,,moral ,,philosophy3  ,,ethics1        
,,deontology ,,and ,,natural ,,law4     
,,by ,,joseph ,,rickaby1 ,s4,j4   ,nihil
 ,obstat3 ,,josephus ,,keating1 ,s4,j4  
,censor deputatus  ,imprimi potest3     
,,joannes ,h4 ,,wright1 ,s4,j4 ,prp4    
,prov4 ,angli  ,nihil ,obstat3 ,c4      
,,schut1 ,d4,d4 ,censor deputatus       
,imprimatur3 ,,edm4 ,,can4 ,,surmont    
,vie4 ,gen4     ,,preface 7#aije74      
,for fifteen years this ,manual has     
enjoyed all the popularity that its     
author could desire4 ,with that         
popularity the author is the last person
 to wish to interfere4 ,therefore1 not  
to throw previous copies out of use1    
this edition makes no alteration either 
in the pagination or the text already   
printed4 ,at the same time the author   
might well be argued to have lapsed into
 strange supineness and indifference to 
moral science1 if in fifteen years he   
had learnt nothing new1 and found       
nothing in his work which he wished to  
improve4 ,whoever will be at the expense

 of purchasing my ,political and ,moral 
,essays 7,benziger1 #aijb1 #fs47 will   
find in the first essay on the ,origin  
and ,extent of ,civil ,authority an     
advantageous substitute for the chapter 
on the ,state in this work4 ,the essay  
is a dissertation written for the degree
 of ,b4 ,sc4 in the ,university of      
,oxford2 and represents1 ,i hope1       
tolerably well the best contemporary    
teaching on the subject4  ,if the       
present work had to be rewritten1 ,i    
should make a triple division of ,moral 
,philosophy1 into ,ethics1 ,deontology  
7the science of ,greek3 to deon1 i4e41  
of what ought to be done71 and ,natural 
,law4 ,for if the principal business of 
,ethics is to determine what moral      
obligation is 7p4 #b71 then the         
classical work on the subject1 the      
,nicomachean ,ethics of ,aristotle1 is  
as the play of ,hamlet with the         
character of ,hamlet left out3 for in   
that work there is no analysis of moral 
obligation1 no attempt to fix the       

comprehension of the idea ,i ought      
7ib474 ,the system there exposed is a   
system of ,eudaemonism1 not of          
,deontology4 ,it is not a treatise on   
,duty1 but on ,happiness3 it tells us   
what ,happiness1 or rational well-being1
 is1 and what conduct is conducive to   
rational well-being4 ,it may be found   
convenient to follow ,aristotle1 and    
avow that the business of ,ethics is not
 ,duty1 not ,obligation1 not ,law1 not  
,sanction1 but ,happiness4 ,that fiery  
little word ought goes unexplained in   
,ethics1 except in an hypothetical      
sense1 that a man ought to do this1 and 
avoid that1 if he means to be a happy   
man3 cf4 p4 #aae4 ,any man who declares 
that he does not care about ethical or  
rational happiness1 stands to ,ethics as
 that man stands to ,music who hath no  
ear for concord of sweet sounds4  ,all  
that ,ethics or ,music can do for such a
 ,philistine is to send him away to     
another city1 pouring ointment on his   
head1 and crowning him with wool1 as    

,plato would dismiss the tragedian      
7,republic ,,iii4 #cih74 ,the author of 
the ,magna ,moralia well says 7,i4 i4   
#ac73 ,no science or faculty ever argues
 the goodness of the end which it       
proposes to itself3 it belongs to some  
other faculty to consider that4 ,neither
 the physician says that health is a    
good thing1 nor the builder that a house
 is a good thing3 but the one announces 
that he produces health and how he      
produces it1 and the builder in like    
manner a house4 ,the professor of       
,ethics indeed1 from the very nature of 
his subject-matter1 says in pointing out
 happiness that it is the rational      
sovereign good of man3 but to any one   
unmoved by that demonstration ,ethics   
can have no more to say4 ,ethics will   
not threaten1 nor talk of duty1 law1 or 
punishment4  ,ethics1 thus strictly     
considered on an ,aristotelian basis1   
are antecedent to ,natural ,theology4   
,they belong rather to ,natural         
,anthropology3 they are a study of human

 nature4 ,but as human nature points to 
,god1 so ,ethics are not wholly         
irrespective of ,god1 considering ,him  
as the object of human happiness and    
worship1--the ,supreme ,being without   
whom all the aspirations of humanity are
 at fault 7pp4 #ac-bf1 #aia-aig74       
,ethics do not refer to the commandments
 of ,god1 for this simple reason1 that  
they have nothing to say to             
commandments1 or laws1 or obligation1 or
 authority4 ,they are simply a system of
 moral hygiene1 which a man may adopt or
 not3 only1 like any other physician1   
the professor of ,ethics utters a       
friendly warning that misery must ensue 
upon the neglect of what makes for      
health4  ,deontology1 not ,ethics1      
expounds and vindicates the idea1 ,i    
ought4 ,it is the science of ,duty4 ,it 
carries the mild suasions of ,ethics    
into laws1 and out of moral prudence it 
creates conscience4 ,and whereas ,ethics
 do not deal with sin1 except under the 
aspect of what is called philosophical  

sin 7p4 #aai1  #f71 ,deontology defines 
sin in its proper theological sense1 as 
an offence against ,god1 or any thought1
 word1 or deed against the law of ,god4 
,deontology therefore presupposes and is
 consequent upon ,natural ,theology4 ,at
 the same time1 while ,ethics indicate a
 valuable proof of the existence of ,god
 as the requisite ,object of ,happiness1
 ,deontology affords a proof of ,him as 
the requisite ,lawgiver4 ,without ,god1 
man's rational desire is frustrate1 and 
man's conscience a misrepresentation of 
fact4 ,footnote #a  ,footnote #a3 ,this 
is ,cardinal ,newman's proof of the     
existence of ,god from ,conscience3 see 
pp4 #abd1 #abe1 and ,grammar of ,assent1
 pp4 #ajd-aaa1 ed4 #ahie4 ,with         
,newman's1 ,conscience has both a       
critical and a judicial office1 compare 
,plato1 ,politicus1 #bfj ,b1 ,greek3    
sumpasaes taes gnostikaes to men        
epitaktikon meros1 to de kritikon4 ,the 
critical office belongs to ,ethics3 the 
judicial1 or preceptive office ,greek3  

to epitaktikon to ,deontology2 and this 
latter points to a ,person who commands 
and judges1 that is1 to ,god4  ,in this 
volume1 pp4 #a-ajh make up the treatise 
on ,ethics3 pp4 #aji-agf that on        
,deontology4  ,aristotle writes3 ,he    
that acts by intelligence and cultivates
 understanding1 is likely to be best    
disposed and dearest to ,god4 ,for if1  
as is thought1 there is any care of     
human things on the part of the heavenly
 powers1 we may reasonably expect them  
to delight in that which is best and    
most akin to themselves1 that is1 in    
intelligence1 and to make a return of   
good to such as supremely love and      
honour intelligence1 as cultivating the 
thing dearest to ,heaven1 and so        
behaving rightly and well4 ,such1       
plainly1 is the behaviour of the wise4  
,the wise man therefore is the dearest  
to ,god 7,nic4 ,eth4 ,x4 ix4 #ac74 ,but 
,aristotle does not work out the        
connexion between ,god and ,his law on  
the one hand and human conscience and   

duty on the other4 ,in that direction   
the ,stoics1 and after them the ,roman  
,jurists1 went further than ,aristotle4 
,by reason of this deficiency1          
,aristotle1 peerless as he is in        
,ethics1 remains an imperfect ,moral    
,philosopher4    ,,preface ,,to ,,the   
,,fourth ,,edition 7#aiah7  #a4 ,i have 
altered the opening pages in accordance 
with the ,preface to the edition of     
#aije4  #b4 ,i have added a paragraph on
 ,syndicalism 7pp4 #bia-b74  #c4 ,also a
 new ,table of ,addenda et ,corrigenda1 
and a new ,index4  ,the quotations from 
,st4 ,thomas may be read in ,english1   
nearly all of them1 in the ,author's    
,aquinas ,ethicus1 #b vols42 #abs4      
7,burns and ,oates47    ,,contents4     
,,part ,i4--,,ethics4  ,,chapter        
,i4--,,of ,,the ,,object-,,matter ,,and 
,,partition ,,of ,,moral ,,philosophy4  
,,chapter ,,ii4--,,of ,,happiness4      
,section ,i4--,of ,ends4 ,section       
,,ii4--,definition of ,happiness4       
,section ,,iii4--,happiness open to     

,man4 ,section ,,iv4--,of the ,object of
 ,perfect ,happiness4 ,section ,v4--,of 
the use of the present life4  ,,chapter 
,,iii4--,,of ,,human ,,acts4 ,section   
,i4--,what makes a human act less       
voluntary4 ,section ,,ii4--,of the      
determinants of ,morality in any given  
action4  ,,chapter ,,iv4--,,of          
,,passions4 ,section ,i4--,of ,passions 
in general4 ,section ,,ii4--,of ,desire4
 ,section ,,iii4--,of ,delight4 ,section
 ,,iv4--,of ,anger4  ,,chapter ,v4--,,of
 ,,habits ,,and ,,virtues4 ,section     
,i4--,of ,habit4 ,section ,,ii4--,of    
,virtues in general4 ,section           
,,iii4--,of the difference between      
,virtues1 ,intellectual and ,moral4     
,section ,,iv4--,of the ,mean in ,moral 
,virtue4 ,section ,v4--,of ,cardinal    
,virtues4 ,section ,,vi4--,of ,prudence4
 ,section ,,vii4--,of ,temperance4      
,section ,,viii4--,of ,fortitude4       
,section ,,ix4--,of ,justice4  ,,part   
,,ii4--,,deontology4  ,,chapter ,i4     
7,,vi47--,,of ,,the ,,origin ,,of       

,,moral ,,obligation4 ,section ,i4--,of 
the natural difference between ,good and
 ,evil4 ,section ,,ii4--,how ,good      
becomes bounden ,duty1 and ,evil is     
advanced to sin4  ,,chapter ,,ii4       
7,,vii47--,,of ,,the ,,eternal ,,law4   
,,chapter ,,iii4 7,,viii47--,,of ,,the  
,,natural ,,law ,,of ,,conscience4      
,section ,i4--,of the ,origin of        
,primary ,moral ,judgments4 ,section    
,,ii4--,of the invariability of ,primary
 ,moral ,judgments4 ,section ,,iii4--,of
 the immutability of the ,natural ,law4 
,section ,,iv4--,of ,probabilism4       
,,chapter ,,iv4 7,,ix47--,,of ,,the     
,,sanction ,,of ,,the ,,natural ,,law4  
,section ,i4--,of a ,twofold ,sanction1 
,natural and ,divine4 ,section          
,,ii4--,of the ,finality of the         
aforesaid ,sanction4 ,section           
,,iii4--,of ,punishment1 ,retrospective 
and ,retributive4  ,,chapter ,v4        
7,x47--,,of ,,utilitarianism4   ,,part  
,,iii4--,,natural ,,law4  ,,chapter     
,i4--,,of ,,duties ,,to ,,god4 ,section 

,i4--,of the ,worship of ,god4 ,section 
,,ii4--,of ,superstitious ,practices4   
,section ,,iii4--,of the duty of knowing
 ,god4  ,,chapter ,,ii4--,,of ,,the     
,,duty ,,of ,,preserving ,,life4        
,section ,i4--,of ,killing1 ,direct and 
,indirect4 ,section ,,ii4--,of ,killing 
done ,indirectly in ,self-defence4      
,section ,,iii4--,of ,suicide4 ,section 
,,iv4--,of ,duelling4  ,,chapter        
,,iii4--,,of ,,speaking ,,the ,,truth4  
,section ,i4--,of the definition of a   
,lie4 ,section ,,ii4--,of the ,evil of  
,lying4 ,section ,,iii4--,of the keeping
 of ,secrets without ,lying4  ,,chapter 
,,iv4--,,of ,,charity4  ,,chapter       
,v4--,,of ,,rights4 ,section ,i4--,of   
the definition and division of ,rights4 
,section ,,ii4--,of the so-called       
,rights of ,animals4 ,section           
,,iii4--,of the right to ,honour and    
,reputation4 ,section ,,iv4--,of        
,contracts4 ,section ,v4--,of ,usury4   
,,chapter ,,vi4--,,of ,,marriage4       
,section ,i4--,of the ,institution of   

,marriage4 ,section ,,ii4--,of the      
,unity of ,marriage4 ,section           
,,iii4--,of the ,indissolubility of     
,marriage4  ,,chapter ,,vii4--,,of      
,,property4 ,section ,i4--,of ,private  
,property4 ,section ,,ii4--,of ,private 
,capital4 ,section ,,iii4--,of ,landed  
,property4  ,,chapter ,,viii4--,,of     
,,the ,,state4 ,section ,i4--,of the    
,monstrosities called ,leviathan and    
,social ,contract4 ,section ,,ii4--,of  
the theory that ,civil ,power is an     
aggregate     formed by subscription of 
the powers of individuals4 ,section     
,,iii4--,of the true state of ,nature1  
which is the     state of civil society1
 and consequently of the ,divine origin 
of ,power4 ,section ,,iv4--,of the      
variety of ,polities4 ,section ,v4--,of 
the ,divine ,right of ,kings and the    
,inalienable ,sovereignty of the        
,people4 ,section ,,vi4--,of the        
,elementary and ,original ,polity4      
,section ,,vii4--,of ,resistance to     
,civil ,power4 ,section ,,viii4--,of the

 ,right of the ,sword4 ,section         
,,ix4--,of ,war4 ,section ,x4--,of the  
,scope and ,aim of ,civil ,government4  
,section ,,xi4--,of ,law and ,liberty4  
,section ,,xii4--,of ,liberty of        
,opinion4    ,,addenda ,,et ,,corrigenda
  p4 #ca4 ,aristotle calls the end      
,greek3 to telos2 the means1 ,greek3 ta 
pros to telos 7,st4 ,thomas1 ea quae    
sunt ad finem72 the circumstances1      
,greek3 ta ein ois hae praxis4          
,observe1 both end and means are willed 
directly1 but the circumstances         
indirectly4  ,the end is intended1      
,greek3 boulaeton2 the means are chosen1
 ,greek3 proaireton2 the circumstances  
are simply permitted1 ,greek3 anekton1  
rightly or wrongly4 ,the intention of   
the end is called by ,english           
philosophers the motive2 while the      
choice of means they call the intention1
 an unfortunate terminology4  p4 #db1 4 
#c4 ,as the wax takes all shapes1 and   
yet is wax still at the bottom2 the     
,greek3 spokeimenon still is wax2 so the

 soul transported in so many several    
passions of joy1 fear1 hope1 sorrow1    
anger1 and the rest1 has for its general
 groundwork of all this1 ,love4 7,henry 
,more1 quoted in ,carey's ,dante1       
,purgatorio1 c4 xviii47 ,hence1 says    
,carey1 ,love does not figure in        
,collins's ,ode on the ,passions4  p4   
#dc4 ,for daring read recklessness4  p4 
#dd4 ,plato is a thorough ,stoic when he
 says 7,phaedo #hc7 that every pleasure 
and pain comes with a nail to pin down  
the soul to the body and make it        
corporeal4 ,his ,stoicism appears in his
 denunciation of the drama 7,republic1  
x4 #fjd74  p4 #dg1 4 #h4 ,the first     
chapter of ,mill's ,autobiography1 pp4  
#dh-ec1 #acc-adi1 supplies an instance4 
p4 #di1 4 ,i1 #a4 #b1 for physical read 
psychical4  ,p4 #eb4 4 #e4 ,this        
serving1 in ,greek3 douleuein1 ,st4     
,ignatius calls inordinate attachment1  
the modern form of idolatry4 ,cf4       
,romans vi4 #af-bb4  p4 #gi4 ,for       
spoiled read spoilt4  p4 #hd1 foot4 ,for

 ways read way4  p4 #he1 #a4 #f from    
foot4 ,substitute3 7,greek3 b7 to       
restrain the said appetite in its       
irascible part from shrinking from      
danger4  p4 #id1 middle4 ,for others    
read other4  p4 #ie4 ,for ,daring read  
,recklessness4  p4 #ajc1 middle4        
,substitute1 neither evening star nor   
morning star is so wonderful4  p4 #ajf1 
4 #f4 ,aristotle speaks of corrective1  
not of commutative justice4 ,on the     
,aristotelian division of justice see   
,political and ,moral ,essays 7,p4 ,m4  
,e471 pp4 #bhe-f4  p4 #aaa1 4 #d4 ,the  
static equivalent of the dynamic idea1  
of orderly development is that the      
eternal harmonies and fitnesses of      
things1 by observance or neglect whereof
 a man comes to be in or out of harmony 
with himself1 with his fellows1 with    
,god4  p4 #acc4 ,to the ,readings add   
,plato ,laws1 ix1 #hge1 ,a1 ,b1 ,c1 ,d4 
p4 #aea4 ,rewrite the ,note thus3 ,the  
author has seen reason somewhat to      
modify this view1 as appears by the     

,appendix4 ,see ,p4,m4,e4 pp4 #ahe-i3   
,fowler's ,progressive ,morality1 or    
,fowler and ,wilson's ,principles of    
,morals1 pp4 #bbg-bdh4  p4 #aha1 #a4 ii 
from top4 ,add1 ,this is the law of our 
nature1 that function is primary1 and   
pleasure only attendant 7,stewart1      
,notes on ,nicomathean ,ethics1 ,,ii4   
#dah74  p4 #bah1 lines #ac-af from top1 
cancel the sentence1 ,to this query1    
etc41 and substitute3 ,the reply is1    
that ,god is never willing that man     
should do an inordinate act2 but suicide
 is an inordinate act1 as has been      
shown2 capital punishment is not 7c4    
viii4 s4 viii4 n4 #g1 p4 #cdi74  p4     
#bcg4 ,for ,the ,month for ,march1      
#ahhc1 read ,p4,m4,e41 pp4 #bae-bcc4  p4
 #bea4 ,to the ,reading add ,p4,m4,e41  
pp4 #bfg-bhc4  p4 #big1 l4#f from foot4 
,after simply evil add3 ,hobbes allows  
that human reason lays down certain good
 rules1 laws of nature which however it 
cannot get kept4 ,for ,hobbes and       
,rousseau see further ,p4,m4,e41 pp4    

#ha-ij4  p4 #cai1 middle4 ,cancel the   
words3 but the sum total of civil power 
is a constant quantity1 the same for all
 ,states4  pp4 #cbb-c4 ,cancel 4 #g for 
reasons alleged in ,p4,m4,e41 pp4       
#ej-gb4 ,substitute3 ,states are living 
organizations and grow1 and their powers
 vary with the stage of their           
development4  p4 #cbc1  #h4 ,for ,this  
seems at variance with1 read ,this      
brings us to consider4  p4 #cch4 ,to the
 ,readings add ,p4,m4,e41 pp4 #ajb-aac4 
p4 #cdg1 middle4 ,cancel from one of    
these prerogatives to the end of the    
sentence4 ,substitute3 of every polity  
even in the most infantine condition4   
99       99       99       99       99  
,,moral ,,philosophy4  ,,part ,i4       
,,ethics4  ,,chapter ,i4  ,,of ,,the    
,,object-,,matter ,,and ,,partition ,,of
 ,,moral ,,philosophy4   #a4 ,moral     
,philosophy is the science of human acts
 in their bearing on human happiness and
 human duty4  #b4 ,those acts alone are 
properly called human1 which a man is   

master of to do or not to do4 ,a human  
act1 then1 is an act voluntary and free4
 ,a man is what his human acts make him4
  #c4 ,a voluntary act is an act that   
proceeds from the will with a knowledge 
of the end to which the act tends4  #d4 
,a free act is an act which so proceeds 
from the will that under the same       
antecedent conditions it might have not 
proceeded4  ,an act may be more or less 
voluntary1 and more or less free4  #e4  
,moral ,philosophy is divided into      
,ethics1 ,deontology1 and ,natural ,law4
 ,ethics consider human acts in their   
bearing on human happiness2 or1 what is 
the same thing1 in their agreement or   
disagreement with man's rational nature1
 and their making for or against his    
last end4 ,deontology is the study of   
moral obligation1 or the fixing of what 
logicians call the comprehension of the 
idea ,i ought4 ,ethics deal with ,greek3
 to prepon1 the becoming2 ,deontology   
with ,greek3 to deon1 the obligatory4   
,deontology is the science of ,duty1 as 

such4 ,natural ,law 7antecedent to      
,positive ,law1 whether divine or human1
 civil or ecclesiastical1 national or   
international7 determines duties in     
detail1--the extension of the idea ,i   
ought1--and thus is the foundation of   
,casuistry4  #f4 ,in the order of       
sciences1 ,ethics are antecedent to     
,natural ,theology2 ,deontology1        
consequent upon it4  ,readings4--,st4   
,thos41 in ,eth41 ,i41 lect4 #a1 init42 
ib41 #a;a #b1 q4 #a1 art4 #a1 in corp42 
ib41 q4 #eh1 art4 #a1 in corp4          
,,chapter ,,ii4  ,,of ,,happiness4      
,,section ,i4--,of ,ends4   #a4 ,every  
human act is done for some end or       
purpose4 ,the end is always regarded by 
the agent in the light of something     
good4 ,if evil be done1 it is done as   
leading to good1 or as bound up with    
good1 or as itself being good for the   
doer under the circumstances2 no man    
ever does evil for sheer evil's sake4   
,yet evil may be the object of the will1
 not by itself1 nor primarily1 but in a 

secondary way1 as bound up with the good
 that is willed in the first place4  #b4
 ,many things willed are neither good   
nor evil in themselves4 ,there is no    
motive for doing them except in so far  
as they lead to some good beyond        
themselves1 or to deliverance from some 
evil1 which deliverance counts as a     
good4 ,a thing is willed1 then1 either  
as being good in itself and an end by   
itself1 or as leading to some good end4 
,once a thing not good and desirable by 
itself has been taken up by the will as 
leading to good1 it may be taken up     
again and again without reference to its
 tendency4 ,but such a thing was not    
originally taken up except in view of   
good to come of it4 ,we may will one    
thing as leading to another1 and that to
 a third1 and so on2 thus one wills     
study for learning1 learning for        
examination purposes1 examination for a 
commission in the army1 and the         
commission for glory4 ,that end in which
 the will rests1 willing it for itself  

without reference to anything beyond1 is
 called the last end4  #c4 ,an end is   
either objective or subjective4 ,the    
objective end is the thing wished for1  
as it exists distinct from the person   
who wishes it4 ,the subjective end is   
the possession of the objective end4    
,that possession is a fact of the       
wisher's own being4 ,thus money may be  
an objective end3 the corresponding     
subjective end is being wealthy4  #d4   
,is there one subjective last end to all
 the human acts of a given individual8  
,is there one supreme motive for all    
that this or that man deliberately does8
 ,at first sight it seems that there is 
not4 ,the same individual will act now  
for glory1 now for lucre1 now for love4 
,but all these different ends are       
reducible to one1 that it may be well   
with him and his4 ,and what is true of  
one man here1 is true of all4 ,all the  
human acts of all men are done for the  
one 7subjective7 last end just          
indicated4 ,this end is called          

happiness4  #e4 ,men place their        
happiness in most different things2 some
 in eating and drinking1 some in the    
heaping up of money1 some in gambling1  
some in political power1 some in the    
gratification of affection1 some in     
reputation of one sort or another4 ,but 
each one seeks his own speciality       
because he thinks that he shall be      
happy1 that it will be well with him1   
when he has attained that4 ,all men1    
then1 do all things for happiness1      
though not all place their happiness in 
the same thing4  #f4 ,just as when one  
goes on a journey1 he need not think of 
his destination at every step of his    
way1 and yet all his steps are directed 
towards his destination3 so men do not  
think of happiness in all they do1 and  
yet all they do is referred to          
happiness4 ,tell a traveller that this  
is the wrong way to his destination1 he 
will avoid it2 convince a man that this 
act will not be well for him1 will not  
further his happiness1 and1 while he    

keeps that conviction principally before
 his eyes1 he will not do the act4 ,but 
as a man who began to travel on         
business1 may come to make travelling   
itself a business1 and travel for the   
sake of going about2 so in all cases    
there is a tendency to elevate into an  
end that which was1 to start with1 only 
valued as a means to an end4 ,so the    
means of happiness1 by being habitually 
pursued1 come to be a part of happiness4
 ,habit is a second nature1 and we      
indulge a habit as we gratify nature4   
,this tendency works itself to an evil  
extreme in cases where men are become   
the slaves of habit1 and do a thing     
because they are got into the way of    
doing it1 though they allow that it is a
 sad and sorry way1 and leads them wide 
of true happiness4 ,these instances show
 perversion of the normal operation of  
the will4  ,readings4--,st4 ,thos41 #a;a
 #b1 q4 #a1 art4 #d1 in corp42 ib41 q4  
#a1 art4 #f1 #g2 ib41 q4 #e1 art4 #h2   
,ar41 ,eth41 ,i41 vii41 #d1 #e4         

,,section ,,ii4--,definition of         
,happiness4   #a4 ,though all men do all
 things1 in the last resort1 that it may
 be well with them and theirs1 that is1 
for happiness vaguely apprehended1 yet  
when they come to specify what happiness
 is1 answers so various are given and   
acted upon1 that we might be tempted to 
conclude that each man is the measure of
 his own happiness1 and that no standard
 of happiness for all can be defined4   
,but it is not so4 ,man is not the      
measure of his own happiness1 any more  
than of his own health4 ,the diet that  
he takes to be healthy1 may prove his   
poison2 and where he looks for          
happiness1 he may find the extreme of   
wretchedness and woe4 ,for man must live
 up to his nature1 to his bodily        
constitution1 to be a healthy man2 and  
to his whole nature1 but especially to  
his mental and moral constitution1 if he
 is to be a happy man4 ,and nature1     
though it admits of individual          
peculiarities1 is specifically the same 

for all4 ,there will1 then1 be one      
definition of happiness for all men1    
specifically as such4  #b4 ,happiness is
 an act1 not a state4 ,that is to say1  
the happiness of man does not lie in his
 having something done to him1 nor in   
his being habitually able to do         
something1 but in his actually doing    
something4 ,to be up and doing1 that is 
happiness1--,greek3 en to zaen kai      
energein4 7,ar41 ,eth41 ,,ix41 ix41 #e47
 ,this is proved from the consideration 
that happiness is the crown and         
perfection of human nature2 but the     
perfection of a thing lies in its       
ultimate act1 or second act1 that is1 in
 its not merely being able to act1 but  
acting4 ,but action is of two sorts4    
,one proceeds from the agent to some    
outward matter1 as cutting and burning4 
,this action cannot be happiness1 for it
 does not perfect the agent1 but rather 
the patient4 ,there is another sort of  
act immanent in the agent himself1 as   
feeling1 understanding1 and willing3    

these perfect the agent4 ,happiness will
 be found to be one of these immanent   
acts4 ,furthermore1 there is action full
 of movement and change1 and there is an
 act done in stillness and rest4 ,the   
latter1 as will presently appear1 is    
happiness2 and partly for this reason1  
and partly to denote the exclusion of   
care and trouble1 happiness is often    
spoken of as a rest4 ,it is also called 
a state1 because one of the elements of 
happiness is permanence4 ,how the act of
 happiness can be permanent1 will appear
 hereafter4  #c4 ,happiness is an act in
 discharge of the function proper to    
man1 as man4 ,there is a function proper
 to the eye1 to the ear1 to the various 
organs of the human body3 there must be 
a function proper to man as such4 ,that 
can be none of the functions of the     
vegetative life1 nor of the mere animal 
life within him4 ,man is not happy by   
doing what a rose-bush can do1 digest   
and assimilate its food3 nor by doing   
what a horse does1 having sensations    

pleasurable and painful1 and muscular   
feelings4 ,man is happy by doing what   
man alone can do in this world1 that is1
 acting by reason and understanding4    
,now the human will acting by reason may
 do three things4 ,it may regulate the  
passions1 notably desire and fear3 the  
outcome will be the moral virtues of    
temperance and fortitude4 ,it may direct
 the understanding1 and ultimately the  
members of the body1 in order to the    
production of some practical result in  
the external world1 as a bridge4        
,lastly1 it may direct the understanding
 to speculate and think1 contemplate and
 consider1 for mere contemplation's     
sake4 ,happiness must take one or other 
of these three lanes4  #d4 ,first1 then1
 happiness is not the practice of the   
moral virtues of temperance and         
fortitude4 ,temperance makes a man      
strong against the temptations to       
irrationality and swinishness that come 
of the bodily appetites4 ,but happiness 
lies1 not in deliverance from what would

 degrade man to the level of the brutes1
 but in something which shall raise man 
to the highest level of human nature4   
,fortitude1 again1 is not exercised     
except in the hour of danger2 but       
happiness lies in an environment of     
security1 not of danger4 ,and in        
general1 the moral virtues can be       
exercised only upon occasions1 as they  
come and go2 but happiness is the light 
of the soul1 that must burn with steady 
flame and uninterrupted act1 and not be 
dependent on chance occurrences4  #e4   
,secondly1 happiness is not the use of  
the practical understanding with a view 
to production4 ,happiness is an end in  
itself1 a terminus beyond which the act 
of the will can go no further2 but this 
use of the understanding is in view of  
an ulterior end1 the thing to be        
produced4 ,that product is either useful
 or artistic2 if useful1 it ministers to
 some further end still2 if artistic1 it
 ministers to contemplation4 ,happiness1
 indeed1 is no exercise of the practical

 understanding whatever4 ,the noblest   
exercises of practical understanding are
 for military purposes and for          
statesmanship4 ,but war surely is not an
 end in itself to any right-minded man4 
,statecraft1 too1 has an end before it1 
the happiness of the people4 ,it is a   
labour in view of happiness4 ,we must   
follow down the third lane1 and say3    
#f4 ,happiness is the act of the        
speculative understanding contemplating 
for contemplation's sake4 ,this act has 
all the marks of happiness4 ,it is the  
highest act of man's highest power4 ,it 
is the most capable of continuance4 ,it 
is fraught with pleasure1 purest and    
highest in quality4 ,it is of all acts  
the most self-sufficient and independent
 of environment1 provided the object be 
to the mind's eye visible4 ,it is       
welcome for its own sake1 not as leading
 to any further good4 ,it is a life of  
ease and leisure3 man is busy that he   
may come to ease4  #g4 ,aristotle says  
of this life of continued active        

contemplation3  ,such a life will be too
 good for man2 for not as he is man will
 he so live1 but inasmuch as there is a 
divine element in his composition4 ,as  
much as this element excels the compound
 into which it enters1 so much does the 
act of the said element excel any act in
 any other line of virtue4 ,if1 then1   
the understanding is divine in          
comparison with man1 the life of the    
understanding is divine in comparison   
with human life4 ,we must not take the  
advice of those who tell us1 that being 
man1 one should cherish the thoughts of 
a man1 or being mortal1 the thoughts of 
a mortal1 but so far as in us lies1 we  
must play the immortal ,greek3          
athanatizein1 and do all in our power to
 live by the best element in our nature3
 for though that element be slight in   
quantity1 in power and in value it far  
outweighs all the rest of our being4 ,a 
man may well be reckoned to be that     
which is the ruling power and the better
 part in him4 4 4 4 ,what is proper to  

each creature by nature1 is best and    
sweetest for each3 such1 then1 is for   
man the life of the understanding1 if   
the understanding preeminently is man4  
7,ar41 ,eth41 ,x41 vii41 #h1 #i47  #h4  
,but if happiness is an act in discharge
 of the function proper to man as man   
7n4 #c71 how can it be happiness to lead
 a life which ,aristotle says is too    
good for man8 ,the solution of this     
paradox is partly contained in the      
concluding words of ,aristotle above    
quoted1 and will still further appear   
presently 7s4 iv41 n4 ,i1 p4 #ba71 where
 we shall argue that human life is a    
state of transition in preparation for a
 higher life of the soul1 to be lived1  
according to the natural order1 when the
 compound of soul and body would no     
longer exist4  #i4 ,the act of          
contemplation1 in which happiness       
consists1 must rest upon a habit of     
contemplation1 which is intellectual    
virtue4 ,an act1 to be perfection and   
happiness1 must be done easily1 sweetly1

 and constantly4 ,but no act of the     
intellect can be so done1 unless it     
rests upon a corresponding habit4 ,if   
the habit has not been acquired1 the act
 will be done fitfully1 at random1 and  
against the grain1 like the music of an 
untrained singer1 or the composition of 
a schoolboy4 ,painful study is not      
happiness1 nor is any studied act4      
,happiness is the play of a mind that   
is1 if not master of1 yet at home with  
its subject4 ,as the intellect is man's 
best and noblest power1 so is           
intellectual virtue1 absolutely         
speaking1 the best virtue of man4  #aj4 
,the use of the speculative             
understanding is discernible in many    
things to which even the common crowd   
turn for happiness1 as news of that     
which is of little or no practical      
concern to self1 sight-seeing1          
theatre-going1 novels1 poetry1 art1     
scenery1 as well as speculative science 
and high literature4 ,a certain         
speculative interest is mixed up with   

all practical work3 the mind lingers on 
the speculation apart from the end in   
view4  #aa4 ,the act of contemplation   
cannot be steadily carried on1 as is    
necessary to happiness1 except in the   
midst of easy surroundings4 ,human      
nature is not self-sufficient for the   
work of contemplation4 ,there is need of
 health and vigour1 and the means of    
maintaining it1 food1 warmth1           
interesting objects around you1 leisure1
 absence of distracting care or pain4   
,none would call a man happy upon the   
rack1 except by way of maintaining a    
thesis4 ,the happiness of a disembodied 
spirit is of course independent of      
bodily conditions1 but it would appear  
that there are conditions of environment
 requisite for even a spirit's          
contemplation4  #ab4 ,happiness must    
endure to length of days4 ,happiness is 
the perfect good of man4 ,but no good is
 perfect that will not last4 ,one       
swallow does not make a summer1 nor does
 one fine day3 neither is man made      

blessed and happy by one day1 nor by a  
brief time4 ,the human mind lighting    
upon good soon asks the question1 ,will 
this last8 ,if the answer is negative1  
the good is not a complete good and     
there is no complete happiness coming of
 it4 ,if the answer is affirmative and  
false1 once more that is not a perfect  
happiness that rests on a delusion4 ,the
 supreme good of a rational being is not
 found in a fool's paradise4 ,we want an
 answer affirmative and true3 ,this     
happiness shall last4  #ac4 ,we now sum 
up and formulate the definition of      
happiness as follows3 ,happiness is a   
bringing of the soul to act according to
 the habit of the best and most perfect 
virtue1 that is1 the virtue of the      
speculative intellect1 borne out by easy
 surroundings1 and enduring to length of
 days--,greek3 energeia psychaes kat    
aretaen taen aristaen kai teleiotataen  
en biph teleio4 7,ar41 ,eth41 ,i41 vii41
 #ae1 #af47  #ad4 ,man is made for      
society4 ,his happiness must be in      

society1 a social happiness1 no lonely  
contemplation4 ,he must be happy in the 
consciousness of his own intellectual   
act1 and happy in the discernment of the
 good that is in those around him1 whom 
he loves4 ,friends and dear ones are no 
small part of those easy surroundings   
that are the condition of happiness4    
#ae4 ,happiness--final1 perfect         
happiness--is not in fighting and       
struggling1 in so far as a struggle     
supposes evil present and imminent2 nor 
in benevolence1 so far as that is       
founded upon misery needing relief4 ,we 
fight for the conquest and suppression  
of evil2 we are benevolent for the      
healing of misery4 ,but it will be      
happiness1 in the limit1 as             
mathematicians speak1 to wish well to   
all in a society where it is well with  
all1 and to struggle with truth for its 
own sake1 ever grasping1 never          
mastering1 as ,jacob wrestled with ,god4
  ,readings4--,ar41 ,eth41 ,i41 vii4    
viii41 #e to end2 ,i41 x41 #h to end2   

,i41 v41 #f2 ,,vii41 xiii41 #c2 ,,ix41  
ix42 ,x41 vii42 ,x41 viii41 #a-aj2 ,ar41
 ,pol41 ,,iv4 7al4 ,,vii471 i41 #c-aj2  
,,iv41 iii41 #g1 #h2 ,st4 ,thos41 la    
#b;ae1 q4 #c1 art4 #b2 ib41 q4 #c1 art4 
#e4 in corp41 ad #c2 ib41 q4 #b1 art4   
#f4   ,,section ,,iii4--,happiness open 
to man4   ,and now as he looked and saw 
the whole ,hellespont covered with the  
vessels of his fleet1 and all the shore 
and every plain about ,abydos as full as
 possible of men1 ,xerxes congratulated 
himself on his good fortune2 but after a
 little while1 he wept4 ,then           
,artabanus1 the ,king's uncle1 when he  
heard that ,xerxes was in tears1 went to
 him1 and said3 ',how different1 sire1  
is what thou art now doing from what    
thou didst a little while ago6 ,then    
thou didst congratulate thyself2 and    
now1 behold6 thou weepest4' ',there came
 upon me1' replied he1 'a sudden pity1  
when ,i thought of the shortness of     
man's life1 and considered that of all  
this host1 so numerous as it is1 not one

 will be alive when a hundred years are 
gone by4' ',and yet there are sadder    
things in life than that1' returned the 
other4 ',short as our time is1 there is 
no man1 whether it be among this        
multitude or elsewhere1 who is so happy1
 as not to have felt the wish--,i will  
not say once1 but full many a time--that
 he were dead rather than alive4        
,calamities fall upon us1 sicknesses vex
 and harass us1 and make life1 short    
though it be1 to appear long4 ,so death1
 through the wretchedness of our life1  
is a most sweet refuge to our race2 and 
,god1 who gives us the tastes that we   
enjoy of pleasant times1 is seen1 in his
 very gift1 to be envious4' 7,herodotus1
 vii41 #de1 #df47  #a4 ,it needs no     
argument to show that happiness1 as     
defined in the last section1 can never  
be perfectly realized in this life4     
,aristotle took his definition to       
represent an ideal to be approximated   
to1 not attained4 ,he calls his sages   
happy as men 7,eth41 ,i41 x41 #af71 that

 is1 imperfectly1 as all things human   
are imperfect4 ,has ,aristotle1 then1   
said the last word on happiness8 ,is    
perfect happiness out of the reach of   
the person whom in this mortal life we  
call man8 ,however that may be1 it is   
plain that man desires perfect          
happiness4 ,every man desires that it   
may be perfectly well with him and his1 
although many have mistaken notions of  
what their own well-being consists in1  
and few can define it philosophically4  
,still they all desire it4 ,the higher a
 man stands in intellect1 the loftier   
and vaster his conception of happiness1 
and the stronger his yearning after it4 
,this argues that the desire of         
happiness is natural to man3 not in the 
sense in which eating and drinking are  
natural1 as being requirements of his   
animal nature1 but in the same way that 
it is natural to him to think and       
converse1 his rational nature so        
requiring4 ,it is a natural desire1 as  
springing from that which is the        

specific characteristic of human nature1
 distinguishing it from mere animal     
nature1 namely reason4 ,it is a natural 
desire in the best and highest sense of 
the word4  #b4 ,contentment is not      
happiness4 ,a man is content with       
little1 but it takes an immensity of    
good to satisfy all his desire1 and     
render him perfectly happy4 ,when we say
 we are content1 we signify that we     
should naturally desire more1 but       
acquiesce in our present portion1 seeing
 that more is not to be had4 ,content1  
says ,dr4 ,bain1 is not the natural     
frame of any mind1 but is the result of 
compromise4  #c4 ,but is not this desire
 of unmixed happiness unreasonable8 ,are
 we not taught to set bounds to our     
desire8 ,is not moderation a virtue1 and
 contentment wisdom8 ,yes1 moderation is
 a virtue1 but it concerns only the use 
of means1 not the apprehension of ends4 
,the patient1 not to say the physician1 
desires medicines in moderation1 so much
 as will do him good and no more2 but1  

so far as his end is health1 he desires 
all possible health1 perfect health4    
,the last end1 then1 is to be desired as
 a thing to possess without end or      
measure1 fully and without defect4  #d4 
,we have then these facts to            
philosophise on3 that all men desire    
perfect happiness3 that this desire is  
natural1 springing from the rational    
soul which sets man above the brute3    
that on earth man may attain to         
contentment1 and to some happiness1 but 
not to perfect happiness3 that          
consequently nature has planted in man a
 desire for which on earth she has      
provided no adequate satisfaction4  #e4 
,if the course of events were fitful and
 wayward1 so that effects started up    
without causes1 and like causes under   
like conditions produced unlike effects1
 and anything might come of anything1   
there would be no such thing as that    
which we call nature4 ,when we speak of 
nature1 we imply a regular and definite 
flow of tendencies1 this thing springing

 from that and leading to that other2   
nothing from nothing1 and nothing       
leading nowhere2 no random1 aimless     
proceedings2 but definite results led up
 to by a regular succession of steps1   
and surely ensuing unless something     
occurs on the way to thwart the process4
 ,how this is reconciled with ,creation 
and ,freewill1 it is not our province to
 enquire3 suffice it to say that a      
natural agent is opposed to a free one1 
and creation is the starting-point of   
nature4 ,but to return4 ,everywhere we  
say1 this is for that1 wherever there   
appears an end and consummation to which
 the process leads1 provided it go on   
unimpeded4 ,now every event that happens
 is a part of some process or other4    
,every act is part of a tendency4 ,there
 are no loose facts in nature1 no things
 that happen1 or are1 otherwise than in 
consequence of something that has       
happened1 or been1 before1 and in view  
of something else that is to happen1 or 
be1 hereafter4 ,the tendencies of nature

 often run counter to one another1 so   
that the result to which this or that   
was tending is frustrated4 ,but a       
tendency is a tendency1 although        
defeated2 this was for that1 although   
that for which it was has got perverted 
to something else4 ,there is no tendency
 which of itself fails and comes to     
naught1 apart from interference4 ,such a
 universal and absolute break-down is   
unknown to nature4  #f4 ,all this       
appears most clearly in organic beings1 
plants and animals4 ,organisms1 except  
the very lowest1 are compounds of a     
number of different parts1 each         
fulfilling a special function for the   
good of the whole4 ,there is no idle    
constituent in an organic body1 none    
without its function4 ,what are called  
rudimentary organs1 even if they serve  
no purpose in the individual1 have their
 use in the species1 or in some higher  
genus4 ,in the animal there is no idle  
natural craving1 or appetite4 ,true1 in 
the individual1 whether plant or animal1

 there are many potentialities frustrate
 and made void4 ,that is neither here   
nor there in philosophy4 ,philosophy    
deals not with individuals but with     
species1 not with ,bucephalus or        
,alexander1 but with horse1 man4 ,it is 
nothing to philosophy that of a thousand
 seeds there germinate perhaps not ten4 
,enough that one seed ever germinates1  
and that all normal specimens are apt to
 do the like1 meeting with proper       
environment4 ,that alone shows that seed
 is not an idle product in this or that 
class of living beings4  #g4 ,but1 it   
will be said1 not everything contained  
in an organism ministers to its good4   
,there is refuse material1 only good to 
get rid of3 there are morbid growths2   
there is that tendency to decay1 by     
which sooner or later the organism will 
perish4 ,first1 then1 a word on         
diseases4 ,diseases are the diseases of 
the individual2 not of the race4 ,the   
race1 as such1 and that is what the     
philosopher studies1 is healthy3 all    

that can be imputed to the race is      
liability to disease4 ,that liability1  
and the tendency to decay and die1 are  
found in living things1 because their   
essence is of finite perfection2 there  
cannot be a plant or animal1 that has   
not these drawbacks in itself1 as such4 
,they represent1 not the work of nature1
 but the failure of nature1 and the     
point beyond which nature can no further
 go4  #h4 ,on the preceding observations
 ,aristotle formulated the great        
maxim--called by ,dr4 ,thomas ,browne1  
,religio ,medici1 p4 i41 sect4 #ae1 the 
only indisputable axiom in              
philosophy1--,nature does nothing in    
vain4 7,ar41 ,pol41 ,i41 viii41 #ab2 ,de
 ,anima1 ,,iii41 ix41 #f2 ,de part4     
animal41 ,i4 i41 p4 #fda1 ed4 ,bekker47 
#i4 ,the desire of happiness1 ample and 
complete1 beyond what this world can    
afford1 is not planted in man by defect 
of his nature1 but by the perfection of 
his nature1 and in view of his further  
perfection4 ,this desire has not the    

character of a drawback1 a thing that   
cannot be helped1 a weakness and decay  
of nature1 and loss of power1 like that 
which sets in with advancing years4 ,a  
locomotive drawing a train warms the air
 about it3 it is a pity that it should  
do so1 for that radiation of heat is a  
loss of power3 but it cannot be helped1 
as locomotives are and must be          
constructed4 ,not such is the desire of 
perfect happiness in the human breast4  
,it is not a disease1 for it is no      
peculiarity of individuals1 but a       
property of the race4 ,it is not a      
decay1 for it grows with the growing    
mind1 being feeblest in childhood1 when 
desires are simplest and most easily    
satisfied1 and strongest where mental   
life is the most vigorous4 ,it is an    
attribute of great minds in proportion  
to their greatness4 ,to be without it1  
would be to live a minor in point of    
intellect1 not much removed from        
imbecility4 ,it is not a waste of       
energy1 rather it furnishes the         

motive-power to all human volition4 ,it 
comes of the natural working of the     
understanding that discerns good1 and   
other good above that1 and so still     
higher and higher good without limit2   
and of the natural working of the will1 
following up and fastening upon what the
 understanding discerns as good4 ,the   
desire in question1 then1 is by no means
 a necessary evil1 or natural flaw1 in  
the human constitution4  #aj4 ,it       
follows that the desire of perfect      
happiness is in man by the normal growth
 of his nature1 and for the better4 ,but
 it would be a vain desire1 and         
objectless1 if it were essentially      
incapable of satisfaction3 and man would
 be a made and abiding piece of         
imperfection1 if there were no good     
accessible to his intellectual nature   
sufficient to meet its proper exigence  
of perfect happiness4 ,but no such      
perfect happiness is attainable in this 
world4 ,therefore there must be a world 
to come1 in which he who was man1 now a 

disembodied spirit1 but still the same  
person1 shall under due conditions find 
a perfect good1 the adequate object of  
his natural desire4 ,else is the deepest
 craving of human nature in vain1 and   
man himself is vanity of vanities4  #aa4
 ,it may be objected that there is no   
need to go beyond this world to explain 
how the desire of perfect happiness is  
not in vain4 ,it works like the desire  
of the philosopher's stone among the old
 alchemists4 ,the thing they were in    
search of was a chimera1 but in looking 
for it they found a real good1 modern   
chemistry4 ,in like manner1 it is       
contended1 though perfect happiness is  
not to be had anywhere1 yet the desire  
of it keeps men from sitting down on the
 path of progress2 and thus to that     
desire we owe all our modern            
civilization1 and all our hope and      
prospect of higher civilization to come4
 ,without questioning the alleged fact  
about the alchemists1 we may reply that 
modern chemistry has dissipated the     

desire of the philosopher's stone1 but  
modern civilization has not dissipated  
the desire of perfect happiness3 it has 
deepened it1 and perhaps rather obscured
 the prospect of its fulfilment4 ,a     
desire that grows with progress         
certainly cannot be satisfied by        
progressing4 ,but if it is never to be  
satisfied1 what is it8 ,a goad thrust   
into the side of man1 that shall keep   
him coursing along from century to      
century1 like ,io under the gadfly1 only
 to find himself in the last century as 
far from the mark as in the first4      
,apart from the hope of the world to    
come1 is the ,italy of to-day happier   
than the ,italy of ,antoninus ,pius8    
,here is a modern ,italian's conclusion3
 ,i have studied man1 ,i have examined  
nature1 ,i have passed whole nights     
observing the starry heavens4 ,and what 
is the result of these long             
investigations8 ,simply this1 that the  
life of man is nothing2 that man himself
 is nothing2 that he will never         

penetrate the mystery which surrounds   
the universe4 ,with this comfortless    
conviction ,i descend into the grave1   
and console myself with the hope of     
speedy annihilation4 ,the lamp goes out2
 and nothing1 nothing can rekindle it4  
,so1 ,nature1 ,i return to thee1 to be  
united with thee for ever4 ,never wilt  
thou have received into thy bosom a more
 unhappy being4 7,la ,nullit della      
,vita4 ,by ,g4 ,p41 #ahhb47  ,this is an
 extreme case1 but much of modern       
progress tends this way4 ,civilization  
is not happiness1 nor is the desire for 
happiness other than vain1 if it merely 
leads to increased civilization4        
,readings4--,st4 ,thomas1 ,c4 ,g41 iii41
 #dh2 ,newman's ,historical             
,sketches--,conversion of ,augustine2   
,mill's ,autobiography1 pp4 #acc-adi4   
,,section ,,iv4--,of the ,object of     
,perfect ,happiness4   #a4 ,as happiness
 is an act of the speculative intellect 
contemplating 7s4 ii41 n4 #f1 p4 #i71 so
 the thing thus contemplated is the     

object of happiness4 ,as happiness is   
the subjective last end1 so will this   
object1 inasmuch as the contemplation of
 it yields perfect happiness1 be the    
objective last end of man4 7s4 i41 nn4  
#c1 #d1 p4 #d47 ,as perfect happiness is
 possible1 and intended by nature1 so is
 this objective last end attainable1 and
 should be attained4 ,but attained by   
man8 ,aye1 there's the rub4 ,it cannot  
be attained in this life1 and after     
death man is no more3 a soul out of the 
body is not man4 ,about the resurrection
 of the body philosophy knows nothing4  
,nature can make out no title to        
resurrection4 ,that is a gratuitous gift
 of ,god in ,christ4 ,when it takes     
effect1 stupebit natura4 ,philosophy    
deals only with the natural order1 with 
man as man1 leaving the supernatural    
order1 or the privileges and status of  
man as a child of ,god1 to the higher   
science of ,scholastic ,theology4 ,had  
,god so willed it1 there might have been
 no supernatural at all4 ,philosophy    

shows the world as it would have been on
 that hypothesis4 ,in that case1 then1  
man would have been1 as ,aristotle      
represents him1 a being incapable of    
perfect happiness2 but he who is man    
could have become perfectly happy in a  
state other than human1 that is1 as a   
disembodied spirit4 ,peter is man3 the  
soul of ,peter1 after separation1 is man
 no longer2 but ,peter is not one       
person1 and ,peter's soul out of the    
body another person2 there is but one   
person there1 with one personal history 
and liabilities4 ,the soul of ,peter is 
,peter still3 therefore the person      
,peter1 or he who is ,peter1 attains to 
happiness1 but not the man ,peter1 as   
man1 apart from the supernatural        
privilege of the resurrection4 ,hence   
,aristotle well said1 though he failed  
to see the significance of his own      
saying1 that man should aim at a life of
 happiness too good for man4 7s4 ii41   
nn4 #g1 #h1 p4 #i47  #b4 ,the object of 
happiness1--the objective last end of   

man1--will be that which the soul       
contemplating in the life to come will  
be perfectly happy by so doing4 ,the    
soul will contemplate all intellectual  
beauty that she finds about her1 all    
heights of truth1 all the expanse of    
goodness and mystery of love4 ,she will 
see herself3 a vast and curious sight is
 one pure spirit3 but that will not be  
enough for her1 her eye travels beyond4 
,she must be in company1 live with      
myriads of pure spirits like            
herself1--see them1 study them1 and     
admire them1 and converse with them in  
closest intimacy4 ,together they must   
explore the secrets of all creation even
 to the most distant star3 they must    
read the laws of the universe1 which    
science laboriously spells out here     
below3 they must range from science to  
art1 and from facts to possibilities1   
till even their pure intellect is       
baffled by the vast intricacy of things 
that might be and are not3 but yet they 
are not satisfied4 ,a point of          

convergency is wanted for all these     
vistas of being1 whence they may go     
forth1 and whither they may return and  
meet3 otherwise the soul is distracted  
and lost in a maze of incoherent        
wandering1 crying out1 ,whence all this8
 and what is it for8 and above all1     
whose is it8 ,these are the questions   
that the human mind asks in her present 
condition3 much more will she ask them  
then1 when wonders are multiplied before
 her gaze3 for it is the same soul there
 and here4 ,here men are tormented in   
mind1 if they find no answer to these   
questions4 ,scientific men cannot leave 
theology alone4 ,they will not be happy 
there without an answer4 ,their         
contemplation will still desiderate     
something beyond all finite being1      
actual or possible4 ,is that ,god8 ,it  
is nothing else4 ,but ,god dwells in    
light inaccessible1 where no creature1  
as such1 can come near ,him nor see     
,him4 ,the beauties of creation1 as so  
many streams of tendency1 meet at the   

foot of ,his ,throne1 and there are     
lost4 ,their course is towards ,him1 and
 is1 so far as it goes1 an indication of
 ,him3 but ,he is infinitely1           
unspeakably above them4 ,no intelligence
 created1 or creatable1 can arrive by   
its own natural perception to see ,him  
as ,he is3 for mind can only discern    
what is proportionate to itself3 and    
,god is out of proportion with all the  
being of all possible creatures4 ,it is 
only by analogy that the word being1 or 
any other word whatever can be applied  
to ,him4 ,as ,plato says1 the ,first    
,good is not ,being1 but over and beyond
 ,being in dignity and power4 7,rep4    
#eji1 ,b47  #c4 ,to see ,god face to    
face1 which is called the beatific      
vision1 is not the natural destiny of   
man1 nor of any possible creature4 ,such
 happiness is not the happiness of man1 
nor of angel1 but of ,god ,himself1 and 
of any creature whom ,he may deign by an
 act of gratuitous condescension to     
invite to sit as guest at ,his own royal

 table4 ,that ,god has so invited men   
and angels1 revelation informs us4      
,scholastic theology enlarges upon that 
revelation1 but it is beyond philosophy4
 ,like the resurrection of the body1 and
 much more even than that1 the ,beatific
 ,vision must be relegated to the realm 
of the ,supernatural4  #d4 ,but even in 
the natural order the object of perfect 
happiness is ,god4 ,the natural and     
supernatural have the same object1 but  
differ in the mode of attainment4 ,by   
supernatural grace1 bearing perfect     
fruit1 man sees ,god with the eyes of   
his soul1 as we see the faces of our    
friends on earth4 ,in perfect happiness 
of the natural order1 creatures alone   
are directly apprehended1 or seen1 and  
from the creature is gathered the       
excellence of the unseen ,god4 ,the     
process is an ascent1 as described by   
,plato1 from the individual to the      
universal1 and from bodily to moral and 
intellectual beauty1 till we reach a    
,beauty eternal1 immutable1 absolute1   

substantial1 and self-existent1 on which
 all other beauties depend for their    
being1 while it is independent of them4 
7,plato1 ,symposium1 #baj1 #baa47       
,unless the ascent be prosecuted thus   
far1 the contemplation is inadequate1   
the happiness incomplete4 ,the mind     
needs to travel to the beginning and end
 of things1 to the ,alpha and ,omega of 
all4 ,the mind needs to reach some      
perfect good3 some object1 which though 
it is beyond the comprehension1 is      
nevertheless understood to be the very  
good of goods1 unalloyed with any       
admixture of defect or imperfection4    
,the mind needs an infinite object to   
rest upon1 though it cannot grasp that  
object positively in its infinity4 ,if  
this is the case even with the human    
mind1 still wearing this muddy vesture  
of decay1 how much more ardent the      
longing1 as how much keener the gaze1 of
 the pure spirit after ,him who is the  
centre and rest of all intellectual     
nature8  #e4 ,creatures to contemplate  

and see ,god in1 are conditions and     
secondary objects of natural happiness4 
,they do not afford happiness finally of
 themselves1 but as manifesting ,god1   
even as a mirror would be of little     
interest except for its power of        
reflection4  #f4 ,in saying that ,god is
 the object of happiness1 we must       
remember that ,he is no cold1 impersonal
 ,beauty1 but a living and loving ,god1 
not indeed in the order of nature our   
,father and ,friend1 but still our kind 
,master and very good ,lord1 who speaks 
to ,his servants from behind the clouds 
that hide ,his face1 and assures them of
 ,his abiding favour and approving love4
 ,more than that1 nature cannot look    
for3 such aspiration were unnatural1    
unreasonable1 mere madness3 it is enough
 for the creature1 as a creature1 in its
 highest estate to stand before ,god1   
hearing ,his voice1 but seeing not ,his 
countenance1 whom1 without ,his free    
grace1 none can look upon and live4     
,reading4--,st4 ,thos41 #a;a #b1 q4 #b1 

art4 #h4   ,,section ,v4--,of the use of
 the present life4   #a4 ,since perfect 
happiness is not to be had in this      
mortal life1 and is to be had hereafter2
 since moreover man has free will and   
the control of his own acts2 it is      
evidently most important for man in this
 life so to control and rule himself    
here as to dispose himself for happiness
 there4 ,happiness rests upon a habit of
 contemplation 7s4 ii41 n4 #i1 p4 #aj71 
rising to ,god4 7s4 iv41 n4 #d1 p4 #bd47
 ,but a habit1 as will be seen1 is not  
formed except by frequent acts1 and may 
be marred and broken by contrary acts4  
,it is1 then1 important for man in this 
life so to act as to acquire a habit of 
lifting his mind to ,god4 ,there are two
 things here1 to lift the mind1 and to  
lift it to ,god4 ,the mind is not       
lifted1 if the man lives not an         
intellectual life1 but the life of a    
swine wallowing in sensual indulgences2 
or a frivolous life1 taking the outside 
of things as they strike the senses1 and

 flitting from image to image           
thoughtlessly2 or a quarrelsome life1   
where reason is swallowed up in anger   
and hatred4 ,again1 however sublime the 
speculation and however active the      
intellect1 if ,god is not constantly    
referred to1 the mind is lifted indeed1 
but not to ,god4 ,it is wisdom1 then1 in
 man during this life to look to ,god   
everywhere1 and ever to seek ,his face2 
to avoid idleness1 anger1 intemperance1 
and pride of intellect4 ,for the mind   
will not soar to ,god when the heart is 
far from ,him4    ,,chapter ,,iii4  ,,of
 ,,human ,,acts4  ,,section ,i4--,what  
makes a human act less voluntary4   #a4 
,see c4 i41 nn4 #b1 #c1 #d4  #b4 ,an act
 is more or less voluntary1 as it is    
done with more or less knowledge1 and   
proceeds more or less fully and purely  
from the will properly so called4       
,whatever diminishes knowledge1 or      
partially supplants the will1 takes off 
from the voluntariness of the act4 ,an  
act is rendered less voluntary by       

ignorance1 by passionate desire1 and by 
fear4  #c4 ,if a man has done something 
in ignorance either of the law or of the
 facts of the case1 and would be sorry  
for it1 were he to find out what he has 
done1 that act is involuntary1 so far as
 it is traceable to ignorance alone4    
,even if he would not be sorry1 still   
the act must be pronounced not          
voluntary1 under the same reservation4  
,ignorance1 sheer ignorance1 takes      
whatever is done under it out of the    
region of volition4 ,nothing is willed  
but what is known4 ,an ignorant man is  
as excusable as a drunken one1 as       
such1--no more and no less4 ,the        
difference is1 that drunkenness         
generally is voluntary2 ignorance often 
is not4 ,but ignorance may be voluntary1
 quite as voluntary as drunkenness4 ,it 
is a capital folly of our age to deny   
the possibility of voluntary            
intellectual error4 ,error is often     
voluntary1 and 7where the matter is one 
that the person officially or otherwise 

is required to know7 immoral too4 ,a    
strange thing it is to say that it is as
 unmeaning to speak of the immorality of
 an intellectual mistake as it would be 
to talk of the colour of a sound4       
7,lecky1 ,european ,morals1 ii41 #bjb47 
#d4 ,there is an ignorance that is      
sought on purpose1 called affected      
ignorance 7in the ,shakspearian sense of
 the word affect71 as when a man will   
not read begging-letters1 that he may   
not give anything away4 ,such ignorance 
does not hinder voluntariness4 ,it      
indicates a strong will of doing or     
omitting1 come what may4 ,there is yet  
another ignorance called crass1 which is
 when a man1 without absolutely         
declining knowledge1 yet takes no pains 
to acquire it in a matter where he is   
aware that truth is important to him4   
,whatever election is made in           
consequence of such ignorance1 is less  
voluntary1 indeed1 than if it were made 
in the full light1 still it is to some  
extent voluntary4 ,it is voluntary in   

its cause1 that is1 in the voluntary    
ignorance that led to it4 ,suppose a man
 sets up as a surgeon1 having made a    
very imperfect study of his art4 ,he is 
aware1 that for want of knowledge and   
skill1 he shall endanger many lives3    
still he neglects opportunities of      
making himself competent1 and goes      
audaciously to work4 ,if any harm comes 
of his bungling1 he can plead           
intellectual error1 an error of judgment
 for the time being2 he did his best as 
well as he knew it4 ,doubtless he did1  
and in that he is unlike the malicious  
maker of mischief3 still he has chosen  
lightly and recklessly to hazard a great
 evil4 ,to that extent his will is bound
 to the evil3 he has chosen it1 as it   
were1 at one remove4  #e4 ,another      
instance4 ,a man is a long way on to    
seeing1 though he does not quite see1   
the claims of the ,church of ,rome on   
his allegiance and submission4 ,he      
suspects that a little more prayer and  
search1 and he shall be a ,roman        

,catholic4 ,to escape this1 he resolves 
to go travelling and give up prayer4    
,this is affected ignorance4 ,another   
has no such perception of the claims of 
,catholicism4 ,he has no religion that  
satisfies him4 ,he is aware             
speculatively of the importance of the  
religious question2 but his heart is not
 in religion at all4 ,with ,demas1 he   
loves the things of this world4 ,very   
attractive and interesting does he find 
this life2 and for the life to come he  
is content to chance it4 ,this is crass 
ignorance of religious truth4 ,such a   
man is not a formal heretic1 for he is  
not altogether wilful and contumacious  
in his error4 ,still neither is it      
wholly involuntary1 nor he wholly       
guiltless4  #f4 ,passionate desire is   
not an affection of the will1 but of the
 sensitive appetite4 ,the will may      
cooperate1 but the passion is not in the
 will4 ,the will may neglect to check   
the passion1 when it might3 it may abet 
and inflame it3 in these ways an act    

done in passion is a voluntary act4     
,still it becomes voluntary only by the 
influx of the will1 positively          
permitting or stimulating3 it is not    
voluntary precisely as it proceeds from 
passion3 for voluntary is that which is 
of the will4 ,it belongs to passion to  
bring on a momentary darkness in the    
understanding3 where such darkness is1  
there is so much the less of a human    
act4 ,but passion in an adult of sane   
mind is hardly strong enough1 of itself 
and wholly without the will1 to execute 
any considerable outward action1        
involving the voluntary muscles4 ,things
 are often said and done1 and put down  
to passion3 but that is not the whole   
account of the matter4 ,the will has    
been for a long time either feeding the 
passions1 or letting them range         
unchecked3 that is the reason of their  
present outburst1 which is voluntary at 
least in its cause4 ,once this evil     
preponderance has been brought about1 it
 is to be examined whether the will1 in 

calm moods1 is making any efforts to    
redress the evil4 ,such efforts1 if     
made1 go towards making the effects of  
passion1 when they come1 involuntary1   
and gradually preventing them           
altogether4  #g4 ,what a man does from  
fear1 he is said to do under compulsion1
 especially if the fear be applied to   
him by some other person in order to    
gain a purpose4 ,such compulsory action 
is distinguished in ordinary parlance   
from voluntary action4 ,and it is       
certainly less voluntary1 inasmuch as   
the will is hedged in to make its choice
 between two evils1 and chooses one or  
other only as being the less evil of the
 two1 not for any liking to the thing in
 itself4 ,still1 all things considered1 
the thing is chosen1 and the action is  
so far voluntary4 ,we may call it       
voluntary in the concrete1 and          
involuntary in the abstract4 ,the thing 
is willed as matters stand1 but in      
itself and apart from existing need it  
is not liked at all4 ,but as acts must  

be judged as they stand1 by what the man
 wills now1 not by what he would will1  
an act done under fear is on the whole  
voluntary4 ,at the same time1 fear      
sometimes excuses from the observance of
 a law1 or of a contract1 which from the
 way in which it was made was never     
meant to bind in so hard a case4 ,not   
all contracts1 however1 are of this     
accommodating nature2 and still less1   
all laws4 ,but even where the law binds1
 the penalty of the law is sometimes not
 incurred1 when the law was broken      
through fear4  ,readings4--,ar41 ,eth41 
,,iii1 i42 ,st4 ,thos41 #a;a #b1 q4 #f1 
art4 #c2 ib41 q4 #f1 art4 #f1 #h2 ib41  
q4 #gg1 art4 #f4   ,,section ,,ii4--,of 
the determinants of morality in any     
given action4   #a4 ,the morality of any
 given action is determined by three    
elements1 the end in view1 the means    
taken1 and the circumstances that       
accompany the taking of the said means4 
,whoever knows this principle1 does not 
thereby know the right and wrong of     

every action1 but he knows how to go    
about the enquiry4 ,it is a rule of     
diagnosis4  #b4 ,in order to know       
whether what a man does befits him as a 
man to do1 the first thing to examine is
 that which he mainly desires and wills 
in his action4 ,now the end is more     
willed and desired than the means4 ,he  
who steals to commit adultery1 says     
,aristotle1 is more of an adulterer than
 a thief4 ,the end in view is what lies 
nearest to a man's heart as he acts4 ,on
 that his mind is chiefly bent2 on that 
his main purpose is fixed4 ,though the  
end is last in the order of execution1  
it is first and foremost in the order of
 intention4 ,therefore the end in view  
enters into morality more deeply than   
any other element of the action4 ,it is 
not1 however1 the most obvious          
determinant1 because it is the last     
point to be gained2 and because1 while  
the means are taken openly1 the end is  
often a secret locked up in the heart of
 the doer1 the same means leading to    

many ends1 as the road to a city leads  
to many homes and resting-places4       
,conversely1 one end may be prosecuted  
by many means1 as there are many roads  
converging upon one goal4  #c4 ,if      
morality were determined by the end in  
view1 and by that alone1 the doctrine   
would hold that the end justifies the   
means4 ,that doctrine is false1 because 
the moral character of a human act      
depends on the thing willed1 or object  
of volition1 according as it is or is   
not a fit object4 ,now the object of    
volition is not only the end in view1   
but likewise the means chosen4 ,besides 
the end1 the means are likewise willed4 
,indeed1 the means are willed more      
immediately even than the end1 as they  
have to be taken first4  #d4 ,a good    
action1 like any other good thing1 must 
possess a certain requisite fulness of  
being1 proper to itself4 ,as it is not  
enough for the physical excellence of a 
man to have the bare essentials1 a body 
with a soul animating it1 but there is  

needed a certain grace of form1 colour1 
agility1 and many accidental qualities  
besides2 so for a good act it is not    
enough that proper means be taken to a  
proper end1 but they must be taken by a 
proper person1 at a proper place and    
time1 in a proper manner1 and with      
manifold other circumstances of         
propriety4  #e4 ,the end in view may be 
either single1 as when you forgive an   
injury solely for the love of ,christ3  
or multiple co-ordinate1 as when you    
forgive both for the love of ,christ and
 for the mediation of a friend1 and are 
disposed to forgive on either ground    
separately2 or multiple subordinate1 as 
when you would not have forgiven on the 
latter ground alone1 but forgive the    
more easily for its addition1 having    
been ready1 however1 to forgive on the  
former alone2 or cumulative1 as when you
 forgive on a number of grounds         
collectively1 on no one of which would  
you have forgiven apart from the rest4  
#f4 ,where there is no outward action1  

but only an internal act1 and the object
 of that act is some good that is willed
 for its own sake1 there can be no      
question of means taken1 as the end in  
view is immediately attained4  #g4 ,the 
means taken and the circumstances of    
those means enter into the morality of  
the act1 formally as they are seen by   
the intellect1 materially as they are in
 themselves4 7,see what is said of      
ignorance1 c4 iii41 s4 i41 nn4 #c-e1 p4 
#bg47 ,this explains the difference     
between formal and material sin4 ,a     
material sin would be formal also1 did  
the agent know what he was doing4 ,no   
sin is culpable that is not formal4     
,but1 as has been said1 there may be a  
culpable perversion of the intellect1 so
 that the man is the author of his own  
obliquity or defect of vision4 ,when    
,saul persecuted the ,christians1 he    
probably sinned materially1 not         
formally4 ,when ,caiphas spoke the truth
 without knowing it1 he said well       
materially1 but ill formally4  #h4 ,in  

looking at the means taken and the      
circumstances that accompany those      
means1 it is important to have a ready  
rule for pronouncing what particular    
belongs to the means and what to the    
circumstances4 ,thus ,clytemnestra deals
 her husband ,agamemnon a deadly stroke 
with an axe1 partly for revenge1 partly 
that she may take to herself another    
consort2 is the deadliness of the blow  
part of the means taken or only an      
accompanying circumstance8 ,it is part  
of the means taken4 ,the means taken    
include every particular that is willed 
and chosen as making for the end in     
view4 ,the fatal character of the blow  
does make to that end2 if ,agamemnon    
does not die1 the revenge will not be   
complete1 and life with ,aegisthus will 
be impossible4 ,on the other hand1 the  
fact that ,clytemnestra is the wife of  
the man whom she murders1 is not a point
 that her will rests upon as furthering 
her purpose at all2 it is an            
accompanying circumstance4 ,this method 

of distinguishing means from            
circumstance is of great value in       
casuistry4  #i4 ,it is clear that not   
every attendant circumstance affects the
 morality of the means taken4 ,thus the 
blow under which ,agamemnon sank was    
neither more nor less guiltily struck   
because it was dealt with an axe1       
because it was under pretence of giving 
him a bath1 or because his feet were    
entangled in a long robe4 ,these        
circumstances are all irrelevant4 ,those
 only are relevant which attach some    
special reasonableness or               
unreasonableness to the thing done ,thus
 the provocation that ,clytemnestra had 
from her husband's introduction of      
,cassandra into her house made her act  
of vengeance less unreasonable3 on the  
other hand it was rendered more         
unreasonable by the circumstance of the 
dear and holy tie that binds wife to    
husband4 ,the provocation and the       
relationship were two relevant          
circumstances in that case4  #aj4 ,but  

it happens sometimes that a circumstance
 only affects the reasonableness of an  
action on the supposition of some       
previous circumstance so affecting it4  
,thus to carry off a thing in large or  
small quantities does not affect the    
reasonableness of the carrying1 unless  
there be already some other circumstance
 attached that renders the act good or  
evil2 as for instance1 if the goods that
 are being removed are stolen property4 
,circumstances of this sort are called  
aggravating--or1 as the case may be1    
extenuating--circumstances4             
,circumstances that of themselves1 and  
apart from any previous supposition1    
make the thing done peculiarly          
reasonable or unreasonable1 are called  
specifying circumstances4 ,they are so  
called1 because they place the action in
 some species of virtue or vice2 whereas
 aggravating or extenuating             
circumstances add to1 or take off from1 
the good or evil of the action in that  
species of virtue or vice to which it   

already belongs4  #aa4 ,a variety of    
specifying circumstances may place one  
and the same action in many various     
species of virtue or vice4 ,thus a      
religious robbing his parents would sin 
at once against justice1 piety1 and     
religion4 ,a nun preferring death to    
dishonour practises three virtues1      
chastity1 fortitude1 and religion4  #ab4
 ,the means chosen may be of four       
several characters3--  7a7 ,a thing evil
 of itself and inexcusable under all    
conceivable circumstances2 for instance1
 blasphemy1 idolatry1 lying4  7b7       
,needing excuse1 as the killing of a    
man1 the looking at an indecent object4 
,such things are not to be done except  
under certain circumstances and with a  
grave reason4 ,thus indecent sights may 
be met in the discharge of professional 
duty4 ,in that case indeed they cease to
 be indecent4 ,they are then only       
indecent when they are viewed without   
cause4 ,the absence of a good motive in 
a case like this commonly implies the   

presence of a bad one4  7c7             
,indifferent1 as walking or sitting     
down4  7d7 ,good of itself1 but liable  
to be vitiated by circumstances1 as     
prayer and almsgiving2 the good of such 
actions may be destroyed wholly or in   
part by their being done out of a vain  
motive1 or unseasonably1 or             
indiscreetly4  #ac4 ,it is said1 ,if thy
 eye be single1 thy whole body shall be 
lightsome4 7,st4 ,matt41 vi41 #bb47 ,the
 eye is the intention contemplating the 
end in view4 ,whoever has placed a good 
end before him1 and regards it steadily 
with a well-ordered love1 never swerving
 in his affection from the way that     
reason would have him love1 must needs  
take towards his end those means1 and   
those only1 which are in themselves     
reasonable and just3 as it is written3  
,thou shalt follow justly after that    
which is just4 7,deut4 xvi41 #bj47 ,thus
 ,i am building a church to the glory of
 ,god2 money runs short3 ,i perceive    
that by signing a certain contract that 

must mean grievous oppression of the    
poor1 ,i shall save considerable        
expense1 whereas1 if ,i refuse1 the     
works will have to be abandoned for want
 of funds4 ,if ,i have purely the glory 
of ,god before my eyes1 ,i certainly    
shall not sign that contract3 for       
injustice ,i know can bear no fruit of  
,divine glory4 ,but if ,i am bent upon  
having the building up in any case1 of  
course ,i shall sign3 but then my love  
for the end in view is no longer pure   
and regulated by reason3 it is not ,god 
but myself that ,i am seeking in the    
work4 ,thus an end entirely just1 holy1 
and pure1 purifies and sanctifies the   
means1 not formally1 by investing with a
 character of justice means in          
themselves unjust1 for that is          
impossible1--the leopard cannot change  
his spots1--but by way of elimination1  
removing unjust means as ineligible to  
my purpose1 and leaving me only those   
means to choose from which are in       
themselves just4  #ad4 ,with means in   

themselves indifferent1 the case is     
otherwise4 ,a holy and pious end does   
formally sanctify those means1 while a  
wicked end vitiates them4 ,i beg the    
reader to observe what sort of means are
 here in question4 ,there is no question
 of means in themselves or in their     
circumstances unjust1 as theft1 lying1  
murder1 but of such indifferent things  
as reading1 writing1 painting1 singing1 
travelling4 ,whoever travels to commit  
sin at the end of his journey1 his very 
travelling1 so far as it is referred to 
that end1 is part of his sin3 it is a   
wicked journey that he takes4 ,and he   
who travels to worship at some shrine or
 place of pilgrimage1 includes his      
journey in his devotion4 ,the end in    
view there sanctifies means in          
themselves indifferent4  #ae4 ,as a     
great part of the things that we do are 
indifferent as well in themselves as in 
the circumstances of the doing of them1 
the moral character of our lives depends
 largely on the ends that we habitually 

propose to ourselves4 ,one man's great  
thought is how to make money2 what he   
reads1 writes1 says1 where he goes1     
where he elects to reside1 his very     
eating1 drinking and personal           
expenditure1 all turns on what he calls 
making his fortune4 ,it is all to gain  
money--quocunque modo rem4 ,another is  
active for bettering the condition of   
the labouring classes3 a third for the  
suppression of vice4 ,these three men go
 some way together in a common orbit of 
small actions1 alike to the eye1 but    
morally unlike1 because of the various  
guiding purposes for which they are     
done4 ,hence1 when we consider such     
pregnant final ends as the service of   
,god and the glory of a world to come1  
it appears how vast is the alteration in
 the moral line and colouring of a man's
 life1 according to his practical taking
 up or setting aside of these great     
ends4  #af4 ,we must beware however of  
an exaggeration here4 ,the final end of 
action is often latent1 not explicitly  

considered4 ,a fervent worshipper of    
,god wishes to refer his whole self with
 all that he does to the ,divine glory  
and service4 ,yet such a one will eat1  
drink1 and be merry with his friends1   
not thinking of ,god at the time4       
,still1 supposing him to keep within the
 bounds of temperance1 he is serving    
,god and doing good actions4 ,but what  
of a man who has entirely broken away   
from ,god1 what of his eating1 drinking1
 and other actions that are of their    
kind indifferent8 ,we cannot call them  
sins3 there is nothing wrong about them1
 neither in the thing done1 nor in the  
circumstances of the doing1 nor in the  
intention4 ,pius ,v4 condemned the      
proposition3 ,all the works of infidels 
are sins4 ,neither must we call such    
actions indifferent in the individual   
who does them1 supposing them to be true
 human acts1 according to the           
definition1 and not done merely         
mechanically4 ,they are not indifferent1
 because they receive a certain measure 

of natural goodness from the good       
natural purpose which they serve1       
namely1 the conservation and well-being 
of the agent4 ,every human act is either
 good or evil in him who does it4 ,i    
speak of natural goodness only4  #ag4   
,the effect consequent upon an action is
 distinguishable from the action itself1
 from which it is not unfrequently      
separated by a considerable interval of 
time1 as the death of a man from poison 
administered a month before4 ,the effect
 consequent enters into morality only in
 so far as it is either chosen as a     
means or intended as an end 7nn4 #b1 #c1
 p4 #ca71 or is annexed as a relevant   
circumstance to the means chosen 7n4 #i1
 p4 #cd474 ,once the act is done1 it    
matters nothing to morality whether the 
effect consequent actually ensues or    
not1 provided no new act be elicited    
thereupon1 whether of commission or of  
culpable omission to prevent4 ,it       
matters not to morality1 but it does    
matter to the agent's claim to reward or

 liability to punishment at the hands of
 human legislators civil and            
ecclesiastical4  #ah4 ,as soul and body 
make one man1 so the inward and outward 
act--as the will to strike and the      
actual blow struck--are one human act4  
,the outward act gives a certain        
physical completeness to the inward4    
,moreover the inward act is no          
thorough-going thing1 if it stops short 
of outward action where the opportunity 
offers4 ,otherwise1 the inward act may  
be as good or as bad morally as inward  
and outward act together4 ,the mere wish
 to kill1 where the deed is impossible1 
may be as wicked as wish and deed       
conjoined4 ,it may be1 but commonly it  
will not1 for this reason1 that the     
outward execution of the deed reacts    
upon the will and calls it forth with   
greater intensity2 the will as it were  
expands where it finds outward vent4    
,there is no one who has not felt the   
relative mildness of inward feelings of 
impatience or indignation1 compared with

 those engendered by speaking out one's 
mind4 ,often also the outward act       
entails a long course of preparation1   
all during which the inward will is     
sustained and frequently renewed1 as in 
a carefully planned burglary4           
,readings4--,st4 ,thos41 #a;a #b;ae1 q4 
#ah1 art4 #a2 ib41 q4 #ah1 art4 #b1 in  
corp41 ad #a2 ib41 q4 #ah1 art4 #c1 in  
corp41 ad #b2 ib41 q4 #ah1 art4 #d-f2   
ib41 q4 #ah1 art4 #h1 in corp41 ad #b1  
#c2 ib41 q4 #ah1 art4 #i1 in corp41 ad  
#c2 ib41 q4 #ah1 art4 #aj1 #c2 ib41 q4  
#ah1 art4 #aa1 in corp42 ib41 q4 #bj1   
art4 #d1 in corp4    ,,chapter ,,iv4    
,,of ,,passions4  ,,section ,i4--,of    
,passions in ,general4   #a4 ,a passion 
is defined to be3 ,a movement of the    
irrational part of the soul1 attended by
 a notable alteration of the body1 on   
the apprehension of good or evil4 ,the  
soul is made up of intellect1 will1 and 
sensible appetite4 ,the first two are   
rational1 the third irrational3 the     
third is the seat of the passions4 ,in a

 disembodied spirit1 or an angel1 there 
are no senses1 no sensible appetite1 no 
passions4 ,the angel1 or the departed   
soul1 can love and hate1 fear and       
desire1 rejoice and grieve1 but these   
are not passions in the pure spirit1    
they are acts of intellect and will     
alone4 ,so man also often loves and     
hates1 and does other acts that are     
synonymous with corresponding passions1 
and yet no passion is there4 ,the man is
 working with his calm reason3 his      
irrational soul is not stirred4 ,to an  
author1 when he is in the humour for it1
 it is a delight to be writing1 but not 
a passionate delight4 ,the will finds   
satisfaction in the act3 the irrational 
soul is not affected by it4 ,or a       
penitent is sorry for his sin3 he       
sincerely regrets it before ,god3 his   
will is heartily turned away1 and wishes
 that that sin had never been3 at the   
same time his eye is dry1 his features  
unmoved1 not a sigh does he utter1 and  
yet he is truly sorry4 ,it is important 

to bear these facts in mind3 else we    
shall be continually mistaking for      
passions what are pure acts of will1 or 
vice versa1 misled by the identity of   
name4  #b4 ,the great mark of a passion 
is its sensible working of itself out   
upon the body1--what ,dr4 ,bain calls   
the diffusive wave of emotion4 ,without 
this mark there is no passion1 but with 
it are other mental states besides      
passions1 as we define them4 ,all strong
 emotion affects the body sensibly1 but 
not all emotions are passions4 ,there   
are emotions that arise from and        
appertain to the rational portion of the
 soul4 ,such are ,surprise1 ,laughter1  
,shame4  ,there is no sense of humour in
 any but rational beings2 and though    
dogs look ashamed and horses betray     
curiosity1 that is only inasmuch as in  
these higher animals there is something 
analogous to what is reason in man4     
,moreover passions are conversant with  
good and evil affecting sense1 but the  
objects of such emotions as those just  

mentioned are not good and evil as such1
 common parlance notwithstanding1       
whereby we are said to laugh at a bon   
mot1 or a good thing4  #c4 ,love is a   
generic passion1 having for its species 
desire and delight1 the contraries of   
which are abhorrence and pain4 ,desire  
is of absent good2 abhorrence is of     
absent evil2 delight is in present good2
 pain is at present evil4 ,the good and 
the evil which is the object of any     
passion must be apprehended by sense1 or
 by imagination in a sensible way1      
whether itself be a thing of sense or   
not4  #d4 ,desire and abhorrence1       
delight and pain1 are conversant with   
good and evil simply4 ,but good is often
 attainable only by an effort1 and evil 
avoidable by an effort4 ,the effort that
 good costs to attain casts a shade of  
evil or undesirableness over it3 we may 
shrink from the effort while coveting   
the good4 ,again1 the fact of evil being
 at all avoidable is a good thing about 
such evil4 ,if we call evil black1 and  

good white1 avoidable evil will be black
 just silvering into grey3 and arduous  
good will be white with a cloud on it4  
,and if the white attracts1 and the     
black repels the appetite1 it appears   
that arduous good is somewhat           
distasteful1 to wit1 to the             
faint-hearted2 and avoidable1 or        
vincible1 evil has its attraction for   
the man of spirit4 ,about these two     
objects1 good hard of getting and evil  
hard of avoidance1 arise four other     
passions1 hope and despair about the    
former1 fear and daring about the       
latter4 ,hope goes out towards a        
difficult good3 despair flies from it1  
the difficulty here being more repellent
 than the good is attractive4 ,fear     
flies from a threatening evil3 while    
daring goes up to the same1 drawn by the
 likelihood of vanquishing it4 ,desire  
and abhorrence1 delight and pain1 hope  
and despair1 fear and daring1 with anger
 and hatred 7of which presently71       
complete our list of passions4  #e4     

,aristotle and his school of old1 called
 ,peripatetics1 recommended the         
moderation of the passions1 not their   
extirpation4 ,the ,stoics on the other  
hand contended that the model man1 the  
sage1 should be totally devoid of       
passions4 ,this celebrated dispute      
turned largely on the two schools not   
understanding the same thing by the word
 passion4 ,yet not entirely so4 ,there  
was a residue of real difference1 and it
 came to this4 ,if the sensitive        
appetite stirs at all1 it must stir in  
one or other of nine ways corresponding 
to the nine passions which we have      
enumerated4 ,such an emotion as         
,laughter affects the imagination and   
the sensitive part of man1 and of course
 the body visibly1 but it does not stir 
the sensitive appetite1 since it does   
not prompt to action4 ,to say then that 
a man has no passions1 means that the   
sensitive appetite never stirs within   
him1 but is wholly dead4 ,but this is   
impossible1 as the ,stoic philosopher   

was fain to confess when he got         
frightened in a storm at sea4 ,having no
 passions cannot in any practical sense 
mean having no movements of the         
sensitive appetite1 for that will be    
afoot of its own proper motion          
independent of reason3 but it may mean  
cherishing no passions1 allowing none to
 arise unresisted1 but suppressing their
 every movement to the utmost that the  
will can4 ,in that sense it is a very   
intelligible and practical piece of     
advice1 that the wise man should labour 
to have no passions4 ,it is the advice  
embodied in ,horace's ,nil admirari1    
,talleyrand's ,no zeal1 ,beaconsfield's 
,beware of enthusiasm4 ,it would have   
man to work like a scientific           
instrument1 calm as a chronometer1      
regulated by reason alone4 ,this was the
 ,stoic teaching1 this the perfection   
that they inculcated1 quite a possible  
goal to make for1 if not to attain4 ,and
 it is worth a wise man's while to      
consider1 whether he should bend his    

efforts in this direction or not4 ,the  
determination here taken and acted upon 
will elaborate quite a different        
character of man one way or the other4  
,the effort made as the ,stoics direct1 
would mean no yielding to excitement1 no
 poetry1 no high-strung devotion1 no    
rapture1 no ecstasy1 no ardour of love1 
no earnest rhetoric spoken or listened  
to1 no mourning1 no rejoicing other than
 the most conventional1 to the          
persistent smothering of whatever is    
natural and really felt1 no tear of pity
 freely let flow1 no touch of noble     
anger responded to1 no scudding before  
the breeze of indignation1--all this1   
that reason may keep on the even tenour 
of her way undisturbed4  #f4 ,the fault 
in this picture is that it is not the   
picture of a man1 but of a spirit4 ,he  
who being man should try to realize it  
in himself1 would fall short of human   
perfection4 ,for though the sensitive   
appetite is distinguished from the will1
 and the two may clash and come in      

conflict1 yet they are not two wholly   
independent powers1 but the one man is  
both will and sensitive appetite1 and he
 rarely operates according to one power 
without the other being brought into    
corresponding play4 ,there is a similar 
concomitance of the operations of       
intellect and imagination4 ,what        
attracts the sensitive appetite1        
commonly allures also the affective     
will1 though on advertence the elective 
will may reject it4 ,on the other hand1 
a strong affection and election of the  
will cannot be without the sensitive    
appetite being stirred1 and that so     
strongly that the motion is notable in  
the body1--in other words1 is a passion4
 ,passion is the natural and in a       
certain degree the inseparable adjunct  
of strong volition4 ,to check one is to 
check the other4 ,not only is the       
passion repressed by repressing the     
volition1 but the repression of the     
passion is also the repression of the   
volition4 ,a man then who did his best  

to repress all movements of passion     
indiscriminately1 would lay fetters on  
his will1 lamentable and cruel and      
impolitic fetters1 where his will was   
bent on any object good and honourable  
and well-judged4  #g4 ,again1 man's will
 is reached by two channels1 from above 
downwards and from below upwards3 it is 
reached through the reason and through  
the imagination and senses4 ,by the     
latter channel it often receives evil   
impressions1 undoubtedly1 but not       
unfrequently by the former also4 ,reason
 may be inconsiderate1 vain1 haughty1   
mutinous1 unduly sceptical4 ,the abuse  
is no justification for closing either  
channel4 ,now the channel of the senses 
and of the imagination is the wider1 and
 in many cases affords the better       
passage of the two4 ,the will that is   
hardly reached by reason1 is approached 
and won by a pathetic sight1 a cry of   
enthusiasm1 a threat that sends a tremor
 through the limbs4 ,rather ,i should   
say the affective will is approached in 

this way3 for it remains with the       
elective will1 on advertence and        
consultation with reason1 to decide     
whether or not it shall be won to       
consent4 ,but were it not for the       
channel of passion1 this will could     
never have been approached at all even  
by reasons the most cogent4 ,rhetoric   
often succeeds1 where mere dry logic    
would have been thrown away4 ,god help  
vast numbers of the human race1 if their
 wills were approachable only through   
their reasons6 ,they would indeed be    
fixtures4  #h4 ,another fact to notice  
is the liability of reason's gaze to    
become morbid and as it were inflamed by
 unremitting exercise4 ,i do not here   
allude to hard study1 but to overcurious
 scanning of the realities of this life1
 and the still greater realities and    
more momentous possibilities of the     
world to come4 ,there is a sense of the 
surroundings being too much for us1 an  
alarm and a giddiness1 that comes of    
sober matter-of-fact thought over-much  

prolonged4 ,then it happens that one or 
more undeniable truths are laid hold of1
 and considered in strong relief and in 
isolation from the rest3 the result is a
 distorted and partial view of truth as 
a whole1 and therewith the mind is      
troubled4 ,here the kindlier passions1  
judiciously allowed to play1 come in to 
soothe the wound and soreness of pure   
intellect1 too keen in its workings for 
one who is not yet a pure spirit4  #i4  
,moral good and evil are predicable only
 of human acts1 in the technical sense  
of the term4 7c4 i41 nn4 #b--d1 p4 #da47
 ,as the passions by definition 7c4 iv41
 s4 i41 n4 #a1 p4 #da7 are not human    
acts1 they can never be morally evil of 
themselves4 ,but they are an occasion of
 moral evil in this way4 ,they often    
serve to wake up the slumbering ,reason4
 ,to that end it is necessary that they 
should start up of themselves without   
the call of ,reason4 ,this would be no  
inconvenience1 if the instant ,reason   
awoke1 and adverted to the tumult and   

stir of ,passion1 she could take command
 of it1 and where she saw fit1 quell it4
 ,but ,reason has no such command1      
except in cases where she has acquired  
it by years of hard fighting4 ,passion  
once afoot holds on her course against  
the dictate of ,reason4 ,true1 so long  
as it remains mere ,passion1 and ,reason
 is not dragged away by it1 no consent  
of the will given1 no voluntary act     
elicited1 still less carried into       
outward effect1--so long as things      
remain thus1 however ,passion may rage1 
there is no moral evil done4 ,but there 
is a great temptation1 and in great     
temptation many men fall4 ,the evil is  
the act of free will1 but the pressure  
on the will is the pressure of ,passion4
 ,but ,passion happily is a young colt  
amenable to discipline4 ,where the      
assaults of ,passion are resolutely and 
piously withstood1 and the incentives   
thereto avoided--unnatural and          
unnecessary incentives ,i mean--,passion
 itself acquires a certain habit of     

obedience to ,reason1 which habit is    
moral virtue4 ,of that presently4  #aj4 
,in a man of confirmed habits of moral  
virtue1 ,passion starts up indeed       
independently of ,reason1 but then      
,reason ordinarily finds little         
difficulty in regulating the ,passion so
 aroused4 ,in a certain high and        
extraordinary condition of human nature1
 not only has ,reason entire mastery    
over ,passion wherever she finds it     
astir1 but ,passion cannot stir in the  
first instance1 without ,reason calling 
upon it to do so4 ,in this case the     
torpor of the will deprecated above 7n4 
#g7 is not to be feared1 because ,reason
 is so vigorous and so masterful as to  
be adequate to range everywhere and meet
 all emergencies without the goad of    
,passion4 ,this state is called by      
divines the state of integrity4 ,in it  
,adam was before he sinned4 ,it was lost
 at the ,fall1 and has not been restored
 by the ,redemption4 ,it is not a thing 
in any way due to human nature3 nothing 

truly natural to man was forfeited by   
,adam's sin4 ,it is no point of         
holiness1 no guerdon of victory1 this   
state of integrity1 but rather a being  
borne on angel's wings above the battle4
 ,but one who has no battle in his own  
breast against ,passion1 may yet suffer 
and bleed and die under exterior        
persecution3 nay1 he may1 if he wills1  
let in ,passion upon himself1 to fear   
and grieve1 when he need not4 ,so did   
the ,second ,adam in the ,garden of     
,gethsemane4  ,readings4--,st4 ,thos41  
#a;a1 q4 #ha1 art4 #b1 in corp42 id41   
#a;a #b1 q4 #bc1 art4 #a1 in corp42 ib41
 q4 #bc1 art4 #b1 in corp42 ,cicero1    
,tusc4 ,disp41 iv41 cc4 #ag-bf2 ,st4    
,aug41 ,de ,civitate ,dei1 ix41 cc4 #d1 
#e2 ,ar1 ,eth41 ,,iii41 v41 #c1 #d2 ib41
 ,i41 xiii41 #ae-ag2 ,st4 ,thos41 #c;a1 
q4 #ae1 art4 #d2 id41 #a;a #b1 q4 #ei1  
art4 #e2 ,plato1 ,timaeus1 #fi1 ,b1 ,e3 
#gj1 ,a4   ,,section ,,ii4--,of ,desire4
   #a4 ,desires are either physical     
cravings1 by moderns called appetites2  

or physical desires or tastes1 called   
desires proper4 ,the appetites have     
their beginning in bodily uneasiness4   
,they are felt needs of something       
required for the animal maintenance of  
the individual or of the race4 ,the     
objects of the several appetites are    
,meat and ,drink1 ,warmth or ,coolness1 
,exercise and ,repose1 ,sleep1 ,sex4    
,the object of mere appetite is marked  
by quantity only1 not by quality4 ,that 
is to say1 the thing is sought for in   
the vague1 in a certain amount          
sufficient to supply the want1 but not  
this or that variety of the thing4 ,the 
cry of a hungry man is1 ,give me to eat1
 if very hungry1 ,give me much3 but so  
far as he is under the mere dominion of 
appetite he does not crave any          
particular article of food1 vegetable or
 animal3 he wants quantity merely4 ,so  
of thirst1 so of all the appetites1     
where there is nothing else but appetite
 present4  #b4 ,but if a thirsty man    
cries for champagne1 or a hungry man    

fancies a venison pasty1 there is       
another element beyond appetite in that 
demand4 ,on the matter of the physical  
craving there is stamped the form of a  
psychical desire4 ,the psychical element
 prescribes a quality of the objects    
sought4 ,the thirsty man thus prompted  
no longer wants drink but wine3 the man 
mewed up within doors no longer calls   
for exercise1 but for a horse or a      
bicycle4 ,it is obvious that in man the 
appetites generally pass into the       
further shape of psychical desire4 ,it  
is when the appetite is vehement1 or the
 man is one who makes slight study of   
his animal wants1 that pure appetite1   
sheer physical craving1 is best shown4  
,darius flying before his conqueror is  
ready to drink at any source1 muddy or  
clear1 a drink is all that he wants3 it 
is all that is wanted by ,st4 ,paul the 
first ,hermit4 ,but your modern lounger 
at the clubs1 what variety of liquors   
are excogitated to please his palate6   
#c4 ,not all psychical desires are on   

the matter of appetite2 they may be     
fixed on any good whatsoever of body or 
of mind4 ,many psychical desires are not
 passions at all1 but reside exclusively
 in the superior part of the soul1 in   
the will prompted by the understanding1 
and do not affect the body in any       
sensible way4 ,such for instance is the 
great desire of happiness4 ,those       
desires that are passions are prompted1 
not by the understanding1 but by the    
imagination or fancy1 imaging to itself 
some particular good1 not good in       
general1 for that the understanding     
contemplates4 ,fancy paints the picture2
 or if sense presents it1 fancy         
appropriates and embellishes it3 the    
sensitive appetite fastens upon the     
representation3 the bodily organs       
sensibly respond2 and there is the      
passion of psychical desire4  #d4       
,physical cravings1 or appetites1 have  
limited objects3 the objects of         
psychical desires may be unlimited4 ,a  
thirsty man thirsts not for an ocean1   

but for drink quantum sufficit3 give him
 that and the appetite is gone4 ,but the
 miser covets all the money that he can 
get3 the voluptuary ranges land and sea 
in search of a new pleasure3 the        
philosopher ever longs for a higher     
knowledge3 the saint is indefatigable in
 doing good4 ,whatever a man takes to be
 an end in itself1 not simply a means1  
that he desires without end or measure4 
,what he desires as a means1 he desires 
under a limitation1 so far forth as it  
makes for the end1 so much and no more4 
,as ,aristotle says of the processes of 
art1 the end in view is the limit1      
,greek3 peras to telos 7cf4 c4 ii41 s4  
iii41 n4 #c1 p4 #ae7 ,whatever is       
desired as an end in itself1 is taken to
 be a part of happiness1 or to represent
 happiness4 ,happiness and the object   
that gives happiness is the one thing   
that man desires for itself1 and desires
 without end or measure4 ,unfortunately 
he is often mistaken in the choice of   
this object4 ,he often takes for an end 

what is properly only a means4 ,they    
whose god is their belly1 have made this
 mistake in regard of the gratification 
of appetite4 ,it is not appetite proper 
that has led to this perversion1 but    
psychical desire1 or appetite inflamed  
by the artificial stimulus of           
imagination4 ,for one who would be      
temperate1 it is more important to      
control his imagination than to trouble 
about his appetite4 ,appetite exhausts  
itself1 sometimes within the bounds of  
what is good for the subject1 sometimes 
beyond them1 but still within some      
bounds2 but there is no limit to the    
cravings bred of imagination4  #e4 ,by  
this canon a man may try himself to     
discover whether or not a favourite     
amusement is gaining too much upon him4 
,an amusement is properly a means to the
 end1 that a man may come away from it  
better fitted to do the serious work of 
his life4 ,pushed beyond a certain      
point1 the amusement ceases to minister 
to this end4 ,the wise man drops it at  

that point4 ,but if one knows not where 
to stop3 or if when stopped in spite of 
himself1 he is restless till he begin   
again1 and never willingly can forego   
any measure of the diversion that comes 
within his reach1 the means in that case
 has passed into an end3 he is enslaved 
to that amusement1 inasmuch as he will  
do anything and everything for the sake 
of it4 ,thus some men serve pleasure1   
and other men money4  #f4 ,hence is     
apparent the folly of supposing that    
crimes against property are preventible 
simply by placing it within the power of
 all members of the community easily to 
earn an honest livelihood1 and therewith
 the satisfaction of all their natural  
needs4 ,it is not merely to escape cold 
and hunger that men turn to burglary or 
fraudulent dealing3 it is more for the  
gratification of a fancy1 the           
satisfaction of an inordinate desire4   
,great crimes are not committed to keep 
the wolf from the door1 but because of  
the wolf in the heart1 the overgrown    

psychical desire1 which is bred in many 
a well-nourished1 warmly clad1          
comfortably housed1 highly educated     
citizen4 ,there is a sin born of fulness
 of bread4  ,readings4--,st4 ,thos41    
#a;a #b1 q4 #cj1 art4 #c1 in corp42 ib41
 q4 #cj1 art4 #d1 in corp42 ,ar41 ,eth41
 ,,iii41 xi41 #a-d3 ,ar41 ,pol41 ,i41   
ix41 #ac2 ib41 ,,ii41 vii41 #aa-ac4     
,n4,b4--,the division of desires into   
physical and psychical is first         
suggested by ,plato1 who 7,rep4 #eeh ,d 
to #eei ,c7 divides them as necessary   
and unnecessary4 ,unnecessary desires he
 treats as evil4 ,what ,plato calls a   
necessary1 ,aristotle calls a physical1 
and ,st4 ,thomas a natural desire4      
,unfortunately1 ,aristotle and ,st4     
,thomas had but one word for our        
,english two1 physical and natural4     
,desires that are not physical1 not     
natural nor necessary to man in his     
animal capacity1 may be highly natural  
and becoming to man as he is a          
reasonable being1 or they may be highly 

unbecoming4 ,these psychical desires1   
called by ,st4 ,thomas not natural1 take
 in at once the noblest and the basest  
aspirations of humanity4   ,,section    
,,iii4--,of ,delight4   #a4 ,delight    
like desire may be either physical or   
psychical4 ,all that has been said above
 of desire under this division applies  
also to delight1 which is the           
realization of desire4 ,this division   
does not altogether fall in with that   
into sensual delights and intellectual  
delights4 ,a professional wine-taster   
could hardly be said to find            
intellectual delight in a bottle of good
 ,champagne1 real ,veuve-,clicquot3 yet 
certainly his is a psychical delight1 no
 mere unsophisticated gratification of  
appetite4 ,sensual delights then are    
those delights which are founded on the 
gratification of appetite1 whether      
simple--in which case the delight is    
physical--or studied and fancy-wrought  
appetite1 the gratification of which is 
psychical delight4 ,intellectual        

delights on the other hand are those    
that come of the exercise of intellect1 
not unsupported by imagination1 but     
where appetite enters not at all1 or    
only as a remote adjunct1 albeit the    
delight may turn upon some sight or     
sound1 as of music1 or of a fine range  
of hills4 ,or the object may be a thing 
of intellect1 pure and removed from     
sense as far as an object of human      
contemplation can be1 for instance1 the 
first elements of matter1 freewill1 the 
immensity of ,god4 ,the study of such   
objects yields a purer intellectual     
delight than that of the preceding4 ,but
 this is a high ground and a keen upper 
air1 where few can tread and breathe4   
#b4 ,a man has more complacency in      
himself upon attaining to some          
intellectual delight than upon a sensual
 satisfaction3 he is prouder to have    
solved a problem than to have enjoyed   
his dinner4 ,also1 he would rather      
forego the capacity of sensual enjoyment
 than that of intellectual pleasure2    

rather lose his sense of taste than his 
science or his scholarship1 if he has   
any notable amount of either4 ,again1   
put sensual delight in one scale1 and in
 the other the intellectual delight of  
honour1 no worthy specimen of a man will
 purchase the pleasure at the price of  
honour4 ,the disgrace attaching to      
certain modes of enjoyment is sufficient
 to make men shun them1 very pleasant   
though they be to sense4 ,again1 sensual
 delight is a passing thing1 waxing and 
waning3 but intellectual delight is     
steady1 grasped and held firmly as a    
whole4 ,but sensual delight comes more  
welcome of the two in this that it      
removes a pre-existing uneasiness1 as   
hunger1 weariness1 nervous prostration1 
thus doing a medicinal office3 whereas  
no such office attaches in the essential
 nature of things to intellectual       
delight1 as that does not presuppose any
 uneasiness2 and though it may remove   
uneasiness1 the removal is difficult1   
because the uneasiness itself is an     

obstacle to the intellectual effort that
 must be made to derive any intellectual
 delight4 ,sensual enjoyment is the     
cheaper physician1 and ailing mortals   
mostly resort to that door4  #c4 ,i will
 omit much usual declamation on the     
dignity and capacity of our nature3 the 
superiority of the soul to the body1 of 
the rational to the animal part of our  
constitution2 upon the worthiness1      
refinement1 and delicacy of some        
satisfactions1 or the meanness1         
grossness1 and sensuality of others3    
because ,i hold that pleasures differ in
 nothing but in continuance and         
intensity4 7,paley1 ,moral ,philosophy1 
bk4 i41 c4 vi47  ,in opposition to the  
above it is here laid down that delights
 do not differ in continuance and       
intensity1 that is1 in quantity1 alone1 
but likewise in quality1 that is1 some  
are nobler1 better1 and more becoming a 
man than others1 and therefore          
preferable on other grounds than those  
of mere continuance and intensity4 ,i   

wish to show that the more pleasant     
pleasure is not always the better       
pleasure2 that even the pleasure which  
is more durable1 and thereby more       
pleasant in the long run1 is not the    
better of the two simply as carrying the
 greater cumulus of pleasure4 ,if this  
is shown1 it will follow that pleasure  
is not identical with good2 or that     
pleasure is not happiness1 not the last 
end of man4  #d4 ,delight comes of      
activity1 not necessarily of change1    
except so far as activity itself        
involves change1 as it always does in   
mortal man4 ,delight sits upon activity1
 as the bloom upon youth4 ,bloom is the 
natural sign of maturity2 and the       
delight that we come to take in doing a 
thing shows that we are at least        
beginning to do it well3 our activity is
 approaching perfection4 ,in this sense 
it is said that delight perfects        
activity4 ,as the activity1 so will be  
the delight4 ,but the activity will be  
as the power of which it is an exercise4

 ,powers like in kind will supply like  
activities1 and these again will yield  
delights alike in kind4 ,there is no    
difference of quality in such delights1 
they differ in quantity alone4 ,thus    
taste and smell are two senses3 the     
difference between them can hardly be   
called one of kind3 therefore the       
delights of smelling and of tasting fall
 under one category4 ,we may exchange so
 much smell for an equal amount of      
taste3 it is a mere matter of quantity4 
,but between sight and hearing on the   
one hand1 and taste and smell and touch 
on the other1 there is a wider          
difference1 due to the fact that        
intellect allies itself more readily to 
the operation of the two former senses4 
#e4 ,widest of all differences is that  
between sense and intellect4 ,to explain
 this difference in full belongs to     
,psychology4 ,enough to say here that   
the object of sense is always           
particular1 bound up in circumstances of
 present time and place1 as this horse3 

while the object of intellect is        
universal1 as horse simply4 ,the human  
intellect never works without the       
concurrence either of sense or of       
imagination1 which is as it were sense  
at second hand4 ,as pure intellectual   
operation is never found in man1 so     
neither is pure intellectual delight1   
like that of an angel4 ,still1 as even  
in man sense and intellect are two      
powers differing in kind1 so must their 
operations differ in kind1 and the      
delights consequent upon those          
operations4 ,therefore1 unless ,paley   
would have been willing to allow that   
the rational and animal parts of our    
nature differ only as more and          
less--which is tantamount to avowing    
that man is but a magnified brute--he   
ought not to have penned his celebrated 
utterance1 that pleasures differ only in
 continuance and intensity3 he should   
have admitted that they differ likewise 
in kind2 or in other words1 that        
pleasures differ in quality as well as  

in quantity4 ,the goodness of a         
pleasure1 then1 is not the mere amount  
of it4 ,to repeat ,st4 ,augustine's     
reflection on the drunken ,milanese3 ,it
 makes a difference what source a man   
draws his delight from4 ,footnote #b ,as
 in man reason is nobler than sense1    
preferable1 and a better good to its    
possessor--for reason it is that makes  
him man and raises him above the        
brute--so the use of the reason and the 
delight that comes thereof is nobler1   
preferable1 and a better good to him    
than the pleasure that is of the mere   
operation of his animal nature4 ,a      
little of the nobler delight outweighs a
 vast volume of the baser3 not that the 
nobler is the pleasanter1 but because it
 is the nobler4 ,nor can it be pretended
 that the nobler prevails as being the  
more durable1 and thereby likely to     
prove the pleasanter in the long run4   
,the nobler is better at the time and in
 itself1 because it is the more human   
delight and characteristic of the higher

 species4 ,i have but to add that what  
is better in itself is not better under 
all circumstances4 ,the best life of man
 can only be lived at intervals4 ,the   
lower operations and the delights that  
go with them have a medicinal power to  
restore the vigour that has become      
enfeebled by a lengthened exercise of   
the higher faculties4 ,at those dead    
points food and fiddling are better than
 philosophy4  ,footnote #b3 ,interest   
unde quis gaudeat4 7,s4 ,aug41          
,confess41 vi41 #f47  #f4 ,this         
medicinal or restorative virtue of      
delight is a fact to bear in mind in    
debating the question how far it is     
right to act for the pleasure that the  
action gives4 ,it is certainly wrong to 
act for mere animal gratification4 ,such
 gratification is a stimulus to us to do
 that which makes for the well-being of 
our nature3 to fling away all intention 
of any good other than the delight of   
the action1 is to mistake the incentive 
for the end proposed4 ,but this is a    

doctrine easily misunderstood4 ,an      
example may save it from being construed
 too rigidly4 ,suppose a man has a      
vinery1 and being fond of fruit he goes 
there occasionally1 and eats1 not for   
hunger1 but as he says1 because he likes
 grapes4 ,he seems to act for mere      
pleasure3 yet who shall be stern enough 
to condemn him1 so that he exceed not in
 quantity8 ,if he returns from the      
vinery in a more amiable and charitable 
mood1 more satisfied with ,providence1  
more apt to converse with men and do his
 work in the commonwealth1 who can deny 
that in acting in view of these ends1 at
 least implicitly1 he has taken lawful  
means to a proper purpose8 ,he has not  
been fed1 but recreated3 he has not     
taken nourishment1 but medicine1        
preventive or remedial1 to a mind       
diseased4 ,it is no doubt a sweet and   
agreeable medicine3 this very           
agreeableness makes its medical virtue4 
,it is a sweet antidote to the          
bitterness of life4 ,but though a man   

may live by medicine1 he does not live  
for it4 ,so no man by rights lives for  
pleasure4 ,the pleasure that a man finds
 in his work encourages him to go on    
with it4 ,the pleasure that a man finds 
by turning aside to what is not work1   
picks him up1 rests and renovates him1  
that he may go forth as from a wayside  
inn1 or diverticulum1 refreshed to      
resume the road of labour4 ,hence we    
gather the solution of the question as  
to the lawfulness of acting for         
pleasure4 ,if a man does a thing because
 it is pleasant1 and takes the pleasure 
as an incentive to carry on his labour1 
or as a remedy to enable him to resume  
it1 he acts for pleasure rightly4 ,for  
this it is not necessary that he should 
expressly think of the pleasure as being
 helpful to labour3 it is enough that he
 accepts the subordination of pleasure  
to work as nature has ordained it2 and  
this ordinance he does accept1 if he    
puts forth no positive volition the     
other way1 whether expressly1 as none   

but a wrong-headed theologian is likely 
to do1 or virtually1 by taking his      
pleasure with such greediness that the  
motion of his will is all spent therein 
as in its last end and terminus1 so that
 the pleasure ceases to be referable to 
aught beyond itself1 a case of much     
easier occurrence4 ,or lastly1 the      
natural subordination of pleasure to    
work may be set aside1 defeated1 and    
rendered impossible by the whole tenour 
of an individual's life1 if he be one of
 those giddy butterflies who flit from  
pleasure to pleasure and do no work at  
all4 ,till late in the morning he       
sleeps1 then breakfasts1 then he shoots1
 lunches1 rides1 bathes1 dines1 listens 
to music1 smokes1 and reads fiction till
 late at night1 then sleeps again2 and  
this1 or the like of this is his day1   
some three hundred days at least in the 
year4 ,this is not mere acting for      
pleasure1 it is living for pleasure1 or 
acting for pleasure so continuously as  
to leave no scope for any further end of

 life4 ,it may be hard to indicate the  
precise hour in which this man's        
pleasure-seeking passes into sin3 still 
this is clear1 his life is not innocent4
 ,clear him of gluttony and lust1 there 
remains upon him the sin of sloth and of
 a wasted existence4  #g4 ,even the very
 highest of delights1 the delight of    
contemplation1 is not the highest of    
goods1 but a concomitant of the highest 
good4 ,the highest good is the final    
object of the will3 but the object of   
the will is not the will's own act3 we  
do not will willing1 as neither do we   
understand understanding1 not at least  
without a reflex effort4 ,what we will  
in contemplating is1 not to be          
delighted1 but to see4 ,this is the     
subjective end and happiness of man1 to 
see1 to contemplate4 ,delight is not    
anything objective3 neither is it the   
subjective last end of humanity4 ,in no 
sense then is delight1 or pleasure1 the 
highest good4  ,readings4--,ar41 ,eth41 
,x41 iv41 #h2 ib41 ,x41 iii41 #h-ac1    

ib41 ,x41 v41 #a-e2 ,plato1 ,gorgias1   
pp4 #did1 #die2 ,mill1 ,utilitarianism1 
#bnd4 edit41 pp4 #aa-l#f2 ,st4 ,thos41  
la #b1 q4 #ca1 art4 #e2 id41 ,contra    
,gentiles1 iii41 #bf1 nn4 #h1 #aj1 #aa1 
#ab4   ,,section ,,iv4--,of ,anger4     
#a4 ,anger is a compound passion1 made  
up of displeasure1 desire1 and hope3    
displeasure at a slight received1 desire
 of revenge and satisfaction1 and hope  
of getting the same1 the getting of it  
being a matter of some difficulty and   
calling for some exertion1 for we are   
not angry with one who lies wholly in   
our power1 or whom we despise4 ,anger   
then is conversant at once with the good
 of vengeance and with the evil of a    
slight received3 the good being somewhat
 difficult to compass1 and the evil not 
altogether easy to wipe out4 7,cf4 s4i41
 n4#d1 p4 #dc47  #b4 ,anger is defined3 
,a desire of open vengeance for an open 
slight1 attended with displeasure at the
 same1 the slight being put upon self1  
or upon some dear one1 unbefittingly4   

,the vengeance that the angry man craves
 is a vengeance that all shall see4 ,no1
 ye unnatural hags1 cries ,lear in his  
fury1 ,i will do such things1--what they
 shall be yet ,i know not1 but they     
shall be the terror of the earth4 ,when 
we are angry1 we talk of making an      
example of the offender4 ,the idea is   
that1 as all the world has seen us      
slighted and set at naught1 so all the  
world1 witnessing the punishment of the 
offending party1 may take to heart the  
lesson which we are enforcing upon him1 
namely1 that we are men of might and    
importance whom none should despise4    
,whoever is angry1 is angry at being    
despised1 flouted to his face and set at
 naught1 either in his own person1 or in
 the person of one whom he venerates and
 loves1 or in some cause that lies near 
to his heart4 ,anger is essentially a   
craving for vengeance on account of a   
wrong done4 ,if then we have suffered1  
but think we deserve to suffer1 we are  
not angry4 ,if we have suffered wrong1  

but the wrong seems to have been done in
 ignorance1 or in the heat of passion1  
we are not angry1 or we are not so very 
angry4 ,if he had known what he was     
about1 we say1 or1 if he had been in his
 right mind1 he could not have brought  
himself to treat me so4 ,but when one   
has done us cool and deliberate wrong1  
then we are angry1 because the slight is
 most considerable4 ,there is an        
appearance of our claims to             
considerations having been weighed1 and 
found wanting4 ,we call it1 a cool piece
 of impertinence1 spiteful malevolence1 
and the like4 ,any other motive to which
 the wrong is traceable on the part of  
the wrong-doer1 lessens our anger       
against him3 but the motive of contempt1
 and that alone1 if we seem to discover 
it in him1 invariably increases it4 ,to 
this all other points are reducible that
 move our anger1 as forgetfulness1      
rudely delivered tidings of misfortune1 
a face of mirth looking on at our       
distress1 or getting in the way and     

thwarting our purpose4  #c4 ,anger      
differs from hatred4 ,hatred is a       
chronic affection1 anger an acute one4  
,hatred wishes evil to a man as it is   
evil1 anger as it is just4 ,anger wishes
 evil to fall on its object in the sight
 of all men1 and with the full          
consciousness of the sufferer3 hatred is
 satisfied with even a secret mischief1 
and1 so that the evil be a grievous one1
 does not much mind whether the sufferer
 be conscious of it or no4 ,thus an     
angry man may wish to see him who has   
offended brought to public confession   
and shame3 but a hater is well content  
to see his enemy spending his fortune   
foolishly1 or dead drunk in a ditch on a
 lonely wayside4 ,the man in anger feels
 grief and annoyance1 not so the hater4 
,at a certain point of suffering anger  
stops1 and is appeased when full        
satisfaction seems to have been made3   
but an enemy is implacable and insatiate
 in his desire of your harm4 ,st4       
,augustine in his ,rule to his brethren 

says3 ,for quarrels1 either have them   
not1 or end them with all speed1 lest   
anger grow to hatred1 and of a mote make
 a beam4  #d4 ,anger1 like vengeance1 is
 then only a safe course to enter on1   
when it proceeds not upon personal but  
upon public grounds4 ,and even by this  
maxim many deceive themselves4          
,readings4--,ar41 ,rhet41 ii41 #b2 ib41 
#d1 ad fin42 ,st4 ,thos41 #a;a #b1 q4   
#df1 art4 #b1 in corp42 ib41 q4 #df1    
art4 #c1 in corp42 ib41 q4 #df1 art4 #f2
 ib41 q4 #dg1 art4 #b4    ,,chapter ,v4 
,,of ,,habits ,,and ,,virtues4          
,,section ,i4--,of ,habit4   #a4 ,a     
habit is a quality difficult to change1 
whereby an agent whose nature it was to 
work one way or another indeterminately1
 is disposed easily and readily at will 
to follow this or that particular line  
of action4 ,habit differs from          
disposition1 as disposition is a quality
 easily changed4 ,thus one in a good    
humour is in a disposition to be kind4  
,habit is a part of character3          

disposition is a passing fit4 ,again1   
habit differs from faculty1 or power3 as
 power enables one to act2 but habit1   
presupposing power1 renders action easy 
and expeditious1 and reliable to come at
 call4 ,we have a power to move our     
limbs1 but a habit to walk or ride or   
swim4 ,habit then is the determinant of 
power4 ,one and the same power works    
well or ill1 but not one and the same   
habit4  #b4 ,a power that has only one  
way of working1 set and fixed1 is not   
susceptible of habit4 ,such powers are  
the forces of inanimate nature1 as      
gravitation and electricity4 ,a thing   
does not gravitate better for           
gravitating often4 ,the moon does not   
obey the earth more readily to-day than 
she did in the days of ,ptolemy1 or of  
the ,chaldean sages4 ,some specious     
claim to habit might be set up on behalf
 of electricity and magnetism4 ,a glass 
rod rubbed at frequent intervals for six
 months1 is a different instrument from 
what it would have been1 if left all    

that time idle in a drawer4 ,then there 
are such cases as the gradual           
magnetising of an iron bar4 ,still we   
cannot speak of electrical habits1 or   
magnetic habits1 not at least in things 
without life1 because there is no will  
there to control the exercise of the    
quality4 ,as well might we speak of a   
tumbledown habit in a row of houses1    
brought on by locomotives running       
underneath their foundations4 ,it is but
 a case of an accumulation of small     
effects1 inducing gradually a new       
molecular arrangement1 so that the old  
powers act under new material           
conditions4 ,but habit is a thing of    
life1 an appurtenance of will1 not of   
course independent of material          
conditions and structural alterations1  
in so far forth as a living and         
volitional is also a material agent1 but
 essentially usable at will1 and brought
 into play and controlled in its        
operation by free choice4 ,therefore a  
habit that works almost automatically   

has less of the character of a true     
habit1 and passes rather out of morality
 into the region of physics4 ,again1 bad
 habits1 vices to which a man is become 
a slave against his better judgment1 are
 less properly called habits than       
virtues are2 for such evil habits do not
 so much attend on volition 7albeit     
volition has created them7 as drag the  
will in their wake4 ,for the like       
reason1 habit is less properly          
predicable of brute animals than of men3
 for brutes have no intelligent will to 
govern their habits4 ,the highest brutes
 are most susceptible of habit4 ,they   
are most like men in being most         
educable4 ,and1 of human progeny1 some  
take up habits1 in the best and         
completest sense of the term1 more      
readily than others4 ,they are better   
subjects for education3 education being 
nothing else than the formation of      
habits4  #c4 ,knowledge consists of     
intellectual habits4 ,but the habits of 
most consequence to the moralist lie in 

the will1 and in the sensitive appetite 
as amenable to the control of the will4 
,in this category come the virtues1 in  
the ordinary sense of that name1 and    
secondarily the vices4  #d4 ,a habit is 
acquired by acts4 ,whereupon this       
difficulty has been started3--,if the   
habit1 say of mental application1 comes 
from acts of study1 and again the acts  
from the habit1 how ever is the habit   
originally acquired8 ,we answer that    
there are two ways in which one thing   
may come from another4 ,it may come in  
point of its very existence1 as child   
from parent2 or in point of some mode of
 existence1 as scholar from master4 ,a  
habit has its very existence from acts  
preceding3 but those acts have their    
existence independent of the habit4 ,the
 acts which are elicited after the habit
 is formed1 owe to the habit1 not their 
existence1 but the mode of their        
existence3 that is to say1 because of   
the habit the acts are now formed       
readily1 reliably1 and artistically1 or 

virtuously4 ,the primitive acts which   
gradually engendered the habit1 were    
done with difficulty1 fitfully1 and with
 many failures1--more by good luck than 
good management1 if it was a matter of  
skill1 and by a special effort rather   
than as a thing of course1 where it was 
question of moral well-doing4 7,see     
c4ii41 s4ii41 n4#i1 p4 #aj47  #e4 ,a    
habit is a living thing3 it grows and   
must be fed4 ,it grows on acts1 and acts
 are the food that sustain it4          
,unexercised1 a habit pines away3       
corruption sets in and disintegration4  
,a man1 we will say1 has a habit of     
thinking of ,god during his work4 ,he   
gives over doing so4 ,that means that he
 either takes to thinking of everything 
and nothing1 or he takes up some        
definite line of thought to the         
exclusion of ,god4 ,either way there is 
a new formation to the gradual ruin of  
the old habit4  #f4 ,habit and custom   
may be distinguished in philosophical   
language4 ,we may say that custom makes 

the habit4 ,custom does not imply any   
skill or special facility4 ,a habit is a
 channel whereby the energies flow1 as  
otherwise they would not have flowed1   
freely and readily in some particular   
direction4 ,a habit1 then1 is a         
determination of a faculty for good or  
for evil4 ,it is something intrinsic in 
a man1 a real modification of his being1
 abiding in him in the intervals between
 one occasion for its exercise and      
another3 whereas custom is a mere       
denomination1 expressive of frequent    
action and no more4 ,thus it would be   
more philosophical to speak of a custom 
of early rising1 and of a custom of     
smoking1 rather than of a habit of      
smoking1 except so far as1 by the use of
 the word habit1 you may wish to point  
to a certain acquired skill of the      
respiratory and facial muscles1 and a   
certain acquired temper of the stomach1 
enabling one to inhale tobacco fumes    
with impunity4  #g4 ,habits are         
acquired1 but it is obvious that the    

rate of acquisition varies in different 
persons4 ,this comes from one person    
being more predisposed by nature than   
another to the acquiring of this or that
 habit4 ,by nature1 that is by the      
native temper and conformation of his   
body wherewith he was born1 this child  
is more prone to literary learning1 that
 to mechanics1 this one to obstinacy and
 contentiousness1 that to sensuality1   
and so of the rest4 ,for though it is by
 the soul that a man learns1 and by the 
act of his will and spiritual powers he 
becomes a glutton or a zealot1          
nevertheless the bodily organs concur   
and act jointly towards these ends4 ,the
 native dispositions of the child's body
 for the acquisition of habits depend to
 an unascertained extent upon the habits
 of his ancestors4 ,this is the fact of 
heredity4  #h4 ,man is said to be a     
creature of habits4 ,the formation of   
habits in the will saves the necessity  
of continually making up the mind anew4 
,a man will act as he has become        

habituated1 except under some special   
motive from without1 or some special    
effort from within4 ,in the case of evil
 habits1 that effort is attended with   
immense difficulty4 ,the habit is indeed
 the man's own creation1 the outcome of 
his free acts4 ,but he is become the    
bondslave of his creature1 so much so   
that when the occasion arrives1         
three-fourths of the act is already     
done1 by the force of the habit alone1  
before his will is awakened1 or drowsily
 moves in its sleep4 ,the only way for  
the will to free itself here is not to  
wait for the occasion to come1 but be   
astir betimes1 keep the occasion at     
arm's length1 and register many a       
determination and firm protest and      
fervent prayer against the habit4 ,he   
who neglects to do this in the interval 
has himself to blame for being overcome 
every time that he falls upon the       
occasion which brings into play the evil
 habit4  ,readings4--,st4 ,thos41 #a;a  
#b1 q4 #di1 art4 #d1 ad #a1 #b2 ib41 q4 

#ej1 art4 #c1 in corp41 ad4 #a1 #b2 ib41
 q4 #ea1 art4 #a1 in corp42 ib41 q4 #ec1
 art4 #c1 in corp42 ,ar41 ,eth41 ,,ii41 
i42 ib41 ,,iii41 v41 #aj-ad2 ib41 ,,ii41
 iv41 #a1 #b1 #d4   ,,section ,,ii4--,of
 ,virtues in ,general4   #a4 ,virtue in 
its most transcendental sense means the 
excellence of a thing according to its  
kind4 ,thus it is the virtue of the eye 
to see1 and of a horse to be fleet of   
foot4 ,vice is a flaw in the make of a  
thing1 going to render it useless for   
the purpose to which it was ordained4   
,from the ethical standpoint1 virtue is 
a habit that a man has got of doing     
moral good1 or doing that which it      
befits his rational nature to do3 and   
vice is a habit of doing moral evil4    
7,see c4 i41 n4 #e47 ,it is important to
 observe that virtue and vice are not   
acts but habits4 ,vices do not make a   
man guilty1 nor do virtues make him     
innocent4 ,a man is guilty or innocent  
according to his acts1 not according to 
his habits4 ,a man may do a wicked thing

 and not be vicious1 or a good action   
and not be virtuous4 ,but no man is     
vicious who has not done one1 two1 aye1 
many wicked things3 and to be virtuous1 
a man must have performed many acts of  
virtue4 ,children do right and wrong1   
but they have neither virtues nor vices 
except in a nascent state3 there has not
 yet been time in them for the habits to
 be formed4 ,when sin is taken away by  
,god and pardoned1 the vice1 that is1   
the evil habit1 if any such existed     
before1 still remains1 and constitutes a
 danger for the future4 ,the habit can  
only be overcome by watchfulness and a  
long continuance of contrary acts4 ,but 
vice is not sin1 nor is sin vice1 nor a 
good deed a virtue4  #b4 ,the name of   
virtue is given to certain habits       
residing in the intellect1 as intuition 
or insight 7into self-evident truths71  
wisdom 7regarding conclusions of main   
application71 science 7of conclusions in
 special departments71 and art4 ,these  
are called intellectual virtues4  ,it   

was a peculiarity of ,socrates'         
teaching1 largely shared by ,plato1 to  
make all virtue intellectual1 a doctrine
 expressed in the formula1 ,virtue is   
knowledge2 which is tantamount to this  
other1 ,vice is ignorance1 or an        
erroneous view4 ,from whence the        
conclusion is inevitable3 ,no evil deed 
is wilfully done2 and therefore1 ,no man
 is to blame for being wicked4  #c4     
,undoubtedly there is a certain element 
of ignorance in all vice1 and a certain 
absence of will about every vicious act4
 ,there is likewise an intellectual side
 to all virtue4 ,these positions we     
willingly concede to the ,socratics4    
,every morally evil act is borne of some
 voluntary inconsiderateness4 ,the agent
 is looking the wrong way in the instant
 at which he does wrong4 ,either he is  
regarding only the solicitations of his 
inferior nature to the neglect of the   
superior1 or he is considering some     
rational good indeed1 but a rational    
good which1 if he would look steadily   

upon it1 he would perceive to be        
unbefitting for him to choose4 ,no man  
can do evil in the very instant in which
 his understanding is considering1 above
 all things else1 that which it behoves 
him specially to consider in the case4  
,again1 in every wrong act1 it is not   
the sheer evil that is willed1 but the  
good through or with the evil4 ,good1   
real or supposed1 is sought for3 evil is
 accepted as leading to good in the way 
of means1 or annexed thereto as a       
circumstance4 ,moreover1 no act is      
virtuous that is elicited quite         
mechanically1 or at the blind instance  
of passion4 ,to be virtuous1 the thing  
must be done on principle1 that is1 at  
the dictate of reason and by the light  
of intellect4  #d4 ,still1 virtue is not
 knowledge4 ,there are other than       
intellectual habits needed to complete  
the character of a virtuous man4 ,i see 
the better course and approve it1 and   
follow the worse1 said the ,roman poet4 
,footnote #c ,the evil which ,i will    

not1 that ,i do1 said the ,apostle4 ,it 
is not enough to have an intellectual   
discernment of and preference for what  
is right3 but the will must be          
habituated to embrace it1 and the       
passions too must be habituated to      
submit and square themselves to right   
being done4 ,in other words1 a virtuous 
man is made up by the union of          
enlightened intellect with the moral    
virtues4 ,the addition is necessary for 
several reasons4  ,footnote #c3 ,video  
meliora proboque1_/,deteriora sequor4   
7,ovid1 ,metamorph41 vii41 #ba47  7a7   
,ordinarily1 the intellect does not     
necessitate the will4 ,the will1 then1  
needs to be clamped and set by habit to 
choose the right thing as the intellect 
proposes it4  7b7 ,intellect1 or        
,reason1 is not absolute in the human   
constitution4 ,as ,aristotle 7,pol41    
,i41 v41 #f7 says3 ,the soul rules the  
body with a despotic command3 but reason
 rules appetite with a command          
constitutional and kingly3 that is to   

say1 as ,aristotle elsewhere 7,eth41    
,i41 xiii41 #ae1 #af7 explains1 passion 
often fights and resists reason1 opposes
 and contradicts3 it has therefore to be
 bound by ordinances and institutions to
 follow reason's lead3 these            
institutions are good habits1 moral     
virtues1 resident there where passion   
itself is resident1 in the inferior     
appetite4 ,it is not enough that the    
rider is competent1 but the horse too   
must be broken in4  7c7 ,it is a saying1
 that no mortal is always wise4 ,there  
are times when reason's utterance is    
faint from weariness and vexation4      
,then1 unless a man has acquired an     
almost mechanical habit of obeying      
reason in the conduct of his will and   
passions1 he will in such a conjuncture 
act inconsiderately and do wrong4 ,that 
habit is moral virtue4 ,moral virtue is 
as the fly-wheel of an engine1 a        
reservoir of force to carry the machine 
past the dead points in its working4 ,or
 again1 moral virtue is as discipline to

 troops suddenly attacked1 or hard      
pressed in the fight4  #e4 ,therefore1  
besides the habits in the intellect that
 bear the name of intellectual virtues1 
the virtuous man must possess other     
habits1 as well in the will1 that this  
power may readily embrace what the      
understanding points out to be good1 as 
in the sensitive appetite in both its   
parts1 concupiscible and irascible1 so  
far forth as appetite is amenable to the
 control of the will1 that it may be so 
controlled and promptly obey the better 
guidance4 ,these habits in the will and 
in the sensitive appetite are called    
moral virtues1 and to them the name of  
virtue is usually confined4             
,readings4--,st4 ,thos41 #a;a #b1 q4    
#ga1 art4 #a1 in corp42 ib41 q4 #eh1    
art4 #b2 ib41 q4 #eh1 art4 #c1 in corp41
 ad #c2 ib41 q4 #ef1 art4 #d1 in corp41 
ad #a-c4   ,,section ,,iii4--,of the    
,difference between ,virtues1           
,intellectual and ,moral4   #a4 ,st4    
,thomas 7#a;a #b1 q4 #ef1 art4 #c1 in   

corp47 ,footnote #d draws this          
difference1 that an intellectual virtue 
gives one a facility in doing a good    
act2 but a moral virtue not only gives  
facility1 but makes one put the facility
 in use4 ,thus a habit of grammar he    
says1 enables one readily to speak      
correctly1 but does not ensure that one 
always shall speak correctly1 for a     
grammarian may make solecisms on        
purpose3 whereas a habit of justice not 
only makes a man prompt and ready to do 
just deeds1 but makes him actually do   
them4 ,not that any habit necessitates  
volition4 ,habits do not necessitate1   
but they facilitate the act of the will4
 7s4 i41 nn4 #a1 #b1 #h1 pp4 #fd1 #fh47 
,footnote #d3 ,by doing good ,st4       
,thomas means the determination of the  
appetite1 rational or sensitive1 to     
good4 ,he says that intellectual virtue 
does not prompt this determination of   
the appetite4 ,of course it does not3 it
 prompts only the act of the power      
wherein it resides3 now it resides in   

the intellect1 not in the appetite2 and 
it prompts the act of the intellect1    
which however is cot always followed by 
an act of appetite in accordance with   
it4  #b4 ,another distinction may be    
gathered from ,st4 ,thomas 7#a;a #b1 q4 
#ba1 art4 #b1 ad #b71 that the special  
intellectual habit called art disposes a
 man to act correctly towards some      
particular end1 but a moral habit       
towards the common end1 scope and       
purpose of all human life4 ,thus medical
 skill ministers to the particular end  
of healing3 while the moral habit of    
temperance serves the general end1 which
 is final happiness and perfection4 ,so 
to give a wrong prescription through    
sheer antecedent ignorance1 is to fail  
as a doctor3 but to get drunk wittingly 
and knowingly is to fail as a man4  #c4 
,the grand distinction between          
intellectual and moral habits seems to  
be this1 that moral habits reside in    
powers which may act against the dictate
 of the understanding1--the error of    

,socrates1 noticed above 7c4 v41 s4 ii41
 n4 #b1 p4 #gj71 lay in supposing that  
they could not so act3 whereas the power
 which is the seat of the intellectual  
habits1 the understanding1 cannot       
possibly act against itself4 ,habits    
dispose the subject to elicit acts of   
the power wherein they reside4 ,moral   
habits induce acts of will and sensitive
 appetite3 intellectual habits1 acts of 
intellect4 ,will and appetite may act   
against what the agent knows to be best3
 but intellect cannot contradict        
intellect4 ,it cannot judge that to be  
true and beautiful which it knows to be 
false and foul4 ,if a musician strikes  
discords on purpose1 or a grammarian    
makes solecisms wilfully1 he is not     
therein contradicting the intellectual  
habit within him1 for it is the office  
of such a habit to aid the intellect to 
judge correctly1 and the intellect here 
does correctly judge the effect         
produced4 ,on the other hand1 if the    
musician or grammarian blunders1 the    

intellect within him has not been       
contradicted1 seeing that he knew no    
better3 the habit of grammar or music   
has not been violated1 but has failed to
 cover the case4 ,therefore the         
intellectual habit is not a safeguard to
 keep a man from going against his      
intelligent self4 ,no such safeguard is 
needed3 the thing is impossible1 in the 
region of pure intellect4 ,in a region  
where no temptation could enter1        
intellectual habits would suffice alone 
of themselves to make a perfectly       
virtuous man4 ,to avoid evil and choose 
good1 it would be enough to know the one
 and the other4 ,but in this world      
seductive reasonings sway the will1 and 
fits of passion the sensitive appetite1 
prompting the one and the other to rise 
up and break away from what the         
intellect knows all along to be the true
 good of man4 ,unless moral virtue be   
there to hold these powers to their     
allegiance1 they will frequently disobey
 the understanding4 ,such disobedience  

is more irrational than any mere        
intellectual error4 ,in an error purely 
intellectual1 where the will has no     
part1 the objective truth indeed is     
missed1 but the intelligence that dwells
 within the man is not flouted and      
gain-sayed4 ,it takes two to make a     
contradiction as to make a quarrel4 ,but
 an intellectual error has only one     
side4 ,the intellect utters some false  
pronouncement1 and there is nothing     
within the man that says otherwise4 ,in 
the moral error there is a contradiction
 within1 an intestine quarrel4 ,the     
intellect pronounces a thing not good1  
not to be taken1 and the sensitive      
appetite will throw a veil over the face
 of intellect1 and seize upon the thing4
 ,that amounts to a contradiction of a  
man's own intelligent self4  #d4 ,it    
appears that1 absolutely speaking1      
intellectual virtue is the greater      
perfection of a man3 indeed in the act  
of that virtue1 as we have seen1 his    
crowning perfection and happiness lies4 

,but moral virtue is the greater        
safeguard4 ,the breach of moral virtue  
is the direr evil4 ,sin is worse than   
ignorance1 and more against reason1     
because it is against the doer's own    
reason4 ,moral virtue then is more      
necessary than intellectual in a world  
where evil is rife1 as it is a more     
vital thing to escape grievous disease  
than to attain the highest development  
of strength and beauty4 ,and as disease 
spoils strength and beauty1 not indeed  
always taking them away1 but rendering  
them valueless1 so evil moral habits    
subvert intellectual virtue1 and turn it
 aside in a wrong direction4 ,the       
vicious will keeps the intellect from   
contemplating the objects which are the 
best good of man3 so the contemplation  
is thrown away on inferior things1 often
 on base things1 and an overgrowth of   
folly ensues on those points whereupon  
it most imports a man to be wise4  ,to  
sum up all in a sentence1 not exclusive 
but dealing with characteristics3 the   

moral virtues are the virtues for this  
world1 intellectual virtue is the virtue
 of the life to come4  ,readings4--,st4 
,thos41 #a;a #b1 q4 #eh1 art4 #b1 in    
corp42 ,ar41 ,eth41 ,i41 xiii41 #ae-ai2 
,st4 ,thos41 #a;a #b1 q4 #ff1 art4 #c4  
,,section ,,iv4--,of the ,mean in ,moral
 ,virtue4   #a4 ,moral virtue is a habit
 of doing the right thing in the conduct
 of the will and the government of the  
passions4 ,doing right is opposed to    
overdoing the thing1 and to underdoing  
it4 ,doing right is taking what it suits
 a rational nature to desire1 and       
eschewing what is unsuitable under the  
circumstances4 7c4 i41 n4 #e47  ,but a  
thing may be unsuitable in two ways1 by 
excess1 and by defect3 the rational     
choice is in the mean between these two4
 ,the moral order here is illustrated   
from the physical4 ,too much exercise   
and too little alike impair the         
strength2 so of meat and drink in regard
 to health2 but diet and exercise in    
moderation1 and in proportion to the    

subject1 create1 increase1 and preserve 
both health and strength4 ,so it is with
 temperance1 and fortitude1 and all     
varieties of moral virtue4 ,he who      
fights shy of everything1 and never     
stands his ground1 becomes a coward2    
while he who never fears at all1 but    
walks boldly up to all danger1 turns out
 rash4 ,the enjoyer of every pleasure1  
who knows not what it is to deny himself
 aught1 is a libertine and loose liver2 
while to throw over all the graces and  
delicious things of life1 not as ,st4   
,paul did1 who counted all things dross1
 that he might gain ,christ1 but        
absolutely1 as though such things were  
of themselves devoid of attraction1 is  
boorishness and insensibility4 ,thus the
 virtues of temperance and fortitude    
perish in excess and defect1 and live in
 the mean4 ,it is to be noticed in this 
illustration that the mean of health is 
not necessarily the mean of virtue4     
,what is too little food1 and too much  
exercise1 for the animal well-being of a

 man1 may be the right amount of both   
for him in some higher relation1        
inasmuch as he is more than a mere      
animal2 as for a soldier in a hard      
campaign1 where a sufficiency of food   
and rest is incompatible with his       
serving his country's need4  #b4 ,the   
taking of means to an end implies the   
taking them in moderation1 not in       
excess1 or we shall overshoot the mark1 
nor again so feebly and inadequately as 
to fall short of it4 ,no mere instrument
 admits of an unlimited use2 but the end
 to be gained fixes limits to the use of
 the instrument1 thus far1 no more1 and 
no less4 ,wherever then reason requires 
an end to be gained1 it requires a use  
of means proportionate to the end1 not  
coming short of it1 nor going so far    
beyond as to defeat the purpose in view4
 ,the variety of good that is called the
 ,useful lies within definite limits1   
between two wildernesses1 so to speak1  
stretching out undefined into the       
distance1 wilderness of ,excess on the  

one side1 and wilderness of ,defect on  
the other4  #c4 ,a true work of art     
cannot be added to or taken from without
 spoiling it4 ,a perfect church would be
 spoiled by a lengthening of the chancel
 or raising the tower1 albeit there are 
buildings1 secular and ecclesiastical1  
that might be drawn out two miles long  
and not look any worse4 ,the colouring  
of a picture must not be too violent and
 positive2 but artistic colouring must  
be chaste1 and artistic utterance       
gentle1 and artistic action calm and    
indicative of self-command4 ,not that   
voice and action should not be          
impassioned for a great emergency1 but  
the very passion should bear the mark of
 control3 in the great master's phrase1 
you must not tear a passion to tatters4 
,it is by moderation sitting upon power 
that works of art truly masculine and   
mighty are produced2 and by this sign   
they are marked off from the lower host 
of things1 gorgeous and redundant1 and  
still more from the order of the loose1 

the lawless1 the exaggerated1 the       
insolent1 and the profane4  #d4 ,on     
these considerations ,aristotle framed  
his celebrated definition of moral      
virtue3 the habit of fixing the choice  
in the golden mean in relation to       
ourselves1 defined by reason1 as a      
prudent man would define it4 ,all virtue
 is a habit1 as we have seen--a habit of
 doing that which is the proper act of  
the power wherein the habit resides4    
,one class of moral virtues is resident 
in the will1 the act of which power is  
properly called choice4 ,the rest of the
 moral virtues reside in the sensitive  
appetite1 which also may be said to     
choose that object on which it fastens4 
,thus moral virtue is a habit of fixing 
the choice4 ,the golden mean between two
 extremes of excess and defect          
respectively has been already explained1
 and may be further shown by a review of
 the virtues4 ,besides fortitude and    
temperance1 already described1          
liberality is a mean between prodigality

 and stinginess2 magnificence between   
vulgar display and pettiness3           
magnanimity between vainglory and       
pusillanimity2 truthfulness between     
exaggeration and dissimulation2         
friendship between complaisance1 or     
flattery1 and frowardness1--and so of   
the rest4 ,the golden mean must be taken
 in relation to ourselves1 because in   
many matters of behaviour and the       
management of the passions the right    
amount for one person would be excessive
 for another1 according to varieties of 
age1 sex1 station1 and disposition4     
,thus anger that might become a layman  
might be unbefitting in a churchman2 and
 a man might be thought loquacious if he
 talked as much as a discreet matron4   
,footnote #e ,the golden mean1 then1    
must be defined by reason according to  
the particular circumstances of each    
case4 ,but as ,reason herself is to seek
 where she is not guided by ,prudence1  
the mean of virtue must be defined1 not 
by the reason of the buffoon            

,pantolabus1 or of ,nomentanus the      
spendthrift1 but as a prudent man would 
define it1 given an insight into the    
case4  ,footnote #e3 ,ar41 ,pol41       
,,iii41 iv41 #ag1 says just the         
converse1 which marks the altered       
position of woman in modern society4    
#e4 ,the golden mean1 as ,horace named  
it 7,od41 ii41 #aj71 obtains            
principally1 if not solely1 in living   
things1 and in what appertains to living
 things1 and in objects of art4 ,a lake1
 as such1 has no natural dimensions3 it 
may be ten miles long1 it may be a      
hundred2 but an elephant or an oak-tree 
cannot go beyond a certain growth4      
,there is a vast range between the      
temperature of a blast-furnace and the  
temperature of the ice-pack on the      
,polar ,sea1 but very limited is the    
range possible in the blood of a living 
man4 ,viewed artistically1 a hill may be
 too low1 or a lake want width1 for     
man's eye to rest upon it with perfect  
satisfaction4 ,the golden mean1 then1 is

 an artistic conception1 and what ,i may
 call an anthropological conception3 it 
suits man1 and is required by man1      
though ,nature may spurn and over-ride  
it4 ,the earthquake1 the hurricane1 and 
the angry ocean are not in the golden   
mean1 not at least from a human point of
 view4 ,if man chooses to personify and 
body forth the powers of nature1 he     
creates some monstrous uncouth figure1  
like the ,assyrian and ,egyptian idols2 
but if man makes a study of man1 and    
brings genius and patient elaboration to
 bear on his work1 there emerges the    
symmetry and perfect proportion of the  
,greek statue4 ,no people ever made so  
much of the beauty of the human form as 
the ancient ,greeks3 they made it the   
object of a passion that marked their   
religion1 their institutions1 their     
literature1 and their art4 ,their       
virtues and their vices turned upon it4 
,hence the golden mean is eminently a   
,greek conception1 a leading idea of the
 ,hellenic race4 ,the ,greek hated a    

thing overdone1 a gaudy ornament1 a     
proud title1 a fulsome compliment1 a    
high-flown speech1 a wordy peroration4  
,nothing too much was the inscription   
over the lintel of the national         
sanctuary at ,delphi4 ,it is the        
surpassing grace of ,greek art of the   
best period1 that in it there shines out
 the highest power1 with nothing too    
much of straining after effect4 ,the    
study of ,greek literary models operates
 as a corrective to redundancy1 and to  
what ill-conditioned minds take to be   
fine writing4 ,the ,greek artist knew   
just how far to go1 and when to stop4   
,that point he called1 in his own       
unsurpassed tongue1 the ,greek3 kairos4 
,the right measure 7kairos7 is at the   
head of all1 says ,pindar4 ,booby1 not  
to have understood by how much the half 
is more than the whole1 is the quaint   
cry of ,hesiod4 ,aeschylus puts these   
verses in the mouth of his ,furies2     
,the golden mean is ,god's delight3     
,extremes are hateful in ,his sight4    

,hold by the mean1 and glorify   ,nor   
anarchy nor slavery4  ,characteristic of
 ,socrates was his irony1 or way of     
understating himself1 in protest against
 the extravagant professions of the     
,sophists4 ,in the reckoning of the     
,pythagoreans1 the ,infinite1 the       
,unlimited1 or ,unchecked1 was marked as
 evil1 in opposition to good1 which was 
the ,limited4 ,from thence1 ,plato1     
taking up his parable1 writes3 ,the     
goddess of the ,limit1 my fair          
,philebus1 seeing insolence and all     
manner of wickedness breaking loose from
 all limit in point of gratification and
 gluttonous greed1 established a law and
 order of limited being2 and you say    
this restraint was the death of         
pleasure2 ,i say it was the saving of   
it4 ,going upon the tradition of his    
countrymen1 upon their art and          
philosophy1 their poetry1 eloquence1    
politics1 and inmost sentiment1         
,aristotle formulated the law of moral  
virtue1 to hold by the golden mean1 as  

discerned by the prudent in view of the 
present circumstances1 between the two  
extremes of excess and defect4  #f4     
,there is only one object on which man  
may throw himself without reserve1 his  
last end1 the adequate object of his    
happiness1 ,god4 ,god is approached by  
faith1 hope1 and charity2 but it belongs
 not to philosophy to speak of these    
supernatural virtues4 ,there remains to 
the philosopher the natural virtue of   
religion1 which is a part of justice4   
,religion has to do with the inward act 
of veneration and with its outward      
expression4 ,to the latter the rule of  
the mean at once applies4 ,moderation in
 religion is necessary1 so far as       
externals are concerned4 ,not that any  
outward assiduity1 pomp1 splendour1 or  
costliness1 can be too much in itself1  
or anything like enough1 to worship ,god
 with1 but it may be too much for our   
limited means1 which in this world are  
drawn on by other calls4 ,but our inward
 veneration for ,god and desire to do   

,him honour1 can never be too intense3  
,blessing the ,lord1 exalt ,him as much 
as you can3 for ,he is above all praise4
 7,ecclus4 xliii4 #cc47  #g4 ,the rule  
of the mean1 then1 is a human rule1 for 
dealing with men1 and with human goods  
considered as means4 ,it is a ,greek    
rule3 for the ,greeks were of all       
nations the fondest admirers of man and 
the things of man4 ,but when we ascend  
to ,god1 we are out among the           
immensities and eternities4 ,the        
vastness of creation1 the infinity of   
the ,creator1--there is no mode or      
measure there4 ,in those heights the    
,hebrew ,psalmist loved to soar4        
,christianity1 with its central dogma of
 the ,incarnation1 is the meeting of    
,hebrew and ,greek4 ,that mystery       
clothes the ,lord ,god of hosts with the
 measured beauty1 grace1 and truth1 that
 man can enter into4 ,but enough of     
this4 ,enough to show that the          
,aristotelian doctrine of the mean is a 
highly suggestive and wide-reaching     

doctrine beyond the sphere of ,morals4  
,it throws out one great branch into    
,art1 another into ,theology4  #h4 ,the 
vicious extremes1 on this side and on   
that of a virtue1 are not always        
conterminous with the virtue itself1 but
 sometimes another and more excellent   
virtue intervenes2 as in giving we may  
pass from justice to liberality1 and    
only through passing the bounds of      
liberality1 do we arrive at the vicious 
extreme of prodigality4 ,so penitential 
fasting intervenes between temperance in
 food and undue neglect of sustenance4  
,but it is to be noted that the central 
virtue1 so to speak1 as justice1        
sobriety1 chastity1 is for all persons  
on all occasions3 the more excellent    
side-virtue1 as liberality1 or total    
abstinence1 is for special occasions and
 special classes of persons4            
,readings4--,ar41 ,eth41 ,,ii41 ii41 #f1
 #g2 ib41 ,,ii41 cc4 #f-i2 ,hor41 ,odes1
 ,,ii41 #aj2 ,ruskin1 ,modern ,painters1
 p4 #c1 s4 i41 c4 x4   ,,section        

,v4--,of ,cardinal ,virtues4   #a4 ,the 
enumeration of cardinal virtues is a    
piece of ,greek philosophy that has     
found its ways into the catechism4      
,prudence1 justice1 fortitude1 and      
temperance are mentioned by ,plato as   
recognised heads of virtue4 ,they are   
recognised1 though less clearly1 by     
,xenophon1 reporting the conversations  
of ,socrates4 ,it does not look as      
though ,socrates invented the division3 
he seems to have received it from an    
earlier source1 possibly ,pythagoras4   
,they are mentioned in ,holy ,scripture 
7,wisdom viii41 #g1 which is however a  
,greek book71 and ,proverbs viii41 #ad4 
,they make no figure in the philosophies
 of ,india and ,china4  #b4 ,the        
cardinal virtues are thus made          
out4--,virtue is a habit that gives a   
man readiness in behaving according to  
the reason that is in him4 ,such a habit
 may be fourfold4 7a7 ,it may reside in 
the reason1 or intellect itself1        
enabling it readily to discern the      

reasonable thing to do1 according to    
particular circumstances as they occur4 
,that habit is the virtue of prudence4  
7b7 ,it may reside in the rational      
appetite1 otherwise called the will1    
disposing a man to act fairly and       
reasonably in his dealings with other   
men4 ,that is justice4 7c7 ,it may      
reside in the irrational1 or sensitive1 
appetite1 and that to a twofold purpose2
 7a7 to restrain the said appetite in   
its concupiscible part from a wanton and
 immoderate eagerness after pleasure2   
that is temperance3 7b7 to incite the   
said appetite in its irascible part not 
to shrink from danger1 where there is   
reason for going on in spite of danger2 
that is fortitude4  #c4 ,plato compares 
the rational soul in man to a           
charioteer1 driving two horses3 one     
horse representing the concupiscible1   
the other the irascible part of the     
sensitive appetite4 ,he draws a vivid   
picture of the resistance of the        
concupiscible part against reason1 how  

madly it rushes after lawless pleasure1 
and how it is only kept in restraint by 
main force again and again applied1 till
 gradually it grows submissive4 ,this   
submissiveness1 gradually acquired1 is  
the virtue of temperance4 ,clearly the  
habit dwells in the appetite1 not in    
reason3 in the horse1 not in the        
charioteer4 ,it is that habitual state1 
which in a horse we call being broken   
in4  ,the concupiscible appetite is     
broken in to reason by temperance       
residing within it4 ,plato lavishes all 
evil names on the steed that represents 
the concupiscible part4 ,but the        
irascible part1 the other steed1 has its
 own fault1 and that fault twofold1     
sometimes of over-venturesomeness1      
sometimes of shying and turning tail4   
,the habit engendered1 in the irascible 
part1 of being neither over-venturesome 
nor over-timorous1 but going by reason1 
is termed fortitude4 ,footnote #f       
,footnote #f3 ,it will help an          
,englishman to understand ,plato's      

comparison1 if instead of concupiscible 
part and irascible part1 we call the one
 steed ,passion and the other ,pluck4   
,pluck fails1 and ,passion runs to      
excess1 till ,pluck is formed to        
fortitude1 and ,passion to temperance4  
#d4 ,as the will is the rational        
appetite1 the proper object of which is 
rational good1 it does not need to be   
prompted by any habit to embrace        
rational good in what concerns only the 
inward administration of the agent's own
 self4 ,there is no difficulty in that  
department1 provided the sensitive      
appetite be kept in hand by fortitude   
and temperance4 ,but where there is     
question of external relations with     
other men1 it is not enough that the    
sensitive appetite be regulated1 but a  
third virtue is necessary1 the habit of 
justice1 to be planted in the will1     
which would otherwise be too weak to    
attend steadily to points1 not of the   
agent's own good merely1 but of the good
 of other men4  #e4 ,thus we have the   

four cardinal virtues3 prudence1 a habit
 of the intellect2 temperance1 a habit  
of the concupiscible appetite2          
fortitude1 a habit of the irascible     
appetite2 and justice1 a habit of the   
will4 ,temperance and ,fortitude in the 
,home ,department2 ,justice for ,foreign
 ,affairs2 with ,prudence for ,premier4 
,or1 to use another comparison1 borrowed
 from ,plato1 prudence is the health of 
the soul1 temperance its beauty1        
fortitude its strength1 and justice its 
wealth4  ,readings4--,st4 ,thos41 #a;a  
#b1 q4 #fa1 art4 #b1 in corp42 ib41 q4  
#ef1 art4 #d1 in corp41 ad #a-c2 ib41 q4
 #ef1 art4 #f1 in corp41 ad #a1 #c2 ib41
 q4 #ei1 art4 #d1 in corp41 ad #b2      
,plato1 ,laws1 #fca ,b1 ,c4   ,,section 
,,vi4--,of ,prudence4   #a4 ,prudence is
 right reason applied to practice1 or   
more fully it may be defined1 the habit 
of intellectual discernment that enables
 one to hit upon the golden mean of     
moral virtue and the way to secure that 
mean4 ,thus prudence tells one what     

amount of punishment is proper for a    
particular delinquent1 and how to secure
 his getting it4 ,it is to be observed  
that prudence does not will the golden  
mean in question1 but simply indicates  
it4 ,to will and desire the mean is the 
work of the moral virtue concerned      
therewith3 as in the case given it is   
the work of vindictive justice4  #b4    
,from the definition of moral virtue    
above given 7c4 v41 s4 iv41 n4 #d1 p4   
#gi71 it is clear that no moral virtue  
can come into act without prudence3 for 
it is the judgment of the prudent man   
that must define in each case the golden
 mean in relation to ourselves1 which   
every moral virtue aims at4 ,thus1      
without prudence1 fortitude passes into 
rashness1 vindictive justice into       
harshness1 clemency into weakness1      
religion into superstition4  #c4 ,but   
may not one with no prudence to guide   
him hit upon the golden mean by some    
happy impulse1 and thus do an act of    
virtue8 ,we answer1 he may do a good    

act1 and if you will1 a virtuous act1   
but not an act of virtue1 not an act    
proceeding from a pre-existent habit in 
the doer4 ,the act is like a good stroke
 made by chance1 not by skill2 and like 
such a stroke1 it cannot be readily     
repeated at the agent's pleasure4 7,see 
c4 v41 s4 i41 n4 #d1 p4 #ff2 and ,ar41  
,eth41 ,,ii41 iv41 #b47  #d4 ,prudence  
in its essence is an intellectual       
virtue1 being a habit resident in the   
understanding3 but it deals with the    
subject-matter of the moral virtues1    
pointing out the measure of temperance1 
the bounds of fortitude1 or the path of 
justice4 ,it is the habit of            
intellectual discernment that must      
enlighten every moral virtue in its     
action4 ,there is no virtue that goes   
blundering and stumbling in the dark4   
#e4 ,he is a prudent man1 that can give 
counsel to others and to himself in     
order to the attainment of ends that are
 worthy of human endeavour4 ,if unworthy
 ends are intended1 however sagaciously 

they are pursued1 that is not prudence4 
,we may call it sagacity1 or shrewdness1
 being a habit of ready discernment and 
application of means to ends4 ,napoleon 
,i4 was conspicuous for this sagacity4  
,it is the key to success in this world4
 ,but prudence discovers worthy ends    
only1 and to them only does it provide  
means4 ,the intellect is often blinded  
by passion1 by desire and by fear1 so as
 not to discern the proper end and term 
to make for in a particular instance and
 a practical case4 ,the general rules of
 conduct remain in the mind1 as that1   
,in anger be mindful of mercy3 but the  
propriety of mercy under the present    
provocation drops out of sight4 ,the    
intellect does not discern the golden   
mean of justice and mercy in relation to
 the circumstances in which the agent   
now finds himself4 ,in other words1 the 
habit of prudence has failed2 and it has
 failed because of the excess of        
passion4 ,thus prudence is dependent on 
the presence of the virtues that        

restrain passion1 namely1 fortitude and 
temperance4 ,a like argument would hold 
for the virtue of justice1 that         
rectifies inordinate action in dealing  
with another4 ,the conclusion is1 that  
as the moral virtues cannot exist       
without prudence1 so neither can        
prudence exist without them3 for vice   
corrupts the judgment of prudence4  #f4 
,hence we arrive at a settlement of the 
question1 whether the virtues can be    
separated1 or whether to possess one is 
to possess all4 ,we must distinguish    
between the rudimentary forms of virtue 
and the perfect habit4 ,the rudimentary 
forms certainly can exist separate3 they
 are a matter of temperament and        
inherited constitution3 and the man whom
 nature has kindly predisposed to       
benevolence1 she has perhaps very       
imperfectly prepared for prudence1      
fortitude1 or sobriety4 ,but one perfect
 habit of any one of the four cardinal  
virtues1 acquired by repeated acts1 and 
available at the call of reason1        

involves the presence1 in a matured     
state1 of the other three habits also4  
,a man who acts irrationally upon one   
ground1 will behave irrationally on     
other grounds also3 or if his conduct be
 rational there1 it will not be from    
regard for reason1 but from impulse1    
temperament1 or from some other motive  
than the proper motive of the virtue    
which he seems to be exercising4        
,readings4--,st4 ,thos41 #a;a #b1 q4    
#ed1 art4 #d2 ib41 q4 #eh1 art4 #e1 in  
corp42 ib41 #b;a #b1 q4 #dg1 art4 #g1   
#ab1 #ac2 ,ar41 ,eth41 ,,vi41 v42 ib41  
,,vi41 xii41 #i1 #aj2 ib41 ,,vi41 xiii41
 #f2 ,st4 ,francis of ,sales1 ,of the   
,love of ,god1 bk4 xi41 c4 vii4         
,,section ,,vii4--,of ,temperance4   #a4
 ,temperance is a virtue which regulates
 by the judgment of reason those desires
 and delights which attend upon the     
operations whereby human nature is      
preserved in the individual and         
propagated in the species4 ,temperance  
is the virtue contrary to the two deadly

 sins of ,gluttony and ,lust4 ,as       
against the former1 it represents       
,abstinence1 or moderation in solid     
food1 and ,sobriety1 which is moderation
 in drink4 ,as against the latter1 it is
 the great virtue of ,chastity4 ,the    
student must bear in mind that1 to a    
philosopher1 ,temperance does not mean  
,total ,abstinence1 and ,abstinence is  
quite independent of ,fridays and       
flesh-meat4 ,temperance then is made up 
of ,abstinence1 ,sobriety1 and          
,chastity4  ,aristotle writes3 ,cases of
 falling short in the taking of         
pleasure1 and of people enjoying        
themselves less than they ought1 are not
 apt to occur3 for such insensibility is
 not human3 but if there be any one to  
whom nothing is pleasant1 and all comes 
alike in the matter of taste1 he must be
 far from the state and condition of    
humanity3 such a being has no name1     
because he is nowhere met with4 ,this is
 true1 because where there is question  
of a virtue1 such as ,temperance1       

resident in the concupiscible appetite1 
we are not concerned with any sullenness
 or moroseness of will1 nor with any    
scrupulosity or imbecility of judgment1 
refusing to gratify the reasonable      
cravings of appetite1 but with the      
habitual leaning and lie of the appetite
 itself4 ,now the concupiscible appetite
 in every man1 of its own nature1 leans 
to its proper object of delectable good4
 ,no virtue is requisite to secure it   
from too little inclination that way3   
but to restrain the appetite from going 
out excessively to delight is the       
function1 and the sole function1 of     
,temperance4 ,the measure of restraint  
is relative1 as the golden mean is      
relative1 and varies with different     
persons and in view of different ends4  
,the training of the athlete is not the 
training of the saint4  #c4 ,besides the
 primary virtue of ,temperance1 and its 
subordinate species 7enumerated above1  
n4 #a71 certain other virtues are       
brought under ,temperance in a secondary

 sense1 as observing in easier matters  
that moderation and self-restraint which
 the primary virtue keeps in the matter 
that is most difficult of all4 ,st4     
,thomas calls these potential parts of  
,temperance4 ,there is question here of 
what is most difficult to man as an     
animal1 not of what is most difficult to
 him as a rational being4 ,to rational  
man1 as such1 ambition is harder to     
restrain than sensuality3 which is      
proved by the fact that fewer men1 who  
have any ambition in them1 do restrain  
that passion than those who restrain the
 animal propensities that are common to 
all4 ,but to man as an animal 7and vast 
numbers of the human race rise little   
above the animal state71 it is hardest  
of all things to restrain those         
appetites that go with the maintenance  
and propagation of flesh and blood4     
,these then are the proper matter of    
,temperance3 other virtues1 potential   
parts of ,temperance1 restrain other    
cravings which are less animal4 ,of     

these virtues the most noticeable are   
humility1 meekness1 and modesty4        
,footnote #g  ,footnote #g3 ,this is    
,st4 ,thomas's arrangement1 placing     
,humility under ,temperance4 ,the       
connection of ,humility with            
,magnanimity1 and thereby with          
,fortitude1 is indicated pp4 #ajj1 #aja4
  #d4 ,there is a thirst after honour   
and preeminence1 arising from           
self-esteem1 and prevalent especially   
where there is little thought of ,god1  
and scant reverence for the present     
majesty of heaven4 ,a man who thinks    
little of his ,maker is great in his own
 eyes1 as our green ,english hills are  
mountains to one who has not seen the   
,alpine heights and snows4 ,apart from  
the consideration of ,god there is no   
humility2 and this is why ,aristotle1   
who treats of virtues as they minister  
to the dealings of man with man1 makes  
no mention of this virtue4 ,there are   
certain outward manifestations in words1
 acts1 and gestures1 the demeanour of a 

humble man1 which is largely identified 
with modesty and with submission to     
others as representing ,god4  #e4       
,modesty is that outward comportment1   
style of dress1 conversation1 and       
carriage1 which indicates the presence  
of ,temperance1 set up on holy pedestal 
7,plato1 ,phaedr41 #bed ,b7 in the heart
 within4  #f4 ,meekness is moderation in
 anger1 and is or should be the virtue  
of all men4 ,clemency is moderation in  
punishment1 and is the virtue of men in 
office1 who bear the sword or the rod4  
#g4 ,as regards the vices opposite to   
,temperance1 an important distinction is
 to be drawn between him who sins by    
outburst of passion and him whose very  
principles are corrupt4 ,footnote #h    
,the former in doing evil acknowledges  
it to be evil1 and is prone to repent of
 it afterwards3 the latter has lost his 
belief in virtue1 and his admiration for
 it3 he drinks in iniquity like water1  
with no after-qualms2 he glories in his 
shame4 ,the former is reclaimable1 the  

latter is reprobate3 his intellect as   
well as his heart is vitiated and gone  
bad4 ,if there were no miracles1 he     
would be a lost man3 but ,god can work  
miracles in the moral as in the physical
 order3 in that there is hope for him4  
,footnote #h3 ,see the note in ,aquinas 
,ethicus1 ,vol4 ,i41 pp4 #agj1 #aga4    
#h4 ,a nation need not be virtuous in   
the great bulk of her citizens1 to be   
great in war and in dominion1 in laws1  
in arts1 and in literature3 but the bulk
 of the people must possess at least the
 sense and appreciation of virtue in    
order to such national greatness4 ,when 
that sense is lost1 the nation is undone
 and become impotent1 for art no less   
than for empire4 ,thus the ,greece of   
,pericles and of ,phidias fell1 to be   
living ,greece no more4  #i4 ,as in     
other moral matters1 no hard and fast   
line of division exists between sinning 
from passion and sinning on principle1  
but cases of the one shade into cases of
 the others1 and by frequent indulgence 

of passion principle is brought         
gradually to decay4  ,readings4--,ar41  
,eth41 ,,iii41 x42 ,st4 ,thos41 #b;a #b1
 q4 #ada1 art4 #b2 ib41 q4 #ada1 art4   
#c1 in corp42 ib41 q4 #adb1 art4 #a2    
ib41 q4 #adc1 art4 #a1 in corp41 ad #b1 
#c2 ib41 q4 #afa1 art4 #a1 ad #e2 ib41  
q4 #afa1 art4 #b1 in corp42 ib41 q4     
#afa1 art4 #f1 in corp41 ad #a2 ib41 q4 
#aeg1 art4 #a1 in corp41 ad #c2 ib1 q4  
#aef1 art4 #c2 ,ar41 ,eth41 ,,vii41     
viii4   ,,section ,,viii4--,of          
,fortitude4   #a4 ,as ,temperance is a  
curb1 restraining animal nature in the  
pursuit of the good to which it goes out
 most eagerly1 namely1 life and the     
means of its continuance1 so ,fortitude 
also is a curb1 withholding that nature 
from irrational flight from the evil    
which it most dreads4 ,aristotle tells  
us what that evil is3 ,most dreadful of 
all things is death1 for it is the      
limit1 and for the dead man there       
appears to be no further good nor evil  
left4 7,eth41 ,,iii1 vi41 b47 ,death is 

truly the limit to human existence3 for1
 though the soul be immortal1 the being 
of flesh and blood1 that we call man1 is
 dissolved in death1 and1 apart from    
supernatural hope of the resurrection1  
extinct for ever4 ,death therefore is   
the direst of all evils in the animal   
economy2 and as such1 is supremely      
abhorred by the sensitive appetite1     
which is the animal part of man4        
,fortitude moderates this abhorrence and
 fear by the dictate of reason4 ,reason 
shows that there are better things than 
life1 and things worse than death1 for  
man in his spiritual capacity as an     
intellectual and immortal being4  #b4   
,fortitude is a mean between ,cowardice 
and ,rashness1 to which opposite        
extremes we are carried by the contrary 
passions of ,fear and ,daring           
respectively4 ,fortitude thus is a      
two-sided virtue1 moderating two        
opposite tendencies3 while ,temperance  
is one-sided1 moderating ,desire alone4 
,life1 rationally considered1 bears     

undoubtedly a high value1 and is not to 
be lightly thrown away1 or risked upon  
trivial or ignoble objects4 ,the brave  
man is circumspect in his ventures1 and 
moderate in his fears1 which implies    
that he does fear somewhat4 ,he will    
fear superhuman visitations1 as the     
judgments of ,god4 ,he will dread       
disgrace1 and still more1 sin4 ,he will 
fear death in an unworthy cause4 ,and   
even in a good cause1 it has well been  
said3 ,the truly brave man is not he who
 fears no danger1 but the man whose mind
 subdues the fear1 and braves the danger
 that nature shrinks from4 ,the ,duke of
 ,marlborough is said to have quaked in 
the saddle as he rode into action1      
saying3 ,this poor body trembles at what
 the mind within is about to do4        
,fortitude then is the virtue that      
restrains fear and regulates            
venturesomeness by the judgment of      
reason1 in danger especially of a grand 
and glorious death4  #c4 ,to the        
ancients1 there was no grander object of

 devotion than the ,state1 their native 
city3 no direr misfortune than its      
dissolution1 or the loss of its         
self-government3 no nobler death than to
 die in arms in its defence4 ,as old    
,tyrtus sang3    ,a noble thing it is to
 lie dead1 fallen in the front ranks1   
,a brave man in battle for his country4 
,footnote #i  ,footnote #i3   ,greek3   
tethnamenai gar kalon1 eni promachoisi  
pesonta1   andr' agathon peri hae       
patridi marnamenon4 7,greek3 ,tyrtaeus  
apud ,lycurg7  ,such a death was taken  
to be the seal and stamp of the highest 
fortitude4 ,nor has ,christianity dimmed
 the glory that invests a soldier's     
death4 ,only it points to a brighter    
glory1 and a death in a still nobler    
cause1 the death of the martyr who dies 
for the faith1 and becomes valiant in   
battle for what is more to him than any 
earthly city1 the ,church1 the ,city of 
,god4 ,nor must the martyr of charity1  
who dies in succouring his neighbour1 go
 without the praise of fortitude3 nor1  

in short1 any one who braves death1 or  
other heavy affliction1 in the discharge
 of duty1 or when forwarding a good     
cause4  #d4 ,a man may brave death in a 
good cause1 and not be doing an act of  
fortitude4 ,so he may subscribe a large 
sum to a charitable purpose without any 
exercise of the virtue of charity4 ,a   
virtue is then only exercised1 when its 
outward act is performed from the proper
 motive of the virtue1 and not from any 
lower motive4 ,thus the proper motive of
 ,fortitude is the conviction that death
 is an evil1 the risk of which is to be 
left out of count as a circumstance     
relatively inconsiderable1 when there is
 question of the defence of certain     
interests dearer to a good man than     
life4 ,an improper motive would be      
anger1 which1 however useful as an      
accessory1 by itself is not an          
intellectual motive at all1 and         
therefore no motive of virtue4 ,the     
recklessness of an angry man is not     
,fortitude4 ,it is not ,fortitude to be 

brave from ignorance or stupidity1 not  
appreciating the danger3 nor again from 
experience1 knowing that the apparent   
danger is not real1 at least to         
yourself4 ,the brave man looks a real   
danger in the face1 and knows it1 and   
goes on in spite of it1 because so it is
 meet and just1 with the cause that he  
has1 to go on4  #e4 ,we may notice as   
potential parts of ,fortitude 7s4 vii41 
n4 #c1 p4 #ib71 the three virtues of    
,magnificence1 ,magnanimity1 and        
,patience4 ,it is the part of ,patience1
 philosophically to endure all          
sufferings short of death4 ,it is the   
part of the former two1 to dare wisely1 
not in a matter of life and death1 but  
in the matter of expense1 for           
,magnificence1 and of honour1 for       
,magnanimity4 ,magnificence1 technically
 understood1 observes the right measure 
in the expenditure of large sums of     
money4 ,as being conversant with large  
sums1 it differs from ,liberality4 ,a   
poor man may be liberal out of his      

little store1 but never magnificent4 ,it
 is a virtue in the rich1 not to be     
afraid of spending largely and lavishly 
on a great occasion1 or a grand purpose4
 ,the expense may be carried beyond what
 the occasion warrants3 that is one     
vicious extreme4 ,the other extreme     
would be to mar a costly work by sordid 
parsimony on a point of detail4 ,it is  
not easy to be magnificent3 in the first
 place1 because not many are rich2 and  
then because riches are seldom united   
with greatness of soul and good         
judgment4 ,something analogous to the   
virtue of ,magnificence is shown in the 
generous use of great abilities1 or1 in 
the supernatural order1 of great graces4
 ,the destinies of the world lie with   
those men who have it in their power to 
be magnificent4  #f4 ,we are come to    
,magnanimity and the ,magnanimous ,man1 
the great creation of ,aristotle4 ,as   
,magnanimity ranks under ,fortitude1    
there must be some fear to which the    
,magnanimous ,man rises superior1 as the

 brave man rises superior to the fear of
 death4 ,what ,magnanimity overcomes is 
the fear of undeserved dishonour4 ,the  
,magnanimous ,man is he who rates       
himself as worthy of great honours1 and 
is so worthy indeed4 ,when honour is    
paid to such a one1 he makes no great   
account of it1 feeling that it is but   
his due1 or even less than his due4 ,if 
he is dishonoured and insulted1 he      
despises the insult as an absurdity1    
offered to a man of his deserts4 ,he is 
too conscious of his real worth to be   
much affected by the expression of his  
neighbour's view of him4 ,for a man is  
most elated1 when complimented on an    
excellence which he was not very sure of
 possessing3 and most sensibly grieved  
at an insult1 where he half suspects    
himself of really making a poor figure1 
whereas he would like to make a good    
one4 ,it is doubtless the serene and    
settled conviction that ,englishmen     
generally entertain of the greatness of 
their country1 that enables them to     

listen with equanimity to abase of      
,england1 such as no other people in    
,europe would endure levelled at        
themselves4  #g4 ,proud is an epithet   
pretty freely applied to ,englishmen    
abroad1 and it seems to fit the         
character of the ,magnanimous ,man4 ,he 
seems a ,pharisee1 and worse than a     
,pharisee4 ,the ,pharisee's pride was to
 some extent mitigated by breaking out  
into that disease of children and silly 
persons1 vanity3 he did all his works to
 be seen of men4 ,but here the disease  
is all driven inwards1 and therefore    
more malignant4 ,the ,magnanimous ,man  
is so much in conceit with himself as to
 have become a scorner of his fellows4  
,he is self-sufficient1 a deity to      
himself1 the very type of ,satanic      
pride4 ,these are the charges brought   
against him4  #h4 ,to purify and rectify
 the character of the ,magnanimous ,man1
 we need to take a leaf out of the book 
of ,christianity4 ,not that there is    
anything essentially ,christian and     

supernatural in what we are about to    
allege3 otherwise it would not belong to
 philosophy3 it is a truth of reason1   
but a truth generally overlooked1 till  
it found its exponent in the ,christian 
preacher1 and its development in the    
articles of the ,christian faith4 ,the  
truth is this4 ,there is in every human 
being what theologians have called man  
and man3 man as he is of himself1 man   
again as he is by the gift and gracious 
mercy of ,god4 ,the reasonably          
,magnanimous ,man is saved from pride by
 this distinction4 ,of himself1 he knows
 that he is nothing but nothingness1    
meanness1 sinfulness1 and a walking sore
 of multitudinous actual sins4 ,i know  
that there dwelleth not in me1 that is1 
in my flesh1 any good4 7,rom4 vii4 #ah47
 ,if he is insulted1 he takes it as his 
due1 not any questionable due1 for then 
he would resent the insult1 but as being
 undoubtedly what he deserves4 ,if he is
 honoured1 he smiles at the absurdity of
 the compliments paid to him4 ,it is as 

if an old gentleman1 a prey to gout and 
rheumatism1 were lauded for his         
fleetness of foot4 ,he is then truly    
magnanimous on this side of his         
character by a kind of obverse          
magnanimity1 that bears insults         
handsomely1 as deserved1 and honours    
modestly1 as undeserved4  #i4 ,but let  
us go round to the other side of the    
reasonably ,magnanimous ,man4 ,he was   
defined to be1 one that deems himself   
worthy of great honours1 and is so      
worthy indeed4 ,now1 nothing is truly   
worthy of honour but virtue4 ,he must   
then be a good man1 full of all virtues2
 and all this goodness that he has1 he  
recognises as being in him of ,god4 ,he 
has received ,god's ,spirit--or         
something analogous in the natural order
 to the gift of the ,holy ,ghost--that  
he may know the things that are given   
him of ,god4 7#b ,cor4 ii4 #ab47 ,it is 
told of ,st4 ,francis of ,assisi1 the   
humblest of men1 that on one occasion   
when he and his companions received from

 some persons extraordinary marks of    
veneration1 he1 contrary to his usual   
wont1 took it not at all amiss3 and said
 to his companions1 who wondered at his 
behaviour1 ,let them alone3 they cannot 
too much honour the work of ,god in us4 
,this magnanimity bears honours         
gracefully1 and insult unflinchingly1   
from a consciousness of internal worth1 
which internal worth and goodness       
however it takes not for its own native 
excellence1 but holds as received from  
,god1 and unto ,god it refers all the   
glory4  #aj4 ,thus the genuine          
,magnanimous ,man is a paradox and a    
prodigy4 ,he despises an insult as      
undeserved1 and he takes it as his due4 
,he is conscious of the vast good that  
is in him2 and he knows that there is no
 good in him4 ,highly honoured1 he      
thinks that he gets but his due1 while  
he believes that vials of scorn and     
ignominy may justly be poured upon him4 
,he will bear the scorn1 because he     
deserves it1 and again1 because it is   

wholly undeserved4 ,the ,magnanimous    
,man is the humble man4 ,the secret of  
his marvellous virtue is his habit of   
practical discernment between the abyss 
of misery that he has within himself1 as
 of himself1 and the high gifts1 also   
within him1 which come of the mercy of  
,god4 ,aristotle well says1 ,magnanimity
 is a sort of robe of honour to the rest
 of the virtues3 it both makes them     
greater and stands not without them3    
therefore it is hard to be truly        
magnanimous1 for that cannot be without 
perfect virtue4 ,we may add1 that in the
 present order of ,providence none can  
be magnanimous without supernatural aid1
 and supernatural considerations of the 
life of ,christ1 which however are not  
in place here4  ,readings4--,ar41 ,eth41
 ,,iii41 vii42 ,st4 ,thos41 #b;a #b1 q4 
#abc1 art #c1 in corp42 ,ar41 ,eth41    
,,iii41 viii42 ,st4 ,thos41 #b;a #b1 q4 
#abc1 art4 i1 ad #b2 ,ar41 ,eth41       
,,iii41 vi42 ,st4 ,thos41 #b;a #b1 q4   
#abc1 art4 #d1 #e4 ,for the ,magnificent

 and ,magnanimous ,man1 ,ar41 ,eth41    
,,iv41 ii41 iii42 ,st4 ,thos41 #b;a #b1 
q4 #abi1 art4 #c1 ad #d1 #e4   ,,section
 ,,ix4--,of ,justice4   #a4 ,justice is 
a habit residing in the will1 prompting 
that power constantly to render unto    
everyone his own4 ,the fundamental      
notion of ,justice is some sort of      
equality4 ,equality supposes two terms1 
physically distinct1 or capable of      
existing separately1 one from the other4
 ,between such terms alone can equality 
be properly predicated4 ,any less       
distinction than this leaves room only  
for equality improperly so called1 and  
therefore no room for what is properly  
termed ,justice4 ,when therefore ,plato1
 going about to find a definition of    
,justice1 which is a main object in his 
,republic1 acquiesces in this position1 
that ,justice consists in every part of 
the soul1 rational1 irascible1 and      
concupiscible1 fulfilling its own proper
 function1 and not taking up the        
function of another1 he fails for this  

reason1 that all ,justice is relative to
 another1 but the different parts of one
 soul are not properly other and other1 
since all go to make up one man3        
therefore1 however much ,justice may be 
identical with doing your own business1 
and leaving your neighbour free to do   
his1 yet this relation obtaining among  
the various parts of the soul cannot    
properly be called ,justice4 ,what      
,plato defines is the beauty1 good      
order1 and moral comeliness of the soul1
 but not ,justice in any sense1 inasmuch
 as it is not referred to any being     
human or divine1 collective or          
individual1 outside of the man himself4 
#b4 ,going upon the principle that all  
,justice is of the nature of equality1  
and is therefore relative to another1 we
 arrive at the definition of general    
justice1 which is all virtue whatsoever1
 inasmuch as it bears upon another      
person than him who practises it4 ,this 
,justice is perfect social virtue1 the  
crown and perfection of all virtue from 

a statesman's point of view2 and in that
 aspect1 as ,aristotle says1 neither    
morning star nor evening star is so     
beautiful4 ,whoever has this virtue     
behaves well1 not by himself merely1 but
 towards others--a great addition4 ,many
 a one who has done well enough as an   
individual1 has done badly in a public  
capacity3 whence the proverb1 that      
office shows the man4 ,this ,justice may
 well be called another man's good3     
though not in the sense of the sophists 
of old1 and the altruists of our time1  
that virtue is a very good thing for    
everyone else than its possessor4       
,virtue1 like health1 may be beneficial 
to neighbours1 but the first benefit of 
it flows in upon the soul to whom it    
belongs3 for virtue is the health of the
 soul4  #c4 ,another elementary notion  
of ,justice connects it with ,law1      
taking ,justice to be conformity to     
,law4 ,this notion exhibits legal       
justice1 which is the same thing1 under 
another aspect1 as the general justice  

mentioned above1 inasmuch as general    
justice includes the exercise of all    
virtues in so far as they bear upon the 
good of others3 and the law1 to which   
legal justice conforms a man1 enjoins   
acts of all virtues for the common good4
 ,it must be observed1 however1 that    
though there is no natural virtue of    
which the law of man may not prescribe  
some exercise1 still no human law       
enjoins all acts of all virtues1 not    
even all obligatory acts4 ,a man may    
fail in his duty though he has kept all 
the laws of man4 ,in order then that    
legal justice may include the whole duty
 of man1 it must be referred to that    
natural and eternal law of ,god1        
revealed or unrevealed1 of which we     
shall speak hereafter4 ,by being        
conformed to this divine law a man is a 
just man1 a righteous man4 ,it is this  
sense of ,justice that appears in the   
theological term1 justification4 ,in    
this sense1 ,zachary and ,elizabeth were
 both just before ,god1 walking in all  

the commandments of the ,lord without   
blame4 7,st4 ,luke i4 #f47  #d4         
,general1 or legal1 justice is not the  
cardinal virtue so called1 but is in one
 point of view identical with all       
virtue4 ,distinguished from the other   
three cardinal virtues is particular    
justice1 which is divided into          
distributive and commutative justice4   
,distributive justice is exercised by   
the community through its head towards  
its individual members1 so that there be
 a fair distribution of the common      
goods1 in varying amount and manner1    
according to the various merits and     
deserts of the several recipients4 ,the 
matters distributed are public          
emoluments and honours1 public burdens1 
rewards1 and also punishments4          
,distributive justice is the virtue of  
the king and of the statesman1 of the   
commander-in-chief1 of the judge1 and of
 the public functionary generally4 ,it  
is violated by favouritism1 partiality1 
and jobbery4 ,distributive justice is   

the ,justice that we adore in the great 
,governor of the ,universe1 saying that 
,he is just in all ,his works1 even     
though we understand them not4 ,when it 
takes the form of punishing1 it is      
called vindictive justice4 ,this is what
 the multitudes clamoured for1 that     
filled the precincts of the ,palace of  
,whitehall in the days of ,charles ,i4  
with cries of ,justice1 ,justice1 for   
the head of ,strafford4  #e4 ,neither   
legal nor distributive justice fully    
answers to the definition of that       
virtue4 ,justice disposes us to give to 
another his own4 ,the party towards whom
 ,justice is practised must be wholly   
other and different from him who        
practises it4 ,but it is clear that the 
member of a civil community is not      
wholly other and different from the     
,state3 he is partially identified with 
the civil community to which he belongs4
 ,therefore neither the tribute of legal
 justice paid by the individual to the  
,state1 nor the grant of distributive   

justice from the ,state to the          
individual1 is an exercise of ,justice  
in the strictest sense4 ,again1 what the
 individual pays to the ,state because  
he is legally bound to pay it1 does not 
become the ,state's own until after     
payment4 ,if he withhold it1 though he  
do wrong1 yet he is not said to be      
keeping any portion of the public       
property in his private hands3 he only  
fails to make some of his private       
property public1 which the law bids him 
abdicate and make over4 ,if this be true
 of money and goods1 it is still more   
evidently true of honour and services4  
,in like manner1 in the matter of       
distributive justice1 the emoluments    
which a subject has a claim to1 the     
rewards which he has merited of the     
,state1 does not become his till he     
actually gets them into his hands4 ,it  
may be unfair and immoral that they are 
withheld from him1 and in that case1 so 
long as the circumstances remain the    
same1 the obligation rest with and      

presses upon the ,state1 and those who  
represent it1 to satisfy his claim3     
still the ,state is not keeping the     
individual from that which is as yet his
 own4 ,in the language of the ,roman    
lawyers1 he has at best a jus ad rem1 a 
right that the thing be made his1 but   
not a jus in re2 that is1 the thing is  
not properly his before he actually gets
 it4  #f4 ,commutative justice alone is 
,justice strictly so called3 for therein
 alone the parties to the act are       
perfectly other and other1 and the      
matter that passes between them1 if     
withheld by one of the parties1 would   
make a case of keeping the other out of 
that which he could still properly call 
by right his own4 ,commutative justice  
runs between two individuals1 or two    
independent ,states1 or between the     
,state and an individual inasmuch as the
 latter is an independent person1 having
 rights of his own against the former4  
,this justice is called commutative1    
from being concerned with exchanges1 or 

contracts1 voluntary and involuntary4   
,the idea of voluntary contract1 like   
that between buyer and seller1 is       
familiar enough4 ,but the notion of an  
involuntary contract is technical1 and  
requires explanation4 ,whoever1 then1   
wrongfully takes that which belongs to  
another1 enters into an involuntary     
contract1 or makes an involuntary       
exchange1 with the party4 ,this he may  
do by taking away his property1 honour1 
reputation1 liberty1 or bodily ease and 
comfort4 ,this is an involuntary        
transaction1 against the will of the    
party that suffers4 ,it is a contract1  
because the party that does the damage  
takes upon himself1 whether he will or  
no1 by the very act of doing it1 the    
obligation of making the damage good1   
and of restoring what he has taken away4
 ,this is the obligation of restitution1
 which attaches to breaches of          
commutative justice1 and1 strictly      
speaking1 to them alone4 ,thus1 if a    
minister has not promoted a deserving   

officer in face of a clear obligation of
 distributive justice1 the obligation   
indeed remains as that of a duty        
unfulfilled1 so long as he remains      
minister with the patronage in his      
hands3 but the promotion1 if he finally 
makes it1 is not an act of restitution3 
it is giving to the officer that which  
was not his before4 ,and if the         
opportunity has passed1 he owes the     
officer nothing in compensation4 ,but if
 he has insulted the officer1 he owes   
him an apology for all time to come3 he 
must give back that honour which        
belonged to the officer1 and of which he
 has robbed him4 ,this is restitution4  
,in a thousand practical cases it is    
important1 and often a very nice        
question to decide1 whether a particular
 offence1 such as failure to pay taxes1 
be a sin against commutative justice or 
only against some more general form of  
the virtue4 ,if the former1 restitution 
is due3 if the latter1 repentance only  
and purpose of better things in future1 

but not reparation of the past4  #g4    
,the old notion1 that ,justice is       
minding your own business1 and leaving  
your neighbour to mind his1 furnishes a 
good rough statement of the obligations 
of commutative justice4 ,they are mainly
 negative1 to leave your neighbour alone
 in his right of life and limb1 of      
liberty and property1 of honour and     
reputation4 ,but in two ways your       
neighbour's business may become yours in
 justice4 ,the first way is1 if you have
 any contract with him1 whether a formal
 contract1 as that between a railway    
company and its passengers1 or a virtual
 contract1 by reason of some office that
 you bear1 as the office of a bishop and
 pastor in relation to the souls of his 
flock4 ,the second way in which         
commutative justice binds you to        
positive action1 is when undue damage is
 likely to occur to another from some   
activity of yours4 ,if1 passing by1 ,i  
see my neighbour's house on fire1 not   
having contracted to watch it for him1  

and not having caused the fire myself1  
,i am not bound in strict justice to    
warn him of his danger4 ,i am bound     
indeed by charity1 but that is not the  
point here4 ,but if the fire has broken 
out from my careless use of fire1       
commutative justice binds me to raise   
the alarm4  #h4 ,the most notable       
potential parts of ,justice--,religion1 
,obedience1 ,truthfulness--enter into   
the treatise of ,natural ,law4          
,readings4--,ar41 ,eth41 ,v41 i42       
,plato1 ,rep41 #dcc ,a2 ib41 #ddc ,c1   
,d1 ,e2 ,st4 ,thos41 #b;a #b1 q4 #eh1   
art4 #b1 in corp2 ib41 q4 #eh1 art4 #e2 
ib41 q4 #eh1 art4 #f1 in corp2 ib41 q4  
#eh1 art4 #g2 ib41 q4 #eh1 art #i1 in   
corp42 ib41 q4 #fa1 art4 #a1 in corp42  
ib41 q4 #fa1 art4 #c1 in corp42 ,ar41   
,eth41 ,v41 ii41 #ab1 #ac2 ,st4 ,thos41 
#b;a #b1 q4 #fb1 art4 #a1 in corp41 ad  
#b4          99       99       99       
99       99   ,,part ,,ii4 ,,deontology4
  ,,chapter ,,vi4  ,,of ,,the ,,origin  
,,of ,,moral ,,obligation4  ,,section   

,i4--,of the natural difference between 
,good and ,evil4   #a4 ,a granite       
boulder lying on an upland moor stands  
indifferently the ,august sun and the   
,january frost1 flood and drought4 ,it  
neither blooms in spring1 nor fades in  
autumn4 ,it is all one to the boulder   
whether it remain in the picturesque    
solitude where the glacier dropped it1  
or be laid in the gutter of a busy      
street4 ,it has no growth nor           
development3 it is not a subject of     
evolution3 there is no goal of          
perfection to which it is tending by    
dint of inward germinal capacity        
seconded by favourable environment4     
,therefore it does not matter what you  
do with it3 all things come alike to    
that lump of rock4  #b4 ,but in a cranny
 or cleft of the same there is a little 
flower growing4 ,you cannot do what you 
will with that flower4 ,it has its      
exigencies and requirements4 ,had it a  
voice1 it could say1 what the stone     
never could3 ,i must have this or that3 

,i must have light1 ,i must have        
moisture1 a certain heat1 some soil to  
grow in4 ,there is a course to be run by
 this flower and the plant that bears   
it1 a development to be wrought out1 a  
perfection to be achieved4 ,for this end
 certain conditions are necessary1 or   
helpful3 certain others prejudicial1 or 
altogether intolerable4 ,in fact1 that  
plant has a progressive nature1 and     
therewith is a subject of good and evil4
 ,good for that plant is what favours   
its natural progress1 and evil is all   
that impedes it4  #c4 ,all organic      
natures are progressive3 that is1 each  
individual of them is apt to make a     
certain progress1 under certain         
conditions1 from birth to maturity4 ,but
 man alone has his progress in any      
degree in his own hands1 to make or to  
mar4 ,man alone1 in the graphic phrase  
of ,appius ,claudius1 is faber fortun   
su1 the shaper of his own destiny4 ,any 
other plant or animal1 other than man1  
however miserable a specimen of its kind

 it finally prove to be1 has always done
 the best for itself under the          
circumstances3 it has attained the limit
 fixed for it by its primitive germinal 
capacity1 as modified by the events of  
its subsequent environment4 ,the        
miserable animal that howls under your  
window at night1 is the finest dog that 
could possibly have come of his blood   
and breeding1 nurture and education4    
,but there is no man now on earth that  
has done all for himself that he might  
have done4 ,we all fall short in many   
things of the perfection that is within 
our reach4 ,man therefore needs to stir 
himself1 and to be energetic with a     
free1 self-determined energy to come up 
to the standard of humanity4 ,it is only
 his free acts that are considered by   
the moralist4 ,such is the definition of
 ,moral ,science1 that it deals with    
human acts2 acts1 that is1 whereof man  
is master to do or not to do4 7c4 i41   
nn4 #a1 #b47  #d4 ,we have it1 then1    
that a morally good act is an act that  

makes towards the progress of human     
nature in him who does it1 and which is 
freely done4 ,similarly1 a morally evil 
act is a bar to progress1 or a diversion
 of it from the right line1 being also a
 free act4 ,now1 that act only can make 
for the progress of human nature1 which 
befits and suits human nature1 and suits
 it in its best and most distinctive    
characteristic4 ,what is best in man1   
what characterises and makes man1 what  
the old schoolmen called the form of    
man1 is his reason4 ,to be up to reason 
is to be up to the standard of humanity4
 ,human progress is progress on the     
lines of reason4 ,to make for that      
progress1 and thereby to be morally     
good1 an act must be done1 not blindly1 
brutishly1 sottishly1 or on any impulse 
of passion1 however beneficial in its   
effects1 but deliberately1 and in       
conscious accordance with the reasonable
 nature of the doer4  #e4 ,whatever be  
man's end and highest good1 he must go  
about to compass it reasonably4 ,he must

 plan1 and be systematic1 and act on    
principle4 ,for instance1 if the public 
health be the highest good1 the laws    
which govern it must be investigated1   
and their requirements carried out1     
without regard to sentiment4 ,if        
pleasure be the good1 we must be artists
 of pleasure4 ,if1 however1 as has been 
seen 7c4 ii47 the highest good of man is
 the highest play of reason herself in a
 life of contemplation1 to be prepared  
for1 though it cannot be adequately and 
worthily lived1 in this world1 then it  
is through following reason1 through    
subjecting appetite to reason by        
temperance1 and the will to reason by   
justice1 and reason herself by a        
reasonable service to ,god1 that this   
end and consummation must be wrought    
out4 ,thus1 in ,plato's phrase 7,rep41  
#ehi ,b71 the moral man acts so that the
 inner man within him1 the rational part
 of his nature1 shall be strongest2     
while he watches with a husbandman's    
care over the many-headed beast of      

appetite1 rearing and training the      
creature's tame heads1 and not letting  
the wild ones grow2 for this purpose    
making an ally of the lion1 the         
irascible part of his nature1 and caring
 for all the parts in common1 making    
them friends to one another and to      
himself4 ,in this way he will meet the  
true exigency of his nature as a whole1 
with due regard to the proper order and 
subordination of the parts4 ,he who     
lives otherwise1 acts in contradiction  
to his rational self4 7c4 v41 s4 iii41  
n4 #c1 p4 #gd74  #f4 ,the result of the 
above reasoning1 if result it has1      
should be to explain and justify the    
,stoic rule1 naturae convenienter       
vivere1 to live according to nature4    
,but some one will say3 ,that is the    
very ideal of wickedness3 all good in   
man comes of overcoming nature1 and     
doing violence to natural cravings3 live
 according to nature1 and you will go   
straight to the devil4 ,i answer3 ,live 
according to a part of your nature1 and 

that the baser and lower1 though also   
the more impetuous and clamorous part1  
and you will certainly go where you say3
 but live up to the whole of your       
nature1 as explained in the last        
paragraph1 and you will be a man indeed1
 and will reach the goal of human       
happiness4 ,but again it may be         
objected1 that our very reason1 to which
 the rest of our nature is naturally    
subordinate1 frequently prompts us to do
 amiss4 ,the objection is a just one1 in
 so far as it goes upon a repudiation of
 the old ,platonic position1 that all   
moral evil comes of the body1 wherein   
the soul is imprisoned1 and of the      
desires which the body fastens upon the 
soul4 ,were that so1 all sins would be  
sins of sensuality4 ,but there are      
spiritual sins1 not prompted by any lust
 or weakness of the body1 as pride and  
mutiny1 self-opinionatedness1 rejection 
of ,divine revelation4 ,the objection   
turns on sins such as these4 ,the answer
 is1 that spiritual sins do not arise   

from any exigency of reason1 but from a 
deficiency of reason2 not from that     
faculty calling upon us1 as we are      
reasonable men1 to take a certain       
course1 in accordance with a just and   
full view of the facts of the case1 but 
from reason failing to look facts fully 
in the face1 and considering only some  
of them to the neglect of others1 the   
consideration of which would alter the  
decision4 ,thus a certain proud creature
 mentioned in ,scripture thought of the 
magnificence of the throne above the    
stars of ,god1 on the mountain of the   
covenant1 on the sides of the north3 he 
did not think how such a pre-eminence   
would become him as a creature4 ,he had 
in view a rational good certainly1 but  
not a rational good for him4 ,partial   
reason1 like a little knowledge1 is a   
dangerous thing4  #g4 ,as it is not in  
the power of ,god to bring it about1    
that the angles of a triangle taken     
together shall amount to anything else  
than two right angles1 so it is not     

within the compass of ,divine           
omnipotence to create a man for whom it 
shall be a good and proper thing1 and   
befitting his nature1 to blaspheme1 to  
perjure himself1 to abandon himself     
recklessly to lust1 or anger1 or any    
other passion4 ,god need not have       
created man at all1 but ,he could not   
have created him with other than human  
exigencies4 ,the reason is1 because ,god
 can only create upon the pattern of    
,his own essence1 which is imitable1    
outside of ,god1 in certain definite    
lines of possibility4 ,these            
possibilities1 founded upon the ,divine 
essence and discerned by the ,divine    
intelligence1 are the ,archetype ,ideas1
 among which the ,divine will has to    
choose1 when it proceeds to create4 ,the
 denial of this doctrine in the         
,nominalist and ,cartesian ,schools1 and
 their reference to the arbitrary will  
of ,god of the eternal1 immutable1 and  
absolutely necessary relations of       
possible things1 is the subversion of   

all science and philosophy4  #h4 ,still 
less are moral distinctions between good
 and evil to be set down to the law of  
the ,state1 or the fashion of society4  
,human convention can no more constitute
 moral good than it can physical good1  
or mathematical or logical truth4 ,it is
 only in cases where two or more courses
 are tolerable1 and one of them needs to
 be chosen and adhered to for the sake  
of social order1 that human authority   
steps in to elect and prescribe one of  
those ways of action1 and brand the     
others as illegitimate1 which would     
otherwise be lawful4 ,this is called the
 making of a positive law4              
,readings4--,st4 ,thos41 #a;a #b1 q4    
#ah1 art4 #e1 in corp42 #a;a #b1 q4 #ga1
 art4 #b2 ,plato1 ,rep41 #ehh ,b to end 
of bk4 ix42 ,ar41 ,eth41 ,,ix41 iv41 nn4
 #d-aj2 ,suarez1 ,de ,legibus1 ,,ii41   
vi41 nn4 #d1 #aa2 ,cicero1 ,de ,legibus1
 i41 cc4 #ae-ag4   ,,section ,,ii4--,how
 ,good becomes bounden ,duty1 and ,evil 
is advanced to ,sin4   #a4 ,the great   

problem of ,moral ,philosophy is the    
explanation of the idea1 ,i ought1 7c4  
i41 n4 #f74 ,we are now come close up to
 the solution of that problem4 ,the word
 ought denotes the necessary bearing of 
means upon end4 ,to every ought there is
 a pendent if4 ,the means ought to be   
taken1 if the end is to be secured4     
,thus we say3 ,you ought to start       
betimes1 if you are to catch your train4
 ,you ought to study harder1 if you are 
to pass your examination4 ,the person   
spoken to might reply3 ,but what if ,i  
do miss my train1 and fail in my        
examination8 ,he might be met with      
another ought3 ,you ought not to miss   
the one1 if you are to keep your        
appointment3 or to fail in the other1 if
 you are to get into a profession4 ,thus
 the train of oughts and ifs extends1   
until we come finally to a concatenation
 like the following3 ,you ought not to  
break your word1 or to give needless    
pain to your parents1 if you don't want 
to do violence to that nature which is  

yours as a reasonable being1 or to      
thwart your own moral development1--and 
so on in a variety of phrases           
descriptive of the argument of the last 
section4 ,here it seems the chain is    
made fast to a staple in the wall4 ,if a
 person goes on to ask1 ,well1 what if  
,i do contradict my rational self8 we   
can only tell him that he is a fool for 
his question4 ,the oughts1 such as those
 wherewith our illustration commenced1  
,kant calls the hypothetical imperative1
 the form being1 ,you must1 unless3 but 
the ought wherein it terminated1 he     
calls the categorical imperative1 the   
alternative being such as no rational   
man can accept1 and therefore no        
alternative at all4  #b4 ,this doctrine 
of the ,categorical ,imperative is      
correct and valuable so far as it goes4 
,but then it does not go far enough4    
,the full notion of what a man ought1 is
 what he must do under pain of sin4 ,sin
 is more than folly1 more than a breach 
of reason4 ,it is mild reproach to a    

great criminal to tell him that he is a 
very foolish person1 a walking          
unreasonableness4 ,if he chooses to     
contradict his rational self1 is not    
that his own affair8 ,is he not his own 
master1 and may he not play the fool if 
he likes8 ,the answer is1 ,no1 he is not
 his own master2 he is under law1 and   
his folly and self-abuse becomes        
criminal and sinful1 by being in        
contravention of the law that forbids   
him to throw himself away thus wantonly4
  #c4 ,kant readily takes up this idea1 
shaping it after his own fashion4 ,he   
contends1--and herein his doctrine is   
not merely deficient1 but positively in 
error1--that the ,categorical           
,imperative1 uttered by a man's own     
reason1 has the force of a law1 made by 
that same reason2 so that the           
legislative authority is within the     
breast of the doer1 who owes it         
obedience4 ,this he calls the autonomy  
of reason4 ,it is also called           
,independent ,morality1 inasmuch as it  

establishes right and wrong without     
regard to external authority1 or to the 
consequences of actions1 or to rewards  
and punishments4 ,the doctrine is       
erroneous1 inasmuch as it undertakes to 
settle the matter of right and wrong    
without reference to external authority2
 and inasmuch as it makes the reason    
within a man1 not the promulgator of the
 law to him1 but his own legislator4    
,for a law is a precept1 a command3 now 
no one issues precepts1 or gives        
commands1 to himself4 ,to command is an 
act of jurisdiction2 and jurisdiction1  
like justice 7see c4 v41 s4 ix41 n4 #a1 
p4 #ajb7 requires a distinction of      
persons1 one ruler1 and another subject4
 ,but the reason in a man is not a      
distinct subject from the will1         
appetites1 or other faculties within    
him1 to which reason dictates3 they are 
all one nature1 one person1 one man2    
consequently1 no one of them can        
strictly be said to command the rest2   
and the dictate of reason1 as emanating 

from within oneself1 is not a law4 ,but 
without a law1 there is no strict       
obligation4 ,therefore the whole theory 
of obligation is not locked up in the   
,categorical ,imperative1 as ,kant      
formulated it4  #d4 ,the above          
argumentation evinces that ,god is not  
under any law2 for there is no other    
,god above ,him to command ,him4 ,as for
 the ideas of what is meet and just in  
the ,divine intelligence1 though the    
,divine will1 being a perfect will1 is  
not liable to act against them1 yet are 
those ideas improperly called a law to  
the ,divine will1 because intellect and 
will are identified in one ,god4 ,kant's
 doctrine makes us all gods4 ,it is a   
deification of the human intellect1 and 
identification of that intellect with   
the supreme and universal ,reason2 and  
at the same time a release of the human 
will from all authority extraneous to   
the individual4 ,this amounts to a      
putting off of all authority properly so
 called1 and makes each man as sovereign

 and unaccountable as his ,maker4 ,thy  
heart is lifted up1 and thou hast said3 
,i am ,god1 and sit in the chair of     
,god3 and hast set thy heart as if it   
were the heart of ,god3 whereas thou art
 a man and not ,god4 7,ezech4 xxviii4   
#b47 ,kant is thus the father of the    
pantheistic school of ,fichte1          
,schelling1 and ,hegel4  #e4 ,but it has
 been contended that this phrase about a
 man who does wrong breaking a law1 is  
only a metaphor and figure of speech1   
unless it be used with reference to the 
enactment of some civil community4 ,thus
 ,john ,austin says that a natural law  
is a law which is not1 but which he who 
uses the expression thinks ought to be  
made4 ,at this rate sin is not a        
transgression of any law1 except so far 
as it happens to be1 in the lawyer's    
sense of the word1 a crime1 or something
 punishable in a human court of justice4
 ,there will then be no law but man's   
law4 ,how then am ,i obliged to obey    
man's law8 ,dr4 ,bain answers3 ,because1

 if you disobey1 you will be punished4  
,but that punishment will be either just
 or unjust3 if unjust1 it originates no 
obligation3 if just1 it presupposes an  
obligation1 as it presupposes a crime   
and sin1 that is1 an obligation         
violated4 ,there seems to be nothing    
left for ,john ,austin but to fall back 
upon ,kant and his ,categorical         
,imperative1 and say that whoever rebels
 against the duly constituted authority 
of the ,state in which he lives1 is a   
rebel against the reason that dwells    
within his own breast1 and which        
requires him to behave like a citizen4  
,so that ultimately it is not the       
,state1 but his own reason that he has  
offended2 and the ,state has no         
authority over him except what his own  
reason gives4  #f4 ,if this were true1  
there would be no sin anywhere except   
what is called philosophical sin1 that  
is1 a breach of the dignity of man's    
rational nature2 and the hardest thing  
that could be said in reprobation of a  

wrongdoer1 would be that he had gone    
against himself1 and against his        
fellow-men1 by outraging reason1 the    
common attribute of the race4  #g4 ,far 
worse than that has the sinner done4 ,he
 has offended against his own reason1   
and thereby against a higher ,reason1   
substantially distinct from his1        
standing to it in the relation of       
,archetype to type1 a ,living ,reason1  
,greek3 hepsychos logos 7cf4 ,ar41      
,eth41 ,v41 iv41 #g71 purely and        
supremely rational4 ,the ,archetype is  
outraged by the violation of the type4  
,moreover1 as the two are substantially 
distinct1 the one being ,god1 the other 
a faculty of man1 there is room for a   
command1 for law4 ,a man may transgress 
and sin1 in more than the philosophical 
sense of the word3 he may be properly a 
law-breaker1 by offending against this  
supreme ,reason1 higher and other than  
his own4  #h4 ,here we must pause and   
meditate a parable4--,there was a       
certain monastery where the monks lived 

in continual violation of monastic      
observance4 ,their ,abbot was a holy    
man1 a model of what a monk ought to be4
 ,but though perfectly cognisant of the 
delinquencies of his community1 he was  
content to display to his subjects the  
edifying example of his own life1 and to
 let it appear that he was aware of     
their doings and pained at them4 ,he    
would croon softly as he went about the 
house old ,hell's words3 ,not so1 my    
sons1 not so3 why do ye these kind of   
things1 very wicked things8 ,but the    
monks took no notice of him4 ,it        
happened in course of time that the     
,abbot went away for about ten days4    
,what he did in that time1 never        
transpired3 though there was some       
whisper of certain spiritual exercises1 
which he was said to have been engaged  
in4 ,certain it is1 that he returned to 
his monastery1 as he left it1 a monk    
devout and regular3 the monk was the    
same1 but the ,abbot was mightily       
altered4 ,the morning after his arrival1

 a ,chapter was held2 the ,abbot had the
 ,rule read from cover to cover1 and    
announced his intention of enforcing the
 same4 ,and he was as good as his word4 
,transgressions of course abounded3 but 
the monks discovered that to transgress 
was quite a different thing now from    
what it had been4 ,seeing the law       
proclaimed1 and the ,abbot in earnest to
 enforce it1 they too reformed          
themselves3 the few who would not reform
 had to leave4 ,the subsequent holy     
lives of those monks do not enter into  
this history4  #i4 ,now1 we might fancy 
,god our ,lord like the ,abbot of that  
monastery in the early years of his     
rule4 ,we might fancy the ,supreme      
,reason1 displeased indeed1 as ,reason  
must be1 at the excesses and follies of 
mankind1 but not otherwise commanding   
men to avoid those evil courses4 ,were  
,god to be thus quiescent1 what we have 
called 7n4 #f7 philosophical sin1 would 
indeed carry this additional malice1    
beyond what was there set down1 of being

 an offence against ,god1 but it would  
not be a grievous offence3 for it would 
not be a sin in the proper sense of the 
term1 not being a transgression of the  
law of ,god1 inasmuch as ,god1 by the   
supposition1 would have given no law4   
,but the supposition itself is absurd4  
,god could not so withhold ,his command4
 ,he is free indeed not to command1 but 
that only by not creating4 ,if ,he wills
 to have creatures1 ,he must likewise   
will to bind them to certain lines of   
action3 which will to bind in ,god is a 
law to the creature4  #aj4 ,this        
assertion1 that ,god cannot but will to 
bind ,his creatures to certain lines of 
action1 must be proved1 though in the   
ascent we have to mount to high regions1
 and breathe those subtle airs that are 
wafted round the throne of the ,eternal4
 ,as ,god is the one source of all      
reality and of all power1 not only can  
there be no being which ,he has not     
created and does not still preserve1 but
 no action either can take place without

 ,his concurrence4 ,god must go with    
,his every creature in its every act3   
otherwise1 on the creature's part1      
nothing could be done4 ,now1 ,god cannot
 be indifferent what manner of act ,he  
shall concur unto4 ,a servant or a      
subject may be indifferent what command 
he receives3 he may will simply to      
obey1--to go here or there1 as he is    
bid1 or to be left without orders where 
he is4 ,that is because he leaves the   
entire direction and management of the  
household to his master4 ,but for ,god  
to be thus indifferent what action ,he  
should lend ,his concurrence to1 would  
be to forego all design and purpose of  
,his own as to the use and destiny of   
the creatures which ,he has made and    
continually preserves4 ,this ,god cannot
 do1 for ,he cannot act aimlessly4 ,it  
would be renouncing the direction of    
,his own work1 and making the creature  
,his superior4 ,god is incapable of such
 renunciation and subservience4 ,he     
must1 then1 will the cooperation which  

,he lends1 and the concurrent action of 
the creature1 to take a certain course1 
regulated and prescribed by ,himself3   
which is our proposition1 that ,god     
cannot but will to bind ,his creatures  
to certain lines of action4 ,if ,his    
free creatures choose to stray from     
these lines1 ,god indeed still          
cooperates1 and to ,his cooperation is  
to be ascribed the physical goodness of 
the action1 not its moral inordinateness
 and inopportuneness4 ,still1 as the    
action is morally inordinate1 ,god may  
be said to cooperate1 in a manner1 where
 ,he would not3 whence we gather some   
conception of the enormity of sin4 7,see
 c4 vii41 nn4 #e1 #f1 pp4 #acj1 #aca47  
#aa4 ,the lines of action laid down and 
prescribed by ,god are not arbitrary and
 irrespective of the subject of the     
command4 ,they are determined in each   
case by the nature of the subject4 ,the 
,author of ,nature is not apt to subvert
 that order which proceeds from         
,himself4 ,he bids every creature act up

 to that nature wherein ,he has created 
it4 ,his commands follow the line of    
natural exigency4 ,what this natural    
exigency amounts to in man in regard to 
his human acts1 we have already seen1   
7c4 vi41 s4 i41 p4 #aji47  #ab4 ,the    
difference between a necessary and a    
free agent is1 that the former is       
determined by its nature to act in a    
certain way1 and cannot act otherwise3  
the latter may act in more ways than    
one4 ,still1 as we have seen1 the nature
 even of a free agent is not indifferent
 to all manner of action4 ,it requires1 
though it does not constrain1 the agent 
to act in certain definite ways1 the    
ways of moral goodness4 ,acting         
otherwise1 as he may do1 the free agent 
gainsays his own nature1 taken as a     
whole1 a thing that a necessary agent   
can nowise do4 ,god therefore who1 as we
 have shown1 wills and commands all     
creatures whatsoever to act on the lines
 of their nature1 has especial reason to
 give this command to ,his rational     

creatures1 with whom alone rests the    
momentous freedom to disobey4  #ac4 ,we 
are now abreast of the question1 of such
 burning interest in these days1 as to  
the connection of ,ethics with          
,theology1 or of ,morality with         
,religion4 ,i will not enquire whether  
the dogmatic atheist is logically       
consistent in maintaining any           
distinction between right and wrong3    
happily1 dogmatic atheists do not       
abound4 ,but there are many who hold    
that1 whether there be a ,god or no1 the
 fact ought not to be imported into     
,moral ,science3 that a ,professor of   
,ethics1 as such1 has no business with  
the name of the ,almighty on his lips1  
any more than a lecturer on ,chemistry  
or ,fortification4 ,this statement must 
be at once qualified by an important    
proviso4 ,if we have any duties of      
worship and praise towards our ,maker3  
if there is such a virtue as religion1  
and such a sin as blasphemy3 surely a   
,professor of ,morals must point that   

out4 ,he cannot in that case suppress   
all reference to ,god1 for the same     
reason that he cannot help going into   
the duties of a man to his wife1 or of  
an individual to the ,state1 if marriage
 and civil government are natural       
institutions4 ,if there is a ,god to be 
worshipped1 any book on ,moral ,science 
is incomplete without a chapter on      
,religion4 ,but the question remains1   
whether the name of ,god should enter   
into the other chapters1 and ,his being 
and authority into the very foundations 
of the science4 ,i do not mean the      
metaphysical foundations2 for           
,metaphysics are like a two-edged sword1
 that cleaves down to the very marrow of
 things1 and must therefore reveal and  
discover ,god4 ,but ,morality1 like     
,mathematics1 takes certain metaphysical
 foundations for granted1 without       
enquiring into them4 ,on these          
foundations we rear the walls1 so to    
speak1 of the science of ,ethics without
 reference to ,god1 but we cannot put   

the roof and crown upon the erection1   
unless we speak of ,him and of ,his law4
 ,moral distinctions1 as we saw 7c4 vi41
 s4 i4 n4 #g1 p4 #aac71 are antecedent  
to the ,divine command to observe them3 
and though they rest ultimately on the  
,divine nature1 that ultimate ground    
belongs to ,metaphysics1 not to ,ethics4
 ,ethics begins with human nature1      
pointing out that there are certain     
human acts that do become a man1 and    
others that do not4 7c4 vi41 s4 i41 p4  
#aji47 ,to see this1 it is not necessary
 to look up above man4 ,thus we shall   
prove lying1 suicide1 and murder to be  
wrong1 and good fellowship a duty1      
without needing to mention the ,divine  
,being1 though by considering ,him the  
proof gains in cogency4 ,or rather1     
apart from ,god we shall prove certain  
acts wrong1 and other acts obligatory as
 duties1 philosophically speaking1 with 
an initial and fundamental wrongness and
 obligation4 ,in the present section we 
have proved once for all1 that what is  

wrong philosophically1 or is            
philosophically a duty1 is the same also
 theologically4 ,thus the initial and   
fundamental obligation is transformed   
into an obligation formal and complete4 
,therefore1 hereafter we shall be       
content to have established the         
philosophical obligation1 knowing that  
the theological side is invariably      
conjoined therewith4 ,as ,st4 ,thomas   
says 7#a;a #b1 q4 #ga1 art4 #f1 ad #e73 
,by theologians sin is considered       
principally as it is an offence against 
,god3 but by the moral philosopher1     
inasmuch as it is contrary to reason4   
,but what is contrary to reason offends 
,god1 and is forbidden by ,divine law1  
and thus becomes a sin4 ,no ,god1 no    
sin4 ,away from ,god1 there is indecency
 and impropriety1 unreasonableness1     
abomination1 and brutality1 all this in 
view of outraged humanity3 there is     
likewise crime against the ,state3 but  
the formal element of sin is wanting4   
,with sin1 of course1 disappears also   

the punishment of sin as such4 ,thus to 
leave ,god wholly out of ,ethics and    
,natural ,law1 is to rob moral evil of  
half its terrors1 and of that very half 
which is more easily understanded of the
 people4 ,a consideration for           
school-managers4  ,readings4--,st4      
,thos41 #a;a1 q4 #bb1 art4 #b1 in corp4 
7against ,lucretius1 ii4 #fdf-fea72     
,suarez1 ,de ,legibus1 ,,ii41 vi41 nn4  
#c1 #e-i1 #ac1 #ad1 #ag1 #bj-bd4        
,,chapter ,,vii4  ,,of ,,the ,,eternal  
,,law4   #a4 ,a law is defined to be3 ,a
 precept just and abiding1 given for    
promulgation to a perfect community4 ,a 
law is primarily a rule of action4 ,the 
first attribute of a law is that it be  
just3 just to the subject on whom it is 
imposed1 as being no harmful abridgment 
of his rights3 just also to other men1  
as not moving him to injustice against  
them4 ,an unjust law is no law at all1  
for it is not a rule of action4 ,still1 
we may sometimes be bound1 when only our
 own rights are infringed1 to submit to 

such an imposition1 not as a law1 for it
 is none1 but on the score of prudence1 
to escape direr evils4 ,a law is no     
fleeting1 occasional rule of conduct1   
suited to meet some passing emergency or
 superficial disturbance4 ,the reason of
 a law lies deep down1 lasting and      
widespread in the nature of the         
governed4 ,a law1 then1 has these two   
further attributes of permanence in     
duration and amplitude in area4 ,every  
law is made for all time1 and lives on  
with the life of the community for whom 
it is enacted1 for ever1 unless it be   
either expressly or implicitly repealed4
 ,a law in a community is like a habit  
in an individual1 an accretion to       
nature1 which abides as part of the     
natural being1 and guides henceforth the
 course of natural action4 ,this analogy
 holds especially of those laws1 which  
are not enacted all of a sudden--and    
such are rarely the best laws--but grow 
upon the people with gradual growth     
unmarked1 like a habit by the repetition

 of acts1 in the way of immemorial      
custom4 ,i have said that a law is for a
 community1 that it requires amplitude  
and large area4 ,a law is not laid down 
for an individual1 except so far as his 
action is of importance to the          
community4 ,the private concerns of one 
man do not afford scope and room enough 
for a law4 ,neither do the domestic     
affairs of one family4 ,a father is not 
a legislator4 ,a law aims at a deep1    
far-reaching1 primary good4 ,but the    
private good of an individual1 and the  
domestic good of a family1 are not      
primary goods1 inasmuch as the          
individual and the family are not       
primary but subordinate beings3 not     
complete and independent1 but dependent 
and partial2 not wholes but parts4 ,the 
individual is part of the family1 and   
the family is part of a higher          
community4 ,it is only when we are come 
to some community which is not part of  
any higher1 that we have found the      
being1 the good of which is primary     

good1 the aim of law4 ,such a community1
 not being part of any higher community 
in the same order1 is in its own order a
 perfect community4 ,thus1 in the       
temporal order1 the individual is part  
of the ,state4 ,the ,state is a perfect 
community2 and the good of the ,state is
 of more consequence than the temporal  
well-being of any individual citizen4   
,the temporal good of the individual1   
then1 is matter of law1 in so far as it 
is subservient to the good of the       
,state4 ,we have1 then1 to hold that a  
law is given to the members of a perfect
 community for the good of the whole4   
,not every precept1 therefore1 is a law3
 nor every superior a lawgiver3 for it  
is not every superior that has charge of
 the good of a perfect community4 ,many 
a precept is given to an individual1    
either for his private good1 as when a  
father commands his child1 or for the   
private good of him that issues the     
precept1 as when a master commands a    
servant4 ,but every law is a precept3   

for a law is an imperative rule of      
action1 in view of a good that is       
necessary1 at least with the necessity  
of convenience4 ,to every law there are 
counsels attached4 ,a law may be said to
 be a nucleus of precept1 having an     
envelope of counsel4 ,every law has also
 a pendent called punishment for those  
who break it3 this is called the        
sanction of the law4 ,a law is also for 
promulgation1 as a birch rod for        
application4 ,the promulgation1 or      
application1 brings the law home to the 
subject1 but is not part of the law     
itself4 ,so much for the definition of  
,law4  #b4 ,we have to learn to look    
upon the whole created universe1 and the
 fulness thereof1 angels1 men1 earth1   
sun1 planets1 fixed stars1 all things   
visible and invisible1 as one great and 
perfect community1 whose ,king and      
,lawgiver is ,god4 ,he is ,king1 because
 ,he is ,creator and ,lord4 ,but        
lordship and kingship are different     
things1 even in ,god4 ,it is one thing  

to be lord and master1 owner and        
proprietor of a chattel1 property and   
domain3 it is another thing to be king  
and governor1 lawgiver and judge of     
political subjects4 ,the former is      
called power of dominion1 or right of   
ownership1 the latter is power of       
jurisdiction4 ,power of dominion is for 
the good of him who wields it3 but power
 of jurisdiction is for the good of the 
governed4 ,as ,god is ,lord of the      
universe1 ,he directs all its operations
 to ,his own glory4 ,as ,he is ,king1   
,he governs as a king should govern1 for
 the good of ,his subjects4 ,in         
intellectual creatures1 whose will is   
not set in opposition to ,god1 the      
subject's good and the glory of the     
,lord finally coincide4 ,god's power of 
dominion is the concern of theologians3 
the moralist is taken up with ,his power
 of jurisdiction1 from whence emanates  
the moral law4  #c4 ,in the last chapter
 7s4 ii41 nn4 #i1 #aj1 pp4 #abj1 #aba71 
we stated the moral law in these terms1 

that ,god wills to bind ,his creatures  
to certain lines of action1 not         
arbitrary lines1 as we saw1 but the     
natural lines of each creature's being4 
,the law thus stated takes in manifestly
 a wider field than that of moral       
action4 ,there is in fact no action of  
created things that is not comprehended 
under this statement4 ,it comprises the 
laws of physical nature and the action  
of physical causes1 no less than the    
moral law and human acts4 ,it is the one
 primeval law of the universe1          
antecedent to all actual creation1 and  
co-eternal with ,god4 ,and yet not      
necessary as ,god3 for had ,god not     
decreed from all eternity to create--and
 ,he need not have decreed it--neither  
would ,he have passed in ,his own       
,divine ,mind this second decree1       
necessarily consequent as it is upon the
 decree of creation1 namely1 that every 
creature should act in the mode of      
action proper of its kind4 ,this decree1
 supervening from eternity upon the     

creative decree1 is called the ,eternal 
,law4  #d4 ,this law does not govern the
 acts of ,god ,himself4 ,god ever does  
what is wise and good1 not because ,he  
binds ,himself by the decree of ,his own
 will so to act1 but because of ,his    
all-perfect nature4 ,his own decrees    
have not for ,him the force of a        
precept3 that is impossible in any case3
 yet ,he cannot act against them1 as    
,his nature allows not of irresolution1 
change of mind1 and inconsistency4  #e4 
,emanating from the will of ,god1 and   
resting upon the nature of the creature1
 it would seem that the ,eternal ,law   
must be irresistible4 ,who resisteth    
,his will8 asks the ,apostle4 7,rom4 ix4
 #ai47 ,the streams of sacred rivers are
 flowing upwards1 and justice and the   
universal order is wrenched back4       
7,euripides1 ,medea1 #dii47 ,it is only 
the perversion spoken of by the poet1   
that can anywise supply the instance    
asked for by the ,apostle4 ,the thing is
 impossible in the physical order4 ,the 

rivers cannot flow upwards1 under the   
conditions under which rivers usually   
flow3 but justice and purity1 truth and 
religion may be wrenched back1 in       
violation of nature and of the law      
eternal4 ,the one thing that breaks this
 law is sin4 ,sin alone is properly     
unnatural4 ,the world is full of        
physical evils1 pain1 famine1 blindness1
 disease1 decay and death4 ,but herein  
is nothing against nature3 the several  
agents act up to their nature1 so far as
 it goes3 it is the defect of nature    
that makes the evil4 ,but sin is no mere
 shortcoming3 it is a turning round and 
going against nature1 as though the     
,july sun should freeze a man1 or the   
summer air suffocate him4 ,physical evil
 comes by the defect of nature1 and by  
permission of the ,eternal ,law4 ,but   
the moral evil of sin is a breach of    
that law4  #f4 ,a great point with      
modern thinkers is the inviolability of 
the laws of physical nature1 e4g41 of   
gravitation or of electrical induction4 

,if these laws are represented1 as ,j4  
,s4 ,mill said they should be1 as       
tendencies only1 they are truly         
inviolable4 ,the law of gravitation is  
equally fulfilled in a falling body1 in 
a body suspended by a string1 and in a  
body borne up by the ministry of an     
angel4 ,there is no law of nature to the
 effect that a supernatural force shall 
never intervene4 ,even if1 as may be    
done perhaps in the greatest miracles1  
,god suspends ,his concurrence1 so that 
the creature acts not at all1 even that 
would be no violation of the physical   
law of the creature's action3 for all   
that such a law provides is1 that the   
creature1 if it acts at all1 shall act  
in a certain way1 not that ,god shall   
always give the concurrence which is the
 necessary condition of its acting at   
all4 ,the laws of physical nature then  
are1 strictly speaking1 never violated1 
although the course of nature is        
occasionally altered by supernatural    
interference1 and continually by free   

human volition4 ,but the laws of        
physical nature1 in the highest         
generality1 are identified with the     
moral law4 ,the one ,eternal ,law       
embraces all the laws of creation4 ,it  
has a physical and a moral side4 ,on the
 former it effects1 on the latter it    
obliges1 but on both sides it is        
imperative2 and though in moral matters 
it be temporarily defeated by sin1 still
 the moral behest must in the end be    
fulfilled as surely as the physical     
behest4 ,the defeat of the law must be  
made good1 the sin must be punished4 ,of
 the ,eternal ,law working itself out in
 the form of punishment1 we shall speak 
presently4  #g4 ,it is important to hold
 this conception of the ,eternal ,law as
 embracing physical nature along with   
rational agents4 ,to confine the law1 as
 modern writers do1 to rational agents  
alone1 is sadly to abridge the view of  
its binding force4 ,the rigid           
application of physical laws is brought 
home to us daily by science and by      

experience3 it is a point gained1 to    
come to understand that the moral law1  
being ultimately one with those physical
 laws1 is no less absolute and          
indefeasible1 though in a different     
manner1 than they4  ,it is hard for us  
to conceive of laws being given to      
senseless things4 ,we cannot ourselves  
prescribe to iron or to sulphur the     
manner of its action4 ,as ,bacon says   
7,novum ,organum1 i41 ,aphorism #d73    
,man can only put natural bodies        
together or asunder3 nature does the    
rest within4 ,that is1 man cannot make  
the laws of nature3 he can only arrange 
collocations of materials so as to avail
 himself of those laws4 ,but ,god makes 
the law1 issuing ,his command1 the      
warrant without which no creature could 
do anything1 that every creature1       
rational and irrational1 shall act each 
according to its kind or nature4 ,such  
is the ,eternal ,law4                   
,readings4--,suarez1 ,de ,legibus1 ,i41 
xii42 ,st4 ,thos41 #a;a #b1 q4 #ij1 art4

 #b-d2 ib41 q4 #ia1 art4 #a1 in corp41  
ad #a2 ib41 q4 #ic1 art4 #a1 in corp42  
ib41 q4 #ic1 art4 #d1 in corp42 ib41 q4 
#ic1 art4 #e1 in corp42 ib41 q4 #ic1    
art4 #f1 in corp42 ,suarez1 ,de         
,legibus1 ,,ii41 vi42 ,cicero1 ,de      
,legibus1 ,,ii41 iv42 id41 ,de          
,republica1 iii4 #bb4    ,,chapter      
,,viii4  ,,of ,,the ,,natural ,,law ,,of
 ,,conscience4  ,,section ,i4--,of the  
,origin of ,primary ,moral ,judgments4  
#a4 ,it is an axiom of the schools1 that
 whatever is received1 is received      
according to the manner of the          
recipient4 ,we have spoken of the law   
that governs the world1 as that law has 
existed from eternity in the mind of    
,god4 ,we have now to consider that law 
as it is received in creatures1 and     
becomes the inward determinant of their 
action4 ,action is either necessary or  
free4 ,the great multitude of creatures 
are wholly necessary agents4 ,even in   
free agents1 most of what is in them1   
and much that proceeds from them1 is of 

necessity1 and beyond the control of    
their will4 ,of necessary action1       
whether material or mental1 we shall    
have nothing further to say4 ,it is     
governed by the ,eternal ,law1 but it is
 not matter of moral philosophy4        
,henceforth we have to do with that law1
 only as it is received in free agents1 
as such1 to be the rule of their        
conduct4 ,the agents being free1 the law
 must be received in a manner consonant 
with their freedom4 ,it is proper to a  
free and rational being to guide itself1
 not to be dragged or pushed1 but to go 
its own way1 yet not arbitrarily1 but   
according to law4 ,the law for such a   
creature must be1 not a physical        
determinant of its action1 but a law    
operating in the manner of a motive to  
the will1 obliging and binding1 yet not 
constraining it3 a law written in the   
intellect after the manner of knowledge3
 a law within the mind and consciousness
 of the creature1 whereby it shall      
measure and regulate its own behaviour4 

,this is the natural law of conscience4 
,it is the ,eternal ,law1 as made known 
to the rational creature1 whereby to    
measure its own free acts4 ,the ,eternal
 ,law is in the ,mind of ,god3 the      
,natural ,law in the minds of men and   
angels4 ,the ,eternal ,law adjusts all  
the operations of creatures3 the        
,natural ,law1 only the free acts of    
intellectual creatures4 ,and yet1 for   
binding force1 the ,natural ,law is one 
with the ,eternal ,law4 ,on a summer    
evening one observes the sunset on the  
west coast2 the heavens are all aglow   
with the sun shining there1 and the     
waters are aglow too1 reflecting the    
sun's rays4 ,the ,eternal ,law is as the
 sun there in the heavens1 the ,natural 
,law is like the reflection in the sea4 
,but it is one light4  #b4 ,it is called
 the ,natural ,law1 first1 because it is
 found1 more or less perfectly          
expressed1 in all rational beings3 now  
whatever is found in all the individuals
 of a kind1 is taken to belong to the   

specific nature1 or type of that kind4  
,again it is called the ,natural ,law1  
because it is a thing which any rational
 nature must necessarily compass and    
contain within itself in order to arrive
 at its own proper perfection and       
maturity4 ,thus this inner law is       
natural1 in the sense in which walking1 
speech1 civilization are natural to man4
 ,a man who has it not1 is below the    
standard of his species4 ,it will be    
seen that dancing1 singing--at least to 
a pitch of professional excellence--and 
a knowledge of ,greek1 are not1 in this 
sense1 natural4 ,the ,natural ,law is   
not natural1 in the sense of coming     
natural1 as provincial people say1 or   
coming to be in man quite irrespectively
 of training and education1 as comes the
 power of breathing4 ,it was absurd of  
,paley 7,mor4 ,phil41 bk4 i41 c4 v47 to 
look to the wild boy of ,hanover1 who   
had grown up in the woods by himself1 to
 display in his person either the       
,natural ,law or any other attribute    

proper to a rational creature4  #c4 ,we 
call this the natural law of conscience1
 because every individual's conscience  
applies this law1 as he understands it1 
to his own particular human acts1 and   
judges of their morality accordingly4   
,what then is conscience8 ,it is not a  
faculty1 not a habit1 it is an act4 ,it 
is a practical judgment of the          
understanding4 ,it is virtually the     
conclusion of a syllogism1 the major    
premiss of which would be some general  
principle of command or counsel in moral
 matters2 the minor1 a statement of fact
 bringing some particular case of your  
own conduct under that law2 and the     
conclusion1 which is conscience1 a      
decision of the case for yourself       
according to that principle3 e4g41      
,there is no obligation of going to     
church on 7what ,catholics call7 a day  
of devotion3 this day ,i am now living  
is only a day of devotion2 therefore ,i 
am not bound to go to church to-day4    
,such is the train of thought1 not      

always so explicitly and formally       
developed1 that passes through the mind1
 when conscience works4 ,it is important
 to remember that conscience is an act  
of intellect1 a judgment1 not on a      
matter of general principle1 not about  
other people's conduct1 but about my own
 action in some particular case1 and the
 amount of moral praise or blame that ,i
 deserve1 or should deserve1 for it4 ,as
 regards action already done1 or not    
done1 conscience testifies1 accusing or 
excusing4 ,as regards action            
contemplated1 conscience restrains or   
prompts1 in the way of either obligation
 or counsel4  #d4 ,conscience is not    
infallible3 it may err1 like any other  
human judgment4 ,a man may be blind1 if 
not exactly to his own action1 at least 
to the motives and circumstances of his 
action4 ,he may have got hold of a wrong
 general principle of conduct4 ,he may  
be in error as to the application of his
 principle to the actual facts4 ,in all 
these ways1 what we may call the        

conscientious syllogism may be at fault1
 like any other syllogism4 ,it may be a 
bad syllogism1 either in logical form1  
or in the matter of fact asserted in the
 premisses4 ,this is an erroneous       
conscience4 ,but1 for action            
contemplated1 even an erroneous         
conscience is an authoritative decision4
 ,if it points to an obligation1 however
 mistakenly1 we are bound either to act 
upon the judgment or get it reversed4   
,we must not contradict our own reason3 
such contradiction is moral evil1 7c4   
v41 s4 iii41 n4 #c1 p4 #gd47 ,if        
conscience by mistake sets us free of   
what is objectively our bounden duty1 we
 are not there and then bound to that   
duty3 but we may be bound at once to get
 that verdict of conscience overhauled  
and reconsidered4 ,conscience in this   
case has proceeded in ignorance1 which  
ignorance will be either vincible or    
invincible1 and must be treated         
according to the rules provided in the  
matter of ignorance1 7c4 iii41 s4 i41   

nn4 #c-e1 p4 #bg74 ,an obligation1      
neglected in invincible ignorance1 makes
 a merely material sin4 7c4 iii41 s4    
ii41 n4 #g1 p4 #cc47  #e4 ,there is     
another element of mind1 often          
confounded under one name with          
conscience1 but distinct from it1 as a  
habit from an act1 and as principles    
from their application4 ,this element   
the schoolmen called synderesis4        
,footnote #aj  ,footnote #aj3 ,on the   
derivation of this word1 whether from   
,greek3 synedaesis or ,greek3           
syntaeresis1 see ,athenum1 #ahgg1 vol4  
i41 pp4 #gch1 #gih1 vol4 iii4 pp4 #af1  
#dh4  ,synderesis is an habitual hold   
upon primary moral judgments1 as1 that  
we must do good1 avoid evil1 requite    
benefactors1 honour superiors1 punish   
evil-doers4 ,there is a hot controversy 
as to how these primary moral judgments 
arise in the mind4 ,the coals of dispute
 are kindled by the assumption1 that    
these moral judgments must needs have a 
totally other origin and birth in the   

mind than speculative first principles1 
as1 that the whole is greater than the  
part1 that two and two are four1 that   
things which are equal to the same thing
 are equal to one another4 ,the         
assumption is specious1 but unfounded4  
,it looks plausible because of this     
difference1 that moral judgments have   
emotions to wait upon them1 speculative 
judgments have not4 ,speculative        
judgments pass like the philosophers    
that write them down1 unheeded in the   
quiet of their studies4 ,but moral      
judgments are rulers of the             
commonwealth3 they are risen to as they 
go by1 with majesty preceding and cares 
coming after4 ,their presence awakens in
 us certain emotions1 conflicts of      
passion1 as we think of the good that we
 should do1 but have not done1 or of the
 evil that goes unremedied and unatoned 
for4 ,commonly a man cannot contemplate 
his duty1 a difficult or an unfulfilled 
duty especially1 without a certain      
emotion1 very otherwise than as he views

 the axioms of mathematics4 ,there is a 
great difference emotionally1 but       
intellectually the two sets of          
principles1 speculative and moral1 are  
held alike as necessary truths1 truths  
that not only are1 but must be1 and     
cannot be otherwise3 truths in which the
 predicate of the proposition that      
states them is contained under the      
subject4 ,such are called self-evident  
propositions2 and the truths that they  
express1 necessary truths4 ,the enquiry 
into the origin of our primary moral    
judgments is thus merged in the         
question1 how we attain to necessary    
truth4  #f4 ,the question belongs to    
,psychology1 not to ,ethics3 but we will
 treat it briefly for ethical purposes4 
,and first for a clear notion of the    
kind of judgments that we are           
investigating4  ,the primary precepts of
 the law of nature stand to the         
practical reason as the first principles
 of scientific demonstration do to the  
speculative reason3 for both sets of    

principles are self-evident4 ,a thing is
 said to be self-evident in two ways1   
either in itself1 or in reference to us4
 ,in itself every proposition1 the      
predicate of which can be got from      
consideration of the subject is said to 
be self-evident4 ,but it happens that to
 one who is ignorant of the definition  
of the subject1 such a proposition will 
not be self-evident3 as this            
proposition1 ,man is a rational being1  
is self-evident in its own nature1      
because to name man is to name something
 rational2 and yet1 to one ignorant what
 man is1 this proposition is not        
self-evident4 ,and hence it is that1 as 
,boethius says3 there are some axioms   
self-evident to all alike4 ,of this     
nature are all those propositions whose 
terms are known to all1 as1 ,every whole
 is greater than its part2 and1 ,things 
which are equal to the same thing are   
equal to one another4 ,some propositions
 again are self-evident only to the     
wise1 who understand the meaning of the 

terms3 as1 to one who understands that  
an angel is not a body1 it is           
self-evident that an angel is not in a  
place by way of circumscription2        
,footnote #aa which is not manifest to  
others1 who do not understand the term4 
7,st4 ,thos41 #a;a #b q4 #id1 art4 #b1  
in corp47  ,footnote #aa3               
,circumscriptive1 which word is         
explained by ,st4 ,thos41 #a;a1 q4 #eb4 
art4 #a4  ,one more extract4 ,from the  
very nature of an intellectual soul it  
is proper to man that1 as soon as he    
knows what a whole is1 and what a part  
is1 he knows that every whole is greater
 than its part2 and so of the rest4 ,but
 what is a whole1 and what a part1 that 
he cannot know except through sensory   
impressions4 ,and therefore ,aristotle  
shows that the knowledge of principles  
comes to us through the senses4 7,st4   
,thos41 #a;a #b1 q4 #ea1 art4 #a1 in    
corp47  #g4 ,thus the propositions that 
right is to be done1 benefactors to be  
requited1 are self-evident1 necessary   

truths1 to any child who has learned by 
experience the meaning of right1 of     
kindness1 and of a return of kindness4  
,yes1 but--some one will say--how ever  
does he get to know what right and wrong
 are8 ,surely sensory experience cannot 
teach him that4 ,we answer1 man's       
thoughts begin in sense1 and are        
perfected by reflection4 ,let us take   
the idea of wrong1 the key to all other 
elementary moral ideas4 ,the steps by   
which a child comes to the fulness of   
the idea of wrong may be these4 ,first1 
the thing is forbidden3 then one gets   
punished for it4 ,punishment and        
prohibition enter in by eye and ear and 
other senses besides4 ,then the thing is
 offensive to those we love and revere4 
,then it is bad for us4 ,then it is     
shameful1 shabby1 unfair1 unkind1       
selfish1 hateful to ,god4 ,all these    
points of the idea of wrong are grasped 
by the intellect1 beginning with sensory
 presentations of what is seen and felt 
and heard said4 ,again with the idea of 

ought4 ,this idea is sometimes said to  
defy analysis4 ,but we have gone about  
7c4 vi47 to analyse it into two         
elements1 nature requiring1 nature's    
,king commanding4 ,the idea of wrong we 
analysed into a breach of this natural  
requirement1 and this ,divine command or
 law4 ,primary moral ideas1 then1 yield 
to intellectual analysis4 ,they are of  
this style3 to be done1 as ,i wish to be
 rational and please ,god3 not to be    
done1 unless ,i wish to spoil myself and
 disobey my ,maker4 ,but primary moral  
ideas1 compared together1 make primary  
moral judgments4 ,primary moral         
judgments1 therefore1 arise in the      
intellect1 by the same process as other 
beliefs arise there in matters of       
necessary truth4  #h4 ,thus1 applying   
the principle known as ,occham's razor1 
that entities are not to be multiplied  
without reason1 we refuse to acknowledge
 any ,moral ,sense1 distinct from       
,intellect4 ,we know of no peculiar     
faculty1 specially made to receive      

ideas1 pleasures and pains in the moral 
order4 7,mackintosh1 ,ethics1 p4 #bjf47 
,most of all1 we emphatically protest   
against any blind power being accredited
 as the organ of morality4 ,we cannot   
accept for our theory of morals1 that   
everything is right which warms the     
breast with a glow of enthusiasm1 and   
all those actions wrong1 at which       
emotional people are prone to cry out1  
dreadful1 shocking4 ,we cannot accept   
emotions for arbitrators1 where it most 
concerns reasonable beings to have what 
the ,apostle calls enlightened eyes of  
the heart 7,ephes4 i4 #ah71 that we may 
know to refuse the evil and to choose   
the good4 7,isaias vii4 #ae47 ,a judge  
may have his emotions1 but his charge to
 the jury must be dictated1 not by his  
heart1 but by his knowledge of the law4 
,and the voice of conscience1 whatever  
feelings it may stir1 must be an        
intellectual utterance1 and1 to be worth
 anything in a case of difficulty1 a    
reasoned conclusion1 based on           

observation of facts1 and application of
 principles1 and consultation with moral
 theologians and casuists4 ,a subjective
 and emotional standard of right and    
wrong is as treacherous and             
untrustworthy as the emotional          
justification of those good people1 who 
come of a sudden to feel converted4  #i4
 ,it would be unnecessary1 except for   
the wrong-headedness of philosophers1 to
 observe that conscience requires       
educating4 ,as moral virtue is a habit  
of appetite1 rational or irrational1 a  
formation resulting from frequent acts2 
and as the child needs to be aided and  
assisted from without towards the       
performance of such acts1 in order to   
overcome the frequent resistance of     
appetite to reason 7c4 v41 s4 ii41 n4   
#d1 p4 #ga73 so the springs of          
conscience are certain intellectual     
habits1 whereby the subject is cognisant
 of the principles of natural law1 and  
of their bearing on his own conduct1    
habits which1 like the habits of moral  

virtue1 require to be formed by acts    
from within and succour from without1   
since merely the rudiments of the habit 
are supplied by nature4 ,even the first 
principles of morality want formulating 
and pointing out to children1 like the  
axioms of geometry4 ,the mother tells   
her little one3 ,ernest1 or ,frank1 be a
 good boy3 while the schoolmaster       
explains to ,master ,ernest that two    
straight lines cannot possibly enclose a
 space4 ,there is something in the boy's
 mind that goes along with and bears out
 both the teaching of his master and his
 mother's exhortation3 something that   
says within him3 ,to be sure1 those     
lines can't enclose a space3 ,certainly1
 ,i ought to be good4 ,it is not merely 
on authority that he accepts these      
propositions4 ,his own understanding    
welcomes and approves them3 so much so1 
that once he has understood them1 he    
would not believe the contrary for being
 told it4 ,you would not persuade a     
child that it was right to pull mother's

 hair2 or that half an orange was       
literally1 as ,hesiod says1 more than   
the whole4 ,he would answer that it     
could not be1 that he knew better4  #aj4
 ,on one ground there is greater need of
 education for the conscience than for  
any other intellectual formation3 that  
is because of the power of evil to      
fascinate and blind on practical issues 
of duty4 ,cicero well puts it3  ,we are 
amazed and perplexed by variety of      
opinions and strife of authorities2 and 
because there is not the same divergence
 upon matters of sense1 we fancy that   
the senses afford natural certainty1    
while1 for moral matters1 because some  
men take one view1 some another1 and the
 same men different views at different  
times1 we consider that any settlement  
that can be arrived at is merely        
conventional1 which is a huge mistake4  
,the fact is1 there is no parent1 nor   
nurse1 nor schoolmaster1 nor poet1 nor  
stage play1 to corrupt the judgments of 
sense1 nor consent of the multitude to  

wrench them away from the truth4 ,it is 
for minds and consciences that all the  
snares are set1 as well by the agency of
 those whom ,i have just mentioned1 who 
take us in our tender and inexperienced 
age1 and ingrain and fashion us as they 
will1 as also by that counterfeit       
presentment of good1 which lurks in the 
folds of every sense1 the mother of all 
evil1 pleasure1 under whose seductive   
blandishments men fail to recognise the 
moral good that nature offers1 because  
it is unaccompanied by this itching     
desire and satisfaction4 7,cicero1 ,de  
,legibus1 i1 #ag47  ,readings4--,st4    
,thos41 #a;a1 q4 #gi1 art4 #aa-ac2      
,plato1 ,protagoras1 #cbe1 #cbf2 ,john  
,grote1 ,examination of ,utilitarian    
,philosophy1 pp4 #afi1 #bjg1 #bjh2      
,cardinal ,newman1 ,grammar of ,assent1 
pp4 l#jb-aab4   ,,section ,,ii4--,of the
 invariability of ,primary ,moral       
,judgments4   #a4 ,the following        
narrative is taken from ,grote's        
,history of ,greece1 c4 #ha43  ,it was a

 proud day for the ,carthaginian general
 ,footnote #ab when he stood as master  
on the ground of ,himera2 enabled to    
fulfil the duty1 and satisfy the        
exigencies1 of revenge for his slain    
grandfather4 ,tragical indeed was the   
consummation of this long-cherished     
purpose4444 ,all the male captives1     
#c1jjj in number1 were conveyed to the  
precise spot where ,hamilkar had been   
slain1 and there put to death with      
indignity1 as an expiatory satisfaction 
to his lost honour4 ,no man can read the
 account of this wholesale massacre     
without horror and repugnance4 ,yet we  
cannot doubt1 that among all the acts of
 ,hannibal's life1 this was the one in  
which he most gloried2 that it realized 
in the most complete and emphatic       
manner1 his concurrent aspirations of   
filial sentiment1 religious obligation1 
and honour as a patriot2 ,footnote #ac  
that to show mercy would have been      
regarded as a mean dereliction of these 
esteemed impulses4444 ,doubtless1 the   

feelings of ,hannibal were cordially    
shared1 and the plenitude of his revenge
 envied1 by the army around him4 ,so    
different1 sometimes so totally         
contrary1 is the tone and direction of  
the moral sentiments1 among different   
ages and nations4  ,footnote #ab3       
,hannibal1 ,b4,c4 #dji1 therefore not   
the victor of ,cannae4 ,footnote #ac3   
,italics mine4  ,we may supplement this 
story by another from ,herodotus 7iii41 
#ch73  ,darius1 after he had got the    
kingdom1 called into his presence       
certain ,greeks who were at hand1 and   
asked1 ',what he should pay them to eat 
the bodies of their fathers when they   
died4' ,to which they answered1 that    
there was no sum that would tempt them  
to do such a thing4 ,he then sent for   
certain ,indians1 of the race called    
,callatians1 men who eat their fathers1 
and asked them1 while the ,greeks were  
standing by1 and knew by the aid of an  
interpreter all that was said--',what he
 should give them to burn the bodies of 

their fathers1 at their decease8' ,the  
,indians exclaimed aloud1 and bade him  
forbear such language4 ,such is the way 
of men2 and ,pindar was right in my     
judgment1 when he said1 ',convention is 
king over all4'  #b4 ,if any one held   
that the natural law of conscience was  
natural in the same way as the sense of 
temperature3 if one held to the         
existence of a ,moral ,sense in all men1
 settling questions of right and wrong1 
as surely as all men know sweet things  
from bitter by tasting them3 these      
stories1 and they could be multiplied by
 hundreds1 abundantly suffice to confute
 the error4 ,there is no authentic copy 
of the moral law1 printed1 framed1 and  
hung up by the hand of ,nature1 in the  
inner sanctuary of every human heart4   
,man has to learn his duties as he      
learns the principles of health1 the    
laws of mechanics1 the construction and 
navigation of vessels1 the theorems of  
geometry1 or any other art or science4  
,and he is just as likely to go wrong1  

and has gone wrong as grievously1 in his
 judgments on moral matters as on any   
other subject of human knowledge4 ,the  
knowledge of duties is natural 7as      
explained in the previous section1 n4   
#b71 not because it comes spontaneously1
 but because it is necessary to our     
nature for the development and          
perfection of the same4 ,thus a man     
ought1 so far as he can1 to learn his   
duties3 but we cannot say of a man1 as  
such1 that he ought to learn geometry or
 navigation4 ,if a man does not know his
 duties1 he is excused by ignorance1    
according to the rules under which      
ignorance excuses 7c4 iii41 s4 i41 nn4  
#c-e1 p4 #bg74 ,if a man does not know  
navigation1 there is no question of     
excuse for what he was not bound to     
learn1 but he may suffer loss by his    
want of knowledge4  #c4 ,it was         
furthermore observed above 7l4c471 that 
the natural law was so called as being  
found expressed more or less perfectly  
in the minds of all men1 and therefore  

being a proper element of human nature4 
,it remains to see how much this        
universal natural expression amounts to4
 ,that is at once apparent from our     
previous explanation of synderesis4 7s4 
i41 nn4 #e1 seq41 p4 #aci47 ,not a      
complete and accurate knowledge of the  
natural law is found in all minds1 far  
from it2 but synderesis is found in all4
 ,this is apparent from ,mr4 ,grote's   
own phrases1 aspirations of filial      
sentiment1 religious obligation1 honour 
as a patriot1 ,parents are to be        
honoured1 we must do our duty to ,god   
and to our country3 there ,hannibal was 
at one with the most approved teachers  
of morality4 ,callatian and ,greek      
agreed in the recognition of the        
commandment1 ,honour thy father and thy 
mother4 ,that was the major premiss of  
them both1 in the moral syllogism 7s4   
i41 n4 #c1 p4 #ace71 which ruled their  
respective consciences4 ,their          
difference was upon the applying minor1 
as it is called2 the ,greek regarding   

the dissolution of the body into its    
elements by fire1 and so saving it from 
corruption1 as the best means of        
honouring the dead3 the ,callatians     
preferring to raise their parents as it 
were to life again1 by making them the  
food of their living children4          
,hannibal1 again1 had before his mind   
the grand principle of retribution1 that
 wrongdoing must be expiated by         
suffering4 ,but he had not heard the    
words ,vengeance is ,mine2 and          
mistakenly supposed it to rest with     
himself to appoint and carry out his own
 measure of revenge4 ,whether he was    
quite so invincibly ignorant on this    
point1 as ,grote represents1 is open to 
doubt4 ,at any rate he was correct in   
the primary moral judgment on which he  
proceeded4  ,reading4--,st4 ,thos41 #a;a
 #b1 q4 #id1 art4 #f4   ,,section       
,,iii4--,of the immutability of the     
,natural ,law4   #a4 ,besides printing1 
many methods are now in vogue for       
multiplying copies of a document4       

,commonly the document is written out   
with special ink on special paper3 the  
copy thus used is called a stencil2 and 
from it other copies are struck off4 ,we
 will suppose the stencil to be that    
page of the ,eternal ,law written in the
 ,mind of ,god1 which regulates human   
acts1 technically so called4 ,the copies
 struck off from that stencil will be   
the ,natural ,law in the mind of this   
man and of that4 ,now1 as all who are   
familiar with copying processes know too
 well1 it happens at times that a copy  
comes out very faint1 and in parts not  
at all4 ,these faint and partial copies 
represent the ,natural ,law as it is    
imperfectly developed in the minds of   
many men4 ,in this sense1 and as we may 
say subjectively1 the ,natural ,law is  
mutable1 very mutable indeed4 ,still1 as
 no one would say that the document had 
been altered1 because some copies of it 
were bad1 so it is not strictly correct 
to say that the ,natural ,law varies    
with these subjective varieties4 ,appeal

 would be made to a full and perfectly  
printed impression of the document1 one 
that rendered the stencil exactly4 ,the 
,natural ,law must be viewed in like    
manner1 as it would exist in a mind     
perfectly enlightened concerning the    
whole duty of man1 and exactly          
reproducing in itself that portion of   
the ,eternal ,law which ordains such    
duty4 ,were such a mind to discern a    
natural obligation to lie differently at
 two different times1 all the relevant  
circumstances being alike in both cases1
 and the moral solution different1 then 
only could the ,natural ,law be held to 
have changed4  #b4 ,but this is clearly 
impossible4 ,the conclusion of a        
geometrical theorem is a truth for all  
time4 ,there is no difference here      
between a complicated theorem1 having   
many conditions1 and a simpler theorem  
with fewer4 ,it is indeed easier for a  
few than for many conditions to be all  
present together3 but the enunciation of
 the conclusion supposes all the        

conditions1 whatever their number4 ,the 
same in a practical manner1 as in the   
stability of a bridge4 ,the bridge that 
would stand in ,england1 would stand in 
,ceylon4 ,if it would not1 there must   
have occurred some change in the        
conditions1 as the heat of the tropical 
sun upon the girders4 ,a point of       
casuistry also1 however knotty1 once    
determined1 is determined for ever and  
aye1 for the circumstances under which  
it was determined4 ,the ,natural ,law in
 this sense is absolutely immutable1 no 
less in each particular application than
 in the most general principles4 ,we    
must uniformly pass the same judgment on
 the same case4 ,what is once right and 
reasonable1 is always right and         
reasonable1 in the same matter4 ,where  
to-day there is only one right course1  
there cannot to-morrow be two1 unless   
circumstances have altered4 ,the        
,natural ,law is thus far immutable1    
every jot and tittle4  #c4 ,no power in 
heaven above nor on earth beneath can   

dispense from any portion of the        
,natural ,law4 ,for the matter of the   
negative precepts of that law is1 as we 
have seen1 something bad in itself and  
repugnant to human nature1 and          
accordingly forbidden by ,god3 while the
 matter of the positive precepts is     
something good and necessary to man1    
commanded by ,god4 ,if ,god were to take
 off ,his command1 or prohibition1 the  
intrinsic exigency1 or intolerableness1 
of the thing to man would still remain1 
being as inseparable from humanity as   
certain mathematical properties from a  
triangle4 ,pride is not made for man1   
nor fornication1 nor lying1 nor polygamy
 ,footnote #ad3 human nature would cry  
out against them1 even were the         
,almighty in a particular instance to   
withdraw ,his prohibition4 ,what would  
be the use1 then1 of any such           
withdrawal8 ,it would not make the evil 
thing good4 ,an evil thing it would     
still remain1 unnatural1 irrational1 and
 as such1 displeasing to ,god1 the      

,supreme ,reason4 ,the man would not be 
free to do the thing1 even though ,god  
did not forbid it4 ,it appears1         
therefore1 that the ,divine prohibition1
 and similarly the ,divine command1     
which we have proved 7c4 vi41 s4 ii41   
nn4 #aj1 #aa1 p4 #aba7 to be necessarily
 imposed in matters of natural evil and 
of naturally imperative good1 is imposed
 as a hard and fast line1 so long as the
 intrinsic good or evil remains the     
same4  ,footnote #ad3 ,there is a       
theological difficulty about the        
polygamy of the patriarchs1 which will  
be touched on in ,natural ,law1 c4 vi41 
s4 ii41 n4 #d4 p4 #bgb4  #d4 ,there is1 
therefore1 no room for ,evolution in    
,ethics and ,natural ,law any more than 
in ,geometry4 ,one variety of           
geometrical construction1 or of moral   
action1 may succeed another2 but the    
truths of the science1 by which those   
varieties are judged1 change not4 ,there
 is indeed this peculiarity about       
morality1 distinguishing it from art1   

that if a man errs invincibly1 the evil 
that he takes for good is not formally  
evil1 or evil as he wills it1 and the   
good that he takes for evil is formally 
evil to him4 7c4 iii41 s4 ii41 n4 #g1 p4
 #cc47 ,so there is variation and       
possible ,evolution in bare formal good 
and bare formal evil1 as ignorance      
gradually changes into knowledge2 and   
likewise ,reversion1 as knowledge       
declines into ignorance4 ,even this     
,evolution and ,reversion have their    
limits3 they cannot occur in the primary
 principles of morality1 as we saw in   
the last section4 ,but morality material
 and objective1--complete morality1     
where the formal and material elements  
agree1 where real wrong is seen to be   
wrong1 and real right is known for      
right--in this morality there is no     
,evolution4 ,if ,hannibal offered human 
sacrifices to his grandfather because he
 knew no better1 and could not have     
known better1 than to think himself     
bound so to do1 he is to be excused1 and

 even praised for his piety3 still it   
was a mistaken piety2 and the act1 apart
 from the light in which the doer viewed
 it1 was a hideous crime4 ,an incorrupt 
teacher of morals would have taught the 
,carthaginian1 not that he was doing    
something perfectly right for his age   
and country1 which1 however1 would be   
wrong in ,germany some centuries later1 
but that he was doing an act there and  
then evil and forbidden of ,god1 from   
which he was bound1 upon admonition1    
instantly to desist4 ,footnote #ae      
,footnote #ae3 ,the author has seen     
reason somewhat to modify this view1 as 
appears by the ,appendix4 7,note to     
,third ,edition47  #e4 ,there are       
,evolution and ,reversion in            
architecture1 but not in the laws of    
stability of structure1 nor in the      
principles of beauty as realized in     
building4 ,a combination1 ugly now1 was 
not beautiful in the days of ,darius4   
,tastes differ1 but not right tastes2   
and moral notions1 but not right moral  

notions4 ,it is true that questions of  
right and wrong occur in one state of   
society1 that had no relevance in an    
earlier state1 the conditions of the    
case not having arisen4 ,but so it is in
 architecture2 there are no arches in   
the ,parthenon4 ,the principle of the   
arch1 however1 held in the age of       
,pericles1 though not applied4  #f4 ,the
 progress of ,moral ,science is the more
 and more perfect development of the    
,natural ,law in the heart of man1 a    
psychological1 not an ontological       
development4 ,and ,moral ,science does  
progress4 ,no man can be a diligent     
student of morality for years1 without  
coming to the understanding of many     
things1 for which one would look in vain
 in ,aristotle's ,ethics and ,politics1 
or in ,cicero1 ,de ,officiis1 or even in
 the ,summa of ,st4 ,thomas1 or perhaps 
in any book ever written4 ,new moral    
questions come for discussion as        
civilization advances4 ,the commercial  
system of modern times would furnish a  

theme for another ,de ,lugo4 ,and still 
on this path of ethical discovery1 to   
quote the text that ,bacon loved1 ,many 
shall pass over1 and knowledge shall be 
multiplied4 7,daniel xii4 #d47          
,readings4--,st4 ,thos41 ,supplement1 q4
 #fe1 art4 #a1 in corp42 ib41 q4 #fe1   
art4 #b1 in corp41 and ad #a2 ,hughes1  
,supernatural ,morals1 pp4 #fg1 #fh1    
reviewed in ,the ,month for ,august1    
#ahia1 pp4 #edb1 #edc4   ,,section      
,,iv4--,of ,probabilism4   #a4          
,sometimes conscience returns a clear1  
positive answer as to the morality of an
 act contemplated4 ,true or false the   
answer may be1 but the ring of it has no
 uncertain sound4 ,at other times       
conscience is perplexed1 and her answer 
is1 perhaps1 and perhaps not4 ,when the 
woman hid ,achimaas and ,jonathan in the
 well1 and said to ,absalom's servants1 
,they passed on in haste 7#b ,kings     
xvii4 #ag-ba71 did she do right in      
speaking thus to save their lives8 ,a   
point that has perplexed consciences for

 centuries4 ,a man's hesitation is      
sometimes subjective and peculiar to    
himself4 ,it turns on a matter of fact1 
which others know full well1 though he  
doubts2 or on a point of law1 dark to   
him1 but clearly ruled by the consent of
 the learned4 ,in such cases it is his  
duty to seek information from people    
about him1 taking so much trouble to    
procure it as the importance of the     
matter warrants1 not consulting ten     
doctors as to the ownership of one hen4 
,but it may be that all due enquiries   
fail4 ,the fact remains obscure2 or     
about the law1 doctors differ1 and      
arguments conflict indecisively4 ,what  
is the man to do8 ,take the safe course3
 suppose there is an obligation1 and act
 accordingly8 ,this principle1 put as a 
command1 would make human life          
intolerable4 ,it is1 moreover1 false1   
when so put1 as we shall presently      
prove4 ,take the easy course1 and leave 
the obligation out of count8 ,this      
principle is more nearly correct than   

the other3 but it needs interpretation1 
else it may prove dangerously lax4  #b4 
,to return to ,achimaas and ,jonathan   
and their hostess4 ,some such reckoning 
as this may have passed through her     
mind3 ,lying lips are an abomination to 
the ,lord3 but is it a lie to put       
murderers off the scent of blood8 ,to   
that question finding no answer1 she may
 have made up her mind in this way3     
,well1 ,i don't know1 but ,i'll risk it4
 ,if that were her procedure1 she did   
not walk by the scientific lines of     
,probabilism4 ,the probabilist runs no  
risk1 enters upon no uncertainty1 and   
yet he by no means always follows what  
is technically termed the safe course1  
that is1 the course which supposes the  
obligation1 e4g41 in the case in point1 
to have said simply where the men were4 
,how then does the probabilist contrive 
to extract certainty out of a case of   
insoluble doubt8 ,by aid of what is     
called a reflex principle4 ,a reflex is 
opposed to a direct principle4 ,a direct

 principle lays down an obligation1 as  
it would bind one who had a perfect     
discernment of the law and of the facts 
of the case1 and of the application of  
the one to the other1 and who was       
perfectly able to keep the law4 ,by a   
reflex principle1 a man judges of his   
own act1 taking account of the          
imperfection of his knowledge and the   
limitations of his power4 ,probabilism  
steps in1 only where a case is          
practically insoluble to an agent upon  
direct principles4 ,the probabilist     
thereupon leaves the direct speculative 
doubt unsolved4 ,he relinquishes the    
attempt of determining what a man should
 do in the case in question1 who had a  
thorough insight into the lie of the    
law4 ,he leaves that aside1 and         
considers what is his duty1 or not his  
duty1 in the deficiency of his          
knowledge4 ,then he strikes upon the    
principle1 which is the root of         
,probabilism1 that a doubtful law has no
 binding power4 ,it will be observed    

that this is a reflex principle4 ,for   
objectively nothing is doubtful1 but    
everything is or is not in point of     
fact4 ,to a mind that had a full grasp  
of the objective order of things1 there 
would be no doubtful law3 such a mind   
would discern the law in every case as  
holding or not holding4 ,but no human   
mind is so perfect4 ,every man has to   
take account of his own limitations of  
vision in judging of his duty4 ,the     
question for me is1 not the law         
absolutely1 but the law as far as ,i can
 make it out4 ,our proposition1 then1   
states that when an individual1 using   
such moral diligence of enquiry as the  
gravity of the matter calls for1 still  
remains in a state of honest doubt as to
 whether the law binds1 in that mental  
condition it does not bind him4  #c4    
,what the law does not forbid1 it leaves
 open4 ,aristotle indeed 7,eth41 ,v41   
xi41 #a7 says the contrary1 that what   
the law does not command 7he instances  
suicide71 it forbids4 ,all that he seems

 to mean is1 that if there be an act    
which at times might appear             
advantageous1 and yet is never          
commanded1 there is a presumption of the
 legislator being averse to that act4   
,again1 there are special occasions1 in 
view of which the legislator undertakes 
to regulate the whole outward conduct of
 a man by positive enactment1 as with a 
soldier on parade3 what is not there    
commanded1 is forbidden4 ,but these     
instances do not derogate from our      
general proposition1 which is proved in 
this way4 ,the office of law is not to  
loose1 but to bind4 ,it declares1 not   
what the subject may do1 but what he    
must or must not4 ,it does not bring    
liberty1 but restriction4 ,therefore1 if
 any one wishes to assert a restriction1
 he must go to a law to prove it4 ,if he
 can find none1 liberty remains4 ,the   
law is laid on liberty4 ,liberty is not 
the outcome of law1 but prior to it4    
,liberty is in possession4 ,the burden  
of proof rests with those who would     

abridge liberty and impose an           
obligation4 ,it is an axiom of law      
itself1 a natural1 not an arbitrary     
axiom1 that better is the condition of  
the possessor3 which amounts in this    
matter to another statement1 also       
axiomatic1 that a law binds not till it 
is promulgated4 ,but a law of which ,i  
have serious outstanding doubts whether 
it exists at all1 or1 if existent1      
whether it reaches my case1 is for this 
occasion a law not duly promulgated to  
me4 ,therefore it binds me not1 and my  
liberty remains4  #d4 ,it remains to    
consider what constitutes a serious     
outstanding doubt4 ,the word outstanding
 has been already explained4 ,it means  
that we have sought for certain         
information1 and cannot procure it4 ,now
 what is a serious doubt8 ,it is a doubt
 founded on a positive opinion against  
the existence of the law1 or its        
applicability to the case in point1 an  
opinion fraught with probability1 solid1
 comparative1 practical probability4    

,the doubt must not be mere negative    
doubt1 or ignorance that cannot tell why
 it doubts2 not a vague suspicion1 or   
sentimental impression that defies all  
intellectual analysis2 not a mere       
subjective inability to make up one's   
mind1 but some counter-reason that      
admits of positive statement1 as we say1
 in black and white4 ,it is true that   
many minds cannot define their grounds  
of doubt1 even when these are real4     
,such minds are unfit to apply the      
doctrine of ,probabilism to themselves1 
but must seek its application from      
others4 ,the opinion against the law1   
when explicitly drawn out1 must be found
 to possess a solid probability4 ,it may
 be either an intrinsic argument from   
reason and the nature of the case1 or an
 extrinsic argument from the word of    
some authority3 but the reason or the   
authority must be grave4 ,the opinion is
 thus said to be intrinsically or       
extrinsically probable4 ,the probability
 must also be comparative4 ,there is    

many an argument1 in itself a very good 
one1 that perishes when we come to      
consider the crushing weight of evidence
 on the other side4 ,an opinion is      
comparatively probable1 when after      
hearing all the reasons and all the     
authorities on the other side1 the said 
opinion still remains not unlikely1     
which is all that we mean to say of an  
opinion here1 when we call it probable4 
,in ordinary ,english1 the word probable
 means more likely than otherwise1 which
 is not the signification of the ,latin 
opinio probabilis4 ,lastly1 the         
probability must be practical3 it must  
take account of all the circumstances of
 the case4 ,practical probability is    
opposed to speculative1 which leaves out
 of count certain circumstances1 which  
are pretty sure to be present1 and to   
make all the difference in the issue4   
,thus it is speculatively probable that 
a ,catholic might without sin remain    
years without confession1 never having  
any grievous sins to confess1 grievous  

sin alone being necessary matter for    
that sacrament4 ,there is no downright  
cogent reason why a man might not do so4
 ,and yet1 if he neglected such ordinary
 means of grace as confession of venial 
sin1 having it within reach1 month after
 month1 no one1 considering the sin     
which surrounds us1 would expect that   
man to go without grievous scathe4 ,in  
mechanics1 there are many machines that 
work prettily enough in speculation and 
on paper1 where the inventors do not    
consider the difficulties of imperfect  
material1 careless handling1 climate1   
and other influences1 that render the   
invention of no practical avail4  #e4   
,the safest use of ,probabilism is in   
the field of property transactions and  
of positive law4 ,there is greatest risk
 of using it amiss in remaining in a    
false religion4 ,all turns upon the     
varying amount of trouble involved in   
moral diligence of enquiry1 according as
 the matter at issue is a point of mere 
observance or of vital interest4  #f4   

,the point on which the probability     
turns must be the lawfulness or         
unlawfulness of the action1 not any     
other issue1 as that of the physical    
consequences4 ,before rolling           
boulder-stones down a hill to amuse     
myself1 it is not enough to have formed 
a probable opinion that there is no one 
coming up4 ,that would be ,probabilism  
misapplied4 ,the correct enquiry is3    
,does any intrinsic reason or extrinsic 
authority make the opinion probable1    
that it is lawful for mere amusement to 
roll down rocks with any belief short of
 certainty that no one will be crushed  
thereby8 ,the probability1 thus turned  
on to the lawfulness of the action1     
breaks down altogether4 ,this           
explanation1 borne in mind1 will save   
much misapprehension4    ,,chapter ,,ix4
  ,,of ,,the ,,sanction ,,of ,,the      
,,natural ,,law4  ,,section ,i4--,of a  
,twofold ,sanction1 ,natural and        
,divine4   #a4 ,the sanction of a law is
 the punishment for breaking it4 ,the   

punishment for final1 persistent breach 
of the natural law is failure to attain 
the perfect state and last end of the   
human soul1 which is happiness4 ,if     
existence be prolonged under this       
failure1 it must be in the contrary     
state of misery4 ,this failure and      
misery is at once a natural result and a
 divine infliction4 ,it is the natural  
result of repeated flagrant acts of     
moral evil1 whereby a man has made his  
nature hideous1 corrupted and overthrown
 it4 7c4 vi41 s4 i41 nn4 #d1 #e1 p4     
#aaa47 ,for an end is gained by taking  
the means1 and lost by neglect of the   
means thereto4 ,now1 as we have seen1   
happiness is an intellectual act1 the   
perfection of an intellectual or        
rational nature 7c4 ii41 s4 ii41 p4 #f72
 and the means to it are living         
rationally3 for a reasonable being1 to  
do well and fare well1 must live by that
 reason1 which is the form of his being4
 7c4 vi41 s4 i41 n4 #d1 p4 #aaa47       
,whoever therefore goes about           

contradicting the reason that is within 
him 7c4 v41 s4 iii41 n4 #c1 p4 #gd7 is  
not in the way to attain to happiness4  
,happiness the end of man1 the creature 
of all others the most complex1 is not  
to be stumbled upon by chance4 ,you may 
make two stones lean upright one against
 the other by chance1 but otherwise than
 by a methodical application of means to
 the end you could not support the spire
 of ,salisbury ,cathedral4  #b4 ,man's  
is a progressive nature 7c4 vi41 s4 i41 
nn4 #b1c1 p4 #aji71 himself being the   
director of his own progress4 ,other    
progressive natures may be spoilt by    
their requirements being denied1 and    
contrary things done to them4 ,man has  
his requirements4 ,it depends mainly on 
himself whether he acts up to them or   
against them4 ,if he acts against them1 
he so far spoils himself2 and once he is
 thoroughly spoilt by his own doing1 the
 final perfection of humanity is gone   
from him for ever4 ,it is the natural   
result4  #c4 ,i have spoken 7n4 #a7 of  

repeated flagrant acts3 not that ,i     
would ignore the evil set of the will   
that results from one gross and         
deliberate evil deed 7see c4 ix41 s4    
ii41 n4 #f1 p4 #afh73 but because the   
case is clearer where the acts have been
 multiplied4 ,however we must not omit  
to observe1 that it is not any vice1 or 
evil habit1 that formally unfits a man  
for his final happiness1 but an actual  
evil set of the will1 coming of actual  
sin unrepented of1 which set is more    
decided1 when that uncancelled sin is   
the last of many such1 and the outcome  
of a habit4 ,but supposing an habitual  
sinner to have repented1 and his        
repentance to have been ratified by     
,god1 and that he dies1 not actually in 
sin1 but before the habit of sin has    
been eradicated 7c4 v41 s4 ii41 n4 #a1  
p4 #fi71--we may say of him1 that his   
foot is set in the right way1 that is1  
his will is actually right1 and the     
obstacle to happiness is removed4 ,the  
evil habit in him is not an actual      

adhesion of his will to evil1 but a     
proneness to relapse into that state4   
,it is only remotely and potentially    
evil4 ,it is a seed of evil1 which      
however will not germinate in the good  
and blissful surroundings to which the  
soul has been transplanted1 but remain  
for ever sterile1 or rather1 will       
speedily decay4  #d4 ,if we leave ,god  
out of morality1 and take account only  
of the philosophical aspect of sin 7c4  
vi41 s4 ii41 n4 #f1 p4 #aai71 we have   
nothing further to say of the sanction  
than this1 which has been said3 ,act    
against nature1 and you will end by     
ruining your nature1 and fail of your   
final perfection and happiness4 ,but now
 ,god comes in1 the giver of the law of 
nature2 and the failure1 already a      
natural result1 must henceforth be      
viewed also as a ,divine chastisement4  
,there is no law without a sanction4    
,there is no law1 the giver of which can
 allow it to be broken with impunity4 ,a
 legislator who dispensed with all      

sanction1 would rightly be taken by     
young and old not to be in earnest in   
his command4 ,if then ,god must give a  
law to man whom ,he has created 7c4 vi41
 s4 ii41 n4 #i1 p4 #abj71 ,he must      
attach a sanction to that law2 and if   
the law is according to the exigency of 
human nature 7c4 vi41 s4 ii41 n4 #aa1 p4
 #abb71 so will the sanction also be the
 natural outcome of that exigency set at
 naught and that law broken4  #e4 ,our  
position gains by the consideration1    
that the object1 in the contemplation of
 which man's soul is to be finally and  
perfectly blessed in the natural order1 
is the ,creator seen through the veils  
of ,his works4 7c4ii41 s4iv41 p4 #ba47  
,this mediate vision of ,god1 albeit it 
is to be the work of a future existence1
 needs practice and preparation in this 
life4 ,god will not be discerned by the 
man who has not been accustomed to look 
for ,him4 ,he will not be seen by the   
swine1 who with head to earth has eaten 
his fill of sensual pleasures1 and has  

cared for nothing better4 ,he will not  
be seen by the covetous man and the     
oppressor1 who never identified ,his    
image hidden away under the             
labour-stained dress of the poor4 ,he   
will not be seen by the man1 who never  
looked up into ,his face in prayer here 
below4 ,he will not be seen by the      
earth-laden spirit1 that cared nothing  
at all for ,god1 that hated the mention 
of ,his name1 that proclaimed ,him1 or  
at least wished ,him1 not to be at all4 
#f4 ,it will be said that this          
argumentation supposes the habits of    
vice1 contracted on earth1 to remain in 
the soul after departure3 but there is  
no proof of that3 nay of some           
vices--those that have more to do with  
the body1 as drunkenness--the habits    
cannot possibly remain1 seeing that the 
appetite wherein they were resident has 
perished with the body4 ,first1 as      
regards the instance cited1 ,i reply    
that we may consider drunkenness in two 
ways1 on the one hand as a turning to   

the creature1 on the other as a turning 
away from reason and the ,creator4 ,the 
craving for liquor cannot remain in the 
soul after death exactly as it was      
before1 though it probably continues in 
some analogous form1 as a thirst for    
wild and irregular excitement3 but the  
loathing and horror of the ways of      
reason and of ,god1 engendered by       
frequent voluntary intoxication1 still  
continues in the soul4 ,and from this   
observation we draw the general answer1 
that whereas in every sin1 whether      
sensual or spiritual1 the most important
 part is played by the will1 and the    
will is a spiritual1 not an organic     
faculty1 a faculty which is a main      
element of the soul whether in or out of
 the body1--therefore the evil bent and 
inclination of the will1 which sin      
involves1 must remain even in the       
departed spirit4 ,lastly1 we may ask3   
,to what purpose is our free-will given 
us1 if all souls1 good and bad alike1   
users and abusers of the liberty they   

had on earth1 enter into their long home
 all of one uniform and spotless hue8   
#g4 ,thus then it comes to be1 by order 
of nature and good consequence1 that the
 man who has abandoned ,god1 goes       
without ,god2 and he who has shunned his
 last end and final good1 arrives not   
unto it2 and he who would not go1 when  
invited1 to the feast1 eats not of the  
same3 and whoso has withdrawn from ,god1
 from him ,god withdraws4 ,a curse he   
loved1 and it shall come upon him2 and  
he would not have a blessing1 and it    
shall be far from him4 ,he put on the   
curse like a garment1 and it has gone in
 like water into his entrails1 and like 
oil into his bones1--like a garment     
which covereth him1 and like a girdle   
wherewith he is girded continually4     
7,psalm cviii4 #ah1 #ai47  #h4          
,conversely1 we might argue the final   
happiness which attaches to the         
observance of the law of nature4 7c4    
ii41 s4 v41 p4 #bf47  ,readings4--,st4  
,thos41 ,cont4 ,gent41 iii41 cc4 #adj1  

#ada1 #adc1 #ade4   ,,section ,,ii4--,of
 the ,finality of the aforesaid         
,sanction4   #a4 ,by a final1 as        
distinguished from an eternal state1 is 
here meant the last state of existence  
in a creature1 whether that state go on 
for ever1 in which case it is final and 
eternal1 or whether it terminate in the 
cessation of that creature's being1     
which is a case of a state final1 but   
not eternal4 ,whether the unhappy souls 
of men1 who have incurred the last      
sentence of the natural law1 shall exist
 for eternity1 is not a question for    
philosophy to decide with certainty4    
,the philosopher rules everything a     
priori1 showing what must be1 if        
something else is4 ,of the action of    
,god in the world1 he can only foretell 
that amount which is thus hypothetically
 necessary4 ,some divine action there   
is1 of which the congruity only1 not the
 necessity1 is apparent to human eyes3  
there the philosopher can tell with     
probability1 but not with certainty1    

what ,god will do4 ,other actions of    
,god are wholly beyond our estimate of  
the reasons of them3 we call them simply
 and entirely free4 ,in that sphere     
philosophy has no information to render 
of her own2 she must wait to hear from  
revelation what ,god has done1 or means 
to do4 ,philosophers have given reasons 
of congruence1 as they call them1 for   
the reprobate sinner not being          
annihilated1 and therefore for his final
 punishment being eternal4 ,those       
reasons go to evince the probability of 
eternal punishment1 a probability which 
is deepened into certainty by           
revelation4 ,we shall not enter into    
them here1 but shall be content to argue
 that a term is set to the career of the
 transgressor1 arrived at which he must 
leave hope behind of ever winning his   
way to happiness1 or ever leading any   
other existence than one of misery4  #b4
 ,the previous question has shown that  
some punishment must attend upon        
violation of the natural law4 ,suppose a

 trangressor has suffered accordingly   
for a certain time after death1 what    
shall be done with him in the end8 ,if  
he does not continue to suffer as long  
as he continues to be1 then one of three
 things3 he must either pass into       
happiness1 or into a new state of       
probation1 or his very punishment must  
be a probation1 wherein if he behaves   
well1 he shall be rewarded with         
happiness at last1 or if ill1 he shall  
continue in misery until he amend4 ,all 
this speculation1 be it understood1 lies
 apart from revelation4 ,if then the    
sufferer passed out of this world1      
substantially and in the main a good    
man1 it is not unreasonable that1 after 
a period of expiatory suffering for     
minor delinquencies1 he should reach    
that happiness which is the just reward 
of his substantial righteousness4 ,but  
what of him who closed his career in    
wickedness exceeding great8 ,mere       
suffering will never make of him a good 
man1 or a fit subject for happiness4    

,but the suffering may be probationary1 
and he may amend himself under the      
trial4 ,against that hypothesis         
philosophers have brought a priori      
arguments to show that the period of    
probation must end with the separation  
of the soul from the body4 ,but waiving 
all such arguments1 let us suppose that 
there might be probation after probation
 even in the world to come4 ,but some   
human souls would continue obstinately  
and unrepentingly set in wickedness1 age
 after age1 and probation after         
probation3 for the possible malice of   
the will is vastly great4 ,what is to   
become of such obstinate characters8 ,it
 seems against the idea of probation1   
that periods of trial should succeed one
 another in an endless series4 ,it would
 be a reasonable rule in a university1  
that an undergraduate who had been      
plucked twenty-five times1 should become
 ineligible for his degree4 ,coming     
after so many failures1 neither would   
the degree be any ornament to him1 nor  

he to the university4 ,a soul cannot    
look for seasons without end of possible
 grace and pardon to shine upon it4 ,the
 series of probations must end          
somewhere4 ,and then8 ,we are come round
 to where we began4 ,when all the       
probation is over1 the soul is found    
either in conformity with the natural   
law1 which means ultimate happiness1 or 
at variance with the law1 and becomes   
miserable with a misery that shall never
 terminate1 unless the soul itself      
ceases to be4  #c4 ,it may be asked1 how
 much conformity to the natural law is  
requisite and sufficient1 to exempt a   
person at the end of his trial from a   
final doom of misery1 or to ensure his  
lasting happiness8 ,the question        
resolves itself into three3--how do sins
 differ in point of gravity8 is grave   
sin ever forgiven8 is the final award to
 be given upon the person's whole life1 
a balance being struck between his good 
and evil deeds1 or is it to be simply   
upon his moral state at the last moment 

of his career of trial8  #d4 ,it was a  
paradox of the ,stoics1 that all        
offences are equal1 the treading down of
 your neighbour's cabbage as heinous a  
crime as sacrilege4 7,horace1 ,satires1 
i41 #c1 #aae-aai47 ,but it is obvious   
that there is a vast difference1 as well
 objectively in the matter of the       
offence1 e4g41 in the instance just     
quoted from ,horace1 as also            
subjectively in the degree of knowledge1
 advertence1 and will1 wherewith the    
offender threw himself into the sin4    
,thus offences come to be distinguished 
as grave and light3 the latter being    
such as with a human master would       
involve a reprimand1 the former1 instant
 dismissal4 ,final misery is not        
incurred except by grave offending4  #e4
 ,the second question1 whether grave sin
 is ever forgiven1 cannot be answered by
 philosophy4 ,of course the sinner may  
see by the light of reason his folly and
 his error1 and thereby conceive some   
sort of sorrow for it1 and retract1 and 

to some extent withdraw his will from it
 on natural grounds4 ,this amendment of 
sin on its moral and philosophical side 
may deserve and earn pardon at human    
hands4 ,but the offence against ,god    
remains to be reckoned for with ,god4   
,now ,god is not bound to forgive       
without receiving satisfaction2 and ,he 
never can receive due satisfaction from 
man for the contempt that a deliberate1 
grave1 and flagrant violation of the    
moral law puts upon the ,infinite       
,majesty of the ,lawgiver4 ,the first   
thing that revelation has to teach us is
 whether1 and on what terms1 ,god is    
ready to pardon grievous sin4  #f4 ,the 
balance between deeds good and evil is  
not struck merely at the instant of     
death4 ,it is being struck continually2 
and man's final destiny turns on how    
that balance stands at the close of his 
time of probation4 ,so long as he keeps 
the substance of the moral law1 the     
balance is in his favour4 ,but one      
downright wilful and grievous           

transgression outweighs with ,god all   
his former good deeds4 ,it is a defiance
 of the ,deity1 a greater insult than   
all his previous life was a service and 
homage4 ,it is as though a loyal        
regiment had mutinied1 or a hitherto    
decent and orderly citizen were taken   
red-handed in murder4 ,if however ,god  
deigns to draw the offender to          
repentance1 and to pardon him1 the      
balance is restored4 ,thus everything   
finally depends on man being free from  
guilt of grievous transgression at the  
instant of death1 or at the end of his  
period of probation1 whenever and       
wherever that end may come4             
,reading4--,lessius1 ,de perfectionibus 
divinis1 #a4xiii41 c4 xxvi41 nn4 #ahc1  
seq4   ,,section ,,iii4--,of ,punishment
 ,retrospective and ,retributive4   #a4 
,the doctrine of the last section might 
stand even in the mind of one who held  
that all punishment is probational1 and 
destined for the amendment of him who   
undergoes it1 to humble him1 to awaken  

his sense of guilt1 and to make him fear
 to transgress again4 ,on this theory of
 punishment1 the man who in his last    
probational suffering refuses to amend1 
must be let drop out of existence as    
incorrigible1 and so clearly his final  
state is one of misery4 ,the theory is  
not inconsistent with final punishment1 
but with eternal punishment1 unless     
indeed we can suppose a creature for all
 eternity to refuse1 and that under     
stress of torment1 a standing invitation
 to repentance4 ,it is however a        
peculiar theory1 and opposite to the    
common tradition of mankind1 which has  
ever been to put gross offenders to     
death1 not as incorrigible1 not simply  
as refuse to be got rid of1 but that    
their fate may be a deterrent to others4
 ,punishment1 in this view1 is medicinal
 to the individual1 and deterrent to the
 community4 ,eternal punishment has been
 defended on the score of its deterrent 
force4 ,both these functions of         
punishment1 the medicinal and the       

deterrent function1 are prospective4    
,but there is asserted a third function1
 which is retrospective3 punishment is  
said to be retributive4 ,it is on this  
ground that the justification of eternal
 punishment mainly rests4 ,we are       
however here concerned1 not with that   
eternity1 but in an endeavour to give a 
full and adequate view of punishment in 
all its functions4  #b4 ,if punishment  
is never retributive1 the human race in 
all countries and ages has been the     
sport of a strange illusion4 ,everyone  
knows what vengeance means4 ,it is a    
desire to punish some one1 or to see him
 punished1 not prospectively and with an
 eye to the future1 for his improvement1
 or as a warning to others1 but         
retrospectively and looking to the past1
 that he may suffer for what he has     
done4 ,is then the idea of vengeance    
nothing but an unclean phantom8 ,is     
there no such thing as vengeance to a   
right-minded man8 ,then is there an evil
 element1 an element essentially and    

positively evil1 in human nature4 ,no   
one will deny that the idea1 and to some
 extent the desire1 of vengeance1 of    
retaliation1 of retrospective infliction
 of suffering in retribution for evil   
done1 of what we learn to call in the   
nursery tit for tat1 is natural to      
mankind4 ,it is found in all men4 ,we   
all respond to the sentiment3    ,mighty
 ,fates1 by ,heaven's decree accomplish1
   ,according as right passes from this 
side to that4   ,for hateful speech let 
speech of hate be paid back3   ,justice 
exacting her due cries this aloud3      
,for murderous blow dealt let the       
murderer pay   ,by stroke of murder     
felt4   ,do and it shall be done unto   
thee3   ,old is this saying and old and 
old again4  ,footnote #af3 schylus1     
,choephori1 #caf1 seq4 ,these lines     
embody the idea on which the dramas of  
the ,shakespeare of ,greece are         
principally founded4 ,but when was a    
work of the highest art based upon an   
idea unsound1 irrational and vicious8   

,nor must we be led away by ,mill       
7,utilitarianism1 c4v47 into confounding
 retaliation1 or vengeance1 with        
self-defence4 ,self-defence is a natural
 idea also1 but not the same as         
retaliation4 ,we defend ourselves       
against a mad dog1 we do not retaliate  
on him4 ,hence we must not argue that1  
because self-defence is prospective1    
therefore so is vengeance4  #c4 ,a thing
 is essentially evil1 when there is no  
possible use of it which is not an      
abuse4 ,not far different is the        
conception of a thing positively evil1  
evil1 that is1 not by reason of any     
deficiency1 or by what it is not1 but   
evil by what it is in itself4 ,such an  
essential1 positive evil in human nature
 would vengeance be1 a natural thing for
 which there was no natural use1 unless 
punishment may in some measure be       
retributive4 ,we cannot admit such a    
flaw in nature4 ,all healthy philosophy 
goes on the principle1 that what is     
natural is so far forth good4 ,otherwise

 we lapse into ,manicheism1 pessimism1  
scepticism1 abysses beyond the reach of 
argument4 ,vengeance undoubtedly prompts
 to many crimes1 but so does the passion
 of love4 ,both are natural impulses4   
,it would scarcely be an exaggeration to
 set down one third of human            
transgressions to love1 and another     
third to revenge3 yet it is the abuse in
 each case1 not the use1 that leads to  
sin4 ,if the matrimonial union were     
wicked and detestable1 as the           
,manicheans taught1 then would the      
passion of love be an abomination       
connatural to man4 ,such another        
enormity would be the affection of      
vengeance1 if punishment could never    
rightly be retributive4  #d4 ,aristotle1
 ,rhetoric1 ,i41 x41 #ag1 distinguishes 
two functions of punishment thus3       
,chastisement is for the benefit of him 
that suffers it1 but vengeance is for   
him that wreaks it1 that he may have    
satisfaction4 ,add to this the warning  
given to the commonwealth by the example

 that is made of the offender1 and we   
have the three functions of punishment1 
medicinal1 deterrent1 and retributive4  
,as it is medicinal1 it serves the      
offender3 as it is deterrent1 it serves 
the commonwealth3 as it is retributive1 
it serves the offended party1 being a   
reparation offered to him4 ,now1 who is 
the offended party in any evil deed8 ,so
 far as it is a sin against justice1 an 
infringement of any man's right1 he is  
the offended party4 ,he is offended1    
however1 not simply and precisely by    
your violation of the moral law1 but by 
your having1 in violation of that law1  
taken away something that belonged to   
him4 ,consequently1 when you make       
restitution and give him back what you  
took away1 with compensation for the    
temporal deprival of it1 he is          
satisfied1 and the offence against him  
is repaired4 ,if you have maliciously   
burnt his house down1 you bring him the 
price of the house and furniture1       
together with further payment for the   

fright and for the inconvenience of     
being1 for the present1 houseless4 ,you 
may do all that1 and yet the moral guilt
 of the conflagration may remain upon   
your soul4 ,but that is no affair of    
his3 he is not the custodian of the     
moral law3 he is not offended by your   
sin1 formally viewed as sin3 nor has he 
any function of punishing you1 taking   
vengeance upon you1 or exacting from you
 retribution for that4 ,but what if his 
wife and children have perished1 and you
 meant them so to perish1 in the fire8  
,your debt of restitution still lies in 
the matter which you took away4 ,of     
course it is a debt that cannot be paid4
 ,you cannot give back his pretty       
chickens and their dam whole and alive  
again4 ,still your inability to pay one 
debt does not make you liable to that   
creditor for another debt1 which is part
 of a wholly different account4 ,he is  
not offended by1 nor are you answerable 
to him for1 your sin in this case any   
more than in the former4  #e4 ,we may do

 an injury to an individual1 commit a   
crime against the ,state1 and sin       
against ,god4 ,the injury to the        
individual is repaired by restitution1  
not by punishment1 and therefore not by 
vengeance1 which is a function of       
punishment4 ,there is no such thing as  
vengeance for a private wrong1 and      
therefore we have the precept to forgive
 our enemies1 and not to avenge         
ourselves1 in which phrase the emphasis 
falls on the word ourselves4 ,the clear 
idea and strong desire of vengeance1    
which nature affords1 shows that there  
is such a thing as vengeance to be taken
 by some one3 it does not warrant every 
form of vengeance1 or allow it to be    
taken by each man for himself4 ,it      
consecrates the principle of            
retribution1 not every application of   
the principle4 ,it is a point of        
synderesis1 not of particular conduct4  
,the reader should recall what was said 
of the vengeance of ,hannibal at        
,himera4 7c4 viii41 s4 ii41 p4 #add47   

#f4 ,it belongs to the ,state to punish 
political sin1 or crime1 and to ,god to 
punish theological sin1 which is sin    
properly so called1 a breach of the     
,eternal ,law4 ,the man who has burnt   
his neighbour's house down1 though he   
has compensated the individual owner1   
may yet be punished by the ,state4 ,the 
owner1 acting in his capacity as        
citizen1 even when he has been          
compensated as an individual1 may still 
hand him over to the ,state for         
punishment4 ,the arson was a violation1 
not only of commutative1 but of legal   
justice 7c4 v41 s4 ix41 nn4 #c1 #f1 pp4 
#ajc1 #ajf71 a disturbance of the public
 peace and social order1 an outrage upon
 the majesty of the law4 ,for this he   
may be punished by the ,state1 which is 
the guardian of all these things1 and   
which has jurisdiction over him to make 
laws for him1 and to enforce their      
sanction against him4 ,civil punishment1
 besides being deterrent1 is retributive
 for the breach of social order4 ,it is 

the vengeance of the commonwealth upon  
the disturber of the public peace4      
,whether the ,state can punish on pure  
grounds of retribution1 away from all   
hope or need of deterring possible      
imitators of the crime1 is a question   
irrelevant to our present enquiry4      
,probably a negative answer should be   
returned4  #g4 ,we come now to the      
punishment of sin by ,god1 the ,living  
,reasonableness1 the ,head of the       
,commonwealth of ,creation1 the         
,legislator of the ,eternal ,law1 the   
,fountain of all ,jurisdiction1 ,him in 
whose hands rests the plenitude of the  
power to punish4 ,an evil deed may be no
 wrong to any individual man1 no crime  
against the ,state1 but it must ever be 
an offence against ,god4 ,it is a       
departure from the order of man's       
progress as a reasonable being 7c4 v41  
s4 iii41 n4 #c1 p4 #gd3 c4 vi41 s4 i41  
nn4 #a-e1 p4 #aji71 which is founded on 
the nature of ,god ,himself 7c4 vi41 s4 
i41 n4 #g1 p4 #aac71 of which order ,god

 is the official guardian 7c4 vi41 s4   
ii41 nn4 #h-aj1 p4 #aai71 and which is  
enjoined by ,god's ,eternal ,law4 7c4   
vii41 n4 #c1 p4 #abi47 ,this law extends
 to all creation1 rational and          
irrational1 animate and inanimate4 ,it  
bids every creature work according to   
his or its own nature and circumstances4
 ,given to irrational beings1 the law is
 simply irresistible and unfailing3 such
 are the physical laws of nature1 so    
many various emanations of the one      
,eternal ,law4 ,given to rational       
creatures1 the law may be resisted and  
broken3 sin is the one thing in the     
universe that does break it4 7c4 vii41  
nn4 #e-g1 p4 #acj47 ,a man may act in   
disregard of the ,eternal ,law on one or
 other of its physical sides1 and so    
much the worse for him1 though he has   
not broken the law1 but merely ignored  
its operation1 as when one eats what is 
unwholesome4 ,much more shall he suffer 
for having broken the law1 in the only  
possible way that it can be broken1 by  

sin4 ,this peculiar violation draws     
after it a peculiar consequence of      
suffering1 penal and retributive4 ,if a 
man gets typhoid fever in his house1 we 
sometimes say it is a punishment on him 
for neglecting his drains1 even when the
 neglect was a mere piece of ignorance  
or inadvertence4 ,it is an evil         
consequence certainly1--the law1 which  
he thought not of1 working itself out in
 the form of disease4 ,but it is not    
properly punishment3 no natural law has 
been really broken3 there has been no   
guilt1 and the suffering is not         
retributive and compensatory4 ,it does  
not go to restore the balance of the    
neglect4 ,it is a lamentable            
consequence1 not a repayment4 ,as1 when 
man wrongs his fellow-man1 he makes with
 him an involuntary contract 7c4 v41 s4 
ix41 n4 #f1 p4 #ajf71 to restore what he
 takes away3 so in sinning against ,god1
 man makes another involuntary contract1
 to pay back in suffering against his   
will what he unduly takes in doing his  

own will against the will of the        
,legislator4 ,as ,st4 ,augustine says of
 ,judas 7,serm4 #abe1 n4 #e73 ,he did   
what he liked1 but he suffered what he  
liked not4 ,in his doing what he liked1 
his sin is found3 in his suffering what 
he liked not1 ,god's ordinance is       
praised4 ,thus it is impossible for the 
,eternal ,law1 which bears down all so  
irresistibly in irrational nature1      
finally to fail of its effect even upon 
the most headstrong and contumacious of 
rational creatures2 but1 as ,st4 ,thomas
 says 7#a;a #b1 q4 #ic1 art4 #f1 in     
corp471 ,the defect of doing is made up 
by suffering1 inasmuch as they suffer   
what the ,eternal ,law prescribes for   
them to the extent to which they fail to
 do what accords with the ,eternal ,law4
 ,and ,st4 ,anselm 7,cur ,deus homo1 nn4
 #ad1 #ae73 ,god cannot possibly lose   
,his honour3 for either the sinner      
spontaneously pays what he owes1 or ,god
 exacts it of him against his will4     
,thus if a man chooses to fly from under

 the will of ,god commanding1 he falls  
under the same will punishing4          
,punishment is called by ,hegel1 the    
other half of sin4 ,lastly1 they are    
,god's own spoken words 7,deut4 xxxii4  
#ce73 ,vengeance is ,mine1 ,i will      
repay4  ,readings4--,st4 ,thos41 ,cont4 
,gent41 iii4 #adj1 n4 #e1 ,amplius2 ib41
 iii41 #add1 nn4 #h1 ,per hoc1 and #i1  
,est autem4  ,for ,plato's views on     
punishment see ,protag4 #cbd ,a1 ,b2    
,gorgias1 #ebe2 ,rep4 #chj ,b1 #fae2    
,phaedo1 #aac ,e2 ,laws1 #hed ,d2 #hfb  
,d1 ,e2 #icd ,a2 #ieg ,e4 ,plato        
recognizes only the medicinal and the   
deterrent functions of punishment1 and  
ignores the retributive4 ,this is not to
 be wondered at in one who wrote3 ,no   
one is wicked voluntarily2 but it is an 
evil habit of body and a faulty         
education that is the cause of every    
case of wickedness 7,timaeus1 #hf ,e2   
cf4 ,laws1 #gca ,c1 ,d71 which error    
receives a masterly confutation in      
,aristotle1 ,ethics1 ,,iii1 v4          

,,chapter ,x4  ,,of ,,utilitarianism4   
#a4 ,though the name utilitarian is an  
,english growth of this century1 the    
philosophy so called probably takes its 
origin from the days when man first     
began to speculate on moral matters4    
,bentham and the two ,mills1 ,austin1   
and ,george ,grote1 have repeated in    
,england the substance of what          
,protagoras and ,epicurus taught in     
,greece1 two thousand years before4 ,it 
is the system of ,ethics to which all   
must incline1 who ignore the spiritual  
side of man's nature and his hopes of a 
better world4 ,it is a morality of the  
earth1 earthy4  #b4 ,utilitarianism has 
not been formulated like the ,athanasian
 ,creed4 ,it is impossible to state it  
and combat it in a form to which all    
,utilitarians will subscribe4 ,indeed1  
it is an amiable weakness of theirs1    
when confronted with the grosser        
consequences that flow from their       
theories1 to run off to some            
explanation1 true enough1 but quite out 

of keeping with the primary tenets of   
their school4 ,we will take what may be 
called a mean reading of the indications
 which various ,utilitarian thinkers    
afford of their mind and philosophy4    
,these authorities1 then1 teach two main
 heads of doctrine3--  7#a7 ,that the   
last end and final good of man lies in  
this world1 and consists in the greatest
 happiness of the greatest number of    
mankind1 happiness being taken to mean  
pleasure as well of the senses as of the
 understanding1 such pleasure as can be 
had in this world1 along with immunity  
from pain4 7,mill's ,utilitarianism1    
#bnd ,ed41 pp4 #i1 seq47  7#b7 ,that    
human acts are right or wrong1 according
 as they are useful or hurtful1 that is1
 according as their consequences make   
for or against the above-mentioned end  
of social happiness4  #c4 ,consequences1
 as ,utilitarians very properly point   
out1 are either general or particular4  
,they add that1 in pronouncing an action
 to be good or evil according to its    

consequences1 they mean the general and 
not the particular consequences4 ,in    
other words1 they bid us consider1 not  
the immediate results of this action1   
but what would be the result to society1
 if this sort of action were generally  
allowed4 ,this point is well put by     
,paley 7,moral ,philosophy1 bk4 ii41 c4 
vii43 all three chapters1 vi41 vii41    
viii41 should be read1 as the best      
explanation of the ,principle of        
,general ,consequences73  ,you cannot   
permit one action and forbid another1   
without showing a difference between    
them4 ,consequently the same sort of    
actions must be generally permitted or  
generally forbidden4 ,where1 therefore1 
the general permission of them would be 
pernicious1 it becomes necessary to lay 
down and support the rule which         
generally forbids them4444 ,the assassin
 knocked the rich villain on the head1  
because he thought him better out of the
 way than in it4 ,if you allow this     
excuse in the present instance1 you must

 allow it to all who act in the same    
manner1 and from the same motive2 that  
is1 you must allow every man to kill any
 one he meets1 whom he thinks noxious or
 useless3 444 a disposition of affairs  
which would soon fill the world with    
misery and confusion1 and ere long put  
an end to human society4  ,my contention
 is1 not with the ,principle of ,general
 ,consequences1 which has a certain     
value in ,ethics1 and is used by many   
writers other than ,utilitarian1 but    
with the two stated above1 n4 #b1 which 
are called the ,greatest ,happiness     
,principle and the ,principle of        
,utility4  #d4 ,against the ,greatest   
,happiness ,principle ,i have these     
complaints3  7#a7 ,utilitarians from    
,paley to ,john ,stuart ,mill aver that 
their teaching is no bar to any man     
hoping for and striving after the       
happiness of the world to come4 ,they   
say that such happiness cannot be better
 attained than by making it your        
principal aim to improve all temporal   

goods and dissipate all temporal evil4  
,their maxim in fact is3 ,take care of  
the things of earth1 and the things of  
heaven will take care of themselves4    
,whereas it was the very contrary       
teaching of ,him1 whom moderns1 who see 
in ,him no higher character1 still love 
to call the greatest of moral teachers3 
,that which fell among thorns are they  
who have heard1 and going their way1 are
 choked with the cares and riches and   
pleasures of this life1 and yield no    
fruit4 7,st4 ,luke viii4 #ad47  7#b7 ,it
 will be said that these thorns grow of 
selfishness1 and that these cares are   
the cares of individual interest1       
whereas the ,utilitarian's delight and  
glory is to live1 not for himself1 but  
for the commonwealth4 ,but how can a    
man1 who takes pleasure to be his       
highest good and happiness1 live        
otherwise than for himself8 ,here we    
come upon the unobserved fault and flaw1
 which entirely vitiates the            
,utilitarian structure4 ,it is an union 

of two opposite and incompatible        
elements4 ,an old poet has said3        
,vinegar and oil in one same vessel     
pour1   ,they stand apart1 unfriendly1  
all the more4  7,aeschylus1 ,agam41     
#ccj1 #cca47  ,utilitarianism consists  
of a still more unfriendly and          
unwholesome mixture of two elements1    
both of them bad1 and unable to stand   
together1 ,hedonism and ,altruism4      
,hedonism is the doctrine that the main 
object and end of life is pleasure3     
which is the position laid down in so   
many words by ,mill 7#a4 c471 that      
actions are right in proportion as they 
tend to promote happiness2 and by       
happiness is intended pleasure and the  
absence of pain4 ,if ,hedonism were     
sound doctrine1 the ,pleasant and the   
,good would be identical1 and the most  
pleasant pleasure would ever be the best
 pleasure4 ,that would take away all    
distinction of kind or quality among    
pleasures1 and differentiate them only  
by intensity and duration4 ,this was    

,paley's doctrine1 a fundamental point  
of ,hedonism1 and therefore also of the 
,utilitarian philosophy4 ,john ,mill1   
very honourably to himself1 but very    
fatally to the system that he was       
writing to defend1 parted company with  
,paley4 ,we have argued against ,paley  
7c4 iv41 s4 iii41 nn4 #c-e1 p4 #ee71    
that there is a better and a worse in   
pleasures1 quite distinct from the more 
or less pleasurable1 even if that more  
be taken in the long run in this world4 
,again it may be considered that        
pleasure1 even the best and highest1 is 
a sort of efflorescence from activity1  
and is for activity1 not activity for   
it2 and better is the activity1 whatever
 it be1 than the pleasure which comes   
thereof2 wherefore no pleasure1 as      
pleasure1 can be the highest good and   
happiness of man4  ,hedonism then is an 
error4 ,but errors may be opposed to one
 another as well as to the truth4       
,hedonism is opposed to ,altruism in    
this way4 ,a man may take pleasure in   

seeing other people enjoy themselves4   
,nothing is more common1 except the     
pleasure taken in enjoying one's own    
self4 ,but if a man only feeds the      
hungry that he may have the satisfaction
 of seeing them eat1 is it the hungry or
 himself that he finally seeks to       
gratify8 ,clearly1 himself4 ,that is the
 behaviour of the ,hedonist1 he acts for
 his own pleasure even in his           
benevolence4 ,the ,altruist1 on the     
contrary1 professes never to act for    
self1 but for society4 ,so that society 
flourish1 he is ready to be crushed and 
ruined1 not in the matter of his        
pleasure only1 but even in that of his  
own good4 ,selfishness1 by which he     
means all manner of regard to self1 is1 
upon his conscience1 the unforgiven sin4
 ,but ,hedonism is selfishness in the   
grossest form1 being the mere pursuit in
 all things of pleasurable              
feeling--feeling being always particular
 and limited to self1 in                
contradistinction to good1 which is     

universal and diffuses itself all round4
 ,the ,hedonist seeks his own pleasure1 
where the ,altruist forbids him to take 
thought1 let alone for his              
gratification1 but even for his good4   
,thus an ,hedonist cannot be ,altruist  
to boot2 and1 trying to combine the two 
characters1 the ,utilitarian is         
committed to a self-contradiction4  ,if 
he relinquishes ,hedonism1 and holds to 
,altruism1 pure and simple1 his position
 is not much improved4 ,altruism        
overlooks the fact1 that man1 as        
compared with other men1 is a person1   
the centre of his own acts1 not a thing1
 to be entirely referred to others4 ,he 
is in relation with others1 as child1   
father1 husband1 master1 citizen2 but   
these relations do not take up the whole
 man4 ,there is a residue within1--an   
inner being and life1 which is not      
referable to any creature outside       
himself1 but only to the ,creator4 ,for 
this inner being1 man is responsible to 
,god alone4 ,the good of this1 the inner

 man of the heart1 is each individual's 
proper and primary care4 ,altruism1 and 
,utilitarianism with it1 ignore the     
interior life of the soul1 and          
substitute human society1 that is1      
ultimately1 the democratic ,state1 in   
place of ,god4  7#c7 ,another confusion 
that the ,greatest ,happiness ,principle
 involves1 is the mistaking the         
political for the ethical end of life4  
,the political end1 which it is the     
statesman's business to aim at1 and the 
citizen's duty to subserve1 is the      
natural happiness of the commonwealth1  
and of individuals as members of the    
commonwealth1 that they may live in it  
in peace and justice1 and with a        
sufficiency of goods for the            
preservation and comfort of bodily life1
 and with that amount of moral rectitude
 which is necessary for this outward    
peace and preservation of the           
commonwealth1 and the perpetuity of the 
human race4 7,suarez1 ,de ,legibus1     
,,iii41 xi41 #g47 ,this is all the good 

that the ,utilitarian contemplates4 ,he 
is satisfied to make a good citizen1 a  
good husband1 a good father1 for the    
transactions of this life4 ,he has no   
concern to make a good man up to the    
ethical standard1 which supposes the    
observance of the whole natural law1    
duties to ,god1 and duties within       
himself1 as well as duties to human     
society1 and by this observance the     
compassing of the everlasting happiness 
of the man's own individual soul4       
,against the ,principle of ,utility ,i  
find these charges3  7#a7 ,it takes the 
sign and indication of moral evil for   
the evil itself1 as if the physician    
should take the symptom for the disease4
 ,it places the wickedness of an act in 
the physical misery and suffering that  
are its consequences4 ,this is1 ,i say1 
a taking of the indication for the thing
 indicated4 ,an act is bad in itself and
 by itself1 as being a violation of the 
rational nature of the doer 7c4 vi41 s4 
i471 and being bad1 it breeds bad       

consequences4 ,but the badness of the   
act is moral2 the badness of the        
consequences1 physical4 ,there is an    
evident intrinsic irrationality1 and    
thereby moral evil1 in such sins as     
intemperance1 peevishness1 and vanity4  
,but let us take an instance of an act1 
apparently harmless in itself1 and evil 
solely because of the consequences4     
,supposing one insists upon playing the 
piano for his own amusement1 to the     
disturbance of an invalid who is lying  
in a critical state in the next room4   
,do the mere consequences make this     
otherwise innocent amusement evil8 ,yes1
 if you consider the amusement in the   
abstract3 but if you take it as this    
human act1 the act is inordinate and    
evil in itself1 or as it is elicited in 
the mind of the agent4 ,the volition    
amounts to this3 ,i prefer my amusement 
to my neighbour's recovery1 which is an 
act unseemly and unreasonable in the    
mind of a social being4 ,utilitarians   
fall into the capital error of ignoring 

the intrinsic value of an act1 and      
estimating it wholly by extrinsic       
results1 because they commonly follow   
the phenomenalist philosophy1 which     
breaks away from all such ideas as      
substance and nature1 and regards       
nothing but sequences and coexistences  
of phenomena4 ,to a phenomenalist the   
precept1 ,live up to thy nature1 can    
have no meaning4  7#b7 ,aristotle       
7,ethics1 ,,ii41 iv41 #c7 draws this    
distinction between virtue and art1 that
 the products of art have their         
excellence in themselves3 it suffices   
therefore that they are of this or that 
quality3 but acts of virtue are not done
 virtuously according to the quality of 
the thing done1 but according to the    
state of mind of the doer2 first1       
according to his knowledge of what he   
was about2 then1 according to his       
volition1 as that was guided or not     
guided by the proper motives of the     
virtue2 thirdly1 according to the       
steadiness and fixedness of his will2   

whereas all these considerations are of 
no account in a work of art1 except the 
single one of the artist being aware of 
what he was about4 ,elsewhere 7,ethics1 
,,vi41 iv41 #b71 he says that virtue is 
distinguished from art as being action1 
not production4 ,the ,principle of      
,utility confounds virtue with art1 or  
perhaps ,i should say1 with             
manufactures4 ,it judges conduct1 as one
 would shoemaking1 by trial of the      
product1 or net result4 ,so far from    
being solicitous1 with ,aristotle1 that 
volition should be guided by the proper 
motives of the virtue which there is    
question of practising 7c4 v41 s4 viii41
 n4 #d1 p4 #if3 ,ar4 ,eth41 ,,iii41     
viii471 ,mill 7,utilitarianism1 p4 #bf7 
tells us that utilitarian moralists have
 gone beyond almost all others in       
affirming that the motive has nothing to
 do with the morality of the action4 ,by
 motive he understands what we have     
called the end in view4 7c4 iii41 s4    
ii41 n4 #b1 p4 #ca47 ,so that1 if one   

man waits on the sick for the love of   
,god1 and another in hope of a legacy1  
the morality of these two acts is the   
same1 just as it makes no difference to 
the usefulness of a pair of boots1 what 
motive it was that set the shoemaker to 
work4 ,true1 ,mill admits that the      
motive has much to do with the worth of 
the agent3 but that1 he hastens to      
explain1 is inasmuch as it indicates 444
 a bent of character from which useful1 
or from which hurtful actions are likely
 to arise4 ,even so1--the shoemaker who 
works to earn money for a carousal1 is  
not likely to go on producing useful    
articles so long as another1 who labours
 to support his family4 ,such is the    
moral difference that ,mill places      
between the two men2 one instrument of  
production is longer available than the 
other4  7#c7 ,another well established  
distinction is that between harm and    
injury1 injury being wilful and unjust  
harm4 ,the housemaid1 who in arranging  
the room has burned your manuscript of  

sugared sonnets1 has done you no injury1
 for she meant none1 but how vast the   
harm to the author and to mankind6 ,harm
 is visible in the effects3 but injury  
only upon examination of the mind of the
 agent4 ,not so1 however1 the           
,utilitarian thinks3 harm being equal1  
he can make no difference between a     
tyrant and a man-eating tiger4 ,thus    
,george ,grote says of a certain        
murderous usurper of the kingdom of     
,macedon3 ,you discover nothing while   
your eye is fixed on ,archelaus         
himself4444 ,but when you turn to the   
persons whom he has killed1 banished1 or
 ruined--to the mass of suffering that  
he has inflicted--and to the widespread 
insecurity which such acts of iniquity  
spread through all societies where they 
become known--there is no lack of       
argument which prompts a reflecting     
spectator to brand him as a most        
dangerous and destructive animal1 no a  
disgraceful man4 7,grote's ,plato1 ii41 
p4 #ajh47 ,why ,archelaus is described  

in terms of the tiger1 and then branded 
as a disgraceful man1 we are at a loss  
to conceive1 except in this way1 that   
the writer's philosophy forsook him at  
the end of the sentence1 and he reverted
 to the common sense of mankind4 ,but he
 should have either ended the sentence  
as suggested in the parenthesis1 or have
 been willing to call the man-eater of  
the ,indian jungle1 who has learned to  
make widows1 and to lay waste their     
cities1 a disgraceful tiger2 or lastly1 
he should have looked back1 where he    
declared it was vain to look1 upon      
,archelaus himself1 and discerned in him
 that moral deformity1 and contradiction
 of reason1 whereof a brute beast is    
incapable1 but which is a disgrace and a
 stain upon humanity4  ,a later writer1 
who presses ,utilitarianism into the    
service of ,socialism1 is plainer-spoken
 than ,grote1 and says bluntly3 ,to be  
honestly mistaken avails nothing4 ,thus 
,herbert ,spencer--who is under the     
delusion that we have come into this    

world each for the sake of himself1 and 
who opposes1 as far as he can1 the      
evolution of society--is verily an      
immoral man4444 ,right is every conduct 
which tends to the welfare of society2  
wrong1 what obstructs that welfare4     
7,gronlund1 ,co-operative ,commonwealth1
 pp4 #bbf1 #bbg47 ,thus is overlaid the 
difference between harm and injury1     
between physical and moral evil3 thus is
 the meaning of a human act ignored3 in 
this abyss of chaos and confusion1 which
 ,utilitarianism has opened out1 ,moral 
,philosophy finds her grave4  7#d7 ,the 
,principle of ,utility sees in virtue a 
habit of self-sacrifice1 useful to the  
community1 but not naturally pleasant1  
and therefore not naturally good and    
desirable1 to him that practises it1 but
 made pleasurable and good and desirable
 to him by practice4 7,mill1 pp4        
#ec-eg47 ,in this way virtue becomes    
naturally a very good thing for every   
one else but its possessor1 but to him  
it is a natural evil1 inasmuch as it    

deprives him of pleasure1 which natural 
evil by habit is gradually converted    
into a factitious and artificial good1  
the man becoming accustomed to it1 as   
the proverb says1 like eels to skinning4
 ,this theory is the resuscitation of   
one current among the ,sophists at      
,athens1 and described by ,plato        
thus4--,the natural good of man is to   
afford himself every indulgence1 even at
 the expense of his neighbours4 ,he     
follows his natural good accordingly3 so
 do his neighbours follow theirs1 and   
try to gratify themselves at his        
expense4 ,fights ensue1 till mankind1   
worried and wearied with fighting1 make 
a compact1 each to give up so much of   
his natural good as interferes with that
 of his neighbour4 ,human society1      
formed on this understanding1 enforces  
the compact in the interest of society4 
,thus the interest of society is opposed
 to the interest of the individual1 in  
this that it keeps him out of his best  
natural good1 which is to do as his     

appetite of pleasure bids him in all    
things1 though it compensates him with a
 second-class good1 by preventing his   
neighbours from pleasure-hunting at his 
expense4 ,if then his neighbours could  
be restrained1 and he left free to      
gratify himself1 that would be perfect  
bliss4 ,but only a despot here or there 
has attained to it4 ,the ordinary man   
must pay his tax of virtue to the       
community1 a loss to him1 but a gain to 
all the rest3 while he is compensated by
 the losses which their virtue entails  
upon them4  ,such was the old ,athenian 
theory1 which ,john ,mill1 the          
,principle of ,utility in his hand1     
completes by saying that by-and-bye1 and
 little by little 7as the prisoner of   
,chillon came to love his dungeon71 the 
hampered individual comes to love1 and  
to find an artificial happiness in1     
those restrictions of his liberty1 which
 are called ,virtue4  ,it was against   
this theory that ,plato wrote his       
,republic1 and1 to compare a little     

thing to a great1 the whole account of  
moral good being in consonance with     
nature1 and of moral obligation rising  
out of the nature of the individual man1
 as has been set forth in this brief    
,text-book1 may serve for a refutation  
of the perverse doctrine of             
,utilitarianism4  ,readings4--,plato1   
,republic1 pp4 #cch ,e1 #cci ,a1 #cdc   
,c1 ,d1 ,e1 #cdd ,a1 ,b1 ,c1 #ceh ,e1   
#cei ,a1 ,b1 #ehj ,b1 ,c4          99   
99       99       99       99   ,,part  
,,iii4 ,,natural ,,law4   ,we assume in 
,natural ,law the preceding treatise on 
,ethics1 and also the principal truths  
of ,natural ,theology4    ,,chapter ,i4 
,,of ,,duties ,,of ,,god4  ,,section    
,i4--,of the ,worship of ,god4   #a4    
,worship is divided into prayer and     
praise4 ,to pray1 and present our       
petitions to the ,most ,high1 is a      
privilege2 a privilege1 however1 which  
we are bound to use at times1 as the    
necessary means for overcoming          
temptations and inclinations to evil4   

,we praise and adore ,god for ,his      
sovereign excellence1 which excellence1 
nevertheless1 would found in us no      
positive duty if we stood free of all   
dependence upon ,god4 ,in such an       
hypothesis we should lie simply under   
the negative duty of not thinking of    
,god1 speaking of ,him1 or acting       
towards ,him otherwise than with all    
reverence4 ,so we should behave to the  
,great ,stranger1 with civility1 with   
admiration even and awe1 but not with   
cordiality1 not with loyalty1 not with  
homage1 not with love4 ,very different  
are our relations and our duties to ,god
 our ,lord1 in whom we live1 move1 and  
have our being4 ,there is nothing in us 
or about us1 no positive perfection of  
ours whatsoever1 that is not ,his gift1 
and a gift that ,he is not giving       
continually1 else it would be lost to   
us4 ,we are therefore bound in ,his     
regard1 not merely to abstention but to 
act4 ,and first1 for inward acts1 we    
must habitually feel1 and at notable    

intervals we must actually elicit1      
sentiments of adoration and praise1 of  
thanksgiving1 of submission1 of loyalty 
and love1 as creatures to their         
,creator1 and as vassals to their very  
good ,lord1 for ,he is our ,creator and 
,lord in the natural order1 not to say  
anything here of the supernatural       
filiation1 by which1 as the ,church     
says1 we dare to call ,god ,our ,father4
  #b4 ,we must also express these       
sentiments by outward act4 ,all the     
signs of reverence1 which man pays to   
his human superior1 must be paid to ,god
 with advantages3 bowing passes into    
prostration1 uncovering the head into   
kneeling1 kissing the hand into offering
 of incense3 not that these particular  
developments are necessary1 but some    
such development must take place4 ,we   
shall not be content to think           
reverential thoughts1 but we shall say1 
or even sing1 great things of ,god's    
greatness and our indebtedness and duty3
 such a vocal exercise is psalmody4 ,we 

shall represent in symbolic action our  
dependence on the ,lord of life and     
death1 and also our sinfulness1 for     
which ,he might justly strike us dead3  
such a representation is sacrifice4  #c4
 ,all this we must do1 first1 for the   
sake of our own souls1 minds and hearts1
 to quicken the inward sentiment of     
adoration and praise4 ,worship1 mostly  
of the silent sort1 worship1 that finds 
no expression in word or                
gesture1--worship away from pealing     
organs and chants of praise1 or the     
simpler music of the human voice1 where 
no hands are uplifted1 nor tongues      
loosened1 nor posture of reverence      
assumed1 becomes with most mortals a    
vague1 aimless reverie1 a course of     
distraction1 dreaminess1 and vacancy of 
mind1 no more worth than the meditations
 of the ,lancashire stone-breaker1 who  
was asked what he thought of during his 
work1--,mostly nowt4  #d4 ,again1 what  
the body is to the soul1 that is        
exterior devotion to interior4 ,from the

 soul interior devotion springs1 and    
through the body it manifests itself4   
,exterior devotion1 without the inward  
spirit that quickens it1 is worship     
unprofitable and dead3 it tends at once 
to corruption1 like the body when the   
soul has left it4 ,interior devotion1 on
 the other hand1 can exist1 though not  
with its full complement1 without the   
exterior4 ,so that it is only in the    
union of the two together that perfect  
worship is given to ,god by men as men4 
,upon which ,st4 ,thomas has this nave  
remark1 that they who blame bodily      
observances being paid to ,god1         
evidently fail to remember that they    
themselves are men4  ,thus we pay tithe 
to ,god for soul and body1 by acts of   
religion interior and exterior4 ,but man
 is1 under ,god1 the lord of this earth 
and of the fulness thereof4 ,he must pay
 tithe for that too by devoting some    
portion of it to the direct service of  
,god1 to whom it all primarily belongs4 
,for mine is the gold and mine the      

silver4 7,aggeus ii4 #i47 ,such are the 
words that ,god spoke through ,his      
prophet to incite ,his people to restore
 his sanctuary4  #f4 ,it is therefore   
not true to say that the sole reason of 
outward worship is to move the          
worshipper to interior devotion4 ,it is 
not true that ,st4 ,peter's at ,rome1   
and ,cologne ,cathedral1 and the ,duomo 
of ,milan1 with all their wealth and    
elaborate ceremonial1 exist and are kept
 up solely because1 things of earth as  
we are1 we cannot be depended upon to   
praise ,god lovingly within the         
white-washed walls of a conventicle1 or 
according to the simple ritual of the   
,society of ,friends4 ,we would not1    
even if we could1 pray habitually among 
such surroundings1 where we could afford
 to better them4 ,we have before us the 
principle of ,st4 ,thomas 7#a;a #b1 q4  
#bd1 art4 #c1 in corp473  ,since man's  
good consists in reason as in its root1 
the more actions proper to man are      
performed under the direction of reason1

 the more perfect will man's good be4   
,hence no one doubts that it belongs to 
the perfection of moral good1 that the  
actions of our bodily members should be 
directed by the law of reason1 444 as   
also that the passions of the soul      
should be regulated by reason4  ,this   
means1 not merely that if the bodily    
members or the passions stir at all1 it 
is a good and desirable thing for them  
to be ruled by reason2 but further that 
it is a positive addition to human      
perfection that they should stir and be 
active1 provided reason guide them4     
7,ethics1 c4 iv41 s4 i41 n4 #f1 p4 #de47
  ,it certainly is an action proper to  
man to express in gesture1 in voice1 in 
concert and company with his fellow-men1
 and by employment of whatever is best  
and fairest and brightest under his     
command in the material creation1 his   
inward affections of loyalty1 of homage 
and devotion1 of awe and reverence1 of  
gratitude and love to his ,creator4     
,good as these affections are in the    

heart of the worshipper1 they receive an
 external complement of goodness and    
perfection by being blazoned forth in   
vocal utterance1 singing1 bending of    
knees1--by the erection and             
embellishment of temples1 and offerings 
of gold1 silver1 precious stones1 and   
incense1--and by men thronging those    
temples in multitudes for social        
worship1--provided always that the      
inward devotion of the heart be there1  
to put a soul into these outward        
demonstrations and offerings4  #g4      
,concerning these religious observances 
interior and exterior1 it is as idle to 
pretend that they are useful to         
,almighty ,god as it is irrelevant to   
object that they are useless to ,him4   
,of course they are useless to ,him4    
,all creation is useless to ,god4 ,a    
,being who can never receive any profit1
 increment1 or gain1 dwells not within  
the region of utilities4 ,theologians   
indeed distinguish between intrinsic and
 extrinsic glory1 that is1 between the  

glory which ,god gives ,himself by ,his 
own contemplation of ,his own essence1  
and the glory which ,his creatures give 
,him4 ,they say that ,god is thus       
capable of extrinsic increment1 to which
 increment the praise and worship of    
,his creatures is useful4 ,but1 after   
all1 they are fain to avow that the     
whole of this extrinsic increment and   
glory is no real gain to ,god1 giving   
,him nothing but what ,he had before in 
an infinitely more excellent mode and   
manner from and of ,himself4 ,thus it   
appears that the extrinsic glory of     
,god1 to which the worship paid ,him by 
man contributes1 is valued1 not because 
it is properly useful to ,him1 but      
because ,he is most properly and highly 
worthy of it4 ,thou art worthy1 ,o ,lord
 our ,god1 to receive glory and honour  
and power3 because thou hast created all
 things1 and for thy will they were1 and
 have been created4 7,apoc4 iv4 ,,ii47  
,and being worthy of this glory1 ,he    
wills to have it1 and does most strictly

 exact it1 for which reason ,he is      
called in the ,scripture a jealous ,god4
 ,so those who reflect some sparkle of  
,god's ,majesty1 and under some aspect  
represent ,his person upon the earth1 as
 do princes1 lay and ecclesiastical1    
have many observances of honour and     
respect paid to them1 which are not     
useful as supplying a need--for who     
needs a salute of twenty-one guns8      
nevertheless their dignity is worthy of 
them1 and they require them accordingly4
  #h4 ,what man feels strongly1 he      
expresses in word and action4 ,what all 
men feel strongly1 they express by      
meeting together for the purpose4 ,so   
that1 if strong religious feeling is an 
element in every good and reasonable    
man's character1 it is bound to find    
expression1 and that a social           
expression4 ,men must worship together  
according to some external form and     
ritual4 ,god may reveal what ,he wills  
that ritual to be4 ,in fact ,he did give
 such a revelation and prescription to  

the ,jews4 ,to ,christians ,he has      
spoken in ,his ,son1 and still speaks in
 ,his ,church4 ,any other than the one  
sacrifice that ,he has instituted1 or   
any other public religious ritual than  
is approved by the religious authority  
which ,he has established1 is to ,him of
 itself1 and apart from the invincibly  
erroneous devotion of them that pay it1 
an abomination3 for ,he has not chosen  
it4 ,still we cannot say that1 in every 
possible state of things1 ,god is bound 
to reveal the ritual that ,he desires1  
or is bound ,himself to designate the   
authority that shall fix the ritual     
which alone ,he will accept and allow   
of4 ,if the will of ,god is not thus    
expressed1 a ritual must still be drawn 
up4 ,in a matter that excites the mind1 
as religion does1 and where a large     
field is open for hallucination and     
eccentricity1 it will not do to have    
individuals parading methods of worship 
of their own invention4 ,here the ,greek
 maxim comes in1 ,greek3 tima tho       

daimonion katha tha patria1 honour the  
,deity after the fashion of thy country4
 ,religious authorities must be set up1 
in the same way that the civil power is 
set up4 ,these authorities will         
determine1 not the object1 but the      
outward manner of worship4 ,every great 
nation1 or important member of the human
 family1 would come probably to have its
 own characteristic rite2 and within    
each rite there would be local          
varieties4  ,readings4--,st4 ,thos41    
,contra ,gentiles1 iii41 #aai2 #b;a #b1 
q4 #ha1 art4 #d1 in corp42 ib41 q4 #ha1 
art4 #g ib41 q4 #hd1 art4 #b3 ib41 q4   
#he1 art4 #a1 in corp41 ad #a1 #c2 ib41 
q4 #ia4   ,,section ,,ii4--,of          
,superstitious ,practices4   #a4        
,superstition is the abuse of religion4 
,it is superstition1 either to worship  
false gods1 or to worship the true ,god 
with unauthorized rites1 or to have     
dealings with wicked spirits1 whether   
those spirits have once animated human  
bodies or not4 ,of the first head1 the  

only avowed instance within our         
civilization is the ,positivist worship 
of the ,great ,being1 that is1 of the   
collective ,worthies of ,humanity1 if   
indeed it amounts to worship4 ,the      
second head might have been meditated by
 ,archbishop ,cranmer with advantage1   
when he was drawing up the ,edwardine   
,ordinal4 ,under the third head comes   
,spiritualism1 which we shall here not  
discuss in detail1 but merely indicate  
certain principles upon which it must be
 judged4  #b4 ,there is nothing         
superstitious or unlawful in simply     
applying natural agencies to the        
production of certain effects1 of which 
they are supposed to be naturally       
capable4444 ,we must consider whether   
there is a fair appearance of the cause 
being able to produce the effect        
naturally4 ,if there is1 the experiment 
will not be unlawful3 for it is lawful  
to use natural causes in order to their 
proper effects4 7#b;a #b1 q4 #if1 art4  
#b1 in corp41 ad #a47 ,but this we must 

understand under two provisos4 ,first1  
that the fair appearance spoken of be   
not opposed by a considerable force of  
evidence1 whether of authority or of    
reason1 tending the other way3 for in   
this matter1 which is not a mere matter 
of legality1 it is not permissible to   
run risks of becoming familiar with     
,god's enemies4 ,secondly1 that the     
cause1 though natural1 be not morally   
prejudicial4 ,not even a natural cause1 
brandy for instance1 may be used to all 
its effects4 ,thus for the mesmeric     
sleep1 though that should be proved to  
be purely natural1 yet the weakening of 
the will thence ensuing1 and the almost 
irresistible dominion acquired by the   
operator over his patient1 render it    
imperative that such a remedy should not
 be applied without grave necessity1 and
 under an operator of assured moral     
character4  #c4 ,st4 ,thomas continues  
in the place last quoted3 ,wherefore1 if
 there is no fair appearance of the     
causes employed being able to produce   

such effects1 it needs must be that they
 are not employed to the causation of   
these effects as causes1 but only as    
signs1 and thus they come under the     
category of preconcerted signals        
arranged with evil spirits4  ,the modern
 ,spiritualist is only too forward to   
avow his understanding with the unseen  
powers2 but he will have it that the    
spirits that he deals with are good and 
harmless4 ,we must prove the spirits by 
the general effects of their            
communications--whether they be in      
accordance with the known laws of       
morality1 and the assured teachings of  
religion1 natural and revealed4 ,also we
 must consider1 from what we know from  
approved sources concerning ,god1 and   
,his holy angels1 and the spirits of the
 just1 either already made perfect1 or  
still suffering for a time1 whether they
 are likely to respond to such signs as 
,spiritualists commonly employ4 ,also we
 must not ignore1 what revelation tells 
us1 of an enemy1 a father of lies1 who  

changes himself into an angel of light1 
and who is ever ready1 so far as it is  
permitted him1 to eke out curiosity1    
folly1 and credulity1 such as he found  
in ,eve4  ,readings4--,st4 ,thos41 #b;a 
#b1 q4 #ic2 ib41 q4 #ie1 art4 #d1 in    
corp4   ,,section ,,iii4--,of the duty  
of knowing ,god4   #a4 ,religious       
worship is bound to its object1 and     
cannot possibly be fixed in the hearts  
of men and the institutions of society1 
if the object be doubtful and           
fluctuating4 ,false religion has often  
been set off with elaborate and gorgeous
 ceremonial1 which has been kept up even
 after the performers had come to see in
 all that light and lustre a mere vain  
and unsubstantial show4 ,such were the  
rites of ,roman polytheism1 as enacted  
by augurs and pontiffs1 the colleagues  
of ,cicero and ,csar4 ,but though that  
worship was maintained1 and even        
augmented1 for political purposes1      
without a creed1 yet never could it have
 arisen without some creed1 however     

mistaken1 earnestly held of old4 ,a firm
 interior conviction is the             
starting-point of all outward worship4  
,but if the modern living worshipper is 
without creed and conviction2 if he be a
 scoffer at heart1 or at least a        
doubter2 what a hollow1 horrid skeleton 
thing is his religion1--all the more    
horrid1 the grander its dress6 ,that is 
not worship1 but mummery4  #b4 ,if then 
to worship ,god is a duty1 as we have   
proved1 it is a duty likewise to know   
,god4 ,this supposes that ,god is       
knowable1 a fact which it does not lie  
within the province of this work to     
prove4 ,to an unknown ,god1 all the     
worship we could render would be to     
build ,him an altar1 without priest1    
prayer1 or sacrifice1 and so leave ,him 
in ,his solitude4 ,god is knowable by   
the manifestation of ,his works 7,rom4  
i4 #ai72 and where ,he is pleased to    
speak1 by the revelation of ,his word4  
,apart from revelation--and1 under a    
certain order of ,providence1 ,god might

 have left us without revelation--we    
should study our ,creator as ,he is made
 manifest in the world around us1 in the
 existence of perishable things1 in the 
order of the universe1 in the region of 
things eternally possible and knowable1 
in moral truths1 in the mental life and 
conscience of man4 ,philosophy would be 
our guide in the search after ,god4 ,men
 with less leisure or ability for       
speculation would acquiesce in the      
pronouncements of philosophers on things
 divine2 and1 in the hypothesis which we
 are contemplating1 ,providence would   
doubtless arrange for the better        
agreement and harmony of philosophers   
among themselves4 ,their trumpet would  
not send forth so uncertain a blast1    
were that the instrument1 in the        
counsels of ,god1 whereby the whole duty
 of religion was to be regulated4 ,as it
 is1 we know better than philosophy     
could teach us3 for ,god hath spoken in 
,his ,son4  ,readings4--,c4 ,gent41 i41 
#d2 #a;a #b1 q4 #ia1 art4 #d1 in corp4  

,,chapter ,,ii4  ,,of ,,the ,,duty ,,of 
,,preserving ,,life4  ,,section ,i4--,of
 ,killing1 ,direct and ,indirect4   #a4 
,in a hilly country1 two or three steps 
sometimes measure all the interval      
between the basins of two rivers1 whose 
mouths are miles apart4 ,in the crisis  
of an illness the merest trifle will    
turn the scale between death and        
recovery4 ,in a nice point of law and   
intricate procedure1 the lawyer is aware
 that scarcely more than the thickness  
of the paper on which he writes lies    
between the case going for his client or
 for the opposite party4 ,to rail at    
these fine technicalities argues a lay  
mind1 unprofessional and undiscerning4  
,hair-splitting1 so far as it is a term 
of real reproach1 means splitting the   
wrong hairs4 ,the expert in any         
profession knows what things to divide  
and distinguish finely1 and what things 
to take in the gross4 ,moral ,science in
 many respects gives its demonstrations1
 and can give them1 only in the way of  

rough drawing1 as ,aristotle says4      
7,greek3 pachulos kai tupo1 ,ethics1    
,i41 iii41 #d47 ,but there are lines of 
division exceeding fine and nice in     
natural morality no less than in        
positive law4 ,the student must not take
 scandal at the fine lines and subtle   
distinctions that we shall be obliged to
 draw in marking off lawful from        
unlawful action touching human life4    
#b4 ,it is never lawful directly to kill
 an innocent man4 ,understand innocent  
in the social and political sense1 of a 
man who has not1 by any human act       
7,ethics1 c4 i41 n4 #b1 p4 #a7 of his   
own1 done any harm to society so        
grievous as to compare with loss of     
life4 ,to kill1 or work any other       
effect1 directly1 is to bring about that
 death1 or other effect1 willing the    
same1 either as an end desirable in     
itself1 as when a man slays his enemy1  
whose death of its own sheer sake is to 
him a satisfaction and a joy1 or as a   
means to an end1 as ,richard ,,iii4     

murdered his nephews to open his own way
 to the throne4 ,we must then in no case
 compass the death of the innocent1     
either intending it as an end1 or       
choosing it as a means4 ,the assertion  
is proved by these considerations4 ,to  
kill a man is to destroy the human      
nature within him3 for1 though the soul 
survives1 he is man no more when he is  
dead4 ,now to destroy a thing is to     
subordinate that thing entirely to your 
self and your own purposes3 for that    
individual thing can never serve any    
other purpose1 once it is destroyed4    
,the man that is killed is then         
subordinated to the slayer1 wholly given
 up1 and as we say1 sacrificed1 to the  
aims and purposes of him who slays him4 
,but that ought not to be1 for man is a 
person4 ,body and soul in him make one  
person1 one personal nature1 which human
 personality is destroyed in death4 ,now
 it is the property of a person to be   
what we may call autocentric1 referring 
its own operations to itself as to a    

centre4 ,every person--and every        
intelligent nature is a person ,footnote
 #ag--;exists and acts primarily for    
himself4 ,a thing is marked off from a  
person by the aptitude of being         
another's and for another4 ,we may      
venture to designate it by the term     
heterocentric4 ,a person therefore may  
destroy a thing1 entirely consume and   
use it up for his own benefit4 ,but he  
may not treat a person as a thing1 and  
destroy that1 either for any end of     
pleasure that he finds in destroying it1
 or in view of any gain or good1        
whereunto that destruction serves him as
 a means4  ,footnote #ag3 ,the exception
 apparent in the ,incarnation is not    
relevant here4  #c4 ,in the above       
argumentation account has not been taken
 of ,god1 to whom for ,his sovereign    
dominion all created personalities stand
 in the light of things1 and may be     
destroyed at ,his pleasure4 ,but account
 has been taken of the ,state1 to which 
the individual is subordinate as a      

citizen1 but not as a man and a person4 
,it is permitted no more to the ,state  
than to the individual ever to destroy  
the innocent directly4  #d4 ,an effect  
is brought about indirectly1 when it is 
neither intended as an end for its own  
sake1 nor chosen as a means making      
towards an end1 but attaches as a       
circumstance concomitant either to the  
end intended or to the means chosen4    
,the case of a circumstance so attaching
 to the means chosen is the only case   
that we need consider here in speaking  
of indirect1 concomitant1 or incidental 
effects4 ,the study of these incidents  
is of vast importance to the moralist4  
,most cases of practical difficulty to  
decide between right and wrong1 arise   
out of them4 ,they are best illustrated 
in the manner of killing4 ,that one     
matter1 well worked out1 becomes a      
pattern for other matters in which they 
occur4 7,ethics1 c4 iii41 s4 ii41 p4    
#ca47  #e4 ,a man is killed indirectly1 
or incidentally1 when he perishes in    

consequence of certain means employed   
towards a certain end1 without his death
 being willed by the employer of those  
means1 or in any way serving that agent 
to the furtherance of the end that he   
has in view4 ,if a visitor to a quarry  
were standing on a piece of rock1 which 
a quarryman had occasion to blast1 and  
the man fired the train regardless of   
the visitor1 the latter would be        
incidentally killed4 ,now incidental    
killing1 even of the innocent1 is not   
under all circumstances unlawful4 ,where
 the end in view is in the highest      
degree important1 the means may be taken
 thereto1 provided always that such an  
issue as the shedding of innocent blood 
be not itself the means discerned and   
elected as furthering the end3 for no   
end however urgent can justify the      
employment of any evil means4 7,ethics1 
c4 iii41 s4 ii41 nn4 #c1 #ac1 pp4 #cb1  
#cf47 ,suppose in the instance just     
given the quarryman saw that1 unless    
that piece of rock where the visitor    

stood were blown up instantly1 a        
catastrophe would happen elsewhere1     
which would be the death of many men1   
and there were no time to warn the      
visitor to clear off1 who could blame   
him if he applied the explosive8 ,the   
means of averting the catastrophe would 
be1 not that visitor's death1 but the   
blowing up of the rock4 ,the presence or
 absence of the visitor1 his death or   
escape1 is all one to the end intended3 
it has no bearing thereon at all4  #f4  
,we must then distinguish between means 
and circumstances4 ,the means help to   
the end1 the circumstances of the means 
do not4 ,when the end is of extreme     
urgency1 circumstances may be           
disregarded3 the means become morally   
divested of them4 ,so ,i have seen an   
island in a river1 a nucleus of rock    
with an environment of alluvial soil4   
,while the stream was flowing placidly  
in its usual course1 the island remained
 intact1 both rock and earth4 ,but when 
the water came rushing in a flood1 which

 was as though the island itself had    
gone speeding up the river1 the loose   
matter at its sides was carried away1   
and only the central rock remained4 ,the
 ordinary flow of the river past the    
island1 or the gentle motion of the     
island up-stream1 keeping all its bulk1 
represents a man acting for an end to   
which reason attaches no great          
importance4 ,he must then take a        
diligent review of all the circumstances
 that have any close connection with his
 action1 to see if there is any that it 
would be wrong for him to will directly4
 ,and if there is1 he must abstain from 
willing it even indirectly3 that is1 he 
must abstain from doing the action1     
which cannot be done without that       
objectionable circumstance attending it4
 ,on the other hand1 the floating island
 being towed rapidly up-stream1 with its
 loose sides falling away1 portrays the 
condition of one acting for a purpose of
 imperative urgency3 he considers the   
means to that end1 and if they are good1

 he concentrates his will upon them and 
uses them1 disregarding1 or even        
deploring1 but nowise willing or being  
responsible for1 the evil concomitants  
which go with those means1 but do not   
make for his end4 ,thus it is1 that a   
circumstance which in ordinary cases    
goes to make the adoption of certain    
means reasonable or unreasonable1 comes1
 in a case of great urgency1 to weigh   
for nothing in the balance of reason1   
owing to the extreme and crying         
reasonableness of the end in view4 ,nor 
is this the end justifying the means1   
for that unhappy circumstance is never a
 means to the end4 7,ethics1 c4 iii41 s4
 ii41 n4 #h1 p4 #cd47  #g4 ,to          
illustrate by a diagram3  ,illustration3
     ,c  7   7    ,u                    
,a-----------------------------------,e7
   7,v   ,a1 the agent1 a bead on a     
wire1 can move only on the line ,,ae1   
that alone being the line of means to   
the end4  ,,ev1 reasonableness of end in
 view1 attracting ,a4  ,,uc1 the amount 

of moral evil which the untoward        
circumstance would involve1 if it were  
willed directly4 ,this ,,uc repels ,a1  
tending to jam it on the line ,,ae1     
which is absolutely rigid4  ,,ae1       
remoteness1 difficulty1 and uncertainty 
of the end in view4  ,,au1 remoteness of
 untoward circumstance from means       
chosen1 which ,a is just in the act of  
taking4 ,then1 for lawful action1 the   
reasonableness required in the end in   
view is represented by the variation--  
,illustration3               ,,uc 4 ,,ae
   ,,ev 99varies99 -------              
,,au   ,we observe that when ,,au is    
zero1 while ,,uc 4 ,,ae remains a finite
 quantity 7representing an appreciable  
evil71 then ,,ev becomes infinite3 that 
is to say1 when the distance1           
difference1 or distinction between the  
evil circumstance and the means comes   
down to nothing at all1 and the evil    
thing actually is the very means taken1 
then an infinite urgency of end in view 
would be requisite to justify the using 

of that means3 in other words1 no end   
possible to man can ever justify an evil
 means4  ,readings4--,st4 ,thos41 #b;a  
#b1 q4#fd1 art4 #f2 ,cardinal de ,lugo1 
,de ,justitia et ,jure1 disp4 #aj1 n4   
#abe4   ,,section ,,ii4--,of ,killing   
done ,indirectly in ,self-defence4   #a4
 ,on the question1 whether it is lawful 
for one man to kill another in          
self-defence1 ,st4 ,thomas writes 7#b;a 
#b1 q4 #fd1 art4 #g73  ,there is nothing
 to hinder one act having two effects1  
of which one only is within the         
intention and election of the doer1     
while the other is beside his intention 
and election1 that is1 is neither       
intended as an end nor elected as a     
means4444 ,from the act therefore of one
 defending himself a twofold effect may 
follow1 one the preservation of his own 
life1 the other the killing of the      
aggressor4 ,now such an act1 in so far  
as the preservation of the doer's own   
life is intended1 has no taint of evil  
about it1 seeing that it is natural to  

everything to preserve itself in being  
as much as it can4 ,nevertheless1 an act
 coming of a good intention may be      
rendered unlawful1 if it be not in      
proportion to the end in view4 ,and     
therefore1 if any one uses greater      
violence than is necessary for the      
defence of his life1 it will be         
unlawful4 ,but if he repels the violence
 in a moderate way1 it will be a lawful 
defence3 for according to the ,civil and
 ,canon ,laws it is allowable to repel  
force by force with the moderation of a 
blameless defence4 ,nor is it necessary 
to salvation for a man to omit the act  
of moderate defence in order to avoid   
the killing of another2 because man is  
more bound to take thought for his own  
life than for the life of his neighbour4
 ,but because to kill a man is not      
allowable except by act of public       
authority for the common good1 it is    
unlawful for a man to intend that is1   
elect and choose as a means to kill     
another man in order to defend himself1 

unless he be one who has public         
authority1 who intending electing to    
kill a man in order to his own defence1 
refers this to the public good4  #b4    
,the right then of self-defence even to 
the shedding of blood involves a mere   
exercise of indirect killing for a      
proportionably grave cause4 ,the cause  
in question is the defence of your own  
life1 or your friend's1 or of some other
 good or possession that can weigh with 
life1 as the honour and inviolability of
 your person1 or a large sum of money4  
,this must be in present danger of being
 taken away otherwise than in due course
 of justice4 ,the danger must be        
present1 and even imminent1 not         
prospective4 ,the right of self-defence 
even to the grievous harming of the     
aggressor1 endures only while the danger
 from him is imminent1 not when it is   
past1 or the evil is already done4 ,the 
right supposes no moral obliquity1 no   
formal injustice on the part of the     
aggressor3 he may be a madman making for

 you with a drawn sword4 ,nay further1  
not even material injustice--that is1   
the quality of an act which would be    
formally unjust1 if only the agent knew 
what he was about--is required4 ,all    
that is requisite is that your life1 or 
something equivalent to life1 be        
threatened1 not in due course of law4   
#c4 ,the essential idea of self-defence 
is that of stopping a trespasser1 one   
who1 however innocently1 is going about 
to trench on that good which you have a 
right to maintain and reserve to        
yourself4 ,it is then no act of         
authority that you perform1 but the     
dealing of one private person with      
another4 ,indeed1 the party stopped is  
hardly regarded as a person3 no account 
is taken of his demerits3 he is regarded
 simply as an abridger and diminisher of
 what you have a right to preserve      
intact4 ,you stop a man as you stop a   
horse1 only with more regard to the     
moderation of a blameless self-defence1 
not using more violence than is         

necessary here and now to preserve what 
you have to preserve4  #d4 ,the         
stopping1 unfortunately1 has often to be
 done in a hurry3 there is no time to   
wait3 for the next moment1 unless you   
act promptly1 it will be all too late1  
or all to no purpose1 to act at all4    
,being done in a hurry1 it has to be    
done in a rough-and-ready way1 with such
 instruments as are to hand3 you cannot 
afford to be nice about the means1      
carefully purifying them1 and shaking   
off the dust of objectionable           
circumstances4 ,now to stop a man in mid
 career all on a sudden1 to render him  
powerless where he was about to strike1 
motionless in the direction whither he  
was about to go1 and that in an instant1
 is of common necessity a rude          
treatment1 very dangerous to him who    
experiences it1 and under some          
conceivable circumstances hopelessly    
fatal4 ,still the fatality--in plain    
words1 the death of the aggressor--is   
not directly willed4 ,it is neither     

intended as an end1 nor chosen as a     
means to an end4 ,it is not welcomed as 
an end and desirable consummation3 on   
the contrary1 it is put up with most    
reluctantly as coming from your act3 for
 you1 a private individual1 have no     
right to will and effect the death of   
any man1 however guilty1 as will be     
proved hereafter4 ,it is not chosen as a
 means3 for1 formally as his death1 it  
is no means to your end1 which was the  
averting of all present danger to your  
right4 ,for that it was enough to stop  
the trespasser2 and you chose the means 
as a stopping means1 not as a killing   
means4 ,true1 in stopping him you killed
 him1 but you did not kill him to stop  
him4 ,you struck him to stop him3 that  
your blow was a mortal blow1 was a      
circumstance which you did not choose   
and could not help4 ,all killing then in
 self-defence is indirect4  #e4 ,by this
 explanation1 resting on ,st4           
,thomas--in opposition to ,cardinal de  
,lugo 7,de ,just4 et ,jure4 #aj1 #adi7  

and others1 who allow killing in        
self-defence to be the actual means     
chosen1 and therefore directly          
willed--we save four grand positions in 
,moral ,science3  7a7 ,the axiom1 that  
it is never lawful directly to take the 
life of an innocent man4 ,for the person
 who perishes by occasion of your       
defending yourself1 may be innocent     
formally1 and even materially also4  7b7
 ,likewise the axiom1 that it is never  
lawful for a private individual to kill 
any one whatever4 ,we say1 from a       
technical standpoint1 that he does not  
kill but arrests the onset of the       
aggressor4  7c7 ,we are in hearty accord
 with the positive law of all civilized 
countries1 which views with extreme     
suspicion all deaths said to be done in 
self-defence1 the law being jealous of  
the blood of its citizens1 and reserving
 the shedding thereof to itself4 ,we    
teach that only by process of law can a 
man ever be directly slain1 his death   
made a means of1 and the person1 who    

strikes him1 really willing and seeking1
 exactly speaking1 to kill him4  7d7    
,the initial error is revealed of a     
theory that we shall have to combat at  
length hereafter1 the theory of ,hobbes 
and ,locke1 that the power of the ,state
 is the mere agglomeration of the powers
 of the individuals who compose it4 ,it 
appears by our explanation that the     
individual has no power strictly to take
 life in any case1 or ever to kill      
directly1 as the ,state does when it    
executes a criminal4  ,as a fifth point 
gained1 we may mention the efficacious  
argument afforded1 as will presently be 
shown1 against the acceptance of a duel 
under any conceivable circumstances1 a  
thesis otherwise not easy to establish  
by reason4  #f4 ,in view of the question
 of the origin of civil government1 we  
must carefully collect the differences  
between self-defence and punishment4    
,death occasioned in self-defence is    
indirect3 death inflicted as punishment 
is direct4 ,punishment is an act of     

authority1 of distributive justice1     
which lies from ruler to subject        
7,ethics1 c4 v41 s4 ix41 n4 #d1 p4      
#ajd73 self-defence is of equal against 
equal4 ,punishment is medicinal to him  
who suffers it1 or deterrent on behalf  
of the community1 or retributive in the 
way of vengeance4 7,ethics1 c4 ix41 s4  
iii41 n4 #d47 ,self-defence is not on   
behalf of the community1 still less for 
the good of the aggressor1 but for the  
good of him who practises it and for the
 preservation of his right3 neither is  
it retributive and retrospective1 as    
vengeance is1 but simply prospective and
 preventive of a harm immediately       
imminent4 ,finally1 the right to punish 
abides day and night3 but the right of  
self-defence holds only while instant   
aggression is threatened4  #g4 ,these   
two diverse ideas of self-defence and   
vengeance were confounded by the ,greeks
 under the one verb ,greek3 amunesthai4 
,they are confounded by ,mill1 ,on      
,utility1 in the fifth chapter where he 

speaks 7p4 #gg7 of the instinct of      
self-defence1 which nine lines below he 
converts into the natural feeling of    
retaliation or vengeance4 ,it is a      
common but a grave mistake1 and the     
parent of much bad philosophy4          
,reading4--,st4 ,thos41 #b;a #b1 q4 #fd1
 art4 #g4   ,,section ,,iii4--,of       
,suicide4   #a4 ,by suicide we shall    
here understand the direct compassing of
 one's own death1 which is an act never 
lawful4 ,there is no difficulty in      
seeing the unlawfulness of suicide for  
ordinary cases4 ,the world could not go 
on1 if men were to kill themselves upon 
every slight disappointment4 ,but       
neither are they likely so to do4 ,it is
 the hard cases1 where men are apt to   
lay violent hands on themselves1 that   
put the moralist on his mettle to       
restrain them by reasons4 ,why should   
not the solitary invalid destroy        
himself1 he whose life has become a     
hopeless torture1 and whose death none  
would mourn8 ,why should not a voluntary

 death be sought as an escape from      
temptation and from imminent sin8 ,why  
should not the first victims of a dire  
contagion acquiesce in being slaughtered
 like cattle8 ,or if it be deemed       
perilous to commit the departure from   
life to each one's private whim and     
fancy1 why not have the thing licensed  
under certificate of three clergymen and
 four doctors1 who could testify that it
 is done on good grounds8  #b4 ,to all  
these questions there is one good answer
 returned by ,paley on the principle of 
,general ,consequences4 7,ethics1 c4 x41
 n4 #c1 p4 #agh47  ,the true question of
 this argument is no other than this3   
,may every man who chooses to destroy   
his life1 innocently do so8 ,limit and  
distinguish the subject as you can1 it  
will come at last to this question4     
,for1 shall we say that we are then at  
liberty to commit suicide1 when we find 
our continuance in life becomes useless 
to mankind8 ,any one who pleases1 may   
make himself useless2 and melancholy    

minds are prone to think themselves     
useless when they really are not so4444 
,in like manner1 whatever other rule you
 assign1 it will ultimately bring us to 
an indiscriminate toleration of suicide1
 in all cases in which there is danger  
of its being committed4 ,it remains1    
therefore1 to enquire what would be the 
effect of such a toleration3 evidently1 
the loss of many lives to the community1
 of which some might be useful or       
important2 the affliction of many       
families1 and the consternation of all3 
for mankind must live in continual alarm
 for the fate of their friends1 when    
every disgust which is powerful enough  
to tempt men to suicide1 shall be deemed
 sufficient to justify it4 7,moral      
,philosophy1 bk4 iv41 c4 iii47  ,a word 
in confirmation of ,paley on the plan of
 the medico-clerical certificate4 ,there
 would be doctors1 and ,i fear clergymen
 too1 who would get a name for giving   
these certificates easily3 under their  
hand many a patient might be smothered  

by his attendants with or without his   
own consent4 ,many another wretch would 
consider1 that if the learned and       
reverend gentlemen empowered to license 
his departure from life only felt what  
he had to endure1 there would be no     
difficulty about the certificate3 so he 
would depart on presumed leave4 ,the    
whole effect would be to make men less  
tender of their own lives1 and by       
consequence of those of others1 to the  
vast unsettling of society4  #c4 ,an    
argument from general consequences1     
however1 does not go down into the      
depths of things4 ,there is always      
something morally crooked and inordinate
 in an action itself1 the general       
consequences whereof are bad4 ,it       
remains to point out the moral          
crookedness1 inordination1 and          
unreasonableness1 that is intrinsic to  
the act of suicide1 apart from its      
consequences4 ,we find the inordination 
in this1 that suicide is an act falling 
upon undue matter1 being an act         

destructive of that which the agent has 
power over only to preserve4 ,it is     
natural to every being1 animate and     
inanimate1 to the full extent of its    
entity and power1 to maintain itself1   
and to resist destruction as long as it 
can4 ,this is the struggle for          
existence1 one of the primary laws of   
nature4 ,man has intelligence and power 
over himself1 that he may conduct his   
own struggle well and wisely4 ,he may   
struggle more or less1 as he sees       
expedient1 looking to higher goods even 
than self-preservation in this mortal   
life3 but he may not take that power of 
managing himself1 which nature invests  
him with for his preservation1 and use  
it to his own destruction4 ,should he do
 so1 he perverts the natural order of   
his own being1 and thereby sins4        
7,ethics1 c4 vi41 s4 i41 nn4 #a-e1 p4   
#aji47  #d4 ,it may be objected1 that   
man is only bound to self-preservation  
so long as life is a blessing2 that1    
when the scale of death far outweighs   

that of life in desirableness1 it is    
cruelty to himself to preserve his life 
any longer1 and a kindness to himself to
 destroy it2 that in such a plight1     
accordingly1 it is not unnatural for a  
man to put himself1 not so much out of  
life as out of misery4 ,to this argument
 it is sometimes answered that1 whereas 
death is the greatest of evils1 it is   
foolish and wicked to resort to dying as
 a refuge against any other calamity4   
,but this answer proves too much4 ,it   
would show that it is never lawful even 
to wish for death3 whereas under many   
conditions1 such as those now under     
consideration1 death is a consummation  
devoutly to be wished1 and may be most  
piously desired1 as a gain and by       
comparison a good3 as ,ecclesiasticus   
says 7xxx4 #ag73 ,better is death than a
 bitter life1 and everlasting rest than 
continual sickness4 ,the truth seems to 
be1 that there are many things highly   
good and desirable in themselves1 which 
become evil when compassed in a         

particular way4 ,the death of a great   
tyrant or persecutor may be a blessing  
to the universe1 but his death by the   
hand of an assassin is an intolerable   
evil4 ,so is death1 as the schoolmen    
say1 in facto esse1 and everlasting     
rest1 better than a bitter life1 but not
 death in fieri1 when that means dying  
by your own hand4 ,there the            
unnaturalness comes in and the          
irrationality4 ,a mother1 watching the  
death agony of her son1 may piously wish
 it over3 but it were an unmotherly act 
to lay her own hand on his mouth and    
smother him4 ,to lay violent hands on   
oneself is abidingly cruel and          
unnatural1 more so than if the suicide's
 own mother slew him4  #e4 ,but though a
 man may not use actual violence against
 his own person1 may he not perhaps     
cease to preserve himself1 abstain from 
food1 as the ,roman noble did1 in the   
tortures of the gout1 and by abstaining 
end them8 ,i answer1 a man's taking food
 periodically is as much part of his    

life as the coursing of the blood in his
 veins4 ,it is doing himself no less    
violence to refuse food ready to hand1  
when he is starving1 on purpose that he 
may starve1 than to open a vein on      
purpose to bleed to death4 ,this1 when  
the food is readily accessible3 the case
 is otherwise when it is not procurable 
except by extraordinary means4  #f4     
,another consideration4 ,to destroy a   
thing is the exclusive right of the     
owner and master of the same4 ,if       
therefore man is his own master1 in the 
sense that no one else can claim        
dominion over him1 may he not           
accordingly destroy himself8 ,the       
metaphysician will point out that master
 denotes a relation1 that every relation
 has two terms1 that consequently a man 
cannot be his own master any more than  
he can be his own father2 and that1 not 
owning himself1 he may not destroy      
himself4 ,but1 leaving this metaphysical
 argument for what it is worth1 we      
observe that man has a ,master1 ,owner1 

,proprietor1 and ,sovereign ,lord1 ,god 
,almighty4 ,to take your own life is to 
usurp the dominion of ,god4 ,it is      
wronging the ,lord of life and death4   
,but none is wronged against his will3  
,god is willing that murderers should be
 hung1 may ,he not also be willing that 
men in misery should hang themselves8   
,to this query suffice it for the       
present to reply1 that ,god governs us  
for our good2 and that capital          
punishment makes for the good of the    
community1 but never suicide4 7c4 viii41
 s4 viii41 n4 #g1 p4 #cdi47  #g4 ,it was
 the doctrine of ,aristotle and the     
,greeks1 that the citizen belongs to the
 ,state1 and that therefore suicide was 
robbing the ,state and doing it a formal
 injury4 ,but no modern ,state takes    
this view of its subjects4 ,no modern   
mind would place suicide in the same    
category of crime with robbing the      
,exchequer4  #h4 ,the great deterrent   
against suicide1 in cases where misery  
meets with recklessness1 is the thought1

    ,in that sleep of death what dreams 
may come6--  above all1 the fear of     
being confronted with an angry ,god4    
,away from belief in ,god's judgments   
and a future state1 our arguments       
against suicide may be good logic1 but  
they make poor rhetoric for those who   
need them most4 ,men are wonderfully    
imitative in killing themselves4 ,once  
the practice is come in vogue1 it       
becomes a rage1 an epidemic4 ,atheism   
and ,materialism form the best nidus for
 the contagion of suicide4 ,it is a     
shrewd remark of ,madame de ,stael3     
,though there are crimes of a darker hue
 than suicide1 yet there is none other  
by which man seems so entirely to       
renounce the protection of ,god4        
,readings4--,ar41 ,eth41 ,,iii41 vii41  
#ac2 ib41 ,v41 xi41 nn4 #a-c2 ,st4      
,thos41 #b;a #b1 q4 #fd1 art4 #e2 ,st4  
,aug41 ,de ,civitate ,dei1 i41 cc4 #bf1 
#bg2 ,paley1 ,mor4 ,phil41 bk4 iv41 c4  
iii4   ,,section ,,iv4--,of ,duelling4  
#a4 ,a duel may be defined3 ,a meeting  

of two parties by private agreement to  
fight with weapons in themselves deadly4
 ,the meeting must be by agreement3 a   
chance meeting of ,montagues and        
,capulets1 where the parties improvise a
 fight on the spot is not a duel4 ,the  
agreement must be private2 anything     
arranged by public authority1 as the    
encounter of ,david with ,goliath1 that 
in the legend of the ,horatii and       
,curiatii1 or the wager of battle in the
 ,middle ,ages is not a duel4 ,it is    
enough that the weapons be in themselves
 deadly1 as swords or pistols1 though   
there be an express stipulation not to  
kill3 but a pre-arranged encounter with 
fists1 with foils with buttons on1 or   
even perhaps with crab-sticks1 is not a 
duel4  #b4 ,the hard case in duelling is
 the case of him who receives the       
challenge4 ,let us make the case as hard
 as possible4 ,in a certain army1 every 
challenge sent to an officer is reported
 to a ,court of ,honour4 ,if the ,court 
decide that it ought to be accepted1    

accept the officer must1 or lose his    
commission and all hope of military     
distinction4 ,in this army1 say1 there  
is an officer of high promise who is    
believed to object to duels on          
conscientious grounds4 ,an enemy        
pretends to have been insulted1 and     
challenges him1 on purpose to see him   
refuse and have to go down into the     
ranks1 his career spoilt4 ,the ,court of
 ,honour rules that the duel must come  
off4 ,of this very case1 ,reiffenstuel1 
a canonist of repute1 about the year    
#agjj1 writes3  ,the answer is1 444 that
 they who in such cases are so          
necessitated and constrained to offer1  
or accept1 a duel1 as that unless they  
offered1 or accepted it1 they would be  
held cowardly1 craven1 mean1 and unfit  
to bear office in the army1 and         
consequently would be deprived of the   
office that they actually enjoy1 and    
support themselves and their family by1 
or would for ever forfeit all hope of   
promotion1 otherwise their due and      

desert1--these ,i say in such a case are
 free from all fault and penalty1       
whether they offer or accept a duel4    
7,in lib4 v4 decret41 tit4 #ad1 nn4 #cj1
 #ca47  ,the author protests in his     
,preface that he wishes his opinions all
 and each to be subject to the judgment1
 censure1 and correction of the ,holy   
,catholic ,church4 ,the opinion above   
quoted was condemned1 word for word as  
it was uttered1 by ,pope ,benedict      
,,xiv4 in #ageb4  ,now for              
,reiffenstuel's reason4 ,the reason1 he 
says1 is1 because in such a case as is  
supposed the acceptance and offering of 
a duel is an absolutely necessary1 and  
thereby a just and lawful1 defence of   
your reputation1 or goods of fortune1   
and1 by equivalence1 even of your life1 
against an unjust aggressor1 who we     
suppose does you an injury1 and thereby 
gives you no choice but to call him out1
 or calls you out1 and accordingly      
assails you in words1 c4 ,hence1 as for 
the needful defence of reputation1 or of

 goods of fortune of great consequence1 
it is lawful1 with the moderation of a  
blameless defence1 to kill an unjust    
aggressor1 so it will be also lawful to 
offer and accept a duel1 and therein    
slay the other party4 ,reiffenstuel here
 evidently supposes that killing done in
 self-defence is direct4 ,those who     
agree with him on that point1 proceed to
 draw differences between self-defence  
and accepting a challenge4 ,of course   
the two are not the same4 ,the true     
difficulty for them lies in making out  
how the reasons which justify           
self-defence in their view of it1 do not
 also justify the acceptance of a duel3 
how1 if ,i may make another man's death 
a means to the preservation of my vital 
right1 ,i may not as well make another  
man's risk of death and my own1 which is
 all that a duel amounts to1 also a     
means1 none other being at hand1 to the 
preserving of my no less vital right4   
,this grave objection does not touch us4
 ,we have denied that killing in        

self-defence is direct4 ,on the lines of
 that denial we meet ,reiffenstuel's    
argument simply as follows4  #c4 ,in    
self-defence1 the aggressor is slain    
indirectly4 ,in a duel1 not indeed the  
death itself1 or mutual slaughter of the
 combatants1 is directly willed1 but the
 risk of mutual slaughter is directly   
willed4 ,but we may not directly will   
the risk of that which we may not       
directly do4 ,and the combatants may not
 directly do themselves or one another  
to death4 ,therefore they may not       
directly risk each his own and his      
antagonist's life4 ,but this risk is of 
the essence of a duel4 ,therefore       
duelling is essentially unlawful4  #d4  
,such is the clenched fist1 so to speak1
 of our argument4 ,now to open it out1  
and prove in detail the several members4
 ,in self-defence1 neither the death of 
the aggressor nor the risk of his death 
is directly willed1 whereas the risk of 
death is directly willed in a duel1     
which difference entirely bars the      

argument from self-defence to duelling4 
,for a duel is a means of recovering and
 preserving honour1 which is effected by
 a display of fortitude1 which again    
consists in exposing yourself to the    
risk of being killed1 and1 as part of   
the bargain1 of killing the other man4  
,the risk to life is of the essence of a
 duel3 it only attains its end--of      
establishing a man's character for      
courage--by being dangerous to life4    
,fortitude essentially consists in      
braving death4 7,ethics1 c4 v41 s4      
viii41 n4 #a1 p4 #id47 ,deadly weapons1 
chosen because they are deadly and      
involve a risk of life in fighting with 
such arms1 are the apt and express means
 for showing readiness to brave death4  
,if the weapons were not deadly1 there  
would be no point in the duel4 ,as a    
matter of fact1 where our definition of 
duel is verified1 and weapons in        
themselves deadly are used1 the         
encounter cannot be other than          
dangerous1 especially between foes and  

where the blood is up4 ,in the ,french  
army1 where the regimental              
fencing-master stands by1 sword in hand1
 ready to parry any too dangerous       
thrust1 serious results still have      
occurred4 ,if any man will have it that 
short smooth-bore pistols at forty paces
 in a fog are not to be counted         
dangerous weapons1 all we can say is    
that ,,mm4 ,gambetta and ,de ,fourton1  
the one being nearly blind1 and the     
other having lost an eye1 did not fight 
a duel4 ,in a duel then the danger of   
being killed and of killing is directly 
willed2 it is the precise means chosen  
to the end in view4  #e4 ,we have proved
 already that it is not lawful directly 
to procure one's own death1 nor the     
death of another innocent man4 ,if any  
one contends that his antagonist is not 
innocent1 not even in a political sense 
7c4 ii41 s4 i41 n4 #b1 p4 #bjc71 we must
 here assume against him1 what we shall 
afterwards prove1 that the guilty are   
not to be directly put to death except  

by public authority4 ,but what we may   
not directly bring about1 we may not    
directly risk the occurrence of4 ,as ,i 
may not throw myself down a cliff1 so   
neither may ,i walk along the edge      
precisely for the chance of a fall4 ,i  
may often walk there with the chance of 
falling1 but not because of the chance4 
,it will be said that the ,english love 
of fox-hunting and ,alpine climbing is  
largely owing to the element of danger  
present in those amusements4 ,but it is 
not the danger pure and simple1 that is 
chosen for amusement3 it is the prospect
 of overcoming danger by skill4 ,the    
same may be said of ,blondin on the     
tight-rope3 it was his skill1 not his   
mere risk1 that was admired4 ,there are 
some risks that no skill can obviate1 as
 those of ,alpine avalanches4 ,we may   
face a mountain slope where avalanches  
occur1 but we must not hang about there 
because of the avalanches1 making our   
amusement or bravado of the chance of   
being killed4 ,that would be willing the

 risk of death directly1 as it is willed
 in duelling4  ,readings4--,paley1 ,mor4
 ,phil41 bk4 iii41 p4 #b1 c4 ix42 ,st4  
,thos41 #b;a #b1 q4 #gb1 art4 #c4       
,,chapter ,,iii4  ,,of ,,speaking ,,the 
,,truth4  ,,section ,i4--,of the        
,definition of a ,lie4   #a4 ,let none  
doubt1 says ,st4 ,augustine1 that he    
lies1 who utters what is false for the  
purpose of deceiving4 ,wherefore the    
utterance of what is false with a will  
to deceive is unquestionably a lie4 ,the
 only question is1 whether this         
definition does not contain more than is
 necessary to the thing defined4 ,the   
objective falseness of what is said     
makes a material falsehood3 the will to 
utter what is false makes a formal      
falsehood 7,ethics1 c4 iii41 s4 ii41 n4 
#g1 p4 #cc73 the will to create a false 
impression regards1 not the falsehood   
itself1 but the effect to follow from   
it4 ,if a person says what is not true1 
but what he takes to be the truth1 he   
tells indeed a material lie1 but at the 

same time he puts forth no human act    
7,ethics1 c4 i41 n4 #b1 p4 #a7 of lying4
 ,if on the other hand he says what he  
believes to be false1 though it turns   
out true1 he tells a formal lie1 though 
not a material one1 and moreover1 he    
does a human act of lying4 ,but human   
acts are the subject-matter of morality4
 ,the moralist therefore is content to  
define the formal lie3 the material     
aspect of the lie is irrelevant to his  
enquiry4 ,a formal lie is saying what   
one believes not to be true1 or         
promising what one intends not to       
perform3 briefly1 it is speaking against
 one's mind4  #b4 ,we shall show        
presently that to speak against one's   
mind is intrinsically1 necessarily1 and 
always evil4 ,but when a thing is thus  
evil in itself1 there is no need to     
bring into the definition of the act1   
from a moral point of view1 the         
intention with which it is done4 ,there 
is no use in prying into ends1 when the 
means taken is an unlawful means for any

 end4 ,if a person blasphemes1 we do not
 ask why he blasphemes3 the intention is
 not part of the blasphemy3 the         
utterance is a sin by itself4 ,but if a 
person strikes1 we ask why he strikes1  
to heal or to slay1 in self-defence or  
in revenge4 ,so1 if speaking against    
one's mind is a thing indifferent and   
colourless in point of morality1 and all
 depends on the intention with which we 
do it1 so that we may speak against our 
minds to put another off1 but not to    
deceive him1 then certainly the         
intention to deceive must be imported   
into the definition of lying4 ,but if1  
as we shall prove presently1 the act of 
so speaking is by no means indifferent  
and colourless1 but is fraught with an  
inordinateness all its own1 then the    
intention may be left out of the        
question1 the act is to be characterised
 on its own merits1 and speech against  
one's mind is the definition of a lie4  
#c4 ,then1 some one will say1 it would  
be a lie for a prisoner in solitary     

confinement to break the silence of his 
cell with the exclamation1 ,queen ,anne 
is not dead4 ,the answer is simple3 it  
takes two to make a speech4 ,a man does 
not properly speak to himself1 nor      
quarrel with himself1 nor deal justly by
 himself4 ,not that it would be a lie to
 deny the death of ,queen ,anne even in 
public3 for speech is an outward        
affirmation1 the appearance of a serious
 will to apply predicate to subject3 but
 in this case there is no appearance of 
a serious will3 on the contrary1 from   
the manifest absurdity of the assertion1
 it is plain that you are joking and do 
not mean to affirm anything4 ,this      
perhaps is as far as we can go in       
permission of what are called lies in   
jest4  ,readings4--,st ,thos41 #b;a #b1 
q4 #aaj1 art4 #a4   ,,section ,,ii4--,of
 the ,evil of ,lying4   #a4 ,human      
society cannot go on1 if men are to be  
allowed indiscriminately to lie to one  
another4 ,thucydides 7iii41 #hc7 gives  
as the reason of the extravagant length 

to which faction ran in ,greece in his  
time3 ,for there was no power to        
reconcile the parties1 no plighted word 
reliable1 no oath held in awe4 ,even in 
trifles no one likes to be lied to1 and 
we are not to do to our neighbour what  
we would not have done to ourselves4    
,the laws of good fellowship require    
that we should put away lying1 and speak
 the truth every man with his neighbour3
 for we are members one of another4     
7,ephesians iv4 #be47 ,this at least in 
ordinary circumstances4 ,the same good  
fellowship requires that in ordinary    
circumstances we should respect the     
lives and property of our fellow-men4   
#b4 ,but it is lawful to take life in   
pursuance of the just judgment of       
authority3 it is lawful to seize upon   
property in self-preservation4 ,these   
exceptions stand very harmoniously with 
the well-being of society1 or rather are
 required by it1 as we shall see later  
on4 ,the law against lying1 so far as it
 is founded on the general prejudice    

done to society by the shock of social  
confidence1 and on the particular       
annoyance of the party lied to1 may seem
 to admit of similar exceptions4        
,whoever has no reasonable objection to 
having life and property taken from him 
in certain contingencies1 can he        
reasonably complain of any hurt or      
inconvenience that he may suffer from a 
lie being told him at times8  #c4 ,i put
 forward this difficulty1 not as though 
it were without its answer in the       
principle of ,general ,consequences3    
still it is a difficulty4 ,besides1 if  
the whole harm of lying is in the       
unpleasant effect wrought upon the      
deceived hearer1 and the scandal and bad
 consequences to society at large1 it is
 a long way to go round to show that    
lying is impossible to ,god4 ,he in     
whose dominion are all the rights and   
claims of man1 is not to be restrained  
by the mere reluctance of ,his creatures
 to be deceived1 or by the general bad  
effects of a lie upon the edifice of    

human credit4 ,as ,master ,he might     
impose this annoyance upon the          
individual1 these bad consequences upon 
society3 or by ,his ,providence ,he     
might prevent their occurring1 whenever 
,he willed in ,his utterances to swerve 
from the truth4 ,the only help for the  
argument for the ,divine veracity on    
these grounds1 is to urge with ,plato   
that none of the motives which lead men 
to lie can ever find place in the mind  
of ,god3 that a lie is a subterfuge1 an 
economy1 a device resorted to under     
stress of circumstances1 such as can    
never serve the turn of the ,supreme    
,being4 ,but though ,god be inaccessible
 to human reasons for departing from the
 truth1 may ,he not have higher reasons1
 mysterious1 and unsearchable1 for such 
a deviation8 ,it is long arguing out    
this point4 ,better bring the discussion
 sharp round with the question3 ,is     
there not some element in the ,divine   
,nature itself1 which makes it          
impossible for ,god to speak false8  #d4

 ,undoubtedly there is such an element1 
deep down1 even at the root of the      
sanctity of ,god4 ,god is holy in that1 
being by essence the fulness of all     
being and all goodness1 ,he is ever true
 to ,himself in every act of ,his       
understanding1 of ,his will1 and of ,his
 power4 ,by ,his understanding ,he      
abidingly covers1 grasps1 and           
comprehends ,his whole ,being4 ,with    
,his will ,he loves ,himself supremely4 
,his power is exercised entirely for    
,his glory--entirely1 but not           
exclusively1 for ,god's last and best   
external glory is in the consummated    
happiness of ,his creatures4 ,whatever  
,god makes1 ,he makes in ,his own       
likeness1 more or less so according to  
the degree of being which ,he imparts to
 the creature4 ,and as whatever ,god    
does is like ,him1 and whatever ,god    
makes is like ,him1 so whatever ,god    
says is like ,him3 ,his spoken word     
answers to ,his inward word and thought4
 ,it holds of ,god as of every being who

 has a thought to think and a word to   
utter3    ,to thine own self be true1   
,and it must follow as the night the    
day1   ,thou canst not then be false to 
any man4  #e4 ,god's sanctity is in ,his
 being true to ,himself4 ,his veracity  
is part of ,his sanctity4 ,he cannot in 
,his speech1 or revelation of ,himself1 
contradict what ,he really has in ,his  
mind1 without ceasing to be holy and    
being no longer ,god4 ,but the sanctity 
of intellectual creatures must be1 like 
their every other pure perfection1      
modelled on the corresponding perfection
 of their ,maker4 ,holiness must mean   
truthfulness in man1 for it means       
truthfulness in ,god4 ,god's words      
cannot be at variance with ,his thought1
 for ,god is essential holiness4 ,nor   
can man speak otherwise than as he      
thinks without marring the attribute of 
holiness in himself1 that is1 without   
doing wrong4  #f4 ,to speak against     
one's mind is an act falling upon undue 
matter4 ,words are naturally signs of   

thoughts4 ,not that the words of any    
given language1 as ,english or ,german1 
have any natural connection with the    
thoughts that they express2 but it is   
natural to men1 natural to every        
intellectual being1 to have some mode of
 expressing his thoughts by outward     
signs2 and once a sign is recognized as 
the sign of a certain thought1 so long  
as the convention remains unrepealed1   
whoever uses that sign1 not having in   
his mind at the time the thought which  
that sign signifies1 but the            
contradictory to it1 is doing violence  
to the natural bond between sign and    
thing signified1 by putting forward the 
former where the latter is not behind   
it4 ,and since the due and proper matter
 for the sign to be put upon is the     
presence in the mind of the thought     
signified1 to make that sign where the  
opposite thought is present1 is1 as ,st4
 ,thomas says1 an act falling upon undue
 matter4 ,the peculiar spiritual and    
moral inviolability of the connection   

between word and thought1 appears from  
the consideration which we have urged of
 the archetype holiness of ,god4 ,this  
then is the real1 intrinsic1 primary1   
and inseparable reason1 why lying1 or   
speech in contradiction with the thought
 of the speaker1 is everywhere and      
always wrong4  #g4 ,grotius 7,de ,jure  
,belli et ,pacis1 ,i4 iii41 c4 i41 nn4  
#aa1 seq47 argues a lie to be wrong     
solely inasmuch as it is in conflict    
with the existing and abiding right of  
the person spoken to4 ,if right here    
means something binding in commutative  
justice 7,ethics1 c4 v41 s4 ix41 n4 #f1 
p4 #ajf71 we deny that any such right is
 violated by what is called a simple    
lie1 that is1 an untruth not in the     
matter of religion1 and not affecting   
the character1 property1 or personal    
well-being of our neighbour4 ,for if a  
simple lie is a violation of commutative
 justice1 it carries the obligation of  
restitution 7,ethics1 c4 v41 s4 ix41 n4 
#f1 p4 #ajg72 that is1 we are bound to  

tell the truth afterwards to the person 
that we have lied to1 even in a matter  
of no practical consequence1--quite a   
new burden on the consciences of men4   
,again1 if the bar to lying were the    
hearer's right1 whoever had dominion    
over another's right might lie to him2  
the parent might lie to the child1 the  
,state to the citizen1 and ,god to man1 
a doctrine which1 away from its         
application to ,god1 ,grotius accepts4  
,lastly since volenti non fit injuria1  
the presumed willingness of the listener
 would license all manner of officious  
and jocose lies1 as the authority of the
 speaker would sanction official        
fabrications4 ,thus1 what with official1
 and what with officious speeches1 it   
would be very hard to believe anybody4  
#h4 ,by our rejection of ,grotius'      
theory we are enabled to answer         
,milton's question3 ,if all killing be  
not murder1 nor all taking from another1
 stealing why must all untruths be lies8
 ,because1 we say1 killing and taking   

away of goods deal with rights which are
 not absolute and unlimited1 but become 
in certain situations void2 whereas an  
untruth turns1 not on another's right1  
but on the exigency of the speaker's own
 rational nature calling for the concord
 of the word signifying with the thought
 signified1 and this exigency never     
varies4 ,untruth and falsehood are but  
polite names for a lie4                 
,readings4--,st4 ,thos41 #b;a #b1 q4    
#aaj1 art4 #c1 in corp41 ad4 #d2 ib41 q4
 #aji1 art4 #b1 #c1 in corp42 ,ar41     
,eth41 ,,iv41 vii42 ,plato1 ,rep41 #chb1
 #chi ,b1 ,c4   ,,section ,,iii4--,of   
the keeping of ,secrets without ,lying4 
#a4 ,there are natural secrets1 secrets 
of promise1 and secrets of trust4 ,a    
natural secret is all a man's own       
private history1 which he would not have
 made public1 as also all that he       
discovers by his own observation of the 
similar private history of his          
neighbours4 ,if a man finds out         
something about his neighbour1 and1     

after he has found it out for himself1  
the neighbour gets him to promise not to
 publish it1 that is a secret of        
promise4 ,lastly1 if one man comes to   
another1 as to a lawyer1 or a surgeon1  
for professional advice1 or simply to a 
friend for moral counsel1 and in order  
thereto imparts to him some of his      
natural secrets1 those secrets1 as they 
are received and held by the person     
consulted1 are called secrets of trust4 
,this latter kind of secret is          
privileged above the other two4 ,a      
natural secret1 and also a secret of    
promise1 must be delivered up on the    
demand of an authority competent to     
inquire in the department where the     
secret lies4 ,but a secret of trust is  
to be given up to no inquirer1 but to be
 kept against all who endeavour to come 
by it1 except where the matter bodes    
mischief and wrong to a third party1 or 
to the community1 and where at the same 
time the owner of the secret cannot be  
persuaded to desist from the wrong4     

,this proviso does not hold for the seal
 of confession1 which is absolutely     
inviolable4  #b4 ,the main art of       
keeping a secret is1 not to talk about  
it4 ,if a man is asked an awkward       
question1 and sees no alternative but to
 let out or lie1 it is usually his own  
fault for having introduced the subject1
 or encouraged the questioner up to that
 point4 ,a wise man lets drop in time   
topics which he is unwilling to have    
pressed4 ,but there are unconscionable  
people who will not be put off1 and who1
 either out of malice or out of         
stupidity1 ply you with questions       
against all rules of good breeding4     
,this direct assault may sometimes be   
retaliated1 and a rude question met by a
 curt answer4 ,but such a reply is not  
always prudent or charitable1 and would 
not unfrequently convey the very        
information required4 ,silence would    
serve no better1 for silence gives      
consent1 and is eloquent at times4      
,there is nothing left for it in such   

cases but to lock your secret up1 as it 
were1 in a separate compartment of your 
breast1 and answer according to the     
remainder of your information1 which is 
not secret1 private1 and confidential4  
,this looks very much like lying1 but it
 is not lying1 it is speaking the truth 
under a broad mental reservation4  #c4  
,mental reservation is an act of the    
mind1 limiting the spoken phrase so that
 it may not bear the full sense which at
 first hearing it seems to bear4 ,the   
reservation1 or limitation of the spoken
 sense1 is said to be broad or pure1    
according as it is1 or is not1 indicated
 externally4 ,a pure mental reservation1
 where the speaker uses words in a      
limited meaning1 without giving any     
outward clue to the limitation1 is in   
nothing different from a lie1 and is    
wrong as a lie is always wrong4 ,a good 
instance is ,archbishop ,cranmer's oath 
of fealty to the ,pope1 he having       
previously protested--of course out of  
hearing of the ,pope or the ,pope's     

representative--that he meant that oath 
in no way to preclude him from labouring
 at the reformation of the ,church in   
,england1 that is1 doing all the evil   
work which ,henry ,,viii4 had marked out
 for him in the teeth of the ,roman     
,bishop4 ,footnote #ah ,even broad      
mental reservation is permissible only  
as a last resource1 when no other means 
are available for the preservation of   
some secret which one has a duty to     
others1 or grave reason of one's own1 to
 keep4  ,footnote #ah3 ,strype's        
,cranmer1 i41 pp #bg1 #bh2 ib41 ii41    
,appendices #e1 #f2 ed4 ,oxon41 #ahab4  
#d4 ,the point to make out is that no   
lie is told4 ,to speak under a          
reservation is a lie1 if it is speech   
against the mind of the speaker4 ,but   
how can it be aught else than speech    
against the mind1 when the heart thinks 
yea1 and the tongue says nay8 ,we answer
 that1 in the case contemplated1 the    
thought of the heart is1 secrets apart1 
nay2 and though the word on the lips is 

nay simply1 yet we must not take that   
word as the whole locution1 but as a    
mere text1 to which the situation of the
 speaker and the matter spoken of form a
 commentary1 legible to any observant   
eye4 ,the word is an annotated text2 nay
 in the body of the page1 with secrets  
apart inscribed in the margin4 ,the     
adequate utterance is the whole page1   
text and gloss together2 that speech    
answers to the thought in the speaker's 
mind2 therefore it is no lie4  #e4 ,the 
essential requisite is that the gloss1  
secrets apart1 be not written in the    
speaker's private mind1 but be outwardly
 and publicly manifest in the matter    
spoken of1 which must be one that       
clearly admits of secrets1 and in the   
circumstances of the speaker1 who is    
driven into a corner1 and obliged to    
answer something1 and yet cannot by any 
prudent man be expected to answer out of
 the fulness of all the knowledge that  
he may possibly possess4  #f4 ,nor let  
it be said that all confidence in the   

replies given to our questions is hereby
 destroyed4 ,for most questions are in  
matters that do not admit of a secret4  
,there the qualification1 secrets apart1
 which may be said to attach to all     
answers1 has no value and meaning3 it is
 mathematically equal to zero2 and we   
may take the answer in full assurance   
just as it reaches our ear4 ,again1 when
 a person volunteers a statement        
unasked1 he cannot be supposed to be    
reserving secrets4 ,but when delicate   
subjects are touched on1 and inquiry is 
pushed to extremity by an unauthorized  
questioner1 secrets apart is the        
handwriting on the wall4  #g4 ,but why  
is not this qualification spoken out    
with the tongue8 ,sometimes it safely   
may be1 and then it should be so added4 
,but1 as the addition is unusual1 our   
taking the trouble to express it would  
often certify to the inquirer that his  
suspicions were correct1 though we ought
 not to tell him so4 ,our aim then must 
be to give such an oral answer as we    

should return1 were the suspicion quite 
unfounded4 ,our questioner1 if he is a  
prudent man1 will piece out our phrase  
with the addition1 secrets apart2 and he
 will understand that he can get nothing
 out of us either way1 which is exactly 
what we wish him to understand4 ,his    
unauthorized interrogatory has been met 
by speech that amounts to silence1      
arguing indeed our prudence1 but leaving
 him as wise as before on the forbidden 
topic4 ,if he is a thoughtless man1 he  
is deceived1 not by any intention or    
election of ours1 but indirectly so far 
as we are concerned1 an incidental      
deception which he has brought on       
himself4  #h4 ,this then is a convention
 that obtains1 not of positive          
institution1 but dictated by nature     
herself1 that on a matter which admits  
of being secret1 any answer elicited    
under stress of necessity must be so    
construed1 as that any grave secret that
 may be touched1 not being morally in   
the power of the respondent to reveal1  

shall be taken to remain reserved4  #i4 
,we may therefore sometimes avoid       
seeming to know what we know1 or to be  
what we are4 ,but we may never of our   
own proper motion step forward and court
 observation as being what we are not1  
or knowing what is against or beyond our
 knowledge4 ,we may dissemble           
occasionally1 but not simulate4 ,the    
dissembler of a secret wishes for       
obscurity and silence3 he wants to have 
the eyes of men turned away from him and
 their curiosity unroused4 ,whatever he 
says or does is to divest the idea of   
there being anything particularly       
interesting about him4 ,but he who      
simulates--call him pretender1 impostor1
 or quack--is nothing1 if not taken     
notice of4 ,the public gaze is his      
sunshine3 obscurity gives him a deadly  
chill4 ,his ambition is to appear out of
 the ordinary1 being really quite within
 common lines3 the dissembler is in some
 respect beyond the ordinary1 but wishes
 not to show himself otherwise than as  

an ordinary mortal with ordinary        
knowledge4 ,the pretender is on the     
offensive1 challenging attention3 the   
dissembler is on his defence against    
notice4 ,simulation1 says ,bolingbroke1 
is a stiletto1 not only an offensive but
 an unlawful weapon1 and the use of it  
may be rarely1 very rarely1 excused1 but
 never justified4 ,dissimulation is a   
shield1 as secrecy is armour3 and it is 
no more possible to preserve secrecy in 
the administration of public affairs    
without dissimulation than it is to     
succeed in it without secrecy4 7,idea of
 a ,patriot ,king47  ,readings4--,de    
,lugo1 ,de ,just4 et ,jure1 #ad1 nn4    
#ace1 #ada1 #adb2 ,the ,month for       
,march1 #ahhc2 ,lockhart's ,life of     
,scott1 v41 #bf4    ,,chapter ,,iv4     
,,of ,,charity4   #a4 ,it is the        
difference between sensible apprehension
 and intellectual knowledge1 that the   
former seizes upon a particular object  
and it only1 as this sweet3 the latter  
takes its object as the type of a class 

of similars1 this and the like of this1 
this sweet as one of the class of sweet 
things4 ,in like manner the love of     
passion1 which is the love of sense1    
regards one sole object4 ,titius is in  
love with ,bertha alone1 not with woman 
in general4 ,but an intellectual love is
 the love of a type of beauty or        
goodness1 of this object and of others  
as they approach in likeness to it4     
,whoever loves ,william from an         
intellectual appreciation of his        
patriotism1 in loving him loves all     
patriots4 ,every animal loves itself    
with a brute1 sensible love1 not a love 
to find fault with1 nor yet a noble and 
exalted sentiment--a love purely        
self-regarding1 quite apart from the    
good that is in self1 but embracing self
 simply as self1 and self alone4 ,this  
is the first love of self even in man4  
,but over and above this animal and     
sensible love1 which no man lacks1 there
 is in all men worthy of the name a     
second self-regarding affection of an   

intellectual cast1 whereby a man loves  
himself as discerning with the eye of   
his soul the excellence of his own      
nature--how noble in reason1 how        
infinite in faculty1 in form and moving 
how express and admirable1 in action how
 like an angel1 in apprehension how like
 a god1 the beauty of the world1 the    
paragon of animals4 ,intellectual       
self-complacence overflows from self to 
similars4 ,it is not self-love1 it is   
love of the race1 the milk of human     
kindness1 philanthropy4  #b4 ,but man is
 a disappointing creature1 after all a  
mere quintessence of dust1 unless he can
 rise above himself by relation with    
some superhuman being1 and make his     
final fortune in some better region than
 this world4 ,reason requires that we   
love ourselves1 and love our fellow-men1
 for and in order to the development of 
the highest gifts and capacities that   
are in us4 ,these are gifts and         
capacities divine1 preparing us to find 
our everlasting happiness in ,god4      

7,ethics1 c4 ii41 s4 iv41 n4 #b1 p4     
#bb47 ,the love that we bear to         
ourselves and our neighbour1 in view of 
our coming from ,god and going to ,god1 
is called the love of charity4 ,charity 
differs from philanthropy in looking    
beyond the present life1 and above      
creatures4 ,a materialist and atheist   
may possess philanthropy1 but not       
charity4  #c4 ,beside the twofold love1 
animal and intellectual1 which we bear  
ourselves1 we may also and should love  
ourselves with the love of charity1     
seeing ,god's gifts in us1 and desiring 
the perfection of those gifts in a happy
 eternity occupied with ,god4 ,the      
charity which we should thus bear to    
ourselves is the model of that which we 
owe to our neighbour1 whom we are to    
love as ourselves1 not with the same    
intensity1 but with the same quality of 
love1 wishing him the good1 human and   
divine1 temporal and eternal1 which we  
wish for ourselves1 though not so       
earnestly as we wish it for ourselves4  

,our love for ourselves is stronger than
 for our neighbour3 for1 if love comes  
of likeness1 much more does it come of  
identity4 ,but by reason of the vast    
preponderance of the good that is       
rational and eternal over that which is 
material and temporal2 and also by      
reason of the principle laid down by    
,st4 ,thomas1 that as to the sharing    
together of 7eternal7 happiness1 greater
 is the union of our neighbour's soul   
with our soul than even of our own body 
with our soul 7#b;a #b1 q4 #bf1 art4 #e1
 ad #b71--we are bound to love our      
neighbour's eternal good better than our
 own temporal good1 and in certain      
special conjunctures to sacrifice the   
latter to the former4 ,we have no duty  
and obligation of loving his temporal   
good above our own temporal good4 ,but  
it is often matter of commendation and  
counsel to sacrifice our temporal       
interest to our neighbour's4 ,this      
sacrifice is no breach of the order of  
charity1 beginning at home3 since what  

is resigned of material and perishable  
profit is gained in moral perfection4   
,especially commendable is the surrender
 of private good for the good of the    
community4 ,charity1 or philanthropy1   
taking this form1 bears the name of     
patriotism and public spirit4  #d4      
,charity1 like material forces1 acts in 
a certain inverse ratio to the distance 
of the object4 ,other considerations    
being equal1 the nearer1 the dearer4    
,nay1 nearness and likeness to ourselves
 goes further than goodness in winning  
our love4 ,this is natural1 and charity 
presupposes nature1 and follows its     
order4 ,as we have more charity for     
ourselves than for others whom we       
acknowledge to be better men1 so        
likewise for our kinsmen and intimate   
friends4 ,we may put the matter thus4   
,charity consists in wishing and seeking
 to procure for a person the good that  
leads to ,god4 ,one element is the      
intensity and eagerness of this wish and
 search2 another is the greatness of the

 good wished4 ,now we wish those who are
 better than ourselves to be rewarded   
according to their deserts with a       
greater good than ourselves3 but this   
wish is but lukewarm compared to the    
intensity of our desire that we and our 
friends with us may attain to all the   
good that we are capable of4  #e4 ,the  
,christian precept to love our enemies  
is merely the enforcement of a natural  
obligation4 ,the obligation stands      
almost self-evident as soon as it is    
cleared of misunderstanding4 ,the love  
of enemies is not based on the ground of
 their being hostile and annoying us4   
,it would be highly unnatural to love   
them on that score4 ,nor are we in duty 
bound to show to one who hates us       
special offices of friendship1 except we
 find him in extreme need1 e4g41 dying  
in a ditch1 as the ,good ,samaritan     
found the ,jew3 otherwise it is enough  
that we be animated towards him with    
that common charity1 which we bear to   
other men who are not further off from  

us than he is4 ,if ,lucius offend       
,titius1 there being no other tie       
between them than the tie of friendship1
 ,titius may1 where the offence is very 
outrageous1 henceforth treat ,lucius as 
a stranger4 ,the question of scandal has
 sometimes to be regarded1 but that is  
an extrinsic circumstance to our present
 subject4 ,nor are we concerned to say  
what is the better thing for ,titius to 
do1 but to say all that he is bound to  
do4 ,he is bound to render himself as   
void of wilful malice1 and as full of   
ordinary courtesy and good feeling      
towards ,lucius1 as he is in the case of
 ,sempronius1 a man whom he never heard 
of till this day4 ,but if there be some 
other antecedent tie between them       
besides the tie of friendship1--for     
instance1 if ,titius and ,lucius are two
 monks of the same convent1 two officers
 in the same regiment1 two partners of  
one firm1--,titius is no longer         
justified in treating ,lucius as a      
stranger4 ,he must regard him with      

ordinary charity2 now ordinary charity  
between two brother-officers1 or two    
fellow-monks1 is not the same as between
 men who have no such tie one with      
another4 ,this is why we laid it down   
that we must be animated towards him who
 has offended us with that common       
charity1 which we bear to other men who 
are not further off from us than he is4 
#f4 ,this then being the exact          
obligation1 the same is easily          
established4 ,we must love our enemies1 
because the reasons given for loving all
 mankind 7nn4 #a1 #b7 are not vitiated  
by this or that man having treated us   
shamefully4 ,the human nature in him    
still remains good actually1 and still  
more1 potentially2 and if good and      
hopeful1 to that extent also lovable4   
,nor is this lovableness a mere         
separable accident4 ,rather1 it is the  
offensive behaviour of the man that is  
the separable accident4 ,at that we may 
well be disgusted and abominate it4 ,but
 the underlying substance remains good1 

not incurably tainted with that vicious 
accident4 ,we must attend to the        
substance1 which is1 rather than to the 
accident1 which happens1 and may be     
abolished4 ,let us endeavour to abolish 
the accident1 still so that we respect  
and regard the substance4 ,let us seek  
for redress under the guidance of       
prudence according to the circumstances 
of the case1 but not for the ruin of our
 enemy4 ,let us not render evil for     
evil1 but even in exacting a just       
satisfaction1 make it of the nature of  
that compensatory evil1 which is by     
consequence good4 ,let us be angry with 
our enemy1 but sin not by hating him4   
7,ethics1 c4 iv41 s4 iv41 n4 #c47 ,we   
may seek satisfaction for any wrong we  
have suffered3 in grave cases we must   
have recourse to the ,state for that3   
but the sin1 if any1 of our adversary is
 not our concern to punish or to seek   
vengeance for4 7,ethics1 c4 ix41 s4     
iii41 n4 #d47  #g4 ,the same reasoning  
holds good even of public enemies1      

tyrants1 persecutors1 anarchists1       
assassins4 ,we must include them in our 
prayers1 wish for their conversion1 and1
 though their case appear hopeless1 we  
must not damn them before their time4   
,if we found one of them dying by       
accident of cold or asphyxia1 we should 
be bound by a grave obligation to use   
all ordinary efforts to bring him round 
and recover him4 ,still we may use our  
best efforts to bring them to justice1  
even to capital punishment1 according to
 the procedure of public law established
 in the country1 and not otherwise4 ,we 
may also with an inefficacious desire1  
that is1 a desire that finds no vent in 
action1 desire their death under an     
alternative thus1 that either living    
they may cease to do evil1 or that ,god 
may call them away to where the wicked  
cease from troubling4 ,but we must not  
desire1 nor be glad of1 their death by  
any unlawful means1 for that were to    
sympathise with crime4  #h4 ,real       
charity shows itself in action1         

succouring a neighbour in need1 which is
 sometimes a counsel1 sometimes a duty4 
,it is an axiom1 that charity is not    
binding with grave inconvenience4 ,the  
gravity of the inconvenience in prospect
 must be measured against the urgency of
 the need to be relieved4 ,a neighbour  
is technically said to be in extreme    
need1 when he is in imminent peril of   
deadly evil to soul or body1 and is     
unable to help himself4 ,we are under   
severe obligation of charity to succour 
any whom we find in this plight4  #i4   
,by charity we give of our own to       
another3 by justice we render to another
 that which is his4 ,charity neglected  
calls for no restitution1 when the need 
that required it is past away3 justice  
violated cries for restitution1 for what
 we have taken away from our neighbour  
remains still his4 ,the obligations of  
justice are negative1 except for the    
fulfilment of contracts3 obligations in 
charity are largely positive4 7,ethics1 
c4 v41 s4 ix41 n4 #g1 p4 #ajh47         

,readings4--,c4 ,gent41 ,,iii41 #aag2   
#b;a #b1 q4 #bf1 art4 #d2 ib41 art4 #g2 
ib41 art4 #h2 #b;a #b1 q4 #be1 art4 #h2 
ib41 art4 #i2 ib41 art4 #f2 ,ferrier1   
,greek ,philosophy1 ,socrates1 nn4 #ac1 
#bf1 #bg1 #bi4 7,remains1 vol4 i41 pp4  
#bbg1 seq47    ,,chapter ,v4  ,,of      
,,rights4  ,,section ,i4--,of the       
definition and division of ,rights4     
#a4 ,a right is that in virtue of which 
a person calls anything his own4 ,more  
elaborately1 a right is a moral power   
residing in a person1 in virtue whereof 
he refers to himself as well his own    
actions as also other things1 which     
stand referred to him in preference to  
other persons4 ,a right is a moral      
power1 as distinguished from physical   
force or ability4 ,it resides in a      
person1 a being whom we call            
autocentric1 as distinguished from a    
thing1 which is heterocentric4 7c4 ii41 
s4 i41 n4 #b1 p4 #bjc47 ,a person is his
 own1 a thing is another's4 ,every      
intellectual nature is a person except  

the ,humanity of ,christ1 an exception  
which does not concern us here4 ,to the 
,creator all created personalities are  
as things1 but that again is not our    
concern in this place1 where we treat of
 the relations between man and man4 ,it 
will have to be noted hereafter with    
great emphasis1 that the individual man 
is a person1 not a thing and chattel1 in
 relation to the ,state1 and            
consequently has rights against the     
,state4  #b4 ,every intellectual being  
has the attribute of reflex             
consciousness4 ,it may turn its regard  
in upon itself1 and call itself me1 and 
its powers and activities mine4 ,it     
certainly has the physical ability of   
acting for self1 and using its powers   
consciously for its own ends4 ,does this
 physical ability represent also a moral
 power8 ,is the agent justified in      
exercising it8 and are his fellows under
 a moral obligation of justice to leave 
him free to exercise it8 7,ethics1 c4   
vi41 s4 i41 nn4 #e1 #f1 p4 #aaa47 ,we   

have seen that morality consists in     
acting up to one's own intellectual or  
rational nature4 ,since then the calling
 oneself me1 and one's power mine1 and  
the using those powers for purposes     
which one's reason approves1 is the     
distinguishing feature of an            
intellectual1 or rational1 and personal 
being1 that being is morally warranted  
so to act4 ,he calls himself his own1   
and his powers his own1 and they are his
 own by the very fact of his calling    
them so by a natural act4 ,and1 as      
justice is to give to another his own1  
others are bound in justice to leave him
 free to dispose of himself and his     
powers1 at least within certain limits4 
,but this would be for man a barren     
freedom1 were he not empowered to lay   
hold of and make his own some things1   
nay many things1 outside of himself1 for
 man is not self-sufficient1 but has    
many natural necessities1 and many      
psychical cravings to boot4 ,therefore  
man's right of preference extends1 not  

only to his own actions1 but also to    
external things1 which he may make his  
own to act upon4  #c4 ,rights are either
 connatural or acquired4 ,connatural    
rights spring from the very being of a  
man1 as he is a person4 ,such are the   
rights to life1 to honour1 to personal  
liberty--that is1 freedom to go where   
you will--to civil liberty--that is1 not
 being a slave--also the rights to marry
 and to acquire property4 ,acquired     
rights spring from some deed of man1    
annexing something to his personality4  
,such are the rights to property1 duly  
entered upon1 to reputation1 to the     
political franchise1 and all rights that
 come by contract4 ,acquired rights may 
descend to heirs4  #d4 ,rights again are
 alienable and inalienable1 which       
division does not coincide with the     
preceding4 ,those rights are            
inalienable1 shorn of which a man cannot
 work out his last end4 ,some rights are
 thus permanently and universally       
inalienable1 as the right to life3      

others are so occasionally and for      
particular persons4  #e4 ,the           
correlative of right is duty3 so that1  
wherever one man has a right1 his       
neighbours have a duty in justice to    
leave him free to exercise the same4    
,but the converse is not true1 that     
wherever one man has a duty towards     
another1 that other has a right to its  
performance1 for there are duties of    
charity1 which do not impart a          
corresponding right1 but only a claim4  
,duties that correspond to rights are   
called by ,english moralists perfect    
duties4 ,duties answering to claims only
 they call imperfect4  #f4 ,of duties1  
some are positive1 which bind always1   
not for always1 as the duty of adoring  
,god4 ,we are always bound to adore1 we 
are not bound to be always adoring4     
,other duties are negative1 and bind    
always1 for always1 as the duties of    
sobriety and chastity4 ,the former class
 of duties we may more easily be excused
 from1 because they can be deferred1 and

 it is at times morally impossible to   
take them up4 ,but negative duty1 as    
,mr4 ,gladstone has finely said1 rises  
with us in the morning1 and goes to rest
 with us at night3 it is the shadow that
 follows us wheresoever we go1 and only 
leaves us when we leave the light of    
life4  #g4 ,only a person has rights1 as
 appears by the definition of a right4  
,again1 only persons have duties1 for   
they only have free will4 ,no one has   
duties without rights1 and no man has   
rights without duties4 ,infants and     
idiots1 in whom the use of reason is    
impeded1 having notwithstanding rights1 
are said to have duties also radically4 
,hence it is wrong to make an idiot     
commit what is in him a material breach 
of some negative duty1 as of temperance4
 ,positive duties he is excused from4   
#h4 ,some have taught that all human    
rights are consequences of duties2 a man
 having first a duty to perform1 and    
then a right to the means necessary to  
its performance4 ,but this doctrine     

appears more pious than probable4 ,for1 
first1 the type and example of sovereign
 right1 ,god1 has no duties4 7,ethics1  
c4 vi41 s4 ii41 n4 #d1 p4 #acj47 ,then  
again1 a man may have a right conjoined 
with a duty--not of justice1 of course1 
but of some other virtue1 as of         
religion--not to use that right4 ,but if
 rights were consequent upon duties1 the
 right would cease in such a case2 and  
to pretend to exercise it would be a sin
 against justice1 which it is not4      
,,section ,,ii4--,of the so-called      
,rights of ,animals4   #a4 ,brute       
beasts1 not having understanding and    
therefore not being persons1 cannot have
 any rights4 ,the conclusion is clear4  
,they are not autocentric4 ,they are of 
the number of things1 which are         
another's3 they are chattels1 or cattle4
 ,we have no duties to them1--not of    
justice1 as is shown2 not of religion1  
unless we are to worship them1 like the 
,egyptians of old2 not of fidelity1 for 
they are incapable of accepting a       

promise4 ,the only question can be of   
charity4 ,have we duties of charity to  
the lower animals8 ,charity is an       
extension of the love of ourselves to   
beings like ourselves1 in view of our   
common nature and our common destiny to 
happiness in ,god4 7c4 iv41 nn4 #a1 #b1 
p4 #bci47 ,it is not for the present    
treatise to prove1 but to assume1 that  
our nature is not common to brute beasts
 but immeasurably above theirs1 higher  
indeed above them than we are below the 
angels4 ,man alone speaks1 man alone    
hopes to contemplate for ever1 if       
not--in the natural order--the ,face of 
his ,father in ,heaven1 at least the    
reflected brightness of that ,divine    
,face4 7,ethics1 c4 ii41 s4 iv41 nn4 #c1
 #d47 ,we have then no duties of        
charity1 nor duties of any kind1 to the 
lower animals1 as neither to stocks and 
stones4  #b4 ,still we have duties about
 stones1 not to fling them through our  
neighbour's windows2 and we have duties 
about brute beasts4 ,we must not harm   

them1 when they are our neighbour's     
property4 ,we must not break out into   
paroxysms of rage and impatience in     
dealing with them4 ,it is a miserable   
way of showing off human pre-eminence1  
to torture poor brutes in malevolent    
glee at their pain and helplessness4    
,such wanton cruelty is especially      
deplorable1 because it disposes the     
perpetrators to be cruel also to men4   
,as ,st4 ,thomas says 7#a;a #b1 q4 #ajb1
 art4 #f1 ad #h73  ,because the passion 
of pity arises from the afflictions of  
others1 and it happens even to brute    
animals to feel pain1 the affection of  
pity may arise in man even about the    
afflictions of animals4 ,obviously1     
whoever is practised in the affection of
 pity towards animals1 is thereby more  
disposed to the affection of pity       
towards men3 whence it is said in       
,proverbs xii4 #aj3 ',the just regardeth
 the lives of his beasts1 but the bowels
 of the wicked are cruel4' ,and         
therefore the ,lord1 seeing the ,jewish 

people to be cruel1 that ,he might      
reclaim them to pity1 wished to train   
them to pity even towards brute beasts1 
forbidding certain things to be done to 
animals which seem to touch upon        
cruelty4 ,and therefore ,he forbade them
 to seethe the kid in the mother's milk 
7,deut4 xiv4 #ba71 or to muzzle the     
treading ox 7,deut4 xxv4 #d71 or to kill
 the old bird with the young4 7,deut4   
xxii4 #f1 #g47  #c4 ,it is wanton       
cruelty to vex and annoy a brute beast  
for sport4 ,this is unworthy of man1 and
 disposes him to inhumanity towards his 
own species4 ,yet the converse is not to
 be relied on3 there have been cruel men
 who have made pets of the brute        
creation4 ,but there is no shadow of    
evil resting on the practice of causing 
pain to brutes in sport1 where the pain 
is not the sport itself1 but an         
incidental concomitant of it4 ,much more
 in all that conduces to the sustenance 
of man may we give pain to brutes1 as   
also in the pursuit of science4 ,nor are

 we bound to any anxious care to make   
this pain as little as may be4 ,brutes  
are as things in our regard3 so far as  
they are useful to us1 they exist for   
us1 not for themselves2 and we do right 
in using them unsparingly for our need  
and convenience1 though not for our     
wantonness4 ,if then any special case of
 pain to a brute creature be a fact of  
considerable value for observation in   
biological science or the medical art1  
no reasoned considerations of morality  
can stand in the way of man making the  
experiment1 yet so that even in the     
quest of science he be mindful of mercy4
  #d4 ,altogether it will be found that 
a sedulous observance of the rights and 
claims of other men1 a mastery over     
one's own passions1 and a reverence for 
the ,creator1 give the best assurance of
 a wise and humane treatment of the     
lower animals4 ,but to preach kindness  
to brutes as a primary obligation1 and  
capital point of amendment in the       
conversion of a sinner1 is to treat the 

symptom and leave unchecked the inward  
malady4  ,reading4--,st4 ,thos41 #b;a   
#b1 q4 #be1 art4 #c4   ,,section        
,,iii4--,of the right to ,honour and    
,reputation4   #a4 ,honour is the       
attestation of another's excellence4    
,reputation is the opinion of many      
touching another's life and conduct4    
,honour is paid to a man to his face1   
whereas his reputation is bruited behind
 his back4 ,honour is taken away by     
insult1 reputation by detraction4 ,if   
the detraction involve a falsehood1 it  
is called calumny or slander4 ,the name 
backbiting1 given to detraction1 points 
to the absence of the person spoken of4 
,but no one meets with an insult except 
where he is present1 either in person or
 by his representative4  #b4 ,both      
honour and reputation are goods that a  
man can call his own1 and has a right   
to1 but on different titles4 ,honour1   
some honour at least1 appertains to a   
man simply for his being a man3         
reputation is won by deeds4 ,honour is  

primarily a connatural right3 reputation
 is acquired4 ,an entire stranger has no
 reputation1 but a certain honour is his
 due to start with4  #c4 ,as there is a 
right to honour and a right to          
reputation1 so insult and detraction are
 sins1 not against charity1 but against 
commutative justice1 calling for        
restitution4 7,ethics1 c4 v41 s4 ix41 n4
 #f1 p4 #ajf47 ,we must tender an       
apology for an insult1 and labour to    
restore the good name that our          
detracting tongue has taken away4  #d4  
,calumny is a double sin1 one sin       
against truth1 and another sin1 the     
heavier of the two1 against justice4 ,if
 the blackening tale be true1 the first 
sin is absent1 but the second is there4 
,the truth of the story is no           
justification for our publishing it4    
,though it is wrong to lie1 it is not   
always right to blurt out the truth1    
especially when we are not asked for it4
 ,there are unprofitable disclosures1   
unseasonable1 harmful1 and wrongful4    

,but1 it will be said1 does not a man   
forego his right to reputation by doing 
the evil that belies his fair fame8 ,no1
 his right remains1 unless the evil that
 he does1 either of its own proper      
working or by the scandal that it gives1
 be subversive of social order4 ,if he  
has committed a crime against society1  
he is to be denounced to the authorities
 who have charge of society3 they will  
judge him1 and1 finding him guilty1 they
 will punish him and brand him with     
infamy4 ,if1 again1 he does evil1 though
 not immediately against society1 yet in
 the face of society and before the sun2
 he shocks the public conscience and    
rends his own reputation4 ,but the evil 
private and proper to himself that any  
man works in secret1 is not society's   
care1 nor affects his social standing1  
nor brings any rightful diminution to   
his good name4 ,if all our secret and   
personal offences are liable to be made 
public by any observer1 which of us     
shall abide it8 ,our character is our   

public character2 and that is not       
forfeit except for some manner of public
 sin4  #e4 ,suppose a veteran1 long     
retired1 has made a name for military   
prowess by boasting of battles wherein  
he never came into danger1 is the one   
old comrade who remembers him for a     
skulker and a runaway1 justified in     
showing him up8 ,no1 for that           
reputation1 however mendaciously got    
together1 is still truly a good         
possession3 it is not a fruit of        
injustice1 therefore it is no matter of 
restitution3 nor is it any instrument of
 injustice1 which the holder is bound to
 drop3 thus1 as he is not bound to      
forego it1 now that he has got it1 so   
his neighbour may not rightfully take it
 from him4  ,reading4--,st4 ,thos41 #b;a
 #b1 q4 #gc1 art4 #a4   ,,section       
,,iv4--,of ,contracts4   #a4 ,a contract
 is a bargain productive of an          
obligation of commutative justice in    
each of the contracting parties4 ,a     
bargain is a consent of two wills to the

 same object4 ,thus a promise1 before it
 is accepted1 is not a bargain4 ,but    
even after acceptance a promise is not a
 contract1 for the promiser may not     
choose to bind himself in justice1 but  
only in good faith1 while the promisee  
is under no obligation whatever4  #b4   
,there are such things as implicit      
contracts1 attached to the bearing of   
certain offices1 whereby a man becomes  
his brother's keeper4 ,the liability    
contracted is limited by the nature of  
the office3 thus a physician is         
officially bound in justice as to his   
patient's pulse1 but not officially as  
to his purse4 ,where there is no        
explicit contract1 the duties which the 
subjects of a person's official care    
have towards him are not duties of      
commutative justice4 ,thus these        
implicit contracts are not strictly     
contracts1 as failing to carry a full   
reciprocity4  #c4 ,contracts are either 
consensual or real1 according as they   
are either complete by the mere consent 

of the parties1 or further require that 
something should change hands and pass  
from one to the other4 ,what contracts  
are consensual1 and what real1 depends  
chiefly on positive law4 ,no natural law
 can tell whether buying and selling1   
for instance1 be a consensual or a real 
contract4 ,the interest of this         
particular case is when the goods are   
lost in transmission3 then whichever of 
the two parties at the time be          
determined to be the owner1 apart from  
culpable negligence or contrary         
agreement of the sender1 he bears the   
loss1 on the principle1 res perit       
domino4  #d4 ,contracts are otherwise   
divided as onerous and gratuitous4 ,in  
an onerous contract either party renders
 some advantage in return for the       
advantage that he receives1 as when     
,titius hires the horse of ,caius4 ,in a
 gratuitous contract all the advantage  
is on one side1 as when ,titius does not
 hire but borrows a horse4 ,the ,roman  
lawyers further distinguish contracts1  

somewhat humorously1 into contracts with
 names and contracts without names1 or  
nominate and innominate1 as anatomists  
name a certain bone the innominate bone1
 and a certain artery the innominate    
artery4 ,innominate contracts are       
reckoned four3 ,i give on the terms of  
your giving1 otherwise than as buying   
and selling1--to some forms of this     
there are ,english names1 as exchange   
and barter3 ,i do on the terms of your  
doing3 ,i do on the terms of your       
giving3 ,i give on the terms of your    
doing4  ,readings4--,de ,lugo1 ,de      
,just4 et ,jure1 #bb1 nn4 #a1 #b1 #e1   
#f1 #i1 #af1 #ag4 ,for buying and       
selling and the frauds incident thereto1
 ,paley1 ,moral ,philosophy1 bk4 iii41  
p4 #a1 c4 vii4   ,,section ,v4--,of     
,usury4   #a4 ,we must distinguish use  
value and market value4 ,the use value  
of an article of property is the esteem 
which the owner has of it from every    
other point of view except as a thing to
 sell4 ,thus a man values his overcoat  

on a journey as a protection from cold  
and rain4 ,a book is valued that was    
held in the dying hand of a parent4     
,this is use value4 ,the market value of
 an article is the estimate of society1 
fixing the rate of exchange between that
 and other articles1 so much of one for 
so much of another1 e4g41 between       
mahogany and cedar wood1 considered as  
things to sell4  #b4 ,answering to this 
twofold value is a twofold exchange1    
private exchange1 which regards use     
value2 and commercial exchange1 which is
 founded on market value4 ,if ,i part   
with my watch to a sailor for carrying  
me across an arm of the sea where there 
is no public ferry1 that is private     
exchange4 ,if ,i pay the ordinary fare  
where there is a public ferry1 that is  
commercial exchange4  #c4 ,private      
exchange begins in the need of at least 
one of the contracting parties4 ,it is  
an act of charity in the other party to 
accommodate him by offering the thing   
needed4 ,if the offer is made otherwise 

than as a gift1 and is accepted1 he who 
avails himself of it is bound in justice
 to see that the afforder of the        
accommodation is compensated for the    
loss that he suffers in affording it4   
,thus far the recipient is bound in     
justice1 and no further in that virtue4 
,however wholesome or profitable the    
thing be to him that gets it1 the       
supplier cannot charge for that but only
 for the loss that he himself suffers1  
or the gain that he foregoes1 in handing
 the thing over1 or the pains that he   
takes1 or the hardship that he endures1 
or the risk that he runs1 in rendering  
the service desired4 ,if all the labour 
to be undergone1 or damage incurred1 or 
risk encountered1 by the sailor who goes
 about by private bargain to be my      
ferryman1 is fairly met by the          
remuneration of a thirty-shilling watch1
 he has no right to stipulate for any   
more1 not though the passage that he    
gives me sets me on the way to a throne4
 ,the peculiar advantage that ,i have in

 prospect does not come out of him1 but 
out of myself4 ,he must not pretend to  
sell what is not his1 what attaches1 not
 to him1 but to me4 ,he can only sell   
his own loss1 risk1 pains and labour4   
,at the same time1 if ,i have any       
gentlemanly or generous feeling in me1  
,i shall be forward to bestow extra     
remuneration on one who has rendered me 
so timely a service3 but this is matter 
of my gratitude1 not of his right and   
claim in justice4 ,gratitude must not be
 put into the bill4 ,and this much of   
private exchange4  #d4 ,commercial      
exchange is conducted according to      
market value4 ,apart from dire          
necessity--and one in dire necessity is 
not fit to enter into commercial        
exchanges--the rule is1 that a seller   
may always ask the market value of his  
article1 however much that may be above 
what the thing cost him1 or the use     
value which it bears to him4 ,thus1 if  
one finds in his garden a rare ,roman   
coin--so far as his tastes go1 a paltry 

bit of metal--he may sell it for        
whatever price numismatists will offer3 
whereas1 if there were no market for    
coins1 but only one individual who doted
 on such things1 the finder could make  
no profit out of that individual1 the   
coin having neither market value with   
the community1 nor use value in the eyes
 of the finder4  #e4 ,as there is a     
twofold value1 and a twofold exchange1  
so a twofold character is impressed on  
the great instrument of exchange1 money4
 ,money1 in one character1 is an        
instrument of private exchange3 in its  
other character1 to mercantile men more 
familiar1 it is an instrument of        
commercial exchange4 ,in the one1 it    
represents use value to the particular  
owner1 more or less to him than it would
 be to some other owner3 in the other1  
it represents market value1 the same to 
all at the same time4  #f4 ,leo ,x4 in  
the ,fifth ,council of ,lateran1 #aeae1 
ruled that--usury is properly           
interpreted to be the attempt to draw   

profit and increment1 without labour1   
without cost1 and without risk1 out of  
the use of a thing that does not        
fructify4 ,in #agde ,benedict ,,xiv4    
wrote in the same sense to the ,bishops 
of ,italy3 ,that kind of sin which is   
called usury1 and which has its proper  
seat and place in the contract of       
mutuum1 consists in turning that        
contract1 which of its own nature       
requires the amount returned exactly to 
balance the amount received1 into a     
ground for demanding a return in excess 
of the amount received4 ,mutuum1 be it  
observed1 is a loan for a definite      
period1 of some article1 the use of     
which lies in its consumption1 as       
matches1 fuel1 food1 and1 in one        
respect1 money4 ,we shall prove this to 
be properly a gratuitous contract4 7s4  
iv41 n4 #d1 p4 #bed47  #g4 ,usury then  
is no mere taking of exorbitant         
interest4 ,there is no question of more 
or less1 but it is usury to take any    
interest at all upon the loan of a piece

 of property1 which  7a7 is of no use   
except to be used up1 spent1 consumed3  
7b7 is not wanted for the lender's own  
consumption within the period of the    
loan3  7c7 is lent upon security that   
obviates risk3  7d7 is so lent that the 
lender foregoes no occasion of lawful   
gain by lending it4  #h4 ,when all these
 four conditions are fulfilled1 and yet 
interest is exacted upon a loan1 such   
interest is usurious and unjust4 ,and   
why8 ,simply by reason of the principle 
that we laid down before1 speaking of   
private exchange 7n4 #c71 a principle   
that is thus stated by ,st4 ,thomas3    
,if one party is much benefited by the  
commodity which he receives of the      
other1 while the other1 the seller1 is  
not a loser by going without the        
article1 no extra price must be put on4 
,the reason is1 because the benefit that
 accrues to one party is not from the   
seller1 but from the condition of the   
buyer4 ,now no one ought to sell to     
another that which is not his1 though he

 may sell the loss that he suffers4 ,he1
 however1 who is much benefited by the  
commodity he receives of another1 may   
spontaneously bestow some extra         
recompense on the seller3 that is the   
part of one who has the feelings of a   
gentleman4 7#b;a4 #b1 q4 #gg1 art4 #a1  
in corp47  #i4 ,st4 ,thomas speaks of   
sales1 but the principle applies equally
 to loans4 ,it is upon loans of money   
that interest is commonly taken1 and of 
money-loans we speak4 ,clearly1         
according to the doctrine stated1 the   
lender can claim the compensation of    
interest1 if he has to pinch himself in 
order to lend1 or lends at a notable    
risk4 ,he is selling his own loss1--or  
risk1 which is loss once removed4 ,but  
supposing he has other monies in hand1  
and the security is good1 and he has    
enough still left for all domestic      
needs1 and for all luxuries that he     
cares to indulge in1--moreover he has   
nothing absolutely to do with his money1
 in the event of his not lending it1 but

 to hoard it up in his strong box1 and  
wait long months till he has occasion to
 use it3 in that case1 if he lends it he
 will be no worse off on the day that he
 gets it back1 no worse off in the time 
while it is away1 than if it had never  
left his coffers4 ,such is the contract 
of mutuum1 shorn of all accidental      
attendant circumstances1 a contract1    
which of its own nature1 as ,benedict   
,,xiv4 says1 that is1 apart from        
circumstances1 requires the amount      
returned exactly to balance the amount  
received4 ,not though the borrower has  
profited of the loan to gain kingdoms1  
is any further return in strict justice 
to be exacted of him on that precise    
account4  #aj4 ,but now an altered case4
 ,suppose land is purchaseable1 and it  
is proposed to stock a farm with cattle1
 and rear them1 and convey them to a    
large town where there is a brisk demand
 for meat--the supposition is not always
 verified1 nor any supposition like it1 
but suppose it verified in some one     

case--then1 though the lender has other 
monies in hand for the needs of his     
household1 and the security is good1 yet
 the money is not so lent as that he    
foregoes no occasion of lawful gain by  
lending it4 ,he foregoes the purchase of
 land and farm stock1 or at least delays
 it1 and delay is loss where profit is  
perennial4 ,on that score of gain       
forfeited he may exact interest on the  
money that he lends1 which interest will
 be no usury4 ,the title of interest    
here given is recognized by divines as  
lucrum cessans1 interruption of profit4 
,the interest is taken1 so far as it    
goes upon a lawful title1 not upon the  
fact of the borrower's profit--that is  
irrelevant--but upon the profit that the
 lender might have made1 had he kept the
 money in hand4  #aa4 ,this latter case 
7n4 #aj7 represents that putting of     
money out to interest1 which is an      
essential feature of modern commerce4   
,the former case 7n4 #i7 is the aspect  
that money-lending commonly bore in the 

,middle ,ages4 ,in those days land was  
hard to buy1 agriculture backward1 roads
 bad1 seas unnavigable1 carrying-trade  
precarious1 messages slow1 raids and    
marauders frequent1 population sparse1  
commerce confined to a few centres1     
mines unworked1 manufactures mostly     
domestic1 capital yet unformed4 ,men    
kept their money in their cellars1 or   
deposited it for safety in religious    
houses3 whence the stories of           
treasure-trove belonging to those days4 
,they took out the coin as they wanted  
it to spend on housekeeping1 or on war1 
or feasting4 ,it was very hard1 next to 
impossible1 to lay out money so as to   
make more money by it4 ,money was in    
those days really barren--a resource for
 housekeeping1 not for trade--a medium  
of private1 not of commercial           
exchange--a representative of use value1
 not of market value4 ,apart from risk  
of non-repayment1 to take interest for  
money that you had no use for but to    
hoard1 was getting a breed of barren    

metal3 it was taking up what you laid   
not down3 it was making profit out of   
your neighbour's need1 or your          
neighbour's gain1 where there was no    
corresponding need unsatisfied1 or gain 
forfeited1 on your part3 it was that    
attempt to draw profit and increment1   
without labour1 without cost1 and       
without risk1 out of the use of a thing 
that does not fructify1 which the ,fifth
 ,lateran ,council defines to be usury4 
#ab4 ,in our time1 thanks to steam and  
electricity1 the increase of population1
 and continued peace1 the whole world   
has become one trading community1       
representing now more1 now less abundant
 opportunities for the investment of    
money1 and the conversion of it into    
other lucrative commodities4 ,money     
consequently with us is not a mere      
medium of private exchange for the      
purposes of housekeeping3 it is a medium
 of commercial exchange4 ,it represents1
 not use value1 but market value4 ,to be
 a thousand pounds out of pocket for a  

year means an opportunity of gain       
irretrievably lost1 gain that could have
 been made otherwise than by            
money-lending4 ,where this is so1 and so
 far as it is so1 the lender may without
 violation of justice point to lucrum   
cessans1 gain lost1 and arrange         
beforehand with the borrower for being  
reimbursed with interest4  #ac4 ,the    
transition from mediaeval housekeeping1 
with its use values and private         
exchange1 to the mercantile society of  
modern times1 was not made in a day1 nor
 went on everywhere at the same rate4   
,it was a growth of ages4 ,in great     
cities commerce rapidly ripened1 and was
 well on towards maturity five centuries
 ago4 ,then the conditions that render  
interest lawful1 and mark it off from   
usury1 readily came to obtain4 ,but     
those centres were isolated4 ,like the  
centres of ossification1 which appear   
here and there in cartilage when it is  
being converted into bone1 they were    
separated one from another by large     

tracts remaining in the primitive       
condition4 ,here you might have a great 
city1 ,hamburg or ,genoa1 an early type 
of commercial enterprise1 and1 fifty    
miles inland1 society was in its        
infancy1 and the great city was as part 
of another world4 ,hence the same       
transaction1 as described by the letter 
of the law1 might mean lawful interest  
in the city1 and usury out in the       
country--the two were so disconnected4  
,in such a situation the legislator has 
to choose between forbidding interest   
here and allowing usury there2 between  
restraining speculation and licensing   
oppression4 ,the mediaeval legislator   
chose the former alternative4 ,church   
and ,state together enacted a number of 
laws to restrain the taking of interest1
 laws that1 like the clothes of infancy1
 are not to be scorned as absurd        
restrictions1 merely because they are   
inapplicable now1 and would not fit the 
modern growth of nations4 ,at this day  
the ,state has repealed those laws1 and 

the ,church has officially signified    
that she no longer insists on them4     
,still she maintains dogmatically that  
there is such a sin as usury1 and what  
it is1 as defined in the ,fifth ,council
 of ,lateran4  ,readings4--,st4 ,thos41 
#b;a #b1 q4 #gg1 art4 #a2 ,ar41 ,pol41  
,i41 ix42 ,st4 ,thos41 #b;a #b1 q4 #gg1 
art4 #d2 ,the ,month for ,september1    
#ahhf2 ,the ,nineteenth ,century for    
,september1 #ahgg1 pp4 #aha1 seq4       
,,chapter ,,vi4  ,,of ,,marriage4       
,,section ,i4--,of the ,institution of  
,marriage4   #a4 ,marriage is defined by
 the ,canonists3 the union of male and  
female1 involving their living together 
in undivided intercourse4 ,in the       
present order of ,providence1 the       
marriage contract between baptized      
persons is a sacrament1 under the       
superintendence of the ,church1 the     
fertile theme of canonists and          
theologians4 ,as philosophers1 we deal  
with marriage as it would be1 were there
 no sacraments1 no ,church1 and no      

,incarnation1 present or to come4 ,this 
is marriage in the order of pure nature4
  #b4 ,it is natural to all animals to  
propagate their kind1 natural therefore 
also to man2 and being natural1 it is so
 far forth also a good thing1 unless we 
are to say with the ,manicheans1 that   
the whole of corporeal nature is an evil
 creation4 ,nay1 so urgent is the       
natural appetite here1 that we must     
argue the existence1 not of a mere      
permission1 but of an exigency of       
nature1 and consequent command of ,god  
7,ethics1 c4 vi41 s4 ii41 nn4 #aa1 #ab1 
p4 #abb71 for the propagation of the    
human species4 ,besides1 there is in the
 individual the duty of                 
self-preservation1 therefore likewise in
 the race4 ,again1 the old cannot       
subsist at all without the support of   
the young1 nor lead a cheerful existence
 without their company4 ,imagine a world
 with no youth in it1 a winter without a
 spring6  #c4 ,there is this difference 
between self-preservation and the       

preservation of the race1 that if a man 
will not eat1 none can eat for him2 but 
if one man omit the propagation of his  
kind1 another can take it up4 ,there are
 many things necessary for the good of  
mankind1 which are not to be done by    
every individual4 ,not all are to be    
soldiers1 nor all builders1 though      
houses are needful1 and sometimes war4  
,nor is it desirable that the human race
 should be multiplied to its utmost     
capacity4 ,it is enough here to mention 
without discussing the teaching of      
,malthus1 how population presses on the 
means of subsistence1 the latter        
increasing in an arithmetical1 the      
former in a geometrical ratio4 ,without 
going the whole way with ,malthus1      
modern economical writers are commonly a
 little ,malthusian1 and shrink from    
giving to all and each of their species 
the word to increase and multiply4  #d4 
,but1 it will be said1 sickly and       
consumptive subjects1 and still more    
those who have any tendency to madness1 

may well be excused from having         
children2 so too may they be excused    
whose poverty cannot keep a family2     
excused too is the inveterate drunkard1 
and all habitual criminals1 by the      
principle of heredity1 lest they        
transmit to posterity an evil bodily    
predisposition2 but the healthy and the 
virtuous1 men sound of mind and limb1 of
 life unspotted1 and in circumstances   
easy1 the flower of the race1--none of  
these surely should omit to raise up    
others to wear his lineaments3 we want  
such men multiplied4 ,i answer1 on      
natural grounds alone3 ,you may counsel1
 but you cannot compel1 either by       
positive law or ethical precept1 any man
 or woman to seek to have children4 ,you
 surely will not breed men by selection1
 like cattle1 as ,plato proposed4 ,the  
union of the sexes1 especially the      
married union1 is an act to be of all   
others the most entirely free1          
spontaneous1 uncommanded1 and           
unconstrained4 ,it should be a union of 

intense mutual love4 ,but a man may not 
meet with any woman that he can love    
with passion2 or1 meeting such1 he may  
not be able to win her4 ,nor1           
considering the indeterminateness of    
points of health1 capacity1 and         
character1 could any certain list be    
drawn up of persons bound to have issue4
 ,thus the utmost that can be argued is 
a counsel in this direction1 a counsel  
that mankind ordinarily are ready enough
 to comply with4 ,but if any one of     
seeming aptitude excuses himself on the 
score of finding no partner to his      
liking1 or of a desire to travel1 or of 
study1 or still more1 of devotion--and  
why should not a man1 ever of natural   
piety1 go out into solitude1 like ,st4  
,antony1 to hold communion with his     
,maker8--all these excuses must be      
taken4 ,it is lawful then in the state  
of mere nature1 upon any one of many    
sufficient grounds1 to stand aside and  
relinquish to your neighbour the        
privilege and responsibility of giving  

increase to the human family4  #e4 ,but 
if it is no one individual's duty to    
propagate his kind1 how is it that we   
have laid down that there is such a     
duty8 ,for the duty is incumbent upon   
them that alone can do it1 and it can   
only be done by individuals4 ,the answer
 rests on a distinction between         
proximate and remote duty4 ,the         
propagation of the race is the remote   
duty of every individual1 but at present
 the proximate1 duty of none4 ,a remote 
duty is a duty not now pressing but     
which would have to be performed in a   
certain contingency1 which contingency  
happening1 the duty becomes proximate4  
,if there appeared a danger of our race 
dying out1 the survivors would be       
beholden1 especially those in power1 to 
take steps for its continuance4 ,rewards
 might then be held out1 like the jus   
trium liberorum instituted at ,rome by  
,augustus2 and if necessary1 penalties  
inflicted on celibacy4 ,in this one     
extreme case the matrimonial union might

 be made matter of legal constraint4    
,but when will such constraint become   
necessary8  #f4 ,the continuance of the 
human race must be wrought out by man   
and woman standing in that abiding and  
exclusive relation to one another1 which
 constitutes the state of marriage4     
,nature abhors promiscuity1 or free     
love4 ,it is the delight of writers who 
use1 perhaps abuse1 ,darwin's name1 to  
picture primitive mankind as all living 
in this infrabestial state4 ,but the    
state supposed is suicidal1 and instead 
of allowing the expansion of the human  
race1 would have produced infertility1  
and probably disease1 and at best only  
allowed the existing numbers to         
maintain1 under the most favourable     
circumstances1 a precarious existence4  
,to suppose1 therefore1 that the whole  
human race for any considerable time    
were without regular marriage1 is       
physiologically impossible4 ,they could 
never have survived it4 7,devas1        
,studies of ,family ,life1  #aja47  #g4 

,even if the alleged promiscuity ever   
did prevail--and it may have obtained to
 some extent in certain degraded        
portions of humanity--its prevalence was
 not its justification4 ,the practice   
cannot have been befitting in any stage 
of the evolution of human society4 ,as  
in all things we suppose our readers to 
have understanding1 we leave it to them 
to think out this matter for themselves4
 ,suffice it here to put forward two    
grand advantages gained and ends        
achieved1 which are called by           
theologians the goods of marriage4  #h4 
,the first good of marriage is the      
offspring that is born of it4 ,nature   
wills1 not only the being1 but the      
well-being of this offspring1 and that  
both in the physical and in the moral   
order4 ,very important for the physical 
health of the child it is1 that it be   
born of parents whose animal            
propensities are under some restraint2  
such restraint the bond of marriage     
implies4 ,then1 in the moral order1 the 

child requires to be educated with love1
 a love that shall be guided by wisdom1 
and supported by firmness4 ,love1       
wisdom1 and firmness1 they are the      
attributes of both parents2 but love is 
especially looked for from the mother1  
wisdom and firmness from the father4    
,and1 what is important1 both have an   
interest in the child such as no other  
human being can take4 ,we are speaking  
of the normal father or mother1 not of  
many worthless parents that actually    
are2 for1 as ,aristotle often lays it   
down1 we must not judge of a thing from 
its bad specimens4 ,no doubt1 the ,state
 could establish public nurseries and   
infant schools1 and provide a staff of  
nurses and governesses1 more scientific 
educators than even the normal parent2  
but who1 that has not been most unhappy 
in his origin1 would wish his own       
infancy to have been reared in such a   
place8 ,what certificated stranger can  
supply for a mother's love8  #i4 ,the   
second good of marriage is the mutual   

faith of the partners4 ,plato never made
 a greater mistake than when he wrote   
that the female sex differs from the    
male in mankind only in this1 that the  
one bears children1 while the other     
begets them2 and consequently that no   
occupation of social life belongs to a  
woman because she is a woman1 or to a   
man because he is a man1 but capacities 
are equally distributed in both sexes1  
and woman naturally bears her share in  
all occupations1 and man his share1 only
 that in all woman is weaker than man4  
7,republic1 #ded ,d2 #dee ,d47 ,over    
against this we must set ,aristotle's   
correction3 ,cohabitation among human   
kind is not for the mere raising of     
children1 but also for the purposes of a
 partnership in life3 for from the first
 the offices of man and woman are       
distinct and different3 thus they       
mutually supply for one another1 putting
 their several advantages into the      
common stock4 7,ar41 ,eth41 ,,viii41    
xii4 #g47 ,elsewhere he sets forth these

 several offices in detail3 ,the nature 
of both partners1 man and woman1 has    
been prearranged by a divine            
dispensation in view of their           
partnership3 for they differ by not     
having their faculties available all to 
the same effect1 but some even to       
opposite effects1 though combining to a 
common end3 for ,god made the one sex   
stronger and the other weaker1 that the 
one for fear may be the more careful1   
and the other for courage the more      
capable of self-defence2 and that the   
one may forage abroad1 while the other  
keeps house3 and for work the one is    
made competent for sedentary            
employments1 but too delicate for an    
out-door life1 while the other makes a  
poor figure at keeping still1 but is    
vigorous and robust in movement2 and    
touching children1 the generation is    
special1 but the improvement of the     
children is the joint labour of both    
parents1 for it belongs to the one to   
nurture1 to the other to chastise4      

7,ar41 ,econ41 i4 #c47  ,these passages 
are enough to suggest more than they    
actually contain1 of two orders of      
qualities arranged antithetically one   
over against another in man and woman1  
so that the one existence becomes       
complementary to the other1 and the two 
conjoined form one perfect human life4  
,this life-communion1 called by divines 
fides1 or mutual faith1 is then the     
second good fruit of marriage4 ,indeed  
it is the more characteristically human 
good1 offspring being rather related to 
the animal side of our nature4 ,but as  
animal and rational elements make one   
human being1 so do offspring and mutual 
faith constitute the adequate good of   
that human union of the sexes1 which we 
call marriage4  #aj4 ,whatever good     
there is in marriage1 connections formed
 by either party beyond the             
marriage-bed1 are agents of confusion to
 the undoing of all that good and the   
practical dissolution of the marriage4  
,readings4--,contra ,gentes1 iii41 #abb2

 ib41 iii41 #abf2 ib41 iii41 #acf2      
,devas1 ,studies of ,family ,life1      
#ij-aja1 where he disposes of the proof 
of primitive promiscuity1 drawn from the
 fact that in early societies kinship is
 traced and property claimed only       
through the mother4   ,,section         
,,ii4--,of the ,unity of ,marriage4     
#a4 ,both man and woman are by nature   
incapable of a second marriage1 while   
their former marriage endures4 ,no woman
 can have two husbands at the same time1
 which is polyandry2 and no man can have
 two wives at the same time1 which is   
polygamy4 ,the second marriage attempted
 is not only illicit1 but invalid3 it is
 no contract1 no marriage at all1 and   
all cohabitation with the second partner
 is sheer adultery4 ,this is a great    
deal more than saying that polyandry and
 polygamy are unlawful4  #b4 ,that is by
 nature no marriage1 which is           
inconsistent with the natural ends of   
marriage1 offspring and mutual faith4   
,but polyandry is thus inconsistent with

 the good of offspring1 and polygamy    
with mutual faith4 ,it is not meant that
 polyandry makes the birth of children  
impossible4 ,but nature is solicitous1  
not for the mere birth1 but for the     
rearing and good estate of the child    
born4 ,now a child born fatherless is in
 an ill plight for its future education4
 ,posthumous children in lawful wedlock 
are born fatherless3 that is a calamity3
 but what shall we think of an          
institution which makes that calamity to
 the child sure always to occur8 ,such  
an institution is polyandry4 ,for in it 
no man can ever know his own child1     
except by likeness1 and likeness in a   
baby face is largely as you choose to   
fancy it4 ,again1 is the polyandrous    
wife to be1 or not to be1 the head of   
the family8 ,if not1 the family--for it 
ought to be one family1 where there is  
one mother--will have as many heads as  
she has husbands1 a pretty specimen of a
 house divided against itself4 ,if she  
is to be the head1 that is a perversion 

of the natural order of predominance    
between the sexes4 ,in any case1        
polyandry is little better than         
promiscuity3 it is fatal to the family  
and1 fatal to the race2 and children    
born of it are born out of marriage4    
#c4 ,against polygamy the case in       
natural law is not quite so strong as   
against polyandry4 ,still it is a strong
 case enough in the interest of the     
wife4 ,the words spoken by the bride to 
the bridegroom in the marriage rite of  
ancient ,rome1 ,ubi tu ,caius1 ego      
,caia1 ,where you are master1 ,i am     
mistress1 declare the relation of mutual
 faith as it should be1 namely1 a       
relation of equality1 with some         
advantage1 preference1 and pre-eminence 
allowed to the husband1 yet not so great
 advantage as to leave him free where   
she is straitly bound1 and reduce her to
 the servile level of one in a row of   
minions to his passion and sharers of   
his divided affections4 ,polygamy in all
 ages has meant the lowering of         

womankind3    ,he will hold thee--      
,something better than his dog1 a little
 dearer than his horse  ,at its         
strongest1 the love of man for woman1   
where polygamy obtains1 is a flame of   
passion1 that quickly spends itself on  
one object1 and then passes to another2 
not a rational1 enduring1 human         
affection4 ,it is also a fact1 that the 
increase of the race is not greater in  
polygamy than in monogamy4 ,thus1 as a  
practice that runs strongly counter to  
one of the great purposes of marriage1  
and is1 to say the least1 no help to the
 other1 and carries with it the         
humiliation of the female sex1 polygamy 
is justly argued to be abhorrent to     
nature4  #d4 ,it is beside the purpose  
of this work to enter into the questions
 of morality that arise out of ,holy    
,scripture1 considered as an inspired   
record of the actions of the ,saints4   
,but the polygamy of the patriarchs of  
old so readily occurs to mind1 that it  
is worth while to mention four          

conceivable explanations1 if only to    
indicate which is and which is not      
reconcilable with our philosophy4 ,the  
first explanation would be1 that        
polygamy is not against the natural law1
 but only against the positive divine   
law1 which was derogated from in this   
instance4 ,we have made it out to be    
against the natural law4 ,the second    
explanation would be that ,god gave the 
patriarchs a dispensation1 strictly so  
called1 from this point of the natural  
law4 ,we have maintained that ,god      
cannot1 strictly speaking1 dispense from
 one jot or tittle of natural law4      
7,ethics1 c4 viii41 s4 iii41 nn4 #a-c1  
p4 #adg47 ,footnote #ai ,a third        
explanation would be founded on the     
words of ,st4 ,paul to the ,athenians   
7,acts xvii4 #cj71 about ,god           
overlooking the times of this ignorance4
 ,this would suppose that mankind1      
beginning in monogamy1 from passion and 
ignorance lapsed quickly into polygamy3 
that the patriarchs in good faith       

conformed to the practice of their time2
 and that ,god1 in their case as with   
the rest of mankind1 awaited ,his own   
destined hour for the light of better   
knowledge to break upon the earth4 ,a   
fourth explanation would be this4 ,god  
by ,his supreme dominion can dissolve   
any marriage4 ,by the same dominative   
power ,he can infringe and partially    
make void any marriage contract without 
entirely undoing it4 ,the marriage      
contract1 existing in its fulness and   
integrity1 is a bar to any second       
similar contract1 as we have proved4    
,but what1 on this theory1 the ,lord    
,god did with the marriages of the      
patriarchs was this3 ,he partially      
unravelled and undid the contract1 so as
 to leave room for a second contract1   
and a third1 each having the bare       
essentials of a marriage1 but none of   
them the full integrity4  ,footnote #ai3
 ,dispensatio is the ,latin for ,greek3 
oikonomia1 and in this case means an    
economy of law1 in the sense that ,god  

did not press the marriage law beyond   
the capacity of the subject 7,matt4 xix4
 #g1h74 ,see my ,newman ,index1 s4v4    
,economy4 ,the schoolmen missed this    
meaning1 and took dispensatio in the    
canonical sense4  ,but1 for the author's
 final view1 see ,appendix4             
,readings4--,contra ,gent41 iii41 #abd2 
,suarez1 ,de ,legibus1 ,,ii41 xv41 #bh4 
,,section ,,iii4--,of the               
,indissolubility of ,marriage4   #a4    
,this section is pointed not so much    
against a separation--which may take    
place by mutual consent1 or without     
that1 by grievous infidelity or cruelty 
of one party--as against a divorce a    
vinculo1 which is a dissolution of a    
marriage in the lifetime of the parties1
 enabling each of them validly and      
lawfully to contract with some other4   
,the unity of marriage is more essential
 than its indissolubility4 ,nature is   
more against polygamy than against      
divorce4 ,even ,henry ,,viii4 stuck at  
polygamy4 ,in the present arrangement1 a

 divorce a vinculo is obtainable in     
three cases4 ,first1 when of two        
unbaptized persons1 man and wife1 the   
one is converted1 and the unconverted   
party refuses to live peaceably in      
wedlock1 the convert may marry again1   
and thereupon also the other party4 ,so 
the ,church understands ,st4 ,paul1 ,i  
,cor4 vii4 #ac1 #ae4 ,again1 the ,pope  
can grant a divorce a vinculo in the    
marriage of baptized persons before     
cohabitation4 ,such a marriage in that  
stage is also dissolved by the          
profession of one of the parties in a   
religious order4 ,beyond these three    
cases1 the ,catholic ,church allows     
neither the lawfulness nor the validity 
of any divorce a vinculo by whomsoever  
given to whatsoever parties4  #b4 ,it is
 ours to investigate the lie of the law 
of nature1 having due regard to the     
points marked1 antecedently to our      
search1 by the definition of infallible 
authority4 ,nothing can be done in the  
,church against the law of nature3 since

 therefore divorce a vinculo is         
sometimes recognized in the ,church1 it 
may be contended that marriage is not by
 nature absolutely indissoluble4 ,on the
 other hand1 it is a proposition        
censured by ,pius ,,ix4 in the          
,syllabus1 n4 #fg3 ,by the law of nature
 the bond of marriage is not            
indissoluble4 ,thus it appears we must  
teach that marriage is naturally        
indissoluble1 still not absolutely so1  
just as a safe is justly advertised as  
fire-proof1 when it will resist any     
conflagration that is likely to occur1  
though it would be consumed in a        
blast-furnace or in a volcano4 ,so      
marriage is indissoluble1 if it holds   
good for all ordinary contingencies1 for
 all difficulties that may be fairly    
reckoned with and regarded as not quite 
improbable1 for every posture of affairs
 that the contracting parties before    
their union need at all consider4 ,or1  
if the three cases of divorce actually  
allowed are to be traced to the         

dominative power of ,god 7,ethics1 c4   
vii41 n4 #b1 p4 #abi71 we may teach that
 marriage is by nature absolutely       
indissoluble1 and that divorce is as    
much against the law of nature as the   
killing of an innocent man1 excepting in
 the case of ,god's dominion being      
employed to quash the contract or the   
right to life4 ,but against this latter 
view is to be set the consideration1    
that ,god is manifestly averse to using 
,his dominative power to overturn       
natural ordinances4 ,he does not hand   
the innocent over to death except in the
 due course of physical nature3 why then
 should ,he ever put forth ,his power   
against the marriage-tie1 unless it be  
that nature herself in certain cases    
postulates its severance8 ,but if such  
is ever nature's petition1 the universal
 and unconditional permanence of the    
marriage-tie cannot be a requisition of 
nature1 nor is divorce absolutely       
excluded by natural law4  #c4 ,thomas   
,sanchez1 than whom there is no greater 

authority on this subject1 records his  
opinion that a certain inseparability is
 of the nature of marriage1 but that    
absolute indissolubility does not attach
 to marriage by the law of nature4 ,he  
adds3 if we consider marriage as it is  
an office of nature for the propagation 
of the race1 it is hard to render a     
reason why for the wife's barrenness the
 husband should not be allowed to put   
her away1 or marry another4 7,de        
,matrimonio1 ,i4 ii41 d4 #ac1 n4 #g47   
,we proceed to prove that a certain     
inseparability is of the nature of      
marriage1 so that marriage may truly be 
said to be indissoluble by the law of   
nature4 ,whether this natural           
indissolubility is absolute1 and holds  
for every conceivable contingency1 the  
student must judge by the proofs4  #d4  
,if a divorce a vinculo were a visible  
object on the matrimonial horizon1 the  
parties would be strongly encouraged    
thereby to form illicit connections1 in 
the expectation of shortly having any   

one of them they chose ratified and     
sanctified by marriage4 ,marriage would 
be entered upon lightly1 as a thing     
easily done and readily undone1 a state 
of things not very far in advance of    
promiscuity4 ,between married persons   
little wounds would fester1 trifling    
sores would be angered into ulcers3 any 
petty strife might lead to a fresh      
contract1 made in haste and repented of 
with speed3 then fond1 vain regrets for 
the former partnership4 ,affinity would 
be a loose bond of friendship between   
families2 and after divorce it would    
turn to enmity4 ,the fair but weaker sex
 would suffer the more by this as by all
 other matrimonial perversions3 for the 
man has not so much difficulty in       
lighting upon another love1 but the     
woman--she illustrates the ,greek       
proverb of a fallen estate3    ,mighty  
was ,miletus in the bygone days of yore4
  ,the divorced wife offers fewer       
attractions than the widow4  #e4 ,it is 
well to bear in mind that1 at least by  

the positive ordinance of ,god in the   
present order of ,his ,providence1 the  
marriage of baptized persons1 after     
cohabitation1 is absolutely             
indissoluble2 and no marriage can be    
dissolved except in the three cases     
specified4 7n4 #a47  ,readings4--,leo   
,,xiii41 ,encyclical on ,christian      
,marriage1 ,arcanum divina sapientia2   
,st4 ,thomas1 ,contra ,gent41 iii1 #abc4
    ,,chapter ,,vii4  ,,of ,,property4  
,,section ,i4--,of ,private ,property4  
#a4 ,property was called by the ,romans 
res familiaris1 the stuff and substance 
of the family4 ,property may be held by 
the individual for himself alone3 but   
any large accumulation of it is commonly
 held by the head of a family1 actual or
 potential1 for the family2 and he      
cherishes it for the sake of his family 
as much as1 or even more than1 for his  
own sake4 ,this is to be borne in mind1 
for many errors in theory and in        
practice spring from a large proprietor 
figuring as an individual1 and not as a 

sort of corporation sole in his capacity
 of paterfamilias4  #b4 ,we have seen   
7c4 v41 s4 i41 n4 #b1 p4 #bde7 how man  
acquires a right over external goods1 as
 it were setting the seal of his own    
personality upon them4 ,it appears upon 
further consideration1 that this right  
must extend beyond the mere making      
things your own for immediate use and   
consumption2 it must extend to the      
storing of things for future and        
perennial use4 ,otherwise we have       
,communism4 ,communism allows men to    
hold property collectively in a common  
stock1 and allows each member of the    
community to take for his peculiar own  
out of that stock whatever for the      
moment he needs2 but it will not permit 
him to appropriate private means of     
subsistence against any notable time to 
come4 ,communism is very good in a      
family1 which is an imperfect community1
 part of a higher community1 the ,state4
 ,it is very good in a monastery1 which 
is like a family3 again1 very good in   

the primitive ,church at ,jerusalem1    
which existed for the time on           
quasi-monastic lines3 very good even in 
a perfect community1 if such there be1  
of tropical savages1 for whom nature    
supplies all things1 bananas to eat and 
palm-leaves to wear1 without any human  
labour of production2 but very bad and  
quite unworkable everywhere else4 ,st4  
,thomas1 following ,aristotle1 puts it  
pithily and sufficiently3 ,private      
property is necessary to human life for 
three reasons3 first1 because every one 
is more careful to look after what      
belongs to himself alone than after what
 is common to all or to many1 since all 
men shun labour and leave to others what
 is matter of joint concern1 as happens 
where there are too many servants3 on   
another ground1 because human affairs   
are more orderly handled1 if on each    
individual there rests his own care of  
managing something1 whereas there would 
be nothing but confusion1 if every one  
without distinction were to have the    

disposal of any thing he chose to take  
in hand3 thirdly1 because by this means 
society is the rather kept at peace1    
every member being content with his own 
possession1 whence we see that among    
those who hold any thing in common and  
undivided ownership strifes not         
unfrequently arise4 7#b;a #b1 q4 #ff1   
art4 #b1 in corp47  #c4 ,if any         
revolutionist yet will have the         
hardihood to say with ,proudhon1        
,property is theft1 we shall ask him1   
,from whom8 ,he will answer of course1  
,from the community4 ,but that answer   
supposes the community to have          
flourished1 a wealthy corporation1      
before private property began4 ,needless
 to say that history knows nothing of   
such a corporation4 ,the saying1 that in
 the beginning all things were in       
common1 is not true in the sense that   
they were positively in common1 like the
 goods of a corporation1 which are      
collective property3 but simply that    
they were negatively in common1 that is1

 not property at all1 neither of        
corporation nor of individual1 but left 
in the middle open to all comers1 for   
each to convert into property by his    
occupation1 and by his labour to enhance
 and multiply4 ,this must be modified by
 the observation1 that the first        
occupants were frequently heads of      
families1 or of small clans1 and        
occupied and held for themselves and    
their people4  #d4 ,the saying1 that all
 things are in common by the law of     
nature1 must be received with still     
greater reserve4 ,really with as much   
truth it might be said that all men are 
unmarried1 or unclad1 or uneducated1 by 
the law of nature4 ,nature unaided by   
human volition provides neither         
property1 nor clothing1 nor marriage1   
nor education1 for man4 ,but nature     
bids1 urges and requires man to bestir  
his voluntary energies for the securing 
of all these things4 ,the law of nature 
does not prescribe this or that         
particular distribution of goods1 as    

neither does it join this man with that 
woman in marriage1 nor insist on plaids 
rather than coats1 nor set all boys to  
learn algebra1 nor fix a ritual for     
divine worship2 but it insists in the   
vague upon some worship1 some education1
 some clothing1 some marriage1 and some 
distribution of goods1 leaving the      
determination in each case to choice1   
custom1 and positive law1 human and     
divine4  #e4 ,all property that can ever
 be immediately serviceable for saving  
human life1 is held under this burden1  
that a perishing fellow-creature1 who   
cannot otherwise help himself in a case 
of extreme need 7c4 iv41 n4 #h1 p4      
#bdc71 may make such use of the property
 of another as shall suffice to rescue  
him from perishing off-hand4 ,if he     
draws largely on another for this       
purpose1 he ought to make compensation  
afterwards1 if he has the means4 ,this  
has been taken for a piece of the       
primeval rock of ,communism cropping up 
from underneath subsequent human        

formations1--quite a mistaken notion4   
,there is no ,communism whatever in the 
transaction4 ,up to the instant when the
 needy man seizes the article that he   
requires to save him from death1 that   
article still belongs to the owner from 
whom he takes it1 who is bound in       
charity to give it to the needy party1  
but not in justice4 ,extreme need does  
not confer ownership1 nor dispossess any
 previous owner3 but it confers the     
right of taking what is another's as    
though it belonged to no one2 and in the
 taking1 the thing passes into the      
ownership of the new occupant1 so that  
for the previous owner forcibly to      
resume it would be a violation of       
justice4 ,english law does not recognise
 this right--properly enough1 for with  
us it would be made a plea for much     
stealing--but refers the destitute to   
the parish4 ,the law is considerately   
worked by the magistrates4 ,a starving  
man1 who took a loaf off a baker's tray1
 has been known to be sentenced to a few

 hours' imprisonment with two good      
meals4  #f4 ,as ,st4 ,paul says 7#b     
,cor4 xii4 #ad71 parents ought to lay up
 for their children1 that they in whom  
their own existence is continued1 may   
not be left unprovided for at their     
decease4 ,the amount laid up necessary  
for this purpose1 ought not to be       
diverted from it4 ,thus much at least   
,natural ,law can tell us of the right  
of inheritance4 ,and concerning         
testamentary right these natural        
considerations are forthcoming1 that it 
adds to the desirability of property1   
that it secures deference to the wealthy
 in their old age1 and that the         
abolition of it might be frustrated by  
an apparatus of confidential donationes 
inter vivos1 that is to say1 making the 
property over in trust before death4    
,further enlargement of the natural     
basis of testamentary right may be      
effected by the judicious reader4       
,readings4--,ar41 ,pol41 ,,ii41 v41 nn4 
#a-af2 ,de ,lugo1 ,de just4 et jure1    

vi41 nn4 #b-f2 ib41 xxi11 nn4 #adc1     
#add2 ,locke1 ,of ,civil ,government1   
c4v42 id41 ,of ,government1 nn4 #hh1    
#hi4   ,,section ,,ii4--,of ,private    
,capital4   #a4 ,reverting to a former  
section 7c4 v41 s4 v41 nn4 #a-e1 p4     
#bee7 we lay down this distinction3     
,goods held for their use value are     
consumer's wealth3 goods held for their 
market value are producer's wealth1     
otherwise called capital4 ,capital then 
is that wealth which a man holds for the
 purpose of gaining further wealth by   
means of commercial exchange4 ,it is    
represented by the razors that are made1
 not to mow the manly beard1 or youthful
 moustache1 of the maker1 but1 as the   
,yorkshire vendor put it1 to sell4  #b4 
,those economists who would allow no    
private ownership of capital1 but would 
have all capital to be ,state property1 
are called ,socialists4 ,they stand     
distinctly apart from the ,communists1  
whom we have been labouring to refute in
 the last section4 ,the ,communist      

forbids all private property3 the       
,socialist allows private property1 but 
in the shape of consumer's wealth alone4
 ,the ,communist ignores the necessity  
of labour3 the ,socialist schemes to    
make all men work4 ,the ,communist      
contemplates a hand-to-mouth            
dispensation of all things3 the         
,socialist locks all things up1 wages in
 private coffers1 capital in government 
stores4 ,the ,communist is a madman3 the
 speculations of the ,socialist are     
sometimes deep4  #c4 ,to what are we to 
attribute the rise of ,socialism1 and   
its growth and propagation so fast and  
vigorous1 that1 its supporters say with 
some colour of evidence1 it is a theory 
destined within a measurable space of   
time to pass into actual practice1      
whether men will or no8 ,the cause is   
not far to seek4 ,there has lighted a   
plague upon all civilized countries1 an 
outbreak fearful and severe3 only by the
 great blessing of ,providence1 joined  
to drastic remedial measures on our     

part1 can we cope with the evil4 ,the   
plague is a cancerous formation of      
luxury growing out of a root of         
pauperism4 ,it is a disease old as the  
world1 but the increase of commerce and 
intercommunication has occasioned its   
bursting upon our generation in a       
peculiarly virulent form4 ,and what is  
more1 ours being a talking age1 the     
disease is made the staple of speeches  
infinite1 and the masses are clamouring 
for a remedy4 ,the remedy proposed is   
,socialism4  #d4 ,socialism in its      
essence is an attempt to transfer to the
 ,state1 governed by universal suffrage1
 the wealth1 and with the wealth the    
social duties1 of what have hitherto    
been the wealthy and governing classes4 
,it is not enough for the multitude that
 they are getting the political power   
out of the hands of the landlord and the
 capitalist3 they envy the one his broad
 acres1 and the other his investments4  
,all must be theirs1 sovereignty and    
wealth alike4 ,if wealth has its duties1

 the people collectively with cheerful  
acceptance will undertake those duties4 
,it shall be ours1 not only to be king1 
but to be employer1 patron1 landlord1   
educator4 ,we will assign to the workman
 his wages1 just and ample and          
perennial3 we will adjust production to 
demand3 we will be the restorers of     
agriculture3 we will monopolise the     
carrying-trade3 we alone will sell      
whatever shall be sold3 we will wash the
 workman in public baths3 his taste     
shall be elevated by our statues and    
pictures1 our theatres1 our music-halls1
 and our churches2 we will gratify his  
curiosity with our news-agencies1 feed  
his thought with our popular philosophy1
 educate his children as our own in our 
primary and secondary schools4          
,furthermore1 we will provide the long  
desiderated career open to talents4 ,the
 stupid boy1 though his father was our  
,prime ,minister1 shall be made a       
cabin-boy1 or a scavenger's assistant1  
an awful example to young gentlemen who 

fail to pass the ,government            
examinations3 while we will pick up1 not
 the gutter child1 for there shall be no
 more children in gutters1 but the son  
of the woman at the mill1 and testing   
him and assigning his career1 first by  
school examinations1 and then by his    
official performances1 we will make him 
in time ,poet ,laureate or ,president of
 the ,board of ,trade1 according to the 
bent of his genius4 ,the astonished     
workman turns round upon the exhibitors 
of this fairy vision3 ,and pray who are 
,you8 ,oh1 you1 we1 the people1 all of  
us together4 ,come put your shoulder to 
the wheel1 and up goes our enterprise4  
,or rather our first motion is          
downwards3 down with landlords and      
cotton-lords and lords of parliament1   
down with contractors and stock-jobbers 
and all who live on the interest of     
their money1 and then our honourable    
multitude will possess and administer   
and govern4  #e4 ,if angels are to hold 
the collective ownership of capital and 

the government of men in the ,socialist 
,commonwealth2 or if every citizen1     
retaining in his private capacity all   
the follies and vices that human flesh  
is heir to1 shall still be vested in    
angelic attributes1 whenever he sits as 
legislator or judge1 or acts on the     
executive of a ,socialist               
commission1--then this new ,commonwealth
 is likely to prove a blessed substitute
 for the rule of the higher classes1    
which in one way or another has hitherto
 obtained in civilized society4 ,but    
till angelic attributes descend on      
earth1 we shall not find a cure for the 
evils of cities and countries in simply 
doubling the functions of government1   
and placing all sovereign rights1 and   
all the most important of proprietory   
rights and duties1 in the hands of a    
numerical majority4  #f4 ,capital1 as we
 have seen1 is a collection of market or
 exchange values in view of further     
exchange4 ,if we call supply ,s and     
demand ,d1 market value is a social     

estimate of the fraction ,d_/,s4        
,another definition has been given3     
,market value is a social estimate of   
the amount of socially useful labour    
which a given article contains4 ,this   
second definition contains this much of 
truth in it1 that directly as the demand
 for an article1 and inversely as the   
supply of the same1 is the amount of    
labour which men find it worth their    
while to spend upon that article for    
commercial purposes4 ,otherwise the     
definition is unsatisfactory and        
involved1 and leads to endless          
discussion4 ,without entering into these
 discussions1 we will remark an         
ambiguity in the term on which they all 
roll1 the term labour1 which ambiguity  
is at the bottom of three fourths of the
 sophistries of popular ,socialism4  #g4
 ,there were two pillars put at the     
entrance of ,solomon's temple1 one on   
the right hand and the other on the     
left3 that which was on the right hand  
he called1 according to the ,septuagint1

 ,direction1 ,greek3 katorthosis1 and   
that on the left hand1 ,strength1       
,greek3 ischus4 7#b ,par4 iii4 #ag47    
,further we are told that ,solomon set  
seventy thousand men to carry burdens on
 their shoulders1 and eighty thousand to
 hew stones in the mountains1 and three 
thousand six hundred to be overseers of 
the work of the people4 7#b ,par4 ii4   
#ah47 ,the history is manifest4         
,strength and ,direction build the      
,temple3 ,strength1 or ,manual ,labour1 
represented by the hodmen and quarrymen1
 and the rest of the hands3 ,direction1 
or ,mental ,labour1 represented by the  
overseers4 ,yet not by them alone3      
surely we must count in as doers of     
mental labour the designer of the       
,temple1 or at least of its decorations1
 that most wise and skilful man1 my     
father ,hiram2 and still more ,king     
,solomon himself and ,david1 the two    
royal minds that originated and         
perfected the idea2 and ,david's        
generals1 ,joab and ,banaias1 who       

secured the peace that was necessary as 
a condition of the building2 and        
innumerable other men of place and power
 in the nation1 but for whose thought   
and prudence the strength of the workman
 would have been thrown away like a     
river poured out in the ,libyan desert4 
,from this example1 eked out with a     
little thought of his own1 the reader   
may estimate the wisdom and credit of   
those who tell factory hands that it is 
their labour which produces all the     
wealth of their employer1 and that1 in  
the day when every man shall receive his
 due1 the employer shall be made a      
workmen like themselves1 and his wealth 
shall go to the increase of their common
 wages4  #h4 ,certainly1 it will be     
said1 the employer should be paid for   
his mental labour1 but why at so        
enormously higher a rate than the manual
 labourers8 ,if we say1 because his     
labour is more valuable1 some           
,socialists would join issue on the     
score that labour is valuable according 

to the time that it takes1 and the      
employer works shorter hours than his   
men4 ,but this taking account of        
quantity alone in labour is an ignoring 
of the distinction which we have drawn  
of two qualities or orders of labour1   
mental and manual2 one more valuable    
than the other as being scarcer and in  
greater demand1 so that a short time of 
one may be set against a long time of   
another1 like a little gold against a   
heap of brass4 ,any man accustomed to   
both orders of labour must have         
observed1 that while he can work with   
his hands at almost any time when he is 
well1 the highest labour of his         
intellect can be done only at rare      
intervals1 and that in one happy hour he
 will sometimes accomplish more than in 
a day4 ,as the same man differs from    
himself at different times1 so does one 
man from another in the average value of
 his mental efforts3 this value is not  
measured by time4  #i4 ,abandoning this 
untenable position1 ,socialists still   

ask3 ,but is the difference in the value
 of their labour quite so vast as is the
 interval between the profits of the    
employer and the pay of his poor        
drudges8 ,honestly we cannot say that it
 is4 ,we are fain to fall back upon the 
consideration1 that the employer        
contributes1 not only his brains to the 
work1 but his capital4 ,ah1 that is just
 it1 is the ,socialists' quick reply3   
,we propose to relieve him of his       
capital1 and remunerate his brainwork   
only3 by that means we shall be able to 
pay sufficiently handsome wages for     
management1 according to the ratio of   
mental and manual labour1 and at the    
same time have a sufficiently large     
surplus over to raise the wages of his  
needy comrades1 those seventy thousand  
hodmen and eighty thousand quarrymen4   
#aj4 ,two reasons may be given for      
turning away from this seductive        
proposal1 and leaving capital 7not      
consumer's wealth merely7 in private    
hands1--and that not only in the hands  

of what we may call mentally productive 
capitalists1 men who oversee their own  
enterprises and manage their own        
workmen1 but even of unproductive       
capitalists1 men who have shares in and 
reap profits out of a business which    
they never meddle with4 ,the first      
reason is1 because this position of the 
productive1 and still more that of the  
unproductive capitalist1 is a prize for 
past industry expended upon production4 
,to understand this1 we must recollect  
once more that men work1 not as         
individuals1 but as heads of families4  
,every working man1 from the sailor to  
the shop-boy1 covets for himself two    
things1 pay and leisure4 ,the same two  
things do mentally productive labourers 
covet4 ,but they covet them1 not for    
themselves alone1 but for their         
families1 and more even for their       
families than for themselves4 ,they     
weary their brains1 planning and        
managing1 that in old age they may      
retire on a competence1 and hand down   

that same competence1 undiminished by   
their having lived on it1 to their      
children4 ,thus the young man works and 
produces1 that the old man1 and the     
child to come1 may have exemption from  
productive labour1 an abiding exemption1
 which cannot be unless he is allowed to
 live on the interest of accumulated    
capital4 ,these positions of affluence  
and rest--sinecures they are1 so far as 
production is concerned--are the prizes 
awarded to the best productive labour4  
,what they who do that labour aim at1 is
 not wages but exemption from toil3     
their wish is not so much to be wealthy 
and have leisure themselves as to found 
a family in wealth and leisure1--the one
 possible foundation of such a family   
being a store of private capital4       
,socialists of course will offer nobler 
prizes for the best productive          
labour1--honour1 and the satisfaction of
 having served the community1 a         
satisfaction which they would have men  
trained from childhood to relish above  

all other joys4 ,unfortunately1 this    
taste is yet unformed1 and the stimulus 
of these nobler prizes is still unproved
 by experience4 ,meanwhile men do work  
hard1 to the advantage of the community1
 for the ignobler prize of family       
affluence and ease4 ,socialists are     
going to take away the good boy's cake  
and give him a sunflower4  #aa4 ,the    
second reason for leaving capital in    
private1 even unproductive hands1 begins
 from the consideration1 that the       
highest end of man on earth is not      
production1 just as it is not           
consumption1 of the necessaries and     
luxuries of life4 ,aristotle bids us1 as
 much as possible in this life1 to play 
the immortal 7,greek3 athanatizein71 and
 do our utmost to live by the best      
element in our nature1 that is1 the     
intellect4 7,ethics1 c4 ii41 s4 ii41 n4 
#g1 p4 #i47 ,there is the intellectual  
life of the statesman in the practical  
order3 and in the speculative order1    
that of the poet1 of the artist1 of the 

scholar1 of the devout                  
contemplative--the outcome of learned   
and pious leisure1 and freedom from     
vulgar cares4 ,one man ascending into   
this higher and better region helps his 
neighbour to follow4 ,the neighbour can 
follow1 even though he be not free from 
productive cares1 but the leader ought  
to be free1 if he is to soar a high1    
sustained and powerful flight1 and guide
 others aloft4 ,these unproductive      
capitalist families then form what we   
may call1 by a figure which rhetoricians
 call oxymoron1 something which comes   
very near a bull1--we may call them an  
endowed lay-clergy3 they are told off   
from the rest of men to lead the way in 
doing1 and causing to be done1 the      
highest work of humanity4 ,the absence  
of the ,first ,class of ,workers would  
render the ,socialist ,utopia a very    
vulgar place4  #ab4 ,nature's ideal is3 
,to all1 plenty3 to some1               
superabundance4 ,the superabundance of  
some is not necessarily incompatible    

with all having plenty3 nay it is a     
positive furtherance of that and of     
still higher ends1 as has been shown4   
,but it is a position of advantage that 
may be abused1 and is abused most       
wantonly3 hence there comes to be       
question of ,socialism4  #ac4 ,the      
,socialism above described is of the old
 sort1 called ,collectivism4 ,a new     
variety has appeared1 ,syndicalism4     
,syndicalism is opposed to              
nationalisation and centralisation of   
capital and power3 it would convert     
workers into owners in each separate    
department of labour1--colliers to own  
the coal1 railwaymen the lines and      
rolling-stock1 agricultural labourers   
the land1 and so on4 ,collectivism might
 conceivably be put in practice1 given a
 sufficiently high standard of social   
virtue1 a quality which ,socialists are 
not in the way to get4 ,as for          
,syndicalism in practice1 ,i leave that 
to the reader to imagine4 ,syndicalism  
stigmatises ,collectivism as a gross    

tyranny4 ,thus divided into two         
irreconcilable factions1 the ,socialists
 are not a happy family4                
,readings4--,the ,creed of ,socialism1  
by ,joseph ,rickaby 7,anti-socialist    
,union1 ,victoria ,street1              
,westminster74   ,,section ,,iii4--,of  
,landed ,property4   #a4 ,land1 like    
cotton1 timber1 or iron-ore1 is a raw   
material wrought up by man4 ,land1 like 
any other thing1 becomes an article of  
property originally by occupation1 and  
its value is enhanced by labour4 ,there 
is no more reason why all land1 or the  
rents of all land1 should belong to the 
,state1 than why all house property1 or 
all house rents1 should belong to the   
,state4 ,if the people need land to live
 on1 so do they need houses to live in1 
coals to burn1 and shoes to wear4       
,socialism1 once admitted1 cannot be    
confined to land alone4 ,it will        
exterminate the lord manufacturer as    
remorselessly as it exterminates the    
landlord4  #b4 ,every man1 it is        

contended1 has a right to live on the   
fruits of the soil4 ,the proposition is 
needlessly long4 ,it should be put      
simply3 ,every man has a right to live4 
,for as to living on the fruits of the  
soil1 there is absolutely nothing else  
that man can live on4 ,all human        
nutriment whatever is derived from what 
geologists call pulverised rocks1 that  
is1 soil4 ,but if it is meant that every
 man has a right to live on the fruits  
of some soil or land of his own1 where  
is the proof8 ,so long as the fruits of 
the earth do not fail to reach a man's  
mouth1 what matters it whose earth it is
 that grows them8 ,some of the richest  
as well as the poorest members of the   
community are landless men4 ,confiscate 
rent to take the place of taxation1 and 
some of the richest men in the community
 will go tax-free4  #c4 ,the land on    
which a nation is settled1 we are told1 
belongs to that nation4 ,yes1 it belongs
 to them as individuals1 yet not so that
 a foreigner is excluded by natural law 

from owning any portion of it4 ,but the 
government have over the land1 and over 
all the property upon it1 what is called
 altum dominium1 or eminent domain1     
which is a power of commanding private  
proprietors to part with their property 
for public purposes1 with compensation1 
whenever compensation is possible4 ,thus
 when a railway gets its ,act of        
,parliament1 the owners through whose   
estates the projected line is to run are
 compelled by an exercise of eminent    
domain to sell to the company4 ,by the  
same power the government in a besieged 
city1 when hard pressed1 might seize    
upon all the stores of food and fuel    
within the walls1 even without          
compensation4 ,altum dominium1 which is 
not dominion properly so called1 is     
sufficient for all national emergencies1
 without making the ,state the universal
 landlord4  #d4 ,it seems impossible to 
imagine an emergency that would justify 
any government in nationalizing all the 
land at once without compensation4 ,none

 but a wealthy government could afford  
the compensation requisite2 and the     
emergency would have to be severe       
indeed1 to make it wise of them to incur
 such an expense4 ,we can imagine a     
government in a newly settled country   
starting on the understanding that all  
land was ,state land1 and that all      
ground rents were to be paid into the   
,state exchequer4 ,this would amount to 
taking rents for taxes2 and instead of a
 landlord in every district we should   
have a tax-gatherer4 ,probably further  
taxation would be necessary3 in ,england
 at any rate the annual expenditure     
exceeds the rental by some twenty       
millions4 ,government1 we may suppose1  
would grant leases of land3 when the    
lease fell in1 the rent would be raised 
for unearned increment1 and lowered for 
decrement1 but not raised for           
improvements effected by the tenant     
himself4 ,in that case the tenant in two
 or three generations might be a        
quasi-proprietor1 his rent being        

ridiculously small in comparison with   
the annual value of the holding4 ,the   
improvements might be the improvements  
of his grandfather1 or even those of a  
complete stranger1 from whom he had     
bought the tenancy4 ,anyhow they might  
be the better portion of the value of   
the land1 and would not be government   
property4 ,or would the government      
insist on purchasing the improvements1  
and look out for a new tenant paying a  
higher rent8 ,lastly1 would the         
government themselves make such         
improvements as many an ,english        
landlord makes now1 for love of the     
country about him and love of his own   
people8  #e4 ,it would be most difficult
 to prevent private property arising in 
land1 even if it all did belong to the  
,state to start with4 ,suppose #aj paid 
for a piece of land for a year1 and     
suppose the occupier said1 ,let me have 
it for ten years1 and ,i will give you  
#bj a year1 ought not the ,state to     
accept the offer8 ,then suppose he said1

 ,give it me for ever and ,i will pay   
#cj a year8 ,again1 ought not the ,state
 to agree8 ,he would then be that       
hateful creature a landowner1 subject to
 a rent-charge4 ,now suppose the ,state 
wanted to do work and had to borrow     
money1 and suppose he offered to give   
for the redemption of the rent-charge a 
sum which could not be borrowed for less
 than #dj a year4 ,again1 ought not the 
,state to accept his offer8 ,yet in that
 case he would become a hopelessly      
unmitigated landlord4 7,lord ,bramwell47
  #f4 ,when there is an alarm of fire in
 a theatre1 any one who could convince  
the audience that there was time enough 
for them all to file out in slow        
succession by the door1 would avert the 
greatest danger that threatened them1   
that of being crushed and trampled on by
 one another4 ,mankind in pursuit of    
wealth are like a crowd rushing         
excitedly through a narrow place of     
exit4 ,whatever man1 or body of men1 or 
institution1 or doctrine1 will moderate 

this love of money 7,greek3             
philargyria71 which ,st4 ,paul 7#a ,tim4
 vi4 #aj7 declares to be the root of all
 evils1 the same is a benefactor to the 
human race1 preventing that cruel       
oppression of the poor1 which comes of  
ruthlessly buying land1 labour1         
everything1 in the cheapest market and  
selling it in the dearest4 ,the landlord
 who always evicts1 if he is not paid   
the highest competition rent1--the      
employer who brings in from afar the    
hands that will work at the lowest      
starvation wage1--these vultures are    
worse enemies to society than           
,socialists1 for they occasion          
,socialism4  #g4 ,socialism1 whether in 
land alone or in all capital1 is an     
endeavour to accomplish by ,state       
control the results that ought to be    
achieved by private virtue4 ,a landlord1
 or an employer1 who remembers his      
position as being what ,homer calls a   
king of men1 ,greek3 anax               
andron1--remembers too1 with ,aristotle1

 that a prince exists for his           
people1--and who1 besides a quasi-royal 
care for the body of tenantry or workmen
 over whom he presides1 has something   
too of a fatherly interest in every one 
of them1 their persons and their        
families1 holding it to be a personal   
tie with himself1 to be in his          
employment or settled upon his          
land1--such a man and the multitude of  
such men form the best bulwark a country
 can possess against ,socialism4 ,such a
 landlord or employer is a praesens     
numen to his workpeople or tenants4 ,in 
the absence of this protective1 personal
 influence of the rich over the poor2 in
 the disorganization of society         
consequent upon the misconduct of its   
subordinate chiefs2 in the stand-off    
attitude of the higher classes1 and the 
defiant independence of the lower2 and  
in the greed of material goods that is  
common to them both1 there lurks a      
danger of unknown magnitude to our      
modern civilization4  ,reading4--,leo   

,,xiii4 on the ,condition of ,labour1   
,encyclical of #aeth ,may1 #ahia4       
,footnote #bj  ,footnote #bj3 ,the right
 of property attaches to things produced
 by labour1 but cannot attach to things 
created by ,god4 ,so ,henry ,george1    
,condition of ,labour1 pp4 #c1 #d4 ,how 
then do we read in ,progress and        
,poverty1 bk4 #g4 ch4 #a3 ,the pen with 
which ,i am writing is justly mine1 and 
that1 in the last resort1 on account of 
the rights of those who dug the material
 from the ground and converted it into a
 pen8 ,was not that material1 iron-ore1 
created by ,god1 equally with any other 
portion of the earth's crust that we may
 please to call land8    ,,chapter      
,,viii4  ,,of ,,the ,,state4  ,,section 
,i4--,of the ,monstrosities called      
,leviathan and ,social ,contract4   #a4 
,thomas ,hobbes1 than whom never was    
greater genius for riding an idea1 right
 or wrong1 to the full length that it   
will go1 was born in #aehh3 and         
notwithstanding his twelve pipes of     

tobacco daily1 his vigorous constitution
 endured to his ninety-second year4 ,the
 first half of his life fell in with the
 age of the greatest predominance of    
,calvinism4 ,in religion he was scarcely
 a ,calvinist1 indeed he laboured under 
a suspicion of atheism3 but his         
philosophy is accurately cast in the    
mould of the grim theology of ,geneva4  
,we may call it the philosophy of       
,calvinism4 ,it has for its central     
tenet1 that human nature either was from
 the first1 or is become1 bad1          
desperately wicked1 depraved1 corrupt1  
and utterly abominable1 so that whatever
 is natural to man1 in so far forth as  
it is natural1 is simply evil4 ,the     
remedy for our evil nature ,hobbes finds
 in no imputed merits of a ,redeemer1 no
 irresistible victorious grace1 but in  
the masterful coercion of a despotic    
civil power4 ,but1 lest any one should  
suspect that there was at least this    
good in man1 a propensity to civil      
society and obedience to the rulers of  

cities1 ,hobbes insists that man is by  
nature wholly averse to society with his
 kind3 that the type of the race is an  
,ishmael1 a wild man1 his hand against  
all men1 and all men's hands against    
him3 in fact that the state of nature is
 a state of war all round4 ,he writes   
7,leviathan1 c4 xiii473 ,men have no    
pleasure1 but on the contrary a great   
deal of grief1 in keeping company where 
there is no power able to overawe them  
all4 ,for every man looketh that his    
companion should value him at the same  
rate he sets on himself2 and upon all   
signs of contempt or undervaluing       
naturally endeavours1 as far as he dares
 7which among them that have no common  
power to keep them quiet1 is far enough 
to make them destroy each other71 to    
extort a greater value from his         
contemners by damage1 and from others by
 the example4444 ,hereby it is manifest1
 that during the time that men live     
without a power to keep them all in awe1
 they are in that condition which is    

called war1 and such a war as is of     
every man against every man4444 ,in such
 condition there is no place for        
industry1 because the fruit thereof is  
uncertain1 and consequently no culture  
of the earth3 no navigation1 nor use of 
the commodities that may be imported by 
sea3 no commodious building3 no         
instruments of moving and removing such 
things as require much force3 no        
knowledge of the face of the earth3 no  
account of time3 no arts1 no letters1 no
 society2 and which is worst of all1    
continual fear and danger of violent    
death2 and the life of man1 solitary1   
poor1 nasty1 brutish1 and short4444 ,to 
this war of every man against every man 
this also is consequent1 that nothing   
can be unjust4 ,the notions of right and
 wrong1 justice and injustice1 have     
there no place4 ,where there is no      
common power there is no law3 where no  
law1 no injustice4444 ,it is consequent 
also to the same condition1 that there  
be no propriety1 no dominion1 no mine   

and thine distinct1 but only that to be 
every man's that he can get1 and for so 
long as he can keep it4  #b4 ,such is   
what ,hobbes is pleased to call the     
natural condition of mankind1 a         
condition which man would have every    
natural reason for getting out of with  
all speed1 were he ever so unhappy as to
 fall into it4 ,it is true that1 apart  
from civil government1 violence would   
reign on earth4 ,but it is not true that
 to live apart from civil government is 
the natural condition of mankind4 ,it is
 not true that the only motive which    
draws men into civil society is the fear
 of violence1 as though there were no   
such facts and exigencies of human      
nature as sympathy1 friendship1         
intellectual curiosity1 art1 religion4  
,it is not true that the one reason for 
the existence of the civil power        
consists in this1 that without the      
restraining hand of the magistrate men  
would bite and devour one another4      
,lastly1 it is not true that all rights1

 notably rights of property1 are the    
creation of the ,state4 ,a man is a man 
first and a citizen afterwards4 ,as a   
man1 he has certain rights actual and   
potential 7c4 v41 s4 i41 p4 #bdd73 these
 the ,state exists1 not to create1 for  
they are prior to it in the order of    
nature1 but to determine them1 where    
indeterminate1 to sanction and to       
safeguard them4  ,natural rights go     
before legal rights1 and are presupposed
 to them1 as the law of nature before   
that law which is civil and positive4   
,it is an idol of the tribe of lawyers  
to ignore all law but that upon which   
their own professional action takes its 
stand4  #c4 ,in considering man as he   
must have come from the hands of nature1
 writes ,jean ,jacques ,rousseau1 ,i    
behold an animal less strong than some1 
less active than others1 but upon the   
whole in organism having the advantage  
of them all4 ,i behold him appeasing his
 hunger under an oak1 slaking his thirst
 in the first brook1 finding a bed at   

the foot of the same tree that furnished
 his repast1 and there you have all his 
cravings satisfied4 7,discours sur      
l'origine de l'ingalit 47 ,this noble   
savage--quite a contrast to ,hobbes's   
ruffian primeval1 nasty1 brutish1 and   
short-lived--observes and imitates the  
industry1 and gradually raises himself  
to the instinct1 of the beasts among    
whom he lives4 ,his constitution is     
robust1 and almost inaccessible to      
malady4 ,he attains to old age1 free    
from gout and rheumatism4 ,he surpasses 
the fiercest wild beasts in address as  
much as they surpass him in strength1   
and so arrives to dwell among them      
without fear4 ,yet withal he is         
distinguished from brutes by freewill   
and perfectibility1 qualities which     
gradually draw him out of his primeval  
condition of tranquil innocence1 lead   
him through a long course of splendours 
and errors1 of vices and virtues1 and   
end by making him a tyrant at once over 
nature and over himself4  #d4           

,rousseau's life1 #agae-aggh1 was a     
continual protest against the formalism1
 affectation1 pedantry and despotism of 
the age of the ,bourbons4 ,his ideal of 
man was the unconventional1             
unconstrained1 solitary1 but harmless   
and easy-going savage4 ,hobbes was the  
growth of a sterner and more serious    
age4 ,the only reality to him in heaven 
and on earth was force3 his one idea in 
philosophy was coercion4 ,human nature  
to him was an embodiment of brute       
violence ever in need of violent        
restraint4 ,rousseau1 an optimist1 saw  
nothing but good in man's original      
nature3 to the pessimist mind of ,hobbes
 all was evil there4 ,neither of them   
saw any natural adaptation to social    
life in the human constitution4 ,to live
 in society was1 in both their views1 an
 artificial arrangement1 an arbitrary   
convention4 ,but ,hobbes found in the   
intolerable evils of a state of nature  
an excellent reason why men should quit 
it for the unnatural condition of       

citizens4 ,rousseau found no reason     
except1 as he says1 quelque funeste     
hasard4 ,the problem for ,hobbes stood  
thus3 how men1 entering society1 might  
be cribbed1 cabined1 and confined to the
 utmost in order to keep down their     
native badness4 ,rousseau's concern was1
 how one might so become a citizen as   
yet to retain to the full the delightful
 liberty of a tropical savage4 ,hobbes's
 solution is the ,leviathan1 ,rousseau's
 the ,social ,contract4 ,the prize1 we  
think1 rests with the ,englishman3 but  
the reader shall judge4  #e4 ,and first 
of the ,social ,contract4 ,rousseau     
proposes to find a form of association  
which shall defend and protect with all 
the strength of the community the person
 and the goods of each associate1 and   
whereby each one1 uniting himself to    
all1 may nevertheless obey none but     
himself and remain as free as before4   
7,contrat ,social1 i4 #f47 ,this        
proposal is hopeless1 it is a           
contradiction in terms4 ,no man can     

contract and remain as free as before1  
but he binds himself either under a     
wider obligation to do or abstain1 where
 he was not bound before1 or under a    
stronger obligation where he was bound  
already4 ,nevertheless ,rousseau finds a
 means of accomplishing the impossible  
and the self-contradictory4 ,each of us 
puts into a common stock his person and 
all his power under the supreme         
direction of the general will2 and we   
receive in our turn the offering of the 
rest1 each member as an inseparable part
 of the whole4 ,instantly1 instead of   
the private person of each contracting  
party1 this act of association produces 
a moral and collective body1 composed of
 as many members as the assembly has    
voices1 which body receives by this same
 act its unity1 its common ,ego1 its    
life and its will4 7ib47 ,this awful    
signing away of all your rights1 so that
 your very personality is merged in that
 of the community--a self-renunciation  
going far beyond that of profession in  

any religious order--ought certainly1 as
 ,rousseau says1 to be the most         
voluntary act in the world2 and he adds 
the characteristic reason3 every man    
being born free and master of himself1  
none can1 under any pretence whatsoever1
 subject him without his own consent4   
7,contrat ,social1 iv4 #b47 ,then you   
ask3 ,when have ,i made this large      
contract by the most voluntary act in   
the world8 ,rousseau replies3 ,when the 
,state is instituted1 consent is in     
residing4 7ib47 ,but1 you reply1 my     
residence is anything but the most      
voluntary act in the world3 it would be 
awkward for me to emigrate2 and if ,i   
did emigrate1 it would only be to some  
other ,state3 ,i cannot possibly camp   
out and be independent in the woods1 nor
 appease my hunger under an oak4 ,to    
this plea ,rousseau quite gives in1     
remarking that family1 goods1 the want  
of an asylum1 necessity1 violence1 may  
keep an inhabitant in the country in    
spite of himself2 and in that case his  

mere sojourn no longer supposes his     
consent to the contract4 7ib47 ,then    
none of us have made the contract1 for  
we have never had the option of living  
anywhere except in some ,state4  #f4    
,hobbes1 after laying down the necessity
 of men combining for protection against
 mutual injustice1 observes that a mere 
promise or agreement not to injure any  
one will not suffice3 for the agreement 
of men is by covenant only1 which is    
artificial2 and therefore no wonder if  
there be something else required besides
 covenant to make their agreement       
constant and lasting1 which is a common 
power to keep them in awe and to direct 
their actions to the common benefit4 ,he
 continues3 ,the only way to erect such 
a common power 444 is to confer all     
their power and strength upon one man or
 upon one assembly of men1 that may     
reduce all their wills by plurality of  
voices unto one will3 which is as much  
as to say1 to appoint one man or        
assembly of men to bear their person2   

and every one to own1 and to acknowledge
 himself to be the author of1 whatsoever
 he that so beareth their person shall  
act or cause to be acted in those things
 which concern the common peace and     
safety2 and therein to submit their     
wills every one to his will1 and their  
judgments to his judgment4 ,this is more
 than consent or concord1--it is a real 
unity of them all in one and the same   
person1 made by covenant of every man   
with every man1 in such manner as if    
every man should say to every man3 ,i   
authorise1 and give up my right of      
governing myself to this man or to this 
assembly of men1 on this condition1 that
 thou give up thy right to him1 and     
authorise all his actions in like       
manner4 ,this done1 the multitude so    
united in one person is called a        
commonwealth1 in ,latin civitas4 ,this  
is the generation of that great         
,leviathan1 or rather1 to speak more    
reverently1 of that mortal god1 to whom 
we owe under the immortal ,god our peace

 and defence4 7,leviathan1 c4 xvii47    
,this idea of all the rights and        
personalities of the individuals who    
contract to live socially being fused   
and welded together into the one        
resultant personality and power of the  
,state1 has evidently been borrowed by  
,rousseau from ,hobbes4 ,we shall deal  
with the idea presently4 ,meanwhile     
several points claim our notice4  #g4   
,the hideous piece of cynicism whereby  
,rousseau 7,contrat ,social1 iv4 #b71   
after promising you that1 if you join   
his commonwealth1 you shall obey none   
but yourself1 then goes on to tell you  
that you obey yourself in obeying the   
will of the majority1 even when it puts 
you in irons or leads you to            
death--because as a citizen you have    
once for all renounced your own will1   
and can only wish what the majority     
wishes1--has its root in the position of
 ,hobbes1 that every subject is author  
of every act the sovereign doth4        
7,leviathan1 c4 xxi47  #h4 ,a real and  

important difference between the        
,leviathan and the ,social ,contract1 is
 that ,hobbes 7c4 xix47 allows various  
distributions of sovereign power1 but   
prefers monarchy3 ,rousseau 7l4 ii41 c4 
i47 will have it that sovereignty is    
vested inalienably in the people3 of    
which doctrine more to follow4  #i4 ,men
 are by nature equal1 say ,rousseau and 
,hobbes and many more respectable       
authors4 ,yes1 in their specific nature1
 that is1 they are all equally men4     
,similarly you have it that all         
triangles are equal1 if that is a       
proposition of any value4 ,but men as   
individuals are not all equal4 ,one is  
stronger in body1 another more able in  
mind3 one predisposed to virtue1 another
 to vice3 one born in affluence and     
honour1 another in squalor4 ,not men in 
the abstract1 but living men1 start at  
different points of vantage1 and the    
distance between them widens as they run
 the race of life4 ,we may lay it down  
as an axiom1 in diametric opposition to 

,rousseau1 that inequalities are        
natural1 equalities artificial4  #aj4   
,man is born free3 so opens the first   
chapter of the ,contrat ,social4 ,if    
free of all duties1 then void of all    
rights 7c4 v41 s4 i41 nn4 #e1 #g1 pp4   
#bdf1 #bdg73 let him then be promptly   
knocked on the head as a sacrifice to   
,malthas2 and with the misformed        
children born in ,plato's ,republic1    
they will bury him in a secret and      
unseen spot1 as is befitting4  #aa4     
,hobbes and ,rousseau go upon this      
maxim1 which has overrun the modern     
world1 that no man can be bound to      
obedience to another without his own    
consent4 ,the maxim would be an         
excellent one1 were men framed like the 
categories of ,aristotle--substance1    
quantity1 quality1 relation1 and the    
rest--each peering out of his own       
pigeon-hole1 an independent1            
self-sufficient entity4 ,but men are    
dependent1 naturally dependent whether  
they will or no1 every human being on   

certain definite others1--the child on  
the parent1 the citizen on the ,state   
whose protection he enjoys1 and all     
alike on ,god4 ,these natural           
dependences carry with them natural     
uncovenanted obediences1--to parents1   
filial duty--to country1 loyalty--to    
,god1 piety3 all which are embraced in  
the ,latin term pietas4 7,see ,st4      
,thomas1 #b;a #b1 q4 #aja1 art4 #a1 in  
corp47 ,the fatal maxim before us is the
 annihilation of pietas4 ,in lieu of    
loyal submission we get a contract1 a   
transaction of reasoned commercial      
selfishness between equal and equal4    
,this perverse substitution has called  
forth ,leo ,,xiii4's remark on the men  
of our time1 ,nothing comes so amiss to 
them as subjection and obedience1 ,nihil
 tam moleste ferunt quam subesse et     
parere4 7,encyclical on ,christian      
,marriage47  #ab4 ,the common           
extravagance of the ,leviathan and the  
,social ,contract is the suppression of 
the individual1 with his rights and his 

very personality1 which is all blended  
in the ,state4 7,see ,rousseau's words  
above quoted1 n4 #e1 and those of       
,hobbes1 n4 #f47 ,the reservations in   
favour of the individual made by        
,hobbes1 ,leviathan1 c4 xxi41 and by    
,rousseau1 ,contrat ,social1 l4 ii41 c4 
iv41 are either trifles or              
self-contradictions4 ,but it is not in  
man's power by any contract thus to     
change his nature1 so as to become from 
autocentric heterocentric 7c4 ii41 s4   
i41 n4 #b1 p4 #bjc2 c4 v41 s4 i41 n4 #a1
 p4 #bdd71 from a person a thing1 from a
 man a chattel1 void of rights and      
consequently of duties1 and bound to    
serve this ,collective ,monster1 this   
,aggregated ,idol1 with the absolute    
devotedness that is due to ,god alone4  
,the worship of the new ,moloch goes    
well with the dark misanthropism of     
,hobbes3 but in ,rousseau1 the believer 
in the perfect goodness of unrestrained 
humanity1 it is about the most glaring  
of his many inconsistencies4 ,it is of  

course eagerly taken up by the          
,socialists1 as carrying all their      
conclusions4 ,it is the political aspect
 of ,socialism4  ,reading4--,burke1     
,warren ,hastings1 ,fourth ,day1 the    
passage beginning1 ,he have arbitrary   
power6   ,,section ,,ii4--,of the theory
 that ,civil ,power is an aggregate     
formed by subscription of the powers of 
individuals4   #a4 ,the ,greeks had a   
name ,greek3 eranos1 which meant a feast
 where the viands were supplied by each 
guest contributing in kind4 ,if1 in a   
party of four1 one man brought a ham1   
another a rabbit1 a third a dish of     
truffles1 and a fourth a salmon1 no one 
would expect that1 when the cover was   
raised1 there should appear a           
pigeon-pie4 ,that would not be in the   
nature of an ,greek3 eranos4 ,now not   
only ,hobbes and ,rousseau1 but ,locke  
and a great multitude of modern         
,englishmen with him1 hold that the     
power of the ,state is an aggregate1 the
 algebraic sum of the powers whereof the

 component members would have stood     
possessed1 had they lived in what is    
called1 by a misleading phrase1 the     
state of nature1 that is1 the condition 
of men not subject to civil authority4  
,these powers1--either1 as ,hobbes and  
,rousseau virtually say1 all of them1   
or1 as ,locke and the common opinion has
 it1 only some of them1 --men are       
supposed to resign as they enter into   
the ,state4 ,if therefore there appears 
in the ,city1 ,nation1 ,state1 or       
,commonwealth1 a certain new and        
peculiar power1 which belongs to no     
individual in the state of nature1 or1  
as ,i prefer to call it1 the extra-civil
 state1 then what we may designate as   
the ,aggregation ,theory breaks down1   
and another origin must be sought of    
civil principality4 ,but there is such a
 power in the ,state1 new and peculiar1 
and not found in any of the component   
individuals3 it is the power and        
authority to punish on civil grounds4   
,it is the right of the rods and axes1  

that were borne before the ,roman       
magistrate4 ,it is1 in its most crucial 
form1 the right to punish with death4   
#b4 ,we are not here concerned with     
proving the existence of this right4 ,it
 is generally admitted3 we assume it    
accordingly1 and shall prove it later   
on4 ,nor are we concerned with domestic 
punishment1 inflicted by the head of a  
family within his own household1 for the
 good of that household1 stopping short 
of any irreparable harm to the sufferer4
 7,st4 ,thos41 #b;a #b1 q4 #fe1 art4 #b1
 ad4 #b47 ,leaving this aside1 we say1  
and have proved already1 that one       
private individual has no right to      
punish another1 neither medicinally for 
the amendment of the delinquent1 nor by 
way of deterrent for the good of the    
community1 nor in the way of retribution
 for his own satisfaction4 ,he has the  
right of self-defence1 but not of       
punishment3 the two things are quite    
different4 ,he may also exact           
restitution1 where restitution is due3  

but that again is not punishing4 ,if he 
is in the extra-civil state1 he may use 
force1 where prudence allows it1 to     
recover what he has lost4 ,this right of
 private war really is surrendered by   
the individual1 when the ,state is      
established3 but war and punishment are 
two totally different ideas4 ,subjects  
are punished3 war is levied on          
independent powers4 7,ethics1 c4 ix41 s4
 iii41 nn4 #d-f1 pp4 #aga-agd2 ,natural 
,law1 c4 ii41 s4 ii41 n4 #f1 p4 #bab47  
#c4 ,opposite is the opinion of ,locke1 
who writes3  ,the execution of the law  
of nature is in that state of nature put
 into every man's hands1 whereby every  
one has a right to punish the           
transgressors of that law to such a     
degree as may hinder its violation3 for 
the law of nature would1 as all other   
laws that concern men in this world1 be 
in vain1 if there were nobody that in   
the state of nature had a power to      
execute that law4 ,we observe that the  
punishment of offenders against the law 

of nature1 as such1 belongs to the      
,legislator1 who is ,god alone4         
,certainly it is well1 nay necessary1   
that there should be human law to bear  
out the law of nature3 but human law is 
the creation of human society in its    
perfection1 which is the ,state4 ,man is
 punished by man for breaking the laws  
of man1 not--except remotely--for       
breaking the laws of ,god4 ,nor would it
 be any inconvenience1 if the law of    
nature were in vain in a state wherein  
nature never intended men to live1      
wherein no multitude of men ever for any
 notable time have lived1 a state which 
is neither actual fact nor ideal        
perfection1 but a mere property of the  
philosophic stage1 a broken article1 an 
outworn speculation4 ,such is the state 
of nature1 as identified with the       
extra-civil state by ,hobbes1 ,locke1   
and ,rousseau4   ,,section ,,iii4--,of  
the true state of ,nature1 which is the 
state of civil society2 and consequently
 of the ,divine origin of ,power4   #a4 

,the ,state is deemed by ,aristotle     
7,politics1 ,,iii41 ix41 #ad73 the union
 of septs and villages in a complete and
 self-sufficient life4 ,the first and   
most elementary community is the family1
 ,greek3 oikia4 ,a knot of families     
associating together1 claiming          
blood-relationship and descent1 real or 
fictitious1 from a common ancestor1     
whose name they bear1 constitute a      
,greek3 genos1 called in ,ireland a     
sept1 in ,scotland a clan1 nameless in  
,england4 ,when the sept come to cluster
 their habitations1 or encampments1 in  
one or more spots1 and to admit         
strangers in blood to dwell among them1 
these hamlets1 or camps1 gradually reach
 the magnitude of a village4 ,when a    
number of these villages1 belonging to  
different septs1 come to be contiguous  
to one another1 this mere juxtaposition 
does not make of them a ,state4 ,nor    
does interchange of commodities1 nor    
intermarriage1 nor an offensive and     
defensive alliance3 these are the mutual

 relations of a confederacy1 ,greek3    
xymmaxia1 but all these and more are    
needed for a ,state1 ,greek3 polis4 ,to 
be a ,state1 it is requisite that these 
septs and villages should agree to      
regulate the conduct of their individual
 members by a common standard of social 
virtue1 sufficient for their well-being 
as one community4 ,this common standard 
is fixed by common consent1 or by the   
decision of some power competent to act 
for all and to punish delinquents4 ,the 
name of this common standard is law4    
7,ethics1 c4 vii41 n4 #a1 p4 #abf47 ,the
 community thus formed leads a life     
complete and self-sufficient1 not being 
a member of another1 but a body by      
itself1--not part of any ulterior       
community1 but complete in the fulness  
of social good and social authority4    
#b4 ,among the ancient ,greeks and      
,italians1 and to some extent also in   
medival ,italy and ,germany1 the city or
 municipality1 with the small country   
district attached1 was the ,state4 ,with

 us the nation is the ,state2 and       
accordingly we say my country where the 
,greek said my city4 ,bearing this      
difference in mind1 as also the fact    
that the sept is not known amongst us   
except to antiquarians1 and likewise    
that the village with us coincides with 
the parish1 and that there are town as  
well as country parishes1--upon these   
modern data we may amend ,aristotle's   
definition thus3 ,the ,state is the     
union of parishes and municipalities in 
a perfect and self-sufficient community4
  #c4 ,the ,city ,state is well         
illustrated in the following narrative  
of ,thucydides 7ii41 #ae73  ,in the time
 of ,cecrops and the early kings as far 
as ,theseus1 ,attica was always divided 
among several independent cities1 with  
their own town-halls and magistrates2   
and when there was no alarm of an enemy1
 the inhabitants did not resort for     
common deliberation to the ,king1 but   
severally managed their own affairs and 
took their own counsel1 and some of them

 even went to war4 ,but when ,theseus   
came to the throne1 he abolished the    
council-chambers and magistracies of the
 other cities1 and centralised all the  
people in what is now the city of       
,athens1 where he appointed their one   
council-chamber and town-hall2 and while
 they continued to occupy their own     
properties as before1 he forced them to 
recognise this as their one city and    
,state4 ,attica before ,theseus was a   
confederacy1 ,greek3 xymmaxia1 not a    
,state1 ,greek3 polis4  #d4 ,a citizen  
is defined3 one who has access to a     
share in deliberative and judicial      
functions4 7,ar41 ,pol4 ,,iii41 i41     
#ab47 ,it is not necessary that he      
actually should share these functions1  
but the way to them should lie open to  
him3 he should be a person qualified to 
share in them4 ,there are various       
degrees of citizenship4 ,under a        
parliamentary government1 we distinguish
 the member of parliament1 the elector1 
and him who will be an elector as soon  

as he gets a house of his own2 and      
again1 the judge1 and him who is liable 
to serve on juries4 ,in an absolute     
monarchy there are no citizens1 only    
subjects4  #e4 ,the distribution of     
power in the ,state1 and especially of  
the sovereign power1 is called the      
polity 7,greek3 politeia1 ,ar41 ,pol41  
,,iii41 vi41 #a71--;a word immortalised 
by the judicious ,hooker1 and happily   
recovered recently to the ,english      
language4 ,the polity then is the       
distribution of the sovereignty4 ,the   
person1 singular or collective1 in whose
 hands the full sovereignty rests1 is   
called the ruler4 ,be it observed that  
what we call the ruler is never one man1
 except in absolute monarchy4 ,by the   
theory of the ,british ,constitution1   
the ruler is ,king1 ,lords1 and         
,commons1 together4  #f4 ,nature        
requires that men generally live in     
society1 domestic and civil1 so that the
 individual be of the family1 and       
families form associations1 which again 

conspire to form one perfect community1 
which is the ,state4 ,the requirement of
 nature may be gathered from the        
universal practice of mankind4 ,if it   
7the word savage7 means people without a
 settled form of government1 without    
laws and without a religion1 then1 go   
where you like1 you will not find such a
 race4 7,max ,mller1 in ,nineteenth     
,century1 ,jan4 #ahhe1 p4 #aad47 ,the   
same may be gathered from a             
consideration of what the ,state is1 and
 of the ends which it serves4 ,the      
,state1 as we have seen 7n4 #b71 is a   
union of septs and villages1 or of      
parishes and municipalities4 ,the       
individual is born and nurtured in the  
family1 and ordinarily becomes in time  
the parent of a new family4 ,families   
must combine to form septs by blood1 or 
villages 7or parishes7 by locality4     
,municipalities we may leave aside1 for 
a municipality is a potential ,state4   
,but we must consider the sept1 village1
 or parish1 which is the community      

intermediate between family and ,state4 
,among the cogent reasons which require 
families to enter into this association1
 we may mention friendship1             
intermarriage1 the interchange of       
services and commodities1 the           
cultivation of the arts1 the            
preservation of traditions and          
inventions4  #g4 ,but it is further     
necessary that these septs1 villages1 or
 parishes1 should band together and     
combine to form a higher community1     
self-sufficient and perfect1--for the   
determining of rights which ,natural    
,law leaves undetermined1--for the      
punishing of disturbers of the peace1 if
 need be1 even with death1--for defence 
against a common enemy1--for a union of 
counsels and resources to the execution 
of magnificent works4 ,this             
self-sufficient and perfect community1  
which is not part of any higher         
community1 is the ,state4  #h4 ,we may  
observe that the whole reason for the   
being of the ,state is not mutual need1 

nor the repression of violence4 ,main   
reasons these are1 no doubt1 but not the
 whole main reason4 ,even if men had no 
need of one another for the supply of   
their animal wants1 they would still    
desire to converse for the satisfaction 
of their intellectual curiosity and     
their social affections4 ,and even if we
 had all remained as void of guile1 and 
as full of light and love1 as our first 
parents were at their creation1 we      
should still have needed the erection of
 ,states4 ,in a ,state there are not    
only criminal but civil courts1 where it
 is not wicked men alone who come to be 
litigants4 ,from sundry passages of     
,scripture it would appear that even    
angels may disagree as to what is best  
and proper3 angelic men certainly may   
and do4 ,it is a mistake to look upon   
civil government1 with its apparatus of 
laws and judgments1 simply as a         
necessary evil1 and remedy of the       
perverseness of mankind4 ,on the        
contrary1 were all men virtuous1 ,states

 would still be formed1 towering in     
magnificence above the ,states known to 
history1 as the cedars of ,lebanon above
 the scanty growths of a fell-side in   
our north country4  #i4 ,there can be no
 ,state without a power to guide and    
govern it4 ,it has indeed become the    
fashion to repeat1 as the latest        
discovery in politics1 that what a      
,state needs is not government but      
administration4 ,this saying comes of a 
theory1 to be examined presently1 that  
sovereign power abides permanently with 
the people at large1 and that the sole  
function of princes1 cabinets1 and      
parliaments1 is to provide means of     
giving effect to the popular will4 ,this
 however is not quite a repudiation of  
government1 but a peculiar view as to   
the seat and centre of government4      
,those who hold it1 vigorously maintain 
the right of the ,many to govern1       
control1 and command the ,few4 ,the need
 of some governing authority in a ,state
 can be denied by none but an           

,anarchist1 a gentleman who lives two   
doors beyond ,rousseau on the side of   
unreason4  #aj4 ,every ,state is        
autonomous1 self-governing1 independent4
 ,either the whole people taken         
collectively must rule the same whole   
taken distributively1 or a part must    
rule the rest4 ,the ruler is either the 
whole commonwealth1 or more frequently a
 part of the commonwealth4 ,an autocrat 
is part of the ,state which he governs4 
,sovereignty whole and entire is        
intrinsic to the ,state4 ,a community   
that is to any extent governed from     
without1 like ,british ,india or        
,london1 is not a ,state1 but part of a 
,state1 for it is not a perfect         
community4  #aa4 ,we have it therefore  
that man is a social animal4 ,naturally 
he is a member of a family4 ,nature     
requires that families should coalesce  
into higher communities1 which again    
naturally converge and culminate in the 
,state4 ,nature further requires that in
 every ,state there should be an        

authority to govern4 ,but authority to  
govern and duty to obey are             
correlatives4 ,nature therefore requires
 submission to the governing authority  
in the ,state4 ,in other words1 ,nature 
abhors anarchy as being the destruction 
of civil society1 and as cutting the    
ground from under the feet of civilised 
man4 ,the genuine state of nature1 that 
state and condition1 which nature allows
 and approves as proper for the         
evolution of the human faculties1 is the
 state of man in civil society4 ,that is
 lost where there is no judge in the    
land4  #ab4 ,there are men full of a    
sentimental deference to authority and  
professions of obedience1 who yet will  
not obey any of the authorities that    
actually are over them4 ,these are      
disobedient men4 ,he is an anarchist in 
practice1 who meditates treason and     
rebellion against the powers that be    
actually over him in the ,state wherein 
he lives4 ,to obey no actual power is to
 obey no power1 as to wear no actual    

clothes is to go naked4 ,to keep up the 
comparison1--as a man may change his    
clothes upon occasion1 and thus go      
through a brief interval of             
unclothedness without injury to health  
or violation of decency1 notwithstanding
 the requirement of nature to wear      
clothes3 so it may be or it may not be  
consonant with the exigency of our      
nature at times to subvert by           
insurrection the existing government in 
order to the substitution of a new      
authority2 that does not concern us     
here4 ,we are stating the general rule  
under ordinary circumstances4 ,the      
submission to civil authority1 which    
nature requires of us1 must be paid in  
the coin of obedience to the actual     
established powers that be4  #ac4 ,any  
one who understands how morality comes  
from ,god 7,ethics1 c4 vi41 s4 ii4 nn4  
#f-i1 #ac1 pp4 #aai-abe71 can have no   
difficulty in seeing how civil power is 
of ,god also4 ,the one point covers the 
other4 ,we need no mention of ,god to   

show that disobedience1 lying1 and the  
seven deadly sins1 are bad things for   
human nature1 things to be avoided even 
if they were not forbidden4 ,all the    
things that ,god forbids are against the
 good of man4 ,their being evil is      
distinguishable from their being        
prohibited1 and antecedent to it4 ,now  
as drunkenness and unchastity are evil  
for man1 so too is anarchy4 ,the one    
remedy for anarchy is civil government4 
,even if there were no ,god1 it would be
 still imperatively necessary1 as we    
have seen1 for mankind to erect         
political institutions1 and to abide by 
the laws and ordinances of              
constitutional power4 ,but there would  
be no formal obligation of submission to
 these laws and ordinances2 and         
resistance to this power would be no    
more than philosophic sin4 7,ethics1 c4 
vi41 s4 ii41 n4 #f1 p4 #aai47 ,what     
makes anarchy truly sinful and wrong is 
the prohibition of it contained in the  
,eternal ,law1 that law whereby ,god    

commands every creature1 and            
particularly every man1 to act in       
accordance with his own proper being and
 nature taken as a whole1 and to avoid  
what is repugnant to the same4 7,ethics1
 c4 vi41 s4 ii41 n4 #i1 p4 #abj47       
,therefore1 as man is naturally social1 
and anarchy is the dissolution of       
society1 ,god forbids anarchy1 and      
enjoins obedience to the civil power1   
under pain of sin and damnation4 ,they  
that resist1 purchase to themselves     
damnation 7,rom4 xiii4 #b73 where the   
theological student1 having the ,greek  
text before him1 will observe that the  
same phrase is used as in #a ,cor4 xi4  
#bi of the unworthy communicant1 as     
though it were the like sin to rend our 
,lord's mystical ,body by civil discord 
as to profane ,his natural ,body by     
sacrilege4 ,but to enjoin obedience and 
to bestow authority are the obverse and 
reverse of one and the same act4 ,god   
therefore gives the civil ruler power   
and authority to command4 ,this is the  

meaning of ,st4 ,paul's teaching that   
there is no power but from ,god1 and    
that the powers that be are ordained of 
,god4 7,rom4 xiii4 #a47  #ad4 ,the      
argument is summed up in these seven    
consequent propositions3  7a7 ,civil    
society is necessary to human nature4   
7b7 ,civil power is necessary to civil  
society4 7c7 ,civil power is naught     
without civil obedience4 7d7 ,civil     
obedience is necessary to human nature4 
7e7 ,god commands whatever is necessary 
to human nature4 7f7 ,god commands      
obedience to the civil power4 7g7 ,god  
commissions the civil power to rule4    
#ae4 ,if any one asks how the ,state and
 the civil power is of ,god any         
otherwise than the railway company with 
its power1 or even the fever with its   
virulence1 a moment's reflection will   
reveal the answer in the facts1 that    
railway communication1 however          
convenient1 is not an essential feature 
of human life1 as the ,state is3 while  
diseases are not requirements in order  

to good1 but incidental defects and     
evils of nature1 permitted by ,god4 ,why
 ,god leaves man to cope with such      
evils1 is not the question here4        
,readings4--,ar41 ,pol41 ,i41 ii42      
,,iii41 i42 ,,iii41 ix43 nn4 #e-ae4     
,,section ,,iv4--,of the ,variety of    
,polities4   #a4 ,one polity alone is   
against the natural law2 that is every  
polity which proves itself unworkable   
and inefficient3 for the rest1 various  
,states exhibit various polities        
workable and lawful1 partly from the    
circumstances1 partly from the choice1  
of the citizens3 but the sum total of   
civil power is a constant quantity1 the 
same for all ,states4 ,we proceed to    
establish the clauses of this statement 
in succession4  #b4 ,if a watch be      
necessary to a railway guard1 and he is 
bound to have one accordingly1 it is    
also necessary1 and he is bound to      
procure it1 that the watch shall go and 
keep time4 ,a watch that will not keep  
time is an unlawful article for him to  

depend upon1 being tantamount to no     
watch1 whereas he is bound to have a    
watch4 ,otherwise1 be his watch large or
 small1 gold1 silver1 or pinchbeck1 all 
this is indifferent1 so long as it be a 
reliable timekeeper4 ,in like manner1 we
 must have a ,state1 we must have a     
government1 and we must have a          
government that can govern4 ,monarchy1  
aristocracy1 parliaments1 wide or narrow
 franchise1 centralisation1             
decentralisation1 any one of these and  
countless other forms--apart from the   
means whereby it is set up--is a lawful 
government1 where it is a workable one2 
unlawful1 and forbidden by ,god and     
nature1 where it cannot work4 ,a form of
 government that from its own intrinsic 
defects could nowhere work1 would be    
everywhere and always unlawful4  #c4    
,you cannot argue from the accomplished 
fact the lawfulness of the means whereby
 it was accomplished4 ,nor do we say    
that every form of government1 which    
succeeds in governing1 was originally   

set up in justice2 nor again that the   
success of its rule is necessarily due  
to the use of just means4 ,the          
,committee of ,public ,safety in ,paris 
in #agid did manage to govern1 but it   
was erected in blood1 and it governed by
 an unscrupulous disregard of           
everybody's rights4 ,all that we say is1
 that no distribution of civil power as 
a distribution1 or no polity as a polity
 7s4 iii41 n4 #e1 p4 #cab71 is unlawful1
 if by it the government can be carried 
on4 ,and the reason is plain4 ,for all  
that nature requires is that there      
should be an efficient civil authority1 
not that this man should have it1 or    
that one man or other should have it    
all1 or that a certain class in council 
assembled should engross it1 or that all
 the inhabitants of the country should  
participate in it4 ,any one of these    
arrangements that will work1 satisfies  
the exigency of nature for civil rule1  
and is therefore in itself a lawful     
polity4  #d4 ,working1 and therefore1 as

 explained1 lawful polities are as      
multitudinous as the species of animals4
 ,besides those that actually are1 there
 is a variety without end1 as of        
animals1 so of polities1 that might be  
and are not4 ,we can classify only the  
main types4 ,we ground our              
classification upon ,ar41 ,pol41 ,,iii41
 vii41 modernising it so as to take in  
forms of representative government1     
whereof ,aristotle had no conception4   
7#a7 ,monarchy1 or the rule of the      
,single ,person1 in whose hands the     
whole power of the ,state is            
concentrated1 e4g41 ,constantine the    
,great4  7#b7 ,aristocracy1 or the rule 
of the ,few1 which will be either direct
 or representative1 according as either 
they themselves by their own votes at   
first hand1 or representatives whom they
 elect1 make the laws4  7#c7 ,democracy1
 or the rule of the ,many1 that is1 of  
the whole community4 ,democracy1 again1 
is either direct 7commonly called pure7 
or representative4 ,the most famous     

approach in history to pure democracy is
 the government of ,athens1 ,b4,c4      
#dch-cch4  7#d7 ,limited ,monarchy4  7a7
 ,monarchy with ,aristocracy1 the       
government of ,england from #afhh to    
#ahcj4  7b7 ,monarchy with ,democracy4  
#e4 ,all civil government is for the    
governed1 that is1 for the community at 
large4 ,the perversion of a polity is   
the losing sight of this principle1 and 
the conducting of the polity in the     
interest of the governing body alone4   
,by such perversion monarchy passes into
 tyranny1 aristocracy into oligarchy1   
and democracy into ochlocracy or        
mob-rule4 ,it might appear strange that1
 where the power rests with the whole   
people collectively1 government should  
ever be carried on otherwise than in the
 interest of the entire community1 did  
we not remember that the majority1 with 
whom the power rests in a democracy1 may
 employ it to trample on and crush the  
minority4 ,thus the ,many may worry and 
harass the ,few1 the mean and poor the  

wealthy and noble3 though commonly      
perhaps the worrying has been the other 
way about4 ,anyhow it is important to   
observe that there is no polity which of
 itself1 and apart from the spirit in   
which it is worked1 is an adequate      
safeguard and rock of defence against   
oppression4  #f4 ,the wide range of     
polities that history presents is not   
drawn out by the caprice of nations4    
,the very fact of a certain nation      
choosing a certain polity1 where they   
are free to choose1 is an indication of 
the bent of the national character1 and 
character is not a caprice4 ,no ,north  
,american population are ever likely to 
elect an absolute monarch to govern     
them4 ,that polity which thrives on the 
shores of the ,caspian1 can strike no   
root on the banks of the ,potomac4 ,the 
choice of a polity is limited by the    
character of the electors and by the    
circumstances in which the election is  
made4 ,not every generation in a nation 
is free to choose its polity3 but the   

choice and institution of the fathers   
binds the children4 ,up to a certain    
point ancestral settlements must be     
respected1 or instability ensues1 and   
anarchy is not far off4 ,thus the spirit
 of freedom should always act as ,burke 
says1 as if in the presence of canonized
 forefathers4  #g4 ,the smallest ,state 
in the world is the little republic of  
,andorra in the ,pyrenees4 ,though it be
 a paradox to say it1 there is as much  
political power in ,andorra as in       
,russia1--one and the same measure of it
 in every ,state4 ,in every ,state there
 is power for civil good to the full    
height of the emergencies that may      
arise4 ,the same emergencies may arise  
everywhere1 and everywhere there is full
 power to see that the commonwealth take
 no harm by them4 ,what a great empire  
can do for this purpose1 e4g41 proclaim 
martial law1 search houses1 lay an      
embargo on the means of transport1      
impress soldiers1 the same can the      
tiniest commonwealth do in the like     

need4 ,and the ordinary functions of    
government are the same in both4  #h4   
,this seems at variance with the theory 
of some constitutions1 according to     
which there are certain so-called       
fundamental laws1 which the legislature 
cannot call in question1 nor deal with  
in any way1 but must take them in all   
its deliberations for positions         
established and uncontrovertible4 ,the  
,british ,constitution recognizes no    
fundamental laws4 ,there is no reform   
that may not legally be broached in     
,parliament and enacted there4          
,parliament is said to be omnipotent1   
able to do everything1 except to make a 
man a woman4 ,but in many legislatures  
it is not so4 ,at ,athens of old there  
were certain measures which no one could
 introduce for discussion in the        
,sovereign ,assembly without rendering  
himself liable to a prosecution ,greek3 
graphae paranomon4 ,and there have been 
many monarchs termed absolute1 who yet  
were bound by their coronation-oath1 or 

by some other agreement with their      
people1 to preserve inviolate certain   
institutions and to maintain certain    
laws4 ,it may be contended that such a  
government as we have in ,england1 which
 is theoretically competent to pass any 
law within the limits of the natural    
law1 has a greater range of power than a
 government whose operation is limited  
by a barrier of fundamental positive    
law4 ,but this contention vanishes when 
we observe that there must remain in the
 ,state1 which has fundamental laws1 a  
power somewhere to reverse them4 ,they  
can be reversed at least by the consent 
of the whole people4 ,thus at ,athens   
the ,greek3 graphae paranomon could be  
suspended by a vote of the ,assembly4 ,a
 people can release their monarch from  
his coronation-oath in such portions of 
it as are not binding absolutely by     
divine law4 ,where fundamental law      
obtains1 a portion of the civil power   
becomes latent1 and only a diminished   
remainder is left free in the hands of  

the person or persons who are there said
 to rule4 ,such person or persons are   
not the adequate ruler of the ,state1 as
 they have not the full power1 but the  
people1 with whom rests the latent      
authority to cancel certain laws1 are to
 that extent partakers in the           
sovereignty4 ,where there is agreement  
of the whole people1 great and small1 no
 part of the power remains latent1 but  
all is set free4 ,with us1 it may be    
observed1 the omnipotence of parliament 
has become a mere lawyer's theory4 ,on  
every great issue1 other than that on   
which the sitting parliament has been   
elected1 it is the practice of ministers
 to go to the country by a new ,general 
,election4 ,thus only a certain measure 
of available authority is free at the   
disposal of parliament3 the rest        
remaining latent in the general body of 
the electorate4 ,such is our            
constitution in practice4  #i4 ,if in   
any ,state the whole power were free in 
the hands of one man1 there we might    

look to see made good the dictum of the 
judicious ,hooker 7,ecclesiastical      
,polity1 bk4 i41 s4 x41 n4 #e73 ,to live
 by one man's will became the cause of  
all men's misery4 ,in a monarchy        
untrammelled by senate or popular       
assembly1 it were well that some of the 
sovereign power should remain latent1   
and that ,his ,majesty should rule in   
accordance with certain laws1 not within
 his royal pleasure to revoke4  #aj4    
,the ,state and the power of the ,state1
 apart from the polity1 is of ,god4 7s4 
iii41 n4 #ad1 p4 #cah47 ,the ,state     
under this or that polity and this or   
that ruler1 is also of ,god4 ,but1 apart
 from the polity1 the ,state is of ,god 
antecedently to any determination of any
 human will3 because1 willy nilly1 man  
must live in civil society and ,god     
commands him so to do4 ,but the ,state  
under this polity and this ruler is of  
,god consequently to some determination 
of human volition4 ,in this consequent  
sense we write ,victoria ,dei gratia4   

#aa4 ,there is little use in the        
enquiry1 ,which is the best polity8     
,there is no polity which excels all    
other polities as man does the rest of  
animals4 ,we judge of polities as of the
 various types of locomotives1 according
 to the nature of the country where they
 are to run4 ,aristotle tells us that if
 we meet with a ,pericles1 we shall do  
best to make him our king1 and hand over
 all our affairs to him4 7,ar41 ,pol41  
,,iii41 xiii41 #be3 cf4 ,thucydides1    
ii41 #fe47 ,otherwise1 for most cities  
and for most men1 apart from exceptional
 circumstances1 or a condition of ideal 
perfection1 but having regard to what is
 ordinarily possible1 he recommends a   
moderate republic under middle-class    
rule4 7,ar41 ,pol41 ,,vi41 xi41 ,ed4    
,congreve47 ,this he calls par          
excellence a polity1 ,greek3 politeia4  
,democracy1 ,greek3 deimokratia with    
,aristotle1 always means that perversion
 of democracy1 which we call mob-rule4  
7,ar41 ,pol41 ,,iii41 vii41 nn4 #c1 #e47

  #ab4 ,in the ,english monarchy the    
whole majesty of the ,state shines forth
 in the ,single ,person who wears the   
,crown4 ,the ,crown is the centre of    
loyalty and gives dignity to the        
government4 ,the ,crown is above all    
parties in the ,state1 knows their      
secrets1 their purposes when in office  
as well as their acts1 and is able to   
mediate1 when party feeling threatens to
 bring government to a standstill4 ,the 
,british ,crown has more weight of      
influence than of prerogative4 ,footnote
 #ba  ,footnote #ba3 ,written in the    
month and year of jubilee1 ,june1 #ahhg4
  ,readings4--,st4 ,thos41 #a;a #b1 q4  
#aje1 art4 #a1 in corp41 ad #b1 #e2     
,ar41 ,pol41 ,,iii41 xv42 ib41 ,,iii41  
xvi41 nn4 #e-h2 ib41 ,,viii4 7al4 ,v471 
xi4 nn4 #a-c4   ,,section ,v4--,of the  
,divine ,right of ,kings and the        
,inalienable ,sovereignty of the        
,people4   #a4 ,those old fanatics of   
arbitrary power dogmatized as if        
hereditary monarchy were the only lawful

 government in the world1 just as our   
new fanatics of popular arbitrary power 
maintain that a popular election is the 
only lawful source of authority4        
7,burke1 ,reflections on ,french        
,revolution47  ,we here stand between   
two idols of the tribe of politicians4  
,we may call them ,gog and ,magog3 ,gog1
 the divine right of kings2 ,magog1 the 
inalienable sovereignty of the people4  
#b4 ,the position known in history as   
the divine right of kings may be best   
described as a political popedom4 ,it is
 the belief of ,catholics that our      
,divine ,redeemer1 instituting ,his     
,church by ,his own personal act as a   
perfect society and spiritual           
commonwealth1 instituted in like manner 
the polity under which ,he willed it to 
be governed1 namely1 the ,papal         
monarchy1 begun in ,st4 ,peter and      
carried to completion according to our  
,lord's design under the line of ,popes1
 ,peter's successors4 ,the monarchy thus
 established is essential to the        

,catholic ,church4 ,we speak not here of
 the temporal power which the ,pope once
 enjoyed in the ,roman ,states1 but of  
his spiritual sovereignty over all      
,christendom4 ,the ,pope cannot validly 
resign and put out of his own and his   
successors' hands1 nor can the          
,cardinals take away from him1 nor the  
,episcopate1 one jot or tittle of this  
spiritual prerogative4 ,he cannot1 for  
instance1 condition his infallibility on
 the consent of a ,general ,council1 or 
surrender the canonization of saints to 
the votes of the faithful at large4     
,such are the inalienable1 ,christ-given
 prerogatives of the ,papacy4 ,henry    
,,viii4 feloniously set himself up for  
,pope within the realm of ,england4     
,blending together temporal and         
spiritual jurisdiction1 he made out his 
rights and prerogatives as a monarch1   
even in the civil order1 to be          
inalienable as in the spiritual4        
,spiritual and civil attributes together
 formed a jewelled circlet1 one and     

indivisible1 immoveably fixed on the    
brow of the ,king's ,most ,sacred       
,majesty4 ,grown and swollen by their   
union with the spirituality1 the civil  
attributes of the ,crown were           
exaggerated to the utmost1 and likewise 
declared inalienable4 ,they were        
exaggerated till they came to embrace   
all the powers of government4 ,the      
privileges of ,parliament1 and the      
limitations to the royal authority1 set 
forth in the ,petition of ,right in     
#afbh1 were regarded as mere concessions
 tenable at the ,king's pleasure3 from  
which point of view we understand the   
readiness of so conscientious a monarch 
as ,charles ,i4 to act against such     
privileges after he had allowed them4   
,but to vest all the powers of          
government inalienably in the ,king1 so 
that whoever else may seem to partake in
 them1 shall partake only by royal      
sufferance1 is tantamount to declaring  
monarchy the sole valid and lawful      
polity4 ,this declaration the ministers1

 lay and clerical1 of our ,charleses and
 ,jameses do not seem to have made in   
express terms4 ,it is1 however1         
contained by implication in their       
celebrated phrase of the inalienable    
prerogatives of the ,crown1 as          
interpreted by the stretches of         
prerogative which they advised4 ,they   
virtually asserted of one particular    
polity1 or distribution of civil power  
7c4 viii41 s4 iii41 n4 #e1 p4 #cab71    
that which is true only of civil power  
taken nakedly1 apart from the mode of   
its distribution--they said of monarchy 
what is true of government--that the sum
 of its power is a constant quantity 7c4
 viii41 s4 iv41 n4 #g1 p4 #cbb71 and    
that it is of ,god antecedently to and  
irrespectively of any determination of  
popular will4 7c4 viii41 s4 iv41 n4 #aj1
 p4 #cbe47  #c4 ,such a position is     
easily refuted1 negatively1 by its being
 wholly unproven1 unless the ,english   
,reformation1 and the servile spirit in 
,church and ,state that promoted and was

 promoted by the ,reformation1 can pass 
for a proof2 and again the position is  
positively refuted1 when we come to     
consider how all that nature requires   
and ,god commands1 is government under  
some polity1 not government everywhere  
under monarchy2 there being many        
workable polities besides monarchy4 7s4 
iv41 nn4 #a-d1 p4 #cai47  #d4 ,the same 
argument that demolishes ,gog1 also     
overturns ,magog4 ,the two idols1       
opposed to one another1 stand upon the  
same pedestal1 the identification of    
government in general with one          
particular polity1 as though a polity   
were the polity4 ,the great assertor and
 worshipper of the inalienable          
sovereignty of the people is ,jean      
,jacques ,rousseau4 ,he starts from     
postulates which we have already        
rejected--that all men are equal 7c4    
viii41 s4 i41 n4 #i1 p4 #cje7--that man 
is born free 7ib41 n4 #aj7--that none   
can be bound to obey another without his
 own consent 7ib41 n4 #aa7--that civil  

society is formed by an arbitrary       
convention 7ib41 n4 #d7--which          
convention is the ,social ,contract4    
7ib41 n4 #e47 ,from these unreasonable  
postulates ,rousseau draws the          
conclusion1 logically enough1 that the  
sovereign will in every ,state is the   
will of the majority of the citizens3   
but the will of the majority1 he goes   
on1 cannot be alienated from the        
majority3 therefore neither can the     
sovereignty be alienated1 but must abide
 permanently with the people ruling by a
 majority of votes4 ,the argumentation  
is excellent1 but the premisses are all 
false4 ,the conclusion is vastly        
popular1 few minds considering from what
 premisses it is drawn4  #e4 ,if        
sovereignty rests inalienably with the  
people1 the one valid polity is pure    
democracy4 ,this proposition1 however1  
,rousseau was not forward to formulate4 
,the ,stuarts had shrunk from           
formulating a similar proposition about 
monarchy1 though they virtually held and

 acted upon it4 ,they were willing      
enough to allow of a parliament1 whose  
privileges and functions should be at   
,his ,majesty's gracious pleasure4 ,thus
 ,rousseau will allow you to have your  
senate1 king1 emperor1 if you will3 only
 remember that he is the prince1 not the
 sovereign4 7,contrat ,social1 l4 iii41 
c4 i47 ,the people collectively are the 
sovereign1 always sovereign4 ,the       
prince1 that is1 he or they to whom the 
administration is entrusted--since all  
the citizens cannot administer          
jointly--is the mere official and       
bailiff of the ,sovereign ,people1 bound
 to carry out their mandate in all      
things1 and removable at their pleasure4
 ,the people must meet periodically1 not
 at the discretion of the prince4 ,these
 meetings must open with two questions1 
never to be omitted1 and to be voted on 
separately4 ,the first is3 ,whether it  
pleases the ,sovereign 7,people7 to     
continue the present form of government4
 ,the second is3 ,whether it pleases the

 ,people to leave the administration to 
the persons at present actually charged 
with it4 7,contrat ,social1 1l4 iv41 c4 
xviii47  #f4 ,the claim of a pure       
democracy like this to supersede all    
other polities cannot be established by 
abstract arguments4 ,that we have seen  
in examining the ,social ,contract4 ,the
 alternative way of establishing such an
 exclusive claim would be to prove that 
the practical efficiency of pure        
democracy immeasurably transcends the   
efficiency of every other possible      
polity4 ,there is indeed yet a third    
mode of proof resorted to4 ,it is said  
that pure democracy everywhere is coming
 and must come2 and that what is thus on
 the line of human progress must be     
right and best for the time that it     
obtains4 ,a grand invention this of     
,positivist genius1 the theory1 that    
whatever is is right2 and the practice1 
always to swim with the stream6 ,but    
supposing that pure democracy is coming1
 how long is it likely to last8 ,the    

answer may be gathered from a review of 
the working difficulties of such a      
polity4  #g4 ,it is made only for a     
small ,state4 ,railway and telegraph    
have indeed diminished the difficulty2  
and have removed the need of all the    
voters meeting in one place1 as was done
 at ,athens4 ,newspapers echo and spread
 with addition the eloquence of popular 
orators1 beyond the ears that actually  
listen to them4 ,still1 think what it   
would be to have a general election1    
upon every bill that passes through     
,parliament3 for that is what pure      
democracy comes to4 ,the plan would     
scarcely work with a total electorate of
 thirty thousand4 ,you say the people   
would entrust a committee with the      
passing of ordinary measures1 reserving 
to themselves the supervision4 ,i am not
 arguing the physical impossibility1 but
 the moral difficulties of such an      
arrangement4 ,for either the people     
throw the reins of government on the    
neck of this committee1 or they keep a  

tight hold upon the committee and guide 
it4 ,in the former case the popular     
sovereignty becomes like that of a      
monarch who leans much on favourites1 a 
sovereignty largely participated in by  
others than the nominal holder of the   
control4 ,on the other hand1 if the     
people do frequently interfere1 and take
 a lively interest in the doings of the 
subordinate assembly1 the people        
themselves must be a small body4 ,an    
active governing body of three hundred  
thousand members would be as great a    
wonder as an active man weighing three  
hundred pounds4 ,only in a small ,state 
is that intense political life possible1
 which a pure democracy must live4      
,there only1 as ,rousseau requires1 can 
the public service be the principal     
affair of the citizens4 ,all things     
considered1 he says1 ,i do not see how  
it is any longer possible for the       
,sovereign 7,people7 to preserve amongst
 us the exercise of his rights1 if the  
city is not very small4 7,contrat       

,social1 l4 iii41 c4 xv47 ,and the      
difficulty of size in a democracy is    
aggravated1 if1 as ,socialists propose1 
the democratic ,state is to be sole     
capitalist within its own limits4 ,the  
perfect sovereignty of the people means 
the disruption of empires1 and the      
pushing to extremity of what is         
variously described as local government1
 home rule1 autonomy1 and               
decentralisation1 till every commune    
becomes an independent ,state4 ,but for 
defence in war and for commerce in      
peace1 these little ,states must        
federate2 and federation means          
centralisation1 external control over   
the majority at home1 restricted foreign
 relations1 in fact the corruption of   
pure democracy4  #h4 ,again1 the perfect
 sovereignty of the people cannot       
subsist except upon the supposition that
 one man is as much a born ruler as     
another1 which means a levelling down of
 the best talent of the community1 for  
that is the only way in which capacities

 can be equalised--a very wasteful and  
ruinous expedient1 and one that the born
 leaders of the people will not long    
endure4 ,then there is the proverbial   
fickleness of democracy1 one day all    
aglow1 and cooled down the next1 never  
pursuing any course steadily1 in foreign
 policy least of all1 though there the  
dearest interests of the ,state are     
often at stake4 ,as one who lived under 
such a government once put it3 ,sheer   
democracy is of all institutions the    
most ill-balanced and ill put together1 
like a wave at sea restlessly tossing   
before the fitful gusts of wind3        
politicians come and go1 and not one of 
them cares for the public interest1 or  
gives it a thought4 7,quoted by         
,demosthenes1 ,speech on the ,embassy1  
p4 #chc ,a47 ,what they do care for and 
think of sedulously1 is pleasing the    
people and clinging to office4 ,in that 
respect they are the counterparts of the
 favourites who cluster round the throne
 of a despotic monarch1 and suck up his 

power by flattering him4 ,peoples have  
their favourites as well as kings4 ,to  
these persons1 the ,cleon or ,gracchus  
of the hour1 they blindly commit the    
management of their concerns1 as the roi
 fainant of old ,frankish times left    
everything to his ,mayor of the ,palace1
 till the ,mayor came to reign in his   
master's stead2 and so has the popular  
favourite ere now developed into the    
military despot4 ,strong-minded kings of
 course are not ruled by favourites1 nor
 are highly intelligent and capable     
peoples2 but it is as hard to find a    
people fit to wield the power of pure   
democracy as to find an individual fit  
for an absolute monarch1 especially     
where the ,state is large4  #i4 ,from   
all this we conclude that the           
new-fashioned ,magog of pure democracy1 
or the perfect sovereignty of the       
people1 is not to be worshipped to the  
overthrow and repudiation of all other  
polities1 any more than the             
old-fashioned ,gog of pure monarchy1    

idolised by ,stuart courtiers under the 
name of the divine right of kings4      
,neither of these is the polity3 each is
 a polity1 but not one to be commonly   
recommended4 ,the study of polities     
admirably illustrates the ,aristotelian 
doctrine of the ,golden ,mean 7,ethics1 
c4 v41 s4 iv41 p4 #gg71 teaching us     
ordinarily to affect limited monarchy or
 limited democracy4 ,but as the mean    
must ever be chosen in relation to      
ourselves1 a ,constantine or an         
,athenian ,demos may represent the      
proper polity in place under            
extraordinary circumstances4            
,reading4--,the ,month for ,july1 #ahhf1
 pp4 #cch1 seqq4   ,,section ,,vi4--,of 
the ,elementary and ,original ,polity4  
#a4 ,all things are double1 one against 
another4 7,ecclus4 xlii4 #be47 ,the son 
of ,sirach may have had in view the     
human body as divisible by a vertical   
median line into two symmetrical halves4
 ,but in each of the halves thus made1  
the same organ or limb is never repeated

 twice in exact likeness1 nor do any two
 parts render exactly the same service4 
,this variety of organs in the bodies of
 the higher animals is called           
differentiation4 ,as we descend in the  
animal series we find less and less of  
differentiation1 till we reach the      
lowest types1 which are little more than
 a mere bag1 whence their name of       
,ascidians4 ,in that ,state which has   
,london for its capital city1 we behold 
one of the highest types of political   
existence4 ,sovereignty is there        
divided1 as usual in modern ,states1    
into three branches1 ,legislative1      
,judicial1 and ,executive4 ,each of     
these branches is shared among many     
persons in various modes and degrees1 so
 that in practice it is not easy to     
enumerate and specify the holders of    
sovereignty1 nor to characterize so     
complex a polity4 ,at the other end of  
the scale we may represent to ourselves 
#bej squatters forming an independent   
,state in the far ,west of ,america4    

,they are a pure democracy1 and the     
sovereignty belongs to them all jointly4
 ,is a man to be tried for his life8    
,the remaining #bdi are his judges4 ,is 
a tax to be levied on ardent spirits8   
,the #bej vote it4 ,is there a call to  
arms8 ,the #bej marshal themselves to   
war4 ,that clearly is the condition of  
minimum differentiation1 where one      
citizen is in all political points the  
exact counterpart of all the rest4 ,of  
all polities it is the most simple and  
elementary possible4 ,and so far forth  
as the natural order of evolution in    
polities1 as in all other things1 is    
from simple to compound1 this is also   
the original polity4 ,it is also the    
residuary polity1 that1 namely1 which   
comes to be1 when all other government  
in the ,state vanishes4 ,thus1 if the   
,powder ,plot had succeeded1 and ,king  
,james ,i41 with the royal family1      
,lords and ,commons1 with the judges and
 chief officers of the ,executive1 had  
all perished together1 the sovereign    

authority in ,england would have        
devolved upon the nation as a whole4    
#b4 ,certain monarchical writers shrink 
from the recognition of pure democracy  
as either the first or the last term of 
the series of polities4 ,they do not    
recognize it as a polity at all4 ,when  
there is no governing body distinct from
 the mass of people at large1 a         
government must be formed1 they say1 by 
popular suffrage4 ,meanwhile1 according 
to them1 the sovereign power rests not  
with the body of electors3 either it is 
not yet created1 or it has lapsed3 but  
as soon as the election is made1 they   
see sovereignty breaking forth like the 
sun rising1 in the person1 single or    
composite1 who is the object of the     
people's choice4 ,this would be the     
correct view of the matter1 if no choice
 were left to the electors1 but they    
were obliged to acquiesce in some       
prearranged polity1 as a ,monarchy1 or a
 ,council of ,ten1 and could do nothing 
more than designate the ,monarch or the 

,council4 ,under such a restriction the 
,cardinals elect the ,pope4 ,but our    
electors can institute any polity they  
see fit4 ,they are a ,constituent       
,assembly4 ,they may fix upon a monarchy
 or a republic1 two or one legislative  
chambers1 a wide or a narrow franchise1 
home rule or centralization3 or they may
 erect a ,provisional ,government for   
five years with another appeal to the   
people at the end of that term4 ,more   
than that4 ,they could impose a         
protective duty upon corn1 or endow the 
,roman ,catholic religion1 making such  
protection or endowment a fundamental   
law 7s4 iv41 n4 #h1 p4 #cbc71 and       
withholding from the government1 which  
they proceed to set up1 the power of    
meddling with that law4 ,they are then  
not only a ,constituent but likewise a  
,legislative ,assembly4 ,but this power 
of making laws and moulding the future  
constitution of the ,state1 what else is
 it but sovereign power1 and indeed the 
very highest manifestation of           

sovereignty8  #c4 ,so far we follow     
,suarez in his controversy with ,james  
,i4 ,the natural order of evolution     
certainly is1 that the ,state should be 
conceived in pure democracy1 and thence 
develop into other polities4 ,but in    
speaking as though the natural order had
 always been the actual order1 ,suarez  
seems to have been betrayed by the      
ardour of controversy into the use of   
incorrect expressions4 ,it is true in   
the abstract1 as he says1 that no       
natural reason can be alleged why       
sovereignty should be fixed upon one    
person1 or one set of persons1 rather   
than upon another1 short of the whole   
community4 ,this is true1 inasmuch as in
 the abstract we view men as men1 in    
which specific character they are all   
equal4 ,but in the concrete and real    
life1 the primeval citizens who start a 
commonwealth are rarely alike and equal1
 as the founders of the ,american       
,republic at the separation from ,great 
,britain pretty well were1 but some men1

 or some order of men1 will so much     
excel the rest in ability1 position1 or 
possessions1 that the rest have really  
no choice but to acquiesce in those     
gifted hands holding the sovereignty4   
,readings4--,suarez1 ,de ,legibus1      
,,iii41 iii41 #f2 ib41 ,,iii41 iv41 nn4 
#b1 #c1 #d2 ,defensio ,fidei1 ,,iii41   
ii41 nn4 #g1 #h1 #i2 ,ar41 ,pol41       
,,iii41 xiv41 #ab2 ib41 ,,viii41 x41 nn4
 #g1 #h2 ,the ,month for ,july1 #ahhf1  
pp4 #cdb-cde4   ,,section ,,vii4--,of   
,resistance to ,civil ,power4   ,when   
they say the ,king owes his crown to the
 choice of his people1 they tell us that
 they mean to say no more than that some
 of the ,king's predecessors have been  
called to the throne by some sort of    
choice4 ,thus they hope to render their 
proposition safe by rendering it        
nugatory4 7,burke1 ,reflections on      
,french ,revolution47  #a4 ,the great   
question about civil power is1 not      
whence it first came in remote          
antiquity1 but whence it is now derived 

and flows continually as from its       
source1 whether from the free consent of
 subjects so long as that lasts1 or     
whether it obtains independently of     
their consent4 ,can subjects overthrow  
the ruler1 or alter the polity itself1  
as often as they have a mind so to do8  
or has the ruler a right to his position
 even against the will of his people8 ,a
 parallel question is1 can a province   
annexed to an empire secede when it     
chooses1 as ,south ,carolina and other  
,confederates once attempted secession  
from the ,american ,union8  #b4 ,these  
questions raise two totally different   
issues1 which must be first carefully   
distinguished and then severally        
answered4 ,the first point at issue is  
whether subjects may dethrone their     
ruler1 a people alter their polity1 or a
 province secede from an empire1 at     
discretion4 ,the second point is1       
whether the same may be done under      
pressure of dire injustice4 ,one little 
matter of phraseology must be rectified 

before an answer is returned to this    
first point4 ,the question whether      
subjects may dethrone their ruler at    
discretion1 from the terms in which it  
is drawn1 can lead to none but a        
negative answer4 ,from the fact that    
they are subjects1 and this man1 or this
 body of men1 their ruler1 their        
allegiance cannot be wholly             
discretionary4 ,that sovereign is a mere
 man of straw1 there is no soul and     
substance of sovereign power in him1 who
 may be knocked down and carted away for
 rubbish1 any moment his so-called      
subjects please4 ,rousseau is quite     
clear on this point4 ,the true          
debateable form of the question is1     
whether the people1 being themselves    
sovereign1 can remove at will the       
official persons who actually administer
 the ,state2 whether they can change the
 polity1 and whether the inhabitants of 
a province can secede4 ,the answer now  
is simple3 all depends upon the polity  
of the particular country where the case

 comes for discussion4 ,and if so it be 
that the constitution makes no provision
 one way or another1 any dispute that   
may occur must be settled by amicable   
arrangement among the parties concerned3
 if they cannot amicably agree1 they    
must fight4 ,to save this last          
eventuality1 it were well that any claim
 which the people in any country may    
have to remove princes and statesmen    
from office1 to alter the polity1 or to 
divide the empire1 should be made matter
 of the clearest understanding and most 
express and unambiguous stipulation4    
,even so1 such a provision must be      
generally viewed with disfavour by the  
political philosopher1 seeing how it    
tends to the weakening and undermining  
of government2 whereas the same         
considerations that make out government 
to be at all a boon and a necessity to  
human nature1 argue incapacity and      
instability in the governing power to be
 a deplorable evil4 ,we must add1 that  
where the people keep in their hands any

 power to alter the polity1 or transfer 
the administration to other hands1 there
 they hold part at least of the         
sovereignty2 and the alteration or      
transference is effected by them1 not as
 subjects1 but as partial ruler4  #c4   
,the second point we raised was1 whether
 a dethronement1 or an alteration of    
polity1 or a secession1 may be brought  
about1 not indeed at discretion for any 
cause1 but under pressure of dire       
injustice4 ,it comes to this3 ,may the  
civil power be resisted when it does    
grievous wrong8 ,let us begin our reply 
with another question3 ,may children    
strike their parents8 ,no4 ,not even in 
self-defence8 when the parent is going  
about to do the child some grievous     
bodily hurt8 ,that is an unpleasant     
question1 but the answer is plain4 ,we  
can make no exceptions to the rule of   
self-defence4 ,self-defence in extreme  
cases may raise the arm of a child      
against its parent3 in a similar        
extremity it may set a people in        

conflict with their civil ruler4 ,still 
we regard with horror the idea of       
striking a parent1 and speak of it      
generally as a thing never to be done3  
so should we regard and speak of        
rebellion4 ,we should not parade it     
before men's eyes as a deed to be       
contemplated1 admired1 and readily put  
in execution4 ,i confess to you1 ,sir1  
writes ,burke1 ,i never liked this      
continual talk of resistance and        
revolution1 or the practice of making   
the extreme medicine of the constitution
 its daily bread4  #d4 ,the conditions  
under which the civil authority may be  
withstood in self-defence1 are fairly   
stated in the ,dublin ,review for       
,april1 #ahfe1 p4 #bib4 ,we must        
premise1 that such a course of          
self-defence once publicly entered upon 
is like a rock rolled over the brow of a
 steep mountain3 down it rolls and      
rebounds from point to point1 gathering 
momentum in the descent1 till in the end
 the ruler1 once defied1 has to be      

dethroned1 the polity subverted1 the    
empire rent1 or they who made the       
resistance must perish4  ,resistance is 
lawful3--7#a7 ,when a government has    
become substantially and habitually     
tyrannical1 and that is when it has lost
 sight of the common good1 and pursues  
its own selfish objects to the manifest 
detriment of its subjects1 especially   
where their religious interests are     
concerned4 7#b7 ,when all legal and     
pacific means have been tried in vain to
 recall the ruler to a sense of his     
duty4 7#c7 ,when there is a reasonable  
probability that resistance will be     
successful1 and not entail greater evils
 than it seeks to remove4 7#d7 ,when the
 judgment formed as to the badness of   
the government1 and the prudence of     
resistance thereto1 is not the opinion  
only of private persons or of a mere    
party3 but is that of the larger and    
better portion of the people1 so that it
 may morally be considered as the       
judgment of the community as a whole4   

#e4 ,side by side with this we will set 
the teaching of ,leo ,,xiii41           
,encyclical1 ,quod ,apostolici4  ,if    
ever it happens that civil power is     
wielded by rulers recklessly and beyond 
all bounds1 the doctrine of the         
,catholic ,church does not allow of     
insurgents rising up against them by    
independent action 7proprio marte71 lest
 the tranquillity of order be more and  
more disturbed1 or society receive      
greater injury thereby3 and when things 
are come to such a pass that there      
appears no other ray or hope of         
preservation1 the same authority teaches
 that a remedy must be sought in the    
merits of ,christian patience and in    
earnest prayers to ,god4  ,the words we 
have italicized seem to point to        
conditions 7#d7 and 7#c7 respectively1  
as laid down by the writer in the       
,dublin ,review4  ,for an instance of a 
king dethroned1 not proprio marte1 but  
with every appearance at least of an act
 of the whole nation1 see the           

dethronement of ,edward ,,ii41 as       
related by ,walsingham1 ,historia       
,anglicana1 ,i41 pp4 #ahf1 #ahg1 ,rolls 
,series4  #f4 ,we save ourselves the    
more virulent and destructive diseases  
of revolution1 sedition1 and civil war1 
by submitting to the milder type of a   
change of ministry4 7,times1 ,april #g1 
#ahhj47  #g4 ,it is not monarchical     
governments alone that can ever be      
resisted lawfully3 but what is sauce for
 the king's goose is sauce also for the 
people's gander4 ,there is no special   
sanctity attaching to democracy4  ,it   
might seem that1 since resistance       
requires to be justified by the approval
 of the larger and better portion of the
 people 7n4 #d1 condition #d7 no just   
resistance can ever be offered to the   
will of the democratic majority4 ,but   
the said majority may be in divers ways 
coerced and cajoled1 a mere packed      
majority1 while the malcontents may be1 
if not the larger1 clearly the better   
portion of the community4 7s4 iv41 n4   

#e1 p4 #cba47  ,readings4--,st4 ,thos41 
,de ,regimine ,principum1 i41 #f2 #b;a  
#b1 q4 #db1 art4 #b2 #b;a #b1 q1 #fi1   
art4 #d1 in corp42 ,locke1 ,of ,civil   
,government1 nn4 #bjj1 #bja1 #bjc1 #bjd1
 #bjh1 #bji1 #bbc1 #bbd1 #bbe1 #bbg1    
#bbi1 #bcj1 #bcb4   ,,section           
,,viii4--,of the ,right of the sword4   
#a4 ,by the right of the sword is       
technically meant the right of          
inflicting capital punishment1 according
 to the ,apostle's words3 ,but if thou  
do that which is evil1 fear3 for he     
beareth not the sword in vain4 7,rom4   
xiii4 #d47 ,we commonly call it the     
power of life and death4  #b4 ,that a   
government may be a working government1 
as it should be 7s4 iv41 n4 #b1 p4      
#cai71 it must not only make laws1 but  
bear out and enforce its legislation by 
the sanction of punishment4 ,if talk and
 argumentation were sufficient to make  
men well-behaved1 manifold and high     
should be the reward of talkers4444 ,but
 in fact it appears that talking does   

very well to incite and stimulate youths
 of fine mind2 and lighting upon a noble
 character and one of healthy tastes1 it
 may dispose such a person to take up   
the practice of virtue3 but it is wholly
 unable to move the multitude to        
goodness2 for it is not their nature to 
obey conscience1 but fear1 nor to       
abstain from evil because it is wrong1  
but because of punishments4 ,the        
multitude live by feeling3 they pursue  
the pleasures that they like and the    
means thereto1 and shun the opposite    
pains1 but they have no idea1 as they   
have had no taste1 of what is right and 
fair and truly sweet4444 ,the man who   
lives by feeling will not listen to the 
voice of reason1 nor can he appreciate  
its warning4 ,how is it possible to     
divert such a one from his course by    
argument8 ,speaking generally1 we say   
that passion yields not to argument but 
to constraint4444 ,the multitude obey on
 compulsion rather than on principle1   
and from fear of pains and penalties    

rather than from a sense of right4      
,these are grounds for believing that   
legislators1 while exhorting to virtue  
and putting certain courses of conduct  
forward as right and honourable1 in the 
expectation that good men will obey the 
call1 as their habits lead them1 should 
at the same time inflict chastisements  
and punishments upon the crossgrained   
and disobedient2 and as for the         
incurably vicious1 put them beyond the  
pale altogether4 ,the result will be1   
that the decent and conscientious       
citizen will listen to the voice of     
reason1 while the worthless votary of   
pleasure is chastened by pain like a    
beast of burden4444 ,law has a coercive 
function1 appealing to force1           
notwithstanding that it is a reasoned   
conclusion of practical wisdom and      
intelligence4 ,the interference of      
persons is odious1 when it stands out   
against the tide of passion1 even where 
it is right and proper to interfere2 but
 no odium attaches to statute law       

enjoining the proper course4            
7,aristotle1 ,ethics1 ,x41 ix47  #c4    
,aristotle seems hard upon the masses1  
likening them to brutes who must be     
governed by the whip4 ,he may be        
supposed to speak from experience of the
 men of his time4 ,if humanity has      
somewhat improved in two and twenty     
centuries1 yet it cannot be contended   
that the whip is grown unnecessary and  
beyond the whip the sword4 ,but we must 
observe a certain modus operandi of     
punishment which ,aristotle has not     
noted1 a more human mode than the terror
 of slavish fear4 ,just punishment1 felt
 as such1 stimulates the conscience to  
discern and abhor the crime4 ,men would 
think little of outraging their own     
nature by excess1 did they not know that
 the laws of ,god and man forbid such   
outrage4 ,again1 they would think little
 even of those laws1 were not the law   
borne out by the sanction of punishment4
 ,a law that may be broken with impunity
 is taken to be the toying of a         

legislator not in earnest4 ,men here are
 as children4 ,a child is cautioned     
against lying4 ,he reckons little of the
 caution3 he tells a lie1 and a flogging
 ensues4 ,thereupon his mind reverts to 
what he was told3 he sees that the      
warning was meant in earnest4 ,he       
reflects that it must have been a wicked
 thing1 that lie which his father1 the  
object of his fond reverence1 chastises 
so sternly4 ,if the thing had been let  
pass1 he would scarcely have regarded it
 as wicked4 ,next time he is more on his
 guard1 not merely because he fears a   
beating1 but because he understands     
better than before that lying is wrong4 
,the awe in which grown-up people stand 
of a red judge1 is not simple fear1 like
 that which keeps the wolf from the     
flock guarded by shepherds and their    
dogs3 but they are alarmed into         
reflection upon the evil which he is    
,god's minister to avenge1 and they are 
moved to keep the law1 not only for     
wrath1 but for conscience sake4 ,from   

this we see that for punishment to be   
really salutary1 its justice must be    
manifest to the culprit1 or to the      
lookers on1 at least in their cooler    
moments4 ,a punishment the justice of   
which is not discernible1 may quell for 
the moment1 but it does not moralise1   
nor abidingly deter4 ,there must be an  
apparent proportion between the offence 
and the punishment4 ,a ,draconian code1 
visiting petty offences with the        
severity due to high misdemeanours1 is  
more of an irritant than a represser of 
crime1 because it goes beyond men's     
consciences4  #d4 ,there is in every    
human breast a strong sense of what the 
learned call lex talionis1 and children 
tit for tat4 ,if a man has done to him  
what he has done to others1 that is the 
straight course of justice2 so says the 
canon of ,rhadamanthus1 quoted by       
,aristotle4 7,eth41 ,v41 v41 #c47 ,we   
have argued the fundamental correctness 
of this rule4 7,ethics1 c4 ix41 s4 iii41
 n4 #b1 p4 #afi47 ,it appears in the    

divine direction given to ,nod3 ,whoso  
sheddeth man's blood1 his blood shall be
 shed4 7,gen4 ix4 #f47 ,it appears in   
that popular sentiment1 which in some   
parts of ,america displays itself in the
 lynching of murderers1 who have unduly 
escaped the hands of the law2 and which1
 under a similar paralysis of law in    
,corsica1 broke out in blood-feuds1     
whereby the nearest relative of the     
deceased went about to slay the         
murderer4 ,such taking of justice into  
private hands is morally unlawful1 as we
 have proved4 7,ethics1 c4 ix41 s4 iii41
 n4 #d1 p4 #aga2 ,natural ,law1 c4      
viii41 s4 ii41 nn4 #b1 #c1 pp4 #cjh1    
#cji47 ,it is a violent outburst of a   
natural and reasonable sentiment        
deprived of its legitimate vent4        
,unquestionably then there is an        
apparent and commonly recognized        
fairness of retribution in the          
infliction of capital punishment for    
murder4 ,thus the first condition of    
appropriate punishment is satisfied1    

that it be manifestly proportioned to   
the crime4  #e4 ,capital punishment is  
moreover expedient1 nay1 necessary to   
the ,state4 ,the right to inflict it is 
one of the essential prerogatives of    
government1 one of those prerogatives   
the sum of which1 as we have seen1 is a 
constant quantity everywhere1 7s4 iv41  
n4 #g1 p4 #cbb74 ,no ,government can    
renounce it4 ,the abolition of capital  
punishment by law only makes the power  
of inflicting it latent in the ,state   
7s4 iv41 n4 #h1 p4 #cbc72 it does not   
and cannot wholly take the power away4  
,you ask3 ,is there not hope1 that if   
humanity goes on improving as it has    
done1 capital punishment will become    
wholly unnecessary8 ,i answer           
that--waiving the question of the       
prospect of improvement--in a ,state    
mainly consisting of ,god-fearing1      
conscientious men1 the infliction of    
capital punishment would rarely be      
necessary1 but the power to inflict it  
could never be dispensed with4 ,if men  

ever become so ideally virtuous1 the    
right of the ,state to visit gross crime
 with death cannot hurt them1 and it    
will strengthen their virtue1 as all    
human social virtue will ever need      
strengthening4  #f4 ,the abiding        
necessity of this right of the sword is 
argued from the strength and frequency  
of the provocations to deeds of         
bloodshed and violence that must ever be
 encountered in human society4 ,what    
these provocations are1 how many and how
 strong1 may be left to the reflection  
of the student who reads his newspaper1 
or even his novel4 ,not the least       
appalling thing about crime1 atrocious  
crime especially1 is the example that it
 gives and the imitators whom it begets4
 ,it is not merely that it sets the     
perpetrator himself on the downward     
path1 so that1 unless detected and      
punished1 a man's first deed of blood is
 rarely his last3 it draws others after 
him by a fatal fascination4 ,like the   
images which the ,epicureans supposed   

all visible objects to slough off and   
shed into the air around them1 such     
phantoms and images of guilt float about
 a great crime1 enter into the mind of  
the spectator and of the hearer1 and    
there1 upon slight occasion1 turn to    
actual repetitions of the original deed4
 ,the one preventive is to append to    
that deed a punishment1 the image of    
which shall also enter into the mind1   
excite horror1 and disenchant the       
recipient4 ,this is not to be done by   
mere banishment of the criminal1 nor by 
his perpetual incarceration4 ,exile and 
prison--particularly in view of the     
humanity of a modern penitentiary--do   
not sufficiently strike the imagination4
 ,one sweet hour of revenge will often  
appear cheap at the price of ten years' 
penal servitude4 ,there is nothing goes 
to the heart like death4 ,death is the  
most striking of terrors2 it is also the
 penalty that most exactly counterpoises
 in the scales of justice the commission
 of a murderous crime4 ,all ,states need

 this dread figure of the ,sword-bearer 
standing at the elbow of the ,sovereign4
  #g4 ,but is not every capital sentence
 a trespass upon the dominion of ,god1  
,lord of life and death8 ,no1 for that  
same ,god it is who has endowed man with
 a nature that needs to grow up in civil
 society1 which civil society again     
needs for its maintenance the power to  
make laws1 to sit in judgment on        
transgressors1 and in extreme cases1 as 
we have proved1 having tried them and   
found them guilty1 to take away even    
their lives1 to the common terror and   
horror of the crime4 ,god1 who wills    
human nature to be1 wills it to be on   
the terms on which alone it can be4 ,to 
that end ,he has handed over to the     
civil ruler so much of ,his own divine  
power of judgment1 as shall enable ,his 
human delegate to govern with assurance 
and effect4 ,that means the right of the
 sword4  #h4 ,it may be objected that to
 kill any man is to treat him as a      
thing1 not a person1 as an              

heterocentric1 not an autocentric being1
 which is a proceeding essentially      
unnatural and wrong1 7c4 ii41 s4 i41 n4 
#b1 p4 #bjc47 ,st4 ,thomas's answer here
 is peculiarly valuable3  ,man by       
sinning withdraws from the order of     
reason1 and thereby falls from human    
dignity1 so far as that consists in man 
being naturally free and existent for   
his own sake autocentric2 and falls in a
 manner into the state of servitude     
proper to beasts1 according to that of  
the ,psalm 7xlviii4 #ae73 ,man when he  
was in honour did not understand3 he    
hath matched himself with senseless     
beasts and become like unto them2 and   
,proverbs xi4 #bi3 ,the fool shall serve
 the wise4 ,and therefore1 though to    
kill a man1 while he abides in his      
native dignity1 be a thing of itself    
evil1 yet to kill a man who is a sinner 
may be good1 as to kill a beast4 ,for   
worse is an evil man than a beast1 and  
more noxious1 as the ,philosopher says4 
7#b;a #b1 q4 #fd1 art4 #b1 ad #c47      

,hence observe3--7#a7 ,that a           
,utilitarian who denies free will1 as   
many of that school do1 stands at some  
loss whence to show cause why even an   
innocent man may not be done to death   
for reasons of ,state1 e4g41 as a       
sanitary precaution4  7#b7 ,that the    
,state must come to a conclusion about  
inward dispositions by presumption from 
overt acts1 arguing serious moral guilt 
before proceeding to capital punishment4
 ,to this extent the ,state is remotely 
a judge of sin4 ,but it does not punish 
sin retributively as sin1 nor even      
medicinally4 ,it punishes the violation 
of its own laws1 to deter future        
offenders4 7,ethics1 c4 ix41 s4 iii41   
nn4 #d-f1 pp4 #aga-agd47                
,readings4--,st4 ,thos41 #b;a #b1 q4    
#fd1 art4 #b1 #c2 #b;a #b1 q4 #ajh1 art4
 #c4   ,,section ,,ix4--,of ,war4   #a4 
,war1 a science by itself1 has no       
interest for the philosopher except as  
an instance on a grand scale of         
self-defence4 ,when the theory of       

self-defence has been mastered 7c4 ii4  
s4 ii41 p4 #bjh71 little further remains
 to be said about war4 ,in a ,state1 the
 self-defence of citizen against citizen
 is confined to the moment of immediate 
physical aggression4 ,but in a region   
where the ,state is powerless and       
practically non-existent1 self-defence  
assumes a far greater amplitude4 7,s4   
ii41 n1 #b1 p4 #cji47 ,when the         
,highland chief lifted the cattle of the
 ,lowland farmer1 and the ,king of      
,scotland lay unconcerned and unable to 
intervene1 feasting at ,holyrood1 or    
fighting on the ,english border1 then1  
if there were a fair hope of recovering 
the booty without a disproportionate    
effusion of blood1 the farmer did right 
to arm his people1 march after the      
robber1 and fight him for the stolen    
oxen1 as the gallant ,baron of          
,bradwardine would fain have done4      
7,waverley1 c4 xv47 ,here is the right  
of self-defence in its full development1
 including the right of private war4    

,but in a private individual this is an 
undesirable1 rank1 and luxuriant growth2
 and when the individual comes to live1 
as it should be his aim to live1 in a   
well-organized ,state1 the growth is    
pruned and cut down3 he may then defend 
himself for the instant when the ,state 
cannot defend him2 but after the wrong  
is done1 he must hold his hand1 and     
quietly apply to the ,state to procure  
him restitution and redress4 ,but there 
is no ,state of ,states1 no ,king of    
,kings1 upon earth2 therefore1 when of  
two independent ,states the one has     
wronged1 or is about to wrong the other1
 and will not desist nor make amends1   
nothing is left for it2 ,nature has made
 no other provision1 but they must      
fight4 ,they must fall back upon the    
steel and the shotted gun1 the ratio    
ultima regum4  #b4 ,the ,lowland farmer 
above mentioned might be spoken of as   
punishing the ,highland robber1         
chastising his insolence1 and the like4 
,this is popular phraseology1 but it is 

not accurate4 ,punishment1 an act of    
vindictive justice1 is from superior to 
inferior4 7,ethics1 c4 v41 s4 ix41 n4   
#d1 p4 #ajd47 ,war1 like other          
self-defence1 is between equals4 ,war is
 indeed an act of authority1 of the     
authority of each belligerent ,state    
over its own subjects1 but not of one   
belligerent over the other4 ,we are not 
here considering the case of putting    
down a rebellion3 rebels are not        
properly belligerents1 and have no      
belligerent rights4  #c4 ,the study of  
,civil and ,canon ,law flourished in the
 ,middle ,ages1 while moral science1    
which is the study of the ,natural ,law1
 was still in its infancy4 ,no wonder   
that the mediaeval jurists occasionally 
formulated maxims1 which can only be    
squared with the principles of ,natural 
,law by an exceeding amount of          
interpretation1--which are in fact much 
better dropped1 quoted though they      
sometimes be by moralists of repute4    
,one such maxim is this1 that a         

wrong-doer becomes the subject of the   
injured party by reason of the offence4 
,admit this1 and you can hardly keep    
clear of ,locke's doctrine of the origin
 of civil power1 7s4 ii41 per totum1 p4 
#cjg2 cf4 ,suarez1 ,de ,caritate1 d4    
xiii41 s4 iv41 nn4 #e1 #f74  #d4 ,we    
have only to repeat about war what we   
said of self-defence1 that all the      
killing that takes place in it is       
incidental1 or indirect4 ,the cannon    
that you see in ,woolwich ,arsenal1 the 
powder and torpedoes1 have for their end
 what ,st4 ,thomas 7,de ,potentia1 q4   
#g1 art4 #b1 ad #aj7 declares to be the 
end and object of the soldier1 to upset 
the foe1 to put him hors de combat4     
,this is accomplished in such rough and 
ready fashion1 as the business admits   
of2 by means attended with incidental   
results of extremest horror4 ,but no    
sooner has the bayonet thrust or the    
bullet laid the soldier low1 and        
converted him into a non-combatant1 than
 the ambulance men are forward to see   

that he shall not die4 ,if indeed even  
in the dust he continues to be          
aggressive1 like the wounded ,arabs at  
,tel-el-,kebir1 he must be quieted and  
repressed a second time4 ,probably he   
will not escape with life from a second 
repression3 still1 speaking with        
philosophic precision1 we must say that 
to quiet1 not to kill him1 is1 or should
 be1 the precise and formal object of   
the will of his slayer in war4 ,st4     
,thomas indeed 7#b;a #b1 q4 #fd1 art4   
#g1 in corp47 seems to allow the soldier
 fighting against the enemy to mean to  
kill his man4 ,but by enemy in this     
passage we should probably understand   
rebel4 ,the soldier spoken of is the    
instrument of the feudal lord bringing  
back to duty his rebellious vassal4 ,in 
the ,middle ,ages1 till the end of the  
fifteenth century1 the notion of        
independent nations scarcely found      
place4  ,in war1 as all cases of        
self-defence1 the killing is indirect4  
,in capital punishment1 on the other    

hand1 the killing is direct3 it being   
chosen as a deterrent means1 that the   
offender be hanged by the neck till he  
is dead1 dead1 dead4 ,this disposes of  
the error1 that capital punishment is an
 act of self-defence on the part of the 
,state against evildoers4 ,we may       
observe finally that by the right of the
 sword1 and by that alone1 not in       
self-defence1 not in war1 but by the    
hand of public justice raised against a 
guilty subject1 can human life ever be  
taken directly4  ,reading4--,st4 ,thos41
 #b;a #b1 q4 #dj1 art4 #a4   ,,section  
,x4--,of the ,scope and ,aim of ,civil  
,government4   #a4 ,i beseech the pious 
reader not to be shocked and scandalised
 by the conclusions of this section4 ,he
 will find them in the end a valuable   
support to theology4 ,the most religious
 mind can have no difficulty in allowing
 that cookery1 as such1 is a business of
 this world only3 that you retain your  
cook1 not to save your soul1 but to     
prepare palatable and wholesome         

nourishment for your body2 that honesty1
 sobriety1 and good temper are          
officially requisite qualifications1    
simply inasmuch as the contrary vices   
would be the plague of your kitchen and 
the spoiling of your dinner4 ,in a      
,catholic house the soup on a ,friday is
 made without meat4 ,that restriction is
 observed1 not as a point of culinary   
art1 but because1 whereas eternal       
salvation is the main end of life1 and  
cookery a subordinate end1 the latter   
must be so prosecuted as not to         
interfere with the former4 ,she who uses
 ingredients forbidden by the ,church1  
is the worse ,christian1 but she may be 
the better cook4 ,now1 to compare a     
great thing with a little1 the ,state   
equally with the kitchen is a creation  
of this world1--there are no            
nationalities1 nor kitchen-ranges       
either1 beyond the grave4 ,civil        
government is a secular concern4 ,the   
scope and aim intrinsic to it1 and      
attainable by its own proper forces1 is 

a certain temporal good4 ,suarez 7,de   
,legibus1 ,,iii41 xi41 #g7 sets forth   
that good to be1--the natural happiness 
of the perfect human community1 whereof 
the civil legislature has the care1 and 
the happiness of individuals as they are
 members of such of a community1 that   
they may live therein peaceably and     
justly1 and with a sufficiency of goods 
for the preservation and comfort of     
their bodily life1 and with so much     
moral rectitude as is necessary for this
 external peace and happiness of the    
commonwealth and the continued          
preservation of human nature4  #b4 ,the 
intrinsic scope and aim of civil        
government is the good of the citizens  
as citizens4 ,that1 we have to show1 is 
not any good of the world to come2 nor  
again the full measure of good requisite
 for individual well-being in this      
world4 ,the good of the citizens as such
 is that which they enjoy in common in  
their social and political capacity3    
namely1 security1 wealth1 liberty1      

commerce1 the arts of life1 arms1 glory1
 empire1 sanitation1 and the like1 all  
which goods1 of their own nature1 reach 
not beyond this world4 ,true1 a certain 
measure of moral rectitude also is      
maintained in common1 but only so much  
as is necessary for the external peace  
and happiness of the commonwealth1 not  
that rectitude of the whole man which is
 required in view of the world to come4 
7,ethics1 c4 x41 n4 #d #c1 p4 #ahb47    
,the intrinsic aim of the ,state1 then1 
falls short of the next life4 ,neither  
does it cover the entire good of the    
individual even for this life4 ,the good
 of the ,state1 and of each citizen as a
 citizen1 which it is the purpose of    
civil government to procure1 is a mere  
grand outline1 within which every man   
has to fill in for himself the little   
square of his own personal perfection   
and happiness4 ,happiness1 as we have   
seen1 lies essentially in inward acts4  
,the conditions of these acts1 outward  
tranquillity and order1 are the         

statesman's care3 the acts themselves   
must be elicited by each individual from
 his own heart4 ,happiness also depends 
greatly on domestic life1 the details of
 which1 at least when they stop short of
 wife-beating1 come not within the      
cognisance of the civil power4 ,it      
remains1 as we have said1 that the scope
 and aim of the ,state1 within its own  
sphere and the compass of its own       
powers1 is the temporal prosperity of   
the body politic1 and the prosperity of 
its members as they are its members and 
citizens1 but not absolutely as they are
 men4 ,we cannot repeat too often the   
saying of ,st4 ,thomas3 ,man is not     
ordained to the political commonwealth  
to the full extent of all that he is and
 has4 7#a;a #b1 q4 #ba1 art4 #d1 ad #c47
  #c4 ,from this view it appears that   
the end for which the ,state exists is  
indeed an important and necessary good1 
but it is not all in all to man1 not his
 perfect and final happiness4 ,to guide 
man to that is the office of the        

,christian ,church in the present order 
of ,providence4 ,cook and statesman must
 so go about the proper ends of their   
several offices1 as not to stand in the 
way of the ,church1 compassing as she   
does that supreme end to which all other
 ends are subordinate4 ,this limitation 
they are bound to observe1 not as cook  
and statesman1 but as men and           
,christians4 ,a perfectly ,christian    
,state1 as ,christian1 has a twofold    
duty4 ,first1 it has a positive duty1 at
 the request of the ,church1 to follow  
up ecclesiastical laws with             
corresponding civil enactments1 e4g41   
laws against criminous clerks and       
excommunicates4 ,on this spiritual      
ground1 being beyond its jurisdiction1  
the ,state must be careful not to       
forestall but to second the precept of  
spiritual authority4 ,it is no business 
of the ,state1 as such1 to punish a     
purely religious offence4 ,the second   
duty of a ,christian ,state1 and a more 
urgent duty even than the former1 is the

 negative one of making no civil        
enactment to the prejudice of the       
,church3 e4g41 not to subject clerics to
 the law of conscription4 ,useful as    
their arms might be for the defence of  
the country1 the ,state must forego that
 utility for the sake of a higher end4  
#d4 ,in the order of pure nature1 which 
is the order of philosophy1 there is of 
course no ,church4 ,still there would   
be1 as we have seen 7c4 i41 s4 i41 n4   
#h1 p4 #aig71 erected on the same lines 
as the civil power1 and working side by 
side with it1 a religious power         
competent to prescribe and conduct      
divine worship4 ,this power the ,state  
would be bound to abet and support1 both
 positively and negatively2 something in
 the same manner1 but not to the same   
degree1 as the ,christian ,state is     
bound to abet the ,church4 ,the supreme 
direction of the natural religious power
 would conveniently be vested in the    
person of the ,civil ,ruler4 ,thus the  
,roman ,emperor was also ,chief         

,pontiff4  #e4 ,how in the mere natural1
 as distinguished from the ,christian   
order1 the provinces of marriage and    
education should be divided between the 
civil and the religious power1 is       
perhaps not a very profitable enquiry4  
,the only use of it is a polemic use in 
arguing with men of no ,christianity4   
,among all men of any religion1 marriage
 has ever been regarded as one of those 
occasions of life that bring man into   
special relation with ,god1 and         
therefore into some dependence on ,god's
 ministers4 ,education1 again1 has a    
religious element1 to be superintended  
by the religious power4 ,education has a
 secular element also1 the general      
superintendence of which cannot be      
denied to the ,state4 ,though children  
are facts of the domestic order1 and the
 care and formation of them belongs     
primarily to their parents1 yet if the  
parents neglect their charge1 the ,state
 can claim the right of intervention ab 
abusu4 ,it certainly is within the      

province of the ,state to prevent any   
parent from launching upon the world a  
brood of young barbarians1 ready to     
disturb the peace of civil society4 ,the
 practical issue is1 who are barbarians 
and what is understood by peace4 ,the   
,emperor ,decius probably considered    
every ,christian child an enemy of the  
,pax ,romana4 ,but the misapplication of
 a maxim does not derogate from its     
truth4 ,it also belongs to the ,state to
 see that no parent behaves like a      
,cyclops 7,greek3 kyklopikos1 ,ar41     
,eth41 ,x41 ix41 #ac7 in his family1    
ordering his children1 not to their     
good1 as a father is bound to do1 but to
 his own tyrannical caprice4 ,for       
instruction1 as distinguished from      
education1 it is the parent's duty to   
provide his child with so much of it as 
is necessary1 in the state of society   
wherein his lot is cast1 to enable the  
child to make his way in the world      
according to the condition of his       
father4 ,in many walks of life one might

 as well be short of a finger as not    
know how to read and write4 ,where      
ignorance is such a disadvantage1 the   
parent is not allowed to let his child  
grow up ignorant4 ,there1 if he neglects
 to have him taught1 the ,state may step
 in with compulsory schooling4          
,compulsory schooling for all           
indiscriminately1 and that up to a high 
standard1 is quite another matter4      
,readings4--,suarez1 ,de ,legibus1      
,,iii41 xi42 ib41 ,,iv41 ii41 nn4 #c1   
#d3 ,st4 ,thos41 #a;a #b1 q4 #ic1 art4  
#c1 ad #c2 ib41 q4 #if1 art4 #b2 ib41 q4
 #ih1 art4 #a1 in corp42ib41 q4 #ii1    
art4 #c1 in corp42 ib41 q4 #ajj1 art4   
#b1 in corp4   ,,section ,,xi4--,of ,law
 and ,liberty4   #a4 ,the student of    
,natural ,law does not share the vulgar 
prejudice against civil law and lawyers4
 ,he knows it for a precept of the      
,natural ,law1 that there should be a   
,state set up1 and that this ,state     
should proceed to positive legislation4 
,this legislation partly coincides with 

,natural ,law in urging the practice of 
that limited measure of morality1 which 
is necessary for the ,state to do its   
office and to be at all4 7s4 x41 n4 #b1 
p4 #cee47 ,this partial enforcement of  
the ,law of ,nature is the main work of 
the criminal law of the ,state4 ,but    
,state legislation goes beyond the      
,natural ,law1 and in the nature of     
things must go beyond it4 ,natural ,law 
leaves a thousand conflicting rights    
undetermined1 which in the interest of  
society1 to save quarrels1 must be      
determined one way or another4  #b4 ,an 
illustration4 ,it is an axiom of        
,natural ,law1 that res perit domino2   
that is1 the owner bears the loss4 ,if  
an article under sale perishes before   
delivery1 the loss falls1 apart from    
contracts to the contrary1 upon         
whichever of the two parties is the     
owner at the time4 ,so far nature rules4
 ,but who is the owner at any given     
time1 and at what stage of the          
transaction does the dominion pass8     

,that can only be settled by custom and 
the law of the land4 ,if ,i order a pipe
 of port from a wine-merchant abroad2 at
 what period the property passes from   
the merchant to me2 whether upon        
delivery of the wine at the merchant's  
warehouse2 upon its being put on        
shipboard at ,oporto2 upon the arrival  
of the ship in ,england at its destined 
port2 or not till the wine be committed 
to my servants1 or deposited in my      
cellar2 all are questions which admit of
 no decision but what custom points out4
 7,paley1 ,mor4 ,phil41 bk4 iii41 p4 i1 
c4 vii47  ,this leads us to remark upon 
the much admired sentence of ,tacitus1  
in corruptissima republica plurimae     
leges1 that not merely the multitude of 
transgressions1 but the very complexity 
of a highly developed civilization1     
requires to be kept in order by a vast  
body of positive law4  #c4 ,incidentally
 we may also remark1 that the law of the
 ,state does not create the right of    
property2 otherwise1 abolishing its own 

creation1 the ,state could bring in     
,communism1 7c4 vii41 s4 i41 p4 #bgh74  
,but finding this right of property     
unprotected and undetermined1 the ,state
 by its criminal law protects property  
against robbers1 and by its civil as    
distinguished from criminal law1 it     
defines numerous open questions between 
possessors as to manner of acquirement  
and conditions of tenure4  #d4 ,all     
civil laws bind the conscience3 some by 
way of a categorical imperative1 ,do    
this3 others by way of a disjunctive1   
,do this1 or being caught acting        
otherwise1 submit to the penalty4 ,the  
latter are called purely penal laws1 an 
expression1 by the way1 which has no    
reference to the days of religious      
persecution4 ,civil law binds the       
conscience categorically whenever the   
civil ruler so intends4 ,in the absence 
of express declaration1 it must be      
presumed that he so intends whenever his
 law is an enforcement of the ,natural  
,law1 or a determination of the same2 as

 when the observance is necessary to the
 preservation of the ,state1 or when the
 ruler determines what lapse of time    
shall be necessary for the acquisition  
of property by prescription4 ,very      
frequently1 the parties to a contract   
tacitly accept the dispositions of the  
civil law as forming part of their      
agreement2 and in this indirect fashion 
the civil law becomes binding on the    
conscience4 ,in this way an ,englishman 
who accepts a bill of exchange tacitly  
binds himself to pay interest at five   
per cent41 if the bill is not met at    
maturity1 for such is the disposition of
 the ,english ,law4 ,it may be further  
observed that no prudent legislator     
would attach a severe penalty to what   
was not already wrong4  #e4 ,in ,roman  
times it was part of the flattery of the
 imperial jurists to their master1 to   
tell him that he was above the laws1    
legibus solutus4 ,in the trial of ,louis
 ,,xvi41 the ,sovereign ,people1 or they
 who called themselves such1 dispensed  

with certain legal formalities on that  
same plea4 ,against the law at ,athens1 
the generals who had fought at          
,arginusae were condemned by one        
collective sentence1 the anger of the   
,sovereign ,people being too impatient  
to vote on them separately1 as the law  
required4 ,hereupon we must observe in  
the first place1 that the ,supreme      
,ruler1 whether one man or a multitude1 
can never be brought to trial in his own
 court for any legal offence4 ,as all   
justice requires two terms3 no power can
 do justice on itself4 7,ethics1 c4 v41 
s4 ix41 n4 #a1 p4 #ajb47 ,this truth is 
embodied in the ,english maxim1 that the
 king can do no wrong4 ,again1 the      
,sovereign is either expressly or       
virtually exempted from the compass of  
many laws1 e4g4 those which concern the 
flying of certain flags or ensigns1 and 
other petty matters4 ,thirdly1 we have  
the principle1 that no being can give a 
law to himself4 7,ethics1 c4 vi4 s4 ii41
 n4 #c1 p4 #aag47 ,lastly1 we must      

observe that there is no law so         
fundamental but what the ,supreme       
,power1 taken in its entirety1 can alter
 it1 and by consequence dispense from   
it4 ,from these considerations it       
follows that the ,sovereign--the        
complete and absolute ,sovereign1 be he 
one man or many--lies under no legal    
obligation to obey any law of his own   
making as such4 ,it does not follow that
 he is perfectly free to ignore the     
laws4 ,he is bound in conscience and    
before ,god to make his government      
effectual2 and effectual it cannot be1  
if the laws are despised2 and despised  
they will be1 if the ,sovereign gives   
scandal by ignoring them in his own     
practice4 ,therefore the ,sovereign1 be 
he ,king1 ,council1 or ,assembly1 is    
bound in conscience and before ,god1    
though not legally of his own           
jurisdiction1 so far himself to stand to
 the observance of the law as not to    
render it nugatory in the eyes and      
practice of others4  #f4 ,law and       

liberty are like the strings and meshes 
of a net4 ,in the one limit of minimum  
of mesh1 the net passes into sack-cloth1
 where nothing could get through4 ,in   
the other limit of maximum of mesh1 the 
net vanishes1 and everything would get  
through4 ,we cannot praise in the       
abstract either a large mesh or a small 
one3 the right size is according to the 
purpose for which the net is to be used 
in each particular case4 ,so neither can
 law nor liberty be praised1 as ,burke  
says1 on a simple view of the subject1  
as it stands stripped of every relation1
 in all the nakedness and solitude of   
metaphysical abstraction4 ,we can only  
praise either as it is clothed in       
circumstances4 ,commonly we are led to  
praise the one by getting too much of   
the other4 ,confounded in a tangle of   
fussy1 vexatious1 perhaps malicious     
restrictions1 men cry loudly for        
liberty4 ,when people all about us are  
doing things by their own sweet will1 we
 are converted to praise of regulation  

and discipline and the wholesome        
restraint of law4  ,readings4--,st4     
,thos41 #a;a #b1 q4 #if1 art4 #e1 ad #c2
 ,suarez1 ,de ,legibus1 ,,iii41 xxxv42  
ib41 ,v41 iv42 ,ruskin1 ,seven ,lamps of
 ,architecture1 c4 vii41  ,i1 #b4       
,,section ,,xii4--,of ,liberty of       
,opinion4   #a4 ,we are here dealing    
with liberty only so far as it means    
exemption from ,state control4 ,so far  
as the ,state is concerned1 a man has   
the fullest liberty to hold in his heart
 the most seditious opinions1 and to    
think the foulest thoughts1 so long as  
they do not appear in his public        
language and conduct4 ,the heart is free
 from all mere human law1 resting in    
subjection to ,his law alone1 and in    
responsibility to ,his judgment1 who is 
the ,searcher of ,hearts4  #b4 ,we are  
dealing then not properly with opinion1 
but with the public expression of       
opinion4 ,we are dealing with that      
expression as controllable by the       
,state1 not acting in deference to the  

invitation of any religious power1 but  
of its own initiative and proper        
authority1 in view of its own end1 scope
 and aim1 which is social order and     
public prosperity for this life4 7s4 x41
 nn4 #b1 #c1 p4 #cee47  #c4 ,that there 
are doctrines dangerous to social order1
 cannot be denied1 unless we are to     
cease to believe in any influence of    
thought upon conduct4 ,it is important  
to the ,state1 that men should have the 
greatest possible horror of crime4 7s4  
viii41 nn4 #c1 #f1 pp4 #cde1 #cdh47     
,this horror is notably impaired when   
all idea of sin is taken away4 ,now the 
idea of sin vanishes with that of ,god4 
7,ethics1 c1 vi41 s4 ii41 nn4 #f1 #g1   
#ac1 pp4 #aai1 #abc47 ,therefore to pull
 down the idea of ,god among a nation of
 theists1 whether by the wiles of a     
courtly ,professor at a ,university1 or 
by the tub-thumping blasphemy of an     
itinerant lecturer1 is to injure the    
,state4 ,the tub-thumper however is the 
more easily reached by the civil        

authority1 especially when his          
discourses raise a tumult among the     
people4 ,but where attacks upon theism  
have become common1 and unbelief is     
already rampant among the masses1 for   
the ,state to interfere with either     
leader of thought1 high or low1 would be
 a shutting of the stable-door after the
 steed was stolen4 ,similarly we should 
speak of those who subvert the received 
notions touching the sanctity of the    
marriage-tie and the law of external    
purity generally1 the obligation of     
civil allegiance1 the rights of property
 and of life4  #d4 ,it will be objected3
 ,the doctrines that you wish to express
 as inimical to the peace of the        
commonwealth1 possibly may be true4 ,did
 not the first heralds of ,christianity 
trouble the peace of the ,roman world8  
,we reply3 ,let the new teachers come to
 us as those apostolic men came1 in     
weakness and in fear and in much        
trembling1 and yet withal in the showing
 of the spirit and power1 with an       

exhortation not of uncleanness1 nor upon
 an occasion of covetousness1 holily and
 justly and without blame 7#a ,cor4 ii4 
#c1 #d2 #a ,thess4 ii4 #c1 #e1 #aj72 and
 we will receive them as angels of ,god1
 even to the plucking out of our own    
eyes1 if need be1 and giving to them4   
7,gal4 iv4 #ae47 ,any hostile reception 
that they may meet with at first from a 
misapplication of our principle1 will   
soon be made up for by welcome and      
veneration4 ,there is no principle that 
may not be momentarily misapplied in all
 good faith4 ,but the mistake in this   
case will readily be rectified4  #e4    
,but1 writes ,j4 ,s4 ,mill1 ,on         
,liberty1 we can never be sure that the 
opinion we are endeavouring to stifle is
 a false opinion4 ,if we cannot1 then is
 there no such thing as certainty upon  
any point of morals1 politics1 or       
religion4 ,assassination of tyrants1    
whether in public or private life1 may  
be wickedness1 or it may be a laudable  
outburst of public spirit1 who knows8   

,which of us is sure that all property  
is not theft8 ,plato's views on marriage
 and infanticide may be correct3 the    
,nihilist may be your true politician2  
and all our religious knowledge dwindles
 down to the confession of ,protagoras3 
,concerning ,gods1 ,i find no clear     
evidence whether they are or are not1 or
 what manner of beings they are4 ,these 
are the sceptical tremors which this    
denial induces4 ,but even scepticism has
 its proof1 which ,mill furnishes as    
follows3 ,all silencing of discussion is
 an assumption of infallibility4 ,the   
very name infallibility has an effect   
upon the modern ,englishman like that of
 ,popery upon his forefathers4 ,it      
shakes his nerves1 obscures his         
judgment1 and scares his seated reason  
to leap up from her throne4 ,but after  
we have recovered from our fright1 we   
recollect that1 whereas infallibility is
 an all-round attribute1 compassing an  
entire subject1 certainty goes out to   
one particular point on the             

circumference2 we may then be certain   
without being infallible4 ,extremely    
fallible as ,i am in geography1 ,i am   
nevertheless certain that ,tunis is in  
,africa4 ,silencing discussion is an    
assumption1 not of infallibility1 but of
 certainty4 ,the man who never dares    
assume that he is certain of anything1  
so certain as to close his ears to all  
further discussion1 comes nothing short 
of a universal sceptic4  #f4 ,we are    
told1 free discussion promotes          
discovery4 ,yes1 free discussion in     
philosophical circles1 free discussion  
among competent persons4 ,but free      
discussion of a subject among the       
incompetent and the incapable1 and the  
passionate and the prejudiced1 is not   
good for the cause of truth2 and if the 
subject be practical and momentous1 it  
is not good for the disputants either1  
nor for the community4 ,if we allow that
 the science and practice of morality is
 not advanced by free debate of ethical 
questions in nurseries and              

boarding-schools1 we must also bear in  
mind that a vast proportion of the human
 family remain all their lives long1 for
 the purpose of such discussions1 as    
incompetent as children4 ,the multitude 
cannot be philosophers4 ,they have      
neither time1 nor intelligence1 nor love
 of hard thinking sufficient to arrive  
at the final and adequate why and       
wherefore of their every duty4 ,though  
capable of doing right1 they are quite  
incapable of doing so philosophically4  
,they do it according as they are led by
 custom and authority4 ,their           
inheritance is the traditionary wisdom  
of mankind1 which they live upon as an  
infant on his estate1 not understanding 
whence their support comes4 ,it is      
dangerous to batter them with objections
 against the received moral law4 ,you   
will overthrow them1 not confirm them by
 the result of your reasonings3 you will
 perplex their intellect1 you will      
confound their good purpose1 you will   
awaken their evil passions4 ,surely it  

is a more necessary point to secure that
 right be done somehow1 than that it be 
philosophically done4 ,the one is       
difficult enough1 the other quite       
impossible for the mass of mankind4     
,therefore1 adapting to our purpose the 
old ,greek oracle3 let us not disturb   
the foundations of popular morality3    
they are better undisturbed--    ,greek3
 ,mae kinei ,kamarinan akinaetos gar    
ameinoon  #g4 ,but is it not immoral to 
interfere with conscience1 and to       
attempt to stifle sincere convictions8  
,the ,state1 we repeat1 has nothing to  
do with conscience as such1 nor with the
 inward convictions of any man4 ,but if 
the ,state is sincerely convinced1 that 
the convictions openly professed and    
propagated by some of its subjects are  
subversive of social order and public   
morality1 whose sincere conviction is it
 that must carry the day in practice8   
,it is of the essence of government that
 the convictions1 sincere or otherwise1 
of the governed shall on certain        

practical issues be waived in the       
external observance in favour of the    
convictions of the ruling power4 ,after 
all1 this talk of conscience and sincere
 convictions is but the canting phrase  
of the day1 according to which          
conscience means mere wild humour and   
headstrong self-will4 ,such teachings as
 those which we would have the ,state to
 suppress1 e4g43 ,an oath is a folly3   
,there is no law of purity3 ,there is no
 harm in doing anything that does not   
annoy your neighbour3 are not the       
teachings of men sincerely convinced3   
they deserve no respect1 consideration1 
or tenderness on that score4 ,we do not 
say1 that the teachers of these         
monstrosities are not convinced1 but    
that they are not honestly and          
conscientiously convinced3 they have    
blinded themselves1 and become the      
guilty authors of their own delusion4   
,not all strong convictions are honestly
 come by or virtuously entertained4  #h4
 ,arraigned for their utterances1 men   

protest their sincerity1 as parties     
indicted for murder do their innocence4 
,we can set but small store by such     
protestations4 ,it is a question of     
evidence to come from other sources than
 from the accused person's own mouth4 ,a
 man indeed must be held to be sincere  
until he is proved to be the contrary4  
,that is the general rule4 ,but there   
are what ,roman lawyers call            
prsumptiones juris2 circumstances which1
 if proved1 will induce the court to    
take a certain view of a case1 and give 
judgment accordingly1 unless by further 
evidence that view is proved to be a    
false one4 ,now when a man proclaims    
some blatant and atrocious error in a   
matter bearing directly upon public     
morals--and it is for the restraint of  
these errors alone that we are          
arguing--there is a decided prsumptio   
juris1 that the error in him1 however   
doggedly he maintains it1 is not a      
sincere1 candid1 and innocently formed  
conviction4 ,the light of nature is not 

so feeble as that1 among civilized men4 
,let the offender be admonished and     
given time to think3 but if1 for all    
warning to the contrary1 the wilful man 
will have his way1 and still propagate  
his error to the confusion of society1  
he must be treated like any other       
virtuous and well-meaning criminal3 he  
must be restrained and coerced to the   
extent that the interests of society    
require4  #i4 ,at the same time it must 
be confessed that when an error1 however
 flagrant and pestilential1 has ceased  
to shock and scandalize the general body
 of the commonwealth2 when the people   
listen to the doctrine without          
indignation1 and their worst sentence   
upon it pronounces it merely queer1     
there is little hope of legal restraints
 there enduring long or effecting much4 
,penalties for the expression of opinion
 are available only so far as they tally
 with the common feeling of the country4
 ,when public opinion ceases to bear    
them out1 it is better not to enforce   

them3 for that were but to provoke      
resentment and make martyrs4 ,no        
regulations can be maintained except in 
a congenial atmosphere4 ,allowance too  
must be made for the danger of driving  
the evil to burrow underground4  #aj4   
,the censorship of opinions even in a   
model ,state would vary in method       
according to men and times4 ,the        
censorship of the ,press in particular  
might be either by ,imprimatur required 
before printing1 or by liability to     
prosecution after4 ,the ,imprimatur     
might be either for all books1 or only  
for a certain class4 ,it might be either
 obligatory1 or merely matter of        
counsel1 to obtain it4 ,we are not to   
adopt promiscuously all the praiseworthy
 institutions of our forefathers4       
,readings4--,cardinal ,newman1 ,letter  
to ,duke of ,norfolk1  #e2 ,the ,month  
for ,june1 #ahhc1 pp4 #bjj1 seqq4       
99       99       99       99       99  
,,appendix   ,of the precepts of        
,natural ,law1 some are more simple and 

of wider extension2 others are          
derivative1 complex1 and extend to fewer
 cases4 ,it is a question of more and   
less1 and no hard and fast line of      
demarcation can be drawn between them4  
,the former however are called primary1 
the latter secondary precepts4 ,again1  
the nature of man is the same in all men
 and at all periods of history for its  
essential elements1 but admits of wide1 
accidental variation and declension for 
the worse4 ,thirdly1 it is clear that   
,natural ,law is a law good and suitable
 for human nature to observe4 ,starting 
from these three axioms1 we apply the   
reasoning of ,st4 ,thomas1 #a;a #b1 q4  
#if1 art4 #b1 not to human law alone1 of
 which he is speaking1 but to sundry    
secondary precepts of ,natural ,law4    
,these are his words3  ,a law is laid   
down as a rule or measure of human acts4
 ,now a measure ought to be homogeneous 
with the thing measured4 ,hence laws    
also must be imposed upon men according 
to their condition4 ,as ,isidore says3  

',a law ought to be possible both       
according to nature and according to the
 custom of the country4' ,now the power 
or faculty of action proceeds from      
interior habit or disposition4 ,the same
 thing is not possible to him who has no
 habit of virtue1 that is possible to a 
virtuous man2 as the same thing is not  
possible to a boy and to a grown man1   
and therefore the same rule is not laid 
down for children as for adults4 ,many  
things are allowed to children1 that in 
adults are visited with legal punishment
 or with blame1 and in like manner many 
things must be allowed to men not       
perfect in virtue1 which would be       
intolerable in virtuous men4  ,this     
reasoning leads us up to a conclusion1  
which ,st4 ,thomas states thus 7la #b1  
q4 #id4 art4 #e73  ,a conceivable way in
 which the ,natural ,law might be       
changed is the way of subtraction1 that 
something should cease to be of the     
,natural ,law that was of it before4    
,understanding change in this sense1 the

 ,natural ,law is absolutely immutable  
in its first principles2 but as to      
secondary precepts1 which are certain   
detailed conclusions closely related to 
the first principles1 the ,natural ,law 
is not so changed as that its dictate is
 not right in most cases steadily to    
abide by2 it may however be changed in  
some particular case1 and in rare       
instances1 through some special causes  
impeding the observance of these        
secondary precepts4  ,the reason for    
this conclusion1 more pregnant1 it may  
be1 than ,st4 ,thomas himself discerned1
 is given briefly as follows 7#b;a #b1  
q4 #eg1 art4 #b1 ad #a73  ,human nature 
is changeable2 and therefore what is    
natural to man may sometimes fail to    
hold good4  ,the precepts of ,natural   
,law that fail to be applicable when    
human nature sinks below par1 are only  
secondary precepts1 and few even of     
them4 ,christianity brings human nature 
up to par1 and fulfils the ,natural ,law
 7,st4 ,matt4 v4 #ag71 enjoining the    

observance of it in its integrity4 ,this
 is the meaning of ,st4 ,john           
,chrysostom's saying3 ,of old not such  
an ample measure of virtue was proposed 
to us2 444 but since the coming of      
,christ the way has been made much      
narrower4 7,de ,virginitate1 c4 #dd3 cf4
 his #agth ,homily on ,st4 ,matt4 v4    
#cg2 indeed the doctrine is familiar in 
his pages47 ,thus the prohibition of    
polygamy1 being a secondary precept of  
the natural law1 failed in its          
application in that age of lapsed       
humanity1 when a woman was better one of
 many wives1 protected by one husband1  
than exposed to promiscuous violence and
 lust4 7,isaias iv4 i47   ,,note ,,on   
,,rousseau4   ,the ruler is the servant 
of the good of the people1 not of the   
will of the people1 except inasmuch as--
  a4 the will of the people is an       
indication of their good1 of which they 
are probable judges2  b4 it is usually  
impossible to do good to the people     
against their steady will4          99  

99       99       99       99   ,,index 
,aggregation theory of civil power1     
,altruism1  ,altum dominium1  ,anger1   
differs from hatred1  ,appetite in the  
modern sense1   in the scholastic sense1
   appetite and desire1  ,archetype     
,ideas1  ,aristotle1 imperfect as a     
moral philosopher1   on happiness1   on 
the passions1   on the mean of virtue1  
on death1   his ,magnanimous ,man1      
distinguishes chastisement from         
vengeance1   virtue from art1   on      
property1   defines a ,state1 a citizen1
 a polity1   on the ,state's need to    
punish1  ,atheism1 effects of social and
 political1  ,autocentric and           
heterocentric1  ,bain1 ,alexander1 on   
content1   on punishability1  ,beatific 
vision1  ,capital ,punishment1   not    
inconsistent with ,god's dominion over  
life1 nor   with the personality        
7autocentric7 of man1   power of 7right 
of the sword71 the distinguishing mark  
of sovereignty1   sole instance of      
rightful direct killing1  ,charity1   to

 enemies1   obligation of1 how differing
 from justice1  ,church and ,state1     
elementary philosophy of1               
,circumstances of act1   distinguished  
from means1  ,civil authority1 of ,god1 
binds the conscience1   latent or free1 
various distributions of1   not tied to 
any one polity1   when rightfully       
resisted1  ,comfort1 no specific against
 crime1  ,communism1  ,conscience1      
natural law of1   defined1   erroneous  
conscience1   requires educating1       
,conscience and the ,state1             
,contemplation1 essence of happiness1   
,contracts1  ,delight1 or pleasure1     
quality of1   said to perfect activity1 
not happiness1  ,democracy1 may be      
tyrannical1   not the sole valid polity1
   sheer democracy difficult to work1   
original and special sanctity attaching 
to democracy1  ,deontology1  ,desire1   
physical and psychical1  ,direct and    
indirect 7or incidental7 defined1       
,divorce1  ,duelling1 essential wrong   
of1  ,dumb animals1 our relations with1 

,duty1 matter not of mere goodness1 but 
of law2   duties of justice1 correlative
 of a right2   duties negative and      
positive1  ,education1 the ,state's part
 in1  ,end in view2 end does not justify
 means2   itself limitless1 sets a limit
 to the means1  ,english monarchy1      
,ethics1 strict view of1  ,evil1 none   
essential and positive in human nature1 
,fear1 as an excuse1  ,food and         
fiddling1 when better than philosophy1  
,fortitude1  ,francis of ,assisi1 ,st41 
,general ,consequences1 principle of1   
,god1 transcends created being1   object
 of human happiness1   ,god and         
possibilities1   cannot but enforce     
morality1   how entering into ,moral    
,philosophy1   does not dispense from   
the natural law1   punishes sin1        
twofold worship of1   ,god beyond the   
sphere of utilities1   duty of knowing  
,him1   why ,he cannot lie1   no ,god1  
no sin1  ,greek taste1  ,grotius and    
,milton1 on lying1  ,habit1 defined1    
acquired by acts1   a living thing1     

needs exercise1   habit and custom1     
man a creature of habits1   habits      
remain in the departed soul1            
,happiness1 defined1   open to man1     
final in contemplation of ,god1   other 
than contentment1   desired without     
limit1   not pleasure1  ,hatred and     
anger1  ,hedonism1  ,hobbes1 his        
,leviathan1  ,honour and reputation1    
,horace1 his phrase1 aurea mediocritas1 
,human act1   outward and inward1 one1  
,humility1  ,hypnotism1  ,ignorance1 as 
an excuse1  ,integrity1 state of1       
,intellectual error1 sometimes          
voluntary1   in that case not mere      
intellectual error1  ,jurisdiction1     
differs from dominion1  ,justice1 always
 relative to another1   legal 7or       
general71distributive1 commutative      
7corrective71   justice and charity     
differ1  ,kant1 his ,categorical        
,imperative1  ,killing1 direct and      
indirect1   indirect in self-defence1   
and in war1   direct only in capital    
punishment1  ,knowledge of ,god1        

obligatory1  ,labour1 qualitative as    
well as quantitative1   capital not     
simply an embodiment of labour1  ,land1 
a raw material1 nationalisation of1     
,law1 defined1   the ,eternal ,law1     
irresistible and yet resisted1   extends
 to all agents1 rational and irrational1
   co-eternal with1 yet not necessary as
 ,god1   laws of physical nature1   law 
of conscience1   fundamental laws of a  
state1   civil law1 necessary complement
 of natural law1   civil law1 how       
binding in conscience1   the ,king1     
legibus solutus1 how far1   law and     
liberty1  ,lay mind1  ,liberty1 the     
meshes of the net of law1   liberty of  
opinion and the press1  ,locke1 on the  
state of nature1  ,lying1 definition of1
   intention to deceive1 no part of the 
definition1   intrinsically and always  
wrong1   why ,god cannot lie1   not     
against commutative justice1   mental   
reservation not in every case a lie1    
,magnanimous man1  ,magnificence1       
,marriage1 duty of the race1 not of the 

individual1   two goods of marriage1    
unity1   indissolubility1  ,material and
 formal1  ,marx1 ,karl1  ,means to end1 
truly willed1   four sorts of1   how far
 and how not sanctified by the end1     
distinguished from circumstances1       
limited by the end1  ,meekness and      
clemency1  ,mental reservation1 not in  
every case a lie1  ,mill1 ,john1        
confounds self-defence with vengeance1  
his ,utilitarianism1   on ,liberty1     
,modesty1  ,morality1 meaning of1       
determinants of1  ,moral ,philosophy1   
definition and division1   a progressive
 science1   subtlety of1  ,moral ,sense1
 no peculiar faculty distinct from      
,intellect1  ,money1 ancient and modern 
use of1  ,nature1 does nothing in vain1 
living according to nature1   laws of   
nature1 inviolable as tendencies1       
state of nature1  ,natural1 in contrast 
with supernatural1   natural and        
physical confounded by ancients1   does 
not mean coming natural1  ,natural law  
of conscience1   mutable subjectively1  

immutable1 situation remaining          
unchanged1   primary and secondary      
precepts1 some of the latter fail to    
hold even objectively1 where human      
nature has sunk below par1              
7notwithstanding71   not open to        
dispensation1  ,nominalism1 subversion  
of philosophy1  ,obedience1 not wholly  
of the nature of a contract1  ,ought1 or
 ,obligation1 analysis of the idea1     
,passion1 as an excuse1   definition of1
   species of1   not to be extirpated1  
never morally evil by itself1   passion 
and principle1 two different sources of 
sin1  ,people1 the1 all government for1 
sovereignty of1   not philosophers1     
,person1 autocentric1 as distinguished  
from a thing 7hetero-centric71   to have
 a right1 you must be a person1  ,plato1
 on desires1   on the mean of virtue1   
his similitude of the charioteer1   his 
phrase1 set up on holy pedestal1   fails
 to discover justice in his ,republic1  
his ignoring of spiritual sins1         
ignores retributive punishment1   object

 of his ,republic1  ,pleasure1 or       
delight1 quality of1   perfects         
activity1   how far wrong to act or live
 for pleasure1   not happiness1         
,polity1 defined1   variety of polities1
   no one polity best1 universal and    
exclusive1   elementary and original    
polity1   the polity the standard of the
 politically allowable1  ,polygamy2     
patriarchal practice1  ,powers that be1 
ordained of ,god1  ,private war1 right  
renounced by civilised man1  ,probable  
opinion1 what1 how a lawful ground of   
action1  ,property1 res familiaris1     
,prudence1  ,punishment1 naturally      
consequent upon sin1   also a divine    
infliction1   final1 eternal1           
medicinal1 deterrent1 retributive1      
human punishment perhaps never purely   
retributive1   capital punishment1      
punishment a stimulus to conscience1    
war not punishment1  ,pyramid of        
capacities1  ,reiffenstuel1 on duelling1
  ,religion1 how connected with         
morality1   duties of religion1         

natural religious power1   the ,state   
and religion1  ,restitution1 when due1  
not retribution1  ,resurrection1        
,revolution1 is it ever right8  ,right1 
a1 defined1   connatural1 acquired1     
alienable1 inalienable1   one man's     
right imports another man's duty1 but   
not conversely1   not all rights        
consequences of duties1   not wholly the
 creation of the ,state1  ,ritual1 needs
 regulation1  ,rousseau1 his ,social    
,contract1   his inalienable sovereignty
 of the people1  ,secrets1              
,self-defence1 differs from punishment  
and from vengeance1   a wrong maxim of  
the jurists1   duelling not             
self-defence1  ,simulation and          
dissimulation1  ,sin1 material and      
formal1   differs from vice1   some by  
mere passion1 other on principle1       
spiritual sins1   philosophical sin1    
sin alone properly unnatural1   entails 
punishment1   grave and light1          
forgiveness of1 an uncertainty in       
philosophy1   sin against ,god1 crime   

against the ,state1   atheism the       
abolition of sin1  ,socialism1          
,collectivism and ,syndicalism1   an    
endeavour to supersede private virtue1  
,soldier's death1  ,spiritualism1       
,state1 individual not all blended in1  
definition of1   a natural requisite1   
more than a necessity of nature1        
involves authority1 to be obeyed1   a   
perfect community1   commanded and      
commissioned by ,god1   a secular       
concern with a secular end1   the ,state
 and virtue1   ,state and ,church1      
,state and education1   doctrines       
dangerous to the ,state1   ,state and   
,conscience1   remotely a judge of sin1 
but does not punish it as such1         
,stoics1 would extirpate passion1       
their naturae convenienter vivere1   a  
paradox of theirs1  ,suarez1 explains   
the natural rise of civil authority1    
neglects the historical1  ,suicide1     
,supernatural1  ,superstitious          
practices1  ,synderesis1  ,temperance1  
,testamentary right1  ,usury1 defined1  

principle upon which it is wrong1       
commercial loans not usurious1 gradual  
opening for such1  ,utilitarianism1 an  
ill-concerted blend of ,hedonism and    
,altruism1  ,value1 use value1 market   
value1  ,vice and ,virtue1 habits1 not  
acts1   not in children1   vice not sin1
  ,virtue1 a habit1   not reducible to  
knowledge1   intellectual and moral1    
how moral and intellectual virtues      
differ1   need of moral virtue1   moral 
virtue 7not theological7 observes the   
mean1   cardinal virtues1   are the     
virtues separable81   potential parts of
 a virtue1   sense of virtue necessary  
to national greatness1   virtue not     
another man's good11   how differing    
from art1   how far the care of the     
,state1  ,virtuous man1 acts on motives 
of virtue1  ,war1 the self-defence of   
nations1   not a punitive operation1    
direct and proper object1 not to kill   
but to put out of action1  ,wild boy of 
,hanover1  ,worship1 interior and       
exterior1 reasons for the latter1   not 

as useful to ,god1 but because ,he is   
worthy of it1