,benedict de ,spinoza1 ,,the ,,ethics 7,ethica ,ordine ,geometrico ,demonstrata7 ,translated by ,r4 ,h4 ,m4 ,elwes ,,part ,i3 ,,concerning ,,god4 ,,definitions4 ,i4 ,by that which is 'self-caused' ,i mean that of which the essence involves existence1 or that of which the nature is only conceivable as existent4 ,,ii4 ,a thing is called 'finite after its kind' when it can be limited by another thing of the same nature2 for instance1 a body is called finite because we always conceive another greater body4 ,so1 also1 a thought is limited by another thought1 but a body is not limited by thought1 nor a thought by body4 ,,iii4 ,by 'substance' ,i mean that which is in itself1 and is conceived through itself3 in other words1 that of which a conception can be formed independently of any other conception4 ,,iv4 ,by 'attribute' ,i mean that which the intellect perceives as constituting the essence of substance4 ,v4 ,by 'mode' ,i mean the modifications 7affectiones7 of substance1 or that which exists in1 and is conceived through1 something other than itself4 ,,vi4 ,by ',god' ,i mean a being absolutely infinite--that is1 a substance consisting in infinite attributes1 of which each expresses eternal and infinite essentiality4 ,explanation--,i say absolutely infinite1 not infinite after its kind3 for1 of a thing infinite only after its kind1 infinite attributes may be denied2 but that which is absolutely infinite1 contains in its essence whatever expresses reality1 and involves no negation4 ,,vii4 ,that thing is called 'free1' which exists solely by the necessity of its own nature1 and of which the action is determined by itself alone4 ,on the other hand1 that thing is necessary1 or rather constrained1 which is determined by something external to itself to a fixed and definite method of existence or action4 ,,viii4 ,by 'eternity' ,i mean existence itself1 in so far as it is conceived necessarily to follow solely from the definition of that which is eternal4 ,explanation--,existence of this kind is conceived as an eternal truth1 like the essence of a thing and1 therefore1 cannot be explained by means of continuance or time1 though continuance may be conceived without a beginning or end4 ,,axioms4 ,i4 ,everything which exists1 exists either in itself or in something else4 ,,ii4 ,that which cannot be conceived through anything else must be conceived through itself4 ,,iii4 ,from a given definite cause an effect necessarily follows2 and1 on the other hand1 if no definite cause be granted1 it is impossible that an effect can follow4 ,,iv4 ,the knowledge of an effect depends on and involves the knowledge of a cause4 ,v4 ,things which have nothing in common cannot be understood1 the one by means of the other2 the conception of one does not involve the conception of the other4 ,,vi4 ,a true idea must correspond with its ideate or object4 ,,vii4 ,if a thing can be conceived as non-existing1 its essence does not involve existence4 ,,propositions4 ,i4 ,substance is by nature prior to its modifications4 ,proof--,this is clear from ,deff4 iii4 and v4 ,,ii4 ,two substances1 whose attributes are different1 have nothing in common4 ,proof--,also evident from ,def4 iii4 ,for each must exist in itself1 and be conceived through itself2 in other words1 the conception of one does not imply the conception of the other4 ,,iii4 ,things which have nothing in common cannot be one the cause of the other4 ,proof--,if they have nothing in common1 it follows that one cannot be apprehended by means of the other 7,ax4 v471 and1 therefore1 one cannot be the cause of the other 7,ax4 iv474 ,q4,e4,d4 ,,iv4 ,two or more distinct things are distinguished one from the other1 either by the difference of the attributes of the substances1 or by the difference of their modifications4 ,proof--,everything which exists1 exists either in itself or in something else 7,ax4 i471-- that is 7by ,deff4 iii4 and v471 nothing is granted in addition to the understanding1 except substance and its modifications4 ,nothing is1 therefore1 given besides the understanding1 by which several things may be distinguished one from the other1 except the substances1 or1 in other words 7see ,ax4 iv471 their attributes and modifications4 ,q4,e4,d4 ,v4 ,there cannot exist in the universe two or more substances having the same nature or attribute4 ,proof--,if several distinct substances be granted1 they must be distinguished one from the other1 either by the difference of their attributes1 or by the difference of their modifications 7,prop4 iv474 ,if only by the difference of their attributes1 it will be granted that there cannot be more than one with an identical attribute4 ,if by the difference of their modifications--as substance is naturally prior to its modifications 7,prop4 i47--it follows that setting the modifications aside1 and considering substance in itself1 that is truly1 7,deff4 iii and vi471 there cannot be conceived one substance different from another--that is 7by ,prop4 iv471 there cannot be granted several substances1 but one substance only4 ,q4,e4,d4 ,,vi4 ,one substance cannot be produced by another substance4 ,proof--,it is impossible that there should be in the universe two substances with an identical attribute1 i4e4 which have anything common to them both 7,prop ii471 and1 therefore 7,prop4 iii471 one cannot be the cause of the other1 neither can one be produced by the other4 ,q4,e4,d4 ,,vi4 ,corollary--,hence it follows that a substance cannot be produced by anything external to itself4 ,for in the universe nothing is granted1 save substances and their modifications 7as appears from ,ax4 i4 and ,deff4 iii4 and v474 ,now 7by the last ,prop47 substance cannot be produced by another substance1 therefore it cannot be produced by anything external to itself4 ,q4,e4,d4 ,this is shown still more readily by the absurdity of the contradictory4 ,for1 if substance be produced by an external cause1 the knowledge of it would depend on the knowledge of its cause 7,ax4 iv471 and 7by ,deff4 iii47 it would itself not be substance4 ,,vii4 ,existence belongs to the nature of substances4 ,proof--,substance cannot be produced by anything external 7,cor41 ,prop vi471 it must1 therefore1 be its own cause--that is1 its essence necessarily involves existence1 or existence belongs to its nature4 ,,viii4 ,every substance is necessarily infinite4 ,proof--,there can only be one substance with an identical attribute1 and existence follows from its nature 7,prop4 vii472 its nature1 therefore1 involves existence1 either as finite or infinite4 ,it does not exist as finite1 for 7by ,deff4 ii47 it would then be limited by something else of the same kind1 which would also necessarily exist 7,prop4 vii472 and there would be two substances with an identical attribute1 which is absurd 7,prop4 v474 ,it therefore exists as infinite4 ,q4,e4,d4 9999999999,note ,i4--,as finite existence involves a partial negation1 and infinite existence is the absolute affirmation of the given nature1 it follows 7solely from ,prop4 vii47 that every substance is necessarily infinite4 9999999999,note ,,ii4--,no doubt it will be difficult for those who think about things loosely1 and have not been accustomed to know them by their primary causes1 to comprehend the demonstration of ,prop4 vii43 for such persons make no distinction between the modifications of substances and the substances themselves1 and are ignorant of the manner in which things are produced2 hence they may attribute to substances the beginning which they observe in natural objects4 ,those who are ignorant of true causes make complete confusion--think that trees might talk just as well as men--that men might be formed from stones as well as from seed2 and imagine that any form might be changed into any other4 ,so1 also1 those who confuse the two natures1 divine and human1 readily attribute human passions to the deity1 especially so long as they do not know how passions originate in the mind4 ,but1 if people would consider the nature of substance1 they would have no doubt about the truth of ,prop4 vii4 ,in fact1 this proposition would be a universal axiom1 and accounted a truism4 ,for1 by substance1 would be understood that which is in itself1 and is conceived through itself--that is1 something of which the conception requires not the conception of anything else2 whereas modifications exist in something external to themselves1 and a conception of them is formed by means of a conception of the things in which they exist4 ,therefore1 we may have true ideas of non-existent modifications2 for1 although they may have no actual existence apart from the conceiving intellect1 yet their essence is so involved in something external to themselves that they may through it be conceived4 ,whereas the only truth substances can have1 external to the intellect1 must consist in their existence1 because they are conceived through themselves4 ,therefore1 for a person to say that he has a clear and distinct--that is1 a true--idea of a substance1 but that he is not sure whether such substance exists1 would be the same as if he said that he had a true idea1 but was not sure whether or no it was false 7a little consideration will make this plain72 or if anyone affirmed that substance is created1 it would be the same as saying that a false idea was true--in short1 the height of absurdity4 ,it must1 then1 necessarily be admitted that the existence of substance as its essence is an eternal truth4 ,and we can hence conclude by another process of reasoning--that there is but one such substance4 ,i think that this may profitably be done at once2 and1 in order to proceed regularly with the demonstration1 we must premise3-- #a4 ,the true definition of a thing neither involves nor expresses anything beyond the nature of the thing defined4 ,from this it follows that-- #b4 ,no definition implies or expresses a certain number of individuals1 inasmuch as it expresses nothing beyond the nature of the thing defined4 ,for instance1 the definition of a triangle expresses nothing beyond the actual nature of a triangle3 it does not imply any fixed number of triangles4 #c4 ,there is necessarily for each individual existent thing a cause why it should exist4 #d4 ,this cause of existence must either be contained in the nature and definition of the thing defined1 or must be postulated apart from such definition4 ,it therefore follows that1 if a given number of individual things exist in nature1 there must be some cause for the existence of exactly that number1 neither more nor less4 ,for example1 if twenty men exist in the universe 7for simplicity's sake1 ,i will suppose them existing simultaneously1 and to have had no predecessors71 and we want to account for the existence of these twenty men1 it will not be enough to show the cause of human existence in general2 we must also show why there are exactly twenty men1 neither more nor less3 for a cause must be assigned for the existence of each individual4 ,now this cause cannot be contained in the actual nature of man1 for the true definition of man does not involve any consideration of the number twenty4 ,consequently1 the cause for the existence of these twenty men1 and1 consequently1 of each of them1 must necessarily be sought externally to each individual4 ,hence we may lay down the absolute rule1 that everything which may consist of several individuals must have an external cause4 ,and1 as it has been shown already that existence appertains to the nature of substance1 existence must necessarily be included in its definition2 and from its definition alone existence must be deducible4 ,but from its definition 7as we have shown1 ,notes ii41 iii471 we cannot infer the existence of several substances2 therefore it follows that there is only one substance of the same nature4 ,q4,e4,d4 ,,ix4 ,the more reality or being a thing has1 the greater the number of its attributes 7,def4 iv474 ,x4 ,each particular attribute of the one substance must be conceived through itself4 ,proof--,an attribute is that which the intellect perceives of substance1 as constituting its essence 7,def4 iv471 and1 therefore1 must be conceived through itself 7,def4 iii474 ,q4,e4,d4 9999999999,note--,it is thus evident that1 though two attributes are1 in fact1 conceived as distinct--that is1 one without the help of the other--yet we cannot1 therefore1 conclude that they constitute two entities1 or two different substances4 ,for it is the nature of substance that each of its attributes is conceived through itself1 inasmuch as all the attributes it has have always existed simultaneously in it1 and none could be produced by any other2 but each expresses the reality or being of substance4 ,it is1 then1 far from an absurdity to ascribe several attributes to one substance3 for nothing in nature is more clear than that each and every entity must be conceived under some attribute1 and that its reality or being is in proportion to the number of its attributes expressing necessity or eternity and infinity4 ,consequently it is abundantly clear1 that an absolutely infinite being must necessarily be defined as consisting in infinite attributes1 each of which expresses a certain eternal and infinite essence4 ,if anyone now ask1 by what sign shall he be able to distinguish different substances1 let him read the following propositions1 which show that there is but one substance in the universe1 and that it is absolutely infinite1 wherefore such a sign would be sought in vain4 ,,xi4 ,god1 or substance1 consisting of infinite attributes1 of which each expresses eternal and infinite essentiality1 necessarily exists4 ,proof--,if this be denied1 conceive1 if possible1 that ,god does not exist3 then his essence does not involve existence4 ,but this 7,prop4 vii47 is absurd4 ,therefore ,god necessarily exists4 ,another proof--,of everything whatsoever a cause or reason must be assigned1 either for its existence1 or for its non-existence--e4g4 if a triangle exist1 a reason or cause must be granted for its existence2 if1 on the contrary1 it does not exist1 a cause must also be granted1 which prevents it from existing1 or annuls its existence4 ,this reason or cause must either be contained in the nature of the thing in question1 or be external to it4 ,for instance1 the reason for the non-existence of a square circle is indicated in its nature1 namely1 because it would involve a contradiction4 ,on the other hand1 the existence of substance follows also solely from its nature1 inasmuch as its nature involves existence4 7,see ,prop4 vii47 ,but the reason for the existence of a triangle or a circle does not follow from the nature of those figures1 but from the order of universal nature in extension4 ,from the latter it must follow1 either that a triangle necessarily exists1 or that it is impossible that it should exist4 ,so much is self-evident4 ,it follows therefrom that a thing necessarily exists1 if no cause or reason be granted which prevents its existence4 ,if1 then1 no cause or reason can be given1 which prevents the existence of ,god1 or which destroys his existence1 we must certainly conclude that he necessarily does exist4 ,if such a reason or cause should be given1 it must either be drawn from the very nature of ,god1 or be external to him--that is1 drawn from another substance of another nature4 ,for if it were of the same nature1 ,god1 by that very fact1 would be admitted to exist4 ,but substance of another nature could have nothing in common with ,god 7by ,prop4 ii471 and therefore would be unable either to cause or to destroy his existence4 ,as1 then1 a reason or cause which would annul the divine existence cannot be drawn from anything external to the divine nature1 such cause must perforce1 if ,god does not exist1 be drawn from ,god's own nature1 which would involve a contradiction4 ,to make such an affirmation about a being absolutely infinite and supremely perfect is absurd2 therefore1 neither in the nature of ,god1 nor externally to his nature1 can a cause or reason be assigned which would annul his existence4 ,therefore1 ,god necessarily exists4 ,q4,e4,d4 ,another proof--,the potentiality of non-existence is a negation of power1 and contrariwise the potentiality of existence is a power1 as is obvious4 ,if1 then1 that which necessarily exists is nothing but finite beings1 such finite beings are more powerful than a being absolutely infinite1 which is obviously absurd2 therefore1 either nothing exists1 or else a being absolutely infinite necessarily exists also4 ,now we exist either in ourselves1 or in something else which necessarily exists 7see ,ax4 i4 and ,prop4 vii474 ,therefore a being absolutely infinite--in other words1 ,god 7,def4 vi47--necessarily exists4 ,q4,e4,d4 9999999999,note--,in this last proof1 ,i have purposely shown ,god's existence 'a posteriori1' so that the proof might be more easily followed1 not because1 from the same premises1 ,god's existence does not follow 'a priori4' ,for1 as the potentiality of existence is a power1 it follows that1 in proportion as reality increases in the nature of a thing1 so also will it increase its strength for existence4 ,therefore a being absolutely infinite1 such as ,god1 has from himself an absolutely infinite power of existence1 and hence he does absolutely exist4 ,perhaps there will be many who will be unable to see the force of this proof1 inasmuch as they are accustomed only to consider those things which flow from external causes4 ,of such things1 they see that those which quickly come to pass--that is1 quickly come into existence--quickly also disappear2 whereas they regard as more difficult of accomplishment --that is1 not so easily brought into existence--those things which they conceive as more complicated4 ,however1 to do away with this misconception1 ,i need not here show the measure of truth in the proverb1 ,what comes quickly1 goes quickly1 nor discuss whether1 from the point of view of universal nature1 all things are equally easy1 or otherwise3 ,i need only remark that ,i am not here speaking of things1 which come to pass through causes external to themselves1 but only of substances which 7by ,prop4 vi47 cannot be produced by any external cause4 ,things which are produced by external causes1 whether they consist of many parts or few1 owe whatsoever perfection or reality they possess solely to the efficacy of their external cause2 wherefore the existence of substance must arise solely from its own nature1 which is nothing else but its essence4 ,thus1 the perfection of a thing does not annul its existence1 but1 on the contrary1 asserts it4 ,imperfection1 on the other hand1 does annul it2 therefore we cannot be more certain of the existence of anything1 than of the existence of a being absolutely infinite or perfect--that is1 of ,god4 ,for inasmuch as his essence excludes all imperfection1 and involves absolute perfection1 all cause for doubt concerning his existence is done away1 and the utmost certainty on the question is given4 ,this1 ,i think1 will be evident to every moderately attentive reader4 ,,xii4 ,no attribute of substance can be conceived from which it would follow that substance can be divided4 ,proof--,the parts into which substance as thus conceived would be divided either will retain the nature of substance1 or they will not4 ,if the former1 then 7by ,prop4 viii47 each part will necessarily be infinite1 and 7by ,prop vi47 self-caused1 and 7by ,prop4 v47 will perforce consist of a different attribute1 so that1 in that case1 several substances could be formed out of one substance1 which 7by ,prop4 vi47 is absurd4 ,moreover1 the parts 7by ,prop4 ii47 would have nothing in common with their whole1 and the whole 7by ,def4 iv4 and ,prop4 ,x7 could both exist and be conceived without its parts1 which everyone will admit to be absurd4 ,if we adopt the second alternative--namely1 that the parts will not retain the nature of substance--then1 if the whole substance were divided into equal parts1 it would lose the nature of substance1 and would cease to exist1 which 7by ,prop4 vii47 is absurd4 ,,xiii4 ,substance absolutely infinite is indivisible4 ,proof--,if it could be divided1 the parts into which it was divided would either retain the nature of absolutely infinite substance1 or they would not4 ,if the former1 we should have several substances of the same nature1 which 7by ,prop4 v47 is absurd4 ,if the latter1 then 7by ,prop4 vii47 substance absolutely infinite could cease to exist1 which 7by ,prop4 xi47 is also absurd4 ,corollary--,it follows that no substance1 and consequently no extended substance1 in so far as it is substance1 is divisible4 9999999999,note--,the indivisibility of substance may be more easily understood as follows4 ,the nature of substance can only be conceived as infinite1 and by a part of substance1 nothing else can be understood than finite substance1 which 7by ,prop4 viii47 involves a manifest contradiction4 ,,xiv4 ,besides ,god no substance can be granted or conceived4 ,proof--,as ,god is a being absolutely infinite1 of whom no attribute that expresses the essence of substance can be denied 7by ,def4 vi471 and he necessarily exists 7by ,prop4 xi472 if any substance besides ,god were granted1 it would have to be explained by some attribute of ,god1 and thus two substances with the same attribute would exist1 which 7by ,prop4 v47 is absurd2 therefore1 besides ,god no substance can be granted1 or consequently be conceived4 ,if it could be conceived1 it would necessarily have to be conceived as existent2 but this 7by the first part of this proof7 is absurd4 ,therefore1 besides ,god no substance can be granted or conceived4 ,q4,e4,d4 ,corollary ,i4--,clearly1 therefore3 #a4 ,god is one1 that is 7by ,def4 vi47 only one substance can be granted in the universe1 and that substance is absolutely infinite1 as we have already indicated 7in the note to ,prop4 x474 ,corollary ,,ii4--,it follows3 #b4 ,that extension and thought are either attributes of ,god or 7by ,ax4 i47 accidents 7affectiones7 of the attributes of ,god4 ,,xv4 ,whatsoever is1 is in ,god1 and without ,god nothing can be1 or be conceived4 ,proof--,besides ,god1 no substance is granted or can be conceived 7by ,prop4 xiv471 that is 7by ,def4 iii47 nothing which is in itself and is conceived through itself4 ,but modes 7by ,def4 v47 can neither be1 nor be conceived without substance2 wherefore they can only be in the divine nature1 and can only through it be conceived4 ,but substances and modes form the sum total of existence 7by ,ax4 i471 therefore1 without ,god nothing can be1 or be conceived4 ,q4,e4,d4 9999999999,note--,some assert that ,god1 like a man1 consists of body and mind1 and is susceptible of passions4 ,how far such persons have strayed from the truth is sufficiently evident from what has been said4 ,but these ,i pass over4 ,for all who have in anywise reflected on the divine nature deny that ,god has a body4 ,of this they find excellent proof in the fact that we understand by body a definite quantity1 so long1 so broad1 so deep1 bounded by a certain shape1 and it is the height of absurdity to predicate such a thing of ,god1 a being absolutely infinite4 ,but meanwhile by other reasons with which they try to prove their point1 they show that they think corporeal or extended substance wholly apart from the divine nature1 and say it was created by ,god4 ,wherefrom the divine nature can have been created1 they are wholly ignorant2 thus they clearly show that they do not know the meaning of their own words4 ,i myself have proved sufficiently clearly1 at any rate in my own judgment 7,cor4 ,prop4 vi41 and ,note #b1 ,prop4 viii471 that no substance can be produced or created by anything other than itself4 ,further1 ,i showed 7in ,prop4 xiv47 that besides ,god no substance can be granted or conceived4 ,hence we drew the conclusion that extended substance is one of the infinite attributes of ,god4 ,however1 in order to explain more fully1 ,i will refute the arguments of my adversaries1 which all start from the following points3-- ,extended substance1 in so far as it is substance1 consists1 as they think1 in parts1 wherefore they deny that it can be infinite1 or consequently1 that it can appertain to ,god4 ,this they illustrate with many examples1 of which ,i will take one or two4 ,if extended substance1 they say1 is infinite1 let it be conceived to be divided into two parts2 each part will then be either finite or infinite4 ,if the former1 then infinite substance is composed of two finite parts1 which is absurd4 ,if the latter1 then one infinite will be twice as large as another infinite1 which is also absurd4 ,further1 if an infinite line be measured out in foot lengths1 it will consist of an infinite number of such parts2 it would equally consist of an infinite number of parts1 if each part measured only an inch3 therefore1 one infinity would be twelve times as great as the other4 ,lastly1 if from a single point there be conceived to be drawn two diverging lines which at first are at a definite distance apart1 but are produced to infinity1 it is certain that the distance between the two lines will be continually increased1 until at length it changes from definite to indefinable4 ,as these absurdities follow1 it is said1 from considering quantity as infinite1 the conclusion is drawn that extended substance must necessarily be finite1 and1 consequently1 cannot appertain to the nature of ,god4 ,the second argument is also drawn from ,god's supreme perfection4 ,god1 it is said1 inasmuch as he is a supremely perfect being1 cannot be passive2 but extended substance1 insofar as it is divisible1 is passive4 ,it follows1 therefore1 that extended substance does not appertain to the essence of ,god4 ,such are the arguments ,i find on the subject in writers1 who by them try to prove that extended substance is unworthy of the divine nature1 and cannot possibly appertain thereto4 ,however1 ,i think an attentive reader will see that ,i have already answered their propositions2 for all their arguments are founded on the hypothesis that extended substance is composed of parts1 and such a hypothesis ,i have shown 7,prop4 xii41 and ,cor4 ,prop4 xiii47 to be absurd4 ,moreover1 anyone who reflects will see that all these absurdities 7if absurdities they be1 which ,i am not now discussing71 from which it is sought to extract the conclusion that extended substance is finite1 do not at all follow from the notion of an infinite quantity1 but merely from the notion that an infinite quantity is measurable1 and composed of finite parts3 therefore1 the only fair conclusion to be drawn is that infinite quantity is not measurable1 and cannot be composed of finite parts4 ,this is exactly what we have already proved 7in ,prop4 xii474 ,wherefore the weapon which they aimed at us has in reality recoiled upon themselves4 ,if1 from this absurdity of theirs1 they persist in drawing the conclusion that extended substance must be finite1 they will in good sooth be acting like a man who asserts that circles have the properties of squares1 and1 finding himself thereby landed in absurdities1 proceeds to deny that circles have any center1 from which all lines drawn to the circumference are equal4 ,for1 taking extended substance1 which can only be conceived as infinite1 one1 and indivisible 7,props4 viii41 v41 xii47 they assert1 in order to prove that it is finite1 that it is composed of finite parts1 and that it can be multiplied and divided4 ,so1 also1 others1 after asserting that a line is composed of points1 can produce many arguments to prove that a line cannot be infinitely divided4 ,assuredly it is not less absurd to assert that extended substance is made up of bodies or parts1 than it would be to assert that a solid is made up of surfaces1 a surface of lines1 and a line of points4 ,this must be admitted by all who know clear reason to be infallible1 and most of all by those who deny the possibility of a vacuum4 ,for if extended substance could be so divided that its parts were really separate1 why should not one part admit of being destroyed1 the others remaining joined together as before8 ,and why should all be so fitted into one another as to leave no vacuum8 ,surely in the case of things1 which are really distinct one from the other1 one can exist without the other1 and can remain in its original condition4 ,as1 then1 there does not exist a vacuum in nature 7of which anon71 but all parts are bound to come together to prevent it1 it follows from this that the parts cannot really be distinguished1 and that extended substance in so far as it is substance cannot be divided4 ,if anyone asks me the further question1 ,why are we naturally so prone to divide quantity8 ,i answer1 that quantity is conceived by us in two ways2 in the abstract and superficially1 as we imagine it2 or as substance1 as we conceive it solely by the intellect4 ,if1 then1 we regard quantity as it is represented in our imagination1 which we often and more easily do1 we shall find that it is finite1 divisible1 and compounded of parts2 but if we regard it as it is represented in our intellect1 and conceive it as substance1 which it is very difficult to do1 we shall then1 as ,i have sufficiently proved1 find that it is infinite1 one1 and indivisible4 ,this will be plain enough to all who make a distinction between the intellect and the imagination1 especially if it be remembered that matter is everywhere the same1 that its parts are not distinguishable1 except in so far as we conceive matter as diversely modified1 whence its parts are distinguished1 not really1 but modally4 ,for instance1 water1 in so far as it is water1 we conceive to be divided1 and its parts to be separated one from the other2 but not in so far as it is extended substance2 from this point of view it is neither separated nor divisible4 ,further1 water1 in so far as it is water1 is produced and corrupted2 but1 in so far as it is substance1 it is neither produced nor corrupted4 ,i think ,i have now answered the second argument2 it is1 in fact1 founded on the same assumption as the first--namely1 that matter1 in so far as it is substance1 is divisible1 and composed of parts4 ,even if it were so1 ,i do not know why it should be considered unworthy of the divine nature1 inasmuch as besides ,god 7by ,prop4 xiv47 no substance can be granted1 wherefrom it could receive its modifications4 ,all things1 ,i repeat1 are in ,god1 and all things which come to pass1 come to pass solely through the laws of the infinite nature of ,god1 and follow 7as ,i will shortly show7 from the necessity of his essence4 ,wherefore it can in nowise be said that ,god is passive in respect to anything other than himself1 or that extended substance is unworthy of the divine nature1 even if it be supposed divisible1 so long as it is granted to be infinite and eternal4 ,but enough of this for the present4 ,,xvi4 ,from the necessity of the divine nature must follow an infinite number of things in infinite ways--that is1 all things which can fall within the sphere of infinite intellect4 ,proof--,this proposition will be clear to everyone1 who remembers that from the given definition of any thing the intellect infers several properties1 which really necessarily follow therefrom 7that is1 from the actual essence of the thing defined72 and it infers more properties in proportion as the definition of the thing expresses more reality1 that is1 in proportion as the essence of the thing defined involves more reality4 ,now1 as the divine nature has absolutely infinite attributes 7by ,def4 vi471 of which each expresses infinite essence after its kind1 it follows that from the necessity of its nature an infinite number of things 7that is1 everything which can fall within the sphere of an infinite intellect7 must necessarily follow4 ,q4,e4,d4 ,corollary ,i4--,hence it follows1 that ,god is the efficient cause of all that can fall within the sphere of an infinite intellect4 ,corollary ,,ii4--,it also follows that ,god is a cause in himself1 and not through an accident of his nature4 ,corollary ,,iii4--,it follows1 thirdly1 that ,god is the absolutely first cause4 ,,xvii4 ,god acts solely by the laws of his own nature1 and is not constrained by anyone4 ,proof--,we have just shown 7in ,prop4 xvi471 that solely from the necessity of the divine nature1 or1 what is the same thing1 solely from the laws of his nature1 an infinite number of things absolutely follow in an infinite number of ways2 and we proved 7in ,prop4 xv471 that without ,god nothing can be nor be conceived2 but that all things are in ,god4 ,wherefore nothing can exist outside himself1 whereby he can be conditioned or constrained to act4 ,wherefore ,god acts solely by the laws of his own nature1 and is not constrained by anyone4 ,q4,e4,d4 ,corollary ,i--,it follows3 #a4 ,that there can be no cause which1 either extrinsically or intrinsically1 besides the perfection of his own nature1 moves ,god to act4 ,corollary ,,ii--,it follows3 #b4 ,that ,god is the sole free cause4 ,for ,god alone exists by the sole necessity of his nature 7by ,prop4 xi4 and ,prop4 xiv41 ,cor4 i471 and acts by the sole necessity of his own nature1 wherefore ,god is 7by ,def4 vii47 the sole free cause4 ,q4,e4,d4 9999999999,note--,others think that ,god is a free cause1 because he can1 as they think1 bring it about1 that those things which we have said follow from his nature--that is1 which are in his power1 should not come to pass1 or should not be produced by him4 ,but this is the same as if they said1 that ,god could bring it about1 that it should follow from the nature of a triangle that its three interior angles should not be equal to two right angles2 or that from a given cause no effect should follow1 which is absurd4 ,moreover1 ,i will show below1 without the aid of this proposition1 that neither intellect nor will appertain to ,god's nature4 ,i know that there are many who think that they can show1 that supreme intellect and free will do appertain to ,god's nature2 for they say they know of nothing more perfect1 which they can attribute to ,god1 than that which is the highest perfection in ourselves4 ,further1 although they conceive ,god as actually supremely intelligent1 they yet do not believe that he can bring into existence everything which he actually understands1 for they think that they would thus destroy ,god's power4 ,if1 they contend1 ,god had created everything which is in his intellect1 he would not be able to create anything more1 and this1 they think1 would clash with ,god's omnipotence2 therefore1 they prefer to asset that ,god is indifferent to all things1 and that he creates nothing except that which he has decided1 by some absolute exercise of will1 to create4 ,however1 ,i think ,i have shown sufficiently clearly 7by ,prop4 xvi47 that from ,god's supreme power1 or infinite nature1 an infinite number of things--that is1 all things have necessarily flowed forth in an infinite number of ways1 or always flow from the same necessity2 in the same way as from the nature of a triangle it follows from eternity and for eternity1 that its three interior angles are equal to two right angles4 ,wherefore the omnipotence of ,god has been displayed from all eternity1 and will for all eternity remain in the same state of activity4 ,this manner of treating the question attributes to ,god an omnipotence1 in my opinion1 far more perfect4 ,for1 otherwise1 we are compelled to confess that ,god understands an infinite number of creatable things1 which he will never be able to create1 for1 if he created all that he understands1 he would1 according to this showing1 exhaust his omnipotence1 and render himself imperfect4 ,wherefore1 in order to establish that ,god is perfect1 we should be reduced to establishing at the same time1 that he cannot bring to pass everything over which his power extends2 this seems to be a hypothesis most absurd1 and most repugnant to ,god's omnipotence4 ,further 7to say a word concerning the intellect and the will which we attribute to ,god71 if intellect and will appertain to the eternal essence of ,god1 we must take these words in some significance quite different from those they usually bear4 ,for intellect and will1 which should constitute the essence of ,god1 would perforce be as far apart as the poles from the human intellect and will1 in fact1 would have nothing in common with them but the name2 there would be about as much correspondence between the two as there is between the ,dog1 the heavenly constellation1 and a dog1 an animal that barks4 ,this ,i will prove as follows4 ,if intellect belongs to the divine nature1 it cannot be in nature1 as ours is generally thought to be1 posterior to1 or simultaneous with the things understood1 inasmuch as ,god is prior to all things by reason of his causality 7,prop4 xvi41 ,cor4 i474 ,on the contrary1 the truth and formal essence of things is as it is1 because it exists by representation as such in the intellect of ,god4 ,wherefore the intellect of ,god1 in so far as it is conceived to constitute ,god's essence1 is1 in reality1 the cause of things1 both of their essence and of their existence4 ,this seems to have been recognized by those who have asserted1 that ,god's intellect1 ,god's will1 and ,god's power1 are one and the same4 ,as1 therefore1 ,god's intellect is the sole cause of things1 namely1 both of their essence and existence1 it must necessarily differ from them in respect to its essence1 and in respect to its existence4 ,for a cause differs from a thing it causes1 precisely in the quality which the latter gains from the former4 ,for example1 a man is the cause of another man's existence1 but not of his essence 7for the latter is an eternal truth71 and1 therefore1 the two men may be entirely similar in essence1 but must be different in existence2 and hence if the existence of one of them cease1 the existence of the other will not necessarily cease also2 but if the essence of one could be destroyed1 and be made false1 the essence of the other would be destroyed also4 ,wherefore1 a thing which is the cause both of the essence and of the existence of a given effect1 must differ from such effect both in respect to its essence1 and also in respect to its existence4 ,now the intellect of ,god is the cause both of the essence and the existence of our intellect2 therefore1 the intellect of ,god in so far as it is conceived to constitute the divine essence1 differs from our intellect both in respect to essence and in respect to existence1 nor can it in anywise agree therewith save in name1 as we said before4 ,the reasoning would be identical in the case of the will1 as anyone can easily see4 ,,xviii4 ,god is the indwelling and not the transient cause of all things4 ,proof--,all things which are1 are in ,god1 and must be conceived through ,god 7by ,prop4 xv471 therefore 7by ,prop4 xvi41 ,cor4 i47 ,god is the cause of those things which are in him4 ,this is our first point4 ,further1 besides ,god there can be no substance 7by ,prop4 xiv471 that is nothing in itself external to ,god4 ,this is our second point4 ,god1 therefore1 is the indwelling and not the transient cause of all things4 ,q4,e4,d4 ,,xix4 ,god1 and all the attributes of ,god1 are eternal4 ,proof--,god 7by ,def4 vi47 is substance1 which 7by ,prop4 xi47 necessarily exists1 that is 7by ,prop4 vii47 existence appertains to its nature1 or 7what is the same thing7 follows from its definition2 therefore1 ,god is eternal 7by ,def4 vii474 ,further1 by the attributes of ,god we must understand that which 7by ,def4 iv47 expresses the essence of the divine substance--in other words1 that which appertains to substance3 that1 ,i say1 should be involved in the attributes of substance4 ,now eternity appertains to the nature of substance 7as ,i have already shown in ,prop4 vii472 therefore1 eternity must appertain to each of the attributes1 and thus all are eternal4 ,q4,e4,d4 9999999999,note--,this proposition is also evident from the manner in which 7in ,prop4 xi47 ,i demonstrated the existence of ,god2 it is evident1 ,i repeat1 from that proof1 that the existence of ,god1 like his essence1 is an eternal truth4 ,further 7in ,prop4 xix4 of my ,principles of the ,cartesian ,philosophy71 ,i have proved the eternity of ,god1 in another manner1 which ,i need not here repeat4 ,,xx4 ,the existence of ,god and his essence are one and the same4 ,proof--,god 7by the last ,prop47 and all his attributes are eternal1 that is 7by ,def4 viii47 each of his attributes expresses existence4 ,therefore the same attributes of ,god which explain his eternal essence1 explain at the same time his eternal existence--in other words1 that which constitutes ,god's essence constitutes at the same time his existence4 ,wherefore ,god's existence and ,god's essence are one and the same4 ,q4,e4,d4 ,corollary ,i4--,hence it follows that ,god's existence1 like his essence1 is an eternal truth4 ,corollary ,,ii4--,secondly1 it follows that ,god1 and all the attributes of ,god1 are unchangeable4 ,for if they could be changed in respect to existence1 they must also be able to be changed in respect to essence--that is1 obviously1 be changed from true to false1 which is absurd4 ,,xxi4 ,all things which follow from the absolute nature of any attribute of ,god must always exist and be infinite1 or1 in other words1 are eternal and infinite through the said attribute4 ,proof--,conceive1 if it be possible 7supposing the proposition to be denied71 that something in some attribute of ,god can follow from the absolute nature of the said attribute1 and that at the same time it is finite1 and has a conditioned existence or duration2 for instance1 the idea of ,god expressed in the attribute thought4 ,now thought1 in so far as it is supposed to be an attribute of ,god1 is necessarily 7by ,prop4 xi47 in its nature infinite4 ,but1 in so far as it possesses the idea of ,god1 it is supposed finite4 ,it cannot1 however1 be conceived as finite1 unless it be limited by thought 7by ,def4 ii472 but it is not limited by thought itself1 in so far as it has constituted the idea of ,god 7for so far it is supposed to be finite72 therefore1 it is limited by thought1 in so far as it has not constituted the idea of ,god1 which nevertheless 7by ,prop4 xi47 must necessarily exist4 ,we have now granted1 therefore1 thought not constituting the idea of ,god1 and1 accordingly1 the idea of ,god does not naturally follow from its nature in so far as it is absolute thought 7for it is conceived as constituting1 and also as not constituting1 the idea of ,god71 which is against our hypothesis4 ,wherefore1 if the idea of ,god expressed in the attribute thought1 or1 indeed1 anything else in any attribute of ,god 7for we may take any example1 as the proof is of universal application7 follows from the necessity of the absolute nature of the said attribute1 the said thing must necessarily be infinite1 which was our first point4 ,furthermore1 a thing which thus follows from the necessity of the nature of any attribute cannot have a limited duration4 ,for if it can1 suppose a thing1 which follows from the necessity of the nature of some attribute1 to exist in some attribute of ,god1 for instance1 the idea of ,god expressed in the attribute thought1 and let it be supposed at some time not to have existed1 or to be about not to exist4 ,now thought being an attribute of ,god must necessarily exist unchanged 7by ,prop4 xi41 and ,prop4 xx41 ,cor4 ii472 and beyond the limits of the duration of the idea of ,god 7supposing the latter at some time not to have existed1 or not to be going to exist7 thought would perforce have existed without the idea of ,god1 which is contrary to our hypothesis1 for we supposed that1 thought being given1 the idea of ,god necessarily flowed therefrom4 ,therefore the idea of ,god expressed in thought1 or anything which necessarily follows from the absolute nature of some attribute of ,god1 cannot have a limited duration1 but through the said attribute is eternal1 which is our second point4 ,bear in mind that the same proposition may be affirmed of anything1 which in any attribute necessarily follows from ,god's absolute nature4 ,,xxii4 ,whatsoever follows from any attribute of ,god1 in so far as it is modified by a modification1 which exists necessarily and as infinite1 through the said attribute1 must also exist necessarily and as infinite4 ,proof--,the proof of this proposition is similar to that of the preceding one4 ,,xxiii4 ,every mode1 which exists both necessarily and as infinite1 must necessarily follow either from the absolute nature of some attribute of ,god1 or from an attribute modified by a modification which exists necessarily1 and as infinite4 ,proof--,a mode exists in something else1 through which it must be conceived 7,def4 v471 that is 7,prop4 xv471 it exists solely in ,god1 and solely through ,god can be conceived4 ,if therefore a mode is conceived as necessarily existing and infinite1 it must necessarily be inferred or perceived through some attribute of ,god1 in so far as such attribute is conceived as expressing the infinity and necessity of existence1 in other words 7,def4 viii47 eternity2 that is1 in so far as it is considered absolutely4 ,a mode1 therefore1 which necessarily exists as infinite1 must follow from the absolute nature of some attribute of ,god1 either immediately 7,prop4 xxi47 or through the means of some modification1 which follows from the absolute nature of the said attribute2 that is 7by ,prop4 xxii471 which exists necessarily and as infinite4 ,,xxiv4 ,the essence of things produced by ,god does not involve existence4 ,proof--,this proposition is evident from ,def4 i4 ,for that of which the nature 7considered in itself7 involves existence is self-caused1 and exists by the sole necessity of its own nature4 ,corollary--,hence it follows that ,god is not only the cause of things coming into existence1 but also of their continuing in existence1 that is1 in scholastic phraseology1 ,god is cause of the being of things 7essendi rerum74 ,for whether things exist1 or do not exist1 whenever we contemplate their essence1 we see that it involves neither existence nor duration2 consequently1 it cannot be the cause of either the one or the other4 ,god must be the sole cause1 inasmuch as to him alone does existence appertain4 7,prop4 xiv4 ,cor4 i47 ,q4,e4,d4 ,,xxv4 ,god is the efficient cause not only of the existence of things1 but also of their essence4 ,proof--,if this be denied1 then ,god is not the cause of the essence of things2 and therefore the essence of things can 7by ,ax4 iv47 be conceived without ,god4 ,this 7by ,prop4 xv47 is absurd4 ,therefore1 ,god is the cause of the essence of things4 ,q4,e4,d4 9999999999,note--,this proposition follows more clearly from ,prop4 xvi4 ,for it is evident thereby that1 given the divine nature1 the essence of things must be inferred from it1 no less than their existence--in a word1 ,god must be called the cause of all things1 in the same sense as he is called the cause of himself4 ,this will be made still clearer by the following corollary4 ,corollary--,individual things are nothing but modifications of the attributes of ,god1 or modes by which the attributes of ,god are expressed in a fixed and definite manner4 ,the proof appears from ,prop4 xv4 and ,def4 v4 ,,xxvi4 ,a thing which is conditioned to act in a particular manner1 has necessarily been thus conditioned by ,god2 and that which has not been conditioned by ,god cannot condition itself to act4 ,proof--,that by which things are said to be conditioned to act in a particular manner is necessarily something positive 7this is obvious72 therefore both of its essence and of its existence ,god by the necessity of his nature is the efficient cause 7,props4 xxv4 and xvi472 this is our first point4 ,our second point is plainly to be inferred therefrom4 ,for if a thing1 which has not been conditioned by ,god1 could condition itself1 the first part of our proof would be false1 and this1 as we have shown is absurd4 ,,xxvii4 ,a thing1 which has been conditioned by ,god to act in a particular way1 cannot render itself unconditioned4 ,proof--,this proposition is evident from ,ax4 iii4 ,,xxviii4 ,every individual thing1 or everything which is finite and has a conditioned existence1 cannot exist or be conditioned to act1 unless it be conditioned for existence and action by a cause other than itself1 which also is finite1 and has a conditioned existence2 and likewise this cause cannot in its turn exist1 or be conditioned to act1 unless it be conditioned for existence and action by another cause1 which also is finite1 and has a conditioned existence1 and so on to infinity4 ,proof--,whatsoever is conditioned to exist and act1 has been thus conditioned by ,god 7by ,prop4 xxvi4 and ,prop4 xxiv41 ,cor47 ,but that which is finite1 and has a conditioned existence1 cannot be produced by the absolute nature of any attribute of ,god2 for whatsoever follows from the absolute nature of any attribute of ,god is infinite and eternal 7by ,prop4 xxi474 ,it must1 therefore1 follow from some attribute of ,god1 in so far as the said attribute is considered as in some way modified2 for substance and modes make up the sum total of existence 7by ,ax4 i4 and ,def4 iii41 v471 while modes are merely modifications of the attributes of ,god4 ,but from ,god1 or from any of his attributes1 in so far as the latter is modified by a modification infinite and eternal1 a conditioned thing cannot follow4 ,wherefore it must follow from1 or be conditioned for1 existence and action by ,god or one of his attributes1 in so far as the latter are modified by some modification which is finite1 and has a conditioned existence4 ,this is our first point4 ,again1 this cause or this modification 7for the reason by which we established the first part of this proof7 must in its turn be conditioned by another cause1 which also is finite1 and has a conditioned existence1 and1 again1 this last by another 7for the same reason72 and so on 7for the same reason7 to infinity4 ,q4,e4,d4 9999999999,note--,as certain things must be produced immediately by ,god1 namely those things which necessarily follow from his absolute nature1 through the means of these primary attributes1 which1 nevertheless1 can neither exist nor be conceived without ,god1 it follows3 #a4 ,that ,god is absolutely the proximate cause of those things immediately produced by him4 ,i say absolutely1 not after his kind1 as is usually stated4 ,for the effects of ,god cannot either exist or be conceived without a cause 7,prop4 xv4 and ,prop4 xxiv4 ,cor474 #b4 ,that ,god cannot properly be styled the remote cause of individual things1 except for the sake of distinguishing these from what he immediately produces1 or rather from what follows from his absolute nature4 ,for1 by a remote cause1 we understand a cause which is in no way conjoined to the effect4 ,but all things which are1 are in ,god1 and so depend on ,god1 that without him they can neither be nor be conceived4 ,,xxix4 ,nothing in the universe is contingent1 but all things are conditioned to exist and operate in a particular manner by the necessity of the divine nature4 ,proof--,whatsoever is1 is in ,god 7,prop4 xv474 ,but ,god cannot be called a thing contingent4 ,for 7by ,prop4 xi47 he exists necessarily1 and not contingently4 ,further1 the modes of the divine nature follow therefrom necessarily1 and not contingently 7,prop4 xvi472 and they thus follow1 whether we consider the divine nature absolutely1 or whether we consider it as in any way conditioned to act 7,prop4 xxvii474 ,further1 ,god is not only the cause of these modes1 in so far as they simply exist 7by ,prop4 xxiv41 ,cor471 but also in so far as they are considered as conditioned for operating in a particular manner 7,prop4 xxvi474 ,if they be not conditioned by ,god 7,prop4 xxvi471 it is impossible1 and not contingent1 that they should condition themselves2 contrariwise1 if they be conditioned by ,god1 it is impossible1 and not contingent1 that they should render themselves unconditioned4 ,wherefore all things are conditioned by the necessity of the divine nature1 not only to exist1 but also to exist and operate in a particular manner1 and there is nothing that is contingent4 ,q4,e4,d4 9999999999,note--,before going any further1 ,i wish here to explain1 what we should understand by nature viewed as active 7natura naturans71 and nature viewed as passive 7natura naturata74 ,i say to explain1 or rather call attention to it1 for ,i think that1 from what has been said1 it is sufficiently clear1 that by nature viewed as active we should understand that which is in itself1 and is conceived through itself1 or those attributes of substance1 which express eternal and infinite essence1 in other words 7,prop4 xiv41 ,cor4 i41 and ,prop4 xvii41 ,cor4 ii47 ,god1 in so far as he is considered as a free cause4 ,by nature viewed as passive ,i understand all that which follows from the necessity of the nature of ,god1 or of any of the attributes of ,god1 that is1 all the modes of the attributes of ,god1 in so far as they are considered as things which are in ,god1 and which without ,god cannot exist or be conceived4 ,,xxx4 ,intellect1 in function 7actu7 finite1 or in function infinite1 must comprehend the attributes of ,god and the modifications of ,god1 and nothing else4 ,proof--,a true idea must agree with its object 7,ax4 vi472 in other words 7obviously7 that which is contained in the intellect in representation must necessarily be granted in nature4 ,but in nature 7by ,prop4 xiv41 ,cor4 i47 there is no substance save ,god1 nor any modifications save those 7,prop4 xv47 which are in ,god1 and cannot without ,god either be or be conceived4 ,therefore the intellect1 in function finite1 or in function infinite1 must comprehend the attributes of ,god and the modifications of ,god1 and nothing else4 ,q4,e4,d4 ,,xxxi4 ,the intellect in function1 whether finite or infinite1 as will1 desire1 love1 c41 should be referred to passive nature and not to active nature4 ,proof--,by the intellect we do not 7obviously7 mean absolute thought1 but only a certain mode of thinking1 differing from other modes1 such as love1 desire1 c41 and therefore 7,def4 v47 requiring to be conceived through absolute thought4 ,it must 7by ,prop4 xv4 and ,def4 vi471 through some attribute of ,god which expresses the eternal and infinite essence of thought1 be so conceived1 that without such attribute it could neither be nor be conceived4 ,it must therefore be referred to nature passive rather than to nature active1 as must also the other modes of thinking4 ,q4,e4,d4 9999999999,note--,i do not here1 by speaking of intellect in function1 admit that there is such a thing as intellect in potentiality3 but1 wishing to avoid all confusion1 ,i desire to speak only of what is most clearly perceived by us1 namely1 of the very act of understanding1 than which nothing is more clearly perceived4 ,for we cannot perceive anything without adding to our knowledge of the act of understanding4 ,,xxxii4 ,will cannot be called a free cause1 but only a necessary cause4 ,proof--,will is only a particular mode of thinking1 like intellect2 therefore 7by ,prop4 xxviii47 no volition can exist1 nor be conditioned to act1 unless it be conditioned by some cause other than itself1 which cause is conditioned by a third cause1 and so on to infinity4 ,but if will be supposed infinite1 it must also be conditioned to exist and act by ,god1 not by virtue of his being substance absolutely infinite1 but by virtue of his possessing an attribute which expresses the infinite and eternal essence of thought 7by ,prop4 xxiii474 ,thus1 however it be conceived1 whether as finite or infinite1 it requires a cause by which it should be conditioned to exist and act4 ,thus 7,def4 vii47 it cannot be called a free cause1 but only a necessary or constrained cause4 ,q4,e4,d4 ,corollary ,i--,hence it follows1 first1 that ,god does not act according to freedom of the will4 ,corollary ,,ii--,it follows1 secondly1 that will and intellect stand in the same relation to the nature of ,god as do motion1 and rest1 and absolutely all natural phenomena1 which must be conditioned by ,god 7,prop4 xxix47 to exist and act in a particular manner4 ,for will1 like the rest1 stands in need of a cause1 by which it is conditioned to exist and act in a particular manner4 ,and although1 when will or intellect be granted1 an infinite number of results may follow1 yet ,god cannot on that account be said to act from freedom of the will1 any more than the infinite number of results from motion and rest would justify us in saying that motion and rest act by free will4 ,wherefore will no more appertains to ,god than does anything else in nature1 but stands in the same relation to him as motion1 rest1 and the like1 which we have shown to follow from the necessity of the divine nature1 and to be conditioned by it to exist and act in a particular manner4 ,,xxxiii4 ,things could not have been brought into being by ,god in any manner or in any order different from that which has in fact obtained4 ,proof--,all things necessarily follow from the nature of ,god 7,prop4 xvi471 and by the nature of ,god are conditioned to exist and act in a particular way 7,prop4 xxix74 ,if things1 therefore1 could have been of a different nature1 or have been conditioned to act in a different way1 so that the order of nature would have been different1 ,god's nature would also have been able to be different from what it now is2 and therefore 7by ,prop4 xi47that different nature also would have perforce existed1 and consequently there would have been able to be two or more ,gods4 ,this 7by ,prop4 xiv41 ,cor4 i47 is absurd4 ,therefore1 things could not have been brought into being by ,god in any other manner1 c4 ,q4,e4,d4 9999999999,note ,i--,as ,i have thus shown1 more clearly than the sun at noonday1 that there is nothing to justify us in calling things contingent1 ,i wish to explain briefly what meaning we shall attach to the word contingent2 but ,i will first explain the words necessary and impossible4 ,a thing is called necessary either in respect to its essence or in respect to its cause2 for the existence of a thing necessarily follows1 either from its essence and definition1 or from a given efficient cause4 ,for similar reasons a thing is said to be impossible2 namely1 inasmuch as its essence or definition involves a contradiction1 or because no external cause is granted1 which is conditioned to produce such an effect2 but a thing can in no respect be called contingent1 save in relation to the imperfection of our knowledge4 ,a thing of which we do not know whether the essence does or does not involve a contradiction1 or of which1 knowing that it does not involve a contradiction1 we are still in doubt concerning the existence1 because the order of causes escapes us1--such a thing1 ,i say1 cannot appear to us either necessary or impossible4 ,wherefore we call it contingent or possible4 9999999999,note ,,ii--,it clearly follows from what we have said1 that things have been brought into being by ,god in the highest perfection1 inasmuch as they have necessarily followed from a most perfect nature4 ,nor does this prove any imperfection in ,god1 for it has compelled us to affirm his perfection4 ,from its contrary proposition1 we should clearly gather 7as ,i have just shown71 that ,god is not supremely perfect1 for if things had been brought into being in any other way1 we should have to assign to ,god a nature different from that1 which we are bound to attribute to him from the consideration of an absolutely perfect being4 ,i do not doubt1 that many will scout this idea as absurd1 and will refuse to give their minds up to contemplating it1 simply because they are accustomed to assign to ,god a freedom very different from that which we 7,def4 vii47 have deduced4 ,they assign to him1 in short1 absolute free will4 ,however1 ,i am also convinced that if such persons reflect on the matter1 and duly weigh in their minds our series of propositions1 they will reject such freedom as they now attribute to ,god1 not only as nugatory1 but also as a great impediment to organized knowledge4 ,there is no need for me to repeat what ,i have said in the note to ,prop4 xvii4 ,but1 for the sake of my opponents1 ,i will show further1 that although it be granted that will pertains to the essence of ,god1 it nevertheless follows from his perfection1 that things could not have been by him created other than they are1 or in a different order2 this is easily proved1 if we reflect on what our opponents themselves concede1 namely1 that it depends solely on the decree and will of ,god1 that each thing is what it is4 ,if it were otherwise1 ,god would not be the cause of all things4 ,further1 that all the decrees of ,god have been ratified from all eternity by ,god himself4 ,if it were otherwise1 ,god would be convicted of imperfection or change4 ,but in eternity there is no such thing as when1 before1 or after2 hence it follows solely from the perfection of ,god1 that ,god never can decree1 or never would have decreed anything but what is2 that ,god did not exist before his decrees1 and would not exist without them4 ,but1 it is said1 supposing that ,god had made a different universe1 or had ordained other decrees from all eternity concerning nature and her order1 we could not therefore conclude any imperfection in ,god4 ,but persons who say this must admit that ,god can change his decrees4 ,for if ,god had ordained any decrees concerning nature and her order1 different from those which he has ordained--in other words1 if he had willed and conceived something different concerning nature--he would perforce have had a different intellect from that which he has1 and also a different will4 ,but if it were allowable to assign to ,god a different intellect and a different will1 without any change in his essence or his perfection1 what would there be to prevent him changing the decrees which he has made concerning created things1 and nevertheless remaining perfect8 ,for his intellect and will concerning things created and their order are the same1 in respect to his essence and perfection1 however they be conceived4 ,further1 all the philosophers whom ,i have read admit that ,god's intellect is entirely actual1 and not at all potential2 as they also admit that ,god's intellect1 and ,god's will1 and ,god's essence are identical1 it follows that1 if ,god had had a different actual intellect and a different will1 his essence would also have been different2 and thus1 as ,i concluded at first1 if things had been brought into being by ,god in a different way from that which has obtained1 ,god's intellect and will1 that is 7as is admitted7 his essence would perforce have been different1 which is absurd4 ,as these things could not have been brought into being by ,god in any but the actual way and order which has obtained2 and as the truth of this proposition follows from the supreme perfection of ,god2 we can have no sound reason for persuading ourselves to believe that ,god did not wish to create all the things which were in his intellect1 and to create them in the same perfection as he had understood them4 ,but1 it will be said1 there is in things no perfection nor imperfection2 that which is in them1 and which causes them to be called perfect or imperfect1 good or bad1 depends solely on the will of ,god4 ,if ,god had so willed1 he might have brought it about that what is now perfection should be extreme imperfection1 and vice versa4 ,what is such an assertion1 but an open declaration that ,god1 who necessarily understands that which he wishes1 might bring it about by his will1 that he should understand things differently from the way in which he does understand them8 ,this 7as we have just shown7 is the height of absurdity4 ,wherefore1 ,i may turn the argument against its employers1 as follows3--,all things depend on the power of ,god4 ,in order that things should be different from what they are1 ,god's will would necessarily have to be different4 ,but ,god's will cannot be different 7as we have just most clearly demonstrated7 from ,god's perfection4 ,therefore neither can things be different4 ,i confess1 that the theory which subjects all things to the will of an indifferent deity1 and asserts that they are all dependent on his fiat1 is less far from the truth than the theory of those1 who maintain that ,god acts in all things with a view of promoting what is good4 ,for these latter persons seem to set up something beyond ,god1 which does not depend on ,god1 but which ,god in acting looks to as an exemplar1 or which he aims at as a definite goal4 ,this is only another name for subjecting ,god to the dominion of destiny1 an utter absurdity in respect to ,god1 whom we have shown to be the first and only free cause of the essence of all things and also of their existence4 ,i need1 therefore1 spend no time in refuting such wild theories4 ,,xxxiv4 ,god's power is identical with his essence4 ,proof--,from the sole necessity of the essence of ,god it follows that ,god is the cause of himself 7,prop4 xi47 and of all things 7,prop4 xvi4 and ,cor474 ,wherefore the power of ,god1 by which he and all things are and act1 is identical with his essence4 ,q4,e4,d4 ,,xxxv4 ,whatsoever we conceive to be in the power of ,god1 necessarily exists4 ,proof--,whatsoever is in ,god's power1 must 7by the last ,prop47 be comprehended in his essence in such a manner1 that it necessarily follows therefrom1 and therefore necessarily exists4 ,q4,e4,d4 ,,xxxvi4 ,there is no cause from whose nature some effect does not follow4 ,proof--,whatsoever exists expresses ,god's nature or essence in a given conditioned manner 7by ,prop4 xxv41 ,cor472 that is1 7by ,prop4 xxxiv471 whatsoever exists1 expresses in a given conditioned manner ,god's power1 which is the cause of all things1 therefore an effect must 7by ,prop4 xvi47 necessarily follow4 ,q4,e4,d4 ,,appendix3 ,in the foregoing ,i have explained the nature and properties of ,god4 ,i have shown that he necessarily exists1 that he is one3 that he is1 and acts solely by the necessity of his own nature2 that he is the free cause of all things1 and how he is so2 that all things are in ,god1 and so depend on him1 that without him they could neither exist nor be conceived2 lastly1 that all things are predetermined by ,god1 not through his free will or absolute fiat1 but from the very nature of ,god or infinite power4 ,i have further1 where occasion afforded1 taken care to remove the prejudices1 which might impede the comprehension of my demonstrations4 ,yet there still remain misconceptions not a few1 which might and may prove very grave hindrances to the understanding of the concatenation of things1 as ,i have explained it above4 ,i have therefore thought it worth while to bring these misconceptions before the bar of reason4 ,all such opinions spring from the notion commonly entertained1 that all things in nature act as men themselves act1 namely1 with an end in view4 ,it is accepted as certain1 that ,god himself directs all things to a definite goal 7for it is said that ,god made all things for man1 and man that he might worship him74 ,i will1 therefore1 consider this opinion1 asking first1 why it obtains general credence1 and why all men are naturally so prone to adopt it82 secondly1 ,i will point out its falsity2 and1 lastly1 ,i will show how it has given rise to prejudices about good and bad1 right and wrong1 praise and blame1 order and confusion1 beauty and ugliness1 and the like4 ,however1 this is not the place to deduce these misconceptions from the nature of the human mind3 it will be sufficient here1 if ,i assume as a starting point1 what ought to be universally admitted1 namely1 that all men are born ignorant of the causes of things1 that all have the desire to seek for what is useful to them1 and that they are conscious of such desire4 ,herefrom it follows1 first1 that men think themselves free inasmuch as they are conscious of their volitions and desires1 and never even dream1 in their ignorance1 of the causes which have disposed them so to wish and desire4 ,secondly1 that men do all things for an end1 namely1 for that which is useful to them1 and which they seek4 ,thus it comes to pass that they only look for a knowledge of the final causes of events1 and when these are learned1 they are content1 as having no cause for further doubt4 ,if they cannot learn such causes from external sources1 they are compelled to turn to considering themselves1 and reflecting what end would have induced them personally to bring about the given event1 and thus they necessarily judge other natures by their own4 ,further1 as they find in themselves and outside themselves many means which assist them not a little in the search for what is useful1 for instance1 eyes for seeing1 teeth for chewing1 herbs and animals for yielding food1 the sun for giving light1 the sea for breeding fish1 c41 they come to look on the whole of nature as a means for obtaining such conveniences4 ,now as they are aware1 that they found these conveniences and did not make them1 they think they have cause for believing1 that some other being has made them for their use4 ,as they look upon things as means1 they cannot believe them to be self-created2 but1 judging from the means which they are accustomed to prepare for themselves1 they are bound to believe in some ruler or rulers of the universe endowed with human freedom1 who have arranged and adapted everything for human use4 ,they are bound to estimate the nature of such rulers 7having no information on the subject7 in accordance with their own nature1 and therefore they assert that the gods ordained everything for the use of man1 in order to bind man to themselves and obtain from him the highest honor4 ,hence also it follows1 that everyone thought out for himself1 according to his abilities1 a different way of worshipping ,god1 so that ,god might love him more than his fellows1 and direct the whole course of nature for the satisfaction of his blind cupidity and insatiable avarice4 ,thus the prejudice developed into superstition1 and took deep root in the human mind2 and for this reason everyone strove most zealously to understand and explain the final causes of things2 but in their endeavor to show that nature does nothing in vain1 i4e4 nothing which is useless to man1 they only seem to have demonstrated that nature1 the gods1 and men are all mad together4 ,consider1 ,i pray you1 the result3 among the many helps of nature they were bound to find some hindrances1 such as storms1 earthquakes1 diseases1 c43 so they declared that such things happen1 because the gods are angry at some wrong done to them by men1 or at some fault committed in their worship4 ,experience day by day protested and showed by infinite examples1 that good and evil fortunes fall to the lot of pious and impious alike2 still they would not abandon their inveterate prejudice1 for it was more easy for them to class such contradictions among other unknown things of whose use they were ignorant1 and thus to retain their actual and innate condition of ignorance1 than to destroy the whole fabric of their reasoning and start afresh4 ,they therefore laid down as an axiom1 that ,god's judgments far transcend human understanding4 ,such a doctrine might well have sufficed to conceal the truth from the human race for all eternity1 if mathematics had not furnished another standard of verity in considering solely the essence and properties of figures without regard to their final causes4 ,there are other reasons 7which ,i need not mention here7 besides mathematics1 which might have caused men's minds to be directed to these general prejudices1 and have led them to the knowledge of the truth4 ,i have now sufficiently explained my first point4 ,there is no need to show at length1 that nature has no particular goal in view1 and that final causes are mere human figments4 ,this1 ,i think1 is already evident enough1 both from the causes and foundations on which ,i have shown such prejudice to be based1 and also from ,prop4 xvi41 and the ,corollary of ,prop4 xxxii41 and1 in fact1 all those propositions in which ,i have shown1 that everything in nature proceeds from a sort of necessity1 and with the utmost perfection4 ,however1 ,i will add a few remarks in order to overthrow this doctrine of a final cause utterly4 ,that which is really a cause it considers as an effect1 and vice versa3 it makes that which is by nature first to be last1 and that which is highest and most perfect to be most imperfect4 ,passing over the questions of cause and priority as self-evident1 it is plain from ,props4 xxi41 xxii41 xxiii4 that the effect is most perfect which is produced immediately by ,god2 the effect which requires for its production several intermediate causes is1 in that respect1 more imperfect4 ,but if those things which were made immediately by ,god were made to enable him to attain his end1 then the things which come after1 for the sake of which the first were made1 are necessarily the most excellent of all4 ,further1 this doctrine does away with the perfection of ,god3 for1 if ,god acts for an object1 he necessarily desires something which he lacks4 ,certainly1 theologians and metaphysicians draw a distinction between the object of want and the object of assimilation2 still they confess that ,god made all things for the sake of himself1 not for the sake of creation4 ,they are unable to point to anything prior to creation1 except ,god himself1 as an object for which ,god should act1 and are therefore driven to admit 7as they clearly must71 that ,god lacked those things for whose attainment he created means1 and further that he desired them4 ,we must not omit to notice that the followers of this doctrine1 anxious to display their talent in assigning final causes1 have imported a new method of argument in proof of their theory--namely1 a reduction1 not to the impossible1 but to ignorance2 thus showing that they have no other method of exhibiting their doctrine4 ,for example1 if a stone falls from a roof onto someone's head1 and kills him1 they will demonstrate by their new method1 that the stone fell in order to kill the man2 for1 if it had not by ,god's will fallen with that object1 how could so many circumstances 7and there are often many concurrent circumstances7 have all happened together by chance8 ,perhaps you will answer that the event is due to the facts that the wind was blowing1 and the man was walking that way4 ,but why1 they will insist1 was the wind blowing1 and why was the man at that very time walking that way8 ,if you again answer1 that the wind had then sprung up because the sea had begun to be agitated the day before1 the weather being previously calm1 and that the man had been invited by a friend1 they will again insist3 ,but why was the sea agitated1 and why was the man invited at that time8 ,so they will pursue their questions from cause to cause1 till at last you take refuge in the will of ,god--in other words1 the sanctuary of ignorance4 ,so1 again1 when they survey the frame of the human body1 they are amazed2 and being ignorant of the causes of so great a work of art1 conclude that it has been fashioned1 not mechanically1 but by divine and supernatural skill1 and has been so put together that one part shall not hurt another4 ,hence anyone who seeks for the true causes of miracles1 and strives to understand natural phenomena as an intelligent being1 and not to gaze at them like a fool1 is set down and denounced as an impious heretic by those1 whom the masses adore as the interpreters of nature and the gods4 ,such persons know that1 with the removal of ignorance1 the wonder which forms their only available means for proving and preserving their authority would vanish also4 ,but ,i now quit this subject1 and pass on to my third point4 ,after men persuaded themselves1 that everything which is created is created for their sake1 they were bound to consider as the chief quality in everything that which is most useful to themselves1 and to account those things the best of all which have the most beneficial effect on mankind4 ,further1 they were bound to form abstract notions for the explanation of the nature of things1 such as goodness1 badness1 order1 confusion1 warmth1 cold1 beauty1 deformity1 and so on2 and from the belief that they are free agents arose the further notions of praise and blame1 sin and merit4 ,i will speak of these latter hereafter1 when ,i treat of human nature2 the former ,i will briefly explain here4 ,everything which conduces to health and the worship of ,god they have called good1 everything which hinders these objects they have styled bad2 and inasmuch as those who do not understand the nature of things do not verify phenomena in any way1 but merely imagine them after a fashion1 and mistake their imagination for understanding1 such persons firmly believe that there is an order in things1 being really ignorant both of things and their own nature4 ,when phenomena are of such a kind1 that the impression they make on our senses requires little effort of imagination1 and can consequently be easily remembered1 we say that they are well-ordered2 if the contrary1 that they are ill-ordered or confused4 ,further1 as things which are easily imagined are more pleasing to us1 men prefer order to confusion--as though there were any order in nature1 except in relation to our imagination--and say that ,god has created all things in order2 thus1 without knowing it1 attributing imagination to ,god1 unless1 indeed1 they would have it that ,god foresaw human imagination1 and arranged everything1 so that it should be most easily imagined4 ,if this be their theory1 they would not1 perhaps1 be daunted by the fact that we find an infinite number of phenomena1 far surpassing our imagination1 and very many others which confound its weakness4 ,but enough has been said on this subject4 ,the other abstract notions are nothing but modes of imagining1 in which the imagination is differently affected3 though they are considered by the ignorant as the chief attributes of things1 inasmuch as they believe that everything was created for the sake of themselves2 and1 according as they are affected by it1 style it good or bad1 healthy or rotten or corrupt4 ,for instance1 if the motion which objects we see communicate to our nerves be conducive to health1 the objects causing it are styled beautiful2 if a contrary motion be excited1 they are styled ugly4 ,things which are perceived through our sense of smell are styled fragrant or fetid2 if through our taste1 sweet or bitter1 full-flavored or insipid2 if through our touch1 hard or soft1 rough or smooth1 c4 ,whatsoever affects our ears is said to give rise to noise1 sound1 or harmony4 ,in this last case1 there are men lunatic enough to believe1 that even ,god himself takes pleasure in harmony2 and philosophers are not lacking who have persuaded themselves1 that the motion of the heavenly bodies gives rise to harmony--all of which instances sufficiently show that everyone judges of things according to the state of his brain1 or rather mistakes for things the forms of his imagination4 ,we need no longer wonder that there have arisen all the controversies we have witnessed1 and finally skepticism3 for1 although human bodies in many respects agree1 yet in very many others they differ2 so that what seems good to one seems confused to another2 what is pleasing to one displeases another1 and so on4 ,i need not further enumerate1 because this is not the place to treat the subject at length1 and also because the fact is sufficiently well known4 ,it is commonly said3 ,so many men1 so many minds2 everyone is wise in his own way2 brains differ as completely as palates4 ,all of which proverbs show1 that men judge of things according to their mental disposition1 and rather imagine than understand3 for1 if they understood phenomena1 they would1 as mathematicians attest1 be convinced1 if not attracted1 by what ,i have urged4 ,we have now perceived1 that all the explanations commonly given of nature are mere modes of imagining1 and do not indicate the true nature of anything1 but only the constitution of the imagination2 and1 although they have names1 as though they were entities1 existing externally to the imagination1 ,i call them entities imaginary rather than real2 and1 therefore1 all arguments against us drawn from such abstractions are easily rebutted4 ,many argue in this way4 ,if all things follow from a necessity of the absolutely perfect nature of ,god1 why are there so many imperfections in nature8 such1 for instance1 as things corrupt to the point of putridity1 loathsome deformity1 confusion1 evil1 sin1 c4 ,but these reasoners are1 as ,i have said1 easily confuted1 for the perfection of things is to be reckoned only from their own nature and power2 things are not more or less perfect1 according as they are serviceable or repugnant to mankind4 ,to those who ask why ,god did not so create all men1 that they should be governed only by reason1 ,i give no answer but this3 because matter was not lacking to him for the creation of every degree of perfection from highest to lowest2 or1 more strictly1 because the laws of his nature are so vast1 as to suffice for the production of everything conceivable by an infinite intelligence1 as ,i have shown in ,prop4 xvi4 ,such are the misconceptions ,i have undertaken to note2 if there are any more of the same sort1 everyone may easily dissipate them for himself with the aid of a little reflection4 ,,end ,,of ,,part ,i