree in the fact1 that they involve the conception of one and the same attribute 7,,ii41 ,def4 i474 ,further1 in the fact that they may be moved less or more quickly1 and may be absolutely in motion or at rest4 ,lemma ,,iii4 ,a body in motion or at rest must be determined to motion or rest by another body1 which other body has been determined to motion or rest by a third body1 and that third again by a fourth1 and so on to infinity4 ,proof--,bodies are individual things 7,,ii41 ,def4 i471 which 7,lemma i47 are distinguished one from the other in respect to motion and rest2 thus 7,i4 xxviii47 each must necessarily be determined to motion or rest by another individual thing1 namely 7,,ii4 vi47 by another body1 which other body is also 7,ax4 i47 in motion or at rest4 ,and this body again can only have been set in motion or caused to rest by being determined by a third body to motion or rest4 ,this third body again by a fourth1 and so on to infinity4 ,q4,e4,d4 ,corollary--,hence it follows1 that a body in motion keeps in motion1 until it is determined to a state of rest by some other body2 and a body at rest remains so1 until it is determined to a state of motion by some other body4 ,this is indeed self-evident4 ,for when ,i suppose1 for instance1 that a given body1 ,a1 is at rest1 and do not take into consideration other bodies in motion1 ,i cannot affirm anything concerning the body ,a1 except that it is at rest4 ,if it afterwards comes to pass that ,a is in motion1 this cannot have resulted from its having been at rest1 for no other consequence could have been involved than its remaining at rest4 ,if1 on the other hand1 ,a be given in motion1 we shall1 so long as we only consider ,a1 be unable to affirm anything concerning it1 except that it is in motion4 ,if ,a is subsequently found to be at rest1 this rest cannot be the result of ,a's previous motion1 for such motion can only have led to continued motion2 the state of rest therefore must have resulted from something1 which was not in ,a1 namely1 from an external cause determining ,a to a state of rest4 -----,axiom ,i--,all modes1 wherein one body is affected by another body1 follow simultaneously from the nature of the body affected and the body affecting2 so that one and the same body may be moved in different modes1 according to the difference in the nature of the bodies moving it2 on the other hand1 different bodies may be moved in different modes by one and the same body4 -----,axiom ,,ii--,when a body in motion impinges on another body at rest1 which it is unable to move1 it recoils1 in order to continue its motion1 and the angle made by the line of motion in the recoil and the plane of the body at rest1 whereon the moving body has impinged1 will be equal to the angle formed by the line of motion of incidence and the same plane4 ,so far we have been speaking only of the most simple bodies1 which are only distinguished one from the other by motion and rest1 quickness and slowness4 ,we now pass on to compound bodies4 ,definition--,when any given bodies of the same or different magnitude are compelled by other bodies to remain in contact1 or if they be moved at the same or different rates of speed1 so that their mutual movements should preserve among themselves a certain fixed relation1 we say that such bodies are 'in union1' and that together they compose one body or individual1 which is distinguished from other bodies by the fact of this union4 -----,axiom ,,iii--,in proportion as the parts of an individual1 or a compound body1 are in contact over a greater or less superficies1 they will with greater or less difficulty admit of being moved from their position2 consequently the individual will1 with greater or less difficulty1 be brought to assume another form4 ,those bodies1 whose parts are in contact over large superficies1 are called 'hard2' those1 whose parts are in contact over small superficies1 are called 'soft2' those1 whose parts are in motion among one another1 are called 'fluid4' ,lemma ,,iv4 ,if from a body or individual1 compounded of several bodies1 certain bodies be separated1 and if1 at the same time1 an equal number of other bodies of the same nature take their place1 the individual will preserve its nature as before1 without any change in its actuality 7forma74 ,proof--,bodies 7,lemma i47 are not distinguished in respect of substance3 that which constitutes the actuality 7formam7 of an individual consists 7by the last ,def47 in a union of bodies2 but this union1 although there is a continual change of bodies1 will 7by our hypothesis7 be maintained2 the individual1 therefore1 will retain its nature as before1 both in respect of substance and in respect of mode4 ,q4,e4,d4 ,lemma ,v4 ,if the parts composing an individual become greater or less1 but in such proportion1 that they all preserve the same mutual relations of motion and rest1 the individual will still preserve its original nature1 and its actuality will not be changed4 ,proof--,the same as for the last ,lemma4 ,lemma ,,vi4 ,if certain bodies composing an individual be compelled to change the motion1 which they have in one direction1 for motion in another direction1 but in such a manner1 that they be able to continue their motions and their mutual communication in the same relations as before1 the individual will retain its own nature without any change of its actuality4 ,proof--,this proposition is self-evident1 for the individual is supposed to retain all that1 which1 in its definition1 we spoke of as its actual being4 ,lemma ,,vii4 ,furthermore1 the individual thus composed preserves its nature1 whether it be1 as a whole1 in motion or at rest1 whether it be moved in this or that direction2 so long as each part retains its motion1 and preserves its communication with other parts as before4 ,proof--,this proposition is evident from the definition of an individual prefixed to ,lemma iv4 9999999999,note--,we thus see1 how a composite individual may be affected in many different ways1 and preserve its nature notwithstanding4 ,thus far we have conceived an individual as composed of bodies only distinguished one from the other in respect of motion and rest1 speed and slowness2 that is1 of bodies of the most simple character4 ,if1 however1 we now conceive another individual composed of several individuals of diverse natures1 we shall find that the number of ways in which it can be affected1 without losing its nature1 will be greatly multiplied4 ,each of its parts would consist of several bodies1 and therefore 7by ,lemma vi47 each part would admit1 without change to its nature1 of quicker or slower motion1 and would consequently be able to transmit its motions more quickly or more slowly to the remaining parts4 ,if we further conceive a third kind of individuals composed of individuals of this second kind1 we shall find that they may be affected in a still greater number of ways without changing their actuality4 ,we may easily proceed thus to infinity1 and conceive the whole of nature as one individual1 whose parts1 that is1 all bodies1 vary in infinite ways1 without any change in the individual as a whole4 ,i should feel bound to explain and demonstrate this point at more length1 if ,i were writing a special treatise on body4 ,but ,i have already said that such is not my object2 ,i have only touched on the question1 because it enables me to prove easily that which ,i have in view4 ,,postulates ,i4 ,the human body is composed of a number of individual parts1 of diverse nature1 each one of which is in itself extremely complex4 ,,ii4 ,of the individual parts composing the human body some are fluid1 some soft1 some hard4 ,,iii4 ,the individual parts composing the human body1 and consequently the human body itself1 are affected in a variety of ways by external bodies4 ,,iv4 ,the human body stands in need for its preservation of a number of other bodies1 by which it is continually1 so to speak1 regenerated4 ,v4 ,when the fluid part of the human body is determined by an external body to impinge often on another soft part1 it changes the surface of the latter1 and1 as it were1 leaves the impression thereupon of the external body which impels it4 ,,vi4 ,the human body can move external bodies1 and arrange them in a variety of ways4 ,,propositions ,,xiv4 ,the human mind is capable of perceiving a great number of things1 and is so in proportion as its body is capable of receiving a great number of impressions4 ,proof--,the human body 7by ,post4 iii4 and vi47 is affected in very many ways by external bodies1 and is capable in very many ways of affecting external bodies4 ,but 7,,ii4xii47 the human mind must perceive all that takes place in the human body2 the human mind is1 therefore1 capable of perceiving a great number of things1 and is so in proportion1 c4 ,q4,e4,d4 ,,xv4 ,the idea1 which constitutes the actual being of the human mind1 is not simple1 but compounded of a great number of ideas4 ,proof--,the idea constituting the actual being of the human mind is the idea of the body 7,,ii4 xiii471 which 7,post4 i47 is composed of a great number of complex individual parts4 ,but there is necessarily in ,god the idea of each individual part whereof the body is composed 7,,ii4 viii4 ,cor472 therefore 7,,ii4 vii471 the idea of the human body is composed of each of these numerous ideas of its component parts4 ,q4,e4,d4 ,,xvi4 ,the idea of every mode1 in which the human body is affected by external bodies1 must involve the nature of the human body1 and also the nature of the external body4 ,proof--,all the modes1 in which any given body is affected1 follow from the nature of the body affected1 and also from the nature of the affecting body 7by ,ax4 i41 after the ,cor4 of ,lemma iii471 wherefore their idea is also necessarily 7by ,i1 ,ax4 iv47 involves the nature of both bodies2 therefore1 the idea of every mode1 in which the human body is affected by external bodies1 involves the nature of the human body and of the external body4 ,q4,e4,d4 ,corollary ,i4--,hence it follows1 first1 that the human mind perceives the nature of a variety of bodies1 together with the nature of its own4 ,corollary ,,ii4--,it follows1 secondly1 that the ideas1 which we have of external bodies1 indicate rather the constitution of our own body than the nature of external bodies4 ,i have amply illustrated this in the ,appendix to ,part ,i4 ,,xvii4 ,if the human body is affected in a manner which involves the nature of any external body1 the human mind will regard the said external body as actually existing1 or as present to itself1 until the human body be affected in such a way1 as to exclude the existence or the presence of the said external body4 ,proof--,this proposition is self-evident1 for so long as the human body continues to be thus affected1 so long will the human mind 7,,ii4 xii47 regard this modification of the body --that is 7by the last ,prop471 it will have the idea of the mode as actually existing1 and this idea involves the nature of the external body2 therefore the mind 7by ,,ii4 xvi41 ,cor4 i47 will regard the external body as actually existing1 until it is affected1 c4 ,q4,e4,d4 ,corollary--,the mind is able to regard as present external bodies1 by which the human body has once been affected1 even though they be no longer in existence or present4 ,proof--,when external bodies determine the fluid parts of the human body1 so that they often impinge on the softer parts1 they change the surface of the last named 7,post4 v72 hence 7,ax4 ii41 after the ,cor4 of ,lemma iii47 they are refracted therefrom in a different manner from that which they followed before such change2 and1 further1 when afterwards they impinge on the new surfaces by their own spontaneous movement1 they will be refracted in the same manner1 as though they had been impelled towards those surfaces by external bodies2 consequently1 they will1 while they continue to be thus refracted1 affect the human body in the same manner1 whereof the mind 7,,ii4 xii47 will again take cognizance --that is 7,,ii4 xvii471 the mind will again regard the external body as present1 and will do so1 as often as the fluid parts of the human body impinge on the aforesaid surfaces by their own spontaneous motion4 ,wherefore1 although the external bodies1 by which the human body has once been affected1 be no longer in existence1 the mind will nevertheless regard them as present1 as often as this action of the body is repeated4 ,q4,e4,d4 9999999999,note--,we thus see how it comes about1 as is often the case1 that we regard as present many things which are not4 ,it is possible that the same result may be brought about by other causes2 but ,i think it suffices for me here to have indicated one possible explanation1 just as well as if ,i had pointed out the true cause4 ,indeed1 ,i do not think ,i am very far from the truth1 for all my assumptions are based on postulates1 which rest1 almost without exception1 on experience1 that cannot be controverted by those who have shown1 as we have1 that the human body1 as we feel it1 exists 7,cor4 after ,,ii4 xiii474 ,furthermore 7,,ii4 vii4 ,cor41 ,,ii4 xvi4 ,cor4 ii471 we clearly understand what is the difference between the idea1 say1 of ,peter1 which constitutes the essence of ,peter's mind1 and the idea of the said ,peter1 which is in another man1 say1 ,paul4 ,the former directly answers to the essence of ,peter's own body1 and only implies existence so long as ,peter exists2 the latter indicates rather the disposition of ,paul's body than the nature of ,peter1 and1 therefore1 while this disposition of ,paul's body lasts1 ,paul's mind will regard ,peter as present to itself1 even though he no longer exists4 ,further1 to retain the usual phraseology1 the modifications of the human body1 of which the ideas represent external bodies as present to us1 we will call the images of things1 though they do not recall the figure of things4 ,when the mind regards bodies in this fashion1 we say that it imagines4 ,i will here draw attention to the fact1 in order to indicate where error lies1 that the imaginations of the mind1 looked at in themselves1 do not contain error4 ,the mind does not err in the mere act of imagining1 but only in so far as it is regarded as being without the idea1 which excludes the existence of such things as it imagines to be present to it4 ,if the mind1 while imagining non-existent things as present to it1 is at the same time conscious that they do not really exist1 this power of imagination must be set down to the efficacy of its nature1 and not to a fault1 especially if this faculty of imagination depend solely on its own nature--that is 7,i4 ,def4 vii471 if this faculty of imagination be free4 ,,xviii4 ,if the human body has once been affected by two or more bodies at the same time1 when the mind afterwards imagines any of them1 it will straightway remember the others also4 ,proof--,the mind 7,,ii4 xvii4 ,cor47 imagines any given body1 because the human body is affected and disposed by the impressions from an external body1 in the same manner as it is affected when certain of its parts are acted on by the said external body2 but 7by our hypothesis7 the body was then so disposed1 that the mind imagined two bodies at once2 therefore1 it will also in the second case imagine two bodies at once1 and the mind1 when it imagines one1 will straightway remember the other4 ,q4,e4,d4 9999999999,note--,we now clearly see what ',memory' is4 ,it is simply a certain association of ideas involving the nature of things outside the human body1 which association arises in the mind according to the order and association of the modifications 7affectiones7 of the human body4 ,i say1 first1 it is an association of those ideas only1 which involve the nature of things outside the human body3 not of ideas which answer to the nature of the said things3 ideas of the modifications of the human body are1 strictly speaking 7,,ii4 xvi471 those which involve the nature both of the human body and of external bodies4 ,i say1 secondly1 that this association arises according to the order and association of the modifications of the human body1 in order to distinguish it from that association of ideas1 which arises from the order of the intellect1 whereby the mind perceives things through their primary causes1 and which is in all men the same4 ,and hence we can further clearly understand1 why the mind from the thought of one thing1 should straightway arrive at the thought of another thing1 which has no similarity with the first2 for instance1 from the thought of the word 'pomum' 7an apple71 a ,roman would straightway arrive at the thought of the fruit apple1 which has no similitude with the articulate sound in question1 nor anything in common with it1 except that the body of the man has often been affected by these two things2 that is1 that the man has often heard the word 'pomum1' while he was looking at the fruit2 similarly every man will go on from one thought to another1 according as his habit has ordered the images of things in his body4 ,for a soldier1 for instance1 when he sees the tracks of a horse in sand1 will at once pass from the thought of a horse to the thought of a horseman1 and thence to the thought of war1 c42 while a countryman will proceed from the thought of a horse to the thought of a plough1 a field1 c4 ,thus every man will follow this or that train of thought1 according as he has been in the habit of conjoining and associating the mental images of things in this or that manner4 ,,xix4 ,the human mind has no knowledge of the body1 and does not know it to exist1 save through the ideas of the modifications whereby the body is affected4 ,proof--,the human mind is the very idea or knowledge of the human body 7,,ii4 xiii471 which 7,,ii4 ix47 is in ,god1 in so far as he is regarded as affected by another idea of a particular thing actually existing3 or1 inasmuch as 7,post4 iv47 the human body stands in need of very many bodies whereby it is1 as it were1 continually regenerated2 and the order and connection of ideas is the same as the order and connection of causes 7,,ii4 vii472 this idea will therefore be in ,god1 in so far as he is regarded as affected by the ideas of very many particular things4 ,thus ,god has the idea of the human body1 or knows the human body1 in so far as he is affected by very many other ideas1 and not in so far as he constitutes the nature of the human mind2 that is 7by ,,ii4 xi4 ,cor471 the human mind does not know the human body4 ,but the ideas of the modifications of body are in ,god1 in so far as he constitutes the nature of the human mind1 or the human mind perceives those modifications 7,,ii4 xii471 and consequently 7,,ii4 xvi47 the human body itself1 and as actually existing2 therefore the mind perceives thus far only the human body4 ,q4,e4,d4 ,,xx4 ,the idea or knowledge of the human mind is also in ,god1 following in ,god in the same manner1 and being referred to ,god in the same manner1 as the idea or knowledge of the human body4 ,proof--,thought is an attribute of ,god 7,,ii4 i472 therefore 7,,ii4 iii47 there must necessarily be in ,god the idea both of thought itself and of all its modifications1 consequently also of the human mind 7,,ii4 xi474 ,further1 this idea or knowledge of the mind does not follow from ,god1 in so far as he is infinite1 but in so far as he is affected by another idea of an individual thing 7,,ii4 ix474 ,but 7,,ii4 vii47 the order and connection of ideas is the same as the order and connection of causes2 therefore this idea or knowledge of the mind is in ,god and is referred to ,god1 in the same manner as the idea or knowledge of the body4 ,q4,e4,d4 ,,xxi4 ,this idea of the mind is united to the mind in the same way as the mind is united to the body4 ,proof--,that the mind is united to the body we have shown from the fact1 that the body is the object of the mind 7,,ii4 xii4 and xiii472 and so for the same reason the idea of the mind must be united with its object1 that is1 with the mind in the same manner as the mind is united to the body4 ,q4,e4,d4 9999999999,note--,this proposition is comprehended much more clearly from what we have said in the note to ,,ii4 vii4 ,we there showed that the idea of body and body1 that is1 mind and body 7,,ii4 xiii471 are one and the same individual conceived now under the attribute of thought1 now under the attribute of extension2 wherefore the idea of the mind and the mind itself are one and the same thing1 which is conceived under one and the same attribute1 namely1 thought4 ,the idea of the mind1 ,i repeat1 and the mind itself are in ,god by the same necessity and follow from him from the same power of thinking4 ,strictly speaking1 the idea of the mind1 that is1 the idea of an idea1 is nothing but the distinctive quality 7forma7 of the idea in so far as it is conceived as a mode of thought without reference to the object2 if a man knows anything1 he1 by that very fact1 knows that he knows it1 and at the same time knows that he knows that he knows it1 and so on to infinity4 ,but ,i will treat of this hereafter4 ,,xxii4 ,the human mind perceives not only the modifications of the body1 but also the ideas of such modifications4 ,proof--,the ideas of the ideas of modifications follow in ,god in the same manner1 and are referred to ,god in the same manner1 as the ideas of the said modifications4 ,this is proved in the same way as ,,ii4 xx4 ,but the ideas of the modifications of the body are in the human mind 7,,ii4 xii471 that is1 in ,god1 in so far as he constitutes the essence of the human mind2 therefore the ideas of these ideas will be in ,god1 in so far as he has the knowledge or idea of the human mind1 that is 7,,ii4 xxi471 they will be in the human mind itself1 which therefore perceives not only the modifications of the body1 but also the ideas of such modifications4 ,q4,e4,d4 ,,xxiii4 ,the mind does not know itself1 except in so far as it perceives the ideas of the modifications of the body4 ,proof--,the idea or knowledge of the mind 7,,ii4 xx47 follows in ,god in the same manner1 and is referred to ,god in the same manner1 as the idea or knowledge of the body4 ,but since 7,,ii4 xix47 the human mind does not know the human body itself1 that is 7,,ii4 xi4 ,cor471 since the knowledge of the human body is not referred to ,god1 in so far as he constitutes the nature of the human mind2 therefore1 neither is the knowledge of the mind referred to ,god1 in so far as he constitutes the essence of the human mind2 therefore 7by the same ,cor4 ,,ii4 xi471 the human mind thus far has no knowledge of itself4 ,further the ideas of the modifications1 whereby the body is affected1 involve the nature of the human body itself 7,,ii4 xvi471 that is 7,,ii4 xiii471 they agree with the nature of the mind2 wherefore the knowledge of these ideas necessarily involves knowledge of the mind2 but 7by the last ,prop47 the knowledge of these ideas is in the human mind itself2 wherefore the human mind thus far only has knowledge of itself4 ,q4,e4,d4 ,,xxiv4 ,the human mind does not involve an adequate knowledge of the parts composing the human body4 ,proof--,the parts composing the human body do not belong to the essence of that body1 except in so far as they communicate their motions to one another in a certain fixed relation 7,def4 after ,lemma iii471 not in so far as they can be regarded as individuals without relation to the human body4 ,the parts of the human body are highly complex individuals 7,post4 i471 whose parts 7,lemma iv47 can be separated from the human body without in any way destroying the nature and distinctive quality of the latter1 and they can communicate their motions 7,ax4 i41 after ,lemma iii47 to other bodies in another relation2 therefore 7,,ii4 iii47 the idea or knowledge of each part will be in ,god1 inasmuch 7,,ii4 ix47 as he is regarded as affected by another idea of a particular thing1 which particular thing is prior in the order of nature to the aforesaid part 7,,ii4 vii474 ,we may affirm the same thing of each part of each individual composing the human body2 therefore1 the knowledge of each part composing the human body is in ,god1 in so far as he is affected by very many ideas of things1 and not in so far as he has the idea of the human body only1 in other words1 the idea which constitutes the nature of the human mind 7,,ii4 xiii472 therefore 7,,ii4 xi4 ,cor471 the human mind does not involve an adequate knowledge of the human body4 ,q4,e4,d4 ,,xxv4 ,the idea of each modification of the human body does not involve an adequate knowledge of the external body4 ,proof--,we have shown that the idea of a modification of the human body involves the nature of an external body1 in so far as that external body conditions the human body in a given manner4 ,but1 in so far as the external body is an individual1 which has no reference to the human body1 the knowledge or idea thereof is in ,god 7,,ii4 ix471 in so far as ,god is regarded as affected by the idea of a further thing1 which 7,,ii4 vii47 is naturally prior to the said external body4 ,wherefore an adequate knowledge of the external body is not in ,god1 in so far as he has the idea of the modification of the human body2 in other words1 the idea of the modification of the human body does not involve an adequate knowledge of the external body4 ,q4,e4,d4 ,,xxvi4 ,the human mind does not perceive any external body as actually existing1 except through the ideas of the modifications of its own body4 ,proof--,if the human body is in no way affected by a given external body1 then 7,,ii4 vii47 neither is the idea of the human body1 in other words1 the human mind1 affected in any way by the idea of the existence of the said external body1 nor does it in any manner perceive its existence4 ,but1 in so far as the human body is affected in any way by a given external body1 thus far 7,,ii4 xvi4 and ,cor47 it perceives that external body4 ,q4,e4,d4 ,corollary--,in so far as the human mind imagines an external body1 it has not an adequate knowledge thereof4 ,proof--,when the human mind regards external bodies through the ideas of the modifications of its own body1 we say that it imagines 7see ,,ii4 xvii4 note72 now the mind can only imagine external bodies as actually existing4 ,therefore 7by ,,ii4 xxv471 in so far as the mind imagines external bodies1 it has not an adequate knowledge of them4 ,q4,e4,d4 ,,xxvii4 ,the idea of each modification of the human body does not involve an adequate knowledge of the human body itself4 ,proof--,every idea of a modification of the human body involves the nature of the human body1 in so far as the human body is regarded as affected in a given manner 7,,ii4 xvi474 ,but inasmuch as the human body is an individual which may be affected in many other ways1 the idea of the said modification1 c4 ,q4,e4,d4 ,,xxviii4 ,the ideas of the modifications of the human body1 in so far as they have reference only to the human mind1 are not clear and distinct1 but confused4 ,proof--,the ideas of the modifications of the human body involve the nature both of the human body and of external bodies 7,,ii4 xvi472 they must involve the nature not only of the human body but also of its parts2 for the modifications are modes 7,post4 iii471 whereby the parts of the human body1 and1 consequently1 the human body as a whole are affected4 ,but 7by ,,ii4 xxiv41 xxv47 the adequate knowledge of external bodies1 as also of the parts composing the human body1 is not in ,god1 in so far as he is regarded as affected by the human mind1 but in so far as he is regarded as affected by other ideas4 ,these ideas of modifications1 in so far as they are referred to the human mind alone1 are as consequences without premisses1 in other words1 confused ideas4 ,q4,e4,d4 9999999999,note--,the idea which constitutes the nature of the human mind is1 in the same manner1 proved not to be1 when considered in itself and alone1 clear and distinct2 as also is the case with the idea of the human mind1 and the ideas of the ideas of the modifications of the human body1 in so far as they are referred to the mind only1 as everyone may easily see4 ,,xxix4 ,the idea of the idea of each modification of the human body does not involve an adequate knowledge of the human mind4 ,proof--,the idea of a modification of the human body 7,,ii4 xxvii47 does not involve an adequate knowledge of the said body1 in other words1 does not adequately express its nature2 that is 7,,ii4 xiii47 it does not agree with the nature of the mind adequately2 therefore 7,i4 ,ax4 vi47 the idea of this idea does not adequately express the nature of the human mind1 or does not involve an adequate knowledge thereof4 ,corollary--,hence it follows that the human mind1 when it perceives things after the common order of nature1 has not an adequate but only a confused and fragmentary knowledge of itself1 of its own body1 and of external bodies4 ,for the mind does not know itself1 except in so far as it perceives the ideas of the modifications of body 7,,ii4 xxiii474 ,it only perceives its own body 7,,ii4 xix47 through the ideas of the modifications of body 7,,ii4 xxiii474 ,it only perceives its own body 7,,ii4 xix47 through the ideas of the modifications1 and only perceives external bodies through the same means2 thus1 in so far as it has such ideas of modification1 it has not an adequate knowledge of itself 7,,ii4 xxix471 nor of its own body 7,,ii4 xxvii471 nor of external bodies 7,,ii4 xxv471 but only a fragmentary and confused knowledge thereof 7,,ii4 xxviii4 and note74 ,q4,e4,d4 9999999999,note--,i say expressly1 that the mind has not an adequate but only a confused knowledge of itself1 its own body1 and of external bodies1 whenever it perceives things after the common order of nature2 that is1 whenever it is determined from without1 namely1 by the fortuitous play of circumstance1 to regard this or that2 not at such times as it is determined from within1 that is1 by the fact of regarding several things at once1 to understand their points of agreement1 difference1 and contrast4 ,whenever it is determined in anywise from within1 it regards things clearly and distinctly1 as ,i will show below4 ,,xxx4 ,we can only have a very inadequate knowledge of the duration of our body4 ,proof--,the duration of our body does not depend on its essence 7,,ii4 ,ax4 i471 nor on the absolute nature of ,god 7,i4 xxi474 ,but 7,i4 xxviii47 it is conditioned to exist and operate by causes1 which in their turn are conditioned to exist and operate in a fixed and definite relation by other causes1 these last again being conditioned by others1 and so on to infinity4 ,the duration of our body therefore depends on the common order of nature1 or the constitution of things4 ,now1 however a thing may be constituted1 the adequate knowledge of that thing is in ,god1 in so far as he has the ideas of all things1 and not in so far as he has the idea of the human body only 7,,ii4 ix4 ,cor474 ,wherefore the knowledge of the duration of our body is in ,god very inadequate1 in so far as he is only regarded as constituting the nature of the human mind2 that is 7,,ii4 xi4 ,cor471 this knowledge is very inadequate to our mind4 ,q4,e4,d4 ,,xxxi4 ,we can only have a very inadequate knowledge of the duration of particular things external to ourselves4 ,proof--,every particular thing1 like the human body1 must be conditioned by another particular thing to exist and operate in a fixed and definite relation2 this other particular thing must likewise be conditioned by a third1 and so on to infinity 7,i4 xxviii474 ,as we have shown in the foregoing proposition1 from this common property of particular things1 we have only a very inadequate knowledge of the duration of our body2 we must draw a similar conclusion with regard to the duration of particular things1 namely1 that we can only have a very inadequate knowledge of the duration thereof4 ,q4,e4,d4 ,corollary--,hence it follows that all particular things are contingent and perishable4 ,for we can have no adequate idea of their duration 7by the last ,prop471 and this is what we must understand by the contingency and perishableness of things 7,i4 xxxiii41 ,note i474 ,for 7,i4 xxix471 except in this sense1 nothing is contingent4 ,,xxxii4 ,all ideas1 in so far as they are referred to ,god1 are true4 ,proof--,all ideas which are in ,god agree in every respect with their objects 7,,ii4 ii4 ,cor471 therefore 7,i4 ,ax4 vi47 they are all true4 ,q4,e4,d4 ,,xxxii4 ,there is nothing positive in ideas1 which causes them to be called false4 ,proof--,if this be denied1 conceive1 if possible1 a positive mode of thinking1 which should constitute the distinctive quality of falsehood4 ,such a mode of thinking cannot be in ,god 7,,ii4 xxxii472 external to ,god it cannot be or be conceived 7,i4 xv474 ,therefore there is nothing positive in ideas which causes them to be called false4 ,q4,e4,d4 ,,xxxiv4 ,every idea1 which in us is absolute or adequate and perfect1 is true4 ,proof--,when we say that an idea in us is adequate and perfect1 we say1 in other words 7,,ii4 xi4 ,cor471 that the idea is adequate and perfect in ,god1 in so far as he constitutes the essence of our mind2 consequently 7,,ii4 xxxii471 we say that such an idea is true4 ,q4,e4,d4 ,,xxxv4 ,falsity consists in the privation of knowledge1 which inadequate1 fragmentary1 or confused ideas involve4 ,proof--,there is nothing positive in ideas1 which causes them to be called false 7,,ii4 xxxiii472 but falsity cannot consist in simple privation 7for minds1 not bodies1 are said to err and to be mistaken71 neither can it consist in absolute ignorance1 for ignorance and error are not identical2 wherefore it consists in the privation of knowledge1 which inadequate1 fragmentary1 or confused ideas involve4 ,q4,e4,d4 9999999999,note--,in the note to ,,ii4 xvii4 ,i explained how error consists in the privation of knowledge1 but in order to throw more light on the subject ,i will give an example4 ,for instance1 men are mistaken in thinking themselves free2 their opinion is made up of consciousness of their own actions1 and ignorance of the causes by which they are conditioned4 ,their idea of freedom1 therefore1 is simply their ignorance of any cause for their actions4 ,as for their saying that human actions depend on the will1 this is a mere phrase without any idea to correspond thereto4 ,what the will is1 and how it moves the body1 they none of them know2 those who boast of such knowledge1 and feign dwellings and habitations for the soul1 are wont to provoke either laughter or disgust4 ,so1 again1 when we look at the sun1 we imagine that it is distant from us about two hundred feet2 this error does not lie solely in this fancy1 but in the fact that1 while we thus imagine1 we do not know the sun's true distance or the cause of the fancy4 ,for although we afterwards learn1 that the sun is distant from us more than six hundred of the earth's diameters1 we none the less shall fancy it to be near2 for we do not imagine the sun as near us1 because we are ignorant of its true distance1 but because the modification of our body involves the essence of the sun1 in so far as our said body is affected thereby4 ,,xxxvi4 ,inadequate and confused ideas follow by the same necessity1 as adequate or clear and distinct ideas4 ,proof--,all ideas are in ,god 7,i4 xv471 and in so far as they are referred to ,god are true 7,,ii4 xxxii47 and 7,,ii4 vii4 ,cor47 adequate2 therefore there are no ideas confused or inadequate1 except in respect to a particular mind 7cf4 ,,ii4 xxiv4 and xxviii472 therefore all ideas1 whether adequate or inadequate1 follow by the same necessity 7,,ii4 vi474 ,q4,e4,d4 ,,xxxvii4 ,that which is common to all 7cf4 ,lemma ,,ii1 above71 and which is equally in a part and in the whole1 does not constitute the essence of any particular thing4 ,proof--,if this be denied1 conceive1 if possible1 that it constitutes the essence of some particular thing2 for instance1 the essence of ,b4 ,then 7,,ii4 ,def4 ii47 it cannot without ,b either exist or be conceived2 but this is against our hypothesis4 ,therefore it does not appertain to ,b's essence1 nor does it constitute the essence of any particular thing4 ,q4,e4,d4 ,,xxxviii4 ,those things1 which are common to all1 and which are equally in a part and in the whole1 cannot be conceived except adequately4 ,proof--,let ,a be something1 which is common to all bodies1 and which is equally present in the part of any given body and in the whole4 ,i say ,a cannot be conceived except adequately4 ,for the idea thereof in ,god will necessarily be adequate 7,,ii4 vii4 ,cor471 both in so far as ,god has the idea of the human body1 and also in so far as he has the idea of the modifications of the human body1 which 7,,ii4 xvi41 xxv41 xxvii47 involve in part the nature of the human body and the nature of external bodies2 that is 7,,ii4 xii41 xiii471 the idea in ,god will necessarily be adequate1 both in so far as he constitutes the human mind1 and in so far as he has the ideas1 which are in the human mind4 ,therefore the mind 7,,ii4 xi4 ,cor47 necessarily perceives ,a adequately1 and has this adequate perception1 both in so far as it perceives itself1 and in so far as it perceives its own or any external body1 nor can ,a be conceived in any other manner4 ,q4,e4,d4 ,corollary--,hence it follows that there are certain ideas or notions common to all men2 for 7by ,lemma ii47 all bodies agree in certain respects1 which 7by the foregoing ,prop47 must be adequately or clearly and distinctly perceived by all4 ,,xxxix4 ,that1 which is common to and a property of the human body and such other bodies as are wont to affect the human body1 and which is present equally in each part of either1 or in the whole1 will be represented by an adequate idea in the mind4 ,proof--,if ,a be that1 which is common to and a property of the human body and external bodies1 and equally present in the human body and in the said external bodies1 in each part of each external body and in the whole1 there will be an adequate idea of ,a in ,god 7,,ii4 vii4 ,cor471 both in so far as he has the idea of the human body1 and in so far as he has the ideas of the given external bodies4 ,let it now be granted1 that the human body is affected by an external body through that1 which it has in common therewith1 namely1 ,a2 the idea of this modification will involve the property ,a 7,,ii4 xvi471 and therefore 7,,ii4 vii4 ,cor47 the idea of this modification1 in so far as it involves the property ,a1 will be adequate in ,god1 in so far as ,god is affected by the idea of the human body2 that is 7,,ii4 xiii471 in so far as he constitutes the nature of the human mind2 therefore 7,,ii4 xi4 ,cor47 this idea is also adequate in the human mind4 ,q4,e4,d4 ,corollary--,hence it follows that the mind is fitted to perceive adequately more things1 in proportion as its body has more in common with other bodies4 ,,xl4 ,whatsoever ideas in the mind follow from ideas which are therein adequate1 are also themselves adequate4 ,proof--,this proposition is self-evident4 ,for when we say that an idea in the human mind follows from ideas which are therein adequate1 we say1 in other words 7,,ii4 xi4 ,cor471 that an idea is in the divine intellect1 whereof ,god is the cause1 not in so far as he is infinite1 nor in so far as he is affected by the ideas of very many particular things1 but only in so far as he constitutes the essence of the human mind4 9999999999,note ,i--,i have thus set forth the cause of those notions1 which are common to all men1 and which form the basis of our ratiocinations4 ,but there are other causes of certain axioms or notions1 which it would be to the purpose to set forth by this method of ours2 for it would thus appear what notions are more useful than others1 and what notions have scarcely any use at all4 ,furthermore1 we should see what notions are common to all men1 and what notions are only clear and distinct to those who are unshackled by prejudice1 and we should detect those which are ill-founded4 ,again we should discern whence the notions called secondary derived their origin1 and consequently the axioms on which they are founded1 and other points of interest connected with these questions4 ,but ,i have decided to pass over the subject here1 partly because ,i have set it aside for another treatise1 partly because ,i am afraid of wearying the reader by too great prolixity4 ,nevertheless1 in order not to omit anything necessary to be known1 ,i will briefly set down the causes1 whence are derived the terms styled transcendental1 such as ,being1 ,thing1 ,something4 ,these terms arose from the fact1 that the human body1 being limited1 is only capable of distinctly forming a certain number of images 7what an image is ,i explained in the ,,ii4 xvii4 note7 within itself at the same time2 if this number be exceeded1 the images will begin to be confused2 if this number of images1 of which the body is capable of forming distinctly within itself1 be largely exceeded1 all will become entirely confused one with another4 ,this being so1 it is evident 7from ,,ii4 ,prop4 xvii4 ,cor41 and xviii47 that the human mind can distinctly imagine as many things simultaneously1 as its body can form images simultaneously4 ,when the images become quite confused in the body1 the mind also imagines all bodies confusedly without any distinction1 and will comprehend them1 as it were1 under one attribute1 namely1 under the attribute of ,being1 ,thing1 c4 ,the same conclusion can be drawn from the fact that images are not always equally vivid1 and from other analogous causes1 which there is no need to explain here2 for the purpose which we have in view it is sufficient for us to consider one only4 ,all may be reduced to this1 that these terms represent ideas in the highest degree confused4 ,from similar causes arise those notions1 which we call general1 such as man1 horse1 dog1 c4 ,they arise1 to wit1 from the fact that so many images1 for instance1 of men1 are formed simultaneously in the human mind1 that the powers of imagination break down1 not indeed utterly1 but to the extent of the mind losing count of small differences between individuals 7e4g4 colour1 size1 c47 and their definite number1 and only distinctly imagining that1 in which all the individuals1 in so far as the body is affected by them1 agree2 for that is the point1 in which each of the said individuals chiefly affected the body2 this the mind expresses by the name man1 and this it predicates of an infinite number of particular individuals4 ,for1 as we have said1 it is unable to imagine the definite number of individuals4 ,we must1 however1 bear in mind1 that these general notions are not formed by all men in the same way1 but vary in each individual according as the point varies1 whereby the body has been most often affected and which the mind most easily imagines or remembers4 ,for instance1 those who have most often regarded with admiration the stature of man1 will by the name of man understand an animal of erect stature2 those who have been accustomed to regard some other attribute1 will form a different general image of man1 for instance1 that man is a laughing animal1 a two-footed animal without feathers1 a rational animal1 and thus1 in other cases1 everyone will form general images of things according to the habit of his body4 ,it is thus not to be wondered at1 that among philosophers1 who seek to explain things in nature merely by the images formed of them1 so many controversies should have arisen4 9999999999,note ,,ii--,from all that has been said above it is clear1 that we1 in many cases1 perceive and form our general notions3--7#a47 ,from particular things represented to our intellect fragmentarily1 confusedly1 and without order through our senses 7,,ii4 xxix4 ,cor472 ,i have settled to call such perceptions by the name of knowledge from the mere suggestions of experience4 7#b47 ,from symbols1 e4g41 from the fact of having read or heard certain words we remember things and form certain ideas concerning them1 similar to those through which we imagine things 7,,ii4 xviii4 ,note74 ,i shall call both these ways of regarding things knowledge of the first kind1 opinion1 or imagination4 7#c47 ,from the fact that we have notions common to all men1 and adequate ideas of the properties of things 7,,ii4 xxxviii4 ,cor41 xxxix4 and ,cor41 and xl472 this ,i call reason and knowledge of the second kind4 ,besides these two kinds of knowledge1 there is1 as ,i will hereafter show1 a third kind of knowledge1 which we will call intuition4 ,this kind of knowledge proceeds from an adequate idea of the absolute essence of certain attributes of ,god to the adequate knowledge of the essence of things4 ,i will illustrate all three kinds of knowledge by a single example4 ,three numbers are given for finding a fourth1 which shall be to the third as the second is to the first4 ,tradesmen without hesitation multiply the second by the third1 and divide the product by the first2 either because they have not forgotten the rule which they received from a master without any proof1 or because they have often made trial of it with simple numbers1 or by virtue of the proof of the nineteenth proposition of the seventh book of ,euclid1 namely1 in virtue of the general property of proportionals4 ,but with very simple numbers there is no need of this4 ,for instance1 one1 two1 three being given1 everyone can see that the fourth proportional is six2 and this is much clearer1 because we infer the fourth number from an intuitive grasping of the ratio1 which the first bears to the second4 ,,xli4 ,knowledge of the first kind is the only source of falsity1 knowledge of the second and third kinds is necessarily true4 ,proof--,to knowledge of the first kind we have 7in the foregoing note7 assigned all those ideas1 which are inadequate and confused2 therefore this kind of knowledge is the only source of falsity 7,,ii4 xxxv474 ,furthermore1 we assigned to the second and third kinds of knowledge those ideas which are adequate2 therefore these kinds are necessarily true 7,,ii4 xxxiv474 ,q4,e4,d4 ,,xlii4 ,knowledge of the second and third kinds1 not knowledge of the first kind1 teaches us to distinguish the true from the false4 ,proof--,this proposition is self-evident4 ,he1 who knows how to distinguish between true and false1 must have an adequate idea of true and false4 ,that is 7,,ii4 xl41 note ii471 he must know the true and the false by the second or third kind of knowledge4 ,,xliii4 ,he1 who has a true idea1 simultaneously knows that he has a true idea1 and cannot doubt of the truth of the thing perceived4 ,proof--,a true idea in us is an idea which is adequate in ,god1 in so far as he is displayed through the nature of the human mind 7,,ii4 xi4 ,cor474 ,let us suppose that there is in ,god1 in so far as he is displayed through the human mind1 an adequate idea1 ,a4 ,the idea of this idea must also necessarily be in ,god1 and be referred to him in the same way as the idea ,a 7by ,,ii4 xx41 whereof the proof is of universal application74 ,but the idea ,a is supposed to be referred to ,god1 in so far as he is displayed through the human mind2 therefore1 the idea of the idea ,a must be referred to ,god in the same manner2 that is 7by ,,ii4 xi4 ,cor471 the adequate idea of the idea ,a will be in the mind1 which has the adequate idea ,a2 therefore he1 who has an adequate idea or knows a thing truly 7,,ii4 xxxiv471 must at the same time have an adequate idea or true knowledge of his knowledge2 that is1 obviously1 he must be assured4 ,q4,e4,d4 9999999999,note--,i explained in the note to ,,ii4 xxi4 what is meant by the idea of an idea2 but we may remark that the foregoing proposition is in itself sufficiently plain4 ,no one1 who has a true idea1 is ignorant that a true idea involves the highest certainty4 ,for to have a true idea is only another expression for knowing a thing perfectly1 or as well as possible4 ,no one1 indeed1 can doubt of this1 unless he thinks that an idea is something lifeless1 like a picture on a panel1 and not a mode of thinking--namely1 the very act of understanding4 ,and who1 ,i ask1 can know that he understands anything1 unless he do first understand it8 ,in other words1 who can know that he is sure of a thing1 unless he be first sure of that thing8 ,further1 what can there be more clear1 and more certain1 than a true idea as a standard of truth8 ,even as light displays both itself and darkness1 so is truth a standard both of itself and of falsity4 ,i think ,i have thus sufficiently answered these questions--namely1 if a true idea is distinguished from a false idea1 only in so far as it is said to agree with its object1 a true idea has no more reality or perfection than a false idea 7since the two are only distinguished by an extrinsic mark72 consequently1 neither will a man who has a true idea have any advantage over him who has only false ideas4 ,further1 how comes it that men have false ideas8 ,lastly1 how can anyone be sure1 that he has ideas which agree with their objects8 ,these questions1 ,i repeat1 ,i have1 in my opinion1 sufficiently answered4 ,the difference between a true idea and a false idea is plain3 from what was said in ,,ii4 xxxv41 the former is related to the latter as being is to not-being4 ,the causes of falsity ,i have set forth very clearly in ,,ii4 xix4 and ,,ii4 xxxv4 with the note4 ,from what is there stated1 the difference between a man who has true ideas1 and a man who has only false ideas1 is made apparent4 ,as for the last question--as to how a man can be sure that he has ideas that agree with their objects1 ,i have just pointed out1 with abundant clearness1 that his knowledge arises from the simple fact1 that he has an idea which corresponds with its object--in other words1 that truth is its own standard4 ,we may add that our mind1 in so far as it perceives things truly1 is part of the infinite intellect of ,god 7,,ii4 xi4 ,cor472 therefore1 the clear and distinct ideas of the mind are as necessarily true as the ideas of ,god4 ,,xliv4 ,it is not in the nature of reason to regard things as contingent1 but as necessary4 ,proof--,it is in the nature of reason to perceive things truly 7,,ii4 xli471 namely 7,i4 ,ax4 vi471 as they are in themselves--that is 7,i4 xxix471 not as contingent1 but as necessary4 ,q4,e4,d4 ,corollary ,i--,hence it follows1 that it is only through our imagination that we consider things1 whether in respect to the future or the past1 as contingent4 9999999999,note--,how this way of looking at things arises1 ,i will briefly explain4 ,we have shown above 7,,ii4 xvii4 and ,cor47 that the mind always regards things as present to itself1 even though they be not in existence1 until some causes arise which exclude their existence and presence4 ,further 7,,ii4 xviii471 we showed that1 if the human body has once been affected by two external bodies simultaneously1 the mind1 when it afterwards imagines one of the said external bodies1 will straightway remember the other--that is1 it will regard both as present to itself1 unless there arise causes which exclude their existence and presence4 ,further1 no one doubts that we imagine time1 from the fact that we imagine bodies to be moved some more slowly than others1 some more quickly1 some at equal speed4 ,thus1 let us suppose that a child yesterday saw ,peter for the first time in the morning1 ,paul at noon1 and ,simon in the evening2 then1 that today he again sees ,peter in the morning4 ,it is evident1 from ,,ii4 ,prop4 xviii41 that1 as soon as he sees the morning light1 he will imagine that the sun will traverse the same parts of the sky1 as it did when he saw it on the preceding day2 in other words1 he will imagine a complete day1 and1 together with his imagination of the morning1 he will imagine ,peter2 with noon1 he will imagine ,paul2 and with evening1 he will imagine ,simon--that is1 he will imagine the existence of ,paul and ,simon in relation to a future time2 on the other hand1 if he sees ,simon in the evening1 he will refer ,peter and ,paul to a past time1 by imagining them simultaneously with the imagination of a past time4 ,if it should at any time happen1 that on some other evening the child should see ,james instead of ,simon1 he will1 on the following morning1 associate with his imagination of evening sometimes ,simon1 sometimes ,james1 not both together3 for the child is supposed to have seen1 at evening1 one or other of them1 not both together4 ,his imagination will therefore waver2 and1 with the imagination of future evenings1 he will associate first one1 then the other--that is1 he will imagine them in the future1 neither of them as certain1 but both as contingent4 ,this wavering of the imagination will be the same1 if the imagination be concerned with things which we thus contemplate1 standing in relation to time past or time present3 consequently1 we may imagine things as contingent1 whether they be referred to time present1 past1 or future4 ,corollary ,,ii--,it is in the nature of reason to perceive things under a certain form of eternity 7sub quadam aeternitatis specie74 ,proof--,it is in the nature of reason to regard things1 not as contingent1 but as necessary 7,,ii4 xliv474 ,reason perceives this necessity of things 7,,ii4 xli47 truly--that is 7,i4 ,ax4 vi471 as it is in itself4 ,but 7,i4 xvi47 this necessity of things is the very necessity of the eternal nature of ,god2 therefore1 it is in the nature of reason to regard things under this form of eternity4 ,we may add that the bases of reason are the notions 7,,ii4 xxxviii471 which answer to things common to all1 and which 7,,ii4 xxxvii47 do not answer to the essence of any particular thing3 which must therefore be conceived without any relation to time1 under a certain form of eternity4 ,,xlv4 ,every idea of every body1 or of every particular thing actually existing1 necessarily involves the eternal and infinite essence of ,god4 ,proof--,the idea of a particular thing actually existing necessarily involves both the existence and the essence of the said thing 7,,ii4 viii474 ,now particular things cannot be conceived without ,god 7,i4 xv472 but1 inasmuch as 7,,ii4 vi47 they have ,god for their cause1 in so far as he is regarded under the attribute of which the things in question are modes1 their ideas must necessarily involve 7,i4 ,ax4 iv47 the conception of the attributes of those ideas--that is 7,i4 vi471 the eternal and infinite essence of ,god4 ,q4,e4,d4 9999999999,note--,by existence ,i do not here mean duration--that is1 existence in so far as it is conceived abstractedly1 and as a certain form of quantity4 ,i am speaking of the very nature of existence1 which is assigned to particular things1 because they follow in infinite numbers and in infinite ways from the eternal necessity of ,god's nature 7,i4 xvi474 ,i am speaking1 ,i repeat1 of the very existence of particular things1 in so far as they are in ,god4 ,for although each particular thing be conditioned by another particular thing to exist in a given way1 yet the force whereby each particular thing perseveres in existing follows from the eternal necessity of ,god's nature 7cf4 ,i4 xxiv4 ,cor474 ,,xlvi4 ,the knowledge of the eternal and infinite essence of ,god which every idea involves is adequate and perfect4 ,proof--,the proof of the last proposition is universal2 and whether a thing be considered as a part or a whole1 the idea thereof1 whether of the whole or of a part 7by the last ,prop471 will involve ,god's eternal and infinite essence4 ,wherefore1 that1 which gives knowledge of the eternal and infinite essence of ,god1 is common to all1 and is equally in the part and in the whole2 therefore 7,,ii4 xxxviii47 this knowledge will be adequate4 ,q4,e4,d4 ,,xlvii4 ,the human mind has an adequate knowledge of the eternal and infinite essence of ,god4 ,proof--,the human mind has ideas 7,,ii4 xxii471 from which 7,,ii4 xxiii47 it perceives itself and its own body 7,,ii4 xix47 and external bodies 7,,ii4 xvi4 ,cor4 i4 and ,,ii4 xvii47 as actually existing2 therefore 7,,ii4 xlv4 and xlvi47 it has an adequate knowledge of the eternal and infinite essence of ,god4 ,q4,e4,d4 9999999999,note--,hence we see1 that the infinite essence and the eternity of ,god are known to all4 ,now as all things are in ,god1 and are conceived through ,god1 we can from this knowledge infer many things1 which we may adequately know1 and we may form that third kind of knowledge of which we spoke in the note to ,,ii4 xl41 and of the excellence and use of which we shall have occasion to speak in ,part ,v4 ,men have not so clear a knowledge of ,god as they have of general notions1 because they are unable to imagine ,god as they do bodies1 and also because they have associated the name ,god with images of things that they are in the habit of seeing1 as indeed they can hardly avoid doing1 being1 as they are1 men1 and continually affected by external bodies4 ,many errors1 in truth1 can be traced to this head1 namely1 that we do not apply names to things rightly4 ,for instance1 when a man says that the lines drawn from the centre of a circle to its circumference are not equal1 he then1 at all events1 assuredly attaches a meaning to the word circle different from that assigned by mathematicians4 ,so again1 when men make mistakes in calculation1 they have one set of figures in their mind1 and another on the paper4 ,if we could see into their minds1 they do not make a mistake2 they seem to do so1 because we think1 that they have the same numbers in their mind as they have on the paper4 ,if this were not so1 we should not believe them to be in error1 any more than ,i thought that a man was in error1 whom ,i lately heard exclaiming that his entrance hall had flown into a neighbour's hen1 for his meaning seemed to me sufficiently clear4 ,very many controversies have arisen from the fact1 that men do not rightly explain their meaning1 or do not rightly interpret the meaning of others4 ,for1 as a matter of fact1 as they flatly contradict themselves1 they assume now one side1 now another1 of the argument1 so as to oppose the opinions1 which they consider mistaken and absurd in their opponents4 ,,xlviii4 ,in the mind there is no absolute or free will2 but the mind is determined to wish this or that by a cause1 which has also been determined by another cause1 and this last by another cause1 and so on to infinity4 ,proof--,the mind is a fixed and definite mode of thought 7,,ii4 xi471 therefore it cannot be the free cause of its actions 7,i4 xvii4 ,cor4 ii472 in other words1 it cannot have an absolute faculty of positive or negative volition2 but 7by ,i4 xxviii47 it must be determined by a cause1 which has also been determined by another cause1 and this last by another1 c4 ,q4,e4,d4 9999999999,note--,in the same way it is proved1 that there is in the mind no absolute faculty of understanding1 desiring1 loving1 c4 ,whence it follows1 that these and similar faculties are either entirely fictitious1 or are merely abstract and general terms1 such as we are accustomed to put together from particular things4 ,thus the intellect and the will stand in the same relation to this or that idea1 or this or that volition1 as lapidity to this or that stone1 or as man to ,peter and ,paul4 ,the cause which leads men to consider themselves free has been set forth in the ,appendix to ,part ,i4 ,but1 before ,i proceed further1 ,i would here remark that1 by the will to affirm and decide1 ,i mean the faculty1 not the desire4 ,i mean1 ,i repeat1 the faculty1 whereby the mind affirms or denies what is true or false1 not the desire1 wherewith the mind wishes for or turns away from any given thing4 ,after we have proved1 that these faculties of ours are general notions1 which cannot be distinguished from the particular instances on which they are based1 we must inquire whether volitions themselves are anything besides the ideas of things4 ,we must inquire1 ,i say1 whether there is in the mind any affirmation or negation beyond that1 which the idea1 in so far as it is an idea1 involves4 ,on which subject see the following proposition1 and ,,ii4 ,def4 iii41 lest the idea of pictures should suggest itself4 ,for by ideas ,i do not mean images such as are formed at the back of the eye1 or in the midst of the brain1 but the conceptions of thought4 ,,xlix4 ,there is in the mind no volition or affirmation and negation1 save that which an idea1 inasmuch as it is an idea1 involves4 ,proof--,there is in the mind no absolute faculty of positive or negative volition1 but only particular volitions1 namely1 this or that affirmation1 and this or that negation4 ,now let us conceive a particular volition1 namely1 the mode of thinking whereby the mind affirms1 that the three interior angles of a triangle are equal to two right angles4 ,this affirmation involves the conception or idea of a triangle1 that is1 without the idea of a triangle it cannot be conceived4 ,it is the same thing to say1 that the concept ,a must involve the concept ,b1 as it is to say1 that ,a cannot be conceived without ,b4 ,further1 this affirmation cannot be made 7,,ii4 ,ax4 iii47 without the idea of a triangle4 ,therefore1 this affirmation can neither be nor be conceived1 without the idea of a triangle4 ,again1 this idea of a triangle must involve this same affirmation1 namely1 that its three interior angles are equal to two right angles4 ,wherefore1 and vice versa1 this idea of a triangle can neither be nor be conceived without this affirmation1 therefore1 this affirmation belongs to the essence of the idea of a triangle1 and is nothing besides4 ,what we have said of this volition 7inasmuch as we have selected it at random7 may be said of any other volition1 namely1 that it is nothing but an idea4 ,q4,e4,d4 ,corollary--,will and understanding are one and the same4 ,proof--,will and understanding are nothing beyond the individual volitions and ideas 7,,ii4 xlviii4 and note74 ,but a particular volition and a particular idea are one and the same 7by the foregoing ,prop472 therefore1 will and understanding are one and the same4 ,q4,e4,d4 9999999999,note--,we have thus removed the cause which is commonly assigned for error4 ,for we have shown above1 that falsity consists solely in the privation of knowledge involved in ideas which are fragmentary and confused4 ,wherefore1 a false idea1 inasmuch as it is false1 does not involve certainty4 ,when we say1 then1 that a man acquiesces in what is false1 and that he has no doubts on the subject1 we do not say that he is certain1 but only that he does not doubt1 or that he acquiesces in what is false1 inasmuch as there are no reasons1 which should cause his imagination to waver 7see ,,ii4 xliv4 note74 ,thus1 although the man be assumed to acquiesce in what is false1 we shall never say that he is certain4 ,for by certainty we mean something positive 7,,ii4 xliii4 and note71 not merely the absence of doubt4 ,however1 in order that the foregoing proposition may be fully explained1 ,i will draw attention to a few additional points1 and ,i will furthermore answer the objections which may be advanced against our doctrine4 ,lastly1 in order to remove every scruple1 ,i have thought it worth while to point out some of the advantages1 which follow therefrom4 ,i say some1 for they will be better appreciated from what we shall set forth in the fifth part4 ,i begin1 then1 with the first point1 and warn my readers to make an accurate distinction between an idea1 or conception of the mind1 and the images of things which we imagine4 ,it is further necessary that they should distinguish between idea and words1 whereby we signify things4 ,these three--namely1 images1 words1 and ideas--are by many persons either entirely confused together1 or not distinguished with sufficient accuracy or care1 and hence people are generally in ignorance1 how absolutely necessary is a knowledge of this doctrine of the will1 both for philosophic purposes and for the wise ordering of life4 ,those who think that ideas consist in images which are formed in us by contact with external bodies1 persuade themselves that the ideas of those things1 whereof we can form no mental picture1 are not ideas1 but only figments1 which we invent by the free decree of our will2 they thus regard ideas as though they were inanimate pictures on a panel1 and1 filled with this misconception1 do not see that an idea1 inasmuch as it is an idea1 involves an affirmation or negation4 ,again1 those who confuse words with ideas1 or with the affirmation which an idea involves1 think that they can wish something contrary to what they feel1 affirm1 or deny4 ,this misconception will easily be laid aside by one1 who reflects on the nature of knowledge1 and seeing that it in no wise involves the conception of extension1 will therefore clearly understand1 that an idea 7being a mode of thinking7 does not consist in the image of anything1 nor in words4 ,the essence of words and images is put together by bodily motions1 which in no wise involve the conception of thought4 ,these few words on this subject will suffice3 ,i will therefore pass on to consider the objections1 which may be raised against our doctrine4 ,of these1 the first is advanced by those1 who think that the will has a wider scope than the understanding1 and that therefore it is different therefrom4 ,the reason for their holding the belief1 that the will has wider scope than the understanding1 is that they assert1 that they have no need of an increase in their faculty of assent1 that is of affirmation or negation1 in order to assent to an infinity of things which we do not perceive1 but that they have need of an increase in their faculty of understanding4 ,the will is thus distinguished from the intellect1 the latter being finite and the former infinite4 ,secondly1 it may be objected that experience seems to teach us especially clearly1 that we are able to suspend our judgment before assenting to things which we perceive2 this is confirmed by the fact that no one is said to be deceived1 in so far as he perceives anything1 but only in so far as he assents or dissents4 ,for instance1 he who feigns a winged horse1 does not therefore admit that a winged horse exists2 that is1 he is not deceived1 unless he admits in addition that a winged horse does exist4 ,nothing therefore seems to be taught more clearly by experience1 than that the will or faculty of assent is free and different from the faculty of understanding4 ,thirdly1 it may be objected that one affirmation does not apparently contain more reality than another2 in other words1 that we do not seem to need for affirming1 that what is true is true1 any greater power than for affirming1 that what is false is true4 ,we have1 however1 seen that one idea has more reality or perfection than another1 for as objects are some more excellent than others1 so also are the ideas of them some more excellent than others2 this also seems to point to a difference between the understanding and the will4 ,fourthly1 it may be objected1 if man does not act from free will1 what will happen if the incentives to action are equally balanced1 as in the case of ,buridan's ass8 ,will he perish of hunger and thirst8 ,if ,i say that he would not1 he would then determine his own action1 and would consequently possess the faculty of going and doing whatever he liked4 ,other objections might also be raised1 but1 as ,i am not bound to put in evidence everything that anyone may dream1 ,i will only set myself to the task of refuting those ,i have mentioned1 and that as briefly as possible4 ,to the first objection ,i answer1 that ,i admit that the will has a wider scope than the understanding1 if by the understanding be meant only clear and distinct ideas2 but ,i deny that the will has a wider scope than the perceptions1 and the faculty of forming conceptions2 nor do ,i see why the faculty of volition should be called infinite1 any more than the faculty of feeling3 for1 as we are able by the same faculty of volition to affirm an infinite number of things 7one after the other1 for we cannot affirm an infinite number simultaneously71 so also can we1 by the same faculty of feeling1 feel or perceive 7in succession7 an infinite number of bodies4 ,if it be said that there is an infinite number of things which we cannot perceive1 ,i answer1 that we cannot attain to such things by any thinking1 nor1 consequently1 by any faculty of volition4 ,but1 it may still be urged1 if ,god wished to bring it about that we should perceive them1 he would be obliged to endow us with a greater faculty of perception1 but not a greater faculty of volition than we have already4 ,this is the same as to say that1 if ,god wished to bring it about that we should understand an infinite number of other entities1 it would be necessary for him to give us a greater understanding1 but not a more universal idea of entity than that which we have already1 in order to grasp such infinite entities4 ,we have shown that will is a universal entity or idea1 whereby we explain all particular volitions--in other words1 that which is common to all such volitions4 ,as1 then1 our opponents maintain that this idea1 common or universal to all volitions1 is a faculty1 it is little to be wondered at that they assert1 that such a faculty extends itself into the infinite1 beyond the limits of the understanding3 for what is universal is predicated alike of one1 of many1 and of an infinite number of individuals4 ,to the second objection ,i reply by denying1 that we have a free power of suspending our judgment3 for1 when we say that anyone suspends his judgment1 we merely mean that he sees1 that he does not perceive the matter in question adequately4 ,suspension of judgment is1 therefore1 strictly speaking1 a perception1 and not free will4 ,in order to illustrate the point1 let us suppose a boy imagining a horse1 and perceive nothing else4 ,inasmuch as this imagination involves the existence of the horse 7,,ii4 xvii4 ,cor471 and the boy does not perceive anything which would exclude the existence of the horse1 he will necessarily regard the horse as present3 he will not be able to doubt of its existence1 although he be not certain thereof4 ,we have daily experience of such a state of things in dreams2 and ,i do not suppose that there is anyone1 who would maintain that1 while he is dreaming1 he has the free power of suspending his judgment concerning the things in his dream1 and bringing it about that he should not dream those things1 which he dreams that he sees2 yet it happens1 notwithstanding1 that even in dreams we suspend our judgment1 namely1 when we dream that we are dreaming4 ,further1 ,i grant that no one can be deceived1 so far as actual perception extends--that is1 ,i grant that the mind's imaginations1 regarded in themselves1 do not involve error 7,,ii4 xvii4 note72 but ,i deny1 that a man does not1 in the act of perception1 make any affirmation4 ,for what is the perception of a winged horse1 save affirming that a horse has wings8 ,if the mind could perceive nothing else but the winged horse1 it would regard the same as present to itself3 it would have no reasons for doubting its existence1 nor any faculty of dissent1 unless the imagination of a winged horse be joined to an idea which precludes the existence of the said horse1 or unless the mind perceives that the idea which it possess of a winged horse is inadequate1 in which case it will either necessarily deny the existence of such a horse1 or will necessarily be in doubt on the subject4 ,i think that ,i have anticipated my answer to the third objection1 namely1 that the will is something universal which is predicated of all ideas1 and that it only signifies that which is common to all ideas1 namely1 an affirmation1 whose adequate essence must1 therefore1 in so far as it is thus conceived in the abstract1 be in every idea1 and be1 in this respect alone1 the same in all1 not in so far as it is considered as constituting the idea's essence3 for1 in this respect1 particular affirmations differ one from the other1 as much as do ideas4 ,for instance1 the affirmation which involves the idea of a circle1 differs from that which involves the idea of a triangle1 as much as the idea of a circle differs from the idea of a triangle4 ,further1 ,i absolutely deny1 that we are in need of an equal power of thinking1 to affirm that that which is true is true1 and to affirm that that which is false is true4 ,these two affirmations1 if we regard the mind1 are in the same relation to one another as being and not-being2 for there is nothing positive in ideas1 which constitutes the actual reality of falsehood 7,,ii4 xxxv4 note1 and xlvii4 note74 ,we must therefore conclude1 that we are easily deceived1 when we confuse universals with singulars1 and the entities of reason and abstractions with realities4 ,as for the fourth objection1 ,i am quite ready to admit1 that a man placed in the equilibrium described 7namely1 as perceiving nothing but hunger and thirst1 a certain food and a certain drink1 each equally distant from him7 would die of hunger and thirst4 ,if ,i am asked1 whether such an one should not rather be considered an ass than a man2 ,i answer1 that ,i do not know1 neither do ,i know how a man should be considered1 who hangs himself1 or how we should consider children1 fools1 madmen1 c4 ,it remains to point out the advantages of a knowledge of this doctrine as bearing on conduct1 and this may be easily gathered from what has been said4 ,the doctrine is good1 #a4 ,inasmuch as it teaches us to act solely according to the decree of ,god1 and to be partakers in the ,divine nature1 and so much the more1 as we perform more perfect actions and more and more understand ,god4 ,such a doctrine not only completely tranquilizes our spirit1 but also shows us where our highest happiness or blessedness is1 namely1 solely in the knowledge of ,god1 whereby we are led to act only as love and piety shall bid us4 ,we may thus clearly understand1 how far astray from a true estimate of virtue are those who expect to be decorated by ,god with high rewards for their virtue1 and their best actions1 as for having endured the direst slavery2 as if virtue and the service of ,god were not in itself happiness and perfect freedom4 #b4 ,inasmuch as it teaches us1 how we ought to conduct ourselves with respect to the gifts of fortune1 or matters which are not in our power1 and do not follow from our nature4 ,for it shows us1 that we should await and endure fortune's smiles or frowns with an equal mind1 seeing that all things follow from the eternal decree of ,god by the same necessity1 as it follows from the essence of a triangle1 that the three angles are equal to two right angles4 #c4 ,this doctrine raises social life1 inasmuch as it teaches us to hate no man1 neither to despise1 to deride1 to envy1 or to be angry with any4 ,further1 as it tells us that each should be content with his own1 and helpful to his neighbour1 not from any womanish pity1 favour1 or superstition1 but solely by the guidance of reason1 according as the time and occasion demand1 as ,i will show in ,part ,,iii4 #d4 ,lastly1 this doctrine confers no small advantage on the commonwealth2 for it teaches how citizens should be governed and led1 not so as to become slaves1 but so that they may freely do whatsoever things are best4 ,i have thus fulfilled the promise made at the beginning of this note1 and ,i thus bring the second part of my treatise to a close4 ,i think ,i have therein explained the nature and properties of the human mind at sufficient length1 and1 considering the difficulty of the subject1 with sufficient clearness4 ,i have laid a foundation1 whereon may be raised many excellent conclusions of the highest utility and most necessary to be known1 as will1 in what follows1 be partly made plain4 ,,end ,,of ,,part ,,ii