,the ,nicomachean ,ethics of ,aristotle 
,by ,aristotle    ,introduction by ,j4  
,a4 ,smith      ,contents               
,,introduction     ,,aristotle',s       
,,ethics   ,,book ,i   ,,book ,,ii      
,,book ,,iii   ,,book ,,iv   ,,book ,v  
,,book ,,vi   ,,book ,,vii   ,,book     
,,viii   ,,book ,,ix   ,,book ,x        
,,notes          ,,introduction         
,the ,ethics of ,aristotle is one half  
of a single treatise of which his       
,politics is the other half4 ,both deal 
with one and the same subject4  ,this   
subject is what ,aristotle calls in one 
place the 8philosophy of  human         
affairs20 but more frequently ,political
 or ,social ,science4 ,in the  two works
 taken together we have their author's  
whole theory of human  conduct or       
practical activity1 that is1 of all     
human activity which is  not directed   
merely to knowledge or truth4 ,the two  
parts of this  treatise are mutually    
complementary1 but in a literary sense  
each is  independent and self-contained4

 ,the proem to the ,ethics is an        
introduction to the whole subject1 not  
merely to the first part2 the  last     
chapter of the ,ethics points forward to
 the ,politics1 and  sketches for that  
part of the treatise the order of       
enquiry to be  pursued 7an order which  
in the actual treatise is not adhered   
to74    ,the principle of distribution  
of the subject-matter between the two   
works is far from obvious1 and has been 
much debated4 ,not much can be  gathered
 from their titles1 which in any case   
were not given to them by  their author4
 ,nor do these titles suggest any very  
compact unity in the  works to which    
they are applied3 the plural forms1     
which survive so  oddly in ,english     
7,ethics1 ,politics71 were intended to  
indicate the  treatment within a single 
work of a group of connected questions4 
,the  unity of the first group arises   
from their centring round the topic of  
character1 that of the second from their
 connection with the existence  and life

 of the city or state4 ,we have thus to 
regard the ,ethics as  dealing with one 
group of problems and the ,politics with
 a second1  both falling within the wide
 compass of ,political ,science4 ,each  
of  these groups falls into sub-groups  
which roughly correspond to the  several
 books in each work4 ,the tendency to   
take up one by one the  various problems
 which had suggested themselves in the  
wide field  obscures both the unity of  
the subject-matter and its proper       
articulation4 ,but it is to be          
remembered that what is offered us is   
avowedly rather an enquiry than an      
exposition of hard and fast  doctrine4  
,nevertheless each work aims at a       
relative completeness1 and it is        
important to observe the relation of    
each to the other4 ,the distinction  is 
not that the one treats of ,moral and   
the other of ,political  ,philosophy1   
nor again that the one deals with the   
moral activity of the  individual and   
the other with that of the ,state1 nor  

once more that the  one gives us the    
theory of human conduct1 while the other
 discusses its  application in practice1
 though not all of these                
misinterpretations are  equally         
erroneous4 ,the clue to the right       
interpretation is given by  ,aristotle  
himself1 where in the last chapter of   
the ,ethics he is  paving the way for   
the ,politics4 ,in the ,ethics he has   
not confined  himself to the abstract or
 isolated individual1 but has always    
thought  of him1 or we might say1 in his
 social and political context1 with a   
given nature due to race and heredity   
and in certain surroundings4 ,so        
viewing him he has studied the nature   
and formation of his  character--all    
that he can make himself or be made by  
others to be4  ,especially he has       
investigated the various admirable forms
 of human  character and the mode of    
their production4 ,but all this1 though 
it  brings more clearly before us what  
goodness or virtue is1 and how it is  to

 be reached1 remains mere theory or     
talk4 ,by itself it does not  enable us 
to become1 or to help others to become1 
good4 ,for this it is  necessary to     
bring into play the great force of the  
,political ,community  or ,state1 of    
which the main instrument is ,law4      
,hence arises the demand  for the       
necessary complement to the ,ethics1    
i4e41 a treatise devoted  to the        
questions which centre round the        
enquiry2 by what organisation  of social
 or political forces1 by what laws or   
institutions can we best  secure the    
greatest amount of good character8      
,we must1 however1 remember that the    
production of good character is not  the
 end of either individual or state      
action3 that is the aim of the  one and 
the other because good character is the 
indispensable condition  and chief      
determinant of happiness1 itself the    
goal of all human doing4  ,the end of   
all action1 individual or collective1 is
 the greatest  happiness of the greatest

 number4 ,there is1 ,aristotle insists1 
no  difference of kind between the good 
of one and the good of many or all4     
,the sole difference is one of amount or
 scale4 ,this does not mean  simply that
 the ,state exists to secure in larger  
measure the objects of  degree which the
 isolated individual attempts1 but is   
too feeble1 to  secure without it4 ,on  
the contrary1 it rather insists that    
whatever  goods society alone enables a 
man to secure have always had to the    
individual--whether he realised it or   
not--the value which1 when so  secured1 
he recognises them to possess4 ,the best
 and happiest life for  the individual  
is that which the ,state renders        
possible1 and this it  does mainly by   
revealing to him the value of new       
objects of desire and  educating him to 
appreciate them4 ,to ,aristotle or to   
,plato the ,state  is1 above all1 a     
large and powerful educative agency     
which gives the  individual increased   
opportunities of self-development and   

greater  capacities for the enjoyment of
 life4    ,looking forward1 then1 to the
 life of the ,state as that which aids  
support1 and combines the efforts of the
 individual to obtain  happiness1       
,aristotle draws no hard and fast       
distinction between the  spheres of     
action of ,man as individual and ,man as
 citizen4 ,nor does the  division of his
 discussion into the ,ethics and the    
,politics rest  upon any such           
distinction4 ,the distinction implied is
 rather between  two stages in the life 
of the civilised man--the stage of      
preparation  for the full life of the   
adult citizen1 and the stage of the     
actual  exercise or enjoyment of        
citizenship4 ,hence the ,ethics1 where  
his  attention is directed upon the     
formation of character1 is largely and  
centrally a treatise on ,moral          
,education4 ,it discusses especially    
those  admirable human qualities which  
fit a man for life in an organised      
civic community1 which makes him 8a good

 citizen10 and considers how  they can  
be fostered or created and their        
opposites prevented4    ,this is the    
kernel of the ,ethics1 and all the rest 
is subordinate to  this main interest   
and purpose4 ,yet 8the rest0 is not     
irrelevant2 the  whole situation in     
which character grows and operates is   
concretely  conceived4 ,there is a basis
 of what we should call ,psychology1    
sketched  in firm outlines1 the deeper  
presuppositions and the wider issues of 
human character and conduct are not     
ignored1 and there is no little of  what
 we should call ,metaphysics4 ,but      
neither the ,psychology nor the         
,metaphysics is elaborated1 and only so 
much is brought forward as  appears     
necessary to put the main facts in their
 proper perspective and  setting4 ,it is
 this combination of width of outlook   
with close  observation of the concrete 
facts of conduct which gives its abiding
  value to the work1 and justifies the  
view of it as containing  ,aristotle's  

,moral ,philosophy4 ,nor is it important
 merely as summing up  the moral        
judgments and speculations of an age now
 long past4 ,it seizes  and dwells upon 
those elements and features in human    
practice which are  most essential and  
permanent1 and it is small wonder that  
so much in it  survives in our own ways 
of regarding conduct and speaking of it4
 ,thus  it still remains one of the     
classics of ,moral ,philosophy1 nor is  
its  value likely soon to be exhausted4 
,as was pointed out above1 the proem    
7,book ,i41 cc4 i-iii47 is a prelude  to
 the treatment of the whole subject     
covered by the ,ethics and the          
,politics together4 ,it sets forth the  
purpose of the enquiry1  describes the  
spirit in which it is to be undertaken  
and what ought to  be the expectation of
 the reader1 and lastly states the      
necessary  conditions of studying it    
with profit4 ,the aim of it is the      
acquisition  and propagation of a       
certain kind of knowledge 7science71 but

 this  knowledge and the thinking which 
brings it about are subsidiary to a     
practical end4 ,the knowledge aimed at  
is of what is best for man and of  the  
conditions of its realisation4 ,such    
knowledge is that which in its          
consumate form we find in great         
statesmen1 enabling them to organise    
and administer their states and regulate
 by law the life of the  citizens to    
their advantage and happiness1 but it is
 the same kind of  knowledge which on a 
smaller scale secures success in the    
management of  the family or of private 
life4    ,it is characteristic of such  
knowledge that it should be deficient in
  8exactness10 in precision of          
statement1 and closeness of logical     
concatenation4 ,we must not look for a  
mathematics of conduct4 ,the            
subject-matter of ,human ,conduct is not
 governed by necessary and  uniform     
laws4 ,but this does not mean that it is
 subject to no laws4  ,there are general
 principles at work in it1 and these can

 be formulated  in 8rules10 which rules 
can be systematised or unified4 ,it is  
all-important to remember that practical
 or moral rules are only  general and   
always admit of exceptions1 and that    
they arise not from  the mere complexity
 of the facts1 but from the liability of
 the facts  to a certain unpredictable  
variation4 ,at their very best1         
practical  rules state probabilities1   
not certainties2 a relative constancy of
  connection is all that exists1 but it 
is enough to serve as a guide in  life4 
,aristotle here holds the balance       
between a misleading hope of  reducing  
the subject-matter of conduct to a few  
simple rigorous  abstract principles1   
with conclusions necessarily issuing    
from them1  and the view that it is the 
field of operation of inscrutable forces
  acting without predictable regularity4
 ,he does not pretend to find in  it    
absolute uniformities1 or to deduce the 
details from his principles4  ,hence1   
too1 he insists on the necessity of     

experience as the source or  test of all
 that he has to say4 ,moral             
experience--the actual possession  and  
exercise of good character--is necessary
 truly to understand moral  principles  
and profitably to apply them4 ,the mere 
intellectual  apprehension of them is   
not possible1 or if possible1           
profitless4    ,the ,ethics is addressed
 to students who are presumed both to   
have  enough general education to       
appreciate these points1 and also to    
have a  solid foundation of good habits4
 ,more than that is not required for the
  profitable study of it4    ,if the    
discussion of the nature and formation  
of character be regarded  as the central
 topic of the ,ethics1 the contents of  
,book ,i41 cc4  iv4-xii4 may be         
considered as still belonging to the    
introduction and  setting1 but these    
chapters contain matter of profound     
importance and  have exercised an       
enormous influence upon subsequent      
thought4 ,they lay  down a principle    

which governs all ,greek thought about  
human life1 viz4  that it is only       
intelligible when viewed as directed    
towards some end  or good4 ,this is the 
,greek way of expressing that all human 
life  involves an ideal                 
element--something which it is not yet  
and which under  certain conditions it  
is to be4 ,in that sense ,greek ,moral  
,philosophy is  essentially idealistic4 
,further it is always assumed that all  
human  practical activity is directed or
 8oriented0 to a single end1 and  that  
that end is knowable or definable in    
advance of its realisation4  ,to know it
 is not merely a matter of speculative  
interest1 it is of the  highest         
practical moment for only in the light  
of it can life be duly  guided1 and     
particularly only so can the state be   
properly organised  and administered4   
,this explains the stress laid          
throughout by ,greek  ,moral ,philosophy
 upon the necessity of knowledge as a   
condition of the  best life4 ,this      

knowledge is not1 though it includes    
knowledge of the  nature of man and his 
circumstances1 it is knowledge of what  
is best--of  man's supreme end or good4 
,but this end is not conceived as       
presented to him by a superior power    
nor even as something which ought to be4
 ,the presentation of the  ,moral ,ideal
 as ,duty is almost absent4 ,from the   
outset it is identified  with the object
 of desire1 of what we not merely judge 
desirable but  actually do desire1 or   
that which would1 if realised1 satisfy  
human  desire4 ,in fact it is what we   
all1 wise and simple1 agree in naming   
8,happiness0 7,welfare or ,well-being7  
,in what then does happiness consist8   
,aristotle summarily sets aside the     
more or less popular identifications of 
it with abundance of physical           
pleasures1 with political power and     
honour1 with the mere possession of     
such superior gifts or attainments as   
normally entitle men to these1  with    
wealth4 ,none of these can constitute   

the end or good of man as  such4 ,on the
 other hand1 he rejects his master      
,plato's conception of a  good which is 
the end of the whole universe1 or at    
least dismisses it  as irrelevant to his
 present enquiry4 ,the good towards     
which all human  desires and practical  
activities are directed must be one     
conformable  to man's special nature and
 circumstances and attainable by his    
efforts4 ,there is in ,aristotle's      
theory of human conduct no trace of     
,plato's 8other worldliness01 he brings 
the moral ideal in ,bacon's  phrase down
 to 8right earth0--and so closer to the 
facts and problems of  actual human     
living4 ,turning from criticism of      
others he states his own  positive view 
of ,happiness1 and1 though he avowedly  
states it merely in  outline his account
 is pregnant with significance4 ,human  
,happiness lies  in activity or         
energising1 and that in a way peculiar  
to man with his  given nature and his   
given circumstances1 it is not          

theoretical1 but  practical3 it is the  
activity not of reason but still of a   
being who  possesses reason and applies 
it1 and it presupposes in that being the
  development1 and not merely the       
natural possession1 of certain relevant 
powers and capacities4 ,the last is the 
prime condition of successful  living   
and therefore of satisfaction1 but      
,aristotle does not ignore  other       
conditions1 such as length of life1     
wealth and good luck1 the  absence or   
diminution of which render happiness not
 impossible1 but  difficult of          
attainment4    ,it is interesting to    
compare this account of ,happiness with 
,mill's in  ,utilitarianism4 ,mill's is 
much the less consistent3 at times he   
distinguishes and at times he           
identifies1 happiness1 pleasure1        
contentment1 and satisfaction4 ,he      
wavers between belief in its general    
attainability and an absence of         
hopefulness4 ,he mixes up in an         
arbitrary way such ingredients as 8not  

expecting more from life than it  is    
capable of bestowing10 8mental          
cultivation10 8improved laws10 etc41    
and in fact leaves the whole conception 
vague1 blurred1 and uncertain4          
,aristotle draws the outline with a     
firmer hand and presents a more         
definite ideal4 ,he allows for the      
influence on happiness of conditions    
only partly1 if at all1 within the      
control of man1 but he clearly makes    
the man positive determinant of man's   
happiness he in himself1 and more       
particularly in what he makes directly  
of his own nature1 and so  indirectly of
 his circumstances4 8#8,tis in ourselves
 that we are thus or  thus0 ,but once   
more this does not involve an artificial
 or abstract  isolation of the          
individual moral agent from his relation
 to other  persons or things from his   
context in society and nature1 nor      
ignore  the relative dependence of his  
life upon a favourable environment4     
,the main factor which determines       

success or failure in human life is  the
 acquisition of certain powers1 for     
,happiness is just the exercise  or     
putting forth of these in actual living1
 everything else is  secondary and      
subordinate4 ,these powers arise from   
the due development  of certain natural 
aptitudes which belong 7in various      
degrees7 to human  nature as such and   
therefore to all normal human beings4   
,in their  developed form they are known
 as virtues 7the ,greek means simply    
8goodnesses10 8perfections10            
8excellences10 or 8fitnesses071 some of 
them are physical1 but others are       
psychical1 and among the latter some1   
and these distinctively or peculiarly   
human1 are 8rational10 i e1  presuppose 
the possession and exercise of mind or  
intelligence4 ,these  last fall into two
 groups1 which ,aristotle distinguishes 
as ,goodnesses  of ,intellect and       
,goodnesses of ,character4 ,they have in
 common that they  all excite in us     
admiration and praise of their          

possessors1 and that  they are not      
natural endowments1 but acquired        
characteristics ,but they  differ in    
important ways4 7#a7 the former are     
excellences or developed  powers of the 
reason as such--of that in us which sees
 and formulates  laws1 rules1           
regularities systems1 and is content in 
the vision of  them1 while the latter   
involve a submission or obedience to    
such rules  of something in us which is 
in itself capricious and irregular1 but 
capable of regulation1 viz our instincts
 and feelings1 7#b7 the former  are     
acquired by study and instruction1 the  
latter by discipline4 ,the  latter      
constitute 8character10 each of them as 
a 8moral virtue0  7literally 8a goodness
 of character071 and upon them primarily
 depends  the realisation of happiness4 
,this is the case at least for the great
  majority of men1 and for all men their
 possession is an indispensable  basis  
of the best1 i e1 the most desirable    
life4 ,they form the chief  or central  

subject-matter of the ,ethics4          
,perhaps the truest way of conceiving   
,aristotle's meaning here is to  regard 
a moral virtue as a form of obedience to
 a maxim or rule of  conduct accepted by
 the agent as valid for a class of      
recurrent  situations in human life4    
,such obedience requires knowledge of   
the rule  and acceptance of it as the   
rule of the agent's own actions1 but not
  necessarily knowledge of its ground or
 of its systematic connexion with  other
 similarly known and similarly accepted 
rules 7,it may be remarked  that the    
,greek word usually translated 8reason10
 means in almost all  cases in the      
,ethics such a rule1 and not the faculty
 which  apprehends1 formulates1         
considers them74    ,the 8moral virtues 
and vices0 make up what we call         
character1 and the  important questions 
arise3 7#a7 ,what is character8 and 7#b7
 ,how is it  formed8 7for character in  
this sense is not a natural endowment2  
it is  formed or produced74 ,aristotle  

deals with these questions in the       
reverse order4 ,his answers are peculiar
 and distinctive--not that they  are    
absolutely novel 7for they are          
anticipated in ,plato71 but that by  him
 they are for the first time distinctly 
and clearly formulated4    7#a47        
,character1 good or bad1 is produced by 
what ,aristotle calls  8habituation10   
that is1 it is the result of the        
repeated doing of acts  which have a    
similar or common quality4 ,such        
repetition acting upon  natural         
aptitudes or propensities gradually     
fixes them in one or other  of two      
opposite directions1 giving them a bias 
towards good or evil4  ,hence the       
several acts which determine goodness or
 badness of character  must be done in a
 certain way1 and thus the formation of 
good character  requires discipline and 
direction from without4 ,not that the   
agent  himself contributes nothing to   
the formation of his character1 but that
  at first he needs guidance4 ,the point

 is not so much that the process  cannot
 be safely left to ,nature1 but that it 
cannot be entrusted to  merely          
intellectual instruction4 ,the process  
is one of assimilation1  largely by     
imitation and under direction and       
control4 ,the result is a  growing      
understanding of what is done1 a choice 
of it for its own sake1  a fixity and   
steadiness of purpose4 ,right acts and  
feelings become1  through habit1 easier 
and more pleasant1 and the doing of them
 a  8second nature40 ,the agent acquires
 the power of doing them freely1        
willingly1 more and more 8of himself40  
,but what are 8right0 acts8 ,in the     
first place1 they are those that        
conform to a rule--to the right rule1   
and ultimately to reason4 ,the  ,greeks 
never waver from the conviction that in 
the end moral conduct is  essentially   
reasonable conduct4 ,but there is a more
 significant way of  describing their   
8rightness10 and here for the first time
 ,aristotle  introduces his famous      

8,doctrine of the ,mean40 ,reasoning    
from the  analogy of 8right0 physical   
acts1 he pronounces that rightness      
always  means adaptation or adjustment  
to the special requirements of a        
situation4 ,to this adjustment he gives 
a quantitative interpretation4  ,to do  
7or to feel7 what is right in a given   
situation is to do or to  feel just the 
amount required--neither more nor less3 
to do wrong is to  do or to feel too    
much or too little--to fall short of or 
over-shoot1 8a  mean0 determined by the 
situation4 ,the repetition of acts which
 lie in  the mean is the cause of the   
formation of each and every 8goodness of
  character10 and for this 8rules0 can  
be given4    7#b7 ,what then is a 8moral
 virtue10 the result of such a process  
duly  directed8 ,it is no mere mood of  
feeling1 no mere liability to emotion1  
no mere natural aptitude or endowment1  
it is a permanent state of the  agent's 
self1 or1 as we might in modern phrase  
put it1 of his will1 it  consists in a  

steady self-imposed obedience to a rule 
of action in  certain situations which  
frequently recur in human life4 ,the    
rule  prescribes the control and        
regulation within limits of the agent's 
natural impulses to act and feel thus   
and thus4 ,the situations fall  into    
groups which constitute the 8fields0 of 
the several 8moral  virtues01 for each  
there is a rule1 conformity to which    
secures  rightness in the individual    
acts4 ,thus the moral ideal appears as a
  code of rules1 accepted by the agent1 
but as yet to him without  rational     
justification and without system or     
unity4 ,but the rules  prescribe no     
mechanical uniformity3 each within its  
limits permits  variety1 and the exactly
 right amount adopted to the            
requirements of  the individual         
situation 7and every actual situation is
 individual7  must be determined by the 
intuition of the moment4 ,there is no   
attempt  to reduce the rich             
possibilities of right action to a      

single monotonous  type4 ,on the        
contrary1 there are acknowledged to be  
many forms of moral  virtue1 and there  
is a long list of them1 with their      
correlative vices  enumerated4    ,the  
,doctrine of the ,mean here takes a form
 in which it has impressed  subsequent  
thinkers1 but which has less importance 
than is usually  ascribed to it4 ,in the
 8,table of the ,virtues and ,vices10   
each of the  virtues is flanked by two  
opposite vices1 which are respectively  
the  excess and defect of that which in 
due measure constitutes the virtue4     
,aristotle tries to show that this is   
the case in regard to every virtue      
named and recognised as such1 but his   
treatment is often forced and the       
endeavour is not very successful4       
,except as a convenient principle of    
arrangement of the various forms of     
praiseworthy or blameworthy  characters1
 generally acknowledged as such by      
,greek opinion1 this form  of the       
doctrine is of no great significance4   

,books ,,iii-,v are occupied with a     
survey of the moral virtues and vices4  
,these seem to have been undertaken in  
order to verify in detail the  general  
account1 but this aim is not kept       
steadily in view4 ,nor is  there any    
well-considered principle of            
classification4 ,what we find is  a sort
 of portrait-gallery of the various     
types of moral excellence  which the    
,greeks of the author's age admired and 
strove to encourage4  ,the discussion is
 full of acute1 interesting and         
sometimes profound  observations4 ,some 
of the types are those which are and    
will be admired  at all times1 but      
others are connected with peculiar      
features of ,greek  life which have now 
passed away4 ,the most important is that
 of ,justice  or the ,just ,man1 to     
which we may later return4 ,but the     
discussion is  preceded by an attempt to
 elucidate some difficult and obscure   
points  in the general account of moral 
virtue and action 7,book ,,iii1 cc i-v74

  ,this section is concerned with the   
notion of ,responsibility4 ,the         
discussion designedly excludes what we  
may call the metaphysical issues  of the
 problem1 which here present themselves1
 it moves on the level of  thought of   
the practical man1 the statesman1 and   
the legislator4  ,coercion and ignorance
 of relevant circumstances render acts  
involuntary and exempt their doer from  
responsibility1 otherwise the  act is   
voluntary and the agent responsible1    
choice or preference of  what is done1  
and inner consent to the deed1 are to be
 presumed4  ,neither passion nor        
ignorance of the right rule can         
extenuate  responsibility4 ,but there is
 a difference between acts done         
voluntarily  and acts done of set choice
 or purpose4 ,the latter imply          
,deliberation4 ,deliberation involves   
thinking1 thinking out means to  ends3  
in deliberate acts the whole nature of  
the agent consents to and  enters into  
the act1 and in a peculiar sense they   

are his1 they are  him in action1 and   
the most significant evidence of what he
 is4  ,aristotle is unable wholly to    
avoid allusion to the metaphysical      
difficulties and what he does here say  
upon them is obscure and                
unsatisfactory4 ,but he insists upon the
 importance in moral action of  the     
agent's inner consent1 and on the       
reality of his individual               
responsibility4 ,for his present purpose
 the metaphysical difficulties  are     
irrelevant4    ,the treatment of        
,justice in ,book ,v has always been a  
source of great  difficulty to students 
of the ,ethics4 ,almost more than any   
other part  of the work it has exercised
 influence upon mediaeval and modern    
thought upon the subject4 ,the          
distinctions and divisions have become  
part of the stock-in-trade of would be  
philosophic jurists4 ,and yet1  oddly   
enough1 most of these distinctions have 
been misunderstood and  the whole       
purport of the discussion misconceived4 

,aristotle is here  dealing with justice
 in a restricted sense viz as that      
special goodness  of character which is 
required of every adult citizen and     
which can be  produced by early         
discipline or habituation4 ,it is the   
temper or  habitual attitude demanded of
 the citizen for the due exercise of his
  functions as taking part in the       
administration of the civic             
community--as a member of the judicature
 and executive4 ,the ,greek  citizen was
 only exceptionally1 and at rare        
intervals if ever1 a  law-maker while at
 any moment he might be called upon to  
act as a judge  7juryman or arbitrator7 
or as an administrator4 ,for the work of
 a  legislator far more than the moral  
virtue of justice or fairmindedness  was
 necessary1 these were requisite to the 
rarer and higher  8intellectual virtue0 
of practical wisdom4 ,then here1 too1   
the  discussion moves on a low level1   
and the raising of fundamental  problems
 is excluded4 ,hence 8distributive      

justice0 is concerned not  with the     
large question of the distribution of   
political power and  privileges among   
the constituent members or classes of   
the state but  with the smaller         
questions of the distribution among     
those of casual  gains and even with the
 division among private claimants of a  
common  fund or inheritance1 while      
8corrective justice0 is concerned solely
  with the management of legal redress4 
,the whole treatment is confused  by the
 unhappy attempt to give a precise      
mathematical form to the  principles of 
justice in the various fields           
distinguished4 ,still it  remains an    
interesting first endeavour to give     
greater exactness to  some of the       
leading conceptions of jurisprudence4   
,book ,,vi appears to have in view two  
aims3 7#a7 to describe goodness of      
intellect and discover its highest form 
or forms2 7#b7 to show how this  is     
related to goodness of character1 and so
 to conduct generally4 ,as  all thinking

 is either theoretical or practical1    
goodness of intellect  has two supreme  
forms--,theoretical and ,practical      
,wisdom4 ,the first1  which apprehends  
the eternal laws of the universe1 has no
 direct  relation to human conduct3 the 
second is identical with that master    
science of human life of which the whole
 treatise1 consisting of the  ,ethics   
and the ,politics1 is an exposition4 ,it
 is this science which  supplies the    
right rules of conduct ,taking them as  
they emerge in and  from practical      
experience1 it formulates them more     
precisely and  organises them into a    
system where they are all seen to       
converge upon  happiness4 ,the mode in  
which such knowledge manifests itself is
 in the  power to show that such and    
such rules of action follow from the    
very  nature of the end or good for man4
 ,it presupposes and starts from a      
clear conception of the end and the wish
 for it as conceived1 and it  proceeds  
by a deduction which is dehberation writ

 large4 ,in the man of  practical wisdom
 this process has reached its perfect   
result1 and the  code of right rules is 
apprehended as a system with a single   
principle  and so as something wholly   
rational or reasonable ,he has not on   
each  occasion to seek and find the     
right rule applicable to the situation1 
he produces it at once from within      
himself1 and can at need justify it  by 
exhibiting its rationale1 i4e4 1 its    
connection with the end4 ,this  is the  
consummate form of reason applied to    
conduct1 but there are  minor forms of  
it1 less independent or original1 but   
nevertheless of  great value1 such as   
the power to think out the proper cause 
of policy  in novel circumstances or the
 power to see the proper line of        
treatment  to follow in a court of law4 
,the form of the thinking which enters  
into conduct is that which  terminates  
in the production of a rule which       
declares some means to the  end of life4
 ,the process presupposes 7a7 a clear   

and just  apprehension of the nature of 
that end--such as the ,ethics itself    
endeavours to supply2 7b7 a correct     
perception of the conditions of  action1
 7a7 at least is impossible except to a 
man whose character  has been duly      
formed by discipline2 it arises only in 
a man who has  acquired moral virtue4   
,for such action and feeling as forms   
bad  character1 blinds the eye of the   
soul and corrupts the moral principle1  
and the place of practical wisdom is    
taken by that parody of itself  which   
,aristotle calls 8cleverness0--the      
8wisdom0 of the unscrupulous man  of the
 world4 ,thus true practical wisdom and 
true goodness of character  are         
interdependent2 neither is genuinely    
possible or 8completely0  present       
without the other4 ,this is ,aristotle's
 contribution to the  discussion of the 
question1 so central in ,greek ,moral   
,philosophy1 of  the relation of the    
intellectual and the passionate factors 
in conduct4    ,aristotle is not an     

intuitionist1 but he recognises the     
implication in  conduct of a direct and 
immediate apprehension both of the end  
and of  the character of his            
circumstances under which it is from    
moment to  moment realised4 ,the        
directness of such apprehension makes it
 analogous  to sensation or             
sense-perception2 but it is on his view 
in the end due  to the existence or     
activity in man of that power in him    
which is the  highest thing in his      
nature1 and akin to or identical with   
the divine  nature--mind1 or            
intelligence4 ,it is this which reveals 
to us what is  best for us--the ideal of
 a happiness which is the object of our 
real  wish and the goal of all our      
efforts4 ,but beyond and above the      
practical ideal of what is best for man 
begins to show itself another  and still
 higher ideal--that of a life not       
distinctively human or in a  narrow     
sense practical1 yet capable of being   
participated in by man  even under the  

actual circumstances of this world4 ,for
 a time1 however1  this further and     
higher ideal is ignored4    ,the next   
book 7,book ,,vii471 is concerned partly
 with moral conditions1  in which the   
agent seems to rise above the level of  
moral virtue or  fall below that of     
moral vice1 but partly and more largely 
with  conditions in which the agent     
occupies a middle position between the  
two4 ,aristotle's attention is here     
directed chiefly towards the  phenomena 
of 8,incontinence10 weakness of will or 
imperfect  self-control4 ,this condition
 was to the ,greeks a matter of only too
  frequent experience1 but it appeared  
to them peculiarly difficult to         
understand4 ,how can a man know what is 
good or best for him1 and yet           
chronically fail to act upon his        
knowledge8 ,socrates was driven to the  
paradox of denying the possibility1 but 
the facts are too strong for  him4      
,knowledge of the right rule may be     
present1 nay the rightfulness  of its   

authority may be acknowledged1 and yet  
time after time it may be  disobeyed2   
the will may be good and yet            
overmastered by the force of  desire1 so
 that the act done is contrary to the   
agent's will4  ,nevertheless the act may
 be the agent's1 and the will therefore 
divided  against itself4 ,aristotle is  
aware of the seriousness and difficulty 
of  the problem1 but in spite of the    
vividness with which he pictures1 and   
the acuteness with which he analyses1   
the situation in which such  action     
occurs1 it cannot be said that he solves
 the problem4 ,it is time  that he rises
 above the abstract view of it as a     
conflict between  reason and passion1   
recognising that passion is involved in 
the  knowledge which in conduct prevails
 or is overborne1 and that the force    
which leads to the wrong act is not     
blind or ignorant passion1 but  always  
has some reason in it4 ,but he tends to 
lapse back into the  abstraction1 and   
his final account is perplexed and      

obscure4 ,he finds  the source of the   
phenomenon in the nature of the desire  
for bodily  pleasures1 which is not     
irrational but has something rational in
 it4  ,such pleasures are not           
necessarily or inherently bad1 as has   
sometimes  been maintained2 on the      
contrary1 they are good1 but only in    
certain  amounts or under certain       
conditions1 so that the will is often   
misled1  hesitates1 and is lost4        
,books ,,viii4 and ,,ix4 7on            
,friendship7 are almost an interruption 
of the  argument4 ,the subject-matter of
 them was a favourite topic of ancient  
writers1 and the treatment is smoother  
and more orderly than elsewhere  in the 
,ethics4 ,the argument is clear1 and may
 be left without comment  to the        
readers4 ,these books contain a         
necessary and attractive  complement to 
the somewhat dry account of ,greek      
morality in the  preceding books1 and   
there are in them profound reflections  
on what may  be called the metaphysics  

of friendship or love4    ,at the       
beginning of ,book ,x4 we return to the 
topic of ,pleasure1 which  is now       
regarded from a different point of view4
 ,in ,book ,,vii4 the  antagonists were 
those who over-emphasised the           
irrationality or badness  of ,pleasure3 
here it is rather those who so          
exaggerate its value as to  confuse or  
identify it with the good or ,happiness4
 ,but there is offered  us in this      
section much more than criticism of the 
errors of others4  ,answers are given   
both to the psychological question1     
8,what is  ,pleasure80 and to the       
ethical question1 8,what is its value80 
,pleasure1  we are told1 is the natural 
concomitant and index of perfect        
activity1  distinguishable but          
inseparable from it--8the activity of a 
subject at  its best acting upon an     
object at its best40 ,it is therefore   
always and  in itself a good1 but its   
value rises and falls with that of the  
activity with which it is conjoined1 and

 which it intensifies and  perfects4    
,hence it follows that the highest and  
best pleasures are  those which         
accompany the highest and best activity4
    ,pleasure is1 therefore1 a necessary
 element in the best life1 but it is    
not the whole of it nor the principal   
ingredient4 ,the value of a life        
depends upon the nature and worth of the
 activity which it involves2  given the 
maximum of full free action1 the maximum
 of pleasure  necessary follows4 ,but on
 what sort of life is such activity     
possible8  ,this leads us back to the   
question1 ,what is happiness8 ,in what  
life can  man find the fullest          
satisfaction for his desires8 ,to this  
question  ,aristotle gives an answer    
which cannot but surprise us after what 
has  preceded4 ,true ,happiness1 great  
satisfaction1 cannot be found by man in 
any form of 8practical0 life1 no1 not in
 the fullest and freest  exercise       
possible of the 8moral virtues10 not in 
the life of the  citizen or of the great

 soldier or statesman4 ,to seek it there
 is to  court failure and               
disappointment4 ,it is to be found in   
the life of the  onlooker1 the          
disinterested spectator2 or1 to put it  
more distinctly1  8in the life of the   
philosopher1 the life of scientific and 
philosophic  contemplation40 ,the       
highest and most satisfying form of life
 possible  to man is 8the contemplative 
life02 it is only in a secondary sense  
and  for those incapable of their life1 
that the practical or moral ideal is    
the best4 ,it is time that such a life  
is not distinctively human1 but  it is  
the privilege of man to partake in it1  
and such participation1 at  however rare
 intervals and for however short a      
period1 is the highest  ,happiness which
 human life can offer4 ,all other       
activities have value  only because and 
in so far as they render this life      
possible4    ,but it must not be        
forgotten that ,aristotle conceives of  
this life as  one of intense activity or

 energising3 it is just this which gives
 it  its supremacy4 ,in spite of the    
almost religious fervour with which he  
speaks of it 78the most orthodox of his 
disciples0 paraphrases his  meaning by  
describing its content as 8the service  
and vision of ,god071  it is clear that 
he identified it with the life of the   
philosopher1 as  he understood it1 a    
life of ceaseless intellectual activity 
in which at  least at times all the     
distractions and disturbances           
inseparable from  practical life seemed 
to disappear and become as nothing4     
,this ideal  was partly an inheritance  
from the more ardent idealism of his    
master  ,plato1 but partly it was the   
expression of personal experience4      
,the nobility of this ideal cannot be   
questioned2 the conception of the  end  
of man or a life lived for truth--of a  
life blissfully absorbed in  the vision 
of truth--is a lofty and inspiring one4 
,but we cannot resist  certain          
criticisms upon its presentation by     

,aristotle3 7#a7 the relation  of it to 
the lower ideal of practice is left     
somewhat obscure2 7#b7 it  is described 
in such a way as renders its realisation
 possible only to  a gifted few1 and    
under exceptional circumstances2 7#c7 it
 seems in  various ways1 as regards its 
content1 to be unnecessarily and        
unjustifiably limited4 ,but it must be  
borne in mind that this is a  first     
endeavour to determine its principle1   
and that similar failures  have attended
 the attempts to describe the           
8religious0 or the  8spiritual0 ideals  
of life1 which have continually been    
suggested by  the apparently inherent   
limitations of the 8practical0 or       
8moral0 life1  which is the subject of  
,moral ,philosophy4    ,the ,moral      
,ideal to those who have most deeply    
reflected on it leads to  the thought of
 an ,ideal beyond and above it1 which   
alone gives it  meaning1 but which seems
 to escape from definite conception by  
man4 ,the  richness and variety of this 

,ideal ceaselessly invite1 but as       
ceaselessly defy1 our attempts to       
imprison it in a definite formula or    
portray it in detailed imagination4 ,yet
 the thought of it is and  remains      
inexpungable from our minds4    ,this   
conception of the best life is not      
forgotten in the ,politics ,the  end of 
life in the state is itself well-living 
and well-doing--a life  which helps to  
produce the best life ,the great agency 
in the production  of such life is the  
,state operating through ,law1 which is 
,reason backed  by ,force4 ,for its     
greatest efficiency there is required   
the development  of a science of        
legislation4 ,the main drift of what he 
says here is  that the most desirable   
thing would be that the best reason of  
the  community should be embodied in its
 laws4 ,but so far as that is not       
possible1 it still is true that anyone  
who would make himself and  others      
better must become a miniature          
legislator--must study the general      

principles of law1 morality1 and        
education4 ,the conception of    with   
which he opened the ,ethics would serve 
as a guide to a father  educating his   
children as well as to the legislator   
legislating for the  state4 ,finding in 
his predecessors no developed doctrine  
on this  subject1 ,aristotle proposes   
himself to undertake the construction of
  it1 and sketches in advance the       
programme of the ,politics in the       
concluding sentence of the ,ethics ,his 
ultimate object is to answer  the       
questions1 ,what is the best form of    
,polity1 how should each be             
constituted1 and what laws and customs  
should it adopt and employ8 ,not  till  
this answer is given will 8the          
philosophy of human affairs0 be         
complete4    ,on looking back it will be
 seen that the discussion of the central
  topic of the nature and formation of  
character has expanded into a           
,philosophy of ,human ,conduct1 merging 
at its beginning and end into           

metaphysics ,the result is a ,moral     
,philosophy set against a background  of
 ,political ,theory and general         
,philosophy4 ,the most characteristic   
features of this ,moral ,philosophy are 
due to the fact of its  essentially     
teleological view of human life and     
action3 7#a7 ,every human  activity1 but
 especially every human practical       
activity1 is directed  towards a simple 
,end discoverable by reflection1 and    
this ,end is  conceived of as the object
 of universal human desire1 as something
 to  be enjoyed1 not as something which 
ought to be done or enacted4            
,anstotle's ,moral ,philosophy is not   
hedonistic but it is eudmomstic1  the   
end is the enjoyment of ,happiness1 not 
the fulfilment of ,duty4 7#b7  ,every   
human practical activity derives its    
value from its efficiency as  a means to
 that end1 it is good or bad1 right or  
wrong1 as it conduces  or fails to      
conduce to ,happiness ,thus his ,moral  
,philosophy is  essentially utilitarian 

or prudential ,right action presupposes 
,thought  or ,thinking1 partly on the   
development of a clearer and distincter 
conception of the end of desire1 partly 
as the deduction from that of  rules    
which state the normally effective      
conditions of its realisation4  ,the    
thinking involved in right conduct is   
calculation--calculation of  means to an
 end fixed by nature and foreknowable   
,action itself is at  its best just the 
realisation of a scheme preconceived and
 thought out  beforehand1 commending    
itself by its inherent attractiveness or
 promise  of enjoyment4    ,this view   
has the great advantage of exhibiting   
morality as essentially  reasonable1 but
 the accompanying disadvantage of       
lowering it into a  somewhat prosaic and
 unideal ,prudentialism1 nor is it saved
 from this  by the tacking on to it1 by 
a sort of after-thought1 of the second  
and  higher ,ideal--an addition which   
ruins the coherence of the account      
without really transmuting its substance

 ,the source of our  dissatisfaction    
with the whole theory lies deeper than  
in its tendency  to identify the end    
with the maximum of enjoyment or        
satisfaction1 or  to regard the goodness
 or badness of acts and feelings as     
lying solely  in their efficacy to      
produce such a result ,it arises from   
the  application to morality of the     
distinction of means and end ,for this  
distinction1 for all its plausibility   
and usefulness in ordinary  thought and 
speech1 cannot finally be maintained ,in
 morality--and this  is vital to its    
character--everything is both means and 
end1 and so  neither in distinction or  
separation1 and all thinking about it   
which  presupposes the finality of this 
distinction wanders into misconception  
and error4 ,the thinking which really   
matters in conduct is not a  thinking   
which imaginatively forecasts ideals    
which promise to fulfil  desire1 or     
calculates means to their               
attainment--that is sometimes  useful1  

sometimes harmful1 and always           
subordinate1 but thinking which  reveals
 to the agent the situation in which he 
is to act1 both1 that  is1 the universal
 situation on which as man he always and
 everywhere  stands1 and the            
ever-varying and ever-novel situation in
 which he as  this individual1 here and 
now1 finds himself4 ,in such knowledge  
of  given or historic fact lie the      
natural determinants of his conduct1 in 
such knowledge alone lies the condition 
of his freedom and his good4    ,but    
this does not mean that ,moral          
,philosophy has not still much to  learn
 from ,aristotle's ,ethics4 ,the work   
still remains one of the best           
introductions to a study of its         
important subject-matter1 it spreads    
before us a view of the relevant facts1 
it reduces them to manageable  compass  
and order1 it raises some of the central
 problems1 and makes  acute and valuable
 suggestions towards their solution4    
,above all1 it  perpetually incites to  

renewed and independent reflection upon 
them4    ,j4 ,a4 ,,smith     ,the       
following is a list of the works of     
,aristotle3--    ,first edition of works
 7with omission of ,rhetorica1 ,poetica1
 and second  book of ,economica71 #e    
vols by ,aldus ,manutius1 ,venice1 #adie
 #h1 re  impression supervised by       
,erasmus and with certain corrections by
  ,grynaeus 7including ,rhetorica and   
,poetica71 #aeca1 #aeci1 revised #aeej1 
later editions were followed by that of 
,immanuel ,bekker and ,brandis  7,greek 
and ,latin71 #e vols4 ,the #eth vol     
contains the ,index by ,bomtz1          
#ahca-gj1 ,didot edition 7,greek and    
,latin71 #e vols #ahdh #gd    ,,english 
,,translations ,edited by ,t ,taylor1   
with ,porphyry's ,introduction1  #i     
vols1 #ahab1 under editorship of ,j ,a  
,smith and ,w ,d ,ross1 ,,ii vols1      
#aijh-ca1 ,loeb editions ,ethica1       
,rhetorica1 ,poetica1 ,physica1         
,politica1  ,metaphysica1 #aibf-cc      
,later editions of separate works ,de   

,anima ,torstrik1 #ahfb1                
,trendelenburg1 #bnd edition1 #ahgg1    
with ,english translation1 ,l ,wallace1 
#ahhb1 ,biehl1 #ahhd1 #ahif1 with       
,english1 ,r ,d ,hicks1 #aijg ,ethica ,j
 ,s  ,brewer 7,nicomachean71 #ahcf1 ,w  
,e ,jelf1 #ahef1 ,j ,f ,t ,rogers1      
#ahfe1 ,a  ,grant1 #aheg #h1 #ahff1     
#ahgd1 #ahhe1 ,e ,moore1 #ahga1 #ahgh1  
#dth edition1  #ahij1 ,ramsauer         
7,nicomachean71 #ahgh1 ,susemihl1 #ahgh1
 #ahhj1 revised by ,o  ,apelt1 #aijc1 ,a
 ,grant1 #ahhe1 ,i ,bywater             
7,nicomachean71 #ahij1 ,j ,burnet1      
#aijj    ,historia ,animalium           
,schneider1 #ahab1 ,aubert and ,wimmer1 
#ahfj2  ,dittmeyer1 #aijg               
,metaphysica ,schwegler1 #ahdh1 ,w      
,christ1 #ahii    ,organon ,waitz1 #ahdd
 #f    ,poetica ,vahlen1 #ahfg1 #ahgd1  
with ,notes by ,e ,moore1 #ahge1 with   
,english  translation by ,e ,r ,wharton1
 #ahhc1 #ahhe1 ,uberweg1 #ahgj1 #ahge1  
with  ,german translation1 ,susemihl1   
#ahgd1 ,schmidt1 #ahge1 ,christ1 #ahgh1 

,i  ,bywater1 #ahih1 ,t ,g ,tucker1     
#ahii    ,de ,republica ,athenientium   
,text and facsimile of ,papyrus1 ,f ,g  
,kenyon1  #ahia1 #crd edition1 #ahib1   
,kaibel and ,wilamowitz-,moellendorf1   
#ahia1 #crd  edition1 #ahih1 ,van       
,herwerden and ,leeuwen 7from ,kenyon's 
text71 #ahia1  ,blass1 #ahib1 #ahie1    
#ahih1 #aijc1 ,j ,e ,sandys1 #ahic      
,politica ,susemihl1 #ahgb1 with        
,german1 #ahgh1 #crd edition1 #ahhb1    
,susemihl and ,hicks1 #ahid1 etc1 ,o    
,immisch1 #aiji    ,physica ,c ,prantl1 
#ahgi    ,rhetorica ,stahr1 #ahfb1      
,sprengel 7with ,latin text71 #ahfg1    
,cope and  ,sandys1 #ahgg1 ,roemer1     
#ahhe1 #ahih    ,,english ,,translations
 ,,of ,,one ,,or ,,more ,,works ,de     
,anima 7with ,parva  ,naturalia71 by ,w 
,a ,hammond1 #aijb ,ethica ,of ,morals  
to ,nicomachus1 by ,e  ,pargiter1 #agde1
 with ,politica by ,j ,gillies1 #agig1  
#ahjd1 #ahac1 with  ,rhetorica and      
,poetica1 by ,t ,taylor1 #ahah1 and     
later editions  ,nicomachean ,ethics1   

#ahai1 mainly from text of ,bekker by ,d
 ,p ,chase1  #ahdg1 revised #ahfa1 and  
later editions1 with an introductory    
essay by ,g  ,h ,lewes 7,camelot        
,classics7 #ahij1 re-edited by ,j ,m    
,mitchell 7,new  ,universal ,library71  
#aijf1 #aiaj1 by ,r ,w ,browne 7,bohn's 
,classical  ,library71 #ahdh1 etc1 by ,r
 ,williams1 #ahfi1 #ahgf1 by ,w ,m      
,hatch and others  7with translation of 
paraphrase attributed to ,andronicus of 
,rhodes71  edited by ,e ,hatch1 #ahgi by
 ,f ,h ,peters1 #ahha1 ,j ,e ,c         
,welldon1 #ahib1 ,j  ,gillies           
7,lubbock's ,hundred ,books7 #ahic      
,historia ,animalium1 by ,r  ,creswell  
7,bonn's ,classical ,library7 #ahdh1    
with ,treatise on ,physiognomy1  by ,t  
,taylor1 #ahji ,metaphysica1 by ,t      
,taylor1 #ahja1 by ,j ,h ,m ,mahon      
7,bohn's ,classical ,library71 #ahdh    
,organon1 with ,porphyry's              
,introduction1  by ,o ,f ,owen 7,bohn's 
,classical ,library71 #ahdh ,posterior  
,analytics1 ,e  ,poste1 #ahej1 ,e ,s    

,bourchier1 #aija1 ,on ,fallacies1 ,e   
,poste1 #ahff ,parva  ,naturaha 7,greek 
and ,english71 by ,g ,r ,t ,ross1 #aijf1
 with ,de ,anima1 by ,w  ,a ,hammond1   
#aijb ,youth and ,old ,age1 ,life and   
,death and ,respiration1 ,w  ,ogle #ahig
 ,poetica1 with ,notes from the ,french 
of ,d ,acier1 #agje1 by ,h ,j  ,pye1    
#aghh1 #agib1 ,t ,twining1 #aghi1 #ahab1
 with ,preface and ,notes by ,h         
,hamilton1 #ahea1 ,treatise on          
,rhetorica and ,poetica1 by ,t ,hobbes  
7,bohn's  ,classical ,library71 #ahej1  
by ,wharton1 #ahhc 7see ,greek version71
 ,s ,h  ,butcher1 #ahie1 #ahih1 #crd    
edition1 #aijb1 ,e ,s ,bourchier1 #aijg1
 by ,ingram  ,bywater1 #aiji ,de        
,partibus ,animalium1 ,w ,ogle1 #ahhb   
,de ,republica  ,athenientium1 by ,e    
,poste1 #ahia1 ,f ,g ,kenyon1 #ahia1 ,t 
,j ,dymes1 #ahia ,de  ,virtutibus et    
,vitus1 by ,w ,bridgman1 #ahjd          
,politica1 from the ,french of  ,regius1
 #aeih1 by ,w ,ellis1 #aggf1 #aggh1     
#ahhh 7,morley's ,universal  ,library71 

#ahic 7,lubbock's ,hundred ,books7 by ,e
 ,walford 7with conomics1  and ,life by 
,dr ,gillies71 7,bohn's ,classical      
,library71 #ahdh1 ,j ,e4 ,c4  ,welldon1 
#ahhc1 ,b ,jowett1 #ahhe1 with          
,introduction and ,index by ,h ,w ,c    
,davis1 #aije1 ,books i iii iv 7vii7    
from ,bekker's text by ,w ,e ,bolland1  
with ,introduction by ,a ,lang1 #ahgg4  
,problemata 7with writings of other     
philosophers71 #aeig1 #afjg1 #afhj1     
#afhd1 etc4 ,rhetorica1 ,a summary by ,t
  ,hobbes1 #afee 7871 new edition1      
#agei1 by the translators of the ,art of
  ,thinking1 #afhf1 #ahaf1 by ,d ,m     
,crimmin1 #ahab1 ,j ,gillies1 #ahbc1    
,anon #ahdg1  ,j ,e ,c ,welldon1 #ahhf1 
,r ,c ,jebb1 with ,introduction and     
,supplementary  ,notes by ,j ,e ,sandys1
 #aiji 7see under ,poetica and ,ethica74
 ,secreta  ,secretorum 7supposititious  
work71 ,anon #agjb1 from the ,hebrew    
version by  ,m ,gaster1 #aijg1 #aijh4   
,version by ,lydgate and ,burgh1 edited 
by ,r ,steele  7,e ,e ,t ,s71 #ahid1    

#ahih4    ,,life1 ,,etc ,j ,w           
,blakesley1 #ahci1 ,a ,crichton         
7,jardine's ,naturalist's  ,library71   
#ahdc1 ,,js ,blackie1 ,four ,phases of  
,morals1 ,socrates1 ,aristotle1  etc1   
#ahga1 ,g ,grote1 ,aristotle1 edited by 
,a ,bain and ,g ,c ,robertson1  #ahgb1  
#ahhj1 ,e ,wallace1 ,outlines of the    
,philosophy of ,aristotle1 #ahge1       
#ahhj1 ,a ,grant 7,ancient ,classics for
 ,english readers71 #ahgg1 ,t ,davidson1
  ,aristotle and ,ancient ,educational  
,ideals 7,great ,educators71 #ahib1 ,f  
,sewall1 ,swedenborg and ,aristotle1    
#ahie1 ,w ,a ,heidel1 ,the ,necessary   
and  the ,contingent of the             
,aristotelian ,system 7,university of   
,chicago  ,contributions to             
,philosophy71 #ahif1 ,f ,w ,bain1 ,on   
the ,realisation of the  ,possible1 and 
the ,spirit of ,aristotle1 #ahii1 ,j ,h 
,hyslop1 ,the ,ethics of  the ,greek    
,philosophers1 etc 7,evolution of       
,ethics71 #aijc1 ,m ,v ,williams1  ,six 
,essays on the ,platonic ,theory of     

,knowledge as expounded in the  later   
dialogues and reviewed by ,aristotle1   
#aijh1 ,j ,m ,watson1  ,aristotle's     
,criticism of ,plato1 #aiji ,a ,e       
,taylor1 ,aristotle1 #aiai1 ,w ,d       
,ross1 ,aristotle1 #aibc4               
,,aristotle',s ,,ethics          ,,book 
,i    ,chapter ,i4      ,every art1 and 
every science reduced to a teachable    
form1 and in like  manner every action  
and moral choice1 aims1 it is thought1  
at some  good3 for which reason a common
 and by no means a bad description of   
the ,chief ,good is1 8that which all    
things aim at40    ,now there plainly is
 a difference in the ,ends proposed3 for
 in some  cases they are acts of        
working1 and in others certain works or 
tangible  results beyond and beside the 
acts of working3 and where there are    
certain ,ends beyond and beside the     
actions1 the works are in their  nature 
better than the acts of working4 ,again1
 since actions and arts  and sciences   
are many1 the ,ends likewise come to be 

many3 of the  healing art1 for instance1
 health2 of the ship-building art1 a    
vessel2  of the military art1 victory2  
and of domestic management1 wealth2 are 
respectively the ,ends4    ,and whatever
 of such actions1 arts1 or sciences     
range under some one  faculty 7as under 
that of horsemanship the art of making  
bridles1 and  all that are connected    
with the manufacture of horse-furniture 
in  general2 this itself again1 and     
every action connected with war1 under  
the military art2 and in the same way   
others under others71 in all  such1 the 
,ends of the master-arts are more       
choice-worthy than those  ranging under 
them1 because it is with a view to the  
former that the  latter are pursued4    
7,and in this comparison it makes no    
difference whether the acts of  working 
are themselves the ,ends of the actions1
 or something further  beside them1 as  
is the case in the arts and sciences we 
have been just  speaking of47    ,since 
then of all things which may be done    

there is some one ,end which  we desire 
for its own sake1 and with a view to    
which we desire  everything else2 and   
since we do not choose in all instances 
with a  further ,end in view 7for then  
men would go on without limit1 and so   
the  desire would be unsatisfied and    
fruitless71 this plainly must be the    
,chief ,good1 i4e4 the best thing of    
all4    ,surely then1 even with         
reference to actual life and conduct1   
the  knowledge of it must have great    
weight2 and like archers1 with a mark   
in view1 we shall be more likely to hit 
upon what is right3 and if so1  we ought
 to try to describe1 in outline at      
least1 what it is and of  which of the  
sciences and faculties it is the ,end4  
,now one would naturally suppose it to  
be the ,end of that which is most       
commanding and most inclusive3 and to   
this description1 #a  plainly answers3  
for this it is that determines which of 
the sciences  should be in the          
communities1 and which kind individuals 

are to learn1  and what degree of       
proficiency is to be required4 ,again2  
we see also  ranging under this the most
 highly esteemed faculties1 such as the 
art  military1 and that of domestic     
management1 and ,rhetoric4 ,well then1  
since this uses all the other practical 
sciences1 and moreover lays  down rules 
as to what men are to do1 and from what 
to abstain1 the ,end  of this must      
include the ,ends of the rest1 and so   
must be ,the ,good of  ,man4 ,and grant 
that this is the same to the individual 
and to the  community1 yet surely that  
of the latter is plainly greater and    
more  perfect to discover and preserve3 
for to do this even for a single        
individual were a matter for            
contentment2 but to do it for a whole   
nation1 and for communities generally1  
were more noble and godlike4    ,such   
then are the objects proposed by our    
treatise1 which is of the  nature of 3  
and ,i conceive ,i shall have spoken on 
them  satisfactorily1 if they be made as

 distinctly clear as the nature of  the 
subject-matter will admit3 for exactness
 must not be looked for in  all         
discussions alike1 any more than in all 
works of handicraft4 ,now  the notions  
of nobleness and justice1 with the      
examination of which   is concerned1    
admit of variation and error to such a  
degree1  that they are supposed by some 
to exist conventionally only1 and not in
  the nature of things3 but then1 again1
 the things which are allowed to  be    
goods admit of a similar error1 because 
harm comes to many from  them3 for      
before now some have perished through   
wealth1 and others  through valour4     
,we must be content then1 in speaking of
 such things and from such data1  to set
 forth the truth roughly and in outline2
 in other words1 since we  are speaking 
of general matter and from general data1
 to draw also  conclusions merely       
general4 ,and in the same spirit should 
each person  receive what we say3 for   
the man of education will seek exactness

 so  far in each subject as the nature  
of the thing admits1 it being plainly   
much the same absurdity to put up with a
 mathematician who tries to  persuade   
instead of proving1 and to demand strict
 demonstrative  reasoning of a          
,rhetorician4    ,now each man judges   
well what he knows1 and of these things 
he is a  good judge3 on each particular 
matter then he is a good judge who has  
been instructed in it1 and in a general 
way the man of general mental           
cultivation4#b    ,hence the young man  
is not a fit student of ,moral          
,philosophy1 for he  has no experience  
in the actions of life1 while all that  
is said  presupposes and is concerned   
with these3 and in the next place1 since
  he is apt to follow the impulses of   
his passions1 he will hear as  though he
 heard not1 and to no profit1 the end in
 view being practice  and not mere      
knowledge4    ,and ,i draw no           
distinction between young in years1 and 
youthful in  temper and disposition3 the

 defect to which ,i allude being no     
direct  result of the time1 but of      
living at the beck and call of passion1 
and  following each object as it        
rises4#c ,for to them that are such the 
knowledge comes to be unprofitable1 as  
to those of imperfect  self-control3    
but1 to those who form their desires and
 act in  accordance with reason1 to have
 knowledge on these points must be very 
profitable4    ,let thus much suffice by
 way of preface on these three points1  
the  student1 the spirit in which our   
observations should be received1 and    
the object which we propose4    ,chapter
 ,,ii4    ,and now1 resuming the        
statement with which we commenced1 since
 all  knowledge and moral choice grasps 
at good of some kind or another1 what   
good is that which we say  aims at8 or1 
in other words1 what is  the highest of 
all the goods which are the objects of  
action8    ,so far as name goes1 there  
is a pretty general agreement3 for      
,,happiness  both the multitude and the 

refined few call it1 and 8living well0  
and  8doing well0 they conceive to be   
the same with 8being happy20 but about  
the ,nature of this ,happiness1 men     
dispute1 and the multitude do not in    
their account of it agree with the wise4
 ,for some say it is some one of  those 
things which are palpable and apparent1 
as pleasure or wealth or  honour2 in    
fact1 some one thing1 some another2 nay1
 oftentimes the same  man gives a       
different account of it2 for when ill1  
he calls it health2  when poor1 wealth3 
and conscious of their own ignorance1   
men admire  those who talk grandly and  
above their comprehension4 ,some again  
held  it to be something by itself1     
other than and beside these many good   
things1 which is in fact to all these   
the cause of their being good4    ,now  
to sift all the opinions would be       
perhaps rather a fruitless task2  so it 
shall suffice to sift those which are   
most generally current1 or  are thought 
to have some reason in them4    ,and    

here we must not forget the difference  
between reasoning from  principles1 and 
reasoning to principles3 for with good  
cause did ,plato  too doubt about this1 
and enquire whether the right road is   
from  principles or to principles1 just 
as in the racecourse from the judges  to
 the further end1 or vice vers4    ,of  
course1 we must begin with what is      
known2 but then this is of two  kinds1  
what we do know1 and what we may know3#e
 perhaps then as  individuals we must   
begin with what we do know4 ,hence the  
necessity  that he should have been well
 trained in habits1 who is to study1    
with  any tolerable chance of profit1   
the principles of nobleness and justice 
and moral philosophy generally4 ,for a  
principle is a matter of fact1  and if  
the fact is sufficiently clear to a man 
there will be no need in  addition of   
the reason for the fact4 ,and he that   
has been thus trained  either has       
principles already1 or can receive them 
easily3 as for him  who neither has nor 

can receive them1 let him hear his      
sentence from  ,hesiod3    ,he is best  
of all who of himself conceiveth all    
things2  ,good again is he too who can  
adopt a good suggestion2  ,but whoso    
neither of himself conceiveth nor       
hearing from another  ,layeth it to     
heart2--he is a useless man4    ,chapter
 ,,iii4    ,but to return from this     
digression4    ,now of the ,chief ,good 
7i4e4 of ,happiness7 men seem to form   
their  notions from the different modes 
of life1 as we might naturally expect3  
the many and most low conceive it to be 
pleasure1 and hence they are  content   
with the life of sensual enjoyment4 ,for
 there are three lines  of life which   
stand out prominently to view3 that just
 mentioned1 and  the life in society1   
and1 thirdly1 the life of contemplation4
    ,now the many are plainly quite     
slavish1 choosing a life like that of   
brute animals3 yet they obtain some     
consideration1 because many of the      
great share the tastes of ,sardanapalus4

 ,the refined and active again  conceive
 it to be honour3 for this may be said  
to be the end of the  life in society3  
yet it is plainly too superficial for   
the object of  our search1 because it is
 thought to rest with those who pay     
rather  than with him who receives it1  
whereas the ,chief ,good we feel        
instinctively must be something which is
 our own1 and not easily to be  taken   
from us4    ,and besides1 men seem to   
pursue honour1 that they may believe    
themselves to be good3#f for instance1  
they seek to be honoured by the  wise1  
and by those among whom they are known1 
and for virtue3 clearly  then1 in the   
opinion at least of these men1 virtue is
 higher than  honour4 ,in truth1 one    
would be much more inclined to think    
this to be  the end of the life in      
society2 yet this itself is plainly not 
sufficiently final3 for it is conceived 
possible1 that a man possessed  of      
virtue might sleep or be inactive all   
through his life1 or1 as a  third case1 

suffer the greatest evils and           
misfortunes3 and the man who  should    
live thus no one would call happy1      
except for mere disputation's  sake4#g  
,and for these let thus much suffice1   
for they have been treated of at        
sufficient length in my ,encyclia4#h    
,a third line of life is that of        
contemplation1 concerning which we      
shall make our examination in the       
following pages4#i    ,as for the life  
of money-making1 it is one of           
constraint1 and wealth  manifestly is   
not the good we are seeking1 because it 
is for use1 that  is1 for the sake of   
something further3 and hence one would  
rather  conceive the forementioned ends 
to be the right ones1 for men rest      
content with them for their own sakes4  
,yet1 clearly1 they are not the  objects
 of our search either1 though many words
 have been wasted on  them4#aj ,so much 
then for these4    ,again1 the notion of
 one ,universal ,good 7the same1 that   
is1 in all  things71 it is better       

perhaps we should examine1 and discuss  
the  meaning of it1 though such an      
enquiry is unpleasant1 because they are 
friends of ours who have introduced     
these 4#aa ,still perhaps it  may appear
 better1 nay to be our duty where the   
safety of the truth is  concerned1 to   
upset if need be even our own theories1 
specially as we  are lovers of wisdom3  
for since both are dear to us1 we are   
bound to  prefer the truth4 ,now they   
who invented this doctrine of 1 did not 
apply it to those things in which they  
spoke of priority and  posteriority1 and
 so they never made any  of numbers2 but
 good is  predicated in the categories  
of ,substance1 ,quality1 and ,relation2 
now  that which exists of itself1 i4e4  
,substance1 is prior in the nature of   
things to that which is relative1       
because this latter is an off-shoot1  as
 it were1 and result of that which is2  
on their own principle then  there      
cannot be a common  in the case of      
these4    ,in the next place1 since good

 is predicated in as many ways as there 
are modes of existence for it is        
predicated in the category of           
,substance1 as ,god1 ,intellect--and in 
that of ,quality1 as ,the ,virtues--and 
in that of ,quantity1 as ,the ,mean--and
 in that of ,relation1 as ,the          
,useful--and in that of ,time1 as       
,opportunity--and in that of ,place1 as 
,abode2 and other such like things1 it  
manifestly cannot be something  common  
and universal and one in all3 else it   
would not have been  predicated in all  
the categories1 but in one only4        
,thirdly1 since those things which range
 under one  are also under  the         
cognisance of one science1 there would  
have been1 on their theory1  only one   
science taking cognisance of all goods  
collectively3 but in  fact there are    
many even for those which range under   
one category3 for  instance1 of         
,opportunity or ,seasonableness 7which  
,i have before  mentioned as being in   
the category of ,time71 the science is1 

in war1  generalship2 in disease1       
medical science2 and of the ,mean 7which
 ,i  quoted before as being in the      
category of ,quantity71 in food1 the    
medical science2 and in labour or       
exercise1 the gymnastic science4 ,a     
person might fairly doubt also what in  
the world they mean by very-this  that  
or the other1 since1 as they would      
themselves allow1 the account  of the   
humanity is one and the same in the     
very-,man1 and in any  individual ,man3 
for so far as the individual and the    
very-,man are both  ,man1 they will not 
differ at all3 and if so1 then very-good
 and any  particular good will not      
differ1 in so far as both are good4 ,nor
 will  it do to say1 that the eternity  
of the very-good makes it to be more    
good2 for what has lasted white ever so 
long1 is no whiter than what  lasts but 
for a day4    ,no4 ,the ,pythagoreans do
 seem to give a more credible account of
 the  matter1 who place 8,one0 among the
 goods in their double list of goods    

and bads3#ab which philosophers1 in     
fact1 ,speusippus#ac seems to have      
followed4    ,but of these matters let  
us speak at some other time4 ,now there 
is  plainly a loophole to object to what
 has been advanced1 on the plea  that   
the theory ,i have attacked is not by   
its advocates applied to all  good3 but 
those goods only are spoken of as being 
under one 1 which  are pursued1 and with
 which men rest content simply for their
 own  sakes3 whereas those things which 
have a tendency to produce or  preserve 
them in any way1 or to hinder their     
contraries1 are called  good because of 
these other goods1 and after another    
fashion4 ,it is  manifest then that the 
goods may be so called in two senses1   
the one  class for their own sakes1 the 
other because of these4    ,very well   
then1 let us separate the independent   
goods from the  instrumental1 and see   
whether they are spoken of as under one 
4  ,but the question next arises1 what  
kind of goods are we to call            

independent8 ,all such as are pursued   
even when separated from other  goods1  
as1 for instance1 being wise1 seeing1   
and certain pleasures and  honours 7for 
these1 though we do pursue them with    
some further end in  view1 one would    
still place among the independent       
goods78 or does it  come in fact to     
this1 that we can call nothing          
independent good except  the 1 and so   
the concrete of it will be nought8      
,if1 on the other hand1 these are       
independent goods1 then we shall        
require that the account of the goodness
 be the same clearly in all1  just as   
that of the whiteness is in snow and    
white lead4 ,but how stands  the fact8  
,why of honour and wisdom and pleasure  
the accounts are  distinct and different
 in so far as they are good4 ,the ,chief
 ,good then  is not something common1   
and after one 4    ,but then1 how does  
the name come to be common 7for it is   
not seemingly  a case of fortuitous     
equivocation78 ,are different individual

 things  called good by virtue of being 
from one source1 or all conducing to one
  end1 or rather by way of analogy1 for 
that intellect is to the soul as  sight 
to the body1 and so on8 ,however1       
perhaps we ought to leave these         
questions now1 for an accurate          
investigation of them is more properly  
the business of a different philosophy4 
,and likewise respecting the  3 for even
 if there is some one good predicated in
 common of all  things that are good1 or
 separable and capable of existing      
independently1 manifestly it cannot be  
the object of human action or           
attainable by ,man2 but we are in search
 now of something that is  so4#ad    ,it
 may readily occur to any one1 that it  
would be better to attain a  knowledge  
of it with a view to such concrete goods
 as are attainable  and practical1      
because1 with this as a kind of model in
 our hands1 we  shall the better know   
what things are good for us             
individually1 and  when we know them1 we

 shall attain them4    ,some            
plausibility1 it is true1 this argument 
possesses1 but it is  contradicted by   
the facts of the ,arts and ,sciences2   
for all these1  though aiming at some   
good1 and seeking that which is         
deficient1 yet  pretermit the knowledge 
of it3 now it is not exactly probable   
that all  artisans without exception    
should be ignorant of so great a help as
  this would be1 and not even look after
 it2 neither is it easy to see  wherein 
a weaver or a carpenter will be profited
 in respect of his  craft by knowing the
 very-good1 or how a man will be the    
more apt to  effect cures or to command 
an army for having seen the  itself4    
,for  manifestly it is not health after 
this general and abstract fashion  which
 is the subject of the physician's      
investigation1 but the health  of ,man1 
or rather perhaps of this or that man2  
for he has to heal  individuals4--,thus 
much on these points4    ,chapter ,,iv4 
,and now let us revert to the ,good of  

which we are in search3 what can  it be8
 for manifestly it is different in      
different actions and arts3  for it is  
different in the healing art and in the 
art military1 and  similarly in the     
rest4 ,what then is the ,chief ,good in 
each8 ,is it not  8that for the sake of 
which the other things are done80 and   
this in the  healing art is health1 and 
in the art military victory1 and in that
 of  house-building a house1 and in any 
other thing something else2 in  short1  
in every action and moral choice the    
,end1 because in all cases  men do      
everything else with a view to this4 ,so
 that if there is some  one ,end of all 
things which are and may be done1 this  
must be the ,good  proposed by doing1 or
 if more than one1 then these4    ,thus 
our discussion after some traversing    
about has come to the same  point which 
we reached before4 ,and this we must try
 yet more to clear  up4    ,now since   
the ends are plainly many1 and of these 
we choose some with a  view to others   

7wealth1 for instance1 musical          
instruments1 and1 in  general1 all      
instruments71 it is clear that all are  
not final3 but the  ,chief ,good is     
manifestly something final2 and so1 if  
there is some one  only which is final1 
this must be the object of our search3  
but if  several1 then the most final of 
them will be it4    ,now that which is  
an object of pursuit in itself we call  
more final  than that which is so with a
 view to something else2 that again     
which  is never an object of choice with
 a view to something else than those    
which are so both in themselves and with
 a view to this ulterior  object3 and so
 by the term 8absolutely final10 we     
denote that which is  an object of      
choice always in itself1 and never with 
a view to any  other4    ,and of this   
nature ,happiness is mostly thought to  
be1 for this we  choose always for its  
own sake1 and never with a view to      
anything  further3 whereas honour1      
pleasure1 intellect1 in fact every      

excellence  we choose for their own     
sakes1 it is true 7because we would     
choose each  of these even if no result 
were to follow71 but we choose them also
  with a view to happiness1 conceiving  
that through their instrumentality  we  
shall be happy3 but no man chooses      
happiness with a view to them1  nor in  
fact with a view to any other thing     
whatsoever4    ,the same result#ae is   
seen to follow also from the notion of  
self-sufficiency1 a quality thought to  
belong to the final good4 ,now by       
sufficient for ,self1 we mean not for a 
single individual living a  solitary    
life1 but for his parents also and      
children and wife1 and1 in  general1    
friends and countrymen2 for man is by   
nature adapted to a  social existence4  
,but of these1 of course1 some limit    
must be fixed3  for if one extends it to
 parents and descendants and friends'   
friends1  there is no end to it4 ,this  
point1 however1 must be left for future 
investigation3 for the present we define

 that to be self-sufficient  8which     
taken alone makes life choice-worthy1   
and to be in want of  nothing20 now of  
such kind we think ,happiness to be3 and
 further1 to be  most choice-worthy of  
all things2 not being reckoned with any 
other  thing1#af for if it were so      
reckoned1 it is plain we must then allow
  it1 with the addition of ever so small
 a good1 to be more choice-worthy  than 
it was before3#ag because what is put to
 it becomes an addition of so  much more
 good1 and of goods the greater is ever 
the more  choice-worthy4    ,so then    
,happiness is manifestly something final
 and self-sufficient1  being the end of 
all things which are and may be done4   
,chapter ,v4    ,but1 it may be1 to call
 ,happiness the ,chief ,good is a mere  
truism1 and  what is wanted is some     
clearer account of its real nature4 ,now
 this  object may be easily attained1   
when we have discovered what is the work
  of man2 for as in the case of         
flute-player1 statuary1 or artisan of   

any  kind1 or1 more generally1 all who  
have any work or course of action1      
their ,chief ,good and ,excellence is   
thought to reside in their work1 so  it 
would seem to be with man1 if there is  
any work belonging to him4    ,are we   
then to suppose1 that while carpenter   
and cobbler have certain  works and     
courses of action1 ,man as ,man has     
none1 but is left by ,nature  without a 
work8 or would not one rather hold1 that
 as eye1 hand1 and  foot1 and generally 
each of his members1 has manifestly some
 special  work2 so too the whole ,man1  
as distinct from all these1 has some    
work  of his own8#ah    ,what then can  
this be8 not mere life1 because that    
plainly is shared  with him even by     
vegetables1 and we want what is peculiar
 to him4 ,we  must separate off then the
 life of mere nourishment and growth1   
and  next will come the life of         
sensation3 but this again manifestly is 
common to horses1 oxen1 and every       
animal4 ,there remains then a kind of   

life of the ,rational ,nature apt to    
act3 and of this ,nature there are  two 
parts denominated ,rational1 the one as 
being obedient to ,reason1  the other as
 having and exerting it4 ,again1 as this
 life is also spoken  of in two ways1#ai
 we must take that which is in the way  
of actual  working1 because this is     
thought to be most properly entitled to 
the  name4 ,if then the work of ,man is 
a working of the soul in accordance     
with reason1 or at least not            
independently of reason1 and we say that
  the work of any given subject1 and of 
that subject good of its kind1  are the 
same in kind 7as1 for instance1 of a    
harp-player and a good  harp-player1 and
 so on in every case1 adding to the work
 eminence in  the way of excellence2 ,i 
mean1 the work of a harp-player is to   
play the  harp1 and of a good           
harp-player to play it well72 if1 ,i    
say1 this is  so1 and we assume the work
 of ,man to be life of a certain kind1  
that is  to say a working of the soul1  

and actions with reason1 and of a good  
man to do these things well and nobly1  
and in fact everything is  finished off 
well in the way of the excellence which 
peculiarly belongs  to it3 if all this  
is so1 then the ,good of ,man comes to  
be 8a working  of the ,soul in the way  
of ,excellence10 or1 if ,excellence     
admits of  degrees1 in the way of the   
best and most perfect ,excellence4      
,and we must add1   2#bj for as it is   
not one swallow or one  fine day that   
makes a spring1 so it is not one day or 
a short time that  makes a man blessed  
and happy4    ,let this then be taken   
for a rough sketch of the ,chief ,good3 
since it  is probably the right way to  
give first the outline1 and fill it in  
afterwards4 ,and it would seem that any 
man may improve and connect what  is    
good in the sketch1 and that time is a  
good discoverer and  co-operator in such
 matters3 it is thus in fact that all   
improvements  in the various arts have  
been brought about1 for any man may fill

 up a  deficiency4    ,you must remember
 also what has been already stated1 and 
not seek for  exactness in all matters  
alike1 but in each according to the     
subject-matter1 and so far as properly  
belongs to the system4 ,the  carpenter  
and geometrician1 for instance1 enquire 
into the right line  in different       
fashion3 the former so far as he wants  
it for his work1  the latter enquires   
into its nature and properties1 because 
he is  concerned with the truth4    ,so 
then should one do in other matters1    
that the incidental matters may  not    
exceed the direct ones4    ,and again1  
you must not demand the reason either in
 all things  alike1#ba because in some  
it is sufficient that the fact has been 
well  demonstrated1 which is the case   
with first principles2 and the fact is  
the first step1 i4e4 starting-point or  
principle4    ,and of these first       
principles some are obtained by         
induction1 some by  perception1#bb some 
by a course of habituation1 others in   

other  different ways4 ,and we must try 
to trace up each in their own nature1   
and take pains to secure their being    
well defined1 because they have  great  
influence on what follows3 it is        
thought1 ,i mean1 that the              
starting-point or principle is more than
 half the whole matter1 and  that many  
of the points of enquiry come           
simultaneously into view  thereby4      
,chapter ,,vi4    ,we must now enquire  
concerning ,happiness1 not only from our
 conclusion  and the data on which our  
reasoning proceeds1 but likewise from   
what is  commonly said about it3 because
 with what is true all things which     
really are are in harmony1 but with that
 which is false the true very  soon     
jars4    ,now there is a common division
 of goods into three classes2 one being 
called external1 the other two those of 
the soul and body respectively1  and    
those belonging to the soul we call most
 properly and specially  good4 ,well1 in
 our definition we assume that the      

actions and workings  of the soul       
constitute ,happiness1 and these of     
course belong to the  soul4 ,and so our 
account is a good one1 at least         
according to this  opinion1 which is of 
ancient date1 and accepted by those who 
profess  philosophy4 ,rightly too are   
certain actions and workings said to be 
the  end1 for thus it is brought into   
the number of the goods of the soul     
instead of the external4 ,agreeing also 
with our definition is the  common      
notion1 that the happy man lives well   
and does well1 for it has  been stated  
by us to be pretty much a kind of living
 well and doing  well4    ,and further1 
the points required in ,happiness are   
found in combination  in our account of 
it4    ,for some think it is virtue1    
others practical wisdom1 others a kind  
of  scientific philosophy2 others that  
it is these1 or else some one of  them1 
in combination with pleasure1 or at     
least not independently of  it2 while   
others again take in external           

prosperity4    ,of these opinions1 some 
rest on the authority of numbers or     
antiquity1  others on that of few1 and  
those men of note3 and it is not likely 
that  either of these classes should be 
wrong in all points1 but be right at    
least in some one1 or even in most4     
,now with those who assert it to be     
,virtue 7,excellence71 or some kind of  
,virtue1 our account agrees3 for working
 in the way of ,excellence surely       
belongs to ,excellence4    ,and there is
 perhaps no unimportant difference      
between conceiving of  the ,chief ,good 
as in possession or as in use1 in other 
words1 as a mere  state or as a working4
 ,for the state or habit#bc may possibly
 exist in  a subject without effecting  
any good1 as1 for instance1 in him who  
is  asleep1 or in any other way         
inactive2 but the working cannot so1 for
 it  will of necessity act1 and act     
well4 ,and as at the ,olympic games it  
is  not the finest and strongest men who
 are crowned1 but they who enter  the   

lists1 for out of these the prize-men   
are selected2 so too in life1  of the   
honourable and the good1 it is they who 
act who rightly win the  prizes4#bd     
,their life too is in itself pleasant3  
for the feeling of pleasure is a  mental
 sensation1 and that is to each pleasant
 of which he is said to  be fond3 a     
horse1 for instance1 to him who is fond 
of horses1 and a  sight to him who is   
fond of sights3 and so in like manner   
just acts to  him who is fond of        
justice1 and more generally the things  
in accordance  with virtue to him who is
 fond of virtue4 ,now in the case of the
  multitude of men the things which they
 individually esteem pleasant  clash1   
because they are not such by nature1    
whereas to the lovers of  nobleness     
those things are pleasant which are such
 by nature3 but the  actions in         
accordance with virtue are of this kind1
 so that they are  pleasant both to the 
individuals and also in themselves4     
,so then their life has no need of      

pleasure as a kind of additional        
appendage1 but involves pleasure in     
itself4 ,for1 besides what ,i have  just
 mentioned1 a man is not a good man at  
all who feels no pleasure in  noble     
actions1#be just as no one would call   
that man just who does not  feel        
pleasure in acting justly1 or liberal   
who does not in liberal  actions1 and   
similarly in the case of the other      
virtues which might be  enumerated3 and 
if this be so1 then the actions in      
accordance with  virtue must be in      
themselves pleasurable4 ,then again they
 are certainly  good and noble1 and each
 of these in the highest degree2 if we  
are to  take as right the judgment of   
the good man1 for he judges as we have  
said4    ,thus then ,happiness is most  
excellent1 most noble1 and most         
pleasant1  and these attributes are not 
separated as in the well-known ,delian  
inscription--    8,most noble is that   
which is most just1 but best is health2 
,and naturally most pleasant is the     

obtaining one's desires40      ,for all 
these co-exist in the best acts of      
working3 and we say that  ,happiness is 
these1 or one1 that is1 the best of     
them4    ,still#bf it is quite plain    
that it does require the addition of    
external goods1 as we have said3 because
 without appliances it is  impossible1  
or at all events not easy1 to do noble  
actions3 for  friends1 money1 and       
political influence are in a manner     
instruments  whereby many things are    
done3 some things there are again a     
deficiency  in which mars blessedness2  
good birth1 for instance1 or fine       
offspring1  or even personal beauty3 for
 he is not at all capable of ,happiness 
who  is very ugly1 or is ill-born1 or   
solitary and childless2 and still less  
perhaps supposing him to have very bad  
children or friends1 or to have  lost   
good ones by death4 ,as we have said    
already1 the addition of  prosperity of 
this kind does seem necessary to        
complete the idea of  ,happiness2 hence 

some rank good fortune1 and others      
virtue1 with  ,happiness4    ,chapter   
,,vii4    ,and hence too a question is  
raised1 whether it is a thing that can  
be  learned1 or acquired by habituation 
or discipline of some other kind1  or   
whether it comes in the way of divine   
dispensation1 or even in the  way of    
chance4    ,now to be sure1 if anything 
else is a gift of the ,gods to men1 it  
is  probable that ,happiness is a gift  
of theirs too1 and specially because  of
 all human goods it is the highest4 ,but
 this1 it may be1 is a  question        
belonging more properly to an           
investigation different from  ours3#bg  
and it is quite clear1 that on the      
supposition of its not  being sent from 
the ,gods direct1 but coming to us by   
reason of virtue  and learning of a     
certain kind1 or discipline1 it is yet  
one of the  most ,godlike things2       
because the prize and ,end of virtue is 
manifestly  somewhat most excellent1 nay
 divine and blessed4    ,it will also on

 this supposition be widely             
participated1 for it may  through       
learning and diligence of a certain kind
 exist in all who have  not been        
maimed#bh for virtue4    ,and if it is  
better we should be happy thus than as a
 result of chance1  this is in itself an
 argument that the case is so2 because  
those things  which are in the way of   
nature1 and in like manner of art1 and  
of every  cause1 and specially the best 
cause1 are by nature in the best way    
possible3 to leave them to chance what  
is greatest and most noble would  be    
very much out of harmony with all these 
facts4#bi    ,the question may be       
determined also by a reference to our   
definition of  ,happiness1 that it is a 
working of the soul in the way of       
excellence or  virtue of a certain kind3
 and of the other goods1 some we must   
have to  begin with1 and those which are
 co-operative and useful are given by   
nature as instruments4#cj    ,these     
considerations will harmonise also with 

what we said at the  commencement3 for  
we assumed the ,end of  to be most      
excellent3  now this bestows most care  
on making the members of the community  
of a  certain character2 good that is   
and apt to do what is honourable4       
,with good reason then neither ox nor   
horse nor any other brute animal  do we 
call happy1 for none of them can partake
 in such working3 and for  this same    
reason a child is not happy either1     
because by reason of his  tender age he 
cannot yet perform such actions3 if the 
term is applied1  it is by way of       
anticipation4    ,for to constitute     
,happiness1 there must be1 as we have   
said1 complete  virtue and a complete   
life3 for many changes and chances of   
all kinds  arise during a life1 and he  
who is most prosperous may become       
involved  in great misfortunes in his   
old age1 as in the heroic poems the tale
 is  told of ,priam3 but the man who has
 experienced such fortune and died in   
wretchedness1 no man calls happy4       

,chapter ,,viii4    ,are we then to call
 no man happy while he lives1 and1 as   
,solon would  have us1 look to the end8 
,and again1 if we are to maintain this  
position1 is a man then happy when he is
 dead8 or is not this a  complete       
absurdity1 specially in us who say      
,happiness is a working of a  certain   
kind8    ,if on the other hand we do not
 assert that the dead man is happy1 and 
,solon does not mean this1 but only that
 one would then be safe in  pronouncing 
a man happy1 as being thenceforward out 
of the reach of  evils and misfortunes1 
this too admits of some dispute1 since  
it is  thought that the dead has        
somewhat both of good and evil 7if1 as  
we  must allow1 a man may have when     
alive but not aware of the              
circumstances71 as honour and dishonour1
 and good and bad fortune of  children  
and descendants generally4    ,nor is   
this view again without its             
difficulties3 for1 after a man has      
lived in blessedness to old age and died

 accordingly1 many changes may  befall  
him in right of his descendants2 some of
 them may be good and  obtain positions 
in life accordant to their merits1      
others again quite  the contrary3 it is 
plain too that the descendants may at   
different  intervals or grades stand in 
all manner of relations to the          
ancestors4#ca ,absurd indeed would be   
the position that even the dead  man is 
to change about with them and become at 
one time happy and at  another          
miserable4 ,absurd however it is on the 
other hand that the  affairs of the     
descendants should in no degree and     
during no time  affect the ancestors4   
,but we must revert to the point first  
raised1#cb since the present  question  
will be easily determined from that4    
,if then we are to look to the end and  
then pronounce the man blessed1  not as 
being so but as having been so at some  
previous time1 surely it  is absurd that
 when he is happy the truth is not to be
 asserted of  him1 because we are       

unwilling to pronounce the living happy 
by reason  of their liability to        
changes1 and because1 whereas we have   
conceived  of happiness as something    
stable and no way easily changeable1 the
 fact  is that good and bad fortune are 
constantly circling about the same      
people3 for it is quite plain1 that if  
we are to depend upon the  fortunes of  
men1 we shall often have to call the    
same man happy1 and a  little while     
after miserable1 thus representing our  
happy man1    8,chameleon-like1 and     
based on rottenness40      ,is not this 
the solution8 that to make our sentence 
dependent on the  changes of fortune1 is
 no way right3 for not in them stands   
the well1  or the ill1 but though human 
life needs these as accessories 7which  
we  have allowed already71 the workings 
in the way of virtue are what  determine
 ,happiness1 and the contrary the       
contrary4    ,and1 by the way1 the      
question which has been here discussed1 
testifies  incidentally to the truth of 

our account of ,happiness4#cc ,for to   
nothing does a stability of human       
results attach so much as it does to    
the workings in the way of virtue1 since
 these are held to be more  abiding even
 than the sciences3 and of these last   
again#cd the most  precious are the most
 abiding1 because the blessed live in   
them most  and most continuously1 which 
seems to be the reason why they are not 
forgotten4 ,so then this stability which
 is sought will be in the happy  man1   
and he will be such through life1 since 
always1 or most of all1 he  will be     
doing and contemplating the things which
 are in the way of  virtue3 and the     
various chances of life he will bear    
most nobly1 and at  all times and in all
 ways harmoniously1 since he is the     
truly good man1  or in the terms of our 
proverb 8a faultless cube40    ,and     
whereas the incidents of chance are     
many1 and differ in greatness  and      
smallness1 the small pieces of good or  
ill fortune evidently do not  affect the

 balance of life1 but the great and     
numerous1 if happening  for good1 will  
make life more blessed 7for it is their 
nature to  contribute to ornament1 and  
the using of them comes to be noble and 
excellent71 but if for ill1 they bruise 
as it were and maim the  blessedness3   
for they bring in positive pain1 and    
hinder many acts of  working4 ,but      
still1 even in these1 nobleness shines  
through when a man  bears contentedly   
many and great mischances not from      
insensibility to  pain but because he is
 noble and high-spirited4    ,and if1 as
 we have said1 the acts of working are  
what determine the  character of the    
life1 no one of the blessed can ever    
become wretched1  because he will never 
do those things which are hateful and   
mean4 ,for  the man who is truly good   
and sensible bears all fortunes1 we     
presume1  becomingly1 and always does   
what is noblest under the circumstances1
  just as a good general employs to the 
best advantage the force he has  with   

him2 or a good shoemaker makes the      
handsomest shoe he can out of  the      
leather which has been given him2 and   
all other good artisans  likewise4 ,and 
if this be so1 wretched never can the   
happy man come to  be3 ,i do not mean to
 say he will be blessed should he fall  
into  fortunes like those of ,priam4    
,nor1 in truth1 is he shifting and      
easily changeable1 for on the one  hand 
from his happiness he will not be shaken
 easily nor by ordinary  mischances1    
but1 if at all1 by those which are great
 and numerous2 and1  on the other1 after
 such mischances he cannot regain his   
happiness in a  little time2 but1 if at 
all1 in a long and complete period1     
during  which he has made himself master
 of great and noble things4    ,why then
 should we not call happy the man who   
works in the way of  perfect virtue1 and
 is furnished with external goods       
sufficient for  acting his part in the  
drama of life3#ce and this during no    
ordinary  period but such as constitutes

 a complete life as we have been        
describing it4    ,or we must add1 that 
not only is he to live so1 but his death
 must be  in keeping with such life1    
since the future is dark to us1 and     
,happiness we assume to be in every way 
an end and complete4 ,and1 if  this be  
so1 we shall call them among the living 
blessed who have and  will have the     
things specified1 but blessed as        
,men4#cf    ,on these points then let it
 suffice to have denned thus much4      
,chapter ,,ix4    ,now that the fortunes
 of their descendants1 and friends      
generally1  contribute nothing towards  
forming the condition of the dead1 is   
plainly a very heartless notion1 and    
contrary to the current opinions4       
,but since things which befall are many1
 and differ in all kinds of  ways1 and  
some touch more nearly1 others less1 to 
go into minute  particular distinctions 
would evidently be a long and endless   
task3 and  so it may suffice to speak   
generally and in outline4    ,if then1  

as of the misfortunes which happen to   
one's self1 some have a  certain weight 
and turn the balance of life1 while     
others are1 so to  speak1 lighter2 so it
 is likewise with those which befall all
 our  friends alike2 if further1 whether
 they whom each suffering befalls be    
alive or dead makes much more difference
 than in a tragedy the  presupposing or 
actual perpetration of the various      
crimes and horrors1  we must take into  
our account this difference also1 and   
still more  perhaps the doubt concerning
 the dead whether they really partake of
  any good or evil2 it seems to result  
from all these considerations1  that if 
anything does pierce the veil and reach 
them1 be the same good  or bad1 it must 
be something trivial and small1 either  
in itself or to  them2 or at least of   
such a magnitude or such a kind as      
neither to make  happy them that are not
 so otherwise1 nor to deprive of their  
blessedness them that are4#cg    ,it is 
plain then that the good or ill fortunes

 of their friends do  affect the dead   
somewhat3 but in such kind and degree as
 neither to  make the happy unhappy nor 
produce any other such effect4          
,chapter ,x4    ,having determined these
 points1 let us examine with respect to 
,happiness1 whether it belongs to the   
class of things praiseworthy or  things 
precious2 for to that of faculties#ch it
 evidently does not4    ,now it is plain
 that everything which is a subject of  
praise is praised  for being of a       
certain kind and bearing a certain      
relation to something  else3 for        
instance1 the just1 and the valiant1 and
 generally the good  man1 and virtue    
itself1 we praise because of the actions
 and the  results3 and the strong man1  
and the quick runner1 and so forth1 we  
praise for being of a certain nature and
 bearing a certain relation to          
something good and excellent 7and this  
is illustrated by attempts to  praise   
the gods2 for they are presented in a   
ludicrous aspect#ci by  being referred  

to our standard1 and this results from  
the fact1 that  all praise does1 as we  
have said1 imply reference to a         
standard74 ,now  if it is to such       
objects that praise belongs1 it is      
evident that what  is applicable to the 
best objects is not praise1 but         
something higher  and better3 which is  
plain matter of fact1 for not only do we
 call the  gods blessed and happy1 but  
of men also we pronounce those blessed  
who  most nearly resemble the gods4 ,and
 in like manner in respect of goods2  no
 man thinks of praising ,happiness as he
 does the principle of  justice1 but    
calls it blessed1 as being somewhat more
 godlike and more  excellent4           
,eudoxus#dj too is thought to have      
advanced a sound argument in support  of
 the claim of pleasure to the highest   
prize3 for the fact that1  though it is 
one of the good things1 it is not       
praised1 he took for an  indication of  
its superiority to those which are      
subjects of praise3 a  superiority he   

attributed also to a god and the ,chief 
,good1 on the  ground that they form the
 standard to which everything besides is
  referred4 ,for praise applies to      
virtue1 because it makes men apt to do  
what is noble2 but encomia to definite  
works of body or mind4#da    ,however1  
it is perhaps more suitable to a regular
 treatise on encomia  to pursue this    
topic with exactness3 it is enough for  
our purpose that  from what has been    
said it is evident that ,happiness      
belongs to the  class of things precious
 and final4 ,and it seems to be so also 
because  of its being a starting-point2 
which it is1 in that with a view to it  
we all do everything else that is done2 
now the starting-point and  cause of    
good things we assume to be something   
precious and divine4    ,chapter ,,xi4  
,moreover1 since ,happiness is a kind of
 working of the soul in the way  of     
perfect ,excellence1 we must enquire    
concerning ,excellence3 for so  probably
 shall we have a clearer view concerning

 ,happiness2 and again1  he who is      
really a statesman is generally thought 
to have spent most  pains on this1 for  
he wishes to make the citizens good and 
obedient to  the laws4 7,for examples of
 this class we have the lawgivers of the
  ,cretans and ,lacedmonians and        
whatever other such there have been47   
,but if this investigation belongs      
properly to 1 then clearly  the enquiry 
will be in accordance with our original 
design4    ,well1 we are to enquire     
concerning ,excellence1 i4e4 ,human     
,excellence  of course1 because it was  
the ,chief ,good of ,man and the        
,happiness of  ,man that we were        
enquiring of just now4    ,and by ,human
 ,excellence we mean not that of man's  
body but that of his  soul2 for we call 
,happiness a working of the ,soul4      
,and if this is so1 it is plain that    
some knowledge of the nature of the     
,soul is necessary for the statesman1   
just as for the oculist a  knowledge of 
the whole body1 and the more so in      

proportion as   is more precious and    
higher than the healing art3 and in fact
  physicians of the higher class do busy
 themselves much with the  knowledge of 
the body4    ,so then the statesman is  
to consider the nature of the ,soul3 but
 he  must do so with these objects in   
view1 and so far only as may suffice    
for the objects of his special enquiry3 
for to carry his speculations  to a     
greater exactness is perhaps a task more
 laborious than falls  within his       
province4    ,in fact1 the few          
statements made on the subject in my    
popular treatises  are quite enough1 and
 accordingly we will adopt them here3   
as1 that the  ,soul consists of two     
parts1 the ,irrational and the ,rational
 7as to  whether these are actually     
divided1 as are the parts of the body1  
and  everything that is capable of      
division2 or are only metaphysically    
speaking two1 being by nature           
inseparable1 as are convex and concave  
circumferences1 matters not in respect  

of our present purpose74 ,and of  the   
,irrational1 the one part seems common  
to other objects1 and in fact           
vegetative2 ,i mean the cause of        
nourishment and growth 7for such a      
faculty of the ,soul one would assume to
 exist in all things that  receive      
nourishment1 even in embryos1 and this  
the same as in the  perfect creatures2  
for this is more likely than that it    
should be a  different one74    ,now the
 ,excellence of this manifestly is not  
peculiar to the human  species but      
common to others3 for this part and this
 faculty is thought  to work most in    
time of sleep1 and the good and bad man 
are least  distinguishable while asleep2
 whence it is a common saying that      
during  one half of life there is no    
difference between the happy and the    
wretched2 and this accords with our     
anticipations1 for sleep is an          
inactivity of the soul1 in so far as it 
is denominated good or bad1  except that
 in some wise some of its movements find

 their way through  the veil and so the 
good come to have better dreams than    
ordinary men4  ,but enough of this3 we  
must forego any further mention of the  
nutritive  part1 since it is not        
naturally capable of the ,excellence    
which is  peculiarly human4    ,and     
there seems to be another ,irrational   
,nature of the ,soul1 which yet  in a   
way partakes of ,reason4 ,for in the man
 who controls his appetites1  and in him
 who resolves to do so and fails1 we    
praise the ,reason or  ,rational part of
 the ,soul1 because it exhorts aright   
and to the best  course3 but clearly    
there is in them1 beside the ,reason1   
some other  natural principle which     
fights with and strains against the     
,reason4  7,for in plain terms1 just as 
paralysed limbs of the body when their  
owners would move them to the right are 
borne aside in a contrary  direction to 
the left1 so is it in the case of the   
,soul1 for the  impulses of men who     
cannot control their appetites are to   

contrary  points3 the difference is that
 in the case of the body we do see what 
is borne aside but in the case of the   
soul we do not4 ,but1 it may be1  not   
the less#db on that account are we to   
suppose that there is in the  ,soul also
 somewhat besides the ,reason1 which is 
opposed to this and  goes against it2 as
 to how it is different1 that is        
irrelevant47    ,but of ,reason this too
 does evidently partake1 as we have     
said3 for  instance1 in the man of      
self-control it obeys ,reason3 and      
perhaps in  the man of perfected        
self-mastery1#dc or the brave man1 it is
 yet  more obedient2 in them it agrees  
entirely with the ,reason4    ,so then  
the ,irrational is plainly twofold3 the 
one part1 the merely  vegetative1 has no
 share of ,reason1 but that of desire1  
or appetition  generally1 does partake  
of it in a sense1 in so far as it is    
obedient  to it and capable of          
submitting to its rule4 7,so too in     
common phrase  we say we have  of our   

father or friends1 and this in a        
different  sense from that in which we  
say we have  of mathematics47#dd    ,now
 that the ,irrational is in some way    
persuaded by the ,reason1  admonition1  
and every act of rebuke and exhortation 
indicate4 ,if then  we are to say that  
this also has ,reason1 then the         
,rational1 as well as  the ,irrational1 
will be twofold1 the one supremely and  
in itself1 the  other paying it a kind  
of filial regard4    ,the ,excellence of
 ,man then is divided in accordance with
 this  difference3 we make two classes1 
calling the one ,intellectual1 and the  
other ,moral2 pure science1             
intelligence1 and practical             
wisdom--,intellectual3 liberality1 and  
perfected self-mastery--,moral3 in      
speaking of a man's ,moral character1 we
 do not say he is a scientific  or      
intelligent but a meek man1 or one of   
perfected self-mastery3 and we  praise  
the man of science in right of his      
mental state2#de and of  these such as  

are praiseworthy we call ,excellences4  
,,book ,,ii    ,chapter ,i4      ,well3 
human ,excellence is of two kinds1      
,intellectual and ,moral3#a now  the    
,intellectual springs originally1 and is
 increased subsequently1  from teaching 
7for the most part that is#b71 and needs
 therefore  experience and time2 whereas
 the ,moral comes from custom1 and so   
the  ,greek term denoting it is but a   
slight deflection from the term         
denoting custom in that language4       
,from this fact it is plain that not one
 of the ,moral ,virtues comes to  be in 
us merely by nature3 because of such    
things as exist by nature1  none can be 
changed by custom3 a stone1 for         
instance1 by nature  gravitating        
downwards1 could never by custom be     
brought to ascend1 not  even if one were
 to try and accustom it by throwing it  
up ten thousand  times2 nor could file  
again be brought to descend1 nor in fact
 could  anything whose nature is in one 
way be brought by custom to be in       

another4 ,the ,virtues then come to be  
in us neither by nature1 nor in  despite
 of nature1#c but we are furnished by   
nature with a capacity  for receiving   
themu and are perfected in them through 
custom4    ,again1 in whatever cases we 
get things by nature1 we get the        
faculties  first and perform the acts of
 working afterwards2 an illustration of 
which is afforded by the case of our    
bodily senses1 for it was not from      
having often seen or heard that we got  
these senses1 but just the  reverse3 we 
had them and so exercised them1 but did 
not have them  because we had exercised 
them4 ,but the ,virtues we get by first 
performing single acts of working1      
which1 again1 is the case of other      
things1 as the arts for instance2 for   
what we have to make when we have       
learned how1 these we learn how to make 
by making3 men come to be  builders1 for
 instance1 by building2 harp-players1 by
 playing on the  harp3 exactly so1 by   
doing just actions we come to be just2  

by doing  the actions of self-mastery we
 come to be perfected in self-mastery2  
and by doing brave actions brave4       
,and to the truth of this testimony is  
borne by what takes place in            
communities3 because the law-givers make
 the individual members good  men by    
habituation1 and this is the intention  
certainly of every  law-giver1 and all  
who do not effect it well fail of their 
intent2 and  herein consists the        
difference between a good ,constitution 
and a bad4    ,again1 every ,virtue is  
either produced or destroyed from and by
 the  very same circumstances3 art too  
in like manner2 ,i mean it is by        
playing the harp that both the good and 
the bad harp-players are  formed3 and   
similarly builders and all the rest2 by 
building well men  will become good     
builders2 by doing it badly bad ones3 in
 fact1 if this  had not been so1 there  
would have been no need of instructors1 
but all  men would have been at once    
good or bad in their several arts       

without  them4    ,so too then is it    
with the ,virtues3 for by acting in the 
various  relations in which we are      
thrown with our fellow men1 we come to  
be1  some just1 some unjust3 and by     
acting in dangerous positions and being 
habituated to feel fear or confidence1  
we come to be1 some brave1  others      
cowards4    ,similarly is it also with  
respect to the occasions of lust and    
anger3  for some men come to be         
perfected in self-mastery and mild1     
others  destitute of all self-control   
and passionate2 the one class by        
behaving  in one way under them1 the    
other by behaving in another4 ,or1 in   
one  word1 the habits are produced from 
the acts of working like to them3  and  
so what we have to do is to give a      
certain character to these  particular  
acts1 because the habits formed         
correspond to the  differences of these4
    ,so then1 whether we are accustomed 
this way or that straight from          
childhood1 makes not a small but an     

important difference1 or rather ,i      
would say it makes all the difference4  
,chapter ,,ii4    ,since then the object
 of the present treatise is not mere    
speculation1  as it is of some others   
7for we are enquiring not merely that we
 may  know what virtue is but that we   
may become virtuous1 else it would have 
been useless71 we must consider as to   
the particular actions how we are  to do
 them1 because1 as we have just said1   
the quality of the habits  that shall be
 formed depends on these4    ,now1 that 
we are to act in accordance with ,right 
,reason is a general  maxim1 and may for
 the present be taken for granted3 we   
will speak of  it hereafter1 and say    
both what ,right ,reason is1 and what   
are its  relations to the other         
virtues4#d    ,but let this point be    
first thoroughly understood between us1 
that all  which can be said on moral    
action must be said in outline1 as it   
were1  and not exactly3 for as we       
remarked at the commencement1 such      

reasoning  only must be required as the 
nature of the subject-matter admits of1 
and matters of moral action and         
expediency have no fixedness any more   
than matters of health4 ,and if the     
subject in its general maxims is  such1 
still less in its application to        
particular cases is exactness           
attainable3#e because these fall not    
under any art or system of rules1  but  
it must be left in each instance to the 
individual agents to look  to the       
exigencies of the particular case1 as it
 is in the art of  healing1 or that of  
navigating a ship4 ,still1 though the   
present  subject is confessedly such1 we
 must try and do what we can for it4    
,first then this must be noted1 that it 
is the nature of such things to  be     
spoiled by defect and excess2 as we see 
in the case of health and  strength     
7since for the illustration of things   
which cannot be seen we  must use those 
that can71 for excessive training       
impairs the strength  as well as        

deficient3 meat and drink1 in like      
manner1 in too great or  too small      
quantities1 impair the health3 while in 
due proportion they  cause1 increase1   
and preserve it4    ,thus it is         
therefore with the habits of perfected  
,self-,mastery and  ,courage and the    
rest of the ,virtues3 for the man who   
flies from and  fears all things1 and   
never stands up against anything1 comes 
to be a  coward2 and he who fears       
nothing1 but goes at everything1 comes  
to be  rash4 ,in like manner too1 he    
that tastes of every pleasure and       
abstains  from none comes to lose all   
self-control2 while he who avoids all1  
as  do the dull and clownish1 comes as  
it were to lose his faculties of        
perception3 that is to say1 the habits  
of perfected ,self-,mastery and         
,courage are spoiled by the excess and  
defect1 but by the mean state are       
preserved4    ,furthermore1 not only do 
the origination1 growth1 and marring of 
the  habits come from and by the same   

circumstances1 but also the acts of     
working after the habits are formed will
 be exercised on the same3 for  so it is
 also with those other things which are 
more directly matters  of sight1        
strength for instance3 for this comes by
 taking plenty of  food and doing plenty
 of work1 and the man who has attained  
strength is  best able to do these3 and 
so it is with the ,virtues1 for not only
 do  we by abstaining from pleasures    
come to be perfected in ,self-,mastery1 
but when we have come to be so we can   
best abstain from them3 similarly  too  
with ,courage3 for it is by accustoming 
ourselves to despise objects  of fear   
and stand up against them that we come  
to be brave2 and after  we have come to 
be so we shall be best able to stand up 
against such  objects4    ,and for a    
test of the formation of the habits we  
must take the pleasure  or pain which   
succeeds the acts2 for he is perfected  
in ,self-,mastery  who not only abstains
 from the bodily pleasures but is glad  

to do so2  whereas he who abstains but  
is sorry to do it has not               
,self-,mastery3 he  again is brave who  
stands up against danger1 either with   
positive  pleasure or at least without  
any pain2 whereas he who does it with   
pain  is not brave4#f    ,for ,moral    
,virtue has for its object-matter       
pleasures and pains1 because  by reason 
of pleasure we do what is bad1 and by   
reason of pain decline  doing what is   
right 7for which cause1 as ,plato       
observes1 men should  have been trained 
straight from their childhood to receive
 pleasure and  pain from proper objects1
 for this is the right education74      
,again3  since ,virtues have to do with 
actions and feelings1 and on every      
feeling and every action pleasure and   
pain follow1 here again is  another     
proof that ,virtue has for its          
object-matter pleasure and pain4  ,the  
same is shown also by the fact that     
punishments are effected  through the   
instrumentality of these2 because they  

are of the nature of  remedies1 and it  
is the nature of remedies to be the     
contraries of the  ills they cure4      
,again1 to quote what we said before3   
every habit of the  ,soul by its very   
nature has relation to1 and exerts      
itself upon1 things  of the same kind as
 those by which it is naturally         
deteriorated or  improved3 now such     
habits do come to be vicious by reason  
of pleasures  and pains1 that is1 by men
 pursuing or avoiding respectively1     
either  such as they ought not1 or at   
wrong times1 or in wrong manner1 and so 
forth 7for which reason1 by the way1    
some people define the ,virtues as      
certain states of impassibility and     
utter quietude1#g but they are  wrong   
because they speak without modification1
 instead of adding 8as  they ought10 8as
 they ought not10 and 8when10 and so    
on74 ,virtue then  is assumed to be that
 habit which is such1 in relation to    
pleasures and  pains1 as to effect the  
best results1 and ,vice the contrary4   

,the following considerations may also  
serve to set this in a clear  light4    
,there are principally three things     
moving us to choice and three  to       
avoidance1 the honourable1 the          
expedient1 the pleasant2 and their      
three contraries1 the dishonourable1 the
 hurtful1 and the painful3 now  the good
 man is apt to go right1 and the bad man
 wrong1 with respect to  all these of   
course1 but most specially with respect 
to pleasure3  because not only is this  
common to him with all animals but also 
it is  a concomitant of all those things
 which move to choice1 since both the   
honourable and the expedient give an    
impression of pleasure4    ,again1 it   
grows up with us all from infancy1 and  
so it is a hard matter  to remove from  
ourselves this feeling1 engrained as it 
is into our very  life4    ,again1 we   
adopt pleasure and pain 7some of us     
more1 and some less7 as  the measure    
even of actions3 for this cause then our
 whole business  must be with them1     

since to receive right or wrong         
impressions of  pleasure and pain is a  
thing of no little importance in respect
 of the  actions4 ,once more2 it is     
harder1 as ,heraclitus says1 to fight   
against  pleasure than against anger3   
now it is about that which is more than 
commonly difficult that art comes into  
being1 and virtue too1 because  in that 
which is difficult the good is of a     
higher order3 and so for  this reason   
too both virtue and moral philosophy    
generally must wholly  busy themselves  
respecting pleasures and pains1 because 
he that uses  these well will be good1  
he that does so ill will be bad4    ,let
 us then be understood to have stated1  
that ,virtue has for its  object-matter 
pleasures and pains1 and that it is     
either increased or  marred by the same 
circumstances 7differently used7 by     
which it is  originally generated1 and  
that it exerts itself on the same       
circumstances out of which it was       
generated4    ,chapter ,,iii4    ,now ,i

 can conceive a person perplexed as to  
the meaning of our  statement1 that men 
must do just actions to become just1 and
 those of  self-mastery to acquire the  
habit of self-mastery2 8for10 he would  
say1  8if men are doing the actions they
 have the respective virtues already1   
just as men are grammarians or musicians
 when they do the actions of  either    
art40 ,may we not reply by saying that  
it is not so even in the  case of the   
arts referred to3 because a man may     
produce something  grammatical either by
 chance or the suggestion of another2   
but then  only will he be a grammarian  
when he not only produces something     
grammatical but does so grammarian-wise1
 i4e4 in virtue of the  grammatical     
knowledge he himself possesses4         
,again1 the cases of the arts and the   
virtues are not parallel3 because  those
 things which are produced by the arts  
have their excellence in  themselves1   
and it is sufficient therefore that     
these when produced  should be in a     

certain state3 but those which are      
produced in the way  of the virtues1    
are1 strictly speaking1 actions of a    
certain kind 7say  of ,justice or       
perfected ,self-,mastery71 not merely if
 in themselves they  are in a certain   
state but if also he who does them does 
them being  himself in a certain state1 
first if knowing what he is doing1 next 
if  with deliberate preference1 and with
 such preference for the things'  own   
sake2 and thirdly if being himself      
stable and unapt to change4 ,now  to    
constitute possession of the arts these 
requisites are not reckoned  in1        
excepting the one point of knowledge3   
whereas for possession of the  virtues  
knowledge avails little or nothing1 but 
the other requisites  avail not a       
little1 but1 in fact1 are all in all1   
and these requisites  as a matter of    
fact do come from oftentimes doing the  
actions of  ,justice and perfected      
,self-,mastery4    ,the facts1#h it is  
true1 are called by the names of these  

habits when  they are such as the just  
or perfectly self-mastering man would   
do2 but  he is not in possession of the 
virtues who merely does these facts1 but
  he who also so does them as the just  
and self-mastering do them4    ,we are  
right then in saying1 that these virtues
 are formed in a man by  his doing the  
actions2 but no one1 if he should leave 
them undone1  would be even in the way  
to become a good man4 ,yet people in    
general do  not perform these actions1  
but taking refuge in talk they flatter  
themselves they are philosophising1 and 
that they will so be good men3  acting  
in truth very like those sick people who
 listen to the doctor  with great       
attention but do nothing that he tells  
them3 just as these  then cannot be well
 bodily under such a course of          
treatment1 so neither  can those be     
mentally by such philosophising4        
,chapter ,,iv4    ,next1 we must examine
 what ,virtue is4#i ,well1 since the    
things which  come to be in the mind    

are1 in all1 of three kinds1 ,feelings1 
,capacities1 ,states1 ,virtue of course 
must belong to one of the three         
classes4    ,by ,feelings1 ,i mean such 
as lust1 anger1 fear1 confidence1 envy1 
joy1  friendship1 hatred1 longing1      
emulation1 compassion1 in short all such
  as are followed by pleasure or pain3  
by ,capacities1 those in right of  which
 we are said to be capable of these     
feelings2 as by virtue of  which we are 
able to have been made angry1 or        
grieved1 or to have  compassionated2 by 
,states1 those in right of which we are 
in a certain  relation good or bad to   
the aforementioned feelings2 to having  
been  made angry1 for instance1 we are  
in a wrong relation if in our anger we  
were too violent or too slack1 but if we
 were in the happy medium we  are in a  
right relation to the feeling4 ,and so  
on of the rest4    ,now ,feelings       
neither the virtues nor vices are1      
because in right of the  ,feelings we   
are not denominated either good or bad1 

but in right of the  virtues and vices  
we are4    ,again1 in right of the      
,feelings we are neither praised nor    
blamed1#aj  7for a man is not commended 
for being afraid or being angry1 nor    
blamed  for being angry merely but for  
being so in a particular way71 but in   
right of the virtues and vices we are4  
,again1 both anger and fear we feel     
without moral choice1 whereas the       
virtues are acts of moral choice1 or at 
least certainly not independent  of it4 
,moreover1 in right of the ,feelings we 
are said to be moved1 but in  right of  
the virtues and vices not to be moved1  
but disposed1 in a  certain way4    ,and
 for these same reasons they are not    
,capacities1 for we are not  called good
 or bad merely because we are able to   
feel1 nor are we  praised or blamed4    
,and again1 ,capacities we have by      
nature1 but we do not come to be good   
or bad by nature1 as we have said       
before4    ,since then the virtues are  
neither ,feelings nor ,capacities1 it   

remains  that they must be ,states4     
,chapter ,v4    ,now what the genus of  
,virtue is has been said2 but we must   
not merely  speak of it thus1 that it is
 a state but say also what kind of a    
state  it is4    ,we must observe then  
that all excellence makes that whereof  
it is the  excellence both to be itself 
in a good state and to perform its work 
well4 ,the excellence of the eye1 for   
instance1 makes both the eye good  and  
its work also3 for by the excellence of 
the eye we see well4 ,so too  the       
excellence of the horse makes a horse   
good1 and good in speed1 and  in        
carrying his rider1 and standing up     
against the enemy4 ,if then this  is    
universally the case1 the excellence of 
,man1 i4e4 ,virtue1 must be a  state    
whereby ,man comes to be good and       
whereby he will perform well his  proper
 work4 ,now how this shall be it is true
 we have said already1 but  still       
perhaps it may throw light on the       
subject to see what is its              

characteristic nature4    ,in all       
quantity then1 whether continuous or    
discrete1#aa one may take  the greater  
part1 the less1 or the exactly equal1   
and these either with  reference to the 
thing itself1 or relatively to us3 and  
the exactly  equal is a mean between    
excess and defect4 ,now by the mean of  
the  thing1 i4e4 absolute mean1 ,i      
denote that which is equidistant from   
either extreme 7which of course is one  
and the same to all71 and by the  mean  
relatively to ourselves1 that which is  
neither too much nor too  little for the
 particular individual4 ,this of course 
is not one nor the  same to all3 for    
instance1 suppose ten is too much and   
two too little1  people take six for the
 absolute mean2 because it exceeds the  
smaller  sum by exactly as much as it is
 itself exceeded by the larger1 and this
  mean is according to arithmetical     
proportion4#ab    ,but the mean         
relatively to ourselves must not be so  
found 2 for it does  not follow1        

supposing ten min#ac is too large a     
quantity to eat and  two too small1 that
 the trainer will order his man six2    
because for the  person who is to take  
it this also may be too much or too     
little3 for  ,milo it would be too      
little1 but for a man just commencing   
his athletic  exercises too much3       
similarly too of the exercises          
themselves1 as  running or wrestling4   
,so then it seems every one possessed of
 skill avoids excess and defect1  but   
seeks for and chooses the mean1 not the 
absolute but the relative4    ,now if   
all skill thus accomplishes well its    
work by keeping an eye on  the mean1 and
 bringing the works to this point       
7whence it is common  enough to say of  
such works as are in a good state1 8one 
cannot add to  or take ought from them10
 under the notion of excess or defect   
destroying goodness but the mean state  
preserving it71 and good  artisans1 as  
we say1 work with their eye on this1 and
 excellence1 like  nature1 is more exact

 and better than any art in the world1  
it must  have an aptitude to aim at the 
mean4    ,it is moral excellence1 i4e4  
,virtue1 of course which ,i mean1       
because  this it is which is concerned  
with feelings and actions1 and in these 
there can be excess and defect and the  
mean3 it is possible1 for  instance1 to 
feel the emotions of fear1 confidence1  
lust1 anger1  compassion1 and pleasure  
and pain generally1 too much or too     
little1  and in either case wrongly2 but
 to feel them when we ought1 on what    
occasions1 towards whom1 why1 and as1 we
 should do1 is the mean1 or in  other   
words the best state1 and this is the   
property of ,virtue4    ,in like manner 
too with respect to the actions1 there  
may be excess and  defect and the mean4 
,now ,virtue is concerned with feelings 
and actions1  in which the excess is    
wrong and the defect is blamed but the  
mean is  praised and goes right2 and    
both these circumstances belong to      
,virtue4  ,virtue then is in a sense a  

mean state1 since it certainly has an   
aptitude for aiming at the mean4        
,again1 one may go wrong in many        
different ways 7because1 as the         
,pythagoreans expressed it1 evil is of  
the class of the infinite1 good  of the 
finite71 but right only in one2 and so  
the former is easy1 the  latter         
difficult2 easy to miss the mark1 but   
hard to hit it3 and for  these reasons1 
therefore1 both the excess and defect   
belong to ,vice1  and the mean state to 
,virtue2 for1 as the poet has it1       
8,men may be bad in many ways1  ,but    
good in one alone40    ,chapter ,,vi4   
,virtue then is 8a state apt to exercise
 deliberate choice1 being in the        
relative mean1 determined by reason1    
and#ad as the man of practical  wisdom  
would determine40    ,it is a middle    
state between too faulty ones1 in the   
way of excess on  one side and of defect
 on the other3 and it is so moreover1   
because the  faulty states on one side  
fall short of1 and those on the other   

exceed1  what is right1 both in the case
 of the feelings and the actions2 but   
,virtue finds1 and when found adopts1   
the mean4    ,and so1 viewing it in     
respect of its essence and definition1  
,virtue is  a mean state2 but in        
reference to the chief good and to      
excellence it  is the highest state     
possible4    ,but it must not be        
supposed that every action or every     
feeling is  capable of subsisting in    
this mean state1 because some there are 
which  are so named as immediately to   
convey the notion of badness1 as        
malevolence1 shamelessness1 envy2 or1 to
 instance in actions1 adultery1  theft1 
homicide2 for all these and suchlike are
 blamed because they are  in themselves 
bad1 not the having too much or too     
little of them4    ,in these then you   
never can go right1 but must always be  
wrong3 nor in  such does the right or   
wrong depend on the selection of a      
proper  person1 time1 or manner 7take   
adultery for instance71 but simply doing

  any one soever of those things is     
being wrong4    ,you might as well      
require that there should be determined 
a mean state1  an excess and a defect in
 respect of acting unjustly1 being      
cowardly1  or giving up all control of  
the passions3 for at this rate there    
will  be of excess and defect a mean    
state2 of excess1 excess2 and of defect1
  defect4    ,but just as of perfected  
self-mastery and courage there is no    
excess  and defect1 because the mean is 
in one point of view the highest        
possible state1 so neither of those     
faulty states can you have a mean       
state1 excess1 or defect1 but howsoever 
done they are wrong3 you  cannot1 in    
short1 have of excess and defect a mean 
state1 nor of a mean  state excess and  
defect4    ,chapter ,,vii4    ,it is not
 enough1 however1 to state this in      
general terms1 we must also  apply it to
 particular instances1 because in       
treatises on moral conduct  general     
statements have an air of vagueness1 but

 those which go into  detail one of     
greater reality3 for the actions after  
all must be in  detail1 and the general 
statements1 to be worth anything1 must  
hold  good here4    ,we must take these 
details then from the well-known        
scheme4#ae    ,i4 ,in respect of fears  
and confidence or boldness3    ,the     
,mean state is ,courage3 men may exceed1
 of course1 either in absence  of fear  
or in positive confidence3 the former   
has no name 7which is a  common case71  
the latter is called rash3 again1 the   
man who has too  much fear and too      
little confidence is called a coward4   
,,ii4 ,in respect of pleasures and pains
 7but not all1 and perhaps fewer  pains 
than pleasures73    ,the ,mean state    
here is perfected ,self-,mastery1 the   
defect total absence  of ,self-control4 
,as for defect in respect of pleasure1  
there are really  no people who are     
chargeable with it1 so1 of course1 there
 is really no  name for such characters1
 but1 as they are conceivable1 we will  

give  them one and call them insensible4
    ,,iii4 ,in respect of giving and    
taking wealth#af 7a73    ,the mean state
 is ,liberality1 the excess             
,prodigality1 the defect  ,stinginess3  
here each of the extremes involves      
really an excess and  defect contrary to
 each other3 ,i mean1 the prodigal gives
 out too much  and takes in too little1 
while the stingy man takes in too much  
and  gives out too little4 7,it must be 
understood that we are now giving       
merely an outline and summary1          
intentionally3 and we will1 in a later  
part of the treatise1 draw out the      
distinctions with greater  exactness47  
,,iv4 ,in respect of wealth 7b73        
,there are other dispositions besides   
these just mentioned2 a mean state      
called ,munificence 7for the munificent 
man differs from the liberal1  the      
former having necessarily to do with    
great wealth1 the latter with  but      
small72 the excess called by the names  
either of ,want of taste or  ,vulgar    

,profusion1 and the defect ,paltriness  
7these also differ from the  extremes   
connected with liberality1 and the      
manner of their difference  shall also  
be spoken of later74    ,v4 ,in respect 
of honour and dishonour 7a73    ,the    
mean state ,greatness of ,soul1 the     
excess which may be called  1#ag and the
 defect ,littleness of ,soul4    ,,vi4  
,in respect of honour and dishonour 7b73
    ,now there is a state bearing the   
same relation to ,greatness of ,soul as 
we said just now ,liberality does to    
,munificence1 with the difference  that 
is of being about a small amount of the 
same thing3 this state  having reference
 to small honour1 as ,greatness of ,soul
 to great honour2  a man may1 of course1
 grasp at honour either more than he    
should or  less2 now he that exceeds in 
his grasping at it is called ambitious1 
he  that falls short unambitious1 he    
that is just as he should be has no     
proper name3 nor in fact have the       
states1 except that the disposition  of 

the ambitious man is called ambition4   
,for this reason those who are  in      
either extreme lay claim to the mean as 
a debateable land1 and we  call the     
virtuous character sometimes by the name
 ambitious1#ah  sometimes by that of    
unambitious1 and we commend sometimes   
the one and  sometimes the other4 ,why  
we do it shall be said in the subsequent
 part  of the treatise2 but now we will 
go on with the rest of the virtues      
after the plan we have laid down4       
,,vii4 ,in respect of anger3    ,here   
too there is excess1 defect1 and a mean 
state2 but since they may  be said to   
have really no proper names1 as we call 
the virtuous  character ,meek1 we will  
call the mean state ,meekness1 and of   
the  extremes1 let the man who is       
excessive be denominated ,passionate1   
and  the faulty state ,passionateness1  
and him who is deficient ,angerless1    
and the defect ,angerlessness4    ,there
 are also three other mean states1      
having some mutual resemblance1  but    

still with differences2 they are alike  
in that they all have for  their        
object-matter intercourse of words and  
deeds1 and they differ in  that one has 
respect to truth herein1 the other two  
to what is  pleasant2 and this in two   
ways1 the one in relaxation and         
amusement1  the other in all things     
which occur in daily life4 ,we must say 
a word  or two about these also1 that we
 may the better see that in all matters 
the mean is praiseworthy1 while the     
extremes are neither right nor  worthy  
of praise but of blame4    ,now of      
these1 it is true1 the majority have    
really no proper names1 but  still we   
must try1 as in the other cases1 to coin
 some for them for the  sake of         
clearness and intelligibleness4    ,i4  
,in respect of truth3     ,the man who  
is in the mean state we will call       
,truthful1 and his state                
,truthfulness1 and as to the disguise of
 truth1 if it be on the side of         
exaggeration1 ,braggadocia1 and him that

 has it a ,braggadocio2 if on   that of 
diminution1 ,reserve and ,reserved shall
 be the terms4    ,,ii4 ,in respect of  
what is pleasant in the way of          
relaxation or  amusement4    ,the mean  
state shall be called ,easy-pleasantry1 
and the character  accordingly a man of 
,easy-pleasantry2 the excess            
,buffoonery1 and the  man a ,buffoon2   
the man deficient herein a ,clown1 and  
his state  ,clownishness4    ,,iii4 ,in 
respect of what is pleasant in daily    
life4    ,he that is as he should be may
 be called ,friendly1 and his mean state
  ,friendliness3 he that exceeds1 if it 
be without any interested motive1       
somewhat too ,complaisant1 if with such 
motive1 a ,flatterer3 he that is        
deficient and in all instances          
unpleasant1 ,quarrelsome and ,cross4    
,there are mean states likewise in      
feelings and matters concerning them4   
,shamefacedness1 for instance1 is no    
virtue1 still a man is praised for      
being shamefaced3 for in these too the  

one is denominated the man in  the mean 
state1 the other in the excess2 the     
,dumbfoundered1 for  instance1 who is   
overwhelmed with shame on all and any   
occasions3 the  man who is in the       
defect1 i4e4 who has no shame at all in 
his  composition1 is called ,shameless3 
but the right character ,shamefaced4    
,indignation against successful vice1#ai
 again1 is a state in the mean  between 
,envy and ,malevolence3 they all three  
have respect to pleasure  and pain      
produced by what happens to one's       
neighbour3 for the man who  has this    
right feeling is annoyed at undeserved  
success of others1  while the envious   
man goes beyond him and is annoyed at   
all success of  others1 and the         
malevolent falls so far short of feeling
 annoyance that  he even rejoices at    
misfortune of others4    ,but for the   
discussion of these also there will be  
another opportunity1  as of ,justice    
too1 because the term is used in more   
senses than one4 ,so  after this we will

 go accurately into each and say how    
they are mean  states3 and in like      
manner also with respect to the         
,intellectual  ,excellences4    ,chapter
 ,,viii4    ,now as there are three     
states in each case1 two faulty either  
in the  way of excess or defect1 and one
 right1 which is the mean state1 of     
course all are in a way opposed to one  
another2 the extremes1 for  instance1   
not only to the mean but also to one    
another1 and the mean to  the extremes3 
for just as the half is greater if      
compared with the less  portion1 and    
less if compared with the greater1 so   
the mean states1  compared with the     
defects1 exceed1 whether in feelings or 
actions1 and  vice versa4 ,the brave    
man1 for instance1 shows as rash when   
compared  with the coward1 and cowardly 
when compared with the rash2 similarly  
too the man of perfected self-mastery1  
viewed in comparison with the  man      
destitute of all perception1 shows like 
a man of no self-control1  but in       

comparison with the man who really has  
no self-control1 he looks  like one     
destitute of all perception3 and the    
liberal man compared with  the stingy   
seems prodigal1 and by the side of the  
prodigal1 stingy4    ,and so the extreme
 characters push away1 so to speak1     
towards each  other the man in the mean 
state2 the brave man is called a rash   
man by  the coward1 and a coward by the 
rash man1 and in the other cases        
accordingly4 ,and there being this      
mutual opposition1 the contrariety      
between the extremes is greater than    
between either and the mean1  because   
they are further from one another than  
from the mean1 just as  the greater or  
less portion differ more from each other
 than either  from the exact half4      
,again1 in some cases an extreme will   
bear a resemblance to the mean2         
rashness1 for instance1 to courage1 and 
prodigality to liberality2 but  between 
the extremes there is the greatest      
dissimilarity4 ,now things  which are   

furthest from one another#bj are defined
 to be contrary1 and  so the further off
 the more contrary will they be4        
,further3 of the extremes in some cases 
the excess1 and in others the  defect1  
is most opposed to the mean3 to courage1
 for instance1 not  rashness which is   
the excess1 but cowardice which is the  
defect2  whereas to perfected           
self-mastery not insensibility which is 
the defect  but absence of all          
self-control which is the excess4       
,and for this there are two reasons to  
be given2 one from the nature of  the   
thing itself1 because from the one      
extreme being nearer and more  like the 
mean1 we do not put this against it1 but
 the other2 as1 for  instance1 since    
rashness is thought to be nearer to     
courage than  cowardice is1 and to      
resemble it more1 we put cowardice      
against courage  rather than rashness1  
because those things which are further  
from the  mean are thought to be more   
contrary to it4 ,this then is one reason

  arising from the thing itself2 there  
is another arising from our own         
constitution and make3 for in each man's
 own case those things give the         
impression of being more contrary to the
 mean to which we individually  have a  
natural bias4 ,thus we have a natural   
bias towards pleasures1 for  which      
reason we are much more inclined to the 
rejection of all  self-control1 than to 
self-discipline4    ,these things then  
to which the bias is1 we call more      
contrary1 and so  total want of         
self-control 7the excess7 is more       
contrary than the  defect is to         
perfected self-mastery4    ,chapter     
,,ix4    ,now that ,moral ,virtue is a  
mean state1 and how it is so1 and that  
it  lies between two faulty states1 one 
in the way of excess and another in  the
 way of defect1 and that it is so       
because it has an aptitude to aim  at   
the mean both in feelings and actions1  
all this has been set forth  fully and  
sufficiently4    ,and so it is hard to  

be good3 for surely hard it is in each  
instance to  find the mean1 just as to  
find the mean point or centre of a      
circle is  not what any man can do1 but 
only he who knows how3 just so to be    
angry1 to give money1 and be expensive1 
is what any man can do1 and  easy3 but  
to do these to the right person1 in due 
proportion1 at the  right time1 with a  
right object1 and in the right manner1  
this is not  as before what any man can 
do1 nor is it easy2 and for this cause  
goodness is rare1 and praiseworthy1 and 
noble4    ,therefore he who aims at the 
mean should make it his first care to   
keep  away from that extreme which is   
more contrary than the other to the     
mean2 just as ,calypso in ,homer advises
 ,ulysses1    8,clear of this smoke and 
surge thy barque direct20    because of 
the two extremes the one is always more1
 and the other less1  erroneous2 and1   
therefore1 since to hit exactly on the  
mean is  difficult1 one must take the   
least of the evils as the safest        

plan2#ba  and this a man will be doing1 
if he follows this method4    ,we ought 
also to take into consideration our own 
natural bias2 which  varies in each     
man's case1 and will be ascertained from
 the pleasure  and pain arising in us4  
,furthermore1 we should force ourselves 
off in  the contrary direction1 because 
we shall find ourselves in the mean     
after we have removed ourselves far from
 the wrong side1 exactly as men  do in  
straightening bent timber4#bb    ,but in
 all cases we must guard most carefully 
against what is pleasant1  and pleasure 
itself1 because we are not impartial    
judges of it4    ,we ought to feel in   
fact towards pleasure as did the old    
counsellors  towards ,helen1 and in all 
cases pronounce a similar sentence2 for 
so by  sending it away from us1 we shall
 err the less4#bc    ,well1 to speak    
very briefly1 these are the precautions 
by adopting  which we shall be best able
 to attain the mean4    ,still1 perhaps1
 after all it is a matter of difficulty1

 and specially  in the particular       
instances3 it is not easy1 for instance1
 to determine  exactly in what manner1  
with what persons1 for what causes1 and 
for  what length of time1 one ought to  
feel anger3 for we ourselves  sometimes 
praise those who are defective in this  
feeling1 and we call  them meek2 at     
another1 we term the hot-tempered manly 
and spirited4    ,then1 again1 he who   
makes a small deflection from what is   
right1 be it  on the side of too much or
 too little1 is not blamed1 only he who 
makes  a considerable one2 for he cannot
 escape observation4 ,but to what point 
or degree a man must err in order to    
incur blame1 it is not easy to          
determine exactly in words3 nor in fact 
any of those points which are  matter of
 perception by the ,moral ,sense3 such  
questions are matters of  detail1 and   
the decision of them rests with the     
,moral ,sense4#bd    ,at all events thus
 much is plain1 that the mean state is  
in all things  praiseworthy1 and that   

practically we must deflect sometimes   
towards  excess sometimes towards       
defect1 because this will be the easiest
  method of hitting on the mean1 that   
is1 on what is right4          ,,book   
,,iii    ,chapter ,i4    ,now since     
,virtue is concerned with the regulation
 of feelings and  actions1 and praise   
and blame arise upon such as are        
voluntary1 while  for the involuntary   
allowance is made1 and sometimes        
compassion is  excited1 it is perhaps a 
necessary task for those who are        
investigating  the nature of ,virtue to 
draw out the distinction between what is
  voluntary and what involuntary2 and it
 is certainly useful for  legislators1  
with respect to the assigning of honours
 and punishments4    ,involuntary       
actions then are thought to be of two   
kinds1 being done  either on compulsion1
 or by reason of ignorance4 ,an action  
is1 properly  speaking1 compulsory1 when
 the origination is external to the     
agent1  being such that in it the agent 

7perhaps we may more properly say the   
patient7 contributes nothing2 as if a   
wind were to convey you anywhere1  or   
men having power over your person4      
,but when actions are done1 either from 
fear of greater evils1 or from  some    
honourable motive1 as1 for instance1 if 
you were ordered to commit  some base   
act by a despot who had your parents or 
children in his  power1 and they were to
 be saved upon your compliance or die   
upon your  refusal1 in such cases there 
is room for a question whether the      
actions  are voluntary or involuntary4  
,a similar question arises with respect 
to cases of throwing goods  overboard in
 a storm3 abstractedly no man throws    
away his property  willingly1 but with a
 view to his own and his shipmates'     
safety any one  would who had any sense4
    ,the truth is1 such actions are of a
 mixed kind1 but are most like          
voluntary actions2 for they are         
choice-worthy at the time when they are 
being done1 and the end or object of the

 action must be taken with  reference to
 the actual occasion4 ,further1 we must 
denominate an action  voluntary or      
involuntary at the time of doing it3 now
 in the given case  the man acts        
voluntarily1 because the originating of 
the motion of his  limbs in such actions
 rests with himself2 and where the      
origination is  in himself it rests with
 himself to do or not to do4    ,such   
actions then are voluntary1 though in   
the abstract perhaps  involuntary       
because no one would choose any of such 
things in and by  itself4    ,but for   
such actions men sometimes are even     
praised1 as when they  endure any       
disgrace or pain to secure great and    
honourable equivalents2  if vice vers1  
then they are blamed1 because it shows a
 base mind to  endure things very       
disgraceful for no honourable object1 or
 for a  trifling one4    ,for some again
 no praise is given1 but allowance is   
made2 as where a  man does what he      
should not by reason of such things as  

overstrain the  powers of human nature1 
or pass the limits of human endurance4  
,some acts perhaps there are for which  
compulsion cannot be pleaded1 but  a man
 should rather suffer the worst and die2
 how absurd1 for instance1  are the     
pleas of compulsion with which ,alcmaeon
 in ,euripides' play  excuses his       
matricide6    ,but it is difficult      
sometimes to decide what kind of thing  
should be  chosen instead of what1 or   
what endured in preference to what1 and 
much  moreso to abide by one's          
decisions3 for in general the           
alternatives are  painful1 and the      
actions required are base1 and so praise
 or blame is  awarded according as      
persons have been compelled or no4      
,what kind of actions then are to be    
called compulsory8 may we say1  simply  
and abstractedly whenever the cause is  
external and the agent  contributes     
nothing2 and that where the acts are in 
themselves such as  one would not wish  
but choice-worthy at the present time   

and in  preference to such and such     
things1 and where the origination rests 
with the agent1 the actions are in      
themselves involuntary but at the  given
 time and in preference to such and such
 things voluntary2 and  they are more   
like voluntary than involuntary1 because
 the actions  consist of little details1
 and these are voluntary4    ,but what  
kind of things one ought to choose      
instead of what1 it is not  easy to     
settle1 for there are many differences  
in particular instances4    ,but suppose
 a person should say1 things pleasant   
and honourable exert a  compulsive force
 7for that they are external and do     
compel72 at that  rate every action is  
on compulsion1 because these are        
universal motives  of action4    ,again1
 they who act on compulsion and against 
their will do so with  pain2 but they   
who act by reason of what is pleasant or
 honourable act  with pleasure4    ,it  
is truly absurd for a man to attribute  
his actions to external  things instead 

of to his own capacity for being easily 
caught by  them2#a or1 again1 to ascribe
 the honourable to himself1 and the base
  ones to pleasure4    ,so then that    
seems to be compulsory 8whose           
origination is from without1  the party 
compelled contributing nothing40        
,chapter ,,ii4    ,now every action of  
which ignorance is the cause is         
not-voluntary1 but  that only is        
involuntary which is attended with pain 
and remorse2 for  clearly the man who   
has done anything by reason of          
ignorance1 but is  not annoyed at his   
own action1 cannot be said to have done 
it with  his will because he did not    
know he was doing it1 nor again against 
his will because he is not sorry for it4
    ,so then of the class 8acting by    
reason of ignorance10 he who feels      
regret afterwards is thought to be an   
involuntary agent1 and him that  has no 
such feeling1 since he certainly is     
different from the other1 we  will call 
a not-voluntary agent2 for as there is a

 real difference it  is better to have a
 proper name4    ,again1 there seems to 
be a difference between acting because  
of  ignorance and acting with ignorance3
 for instance1 we do not usually  assign
 ignorance as the cause of the actions  
of the drunken or angry  man1 but either
 the drunkenness or the anger1 yet they 
act not  knowingly but with ignorance4  
,again1 every bad man is ignorant what  
he ought to do and what to leave        
undone1 and by reason of such error men 
become unjust and wholly evil4          
,again1 we do not usually apply the term
 involuntary when a man is  ignorant of 
his own true interest2#b because        
ignorance which affects  moral choice#c 
constitutes depravity but not           
involuntariness3 nor does  any ignorance
 of principle 7because for this men are 
blamed7 but  ignorance in particular    
details1 wherein consists the action and
  wherewith it is concerned1 for in     
these there is both compassion and      
allowance1 because he who acts in       

ignorance of any of them acts in a      
proper sense involuntarily4    ,it may  
be as well1 therefore1 to define these  
particular details2 what  they are1 and 
how many2 viz4 who acts1 what he is     
doing1 with respect  to what or in what1
 sometimes with what1 as with what      
instrument1 and  with what result2#d as 
that of preservation1 for instance1 and 
how1 as  whether softly or violently4   
,all these particulars1 in one and the  
same case1 no man in his senses  could  
be ignorant of2 plainly not of the      
agent1 being himself4 ,but what  he is  
doing a man may be ignorant1 as men in  
speaking say a thing  escaped them      
unawares2 or as ,aeschylus did with     
respect to the  ,mysteries1 that he was 
not aware that it was unlawful to speak 
of them2  or as in the case of that     
catapult accident the other day the man 
said  he discharged it merely to display
 its operation4 ,or a person might      
suppose a son to be an enemy1 as ,merope
 did2 or that the spear really  pointed 

was rounded off2 or that the stone was a
 pumice2 or in striking  with a view to 
save might kill2 or might strike when   
merely wishing to  show another1 as     
people do in sham-fighting4    ,now     
since ignorance is possible in respect  
to all these details in  which the      
action consists1 he that acted in       
ignorance of any of them is  thought to 
have acted involuntarily1 and he most so
 who was in  ignorance as regards the   
most important1 which are thought to be 
those  in which the action consists1 and
 the result4    ,further1 not only must 
the ignorance be of this kind1 to       
constitute an  action involuntary1 but  
it must be also understood that the     
action is  followed by pain and regret4 
,chapter ,,iii4    ,now since all       
involuntary action is either upon       
compulsion or by reason  of ignorance1  
,voluntary ,action would seem to be     
8that whose origination  is in the      
agent1 he being aware of the particular 
details in which the  action consists40 

,for1 it may be1 men are not justified  
by calling those actions  involuntary1  
which are done by reason of ,anger or   
,lust4    ,because1 in the first place1 
if this be so no other animal but man1  
and  not even children1 can be said to  
act voluntarily4 ,next1 is it meant     
that we never act voluntarily when we   
act from ,lust or ,anger1 or that  we   
act voluntarily in doing what is right  
and involuntarily in doing  what is     
discreditable8 ,the latter supposition  
is absurd1 since the  cause is one and  
the same4 ,then as to the former1 it is 
a strange thing  to maintain actions to 
be involuntary which we are bound to    
grasp at3  now there are occasions on   
which anger is a duty1#e and there are  
things which we are bound to lust       
after1#f health1 for instance1 and      
learning4    ,again1 whereas actions    
strictly involuntary are thought to be  
attended  with pain1 those which are    
done to gratify lust are thought to be  
pleasant4    ,again3 how does the       

involuntariness make any difference#g   
between  wrong actions done from        
deliberate calculation1 and those done  
by  reason of anger8 for both ought to  
be avoided1 and the irrational  feelings
 are thought to be just as natural to   
man as reason1 and so of  course must be
 such actions of the individual as are  
done from ,anger  and ,lust4 ,it is     
absurd then to class these actions among
 the  involuntary4    ,chapter ,,iv4    
,having thus drawn out the distinction  
between voluntary and involuntary       
action our next step is to examine into 
the nature of ,moral ,choice1  because  
this seems most intimately connected    
with ,virtue and to be a  more decisive 
test of moral character than a man's    
acts are4    ,now ,moral ,choice is     
plainly voluntary1 but the two are not  
co-extensive1 voluntary being the more  
comprehensive term2 for first1  children
 and all other animals share in         
voluntary action but not in  ,moral     
,choice2 and next1 sudden actions we    

call voluntary but do not  ascribe them 
to ,moral ,choice4    ,nor do they      
appear to be right who say it is lust or
 anger1 or wish1 or  opinion of a       
certain kind2 because1 in the first     
place1 ,moral ,choice is  not shared by 
the irrational animals while ,lust and  
,anger are4 ,next2  the man who fails of
 self-control acts from ,lust but not   
from ,moral  ,choice2 the man of        
self-control1 on the contrary1 from     
,moral ,choice1  not from ,lust4 ,again3
 whereas ,lust is frequently opposed to 
,moral  ,choice1 ,lust is not to ,lust4 
,lastly3 the object-matter of ,lust is  
the pleasant and the painful1 but  of   
,moral ,choice neither the one nor the  
other4 ,still less can it be  ,anger1   
because actions done from ,anger are    
thought generally to be  least of all   
consequent on ,moral ,choice4    ,nor is
 it ,wish either1 though appearing      
closely connected with it2  because1 in 
the first place1 ,moral ,choice has not 
for its objects  impossibilities1 and if

 a man were to say he chose them he     
would be  thought to be a fool2 but     
,wish may have impossible things for its
  objects1 immortality for instance4    
,wish again may be exercised on things  
in the accomplishment of which  one's   
self could have nothing to do1 as the   
success of any particular  actor or     
athlete2 but no man chooses things of   
this nature1 only such  as he believes  
he may himself be instrumental in       
procuring4    ,further3 ,wish has for   
its object the ,end rather1 but ,moral  
,choice the  means to the ,end2 for     
instance1 we wish to be healthy but we  
choose the  means which will make us so2
 or happiness again we wish for1 and    
commonly say so1 but to say we choose is
 not an appropriate term1  because1 in  
short1 the province of ,moral ,choice   
seems to be those  things which are in  
our own power4    ,neither can it be    
,opinion2 for ,opinion is thought to be 
unlimited in  its range of objects1 and 
to be exercised as well upon things     

eternal  and impossible as on those     
which are in our own power3 again1      
,opinion  is logically divided into true
 and false1 not into good and bad as    
,moral ,choice is4    ,however1 nobody  
perhaps maintains its identity with     
,opinion simply2 but  it is not the same
 with opinion of any kind1#h because by 
choosing good  and bad things we are    
constituted of a certain character1 but 
by having  opinions on them we are not4 
,again1 we choose to take or avoid1 and 
so on1 but we opine what a thing  is1 or
 for what it is serviceable1 or how2 but
 we do not opine to take  or avoid4     
,further1 ,moral ,choice is commended   
rather for having a right object  than  
for being judicious1 but ,opinion for   
being formed in accordance  with truth4 
,again1 we choose such things as we     
pretty well know to be good1 but we     
form opinions respecting such as we do  
not know at all4    ,and it is not      
thought that choosing and opining best  
always go  together1 but that some opine

 the better course and yet by reason of 
viciousness choose not the things which 
they should4    ,it may be urged1 that  
,opinion always precedes or accompanies 
,moral  ,choice2 be it so1 this makes no
 difference1 for this is not the point  
in question1 but whether ,moral ,choice 
is the same as ,opinion of a  certain   
kind4    ,since then it is none of the  
aforementioned things1 what is it1 or   
how  is it characterised8 ,voluntary it 
plainly is1 but not all voluntary       
action is an object of ,moral ,choice4  
,may we not say then1 it is 8that       
voluntary which has passed through a    
stage of previous deliberation80        
because ,moral ,choice is attended with 
reasoning and intellectual  process4    
,the etymology of its ,greek name seems 
to give a hint of it1  being when       
analysed 8chosen in preference to       
somewhat else40    ,chapter ,v4    ,well
 then2 do men deliberate about          
everything1 and is anything soever  the 
object of ,deliberation1 or are there   

some matters with respect to  which     
there is none8 7,it may be as well      
perhaps to say1 that by 8object  of     
,deliberation0 is meant such matter as a
 sensible man would  deliberate upon1   
not what any fool or madman might47     
,well3 about eternal things no one      
deliberates2 as1 for instance1 the      
universe1 or the incommensurability of  
the diameter and side of a  square4     
,nor again about things which are in    
motion but which always happen in  the  
same way either necessarily1 or         
naturally1 or from some other  cause1 as
 the solstices or the sunrise4    ,nor  
about those which are variable1 as      
drought and rains2 nor  fortuitous      
matters1 as finding of treasure4    ,nor
 in fact even about all human affairs2  
no ,lacedmonian1 for  instance1         
deliberates as to the best course for   
the ,scythian government  to adopt2     
because in such cases we have no power  
over the result4    ,but we do          
deliberate respecting such practical    

matters as are in our  own power 7which 
are what are left after all our         
exclusions74    ,i have adopted this    
division because causes seem to be      
divisible into  nature1 necessity1      
chance1 and moreover intellect1 and all 
human  powers4    ,and as man in general
 deliberates about what man in general  
can effect1  so individuals do about    
such practical things as can be effected
  through their own instrumentality4    
,again1 we do not deliberate respecting 
such arts or sciences as are  exact and 
independent3 as1 for instance1 about    
written characters1  because we have no 
doubt how they should be formed2 but we 
do  deliberate on all buch things as are
 usually done through our own           
instrumentality1 but not invariably in  
the same way2 as1 for instance1  about  
matters connected with the healing art1 
or with money-making2  and1 again1 more 
about piloting ships than gymnastic     
exercises1 because  the former has been 
less exactly determined1 and so forth2  

and more  about arts than sciences1     
because we more frequently doubt        
respecting  the former4    ,so then     
,deliberation takes place in such       
matters as are under general  laws1 but 
still uncertain how in any given case   
they will issue1 i4e4  in which there is
 some indefiniteness2 and for great     
matters we  associate coadjutors in     
counsel1 distrusting our ability to     
settle them  alone4    ,further1 we     
deliberate not about ,ends1 but ,means  
to ,ends4 ,no physician1  for instance1 
deliberates whether he will cure1 nor   
orator whether he  will persuade1 nor   
statesman whether he will produce a good
  constitution1 nor in fact any man in  
any other function about his  particular
 ,end2 but having set before them a     
certain ,end they look how  and through 
what means it may be accomplished3 if   
there is a choice of  means1 they       
examine further which are easiest and   
most creditable2 or1  if there is but   
one means of accomplishing the object1  

then how it may  be through this1 this  
again through what1 till they come to   
the first  cause2 and this will be the  
last found2 for a man engaged in a      
process  of deliberation seems to seek  
and analyse1 as a man1 to solve a       
problem1 analyses the figure given him4 
,and plainly not every search is        
,deliberation1 those in mathematics to  
wit1 but every ,deliberation is a       
search1 and the last step in the        
analysis is the first in the            
constructive process4 ,and if in the    
course of their search men come  upon an
 impossibility1 they give it up2 if     
money1 for instance1 be  necessary1 but 
cannot be got3 but if the thing appears 
possible they  then attempt to do it4   
,and by possible ,i mean what may be    
done through our own instrumentality    
7of course what may be done through our 
friends is through our own              
instrumentality in a certain sense1     
because the origination in such  cases  
rests with us74 ,and the object of      

search is sometimes the  necessary      
instruments1 sometimes the method of    
using them2 and  similarly in the rest  
sometimes through what1 and sometimes   
how or  through what4#i    ,so it seems1
 as has been said1 that ,man is the     
originator of his  actions2 and         
,deliberation has for its object        
whatever may be done  through one's own 
instrumentality1 and the actions are    
with a view to  other things2 and so it 
is1 not the ,end1 but the ,means to     
,ends on which  ,deliberation is        
employed4    ,nor1 again1 is it employed
 on matters of detail1 as whether the   
substance before me is bread1 or has    
been properly cooked2 for these  come   
under the province of sense1 and if a   
man is to be always  deliberating1 he   
may go on ad infinitum4    ,further1    
exactly the same matter is the object   
both of ,deliberation and  ,moral       
,choice2 but that which is the object of
 ,moral ,choice is  thenceforward       
separated off and definite1#aj because  

by object of  ,moral ,choice is denoted 
that which after ,deliberation has been 
preferred to something else3 for each   
man leaves off searching how he  shall  
do a thing when he has brought the      
origination up to himself1  i4e4 to the 
governing principle in himself1#aa      
because it is this  which makes the     
choice4 ,a good illustration of this is 
furnished by the  old regal             
constitutions which ,homer drew from1 in
 which the ,kings would  announce to the
 commonalty what they had determined    
before4    ,now since that which is the 
object of ,moral ,choice is something in
 our  own power1 which is the object of 
deliberation and the grasping of the    
,will1 ,moral ,choice must be 8a        
grasping after something in our own     
power  consequent upon ,deliberation30  
because after having deliberated we     
decide1 and then grasp by our ,will in  
accordance with the result of our       
deliberation4#ab    ,let this be        
accepted as a sketch of the nature and  

object of ,moral  ,choice1 that object  
being 8,means to ,ends40    ,chapter    
,,vi4    ,that ,wish has for its        
object-matter the ,end1 has been already
 stated2  but there are two opinions    
respecting it2 some thinking that its   
object  is real good1 others whatever   
impresses the mind with a notion of     
good4    ,now those who maintain that   
the object of ,wish is real good are    
beset  by this difficulty1 that what is 
wished for by him who chooses wrongly   
is not really an object of ,wish        
7because1 on their theory1 if it is an  
object of wish1 it must be good1 but it 
is1 in the case supposed1  evil74 ,those
 who maintain1 on the contrary1 that    
that which impresses  the mind with a   
notion of good is properly the object of
 ,wish1 have to  meet this difficulty1  
that there is nothing naturally an      
object of ,wish  but to each individual 
whatever seems good to him2 now         
different people  have different        
notions1 and it may chance contrary     

ones4    ,but1 if these opinions do not 
satisfy us1 may we not say that1        
abstractedly and as a matter of         
objective truth1 the really good is the 
object of ,wish1 but to each individual 
whatever impresses his mind with  the   
notion of good4#ac ,and so to the good  
man that is an object of  ,wish which is
 really and truly so1 but to the bad man
 anything may be2  just as physically   
those things are wholesome to the       
healthy which are  really so1 but other 
things to the sick4 ,and so too of      
bitter and  sweet1 and hot and heavy1   
and so on4 ,for the good man judges in  
every  instance correctly1 and in every 
instance the notion conveyed to his     
mind is the true one4    ,for there are 
fair and pleasant things peculiar to1   
and so varying  with1 each state2 and   
perhaps the most distinguishing         
characteristic of  the good man is his  
seeing the truth in every instance1 he  
being1 in  fact1 the rule and measure of
 these matters4    ,the multitude of men

 seem to be deceived by reason of       
pleasure1 because  though it is not     
really a good it impresses their minds  
with the notion  of goodness1 so they   
choose what is pleasant as good and     
avoid pain as  an evil4    ,chapter     
,,vii4    ,now since the ,end is the    
object of ,wish1 and the means to the   
,end of  ,deliberation and ,moral       
,choice1 the actions regarding these    
matters must  be in the way of ,moral   
,choice1 i4e4 voluntary3 but the acts of
  working out the virtues are such      
actions1 and therefore ,virtue is in    
our power4    ,and so too is ,vice3     
because wherever it is in our power to  
do it is  also in our power to forbear  
doing1 and vice vers3 therefore if the  
doing 7being in a given case creditable7
 is in our power1 so too is the         
forbearing 7which is in the same case   
discreditable71 and vice vers4    ,but  
if it is in our power to do and to      
forbear doing what is creditable  or the
 contrary1 and these respectively       

constitute the being good or  bad1 then 
the being good or vicious characters is 
in our power4    ,as for the well-known 
saying1 8,no man voluntarily is wicked  
or  involuntarily happy10 it is partly  
true1 partly false2 for no man is  happy
 against his will1 of course1 but       
wickedness is voluntary4 ,or must  we   
dispute the statements lately made1 and 
not say that ,man is the  originator or 
generator of his actions as much as of  
his children8    ,but if this is matter 
of plain manifest fact1 and we cannot   
refer our  actions to any other         
originations beside those in our own    
power1 those  things must be in our own 
power1 and so voluntary1 the            
originations of  which are in ourselves4
    ,moreover1 testimony seems to be    
borne to these positions both privately 
by individuals1 and by law-givers too1  
in that they chastise and punish  those 
who do wrong 7unless they do so on      
compulsion1 or by reason of  ignorance  
which is not self-caused71 while they   

honour those who act  rightly1 under the
 notion of being likely to encourage the
 latter and  restrain the former4 ,but  
such things as are not in our own power1
  i4e4 not voluntary1 no one thinks of  
encouraging us to do1 knowing it  to be 
of no avail for one to have been        
persuaded not to be hot 7for  instance71
 or feel pain1 or be hungry1 and so     
forth1 because we shall  have those     
sensations all the same4    ,and what   
makes the case stronger is this3 that   
they chastise for the  very fact of     
ignorance1 when it is thought to be     
self-caused2 to the  drunken1 for       
instance1 penalties are double1 because 
the origination in  such case lies in a 
man's own self3 for he might have helped
 getting  drunk1 and this is the cause  
of his ignorance4    ,again1 those also 
who are ignorant of legal regulations   
which they are  bound to know1 and which
 are not hard to know1 they chastise2   
and  similarly in all other cases where 
neglect is thought to be the cause  of  

the ignorance1 under the notion that it 
was in their power to  prevent their    
ignorance1 because they might have paid 
attention4    ,but perhaps a man is of  
such a character that he cannot attend  
to such  things3 still men are          
themselves the causes of having become  
such  characters by living carelessly1  
and also of being unjust or destitute   
of self-control1 the former by doing    
evil actions1 the latter by  spending   
their time in drinking and such-like2   
because the particular  acts of working 
form corresponding characters1 as is    
shown by those who  are practising for  
any contest or particular course of     
action1 for such  men persevere in the  
acts of working4    ,as for the plea1   
that a man did not know that habits are 
produced from  separate acts of working1
 we reply1 such ignorance is a mark of  
excessive stupidity4    ,furthermore1 it
 is wholly irrelevant to say that the   
man who acts  unjustly or dissolutely   
does not wish to attain the habits of   

these  vices3 for if a man wittingly    
does those things whereby he must become
  unjust he is to all intents and       
purposes unjust voluntarily2 but he     
cannot with a wish cease to be unjust   
and become just4 ,for1 to take the      
analogous case1 the sick man cannot with
 a wish be well again1 yet in a         
supposable case he is voluntarily ill   
because he has produced his  sickness by
 living intemperately and disregarding  
his physicians4 ,there  was a time then 
when he might have helped being ill1 but
 now he has let  himself go he cannot   
any longer2 just as he who has let a    
stone out of  his hand cannot recall    
it1#ad and yet it rested with him to aim
 and  throw it1 because the origination 
was in his power4 ,just so the unjust   
man1 and he who has lost all            
self-control1 might originally have     
helped  being what they are1 and so they
 are voluntarily what they are2 but now 
that they are become so they no longer  
have the power of being  otherwise4     

,and not only are mental diseases       
voluntary1 but the bodily are so in     
some men1 whom we accordingly blame3 for
 such as are naturally deformed  no one 
blames1 only such as are so by reason of
 want of exercise1 and  neglect3 and so 
too of weakness and maiming3 no one     
would think of  upbraiding1 but would   
rather compassionate1 a man who is blind
 by  nature1 or from disease1 or from an
 accident2 but every one would blame    
him who was so from excess of wine1 or  
any other kind of intemperance4  ,it    
seems1 then1 that in respect of bodily  
diseases1 those which depend  on        
ourselves are censured1 those which do  
not are not censured2 and if  so1 then  
in the case of the mental disorders1    
those which are censured  must depend   
upon ourselves4    ,but suppose a man to
 say1 8that 7by our own admission7 all  
men aim at  that which conveys to their 
minds an impression of good1 and that   
men  have no control over this          
impression1 but that the ,end impresses 

each  with a notion correspondent to his
 own individual character2 that to be   
sure if each man is in a way the cause  
of his own moral state1 so he  will be  
also of the kind of impression he       
receives3 whereas1 if this is  not so1  
no one is the cause to himself of doing 
evil actions1 but he  does them by      
reason of ignorance of the true ,end1   
supposing that  through their means he  
will secure the chief good4 ,further1   
that this  aiming at the ,end is no     
matter of one's own choice1 but one must
 be  born with a power of mental vision1
 so to speak1 whereby to judge  fairly  
and choose that which is really good2   
and he is blessed by  nature who has    
this naturally well3 because it is the  
most important  thing and the fairest1  
and what a man cannot get or learn from 
another  but will have such as nature   
has given it2 and for this to be so     
given  well and fairly would be         
excellence of nature in the highest and 
truest  sense40    ,if all this be true1

 how will ,virtue be a whit more        
voluntary than  ,vice8 ,alike to the    
good man and the bad1 the ,end gives its
 impression  and is fixed by nature or  
howsoever you like to say1 and they act 
so  and so1 referring everything else to
 this ,end4    ,whether then we suppose 
that the ,end impresses each man's mind 
with  certain notions not merely by     
nature1 but that there is somewhat also 
dependent on himself2 or that the ,end  
is given by nature1 and yet  ,virtue is 
voluntary because the good man does all 
the rest voluntarily1  ,vice must be    
equally so2 because his own agency      
equally attaches to the  bad man in the 
actions1 even if not in the selection of
 the ,end4    ,if then1 as is commonly  
said1 the ,virtues are voluntary        
7because we at  least cooperate#ae in   
producing our moral states1 and we      
assume the  ,end to be of a certain kind
 according as we are ourselves of       
certain  characters71 the ,vices must be
 voluntary also1 because the cases are  

exactly similar4    ,chapter ,,viii4    
,well now1 we have stated generally     
respecting the ,moral ,virtues1 the     
genus 7in outline71 that they are mean  
states1 and that they are  habits1 and  
how they are formed1 and that they are  
of themselves  calculated to act upon   
the circumstances out of which they were
 formed1  and that they are in our own  
power and voluntary1 and are to be done 
so  as right ,reason may direct4    ,but
 the particular actions and the habits  
are not voluntary in the same  sense2   
for of the actions we are masters from  
beginning to end  7supposing of course a
 knowledge of the particular details71  
but only  of the origination of the     
habits1 the addition by small particular
  accessions not being cognisiable 7as  
is the case with sicknesses73  still    
they are voluntary because it rested    
with us to use our  circumstances this  
way or that4    ,chapter ,,ix4    ,here 
we will resume the particular discussion
 of the ,moral ,virtues1 and  say what  

they are1 what is their object-matter1  
and how they stand  respectively related
 to it3 of course their number will be  
thereby  shown4    ,first1 then1 of     
,courage4 ,now that it is a mean state1 
in respect of  fear and boldness1 has   
been already said3 further1 the objects 
of our  fears are obviously things      
fearful or1 in a general way of         
statement1  evils2 which accounts for   
the common definition of fear1 viz4     
8expectation of evil40    ,of course we 
fear evils of all kinds3 disgrace1 for  
instance1 poverty1  disease1            
desolateness1 death2 but not all these  
seem to be the  object-matter of the    
,brave man1 because there are things    
which to fear  is right and noble1 and  
not to fear is base2 disgrace1 for      
example1  since he who fears this is a  
good man and has a sense of honour1 and 
he  who does not fear it is shameless   
7though there are those who call him    
,brave by analogy1 because he somewhat  
resembles the ,brave man who  agrees    

with him in being free from fear72 but  
poverty1 perhaps1 or  disease1 and in   
fact whatever does not proceed from     
viciousness1 nor is  attributable to his
 own fault1 a man ought not to fear3    
still1 being  fearless in respect of    
these would not constitute a man ,brave 
in the  proper sense of the term4       
,yet we do apply the term#af in right of
 the similarity of the cases2  for there
 are men who1 though timid in the       
dangers of war1 are liberal  men and are
 stout enough to face loss of wealth4   
,and1 again1 a man is not a coward for  
fearing insult to his wife or  children1
 or envy1 or any such thing2 nor is he a
 ,brave man for being  bold when going  
to be scourged4    ,what kind of fearful
 things then do constitute the          
object-matter of the  ,brave man8 first 
of all1 must they not be the greatest1  
since no man is  more apt to withstand  
what is dreadful4 ,now the object of the
 greatest  dread is death1 because it is
 the end of all things1 and the dead man

  is thought to be capable neither of   
good nor evil4 ,still it would seem     
that the ,brave man has not for his     
object-matter even death in every       
circumstance2 on the sea1 for example1  
or in sickness3 in what  circumstances  
then8 must it not be in the most        
honourable8 now such is  death in war1  
because it is death in the greatest and 
most honourable  danger2 and this is    
confirmed by the honours awarded in     
communities1  and by monarchs4    ,he   
then may be most properly denominated   
,brave who is fearless in  respect of   
honourable death and such sudden        
emergencies as threaten  death2 now such
 specially are those which arise in the 
course of war4    ,it is not meant but  
that the ,brave man will be fearless    
also on the sea  7and in sickness71 but 
not in the same way as sea-faring men2  
for these  are light-hearted and hopeful
 by reason of their experience1 while   
landsmen though ,brave are apt to give  
themselves up for lost and  shudder at  

the notion of such a death3 to which it 
should be added that  ,courage is       
exerted in circumstances which admit of 
doing something to  help one's self1 or 
in which death would be honourable2 now 
neither of  these requisites attach to  
destruction by drowning or sickness4    
,chapter ,x4    ,again1 fearful is a    
term of relation1 the same thing not    
being so to  all1 and there is according
 to common parlance somewhat so fearful 
as  to be beyond human endurance3 this  
of course would be fearful to every  man
 of sense1 but those objects which are  
level to the capacity of man  differ in 
magnitude and admit of degrees1 so too  
the objects of  confidence or boldness4 
,now the ,brave man cannot be frighted  
from his propriety 7but of course  only 
so far as he is man72 fear such things  
indeed he will1 but he will  stand up   
against them as he ought and as right   
reason may direct1 with  a view to what 
is honourable1 because this is the end  
of the virtue4    ,now it is possible to

 fear these things too much1 or too     
little1 or  again to fear what is not   
really fearful as if it were such4 ,so  
the  errors come to be either that a man
 fears when he ought not to fear at     
all1 or that he fears in an improper    
way1 or at a wrong time1 and so  forth2 
and so too in respect of things         
inspiring confidence4 ,he is  ,brave    
then who withstands1 and fears1 and is  
bold1 in respect of right  objects1 from
 a right motive1 in right manner1 and at
 right times3  since the ,brave man     
suffers or acts as he ought and as right
 reason may  direct4    ,now the end of 
every separate act of working is that   
which accords with  the habit1 and so to
 the ,brave man ,courage2 which is      
honourable2  therefore such is also the 
,end1 since the character of each is    
determined by the ,end4#ag    ,so honour
 is the motive from which the ,brave man
 withstands things  fearful and performs
 the acts which accord with ,courage4   
,of the characters on the side of       

,excess1 he who exceeds in utter        
absence of fear has no appropriate name 
7,i observed before that many  states   
have none71 but he would be a madman or 
inaccessible to pain if  he feared      
nothing1 neither earthquake1 nor the    
billows1 as they tell of  the ,celts4   
,he again who exceeds in confidence in  
respect of things fearful is  rash4 ,he 
is thought moreover to be a braggart1   
and to advance unfounded  claims to the 
character of ,brave3 the relation which 
the ,brave man  really bears to objects 
of fear this man wishes to appear to    
bear1 and  so imitates him in whatever  
points he can2 for this reason most of  
them  exhibit a curious mixture of      
rashness and cowardice2 because1        
affecting  rashness in these            
circumstances1 they do not withstand    
what is truly  fearful4    ,the man     
moreover who exceeds in feeling fear is 
a coward1 since there  attach to him the
 circumstances of fearing wrong objects1
 in wrong  ways1 and so forth4 ,he is   

deficient also in feeling confidence1   
but he  is most clearly seen as         
exceeding in the case of pains2 he is a 
fainthearted kind of man1 for he fears  
all things3 the ,brave man is  just the 
contrary1 for boldness is the property  
of the light-hearted  and hopeful4      
,so the coward1 the rash1 and the ,brave
 man have exactly the same              
object-matter1 but stand differently    
related to it3 the two  first-mentioned 
respectively exceed and are deficient1  
the last is in a  mean state and as he  
ought to be4 ,the rash again are        
precipitate1 and1  being eager before   
danger1 when actually in it fall away1  
while the  ,brave are quick and sharp in
 action1 but before are quiet and       
composed4    ,well then1 as has been    
said1 ,courage is a mean state in       
respect of  objects inspiring boldness  
or fear1 in the circumstances which have
  been stated1 and the ,brave man       
chooses his line and withstands danger  
either because to do so is honourable1  

or because not to do so is base4  ,but  
dying to escape from poverty1 or the    
pangs of love1 or anything  that is     
simply painful1 is the act not of a     
,brave man but of a coward2  because it 
is mere softness to fly from what is    
toilsome1 and the  suicide braves the   
terrors of death not because it is      
honourable but to  get out of the reach 
of evil4    ,chapter ,,xi4    ,courage  
proper is somewhat of the kind ,i have  
described1 but there are  dispositions1 
differing in five ways1#ah which also   
bear in common  parlance the name of    
,courage4    ,we will take first that   
which bears most resemblance to the     
true1 the  ,courage of ,citizenship1 so 
named because the motives which are     
thought  to actuate the members of a    
community in braving danger are the     
penalties and disgrace held out by the  
laws to cowardice1 and the  dignities   
conferred on the ,brave2 which is       
thought to be the reason why  those are 
the bravest people among whom cowards   

are visited with  disgrace and the      
,brave held in honour4    ,such is the  
kind of ,courage ,homer exhibits in his 
characters2 ,diomed  and ,hector for    
example4 ,the latter says1              
8,polydamas will be the first to fix    
,disgrace upon me40      ,diomed again1 
8,for ,hector surely will hereafter say1
  ,speaking in ,troy1 ,tydides by my    
hand0--      ,this ,i say most nearly   
resembles the ,courage before spoken of1
 because  it arises from virtue1 from a 
feeling of shame1 and a desire of what  
is  noble 7that is1 of honour71 and     
avoidance of disgrace which is base4    
,in the same rank one would be inclined 
to place those also who act  under      
compulsion from their commanders2 yet   
are they really lower1  because not a   
sense of honour but fear is the motive  
from which they  act1 and what they seek
 to avoid is not that which is base but 
that  which is simply painful3          
commanders do in fact compel their men  
sometimes1 as ,hector says 7to quote    

,homer again71    8,but whomsoever ,i   
shall find cowering afar from the fight1
  ,the teeth of dogs he shall by no     
means escape40      ,those commanders   
who station staunch troops by doubtful  
ones1#ai or  who beat their men if they 
flinch1 or who draw their troops up in  
line  with the trenches1 or other       
similar obstacles1 in their rear1 do in 
effect the same as ,hector1 for they all
 use compulsion4    ,but a man is to be 
,brave1 not on compulsion1 but from a   
sense of  honour4    ,in the next place1
 ,experience and ,skill in the various  
particulars is  thought to be a species 
of ,courage3 whence ,socrates also      
thought that  ,courage was knowledge4#bj
    ,this quality is exhibited of course
 by different men under different       
circumstances1 but in warlike matters1  
with which we are now concerned1  it is 
exhibited by the soldiers 78the         
regulars073 for there are1 it  would    
seem1 many things in war of no real     
importance#ba which these  have been    

constantly used to see2 so they have a  
show of ,courage  because other people  
are not aware of the real nature of     
these things4  ,then again by reason of 
their skill they are better able than   
any  others to inflict without suffering
 themselves1 because they are able  to  
use their arms and have such as are most
 serviceable both with a  view to       
offence and defence3 so that their case 
is parallel to that of  armed men       
fighting with unarmed or trained        
athletes with amateurs1  since in       
contests of this kind those are the best
 fighters1 not who are  the bravest men1
 but who are the strongest and are in   
the best  condition4    ,in fact1 the   
regular troops come to be cowards       
whenever the danger is  greater than    
their means of meeting it2 supposing1   
for example1 that  they are inferior in 
numbers and resources3 then they are the
 first to  fly1 but the mere militia    
stand and fall on the ground 7which as  
you  know really happened at the        

,hermum71#bb for in the eyes of these   
flight was disgraceful and death        
preferable to safety bought at such a   
price3 while 8the regulars0 originally  
went into the danger under a  notion of 
their own superiority1 but on           
discovering their error they  took to   
flight1#bc having greater fear of death 
than of disgrace2 but  this is not the  
feeling of the ,brave man4    ,thirdly1 
mere ,animal ,spirit is sometimes       
brought under the term  ,courage3 they  
are thought to be ,brave who are carried
 on by mere ,animal  ,spirit1 as are    
wild beasts against those who have      
wounded them1 because  in fact the      
really ,brave have much ,spirit1 there  
being nothing like it  for going at     
danger of any kind2 whence those        
frequent expressions in  ,homer1        
8infused strength into his spirit10     
8roused his strength and  spirit10 or   
again1 8and keen strength in his        
nostrils10 8his blood  boiled30 for all 
these seem to denote the arousing and   

impetuosity of  the ,animal ,spirit4    
,now they that are truly ,brave act from
 a sense of honour1 and this  ,animal   
,spirit co-operates with them2 but wild 
beasts from pain1 that is  because they 
have been wounded1 or are frightened2   
since if they are  quietly in their own 
haunts1 forest or marsh1 they do not    
attack men4  ,surely they are not ,brave
 because they rush into danger when     
goaded on  by pain and mere ,spirit1    
without any view of the danger3 else    
would  asses be ,brave when they are    
hungry1 for though beaten they will not 
then leave their pasture3 profligate men
 besides do many bold actions  by reason
 of their lust4 ,we may conclude then   
that they are not ,brave  who are goaded
 on to meet danger by pain and mere     
,spirit2 but still  this temper which   
arises from ,animal ,spirit appears to  
be most natural1  and would be ,courage 
of the true kind if it could have added 
to it  moral choice and the proper      
motive4    ,so men also are pained by a 

feeling of anger1 and take pleasure in  
revenge2 but they who fight from these  
causes may be good fighters1 but  they  
are not truly ,brave 7in that they do   
not act from a sense of  honour1 nor as 
reason directs1 but merely from the     
present feeling71  still they bear some 
resemblance to that character4    ,nor1 
again1 are the ,sanguine and ,hopeful   
therefore ,brave3 since their  boldness 
in dangers arises from their frequent   
victories over numerous  foes4 ,the two 
characters are alike1 however1 in that  
both are  confident2 but then the ,brave
 are so from the afore-mentioned causes1
  whereas these are so from a settled   
conviction of their being superior  and 
not likely to suffer anything in return 
7they who are intoxicated  do much the  
same1 for they become hopeful when in   
that state72 but when  the event        
disappoints their expectations they run 
away3 now it was said  to be the        
character of a ,brave man to withstand  
things which are  fearful to man or     

produce that impression1 because it is  
honourable so  to do and the contrary is
 dishonourable4    ,for this reason it  
is thought to be a greater proof of     
,courage to be  fearless and undisturbed
 under the pressure of sudden fear than 
under  that which may be anticipated1   
because ,courage then comes rather from 
a  fixed habit1 or less from            
preparation3 since as to foreseen       
dangers a  man might take his line even 
from calculation and reasoning1 but in  
those which are sudden he will do so    
according to his fixed habit of  mind4  
,fifthly and lastly1 those who are      
acting under ,ignorance have a show of  
,courage and are not very far from the  
,hopeful2 but still they are  inferior  
inasmuch as they have no opinion of     
themselves2 which the  others have1 and 
therefore stay and contest a field for  
some little  time2 but they who have    
been deceived fly the moment they know  
things  to be otherwise than they       
supposed1 which the ,argives experienced

 when  they fell on the ,lacedmonians1  
taking them for the men of ,sicyon4     
,chapter ,,xii4    ,we have described   
then what kind of men the ,brave are1   
and what they  who are thought to be1   
but are not really1 ,brave4    ,it must 
be remarked1 however1 that though       
,courage has for its  object-matter     
boldness and fear it has not both       
equally so1 but objects  of fear much   
more than the former2 for he that under 
pressure of these  is undisturbed and   
stands related to them as he ought is   
better  entitled to the name of ,brave  
than he who is properly affected towards
  objects of confidence4 ,so then men   
are termed ,brave for withstanding      
painful things4    ,it follows that     
,courage involves pain and is justly    
praised1 since it  is a harder matter to
 withstand things that are painful than 
to abstain  from such as are pleasant4  
,it must not be thought but that the    
,end and object of ,courage is          
pleasant1 but it is obscured by the     

surrounding circumstances3 which        
happens also in the gymnastic games2 to 
the boxers the ,end is pleasant  with a 
view to which they act1 ,i mean the     
crown and the honours2 but  the         
receiving the blows they do is painful  
and annoying to flesh and  blood1 and so
 is all the labour they have to undergo2
 and1 as these  drawbacks are many1 the 
object in view being small appears to   
have no  pleasantness in it4    ,if then
 we may say the same of ,courage1 of    
course death and wounds must  be painful
 to the ,brave man and against his will3
 still he endures  these because it is  
honourable so to do or because it is    
dishonourable  not to do so4 ,and the   
more complete his virtue and his        
happiness so  much the more will he be  
pained at the notion of death3 since to 
such a  man as he is it is best worth   
while to live1 and he with full         
consciousness is deprived of the        
greatest goods by death1 and this is a  
painful idea4 ,but he is not the less   

,brave for feeling it to be so1 nay     
rather it may be he is shown to be more 
so because he chooses the  honour that  
may be reaped in war in preference to   
retaining safe  possession of these     
other goods4 ,the fact is that to act   
with pleasure  does not belong to all   
the virtues1 except so far as a man     
realises the  ,end of his actions4      
,but there is perhaps no reason why not 
such men should make the best  soldiers1
 but those who are less truly ,brave but
 have no other good to  care for3 these 
being ready to meet danger and bartering
 their lives  against small gain4       
,let thus much be accepted as sufficient
 on the subject of ,courage2 the  true  
nature of which it is not difficult to  
gather1 in outline at  least1 from what 
has been said4    ,chapter ,,xiii4      
,next let us speak of ,perfected        
,self-,mastery1 which seems to claim the
  next place to ,courage1 since these   
two are the ,excellences of the         
,irrational part of the ,soul4    ,that 

it is a mean state1 having for its      
object-matter ,pleasures1 we  have      
already said 7,pains being in fact its  
object-matter in a less  degree and     
dissimilar manner71 the state of utter  
absence of  self-control has plainly the
 same object-matter2 the next thing then
 is  to determine what kind of          
,pleasures4    ,let ,pleasures then be  
understood to be divided into mental and
 bodily3  instances of the former being 
love of honour or of learning3 it being 
plain that each man takes pleasure in   
that of these two objects which  he has 
a tendency to like1 his body being no   
way affected but rather  his intellect4 
,now men are not called perfectly       
self-mastering or  wholly destitute of  
self-control in respect of pleasures of 
this class3  nor in fact in respect of  
any which are not bodily2 those for     
example  who love to tell long stories1 
and are prosy1 and spend their days     
about mere chance matters1 we call      
gossips but not wholly destitute of     

self-control1 nor again those who are   
pained at the loss of money or  friends4
    ,it is bodily ,pleasures then which 
are the object-matter of ,perfected     
,self-,mastery1 but not even all these  
indifferently3 ,i mean1 that they  who  
take pleasure in objects perceived by   
the ,sight1 as colours1 and  forms1 and 
painting1 are not denominated men of    
,perfected ,self-,mastery1  or wholly   
destitute of self-control2 and yet it   
would seem that one may  take pleasure  
even in such objects1 as one ought to   
do1 or excessively1  or too little4     
,so too of objects perceived by the     
sense of ,hearing2 no one applies the   
terms before quoted respectively to     
those who are excessively pleased  with 
musical tunes or acting1 or to those who
 take such pleasure as  they ought4     
,nor again to those persons whose       
pleasure arises from the sense of       
,smell1 except incidentally3#bd ,i mean1
 we do not say men have no  self-control
 because they take pleasure in the scent

 of fruit1 or  flowers1 or incense1 but 
rather when they do so in the smells of 
unguents and sauces3 since men destitute
 of self-control take pleasure  herein1 
because hereby the objects of their     
lusts are recalled to their  imagination
 7you may also see other men take       
pleasure in the smell of  food when they
 are hungry73 but to take pleasure in   
such is a mark of  the character before 
named since these are objects of desire 
to him4    ,now not even brutes receive 
pleasure in right of these senses1      
except  incidentally4 ,i mean1 it is not
 the scent of hares' flesh but the      
eating it which dogs take pleasure in1  
perception of which pleasure is  caused 
by the sense of ,smell4 ,or again1 it is
 not the lowing of the ox  but eating   
him which the lion likes2 but of the    
fact of his nearness  the lion is made  
sensible by the lowing1 and so he       
appears to take  pleasure in this4 ,in  
like manner1 he has no pleasure in      
merely seeing  or finding a stag or wild

 goat1 but in the prospect of a meal4   
,the habits of ,perfect ,self-,mastery  
and entire absence of self-control  have
 then for their object-matter such      
pleasures as brutes also share  in1 for 
which reason they are plainly servile   
and brutish3 they are  ,touch and       
,taste4    ,but even ,taste men seem to 
make little or no use of2 for to the    
sense  of ,taste belongs the            
distinguishing of flavours2 what men do1
 in fact1  who are testing the quality  
of wines or seasoning 8made dishes40    
,but men scarcely take pleasure at all  
in these things1 at least those  whom we
 call destitute of self-control do not1 
but only in the actual  enjoyment which 
arises entirely from the sense of       
,touch1 whether in  eating or in        
drinking1 or in grosser lusts4 ,this    
accounts for the wish  said to have been
 expressed once by a great glutton1     
8that his throat  had been formed longer
 than a crane's neck10 implying that his
 pleasure  was derived from the ,touch4 

,the sense then with which is connected 
the habit of absence of  self-control is
 the most common of all the senses1 and 
this habit would  seem to be justly a   
matter of reproach1 since it attaches to
 us not in  so far as we are men but in 
so far as we are animals4 ,indeed it is 
brutish to take pleasure in such things 
and to like them best of all2  for the  
most respectable of the pleasures       
arising from the touch have  been set   
aside2 those1 for instance1 which occur 
in the course of  gymnastic training    
from the rubbing and the warm bath3     
because the  touch of the man destitute 
of self-control is not indifferently of 
any part of the body but only of        
particular parts4    ,now of lusts or   
desires some are thought to be          
universal1 others  peculiar and         
acquired2 thus desire for food is       
natural since every one  who really     
needs desires also food1 whether solid  
or liquid1 or both  7and1 as ,homer     
says1 the man in the prime of youth     

needs and desires  intercourse with the 
other sex72 but when we come to this or 
that  particular kind1 then neither is  
the desire universal nor in all men is  
it directed to the same objects4 ,and   
therefore the conceiving of such        
desires plainly attaches to us as       
individuals4 ,it must be admitted1      
however1 that there is something natural
 in it3 because different  things are   
pleasant to different men and a         
preference of some  particular objects  
to chance ones is universal4 ,well then1
 in the case  of the desires which are  
strictly and properly natural few men go
 wrong  and all in one direction1 that  
is1 on the side of too much3 ,i mean1 to
  eat and drink of such food as happens 
to be on the table till one is          
overfilled is exceeding in quantity the 
natural limit1 since the  natural desire
 is simply a supply of a real           
deficiency4    ,for this reason these   
men are called belly-mad1 as filling it 
beyond  what they ought1 and it is the  

slavish who become of this character4   
,but in respect of the peculiar         
pleasures many men go wrong and in many 
different ways2 for whereas the term    
8fond of so and so0 implies either      
taking pleasure in wrong objects1 or    
taking pleasure excessively1 or as  the 
mass of men do1 or in a wrong way1 they 
who are destitute of all  self-control  
exceed in all these ways2 that is to    
say1 they take  pleasure in some things 
in which they ought not to do so        
7because they  are properly objects of  
detestation71 and in such as it is right
 to  take pleasure in they do so more   
than they ought and as the mass of men  
do4    ,well then1 that excess with     
respect to pleasures is absence of      
self-control1 and blameworthy1 is plain4
 ,but viewing these habits on  the side 
of pains1 we find that a man is not said
 to have the virtue  for withstanding   
them 7as in the case of ,courage71 nor  
the vice for not  withstanding them2 but
 the man destitute of self-control is   

such1  because he is pained more than he
 ought to be at not obtaining things    
which are pleasant 7and thus his        
pleasure produces pain to him71 and  the
 man of ,perfected ,self-,mastery is    
such in virtue of not being pained  by  
their absence1 that is1 by having to    
abstain from what is pleasant4    ,now  
the man destitute of self-control       
desires either all pleasant  things     
indiscriminately or those which are     
specially pleasant1 and he  is impelled 
by his desire to choose these things in 
preference to all  others2 and this     
involves pain1 not only when he misses  
the attainment  of his objects but1 in  
the very desiring them1 since all desire
 is  accompanied by pain4 ,surely it is 
a strange case this1 being pained by    
reason of pleasure4    ,as for men who  
are defective on the side of pleasure1  
who take less  pleasure in things than  
they ought1 they are almost imaginary   
characters1 because such absence of     
sensual perception is not natural  to   

man3 for even the other animals         
distinguish between different kinds  of 
food1 and like some kinds and dislike   
others4 ,in fact1 could a man  be found 
who takes no pleasure in anything and to
 whom all things are  alike1 he would be
 far from being human at all3 there is  
no name for  such a character because it
 is simply imaginary4    ,but the man of
 ,perfected ,self-,mastery is in the    
mean with respect to  these objects3    
that is to say1 he neither takes        
pleasure in the things  which delight   
the vicious man1 and in fact rather     
dislikes them1 nor at  all in improper  
objects2 nor to any great degree in any 
object of the  class2 nor is he pained  
at their absence2 nor does he desire    
them2 or1  if he does1 only in          
moderation1 and neither more than he    
ought1 nor at  improper times1 and so   
forth2 but such things as are conducive 
to  health and good condition of body1  
being also pleasant1 these he will      
grasp at in moderation and as he ought  

to do1 and also such other  pleasant    
things as do not hinder these objects1  
and are not unseemly or                 
disproportionate to his means2 because  
he that should grasp at such  would be  
liking such pleasures more than is      
proper2 but the man of  ,perfected      
,self-,mastery is not of this character1
 but regulates his  desires by the      
dictates of right reason4    ,chapter   
,,xiv4    ,now the vice of being        
destitute of all ,self-,control seems to
 be more  truly voluntary than          
,cowardice1 because pleasure is the     
cause of the  former and pain of the    
latter1 and pleasure is an object of    
choice1  pain of avoidance4 ,and again1 
pain deranges and spoils the natural    
disposition of its victim1 whereas      
pleasure has no such effect and is  more
 voluntary and therefore more justly    
open to reproach4    ,it is so also for 
the following reason2 that it is easier 
to be inured  by habit to resist the    
objects of pleasure1 there being many   

things of  this kind in life and the    
process of habituation being            
unaccompanied by  danger2 whereas the   
case is the reverse as regards the      
objects of fear4    ,again1 ,cowardice  
as a confirmed habit would seem to be   
voluntary in a  different way from the  
particular instances which form the     
habit2  because it is painless1 but     
these derange the man by reason of pain 
so  that he throws away his arms and    
otherwise behaves himself unseemly1  for
 which reason they are even thought by  
some to exercise a power of  compulsion4
    ,but to the man destitute of        
,self-,control the particular instances 
are  on the contrary quite voluntary1   
being done with desire and direct       
exertion of the will1 but the general   
result is less voluntary3 since  no man 
desires to form the habit4    ,the name 
of this vice 7which signifies           
etymologically unchastened-ness7  we    
apply also to the faults of children1   
there being a certain  resemblance      

between the cases3 to which the name is 
primarily applied1  and to which        
secondarily or derivatively1 is not     
relevant to the  present subject1 but it
 is evident that the later in point of  
time must  get the name from the        
earlier4 ,and the metaphor seems to be a
 very good  one2 for whatever grasps    
after base things1 and is liable to     
great  increase1 ought to be chastened2 
and to this description desire and the  
child answer most truly1 in that        
children also live under the direction  
of desire and the grasping after what is
 pleasant is most prominently  seen in  
these4    ,unless then the appetite be  
obedient and subjected to the governing 
principle it will become very great3 for
 in the fool the grasping after  what is
 pleasant is insatiable and             
undiscriminating2 and every acting  out 
of the desire increases the kindred     
habit1 and if the desires are  great and
 violent in degree they even expel      
,reason entirely2 therefore  they ought 

to be moderate and few1 and in no       
respect to be opposed to  ,reason4 ,now 
when the appetite is in such a state we 
denominate it  obedient and chastened4  
,in short1 as the child ought to live   
with constant regard to the orders  of  
its educator1 so should the appetitive  
principle with regard to  those of      
,reason4    ,so then in the man of      
,perfected ,self-,mastery1 the          
appetitive principle  must be accordant 
with ,reason3 for what is right is the  
mark at which  both principles aim3 that
 is to say1 the man of perfected        
self-mastery  desires what he ought in  
right manner and at right times1 which  
is  exactly what ,reason directs4 ,let  
this be taken for our account of        
,perfected ,self-,mastery4              
,,book ,,iv    ,chapter ,i4      ,we    
will next speak of ,liberality4 ,now    
this is thought to be the mean  state1  
having for its object-matter ,wealth3 ,i
 mean1 the ,liberal man is  praised not 
in the circumstances of war1 nor in     

those which constitute  the character of
 perfected self-mastery1 nor again in   
judicial  decisions1 but in respect of  
giving and receiving ,wealth1 chiefly   
the  former4 ,by the term ,wealth ,i    
mean 8all those things whose worth is   
measured by money40    ,now the states  
of excess and defect in regard of       
,wealth are  respectively ,prodigality  
and ,stinginess3 the latter of these    
terms we  attach invariably to those who
 are over careful about ,wealth1 but the
  former we apply sometimes with a      
complex notion2 that is to say1 we  give
 the name to those who fail of          
self-control and spend money on the     
unrestrained gratification of their     
passions2 and this is why they are      
thought to be most base1 because they   
have many vices at once4    ,it must be 
noted1 however1 that this is not a      
strict and proper use of  the term1     
since its natural etymological meaning  
is to denote him who  has one particular
 evil1 viz4 the wasting his substance3  

he is unsaved  7as the term literally   
denotes7 who is wasting away by his own 
fault2  and this he really may be said  
to be2 the destruction of his substance 
is thought to be a kind of wasting of   
himself1 since these things are  the    
means of living4 ,well1 this is our     
acceptation of the term  ,prodigality4  
,again4 ,whatever things are for use may
 be used well or ill1 and ,wealth       
belongs to this class4 ,he uses each    
particular thing best who has the       
virtue to whose province it belongs3 so 
that he will use ,wealth best  who has  
the virtue respecting ,wealth1 that is  
to say1 the ,liberal man4               
,expenditure and giving are thought to  
be the using of money1 but  receiving   
and keeping one would rather call the   
possessing of it4 ,and  so the giving to
 proper persons is more characteristic  
of the ,liberal  man1 than the receiving
 from proper quarters and forbearing to 
receive  from the contrary4 ,in fact    
generally1 doing well by others is more 

characteristic of virtue than being done
 well by1 and doing things  positively  
honourable than forbearing to do things 
dishonourable2 and  any one may see that
 the doing well by others and doing     
things  positively honourable attaches  
to the act of giving1 but to that of    
receiving only the being done well by or
 forbearing to do what is               
dishonourable4    ,besides1 thanks are  
given to him who gives1 not to him who  
merely  forbears to receive1 and praise 
even more4 ,again1 forbearing to receive
  is easier than giving1 the case of    
being too little freehanded with  one's 
own being commoner than taking that     
which is not one's own4    ,and again1  
it is they who give that are denominated
 ,liberal1 while they  who forbear to   
receive are commended1 not on the score 
of ,liberality  but of just dealing1    
while for receiving men are not1 in     
fact1 praised  at all4    ,and the      
,liberal are liked almost best of all   
virtuous characters1  because they are  

profitable to others1 and this their    
profitableness  consists in their       
giving4    ,furthermore3 all the actions
 done in accordance with virtue are     
honourable1 and done from the motive of 
honour3 and the ,liberal man1           
therefore1 will give from a motive of   
honour1 and will give rightly2 ,i  mean1
 to proper persons1 in right proportion1
 at right times1 and  whatever is       
included in the term 8right giving30 and
 this too with  positive pleasure1 or at
 least without pain1 since whatever is  
done in  accordance with virtue is      
pleasant or at least not unpleasant1    
most  certainly not attended with       
positive pain4    ,but the man who gives
 to improper people1 or not from a      
motive of  honour but from some other   
cause1 shall be called not ,liberal but 
something else4 ,neither shall he be so 
denominated who does it with  pain3 this
 being a sign that he would prefer his  
wealth to the  honourable action1 and   
this is no part of the ,liberal man's   

character2  neither will such an one    
receive from improper sources1 because  
the so  receiving is not characteristic 
of one who values not wealth3 nor again 
will he be apt to ask1 because one who  
does kindnesses to others does  not     
usually receive them willingly2 but from
 proper sources 7his own  property1 for 
instance7 he will receive1 doing this   
not as honourable  but as necessary1    
that he may have somewhat to give3      
neither will he be  careless of his own1
 since it is his wish through these to  
help others  in need3 nor will he give  
to chance people1 that he may have      
wherewith  to give to those to whom he  
ought1 at right times1 and on occasions 
when it is honourable so to do4         
,again1 it is a trait in the ,liberal   
man's character even to exceed very     
much in giving so as to leave too little
 for himself1 it being  characteristic  
of such an one not to have a thought of 
self4    ,now ,liberality is a term of  
relation to a man's means1 for the      

,liberal-ness depends not on the amount 
of what is given but on the  moral state
 of the giver which gives in proportion 
to his means4 ,there  is then no reason 
why he should not be the more ,liberal  
man who gives  the less amount1 if he   
has less to give out of4    ,again1 they
 are thought to be more ,liberal who    
have inherited1 not  acquired for       
themselves1 their means2 because1 in the
 first place1 they  have never          
experienced want1 and next1 all people  
love most their own  works1 just as     
parents do and poets4    ,it is not easy
 for the ,liberal man to be rich1 since 
he is neither apt  to receive nor to    
keep but to lavish1 and values not      
wealth for its own  sake but with a view
 to giving it away4 ,hence it is        
commonly charged  upon fortune that they
 who most deserve to be rich are least  
so4 ,yet  this happens reasonably       
enough2 it is impossible he should have 
wealth  who does not take any care to   
have it1 just as in any similar case4   

,yet he will not give to improper       
people1 nor at wrong times1 and so on3  
because he would not then be acting in  
accordance with ,liberality1 and  if he 
spent upon such objects1 would have     
nothing to spend on those on  which he  
ought3 for1 as ,i have said before1 he  
is ,liberal who spends in  proportion to
 his means1 and on proper objects1 while
 he who does so in  excess is prodigal  
7this is the reason why we never call   
despots  prodigal1 because it does not  
seem to be easy for them by their gifts 
and expenditure to go beyond their      
immense possessions74    ,to sum up     
then4 ,since ,liberality is a mean state
 in respect of the  giving and receiving
 of wealth1 the ,liberal man will give  
and spend on  proper objects1 and in    
proper proportion1 in great things and  
in small  alike1 and all this with      
pleasure to himself2 also he will       
receive from  right sources1 and in     
right proportion3 because1 as the virtue
 is a  mean state in respect of both1 he

 will do both as he ought1 and1 in      
fact1 upon proper giving follows the    
correspondent receiving1 while  that    
which is not such is contrary to it4    
7,now those which follow one  another   
come to co-exist in the same person1    
those which are contraries  plainly do  
not47    ,again1 should it happen to him
 to spend money beyond what is needful1 
or otherwise than is well1 he will be   
vexed1 but only moderately and as  he   
ought2 for feeling pleasure and pain at 
right objects1 and in right  manner1 is 
a property of ,virtue4    ,the ,liberal 
man is also a good man to have for a    
partner in respect of  wealth3 for he   
can easily be wronged1 since he values  
not wealth1 and  is more vexed at not   
spending where he ought to have done so 
than at  spending where he ought not1   
and he relishes not the maxim of        
,simonides4    ,chapter ,,ii4    ,but   
the ,prodigal man goes wrong also in    
these points1 for he is neither  pleased
 nor pained at proper objects or in     

proper manner1 which will  become more  
plain as we proceed4    ,we have said   
already that ,prodigality and           
,stinginess are respectively  states of 
excess and defect1 and this in two      
things1 giving and  receiving           
7expenditure of course we class under   
giving74 ,well now1  ,prodigality       
exceeds in giving and forbearing to     
receive and is  deficient in receiving1 
while ,stinginess is deficient in giving
 and  exceeds in receiving1 but it is in
 small things4    ,the two parts of     
,prodigality1 to be sure1 do not        
commonly go together2  it is not easy1  
,i mean1 to give to all if you receive  
from none1  because private individuals 
thus giving will soon find their means  
run  short1 and such are in fact thought
 to be prodigal4 ,he that should        
combine both would seem to be no little 
superior to the ,stingy man3 for  he may
 be easily cured1 both by advancing in  
years1 and also by the  want of means1  
and he may come thus to the mean3 he    

has1 you see1  already the facts of the 
,liberal man1 he gives and forbears to  
receive1 only he does neither in right  
manner or well4 ,so if he could  be     
wrought upon by habituation in this     
respect1 or change in any other  way1 he
 would be a real ,liberal man1 for he   
will give to those to whom  he should1  
and will forbear to receive whence he   
ought not4 ,this is the  reason too why 
he is thought not to be low in moral    
character1 because  to exceed in giving 
and in forbearing to receive is no sign 
of badness  or meanness1 but only of    
folly4    ,well then1 he who is         
,prodigal in this fashion is thought far
 superior  to the ,stingy man for the   
aforementioned reasons1 and also because
 he  does good to many1 but the ,stingy 
man to no one1 not even to himself4     
,but most ,prodigals1 as has been said1 
combine with their other faults  that of
 receiving from improper sources1 and on
 this point are ,stingy3  and they      
become grasping1 because they wish to   

spend and cannot do this  easily1 since 
their means soon run short and they are 
necessitated to  get from some other    
quarter2 and then again1 because they   
care not for  what is honourable1 they  
receive recklessly1 and from all sources
  indifferently1 because they desire to 
give but care not how or whence4    ,and
 for this reason their givings are not  
,liberal1 inasmuch as they are  not     
honourable1 nor purely disinterested1   
nor done in right fashion2  but they    
oftentimes make those rich who should be
 poor1 and to those  who are quiet      
respectable kind of people they will    
give nothing1 but to  flatterers1 or    
those who subserve their pleasures in   
any way1 they will  give much4 ,and     
therefore most of them are utterly      
devoid of  self-restraint2 for as they  
are open-handed they are liberal in     
expenditure upon the unrestrained       
gratification of their passions1 and    
turn off to their pleasures because they
 do not live with reference to  what is 

honourable4    ,thus then the ,prodigal1
 if unguided1 slides into these faults2 
but if  he could get care bestowed on   
him he might come to the mean and to    
what  is right4    ,stinginess1 on the  
contrary1 is incurable3 old age1 for    
instance1 and  incapacity of any kind1  
is thought to make people ,stingy2 and  
it is  more congenial to human nature   
than ,prodigality1 the mass of men being
  fond of money rather than apt to give3
 moreover it extends far and has  many  
phases1 the modes of stinginess being   
thought to be many4 ,for as  it consists
 of two things1 defect of giving and    
excess of receiving1  everybody does not
 have it entire1 but it is sometimes    
divided1 and one  class of persons      
exceed in receiving1 the other are      
deficient in  giving4 ,i mean those who 
are designated by such appellations as  
sparing1 close-fisted1 niggards1 are all
 deficient in giving2 but other  men's  
property they neither desire nor are    
willing to receive1 in some  instances  

from a real moderation and shrinking    
from what is base4    ,there are some   
people whose motive1 either supposed or 
alleged1 for  keeping their property is 
this1 that they may never be driven to  
do  anything dishonourable3 to this     
class belongs the skinflint1 and every  
one of similar character1 so named from 
the excess of not-giving4  ,others again
 decline to receive their neighbour's   
goods from a motive  of fear2 their     
notion being that it is not easy to take
 other people's  things yourself without
 their taking yours3 so they are content
 neither  to receive nor give4    ,the  
other class again who are ,stingy in    
respect of receiving exceed in  that    
they receive anything from any source2  
such as they who work at  illiberal     
employments1 brothel keepers1 and       
such-like1 and usurers who  lend small  
sums at large interest3 for all these   
receive from improper  sources1 and     
improper amounts4 ,their common         
characteristic is  base-gaining1 since  

they all submit to disgrace for the sake
 of gain  and that small2 because those 
who receive great things neither whence 
they ought1 nor what they ought 7as for 
instance despots who sack  cities and   
plunder temples71 we denominate wicked1 
impious1 and unjust1  but not ,stingy4  
,now the dicer and bath-plunderer and   
the robber belong to the class of  the  
,stingy1 for they are given to base     
gain3 both busy themselves and  submit  
to disgrace for the sake of gain1 and   
the one class incur the  greatest       
dangers for the sake of their booty1    
while the others make  gain of their    
friends to whom they ought to be giving4
    ,so both classes1 as wishing to make
 gain from improper sources1 are  given 
to base gain1 and all such receivings   
are ,stingy4 ,and with good  reason is  
,stinginess called the contrary of      
,liberality3 both because it  is a      
greater evil than ,prodigality1 and     
because men err rather in this          
direction than in that of the           

,prodigality which we have spoken of as 
properly and completely such4    ,let   
this be considered as what we have to   
say respecting ,liberality and  the     
contrary vices4    ,chapter ,,iii4      
,next in order would seem to come a     
dissertation on ,magnificence1 this     
being thought to be1 like liberality1 a 
virtue having for its  object-matter    
,wealth2 but it does not1 like that1    
extend to all  transactions in respect  
of ,wealth1 but only applies to such as 
are  expensive1 and in these            
circumstances it exceeds liberality in  
respect  of magnitude1 because it is    
7what the very name in ,greek hints at7 
fitting expense on a large scale3 this  
term is of course relative3 ,i  mean1   
the expenditure of equipping and        
commanding a trireme is not the  same as
 that of giving a public spectacle3     
8fitting0 of course also is  relative to
 the individual1 and the matter wherein 
and upon which he  has to spend4 ,and a 
man is not denominated ,magnificent for 

spending as  he should do in small or   
ordinary things1 as1 for instance1      
8,oft to the wandering beggar did ,i    
give10      but for doing so in great   
matters3 that is to say1 the            
,magnificent man  is liberal1 but the   
liberal is not thereby ,magnificent4    
,the falling  short of such a state is  
called ,meanness1 the exceeding it      
,vulgar  ,profusion1 ,want of ,taste1   
and so on2 which are faulty1 not because
 they  are on an excessive scale in     
respect of right objects but1 because   
they  show off in improper objects1 and 
in improper manner3 of these we will    
speak presently4 ,the ,magnificent man  
is like a man of skill1 because he  can 
see what is fitting1 and can spend      
largely in good taste2 for1 as  we said 
at the commencement1 the confirmed habit
 is determined by the  separate acts of 
working1 and by its object-matter4      
,well1 the expenses of the ,magnificent 
man are great and fitting3 such  also   
are his works 7because this secures the 

expenditure being not  great merely1 but
 befitting the work74 ,so then the work 
is to be  proportionate to the expense1 
and this again to the work1 or even     
above  it3 and the ,magnificent man will
 incur such expenses from the motive of 
honour1 this being common to all the    
virtues1 and besides he will do it  with
 pleasure and lavishly2 excessive       
accuracy in calculation being  ,mean4   
,he will consider also how a thing may  
be done most beautifully  and fittingly1
 rather1 than for how much it may be    
done1 and how at the  least expense4    
,so the ,magnificent man must be also a 
liberal man1 because the liberal  man   
will also spend what he ought1 and in   
right manner3 but it is the  ,great1    
that is to say tke large scale1 which is
 distinctive of the  ,magnificent man1  
the object-matter of liberality being   
the same1 and  without spending more    
money than another man he will make the 
work more  magnificent4 ,i mean1 the    
excellence of a possession and of a work

 is  not the same3 as a piece of        
property that thing is most valuable    
which  is worth most1 gold for instance2
 but as a work that which is great and  
beautiful1 because the contemplation of 
such an object is admirable1  and so is 
that which is ,magnificent4 ,so the     
excellence of a work is  ,magnificence  
on a large scale4 ,there are cases of   
expenditure which we  call honourable1  
such as are dedicatory offerings to the 
gods1 and the  furnishing their temples1
 and sacrifices1 and in like manner     
everything  that has reference to the   
,deity1 and all such public matters as  
are  objects of honourable ambition1 as 
when men think in any case that it  is  
their duty to furnish a chorus for the  
stage splendidly1 or fit out  and       
maintain a trireme1 or give a general   
public feast4    ,now in all these1 as  
has been already stated1 respect is had 
also to  the rank and the means of the  
man who is doing them3 because they     
should be proportionate to these1 and   

befit not the work only but also  the   
doer of the work4 ,for this reason a    
poor man cannot be a  ,magnificent man1 
since he has not means wherewith to     
spend largely and  yet becomingly2 and  
if he attempts it he is a fool1 inasmuch
 as it is  out of proportion and        
contrary to propriety1 whereas to be in 
accordance with virtue a thing must be  
done rightly4    ,such expenditure is   
fitting moreover for those to whom such 
things  previously belong1 either       
through themselves or through their     
ancestors  or people with whom they are 
connected1 and to the high-born or      
people  of high repute1 and so on3      
because all these things imply greatness
 and  reputation4    ,so then the       
,magnificent man is pretty much as ,i   
have described him1 and  ,magnificence  
consists in such expenditures3 because  
they are the  greatest and most         
honourable3 and of private ones such as 
come but once  for all1 marriage to wit1
 and things of that kind2 and any       

occasion  which engages the interest of 
the community in general1 or of those   
who  are in power2 and what concerns    
receiving and despatching strangers2    
and gifts1 and repaying gifts3 because  
the ,magnificent man is not apt  to     
spend upon himself but on the public    
good1 and gifts are pretty much  in the 
same case as dedicatory offerings4      
,it is characteristic also of the       
,magnificent man to furnish his house   
suitably to his wealth1 for this also in
 a way reflects credit2 and  again1 to  
spend rather upon such works as are of  
long duration1 these  being most        
honourable4 ,and again1 propriety in    
each case1 because the  same things are 
not suitable to gods and men1 nor in a  
temple and a  tomb4 ,and again1 in the  
case of expenditures1 each must be great
 of its  kind1 and great expense on a   
great object is most magnificent1 that  
is  in any case what is great in these  
particular things4    ,there is a       
difference too between greatness of a   

work and greatness of  expenditure3 for 
instance1 a very beautiful ball or cup  
is magnificent  as a present to a child1
 while the price of it is small and     
almost  mean4 ,therefore it is          
characteristic of the ,magnificent man  
to do  magnificently whatever he is     
about3 for whatever is of this kind     
cannot  be easily surpassed1 and bears a
 proper proportion to the expenditure4  
,such then is the ,magnificent man4     
,the man who is in the state of excess1 
called one of ,vulgar ,profusion1  is in
 excess because he spends improperly1 as
 has been said4 ,i mean in  cases       
requiring small expenditure he lavishes 
much and shows off out of  taste2 giving
 his club a feast fit for a             
wedding-party1 or if he has to  furnish 
a chorus for a comedy1 giving the actors
 purple to wear in the  first scene1 as 
did the ,megarians4 ,and all such things
 he will do1 not  with a view to that   
which is really honourable1 but to      
display his  wealth1 and because he     

thinks he shall be admired for these    
things2 and  he will spend little where 
he ought to spend much1 and much where  
he  should spend little4    ,the ,mean  
man will be deficient in every case1 and
 even where he has  spent the most he   
will spoil the whole effect for want of 
some trifle2  he is procrastinating in  
all he does1 and contrives how he may   
spend  the least1 and does even that    
with lamentations about the expense1 and
  thinking that he does all things on a 
greater scale than he ought4    ,of     
course1 both these states are faulty1   
but they do not involve  disgrace       
because they are neither hurtful to     
others nor very unseemly4    ,chapter   
,,iv4    ,the very name of              
,great-mindedness implies1 that great   
things are its  object-matter2 and we   
will first settle what kind of things4  
,it makes  no difference1 of course1    
whether we regard the moral state in the
  abstract or as exemplified in an      
individual4    ,well then1 he is thought

 to be ,great-minded who values himself 
highly  and at the same time justly1    
because he that does so without grounds 
is  foolish1 and no virtuous character  
is foolish or senseless4 ,well1 the     
character ,i have described is          
,great-minded4 ,the man who estimates   
himself lowly1 and at the same time     
justly1 is modest2 but not              
,great-minded1 since this latter quality
 implies greatness1 just as  beauty     
implies a large bodily conformation     
while small people are neat  and well   
made but not beautiful4    ,again1 he   
who values himself highly without just  
grounds is a ,vain man3  though the name
 must not be applied to every case of   
unduly high  self-estimation4 ,he that  
values himself below his real worth is  
,small-minded1 and whether that worth is
 great1 moderate1 or small1 his  own    
estimate falls below it4 ,and he is the 
strongest case of this error  who is    
really a man of great worth1 for what   
would he have done had his  worth been  

less8    ,the ,great-minded man is then1
 as far as greatness is concerned1 at   
the  summit1 but in respect of propriety
 he is in the mean1 because he          
estimates himself at his real value 7the
 other characters respectively  are in  
excess and defect74 ,since then he      
justly estimates himself at a  high1 or 
rather at the highest possible rate1 his
 character will have  respect specially 
to one thing3 this term 8rate0 has      
reference of  course to external goods3 
and of these we should assume that to be
 the  greatest which we attribute to the
 gods1 and which is the special  object 
of desire to those who are in power1 and
 which is the prize  proposed to the    
most honourable actions3 now honour     
answers to these  descriptions1 being   
the greatest of external goods4 ,so the 
,great-minded  man bears himself as he  
ought in respect of honour and          
dishonour4 ,in  fact1 without need of   
words1 the ,great-minded plainly have   
honour for  their object-matter3 since  

honour is what the great consider       
themselves  specially worthy of1 and    
according to a certain rate4    ,the    
,small-minded man is deficient1 both as 
regards himself1 and also as  regards   
the estimation of the ,great-minded3    
while the ,vain man is in  excess as    
regards himself1 but does not get beyond
 the ,great-minded  man4 ,now the       
,great-minded man1 being by the         
hypothesis worthy of the  greatest      
things1 must be of the highest          
excellence1 since the better a  man is  
the more is he worth1 and he who is best
 is worth the most3 it  follows then1   
that to be truly ,great-minded a man    
must be good1 and  whatever is great in 
each virtue would seem to belong to the 
,great-minded4 ,it would no way         
correspond with the character of the    
,great-minded to flee spreading his     
hands all abroad2 nor to injure any     
one2 for with what object in view will  
he do what is base1 in whose  eyes      
nothing is great8 in short1 if one were 

to go into particulars1  the            
,great-minded man would show quite      
ludicrously unless he were a good  man3 
he would not be in fact deserving of    
honour if he were a bad man1  honour    
being the prize of virtue and given to  
the good4    ,this virtue1 then1 of     
,great-mindedness seems to be a kind of 
ornament  of all the other virtues1 in  
that it makes them better and cannot be 
without them2 and for this reason it is 
a hard matter to be really and  truly   
,great-minded2 for it cannot be without 
thorough goodness and  nobleness of     
character4    ,honour then and dishonour
 are specially the object-matter of the 
,great-minded man3 and at such as is    
great1 and given by good men1 he  will  
be pleased moderately as getting his    
own1 or perhaps somewhat less  for no   
honour can be quite adequate to perfect 
virtue3 but still he  will accept this  
because they have nothing higher to give
 him4 ,but such  as is given by ordinary
 people and on trifling grounds he will 

entirely  despise1 because these do not 
come up to his deserts3 and dishonour   
likewise1 because in his case there     
cannot be just ground for it4    ,now   
though1 as ,i have said1 honour is      
specially the object-matter of  the     
,great-minded man1 ,i do not mean but   
that likewise in respect of  wealth and 
power1 and good or bad fortune of every 
kind1 he will bear  himself with        
moderation1 fall out how they may1 and  
neither in  prosperity will he be       
overjoyed nor in adversity will he be   
unduly  pained4 ,for not even in respect
 of honour does he so bear himself2 and 
yet it is the greatest of all such      
objects1 since it is the cause of  power
 and wealth being choice-worthy1 for    
certainly they who have them  desire to 
receive honour through them4 ,so to whom
 honour even is a  small thing to him   
will all other things also be so2 and   
this is why  such men are thought to be 
supercilious4    ,it seems too that     
pieces of good fortune contribute to    

form this  character of                 
,great-mindedness3 ,i mean1 the nobly   
born1 or men of  influence1 or the      
wealthy1 are considered to be entitled  
to honour1 for  they are in a position  
of eminence and whatever is eminent by  
good is  more entitled to honour3 and   
this is why such circumstances dispose  
men  rather to ,great-mindedness1       
because they receive honour at the hands
 of  some men4    ,now really and truly 
the good man alone is entitled to       
honour2 only if  a man unites in himself
 goodness with these external advantages
 he is  thought to be more entitled to  
honour3 but they who have them without  
also having virtue are not justified in 
their high estimate of  themselves1 nor 
are they rightly denominated            
,great-minded2 since  perfect virtue is 
one of the indispensable conditions to  
such   character4    ,further1 such men 
become supercilious and insolent1 it not
 being easy  to bear prosperity well    
without goodness2 and not being able to 

bear  it1 and possessed with an idea of 
their own superiority to others1 they   
despise them1 and do just whatever their
 fancy prompts2 for they mimic  the     
,great-minded man1 though they are not  
like him1 and they do this in  such     
points as they can1 so without doing the
 actions which can only  flow from real 
goodness they despise others4 ,whereas  
the ,great-minded  man despises on good 
grounds 7for he forms his opinions      
truly71 but the  mass of men do it at   
random4    ,moreover1 he is not a man to
 incur little risks1 nor does he court  
danger1 because there are but few things
 he has a value for2 but he  will incur 
great dangers1 and when he does venture 
he is prodigal of  his life as knowing  
that there are terms on which it is not 
worth his  while to live4 ,he is the    
sort of man to do kindnesses1 but he is 
ashamed to receive them2 the former     
putting a man in the position of        
superiority1 the latter in that of      
inferiority2 accordingly he will        

greatly overpay any kindness done to    
him1 because the original actor  will   
thus be laid under obligation and be in 
the position of the party  benefited4   
,such men seem likewise to remember     
those they have done  kindnesses to1 but
 not those from whom they have received 
them3 because  he who has received is   
inferior to him who has done the        
kindness and  our friend wishes to be   
superior2 accordingly he is pleased to  
hear of  his own kind acts but not of   
those done to himself 7and this is why1 
in  ,homer1 ,thetis does not mention to 
,jupiter the kindnesses she had done    
him1 nor did the ,lacedmonians to the   
,athenians but only the benefits  they  
had received74    ,further1 it is       
characteristic of the ,great-minded man 
to ask favours  not at all1 or very     
reluctantly1 but to do a service very   
readily2 and  to bear himself loftily   
towards the great or fortunate1 but     
towards  people of middle station       
affably2 because to be above the former 

is  difficult and so a grand thing1 but 
to be above the latter is easy2 and  to 
be high and mighty towards the former is
 not ignoble1 but to do it  towards     
those of humble station would be low and
 vulgar2 it would be  like parading     
strength against the weak4    ,and      
again1 not to put himself in the way of 
honour1 nor to go where  others are the 
chief men2 and to be remiss and         
dilatory1 except in the  case of some   
great honour or work2 and to be         
concerned in few things1  and those     
great and famous4 ,it is a property of  
him also to be open1  both in his       
dislikes and his likings1 because       
concealment is a  consequent of fear4   
,likewise to be careful for reality     
rather than  appearance1 and talk and   
act openly 7for his contempt for others 
makes  him a bold man1 for which same   
reason he is apt to speak the truth1    
except where the principle of reserve   
comes in71 but to be reserved  towards  
the generality of men4    ,and to be    

unable to live with reference to any    
other but a friend2  because doing so is
 servile1 as may be seen in that all    
flatterers are  low and men in low      
estate are flatterers4 ,neither is his  
admiration  easily excited1 because     
nothing is great in his eyes2 nor does  
he bear  malice1 since remembering      
anything1 and specially wrongs1 is no   
part of  ,great-mindedness1 but rather  
overlooking them2 nor does he talk of   
other men2 in fact1 he will not speak   
either of himself or of any  other2 he  
neither cares to be praised himself nor 
to have others  blamed2 nor again does  
he praise freely1 and for this reason he
 is not  apt to speak ill even of his   
enemies except to show contempt and     
insolence4    ,and he is by no means apt
 to make laments about things which     
cannot be  helped1 or requests about    
those which are trivial2 because to be  
thus  disposed with respect to these    
things is consequent only upon real     
anxiety about them4 ,again1 he is the   

kind of man to acquire what is          
beautiful and unproductive rather than  
what is productive and  profitable3 this
 being rather the part of an independent
 man4    ,also slow motion1 deep-toned  
voice1 and deliberate style of speech1  
are  thought to be characteristic of the
 ,great-minded man3 for he who is       
earnest about few things is not likely  
to be in a hurry1 nor he who  esteems   
nothing great to be very intent3 and    
sharp tones and quickness  are the      
result of these4    ,chapter ,v4        
,this then is my idea of the            
,great-minded man2 and he who is in the 
defect is a ,small-minded man1 he who is
 in the excess a ,vain man4  ,however1  
as we observed in respect of the last   
character we discussed1  these extremes 
are not thought to be vicious exactly1  
but only  mistaken1 for they do no harm4
    ,the ,small-minded man1 for         
instance1 being really worthy of good   
deprives himself of his deserts1 and    
seems to have somewhat faulty from  not 

having a sufficiently high estimate of  
his own desert1 in fact from            
self-ignorance3 because1 but for this1  
he would have grasped after what  he    
really is entitled to1 and that is good4
 ,still such characters are  not thought
 to be foolish1 but rather laggards4    
,but the having such an  opinion of     
themselves seems to have a deteriorating
 effect on the  character3 because in   
all cases men's aims are regulated by   
their  supposed desert1 and thus these  
men1 under a notion of their own want   
of desert1 stand aloof from honourable  
actions and courses1 and  similarly from
 external goods4    ,but the ,vain are  
foolish and self-ignorant1 and that     
palpably3 because  they attempt         
honourable things1 as though they were  
worthy1 and then  they are detected4    
,they also set themselves off1 by dress1
 and  carriage1 and such-like things1   
and desire that their good              
circumstances may be seen1 and they talk
 of them under the notion of  receiving 

honour thereby4 ,small-mindedness rather
 than ,vanity is  opposed to            
,great-mindedness1 because it is more   
commonly met with and  is worse4        
,chapter ,,vi4    ,well1 the virtue of  
,great-mindedness has for its object    
great ,honour1  as we have said3 and    
there seems to be a virtue having       
,honour also for  its object 7as we     
stated in the former book71 which may   
seem to bear to  ,great-mindedness the  
same relation that ,liberality does to  
,magnificence3 that is1 both these      
virtues stand aloof from what is  great 
but dispose us as we ought to be        
disposed towards moderate and  small    
matters4 ,further3 as in giving and     
receiving of wealth there is a  mean    
state1 an excess1 and a defect1 so      
likewise in grasping after  ,honour     
there is the more or less than is right1
 and also the doing so  from right      
sources and in right manner4    ,for we 
blame the lover of ,honour as aiming at 
,honour more than he  ought1 and from   

wrong sources2 and him who is destitute 
of a love of  ,honour as not choosing to
 be honoured even for what is noble4    
,sometimes  again we praise the lover of
 ,honour as manly and having a love for 
what  is noble1 and him who has no love 
for it as being moderate and modest  7as
 we noticed also in the former          
discussion of these virtues74    ,it is 
clear then that since 8,lover of so and 
so0 is a term capable of  several       
meanings1 we do not always denote the   
same quality by the term  8,lover of    
,honour20 but when we use it as a term  
of commendation we  denote more than the
 mass of men are2 when for blame more   
than a man  should be4    ,and the mean 
state having no proper name the extremes
 seem to dispute  for it as unoccupied  
ground3 but of course where there is    
excess and  defect there must be also   
the mean4 ,and in point of fact1 men do 
grasp  at ,honour more than they should1
 and less1 and sometimes just as they   
ought2 for instance1 this state is      

praised1 being a mean state in  regard  
of ,honour1 but without any appropriate 
name4 ,compared with what  is called    
,ambition it shows like a want of love  
for ,honour1 and  compared with this it 
shows like ,ambition1 or compared with  
both1 like  both faults3 nor is this a  
singular case among the virtues4 ,here  
the  extreme characters appear to be    
opposed1 because the mean has no name   
appropriated to it4    ,chapter ,,vii4  
,meekness is a mean state1 having for   
its object-matter ,anger3 and as  the   
character in the mean has no name1 and  
we may almost say the same  of the      
extremes1 we give the name of ,meekness 
7leaning rather to the  defect1 which   
has no name either7 to the character in 
the mean4    ,the excess may be called  
an over-aptness to ,anger3 for the      
passion is  ,anger1 and the producing   
causes many and various4 ,now he who is 
angry  at what and with whom he ought1  
and further1 in right manner and time1  
and for proper length of time1 is       

praised1 so this ,man will be ,meek     
since ,meekness is praised4 ,for the    
notion represented by the term ,meek    
man is the being imperturbable1 and not 
being led away by passion1 but  being   
angry in that manner1 and at those      
things1 and for that length of  time1   
which ,reason may direct4 ,this         
character however is thought to err     
rather on the side of defect1 inasmuch  
as he is not apt to take revenge  but   
rather to make allowances and forgive4  
,and the defect1 call it  ,angerlessness
 or what you will1 is blamed3 ,i mean1  
they who are not  angry at things at    
which they ought to be angry are thought
 to be  foolish1 and they who are angry 
not in right manner1 nor in right time1 
nor with those with whom they ought2 for
 a man who labours under this  defect is
 thought to have no perception1 nor to  
be pained1 and to have  no tendency to  
avenge himself1 inasmuch as he feels no 
anger3 now to  bear with scurrility in  
one's own person1 and patiently see     

one's own  friends suffer it1 is a      
slavish thing4    ,as for the excess1 it
 occurs in all forms2 men are angry with
 those  with whom1 and at things with   
which1 they ought not to be1 and more   
than they ought1 and too hastily1 and   
for too great a length of time4 ,i  do  
not mean1 however1 that these are       
combined in any one person3 that  would 
in fact be impossible1 because the evil 
destroys itself1 and if  it is developed
 in its full force it becomes           
unbearable4    ,now those whom we term  
the ,passionate are soon angry1 and with
 people  with whom and at things at     
which they ought not1 and in an         
excessive  degree1 but they soon cool   
again1 which is the best point about    
them4  ,and this results from their not 
repressing their anger1 but repaying    
their enemies 7in that they show their  
feeings by reason of their  vehemence71 
and then they have done with it4    ,the
 ,choleric again are excessively        
vehement1 and are angry at  everything1 

and on every occasion2 whence comes     
their ,greek name  signifying that their
 choler lies high4    ,the              
,bitter-tempered are hard to reconcile  
and keep their anger for a  long while1 
because they repress the feeling3 but   
when they have  revenged themselves then
 comes a lull2 for the vengeance        
destroys their  anger by producing      
pleasure in lieu of pain4 ,but if this  
does not  happen they keep the weight on
 their minds3 because1 as it does not   
show itself1 no one attempts to reason  
it away1 and digesting anger  within    
one's self takes time4 ,such men are    
very great nuisances to  themselves and 
to their best friends4    ,again1 we    
call those ,cross-grained who are angry 
at wrong objects1 and  in excessive     
degree1 and for too long a time1 and who
 are not appeased  without vengeance or 
at least punishing the offender4    ,to 
,meekness we oppose the excess rather   
than the defect1 because it is  of more 
common occurrence3 for human nature is  

more disposed to take  than to forgo    
revenge4 ,and the ,cross-grained are    
worse to live with  than they who are   
too phlegmatic4    ,now1 from what has  
been here said1 that is also plain which
 was said  before4 ,i mean1 it is no    
easy matter to define how1 and with what
  persons1 and at what kind of things1  
and how long one ought to be  angry1 and
 up to what point a person is right or  
is wrong4 ,for he that  transgresses the
 strict rule only a little1 whether on  
the side of too  much or too little1 is 
not blamed3 sometimes we praise those   
who are  deficient in the feeling and   
call them ,meek1 sometimes we call the  
irritable ,spirited as being well       
qualified for government4 ,so it is not 
easy to lay down1 in so many words1 for 
what degree or kind of  transgression a 
man is blameable3 because the decision  
is in  particulars1 and rests therefore 
with the ,moral ,sense4 ,thus much1     
however1 is plain1 that the mean state  
is praiseworthy1 in virtue of  which we 

are angry with those with whom1 and at  
those things with  which1 we ought to be
 angry1 and in right manner1 and so on2 
while the  excesses and defects are     
blameable1 slightly so if only slight1  
more so  if greater1 and when           
considerable very blameable4    ,it is  
clear1 therefore1 that the mean state is
 what we are to hold to4    ,this then  
is to be taken as our account of the    
various moral states  which have ,anger 
for their object-matter4    ,chapter    
,,viii4    ,next1 as regards social     
intercourse and interchange of words and
 acts1  some men are thought to be      
,over-,complaisant who1 with a view     
solely to  giving pleasure1 agree to    
everything and never oppose1 but think  
their  line is to give no pain to those 
they are thrown amongst3 they1 on the   
other hand1 are called ,cross and       
,contentious who take exactly the       
contrary line to these1 and oppose in   
everything1 and have no care at  all    
whether they give pain or not4    ,now  

it is quite clear of course1 that the   
states ,i have named are  blameable1 and
 that the mean between them is          
praiseworthy1 in virtue of  which a man 
will let pass what he ought as he ought1
 and also will  object in like manner4  
,however1 this state has no name        
appropriated1  but it is most like      
,friendship2 since the man who exhibits 
it is just  the kind of man whom we     
would call the amiable friend1 with the 
addition of strong earnest affection2   
but then this is the very point  in     
which it differs from ,friendship1 that 
it is quite independent of  any feeling 
or strong affection for those among whom
 the man mixes3 ,i  mean1 that he takes 
everything as he ought1 not from any    
feeling of  love or hatred1 but simply  
because his natural disposition leads   
him to  do so2 he will do it alike to   
those whom he does know and those whom  
he  does not1 and those with whom he is 
intimate and those with whom he is  not2
 only in each case as propriety         

requires1 because it is not fitting  to 
care alike for intimates and strangers1 
nor again to pain them  alike4    ,it   
has been stated in a general way that   
his social intercourse will be          
regulated by propriety1 and his aim will
 be to avoid giving pain and to         
contribute to pleasure1 but with a      
constant reference to what is noble  and
 expedient4    ,his proper object-matter
 seems to be the pleasures and pains    
which  arise out of social intercourse1 
but whenever it is not honourable or    
even hurtful to him to contribute to    
pleasure1 in these instances he  will   
run counter and prefer to give pain4    
,or if the things in question involve   
unseemliness to the doer1 and this  not 
inconsiderable1 or any harm1 whereas his
 opposition will cause some  little     
pain1 here he will not agree but will   
run counter4    ,again1 he will regulate
 differently his intercourse with great 
men and  with ordinary men1 and with all
 people according to the knowledge he   

has of them2 and in like manner1 taking 
in any other differences which  may     
exist1 giving to each his due1 and in   
itself preferring to give  pleasure and 
cautious not to give pain1 but still    
guided by the  results1 ,i mean by what 
is noble and expedient according as they
  preponderate4    ,again1 he will      
inflict trifling pain with a view to    
consequent  pleasure4    ,well1 the man 
bearing the mean character is pretty    
well such as ,i have  described him1 but
 he has no name appropriated to him3 of 
those who try  to give pleasure1 the man
 who simply and disinterestedly tries to
 be  agreeable is called                
,over-,complaisant1 he who does it with 
a view to  secure some profit in the way
 of wealth1 or those things which wealth
  may procure1 is a ,flatterer3 ,i have 
said before1 that the man who is        
8always non-content0 is ,cross and      
,contentious4 ,here the extremes have   
the appearance of being opposed to one  
another1 because the mean has no        

appropriate name4    ,chapter ,,ix4     
,the mean state which steers clear of   
,exaggeration has pretty much the  same 
object-matter as the last we described1 
and likewise has no name  appropriated  
to it4 ,still it may be as well to go   
over these states3  because1 in the     
first place1 by a particular discussion 
of each we  shall be better acquainted  
with the general subject of moral       
character1  and next we shall be the    
more convinced that the virtues are mean
  states by seeing that this is         
universally the case4    ,in respect    
then of living in society1 those who    
carry on this  intercourse with a view  
to pleasure and pain have been already  
spoken  of2 we will now go on to speak  
of those who are ,true or ,false1 alike 
in  their words and deeds and in the    
claims which they advance4    ,now the  
,exaggerator is thought to have a       
tendency to lay claim to  things        
reflecting credit on him1 both when they
 do not belong to him at  all and also  

in greater degree than that in which    
they really do3  whereas the ,reserved  
man1 on the contrary1 denies those which
 really  belong to him or else          
depreciates them1 while the mean        
character being  a ,plain-matter-of-fact
 person is ,truthful in life and word1  
admitting  the existence of what does   
really belong to him and making it      
neither  greater nor less than the      
truth4    ,it is possible of course to  
take any of these lines either with or  
without some further view3 but in       
general men speak1 and act1 and live1   
each according to his particular        
character and disposition1 unless       
indeed a man is acting from any special 
motive4    ,now since falsehood is in   
itself low and blameable1 while truth is
  noble and praiseworthy1 it follows    
that the ,truthful man 7who is also  in 
the mean7 is praiseworthy1 and the two  
who depart from strict truth  are both  
blameable1 but especially the           
,exaggerator4    ,we will now speak of  

each1 and first of the ,truthful man3 ,i
 call him  ,truthful1 because we are not
 now meaning the man who is true in his 
agreements nor in such matters as amount
 to justice or injustice 7this  would   
come within the province of a different 
virtue71 but1 in such as  do not involve
 any such serious difference as this1   
the man we are  describing is true in   
life and word simply because he is in a 
certain  moral state4    ,and he that is
 such must be judged to be a good man3  
for he that has a  love for ,truth as   
such1 and is guided by it in matters    
indifferent1  will be so likewise even  
more in such as are not indifferent2 for
  surely he will have a dread of        
falsehood as base1 since he shunned it  
even in itself3 and he that is of such a
 character is praiseworthy1 yet  he     
leans rather to that which is below the 
truth1 this having an  appearance of    
being in better taste because           
exaggerations are so  hateful4    ,as   
for the man who lays claim to things    

above what really belongs to  him       
without any special motive1 he is like a
 base man because he  would not         
otherwise have taken pleasure in        
falsehood1 but he shows as a  fool      
rather than as a knave4 ,but if a man   
does this with a special  motive1       
suppose for honour or glory1 as the     
,braggart does1 then he is  not so very 
blameworthy1 but if1 directly or        
indirectly1 for pecuniary               
considerations1 he is more unseemly4    
,now the ,braggart is such not by his   
power but by his purpose1 that is  to   
say1 in virtue of his moral state1 and  
because he is a man of a  certain kind2 
just as there are liars who take        
pleasure in falsehood  for its own sake 
while others lie from a desire of glory 
or gain4 ,they  who exaggerate with a   
view to glory pretend to such qualities 
as are  followed by praise or highest   
congratulation2 they who do it with a   
view to gain assume those which their   
neighbours can avail themselves  of1 and

 the absence of which can be concealed1 
as a man's being a  skilful soothsayer  
or physician2 and accordingly most men  
pretend to  such things and exaggerate  
in this direction1 because the faults ,i
 have  mentioned are in them4    ,the   
,reserved1 who depreciate their own     
qualities1 have the appearance  of being
 more refined in their characters1      
because they are not thought  to speak  
with a view to gain but to avoid        
grandeur3 one very common  trait in such
 characters is their denying common     
current opinions1 as  ,socrates used to 
do4 ,there are people who lay claim     
falsely to small  things and things the 
falsity of their pretensions to which is
 obvious2  these are called ,factotums  
and are very despicable4    ,this very  
,reserve sometimes shows like           
,exaggeration2 take1 for  instance1 the 
excessive plainness of dress affected by
 the  ,lacedmonians3 in fact1 both      
excess and the extreme of deficiency    
partake of the nature of ,exaggeration4 

,but they who practise ,reserve in      
moderation1 and in cases in which the   
truth is not very obvious and  plain1   
give an impression of refinement4 ,here 
it is the ,exaggerator 7as  being the   
worst character7 who appears to be      
opposed to the ,truthful  ,man4         
,chapter ,x4    ,next1 as life has its  
pauses and in them admits of pastime    
combined  with ,jocularity1 it is       
thought that in this respect also there 
is a  kind of fitting intercourse1 and  
that rules may be prescribed as to the  
kind of things one should say and the   
manner of saying them2 and in  respect  
of hearing likewise 7and there will be a
 difference between the  saying and     
hearing such and such things74 ,it is   
plain that in regard to  these things   
also there will be an excess and defect 
and a mean4    ,now they who exceed in  
the ridiculous are judged to be         
,buffoons and  ,vulgar1 catching at it  
in any and every way and at any cost1   
and aiming  rather at raising laughter  

than at saying what is seemly and at    
avoiding to pain the object of their    
wit4 ,they1 on the other hand1 who      
would not for the world make a joke     
themselves and are displeased with  such
 as do are thought to be ,clownish and  
,stern4 ,but they who are  ,jocular in  
good taste are denominated by a ,greek  
term expressing  properly ease of       
movement1 because such are thought to   
be1 as one may  say1 motions of the     
moral character2 and as bodies are      
judged of by  their motions so too are  
moral characters4    ,now as the        
ridiculous lies on the surface1 and the 
majority of men take  more pleasure than
 they ought in ,jocularity and ,jesting1
 the ,buffoons  too get this name of    
,easy ,pleasantry1 as if refined and    
gentlemanlike2  but that they differ    
from these1 and considerably too1 is    
plain from  what has been said4    ,one 
quality which belongs to the mean state 
is ,tact3 it is  characteristic of a man
 of ,tact to say and listen to such     

things as are  fit for a good man and a 
gentleman to say and listen to3 for     
there are  things which are becoming for
 such a one to say and listen to in the 
way of ,jocularity1 and there is a      
difference between the ,jocularity of   
the ,gentleman and that of the          
,vulgarian2 and again1 between that of  
the  educated and uneducated man4 ,this 
you may see from a comparison of the    
,old and ,new ,comedy3 in the former    
obscene talk made the fun2 in the       
latter it is rather innuendo3 and this  
is no slight difference as  regards     
decency4    ,well then1 are we to       
characterise him who jests well by his  
saying what  is becoming a gentleman1 or
 by his avoiding to pain the object of  
his  wit1 or even by his giving him     
pleasure8 or will not such a definition 
be vague1 since different things are    
hateful and pleasant to different  men8 
,be this as it may1 whatever he says    
such things will he also listen to1     
since it is commonly held that a man    

will do what he will bear to hear3  this
 must1 however1 be limited2 a man will  
not do quite all that he  will hear3    
because jesting is a species of         
scurrility and there are  some points of
 scurrility forbidden by law2 it may be 
certain points of  jesting should have  
been also so forbidden4 ,so then the    
refined and  gentlemanlike man will bear
 himself thus as being a law to himself4
  ,such is the mean character1 whether  
denominated the man of ,tact or of      
,easy ,pleasantry4    ,but the ,buffoon 
cannot resist the ridiculous1 sparing   
neither himself  nor any one else so    
that he can but raise his laugh1 saying 
things of  such kind as no man of       
refinement would say and some which he  
would not  even tolerate if said by     
others in his hearing4    ,the ,clownish
 man is for such intercourse wholly     
useless3 inasmuch as  contributing      
nothing jocose of his own he is savage  
with all who do4    ,yet some pause and 
amusement in life are generally judged  

to be  indispensable4    ,the three mean
 states which have been described do    
occur in life1 and  the object-matter of
 all is interchange of words and deeds4 
,they  differ1 in that one of them is   
concerned with truth1 and the other two 
with the pleasurable3 and of these two  
again1 the one is conversant  with the  
jocosities of life1 the other with all  
other points of social  intercourse4    
,chapter ,,xi4    ,to speak of ,shame as
 a ,virtue is incorrect1 because it is  
much more  like a feeling than a moral  
state4 ,it is defined1 we know1 to be 8a
  kind of fear of disgrace10 and its    
effects are similar to those of the     
fear of danger1 for they who feel ,shame
 grow red and they who fear  death turn 
pale4 ,so both are evidently in a way   
physical1 which is  thought to be a mark
 of a feeling rather than a moral state4
    ,moreover1 it is a feeling not      
suitable to every age1 but only to      
youth3  we do think that the young      
should be ,shamefaced1 because since    

they  live at the beck and call of      
passion they do much that is wrong and  
,shame acts on them as a check4 ,in     
fact1 we praise such young men as are   
,shamefaced1 but no one would ever      
praise an old man for being given to    
it1 inasmuch as we hold that he ought   
not to do things which cause  ,shame2   
for ,shame1 since it arises at low bad  
actions1 does not at all  belong to the 
good man1 because such ought not to be  
done at all3 nor  does it make any      
difference to allege that some things   
are disgraceful  really1 others only    
because they are thought so2 for neither
 should be  done1 so that a man ought   
not to be in the position of feeling    
,shame4  ,in truth1 to be such a man as 
to do anything disgraceful is the part  
of  a faulty character4 ,and for a man  
to be such that he would feel ,shame  if
 he should do anything disgraceful1 and 
to think that this  constitutes him a   
good man1 is absurd3 because ,shame is  
felt at  voluntary actions only1 and a  

good man will never voluntarily do what 
is base4    ,true it is1 that ,shame may
 be good on a certain supposition1 as   
8if a  man should do such things1 he    
would feel ,shame30 but then the        
,virtues  are good in themselves1 and   
not merely in supposed cases4 ,and1     
granted  that impudence and the not     
being ashamed to do what is disgraceful 
is  base1 it does not the more follow   
that it is good for a man to do such    
things and feel ,shame4    ,nor is      
,self-,control properly a ,virtue1 but a
 kind of mixed state3  however1 all     
about this shall be set forth in a      
future ,book4          ,,book ,v        
,chapter ,i4      ,now the points for   
our enquiry in respect of ,justice and  
,injustice are1  what kind of actions   
are their object-matter1 and what kind  
of a mean  state ,justice is1 and       
between what points the abstract        
principle of it1  i4e4 the ,just1 is a  
mean4 ,and our enquiry shall be1 if you 
please1  conducted in the same method as

 we have observed in the foregoing parts
  of this ,treatise4    ,we see then    
that all men mean by the term ,justice a
 moral state such  that in consequence  
of it men have the capacity of doing    
what is just1  and actually do it1 and  
wish it3#a similarly also with respect  
to  ,injustice1 a moral state such that 
in consequence of it men do unjustly    
and wish what is unjust3 let us also be 
content then with these as a            
ground-work sketched out4    ,i mention 
the two1 because the same does not hold 
with regard to ,states  whether of mind 
or body as with regard to ,sciences or  
,faculties3 ,i mean  that whereas it is 
thought that the same ,faculty or       
,science embraces  contraries1 a ,state 
will not3 from health1 for instance1 not
 the  contrary acts are done but the    
healthy ones only2 we say a man walks   
healthily when he walks as the healthy  
man would4    ,however1 of the two      
contrary states the one may be          
frequently known  from the other1 and   

oftentimes the states from their        
subject-matter3 if  it be seen clearly  
what a good state of body is1 then is it
 also seen  what a bad state is1 and    
from the things which belong to a good  
state  of body the good state itself is 
seen1 and vice vers4 ,if1 for  instance1
 the good state is firmness of flesh it 
follows that the bad  state is          
flabbiness of flesh2 and whatever causes
 firmness of flesh is  connected with   
the good state4    ,it follows moreover 
in general1#b that if of two contrary   
terms the  one is used in many senses so
 also will the other be2 as1 for        
instance1  if 8the ,just10 then also    
8the ,unjust40 ,now ,justice and        
,injustice do  seem to be used          
respectively in many senses1 but1       
because the line of  demarcation between
 these is very fine and minute1#c it    
commonly  escapes notice that they are  
thus used1 and it is not plain and      
manifest as where the various           
significations of terms are widely      

different for in these last the visible 
difference is great1 for  instance1 the 
word  is used equivocally to denote the 
bone which  is under the neck of animals
 and the instrument with which people   
close  doors4    ,let it be ascertained 
then in how many senses the term        
8,unjust man0 is  used4 ,well1 he who   
violates the law1 and he who is a       
grasping man1 and  the unequal man1 are 
all thought to be ,unjust and so        
manifestly the  ,just man will be1 the  
man who acts according to law1 and the  
equal man  8,the ,just0 then will be the
 lawful and the equal1 and 8the ,unjust0
 the  unlawful and the unequal4         
,well1 since the ,unjust man is also a  
grasping man1 he will be so1 of  course1
 with respect to good things1 but not of
 every kind1 only those  which are the  
subject-matter of good and bad fortune  
and which are in  themselves always good
 but not always to the individual4#d    
,yet men  pray for and pursue these     
things3 this they should not do but pray

 that  things which are in the abstract 
good may be so also to them1 and  choose
 what is good for themselves4    ,but   
the ,unjust man does not always choose  
actually the greater part1  but even    
sometimes the less2 as in the case of   
things which are simply  evil3 still1   
since the less evil is thought to be in 
a manner a good  and the grasping is    
after good1 therefore even in this case 
he is  thought to be a grasping man1    
i4e4 one who strives for more good than 
fairly falls to his share3 of course he 
is also an unequal man1 this  being an  
inclusive and common term4    ,chapter  
,,ii4    ,we said that the violator of  
,law is ,unjust1 and the keeper of the  
,law  ,just3 further1 it is plain that  
all ,lawful things are in a manner      
,just1  because by ,lawful we understand
 what have been defined by the          
legislative power and each of these we  
say is ,just4 ,the ,laws too give       
directions on all points1 aiming either 
at the common good of all1 or  that of  

the best1 or that of those in power     
7taking for the standard  real goodness 
or adopting some other estimate72 in one
 way we mean by  ,just1 those things    
which are apt to produce and preserve   
happiness and  its ingredients for the  
social community4    ,further1 the ,law 
commands the doing the deeds not only of
 the brave man  7as not leaving the     
ranks1 nor flying1 nor throwing away    
one's arms71  but those also of the     
perfectly self-mastering man1 as        
abstinence from  adultery and           
wantonness2 and those of the meek man1  
as refraining from  striking others or  
using abusive language3 and in like     
manner in  respect of the other virtues 
and vices commanding some things and    
forbidding others1 rightly if it is a   
good law1 in a way somewhat  inferior if
 it is one extemporised4    ,now this   
,justice is in fact perfect ,virtue1 yet
 not simply so but as  exercised towards
 one's neighbour3 and for this reason   
,justice is  thought oftentimes to be   

the best of the ,virtues1 and           
8neither ,hesper nor the ,morning-star  
,so worthy of our admiration30      and 
in a proverbial saying we express the   
same2    8,all virtue is in ,justice    
comprehended40      ,and it is in a     
special sense perfect ,virtue because it
 is the practice  of perfect ,virtue4   
,and perfect it is because he that has  
it is able to  practise his virtue      
towards his neighbour and not merely on 
himself2 ,i  mean1 there are many who   
can practise virtue in the regulation of
 their  own personal conduct who are    
wholly unable to do it in transactions  
with their neighbour4 ,and for this     
reason that saying of ,bias is  thought 
to be a good one1    8,rule will show   
what a man is20      for he who bears   
,rule is necessarily in contact with    
others1 i4e4 in a  community4 ,and for  
this same reason ,justice alone of all  
the ,virtues is  thought to be a good to
 others1 because it has immediate       
relation to  some other person1 inasmuch

 as the ,just man does what is          
advantageous  to another1 either to his 
ruler or fellow-subject4 ,now he is the 
basest  of men who practises vice not   
only in his own person1#e but towards   
his friends also2 but he the best who   
practises virtue not merely in  his own 
person but towards his neighbour1 for   
this is a matter of some  difficulty4   
,however1 ,justice in this sense is not 
a part of ,virtue but is  co-extensive  
with ,virtue2 nor is the ,injustice     
which answers to it a  part of ,vice but
 co-extensive with ,vice4 ,now wherein  
,justice in this  sense differs from    
,virtue appears from what has been said3
 it is the  same really1 but the point  
of view is not the same3 in so far as it
 has  respect to one's neighbour it is  
,justice1 in so far as it is such and   
such a moral state it is simply ,virtue4
    ,chapter ,,iii4    ,but the object  
of our enquiry is ,justice1 in the sense
 in which it is a  part of ,virtue 7for 
there is such a thing1 as we commonly   

say71 and  likewise with respect to     
particular ,injustice4 ,and of the      
existence of  this last the following   
consideration is a proof3 there are many
 vices  by practising which a man acts  
unjustly1 of course1 but does not grasp 
at more than his share of good2 if1 for 
instance1 by reason of  cowardice he    
throws away his shield1 or by reason of 
ill-temper he uses  abusive language1 or
 by reason of stinginess does not give a
 friend  pecuniary assistance2 but      
whenever he does a grasping action1 it  
is  often in the way of none of these   
vices1 certainly not in all of them1    
still in the way of some vice or other  
7for we blame him71 and in the  way of  
,injustice4 ,there is then some kind of 
,injustice distinct from  that          
co-extensive with ,vice and related to  
it as a part to a whole1 and  some      
8,unjust0 related to that which is      
co-extensive with violation of  the law 
as a part to a whole4    ,again1 suppose
 one man seduces a man's wife with a    

view to gain and  actually gets some    
advantage by it1#f and another does the 
same from  impulse of lust1 at an       
expense of money and damage2 this latter
 will be  thought to be rather destitute
 of self-mastery than a grasping man1   
and  the former ,unjust but not         
destitute of self-mastery3 now why8     
plainly  because of his gaining4        
,again1 all other acts of ,injustice we 
refer to some particular  depravity1 as1
 if a man commits adultery1 to          
abandonment to his  passions2 if he     
deserts his comrade1 to cowardice2 if he
 strikes  another1 to anger3 but if he  
gains by the act to no other vice than  
to  ,injustice4    ,thus it is clear    
that there is a kind of ,injustice      
different from and  besides that which  
includes all ,vice1 having the same name
 because the  definition is in the same 
genus2 for both have their force in     
dealings  with others1 but the one acts 
upon honour1 or wealth1 or safety1 or by
  whatever one name we can include all  

these things1 and is actuated by        
pleasure attendant on gain1 while the   
other acts upon all things which        
constitute the sphere of the good man's 
action4    ,chapter ,,iv4    ,now that  
there is more than one kind of ,justice1
 and that there is one  which is        
distinct from and besides that which is 
co-extensive with1  ,virtue1 is plain3  
we must next ascertain what it is1 and  
what are its  characteristics4    ,well1
 the ,unjust has been divided into the  
unlawful and the unequal1  and the ,just
 accordingly into the lawful and the    
equal3 the  aforementioned ,injustice is
 in the way of the unlawful4 ,and as the
  unequal and the more#g are not the    
same1 but differing as part to  whole   
7because all more is unequal1 but not   
all unequal more71 so the  ,unjust and  
the ,injustice we are now in search of  
are not the same with1  but other than1 
those before mentioned1 the one being   
the parts1 the  other the wholes2 for   
this particular ,injustice is a part of 

the  ,injustice co-extensive with ,vice1
 and likewise this ,justice of the      
,justice co-extensive with ,virtue4 ,so 
that what we have now to speak of  is   
the particular ,justice and ,injustice1 
and likewise the particular  ,just and  
,unjust4    ,here then let us dismiss   
any further consideration of the        
,justice  ranking as co-extensive with  
,virtue 7being the practice of ,virtue  
in  all its bearings towards others71   
and of the co-relative ,injustice       
7being similarly the practice of ,vice74
 ,it is clear too1 that we must         
separate off the ,just and the ,unjust  
involved in these3 because one may      
pretty well say that most lawful things 
are those which naturally  result in    
action from ,virtue in its fullest      
sense1 because the law  enjoins the     
living in accordance with each ,virtue  
and forbids living in  accordance with  
each ,vice4 ,and the producing causes of
 ,virtue in all  its bearings are those 
enactments which have been made         

respecting  education for society4      
,by the way1 as to individual education1
 in respect of which a man is  simply   
good without reference to others1       
whether it is the province of   or some 
other science we must determine at a    
future time3 for  it may be it is not   
the same thing to be a good man and a   
good citizen  in every case4#h          
,chapter ,v4    ,now of the ,particular 
,justice1 and the ,just involved in it1 
one species  is that which is concerned 
in the distributions of honour1 or      
wealth1  or such other things as are to 
be shared among the members of the      
social community 7because in these one  
man as compared with another may  have  
either an equal or an unequal share71   
and the other is that which  is         
,corrective in the various transactions 
between man and man4    ,and of this    
latter there are two parts3 because of  
transactions some  are voluntary and    
some involuntary2 voluntary1 such as    
follow2 selling1  buying1 use1 bail1    

borrowing1 deposit1 hiring3 and this    
class is called  voluntary because the  
origination of these transactions is    
voluntary4    ,the involuntary again are
 either such as effect secrecy2 as      
theft1  adultery1 poisoning1 pimping1   
kidnapping of slaves1 assassination1    
false witness2 or accompanied with open 
violence2 as insult1 bonds1  death1     
plundering1 maiming1 foul language1     
slanderous abuse4    ,chapter ,,vi4     
,well1 the unjust man we have said is   
unequal1 and the abstract 8,unjust0     
unequal3 further1 it is plain that there
 is some mean of the unequal1  that is  
to say1 the equal or exact half 7because
 in whatever action  there is the       
greater and the less there is also the  
equal1 i4e4 the  exact half74 ,if then  
the ,unjust is unequal the ,just is     
equal1 which all  must allow without    
further proof3 and as the equal is a    
mean the ,just  must be also a mean4    
,now the equal implies two terms at     
least3 it  follows then that the ,just  

is both a mean and equal1 and these to  
certain persons2 and1 in so far as it is
 a mean1 between certain things  7that  
is1 the greater and the less71 and1 so  
far as it is equal1  between two1 and in
 so far as it is just it is so to       
certain persons4  ,the ,just then must  
imply four terms at least1 for those#i  
to which it  is just are two1 and the   
terms representing the things are two4  
,and there will be the same equality    
between the terms representing the      
persons1 as between those representing  
the things3 because as the  latter are  
to one another so are the former3 for if
 the persons are not  equal they must   
not have equal shares2 in fact this is  
the very source  of all the quarrelling 
and wrangling in the world1 when either 
they who  are equal have and get awarded
 to them things not equal1 or being not 
equal those things which are equal4     
,again1 the necessity of this  equality 
of ratios is shown by the common phrase 
8according to rate10  for all agree that

 the ,just in distributions ought to be 
according to  some rate3 but what that  
rate is to be1 all do not agree2 the    
democrats  are for freedom1 oligarchs   
for wealth1 others for nobleness of     
birth1  and the aristocratic party for  
virtue4    ,the ,just1 then1 is a       
certain proportionable thing4 ,for      
proportion does  not apply merely to    
number in the abstract1#aj but to number
  generally1 since it is equality of    
ratios1 and implies four terms at  least
 7that this is the case in what may be  
called discrete proportion  is plain and
 obvious1 but it is true also in        
continual proportion1 for  this uses the
 one term as two1 and mentions it twice2
 thus ,a3,b3,c may be  expressed        
,a3,b33,b3,c4 ,in the first1 ,b is named
 twice2 and so1 if1 as in  the second1  
,b is actually written twice1 the       
proportionals will be  four73 and the   
,just likewise implies four terms at the
 least1 and the  ratio between the two  
pair of terms is the same1 because the  

persons  and the things are divided     
similarly4 ,it will stand then thus1    
,a3,b33,c3,d1 and then permutando       
,a3,c33,b3,d1 and then 7supposing ,c and
 ,d to  represent the things7           
,a,c3,b,d33,a3,b4 ,the distribution in  
fact consisting  in putting together    
these terms thus3 and if they are put   
together so  as to preserve this same   
ratio1 the distribution puts them       
together  justly4#aa ,so then the       
joining together of the first and third 
and  second and fourth proportionals is 
the ,just in the distribution1 and  this
 ,just is the mean relatively to that   
which violates the  proportionate1 for  
the proportionate is a mean and the     
,just is  proportionate4 ,now           
mathematicians call this kind of        
proportion  geometrical3 for in         
geometrical proportion the whole is to  
the whole as  each part to each part4   
,furthermore this proportion is not     
continual1  because the person and thing
 do not make up one term4    ,the ,just 

then is this proportionate1 and the     
,unjust that which violates  the        
proportionate2 and so there comes to be 
the greater and the less3  which in fact
 is the case in actual transactions1    
because he who acts  unjustly has the   
greater share and he who is treated     
unjustly has the  less of what is good3 
but in the case of what is bad this is  
reversed3  for the less evil compared   
with the greater comes to be reckoned   
for  good1 because the less evil is more
 choice-worthy than the greater1 and    
what is choice-worthy is good1 and the  
more so the greater good4    ,this then 
is the one species of the ,just4        
,chapter ,,vii4    ,and the remaining   
one is the ,corrective1 which arises in 
voluntary as  well as involuntary       
transactions4 ,now this just has a      
different form  from the aforementioned2
 for that which is concerned in         
distribution of  common property is     
always according to the aforementioned  
proportion3 ,i  mean that1 if the       

division is made out of common property1
 the shares  will bear the same         
proportion to one another as the        
original  contributions did3 and the    
,unjust which is opposite to this ,just 
is  that which violates the             
proportionate4    ,but the ,just which  
arises in transactions between men is an
 equal in a  certain sense1 and the     
,unjust an unequal1 only not in the way 
of that  proportion but of              
arithmetical4#ab ,because it makes no   
difference  whether a robbery1 for      
instance1 is committed by a good man on 
a bad or  by a bad man on a good1 nor   
whether a good or a bad man has         
committed  adultery3 the law looks only 
to the difference created by the injury 
and treats the men as previously equal1 
where the one does and the  other       
suffers injury1 or the one has done and 
the other suffered harm4  ,and so this  
,unjust1 being unequal1 the judge       
endeavours to reduce to  equality again1
 because really when the one party has  

been wounded and  the other has struck  
him1 or the one kills and the other     
dies1 the  suffering and the doing are  
divided into unequal shares2 well1 the  
judge tries to restore equality by      
penalty1 thereby taking from the  gain4 
,for these terms gain and loss are      
applied to these cases1 though  perhaps 
the term in some particular instance may
 not be strictly  proper1 as gain1 for  
instance1 to the man who has given a    
blow1 and  loss to him who has received 
it3 still1 when the suffering has been  
estimated1 the one is called loss and   
the other gain4    ,and so the equal is 
a mean between the more and the less1   
which  represent gain and loss in       
contrary ways 7,i mean1 that the more of
 good  and the less of evil is gain1 the
 less of good and the more of evil is   
loss73 between which the equal was      
stated to be a mean1 which equal we  say
 is ,just3 and so the ,corrective ,just 
must be the mean between loss  and gain4
 ,and this is the reason why1 upon a    

dispute arising1 men have  recourse to  
the judge3 going to the judge is in fact
 going to the ,just1  for the judge is  
meant to be the personification of the  
,just4#ac ,and  men seek a judge as one 
in the mean1 which is expressed in a    
name given  by some to judges 71 or     
middle-men7 under the notion that if    
they can hit on the mean they shall hit 
on the ,just4 ,the ,just is then  surely
 a mean since the judge is also4    ,so 
it is the office of a judge to make     
things equal1 and the line1 as  it were1
 having been unequally divided1 he takes
 from the greater part  that by which it
 exceeds the half1 and adds this on to  
the less4 ,and  when the whole is       
divided into two exactly equal portions 
then men say  they have their own1 when 
they have gotten the equal2 and the     
equal is  a mean between the greater and
 the less according to arithmetical     
equality4    ,this1 by the way1 accounts
 for the etymology of the term by which 
we in  ,greek express the ideas of ,just

 and ,judge2 7 quasi 1 that  is in two  
parts1 and  quasi 1 he who divides into 
two  parts74 ,for when from one of two  
equal magnitudes somewhat has been      
taken and added to the other1 this      
latter exceeds the former by twice  that
 portion3 if it had been merely taken   
from the former and not added  to the   
latter1 then the latter would have      
exceeded the former only by  that one   
portion2 but in the other case1 the     
greater exceeds the mean  by one1 and   
the mean exceeds also by one that       
magnitude from which the  portion was   
taken4 ,by this illustration1 then1 we  
obtain a rule to  determine what one    
ought to take from him who has the      
greater1 and what  to add to him who has
 the less4 ,the excess of the mean over 
the less  must be added to the less1 and
 the excess of the greater over the mean
  be taken from the greater4    ,thus   
let there be three straight lines equal 
to one another4 ,from one  of them cut  
off a portion1 and add as much to       

another of them4 ,the  whole line thus  
made will exceed the remainder of the   
first-named line1  by twice the portion 
added1 and will exceed the untouched    
line by that  portion4#ad ,and these    
terms loss and gain are derived from    
voluntary  exchange3 that is to say1 the
 having more than what was one's own is 
called gaining1 and the having less than
 one's original stock is called  losing2
 for instance1 in buying or selling1 or 
any other transactions  which are       
guaranteed by law3 but when the result  
is neither more nor  less1 but exactly  
the same as there was originally1#ae    
people say they  have their own1 and    
neither lose nor gain4    ,so then the  
,just we have been speaking of is a mean
 between loss and  gain arising in      
involuntary transactions2 that is1 it is
 the having the  same after the         
transaction as one had before it took   
place4    ,chapter ,,viii4      ,there  
are people who have a notion that       
,reciprocation is simply just1  as the  

,pythagoreans said3 for they defined the
 ,just simply and without  qualification
 as 8,that which reciprocates with      
another40 ,but this  simple             
,reciprocation will not fit on either to
 the ,distributive ,just1  or the       
,corrective 7and yet this is the        
interpretation they put on the          
,rhadamanthian rule of ,just1    ,if a  
man should suffer what he hath done1    
then there would be  straightforward    
justice207      for in many cases       
differences arise3 as1 for instance1    
suppose one in  authority has struck a  
man1 he is not to be struck in turn2 or 
if a man  has struck one in authority1  
he must not only be struck but punished 
also4#af ,and again1 the voluntariness  
or involuntariness of actions  makes a  
great difference4    ,but in dealings of
 exchange such a principle of ,justice  
as this  ,reciprocation forms the bond  
of union1 but then it must be           
,reciprocation according to proportion  
and not exact equality1 because  by     

proportionate reciprocity of action the 
social community is held  together1 ,for
 either ,reciprocation of evil is meant1
 and if this be not  allowed it is      
thought to be a servile condition of    
things3 or else  ,reciprocation of good1
 and if this be not effected then there 
is no  admission to participation which 
is the very bond of their union4    ,and
 this is the moral of placing the       
,temple of the ,graces 77 in  the public
 streets2 to impress the notion that    
there may be requital1  this being      
peculiar to #ag because a man ought to  
requite with a  good turn the man who   
has done him a favour and then to become
 himself  the originator of another 1 by
 doing him a favour4    ,now the acts of
 mutual giving in due proportion may be 
represented by  the diameters of a      
parallelogram1 at the four angles of    
which the  parties and their wares are  
so placed that the side connecting the  
parties be opposite to that connecting  
the wares1 and each party be  connected 

by one side with his own ware1 as in the
 accompanying  diagram4                 
,illustration    ,the builder is to     
receive from the shoemaker of his ware1 
and to give  him of his own3 if then    
there be first proportionate equality1  
and  then the ,reciprocation takes      
place1 there will be the just result    
which we are speaking of3 if not1 there 
is not the equal1 nor will the          
connection stand3 for there is no reason
 why the ware of the one may  not be    
better than that of the other1 and      
therefore before the exchange  is made  
they must have been equalised4 ,and this
 is so also in the other  arts3 for they
 would have been destroyed entirely if  
there were not a  correspondence in     
point of quantity and quality between   
the producer  and the consumer4 ,for1 we
 must remember1 no dealing arises       
between two  of the same kind1 two      
physicians1 for instance2 but say       
between a  physician and agriculturist1 
or1 to state it generally1 between those

  who are different and not equal1 but  
these of course must have been          
equalised before the exchange can take  
place4    ,it is therefore indispensable
 that all things which can be exchanged 
should be capable of comparison1 and for
 this purpose money has come  in1 and   
comes to be a kind of medium1 for it    
measures all things and so  likewise the
 excess and defect2 for instance1 how   
many shoes are equal  to a house or a   
given quantity of food4 ,as then the    
builder to the  shoemaker1 so many shoes
 must be to the house 7or food1 if      
instead of a  builder an agriculturist  
be the exchanging party72 for unless    
there is  this proportion there cannot  
be exchange or dealing1 and this        
proportion cannot be unless the terms   
are in some way equal2 hence the  need1 
as was stated above1 of some one measure
 of all things4 ,now this  is really and
 truly the ,demand for them1 which is   
the common bond of  all such dealings4  
,for if the parties were not in want at 

all or not  similarly of one another's  
wares1 there would either not be any    
exchange1 or at least not the same4     
,and money has come to be1 by general   
agreement1 a representative of  ,demand3
 and the account of its ,greek name  is 
this1 that it is  what it is not        
naturally but by custom or law 771 and  
it rests  with us to change its value1  
or make it wholly useless4    ,very well
 then1 there will be ,reciprocation when
 the terms have been  equalised so as to
 stand in this proportion2              
,agriculturist 3 ,shoemaker  3 3 wares  
of ,shoemaker 3 wares of ,agriculturist2
 but you must bring  them to this form  
of proportion when they exchange1       
otherwise the one  extreme will combine 
both exceedings of the mean3#ah but when
 they  have exactly their own then they 
are equal and have dealings1 because    
the same equality can come to be in     
their case4 ,let ,a represent an        
agriculturist1 ,c food1 ,b a shoemaker1 
,d his wares equalised with ,a's4  ,then

 the proportion will be correct1        
,a3,b33,c3,d2 now ,reciprocation will   
be practicable1 if it were not1 there   
would have been no dealing4    ,now that
 what connects men in such transactions 
is ,demand1 as being  some one thing1 is
 shown by the fact that1 when either one
 does not  want the other or neither    
want one another1 they do not exchange  
at  all3 whereas they do#ai when one    
wants what the other man has1 wine  for 
instance1 giving in return corn for     
exportation4    ,and further1 money is a
 kind of security to us in respect of   
exchange  at some future time 7supposing
 that one wants nothing now that we     
shall  have it when we do73 the theory  
of money being that whenever one brings 
it one can receive commodities in       
exchange3 of course this too is  liable 
to depreciation1 for its purchasing     
power is not always the  same1 but still
 it is of a more permanent nature than  
the commodities  it represents4 ,and    
this is the reason why all things should

 have a  price set upon them1 because   
thus there may be exchange at any time1 
and if exchange then dealing4 ,so money1
 like a measure1 making all  things     
commensurable equalises them3 for if    
there was not exchange  there would not 
have been dealing1 nor exchange if there
 were not  equality1 nor equality if    
there were not the capacity of being    
commensurate3 it is impossible that     
things so greatly different should  be  
really commensurate1 but we can         
approximate sufficiently for all        
practical purposes in reference to      
,demand4 ,the common measure must be    
some one thing1 and also from agreement 
7for which reason it is called  71 for  
this makes all things commensurable3 in 
fact1 all things  are measured by money4
 ,let ,b represent ten min1 ,a a house  
worth five  min1 or in other words half 
,b1 ,c a bed worth #a_/ajth of ,b3 it is
 clear  then how many beds are equal to 
one house1 namely1 five4    ,it is      
obvious also that exchange was thus     

conducted before the  existence of      
money3 for it makes no difference       
whether you give for a  house five beds 
or the price of five beds4    ,chapter  
,,ix4    ,we have now said then what the
 abstract ,just and ,unjust are1 and    
these  having been defined it is plain  
that just acting is a mean between      
acting unjustly and being acted unjustly
 towards3 the former being  equivalent  
to having more1 and the latter to having
 less4    ,but ,justice1 it must be     
observed1 is a mean state not after the 
same  manner as the forementioned       
virtues1 but because it aims at         
producing  the mean1 while ,injustice   
occupies both the extremes4    ,and     
,justice is the moral state in virtue of
 which the just man is said  to have the
 aptitude for practising the ,just in   
the way of moral  choice1 and for making
 division between1 himself and another1 
or  between two other men1 not so as to 
give to himself the greater and to  his 
neighbour the less share of what is     

choice-worthy and contrariwise  of what 
is hurtful1 but what is proportionably  
equal1 and in like  manner when         
adjudging the rights of two other men4  
,injustice is all this with respect to  
the ,unjust3 and since the ,unjust  is  
excess or defect of what is good or     
hurtful respectively1 in  violation of  
the proportionate1 therefore ,injustice 
is both excess and  defect because it   
aims at producing excess and defect2    
excess1 that is1  in a man's own case of
 what is simply advantageous1 and defect
 of what  is hurtful3 and in the case of
 other men in like manner generally     
speaking1 only that the proportionate is
 violated not always in one  direction  
as before but whichever way it happens  
in the given case4 ,and  of the ,unjust 
act the less is being acted unjustly    
towards1 and the  greater the acting    
unjustly towards others4#bj    ,let this
 way of describing the nature of        
,justice and ,injustice1 and  likewise  
the ,just and the ,unjust generally1 be 

accepted as sufficient4    ,chapter ,x4 
,again1 since a man may do unjust acts  
and not yet have formed a  character of 
injustice1 the question arises whether a
 man is unjust in  each particular form 
of injustice1 say a thief1 or adulterer1
 or  robber1 by doing acts of a given   
character4    ,we may say1 ,i think1    
that this will not of itself make any   
difference2  a man may1 for instance1   
have had connection with another's wife1
  knowing well with whom he was sinning1
 but he may have done it not of         
deliberate choice but from the impulse  
of passion3 of course he acts  unjustly1
 but he has not necessarily formed an   
unjust character3 that  is1 he may have 
stolen yet not be a thief2 or committed 
an act of  adultery but still not be an 
adulterer1 and so on in other cases     
which  might be enumerated4#ba    ,of   
the relation which ,reciprocation bears 
to the ,just we have already  spoken3   
and here it should be noticed that the  
,just which we are  investigating is    

both the ,just in the abstract and also 
as exhibited in  ,social ,relations1    
which latter arises in the case of those
 who live in  communion with a view to  
independence and who are free and equal 
either  proportionately or              
numerically4#bb    ,it follows then that
 those who are not in this position have
 not among  themselves the ,social      
,just1 but still ,just of some kind and 
resembling  that other4 ,for ,just      
implies mutually acknowledged law1 and  
law the  possibility of injustice1 for  
adjudication is the act of              
distinguishing  between the ,just and   
the ,unjust4    ,and among whomsoever   
there is the possibility of injustice   
among these  there is that of acting    
unjustly2 but it does not hold          
conversely that  injustice attaches to  
all among whom there is the possibility 
of acting  unjustly1 since by the former
 we mean giving one's self the larger   
share of what is abstractedly good and  
the less of what is abstractedly  evil4 

,this1 by the way1 is the reason why we 
do not allow a man to govern1  but      
,principle1 because a man governs for   
himself and comes to be a  despot3 but  
the office of a ruler is to be guardian 
of the ,just and  therefore of the      
,equal4 ,well then1 since he seems to   
have no peculiar  personal advantage1   
supposing him a ,just man1 for in this  
case he does  not allot to himself the  
larger share of what is abstractedly    
good  unless it falls to his share      
proportionately 7for which reason he    
really governs for others1 and so       
,justice1 men say1 is a good not to     
one's self so much as to others1 as was 
mentioned before71 therefore  some      
compensation must be given him1 as there
 actually is in the shape  of honour and
 privilege2 and wherever these are not  
adequate there  rulers turn into        
despots4    ,but the ,just which arises 
in the relations of ,master and ,father1
 is not  identical with1 but similar to1
 these2 because there is no possibility 

of injustice towards those things which 
are absolutely one's own2 and a  slave  
or child 7so long as this last is of a  
certain age and not  separated into an  
independent being71 is1 as it were1 part
 of a man's  self1 and no man chooses to
 hurt himself1 for which reason there   
cannot  be injustice towards one's own  
self3 therefore neither is there the    
social ,unjust or ,just1 which was      
stated to be in accordance with law  and
 to exist between those among whom law  
naturally exists1 and these  were said  
to be they to whom belongs equality of  
ruling and being  ruled4    ,hence also 
there is ,just rather between a man and 
his wife than between  a man and his    
children or slaves2 this is in fact the 
,just arising in  domestic relations3   
and this too is different from the      
,social ,just4    ,further1 this        
last-mentioned ,just is of two kinds1   
natural and  conventional2 the former   
being that which has everywhere the same
 force  and does not depend upon being  

received or not2 the latter being that  
which originally may be this way or that
 indifferently but not after  enactment3
 for instance1 the price of ransom being
 fixed at a mina1 or  the sacrificing a 
goat instead of two sheep2 and again1   
all cases of  special enactment1 as the 
sacrificing to ,brasidas as a hero2 in  
short1  all matters of special decree4  
,but there are some men who think that  
all the ,justs are of this latter  kind1
 and on this ground3 whatever exists by 
nature1 they say1 is  unchangeable and  
has everywhere the same force2 fire1 for
 instance1  burns not here only but in  
,persia as well1 but the ,justs they see
  changed in various places4    ,now    
this is not really so1 and yet it is in 
a way 7though among the  gods perhaps by
 no means73 still even amongst ourselves
 there is  somewhat existing by nature3 
allowing that everything is subject to  
change1 still there is that which does  
exist by nature1 and that which  does   
not4#bc    ,nay1 we may go further1 and 

say that it is practically plain what   
among  things which can be otherwise    
does exist by nature1 and what does not 
but is dependent upon enactment and     
conventional1 even granting that  both  
are alike subject to be changed3 and the
 same distinctive  illustration will    
apply to this and other cases2 the right
 hand is  naturally the stronger1 still 
some men may become equally strong in   
both4    ,a parallel may be drawn       
between the ,justs which depend upon    
convention  and expedience1 and         
measures2 for wine and corn measures are
 not equal  in all places1 but where men
 buy they are large1 and where these    
same  sell again they are smaller3 well1
 in like manner the ,justs which are    
not natural1 but of human invention1 are
 not everywhere the same1 for  not even 
the forms of government are1 and yet    
there is one only which  by nature would
 be best in all places4    ,chapter     
,,xi4    ,now of ,justs and ,lawfuls    
each bears to the acts which embody and 

exemplify it the relation of an         
universal to a particular2 the acts     
being many1 but each of the principles  
only singular because each is an        
universal4 ,and so there is a difference
 between an unjust act and the  abstract
 ,unjust1 and the just act and the      
abstract ,just3 ,i mean1 a  thing is    
unjust in itself1 by nature or by       
ordinance2 well1 when this  has been    
embodied in act1 there is an unjust act1
 but not till then1  only some unjust   
thing4#bd ,and similarly of a just act4 
7,perhaps   is more correctly the common
 or generic term for just  act1 the word
 1 which ,i have here used1 meaning     
generally and  properly the act         
corrective of the unjust act47 ,now as  
to each of them1  what kinds there are1 
and how many1 and what is their         
object-matter1 we  must examine         
afterwards4    ,for the present we      
proceed to say that1 the ,justs and the 
,unjusts being  what have been          
mentioned1 a man is said to act unjustly

 or justly when  he embodies these      
abstracts in voluntary actions1 but when
 in  involuntary1 then he neither acts  
unjustly or justly except  accidentally2
 ,i mean that the being just or unjust  
is really only  accidental to the agents
 in such cases4    ,so both unjust and  
just actions are limited by the being   
voluntary or  the contrary3 for when an 
embodying of the ,unjust is voluntary1  
then it  is blamed and is at the same   
time also an unjust action3 but1 if     
voluntariness does not attach1 there    
will be a thing which is in itself      
unjust but not yet an unjust action4    
,by voluntary1 ,i mean1 as we stated    
before1 whatsoever of things in his  own
 power a man does with knowledge1 and   
the absence of ignorance as to  the     
person to whom1 or the instrument with  
which1 or the result with  which he     
does2 as1 for instance1 whom he strikes1
 what he strikes him  with1 and with    
what probable result2 and each of these 
points again1  not accidentally nor by  

compulsion2 as supposing another man    
were to  seize his hand and strike a    
third person with it1 here1 of course1  
the  owner of the hand acts not         
voluntarily1 because it did not rest    
with  him to do or leave undone3 or     
again1 it is conceivable that the person
  struck may be his father1 and he may  
know that it is a man1 or even one  of  
the present company1 whom he is         
striking1 but not know that it is  his  
father4 ,and let these same distinctions
 be supposed to be carried  into the    
case of the result and in fact the whole
 of any given action4  ,in fine then1   
that is involuntary which is done       
through ignorance1 or  which1 not       
resulting from ignorance1 is not in the 
agent's control or  is done on          
compulsion4    ,i mention these cases1  
because there are many natural things   
which we  do and suffer knowingly but   
still no one of which is either         
voluntary  or involuntary1 growing old1 
or dying1 for instance4    ,again1      

accidentality may attach to the unjust  
in like manner as to the  just acts4    
,for instance1 a man may have restored  
what was deposited  with him1 but       
against his will and from fear of the   
consequences of a  refusal3 we must not 
say that he either does what is just1 or
 does  justly1 except accidentally3 and 
in like manner the man who through      
compulsion and against his will fails to
 restore a deposit1 must be  said to do 
unjustly1 or to do what is unjust1      
accidentally only4    ,again1 voluntary 
actions we do either from deliberate    
choice or without  it2 from it1 when we 
act from previous deliberation2 without 
it1 when  without any previous          
deliberation4 ,since then hurts which   
may be done  in transactions between man
 and man are threefold1 those mistakes  
which  are attended with ignorance are1 
when a man either does a thing not to   
the man to whom he meant to do it1 or   
not the thing he meant to do1 or  not   
with the instrument1 or not with the    

result which he intended3  either he did
 not think he should hit him at all1 or 
not with this1 or  this is not the man  
he thought he should hit1 or he did not 
think this  would be the result of the  
blow but a result has followed which he 
did  not anticipate2 as1 for instance1  
he did it not to wound but merely to    
prick him2 or it is not the man whom1 or
 the way in which1 he meant4    ,now    
when the hurt has come about contrary to
 all reasonable  expectation1 it is a   
,misadventure2 when though not contrary 
to  expectation yet without any         
viciousness1 it is a ,mistake2 for a man
  makes a mistake when the origination  
of the cause rests with himself1  he has
 a misadventure when it is external to  
himself4 ,when again he  acts with      
knowledge1 but not from previous        
deliberation1 it is an  unjust action2  
for instance1 whatever happens to men   
from anger or  other passions which are 
necessary or natural3 for when doing    
these  hurts or making these mistakes   

they act unjustly of course and their   
actions are unjust1 still they are not  
yet confirmed unjust or wicked  persons 
by reason of these1 because the hurt did
 not arise from  depravity in the doer  
of it3 but when it does arise from      
deliberate  choice1 then the doer is a  
confirmed unjust and depraved man4      
,and on this principle acts done from   
anger are fairly judged not to be  from 
malice prepense1 because it is not the  
man who acts in wrath who  is the       
originator really but he who caused his 
wrath4 ,and again1 the  question at     
issue in such cases is not respecting   
the fact but  respecting the justice of 
the case1 the occasion of anger being a 
notion of injury4#be ,i mean1 that the  
parties do not dispute about the  fact1 
as in questions of contract 7where one  
of the two must be a  rogue1 unless real
 forgetfulness can be pleaded71 but1    
admitting the  fact1 they dispute on    
which side the justice of the case lies 
7the one  who plotted against the other1

 i4e4 the real aggressor1 of course1    
cannot be ignorant71#bf so that the one 
thinks there is injustice  committed    
while the other does not4    ,well then1
 a man acts unjustly if he has hurt     
another of deliberate  purpose1 and he  
who commits such acts of injustice is   
ipso facto an  unjust character when    
they are in violation of the            
proportionate or the  equal2 and in like
 manner also a man is a just character  
when he acts  justly of deliberate      
purpose1 and he does act justly if he   
acts  voluntarily4    ,then as for      
involuntary acts of harm1 they are      
either such as are  excusable or such as
 are not3 under the former head come all
 errors  done not merely in ignorance   
but from ignorance2 under the latter all
  that are done not from ignorance but  
in ignorance caused by some  passion    
which is neither natural nor fairly     
attributable to human  infirmity4       
,chapter ,,xii4    ,now a question may  
be raised whether we have spoken with   

sufficient  distinctness as to being    
unjustly dealt with1 and dealing        
unjustly  towards others4    ,first1    
whether the case is possible which      
,euripides has put1 saying  somewhat    
strangely1    8,my mother he hath slain2
  the tale is short1  ,either he        
willingly did slay her willing1  ,or    
else with her will but against his own40
      ,i mean then1 is it really        
possible for a person to be unjustly    
dealt  with with his own consent1 or    
must every case of being unjustly dealt 
with be against the will of the sufferer
 as every act of unjust dealing  is     
voluntary8    ,and next1 are cases of   
being unjustly dealt with to be ruled   
all one  way as every act of unjust     
dealing is voluntary8 or may we say that
  some cases are voluntary and some     
involuntary8    ,similarly also as      
regards being justly dealt with3 all    
just acting is  voluntary1 so that it is
 fair to suppose that the being dealt   
with  unjustly or justly must be        

similarly opposed1 as to being either   
voluntary or involuntary4    ,now as for
 being justly dealt with1 the position  
that every case of  this is voluntary is
 a strange one1 for some are certainly  
justly dealt  with without their        
will4#bg ,the fact is a man may also    
fairly raise  this question1 whether in 
every case he who has suffered what is  
unjust  is therefore unjustly dealt     
with1 or rather that the case is the    
same  with suffering as it is with      
acting2 namely that in both it is       
possible  to participate in what is     
just1 but only accidentally4 ,clearly   
the case  of what is unjust is similar3 
for doing things in themselves unjust is
  not identical with acting unjustly1   
nor is suffering them the same as  being
 unjustly dealt with4 ,so too of acting 
justly and being justly  dealt with1    
since it is impossible to be unjustly   
dealt with unless  some one else acts   
unjustly or to be justly dealt with     
unless some one  else acts justly4      

,now if acting unjustly is simply       
8hurting another voluntarily0 7by  which
 ,i mean1 knowing whom you are hurting1 
and wherewith1 and how you  are hurting 
him71 and the man who fails of          
self-control voluntarily  hurts himself1
 then this will be a case of being      
voluntarily dealt  unjustly with1 and it
 will be possible for a man to deal     
unjustly with  himself4 7,this by the   
way is one of the questions raised1     
whether it is  possible for a man to    
deal unjustly with himself47 ,or again1 
a man may1  by reason of failing of     
self-control1 receive hurt from another 
man  acting voluntarily1 and so here    
will be another case of being unjustly  
dealt with voluntarily4    ,the         
solution1 ,i take it1 is this3 the      
definition of being unjustly  dealt with
 is not correct1 but we must add1 to the
 hurting with the  knowledge of the     
person hurt and the instrument and the  
manner of  hurting him1 the fact of its 
being against the wish of the man who is

  hurt4    ,so then a man may be hurt   
and suffer what is in itself unjust     
voluntarily1 but unjustly dealt with    
voluntarily no man can be3 since  no man
 wishes to be hurt1 not even he who     
fails of self-control1 who  really acts 
contrary to his wish3 for no man wishes 
for that which he  does not think to be 
good1 and the man who fails of          
self-control does  not what he thinks he
 ought to do4    ,and again1 he that    
gives away his own property 7as ,homer  
says ,glaucus  gave to ,diomed1 8armour 
of gold for brass1 armour worth a       
hundred oxen  for that which was worth  
but nine07 is not unjustly dealt with1  
because  the giving rests entirely with 
himself2 but being unjustly dealt with  
does not1 there must be some other      
person who is dealing unjustly  towards 
him4    ,with respect to being unjustly 
dealt with then1 it is clear that it is 
not voluntary4    ,chapter ,,xiii4      
,there remain yet two points on which we
 purposed to speak3 first1 is he        

chargeable with an unjust act who in    
distribution has given the  larger share
 to one party contrary to the proper    
rate1 or he that has  the larger share8 
next1 can a man deal unjustly by        
himself8    ,in the first question1 if  
the first-named alternative is possible 
and  it is the distributor who acts     
unjustly and not he who has the larger  
share1 then supposing that a person     
knowingly and willingly gives more  to  
another than to himself here is a case  
of a man dealing unjustly by  himself2  
which1 in fact1 moderate men are thought
 to do1 for it is a  characteristic of  
the equitable man to take less than his 
due4    ,is not this the answer8 that   
the case is not quite fairly stated1    
because of some other good1 such as     
credit or the abstract honourable1  in  
the supposed case the man did get the   
larger share4 ,and again1 the           
difficulty is solved by reference to the
 definition of unjust dealing3  for the 
man suffers nothing contrary to his own 

wish1 so that1 on this  score at least1 
he is not unjustly dealt with1 but1 if  
anything1 he is  hurt only4    ,it is   
evident also that it is the distributor 
who acts unjustly and not  the man who  
has the greater share3 because the mere 
fact of the  abstract ,unjust attaching 
to what a man does1 does not constitute 
unjust action1 but the doing this       
voluntarily3 and voluntariness  attaches
 to that quarter whence is the          
origination of the action1 which        
clearly is in the distributor not in the
 receiver4 ,and again the term  doing is
 used in several senses2 in one sense   
inanimate objects kill1  or the hand1 or
 the slave by his master's bidding2 so  
the man in  question does not act       
unjustly but does things which are in   
themselves  unjust4    ,again1 suppose  
that a man has made a wrongful award in 
ignorance2 in  the eye of the law he    
does not act unjustly nor is his        
awarding unjust1  but yet he is in a    
certain sense3 for the ,just according  

to law and  primary or natural ,just are
 not coincident3 but1 if he knowingly   
decided unjustly1 then he himself as    
well as the receiver got the  larger    
share1 that is1 either of favour from   
the receiver or private  revenge against
 the other party3 and so the man who    
decided unjustly  from these motives    
gets a larger share1 in exactly the same
 sense as a  man would who received part
 of the actual matter of the unjust     
action3  because in this case the man   
who wrongly adjudged1 say a field1 did  
not  actually get land but money by his 
unjust decision4    ,chapter ,,xiv4     
,now men suppose that acting ,unjustly  
rests entirely with themselves1  and    
conclude that acting ,justly is         
therefore also easy4 ,but this is not   
really so2 to have connection with a    
neighbour's wife1 or strike one's       
neighbour1 or give the money with one's 
hand1 is of course easy and  rests with 
one's self3 but the doing these acts    
with certain inward  dispositions       

neither is easy nor rests entirely with 
one's self4 ,and in  like way1 the      
knowing what is ,just and what ,unjust  
men think no great  instance of wisdom  
because it is not hard to comprehend    
those things of  which the laws speak4  
,they forget that these are not ,just   
actions1  except accidentally3 to be    
,just they must be done and distributed 
in a  certain manner3 and this is a more
 difficult task than knowing what       
things are wholesome2 for in this branch
 of knowledge it is an easy  matter to  
know honey1 wine1 hellebore1 cautery1 or
 the use of the  knife1 but the knowing 
how one should administer these with a  
view to  health1 and to whom and at what
 time1 amounts in fact to being a       
physician4    ,from this very same      
mistake they suppose also1 that acting  
,unjustly is  equally in the power of   
the ,just man1 for the ,just man no     
less1 nay  even more1 than the ,unjust1 
may be able to do the particular acts2  
he  may be able to have intercourse with

 a woman or strike a man2 or the  brave 
man to throw away his shield and turn   
his back and run this way  or that4     
,true3 but then it is not the mere doing
 these things which  constitutes acts of
 cowardice or injustice 7except         
accidentally71 but  the doing them with 
certain inward dispositions3 just as it 
is not the  mere using or not using the 
knife1 administering or not             
administering  certain drugs1 which     
constitutes medical treatment or curing1
 but doing  these things in a certain   
particular way4    ,again the abstract  
principles of ,justice have their       
province among  those who partake of    
what is abstractedly good1 and can have 
too much  or too little of these4#bh    
,now there are beings who cannot have   
too  much of them1 as perhaps the gods2 
there are others1 again1 to whom no     
particle of them is of use1 those who   
are incurably wicked to whom all  things
 are hurtful2 others to whom they are   
useful to a certain degree3  for this   

reason then the province of ,justice is 
among ,men4    ,chapter ,,xv4    ,we    
have next to speak of ,equity and the   
,equitable1 that is to say1 of  the     
relations of ,equity to ,justice and the
 ,equitable to the ,just2 for  when we  
look into the matter the two do not     
appear identical nor yet  different in  
kind2 and we sometimes commend the      
,equitable and the man  who embodies it 
in his actions1 so that by way of praise
 we commonly  transfer the term also to 
other acts instead of the term good1    
thus  showing that the more ,equitable a
 thing is the better it is3 at other    
times following a certain train of      
reasoning we arrive at a difficulty1  in
 that the ,equitable though distinct    
from the ,just is yet  praiseworthy2 it 
seems to follow either that the ,just is
 not good or  the ,equitable not ,just1 
since they are by hypothesis different2 
or if  both are good then they are      
identical4    ,this is a tolerably fair 
statement of the difficulty which on    

these  grounds arises in respect of the 
,equitable2 but1 in fact1 all these may 
be reconciled and really involve no     
contradiction3 for the ,equitable is    
,just1 being also better than one form  
of ,just1 but is not better than  the   
,just as though it were different from  
it in kind3 ,just and  ,equitable then  
are identical1 and1 both being good1 the
 ,equitable is  the better of the two4  
,what causes the difficulty is this2 the
 ,equitable is ,just1 but not the  ,just
 which is in accordance with written    
law1 being in fact a  correction of that
 kind of ,just4 ,and the account of this
 is1 that every  law is necessarily     
universal while there are some things   
which it is  not possible to speak of   
rightly in any universal or general     
statement4  ,where then there is a      
necessity for general statement1 while a
 general  statement cannot apply rightly
 to all cases1 the law takes the        
generality of cases1 being fully aware  
of the error thus involved2 and  rightly

 too notwithstanding1 because the fault 
is not in the law1 or in  the framer of 
the law1 but is inherent in the nature  
of the thing1  because the matter of all
 action is necessarily such4    ,when   
then the law has spoken in general      
terms1 and there arises a case  of      
exception to the general rule1 it is    
proper1 in so far as the  lawgiver omits
 the case and by reason of his          
universality of statement  is wrong1 to 
set right the omission by ruling it as  
the lawgiver  himself would rule were he
 there present1 and would have provided 
by  law had he foreseen the case would  
arise4 ,and so the ,equitable is ,just  
but better than one form of ,just2 ,i do
 not mean the abstract ,just but  the   
error which arises out of the           
universality of statement3 and this  is 
the nature of the ,equitable1 8a        
correction of ,law1 where ,law is       
defective by reason of its              
universality40    ,this is the reason   
why not all things are according to law1

 because  there are things about which  
it is simply impossible to lay down a   
law1  and so we want special enactments 
for particular cases4 ,for to speak     
generally1 the rule of the undefined    
must be itself undefined also1  just as 
the rule to measure ,lesbian building is
 made of lead3 for this  rule shifts    
according to the form of each stone and 
the special  enactment according to the 
facts of the case in question4    ,it is
 clear then what the ,equitable is2     
namely that it is ,just but  better than
 one form of ,just3 and hence it appears
 too who the  ,equitable man is3 he is  
one who has a tendency to choose and    
carry out  these principles1 and who is 
not apt to press the letter of the law  
on  the worse side but content to waive 
his strict claims though backed by  the 
law3 and this moral state is ,equity1   
being a species of ,justice1  not a     
different moral state from ,justice4    
,chapter ,,xvi4    ,the answer to the   
second of the two questions indicated   

above1 8whether  it is possible for a   
man to deal unjustly by himself10 is    
obvious from  what has been already     
stated4    ,in the first place1 one     
class of ,justs is those which are      
enforced by  law in accordance with     
,virtue in the most extensive sense of  
the term3  for instance1 the law does   
not bid a man kill himself2 and whatever
 it  does not bid it forbids3 well1     
whenever a man does hurt contrary to the
  law 7unless by way of requital of     
hurt71 voluntarily1 i4e4 knowing to     
whom he does it and wherewith1 he acts  
,unjustly4 ,now he that from rage  kills
 himself1 voluntarily1 does this in     
contravention of ,right ,reason1  which 
the law does not permit4 ,he therefore  
acts ,unjustly3 but towards  whom8      
towards the ,community1 not towards     
himself 7because he suffers  with his   
own consent1 and no man can be ,unjustly
 dealt with with his  own consent71 and 
on this principle the ,community        
punishes him2 that is  a certain infamy 

is attached to the suicide as to one who
 acts ,unjustly  towards the ,community4
    ,next1 a man cannot deal ,unjustly  
by himself in the sense in which a man  
is ,unjust who only does ,unjust acts   
without being entirely bad 7for the  two
 things are different1 because the      
,unjust man is in a way bad1 as  the    
coward is1 not as though he were        
chargeable with badness in the  full    
extent of the term1 and so he does not  
act ,unjustly in this  sense71 because  
if it were so then it would be possible 
for the same  thing to have been taken  
away from and added to the same         
person3#bi  but this is really not      
possible1 the ,just and the ,unjust     
always  implying a plurality of persons4
    ,again1 an ,unjust action must be   
voluntary1 done of deliberate purpose1  
and aggressive 7for the man who hurts   
because he has first suffered and  is   
merely requiting the same is not thought
 to act ,unjustly71 but here  the man   
does to himself and suffers the same    

things at the same time4    ,again1 it  
would imply the possibility of being    
,unjustly dealt with with  one's own    
consent4    ,and1 besides all this1 a   
man cannot act ,unjustly without his act
  falling under some particular crime2  
now a man cannot seduce his own  wife1  
commit a burglary on his own premises1  
or steal his own property4    ,after    
all1 the general answer to the question 
is to allege what was  settled          
respecting being ,unjustly dealt with   
with one's own consent4    ,chapter     
,,xvii4    ,it is obvious1 moreover1    
that being ,unjustly dealt by and       
dealing  ,unjustly by others are both   
wrong2 because the one is having less1  
the  other having more1 than the mean1  
and the case is parallel to that of  the
 healthy in the healing art1 and that of
 good condition in the art  of training3
 but still the dealing ,unjustly by     
others is the worst of  the two1 because
 this involves wickedness and is        
blameworthy2  wickedness1 ,i mean1      

either wholly1 or nearly so 7for not all
 voluntary  wrong implies injustice71   
but the being ,unjustly dealt by does   
not  involve wickedness or injustice4   
,in itself then1 the being ,unjustly    
dealt by is the least bad1 but          
accidentally it may be the greater evil 
of the two4 ,however1 scientific        
statement cannot take in such           
considerations2 a pleurisy1 for         
instance1  is called a greater physical 
evil than a bruise3 and yet this last   
may  be the greater accidentally2 it may
 chance that a bruise received in a     
fall may cause one to be captured by the
 enemy and slain4    ,further3 ,just1 in
 the way of metaphor and similitude1    
there may be ,i do  not say between a   
man and himself exactly but between     
certain parts of  his nature2 but not   
,just of every kind1 only such as       
belongs to the  relation of master and  
slave1 or to that of the head of a      
family4 ,for  all through this treatise 
the rational part of the ,soul has been 

viewed  as distinct from the irrational4
    ,now1 taking these into             
consideration1 there is thought to be a 
possibility of injustice towards one's  
self1 because herein it is  possible for
 men to suffer somewhat in contradiction
 of impulses really  their own2 and so  
it is thought that there is ,just of a  
certain kind  between these parts       
mutually1 as between ruler and ruled4   
,let this then be accepted as an account
 of the distinctions which we  recognise
 respecting ,justice and the rest of the
 moral virtues4#cj          ,,book ,,vi 
,chapter ,i4      ,having stated in a   
former part of this treatise that men   
should choose  the mean instead of      
either the excess or defect1 and that   
the mean is  according to the dictates  
of ,right ,reason2 we will now proceed  
to  explain this term4    ,for in all   
the habits which we have expressly      
mentioned1 as likewise in  all the      
others1 there is1 so to speak1 a mark   
with his eye fixed on  which the man who

 has ,reason tightens or slacks his     
rope2#a and there  is a certain limit of
 those mean states which we say are in  
accordance  with ,right ,reason1 and lie
 between excess on the one hand and     
defect on  the other4    ,now to speak  
thus is true enough but conveys no very 
definite meaning3  as1 in fact1 in all  
other pursuits requiring attention and  
diligence on  which skill and science   
are brought to bear2 it is quite true of
 course  to say that men are neither to 
labour nor relax too much or too little1
  but in moderation1 and as ,right      
,reason directs2 yet if this were all a 
man had he would not be greatly the     
wiser2 as1 for instance1 if in  answer  
to the question1 what are proper        
applications to the body1 he  were to be
 told1 8,oh6 of course1 whatever the    
science of medicine1 and  in such manner
 as the physician1 directs40    ,and so 
in respect of the mental states it is   
requisite not merely that  this should  
be true which has been already stated1  

but further that it  should be expressly
 laid down what ,right ,reason is1 and  
what is the  definition of it4          
,chapter ,,ii4    ,now in our division  
of the ,excellences of the ,soul1 we    
said there were  two classes1 the ,moral
 and the ,intellectual3 the former we   
have already  gone through2 and we will 
now proceed to speak of the others1     
premising  a few words respecting the   
,soul itself4 ,it was stated before1 you
 will  remember1 that the ,soul consists
 of two parts1 the ,rational1 and       
,irrational3 we must now make a similar 
division of the ,rational4    ,let it be
 understood then that there are two     
parts of the ,soul  possessed of        
,reason2 one whereby we realise those   
existences whose  causes cannot be      
otherwise than they are1 and one whereby
 we realise  those which can be         
otherwise than they are1#b 7for there   
must be1  answering to things           
generically different1 generically      
different parts  of the soul naturally  

adapted to each1 since these parts of   
the soul  possess their knowledge in    
virtue of a certain resemblance and     
appropriateness in themselves to the    
objects of which they are               
percipients72#c and let us name the     
former1 8that which is apt to  know10   
the latter1 8that which is apt to       
calculate0 7because  deliberating and   
calculating are the same1 and no one    
ever deliberates  about things which    
cannot be otherwise than they are3 and  
so the  ,calculative will be one part of
 the ,rational faculty of the soul74    
,we must discover1 then1 which is the   
best state of each of these1  because   
that will be the ,excellence of each2   
and this again is relative  to the work 
each has to do4#d    ,there are in the  
,soul three functions on which depend   
moral action and  truth2 ,sense1        
,intellect1 ,appetition1 whether vague  
,desire or definite  ,will4 ,now of     
these ,sense is the originating cause of
 no moral action1  as is seen from the  

fact that brutes have ,sense but are in 
no way  partakers of moral action4#e    
,intellect and ,will are thus connected1
 what in the ,intellectual  operation is
 ,affirmation and ,negation that in the 
,will is ,pursuit and  ,avoidance1 ,and 
so1 since ,moral ,virtue is a ,state apt
 to exercise ,moral  ,choice and ,moral 
,choice is ,will consequent on          
deliberation1 the ,reason  must be true 
and the ,will right1 to constitute good 
,moral ,choice1 and  what the ,reason   
affirms the ,will must pursue4#f    ,now
 this ,intellectual operation and this  
,truth is what bears upon ,moral        
,action2 of course truth and falsehood  
must be the good and the bad of  that   
,intellectual ,operation which is purely
 ,speculative1 and concerned  neither   
with action nor production1 because this
 is manifestly the work  of every       
,intellectual faculty1 while of the     
faculty which is of a mixed  ,practical 
and ,intellectual nature1 the work is   
that ,truth which1 as ,i  have described

 above1 corresponds to the right        
movement of the ,will4    ,now the      
starting-point of moral action is ,moral
 ,choice1 7,i mean1 what  actually sets 
it in motion1 not the final cause17#g   
and of ,moral  ,choice1 ,appetition1 and
 ,reason directed to a certain result3  
and thus  ,moral ,choice is neither     
independent of intellect1 i4 e4         
intellectual  operation1 nor of a       
certain moral state3 for right or wrong 
action  cannot be1 independently of     
operation of the ,intellect1 and moral  
character4    ,but operation of the     
,intellect by itself moves nothing1 only
 when  directed to a certain result1 i4 
e4 exercised in ,moral ,action3 7,i say 
nothing of its being exercised in       
production1 because this function is    
originated by the former3 for every one 
who makes makes with a view to  somewhat
 further2 and that which is or may be   
made1 is not an ,end in  itself1 but    
only relatively to somewhat else1 and   
belonging to some  one3#h whereas that  

which is or may be done is an ,end in   
itself1  because acting well is an ,end 
in itself1 and this is the object of the
  ,will17 and so ,moral ,choice is      
either#i ,intellect put in a position of
  ,will-ing1 or ,appetition subjected to
 an ,intellectual ,process4 ,and such  a
 ,cause is ,man4    ,but nothing which  
is done and past can be the object of   
,moral ,choice2  for instance1 no man   
chooses to have sacked ,troy2 because1  
in fact1 no  one ever deliberates about 
what is past1 but only about that which 
is  future1 and which may therefore be  
influenced1 whereas what has been       
cannot not have been3 and so ,agathon is
 right in saying    8,of this alone is  
,deity bereft1  ,to make undone whatever
 hath been done40      ,thus then ,truth
 is the work of both the ,intellectual  
,parts of the ,soul2  those states      
therefore are the ,excellences of each  
in which each will  best attain truth4  
,chapter ,,iii4    ,commencing then from
 the point stated above we will now     

speak of these  ,excellences again4 ,let
 those faculties whereby the ,soul      
attains truth  in ,affirmation or       
,negation1 be assumed to be in number   
five3#aj viz4  ,art1 ,knowledge1        
,practical ,wisdom1 ,science1           
,intuition3 7,supposition and  ,opinion 
,i do not include1 because by these one 
may go wrong47    ,what ,knowledge is1  
is plain from the following of          
considerations1 if  one is to speak     
accurately1 instead of being led away by
 resemblances4  ,for we all conceive    
that what we strictly speaking know1    
cannot be  otherwise than it is1 because
 as to those things which can be        
otherwise  than they are1 we are        
uncertain whether they are or are not1  
the moment  they cease to be within the 
sphere of our actual observation4    ,so
 then1 whatever comes within the range  
of ,knowledge is by necessity1  and     
therefore eternal1 7because all things  
are so which exist  necessarily17 and   
all eternal things are without          

beginning1 and  indestructible4         
,again1 all ,knowledge is thought to be 
capable of being taught1 and what  comes
 within its range capable of being      
learned4 ,and all teaching is  based    
upon previous knowledge2 7a statement   
you will find in the  ,analytics        
also17#aa for there are two ways of     
teaching1 by ,syllogism  and by         
,induction4 ,in fact4 ,induction is the 
source of universal  propositions1 and  
,syllogism reasons from these           
universals4#ab  ,syllogism then may     
reason from principles which cannot be  
themselves  proved ,syllogistically3 and
 therefore must by ,induction4    ,so   
,knowledge is 8a state or mental faculty
 apt to demonstrate  syllogistically10  
c4 as in the ,analytics3#ac because a   
man1 strictly  and properly speaking1   
knows1 when he establishes his          
conclusion in a  certain way1 and the   
principles are known to him3 for if they
 are not  better known to him than the  
conclusion1 such knowledge as he has    

will  be merely accidental4    ,let thus
 much be accepted as a definition of    
,knowledge4    ,chapter ,,iv4    ,matter
 which may exist otherwise than it      
actually does in any given  case        
7commonly called ,contingent7 is of two 
kinds1 that which is the  object of     
,making1 and that which is the object of
 ,doing2 now ,making and  ,doing are two
 different things 7as we show in the    
exoteric treatise71  and so that state  
of mind1 conjoined with ,reason1 which  
is apt to ,do1  is distinct from that   
also conjoined with ,reason1 which is   
apt to ,make3  and for this reason they 
are not included one by the other1 that 
is1  ,doing is not ,making1 nor ,making 
,doing4#ad ,now#ae as ,architecture is  
an ,art1 and is the same as 8a certain  
state of mind1 conjoined with  ,reason1 
which is apt to ,make10 and as there is 
no ,art which is not such  a state1 nor 
any such state which is not an ,art1    
,art1 in its strict and  proper sense1  
must be 8a state of mind1 conjoined with

 true ,reason1 apt  to ,make40    ,now  
all ,art has to do with production1 and 
contrivance1 and seeing how  any of     
those things may be produced which may  
either be or not be1 and  the           
origination of which rests with the     
maker and not with the thing  made4     
,and1 so neither things which exist or  
come into being necessarily1 nor  things
 in the way of nature1 come under the   
province of ,art1 because  these are    
self-originating4 ,and since ,making and
 ,doing are distinct1  ,art must be     
concerned with the former and not the   
latter4 ,and in a  certain sense ,art   
and ,fortune are concerned with the same
 things1 as1  ,agathon says by the way1 
8,art ,fortune loves1 and is of her     
beloved40      ,so ,art1 as has been    
stated1 is 8a certain state of mind1 apt
 to ,make1  conjoined with true         
,reason20 its absence1 on the contrary1 
is the same  state conjoined with false 
,reason1 and both are employed upon     
,contingent matter4    ,chapter ,v4     

,as for ,practical ,wisdom1 we shall    
ascertain its nature by examining to    
what kind of persons we in common       
language ascribe it4#af    ,it is       
thought then to be the property of the  
,practically ,wise man to be  able to   
deliberate well respecting what is good 
and expedient for  himself1 not in any  
definite line1#ag as what is conducive  
to health  or strength1 but what to     
living well4 ,a proof of this is that we
 call  men ,wise in this or that1 when  
they calculate well with a view to some 
good end in a case where there is no    
definite rule4 ,and so1 in a  general   
way of speaking1 the man who is good at 
deliberation will be  ,practically      
,wise4 ,now no man deliberates          
respecting things which cannot  be      
otherwise than they are1 nor such as lie
 not within the range of his  own       
action3 and so1 since ,knowledge        
requires strict demonstrative           
reasoning1 of which ,contingent matter  
does not admit 7,i say ,contingent      

matter1 because all matters of          
deliberation must be ,contingent and    
deliberation cannot take place with     
respect to things which are             
,necessarily71 ,practical ,wisdom cannot
 be ,knowledge nor ,art2 nor the        
former1 because what falls under the    
province of ,doing must be  ,contingent2
 not the latter1 because ,doing and     
,making are different in  kind4    ,it  
remains then that it must be 8a state of
 mind true1 conjoined with  ,reason1 and
 apt to ,do1 having for its object those
 things which are  good or bad for      
,man30 because of ,making something     
beyond itself is  always the object1 but
 cannot be of ,doing because the very   
well-doing  is in itself an ,end4       
,for this reason we think ,pericles and 
men of that stamp to be  ,practically   
,wise1 because they can see what is good
 for themselves and  for men in general1
 and we also think those to be such who 
are skilled  in domestic management or  
civil government4 ,in fact1 this is the 

reason  why we call the habit of        
perfected self-mastery by the name which
 in  ,greek it bears1 etymologically    
signifying 8that which preserves the    
,practical ,wisdom30 for what it does   
preserve is the ,notion ,i have         
mentioned1 i4e4 of one's own true       
interest4#ah    ,for it is not every    
kind of ,notion which the pleasant and  
the painful  corrupt and pervert1 as1   
for instance1 that 8the three angles of 
every  rectilineal triangle are equal to
 two right angles10 but only those      
bearing on moral action4    ,for the    
,principles of the matters of moral     
action are the final cause  of them3#ai 
now to the man who has been corrupted by
 reason of  pleasure or pain the        
,principle immediately becomes obscured1
 nor does  he see that it is his duty to
 choose and act in each instance with a 
view to this final cause and by reason  
of it3 for viciousness has a  tendency  
to destroy the moral ,principle3 and so 
,practical ,wisdom must  be 8a state    

conjoined with reason1 true1 having     
human good for its  object1 and apt to  
do40    ,then again ,art admits of      
degrees of excellence1 but ,practical   
,wisdom  does not3#bj and in ,art he who
 goes wrong purposely is preferable to  
him who does so unwittingly1#ba but not 
so in respect of ,practical  ,wisdom or 
the other ,virtues4 ,it plainly is then 
an ,excellence of a  certain kind1 and  
not an ,art4    ,now as there are two   
parts of the ,soul which have ,reason1  
it must be  the ,excellence of the      
,opinionative which we called before    
calculative  or deliberative1 because   
both ,opinion and ,practical ,wisdom are
  exercised upon ,contingent matter4    
,and further1 it is not simply a state  
conjoined with ,reason1 as is proved by 
the fact that such a state may  be      
forgotten and so lost while ,practical  
,wisdom cannot4    ,chapter ,,vi4       
,now ,knowledge is a conception         
concerning universals and ,necessary    
matter1 and there are of course certain 

,first ,principles in all trains  of    
demonstrative reasoning 7that is of all 
,knowledge because this is  connected   
with reasoning73 that faculty1 then1    
which takes in the first  principles of 
that which comes under the range of     
,knowledge1 cannot be  either           
,knowledge1 or ,art1 or ,practical      
,wisdom3 not ,knowledge1 because  what  
is the object of ,knowledge must be     
derived from demonstrative  reasoning2  
not either of the other two1 because    
they are exercised upon  ,contingent    
matter only4 ,nor can it be ,science    
which takes in these1  because the      
,scientific ,man must in some cases     
depend on demonstrative  ,reasoning4    
,it comes then to this3 since the       
faculties whereby we always attain      
truth and are never deceived when       
dealing with matter ,necessary or even  
,contingent are ,knowledge1 ,practical  
,wisdom1 ,science1 and ,intuition1 and  
the faculty which takes in ,first       
,principles cannot be any of the three  

first2 the last1 namely ,intuition1 must
 be it which performs this  function4   
,chapter ,,vii4    ,science is a term we
 use principally in two meanings3 in the
 first  place1 in the ,arts we ascribe  
it to those who carry their arts to the 
highest accuracy2#bb ,phidias1 for      
instance1 we call a ,scientific or      
cunning sculptor2 ,polycleitus a        
,scientific or cunning statuary2        
meaning1 in this instance1 nothing else 
by ,science than an excellence  of art3 
in the other sense1 we think some to be 
,scientific in a general  way1 not in   
any particular line or in any particular
 thing1 just as  ,homer says of a man in
 his ,margites2 8,him the ,gods made    
neither a  digger of the ground1 nor    
ploughman1 nor in any other way         
,scientific40    ,so it is plain that   
,science must mean the most accurate of 
all  ,knowledge2 but if so1 then the    
,scientific man must not merely know the
  deductions from the ,first ,principles
 but be in possession of truth          

respecting the ,first ,principles4 ,so  
that ,science must be equivalent to     
,intuition and ,knowledge2 it is1 so to 
speak1 ,knowledge of the most  precious 
objects1 with a head on4#bc    ,i say of
 the most precious things1 because it is
 absurd to suppose  1#bd or ,practical  
,wisdom1 to be the highest1 unless it   
can be  shown that ,man is the most     
excellent of all that exists in the     
,universe4 ,now if 8healthy0 and 8good0 
are relative terms1 differing  when     
applied to men or to fish1 but 8white0  
and 8straight0 are the same  always1 men
 must allow that the ,scientific is the 
same always1 but the  ,practically ,wise
 varies3 for whatever provides all      
things well for  itself1 to this they   
would apply the term ,practically ,wise1
 and commit  these matters to it2 which 
is the reason1 by the way1 that they    
call  some brutes ,practically ,wise1   
such that is as plainly have a faculty  
of  forethought respecting their own    
subsistence4    ,and it is quite plain  

that ,science and  cannot be identical3 
because if men give the name of ,science
 to that faculty which is  employed upon
 what is expedient for themselves1 there
 will be many  instead of one1 because  
there is not one and the same faculty   
employed  on the good of all animals    
collectively1 unless in the same sense  
as  you may say there is one art of     
healing with respect to all living      
beings4    ,if it is urged that man is  
superior to all other animals1 that     
makes no  difference3 for there are many
 other things more ,godlike in their    
nature than ,man1 as1 most obviously1   
the elements of which the ,universe  is 
composed4#be    ,it is plain then that  
,science is the union of ,knowledge and 
,intuition1  and has for its objects    
those things which are most precious in 
their  nature4 ,accordingly1            
,anexagoras1 ,thales1 and men of that   
stamp1 people  call ,scientific1 but not
 ,practically ,wise because they see    
them  ignorant of what concerns         

themselves2 and they say that what they 
know  is quite out of the common run    
certainly1 and wonderful1 and hard1 and 
very fine no doubt1 but still useless   
because they do not seek after  what is 
good for them as men4    ,chapter       
,,viii4    ,but ,practical ,wisdom is   
employed upon human matters1 and such as
 are  objects of deliberation 7for we   
say1 that to deliberate well is most    
peculiarly the work of the man who      
possesses this ,wisdom71 and no man     
deliberates about things which cannot be
 otherwise than they are1 nor  about any
 save those that have some definite ,end
 and this ,end good  resulting from     
,moral ,action2 and the man to whom we  
should give the  name of ,good in       
,counsel1 simply and without            
modification1 is he who in  the way of  
calculation has a capacity for attaining
 that of practical  goods which is the  
best for ,man4    ,nor again does       
,practical ,wisdom consist in a         
knowledge of general  principles only1  

but it is necessary that one should know
 also the  particular details1 because  
it is apt to act1 and action is         
concerned  with details3 for which      
reason sometimes men who have not much  
knowledge are more practical than others
 who have2 among others1 they  who      
derive all they know from actual        
experience3 suppose a man to know1  for 
instance1 that light meats are easy of  
digestion and wholesome1 but  not what  
kinds of meat are light1 he will not    
produce a healthy state2  that man will 
have a much better chance of doing so1  
who knows that the  flesh of birds is   
light and wholesome4 ,since then        
,practical ,wisdom is  apt to act1 one  
ought to have both kinds of knowledge1  
or1 if only one1  the knowledge of      
details rather than of ,principles4 ,so 
there will be in  respect of ,practical 
,wisdom the distinction of supreme and  
subordinate4#bf    ,further3  and       
,practical ,wisdom are the same mental  
state1 but  the point of view is not the

 same4    ,of ,practical ,wisdom exerted
 upon a community that which ,i would   
call  the ,supreme is the faculty of    
,legislation2 the subordinate1 which is 
concerned with the details1 generally   
has the common name 1 and  its functions
 are ,action and ,deliberation 7for the 
particular enactment  is a matter of    
action1 being the ultimate issue of this
 branch of  ,practical ,wisdom1 and     
therefore people commonly say1 that     
these men  alone are really engaged in  
government1 because they alone act1     
filling  the same place relatively to   
legislators1 that workmen do to a       
master74#bg    ,again1 that is thought  
to be ,practical ,wisdom in the most    
proper sense  which has for its object  
the interest of the ,individual3 and    
this  usually appropriates the common   
name3 the others are called             
respectively ,domestic ,management1     
,legislation1 ,executive ,government    
divided into two branches1 ,deliberative
 and ,judicial4#bh ,now of  course1     

knowledge for one's self is one kind of 
knowledge1 but it  admits of many shades
 of difference3 and it is a common      
notion that the  man who knows and      
busies himself about his own concerns   
merely is the  man of ,practical        
,wisdom1 while they who extend their    
solicitude to  society at large are     
considered meddlesome4    ,euripides has
 thus embodied this sentiment2 8,how10  
says one of his  ,characters1 8,how     
foolish am ,i1 who whereas ,i might have
 shared equally1  idly numbered among   
the multitude of the army 999999 for    
them that are  busy and meddlesome ,jove
 hates10 because the generality of      
mankind  seek their own good and hold   
that this is their proper business4 ,it 
is  then from this opinion that the     
notion has arisen that such men are the 
,practically-,wise4 ,and yet it is just 
possible that the good of the           
individual cannot be secured            
independently of connection with a      
family  or a community4 ,and again1 how 

a man should manage his own affairs is  
sometimes not quite plain1 and must be  
made a matter of enquiry4#bi    ,a      
corroboration of what ,i have said is#cj
 the fact1 that the young  come to be   
geometricians1 and mathematicians1 and  
,scientific in such  matters1 but it is 
not thought that a young man can come to
 be  possessed of ,practical ,wisdom3   
now the reason is1 that this ,wisdom has
  for its object particular facts1 which
 come to be known from  experience1     
which a young man has not because it is 
produced only by  length of time4    ,by
 the way1 a person might also           
enquire1#ca why a boy may be made a     
mathematician but not ,scientific or a  
natural philosopher4 ,is not this  the  
reason8 that mathematics are taken in by
 the process of  abstraction1 but the   
principles of ,science#cb and natural   
philosophy  must be gained by           
experiment2 and the latter young men    
talk of but do  not realise1 while the  
nature of the former is plain and clear4

    ,again1 in matter of practice1 error
 attaches either to the general  rule1  
in the process of deliberation1 or to   
the particular fact3 for  instance1 this
 would be a general rule1 8,all water of
 a certain gravity  is bad20 the        
particular fact1 8this water is of that 
gravity40    ,and that ,practical       
,wisdom is not ,knowledge is plain1 for 
it has to do  with the ultimate         
issue1#cc as has been said1 because     
every object of  action is of this      
nature4    ,to ,intuition it is opposed1
 for this takes in those principles     
which  cannot be proved by reasoning1   
while ,practical ,wisdom is concerned   
with  the ultimate particular fact which
 cannot be realised by ,knowledge but   
by ,sense2 ,i do not mean one of the    
five senses1 but the same by which  we  
take in the mathematical fact1 that no  
rectilineal figure can be  contained by 
less than three lines1 i4e4 that a      
triangle is the  ultimate figure1       
because here also is a stopping point4  

,this however is ,sense rather than     
,practical ,wisdom1 which is of another 
kind4#cd    ,chapter ,,ix4    ,now the  
acts of enquiring and deliberating      
differ1 though deliberating  is a kind  
of enquiring4 ,we ought to ascertain    
about ,good ,counsel  likewise what it  
is1 whether a kind of ,knowledge1 or    
,opinion1 or ,happy  ,conjecture1 or    
some other kind of faculty4 ,knowledge  
it obviously is  not1 because men do not
 enquire about what they know1 and ,good
 ,counsel  is a kind of deliberation1   
and the man who is deliberating is      
enquiring  and calculating4    ,neither 
is it ,happy ,conjecture2 because this  
is independent of  reasoning1 and a     
rapid operation2 but men deliberate a   
long time1 and  it is a common saying   
that one should execute speedily what   
has been  resolved upon in deliberation1
 but deliberate slowly4    ,quick       
perception of causes#ce again is a      
different faculty from good  counsel1   
for it is a species of ,happy           

,conjecture4 ,nor is ,good ,counsel     
,opinion of any kind4    ,well then1    
since he who deliberates ill goes wrong1
 and he who  deliberates well does so   
rightly1 it is clear that ,good ,counsel
 is  rightness of some kind1 but not of 
,knowledge nor of ,opinion3 for         
,knowledge cannot be called right       
because it cannot be wrong1 and         
,rightness of ,opinion is ,truth3 and   
again1 all which is the object of       
opinion is definitely marked out4#cf    
,still1 however1 ,good ,counsel is not  
independent of ,reason1 ,does it  remain
 then that it is a rightness of         
,intellectual ,operation simply1        
because this does not amount to an      
assertion2 and the objection to         
,opinion was that it is not a process of
 enquiry but already a definite         
assertion2 whereas whosoever            
deliberates1 whether well or ill1 is    
engaged in enquiry and calculation4     
,well1 ,good ,counsel is a ,rightness of
 deliberation1 and so the first         

question must regard the nature and     
objects of deliberation4 ,now  remember 
,rightness is an equivocal term2 we     
plainly do not mean  ,rightness of any  
kind whatever2 the 1 for instance1 or   
the bad  man1 will obtain by his        
calculation what he sets before him as  
an  object1 and so he may be said to    
have deliberated rightly in one  sense1 
but will have attained a great evil4    
,whereas to have deliberated  well is   
thought to be a good1 because ,good     
,counsel is ,rightness of  deliberation 
of such a nature as is apt to attain    
good4    ,but even this again you may   
get by false reasoning1 and hit upon the
  right effect though not through right 
means1#cg your middle term being        
fallacious3 and so neither will this be 
yet ,good ,counsel in consequence  of   
which you get what you ought but not    
through proper means4    ,again1 one man
 may hit on a thing after long          
deliberation1 another  quickly4 ,and so 
that before described will not be yet   

,good ,counsel1 but  the ,rightness must
 be with reference to what is expedient2
 and you must  have a proper end in     
view1 pursue it in a right manner and   
right time4    ,once more4 ,one may     
deliberate well either generally or     
towards some  particular ,end4#ch ,good 
counsel in the general then is that     
which goes  right towards that which is 
the ,end in a general way of            
consideration2  in particular1 that     
which does so towards some particular   
,end4    ,since then deliberating well  
is a quality of men possessed of        
,practical  ,wisdom1 ,good ,counsel must
 be 8,rightness in respect of what      
conduces to  a given ,end1 of which#ci  
,practical ,wisdom is the true          
conception40    ,chapter ,x4    ,there  
is too the faculty of ,judiciousness1   
and also its absence1 in  virtue of     
which we call men ,judicious or the     
contrary4    ,now ,judiciousness is     
neither entirely identical with         
,knowledge or  ,opinion 7for then all   

would have been ,judicious71 nor is it  
any one  specific science1 as medical   
science whose object matter is things   
wholesome2 or geometry whose object     
matter is magnitude3 for it has not  for
 its object things which always exist   
and are immutable1 nor of  those things 
which come into being just any which may
 chance2 but those  in respect of which 
a man might doubt and deliberate4       
,and so it has the same object matter as
 ,practical ,wisdom2 yet the two        
faculties are not identical1 because    
,practical ,wisdom has the capacity  for
 commanding and taking the initiative1  
for its ,end is 8what one  should do or 
not do30 but ,judiciousness is only apt 
to decide upon  suggestions 7though we  
do in ,greek put 8well0 on to the       
faculty and its  concrete noun1 these   
really mean exactly the same as the     
plain words71  and ,judiciousness is    
neither the having ,practical ,wisdom1  
nor attaining  it3 but just as learning 
is termed  when a man uses his          

knowledge1 so judiciousness consists in 
employing the ,opinionative  faculty in 
judging concerning those things which   
come within the  province of ,practical 
,wisdom1 when another enunciates them2  
and not  judging merely1 but judging    
well 7for  and  mean exactly the  same  
thing74 ,and the ,greek name of this    
faculty is derived from the use  of the 
term  in learning3  and  being often    
used as synonymous4    ,the faculty     
called 1#dj in right of which we call   
men 1  or say they have 1 is 8the right 
judgment of the equitable man40 ,a      
proof of which is that we most commonly 
say that the equitable man has  a       
tendency to make allowance1 and the     
making allowance in certain cases  is   
equitable4 ,and  7the word denoting     
allowance7 is right   having a capacity 
of making equitable decisions1 ,by      
8right0 ,i mean that  of the ,truthful  
man4    ,chapter ,,xi4    ,now all these
 mental states#da tend to the same      
object1 as indeed  common language leads

 us to expect3 ,i mean1 we speak of 1   
,judiciousness1 ,practical ,wisdom1 and 
,practical ,intuition1 attributing  the 
possession of  and ,practical ,intuition
 to the same ,individuals  whom we      
denominate ,practically-,wise and       
,judicious3 because all these  faculties
 are employed upon the extremes1#db i4e4
 on particular  details2 and in right of
 his aptitude for deciding on the       
matters which  come within the province 
of the ,practically-,wise1 a man is     
,judicious  and possessed of good 2 i4e4
 he is disposed to make allowance1 for  
considerations of equity are entertained
 by all good men alike in  transactions 
with their fellows4    ,and all matters 
of ,moral ,action belong to the class of
 particulars1  otherwise called         
extremes3 for the man of ,practical     
,wisdom must know  them1 and            
,judiciousness and  are concerned with  
matters of ,moral  ,actions1 which are  
extremes4    ,intuition1 moreover1 takes
 in the extremes at both ends3#dc ,i    

mean1  the first and last terms must be 
taken in not by reasoning but by        
,intuition so that ,intuition comes to  
be of two kinds1 and that which  belongs
 to strict demonstrative reasonings     
takes in immutable1 i4e4  ,necessary1   
first terms2 while that which is        
employed in practical  matters takes in 
the extreme1 the ,contingent1 and the   
minor  ,premiss3#dd for the minor       
,premisses are the source of the ,final 
,cause1  ,universals being made up out  
of ,particulars4#de ,to take in these1  
of  course1 we must have ,sense1 i4e4 in
 other words ,practical ,intuition4     
,and for this reason these are thought  
to be simply gifts of nature2 and       
whereas no man is thought to be         
,scientific by nature1 men are thought  
to have 1 and ,judiciousness1 and       
,practical ,intuition3 a proof of  which
 is that we think these faculties are a 
consequence even of  particular ages1   
and this given age has ,practical       
,intuition and 1  we say1 as if under   

the notion that nature is the cause4    
,and thus  ,intuition is both the       
beginning and end1 because the proofs   
are based  upon the one kind of extremes
 and concern the other4    ,and so#df   
one should attend to the undemonstrable 
dicta and opinions  of the skilful1 the 
old and the ,practically-,wise1 no less 
than to those  which are based on strict
 reasoning1 because they see aright1    
having  gained their power of moral     
vision from experience4    ,chapter     
,,xii4    ,well1 we have now stated the 
nature and objects of ,practical ,wisdom
 and  ,science respectively1 and that   
they belong each to a different part of 
the ,soul4 ,but ,i can conceive a person
 questioning their utility4  8,science10
 he would say1 8concerns itself with    
none of the causes of  human happiness  
7for it has nothing to do with producing
 anything73  ,practical ,wisdom has this
 recommendation1 ,i grant1 but where is 
the  need of it1 since its province is  
those things which are just and         

honourable1 and good for man1 and these 
are the things which the good  man as   
such does2 but we are not a bit the more
 apt to do them because  we know them1  
since the ,moral ,virtues are ,habits2  
just as we are not  more apt to be      
healthy or in good condition from mere  
knowledge of what  relates to these 7,i 
mean1#dg of course1 things so called not
 from  their producing health1 etc41 but
 from their evidencing it in a          
particular subject71 for we are not more
 apt to be healthy and in good          
condition merely from knowing the art of
 medicine or training4    8,if it be    
urged that knowing what is good does not
 by itself make a  ,practically-,wise   
man but becoming good2 still this       
,wisdom will be no  use either to those 
that are good1 and so have it already1  
or to those  who have it not2 because it
 will make no difference to them whether
  they have it themselves or put        
themselves under the guidance of others 
who have2 and we might be contented to  

be in respect of this as in  respect of 
health3 for though we wish to be healthy
 still we do not set  about learning the
 art of healing4    8,furthermore1 it   
would seem to be strange that1 though   
lower in the  scale than ,science1 it is
 to be its master2 which it is1 because 
whatever produces results takes the rule
 and directs in each matter40    ,this  
then is what we are to talk about1 for  
these are the only points  now raised4  
,now first we say that being            
respectively ,excellences of different  
parts  of the ,soul they must be        
choice-worthy1 even on the supposition  
that  they neither of them produce      
results4    ,in the next place we say   
that they do produce results2 that      
,science  makes ,happiness1 not as the  
medical art but as healthiness makes    
health3#dh because1 being a part of     
,virtue in its most extensive  sense1 it
 makes a man happy by being possessed   
and by working4    ,next1 ,man's work as
 ,man is accomplished by virtue of      

,practical ,wisdom  and ,moral ,virtue1 
the latter giving the right aim and     
direction1 the  former the right means  
to its attainment2#di but of the fourth 
part of  the ,soul1 the mere nutritive  
principle1 there is no such ,excellence1
  because nothing is in its power to do 
or leave undone4#ej    ,as to our not   
being more apt to do what is noble and  
just by reason of  possessing ,practical
 ,wisdom1 we must begin a little higher 
up1#ea  taking this for our             
starting-point4 ,as we say that men may 
do things in  themselves just and yet   
not be just men2 for instance1 when men 
do what  the laws require of them1      
either against their will1 or by reason 
of  ignorance or something else1 at all 
events not for the sake of the  things  
themselves2 and yet they do what they   
ought and all that the  good man should 
do2 so it seems that to be a good man   
one must do each  act in a particular   
frame of mind1 ,i mean from ,moral      
,choice and for the  sake of the things 

themselves which are done4 ,now it is   
,virtue which  makes the ,moral ,choice 
right1 but whatever is naturally        
required to  carry out that ,choice     
comes under the province not of ,virtue 
but of a  different faculty4 ,we must   
halt1 as it were1 awhile1 and speak more
  clearly on these points4    ,there is 
then a certain faculty1 commonly named  
,cleverness1 of such a  nature as to be 
able to do and attain whatever conduces 
to any given  purpose3 now if that      
purpose be a good one the faculty is    
praiseworthy2  if otherwise1 it goes by 
a name which1 denoting strictly the     
ability1  implies the willingness to do 
anything2 we accordingly call the       
,practically-,wise ,clever1 and also    
those who can and will do  anything4#eb 
,now ,practical ,wisdom is not identical
 with ,cleverness1 nor is it  without   
this power of adapting means to ends3   
but this ,eye of the ,soul  7as we may  
call it7 does not attain its proper     
state without goodness1  as we have said

 before and as is quite plain1 because  
the syllogisms  into which ,moral       
,action may be analysed have for their  
,major  ,premiss1#ec 8since ---- is the 
,end and the ,chief ,good0#ed 7fill up  
the  blank with just anything you       
please1 for we merely want to exhibit   
the  ,form1 so that anything will do71  
but how this blank should be filled  is 
seen only by the good man3 because ,vice
 distorts the moral vision  and causes  
men to be deceived in respect of        
practical principles4#ee    ,it is      
clear1 therefore1 that a man cannot be a
 ,practically-,wise1  without being a   
good1 man4    ,we must enquire again    
also about ,virtue3 for it may be       
divided into  ,natural ,virtue and      
,matured1 which two bear to each other a
 relation  similar to that which        
,practical ,wisdom bears to ,cleverness1
 one not of  identity but resemblance4  
,i speak of ,natural ,virtue1 because   
men hold  that each of the moral        
dispositions attach to us all somehow by

 nature3  we have dispositions#ef       
towards justice1 self-mastery and       
courage1 for  instance1 immediately from
 our birth3 but still we seek ,goodness 
in its  highest sense as something      
distinct from these1 and that these     
dispositions should attach to us in a   
somewhat different fashion4#eg          
,children and brutes have these natural 
states1 but then they are  plainly      
hurtful unless combined with an         
intellectual element3 at least  thus    
much is matter of actual experience and 
observation1 that as a  strong body     
destitute of sight must1 if set in      
motion1 fall violently  because it has  
not sight1 so it is also in the case we 
are considering3  but if it can get the 
intellectual element it then excels in  
acting4  ,just so the ,natural ,state of
 ,virtue1 being like this strong body1  
will  then be ,virtue in the highest    
sense when it too is combined with the  
intellectual element4    ,so that1 as in
 the case of the ,opinionative faculty1 

there are two  forms1 ,cleverness and   
,practical ,wisdom2 so also in the case 
of the  ,moral there are two1 ,natural  
,virtue and ,matured2 and of these the  
latter cannot be formed without         
,practical ,wisdom4#eh    ,this leads   
some to say that all the ,virtues are   
merely intellectual  ,practical ,wisdom1
 and ,socrates was partly right in his  
enquiry and  partly wrong3 wrong in that
 he thought all the ,virtues were merely
  intellectual ,practical ,wisdom1 right
 in saying they were not  independent of
 that faculty4    ,a proof of which is  
that now all1 in defining ,virtue1 add  
on the  8state0 mentioning also to what 
standard it has reference1 namely  that 
8which is accordant with ,right         
,reason30 now 8right0 means in          
accordance with ,practical ,wisdom4 ,so 
then all seem to have an  instinctive   
notion that that state which is in      
accordance with  ,practical ,wisdom is  
,virtue2 however1 we must make a slight 
change in  their statement1 because that

 state is ,virtue1 not merely which is  
in  accordance with but which implies   
the possession of ,right ,reason2       
which1 upon such matters1 is ,practical 
,wisdom4 ,the difference between  us and
 ,socrates is this3 he thought the      
,virtues were reasoning  processes 7i4e4
 that they were all instances of        
,knowledge in its  strict sense71 but we
 say they imply the possession of       
,reason4    ,from what has been said    
then it is clear that one cannot be1    
strictly  speaking1 good without        
,practical ,wisdom nor                  
,practically-,wise without  moral       
goodness4    ,and by the distinction    
between ,natural and ,matured ,virtue   
one can meet  the reasoning by which it 
might be argued 8that the ,virtues are  
separable because the same man is not by
 nature most inclined to all at  once so
 that he will have acquired this one    
before he has that other30  we would    
reply that this is possible with respect
 to the ,natural  ,virtues but not with 

respect to those in right of which a man
 is  denominated simply good3 because   
they will all belong to him together    
with the one faculty of ,practical      
,wisdom4    ,it is plain too that even  
had it not been apt to act we should    
have  needed it1 because it is the      
,excellence of a part of the ,soul2 and 
that  the moral choice cannot be right  
independently of ,practical ,wisdom and 
,moral ,goodness2 because this gives the
 right ,end1 that causes the doing      
these things which conduce to the ,end4 
,then again1 it is not ,master of       
,science 7i4e4 of the superior part of  
the ,soul71 just as neither is the      
healing art ,master of health2 for it   
does not make use of it1 but looks how  
it may come to be3 so it  commands for  
the sake of it but does not command it4 
,the objection is1 in fact1 about as    
valid as if a man should say   governs  
the gods because it gives orders about  
all things in  the communty4            
,,appendix    ,on 1 from ,i4 ,post4     

,analyt4 chap4 i4 and ii4      7,such   
parts only are translated as throw light
 on the ,ethics47    ,all teaching1 and 
all intellectual learning1 proceeds on  
the basis of  previous knowledge1 as    
will appear on an examination of all4   
,the  ,mathematical ,sciences1 and every
 other system1 draw their conclusions   
in this method4 ,so too of reasonings1  
whether by syllogism1 or  induction3 for
 both teach through what is previously  
known1 the former  assuming the         
premisses as from wise men1 the latter  
proving universals  from the evidentness
 of the particulars4 ,in like manner too
  rhetoricians persuade1 either through 
examples 7which amounts to  induction71 
or through enthymemes 7which amounts to 
syllogism74     ,,chap4 ,,ii      ,well1
 we suppose that we know things 7in the 
strict and proper sense  of the word7   
when we suppose ourselves to know the   
cause by reason of  which the thing is  
to be the cause of it2 and that this    
cannot be  otherwise4 ,it is plain that 

the idea intended to be conveyed by the 
term knowing is something of this kind2 
because they who do not  really know    
suppose themselves thus related to the  
matter in hand and  they who do know    
really are so that of whatsoever there  
is properly  speaking ,knowledge this   
cannot be otherwise than it is ,whether 
or no  there is another way of knowing  
we will say afterwards1 but we do say   
that we know through demonstration1 by  
which ,i mean a syllogism apt to        
produce ,knowledge1 i4e4 in right of    
which through having it1 we know4    ,if
 ,knowledge then is such as we have     
described it1 the ,knowledge  produced  
by demonstrative reasoning must be drawn
 from premisses true  and first1 and    
incapable of syllogistic proof1 and     
better known1  and prior in order of    
time1 and causes of the conclusion1 for 
so  the principles will be akin to the  
conclusion demonstrated4    7,syllogism1
 of course there may be without such    
premisses1 but it will  not be          

demonstration because it will not       
produce knowledge74    ,true1 they must 
be1 because it is impossible to know    
that which is  not4    ,first1 that is  
indemonstrable1 because1 if             
demonstrable1 he cannot be  said to know
 them who has no demonstration of them  
for knowing such  things as are         
demonstrable is the same as having      
demonstration of them4    ,causes they  
must be1 and better known1 and prior in 
time1  causes1 because we then know when
 we are acquainted with the cause1  and 
prior1 if causes1 and known beforehand1 
not merely comprehended  in idea but    
known to exist 7,the terms prior1 and   
better known1 bear two  senses for prior
 by nature and prior relatively to      
ourselves are  not the same1 nor better 
known by nature1 and better known to us 
,i  mean1 by prior and better known     
relatively to ourselves1 such  things as
 are nearer to sensation1 but           
abstractedly so such as are  further    
,those are furthest which are most      

universal those nearest which  are      
particulars1 and these are mutually     
opposed47    ,and by first1 ,i mean     
principles akin to the conclusion1 for  
principle means the same as first ,and  
the principle or first step in          
demonstration is a proposition incapable
 of syllogistic proof1 i4e4  one to     
which there is none prior4 ,now of such 
syllogistic principles ,i  call that a  
which you cannot demonstrate1 and which 
is  unnecessary with a view to learning 
something else4 ,that which is          
necessary in order to learn something   
else is an ,axiom4    ,further1 since   
one is to believe and know the thing by 
having a  syllogism of the kind called  
demonstration1 and what constitutes it  
to  be such is the nature of the        
premisses1 it is necessary not merely to
  know before1 but to know better than  
the conclusion1 either all or  at least 
some of1 the principles1 because that   
which is the cause of a  quality        
inhering in something else always       

inheres itself more as the  cause of our
 loving is itself more lovable4 ,so1    
since the principles  are the cause of  
our knowing and behoving we know and    
believe them  more1 because by reason of
 them we know also the conclusion       
following4    ,further3 the man who is  
to have the ,knowledge which comes      
through  demonstration must not merely  
know and believe his principles better  
than he does his conclusion1 but he must
 believe nothing more firmly  than the  
contradictories of those principles out 
of which the contrary  fallacy may be   
constructed3 since he who knows1 is to  
be simply and  absolutely infallible4   
,,book ,,vii    ,chapter ,i4      ,next 
we must take a different point to start 
from1#a and observe that  of what is to 
be avoided in respect of moral character
 there are three  forms2 ,vice1         
,imperfect ,self-,control1 and          
,brutishness4 ,of the two former  it is 
plain what the contraries are1 for we   
call the one ,virtue1 the  other        

,self-,control2 and as answering to     
,brutishness it will be most  suitable  
to assign ,superhuman1 i4e4 heroical and
 godlike ,virtue1 as1 in  ,homer1 ,priam
 says of ,hector 8that he was very      
excellent1 nor was he  like the         
offspring of mortal man1 but of a god40 
and so1 if1 as is  commonly said1 men   
are raised to the position of gods by   
reason of very  high excellence in      
,virtue1 the state opposed to the       
,brutish will  plainly be of this       
nature3 because as brutes are not       
virtuous or  vicious so neither are     
gods2 but the state of these is         
something more  precious than ,virtue1  
of the former something different in    
kind from  ,vice4    ,and as1 on the one
 hand1 it is a rare thing for a man to  
be godlike 7a  term the ,lacedmonians   
are accustomed to use when they admire a
 man  exceedingly2    they call him71 so
 the brutish man is rare2  the character
 is found most among barbarians1 and    
some cases of it are  caused by disease 

or maiming2 also such men as exceed in  
vice all  ordinary measures we therefore
 designate by this opprobrious term4    
,well1 we must in a subsequent place    
make some mention of this  disposition1 
and ,vice has been spoken of before3 for
 the present we  must speak of          
,imperfect ,self-,control and its       
kindred faults of ,softness  and        
,luxury1 on the one hand1 and of        
,self-,control and ,endurance on the    
other2 since we are to conceive of them1
 not as being the same states  exactly  
as ,virtue and ,vice respectively1 nor  
again as differing in  kind4    ,and we 
should adopt the same course as before1 
i4e4 state the  phenomena1 and1 after   
raising and discussing difficulties     
which suggest  themselves1 then exhibit1
 if possible1 all the opinions afloat   
respecting these affections of the moral
 character2 or1 if not all1 the  greater
 part and the most important3 for we may
 consider we have  illustrated the      
matter sufficiently when the            

difficulties have been  solved1 and such
 theories as are most approved are left 
as a residuum4    ,the chief points may 
be thus enumerated4 ,it is thought1     
,i4 ,that ,self-,control and ,endurance 
belong to the class of things good  and 
praiseworthy1 while ,imperfect          
,self-,control and ,softness belong to  
that of things low and blameworthy4     
,,ii4 ,that the man of ,self-,control is
 identical with the man who is apt  to  
abide by his resolution1 and the man of 
,imperfect ,self-,control with  him who 
is apt to depart from his resolution4   
,,iii4 ,that the man of ,imperfect      
,self-,control does things at the       
instigation of his passions1 knowing    
them to be wrong1 while the man of      
,self-,control1 knowing his lusts to be 
wrong1 refuses1 by the influence  of    
reason1 to follow their suggestions4    
,,iv4 ,that the man of ,perfected       
,self-,mastery unites the qualities of  
,self-,control and ,endurance1 and some 
say that every one who unites  these is 

a man of ,perfect ,self-,mastery1 others
 do not4    ,v4 ,some confound the two  
characters of the man who has no        
,self-,control1 and the man of          
,imperfect ,self-,control1 while others 
distinguish between them4    ,,vi4 ,it  
is sometimes said that the man of       
,practical ,wisdom cannot be a  man of  
,imperfect ,self-,control1 sometimes    
that men who are ,practically  ,wise and
 ,clever are of ,imperfect              
,self-,control4    ,,vii4 ,again1 men   
are said to be of ,imperfect            
,self-,control1 not simply  but with the
 addition of the thing wherein1 as in   
respect of anger1 of  honour1 and gain4 
,these then are pretty well the common  
statements4    ,chapter ,,ii4      ,now 
a man may raise a question as to the    
nature of the right conception  in      
violation of which a man fails of       
,self-,control4    ,that he can so fail 
when knowing in the strict sense what is
 right  some say is impossible3 for it  
is a strange thing1 as ,socrates        

thought1  that while ,knowledge is      
present in his mind something else      
should  master him and drag him about   
like a slave4 ,socrates in fact         
contended  generally against the theory1
 maintaining there is no such state as  
that of ,imperfect ,self-,control1 for  
that no one acts contrary to what  is   
best conceiving it to be best but by    
reason of ignorance what is  best4      
,with all due respect to ,socrates1 his 
account of the matter is at  variance   
with plain facts1 and we must enquire   
with respect to the  affection1 if it be
 caused by ignorance what is the nature 
of the  ignorance3 for that the man so  
failing does not suppose his acts to be 
right before he is under the influence  
of passion is quite plain4#b    ,there  
are people who partly agree with        
,socrates and partly not3 that  nothing 
can be stronger than ,knowledge they    
agree1 but that no man acts  in         
contravention of his conviction of what 
is better they do not agree2  and so    

they say that it is not ,knowledge1 but 
only ,opinion1 which the  man in        
question has and yet yields to the      
instigation of his pleasures4    ,but   
then1 if it is ,opinion and not         
,knowledge1 that is it the opposing     
conception be not strong but only mild  
7as in the case of real doubt71  the not
 abiding by it in the face of strong    
lusts would be excusable3  but          
wickedness is not excusable1 nor is     
anything which deserves blame4    ,well 
then1 is it ,practical ,wisdom which in 
this case offers opposition3  for that  
is the strongest principle8 ,the        
supposition is absurd1 for we  shall    
have the same man uniting ,practical    
,wisdom and ,imperfect  ,self-,control1 
and surely no single person would       
maintain that it is  consistent with the
 character of ,practical ,wisdom to do  
voluntarily  what is very wrong2 and    
besides we have shown before that the   
very mark  of a man of this character is
 aptitude to act1 as distinguished from 

mere knowledge of what is right2 because
 he is a man conversant with  particular
 details1 and possessed of all the other
 virtues4    ,again1 if the having      
strong and bad lusts is necessary to the
 idea of  the man of ,self-,control1    
this character cannot be identical with 
the  man of ,perfected ,self-,mastery1  
because the having strong desires or bad
  ones does not enter into the idea of  
this latter character3 and yet the  man 
of ,self-,control must have such3 for   
suppose them good2 then the  moral state
 which should hinder a man from         
following their suggestions  must be    
bad1 and so ,self-,control would not be 
in all cases good3  suppose them on the 
other hand to be weak and not wrong1 it 
would be  nothing grand2 nor anything   
great1 supposing them to be wrong and   
weak4    ,again1 if ,self-,control makes
 a man apt to abide by all opinions     
without  exception1 it may be bad1 as   
suppose the case of a false opinion3 and
  if ,imperfect ,self-,control makes a  

man apt to depart from all without      
exception1 we shall have cases where it 
will be good2 take that of  ,neoptolemus
 in the ,philoctetes of ,sophocles1 for 
instance3 he is to be  praised for not  
abiding by what he was persuaded to by  
,ulysses1 because  he was pained at     
being guilty of falsehood4    ,or again1
 false sophistical reasoning presents a 
difficulty3 for  because men wish to    
prove paradoxes that they may be counted
 clever  when they succeed1 the         
reasoning that has been used becomes a  
difficulty3 for the intellect is        
fettered2 a man being unwilling to      
abide by the conclusion because it does 
not please his judgment1 but  unable to 
advance because he cannot disentangle   
the web of sophistical  reasoning4      
,or again1 it is conceivable on this    
supposition that folly joined with      
,imperfect ,self-,control may turn out1 
in a given case1 goodness3 for by       
reason of his imperfection of           
self-control a man acts in a way which  

contradicts his notions2 now his notion 
is that what is really good is  bad and 
ought not to be done2 and so he will    
eventually do what is good  and not what
 is bad4    ,again1 on the same         
supposition1 the man who acting on      
conviction  pursues and chooses things  
because they are pleasant must be       
thought a  better man than he who does  
so not by reason of a quasi-rational    
conviction but of ,imperfect            
,self-,control3 because he is more open 
to  cure by reason of the possibility of
 his receiving a contrary  conviction4  
,but to the man of ,imperfect           
,self-,control would apply the  proverb1
 8when water chokes1 what should a man  
drink then80 for had he  never been     
convinced at all in respect of what he  
does1#c then by a  conviction in a      
contrary direction he might have stopped
 in his course2  but now though he has  
had convictions he notwithstanding acts 
against  them4    ,again1 if any and    
every thing is the object-matter of     

,imperfect and  ,perfect ,self-,control1
 who is the man of ,imperfect           
,self-,control simply8  because no one  
unites all cases of it1 and we commonly 
say that some  men are so simply1 not   
adding any particular thing in which    
they are  so4    ,well1 the difficulties
 raised are pretty near such as ,i have 
described  them1 and of these theories  
we must remove some and leave others as 
established2 because the solving of a   
difficulty is a positive act of         
establishing something as true4         
,chapter ,,iii4    ,now we must examine 
first whether men of ,imperfect         
,self-,control act  with a knowledge of 
what is right or not3 next1 if with such
 knowledge1  in what sense2 and next    
what are we to assume is the            
object-matter of  the man of ,imperfect 
,self-,control1 and of the man of       
,self-,control2 ,i  mean1 whether       
pleasure and pain of all kinds or       
certain definite ones2  and as to       
,self-,control and ,endurance1 whether  

these are designations of  the same     
character or different4 ,and in like    
manner we must go into all  questions   
which are connected with the present4   
,but the real starting point of the     
enquiry is1 whether the two  characters 
of ,self-,control and ,imperfect        
,self-,control are distinguished  by    
their object-matter1 or their respective
 relations to it4 ,i mean1  whether the 
man of ,imperfect ,self-,control is such
 simply by virtue of  having such and   
such object-matter2 or not1 but by      
virtue of his being  related to it in   
such and such a way1 or by virtue of    
both3 next1  whether ,self-,control and 
,imperfect ,self-,control are unlimited 
in their  object-matter3 because he who 
is designated without any addition a man
  of ,imperfect ,self-,control is not   
unlimited in his object-matter1 but  has
 exactly the same as the man who has    
lost all ,self-,control3 nor is  he so  
designated because of his relation to   
this object-matter merely  7for then his

 character would be identical with that 
just mentioned1  loss of all            
,self-,control71 but because of his     
relation to it being such  and such4    
,for the man who has lost all           
,self-,control is led on with           
deliberate moral choice1 holding that it
 is his line to pursue pleasure  as it  
rises3 while the man of ,imperfect      
,self-,control does not think  that he  
ought to pursue it1 but does pursue it  
all the same4    ,now as to the notion  
that it is ,true ,opinion and not       
,knowledge in  contravention of which   
men fail in ,self-,control1 it makes no 
difference  to the point in question1   
because some of those who hold ,opinions
 have  no doubt about them but suppose  
themselves to have accurate ,knowledge2 
if then it is urged that men holding    
,opinions will be more likely than  men 
who have ,knowledge to act in           
contravention of their conceptions1 as  
having but a moderate belief in them2 we
 reply1 ,knowledge will not  differ in  

this respect from ,opinion3 because some
 men believe their own  ,opinions no    
less firmly than others do their        
positive ,knowledge3  ,heraclitus is a  
case in point4    ,rather the following 
is the account of it3 the term knowing  
has two  senses2 both the man who does  
not use his ,knowledge1 and he who does1
  are said to know3 there will be a     
difference between a man's acting       
wrongly1 who though possessed of        
,knowledge does not call it into        
operation1 and his doing so who has it  
and actually exercises it3 the  latter  
is a strange case1 but the mere having1 
if not exercising1  presents no anomaly4
    ,again1 as there are two kinds of   
propositions affecting action1#d        
universal and particular1 there is no   
reason why a man may not act  against   
his ,knowledge1 having both propositions
 in his mind1 using the  universal but  
not the particular1 for the particulars 
are the objects  of moral action4       
,there is a difference also in universal

 propositions2#e a universal            
proposition may relate partly to a man's
 self and partly to the thing  in       
question3 take the following for        
instance2 8dry food is good for  every  
man10 this may have the two minor       
premisses1 8this is a man10 and  8so and
 so is dry food20 but whether a given   
substance is so and so a  man either has
 not the ,knowledge or does not exert   
it4 ,according to  these different      
senses there will be an immense         
difference1 so that for  a man to know  
in the one sense1 and yet act wrongly1  
would be nothing  strange1 but in any of
 the other senses it would be a matter  
for  wonder4    ,again1 men may have    
,knowledge in a way different from any  
of those  which have been now stated3   
for we constantly see a man's state so  
differing by having and not using       
,knowledge1 that he has it in a sense   
and also has not2 when a man is asleep1 
for instance1 or mad1 or drunk3  well1  
men under the actual operation of       

passion are in exactly similar          
conditions2 for anger1 lust1 and some   
other such-like things1  manifestly make
 changes even in the body1 and in some  
they even cause  madness2 it is plain   
then that we must say the men of        
,imperfect  ,self-,control are in a     
state similar to these4    ,and their   
saying what embodies ,knowledge is no   
proof of their actually  then exercising
 it1 because they who are under the     
operation of these  passions repeat     
demonstrations2 or verses of            
,empedocles1#f just as  children1 when  
first learning1 string words together1  
but as yet know  nothing of their       
meaning1 because they must grow into it1
 and this is a  process requiring time3 
so that we must suppose these men who   
fail in  ,self-,control to say these    
moral sayings just as actors do4        
,furthermore1 a man may look at the     
account of the phnomenon in the         
following way1 from an examination of   
the actual working of the mind3  ,all   

action may be analysed into a syllogism1
 in which the one premiss  is an        
universal maxim and the other concerns  
particulars of which ,sense  moral or   
physical1 as the case may be is         
cognisant3 now when one  results from   
these two1 it follows necessarily that1 
as far as theory  goes the mind must    
assert the conclusion1 and in practical 
propositions  the man must act          
accordingly4    ,for instance1 let the  
universal be1 8,all that is sweet should
 be  tasted10 the particular1 8,this is 
sweet20 it follows necessarily that  he 
who is able and is not hindered should  
not only draw1 but put in  practice1 the
 conclusion 8,this is to be tasted40    
,when then there is in  the mind one    
universal proposition forbidding to     
taste1 and the other  8,all that is     
sweet is pleasant0 with its minor 8,this
 is sweet0 7which  is the one that      
really works71 and desire happens to be 
in the man1 the  first universal bids   
him avoid this but the desire leads him 

on to  taste2 for it has the power of   
moving the various organs3 and so it    
results that he fails in ,self-,control1
 in a certain sense under the  influence
 of ,reason and ,opinion not contrary in
 itself to ,reason but  only            
accidentally so2 because it is the      
desire that is contrary to  ,right      
,reason1 but not the ,opinion3#g and so 
for this reason brutes are  not         
accounted of ,imperfect ,self-,control1 
because they have no power of           
conceiving universals but only of       
receiving and retaining particular      
impressions4    ,as to the manner in    
which the ignorance is removed and the  
man of  ,imperfect ,self-,control       
recovers his ,knowledge1 the account is 
the same  as with respect to him who is 
drunk or asleep1 and is not peculiar to 
this affection1 so physiologists#h are  
the right people to apply to4  ,but     
whereas the minor premiss of every      
practical syllogism is an  opinion on   
matter cognisable by ,sense and         

determines the actions2 he  who is under
 the influence of passion either has not
 this1 or so has it  that his having    
does not amount to knowing but merely   
saying1 as a  man when drunk might      
repeat ,empedocles' verses2 and because 
the minor  term#i is neither universal1 
nor is thought to have the power of     
producing ,knowledge in like manner as  
the universal term3 and so the  result  
which ,socrates was seeking comes out1  
that is to say1 the  affection does not 
take place in the presence of that which
 is thought  to be specially and        
properly ,knowledge1 nor is this dragged
 about by  reason of the affection1 but 
in the presence of that ,knowledge which
 is  conveyed by ,sense4    ,let this   
account then be accepted of the question
 respecting the  failure in             
,self-,control1 whether it is with      
,knowledge1 and the manner  in which    
such failure is possible or not1 though 
a man possesses  ,knowledge4    ,chapter
 ,,iv4    ,the next question to be      

discussed is whether there is a         
character to be  designated by the term 
8of ,imperfect ,self-,control0 simply1  
or whether  all who are so are to be    
accounted such1 in respect of some      
particular  thing2 and1 if there is such
 a character1 what is his object-matter4
    ,now that pleasures and pains are   
the object-matter of men of             
,self-,control and of ,endurance1 and   
also of men of ,imperfect               
,self-,control and ,softness1 is plain4 
,further1 things which produce pleasure 
are either necessary1 or objects  of    
choice in themselves but yet admitting  
of excess4 ,all bodily things  which    
produce pleasure are necessary2 and ,i  
call such those which  relate to food   
and other grosser appetities1 in short  
such bodily  things as we assumed were  
the ,object-matter of absence of        
,self-,control  and of ,perfected       
,self-,mastery4    ,the other class of  
objects are not necessary1 but objects  
of choice in  themselves3 ,i mean1 for  

instance1 victory1 honour1 wealth1 and  
such-like good or pleasant things4 ,and 
those who are excessive in their  liking
 for such things contrary to the        
principle of ,right ,reason which  is in
 their own breasts we do not designate  
men of ,imperfect  ,self-,control       
simply1 but with the addition of the    
thing wherein1 as in  respect of money1 
or gain1 or honour1 or anger1 and not   
simply2 because  we consider them as    
different characters and only having    
that title in  right of a kind of       
resemblance 7as when we add to a man's  
name  8conqueror in the ,olympic games0 
the account of him as ,man differs but  
little from the account of him as the   
,man who conquered in the ,olympic      
games1 but still it is different74 ,and 
a proof of the real difference  between 
these so designated with an addition and
 those simply so called  is this1 that  
,imperfect ,self-,control is blamed1 not
 as an error merely  but also as being a
 vice1 either wholly or partially2 but  

none of these  other cases is so blamed4
    ,but of those who have for their    
object-matter the bodily enjoyments1    
which we say are also the object-matter 
of the man of ,perfected  ,self-,mastery
 and the man who has lost all           
,self-,control1 he that pursues         
excessive pleasures and too much        
avoids#aj things which are painful  7as 
hunger and thirst1 heat and cold1 and   
everything connected with  touch and    
taste71 not from moral choice but in    
spite of his moral  choice and          
intellectual conviction1 is termed 8a   
man of ,imperfect  ,self-,control10 not 
with the addition of any particular     
object-matter as  we do in respect of   
want of control of anger but simply4    
,and a proof that the term is thus      
applied is that the kindred term        
8,soft0 is used in respect of these     
enjoyments but not in respect of any  of
 those others4 ,and for this reason we  
put into the same rank the man  of      
,imperfect ,self-,control1 the man who  

has lost it entirely1 the man  who has  
it1 and the man of ,perfected           
,self-,mastery2 but not any of those    
other characters1 because the former    
have for their object-matter the  same  
pleasures and pains3 but though they    
have the same object-matter1  they are  
not related to it in the same way1 but  
two of them act upon  moral choice1 two 
without it4 ,and so we should say that  
man is more  entirely given up to his   
passions who pursues excessive          
pleasures1 and  avoids moderate pains1  
being either not at all1 or at least but
 little1  urged by desire1 than the man 
who does so because his desire is very  
strong3 because we think what would the 
former be likely to do if he  had the   
additional stimulus of youthful lust and
 violent pain  consequent on the want of
 those pleasures which we have          
denominated  necessary8    ,well then1  
since of desires and pleasures there are
 some which are in  kind honourable and 
good 7because things pleasant are       

divisible1 as we  said before1 into such
 as are naturally objects of choice1    
such as are  naturally objects of       
avoidance1 and such as are in themselves
  indifferent1 money1 gain1 honour1     
victory1 for instance72 in respect of   
all such and those that are indifferent1
 men are blamed not merely#aa  for being
 affected by or desiring or liking them1
 but for exceeding in  any way in these 
feelings4    ,and so they are blamed1   
whosoever in spite of ,reason are       
mastered by1  that is pursue1 any       
object1 though in its nature noble and  
good2 they1  for instance1 who are more 
earnest than they should be respecting  
honour1 or their children or parents2   
not but what these are good  objects and
 men are praised for being earnest about
 them3 but still  they admit of excess2 
for instance1 if any one1 as ,niobe did1
 should  fight even against the gods1 or
 feel towards his father as ,satyrus1   
who  got therefrom the nickname of 1    
because he was thought to be  very      

foolish4    ,now depravity there is none
 in regard of these things1 for the     
reason  assigned above1 that each of    
them in itself is a thing naturally     
choice-worthy1 yet the excesses in      
respect of them are wrong and matter    
for blame3 and similarly there is no    
,imperfect ,self-,control in respect  of
 these things2 that being not merely a  
thing that should be avoided  but       
blameworthy4    ,but because of the     
resemblance of the affection to the     
,imperfection of  ,self-,control the    
term is used with the addition in each  
case of the  particular object-matter1  
just as men call a man a bad physician1 
or  bad actor1 whom they would not think
 of calling simply bad4 ,as then in     
these cases we do not apply the term    
simply because each of the states  is   
not a vice1 but only like a vice in the 
way of analogy1#ab so it is  plain that 
in respect of ,imperfect ,self-,control 
and ,self-,control we  must limit the   
names to those states which have the    

same object-matter  as ,perfected       
,self-,mastery and utter loss of        
,self-,control1 and that we  do apply it
 to the case of anger only in the way of
 resemblance3 for  which reason1 with an
 addition1 we designate a man of        
,imperfect  ,self-,control in respect of
 anger1 as of honour or of gain4        
,chapter ,v4    ,as there are some      
things naturally pleasant1 and of these 
two kinds2  those1 namely1 which are    
pleasant generally1 and those which are 
so  relatively to particular kinds of   
animals and men2 so there are others    
which are not naturally pleasant but    
which come to be so in consequence      
either of maimings1 or custom1 or       
depraved natural tastes3 and one may    
observe moral states similar to those we
 have been speaking of1 having          
respectively these classes of things for
 their object-matter4    ,i mean the    
,brutish1 as in the case of the female  
who1 they say1 would  rip up women with 
child and eat the foetus2 or the tastes 

which are  found among the savage tribes
 bordering on the ,pontus1 some liking  
raw  flesh1 and some being cannibals1   
and some lending one another their      
children to make feasts of2 or what is  
said of ,phalaris4 ,these are  instances
 of ,brutish states1 caused in some by  
disease or madness2  take1 for instance1
 the man who sacrificed and ate his     
mother1 or him  who devoured the liver  
of his fellow-servant4 ,instances again 
of those  caused by disease or by       
custom1 would be1 plucking out of hair1 
or  eating one's nails1 or eating coals 
and earth4#ac ,now wherever nature  is  
really the cause no one would think of  
calling men of ,imperfect               
,self-,control1 444 nor1 in like manner1
 such as are in a diseased state        
through custom4    ,the having any of   
these inclinations is something foreign 
to what is  denominated ,vice1 just as  
,brutishness is3 and when a man has them
 his  mastering them is not properly    
,self-,control1 nor his being mastered  

by  them ,imperfection of ,self-,control
 in the proper sense1 but only in the   
way of resemblance2 just as we may say a
 man of ungovernable wrath  fails of    
,self-,control in respect of anger but  
not simply fails of  ,self-,control4    
,for all excessive folly1 cowardice1    
absence of  ,self-,control1 or          
irritability1 are either ,brutish or    
morbid4 ,the man1  for instance1 who is 
naturally afraid of all things1 even if 
a mouse  should stir1 is cowardly after 
a ,brutish sort2 there was a man again  
who1 by reason of disease1 was afraid of
 a cat3 and of the fools1 they  who are 
naturally destitute of ,reason and live 
only by ,sense are  ,brutish1 as are    
some tribes of the far-off barbarians1  
while others who  are so by reason of   
diseases1 epileptic or frantic1 are in  
morbid  states4    ,so then1 of these   
inclinations1 a man may sometimes merely
 have one  without yielding to it3 ,i   
mean1 suppose that ,phalaris had        
restrained  his unnatural desire to eat 

a child3 or he may both have and yield  
to  it4 ,as then ,vice when such as     
belongs to human nature is called ,vice 
simply1 while the other is so called    
with the addition of 8brutish0 or       
8morbid10 but not simply ,vice1 so      
manifestly there is ,brutish and        
,morbid ,imperfection of ,self-,control1
 but that alone is entitled to the  name
 without any qualification which is of  
the nature of utter absence  of         
,self-,control1 as it is found in ,man4 
,chapter ,,vi4    ,it is plain then that
 the object-matter of ,imperfect        
,self-,control and  ,self-,control is   
restricted to the same as that of utter 
absence of  ,self-,control and that of  
,perfected ,self-,mastery1 and that the 
rest is  the object-matter of a         
different species so named              
metaphorically and  not simply3 we will 
now examine the position1 8that         
,imperfect  ,self-,control in respect of
 ,anger is less disgraceful than that in
  respect of ,lusts40    ,in the first  

place1 it seems that ,anger does in a   
way listen to ,reason  but mishears it2 
as quick servants who run out before    
they have heard  the whole of what is   
said and then mistake the order2 dogs1  
again1 bark  at the slightest stir1     
before they have seen whether it be     
friend or  foe2 just so ,anger1 by      
reason of its natural heat and          
quickness1  listening to ,reason1 but   
without having heard the command of     
,reason1  rushes to its revenge4 ,that  
is to say1 ,reason or some impression on
 the  mind shows there is insolence or  
contempt#ad in the offender1 and then   
,anger1 reasoning as it were that one   
ought to fight against what is  such1   
fires up immediately3 whereas ,lust1 if 
,reason or ,sense1 as the  case may be1 
merely says a thing is sweet1 rushes to 
the enjoyment of  it3 and so ,anger     
follows ,reason in a manner1 but ,lust  
does not and is  therefore more         
disgraceful3 because he that cannot     
control his anger  yields in a manner to

 ,reason1 but the other to his ,lust and
 not to  ,reason at all4    ,again1 a   
man is more excusable for following such
 desires as are  natural1 just as he is 
for following such ,lusts as are common 
to all  and to that degree in which they
 are common4 ,now ,anger and            
irritability  are more natural than     
,lusts when in excess and for objects   
not  necessary4 7,this was the ground of
 the defence the man made who beat  his 
father1 8,my father10 he said1 8used to 
beat his1 and his father his  again1 and
 this little fellow here10 pointing to  
his child1 8will beat  me when he is    
grown a man3 it runs in the family40    
,and the father1 as  he was being       
dragged along1 bid his son leave off    
beating him at the  door1 because he had
 himself been used to drag his father so
 far and no  farther47    ,again1       
characters are less unjust in proportion
 as they involve less  insidiousness4   
,now the ,angry man is not insidious1   
nor is ,anger1 but  quite open3 but     

,lust is3 as they say of ,venus1        
8,cyprus-born ,goddess1 weaver of       
deceits0      ,or ,homer of the girdle  
called the ,cestus1    8,persuasiveness 
cheating e'en the subtlest mind40       
,and so since this kind of ,imperfect   
,self-,control is more unjust1 it is    
also more disgraceful than that in      
respect of ,anger1 and is simply        
,imperfect ,self-,control1 and ,vice in 
a certain sense4    ,again1 no man feels
 pain in being insolent1 but every one  
who acts  through ,anger does act with  
pain2 and he who acts insolently does it
  with pleasure4 ,if then those things  
are most unjust with which we have  most
 right to be angry1 then ,imperfect     
,self-,control1 arising from ,lust1  is 
more so than that arising from ,anger3  
because in ,anger there is no           
insolence4#ae    ,well then1 it is clear
 that ,imperfect ,self-,control in      
respect of ,lusts  is more disgraceful  
than that in respect of ,anger1 and that
 the  object-matter of ,self-,control1  

and the ,imperfection of it1 are bodily 
,lusts and pleasures2 but of these last 
we must take into account the           
differences2 for1 as was said at the    
commencement1 some are proper to  the   
human race and natural both in kind and 
degree1 others ,brutish1 and  others    
caused by maimings and diseases4    ,now
 the first of these only are the        
object-matter of ,perfected             
,self-,mastery and utter absence of     
,self-,control2 and therefore we never  
attribute either of these states to     
,brutes 7except metaphorically1 and     
whenever any one kind of animal differs 
entirely from another in  insolence1    
mischievousness1 or voracity71 because  
they have not moral  choice or process  
of deliberation1 but are quite different
 from that  kind of creature just as are
 madmen from other men4    ,brutishness 
is not so low in the scale as ,vice1 yet
 it is to be  regarded with more fear3  
because it is not that the highest      
principle  has been corrupted1 as in the

 human creature1 but the subject has it 
not at all4    ,it is much the same1    
therefore1 as if one should compare an  
inanimate  with an animate being1 which 
were the worse3 for the badness of that 
which has no principle of origination is
 always less harmful2 now  ,intellect is
 a principle of origination4 ,a similar 
case would be the  comparing injustice  
and an unjust man together3 for in      
different ways  each is the worst3 a bad
 man would produce ten thousand times as
 much  harm as a bad brute4    ,chapter 
,,vii4    ,now with respect to the      
pleasures and pains which come to a man 
through  ,touch and ,taste1 and the     
desiring or avoiding such 7which we     
determined  before to constitute the    
object-matter of the states of utter    
absence  of ,self-,control and          
,perfected ,self-,mastery71 one may be  
so disposed as  to yield to temptations 
to which most men would be superior1 or 
to be  superior to those to which most  
men would yield3 in respect of          

pleasures1 these characters will be     
respectively the man of ,imperfect      
,self-,control1 and the man of          
,self-,control2 and1 in respect of      
pains1  the man of ,softness and the man
 of ,endurance3 but the moral state of  
most men is something between the two1  
even though they lean somewhat  to the  
worse characters4    ,again1 since of   
the pleasures indicated some are        
necessary and some are  not1 others are 
so to a certain degree but not the      
excess or defect of  them1 and similarly
 also of ,lusts and pains1 the man who  
pursues the  excess of pleasant things1 
or such as are in themselves excess1 or 
from  moral choice1 for their own sake1 
and not for anything else which is to   
result from them1 is a man utterly void 
of ,self-,control3 for he must be       
incapable of remorse1 and so incurable1 
because he that has not remorse  is     
incurable4 7,he that has too little love
 of pleasure is the opposite  character1
 and the man of ,perfected              

,self-,mastery the mean character47  ,he
 is of a similar character who avoids   
the bodily pains1 not because  he       
cannot1 but because he chooses not to1  
withstand them4    ,but of the          
characters who go wrong without choosing
 so to do1 the one  is led on by reason 
of pleasure1 the other because he avoids
 the pain  it would cost him to deny his
 lust2 and so they are different the one
  from the other4 ,now every one would  
pronounce a man worse for doing         
something base without any impulse of   
desire1 or with a very slight  one1 than
 for doing the same from the impulse of 
a very strong desire2  for striking a   
man when not angry than if he did so in 
wrath3 because  one naturally says1     
8,what would he have done had he been   
under the  influence of passion80 7and  
on this ground1 by the bye1 the man     
utterly  void of ,self-,control is worse
 than he who has it imperfectly74       
,however1  of the two characters which  
have been mentioned1#af as included in  

that of utter absence of ,self-,control1
 the one is rather ,softness1 the  other
 properly the man of no ,self-,control4 
,furthermore1 to the character of       
,imperfect ,self-,control is opposed    
that  of ,self-,control1 and to that of 
,softness that of ,endurance3 because   
,endurance consists in continued        
resistance but ,self-,control in actual 
mastery1 and continued resistance and   
actual mastery are as different  as not 
being conquered is from conquering2 and 
so ,self-,control is more  choice-worthy
 than ,endurance4    ,again1 he who     
fails when exposed to those temptations 
against which the  common run of men    
hold out1 and are well able to do so1 is
 ,soft and  ,luxurious 7,luxury being a 
kind of ,softness73 the kind of man1 ,i 
mean1  to let his robe drag in the dirt 
to avoid the trouble of lifting it1  and
 who1 aping the sick man1 does not      
however suppose himself wretched  though
 he is like a wretched man4 ,so it is   
too with respect to  ,self-,control and 

the ,imperfection of it3 if a man yields
 to pleasures  or pains which are       
violent and excessive it is no matter   
for wonder1  but rather for allowance if
 he made what resistance he could       
7instances  are1 ,philoctetes in        
,theodectes' drama when wounded by the  
viper2 or  ,cercyon in the ,alope of    
,carcinus1 or men who in trying to      
suppress  laughter burst into a loud    
continuous fit of it1 as happened1 you  
remember1 to ,xenophantus71 but it is a 
matter for wonder when a man  yields to 
and cannot contend against those        
pleasures or pains which the  common    
herd are able to resist2 always         
supposing his failure not to be  owing  
to natural constitution or disease1 ,i  
mean1 as the ,scythian kings  are       
constitutionally ,soft1 or the natural  
difference between the sexes4    ,again1
 the man who is a slave to amusement is 
commonly thought to be  destitute of    
,self-,control1 but he really is ,soft2 
because amusement is  an act of         

relaxing1 being an act of resting1 and  
the character in  question is one of    
those who exceed due bounds in respect  
of this4    ,moreover of ,imperfect     
,self-,control there are two forms1     
,precipitancy  and ,weakness3 those who 
have it in the latter form though they  
have  made resolutions do not abide by  
them by reason of passion2 the others   
are led by passion because they have    
never formed any resolutions at  all3   
while there are some who1 like those who
 by tickling themselves  beforehand get 
rid of ticklishness1 having felt and    
seen beforehand the  approach of        
temptation1 and roused up themselves and
 their resolution1  yield not to        
passion2 whether the temptation be      
somewhat pleasant or  somewhat painful4 
,the ,precipitate form of ,imperfect    
,self-,control they  are most liable to 
who are constitutionally of a sharp or  
melancholy  temperament3 because the one
 by reason of the swiftness1 the other  
by  reason of the violence1 of their    

passions1 do not wait for ,reason1      
because they are disposed to follow     
whatever notion is impressed upon  their
 minds4    ,again1 the man utterly      
destitute of ,self-,control1 as was     
observed  before1 is not given to       
remorse3 for it is part of his character
 that  he abides by his moral choice3   
but the man of ,imperfect ,self-,control
 is  almost made up of remorse3 and so  
the case is not as we determined it     
before1 but the former is incurable and 
the latter may be cured3 for  depravity 
is like chronic diseases1 dropsy and    
consumption for  instance1 but          
,imperfect ,self-,control is like acute 
disorders3 the  former being a          
continuous evil1 the latter not so4     
,and1 in fact1  ,imperfect              
,self-,control and ,confirmed ,vice are 
different in kind3 the  latter being    
imperceptible to its victim1 the former 
not so4#ag    ,but1 of the different    
forms of ,imperfect ,self-,control1     
those are better  who are carried off   

their feet by a sudden access of        
temptation than  they who have ,reason  
but do not abide by it2 these last being
 overcome  by passion less in degree1   
and not wholly without premeditation as 
are  the others3 for the man of         
,imperfect ,self-,control is like those 
who are  soon intoxicated and by little 
wine and less than the common run of    
men4    ,well then1 that ,imperfection  
of ,self-,control is not ,confirmed     
,viciousness is plain3 and yet perhaps  
it is such in a way1 because in  one    
sense it is contrary to moral choice and
 in another the result of  it3#ah at all
 events1 in respect of the actions1 the 
case is much like  what ,demodocus said 
of the ,miletians4 8,the people of      
,miletus are not  fools1 but they do    
just the kind of things that fools do20 
and so they  of ,imperfect              
,self-,control are not unjust1 but they 
do unjust acts4    ,but to resume4      
,since the man of ,imperfect            
,self-,control is of such a  character  

as to follow bodily pleasures in excess 
and in defiance of  ,right ,reason1     
without acting on any deliberate        
conviction1 whereas the  man utterly    
destitute of ,self-,control does act    
upon a conviction which  rests on his   
natural inclination to follow after     
these pleasures2 the  former may be     
easily persuaded to a different course1 
but the latter  not3 for ,virtue and    
,vice respectively preserve and corrupt 
the moral  principle2 now the motive is 
the principle or starting point in moral
  actions1 just as axioms and postulates
 are in mathematics3 and neither  in    
morals nor mathematics is it ,reason    
which is apt to teach the  principle2   
but ,excellence1 either natural or      
acquired by custom1 in  holding right   
notions with respect to the principle4  
,he who does this  in morals is the man 
of ,perfected ,self-,mastery1 and the   
contrary  character is the man utterly  
destitute of ,self-,control4    ,again1 
there is a character liable to be taken 

off his feet in defiance  of ,right     
,reason because of passion2 whom passion
 so far masters as to  prevent his      
acting in accordance with ,right        
,reason1 but not so far as  to make him 
be convinced that it is his proper line 
to follow after  such pleasures without 
limit3 this character is the man of     
,imperfect  ,self- ,control1 better than
 he who is utterly destitute of it1 and 
not a  bad man simply and without       
qualification3 because in him the       
highest  and best part1 i4e4 principle1 
is preserved3 and there is another      
character opposed to him who is apt to  
abide by his resolutions1 and  not to   
depart from them2 at all events1 not at 
the instigation of  passion4    ,it is  
evident then from all this1 that        
,self-,control is a good state and  the 
,imperfection of it a bad one4          
,chapter ,,viii4    ,next comes the     
question1 whether a man is a man of     
,self-,control for  abiding by his      
conclusions and moral choice be they of 

what kind they  may1 or only by the     
right one2 or again1 a man of ,imperfect
  ,self-,control for not abiding by his 
conclusions and moral choice be  they of
 whatever kind2 or1 to put the case we  
did before1 is he such  for not abiding 
by false conclusions and wrong moral    
choice8    ,is not this the truth1 that 
incidentally it is by conclusions and   
moral choice of any kind that the one   
character abides and the other  does    
not1 but per se true conclusions and    
right moral choice3#ai to  explain what 
is meant by incidentally1 and per se2   
suppose a man  chooses or pursues this  
thing for the sake of that1 he is said  
to  pursue and choose that per se1 but  
this only incidentally4 ,for the  term  
per se we use commonly the word         
8simply10 and so1 in a way1 it  is      
opinion of any kind soever by which the 
two characters respectively  abide or   
not1 but he is 8simply0 entitled to the 
designations who  abides or not by the  
true opinion4    ,there are also people1

 who have a trick of abiding by their1  
own  opinions1 who are commonly called  
,positive1 as they who are hard to be   
persuaded1 and whose convictions are not
 easily changed3 now these  people bear 
some resemblance to the character of    
,self-,control1 just as  the prodigal to
 the liberal or the rash man to the     
brave1 but they are  different in many  
points4 ,the man of ,self-,control does 
not change by  reason of passion and    
lust1 yet when occasion so requires he  
will be  easy of persuasion3 but the    
,positive man changes not at the call of
  ,reason1 though many of this class    
take up certain desires and are led  by 
their pleasures4 ,among the class of    
,positive are the ,opinionated1  the    
,ignorant1 and the ,bearish3 the first1 
from the motives of pleasure  and pain3 
,i mean1 they have the pleasurable      
feeling of a kind of  victory in not    
having their convictions changed1 and   
they are pained  when their decrees1 so 
to speak1 are reversed3 so that1 in     

fact1 they  rather resemble the man of  
,imperfect ,self-,control than the man  
of  ,self-,control4    ,again1 there are
 some who depart from their resolutions 
not by reason  of any ,imperfection of  
,self-,control2 take1 for instance1     
,neoptolemus in  the ,philoctetes of    
,sophocles4 ,here certainly pleasure was
 the motive of  his departure from his  
resolution1 but then it was one of a    
noble sort3  for to be truthful was     
noble in his eyes and he had been       
persuaded by  ,ulysses to lie4    ,so it
 is not every one who acts from the     
motive of pleasure who is  utterly      
destitute of ,self-,control or base or  
of ,imperfect ,self-,control1  only he  
who acts from the impulse of a base     
pleasure4    ,chapter ,,ix4    ,moreover
 as there is a character who takes less 
pleasure than he ought  in bodily       
enjoyments1 and he also fails to abide  
by the conclusion of  his ,reason1#bj   
the man of ,self-,control is the mean   
between him and the  man of ,imperfect  

,self-,control3 that is to say1 the     
latter fails to  abide by them because  
of somewhat too much1 the former because
 of  somewhat too little2 while the man 
of ,self-,control abides by them1 and   
never changes by reason of anything else
 than such conclusions4    ,now of      
course since ,self-,control is good both
 the contrary ,states must  be bad1 as  
indeed they plainly are3 but because the
 one of them is seen  in few persons1   
and but rarely in them1 ,self-,control  
comes to be viewed  as if opposed only  
to the ,imperfection of it1 just as     
,perfected  ,self-,mastery is thought to
 be opposed only to utter want of       
,self-,control4    ,again1 as many terms
 are used in the way of similitude1 so  
people have  come to talk of the        
,self-,control of the man of ,perfected 
,self-,mastery  in the way of           
similitude3 for the man of              
,self-,control and the man of           
,perfected ,self-,mastery have this in  
common1 that they do nothing  against   

,right ,reason on the impulse of bodily 
pleasures1 but then the  former has bad 
desires1 the latter not2 and the latter 
is so  constituted as not even to feel  
pleasure contrary to his ,reason1 the   
former feels but does not yield to it4  
,like again are the man of ,imperfect   
,self-,control and he who is utterly    
destitute of it1 though in reality      
distinct3 both follow bodily  pleasures1
 but the latter under a notion that it  
is the proper line for  him to take1 his
 former without any such notion4    ,and
 it is not possible for the same man to 
be at once a man of  ,practical ,wisdom 
and of ,imperfect ,self-,control3       
because the character  of ,practical    
,wisdom includes1 as we showed before1  
goodness of moral  character4 ,and      
again1 it is not knowledge merely1 but  
aptitude for  action1 which constitutes 
,practical ,wisdom3 and of this aptitude
 the  man of ,imperfect ,self-,control  
is destitute4 ,but there is no reason   
why  the ,clever man should not be of   

,imperfect ,self-,control3 and the      
reason  why some men are occasionally   
thought to be men of ,practical ,wisdom1
  and yet of ,imperfect ,self-,control1 
is this1 that ,cleverness differs  from 
,practical ,wisdom in the way ,i stated 
in a former book1 and is very  near it  
so far as the intellectual element is   
concerned but differs in  respect of the
 moral choice4    ,nor is the man of    
,imperfect ,self-,control like the man  
who both has and  calls into exercise   
his knowledge1 but like the man who1    
having it1 is  overpowered by sleep or  
wine4 ,again1 he acts voluntarily       
7because he  knows1 in a certain sense1 
what he does and the result of it71 but 
he  is not a confirmed bad man1 for his 
moral choice is good1 so he is at  all  
events only half bad4 ,nor is he unjust1
 because he does not act  with          
deliberate intent3 for of the two chief 
forms of the character1  the one is not 
apt to abide by his deliberate          
resolutions1 and the  other1 the man of 

constitutional strength of passion1 is  
not apt to  deliberate at all4    ,so in
 fact the man of ,imperfect             
,self-,control is like a community which
  makes all proper enactments1 and has  
admirable laws1 only does not act  on   
them1 verifying the scoff of            
,anaxandrides1    8,that ,state did will
 it1 which cares nought for laws20      
whereas the bad man is like one which   
acts upon its laws1 but then            
unfortunately they are bad ones4        
,imperfection of ,self-,control and     
,self-,control1 after all1 are above the
  average state of men2 because he of   
the latter character is more true  to   
his ,reason1 and the former less so1    
than is in the power of most  men4      
,again1 of the two forms of ,imperfect  
,self-,control that is more easily      
cured which they have who are           
constitutionally of strong passions1    
than  that of those who form resolutions
 and break them2 and they that are so   
through habituation than they that are  

so naturally2 since of course  custom is
 easier to change than nature1 because  
the very resemblance of  custom to      
nature is what constitutes the          
difficulty of changing it2 as  ,evenus  
says1    8,practice1 ,i say1 my friend1 
doth long endure1  ,and at the last is  
even very nature40      ,we have now    
said then what ,self-,control is1 what  
,imperfection of  ,self-,control1 what  
,endurance1 and what ,softness1 and how 
these states  are mutually related4     
,,appendix4  ,book ,,vii4 ,chapters #ab 
to #ae4 7,bekker47    ,to consider the  
subject of ,pleasure and ,pain falls    
within the province  of the             
,social-,science ,philosopher1 since he 
it is who has to fix the  ,master-,end  
which is to guide us in dominating any  
object absolutely  evil or good4    ,but
 we may say more3 an enquiry into their 
nature is absolutely  necessary4 ,first1
 because we maintained that ,moral      
,virtue and ,moral  ,vice are both      
concerned with ,pains and ,pleasures3   

next1 because the  greater part of      
mankind assert that ,happiness must     
include ,pleasure  7which by the way    
accounts for the word they use1 2       
being the root of that word74    ,now   
some hold that no one ,pleasure is good1
 either in itself or as a  matter of    
result1 because ,good and ,pleasure are 
not identical4 ,others  that some       
,pleasures are good but the greater     
number bad4 ,there is yet a  third view2
 granting that every ,pleasure is good1 
still the ,chief ,good  cannot possibly 
be ,pleasure4    ,in support of the     
first opinion 7that ,pleasure is utterly
 not-good7 it  is urged that3    #a4    
,every ,pleasure is a sensible process  
towards a complete state2 but  no such  
process is akin to the end to be        
attained3 e4g4 no process of  building  
to the completed house4    #b4 ,the man 
of ,perfected ,self-,mastery avoids     
,pleasures4    #c4 ,the man of          
,practical ,wisdom aims at avoiding     
,pain1 not at attaining  ,pleasure4     

#d4 ,pleasures are an impediment to     
thought1 and the more so the more       
keenly they are felt4 ,an obvious       
instance will readily occur4    #e4     
,pleasure cannot be referred to any     
,art3 and yet every good is the  result 
of some ,art4    #f4 ,children and      
brutes pursue ,pleasures4    ,in support
 of the second 7that not all ,pleasures 
are good71 ,that there  are some base   
and matter of reproach1 and some even   
hurtful3 because  some things that are  
pleasant produce disease4    ,in support
 of the third 7that ,pleasure is not the
 ,chief ,good71 ,that it  is not an ,end
 but a process towards creating an ,end4
    ,this is1 ,i think1 a fair account  
of current views on the matter4    ,but 
that the reasons alleged do not prove it
 either to be not-good or  the ,chief   
,good is plain from the following       
considerations4    ,first4 ,good being  
either absolute or relative1 of course  
the natures  and states embodying it    
will be so too2 therefore also the      

movements  and the processes of         
creation4 ,so1 of those which are       
thought to be bad  some will be bad     
absolutely1 but relatively not bad1     
perhaps even  choice-worthy2 some not   
even choice-worthy relatively to any    
particular  person1 only at certain     
times or for a short time but not in    
themselves  choice-worthy4    ,others   
again are not even ,pleasures at all    
though they produce that  impression on 
the mind3 all such ,i mean as imply pain
 and whose purpose  is cure2 those of   
sick people1 for instance4    ,next1    
since ,good may be either an active     
working or a state1 those   or  which   
tend to place us in our natural state   
are  pleasant incidentally because of   
that tendency3 but the active working   
is really in the desires excited in the 
remaining 7sound7 part of our  state or 
nature3 for there are ,pleasures which  
have no connection with  pain or desire3
 the acts of contemplative intellect1   
for instance1 in  which case there is no

 deficiency in the nature or state of   
him who  performs the acts4    ,a proof 
of this is that the same pleasant thing 
does not produce the  sensation of      
,pleasure when the natural state is     
being filled up or  completed as when it
 is already in its normal condition3 in 
this latter  case what give the         
sensation are things pleasant per se1 in
 the  former even those things which are
 contrary4 ,i mean1 you find people     
taking pleasure in sharp or bitter      
things of which no one is naturally  or 
in itself pleasant2 of course not       
therefore the ,pleasures arising  from  
them1 because it is obvious that as is  
the classification of  pleasant things  
such must be that of the ,pleasures     
arising from them4    ,next1 it does not
 follow that there must be something    
else better than  any given pleasure    
because 7as some say7 the ,end must be  
better than  the process which creates  
it4 ,for it is not true that all        
,pleasures are  processes or even       

attended by any process1 but 7some are7 
active  workings or even ,ends3 in fact 
they result not from our coming to be   
something but from our using our powers4
 ,again1 it is not true that the  ,end  
is1 in every case1 distinct from the    
process3 it is true only in  the case of
 such processes as conduce to the       
perfecting of the natural  state4       
,for which reason it is wrong to say    
that ,pleasure is 8a sensible  process  
of production40 ,for 8process etc40     
should be substituted  8active working  
of the natural state10 for 8sensible0   
8unimpeded40 ,the  reason of its being  
thought to be a 8process etc40 is that  
it is good  in the highest sense3 people
 confusing 8active working0 and         
8process10  whereas they really are     
distinct4    ,next1 as to the argument  
that there are bad ,pleasures because   
some  things which are pleasant are also
 hurtful to health1 it is the same as   
saying that some healthful things are   
bad for 8business40 ,in this  sense1 of 

course1 both may be said to be bad1 but 
then this does not  make them out to be 
bad simpliciter3 the exercise of the    
pure  ,intellect sometimes hurts a man's
 health3 but what hinders ,practical    
,wisdom or any state whatever is1 not   
the ,pleasure peculiar to1 but some     
,pleasure foreign to it3 the ,pleasures 
arising from the exercise of the  pure  
,intellect or from learning only promote
 each4    ,next4 8,no ,pleasure is the  
work of any ,art40 ,what else would you 
expect8  ,no active working is the work 
of any ,art1 only the faculty of so     
working4 ,still the perfumer's ,art or  
the cook's are thought to belong  to    
,pleasure4    ,next4 8,the man of       
,perfected ,self-,mastery avoids        
,pleasures40 8,the man of  ,practical   
,wisdom aims at escaping ,pain rather   
than at attaining  ,pleasure40          
8,children and brutes pursue            
,pleasures40    ,one answer will do for 
all4    ,we have already said in what   
sense all ,pleasures are good per se and

  in what sense not all are good3 it is 
the latter class that brutes and        
children pursue1 such as are accompanied
 by desire and pain1 that is  the bodily
 ,pleasures 7which answer to this       
description7 and the  excesses of them3 
in short1 those in respect of which the 
man utterly  destitute of ,self-,control
 is thus utterly destitute4 ,and it is  
the  absence of the pain arising from   
these ,pleasures that the man of        
,practical ,wisdom aims at4 ,it follows 
that these ,pleasures are what the  man 
of ,perfected ,self-,mastery avoids3 for
 obviously he has ,pleasures  peculiarly
 his own4    ,then again1 it is allowed 
that ,pain is an evil and a thing to be 
avoided partly as bad per se1 partly as 
being a hindrance in some  particular   
way4 ,now the contrary of that which is 
to be avoided1 qu  it is to be avoided1 
i4e4 evil1 is good4 ,pleasure then must 
be a  good4    ,the attempted answer of 
,speusippus1 8that ,pleasure may be     
opposed and  yet not contrary to ,pain1 

just as the greater portion of any      
magnitude  is contrary to the less but  
only opposed to the exact half10 will   
not  hold3 for he cannot say that       
,pleasure is identical with evil of any 
kind4    ,again4 ,granting that some    
,pleasures are low1 there is no reason  
why  some particular ,pleasure may not  
be very good1 just as some particular   
,science may be although there are some 
which are low4    ,perhaps it even      
follows1 since each state may have      
active working  unimpeded1 whether the  
active workings of all be ,happiness or 
that of  some one of them1 that this    
active working1 if it be unimpeded1 must
 be  choice-worthy3 now ,pleasure is    
exactly this4 ,so that the ,chief ,good 
may  be ,pleasure of some kind1 though  
most ,pleasures be 7let us assume7 low  
per se4    ,and for this reason all men 
think the happy life is pleasant1 and   
interweave ,pleasure with ,happiness4   
,reasonably enough3 because  ,happiness 
is perfect1 but no impeded active       

working is perfect2 and  therefore the  
happy man needs as an addition the goods
 of the body and  the goods external and
 fortune that in these points he may not
 be  fettered4 ,as for those who say    
that he who is being tortured on the    
wheel1 or falls into great misfortunes  
is happy provided only he be  good1 they
 talk nonsense1 whether they mean to do 
so or not4 ,on the  other hand1 because 
fortune is needed as an addition1 some  
hold good  fortune to be identical with 
,happiness3 which it is not1 for even   
this  in excess is a hindrance1 and     
perhaps then has no right to be called  
good fortune since it is good only in so
 far as it contributes to  ,happiness4  
,the fact that all animals1 brute and   
human alike1 pursue ,pleasure1 is  some 
presumption of its being in a sense the 
,chief ,good2    78,there must be       
something in what most folks say107 only
 as one and the  same nature or state   
neither is nor is thought to be the     
best1 so  neither do all pursue the same

 ,pleasure1 ,pleasure nevertheless all  
do4  ,nay further1 what they pursue is1 
perhaps1 not what they think nor what   
they would say they pursue1 but really  
one and the same3 for in all  there is  
some instinct above themselves4 ,but the
 bodily ,pleasures have  received the   
name exclusively1 because theirs is the 
most frequent form  and that which is   
universally partaken of2 and so1 because
 to many  these alone are known they    
believe them to be the only ones which  
exist4    ,it is plain too that1 unless 
,pleasure and its active working be     
good1  it will not be true that the     
happy man's life embodies ,pleasure3 for
  why will he want it on the supposition
 that it is not good and that he  can   
live even with ,pain8 because1 assuming 
that ,pleasure is not good1  then ,pain 
is neither evil nor good1 and so why    
should he avoid it8    ,besides1 the    
life of the good man is not more        
pleasurable than any  other unless it be
 granted that his active workings are so

 too4    ,some enquiry into the bodily  
,pleasures is also necessary for those  
who  say that some ,pleasures1 to be    
sure1 are highly choice-worthy 7the good
  ones to wit71 but not the bodily      
,pleasures2 that is1 those which are    
the object-matter of the man utterly    
destitute of ,self-,control4    ,if so1 
we ask1 why are the contrary ,pains bad8
 they cannot be 7on their  assumption7  
because the contrary of bad is good4    
,may we not say that the necessary      
bodily ,pleasures are good in the  sense
 in which that which is not-bad is good8
 or that they are good  only up to a    
certain point8 because such states or   
movements as cannot  have too much of   
the better cannot have too much of      
,pleasure1 but those  which can of the  
former can also of the latter4 ,now the 
bodily  ,pleasures do admit of excess3  
in fact the low bad man is such because 
he pursues the excess of them instead of
 those which are necessary  7meat1      
drink1 and the objects of other animal  

appetites do give  pleasure to all1 but 
not in right manner or degree to all74  
,but his  relation to ,pain is exactly  
the contrary3 it is not excessive ,pain1
 but  ,pain at all1 that he avoids which
 makes him to be in this way too a  bad 
low man1 because only in the case of him
 who pursues excessive  ,pleasure is    
,pain contrary to excessive ,pleasure4  
,it is not enough however merely to     
state the truth1 we should also show    
how the false view arises2 because this 
strengthens conviction4 ,i mean1  when  
we have given a probable reason why that
 impresses people as true  which really 
is not true1 it gives them a stronger   
conviction of the  truth4 ,and so we    
must now explain why the bodily         
,pleasures appear to  people to be more 
choice-worthy than any others4    ,the  
first obvious reason is1 that bodily    
,pleasure drives out ,pain2 and  because
 ,pain is felt in excess men pursue     
,pleasure in excess1 i4e4  generally    
bodily ,pleasure1 under the notion of   

its being a remedy for  that ,pain4     
,these remedies1 moreover1 come to be   
violent ones2 which is  the very reason 
they are pursued1 since the impression  
they produce on  the mind is owing to   
their being looked at side by side with 
their  contrary4    ,and1 as has been   
said before1 there are the two following
 reasons why  bodily ,pleasure is       
thought to be not-good4    #a4 ,some    
,pleasures of this class are actings of 
a low nature1 whether  congenital as in 
brutes1 or acquired by custom as in low 
bad men4    #b4 ,others are in the      
nature of cures1 cures that is of some  
deficiency2  now of course it is better 
to have the healthy state originally    
than  that it should accrue afterwards4 
7,but some ,pleasures result when       
natural states are being perfected3     
these therefore are good as a matter of 
result47    ,again1 the very fact of    
their being violent causes them to be   
pursued  by such as can relish no       
others3 such men in fact create violent 

thirsts for themselves 7if harmless ones
 then we find no fault1 if  harmful then
 it is bad and low7 because they have no
 other things to  take pleasure in1 and 
the neutral state is distasteful to some
 people  constitutionally2 for toil of  
some kind is inseparable from life1 as  
physiologists testify1 telling us that  
the acts of seeing or hearing  are      
painful1 only that we are used to the   
pain and do not find it out4            
,similarly in youth the constant growth 
produces a state much like that  of     
vinous intoxication1 and youth is       
pleasant4 ,again1 men of the            
melancholic temperament constantly need 
some remedial process 7because  the     
body1 from its temperament1 is          
constantly being worried71 and they  are
 in a chronic state of violent desire4  
,but ,pleasure drives out ,pain2  not   
only such ,pleasure as is directly      
contrary to ,pain but even any          
,pleasure provided it be strong3 and    
this is how men come to be utterly      

destitute of ,self-,mastery1 i4e4 low   
and bad4    ,but those ,pleasures which 
are unconnected with ,pains do not admit
 of  excess3 i4e4 such as belong to     
objects which are naturally pleasant    
and not merely as a matter of result3 by
 the latter class ,i mean such  as are  
remedial1 and the reason why these are  
thought to be pleasant is  that the cure
 results from the action in some way of 
that part of the  constitution which    
remains sound4 ,by 8pleasant naturally0 
,i mean such  as put into action a      
nature which is pleasant4    ,the reason
 why no one and the same thing is       
invariably pleasant is that  our nature 
is1 not simple1 but complex1 involving  
something different  from itself 7so far
 as we are corruptible beings74 ,suppose
 then that  one part of this nature be  
doing something1 this something is1 to  
the  other part1 unnatural3 but1 if     
there be an equilibrium of the two      
natures1 then whatever is being done is 
indifferent4 ,it is obvious that  if    

there be any whose nature is simple and 
not complex1 to such a being  the same  
course of acting will always be the most
 pleasurable4    ,for this reason it is 
that the ,divinity feels ,pleasure which
 is always  one1 i4e4 simple3 not motion
 merely but also motionlessness acts1   
and  ,pleasure resides rather in the    
absence than in the presence of motion4 
,the reason why the ,poet's dictum      
8change is of all things most  pleasant0
 is true1 is 8a baseness in our blood20 
for as the bad man is  easily           
changeable1 bad must be also the nature 
that craves change1  i4e4 it is neither 
simple nor good4    ,we have now said   
our say about ,self-,control and its    
opposite2 and about  ,pleasure and      
,pain4 ,what each is1 and how the one   
set is good the other  bad4 ,we have yet
 to speak of ,friendship4               
,,book ,,viii    ,chapter ,i4      ,next
 would seem properly to follow a        
dissertation on ,friendship3  because1  
in the first place1 it is either itself 

a virtue or connected  with virtue2 and 
next it is a thing most necessary for   
life1 since no  one would choose to live
 without friends though he should have  
all the  other good things in the world3
 and1 in fact1 men who are rich or      
possessed of authority and influence are
 thought to have special need  of       
friends3 for where is the use of such   
prosperity if there be taken  away the  
doing of kindnesses of which friends are
 the most usual and  most commendable   
objects8 ,or how can it be kept or      
preserved without  friends8 because the 
greater it is so much the more slippery 
and  hazardous3 in poverty moreover and 
all other adversities men think  friends
 to be their only refuge4               
,furthermore1 ,friendship helps the     
young to keep from error3 the old1 in   
respect of attention and such           
deficiencies in action as their weakness
  makes them liable to2 and those who   
are in their prime1 in respect of  noble
 deeds 78,they two together going10     

,homer says1 you may  remember71 because
 they are thus more able to devise plans
 and carry  them out4    ,again1 it     
seems to be implanted in us by ,nature3 
as1 for instance1 in  the parent towards
 the offspring and the offspring towards
 the parent  7not merely in the human   
species1 but likewise in birds and most 
animals71 and in those of the same tribe
 towards one another1 and  specially in 
men of the same nation2 for which reason
 we commend those  men who love their   
fellows3 and one may see in the course  
of travel how  close of kin and how     
friendly man is to man4    ,furthermore1
 ,friendship seems to be the bond of    
,social ,communities1 and  legislators  
seem to be more anxious to secure it    
than ,justice even4 ,i  mean1 ,unanimity
 is somewhat like to ,friendship1 and   
this they certainly  aim at and         
specially drive out faction as being    
inimical4    ,again1 where people are in
 ,friendship ,justice is not required2#a
 but1  on the other hand1 though they   

are just they need ,friendship in       
addition1 and that principle which is   
most truly just is thought to  partake  
of the nature of ,friendship4           
,lastly1 not only is it a thing         
necessary but honourable likewise3 since
  we praise those who are fond of       
friends1 and the having numerous        
friends is thought a matter of credit to
 a man2 some go so far as to  hold1 that
 8good man0 and 8friend0 are terms      
synonymous4    ,chapter ,,ii4    ,yet   
the disputed points respecting it are   
not few3 some men lay down  that it is a
 kind of resemblance1 and that men who  
are like one another  are friends3      
whence come the common sayings1 8,like  
will to like10  8,birds of a feather10  
and so on4 ,others1 on the contrary1    
say1 that all  such come under the      
maxim1 8,two of a trade never agree40#b 
,again1 some men push their enquiries on
 these points higher and reason         
physically3 as ,euripides1 who says1    
8,the earth by drought consumed doth    

love the rain1  ,and the great heaven1  
overcharged with rain1  ,doth love to   
fall in showers upon the earth40        
,heraclitus1 again1 maintains1 that     
8contrariety is expedient1 and that  the
 best agreement arises from things      
differing1 and that all things  come    
into being in the way of the principle  
of antagonism40    ,empedocles1 among   
others1 in direct opposition to these1  
affirms1 that  8like aims at like40     
,these physical questions we will take  
leave to omit1 inasmuch as they  are    
foreign to the present enquiry2 and we  
will examine such as are  proper to man 
and concern moral characters and        
feelings3 as1 for  instance1 8,does     
,friendship arise among all without     
distinction1 or is  it impossible for   
bad men to be friends80 and1 8,is there 
but one  species of ,friendship1 or     
several80 for they who ground the       
opinion  that there is but one on the   
fact that ,friendship admits of degrees 
hold that upon insufficient proof2      

because things which are different  in  
species admit likewise of degrees 7on   
this point we have spoken  before74     
,chapter ,,iii4    ,our view will soon  
be cleared on these points when we have 
ascertained  what is properly the       
object-matter of ,friendship3 for it is 
thought  that not everything            
indiscriminately1 but some peculiar     
matter alone1  is the object of this    
affection2 that is to say1 what is good1
 or  pleasurable1 or useful4 ,now it    
would seem that that is useful through  
which accrues any good or pleasure1 and 
so the objects of ,friendship1  as      
absolute ,ends1 are the good and the    
pleasurable4    ,a question here arises2
 whether it is good absolutely or that  
which is  good to the individuals1 for  
which men feel ,friendship 7these two   
being  sometimes distinct73 and         
similarly in respect of the pleasurable4
 ,it  seems then that each individual   
feels it towards that which is good to  
himself1 and that abstractedly it is the

 real good which is the object  of      
,friendship1 and to each individual that
 which is good to each4 ,it  comes then 
to this2 that each individual feels     
,friendship not for what  is but for    
that which conveys to his mind the      
impression of being  good to himself4   
,but this will make no real difference1 
because that  which is truly the object 
of ,friendship will also convey this    
impression to the mind4    ,there are   
then three causes from which men feel   
,friendship3 but the  term is not       
applied to the case of fondness for     
things inanimate  because there is no   
requital of the affection nor desire for
 the good  of those objects3 it         
certainly savours of the ridiculous to  
say that a  man fond of wine wishes well
 to it3 the only sense in which it is   
true  being that he wishes it to be kept
 safe and sound for his own use and     
benefit4#c ,but to the friend they say  
one should wish all good for his  sake4 
,and when men do thus wish good to      

another 7he not reciprocating  the      
feeling71 people call them ,kindly2     
because ,friendship they describe  as   
being 8,kindliness between persons who  
reciprocate it40 ,but must they  not add
 that the feeling must be mutually      
known8 for many men are  kindly disposed
 towards those whom they have never seen
 but whom they  conceive to be amiable  
or useful3 and this notion amounts to   
the same  thing as a real feeling       
between them4    ,well1 these are       
plainly ,kindly-disposed towards one    
another3 but how  can one call them     
friends while their mutual feelings are 
unknown to  one another8 to complete the
 idea of ,friendship1 then1 it is       
requisite  that they have kindly        
feelings towards one another1 and wish  
one  another good from one of the       
aforementioned causes1 and that these   
kindly feelings should be mutually      
known4    ,chapter ,,iv4    ,as the     
motives to ,friendship differ in kind so
 do the respective  feelings and        

,friendships4 ,the species then of      
,friendship are three1 in  number equal 
to the objects of it1 since in the line 
of each there may  be 8mutual affection 
mutually known40    ,now they who have  
,friendship for one another desire one  
another's good  according to the motive 
of their ,friendship2 accordingly they  
whose  motive is utility have no        
,friendship for one another really1 but 
only  in so far as some good arises to  
them from one another4    ,and they     
whose motive is pleasure are in like    
case3 ,i mean1 they have  ,friendship   
for men of easy pleasantry1 not because 
they are of a given  character but      
because they are pleasant to themselves4
 ,so then they  whose motive to         
,friendship is utility love their       
friends for what is  good to themselves2
 they whose motive is pleasure do so for
 what is  pleasurable to themselves2    
that is to say1 not in so far as the    
friend  beloved is but in so far as he  
is useful or pleasurable4 ,these        

,friendships then are a matter of       
result3 since the object is not  beloved
 in that he is the man he is but in that
 he furnishes advantage  or pleasure as 
the case may be4    ,such ,friendships  
are of course very liable to dissolution
 if the  parties do not continue alike3 
,i mean1 that the others cease to have  
any ,friendship for them when they are  
no longer pleasurable or useful4  ,now  
it is the nature of utility not to be   
permanent but constantly  varying3 so1  
of course1 when the motive which made   
them friends is  vanished1 the          
,friendship likewise dissolves2 since it
 existed only  relatively to those      
circumstances4    ,friendship of this   
kind is thought to exist principally    
among the old  7because men at that time
 of life pursue not what is pleasurable 
but  what is profitable72 and in such1  
of men in their prime and of the  young1
 as are given to the pursuit of profit4 
,they that are such have  no intimate   
intercourse with one another2 for       

sometimes they are not  even pleasurable
 to one another2 nor1 in fact1 do they  
desire such  intercourse unless their   
friends are profitable to them1 because 
they  are pleasurable only in so far as 
they have hopes of advantage4 ,with     
these ,friendships is commonly ranked   
that of hospitality4    ,but the        
,friendship of the young is thought to  
be based on the motive of  pleasure3    
because they live at the beck and call  
of passion and  generally pursue what is
 pleasurable to themselves and the      
object of  the present moment3 and as   
their age changes so likewise do their  
pleasures4    ,this is the reason why   
they form and dissolve ,friendships     
rapidly3  since the ,friendship changes 
with the pleasurable object and such    
pleasure changes quickly4    ,the young 
are also much given up to ,love2 this   
passion being1 in great  measure1 a     
matter of impulse and based on pleasure3
 for which cause  they conceive         
,friendships and quickly drop them1     

changing often in the  same day3 but    
these wish for society and intimate     
intercourse with  their friends1 since  
they thus attain the object of their    
,friendship4    ,chapter ,v4    ,that   
then is perfect ,friendship which       
subsists between those who are  good and
 whose similarity consists in their     
goodness3 for these men  wish one       
another's good in similar ways2 in so   
far as they are good  7and good they are
 in themselves72 and those are specially
 friends who  wish good to their friends
 for their sakes1 because they feel thus
  towards them on their own account and 
not as a mere matter of result2  so the 
,friendship between these men continues 
to subsist so long as  they are good2   
and goodness1 we know1 has in it a      
principle of  permanence4    ,moreover1 
each party is good abstractedly and also
 relatively to his  friend1 for all good
 men are not only abstractedly good but 
also useful  to one another4 ,such      
friends are also mutually pleasurable   

because all  good men are so            
abstractedly1 and also relatively to one
 another1  inasmuch as to each          
individual those actions are pleasurable
 which  correspond to his nature1 and   
all such as are like them4 ,now when men
  are good these will be always the     
same1 or at least similar4              
,friendship then under these            
circumstances is permanent1 as we should
  reasonably expect1 since it combines  
in itself all the requisite             
qualifications of friends4 ,i mean1 that
 ,friendship of whatever kind is  based 
upon good or pleasure 7either           
abstractedly or relatively to the       
person entertaining the sentiment of    
,friendship71 and results from a        
similarity of some sort2 and to this    
kind belong all the aforementioned      
requisites in the parties themselves1   
because in this the parties are         
similar1 and so on3#d moreover1 in it   
there is the abstractedly good  and the 
abstractedly pleasant1 and as these are 

specially the  object-matter of         
,friendship so the feeling and the state
 of ,friendship  is found most intense  
and most excellent in men thus          
qualified4    ,rare it is probable      
,friendships of this kind will be1      
because men of  this kind are rare4     
,besides1 all requisite qualifications  
being  presupposed1 there is further    
required time and intimacy3 for1 as the 
proverb says1 men cannot know one       
another 8till they have eaten the       
requisite quantity of salt together20   
nor can they in fact admit one  another 
to intimacy1 much less be friends1 till 
each has appeared to  the other and been
 proved to be a fit object of           
,friendship4 ,they who  speedily        
commence an interchange of friendly     
actions may be said to  wish to be      
friends1 but they are not so unless they
 are also proper  objects of ,friendship
 and mutually known to be such3 that is 
to say1 a  desire for ,friendship may   
arise quickly but not ,friendship       

itself4    ,well1 this ,friendship is   
perfect both in respect of the time and 
in all  other points2 and exactly the   
same and similar results accrue to each 
party from the other2 which ought to be 
the case between friends4    ,the       
friendship based upon the pleasurable   
is1 so to say1 a copy of  this1 since   
the good are sources of pleasure to one 
another3 and that  based on utility     
likewise1 the good being also useful to 
one another4  ,between men thus         
connected ,friendships are most         
permanent when the same  result accrues 
to both from one another1 pleasure1 for 
instance2 and  not merely so but from   
the same source1 as in the case of two  
men of  easy pleasantry2 and not as it  
is in that of a lover and the object of 
his affection1 these not deriving their 
pleasure from the same causes1  but the 
former from seeing the latter and the   
latter from receiving the  attentions of
 the former3 and when the bloom of youth
 fades the  ,friendship sometimes ceases

 also1 because then the lover derives no
  pleasure from seeing and the object of
 his affection ceases to receive  the   
attentions which were paid before3 in   
many cases1 however1 people  so         
connected continue friends1 if being of 
similar tempers they have  come from    
custom to like one another's            
disposition4    ,where people do not    
interchange pleasure but profit in      
matters of ,love1  the ,friendship is   
both less intense in degree and also    
less permanent3  in fact1 they who are  
friends because of advantage commonly   
part when  the advantage ceases2 for1 in
 reality1 they never were friends of one
  another but of the advantage4    ,so  
then it appears that from motives of    
pleasure or profit bad men may  be      
friends to one another1 or good men to  
bad men or men of neutral  character to 
one of any character whatever3 but      
disinterestedly1 for  the sake of one   
another1 plainly the good alone can be  
friends2 because  bad men have no       

pleasure even in themselves unless in so
 far as some  advantage arises4    ,and 
further1 the ,friendship of the good is 
alone superior to calumny2  it not being
 easy for men to believe a third person 
respecting one whom  they have long     
tried and proved3 there is between good 
men mutual  confidence1 and the feeling 
that one's friend would never have done 
one  wrong1 and all other such things as
 are expected in ,friendship really     
worthy the name2 but in the other kinds 
there is nothing to prevent all  such   
suspicions4    ,i call them             
,friendships1 because since men commonly
 give the name of  friends to those who 
are connected from motives of profit    
7which is  justified by political       
language1 for alliances between states  
are  thought to be contracted with a    
view to advantage71 and to those who    
are attached to one another by the      
motive of pleasure 7as children  are71  
we may perhaps also be allowed to call  
such persons friends1 and  say there are

 several species of ,friendship2        
primarily and specially  that of the    
good1 in that they are good1 and the    
rest only in the way  of resemblance3 ,i
 mean1 people connected otherwise are   
friends in that  way in which there     
arises to them somewhat good and some   
mutual  resemblance 7because1 we must   
remember the pleasurable is good to     
those  who are fond of it74    ,these   
secondary ,friendships1 however1 do not 
combine very well2 that is  to say1 the 
same persons do not become friends by   
reason of advantage  and by reason of   
the pleasurable1 for these matters of   
result are not  often combined4 ,and    
,friendship having been divided into    
these kinds1  bad men will be friends by
 reason of pleasure or profit1 this     
being  their point of resemblance2 while
 the good are friends for one  another's
 sake1 that is1 in so far as they are   
good4    ,these last may be termed      
abstractedly and simply friends1 the    
former as  a matter of result and termed

 friends from their resemblance to these
  last4    ,chapter ,,vi4      ,further2
 just as in respect of the different    
virtues some men are  termed good in    
respect of a certain inward state1      
others in respect of  acts of working1  
so is it in respect of ,friendship3 ,i  
mean1 they who  live together take      
pleasure in1 and impart good to1 one    
another3 but  they who are asleep or are
 locally separated do not perform acts1 
but  only are in such a state as to act 
in a friendly way if they acted at  all3
 distance has in itself no direct effect
 upon ,friendship1 but only  prevents   
the acting it out3 yet1 if the absence  
be protracted1 it is  thought to cause a
 forgetfulness even of the ,friendship3 
and hence it  has been said1 8many and  
many a ,friendship doth want of         
intercourse  destroy40    ,accordingly1 
neither the old nor the morose appear to
 be calculated for  ,friendship1 because
 the pleasurableness in them is small1  
and no one  can spend his days in       

company with that which is positively   
painful or  even not pleasurable2 since 
to avoid the painful and aim at the     
pleasurable is one of the most obvious  
tendencies of human nature4 ,they  who  
get on with one another very fairly1 but
 are not in habits of  intimacy1 are    
rather like people having kindly        
feelings towards one  another than      
friends2 nothing being so characteristic
 of friends as the  living with one     
another1 because the necessitous desire 
assistance1 and  the happy              
companionship1 they being the last      
persons in the world for  solitary      
existence3 but people cannot spend their
 time together unless  they are mutually
 pleasurable and take pleasure in the   
same objects1 a  quality which is       
thought to appertain to the ,friendship 
of  companionship4    ,chapter ,,vii4   
,the connection then subsisting between 
the good is ,friendship par  excellence1
 as has already been frequently said3   
since that which is  abstractedly good  

or pleasant is thought to be an object  
of ,friendship  and choice-worthy1 and  
to each individual whatever is such to  
him2 and  the good man to the good man  
for both these reasons4    7,now the    
entertaining the sentiment is like a    
feeling1 but ,friendship  itself like a 
state3 because the former may have for  
its object even  things inanimate1 but  
requital of ,friendship is attended with
 moral  choice which proceeds from a    
moral state3 and again1 men wish good to
  the objects of their ,friendship for  
their sakes1 not in the way of a  mere  
feeling but of moral state47    ,and the
 good1 in loving their friend1 love     
their own good 7inasmuch as  the good   
man1 when brought into that relation1   
becomes a good to him  with whom he is  
so connected71 so that either party     
loves his own good1  and repays his     
friend equally both in wishing well and 
in the  pleasurable3 for equality is    
said to be a tie of ,friendship4 ,well1 
these points belong most to the         

,friendship between good men4    ,but   
between morose or elderly men           
,friendship is less apt to arise1       
because they are somewhat               
awkward-tempered1 and take less pleasure
 in  intercourse and society2 these     
being thought to be specially friendly  
and productive of ,friendship3 and so   
young men become friends quickly1  old  
men not so 7because people do not become
 friends with any1 unless  they take    
pleasure in them72 and in like manner   
neither do the morose4  ,yet men of     
these classes entertain kindly feelings 
towards one another3  they wish good to 
one another and render mutual assistance
 in respect  of their needs1 but they   
are not quite friends1 because they     
neither  spend their time together nor  
take pleasure in one another1 which     
circumstances are thought specially to  
belong to ,friendship4    ,to be a      
friend to many people1 in the way of the
 perfect ,friendship1 is  not possible2 
just as you cannot be in love with many 

at once3 it is1  so to speak1 a state of
 excess which naturally has but one     
object2 and  besides1 it is not an easy 
thing for one man to be very much       
pleased  with many people at the same   
time1 nor perhaps to find many really   
good4 ,again1 a man needs experience1   
and to be in habits of close  intimacy1 
which is very difficult4    ,but it is  
possible to please many on the score of 
advantage and  pleasure3 because there  
are many men of the kind1 and the       
services may  be rendered in a very     
short time4    ,of the two imperfect    
kinds that which most resembles the     
perfect is the  ,friendship based upon  
pleasure1 in which the same results     
accrue from  both and they take pleasure
 in one another or in the same objects2 
such  as are the ,friendships of the    
young1 because a generous spirit is most
  found in these4 ,the ,friendship      
because of advantage is the connecting  
link of shopkeepers4    ,then again1 the
 very happy have no need of persons who 

are profitable1  but of pleasant ones   
they have because they wish to have     
people to live  intimately with2 and    
what is painful they bear for a short   
time indeed1  but continuously no one   
could support it1 nay1 not even the     
,chief ,good  itself1 if it were painful
 to him individually3 and so they look  
out  for pleasant friends3 perhaps they 
ought to require such to be good  also2 
and good moreover to themselves         
individually1 because then they  will   
have all the proper requisites of       
,friendship4    ,men in power are often 
seen to make use of several distinct    
friends3  for some are useful to them   
and others pleasurable1 but the two are 
not  often united3 because they do not1 
in fact1 seek such as shall combine     
pleasantness and goodness1 nor such as  
shall be useful for honourable          
purposes3 but with a view to attain what
 is pleasant they look out for  men of  
easy-pleasantry2 and again1 for men who 
are clever at executing  any business   

put into their hands3 and these         
qualifications are not  commonly found  
united in the same man4    ,it has been 
already stated that the good man unites 
the qualities of  pleasantness and      
usefulness3 but then such a one will not
 be a friend  to a superior unless he be
 also his superior in goodness3 for if  
this  be not the case1 he cannot1 being 
surpassed in one point1 make things     
equal by a proportionate degree of      
,friendship4#e ,and characters who      
unite superiority of station and        
goodness are not common4    ,chapter    
,,viii4    ,now all the kinds of        
,friendship which have been already     
mentioned exist  in a state of equality1
 inasmuch as either the same results    
accrue to  both and they wish the same  
things to one another1 or else they     
barter  one thing against another2      
pleasure1 for instance1 against profit3 
it  has been said already that          
,friendships of this latter kind are    
less  intense in degree and less        

permanent4    ,and it is their          
resemblance or dissimilarity to the same
 thing which  makes them to be thought  
to be and not to be ,friendships3 they  
show  like ,friendships in right of     
their likeness to that which is based on
  virtue 7the one kind having the       
pleasurable1 the other the profitable1  
both of which belong also to the other72
 and again1 they do not show  like      
,friendships by reason of their         
unlikeness to that true kind2 which     
unlikeness consists herein1 that while  
that is above calumny and so  permanent 
these quickly change and differ in many 
other points4    ,but there is another  
form of ,friendship1 that1 namely1 in   
which the one  party is superior to the 
other2 as between father and son1 elder 
and  younger1 husband and wife1 ruler   
and ruled4 ,these also differ one from  
another3 ,i mean1 the ,friendship       
between parents and children is not the 
same as between ruler and the ruled1 nor
 has the father the same  towards the   

son as the son towards the father1 nor  
the husband towards  the wife as she    
towards him2 because the work1 and      
therefore the  excellence1 of each of   
these is different1 and different       
therefore are  the causes of their      
feeling ,friendship2 distinct and       
different  therefore are their feelings 
and states of ,friendship4    ,and the  
same results do not accrue to each from 
the other1 nor in fact  ought they to be
 looked for3 but1 when children render  
to their parents  what they ought to the
 authors of their being1 and parents to 
their  sons what they ought to their    
offspring1 the ,friendship between such 
parties will be permanent and equitable4
    ,further2 the feeling of ,friendship
 should be in a due proportion in all   
,friendships which are between superior 
and inferior2 ,i mean1 the better  man1 
or the more profitable1 and so forth1   
should be the object of a  stronger     
feeling than he himself entertains1     
because when the feeling  of ,friendship

 comes to be after a certain rate then  
equality in a  certain sense is         
produced1 which is thought to be a      
requisite in  ,friendship4    7,it must 
be remembered1 however1 that the equal  
is not in the same case  as regards     
,justice and ,friendship3 for in strict 
,justice the exactly  proportioned equal
 ranks first1 and the actual numerically
 equal ranks  second1 while in          
,friendship this is exactly reversed47  
,and that equality is thus requisite is 
plainly shown by the occurrence  of a   
great difference of goodness or badness1
 or prosperity1 or  something else3 for 
in this case1 people are not any longer 
friends1  nay they do not even feel that
 they ought to be4 ,the clearest        
illustration is perhaps the case of the 
gods1 because they are most  superior in
 all good things4 ,it is obvious too1 in
 the case of kings1  for they who are   
greatly their inferiors do not feel     
entitled to be  friends to them2 nor do 
people very insignificant to be friends 

to  those of very high excellence or    
wisdom4 ,of course1 in such cases it is 
out of the question to attempt to define
 up to what point they may  continue    
friends3 for you may remove many points 
of agreement and the  ,friendship last  
nevertheless2 but when one of the       
parties is very far  separated 7as a god
 from men71 it cannot continue any      
longer4    ,this has given room for a   
doubt1 whether friends do really wish to
  their friends the very highest goods1 
as that they may be gods3  because1 in  
case the wish were accomplished1 they   
would no longer have  them for friends1 
nor in fact would they have the good    
things they had1  because friends are   
good things4 ,if then it has been       
rightly said that  a friend wishes to   
his friend good things for that friend's
 sake1 it  must be understood that he is
 to remain such as he now is3 that is to
  say1 he will wish the greatest good to
 him of which as man he is  capable3 yet
 perhaps not all1 because each man      

desires good for himself  most of all4  
,it is thought that desire for honour   
makes the mass of men wish rather  to be
 the objects of the feeling of          
,friendship than to entertain it        
themselves 7and for this reason they are
 fond of flatterers1 a  flatterer being 
a friend inferior or at least pretending
 to be such and  rather to entertain    
towards another the feeling of          
,friendship than to  be himself the     
object of it71 since the former is      
thought to be nearly  the same as being 
honoured1 which the mass of men desire4 
,and yet men  seem to choose honour1 not
 for its own sake1 but incidentally3#f  
,i  mean1 the common run of men delight 
to be honoured by those in power        
because of the hope it raises2 that is  
they think they shall get from  them    
anything they may happen to be in want  
of1 so they delight in  honour as an    
earnest of future benefit4 ,they again  
who grasp at honour  at the hands of the
 good and those who are really          

acquainted with their  merits desire to 
confirm their own opinion about         
themselves3 so they  take pleasure in   
the conviction that they are good1 which
 is based on  the sentence of those who 
assert it4 ,but in being the objects of 
,friendship men delight for its own     
sake1 and so this may be judged to  be  
higher than being honoured and          
,friendship to be in itself             
choice-worthy4 ,friendship1 moreover1 is
 thought to consist in feeling1  rather 
than being the object of1 the sentiment 
of ,friendship1 which is  proved by the 
delight mothers have in the feeling3    
some there are who  give their children 
to be adopted and brought up by others1 
and knowing  them bear this feeling     
towards them never seeking to have it   
returned1  if both are not possible2 but
 seeming to be content with seeing them 
well off and bearing this feeling       
themselves towards them1 even though    
they1 by reason of ignorance1 never     
render to them any filial regard or     

love4    ,since then ,friendship stands 
rather in the entertaining1 than in     
being  the object of1 the sentiment1 and
 they are praised who are fond of  their
 friends1 it seems that entertaining the
 sentiment is the  ,excellence of       
friends2 and so1 in whomsoever this     
exists in due  proportion these are     
stable friends and their ,friendship is 
permanent4  ,and in this way may they   
who are unequal best be friends1 because
 they  may thus be made equal4          
,equality1 then1 and similarity are a   
tie to ,friendship1 and specially  the  
similarity of goodness1 because good    
men1 being stable in  themselves1 are   
also stable as regards others1 and      
neither ask  degrading services nor     
render them1 but1 so to say1 rather     
prevent  them3 for it is the part of the
 good neither to do wrong themselves nor
  to allow their friends in so doing4   
,the bad1 on the contrary1 have no      
principle of stability3 in fact1 they   
do not even continue like themselves3   

only they come to be friends for  a     
short time from taking delight in one   
another's wickedness4 ,those  connected 
by motives of profit1 or pleasure1 hold 
together somewhat  longer3 so long1 that
 is to say1 as they can give pleasure or
 profit  mutually4    ,the ,friendship  
based on motives of profit is thought to
 be most of all  formed out of contrary 
elements3 the poor man1 for instance1 is
 thus a  friend of the rich1 and the    
ignorant of the man of information2 that
 is  to say1 a man desiring that of     
which he is1 as it happens1 in want1    
gives something else in exchange for it4
 ,to this same class we may  refer the  
lover and beloved1 the beautiful and the
 ill-favoured4 ,for  this reason lovers 
sometimes show in a ridiculous light by 
claiming to  be the objects of as       
intense a feeling as they themselves    
entertain3 of  course if they are       
equally fit objects of ,friendship they 
are perhaps  entitled to claim this1 but
 if they have nothing of the kind it is 

ridiculous4    ,perhaps1 moreover1 the  
contrary does not aim at its contrary   
for its  own sake but incidentally3 the 
mean is really what is grasped at2 it   
being good for the dry1 for instance1   
not to become wet but to attain  the    
mean1 and so of the hot1 etc4           
,however1 let us drop these questions1  
because they are in fact somewhat       
foreign to our purpose4    ,chapter     
,,ix4    ,it seems too1 as was stated at
 the commencement1 that ,friendship and 
,justice have the same object-matter1   
and subsist between the same  persons3  
,i mean that in every ,communion there  
is thought to be some  principle of     
,justice and also some ,friendship3 men 
address as friends1  for instance1 those
 who are their comrades by sea1 or in   
war1 and in  like manner also those who 
are brought into ,communion with them in
  other ways3 and the ,friendship1      
because also the ,justice1 is           
co-extensive with the ,communion1 ,this 
justifies the common proverb1  8the     

goods of friends are common10 since     
,friendship rests upon  ,communion4     
,now brothers and intimate companions   
have all in common1 but other  people   
have their property separate1 and some  
have more in common and  others less1   
because the ,friendships likewise differ
 in degree4 ,so too  do the various     
principles of ,justice involved1 not    
being the same  between parents and     
children as between brothers1 nor       
between  companions as between          
fellow-citizens merely1 and so on of all
 the  other conceivable ,friendships4   
,different also are the principles of   
,injustice as regards these different   
grades1 and the acts become  intensified
 by being done to friends2 for instance1
 it is worse to rob  your companion than
 one who is merely a fellow-citizen2 to 
refuse help  to a brother than to a     
stranger2 and to strike your father than
 any one  else4 ,so then the ,justice   
naturally increases with the degree of  
,friendship1 as being between the same  

parties and of equal extent4    ,all    
cases of ,communion are parts1 so to    
say1 of the great ,social one1  since in
 them men associate with a view to some 
advantage and to  procure some of those 
things which are needful for life2 and  
the great  ,social ,communion is thought
 originally to have been associated and 
to  continue for the sake of some       
advantage3 this being the point at which
  legislators aim1 affirming that to be 
just which is generally  expedient4     
,all the other cases of ,communion aim  
at advantage in particular points2  the 
crew of a vessel at that which is to    
result from the voyage which  is        
undertaken with a view to making money1 
or some such object2  comrades in war at
 that which is to result from the war1  
grasping  either at wealth or victory1  
or it may be a political position2 and  
those of the same tribe1 or ,demus1 in  
like manner4    ,some of them are       
thought to be formed for pleasure's     
sake1 those1 for  instance1 of          

bacchanals or club-fellows1 which are   
with a view to  ,sacrifice or merely    
company4 ,but all these seem to be      
ranged under the  great ,social one1    
inasmuch as the aim of this is1 not     
merely the  expediency of the moment    
but1 for life and at all times2 with a  
view to  which the members of it        
institute sacrifices and their attendant
  assemblies1 to render honour to the   
gods and procure for themselves  respite
 from toil combined with pleasure4 ,for 
it appears that  sacrifices and         
religious assemblies in old times were  
made as a kind of  first-fruits after   
the ingathering of the crops1 because at
 such  seasons they had most leisure4   
,so then it appears that all the        
instances of ,communion are parts of the
  great ,social one3 and corresponding  
,friendships will follow upon such      
,communions4    ,chapter ,x4    ,of     
,political ,constitutions there are     
three kinds2 and equal in number  are   
the deflections from them1 being1 so to 

say1 corruptions of them4    ,the former
 are ,kingship1 ,aristocracy1 and that  
which recognises the  principle of      
wealth1 which it seems appropriate to   
call ,timocracy 7,i  give to it the name
 of a political constitution because    
people commonly  do so74 ,of these the  
best is ,monarchy1 and ,timocracy the   
worst4    ,from ,monarchy the deflection
 is ,despotism2 both being ,monarchies  
but  widely differing from each other2  
for the ,despot looks to his own        
advantage1 but the ,king to that of his 
subjects3 for he is in fact no  ,king   
who is not thoroughly independent and   
superior to the rest in all  good       
things1 and he that is this has no      
further wants3 he will not then  have to
 look to his own advantage but to that  
of his subjects1 for he  that is not in 
such a position is a mere ,king elected 
by lot for the  nonce4    ,but          
,despotism is on a contrary footing to  
this ,kingship1 because the  ,despot    
pursues his own good3 and in the case of

 this its inferiority is  most evident1 
and what is worse is contrary to what is
 best4 ,the  ,transition to ,despotism  
is made from ,kingship1 ,despotism being
 a  corrupt form of ,monarchy1 that is  
to say1 the bad ,king comes to be a     
,despot4    ,from ,aristocracy to       
,oligarchy the transition is made by the
 fault of  the ,rulers in distributing  
the public property contrary to right   
proportion2 and giving either all that  
is good1 or the greatest share1  to     
themselves2 and the offices to the same 
persons always1 making  wealth their    
idol2 thus a few bear rule and they bad 
men in the place  of the best4    ,from 
,timocracy the transition is to         
,democracy1 they being contiguous3  for 
it is the nature of ,timocracy to be in 
the hands of a multitude1  and all in   
the same grade of property are equal4   
,democracy is the least  vicious of all1
 since herein the form of the           
constitution undergoes  least change4   
,well1 these are generally the changes  

to which the various  ,constitutions are
 liable1 being the least in degree and  
the easiest to  make4    ,likenesses1   
and1 as it were1 models of them1 one may
 find even in  ,domestic life3 for      
instance1 the ,communion between a      
,father and his  ,sons presents the     
figure of ,kingship1 because the        
children are the  ,father's care3 and   
hence ,homer names ,jupiter ,father     
because ,kingship is  intended to be a  
paternal rule4 ,among the ,persians1    
however1 the  ,father's rule is         
,despotic1 for they treat their ,sons as
 slaves4 7,the  relation of ,master to  
,slaves is of the nature of ,despotism  
because the  point regarded herein is   
the ,master's interest73 this now       
strikes me to  be as it ought1 but the  
,persian custom to be mistaken2 because 
for  different persons there should be  
different rules4    ,between ,husband   
and ,wife the relation takes the form of
 ,aristocracy1  because he rules by     
right and in such points only as the    

,husband  should1 and gives to the ,wife
 all that befits her to have4 ,where the
  ,husband lords it in everything he    
changes the relation into an            
,oligarchy2 because he does it contrary 
to right and not as being the  better of
 the two4 ,in some instances the ,wives 
take the reins of  government1 being    
heiresses3 here the rule is carried on  
not in right  of goodness but by reason 
of wealth and power1 as it is in        
,oligarchies4    ,timocracy finds its   
type in the relation of ,brothers3 they 
being equal  except as to such          
differences as age introduces3 for which
 reason1 if  they are very different in 
age1 the ,friendship comes to be no     
longer a  fraternal one3 while          
,democracy is represented specially by  
families  which have no head 7all being 
there equal71 or in which the proper    
head  is weak and so every member does  
that which is right in his own eyes4    
,chapter ,,xi4    ,attendant then on    
each form of ,political ,constitution   

there plainly is  ,friendship exactly   
co-extensive with the principle of      
,justice2 that  between a ,king and his 
,subjects being in the relation of a    
superiority  of benefit1 inasmuch as he 
benefits his subjects2 it being assumed 
that  he is a good king and takes care  
of their welfare as a shepherd tends    
his flock2 whence ,homer 7to quote him  
again7 calls ,agamemnon1 8shepherd  of  
the people40 ,and of this same kind is  
the ,paternal ,friendship1 only  that it
 exceeds the former in the greatness of 
the benefits done2  because the father  
is the author of being 7which is        
esteemed the  greatest benefit7 and of  
maintenance and education 7these things 
are  also1 by the way1 ascribed to      
ancestors generally73 and by the law of 
nature the father has the right of rule 
over his sons1 ancestors over  their    
descendants1 and the king over his      
subjects4    ,these friendships are also
 between superiors and inferiors1 for   
which  reason parents are not merely    

loved but also honoured4 ,the principle 
of  ,justice also between these parties 
is not exactly the same but  according  
to proportiton1 because so also is the  
,friendship4    ,now between ,husband   
and ,wife there is the same ,friendship 
as in  ,aristocracy3 for the relation is
 determined by relative excellence1 and 
the better person has the greater good  
and each has what befits3 so too  also  
is the principle of ,justice between    
them4    ,the ,fraternal ,friendship is 
like that of ,companions1 because       
brothers  are equal and much of an age1 
and such persons have generally like    
feelings and like dispositions4 ,like to
 this also is the ,friendship of  a     
,timocracy1 because the citizens are    
intended to be equal and  equitable3    
rule1 therefore1 passes from hand to    
hand1 and is  distributed on equal      
terms3 so too is the ,friendship        
accordingly4    ,in the deflections from
 the constitutional forms1 just as the  
principle  of ,justice is but small so  

is the ,friendship also3 and least of   
all in  the most perverted form3 in     
,despotism there is little or no        
,friendship4  ,for generally wherever   
the ruler and the ruled have nothing in 
common  there is no ,friendship because 
there is no ,justice2 but the case is as
  between an artisan and his tool1 or   
between soul and body1 and master  and  
slave2 all these are benefited by those 
who use them1 but towards  things       
inanimate there is neither ,friendship  
nor ,justice3 nor even  towards a horse 
or an ox1 or a slave qu slave1 because  
there is  nothing in common3 a slave as 
such is an animate tool1 a tool an      
inanimate slave4 ,qu slave1 then1 there 
is no ,friendship towards him1  only qu 
man3 for it is thought that there is    
some principle of  ,justice between     
every man1 and every other who can share
 in law and be  a party to an agreement2
 and so somewhat of ,friendship1 in so  
far as he  is man4 ,so in ,despotisms   
the ,friendships and the principle of   

,justice  are inconsiderable in extent1 
but in ,democracies they are most       
considerable because they who are equal 
have much in common4    ,chapter ,,xii4 
,now of course all ,friendship is based 
upon ,communion1 as has been  already   
stated3 but one would be inclined to    
separate off from the rest  the         
,friendship of ,kindred1 and that of    
,companions3 whereas those of men  of   
the same city1 or tribe1 or crew1 and   
all such1 are more peculiarly1  it would
 seem1 based upon ,communion1 inasmuch  
as they plainly exist in  right of some 
agreement expressed or implied3 among   
these one may rank  also the ,friendship
 of ,hospitality1    ,the ,friendship of
 ,kindred is likewise of many kinds1 and
 appears in all  its varieties to depend
 on the ,parental3 parents1 ,i mean1    
love their  children as being a part of 
themselves1 children love their parents 
as  being themselves somewhat derived   
from them4 ,but parents know their      
offspring more than these know that they

 are from the parents1 and the  source  
is more closely bound to that which is  
produced than that which  is produced is
 to that which formed it3 of course1    
whatever is derived  from one's self is 
proper to that from which it is so      
derived 7as1 for  instance1 a tooth or a
 hair1 or any other thing whatever to   
him that  has it73 but the source to it 
is in no degree proper1 or in an        
inferior  degree at least4    ,then     
again the greater length of time comes  
in3 the parents love their  offspring   
from the first moment of their being1   
but their offspring  them only after a  
lapse of time when they have attained   
intelligence or  instinct4 ,these       
considerations serve also to show why   
mothers have  greater strength of       
affection than fathers4    ,now parents 
love their children as themselves 7since
 what is derived  from themselves       
becomes a kind of other ,self by the    
fact of  separation71 but children their
 parents as being sprung from them4 ,and

  brothers love one another from being  
sprung from the same2 that is1  their   
sameness with the common stock creates a
 sameness with one  another2#g whence   
come the phrases1 8same blood10 8root10 
and so on4  ,in fact they are the same1 
in a sense1 even in the separate        
distinct  individuals4    ,then again   
the being brought up together1 and the  
nearness of age1 are  a great help      
towards ,friendship1 for a man likes one
 of his own age and  persons who are    
used to one another are companions1     
which accounts for  the resemblance     
between the ,friendship of ,brothers and
 that of  ,companions4    ,and cousins  
and all other relatives derive their    
bond of union from  these1 that is to   
say1 from their community of origin3 and
 the strength  of this bond varies      
according to their respective distances 
from the  common ancestor4    ,further3 
the ,friendship felt by children towards
 parents1 and by men  towards the gods1 
is as towards something good and above  

them2 because  these have conferred the 
greatest possible benefits1 in that they
 are  the causes of their being and     
being nourished1 and of their having    
been  educated after they were brought  
into being4    ,and ,friendship of this 
kind has also the pleasurable and the   
profitable  more than that between      
persons unconnected by blood1 in        
proportion as  their life is also more  
shared in common4 ,then again in the    
,fraternal  ,friendship there is all    
that there is in that of ,companions1   
and more  in the good1 and generally in 
those who are alike2 in proportion as   
they are more closely tied and from     
their very birth have a feeling of      
affection for one another to begin with1
 and as they are more like in           
disposition who spring from the same    
stock and have grown up together  and   
been educated alike3 and besides this   
they have the greatest  opportunities in
 respect of time for proving one        
another1 and can  therefore depend most 

securely upon the trial4    ,between    
,husband and ,wife there is thought to  
be ,friendship by a law of  nature3 man 
being by nature disposed to pair1 more  
than to associate in  ,communities3 in  
proportion as the family is prior in    
order of time and  more absolutely      
necessary than the ,community4 ,and     
procreation is more  common to him with 
other animals2 all the other animals    
have ,communion  thus far1 but human    
creatures cohabit not merely for the    
sake of  procreation but also with a    
view to life in general33#h because in  
this connection the works are           
immediately divided1 and some belong to 
the man1 others to the woman3 thus they 
help one the other1 putting  what is    
peculiar to each into the common stock4 
,and for these reasons this ,friendship 
is thought to combine the  profitable   
and the pleasurable3 it will be also    
based upon virtue if  they are good     
people2 because each has goodness and   
they may take  delight in this quality  

in each other4 ,children too are thought
 to be a  tie3 accordingly the childless
 sooner separate1 for the children are a
  good common to both and anything in   
common is a bond of union4    ,the      
question how a man is to live with his  
wife1 or 7more generally7  one friend   
with another1 appears to be no other    
than this1 how it is  just that they    
should3 because plainly there is not the
 same principle  of ,justice between a  
friend and friend1 as between strangers1
 or  companions1 or mere chance         
fellow-travellers4    ,chapter ,,xiii4  
,there are then1 as was stated at the   
commencement of this book1 three  kinds 
of ,friendship1 and in each there may be
 friends on a footing of  equality and  
friends in the relation of superior and 
inferior2 we find1  ,i mean1 that people
 who are alike in goodness1 become      
friends1 and  better with worse1 and so 
also pleasant people2 again1 because of 
advantage people are friends1 either    
balancing exactly their mutual          

profitableness or differing from one    
another herein4 ,well then1 those  who  
are equal should in right of this       
equality be equalised also by the       
degree of their ,friendship and the     
other points1 and those who are on a    
footing of inequality by rendering      
,friendship in proportion to the        
superiority of the other party4         
,fault-finding and blame arises1 either 
solely or most naturally1 in            
,friendship of which utility is the     
motive3 for they who are friends by     
reason of goodness1 are eager to do     
kindnesses to one another because  this 
is a natural result of goodness and     
,friendship2 and when men are  vying    
with each other for this ,end there can 
be no fault-finding nor  contention3    
since no one is annoyed at one who      
entertains for him the  sentiment of    
,friendship and does kindnesses to him1 
but if of a refined  mind he requites   
him with kind actions4 ,and suppose that
 one of the two  exceeds the other1 yet 

as he is attaining his object he will   
not find  fault with his friend1 for    
good is the object of each party4       
,neither can there well be quarrels     
between men who are friends for         
pleasure's sake3 because supposing them 
to delight in living together  then both
 attain their desire2 or if not a man   
would be put in a  ridiculous light who 
should find fault with another for not  
pleasing  him1 since it is in his power 
to forbear intercourse with him4 ,but   
the  ,friendship because of advantage is
 very liable to fault-finding2  because1
 as the parties use one another with a  
view to advantage1 the  requirements are
 continually enlarging1 and they think  
they have less  than of right belongs to
 them1 and find fault because though    
justly  entitled they do not get as much
 as they want3 while they who do the    
kindnesses1 can never come up to the    
requirements of those to whom they  are 
being done4    ,it seems also1 that as  
the ,just is of two kinds1 the unwritten

 and the  legal1 so ,friendship because 
of advantage is of two kinds1 what may  
be  called the ,moral1 and the ,legal3  
and the most fruitful source of         
complaints is that parties contract     
obligations and discharge them not  in  
the same line of ,friendship4 ,the      
,legal is upon specified conditions1    
either purely tradesmanlike from hand to
 hand or somewhat more  gentlemanly as  
regards time but still by agreement a   
quid pro quo4    ,in this ,legal kind   
the obligation is clear and admits of no
 dispute1  the friendly element is the  
delay in requiring its discharge3 and   
for  this reason in some countries no   
actions can be maintained at ,law for   
the recovery of such debts1 it being    
held that they who have dealt on  the   
footing of credit must be content to    
abide the issue4    ,that which may be  
termed the ,moral kind is not upon      
specified  conditions1 but a man gives  
as to his friend and so on3 but still he
  expects to receive an equivalent1 or  

even more1 as though he had not  given  
but lent3 he also will find fault1      
because he does not get the  obligation 
discharged in the same way as it was    
contracted4    ,now this results from   
the fact1 that all men1 or the          
generality at  least1 wish what is      
honourable1 but1 when tested1 choose    
what is  profitable2 and the doing      
kindnesses disinterestedly is honourable
  while receiving benefits is           
profitable4 ,in such cases one should1  
if  able1 make a return proportionate to
 the good received1 and do so           
willingly1 because one ought not to make
 a disinterested friend#i of a  man     
against his inclination3 one should act1
 ,i say1 as having made a  mistake      
originally in receiving kindness from   
one from whom one ought  not to have    
received it1 he being not a friend nor  
doing the act  disinterestedly2 one     
should therefore discharge one's self of
 the  obligation as having received a   
kindness on specified terms3 and if     

able a man would engage to repay the    
kindness1 while if he were unable  even 
the doer of it would not expect it of   
him3 so that if he is able  he ought to 
repay it4 ,but one ought at the first to
 ascertain from whom  one is receiving  
kindness1 and on what understanding1    
that on that same  understanding one may
 accept it or not4    ,a question       
admitting of dispute is whether one is  
to measure a kindness  by the good done 
to the receiver of it1 and make this the
 standard by  which to requite1 or by   
the kind intention of the doer8    ,for 
they who have received kindnesses       
frequently plead in depreciation  that  
they have received from their           
benefactors such things as were  small  
for them to give1 or such as they       
themselves could have got from  others3 
while the doers of the kindnesses affirm
 that they gave the  best they had1 and 
what could not have been got from       
others1 and under  danger1 or in        
such-like straits4    ,may we not say1  

that as utility is the motive of the    
,friendship the  advantage conferred on 
the receiver must be the standard8      
because he it  is who requests the      
kindness and the other serves him in his
 need on  the understanding that he is  
to get an equivalent3 the assistance    
rendered is then exactly proportionate  
to the advantage which the  receiver has
 obtained1 and he should therefore repay
 as much as he  gained by it1 or even   
more1 this being more creditable4    ,in
 ,friendships based on goodness1 the    
question1 of course1 is never  raised1  
but herein the motive of the doer seems 
to be the proper  standard1 since virtue
 and moral character depend principally 
on  motive4    ,chapter ,,xiv4          
,quarrels arise also in those           
,friendships in which the parties are   
unequal because each party thinks       
himself entitled to the greater  share1 
and of course1 when this happens1 the   
,friendship is broken up4    ,the man   
who is better than the other thinks that

 having the greater  share pertains to  
him of right1 for that more is always   
awarded to the  good man3 and similarly 
the man who is more profitable to       
another than  that other to him3 8one   
who is useless10 they say1 8ought not to
 share  equally1 for it comes to a tax1 
and not a ,friendship1 unless the fruits
  of the ,friendship are reaped in      
proportion to the works done30 their    
notion being1 that as in a money        
partnership they who contribute more    
receive more so should it be in         
,friendship likewise4    ,on the other  
hand1 the needy man and the less        
virtuous advance the  opposite claim3   
they urge that 8it is the very business 
of a good  friend to help those who are 
in need1 else what is the use of having 
a  good or powerful friend if one is not
 to reap the advantage at all80    ,now 
each seems to advance a right claim and 
to be entitled to get more  out of the  
connection than the other1 only not more
 of the same  thing3 but the superior   

man should receive more respect1 the    
needy man  more profit3 respect being   
the reward of goodness and beneficence1 
profit being the aid of need4    ,this  
is plainly the principle acted upon in  
,political ,communities3 he  receives no
 honour who gives no good to the common 
stock3 for the  property of the ,public 
is given to him who does good to the    
,public1 and  honour is the property of 
the ,public2 it is not possible both to 
make  money out of the ,public and      
receive honour likewise2 because no one 
will put up with the less in every      
respect3 so to him who suffers loss  as 
regards money they award honour1 but    
money to him who can be paid by  gifts3 
since1 as has been stated before1 the   
observing due proportion  equalises and 
preserves ,friendship4    ,like rules   
then should be observed in the          
intercourse of friends who  are unequal2
 and to him who advantages another in   
respect of money1 or  goodness1 that    
other should repay honour1 making       

requital according to  his power2       
because ,friendship requires what is    
possible1 not what is  strictly due1    
this being not possible in all cases1 as
 in the honours  paid to the gods and to
 parents3 no man could ever make the due
 return  in these cases1 and so he is   
thought to be a good man who pays       
respect  according to his ability4      
,for this reason it may be judged never 
to be allowable for a son to  disown his
 father1 whereas a father may his son3  
because he that owes  is bound to pay2  
now a son can never1 by anything he has 
done1 fully  requite the benefits first 
conferred on him by his father1 and so  
is  always a debtor4 ,but they to whom  
anything is owed may cast off their     
debtors3 therefore the father may his   
son4 ,but at the same time it must      
perhaps be admitted1 that it seems no   
father ever would sever himself  utterly
 from a son1 except in a case of        
exceeding depravity3 because1           
independently of the natural            

,friendship1 it is like human nature not
 to  put away from one's self the       
assistance which a son might render4    
,but  to the son1 if depraved1 assisting
 his father is a thing to be avoided1   
or at least one which he will not be    
very anxious to do2 most men being      
willing enough to receive kindness1 but 
averse to doing it as  unprofitable4    
,let thus much suffice on these points4 
,,book ,,ix    ,chapter ,i4      ,well1 
in all the ,friendships the parties to  
which are dissimilar it is  the         
proportionate which equalises and       
preserves the ,friendship1 as has  been 
already stated3 ,i mean1 in the ,social 
,friendship the cobbler1 for  instance1 
gets an equivalent for his shoes after a
 certain rate2 and  the weaver1 and all 
others in like manner4 ,now in this case
 a common  measure has been provided in 
money1 and to this accordingly all      
things  are referred and by this are    
measured3 but in the ,friendship of     
,love  the complaint is sometimes from  

the lover that1 though he loves         
exceedingly1 his love is not requited2  
he having perhaps all the time  nothing 
that can be the object of ,friendship3  
again1 oftentimes from  the object of   
love that he who as a suitor promised   
any and every thing  now performs       
nothing4 ,these cases occur because the 
,friendship of the  lover for the       
beloved object is based upon pleasure1  
that of the other  for him upon utility1
 and in one of the parties the requisite
 quality  is not found3 for1 as these   
are respectively the grounds of the     
,friendship1 the ,friendship comes to be
 broken up because the motives to  it   
cease to exist3 the parties loved not   
one another but qualities in  one       
another which are not permanent1 and so 
neither are the  ,friendships3 whereas  
the ,friendship based upon the moral    
character of  the parties1 being        
independent and disinterested1 is       
permanent1 as we  have already stated4  
,quarrels arise also when the parties   

realise different results and not  those
 which they desire2 for the not         
attaining one's special object is  all  
one1 in this case1 with getting nothing 
at all3 as in the  well-known case where
 a man made promises to a musician1     
rising in  proportion to the excellence 
of his music2 but when1 the next        
morning1  the musician claimed the      
performance of his promises1 he said    
that he  had given him pleasure for     
pleasure3 of course1 if each party had  
intended this1 it would have been all   
right3 but if the one desires  amusement
 and the other gain1 and the one gets   
his object but the other  not1 the      
dealing cannot be fair3 because a man   
fixes his mind upon what  he happens to 
want1 and will give so and so for that  
specific thing4    ,the question then   
arises1 who is to fix the rate8 the man 
who first  gives1 or the man who first  
takes8 because1 prim facie1 the man who 
first gives seems to leave the rate to  
be fixed by the other party4  ,this1    

they say1 was in fact the practice of   
,protagoras3 when he taught  a man      
anything he would bid the learner       
estimate the worth of the  knowledge    
gained by his own private opinion2 and  
then he used to take  so much from him4 
,in such cases some people adopt the    
rule1    8,with specified reward a      
friend should be content40      ,they   
are certainly fairly found fault with   
who take the money in  advance and then 
do nothing of what they said they would 
do1 their  promises having been so far  
beyond their ability2 for such men do   
not  perform what they agreed1 ,the     
,sophists1 however1 are perhaps obliged 
to  take this course1 because no one    
would give a sixpence for their         
knowledge4 ,these then1 ,i say1 are     
fairly found fault with1 because they   
do not what they have already taken     
money for doing4    ,in cases where no  
stipulation as to the respective        
services is made  they who              
disinterestedly do the first service    

will not raise the  question 7as we have
 said before71 because it is the nature 
of  ,friendship1 based on mutual        
goodness to be reference to the         
intention  of the other1 the intention  
being characteristic of the true friend 
and  of goodness4    ,and it would seem 
the same rule should be laid down for   
those who are  connected with one       
another as teachers and learners of     
philosophy2 for  here the value of the  
commodity cannot be measured by money1  
and1 in  fact1 an exactly equivalent    
price cannot be set upon it1 but perhaps
 it  is sufficient to do what one can1  
as in the case of the gods or one's     
parents4    ,but where the original     
giving is not upon these terms but      
avowedly for  some return1 the most     
proper course is perhaps for the        
requital to be  such as both shall allow
 to be proportionate1 and1 where this   
cannot  be1 then for the receiver to fix
 the value would seem to be not only    
necessary but also fair3 because when   

the first giver gets that which  is     
equivalent to the advantage received by 
the other1 or to what he  would have    
given to secure the pleasure he has had1
 then he has the  value from him3 for   
not only is this seen to be the course  
adopted in  matters of buying and       
selling but also in some places the law 
does not  allow of actions upon         
voluntary dealings2 on the principle    
that when  one man has trusted another  
he must be content to have the          
obligation  discharged in the same      
spirit as he originally contracted it3  
that is  to say1 it is thought fairer   
for the trusted1 than for the trusting1 
party1 to fix the value4 ,for1 in       
general1 those who have and those who   
wish to get things do not set the same  
value on them3 what is their  own1 and  
what they give in each case1 appears to 
them worth a great  deal3 but yet the   
return is made according to the estimate
 of those who  have received first1 it  
should perhaps be added that the        

receiver  should estimate what he has   
received1 not by the value he sets upon 
it  now that he has it1 but by that     
which he set upon it before he obtained 
it4    ,chapter ,,ii4    ,questions also
 arise upon such points as the          
following3 ,whether one's  father has an
 unlimited claim on one's services and  
obedience1 or  whether the sick man is  
to obey his physician8 or1 in an        
election of a  general1 the warlike     
qualities of the candidates should be   
alone  regarded8    ,in like manner     
whether one should do a service rather  
to one's friend  or to a good man8      
whether one should rather requite a     
benefactor or  give to one's companion1 
supposing that both are not within one's
  power8    ,is not the true answer that
 it is no easy task to determine all    
such  questions accurately1 inasmuch as 
they involve numerous differences of    
all kinds1 in respect of amount and what
 is honourable and what is  necessary8  
,it is obvious1 of course1 that no one  

person can unite in  himself all claims4
 ,again1 the requital of benefits is1 in
 general1 a  higher duty than doing     
unsolicited kindnesses to one's         
companion2 in  other words1 the         
discharging of a debt is more obligatory
 upon one than  the duty of giving to a 
companion4 ,and yet this rule may admit 
of  exceptions2 for instance1 which is  
the higher duty8 for one who has  been  
ransomed out of the hands of robbers to 
ransom in return his  ransomer1 be he   
who he may1 or to repay him on his      
demand though he has  not been taken by 
robbers1 or to ransom his own father8   
for it would  seem that a man ought to  
ransom his father even in preference to 
himself4    ,well then1 as has been said
 already1 as a general rule the debt    
should  be discharged1 but if in a      
particular case the giving greatly      
preponderates as being either honourable
 or necessary1 we must be  swayed by    
these considerations3 ,i mean1 in some  
cases the requital of  the obligation   

previously existing may not be equal2   
suppose1 for  instance1 that the        
original benefactor has conferred a     
kindness on a  good man1 knowing him to 
be such1 whereas this said good man has 
to  repay it believing him to be a      
scoundrel4    ,and again1 in certain    
cases no obligation lies on a man to    
lend to one  who has lent to him2       
suppose1 for instance1 that a bad man   
lent to him1  as being a good man1 under
 the notion that he should get repaid1  
whereas the said good man has no hope of
 repayment from him being a bad  man4   
,either then the case is really as we   
have supposed it and then the  claim is 
not equal1 or it is not so but supposed 
to be2 and still in so  acting people   
are not to be thought to act wrongly4   
,in short1 as has  been oftentimes      
stated before1 all statements regarding 
feelings and  actions can be definite   
only in proportion as their             
object-matter is  so2 it is of course   
quite obvious that all people have not  

the same  claim upon one1 nor are the   
claims of one's father unlimited2 just  
as  ,jupiter does not claim all kinds of
 sacrifice without distinction3 and     
since the claims of parents1 brothers1  
companions1 and benefactors1 are  all   
different1 we must give to each what    
belongs to and befits each4    ,and this
 is seen to be the course commonly      
pursued3 to marriages men  commonly     
invite their relatives1 because these   
are from a common stock  and therefore  
all the actions in any way pertaining   
thereto are common  also3 and to        
funerals men think that relatives ought 
to assemble in  preference to other     
people1 for the same reason4    ,and it 
would seem that in respect of           
maintenance it is our duty to  assist   
our parents in preference to all others1
 as being their debtors1  and because it
 is more honourable to succour in these 
respects the  authors of our existence  
than ourselves4 ,honour likewise we     
ought to  pay to our parents just as to 

the gods1 but then1 not all kinds of    
honour3 not the same1 for instance1 to a
 father as to a mother3 nor  again to a 
father the honour due to a scientific   
man or to a general  but that which is a
 father's due1 and in like manner to a  
mother that  which is a mother's4    ,to
 all our elders also the honour         
befitting their age1 by rising up in    
their presence1 turning out of the way  
for them1 and all similar marks  of     
respect3 to our companions again1 or    
brothers1 frankness and free            
participation in all we have4 ,and to   
those of the same family1 or  tribe1 or 
city1 with ourselves1 and all similarly 
connected with us1 we  should constantly
 try to render their due1 and to        
discriminate what  belongs to each in   
respect of nearness of connection1 or   
goodness1 or  intimacy3 of course in the
 case of those of the same class the    
discrimination is easier2 in that of    
those who are in different classes  it  
is a matter of more trouble4 ,this1     

however1 should not be a reason  for    
giving up the attempt1 but we must      
observe the distinctions so far  as it  
is practicable to do so4    ,chapter    
,,iii4    ,a question is also raised as 
to the propriety of dissolving or not   
dissolving those ,friendships the       
parties to which do not remain what     
they were when the connection was       
formed4    ,now surely in respect of    
those whose motive to ,friendship is    
utility or  pleasure there can be       
nothing wrong in breaking up the        
connection when  they no longer have    
those qualities2 because they were      
friends not of  one another1 but of     
those qualities3 and1 these having      
failed1 it is  only reasonable to expect
 that they should cease to entertain the
  sentiment4    ,but a man has reason to
 find fault if the other party1 being   
really  attached to him because of      
advantage or pleasure1 pretended to be  
so  because of his moral character3 in  
fact1 as we said at the  commencement1  

the most common source of quarrels      
between friends is  their not being     
friends on the same grounds as they     
suppose themselves  to be4    ,now when 
a man has been deceived in having       
supposed himself to excite  the         
sentiment of ,friendship by reason of   
his moral character1 the other  party   
doing nothing to indicate he has but    
himself to blame3 but when  he has been 
deceived by the pretence of the other he
 has a right to  find fault with the man
 who has so deceived him1 aye even more 
than  with utterers of false coin1 in   
proportion to the greater preciousness  
of that which is the object-matter of   
the villany4    ,but suppose a man takes
 up another as being a good man1 who    
turns out1  and is found by him1 to be a
 scoundrel1 is he bound still to        
entertain  ,friendship for him8 or may  
we not say at once it is impossible8    
since  it is not everything which is the
 object-matter of ,friendship1 but only 
that which is good2 and so there is no  

obligation to be a bad man's  friend1   
nor1 in fact1 ought one to be such3 for 
one ought not to be a  lover of evil1   
nor to be assimilated to what is base2  
which would be  implied1 because we have
 said before1 like is friendly to like4 
,are we then to break with him          
instantly8 not in all cases2 only where 
our friends are incurably depraved2 when
 there is a chance of amendment  we are 
bound to aid in repairing the moral     
character of our friends  even more than
 their substance1 in proportion as it is
 better and more  closely related to    
,friendship4 ,still he who should break 
off the  connection is not to be judged 
to act wrongly1 for he never was a      
friend to such a character as the other 
now is1 and therefore1 since  the man is
 changed and he cannot reduce him to his
 original state1 he  backs out of the   
connection4    ,to put another case3    
suppose that one party remains what he  
was when  the ,friendship was formed1   
while the other becomes morally improved

 and  widely different from his friend  
in goodness2 is the improved character  
to treat the other as a friend8    ,may 
we not say it is impossible8 ,the case  
of course is clearest where  there is a 
great difference1 as in the ,friendships
 of boys3 for suppose  that of two      
boyish friends the one still continues a
 boy in mind and  the other becomes a   
man of the highest character1 how can   
they be  friends8 since they neither are
 pleased with the same objects nor like 
and dislike the same things3 for these  
points will not belong to them  as      
regards one another1 and without them it
 was assumed they cannot be  friends    
because they cannot live in intimacy3   
and of the case of those  who cannot do 
so we have spoken before4    ,well then1
 is the improved party to bear himself  
towards his former  friend in no way    
differently to what he would have done  
had the  connection never existed8      
,surely he ought to bear in mind the    
intimacy of past times1 and just as  we 

think ourselves bound to do favours for 
our friends in preference to  strangers1
 so to those who have been friends and  
are so no longer we  should allow       
somewhat on the score of previous       
,friendship1 whenever the  cause of     
severance is not excessive depravity on 
their part4    ,chapter ,,iv4    ,now   
the friendly feelings which are         
exhibited towards our friends1 and  by  
which ,friendships are characterised1   
seem to have sprung out of  those which 
we entertain toward ourselves4    ,i    
mean1 people define a friend to be 8one 
who intends and does what is  good 7or  
what he believes to be good7 to another 
for that other's  sake10 or 8one who    
wishes his friend to be and to live for 
that  friend's own sake0 7which is the  
feeling of mothers towards their        
children1 and of friends who have come  
into collision74 ,others again1  8one   
who lives with another and chooses the  
same objects10 or 8one who  sympathises 
with his friend in his sorrows and in   

his joys0 7this too  is especially the  
case with mothers74    ,well1 by some   
one of these marks people generally     
characterise  ,friendship3 and each of  
these the good man has towards himself1 
and all  others have them in so far as  
they suppose themselves to be good4     
7,for1  as has been said before1        
goodness1 that is the good man1 seems to
 be a  measure to every one else47      
,for he is at unity in himself1 and with
 every part of his soul he  desires the 
same objects2 and he wishes for himself 
both what is1 and  what he believes to  
be1 good2 and he does it 7it being      
characteristic  of the good man to work 
at what is good71 and for the sake of   
himself1  inasmuch as he does it for the
 sake of his ,intellectual ,principle   
which  is generally thought to be a     
man's ,self4 ,again1 he wishes himself  
,and  specially this ,principle whereby 
he is an intelligent being1 to live  and
 be preserved in life1 because existence
 is a good to him that is a  good man4  

,but it is to himself that each         
individual wishes what is good1 and no  
man1 conceiving the possibility of his  
becoming other than he now is1  chooses 
that that ,new ,self should have all    
things indiscriminately3 a  god1 for    
instance1 has at the present moment the 
,chief ,good1 but he has  it in right of
 being whatever he actually now is3 and 
the ,intelligent  ,principle must be    
judged to be each man's ,self1 or at    
least eminently  so though other        
,principles help1 of course1 to         
constitute him the man  he is4          
,furthermore1 the good man wishes to    
continue to live with himself2 for  he  
can do it with pleasure1 in that his    
memories of past actions are  full of   
delight and his anticipations of the    
future are good and such  are           
pleasurable4 ,then1 again1 he has good  
store of matter for his  ,intellect to  
contemplate1 and he most especially     
sympathises with his  ,self in its      
griefs and joys1 because the objects    

which give him pain  and pleasure are at
 all times the same1 not one thing      
to-day and a  different one to-morrow3  
because he is not given to repentance1#a
 if  one may so speak4 ,it is then      
because each of these feelings are      
entertained by the good man towards his 
own ,self and a friend feels  towards a 
friend as towards himself 7a friend     
being in fact another  ,self71 that     
,friendship is thought to be some one of
 these things and  they are accounted   
friends in whom they are found4 ,whether
 or no there  can really be ,friendship 
between a man and his ,self is a        
question we  will not at present        
entertain3 there may be thought to be   
,friendship1  in so far as there are two
 or more of the aforesaid requisites1   
and  because the highest degree of      
,friendship1 in the usual acceptation of
  that term1 resembles the feeling      
entertained by a man towards himself4   
,but it may be urged that the aforesaid 
requisites are to all appearance  found 

in the common run of men1 though they   
are men of a low stamp4    ,may it not  
be answered1 that they share in them    
only in so far as they  please          
themselves1 and conceive themselves to  
be good8 for certainly1  they are not   
either really1 or even apparently1 found
 in any one of  those who are very      
depraved and villainous2 we may almost  
say not even  in those who are bad men  
at all3 for they are at variance with   
themselves and lust after different     
things from those which in cool  reason 
they wish for1 just as men who fail of  
,self-,control3 ,i mean1  they choose   
things which1 though hurtful1 are       
pleasurable1 in  preference to those    
which in their own minds they believe to
 be good3  others again1 from cowardice 
and indolence1 decline to do what still 
they are convinced is best for them3    
while they who from their  depravity    
have actually done many dreadful actions
 hate and avoid life1  and accordingly  
kill themselves3 and the wicked seek    

others in whose  company to spend their 
time1 but fly from themselves because   
they have  many unpleasant subjects of  
memory1 and can only look forward to    
others  like them when in solitude but  
drown their remorse in the company of   
others3 and as they have nothing to     
raise the sentiment of ,friendship  so  
they never feel it towards themselves4  
,neither1 in fact1 can they who are of  
this character sympathise with  their   
,selves in their joys and sorrows1      
because their soul is1 as it  were1 rent
 by faction1 and the one principle1 by  
reason of the  depravity in them1 is    
grieved at abstaining from certain      
things1 while  the other and better     
principle is pleased thereat2 and the   
one drags  them this way and the other  
that way1 as though actually tearing    
them  asunder4#b ,and though it is      
impossible actually to have at the same 
time the sensations of pain and         
pleasure2 yet after a little time the   
man is sorry for having been pleased1   

and he could wish that those  objects   
had not given him pleasure2 for the     
wicked are full of remorse4    ,it is   
plain then that the wicked man cannot be
 in the position of a  friend even      
towards himself1 because he has in      
himself nothing which  can excite the   
sentiment of ,friendship4 ,if then to be
 thus is  exceedingly wretched it is a  
man's duty to flee from wickedness with 
all his might and to strive to be good1 
because thus may he be friends  with    
himself and may come to be a friend to  
another4    ,chapter ,v4    ,kindly     
,feeling1 though resembling ,friendship1
 is not identical with it1  because it  
may exist in reference to those whom we 
do not know and  without the object of  
it being aware of its existence1 which  
,friendship  cannot4 7,this1 by the way1
 has also been said before47 ,and       
further1 it  is not even ,affection     
because it does not imply intensity nor 
yearning1  which are both consequences  
of ,affection4 ,again ,affection        

requires  intimacy but ,kindly ,feeling 
may arise quite suddenly1 as happens    
sometimes in respect of men against whom
 people are matched in any way1  ,i mean
 they come to be kindly disposed to them
 and sympathise in their  wishes1 but   
still they would not join them in any   
action1 because1 as  we said1 they      
conceive this feeling of kindness       
suddenly and so have  but a superficial 
liking4    ,what it does seem to be is  
the starting point of a ,friendship2    
just as  pleasure1 received through the 
sight1 is the commencement of ,love3 for
  no one falls in love without being    
first pleased with the personal         
appearance of the beloved object1 and   
yet he who takes pleasure in it  does   
not therefore necessarily love1 but when
 he wearies for the object  in its      
absence and desires its presence4       
,exactly in the same way men  cannot be 
friends without having passed through   
the stage of ,kindly  ,feeling1 and yet 
they who are in that stage do not       

necessarily advance  to ,friendship3    
they merely have an inert wish for the  
good of those  toward whom they         
entertain the feeling1 but would not    
join them in any  action1 nor put       
themselves out of the way for them4 ,so 
that1 in a  metaphorical way of         
speaking1 one might say that it is      
dormant  ,friendship1 and when it has   
endured for a space and ripened into    
intimacy comes to be real ,friendship2  
but not that whose object is  advantage 
or pleasure1 because such motives cannot
 produce even ,kindly  ,feeling4    ,i  
mean1 he who has received a kindness    
requites it by ,kindly ,feeling  towards
 his benefactor1 and is right in so     
doing3 but he who wishes  another to be 
prosperous1 because he has hope of      
advantage through his  instrumentality1 
does not seem to be kindly disposed to  
that person but  rather to himself2 just
 as neither is he his friend if he pays 
court to  him for any interested        
purpose4    ,kindly ,feeling always     

arises by reason of goodness and a      
certain  amiability1 when one man gives 
another the notion of being a fine      
fellow1 or brave man1 etc41 as we said  
was the case sometimes with  those      
matched against one another4    ,chapter
 ,,vi4    ,unity of ,sentiment is also  
plainly connected with ,friendship1 and 
therefore is not the same as ,unity of  
,opinion1 because this might exist  even
 between people unacquainted with one   
another4    ,nor do men usually say     
people are united in sentiment merely   
because  they agree in opinion on any   
point1 as1 for instance1 on points of   
astronomical science 7,unity of         
,sentiment herein not having any        
connection with ,friendship71 but they  
say that ,communities have ,unity  of   
,sentiment when they agree respecting   
points of expediency and take  the same 
line and carry out what has been        
determined in common  consultation4     
,thus we see that ,unity of ,sentiment  
has for its object matters of  action1  

and such of these as are of importance1 
and of mutual1 or1 in  the case of      
single ,states1 common1 interest3 when1 
for instance1 all  agree in the choice  
of magistrates1 or forming alliance with
 the  ,lacedmonians1 or appointing      
,pittacus ruler 7that is to say1        
supposing  he himself was willing74 ,but
 when each wishes himself to be in power
  7as the brothers in the ,phniss71 they
 quarrel and form parties3 for1         
plainly1 ,unity of ,sentiment does not  
merely imply that each entertains  the  
same idea be it what it may1 but that   
they do so in respect of the  same      
object1 as when both the populace and   
the sensible men of a ,state  desire    
that the best men should be in office1  
because then all attain  their object4  
,thus ,unity of ,sentiment is plainly a 
social ,friendship1 as it is also  said 
to be3 since it has for its             
object-matter things expedient and      
relating to life4    ,and this ,unity   
exists among the good3 for they have it 

towards  themselves and towards one     
another1 being1 if ,i may be allowed the
  expression1 in the same position3 ,i  
mean1 the wishes of such men are  steady
 and do not ebb and flow like the       
,euripus1 and they wish what is  just   
and expedient and aim at these things in
 common4    ,the bad1 on the contrary1  
can as little have ,unity of ,sentiment 
as they  can be real friends1 except to 
a very slight extent1 desiring as they  
do unfair advantage in things profitable
 while they shirk labour and  service   
for the common good3 and while each man 
wishes for these things  for himself he 
is jealous of and hinders his neighbour3
 and as they do  not watch over the     
common good it is lost4 ,the result is  
that they  quarrel while they are for   
keeping one another to work but are not 
willing to perform their just share4    
,chapter ,,vii4    ,benefactors are     
commonly held to have more ,friendship  
for the objects  of their kindness than 
these for them3 and the fact is made a  

subject  of discussion and enquiry1 as  
being contrary to reasonable            
expectation4    ,the account of the     
matter which satisfies most persons is  
that the one  are debtors and the others
 creditors3 and therefore that1 as in   
the  case of actual loans the debtors   
wish their creditors out of the way     
while the creditors are anxious for the 
preservation of their debtors1  so those
 who have done kindnesses desire the    
continued existence of the  people they 
have done them to1 under the notion of  
getting a return of  their good offices1
 while these are not particularly       
anxious about  requital4    ,epicharmus1
 ,i suspect1 would very probably say    
that they who give this  solution judge 
from their own baseness2 yet it         
certainly is like human  nature1 for the
 generality of men have short memories  
on these points1  and aim rather at     
receiving than conferring benefits4     
,but the real cause1 it would seem1     
rests upon nature1 and the case is  not 

parallel to that of creditors2 because  
in this there is no  affection to the   
persons1 but merely a wish for their    
preservation with  a view to the return3
 whereas1 in point of fact1 they who    
have done  kindnesses feel friendship   
and love for those to whom they have    
done  them1 even though they neither    
are1 nor can by possibility hereafter   
be1 in a position to serve their        
benefactors4    ,and this is the case   
also with artisans2 every one1 ,i mean1 
feels more  affection for his own work  
than that work possibly could for him if
 it  were animate4 ,it is perhaps       
specially the case with poets3 for these
  entertain very great affection for    
their poems1 loving them as their  own  
children4 ,it is to this kind of thing  
,i should be inclined to  compare the   
case of benefactors3 for the object of  
their kindness is  their own work1 and  
so they love this more than this loves  
its creator4    ,and the account of this
 is that existence is to all a thing    

choice-worthy and an object of          
affection2 now we exist by acts of      
working1 that is1 by living and acting2 
he then that has created a  given work  
exists1 it may be said1 by his act of   
working3 therefore he  loves his work   
because he loves existence4 ,and this is
 natural1 for the  work produced        
displays in act what existed before     
potentially4    ,then again1 the        
benefactor has a sense of honour in     
right of his  action1 so that he may    
well take pleasure in him in whom this  
resides2  but to him who has received   
the benefit there is nothing honourable 
in  respect of his benefactor1 only     
something advantageous which is both    
less pleasant and less the object of    
,friendship4    ,again1 pleasure is     
derived from the actual working out of a
 present  action1 from the anticipation 
of a future one1 and from the           
recollection of a past one3 but the     
highest pleasure and special object  of 
affection is that which attends on the  

actual working4 ,now the  benefactor's  
work abides 7for the honourable is      
enduring71 but the  advantage of him who
 has received the kindness passes away4 
,again1 there is pleasure in            
recollecting honourable actions1 but in 
recollecting advantageous ones there is 
none at all or much less 7by  the way   
though1 the contrary is true of the     
expectation of advantage74    ,further1 
the entertaining the feeling of         
,friendship is like acting on  another2 
but being the object of the feeling is  
like being acted upon4    ,so then1     
entertaining the sentiment of           
,friendship1 and all feelings  connected
 with it1 attend on those who1 in the   
given case of a  benefaction1 are the   
superior party4    ,once more3 all      
people value most what has cost them    
much labour in the  production2 for     
instance1 people who have themselves    
made their money  are fonder of it than 
those who have inherited it3 and        
receiving  kindness is1 it seems1       

unlaborious1 but doing it is laborious4 
,and this  is the reason why the female 
parents are most fond of their          
offspring2  for their part in producing 
them is attended with most labour1 and  
they  know more certainly that they are 
theirs4 ,this feeling would seem also   
to belong to benefactors4    ,chapter   
,,viii4    ,a question is also raised as
 to whether it is right to love one's   
,self  best1 or some one else3 because  
men find fault with those who love      
themselves best1 and call them in a     
disparaging way lovers of ,self2 and    
the bad man is thought to do everything 
he does for his own sake  merely1 and   
the more so the more depraved he is2    
accordingly men  reproach him with never
 doing anything unselfish3 whereas the  
good man  acts from a sense of honour   
7and the more so the better man he is71 
and  for his friend's sake1 and is      
careless of his own interest4    ,but   
with these theories facts are at        
variance1 and not unnaturally3 for  it  

is commonly said also that a man is to  
love most him who is most his  friend1  
and he is most a friend who wishes good 
to him to whom he  wishes it for that   
man's sake even though no one knows4    
,now these  conditions1 and in fact all 
the rest by which a friend is           
characterised1 belong specially to each 
individual in respect of his  ,self3 for
 we have said before that all the       
friendly feelings are  derived to others
 from those which have ,self primarily  
for their  object4 ,and all the current 
proverbs support this view2 for         
instance1  8one soul10 8the goods of    
friends are common10 8equality is a tie 
of  ,friendship10 8the knee is nearer   
than the shin40 ,for all these things   
exist specially with reference to a     
man's own ,self3 he is specially a      
friend to himself and so he is bound to 
love himself the most4    ,it is with   
good reason questioned which of the two 
parties one should  follow1 both having 
plausibility on their side4 ,perhaps    

then1 in  respect of theories of this   
kind1 the proper course is to           
distinguish  and define how far each is 
true1 and in what way4 ,if we could     
ascertain  the sense in which each uses 
the term 8,self-loving10 this point     
might  be cleared up4    ,well now1 they
 who use it disparagingly give the name 
to those who1 in  respect of wealth1 and
 honours1 and pleasures of the body1    
give to  themselves the larger share3   
because the mass of mankind grasp after 
these and are earnest about them as     
being the best things2 which is the     
reason why they are matters of          
contention4 ,they who are covetous in   
regard to these gratify their lusts and 
passions in general1 that is to  say the
 irrational part of their soul3 now the 
mass of mankind are so  disposed1 for   
which reason the appellation has taken  
its rise from that  mass which is low   
and bad4 ,of course they are justly     
reproached who are  ,self-loving in this
 sense4    ,and that the generality of  

men are accustomed to apply the term to 
denominate those who do give such things
 to themselves is quite plain3  suppose1
 for instance1 that a man were anxious  
to do1 more than other  men1 acts of    
justice1 or self-mastery1 or any other  
virtuous acts1 and1  in general1 were to
 secure to himself that which is        
abstractedly noble  and honourable1 no  
one would call him ,self-loving1 nor    
blame him4    ,yet might such an one be 
judged to be more truly ,self-loving3   
certainly  he gives to himself the      
things which are most noble and most    
good1 and  gratifies that ,principle of 
his nature which is most rightfully     
authoritative1 and obeys it in          
everything3 and just as that which      
possesses the highest authority is      
thought to constitute a ,community or   
any other system1 so also in the case of
 ,man3 and so he is most truly          
,self-loving who loves and gratifies    
this ,principle4    ,again1 men are said
 to have1 or to fail of having1         

self-control1  according as the         
,intellect controls or not1 it being    
plainly implied  thereby that this      
,principle constitutes each individual2 
and people are  thought to have done of 
themselves1 and voluntarily1 those      
things  specially which are done with   
,reason4    ,it is plain1 therefore1    
that this ,principle does1 either       
entirely or  specially constitute the   
individual man1 and that the good man   
specially loves this4 ,for this reason  
then he must be specially  ,self-loving1
 in a kind other than that which is     
reproached1 and as far  superior to it  
as living in accordance with ,reason is 
to living at the  beck and call of      
passion1 and aiming at the truly noble  
to aiming at  apparent advantage4       
,now all approve and commend those who  
are eminently earnest about  honourable 
actions1 and if all would vie with one  
another in respect of  the 1 and be     
intent upon doing what is most truly    
noble and  honourable1 society at large 

would have all that is proper while each
  individual in particular would have   
the greatest of goods1 ,virtue being    
assumed to be such4    ,and so the good 
man ought to be ,self-loving3 because by
 doing what is  noble he will have      
advantage himself and will do good to   
others3 but  the bad man ought not to   
be1 because he will harm himself and his
  neighbours by following low and evil  
passions4 ,in the case of the bad  man1 
what he ought to do and what he does are
 at variance1 but the good  man does    
what he ought to do1 because all        
,intellect chooses what is  best for    
itself and the good man puts himself    
under the direction of  ,intellect4     
,of the good man it is true likewise    
that he does many things for the  sake  
of his friends and his country1 even to 
the extent of dying for  them1 if need  
be3 for money and honours1 and1 in      
short1 all the good  things which others
 fight for1 he will throw away while    
eager to secure  to himself the 3 he    

will prefer a brief and great joy to a  
tame  and enduring one1 and to live     
nobly for one year rather than          
ordinarily  for many1 and one great and 
noble action to many trifling ones4 ,and
  this is perhaps that which befals men 
who die for their country and  friends2 
they choose great glory for themselves3 
and they will lavish  their own money   
that their friends may receive more1 for
 hereby the  friend gets the money but  
the man himself the 2 so1 in fact he    
gives to himself the greater good4 ,it  
is the same with honours and  offices2  
all these things he will give up to his 
friend1 because this  reflects honour   
and praise on himself3 and so with good 
reason is he  esteemed a fine character 
since he chooses the honourable before  
all  things else4 ,it is possible also  
to give up the opportunities of action  
to a friend2 and to have caused a       
friend's doing a thing may be more      
noble than having done it one's self4   
,in short1 in all praiseworthy things   

the good man does plainly give to       
himself a larger share of the           
honourable4 ,in this sense it is right  
to  be ,self-loving1 in the vulgar      
acceptation of the term it is not4      
,chapter ,,ix4    ,a question is raised 
also respecting the ,happy man1 whether 
he will  want ,friends1 or no8    ,some 
say that they who are blessed and       
independent have no need of  ,friends1  
for they already have all that is good1 
and so1 as being  independent1 want     
nothing further3 whereas the notion of a
 friend's  office is to be as it were a 
second ,self and procure for a man what 
he  cannot get by himself3 hence the    
saying1    8,when ,fortune gives us     
good1 what need we ,friends80      ,on  
the other hand1 it looks absurd1 while  
we are assigning to the ,happy  man all 
other good things1 not to give him      
,friends1 which are1 after  all1 thought
 to be the greatest of external goods4  
,again1 if it is more characteristic of 
a friend to confer than to  receive     

kindnesses1 and if to be beneficent     
belongs to the good man and  to the     
character of virtue1 and if it is more  
noble to confer  kindnesses on friends  
than strangers1 the good man will need  
objects  for his benefactions4 ,and out 
of this last consideration springs a    
question whether the need of ,friends be
 greater in prosperity or  adversity1   
since the unfortunate man wants people  
to do him kindnesses  and they who are  
fortunate want objects for their kind   
acts4    ,again1 it is perhaps absurd to
 make our ,happy man a solitary1 because
  no man would choose the possession of 
all goods in the world on the  condition
 of solitariness1 man being a social    
animal and formed by  nature for living 
with others3 of course the ,happy man   
has this  qualification since he has all
 those things which are good by nature3 
and it is obvious that the society of   
friends and good men must be  preferable
 to that of strangers and ordinary      
people1 and we conclude1  therefore1    

that the ,happy man does need ,friends4 
,but then1 what do they mean whom we    
quoted first1 and how are they  right8  
,is it not that the mass of mankind mean
 by ,friends those who are  useful8 and 
of course the ,happy man will not need  
such because he has  all good things    
already2 neither will he need such as   
are ,friends with  a view to the        
pleasurable1 or at least only to a      
slight extent2 because  his life1 being 
already pleasurable1 does not want      
pleasure imported  from without2 and so1
 since the ,happy man does not need     
,friends of  these kinds1 he is thought 
not to need any at all4    ,but it may  
be1 this is not true3 for it was stated 
originally1 that  ,happiness is a kind  
of ,working2 now ,working plainly is    
something that  must come into being1   
not be already there like a mere piece  
of  property4    ,if then the being     
happy consists in living and working1   
and the good  man's working is in itself
 excellent and pleasurable 7as we said  

at the  commencement of the treatise71  
and if what is our own reckons among    
things pleasurable1 and if we can view  
our neighbours better than  ourselves   
and their actions better than we can our
 own1 then the  actions of their        
,friends who are good men are           
pleasurable to the good2  inasmuch as   
they have both the requisites which are 
naturally pleasant4  ,so the man in the 
highest state of happiness will need    
,friends of this  kind1 since he desires
 to contemplate good actions1 and       
actions of his  own1 which those of his 
friend1 being a good man1 are4          
,again1 common opinion requires that the
 ,happy man live with pleasure to       
himself3 now life is burthensome to a   
man in solitude1 for it is not  easy to 
work continuously by one's self1 but in 
company with1 and in  regard to others1 
it is easier1 and therefore the working1
 being  pleasurable in itself will be   
more continuous 7a thing which should be
  in respect of the ,happy man72 for the

 good man1 in that he is good  takes    
pleasure in the actions which accord    
with ,virtue and is annoyed  at those   
which spring from ,vice1 just as a      
musical man is pleased with  beautiful  
music and annoyed by bad4 ,and besides1 
as ,theognis says1  ,virtue itself may  
be improved by practice1 from living    
with the good4    ,and1 upon the        
following considerations more purely    
metaphysical1 it  will probably appear  
that the good friend is naturally       
choice-worthy to  the good man4 ,we have
 said before1 that whatever is naturally
 good is  also in itself good and       
pleasant to the good man2 now the fact  
of  living1 so far as animals are       
concerned1 is characterised generally by
  the power of sentience1 in man it is  
characterised by that of  sentience1 or 
of rationality 7the faculty of course   
being referred to  the actual operation 
of the faculty1 certainly the main point
 is the  actual operation of it72 so    
that living seems mainly to consist in  

the  act of sentience or exerting       
rationality3 now the fact of living is  
in  itself one of the things that are   
good and pleasant 7for it is a  definite
 totality1 and whatever is such belongs 
to the nature of good71  but what is    
naturally good is good to the good man3 
for which reason it  seems to be        
pleasant to all4 7,of course one must   
not suppose a life  which is depraved   
and corrupted1 nor one spent in pain1   
for that which  is such is indefinite as
 are its inherent qualities3 however1   
what is  to be said of pain will be     
clearer in what is to follow47    ,if   
then the fact of living is in itself    
good and pleasant 7and this  appears    
from the fact that all desire it1 and   
specially those who are  good and in    
high happiness2 their course of life    
being most  choice-worthy and their     
existence most choice-worthy likewise71 
then  also he that sees perceives that  
he sees2 and he that hears perceives    
that he hears2 and he that walks        

perceives that he walks2 and in all  the
 other instances in like manner there is
 a faculty which reflects  upon and     
perceives the fact that we are working1 
so that we can  perceive that we        
perceive and intellectually know that we
  intellectually know3 but to perceive  
that we perceive or that we             
intellectually know is to perceive that 
we exist1 since existence was  defined  
to be perceiving or intellectually      
knowing4 ,now to perceive  that one     
lives is a thing pleasant in itself1    
life being a thing  naturally good1 and 
the perceiving of the presence in       
ourselves of  things naturally good     
being pleasant4    ,therefore the fact  
of living is choice-worthy1 and to the  
good  specially so since existence is   
good and pleasant to them3 for they     
receive pleasure from the internal      
consciousness of that which in  itself  
is good4    ,but the good man is to his 
friend as to himself1 friend being but a
  name for a second ,self2 therefore as 

his own existence is choice-worthy  to  
each so too1 or similarly at least1 is  
his friend's existence4 ,but  the ground
 of one's own existence being           
choice-worthy is the perceiving  of     
one's self being good1 any such         
perception being in itself pleasant4    
,therefore one ought to be thoroughly   
conscious of one's friend's  existence1 
which will result from living with him1 
that is sharing in  his words and       
thoughts3 for this is the meaning of the
 term as applied  to the human species1 
not mere feeding together as in the case
 of  brutes4    ,if then to the man in a
 high state of happiness existence is in
 itself  choice-worthy1 being naturally 
good and pleasant1 and so too a friend's
  existence1 then the friend also must  
be among things choice-worthy4 ,but     
whatever is choice-worthy to a man he   
should have or else he will be in  this 
point deficient4 ,the man therefore who 
is to come up to our notion  8,happy0   
will need good ,friends4    ,chapter ,x4

    ,are we then to make our friends as 
numerous as possible8 or1 as in  respect
 of acquaintance it is thought to have  
been well said 8have not  thou many     
acquaintances yet be not without20 so   
too in respect of  ,friendship may we   
adopt the precept1 and say that a man   
should not be  without friends1 nor     
again have exceeding many friends8      
,now as for friends who are intended for
 use1 the maxim ,i have quoted  will1 it
 seems1 fit in exceedingly well1 because
 to requite the  services of many is a  
matter of labour1 and a whole life would
 not be  long enough to do this for     
them4 ,so that1 if more numerous than   
what  will suffice for one's own life1  
they become officious1 and are          
hindrances in respect of living well3   
and so we do not want them4 ,and  again 
of those who are to be for pleasure a   
few are quite enough1 just  like        
sweetening in our food4    ,but of the  
good are we to make as many as ever we  
can1 or is there any  measure of the    

number of friends1 as there is of the   
number to  constitute a ,political      
,community8 ,i mean1 you cannot make one
 out of  ten men1 and if you increase   
the number to one hundred thousand it is
  not any longer a ,community4 ,however1
 the number is not perhaps some one     
definite number but any between certain 
extreme limits4    ,well1 of friends    
likewise there is a limited number1     
which perhaps may  be laid down to be   
the greatest number with whom it would  
be possible  to keep up intimacy2 this  
being thought to be one of the greatest 
marks  of ,friendship1 and it being     
quite obvious that it is not possible to
 be  intimate with many1 in other words1
 to part one's self among many4 ,and    
besides it must be remembered that they 
also are to be friends to one  another  
if they are all to live together3 but it
 is a matter of  difficulty to find this
 in many men at once4    ,it comes      
likewise to be difficult to bring home  
to one's self the joys  and sorrows of  

many3 because in all probability one    
would have to  sympathise at the same   
time with the joys of this one and the  
sorrows  of that other4    ,perhaps then
 it is well not to endeavour to have    
very many friends but  so many as are   
enough for intimacy3 because1 in fact1  
it would seem not  to be possible to be 
very much a friend to many at the same  
time3 and1  for the same reason1 not to 
be in love with many objects at the same
  time3 love being a kind of excessive  
,friendship which implies but one       
object3 and all strong emotions must be 
limited in the number towards  whom they
 are felt4    ,and if we look to facts  
this seems to be so3 for not many at a  
time  become friends in the way of      
companionship1 all the famous           
,friendships  of the kind are between   
two persons3 whereas they who have many 
friends1 and meet everybody on the      
footing of intimacy1 seem to be  friends
 really to no one except in the way of  
general society2 ,i mean  the characters

 denominated as over-complaisant4    ,to
 be sure1 in the way merely of society1 
a man may be a friend to many  without  
being necessarily over-complaisant1 but 
being truly good3 but  one cannot be a  
friend to many because of their virtue1 
and for the  persons' own sake2 in fact1
 it is a matter for contentment to find 
even  a few such4    ,chapter ,,xi4     
,again3 are friends most needed in      
prosperity or in adversity8 they are    
required1 we know1 in both states1      
because the unfortunate need help  and  
the prosperous want people to live with 
and to do kindnesses to3  for they have 
a desire to act kindly to some one4     
,to have friends is more necessary in   
adversity1 and therefore in this  case  
useful ones are wanted2 and to have them
 in prosperity is more  honourable1 and 
this is why the prosperous want good men
 for friends1  it being preferable to   
confer benefits on1 and to live with1   
these4 ,for  the very presence of       
friends is pleasant even in adversity3  

since men  when grieved are comforted by
 the sympathy of their friends4    ,and 
from this1 by the way1 the question     
might be raised1 whether it is  that    
they do in a manner take part of the    
weight of calamities1 or only  that     
their presence1 being pleasurable1 and  
the consciousness of their  sympathy1   
make the pain of the sufferer less4     
,however1 we will not further discuss   
whether these which have been  suggested
 or some other causes produce the       
relief1 at least the effect  we speak of
 is a matter of plain fact4    ,but     
their presence has probably a mixed     
effect3 ,i mean1 not only is the  very  
seeing friends pleasant1 especially to  
one in misfortune1 and  actual help     
towards lessening the grief is afforded 
7the natural  tendency of a friend1 if  
he is gifted with tact1 being to comfort
 by  look and word1 because he is well  
acquainted with the sufferer's temper   
and disposition and therefore knows what
 things give him pleasure and  pain71   

but also the perceiving a friend to be  
grieved at his  misfortunes causes the  
sufferer pain1 because every one avoids 
being  cause of pain to his friends4    
,and for this reason they who are of a  
manly nature are cautious not to        
implicate their friends in their pain2  
and unless a man is exceedingly callous 
to the pain of others he cannot  bear   
the pain which is thus caused to his    
friends3 in short1 he does  not admit   
men to wail with him1 not being given to
 wail at all3 women1  it is true1 and   
men who resemble women1 like to have    
others to groan  with them1 and love    
such as friends and sympathisers4 ,but  
it is plain  that it is our duty in all 
things to imitate the highest character4
    ,on the other hand1 the advantages  
of friends in our prosperity are the    
pleasurable intercourse and the         
consciousness that they are pleased at  
our good fortune4    ,it would seem1    
therefore1 that we ought to call in     
friends readily on  occasion of good    

fortune1 because it is noble to be ready
 to do good to  others3 but on occasion 
of bad fortune1 we should do so with    
reluctance2 for we should as little as  
possible make others share in  our ills2
 on which principle goes the saying1 8,i
 am unfortunate1 let  that suffice40    
,the most proper occasion for calling   
them in is when  with small trouble or  
annoyance to themselves they can be of  
very great  use to the person who needs 
them4    ,but1 on the contrary1 it is   
fitting perhaps to go to one's friends  
in  their misfortunes unasked and with  
alacrity 7because kindness is the       
friend's office and specially towards   
those who are in need and who do  not   
demand it as a right1 this being more   
creditable and more pleasant  to both72 
and on occasion of their good fortune to
 go readily1 if we  can forward it in   
any way 7because men need their friends 
for this  likewise71 but to be backward 
in sharing it1 any great eagerness to   
receive advantage not being creditable4 

,one should perhaps be cautious not to  
present the appearance of  sullenness in
 declining the sympathy or help of      
friends1 for this  happens occasionally4
    ,it appears then that the presence  
of friends is1 under all  circumstances1
 choice-worthy4    ,chapter ,,xii4      
,may we not say then that1 as seeing the
 beloved object is most prized  by      
lovers and they choose this sense rather
 than any of the others  because ,love  
8,is engendered in the eyes1  ,with     
gazing fed10      in like manner        
intimacy is to friends most             
choice-worthy1 ,friendship  being       
communion8 ,again1 as a man is to       
himself so is he to his friend2  now    
with respect to himself the perception  
of his own existence is  choice-worthy1 
therefore is it also in respect of his  
friend4    ,and besides1 their          
,friendship is acted out in intimacy1   
and so with  good reason they desire    
this4 ,and whatever in each man's       
opinion  constitutes existence1 or      

whatsoever it is for the sake of which  
they  choose life1 herein they wish     
their friends to join with them2 and so 
some men drink together1 others gamble1 
others join in gymnastic  exercises or  
hunting1 others study philosophy        
together3 in each case  spending their  
days together in that which they like   
best of all things  in life1 for since  
they wish to be intimate with their     
friends they do  and partake in those   
things whereby they think to attain this
 object4    ,therefore the ,friendship  
of the wicked comes to be depraved2 for1
 being  unstable1 they share in what is 
bad and become depraved in being made   
like to one another3 but the ,friendship
 of the good is good1 growing  with     
their intercourse2 they improve also1 as
 it seems1 by repeated  acts1 and by    
mutual correction1 for they receive     
impress from one  another in the points 
which give them pleasure2 whence says   
the ,poet1    8,thou from the good1 good
 things shalt surely learn40      ,here 

then we will terminate our discourse of 
,friendship4 ,the next thing  is to go  
into the subject of ,pleasure4          
,,book ,x    ,chapter ,i4      ,next1 it
 would seem1 follows a discussion       
respecting ,pleasure1 for it  is thought
 to be most closely bound up with our   
kind3 and so men train  the young1      
guiding them on their course by the     
rudders of ,pleasure and  ,pain4 ,and to
 like and dislike what one ought is     
judged to be most  important for the    
formation of good moral character3      
because these  feelings extend all one's
 life through1 giving a bias towards and
  exerting an influence on the side of  
,virtue and ,happiness1 since men       
choose what is pleasant and avoid what  
is painful4    ,subjects such as these  
then1 it would seem1 we ought by no     
means to  pass by1 and specially since  
they involve much difference of opinion4
  ,there are those who call ,pleasure   
the ,chief ,good2 there are others who  
on the contrary maintain that it is     

exceedingly bad2#a some perhaps  from a 
real conviction that such is the case1  
others from a notion that  it is better1
 in reference to our life and conduct1  
to show up ,pleasure  as bad1 even if it
 is not so really2 arguing that1 as the 
mass of men  have a bias towards it and 
are the slaves of their pleasures1 it is
  right to draw them to the contrary1   
for that so they may possibly  arrive at
 the mean4#b    ,i confess ,i suspect   
the soundness of this policy2 in matters
 respecting  men's feelings and actions 
theories are less convincing than facts3
  whenever1 therefore1 they are found   
conflicting with actual experience1     
they not only are despised but involve  
the truth in their fall3 he1 for        
instance1 who deprecates ,pleasure1 if  
once seen to aim at it1 gets the  credit
 of backsliding to it as being          
universally such as he said it  was1 the
 mass of men being incapable of nice    
distinctions4    ,real accounts1        
therefore1 of such matters seem to be   

most expedient1  not with a view to     
knowledge merely but to life and        
conduct3 for they  are believed as being
 in harm with facts1 and so they prevail
 with the  wise to live in accordance   
with them4    ,but of such              
considerations enough3 let us now       
proceed to the current  maxims          
respecting ,pleasure4    ,chapter ,,ii4 
,now ,eudoxus thought ,pleasure to be   
the ,chief ,good because he saw all1    
rational and irrational alike1 aiming at
 it3 and he argued that1 since  in all  
what was the object of choice must be   
good and what most so the  best1 the    
fact of all being drawn to the same     
thing proved this thing  to be the best 
for all3 8,for each10 he said1 8finds   
what is good for  itself just as it does
 its proper nourishment1 and so that    
which is  good for all1 and the object  
of the aim of all1 is their ,chief      
,good40    7,and his theories were      
received1 not so much for their own     
sake1 as  because of his excellent moral

 character2 for he was thought to be    
eminently possessed of perfect          
self-mastery1 and therefore it was not  
thought that he said these things       
because he was a lover of ,pleasure  but
 that he really was so convinced47      
,and he thought his position was not    
less proved by the argument from  the   
contrary3 that is1 since ,pain was in   
itself an object of avoidance  to all   
the contrary must be in like manner an  
object of choice4    ,again he urged    
that that is most choice-worthy which we
 choose1 not by  reason of1 or with a   
view to1 anything further2 and that     
,pleasure is  confessedly of this kind  
because no one ever goes on to ask to   
what  purpose he is pleased1 feeling    
that ,pleasure is in itself             
choice-worthy4    ,again1 that when     
added to any other good it makes it more
  choice-worthy2 as1 for instance1 to   
actions of justice1 or perfected        
self-mastery2 and good can only be      
increased by itself4    ,however1 this  

argument at least seems to prove only   
that it belongs to  the class of goods1 
and not that it does so more than       
anything else3  for every good is more  
choicewortby in combination with some   
other than  when taken quite alone4 ,in 
fact1 it is by just such an argument    
that  ,plato proves that ,pleasure is   
not the ,chief ,good3#c 8,for10 says he1
  8the life of ,pleasure is more        
choice-worthy in combination with       
,practical ,wisdom than apart from it2  
but1 if the compound better then  simple
 ,pleasure cannot be the ,chief ,good2  
because the very ,chief ,good  cannot by
 any addition become choice-worthy than 
it is already30 and it  is obvious that 
nothing else can be the ,chief ,good1   
which by  combination with any of the   
things in themselves good comes to be   
more  choice-worthy4    ,what is there  
then of such a nature8 7meaning1 of     
course1 whereof we  can partake2 because
 that which we are in search of must be 
such74    ,as for those who object that 

8what all aim at is not necessarily     
good10  ,i confess ,i cannot see much in
 what they say1 because what all think  
we say is4 ,and he who would cut away   
this ground from under us will  not     
bring forward things more dependable3   
because if the argument had  rested on  
the desires of irrational creatures     
there might have been  something in what
 he says1 but1 since the rational also  
desire  ,pleasure1 how can his objection
 be allowed any weight8 and it may be   
that1 even in the lower animals1 there  
is some natural good principle  above   
themselves which aims at the good       
peculiar to them4    ,nor does that seem
 to be sound which is urged respecting  
the argument  from the contrary3 ,i     
mean1 some people say 8it does not      
follow that  ,pleasure must be good     
because ,pain is evil1 since evil may be
 opposed  to evil1 and both evil and    
good to what is indifferent30 now what  
they  say is right enough in itself but 
does not hold in the present  instance4 

,if both ,pleasure and ,pain were bad   
both would have been  objects of        
avoidance2 or if neither then neither   
would have been1 at  all events they    
must have fared alike3 but now men do   
plainly avoid the  one as bad and choose
 the other as good1 and so there is a   
complete  opposition4    ,nor again is  
,pleasure therefore excluded from being 
good because it  does not belong to the 
class of qualities3#d the acts of       
,virtue are  not qualities1 neither is  
,happiness yet surely both are goods4   
,again1 they say the ,chief ,good is    
limited but ,pleasure unlimited1 in     
that it admits of degrees4    ,now if   
they judge this from the act of feeling 
,pleasure then the same  thing will     
apply to justice and all the other      
virtues1#e in respect of  which clearly 
it is said that men are more or less of 
such and such  characters 7according to 
the different virtues71 they are more   
just or  more brave1 or one may practise
 justice and self-mastery more or less4 

,if1 on the other hand1 they judge in   
respect of the ,pleasures  themselves   
then it may be they miss the true cause1
 namely that some  are unmixed and      
others mixed3 for just as health being  
in itself  limited1 admits of degrees1  
why should not ,pleasure do so and yet  
be  limited8 in the former case we      
account for it by the fact that there is
  not the same adjustment of parts in   
all men1 nor one and the same  always in
 the same individual3 but health1 though
 relaxed1 remains up  to a certain      
point1 and differs in degrees2 and of   
course the same may  be the case with   
,pleasure4    ,again1 assuming the      
,chief ,good to be perfect and all      
,movements#f and  ,generations          
imperfect1 they try to shew that        
,pleasure is a ,movement and  a         
,generation4    ,yet they do not seem   
warranted in saying even that it is a   
,movement3  for to every ,movement are  
thought to belong swiftness and         
slowness1 and  if not in itself1 as to  

that of the universe1 yet relatively3   
but to  ,pleasure neither of these      
belongs3 for though one may have got    
quickly  into the state ,pleasure1 as   
into that of anger1 one cannot be in the
  state quickly1#g nor relatively to the
 state of any other person2 but  we can 
walk or grow1 and so on1 quickly or     
slowly4    ,of course it is possible to 
change into the state of ,pleasure      
quickly  or slowly1 but to act in the   
state 7by which1 ,i mean1 have the      
perception of ,pleasure7 quickly1 is not
 possible4    ,and how can it be a      
,generation8 because1 according to      
notions generally  held1 not anything is
 generated from anything1 but a thing   
resolves  itself into that out of which 
it was generated3 whereas of that of    
which ,pleasure is a ,generation ,pain  
is a ,destruction4    ,again1 they say  
that ,pain is a lack of something       
suitable to nature and  ,pleasure a     
supply of it4    ,but these are         
affections of the body3 now if ,pleasure

 really is a  supplying of somewhat     
suitable to nature1 that must feel the  
,pleasure  in which the supply takes    
place1 therefore the body of course3 yet
 this  is not thought to be so3 neither 
then is ,pleasure a supplying1 only a   
person of course will be pleased when a 
supply takes place just as he  will be  
pained when he is cut short4    ,this   
notion would seem to have arisen out of 
the ,pains and ,pleasures  connected    
with natural nourishment2 because1 when 
people have felt a  lack and so have had
 ,pain first1 they1 of course1 are      
pleased with the  supply of their lack4 
,but this is not the case with all      
,pleasures3 those attendant on          
mathematical studies1 for instance1 are 
unconnected with any ,pain2 and  of such
 as attend on the senses those which    
arise through the sense of  ,smell2 and 
again1 many sounds1 and sights1 and     
memories1 and hopes3 now  of what can   
these be ,generations8 because there has
 been here no lack  of anything to be   

afterwards supplied4    ,and to those   
who bring forward disgraceful ,pleasures
 we may reply that  these are not really
 pleasant things2 for it does not follow
 because  they are pleasant to the      
ill-disposed that we are to admit that  
they  are pleasant except to them2 just 
as we should not say that those  things 
are really wholesome1 or sweet1 or      
bitter1 which are so to the  sick1 or   
those objects really white which give   
that impression to  people labouring    
under ophthalmia4#h    ,or we might say 
thus1 that the ,pleasures are           
choice-worthy but not as  derived from  
these sources3 just as wealth is1 but   
not as the price of  treason2 or health1
 but not on the terms of eating anything
 however  loathsome4    ,or again1 may  
we not say that ,pleasures differ in    
kind8 those derived  from honourable    
objects1 for instance are different from
 those arising  from disgraceful ones2  
and it is not possible to experience the
  ,pleasure of the just man without     

being just1 or of the musical man       
without being musical2 and so on of     
others4    ,the distinction commonly    
drawn between the friend and the        
flatterer  would seem to show clearly   
either that ,pleasure is not a good1 or 
that  there are different kinds of      
,pleasure3 for the former is thought to 
have good as the object of his          
intercourse1 the latter ,pleasure only2 
and this last is reproached1 but the    
former men praise as having  different  
objects in his intercourse4    ,again1  
no one would choose to live with a      
child's intellect all his  life through1
 though receiving the highest possible  
,pleasure from such  objects as children
 receive it from2 or to take ,pleasure  
in doing any  of the most disgraceful   
things1 though sure never to be pained4 
,there are many things also about which 
we should be diligent even  though they 
brought no ,pleasure2 as seeing1        
remembering1 knowing1  possessing the   
various ,excellences2 and the fact that 

,pleasures do  follow on these naturally
 makes no difference1 because we should 
certainly choose them even though no    
,pleasure resulted from them4    ,it    
seems then to be plain that ,pleasure is
 not the ,chief ,good1 nor is  every    
kind of it choice-worthy3 and that there
 are some choice-worthy  in themselves1 
differing in kind1 i4e4 in the sources  
from which they  are derived4 ,let this 
then suffice by way of an account of the
 current  maxims respecting ,pleasure   
and ,pain4    ,chapter ,,iii4    ,now   
what it is1 and how characterised1 will 
be more plain if we take up  the subject
 afresh4    ,an act of ,sight is thought
 to be complete at any moment2 that is  
to  say1 it lacks nothing the accession 
of which subsequently will complete  its
 whole nature4    ,well1 ,pleasure      
resembles this3 because it is a whole1  
as one may say2  and one could not at   
any moment of time take a ,pleasure     
whose whole  nature would be completed  
by its lasting for a longer time4 ,and  

for  this reason it is not a ,movement3 
for all ,movement takes place in time   
of certain duration and has a certain   
,end to accomplish2 for instance1  the  
,movement of house-building#i is then   
only complete when the  builder has     
produced what he intended1 that is1     
either in the whole  time necessary to  
complete the whole design1 or in a given
  portion4#aj ,but all the subordinate  
,movements are incomplete in the  parts 
of the time1 and are different in kind  
from the whole movement  and from one   
another 7,i mean1 for instance1 that the
 fitting the stones  together is a      
,movement different from that of fluting
 the column1 and  both again from the   
construction of the ,temple as a whole3 
but this  last is complete as lacking   
nothing to the result proposed2 whereas 
that of the basement1 or of the         
triglyph1 is incomplete1 because each   
is a ,movement of a part merely74    ,as
 ,i said then1 they differ in kind1 and 
you cannot at any time you  choose find 

a ,movement complete in its whole       
nature1 but1 if at all1 in  the whole   
time requisite4    ,and so it is with   
the ,movement of walking and all others3
 for1 if  motion be a ,movement from one
 place to another place1 then of it too 
there are different kinds1 flying1      
walking1 leaping1 and such-like4 ,and   
not only so1 but there are different    
kinds even in walking3 the  where-from  
and where-to are not the same in the    
whole ,course as in a  portion of it2   
nor in one portion as in another2 nor is
 crossing this  line the same as        
crossing that3 because a man is not     
merely crossing a  line but a line in a 
given place1 and this is in a different 
place from  that4    ,of ,movement ,i   
have discoursed exactly in another      
treatise4 ,i will now  therefore only   
say that it seems not to be complete at 
any given  moment2 and that most        
movements are incomplete and            
specifically  different1 since the      
whence and whither constitute different 

species4    ,but of ,pleasure the whole 
nature is complete at any given moment3 
it is  plain then that ,pleasure and    
,movement must be different from one    
another1 and that ,pleasure belongs to  
the class of things whole and  complete4
 ,and this might appear also from the   
impossibility of moving  except in a    
definite time1 whereas there is none    
with respect to the  sensation of       
,pleasure1 for what exists at the very  
present moment is a  kind of 8whole40   
,from these considerations then it is   
plain that people are not  warranted in 
saying that ,pleasure is a ,movement or 
a ,generation3  because these terms are 
not applicable to all things1 only to   
such as  are divisible and not 8wholes30
 ,i mean that of an act of ,sight there 
is  no ,generation1 nor is there of a   
point1 nor of a monad1 nor is any one   
of these a ,movement or a ,generation3  
neither then of ,pleasure is there      
,movement or ,generation1 because it is1
 as one may say1 8a whole40#aa          

,chapter ,,iv4    ,now since every      
,percipient ,faculty works upon the     
,object answering to  it1 and perfectly 
the ,faculty in a good state upon the   
most excellent  of the ,objects within  
its range 7for ,perfect ,working is     
thought to be  much what ,i have        
described2 and we will not raise any    
question about  saying 8the ,faculty0   
works1 instead of1 8that subject wherein
 the  ,faculty resides071 in each case  
the best ,working is that of the        
,faculty  in its best state upon the    
best of the ,objects answering to it4   
,and  this will be1 further1 most       
perfect and most pleasant3 for ,pleasure
 is  attendant upon every ,percipient   
,faculty1 and in like manner on every   
intellectual operation and speculation2 
and that is most pleasant which  is most
 perfect1 and that most perfect which is
 the ,working of the best  ,faculty upon
 the most excellent of the ,objects     
within its range4    ,and ,pleasure     
perfects the ,working4 ,but ,pleasure   

does not perfect it in  the same way as 
the ,faculty and ,object of ,perception 
do1 being good2  just as health and the 
physician are not in similar senses     
causes of a  healthy state4    ,and that
 ,pleasure does arise upon the exercise 
of every ,percipient  ,faculty is       
evident1 for we commonly say that sights
 and sounds are  pleasant2 it is plain  
also that this is especially the case   
when the  ,faculty is most excellent and
 works upon a similar ,object3 and when 
both the ,object and ,faculty of        
,perception are such1 ,pleasure will    
always exist1 supposing of course an    
agent and a patient4    ,furthermore1   
,pleasure perfects the act of ,working  
not in the way of an  inherent state but
 as a supervening finish1 such as is    
bloom in people  at their prime4        
,therefore so long as the ,object of    
intellectual or  sensitive ,perception  
is such as it should be and also the    
,faculty which  discerns or realises the
 ,object1 there will be ,pleasure in the

 ,working3  because when that which has 
the capacity of being acted on and that 
which is apt to act are alike and       
similarly related1 the same result      
follows naturally4    ,how is it then   
that no one feels ,pleasure             
continuously8 is it not that  he        
wearies1 because all human faculties are
 incapable of unintermitting  exertion2 
and so1 of course1 ,pleasure does not   
arise either1 because  that follows upon
 the act of ,working4 ,but there are    
some things which  please when new1 but 
afterwards not in the like way1 for     
exactly the  same reason3 that at first 
the mind is roused and works on these   
,objects with its powers at full        
tension2 just as they who are gazing    
stedfastly at anything2 but afterwards  
the act of ,working is not of the  kind 
it was at first1 but careless1 and so   
the ,pleasure too is dulled4    ,again1 
a person may conclude that all men grasp
 at ,pleasure1 because  all aim likewise
 at ,life and ,life is an act of        

,working1 and every man  works at and   
with those things which also he best    
likes2 the musical  man1 for instance1  
works with his hearing at music2 the    
studious man  with his intellect at     
speculative questions1 and so forth4    
,and ,pleasure  perfects the acts of    
,working1 and so ,life after which men  
grasp4 ,no  wonder then that they aim   
also at ,pleasure1 because to each it   
perfects  ,life1 which is itself        
choice-worthy4 7,we will take leave to  
omit the  question whether we choose    
,life for ,pleasure's sake of ,pleasure 
for  ,life's sake2 because these two    
plainly are closely connected and admit 
not of separation2 since ,pleasure comes
 not into being without ,working1  and  
again1 every ,working ,pleasure         
perfects47    ,and this is one reason   
why ,pleasures are thought to differ in 
kind1  because we suppose that things   
which differ in kind must be perfected  
by things so differing3 it plainly being
 the case with the productions  of      

,nature and ,art2 as animals1 and trees1
 and pictures1 and statues1  and houses1
 and furniture2 and so we suppose that  
in like manner acts  of ,working which  
are different in kind are perfected by  
things  differing in kind4 ,now         
,intellectual ,workings differ          
specifically from  those of the ,senses1
 and these last from one another2       
therefore so do  the ,pleasures which   
perfect them4    ,this may be shown also
 from the intimate connection subsisting
 between  each ,pleasure and the        
,working which it perfects3 ,i mean1    
that the  ,pleasure proper to any       
,working increases that ,working2 for   
they who  work with ,pleasure sift all  
things more closely and carry them out  
to a  greater degree of nicety2 for     
instance1 those men become geometricians
  who take ,pleasure in geometry1 and   
they apprehend particular points  more  
completely3 in like manner men who are  
fond of music1 or  architecture1 or     
anything else1 improve each on his own  

pursuit1  because they feel ,pleasure in
 them4 ,thus the ,pleasures aid in      
increasing the ,workings1 and things    
which do so aid are proper and          
peculiar3 but the things which are      
proper and peculiar to others           
specifically different are themselves   
also specifically different4    ,yet    
even more clearly may this be shown from
 the fact that the  ,pleasures arising  
from one kind of ,workings hinder other 
,workings2 for  instance1 people who are
 fond of flute-music cannot keep their  
attention to conversation or discourse  
when they catch the sound of a  flute2  
because they take more ,pleasure in     
flute-playing than in the  ,working they
 are at the time engaged on2 in other   
words1 the ,pleasure  attendant on      
flute-playing destroys the ,working of  
conversation or  discourse4    ,much the
 same kind of thing takes place in other
 cases1 when a person  is engaged in two
 different ,workings at the same time3  
that is1 the  pleasanter of the two     

keeps pushing out the other1 and1 if the
  disparity in pleasantness be great1   
then more and more till a man even      
ceases altogether to work at the other4 
,this is the reason why1 when we are    
very much pleased with anything         
whatever1 we do nothing else1 and it is 
only when we are but moderately  pleased
 with one occupation that we vary it    
with another3 people1 for  instance1 who
 eat sweetmeats in the theatre do so    
most when the  performance is           
indifferent4    ,since then the proper  
and peculiar ,pleasure gives accuracy to
 the  ,workings and makes them more     
enduring and better of their kind1 while
  those ,pleasures which are foreign to 
them mar them1 it is plain there  is a  
wide difference between them3 in fact1  
,pleasures foreign to any  ,working have
 pretty much the same effect as the     
,pains proper to it1#ab  which1 in fact1
 destroy the ,workings2 ,i mean1 if one 
man dislikes  writing1 or another       
calculation1 the one does not write1 the

 other does  not calculate2 because1 in 
each case1 the ,working is attended with
 some  ,pain3 so then contrary effects  
are produced upon the ,workings by the  
,pleasures and ,pains proper to them1 by
 which ,i mean those which arise  upon  
the ,working1 in itself1 independently  
of any other circumstances4  ,as for the
 ,pleasures foreign to a ,working1 we   
have said already that  they produce a  
similar effect to the ,pain proper to   
it2 that is they  destroy the ,working1 
only not in like way4    ,well then1 as 
,workings differ from one another in    
goodness and badness1  some being fit   
objects of choice1 others of avoidance1 
and others in  their nature indifferent1
 ,pleasures are similarly related2 since
 its  own proper ,pleasure attends or   
each ,working3 of course that proper to 
a  good ,working is good1 that proper to
 a bad1 bad3 for even the desires  for  
what is noble are praiseworthy1 and for 
what is base blameworthy4               
,furthermore1 the ,pleasures attendant  

on ,workings are more closely  connected
 with them even than the desires after  
them3 for these last  are separate both 
in time and nature1 but the former are  
close to the  ,workings1 and so         
indivisible from them as to raise a     
question whether  the ,working and the  
,pleasure are identical2 but ,pleasure  
does not seem  to be an ,intellectual   
,operation nor a ,faculty of            
,perception1 because  that is absurd2   
but yet it gives some the impression of 
being the same  from not being separated
 from these4    ,as then the ,workings  
are different so are their ,pleasures2  
now ,sight  differs from ,touch in      
purity1 and ,hearing and ,smelling from 
,taste2  therefore1 in like manner1 do  
their ,pleasures2 and again1            
,intellectual  ,pleasures from these    
,sensual1 and the different kinds both  
of  ,intellectual and ,sensual from one 
another4    ,it is thought1 moreover1   
that each animal has a ,pleasure proper 
to  itself1 as it has a proper ,work2   

that ,pleasure of course which is       
attendant on the ,working4 ,and the     
soundness of this will appear upon      
particular inspection3 for horse1 dog1  
and man have different  ,pleasures2 as  
,heraclitus says1 an ass would sooner   
have hay than gold2  in other words1    
provender is pleasanter to asses than   
gold4 ,so then the  ,pleasures of       
animals specifically different are also 
specifically  different1 but those of   
the same1 we may reasonably suppose1 are
  without difference4    ,yet in the    
case of human creatures they differ not 
a little3 for the  very same things     
please some and pain others3 and what   
are painful and  hateful to some are    
pleasant to and liked by others4 ,the   
same is the  case with sweet things3 the
 same will not seem so to the man in a  
fever  as to him who is in health3 nor  
will the invalid and the person in      
robust health have the same notion of   
warmth4 ,the same is the case with      
other things also4    ,now in all such  

cases that is held to be which impresses
 the good man  with the notion of being 
such and such2 and if this is a second  
maxim  7as it is usually held to be71   
and ,virtue1 that is1 the ,good man1 in 
that he is such1 is the measure of      
everything1 then those must be real     
,pleasures which gave him the impression
 of being so and those things  pleasant 
in which he takes ,pleasure4 ,nor is it 
at all astonishing that  what are to him
 unpleasant should give another person  
the impression of  being pleasant1 for  
men are liable to many corruptions and  
marrings2  and the things in question   
are not pleasant really1 only to these  
particular persons1 and to them only as 
being thus disposed4    ,well of course1
 you may say1 it is obvious that we must
 assert those  which are confessedly    
disgraceful to be real ,pleasures1      
except to  depraved tastes3 but of those
 which are thought to be good what kind1
  or which1 must we say is ,the         
,pleasure of ,man8 is not the answer    

plain  from considering the ,workings1  
because the ,pleasures follow upon      
these8    ,if then there be one or      
several ,workings which belong to the   
perfect  and blessed man1 the ,pleasures
 which perfect these ,workings must be  
said to be specially and properly ,the  
,pleasures of ,man2 and all the  rest in
 a secondary sense1 and in various      
degrees according as the  ,workings are 
related to those highest and best ones4 
,chapter ,v4    ,now that we have spoken
 about the ,excellences of both kinds1  
and  ,friendship in its varieties1 and  
,pleasures1 it remains to sketch out    
,happiness1 since we assume that to be  
the one ,end of all human things3  and  
we shall save time and trouble by       
recapitulating what was stated  before4 
,well then1 we said that it is not a    
,state merely2 because1 if it were1  it 
might belong to one who slept all his   
life through and merely  vegetated1 or  
to one who fell into very great         
calamities3 and so1 if  these           

possibilities displease us and we would 
rather put it into the  rank of some    
kind of ,working 7as was also said      
before71 and ,workings  are of different
 kinds 7some being necessary and        
choice-worthy with a  view to other     
things1 while others are so in          
themselves71 it is plain  we must rank  
,happiness among those choice-worthy for
 their own sakes  and not among those   
which are so with a view to something   
further3  because ,happiness has no lack
 of anything but is self-sufficient4    
,by choice-worthy in themselves are     
meant those from which nothing is       
sought beyond the act of ,working3 and  
of this kind are thought to be  the     
actions according to ,virtue1 because   
doing what is noble and  excellent is   
one of those things which are           
choice-worthy for their own  sake alone4
    ,and again1 such amusements as are  
pleasant2 because people do not  choose 
them with any further purpose3 in fact  
they receive more harm  than profit from

 them1 neglecting their persons and     
their property4  ,still the common run  
of those who are judged happy take      
refuge in such  pastimes1 which is the  
reason why they who have varied talent  
in such  are highly esteemed among      
despots2 because they make themselves   
pleasant in those things which these aim
 at1 and these accordingly want  such   
men4    ,now these things are thought to
 be appurtenances of ,happiness because 
men in power spend their leisure herein3
 yet1 it may be1 we cannot  argue from  
the example of such men3 because there  
is neither ,virtue nor  ,intellect      
necessarily involved in having power1   
and yet these are the  only sources of  
good ,workings3 nor does it follow that 
because these  men1 never having tasted 
pure and generous ,pleasure1 take refuge
 in  bodily ones1 we are therefore to   
believe them to be more choice-worthy3  
for children too believe that those     
things are most excellent which are     
precious in their eyes4    ,we may well 

believe that as children and men have   
different ideas as to  what is precious 
so too have the bad and the good3       
therefore1 as we  have many times said1 
those things are really precious and    
pleasant  which seem so to the good man3
 and as to each individual that ,working
  is most choice-worthy which is in     
accordance with his own state to the    
good man that is so which is in         
accordance with ,virtue4    ,happiness  
then stands not in amusement2 in fact   
the very notion is  absurd of the ,end  
being amusement1 and of one's toiling   
and enduring  hardness all one's life   
long with a view to amusement3 for      
everything  in the world1 so to speak1  
we choose with some further ,end in     
view1  except ,happiness1 for that is   
the ,end comprehending all others4 ,now 
to  take pains and to labour with a view
 to amusement is plainly foolish  and   
very childish3 but to amuse one's self  
with a view to steady  employment       
afterwards1 as ,anacharsis says1 is     

thought to be right3 for  amusement is  
like rest1 and men want rest because    
unable to labour  continuously4         
,rest1 therefore1 is not an ,end1       
because it is adopted with a view to    
,working afterwards4    ,again1 it is   
held that the ,happy ,life must be one  
in the way of  ,excellence1 and this is 
accompanied by earnestness1#ac and      
stands not  in amusement4 ,moreover     
those things which are done in earnest1 
we say1  are better than things merely  
ludicrous and joined with amusement3 and
  we say that the ,working of the better
 part1 or the better man1 is more       
earnest2 and the ,working of the better 
is at once better and more  capable of  
,happiness4    ,then1 again1 as for     
bodily ,pleasures1 any ordinary person1 
or even a  slave1 might enjoy them1 just
 as well as the best man living but     
,happiness no one supposes a slave to   
share except so far as it is  implied in
 life3 because ,happiness stands not in 
such pastimes but in  the ,workings in  

the way of ,excellence1 as has also been
 stated before4    ,chapter ,,vi4       
,now if ,happiness is a ,working in the 
way of ,excellence of course that       
,excellence must be the highest1 that is
 to say1 the ,excellence of the  best   
,principle4 ,whether then this best     
,principle is ,intellect or some  other 
which is thought naturally to rule and  
to lead and to conceive of  noble and   
divine things1 whether being in its own 
nature divine or the  most divine of all
 our internal ,principles1 the ,working 
of this in  accordance with its own     
proper ,excellence must be the perfect  
,happiness4    ,that it is              
,contemplative has been already stated3 
and this would seem  to be consistent   
with what we said before and with truth3
 for1 in the  first place1 this ,working
 is of the highest kind1 since the      
,intellect  is the highest of our       
internal ,principles and the subjects   
with which  it is conversant the highest
 of all which fall within the range of  

our  knowledge4    ,next1 it is also    
most ,continuous3 for we are better able
 to contemplate  than to do anything    
else whatever1 continuously4    ,again1 
we think ,pleasure must be in some way  
an ingredient in  ,happiness1 and of all
 ,workings in accordance with           
,excellence that in  the way of ,science
 is confessedly most pleasant3 at least 
the pursuit  of ,science is thought to  
contain ,pleasures admirable for purity 
and  permanence2 and it is reasonable to
 suppose that the employment is more    
pleasant to those who have mastered1    
than to those who are yet seeking  for1 
it4#ad    ,and the ,self-,sufficiency   
which people speak of will attach       
chiefly to  the ,contemplative ,working3
 of course the actual necessaries of    
life are  needed alike by the man of    
science1 and the just man1 and all the  
other  characters2 but1 supposing all   
sufficiently supplied with these1 the   
just man needs people towards whom1 and 
in concert with whom1 to  practise his  

justice2 and in like manner the man of  
perfected  self-mastery1 and the brave  
man1 and so on of the rest2 whereas the 
man  of science can contemplate and     
speculate even when quite alone1 and the
  more entirely he deserves the         
appellation the more able is he to do   
so3  it may be he can do better for     
having fellow-workers but still he is   
certainly most ,self-,sufficient4       
,again1 this alone would seem to be     
rested in for its own sake1 since       
nothing results from it beyond the fact 
of having contemplated2 whereas  from   
all things which are objects of moral   
action we do mean to get  something     
beside the doing them1 be the same more 
or less4    ,also1 ,happiness is thought
 to stand in perfect rest2#ae for we    
toil  that we may rest1 and war that we 
may be at peace4 ,now all the           
,practical ,virtues require either      
society or war for their ,working1 and  
the actions regarding these are thought 
to exclude rest2 those of war  entirely1

 because no one chooses war1 nor        
prepares for war1 for war's  sake3 he   
would indeed be thought a bloodthirsty  
villain who should make  enemies of his 
friends to secure the existence of      
fighting and  bloodshed4 ,the ,working  
also of the statesman excludes the idea 
of rest1  and1 beside the actual work of
 government1 seeks for power and        
dignities or at least ,happiness for the
 man himself and his  fellow-citizens3 a
 ,happiness distinct#af from the        
national ,happiness1  which we evidently
 seek as being different and distinct4  
,if then of all the actions in          
accordance with the various virtues     
those  of policy and war are pre-eminent
 in honour and greatness1 and these  are
 restless1 and aim at some further ,end 
and are not choice-worthy for  their own
 sakes1 but the ,working of the         
,intellect1 being apt for               
contemplation1 is thought to excel in   
earnestness1 and to aim at no ,end      
beyond itself and to have ,pleasure of  

its own which helps to increase  the    
,working1 and if the attributes of      
,self-,sufficiency1 and capacity of     
rest1 and unweariedness 7as far as is   
compatible with the infirmity of  human 
nature71 and all other attributes of the
 highest ,happiness1  plainly belong to 
this ,working1 this must be perfect     
,happiness1 if  attaining a complete    
duration of life1 which condition is    
added because  none of the points of    
,happiness is incomplete4    ,but such a
 life will be higher than mere human    
nature1 because a man  will live thus1  
not in so far as he is man but in so far
 as there is in  him a divine           
,principle3 and in proportion as this   
,principle excels his  composite nature 
so far does the ,working thereof excel  
that in  accordance with any other kind 
of ,excellence3 and therefore1 if pure  
,intellect1 as compared with human      
nature1 is divine1 so too will the  life
 in accordance with it be divine        
compared with man's ordinary life4      

,yet must we not give ear to those who  
bid one as man to mind only man's       
affairs1 or as mortal only mortal       
things2 but1 so far as we can1 make     
ourselves like immortals and do all with
 a view to living in accordance  with   
the highest ,principle in us1 for small 
as it may be in bulk yet in  power and  
preciousness it far more excels all the 
others4    ,in fact this ,principle     
would seem to constitute each man's     
8,self10  since it is supreme and above 
all others in goodness it would be      
absurd then for a man not to choose his 
own life but that of some  other4       
,and here will apply an observation made
 before1 that whatever is proper  to    
each is naturally best and pleasantest  
to him3 such then is to ,man  the life  
in accordance with pure ,intellect      
7since this ,principle is  most truly   
,man71 and if so1 then it is also the   
happiest4    ,and second in degree of   
,happiness will be that ,life which is  
in  accordance with the other kind of   

,excellence1 for the ,workings in       
accordance with this are proper to ,man3
 ,i mean1 we do actions of  justice1    
courage1 and the other virtues1 towards 
one another1 in  contracts1 services of 
different kinds1 and in all kinds of    
actions and  feelings too1 by observing 
what is befitting for each3 and all     
these  plainly are proper to man4       
,further1 the ,excellence of the ,moral 
character is thought to result in some  
points from physical  circumstances1 and
 to be1 in many1 very closely connected 
with the  passions4    ,again1          
,practical ,wisdom#ag and ,excellence of
 the ,moral character are  very closely 
united2 since the ,principles of        
,practical ,wisdom are in  accordance   
with the ,moral ,virtues and these are  
right when they accord  with ,practical 
,wisdom4    ,these moreover1 as bound up
 with the passions1 must belong to the  
composite nature1 and the ,excellences  
or ,virtues of the composite  nature are
 proper to man3 therefore so too will be

 the life and  ,happiness which is in   
accordance with them4 ,but that of the  
,pure  ,intellect is separate and       
distinct3 and let this suffice upon the 
subject1 since great exactness is beyond
 our purpose1    ,it would seem1        
moreover1 to require supply of external 
goods to a small  degree1 or certainly  
less than the ,moral ,happiness3 for1 as
 far as  necessaries of life are        
concerned1 we will suppose both         
characters to  need them equally        
7though1 in point of fact1 the man who  
lives in  society does take more pains  
about his person and all that kind of   
thing2 there will really be some little 
difference71 but when we come  to       
consider their ,workings there will be  
found a great difference4    ,i mean1   
the liberal man must have money to do   
his liberal actions with1  and the just 
man to meet his engagements 7for mere   
intentions are  uncertain1 and even     
those who are unjust make a pretence of 
wishing  to do justly71 and the brave   

man must have power1 if he is to perform
  any of the actions which appertain to 
his particular ,virtue1 and the  man of 
perfected self-mastery must have        
opportunity of temptation1 else  how    
shall he or any of the others display   
his real character8    7,by the way1 a  
question is sometimes raised1 whether   
the moral choice  or the actions have   
most to do with ,virtue1 since it       
consists in both3  it is plain that the 
perfection of virtuous action requires  
both3 but  for the actions many things  
are required1 and the greater and more  
numerous they are the more47 ,but as for
 the man engaged in  ,contemplative     
,speculation1 not only are such things  
unnecessary for his  ,working1 but1 so  
to speak1 they are even hindrances3 as  
regards the  ,contemplation at least2   
because of course in so far as he is    
,man and  lives in society he chooses to
 do what ,virtue requires1 and so he    
will  need such things for maintaining  
his character as ,man though not as a   

speculative philosopher4    ,and that   
the perfect ,happiness must be a kind of
 ,contemplative ,working  may appear    
also from the following consideration3  
our conception of the  gods is that they
 are above all blessed and happy3 now   
what kind of  ,moral actions are we to  
attribute to them8 those of justice8    
nay1 will  they not be set in a         
ridiculous light if represented as      
forming  contracts1 and restoring       
deposits1 and so on8 well then1 shall we
  picture them performing brave actions1
 withstanding objects of fear and       
meeting dangers1 because it is noble to 
do so8 or liberal ones8 but to  whom    
shall they be giving8 and further1 it is
 absurd to think they have  money or    
anything of the kind4 ,and as for       
actions of perfected  self-mastery1 what
 can theirs be8 would it not be a       
degrading praise  that they have no bad 
desires8 ,in short1 if one followed the 
subject  into all details all the       
circumstances connected with ,moral     

actions  would appear trivial and       
unworthy of ,gods4    ,still1 every one 
believes that they live1 and therefore  
that they ,work  because it is not      
supposed that they sleep their time away
 like  ,endymion3 now if from a living  
being you take away ,action1 still more 
if ,creation1 what remains but          
,contemplation8 ,so then the ,working of
 the  ,gods1 eminent in blessedness1    
will be one apt for ,contemplative      
,speculation2 and of all human ,workings
 that will have the greatest  capacity  
for ,happiness which is nearest akin to 
this4    ,a corroboration of which      
position is the fact that the other     
animals do  not partake of ,happiness1  
being completely shut out from any such 
,working4    ,to the ,gods then all     
their life is blessed2 and to men in so 
far as  there is in it some copy of such
 ,working1 but of the other animals none
  is happy because it in no way shares  
in ,contemplative ,speculation4         
,happiness then is co-extensive with    

this ,contemplative ,speculation1 and   
in proportion as people have the act of 
,contemplation so far have they  also   
the being happy1 not incidentally1 but  
in the way of ,contemplative            
,speculation because it is in itself    
precious4    ,chapter ,,vii4    ,so     
,happiness must be a kind of            
,contemplative ,speculation2 but since  
it  is ,man we are speaking of he will  
need likewise ,external ,prosperity1    
because his ,nature is not by itself    
sufficient for ,speculation1 but  there 
must be health of body1 and nourishment1
 and tendance of all  kinds4            
,however1 it must not be thought1       
because without external goods a man    
cannot enjoy high ,happiness1 that      
therefore he will require many and      
great goods in order to be happy3 for   
neither ,self-sufficiency1 nor  ,action1
 stand in ,excess1 and it is quite      
possible to act nobly without  being    
ruler of sea and land1 since even with  
moderate means a man may  act in        

accordance with ,virtue4    ,and this   
may be clearly seen in that men in      
private stations are  thought to act    
justly1 not merely no less than men in  
power but even  more3 it will be quite  
enough that just so much should belong  
to a man  as is necessary1 for his life 
will be happy who works in accordance   
with ,virtue4    ,solon perhaps drew a  
fair picture of the ,happy1 when he said
 that they  are men moderately supplied 
with external goods1 and who have       
achieved  the most noble deeds1 as he   
thought1 and who have lived with perfect
  self-mastery3 for it is quite possible
 for men of moderate means to act  as   
they ought4    ,anaxagoras also seems to
 have conceived of the ,happy man not as
 either  rich or powerful1 saying that  
he should not wonder if he were         
accounted  a strange man in the judgment
 of the multitude3 for they judge by    
outward circumstances of which alone    
they have any perception4    ,and thus  
the opinions of the ,wise seem to be    

accordant with our account  of the      
matter3 of course such things carry some
 weight1 but truth1 in  matters of moral
 action1 is judged from facts and from  
actual life1 for  herein rests the      
decision4 ,so what we should do is to   
examine the  preceding statements by    
referring them to facts and to actual   
life1 and  when they harmonise with     
facts we may accept them1 when they are 
at  variance with them conceive of them 
as mere theories4    ,now he that works 
in accordance with1 and pays observance 
to1 ,pure  ,intellect1 and tends this1  
seems likely to be both in the best     
frame of  mind and dearest to the ,gods3
 because if1 as is thought1 any care is 
bestowed on human things by the ,gods   
then it must be reasonable to  think    
that they take pleasure in what is best 
and most akin to  themselves 7and this  
must be the ,pure ,intellect72 and that 
they requite  with kindness those who   
love and honour this most1 as paying    
observance  to what is dear to them1 and

 as acting rightly and nobly4 ,and it is
  quite obvious that the man of ,science
 chiefly combines all these3 he is      
therefore dearest to the ,gods1 and it  
is probable that he is at the  same time
 most ,happy4    ,thus then on this view
 also the man of ,science will be most  
,happy4    ,chapter ,,viii4    ,now then
 that we have said enough in our sketchy
 kind of way on these  subjects2 ,i     
mean1 on the ,virtues1 and also on      
,friendship and ,pleasure2  are we to   
suppose that our original purpose is    
completed8 ,must we not  rather         
acknowledge1 what is commonly said1 that
 in matters of moral  action mere       
,speculation and ,knowledge is not the  
real ,end but rather  ,practice3 and if 
so1 then neither in respect of ,virtue  
is ,knowledge  enough2 we must further  
strive to have and exert it1 and take   
whatever  other means there are of      
becoming good4    ,now if talking and   
writing were of themselves sufficient to
 make men  good1 they would justly1 as  

,theognis observes have reaped numerous 
and  great rewards1 and the thing to do 
would be to provide them3 but in  point 
of fact1 while they plainly have the    
power to guide and stimulate  the       
generous among the young and to base    
upon true virtuous principle  any noble 
and truly high-minded disposition1 they 
as plainly are  powerless to guide the  
mass of men to ,virtue and goodness2    
because it  is not their nature to be   
amenable to a sense of shame but only to
  fear2 nor to abstain from what is low 
and mean because it is  disgraceful to  
do it but because of the punishment     
attached to it3 in  fact1 as they live  
at the beck and call of passion1 they   
pursue their  own proper pleasures and  
the means of securing them1 and they    
avoid the  contrary pains2 but as for   
what is noble and truly pleasurable they
  have not an idea of it1 inasmuch as   
they have never tasted of it4    ,men   
such as these then what mere words can  
transform8 ,no1 indeed6 it is  either   

actually impossible1 or a task of no    
mean difficulty1 to alter  by words what
 has been of old taken into men's very  
dispositions3 and1  it may be1 it is a  
ground for contentment if with all the  
means and  appliances for goodness in   
our hands we can attain to ,virtue4     
,the formation of a virtuous character  
some ascribe to ,nature1 some to        
,custom1 and some to ,teaching4 ,now    
,nature's part1 be it what it may1      
obviously does not rest with us1 but    
belongs to those who in the truest      
sense are fortunate1 by reason of       
certain divine agency1    ,then1 as for 
,words and ,precept1 they1 it is to be  
feared1 will not  avail with all2 but it
 may be necessary for the mind of the   
disciple to  have been previously       
prepared for liking and disliking as he 
ought2  just as the soil must1 to       
nourish the seed sown4 ,for he that     
lives in  obedience to passion cannot   
hear any advice that would dissuade him1
  nor1 if he heard1 understand3 now him 

that is thus how can one reform8  in    
fact1 generally1 passion is not thought 
to yield to ,reason but to  brute force4
 ,so then there must be1 to begin with1 
a kind of affinity  to ,virtue in the   
disposition2 which must cleave to what  
is honourable  and loath what is        
disgraceful4 ,but to get right guidance 
towards ,virtue  from the earliest youth
 is not easy unless one is brought up   
under laws  of such kind2 because living
 with self-mastery and endurance is not 
pleasant to the mass of men1 and        
specially not to the young4 ,for this   
reason the food1 and manner of living   
generally1 ought to be the  subject of  
legal regulation1 because things when   
become habitual will  not be            
disagreeable4    ,yet perhaps it is not 
sufficient that men while young should  
get right  food and tendance1 but1      
inasmuch as they will have to practise  
and  become accustomed to certain things
 even after they have attained to  man's
 estate1 we shall want laws on these    

points as well1 and1 in fine1           
respecting one's whole life1 since the  
mass of men are amenable to  compulsion 
rather than ,reason1 and to punishment  
rather than to a sense  of honour4      
,and therefore some men hold that while 
lawgivers should employ the  sense of   
honour to exhort and guide men to       
,virtue1 under the notion  that they    
will then obey who have been well       
trained in habits2 they  should impose  
chastisement and penalties on those who 
disobey and are  of less promising      
nature2 and the incurable expel         
entirely3 because the  good man and he  
who lives under a sense of honour will  
be obedient to  reason2 and the baser   
sort1 who grasp at pleasure1 will be    
kept in  check1 like beasts of burthen  
by pain4 ,therefore also they say that  
the  pains should be such as are most   
contrary to the pleasures which are     
liked4    ,as has been said already1 he 
who is to be good must have been brought
  up and habituated well1 and then live 

accordingly under good  institutions1   
and never do what is low and mean1      
either against or with  his will4 ,now  
these objects can be attained only by   
men living in  accordance with some     
guiding ,intellect and right order1 with
 power to  back them4    ,as for the    
,paternal ,rule1 it possesses neither   
strength nor compulsory  power1 nor in  
fact does the ,rule of any one man1     
unless he is a king or  some one in like
 case3 but the ,law has power to compel1
 since it is a  declaration emanating   
from ,practical ,wisdom and ,intellect4 
,and people  feel enmity towards their  
fellow-men who oppose their impulses1   
however  rightly they may do so3 the    
,law1 on the contrary1 is not the object
 of  hatred1 though enforcing right     
rules4    ,the ,lacedmonian is nearly   
the only ,state in which the framer of  
the  ,constitution has made any         
provision1 it would seem1 respecting the
 food  and manner of living of the      
people3 in most ,states these points are

  entirely neglected1 and each man lives
 just as he likes1 ruling his  wife and 
children ,cyclops-,fashion4    ,of      
course1 the best thing would be that    
there should be a right ,public  ,system
 and that we should be able to carry it 
out3 but1 since as a  public matter     
those points are neglected1 the duty    
would seem to  devolve upon each        
individual to contribute to the cause of
 ,virtue with  his own children and     
friends1 or at least to make this his   
aim and  purpose3 and this1 it would    
seem1 from what has been said1 he will  
be  best able to do by making a         
,legislator of himself3 since all public
  systems1 it is plain1 are formed by   
the instrumentality of laws and  those  
are good which are formed by that of    
good laws3 whether they are  written or 
unwritten1 whether they are applied to  
the training of one  or many1 will not1 
it seems1 make any difference1 just as  
it does not  in music1 gymnastics1 or   
any other such accomplishments1 which   

are  gained by practice4    ,for just as
 in ,communities laws and customs       
prevail1 so too in families  the express
 commands of the ,head1 and customs     
also3 and even more in  the latter1     
because of blood-relationship and the   
benefits conferred3  for there you have1
 to begin with1 people who have         
affection and are  naturally obedient to
 the authority which controls them4     
,then1 furthermore1 ,private training   
has advantages over ,public1 as in  the 
case of the healing art3 for instance1  
as a general rule1 a man who  is in a   
fever should keep quiet1 and starve2 but
 in a particular case1  perhaps1 this   
may not hold good2 or1 to take a        
different illustration1  the boxer will 
not use the same way of fighting with   
all antagonists4    ,it would seem then 
that the individual will be most exactly
 attended to  under ,private care1      
because so each will be more likely to  
obtain what  is expedient for him4 ,of  
course1 whether in the art of healing1  

or  gymnastics1 or any other1 a man will
 treat individual cases the better  for 
being acquainted with general rules2 as1
 8that so and so is good  for all1 or   
for men in such and such cases30 because
 general maxims are  not only said to be
 but are the object-matter of sciences3 
still this  is no reason against the    
possibility of a man's taking excellent 
care  of some one case1 though he       
possesses no scientific knowledge but   
from experience is exactly acquainted   
with what happens in each point2  just  
as some people are thought to doctor    
themselves best though they  would be   
wholly unable to administer relief to   
others4 ,yet it may seem  to be         
necessary nevertheless1 for one who     
wishes to become a real  artist and well
 acquainted with the theory of his      
profession1 to have  recourse to general
 principles and ascertain all their     
capacities3 for  we have already stated 
that these are the object-matter of     
sciences4    ,if then it appears that we

 may become good through the            
instrumentality  of laws1 of course     
whoso wishes to make men better by a    
system of care  and training must try to
 make a ,legislator of himself2 for to  
treat  skilfully just any one who may be
 put before you is not what any         
ordinary person can do1 but1 if any one1
 he who has knowledge2 as in  the       
healing art1 and all others which       
involve careful practice and  skill4    
,will not then our next business be to  
enquire from what sources1 or how  one  
may acquire this faculty of             
,legislation2 or shall we say1 that1 as 
in similar cases1 ,statesmen are the    
people to learn from1 since this        
faculty was thought to be a part of the 
,social ,science8 ,must we not  admit   
that the ,political ,science plainly    
does not stand on a similar  footing to 
that of other sciences and faculties8 ,i
 mean1 that while in  all other cases   
those who impart the faculties and      
themselves exert  them are identical    

7physicians and painters for instance7  
matters of  ,statesmanship the ,sophists
 profess to teach1 but not one of them  
practises it1 that being left to those  
actually engaged in it3 and  these might
 really very well be thought to do it by
 some singular knack  and by mere       
practice rather than by any intellectual
 process3 for they  neither write nor   
speak on these matters 7though it might 
be more to  their credit than composing 
speeches for the courts or the          
assembly71  nor again have they made    
,statesmen of their own sons or their   
friends4    ,one can hardly suppose but 
that they would have done so if they    
could1  seeing that they could have     
bequeathed no more precious legacy to   
their  communities1 nor would they have 
preferred1 for themselves or their      
dearest friends1 the possession of any  
faculty rather than this4    ,practice1 
however1 seems to contribute no little  
to its acquisition2  merely breathing   
the atmosphere of politics would never  

have made  ,statesmen of them1 and      
therefore we may conclude that they who 
would  acquire a knowledge of           
,statesmanship must have in addition    
practice4    ,but of the ,sophists they 
who profess to teach it are plainly a   
long way  off from doing so3 in fact1   
they have no knowledge at all of its    
nature  and objects2 if they had1 they  
would never have put it on the same     
footing with ,rhetoric or even on a     
lower3 neither would they have          
conceived it to be 8an easy matter to   
legislate by simply collecting  such    
laws as are famous because of course one
 could select the best10  as though the 
selection were not a matter of skill1   
and the judging  aright a very great    
matter1 as in ,music3 for they alone1   
who have  practical knowledge of a      
thing1 can judge the performances       
rightly or  understand with what means  
and in what way they are accomplished1  
and  what harmonises with what3 the     
unlearned must be content with being    

able to discover whether the result is  
good or bad1 as in painting4    ,now    
laws may be called the performances or  
tangible results of  ,political         
,science2 how then can a man acquire    
from these the faculty of  ,legislation1
 or choose the best8 we do not see men  
made physicians by  compilations3 and   
yet in these treatises men endeavour to 
give not only  the cases but also how   
they may be cured1 and the proper       
treatment in  each case1 dividing the   
various bodily habits4 ,well1 these are 
thought  to be useful to professional   
men1 but to the unprofessional useless4 
,in  like manner it may be that         
collections of laws and ,constitutions  
would  be exceedingly useful to such as 
are able to speculate on them1 and      
judge what is well1 and what ill1 and   
what kind of things fit in with  what   
others3 but they who without this       
qualification should go through  such   
matters cannot have right judgment1     
unless they have it by  instinct1 though

 they may become more intelligent in    
such matters4    ,since then those who  
have preceded us have left              
uninvestigated the  subject of          
,legislation1 it will be better perhaps 
for us to investigate  it ourselves1    
and1 in fact1 the whole subject of      
,polity1 that thus what  we may call    
,human ,philosophy may be completed as  
far as in us lies4    ,first then1 let  
us endeavour to get whatever fragments  
of good there  may be in the statements 
of our predecessors1 next1 from the     
,polities  we have collected1 ascertain 
what kind of things preserve or destroy 
,communities1 and what1 particular      
,constitutions2 and the cause why some  
are well and others ill managed1 for    
after such enquiry1 we shall be  the    
better able to take a concentrated view 
as to what kind of  ,constitution is    
best1 what kind of regulations are best 
for each1 and  what laws and customs4   
,,notes    ,,book ,i      #a ,for this  
term1 as here employed1 our language    

contains no  equivalent expression      
except an inconvenient paraphrase4      
,there are three senses which it bears  
in this treatise3 the first 7in  which  
it is here employed7 is its strict      
etymological signfication 8,the  science
 of ,society10 and this includes        
everything which can bear at all  upon  
the well-being of ,man in his social    
capacity1 8,quicquid agunt  homines     
nostri est farrago libelli40 ,it is in  
this view that it is  fairly denominated
 most commanding and inclusive4    ,the 
second sense 7in which it occurs next1  
just below7 is 8,moral  ,philosophy40   
,aristotle explains the term in this    
sense in the ,rhetoric  7#a #b7 ,greek3 
hae peri ta aethae pragmateia aen       
dikaion esti  prosagoreuen politikaen4  
,he has principally in view in this     
treatise  the moral training of the     
,individual1 the branch of the ,science 
of  ,society which we call ,ethics      
,proper1 bearing the same relation to   
the  larger ,science as the hewing and  

squaring of the stones to the building  
of the ,temple1 or the drill of the     
,recruit to the manoeuvres of the       
field4 ,greek ,philosophy viewed men    
principally as constituent parts of  a  
,greek3 polis1 considering this function
 to be the real ,end of each1  and this 
state as that in which the ,individual  
attained his highest and  most complete 
development4    ,the third sense is     
8,the detail of ,civil ,government10    
which ,aristotle  expressly states 7vi4 
#h7 was the most common acceptation of  
the term4    #b ,matters of which a man 
is to judge either belong to some       
definite art or science1 or they do not4
 ,in the former case he is the  best    
judge who has thorough acquaintance with
 that art or science1 in  the latter1   
the man whose powers have been developed
 and matured by  education4 ,a lame     
horse one would show to a farmer1 not to
 the best and  wisest man of one's      
acquaintance2 to the latter1 one would  
apply in a  difficult case of conduct4  

,experience answers to the first1 a     
state of self-control to the latter4    
#c ,in the last chapter of the third    
book of this treatise it  is said of the
 fool1 that his desire of pleasure is   
not only  insatiable1 but indiscriminate
 in its objects1 4    #d  is a word used
 in this treatise in various            
significations4 ,the  primary one is    
8beginning or first cause10 and this    
runs through all  its various uses4     
8,rule10 and sometimes 8,rulers10 are   
denoted by this term the initiative     
being a property of ,rule4              
8,principle0 is a very usual            
signification of it1 and in fact the    
most  characteristic of the ,ethics4    
,the word ,principle means              
8starting-point40 ,every action has two 
beginnings1 that of ,resolve   1 and    
that of ,action 7  74 ,i desire praise  
of men this  then is the beginning of   
,resolve4 ,having considered how it is  
to be  attained1 ,i resolve upon some   
course and this ,resolve is the         

beginning  of ,action4    ,the          
beginnings of ,resolve1  or ,motives1   
when formally stated1 are  the major    
premisses of what ,aristotle calls the  
1 i4e4 the reasoning into which actions 
may be analysed4    ,thus we say that   
the desire of human praise was the      
motive of the  ,pharisees1 or the       
principle on which they acted4    ,their
 practical syllogism then would stand   
thus3    ,whatever gains human praise is
 to be done2  ,public praying and       
almsgiving gave human praise3  ergo     
,public praying and almsgiving are to be
 done4      ,the major premisses may be 
stored up in the mind as rules of       
action1  and this is what is commonly   
meant by having principles good or bad4 
#e ,the difficulty of this passage      
consists in determining the             
signification of the terms ,greek3      
gnorima aemin and ,greek3 gnorima  aplos
    ,i have translated them without     
reference to their use elsewhere1 as    
denoting respectively what is and what  

may be known4 ,all truth is  ,greek3    
gnorimon aplos1 but that alone ,greek3  
aemin which we  individually realise1   
therefore those principles alone are    
,greek3  gnorima aemin which we have    
received as true4 ,from this appears    
immediately the necessity of good       
training as preparatory to the study  of
 ,moral ,philosophy for good training in
 habits will either work  principles    
into our nature1 or make us capable of  
accepting them as  soon as they are put 
before us2 which no mere intellectual   
training can  do4 ,the child who has    
been used to obey his parents may never 
have  heard the fifth ,commandment but  
it is in the very texture of his        
nature1 and the first time he hears it  
he will recognise it as morally  true   
and right the principle is in his case a
 fact1 the reason for  which he is as   
little inclined to ask as any one would 
be able to prove  its truth if he should
 ask4    ,but these terms are employed  
elsewhere 7,analytica ,post ,i cap4 #aa4

 sect4  #aj7 to denote respectively     
particulars and universals ,the latter  
are so  denominated1 because principles 
or laws must be supposed to have        
existed before the instances of their   
operation4 ,justice must have  existed  
before just actions1 ,redness before red
 things1 but since what  we meet with   
are the concrete instances 7from which  
we gather the  principles and laws71 the
 particulars are said to be ,greek3     
gnorimotera aemin    ,adopting this     
signification gives greater unity to the
 whole passage1  which will then stand  
thus4 ,the question being whether we are
 to assume  principles1 or obtain them  
by an analysis of facts1 ,aristotle     
says1 8,we  must begin of course with   
what is known but then this term denotes
  either particulars or universals      
perhaps we then must begin with         
particulars and hence the necessity of a
 previous good training in  habits1 etc4
 7which of course is beginning with     
particular facts71 for  a fact is a     

starting point1 and if this be          
sufficiently clear1 there  will be no   
want of the reason for the fact in      
addition0    ,the objection to this     
method of translation is1 that ,greek3  
archai  occurs immediately afterwards in
 the sense of 8principles40    ,utere   
tuo judicio nihil enim impedio4    #f   
,or 8prove themselves good10 as in the  
,prior ,analytics1 ii #be1  ,greek3     
apanta pisteuomen k4t l but the other   
rendering is supported  by a passage in 
,book ,,viii4 chap4 ix4 ,greek3 oi d'   
upo ton epieikon kai  eidoton oregomenoi
 timaes bebaiosai ten oikeian doxan     
ephientai peri  auton chairousi de oti  
eisin agathoi1 pisteuontes te ton       
legonton  krisei    #g ,greek3 thesis   
meant originally some paradoxical       
statement by any  philosopher of name   
enough to venture on one1 but had come  
to mean any  dialectical question4      
,topics1 ,i4 chap4 ix4    #h ,a lost    
work1 supposed to have been so called1  
because  containing miscellaneous       

questions4    #i ,it is only quite at   
the close of the treatise that          
,aristotle refers  to this1 and allows  
that ,greek3 theoria constitutes the    
highest  happiness because it is the    
exercise of the highest faculty in man  
the  reason of thus deferring the       
statement being that till the lower1    
that  is the moral1 nature has been     
reduced to perfect order1 ,greek3       
theoria cannot have place1 though1 had  
it been held out from the  first1 men   
would have been for making the          
experiment at once1 without  the trouble
 of self-discipline4    #aj ,or1 as some
 think1 8many theories have been founded
 on them40    #aa ,the  is the          
archetype1 the  the concrete embodying  
the  resemblance of it2 hence ,aristotle
 alludes to the theory under both       
names1 and this is the reason for       
retaining the ,greek terms4    #ab ,the 
list ran thus--      ,greek3    to peras
     to apeiron          to euthu    to 
perisson  to artion           to phos   

to en        to plethos          to     
tetragonon    to dexion    to aristeron 
to aeremoun    to arren     to thelu    
to agathon        #ac ,plato's sister's 
son4    #ad ,this is the capital defect 
in ,aristotle's eyes1 who being         
eminently practical1 could not like a   
theory which not only did not           
necessarily lead to action1 but had a   
tendency to discourage it by  enabling  
unreal men to talk finely4 ,if true1 the
 theory is merely a way  of stating     
facts1 and leads to no action4    #ae   
i4e4 the identification of ,happiness   
with the ,chief ,good4    #af i4e4      
without the capability of addition4     
#ag ,and then ,happiness would at once  
be shown not to be the ,chief  ,good4   
,it is a contradiction in terms to speak
 of adding to the ,chief  ,good4 ,see   
,book ,x4 chap4 #aa4 ,greek3 delon os   
oud allo ouden tagathon an  eiae o meta 
tenos ton kath' auto agathon airetoteron
 ginetai4    #ah ,compare ,bishop       
,butler's account of 8,human ,nature as 

a ,system0 in  the ,preface to his      
,sermons4    #ai i4e4 as working or as  
quiescent4    #bj ,the mere translation 
of this term would convey no idea of its
  meaning1 ,i have therefore retained   
the ,greek term4 ,it is afterwards      
explained to include space of time and  
external appliances requisite  for the  
full development of ,man's energies2    
here the time only is  alluded to4      
#ba ,this principle is more fully       
stated1 with illustrations1  in the     
,topics1 ,i4 chap4 ix4    #bb ,either   
that of the bodily senses1 or that of   
the moral senses4  8,fire burns10 is an 
instance of the former1 8,treason is    
odious10 of the  latter4    #bc ,i have 
thought it worthwhile to vary the       
interpretation of this  word1 because   
though 8habitus0 may be equivalent to   
all the senses of  ,greek3 exis1 8habit0
 is not1 at least according to our      
colloquial  usage we commonly denote by 
8habit0 a state formed by habituation4  
#bd ,another and perhaps more obvious   

method of rendering this passage  is to 
apply ,greek3 kalon kagathon to things1 
and let them depend  grammatically on   
,greek3 epaeboli4 ,it is to be          
remembered1 however1  that ,greek3 kalos
 kagathos bore a special and well-known 
meaning also  the comparison is in the  
text more complete1 and the point of the
  passage seems more completely brought 
out4    #be 8,goodness always implies   
the love of itself1 an affection to     
goodness40 7,bishop ,butler1 ,sermon    
xiii 7 ,aristotle describes pleasure  in
 the ,tenth ,book of this ,treatise as  
the result of any faculty of  perception
 meeting with the corresponding object1 
vicious pleasure  being as truly        
pleasure as the most refined and        
exalted4 ,if ,goodness  then implies the
 love of itself1 the percipient will    
always have its  object present1 and    
pleasure continually result4    #bf ,in 
spite of theory1 we know as a matter of 
fact that external  circumstances are   
necessary to complete the idea of       

,happiness not that  ,happiness is      
capable of addition1 but that when we   
assert it to be  identical with virtuous
 action we must understand that it is to
 have a  fair field2 in fact1 the other 
side of ,greek3 bios teleios4    #bg ,it
 is remarkable how ,aristotle here again
 shelves what he  considers an          
unpractical question4 ,if ,happiness    
were really a direct  gift from ,heaven1
 independently of human conduct1 all    
motive to  self-discipline and moral    
improvement would vanish ,he shows      
therefore  that it is no depreciation of
 the value of ,happiness to suppose it  
to  come partly at least from ourselves1
 and he then goes on with other  reasons
 why we should think with him4    #bh   
,this term is important1 what has been  
maimed was once perfect2 he  does not   
contemplate as possible the case of a   
man being born incapable  of virtue1 and
 so of happiness4    #bi ,greek ,plato4 
,phdon4 xlvi4    #cj ,but why give      
materials and instruments1 if there is  

no work to do8    #ca ,the supposed pair
 of ancestors4    #cb ,solon says1      
8,call no man happy till he is dead40   
,he must mean  either1 ,the man when    
dead is happy 7a71 or1 ,the man when    
dead may be  said to have been happy    
7b74 ,if the former1 does he mean       
positive  happiness 7a78 or only freedom
 from unhappiness 778 ,we cannot allow  
7a71 ,men's opinions disallow 771 ,we   
revert now to the consideration of  7b74
    #cc ,the difficulty was raised by   
the clashing of a notion commonly  held1
 and a fact universally experienced4    
,most people conceive that  ,happiness  
should be abiding1 every one knows that 
fortune is  changeable4 ,it is the      
notion which supports the definition1   
because we  have therein based          
,happiness on the most abiding cause4   
#cd ,i have taken   to refer to 1       
against ,magirus  and the ,paraphrase of
 ,andronicus ,rhodius4 ,i would refer to
 ,aristotle's  account of  in the ,tenth
 ,book1 chap4 vii4 where he expressly   

says  of the working of  or pure        
intelect1 that it is 8most continuous40 
#ce ,the term seems to be employed      
advisedly4 ,the ,choragus1 of  course1  
dressed his actors for their parts2 not 
according to their  fancies or his own4 
,hooker has 7,e4 ,p4 v4 ixxvi4 #e7 a    
passage which seems to be an admirable  
paraphrase on this4    8,again1 that the
 measure of our outward prosperity be   
taken by  proportion with that which    
every man's estate in this present life 
requireth4 ,external abilities are      
instruments of action4 ,it contenteth   
wise artificers to have their           
instruments proportionable to their     
work1  rather fit for use than huge and 
goodly to please the eye4 ,seeing then  
the actions of a servant do not need    
that which may be necessary for  men of 
calling and place in the world1 neither 
men of inferior  condition many things  
which greater personages can hardly     
want2 surely  they are blessed in       
worldly respects who have wherewith to  

perform what  their station and place   
asketh1 though they have no more40      
#cf ,always bearing in mind that man    
8never continueth in one stay40    #cg  
,the meaning is this3 personal fortunes1
 we have said1 must be in  certain      
weight and number to affect our own     
happiness1 this will be  true1 of       
course1 of those which are reflected on 
us from our friends3  and these are the 
only ones to which the dead are supposed
 to be  liable8 add then the difference 
of sensibility which it is fair to      
presume1 and there is a very small      
residuum of joy or sorrow4    #ch ,this 
is meant for an exhaustive division of  
goods1 which are  either so in esse or  
in posse4    ,if in esse1 they are      
either above praise1 or subjects of     
praise4  ,those in posse1 here called   
faculties1 are good only when rightly   
used4 ,thus ,rhetoric is a faculty which
 may be used to promote justice  or     
abused to support villainy4 ,money in   
like way4    #ci ,the doubt is1 whether 

,greek or ,greek is the subject of the  
sentence4 ,it is translated as above1   
not merely with reference to the  sense 
of this passage1 but on a comparison    
with a similar one in ,book  ,x4 chap   
#h4 ,greek4    #dj ,eudoxus1 a          
philosopher holding the doctrine        
afterwards adopted by  ,epicurus        
respecting pleasure1 but 7as ,aristotle 
testifies in the ,tenth  ,book7 of      
irreproachable character4    #da ,see   
the ,rhetoric1 ,book ,i4 chap ix4    #db
 ,the unseen is at least as real as the 
seen4    #dc ,the terms are borrowed    
from the ,seventh ,book and are here    
used in  their strict philosophical     
meaning4 ,the ,greek3 enkrates is he who
 has  bad or unruly appetites1 but whose
 reason is strong enough to keep them   
under4 ,the ,greek3 akrates is he whose 
appetites constantly prevail  over his  
reason and previous good resolutions4   
,by the law of habits the former is     
constantly approximating to a state  in 
which the appetites are wholly quelled4 

,this state is called ,greek3           
sophrosyne1 and the man in it ,greek3   
sophron4 ,by the same law the           
remonstrances of reason in the latter   
grow fainter and fainter till  they are 
silenced for ever4 ,this state is called
 ,greek3 akolasia1 and  the man in it   
,greek3 akolastos4    #dd ,this is      
untranslateable4 ,as the ,greek phrase1 
,greek3 echein logon  tinos1 really     
denotes substituting that person's      
,greek3 logos for  one's own1 so the    
,irrational nature in a man of          
self-control or  perfected self-mastery 
substitutes the orders of ,reason for   
its own  impulses4 ,the other phrase    
means the actual possession of          
mathematical  truths as part of the     
mental furniture1 i4e4 knowing them4    
#de ,greek3 xin may be taken as opposed 
to ,greek3 energeian1 and  the meaning  
will be1 to show a difference between   
,moral and  ,intellectual ,excellences1 
that men are commended for merely having
 the  latter1 but only for exerting and 

using the former4      ,,book ,,ii    #a
 ,which we call simply virtue4    #b    
,for nature must of course supply the   
capacity4    #c ,or 8as a simple result 
of nature40    #d ,this is done in the  
,sixth ,book4    #e ,it is1 in truth1 in
 the application of rules to particular 
details  of practice that our moral     
,responsibility chiefly lies no rule can
 be  so framed1 that evasion shall be   
impossible4 ,see ,bishop ,butler's      
,sermon  on the character of ,balaam1   
and that on ,self-,deceit4    #f ,the   
words  and  are not used here in their  
strict  significations to denote        
confirmed states of vice3 the           
necessarily feels pain1 because he must 
always be thwarting passions  which are 
a real part of his nature2 though this  
pain will grow less  and less as he     
nears the point of  or perfected        
,self-,mastery1  which being attained   
the pain will then and then only cease  
entirely4  ,so a certain degree of fear 
is necessary to the formation of true   

courage4 ,all that is meant here is1    
that no habit of courage or             
self-mastery can be said to be matured1 
until pain altogether vanishes4    #g   
,virtue consists in the due regulation  
of all the parts of our  nature our     
passions are a real part of that nature1
 and as such have  their proper office1 
it is an error then to aim at their     
extirpation4  ,it is true that in a     
perfect moral state emotion will be     
rare1 but then  this will have been     
gained by regular process1 being the    
legitimate  result of the law that      
8passive impressions weaken as active   
habits are  strengthened1 by            
repetition40 ,if musical instruments are
 making  discord1 ,i may silence or ,i  
may bring them into harmony in either   
case  ,i get rid of discord1 but in the 
latter ,i have the positive enjoyment   
of music4 ,the ,stoics would have the   
passions rooted out1 ,aristotle  would  
have them cultivated to use an apt      
figure 7whose ,i know not71  ,they would

 pluck the blossom off at once1 he would
 leave it to fall in  due course when   
the fruit was formed4 ,of them we might 
truly say1  ,solitudinem faciunt1 pacem 
appellant4 ,see on this point ,bishop   
,butler's fifth ,sermon1 and sect4 #aa4 
of the chapter on ,moral ,discipline  in
 the first part of his ,analogy4    #h  
,i have adopted this word from our old  
writers1 because our word  act is so    
commonly interchanged with action4      
,greek3 ,praxis  7action7 properly      
denotes the whole process from the      
conception to the  performance4 ,greek3 
,pragma 7fact7 only the result4 ,the    
latter may be  right when the former is 
wrong if1 for example1 a murderer was   
killed  by his accomplices4 ,again1 the 
,greek3 praxis may be good though the   
,greek3 pragma be wrong1 as if a man    
under erroneous impressions does  what  
would have been right if his impressions
 had been true 7subject of  course to   
the question how far he is guiltless of 
his original error71  but in this case  

we could not call the ,greek3 praxis    
right4 ,no  repetition of ,greek3       
pragmata goes to form a habit4 ,see     
,bishop ,butler  on the ,theory of      
,habits m the chapter on ,moral         
,discipline1 quoted  above1 sect4 #aa4  
8,and in like manner as habits belonging
 to the body10  etc4    #i ,being about 
to give a strict logical definition of  
,virtue1  ,aristotle ascertains first   
what is its genus ,greek3 ti estin4     
#aj ,that is1 not for merely having     
them1 because we did not make           
ourselves4    ,see ,bishop ,butler's    
account of our nature as containing     
8particular  propensions10 in sect4 iv4 
of the chapter on ,moral discipline1 and
 in  the ,preface to the ,sermons4      
#aa ,this refers to the division of     
quantity 7,greek3 poson7 in the         
,categories4 ,those ,quantities are     
called by ,aristotle ,continuous whose  
parts have position relatively to one   
another1 as a line1 surface1 or  solid1 
those discrete1 whose parts have no such

 relation1 as numbers  themselves1 or   
any string of words grammatically       
unconnected4    #ab ,numbers are in     
arithmetical proportion 7more usually   
called  progression71 when they increase
 or decrease by a common difference     
thus1 #b1 #f1 #aj are so1 because #b  #d
  #f1 #f  #d #aj1 or vice versa1  #aj - 
#d  #f1 #f - #d  #b4    #ac ,if the mina
 be taken at #ae oz4 avoirdupois1       
7,dict4 of ,g4 and ,r4  ,antiquities1   
article ,talentum17 we must be sadly    
degenerate in our  gastric capacity4    
#ad ,the two are necessary1 because     
since the reason itself may be          
perverted1 a man must have recourse to  
an external standard2 we may  suppose   
his ,greek3 logos originally to have    
been a sufficient guide1  but when he   
has injured his moral perceptions in any
 degree1 he must go  out of himself for 
direction4    #ae ,this is one of the   
many expressions which seem to imply    
that this  treatise is rather a         
collection of notes of a viv voce       

lecture than  a set formal treatise4    
8,the table0 of virtues and vices       
probably was  sketched out and exhibited
 to the audience4    #af ,afterwards    
defined as 8,all things whose value is  
measured by  money40    #ag ,we have no 
term exactly equivalent2 it may be      
illustrated by  ,horace's use of the    
term hiatus3    8,quid dignum tanto     
feret hic promissor hiatu80 ,opening the
 mouth wide  gives a promise of         
something great to come1 if nothing     
great does come1  this is a case of     
,greek3 chaunotes or fruitless and      
unmeaning  hiatus2 the transference to  
the present subject is easy4    #ah ,in 
like manner we talk of laudable         
ambition1 implying of course  there may 
be that which is not laudable4    #ai   
,an expression of ,bishop ,butler's1    
which corresponds exactly to the        
definition of ,greek3 nemesis in the    
,rhetoric4    #bj ,that is1 in the same 
genus2 to be contraries1 things must be 
generically connected3 ,greek3 ta       

pleiston allelon diestekota ton en to   
auto genei enantia orizontai4           
,categories1 iv4 #ae4    #ba 8,greek3   
,deuteros plous is a proverb10 says the 
,scholiast on the  ,phaedo1 8used of    
those who do anything safely and        
cautiously inasmuch  as they who have   
miscarried in their first voyage1 set   
about then3  preparations for the second
 cautiously10 and he then alludes to    
this  passage4    #bb ,that is1 you must
 allow for the recoil4 8,naturam        
expellas furca  tamen usque recurret40  
,p4 #dc1 l4 #b4 ,this illustration sets 
in so clear a light the doctrines       
entertained respectively by ,aristotle1 
,eudoxus1 and the ,stoics  regarding    
pleasure1 that it is worth while to go  
into it fully4    ,the reference is to  
,iliad iii4 #aed-afj4 ,the old          
counsellors1 as ,helen  comes upon the  
city wall1 acknowledge her surpassing   
beauty1 and have  no difficulty in      
understanding how both nations should   
have incurred  such suffering for her   

sake still1 fair as she is1 home she    
must go1  that she bring not ruin on    
themselves and their posterity4    ,this
 exactly represents ,aristotle's        
relation to ,pleasure he does not1  with
 ,eudoxus and his followers1 exalt it   
into the ,summum ,bonum 7as  ,paris     
would risk all for ,helen71 nor does he 
the the ,stoics call it  wholly evil1 as
 ,hector might have said that the woes  
,helen had caused  had 8banished all the
 beauty from her cheek10 but1 with the  
aged  counsellors1 admits its charms1   
but aware of their dangerousness        
resolves to deny himself1 he 8feels her 
sweetness1 yet defies her  thrall40     
#bd  is here used as an analogous noun1 
to denote the faculty  which1 in respect
 of moral matters1 discharges the same  
function that  bodily sense does in     
respect of physical objects4 ,it is     
worth while to  notice how in our       
colloquial language we carry out the    
same analogy4 ,we  say of a transaction1
 that it 8looks ugly10 8sounds oddly10  

is a 8nasty  job10 8stinks in our       
nostrils10 is a 8hard dealing40         
,,book ,,iii    #a ,a man is not        
responsible for being ,greek3 theratos1 
because  8particular propensions1 from  
their very nature1 must be felt1 the    
objects of them being present1 though   
they cannot be gratified at all1  or not
 with the allowance of the moral        
principle40 ,but he is  responsible for 
being ,greek3 eutheratos1 because1      
though thus formed1  he 8might have     
improved and raised himself to an higher
 and more secure  state of virtue by the
 contrary behaviour1 by steadily        
following the  moral principle1 supposed
 to be one part of his nature1 and thus 
withstanding that unavoidable danger of 
defection which necessarily  arose from 
propension1 the other part of it4 ,for  
by thus preserving his  integrity for   
some time1 his danger would lessen1     
since propensions1 by  being inured to  
submit1 would do it more easily and of  
course and his  security against this   

lessening danger would increase1 since  
the moral  principle would gain         
additional strength by exercise1 both   
which things  are implied in the notion 
of virtuous habits40 7,from the chapter 
on  ,moral ,discipline m the ,analogy1  
sect4 iv47 ,the purpose of this         
disquisition is to refute the           
,necessitarians2 it is resumed in the   
third chapter of this ,book4    #b      
,virtue is not only the duty1 but 7by   
the laws of the ,moral  ,government of  
the ,world7 also the interest of ,man1  
or to express it in  ,bishop ,butler's  
manner1 ,conscience and ,reasonable     
self-love are the two  principles in our
 nature which of right have supremacy   
over the rest1  and these two lead in   
point of fact the same course of action4
 7,sermon  ,,ii47    #c ,any ignorance  
of particular facts affects the         
rightness not of the  ,greek3 praxis1   
but of the ,greek3 pragma1 but ignorance
 of i4e4  incapacity to discern1        
,principles1 shows the ,moral           

,constitution to have  been depraved1   
i4e4 shows ,conscience to be perverted1 
or the sight of  ,self-love to be       
impaired4    #d ,greek3 eneka primarily 
denotes the relation of cause and effect
  all circumstances which in any way    
contribute to a cert result are  ,greek3
 eneka that result4    ,from the power  
which we have or acquire of deducing    
future results from  present causes we  
are enabled to act towards1 with a view 
to produce1  these results thus ,greek3 
eneka comes to mean not causation       
merely1  but designed causation and so  
,greek3 on eneka is used for ,motive1   
or final cause4    ,it is the primary   
meaning which is here intended1 it would
 be a  contradiction in terms to speak  
of a man's being ignorant of his own    
,motive of action4    ,when the man     
8drew a bow at a venture and smote the  
,king of ,israel  between the joints of 
the harnesss0 7i ,kings xxii #cd7 he did
 it ,greek3  eneka ton apdkteinai the   
,king of ,israel1 in the primary sense  

of  ,greek3 eneka that is to say1 the   
,king's death was in fact the  result1  
but could not have been the motive1 of  
the shot1 because the  ,king was        
disguised and the shot was at a venture4
    #e ,bishop ,butler would agree to   
this3 he says of settled deliberate     
anger1 8,it seems in us plainly         
connected with a sense of virtue and    
vice1 of moral good and evil40 ,see the 
whole ,sermon on ,resentment4    #f     
,aristotle has1 ,i venture to think1    
rather quibbled here1 by using  ,greek3 
epithumia and its verb1 equivocally as  
there is no following  his argument     
without condescending to the same       
device1 ,i have used our  word lust in  
its ancient signification ,ps4 xxiv4    
#ab1 8,what man is he  that lusteth to  
live80    #g ,the meaning is1 that the  
onus probandi is thrown upon the person 
who maintains the distinction1          
,aristotle has a prima facie case4 ,the 
whole passage is one of difficulty4     
,card wells text gives the passage  from

 ,greek3 dokei de as a separate argument
 ,bekker's seems to intend  al #ha      
ir_/jdeis as a separate argument but if 
so1 the argument would be  a mere       
petitio principii4 ,i have adopted      
,cardwell's reading in part1  but retain
 the comma at ,greek3 dmpho and have    
translated the last  four words as      
applying to the whole discussion1       
whereas ,cardwell's  reading seems to   
restrict them to the last argument4     
#h i4e4 on objects of ,moral ,choice1   
opinion of this kind is not the  same as
 ,moral ,choice1 because actions alone  
form habits and constitute  character1  
opinions are in general signs of        
character1 but when they  begin to be   
acted on they cease to be opinions1 and 
merge in ,moral  ,choice4    8,treason  
doth never prosper1 what's the reason8  
,when it doth prosper1 none dare call it
 ,treason40    #i ,the introduction of  
the words ,greek3 dia tinos seems a mere
  useless repetition1 as in the second  
chapter ,greek3 en tini added to        

,greek3 peri ti4 ,these ,i take for some
 among the many indications that  the   
treatise is a collection of notes for   
lectures1 and not a finished  or        
systematic one4    #aj ,suppose that    
three alternatives lay before a man1    
each of the  three is of course an      
object of ,deliberation2 when he has    
made his  choice1 the alternative chosen
 does not cease to be in nature an      
object  of ,deliberation1 but superadds 
the character of being chosen and so    
distinguished4 ,three men are admitted  
candidates for an office1 the one       
chosen is the successful candidate1 so  
of the three ,greek3 bouleuta1  the one 
chosen is the ,greek3 bouleuton         
proaireton4    #aa ,compare ,bishop     
,butler's 8,system of ,human ,nature10  
in the ,preface  to the ,sermons4    #ab
 ,these words1 ,greek3 ek tou           
bouleusasthai--bouleusin1 contain the   
account of the whole mental machinery of
 any action4 ,the first step is  a      
,wish1 implied in the first here        

mentioned1 viz4 ,deliberation1 for it   
has been already laid down that         
,deliberation has for its object-matter 
means to ,ends supposed to be set before
 the mind1 the next step is             
,deliberation1 the next ,decision1 the  
last the definite extending of the      
mental hand towards the object thus     
selected1 the two last constitute       
,greek3 proairesis in its full meaning4 
,the word ,greek3 orexis means          
literally 8a grasping at or after0 now  
as this physically may be either  vague 
or definite1 so too may the mental act1 
consequently the term as  transferred to
 the mind has two uses1 and denotes     
either the first  wish1 ,greek3         
boulaesis1 or the last definite         
movement1 ,will in its  strict and      
proper sense4 ,these two uses are       
recognised in the ,rhetoric  7,i #aj71  
where ,greek3 orexis is divided into    
,greek3 alogos and  ,greek3 logistikae4 
,the illustration then afforded by the  
polities alluded to is this1 as  the    

,kings first decided and then announced 
their decision for  acceptance and      
execution by their subjects1 so ,reason1
 having decided  on the course to be    
taken1 communicates its decision to the 
,will1 which  then proceeds to move     
,greek3 ta organika merae4 ,to instance 
in an  action of the mixed kind         
mentioned in the first chapter1 safe    
arrival  at land is naturally desired1  
two means are suggested1 either a       
certain  loss of goods1 or trying to    
save both lives and goods1 the question 
being debated1 the former is chosen1    
this decision is communicated to  the   
,will1 which causes the owner's hands to
 throw overboard his goods3  the act is 
denominated voluntary1 because the ,will
 is consenting1 but  in so denominating 
it1 we leave out of sight how that      
consent was  obtained4 ,in a purely     
compulsory case the never gets beyond   
the stage  of ,wish1 for no means are   
power and deliberation therefore is     
useless1  consequently there is neither 

,decision nor ,will1 in other words1 no 
,choice4    #ac ,compare the statement  
in the ,rhetoric1 #a #aj1 ,greek3 esti d
 hae  men boulaeis agathou orexis       
7oudeis gar bouletai all ae otan oiaetho
  einai agathon7    #ad ,a stone once   
set in motion cannot be recalled1       
because it is then  placed under the    
operation of natural laws which cannot  
be controlled  or altered1 so too in    
,moral declension1 there is a point at  
which  gravitation operates             
irretrievably1 8there is a certain bound
 to  imprudence and misbehaviour which  
being transgressed1 there remains no    
place for repentance in the natural     
course of things40 ,bishop ,butler's    
,analogy1 ,first ,part1 chap #aa4    #ae
 ,habits being formed by acting in a    
certain way under certain  circumstances
 we can only choose how we will act not 
what circumstances  we will have to act 
under4    #af 8,moral ,courage0 is our  
phrase4    #ag ,the meaning of this     
passage can scarcely be conveyed except 

by a  paraphrase4    8,the object of    
each separate act of working is that    
which accords with  the habit they go to
 form4 ,courage is the habit which      
separate acts of  bravery go to form1   
therefore the object of these is that   
which accords  with ,courage1 i4e4      
,courage itself4 ,but ,courage is       
honourable 7which  implies that the end 
and object of it is honour1 since things
 are  denominated according to their end
 and object71 therefore the object of   
each separate act of bravery is honour40
    #ah ,for true ,courage is required1 
i4 ,exact appreciation of danger4 #b4   
,a ,proper motive for resisting fear4   
,each of the ,spurious kinds will be    
found to fail in one or other1 or both4 
#ai ,this may merely mean1 8who give    
strict orders0 not to flinch1  which    
would imply the necessity of compulsion 
,the word is capable of  the sense given
 above1 which seems more forcible4      
#bj ,see ,book ,,vi4 chap4 xiii4 near   
the end ,greek3 sokrataes aehen oun     

logous tas aretas oeto einai 7epiotaemas
 gar einai pasas7    #ba ,such as the   
noise1 the rapid movements1 and apparent
 confusion  which to an inexperienced   
eye and ear would be alarming4 ,so ,livy
 says  of the ,gauls1 v4 #cg1 ,nata in  
vanos tumultus gens4    #bb;,in ,coronea
 in ,botia1 on the occasion of the      
citadel being betrayed  to some         
,phocians4 8,the regulars0 were         
,boeotian troops1 the ,greek3  politika 
,coroneans4    #bc ,by the difference of
 tense it seems ,aristotle has mixed up 
two  things1 beginning to speak of the  
particular instance1 and then carried   
into the general statement again4 ,this 
it is scarce worth while to  imitate4   
#bd ,the meaning of the phrase ,greek3  
kata sumbebaekos1 as here used1  in     
given in the ,seventh ,book1 chap4 ,x4  
,greek3 ei gar tis todi dia todi        
aireitai ae diokei1 kath ahuto men touto
 diokei kai aireitai1 kata  sumbebaekos 
de to proteron4      ,,book ,v    #a    
,each term is important to make up the  

character of ,justice1 men  must have   
the capacity1 do the acts1 and do them  
from moral choice4    #b ,but not       
always4 ,greek3 ,philein1 for instance1 
has two senses1 8to  love0 and 8to      
kiss10 ,greek3 misein but one4 ,topics1 
,i4 chap4 ,,xiii4 #e4    #c ,things are 
,greek3 homonuma which have only their  
name in  common1 being in themselves    
different4 ,the ,greek3 homonumia is    
close therefore when the difference     
though real is but slight4 ,there  is no
 ,english expression for ,greek3        
homonumia1 8equivocal0 being  applied to
 a term and not to its various          
significates4    #d ,see ,book ,i4 chap4
 #a4 ,greek3 toiautaen de tina planaen  
echei kai  tagatha k4t4l4    #e ,a man  
habitually drunk in private is viewed by
 our law as confining  his vice to      
himself1 and the law therefore does not 
attempt to touch  him2 a religious      
hermit may be viewed as one who confines
 his virtue to  his own person4    #f   
,see the account of ,sejanus and ,livia4

 ,tac4 ,annal4 ,,iv4 #c4    #g          
,cardwell's text1 which here gives      
,greek3 paranomon1 yields a much  easier
 and more natural sense4 ,all ,injustice
 violates law1 but only the  particular 
kinds violate equality2 and therefore   
the unlawful 3 the  unequal 33 universal
 ,injustice the particular i4e4 as whole
 to part4    ,there is a reading which  
also alters the words within the        
parenthesis1  but this hardly affects   
the gist of the passage4    #h ,there   
are two reasons why the characters are  
not necessarily  coincident4 ,he is a   
good citizen1 who does his best to carry
 out the  ,greek3 politeia under which  
he lives1 but this may be faulty1 so    
therefore pro tanto is he4    ,again1 it
 is sufficient1 so far as the ,community
 is concerned1 that he  does the facts  
of a good man but for the perfection of 
his own  individual character1 he must  
do them virtuously4 ,a man may move     
rightly in his social orbit1 without    
revolving rightly on his own axis4      

,the question is debated in the         
,politics1 ,,iii4 #b4 ,compare also the 
distinction between the brave man1 and  
good soldier 7supra1 ,book ,,iii4  chap4
 xii471 and also ,bishop ,butler's first
 ,sermon4    #i ,terms used for persons4
    #aj ,by ,greek3---- is meant numbers
 themselves1 #d1 #bj1 #ej1 etc1 by      
,greek3---- these numbers exemplified1  
#d horses1 #bj sheep1 etc4    #aa ,the  
profits of a mercantile transaction 7say
 #ajjj7 are to be  divided between ,a   
and ,b1 in the ratio of #b to #c 7which 
is the real  point to be settled72 then1
    ,a 3 ,b 33 #djj 3 #fjj4    ,a 3 #djj
 33 ,b 3 #fjj 7permutando1 and assuming 
a value for ,a and ,b1 so as  to make   
them commensurable with the respectiy   
sums74    ,a#djj 3 ,b#fjj 33 ,a 3 ,b4   
,this represents the actual             
distribution2 its  fairness depending   
entirely on that of the first           
proportion4    #ab i4e4 where the ratio 
is that of equality1 thus #b 3 #b 33 #dj
 3 #dj    #ac ,her ,majesty's           

8,justices40    #ad ,i have omitted the 
next three lines1 as they seem to be out
 of  place here1 and to occur much more 
naturally afterwards2 it not being      
likely that they were originally twice  
written1 one is perhaps at  liberty to  
give ,aristotle the benefit of the      
doubt1 and conclude that  he put them   
where they made the best sense4    #ae  
,this ,i believe to be the meaning of   
the passage but do not pretend  to be   
able to get it out of the words4    #af 
,this is apparently contrary to what was
 said before1 but not  really so4       
,aristotle does not mean that the man in
 authority struck  wrongfully1 but he   
takes the extreme case of simple        
,reciprocation1 and  in the second case1
 the man who strikes one in authority   
commits two  offences1 one against the  
person 7and so far they are equal71 and 
another against the office4    #ag      
denotes1 #ast1 a kindly feeling issuing 
in a gratuitous act  of kindness1       
#bndly1 the effect of this act of       

kindness on a generous  mind2 #crdly1   
this effect issuing in a requital of the
 kindness4    #ah ,the ,shoemaker would 
get a house while the ,builder only had 
7say7  one pair of shoes1 or at all     
events not so many as he ought to have4 
,thus the man producing the least       
valuable ware would get the most        
valuable1 and vice versa4    ,adopting1 
as ,i have done1 the reading which omits
 ,greek3---- at  ,greek3----1 we have   
simply a repetition of the caution1 that
 before  ,reciprocation is attempted1   
there must be the same ratio between the
  wares as between the persons1 i4e4 the
 ratio of equality4    ,if we admit     
,greek3 ou1 the meaning may be1 that you
 must not bring  into the proportion the
 difference mentioned above ,greek3     
eteron kai  ouk ison1 since for the     
purposes of commerce all men are equal4 
,say that the ,builder is to the        
,shoemaker as #aj3a4 ,then there must be
  the same ratio between the wares1     
consequently the highest artist will    

carry off the most valuable wares1 thus 
combining in himself both  ,greek3      
uperochai4 ,the following are the three 
cases1 given #ajj pr4  shoes  #a house4 
,builder 3 ,shoemaker 3 3 #a  pr4  shoes
      3 #a house--wrong4       ----     
----          #ajj pr4 shoes      3 #a  
house--right       ----          ----   
#aj 7#ajj pr4 shoes7 3 #a house--wrong4 
#ai ,greek ,compare a similar use of    
,greek4 ,de ,interpretatione1 ,,ii4  #b4
 ,greek4    #bj ,every unjust act       
embodies ,greek3 to adikon1 which is a  
violation  of ,greek3 to ison1 and so   
implies a greater and a less share1 the 
former being said to fall to the doer1  
the latter to the sufferer1 of  injury4 
#ba ,this passage certainly occurs      
awkwardly here4 ,if attached to the     
close of the preceding ,chapter it would
 leave that ,chapter incomplete1  for   
the question is not gone into1 but only 
stated4 ,as the commencement  of this   
,chapter it is yet more out of place2 ,i
 should propose to insert  it at the    

commencement of the following ,chapter1 
to which it forms an  appropriate       
introduction4    #bb ,in a pure         
democracy men are absolutely1 i4e4      
numerically1 equal1  in other forms only
 proportionately equal4 ,thus the       
meanest ,british  subject is            
proportionately equal to the ,sovereign1
 that is to say1 is  as fully secured in
 his rights as the ,sovereign in hers4  
#bc ,or1 according to ,cardwell's       
reading 7,greek3 kineton ou mentoi  pan7
 8but amongst ourselves there is ,just1 
which is naturally  variable1 but       
certainly all ,just is not such40 ,the  
sense of the passage  is not affected by
 the reading4 ,in ,bekker's text we must
 take ,greek3  kineton to mean the same 
as ,greek3 kinoumenon1 i4e4 8we admit   
there is no ,just which has not been    
sometimes disallowed1 still10 etc4      
,with ,cardwell's1 ,greek3 kineton will 
mean 8which not only does but  naturally
 may vary40    #bd ,murder is unjust by 
the law of nature1 ,smuggling by        

enactment4  ,therefore any act which can
 be referred to either of these heads is
 an  unjust act1 or1 as ,bishop ,butler 
phrases it1 an act materially  unjust4  
,thus much may be decided without       
reference to the agent4 ,see  the note  
on page #cb1 l4 #af4    #be 8,as        
distinct from pain or loss40 ,bishop    
,butler's ,sermon on  ,resentment4 ,see 
also1 ,rhet4 #aa4 #b ,def4 of ,greek3   
orgae4    #bf ,this method of reading   
the passage is taken from ,zell as      
quoted in  ,cardwell's ,notes1 and seems
 to yield the best sense4 ,the          
,paraphrast  gives it as follows3       
8,but the aggressor is not ignorant that
 he began1 and so he feels  himself to  
be wrong and will not acknowledge that  
he is the  aggressor1 but the other does
 not40    #bg ,as when a man is         
8justified at the ,grass ,market10 i4e4 
hung4    #bh ,where the stock of good is
 limited1 if any individual takes more  
than his share some one else must have  
less than his share2 where it is        

infinite1 or where there is no good at  
all this cannot happen4    #bi ,the     
reference is to chap4 vii4 where it was 
said that the law  views the parties in 
a case of particular injustice as       
originally  equal1 but now unequal1 the 
wrong doer the gainer and the sufferer  
the  loser by the wrong1 but in the case
 above supposed there is but one  party4
    #cj ,so in the ,politics1 #a4 #b4   
,hae men gar psuchae tou somatos archei 
despotikaen archaen1 o de nous  taes    
orexeos politikaen kai despotikaev4     
,compare also ,bishop ,butler's account 
of human nature as a system--of the     
different authority of certain          
principles1 and specially the supremacy 
of ,conscience4      ,,book ,,vi    #a  
,i understand the illustration to be    
taken from the process of  lowering a   
weight into its place2 a block of marble
 or stone1 for  instance1 in a building4
    #b ,called for convenience sake     
,necessary and ,contingent matter4    #c
 ,one man learns ,mathematics more      

easily than another1 in common          
language1 he has a turn for             
,mathematics1 i e something in his      
mental conformation answers to that     
science ,the ,phrenologist shows the    
bump denoting this aptitude4    #d ,and 
therefore the question resolves itself  
into this1 8,what is the  work of the   
,speculative1 and what of the           
,practical1 faculty of ,reason40  ,see  
the description of apetae ,,ii4 #e4     
#e praxis is here used in its strict and
 proper meaning4    #f ,that is to say1 
the ,will waits upon deliberation in    
which ,reason is the  judge2 when the   
decision is pronounced1 the ,will must  
act accordingly4    ,the question at    
issue always is1 ,is this ,good8 because
 the ,will is  only moved by an         
impression of ,good2 the ,decision then 
will be always  ,aye or ,no1 and the    
mental hand is put forth to grasp in the
 former  case1 and retracted in the     
later4    ,so far as what must take     
place in every ,moral ,action1 right or 

wrong1  the ,machinery of the mind being
 supposed uninjured but to constitute a 
good ,moral ,choice1 i e44 a good       
,action1 the ,reason must have said ,aye
  when it ought4    ,the cases of faulty
 action will be1 either when the        
,machinery is  perfect but wrongly      
directed1 as in the case of a deliberate
 crime1 or  when the direction given by 
the ,reason is right but the ,will does 
not  move in accordance with that       
direction1 in other words1 when the     
,machinery is out of order2 as in the   
case of the ,greek3 akrates--video      
meliora proboque1 ,deteriora sequor4    
#g ,see the note on ,greek3 ,arche on   
page #d1 l4 #cj4    #h ,the cobbler is  
at his last1 why8 to make shoes1 which  
are to clothe  the feet of someone and  
the price to be paid1 i4e4 the produce  
of his  industry1 is to enable him to   
support his wife and children2 thus his 
production is subordinate to ,moral     
,action4    #i ,it may be fairly        
presumed that ,aristotle would not thus 

have varied  his phrase without some    
real difference of meaning4 ,that       
difference is  founded1 ,i think1 on the
 two senses of ,greek3 orexis before    
alluded  to 7note1 p4 #ec1 l4 #cc74 ,the
 first impulse of the mind towards      
,action  may be given either by a vague 
desire or by the suggestion of ,reason4 
,the vague desire passing through the   
deliberate stage would issue in  ,moral 
,choice4 ,reason must enlist the ,will  
before any ,action can take  place4     
,reason ought to be the originator in   
all cases1 as ,bishop ,butler  observes 
that ,conscience should be4 ,if this    
were so1 every act of ,moral  ,choice   
would be ,greek3 orektikos nous4    ,but
 one obvious function of the feelings   
and passions in our composite  nature is
 to instigate ,action1 when ,reason and 
,conscience by themselves  do not3 so   
that as a matter of fact our ,moral     
,choice is1 in general1  fairly         
described as ,greek3 orexis dianoetike4 
,see ,bishop ,butler's  ,sermon ,,ii4   

and the ,first upon ,compassion4    #aj 
,the mind attains truth1 either for the 
sake of truth itself  7,greek3 aplos71  
or for the sake of something further    
7,greek3 eneka  tinos74 ,if the first   
then either syllogistically 7,greek3    
episteme71  non-syllogistically 7,greek3
 nous71 or by union of the two methods  
7,greek3 sophla74 ,if the second1 either
 with a view to act 7,greek3            
phronesis71 or with a view to make      
7,greek3 techne74    ,otherwise4 ,the   
mind contemplates ,matter ,necessary or 
,contingent4 ,if  necessary1 ,principles
 7,greek3 nous71 ,deductions 7,greek3   
episteme71  or ,mixed 7,greek3 sophla74 
,if ,contingent1 ,action 7,greek3       
phronesis71  ,production 7,greek3       
techen74 7,giphanius quoted in          
,cardwell's notes47    #aa ,it is the   
opening statement of the ,post          
,analytics4    #ab ,aristotle in his    
logical analysis of ,induction1 ,prior4 
,analytics  ,,ii4 #be1 defines it to be 
8the proving the inherence of the major 

term  in the middle 7i4e4 proving the   
truth of the major premiss in fig4 #a7  
through the minor term40 ,he presupposes
 a ,syllogism in the first ,figure  with
 an universal affirmative conclusion1   
which reasons1 of course1  from an      
universal1 which universal is to be     
taken as proved by  ,induction4 ,his    
doctrine turns upon a canon which he    
there quotes4 8,if  of one and the same 
term two others be predicated1 one of   
which is  coextensive with that one and 
the same1 the other may be predicated of
  that which is thus coextensive40 ,the 
fact of this coextensiveness must  be   
ascertained by ,greek3 nous1 in other   
words1 by the ,inductive  ,faculty4 ,we 
will take ,aldrich's instance4      ,all
 ,magnets attract iron      ,a ,b ,c are
 ,magnets      ,a ,b ,c attract iron4   
,presupposed ,syllogism reasoning from  
an universal4    ,a ,b ,c attract iron  
7,matter of observation and experiment7 
,all ,magnets are ,a ,b ,c 7,assumed by 
,greek3 nous1 i4e4 the ,inductive       

faculty7    ,all ,magnets attract iron  
7,major premiss of the last ,syllogism  
proved by  taking the minor term of that
 for the middle term of this47    ,or1  
according to the canon quoted above3 ,a 
,b ,c are ,magnets4 ,a ,b ,c  attract   
iron4    ,but ,greek3 nous tells me that
 the term ,magnets is coextensive with  
the term ,a ,b ,c1 therefore of all     
,magnets ,i may predicate that they     
attract iron4    ,induction is said by  
,aristotle to be ,greek3 hoia phanton1  
but he says  in the same place that for 
this reason we must conceive 7,greek3   
noehin7 the term containing the         
particular ,instances 7as ,a ,b ,c      
above7  as composed of all the          
,individuals4    ,if ,induction implied 
actual examination of all particular    
instances it  would cease to be         
,reasoning at all and sink into repeated
 acts of  ,simple ,apprehension it is   
really the bridging over of a chasm1 not
 the  steps cut in the rock on either   
side to enable us to walk down into and 

again out of it4 ,it is a branch of     
probable ,reasoning1 and its validity   
depends entirely upon the quality of the
 particular mind which  performs it4    
,rapid ,induction has always been a     
distinguishing mark of  ,genius the     
certainty produced by it is ,subjective 
and not ,objective4 ,it  may be useful  
to exhibit it ,syllogistically1 but the 
,syllogism which  exhibits it is either 
nugatory1 or contains a premiss         
literally  false4 ,it will be found     
useful to compare on the subject of     
,induction  as the term is used by      
,aristotle1 ,analytica ,prior4 ,,ii #be 
#bf ,analytica  ,post4 ,i4 #a1 #c1 and  
,i4 ,topics ,,vi ,i and ,x4    #ac ,the 
reference is made to the ,post ,analyt  
,i ,,ii and it is impossible  to        
understand the account of ,greek3       
epistaemae without a perusal of  the    
chapter1 the additions to the definition
 referred to relate to the  nature of   
the premisses from which ,greek3        
epistaemae draws its  conclusions they  

are to be 8true1 first principles       
incapable of any  syllogistic proof1    
better known than the conclusion1 prior 
to it1 and  causes of it40 7,see the    
appendix to this ,book47    #ad ,this is
 the test of correct logical division1  
that the membra  dividentia shall be    
opposed1 i4e4 not included the one by   
the other4    #ae ,the meaning of the   
,greek3 hepehi appears to be this3 the  
appeal  is made in the first instance to
 popular language1 just as it the case  
of ,greek3 epistaemae1 and will be in   
those of ,greek3 phronaesis and  ,greek3
 sophia4 ,we commonly call ,architecture
 an ,art1 and it is so and  so1         
therefore the name ,art and this so and 
so are somehow connected to  prove that 
connection to be 8coextensiveness10 we  
predicate one of the  other and then    
simply convert the proposition1 which is
 the proper test  of any logical        
definition1 or of any specific property4
 ,see the ,topics1  #a4 vi4    #af ,see 
the parable of the unjust ,steward1 in  

which the popular sense  of ,greek3     
phronaesis is strongly brought out2     
,greek3 ephaenesen ho  kurios ton       
oikonomon taes adikias oti phronimos    
epoiaesen hoti ohi  viohi tou aionos    
toutou phronimoteroi1 k4t4l4--,luke xvi4
 #h4    #ag ,compare the ,greek3 aplos  
and ,greek3 kath' ekasta pepaideumenos  
of ,book ,i4 chap4 #a4    #ah ,the two  
aspects under which ,virtue may be      
considered as claiming  the allegiance  
of moral agents are1 that of being      
right1 and that of  being truly         
expedient1 because ,conscience and      
,reasonable ,self-,love are  the two    
,principles of our moral constitution   
naturally supreme and  8,conscience and 
,self-,love1 if we understand our true  
happiness1  always lead us the same     
way40 ,bishop ,butler1 end of ,sermon   
,,iii4    ,and again3    8,if by a sense
 of interest is meant a practical regard
 to what is  upon the whole our         
,happiness this is not only coincident  
with the  principle of ,virtue or ,moral

 ,rectitude1 but is a part of the idea  
itself4 ,and it is evident this         
,reasonable ,self-,love wants to be     
improved as really as any principle in  
our nature4 ,so little cause is  there  
for ,moralists to disclaim this         
principle40 ,from the note on sect4  iv4
 of the chapter on ,moral ,discipline1  
,analogy1 part ,i chap4 v4    #ai ,see  
the note on ,greek3 ,arche on page #d1  
l4 #cj4    ,the student will find it    
worth while to compare this passage with
 the  following--,chap4 xiii4 of this   
book beginning ,greek3 e d' exis to     
ommati touto k4 t4 l--vii4 #d4 ,greek3  
eti kai ode physikos4 k4t4l4  vii4      
#i4--;,greek3 ae gar arethae kai ae     
mochthaeria4 k4t4l4--iii4 #g ad  finem4 
,greek3 ei de tis legoi4 k4t4l4    #bj  
,this is not quite fair4 ,used in its   
strict sense1 ,art does not  admit of   
degrees of excellence any more than     
,practical ,wisdom4 ,in  popular        
language we use the term 8wiser man10 as
 readily as 8better  artist0 really     

denoting in each case different degrees 
of approximation  to ,practical ,wisdom 
and ,art respectively1 ,greek3 dia to   
ginesthai tous  epainous di anaphoras4  
,i4 #ab4    #ba ,he would be a better   
,chymist who should poison              
intentionally1  than he on whose mind   
the prevailing impression was that      
8,epsom ,salts  mean ,oxalic ,acid1 and 
,syrup of ,senna ,laudanum40    #bb,the 
term ,wisdom is used in our ,english    
,translation of the ,old  ,testament in 
the sense first given to ,greek3----    
here4 8,then wrought  ,bezaleel and     
,ahohab1 and every wise-hearted man1 in 
whom the ,lord put  wisdom and          
understanding to know how to work all   
manner of work for  the service of the  
,sanctuary0 ,exodus xxxvi4 i4    #bc    
,greek3---- and ,greek3----1 7in the    
strict sense1 for it is used in  many   
different senses in this book7 are      
different parts of the whole  function  
,greek3----1 ,greek3---- takes in       
conclusions1 drawn by strict  reasoning 

from ,principles of a certain kind which
 ,greek3 ---- supplies4  ,it is         
conceivable that a man might go on      
gaining these principles by  ,intuition 
and never reasoning from them1 and so   
,greek3 ---- might exist  independent of
 ,greek3----1 but not this without that4
 ,put the two  together1 the head to the
 trunk1 and you form the living being   
,greek3----4 ,there are three branches  
of ,greek3---- according to ,greek      
,philosophy1 ,greek3----1 ,greek3----1  
,greek3----4 ,science is perhaps the    
nearest ,english term1 but we have none 
really equivalent4    #bd;,greek3---- is
 here used in its most extensive sense1 
,greek3----  would be its chief         
,instrument4    #be ,the faculty        
concerned with which is ,greek3----4    
#bf ,in every branch of ,moral ,action  
in which ,practical ,wisdom is  employed
 there will be general principles1 and  
the application of them1  but in some   
branches there are distinct names       
appropriated to the  operations of      

,practical ,wisdom1 in others there are 
not4    ,thus ,practical ,wisdom1 when  
employed on the general principles of   
,civil  ,government1 is called          
,legislation1 as administering its      
particular  functions it is called      
simply ,government4 ,in ,domestic       
,management1 there  are of course       
general ,rules1 and also the particular 
application of  them2 but here the      
faculty is called only by one name4 ,so 
too when  ,self-,interest is the object 
of ,practical ,wisdom4    #bg           
,greek3----1 8our mere ,operatives in   
,public business40 7,chalmers47    #bh  
,practical ,wisdom may be employed      
either respecting ,self1 7which is      
,greek3---- proper7 or not-,self1 i4e4  
either one's family,greek3----1  or     
one's community,greek3----1 but here the
 supreme and subordinate are            
distinguished1 the former is            
,greek3----1 the latter ,greek3----     
proper1  whose functions are            
deliberation and the administration of  

justice4    #bi ,but where can this be  
done1 if there be no community8 see     
,horace's  account of the way in which  
his father made him reap instruction    
from  the examples in the society around
 him4 #a4 ,sat4 iv4 #aje1 etc4 ,see also
  ,bishop ,butler1 ,analogy1 part ,i4   
chap4 v4 sect4 iii4    ,the whole       
question of the ,selfish ,morality is   
treated in ,bishop  ,butler's first     
three and the eleventh ,sermons1 in     
which he shows the  coincidence in fact 
of enlightened ,self-,love and          
,benevolence i4e4  love of others4      
,compare also what is said in the first 
,book of this  treatise1 chap4 v41 about
 ,greek3 autarkeia4    #cj ,more truly  
8implied10 namely1 that ,practical      
,wisdom results from  experience4    #ca
 ,this observation seems to be          
introduced1 simply because suggested  by
 the last1 and not because at all       
relevant to the matter in hand4    #cb  
,an instance of ,principles gained      
,greek3 aisthesei4 7,book #a4  chap4    

viii47    #cc ,particulars are called   
,greek3 eschata because they are last   
arrived at in the deliberative process1 
but a little further on we have  the    
term applied to first principles1       
because they stand at one  extremity1   
and facts at the other1 of the line of  
action4    #cd ,i prefer the reading    
,greek3 e phronesis1 which gives this   
sense1  8,well1 as ,i have said1        
,practical ,wisdom is this kind of      
sense1 and the  other we mentioned is   
different in kind40 ,in a passage so    
utterly  unimportant1 and thrown in     
almost colloquially1 it is not worth    
while  to take much trouble about such a
 point4    #ce ,the definition of it in 
the ,organon 7,post ,analyt4 #a4 xxiv471
 8a  happy conjecture of the middle term
 without time to consider of it40       
,the quaestio states the phenomena1 and 
the middle term the causation  the rapid
 ascertaining of which constitutes      
,greek3 anchinoia4 ,all  that receives  
light from the sun is bright on the side

 next to the sun4  ,the moon receives   
light from the sun1 ,the moon is bright 
on the side  next the sun4 ,the ,greek3 
anchinoia consists in rapidly and       
correctly  accounting for the observed  
fact1 that the moon is bright on the    
side  next to the sun4    #cf ,opinion  
is a complete1 deliberation an          
incomplete1 mental act4    #cg ,the ,end
 does not sanctify the ,means4    #ch   
,the meaning is1 there is one ,end      
including all others2 and in this  sense
 ,greek3 phronesis is concerned with    
means1 not ,ends but there  are also    
many subordinate ,ends which are in fact
 ,means to the ,great ,end  of all4     
,good counsel has reference not merely  
to the grand ,end1 but to  the          
subordinate ,ends which ,greek3         
phronesis selects as being right  means 
to the ,grand ,end of all4    #ci ,the  
relative ,greek3 on might be referred to
 ,greek3 sumpheron1  but that ,greek3   
eubonlia has been already divided into  
two kinds1 and  this construction would 

restrict the name to one of them1 namely
 that  ,greek3 pros ti telos as opposed 
to that ,greek3 pros to telos aplos4    
#dj ,we have no term which at all       
approximates to the meaning of this     
word1 much less will our language admit 
of the play upon it which  connects it  
with ,greek3 suggnomae4    #da ,meaning1
 of course1 all those which relate to   
,moral ,action4  ,greek3 psronaesis  is 
equivalent to ,greek3 euboulia1 ounesis1
  gnomae1 and nous 7in the new sense    
here given to it74    ,the faculty which
 guides us truly in all matters of      
,moral ,action is  ,greek3 phronaesis1  
i4e4 ,reason directed by ,goodness or   
,goodness  informed by ,reason4 ,but    
just as every faculty of body and soul  
is not  actually in operation at the    
same time1 though the ,man is acting1 so
  proper names are given to the various 
,functions of ,practical ,wisdom4    ,is
 the ,greek3 phronimos forming plans to 
attain some particular ,end8  he is then
 ,greek3 euboulos--is he passing under  

review the suggestions  of others8 he is
 ,greek3 sunetos--is he judging of the  
acts of others8  he admits ,greek3      
gnomae to temper the strictness of      
justness--is he  applying general ,rules
 to particular cases8 he is exercising  
,greek3  nous praktikos or ,greek3      
agsthaesis--while in each and all he is 
,greek3 phronimos8    #db ,see note1 on 
p4 #adj4    #dc ,there are cases where  
we must simply accept or reject without 
proof3 either when ,principles are      
propounded which are prior to all       
reasoning1 or when particular facts are 
brought before us which are  simply     
matters of ,greek3 agsthaesis4          
,aristotle here brings both these  cases
 within the province of ,greek3 nous1   
i4e4 he calls by this  name the ,faculty
 which attains ,truth in each4    #dd   
i4e4 of the ,greek3 syllogisimai ton    
prakton4    #de ,see the note on ,greek3
 ,archae on p4 #d1a #cj4 ,as a matter of
 fact  and mental experience the ,major 
,premiss of the ,practica ,syllogism is 

wrought into the mind by repeatedly     
acting upon the ,minor ,premiss  7i4e4  
by ,greek3 ethismos74         ,all that 
is pleasant is to be done1       ,this  
is pleasant1       ,this is to be done  
,by habitually acting on the ,minor     
,premiss1 i4e4 on the suggestions of    
,greek3 epithymia1 a man comes really to
 hold the ,major ,premiss4  ,aristotle  
says of the man destitute of all        
self-control that he is  firmly         
persuaded that it is his proper line to 
pursue the gratification  of his bodily 
appetites1 ,greek3 dia to toioytos einai
 oios diokein  aytas4 ,and his analysis 
of ,greek3 akrasia 7the state of        
progress  towards this utter abandonment
 to passion7 shows that each case of    
previous good resolution succumbing to  
temptation is attributable to  ,greek3  
epithymia suggesting its own ,minor     
,premiss in place of the  right one4    
,book ,,vii4 #h and #e4    #df ,the     
consequentia is this3    ,there are     
cases both of principles and facts which

 cannot admit of  reasoning1 and must be
 authoritatively determined by ,greek3  
nous4  ,what makes ,greek3 nous to be a 
true guide8 only practice1 i4e4         
,experience1 and therefore1 etc4    #dg 
,this is a note to explain ,greek3      
hygieina and ,greek3 euektika1  he gives
 these three uses of the term ,greek3   
hygieinon in the ,topics1  ,i4 xiii4    
#aj1          ,greek3 to men hygieias   
poitikon1 ,greek3 hygieinon legetai     
,greek3 to de phylaktikon1              
,greek3 to de smantikon4    ,of course  
the same will apply to ,greek3          
euektikon4    #dh ,healthiness is the   
formal cause of health4       ,medicine 
is the efficient cause of health4       
,see ,book ,x4 chap4 iv4 ,greek3 hosper 
oud h hygieia kai ho iatros  homoios    
aitia esti tou ugiainein4    #di ,greek3
 phronsis is here used in a partial     
sense to signify the  ,intellectual1 as 
distinct from the ,moral1 element of    
,practical ,wisdom4    #ej ,this is     
another case of an observation being    

thrown in obiter1  not relevant to1 but 
suggested by1 the matter in hand4    #ea
 ,see ,book ,,ii4 chap4 iii4 and ,v4    
xiii4    #eb,the article is supplied at 
,greek3 panourgous1 because the         
abstract word has just been used        
expressly in a bad sense4 8,up to       
anything0 is the nearest equivalent to  
,greek3 panourgos1 but too  nearly      
approaches to a colloquial vulgarism4   
#ec ,see the note on ,greek3 ,arch on   
page #d1 l4 #cj4    ,p4 #adg1 l4 #ad4   
,and for the ,minor1 of course1         
8,this particular action is------40     
,we may paraphrase ,greek3 to telos by  
,greek3 ti dei prattein--ti gar  dei    
prattein h m1 to telos auts estin i4e4  
,greek3 ts  phronseos4--7,chap4 xi4 of  
this ,book47    #ee 8,look asquint on   
the face of truth40 ,sir ,t4 ,browne1   
,religio  ,medici4    #ef ,the term     
,greek3 sophronikoi must be understood  
as governing the  signification of the  
other two terms1 there being no single  
,greek term  to denote in either case   

mere dispositions towards these         
,virtues4    #eg ,compare the passage at
 the commencement of ,book ,x4 ,greek3  
nun de  phainontai ,greek3 katokochimon 
ek ts arets4    #eh ,it must be         
remembered1 that ,greek3 phronsis is    
used throughout  this chapter in two    
senses1 its proper and complete sense of
 ,practical  ,wisdom1 and its incomplete
 one of merely the ,intellectual        
,element of  it4      ,,book ,,vii    #a
 ,the account of ,virtue and ,vice      
hitherto given represents rather  what  
men may be than what they are4 ,in this 
book we take a  practical view of       
,virtue and ,vice1 in their ordinary1   
every day  development4    #b ,this     
illustrates the expression1 8,deceits of
 the ,flesh40    #c ,another reading    
omits the ,greek3----2 the meaning of   
the whole  passage would be exactly the 
same--it would then run1 8if he had been
  convinced of the rightness of what he 
does1 i4e4 if he were now  acting on    
conviction1 he might stop in his course 

on a change of  conviction40    #d      
,major and minor ,premises of the       
,greek3---- ,greek----    #e,some       
necessarily implying knowledge of the   
particular1 others not4    #f ,as a     
modern parallel1 take old ,trumbull in  
,scott's 8,red ,gauntlet40    #g ,that  
is1 as ,i understand it1 either the     
major or the minor premise1  it is true1
 that 8all that is sweet is pleasant10  
it is true also1 that  8this is sweet10 
what is contrary to ,right ,reason is   
the bringing in  this minor to the major
 i4e4 the universal maxim1 forbidding to
  taste4 ,thus1 a man goes to a         
convivial meeting with the maxim in his 
mind 8,all excess is to be avoided10 at 
a certain time his ,greek3----  tells   
him 8,this glass is excess40 ,as a      
matter of mere reasoning1 he  cannot    
help receiving the conclusion 8,this    
glass is to be avoided10 and  supposing 
him to be morally sound he would        
accordingly abstain4 ,but  ,greek3----1 
being a simple tendency towards         

indulgence suggests1 in  place of the   
minor premise 8,this is excess10 its own
 premise 8,this is  sweet10 this again  
suggests the self-indulgent maxim or    
principle  7#8,greek3----71 8,all that  
is sweet is to be tasted10 and so1 by   
strict  logical sequence1 proves 8,this 
glass is to be tasted40    ,the solution
 then of the phnomenon of ,greek3---- is
 this that  ,greek3----1 by its direct  
action on the animal nature1 swamps the 
suggestions of ,right ,reason4    ,on   
the high ground of ,universals1         
,greek3---- i4e4 ,greek3---- easily     
defeats ,greek3----4 ,the ,greek3----1  
an hour before he is in temptation1     
would never deliberately prefer the     
maxim 8,all that is sweet is to be      
tasted0 to 8,all excess is to be        
avoided40 ,the ,greek3---- would4       
,horace has a good comment upon this    
7,,ii ,sat #b73         ,qu virtus et   
quanta1 bom1 sit vivere parvo           
,discite1 non inter lances mensasque    
nitentes       ,verum hic impransi mecum

 disquirite      ,compare also ,proverbs
 ,,xxiii4 #ca4 8,look not thou upon the 
wine when it  is red10 etc4    #h ,as we
 commonly speak1 ,metaphysicians4       
,physiology of course includes          
,metaphysics4    #i ,greek3 oron4       
,aristotle's own account of this word   
7,prior ,analyt  ii4 #a7 is ,greek3 eis 
on dialuetai hae protasis1 but both in  
the  account of ,greek3 nous and here it
 seems that the proposition itself  is  
really indicated by it4    #aj ,the     
,greek would give 8avoids excessive     
pain10 but this is not  true1 for the   
excess of pain would be ground for      
excuse the warrant for  translating as  
in the text1 is the passage occurring   
just below ,greek3  diokei tas uperbolas
 kai pheugei metrias lupas4    #aa      
,compare ,bishop ,butler on ,particular 
,propensions1 ,analogy1 ,part ,i  chap v
 sect4 iv4    #ab ,that is1 they are to 
the right states as ,vice to ,virtue4   
#ad ,consult in connection with this    
,chapter the ,chapter on ,greek3  orgae 

in the ,rhetoric1 ,,ii4 #b1 and ,bishop 
,butler's ,sermon on  ,resentment4      
#ae ,the reasoning here being somewhat  
obscure from the concisement of         
expression1 the following exposition of 
it is subjoined4         ,actions of    
,lust are wrong actions done with       
pleasure1       ,wrong actions done with
 pleasure are more justly objects of    
wrath199       ,such as are more justly 
objects of wrath are more unjust1       
,actions of ,lust are more unjust       
99 ,greek3 hubpis is introduced as the  
single instance from       which this   
premiss is proved inductively4 ,see the 
account of it in       the ,chapter of  
the ,rhetoric referred to in the        
preceding note4    #af;,greek3 ton dae  
lechthenton4 ,considerable difference of
 opinion  exists as to the proper       
meaning of these words4 ,the emendation 
which  substitutes ,greek3 akrataes for 
,greek3 akolastos removes all           
difficulty1 as the clause would then    
naturally refer to ,greek3 ton mae      

proairoumenon but ,zell adheres to the  
reading in the text of ,bekker1  because
 the authority of ,,mss and old editions
 is all on this side4    ,i understand  
,greek3 mallon as meant to modify the   
word ,greek3  malakias1 which properly  
denotes that phase of ,greek3 akrasia   
7not  ,greek3 akolasia7 which is caused 
by pain4    ,the ,greek3 akolastos      
deliberately pursues pleasure and       
declines  pain if there is to be a      
distinct name for the latter phase1 it  
comes  under ,greek3 malakia more nearly
 than any other term1 though perhaps    
not quite properly4    ,or the words may
 be understood as referring to the class
 of wrong acts  caused by avoidance of  
pain1 whether deliberate or otherwise1  
and then  of course the names of ,greek3
 malakia and ,greek3 akolasia may be    
fitly given respectively4    #ag 8,if we
 went into a hospital where all were    
sick or dying1 we  should think those   
least ill who were insensible to pain2 a
 physician  who knew the whole1 would   

behold them with despair4 ,and there is 
a  mortification of the soul as well as 
of the body1 in which the first         
symptoms of returning hope are pain and 
anguish0 ,sewell1 ,sermons to  ,young   
,men 7,sermon xii47    #ah ,before the  
time of trial comes the man deliberately
 makes his  ,moral ,choice to act       
rightly1 but1 at the moment of acting1  
the powerful  strain of desire makes him
 contravene this choice his ,will does  
not act  in accordance with the         
affirmation or negation of his ,reason4 
,his  actions are therefore of the mixed
 kind4 ,see ,book ,,iii4 chap4 i1 and   
note on page #abh4    #ai ,let a man be 
punctual on principle to any one        
engagement in the  day1 and he must1 as 
a matter of course1 keep all his others 
in their  due places relatively to this 
one2 and so will often wear an          
appearance  of being needlessly         
punctilious in trifles4    #bj ,because 
he is destitute of these minor springs  
of action1 which  are intended to supply

 the defects of the higher principle4   
,see ,bishop ,butler's first ,sermon on 
,compassion1 and the conclusion of  note
 on p4 #abi4      ,,book ,,viii    #a   
8,owe no man anything1 but to love one  
another for he that loveth  another hath
 fulfilled the ,law40 ,romans ,,xiii4   
#h4    #b ,greek3 kerameis4 ,the        
,proverb in full is a line from ,hesiod1
  ,greek3 kahi keramehus keramei koteei 
kai tektoni tekton4    #c ,in this      
sense1 therefore1 is it sung of ,mrs4   
,gilpin that she         8two stone     
bottles found1       ,to hold the liquor
 that she loved1       ,and keep it safe
 and sound40    #d ,cardwell's reading1 
,greek3 tautae gar omoioi1 kai ta loipa 
is  here adopted1 as yielding a better  
sense than ,bekker's4    #e,the ,great  
man will have a right to look for more  
,friendship than he  bestows1 but the   
,good man can feel ,friendship only for1
 and in  proportion to1 the goodness of 
the other4    #f ,see note on page #fh1 
#a4 #h4    #g ,see ,i4 ,topics1 ,chap4  

v4 on the various senses of ,greek3     
tauton4    #h 8,for the mutual society1 
help1 and comfort that the one ought to 
have of the other1 both in prosperity   
and adversity40    #i ,which one would  
be assuming he was1 if one declined to  
recognise  the obligation to requite the
 favour or kindness4      ,,book ,,ix   
#a 8,neither the ,son of man1 that ,he  
should repent40 ,numbers xxiii4  #ai4   
8,in a few instances the ,second        
,intention1 or ,philosophical employment
  of a ,term1 is more extensive than the
 ,first ,intention1 or popular use40    
,whately1 ,logic1 iii4 #aj4    #b 8,i   
have sometimes considered in what       
troublesome case is that  ,chamberlain  
in an ,inn who being but one is to give 
attendance to many  guests4 ,for suppose
 them all in one chamber1 yet1 if one   
shall command  him to come to the       
window1 and the other to the table1 and 
another to  the bed1 and another to the 
chimney1 and another to come upstairs1  
and  another to go downstairs1 and all  

in the same instant1 how would he be    
distracted to please them all8 ,and yet 
such is the sad condition of nay  soul  
by nature1 not only a servant but a     
slave unto sin4 ,pride calls me  to the 
window1 gluttony to the table1          
wantonness to the bed1 laziness  to the 
chimney1 ambition commands me to go     
upstairs1 and covetousness  to come     
down4 ,vices1 ,i see1 are as well       
contrary to themselves as to  ,virtue40 
7,fuller's ,good ,thoughts in ,bad      
,times4 ,mix't ,contemplations1  viii47 
,,book ,x    #a ,see note1 p4 #dc4    #b
 ,see ,book ,,ii4 chap4 ix4    #c ,see  
,book ,i4 chap4 v4 ad finem4    #d ,the 
notion alluded to is that of the greek3 
idea3 that there is  no real substantial
 good except the greek3 auto agathon1   
and  therefore whatever is so called is 
so named in right of its  participation 
in that4    #e ,see note on page #acf1  
#a4 #ae4    ,p4 #bch1 #a4 #bd4 ,movement
 is1 according to ,aristotle1 of six    
kinds3     ,from not being to being    4

  4  4  4    ,generation     ,from being
 to not being    4  4  4  4             
,destruction     ,from being to being   
more   4  4  4  4    ,increase     ,from
 being to being less   4  4  4  4       
,diminution     ,from being here to     
being there   4  4    ,change of ,place 
,from being in this way to being in that
  ,alteration    #g ,a may go to sleep  
quicker than ,b1 but cannot do more     
sleep in  a given time4    #h ,compare  
,book ,,iii4 chap4 vi4 ,greek3 osper kai
 epi ton somaton1 k4  t4 l4    #i ,which
 is of course a ,greek3 genesis4    #aj 
,that is1 subordinate ,movements are    
complete before the whole  ,movement is4
    #aa ,pleasure is so instantaneous a 
sensation1 that it cannot be  conceived 
divisible or incomplete2 the longest    
continued ,pleasure is  only a          
succession of single sparks1 so rapid as
 to give the appearance  of a stream1 of
 light4    #ab ,a man is as effectually 
hindered from taking a walk by the      
,greek3  allotria haedouae of reading a 

novel1 as by the ,greek3 oikeia lupae   
of gout in the feet4    #ac ,i have thus
 rendered ,greek3 spoudae 7ouk agnoon to
  hamartanomenon72 but1 though the      
,english term does not represent the    
depth of the ,greek one1 it is some     
approximation to the truth to  connect  
an earnest serious purpose with         
,happiness4    #ad ,bishop ,butler1     
contra 7,sermon ,,xv474    8,knowledge  
is not our proper ,happiness4 ,whoever  
will in the least  attend to the thing  
will see that it is the gaining1 not the
 having1 of  it1 which is the           
entertainment of the mind40 ,the two    
statements may  however be reconciled4  
,aristotle may be well understood only  
to mean1  that the pursuit of knowledge 
will be the pleasanter1 the freer it is 
from the minor hindrances which attend  
on learning4    #ae ,the clause         
immediately following indicates that    
,aristotle felt  this statement to be at
 first sight startling1 ,happiness      
having been  all the way through        

connected with ,greek3 energeia1 but the
 statement  illustrates and confirms    
what was said in note on page #f1 #a4   
#ae4    #af ,that is to say1 he aims at 
producing not merely a happy aggregate1 
but an aggregate of happy individuals4  
,compare what is said of  ,legislators  
in the last chapter of ,book ,i and the 
first of ,book ,,ii4    #ag ,see note1  
page #adf1 #a4 #ag4