,,democracy ,,and ,,education by ,john ,dewey ,transcriber's ,note3 ,i have tried to make this the most accurate text possible but ,i am sure that there are still mistakes4 ,please feel free to email me any errors or mistakes that you find4 ,citing the ,chapter and paragraph4 ,haraddaaol4com and davidrinconnect4com are my email addresses for now4 ,david ,reed ,i would like to dedicate this etext to my mother who was a elementary school teacher for more years than ,i can remember4 ,thanks4 ,contents3 ,chapter ,one3 ,education as a ,necessity of ,life ,chapter ,two3 ,education as a ,social ,function ,chapter ,three3 ,education as ,direction ,chapter ,four3 ,education as ,growth ,chapter ,five3 ,preparation1 ,unfolding1 and ,formal ,discipline ,chapter ,six3 ,education as ,conservative and ,progressive ,chapter ,seven3 ,the ,democratic ,conception in ,education ,chapter ,eight3 ,aims in ,education ,chapter ,nine3 ,natural ,development and ,social ,efficiency as ,aims ,chapter ,ten3 ,interest and ,discipline ,chapter ,eleven3 ,experience and ,thinking ,chapter ,twelve3 ,thinking in ,education ,chapter ,thirteen3 ,the ,nature of ,method ,chapter ,fourteen3 ,the ,nature of ,subject ,matter ,chapter ,fifteen3 ,play and ,work in the ,curriculum ,chapter ,sixteen3 ,the ,significance of ,geography and ,history ,chapter ,seventeen3 ,science in the ,course of ,study ,chapter ,eighteen3 ,educational ,values ,chapter ,nineteen3 ,labor and ,leisure ,chapter ,twenty3 ,intellectual and ,practical ,studies ,chapter ,twenty-one3 ,physical and ,social ,studies3 ,naturalism and ,humanism ,chapter ,twenty-two3 ,the ,individual and the ,world ,chapter ,twenty-,three3 ,vocational ,aspects of ,education ,chapter ,twenty-four3 ,philosophy of ,education ,chapter ,twenty-five3 ,theories of ,knowledge ,chapter ,twenty-six3 ,theories of ,morals ,chapter ,one3 ,education as a ,necessity of ,life #a4 ,renewal of ,life by ,transmission4 ,the most notable distinction between living and inanimate things is that the former maintain themselves by renewal4 ,a stone when struck resists4 ,if its resistance is greater than the force of the blow struck1 it remains outwardly unchanged4 ,otherwise1 it is shattered into smaller bits4 ,never does the stone attempt to react in such a way that it may maintain itself against the blow1 much less so as to render the blow a contributing factor to its own continued action4 ,while the living thing may easily be crushed by superior force1 it none the less tries to turn the energies which act upon it into means of its own further existence4 ,if it cannot do so1 it does not just split into smaller pieces 7at least in the higher forms of life71 but loses its identity as a living thing4 ,as long as it endures1 it struggles to use surrounding energies in its own behalf4 ,it uses light1 air1 moisture1 and the material of soil4 ,to say that it uses them is to say that it turns them into means of its own conservation4 ,as long as it is growing1 the energy it expends in thus turning the environment to account is more than compensated for by the return it gets3 it grows4 ,understanding the word control in this sense1 it may be said that a living being is one that subjugates and controls for its own continued activity the energies that would otherwise use it up4 ,life is a self-renewing process through action upon the environment4 ,in all the higher forms this process cannot be kept up indefinitely4 ,after a while they succumb2 they die4 ,the creature is not equal to the task of indefinite self-renewal4 ,but continuity of the life process is not dependent upon the prolongation of the existence of any one individual4 ,reproduction of other forms of life goes on in continuous sequence4 ,and though1 as the geological record shows1 not merely individuals but also species die out1 the life process continues in increasingly complex forms4 ,as some species die out1 forms better adapted to utilize the obstacles against which they struggled in vain come into being4 ,continuity of life means continual readaptation of the environment to the needs of living organisms4 ,we have been speaking of life in its lowest terms--as a physical thing4 ,but we use the word ,life to denote the whole range of experience1 individual and racial4 ,when we see a book called the ,life of ,lincoln we do not expect to find within its covers a treatise on physiology4 ,we look for an account of social antecedents2 a description of early surroundings1 of the conditions and occupation of the family2 of the chief episodes in the development of character2 of signal struggles and achievements2 of the individual's hopes1 tastes1 joys and sufferings4 ,in precisely similar fashion we speak of the life of a savage tribe1 of the ,athenian people1 of the ,american nation4 ,life covers customs1 institutions1 beliefs1 victories and defeats1 recreations and occupations4 ,we employ the word experience in the same pregnant sense4 ,and to it1 as well as to life in the bare physiological sense1 the principle of continuity through renewal applies4 ,with the renewal of physical existence goes1 in the case of human beings1 the recreation of beliefs1 ideals1 hopes1 happiness1 misery1 and practices4 ,the continuity of any experience1 through renewing of the social group1 is a literal fact4 ,education1 in its broadest sense1 is the means of this social continuity of life4 ,every one of the constituent elements of a social group1 in a modern city as in a savage tribe1 is born immature1 helpless1 without language1 beliefs1 ideas1 or social standards4 ,each individual1 each unit who is the carrier of the life-experience of his group1 in time passes away4 ,yet the life of the group goes on4 ,the primary ineluctable facts of the birth and death of each one of the constituent members in a social group determine the necessity of education4 ,on one hand1 there is the contrast between the immaturity of the new-born members of the group--its future sole representatives--and the maturity of the adult members who possess the knowledge and customs of the group4 ,on the other hand1 there is the necessity that these immature members be not merely physically preserved in adequate numbers1 but that they be initiated into the interests1 purposes1 information1 skill1 and practices of the mature members3 otherwise the group will cease its characteristic life4 ,even in a savage tribe1 the achievements of adults are far beyond what the immature members would be capable of if left to themselves4 ,with the growth of civilization1 the gap between the original capacities of the immature and the standards and customs of the elders increases4 ,mere physical growing up1 mere mastery of the bare necessities of subsistence will not suffice to reproduce the life of the group4 ,deliberate effort and the taking of thoughtful pains are required4 ,beings who are born not only unaware of1 but quite indifferent to1 the aims and habits of the social group have to be rendered cognizant of them and actively interested4 ,education1 and education alone1 spans the gap4 ,society exists through a process of transmission quite as much as biological life4 ,this transmission occurs by means of communication of habits of doing1 thinking1 and feeling from the older to the younger4 ,without this communication of ideals1 hopes1 expectations1 standards1 opinions1 from those members of society who are passing out of the group life to those who are coming into it1 social life could not survive4 ,if the members who compose a society lived on continuously1 they might educate the new-born members1 but it would be a task directed by personal interest rather than social need4 ,now it is a work of necessity4 ,if a plague carried off the members of a society all at once1 it is obvious that the group would be permanently done for4 ,yet the death of each of its constituent members is as certain as if an epidemic took them all at once4 ,but the graded difference in age1 the fact that some are born as some die1 makes possible through transmission of ideas and practices the constant reweaving of the social fabric4 ,yet this renewal is not automatic4 ,unless pains are taken to see that genuine and thorough transmission takes place1 the most civilized group will relapse into barbarism and then into savagery4 ,in fact1 the human young are so immature that if they were left to themselves without the guidance and succor of others1 they could not acquire the rudimentary abilities necessary for physical existence4 ,the young of human beings compare so poorly in original efficiency with the young of many of the lower animals1 that even the powers needed for physical sustentation have to be acquired under tuition4 ,how much more1 then1 is this the case with respect to all the technological1 artistic1 scientific1 and moral achievements of humanity6 #b4 ,education and ,communication4 ,so obvious1 indeed1 is the necessity of teaching and learning for the continued existence of a society that we may seem to be dwelling unduly on a truism4 ,but justification is found in the fact that such emphasis is a means of getting us away from an unduly scholastic and formal notion of education4 ,schools are1 indeed1 one important method of the transmission which forms the dispositions of the immature2 but it is only one means1 and1 compared with other agencies1 a relatively superficial means4 ,only as we have grasped the necessity of more fundamental and persistent modes of tuition can we make sure of placing the scholastic methods in their true context4 ,society not only continues to exist by transmission1 by communication1 but it may fairly be said to exist in transmission1 in communication4 ,there is more than a verbal tie between the words common1 community1 and communication4 ,men live in a community in virtue of the things which they have in common2 and communication is the way in which they come to possess things in common4 ,what they must have in common in order to form a community or society are aims1 beliefs1 aspirations1 knowledge--a common understanding--like-mindedness as the sociologists say4 ,such things cannot be passed physically from one to another1 like bricks2 they cannot be shared as persons would share a pie by dividing it into physical pieces4 ,the communication which insures participation in a common understanding is one which secures similar emotional and intellectual dispositions--like ways of responding to expectations and requirements4 ,persons do not become a society by living in physical proximity1 any more than a man ceases to be socially influenced by being so many feet or miles removed from others4 ,a book or a letter may institute a more intimate association between human beings separated thousands of miles from each other than exists between dwellers under the same roof4 ,individuals do not even compose a social group because they all work for a common end4 ,the parts of a machine work with a maximum of cooperativeness for a common result1 but they do not form a community4 ,if1 however1 they were all cognizant of the common end and all interested in it so that they regulated their specific activity in view of it1 then they would form a community4 ,but this would involve communication4 ,each would have to know what the other was about and would have to have some way of keeping the other informed as to his own purpose and progress4 ,consensus demands communication4 ,we are thus compelled to recognize that within even the most social group there are many relations which are not as yet social4 ,a large number of human relationships in any social group are still upon the machine-like plane4 ,individuals use one another so as to get desired results1 without reference to the emotional and intellectual disposition and consent of those used4 ,such uses express physical superiority1 or superiority of position1 skill1 technical ability1 and command of tools1 mechanical or fiscal4 ,so far as the relations of parent and child1 teacher and pupil1 employer and employee1 governor and governed1 remain upon this level1 they form no true social group1 no matter how closely their respective activities touch one another4 ,giving and taking of orders modifies action and results1 but does not of itself effect a sharing of purposes1 a communication of interests4 ,not only is social life identical with communication1 but all communication 7and hence all genuine social life7 is educative4 ,to be a recipient of a communication is to have an enlarged and changed experience4 ,one shares in what another has thought and felt and in so far1 meagerly or amply1 has his own attitude modified4 ,nor is the one who communicates left unaffected4 ,try the experiment of communicating1 with fullness and accuracy1 some experience to another1 especially if it be somewhat complicated1 and you will find your own attitude toward your experience changing2 otherwise you resort to expletives and ejaculations4 ,the experience has to be formulated in order to be communicated4 ,to formulate requires getting outside of it1 seeing it as another would see it1 considering what points of contact it has with the life of another so that it may be got into such form that he can appreciate its meaning4 ,except in dealing with commonplaces and catch phrases one has to assimilate1 imaginatively1 something of another's experience in order to tell him intelligently of one's own experience4 ,all communication is like art4 ,it may fairly be said1 therefore1 that any social arrangement that remains vitally social1 or vitally shared1 is educative to those who participate in it4 ,only when it becomes cast in a mold and runs in a routine way does it lose its educative power4 ,in final account1 then1 not only does social life demand teaching and learning for its own permanence1 but the very process of living together educates4 ,it enlarges and enlightens experience2 it stimulates and enriches imagination2 it creates responsibility for accuracy and vividness of statement and thought4 ,a man really living alone 7alone mentally as well as physically7 would have little or no occasion to reflect upon his past experience to extract its net meaning4 ,the inequality of achievement between the mature and the immature not only necessitates teaching the young1 but the necessity of this teaching gives an immense stimulus to reducing experience to that order and form which will render it most easily communicable and hence most usable4 #c4 ,the ,place of ,formal ,education4 ,there is1 accordingly1 a marked difference between the education which every one gets from living with others1 as long as he really lives instead of just continuing to subsist1 and the deliberate educating of the young4 ,in the former case the education is incidental2 it is natural and important1 but it is not the express reason of the association4 ,while it may be said1 without exaggeration1 that the measure of the worth of any social institution1 economic1 domestic1 political1 legal1 religious1 is its effect in enlarging and improving experience2 yet this effect is not a part of its original motive1 which is limited and more immediately practical4 ,religious associations began1 for example1 in the desire to secure the favor of overruling powers and to ward off evil influences2 family life in the desire to gratify appetites and secure family perpetuity2 systematic labor1 for the most part1 because of enslavement to others1 etc4 ,only gradually was the by-product of the institution1 its effect upon the quality and extent of conscious life1 noted1 and only more gradually still was this effect considered as a directive factor in the conduct of the institution4 ,even today1 in our industrial life1 apart from certain values of industriousness and thrift1 the intellectual and emotional reaction of the forms of human association under which the world's work is carried on receives little attention as compared with physical output4 ,but in dealing with the young1 the fact of association itself as an immediate human fact1 gains in importance4 ,while it is easy to ignore in our contact with them the effect of our acts upon their disposition1 or to subordinate that educative effect to some external and tangible result1 it is not so easy as in dealing with adults4 ,the need of training is too evident2 the pressure to accomplish a change in their attitude and habits is too urgent to leave these consequences wholly out of account4 ,since our chief business with them is to enable them to share in a common life we cannot help considering whether or no we are forming the powers which will secure this ability4 ,if humanity has made some headway in realizing that the ultimate value of every institution is its distinctively human effect--its effect upon conscious experience--we may well believe that this lesson has been learned largely through dealings with the young4 ,we are thus led to distinguish1 within the broad educational process which we have been so far considering1 a more formal kind of education--that of direct tuition or schooling4 ,in undeveloped social groups1 we find very little formal teaching and training4 ,savage groups mainly rely for instilling needed dispositions into the young upon the same sort of association which keeps adults loyal to their group4 ,they have no special devices1 material1 or institutions for teaching save in connection with initiation ceremonies by which the youth are inducted into full social membership4 ,for the most part1 they depend upon children learning the customs of the adults1 acquiring their emotional set and stock of ideas1 by sharing in what the elders are doing4 ,in part1 this sharing is direct1 taking part in the occupations of adults and thus serving an apprenticeship2 in part1 it is indirect1 through the dramatic plays in which children reproduce the actions of grown-ups and thus learn to know what they are like4 ,to savages it would seem preposterous to seek out a place where nothing but learning was going on in order that one might learn4 ,but as civilization advances1 the gap between the capacities of the young and the concerns of adults widens4 ,learning by direct sharing in the pursuits of grown-ups becomes increasingly difficult except in the case of the less advanced occupations4 ,much of what adults do is so remote in space and in meaning that playful imitation is less and less adequate to reproduce its spirit4 ,ability to share effectively in adult activities thus depends upon a prior training given with this end in view4 ,intentional agencies--schools--and explicit material--studies--are devised4 ,the task of teaching certain things is delegated to a special group of persons4 ,without such formal education1 it is not possible to transmit all the resources and achievements of a complex society4 ,it also opens a way to a kind of experience which would not be accessible to the young1 if they were left to pick up their training in informal association with others1 since books and the symbols of knowledge are mastered4 ,but there are conspicuous dangers attendant upon the transition from indirect to formal education4 ,sharing in actual pursuit1 whether directly or vicariously in play1 is at least personal and vital4 ,these qualities compensate1 in some measure1 for the narrowness of available opportunities4 ,formal instruction1 on the contrary1 easily becomes remote and dead--abstract and bookish1 to use the ordinary words of depreciation4 ,what accumulated knowledge exists in low grade societies is at least put into practice2 it is transmuted into character2 it exists with the depth of meaning that attaches to its coming within urgent daily interests4 ,but in an advanced culture much which has to be learned is stored in symbols4 ,it is far from translation into familiar acts and objects4 ,such material is relatively technical and superficial4 ,taking the ordinary standard of reality as a measure1 it is artificial4 ,for this measure is connection with practical concerns4 ,such material exists in a world by itself1 unassimilated to ordinary customs of thought and expression4 ,there is the standing danger that the material of formal instruction will be merely the subject matter of the schools1 isolated from the subject matter of life-experience4 ,the permanent social interests are likely to be lost from view4 ,those which have not been carried over into the structure of social life1 but which remain largely matters of technical information expressed in symbols1 are made conspicuous in schools4 ,thus we reach the ordinary notion of education3 the notion which ignores its social necessity and its identity with all human association that affects conscious life1 and which identifies it with imparting information about remote matters and the conveying of learning through verbal signs3 the acquisition of literacy4 ,hence one of the weightiest problems with which the philosophy of education has to cope is the method of keeping a proper balance between the informal and the formal1 the incidental and the intentional1 modes of education4 ,when the acquiring of information and of technical intellectual skill do not influence the formation of a social disposition1 ordinary vital experience fails to gain in meaning1 while schooling1 in so far1 creates only sharps in learning--that is1 egoistic specialists4 ,to avoid a split between what men consciously know because they are aware of having learned it by a specific job of learning1 and what they unconsciously know because they have absorbed it in the formation of their characters by intercourse with others1 becomes an increasingly delicate task with every development of special schooling4 ,summary4 ,it is the very nature of life to strive to continue in being4 ,since this continuance can be secured only by constant renewals1 life is a self-renewing process4 ,what nutrition and reproduction are to physiological life1 education is to social life4 ,this education consists primarily in transmission through communication4 ,communication is a process of sharing experience till it becomes a common possession4 ,it modifies the disposition of both the parties who partake in it4 ,that the ulterior significance of every mode of human association lies in the contribution which it makes to the improvement of the quality of experience is a fact most easily recognized in dealing with the immature4 ,that is to say1 while every social arrangement is educative in effect1 the educative effect first becomes an important part of the purpose of the association in connection with the association of the older with the younger4 ,as societies become more complex in structure and resources1 the need of formal or intentional teaching and learning increases4 ,as formal teaching and training grow in extent1 there is the danger of creating an undesirable split between the experience gained in more direct associations and what is acquired in school4 ,this danger was never greater than at the present time1 on account of the rapid growth in the last few centuries of knowledge and technical modes of skill4 ,chapter ,two3 ,education as a ,social ,function #a4 ,the ,nature and ,meaning of ,environment4 ,we have seen that a community or social group sustains itself through continuous self-renewal1 and that this renewal takes place by means of the educational growth of the immature members of the group4 ,by various agencies1 unintentional and designed1 a society transforms uninitiated and seemingly alien beings into robust trustees of its own resources and ideals4 ,education is thus a fostering1 a nurturing1 a cultivating1 process4 ,all of these words mean that it implies attention to the conditions of growth4 ,we also speak of rearing1 raising1 bringing up--words which express the difference of level which education aims to cover4 ,etymologically1 the word education means just a process of leading or bringing up4 ,when we have the outcome of the process in mind1 we speak of education as shaping1 forming1 molding activity--that is1 a shaping into the standard form of social activity4 ,in this chapter we are concerned with the general features of the way in which a social group brings up its immature members into its own social form4 ,since what is required is a transformation of the quality of experience till it partakes in the interests1 purposes1 and ideas current in the social group1 the problem is evidently not one of mere physical forming4 ,things can be physically transported in space2 they may be bodily conveyed4 ,beliefs and aspirations cannot be physically extracted and inserted4 ,how then are they communicated8 ,given the impossibility of direct contagion or literal inculcation1 our problem is to discover the method by which the young assimilate the point of view of the old1 or the older bring the young into like-mindedness with themselves4 ,the answer1 in general formulation1 is3 ,by means of the action of the environment in calling out certain responses4 ,the required beliefs cannot be hammered in2 the needed attitudes cannot be plastered on4 ,but the particular medium in which an individual exists leads him to see and feel one thing rather than another2 it leads him to have certain plans in order that he may act successfully with others2 it strengthens some beliefs and weakens others as a condition of winning the approval of others4 ,thus it gradually produces in him a certain system of behavior1 a certain disposition of action4 ,the words environment1 medium denote something more than surroundings which encompass an individual4 ,they denote the specific continuity of the surroundings with his own active tendencies4 ,an inanimate being is1 of course1 continuous with its surroundings2 but the environing circumstances do not1 save metaphorically1 constitute an environment4 ,for the inorganic being is not concerned in the influences which affect it4 ,on the other hand1 some things which are remote in space and time from a living creature1 especially a human creature1 may form his environment even more truly than some of the things close to him4 ,the things with which a man varies are his genuine environment4 ,thus the activities of the astronomer vary with the stars at which he gazes or about which he calculates4 ,of his immediate surroundings1 his telescope is most intimately his environment4 ,the environment of an antiquarian1 as an antiquarian1 consists of the remote epoch of human life with which he is concerned1 and the relics1 inscriptions1 etc41 by which he establishes connections with that period4 ,in brief1 the environment consists of those conditions that promote or hinder1 stimulate or inhibit1 the characteristic activities of a living being4 ,water is the environment of a fish because it is necessary to the fish's activities--to its life4 ,the north pole is a significant element in the environment of an arctic explorer1 whether he succeeds in reaching it or not1 because it defines his activities1 makes them what they distinctively are4 ,just because life signifies not bare passive existence 7supposing there is such a thing71 but a way of acting1 environment or medium signifies what enters into this activity as a sustaining or frustrating condition4 #b4 ,the ,social ,environment4 ,a being whose activities are associated with others has a social environment4 ,what he does and what he can do depend upon the expectations1 demands1 approvals1 and condemnations of others4 ,a being connected with other beings cannot perform his own activities without taking the activities of others into account4 ,for they are the indispensable conditions of the realization of his tendencies4 ,when he moves he stirs them and reciprocally4 ,we might as well try to imagine a business man doing business1 buying and selling1 all by himself1 as to conceive it possible to define the activities of an individual in terms of his isolated actions4 ,the manufacturer moreover is as truly socially guided in his activities when he is laying plans in the privacy of his own counting house as when he is buying his raw material or selling his finished goods4 ,thinking and feeling that have to do with action in association with others is as much a social mode of behavior as is the most overt cooperative or hostile act4 ,what we have more especially to indicate is how the social medium nurtures its immature members4 ,there is no great difficulty in seeing how it shapes the external habits of action4 ,even dogs and horses have their actions modified by association with human beings2 they form different habits because human beings are concerned with what they do4 ,human beings control animals by controlling the natural stimuli which influence them2 by creating a certain environment in other words4 ,food1 bits and bridles1 noises1 vehicles1 are used to direct the ways in which the natural or instinctive responses of horses occur4 ,by operating steadily to call out certain acts1 habits are formed which function with the same uniformity as the original stimuli4 ,if a rat is put in a maze and finds food only by making a given number of turns in a given sequence1 his activity is gradually modified till he habitually takes that course rather than another when he is hungry4 ,human actions are modified in a like fashion4 ,a burnt child dreads the fire2 if a parent arranged conditions so that every time a child touched a certain toy he got burned1 the child would learn to avoid that toy as automatically as he avoids touching fire4 ,so far1 however1 we are dealing with what may be called training in distinction from educative teaching4 ,the changes considered are in outer action rather than in mental and emotional dispositions of behavior4 ,the distinction is not1 however1 a sharp one4 ,the child might conceivably generate in time a violent antipathy1 not only to that particular toy1 but to the class of toys resembling it4 ,the aversion might even persist after he had forgotten about the original burns2 later on he might even invent some reason to account for his seemingly irrational antipathy4 ,in some cases1 altering the external habit of action by changing the environment to affect the stimuli to action will also alter the mental disposition concerned in the action4 ,yet this does not always happen2 a person trained to dodge a threatening blow1 dodges automatically with no corresponding thought or emotion4 ,we have to find1 then1 some differentia of training from education4 ,a clew may be found in the fact that the horse does not really share in the social use to which his action is put4 ,some one else uses the horse to secure a result which is advantageous by making it advantageous to the horse to perform the act--he gets food1 etc4 ,but the horse1 presumably1 does not get any new interest4 ,he remains interested in food1 not in the service he is rendering4 ,he is not a partner in a shared activity4 ,were he to become a copartner1 he would1 in engaging in the conjoint activity1 have the same interest in its accomplishment which others have4 ,he would share their ideas and emotions4 ,now in many cases--too many cases--the activity of the immature human being is simply played upon to secure habits which are useful4 ,he is trained like an animal rather than educated like a human being4 ,his instincts remain attached to their original objects of pain or pleasure4 ,but to get happiness or to avoid the pain of failure he has to act in a way agreeable to others4 ,in other cases1 he really shares or participates in the common activity4 ,in this case1 his original impulse is modified4 ,he not merely acts in a way agreeing with the actions of others1 but1 in so acting1 the same ideas and emotions are aroused in him that animate the others4 ,a tribe1 let us say1 is warlike4 ,the successes for which it strives1 the achievements upon which it sets store1 are connected with fighting and victory4 ,the presence of this medium incites bellicose exhibitions in a boy1 first in games1 then in fact when he is strong enough4 ,as he fights he wins approval and advancement2 as he refrains1 he is disliked1 ridiculed1 shut out from favorable recognition4 ,it is not surprising that his original belligerent tendencies and emotions are strengthened at the expense of others1 and that his ideas turn to things connected with war4 ,only in this way can he become fully a recognized member of his group4 ,thus his mental habitudes are gradually assimilated to those of his group4 ,if we formulate the principle involved in this illustration1 we shall perceive that the social medium neither implants certain desires and ideas directly1 nor yet merely establishes certain purely muscular habits of action1 like instinctively winking or dodging a blow4 ,setting up conditions which stimulate certain visible and tangible ways of acting is the first step4 ,making the individual a sharer or partner in the associated activity so that he feels its success as his success1 its failure as his failure1 is the completing step4 ,as soon as he is possessed by the emotional attitude of the group1 he will be alert to recognize the special ends at which it aims and the means employed to secure success4 ,his beliefs and ideas1 in other words1 will take a form similar to those of others in the group4 ,he will also achieve pretty much the same stock of knowledge since that knowledge is an ingredient of his habitual pursuits4 ,the importance of language in gaining knowledge is doubtless the chief cause of the common notion that knowledge may be passed directly from one to another4 ,it almost seems as if all we have to do to convey an idea into the mind of another is to convey a sound into his ear4 ,thus imparting knowledge gets assimilated to a purely physical process4 ,but learning from language will be found1 when analyzed1 to confirm the principle just laid down4 ,it would probably be admitted with little hesitation that a child gets the idea of1 say1 a hat by using it as other persons do2 by covering the head with it1 giving it to others to wear1 having it put on by others when going out1 etc4 ,but it may be asked how this principle of shared activity applies to getting through speech or reading the idea of1 say1 a ,greek helmet1 where no direct use of any kind enters in4 ,what shared activity is there in learning from books about the discovery of ,america8 ,since language tends to become the chief instrument of learning about many things1 let us see how it works4 ,the baby begins of course with mere sounds1 noises1 and tones having no meaning1 expressing1 that is1 no idea4 ,sounds are just one kind of stimulus to direct response1 some having a soothing effect1 others tending to make one jump1 and so on4 ,the sound h-a-t would remain as meaningless as a sound in ,choctaw1 a seemingly inarticulate grunt1 if it were not uttered in connection with an action which is participated in by a number of people4 ,when the mother is taking the infant out of doors1 she says hat as she puts something on the baby's head4 ,being taken out becomes an interest to the child2 mother and child not only go out with each other physically1 but both are concerned in the going out2 they enjoy it in common4 ,by conjunction with the other factors in activity the sound hat soon gets the same meaning for the child that it has for the parent2 it becomes a sign of the activity into which it enters4 ,the bare fact that language consists of sounds which are mutually intelligible is enough of itself to show that its meaning depends upon connection with a shared experience4 ,in short1 the sound h-a-t gains meaning in precisely the same way that the thing hat gains it1 by being used in a given way4 ,and they acquire the same meaning with the child which they have with the adult because they are used in a common experience by both4 ,the guarantee for the same manner of use is found in the fact that the thing and the sound are first employed in a joint activity1 as a means of setting up an active connection between the child and a grownup4 ,similar ideas or meanings spring up because both persons are engaged as partners in an action where what each does depends upon and influences what the other does4 ,if two savages were engaged in a joint hunt for game1 and a certain signal meant move to the right to the one who uttered it1 and move to the left to the one who heard it1 they obviously could not successfully carry on their hunt together4 ,understanding one another means that objects1 including sounds1 have the same value for both with respect to carrying on a common pursuit4 ,after sounds have got meaning through connection with other things employed in a joint undertaking1 they can be used in connection with other like sounds to develop new meanings1 precisely as the things for which they stand are combined4 ,thus the words in which a child learns about1 say1 the ,greek helmet originally got a meaning 7or were understood7 by use in an action having a common interest and end4 ,they now arouse a new meaning by inciting the one who hears or reads to rehearse imaginatively the activities in which the helmet has its use4 ,for the time being1 the one who understands the words ,greek helmet becomes mentally a partner with those who used the helmet4 ,he engages1 through his imagination1 in a shared activity4 ,it is not easy to get the full meaning of words4 ,most persons probably stop with the idea that helmet denotes a queer kind of headgear a people called the ,greeks once wore4 ,we conclude1 accordingly1 that the use of language to convey and acquire ideas is an extension and refinement of the principle that things gain meaning by being used in a shared experience or joint action2 in no sense does it contravene that principle4 ,when words do not enter as factors into a shared situation1 either overtly or imaginatively1 they operate as pure physical stimuli1 not as having a meaning or intellectual value4 ,they set activity running in a given groove1 but there is no accompanying conscious purpose or meaning4 ,thus1 for example1 the plus sign may be a stimulus to perform the act of writing one number under another and adding the numbers1 but the person performing the act will operate much as an automaton would unless he realizes the meaning of what he does4 #c4 ,the ,social ,medium as ,educative4 ,our net result thus far is that social environment forms the mental and emotional disposition of behavior in individuals by engaging them in activities that arouse and strengthen certain impulses1 that have certain purposes and entail certain consequences4 ,a child growing up in a family of musicians will inevitably have whatever capacities he has in music stimulated1 and1 relatively1 stimulated more than other impulses which might have been awakened in another environment4 ,save as he takes an interest in music and gains a certain competency in it1 he is out of it2 he is unable to share in the life of the group to which he belongs4 ,some kinds of participation in the life of those with whom the individual is connected are inevitable2 with respect to them1 the social environment exercises an educative or formative influence unconsciously and apart from any set purpose4 ,in savage and barbarian communities1 such direct participation 7constituting the indirect or incidental education of which we have spoken7 furnishes almost the sole influence for rearing the young into the practices and beliefs of the group4 ,even in present-day societies1 it furnishes the basic nurture of even the most insistently schooled youth4 ,in accord with the interests and occupations of the group1 certain things become objects of high esteem2 others of aversion4 ,association does not create impulses or affection and dislike1 but it furnishes the objects to which they attach themselves4 ,the way our group or class does things tends to determine the proper objects of attention1 and thus to prescribe the directions and limits of observation and memory4 ,what is strange or foreign 7that is to say outside the activities of the groups7 tends to be morally forbidden and intellectually suspect4 ,it seems almost incredible to us1 for example1 that things which we know very well could have escaped recognition in past ages4 ,we incline to account for it by attributing congenital stupidity to our forerunners and by assuming superior native intelligence on our own part4 ,but the explanation is that their modes of life did not call for attention to such facts1 but held their minds riveted to other things4 ,just as the senses require sensible objects to stimulate them1 so our powers of observation1 recollection1 and imagination do not work spontaneously1 but are set in motion by the demands set up by current social occupations4 ,the main texture of disposition is formed1 independently of schooling1 by such influences4 ,what conscious1 deliberate teaching can do is at most to free the capacities thus formed for fuller exercise1 to purge them of some of their grossness1 and to furnish objects which make their activity more productive of meaning4 ,while this unconscious influence of the environment is so subtle and pervasive that it affects every fiber of character and mind1 it may be worth while to specify a few directions in which its effect is most marked4 ,first1 the habits of language4 ,fundamental modes of speech1 the bulk of the vocabulary1 are formed in the ordinary intercourse of life1 carried on not as a set means of instruction but as a social necessity4 ,the babe acquires1 as we well say1 the mother tongue4 ,while speech habits thus contracted may be corrected or even displaced by conscious teaching1 yet1 in times of excitement1 intentionally acquired modes of speech often fall away1 and individuals relapse into their really native tongue4 ,secondly1 manners4 ,example is notoriously more potent than precept4 ,good manners come1 as we say1 from good breeding or rather are good breeding2 and breeding is acquired by habitual action1 in response to habitual stimuli1 not by conveying information4 ,despite the never ending play of conscious correction and instruction1 the surrounding atmosphere and spirit is in the end the chief agent in forming manners4 ,and manners are but minor morals4 ,moreover1 in major morals1 conscious instruction is likely to be efficacious only in the degree in which it falls in with the general walk and conversation of those who constitute the child's social environment4 ,thirdly1 good taste and esthetic appreciation4 ,if the eye is constantly greeted by harmonious objects1 having elegance of form and color1 a standard of taste naturally grows up4 ,the effect of a tawdry1 unarranged1 and over-decorated environment works for the deterioration of taste1 just as meager and barren surroundings starve out the desire for beauty4 ,against such odds1 conscious teaching can hardly do more than convey second-hand information as to what others think4 ,such taste never becomes spontaneous and personally engrained1 but remains a labored reminder of what those think to whom one has been taught to look up4 ,to say that the deeper standards of judgments of value are framed by the situations into which a person habitually enters is not so much to mention a fourth point1 as it is to point out a fusion of those already mentioned4 ,we rarely recognize the extent in which our conscious estimates of what is worth while and what is not1 are due to standards of which we are not conscious at all4 ,but in general it may be said that the things which we take for granted without inquiry or reflection are just the things which determine our conscious thinking and decide our conclusions4 ,and these habitudes which lie below the level of reflection are just those which have been formed in the constant give and take of relationship with others4 #d4 ,the ,school as a ,special ,environment4 ,the chief importance of this foregoing statement of the educative process which goes on willy-nilly is to lead us to note that the only way in which adults consciously control the kind of education which the immature get is by controlling the environment in which they act1 and hence think and feel4 ,we never educate directly1 but indirectly by means of the environment4 ,whether we permit chance environments to do the work1 or whether we design environments for the purpose makes a great difference4 ,and any environment is a chance environment so far as its educative influence is concerned unless it has been deliberately regulated with reference to its educative effect4 ,an intelligent home differs from an unintelligent one chiefly in that the habits of life and intercourse which prevail are chosen1 or at least colored1 by the thought of their bearing upon the development of children4 ,but schools remain1 of course1 the typical instance of environments framed with express reference to influencing the mental and moral disposition of their members4 ,roughly speaking1 they come into existence when social traditions are so complex that a considerable part of the social store is committed to writing and transmitted through written symbols4 ,written symbols are even more artificial or conventional than spoken2 they cannot be picked up in accidental intercourse with others4 ,in addition1 the written form tends to select and record matters which are comparatively foreign to everyday life4 ,the achievements accumulated from generation to generation are deposited in it even though some of them have fallen temporarily out of use4 ,consequently as soon as a community depends to any considerable extent upon what lies beyond its own territory and its own immediate generation1 it must rely upon the set agency of schools to insure adequate transmission of all its resources4 ,to take an obvious illustration3 ,the life of the ancient ,greeks and ,romans has profoundly influenced our own1 and yet the ways in which they affect us do not present themselves on the surface of our ordinary experiences4 ,in similar fashion1 peoples still existing1 but remote in space1 ,british1 ,germans1 ,italians1 directly concern our own social affairs1 but the nature of the interaction cannot be understood without explicit statement and attention4 ,in precisely similar fashion1 our daily associations cannot be trusted to make clear to the young the part played in our activities by remote physical energies1 and by invisible structures4 ,hence a special mode of social intercourse is instituted1 the school1 to care for such matters4 ,this mode of association has three functions sufficiently specific1 as compared with ordinary associations of life1 to be noted4 ,first1 a complex civilization is too complex to be assimilated in toto4 ,it has to be broken up into portions1 as it were1 and assimilated piecemeal1 in a gradual and graded way4 ,the relationships of our present social life are so numerous and so interwoven that a child placed in the most favorable position could not readily share in many of the most important of them4 ,not sharing in them1 their meaning would not be communicated to him1 would not become a part of his own mental disposition4 ,there would be no seeing the trees because of the forest4 ,business1 politics1 art1 science1 religion1 would make all at once a clamor for attention2 confusion would be the outcome4 ,the first office of the social organ we call the school is to provide a simplified environment4 ,it selects the features which are fairly fundamental and capable of being responded to by the young4 ,then it establishes a progressive order1 using the factors first acquired as means of gaining insight into what is more complicated4 ,in the second place1 it is the business of the school environment to eliminate1 so far as possible1 the unworthy features of the existing environment from influence upon mental habitudes4 ,it establishes a purified medium of action4 ,selection aims not only at simplifying but at weeding out what is undesirable4 ,every society gets encumbered with what is trivial1 with dead wood from the past1 and with what is positively perverse4 ,the school has the duty of omitting such things from the environment which it supplies1 and thereby doing what it can to counteract their influence in the ordinary social environment4 ,by selecting the best for its exclusive use1 it strives to reinforce the power of this best4 ,as a society becomes more enlightened1 it realizes that it is responsible not to transmit and conserve the whole of its existing achievements1 but only such as make for a better future society4 ,the school is its chief agency for the accomplishment of this end4 ,in the third place1 it is the office of the school environment to balance the various elements in the social environment1 and to see to it that each individual gets an opportunity to escape from the limitations of the social group in which he was born1 and to come into living contact with a broader environment4 ,such words as society and community are likely to be misleading1 for they have a tendency to make us think there is a single thing corresponding to the single word4 ,as a matter of fact1 a modern society is many societies more or less loosely connected4 ,each household with its immediate extension of friends makes a society2 the village or street group of playmates is a community2 each business group1 each club1 is another4 ,passing beyond these more intimate groups1 there is in a country like our own a variety of races1 religious affiliations1 economic divisions4 ,inside the modern city1 in spite of its nominal political unity1 there are probably more communities1 more differing customs1 traditions1 aspirations1 and forms of government or control1 than existed in an entire continent at an earlier epoch4 ,each such group exercises a formative influence on the active dispositions of its members4 ,a clique1 a club1 a gang1 a ,fagin's household of thieves1 the prisoners in a jail1 provide educative environments for those who enter into their collective or conjoint activities1 as truly as a church1 a labor union1 a business partnership1 or a political party4 ,each of them is a mode of associated or community life1 quite as much as is a family1 a town1 or a state4 ,there are also communities whose members have little or no direct contact with one another1 like the guild of artists1 the republic of letters1 the members of the professional learned class scattered over the face of the earth4 ,for they have aims in common1 and the activity of each member is directly modified by knowledge of what others are doing4 ,in the olden times1 the diversity of groups was largely a geographical matter4 ,there were many societies1 but each1 within its own territory1 was comparatively homogeneous4 ,but with the development of commerce1 transportation1 intercommunication1 and emigration1 countries like the ,united ,states are composed of a combination of different groups with different traditional customs4 ,it is this situation which has1 perhaps more than any other one cause1 forced the demand for an educational institution which shall provide something like a homogeneous and balanced environment for the young4 ,only in this way can the centrifugal forces set up by juxtaposition of different groups within one and the same political unit be counteracted4 ,the intermingling in the school of youth of different races1 differing religions1 and unlike customs creates for all a new and broader environment4 ,common subject matter accustoms all to a unity of outlook upon a broader horizon than is visible to the members of any group while it is isolated4 ,the assimilative force of the ,american public school is eloquent testimony to the efficacy of the common and balanced appeal4 ,the school has the function also of coordinating within the disposition of each individual the diverse influences of the various social environments into which he enters4 ,one code prevails in the family2 another1 on the street2 a third1 in the workshop or store2 a fourth1 in the religious association4 ,as a person passes from one of the environments to another1 he is subjected to antagonistic pulls1 and is in danger of being split into a being having different standards of judgment and emotion for different occasions4 ,this danger imposes upon the school a steadying and integrating office4 ,summary4 ,the development within the young of the attitudes and dispositions necessary to the continuous and progressive life of a society cannot take place by direct conveyance of beliefs1 emotions1 and knowledge4 ,it takes place through the intermediary of the environment4 ,the environment consists of the sum total of conditions which are concerned in the execution of the activity characteristic of a living being4 ,the social environment consists of all the activities of fellow beings that are bound up in the carrying on of the activities of any one of its members4 ,it is truly educative in its effect in the degree in which an individual shares or participates in some conjoint activity4 ,by doing his share in the associated activity1 the individual appropriates the purpose which actuates it1 becomes familiar with its methods and subject matters1 acquires needed skill1 and is saturated with its emotional spirit4 ,the deeper and more intimate educative formation of disposition comes1 without conscious intent1 as the young gradually partake of the activities of the various groups to which they may belong4 ,as a society becomes more complex1 however1 it is found necessary to provide a special social environment which shall especially look after nurturing the capacities of the immature4 ,three of the more important functions of this special environment are3 simplifying and ordering the factors of the disposition it is wished to develop2 purifying and idealizing the existing social customs2 creating a wider and better balanced environment than that by which the young would be likely1 if left to themselves1 to be influenced4 ,chapter ,three3 ,education as ,direction #a4 ,the ,environment as ,directive4 ,we now pass to one of the special forms which the general function of education assumes3 namely1 that of direction1 control1 or guidance4 ,of these three words1 direction1 control1 and guidance1 the last best conveys the idea of assisting through cooperation the natural capacities of the individuals guided2 control conveys rather the notion of an energy brought to bear from without and meeting some resistance from the one controlled2 direction is a more neutral term and suggests the fact that the active tendencies of those directed are led in a certain continuous course1 instead of dispersing aimlessly4 ,direction expresses the basic function1 which tends at one extreme to become a guiding assistance and at another1 a regulation or ruling4 ,but in any case1 we must carefully avoid a meaning sometimes read into the term control4 ,it is sometimes assumed1 explicitly or unconsciously1 that an individual's tendencies are naturally purely individualistic or egoistic1 and thus antisocial4 ,control then denotes the process by which he is brought to subordinate his natural impulses to public or common ends4 ,since1 by conception1 his own nature is quite alien to this process and opposes it rather than helps it1 control has in this view a flavor of coercion or compulsion about it4 ,systems of government and theories of the state have been built upon this notion1 and it has seriously affected educational ideas and practices4 ,but there is no ground for any such view4 ,individuals are certainly interested1 at times1 in having their own way1 and their own way may go contrary to the ways of others4 ,but they are also interested1 and chiefly interested upon the whole1 in entering into the activities of others and taking part in conjoint and cooperative doings4 ,otherwise1 no such thing as a community would be possible4 ,and there would not even be any one interested in furnishing the policeman to keep a semblance of harmony unless he thought that thereby he could gain some personal advantage4 ,control1 in truth1 means only an emphatic form of direction of powers1 and covers the regulation gained by an individual through his own efforts quite as much as that brought about when others take the lead4 ,in general1 every stimulus directs activity4 ,it does not simply excite it or stir it up1 but directs it toward an object4 ,put the other way around1 a response is not just a re-action1 a protest1 as it were1 against being disturbed2 it is1 as the word indicates1 an answer4 ,it meets the stimulus1 and corresponds with it4 ,there is an adaptation of the stimulus and response to each other4 ,a light is the stimulus to the eye to see something1 and the business of the eye is to see4 ,if the eyes are open and there is light1 seeing occurs2 the stimulus is but a condition of the fulfillment of the proper function of the organ1 not an outside interruption4 ,to some extent1 then1 all direction or control is a guiding of activity to its own end2 it is an assistance in doing fully what some organ is already tending to do4 ,this general statement needs1 however1 to be qualified in two respects4 ,in the first place1 except in the case of a small number of instincts1 the stimuli to which an immature human being is subject are not sufficiently definite to call out1 in the beginning1 specific responses4 ,there is always a great deal of superfluous energy aroused4 ,this energy may be wasted1 going aside from the point2 it may also go against the successful performance of an act4 ,it does harm by getting in the way4 ,compare the behavior of a beginner in riding a bicycle with that of the expert4 ,there is little axis of direction in the energies put forth2 they are largely dispersive and centrifugal4 ,direction involves a focusing and fixating of action in order that it may be truly a response1 and this requires an elimination of unnecessary and confusing movements4 ,in the second place1 although no activity can be produced in which the person does not cooperate to some extent1 yet a response may be of a kind which does not fit into the sequence and continuity of action4 ,a person boxing may dodge a particular blow successfully1 but in such a way as to expose himself the next instant to a still harder blow4 ,adequate control means that the successive acts are brought into a continuous order2 each act not only meets its immediate stimulus but helps the acts which follow4 ,in short1 direction is both simultaneous and successive4 ,at a given time1 it requires that1 from all the tendencies that are partially called out1 those be selected which center energy upon the point of need4 ,successively1 it requires that each act be balanced with those which precede and come after1 so that order of activity is achieved4 ,focusing and ordering are thus the two aspects of direction1 one spatial1 the other temporal4 ,the first insures hitting the mark2 the second keeps the balance required for further action4 ,obviously1 it is not possible to separate them in practice as we have distinguished them in idea4 ,activity must be centered at a given time in such a way as to prepare for what comes next4 ,the problem of the immediate response is complicated by one's having to be on the lookout for future occurrences4 ,two conclusions emerge from these general statements4 ,on the one hand1 purely external direction is impossible4 ,the environment can at most only supply stimuli to call out responses4 ,these responses proceed from tendencies already possessed by the individual4 ,even when a person is frightened by threats into doing something1 the threats work only because the person has an instinct of fear4 ,if he has not1 or if1 though having it1 it is under his own control1 the threat has no more influence upon him than light has in causing a person to see who has no eyes4 ,while the customs and rules of adults furnish stimuli which direct as well as evoke the activities of the young1 the young1 after all1 participate in the direction which their actions finally take4 ,in the strict sense1 nothing can be forced upon them or into them4 ,to overlook this fact means to distort and pervert human nature4 ,to take into account the contribution made by the existing instincts and habits of those directed is to direct them economically and wisely4 ,speaking accurately1 all direction is but re-direction2 it shifts the activities already going on into another channel4 ,unless one is cognizant of the energies which are already in operation1 one's attempts at direction will almost surely go amiss4 ,on the other hand1 the control afforded by the customs and regulations of others may be short-sighted4 ,it may accomplish its immediate effect1 but at the expense of throwing the subsequent action of the person out of balance4 ,a threat may1 for example1 prevent a person from doing something to which he is naturally inclined by arousing fear of disagreeable consequences if he persists4 ,but he may be left in the position which exposes him later on to influences which will lead him to do even worse things4 ,his instincts of cunning and slyness may be aroused1 so that things henceforth appeal to him on the side of evasion and trickery more than would otherwise have been the case4 ,those engaged in directing the actions of others are always in danger of overlooking the importance of the sequential development of those they direct4 #b4 ,modes of ,social ,direction4 ,adults are naturally most conscious of directing the conduct of others when they are immediately aiming so to do4 ,as a rule1 they have such an aim consciously when they find themselves resisted2 when others are doing things they do not wish them to do4 ,but the more permanent and influential modes of control are those which operate from moment to moment continuously without such deliberate intention on our part4 #a4 ,when others are not doing what we would like them to or are threatening disobedience1 we are most conscious of the need of controlling them and of the influences by which they are controlled4 ,in such cases1 our control becomes most direct1 and at this point we are most likely to make the mistakes just spoken of4 ,we are even likely to take the influence of superior force for control1 forgetting that while we may lead a horse to water we cannot make him drink2 and that while we can shut a man up in a penitentiary we cannot make him penitent4 ,in all such cases of immediate action upon others1 we need to discriminate between physical results and moral results4 ,a person may be in such a condition that forcible feeding or enforced confinement is necessary for his own good4 ,a child may have to be snatched with roughness away from a fire so that he shall not be burnt4 ,but no improvement of disposition1 no educative effect1 need follow4 ,a harsh and commanding tone may be effectual in keeping a child away from the fire1 and the same desirable physical effect will follow as if he had been snatched away4 ,but there may be no more obedience of a moral sort in one case than in the other4 ,a man can be prevented from breaking into other persons' houses by shutting him up1 but shutting him up may not alter his disposition to commit burglary4 ,when we confuse a physical with an educative result1 we always lose the chance of enlisting the person's own participating disposition in getting the result desired1 and thereby of developing within him an intrinsic and persisting direction in the right way4 ,in general1 the occasion for the more conscious acts of control should be limited to acts which are so instinctive or impulsive that the one performing them has no means of foreseeing their outcome4 ,if a person cannot foresee the consequences of his act1 and is not capable of understanding what he is told about its outcome by those with more experience1 it is impossible for him to guide his act intelligently4 ,in such a state1 every act is alike to him4 ,whatever moves him does move him1 and that is all there is to it4 ,in some cases1 it is well to permit him to experiment1 and to discover the consequences for himself in order that he may act intelligently next time under similar circumstances4 ,but some courses of action are too discommoding and obnoxious to others to allow of this course being pursued4 ,direct disapproval is now resorted to4 ,shaming1 ridicule1 disfavor1 rebuke1 and punishment are used4 ,or contrary tendencies in the child are appealed to to divert him from his troublesome line of behavior4 ,his sensitiveness to approbation1 his hope of winning favor by an agreeable act1 are made use of to induce action in another direction4 #b4 ,these methods of control are so obvious 7because so intentionally employed7 that it would hardly be worth while to mention them if it were not that notice may now be taken1 by way of contrast1 of the other more important and permanent mode of control4 ,this other method resides in the ways in which persons1 with whom the immature being is associated1 use things2 the instrumentalities with which they accomplish their own ends4 ,the very existence of the social medium in which an individual lives1 moves1 and has his being is the standing effective agency of directing his activity4 ,this fact makes it necessary for us to examine in greater detail what is meant by the social environment4 ,we are given to separating from each other the physical and social environments in which we live4 ,the separation is responsible on one hand for an exaggeration of the moral importance of the more direct or personal modes of control of which we have been speaking2 and on the other hand for an exaggeration1 in current psychology and philosophy1 of the intellectual possibilities of contact with a purely physical environment4 ,there is not1 in fact1 any such thing as the direct influence of one human being on another apart from use of the physical environment as an intermediary4 ,a smile1 a frown1 a rebuke1 a word of warning or encouragement1 all involve some physical change4 ,otherwise1 the attitude of one would not get over to alter the attitude of another4 ,comparatively speaking1 such modes of influence may be regarded as personal4 ,the physical medium is reduced to a mere means of personal contact4 ,in contrast with such direct modes of mutual influence1 stand associations in common pursuits involving the use of things as means and as measures of results4 ,even if the mother never told her daughter to help her1 or never rebuked her for not helping1 the child would be subjected to direction in her activities by the mere fact that she was engaged1 along with the parent1 in the household life4 ,imitation1 emulation1 the need of working together1 enforce control4 ,if the mother hands the child something needed1 the latter must reach the thing in order to get it4 ,where there is giving there must be taking4 ,the way the child handles the thing after it is got1 the use to which it is put1 is surely influenced by the fact that the child has watched the mother4 ,when the child sees the parent looking for something1 it is as natural for it also to look for the object and to give it over when it finds it1 as it was1 under other circumstances1 to receive it4 ,multiply such an instance by the thousand details of daily intercourse1 and one has a picture of the most permanent and enduring method of giving direction to the activities of the young4 ,in saying this1 we are only repeating what was said previously about participating in a joint activity as the chief way of forming disposition4 ,we have explicitly added1 however1 the recognition of the part played in the joint activity by the use of things4 ,the philosophy of learning has been unduly dominated by a false psychology4 ,it is frequently stated that a person learns by merely having the qualities of things impressed upon his mind through the gateway of the senses4 ,having received a store of sensory impressions1 association or some power of mental synthesis is supposed to combine them into ideas--into things with a meaning4 ,an object1 stone1 orange1 tree1 chair1 is supposed to convey different impressions of color1 shape1 size1 hardness1 smell1 taste1 etc41 which aggregated together constitute the characteristic meaning of each thing4 ,but as matter of fact1 it is the characteristic use to which the thing is put1 because of its specific qualities1 which supplies the meaning with which it is identified4 ,a chair is a thing which is put to one use2 a table1 a thing which is employed for another purpose2 an orange is a thing which costs so much1 which is grown in warm climes1 which is eaten1 and when eaten has an agreeable odor and refreshing taste1 etc4 ,the difference between an adjustment to a physical stimulus and a mental act is that the latter involves response to a thing in its meaning2 the former does not4 ,a noise may make me jump without my mind being implicated4 ,when ,i hear a noise and run and get water and put out a blaze1 ,i respond intelligently2 the sound meant fire1 and fire meant need of being extinguished4 ,i bump into a stone1 and kick it to one side purely physically4 ,i put it to one side for fear some one will stumble upon it1 intelligently2 ,i respond to a meaning which the thing has4 ,i am startled by a thunderclap whether ,i recognize it or not--more likely1 if ,i do not recognize it4 ,but if ,i say1 either out loud or to myself1 that is thunder1 ,i respond to the disturbance as a meaning4 ,my behavior has a mental quality4 ,when things have a meaning for us1 we mean 7intend1 propose7 what we do3 when they do not1 we act blindly1 unconsciously1 unintelligently4 ,in both kinds of responsive adjustment1 our activities are directed or controlled4 ,but in the merely blind response1 direction is also blind4 ,there may be training1 but there is no education4 ,repeated responses to recurrent stimuli may fix a habit of acting in a certain way4 ,all of us have many habits of whose import we are quite unaware1 since they were formed without our knowing what we were about4 ,consequently they possess us1 rather than we them4 ,they move us2 they control us4 ,unless we become aware of what they accomplish1 and pass judgment upon the worth of the result1 we do not control them4 ,a child might be made to bow every time he met a certain person by pressure on his neck muscles1 and bowing would finally become automatic4 ,it would not1 however1 be an act of recognition or deference on his part1 till he did it with a certain end in view--as having a certain meaning4 ,and not till he knew what he was about and performed the act for the sake of its meaning could he be said to be brought up or educated to act in a certain way4 ,to have an idea of a thing is thus not just to get certain sensations from it4 ,it is to be able to respond to the thing in view of its place in an inclusive scheme of action2 it is to foresee the drift and probable consequence of the action of the thing upon us and of our action upon it4 ,to have the same ideas about things which others have1 to be like-minded with them1 and thus to be really members of a social group1 is therefore to attach the same meanings to things and to acts which others attach4 ,otherwise1 there is no common understanding1 and no community life4 ,but in a shared activity1 each person refers what he is doing to what the other is doing and vice-versa4 ,that is1 the activity of each is placed in the same inclusive situation4 ,to pull at a rope at which others happen to be pulling is not a shared or conjoint activity1 unless the pulling is done with knowledge that others are pulling and for the sake of either helping or hindering what they are doing4 ,a pin may pass in the course of its manufacture through the hands of many persons4 ,but each may do his part without knowledge of what others do or without any reference to what they do2 each may operate simply for the sake of a separate result--his own pay4 ,there is1 in this case1 no common consequence to which the several acts are referred1 and hence no genuine intercourse or association1 in spite of juxtaposition1 and in spite of the fact that their respective doings contribute to a single outcome4 ,but if each views the consequences of his own acts as having a bearing upon what others are doing and takes into account the consequences of their behavior upon himself1 then there is a common mind2 a common intent in behavior4 ,there is an understanding set up between the different contributors2 and this common understanding controls the action of each4 ,suppose that conditions were so arranged that one person automatically caught a ball and then threw it to another person who caught and automatically returned it2 and that each so acted without knowing where the ball came from or went to4 ,clearly1 such action would be without point or meaning4 ,it might be physically controlled1 but it would not be socially directed4 ,but suppose that each becomes aware of what the other is doing1 and becomes interested in the other's action and thereby interested in what he is doing himself as connected with the action of the other4 ,the behavior of each would then be intelligent2 and socially intelligent and guided4 ,take one more example of a less imaginary kind4 ,an infant is hungry1 and cries while food is prepared in his presence4 ,if he does not connect his own state with what others are doing1 nor what they are doing with his own satisfaction1 he simply reacts with increasing impatience to his own increasing discomfort4 ,he is physically controlled by his own organic state4 ,but when he makes a back and forth reference1 his whole attitude changes4 ,he takes an interest1 as we say2 he takes note and watches what others are doing4 ,he no longer reacts just to his own hunger1 but behaves in the light of what others are doing for its prospective satisfaction4 ,in that way1 he also no longer just gives way to hunger without knowing it1 but he notes1 or recognizes1 or identifies his own state4 ,it becomes an object for him4 ,his attitude toward it becomes in some degree intelligent4 ,and in such noting of the meaning of the actions of others and of his own state1 he is socially directed4 ,it will be recalled that our main proposition had two sides4 ,one of them has now been dealt with3 namely1 that physical things do not influence mind 7or form ideas and beliefs7 except as they are implicated in action for prospective consequences4 ,the other point is persons modify one another's dispositions only through the special use they make of physical conditions4 ,consider first the case of so-called expressive movements to which others are sensitive2 blushing1 smiling1 frowning1 clinching of fists1 natural gestures of all kinds4 ,in themselves1 these are not expressive4 ,they are organic parts of a person's attitude4 ,one does not blush to show modesty or embarrassment to others1 but because the capillary circulation alters in response to stimuli4 ,but others use the blush1 or a slightly perceptible tightening of the muscles of a person with whom they are associated1 as a sign of the state in which that person finds himself1 and as an indication of what course to pursue4 ,the frown signifies an imminent rebuke for which one must prepare1 or an uncertainty and hesitation which one must1 if possible1 remove by saying or doing something to restore confidence4 ,a man at some distance is waving his arms wildly4 ,one has only to preserve an attitude of detached indifference1 and the motions of the other person will be on the level of any remote physical change which we happen to note4 ,if we have no concern or interest1 the waving of the arms is as meaningless to us as the gyrations of the arms of a windmill4 ,but if interest is aroused1 we begin to participate4 ,we refer his action to something we are doing ourselves or that we should do4 ,we have to judge the meaning of his act in order to decide what to do4 ,is he beckoning for help8 ,is he warning us of an explosion to be set off1 against which we should guard ourselves8 ,in one case1 his action means to run toward him2 in the other case1 to run away4 ,in any case1 it is the change he effects in the physical environment which is a sign to us of how we should conduct ourselves4 ,our action is socially controlled because we endeavor to refer what we are to do to the same situation in which he is acting4 ,language is1 as we have already seen 7ante1 p4 #ae7 a case of this joint reference of our own action and that of another to a common situation4 ,hence its unrivaled significance as a means of social direction4 ,but language would not be this efficacious instrument were it not that it takes place upon a background of coarser and more tangible use of physical means to accomplish results4 ,a child sees persons with whom he lives using chairs1 hats1 tables1 spades1 saws1 plows1 horses1 money in certain ways4 ,if he has any share at all in what they are doing1 he is led thereby to use things in the same way1 or to use other things in a way which will fit in4 ,if a chair is drawn up to a table1 it is a sign that he is to sit in it2 if a person extends his right hand1 he is to extend his2 and so on in a never ending stream of detail4 ,the prevailing habits of using the products of human art and the raw materials of nature constitute by all odds the deepest and most pervasive mode of social control4 ,when children go to school1 they already have minds--they have knowledge and dispositions of judgment which may be appealed to through the use of language4 ,but these minds are the organized habits of intelligent response which they have previously required by putting things to use in connection with the way other persons use things4 ,the control is inescapable2 it saturates disposition4 ,the net outcome of the discussion is that the fundamental means of control is not personal but intellectual4 ,it is not moral in the sense that a person is moved by direct personal appeal from others1 important as is this method at critical junctures4 ,it consists in the habits of understanding1 which are set up in using objects in correspondence with others1 whether by way of cooperation and assistance or rivalry and competition4 ,mind as a concrete thing is precisely the power to understand things in terms of the use made of them2 a socialized mind is the power to understand them in terms of the use to which they are turned in joint or shared situations4 ,and mind in this sense is the method of social control4 #c4 ,imitation and ,social ,psychology4 ,we have already noted the defects of a psychology of learning which places the individual mind naked1 as it were1 in contact with physical objects1 and which believes that knowledge1 ideas1 and beliefs accrue from their interaction4 ,only comparatively recently has the predominating influence of association with fellow beings in the formation of mental and moral disposition been perceived4 ,even now it is usually treated as a kind of adjunct to an alleged method of learning by direct contact with things1 and as merely supplementing knowledge of the physical world with knowledge of persons4 ,the purport of our discussion is that such a view makes an absurd and impossible separation between persons and things4 ,interaction with things may form habits of external adjustment4 ,but it leads to activity having a meaning and conscious intent only when things are used to produce a result4 ,and the only way one person can modify the mind of another is by using physical conditions1 crude or artificial1 so as to evoke some answering activity from him4 ,such are our two main conclusions4 ,it is desirable to amplify and enforce them by placing them in contrast with the theory which uses a psychology of supposed direct relationships of human beings to one another as an adjunct to the psychology of the supposed direct relation of an individual to physical objects4 ,in substance1 this so-called social psychology has been built upon the notion of imitation4 ,consequently1 we shall discuss the nature and role of imitation in the formation of mental disposition4 ,according to this theory1 social control of individuals rests upon the instinctive tendency of individuals to imitate or copy the actions of others4 ,the latter serve as models4 ,the imitative instinct is so strong that the young devote themselves to conforming to the patterns set by others and reproducing them in their own scheme of behavior4 ,according to our theory1 what is here called imitation is a misleading name for partaking with others in a use of things which leads to consequences of common interest4 ,the basic error in the current notion of imitation is that it puts the cart before the horse4 ,it takes an effect for the cause of the effect4 ,there can be no doubt that individuals in forming a social group are like-minded2 they understand one another4 ,they tend to act with the same controlling ideas1 beliefs1 and intentions1 given similar circumstances4 ,looked at from without1 they might be said to be engaged in imitating one another4 ,in the sense that they are doing much the same sort of thing in much the same sort of way1 this would be true enough4 ,but imitation throws no light upon why they so act2 it repeats the fact as an explanation of itself4 ,it is an explanation of the same order as the famous saying that opium puts men to sleep because of its dormitive power4 ,objective likeness of acts and the mental satisfaction found in being in conformity with others are baptized by the name imitation4 ,this social fact is then taken for a psychological force1 which produced the likeness4 ,a considerable portion of what is called imitation is simply the fact that persons being alike in structure respond in the same way to like stimuli4 ,quite independently of imitation1 men on being insulted get angry and attack the insulter4 ,this statement may be met by citing the undoubted fact that response to an insult takes place in different ways in groups having different customs4 ,in one group1 it may be met by recourse to fisticuffs1 in another by a challenge to a duel1 in a third by an exhibition of contemptuous disregard4 ,this happens1 so it is said1 because the model set for imitation is different4 ,but there is no need to appeal to imitation4 ,the mere fact that customs are different means that the actual stimuli to behavior are different4 ,conscious instruction plays a part2 prior approvals and disapprovals have a large influence4 ,still more effective is the fact that unless an individual acts in the way current in his group1 he is literally out of it4 ,he can associate with others on intimate and equal terms only by behaving in the way in which they behave4 ,the pressure that comes from the fact that one is let into the group action by acting in one way and shut out by acting in another way is unremitting4 ,what is called the effect of imitation is mainly the product of conscious instruction and of the selective influence exercised by the unconscious confirmations and ratifications of those with whom one associates4 ,suppose that some one rolls a ball to a child2 he catches it and rolls it back1 and the game goes on4 ,here the stimulus is not just the sight of the ball1 or the sight of the other rolling it4 ,it is the situation--the game which is playing4 ,the response is not merely rolling the ball back2 it is rolling it back so that the other one may catch and return it1--that the game may continue4 ,the pattern or model is not the action of the other person4 ,the whole situation requires that each should adapt his action in view of what the other person has done and is to do4 ,imitation may come in but its role is subordinate4 ,the child has an interest on his own account2 he wants to keep it going4 ,he may then note how the other person catches and holds the ball in order to improve his own acts4 ,he imitates the means of doing1 not the end or thing to be done4 ,and he imitates the means because he wishes1 on his own behalf1 as part of his own initiative1 to take an effective part in the game4 ,one has only to consider how completely the child is dependent from his earliest days for successful execution of his purposes upon fitting his acts into those of others to see what a premium is put upon behaving as others behave1 and of developing an understanding of them in order that he may so behave4 ,the pressure for likemindedness in action from this source is so great that it is quite superfluous to appeal to imitation4 ,as matter of fact1 imitation of ends1 as distinct from imitation of means which help to reach ends1 is a superficial and transitory affair which leaves little effect upon disposition4 ,idiots are especially apt at this kind of imitation2 it affects outward acts but not the meaning of their performance4 ,when we find children engaging in this sort of mimicry1 instead of encouraging them 7as we would do if it were an important means of social control7 we are more likely to rebuke them as apes1 monkeys1 parrots1 or copy cats4 ,imitation of means of accomplishment is1 on the other hand1 an intelligent act4 ,it involves close observation1 and judicious selection of what will enable one to do better something which he already is trying to do4 ,used for a purpose1 the imitative instinct may1 like any other instinct1 become a factor in the development of effective action4 ,this excursus should1 accordingly1 have the effect of reinforcing the conclusion that genuine social control means the formation of a certain mental disposition2 a way of understanding objects1 events1 and acts which enables one to participate effectively in associated activities4 ,only the friction engendered by meeting resistance from others leads to the view that it takes place by forcing a line of action contrary to natural inclinations4 ,only failure to take account of the situations in which persons are mutually concerned 7or interested in acting responsively to one another7 leads to treating imitation as the chief agent in promoting social control4 #d4 ,some ,applications to ,education4 ,why does a savage group perpetuate savagery1 and a civilized group civilization8 ,doubtless the first answer to occur to mind is because savages are savages2 being of low-grade intelligence and perhaps defective moral sense4 ,but careful study has made it doubtful whether their native capacities are appreciably inferior to those of civilized man4 ,it has made it certain that native differences are not sufficient to account for the difference in culture4 ,in a sense the mind of savage peoples is an effect1 rather than a cause1 of their backward institutions4 ,their social activities are such as to restrict their objects of attention and interest1 and hence to limit the stimuli to mental development4 ,even as regards the objects that come within the scope of attention1 primitive social customs tend to arrest observation and imagination upon qualities which do not fructify in the mind4 ,lack of control of natural forces means that a scant number of natural objects enter into associated behavior4 ,only a small number of natural resources are utilized and they are not worked for what they are worth4 ,the advance of civilization means that a larger number of natural forces and objects have been transformed into instrumentalities of action1 into means for securing ends4 ,we start not so much with superior capacities as with superior stimuli for evocation and direction of our capacities4 ,the savage deals largely with crude stimuli2 we have weighted stimuli4 ,prior human efforts have made over natural conditions4 ,as they originally existed they were indifferent to human endeavors4 ,every domesticated plant and animal1 every tool1 every utensil1 every appliance1 every manufactured article1 every esthetic decoration1 every work of art means a transformation of conditions once hostile or indifferent to characteristic human activities into friendly and favoring conditions4 ,because the activities of children today are controlled by these selected and charged stimuli1 children are able to traverse in a short lifetime what the race has needed slow1 tortured ages to attain4 ,the dice have been loaded by all the successes which have preceded4 ,stimuli conducive to economical and effective response1 such as our system of roads and means of transportation1 our ready command of heat1 light1 and electricity1 our ready-made machines and apparatus for every purpose1 do not1 by themselves or in their aggregate1 constitute a civilization4 ,but the uses to which they are put are civilization1 and without the things the uses would be impossible4 ,time otherwise necessarily devoted to wresting a livelihood from a grudging environment and securing a precarious protection against its inclemencies is freed4 ,a body of knowledge is transmitted1 the legitimacy of which is guaranteed by the fact that the physical equipment in which it is incarnated leads to results that square with the other facts of nature4 ,thus these appliances of art supply a protection1 perhaps our chief protection1 against a recrudescence of these superstitious beliefs1 those fanciful myths and infertile imaginings about nature in which so much of the best intellectual power of the past has been spent4 ,if we add one other factor1 namely1 that such appliances be not only used1 but used in the interests of a truly shared or associated life1 then the appliances become the positive resources of civilization4 ,if ,greece1 with a scant tithe of our material resources1 achieved a worthy and noble intellectual and artistic career1 it is because ,greece operated for social ends such resources as it had4 ,but whatever the situation1 whether one of barbarism or civilization1 whether one of stinted control of physical forces1 or of partial enslavement to a mechanism not yet made tributary to a shared experience1 things as they enter into action furnish the educative conditions of daily life and direct the formation of mental and moral disposition4 ,intentional education signifies1 as we have already seen1 a specially selected environment1 the selection being made on the basis of materials and method specifically promoting growth in the desired direction4 ,since language represents the physical conditions that have been subjected to the maximum transformation in the interests of social life--physical things which have lost their original quality in becoming social tools--it is appropriate that language should play a large part compared with other appliances4 ,by it we are led to share vicariously in past human experience1 thus widening and enriching the experience of the present4 ,we are enabled1 symbolically and imaginatively1 to anticipate situations4 ,in countless ways1 language condenses meanings that record social outcomes and presage social outlooks4 ,so significant is it of a liberal share in what is worth while in life that unlettered and uneducated have become almost synonymous4 ,the emphasis in school upon this particular tool has1 however1 its dangers--dangers which are not theoretical but exhibited in practice4 ,why is it1 in spite of the fact that teaching by pouring in1 learning by a passive absorption1 are universally condemned1 that they are still so entrenched in practice8 ,that education is not an affair of telling and being told1 but an active and constructive process1 is a principle almost as generally violated in practice as conceded in theory4 ,is not this deplorable situation due to the fact that the doctrine is itself merely told8 ,it is preached2 it is lectured2 it is written about4 ,but its enactment into practice requires that the school environment be equipped with agencies for doing1 with tools and physical materials1 to an extent rarely attained4 ,it requires that methods of instruction and administration be modified to allow and to secure direct and continuous occupations with things4 ,not that the use of language as an educational resource should lessen2 but that its use should be more vital and fruitful by having its normal connection with shared activities4 ,these things ought ye to have done1 and not to have left the others undone4 ,and for the school these things mean equipment with the instrumentalities of cooperative or joint activity4 ,for when the schools depart from the educational conditions effective in the out-of-school environment1 they necessarily substitute a bookish1 a pseudo-intellectual spirit for a social spirit4 ,children doubtless go to school to learn1 but it has yet to be proved that learning occurs most adequately when it is made a separate conscious business4 ,when treating it as a business of this sort tends to preclude the social sense which comes from sharing in an activity of common concern and value1 the effort at isolated intellectual learning contradicts its own aim4 ,we may secure motor activity and sensory excitation by keeping an individual by himself1 but we cannot thereby get him to understand the meaning which things have in the life of which he is a part4 ,we may secure technical specialized ability in algebra1 ,latin1 or botany1 but not the kind of intelligence which directs ability to useful ends4 ,only by engaging in a joint activity1 where one person's use of material and tools is consciously referred to the use other persons are making of their capacities and appliances1 is a social direction of disposition attained4 ,summary4 ,the natural or native impulses of the young do not agree with the life-customs of the group into which they are born4 ,consequently they have to be directed or guided4 ,this control is not the same thing as physical compulsion2 it consists in centering the impulses acting at any one time upon some specific end and in introducing an order of continuity into the sequence of acts4 ,the action of others is always influenced by deciding what stimuli shall call out their actions4 ,but in some cases as in commands1 prohibitions1 approvals1 and disapprovals1 the stimuli proceed from persons with a direct view to influencing action4 ,since in such cases we are most conscious of controlling the action of others1 we are likely to exaggerate the importance of this sort of control at the expense of a more permanent and effective method4 ,the basic control resides in the nature of the situations in which the young take part4 ,in social situations the young have to refer their way of acting to what others are doing and make it fit in4 ,this directs their action to a common result1 and gives an understanding common to the participants4 ,for all mean the same thing1 even when performing different acts4 ,this common understanding of the means and ends of action is the essence of social control4 ,it is indirect1 or emotional and intellectual1 not direct or personal4 ,moreover it is intrinsic to the disposition of the person1 not external and coercive4 ,to achieve this internal control through identity of interest and understanding is the business of education4 ,while books and conversation can do much1 these agencies are usually relied upon too exclusively4 ,schools require for their full efficiency more opportunity for conjoint activities in which those instructed take part1 so that they may acquire a social sense of their own powers and of the materials and appliances used4 ,chapter ,four3 ,education as ,growth #a4 ,the ,conditions of ,growth4 ,in directing the activities of the young1 society determines its own future in determining that of the young4 ,since the young at a given time will at some later date compose the society of that period1 the latter's nature will largely turn upon the direction children's activities were given at an earlier period4 ,this cumulative movement of action toward a later result is what is meant by growth4 ,the primary condition of growth is immaturity4 ,this may seem to be a mere truism--saying that a being can develop only in some point in which he is undeveloped4 ,but the prefix im of the word immaturity means something positive1 not a mere void or lack4 ,it is noteworthy that the terms capacity and potentiality have a double meaning1 one sense being negative1 the other positive4 ,capacity may denote mere receptivity1 like the capacity of a quart measure4 ,we may mean by potentiality a merely dormant or quiescent state--a capacity to become something different under external influences4 ,but we also mean by capacity an ability1 a power2 and by potentiality potency1 force4 ,now when we say that immaturity means the possibility of growth1 we are not referring to absence of powers which may exist at a later time2 we express a force positively present--the ability to develop4 ,our tendency to take immaturity as mere lack1 and growth as something which fills up the gap between the immature and the mature is due to regarding childhood comparatively1 instead of intrinsically4 ,we treat it simply as a privation because we are measuring it by adulthood as a fixed standard4 ,this fixes attention upon what the child has not1 and will not have till he becomes a man4 ,this comparative standpoint is legitimate enough for some purposes1 but if we make it final1 the question arises whether we are not guilty of an overweening presumption4 ,children1 if they could express themselves articulately and sincerely1 would tell a different tale2 and there is excellent adult authority for the conviction that for certain moral and intellectual purposes adults must become as little children4 ,the seriousness of the assumption of the negative quality of the possibilities of immaturity is apparent when we reflect that it sets up as an ideal and standard a static end4 ,the fulfillment of growing is taken to mean an accomplished growth3 that is to say1 an ,ungrowth1 something which is no longer growing4 ,the futility of the assumption is seen in the fact that every adult resents the imputation of having no further possibilities of growth2 and so far as he finds that they are closed to him mourns the fact as evidence of loss1 instead of falling back on the achieved as adequate manifestation of power4 ,why an unequal measure for child and man8 ,taken absolutely1 instead of comparatively1 immaturity designates a positive force or ability1--the power to grow4 ,we do not have to draw out or educe positive activities from a child1 as some educational doctrines would have it4 ,where there is life1 there are already eager and impassioned activities4 ,growth is not something done to them2 it is something they do4 ,the positive and constructive aspect of possibility gives the key to understanding the two chief traits of immaturity1 dependence and plasticity4 7#a7 ,it sounds absurd to hear dependence spoken of as something positive1 still more absurd as a power4 ,yet if helplessness were all there were in dependence1 no development could ever take place4 ,a merely impotent being has to be carried1 forever1 by others4 ,the fact that dependence is accompanied by growth in ability1 not by an ever increasing lapse into parasitism1 suggests that it is already something constructive4 ,being merely sheltered by others would not promote growth4 ,for 7#b7 it would only build a wall around impotence4 ,with reference to the physical world1 the child is helpless4 ,he lacks at birth and for a long time thereafter power to make his way physically1 to make his own living4 ,if he had to do that by himself1 he would hardly survive an hour4 ,on this side his helplessness is almost complete4 ,the young of the brutes are immeasurably his superiors4 ,he is physically weak and not able to turn the strength which he possesses to coping with the physical environment4 #a4 ,the thoroughgoing character of this helplessness suggests1 however1 some compensating power4 ,the relative ability of the young of brute animals to adapt themselves fairly well to physical conditions from an early period suggests the fact that their life is not intimately bound up with the life of those about them4 ,they are compelled1 so to speak1 to have physical gifts because they are lacking in social gifts4 ,human infants1 on the other hand1 can get along with physical incapacity just because of their social capacity4 ,we sometimes talk and think as if they simply happened to be physically in a social environment2 as if social forces exclusively existed in the adults who take care of them1 they being passive recipients4 ,if it were said that children are themselves marvelously endowed with power to enlist the cooperative attention of others1 this would be thought to be a backhanded way of saying that others are marvelously attentive to the needs of children4 ,but observation shows that children are gifted with an equipment of the first order for social intercourse4 ,few grown-up persons retain all of the flexible and sensitive ability of children to vibrate sympathetically with the attitudes and doings of those about them4 ,inattention to physical things 7going with incapacity to control them7 is accompanied by a corresponding intensification of interest and attention as to the doings of people4 ,the native mechanism of the child and his impulses all tend to facile social responsiveness4 ,the statement that children1 before adolescence1 are egotistically self-centered1 even if it were true1 would not contradict the truth of this statement4 ,it would simply indicate that their social responsiveness is employed on their own behalf1 not that it does not exist4 ,but the statement is not true as matter of fact4 ,the facts which are cited in support of the alleged pure egoism of children really show the intensity and directness with which they go to their mark4 ,if the ends which form the mark seem narrow and selfish to adults1 it is only because adults 7by means of a similar engrossment in their day7 have mastered these ends1 which have consequently ceased to interest them4 ,most of the remainder of children's alleged native egoism is simply an egoism which runs counter to an adult's egoism4 ,to a grown-up person who is too absorbed in his own affairs to take an interest in children's affairs1 children doubtless seem unreasonably engrossed in their own affairs4 ,from a social standpoint1 dependence denotes a power rather than a weakness2 it involves interdependence4 ,there is always a danger that increased personal independence will decrease the social capacity of an individual4 ,in making him more self-reliant1 it may make him more self-sufficient2 it may lead to aloofness and indifference4 ,it often makes an individual so insensitive in his relations to others as to develop an illusion of being really able to stand and act alone--an unnamed form of insanity which is responsible for a large part of the remediable suffering of the world4 #b4 ,the specific adaptability of an immature creature for growth constitutes his plasticity4 ,this is something quite different from the plasticity of putty or wax4 ,it is not a capacity to take on change of form in accord with external pressure4 ,it lies near the pliable elasticity by which some persons take on the color of their surroundings while retaining their own bent4 ,but it is something deeper than this4 ,it is essentially the ability to learn from experience2 the power to retain from one experience something which is of avail in coping with the difficulties of a later situation4 ,this means power to modify actions on the basis of the results of prior experiences1 the power to develop dispositions4 ,without it1 the acquisition of habits is impossible4 ,it is a familiar fact that the young of the higher animals1 and especially the human young1 have to learn to utilize their instinctive reactions4 ,the human being is born with a greater number of instinctive tendencies than other animals4 ,but the instincts of the lower animals perfect themselves for appropriate action at an early period after birth1 while most of those of the human infant are of little account just as they stand4 ,an original specialized power of adjustment secures immediate efficiency1 but1 like a railway ticket1 it is good for one route only4 ,a being who1 in order to use his eyes1 ears1 hands1 and legs1 has to experiment in making varied combinations of their reactions1 achieves a control that is flexible and varied4 ,a chick1 for example1 pecks accurately at a bit of food in a few hours after hatching4 ,this means that definite coordinations of activities of the eyes in seeing and of the body and head in striking are perfected in a few trials4 ,an infant requires about six months to be able to gauge with approximate accuracy the action in reaching which will coordinate with his visual activities2 to be able1 that is1 to tell whether he can reach a seen object and just how to execute the reaching4 ,as a result1 the chick is limited by the relative perfection of its original endowment4 ,the infant has the advantage of the multitude of instinctive tentative reactions and of the experiences that accompany them1 even though he is at a temporary disadvantage because they cross one another4 ,in learning an action1 instead of having it given ready-made1 one of necessity learns to vary its factors1 to make varied combinations of them1 according to change of circumstances4 ,a possibility of continuing progress is opened up by the fact that in learning one act1 methods are developed good for use in other situations4 ,still more important is the fact that the human being acquires a habit of learning4 ,he learns to learn4 ,the importance for human life of the two facts of dependence and variable control has been summed up in the doctrine of the significance of prolonged infancy4 #a ,this prolongation is significant from the standpoint of the adult members of the group as well as from that of the young4 ,the presence of dependent and learning beings is a stimulus to nurture and affection4 ,the need for constant continued care was probably a chief means in transforming temporary cohabitations into permanent unions4 ,it certainly was a chief influence in forming habits of affectionate and sympathetic watchfulness2 that constructive interest in the well-being of others which is essential to associated life4 ,intellectually1 this moral development meant the introduction of many new objects of attention2 it stimulated foresight and planning for the future4 ,thus there is a reciprocal influence4 ,increasing complexity of social life requires a longer period of infancy in which to acquire the needed powers2 this prolongation of dependence means prolongation of plasticity1 or power of acquiring variable and novel modes of control4 ,hence it provides a further push to social progress4 #b4 ,habits as ,expressions of ,growth4 ,we have already noted that plasticity is the capacity to retain and carry over from prior experience factors which modify subsequent activities4 ,this signifies the capacity to acquire habits1 or develop definite dispositions4 ,we have now to consider the salient features of habits4 ,in the first place1 a habit is a form of executive skill1 of efficiency in doing4 ,a habit means an ability to use natural conditions as means to ends4 ,it is an active control of the environment through control of the organs of action4 ,we are perhaps apt to emphasize the control of the body at the expense of control of the environment4 ,we think of walking1 talking1 playing the piano1 the specialized skills characteristic of the etcher1 the surgeon1 the bridge-builder1 as if they were simply ease1 deftness1 and accuracy on the part of the organism4 ,they are that1 of course2 but the measure of the value of these qualities lies in the economical and effective control of the environment which they secure4 ,to be able to walk is to have certain properties of nature at our disposal--and so with all other habits4 ,education is not infrequently defined as consisting in the acquisition of those habits that effect an adjustment of an individual and his environment4 ,the definition expresses an essential phase of growth4 ,but it is essential that adjustment be understood in its active sense of control of means for achieving ends4 ,if we think of a habit simply as a change wrought in the organism1 ignoring the fact that this change consists in ability to effect subsequent changes in the environment1 we shall be led to think of adjustment as a conformity to environment as wax conforms to the seal which impresses it4 ,the environment is thought of as something fixed1 providing in its fixity the end and standard of changes taking place in the organism2 adjustment is just fitting ourselves to this fixity of external conditions4 #b ,habit as habituation is indeed something relatively passive2 we get used to our surroundings--to our clothing1 our shoes1 and gloves2 to the atmosphere as long as it is fairly equable2 to our daily associates1 etc4 ,conformity to the environment1 a change wrought in the organism without reference to ability to modify surroundings1 is a marked trait of such habituations4 ,aside from the fact that we are not entitled to carry over the traits of such adjustments 7which might well be called accommodations1 to mark them off from active adjustments7 into habits of active use of our surroundings1 two features of habituations are worth notice4 ,in the first place1 we get used to things by first using them4 ,consider getting used to a strange city4 ,at first1 there is excessive stimulation and excessive and ill-adapted response4 ,gradually certain stimuli are selected because of their relevancy1 and others are degraded4 ,we can say either that we do not respond to them any longer1 or more truly that we have effected a persistent response to them--an equilibrium of adjustment4 ,this means1 in the second place1 that this enduring adjustment supplies the background upon which are made specific adjustments1 as occasion arises4 ,we are never interested in changing the whole environment2 there is much that we take for granted and accept just as it already is4 ,upon this background our activities focus at certain points in an endeavor to introduce needed changes4 ,habituation is thus our adjustment to an environment which at the time we are not concerned with modifying1 and which supplies a leverage to our active habits4 ,adaptation1 in fine1 is quite as much adaptation of the environment to our own activities as of our activities to the environment4 ,a savage tribe manages to live on a desert plain4 ,it adapts itself4 ,but its adaptation involves a maximum of accepting1 tolerating1 putting up with things as they are1 a maximum of passive acquiescence1 and a minimum of active control1 of subjection to use4 ,a civilized people enters upon the scene4 ,it also adapts itself4 ,it introduces irrigation2 it searches the world for plants and animals that will flourish under such conditions2 it improves1 by careful selection1 those which are growing there4 ,as a consequence1 the wilderness blossoms as a rose4 ,the savage is merely habituated2 the civilized man has habits which transform the environment4 ,the significance of habit is not exhausted1 however1 in its executive and motor phase4 ,it means formation of intellectual and emotional disposition as well as an increase in ease1 economy1 and efficiency of action4 ,any habit marks an inclination--an active preference and choice for the conditions involved in its exercise4 ,a habit does not wait1 ,micawber-like1 for a stimulus to turn up so that it may get busy2 it actively seeks for occasions to pass into full operation4 ,if its expression is unduly blocked1 inclination shows itself in uneasiness and intense craving4 ,a habit also marks an intellectual disposition4 ,where there is a habit1 there is acquaintance with the materials and equipment to which action is applied4 ,there is a definite way of understanding the situations in which the habit operates4 ,modes of thought1 of observation and reflection1 enter as forms of skill and of desire into the habits that make a man an engineer1 an architect1 a physician1 or a merchant4 ,in unskilled forms of labor1 the intellectual factors are at minimum precisely because the habits involved are not of a high grade4 ,but there are habits of judging and reasoning as truly as of handling a tool1 painting a picture1 or conducting an experiment4 ,such statements are1 however1 understatements4 ,the habits of mind involved in habits of the eye and hand supply the latter with their significance4 ,above all1 the intellectual element in a habit fixes the relation of the habit to varied and elastic use1 and hence to continued growth4 ,we speak of fixed habits4 ,well1 the phrase may mean powers so well established that their possessor always has them as resources when needed4 ,but the phrase is also used to mean ruts1 routine ways1 with loss of freshness1 open-mindedness1 and originality4 ,fixity of habit may mean that something has a fixed hold upon us1 instead of our having a free hold upon things4 ,this fact explains two points in a common notion about habits3 their identification with mechanical and external modes of action to the neglect of mental and moral attitudes1 and the tendency to give them a bad meaning1 an identification with bad habits4 ,many a person would feel surprised to have his aptitude in his chosen profession called a habit1 and would naturally think of his use of tobacco1 liquor1 or profane language as typical of the meaning of habit4 ,a habit is to him something which has a hold on him1 something not easily thrown off even though judgment condemn it4 ,habits reduce themselves to routine ways of acting1 or degenerate into ways of action to which we are enslaved just in the degree in which intelligence is disconnected from them4 ,routine habits are unthinking habits3 bad habits are habits so severed from reason that they are opposed to the conclusions of conscious deliberation and decision4 ,as we have seen1 the acquiring of habits is due to an original plasticity of our natures3 to our ability to vary responses till we find an appropriate and efficient way of acting4 ,routine habits1 and habits that possess us instead of our possessing them1 are habits which put an end to plasticity4 ,they mark the close of power to vary4 ,there can be no doubt of the tendency of organic plasticity1 of the physiological basis1 to lessen with growing years4 ,the instinctively mobile and eagerly varying action of childhood1 the love of new stimuli and new developments1 too easily passes into a settling down1 which means aversion to change and a resting on past achievements4 ,only an environment which secures the full use of intelligence in the process of forming habits can counteract this tendency4 ,of course1 the same hardening of the organic conditions affects the physiological structures which are involved in thinking4 ,but this fact only indicates the need of persistent care to see to it that the function of intelligence is invoked to its maximum possibility4 ,the short-sighted method which falls back on mechanical routine and repetition to secure external efficiency of habit1 motor skill without accompanying thought1 marks a deliberate closing in of surroundings upon growth4 #c4 ,the ,educational ,bearings of the ,conception of ,development4 ,we have had so far but little to say in this chapter about education4 ,we have been occupied with the conditions and implications of growth4 ,if our conclusions are justified1 they carry with them1 however1 definite educational consequences4 ,when it is said that education is development1 everything depends upon how development is conceived4 ,our net conclusion is that life is development1 and that developing1 growing1 is life4 ,translated into its educational equivalents1 that means 7i7 that the educational process has no end beyond itself2 it is its own end2 and that 7ii7 the educational process is one of continual reorganizing1 reconstructing1 transforming4 #a4 ,development when it is interpreted in comparative terms1 that is1 with respect to the special traits of child and adult life1 means the direction of power into special channels3 the formation of habits involving executive skill1 definiteness of interest1 and specific objects of observation and thought4 ,but the comparative view is not final4 ,the child has specific powers2 to ignore that fact is to stunt or distort the organs upon which his growth depends4 ,the adult uses his powers to transform his environment1 thereby occasioning new stimuli which redirect his powers and keep them developing4 ,ignoring this fact means arrested development1 a passive accommodation4 ,normal child and normal adult alike1 in other words1 are engaged in growing4 ,the difference between them is not the difference between growth and no growth1 but between the modes of growth appropriate to different conditions4 ,with respect to the development of powers devoted to coping with specific scientific and economic problems we may say the child should be growing in manhood4 ,with respect to sympathetic curiosity1 unbiased responsiveness1 and openness of mind1 we may say that the adult should be growing in childlikeness4 ,one statement is as true as the other4 ,three ideas which have been criticized1 namely1 the merely privative nature of immaturity1 static adjustment to a fixed environment1 and rigidity of habit1 are all connected with a false idea of growth or development1--that it is a movement toward a fixed goal4 ,growth is regarded as having an end1 instead of being an end4 ,the educational counterparts of the three fallacious ideas are first1 failure to take account of the instinctive or native powers of the young2 secondly1 failure to develop initiative in coping with novel situations2 thirdly1 an undue emphasis upon drill and other devices which secure automatic skill at the expense of personal perception4 ,in all cases1 the adult environment is accepted as a standard for the child4 ,he is to be brought up to it4 ,natural instincts are either disregarded or treated as nuisances--as obnoxious traits to be suppressed1 or at all events to be brought into conformity with external standards4 ,since conformity is the aim1 what is distinctively individual in a young person is brushed aside1 or regarded as a source of mischief or anarchy4 ,conformity is made equivalent to uniformity4 ,consequently1 there are induced lack of interest in the novel1 aversion to progress1 and dread of the uncertain and the unknown4 ,since the end of growth is outside of and beyond the process of growing1 external agents have to be resorted to to induce movement toward it4 ,whenever a method of education is stigmatized as mechanical1 we may be sure that external pressure is brought to bear to reach an external end4 #b4 ,since in reality there is nothing to which growth is relative save more growth1 there is nothing to which education is subordinate save more education4 ,it is a commonplace to say that education should not cease when one leaves school4 ,the point of this commonplace is that the purpose of school education is to insure the continuance of education by organizing the powers that insure growth4 ,the inclination to learn from life itself and to make the conditions of life such that all will learn in the process of living is the finest product of schooling4 ,when we abandon the attempt to define immaturity by means of fixed comparison with adult accomplishments1 we are compelled to give up thinking of it as denoting lack of desired traits4 ,abandoning this notion1 we are also forced to surrender our habit of thinking of instruction as a method of supplying this lack by pouring knowledge into a mental and moral hole which awaits filling4 ,since life means growth1 a living creature lives as truly and positively at one stage as at another1 with the same intrinsic fullness and the same absolute claims4 ,hence education means the enterprise of supplying the conditions which insure growth1 or adequacy of life1 irrespective of age4 ,we first look with impatience upon immaturity1 regarding it as something to be got over as rapidly as possible4 ,then the adult formed by such educative methods looks back with impatient regret upon childhood and youth as a scene of lost opportunities and wasted powers4 ,this ironical situation will endure till it is recognized that living has its own intrinsic quality and that the business of education is with that quality4 ,realization that life is growth protects us from that so-called idealizing of childhood which in effect is nothing but lazy indulgence4 ,life is not to be identified with every superficial act and interest4 ,even though it is not always easy to tell whether what appears to be mere surface fooling is a sign of some nascent as yet untrained power1 we must remember that manifestations are not to be accepted as ends in themselves4 ,they are signs of possible growth4 ,they are to be turned into means of development1 of carrying power forward1 not indulged or cultivated for their own sake4 ,excessive attention to surface phenomena 7even in the way of rebuke as well as of encouragement7 may lead to their fixation and thus to arrested development4 ,what impulses are moving toward1 not what they have been1 is the important thing for parent and teacher4 ,the true principle of respect for immaturity cannot be better put than in the words of ,emerson3 ,respect the child4 ,be not too much his parent4 ,trespass not on his solitude4 ,but ,i hear the outcry which replies to this suggestion3 ,would you verily throw up the reins of public and private discipline2 would you leave the young child to the mad career of his own passions and whimsies1 and call this anarchy a respect for the child's nature8 ,i answer1--,respect the child1 respect him to the end1 but also respect yourself4444 ,the two points in a boy's training are1 to keep his naturel and train off all but that2 to keep his naturel1 but stop off his uproar1 fooling1 and horseplay2 keep his nature and arm it with knowledge in the very direction in which it points4 ,and as ,emerson goes on to show this reverence for childhood and youth instead of opening up an easy and easy-going path to the instructors1 involves at once1 immense claims on the time1 the thought1 on the life of the teacher4 ,it requires time1 use1 insight1 event1 all the great lessons and assistances of ,god2 and only to think of using it implies character and profoundness4 ,summary4 ,power to grow depends upon need for others and plasticity4 ,both of these conditions are at their height in childhood and youth4 ,plasticity or the power to learn from experience means the formation of habits4 ,habits give control over the environment1 power to utilize it for human purposes4 ,habits take the form both of habituation1 or a general and persistent balance of organic activities with the surroundings1 and of active capacities to readjust activity to meet new conditions4 ,the former furnishes the background of growth2 the latter constitute growing4 ,active habits involve thought1 invention1 and initiative in applying capacities to new aims4 ,they are opposed to routine which marks an arrest of growth4 ,since growth is the characteristic of life1 education is all one with growing2 it has no end beyond itself4 ,the criterion of the value of school education is the extent in which it creates a desire for continued growth and supplies means for making the desire effective in fact4 #a ,intimations of its significance are found in a number of writers1 but ,john ,fiske1 in his ,excursions of an ,evolutionist1 is accredited with its first systematic exposition4 #b ,this conception is1 of course1 a logical correlate of the conceptions of the external relation of stimulus and response1 considered in the last chapter1 and of the negative conceptions of immaturity and plasticity noted in this chapter4 ,chapter ,five3 ,preparation1 ,unfolding1 and ,formal ,discipline #a4 ,education as ,preparation4 ,we have laid it down that the educative process is a continuous process of growth1 having as its aim at every stage an added capacity of growth4 ,this conception contrasts sharply with other ideas which have influenced practice4 ,by making the contrast explicit1 the meaning of the conception will be brought more clearly to light4 ,the first contrast is with the idea that education is a process of preparation or getting ready4 ,what is to be prepared for is1 of course1 the responsibilities and privileges of adult life4 ,children are not regarded as social members in full and regular standing4 ,they are looked upon as candidates2 they are placed on the waiting list4 ,the conception is only carried a little farther when the life of adults is considered as not having meaning on its own account1 but as a preparatory probation for another life4 ,the idea is but another form of the notion of the negative and privative character of growth already criticized2 hence we shall not repeat the criticisms1 but pass on to the evil consequences which flow from putting education on this basis4 ,in the first place1 it involves loss of impetus4 ,motive power is not utilized4 ,children proverbially live in the present2 that is not only a fact not to be evaded1 but it is an excellence4 ,the future just as future lacks urgency and body4 ,to get ready for something1 one knows not what nor why1 is to throw away the leverage that exists1 and to seek for motive power in a vague chance4 ,under such circumstances1 there is1 in the second place1 a premium put on shilly-shallying and procrastination4 ,the future prepared for is a long way off2 plenty of time will intervene before it becomes a present4 ,why be in a hurry about getting ready for it8 ,the temptation to postpone is much increased because the present offers so many wonderful opportunities and proffers such invitations to adventure4 ,naturally attention and energy go to them2 education accrues naturally as an outcome1 but a lesser education than if the full stress of effort had been put upon making conditions as educative as possible4 ,a third undesirable result is the substitution of a conventional average standard of expectation and requirement for a standard which concerns the specific powers of the individual under instruction4 ,for a severe and definite judgment based upon the strong and weak points of the individual is substituted a vague and wavering opinion concerning what youth may be expected1 upon the average1 to become in some more or less remote future2 say1 at the end of the year1 when promotions are to take place1 or by the time they are ready to go to college or to enter upon what1 in contrast with the probationary stage1 is regarded as the serious business of life4 ,it is impossible to overestimate the loss which results from the deflection of attention from the strategic point to a comparatively unproductive point4 ,it fails most just where it thinks it is succeeding--in getting a preparation for the future4 ,finally1 the principle of preparation makes necessary recourse on a large scale to the use of adventitious motives of pleasure and pain4 ,the future having no stimulating and directing power when severed from the possibilities of the present1 something must be hitched on to it to make it work4 ,promises of reward and threats of pain are employed4 ,healthy work1 done for present reasons and as a factor in living1 is largely unconscious4 ,the stimulus resides in the situation with which one is actually confronted4 ,but when this situation is ignored1 pupils have to be told that if they do not follow the prescribed course penalties will accrue2 while if they do1 they may expect1 some time in the future1 rewards for their present sacrifices4 ,everybody knows how largely systems of punishment have had to be resorted to by educational systems which neglect present possibilities in behalf of preparation for a future4 ,then1 in disgust with the harshness and impotency of this method1 the pendulum swings to the opposite extreme1 and the dose of information required against some later day is sugar-coated1 so that pupils may be fooled into taking something which they do not care for4 ,it is not of course a question whether education should prepare for the future4 ,if education is growth1 it must progressively realize present possibilities1 and thus make individuals better fitted to cope with later requirements4 ,growing is not something which is completed in odd moments2 it is a continuous leading into the future4 ,if the environment1 in school and out1 supplies conditions which utilize adequately the present capacities of the immature1 the future which grows out of the present is surely taken care of4 ,the mistake is not in attaching importance to preparation for future need1 but in making it the mainspring of present effort4 ,because the need of preparation for a continually developing life is great1 it is imperative that every energy should be bent to making the present experience as rich and significant as possible4 ,then as the present merges insensibly into the future1 the future is taken care of4 #b4 ,education as ,unfolding4 ,there is a conception of education which professes to be based upon the idea of development4 ,but it takes back with one hand what it proffers with the other4 ,development is conceived not as continuous growing1 but as the unfolding of latent powers toward a definite goal4 ,the goal is conceived of as completion1--perfection4 ,life at any stage short of attainment of this goal is merely an unfolding toward it4 ,logically the doctrine is only a variant of the preparation theory4 ,practically the two differ in that the adherents of the latter make much of the practical and professional duties for which one is preparing1 while the developmental doctrine speaks of the ideal and spiritual qualities of the principle which is unfolding4 ,the conception that growth and progress are just approximations to a final unchanging goal is the last infirmity of the mind in its transition from a static to a dynamic understanding of life4 ,it simulates the style of the latter4 ,it pays the tribute of speaking much of development1 process1 progress4 ,but all of these operations are conceived to be merely transitional2 they lack meaning on their own account4 ,they possess significance only as movements toward something away from what is now going on4 ,since growth is just a movement toward a completed being1 the final ideal is immobile4 ,an abstract and indefinite future is in control with all which that connotes in depreciation of present power and opportunity4 ,since the goal of perfection1 the standard of development1 is very far away1 it is so beyond us that1 strictly speaking1 it is unattainable4 ,consequently1 in order to be available for present guidance it must be translated into something which stands for it4 ,otherwise we should be compelled to regard any and every manifestation of the child as an unfolding from within1 and hence sacred4 ,unless we set up some definite criterion representing the ideal end by which to judge whether a given attitude or act is approximating or moving away1 our sole alternative is to withdraw all influences of the environment lest they interfere with proper development4 ,since that is not practicable1 a working substitute is set up4 ,usually1 of course1 this is some idea which an adult would like to have a child acquire4 ,consequently1 by suggestive questioning or some other pedagogical device1 the teacher proceeds to draw out from the pupil what is desired4 ,if what is desired is obtained1 that is evidence that the child is unfolding properly4 ,but as the pupil generally has no initiative of his own in this direction1 the result is a random groping after what is wanted1 and the formation of habits of dependence upon the cues furnished by others4 ,just because such methods simulate a true principle and claim to have its sanction they may do more harm than would outright telling1 where1 at least1 it remains with the child how much will stick4 ,within the sphere of philosophic thought there have been two typical attempts to provide a working representative of the absolute goal4 ,both start from the conception of a whole--an absolute--which is immanent in human life4 ,the perfect or complete ideal is not a mere ideal2 it is operative here and now4 ,but it is present only implicitly1 potentially1 or in an enfolded condition4 ,what is termed development is the gradual making explicit and outward of what is thus wrapped up4 ,froebel and ,hegel1 the authors of the two philosophic schemes referred to1 have different ideas of the path by which the progressive realization of manifestation of the complete principle is effected4 ,according to ,hegel1 it is worked out through a series of historical institutions which embody the different factors in the ,absolute4 ,according to ,froebel1 the actuating force is the presentation of symbols1 largely mathematical1 corresponding to the essential traits of the ,absolute4 ,when these are presented to the child1 the ,whole1 or perfection1 sleeping within him1 is awakened4 ,a single example may indicate the method4 ,every one familiar with the kindergarten is acquainted with the circle in which the children gather4 ,it is not enough that the circle is a convenient way of grouping the children4 ,it must be used because it is a symbol of the collective life of mankind in general4 ,froebel's recognition of the significance of the native capacities of children1 his loving attention to them1 and his influence in inducing others to study them1 represent perhaps the most effective single force in modern educational theory in effecting widespread acknowledgment of the idea of growth4 ,but his formulation of the notion of development and his organization of devices for promoting it were badly hampered by the fact that he conceived development to be the unfolding of a ready-made latent principle4 ,he failed to see that growing is growth1 developing is development1 and consequently placed the emphasis upon the completed product4 ,thus he set up a goal which meant the arrest of growth1 and a criterion which is not applicable to immediate guidance of powers1 save through translation into abstract and symbolic formulae4 ,a remote goal of complete unfoldedness is1 in technical philosophic language1 transcendental4 ,that is1 it is something apart from direct experience and perception4 ,so far as experience is concerned1 it is empty2 it represents a vague sentimental aspiration rather than anything which can be intelligently grasped and stated4 ,this vagueness must be compensated for by some a priori formula4 ,froebel made the connection between the concrete facts of experience and the transcendental ideal of development by regarding the former as symbols of the latter4 ,to regard known things as symbols1 according to some arbitrary a priori formula--and every a priori conception must be arbitrary--is an invitation to romantic fancy to seize upon any analogies which appeal to it and treat them as laws4 ,after the scheme of symbolism has been settled upon1 some definite technique must be invented by which the inner meaning of the sensible symbols used may be brought home to children4 ,adults being the formulators of the symbolism are naturally the authors and controllers of the technique4 ,the result was that ,froebel's love of abstract symbolism often got the better of his sympathetic insight2 and there was substituted for development as arbitrary and externally imposed a scheme of dictation as the history of instruction has ever seen4 ,with ,hegel the necessity of finding some working concrete counterpart of the inaccessible ,absolute took an institutional1 rather than symbolic1 form4 ,his philosophy1 like ,froebel's1 marks in one direction an indispensable contribution to a valid conception of the process of life4 ,the weaknesses of an abstract individualistic philosophy were evident to him2 he saw the impossibility of making a clean sweep of historical institutions1 of treating them as despotisms begot in artifice and nurtured in fraud4 ,in his philosophy of history and society culminated the efforts of a whole series of ,german writers--,lessing1 ,herder1 ,kant1 ,schiller1 ,goethe--to appreciate the nurturing influence of the great collective institutional products of humanity4 ,for those who learned the lesson of this movement1 it was henceforth impossible to conceive of institutions or of culture as artificial4 ,it destroyed completely--in idea1 not in fact--the psychology that regarded mind as a ready-made possession of a naked individual by showing the significance of objective mind--language1 government1 art1 religion--in the formation of individual minds4 ,but since ,hegel was haunted by the conception of an absolute goal1 he was obliged to arrange institutions as they concretely exist1 on a stepladder of ascending approximations4 ,each in its time and place is absolutely necessary1 because a stage in the self-realizing process of the absolute mind4 ,taken as such a step or stage1 its existence is proof of its complete rationality1 for it is an integral element in the total1 which is ,reason4 ,against institutions as they are1 individuals have no spiritual rights2 personal development1 and nurture1 consist in obedient assimilation of the spirit of existing institutions4 ,conformity1 not transformation1 is the essence of education4 ,institutions change as history shows2 but their change1 the rise and fall of states1 is the work of the world-spirit4 ,individuals1 save the great heroes who are the chosen organs of the world-spirit1 have no share or lot in it4 ,in the later nineteenth century1 this type of idealism was amalgamated with the doctrine of biological evolution4 ,evolution was a force working itself out to its own end4 ,as against it1 or as compared with it1 the conscious ideas and preference of individuals are impotent4 ,or1 rather1 they are but the means by which it works itself out4 ,social progress is an organic growth1 not an experimental selection4 ,reason is all powerful1 but only ,absolute ,reason has any power4 ,the recognition 7or rediscovery1 for the idea was familiar to the ,greeks7 that great historic institutions are active factors in the intellectual nurture of mind was a great contribution to educational philosophy4 ,it indicated a genuine advance beyond ,rousseau1 who had marred his assertion that education must be a natural development and not something forced or grafted upon individuals from without1 by the notion that social conditions are not natural4 ,but in its notion of a complete and all-inclusive end of development1 the ,hegelian theory swallowed up concrete individualities1 though magnifying ,the ,individual in the abstract4 ,some of ,hegel's followers sought to reconcile the claims of the ,whole and of individuality by the conception of society as an organic whole1 or organism4 ,that social organization is presupposed in the adequate exercise of individual capacity is not to be doubted4 ,but the social organism1 interpreted after the relation of the organs of the body to each other and to the whole body1 means that each individual has a certain limited place and function1 requiring to be supplemented by the place and functions of the other organs4 ,as one portion of the bodily tissue is differentiated so that it can be the hand and the hand only1 another1 the eye1 and so on1 all taken together making the organism1 so one individual is supposed to be differentiated for the exercise of the mechanical operations of society1 another for those of a statesman1 another for those of a scholar1 and so on4 ,the notion of organism is thus used to give a philosophic sanction to class distinctions in social organization--a notion which in its educational application again means external dictation instead of growth4 #c4 ,education as ,training of ,faculties4 ,a theory which has had great vogue and which came into existence before the notion of growth had much influence is known as the theory of formal discipline4 ,it has in view a correct ideal2 one outcome of education should be the creation of specific powers of accomplishment4 ,a trained person is one who can do the chief things which it is important for him to do better than he could without training3 better signifying greater ease1 efficiency1 economy1 promptness1 etc4 ,that this is an outcome of education was indicated in what was said about habits as the product of educative development4 ,but the theory in question takes1 as it were1 a short cut2 it regards some powers 7to be presently named7 as the direct and conscious aims of instruction1 and not simply as the results of growth4 ,there is a definite number of powers to be trained1 as one might enumerate the kinds of strokes which a golfer has to master4 ,consequently education should get directly at the business of training them4 ,but this implies that they are already there in some untrained form2 otherwise their creation would have to be an indirect product of other activities and agencies4 ,being there already in some crude form1 all that remains is to exercise them in constant and graded repetitions1 and they will inevitably be refined and perfected4 ,in the phrase formal discipline as applied to this conception1 discipline refers both to the outcome of trained power and to the method of training through repeated exercise4 ,the forms of powers in question are such things as the faculties of perceiving1 retaining1 recalling1 associating1 attending1 willing1 feeling1 imagining1 thinking1 etc41 which are then shaped by exercise upon material presented4 ,in its classic form1 this theory was expressed by ,locke4 ,on the one hand1 the outer world presents the material or content of knowledge through passively received sensations4 ,on the other hand1 the mind has certain ready powers1 attention1 observation1 retention1 comparison1 abstraction1 compounding1 etc4 ,knowledge results if the mind discriminates and combines things as they are united and divided in nature itself4 ,but the important thing for education is the exercise or practice of the faculties of the mind till they become thoroughly established habitudes4 ,the analogy constantly employed is that of a billiard player or gymnast1 who by repeated use of certain muscles in a uniform way at last secures automatic skill4 ,even the faculty of thinking was to be formed into a trained habit by repeated exercises in making and combining simple distinctions1 for which1 ,locke thought1 mathematics affords unrivaled opportunity4 ,locke's statements fitted well into the dualism of his day4 ,it seemed to do justice to both mind and matter1 the individual and the world4 ,one of the two supplied the matter of knowledge and the object upon which mind should work4 ,the other supplied definite mental powers1 which were few in number and which might be trained by specific exercises4 ,the scheme appeared to give due weight to the subject matter of knowledge1 and yet it insisted that the end of education is not the bare reception and storage of information1 but the formation of personal powers of attention1 memory1 observation1 abstraction1 and generalization4 ,it was realistic in its emphatic assertion that all material whatever is received from without2 it was idealistic in that final stress fell upon the formation of intellectual powers4 ,it was objective and impersonal in its assertion that the individual cannot possess or generate any true ideas on his own account2 it was individualistic in placing the end of education in the perfecting of certain faculties possessed at the outset by the individual4 ,this kind of distribution of values expressed with nicety the state of opinion in the generations following upon ,locke4 ,it became1 without explicit reference to ,locke1 a common-place of educational theory and of psychology4 ,practically1 it seemed to provide the educator with definite1 instead of vague1 tasks4 ,it made the elaboration of a technique of instruction relatively easy4 ,all that was necessary was to provide for sufficient practice of each of the powers4 ,this practice consists in repeated acts of attending1 observing1 memorizing1 etc4 ,by grading the difficulty of the acts1 making each set of repetitions somewhat more difficult than the set which preceded it1 a complete scheme of instruction is evolved4 ,there are various ways1 equally conclusive1 of criticizing this conception1 in both its alleged foundations and in its educational application4 7#a7 ,perhaps the most direct mode of attack consists in pointing out that the supposed original faculties of observation1 recollection1 willing1 thinking1 etc41 are purely mythological4 ,there are no such ready-made powers waiting to be exercised and thereby trained4 ,there are1 indeed1 a great number of original native tendencies1 instinctive modes of action1 based on the original connections of neurones in the central nervous system4 ,there are impulsive tendencies of the eyes to follow and fixate light2 of the neck muscles to turn toward light and sound2 of the hands to reach and grasp2 and turn and twist and thump2 of the vocal apparatus to make sounds2 of the mouth to spew out unpleasant substances2 to gag and to curl the lip1 and so on in almost indefinite number4 ,but these tendencies 7a7 instead of being a small number sharply marked off from one another1 are of an indefinite variety1 interweaving with one another in all kinds of subtle ways4 7b7 ,instead of being latent intellectual powers1 requiring only exercise for their perfecting1 they are tendencies to respond in certain ways to changes in the environment so as to bring about other changes4 ,something in the throat makes one cough2 the tendency is to eject the obnoxious particle and thus modify the subsequent stimulus4 ,the hand touches a hot thing2 it is impulsively1 wholly unintellectually1 snatched away4 ,but the withdrawal alters the stimuli operating1 and tends to make them more consonant with the needs of the organism4 ,it is by such specific changes of organic activities in response to specific changes in the medium that that control of the environment of which we have spoken 7see ante1 p4 #bd7 is effected4 ,now all of our first seeings and hearings and touchings and smellings and tastings are of this kind4 ,in any legitimate sense of the words mental or intellectual or cognitive1 they are lacking in these qualities1 and no amount of repetitious exercise could bestow any intellectual properties of observation1 judgment1 or intentional action 7volition7 upon them4 7#b7 ,consequently the training of our original impulsive activities is not a refinement and perfecting achieved by exercise as one might strengthen a muscle by practice4 ,it consists rather 7a7 in selecting from the diffused responses which are evoked at a given time those which are especially adapted to the utilization of the stimulus4 ,that is to say1 among the reactions of the body in general occur upon stimulation of the eye by light1 all except those which are specifically adapted to reaching1 grasping1 and manipulating the object effectively are gradually eliminated--or else no training occurs4 ,as we have already noted1 the primary reactions1 with a very few exceptions are too diffused and general to be practically of much use in the case of the human infant4 ,hence the identity of training with selective response4 7,compare p4 #be47 7b7 ,equally important is the specific coordination of different factors of response which takes place4 ,there is not merely a selection of the hand reactions which effect grasping1 but of the particular visual stimuli which call out just these reactions and no others1 and an establishment of connection between the two4 ,but the coordinating does not stop here4 ,characteristic temperature reactions may take place when the object is grasped4 ,these will also be brought in2 later1 the temperature reaction may be connected directly with the optical stimulus1 the hand reaction being suppressed--as a bright flame1 independent of close contact1 may steer one away4 ,or the child in handling the object pounds with it1 or crumples it1 and a sound issues4 ,the ear response is then brought into the system of response4 ,if a certain sound 7the conventional name7 is made by others and accompanies the activity1 response of both ear and the vocal apparatus connected with auditory stimulation will also become an associated factor in the complex response4 7#c7 ,the more specialized the adjustment of response and stimulus to each other 7for1 taking the sequence of activities into account1 the stimuli are adapted to reactions as well as reactions to stimuli7 the more rigid and the less generally available is the training secured4 ,in equivalent language1 less intellectual or educative quality attaches to the training4 ,the usual way of stating this fact is that the more specialized the reaction1 the less is the skill acquired in practicing and perfecting it transferable to other modes of behavior4 ,according to the orthodox theory of formal discipline1 a pupil in studying his spelling lesson acquires1 besides ability to spell those particular words1 an increase of power of observation1 attention1 and recollection which may be employed whenever these powers are needed4 ,as matter of fact1 the more he confines himself to noticing and fixating the forms of words1 irrespective of connection with other things 7such as the meaning of the words1 the context in which they are habitually used1 the derivation and classification of the verbal form1 etc47 the less likely is he to acquire an ability which can be used for anything except the mere noting of verbal visual forms4 ,he may not even be increasing his ability to make accurate distinctions among geometrical forms1 to say nothing of ability to observe in general4 ,he is merely selecting the stimuli supplied by the forms of the letters and the motor reactions of oral or written reproduction4 ,the scope of coordination 7to use our prior terminology7 is extremely limited4 ,the connections which are employed in other observations and recollections 7or reproductions7 are deliberately eliminated when the pupil is exercised merely upon forms of letters and words4 ,having been excluded1 they cannot be restored when needed4 ,the ability secured to observe and to recall verbal forms is not available for perceiving and recalling other things4 ,in the ordinary phraseology1 it is not transferable4 ,but the wider the context--that is to say1 the more varied the stimuli and responses coordinated--the more the ability acquired is available for the effective performance of other acts2 not1 strictly speaking1 because there is any transfer1 but because the wide range of factors employed in the specific act is equivalent to a broad range of activity1 to a flexible1 instead of to a narrow and rigid1 coordination4 7#d7 ,going to the root of the matter1 the fundamental fallacy of the theory is its dualism2 that is to say1 its separation of activities and capacities from subject matter4 ,there is no such thing as an ability to see or hear or remember in general2 there is only the ability to see or hear or remember something4 ,to talk about training a power1 mental or physical1 in general1 apart from the subject matter involved in its exercise1 is nonsense4 ,exercise may react upon circulation1 breathing1 and nutrition so as to develop vigor or strength1 but this reservoir is available for specific ends only by use in connection with the material means which accomplish them4 ,vigor will enable a man to play tennis or golf or to sail a boat better than he would if he were weak4 ,but only by employing ball and racket1 ball and club1 sail and tiller1 in definite ways does he become expert in any one of them2 and expertness in one secures expertness in another only so far as it is either a sign of aptitude for fine muscular coordinations or as the same kind of coordination is involved in all of them4 ,moreover1 the difference between the training of ability to spell which comes from taking visual forms in a narrow context and one which takes them in connection with the activities required to grasp meaning1 such as context1 affiliations of descent1 etc41 may be compared to the difference between exercises in the gymnasium with pulley weights to develop certain muscles1 and a game or sport4 ,the former is uniform and mechanical2 it is rigidly specialized4 ,the latter is varied from moment to moment2 no two acts are quite alike2 novel emergencies have to be met2 the coordinations forming have to be kept flexible and elastic4 ,consequently1 the training is much more general2 that is to say1 it covers a wider territory and includes more factors4 ,exactly the same thing holds of special and general education of the mind4 ,a monotonously uniform exercise may by practice give great skill in one special act2 but the skill is limited to that act1 be it bookkeeping or calculations in logarithms or experiments in hydrocarbons4 ,one may be an authority in a particular field and yet of more than usually poor judgment in matters not closely allied1 unless the training in the special field has been of a kind to ramify into the subject matter of the other fields4 7#e7 ,consequently1 such powers as observation1 recollection1 judgment1 esthetic taste1 represent organized results of the occupation of native active tendencies with certain subject matters4 ,a man does not observe closely and fully by pressing a button for the observing faculty to get to work 7in other words by willing to observe72 but if he has something to do which can be accomplished successfully only through intensive and extensive use of eye and hand1 he naturally observes4 ,observation is an outcome1 a consequence1 of the interaction of sense organ and subject matter4 ,it will vary1 accordingly1 with the subject matter employed4 ,it is consequently futile to set up even the ulterior development of faculties of observation1 memory1 etc41 unless we have first determined what sort of subject matter we wish the pupil to become expert in observing and recalling and for what purpose4 ,and it is only repeating in another form what has already been said1 to declare that the criterion here must be social4 ,we want the person to note and recall and judge those things which make him an effective competent member of the group in which he is associated with others4 ,otherwise we might as well set the pupil to observing carefully cracks on the wall and set him to memorizing meaningless lists of words in an unknown tongue--which is about what we do in fact when we give way to the doctrine of formal discipline4 ,if the observing habits of a botanist or chemist or engineer are better habits than those which are thus formed1 it is because they deal with subject matter which is more significant in life4 ,in concluding this portion of the discussion1 we note that the distinction between special and general education has nothing to do with the transferability of function or power4 ,in the literal sense1 any transfer is miraculous and impossible4 ,but some activities are broad2 they involve a coordination of many factors4 ,their development demands continuous alternation and readjustment4 ,as conditions change1 certain factors are subordinated1 and others which had been of minor importance come to the front4 ,there is constant redistribution of the focus of the action1 as is seen in the illustration of a game as over against pulling a fixed weight by a series of uniform motions4 ,thus there is practice in prompt making of new combinations with the focus of activity shifted to meet change in subject matter4 ,wherever an activity is broad in scope 7that is1 involves the coordinating of a large variety of sub-activities71 and is constantly and unexpectedly obliged to change direction in its progressive development1 general education is bound to result4 ,for this is what general means2 broad and flexible4 ,in practice1 education meets these conditions1 and hence is general1 in the degree in which it takes account of social relationships4 ,a person may become expert in technical philosophy1 or philology1 or mathematics or engineering or financiering1 and be inept and ill-advised in his action and judgment outside of his specialty4 ,if however his concern with these technical subject matters has been connected with human activities having social breadth1 the range of active responses called into play and flexibly integrated is much wider4 ,isolation of subject matter from a social context is the chief obstruction in current practice to securing a general training of mind4 ,literature1 art1 religion1 when thus dissociated1 are just as narrowing as the technical things which the professional upholders of general education strenuously oppose4 ,summary4 ,the conception that the result of the educative process is capacity for further education stands in contrast with some other ideas which have profoundly influenced practice4 ,the first contrasting conception considered is that of preparing or getting ready for some future duty or privilege4 ,specific evil effects were pointed out which result from the fact that this aim diverts attention of both teacher and taught from the only point to which it may be fruitfully directed--namely1 taking advantage of the needs and possibilities of the immediate present4 ,consequently it defeats its own professed purpose4 ,the notion that education is an unfolding from within appears to have more likeness to the conception of growth which has been set forth4 ,but as worked out in the theories of ,froebel and ,hegel1 it involves ignoring the interaction of present organic tendencies with the present environment1 just as much as the notion of preparation4 ,some implicit whole is regarded as given ready-made and the significance of growth is merely transitory2 it is not an end in itself1 but simply a means of making explicit what is already implicit4 ,since that which is not explicit cannot be made definite use of1 something has to be found to represent it4 ,according to ,froebel1 the mystic symbolic value of certain objects and acts 7largely mathematical7 stand for the ,absolute ,whole which is in process of unfolding4 ,according to ,hegel1 existing institutions are its effective actual representatives4 ,emphasis upon symbols and institutions tends to divert perception from the direct growth of experience in richness of meaning4 ,another influential but defective theory is that which conceives that mind has1 at birth1 certain mental faculties or powers1 such as perceiving1 remembering1 willing1 judging1 generalizing1 attending1 etc41 and that education is the training of these faculties through repeated exercise4 ,this theory treats subject matter as comparatively external and indifferent1 its value residing simply in the fact that it may occasion exercise of the general powers4 ,criticism was directed upon this separation of the alleged powers from one another and from the material upon which they act4 ,the outcome of the theory in practice was shown to be an undue emphasis upon the training of narrow specialized modes of skill at the expense of initiative1 inventiveness1 and readaptability--qualities which depend upon the broad and consecutive interaction of specific activities with one another4 #a ,as matter of fact1 the interconnection is so great1 there are so many paths of construction1 that every stimulus brings about some change in all of the organs of response4 ,we are accustomed however to ignore most of these modifications of the total organic activity1 concentrating upon that one which is most specifically adapted to the most urgent stimulus of the moment4 #b ,this statement should be compared with what was said earlier about the sequential ordering of responses 7p4 #be74 ,it is merely a more explicit statement of the way in which that consecutive arrangement occurs4 ,chapter ,six3 ,education as ,conservative and ,progressive #a4 ,education as ,formation4 ,we now come to a type of theory which denies the existence of faculties and emphasizes the unique role of subject matter in the development of mental and moral disposition4 ,according to it1 education is neither a process of unfolding from within nor is it a training of faculties resident in mind itself4 ,it is rather the formation of mind by setting up certain associations or connections of content by means of a subject matter presented from without4 ,education proceeds by instruction taken in a strictly literal sense1 a building into the mind from without4 ,that education is formative of mind is not questioned2 it is the conception already propounded4 ,but formation here has a technical meaning dependent upon the idea of something operating from without4 ,herbart is the best historical representative of this type of theory4 ,he denies absolutely the existence of innate faculties4 ,the mind is simply endowed with the power of producing various qualities in reaction to the various realities which act upon it4 ,these qualitatively different reactions are called presentations 7,vorstellungen74 ,every presentation once called into being persists2 it may be driven below the threshold of consciousness by new and stronger presentations1 produced by the reaction of the soul to new material1 but its activity continues by its own inherent momentum1 below the surface of consciousness4 ,what are termed faculties--attention1 memory1 thinking1 perception1 even the sentiments1 are arrangements1 associations1 and complications1 formed by the interaction of these submerged presentations with one another and with new presentations4 ,perception1 for example1 is the complication of presentations which result from the rise of old presentations to greet and combine with new ones2 memory is the evoking of an old presentation above the threshold of consciousness by getting entangled with another presentation1 etc4 ,pleasure is the result of reinforcement among the independent activities of presentations2 pain of their pulling different ways1 etc4 ,the concrete character of mind consists1 then1 wholly of the various arrangements formed by the various presentations in their different qualities4 ,the furniture of the mind is the mind4 ,mind is wholly a matter of contents4 ,the educational implications of this doctrine are threefold4 7#a7 ,this or that kind of mind is formed by the use of objects which evoke this or that kind of reaction and which produce this or that arrangement among the reactions called out4 ,the formation of mind is wholly a matter of the presentation of the proper educational materials4 7#b7 ,since the earlier presentations constitute the apperceiving organs which control the assimilation of new presentations1 their character is all important4 ,the effect of new presentations is to reinforce groupings previously formed4 ,the business of the educator is1 first1 to select the proper material in order to fix the nature of the original reactions1 and1 secondly1 to arrange the sequence of subsequent presentations on the basis of the store of ideas secured by prior transactions4 ,the control is from behind1 from the past1 instead of1 as in the unfolding conception1 in the ultimate goal4 7#c7 ,certain formal steps of all method in teaching may be laid down4 ,presentation of new subject matter is obviously the central thing1 but since knowing consists in the way in which this interacts with the contents already submerged below consciousness1 the first thing is the step of preparation1--that is1 calling into special activity and getting above the floor of consciousness those older presentations which are to assimilate the new one4 ,then after the presentation1 follow the processes of interaction of new and old2 then comes the application of the newly formed content to the performance of some task4 ,everything must go through this course2 consequently there is a perfectly uniform method in instruction in all subjects for all pupils of all ages4 ,herbart's great service lay in taking the work of teaching out of the region of routine and accident4 ,he brought it into the sphere of conscious method2 it became a conscious business with a definite aim and procedure1 instead of being a compound of casual inspiration and subservience to tradition4 ,moreover1 everything in teaching and discipline could be specified1 instead of our having to be content with vague and more or less mystic generalities about ultimate ideals and speculative spiritual symbols4 ,he abolished the notion of ready-made faculties1 which might be trained by exercise upon any sort of material1 and made attention to concrete subject matter1 to the content1 all-important4 ,herbart undoubtedly has had a greater influence in bringing to the front questions connected with the material of study than any other educational philosopher4 ,he stated problems of method from the standpoint of their connection with subject matter3 method having to do with the manner and sequence of presenting new subject matter to insure its proper interaction with old4 ,the fundamental theoretical defect of this view lies in ignoring the existence in a living being of active and specific functions which are developed in the redirection and combination which occur as they are occupied with their environment4 ,the theory represents the ,schoolmaster come to his own4 ,this fact expresses at once its strength and its weakness4 ,the conception that the mind consists of what has been taught1 and that the importance of what has been taught consists in its availability for further teaching1 reflects the pedagogue's view of life4 ,the philosophy is eloquent about the duty of the teacher in instructing pupils2 it is almost silent regarding his privilege of learning4 ,it emphasizes the influence of intellectual environment upon the mind2 it slurs over the fact that the environment involves a personal sharing in common experiences4 ,it exaggerates beyond reason the possibilities of consciously formulated and used methods1 and underestimates the role of vital1 unconscious1 attitudes4 ,it insists upon the old1 the past1 and passes lightly over the operation of the genuinely novel and unforeseeable4 ,it takes1 in brief1 everything educational into account save its essence1--vital energy seeking opportunity for effective exercise4 ,all education forms character1 mental and moral1 but formation consists in the selection and coordination of native activities so that they may utilize the subject matter of the social environment4 ,moreover1 the formation is not only a formation of native activities1 but it takes place through them4 ,it is a process of reconstruction1 reorganization4 #b4 ,education as ,recapitulation and ,retrospection4 ,a peculiar combination of the ideas of development and formation from without has given rise to the recapitulation theory of education1 biological and cultural4 ,the individual develops1 but his proper development consists in repeating in orderly stages the past evolution of animal life and human history4 ,the former recapitulation occurs physiologically2 the latter should be made to occur by means of education4 ,the alleged biological truth that the individual in his growth from the simple embryo to maturity repeats the history of the evolution of animal life in the progress of forms from the simplest to the most complex 7or expressed technically1 that ontogenesis parallels phylogenesis7 does not concern us1 save as it is supposed to afford scientific foundation for cultural recapitulation of the past4 ,cultural recapitulation says1 first1 that children at a certain age are in the mental and moral condition of savagery2 their instincts are vagrant and predatory because their ancestors at one time lived such a life4 ,consequently 7so it is concluded7 the proper subject matter of their education at this time is the material--especially the literary material of myths1 folk-tale1 and song--produced by humanity in the analogous stage4 ,then the child passes on to something corresponding1 say1 to the pastoral stage1 and so on till at the time when he is ready to take part in contemporary life1 he arrives at the present epoch of culture4 ,in this detailed and consistent form1 the theory1 outside of a small school in ,germany 7followers of ,herbart for the most part71 has had little currency4 ,but the idea which underlies it is that education is essentially retrospective2 that it looks primarily to the past and especially to the literary products of the past1 and that mind is adequately formed in the degree in which it is patterned upon the spiritual heritage of the past4 ,this idea has had such immense influence upon higher instruction especially1 that it is worth examination in its extreme formulation4 ,in the first place1 its biological basis is fallacious4 ,embyronic growth of the human infant preserves1 without doubt1 some of the traits of lower forms of life4 ,but in no respect is it a strict traversing of past stages4 ,if there were any strict law of repetition1 evolutionary development would clearly not have taken place4 ,each new generation would simply have repeated its predecessors' existence4 ,development1 in short1 has taken place by the entrance of shortcuts and alterations in the prior scheme of growth4 ,and this suggests that the aim of education is to facilitate such short-circuited growth4 ,the great advantage of immaturity1 educationally speaking1 is that it enables us to emancipate the young from the need of dwelling in an outgrown past4 ,the business of education is rather to liberate the young from reviving and retraversing the past than to lead them to a recapitulation of it4 ,the social environment of the young is constituted by the presence and action of the habits of thinking and feeling of civilized men4 ,to ignore the directive influence of this present environment upon the young is simply to abdicate the educational function4 ,a biologist has said3 ,the history of development in different animals4 4 4 offers to us4 4 4 a series of ingenious1 determined1 varied but more or less unsuccessful efforts to escape from the necessity of recapitulating1 and to substitute for the ancestral method a more direct method4 ,surely it would be foolish if education did not deliberately attempt to facilitate similar efforts in conscious experience so that they become increasingly successful4 ,the two factors of truth in the conception may easily be disentangled from association with the false context which perverts them4 ,on the biological side we have simply the fact that any infant starts with precisely the assortment of impulsive activities with which he does start1 they being blind1 and many of them conflicting with one another1 casual1 sporadic1 and unadapted to their immediate environment4 ,the other point is that it is a part of wisdom to utilize the products of past history so far as they are of help for the future4 ,since they represent the results of prior experience1 their value for future experience may1 of course1 be indefinitely great4 ,literatures produced in the past are1 so far as men are now in possession and use of them1 a part of the present environment of individuals2 but there is an enormous difference between availing ourselves of them as present resources and taking them as standards and patterns in their retrospective character4 7#a7 ,the distortion of the first point usually comes about through misuse of the idea of heredity4 ,it is assumed that heredity means that past life has somehow predetermined the main traits of an individual1 and that they are so fixed that little serious change can be introduced into them4 ,thus taken1 the influence of heredity is opposed to that of the environment1 and the efficacy of the latter belittled4 ,but for educational purposes heredity means neither more nor less than the original endowment of an individual4 ,education must take the being as he is2 that a particular individual has just such and such an equipment of native activities is a basic fact4 ,that they were produced in such and such a way1 or that they are derived from one's ancestry1 is not especially important for the educator1 however it may be with the biologist1 as compared with the fact that they now exist4 ,suppose one had to advise or direct a person regarding his inheritance of property4 ,the fallacy of assuming that the fact it is an inheritance1 predetermines its future use1 is obvious4 ,the advisor is concerned with making the best use of what is there--putting it at work under the most favorable conditions4 ,obviously he cannot utilize what is not there2 neither can the educator4 ,in this sense1 heredity is a limit of education4 ,recognition of this fact prevents the waste of energy and the irritation that ensue from the too prevalent habit of trying to make by instruction something out of an individual which he is not naturally fitted to become4 ,but the doctrine does not determine what use shall be made of the capacities which exist4 ,and1 except in the case of the imbecile1 these original capacities are much more varied and potential1 even in the case of the more stupid1 than we as yet know properly how to utilize4 ,consequently1 while a careful study of the native aptitudes and deficiencies of an individual is always a preliminary necessity1 the subsequent and important step is to furnish an environment which will adequately function whatever activities are present4 ,the relation of heredity and environment is well expressed in the case of language4 ,if a being had no vocal organs from which issue articulate sounds1 if he had no auditory or other sense-receptors and no connections between the two sets of apparatus1 it would be a sheer waste of time to try to teach him to converse4 ,he is born short in that respect1 and education must accept the limitation4 ,but if he has this native equipment1 its possession in no way guarantees that he will ever talk any language or what language he will talk4 ,the environment in which his activities occur and by which they are carried into execution settles these things4 ,if he lived in a dumb unsocial environment where men refused to talk to one another and used only that minimum of gestures without which they could not get along1 vocal language would be as unachieved by him as if he had no vocal organs4 ,if the sounds which he makes occur in a medium of persons speaking the ,chinese language1 the activities which make like sounds will be selected and coordinated4 ,this illustration may be applied to the entire range of the educability of any individual4 ,it places the heritage from the past in its right connection with the demands and opportunities of the present4 7#b7 ,the theory that the proper subject matter of instruction is found in the culture-products of past ages 7either in general1 or more specifically in the particular literatures which were produced in the culture epoch which is supposed to correspond with the stage of development of those taught7 affords another instance of that divorce between the process and product of growth which has been criticized4 ,to keep the process alive1 to keep it alive in ways which make it easier to keep it alive in the future1 is the function of educational subject matter4 ,but an individual can live only in the present4 ,the present is not just something which comes after the past2 much less something produced by it4 ,it is what life is in leaving the past behind it4 ,the study of past products will not help us understand the present1 because the present is not due to the products1 but to the life of which they were the products4 ,a knowledge of the past and its heritage is of great significance when it enters into the present1 but not otherwise4 ,and the mistake of making the records and remains of the past the main material of education is that it cuts the vital connection of present and past1 and tends to make the past a rival of the present and the present a more or less futile imitation of the past4 ,under such circumstances1 culture becomes an ornament and solace2 a refuge and an asylum4 ,men escape from the crudities of the present to live in its imagined refinements1 instead of using what the past offers as an agency for ripening these crudities4 ,the present1 in short1 generates the problems which lead us to search the past for suggestion1 and which supplies meaning to what we find when we search4 ,the past is the past precisely because it does not include what is characteristic in the present4 ,the moving present includes the past on condition that it uses the past to direct its own movement4 ,the past is a great resource for the imagination2 it adds a new dimension to life1 but ,,od condition that it be seen as the past of the present1 and not as another and disconnected world4 ,the principle which makes little of the present act of living and operation of growing1 the only thing always present1 naturally looks to the past because the future goal which it sets up is remote and empty4 ,but having turned its back upon the present1 it has no way of returning to it laden with the spoils of the past4 ,a mind that is adequately sensitive to the needs and occasions of the present actuality will have the liveliest of motives for interest in the background of the present1 and will never have to hunt for a way back because it will never have lost connection4 #c4 ,education as ,reconstruction4 ,in its contrast with the ideas both of unfolding of latent powers from within1 and of the formation from without1 whether by physical nature or by the cultural products of the past1 the ideal of growth results in the conception that education is a constant reorganizing or reconstructing of experience4 ,it has all the time an immediate end1 and so far as activity is educative1 it reaches that end--the direct transformation of the quality of experience4 ,infancy1 youth1 adult life1--all stand on the same educative level in the sense that what is really learned at any and every stage of experience constitutes the value of that experience1 and in the sense that it is the chief business of life at every point to make living thus contribute to an enrichment of its own perceptible meaning4 ,we thus reach a technical definition of education3 ,it is that reconstruction or reorganization of experience which adds to the meaning of experience1 and which increases ability to direct the course of subsequent experience4 7#a7 ,the increment of meaning corresponds to the increased perception of the connections and continuities of the activities in which we are engaged4 ,the activity begins in an impulsive form2 that is1 it is blind4 ,it does not know what it is about2 that is to say1 what are its interactions with other activities4 ,an activity which brings education or instruction with it makes one aware of some of the connections which had been imperceptible4 ,to recur to our simple example1 a child who reaches for a bright light gets burned4 ,henceforth he knows that a certain act of touching in connection with a certain act of vision 7and vice-versa7 means heat and pain2 or1 a certain light means a source of heat4 ,the acts by which a scientific man in his laboratory learns more about flame differ no whit in principle4 ,by doing certain things1 he makes perceptible certain connections of heat with other things1 which had been previously ignored4 ,thus his acts in relation to these things get more meaning2 he knows better what he is doing or is about when he has to do with them2 he can intend consequences instead of just letting them happen--all synonymous ways of saying the same thing4 ,at the same stroke1 the flame has gained in meaning2 all that is known about combustion1 oxidation1 about light and temperature1 may become an intrinsic part of its intellectual content4 7#b7 ,the other side of an educative experience is an added power of subsequent direction or control4 ,to say that one knows what he is about1 or can intend certain consequences1 is to say1 of course1 that he can better anticipate what is going to happen2 that he can1 therefore1 get ready or prepare in advance so as to secure beneficial consequences and avert undesirable ones4 ,a genuinely educative experience1 then1 one in which instruction is conveyed and ability increased1 is contradistinguished from a routine activity on one hand1 and a capricious activity on the other4 7a7 ,in the latter one does not care what happens2 one just lets himself go and avoids connecting the consequences of one's act 7the evidences of its connections with other things7 with the act4 ,it is customary to frown upon such aimless random activity1 treating it as willful mischief or carelessness or lawlessness4 ,but there is a tendency to seek the cause of such aimless activities in the youth's own disposition1 isolated from everything else4 ,but in fact such activity is explosive1 and due to maladjustment with surroundings4 ,individuals act capriciously whenever they act under external dictation1 or from being told1 without having a purpose of their own or perceiving the bearing of the deed upon other acts4 ,one may learn by doing something which he does not understand2 even in the most intelligent action1 we do much which we do not mean1 because the largest portion of the connections of the act we consciously intend are not perceived or anticipated4 ,but we learn only because after the act is performed we note results which we had not noted before4 ,but much work in school consists in setting up rules by which pupils are to act of such a sort that even after pupils have acted1 they are not led to see the connection between the result--say the answer--and the method pursued4 ,so far as they are concerned1 the whole thing is a trick and a kind of miracle4 ,such action is essentially capricious1 and leads to capricious habits4 7b7 ,routine action1 action which is automatic1 may increase skill to do a particular thing4 ,in so far1 it might be said to have an educative effect4 ,but it does not lead to new perceptions of bearings and connections2 it limits rather than widens the meaning-horizon4 ,and since the environment changes and our way of acting has to be modified in order successfully to keep a balanced connection with things1 an isolated uniform way of acting becomes disastrous at some critical moment4 ,the vaunted skill turns out gross ineptitude4 ,the essential contrast of the idea of education as continuous reconstruction with the other one-sided conceptions which have been criticized in this and the previous chapter is that it identifies the end 7the result7 and the process4 ,this is verbally self-contradictory1 but only verbally4 ,it means that experience as an active process occupies time and that its later period completes its earlier portion2 it brings to light connections involved1 but hitherto unperceived4 ,the later outcome thus reveals the meaning of the earlier1 while the experience as a whole establishes a bent or disposition toward the things possessing this meaning4 ,every such continuous experience or activity is educative1 and all education resides in having such experiences4 ,it remains only to point out 7what will receive more ample attention later7 that the reconstruction of experience may be social as well as personal4 ,for purposes of simplification we have spoken in the earlier chapters somewhat as if the education of the immature which fills them with the spirit of the social group to which they belong1 were a sort of catching up of the child with the aptitudes and resources of the adult group4 ,in static societies1 societies which make the maintenance of established custom their measure of value1 this conception applies in the main4 ,but not in progressive communities4 ,they endeavor to shape the experiences of the young so that instead of reproducing current habits1 better habits shall be formed1 and thus the future adult society be an improvement on their own4 ,men have long had some intimation of the extent to which education may be consciously used to eliminate obvious social evils through starting the young on paths which shall not produce these ills1 and some idea of the extent in which education may be made an instrument of realizing the better hopes of men4 ,but we are doubtless far from realizing the potential efficacy of education as a constructive agency of improving society1 from realizing that it represents not only a development of children and youth but also of the future society of which they will be the constituents4 ,summary4 ,education may be conceived either retrospectively or prospectively4 ,that is to say1 it may be treated as process of accommodating the future to the past1 or as an utilization of the past for a resource in a developing future4 ,the former finds its standards and patterns in what has gone before4 ,the mind may be regarded as a group of contents resulting from having certain things presented4 ,in this case1 the earlier presentations constitute the material to which the later are to be assimilated4 ,emphasis upon the value of the early experiences of immature beings is most important1 especially because of the tendency to regard them as of little account4 ,but these experiences do not consist of externally presented material1 but of interaction of native activities with the environment which progressively modifies both the activities and the environment4 ,the defect of the ,herbartian theory of formation through presentations consists in slighting this constant interaction and change4 ,the same principle of criticism applies to theories which find the primary subject matter of study in the cultural products--especially the literary products--of man's history4 ,isolated from their connection with the present environment in which individuals have to act1 they become a kind of rival and distracting environment4 ,their value lies in their use to increase the meaning of the things with which we have actively to do at the present time4 ,the idea of education advanced in these chapters is formally summed up in the idea of continuous reconstruction of experience1 an idea which is marked off from education as preparation for a remote future1 as unfolding1 as external formation1 and as recapitulation of the past4 ,chapter ,seven3 ,the ,democratic ,conception in ,education ,for the most part1 save incidentally1 we have hitherto been concerned with education as it may exist in any social group4 ,we have now to make explicit the differences in the spirit1 material1 and method of education as it operates in different types of community life4 ,to say that education is a social function1 securing direction and development in the immature through their participation in the life of the group to which they belong1 is to say in effect that education will vary with the quality of life which prevails in a group4 ,particularly is it true that a society which not only changes but-which has the ideal of such change as will improve it1 will have different standards and methods of education from one which aims simply at the perpetuation of its own customs4 ,to make the general ideas set forth applicable to our own educational practice1 it is1 therefore1 necessary to come to closer quarters with the nature of present social life4 #a4 ,the ,implications of ,human ,association4 ,society is one word1 but many things4 ,men associate together in all kinds of ways and for all kinds of purposes4 ,one man is concerned in a multitude of diverse groups1 in which his associates may be quite different4 ,it often seems as if they had nothing in common except that they are modes of associated life4 ,within every larger social organization there are numerous minor groups3 not only political subdivisions1 but industrial1 scientific1 religious1 associations4 ,there are political parties with differing aims1 social sets1 cliques1 gangs1 corporations1 partnerships1 groups bound closely together by ties of blood1 and so on in endless variety4 ,in many modern states and in some ancient1 there is great diversity of populations1 of varying languages1 religions1 moral codes1 and traditions4 ,from this standpoint1 many a minor political unit1 one of our large cities1 for example1 is a congeries of loosely associated societies1 rather than an inclusive and permeating community of action and thought4 7,see ante1 p4 #bj47 ,the terms society1 community1 are thus ambiguous4 ,they have both a eulogistic or normative sense1 and a descriptive sense2 a meaning de jure and a meaning de facto4 ,in social philosophy1 the former connotation is almost always uppermost4 ,society is conceived as one by its very nature4 ,the qualities which accompany this unity1 praiseworthy community of purpose and welfare1 loyalty to public ends1 mutuality of sympathy1 are emphasized4 ,but when we look at the facts which the term denotes instead of confining our attention to its intrinsic connotation1 we find not unity1 but a plurality of societies1 good and bad4 ,men banded together in a criminal conspiracy1 business aggregations that prey upon the public while serving it1 political machines held together by the interest of plunder1 are included4 ,if it is said that such organizations are not societies because they do not meet the ideal requirements of the notion of society1 the answer1 in part1 is that the conception of society is then made so ideal as to be of no use1 having no reference to facts2 and in part1 that each of these organizations1 no matter how opposed to the interests of other groups1 has something of the praiseworthy qualities of ,society which hold it together4 ,there is honor among thieves1 and a band of robbers has a common interest as respects its members4 ,gangs are marked by fraternal feeling1 and narrow cliques by intense loyalty to their own codes4 ,family life may be marked by exclusiveness1 suspicion1 and jealousy as to those without1 and yet be a model of amity and mutual aid within4 ,any education given by a group tends to socialize its members1 but the quality and value of the socialization depends upon the habits and aims of the group4 ,hence1 once more1 the need of a measure for the worth of any given mode of social life4 ,in seeking this measure1 we have to avoid two extremes4 ,we cannot set up1 out of our heads1 something we regard as an ideal society4 ,we must base our conception upon societies which actually exist1 in order to have any assurance that our ideal is a practicable one4 ,but1 as we have just seen1 the ideal cannot simply repeat the traits which are actually found4 ,the problem is to extract the desirable traits of forms of community life which actually exist1 and employ them to criticize undesirable features and suggest improvement4 ,now in any social group whatever1 even in a gang of thieves1 we find some interest held in common1 and we find a certain amount of interaction and cooperative intercourse with other groups4 ,from these two traits we derive our standard4 ,how numerous and varied are the interests which are consciously shared8 ,how full and free is the interplay with other forms of association8 ,if we apply these considerations to1 say1 a criminal band1 we find that the ties which consciously hold the members together are few in number1 reducible almost to a common interest in plunder2 and that they are of such a nature as to isolate the group from other groups with respect to give and take of the values of life4 ,hence1 the education such a society gives is partial and distorted4 ,if we take1 on the other hand1 the kind of family life which illustrates the standard1 we find that there are material1 intellectual1 aesthetic interests in which all participate and that the progress of one member has worth for the experience of other members--it is readily communicable--and that the family is not an isolated whole1 but enters intimately into relationships with business groups1 with schools1 with all the agencies of culture1 as well as with other similar groups1 and that it plays a due part in the political organization and in return receives support from it4 ,in short1 there are many interests consciously communicated and shared2 and there are varied and free points of contact with other modes of association4 ,i4 ,let us apply the first element in this criterion to a despotically governed state4 ,it is not true there is no common interest in such an organization between governed and governors4 ,the authorities in command must make some appeal to the native activities of the subjects1 must call some of their powers into play4 ,talleyrand said that a government could do everything with bayonets except sit on them4 ,this cynical declaration is at least a recognition that the bond of union is not merely one of coercive force4 ,it may be said1 however1 that the activities appealed to are themselves unworthy and degrading--that such a government calls into functioning activity simply capacity for fear4 ,in a way1 this statement is true4 ,but it overlooks the fact that fear need not be an undesirable factor in experience4 ,caution1 circumspection1 prudence1 desire to foresee future events so as to avert what is harmful1 these desirable traits are as much a product of calling the impulse of fear into play as is cowardice and abject submission4 ,the real difficulty is that the appeal to fear is isolated4 ,in evoking dread and hope of specific tangible reward--say comfort and ease--many other capacities are left untouched4 ,or rather1 they are affected1 but in such a way as to pervert them4 ,instead of operating on their own account they are reduced to mere servants of attaining pleasure and avoiding pain4 ,this is equivalent to saying that there is no extensive number of common interests2 there is no free play back and forth among the members of the social group4 ,stimulation and response are exceedingly one-sided4 ,in order to have a large number of values in common1 all the members of the group must have an equable opportunity to receive and to take from others4 ,there must be a large variety of shared undertakings and experiences4 ,otherwise1 the influences which educate some into masters1 educate others into slaves4 ,and the experience of each party loses in meaning1 when the free interchange of varying modes of life-experience is arrested4 ,a separation into a privileged and a subject-class prevents social endosmosis4 ,the evils thereby affecting the superior class are less material and less perceptible1 but equally real4 ,their culture tends to be sterile1 to be turned back to feed on itself2 their art becomes a showy display and artificial2 their wealth luxurious2 their knowledge overspecialized2 their manners fastidious rather than humane4 ,lack of the free and equitable intercourse which springs from a variety of shared interests makes intellectual stimulation unbalanced4 ,diversity of stimulation means novelty1 and novelty means challenge to thought4 ,the more activity is restricted to a few definite lines--as it is when there are rigid class lines preventing adequate interplay of experiences--the more action tends to become routine on the part of the class at a disadvantage1 and capricious1 aimless1 and explosive on the part of the class having the materially fortunate position4 ,plato defined a slave as one who accepts from another the purposes which control his conduct4 ,this condition obtains even where there is no slavery in the legal sense4 ,it is found wherever men are engaged in activity which is socially serviceable1 but whose service they do not understand and have no personal interest in4 ,much is said about scientific management of work4 ,it is a narrow view which restricts the science which secures efficiency of operation to movements of the muscles4 ,the chief opportunity for science is the discovery of the relations of a man to his work--including his relations to others who take part--which will enlist his intelligent interest in what he is doing4 ,efficiency in production often demands division of labor4 ,but it is reduced to a mechanical routine unless workers see the technical1 intellectual1 and social relationships involved in what they do1 and engage in their work because of the motivation furnished by such perceptions4 ,the tendency to reduce such things as efficiency of activity and scientific management to purely technical externals is evidence of the one-sided stimulation of thought given to those in control of industry--those who supply its aims4 ,because of their lack of all-round and well-balanced social interest1 there is not sufficient stimulus for attention to the human factors and relationships in industry4 ,intelligence is narrowed to the factors concerned with technical production and marketing of goods4 ,no doubt1 a very acute and intense intelligence in these narrow lines can be developed1 but the failure to take into account the significant social factors means none the less an absence of mind1 and a corresponding distortion of emotional life4 ,,ii4 ,this illustration 7whose point is to be extended to all associations lacking reciprocity of interest7 brings us to our second point4 ,the isolation and exclusiveness of a gang or clique brings its antisocial spirit into relief4 ,but this same spirit is found wherever one group has interests of its own which shut it out from full interaction with other groups1 so that its prevailing purpose is the protection of what it has got1 instead of reorganization and progress through wider relationships4 ,it marks nations in their isolation from one another2 families which seclude their domestic concerns as if they had no connection with a larger life2 schools when separated from the interest of home and community2 the divisions of rich and poor2 learned and unlearned4 ,the essential point is that isolation makes for rigidity and formal institutionalizing of life1 for static and selfish ideals within the group4 ,that savage tribes regard aliens and enemies as synonymous is not accidental4 ,it springs from the fact that they have identified their experience with rigid adherence to their past customs4 ,on such a basis it is wholly logical to fear intercourse with others1 for such contact might dissolve custom4 ,it would certainly occasion reconstruction4 ,it is a commonplace that an alert and expanding mental life depends upon an enlarging range of contact with the physical environment4 ,but the principle applies even more significantly to the field where we are apt to ignore it--the sphere of social contacts4 ,every expansive era in the history of mankind has coincided with the operation of factors which have tended to eliminate distance between peoples and classes previously hemmed off from one another4 ,even the alleged benefits of war1 so far as more than alleged1 spring from the fact that conflict of peoples at least enforces intercourse between them and thus accidentally enables them to learn from one another1 and thereby to expand their horizons4 ,travel1 economic and commercial tendencies1 have at present gone far to break down external barriers2 to bring peoples and classes into closer and more perceptible connection with one another4 ,it remains for the most part to secure the intellectual and emotional significance of this physical annihilation of space4 #b4 ,the ,democratic ,ideal4 ,the two elements in our criterion both point to democracy4 ,the first signifies not only more numerous and more varied points of shared common interest1 but greater reliance upon the recognition of mutual interests as a factor in social control4 ,the second means not only freer interaction between social groups 7once isolated so far as intention could keep up a separation7 but change in social habit--its continuous readjustment through meeting the new situations produced by varied intercourse4 ,and these two traits are precisely what characterize the democratically constituted society4 ,upon the educational side1 we note first that the realization of a form of social life in which interests are mutually interpenetrating1 and where progress1 or readjustment1 is an important consideration1 makes a democratic community more interested than other communities have cause to be in deliberate and systematic education4 ,the devotion of democracy to education is a familiar fact4 ,the superficial explanation is that a government resting upon popular suffrage cannot be successful unless those who elect and who obey their governors are educated4 ,since a democratic society repudiates the principle of external authority1 it must find a substitute in voluntary disposition and interest2 these can be created only by education4 ,but there is a deeper explanation4 ,a democracy is more than a form of government2 it is primarily a mode of associated living1 of conjoint communicated experience4 ,the extension in space of the number of individuals who participate in an interest so that each has to refer his own action to that of others1 and to consider the action of others to give point and direction to his own1 is equivalent to the breaking down of those barriers of class1 race1 and national territory which kept men from perceiving the full import of their activity4 ,these more numerous and more varied points of contact denote a greater diversity of stimuli to which an individual has to respond2 they consequently put a premium on variation in his action4 ,they secure a liberation of powers which remain suppressed as long as the incitations to action are partial1 as they must be in a group which in its exclusiveness shuts out many interests4 ,the widening of the area of shared concerns1 and the liberation of a greater diversity of personal capacities which characterize a democracy1 are not of course the product of deliberation and conscious effort4 ,on the contrary1 they were caused by the development of modes of manufacture and commerce1 travel1 migration1 and intercommunication which flowed from the command of science over natural energy4 ,but after greater individualization on one hand1 and a broader community of interest on the other have come into existence1 it is a matter of deliberate effort to sustain and extend them4 ,obviously a society to which stratification into separate classes would be fatal1 must see to it that intellectual opportunities are accessible to all on equable and easy terms4 ,a society marked off into classes need he specially attentive only to the education of its ruling elements4 ,a society which is mobile1 which is full of channels for the distribution of a change occurring anywhere1 must see to it that its members are educated to personal initiative and adaptability4 ,otherwise1 they will be overwhelmed by the changes in which they are caught and whose significance or connections they do not perceive4 ,the result will be a confusion in which a few will appropriate to themselves the results of the blind and externally directed activities of others4 #c4 ,the ,platonic ,educational ,philosophy4 ,subsequent chapters will be devoted to making explicit the implications of the democratic ideas in education4 ,in the remaining portions of this chapter1 we shall consider the educational theories which have been evolved in three epochs when the social import of education was especially conspicuous4 ,the first one to be considered is that of ,plato4 ,no one could better express than did he the fact that a society is stably organized when each individual is doing that for which he has aptitude by nature in such a way as to be useful to others 7or to contribute to the whole to which he belongs72 and that it is the business of education to discover these aptitudes and progressively to train them for social use4 ,much which has been said so far is borrowed from what ,plato first consciously taught the world4 ,but conditions which he could not intellectually control led him to restrict these ideas in their application4 ,he never got any conception of the indefinite plurality of activities which may characterize an individual and a social group1 and consequently limited his view to a limited number of classes of capacities and of social arrangements4 ,plato's starting point is that the organization of society depends ultimately upon knowledge of the end of existence4 ,if we do not know its end1 we shall be at the mercy of accident and caprice4 ,unless we know the end1 the good1 we shall have no criterion for rationally deciding what the possibilities are which should be promoted1 nor how social arrangements are to be ordered4 ,we shall have no conception of the proper limits and distribution of activities--what he called justice--as a trait of both individual and social organization4 ,but how is the knowledge of the final and permanent good to be achieved8 ,in dealing with this question we come upon the seemingly insuperable obstacle that such knowledge is not possible save in a just and harmonious social order4 ,everywhere else the mind is distracted and misled by false valuations and false perspectives4 ,a disorganized and factional society sets up a number of different models and standards4 ,under such conditions it is impossible for the individual to attain consistency of mind4 ,only a complete whole is fully self-consistent4 ,a society which rests upon the supremacy of some factor over another irrespective of its rational or proportionate claims1 inevitably leads thought astray4 ,it puts a premium on certain things and slurs over others1 and creates a mind whose seeming unity is forced and distorted4 ,education proceeds ultimately from the patterns furnished by institutions1 customs1 and laws4 ,only in a just state will these be such as to give the right education2 and only those who have rightly trained minds will be able to recognize the end1 and ordering principle of things4 ,we seem to be caught in a hopeless circle4 ,however1 ,plato suggested a way out4 ,a few men1 philosophers or lovers of wisdom--or truth--may by study learn at least in outline the proper patterns of true existence4 ,if a powerful ruler should form a state after these patterns1 then its regulations could be preserved4 ,an education could be given which would sift individuals1 discovering what they were good for1 and supplying a method of assigning each to the work in life for which his nature fits him4 ,each doing his own part1 and never transgressing1 the order and unity of the whole would be maintained4 ,it would be impossible to find in any scheme of philosophic thought a more adequate recognition on one hand of the educational significance of social arrangements and1 on the other1 of the dependence of those arrangements upon the means used to educate the young4 ,it would be impossible to find a deeper sense of the function of education in discovering and developing personal capacities1 and training them so that they would connect with the activities of others4 ,yet the society in which the theory was propounded was so undemocratic that ,plato could not work out a solution for the problem whose terms he clearly saw4 ,while he affirmed with emphasis that the place of the individual in society should not be determined by birth or wealth or any conventional status1 but by his own nature as discovered in the process of education1 he had no perception of the uniqueness of individuals4 ,for him they fall by nature into classes1 and into a very small number of classes at that4 ,consequently the testing and sifting function of education only shows to which one of three classes an individual belongs4 ,there being no recognition that each individual constitutes his own class1 there could be no recognition of the infinite diversity of active tendencies and combinations of tendencies of which an individual is capable4 ,there were only three types of faculties or powers in the individual's constitution4 ,hence education would soon reach a static limit in each class1 for only diversity makes change and progress4 ,in some individuals1 appetites naturally dominate2 they are assigned to the laboring and trading class1 which expresses and supplies human wants4 ,others reveal1 upon education1 that over and above appetites1 they have a generous1 outgoing1 assertively courageous disposition4 ,they become the citizen-subjects of the state2 its defenders in war2 its internal guardians in peace4 ,but their limit is fixed by their lack of reason1 which is a capacity to grasp the universal4 ,those who possess this are capable of the highest kind of education1 and become in time the legislators of the state--for laws are the universals which control the particulars of experience4 ,thus it is not true that in intent1 ,plato subordinated the individual to the social whole4 ,but it is true that lacking the perception of the uniqueness of every individual1 his incommensurability with others1 and consequently not recognizing that a society might change and yet be stable1 his doctrine of limited powers and classes came in net effect to the idea of the subordination of individuality4 ,we cannot better ,plato's conviction that an individual is happy and society well organized when each individual engages in those activities for which he has a natural equipment1 nor his conviction that it is the primary office of education to discover this equipment to its possessor and train him for its effective use4 ,but progress in knowledge has made us aware of the superficiality of ,plato's lumping of individuals and their original powers into a few sharply marked-off classes2 it has taught us that original capacities are indefinitely numerous and variable4 ,it is but the other side of this fact to say that in the degree in which society has become democratic1 social organization means utilization of the specific and variable qualities of individuals1 not stratification by classes4 ,although his educational philosophy was revolutionary1 it was none the less in bondage to static ideals4 ,he thought that change or alteration was evidence of lawless flux2 that true reality was unchangeable4 ,hence while he would radically change the existing state of society1 his aim was to construct a state in which change would subsequently have no place4 ,the final end of life is fixed2 given a state framed with this end in view1 not even minor details are to be altered4 ,though they might not be inherently important1 yet if permitted they would inure the minds of men to the idea of change1 and hence be dissolving and anarchic4 ,the breakdown of his philosophy is made apparent in the fact that he could not trust to gradual improvements in education to bring about a better society which should then improve education1 and so on indefinitely4 ,correct education could not come into existence until an ideal state existed1 and after that education would be devoted simply to its conservation4 ,for the existence of this state he was obliged to trust to some happy accident by which philosophic wisdom should happen to coincide with possession of ruling power in the state4 #d4 ,the ,individualistic ,ideal of the ,eighteenth ,century4 ,in the eighteenth-century philosophy we find ourselves in a very different circle of ideas4 ,nature still means something antithetical to existing social organization2 ,plato exercised a great influence upon ,rousseau4 ,but the voice of nature now speaks for the diversity of individual talent and for the need of free development of individuality in all its variety4 ,education in accord with nature furnishes the goal and the method of instruction and discipline4 ,moreover1 the native or original endowment was conceived1 in extreme cases1 as nonsocial or even as antisocial4 ,social arrangements were thought of as mere external expedients by which these nonsocial individuals might secure a greater amount of private happiness for themselves4 ,nevertheless1 these statements convey only an inadequate idea of the true significance of the movement4 ,in reality its chief interest was in progress and in social progress4 ,the seeming antisocial philosophy was a somewhat transparent mask for an impetus toward a wider and freer society--toward cosmopolitanism4 ,the positive ideal was humanity4 ,in membership in humanity1 as distinct from a state1 man's capacities would be liberated2 while in existing political organizations his powers were hampered and distorted to meet the requirements and selfish interests of the rulers of the state4 ,the doctrine of extreme individualism was but the counterpart1 the obverse1 of ideals of the indefinite perfectibility of man and of a social organization having a scope as wide as humanity4 ,the emancipated individual was to become the organ and agent of a comprehensive and progressive society4 ,the heralds of this gospel were acutely conscious of the evils of the social estate in which they found themselves4 ,they attributed these evils to the limitations imposed upon the free powers of man4 ,such limitation was both distorting and corrupting4 ,their impassioned devotion to emancipation of life from external restrictions which operated to the exclusive advantage of the class to whom a past feudal system consigned power1 found intellectual formulation in a worship of nature4 ,to give nature full swing was to replace an artificial1 corrupt1 and inequitable social order by a new and better kingdom of humanity4 ,unrestrained faith in ,nature as both a model and a working power was strengthened by the advances of natural science4 ,inquiry freed from prejudice and artificial restraints of church and state had revealed that the world is a scene of law4 ,the ,newtonian solar system1 which expressed the reign of natural law1 was a scene of wonderful harmony1 where every force balanced with every other4 ,natural law would accomplish the same result in human relations1 if men would only get rid of the artificial man-imposed coercive restrictions4 ,education in accord with nature was thought to be the first step in insuring this more social society4 ,it was plainly seen that economic and political limitations were ultimately dependent upon limitations of thought and feeling4 ,the first step in freeing men from external chains was to emancipate them from the internal chains of false beliefs and ideals4 ,what was called social life1 existing institutions1 were too false and corrupt to be intrusted with this work4 ,how could it be expected to undertake it when the undertaking meant its own destruction8 ,nature must then be the power to which the enterprise was to be left4 ,even the extreme sensationalistic theory of knowledge which was current derived itself from this conception4 ,to insist that mind is originally passive and empty was one way of glorifying the possibilities of education4 ,if the mind was a wax tablet to be written upon by objects1 there were no limits to the possibility of education by means of the natural environment4 ,and since the natural world of objects is a scene of harmonious truth1 this education would infallibly produce minds filled with the truth4 #e4 ,education as ,national and as ,social4 ,as soon as the first enthusiasm for freedom waned1 the weakness of the theory upon the constructive side became obvious4 ,merely to leave everything to nature was1 after all1 but to negate the very idea of education2 it was to trust to the accidents of circumstance4 ,not only was some method required but also some positive organ1 some administrative agency for carrying on the process of instruction4 ,the complete and harmonious development of all powers1 having as its social counterpart an enlightened and progressive humanity1 required definite organization for its realization4 ,private individuals here and there could proclaim the gospel2 they could not execute the work4 ,a ,pestalozzi could try experiments and exhort philanthropically inclined persons having wealth and power to follow his example4 ,but even ,pestalozzi saw that any effective pursuit of the new educational ideal required the support of the state4 ,the realization of the new education destined to produce a new society was1 after all1 dependent upon the activities of existing states4 ,the movement for the democratic idea inevitably became a movement for publicly conducted and administered schools4 ,so far as ,europe was concerned1 the historic situation identified the movement for a state-supported education with the nationalistic movement in political life--a fact of incalculable significance for subsequent movements4 ,under the influence of ,german thought in particular1 education became a civic function and the civic function was identified with the realization of the ideal of the national state4 ,the state was substituted for humanity2 cosmopolitanism gave way to nationalism4 ,to form the citizen1 not the man1 became the aim of education4 #a ,the historic situation to which reference is made is the after-effects of the ,napoleonic conquests1 especially in ,germany4 ,the ,german states felt 7and subsequent events demonstrate the correctness of the belief7 that systematic attention to education was the best means of recovering and maintaining their political integrity and power4 ,externally they were weak and divided4 ,under the leadership of ,prussian statesmen they made this condition a stimulus to the development of an extensive and thoroughly grounded system of public education4 ,this change in practice necessarily brought about a change in theory4 ,the individualistic theory receded into the background4 ,the state furnished not only the instrumentalities of public education but also its goal4 ,when the actual practice was such that the school system1 from the elementary grades through the university faculties1 supplied the patriotic citizen and soldier and the future state official and administrator and furnished the means for military1 industrial1 and political defense and expansion1 it was impossible for theory not to emphasize the aim of social efficiency4 ,and with the immense importance attached to the nationalistic state1 surrounded by other competing and more or less hostile states1 it was equally impossible to interpret social efficiency in terms of a vague cosmopolitan humanitarianism4 ,since the maintenance of a particular national sovereignty required subordination of individuals to the superior interests of the state both in military defense and in struggles for international supremacy in commerce1 social efficiency was understood to imply a like subordination4 ,the educational process was taken to be one of disciplinary training rather than of personal development4 ,since1 however1 the ideal of culture as complete development of personality persisted1 educational philosophy attempted a reconciliation of the two ideas4 ,the reconciliation took the form of the conception of the organic character of the state4 ,the individual in his isolation is nothing2 only in and through an absorption of the aims and meaning of organized institutions does he attain true personality4 ,what appears to be his subordination to political authority and the demand for sacrifice of himself to the commands of his superiors is in reality but making his own the objective reason manifested in the state--the only way in which he can become truly rational4 ,the notion of development which we have seen to be characteristic of institutional idealism 7as in the ,hegelian philosophy7 was just such a deliberate effort to combine the two ideas of complete realization of personality and thoroughgoing disciplinary subordination to existing institutions4 ,the extent of the transformation of educational philosophy which occurred in ,germany in the generation occupied by the struggle against ,napoleon for national independence1 may be gathered from ,kant1 who well expresses the earlier individual-cosmopolitan ideal4 ,in his treatise on ,pedagogics1 consisting of lectures given in the later years of the eighteenth century1 he defines education as the process by which man becomes man4 ,mankind begins its history submerged in nature--not as ,man who is a creature of reason1 while nature furnishes only instinct and appetite4 ,nature offers simply the germs which education is to develop and perfect4 ,the peculiarity of truly human life is that man has to create himself by his own voluntary efforts2 he has to make himself a truly moral1 rational1 and free being4 ,this creative effort is carried on by the educational activities of slow generations4 ,its acceleration depends upon men consciously striving to educate their successors not for the existing state of affairs but so as to make possible a future better humanity4 ,but there is the great difficulty4 ,each generation is inclined to educate its young so as to get along in the present world instead of with a view to the proper end of education3 the promotion of the best possible realization of humanity as humanity4 ,parents educate their children so that they may get on2 princes educate their subjects as instruments of their own purposes4 ,who1 then1 shall conduct education so that humanity may improve8 ,we must depend upon the efforts of enlightened men in their private capacity4 ,all culture begins with private men and spreads outward from them4 ,simply through the efforts of persons of enlarged inclinations1 who are capable of grasping the ideal of a future better condition1 is the gradual approximation of human nature to its end possible4 ,rulers are simply interested in such training as will make their subjects better tools for their own intentions4 ,even the subsidy by rulers of privately conducted schools must be carefully safeguarded4 ,for the rulers' interest in the welfare of their own nation instead of in what is best for humanity1 will make them1 if they give money for the schools1 wish to draw their plans4 ,we have in this view an express statement of the points characteristic of the eighteenth century individualistic cosmopolitanism4 ,the full development of private personality is identified with the aims of humanity as a whole and with the idea of progress4 ,in addition we have an explicit fear of the hampering influence of a state-conducted and state-regulated education upon the attainment of these ideas4 ,but in less than two decades after this time1 ,kant's philosophic successors1 ,fichte and ,hegel1 elaborated the idea that the chief function of the state is educational2 that in particular the regeneration of ,germany is to be accomplished by an education carried on in the interests of the state1 and that the private individual is of necessity an egoistic1 irrational being1 enslaved to his appetites and to circumstances unless he submits voluntarily to the educative discipline of state institutions and laws4 ,in this spirit1 ,germany was the first country to undertake a public1 universal1 and compulsory system of education extending from the primary school through the university1 and to submit to jealous state regulation and supervision all private educational enterprises4 ,two results should stand out from this brief historical survey4 ,the first is that such terms as the individual and the social conceptions of education are quite meaningless taken at large1 or apart from their context4 ,plato had the ideal of an education which should equate individual realization and social coherency and stability4 ,his situation forced his ideal into the notion of a society organized in stratified classes1 losing the individual in the class4 ,the eighteenth century educational philosophy was highly individualistic in form1 but this form was inspired by a noble and generous social ideal3 that of a society organized to include humanity1 and providing for the indefinite perfectibility of mankind4 ,the idealistic philosophy of ,germany in the early nineteenth century endeavored again to equate the ideals of a free and complete development of cultured personality with social discipline and political subordination4 ,it made the national state an intermediary between the realization of private personality on one side and of humanity on the other4 ,consequently1 it is equally possible to state its animating principle with equal truth either in the classic terms of harmonious development of all the powers of personality or in the more recent terminology of social efficiency4 ,all this reinforces the statement which opens this chapter3 ,the conception of education as a social process and function has no definite meaning until we define the kind of society we have in mind4 ,these considerations pave the way for our second conclusion4 ,one of the fundamental problems of education in and for a democratic society is set by the conflict of a nationalistic and a wider social aim4 ,the earlier cosmopolitan and humanitarian conception suffered both from vagueness and from lack of definite organs of execution and agencies of administration4 ,in ,europe1 in the ,continental states particularly1 the new idea of the importance of education for human welfare and progress was captured by national interests and harnessed to do a work whose social aim was definitely narrow and exclusive4 ,the social aim of education and its national aim were identified1 and the result was a marked obscuring of the meaning of a social aim4 ,this confusion corresponds to the existing situation of human intercourse4 ,on the one hand1 science1 commerce1 and art transcend national boundaries4 ,they are largely international in quality and method4 ,they involve interdependencies and cooperation among the peoples inhabiting different countries4 ,at the same time1 the idea of national sovereignty has never been as accentuated in politics as it is at the present time4 ,each nation lives in a state of suppressed hostility and incipient war with its neighbors4 ,each is supposed to be the supreme judge of its own interests1 and it is assumed as matter of course that each has interests which are exclusively its own4 ,to question this is to question the very idea of national sovereignty which is assumed to be basic to political practice and political science4 ,this contradiction 7for it is nothing less7 between the wider sphere of associated and mutually helpful social life and the narrower sphere of exclusive and hence potentially hostile pursuits and purposes1 exacts of educational theory a clearer conception of the meaning of social as a function and test of education than has yet been attained4 ,is it possible for an educational system to be conducted by a national state and yet the full social ends of the educative process not be restricted1 constrained1 and corrupted8 ,internally1 the question has to face the tendencies1 due to present economic conditions1 which split society into classes some of which are made merely tools for the higher culture of others4 ,externally1 the question is concerned with the reconciliation of national loyalty1 of patriotism1 with superior devotion to the things which unite men in common ends1 irrespective of national political boundaries4 ,neither phase of the problem can be worked out by merely negative means4 ,it is not enough to see to it that education is not actively used as an instrument to make easier the exploitation of one class by another4 ,school facilities must be secured of such amplitude and efficiency as will in fact and not simply in name discount the effects of economic inequalities1 and secure to all the wards of the nation equality of equipment for their future careers4 ,accomplishment of this end demands not only adequate administrative provision of school facilities1 and such supplementation of family resources as will enable youth to take advantage of them1 but also such modification of traditional ideals of culture1 traditional subjects of study and traditional methods of teaching and discipline as will retain all the youth under educational influences until they are equipped to be masters of their own economic and social careers4 ,the ideal may seem remote of execution1 but the democratic ideal of education is a farcical yet tragic delusion except as the ideal more and more dominates our public system of education4 ,the same principle has application on the side of the considerations which concern the relations of one nation to another4 ,it is not enough to teach the horrors of war and to avoid everything which would stimulate international jealousy and animosity4 ,the emphasis must be put upon whatever binds people together in cooperative human pursuits and results1 apart from geographical limitations4 ,the secondary and provisional character of national sovereignty in respect to the fuller1 freer1 and more fruitful association and intercourse of all human beings with one another must be instilled as a working disposition of mind4 ,if these applications seem to be remote from a consideration of the philosophy of education1 the impression shows that the meaning of the idea of education previously developed has not been adequately grasped4 ,this conclusion is bound up with the very idea of education as a freeing of individual capacity in a progressive growth directed to social aims4 ,otherwise a democratic criterion of education can only be inconsistently applied4 ,summary4 ,since education is a social process1 and there are many kinds of societies1 a criterion for educational criticism and construction implies a particular social ideal4 ,the two points selected by which to measure the worth of a form of social life are the extent in which the interests of a group are shared by all its members1 and the fullness and freedom with which it interacts with other groups4 ,an undesirable society1 in other words1 is one which internally and externally sets up barriers to free intercourse and communication of experience4 ,a society which makes provision for participation in its good of all its members on equal terms and which secures flexible readjustment of its institutions through interaction of the different forms of associated life is in so far democratic4 ,such a society must have a type of education which gives individuals a personal interest in social relationships and control1 and the habits of mind which secure social changes without introducing disorder4 ,three typical historic philosophies of education were considered from this point of view4 ,the ,platonic was found to have an ideal formally quite similar to that stated1 but which was compromised in its working out by making a class rather than an individual the social unit4 ,the so-called individualism of the eighteenth-century enlightenment was found to involve the notion of a society as broad as humanity1 of whose progress the individual was to be the organ4 ,but it lacked any agency for securing the development of its ideal as was evidenced in its falling back upon ,nature4 ,the institutional idealistic philosophies of the nineteenth century supplied this lack by making the national state the agency1 but in so doing narrowed the conception of the social aim to those who were members of the same political unit1 and reintroduced the idea of the subordination of the individual to the institution4 #a ,there is a much neglected strain in ,rousseau tending intellectually in this direction4 ,he opposed the existing state of affairs on the ground that it formed neither the citizen nor the man4 ,under existing conditions1 he preferred to try for the latter rather than for the former4 ,but there are many sayings of his which point to the formation of the citizen as ideally the higher1 and which indicate that his own endeavor1 as embodied in the ,emile1 was simply the best makeshift the corruption of the times permitted him to sketch4 ,chapter ,eight3 ,aims in ,education #a4 ,the ,nature of an ,aim4 ,the account of education given in our earlier chapters virtually anticipated the results reached in a discussion of the purport of education in a democratic community4 ,for it assumed that the aim of education is to enable individuals to continue their education--or that the object and reward of learning is continued capacity for growth4 ,now this idea cannot be applied to all the members of a society except where intercourse of man with man is mutual1 and except where there is adequate provision for the reconstruction of social habits and institutions by means of wide stimulation arising from equitably distributed interests4 ,and this means a democratic society4 ,in our search for aims in education1 we are not concerned1 therefore1 with finding an end outside of the educative process to which education is subordinate4 ,our whole conception forbids4 ,we are rather concerned with the contrast which exists when aims belong within the process in which they operate and when they are set up from without4 ,and the latter state of affairs must obtain when social relationships are not equitably balanced4 ,for in that case1 some portions of the whole social group will find their aims determined by an external dictation2 their aims will not arise from the free growth of their own experience1 and their nominal aims will be means to more ulterior ends of others rather than truly their own4 ,our first question is to define the nature of an aim so far as it falls within an activity1 instead of being furnished from without4 ,we approach the definition by a contrast of mere results with ends4 ,any exhibition of energy has results4 ,the wind blows about the sands of the desert2 the position of the grains is changed4 ,here is a result1 an effect1 but not an end4 ,for there is nothing in the outcome which completes or fulfills what went before it4 ,there is mere spatial redistribution4 ,one state of affairs is just as good as any other4 ,consequently there is no basis upon which to select an earlier state of affairs as a beginning1 a later as an end1 and to consider what intervenes as a process of transformation and realization4 ,consider for example the activities of bees in contrast with the changes in the sands when the wind blows them about4 ,the results of the bees' actions may be called ends not because they are designed or consciously intended1 but because they are true terminations or completions of what has preceded4 ,when the bees gather pollen and make wax and build cells1 each step prepares the way for the next4 ,when cells are built1 the queen lays eggs in them2 when eggs are laid1 they are sealed and bees brood them and keep them at a temperature required to hatch them4 ,when they are hatched1 bees feed the young till they can take care of themselves4 ,now we are so familiar with such facts1 that we are apt to dismiss them on the ground that life and instinct are a kind of miraculous thing anyway4 ,thus we fail to note what the essential characteristic of the event is2 namely1 the significance of the temporal place and order of each element2 the way each prior event leads into its successor while the successor takes up what is furnished and utilizes it for some other stage1 until we arrive at the end1 which1 as it were1 summarizes and finishes off the process4 ,since aims relate always to results1 the first thing to look to when it is a question of aims1 is whether the work assigned possesses intrinsic continuity4 ,or is it a mere serial aggregate of acts1 first doing one thing and then another8 ,to talk about an educational aim when approximately each act of a pupil is dictated by the teacher1 when the only order in the sequence of his acts is that which comes from the assignment of lessons and the giving of directions by another1 is to talk nonsense4 ,it is equally fatal to an aim to permit capricious or discontinuous action in the name of spontaneous self-expression4 ,an aim implies an orderly and ordered activity1 one in which the order consists in the progressive completing of a process4 ,given an activity having a time span and cumulative growth within the time succession1 an aim means foresight in advance of the end or possible termination4 ,if bees anticipated the consequences of their activity1 if they perceived their end in imaginative foresight1 they would have the primary element in an aim4 ,hence it is nonsense to talk about the aim of education--or any other undertaking--where conditions do not permit of foresight of results1 and do not stimulate a person to look ahead to see what the outcome of a given activity is to be4 ,in the next place the aim as a foreseen end gives direction to the activity2 it is not an idle view of a mere spectator1 but influences the steps taken to reach the end4 ,the foresight functions in three ways4 ,in the first place1 it involves careful observation of the given conditions to see what are the means available for reaching the end1 and to discover the hindrances in the way4 ,in the second place1 it suggests the proper order or sequence in the use of means4 ,it facilitates an economical selection and arrangement4 ,in the third place1 it makes choice of alternatives possible4 ,if we can predict the outcome of acting this way or that1 we can then compare the value of the two courses of action2 we can pass judgment upon their relative desirability4 ,if we know that stagnant water breeds mosquitoes and that they are likely to carry disease1 we can1 disliking that anticipated result1 take steps to avert it4 ,since we do not anticipate results as mere intellectual onlookers1 but as persons concerned in the outcome1 we are partakers in the process which produces the result4 ,we intervene to bring about this result or that4 ,of course these three points are closely connected with one another4 ,we can definitely foresee results only as we make careful scrutiny of present conditions1 and the importance of the outcome supplies the motive for observations4 ,the more adequate our observations1 the more varied is the scene of conditions and obstructions that presents itself1 and the more numerous are the alternatives between which choice may be made4 ,in turn1 the more numerous the recognized possibilities of the situation1 or alternatives of action1 the more meaning does the chosen activity possess1 and the more flexibly controllable is it4 ,where only a single outcome has been thought of1 the mind has nothing else to think of2 the meaning attaching to the act is limited4 ,one only steams ahead toward the mark4 ,sometimes such a narrow course may be effective4 ,but if unexpected difficulties offer themselves1 one has not as many resources at command as if he had chosen the same line of action after a broader survey of the possibilities of the field4 ,he cannot make needed readjustments readily4 ,the net conclusion is that acting with an aim is all one with acting intelligently4 ,to foresee a terminus of an act is to have a basis upon which to observe1 to select1 and to order objects and our own capacities4 ,to do these things means to have a mind--for mind is precisely intentional purposeful activity controlled by perception of facts and their relationships to one another4 ,to have a mind to do a thing is to foresee a future possibility2 it is to have a plan for its accomplishment2 it is to note the means which make the plan capable of execution and the obstructions in the way1--or1 if it is really a mind to do the thing and not a vague aspiration--it is to have a plan which takes account of resources and difficulties4 ,mind is capacity to refer present conditions to future results1 and future consequences to present conditions4 ,and these traits are just what is meant by having an aim or a purpose4 ,a man is stupid or blind or unintelligent--lacking in mind--just in the degree in which in any activity he does not know what he is about1 namely1 the probable consequences of his acts4 ,a man is imperfectly intelligent when he contents himself with looser guesses about the outcome than is needful1 just taking a chance with his luck1 or when he forms plans apart from study of the actual conditions1 including his own capacities4 ,such relative absence of mind means to make our feelings the measure of what is to happen4 ,to be intelligent we must stop1 look1 listen in making the plan of an activity4 ,to identify acting with an aim and intelligent activity is enough to show its value--its function in experience4 ,we are only too given to making an entity out of the abstract noun consciousness4 ,we forget that it comes from the adjective conscious4 ,to be conscious is to be aware of what we are about2 conscious signifies the deliberate1 observant1 planning traits of activity4 ,consciousness is nothing which we have which gazes idly on the scene around one or which has impressions made upon it by physical things2 it is a name for the purposeful quality of an activity1 for the fact that it is directed by an aim4 ,put the other way about1 to have an aim is to act with meaning1 not like an automatic machine2 it is to mean to do something and to perceive the meaning of things in the light of that intent4 #b4 ,the ,criteria of ,good ,aims4 ,we may apply the results of our discussion to a consideration of the criteria involved in a correct establishing of aims4 7#a7 ,the aim set up must be an outgrowth of existing conditions4 ,it must be based upon a consideration of what is already going on2 upon the resources and difficulties of the situation4 ,theories about the proper end of our activities--educational and moral theories--often violate this principle4 ,they assume ends lying outside our activities2 ends foreign to the concrete makeup of the situation2 ends which issue from some outside source4 ,then the problem is to bring our activities to bear upon the realization of these externally supplied ends4 ,they are something for which we ought to act4 ,in any case such aims limit intelligence2 they are not the expression of mind in foresight1 observation1 and choice of the better among alternative possibilities4 ,they limit intelligence because1 given ready-made1 they must be imposed by some authority external to intelligence1 leaving to the latter nothing but a mechanical choice of means4 7#b7 ,we have spoken as if aims could be completely formed prior to the attempt to realize them4 ,this impression must now be qualified4 ,the aim as it first emerges is a mere tentative sketch4 ,the act of striving to realize it tests its worth4 ,if it suffices to direct activity successfully1 nothing more is required1 since its whole function is to set a mark in advance2 and at times a mere hint may suffice4 ,but usually--at least in complicated situations--acting upon it brings to light conditions which had been overlooked4 ,this calls for revision of the original aim2 it has to be added to and subtracted from4 ,an aim must1 then1 be flexible2 it must be capable of alteration to meet circumstances4 ,an end established externally to the process of action is always rigid4 ,being inserted or imposed from without1 it is not supposed to have a working relationship to the concrete conditions of the situation4 ,what happens in the course of action neither confirms1 refutes1 nor alters it4 ,such an end can only be insisted upon4 ,the failure that results from its lack of adaptation is attributed simply to the perverseness of conditions1 not to the fact that the end is not reasonable under the circumstances4 ,the value of a legitimate aim1 on the contrary1 lies in the fact that we can use it to change conditions4 ,it is a method for dealing with conditions so as to effect desirable alterations in them4 ,a farmer who should passively accept things just as he finds them would make as great a mistake as he who framed his plans in complete disregard of what soil1 climate1 etc41 permit4 ,one of the evils of an abstract or remote external aim in education is that its very inapplicability in practice is likely to react into a haphazard snatching at immediate conditions4 ,a good aim surveys the present state of experience of pupils1 and forming a tentative plan of treatment1 keeps the plan constantly in view and yet modifies it as conditions develop4 ,the aim1 in short1 is experimental1 and hence constantly growing as it is tested in action4 7#c7 ,the aim must always represent a freeing of activities4 ,the term end in view is suggestive1 for it puts before the mind the termination or conclusion of some process4 ,the only way in which we can define an activity is by putting before ourselves the objects in which it terminates--as one's aim in shooting is the target4 ,but we must remember that the object is only a mark or sign by which the mind specifies the activity one desires to carry out4 ,strictly speaking1 not the target but hitting the target is the end in view2 one takes aim by means of the target1 but also by the sight on the gun4 ,the different objects which are thought of are means of directing the activity4 ,thus one aims at1 say1 a rabbit2 what he wants is to shoot straight3 a certain kind of activity4 ,or1 if it is the rabbit he wants1 it is not rabbit apart from his activity1 but as a factor in activity2 he wants to eat the rabbit1 or to show it as evidence of his marksmanship--he wants to do something with it4 ,the doing with the thing1 not the thing in isolation1 is his end4 ,the object is but a phase of the active end1--continuing the activity successfully4 ,this is what is meant by the phrase1 used above1 freeing activity4 ,in contrast with fulfilling some process in order that activity may go on1 stands the static character of an end which is imposed from without the activity4 ,it is always conceived of as fixed2 it is something to be attained and possessed4 ,when one has such a notion1 activity is a mere unavoidable means to something else2 it is not significant or important on its own account4 ,as compared with the end it is but a necessary evil2 something which must be gone through before one can reach the object which is alone worth while4 ,in other words1 the external idea of the aim leads to a separation of means from end1 while an end which grows up within an activity as plan for its direction is always both ends and means1 the distinction being only one of convenience4 ,every means is a temporary end until we have attained it4 ,every end becomes a means of carrying activity further as soon as it is achieved4 ,we call it end when it marks off the future direction of the activity in which we are engaged2 means when it marks off the present direction4 ,every divorce of end from means diminishes by that much the significance of the activity and tends to reduce it to a drudgery from which one would escape if he could4 ,a farmer has to use plants and animals to carry on his farming activities4 ,it certainly makes a great difference to his life whether he is fond of them1 or whether he regards them merely as means which he has to employ to get something else in which alone he is interested4 ,in the former case1 his entire course of activity is significant2 each phase of it has its own value4 ,he has the experience of realizing his end at every stage2 the postponed aim1 or end in view1 being merely a sight ahead by which to keep his activity going fully and freely4 ,for if he does not look ahead1 he is more likely to find himself blocked4 ,the aim is as definitely a means of action as is any other portion of an activity4 #c4 ,applications in ,education4 ,there is nothing peculiar about educational aims4 ,they are just like aims in any directed occupation4 ,the educator1 like the farmer1 has certain things to do1 certain resources with which to do1 and certain obstacles with which to contend4 ,the conditions with which the farmer deals1 whether as obstacles or resources1 have their own structure and operation independently of any purpose of his4 ,seeds sprout1 rain falls1 the sun shines1 insects devour1 blight comes1 the seasons change4 ,his aim is simply to utilize these various conditions2 to make his activities and their energies work together1 instead of against one another4 ,it would be absurd if the farmer set up a purpose of farming1 without any reference to these conditions of soil1 climate1 characteristic of plant growth1 etc4 ,his purpose is simply a foresight of the consequences of his energies connected with those of the things about him1 a foresight used to direct his movements from day to day4 ,foresight of possible consequences leads to more careful and extensive observation of the nature and performances of the things he had to do with1 and to laying out a plan--that is1 of a certain order in the acts to be performed4 ,it is the same with the educator1 whether parent or teacher4 ,it is as absurd for the latter to set up his own aims as the proper objects of the growth of the children as it would be for the farmer to set up an ideal of farming irrespective of conditions4 ,aims mean acceptance of responsibility for the observations1 anticipations1 and arrangements required in carrying on a function--whether farming or educating4 ,any aim is of value so far as it assists observation1 choice1 and planning in carrying on activity from moment to moment and hour to hour2 if it gets in the way of the individual's own common sense 7as it will surely do if imposed from without or accepted on authority7 it does harm4 ,and it is well to remind ourselves that education as such has no aims4 ,only persons1 parents1 and teachers1 etc41 have aims1 not an abstract idea like education4 ,and consequently their purposes are indefinitely varied1 differing with different children1 changing as children grow and with the growth of experience on the part of the one who teaches4 ,even the most valid aims which can be put in words will1 as words1 do more harm than good unless one recognizes that they are not aims1 but rather suggestions to educators as to how to observe1 how to look ahead1 and how to choose in liberating and directing the energies of the concrete situations in which they find themselves4 ,as a recent writer has said3 ,to lead this boy to read ,scott's novels instead of old ,sleuth's stories2 to teach this girl to sew2 to root out the habit of bullying from ,john's make-up2 to prepare this class to study medicine1--these are samples of the millions of aims we have actually before us in the concrete work of education4 ,bearing these qualifications in mind1 we shall proceed to state some of the characteristics found in all good educational aims4 7#a7 ,an educational aim must be founded upon the intrinsic activities and needs 7including original instincts and acquired habits7 of the given individual to be educated4 ,the tendency of such an aim as preparation is1 as we have seen1 to omit existing powers1 and find the aim in some remote accomplishment or responsibility4 ,in general1 there is a disposition to take considerations which are dear to the hearts of adults and set them up as ends irrespective of the capacities of those educated4 ,there is also an inclination to propound aims which are so uniform as to neglect the specific powers and requirements of an individual1 forgetting that all learning is something which happens to an individual at a given time and place4 ,the larger range of perception of the adult is of great value in observing the abilities and weaknesses of the young1 in deciding what they may amount to4 ,thus the artistic capacities of the adult exhibit what certain tendencies of the child are capable of2 if we did not have the adult achievements we should be without assurance as to the significance of the drawing1 reproducing1 modeling1 coloring activities of childhood4 ,so if it were not for adult language1 we should not be able to see the import of the babbling impulses of infancy4 ,but it is one thing to use adult accomplishments as a context in which to place and survey the doings of childhood and youth2 it is quite another to set them up as a fixed aim without regard to the concrete activities of those educated4 7#b7 ,an aim must be capable of translation into a method of cooperating with the activities of those undergoing instruction4 ,it must suggest the kind of environment needed to liberate and to organize their capacities4 ,unless it lends itself to the construction of specific procedures1 and unless these procedures test1 correct1 and amplify the aim1 the latter is worthless4 ,instead of helping the specific task of teaching1 it prevents the use of ordinary judgment in observing and sizing up the situation4 ,it operates to exclude recognition of everything except what squares up with the fixed end in view4 ,every rigid aim just because it is rigidly given seems to render it unnecessary to give careful attention to concrete conditions4 ,since it must apply anyhow1 what is the use of noting details which do not count8 ,the vice of externally imposed ends has deep roots4 ,teachers receive them from superior authorities2 these authorities accept them from what is current in the community4 ,the teachers impose them upon children4 ,as a first consequence1 the intelligence of the teacher is not free2 it is confined to receiving the aims laid down from above4 ,too rarely is the individual teacher so free from the dictation of authoritative supervisor1 textbook on methods1 prescribed course of study1 etc41 that he can let his mind come to close quarters with the pupil's mind and the subject matter4 ,this distrust of the teacher's experience is then reflected in lack of confidence in the responses of pupils4 ,the latter receive their aims through a double or treble external imposition1 and are constantly confused by the conflict between the aims which are natural to their own experience at the time and those in which they are taught to acquiesce4 ,until the democratic criterion of the intrinsic significance of every growing experience is recognized1 we shall be intellectually confused by the demand for adaptation to external aims4 7#c7 ,educators have to be on their guard against ends that are alleged to be general and ultimate4 ,every activity1 however specific1 is1 of course1 general in its ramified connections1 for it leads out indefinitely into other things4 ,so far as a general idea makes us more alive to these connections1 it cannot be too general4 ,but general also means abstract1 or detached from all specific context4 ,and such abstractness means remoteness1 and throws us back1 once more1 upon teaching and learning as mere means of getting ready for an end disconnected from the means4 ,that education is literally and all the time its own reward means that no alleged study or discipline is educative unless it is worth while in its own immediate having4 ,a truly general aim broadens the outlook2 it stimulates one to take more consequences 7connections7 into account4 ,this means a wider and more flexible observation of means4 ,the more interacting forces1 for example1 the farmer takes into account1 the more varied will be his immediate resources4 ,he will see a greater number of possible starting places1 and a greater number of ways of getting at what he wants to do4 ,the fuller one's conception of possible future achievements1 the less his present activity is tied down to a small number of alternatives4 ,if one knew enough1 one could start almost anywhere and sustain his activities continuously and fruitfully4 ,understanding then the term general or comprehensive aim simply in the sense of a broad survey of the field of present activities1 we shall take up some of the larger ends which have currency in the educational theories of the day1 and consider what light they throw upon the immediate concrete and diversified aims which are always the educator's real concern4 ,we premise 7as indeed immediately follows from what has been said7 that there is no need of making a choice among them or regarding them as competitors4 ,when we come to act in a tangible way we have to select or choose a particular act at a particular time1 but any number of comprehensive ends may exist without competition1 since they mean simply different ways of looking at the same scene4 ,one cannot climb a number of different mountains simultaneously1 but the views had when different mountains are ascended supplement one another3 they do not set up incompatible1 competing worlds4 ,or1 putting the matter in a slightly different way1 one statement of an end may suggest certain questions and observations1 and another statement another set of questions1 calling for other observations4 ,then the more general ends we have1 the better4 ,one statement will emphasize what another slurs over4 ,what a plurality of hypotheses does for the scientific investigator1 a plurality of stated aims may do for the instructor4 ,summary4 ,an aim denotes the result of any natural process brought to consciousness and made a factor in determining present observation and choice of ways of acting4 ,it signifies that an activity has become intelligent4 ,specifically it means foresight of the alternative consequences attendant upon acting in a given situation in different ways1 and the use of what is anticipated to direct observation and experiment4 ,a true aim is thus opposed at every point to an aim which is imposed upon a process of action from without4 ,the latter is fixed and rigid2 it is not a stimulus to intelligence in the given situation1 but is an externally dictated order to do such and such things4 ,instead of connecting directly with present activities1 it is remote1 divorced from the means by which it is to be reached4 ,instead of suggesting a freer and better balanced activity1 it is a limit set to activity4 ,in education1 the currency of these externally imposed aims is responsible for the emphasis put upon the notion of preparation for a remote future and for rendering the work of both teacher and pupil mechanical and slavish4 ,chapter ,nine3 ,natural ,development and ,social ,efficiency as ,aims #a4 ,nature as ,supplying the ,aim4 ,we have just pointed out the futility of trying to establish the aim of education--some one final aim which subordinates all others to itself4 ,we have indicated that since general aims are but prospective points of view from which to survey the existing conditions and estimate their possibilities1 we might have any number of them1 all consistent with one another4 ,as matter of fact1 a large number have been stated at different times1 all having great local value4 ,for the statement of aim is a matter of emphasis at a given time4 ,and we do not emphasize things which do not require emphasis--that is1 such things as are taking care of themselves fairly well4 ,we tend rather to frame our statement on the basis of the defects and needs of the contemporary situation2 we take for granted1 without explicit statement which would be of no use1 whatever is right or approximately so4 ,we frame our explicit aims in terms of some alteration to be brought about4 ,it is1 then1 ,,do paradox requiring explanation that a given epoch or generation tends to emphasize in its conscious projections just the things which it has least of in actual fact4 ,a time of domination by authority will call out as response the desirability of great individual freedom2 one of disorganized individual activities the need of social control as an educational aim4 ,the actual and implicit practice and the conscious or stated aim thus balance each other4 ,at different times such aims as complete living1 better methods of language study1 substitution of things for words1 social efficiency1 personal culture1 social service1 complete development of personality1 encyclopedic knowledge1 discipline1 a esthetic contemplation1 utility1 etc41 have served4 ,the following discussion takes up three statements of recent influence2 certain others have been incidentally discussed in the previous chapters1 and others will be considered later in a discussion of knowledge and of the values of studies4 ,we begin with a consideration that education is a process of development in accordance with nature1 taking ,rousseau's statement1 which opposed natural to social 7,see ante1 p4 #ia72 and then pass over to the antithetical conception of social efficiency1 which often opposes social to natural4 7#a7 ,educational reformers disgusted with the conventionality and artificiality of the scholastic methods they find about them are prone to resort to nature as a standard4 ,nature is supposed to furnish the law and the end of development2 ours it is to follow and conform to her ways4 ,the positive value of this conception lies in the forcible way in which it calls attention to the wrongness of aims which do not have regard to the natural endowment of those educated4 ,its weakness is the ease with which natural in the sense of normal is confused with the physical4 ,the constructive use of intelligence in foresight1 and contriving1 is then discounted2 we are just to get out of the way and allow nature to do the work4 ,since no one has stated in the doctrine both its truth and falsity better than ,rousseau1 we shall turn to him4 ,education1 he says1 we receive from three sources--,nature1 men1 and things4 ,the spontaneous development of our organs and capacities constitutes the education of ,nature4 ,the use to which we are taught to put this development constitutes that education given us by ,men4 ,the acquirement of personal experience from surrounding objects constitutes that of things4 ,only when these three kinds of education are consonant and make for the same end1 does a man tend towards his true goal4 ,if we are asked what is this end1 the answer is that of ,nature4 ,for since the concurrence of the three kinds of education is necessary to their completeness1 the kind which is entirely independent of our control must necessarily regulate us in determining the other two4 ,then he defines ,nature to mean the capacities and dispositions which are inborn1 as they exist prior to the modification due to constraining habits and the influence of the opinion of others4 ,the wording of ,rousseau will repay careful study4 ,it contains as fundamental truths as have been uttered about education in conjunction with a curious twist4 ,it would be impossible to say better what is said in the first sentences4 ,the three factors of educative development are 7a7 the native structure of our bodily organs and their functional activities2 7b7 the uses to which the activities of these organs are put under the influence of other persons2 7c7 their direct interaction with the environment4 ,this statement certainly covers the ground4 ,his other two propositions are equally sound2 namely1 7a7 that only when the three factors of education are consonant and cooperative does adequate development of the individual occur1 and 7b7 that the native activities of the organs1 being original1 are basic in conceiving consonance4 ,but it requires but little reading between the lines1 supplemented by other statements of ,rousseau1 to perceive that instead of regarding these three things as factors which must work together to some extent in order that any one of them may proceed educatively1 he regards them as separate and independent operations4 ,especially does he believe that there is an independent and1 as he says1 spontaneous development of the native organs and faculties4 ,he thinks that this development can go on irrespective of the use to which they are put4 ,and it is to this separate development that education coming from social contact is to be subordinated4 ,now there is an immense difference between a use of native activities in accord with those activities themselves--as distinct from forcing them and perverting them--and supposing that they have a normal development apart from any use1 which development furnishes the standard and norm of all learning by use4 ,to recur to our previous illustration1 the process of acquiring language is a practically perfect model of proper educative growth4 ,the start is from native activities of the vocal apparatus1 organs of hearing1 etc4 ,but it is absurd to suppose that these have an independent growth of their own1 which left to itself would evolve a perfect speech4 ,taken literally1 ,rousseau's principle would mean that adults should accept and repeat the babblings and noises of children not merely as the beginnings of the development of articulate speech--which they are--but as furnishing language itself--the standard for all teaching of language4 ,the point may be summarized by saying that ,rousseau was right1 introducing a much-needed reform into education1 in holding that the structure and activities of the organs furnish the conditions of all teaching of the use of the organs2 but profoundly wrong in intimating that they supply not only the conditions but also the ends of their development4 ,as matter of fact1 the native activities develop1 in contrast with random and capricious exercise1 through the uses to which they are put4 ,and the office of the social medium is1 as we have seen1 to direct growth through putting powers to the best possible use4 ,the instinctive activities may be called1 metaphorically1 spontaneous1 in the sense that the organs give a strong bias for a certain sort of operation1--a bias so strong that we cannot go contrary to it1 though by trying to go contrary we may pervert1 stunt1 and corrupt them4 ,but the notion of a spontaneous normal development of these activities is pure mythology4 ,the natural1 or native1 powers furnish the initiating and limiting forces in all education2 they do not furnish its ends or aims4 ,there is no learning except from a beginning in unlearned powers1 but learning is not a matter of the spontaneous overflow of the unlearned powers4 ,rousseau's contrary opinion is doubtless due to the fact that he identified ,god with ,nature2 to him the original powers are wholly good1 coming directly from a wise and good creator4 ,to paraphrase the old saying about the country and the town1 ,god made the original human organs and faculties1 man makes the uses to which they are put4 ,consequently the development of the former furnishes the standard to which the latter must be subordinated4 ,when men attempt to determine the uses to which the original activities shall be put1 they interfere with a divine plan4 ,the interference by social arrangements with ,nature1 ,god's work1 is the primary source of corruption in individuals4 ,rousseau's passionate assertion of the intrinsic goodness of all natural tendencies was a reaction against the prevalent notion of the total depravity of innate human nature1 and has had a powerful influence in modifying the attitude towards children's interests4 ,but it is hardly necessary to say that primitive impulses are of themselves neither good nor evil1 but become one or the other according to the objects for which they are employed4 ,that neglect1 suppression1 and premature forcing of some instincts at the expense of others1 are responsible for many avoidable ills1 there can be no doubt4 ,but the moral is not to leave them alone to follow their own spontaneous development1 but to provide an environment which shall organize them4 ,returning to the elements of truth contained in ,rousseau's statements1 we find that natural development1 as an aim1 enables him to point the means of correcting many evils in current practices1 and to indicate a number of desirable specific aims4 7#a7 ,natural development as an aim fixes attention upon the bodily organs and the need of health and vigor4 ,the aim of natural development says to parents and teachers3 ,make health an aim2 normal development cannot be had without regard to the vigor of the body--an obvious enough fact and yet one whose due recognition in practice would almost automatically revolutionize many of our educational practices4 ,nature is indeed a vague and metaphorical term1 but one thing that ,nature may be said to utter is that there are conditions of educational efficiency1 and that till we have learned what these conditions are and have learned to make our practices accord with them1 the noblest and most ideal of our aims are doomed to suffer--are verbal and sentimental rather than efficacious4 7#b7 ,the aim of natural development translates into the aim of respect for physical mobility4 ,in ,rousseau's words3 ,children are always in motion2 a sedentary life is injurious4 ,when he says that ,nature's intention is to strengthen the body before exercising the mind he hardly states the fact fairly4 ,but if he had said that nature's intention 7to adopt his poetical form of speech7 is to develop the mind especially by exercise of the muscles of the body he would have stated a positive fact4 ,in other words1 the aim of following nature means1 in the concrete1 regard for the actual part played by use of the bodily organs in explorations1 in handling of materials1 in plays and games4 7#c7 ,the general aim translates into the aim of regard for individual differences among children4 ,nobody can take the principle of consideration of native powers into account without being struck by the fact that these powers differ in different individuals4 ,the difference applies not merely to their intensity1 but even more to their quality and arrangement4 ,as ,rouseau said3 ,each individual is born with a distinctive temperament4 ,we indiscriminately employ children of different bents on the same exercises2 their education destroys the special bent and leaves a dull uniformity4 ,therefore after we have wasted our efforts in stunting the true gifts of nature we see the short-lived and illusory brilliance we have substituted die away1 while the natural abilities we have crushed do not revive4 ,lastly1 the aim of following nature means to note the origin1 the waxing1 and waning1 of preferences and interests4 ,capacities bud and bloom irregularly2 there is no even four-abreast development4 ,we must strike while the iron is hot4 ,especially precious are the first dawnings of power4 ,more than we imagine1 the ways in which the tendencies of early childhood are treated fix fundamental dispositions and condition the turn taken by powers that show themselves later4 ,educational concern with the early years of life--as distinct from inculcation of useful arts--dates almost entirely from the time of the emphasis by ,pestalozzi and ,froebel1 following ,rousseau1 of natural principles of growth4 ,the irregularity of growth and its significance is indicated in the following passage of a student of the growth of the nervous system4 ,while growth continues1 things bodily and mental are lopsided1 for growth is never general1 but is accentuated now at one spot1 now at another4 ,the methods which shall recognize in the presence of these enormous differences of endowment the dynamic values of natural inequalities of growth1 and utilize them1 preferring irregularity to the rounding out gained by pruning will most closely follow that which takes place in the body and thus prove most effective4 #a ,observation of natural tendencies is difficult under conditions of restraint4 ,they show themselves most readily in a child's spontaneous sayings and doings1--that is1 in those he engages in when not put at set tasks and when not aware of being under observation4 ,it does not follow that these tendencies are all desirable because they are natural2 but it does follow that since they are there1 they are operative and must be taken account of4 ,we must see to it that the desirable ones have an environment which keeps them active1 and that their activity shall control the direction the others take and thereby induce the disuse of the latter because they lead to nothing4 ,many tendencies that trouble parents when they appear are likely to be transitory1 and sometimes too much direct attention to them only fixes a child's attention upon them4 ,at all events1 adults too easily assume their own habits and wishes as standards1 and regard all deviations of children's impulses as evils to be eliminated4 ,that artificiality against which the conception of following nature is so largely a protest1 is the outcome of attempts to force children directly into the mold of grown-up standards4 ,in conclusion1 we note that the early history of the idea of following nature combined two factors which had no inherent connection with one another4 ,before the time of ,rousseau educational reformers had been inclined to urge the importance of education by ascribing practically unlimited power to it4 ,all the differences between peoples and between classes and persons among the same people were said to be due to differences of training1 of exercise1 and practice4 ,originally1 mind1 reason1 understanding is1 for all practical purposes1 the same in all4 ,this essential identity of mind means the essential equality of all and the possibility of bringing them all to the same level4 ,as a protest against this view1 the doctrine of accord with nature meant a much less formal and abstract view of mind and its powers4 ,it substituted specific instincts and impulses and physiological capacities1 differing from individual to individual 7just as they differ1 as ,rousseau pointed out1 even in dogs of the same litter71 for abstract faculties of discernment1 memory1 and generalization4 ,upon this side1 the doctrine of educative accord with nature has been reinforced by the development of modern biology1 physiology1 and psychology4 ,it means1 in effect1 that great as is the significance of nurture1 of modification1 and transformation through direct educational effort1 nature1 or unlearned capacities1 affords the foundation and ultimate resources for such nurture4 ,on the other hand1 the doctrine of following nature was a political dogma4 ,it meant a rebellion against existing social institutions1 customs1 and ideals 7,see ante1 p4 #ia74 ,rousseau's statement that everything is good as it comes from the hands of the ,creator has its signification only in its contrast with the concluding part of the same sentence3 ,everything degenerates in the hands of man4 ,and again he says3 ,natural man has an absolute value2 he is a numerical unit1 a complete integer and has no relation save to himself and to his fellow man4 ,civilized man is only a relative unit1 the numerator of a fraction whose value depends upon its dominator1 its relation to the integral body of society4 ,good political institutions are those which make a man unnatural4 ,it is upon this conception of the artificial and harmful character of organized social life as it now exists #b that he rested the notion that nature not merely furnishes prime forces which initiate growth but also its plan and goal4 ,that evil institutions and customs work almost automatically to give a wrong education which the most careful schooling cannot offset is true enough2 but the conclusion is not to education apart from the environment1 but to provide an environment in which native powers will be put to better uses4 #b4 ,social ,efficiency as ,aim4 ,a conception which made nature supply the end of a true education and society the end of an evil one1 could hardly fail to call out a protest4 ,the opposing emphasis took the form of a doctrine that the business of education is to supply precisely what nature fails to secure2 namely1 habituation of an individual to social control2 subordination of natural powers to social rules4 ,it is not surprising to find that the value in the idea of social efficiency resides largely in its protest against the points at which the doctrine of natural development went astray2 while its misuse comes when it is employed to slur over the truth in that conception4 ,it is a fact that we must look to the activities and achievements of associated life to find what the development of power--that is to say1 efficiency--means4 ,the error is in implying that we must adopt measures of subordination rather than of utilization to secure efficiency4 ,the doctrine is rendered adequate when we recognize that social efficiency is attained not by negative constraint but by positive use of native individual capacities in occupations having a social meaning4 7#a7 ,translated into specific aims1 social efficiency indicates the importance of industrial competency4 ,persons cannot live without means of subsistence2 the ways in which these means are employed and consumed have a profound influence upon all the relationships of persons to one another4 ,if an individual is not able to earn his own living and that of the children dependent upon him1 he is a drag or parasite upon the activities of others4 ,he misses for himself one of the most educative experiences of life4 ,if he is not trained in the right use of the products of industry1 there is grave danger that he may deprave himself and injure others in his possession of wealth4 ,no scheme of education can afford to neglect such basic considerations4 ,yet in the name of higher and more spiritual ideals1 the arrangements for higher education have often not only neglected them1 but looked at them with scorn as beneath the level of educative concern4 ,with the change from an oligarchical to a democratic society1 it is natural that the significance of an education which should have as a result ability to make one's way economically in the world1 and to manage economic resources usefully instead of for mere display and luxury1 should receive emphasis4 ,there is1 however1 grave danger that in insisting upon this end1 existing economic conditions and standards will be accepted as final4 ,a democratic criterion requires us to develop capacity to the point of competency to choose and make its own career4 ,this principle is violated when the attempt is made to fit individuals in advance for definite industrial callings1 selected not on the basis of trained original capacities1 but on that of the wealth or social status of parents4 ,as a matter of fact1 industry at the present time undergoes rapid and abrupt changes through the evolution of new inventions4 ,new industries spring up1 and old ones are revolutionized4 ,consequently an attempt to train for too specific a mode of efficiency defeats its own purpose4 ,when the occupation changes its methods1 such individuals are left behind with even less ability to readjust themselves than if they had a less definite training4 ,but1 most of all1 the present industrial constitution of society is1 like every society which has ever existed1 full of inequities4 ,it is the aim of progressive education to take part in correcting unfair privilege and unfair deprivation1 not to perpetuate them4 ,wherever social control means subordination of individual activities to class authority1 there is danger that industrial education will be dominated by acceptance of the status quo4 ,differences of economic opportunity then dictate what the future callings of individuals are to be4 ,we have an unconscious revival of the defects of the ,platonic scheme 7ante1 p4 #hi7 without its enlightened method of selection4 7#b7 ,civic efficiency1 or good citizenship4 ,it is1 of course1 arbitrary to separate industrial competency from capacity in good citizenship4 ,but the latter term may be used to indicate a number of qualifications which are vaguer than vocational ability4 ,these traits run from whatever make an individual a more agreeable companion to citizenship in the political sense3 it denotes ability to judge men and measures wisely and to take a determining part in making as well as obeying laws4 ,the aim of civic efficiency has at least the merit of protecting us from the notion of a training of mental power at large4 ,it calls attention to the fact that power must be relative to doing something1 and to the fact that the things which most need to be done are things which involve one's relationships with others4 ,here again we have to be on guard against understanding the aim too narrowly4 ,an over-definite interpretation would at certain periods have excluded scientific discoveries1 in spite of the fact that in the last analysis security of social progress depends upon them4 ,for scientific men would have been thought to be mere theoretical dreamers1 totally lacking in social efficiency4 ,it must be borne in mind that ultimately social efficiency means neither more nor less than capacity to share in a give and take of experience4 ,it covers all that makes one's own experience more worth while to others1 and all that enables one to participate more richly in the worthwhile experiences of others4 ,ability to produce and to enjoy art1 capacity for recreation1 the significant utilization of leisure1 are more important elements in it than elements conventionally associated oftentimes with citizenship4 ,in the broadest sense1 social efficiency is nothing less than that socialization of mind which is actively concerned in making experiences more communicable2 in breaking down the barriers of social stratification which make individuals impervious to the interests of others4 ,when social efficiency is confined to the service rendered by overt acts1 its chief constituent 7because its only guarantee7 is omitted1--intelligent sympathy or good will4 ,for sympathy as a desirable quality is something more than mere feeling2 it is a cultivated imagination for what men have in common and a rebellion at whatever unnecessarily divides them4 ,what is sometimes called a benevolent interest in others may be but an unwitting mask for an attempt to dictate to them what their good shall be1 instead of an endeavor to free them so that they may seek and find the good of their own choice4 ,social efficiency1 even social service1 are hard and metallic things when severed from an active acknowledgment of the diversity of goods which life may afford to different persons1 and from faith in the social utility of encouraging every individual to make his own choice intelligent4 #c4 ,culture as ,aim4 ,whether or not social efficiency is an aim which is consistent with culture turns upon these considerations4 ,culture means at least something cultivated1 something ripened2 it is opposed to the raw and crude4 ,when the natural is identified with this rawness1 culture is opposed to what is called natural development4 ,culture is also something personal2 it is cultivation with respect to appreciation of ideas and art and broad human interests4 ,when efficiency is identified with a narrow range of acts1 instead of with the spirit and meaning of activity1 culture is opposed to efficiency4 ,whether called culture or complete development of personality1 the outcome is identical with the true meaning of social efficiency whenever attention is given to what is unique in an individual--and he would not be an individual if there were not something incommensurable about him4 ,its opposite is the mediocre1 the average4 ,whenever distinctive quality is developed1 distinction of personality results1 and with it greater promise for a social service which goes beyond the supply in quantity of material commodities4 ,for how can there be a society really worth serving unless it is constituted of individuals of significant personal qualities8 ,the fact is that the opposition of high worth of personality to social efficiency is a product of a feudally organized society with its rigid division of inferior and superior4 ,the latter are supposed to have time and opportunity to develop themselves as human beings2 the former are confined to providing external products4 ,when social efficiency as measured by product or output is urged as an ideal in a would-be democratic society1 it means that the depreciatory estimate of the masses characteristic of an aristocratic community is accepted and carried over4 ,but if democracy has a moral and ideal meaning1 it is that a social return be demanded from all and that opportunity for development of distinctive capacities be afforded all4 ,the separation of the two aims in education is fatal to democracy2 the adoption of the narrower meaning of efficiency deprives it of its essential justification4 ,the aim of efficiency 7like any educational aim7 must be included within the process of experience4 ,when it is measured by tangible external products1 and not by the achieving of a distinctively valuable experience1 it becomes materialistic4 ,results in the way of commodities which may be the outgrowth of an efficient personality are1 in the strictest sense1 by-products of education3 by-products which are inevitable and important1 but nevertheless by-products4 ,to set up an external aim strengthens by reaction the false conception of culture which identifies it with something purely inner4 ,and the idea of perfecting an inner personality is a sure sign of social divisions4 ,what is called inner is simply that which does not connect with others--which is not capable of free and full communication4 ,what is termed spiritual culture has usually been futile1 with something rotten about it1 just because it has been conceived as a thing which a man might have internally--and therefore exclusively4 ,what one is as a person is what one is as associated with others1 in a free give and take of intercourse4 ,this transcends both the efficiency which consists in supplying products to others and the culture which is an exclusive refinement and polish4 ,any individual has missed his calling1 farmer1 physician1 teacher1 student1 who does not find that the accomplishments of results of value to others is an accompaniment of a process of experience inherently worth while4 ,why then should it be thought that one must take his choice between sacrificing himself to doing useful things for others1 or sacrificing them to pursuit of his own exclusive ends1 whether the saving of his own soul or the building of an inner spiritual life and personality8 ,what happens is that since neither of these things is persistently possible1 we get a compromise and an alternation4 ,one tries each course by turns4 ,there is no greater tragedy than that so much of the professedly spiritual and religious thought of the world has emphasized the two ideals of self-sacrifice and spiritual self-perfecting instead of throwing its weight against this dualism of life4 ,the dualism is too deeply established to be easily overthrown2 for that reason1 it is the particular task of education at the present time to struggle in behalf of an aim in which social efficiency and personal culture are synonyms instead of antagonists4 ,summary4 ,general or comprehensive aims are points of view for surveying the specific problems of education4 ,consequently it is a test of the value of the manner in which any large end is stated to see if it will translate readily and consistently into the procedures which are suggested by another4 ,we have applied this test to three general aims3 ,development according to nature1 social efficiency1 and culture or personal mental enrichment4 ,in each case we have seen that the aims when partially stated come into conflict with each other4 ,the partial statement of natural development takes the primitive powers in an alleged spontaneous development as the end-all4 ,from this point of view training which renders them useful to others is an abnormal constraint2 one which profoundly modifies them through deliberate nurture is corrupting4 ,but when we recognize that natural activities mean native activities which develop only through the uses in which they are nurtured1 the conflict disappears4 ,similarly a social efficiency which is defined in terms of rendering external service to others is of necessity opposed to the aim of enriching the meaning of experience1 while a culture which is taken to consist in an internal refinement of a mind is opposed to a socialized disposition4 ,but social efficiency as an educational purpose should mean cultivation of power to join freely and fully in shared or common activities4 ,this is impossible without culture1 while it brings a reward in culture1 because one cannot share in intercourse with others without learning--without getting a broader point of view and perceiving things of which one would otherwise be ignorant4 ,and there is perhaps no better definition of culture than that it is the capacity for constantly expanding the range and accuracy of one's perception of meanings4 #a ,donaldson1 ,growth of ,brain1 p4 #cef4 #b ,we must not forget that ,rousseau had the idea of a radically different sort of society1 a fraternal society whose end should be identical with the good of all its members1 which he thought to be as much better than existing states as these are worse than the state of nature4 ,chapter ,ten3 ,interest and ,discipline #a4 ,the ,meaning of the ,terms4 ,we have already noticed the difference in the attitude of a spectator and of an agent or participant4 ,the former is indifferent to what is going on2 one result is just as good as another1 since each is just something to look at4 ,the latter is bound up with what is going on2 its outcome makes a difference to him4 ,his fortunes are more or less at stake in the issue of events4 ,consequently he does whatever he can to influence the direction present occurrences take4 ,one is like a man in a prison cell watching the rain out of the window2 it is all the same to him4 ,the other is like a man who has planned an outing for the next day which continuing rain will frustrate4 ,he cannot1 to be sure1 by his present reactions affect to-morrow's weather1 but he may take some steps which will influence future happenings1 if only to postpone the proposed picnic4 ,if a man sees a carriage coming which may run over him1 if he cannot stop its movement1 he can at least get out of the way if he foresees the consequence in time4 ,in many instances1 he can intervene even more directly4 ,the attitude of a participant in the course of affairs is thus a double one3 there is solicitude1 anxiety concerning future consequences1 and a tendency to act to assure better1 and avert worse1 consequences4 ,there are words which denote this attitude3 concern1 interest4 ,these words suggest that a person is bound up with the possibilities inhering in objects2 that he is accordingly on the lookout for what they are likely to do to him2 and that1 on the basis of his expectation or foresight1 he is eager to act so as to give things one turn rather than another4 ,interest and aims1 concern and purpose1 are necessarily connected4 ,such words as aim1 intent1 end1 emphasize the results which are wanted and striven for2 they take for granted the personal attitude of solicitude and attentive eagerness4 ,such words as interest1 affection1 concern1 motivation1 emphasize the bearing of what is foreseen upon the individual's fortunes1 and his active desire to act to secure a possible result4 ,they take for granted the objective changes4 ,but the difference is but one of emphasis2 the meaning that is shaded in one set of words is illuminated in the other4 ,what is anticipated is objective and impersonal2 to-morrow's rain2 the possibility of being run over4 ,but for an active being1 a being who partakes of the consequences instead of standing aloof from them1 there is at the same time a personal response4 ,the difference imaginatively foreseen makes a present difference1 which finds expression in solicitude and effort4 ,while such words as affection1 concern1 and motive indicate an attitude of personal preference1 they are always attitudes toward objects--toward what is foreseen4 ,we may call the phase of objective foresight intellectual1 and the phase of personal concern emotional and volitional1 but there is no separation in the facts of the situation4 ,such a separation could exist only if the personal attitudes ran their course in a world by themselves4 ,but they are always responses to what is going on in the situation of which they are a part1 and their successful or unsuccessful expression depends upon their interaction with other changes4 ,life activities flourish and fail only in connection with changes of the environment4 ,they are literally bound up with these changes2 our desires1 emotions1 and affections are but various ways in which our doings are tied up with the doings of things and persons about us4 ,instead of marking a purely personal or subjective realm1 separated from the objective and impersonal1 they indicate the non-existence of such a separate world4 ,they afford convincing evidence that changes in things are not alien to the activities of a self1 and that the career and welfare of the self are bound up with the movement of persons and things4 ,interest1 concern1 mean that self and world are engaged with each other in a developing situation4 ,the word interest1 in its ordinary usage1 expresses 7i7 the whole state of active development1 7ii7 the objective results that are foreseen and wanted1 and 7iii7 the personal emotional inclination4 7,i7 ,an occupation1 employment1 pursuit1 business is often referred to as an interest4 ,thus we say that a man's interest is politics1 or journalism1 or philanthropy1 or archaeology1 or collecting ,japanese prints1 or banking4 7ii7 ,by an interest we also mean the point at which an object touches or engages a man2 the point where it influences him4 ,in some legal transactions a man has to prove interest in order to have a standing at court4 ,he has to show that some proposed step concerns his affairs4 ,a silent partner has an interest in a business1 although he takes no active part in its conduct because its prosperity or decline affects his profits and liabilities4 7iii7 ,when we speak of a man as interested in this or that the emphasis falls directly upon his personal attitude4 ,to be interested is to be absorbed in1 wrapped up in1 carried away by1 some object4 ,to take an interest is to be on the alert1 to care about1 to be attentive4 ,we say of an interested person both that he has lost himself in some affair and that he has found himself in it4 ,both terms express the engrossment of the self in an object4 ,when the place of interest in education is spoken of in a depreciatory way1 it will be found that the second of the meanings mentioned is first exaggerated and then isolated4 ,interest is taken to mean merely the effect of an object upon personal advantage or disadvantage1 success or failure4 ,separated from any objective development of affairs1 these are reduced to mere personal states of pleasure or pain4 ,educationally1 it then follows that to attach importance to interest means to attach some feature of seductiveness to material otherwise indifferent2 to secure attention and effort by offering a bribe of pleasure4 ,this procedure is properly stigmatized as soft pedagogy2 as a soup-kitchen theory of education4 ,but the objection is based upon the fact--or assumption--that the forms of skill to be acquired and the subject matter to be appropriated have no interest on their own account3 in other words1 they are supposed to be irrelevant to the normal activities of the pupils4 ,the remedy is not in finding fault with the doctrine of interest1 any more than it is to search for some pleasant bait that may be hitched to the alien material4 ,it is to discover objects and modes of action1 which are connected with present powers4 ,the function of this material in engaging activity and carrying it on consistently and continuously is its interest4 ,if the material operates in this way1 there is no call either to hunt for devices which will make it interesting or to appeal to arbitrary1 semi-coerced effort4 ,the word interest suggests1 etymologically1 what is between1--that which connects two things otherwise distant4 ,in education1 the distance covered may be looked at as temporal4 ,the fact that a process takes time to mature is so obvious a fact that we rarely make it explicit4 ,we overlook the fact that in growth there is ground to be covered between an initial stage of process and the completing period2 that there is something intervening4 ,in learning1 the present powers of the pupil are the initial stage2 the aim of the teacher represents the remote limit4 ,between the two lie means--that is middle conditions3--acts to be performed2 difficulties to be overcome2 appliances to be used4 ,only through them1 in the literal time sense1 will the initial activities reach a satisfactory consummation4 ,these intermediate conditions are of interest precisely because the development of existing activities into the foreseen and desired end depends upon them4 ,to be means for the achieving of present tendencies1 to be between the agent and his end1 to be of interest1 are different names for the same thing4 ,when material has to be made interesting1 it signifies that as presented1 it lacks connection with purposes and present power3 or that if the connection be there1 it is not perceived4 ,to make it interesting by leading one to realize the connection that exists is simply good sense2 to make it interesting by extraneous and artificial inducements deserves all the bad names which have been applied to the doctrine of interest in education4 ,so much for the meaning of the term interest4 ,now for that of discipline4 ,where an activity takes time1 where many means and obstacles lie between its initiation and completion1 deliberation and persistence are required4 ,it is obvious that a very large part of the everyday meaning of will is precisely the deliberate or conscious disposition to persist and endure in a planned course of action in spite of difficulties and contrary solicitations4 ,a man of strong will1 in the popular usage of the words1 is a man who is neither fickle nor half-hearted in achieving chosen ends4 ,his ability is executive2 that is1 he persistently and energetically strives to execute or carry out his aims4 ,a weak will is unstable as water4 ,clearly there are two factors in will4 ,one has to do with the foresight of results1 the other with the depth of hold the foreseen outcome has upon the person4 7,i7 ,obstinacy is persistence but it is not strength of volition4 ,obstinacy may be mere animal inertia and insensitiveness4 ,a man keeps on doing a thing just because he has got started1 not because of any clearly thought-out purpose4 ,in fact1 the obstinate man generally declines 7although he may not be quite aware of his refusal7 to make clear to himself what his proposed end is2 he has a feeling that if he allowed himself to get a clear and full idea of it1 it might not be worth while4 ,stubbornness shows itself even more in reluctance to criticize ends which present themselves than it does in persistence and energy in use of means to achieve the end4 ,the really executive man is a man who ponders his ends1 who makes his ideas of the results of his actions as clear and full as possible4 ,the people we called weak-willed or self-indulgent always deceive themselves as to the consequences of their acts4 ,they pick out some feature which is agreeable and neglect all attendant circumstances4 ,when they begin to act1 the disagreeable results they ignored begin to show themselves4 ,they are discouraged1 or complain of being thwarted in their good purpose by a hard fate1 and shift to some other line of action4 ,that the primary difference between strong and feeble volition is intellectual1 consisting in the degree of persistent firmness and fullness with which consequences are thought out1 cannot be over-emphasized4 7ii7 ,there is1 of course1 such a thing as a speculative tracing out of results4 ,ends are then foreseen1 but they do not lay deep hold of a person4 ,they are something to look at and for curiosity to play with rather than something to achieve4 ,there is no such thing as over-intellectuality1 but there is such a thing as a one-sided intellectuality4 ,a person takes it out as we say in considering the consequences of proposed lines of action4 ,a certain flabbiness of fiber prevents the contemplated object from gripping him and engaging him in action4 ,and most persons are naturally diverted from a proposed course of action by unusual1 unforeseen obstacles1 or by presentation of inducements to an action that is directly more agreeable4 ,a person who is trained to consider his actions1 to undertake them deliberately1 is in so far forth disciplined4 ,add to this ability a power to endure in an intelligently chosen course in face of distraction1 confusion1 and difficulty1 and you have the essence of discipline4 ,discipline means power at command2 mastery of the resources available for carrying through the action undertaken4 ,to know what one is to do and to move to do it promptly and by use of the requisite means is to be disciplined1 whether we are thinking of an army or a mind4 ,discipline is positive4 ,to cow the spirit1 to subdue inclination1 to compel obedience1 to mortify the flesh1 to make a subordinate perform an uncongenial task--these things are or are not disciplinary according as they do or do not tend to the development of power to recognize what one is about and to persistence in accomplishment4 ,it is hardly necessary to press the point that interest and discipline are connected1 not opposed4 7i7 ,even the more purely intellectual phase of trained power--apprehension of what one is doing as exhibited in consequences--is not possible without interest4 ,deliberation will be perfunctory and superficial where there is no interest4 ,parents and teachers often complain--and correctly--that children do not want to hear1 or want to understand4 ,their minds are not upon the subject precisely because it does not touch them2 it does not enter into their concerns4 ,this is a state of things that needs to be remedied1 but the remedy is not in the use of methods which increase indifference and aversion4 ,even punishing a child for inattention is one way of trying to make him realize that the matter is not a thing of complete unconcern2 it is one way of arousing interest1 or bringing about a sense of connection4 ,in the long run1 its value is measured by whether it supplies a mere physical excitation to act in the way desired by the adult or whether it leads the child to think--that is1 to reflect upon his acts and impregnate them with aims4 7ii7 ,that interest is requisite for executive persistence is even more obvious4 ,employers do not advertise for workmen who are not interested in what they are doing4 ,if one were engaging a lawyer or a doctor1 it would never occur to one to reason that the person engaged would stick to his work more conscientiously if it was so uncongenial to him that he did it merely from a sense of obligation4 ,interest measures--or rather is--the depth of the grip which the foreseen end has upon one1 moving one to act for its realization4 #b4 ,the ,importance of the ,idea of ,interest in ,education4 ,interest represents the moving force of objects--whether perceived or presented in imagination--in any experience having a purpose4 ,in the concrete1 the value of recognizing the dynamic place of interest in an educative development is that it leads to considering individual children in their specific capabilities1 needs1 and preferences4 ,one who recognizes the importance of interest will not assume that all minds work in the same way because they happen to have the same teacher and textbook4 ,attitudes and methods of approach and response vary with the specific appeal the same material makes1 this appeal itself varying with difference of natural aptitude1 of past experience1 of plan of life1 and so on4 ,but the facts of interest also supply considerations of general value to the philosophy of education4 ,rightly understood1 they put us on our guard against certain conceptions of mind and of subject matter which have had great vogue in philosophic thought in the past1 and which exercise a serious hampering influence upon the conduct of instruction and discipline4 ,too frequently mind is set over the world of things and facts to be known2 it is regarded as something existing in isolation1 with mental states and operations that exist independently4 ,knowledge is then regarded as an external application of purely mental existences to the things to be known1 or else as a result of the impressions which this outside subject matter makes on mind1 or as a combination of the two4 ,subject matter is then regarded as something complete in itself2 it is just something to be learned or known1 either by the voluntary application of mind to it or through the impressions it makes on mind4 ,the facts of interest show that these conceptions are mythical4 ,mind appears in experience as ability to respond to present stimuli on the basis of anticipation of future possible consequences1 and with a view to controlling the kind of consequences that are to take place4 ,the things1 the subject matter known1 consist of whatever is recognized as having a bearing upon the anticipated course of events1 whether assisting or retarding it4 ,these statements are too formal to be very intelligible4 ,an illustration may clear up their significance4 ,you are engaged in a certain occupation1 say writing with a typewriter4 ,if you are an expert1 your formed habits take care of the physical movements and leave your thoughts free to consider your topic4 ,suppose1 however1 you are not skilled1 or that1 even if you are1 the machine does not work well4 ,you then have to use intelligence4 ,you do not wish to strike the keys at random and let the consequences be what they may2 you wish to record certain words in a given order so as to make sense4 ,you attend to the keys1 to what you have written1 to your movements1 to the ribbon or the mechanism of the machine4 ,your attention is not distributed indifferently and miscellaneously to any and every detail4 ,it is centered upon whatever has a bearing upon the effective pursuit of your occupation4 ,your look is ahead1 and you are concerned to note the existing facts because and in so far as they are factors in the achievement of the result intended4 ,you have to find out what your resources are1 what conditions are at command1 and what the difficulties and obstacles are4 ,this foresight and this survey with reference to what is foreseen constitute mind4 ,action that does not involve such a forecast of results and such an examination of means and hindrances is either a matter of habit or else it is blind4 ,in neither case is it intelligent4 ,to be vague and uncertain as to what is intended and careless in observation of conditions of its realization is to be1 in that degree1 stupid or partially intelligent4 ,if we recur to the case where mind is not concerned with the physical manipulation of the instruments but with what one intends to write1 the case is the same4 ,there is an activity in process2 one is taken up with the development of a theme4 ,unless one writes as a phonograph talks1 this means intelligence2 namely1 alertness in foreseeing the various conclusions to which present data and considerations are tending1 together with continually renewed observation and recollection to get hold of the subject matter which bears upon the conclusions to be reached4 ,the whole attitude is one of concern with what is to be1 and with what is so far as the latter enters into the movement toward the end4 ,leave out the direction which depends upon foresight of possible future results1 and there is no intelligence in present behavior4 ,let there be imaginative forecast but no attention to the conditions upon which its attainment depends1 and there is self-deception or idle dreaming--abortive intelligence4 ,if this illustration is typical1 mind is not a name for something complete by itself2 it is a name for a course of action in so far as that is intelligently directed2 in so far1 that is to say1 as aims1 ends1 enter into it1 with selection of means to further the attainment of aims4 ,intelligence is not a peculiar possession which a person owns2 but a person is intelligent in so far as the activities in which he plays a part have the qualities mentioned4 ,nor are the activities in which a person engages1 whether intelligently or not1 exclusive properties of himself2 they are something in which he engages and partakes4 ,other things1 the independent changes of other things and persons1 cooperate and hinder4 ,the individual's act may be initial in a course of events1 but the outcome depends upon the interaction of his response with energies supplied by other agencies4 ,conceive mind as anything but one factor partaking along with others in the production of consequences1 and it becomes meaningless4 ,the problem of instruction is thus that of finding material which will engage a person in specific activities having an aim or purpose of moment or interest to him1 and dealing with things not as gymnastic appliances but as conditions for the attainment of ends4 ,the remedy for the evils attending the doctrine of formal discipline previously spoken of1 is not to be found by substituting a doctrine of specialized disciplines1 but by reforming the notion of mind and its training4 ,discovery of typical modes of activity1 whether play or useful occupations1 in which individuals are concerned1 in whose outcome they recognize they have something at stake1 and which cannot be carried through without reflection and use of judgment to select material of observation and recollection1 is the remedy4 ,in short1 the root of the error long prevalent in the conception of training of mind consists in leaving out of account movements of things to future results in which an individual shares1 and in the direction of which observation1 imagination1 and memory are enlisted4 ,it consists in regarding mind as complete in itself1 ready to be directly applied to a present material4 ,in historic practice the error has cut two ways4 ,on one hand1 it has screened and protected traditional studies and methods of teaching from intelligent criticism and needed revisions4 ,to say that they are disciplinary has safeguarded them from all inquiry4 ,it has not been enough to show that they were of no use in life or that they did not really contribute to the cultivation of the self4 ,that they were disciplinary stifled every question1 subdued every doubt1 and removed the subject from the realm of rational discussion4 ,by its nature1 the allegation could not be checked up4 ,even when discipline did not accrue as matter of fact1 when the pupil even grew in laxity of application and lost power of intelligent self-direction1 the fault lay with him1 not with the study or the methods of teaching4 ,his failure was but proof that he needed more discipline1 and thus afforded a reason for retaining the old methods4 ,the responsibility was transferred from the educator to the pupil because the material did not have to meet specific tests2 it did not have to be shown that it fulfilled any particular need or served any specific end4 ,it was designed to discipline in general1 and if it failed1 it was because the individual was unwilling to be disciplined4 ,in the other direction1 the tendency was towards a negative conception of discipline1 instead of an identification of it with growth in constructive power of achievement4 ,as we have already seen1 will means an attitude toward the future1 toward the production of possible consequences1 an attitude involving effort to foresee clearly and comprehensively the probable results of ways of acting1 and an active identification with some anticipated consequences4 ,identification of will1 or effort1 with mere strain1 results when a mind is set up1 endowed with powers that are only to be applied to existing material4 ,a person just either will or will not apply himself to the matter in hand4 ,the more indifferent the subject matter1 the less concern it has for the habits and preferences of the individual1 the more demand there is for an effort to bring the mind to bear upon it--and hence the more discipline of will4 ,to attend to material because there is something to be done in which the person is concerned is not disciplinary in this view2 not even if it results in a desirable increase of constructive power4 ,application just for the sake of application1 for the sake of training1 is alone disciplinary4 ,this is more likely to occur if the subject matter presented is uncongenial1 for then there is no motive 7so it is supposed7 except the acknowledgment of duty or the value of discipline4 ,the logical result is expressed with literal truth in the words of an ,american humorist3 ,it makes no difference what you teach a boy so long as he doesn't like it4 ,the counterpart of the isolation of mind from activities dealing with objects to accomplish ends is isolation of the subject matter to be learned4 ,in the traditional schemes of education1 subject matter means so much material to be studied4 ,various branches of study represent so many independent branches1 each having its principles of arrangement complete within itself4 ,history is one such group of facts2 algebra another2 geography another1 and so on till we have run through the entire curriculum4 ,having a ready-made existence on their own account1 their relation to mind is exhausted in what they furnish it to acquire4 ,this idea corresponds to the conventional practice in which the program of school work1 for the day1 month1 and successive years1 consists of studies all marked off from one another1 and each supposed to be complete by itself--for educational purposes at least4 ,later on a chapter is devoted to the special consideration of the meaning of the subject matter of instruction4 ,at this point1 we need only to say that1 in contrast with the traditional theory1 anything which intelligence studies represents things in the part which they play in the carrying forward of active lines of interest4 ,just as one studies his typewriter as part of the operation of putting it to use to effect results1 so with any fact or truth4 ,it becomes an object of study--that is1 of inquiry and reflection--when it figures as a factor to be reckoned with in the completion of a course of events in which one is engaged and by whose outcome one is affected4 ,numbers are not objects of study just because they are numbers already constituting a branch of learning called mathematics1 but because they represent qualities and relations of the world in which our action goes on1 because they are factors upon which the accomplishment of our purposes depends4 ,stated thus broadly1 the formula may appear abstract4 ,translated into details1 it means that the act of learning or studying is artificial and ineffective in the degree in which pupils are merely presented with a lesson to be learned4 ,study is effectual in the degree in which the pupil realizes the place of the numerical truth he is dealing with in carrying to fruition activities in which he is concerned4 ,this connection of an object and a topic with the promotion of an activity having a purpose is the first and the last word of a genuine theory of interest in education4 #c4 ,some ,social ,aspects of the ,question4 ,while the theoretical errors of which we have been speaking have their expressions in the conduct of schools1 they are themselves the outcome of conditions of social life4 ,a change confined to the theoretical conviction of educators will not remove the difficulties1 though it should render more effective efforts to modify social conditions4 ,men's fundamental attitudes toward the world are fixed by the scope and qualities of the activities in which they partake4 ,the ideal of interest is exemplified in the artistic attitude4 ,art is neither merely internal nor merely external2 merely mental nor merely physical4 ,like every mode of action1 it brings about changes in the world4 ,the changes made by some actions 7those which by contrast may be called mechanical7 are external2 they are shifting things about4 ,no ideal reward1 no enrichment of emotion and intellect1 accompanies them4 ,others contribute to the maintenance of life1 and to its external adornment and display4 ,many of our existing social activities1 industrial and political1 fall in these two classes4 ,neither the people who engage in them1 nor those who are directly affected by them1 are capable of full and free interest in their work4 ,because of the lack of any purpose in the work for the one doing it1 or because of the restricted character of its aim1 intelligence is not adequately engaged4 ,the same conditions force many people back upon themselves4 ,they take refuge in an inner play of sentiment and fancies4 ,they are aesthetic but not artistic1 since their feelings and ideas are turned upon themselves1 instead of being methods in acts which modify conditions4 ,their mental life is sentimental2 an enjoyment of an inner landscape4 ,even the pursuit of science may become an asylum of refuge from the hard conditions of life--not a temporary retreat for the sake of recuperation and clarification in future dealings with the world4 ,the very word art may become associated not with specific transformation of things1 making them more significant for mind1 but with stimulations of eccentric fancy and with emotional indulgences4 ,the separation and mutual contempt of the practical man and the man of theory or culture1 the divorce of fine and industrial arts1 are indications of this situation4 ,thus interest and mind are either narrowed1 or else made perverse4 ,compare what was said in an earlier chapter about the one-sided meanings which have come to attach to the ideas of efficiency and of culture4 ,this state of affairs must exist so far as society is organized on a basis of division between laboring classes and leisure classes4 ,the intelligence of those who do things becomes hard in the unremitting struggle with things2 that of those freed from the discipline of occupation becomes luxurious and effeminate4 ,moreover1 the majority of human beings still lack economic freedom4 ,their pursuits are fixed by accident and necessity of circumstance2 they are not the normal expression of their own powers interacting with the needs and resources of the environment4 ,our economic conditions still relegate many men to a servile status4 ,as a consequence1 the intelligence of those in control of the practical situation is not liberal4 ,instead of playing freely upon the subjugation of the world for human ends1 it is devoted to the manipulation of other men for ends that are non-human in so far as they are exclusive4 ,this state of affairs explains many things in our historic educational traditions4 ,it throws light upon the clash of aims manifested in different portions of the school system2 the narrowly utilitarian character of most elementary education1 and the narrowly disciplinary or cultural character of most higher education4 ,it accounts for the tendency to isolate intellectual matters till knowledge is scholastic1 academic1 and professionally technical1 and for the widespread conviction that liberal education is opposed to the requirements of an education which shall count in the vocations of life4 ,but it also helps define the peculiar problem of present education4 ,the school cannot immediately escape from the ideals set by prior social conditions4 ,but it should contribute through the type of intellectual and emotional disposition which it forms to the improvement of those conditions4 ,and just here the true conceptions of interest and discipline are full of significance4 ,persons whose interests have been enlarged and intelligence trained by dealing with things and facts in active occupations having a purpose 7whether in play or work7 will be those most likely to escape the alternatives of an academic and aloof knowledge and a hard1 narrow1 and merely practical practice4 ,to organize education so that natural active tendencies shall be fully enlisted in doing something1 while seeing to it that the doing requires observation1 the acquisition of information1 and the use of a constructive imagination1 is what most needs to be done to improve social conditions4 ,to oscillate between drill exercises that strive to attain efficiency in outward doing without the use of intelligence1 and an accumulation of knowledge that is supposed to be an ultimate end in itself1 means that education accepts the present social conditions as final1 and thereby takes upon itself the responsibility for perpetuating them4 ,a reorganization of education so that learning takes place in connection with the intelligent carrying forward of purposeful activities is a slow work4 ,it can only be accomplished piecemeal1 a step at a time4 ,but this is not a reason for nominally accepting one educational philosophy and accommodating ourselves in practice to another4 ,it is a challenge to undertake the task of reorganization courageously and to keep at it persistently4 ,summary4 ,interest and discipline are correlative aspects of activity having an aim4 ,interest means that one is identified with the objects which define the activity and which furnish the means and obstacles to its realization4 ,any activity with an aim implies a distinction between an earlier incomplete phase and later completing phase2 it implies also intermediate steps4 ,to have an interest is to take things as entering into such a continuously developing situation1 instead of taking them in isolation4 ,the time difference between the given incomplete state of affairs and the desired fulfillment exacts effort in transformation1 it demands continuity of attention and endurance4 ,this attitude is what is practically meant by will4 ,discipline or development of power of continuous attention is its fruit4 ,the significance of this doctrine for the theory of education is twofold4 ,on the one hand it protects us from the notion that mind and mental states are something complete in themselves1 which then happen to be applied to some ready-made objects and topics so that knowledge results4 ,it shows that mind and intelligent or purposeful engagement in a course of action into which things enter are identical4 ,hence to develop and train mind is to provide an environment which induces such activity4 ,on the other side1 it protects us from the notion that subject matter on its side is something isolated and independent4 ,it shows that subject matter of learning is identical with all the objects1 ideas1 and principles which enter as resources or obstacles into the continuous intentional pursuit of a course of action4 ,the developing course of action1 whose end and conditions are perceived1 is the unity which holds together what are often divided into an independent mind on one side and an independent world of objects and facts on the other4 ,chapter ,eleven3 ,experience and ,thinking #a4 ,the ,nature of ,experience4 ,the nature of experience can be understood only by noting that it includes an active and a passive element peculiarly combined4 ,on the active hand1 experience is trying--a meaning which is made explicit in the connected term experiment4 ,on the passive1 it is undergoing4 ,when we experience something we act upon it1 we do something with it2 then we suffer or undergo the consequences4 ,we do something to the thing and then it does something to us in return3 such is the peculiar combination4 ,the connection of these two phases of experience measures the fruitfulness or value of the experience4 ,mere activity does not constitute experience4 ,it is dispersive1 centrifugal1 dissipating4 ,experience as trying involves change1 but change is meaningless transition unless it is consciously connected with the return wave of consequences which flow from it4 ,when an activity is continued into the undergoing of consequences1 when the change made by action is reflected back into a change made in us1 the mere flux is loaded with significance4 ,we learn something4 ,it is not experience when a child merely sticks his finger into a flame2 it is experience when the movement is connected with the pain which he undergoes in consequence4 ,henceforth the sticking of the finger into flame means a burn4 ,being burned is a mere physical change1 like the burning of a stick of wood1 if it is not perceived as a consequence of some other action4 ,blind and capricious impulses hurry us on heedlessly from one thing to another4 ,so far as this happens1 everything is writ in water4 ,there is none of that cumulative growth which makes an experience in any vital sense of that term4 ,on the other hand1 many things happen to us in the way of pleasure and pain which we do not connect with any prior activity of our own4 ,they are mere accidents so far as we are concerned4 ,there is no before or after to such experience2 no retrospect nor outlook1 and consequently no meaning4 ,we get nothing which may be carried over to foresee what is likely to happen next1 and no gain in ability to adjust ourselves to what is coming--no added control4 ,only by courtesy can such an experience be called experience4 ,to learn from experience is to make a backward and forward connection between what we do to things and what we enjoy or suffer from things in consequence4 ,under such conditions1 doing becomes a trying2 an experiment with the world to find out what it is like2 the undergoing becomes instruction--discovery of the connection of things4 ,two conclusions important for education follow4 7#a7 ,experience is primarily an active-passive affair2 it is not primarily cognitive4 ,but 7#b7 the measure of the value of an experience lies in the perception of relationships or continuities to which it leads up4 ,it includes cognition in the degree in which it is cumulative or amounts to something1 or has meaning4 ,in schools1 those under instruction are too customarily looked upon as acquiring knowledge as theoretical spectators1 minds which appropriate knowledge by direct energy of intellect4 ,the very word pupil has almost come to mean one who is engaged not in having fruitful experiences but in absorbing knowledge directly4 ,something which is called mind or consciousness is severed from the physical organs of activity4 ,the former is then thought to be purely intellectual and cognitive2 the latter to be an irrelevant and intruding physical factor4 ,the intimate union of activity and undergoing its consequences which leads to recognition of meaning is broken2 instead we have two fragments3 mere bodily action on one side1 and meaning directly grasped by spiritual activity on the other4 ,it would be impossible to state adequately the evil results which have flowed from this dualism of mind and body1 much less to exaggerate them4 ,some of the more striking effects1 may1 however1 be enumerated4 7a7 ,in part bodily activity becomes an intruder4 ,having nothing1 so it is thought1 to do with mental activity1 it becomes a distraction1 an evil to be contended with4 ,for the pupil has a body1 and brings it to school along with his mind4 ,and the body is1 of necessity1 a wellspring of energy2 it has to do something4 ,but its activities1 not being utilized in occupation with things which yield significant results1 have to be frowned upon4 ,they lead the pupil away from the lesson with which his mind ought to be occupied2 they are sources of mischief4 ,the chief source of the problem of discipline in schools is that the teacher has often to spend the larger part of the time in suppressing the bodily activities which take the mind away from its material4 ,a premium is put on physical quietude2 on silence1 on rigid uniformity of posture and movement2 upon a machine-like simulation of the attitudes of intelligent interest4 ,the teachers' business is to hold the pupils up to these requirements and to punish the inevitable deviations which occur4 ,the nervous strain and fatigue which result with both teacher and pupil are a necessary consequence of the abnormality of the situation in which bodily activity is divorced from the perception of meaning4 ,callous indifference and explosions from strain alternate4 ,the neglected body1 having no organized fruitful channels of activity1 breaks forth1 without knowing why or how1 into meaningless boisterousness1 or settles into equally meaningless fooling--both very different from the normal play of children4 ,physically active children become restless and unruly2 the more quiescent1 so-called conscientious ones spend what energy they have in the negative task of keeping their instincts and active tendencies suppressed1 instead of in a positive one of constructive planning and execution2 they are thus educated not into responsibility for the significant and graceful use of bodily powers1 but into an enforced duty not to give them free play4 ,it may be seriously asserted that a chief cause for the remarkable achievements of ,greek education was that it was never misled by false notions into an attempted separation of mind and body4 7b7 ,even1 however1 with respect to the lessons which have to be learned by the application of mind1 some bodily activities have to be used4 ,the senses--especially the eye and ear--have to be employed to take in what the book1 the map1 the blackboard1 and the teacher say4 ,the lips and vocal organs1 and the hands1 have to be used to reproduce in speech and writing what has been stowed away4 ,the senses are then regarded as a kind of mysterious conduit through which information is conducted from the external world into the mind2 they are spoken of as gateways and avenues of knowledge4 ,to keep the eyes on the book and the ears open to the teacher's words is a mysterious source of intellectual grace4 ,moreover1 reading1 writing1 and figuring--important school arts--demand muscular or motor training4 ,the muscles of eye1 hand1 and vocal organs accordingly have to be trained to act as pipes for carrying knowledge back out of the mind into external action4 ,for it happens that using the muscles repeatedly in the same way fixes in them an automatic tendency to repeat4 ,the obvious result is a mechanical use of the bodily activities which 7in spite of the generally obtrusive and interfering character of the body in mental action7 have to be employed more or less4 ,for the senses and muscles are used not as organic participants in having an instructive experience1 but as external inlets and outlets of mind4 ,before the child goes to school1 he learns with his hand1 eye1 and ear1 because they are organs of the process of doing something from which meaning results4 ,the boy flying a kite has to keep his eye on the kite1 and has to note the various pressures of the string on his hand4 ,his senses are avenues of knowledge not because external facts are somehow conveyed to the brain1 but because they are used in doing something with a purpose4 ,the qualities of seen and touched things have a bearing on what is done1 and are alertly perceived2 they have a meaning4 ,but when pupils are expected to use their eyes to note the form of words1 irrespective of their meaning1 in order to reproduce them in spelling or reading1 the resulting training is simply of isolated sense organs and muscles4 ,it is such isolation of an act from a purpose which makes it mechanical4 ,it is customary for teachers to urge children to read with expression1 so as to bring out the meaning4 ,but if they originally learned the sensory-motor technique of reading--the ability to identify forms and to reproduce the sounds they stand for--by methods which did not call for attention to meaning1 a mechanical habit was established which makes it difficult to read subsequently with intelligence4 ,the vocal organs have been trained to go their own way automatically in isolation2 and meaning cannot be tied on at will4 ,drawing1 singing1 and writing may be taught in the same mechanical way2 for1 we repeat1 any way is mechanical which narrows down the bodily activity so that a separation of body from mind--that is1 from recognition of meaning--is set up4 ,mathematics1 even in its higher branches1 when undue emphasis is put upon the technique of calculation1 and science1 when laboratory exercises are given for their own sake1 suffer from the same evil4 7c7 ,on the intellectual side1 the separation of mind from direct occupation with things throws emphasis on things at the expense of relations or connections4 ,it is altogether too common to separate perceptions and even ideas from judgments4 ,the latter are thought to come after the former in order to compare them4 ,it is alleged that the mind perceives things apart from relations2 that it forms ideas of them in isolation from their connections--with what goes before and comes after4 ,then judgment or thought is called upon to combine the separated items of knowledge so that their resemblance or causal connection shall be brought out4 ,as matter of fact1 every perception and every idea is a sense of the bearings1 use1 and cause1 of a thing4 ,we do not really know a chair or have an idea of it by inventorying and enumerating its various isolated qualities1 but only by bringing these qualities into connection with something else--the purpose which makes it a chair and not a table2 or its difference from the kind of chair we are accustomed to1 or the period which it represents1 and so on4 ,a wagon is not perceived when all its parts are summed up2 it is the characteristic connection of the parts which makes it a wagon4 ,and these connections are not those of mere physical juxtaposition2 they involve connection with the animals that draw it1 the things that are carried on it1 and so on4 ,judgment is employed in the perception2 otherwise the perception is mere sensory excitation or else a recognition of the result of a prior judgment1 as in the case of familiar objects4 ,words1 the counters for ideals1 are1 however1 easily taken for ideas4 ,and in just the degree in which mental activity is separated from active concern with the world1 from doing something and connecting the doing with what is undergone1 words1 symbols1 come to take the place of ideas4 ,the substitution is the more subtle because some meaning is recognized4 ,but we are very easily trained to be content with a minimum of meaning1 and to fail to note how restricted is our perception of the relations which confer significance4 ,we get so thoroughly used to a kind of pseudo-idea1 a half perception1 that we are not aware how half-dead our mental action is1 and how much keener and more extensive our observations and ideas would be if we formed them under conditions of a vital experience which required us to use judgment3 to hunt for the connections of the thing dealt with4 ,there is no difference of opinion as to the theory of the matter4 ,all authorities agree that that discernment of relationships is the genuinely intellectual matter2 hence1 the educative matter4 ,the failure arises in supposing that relationships can become perceptible without experience--without that conjoint trying and undergoing of which we have spoken4 ,it is assumed that mind can grasp them if it will only give attention1 and that this attention may be given at will irrespective of the situation4 ,hence the deluge of half-observations1 of verbal ideas1 and unassimilated knowledge which afflicts the world4 ,an ounce of experience is better than a ton of theory simply because it is only in experience that any theory has vital and verifiable significance4 ,an experience1 a very humble experience1 is capable of generating and carrying any amount of theory 7or intellectual content71 but a theory apart from an experience cannot be definitely grasped even as theory4 ,it tends to become a mere verbal formula1 a set of catchwords used to render thinking1 or genuine theorizing1 unnecessary and impossible4 ,because of our education we use words1 thinking they are ideas1 to dispose of questions1 the disposal being in reality simply such an obscuring of perception as prevents us from seeing any longer the difficulty4 #b4 ,reflection in ,experience4 ,thought or reflection1 as we have already seen virtually if not explicitly1 is the discernment of the relation between what we try to do and what happens in consequence4 ,no experience having a meaning is possible without some element of thought4 ,but we may contrast two types of experience according to the proportion of reflection found in them4 ,all our experiences have a phase of cut and try in them--what psychologists call the method of trial and error4 ,we simply do something1 and when it fails1 we do something else1 and keep on trying till we hit upon something which works1 and then we adopt that method as a rule of thumb measure in subsequent procedure4 ,some experiences have very little else in them than this hit and miss or succeed process4 ,we see that a certain way of acting and a certain consequence are connected1 but we do not see how they are4 ,we do not see the details of the connection2 the links are missing4 ,our discernment is very gross4 ,in other cases we push our observation farther4 ,we analyze to see just what lies between so as to bind together cause and effect1 activity and consequence4 ,this extension of our insight makes foresight more accurate and comprehensive4 ,the action which rests simply upon the trial and error method is at the mercy of circumstances2 they may change so that the act performed does not operate in the way it was expected to4 ,but if we know in detail upon what the result depends1 we can look to see whether the required conditions are there4 ,the method extends our practical control4 ,for if some of the conditions are missing1 we may1 if we know what the needed antecedents for an effect are1 set to work to supply them2 or1 if they are such as to produce undesirable effects as well1 we may eliminate some of the superfluous causes and economize effort4 ,in discovery of the detailed connections of our activities and what happens in consequence1 the thought implied in cut and try experience is made explicit4 ,its quantity increases so that its proportionate value is very different4 ,hence the quality of the experience changes2 the change is so significant that we may call this type of experience reflective--that is1 reflective par excellence4 ,the deliberate cultivation of this phase of thought constitutes thinking as a distinctive experience4 ,thinking1 in other words1 is the intentional endeavor to discover specific connections between something which we do and the consequences which result1 so that the two become continuous4 ,their isolation1 and consequently their purely arbitrary going together1 is canceled2 a unified developing situation takes its place4 ,the occurrence is now understood2 it is explained2 it is reasonable1 as we say1 that the thing should happen as it does4 ,thinking is thus equivalent to an explicit rendering of the intelligent element in our experience4 ,it makes it possible to act with an end in view4 ,it is the condition of our having aims4 ,as soon as an infant begins to expect he begins to use something which is now going on as a sign of something to follow2 he is1 in however simple a fashion1 judging4 ,for he takes one thing as evidence of something else1 and so recognizes a relationship4 ,any future development1 however elaborate it may be1 is only an extending and a refining of this simple act of inference4 ,all that the wisest man can do is to observe what is going on more widely and more minutely and then select more carefully from what is noted just those factors which point to something to happen4 ,the opposites1 once more1 to thoughtful action are routine and capricious behavior4 ,the former accepts what has been customary as a full measure of possibility and omits to take into account the connections of the particular things done4 ,the latter makes the momentary act a measure of value1 and ignores the connections of our personal action with the energies of the environment4 ,it says1 virtually1 things are to be just as ,i happen to like them at this instant1 as routine says in effect let things continue just as ,i have found them in the past4 ,both refuse to acknowledge responsibility for the future consequences which flow from present action4 ,reflection is the acceptance of such responsibility4 ,the starting point of any process of thinking is something going on1 something which just as it stands is incomplete or unfulfilled4 ,its point1 its meaning lies literally in what it is going to be1 in how it is going to turn out4 ,as this is written1 the world is filled with the clang of contending armies4 ,for an active participant in the war1 it is clear that the momentous thing is the issue1 the future consequences1 of this and that happening4 ,he is identified1 for the time at least1 with the issue2 his fate hangs upon the course things are taking4 ,but even for an onlooker in a neutral country1 the significance of every move made1 of every advance here and retreat there1 lies in what it portends4 ,to think upon the news as it comes to us is to attempt to see what is indicated as probable or possible regarding an outcome4 ,to fill our heads1 like a scrapbook1 with this and that item as a finished and done-for thing1 is not to think4 ,it is to turn ourselves into a piece of registering apparatus4 ,to consider the bearing of the occurrence upon what may be1 but is not yet1 is to think4 ,nor will the reflective experience be different in kind if we substitute distance in time for separation in space4 ,imagine the war done with1 and a future historian giving an account of it4 ,the episode is1 by assumption1 past4 ,but he cannot give a thoughtful account of the war save as he preserves the time sequence2 the meaning of each occurrence1 as he deals with it1 lies in what was future for it1 though not for the historian4 ,to take it by itself as a complete existence is to take it unreflectively4 ,reflection also implies concern with the issue--a certain sympathetic identification of our own destiny1 if only dramatic1 with the outcome of the course of events4 ,for the general in the war1 or a common soldier1 or a citizen of one of the contending nations1 the stimulus to thinking is direct and urgent4 ,for neutrals1 it is indirect and dependent upon imagination4 ,but the flagrant partisanship of human nature is evidence of the intensity of the tendency to identify ourselves with one possible course of events1 and to reject the other as foreign4 ,if we cannot take sides in overt action1 and throw in our little weight to help determine the final balance1 we take sides emotionally and imaginatively4 ,we desire this or that outcome4 ,one wholly indifferent to the outcome does not follow or think about what is happening at all4 ,from this dependence of the act of thinking upon a sense of sharing in the consequences of what goes on1 flows one of the chief paradoxes of thought4 ,born in partiality1 in order to accomplish its tasks it must achieve a certain detached impartiality4 ,the general who allows his hopes and desires to affect his observations and interpretations of the existing situation will surely make a mistake in calculation4 ,while hopes and fears may be the chief motive for a thoughtful following of the war on the part of an onlooker in a neutral country1 he too will think ineffectively in the degree in which his preferences modify the stuff of his observations and reasonings4 ,there is1 however1 no incompatibility between the fact that the occasion of reflection lies in a personal sharing in what is going on and the fact that the value of the reflection lies upon keeping one's self out of the data4 ,the almost insurmountable difficulty of achieving this detachment is evidence that thinking originates in situations where the course of thinking is an actual part of the course of events and is designed to influence the result4 ,only gradually and with a widening of the area of vision through a growth of social sympathies does thinking develop to include what lies beyond our direct interests3 a fact of great significance for education4 ,to say that thinking occurs with reference to situations which are still going on1 and incomplete1 is to say that thinking occurs when things are uncertain or doubtful or problematic4 ,only what is finished1 completed1 is wholly assured4 ,where there is reflection there is suspense4 ,the object of thinking is to help reach a conclusion1 to project a possible termination on the basis of what is already given4 ,certain other facts about thinking accompany this feature4 ,since the situation in which thinking occurs is a doubtful one1 thinking is a process of inquiry1 of looking into things1 of investigating4 ,acquiring is always secondary1 and instrumental to the act of inquiring4 ,it is seeking1 a quest1 for something that is not at hand4 ,we sometimes talk as if original research were a peculiar prerogative of scientists or at least of advanced students4 ,but all thinking is research1 and all research is native1 original1 with him who carries it on1 even if everybody else in the world already is sure of what he is still looking for4 ,it also follows that all thinking involves a risk4 ,certainty cannot be guaranteed in advance4 ,the invasion of the unknown is of the nature of an adventure2 we cannot be sure in advance4 ,the conclusions of thinking1 till confirmed by the event1 are1 accordingly1 more or less tentative or hypothetical4 ,their dogmatic assertion as final is unwarranted1 short of the issue1 in fact4 ,the ,greeks acutely raised the question3 ,how can we learn8 ,for either we know already what we are after1 or else we do not know4 ,in neither case is learning possible2 on the first alternative because we know already2 on the second1 because we do not know what to look for1 nor if1 by chance1 we find it can we tell that it is what we were after4 ,the dilemma makes no provision for coming to know1 for learning2 it assumes either complete knowledge or complete ignorance4 ,nevertheless the twilight zone of inquiry1 of thinking1 exists4 ,the possibility of hypothetical conclusions1 of tentative results1 is the fact which the ,greek dilemma overlooked4 ,the perplexities of the situation suggest certain ways out4 ,we try these ways1 and either push our way out1 in which case we know we have found what we were looking for1 or the situation gets darker and more confused--in which case1 we know we are still ignorant4 ,tentative means trying out1 feeling one's way along provisionally4 ,taken by itself1 the ,greek argument is a nice piece of formal logic4 ,but it is also true that as long as men kept a sharp disjunction between knowledge and ignorance1 science made only slow and accidental advance4 ,systematic advance in invention and discovery began when men recognized that they could utilize doubt for purposes of inquiry by forming conjectures to guide action in tentative explorations1 whose development would confirm1 refute1 or modify the guiding conjecture4 ,while the ,greeks made knowledge more than learning1 modern science makes conserved knowledge only a means to learning1 to discovery4 ,to recur to our illustration4 ,a commanding general cannot base his actions upon either absolute certainty or absolute ignorance4 ,he has a certain amount of information at hand which is1 we will assume1 reasonably trustworthy4 ,he then infers certain prospective movements1 thus assigning meaning to the bare facts of the given situation4 ,his inference is more or less dubious and hypothetical4 ,but he acts upon it4 ,he develops a plan of procedure1 a method of dealing with the situation4 ,the consequences which directly follow from his acting this way rather than that test and reveal the worth of his reflections4 ,what he already knows functions and has value in what he learns4 ,but will this account apply in the case of the one in a neutral country who is thoughtfully following as best he can the progress of events8 ,in form1 yes1 though not of course in content4 ,it is self-evident that his guesses about the future indicated by present facts1 guesses by which he attempts to supply meaning to a multitude of disconnected data1 cannot be the basis of a method which shall take effect in the campaign4 ,that is not his problem4 ,but in the degree in which he is actively thinking1 and not merely passively following the course of events1 his tentative inferences will take effect in a method of procedure appropriate to his situation4 ,he will anticipate certain future moves1 and will be on the alert to see whether they happen or not4 ,in the degree in which he is intellectually concerned1 or thoughtful1 he will be actively on the lookout2 he will take steps which although they do not affect the campaign1 modify in some degree his subsequent actions4 ,otherwise his later ,i told you so has no intellectual quality at all2 it does not mark any testing or verification of prior thinking1 but only a coincidence that yields emotional satisfaction--and includes a large factor of self-deception4 ,the case is comparable to that of an astronomer who from given data has been led to foresee 7infer7 a future eclipse4 ,no matter how great the mathematical probability1 the inference is hypothetical--a matter of probability4 #a ,the hypothesis as to the date and position of the anticipated eclipse becomes the material of forming a method of future conduct4 ,apparatus is arranged2 possibly an expedition is made to some far part of the globe4 ,in any case1 some active steps are taken which actually change some physical conditions4 ,and apart from such steps and the consequent modification of the situation1 there is no completion of the act of thinking4 ,it remains suspended4 ,knowledge1 already attained knowledge1 controls thinking and makes it fruitful4 ,so much for the general features of a reflective experience4 ,they are 7i7 perplexity1 confusion1 doubt1 due to the fact that one is implicated in an incomplete situation whose full character is not yet determined2 7ii7 a conjectural anticipation--a tentative interpretation of the given elements1 attributing to them a tendency to effect certain consequences2 7iii7 a careful survey 7examination1 inspection1 exploration1 analysis7 of all attainable consideration which will define and clarify the problem in hand2 7iv7 a consequent elaboration of the tentative hypothesis to make it more precise and more consistent1 because squaring with a wider range of facts2 7v7 taking one stand upon the projected hypothesis as a plan of action which is applied to the existing state of affairs3 doing something overtly to bring about the anticipated result1 and thereby testing the hypothesis4 ,it is the extent and accuracy of steps three and four which mark off a distinctive reflective experience from one on the trial and error plane4 ,they make thinking itself into an experience4 ,nevertheless1 we never get wholly beyond the trial and error situation4 ,our most elaborate and rationally consistent thought has to be tried in the world and thereby tried out4 ,and since it can never take into account all the connections1 it can never cover with perfect accuracy all the consequences4 ,yet a thoughtful survey of conditions is so careful1 and the guessing at results so controlled1 that we have a right to mark off the reflective experience from the grosser trial and error forms of action4 ,summary4 ,in determining the place of thinking in experience we first noted that experience involves a connection of doing or trying with something which is undergone in consequence4 ,a separation of the active doing phase from the passive undergoing phase destroys the vital meaning of an experience4 ,thinking is the accurate and deliberate instituting of connections between what is done and its consequences4 ,it notes not only that they are connected1 but the details of the connection4 ,it makes connecting links explicit in the form of relationships4 ,the stimulus to thinking is found when we wish to determine the significance of some act1 performed or to be performed4 ,then we anticipate consequences4 ,this implies that the situation as it stands is1 either in fact or to us1 incomplete and hence indeterminate4 ,the projection of consequences means a proposed or tentative solution4 ,to perfect this hypothesis1 existing conditions have to be carefully scrutinized and the implications of the hypothesis developed--an operation called reasoning4 ,then the suggested solution--the idea or theory--has to be tested by acting upon it4 ,if it brings about certain consequences1 certain determinate changes1 in the world1 it is accepted as valid4 ,otherwise it is modified1 and another trial made4 ,thinking includes all of these steps1--the sense of a problem1 the observation of conditions1 the formation and rational elaboration of a suggested conclusion1 and the active experimental testing4 ,while all thinking results in knowledge1 ultimately the value of knowledge is subordinate to its use in thinking4 ,for we live not in a settled and finished world1 but in one which is going on1 and where our main task is prospective1 and where retrospect--and all knowledge as distinct from thought is retrospect--is of value in the solidity1 security1 and fertility it affords our dealings with the future4 #a ,it is most important for the practice of science that men in many cases can calculate the degree of probability and the amount of probable error involved1 but that does alter the features of the situation as described4 ,it refines them4 ,chapter ,twelve3 ,thinking in ,education #a4 ,the ,essentials of ,method4 ,no one doubts1 theoretically1 the importance of fostering in school good habits of thinking4 ,but apart from the fact that the acknowledgment is not so great in practice as in theory1 there is not adequate theoretical recognition that all which the school can or need do for pupils1 so far as their minds are concerned 7that is1 leaving out certain specialized muscular abilities71 is to develop their ability to think4 ,the parceling out of instruction among various ends such as acquisition of skill 7in reading1 spelling1 writing1 drawing1 reciting72 acquiring information 7in history and geography71 and training of thinking is a measure of the ineffective way in which we accomplish all three4 ,thinking which is not connected with increase of efficiency in action1 and with learning more about ourselves and the world in which we live1 has something the matter with it just as thought 7,see ante1 p4 #adg74 ,and skill obtained apart from thinking is not connected with any sense of the purposes for which it is to be used4 ,it consequently leaves a man at the mercy of his routine habits and of the authoritative control of others1 who know what they are about and who are not especially scrupulous as to their means of achievement4 ,and information severed from thoughtful action is dead1 a mind-crushing load4 ,since it simulates knowledge and thereby develops the poison of conceit1 it is a most powerful obstacle to further growth in the grace of intelligence4 ,the sole direct path to enduring improvement in the methods of instruction and learning consists in centering upon the conditions which exact1 promote1 and test thinking4 ,thinking is the method of intelligent learning1 of learning that employs and rewards mind4 ,we speak1 legitimately enough1 about the method of thinking1 but the important thing to bear in mind about method is that thinking is method1 the method of intelligent experience in the course which it takes4 ,i4 ,the initial stage of that developing experience which is called thinking is experience4 ,this remark may sound like a silly truism4 ,it ought to be one2 but unfortunately it is not4 ,on the contrary1 thinking is often regarded both in philosophic theory and in educational practice as something cut off from experience1 and capable of being cultivated in isolation4 ,in fact1 the inherent limitations of experience are often urged as the sufficient ground for attention to thinking4 ,experience is then thought to be confined to the senses and appetites2 to a mere material world1 while thinking proceeds from a higher faculty 7of reason71 and is occupied with spiritual or at least literary things4 ,so1 oftentimes1 a sharp distinction is made between pure mathematics as a peculiarly fit subject matter of thought 7since it has nothing to do with physical existences7 and applied mathematics1 which has utilitarian but not mental value4 ,speaking generally1 the fundamental fallacy in methods of instruction lies in supposing that experience on the part of pupils may be assumed4 ,what is here insisted upon is the necessity of an actual empirical situation as the initiating phase of thought4 ,experience is here taken as previously defined3 trying to do something and having the thing perceptibly do something to one in return4 ,the fallacy consists in supposing that we can begin with ready-made subject matter of arithmetic1 or geography1 or whatever1 irrespective of some direct personal experience of a situation4 ,even the kindergarten and ,montessori techniques are so anxious to get at intellectual distinctions1 without waste of time1 that they tend to ignore--or reduce--the immediate crude handling of the familiar material of experience1 and to introduce pupils at once to material which expresses the intellectual distinctions which adults have made4 ,but the first stage of contact with any new material1 at whatever age of maturity1 must inevitably be of the trial and error sort4 ,an individual must actually try1 in play or work1 to do something with material in carrying out his own impulsive activity1 and then note the interaction of his energy and that of the material employed4 ,this is what happens when a child at first begins to build with blocks1 and it is equally what happens when a scientific man in his laboratory begins to experiment with unfamiliar objects4 ,hence the first approach to any subject in school1 if thought is to be aroused and not words acquired1 should be as unscholastic as possible4 ,to realize what an experience1 or empirical situation1 means1 we have to call to mind the sort of situation that presents itself outside of school2 the sort of occupations that interest and engage activity in ordinary life4 ,and careful inspection of methods which are permanently successful in formal education1 whether in arithmetic or learning to read1 or studying geography1 or learning physics or a foreign language1 will reveal that they depend for their efficiency upon the fact that they go back to the type of the situation which causes reflection out of school in ordinary life4 ,they give the pupils something to do1 not something to learn2 and the doing is of such a nature as to demand thinking1 or the intentional noting of connections2 learning naturally results4 ,that the situation should be of such a nature as to arouse thinking means of course that it should suggest something to do which is not either routine or capricious--something1 in other words1 presenting what is new 7and hence uncertain or problematic7 and yet sufficiently connected with existing habits to call out an effective response4 ,an effective response means one which accomplishes a perceptible result1 in distinction from a purely haphazard activity1 where the consequences cannot be mentally connected with what is done4 ,the most significant question which can be asked1 accordingly1 about any situation or experience proposed to induce learning is what quality of problem it involves4 ,at first thought1 it might seem as if usual school methods measured well up to the standard here set4 ,the giving of problems1 the putting of questions1 the assigning of tasks1 the magnifying of difficulties1 is a large part of school work4 ,but it is indispensable to discriminate between genuine and simulated or mock problems4 ,the following questions may aid in making such discrimination4 7a7 ,is there anything but a problem8 ,does the question naturally suggest itself within some situation or personal experience8 ,or is it an aloof thing1 a problem only for the purposes of conveying instruction in some school topic8 ,is it the sort of trying that would arouse observation and engage experimentation outside of school8 7b7 ,is it the pupil's own problem1 or is it the teacher's or textbook's problem1 made a problem for the pupil only because he cannot get the required mark or be promoted or win the teacher's approval1 unless he deals with it8 ,obviously1 these two questions overlap4 ,they are two ways of getting at the same point3 ,is the experience a personal thing of such a nature as inherently to stimulate and direct observation of the connections involved1 and to lead to inference and its testing8 ,or is it imposed from without1 and is the pupil's problem simply to meet the external requirement8 ,such questions may give us pause in deciding upon the extent to which current practices are adapted to develop reflective habits4 ,the physical equipment and arrangements of the average schoolroom are hostile to the existence of real situations of experience4 ,what is there similar to the conditions of everyday life which will generate difficulties8 ,almost everything testifies to the great premium put upon listening1 reading1 and the reproduction of what is told and read4 ,it is hardly possible to overstate the contrast between such conditions and the situations of active contact with things and persons in the home1 on the playground1 in fulfilling of ordinary responsibilities of life4 ,much of it is not even comparable with the questions which may arise in the mind of a boy or girl in conversing with others or in reading books outside of the school4 ,no one has ever explained why children are so full of questions outside of the school 7so that they pester grown-up persons if they get any encouragement71 and the conspicuous absence of display of curiosity about the subject matter of school lessons4 ,reflection on this striking contrast will throw light upon the question of how far customary school conditions supply a context of experience in which problems naturally suggest themselves4 ,no amount of improvement in the personal technique of the instructor will wholly remedy this state of things4 ,there must be more actual material1 more stuff1 more appliances1 and more opportunities for doing things1 before the gap can be overcome4 ,and where children are engaged in doing things and in discussing what arises in the course of their doing1 it is found1 even with comparatively indifferent modes of instruction1 that children's inquiries are spontaneous and numerous1 and the proposals of solution advanced1 varied1 and ingenious4 ,as a consequence of the absence of the materials and occupations which generate real problems1 the pupil's problems are not his2 or1 rather1 they are his only as a pupil1 not as a human being4 ,hence the lamentable waste in carrying over such expertness as is achieved in dealing with them to the affairs of life beyond the schoolroom4 ,a pupil has a problem1 but it is the problem of meeting the peculiar requirements set by the teacher4 ,his problem becomes that of finding out what the teacher wants1 what will satisfy the teacher in recitation and examination and outward deportment4 ,relationship to subject matter is no longer direct4 ,the occasions and material of thought are not found in the arithmetic or the history or geography itself1 but in skillfully adapting that material to the teacher's requirements4 ,the pupil studies1 but unconsciously to himself the objects of his study are the conventions and standards of the school system and school authority1 not the nominal studies4 ,the thinking thus evoked is artificially one-sided at the best4 ,at its worst1 the problem of the pupil is not how to meet the requirements of school life1 but how to seem to meet them--or1 how to come near enough to meeting them to slide along without an undue amount of friction4 ,the type of judgment formed by these devices is not a desirable addition to character4 ,if these statements give too highly colored a picture of usual school methods1 the exaggeration may at least serve to illustrate the point3 the need of active pursuits1 involving the use of material to accomplish purposes1 if there are to be situations which normally generate problems occasioning thoughtful inquiry4 ,,ii4 ,there must be data at command to supply the considerations required in dealing with the specific difficulty which has presented itself4 ,teachers following a developing method sometimes tell children to think things out for themselves as if they could spin them out of their own heads4 ,the material of thinking is not thoughts1 but actions1 facts1 events1 and the relations of things4 ,in other words1 to think effectively one must have had1 or now have1 experiences which will furnish him resources for coping with the difficulty at hand4 ,a difficulty is an indispensable stimulus to thinking1 but not all difficulties call out thinking4 ,sometimes they overwhelm and submerge and discourage4 ,the perplexing situation must be sufficiently like situations which have already been dealt with so that pupils will have some control of the meanings of handling it4 ,a large part of the art of instruction lies in making the difficulty of new problems large enough to challenge thought1 and small enough so that1 in addition to the confusion naturally attending the novel elements1 there shall be luminous familiar spots from which helpful suggestions may spring4 ,in one sense1 it is a matter of indifference by what psychological means the subject matter for reflection is provided4 ,memory1 observation1 reading1 communication1 are all avenues for supplying data4 ,the relative proportion to be obtained from each is a matter of the specific features of the particular problem in hand4 ,it is foolish to insist upon observation of objects presented to the senses if the student is so familiar with the objects that he could just as well recall the facts independently4 ,it is possible to induce undue and crippling dependence upon sense-presentations4 ,no one can carry around with him a museum of all the things whose properties will assist the conduct of thought4 ,a well-trained mind is one that has a maximum of resources behind it1 so to speak1 and that is accustomed to go over its past experiences to see what they yield4 ,on the other hand1 a quality or relation of even a familiar object may previously have been passed over1 and be just the fact that is helpful in dealing with the question4 ,in this case direct observation is called for4 ,the same principle applies to the use to be made of observation on one hand and of reading and telling on the other4 ,direct observation is naturally more vivid and vital4 ,but it has its limitations2 and in any case it is a necessary part of education that one should acquire the ability to supplement the narrowness of his immediately personal experiences by utilizing the experiences of others4 ,excessive reliance upon others for data 7whether got from reading or listening7 is to be depreciated4 ,most objectionable of all is the probability that others1 the book or the teacher1 will supply solutions ready-made1 instead of giving material that the student has to adapt and apply to the question in hand for himself4 ,there is no inconsistency in saying that in schools there is usually both too much and too little information supplied by others4 ,the accumulation and acquisition of information for purposes of reproduction in recitation and examination is made too much of4 ,knowledge1 in the sense of information1 means the working capital1 the indispensable resources1 of further inquiry2 of finding out1 or learning1 more things4 ,frequently it is treated as an end itself1 and then the goal becomes to heap it up and display it when called for4 ,this static1 cold-storage ideal of knowledge is inimical to educative development4 ,it not only lets occasions for thinking go unused1 but it swamps thinking4 ,no one could construct a house on ground cluttered with miscellaneous junk4 ,pupils who have stored their minds with all kinds of material which they have never put to intellectual uses are sure to be hampered when they try to think4 ,they have no practice in selecting what is appropriate1 and no criterion to go by2 everything is on the same dead static level4 ,on the other hand1 it is quite open to question whether1 if information actually functioned in experience through use in application to the student's own purposes1 there would not be need of more varied resources in books1 pictures1 and talks than are usually at command4 ,,iii4 ,the correlate in thinking of facts1 data1 knowledge already acquired1 is suggestions1 inferences1 conjectured meanings1 suppositions1 tentative explanations3--ideas1 in short4 ,careful observation and recollection determine what is given1 what is already there1 and hence assured4 ,they cannot furnish what is lacking4 ,they define1 clarify1 and locate the question2 they cannot supply its answer4 ,projection1 invention1 ingenuity1 devising come in for that purpose4 ,the data arouse suggestions1 and only by reference to the specific data can we pass upon the appropriateness of the suggestions4 ,but the suggestions run beyond what is1 as yet1 actually given in experience4 ,they forecast possible results1 things to do1 not facts 7things already done74 ,inference is always an invasion of the unknown1 a leap from the known4 ,in this sense1 a thought 7what a thing suggests but is not as it is presented7 is creative1--an incursion into the novel4 ,it involves some inventiveness4 ,what is suggested must1 indeed1 be familiar in some context2 the novelty1 the inventive devising1 clings to the new light in which it is seen1 the different use to which it is put4 ,when ,newton thought of his theory of gravitation1 the creative aspect of his thought was not found in its materials4 ,they were familiar2 many of them commonplaces--sun1 moon1 planets1 weight1 distance1 mass1 square of numbers4 ,these were not original ideas2 they were established facts4 ,his originality lay in the use to which these familiar acquaintances were put by introduction into an unfamiliar context4 ,the same is true of every striking scientific discovery1 every great invention1 every admirable artistic production4 ,only silly folk identify creative originality with the extraordinary and fanciful2 others recognize that its measure lies in putting everyday things to uses which had not occurred to others4 ,the operation is novel1 not the materials out of which it is constructed4 ,the educational conclusion which follows is that all thinking is original in a projection of considerations which have not been previously apprehended4 ,the child of three who discovers what can be done with blocks1 or of six who finds out what he can make by putting five cents and five cents together1 is really a discoverer1 even though everybody else in the world knows it4 ,there is a genuine increment of experience2 not another item mechanically added on1 but enrichment by a new quality4 ,the charm which the spontaneity of little children has for sympathetic observers is due to perception of this intellectual originality4 ,the joy which children themselves experience is the joy of intellectual constructiveness--of creativeness1 if the word may be used without misunderstanding4 ,the educational moral ,i am chiefly concerned to draw is not1 however1 that teachers would find their own work less of a grind and strain if school conditions favored learning in the sense of discovery and not in that of storing away what others pour into them2 nor that it would be possible to give even children and youth the delights of personal intellectual productiveness--true and important as are these things4 ,it is that no thought1 no idea1 can possibly be conveyed as an idea from one person to another4 ,when it is told1 it is1 to the one to whom it is told1 another given fact1 not an idea4 ,the communication may stimulate the other person to realize the question for himself and to think out a like idea1 or it may smother his intellectual interest and suppress his dawning effort at thought4 ,but what he directly gets cannot be an idea4 ,only by wrestling with the conditions of the problem at first hand1 seeking and finding his own way out1 does he think4 ,when the parent or teacher has provided the conditions which stimulate thinking and has taken a sympathetic attitude toward the activities of the learner by entering into a common or conjoint experience1 all has been done which a second party can do to instigate learning4 ,the rest lies with the one directly concerned4 ,if he cannot devise his own solution 7not of course in isolation1 but in correspondence with the teacher and other pupils7 and find his own way out he will not learn1 not even if he can recite some correct answer with one hundred per cent accuracy4 ,we can and do supply ready-made ideas by the thousand2 we do not usually take much pains to see that the one learning engages in significant situations where his own activities generate1 support1 and clinch ideas--that is1 perceived meanings or connections4 ,this does not mean that the teacher is to stand off and look on2 the alternative to furnishing ready-made subject matter and listening to the accuracy with which it is reproduced is not quiescence1 but participation1 sharing1 in an activity4 ,in such shared activity1 the teacher is a learner1 and the learner is1 without knowing it1 a teacher--and upon the whole1 the less consciousness there is1 on either side1 of either giving or receiving instruction1 the better4 ,,iv4 ,ideas1 as we have seen1 whether they be humble guesses or dignified theories1 are anticipations of possible solutions4 ,they are anticipations of some continuity or connection of an activity and a consequence which has not as yet shown itself4 ,they are therefore tested by the operation of acting upon them4 ,they are to guide and organize further observations1 recollections1 and experiments4 ,they are intermediate in learning1 not final4 ,all educational reformers1 as we have had occasion to remark1 are given to attacking the passivity of traditional education4 ,they have opposed pouring in from without1 and absorbing like a sponge2 they have attacked drilling in material as into hard and resisting rock4 ,but it is not easy to secure conditions which will make the getting of an idea identical with having an experience which widens and makes more precise our contact with the environment4 ,activity1 even self-activity1 is too easily thought of as something merely mental1 cooped up within the head1 or finding expression only through the vocal organs4 ,while the need of application of ideas gained in study is acknowledged by all the more successful methods of instruction1 the exercises in application are sometimes treated as devices for fixing what has already been learned and for getting greater practical skill in its manipulation4 ,these results are genuine and not to be despised4 ,but practice in applying what has been gained in study ought primarily to have an intellectual quality4 ,as we have already seen1 thoughts just as thoughts are incomplete4 ,at best they are tentative2 they are suggestions1 indications4 ,they are standpoints and methods for dealing with situations of experience4 ,till they are applied in these situations they lack full point and reality4 ,only application tests them1 and only testing confers full meaning and a sense of their reality4 ,short of use made of them1 they tend to segregate into a peculiar world of their own4 ,it may be seriously questioned whether the philosophies 7to which reference has been made in section #b of chapter ,x7 which isolate mind and set it over against the world did not have their origin in the fact that the reflective or theoretical class of men elaborated a large stock of ideas which social conditions did not allow them to act upon and test4 ,consequently men were thrown back into their own thoughts as ends in themselves4 ,however this may be1 there can be no doubt that a peculiar artificiality attaches to much of what is learned in schools4 ,it can hardly be said that many students consciously think of the subject matter as unreal2 but it assuredly does not possess for them the kind of reality which the subject matter of their vital experiences possesses4 ,they learn not to expect that sort of reality of it2 they become habituated to treating it as having reality for the purposes of recitations1 lessons1 and examinations4 ,that it should remain inert for the experiences of daily life is more or less a matter of course4 ,the bad effects are twofold4 ,ordinary experience does not receive the enrichment which it should2 it is not fertilized by school learning4 ,and the attitudes which spring from getting used to and accepting half-understood and ill-digested material weaken vigor and efficiency of thought4 ,if we have dwelt especially on the negative side1 it is for the sake of suggesting positive measures adapted to the effectual development of thought4 ,where schools are equipped with laboratories1 shops1 and gardens1 where dramatizations1 plays1 and games are freely used1 opportunities exist for reproducing situations of life1 and for acquiring and applying information and ideas in the carrying forward of progressive experiences4 ,ideas are not segregated1 they do not form an isolated island4 ,they animate and enrich the ordinary course of life4 ,information is vitalized by its function2 by the place it occupies in direction of action4 ,the phrase opportunities exist is used purposely4 ,they may not be taken advantage of2 it is possible to employ manual and constructive activities in a physical way1 as means of getting just bodily skill2 or they may be used almost exclusively for utilitarian1 i4e41 pecuniary1 ends4 ,but the disposition on the part of upholders of cultural education to assume that such activities are merely physical or professional in quality1 is itself a product of the philosophies which isolate mind from direction of the course of experience and hence from action upon and with things4 ,when the mental is regarded as a self-contained separate realm1 a counterpart fate befalls bodily activity and movements4 ,they are regarded as at the best mere external annexes to mind4 ,they may be necessary for the satisfaction of bodily needs and the attainment of external decency and comfort1 but they do not occupy a necessary place in mind nor enact an indispensable role in the completion of thought4 ,hence they have no place in a liberal education--i4e41 one which is concerned with the interests of intelligence4 ,if they come in at all1 it is as a concession to the material needs of the masses4 ,that they should be allowed to invade the education of the elite is unspeakable4 ,this conclusion follows irresistibly from the isolated conception of mind1 but by the same logic it disappears when we perceive what mind really is--namely1 the purposive and directive factor in the development of experience4 ,while it is desirable that all educational institutions should be equipped so as to give students an opportunity for acquiring and testing ideas and information in active pursuits typifying important social situations1 it will1 doubtless1 be a long time before all of them are thus furnished4 ,but this state of affairs does not afford instructors an excuse for folding their hands and persisting in methods which segregate school knowledge4 ,every recitation in every subject gives an opportunity for establishing cross connections between the subject matter of the lesson and the wider and more direct experiences of everyday life4 ,classroom instruction falls into three kinds4 ,the least desirable treats each lesson as an independent whole4 ,it does not put upon the student the responsibility of finding points of contact between it and other lessons in the same subject1 or other subjects of study4 ,wiser teachers see to it that the student is systematically led to utilize his earlier lessons to help understand the present one1 and also to use the present to throw additional light upon what has already been acquired4 ,results are better1 but school subject matter is still isolated4 ,save by accident1 out-of-school experience is left in its crude and comparatively irreflective state4 ,it is not subject to the refining and expanding influences of the more accurate and comprehensive material of direct instruction4 ,the latter is not motivated and impregnated with a sense of reality by being intermingled with the realities of everyday life4 ,the best type of teaching bears in mind the desirability of affecting this interconnection4 ,it puts the student in the habitual attitude of finding points of contact and mutual bearings4 ,summary4 ,processes of instruction are unified in the degree in which they center in the production of good habits of thinking4 ,while we may speak1 without error1 of the method of thought1 the important thing is that thinking is the method of an educative experience4 ,the essentials of method are therefore identical with the essentials of reflection4 ,they are first that the pupil have a genuine situation of experience--that there be a continuous activity in which he is interested for its own sake2 secondly1 that a genuine problem develop within this situation as a stimulus to thought2 third1 that he possess the information and make the observations needed to deal with it2 fourth1 that suggested solutions occur to him which he shall be responsible for developing in an orderly way2 fifth1 that he have opportunity and occasion to test his ideas by application1 to make their meaning clear and to discover for himself their validity4 ,chapter ,thirteen3 ,the ,nature of ,method #a4 ,the ,unity of ,subject ,matter and ,method4 ,the trinity of school topics is subject matter1 methods1 and administration or government4 ,we have been concerned with the two former in recent chapters4 ,it remains to disentangle them from the context in which they have been referred to1 and discuss explicitly their nature4 ,we shall begin with the topic of method1 since that lies closest to the considerations of the last chapter4 ,before taking it up1 it may be well1 however1 to call express attention to one implication of our theory2 the connection of subject matter and method with each other4 ,the idea that mind and the world of things and persons are two separate and independent realms--a theory which philosophically is known as dualism--carries with it the conclusion that method and subject matter of instruction are separate affairs4 ,subject matter then becomes a ready-made systematized classification of the facts and principles of the world of nature and man4 ,method then has for its province a consideration of the ways in which this antecedent subject matter may be best presented to and impressed upon the mind2 or1 a consideration of the ways in which the mind may be externally brought to bear upon the matter so as to facilitate its acquisition and possession4 ,in theory1 at least1 one might deduce from a science of the mind as something existing by itself a complete theory of methods of learning1 with no knowledge of the subjects to which the methods are to be applied4 ,since many who are actually most proficient in various branches of subject matter are wholly innocent of these methods1 this state of affairs gives opportunity for the retort that pedagogy1 as an alleged science of methods of the mind in learning1 is futile2--a mere screen for concealing the necessity a teacher is under of profound and accurate acquaintance with the subject in hand4 ,but since thinking is a directed movement of subject matter to a completing issue1 and since mind is the deliberate and intentional phase of the process1 the notion of any such split is radically false4 ,the fact that the material of a science is organized is evidence that it has already been subjected to intelligence2 it has been methodized1 so to say4 ,zoology as a systematic branch of knowledge represents crude1 scattered facts of our ordinary acquaintance with animals after they have been subjected to careful examination1 to deliberate supplementation1 and to arrangement to bring out connections which assist observation1 memory1 and further inquiry4 ,instead of furnishing a starting point for learning1 they mark out a consummation4 ,method means that arrangement of subject matter which makes it most effective in use4 ,never is method something outside of the material4 ,how about method from the standpoint of an individual who is dealing with subject matter8 ,again1 it is not something external4 ,it is simply an effective treatment of material--efficiency meaning such treatment as utilizes the material 7puts it to a purpose7 with a minimum of waste of time and energy4 ,we can distinguish a way of acting1 and discuss it by itself2 but the way exists only as way-of-dealing-with-material4 ,method is not antithetical to subject matter2 it is the effective direction of subject matter to desired results4 ,it is antithetical to random and ill-considered action1--ill-considered signifying ill-adapted4 ,the statement that method means directed movement of subject matter towards ends is formal4 ,an illustration may give it content4 ,every artist must have a method1 a technique1 in doing his work4 ,piano playing is not hitting the keys at random4 ,it is an orderly way of using them1 and the order is not something which exists ready-made in the musician's hands or brain prior to an activity dealing with the piano4 ,order is found in the disposition of acts which use the piano and the hands and brain so as to achieve the result intended4 ,it is the action of the piano directed to accomplish the purpose of the piano as a musical instrument4 ,it is the same with pedagogical method4 ,the only difference is that the piano is a mechanism constructed in advance for a single end2 while the material of study is capable of indefinite uses4 ,but even in this regard the illustration may apply if we consider the infinite variety of kinds of music which a piano may produce1 and the variations in technique required in the different musical results secured4 ,method in any case is but an effective way of employing some material for some end4 ,these considerations may be generalized by going back to the conception of experience4 ,experience as the perception of the connection between something tried and something undergone in consequence is a process4 ,apart from effort to control the course which the process takes1 there is no distinction of subject matter and method4 ,there is simply an activity which includes both what an individual does and what the environment does4 ,a piano player who had perfect mastery of his instrument would have no occasion to distinguish between his contribution and that of the piano4 ,in well-formed1 smooth-running functions of any sort1--skating1 conversing1 hearing music1 enjoying a landscape1--there is no consciousness of separation of the method of the person and of the subject matter4 ,in whole-hearted play and work there is the same phenomenon4 ,when we reflect upon an experience instead of just having it1 we inevitably distinguish between our own attitude and the objects toward which we sustain the attitude4 ,when a man is eating1 he is eating food4 ,he does not divide his act into eating and food4 ,but if he makes a scientific investigation of the act1 such a discrimination is the first thing he would effect4 ,he would examine on the one hand the properties of the nutritive material1 and on the other hand the acts of the organism in appropriating and digesting4 ,such reflection upon experience gives rise to a distinction of what we experience 7the experienced7 and the experiencing--the how4 ,when we give names to this distinction we have subject matter and method as our terms4 ,there is the thing seen1 heard1 loved1 hated1 imagined1 and there is the act of seeing1 hearing1 loving1 hating1 imagining1 etc4 ,this distinction is so natural and so important for certain purposes1 that we are only too apt to regard it as a separation in existence and not as a distinction in thought4 ,then we make a division between a self and the environment or world4 ,this separation is the root of the dualism of method and subject matter4 ,that is1 we assume that knowing1 feeling1 willing1 etc41 are things which belong to the self or mind in its isolation1 and which then may be brought to bear upon an independent subject matter4 ,we assume that the things which belong in isolation to the self or mind have their own laws of operation irrespective of the modes of active energy of the object4 ,these laws are supposed to furnish method4 ,it would be no less absurd to suppose that men can eat without eating something1 or that the structure and movements of the jaws1 throat muscles1 the digestive activities of stomach1 etc41 are not what they are because of the material with which their activity is engaged4 ,just as the organs of the organism are a continuous part of the very world in which food materials exist1 so the capacities of seeing1 hearing1 loving1 imagining are intrinsically connected with the subject matter of the world4 ,they are more truly ways in which the environment enters into experience and functions there than they are independent acts brought to bear upon things4 ,experience1 in short1 is not a combination of mind and world1 subject and object1 method and subject matter1 but is a single continuous interaction of a great diversity 7literally countless in number7 of energies4 ,for the purpose of controlling the course or direction which the moving unity of experience takes we draw a mental distinction between the how and the what4 ,while there is no way of walking or of eating or of learning over and above the actual walking1 eating1 and studying1 there are certain elements in the act which give the key to its more effective control4 ,special attention to these elements makes them more obvious to perception 7letting other factors recede for the time being from conspicuous recognition74 ,getting an idea of how the experience proceeds indicates to us what factors must be secured or modified in order that it may go on more successfully4 ,this is only a somewhat elaborate way of saying that if a man watches carefully the growth of several plants1 some of which do well and some of which amount to little or nothing1 he may be able to detect the special conditions upon which the prosperous development of a plant depends4 ,these conditions1 stated in an orderly sequence1 would constitute the method or way or manner of its growth4 ,there is no difference between the growth of a plant and the prosperous development of an experience4 ,it is not easy1 in either case1 to seize upon just the factors which make for its best movement4 ,but study of cases of success and failure and minute and extensive comparison1 helps to seize upon causes4 ,when we have arranged these causes in order1 we have a method of procedure or a technique4 ,a consideration of some evils in education that flow from the isolation of method from subject matter will make the point more definite4 7,i7 ,in the first place1 there is the neglect 7of which we have spoken7 of concrete situations of experience4 ,there can be no discovery of a method without cases to be studied4 ,the method is derived from observation of what actually happens1 with a view to seeing that it happen better next time4 ,but in instruction and discipline1 there is rarely sufficient opportunity for children and youth to have the direct normal experiences from which educators might derive an idea of method or order of best development4 ,experiences are had under conditions of such constraint that they throw little or no light upon the normal course of an experience to its fruition4 ,methods have then to be authoritatively recommended to teachers1 instead of being an expression of their own intelligent observations4 ,under such circumstances1 they have a mechanical uniformity1 assumed to be alike for all minds4 ,where flexible personal experiences are promoted by providing an environment which calls out directed occupations in work and play1 the methods ascertained will vary with individuals--for it is certain that each individual has something characteristic in his way of going at things4 7ii7 ,in the second place1 the notion of methods isolated from subject matter is responsible for the false conceptions of discipline and interest already noted4 ,when the effective way of managing material is treated as something ready-made apart from material1 there are just three possible ways in which to establish a relationship lacking by assumption4 ,one is to utilize excitement1 shock of pleasure1 tickling the palate4 ,another is to make the consequences of not attending painful2 we may use the menace of harm to motivate concern with the alien subject matter4 ,or a direct appeal may be made to the person to put forth effort without any reason4 ,we may rely upon immediate strain of will4 ,in practice1 however1 the latter method is effectual only when instigated by fear of unpleasant results4 7iii7 ,in the third place1 the act of learning is made a direct and conscious end in itself4 ,under normal conditions1 learning is a product and reward of occupation with subject matter4 ,children do not set out1 consciously1 to learn walking or talking4 ,one sets out to give his impulses for communication and for fuller intercourse with others a show4 ,he learns in consequence of his direct activities4 ,the better methods of teaching a child1 say1 to read1 follow the same road4 ,they do not fix his attention upon the fact that he has to learn something and so make his attitude self-conscious and constrained4 ,they engage his activities1 and in the process of engagement he learns3 the same is true of the more successful methods in dealing with number or whatever4 ,but when the subject matter is not used in carrying forward impulses and habits to significant results1 it is just something to be learned4 ,the pupil's attitude to it is just that of having to learn it4 ,conditions more unfavorable to an alert and concentrated response would be hard to devise4 ,frontal attacks are even more wasteful in learning than in war4 ,this does not mean1 however1 that students are to be seduced unaware into preoccupation with lessons4 ,it means that they shall be occupied with them for real reasons or ends1 and not just as something to be learned4 ,this is accomplished whenever the pupil perceives the place occupied by the subject matter in the fulfilling of some experience4 7iv7 ,in the fourth place1 under the influence of the conception of the separation of mind and material1 method tends to be reduced to a cut and dried routine1 to following mechanically prescribed steps4 ,no one can tell in how many schoolrooms children reciting in arithmetic or grammar are compelled to go through1 under the alleged sanction of method1 certain preordained verbal formulae4 ,instead of being encouraged to attack their topics directly1 experimenting with methods that seem promising and learning to discriminate by the consequences that accrue1 it is assumed that there is one fixed method to be followed4 ,it is also naively assumed that if the pupils make their statements and explanations in a certain form of analysis1 their mental habits will in time conform4 ,nothing has brought pedagogical theory into greater disrepute than the belief that it is identified with handing out to teachers recipes and models to be followed in teaching4 ,flexibility and initiative in dealing with problems are characteristic of any conception to which method is a way of managing material to develop a conclusion4 ,mechanical rigid woodenness is an inevitable corollary of any theory which separates mind from activity motivated by a purpose4 #b4 ,method as ,general and as ,individual4 ,in brief1 the method of teaching is the method of an art1 of action intelligently directed by ends4 ,but the practice of a fine art is far from being a matter of extemporized inspirations4 ,study of the operations and results of those in the past who have greatly succeeded is essential4 ,there is always a tradition1 or schools of art1 definite enough to impress beginners1 and often to take them captive4 ,methods of artists in every branch depend upon thorough acquaintance with materials and tools2 the painter must know canvas1 pigments1 brushes1 and the technique of manipulation of all his appliances4 ,attainment of this knowledge requires persistent and concentrated attention to objective materials4 ,the artist studies the progress of his own attempts to see what succeeds and what fails4 ,the assumption that there are no alternatives between following ready-made rules and trusting to native gifts1 the inspiration of the moment and undirected hard work1 is contradicted by the procedures of every art4 ,such matters as knowledge of the past1 of current technique1 of materials1 of the ways in which one's own best results are assured1 supply the material for what may be called general method4 ,there exists a cumulative body of fairly stable methods for reaching results1 a body authorized by past experience and by intellectual analysis1 which an individual ignores at his peril4 ,as was pointed out in the discussion of habit-forming 7ante1 p4 #di71 there is always a danger that these methods will become mechanized and rigid1 mastering an agent instead of being powers at command for his own ends4 ,but it is also true that the innovator who achieves anything enduring1 whose work is more than a passing sensation1 utilizes classic methods more than may appear to himself or to his critics4 ,he devotes them to new uses1 and in so far transforms them4 ,education also has its general methods4 ,and if the application of this remark is more obvious in the case of the teacher than of the pupil1 it is equally real in the case of the latter4 ,part of his learning1 a very important part1 consists in becoming master of the methods which the experience of others has shown to be more efficient in like cases of getting knowledge4 #a ,these general methods are in no way opposed to individual initiative and originality--to personal ways of doing things4 ,on the contrary they are reinforcements of them4 ,for there is radical difference between even the most general method and a prescribed rule4 ,the latter is a direct guide to action2 the former operates indirectly through the enlightenment it supplies as to ends and means4 ,it operates1 that is to say1 through intelligence1 and not through conformity to orders externally imposed4 ,ability to use even in a masterly way an established technique gives no warranty of artistic work1 for the latter also depends upon an animating idea4 ,if knowledge of methods used by others does not directly tell us what to do1 or furnish ready-made models1 how does it operate8 ,what is meant by calling a method intellectual8 ,take the case of a physician4 ,no mode of behavior more imperiously demands knowledge of established modes of diagnosis and treatment than does his4 ,but after all1 cases are like1 not identical4 ,to be used intelligently1 existing practices1 however authorized they may be1 have to be adapted to the exigencies of particular cases4 ,accordingly1 recognized procedures indicate to the physician what inquiries to set on foot for himself1 what measures to try4 ,they are standpoints from which to carry on investigations2 they economize a survey of the features of the particular case by suggesting the things to be especially looked into4 ,the physician's own personal attitudes1 his own ways 7individual methods7 of dealing with the situation in which he is concerned1 are not subordinated to the general principles of procedure1 but are facilitated and directed by the latter4 ,the instance may serve to point out the value to the teacher of a knowledge of the psychological methods and the empirical devices found useful in the past4 ,when they get in the way of his own common sense1 when they come between him and the situation in which he has to act1 they are worse than useless4 ,but if he has acquired them as intellectual aids in sizing up the needs1 resources1 and difficulties of the unique experiences in which he engages1 they are of constructive value4 ,in the last resort1 just because everything depends upon his own methods of response1 much depends upon how far he can utilize1 in making his own response1 the knowledge which has accrued in the experience of others4 ,as already intimated1 every word of this account is directly applicable also to the method of the pupil1 the way of learning4 ,to suppose that students1 whether in the primary school or in the university1 can be supplied with models of method to be followed in acquiring and expounding a subject is to fall into a self-deception that has lamentable consequences4 7,see ante1 p4 #afi47 ,one must make his own reaction in any case4 ,indications of the standardized or general methods used in like cases by others--particularly by those who are already experts--are of worth or of harm according as they make his personal reaction more intelligent or as they induce a person to dispense with exercise of his own judgment4 ,if what was said earlier 7,see p4 #aei7 about originality of thought seemed overstrained1 demanding more of education than the capacities of average human nature permit1 the difficulty is that we lie under the incubus of a superstition4 ,we have set up the notion of mind at large1 of intellectual method that is the same for all4 ,then we regard individuals as differing in the quantity of mind with which they are charged4 ,ordinary persons are then expected to be ordinary4 ,only the exceptional are allowed to have originality4 ,the measure of difference between the average student and the genius is a measure of the absence of originality in the former4 ,but this notion of mind in general is a fiction4 ,how one person's abilities compare in quantity with those of another is none of the teacher's business4 ,it is irrelevant to his work4 ,what is required is that every individual shall have opportunities to employ his own powers in activities that have meaning4 ,mind1 individual method1 originality 7these are convertible terms7 signify the quality of purposive or directed action4 ,if we act upon this conviction1 we shall secure more originality even by the conventional standard than now develops4 ,imposing an alleged uniform general method upon everybody breeds mediocrity in all but the very exceptional4 ,and measuring originality by deviation from the mass breeds eccentricity in them4 ,thus we stifle the distinctive quality of the many1 and save in rare instances 7like1 say1 that of ,darwin7 infect the rare geniuses with an unwholesome quality4 #c4 ,the ,traits of ,individual ,method4 ,the most general features of the method of knowing have been given in our chapter on thinking4 ,they are the features of the reflective situation3 ,problem1 collection and analysis of data1 projection and elaboration of suggestions or ideas1 experimental application and testing2 the resulting conclusion or judgment4 ,the specific elements of an individual's method or way of attack upon a problem are found ultimately in his native tendencies and his acquired habits and interests4 ,the method of one will vary from that of another 7and properly vary7 as his original instinctive capacities vary1 as his past experiences and his preferences vary4 ,those who have already studied these matters are in possession of information which will help teachers in understanding the responses different pupils make1 and help them in guiding these responses to greater efficiency4 ,child-study1 psychology1 and a knowledge of social environment supplement the personal acquaintance gained by the teacher4 ,but methods remain the personal concern1 approach1 and attack of an individual1 and no catalogue can ever exhaust their diversity of form and tint4 ,some attitudes may be named1 however1-which are central in effective intellectual ways of dealing with subject matter4 ,among the most important are directness1 open-mindedness1 single-mindedness 7or whole-heartedness71 and responsibility4 #a4 ,it is easier to indicate what is meant by directness through negative terms than in positive ones4 ,self-consciousness1 embarrassment1 and constraint are its menacing foes4 ,they indicate that a person is not immediately concerned with subject matter4 ,something has come between which deflects concern to side issues4 ,a self-conscious person is partly thinking about his problem and partly about what others think of his performances4 ,diverted energy means loss of power and confusion of ideas4 ,taking an attitude is by no means identical with being conscious of one's attitude4 ,the former is spontaneous1 naive1 and simple4 ,it is a sign of whole-souled relationship between a person and what he is dealing with4 ,the latter is not of necessity abnormal4 ,it is sometimes the easiest way of correcting a false method of approach1 and of improving the effectiveness of the means one is employing1--as golf players1 piano players1 public speakers1 etc41 have occasionally to give especial attention to their position and movements4 ,but this need is occasional and temporary4 ,when it is effectual a person thinks of himself in terms of what is to be done1 as one means among others of the realization of an end--as in the case of a tennis player practicing to get the feel of a stroke4 ,in abnormal cases1 one thinks of himself not as part of the agencies of execution1 but as a separate object--as when the player strikes an attitude thinking of the impression it will make upon spectators1 or is worried because of the impression he fears his movements give rise to4 ,confidence is a good name for what is intended by the term directness4 ,it should not be confused1 however1 with self-confidence which may be a form of self-consciousness--or of cheek4 ,confidence is not a name for what one thinks or feels about his attitude it is not reflex4 ,it denotes the straightforwardness with which one goes at what he has to do4 ,it denotes not conscious trust in the efficacy of one's powers but unconscious faith in the possibilities of the situation4 ,it signifies rising to the needs of the situation4 ,we have already pointed out 7,see p4 #afi7 the objections to making students emphatically aware of the fact that they are studying or learning4 ,just in the degree in which they are induced by the conditions to be so aware1 they are not studying and learning4 ,they are in a divided and complicated attitude4 ,whatever methods of a teacher call a pupil's attention off from what he has to do and transfer it to his own attitude towards what he is doing impair directness of concern and action4 ,persisted in1 the pupil acquires a permanent tendency to fumble1 to gaze about aimlessly1 to look for some clew of action beside that which the subject matter supplies4 ,dependence upon extraneous suggestions and directions1 a state of foggy confusion1 take the place of that sureness with which children 7and grown-up people who have not been sophisticated by education7 confront the situations of life4 #b4 ,open-mindedness4 ,partiality is1 as we have seen1 an accompaniment of the existence of interest1 since this means sharing1 partaking1 taking sides in some movement4 ,all the more reason1 therefore1 for an attitude of mind which actively welcomes suggestions and relevant information from all sides4 ,in the chapter on ,aims it was shown that foreseen ends are factors in the development of a changing situation4 ,they are the means by which the direction of action is controlled4 ,they are subordinate to the situation1 therefore1 not the situation to them4 ,they are not ends in the sense of finalities to which everything must be bent and sacrificed4 ,they are1 as foreseen1 means of guiding the development of a situation4 ,a target is not the future goal of shooting2 it is the centering factor in a present shooting4 ,openness of mind means accessibility of mind to any and every consideration that will throw light upon the situation that needs to be cleared up1 and that will help determine the consequences of acting this way or that4 ,efficiency in accomplishing ends which have been settled upon as unalterable can coexist with a narrowly opened mind4 ,but intellectual growth means constant expansion of horizons and consequent formation of new purposes and new responses4 ,these are impossible without an active disposition to welcome points of view hitherto alien2 an active desire to entertain considerations which modify existing purposes4 ,retention of capacity to grow is the reward of such intellectual hospitality4 ,the worst thing about stubbornness of mind1 about prejudices1 is that they arrest development2 they shut the mind off from new stimuli4 ,open-mindedness means retention of the childlike attitude2 closed-mindedness means premature intellectual old age4 ,exorbitant desire for uniformity of procedure and for prompt external results are the chief foes which the open-minded attitude meets in school4 ,the teacher who does not permit and encourage diversity of operation in dealing with questions is imposing intellectual blinders upon pupils--restricting their vision to the one path the teacher's mind happens to approve4 ,probably the chief cause of devotion to rigidity of method is1 however1 that it seems to promise speedy1 accurately measurable1 correct results4 ,the zeal for answers is the explanation of much of the zeal for rigid and mechanical methods4 ,forcing and overpressure have the same origin1 and the same result upon alert and varied intellectual interest4 ,open-mindedness is not the same as empty-mindedness4 ,to hang out a sign saying ,come right in2 there is no one at home is not the equivalent of hospitality4 ,but there is a kind of passivity1 willingness to let experiences accumulate and sink in and ripen1 which is an essential of development4 ,results 7external answers or solutions7 may be hurried2 processes may not be forced4 ,they take their own time to mature4 ,were all instructors to realize that the quality of mental process1 not the production of correct answers1 is the measure of educative growth something hardly less than a revolution in teaching would be worked4 #c4 ,single-mindedness4 ,so far as the word is concerned1 much that was said under the head of directness is applicable4 ,but what the word is here intended to convey is completeness of interest1 unity of purpose2 the absence of suppressed but effectual ulterior aims for which the professed aim is but a mask4 ,it is equivalent to mental integrity4 ,absorption1 engrossment1 full concern with subject matter for its own sake1 nurture it4 ,divided interest and evasion destroy it4 ,intellectual integrity1 honesty1 and sincerity are at bottom not matters of conscious purpose but of quality of active response4 ,their acquisition is fostered of course by conscious intent1 but self-deception is very easy4 ,desires are urgent4 ,when the demands and wishes of others forbid their direct expression they are easily driven into subterranean and deep channels4 ,entire surrender1 and wholehearted adoption of the course of action demanded by others are almost impossible4 ,deliberate revolt or deliberate attempts to deceive others may result4 ,but the more frequent outcome is a confused and divided state of interest in which one is fooled as to one's own real intent4 ,one tries to serve two masters at once4 ,social instincts1 the strong desire to please others and get their approval1 social training1 the general sense of duty and of authority1 apprehension of penalty1 all lead to a half-hearted effort to conform1 to pay attention to the lesson1 or whatever the requirement is4 ,amiable individuals want to do what they are expected to do4 ,consciously the pupil thinks he is doing this4 ,but his own desires are not abolished4 ,only their evident exhibition is suppressed4 ,strain of attention to what is hostile to desire is irksome2 in spite of one's conscious wish1 the underlying desires determine the main course of thought1 the deeper emotional responses4 ,the mind wanders from the nominal subject and devotes itself to what is intrinsically more desirable4 ,a systematized divided attention expressing the duplicity of the state of desire is the result4 ,one has only to recall his own experiences in school or at the present time when outwardly employed in actions which do not engage one's desires and purposes1 to realize how prevalent is this attitude of divided attention--double-mindedness4 ,we are so used to it that we take it for granted that a considerable amount of it is necessary4 ,it may be2 if so1 it is the more important to face its bad intellectual effects4 ,obvious is the loss of energy of thought immediately available when one is consciously trying 7or trying to seem to try7 to attend to one matter1 while unconsciously one's imagination is spontaneously going out to more congenial affairs4 ,more subtle and more permanently crippling to efficiency of intellectual activity is a fostering of habitual self-deception1 with the confused sense of reality which accompanies it4 ,a double standard of reality1 one for our own private and more or less concealed interests1 and another for public and acknowledged concerns1 hampers1 in most of us1 integrity and completeness of mental action4 ,equally serious is the fact that a split is set up between conscious thought and attention and impulsive blind affection and desire4 ,reflective dealings with the material of instruction is constrained and half-hearted2 attention wanders4 ,the topics to which it wanders are unavowed and hence intellectually illicit2 transactions with them are furtive4 ,the discipline that comes from regulating response by deliberate inquiry having a purpose fails2 worse than that1 the deepest concern and most congenial enterprises of the imagination 7since they center about the things dearest to desire7 are casual1 concealed4 ,they enter into action in ways which are unacknowledged4 ,not subject to rectification by consideration of consequences1 they are demoralizing4 ,school conditions favorable to this division of mind between avowed1 public1 and socially responsible undertakings1 and private1 ill-regulated1 and suppressed indulgences of thought are not hard to find4 ,what is sometimes called stern discipline1 i4e41 external coercive pressure1 has this tendency4 ,motivation through rewards extraneous to the thing to be done has a like effect4 ,everything that makes schooling merely preparatory 7,see ante1 p4 #ee7 works in this direction4 ,ends being beyond the pupil's present grasp1 other agencies have to be found to procure immediate attention to assigned tasks4 ,some responses are secured1 but desires and affections not enlisted must find other outlets4 ,not less serious is exaggerated emphasis upon drill exercises designed to produce skill in action1 independent of any engagement of thought--exercises have no purpose but the production of automatic skill4 ,nature abhors a mental vacuum4 ,what do teachers imagine is happening to thought and emotion when the latter get no outlet in the things of immediate activity8 ,were they merely kept in temporary abeyance1 or even only calloused1 it would not be a matter of so much moment4 ,but they are not abolished2 they are not suspended2 they are not suppressed--save with reference to the task in question4 ,they follow their own chaotic and undisciplined course4 ,what is native1 spontaneous1 and vital in mental reaction goes unused and untested1 and the habits formed are such that these qualities become less and less available for public and avowed ends4 #d4 ,responsibility4 ,by responsibility as an element in intellectual attitude is meant the disposition to consider in advance the probable consequences of any projected step and deliberately to accept them3 to accept them in the sense of taking them into account1 acknowledging them in action1 not yielding a mere verbal assent4 ,ideas1 as we have seen1 are intrinsically standpoints and methods for bringing about a solution of a perplexing situation2 forecasts calculated to influence responses4 ,it is only too easy to think that one accepts a statement or believes a suggested truth when one has not considered its implications2 when one has made but a cursory and superficial survey of what further things one is committed to by acceptance4 ,observation and recognition1 belief and assent1 then become names for lazy acquiescence in what is externally presented4 ,it would be much better to have fewer facts and truths in instruction--that is1 fewer things supposedly accepted1--if a smaller number of situations could be intellectually worked out to the point where conviction meant something real--some identification of the self with the type of conduct demanded by facts and foresight of results4 ,the most permanent bad results of undue complication of school subjects and congestion of school studies and lessons are not the worry1 nervous strain1 and superficial acquaintance that follow 7serious as these are71 but the failure to make clear what is involved in really knowing and believing a thing4 ,intellectual responsibility means severe standards in this regard4 ,these standards can be built up only through practice in following up and acting upon the meaning of what is acquired4 ,intellectual thoroughness is thus another name for the attitude we are considering4 ,there is a kind of thoroughness which is almost purely physical3 the kind that signifies mechanical and exhausting drill upon all the details of a subject4 ,intellectual thoroughness is seeing a thing through4 ,it depends upon a unity of purpose to which details are subordinated1 not upon presenting a multitude of disconnected details4 ,it is manifested in the firmness with which the full meaning of the purpose is developed1 not in attention1 however conscientious it may be1 to the steps of action externally imposed and directed4 ,summary4 ,method is a statement of the way the subject matter of an experience develops most effectively and fruitfully4 ,it is derived1 accordingly1 from observation of the course of experiences where there is no conscious distinction of personal attitude and manner from material dealt with4 ,the assumption that method is something separate is connected with the notion of the isolation of mind and self from the world of things4 ,it makes instruction and learning formal1 mechanical1 constrained4 ,while methods are individualized1 certain features of the normal course of an experience to its fruition may be discriminated1 because of the fund of wisdom derived from prior experiences and because of general similarities in the materials dealt with from time to time4 ,expressed in terms of the attitude of the individual the traits of good method are straightforwardness1 flexible intellectual interest or open-minded will to learn1 integrity of purpose1 and acceptance of responsibility for the consequences of one's activity including thought4 #a ,this point is developed below in a discussion of what are termed psychological and logical methods respectively4 ,see p4 #bai4 ,chapter ,fourteen3 ,the ,nature of ,subject ,matter #a4 ,subject ,matter of ,educator and of ,learner4 ,so far as the nature of subject matter in principle is concerned1 there is nothing to add to what has been said 7,see ante1 p4 #acd74 ,it consists of the facts observed1 recalled1 read1 and talked about1 and the ideas suggested1 in course of a development of a situation having a purpose4 ,this statement needs to be rendered more specific by connecting it with the materials of school instruction1 the studies which make up the curriculum4 ,what is the significance of our definition in application to reading1 writing1 mathematics1 history1 nature study1 drawing1 singing1 physics1 chemistry1 modern and foreign languages1 and so on8 ,let us recur to two of the points made earlier in our discussion4 ,the educator's part in the enterprise of education is to furnish the environment which stimulates responses and directs the learner's course4 ,in last analysis1 all that the educator can do is modify stimuli so that response will as surely as is possible result in the formation of desirable intellectual and emotional dispositions4 ,obviously studies or the subject matter of the curriculum have intimately to do with this business of supplying an environment4 ,the other point is the necessity of a social environment to give meaning to habits formed4 ,in what we have termed informal education1 subject matter is carried directly in the matrix of social intercourse4 ,it is what the persons with whom an individual associates do and say4 ,this fact gives a clew to the understanding of the subject matter of formal or deliberate instruction4 ,a connecting link is found in the stories1 traditions1 songs1 and liturgies which accompany the doings and rites of a primitive social group4 ,they represent the stock of meanings which have been precipitated out of previous experience1 which are so prized by the group as to be identified with their conception of their own collective life4 ,not being obviously a part of the skill exhibited in the daily occupations of eating1 hunting1 making war and peace1 constructing rugs1 pottery1 and baskets1 etc41 they are consciously impressed upon the young2 often1 as in the initiation ceremonies1 with intense emotional fervor4 ,even more pains are consciously taken to perpetuate the myths1 legends1 and sacred verbal formulae of the group than to transmit the directly useful customs of the group just because they cannot be picked up1 as the latter can be in the ordinary processes of association4 ,as the social group grows more complex1 involving a greater number of acquired skills which are dependent1 either in fact or in the belief of the group1 upon standard ideas deposited from past experience1 the content of social life gets more definitely formulated for purposes of instruction4 ,as we have previously noted1 probably the chief motive for consciously dwelling upon the group life1 extracting the meanings which are regarded as most important and systematizing them in a coherent arrangement1 is just the need of instructing the young so as to perpetuate group life4 ,once started on this road of selection1 formulation1 and organization1 no definite limit exists4 ,the invention of writing and of printing gives the operation an immense impetus4 ,finally1 the bonds which connect the subject matter of school study with the habits and ideals of the social group are disguised and covered up4 ,the ties are so loosened that it often appears as if there were none2 as if subject matter existed simply as knowledge on its own independent behoof1 and as if study were the mere act of mastering it for its own sake1 irrespective of any social values4 ,since it is highly important for practical reasons to counter-act this tendency 7,see ante1 p4 #h7 the chief purposes of our theoretical discussion are to make clear the connection which is so readily lost from sight1 and to show in some detail the social content and function of the chief constituents of the course of study4 ,the points need to be considered from the standpoint of instructor and of student4 ,to the former1 the significance of a knowledge of subject matter1 going far beyond the present knowledge of pupils1 is to supply definite standards and to reveal to him the possibilities of the crude activities of the immature4 7i7 ,the material of school studies translates into concrete and detailed terms the meanings of current social life which it is desirable to transmit4 ,it puts clearly before the instructor the essential ingredients of the culture to be perpetuated1 in such an organized form as to protect him from the haphazard efforts he would be likely to indulge in if the meanings had not been standardized4 7ii7 ,a knowledge of the ideas which have been achieved in the past as the outcome of activity places the educator in a position to perceive the meaning of the seeming impulsive and aimless reactions of the young1 and to provide the stimuli needed to direct them so that they will amount to something4 ,the more the educator knows of music the more he can perceive the possibilities of the inchoate musical impulses of a child4 ,organized subject matter represents the ripe fruitage of experiences like theirs1 experiences involving the same world1 and powers and needs similar to theirs4 ,it does not represent perfection or infallible wisdom2 but it is the best at command to further new experiences which may1 in some respects at least1 surpass the achievements embodied in existing knowledge and works of art4 ,from the standpoint of the educator1 in other words1 the various studies represent working resources1 available capital4 ,their remoteness from the experience of the young is not1 however1 seeming2 it is real4 ,the subject matter of the learner is not1 therefore1 it cannot be1 identical with the formulated1 the crystallized1 and systematized subject matter of the adult2 the material as found in books and in works of art1 etc4 ,the latter represents the possibilities of the former2 not its existing state4 ,it enters directly into the activities of the expert and the educator1 not into that of the beginner1 the learner4 ,failure to bear in mind the difference in subject matter from the respective standpoints of teacher and student is responsible for most of the mistakes made in the use of texts and other expressions of preexistent knowledge4 ,the need for a knowledge of the constitution and functions1 in the concrete1 of human nature is great just because the teacher's attitude to subject matter is so different from that of the pupil4 ,the teacher presents in actuality what the pupil represents only in posse4 ,that is1 the teacher already knows the things which the student is only learning4 ,hence the problem of the two is radically unlike4 ,when engaged in the direct act of teaching1 the instructor needs to have subject matter at his fingers' ends2 his attention should be upon the attitude and response of the pupil4 ,to understand the latter in its interplay with subject matter is his task1 while the pupil's mind1 naturally1 should be not on itself but on the topic in hand4 ,or to state the same point in a somewhat different manner3 the teacher should be occupied not with subject matter in itself but in its interaction with the pupils' present needs and capacities4 ,hence simple scholarship is not enough4 ,in fact1 there are certain features of scholarship or mastered subject matter--taken by itself--which get in the way of effective teaching unless the instructor's habitual attitude is one of concern with its interplay in the pupil's own experience4 ,in the first place1 his knowledge extends indefinitely beyond the range of the pupil's acquaintance4 ,it involves principles which are beyond the immature pupil's understanding and interest4 ,in and of itself1 it may no more represent the living world of the pupil's experience than the astronomer's knowledge of ,mars represents a baby's acquaintance with the room in which he stays4 ,in the second place1 the method of organization of the material of achieved scholarship differs from that of the beginner4 ,it is not true that the experience of the young is unorganized--that it consists of isolated scraps4 ,but it is organized in connection with direct practical centers of interest4 ,the child's home is1 for example1 the organizing center of his geographical knowledge4 ,his own movements about the locality1 his journeys abroad1 the tales of his friends1 give the ties which hold his items of information together4 ,but the geography of the geographer1 of the one who has already developed the implications of these smaller experiences1 is organized on the basis of the relationship which the various facts bear to one another--not the relations which they bear to his house1 bodily movements1 and friends4 ,to the one who is learned1 subject matter is extensive1 accurately defined1 and logically interrelated4 ,to the one who is learning1 it is fluid1 partial1 and connected through his personal occupations4 #a ,the problem of teaching is to keep the experience of the student moving in the direction of what the expert already knows4 ,hence the need that the teacher know both subject matter and the characteristic needs and capacities of the student4 #b4 ,the ,development of ,subject ,matter in the ,learner4 ,it is possible1 without doing violence to the facts1 to mark off three fairly typical stages in the growth of subject matter in the experience of the learner4 ,in its first estate1 knowledge exists as the content of intelligent ability--power to do4 ,this kind of subject matter1 or known material1 is expressed in familiarity or acquaintance with things4 ,then this material gradually is surcharged and deepened through communicated knowledge or information4 ,finally1 it is enlarged and worked over into rationally or logically organized material--that of the one who1 relatively speaking1 is expert in the subject4 ,i4 ,the knowledge which comes first to persons1 and that remains most deeply ingrained1 is knowledge of how to do2 how to walk1 talk1 read1 write1 skate1 ride a bicycle1 manage a machine1 calculate1 drive a horse1 sell goods1 manage people1 and so on indefinitely4 ,the popular tendency to regard instinctive acts which are adapted to an end as a sort of miraculous knowledge1 while unjustifiable1 is evidence of the strong tendency to identify intelligent control of the means of action with knowledge4 ,when education1 under the influence of a scholastic conception of knowledge which ignores everything but scientifically formulated facts and truths1 fails to recognize that primary or initial subject matter always exists as matter of an active doing1 involving the use of the body and the handling of material1 the subject matter of instruction is isolated from the needs and purposes of the learner1 and so becomes just a something to be memorized and reproduced upon demand4 ,recognition of the natural course of development1 on the contrary1 always sets out with situations which involve learning by doing4 ,arts and occupations form the initial stage of the curriculum1 corresponding as they do to knowing how to go about the accomplishment of ends4 ,popular terms denoting knowledge have always retained the connection with ability in action lost by academic philosophies4 ,ken and can are allied words4 ,attention means caring for a thing1 in the sense of both affection and of looking out for its welfare4 ,mind means carrying out instructions in action--as a child minds his mother--and taking care of something--as a nurse minds the baby4 ,to be thoughtful1 considerate1 means to heed the claims of others4 ,apprehension means dread of undesirable consequences1 as well as intellectual grasp4 ,to have good sense or judgment is to know the conduct a situation calls for2 discernment is not making distinctions for the sake of making them1 an exercise reprobated as hair splitting1 but is insight into an affair with reference to acting4 ,wisdom has never lost its association with the proper direction of life4 ,only in education1 never in the life of farmer1 sailor1 merchant1 physician1 or laboratory experimenter1 does knowledge mean primarily a store of information aloof from doing4 ,having to do with things in an intelligent way issues in acquaintance or familiarity4 ,the things we are best acquainted with are the things we put to frequent use--such things as chairs1 tables1 pen1 paper1 clothes1 food1 knives and forks on the commonplace level1 differentiating into more special objects according to a person's occupations in life4 ,knowledge of things in that intimate and emotional sense suggested by the word acquaintance is a precipitate from our employing them with a purpose4 ,we have acted with or upon the thing so frequently that we can anticipate how it will act and react--such is the meaning of familiar acquaintance4 ,we are ready for a familiar thing2 it does not catch us napping1 or play unexpected tricks with us4 ,this attitude carries with it a sense of congeniality or friendliness1 of ease and illumination2 while the things with which we are not accustomed to deal are strange1 foreign1 cold1 remote1 abstract4 ,,ii4 ,but it is likely that elaborate statements regarding this primary stage of knowledge will darken understanding4 ,it includes practically all of our knowledge which is not the result of deliberate technical study4 ,modes of purposeful doing include dealings with persons as well as things4 ,impulses of communication and habits of intercourse have to be adapted to maintaining successful connections with others2 a large fund of social knowledge accrues4 ,as a part of this intercommunication one learns much from others4 ,they tell of their experiences and of the experiences which1 in turn1 have been told them4 ,in so far as one is interested or concerned in these communications1 their matter becomes a part of one's own experience4 ,active connections with others are such an intimate and vital part of our own concerns that it is impossible to draw sharp lines1 such as would enable us to say1 ,here my experience ends2 there yours begins4 ,in so far as we are partners in common undertakings1 the things which others communicate to us as the consequences of their particular share in the enterprise blend at once into the experience resulting from our own special doings4 ,the ear is as much an organ of experience as the eye or hand2 the eye is available for reading reports of what happens beyond its horizon4 ,things remote in space and time affect the issue of our actions quite as much as things which we can smell and handle4 ,they really concern us1 and1 consequently1 any account of them which assists us in dealing with things at hand falls within personal experience4 ,information is the name usually given to this kind of subject matter4 ,the place of communication in personal doing supplies us with a criterion for estimating the value of informational material in school4 ,does it grow naturally out of some question with which the student is concerned8 ,does it fit into his more direct acquaintance so as to increase its efficacy and deepen its meaning8 ,if it meets these two requirements1 it is educative4 ,the amount heard or read is of no importance--the more the better1 provided the student has a need for it and can apply it in some situation of his own4 ,but it is not so easy to fulfill these requirements in actual practice as it is to lay them down in theory4 ,the extension in modern times of the area of intercommunication2 the invention of appliances for securing acquaintance with remote parts of the heavens and bygone events of history2 the cheapening of devices1 like printing1 for recording and distributing information--genuine and alleged--have created an immense bulk of communicated subject matter4 ,it is much easier to swamp a pupil with this than to work it into his direct experiences4 ,all too frequently it forms another strange world which just overlies the world of personal acquaintance4 ,the sole problem of the student is to learn1 for school purposes1 for purposes of recitations and promotions1 the constituent parts of this strange world4 ,probably the most conspicuous connotation of the word knowledge for most persons to-day is just the body of facts and truths ascertained by others2 the material found in the rows and rows of atlases1 cyclopedias1 histories1 biographies1 books of travel1 scientific treatises1 on the shelves of libraries4 ,the imposing stupendous bulk of this material has unconsciously influenced men's notions of the nature of knowledge itself4 ,the statements1 the propositions1 in which knowledge1 the issue of active concern with problems1 is deposited1 are taken to be themselves knowledge4 ,the record of knowledge1 independent of its place as an outcome of inquiry and a resource in further inquiry1 is taken to be knowledge4 ,the mind of man is taken captive by the spoils of its prior victories2 the spoils1 not the weapons and the acts of waging the battle against the unknown1 are used to fix the meaning of knowledge1 of fact1 and truth4 ,if this identification of knowledge with propositions stating information has fastened itself upon logicians and philosophers1 it is not surprising that the same ideal has almost dominated instruction4 ,the course of study consists largely of information distributed into various branches of study1 each study being subdivided into lessons presenting in serial cutoff portions of the total store4 ,in the seventeenth century1 the store was still small enough so that men set up the ideal of a complete encyclopedic mastery of it4 ,it is now so bulky that the impossibility of any one man's coming into possession of it all is obvious4 ,but the educational ideal has not been much affected4 ,acquisition of a modicum of information in each branch of learning1 or at least in a selected group1 remains the principle by which the curriculum1 from elementary school through college1 is formed2 the easier portions being assigned to the earlier years1 the more difficult to the later4 ,the complaints of educators that learning does not enter into character and affect conduct2 the protests against memoriter work1 against cramming1 against gradgrind preoccupation with facts1 against devotion to wire-drawn distinctions and ill-understood rules and principles1 all follow from this state of affairs4 ,knowledge which is mainly second-hand1 other men's knowledge1 tends to become merely verbal4 ,it is no objection to information that it is clothed in words2 communication necessarily takes place through words4 ,but in the degree in which what is communicated cannot be organized into the existing experience of the learner1 it becomes mere words3 that is1 pure sense-stimuli1 lacking in meaning4 ,then it operates to call out mechanical reactions1 ability to use the vocal organs to repeat statements1 or the hand to write or to do sums4 ,to be informed is to be posted2 it is to have at command the subject matter needed for an effective dealing with a problem1 and for giving added significance to the search for solution and to the solution itself4 ,informational knowledge is the material which can be fallen back upon as given1 settled1 established1 assured in a doubtful situation4 ,it is a kind of bridge for mind in its passage from doubt to discovery4 ,it has the office of an intellectual middleman4 ,it condenses and records in available form the net results of the prior experiences of mankind1 as an agency of enhancing the meaning of new experiences4 ,when one is told that ,brutus assassinated ,caesar1 or that the length of the year is three hundred sixty-five and one fourth days1 or that the ratio of the diameter of the circle to its circumference is #c4adae4 4 4 one receives what is indeed knowledge for others1 but for him it is a stimulus to knowing4 ,his acquisition of knowledge depends upon his response to what is communicated4 #c4 ,science or ,rationalized ,knowledge4 ,science is a name for knowledge in its most characteristic form4 ,it represents in its degree1 the perfected outcome of learning1--its consummation4 ,what is known1 in a given case1 is what is sure1 certain1 settled1 disposed of2 that which we think with rather than that which we think about4 ,in its honorable sense1 knowledge is distinguished from opinion1 guesswork1 speculation1 and mere tradition4 ,in knowledge1 things are ascertained2 they are so and not dubiously otherwise4 ,but experience makes us aware that there is difference between intellectual certainty of subject matter and our certainty4 ,we are made1 so to speak1 for belief2 credulity is natural4 ,the undisciplined mind is averse to suspense and intellectual hesitation2 it is prone to assertion4 ,it likes things undisturbed1 settled1 and treats them as such without due warrant4 ,familiarity1 common repute1 and congeniality to desire are readily made measuring rods of truth4 ,ignorance gives way to opinionated and current error1--a greater foe to learning than ignorance itself4 ,a ,socrates is thus led to declare that consciousness of ignorance is the beginning of effective love of wisdom1 and a ,descartes to say that science is born of doubting4 ,we have already dwelt upon the fact that subject matter1 or data1 and ideas have to have their worth tested experimentally3 that in themselves they are tentative and provisional4 ,our predilection for premature acceptance and assertion1 our aversion to suspended judgment1 are signs that we tend naturally to cut short the process of testing4 ,we are satisfied with superficial and immediate short-visioned applications4 ,if these work out with moderate satisfactoriness1 we are content to suppose that our assumptions have been confirmed4 ,even in the case of failure1 we are inclined to put the blame not on the inadequacy and incorrectness of our data and thoughts1 but upon our hard luck and the hostility of circumstance4 ,we charge the evil consequence not to the error of our schemes and our incomplete inquiry into conditions 7thereby getting material for revising the former and stimulus for extending the latter7 but to untoward fate4 ,we even plume ourselves upon our firmness in clinging to our conceptions in spite of the way in which they work out4 ,science represents the safeguard of the race against these natural propensities and the evils which flow from them4 ,it consists of the special appliances and methods which the race has slowly worked out in order to conduct reflection under conditions whereby its procedures and results are tested4 ,it is artificial 7an acquired art71 not spontaneous2 learned1 not native4 ,to this fact is due the unique1 the invaluable place of science in education1 and also the dangers which threaten its right use4 ,without initiation into the scientific spirit one is not in possession of the best tools which humanity has so far devised for effectively directed reflection4 ,one in that case not merely conducts inquiry and learning without the use of the best instruments1 but fails to understand the full meaning of knowledge4 ,for he does not become acquainted with the traits that mark off opinion and assent from authorized conviction4 ,on the other hand1 the fact that science marks the perfecting of knowing in highly specialized conditions of technique renders its results1 taken by themselves1 remote from ordinary experience--a quality of aloofness that is popularly designated by the term abstract4 ,when this isolation appears in instruction1 scientific information is even more exposed to the dangers attendant upon presenting ready-made subject matter than are other forms of information4 ,science has been defined in terms of method of inquiry and testing4 ,at first sight1 this definition may seem opposed to the current conception that science is organized or systematized knowledge4 ,the opposition1 however1 is only seeming1 and disappears when the ordinary definition is completed4 ,not organization but the kind of organization effected by adequate methods of tested discovery marks off science4 ,the knowledge of a farmer is systematized in the degree in which he is competent4 ,it is organized on the basis of relation of means to ends--practically organized4 ,its organization as knowledge 7that is1 in the eulogistic sense of adequately tested and confirmed7 is incidental to its organization with reference to securing crops1 live-stock1 etc4 ,but scientific subject matter is organized with specific reference to the successful conduct of the enterprise of discovery1 to knowing as a specialized undertaking4 ,reference to the kind of assurance attending science will shed light upon this statement4 ,it is rational assurance1--logical warranty4 ,the ideal of scientific organization is1 therefore1 that every conception and statement shall be of such a kind as to follow from others and to lead to others4 ,conceptions and propositions mutually imply and support one another4 ,this double relation of leading to and confirming is what is meant by the terms logical and rational4 ,the everyday conception of water is more available for ordinary uses of drinking1 washing1 irrigation1 etc41 than the chemist's notion of it4 ,the latter's description of it as ,h#bj is superior from the standpoint of place and use in inquiry4 ,it states the nature of water in a way which connects it with knowledge of other things1 indicating to one who understands it how the knowledge is arrived at and its bearings upon other portions of knowledge of the structure of things4 ,strictly speaking1 it does not indicate the objective relations of water any more than does a statement that water is transparent1 fluid1 without taste or odor1 satisfying to thirst1 etc4 ,it is just as true that water has these relations as that it is constituted by two molecules of hydrogen in combination with one of oxygen4 ,but for the particular purpose of conducting discovery with a view to ascertainment of fact1 the latter relations are fundamental4 ,the more one emphasizes organization as a mark of science1 then1 the more he is committed to a recognition of the primacy of method in the definition of science4 ,for method defines the kind of organization in virtue of which science is science4 #d4 ,subject ,matter as ,social4 ,our next chapters will take up various school activities and studies and discuss them as successive stages in that evolution of knowledge which we have just been discussing4 ,it remains to say a few words upon subject matter as social1 since our prior remarks have been mainly concerned with its intellectual aspect4 ,a difference in breadth and depth exists even in vital knowledge2 even in the data and ideas which are relevant to real problems and which are motivated by purposes4 ,for there is a difference in the social scope of purposes and the social importance of problems4 ,with the wide range of possible material to select from1 it is important that education 7especially in all its phases short of the most specialized7 should use a criterion of social worth4 ,all information and systematized scientific subject matter have been worked out under the conditions of social life and have been transmitted by social means4 ,but this does not prove that all is of equal value for the purposes of forming the disposition and supplying the equipment of members of present society4 ,the scheme of a curriculum must take account of the adaptation of studies to the needs of the existing community life2 it must select with the intention of improving the life we live in common so that the future shall be better than the past4 ,moreover1 the curriculum must be planned with reference to placing essentials first1 and refinements second4 ,the things which are socially most fundamental1 that is1 which have to do with the experiences in which the widest groups share1 are the essentials4 ,the things which represent the needs of specialized groups and technical pursuits are secondary4 ,there is truth in the saying that education must first be human and only after that professional4 ,but those who utter the saying frequently have in mind in the term human only a highly specialized class3 the class of learned men who preserve the classic traditions of the past4 ,they forget that material is humanized in the degree in which it connects with the common interests of men as men4 ,democratic society is peculiarly dependent for its maintenance upon the use in forming a course of study of criteria which are broadly human4 ,democracy cannot flourish where the chief influences in selecting subject matter of instruction are utilitarian ends narrowly conceived for the masses1 and1 for the higher education of the few1 the traditions of a specialized cultivated class4 ,the notion that the essentials of elementary education are the three ,r's mechanically treated1 is based upon ignorance of the essentials needed for realization of democratic ideals4 ,unconsciously it assumes that these ideals are unrealizable2 it assumes that in the future1 as in the past1 getting a livelihood1 making a living1 must signify for most men and women doing things which are not significant1 freely chosen1 and ennobling to those who do them2 doing things which serve ends unrecognized by those engaged in them1 carried on under the direction of others for the sake of pecuniary reward4 ,for preparation of large numbers for a life of this sort1 and only for this purpose1 are mechanical efficiency in reading1 writing1 spelling and figuring1 together with attainment of a certain amount of muscular dexterity1 essentials4 ,such conditions also infect the education called liberal1 with illiberality4 ,they imply a somewhat parasitic cultivation bought at the expense of not having the enlightenment and discipline which come from concern with the deepest problems of common humanity4 ,a curriculum which acknowledges the social responsibilities of education must present situations where problems are relevant to the problems of living together1 and where observation and information are calculated to develop social insight and interest4 ,summary4 ,the subject matter of education consists primarily of the meanings which supply content to existing social life4 ,the continuity of social life means that many of these meanings are contributed to present activity by past collective experience4 ,as social life grows more complex1 these factors increase in number and import4 ,there is need of special selection1 formulation1 and organization in order that they may be adequately transmitted to the new generation4 ,but this very process tends to set up subject matter as something of value just by itself1 apart from its function in promoting the realization of the meanings implied in the present experience of the immature4 ,especially is the educator exposed to the temptation to conceive his task in terms of the pupil's ability to appropriate and reproduce the subject matter in set statements1 irrespective of its organization into his activities as a developing social member4 ,the positive principle is maintained when the young begin with active occupations having a social origin and use1 and proceed to a scientific insight in the materials and laws involved1 through assimilating into their more direct experience the ideas and facts communicated by others who have had a larger experience4 #a ,since the learned man should also still be a learner1 it will be understood that these contrasts are relative1 not absolute4 ,but in the earlier stages of learning at least they are practically all-important4 ,chapter ,fifteen3 ,play and ,work in the ,curriculum #a4 ,the ,place of ,active ,occupations in ,education4 ,in consequence partly of the efforts of educational reformers1 partly of increased interest in child-psychology1 and partly of the direct experience of the schoolroom1 the course of study has in the past generation undergone considerable modification4 ,the desirability of starting from and with the experience and capacities of learners1 a lesson enforced from all three quarters1 has led to the introduction of forms of activity1 in play and work1 similar to those in which children and youth engage outside of school4 ,modern psychology has substituted for the general1 ready-made faculties of older theory a complex group of instinctive and impulsive tendencies4 ,experience has shown that when children have a chance at physical activities which bring their natural impulses into play1 going to school is a joy1 management is less of a burden1 and learning is easier4 ,sometimes1 perhaps1 plays1 games1 and constructive occupations are resorted to only for these reasons1 with emphasis upon relief from the tedium and strain of regular school work4 ,there is no reason1 however1 for using them merely as agreeable diversions4 ,study of mental life has made evident the fundamental worth of native tendencies to explore1 to manipulate tools and materials1 to construct1 to give expression to joyous emotion1 etc4 ,when exercises which are prompted by these instincts are a part of the regular school program1 the whole pupil is engaged1 the artificial gap between life in school and out is reduced1 motives are afforded for attention to a large variety of materials and processes distinctly educative in effect1 and cooperative associations which give information in a social setting are provided4 ,in short1 the grounds for assigning to play and active work a definite place in the curriculum are intellectual and social1 not matters of temporary expediency and momentary agreeableness4 ,without something of the kind1 it is not possible to secure the normal estate of effective learning2 namely1 that knowledge-getting be an outgrowth of activities having their own end1 instead of a school task4 ,more specifically1 play and work correspond1 point for point1 with the traits of the initial stage of knowing1 which consists1 as we saw in the last chapter1 in learning how to do things and in acquaintance with things and processes gained in the doing4 ,it is suggestive that among the ,greeks1 till the rise of conscious philosophy1 the same word1 techne1 was used for art and science4 ,plato gave his account of knowledge on the basis of an analysis of the knowledge of cobblers1 carpenters1 players of musical instruments1 etc41 pointing out that their art 7so far as it was not mere routine7 involved an end1 mastery of material or stuff worked upon1 control of appliances1 and a definite order of procedure--all of which had to be known in order that there be intelligent skill or art4 ,doubtless the fact that children normally engage in play and work out of school has seemed to many educators a reason why they should concern themselves in school with things radically different4 ,school time seemed too precious to spend in doing over again what children were sure to do any way4 ,in some social conditions1 this reason has weight4 ,in pioneer times1 for example1 outside occupations gave a definite and valuable intellectual and moral training4 ,books and everything concerned with them were1 on the other hand1 rare and difficult of access2 they were the only means of outlet from a narrow and crude environment4 ,wherever such conditions obtain1 much may be said in favor of concentrating school activity upon books4 ,the situation is very different1 however1 in most communities to-day4 ,the kinds of work in which the young can engage1 especially in cities1 are largely anti-educational4 ,that prevention of child labor is a social duty is evidence on this point4 ,on the other hand1 printed matter has been so cheapened and is in such universal circulation1 and all the opportunities of intellectual culture have been so multiplied1 that the older type of book work is far from having the force it used to possess4 ,but it must not be forgotten that an educational result is a by-product of play and work in most out-of-school conditions4 ,it is incidental1 not primary4 ,consequently the educative growth secured is more or less accidental4 ,much work shares in the defects of existing industrial society--defects next to fatal to right development4 ,play tends to reproduce and affirm the crudities1 as well as the excellencies1 of surrounding adult life4 ,it is the business of the school to set up an environment in which play and work shall be conducted with reference to facilitating desirable mental and moral growth4 ,it is not enough just to introduce plays and games1 hand work and manual exercises4 ,everything depends upon the way in which they are employed4 #b4 ,available ,occupations4 ,a bare catalogue of the list of activities which have already found their way into schools indicates what a rich field is at hand4 ,there is work with paper1 cardboard1 wood1 leather1 cloth1 yarns1 clay and sand1 and the metals1 with and without tools4 ,processes employed are folding1 cutting1 pricking1 measuring1 molding1 modeling1 pattern-making1 heating and cooling1 and the operations characteristic of such tools as the hammer1 saw1 file1 etc4 ,outdoor excursions1 gardening1 cooking1 sewing1 printing1 book-binding1 weaving1 painting1 drawing1 singing1 dramatization1 story-telling1 reading and writing as active pursuits with social aims 7not as mere exercises for acquiring skill for future use71 in addition to a countless variety of plays and games1 designate some of the modes of occupation4 ,the problem of the educator is to engage pupils in these activities in such ways that while manual skill and technical efficiency are gained and immediate satisfaction found in the work1 together with preparation for later usefulness1 these things shall be subordinated to education--that is1 to intellectual results and the forming of a socialized disposition4 ,what does this principle signify8 ,in the first place1 the principle rules out certain practices4 ,activities which follow definite prescription and dictation or which reproduce without modification ready-made models1 may give muscular dexterity1 but they do not require the perception and elaboration of ends1 nor 7what is the same thing in other words7 do they permit the use of judgment in selecting and adapting means4 ,not merely manual training specifically so called but many traditional kindergarten exercises have erred here4 ,moreover1 opportunity for making mistakes is an incidental requirement4 ,not because mistakes are ever desirable1 but because overzeal to select material and appliances which forbid a chance for mistakes to occur1 restricts initiative1 reduces judgment to a minimum1 and compels the use of methods which are so remote from the complex situations of life that the power gained is of little availability4 ,it is quite true that children tend to exaggerate their powers of execution and to select projects that are beyond them4 ,but limitation of capacity is one of the things which has to be learned2 like other things1 it is learned through the experience of consequences4 ,the danger that children undertaking too complex projects will simply muddle and mess1 and produce not merely crude results 7which is a minor matter7 but acquire crude standards 7which is an important matter7 is great4 ,but it is the fault of the teacher if the pupil does not perceive in due season the inadequacy of his performances1 and thereby receive a stimulus to attempt exercises which will perfect his powers4 ,meantime it is more important to keep alive a creative and constructive attitude than to secure an external perfection by engaging the pupil's action in too minute and too closely regulated pieces of work4 ,accuracy and finish of detail can be insisted upon in such portions of a complex work as are within the pupil's capacity4 ,unconscious suspicion of native experience and consequent overdoing of external control are shown quite as much in the material supplied as in the matter of the teacher's orders4 ,the fear of raw material is shown in laboratory1 manual training shop1 ,froebelian kindergarten1 and ,montessori house of childhood4 ,the demand is for materials which have already been subjected to the perfecting work of mind3 a demand which shows itself in the subject matter of active occupations quite as well as in academic book learning4 ,that such material will control the pupil's operations so as to prevent errors is true4 ,the notion that a pupil operating with such material will somehow absorb the intelligence that went originally to its shaping is fallacious4 ,only by starting with crude material and subjecting it to purposeful handling will he gain the intelligence embodied in finished material4 ,in practice1 overemphasis upon formed material leads to an exaggeration of mathematical qualities1 since intellect finds its profit in physical things from matters of size1 form1 and proportion and the relations that flow from them4 ,but these are known only when their perception is a fruit of acting upon purposes which require attention to them4 ,the more human the purpose1 or the more it approximates the ends which appeal in daily experience1 the more real the knowledge4 ,when the purpose of the activity is restricted to ascertaining these qualities1 the resulting knowledge is only technical4 ,to say that active occupations should be concerned primarily with wholes is another statement of the same principle4 ,wholes for purposes of education are not1 however1 physical affairs4 ,intellectually the existence of a whole depends upon a concern or interest2 it is qualitative1 the completeness of appeal made by a situation4 ,exaggerated devotion to formation of efficient skill irrespective of present purpose always shows itself in devising exercises isolated from a purpose4 ,laboratory work is made to consist of tasks of accurate measurement with a view to acquiring knowledge of the fundamental units of physics1 irrespective of contact with the problems which make these units important2 or of operations designed to afford facility in the manipulation of experimental apparatus4 ,the technique is acquired independently of the purposes of discovery and testing which alone give it meaning4 ,kindergarten employments are calculated to give information regarding cubes1 spheres1 etc41 and to form certain habits of manipulation of material 7for everything must always be done just so71 the absence of more vital purposes being supposedly compensated for by the alleged symbolism of the material used4 ,manual training is reduced to a series of ordered assignments calculated to secure the mastery of one tool after another and technical ability in the various elements of construction--like the different joints4 ,it is argued that pupils must know how to use tools before they attack actual making1--assuming that pupils cannot learn how in the process of making4 ,pestalozzi's just insistence upon the active use of the senses1 as a substitute for memorizing words1 left behind it in practice schemes for object lessons intended to acquaint pupils with all the qualities of selected objects4 ,the error is the same3 in all these cases it is assumed that before objects can be intelligently used1 their properties must be known4 ,in fact1 the senses are normally used in the course of intelligent 7that is1 purposeful7 use of things1 since the qualities perceived are factors to be reckoned with in accomplishment4 ,witness the different attitude of a boy in making1 say1 a kite1 with respect to the grain and other properties of wood1 the matter of size1 angles1 and proportion of parts1 to the attitude of a pupil who has an object-lesson on a piece of wood1 where the sole function of wood and its properties is to serve as subject matter for the lesson4 ,the failure to realize that the functional development of a situation alone constitutes a whole for the purpose of mind is the cause of the false notions which have prevailed in instruction concerning the simple and the complex4 ,for the person approaching a subject1 the simple thing is his purpose--the use he desires to make of material1 tool1 or technical process1 no matter how complicated the process of execution may be4 ,the unity of the purpose1 with the concentration upon details which it entails1 confers simplicity upon the elements which have to be reckoned with in the course of action4 ,it furnishes each with a single meaning according to its service in carrying on the whole enterprise4 ,after one has gone through the process1 the constituent qualities and relations are elements1 each possessed with a definite meaning of its own4 ,the false notion referred to takes the standpoint of the expert1 the one for whom elements exist2 isolates them from purposeful action1 and presents them to beginners as the simple things4 ,but it is time for a positive statement4 ,aside from the fact that active occupations represent things to do1 not studies1 their educational significance consists in the fact that they may typify social situations4 ,men's fundamental common concerns center about food1 shelter1 clothing1 household furnishings1 and the appliances connected with production1 exchange1 and consumption4 ,representing both the necessities of life and the adornments with which the necessities have been clothed1 they tap instincts at a deep level2 they are saturated with facts and principles having a social quality4 ,to charge that the various activities of gardening1 weaving1 construction in wood1 manipulation of metals1 cooking1 etc41 which carry over these fundamental human concerns into school resources1 have a merely bread and butter value is to miss their point4 ,if the mass of mankind has usually found in its industrial occupations nothing but evils which had to be endured for the sake of maintaining existence1 the fault is not in the occupations1 but in the conditions under which they are carried on4 ,the continually increasing importance of economic factors in contemporary life makes it the more needed that education should reveal their scientific content and their social value4 ,for in schools1 occupations are not carried on for pecuniary gain but for their own content4 ,freed from extraneous associations and from the pressure of wage-earning1 they supply modes of experience which are intrinsically valuable2 they are truly liberalizing in quality4 ,gardening1 for example1 need not be taught either for the sake of preparing future gardeners1 or as an agreeable way of passing time4 ,it affords an avenue of approach to knowledge of the place farming and horticulture have had in the history of the race and which they occupy in present social organization4 ,carried on in an environment educationally controlled1 they are means for making a study of the facts of growth1 the chemistry of soil1 the role of light1 air1 and moisture1 injurious and helpful animal life1 etc4 ,there is nothing in the elementary study of botany which cannot be introduced in a vital way in connection with caring for the growth of seeds4 ,instead of the subject matter belonging to a peculiar study called botany1 it will then belong to life1 and will find1 moreover1 its natural correlations with the facts of soil1 animal life1 and human relations4 ,as students grow mature1 they will perceive problems of interest which may be pursued for the sake of discovery1 independent of the original direct interest in gardening--problems connected with the germination and nutrition of plants1 the reproduction of fruits1 etc41 thus making a transition to deliberate intellectual investigations4 ,the illustration is intended to apply1 of course1 to other school occupations1--wood-working1 cooking1 and on through the list4 ,it is pertinent to note that in the history of the race the sciences grew gradually out from useful social occupations4 ,physics developed slowly out of the use of tools and machines2 the important branch of physics known as mechanics testifies in its name to its original associations4 ,the lever1 wheel1 inclined plane1 etc41 were among the first great intellectual discoveries of mankind1 and they are none the less intellectual because they occurred in the course of seeking for means of accomplishing practical ends4 ,the great advance of electrical science in the last generation was closely associated1 as effect and as cause1 with application of electric agencies to means of communication1 transportation1 lighting of cities and houses1 and more economical production of goods4 ,these are social ends1 moreover1 and if they are too closely associated with notions of private profit1 it is not because of anything in them1 but because they have been deflected to private uses3--a fact which puts upon the school the responsibility of restoring their connection1 in the mind of the coming generation1 with public scientific and social interests4 ,in like ways1 chemistry grew out of processes of dying1 bleaching1 metal working1 etc41 and in recent times has found innumerable new uses in industry4 ,mathematics is now a highly abstract science2 geometry1 however1 means literally earth-measuring3 the practical use of number in counting to keep track of things and in measuring is even more important to-day than in the times when it was invented for these purposes4 ,such considerations 7which could be duplicated in the history of any science7 are not arguments for a recapitulation of the history of the race or for dwelling long in the early rule of thumb stage4 ,but they indicate the possibilities--greater to-day than ever before--of using active occupations as opportunities for scientific study4 ,the opportunities are just as great on the social side1 whether we look at the life of collective humanity in its past or in its future4 ,the most direct road for elementary students into civics and economics is found in consideration of the place and office of industrial occupations in social life4 ,even for older students1 the social sciences would be less abstract and formal if they were dealt with less as sciences 7less as formulated bodies of knowledge7 and more in their direct subject-matter as that is found in the daily life of the social groups in which the student shares4 ,connection of occupations with the method of science is at least as close as with its subject matter4 ,the ages when scientific progress was slow were the ages when learned men had contempt for the material and processes of everyday life1 especially for those concerned with manual pursuits4 ,consequently they strove to develop knowledge out of general principles--almost out of their heads--by logical reasons4 ,it seems as absurd that learning should come from action on and with physical things1 like dropping acid on a stone to see what would happen1 as that it should come from sticking an awl with waxed thread through a piece of leather4 ,but the rise of experimental methods proved that1 given control of conditions1 the latter operation is more typical of the right way of knowledge than isolated logical reasonings4 ,experiment developed in the seventeenth and succeeding centuries and became the authorized way of knowing when men's interests were centered in the question of control of nature for human uses4 ,the active occupations in which appliances are brought to bear upon physical things with the intention of effecting useful changes is the most vital introduction to the experimental method4 #c4 ,work and ,play4 ,what has been termed active occupation includes both play and work4 ,in their intrinsic meaning1 play and industry are by no means so antithetical to one another as is often assumed1 any sharp contrast being due to undesirable social conditions4 ,both involve ends consciously entertained and the selection and adaptations of materials and processes designed to effect the desired ends4 ,the difference between them is largely one of time-span1 influencing the directness of the connection of means and ends4 ,in play1 the interest is more direct--a fact frequently indicated by saying that in play the activity is its own end1 instead of its having an ulterior result4 ,the statement is correct1 but it is falsely taken1 if supposed to mean that play activity is momentary1 having no element of looking ahead and none of pursuit4 ,hunting1 for example1 is one of the commonest forms of adult play1 but the existence of foresight and the direction of present activity by what one is watching for are obvious4 ,when an activity is its own end in the sense that the action of the moment is complete in itself1 it is purely physical2 it has no meaning 7,see p4 #gg74 ,the person is either going through motions quite blindly1 perhaps purely imitatively1 or else is in a state of excitement which is exhausting to mind and nerves4 ,both results may be seen in some types of kindergarten games where the idea of play is so highly symbolic that only the adult is conscious of it4 ,unless the children succeed in reading in some quite different idea of their own1 they move about either as if in a hypnotic daze1 or they respond to a direct excitation4 ,the point of these remarks is that play has an end in the sense of a directing idea which gives point to the successive acts4 ,persons who play are not just doing something 7pure physical movement72 they are trying to do or effect something1 an attitude that involves anticipatory forecasts which stimulate their present responses4 ,the anticipated result1 however1 is rather a subsequent action than the production of a specific change in things4 ,consequently play is free1 plastic4 ,where some definite external outcome is wanted1 the end has to be held to with some persistence1 which increases as the contemplated result is complex and requires a fairly long series of intermediate adaptations4 ,when the intended act is another activity1 it is not necessary to look far ahead and it is possible to alter it easily and frequently4 ,if a child is making a toy boat1 he must hold on to a single end and direct a considerable number of acts by that one idea4 ,if he is just playing boat he may change the material that serves as a boat almost at will1 and introduce new factors as fancy suggests4 ,the imagination makes what it will of chairs1 blocks1 leaves1 chips1 if they serve the purpose of carrying activity forward4 ,from a very early age1 however1 there is no distinction of exclusive periods of play activity and work activity1 but only one of emphasis4 ,there are definite results which even young children desire1 and try to bring to pass4 ,their eager interest in sharing the occupations of others1 if nothing else1 accomplishes this4 ,children want to help2 they are anxious to engage in the pursuits of adults which effect external changes3 setting the table1 washing dishes1 helping care for animals1 etc4 ,in their plays1 they like to construct their own toys and appliances4 ,with increasing maturity1 activity which does not give back results of tangible and visible achievement loses its interest4 ,play then changes to fooling and if habitually indulged in is demoralizing4 ,observable results are necessary to enable persons to get a sense and a measure of their own powers4 ,when make-believe is recognized to be make-believe1 the device of making objects in fancy alone is too easy to stimulate intense action4 ,one has only to observe the countenance of children really playing to note that their attitude is one of serious absorption2 this attitude cannot be maintained when things cease to afford adequate stimulation4 ,when fairly remote results of a definite character are foreseen and enlist persistent effort for their accomplishment1 play passes into work4 ,like play1 it signifies purposeful activity and differs not in that activity is subordinated to an external result1 but in the fact that a longer course of activity is occasioned by the idea of a result4 ,the demand for continuous attention is greater1 and more intelligence must be shown in selecting and shaping means4 ,to extend this account would be to repeat what has been said under the caption of aim1 interest1 and thinking4 ,it is pertinent1 however1 to inquire why the idea is so current that work involves subordination of an activity to an ulterior material result4 ,the extreme form of this subordination1 namely drudgery1 offers a clew4 ,activity carried on under conditions of external pressure or coercion is not carried on for any significance attached to the doing4 ,the course of action is not intrinsically satisfying2 it is a mere means for avoiding some penalty1 or for gaining some reward at its conclusion4 ,what is inherently repulsive is endured for the sake of averting something still more repulsive or of securing a gain hitched on by others4 ,under unfree economic conditions1 this state of affairs is bound to exist4 ,work or industry offers little to engage the emotions and the imagination2 it is a more or less mechanical series of strains4 ,only the hold which the completion of the work has upon a person will keep him going4 ,but the end should be intrinsic to the action2 it should be its end--a part of its own course4 ,then it affords a stimulus to effort very different from that arising from the thought of results which have nothing to do with the intervening action4 ,as already mentioned1 the absence of economic pressure in schools supplies an opportunity for reproducing industrial situations of mature life under conditions where the occupation can be carried on for its own sake4 ,if in some cases1 pecuniary recognition is also a result of an action1 though not the chief motive for it1 that fact may well increase the significance of the occupation4 ,where something approaching drudgery or the need of fulfilling externally imposed tasks exists1 the demand for play persists1 but tends to be perverted4 ,the ordinary course of action fails to give adequate stimulus to emotion and imagination4 ,so in leisure time1 there is an imperious demand for their stimulation by any kind of means2 gambling1 drink1 etc41 may be resorted to4 ,or1 in less extreme cases1 there is recourse to idle amusement2 to anything which passes time with immediate agreeableness4 ,recreation1 as the word indicates1 is recuperation of energy4 ,no demand of human nature is more urgent or less to be escaped4 ,the idea that the need can be suppressed is absolutely fallacious1 and the ,puritanic tradition which disallows the need has entailed an enormous crop of evils4 ,if education does not afford opportunity for wholesome recreation and train capacity for seeking and finding it1 the suppressed instincts find all sorts of illicit outlets1 sometimes overt1 sometimes confined to indulgence of the imagination4 ,education has no more serious responsibility than making adequate provision for enjoyment of recreative leisure2 not only for the sake of immediate health1 but still more if possible for the sake of its lasting effect upon habits of mind4 ,art is again the answer to this demand4 ,summary4 ,in the previous chapter we found that the primary subject matter of knowing is that contained in learning how to do things of a fairly direct sort4 ,the educational equivalent of this principle is the consistent use of simple occupations which appeal to the powers of youth and which typify general modes of social activity4 ,skill and information about materials1 tools1 and laws of energy are acquired while activities are carried on for their own sake4 ,the fact that they are socially representative gives a quality to the skill and knowledge gained which makes them transferable to out-of-school situations4 ,it is important not to confuse the psychological distinction between play and work with the economic distinction4 ,psychologically1 the defining characteristic of play is not amusement nor aimlessness4 ,it is the fact that the aim is thought of as more activity in the same line1 without defining continuity of action in reference to results produced4 ,activities as they grow more complicated gain added meaning by greater attention to specific results achieved4 ,thus they pass gradually into work4 ,both are equally free and intrinsically motivated1 apart from false economic conditions which tend to make play into idle excitement for the well to do1 and work into uncongenial labor for the poor4 ,work is psychologically simply an activity which consciously includes regard for consequences as a part of itself2 it becomes constrained labor when the consequences are outside of the activity as an end to which activity is merely a means4 ,work which remains permeated with the play attitude is art--in quality if not in conventional designation4 ,chapter ,sixteen3 ,the ,significance of ,geography and ,history #a4 ,extension of ,meaning of ,primary ,activities4 ,nothing is more striking than the difference between an activity as merely physical and the wealth of meanings which the same activity may assume4 ,from the outside1 an astronomer gazing through a telescope is like a small boy looking through the same tube4 ,in each case1 there is an arrangement of glass and metal1 an eye1 and a little speck of light in the distance4 ,yet at a critical moment1 the activity of an astronomer might be concerned with the birth of a world1 and have whatever is known about the starry heavens as its significant content4 ,physically speaking1 what man has effected on this globe in his progress from savagery is a mere scratch on its surface1 not perceptible at a distance which is slight in comparison with the reaches even of the solar system4 ,yet in meaning what has been accomplished measures just the difference of civilization from savagery4 ,although the activities1 physically viewed1 have changed somewhat1 this change is slight in comparison with the development of the meanings attaching to the activities4 ,there is no limit to the meaning which an action may come to possess4 ,it all depends upon the context of perceived connections in which it is placed2 the reach of imagination in realizing connections is inexhaustible4 ,the advantage which the activity of man has in appropriating and finding meanings makes his education something else than the manufacture of a tool or the training of an animal4 ,the latter increase efficiency2 they do not develop significance4 ,the final educational importance of such occupations in play and work as were considered in the last chapter is that they afford the most direct instrumentalities for such extension of meaning4 ,set going under adequate conditions they are magnets for gathering and retaining an indefinitely wide scope of intellectual considerations4 ,they provide vital centers for the reception and assimilation of information4 ,when information is purveyed in chunks simply as information to be retained for its own sake1 it tends to stratify over vital experience4 ,entering as a factor into an activity pursued for its own sake--whether as a means or as a widening of the content of the aim--it is informing4 ,the insight directly gained fuses with what is told4 ,individual experience is then capable of taking up and holding in solution the net results of the experience of the group to which he belongs--including the results of sufferings and trials over long stretches of time4 ,and such media have no fixed saturation point where further absorption is impossible4 ,the more that is taken in1 the greater capacity there is for further assimilation4 ,new receptiveness follows upon new curiosity1 and new curiosity upon information gained4 ,the meanings with which activities become charged1 concern nature and man4 ,this is an obvious truism1 which however gains meaning when translated into educational equivalents4 ,so translated1 it signifies that geography and history supply subject matter which gives background and outlook1 intellectual perspective1 to what might otherwise be narrow personal actions or mere forms of technical skill4 ,with every increase of ability to place our own doings in their time and space connections1 our doings gain in significant content4 ,we realize that we are citizens of no mean city in discovering the scene in space of which we are denizens1 and the continuous manifestation of endeavor in time of which we are heirs and continuers4 ,thus our ordinary daily experiences cease to be things of the moment and gain enduring substance4 ,of course if geography and history are taught as ready-made studies which a person studies simply because he is sent to school1 it easily happens that a large number of statements about things remote and alien to everyday experience are learned4 ,activity is divided1 and two separate worlds are built up1 occupying activity at divided periods4 ,no transmutation takes place2 ordinary experience is not enlarged in meaning by getting its connections2 what is studied is not animated and made real by entering into immediate activity4 ,ordinary experience is not even left as it was1 narrow but vital4 ,rather1 it loses something of its mobility and sensitiveness to suggestions4 ,it is weighed down and pushed into a corner by a load of unassimilated information4 ,it parts with its flexible responsiveness and alert eagerness for additional meaning4 ,mere amassing of information apart from the direct interests of life makes mind wooden2 elasticity disappears4 ,normally every activity engaged in for its own sake reaches out beyond its immediate self4 ,it does not passively wait for information to be bestowed which will increase its meaning2 it seeks it out4 ,curiosity is not an accidental isolated possession2 it is a necessary consequence of the fact that an experience is a moving1 changing thing1 involving all kinds of connections with other things4 ,curiosity is but the tendency to make these conditions perceptible4 ,it is the business of educators to supply an environment so that this reaching out of an experience may be fruitfully rewarded and kept continuously active4 ,within a certain kind of environment1 an activity may be checked so that the only meaning which accrues is of its direct and tangible isolated outcome4 ,one may cook1 or hammer1 or walk1 and the resulting consequences may not take the mind any farther than the consequences of cooking1 hammering1 and walking in the literal--or physical--sense4 ,but nevertheless the consequences of the act remain far-reaching4 ,to walk involves a displacement and reaction of the resisting earth1 whose thrill is felt wherever there is matter4 ,it involves the structure of the limbs and the nervous system2 the principles of mechanics4 ,to cook is to utilize heat and moisture to change the chemical relations of food materials2 it has a bearing upon the assimilation of food and the growth of the body4 ,the utmost that the most learned men of science know in physics1 chemistry1 physiology is not enough to make all these consequences and connections perceptible4 ,the task of education1 once more1 is to see to it that such activities are performed in such ways and under such conditions as render these conditions as perceptible as possible4 ,to learn geography is to gain in power to perceive the spatial1 the natural1 connections of an ordinary act2 to learn history is essentially to gain in power to recognize its human connections4 ,for what is called geography as a formulated study is simply the body of facts and principles which have been discovered in other men's experience about the natural medium in which we live1 and in connection with which the particular acts of our life have an explanation4 ,so history as a formulated study is but the body of known facts about the activities and sufferings of the social groups with which our own lives are continuous1 and through reference to which our own customs and institutions are illuminated4 #b4 ,the ,complementary ,nature of ,history and ,geography4 ,history and geography--including in the latter1 for reasons about to be mentioned1 nature study--are the information studies par excellence of the schools4 ,examination of the materials and the method of their use will make clear that the difference between penetration of this information into living experience and its mere piling up in isolated heaps depends upon whether these studies are faithful to the interdependence of man and nature which affords these studies their justification4 ,nowhere1 however1 is there greater danger that subject matter will be accepted as appropriate educational material simply because it has become customary to teach and learn it4 ,the idea of a philosophic reason for it1 because of the function of the material in a worthy transformation of experience1 is looked upon as a vain fancy1 or as supplying a high-sounding phraseology in support of what is already done4 ,the words history and geography suggest simply the matter which has been traditionally sanctioned in the schools4 ,the mass and variety of this matter discourage an attempt to see what it really stands for1 and how it can be so taught as to fulfill its mission in the experience of pupils4 ,but unless the idea that there is a unifying and social direction in education is a farcical pretense1 subjects that bulk as large in the curriculum as history and geography1 must represent a general function in the development of a truly socialized and intellectualized experience4 ,the discovery of this function must be employed as a criterion for trying and sifting the facts taught and the methods used4 ,the function of historical and geographical subject matter has been stated2 it is to enrich and liberate the more direct and personal contacts of life by furnishing their context1 their background and outlook4 ,while geography emphasizes the physical side and history the social1 these are only emphases in a common topic1 namely1 the associated life of men4 ,for this associated life1 with its experiments1 its ways and means1 its achievements and failures1 does not go on in the sky nor yet in a vacuum4 ,it takes place on the earth4 ,this setting of nature does not bear to social activities the relation that the scenery of a theatrical performance bears to a dramatic representation2 it enters into the very make-up of the social happenings that form history4 ,nature is the medium of social occurrences4 ,it furnishes original stimuli2 it supplies obstacles and resources4 ,civilization is the progressive mastery of its varied energies4 ,when this interdependence of the study of history1 representing the human emphasis1 with the study of geography1 representing the natural1 is ignored1 history sinks to a listing of dates with an appended inventory of events1 labeled important2 or else it becomes a literary phantasy--for in purely literary history the natural environment is but stage scenery4 ,geography1 of course1 has its educative influence in a counterpart connection of natural facts with social events and their consequences4 ,the classic definition of geography as an account of the earth as the home of man expresses the educational reality4 ,but it is easier to give this definition than it is to present specific geographical subject matter in its vital human bearings4 ,the residence1 pursuits1 successes1 and failures of men are the things that give the geographic data their reason for inclusion in the material of instruction4 ,but to hold the two together requires an informed and cultivated imagination4 ,when the ties are broken1 geography presents itself as that hodge-podge of unrelated fragments too often found4 ,it appears as a veritable rag-bag of intellectual odds and ends3 the height of a mountain here1 the course of a river there1 the quantity of shingles produced in this town1 the tonnage of the shipping in that1 the boundary of a county1 the capital of a state4 ,the earth as the home of man is humanizing and unified2 the earth viewed as a miscellany of facts is scattering and imaginatively inert4 ,geography is a topic that originally appeals to imagination--even to the romantic imagination4 ,it shares in the wonder and glory that attach to adventure1 travel1 and exploration4 ,the variety of peoples and environments1 their contrast with familiar scenes1 furnishes infinite stimulation4 ,the mind is moved from the monotony of the customary4 ,and while local or home geography is the natural starting point in the reconstructive development of the natural environment1 it is an intellectual starting point for moving out into the unknown1 not an end in itself4 ,when not treated as a basis for getting at the large world beyond1 the study of the home geography becomes as deadly as do object lessons which simply summarize the properties of familiar objects4 ,the reason is the same4 ,the imagination is not fed1 but is held down to recapitulating1 cataloguing1 and refining what is already known4 ,but when the familiar fences that mark the limits of the village proprietors are signs that introduce an understanding of the boundaries of great nations1 even fences are lighted with meaning4 ,sunlight1 air1 running water1 inequality of earth's surface1 varied industries1 civil officers and their duties--all these things are found in the local environment4 ,treated as if their meaning began and ended in those confines1 they are curious facts to be laboriously learned4 ,as instruments for extending the limits of experience1 bringing within its scope peoples and things otherwise strange and unknown1 they are transfigured by the use to which they are put4 ,sunlight1 wind1 stream1 commerce1 political relations come from afar and lead the thoughts afar4 ,to follow their course is to enlarge the mind not by stuffing it with additional information1 but by remaking the meaning of what was previously a matter of course4 ,the same principle coordinates branches1 or phases1 of geographical study which tend to become specialized and separate4 ,mathematical or astronomical1 physiographic1 topographic1 political1 commercial1 geography1 all make their claims4 ,how are they to be adjusted8 ,by an external compromise that crowds in so much of each8 ,no other method is to be found unless it be constantly borne in mind that the educational center of gravity is in the cultural or humane aspects of the subject4 ,from this center1 any material becomes relevant in so far as it is needed to help appreciate the significance of human activities and relations4 ,the differences of civilization in cold and tropical regions1 the special inventions1 industrial and political1 of peoples in the temperate regions1 cannot be understood without appeal to the earth as a member of the solar system4 ,economic activities deeply influence social intercourse and political organization on one side1 and reflect physical conditions on the other4 ,the specializations of these topics are for the specialists2 their interaction concerns man as a being whose experience is social4 ,to include nature study within geography doubtless seems forced2 verbally1 it is4 ,but in educational idea there is but one reality1 and it is pity that in practice we have two names3 for the diversity of names tends to conceal the identity of meaning4 ,nature and the earth should be equivalent terms1 and so should earth study and nature study4 ,everybody knows that nature study has suffered in schools from scrappiness of subject matter1 due to dealing with a large number of isolated points4 ,the parts of a flower have been studied1 for example1 apart from the flower as an organ2 the flower apart from the plant2 the plant apart from the soil1 air1 and light in which and through which it lives4 ,the result is an inevitable deadness of topics to which attention is invited1 but which are so isolated that they do not feed imagination4 ,the lack of interest is so great that it was seriously proposed to revive animism1 to clothe natural facts and events with myths in order that they might attract and hold the mind4 ,in numberless cases1 more or less silly personifications were resorted to4 ,the method was silly1 but it expressed a real need for a human atmosphere4 ,the facts had been torn to pieces by being taken out of their context4 ,they no longer belonged to the earth2 they had no abiding place anywhere4 ,to compensate1 recourse was had to artificial and sentimental associations4 ,the real remedy is to make nature study a study of nature1 not of fragments made meaningless through complete removal from the situations in which they are produced and in which they operate4 ,when nature is treated as a whole1 like the earth in its relations1 its phenomena fall into their natural relations of sympathy and association with human life1 and artificial substitutes are not needed4 #c4 ,history and ,present ,social ,life4 ,the segregation which kills the vitality of history is divorce from present modes and concerns of social life4 ,the past just as past is no longer our affair4 ,if it were wholly gone and done with1 there would be only one reasonable attitude toward it4 ,let the dead bury their dead4 ,but knowledge of the past is the key to understanding the present4 ,history deals with the past1 but this past is the history of the present4 ,an intelligent study of the discovery1 explorations1 colonization of ,america1 of the pioneer movement westward1 of immigration1 etc41 should be a study of the ,united ,states as it is to-day3 of the country we now live in4 ,studying it in process of formation makes much that is too complex to be directly grasped open to comprehension4 ,genetic method was perhaps the chief scientific achievement of the latter half of the nineteenth century4 ,its principle is that the way to get insight into any complex product is to trace the process of its making1--to follow it through the successive stages of its growth4 ,to apply this method to history as if it meant only the truism that the present social state cannot be separated from its past1 is one-sided4 ,it means equally that past events cannot be separated from the living present and retain meaning4 ,the true starting point of history is always some present situation with its problems4 ,this general principle may be briefly applied to a consideration of its bearing upon a number of points4 ,the biographical method is generally recommended as the natural mode of approach to historical study4 ,the lives of great men1 of heroes and leaders1 make concrete and vital historic episodes otherwise abstract and incomprehensible4 ,they condense into vivid pictures complicated and tangled series of events spread over so much space and time that only a highly trained mind can follow and unravel them4 ,there can be no doubt of the psychological soundness of this principle4 ,but it is misused when employed to throw into exaggerated relief the doings of a few individuals without reference to the social situations which they represent4 ,when a biography is related just as an account of the doings of a man isolated from the conditions that aroused him and to which his activities were a response1 we do not have a study of history1 for we have no study of social life1 which is an affair of individuals in association4 ,we get only a sugar coating which makes it easier to swallow certain fragments of information4 ,much attention has been given of late to primitive life as an introduction to learning history4 ,here also there is a right and a wrong way of conceiving its value4 ,the seemingly ready-made character and the complexity of present conditions1 their apparently hard and fast character1 is an almost insuperable obstacle to gaining insight into their nature4 ,recourse to the primitive may furnish the fundamental elements of the present situation in immensely simplified form4 ,it is like unraveling a cloth so complex and so close to the eyes that its scheme cannot be seen1 until the larger coarser features of the pattern appear4 ,we cannot simplify the present situations by deliberate experiment1 but resort to primitive life presents us with the sort of results we should desire from an experiment4 ,social relationships and modes of organized action are reduced to their lowest terms4 ,when this social aim is overlooked1 however1 the study of primitive life becomes simply a rehearsing of sensational and exciting features of savagery4 ,primitive history suggests industrial history4 ,for one of the chief reasons for going to more primitive conditions to resolve the present into more easily perceived factors is that we may realize how the fundamental problems of procuring subsistence1 shelter1 and protection have been met2 and by seeing how these were solved in the earlier days of the human race1 form some conception of the long road which has had to be traveled1 and of the successive inventions by which the race has been brought forward in culture4 ,we do not need to go into disputes regarding the economic interpretation of history to realize that the industrial history of mankind gives insight into two important phases of social life in a way which no other phase of history can possibly do4 ,it presents us with knowledge of the successive inventions by which theoretical science has been applied to the control of nature in the interests of security and prosperity of social life4 ,it thus reveals the successive causes of social progress4 ,its other service is to put before us the things that fundamentally concern all men in common--the occupations and values connected with getting a living4 ,economic history deals with the activities1 the career1 and fortunes of the common man as does no other branch of history4 ,the one thing every individual must do is to live2 the one thing that society must do is to secure from each individual his fair contribution to the general well being and see to it that a just return is made to him4 ,economic history is more human1 more democratic1 and hence more liberalizing than political history4 ,it deals not with the rise and fall of principalities and powers1 but with the growth of the effective liberties1 through command of nature1 of the common man for whom powers and principalities exist4 ,industrial history also offers a more direct avenue of approach to the realization of the intimate connection of man's struggles1 successes1 and failures with nature than does political history--to say nothing of the military history into which political history so easily runs when reduced to the level of youthful comprehension4 ,for industrial history is essentially an account of the way in which man has learned to utilize natural energy from the time when men mostly exploited the muscular energies of other men to the time when1 in promise if not in actuality1 the resources of nature are so under command as to enable men to extend a common dominion over her4 ,when the history of work1 when the conditions of using the soil1 forest1 mine1 of domesticating and cultivating grains and animals1 of manufacture and distribution1 are left out of account1 history tends to become merely literary--a systematized romance of a mythical humanity living upon itself instead of upon the earth4 ,perhaps the most neglected branch of history in general education is intellectual history4 ,we are only just beginning to realize that the great heroes who have advanced human destiny are not its politicians1 generals1 and diplomatists1 but the scientific discoverers and inventors who have put into man's hands the instrumentalities of an expanding and controlled experience1 and the artists and poets who have celebrated his struggles1 triumphs1 and defeats in such language1 pictorial1 plastic1 or written1 that their meaning is rendered universally accessible to others4 ,one of the advantages of industrial history as a history of man's progressive adaptation of natural forces to social uses is the opportunity which it affords for consideration of advance in the methods and results of knowledge4 ,at present men are accustomed to eulogize intelligence and reason in general terms2 their fundamental importance is urged4 ,but pupils often come away from the conventional study of history1 and think either that the human intellect is a static quantity which has not progressed by the invention of better methods1 or else that intelligence1 save as a display of personal shrewdness1 is a negligible historic factor4 ,surely no better way could be devised of instilling a genuine sense of the part which mind has to play in life than a study of history which makes plain how the entire advance of humanity from savagery to civilization has been dependent upon intellectual discoveries and inventions1 and the extent to which the things which ordinarily figure most largely in historical writings have been side issues1 or even obstructions for intelligence to overcome4 ,pursued in this fashion1 history would most naturally become of ethical value in teaching4 ,intelligent insight into present forms of associated life is necessary for a character whose morality is more than colorless innocence4 ,historical knowledge helps provide such insight4 ,it is an organ for analysis of the warp and woof of the present social fabric1 of making known the forces which have woven the pattern4 ,the use of history for cultivating a socialized intelligence constitutes its moral significance4 ,it is possible to employ it as a kind of reservoir of anecdotes to be drawn on to inculcate special moral lessons on this virtue or that vice4 ,but such teaching is not so much an ethical use of history as it is an effort to create moral impressions by means of more or less authentic material4 ,at best1 it produces a temporary emotional glow2 at worst1 callous indifference to moralizing4 ,the assistance which may be given by history to a more intelligent sympathetic understanding of the social situations of the present in which individuals share is a permanent and constructive moral asset4 ,summary4 ,it is the nature of an experience to have implications which go far beyond what is at first consciously noted in it4 ,bringing these connections or implications to consciousness enhances the meaning of the experience4 ,any experience1 however trivial in its first appearance1 is capable of assuming an indefinite richness of significance by extending its range of perceived connections4 ,normal communication with others is the readiest way of effecting this development1 for it links up the net results of the experience of the group and even the race with the immediate experience of an individual4 ,by normal communication is meant that in which there is a joint interest1 a common interest1 so that one is eager to give and the other to take4 ,it contrasts with telling or stating things simply for the sake of impressing them upon another1 merely in order to test him to see how much he has retained and can literally reproduce4 ,geography and history are the two great school resources for bringing about the enlargement of the significance of a direct personal experience4 ,the active occupations described in the previous chapter reach out in space and time with respect to both nature and man4 ,unless they are taught for external reasons or as mere modes of skill their chief educational value is that they provide the most direct and interesting roads out into the larger world of meanings stated in history and geography4 ,while history makes human implications explicit and geography natural connections1 these subjects are two phases of the same living whole1 since the life of men in association goes on in nature1 not as an accidental setting1 but as the material and medium of development4 ,chapter ,seventeen3 ,science in the ,course of ,study #a4 ,the ,logical and the ,psychological4 ,by science is meant1 as already stated1 that knowledge which is the outcome of methods of observation1 reflection1 and testing which are deliberately adopted to secure a settled1 assured subject matter4 ,it involves an intelligent and persistent endeavor to revise current beliefs so as to weed out what is erroneous1 to add to their accuracy1 and1 above all1 to give them such shape that the dependencies of the various facts upon one another may be as obvious as possible4 ,it is1 like all knowledge1 an outcome of activity bringing about certain changes in the environment4 ,but in its case1 the quality of the resulting knowledge is the controlling factor and not an incident of the activity4 ,both logically and educationally1 science is the perfecting of knowing1 its last stage4 ,science1 in short1 signifies a realization of the logical implications of any knowledge4 ,logical order is not a form imposed upon what is known2 it is the proper form of knowledge as perfected4 ,for it means that the statement of subject matter is of a nature to exhibit to one who understands it the premises from which it follows and the conclusions to which it points 7,see ante1 p4 #aij74 ,as from a few bones the competent zoologist reconstructs an animal2 so from the form of a statement in mathematics or physics the specialist in the subject can form an idea of the system of truths in which it has its place4 ,to the non-expert1 however1 this perfected form is a stumbling block4 ,just because the material is stated with reference to the furtherance of knowledge as an end in itself1 its connections with the material of everyday life are hidden4 ,to the layman the bones are a mere curiosity4 ,until he had mastered the principles of zoology1 his efforts to make anything out of them would be random and blind4 ,from the standpoint of the learner scientific form is an ideal to be achieved1 not a starting point from which to set out4 ,it is1 nevertheless1 a frequent practice to start in instruction with the rudiments of science somewhat simplified4 ,the necessary consequence is an isolation of science from significant experience4 ,the pupil learns symbols without the key to their meaning4 ,he acquires a technical body of information without ability to trace its connections with the objects and operations with which he is familiar--often he acquires simply a peculiar vocabulary4 ,there is a strong temptation to assume that presenting subject matter in its perfected form provides a royal road to learning4 ,what more natural than to suppose that the immature can be saved time and energy1 and be protected from needless error by commencing where competent inquirers have left off8 ,the outcome is written large in the history of education4 ,pupils begin their study of science with texts in which the subject is organized into topics according to the order of the specialist4 ,technical concepts1 with their definitions1 are introduced at the outset4 ,laws are introduced at a very early stage1 with at best a few indications of the way in which they were arrived at4 ,the pupils learn a science instead of learning the scientific way of treating the familiar material of ordinary experience4 ,the method of the advanced student dominates college teaching2 the approach of the college is transferred into the high school1 and so down the line1 with such omissions as may make the subject easier4 ,the chronological method which begins with the experience of the learner and develops from that the proper modes of scientific treatment is often called the psychological method in distinction from the logical method of the expert or specialist4 ,the apparent loss of time involved is more than made up for by the superior understanding and vital interest secured4 ,what the pupil learns he at least understands4 ,moreover by following1 in connection with problems selected from the material of ordinary acquaintance1 the methods by which scientific men have reached their perfected knowledge1 he gains independent power to deal with material within his range1 and avoids the mental confusion and intellectual distaste attendant upon studying matter whose meaning is only symbolic4 ,since the mass of pupils are never going to become scientific specialists1 it is much more important that they should get some insight into what scientific method means than that they should copy at long range and second hand the results which scientific men have reached4 ,students will not go so far1 perhaps1 in the ground covered1 but they will be sure and intelligent as far as they do go4 ,and it is safe to say that the few who go on to be scientific experts will have a better preparation than if they had been swamped with a large mass of purely technical and symbolically stated information4 ,in fact1 those who do become successful men of science are those who by their own power manage to avoid the pitfalls of a traditional scholastic introduction into it4 ,the contrast between the expectations of the men who a generation or two ago strove1 against great odds1 to secure a place for science in education1 and the result generally achieved is painful4 ,herbert ,spencer1 inquiring what knowledge is of most worth1 concluded that from all points of view scientific knowledge is most valuable4 ,but his argument unconsciously assumed that scientific knowledge could be communicated in a ready-made form4 ,passing over the methods by which the subject matter of our ordinary activities is transmuted into scientific form1 it ignored the method by which alone science is science4 ,instruction has too often proceeded upon an analogous plan4 ,but there is no magic attached to material stated in technically correct scientific form4 ,when learned in this condition it remains a body of inert information4 ,moreover its form of statement removes it further from fruitful contact with everyday experiences than does the mode of statement proper to literature4 ,nevertheless that the claims made for instruction in science were unjustifiable does not follow4 ,for material so taught is not science to the pupil4 ,contact with things and laboratory exercises1 while a great improvement upon textbooks arranged upon the deductive plan1 do not of themselves suffice to meet the need4 ,while they are an indispensable portion of scientific method1 they do not as a matter of course constitute scientific method4 ,physical materials may be manipulated with scientific apparatus1 but the materials may be disassociated in themselves and in the ways in which they are handled1 from the materials and processes used out of school4 ,the problems dealt with may be only problems of science3 problems1 that is1 which would occur to one already initiated in the science of the subject4 ,our attention may be devoted to getting skill in technical manipulation without reference to the connection of laboratory exercises with a problem belonging to subject matter4 ,there is sometimes a ritual of laboratory instruction as well as of heathen religion4 #a ,it has been mentioned1 incidentally1 that scientific statements1 or logical form1 implies the use of signs or symbols4 ,the statement applies1 of course1 to all use of language4 ,but in the vernacular1 the mind proceeds directly from the symbol to the thing signified4 ,association with familiar material is so close that the mind does not pause upon the sign4 ,the signs are intended only to stand for things and acts4 ,but scientific terminology has an additional use4 ,it is designed1 as we have seen1 not to stand for the things directly in their practical use in experience1 but for the things placed in a cognitive system4 ,ultimately1 of course1 they denote the things of our common sense acquaintance4 ,but immediately they do not designate them in their common context1 but translated into terms of scientific inquiry4 ,atoms1 molecules1 chemical formulae1 the mathematical propositions in the study of physics--all these have primarily an intellectual value and only indirectly an empirical value4 ,they represent instruments for the carrying on of science4 ,as in the case of other tools1 their significance can be learned only by use4 ,we cannot procure understanding of their meaning by pointing to things1 but only by pointing to their work when they are employed as part of the technique of knowledge4 ,even the circle1 square1 etc41 of geometry exhibit a difference from the squares and circles of familiar acquaintance1 and the further one proceeds in mathematical science the greater the remoteness from the everyday empirical thing4 ,qualities which do not count for the pursuit of knowledge about spatial relations are left out2 those which are important for this purpose are accentuated4 ,if one carries his study far enough1 he will find even the properties which are significant for spatial knowledge giving way to those which facilitate knowledge of other things--perhaps a knowledge of the general relations of number4 ,there will be nothing in the conceptual definitions even to suggest spatial form1 size1 or direction4 ,this does not mean that they are unreal mental inventions1 but it indicates that direct physical qualities have been transmuted into tools for a special end--the end of intellectual organization4 ,in every machine the primary state of material has been modified by subordinating it to use for a purpose4 ,not the stuff in its original form but in its adaptation to an end is important4 ,no one would have a knowledge of a machine who could enumerate all the materials entering into its structure1 but only he who knew their uses and could tell why they are employed as they are4 ,in like fashion one has a knowledge of mathematical conceptions only when he sees the problems in which they function and their specific utility in dealing with these problems4 ,knowing the definitions1 rules1 formulae1 etc41 is like knowing the names of parts of a machine without knowing what they do4 ,in one case1 as in the other1 the meaning1 or intellectual content1 is what the element accomplishes in the system of which it is a member4 #b4 ,science and ,social ,progress4 ,assuming that the development of the direct knowledge gained in occupations of social interest is carried to a perfected logical form1 the question arises as to its place in experience4 ,in general1 the reply is that science marks the emancipation of mind from devotion to customary purposes and makes possible the systematic pursuit of new ends4 ,it is the agency of progress in action4 ,progress is sometimes thought of as consisting in getting nearer to ends already sought4 ,but this is a minor form of progress1 for it requires only improvement of the means of action or technical advance4 ,more important modes of progress consist in enriching prior purposes and in forming new ones4 ,desires are not a fixed quantity1 nor does progress mean only an increased amount of satisfaction4 ,with increased culture and new mastery of nature1 new desires1 demands for new qualities of satisfaction1 show themselves1 for intelligence perceives new possibilities of action4 ,this projection of new possibilities leads to search for new means of execution1 and progress takes place2 while the discovery of objects not already used leads to suggestion of new ends4 ,that science is the chief means of perfecting control of means of action is witnessed by the great crop of inventions which followed intellectual command of the secrets of nature4 ,the wonderful transformation of production and distribution known as the industrial revolution is the fruit of experimental science4 ,railways1 steamboats1 electric motors1 telephone and telegraph1 automobiles1 aeroplanes and dirigibles are conspicuous evidences of the application of science in life4 ,but none of them would be of much importance without the thousands of less sensational inventions by means of which natural science has been rendered tributary to our daily life4 ,it must be admitted that to a considerable extent the progress thus procured has been only technical3 it has provided more efficient means for satisfying preexistent desires1 rather than modified the quality of human purposes4 ,there is1 for example1 no modern civilization which is the equal of ,greek culture in all respects4 ,science is still too recent to have been absorbed into imaginative and emotional disposition4 ,men move more swiftly and surely to the realization of their ends1 but their ends too largely remain what they were prior to scientific enlightenment4 ,this fact places upon education the responsibility of using science in a way to modify the habitual attitude of imagination and feeling1 not leave it just an extension of our physical arms and legs4 ,the advance of science has already modified men's thoughts of the purposes and goods of life to a sufficient extent to give some idea of the nature of this responsibility and the ways of meeting it4 ,science taking effect in human activity has broken down physical barriers which formerly separated men2 it has immensely widened the area of intercourse4 ,it has brought about interdependence of interests on an enormous scale4 ,it has brought with it an established conviction of the possibility of control of nature in the interests of mankind and thus has led men to look to the future1 instead of the past4 ,the coincidence of the ideal of progress with the advance of science is not a mere coincidence4 ,before this advance men placed the golden age in remote antiquity4 ,now they face the future with a firm belief that intelligence properly used can do away with evils once thought inevitable4 ,to subjugate devastating disease is no longer a dream2 the hope of abolishing poverty is not utopian4 ,science has familiarized men with the idea of development1 taking effect practically in persistent gradual amelioration of the estate of our common humanity4 ,the problem of an educational use of science is then to create an intelligence pregnant with belief in the possibility of the direction of human affairs by itself4 ,the method of science engrained through education in habit means emancipation from rule of thumb and from the routine generated by rule of thumb procedure4 ,the word empirical in its ordinary use does not mean connected with experiment1 but rather crude and unrational4 ,under the influence of conditions created by the non-existence of experimental science1 experience was opposed in all the ruling philosophies of the past to reason and the truly rational4 ,empirical knowledge meant the knowledge accumulated by a multitude of past instances without intelligent insight into the principles of any of them4 ,to say that medicine was empirical meant that it was not scientific1 but a mode of practice based upon accumulated observations of diseases and of remedies used more or less at random4 ,such a mode of practice is of necessity happy-go-lucky2 success depends upon chance4 ,it lends itself to deception and quackery4 ,industry that is empirically controlled forbids constructive applications of intelligence2 it depends upon following in an imitative slavish manner the models set in the past4 ,experimental science means the possibility of using past experiences as the servant1 not the master1 of mind4 ,it means that reason operates within experience1 not beyond it1 to give it an intelligent or reasonable quality4 ,science is experience becoming rational4 ,the effect of science is thus to change men's idea of the nature and inherent possibilities of experience4 ,by the same token1 it changes the idea and the operation of reason4 ,instead of being something beyond experience1 remote1 aloof1 concerned with a sublime region that has nothing to do with the experienced facts of life1 it is found indigenous in experience3--the factor by which past experiences are purified and rendered into tools for discovery and advance4 ,the term abstract has a rather bad name in popular speech1 being used to signify not only that which is abstruse and hard to understand1 but also that which is far away from life4 ,but abstraction is an indispensable trait in reflective direction of activity4 ,situations do not literally repeat themselves4 ,habit treats new occurrences as if they were identical with old ones2 it suffices1 accordingly1 when the different or novel element is negligible for present purposes4 ,but when the new element requires especial attention1 random reaction is the sole recourse unless abstraction is brought into play4 ,for abstraction deliberately selects from the subject matter of former experiences that which is thought helpful in dealing with the new4 ,it signifies conscious transfer of a meaning embedded in past experience for use in a new one4 ,it is the very artery of intelligence1 of the intentional rendering of one experience available for guidance of another4 ,science carries on this working over of prior subject matter on a large scale4 ,it aims to free an experience from all which is purely personal and strictly immediate2 it aims to detach whatever it has in common with the subject matter of other experiences1 and which1 being common1 may be saved for further use4 ,it is1 thus1 an indispensable factor in social progress4 ,in any experience just as it occurs there is much which1 while it may be of precious import to the individual implicated in the experience1 is peculiar and unreduplicable4 ,from the standpoint of science1 this material is accidental1 while the features which are widely shared are essential4 ,whatever is unique in the situation1 since dependent upon the peculiarities of the individual and the coincidence of circumstance1 is not available for others2 so that unless what is shared is abstracted and fixed by a suitable symbol1 practically all the value of the experience may perish in its passing4 ,but abstraction and the use of terms to record what is abstracted put the net value of individual experience at the permanent disposal of mankind4 ,no one can foresee in detail when or how it may be of further use4 ,the man of science in developing his abstractions is like a manufacturer of tools who does not know who will use them nor when4 ,but intellectual tools are indefinitely more flexible in their range of adaptation than other mechanical tools4 ,generalization is the counterpart of abstraction4 ,it is the functioning of an abstraction in its application to a new concrete experience1--its extension to clarify and direct new situations4 ,reference to these possible applications is necessary in order that the abstraction may be fruitful1 instead of a barren formalism ending in itself4 ,generalization is essentially a social device4 ,when men identified their interests exclusively with the concerns of a narrow group1 their generalizations were correspondingly restricted4 ,the viewpoint did not permit a wide and free survey4 ,men's thoughts were tied down to a contracted space and a short time1--limited to their own established customs as a measure of all possible values4 ,scientific abstraction and generalization are equivalent to taking the point of view of any man1 whatever his location in time and space4 ,while this emancipation from the conditions and episodes of concrete experiences accounts for the remoteness1 the abstractness1 of science1 it also accounts for its wide and free range of fruitful novel applications in practice4 ,terms and propositions record1 fix1 and convey what is abstracted4 ,a meaning detached from a given experience cannot remain hanging in the air4 ,it must acquire a local habitation4 ,names give abstract meanings a physical locus and body4 ,formulation is thus not an after-thought or by-product2 it is essential to the completion of the work of thought4 ,persons know many things which they cannot express1 but such knowledge remains practical1 direct1 and personal4 ,an individual can use it for himself2 he may be able to act upon it with efficiency4 ,artists and executives often have their knowledge in this state4 ,but it is personal1 untransferable1 and1 as it were1 instinctive4 ,to formulate the significance of an experience a man must take into conscious account the experiences of others4 ,he must try to find a standpoint which includes the experience of others as well as his own4 ,otherwise his communication cannot be understood4 ,he talks a language which no one else knows4 ,while literary art furnishes the supreme successes in stating of experiences so that they are vitally significant to others1 the vocabulary of science is designed1 in another fashion1 to express the meaning of experienced things in symbols which any one will know who studies the science4 ,aesthetic formulation reveals and enhances the meaning of experiences one already has2 scientific formulation supplies one with tools for constructing new experiences with transformed meanings4 ,to sum up3 ,science represents the office of intelligence1 in projection and control of new experiences1 pursued systematically1 intentionally1 and on a scale due to freedom from limitations of habit4 ,it is the sole instrumentality of conscious1 as distinct from accidental1 progress4 ,and if its generality1 its remoteness from individual conditions1 confer upon it a certain technicality and aloofness1 these qualities are very different from those of merely speculative theorizing4 ,the latter are in permanent dislocation from practice2 the former are temporarily detached for the sake of wider and freer application in later concrete action4 ,there is a kind of idle theory which is antithetical to practice2 but genuinely scientific theory falls within practice as the agency of its expansion and its direction to new possibilities4 #c4 ,naturalism and ,humanism in ,education4 ,there exists an educational tradition which opposes science to literature and history in the curriculum4 ,the quarrel between the representatives of the two interests is easily explicable historically4 ,literature and language and a literary philosophy were entrenched in all higher institutions of learning before experimental science came into being4 ,the latter had naturally to win its way4 ,no fortified and protected interest readily surrenders any monopoly it may possess4 ,but the assumption1 from whichever side1 that language and literary products are exclusively humanistic in quality1 and that science is purely physical in import1 is a false notion which tends to cripple the educational use of both studies4 ,human life does not occur in a vacuum1 nor is nature a mere stage setting for the enactment of its drama 7ante1 p4 #baa74 ,man's life is bound up in the processes of nature2 his career1 for success or defeat1 depends upon the way in which nature enters it4 ,man's power of deliberate control of his own affairs depends upon ability to direct natural energies to use3 an ability which is in turn dependent upon insight into nature's processes4 ,whatever natural science may be for the specialist1 for educational purposes it is knowledge of the conditions of human action4 ,to be aware of the medium in which social intercourse goes on1 and of the means and obstacles to its progressive development is to be in command of a knowledge which is thoroughly humanistic in quality4 ,one who is ignorant of the history of science is ignorant of the struggles by which mankind has passed from routine and caprice1 from superstitious subjection to nature1 from efforts to use it magically1 to intellectual self-possession4 ,that science may be taught as a set of formal and technical exercises is only too true4 ,this happens whenever information about the world is made an end in itself4 ,the failure of such instruction to procure culture is not1 however1 evidence of the antithesis of natural knowledge to humanistic concern1 but evidence of a wrong educational attitude4 ,dislike to employ scientific knowledge as it functions in men's occupations is itself a survival of an aristocratic culture4 ,the notion that applied knowledge is somehow less worthy than pure knowledge1 was natural to a society in which all useful work was performed by slaves and serfs1 and in which industry was controlled by the models set by custom rather than by intelligence4 ,science1 or the highest knowing1 was then identified with pure theorizing1 apart from all application in the uses of life2 and knowledge relating to useful arts suffered the stigma attaching to the classes who engaged in them 7,see below1 ,ch4 ,,xix74 ,the idea of science thus generated persisted after science had itself adopted the appliances of the arts1 using them for the production of knowledge1 and after the rise of democracy4 ,taking theory just as theory1 however1 that which concerns humanity is of more significance for man than that which concerns a merely physical world4 ,in adopting the criterion of knowledge laid down by a literary culture1 aloof from the practical needs of the mass of men1 the educational advocates of scientific education put themselves at a strategic disadvantage4 ,so far as they adopt the idea of science appropriate to its experimental method and to the movements of a democratic and industrial society1 they have no difficulty in showing that natural science is more humanistic than an alleged humanism which bases its educational schemes upon the specialized interests of a leisure class4 ,for1 as we have already stated1 humanistic studies when set in opposition to study of nature are hampered4 ,they tend to reduce themselves to exclusively literary and linguistic studies1 which in turn tend to shrink to the classics1 to languages no longer spoken4 ,for modern languages may evidently be put to use1 and hence fall under the ban4 ,it would be hard to find anything in history more ironical than the educational practices which have identified the humanities exclusively with a knowledge of ,greek and ,latin4 ,greek and ,roman art and institutions made such important contributions to our civilization that there should always be the amplest opportunities for making their acquaintance4 ,but to regard them as par excellence the humane studies involves a deliberate neglect of the possibilities of the subject matter which is accessible in education to the masses1 and tends to cultivate a narrow snobbery3 that of a learned class whose insignia are the accidents of exclusive opportunity4 ,knowledge is humanistic in quality not because it is about human products in the past1 but because of what it does in liberating human intelligence and human sympathy4 ,any subject matter which accomplishes this result is humane1 and any subject matter which does not accomplish it is not even educational4 ,summary4 ,science represents the fruition of the cognitive factors in experience4 ,instead of contenting itself with a mere statement of what commends itself to personal or customary experience1 it aims at a statement which will reveal the sources1 grounds1 and consequences of a belief4 ,the achievement of this aim gives logical character to the statements4 ,educationally1 it has to be noted that logical characteristics of method1 since they belong to subject matter which has reached a high degree of intellectual elaboration1 are different from the method of the learner--the chronological order of passing from a cruder to a more refined intellectual quality of experience4 ,when this fact is ignored1 science is treated as so much bare information1 which however is less interesting and more remote than ordinary information1 being stated in an unusual and technical vocabulary4 ,the function which science has to perform in the curriculum is that which it has performed for the race3 emancipation from local and temporary incidents of experience1 and the opening of intellectual vistas unobscured by the accidents of personal habit and predilection4 ,the logical traits of abstraction1 generalization1 and definite formulation are all associated with this function4 ,in emancipating an idea from the particular context in which it originated and giving it a wider reference the results of the experience of any individual are put at the disposal of all men4 ,thus ultimately and philosophically science is the organ of general social progress4 #a ,upon the positive side1 the value of problems arising in work in the garden1 the shop1 etc41 may be referred to 7,see p4 #bjj74 ,the laboratory may be treated as an additional resource to supply conditions and appliances for the better pursuit of these problems4 ,chapter ,eighteen3 ,educational ,values ,the considerations involved in a discussion of educational values have already been brought out in the discussion of aims and interests4 ,the specific values usually discussed in educational theories coincide with aims which are usually urged4 ,they are such things as utility1 culture1 information1 preparation for social efficiency1 mental discipline or power1 and so on4 ,the aspect of these aims in virtue of which they are valuable has been treated in our analysis of the nature of interest1 and there is no difference between speaking of art as an interest or concern and referring to it as a value4 ,it happens1 however1 that discussion of values has usually been centered about a consideration of the various ends subserved by specific subjects of the curriculum4 ,it has been a part of the attempt to justify those subjects by pointing out the significant contributions to life accruing from their study4 ,an explicit discussion of educational values thus affords an opportunity for reviewing the prior discussion of aims and interests on one hand and of the curriculum on the other1 by bringing them into connection with one another4 #a4 ,the ,nature of ,realization or ,appreciation4 ,much of our experience is indirect2 it is dependent upon signs which intervene between the things and ourselves1 signs which stand for or represent the former4 ,it is one thing to have been engaged in war1 to have shared its dangers and hardships2 it is another thing to hear or read about it4 ,all language1 all symbols1 are implements of an indirect experience2 in technical language the experience which is procured by their means is mediated4 ,it stands in contrast with an immediate1 direct experience1 something in which we take part vitally and at first hand1 instead of through the intervention of representative media4 ,as we have seen1 the scope of personal1 vitally direct experience is very limited4 ,if it were not for the intervention of agencies for representing absent and distant affairs1 our experience would remain almost on the level of that of the brutes4 ,every step from savagery to civilization is dependent upon the invention of media which enlarge the range of purely immediate experience and give it deepened as well as wider meaning by connecting it with things which can only be signified or symbolized4 ,it is doubtless this fact which is the cause of the disposition to identify an uncultivated person with an illiterate person--so dependent are we on letters for effective representative or indirect experience4 ,at the same time 7as we have also had repeated occasion to see7 there is always a danger that symbols will not be truly representative2 danger that instead of really calling up the absent and remote in a way to make it enter a present experience1 the linguistic media of representation will become an end in themselves4 ,formal education is peculiarly exposed to this danger1 with the result that when literacy supervenes1 mere bookishness1 what is popularly termed the academic1 too often comes with it4 ,in colloquial speech1 the phrase a realizing sense is used to express the urgency1 warmth1 and intimacy of a direct experience in contrast with the remote1 pallid1 and coldly detached quality of a representative experience4 ,the terms mental realization and appreciation 7or genuine appreciation7 are more elaborate names for the realizing sense of a thing4 ,it is not possible to define these ideas except by synonyms1 like coming home to one really taking it in1 etc41 for the only way to appreciate what is meant by a direct experience of a thing is by having it4 ,but it is the difference between reading a technical description of a picture1 and seeing it2 or between just seeing it and being moved by it2 between learning mathematical equations about light and being carried away by some peculiarly glorious illumination of a misty landscape4 ,we are thus met by the danger of the tendency of technique and other purely representative forms to encroach upon the sphere of direct appreciations2 in other words1 the tendency to assume that pupils have a foundation of direct realization of situations sufficient for the superstructure of representative experience erected by formulated school studies4 ,this is not simply a matter of quantity or bulk4 ,sufficient direct experience is even more a matter of quality2 it must be of a sort to connect readily and fruitfully with the symbolic material of instruction4 ,before teaching can safely enter upon conveying facts and ideas through the media of signs1 schooling must provide genuine situations in which personal participation brings home the import of the material and the problems which it conveys4 ,from the standpoint of the pupil1 the resulting experiences are worth while on their own account2 from the standpoint of the teacher they are also means of supplying subject matter required for understanding instruction involving signs1 and of evoking attitudes of open-mindedness and concern as to the material symbolically conveyed4 ,in the outline given of the theory of educative subject matter1 the demand for this background of realization or appreciation is met by the provision made for play and active occupations embodying typical situations4 ,nothing need be added to what has already been said except to point out that while the discussion dealt explicitly with the subject matter of primary education1 where the demand for the available background of direct experience is most obvious1 the principle applies to the primary or elementary phase of every subject4 ,the first and basic function of laboratory work1 for example1 in a high school or college in a new field1 is to familiarize the student at first hand with a certain range of facts and problems--to give him a feeling for them4 ,getting command of technique and of methods of reaching and testing generalizations is at first secondary to getting appreciation4 ,as regards the primary school activities1 it is to be borne in mind that the fundamental intent is not to amuse nor to convey information with a minimum of vexation nor yet to acquire skill1--though these results may accrue as by-products1--but to enlarge and enrich the scope of experience1 and to keep alert and effective the interest in intellectual progress4 ,the rubric of appreciation supplies an appropriate head for bringing out three further principles3 the nature of effective or real 7as distinct from nominal7 standards of value2 the place of the imagination in appreciative realizations2 and the place of the fine arts in the course of study4 #a4 ,the nature of standards of valuation4 ,every adult has acquired1 in the course of his prior experience and education1 certain measures of the worth of various sorts of experience4 ,he has learned to look upon qualities like honesty1 amiability1 perseverance1 loyalty1 as moral goods2 upon certain classics of literature1 painting1 music1 as aesthetic values1 and so on4 ,not only this1 but he has learned certain rules for these values--the golden rule in morals2 harmony1 balance1 etc41 proportionate distribution in aesthetic goods2 definition1 clarity1 system in intellectual accomplishments4 ,these principles are so important as standards of judging the worth of new experiences that parents and instructors are always tending to teach them directly to the young4 ,they overlook the danger that standards so taught will be merely symbolic2 that is1 largely conventional and verbal4 ,in reality1 working as distinct from professed standards depend upon what an individual has himself specifically appreciated to be deeply significant in concrete situations4 ,an individual may have learned that certain characteristics are conventionally esteemed in music2 he may be able to converse with some correctness about classic music2 he may even honestly believe that these traits constitute his own musical standards4 ,but if in his own past experience1 what he has been most accustomed to and has most enjoyed is ragtime1 his active or working measures of valuation are fixed on the ragtime level4 ,the appeal actually made to him in his own personal realization fixes his attitude much more deeply than what he has been taught as the proper thing to say2 his habitual disposition thus fixed forms his real norm of valuation in subsequent musical experiences4 ,probably few would deny this statement as to musical taste4 ,but it applies equally well in judgments of moral and intellectual worth4 ,a youth who has had repeated experience of the full meaning of the value of kindliness toward others built into his disposition has a measure of the worth of generous treatment of others4 ,without this vital appreciation1 the duty and virtue of unselfishness impressed upon him by others as a standard remains purely a matter of symbols which he cannot adequately translate into realities4 ,his knowledge is second-handed2 it is only a knowledge that others prize unselfishness as an excellence1 and esteem him in the degree in which he exhibits it4 ,thus there grows up a split between a person's professed standards and his actual ones4 ,a person may be aware of the results of this struggle between his inclinations and his theoretical opinions2 he suffers from the conflict between doing what is really dear to him and what he has learned will win the approval of others4 ,but of the split itself he is unaware2 the result is a kind of unconscious hypocrisy1 an instability of disposition4 ,in similar fashion1 a pupil who has worked through some confused intellectual situation and fought his way to clearing up obscurities in a definite outcome1 appreciates the value of clarity and definition4 ,he has a standard which can be depended upon4 ,he may be trained externally to go through certain motions of analysis and division of subject matter and may acquire information about the value of these processes as standard logical functions1 but unless it somehow comes home to him at some point as an appreciation of his own1 the significance of the logical norms--so-called--remains as much an external piece of information as1 say1 the names of rivers in ,china4 ,he may be able to recite1 but the recital is a mechanical rehearsal4 ,it is1 then1 a serious mistake to regard appreciation as if it were confined to such things as literature and pictures and music4 ,its scope is as comprehensive as the work of education itself4 ,the formation of habits is a purely mechanical thing unless habits are also tastes--habitual modes of preference and esteem1 an effective sense of excellence4 ,there are adequate grounds for asserting that the premium so often put in schools upon external discipline1 and upon marks and rewards1 upon promotion and keeping back1 are the obverse of the lack of attention given to life situations in which the meaning of facts1 ideas1 principles1 and problems is vitally brought home4 #b4 ,appreciative realizations are to be distinguished from symbolic or representative experiences4 ,they are not to be distinguished from the work of the intellect or understanding4 ,only a personal response involving imagination can possibly procure realization even of pure facts4 ,the imagination is the medium of appreciation in every field4 ,the engagement of the imagination is the only thing that makes any activity more than mechanical4 ,unfortunately1 it is too customary to identify the imaginative with the imaginary1 rather than with a warm and intimate taking in of the full scope of a situation4 ,this leads to an exaggerated estimate of fairy tales1 myths1 fanciful symbols1 verse1 and something labeled ,fine ,art1 as agencies for developing imagination and appreciation2 and1 by neglecting imaginative vision in other matters1 leads to methods which reduce much instruction to an unimaginative acquiring of specialized skill and amassing of a load of information4 ,theory1 and--to some extent--practice1 have advanced far enough to recognize that play-activity is an imaginative enterprise4 ,but it is still usual to regard this activity as a specially marked-off stage of childish growth1 and to overlook the fact that the difference between play and what is regarded as serious employment should be not a difference between the presence and absence of imagination1 but a difference in the materials with which imagination is occupied4 ,the result is an unwholesome exaggeration of the phantastic and unreal phases of childish play and a deadly reduction of serious occupation to a routine efficiency prized simply for its external tangible results4 ,achievement comes to denote the sort of thing that a well-planned machine can do better than a human being can1 and the main effect of education1 the achieving of a life of rich significance1 drops by the wayside4 ,meantime mind-wandering and wayward fancy are nothing but the unsuppressible imagination cut loose from concern with what is done4 ,an adequate recognition of the play of imagination as the medium of realization of every kind of thing which lies beyond the scope of direct physical response is the sole way of escape from mechanical methods in teaching4 ,the emphasis put in this book1 in accord with many tendencies in contemporary education1 upon activity1 will be misleading if it is not recognized that the imagination is as much a normal and integral part of human activity as is muscular movement4 ,the educative value of manual activities and of laboratory exercises1 as well as of play1 depends upon the extent in which they aid in bringing about a sensing of the meaning of what is going on4 ,in effect1 if not in name1 they are dramatizations4 ,their utilitarian value in forming habits of skill to be used for tangible results is important1 but not when isolated from the appreciative side4 ,were it not for the accompanying play of imagination1 there would be no road from a direct activity to representative knowledge2 for it is by imagination that symbols are translated over into a direct meaning and integrated with a narrower activity so as to expand and enrich it4 ,when the representative creative imagination is made merely literary and mythological1 symbols are rendered mere means of directing physical reactions of the organs of speech4 #c4 ,in the account previously given nothing was explicitly said about the place of literature and the fine arts in the course of study4 ,the omission at that point was intentional4 ,at the outset1 there is no sharp demarcation of useful1 or industrial1 arts and fine arts4 ,the activities mentioned in ,chapter ,,xv contain within themselves the factors later discriminated into fine and useful arts4 ,as engaging the emotions and the imagination1 they have the qualities which give the fine arts their quality4 ,as demanding method or skill1 the adaptation of tools to materials with constantly increasing perfection1 they involve the element of technique indispensable to artistic production4 ,from the standpoint of product1 or the work of art1 they are naturally defective1 though even in this respect when they comprise genuine appreciation they often have a rudimentary charm4 ,as experiences they have both an artistic and an esthetic quality4 ,when they emerge into activities which are tested by their product and when the socially serviceable value of the product is emphasized1 they pass into useful or industrial arts4 ,when they develop in the direction of an enhanced appreciation of the immediate qualities which appeal to taste1 they grow into fine arts4 ,in one of its meanings1 appreciation is opposed to depreciation4 ,it denotes an enlarged1 an intensified prizing1 not merely a prizing1 much less--like depreciation--a lowered and degraded prizing4 ,this enhancement of the qualities which make any ordinary experience appealing1 appropriable--capable of full assimilation--and enjoyable1 constitutes the prime function of literature1 music1 drawing1 painting1 etc41 in education4 ,they are not the exclusive agencies of appreciation in the most general sense of that word2 but they are the chief agencies of an intensified1 enhanced appreciation4 ,as such1 they are not only intrinsically and directly enjoyable1 but they serve a purpose beyond themselves4 ,they have the office1 in increased degree1 of all appreciation in fixing taste1 in forming standards for the worth of later experiences4 ,they arouse discontent with conditions which fall below their measure2 they create a demand for surroundings coming up to their own level4 ,they reveal a depth and range of meaning in experiences which otherwise might be mediocre and trivial4 ,they supply1 that is1 organs of vision4 ,moreover1 in their fullness they represent the concentration and consummation of elements of good which are otherwise scattered and incomplete4 ,they select and focus the elements of enjoyable worth which make any experience directly enjoyable4 ,they are not luxuries of education1 but emphatic expressions of that which makes any education worth while4 #b4 ,the ,valuation of ,studies4 ,the theory of educational values involves not only an account of the nature of appreciation as fixing the measure of subsequent valuations1 but an account of the specific directions in which these valuations occur4 ,to value means primarily to prize1 to esteem2 but secondarily it means to apprise1 to estimate4 ,it means1 that is1 the act of cherishing something1 holding it dear1 and also the act of passing judgment upon the nature and amount of its value as compared with something else4 ,to value in the latter sense is to valuate or evaluate4 ,the distinction coincides with that sometimes made between intrinsic and instrumental values4 ,intrinsic values are not objects of judgment1 they cannot 7as intrinsic7 be compared1 or regarded as greater and less1 better or worse4 ,they are invaluable2 and if a thing is invaluable1 it is neither more nor less so than any other invaluable4 ,but occasions present themselves when it is necessary to choose1 when we must let one thing go in order to take another4 ,this establishes an order of preference1 a greater and less1 better and worse4 ,things judged or passed upon have to be estimated in relation to some third thing1 some further end4 ,with respect to that1 they are means1 or instrumental values4 ,we may imagine a man who at one time thoroughly enjoys converse with his friends1 at another the hearing of a symphony2 at another the eating of his meals2 at another the reading of a book2 at another the earning of money1 and so on4 ,as an appreciative realization1 each of these is an intrinsic value4 ,it occupies a particular place in life2 it serves its own end1 which cannot be supplied by a substitute4 ,there is no question of comparative value1 and hence none of valuation4 ,each is the specific good which it is1 and that is all that can be said4 ,in its own place1 none is a means to anything beyond itself4 ,but there may arise a situation in which they compete or conflict1 in which a choice has to be made4 ,now comparison comes in4 ,since a choice has to be made1 we want to know the respective claims of each competitor4 ,what is to be said for it8 ,what does it offer in comparison with1 as balanced over against1 some other possibility8 ,raising these questions means that a particular good is no longer an end in itself1 an intrinsic good4 ,for if it were1 its claims would be incomparable1 imperative4 ,the question is now as to its status as a means of realizing something else1 which is then the invaluable of that situation4 ,if a man has just eaten1 or if he is well fed generally and the opportunity to hear music is a rarity1 he will probably prefer the music to eating4 ,in the given situation that will render the greater contribution4 ,if he is starving1 or if he is satiated with music for the time being1 he will naturally judge food to have the greater worth4 ,in the abstract or at large1 apart from the needs of a particular situation in which choice has to be made1 there is no such thing as degrees or order of value4 ,certain conclusions follow with respect to educational values4 ,we cannot establish a hierarchy of values among studies4 ,it is futile to attempt to arrange them in an order1 beginning with one having least worth and going on to that of maximum value4 ,in so far as any study has a unique or irreplaceable function in experience1 in so far as it marks a characteristic enrichment of life1 its worth is intrinsic or incomparable4 ,since education is not a means to living1 but is identical with the operation of living a life which is fruitful and inherently significant1 the only ultimate value which can be set up is just the process of living itself4 ,and this is not an end to which studies and activities are subordinate means2 it is the whole of which they are ingredients4 ,and what has been said about appreciation means that every study in one of its aspects ought to have just such ultimate significance4 ,it is true of arithmetic as it is of poetry that in some place and at some time it ought to be a good to be appreciated on its own account--just as an enjoyable experience1 in short4 ,if it is not1 then when the time and place come for it to be used as a means or instrumentality1 it will be in just that much handicapped4 ,never having been realized or appreciated for itself1 one will miss something of its capacity as a resource for other ends4 ,it equally follows that when we compare studies as to their values1 that is1 treat them as means to something beyond themselves1 that which controls their proper valuation is found in the specific situation in which they are to be used4 ,the way to enable a student to apprehend the instrumental value of arithmetic is not to lecture him upon the benefit it will be to him in some remote and uncertain future1 but to let him discover that success in something he is interested in doing depends upon ability to use number4 ,it also follows that the attempt to distribute distinct sorts of value among different studies is a misguided one1 in spite of the amount of time recently devoted to the undertaking4 ,science for example may have any kind of value1 depending upon the situation into which it enters as a means4 ,to some the value of science may be military2 it may be an instrument in strengthening means of offense or defense2 it may be technological1 a tool for engineering2 or it may be commercial--an aid in the successful conduct of business2 under other conditions1 its worth may be philanthropic--the service it renders in relieving human suffering2 or again it may be quite conventional--of value in establishing one's social status as an educated person4 ,as matter of fact1 science serves all these purposes1 and it would be an arbitrary task to try to fix upon one of them as its real end4 ,all that we can be sure of educationally is that science should be taught so as to be an end in itself in the lives of students--something worth while on account of its own unique intrinsic contribution to the experience of life4 ,primarily it must have appreciation value4 ,if we take something which seems to be at the opposite pole1 like poetry1 the same sort of statement applies4 ,it may be that1 at the present time1 its chief value is the contribution it makes to the enjoyment of leisure4 ,but that may represent a degenerate condition rather than anything necessary4 ,poetry has historically been allied with religion and morals2 it has served the purpose of penetrating the mysterious depths of things4 ,it has had an enormous patriotic value4 ,homer to the ,greeks was a ,bible1 a textbook of morals1 a history1 and a national inspiration4 ,in any case1 it may be said that an education which does not succeed in making poetry a resource in the business of life as well as in its leisure1 has something the matter with it--or else the poetry is artificial poetry4 ,the same considerations apply to the value of a study or a topic of a study with reference to its motivating force4 ,those responsible for planning and teaching the course of study should have grounds for thinking that the studies and topics included furnish both direct increments to the enriching of lives of the pupils and also materials which they can put to use in other concerns of direct interest4 ,since the curriculum is always getting loaded down with purely inherited traditional matter and with subjects which represent mainly the energy of some influential person or group of persons in behalf of something dear to them1 it requires constant inspection1 criticism1 and revision to make sure it is accomplishing its purpose4 ,then there is always the probability that it represents the values of adults rather than those of children and youth1 or those of pupils a generation ago rather than those of the present day4 ,hence a further need for a critical outlook and survey4 ,but these considerations do not mean that for a subject to have motivating value to a pupil 7whether intrinsic or instrumental7 is the same thing as for him to be aware of the value1 or to be able to tell what the study is good for4 ,in the first place1 as long as any topic makes an immediate appeal1 it is not necessary to ask what it is good for4 ,this is a question which can be asked only about instrumental values4 ,some goods are not good for anything2 they are just goods4 ,any other notion leads to an absurdity4 ,for we cannot stop asking the question about an instrumental good1 one whose value lies in its being good for something1 unless there is at some point something intrinsically good1 good for itself4 ,to a hungry1 healthy child1 food is a good of the situation2 we do not have to bring him to consciousness of the ends subserved by food in order to supply a motive to eat4 ,the food in connection with his appetite is a motive4 ,the same thing holds of mentally eager pupils with respect to many topics4 ,neither they nor the teacher could possibly foretell with any exactness the purposes learning is to accomplish in the future2 nor as long as the eagerness continues is it advisable to try to specify particular goods which are to come of it4 ,the proof of a good is found in the fact that the pupil responds2 his response is use4 ,his response to the material shows that the subject functions in his life4 ,it is unsound to urge that1 say1 ,latin has a value per se in the abstract1 just as a study1 as a sufficient justification for teaching it4 ,but it is equally absurd to argue that unless teacher or pupil can point out some definite assignable future use to which it is to be put1 it lacks justifying value4 ,when pupils are genuinely concerned in learning ,latin1 that is of itself proof that it possesses value4 ,the most which one is entitled to ask in such cases is whether in view of the shortness of time1 there are not other things of intrinsic value which in addition have greater instrumental value4 ,this brings us to the matter of instrumental values--topics studied because of some end beyond themselves4 ,if a child is ill and his appetite does not lead him to eat when food is presented1 or if his appetite is perverted so that he prefers candy to meat and vegetables1 conscious reference to results is indicated4 ,he needs to be made conscious of consequences as a justification of the positive or negative value of certain objects4 ,or the state of things may be normal enough1 and yet an individual not be moved by some matter because he does not grasp how his attainment of some intrinsic good depends upon active concern with what is presented4 ,in such cases1 it is obviously the part of wisdom to establish consciousness of connection4 ,in general what is desirable is that a topic be presented in such a way that it either have an immediate value1 and require no justification1 or else be perceived to be a means of achieving something of intrinsic value4 ,an instrumental value then has the intrinsic value of being a means to an end4 ,it may be questioned whether some of the present pedagogical interest in the matter of values of studies is not either excessive or else too narrow4 ,sometimes it appears to be a labored effort to furnish an apologetic for topics which no longer operate to any purpose1 direct or indirect1 in the lives of pupils4 ,at other times1 the reaction against useless lumber seems to have gone to the extent of supposing that no subject or topic should be taught unless some quite definite future utility can be pointed out by those making the course of study or by the pupil himself1 unmindful of the fact that life is its own excuse for being2 and that definite utilities which can be pointed out are themselves justified only because they increase the experienced content of life itself4 #c4 ,the ,segregation and ,organization of ,values4 ,it is of course possible to classify in a general way the various valuable phases of life4 ,in order to get a survey of aims sufficiently wide 7,see ante1 p4 #aaj7 to give breadth and flexibility to the enterprise of education1 there is some advantage in such a classification4 ,but it is a great mistake to regard these values as ultimate ends to which the concrete satisfactions of experience are subordinate4 ,they are nothing but generalizations1 more or less adequate1 of concrete goods4 ,health1 wealth1 efficiency1 sociability1 utility1 culture1 happiness itself are only abstract terms which sum up a multitude of particulars4 ,to regard such things as standards for the valuation of concrete topics and process of education is to subordinate to an abstraction the concrete facts from which the abstraction is derived4 ,they are not in any true sense standards of valuation2 these are found1 as we have previously seen1 in the specific realizations which form tastes and habits of preference4 ,they are1 however1 of significance as points of view elevated above the details of life whence to survey the field and see how its constituent details are distributed1 and whether they are well proportioned4 ,no classification can have other than a provisional validity4 ,the following may prove of some help4 ,we may say that the kind of experience to which the work of the schools should contribute is one marked by executive competency in the management of resources and obstacles encountered 7efficiency72 by sociability1 or interest in the direct companionship of others2 by aesthetic taste or capacity to appreciate artistic excellence in at least some of its classic forms2 by trained intellectual method1 or interest in some mode of scientific achievement2 and by sensitiveness to the rights and claims of others--conscientiousness4 ,and while these considerations are not standards of value1 they are useful criteria for survey1 criticism1 and better organization of existing methods and subject matter of instruction4 ,the need of such general points of view is the greater because of a tendency to segregate educational values due to the isolation from one another of the various pursuits of life4 ,the idea is prevalent that different studies represent separate kinds of values1 and that the curriculum should1 therefore1 be constituted by gathering together various studies till a sufficient variety of independent values have been cared for4 ,the following quotation does not use the word value1 but it contains the notion of a curriculum constructed on the idea that there are a number of separate ends to be reached1 and that various studies may be evaluated by referring each study to its respective end4 ,memory is trained by most studies1 but best by languages and history2 taste is trained by the more advanced study of languages1 and still better by ,english literature2 imagination by all higher language teaching1 but chiefly by ,greek and ,latin poetry2 observation by science work in the laboratory1 though some training is to be got from the earlier stages of ,latin and ,greek2 for expression1 ,greek and ,latin composition comes first and ,english composition next2 for abstract reasoning1 mathematics stands almost alone2 for concrete reasoning1 science comes first1 then geometry2 for social reasoning1 the ,greek and ,roman historians and orators come first1 and general history next4 ,hence the narrowest education which can claim to be at all complete includes ,latin1 one modern language1 some history1 some ,english literature1 and one science4 ,there is much in the wording of this passage which is irrelevant to our point and which must be discounted to make it clear4 ,the phraseology betrays the particular provincial tradition within which the author is writing4 ,there is the unquestioned assumption of faculties to be trained1 and a dominant interest in the ancient languages2 there is comparative disregard of the earth on which men happen to live and the bodies they happen to carry around with them4 ,but with allowances made for these matters 7even with their complete abandonment7 we find much in contemporary educational philosophy which parallels the fundamental notion of parceling out special values to segregated studies4 ,even when some one end is set up as a standard of value1 like social efficiency or culture1 it will often be found to be but a verbal heading under which a variety of disconnected factors are comprised4 ,and although the general tendency is to allow a greater variety of values to a given study than does the passage quoted1 yet the attempt to inventory a number of values attaching to each study and to state the amount of each value which the given study possesses emphasizes an implied educational disintegration4 ,as matter of fact1 such schemes of values of studies are largely but unconscious justifications of the curriculum with which one is familiar4 ,one accepts1 for the most part1 the studies of the existing course and then assigns values to them as a sufficient reason for their being taught4 ,mathematics is said to have1 for example1 disciplinary value in habituating the pupil to accuracy of statement and closeness of reasoning2 it has utilitarian value in giving command of the arts of calculation involved in trade and the arts2 culture value in its enlargement of the imagination in dealing with the most general relations of things2 even religious value in its concept of the infinite and allied ideas4 ,but clearly mathematics does not accomplish such results1 because it is endowed with miraculous potencies called values2 it has these values if and when it accomplishes these results1 and not otherwise4 ,the statements may help a teacher to a larger vision of the possible results to be effected by instruction in mathematical topics4 ,but unfortunately1 the tendency is to treat the statement as indicating powers inherently residing in the subject1 whether they operate or not1 and thus to give it a rigid justification4 ,if they do not operate1 the blame is put not on the subject as taught1 but on the indifference and recalcitrancy of pupils4 ,this attitude toward subjects is the obverse side of the conception of experience or life as a patchwork of independent interests which exist side by side and limit one another4 ,students of politics are familiar with a check and balance theory of the powers of government4 ,there are supposed to be independent separate functions1 like the legislative1 executive1 judicial1 administrative1 and all goes well if each of these checks all the others and thus creates an ideal balance4 ,there is a philosophy which might well be called the check and balance theory of experience4 ,life presents a diversity of interests4 ,left to themselves1 they tend to encroach on one another4 ,the ideal is to prescribe a special territory for each till the whole ground of experience is covered1 and then see to it each remains within its own boundaries4 ,politics1 business1 recreation1 art1 science1 the learned professions1 polite intercourse1 leisure1 represent such interests4 ,each of these ramifies into many branches3 business into manual occupations1 executive positions1 bookkeeping1 railroading1 banking1 agriculture1 trade and commerce1 etc41 and so with each of the others4 ,an ideal education would then supply the means of meeting these separate and pigeon-holed interests4 ,and when we look at the schools1 it is easy to get the impression that they accept this view of the nature of adult life1 and set for themselves the task of meeting its demands4 ,each interest is acknowledged as a kind of fixed institution to which something in the course of study must correspond4 ,the course of study must then have some civics and history politically and patriotically viewed3 some utilitarian studies2 some science2 some art 7mainly literature of course72 some provision for recreation2 some moral education2 and so on4 ,and it will be found that a large part of current agitation about schools is concerned with clamor and controversy about the due meed of recognition to be given to each of these interests1 and with struggles to secure for each its due share in the course of study2 or1 if this does not seem feasible in the existing school system1 then to secure a new and separate kind of schooling to meet the need4 ,in the multitude of educations education is forgotten4 ,the obvious outcome is congestion of the course of study1 overpressure and distraction of pupils1 and a narrow specialization fatal to the very idea of education4 ,but these bad results usually lead to more of the same sort of thing as a remedy4 ,when it is perceived that after all the requirements of a full life experience are not met1 the deficiency is not laid to the isolation and narrowness of the teaching of the existing subjects1 and this recognition made the basis of reorganization of the system4 ,no1 the lack is something to be made up for by the introduction of still another study1 or1 if necessary1 another kind of school4 ,and as a rule those who object to the resulting overcrowding and consequent superficiality and distraction usually also have recourse to a merely quantitative criterion3 the remedy is to cut off a great many studies as fads and frills1 and return to the good old curriculum of the three ,r's in elementary education and the equally good and equally old-fashioned curriculum of the classics and mathematics in higher education4 ,the situation has1 of course1 its historic explanation4 ,various epochs of the past have had their own characteristic struggles and interests4 ,each of these great epochs has left behind itself a kind of cultural deposit1 like a geologic stratum4 ,these deposits have found their way into educational institutions in the form of studies1 distinct courses of study1 distinct types of schools4 ,with the rapid change of political1 scientific1 and economic interests in the last century1 provision had to be made for new values4 ,though the older courses resisted1 they have had at least in this country to retire their pretensions to a monopoly4 ,they have not1 however1 been reorganized in content and aim2 they have only been reduced in amount4 ,the new studies1 representing the new interests1 have not been used to transform the method and aim of all instruction2 they have been injected and added on4 ,the result is a conglomerate1 the cement of which consists in the mechanics of the school program or time table4 ,thence arises the scheme of values and standards of value which we have mentioned4 ,this situation in education represents the divisions and separations which obtain in social life4 ,the variety of interests which should mark any rich and balanced experience have been torn asunder and deposited in separate institutions with diverse and independent purposes and methods4 ,business is business1 science is science1 art is art1 politics is politics1 social intercourse is social intercourse1 morals is morals1 recreation is recreation1 and so on4 ,each possesses a separate and independent province with its own peculiar aims and ways of proceeding4 ,each contributes to the others only externally and accidentally4 ,all of them together make up the whole of life by just apposition and addition4 ,what does one expect from business save that it should furnish money1 to be used in turn for making more money and for support of self and family1 for buying books and pictures1 tickets to concerts which may afford culture1 and for paying taxes1 charitable gifts and other things of social and ethical value8 ,how unreasonable to expect that the pursuit of business should be itself a culture of the imagination1 in breadth and refinement2 that it should directly1 and not through the money which it supplies1 have social service for its animating principle and be conducted as an enterprise in behalf of social organization6 ,the same thing is to be said1 mutatis mutandis1 of the pursuit of art or science or politics or religion4 ,each has become specialized not merely in its appliances and its demands upon time1 but in its aim and animating spirit4 ,unconsciously1 our course of studies and our theories of the educational values of studies reflect this division of interests4 ,the point at issue in a theory of educational value is then the unity or integrity of experience4 ,how shall it be full and varied without losing unity of spirit8 ,how shall it be one and yet not narrow and monotonous in its unity8 ,ultimately1 the question of values and a standard of values is the moral question of the organization of the interests of life4 ,educationally1 the question concerns that organization of schools1 materials1 and methods which will operate to achieve breadth and richness of experience4 ,how shall we secure breadth of outlook without sacrificing efficiency of execution8 ,how shall we secure the diversity of interests1 without paying the price of isolation8 ,how shall the individual be rendered executive in his intelligence instead of at the cost of his intelligence8 ,how shall art1 science1 and politics reinforce one another in an enriched temper of mind instead of constituting ends pursued at one another's expense8 ,how can the interests of life and the studies which enforce them enrich the common experience of men instead of dividing men from one another8 ,with the questions of reorganization thus suggested1 we shall be concerned in the concluding chapters4 ,summary4 ,fundamentally1 the elements involved in a discussion of value have been covered in the prior discussion of aims and interests4 ,but since educational values are generally discussed in connection with the claims of the various studies of the curriculum1 the consideration of aim and interest is here resumed from the point of view of special studies4 ,the term value has two quite different meanings4 ,on the one hand1 it denotes the attitude of prizing a thing finding it worth while1 for its own sake1 or intrinsically4 ,this is a name for a full or complete experience4 ,to value in this sense is to appreciate4 ,but to value also means a distinctively intellectual act--an operation of comparing and judging--to valuate4 ,this occurs when direct full experience is lacking1 and the question arises which of the various possibilities of a situation is to be preferred in order to reach a full realization1 or vital experience4 ,we must not1 however1 divide the studies of the curriculum into the appreciative1 those concerned with intrinsic value1 and the instrumental1 concerned with those which are of value or ends beyond themselves4 ,the formation of proper standards in any subject depends upon a realization of the contribution which it makes to the immediate significance of experience1 upon a direct appreciation4 ,literature and the fine arts are of peculiar value because they represent appreciation at its best--a heightened realization of meaning through selection and concentration4 ,but every subject at some phase of its development should possess1 what is for the individual concerned with it1 an aesthetic quality4 ,contribution to immediate intrinsic values in all their variety in experience is the only criterion for determining the worth of instrumental and derived values in studies4 ,the tendency to assign separate values to each study and to regard the curriculum in its entirety as a kind of composite made by the aggregation of segregated values is a result of the isolation of social groups and classes4 ,hence it is the business of education in a democratic social group to struggle against this isolation in order that the various interests may reinforce and play into one another4 ,chapter ,nineteen3 ,labor and ,leisure #a4 ,the ,origin of the ,opposition4 ,the isolation of aims and values which we have been considering leads to opposition between them4 ,probably the most deep-seated antithesis which has shown itself in educational history is that between education in preparation for useful labor and education for a life of leisure4 ,the bare terms useful labor and leisure confirm the statement already made that the segregation and conflict of values are not self-inclosed1 but reflect a division within social life4 ,were the two functions of gaining a livelihood by work and enjoying in a cultivated way the opportunities of leisure1 distributed equally among the different members of a community1 it would not occur to any one that there was any conflict of educational agencies and aims involved4 ,it would be self-evident that the question was how education could contribute most effectively to both4 ,and while it might be found that some materials of instruction chiefly accomplished one result and other subject matter the other1 it would be evident that care must be taken to secure as much overlapping as conditions permit2 that is1 the education which had leisure more directly in view should indirectly reinforce as much as possible the efficiency and the enjoyment of work1 while that aiming at the latter should produce habits of emotion and intellect which would procure a worthy cultivation of leisure4 ,these general considerations are amply borne out by the historical development of educational philosophy4 ,the separation of liberal education from professional and industrial education goes back to the time of the ,greeks1 and was formulated expressly on the basis of a division of classes into those who had to labor for a living and those who were relieved from this necessity4 ,the conception that liberal education1 adapted to men in the latter class1 is intrinsically higher than the servile training given to the latter class reflected the fact that one class was free and the other servile in its social status4 ,the latter class labored not only for its own subsistence1 but also for the means which enabled the superior class to live without personally engaging in occupations taking almost all the time and not of a nature to engage or reward intelligence4 ,that a certain amount of labor must be engaged in goes without saying4 ,human beings have to live and it requires work to supply the resources of life4 ,even if we insist that the interests connected with getting a living are only material and hence intrinsically lower than those connected with enjoyment of time released from labor1 and even if it were admitted that there is something engrossing and insubordinate in material interests which leads them to strive to usurp the place belonging to the higher ideal interests1 this would not--barring the fact of socially divided classes--lead to neglect of the kind of education which trains men for the useful pursuits4 ,it would rather lead to scrupulous care for them1 so that men were trained to be efficient in them and yet to keep them in their place2 education would see to it that we avoided the evil results which flow from their being allowed to flourish in obscure purlieus of neglect4 ,only when a division of these interests coincides with a division of an inferior and a superior social class will preparation for useful work be looked down upon with contempt as an unworthy thing3 a fact which prepares one for the conclusion that the rigid identification of work with material interests1 and leisure with ideal interests is itself a social product4 ,the educational formulations of the social situation made over two thousand years ago have been so influential and give such a clear and logical recognition of the implications of the division into laboring and leisure classes1 that they deserve especial note4 ,according to them1 man occupies the highest place in the scheme of animate existence4 ,in part1 he shares the constitution and functions of plants and animals--nutritive1 reproductive1 motor or practical4 ,the distinctively human function is reason existing for the sake of beholding the spectacle of the universe4 ,hence the truly human end is the fullest possible of this distinctive human prerogative4 ,the life of observation1 meditation1 cogitation1 and speculation pursued as an end in itself is the proper life of man4 ,from reason moreover proceeds the proper control of the lower elements of human nature--the appetites and the active1 motor1 impulses4 ,in themselves greedy1 insubordinate1 lovers of excess1 aiming only at their own satiety1 they observe moderation--the law of the mean--and serve desirable ends as they are subjected to the rule of reason4 ,such is the situation as an affair of theoretical psychology and as most adequately stated by ,aristotle4 ,but this state of things is reflected in the constitution of classes of men and hence in the organization of society4 ,only in a comparatively small number is the function of reason capable of operating as a law of life4 ,in the mass of people1 vegetative and animal functions dominate4 ,their energy of intelligence is so feeble and inconstant that it is constantly overpowered by bodily appetite and passion4 ,such persons are not truly ends in themselves1 for only reason constitutes a final end4 ,like plants1 animals and physical tools1 they are means1 appliances1 for the attaining of ends beyond themselves1 although unlike them they have enough intelligence to exercise a certain discretion in the execution of the tasks committed to them4 ,thus by nature1 and not merely by social convention1 there are those who are slaves--that is1 means for the ends of others4 #a ,the great body of artisans are in one important respect worse off than even slaves4 ,like the latter they are given up to the service of ends external to themselves2 but since they do not enjoy the intimate association with the free superior class experienced by domestic slaves they remain on a lower plane of excellence4 ,moreover1 women are classed with slaves and craftsmen as factors among the animate instrumentalities of production and reproduction of the means for a free or rational life4 ,individually and collectively there is a gulf between merely living and living worthily4 ,in order that one may live worthily he must first live1 and so with collective society4 ,the time and energy spent upon mere life1 upon the gaining of subsistence1 detracts from that available for activities that have an inherent rational meaning2 they also unfit for the latter4 ,means are menial1 the serviceable is servile4 ,the true life is possible only in the degree in which the physical necessities are had without effort and without attention4 ,hence slaves1 artisans1 and women are employed in furnishing the means of subsistence in order that others1 those adequately equipped with intelligence1 may live the life of leisurely concern with things intrinsically worth while4 ,to these two modes of occupation1 with their distinction of servile and free activities 7or arts7 correspond two types of education3 the base or mechanical and the liberal or intellectual4 ,some persons are trained by suitable practical exercises for capacity in doing things1 for ability to use the mechanical tools involved in turning out physical commodities and rendering personal service4 ,this training is a mere matter of habituation and technical skill2 it operates through repetition and assiduity in application1 not through awakening and nurturing thought4 ,liberal education aims to train intelligence for its proper office3 to know4 ,the less this knowledge has to do with practical affairs1 with making or producing1 the more adequately it engages intelligence4 ,so consistently does ,aristotle draw the line between menial and liberal education that he puts what are now called the fine arts1 music1 painting1 sculpture1 in the same class with menial arts so far as their practice is concerned4 ,they involve physical agencies1 assiduity of practice1 and external results4 ,in discussing1 for example1 education in music he raises the question how far the young should be practiced in the playing of instruments4 ,his answer is that such practice and proficiency may be tolerated as conduce to appreciation2 that is1 to understanding and enjoyment of music when played by slaves or professionals4 ,when professional power is aimed at1 music sinks from the liberal to the professional level4 ,one might then as well teach cooking1 says ,aristotle4 ,even a liberal concern with the works of fine art depends upon the existence of a hireling class of practitioners who have subordinated the development of their own personality to attaining skill in mechanical execution4 ,the higher the activity the more purely mental is it2 the less does it have to do with physical things or with the body4 ,the more purely mental it is1 the more independent or self-sufficing is it4 ,these last words remind us that ,aristotle again makes a distinction of superior and inferior even within those living the life of reason4 ,for there is a distinction in ends and in free action1 according as one's life is merely accompanied by reason or as it makes reason its own medium4 ,that is to say1 the free citizen who devotes himself to the public life of his community1 sharing in the management of its affairs and winning personal honor and distinction1 lives a life accompanied by reason4 ,but the thinker1 the man who devotes himself to scientific inquiry and philosophic speculation1 works1 so to speak1 in reason1 not simply by 994 ,even the activity of the citizen in his civic relations1 in other words1 retains some of the taint of practice1 of external or merely instrumental doing4 ,this infection is shown by the fact that civic activity and civic excellence need the help of others2 one cannot engage in public life all by himself4 ,but all needs1 all desires imply1 in the philosophy of ,aristotle1 a material factor2 they involve lack1 privation2 they are dependent upon something beyond themselves for completion4 ,a purely intellectual life1 however1 one carries on by himself1 in himself2 such assistance as he may derive from others is accidental1 rather than intrinsic4 ,in knowing1 in the life of theory1 reason finds its own full manifestation2 knowing for the sake of knowing irrespective of any application is alone independent1 or self-sufficing4 ,hence only the education that makes for power to know as an end in itself1 without reference to the practice of even civic duties1 is truly liberal or free4 #b4 ,the ,present ,situation4 ,if the ,aristotelian conception represented just ,aristotle's personal view1 it would be a more or less interesting historical curiosity4 ,it could be dismissed as an illustration of the lack of sympathy or the amount of academic pedantry which may coexist with extraordinary intellectual gifts4 ,but ,aristotle simply described without confusion and without that insincerity always attendant upon mental confusion1 the life that was before him4 ,that the actual social situation has greatly changed since his day there is no need to say4 ,but in spite of these changes1 in spite of the abolition of legal serfdom1 and the spread of democracy1 with the extension of science and of general education 7in books1 newspapers1 travel1 and general intercourse as well as in schools71 there remains enough of a cleavage of society into a learned and an unlearned class1 a leisure and a laboring class1 to make his point of view a most enlightening one from which to criticize the separation between culture and utility in present education4 ,behind the intellectual and abstract distinction as it figures in pedagogical discussion1 there looms a social distinction between those whose pursuits involve a minimum of self-directive thought and aesthetic appreciation1 and those who are concerned more directly with things of the intelligence and with the control of the activities of others4 ,aristotle was certainly permanently right when he said that any occupation or art or study deserves to be called mechanical if it renders the body or soul or intellect of free persons unfit for the exercise and practice of excellence4 ,the force of the statement is almost infinitely increased when we hold1 as we nominally do at present1 that all persons1 instead of a comparatively few1 are free4 ,for when the mass of men and all women were regarded as unfree by the very nature of their bodies and minds1 there was neither intellectual confusion nor moral hypocrisy in giving them only the training which fitted them for mechanical skill1 irrespective of its ulterior effect upon their capacity to share in a worthy life4 ,he was permanently right also when he went on to say that all mercenary employments as well as those which degrade the condition of the body are mechanical1 since they deprive the intellect of leisure and dignity1--permanently right1 that is1 if gainful pursuits as matter of fact deprive the intellect of the conditions of its exercise and so of its dignity4 ,if his statements are false1 it is because they identify a phase of social custom with a natural necessity4 ,but a different view of the relations of mind and matter1 mind and body1 intelligence and social service1 is better than ,aristotle's conception only if it helps render the old idea obsolete in fact--in the actual conduct of life and education4 ,aristotle was permanently right in assuming the inferiority and subordination of mere skill in performance and mere accumulation of external products to understanding1 sympathy of appreciation1 and the free play of ideas4 ,if there was an error1 it lay in assuming the necessary separation of the two3 in supposing that there is a natural divorce between efficiency in producing commodities and rendering service1 and self-directive thought2 between significant knowledge and practical achievement4 ,we hardly better matters if we just correct his theoretical misapprehension1 and tolerate the social state of affairs which generated and sanctioned his conception4 ,we lose rather than gain in change from serfdom to free citizenship if the most prized result of the change is simply an increase in the mechanical efficiency of the human tools of production4 ,so we lose rather than gain in coming to think of intelligence as an organ of control of nature through action1 if we are content that an unintelligent1 unfree state persists in those who engage directly in turning nature to use1 and leave the intelligence which controls to be the exclusive possession of remote scientists and captains of industry4 ,we are in a position honestly to criticize the division of life into separate functions and of society into separate classes only so far as we are free from responsibility for perpetuating the educational practices which train the many for pursuits involving mere skill in production1 and the few for a knowledge that is an ornament and a cultural embellishment4 ,in short1 ability to transcend the ,greek philosophy of life and education is not secured by a mere shifting about of the theoretical symbols meaning free1 rational1 and worthy4 ,it is not secured by a change of sentiment regarding the dignity of labor1 and the superiority of a life of service to that of an aloof self-sufficing independence4 ,important as these theoretical and emotional changes are1 their importance consists in their being turned to account in the development of a truly democratic society1 a society in which all share in useful service and all enjoy a worthy leisure4 ,it is not a mere change in the concepts of culture--or a liberal mind--and social service which requires an educational reorganization2 but the educational transformation is needed to give full and explicit effect to the changes implied in social life4 ,the increased political and economic emancipation of the masses has shown itself in education2 it has effected the development of a common school system of education1 public and free4 ,it has destroyed the idea that learning is properly a monopoly of the few who are predestined by nature to govern social affairs4 ,but the revolution is still incomplete4 ,the idea still prevails that a truly cultural or liberal education cannot have anything in common1 directly at least1 with industrial affairs1 and that the education which is fit for the masses must be a useful or practical education in a sense which opposes useful and practical to nurture of appreciation and liberation of thought4 ,as a consequence1 our actual system is an inconsistent mixture4 ,certain studies and methods are retained on the supposition that they have the sanction of peculiar liberality1 the chief content of the term liberal being uselessness for practical ends4 ,this aspect is chiefly visible in what is termed the higher education--that of the college and of preparation for it4 ,but it has filtered through into elementary education and largely controls its processes and aims4 ,but1 on the other hand1 certain concessions have been made to the masses who must engage in getting a livelihood and to the increased role of economic activities in modern life4 ,these concessions are exhibited in special schools and courses for the professions1 for engineering1 for manual training and commerce1 in vocational and prevocational courses2 and in the spirit in which certain elementary subjects1 like the three ,r's1 are taught4 ,the result is a system in which both cultural and utilitarian subjects exist in an inorganic composite where the former are not by dominant purpose socially serviceable and the latter not liberative of imagination or thinking power4 ,in the inherited situation1 there is a curious intermingling1 in even the same study1 of concession to usefulness and a survival of traits once exclusively attributed to preparation for leisure4 ,the utility element is found in the motives assigned for the study1 the liberal element in methods of teaching4 ,the outcome of the mixture is perhaps less satisfactory than if either principle were adhered to in its purity4 ,the motive popularly assigned for making the studies of the first four or five years consist almost entirely of reading1 spelling1 writing1 and arithmetic1 is1 for example1 that ability to read1 write1 and figure accurately is indispensable to getting ahead4 ,these studies are treated as mere instruments for entering upon a gainful employment or of later progress in the pursuit of learning1 according as pupils do not or do remain in school4 ,this attitude is reflected in the emphasis put upon drill and practice for the sake of gaining automatic skill4 ,if we turn to ,greek schooling1 we find that from the earliest years the acquisition of skill was subordinated as much as possible to acquisition of literary content possessed of aesthetic and moral significance4 ,not getting a tool for subsequent use but present subject matter was the emphasized thing4 ,nevertheless the isolation of these studies from practical application1 their reduction to purely symbolic devices1 represents a survival of the idea of a liberal training divorced from utility4 ,a thorough adoption of the idea of utility would have led to instruction which tied up the studies to situations in which they were directly needed and where they were rendered immediately and not remotely helpful4 ,it would be hard to find a subject in the curriculum within which there are not found evil results of a compromise between the two opposed ideals4 ,natural science is recommended on the ground of its practical utility1 but is taught as a special accomplishment in removal from application4 ,on the other hand1 music and literature are theoretically justified on the ground of their culture value and are then taught with chief emphasis upon forming technical modes of skill4 ,if we had less compromise and resulting confusion1 if we analyzed more carefully the respective meanings of culture and utility1 we might find it easier to construct a course of study which should be useful and liberal at the same time4 ,only superstition makes us believe that the two are necessarily hostile so that a subject is illiberal because it is useful and cultural because it is useless4 ,it will generally be found that instruction which1 in aiming at utilitarian results1 sacrifices the development of imagination1 the refining of taste and the deepening of intellectual insight--surely cultural values--also in the same degree renders what is learned limited in its use4 ,not that it makes it wholly unavailable but that its applicability is restricted to routine activities carried on under the supervision of others4 ,narrow modes of skill cannot be made useful beyond themselves2 any mode of skill which is achieved with deepening of knowledge and perfecting of judgment is readily put to use in new situations and is under personal control4 ,it was not the bare fact of social and economic utility which made certain activities seem servile to the ,greeks but the fact that the activities directly connected with getting a livelihood were not1 in their days1 the expression of a trained intelligence nor carried on because of a personal appreciation of their meaning4 ,so far as farming and the trades were rule-of-thumb occupations and so far as they were engaged in for results external to the minds of agricultural laborers and mechanics1 they were illiberal--but only so far4 ,the intellectual and social context has now changed4 ,the elements in industry due to mere custom and routine have become subordinate in most economic callings to elements derived from scientific inquiry4 ,the most important occupations of today represent and depend upon applied mathematics1 physics1 and chemistry4 ,the area of the human world influenced by economic production and influencing consumption has been so indefinitely widened that geographical and political considerations of an almost infinitely wide scope enter in4 ,it was natural for ,plato to deprecate the learning of geometry and arithmetic for practical ends1 because as matter of fact the practical uses to which they were put were few1 lacking in content and mostly mercenary in quality4 ,but as their social uses have increased and enlarged1 their liberalizing or intellectual value and their practical value approach the same limit4 ,doubtless the factor which chiefly prevents our full recognition and employment of this identification is the conditions under which so much work is still carried on4 ,the invention of machines has extended the amount of leisure which is possible even while one is at work4 ,it is a commonplace that the mastery of skill in the form of established habits frees the mind for a higher order of thinking4 ,something of the same kind is true of the introduction of mechanically automatic operations in industry4 ,they may release the mind for thought upon other topics4 ,but when we confine the education of those who work with their hands to a few years of schooling devoted for the most part to acquiring the use of rudimentary symbols at the expense of training in science1 literature1 and history1 we fail to prepare the minds of workers to take advantage of this opportunity4 ,more fundamental is the fact that the great majority of workers have no insight into the social aims of their pursuits and no direct personal interest in them4 ,the results actually achieved are not the ends of their actions1 but only of their employers4 ,they do what they do1 not freely and intelligently1 but for the sake of the wage earned4 ,it is this fact which makes the action illiberal1 and which will make any education designed simply to give skill in such undertakings illiberal and immoral4 ,the activity is not free because not freely participated in4 ,nevertheless1 there is already an opportunity for an education which1 keeping in mind the larger features of work1 will reconcile liberal nurture with training in social serviceableness1 with ability to share efficiently and happily in occupations which are productive4 ,and such an education will of itself tend to do away with the evils of the existing economic situation4 ,in the degree in which men have an active concern in the ends that control their activity1 their activity becomes free or voluntary and loses its externally enforced and servile quality1 even though the physical aspect of behavior remain the same4 ,in what is termed politics1 democratic social organization makes provision for this direct participation in control3 in the economic region1 control remains external and autocratic4 ,hence the split between inner mental action and outer physical action of which the traditional distinction between the liberal and the utilitarian is the reflex4 ,an education which should unify the disposition of the members of society would do much to unify society itself4 ,summary4 ,of the segregations of educational values discussed in the last chapter1 that between culture and utility is probably the most fundamental4 ,while the distinction is often thought to be intrinsic and absolute1 it is really historical and social4 ,it originated1 so far as conscious formulation is concerned1 in ,greece1 and was based upon the fact that the truly human life was lived only by a few who subsisted upon the results of the labor of others4 ,this fact affected the psychological doctrine of the relation of intelligence and desire1 theory and practice4 ,it was embodied in a political theory of a permanent division of human beings into those capable of a life of reason and hence having their own ends1 and those capable only of desire and work1 and needing to have their ends provided by others4 ,the two distinctions1 psychological and political1 translated into educational terms1 effected a division between a liberal education1 having to do with the self-sufficing life of leisure devoted to knowing for its own sake1 and a useful1 practical training for mechanical occupations1 devoid of intellectual and aesthetic content4 ,while the present situation is radically diverse in theory and much changed in fact1 the factors of the older historic situation still persist sufficiently to maintain the educational distinction1 along with compromises which often reduce the efficacy of the educational measures4 ,the problem of education in a democratic society is to do away with the dualism and to construct a course of studies which makes thought a guide of free practice for all and which makes leisure a reward of accepting responsibility for service1 rather than a state of exemption from it4 #a ,aristotle does not hold that the class of actual slaves and of natural slaves necessarily coincide4 ,chapter ,twenty3 ,intellectual and ,practical ,studies #a4 ,the ,opposition of ,experience and ,true ,knowledge4 ,as livelihood and leisure are opposed1 so are theory and practice1 intelligence and execution1 knowledge and activity4 ,the latter set of oppositions doubtless springs from the same social conditions which produce the former conflict2 but certain definite problems of education connected with them make it desirable to discuss explicitly the matter of the relationship and alleged separation of knowing and doing4 ,the notion that knowledge is derived from a higher source than is practical activity1 and possesses a higher and more spiritual worth1 has a long history4 ,the history so far as conscious statement is concerned takes us back to the conceptions of experience and of reason formulated by ,plato and ,aristotle4 ,much as these thinkers differed in many respects1 they agreed in identifying experience with purely practical concerns2 and hence with material interests as to its purpose and with the body as to its organ4 ,knowledge1 on the other hand1 existed for its own sake free from practical reference1 and found its source and organ in a purely immaterial mind2 it had to do with spiritual or ideal interests4 ,again1 experience always involved lack1 need1 desire2 it was never self-sufficing4 ,rational knowing on the other hand1 was complete and comprehensive within itself4 ,hence the practical life was in a condition of perpetual flux1 while intellectual knowledge concerned eternal truth4 ,this sharp antithesis is connected with the fact that ,athenian philosophy began as a criticism of custom and tradition as standards of knowledge and conduct4 ,in a search for something to replace them1 it hit upon reason as the only adequate guide of belief and activity4 ,since custom and tradition were identified with experience1 it followed at once that reason was superior to experience4 ,moreover1 experience1 not content with its proper position of subordination1 was the great foe to the acknowledgment of the authority of reason4 ,since custom and traditionary beliefs held men in bondage1 the struggle of reason for its legitimate supremacy could be won only by showing the inherently unstable and inadequate nature of experience4 ,the statement of ,plato that philosophers should be kings may best be understood as a statement that rational intelligence and not habit1 appetite1 impulse1 and emotion should regulate human affairs4 ,the former secures unity1 order1 and law2 the latter signify multiplicity and discord1 irrational fluctuations from one estate to another4 ,the grounds for the identification of experience with the unsatisfactory condition of things1 the state of affairs represented by rule of mere custom1 are not far to seek4 ,increasing trade and travel1 colonizations1 migrations and wars1 had broadened the intellectual horizon4 ,the customs and beliefs of different communities were found to diverge sharply from one another4 ,civil disturbance had become a custom in ,athens2 the fortunes of the city seemed given over to strife of factions4 ,the increase of leisure coinciding with the broadening of the horizon had brought into ken many new facts of nature and had stimulated curiosity and speculation4 ,the situation tended to raise the question as to the existence of anything constant and universal in the realm of nature and society4 ,reason was the faculty by which the universal principle and essence is apprehended2 while the senses were the organs of perceiving change1--the unstable and the diverse as against the permanent and uniform4 ,the results of the work of the senses1 preserved in memory and imagination1 and applied in the skill given by habit1 constituted experience4 ,experience at its best is thus represented in the various handicrafts--the arts of peace and war4 ,the cobbler1 the flute player1 the soldier1 have undergone the discipline of experience to acquire the skill they have4 ,this means that the bodily organs1 particularly the senses1 have had repeated contact with things and that the result of these contacts has been preserved and consolidated till ability in foresight and in practice had been secured4 ,such was the essential meaning of the term empirical4 ,it suggested a knowledge and an ability not based upon insight into principles1 but expressing the result of a large number of separate trials4 ,it expressed the idea now conveyed by method of trial and error1 with especial emphasis upon the more or less accidental character of the trials4 ,so far as ability of control1 of management1 was concerned1 it amounted to rule-of-thumb procedure1 to routine4 ,if new circumstances resembled the past1 it might work well enough2 in the degree in which they deviated1 failure was likely4 ,even to-day to speak of a physician as an empiricist is to imply that he lacks scientific training1 and that he is proceeding simply on the basis of what he happens to have got out of the chance medley of his past practice4 ,just because of the lack of science or reason in experience it is hard to keep it at its poor best4 ,the empiric easily degenerates into the quack4 ,he does not know where his knowledge begins or leaves off1 and so when he gets beyond routine conditions he begins to pretend--to make claims for which there is no justification1 and to trust to luck and to ability to impose upon others--to bluff4 ,moreover1 he assumes that because he has learned one thing1 he knows others--as the history of ,athens showed that the common craftsmen thought they could manage household affairs1 education1 and politics1 because they had learned to do the specific things of their trades4 ,experience is always hovering1 then1 on the edge of pretense1 of sham1 of seeming1 and appearance1 in distinction from the reality upon which reason lays hold4 ,the philosophers soon reached certain generalizations from this state of affairs4 ,the senses are connected with the appetites1 with wants and desires4 ,they lay hold not on the reality of things but on the relation which things have to our pleasures and pains1 to the satisfaction of wants and the welfare of the body4 ,they are important only for the life of the body1 which is but a fixed substratum for a higher life4 ,experience thus has a definitely material character2 it has to do with physical things in relation to the body4 ,in contrast1 reason1 or science1 lays hold of the immaterial1 the ideal1 the spiritual4 ,there is something morally dangerous about experience1 as such words as sensual1 carnal1 material1 worldly1 interests suggest2 while pure reason and spirit connote something morally praiseworthy4 ,moreover1 ineradicable connection with the changing1 the inexplicably shifting1 and with the manifold1 the diverse1 clings to experience4 ,its material is inherently variable and untrustworthy4 ,it is anarchic1 because unstable4 ,the man who trusts to experience does not know what he depends upon1 since it changes from person to person1 from day to day1 to say nothing of from country to country4 ,its connection with the many1 with various particulars1 has the same effect1 and also carries conflict in its train4 ,only the single1 the uniform1 assures coherence and harmony4 ,out of experience come warrings1 the conflict of opinions and acts within the individual and between individuals4 ,from experience no standard of belief can issue1 because it is the very nature of experience to instigate all kinds of contrary beliefs1 as varieties of local custom proved4 ,its logical outcome is that anything is good and true to the particular individual which his experience leads him to believe true and good at a particular time and place4 ,finally practice falls of necessity within experience4 ,doing proceeds from needs and aims at change4 ,to produce or to make is to alter something2 to consume is to alter4 ,all the obnoxious characters of change and diversity thus attach themselves to doing while knowing is as permanent as its object4 ,to know1 to grasp a thing intellectually or theoretically1 is to be out of the region of vicissitude1 chance1 and diversity4 ,truth has no lack2 it is untouched by the perturbations of the world of sense4 ,it deals with the eternal and the universal4 ,and the world of experience can be brought under control1 can be steadied and ordered1 only through subjection to its law of reason4 ,it would not do1 of course1 to say that all these distinctions persisted in full technical definiteness4 ,but they all of them profoundly influenced men's subsequent thinking and their ideas about education4 ,the contempt for physical as compared with mathematical and logical science1 for the senses and sense observation2 the feeling that knowledge is high and worthy in the degree in which it deals with ideal symbols instead of with the concrete2 the scorn of particulars except as they are deductively brought under a universal2 the disregard for the body2 the depreciation of arts and crafts as intellectual instrumentalities1 all sought shelter and found sanction under this estimate of the respective values of experience and reason--or1 what came to the same thing1 of the practical and the intellectual4 ,medieval philosophy continued and reinforced the tradition4 ,to know reality meant to be in relation to the supreme reality1 or ,god1 and to enjoy the eternal bliss of that relation4 ,contemplation of supreme reality was the ultimate end of man to which action is subordinate4 ,experience had to do with mundane1 profane1 and secular affairs1 practically necessary indeed1 but of little import in comparison with supernatural objects of knowledge4 ,when we add to this motive the force derived from the literary character of the ,roman education and the ,greek philosophic tradition1 and conjoin to them the preference for studies which obviously demarcated the aristocratic class from the lower classes1 we can readily understand the tremendous power exercised by the persistent preference of the intellectual over the practical not simply in educational philosophies but in the higher schools4 #b4 ,the ,modern ,theory of ,experience and ,knowledge4 ,as we shall see later1 the development of experimentation as a method of knowledge makes possible and necessitates a radical transformation of the view just set forth4 ,but before coming to that1 we have to note the theory of experience and knowledge developed in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries4 ,in general1 it presents us with an almost complete reversal of the classic doctrine of the relations of experience and reason4 ,to ,plato experience meant habituation1 or the conservation of the net product of a lot of past chance trials4 ,reason meant the principle of reform1 of progress1 of increase of control4 ,devotion to the cause of reason meant breaking through the limitations of custom and getting at things as they really were4 ,to the modern reformers1 the situation was the other way around4 ,reason1 universal principles1 a priori notions1 meant either blank forms which had to be filled in by experience1 by sense observations1 in order to get significance and validity2 or else were mere indurated prejudices1 dogmas imposed by authority1 which masqueraded and found protection under august names4 ,the great need was to break way from captivity to conceptions which1 as ,bacon put it1 anticipated nature and imposed merely human opinions upon her1 and to resort to experience to find out what nature was like4 ,appeal to experience marked the breach with authority4 ,it meant openness to new impressions2 eagerness in discovery and invention instead of absorption in tabulating and systematizing received ideas and proving them by means of the relations they sustained to one another4 ,it was the irruption into the mind of the things as they really were1 free from the veil cast over them by preconceived ideas4 ,the change was twofold4 ,experience lost the practical meaning which it had borne from the time of ,plato4 ,it ceased to mean ways of doing and being done to1 and became a name for something intellectual and cognitive4 ,it meant the apprehension of material which should ballast and check the exercise of reasoning4 ,by the modern philosophic empiricist and by his opponent1 experience has been looked upon just as a way of knowing4 ,the only question was how good a way it is4 ,the result was an even greater intellectualism than is found in ancient philosophy1 if that word be used to designate an emphatic and almost exclusive interest in knowledge in its isolation4 ,practice was not so much subordinated to knowledge as treated as a kind of tag-end or aftermath of knowledge4 ,the educational result was only to confirm the exclusion of active pursuits from the school1 save as they might be brought in for purely utilitarian ends--the acquisition by drill of certain habits4 ,in the second place1 the interest in experience as a means of basing truth upon objects1 upon nature1 led to looking at the mind as purely receptive4 ,the more passive the mind is1 the more truly objects will impress themselves upon it4 ,for the mind to take a hand1 so to speak1 would be for it in the very process of knowing to vitiate true knowledge--to defeat its own purpose4 ,the ideal was a maximum of receptivity4 ,since the impressions made upon the mind by objects were generally termed sensations1 empiricism thus became a doctrine of sensationalism--that is to say1 a doctrine which identified knowledge with the reception and association of sensory impressions4 ,in ,john ,locke1 the most influential of the empiricists1 we find this sensationalism mitigated by a recognition of certain mental faculties1 like discernment or discrimination1 comparison1 abstraction1 and generalization which work up the material of sense into definite and organized forms and which even evolve new ideas on their own account1 such as the fundamental conceptions of morals and mathematics4 7,see ante1 p4 #fa47 ,but some of his successors1 especially in ,france in the latter part of the eighteenth century1 carried his doctrine to the limit2 they regarded discernment and judgment as peculiar sensations made in us by the conjoint presence of other sensations4 ,locke had held that the mind is a blank piece of paper1 or a wax tablet with nothing engraved on it at birth 7a tabula rasa7 so far as any contents of ideas were concerned1 but had endowed it with activities to be exercised upon the material received4 ,his ,french successors razed away the powers and derived them also from impressions received4 ,as we have earlier noted1 this notion was fostered by the new interest in education as method of social reform4 7,see ante1 p4 #ic47 ,the emptier the mind to begin with1 the more it may be made anything we wish by bringing the right influences to bear upon it4 ,thus ,helvetius1 perhaps the most extreme and consistent sensationalist1 proclaimed that education could do anything--that it was omnipotent4 ,within the sphere of school instruction1 empiricism found its directly beneficial office in protesting against mere book learning4 ,if knowledge comes from the impressions made upon us by natural objects1 it is impossible to procure knowledge without the use of objects which impress the mind4 ,words1 all kinds of linguistic symbols1 in the lack of prior presentations of objects with which they may be associated1 convey nothing but sensations of their own shape and color--certainly not a very instructive kind of knowledge4 ,sensationalism was an extremely handy weapon with which to combat doctrines and opinions resting wholly upon tradition and authority4 ,with respect to all of them1 it set up a test3 ,where are the real objects from which these ideas and beliefs are received8 ,if such objects could not be produced1 ideas were explained as the result of false associations and combinations4 ,empiricism also insisted upon a first-hand element4 ,the impression must be made upon me1 upon my mind4 ,the further we get away from this direct1 first-hand source of knowledge1 the more numerous the sources of error1 and the vaguer the resulting idea4 ,as might be expected1 however1 the philosophy was weak upon the positive side4 ,of course1 the value of natural objects and firsthand acquaintance was not dependent upon the truth of the theory4 ,introduced into the schools they would do their work1 even if the sensational theory about the way in which they did it was quite wrong4 ,so far1 there is nothing to complain of4 ,but the emphasis upon sensationalism also operated to influence the way in which natural objects were employed1 and to prevent full good being got from them4 ,object lessons tended to isolate the mere sense-activity and make it an end in itself4 ,the more isolated the object1 the more isolated the sensory quality1 the more distinct the sense-impression as a unit of knowledge4 ,the theory worked not only in the direction of this mechanical isolation1 which tended to reduce instruction to a kind of physical gymnastic of the sense-organs 7good like any gymnastic of bodily organs1 but not more so71 but also to the neglect of thinking4 ,according to the theory there was no need of thinking in connection with sense-observation2 in fact1 in strict theory such thinking would be impossible till afterwards1 for thinking consisted simply in combining and separating sensory units which had been received without any participation of judgment4 ,as a matter of fact1 accordingly1 practically no scheme of education upon a purely sensory basis has ever been systematically tried1 at least after the early years of infancy4 ,its obvious deficiencies have caused it to be resorted to simply for filling in rationalistic knowledge 7that is to say1 knowledge of definitions1 rules1 classifications1 and modes of application conveyed through symbols71 and as a device for lending greater interest to barren symbols4 ,there are at least three serious defects of sensationalistic empiricism as an educational philosophy of knowledge4 7a7 the historical value of the theory was critical2 it was a dissolvent of current beliefs about the world and political institutions4 ,it was a destructive organ of criticism of hard and fast dogmas4 ,but the work of education is constructive1 not critical4 ,it assumes not old beliefs to be eliminated and revised1 but the need of building up new experience into intellectual habitudes as correct as possible from the start4 ,sensationalism is highly unfitted for this constructive task4 ,mind1 understanding1 denotes responsiveness to meanings 7ante1 p4 #bi71 not response to direct physical stimuli4 ,and meaning exists only with reference to a context1 which is excluded by any scheme which identifies knowledge with a combination of sense-impressions4 ,the theory1 so far as educationally applied1 led either to a magnification of mere physical excitations or else to a mere heaping up of isolated objects and qualities4 7b7 ,while direct impression has the advantage of being first hand1 it also has the disadvantage of being limited in range4 ,direct acquaintance with the natural surroundings of the home environment so as to give reality to ideas about portions of the earth beyond the reach of the senses1 and as a means of arousing intellectual curiosity1 is one thing4 ,as an end-all and be-all of geographical knowledge it is fatally restricted4 ,in precisely analogous fashion1 beans1 shoe pegs1 and counters may be helpful aids to a realization of numerical relations1 but when employed except as aids to thought--the apprehension of meaning--they become an obstacle to the growth of arithmetical understanding4 ,they arrest growth on a low plane1 the plane of specific physical symbols4 ,just as the race developed especial symbols as tools of calculation and mathematical reasonings1 because the use of the fingers as numerical symbols got in the way1 so the individual must progress from concrete to abstract symbols--that is1 symbols whose meaning is realized only through conceptual thinking4 ,and undue absorption at the outset in the physical object of sense hampers this growth4 7c7 ,a thoroughly false psychology of mental development underlay sensationalistic empiricism4 ,experience is in truth a matter of activities1 instinctive and impulsive1 in their interactions with things4 ,what even an infant experiences is not a passively received quality impressed by an object1 but the effect which some activity of handling1 throwing1 pounding1 tearing1 etc41 has upon an object1 and the consequent effect of the object upon the direction of activities4 7,see ante1 p4 #adj47 ,fundamentally 7as we shall see in more detail71 the ancient notion of experience as a practical matter is truer to fact that the modern notion of it as a mode of knowing by means of sensations4 ,the neglect of the deep-seated active and motor factors of experience is a fatal defect of the traditional empirical philosophy4 ,nothing is more uninteresting and mechanical than a scheme of object lessons which ignores and as far as may be excludes the natural tendency to learn about the qualities of objects by the uses to which they are put through trying to do something with them4 ,it is obvious1 accordingly1 that even if the philosophy of experience represented by modern empiricism had received more general theoretical assent than has been accorded to it1 it could not have furnished a satisfactory philosophy of the learning process4 ,its educational influence was confined to injecting a new factor into the older curriculum1 with incidental modifications of the older studies and methods4 ,it introduced greater regard for observation of things directly and through pictures and graphic descriptions1 and it reduced the importance attached to verbal symbolization4 ,but its own scope was so meager that it required supplementation by information concerning matters outside of sense-perception and by matters which appealed more directly to thought4 ,consequently it left unimpaired the scope of informational and abstract1 or rationalistic studies4 #c4 ,experience as ,experimentation4 ,it has already been intimated that sensational empiricism represents neither the idea of experience justified by modern psychology nor the idea of knowledge suggested by modern scientific procedure4 ,with respect to the former1 it omits the primary position of active response which puts things to use and which learns about them through discovering the consequences that result from use4 ,it would seem as if five minutes' unprejudiced observation of the way an infant gains knowledge would have sufficed to overthrow the notion that he is passively engaged in receiving impressions of isolated ready-made qualities of sound1 color1 hardness1 etc4 ,for it would be seen that the infant reacts to stimuli by activities of handling1 reaching1 etc41 in order to see what results follow upon motor response to a sensory stimulation2 it would be seen that what is learned are not isolated qualities1 but the behavior which may be expected from a thing1 and the changes in things and persons which an activity may be expected to produce4 ,in other words1 what he learns are connections4 ,even such qualities as red color1 sound of a high pitch1 have to be discriminated and identified on the basis of the activities they call forth and the consequences these activities effect4 ,we learn what things are hard and what are soft by finding out through active experimentation what they respectively will do and what can be done and what cannot be done with them4 ,in like fashion1 children learn about persons by finding out what responsive activities these persons exact and what these persons will do in reply to the children's activities4 ,and the combination of what things do to us 7not in impressing qualities on a passive mind7 in modifying our actions1 furthering some of them and resisting and checking others1 and what we can do to them in producing new changes constitutes experience4 ,the methods of science by which the revolution in our knowledge of the world dating from the seventeenth century1 was brought about1 teach the same lesson4 ,for these methods are nothing but experimentation carried out under conditions of deliberate control4 ,to the ,greek1 it seemed absurd that such an activity as1 say1 the cobbler punching holes in leather1 or using wax and needle and thread1 could give an adequate knowledge of the world4 ,it seemed almost axiomatic that for true knowledge we must have recourse to concepts coming from a reason above experience4 ,but the introduction of the experimental method signified precisely that such operations1 carried on under conditions of control1 are just the ways in which fruitful ideas about nature are obtained and tested4 ,in other words1 it is only needed to conduct such an operation as the pouring of an acid on a metal for the purpose of getting knowledge instead of for the purpose of getting a trade result1 in order to lay hold of the principle upon which the science of nature was henceforth to depend4 ,sense perceptions were indeed indispensable1 but there was less reliance upon sense perceptions in their natural or customary form than in the older science4 ,they were no longer regarded as containing within themselves some form or species of universal kind in a disguised mask of sense which could be stripped off by rational thought4 ,on the contrary1 the first thing was to alter and extend the data of sense perception3 to act upon the given objects of sense by the lens of the telescope and microscope1 and by all sorts of experimental devices4 ,to accomplish this in a way which would arouse new ideas 7hypotheses1 theories7 required even more general ideas 7like those of mathematics7 than were at the command of ancient science4 ,but these general conceptions were no longer taken to give knowledge in themselves4 ,they were implements for instituting1 conducting1 interpreting experimental inquiries and formulating their results4 ,the logical outcome is a new philosophy of experience and knowledge1 a philosophy which no longer puts experience in opposition to rational knowledge and explanation4 ,experience is no longer a mere summarizing of what has been done in a more or less chance way in the past2 it is a deliberate control of what is done with reference to making what happens to us and what we do to things as fertile as possible of suggestions 7of suggested meanings7 and a means for trying out the validity of the suggestions4 ,when trying1 or experimenting1 ceases to be blinded by impulse or custom1 when it is guided by an aim and conducted by measure and method1 it becomes reasonable--rational4 ,when what we suffer from things1 what we undergo at their hands1 ceases to be a matter of chance circumstance1 when it is transformed into a consequence of our own prior purposive endeavors1 it becomes rationally significant--enlightening and instructive4 ,the antithesis of empiricism and rationalism loses the support of the human situation which once gave it meaning and relative justification4 ,the bearing of this change upon the opposition of purely practical and purely intellectual studies is self-evident4 ,the distinction is not intrinsic but is dependent upon conditions1 and upon conditions which can be regulated4 ,practical activities may be intellectually narrow and trivial2 they will be so in so far as they are routine1 carried on under the dictates of authority1 and having in view merely some external result4 ,but childhood and youth1 the period of schooling1 is just the time when it is possible to carry them on in a different spirit4 ,it is inexpedient to repeat the discussions of our previous chapters on thinking and on the evolution of educative subject matter from childlike work and play to logically organized subject matter4 ,the discussions of this chapter and the prior one should1 however1 give an added meaning to those results4 7i7 ,experience itself primarily consists of the active relations subsisting between a human being and his natural and social surroundings4 ,in some cases1 the initiative in activity is on the side of the environment2 the human being undergoes or suffers certain checkings and deflections of endeavors4 ,in other cases1 the behavior of surrounding things and persons carries to a successful issue the active tendencies of the individual1 so that in the end what the individual undergoes are consequences which he has himself tried to produce4 ,in just the degree in which connections are established between what happens to a person and what he does in response1 and between what he does to his environment and what it does in response to him1 his acts and the things about him acquire meaning4 ,he learns to understand both himself and the world of men and things4 ,purposive education or schooling should present such an environment that this interaction will effect acquisition of those meanings which are so important that they become1 in turn1 instruments of further learnings4 7ante1 ,ch4 ,,xi47 ,as has been repeatedly pointed out1 activity out of school is carried on under conditions which have not been deliberately adapted to promoting the function of understanding and formation of effective intellectual dispositions4 ,the results are vital and genuine as far as they go1 but they are limited by all kinds of circumstances4 ,some powers are left quite undeveloped and undirected2 others get only occasional and whimsical stimulations2 others are formed into habits of a routine skill at the expense of aims and resourceful initiative and inventiveness4 ,it is not the business of the school to transport youth from an environment of activity into one of cramped study of the records of other men's learning2 but to transport them from an environment of relatively chance activities 7accidental in the relation they bear to insight and thought7 into one of activities selected with reference to guidance of learning4 ,a slight inspection of the improved methods which have already shown themselves effective in education will reveal that they have laid hold1 more or less consciously1 upon the fact that intellectual studies instead of being opposed to active pursuits represent an intellectualizing of practical pursuits4 ,it remains to grasp the principle with greater firmness4 7ii7 ,the changes which are taking place in the content of social life tremendously facilitate selection of the sort of activities which will intellectualize the play and work of the school4 ,when one bears in mind the social environment of the ,greeks and the people of the ,middle ,ages1 where such practical activities as could be successfully carried on were mostly of a routine and external sort and even servile in nature1 one is not surprised that educators turned their backs upon them as unfitted to cultivate intelligence4 ,but now that even the occupations of the household1 agriculture1 and manufacturing as well as transportation and intercourse are instinct with applied science1 the case stands otherwise4 ,it is true that many of those who now engage in them are not aware of the intellectual content upon which their personal actions depend4 ,but this fact only gives an added reason why schooling should use these pursuits so as to enable the coming generation to acquire a comprehension now too generally lacking1 and thus enable persons to carry on their pursuits intelligently instead of blindly4 7iii7 ,the most direct blow at the traditional separation of doing and knowing and at the traditional prestige of purely intellectual studies1 however1 has been given by the progress of experimental science4 ,if this progress has demonstrated anything1 it is that there is no such thing as genuine knowledge and fruitful understanding except as the offspring of doing4 ,the analysis and rearrangement of facts which is indispensable to the growth of knowledge and power of explanation and right classification cannot be attained purely mentally--just inside the head4 ,men have to do something to the things when they wish to find out something2 they have to alter conditions4 ,this is the lesson of the laboratory method1 and the lesson which all education has to learn4 ,the laboratory is a discovery of the condition under which labor may become intellectually fruitful and not merely externally productive4 ,if1 in too many cases at present1 it results only in the acquisition of an additional mode of technical skill1 that is because it still remains too largely but an isolated resource1 not resorted to until pupils are mostly too old to get the full advantage of it1 and even then is surrounded by other studies where traditional methods isolate intellect from activity4 ,summary4 ,the ,greeks were induced to philosophize by the increasing failure of their traditional customs and beliefs to regulate life4 ,thus they were led to criticize custom adversely and to look for some other source of authority in life and belief4 ,since they desired a rational standard for the latter1 and had identified with experience the customs which had proved unsatisfactory supports1 they were led to a flat opposition of reason and experience4 ,the more the former was exalted1 the more the latter was depreciated4 ,since experience was identified with what men do and suffer in particular and changing situations of life1 doing shared in the philosophic depreciation4 ,this influence fell in with many others to magnify1 in higher education1 all the methods and topics which involved the least use of sense-observation and bodily activity4 ,the modern age began with a revolt against this point of view1 with an appeal to experience1 and an attack upon so-called purely rational concepts on the ground that they either needed to be ballasted by the results of concrete experiences1 or else were mere expressions of prejudice and institutionalized class interest1 calling themselves rational for protection4 ,but various circumstances led to considering experience as pure cognition1 leaving out of account its intrinsic active and emotional phases1 and to identifying it with a passive reception of isolated sensations4 ,hence the education reform effected by the new theory was confined mainly to doing away with some of the bookishness of prior methods2 it did not accomplish a consistent reorganization4 ,meantime1 the advance of psychology1 of industrial methods1 and of the experimental method in science makes another conception of experience explicitly desirable and possible4 ,this theory reinstates the idea of the ancients that experience is primarily practical1 not cognitive--a matter of doing and undergoing the consequences of doing4 ,but the ancient theory is transformed by realizing that doing may be directed so as to take up into its own content all which thought suggests1 and so as to result in securely tested knowledge4 ,experience then ceases to be empirical and becomes experimental4 ,reason ceases to be a remote and ideal faculty1 and signifies all the resources by which activity is made fruitful in meaning4 ,educationally1 this change denotes such a plan for the studies and method of instruction as has been developed in the previous chapters4 ,chapter ,twenty-one3 ,physical and ,social ,studies3 ,naturalism and ,humanism ,,allusion has already been made to the conflict of natural science with literary studies for a place in the curriculum4 ,the solution thus far reached consists essentially in a somewhat mechanical compromise whereby the field is divided between studies having nature and studies having man as their theme4 ,the situation thus presents us with another instance of the external adjustment of educational values1 and focuses attention upon the philosophy of the connection of nature with human affairs4 ,in general1 it may be said that the educational division finds a reflection in the dualistic philosophies4 ,mind and the world are regarded as two independent realms of existence having certain points of contact with each other4 ,from this point of view it is natural that each sphere of existence should have its own separate group of studies connected with it2 it is even natural that the growth of scientific studies should be viewed with suspicion as marking a tendency of materialistic philosophy to encroach upon the domain of spirit4 ,any theory of education which contemplates a more unified scheme of education than now exists is under the necessity of facing the question of the relation of man to nature4 #a4 ,the ,historic ,background of ,humanistic ,study4 ,it is noteworthy that classic ,greek philosophy does not present the problem in its modern form4 ,socrates indeed appears to have thought that science of nature was not attainable and not very important4 ,the chief thing to know is the nature and end of man4 ,upon that knowledge hangs all that is of deep significance--all moral and social achievement4 ,plato1 however1 makes right knowledge of man and society depend upon knowledge of the essential features of nature4 ,his chief treatise1 entitled the ,republic1 is at once a treatise on morals1 on social organization1 and on the metaphysics and science of nature4 ,since he accepts the ,socratic doctrine that right achievement in the former depends upon rational knowledge1 he is compelled to discuss the nature of knowledge4 ,since he accepts the idea that the ultimate object of knowledge is the discovery of the good or end of man1 and is discontented with the ,socratic conviction that all we know is our own ignorance1 he connects the discussion of the good of man with consideration of the essential good or end of nature itself4 ,to attempt to determine the end of man apart from a knowledge of the ruling end which gives law and unity to nature is impossible4 ,it is thus quite consistent with his philosophy that he subordinates literary studies 7under the name of music7 to mathematics and to physics as well as to logic and metaphysics4 ,but on the other hand1 knowledge of nature is not an end in itself2 it is a necessary stage in bringing the mind to a realization of the supreme purpose of existence as the law of human action1 corporate and individual4 ,to use the modern phraseology1 naturalistic studies are indispensable1 but they are in the interests of humanistic and ideal ends4 ,aristotle goes even farther1 if anything1 in the direction of naturalistic studies4 ,he subordinates 7ante1 p4 #bed7 civic relations to the purely cognitive life4 ,the highest end of man is not human but divine--participation in pure knowing which constitutes the divine life4 ,such knowing deals with what is universal and necessary1 and finds1 therefore1 a more adequate subject matter in nature at its best than in the transient things of man4 ,if we take what the philosophers stood for in ,greek life1 rather than the details of what they say1 we might summarize by saying that the ,greeks were too much interested in free inquiry into natural fact and in the aesthetic enjoyment of nature1 and were too deeply conscious of the extent in which society is rooted in nature and subject to its laws1 to think of bringing man and nature into conflict4 ,two factors conspire in the later period of ancient life1 however1 to exalt literary and humanistic studies4 ,one is the increasingly reminiscent and borrowed character of culture2 the other is the political and rhetorical bent of ,roman life4 ,greek achievement in civilization was native2 the civilization of the ,alexandrians and ,romans was inherited from alien sources4 ,consequently it looked back to the records upon which it drew1 instead of looking out directly upon nature and society1 for material and inspiration4 ,we cannot do better than quote the words of ,hatch to indicate the consequences for educational theory and practice4 ,greece on one hand had lost political power1 and on the other possessed in her splendid literature an inalienable heritage4 ,it was natural that she should turn to letters4 ,it was natural also that the study of letters should be reflected upon speech4 ,the mass of men in the ,greek world tended to lay stress on that acquaintance with the literature of bygone generations1 and that habit of cultivated speech1 which has ever since been commonly spoken of as education4 ,our own comes by direct tradition from it4 ,it set a fashion which until recently has uniformly prevailed over the entire civilized world4 ,we study literature rather than nature because the ,greeks did so1 and because when the ,romans and the ,roman provincials resolved to educate their sons1 they employed ,greek teachers and followed in ,greek paths4 #a ,the so-called practical bent of the ,romans worked in the same direction4 ,in falling back upon the recorded ideas of the ,greeks1 they not only took the short path to attaining a cultural development1 but they procured just the kind of material and method suited to their administrative talents4 ,for their practical genius was not directed to the conquest and control of nature but to the conquest and control of men4 ,mr4 ,hatch1 in the passage quoted1 takes a good deal of history for granted in saying that we have studied literature rather than nature because the ,greeks1 and the ,romans whom they taught1 did so4 ,what is the link that spans the intervening centuries8 ,the question suggests that barbarian ,europe but repeated on a larger scale and with increased intensity the ,roman situation4 ,it had to go to school to ,greco-,roman civilization2 it also borrowed rather than evolved its culture4 ,not merely for its general ideas and their artistic presentation but for its models of law it went to the records of alien peoples4 ,and its dependence upon tradition was increased by the dominant theological interests of the period4 ,for the authorities to which the ,church appealed were literatures composed in foreign tongues4 ,everything converged to identify learning with linguistic training and to make the language of the learned a literary language instead of the mother speech4 ,the full scope of this fact escapes us1 moreover1 until we recognize that this subject matter compelled recourse to a dialectical method4 ,scholasticism frequently has been used since the time of the revival of learning as a term of reproach4 ,but all that it means is the method of ,the ,schools1 or of the ,school ,men4 ,in its essence1 it is nothing but a highly effective systematization of the methods of teaching and learning which are appropriate to transmit an authoritative body of truths4 ,where literature rather than contemporary nature and society furnishes material of study1 methods must be adapted to defining1 expounding1 and interpreting the received material1 rather than to inquiry1 discovery1 and invention4 ,and at bottom what is called ,scholasticism is the whole-hearted and consistent formulation and application of the methods which are suited to instruction when the material of instruction is taken ready-made1 rather than as something which students are to find out for themselves4 ,so far as schools still teach from textbooks and rely upon the principle of authority and acquisition rather than upon that of discovery and inquiry1 their methods are ,scholastic--minus the logical accuracy and system of ,scholasticism at its best4 ,aside from laxity of method and statement1 the only difference is that geographies and histories and botanies and astronomies are now part of the authoritative literature which is to be mastered4 ,as a consequence1 the ,greek tradition was lost in which a humanistic interest was used as a basis of interest in nature1 and a knowledge of nature used to support the distinctively human aims of man4 ,life found its support in authority1 not in nature4 ,the latter was moreover an object of considerable suspicion4 ,contemplation of it was dangerous1 for it tended to draw man away from reliance upon the documents in which the rules of living were already contained4 ,moreover nature could be known only through observation2 it appealed to the senses--which were merely material as opposed to a purely immaterial mind4 ,furthermore1 the utilities of a knowledge of nature were purely physical and secular2 they connected with the bodily and temporal welfare of man1 while the literary tradition concerned his spiritual and eternal well-being4 #b4 ,the ,modern ,scientific ,interest in ,nature4 ,the movement of the fifteenth century which is variously termed the revival of learning and the renascence was characterized by a new interest in man's present life1 and accordingly by a new interest in his relationships with nature4 ,it was naturalistic1 in the sense that it turned against the dominant supernaturalistic interest4 ,it is possible that the influence of a return to classic ,greek pagan literature in bringing about this changed mind has been overestimated4 ,undoubtedly the change was mainly a product of contemporary conditions4 ,but there can be no doubt that educated men1 filled with the new point of view1 turned eagerly to ,greek literature for congenial sustenance and reinforcement4 ,and to a considerable extent1 this interest in ,greek thought was not in literature for its own sake1 but in the spirit it expressed4 ,the mental freedom1 the sense of the order and beauty of nature1 which animated ,greek expression1 aroused men to think and observe in a similar untrammeled fashion4 ,the history of science in the sixteenth century shows that the dawning sciences of physical nature largely borrowed their points of departure from the new interest in ,greek literature4 ,as ,windelband has said1 the new science of nature was the daughter of humanism4 ,the favorite notion of the time was that man was in microcosm that which the universe was in macrocosm4 ,this fact raises anew the question of how it was that nature and man were later separated and a sharp division made between language and literature and the physical sciences4 ,four reasons may be suggested4 7a7 ,the old tradition was firmly entrenched in institutions4 ,politics1 law1 and diplomacy remained of necessity branches of authoritative literature1 for the social sciences did not develop until the methods of the sciences of physics and chemistry1 to say nothing of biology1 were much further advanced4 ,the same is largely true of history4 ,moreover1 the methods used for effective teaching of the languages were well developed2 the inertia of academic custom was on their side4 ,just as the new interest in literature1 especially ,greek1 had not been allowed at first to find lodgment in the scholastically organized universities1 so when it found its way into them it joined hands with the older learning to minimize the influence of experimental science4 ,the men who taught were rarely trained in science2 the men who were scientifically competent worked in private laboratories and through the medium of academies which promoted research1 but which were not organized as teaching bodies4 ,finally1 the aristocratic tradition which looked down upon material things and upon the senses and the hands was still mighty4 7b7 ,the ,protestant revolt brought with it an immense increase of interest in theological discussion and controversies4 ,the appeal on both sides was to literary documents4 ,each side had to train men in ability to study and expound the records which were relied upon4 ,the demand for training men who could defend the chosen faith against the other side1 who were able to propagandize and to prevent the encroachments of the other side1 was such that it is not too much to say that by the middle of the seventeenth century the linguistic training of gymnasia and universities had been captured by the revived theological interest1 and used as a tool of religious education and ecclesiastical controversy4 ,thus the educational descent of the languages as they are found in education to-day is not direct from the revival of learning1 but from its adaptation to theological ends4 7c7 ,the natural sciences were themselves conceived in a way which sharpened the opposition of man and nature4 ,francis ,bacon presents an almost perfect example of the union of naturalistic and humanistic interest4 ,science1 adopting the methods of observation and experimentation1 was to give up the attempt to anticipate nature--to impose preconceived notions upon her--and was to become her humble interpreter4 ,in obeying nature intellectually1 man would learn to command her practically4 ,knowledge is power4 ,this aphorism meant that through science man is to control nature and turn her energies to the execution of his own ends4 ,bacon attacked the old learning and logic as purely controversial1 having to do with victory in argument1 not with discovery of the unknown4 ,through the new method of thought which was set forth in his new logic an era of expansive discoveries was to emerge1 and these discoveries were to bear fruit in inventions for the service of man4 ,men were to give up their futile1 never-finished effort to dominate one another to engage in the cooperative task of dominating nature in the interests of humanity4 ,in the main1 ,bacon prophesied the direction of subsequent progress4 ,but he anticipated the advance4 ,he did not see that the new science was for a long time to be worked in the interest of old ends of human exploitation4 ,he thought that it would rapidly give man new ends4 ,instead1 it put at the disposal of a class the means to secure their old ends of aggrandizement at the expense of another class4 ,the industrial revolution followed1 as he foresaw1 upon a revolution in scientific method4 ,but it is taking the revolution many centuries to produce a new mind4 ,feudalism was doomed by the applications of the new science1 for they transferred power from the landed nobility to the manufacturing centers4 ,but capitalism rather than a social humanism took its place4 ,production and commerce were carried on as if the new science had no moral lesson1 but only technical lessons as to economies in production and utilization of saving in self-interest4 ,naturally1 this application of physical science 7which was the most conspicuously perceptible one7 strengthened the claims of professed humanists that science was materialistic in its tendencies4 ,it left a void as to man's distinctively human interests which go beyond making1 saving1 and expending money2 and languages and literature put in their claim to represent the moral and ideal interests of humanity4 7d7 ,moreover1 the philosophy which professed itself based upon science1 which gave itself out as the accredited representative of the net significance of science1 was either dualistic in character1 marked by a sharp division between mind 7characterizing man7 and matter1 constituting nature2 or else it was openly mechanical1 reducing the signal features of human life to illusion4 ,in the former case1 it allowed the claims of certain studies to be peculiar consignees of mental values1 and indirectly strengthened their claim to superiority1 since human beings would incline to regard human affairs as of chief importance at least to themselves4 ,in the latter case1 it called out a reaction which threw doubt and suspicion upon the value of physical science1 giving occasion for treating it as an enemy to man's higher interests4 ,greek and medieval knowledge accepted the world in its qualitative variety1 and regarded nature's processes as having ends1 or in technical phrase as teleological4 ,new science was expounded so as to deny the reality of all qualities in real1 or objective1 existence4 ,sounds1 colors1 ends1 as well as goods and bads1 were regarded as purely subjective--as mere impressions in the mind4 ,objective existence was then treated as having only quantitative aspects--as so much mass in motion1 its only differences being that at one point in space there was a larger aggregate mass than at another1 and that in some spots there were greater rates of motion than at others4 ,lacking qualitative distinctions1 nature lacked significant variety4 ,uniformities were emphasized1 not diversities2 the ideal was supposed to be the discovery of a single mathematical formula applying to the whole universe at once from which all the seeming variety of phenomena could be derived4 ,this is what a mechanical philosophy means4 ,such a philosophy does not represent the genuine purport of science4 ,it takes the technique for the thing itself2 the apparatus and the terminology for reality1 the method for its subject matter4 ,science does confine its statements to conditions which enable us to predict and control the happening of events1 ignoring the qualities of the events4 ,hence its mechanical and quantitative character4 ,but in leaving them out of account1 it does not exclude them from reality1 nor relegate them to a purely mental region2 it only furnishes means utilizable for ends4 ,thus while in fact the progress of science was increasing man's power over nature1 enabling him to place his cherished ends on a firmer basis than ever before1 and also to diversify his activities almost at will1 the philosophy which professed to formulate its accomplishments reduced the world to a barren and monotonous redistribution of matter in space4 ,thus the immediate effect of modern science was to accentuate the dualism of matter and mind1 and thereby to establish the physical and the humanistic studies as two disconnected groups4 ,since the difference between better and worse is bound up with the qualities of experience1 any philosophy of science which excludes them from the genuine content of reality is bound to leave out what is most interesting and most important to mankind4 #c4 ,the ,present ,educational ,problem4 ,in truth1 experience knows no division between human concerns and a purely mechanical physical world4 ,man's home is nature2 his purposes and aims are dependent for execution upon natural conditions4 ,separated from such conditions they become empty dreams and idle indulgences of fancy4 ,from the standpoint of human experience1 and hence of educational endeavor1 any distinction which can be justly made between nature and man is a distinction between the conditions which have to be reckoned with in the formation and execution of our practical aims1 and the aims themselves4 ,this philosophy is vouched for by the doctrine of biological development which shows that man is continuous with nature1 not an alien entering her processes from without4 ,it is reinforced by the experimental method of science which shows that knowledge accrues in virtue of an attempt to direct physical energies in accord with ideas suggested in dealing with natural objects in behalf of social uses4 ,every step forward in the social sciences--the studies termed history1 economics1 politics1 sociology--shows that social questions are capable of being intelligently coped with only in the degree in which we employ the method of collected data1 forming hypotheses1 and testing them in action which is characteristic of natural science1 and in the degree in which we utilize in behalf of the promotion of social welfare the technical knowledge ascertained by physics and chemistry4 ,advanced methods of dealing with such perplexing problems as insanity1 intemperance1 poverty1 public sanitation1 city planning1 the conservation of natural resources1 the constructive use of governmental agencies for furthering the public good without weakening personal initiative1 all illustrate the direct dependence of our important social concerns upon the methods and results of natural science4 ,with respect then to both humanistic and naturalistic studies1 education should take its departure from this close interdependence4 ,it should aim not at keeping science as a study of nature apart from literature as a record of human interests1 but at cross-fertilizing both the natural sciences and the various human disciplines such as history1 literature1 economics1 and politics4 ,pedagogically1 the problem is simpler than the attempt to teach the sciences as mere technical bodies of information and technical forms of physical manipulation1 on one side2 and to teach humanistic studies as isolated subjects1 on the other4 ,for the latter procedure institutes an artificial separation in the pupils' experience4 ,outside of school pupils meet with natural facts and principles in connection with various modes of human action4 7,see ante1 p4 #cj47 ,in all the social activities in which they have shared they have had to understand the material and processes involved4 ,to start them in school with a rupture of this intimate association breaks the continuity of mental development1 makes the student feel an indescribable unreality in his studies1 and deprives him of the normal motive for interest in them4 ,there is no doubt1 of course1 that the opportunities of education should be such that all should have a chance who have the disposition to advance to specialized ability in science1 and thus devote themselves to its pursuit as their particular occupation in life4 ,but at present1 the pupil too often has a choice only between beginning with a study of the results of prior specialization where the material is isolated from his daily experiences1 or with miscellaneous nature study1 where material is presented at haphazard and does not lead anywhere in particular4 ,the habit of introducing college pupils into segregated scientific subject matter1 such as is appropriate to the man who wishes to become an expert in a given field1 is carried back into the high schools4 ,pupils in the latter simply get a more elementary treatment of the same thing1 with difficulties smoothed over and topics reduced to the level of their supposed ability4 ,the cause of this procedure lies in following tradition1 rather than in conscious adherence to a dualistic philosophy4 ,but the effect is the same as if the purpose were to inculcate an idea that the sciences which deal with nature have nothing to do with man1 and vice versa4 ,a large part of the comparative ineffectiveness of the teaching of the sciences1 for those who never become scientific specialists1 is the result of a separation which is unavoidable when one begins with technically organized subject matter4 ,even if all students were embryonic scientific specialists1 it is questionable whether this is the most effective procedure4 ,considering that the great majority are concerned with the study of sciences only for its effect upon their mental habits--in making them more alert1 more open-minded1 more inclined to tentative acceptance and to testing of ideas propounded or suggested1--and for achieving a better understanding of their daily environment1 it is certainly ill-advised4 ,too often the pupil comes out with a smattering which is too superficial to be scientific and too technical to be applicable to ordinary affairs4 ,the utilization of ordinary experience to secure an advance into scientific material and method1 while keeping the latter connected with familiar human interests1 is easier to-day than it ever was before4 ,the usual experience of all persons in civilized communities to-day is intimately associated with industrial processes and results4 ,these in turn are so many cases of science in action4 ,the stationary and traction steam engine1 gasoline engine1 automobile1 telegraph and telephone1 the electric motor enter directly into the lives of most individuals4 ,pupils at an early age are practically acquainted with these things4 ,not only does the business occupation of their parents depend upon scientific applications1 but household pursuits1 the maintenance of health1 the sights seen upon the streets1 embody scientific achievements and stimulate interest in the connected scientific principles4 ,the obvious pedagogical starting point of scientific instruction is not to teach things labeled science1 but to utilize the familiar occupations and appliances to direct observation and experiment1 until pupils have arrived at a knowledge of some fundamental principles by understanding them in their familiar practical workings4 ,the opinion sometimes advanced that it is a derogation from the purity of science to study it in its active incarnation1 instead of in theoretical abstraction1 rests upon a misunderstanding4 ,,as matter of fact1 any subject is cultural in the degree in which it is apprehended in its widest possible range of meanings4 ,perception of meanings depends upon perception of connections1 of context4 ,to see a scientific fact or law in its human as well as in its physical and technical context is to enlarge its significance and give it increased cultural value4 ,its direct economic application1 if by economic is meant something having money worth1 is incidental and secondary1 but a part of its actual connections4 ,the important thing is that the fact be grasped in its social connections--its function in life4 ,on the other hand1 humanism means at bottom being imbued with an intelligent sense of human interests4 ,the social interest1 identical in its deepest meaning with a moral interest1 is necessarily supreme with man4 ,knowledge about man1 information as to his past1 familiarity with his documented records of literature1 may be as technical a possession as the accumulation of physical details4 ,men may keep busy in a variety of ways1 making money1 acquiring facility in laboratory manipulation1 or in amassing a store of facts about linguistic matters1 or the chronology of literary productions4 ,unless such activity reacts to enlarge the imaginative vision of life1 it is on a level with the busy work of children4 ,it has the letter without the spirit of activity4 ,it readily degenerates itself into a miser's accumulation1 and a man prides himself on what he has1 and not on the meaning he finds in the affairs of life4 ,any study so pursued that it increases concern for the values of life1 any study producing greater sensitiveness to social well-being and greater ability to promote that well-being is humane study4 ,the humanistic spirit of the ,greeks was native and intense but it was narrow in scope4 ,everybody outside the ,hellenic circle was a barbarian1 and negligible save as a possible enemy4 ,acute as were the social observations and speculations of ,greek thinkers1 there is not a word in their writings to indicate that ,greek civilization was not self-inclosed and self-sufficient4 ,there was1 apparently1 no suspicion that its future was at the mercy of the despised outsider4 ,within the ,greek community1 the intense social spirit was limited by the fact that higher culture was based on a substratum of slavery and economic serfdom--classes necessary to the existence of the state1 as ,aristotle declared1 and yet not genuine parts of it4 ,the development of science has produced an industrial revolution which has brought different peoples in such close contact with one another through colonization and commerce that no matter how some nations may still look down upon others1 no country can harbor the illusion that its career is decided wholly within itself4 ,the same revolution has abolished agricultural serfdom1 and created a class of more or less organized factory laborers with recognized political rights1 and who make claims for a responsible role in the control of industry--claims which receive sympathetic attention from many among the well-to-do1 since they have been brought into closer connections with the less fortunate classes through the breaking down of class barriers4 ,this state of affairs may be formulated by saying that the older humanism omitted economic and industrial conditions from its purview4 ,consequently1 it was one sided4 ,culture1 under such circumstances1 inevitably represented the intellectual and moral outlook of the class which was in direct social control4 ,such a tradition as to culture is1 as we have seen 7ante1 p4 #bfj71 aristocratic2 it emphasizes what marks off one class from another1 rather than fundamental common interests4 ,its standards are in the past2 for the aim is to preserve what has been gained rather than widely to extend the range of culture4 ,the modifications which spring from taking greater account of industry and of whatever has to do with making a living are frequently condemned as attacks upon the culture derived from the past4 ,but a wider educational outlook would conceive industrial activities as agencies for making intellectual resources more accessible to the masses1 and giving greater solidity to the culture of those having superior resources4 ,in short1 when we consider the close connection between science and industrial development on the one hand1 and between literary and aesthetic cultivation and an aristocratic social organization on the other1 we get light on the opposition between technical scientific studies and refining literary studies4 ,we have before us the need of overcoming this separation in education if society is to be truly democratic4 ,summary4 ,the philosophic dualism between man and nature is reflected in the division of studies between the naturalistic and the humanistic with a tendency to reduce the latter to the literary records of the past4 ,this dualism is not characteristic 7as were the others which we have noted7 of ,greek thought4 ,it arose partly because of the fact that the culture of ,rome and of barbarian ,europe was not a native product1 being borrowed directly or indirectly from ,greece1 and partly because political and ecclesiastic conditions emphasized dependence upon the authority of past knowledge as that was transmitted in literary documents4 ,at the outset1 the rise of modern science prophesied a restoration of the intimate connection of nature and humanity1 for it viewed knowledge of nature as the means of securing human progress and well-being4 ,but the more immediate applications of science were in the interests of a class rather than of men in common2 and the received philosophic formulations of scientific doctrine tended either to mark it off as merely material from man as spiritual and immaterial1 or else to reduce mind to a subjective illusion4 ,in education1 accordingly1 the tendency was to treat the sciences as a separate body of studies1 consisting of technical information regarding the physical world1 and to reserve the older literary studies as distinctively humanistic4 ,the account previously given of the evolution of knowledge1 and of the educational scheme of studies based upon it1 are designed to overcome the separation1 and to secure recognition of the place occupied by the subject matter of the natural sciences in human affairs4 #a ,the ,influence of ,greek ,ideas and ,usages upon the ,christian ,church4 pp4 #dc-dd4 ,chapter ,twenty-two3 ,the ,individual and the ,world #a4 ,mind as ,purely ,individual4 ,we have been concerned with the influences which have effected a division between work and leisure1 knowing and doing1 man and nature4 ,these influences have resulted in splitting up the subject matter of education into separate studies4 ,they have also found formulation in various philosophies which have opposed to each other body and mind1 theoretical knowledge and practice1 physical mechanism and ideal purpose4 ,upon the philosophical side1 these various dualisms culminate in a sharp demarcation of individual minds from the world1 and hence from one another4 ,while the connection of this philosophical position with educational procedure is not so obvious as is that of the points considered in the last three chapters1 there are certain educational considerations which correspond to it2 such as the antithesis supposed to exist between subject matter 7the counterpart of the world7 and method 7the counterpart of mind72 such as the tendency to treat interest as something purely private1 without intrinsic connection with the material studied4 ,aside from incidental educational bearings1 it will be shown in this chapter that the dualistic philosophy of mind and the world implies an erroneous conception of the relationship between knowledge and social interests1 and between individuality or freedom1 and social control and authority4 ,the identification of the mind with the individual self and of the latter with a private psychic consciousness is comparatively modern4 ,in both the ,greek and medieval periods1 the rule was to regard the individual as a channel through which a universal and divine intelligence operated4 ,the individual was in no true sense the knower2 the knower was the ,reason which operated through him4 ,the individual interfered at his peril1 and only to the detriment of the truth4 ,in the degree in which the individual rather than reason knew1 conceit1 error1 and opinion were substituted for true knowledge4 ,in ,greek life1 observation was acute and alert2 and thinking was free almost to the point of irresponsible speculations4 ,accordingly the consequences of the theory were only such as were consequent upon the lack of an experimental method4 ,without such a method individuals could not engage in knowing1 and be checked up by the results of the inquiries of others4 ,without such liability to test by others1 the minds of men could not be intellectually responsible2 results were to be accepted because of their aesthetic consistency1 agreeable quality1 or the prestige of their authors4 ,in the barbarian period1 individuals were in a still more humble attitude to truth2 important knowledge was supposed to be divinely revealed1 and nothing remained for the minds of individuals except to work it over after it had been received on authority4 ,aside from the more consciously philosophic aspects of these movements1 it never occurs to any one to identify mind and the personal self wherever beliefs are transmitted by custom4 ,in the medieval period there was a religious individualism4 ,the deepest concern of life was the salvation of the individual soul4 ,in the later ,middle ,ages1 this latent individualism found conscious formulation in the nominalistic philosophies1 which treated the structure of knowledge as something built up within the individual through his own acts1 and mental states4 ,with the rise of economic and political individualism after the sixteenth century1 and with the development of ,protestantism1 the times were ripe for an emphasis upon the rights and duties of the individual in achieving knowledge for himself4 ,this led to the view that knowledge is won wholly through personal and private experiences4 ,as a consequence1 mind1 the source and possessor of knowledge1 was thought of as wholly individual4 ,thus upon the educational side1 we find educational reformers1 like ,montaigne1 ,bacon1 ,locke1 henceforth vehemently denouncing all learning which is acquired on hearsay1 and asserting that even if beliefs happen to be true1 they do not constitute knowledge unless they have grown up in and been tested by personal experience4 ,the reaction against authority in all spheres of life1 and the intensity of the struggle1 against great odds1 for freedom of action and inquiry1 led to such an emphasis upon personal observations and ideas as in effect to isolate mind1 and set it apart from the world to be known4 ,this isolation is reflected in the great development of that branch of philosophy known as epistemology--the theory of knowledge4 ,the identification of mind with the self1 and the setting up of the self as something independent and self-sufficient1 created such a gulf between the knowing mind and the world that it became a question how knowledge was possible at all4 ,given a subject--the knower--and an object--the thing to be known--wholly separate from one another1 it is necessary to frame a theory to explain how they get into connection with each other so that valid knowledge may result4 ,this problem1 with the allied one of the possibility of the world acting upon the mind and the mind acting upon the world1 became almost the exclusive preoccupation of philosophic thought4 ,the theories that we cannot know the world as it really is but only the impressions made upon the mind1 or that there is no world beyond the individual mind1 or that knowledge is only a certain association of the mind's own states1 were products of this preoccupation4 ,we are not directly concerned with their truth2 but the fact that such desperate solutions were widely accepted is evidence of the extent to which mind had been set over the world of realities4 ,the increasing use of the term consciousness as an equivalent for mind1 in the supposition that there is an inner world of conscious states and processes1 independent of any relationship to nature and society1 an inner world more truly and immediately known than anything else1 is evidence of the same fact4 ,in short1 practical individualism1 or struggle for greater freedom of thought in action1 was translated into philosophic subjectivism4 #b4 ,individual ,mind as the ,agent of ,reorganization4 ,it should be obvious that this philosophic movement misconceived the significance of the practical movement4 ,instead of being its transcript1 it was a perversion4 ,men were not actually engaged in the absurdity of striving to be free from connection with nature and one another4 ,they were striving for greater freedom in nature and society4 ,they wanted greater power to initiate changes in the world of things and fellow beings2 greater scope of movement and consequently greater freedom in observations and ideas implied in movement4 ,they wanted not isolation from the world1 but a more intimate connection with it4 ,they wanted to form their beliefs about it at first hand1 instead of through tradition4 ,they wanted closer union with their fellows so that they might influence one another more effectively and might combine their respective actions for mutual aims4 ,so far as their beliefs were concerned1 they felt that a great deal which passed for knowledge was merely the accumulated opinions of the past1 much of it absurd and its correct portions not understood when accepted on authority4 ,men must observe for themselves1 and form their own theories and personally test them4 ,such a method was the only alternative to the imposition of dogma as truth1 a procedure which reduced mind to the formal act of acquiescing in truth4 ,such is the meaning of what is sometimes called the substitution of inductive experimental methods of knowing for deductive4 ,in some sense1 men had always used an inductive method in dealing with their immediate practical concerns4 ,architecture1 agriculture1 manufacture1 etc41 had to be based upon observation of the activities of natural objects1 and ideas about such affairs had to be checked1 to some extent1 by results4 ,but even in such things there was an undue reliance upon mere custom1 followed blindly rather than understandingly4 ,and this observational-experimental method was restricted to these practical matters1 and a sharp distinction maintained between practice and theoretical knowledge or truth4 7,see ,ch4 ,,xx47 ,the rise of free cities1 the development of travel1 exploration1 and commerce1 the evolution of new methods of producing commodities and doing business1 threw men definitely upon their own resources4 ,the reformers of science like ,galileo1 ,descartes1 and their successors1 carried analogous methods into ascertaining the facts about nature4 ,an interest in discovery took the place of an interest in systematizing and proving received beliefs4 ,a just philosophic interpretation of these movements would1 indeed1 have emphasized the rights and responsibilities of the individual in gaining knowledge and personally testing beliefs1 no matter by what authorities they were vouched for4 ,but it would not have isolated the individual from the world1 and consequently isolated individuals--in theory--from one another4 ,it would have perceived that such disconnection1 such rupture of continuity1 denied in advance the possibility of success in their endeavors4 ,as matter of fact every individual has grown up1 and always must grow up1 in a social medium4 ,his responses grow intelligent1 or gain meaning1 simply because he lives and acts in a medium of accepted meanings and values4 7,see ante1 p4 #cj47 ,through social intercourse1 through sharing in the activities embodying beliefs1 he gradually acquires a mind of his own4 ,the conception of mind as a purely isolated possession of the self is at the very antipodes of the truth4 ,the self achieves mind in the degree in which knowledge of things is incarnate in the life about him2 the self is not a separate mind building up knowledge anew on its own account4 ,yet there is a valid distinction between knowledge which is objective and impersonal1 and thinking which is subjective and personal4 ,in one sense1 knowledge is that which we take for granted4 ,it is that which is settled1 disposed of1 established1 under control4 ,what we fully know1 we do not need to think about4 ,in common phrase1 it is certain1 assured4 ,and this does not mean a mere feeling of certainty4 ,it denotes not a sentiment1 but a practical attitude1 a readiness to act without reserve or quibble4 ,of course we may be mistaken4 ,what is taken for knowledge--for fact and truth--at a given time may not be such4 ,but everything which is assumed without question1 which is taken for granted in our intercourse with one another and nature is what1 at the given time1 is called knowledge4 ,thinking on the contrary1 starts1 as we have seen1 from doubt or uncertainty4 ,it marks an inquiring1 hunting1 searching attitude1 instead of one of mastery and possession4 ,through its critical process true knowledge is revised and extended1 and our convictions as to the state of things reorganized4 ,clearly the last few centuries have been typically a period of revision and reorganization of beliefs4 ,men did not really throw away all transmitted beliefs concerning the realities of existence1 and start afresh upon the basis of their private1 exclusive sensations and ideas4 ,they could not have done so if they had wished to1 and if it had been possible general imbecility would have been the only outcome4 ,men set out from what had passed as knowledge1 and critically investigated the grounds upon which it rested2 they noted exceptions2 they used new mechanical appliances to bring to light data inconsistent with what had been believed2 they used their imaginations to conceive a world different from that in which their forefathers had put their trust4 ,the work was a piecemeal1 a retail1 business4 ,one problem was tackled at a time4 ,the net results of all the revisions amounted1 however1 to a revolution of prior conceptions of the world4 ,what occurred was a reorganization of prior intellectual habitudes1 infinitely more efficient than a cutting loose from all connections would have been4 ,this state of affairs suggests a definition of the role of the individual1 or the self1 in knowledge2 namely1 the redirection1 or reconstruction of accepted beliefs4 ,every new idea1 every conception of things differing from that authorized by current belief1 must have its origin in an individual4 ,new ideas are doubtless always sprouting1 but a society governed by custom does not encourage their development4 ,on the contrary1 it tends to suppress them1 just because they are deviations from what is current4 ,the man who looks at things differently from others is in such a community a suspect character2 for him to persist is generally fatal4 ,even when social censorship of beliefs is not so strict1 social conditions may fail to provide the appliances which are requisite if new ideas are to be adequately elaborated2 or they may fail to provide any material support and reward to those who entertain them4 ,hence they remain mere fancies1 romantic castles in the air1 or aimless speculations4 ,the freedom of observation and imagination involved in the modern scientific revolution were not easily secured2 they had to be fought for2 many suffered for their intellectual independence4 ,but1 upon the whole1 modern ,european society first permitted1 and then1 in some fields at least1 deliberately encouraged the individual reactions which deviate from what custom prescribes4 ,discovery1 research1 inquiry in new lines1 inventions1 finally came to be either the social fashion1 or in some degree tolerable4 ,however1 as we have already noted1 philosophic theories of knowledge were not content to conceive mind in the individual as the pivot upon which reconstruction of beliefs turned1 thus maintaining the continuity of the individual with the world of nature and fellow men4 ,they regarded the individual mind as a separate entity1 complete in each person1 and isolated from nature and hence from other minds4 ,thus a legitimate intellectual individualism1 the attitude of critical revision of former beliefs which is indispensable to progress1 was explicitly formulated as a moral and social individualism4 ,when the activities of mind set out from customary beliefs and strive to effect transformations of them which will in turn win general conviction1 there is no opposition between the individual and the social4 ,the intellectual variations of the individual in observation1 imagination1 judgment1 and invention are simply the agencies of social progress1 just as conformity to habit is the agency of social conservation4 ,but when knowledge is regarded as originating and developing within an individual1 the ties which bind the mental life of one to that of his fellows are ignored and denied4 ,when the social quality of individualized mental operations is denied1 it becomes a problem to find connections which will unite an individual with his fellows4 ,moral individualism is set up by the conscious separation of different centers of life4 ,it has its roots in the notion that the consciousness of each person is wholly private1 a self-inclosed continent1 intrinsically independent of the ideas1 wishes1 purposes of everybody else4 ,but when men act1 they act in a common and public world4 ,this is the problem to which the theory of isolated and independent conscious minds gave rise3 ,given feelings1 ideas1 desires1 which have nothing to do with one another1 how can actions proceeding from them be controlled in a social or public interest8 ,given an egoistic consciousness1 how can action which has regard for others take place8 ,moral philosophies which have started from such premises have developed four typical ways of dealing with the question4 7i7 ,one method represents the survival of the older authoritative position1 with such concessions and compromises as the progress of events has made absolutely inevitable4 ,the deviations and departures characterizing an individual are still looked upon with suspicion2 in principle they are evidences of the disturbances1 revolts1 and corruptions inhering in an individual apart from external authoritative guidance4 ,in fact1 as distinct from principle1 intellectual individualism is tolerated in certain technical regions--in subjects like mathematics and physics and astronomy1 and in the technical inventions resulting therefrom4 ,but the applicability of a similar method to morals1 social1 legal1 and political matters1 is denied4 ,in such matters1 dogma is still to be supreme2 certain eternal truths made known by revelation1 intuition1 or the wisdom of our forefathers set unpassable limits to individual observation and speculation4 ,the evils from which society suffers are set down to the efforts of misguided individuals to transgress these boundaries4 ,between the physical and the moral sciences1 lie intermediate sciences of life1 where the territory is only grudgingly yielded to freedom of inquiry under the pressure of accomplished fact4 ,although past history has demonstrated that the possibilities of human good are widened and made more secure by trusting to a responsibility built up within the very process of inquiry1 the authority theory sets apart a sacred domain of truth which must be protected from the inroads of variation of beliefs4 ,educationally1 emphasis may not be put on eternal truth1 but it is put on the authority of book and teacher1 and individual variation is discouraged4 7ii7 ,another method is sometimes termed rationalism or abstract intellectualism4 ,a formal logical faculty is set up in distinction from tradition and history and all concrete subject matter4 ,this faculty of reason is endowed with power to influence conduct directly4 ,since it deals wholly with general and impersonal forms1 when different persons act in accord with logical findings1 their activities will be externally consistent4 ,there is no doubt of the services rendered by this philosophy4 ,it was a powerful factor in the negative and dissolving criticism of doctrines having nothing but tradition and class interest behind them2 it accustomed men to freedom of discussion and to the notion that beliefs had to be submitted to criteria of reasonableness4 ,it undermined the power of prejudice1 superstition1 and brute force1 by habituating men to reliance upon argument1 discussion1 and persuasion4 ,it made for clarity and order of exposition4 ,but its influence was greater in destruction of old falsities than in the construction of new ties and associations among men4 ,its formal and empty nature1 due to conceiving reason as something complete in itself apart from subject matter1 its hostile attitude toward historical institutions1 its disregard of the influence of habit1 instinct1 and emotion1 as operative factors in life1 left it impotent in the suggestion of specific aims and methods4 ,bare logic1 however important in arranging and criticizing existing subject matter1 cannot spin new subject matter out of itself4 ,in education1 the correlative is trust in general ready-made rules and principles to secure agreement1 irrespective of seeing to it that the pupil's ideas really agree with one another4 7iii7 ,while this rationalistic philosophy was developing in ,france1 ,english thought appealed to the intelligent self-interest of individuals in order to secure outer unity in the acts which issued from isolated streams of consciousness4 ,legal arrangements1 especially penal administration1 and governmental regulations1 were to be such as to prevent the acts which proceeded from regard for one's own private sensations from interfering with the feelings of others4 ,education was to instill in individuals a sense that non-interference with others and some degree of positive regard for their welfare were necessary for security in the pursuit of one's own happiness4 ,chief emphasis was put1 however1 upon trade as a means of bringing the conduct of one into harmony with that of others4 ,in commerce1 each aims at the satisfaction of his own wants1 but can gain his own profit only by furnishing some commodity or service to another4 ,thus in aiming at the increase of his own private pleasurable states of consciousness1 he contributes to the consciousness of others4 ,again there is no doubt that this view expressed and furthered a heightened perception of the values of conscious life1 and a recognition that institutional arrangements are ultimately to be judged by the contributions which they make to intensifying and enlarging the scope of conscious experience4 ,it also did much to rescue work1 industry1 and mechanical devices from the contempt in which they had been held in communities founded upon the control of a leisure class4 ,in both ways1 this philosophy promoted a wider and more democratic social concern4 ,but it was tainted by the narrowness of its fundamental premise3 the doctrine that every individual acts only from regard for his own pleasures and pains1 and that so-called generous and sympathetic acts are only indirect ways of procuring and assuring one's own comfort4 ,in other words1 it made explicit the consequences inhering in any doctrine which makes mental life a self-inclosed thing1 instead of an attempt to redirect and readapt common concerns4 ,it made union among men a matter of calculation of externals4 ,it lent itself to the contemptuous assertions of ,carlyle that it was a doctrine of anarchy plus a constable1 and recognized only a cash nexus among men4 ,the educational equivalents of this doctrine in the uses made of pleasurable rewards and painful penalties are only too obvious4 7iv7 ,typical ,german philosophy followed another path4 ,it started from what was essentially the rationalistic philosophy of ,descartes and his ,french successors4 ,but while ,french thought upon the whole developed the idea of reason in opposition to the religious conception of a divine mind residing in individuals1 ,german thought 7as in ,hegel7 made a synthesis of the two4 ,reason is absolute4 ,nature is incarnate reason4 ,history is reason in its progressive unfolding in man4 ,an individual becomes rational only as he absorbs into himself the content of rationality in nature and in social institutions4 ,for an absolute reason is not1 like the reason of rationalism1 purely formal and empty2 as absolute it must include all content within itself4 ,thus the real problem is not that of controlling individual freedom so that some measure of social order and concord may result1 but of achieving individual freedom through developing individual convictions in accord with the universal law found in the organization of the state as objective ,reason4 ,while this philosophy is usually termed absolute or objective idealism1 it might better be termed1 for educational purposes at least1 institutional idealism4 7,see ante1 p4 #ei47 ,it idealized historical institutions by conceiving them as incarnations of an immanent absolute mind4 ,there can be no doubt that this philosophy was a powerful influence in rescuing philosophy in the beginning of the nineteenth century from the isolated individualism into which it had fallen in ,france and ,england4 ,it served also to make the organization of the state more constructively interested in matters of public concern4 ,it left less to chance1 less to mere individual logical conviction1 less to the workings of private self-interest4 ,it brought intelligence to bear upon the conduct of affairs2 it accentuated the need of nationally organized education in the interests of the corporate state4 ,it sanctioned and promoted freedom of inquiry in all technical details of natural and historical phenomena4 ,but in all ultimate moral matters1 it tended to reinstate the principle of authority4 ,it made for efficiency of organization more than did any of the types of philosophy previously mentioned1 but it made no provision for free experimental modification of this organization4 ,political democracy1 with its belief in the right of individual desire and purpose to take part in readapting even the fundamental constitution of society1 was foreign to it4 #c4 ,educational ,equivalents4 ,it is not necessary to consider in detail the educational counterparts of the various defects found in these various types of philosophy4 ,it suffices to say that in general the school has been the institution which exhibited with greatest clearness the assumed antithesis between purely individualistic methods of learning and social action1 and between freedom and social control4 ,the antithesis is reflected in the absence of a social atmosphere and motive for learning1 and the consequent separation1 in the conduct of the school1 between method of instruction and methods of government2 and in the slight opportunity afforded individual variations4 ,when learning is a phase of active undertakings which involve mutual exchange1 social control enters into the very process of learning4 ,when the social factor is absent1 learning becomes a carrying over of some presented material into a purely individual consciousness1 and there is no inherent reason why it should give a more socialized direction to mental and emotional disposition4 ,there is tendency on the part of both the upholders and the opponents of freedom in school to identify it with absence of social direction1 or1 sometimes1 with merely physical unconstraint of movement4 ,but the essence of the demand for freedom is the need of conditions which will enable an individual to make his own special contribution to a group interest1 and to partake of its activities in such ways that social guidance shall be a matter of his own mental attitude1 and not a mere authoritative dictation of his acts4 ,because what is often called discipline and government has to do with the external side of conduct alone1 a similar meaning is attached1 by reaction1 to freedom4 ,but when it is perceived that each idea signifies the quality of mind expressed in action1 the supposed opposition between them falls away4 ,freedom means essentially the part played by thinking--which is personal--in learning3--it means intellectual initiative1 independence in observation1 judicious invention1 foresight of consequences1 and ingenuity of adaptation to them4 ,but because these are the mental phase of behavior1 the needed play of individuality--or freedom--cannot be separated from opportunity for free play of physical movements4 ,enforced physical quietude may be unfavorable to realization of a problem1 to undertaking the observations needed to define it1 and to performance of the experiments which test the ideas suggested4 ,much has been said about the importance of self-activity in education1 but the conception has too frequently been restricted to something merely internal--something excluding the free use of sensory and motor organs4 ,those who are at the stage of learning from symbols1 or who are engaged in elaborating the implications of a problem or idea preliminary to more carefully thought-out activity1 may need little perceptible overt activity4 ,but the whole cycle of self-activity demands an opportunity for investigation and experimentation1 for trying out one's ideas upon things1 discovering what can be done with materials and appliances4 ,and this is incompatible with closely restricted physical activity4 ,individual activity has sometimes been taken as meaning leaving a pupil to work by himself or alone4 ,relief from need of attending to what any one else is doing is truly required to secure calm and concentration4 ,children1 like grown persons1 require a judicious amount of being let alone4 ,but the time1 place1 and amount of such separate work is a matter of detail1 not of principle4 ,there is no inherent opposition between working with others and working as an individual4 ,on the contrary1 certain capacities of an individual are not brought out except under the stimulus of associating with others4 ,that a child must work alone and not engage in group activities in order to be free and let his individuality develop1 is a notion which measures individuality by spatial distance and makes a physical thing of it4 ,individuality as a factor to be respected in education has a double meaning4 ,in the first place1 one is mentally an individual only as he has his own purpose and problem1 and does his own thinking4 ,the phrase think for one's self is a pleonasm4 ,unless one does it for one's self1 it isn't thinking4 ,only by a pupil's own observations1 reflections1 framing and testing of suggestions can what he already knows be amplified and rectified4 ,thinking is as much an individual matter as is the digestion of food4 ,in the second place1 there are variations of point of view1 of appeal of objects1 and of mode of attack1 from person to person4 ,when these variations are suppressed in the alleged interests of uniformity1 and an attempt is made to have a single mold of method of study and recitation1 mental confusion and artificiality inevitably result4 ,originality is gradually destroyed1 confidence in one's own quality of mental operation is undermined1 and a docile subjection to the opinion of others is inculcated1 or else ideas run wild4 ,the harm is greater now than when the whole community was governed by customary beliefs1 because the contrast between methods of learning in school and those relied upon outside the school is greater4 ,that systematic advance in scientific discovery began when individuals were allowed1 and then encouraged1 to utilize their own peculiarities of response to subject matter1 no one will deny4 ,if it is said in objection1 that pupils in school are not capable of any such originality1 and hence must be confined to appropriating and reproducing things already known by the better informed1 the reply is twofold4 7i7 ,we are concerned with originality of attitude which is equivalent to the unforced response of one's own individuality1 not with originality as measured by product4 ,no one expects the young to make original discoveries of just the same facts and principles as are embodied in the sciences of nature and man4 ,but it is not unreasonable to expect that learning may take place under such conditions that from the standpoint of the learner there is genuine discovery4 ,while immature students will not make discoveries from the standpoint of advanced students1 they make them from their own standpoint1 whenever there is genuine learning4 7ii7 ,in the normal process of becoming acquainted with subject matter already known to others1 even young pupils react in unexpected ways4 ,there is something fresh1 something not capable of being fully anticipated by even the most experienced teacher1 in the ways they go at the topic1 and in the particular ways in which things strike them4 ,too often all this is brushed aside as irrelevant2 pupils are deliberately held to rehearsing material in the exact form in which the older person conceives it4 ,the result is that what is instinctively original in individuality1 that which marks off one from another1 goes unused and undirected4 ,teaching then ceases to be an educative process for the teacher4 ,at most he learns simply to improve his existing technique2 he does not get new points of view2 he fails to experience any intellectual companionship4 ,hence both teaching and learning tend to become conventional and mechanical with all the nervous strain on both sides therein implied4 ,as maturity increases and as the student has a greater background of familiarity upon which a new topic is projected1 the scope of more or less random physical experimentation is reduced4 ,activity is defined or specialized in certain channels4 ,to the eyes of others1 the student may be in a position of complete physical quietude1 because his energies are confined to nerve channels and to the connected apparatus of the eyes and vocal organs4 ,but because this attitude is evidence of intense mental concentration on the part of the trained person1 it does not follow that it should be set up as a model for students who still have to find their intellectual way about4 ,and even with the adult1 it does not cover the whole circuit of mental energy4 ,it marks an intermediate period1 capable of being lengthened with increased mastery of a subject1 but always coming between an earlier period of more general and conspicuous organic action and a later time of putting to use what has been apprehended4 ,when1 however1 education takes cognizance of the union of mind and body in acquiring knowledge1 we are not obliged to insist upon the need of obvious1 or external1 freedom4 ,it is enough to identify the freedom which is involved in teaching and studying with the thinking by which what a person already knows and believes is enlarged and refined4 ,if attention is centered upon the conditions which have to be met in order to secure a situation favorable to effective thinking1 freedom will take care of itself4 ,the individual who has a question which being really a question to him instigates his curiosity1 which feeds his eagerness for information that will help him cope with it1 and who has at command an equipment which will permit these interests to take effect1 is intellectually free4 ,whatever initiative and imaginative vision he possesses will be called into play and control his impulses and habits4 ,his own purposes will direct his actions4 ,otherwise1 his seeming attention1 his docility1 his memorizings and reproductions1 will partake of intellectual servility4 ,such a condition of intellectual subjection is needed for fitting the masses into a society where the many are not expected to have aims or ideas of their own1 but to take orders from the few set in authority4 ,it is not adapted to a society which intends to be democratic4 ,summary4 ,true individualism is a product of the relaxation of the grip of the authority of custom and traditions as standards of belief4 ,aside from sporadic instances1 like the height of ,greek thought1 it is a comparatively modern manifestation4 ,not but that there have always been individual diversities1 but that a society dominated by conservative custom represses them or at least does not utilize them and promote them4 ,for various reasons1 however1 the new individualism was interpreted philosophically not as meaning development of agencies for revising and transforming previously accepted beliefs1 but as an assertion that each individual's mind was complete in isolation from everything else4 ,in the theoretical phase of philosophy1 this produced the epistemological problem3 the question as to the possibility of any cognitive relationship of the individual to the world4 ,in its practical phase1 it generated the problem of the possibility of a purely individual consciousness acting on behalf of general or social interests1--the problem of social direction4 ,while the philosophies which have been elaborated to deal with these questions have not affected education directly1 the assumptions underlying them have found expression in the separation frequently made between study and government and between freedom of individuality and control by others4 ,regarding freedom1 the important thing to bear in mind is that it designates a mental attitude rather than external unconstraint of movements1 but that this quality of mind cannot develop without a fair leeway of movements in exploration1 experimentation1 application1 etc4 ,a society based on custom will utilize individual variations only up to a limit of conformity with usage2 uniformity is the chief ideal within each class4 ,a progressive society counts individual variations as precious since it finds in them the means of its own growth4 ,hence a democratic society must1 in consistency with its ideal1 allow for intellectual freedom and the play of diverse gifts and interests in its educational measures4 ,chapter ,twenty-,three3 ,vocational ,aspects of ,education #a4 ,the ,meaning of ,vocation4 ,at the present time the conflict of philosophic theories focuses in discussion of the proper place and function of vocational factors in education4 ,the bald statement that significant differences in fundamental philosophical conceptions find their chief issue in connection with this point may arouse incredulity3 there seems to be too great a gap between the remote and general terms in which philosophic ideas are formulated and the practical and concrete details of vocational education4 ,but a mental review of the intellectual presuppositions underlying the oppositions in education of labor and leisure1 theory and practice1 body and mind1 mental states and the world1 will show that they culminate in the antithesis of vocational and cultural education4 ,traditionally1 liberal culture has been linked to the notions of leisure1 purely contemplative knowledge and a spiritual activity not involving the active use of bodily organs4 ,culture has also tended1 latterly1 to be associated with a purely private refinement1 a cultivation of certain states and attitudes of consciousness1 separate from either social direction or service4 ,it has been an escape from the former1 and a solace for the necessity of the latter4 ,so deeply entangled are these philosophic dualisms with the whole subject of vocational education1 that it is necessary to define the meaning of vocation with some fullness in order to avoid the impression that an education which centers about it is narrowly practical1 if not merely pecuniary4 ,a vocation means nothing but such a direction of life activities as renders them perceptibly significant to a person1 because of the consequences they accomplish1 and also useful to his associates4 ,the opposite of a career is neither leisure nor culture1 but aimlessness1 capriciousness1 the absence of cumulative achievement in experience1 on the personal side1 and idle display1 parasitic dependence upon the others1 on the social side4 ,occupation is a concrete term for continuity4 ,it includes the development of artistic capacity of any kind1 of special scientific ability1 of effective citizenship1 as well as professional and business occupations1 to say nothing of mechanical labor or engagement in gainful pursuits4 ,we must avoid not only limitation of conception of vocation to the occupations where immediately tangible commodities are produced1 but also the notion that vocations are distributed in an exclusive way1 one and only one to each person4 ,such restricted specialism is impossible2 nothing could be more absurd than to try to educate individuals with an eye to only one line of activity4 ,in the first place1 each individual has of necessity a variety of callings1 in each of which he should be intelligently effective2 and in the second place any one occupation loses its meaning and becomes a routine keeping busy at something in the degree in which it is isolated from other interests4 7i7 ,no one is just an artist and nothing else1 and in so far as one approximates that condition1 he is so much the less developed human being2 he is a kind of monstrosity4 ,he must1 at some period of his life1 be a member of a family2 he must have friends and companions2 he must either support himself or be supported by others1 and thus he has a business career4 ,he is a member of some organized political unit1 and so on4 ,we naturally name his vocation from that one of the callings which distinguishes him1 rather than from those which he has in common with all others4 ,but we should not allow ourselves to be so subject to words as to ignore and virtually deny his other callings when it comes to a consideration of the vocational phases of education4 7ii7 ,as a man's vocation as artist is but the emphatically specialized phase of his diverse and variegated vocational activities1 so his efficiency in it1 in the humane sense of efficiency1 is determined by its association with other callings4 ,a person must have experience1 he must live1 if his artistry is to be more than a technical accomplishment4 ,he cannot find the subject matter of his artistic activity within his art2 this must be an expression of what he suffers and enjoys in other relationships--a thing which depends in turn upon the alertness and sympathy of his interests4 ,what is true of an artist is true of any other special calling4 ,there is doubtless--in general accord with the principle of habit--a tendency for every distinctive vocation to become too dominant1 too exclusive and absorbing in its specialized aspect4 ,this means emphasis upon skill or technical method at the expense of meaning4 ,hence it is not the business of education to foster this tendency1 but rather to safeguard against it1 so that the scientific inquirer shall not be merely the scientist1 the teacher merely the pedagogue1 the clergyman merely one who wears the cloth1 and so on4 #b4 ,the ,place of ,vocational ,aims in ,education4 ,bearing in mind the varied and connected content of the vocation1 and the broad background upon which a particular calling is projected1 we shall now consider education for the more distinctive activity of an individual4 #a4 ,an occupation is the only thing which balances the distinctive capacity of an individual with his social service4 ,to find out what one is fitted to do and to secure an opportunity to do it is the key to happiness4 ,nothing is more tragic than failure to discover one's true business in life1 or to find that one has drifted or been forced by circumstance into an uncongenial calling4 ,a right occupation means simply that the aptitudes of a person are in adequate play1 working with the minimum of friction and the maximum of satisfaction4 ,with reference to other members of a community1 this adequacy of action signifies1 of course1 that they are getting the best service the person can render4 ,it is generally believed1 for example1 that slave labor was ultimately wasteful even from the purely economic point of view--that there was not sufficient stimulus to direct the energies of slaves1 and that there was consequent wastage4 ,moreover1 since slaves were confined to certain prescribed callings1 much talent must have remained unavailable to the community1 and hence there was a dead loss4 ,slavery only illustrates on an obvious scale what happens in some degree whenever an individual does not find himself in his work4 ,and he cannot completely find himself when vocations are looked upon with contempt1 and a conventional ideal of a culture which is essentially the same for all is maintained4 ,plato 7ante1 p4 #hh7 laid down the fundamental principle of a philosophy of education when he asserted that it was the business of education to discover what each person is good for1 and to train him to mastery of that mode of excellence1 because such development would also secure the fulfillment of social needs in the most harmonious way4 ,his error was not in qualitative principle1 but in his limited conception of the scope of vocations socially needed2 a limitation of vision which reacted to obscure his perception of the infinite variety of capacities found in different individuals4 #b4 ,an occupation is a continuous activity having a purpose4 ,education through occupations consequently combines within itself more of the factors conducive to learning than any other method4 ,it calls instincts and habits into play2 it is a foe to passive receptivity4 ,it has an end in view2 results are to be accomplished4 ,hence it appeals to thought2 it demands that an idea of an end be steadily maintained1 so that activity cannot be either routine or capricious4 ,since the movement of activity must be progressive1 leading from one stage to another1 observation and ingenuity are required at each stage to overcome obstacles and to discover and readapt means of execution4 ,in short1 an occupation1 pursued under conditions where the realization of the activity rather than merely the external product is the aim1 fulfills the requirements which were laid down earlier in connection with the discussion of aims1 interest1 and thinking4 7,see ,chapters ,,viii1 ,x1 ,,xii47 ,a calling is also of necessity an organizing principle for information and ideas2 for knowledge and intellectual growth4 ,it provides an axis which runs through an immense diversity of detail2 it causes different experiences1 facts1 items of information to fall into order with one another4 ,the lawyer1 the physician1 the laboratory investigator in some branch of chemistry1 the parent1 the citizen interested in his own locality1 has a constant working stimulus to note and relate whatever has to do with his concern4 ,he unconsciously1 from the motivation of his occupation1 reaches out for all relevant information1 and holds to it4 ,the vocation acts as both magnet to attract and as glue to hold4 ,such organization of knowledge is vital1 because it has reference to needs2 it is so expressed and readjusted in action that it never becomes stagnant4 ,no classification1 no selection and arrangement of facts1 which is consciously worked out for purely abstract ends1 can ever compare in solidity or effectiveness with that knit under the stress of an occupation2 in comparison the former sort is formal1 superficial1 and cold4 #c4 ,the only adequate training for occupations is training through occupations4 ,the principle stated early in this book 7see ,chapter ,,vi7 that the educative process is its own end1 and that the only sufficient preparation for later responsibilities comes by making the most of immediately present life1 applies in full force to the vocational phases of education4 ,the dominant vocation of all human beings at all times is living--intellectual and moral growth4 ,in childhood and youth1 with their relative freedom from economic stress1 this fact is naked and unconcealed4 ,to predetermine some future occupation for which education is to be a strict preparation is to injure the possibilities of present development and thereby to reduce the adequacy of preparation for a future right employment4 ,to repeat the principle we have had occasion to appeal to so often1 such training may develop a machine-like skill in routine lines 7it is far from being sure to do so1 since it may develop distaste1 aversion1 and carelessness71 but it will be at the expense of those qualities of alert observation and coherent and ingenious planning which make an occupation intellectually rewarding4 ,in an autocratically managed society1 it is often a conscious object to prevent the development of freedom and responsibility1 a few do the planning and ordering1 the others follow directions and are deliberately confined to narrow and prescribed channels of endeavor4 ,however much such a scheme may inure to the prestige and profit of a class1 it is evident that it limits the development of the subject class2 hardens and confines the opportunities for learning through experience of the master class1 and in both ways hampers the life of the society as a whole4 7,see ante1 p4 #bfj47 ,the only alternative is that all the earlier preparation for vocations be indirect rather than direct2 namely1 through engaging in those active occupations which are indicated by the needs and interests of the pupil at the time4 ,only in this way can there be on the part of the educator and of the one educated a genuine discovery of personal aptitudes so that the proper choice of a specialized pursuit in later life may be indicated4 ,moreover1 the discovery of capacity and aptitude will be a constant process as long as growth continues4 ,it is a conventional and arbitrary view which assumes that discovery of the work to be chosen for adult life is made once for all at some particular date4 ,one has discovered in himself1 say1 an interest1 intellectual and social1 in the things which have to do with engineering and has decided to make that his calling4 ,at most1 this only blocks out in outline the field in which further growth is to be directed4 ,it is a sort of rough sketch for use in direction of further activities4 ,it is the discovery of a profession in the sense in which ,columbus discovered ,america when he touched its shores4 ,future explorations of an indefinitely more detailed and extensive sort remain to be made4 ,when educators conceive vocational guidance as something which leads up to a definitive1 irretrievable1 and complete choice1 both education and the chosen vocation are likely to be rigid1 hampering further growth4 ,in so far1 the calling chosen will be such as to leave the person concerned in a permanently subordinate position1 executing the intelligence of others who have a calling which permits more flexible play and readjustment4 ,and while ordinary usages of language may not justify terming a flexible attitude of readjustment a choice of a new and further calling1 it is such in effect4 ,if even adults have to be on the lookout to see that their calling does not shut down on them and fossilize them1 educators must certainly be careful that the vocational preparation of youth is such as to engage them in a continuous reorganization of aims and methods4 #c4 ,present ,opportunities and ,dangers4 ,in the past1 education has been much more vocational in fact than in name4 7i7 ,the education of the masses was distinctly utilitarian4 ,it was called apprenticeship rather than education1 or else just learning from experience4 ,the schools devoted themselves to the three ,r's in the degree in which ability to go through the forms of reading1 writing1 and figuring were common elements in all kinds of labor4 ,taking part in some special line of work1 under the direction of others1 was the out-of-school phase of this education4 ,the two supplemented each other2 the school work in its narrow and formal character was as much a part of apprenticeship to a calling as that explicitly so termed4 7ii7 ,to a considerable extent1 the education of the dominant classes was essentially vocational--it only happened that their pursuits of ruling and of enjoying were not called professions4 ,for only those things were named vocations or employments which involved manual labor1 laboring for a reward in keep1 or its commuted money equivalent1 or the rendering of personal services to specific persons4 ,for a long time1 for example1 the profession of the surgeon and physician ranked almost with that of the valet or barber--partly because it had so much to do with the body1 and partly because it involved rendering direct service for pay to some definite person4 ,but if we go behind words1 the business of directing social concerns1 whether politically or economically1 whether in war or peace1 is as much a calling as anything else2 and where education has not been completely under the thumb of tradition1 higher schools in the past have been upon the whole calculated to give preparation for this business4 ,moreover1 display1 the adornment of person1 the kind of social companionship and entertainment which give prestige1 and the spending of money1 have been made into definite callings4 ,unconsciously to themselves the higher institutions of learning have been made to contribute to preparation for these employments4 ,even at present1 what is called higher education is for a certain class 7much smaller than it once was7 mainly preparation for engaging effectively in these pursuits4 ,in other respects1 it is largely1 especially in the most advanced work1 training for the calling of teaching and special research4 ,by a peculiar superstition1 education which has to do chiefly with preparation for the pursuit of conspicuous idleness1 for teaching1 and for literary callings1 and for leadership1 has been regarded as non-vocational and even as peculiarly cultural4 ,the literary training which indirectly fits for authorship1 whether of books1 newspaper editorials1 or magazine articles1 is especially subject to this superstition3 many a teacher and author writes and argues in behalf of a cultural and humane education against the encroachments of a specialized practical education1 without recognizing that his own education1 which he calls liberal1 has been mainly training for his own particular calling4 ,he has simply got into the habit of regarding his own business as essentially cultural and of overlooking the cultural possibilities of other employments4 ,at the bottom of these distinctions is undoubtedly the tradition which recognizes as employment only those pursuits where one is responsible for his work to a specific employer1 rather than to the ultimate employer1 the community4 ,there are1 however1 obvious causes for the present conscious emphasis upon vocational education--for the disposition to make explicit and deliberate vocational implications previously tacit4 7i7 ,in the first place1 there is an increased esteem1 in democratic communities1 of whatever has to do with manual labor1 commercial occupations1 and the rendering of tangible services to society4 ,in theory1 men and women are now expected to do something in return for their support--intellectual and economic--by society4 ,labor is extolled2 service is a much-lauded moral ideal4 ,while there is still much admiration and envy of those who can pursue lives of idle conspicuous display1 better moral sentiment condemns such lives4 ,social responsibility for the use of time and personal capacity is more generally recognized than it used to be4 7ii7 ,in the second place1 those vocations which are specifically industrial have gained tremendously in importance in the last century and a half4 ,manufacturing and commerce are no longer domestic and local1 and consequently more or less incidental1 but are world-wide4 ,they engage the best energies of an increasingly large number of persons4 ,the manufacturer1 banker1 and captain of industry have practically displaced a hereditary landed gentry as the immediate directors of social affairs4 ,the problem of social readjustment is openly industrial1 having to do with the relations of capital and labor4 ,the great increase in the social importance of conspicuous industrial processes has inevitably brought to the front questions having to do with the relationship of schooling to industrial life4 ,no such vast social readjustment could occur without offering a challenge to an education inherited from different social conditions1 and without putting up to education new problems4 7iii7 ,in the third place1 there is the fact already repeatedly mentioned3 ,industry has ceased to be essentially an empirical1 rule-of-thumb procedure1 handed down by custom4 ,its technique is now technological3 that is to say1 based upon machinery resulting from discoveries in mathematics1 physics1 chemistry1 bacteriology1 etc4 ,the economic revolution has stimulated science by setting problems for solution1 by producing greater intellectual respect for mechanical appliances4 ,and industry received back payment from science with compound interest4 ,as a consequence1 industrial occupations have infinitely greater intellectual content and infinitely larger cultural possibilities than they used to possess4 ,the demand for such education as will acquaint workers with the scientific and social bases and bearings of their pursuits becomes imperative1 since those who are without it inevitably sink to the role of appendages to the machines they operate4 ,under the old regime all workers in a craft were approximately equals in their knowledge and outlook4 ,personal knowledge and ingenuity were developed within at least a narrow range1 because work was done with tools under the direct command of the worker4 ,now the operator has to adjust himself to his machine1 instead of his tool to his own purposes4 ,while the intellectual possibilities of industry have multiplied1 industrial conditions tend to make industry1 for great masses1 less of an educative resource than it was in the days of hand production for local markets4 ,the burden of realizing the intellectual possibilities inhering in work is thus thrown back on the school4 7iv7 ,in the fourth place1 the pursuit of knowledge has become1 in science1 more experimental1 less dependent upon literary tradition1 and less associated with dialectical methods of reasoning1 and with symbols4 ,as a result1 the subject matter of industrial occupation presents not only more of the content of science than it used to1 but greater opportunity for familiarity with the method by which knowledge is made4 ,the ordinary worker in the factory is of course under too immediate economic pressure to have a chance to produce a knowledge like that of the worker in the laboratory4 ,but in schools1 association with machines and industrial processes may be had under conditions where the chief conscious concern of the students is insight4 ,the separation of shop and laboratory1 where these conditions are fulfilled1 is largely conventional1 the laboratory having the advantage of permitting the following up of any intellectual interest a problem may suggest2 the shop the advantage of emphasizing the social bearings of the scientific principle1 as well as1 with many pupils1 of stimulating a livelier interest4 7v7 ,finally1 the advances which have been made in the psychology of learning in general and of childhood in particular fall into line with the increased importance of industry in life4 ,for modern psychology emphasizes the radical importance of primitive unlearned instincts of exploring1 experimentation1 and trying on4 ,it reveals that learning is not the work of something ready-made called mind1 but that mind itself is an organization of original capacities into activities having significance4 ,as we have already seen 7ante1 p4 #bjd71 in older pupils work is to educative development of raw native activities what play is for younger pupils4 ,moreover1 the passage from play to work should be gradual1 not involving a radical change of attitude but carrying into work the elements of play1 plus continuous reorganization in behalf of greater control4 ,the reader will remark that these five points practically resume the main contentions of the previous part of the work4 ,both practically and philosophically1 the key to the present educational situation lies in a gradual reconstruction of school materials and methods so as to utilize various forms of occupation typifying social callings1 and to bring out their intellectual and moral content4 ,this reconstruction must relegate purely literary methods--including textbooks--and dialectical methods to the position of necessary auxiliary tools in the intelligent development of consecutive and cumulative activities4 ,but our discussion has emphasized the fact that this educational reorganization cannot be accomplished by merely trying to give a technical preparation for industries and professions as they now operate1 much less by merely reproducing existing industrial conditions in the school4 ,the problem is not that of making the schools an adjunct to manufacture and commerce1 but of utilizing the factors of industry to make school life more active1 more full of immediate meaning1 more connected with out-of-school experience4 ,the problem is not easy of solution4 ,there is a standing danger that education will perpetuate the older traditions for a select few1 and effect its adjustment to the newer economic conditions more or less on the basis of acquiescence in the untransformed1 unrationalized1 and unsocialized phases of our defective industrial regime4 ,put in concrete terms1 there is danger that vocational education will be interpreted in theory and practice as trade education3 as a means of securing technical efficiency in specialized future pursuits4 ,education would then become an instrument of perpetuating unchanged the existing industrial order of society1 instead of operating as a means of its transformation4 ,the desired transformation is not difficult to define in a formal way4 ,it signifies a society in which every person shall be occupied in something which makes the lives of others better worth living1 and which accordingly makes the ties which bind persons together more perceptible--which breaks down the barriers of distance between them4 ,it denotes a state of affairs in which the interest of each in his work is uncoerced and intelligent3 based upon its congeniality to his own aptitudes4 ,it goes without saying that we are far from such a social state2 in a literal and quantitative sense1 we may never arrive at it4 ,but in principle1 the quality of social changes already accomplished lies in this direction4 ,there are more ample resources for its achievement now than ever there have been before4 ,no insuperable obstacles1 given the intelligent will for its realization1 stand in the way4 ,success or failure in its realization depends more upon the adoption of educational methods calculated to effect the change than upon anything else4 ,for the change is essentially a change in the quality of mental disposition--an educative change4 ,this does not mean that we can change character and mind by direct instruction and exhortation1 apart from a change in industrial and political conditions4 ,such a conception contradicts our basic idea that character and mind are attitudes of participative response in social affairs4 ,but it does mean that we may produce in schools a projection in type of the society we should like to realize1 and by forming minds in accord with it gradually modify the larger and more recalcitrant features of adult society4 ,sentimentally1 it may seem harsh to say that the greatest evil of the present regime is not found in poverty and in the suffering which it entails1 but in the fact that so many persons have callings which make no appeal to them1 which are pursued simply for the money reward that accrues4 ,for such callings constantly provoke one to aversion1 ill will1 and a desire to slight and evade4 ,neither men's hearts nor their minds are in their work4 ,on the other hand1 those who are not only much better off in worldly goods1 but who are in excessive1 if not monopolistic1 control of the activities of the many are shut off from equality and generality of social intercourse4 ,they are stimulated to pursuits of indulgence and display2 they try to make up for the distance which separates them from others by the impression of force and superior possession and enjoyment which they can make upon others4 ,it would be quite possible for a narrowly conceived scheme of vocational education to perpetuate this division in a hardened form4 ,taking its stand upon a dogma of social predestination1 it would assume that some are to continue to be wage earners under economic conditions like the present1 and would aim simply to give them what is termed a trade education--that is1 greater technical efficiency4 ,technical proficiency is often sadly lacking1 and is surely desirable on all accounts--not merely for the sake of the production of better goods at less cost1 but for the greater happiness found in work4 ,for no one cares for what one cannot half do4 ,but there is a great difference between a proficiency limited to immediate work1 and a competency extended to insight into its social bearings2 between efficiency in carrying out the plans of others and in one forming one's own4 ,at present1 intellectual and emotional limitation characterizes both the employing and the employed class4 ,while the latter often have no concern with their occupation beyond the money return it brings1 the former's outlook may be confined to profit and power4 ,the latter interest generally involves much greater intellectual initiation and larger survey of conditions4 ,for it involves the direction and combination of a large number of diverse factors1 while the interest in wages is restricted to certain direct muscular movements4 ,but none the less there is a limitation of intelligence to technical and non-humane1 non-liberal channels1 so far as the work does not take in its social bearings4 ,and when the animating motive is desire for private profit or personal power1 this limitation is inevitable4 ,in fact1 the advantage in immediate social sympathy and humane disposition often lies with the economically unfortunate1 who have not experienced the hardening effects of a one-sided control of the affairs of others4 ,any scheme for vocational education which takes its point of departure from the industrial regime that now exists1 is likely to assume and to perpetuate its divisions and weaknesses1 and thus to become an instrument in accomplishing the feudal dogma of social predestination4 ,those who are in a position to make their wishes good1 will demand a liberal1 a cultural occupation1 and one which fits for directive power the youth in whom they are directly interested4 ,to split the system1 and give to others1 less fortunately situated1 an education conceived mainly as specific trade preparation1 is to treat the schools as an agency for transferring the older division of labor and leisure1 culture and service1 mind and body1 directed and directive class1 into a society nominally democratic4 ,such a vocational education inevitably discounts the scientific and historic human connections of the materials and processes dealt with4 ,to include such things in narrow trade education would be to waste time2 concern for them would not be practical4 ,they are reserved for those who have leisure at command--the leisure due to superior economic resources4 ,such things might even be dangerous to the interests of the controlling class1 arousing discontent or ambitions beyond the station of those working under the direction of others4 ,but an education which acknowledges the full intellectual and social meaning of a vocation would include instruction in the historic background of present conditions2 training in science to give intelligence and initiative in dealing with material and agencies of production2 and study of economics1 civics1 and politics1 to bring the future worker into touch with the problems of the day and the various methods proposed for its improvement4 ,above all1 it would train power of readaptation to changing conditions so that future workers would not become blindly subject to a fate imposed upon them4 ,this ideal has to contend not only with the inertia of existing educational traditions1 but also with the opposition of those who are entrenched in command of the industrial machinery1 and who realize that such an educational system if made general would threaten their ability to use others for their own ends4 ,but this very fact is the presage of a more equitable and enlightened social order1 for it gives evidence of the dependence of social reorganization upon educational reconstruction4 ,it is accordingly an encouragement to those believing in a better order to undertake the promotion of a vocational education which does not subject youth to the demands and standards of the present system1 but which utilizes its scientific and social factors to develop a courageous intelligence1 and to make intelligence practical and executive4 ,summary4 ,a vocation signifies any form of continuous activity which renders service to others and engages personal powers in behalf of the accomplishment of results4 ,the question of the relation of vocation to education brings to a focus the various problems previously discussed regarding the connection of thought with bodily activity2 of individual conscious development with associated life2 of theoretical culture with practical behavior having definite results2 of making a livelihood with the worthy enjoyment of leisure4 ,in general1 the opposition to recognition of the vocational phases of life in education 7except for the utilitarian three ,r's in elementary schooling7 accompanies the conservation of aristocratic ideals of the past4 ,but1 at the present juncture1 there is a movement in behalf of something called vocational training which1 if carried into effect1 would harden these ideas into a form adapted to the existing industrial regime4 ,this movement would continue the traditional liberal or cultural education for the few economically able to enjoy it1 and would give to the masses a narrow technical trade education for specialized callings1 carried on under the control of others4 ,this scheme denotes1 of course1 simply a perpetuation of the older social division1 with its counterpart intellectual and moral dualisms4 ,but it means its continuation under conditions where it has much less justification for existence4 ,for industrial life is now so dependent upon science and so intimately affects all forms of social intercourse1 that there is an opportunity to utilize it for development of mind and character4 ,moreover1 a right educational use of it would react upon intelligence and interest so as to modify1 in connection with legislation and administration1 the socially obnoxious features of the present industrial and commercial order4 ,it would turn the increasing fund of social sympathy to constructive account1 instead of leaving it a somewhat blind philanthropic sentiment4 ,it would give those who engage in industrial callings desire and ability to share in social control1 and ability to become masters of their industrial fate4 ,it would enable them to saturate with meaning the technical and mechanical features which are so marked a feature of our machine system of production and distribution4 ,so much for those who now have the poorer economic opportunities4 ,with the representatives of the more privileged portion of the community1 it would increase sympathy for labor1 create a disposition of mind which can discover the culturing elements in useful activity1 and increase a sense of social responsibility4 ,the crucial position of the question of vocational education at present is due1 in other words1 to the fact that it concentrates in a specific issue two fundamental questions3--,whether intelligence is best exercised apart from or within activity which puts nature to human use1 and whether individual culture is best secured under egoistic or social conditions4 ,no discussion of details is undertaken in this chapter1 because this conclusion but summarizes the discussion of the previous chapters1 ,,xv to ,,xxii1 inclusive4 ,chapter ,twenty-four3 ,philosophy of ,education #a4 ,a ,critical ,review4 ,although we are dealing with the philosophy of education1 ,,do definition of philosophy has yet been given2 nor has there been an explicit consideration of the nature of a philosophy of education4 ,this topic is now introduced by a summary account of the logical order implied in the previous discussions1 for the purpose of bringing out the philosophic issues involved4 ,afterwards we shall undertake a brief discussion1 in more specifically philosophical terms1 of the theories of knowledge and of morals implied in different educational ideals as they operate in practice4 ,the prior chapters fall logically into three parts4 ,i4 ,the first chapters deal with education as a social need and function4 ,their purpose is to outline the general features of education as the process by which social groups maintain their continuous existence4 ,education was shown to be a process of renewal of the meanings of experience through a process of transmission1 partly incidental to the ordinary companionship or intercourse of adults and youth1 partly deliberately instituted to effect social continuity4 ,this process was seen to involve control and growth of both the immature individual and the group in which he lives4 ,this consideration was formal in that it took no specific account of the quality of the social group concerned--the kind of society aiming at its own perpetuation through education4 ,the general discussion was then specified by application to social groups which are intentionally progressive1 and which aim at a greater variety of mutually shared interests in distinction from those which aim simply at the preservation of established customs4 ,such societies were found to be democratic in quality1 because of the greater freedom allowed the constituent members1 and the conscious need of securing in individuals a consciously socialized interest1 instead of trusting mainly to the force of customs operating under the control of a superior class4 ,the sort of education appropriate to the development of a democratic community was then explicitly taken as the criterion of the further1 more detailed analysis of education4 ,,ii4 ,this analysis1 based upon the democratic criterion1 was seen to imply the ideal of a continuous reconstruction or reorganizing of experience1 of such a nature as to increase its recognized meaning or social content1 and as to increase the capacity of individuals to act as directive guardians of this reorganization4 7,see ,chapters ,,vi-,,vii47 ,this distinction was then used to outline the respective characters of subject matter and method4 ,it also defined their unity1 since method in study and learning upon this basis is just the consciously directed movement of reorganization of the subject matter of experience4 ,from this point of view the main principles of method and subject matter of learning were developed 7,chapters ,,xiii-,,xiv47 ,,iii4 ,save for incidental criticisms designed to illustrate principles by force of contrast1 this phase of the discussion took for granted the democratic criterion and its application in present social life4 ,in the subsequent chapters 7,,xviii-,,xxii7 we considered the present limitation of its actual realization4 ,they were found to spring from the notion that experience consists of a variety of segregated domains1 or interests1 each having its own independent value1 material1 and method1 each checking every other1 and1 when each is kept properly bounded by the others1 forming a kind of balance of powers in education4 ,we then proceeded to an analysis of the various assumptions underlying this segregation4 ,on the practical side1 they were found to have their cause in the divisions of society into more or less rigidly marked-off classes and groups--in other words1 in obstruction to full and flexible social interaction and intercourse4 ,these social ruptures of continuity were seen to have their intellectual formulation in various dualisms or antitheses--such as that of labor and leisure1 practical and intellectual activity1 man and nature1 individuality and association1 culture and vocation4 ,in this discussion1 we found that these different issues have their counterparts in formulations which have been made in classic philosophic systems2 and that they involve the chief problems of philosophy--such as mind 7or spirit7 and matter1 body and mind1 the mind and the world1 the individual and his relationships to others1 etc4 ,underlying these various separations we found the fundamental assumption to be an isolation of mind from activity involving physical conditions1 bodily organs1 material appliances1 and natural objects4 ,consequently1 there was indicated a philosophy which recognizes the origin1 place1 and function of mind in an activity which controls the environment4 ,thus we have completed the circuit and returned to the conceptions of the first portion of this book3 such as the biological continuity of human impulses and instincts with natural energies2 the dependence of the growth of mind upon participation in conjoint activities having a common purpose2 the influence of the physical environment through the uses made of it in the social medium2 the necessity of utilization of individual variations in desire and thinking for a progressively developing society2 the essential unity of method and subject matter2 the intrinsic continuity of ends and means2 the recognition of mind as thinking which perceives and tests the meanings of behavior4 ,these conceptions are consistent with the philosophy which sees intelligence to be the purposive reorganization1 through action1 of the material of experience2 and they are inconsistent with each of the dualistic philosophies mentioned4 #b4 ,the ,nature of ,philosophy4 ,our further task is to extract and make explicit the idea of philosophy implicit in these considerations4 ,we have already virtually described1 though not defined1 philosophy in terms of the problems with which it deals2 and we have pointed out that these problems originate in the conflicts and difficulties of social life4 ,the problems are such things as the relations of mind and matter2 body and soul2 humanity and physical nature2 the individual and the social2 theory--or knowing1 and practice--or doing4 ,the philosophical systems which formulate these problems record the main lineaments and difficulties of contemporary social practice4 ,they bring to explicit consciousness what men have come to think1 in virtue of the quality of their current experience1 about nature1 themselves1 and the reality they conceive to include or to govern both4 ,as we might expect1 then1 philosophy has generally been defined in ways which imply a certain totality1 generality1 and ultimateness of both subject matter and method4 ,with respect to subject matter1 philosophy is an attempt to comprehend--that is1 to gather together the varied details of the world and of life into a single inclusive whole1 which shall either be a unity1 or1 as in the dualistic systems1 shall reduce the plural details to a small number of ultimate principles4 ,on the side of the attitude of the philosopher and of those who accept his conclusions1 there is the endeavor to attain as unified1 consistent1 and complete an outlook upon experience as is possible4 ,this aspect is expressed in the word 'philosophy'--love of wisdom4 ,whenever philosophy has been taken seriously1 it has always been assumed that it signified achieving a wisdom which would influence the conduct of life4 ,witness the fact that almost all ancient schools of philosophy were also organized ways of living1 those who accepted their tenets being committed to certain distinctive modes of conduct2 witness the intimate connection of philosophy with the theology of the ,roman church in the middle ages1 its frequent association with religious interests1 and1 at national crises1 its association with political struggles4 ,this direct and intimate connection of philosophy with an outlook upon life obviously differentiates philosophy from science4 ,particular facts and laws of science evidently influence conduct4 ,they suggest things to do and not do1 and provide means of execution4 ,when science denotes not simply a report of the particular facts discovered about the world but a general attitude toward it--as distinct from special things to do --it merges into philosophy4 ,for an underlying disposition represents an attitude not to this and that thing nor even to the aggregate of known things1 but to the considerations which govern conduct4 ,hence philosophy cannot be defined simply from the side of subject matter4 ,for this reason1 the definition of such conceptions as generality1 totality1 and ultimateness is most readily reached from the side of the disposition toward the world which they connote4 ,in any literal and quantitative sense1 these terms do not apply to the subject matter of knowledge1 for completeness and finality are out of the question4 ,the very nature of experience as an ongoing1 changing process forbids4 ,in a less rigid sense1 they apply to science rather than to philosophy4 ,for obviously it is to mathematics1 physics1 chemistry1 biology1 anthropology1 history1 etc4 that we must go1 not to philosophy1 to find out the facts of the world4 ,it is for the sciences to say what generalizations are tenable about the world and what they specifically are4 ,but when we ask what sort of permanent disposition of action toward the world the scientific disclosures exact of us we are raising a philosophic question4 ,from this point of view1 totality does not mean the hopeless task of a quantitative summation4 ,it means rather consistency of mode of response in reference to the plurality of events which occur4 ,consistency does not mean literal identity2 for since the same thing does not happen twice1 an exact repetition of a reaction involves some maladjustment4 ,totality means continuity--the carrying on of a former habit of action with the readaptation necessary to keep it alive and growing4 ,instead of signifying a ready-made complete scheme of action1 it means keeping the balance in a multitude of diverse actions1 so that each borrows and gives significance to every other4 ,any person who is open-minded and sensitive to new perceptions1 and who has concentration and responsibility in connecting them has1 in so far1 a philosophic disposition4 ,one of the popular senses of philosophy is calm and endurance in the face of difficulty and loss2 it is even supposed to be a power to bear pain without complaint4 ,this meaning is a tribute to the influence of the ,stoic philosophy rather than an attribute of philosophy in general4 ,but in so far as it suggests that the wholeness characteristic of philosophy is a power to learn1 or to extract meaning1 from even the unpleasant vicissitudes of experience and to embody what is learned in an ability to go on learning1 it is justified in any scheme4 ,an analogous interpretation applies to the generality and ultimateness of philosophy4 ,taken literally1 they are absurd pretensions2 they indicate insanity4 ,finality does not mean1 however1 that experience is ended and exhausted1 but means the disposition to penetrate to deeper levels of meaning--to go below the surface and find out the connections of any event or object1 and to keep at it4 ,in like manner the philosophic attitude is general in the sense that it is averse to taking anything as isolated2 it tries to place an act in its context--which constitutes its significance4 ,it is of assistance to connect philosophy with thinking in its distinction from knowledge4 ,knowledge1 grounded knowledge1 is science2 it represents objects which have been settled1 ordered1 disposed of rationally4 ,thinking1 on the other hand1 is prospective in reference4 ,it is occasioned by an unsettlement and it aims at overcoming a disturbance4 ,philosophy is thinking what the known demands of us--what responsive attitude it exacts4 ,it is an idea of what is possible1 not a record of accomplished fact4 ,hence it is hypothetical1 like all thinking4 ,it presents an assignment of something to be done--something to be tried4 ,its value lies not in furnishing solutions 7which can be achieved only in action7 but in defining difficulties and suggesting methods for dealing with them4 ,philosophy might almost be described as thinking which has become conscious of itself--which has generalized its place1 function1 and value in experience4 ,more specifically1 the demand for a total attitude arises because there is the need of integration in action of the conflicting various interests in life4 ,where interests are so superficial that they glide readily into one another1 or where they are not sufficiently organized to come into conflict with one another1 the need for philosophy is not perceptible4 ,but when the scientific interest conflicts with1 say1 the religious1 or the economic with the scientific or aesthetic1 or when the conservative concern for order is at odds with the progressive interest in freedom1 or when institutionalism clashes with individuality1 there is a stimulus to discover some more comprehensive point of view from which the divergencies may be brought together1 and consistency or continuity of experience recovered4 ,often these clashes may be settled by an individual for himself2 the area of the struggle of aims is limited and a person works out his own rough accommodations4 ,such homespun philosophies are genuine and often adequate4 ,but they do not result in systems of philosophy4 ,these arise when the discrepant claims of different ideals of conduct affect the community as a whole1 and the need for readjustment is general4 ,these traits explain some things which are often brought as objections against philosophies1 such as the part played in them by individual speculation1 and their controversial diversity1 as well as the fact that philosophy seems to be repeatedly occupied with much the same questions differently stated4 ,without doubt1 all these things characterize historic philosophies more or less4 ,but they are not objections to philosophy so much as they are to human nature1 and even to the world in which human nature is set4 ,if there are genuine uncertainties in life1 philosophies must reflect that uncertainty4 ,if there are different diagnoses of the cause of a difficulty1 and different proposals for dealing with it2 if1 that is1 the conflict of interests is more or less embodied in different sets of persons1 there must be divergent competing philosophies4 ,with respect to what has happened1 sufficient evidence is all that is needed to bring agreement and certainty4 ,the thing itself is sure4 ,but with reference to what it is wise to do in a complicated situation1 discussion is inevitable precisely because the thing itself is still indeterminate4 ,one would not expect a ruling class living at ease to have the same philosophy of life as those who were having a hard struggle for existence4 ,if the possessing and the dispossessed had the same fundamental disposition toward the world1 it would argue either insincerity or lack of seriousness4 ,a community devoted to industrial pursuits1 active in business and commerce1 is not likely to see the needs and possibilities of life in the same way as a country with high aesthetic culture and little enterprise in turning the energies of nature to mechanical account4 ,a social group with a fairly continuous history will respond mentally to a crisis in a very different way from one which has felt the shock of abrupt breaks4 ,even if the same data were present1 they would be evaluated differently4 ,but the different sorts of experience attending different types of life prevent just the same data from presenting themselves1 as well as lead to a different scheme of values4 ,as for the similarity of problems1 this is often more a matter of appearance than of fact1 due to old discussions being translated into the terms of contemporary perplexities4 ,but in certain fundamental respects the same predicaments of life recur from time to time with only such changes as are due to change of social context1 including the growth of the sciences4 ,the fact that philosophic problems arise because of widespread and widely felt difficulties in social practice is disguised because philosophers become a specialized class which uses a technical language1 unlike the vocabulary in which the direct difficulties are stated4 ,but where a system becomes influential1 its connection with a conflict of interests calling for some program of social adjustment may always be discovered4 ,at this point1 the intimate connection between philosophy and education appears4 ,in fact1 education offers a vantage ground from which to penetrate to the human1 as distinct from the technical1 significance of philosophic discussions4 ,the student of philosophy in itself is always in danger of taking it as so much nimble or severe intellectual exercise--as something said by philosophers and concerning them alone4 ,but when philosophic issues are approached from the side of the kind of mental disposition to which they correspond1 or the differences in educational practice they make when acted upon1 the life-situations which they formulate can never be far from view4 ,if a theory makes no difference in educational endeavor1 it must be artificial4 ,the educational point of view enables one to envisage the philosophic problems where they arise and thrive1 where they are at home1 and where acceptance or rejection makes a difference in practice4 ,if we are willing to conceive education as the process of forming fundamental dispositions1 intellectual and emotional1 toward nature and fellow men1 philosophy may even be defined as the general theory of education4 ,unless a philosophy is to remain symbolic--or verbal--or a sentimental indulgence for a few1 or else mere arbitrary dogma1 its auditing of past experience and its program of values must take effect in conduct4 ,public agitation1 propaganda1 legislative and administrative action are effective in producing the change of disposition which a philosophy indicates as desirable1 but only in the degree in which they are educative--that is to say1 in the degree in which they modify mental and moral attitudes4 ,and at the best1 such methods are compromised by the fact they are used with those whose habits are already largely set1 while education of youth has a fairer and freer field of operation4 ,on the other side1 the business of schooling tends to become a routine empirical affair unless its aims and methods are animated by such a broad and sympathetic survey of its place in contemporary life as it is the business of philosophy to provide4 ,positive science always implies practically the ends which the community is concerned to achieve4 ,isolated from such ends1 it is matter of indifference whether its disclosures are used to cure disease or to spread it2 to increase the means of sustenance of life or to manufacture war material to wipe life out4 ,if society is interested in one of these things rather than another1 science shows the way of attainment4 ,philosophy thus has a double task3 that of criticizing existing aims with respect to the existing state of science1 pointing out values which have become obsolete with the command of new resources1 showing what values are merely sentimental because there are no means for their realization2 and also that of interpreting the results of specialized science in their bearing on future social endeavor4 ,it is impossible that it should have any success in these tasks without educational equivalents as to what to do and what not to do4 ,for philosophic theory has no ,aladdin's lamp to summon into immediate existence the values which it intellectually constructs4 ,in the mechanical arts1 the sciences become methods of managing things so as to utilize their energies for recognized aims4 ,by the educative arts philosophy may generate methods of utilizing the energies of human beings in accord with serious and thoughtful conceptions of life4 ,education is the laboratory in which philosophic distinctions become concrete and are tested4 ,it is suggestive that ,european philosophy originated 7among the ,athenians7 under the direct pressure of educational questions4 ,the earlier history of philosophy1 developed by the ,greeks in ,asia ,minor and ,italy1 so far as its range of topics is concerned1 is mainly a chapter in the history of science rather than of philosophy as that word is understood to-day4 ,it had nature for its subject1 and speculated as to how things are made and changed4 ,later the traveling teachers1 known as the ,sophists1 began to apply the results and the methods of the natural philosophers to human conduct4 ,when the ,sophists1 the first body of professional educators in ,europe1 instructed the youth in virtue1 the political arts1 and the management of city and household1 philosophy began to deal with the relation of the individual to the universal1 to some comprehensive class1 or to some group2 the relation of man and nature1 of tradition and reflection1 of knowledge and action4 ,can virtue1 approved excellence in any line1 be learned1 they asked8 ,what is learning8 ,it has to do with knowledge4 ,what1 then1 is knowledge8 ,how is it achieved8 ,through the senses1 or by apprenticeship in some form of doing1 or by reason that has undergone a preliminary logical discipline8 ,since learning is coming to know1 it involves a passage from ignorance to wisdom1 from privation to fullness from defect to perfection1 from non-being to being1 in the ,greek way of putting it4 ,how is such a transition possible8 ,is change1 becoming1 development really possible and if so1 how8 ,and supposing such questions answered1 what is the relation of instruction1 of knowledge1 to virtue8 ,this last question led to opening the problem of the relation of reason to action1 of theory to practice1 since virtue clearly dwelt in action4 ,was not knowing1 the activity of reason1 the noblest attribute of man8 ,and consequently was not purely intellectual activity itself the highest of all excellences1 compared with which the virtues of neighborliness and the citizen's life were secondary8 ,or1 on the other hand1 was the vaunted intellectual knowledge more than empty and vain pretense1 demoralizing to character and destructive of the social ties that bound men together in their community life8 ,was not the only true1 because the only moral1 life gained through obedient habituation to the customary practices of the community8 ,and was not the new education an enemy to good citizenship1 because it set up a rival standard to the established traditions of the community8 ,in the course of two or three generations such questions were cut loose from their original practical bearing upon education and were discussed on their own account2 that is1 as matters of philosophy as an independent branch of inquiry4 ,but the fact that the stream of ,european philosophical thought arose as a theory of educational procedure remains an eloquent witness to the intimate connection of philosophy and education4 ,philosophy of education is not an external application of ready-made ideas to a system of practice having a radically different origin and purpose3 it is only an explicit formulation of the problems of the formation of right mental and moral habitudes in respect to the difficulties of contemporary social life4 ,the most penetrating definition of philosophy which can be given is1 then1 that it is the theory of education in its most general phases4 ,the reconstruction of philosophy1 of education1 and of social ideals and methods thus go hand in hand4 ,if there is especial need of educational reconstruction at the present time1 if this need makes urgent a reconsideration of the basic ideas of traditional philosophic systems1 it is because of the thoroughgoing change in social life accompanying the advance of science1 the industrial revolution1 and the development of democracy4 ,such practical changes cannot take place without demanding an educational reformation to meet them1 and without leading men to ask what ideas and ideals are implicit in these social changes1 and what revisions they require of the ideas and ideals which are inherited from older and unlike cultures4 ,incidentally throughout the whole book1 explicitly in the last few chapters1 we have been dealing with just these questions as they affect the relationship of mind and body1 theory and practice1 man and nature1 the individual and social1 etc4 ,in our concluding chapters we shall sum up the prior discussions with respect first to the philosophy of knowledge1 and then to the philosophy of morals4 ,summary4 ,after a review designed to bring out the philosophic issues implicit in the previous discussions1 philosophy was defined as the generalized theory of education4 ,philosophy was stated to be a form of thinking1 which1 like all thinking1 finds its origin in what is uncertain in the subject matter of experience1 which aims to locate the nature of the perplexity and to frame hypotheses for its clearing up to be tested in action4 ,philosophic thinking has for its differentia the fact that the uncertainties with which it deals are found in widespread social conditions and aims1 consisting in a conflict of organized interests and institutional claims4 ,since the only way of bringing about a harmonious readjustment of the opposed tendencies is through a modification of emotional and intellectual disposition1 philosophy is at once an explicit formulation of the various interests of life and a propounding of points of view and methods through which a better balance of interests may be effected4 ,since education is the process through which the needed transformation may be accomplished and not remain a mere hypothesis as to what is desirable1 we reach a justification of the statement that philosophy is the theory of education as a deliberately conducted practice4 ,chapter ,twenty-five3 ,theories of ,knowledge #a4 ,continuity versus ,dualism4 ,a number of theories of knowing have been criticized in the previous pages4 ,in spite of their differences from one another1 they all agree in one fundamental respect which contrasts with the theory which has been positively advanced4 ,the latter assumes continuity2 the former state or imply certain basic divisions1 separations1 or antitheses1 technically called dualisms4 ,the origin of these divisions we have found in the hard and fast walls which mark off social groups and classes within a group3 like those between rich and poor1 men and women1 noble and baseborn1 ruler and ruled4 ,these barriers mean absence of fluent and free intercourse4 ,this absence is equivalent to the setting up of different types of life-experience1 each with isolated subject matter1 aim1 and standard of values4 ,every such social condition must be formulated in a dualistic philosophy1 if philosophy is to be a sincere account of experience4 ,when it gets beyond dualism--as many philosophies do in form--it can only be by appeal to something higher than anything found in experience1 by a flight to some transcendental realm4 ,and in denying duality in name such theories restore it in fact1 for they end in a division between things of this world as mere appearances and an inaccessible essence of reality4 ,so far as these divisions persist and others are added to them1 each leaves its mark upon the educational system1 until the scheme of education1 taken as a whole1 is a deposit of various purposes and procedures4 ,the outcome is that kind of check and balance of segregated factors and values which has been described4 7,see ,chapter ,,xviii47 ,the present discussion is simply a formulation1 in the terminology of philosophy1 of various antithetical conceptions involved in the theory of knowing4 ,in the first place1 there is the opposition of empirical and higher rational knowing4 ,the first is connected with everyday affairs1 serves the purposes of the ordinary individual who has no specialized intellectual pursuit1 and brings his wants into some kind of working connection with the immediate environment4 ,such knowing is depreciated1 if not despised1 as purely utilitarian1 lacking in cultural significance4 ,rational knowledge is supposed to be something which touches reality in ultimate1 intellectual fashion2 to be pursued for its own sake and properly to terminate in purely theoretical insight1 not debased by application in behavior4 ,socially1 the distinction corresponds to that of the intelligence used by the working classes and that used by a learned class remote from concern with the means of living4 ,philosophically1 the difference turns about the distinction of the particular and universal4 ,experience is an aggregate of more or less isolated particulars1 acquaintance with each of which must be separately made4 ,reason deals with universals1 with general principles1 with laws1 which lie above the welter of concrete details4 ,in the educational precipitate1 the pupil is supposed to have to learn1 on one hand1 a lot of items of specific information1 each standing by itself1 and upon the other hand1 to become familiar with a certain number of laws and general relationships4 ,geography1 as often taught1 illustrates the former2 mathematics1 beyond the rudiments of figuring1 the latter4 ,for all practical purposes1 they represent two independent worlds4 ,another antithesis is suggested by the two senses of the word learning4 ,on the one hand1 learning is the sum total of what is known1 as that is handed down by books and learned men4 ,it is something external1 an accumulation of cognitions as one might store material commodities in a warehouse4 ,truth exists ready-made somewhere4 ,study is then the process by which an individual draws on what is in storage4 ,on the other hand1 learning means something which the individual does when he studies4 ,it is an active1 personally conducted affair4 ,the dualism here is between knowledge as something external1 or1 as it is often called1 objective1 and knowing as something purely internal1 subjective1 psychical4 ,there is1 on one side1 a body of truth1 ready-made1 and1 on the other1 a ready-made mind equipped with a faculty of knowing--if it only wills to exercise it1 which it is often strangely loath to do4 ,the separation1 often touched upon1 between subject matter and method is the educational equivalent of this dualism4 ,socially the distinction has to do with the part of life which is dependent upon authority and that where individuals are free to advance4 ,another dualism is that of activity and passivity in knowing4 ,purely empirical and physical things are often supposed to be known by receiving impressions4 ,physical things somehow stamp themselves upon the mind or convey themselves into consciousness by means of the sense organs4 ,rational knowledge and knowledge of spiritual things is supposed1 on the contrary1 to spring from activity initiated within the mind1 an activity carried on better if it is kept remote from all sullying touch of the senses and external objects4 ,the distinction between sense training and object lessons and laboratory exercises1 and pure ideas contained in books1 and appropriated--so it is thought--by some miraculous output of mental energy1 is a fair expression in education of this distinction4 ,socially1 it reflects a division between those who are controlled by direct concern with things and those who are free to cultivate themselves4 ,another current opposition is that said to exist between the intellect and the emotions4 ,the emotions are conceived to be purely private and personal1 having nothing to do with the work of pure intelligence in apprehending facts and truths1--except perhaps the single emotion of intellectual curiosity4 ,the intellect is a pure light2 the emotions are a disturbing heat4 ,the mind turns outward to truth2 the emotions turn inward to considerations of personal advantage and loss4 ,thus in education we have that systematic depreciation of interest which has been noted1 plus the necessity in practice1 with most pupils1 of recourse to extraneous and irrelevant rewards and penalties in order to induce the person who has a mind 7much as his clothes have a pocket7 to apply that mind to the truths to be known4 ,thus we have the spectacle of professional educators decrying appeal to interest while they uphold with great dignity the need of reliance upon examinations1 marks1 promotions and emotions1 prizes1 and the time-honored paraphernalia of rewards and punishments4 ,the effect of this situation in crippling the teacher's sense of humor has not received the attention which it deserves4 ,all of these separations culminate in one between knowing and doing1 theory and practice1 between mind as the end and spirit of action and the body as its organ and means4 ,we shall not repeat what has been said about the source of this dualism in the division of society into a class laboring with their muscles for material sustenance and a class which1 relieved from economic pressure1 devotes itself to the arts of expression and social direction4 ,nor is it necessary to speak again of the educational evils which spring from the separation4 ,we shall be content to summarize the forces which tend to make the untenability of this conception obvious and to replace it by the idea of continuity4 7i7 ,the advance of physiology and the psychology associated with it have shown the connection of mental activity with that of the nervous system4 ,too often recognition of connection has stopped short at this point2 the older dualism of soul and body has been replaced by that of the brain and the rest of the body4 ,but in fact the nervous system is only a specialized mechanism for keeping all bodily activities working together4 ,instead of being isolated from them1 as an organ of knowing from organs of motor response1 it is the organ by which they interact responsively with one another4 ,the brain is essentially an organ for effecting the reciprocal adjustment to each other of the stimuli received from the environment and responses directed upon it4 ,note that the adjusting is reciprocal2 the brain not only enables organic activity to be brought to bear upon any object of the environment in response to a sensory stimulation1 but this response also determines what the next stimulus will be4 ,see what happens1 for example1 when a carpenter is at work upon a board1 or an etcher upon his plate--or in any case of a consecutive activity4 ,while each motor response is adjusted to the state of affairs indicated through the sense organs1 that motor response shapes the next sensory stimulus4 ,generalizing this illustration1 the brain is the machinery for a constant reorganizing of activity so as to maintain its continuity2 that is to say1 to make such modifications in future action as are required because of what has already been done4 ,the continuity of the work of the carpenter distinguishes it from a routine repetition of identically the same motion1 and from a random activity where there is nothing cumulative4 ,what makes it continuous1 consecutive1 or concentrated is that each earlier act prepares the way for later acts1 while these take account of or reckon with the results already attained--the basis of all responsibility4 ,no one who has realized the full force of the facts of the connection of knowing with the nervous system and of the nervous system with the readjusting of activity continuously to meet new conditions1 will doubt that knowing has to do with reorganizing activity1 instead of being something isolated from all activity1 complete on its own account4 7ii7 ,the development of biology clinches this lesson1 with its discovery of evolution4 ,for the philosophic significance of the doctrine of evolution lies precisely in its emphasis upon continuity of simpler and more complex organic forms until we reach man4 ,the development of organic forms begins with structures where the adjustment of environment and organism is obvious1 and where anything which can be called mind is at a minimum4 ,as activity becomes more complex1 coordinating a greater number of factors in space and time1 intelligence plays a more and more marked role1 for it has a larger span of the future to forecast and plan for4 ,the effect upon the theory of knowing is to displace the notion that it is the activity of a mere onlooker or spectator of the world1 the notion which goes with the idea of knowing as something complete in itself4 ,for the doctrine of organic development means that the living creature is a part of the world1 sharing its vicissitudes and fortunes1 and making itself secure in its precarious dependence only as it intellectually identifies itself with the things about it1 and1 forecasting the future consequences of what is going on1 shapes its own activities accordingly4 ,if the living1 experiencing being is an intimate participant in the activities of the world to which it belongs1 then knowledge is a mode of participation1 valuable in the degree in which it is effective4 ,it cannot be the idle view of an unconcerned spectator4 7iii7 ,the development of the experimental method as the method of getting knowledge and of making sure it is knowledge1 and not mere opinion--the method of both discovery and proof--is the remaining great force in bringing about a transformation in the theory of knowledge4 ,the experimental method has two sides4 7i7 ,on one hand1 it means that we have no right to call anything knowledge except where our activity has actually produced certain physical changes in things1 which agree with and confirm the conception entertained4 ,short of such specific changes1 our beliefs are only hypotheses1 theories1 suggestions1 guesses1 and are to be entertained tentatively and to be utilized as indications of experiments to be tried4 7ii7 ,on the other hand1 the experimental method of thinking signifies that thinking is of avail2 that it is of avail in just the degree in which the anticipation of future consequences is made on the basis of thorough observation of present conditions4 ,experimentation1 in other words1 is not equivalent to blind reacting4 ,such surplus activity--a surplus with reference to what has been observed and is now anticipated--is indeed an unescapable factor in all our behavior1 but it is not experiment save as consequences are noted and are used to make predictions and plans in similar situations in the future4 ,the more the meaning of the experimental method is perceived1 the more our trying out of a certain way of treating the material resources and obstacles which confront us embodies a prior use of intelligence4 ,what we call magic was with respect to many things the experimental method of the savage2 but for him to try was to try his luck1 not his ideas4 ,the scientific experimental method is1 on the contrary1 a trial of ideas2 hence even when practically--or immediately--unsuccessful1 it is intellectual1 fruitful2 for we learn from our failures when our endeavors are seriously thoughtful4 ,the experimental method is new as a scientific resource--as a systematized means of making knowledge1 though as old as life as a practical device4 ,hence it is not surprising that men have not recognized its full scope4 ,for the most part1 its significance is regarded as belonging to certain technical and merely physical matters4 ,it will doubtless take a long time to secure the perception that it holds equally as to the forming and testing of ideas in social and moral matters4 ,men still want the crutch of dogma1 of beliefs fixed by authority1 to relieve them of the trouble of thinking and the responsibility of directing their activity by thought4 ,they tend to confine their own thinking to a consideration of which one among the rival systems of dogma they will accept4 ,hence the schools are better adapted1 as ,john ,stuart ,mill said1 to make disciples than inquirers4 ,but every advance in the influence of the experimental method is sure to aid in outlawing the literary1 dialectic1 and authoritative methods of forming beliefs which have governed the schools of the past1 and to transfer their prestige to methods which will procure an active concern with things and persons1 directed by aims of increasing temporal reach and deploying greater range of things in space4 ,in time the theory of knowing must be derived from the practice which is most successful in making knowledge2 and then that theory will be employed to improve the methods which are less successful4 #b4 ,schools of ,method4 ,there are various systems of philosophy with characteristically different conceptions of the method of knowing4 ,some of them are named scholasticism1 sensationalism1 rationalism1 idealism1 realism1 empiricism1 transcendentalism1 pragmatism1 etc4 ,many of them have been criticized in connection with the discussion of some educational problem4 ,we are here concerned with them as involving deviations from that method which has proved most effective in achieving knowledge1 for a consideration of the deviations may render clearer the true place of knowledge in experience4 ,in brief1 the function of knowledge is to make one experience freely available in other experiences4 ,the word freely marks the difference between the principle of knowledge and that of habit4 ,habit means that an individual undergoes a modification through an experience1 which modification forms a predisposition to easier and more effective action in a like direction in the future4 ,thus it also has the function of making one experience available in subsequent experiences4 ,within certain limits1 it performs this function successfully4 ,but habit1 apart from knowledge1 does not make allowance for change of conditions1 for novelty4 ,prevision of change is not part of its scope1 for habit assumes the essential likeness of the new situation with the old4 ,consequently it often leads astray1 or comes between a person and the successful performance of his task1 just as the skill1 based on habit alone1 of the mechanic will desert him when something unexpected occurs in the running of the machine4 ,but a man who understands the machine is the man who knows what he is about4 ,he knows the conditions under which a given habit works1 and is in a position to introduce the changes which will readapt it to new conditions4 ,in other words1 knowledge is a perception of those connections of an object which determine its applicability in a given situation4 ,to take an extreme example2 savages react to a flaming comet as they are accustomed to react to other events which threaten the security of their life4 ,since they try to frighten wild animals or their enemies by shrieks1 beating of gongs1 brandishing of weapons1 etc41 they use the same methods to scare away the comet4 ,to us1 the method is plainly absurd--so absurd that we fail to note that savages are simply falling back upon habit in a way which exhibits its limitations4 ,the only reason we do not act in some analogous fashion is because we do not take the comet as an isolated1 disconnected event1 but apprehend it in its connections with other events4 ,we place it1 as we say1 in the astronomical system4 ,we respond to its connections and not simply to the immediate occurrence4 ,thus our attitude to it is much freer4 ,we may approach it1 so to speak1 from any one of the angles provided by its connections4 ,we can bring into play1 as we deem wise1 any one of the habits appropriate to any one of the connected objects4 ,thus we get at a new event indirectly instead of immediately--by invention1 ingenuity1 resourcefulness4 ,an ideally perfect knowledge would represent such a network of interconnections that any past experience would offer a point of advantage from which to get at the problem presented in a new experience4 ,in fine1 while a habit apart from knowledge supplies us with a single fixed method of attack1 knowledge means that selection may be made from a much wider range of habits4 ,two aspects of this more general and freer availability of former experiences for subsequent ones may be distinguished4 7,see ante1 p4 #gg47 7i7 ,one1 the more tangible1 is increased power of control4 ,what cannot be managed directly may be handled indirectly2 or we can interpose barriers between us and undesirable consequences2 or we may evade them if we cannot overcome them4 ,genuine knowledge has all the practical value attaching to efficient habits in any case4 7ii7 ,but it also increases the meaning1 the experienced significance1 attaching to an experience4 ,a situation to which we respond capriciously or by routine has only a minimum of conscious significance2 we get nothing mentally from it4 ,but wherever knowledge comes into play in determining a new experience there is mental reward2 even if we fail practically in getting the needed control we have the satisfaction of experiencing a meaning instead of merely reacting physically4 ,while the content of knowledge is what has happened1 what is taken as finished and hence settled and sure1 the reference of knowledge is future or prospective4 ,for knowledge furnishes the means of understanding or giving meaning to what is still going on and what is to be done4 ,the knowledge of a physician is what he has found out by personal acquaintance and by study of what others have ascertained and recorded4 ,but it is knowledge to him because it supplies the resources by which he interprets the unknown things which confront him1 fills out the partial obvious facts with connected suggested phenomena1 foresees their probable future1 and makes plans accordingly4 ,when knowledge is cut off from use in giving meaning to what is blind and baffling1 it drops out of consciousness entirely or else becomes an object of aesthetic contemplation4 ,there is much emotional satisfaction to be had from a survey of the symmetry and order of possessed knowledge1 and the satisfaction is a legitimate one4 ,but this contemplative attitude is aesthetic1 not intellectual4 ,it is the same sort of joy that comes from viewing a finished picture or a well composed landscape4 ,it would make no difference if the subject matter were totally different1 provided it had the same harmonious organization4 ,indeed1 it would make no difference if it were wholly invented1 a play of fancy4 ,applicability to the world means not applicability to what is past and gone--that is out of the question by the nature of the case2 it means applicability to what is still going on1 what is still unsettled1 in the moving scene in which we are implicated4 ,the very fact that we so easily overlook this trait1 and regard statements of what is past and out of reach as knowledge is because we assume the continuity of past and future4 ,we cannot entertain the conception of a world in which knowledge of its past would not be helpful in forecasting and giving meaning to its future4 ,we ignore the prospective reference just because it is so irretrievably implied4 ,yet many of the philosophic schools of method which have been mentioned transform the ignoring into a virtual denial4 ,they regard knowledge as something complete in itself irrespective of its availability in dealing with what is yet to be4 ,and it is this omission which vitiates them and which makes them stand as sponsors for educational methods which an adequate conception of knowledge condemns4 ,for one has only to call to mind what is sometimes treated in schools as acquisition of knowledge to realize how lacking it is in any fruitful connection with the ongoing experience of the students--how largely it seems to be believed that the mere appropriation of subject matter which happens to be stored in books constitutes knowledge4 ,no matter how true what is learned to those who found it out and in whose experience it functioned1 there is nothing which makes it knowledge to the pupils4 ,it might as well be something about ,mars or about some fanciful country unless it fructifies in the individual's own life4 ,at the time when scholastic method developed1 it had relevancy to social conditions4 ,it was a method for systematizing and lending rational sanction to material accepted on authority4 ,this subject matter meant so much that it vitalized the defining and systematizing brought to bear upon it4 ,under present conditions the scholastic method1 for most persons1 means a form of knowing which has no especial connection with any particular subject matter4 ,it includes making distinctions1 definitions1 divisions1 and classifications for the mere sake of making them--with no objective in experience4 ,the view of thought as a purely physical activity having its own forms1 which are applied to any material as a seal may be stamped on any plastic stuff1 the view which underlies what is termed formal logic is essentially the scholastic method generalized4 ,the doctrine of formal discipline in education is the natural counterpart of the scholastic method4 ,the contrasting theories of the method of knowledge which go by the name of sensationalism and rationalism correspond to an exclusive emphasis upon the particular and the general respectively--or upon bare facts on one side and bare relations on the other4 ,in real knowledge1 there is a particularizing and a generalizing function working together4 ,so far as a situation is confused1 it has to be cleared up2 it has to be resolved into details1 as sharply defined as possible4 ,specified facts and qualities constitute the elements of the problem to be dealt with1 and it is through our sense organs that they are specified4 ,as setting forth the problem1 they may well be termed particulars1 for they are fragmentary4 ,since our task is to discover their connections and to recombine them1 for us at the time they are partial4 ,they are to be given meaning2 hence1 just as they stand1 they lack it4 ,anything which is to be known1 whose meaning has still to be made out1 offers itself as particular4 ,but what is already known1 if it has been worked over with a view to making it applicable to intellectually mastering new particulars1 is general in function4 ,its function of introducing connection into what is otherwise unconnected constitutes its generality4 ,any fact is general if we use it to give meaning to the elements of a new experience4 ,reason is just the ability to bring the subject matter of prior experience to bear to perceive the significance of the subject matter of a new experience4 ,a person is reasonable in the degree in which he is habitually open to seeing an event which immediately strikes his senses not as an isolated thing but in its connection with the common experience of mankind4 ,without the particulars as they are discriminated by the active responses of sense organs1 there is no material for knowing and no intellectual growth4 ,without placing these particulars in the context of the meanings wrought out in the larger experience of the past--without the use of reason or thought--particulars are mere excitations or irritations4 ,the mistake alike of the sensational and the rationalistic schools is that each fails to see that the function of sensory stimulation and thought is relative to reorganizing experience in applying the old to the new1 thereby maintaining the continuity or consistency of life4 ,the theory of the method of knowing which is advanced in these pages may be termed pragmatic4 ,its essential feature is to maintain the continuity of knowing with an activity which purposely modifies the environment4 ,it holds that knowledge in its strict sense of something possessed consists of our intellectual resources--of all the habits that render our action intelligent4 ,only that which has been organized into our disposition so as to enable us to adapt the environment to our needs and to adapt our aims and desires to the situation in which we live is really knowledge4 ,knowledge is not just something which we are now conscious of1 but consists of the dispositions we consciously use in understanding what now happens4 ,knowledge as an act is bringing some of our dispositions to consciousness with a view to straightening out a perplexity1 by conceiving the connection between ourselves and the world in which we live4 ,summary4 ,such social divisions as interfere with free and full intercourse react to make the intelligence and knowing of members of the separated classes one-sided4 ,those whose experience has to do with utilities cut off from the larger end they subserve are practical empiricists2 those who enjoy the contemplation of a realm of meanings in whose active production they have had no share are practical rationalists4 ,those who come in direct contact with things and have to adapt their activities to them immediately are1 in effect1 realists2 those who isolate the meanings of these things and put them in a religious or so-called spiritual world aloof from things are1 in effect1 idealists4 ,those concerned with progress1 who are striving to change received beliefs1 emphasize the individual factor in knowing2 those whose chief business it is to withstand change and conserve received truth emphasize the universal and the fixed--and so on4 ,philosophic systems in their opposed theories of knowledge present an explicit formulation of the traits characteristic of these cut-off and one-sided segments of experience--one-sided because barriers to intercourse prevent the experience of one from being enriched and supplemented by that of others who are differently situated4 ,in an analogous way1 since democracy stands in principle for free interchange1 for social continuity1 it must develop a theory of knowledge which sees in knowledge the method by which one experience is made available in giving direction and meaning to another4 ,the recent advances in physiology1 biology1 and the logic of the experimental sciences supply the specific intellectual instrumentalities demanded to work out and formulate such a theory4 ,their educational equivalent is the connection of the acquisition of knowledge in the schools with activities1 or occupations1 carried on in a medium of associated life4 ,chapter ,twenty-six3 ,theories of ,morals #a4 ,the ,inner and the ,outer4 ,since morality is concerned with conduct1 any dualisms which are set up between mind and activity must reflect themselves in the theory of morals4 ,since the formulations of the separation in the philosophic theory of morals are used to justify and idealize the practices employed in moral training1 a brief critical discussion is in place4 ,it is a commonplace of educational theory that the establishing of character is a comprehensive aim of school instruction and discipline4 ,hence it is important that we should be on our guard against a conception of the relations of intelligence to character which hampers the realization of the aim1 and on the look-out for the conditions which have to be provided in order that the aim may be successfully acted upon4 ,the first obstruction which meets us is the currency of moral ideas which split the course of activity into two opposed factors1 often named respectively the inner and outer1 or the spiritual and the physical4 ,this division is a culmination of the dualism of mind and the world1 soul and body1 end and means1 which we have so frequently noted4 ,in morals it takes the form of a sharp demarcation of the motive of action from its consequences1 and of character from conduct4 ,motive and character are regarded as something purely inner1 existing exclusively in consciousness1 while consequences and conduct are regarded as outside of mind1 conduct having to do simply with the movements which carry out motives2 consequences with what happens as a result4 ,different schools identify morality with either the inner state of mind or the outer act and results1 each in separation from the other4 ,action with a purpose is deliberate2 it involves a consciously foreseen end and a mental weighing of considerations pro and eon4 ,it also involves a conscious state of longing or desire for the end4 ,the deliberate choice of an aim and of a settled disposition of desire takes time4 ,during this time complete overt action is suspended4 ,a person who does not have his mind made up1 does not know what to do4 ,consequently he postpones definite action so far as possible4 ,his position may be compared to that of a man considering jumping across a ditch4 ,if he were sure he could or could not make it1 definite activity in some direction would occur4 ,but if he considers1 he is in doubt2 he hesitates4 ,during the time in which a single overt line of action is in suspense1 his activities are confined to such redistributions of energy within the organism as will prepare a determinate course of action4 ,he measures the ditch with his eyes2 he brings himself taut to get a feel of the energy at his disposal2 he looks about for other ways across1 he reflects upon the importance of getting across4 ,all this means an accentuation of consciousness2 it means a turning in upon the individual's own attitudes1 powers1 wishes1 etc4 ,obviously1 however1 this surging up of personal factors into conscious recognition is a part of the whole activity in its temporal development4 ,there is not first a purely psychical process1 followed abruptly by a radically different physical one4 ,there is one continuous behavior1 proceeding from a more uncertain1 divided1 hesitating state to a more overt1 determinate1 or complete state4 ,the activity at first consists mainly of certain tensions and adjustments within the organism2 as these are coordinated into a unified attitude1 the organism as a whole acts--some definite act is undertaken4 ,we may distinguish1 of course1 the more explicitly conscious phase of the continuous activity as mental or psychical4 ,but that only identifies the mental or psychical to mean the indeterminate1 formative state of an activity which in its fullness involves putting forth of overt energy to modify the environment4 ,our conscious thoughts1 observations1 wishes1 aversions are important1 because they represent inchoate1 nascent activities4 ,they fulfill their destiny in issuing1 later on1 into specific and perceptible acts4 ,and these inchoate1 budding organic readjustments are important because they are our sole escape from the dominion of routine habits and blind impulse4 ,they are activities having a new meaning in process of development4 ,hence1 normally1 there is an accentuation of personal consciousness whenever our instincts and ready formed habits find themselves blocked by novel conditions4 ,then we are thrown back upon ourselves to reorganize our own attitude before proceeding to a definite and irretrievable course of action4 ,unless we try to drive our way through by sheer brute force1 we must modify our organic resources to adapt them to the specific features of the situation in which we find ourselves4 ,the conscious deliberating and desiring which precede overt action are1 then1 the methodic personal readjustment implied in activity in uncertain situations4 ,this role of mind in continuous activity is not always maintained1 however4 ,desires for something different1 aversion to the given state of things caused by the blocking of successful activity1 stimulates the imagination4 ,the picture of a different state of things does not always function to aid ingenious observation and recollection to find a way out and on4 ,except where there is a disciplined disposition1 the tendency is for the imagination to run loose4 ,instead of its objects being checked up by conditions with reference to their practicability in execution1 they are allowed to develop because of the immediate emotional satisfaction which they yield4 ,when we find the successful display of our energies checked by uncongenial surroundings1 natural and social1 the easiest way out is to build castles in the air and let them be a substitute for an actual achievement which involves the pains of thought4 ,so in overt action we acquiesce1 and build up an imaginary world in1 mind4 ,this break between thought and conduct is reflected in those theories which make a sharp separation between mind as inner and conduct and consequences as merely outer4 ,for the split may be more than an incident of a particular individual's experience4 ,the social situation may be such as to throw the class given to articulate reflection back into their own thoughts and desires without providing the means by which these ideas and aspirations can be used to reorganize the environment4 ,under such conditions1 men take revenge1 as it were1 upon the alien and hostile environment by cultivating contempt for it1 by giving it a bad name4 ,they seek refuge and consolation within their own states of mind1 their own imaginings and wishes1 which they compliment by calling both more real and more ideal than the despised outer world4 ,such periods have recurred in history4 ,in the early centuries of the ,christian era1 the influential moral systems of ,stoicism1 of monastic and popular ,christianity and other religious movements of the day1 took shape under the influence of such conditions4 ,the more action which might express prevailing ideals was checked1 the more the inner possession and cultivation of ideals was regarded as self-sufficient--as the essence of morality4 ,the external world in which activity belongs was thought of as morally indifferent4 ,everything lay in having the right motive1 even though that motive was not a moving force in the world4 ,much the same sort of situation recurred in ,germany in the later eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries2 it led to the ,kantian insistence upon the good will as the sole moral good1 the will being regarded as something complete in itself1 apart from action and from the changes or consequences effected in the world4 ,later it led to any idealization of existing institutions as themselves the embodiment of reason4 ,the purely internal morality of meaning well1 of having a good disposition regardless of what comes of it1 naturally led to a reaction4 ,this is generally known as either hedonism or utilitarianism4 ,it was said in effect that the important thing morally is not what a man is inside of his own consciousness1 but what he does--the consequences which issue1 the charges he actually effects4 ,inner morality was attacked as sentimental1 arbitrary1 dogmatic1 subjective--as giving men leave to dignify and shield any dogma congenial to their self-interest or any caprice occurring to imagination by calling it an intuition or an ideal of conscience4 ,results1 conduct1 are what counts2 they afford the sole measure of morality4 ,ordinary morality1 and hence that of the schoolroom1 is likely to be an inconsistent compromise of both views4 ,on one hand1 certain states of feeling are made much of2 the individual must mean well1 and if his intentions are good1 if he had the right sort of emotional consciousness1 he may be relieved of responsibility for full results in conduct4 ,but since1 on the other hand1 certain things have to be done to meet the convenience and the requirements of others1 and of social order in general1 there is great insistence upon the doing of certain things1 irrespective of whether the individual has any concern or intelligence in their doing4 ,he must toe the mark2 he must have his nose held to the grindstone2 he must obey2 he must form useful habits2 he must learn self-control1--all of these precepts being understood in a way which emphasizes simply the immediate thing tangibly done1 irrespective of the spirit of thought and desire in which it is done1 and irrespective therefore of its effect upon other less obvious doings4 ,it is hoped that the prior discussion has sufficiently elaborated the method by which both of these evils are avoided4 ,one or both of these evils must result wherever individuals1 whether young or old1 cannot engage in a progressively cumulative undertaking under conditions which engage their interest and require their reflection4 ,for only in such cases is it possible that the disposition of desire and thinking should be an organic factor in overt and obvious conduct4 ,given a consecutive activity embodying the student's own interest1 where a definite result is to be obtained1 and where neither routine habit nor the following of dictated directions nor capricious improvising will suffice1 and there the rise of conscious purpose1 conscious desire1 and deliberate reflection are inevitable4 ,they are inevitable as the spirit and quality of an activity having specific consequences1 not as forming an isolated realm of inner consciousness4 #b4 ,the ,opposition of ,duty and ,interest4 ,probably there is no antithesis more often set up in moral discussion than that between acting from principle and from interest4 ,to act on principle is to act disinterestedly1 according to a general law1 which is above all personal considerations4 ,to act according to interest is1 so the allegation runs1 to act selfishly1 with one's own personal profit in view4 ,it substitutes the changing expediency of the moment for devotion to unswerving moral law4 ,the false idea of interest underlying this opposition has already been criticized 7,see ,chapter ,x71 but some moral aspects of the question will now be considered4 ,a clew to the matter may be found in the fact that the supporters of the interest side of the controversy habitually use the term self-interest4 ,starting from the premises that unless there is interest in an object or idea1 there is no motive force1 they end with the conclusion that even when a person claims to be acting from principle or from a sense of duty1 he really acts as he does because there is something in it for himself4 ,the premise is sound2 the conclusion false4 ,in reply the other school argues that since man is capable of generous self-forgetting and even self-sacrificing action1 he is capable of acting without interest4 ,again the premise is sound1 and the conclusion false4 ,the error on both sides lies in a false notion of the relation of interest and the self4 ,both sides assume that the self is a fixed and hence isolated quantity4 ,as a consequence1 there is a rigid dilemma between acting for an interest of the self and without interest4 ,if the self is something fixed antecedent to action1 then acting from interest means trying to get more in the way of possessions for the self--whether in the way of fame1 approval of others1 power over others1 pecuniary profit1 or pleasure4 ,then the reaction from this view as a cynical depreciation of human nature leads to the view that men who act nobly act with no interest at all4 ,yet to an unbiased judgment it would appear plain that a man must be interested in what he is doing or he would not do it4 ,a physician who continues to serve the sick in a plague at almost certain danger to his own life must be interested in the efficient performance of his profession--more interested in that than in the safety of his own bodily life4 ,but it is distorting facts to say that this interest is merely a mask for an interest in something else which he gets by continuing his customary services--such as money or good repute or virtue2 that it is only a means to an ulterior selfish end4 ,the moment we recognize that the self is not something ready-made1 but something in continuous formation through choice of action1 the whole situation clears up4 ,a man's interest in keeping at his work in spite of danger to life means that his self is found in that work2 if he finally gave up1 and preferred his personal safety or comfort1 it would mean that he preferred to be that kind of a self4 ,the mistake lies in making a separation between interest and self1 and supposing that the latter is the end to which interest in objects and acts and others is a mere means4 ,in fact1 self and interest are two names for the same fact2 the kind and amount of interest actively taken in a thing reveals and measures the quality of selfhood which exists4 ,bear in mind that interest means the active or moving identity of the self with a certain object1 and the whole alleged dilemma falls to the ground4 ,unselfishness1 for example1 signifies neither lack of interest in what is done 7that would mean only machine-like indifference7 nor selflessness--which would mean absence of virility and character4 ,as employed everywhere outside of this particular theoretical controversy1 the term unselfishness refers to the kind of aims and objects which habitually interest a man4 ,and if we make a mental survey of the kind of interests which evoke the use of this epithet1 we shall see that they have two intimately associated features4 7i7 ,the generous self consciously identifies itself with the full range of relationships implied in its activity1 instead of drawing a sharp line between itself and considerations which are excluded as alien or indifferent2 7ii7 it readjusts and expands its past ideas of itself to take in new consequences as they become perceptible4 ,when the physician began his career he may not have thought of a pestilence2 he may not have consciously identified himself with service under such conditions4 ,but1 if he has a normally growing or active self1 when he finds that his vocation involves such risks1 he willingly adopts them as integral portions of his activity4 ,the wider or larger self which means inclusion instead of denial of relationships is identical with a self which enlarges in order to assume previously unforeseen ties4 ,in such crises of readjustment--and the crisis may be slight as well as great--there may be a transitional conflict of principle with interest4 ,it is the nature of a habit to involve ease in the accustomed line of activity4 ,it is the nature of a readjusting of habit to involve an effort which is disagreeable--something to which a man has deliberately to hold himself4 ,in other words1 there is a tendency to identify the self--or take interest--in what one has got used to1 and to turn away the mind with aversion or irritation when an unexpected thing which involves an unpleasant modification of habit comes up4 ,since in the past one has done one's duty without having to face such a disagreeable circumstance1 why not go on as one has been8 ,to yield to this temptation means to narrow and isolate the thought of the self--to treat it as complete4 ,any habit1 no matter how efficient in the past1 which has become set1 may at any time bring this temptation with it4 ,to act from principle in such an emergency is not to act on some abstract principle1 or duty at large2 it is to act upon the principle of a course of action1 instead of upon the circumstances which have attended it4 ,the principle of a physician's conduct is its animating aim and spirit--the care for the diseased4 ,the principle is not what justifies an activity1 for the principle is but another name for the continuity of the activity4 ,if the activity as manifested in its consequences is undesirable1 to act upon principle is to accentuate its evil4 ,and a man who prides himself upon acting upon principle is likely to be a man who insists upon having his own way without learning from experience what is the better way4 ,he fancies that some abstract principle justifies his course of action without recognizing that his principle needs justification4 ,assuming1 however1 that school conditions are such as to provide desirable occupations1 it is interest in the occupation as a whole--that is1 in its continuous development--which keeps a pupil at his work in spite of temporary diversions and unpleasant obstacles4 ,where there is no activity having a growing significance1 appeal to principle is either purely verbal1 or a form of obstinate pride or an appeal to extraneous considerations clothed with a dignified title4 ,undoubtedly there are junctures where momentary interest ceases and attention flags1 and where reinforcement is needed4 ,but what carries a person over these hard stretches is not loyalty to duty in the abstract1 but interest in his occupation4 ,duties are offices--they are the specific acts needed for the fulfilling of a function--or1 in homely language--doing one's job4 ,and the man who is genuinely interested in his job is the man who is able to stand temporary discouragement1 to persist in the face of obstacles1 to take the lean with the fat3 he makes an interest out of meeting and overcoming difficulties and distraction4 #c4 ,intelligence and ,character4 ,a noteworthy paradox often accompanies discussions of morals4 ,on the one hand1 there is an identification of the moral with the rational4 ,reason is set up as a faculty from which proceed ultimate moral intuitions1 and sometimes1 as in the ,kantian theory1 it is said to supply the only proper moral motive4 ,on the other hand1 the value of concrete1 everyday intelligence is constantly underestimated1 and even deliberately depreciated4 ,morals is often thought to be an affair with which ordinary knowledge has nothing to do4 ,moral knowledge is thought to be a thing apart1 and conscience is thought of as something radically different from consciousness4 ,this separation1 if valid1 is of especial significance for education4 ,moral education in school is practically hopeless when we set up the development of character as a supreme end1 and at the same time treat the acquiring of knowledge and the development of understanding1 which of necessity occupy the chief part of school time1 as having nothing to do with character4 ,on such a basis1 moral education is inevitably reduced to some kind of catechetical instruction1 or lessons about morals4 ,lessons about morals signify as matter of course lessons in what other people think about virtues and duties4 ,it amounts to something only in the degree in which pupils happen to be already animated by a sympathetic and dignified regard for the sentiments of others4 ,without such a regard1 it has no more influence on character than information about the mountains of ,asia2 with a servile regard1 it increases dependence upon others1 and throws upon those in authority the responsibility for conduct4 ,as a matter of fact1 direct instruction in morals has been effective only in social groups where it was a part of the authoritative control of the many by the few4 ,not the teaching as such but the reinforcement of it by the whole regime of which it was an incident made it effective4 ,to attempt to get similar results from lessons about morals in a democratic society is to rely upon sentimental magic4 ,at the other end of the scale stands the ,socratic-,platonic teaching which identifies knowledge and virtue--which holds that no man does evil knowingly but only because of ignorance of the good4 ,this doctrine is commonly attacked on the ground that nothing is more common than for a man to know the good and yet do the bad3 not knowledge1 but habituation or practice1 and motive are what is required4 ,aristotle1 in fact1 at once attacked the ,platonic teaching on the ground that moral virtue is like an art1 such as medicine2 the experienced practitioner is better than a man who has theoretical knowledge but no practical experience of disease and remedies4 ,the issue turns1 however1 upon what is meant by knowledge4 ,aristotle's objection ignored the gist of ,plato's teaching to the effect that man could not attain a theoretical insight into the good except as he had passed through years of practical habituation and strenuous discipline4 ,knowledge of the good was not a thing to be got either from books or from others1 but was achieved through a prolonged education4 ,it was the final and culminating grace of a mature experience of life4 ,irrespective of ,plato's position1 it is easy to perceive that the term knowledge is used to denote things as far apart as intimate and vital personal realization1--a conviction gained and tested in experience1--and a second-handed1 largely symbolic1 recognition that persons in general believe so and so--a devitalized remote information4 ,that the latter does not guarantee conduct1 that it does not profoundly affect character1 goes without saying4 ,but if knowledge means something of the same sort as our conviction gained by trying and testing that sugar is sweet and quinine bitter1 the case stands otherwise4 ,every time a man sits on a chair rather than on a stove1 carries an umbrella when it rains1 consults a doctor when ill--or in short performs any of the thousand acts which make up his daily life1 he proves that knowledge of a certain kind finds direct issue in conduct4 ,there is every reason to suppose that the same sort of knowledge of good has a like expression2 in fact good is an empty term unless it includes the satisfactions experienced in such situations as those mentioned4 ,knowledge that other persons are supposed to know something might lead one to act so as to win the approbation others attach to certain actions1 or at least so as to give others the impression that one agrees with them2 there is no reason why it should lead to personal initiative and loyalty in behalf of the beliefs attributed to them4 ,it is not necessary1 accordingly1 to dispute about the proper meaning of the term knowledge4 ,it is enough for educational purposes to note the different qualities covered by the one name1 to realize that it is knowledge gained at first hand through the exigencies of experience which affects conduct in significant ways4 ,if a pupil learns things from books simply in connection with school lessons and for the sake of reciting what he has learned when called upon1 then knowledge will have effect upon some conduct--namely upon that of reproducing statements at the demand of others4 ,there is nothing surprising that such knowledge should not have much influence in the life out of school4 ,but this is not a reason for making a divorce between knowledge and conduct1 but for holding in low esteem this kind of knowledge4 ,the same thing may be said of knowledge which relates merely to an isolated and technical specialty2 it modifies action but only in its own narrow line4 ,in truth1 the problem of moral education in the schools is one with the problem of securing knowledge--the knowledge connected with the system of impulses and habits4 ,for the use to which any known fact is put depends upon its connections4 ,the knowledge of dynamite of a safecracker may be identical in verbal form with that of a chemist2 in fact1 it is different1 for it is knit into connection with different aims and habits1 and thus has a different import4 ,our prior discussion of subject-matter as proceeding from direct activity having an immediate aim1 to the enlargement of meaning found in geography and history1 and then to scientifically organized knowledge1 was based upon the idea of maintaining a vital connection between knowledge and activity4 ,what is learned and employed in an occupation having an aim and involving cooperation with others is moral knowledge1 whether consciously so regarded or not4 ,for it builds up a social interest and confers the intelligence needed to make that interest effective in practice4 ,just because the studies of the curriculum represent standard factors in social life1 they are organs of initiation into social values4 ,as mere school studies1 their acquisition has only a technical worth4 ,acquired under conditions where their social significance is realized1 they feed moral interest and develop moral insight4 ,moreover1 the qualities of mind discussed under the topic of method of learning are all of them intrinsically moral qualities4 ,open-mindedness1 single-mindedness1 sincerity1 breadth of outlook1 thoroughness1 assumption of responsibility for developing the consequences of ideas which are accepted1 are moral traits4 ,the habit of identifying moral characteristics with external conformity to authoritative prescriptions may lead us to ignore the ethical value of these intellectual attitudes1 but the same habit tends to reduce morals to a dead and machinelike routine4 ,consequently while such an attitude has moral results1 the results are morally undesirable--above all in a democratic society where so much depends upon personal disposition4 #d4 ,the ,social and the ,moral4 ,all of the separations which we have been criticizing--and which the idea of education set forth in the previous chapters is designed to avoid--spring from taking morals too narrowly1--giving them1 on one side1 a sentimental goody-goody turn without reference to effective ability to do what is socially needed1 and1 on the other side1 overemphasizing convention and tradition so as to limit morals to a list of definitely stated acts4 ,as a matter of fact1 morals are as broad as acts which concern our relationships with others4 ,and potentially this includes all our acts1 even though their social bearing may not be thought of at the time of performance4 ,for every act1 by the principle of habit1 modifies disposition--it sets up a certain kind of inclination and desire4 ,and it is impossible to tell when the habit thus strengthened may have a direct and perceptible influence on our association with others4 ,certain traits of character have such an obvious connection with our social relationships that we call them moral in an emphatic sense--truthfulness1 honesty1 chastity1 amiability1 etc4 ,but this only means that they are1 as compared with some other attitudes1 central3--that they carry other attitudes with them4 ,they are moral in an emphatic sense not because they are isolated and exclusive1 but because they are so intimately connected with thousands of other attitudes which we do not explicitly recognize--which perhaps we have not even names for4 ,to call them virtues in their isolation is like taking the skeleton for the living body4 ,the bones are certainly important1 but their importance lies in the fact that they support other organs of the body in such a way as to make them capable of integrated effective activity4 ,and the same is true of the qualities of character which we specifically designate virtues4 ,morals concern nothing less than the whole character1 and the whole character is identical with the man in all his concrete make-up and manifestations4 ,to possess virtue does not signify to have cultivated a few namable and exclusive traits2 it means to be fully and adequately what one is capable of becoming through association with others in all the offices of life4 ,the moral and the social quality of conduct are1 in the last analysis1 identical with each other4 ,it is then but to restate explicitly the import of our earlier chapters regarding the social function of education to say that the measure of the worth of the administration1 curriculum1 and methods of instruction of the school is the extent to which they are animated by a social spirit4 ,and the great danger which threatens school work is the absence of conditions which make possible a permeating social spirit2 this is the great enemy of effective moral training4 ,for this spirit can be actively present only when certain conditions are met4 7i7 ,in the first place1 the school must itself be a community life in all which that implies4 ,social perceptions and interests can be developed only in a genuinely social medium--one where there is give and take in the building up of a common experience4 ,informational statements about things can be acquired in relative isolation by any one who previously has had enough intercourse with others to have learned language4 ,but realization of the meaning of the linguistic signs is quite another matter4 ,that involves a context of work and play in association with others4 ,the plea which has been made for education through continued constructive activities in this book rests upon the fact they afford an opportunity for a social atmosphere4 ,in place of a school set apart from life as a place for learning lessons1 we have a miniature social group in which study and growth are incidents of present shared experience4 ,playgrounds1 shops1 workrooms1 laboratories not only direct the natural active tendencies of youth1 but they involve intercourse1 communication1 and cooperation1--all extending the perception of connections4 7ii7 ,the learning in school should be continuous with that out of school4 ,there should be a free interplay between the two4 ,this is possible only when there are numerous points of contact between the social interests of the one and of the other4 ,a school is conceivable in which there should be a spirit of companionship and shared activity1 but where its social life would no more represent or typify that of the world beyond the school walls than that of a monastery4 ,social concern and understanding would be developed1 but they would not be available outside2 they would not carry over4 ,the proverbial separation of town and gown1 the cultivation of academic seclusion1 operate in this direction4 ,so does such adherence to the culture of the past as generates a reminiscent social spirit1 for this makes an individual feel more at home in the life of other days than in his own4 ,a professedly cultural education is peculiarly exposed to this danger4 ,an idealized past becomes the refuge and solace of the spirit2 present-day concerns are found sordid1 and unworthy of attention4 ,but as a rule1 the absence of a social environment in connection with which learning is a need and a reward is the chief reason for the isolation of the school2 and this isolation renders school knowledge inapplicable to life and so infertile in character4 ,a narrow and moralistic view of morals is responsible for the failure to recognize that all the aims and values which are desirable in education are themselves moral4 ,discipline1 natural development1 culture1 social efficiency1 are moral traits--marks of a person who is a worthy member of that society which it is the business of education to further4 ,there is an old saying to the effect that it is not enough for a man to be good2 he must be good for something4 ,the something for which a man must be good is capacity to live as a social member so that what he gets from living with others balances with what he contributes4 ,what he gets and gives as a human being1 a being with desires1 emotions1 and ideas1 is not external possessions1 but a widening and deepening of conscious life--a more intense1 disciplined1 and expanding realization of meanings4 ,what he materially receives and gives is at most opportunities and means for the evolution of conscious life4 ,otherwise1 it is neither giving nor taking1 but a shifting about of the position of things in space1 like the stirring of water and sand with a stick4 ,discipline1 culture1 social efficiency1 personal refinement1 improvement of character are but phases of the growth of capacity nobly to share in such a balanced experience4 ,and education is not a mere means to such a life4 ,education is such a life4 ,to maintain capacity for such education is the essence of morals4 ,for conscious life is a continual beginning afresh4 ,summary4 ,the most important problem of moral education in the school concerns the relationship of knowledge and conduct4 ,for unless the learning which accrues in the regular course of study affects character1 it is futile to conceive the moral end as the unifying and culminating end of education4 ,when there is no intimate organic connection between the methods and materials of knowledge and moral growth1 particular lessons and modes of discipline have to be resorted to3 knowledge is not integrated into the usual springs of action and the outlook on life1 while morals become moralistic--a scheme of separate virtues4 ,the two theories chiefly associated with the separation of learning from activity1 and hence from morals1 are those which cut off inner disposition and motive--the conscious personal factor--and deeds as purely physical and outer2 and which set action from interest in opposition to that from principle4 ,both of these separations are overcome in an educational scheme where learning is the accompaniment of continuous activities or occupations which have a social aim and utilize the materials of typical social situations4 ,for under such conditions1 the school becomes itself a form of social life1 a miniature community and one in close interaction with other modes of associated experience beyond school walls4 ,all education which develops power to share effectively in social life is moral4 ,it forms a character which not only does the particular deed socially necessary but one which is interested in that continuous readjustment which is essential to growth4 ,interest in learning from all the contacts of life is the essential moral interest4