,,the ,,monist ,a ,,quarterly ,,magazine ,,vol4 ,,iii4 ,,chicago3 ,,the ,,open ,,court ,,publishing ,,co4 #ahib-ahic ,,copyright1 #ahic1 ,,by ,,the ,,open ,,court ,,publishing ,,co4 ,,contents ,,of ,,volume ,,iii4 ,,page ,,articles4 ,auta1 ,the ,doctrine of4 ,by ,c4 ,lloyd ,morgan #afa ,cruelty and ,pity in ,woman4 ,by ,guillaume ,ferrero #bbj ,doctrine of ,auta1 ,the4 ,by ,c4 ,lloyd ,morgan #afa ,education1 ,nationalisation of1 and the ,universities4 ,by ,h4 von ,holst #dic ,evolutionary ,love4 ,by ,charles ,s4 ,peirce #agf ,foundations of ,theism1 ,the4 ,by ,e4 ,d4 ,cope #fbc ,founder of ,tychism1 ,the3 ,his ,methods1 ,philosophy1 and ,criticisms4 ,editor #ega ,fourth ,dimension1 ,the ,by ,hermann ,schubert #djb ,hindu ,monism4 ,by ,richard ,garbe #ea ,insects1 ,the ,nervous ,ganglia of4 ,by ,alfred ,binet #ce ,intuition and ,reason4 ,by ,christine ,ladd ,franklin #baa ,issues of 8,synechism10 ,the4 ,by ,g4 ,m4 ,mc,crie #chj ,love1 ,evolutionary4 ,by ,charles ,s4 ,peirce #agf ,man's ,glassy ,essence4 ,by ,charles ,s4 ,peirce #a ,meaning and ,metaphor4 ,by ,lady ,victoria ,welby #eaj ,mental ,mummies4 ,by ,felix ,l4 ,oswald #cj ,modern ,science1 ,religion and4 ,by ,f4 ,jodl #cbi ,monism1 ,hindu4 ,by ,richard ,garbe #ea ,nationalisation of ,education and the ,universities4 ,by ,h4 von ,holst #dic ,necessitarians1 ,reply to the4 ,by ,charles ,s4 ,peirce #ebf ,necessity1 ,the ,idea of3 ,its ,basis and ,its ,scope4 ,editor #fh ,necessity1 ,the ,superstition of4 ,by ,john ,dewey #cfb ,panbiotism1 ,panpsychism and4 ,editor #bcd ,panpsychism and ,panbiotism4 ,editor #bcd ,reason1 ,intuition and4 ,by ,christine ,ladd ,franklin #baa ,religion and ,modern ,science4 ,by ,f4 ,jodl #cbi ,religion of ,science1 ,the4 ,editor #ceb ,renan3 ,a ,discourse ,given at ,south ,place ,chapel1 ,london4 ,by ,moncure ,d4 ,conway #bja ,reply to the ,necessitarians4 ,by ,charles ,s4 ,peirce #ebf ,science1 ,the ,religion of4 ,editor #ceb ,superstition of ,necessity1 ,the4 ,by ,john ,dewey #cfb 8,synechism10 ,the ,issues of4 ,by ,g4 ,m4 ,mc,crie #chj ,theism1 ,the ,foundations of4 ,by ,e4 ,d4 ,cope #fbc ,thought in ,america1 ,the ,future of4 ,by ,e4 ,d4 ,cope #bc ,tychism1 ,the ,founder of3 ,his ,methods1 ,philosophy1 and ,criticisms4 ,editor #ega ,universities1 ,nationalisation of ,education and the4 ,by ,h4 von ,holst #dic ,woman1 ,cruelty and ,pity in4 ,by ,guillaume ,ferrero #bbj ,,literary ,,correspondence4 ,france4 ,by ,lucien ,arrat #aaa1 #beh ,france1 ,the ,religious ,outlook in4 ,by ,theodore ,stanton #dej ,germany4 ,by ,christian ,ufer #bfd1 #fdj ,new ,french ,books4 ,by ,lucien ,arrat #def ,recent ,evolutionary ,studies in ,germany4 ,by ,carus ,sterne #ig ,,criticisms ,,and ,,discussions4 ,a ,letter from ,mr4 ,herbert ,spencer #bgb ,comte and ,turgot4 ,by ,louis ,belrose1 ,jr4 #aah ,is ,monism ,arbitrary8 ,editor #abd ,james's ,psychology1 ,observations on ,some ,points of4 ,by ,w4 ,l4 ,worcester #bhe ,logic as ,relation ,lore4 ,by ,f4 ,c4 ,russell #bgb ,mathematics a ,description of ,operations with ,pure ,forms4 ,editor #acc ,reply to a ,critic1 ,a4 ,by ,edward ,t4 ,dixon #abg ,sensation1 ,prof4 ,ernst ,mach's ,term #bih ,some ,remarks ,upon ,professor ,james's ,discussion of ,attention4 ,by ,hiram ,m4 ,stanley #abb ,,book ,,reviews4 ,acht ,abhandlungen1 ,herrn ,professor ,dr4 ,karl ,ludwig ,michelet zum #ij4 ,geburtstag #dgh ,arrat1 ,lucien4 ,psychologie du ,peintre #adb ,baets1 l',abb ,maurice de4 ,l'cole d'anthropologie criminelle #fdi ,becker1 ,george ,f4 ,finite ,homogeneous ,strain1 ,flow1 and ,rupture of ,rocks #dhj ,berendt1 ,m4 and ,j4 ,friedlnder4 ,der ,pessimismus im ,lichte einer hheren ,weltauffassung #dgg ,binet1 ,alfred4 ,les ,altrations de la ,personnalit #ade ,blackwell1 ,antoinette ,brown4 ,the ,philosophy of ,individuality1 or the ,one and the ,many #fdi ,cattell1 ,james ,mc,keen1 and ,george ,stuart ,fullerton4 ,on the ,perception of ,small ,differences #ada ,delbuf1 ,j4 ,l',hypnotisme devant les ,chambres ,legislatives ,belges #cah ,dessoir1 ,max4 ,ueber den ,hautsinn #cai ,dixon1 ,edward ,t4 ,an ,essay on ,reasoning #ach ,dreher1 ,eugen4 ,der ,materialismus1 eine ,verirrung des menschlichen ,geistes1 widerlegt durch eine zeitgemsse ,weltanschauung #dgi ,edinger1 ,l4 ,vergleichend-entwickelungsgeschichtlich e und anatomische ,studien im ,bereiche der ,hirnanatomie4 #c4 ,riechapparat und ,ammonshorn #fdh ,engel1 ,gustav4 ,die ,philosophie und die sociale ,frage #dgh ,eucken1 ,rudolf4 ,die ,grundbegriffe der ,gegenwart #fej ,friedlnder1 ,j4 and ,m4 ,berendt4 ,der ,pessimismus im ,lichte einer hheren ,weltauffassung #dgg ,fullerton1 ,george ,stuart1 and ,james ,mc,keen ,cattel4 ,on the ,perception of ,small ,differences #ada ,george1 ,henry4 ,a ,perplexed ,philosopher #dhb ,gutberlet1 ,constantin4 ,die ,willensfreiheit und ihre ,gegner #fdf ,hiller1 ,h4 ,croft4 ,against ,dogma and ,free-,will #fdi ,hirth1 ,georges4 ,physiologie de ,l',art #adc ,holtzmann1 ,heinrich ,julius4 ,hand-,commentar zum neuen ,testament4 ,,iv4 ,evangelium1 ,briefe und ,offenbarung des ,johannes #fdc ,holtzmann1 ,heinrich ,julius4 ,lehrbuch der historisch-kritischen ,einleitung in das neue ,testament #aej ,janet1 ,pierre4 tat mental des hystriques les stigmates mentaux #fdh ,jol1 ,karl4 ,der echte und der ,xenophontische ,sokrates #dhj ,jones1 ,e4 ,e4 ,constance4 ,an ,introduction to ,general ,logic #cad ,lindemann1 ,ferdinand4 ,vorlesungen ber ,geometrie #cad ,lotze1 ,hermann4 ,outlines of a ,philosophy of ,religion #adj ,lubbock1 ,john4 ,the ,beauties of ,nature #cbc ,meynert1 ,theodore4 ,sammlung von populr-wissenschaftlichen ,vortrgen ber den ,bau und die ,leistungen des ,gehirns #aea ,mik1 ,j4 ,graber's ,leitfaden der ,zoologie fr die oberen ,classen der ,mittelschulen #cbb ,mnsterberg1 ,hugo4 ,beitrge zur experimentellen ,psychologie #cjd ,oelzelt-,newin1 ,anton4 ,ueber sittliche ,dispositionen #cbc ,offner1 ,max4 ,ueber die ,grundformen der ,vorstellungsverbindung #dgi ,paszkowski1 ,wilhelm4 ,wie steht es jetzt mit der ,philosophie1 und was haben wir von ihr zu hoffen8 #dgh ,paulsen1 ,friedrich4 ,einleitung in die ,philosophie #dff ,rolfes1 ,eugen4 ,die ,aristotelische ,auffassung vom ,verhltnisse ,gottes zur ,welt und zum ,menschen #caa ,royce1 ,josiah4 ,the ,spirit of ,modern ,philosophy #cjf ,royer1 ,clmence4 ,recherches d'optique physiologique et physique #cbj ,salter1 ,william ,m4 ,first ,steps in ,philosophy #dgj ,schellwien1 ,robert4 ,max ,stirner und ,friedrich ,nietzsche #caa ,schmidt1 ,johannes4 ,die ,urheimath der ,indogermanen und das europische ,zahlsystem #adi ,schmidkunz1 ,hans4 ,der ,hypnotismus in gemeinfasslicher ,darstellung #cag ,sharp1 ,frank ,chapman4 ,the sthetic ,element in ,morality #fej ,sidgwick1 ,alfred4 ,distinction and the ,criticism of ,beliefs #cab ,spencer1 ,herbert4 ,social ,statics and ,justice #acf ,sterne1 ,carus4 ,natur und ,kunst #cbc ,topinard1 ,paul4 ,l',homme dans la ,nature #adf ,topinard1 ,paul4 ,l',anthropologie du ,bengale #cbb ,tufts1 ,james ,hayden4 ,the ,sources of ,development of ,kant's ,teleology #cab ,verworn1 ,max4 ,die ,bewegung der lebendigen ,substanz #cba ,williams1 ,c4 ,m4 ,a ,review of the ,systems of ,ethics ,founded on the ,theory of ,evolution #dgd ,wundt1 ,wilhelm4 ,vorlesungen ber die ,menschen- und ,thierseele #cjj ,wundt1 ,wilhelm4 ,hypnotismus und ,suggestion #cae ,wundt1 ,wilhelm4 ,grundzge der physiologischen ,psychologie #fdh ,,periodicals #aec-afj2 #cbe-cbh2 #dhh-dib2 #fea-feh4 ,,appendix4 ,plates belonging to the article 8,the ,nervous ,ganglia of ,insects40 7,in ,no4 #a of this volume47 ,,vol4 ,,iii4 ,,october1 #ahib4 ,,no4 #a4 ,,the ,,monist4 ,,man',s ,,glassy ,,essence4 ,in ,the ,monist for ,january1 #ahia1 ,i tried to show what conceptions ought to form the brick and mortar of a philosophical system4 ,chief among these was that of absolute chance for which ,i argued again in last ,april's number4#a ,in ,july1 ,i applied another fundamental idea1 that of continuity1 to the law of mind4 ,next in order1 ,i have to elucidate1 from the point of view chosen1 the relation between the psychical and physical aspects of a substance4 ,the first step towards this ought1 ,i think1 to be the framing of a molecular theory of protoplasm4 ,but before doing that1 it seems indispensable to glance at the constitution of matter1 in general4 ,we shall1 thus1 unavoidably make a long detour2 but1 after all1 our pains will not be wasted1 for the problems of the papers that are to follow in the series will call for the consideration of the same question4 ,all physicists are rightly agreed the evidence is overwhelming which shows all sensible matter is composed of molecules in swift motion and exerting enormous mutual attractions1 and perhaps repulsions1 too4 ,even ,sir ,william ,thomson1 ,lord ,kelvin1 who wishes to explode action at a distance and return to the doctrine of a plenum1 not only speaks of molecules1 but undertakes to assign definite magnitudes to them4 ,the brilliant ,judge ,stallo1 a man who did not always rightly estimate his own qualities in accepting tasks for himself1 declared war upon the atomic theory in a book well worth careful perusal4 ,to the old arguments in favor of atoms which he found in ,fechner's monograph1 he was able to make replies of considerable force1 though they were not sufficient to destroy those arguments4 ,but against modern proofs he made no headway at all4 ,these set out from the mechanical theory of heat4 ,rumford's experiments showed that heat is not a substance4 ,joule demonstrated that it was a form of energy4 ,the heating of gases under constant volume1 and other facts instanced by ,rankine1 proved that it could not be an energy of strain4 ,this drove physicists to the conclusion that it was a mode of motion4 ,then it was remembered that ,john ,bernoulli had shown that the pressure of gases could be accounted for by assuming their molecules to be moving uniformly in rectilinear paths4 ,the same hypothesis was now seen to account for ,avogadro's law1 that in equal volumes of different kinds of gases exposed to the same pressure and temperature are contained equal numbers of molecules4 ,shortly after1 it was found to account for the laws of diffusion and viscosity of gases1 and for the numerical relation between these properties4 ,finally1 ,crookes's radiometer furnished the last link in the strongest chain of evidence which supports any physical hypothesis4 ,such being the constitution of gases1 liquids must clearly be bodies in which the molecules wander in curvilinear paths1 while in solids they move in orbits or quasi-orbits4 7,see my definition solid ,,ii1 #a1 in the 8,century ,dictionary407 ,we see that the resistance to compression and to interpenetration between sensible bodies is1 by one of the prime propositions of the molecular theory1 due in large measure to the kinetical energy of the particles1 which must be supposed to be quite remote from one another1 on the average1 even in solids4 ,this resistance is no doubt influenced by finite attractions and repulsions between the molecules4 ,all the impenetrability of bodies which we can observe is1 therefore1 a limited impenetrability due to kinetic and positional energy4 ,this being the case1 we have no logical right to suppose that absolute impenetrability1 or the exclusive occupancy of space1 belongs to molecules or to atoms4 ,it is an unwarranted hypothesis1 not a vera causa4#b ,unless we are to give up the theory of energy1 finite positional attractions and repulsions between molecules must be admitted4 ,absolute impenetrability would amount to an infinite repulsion at a certain distance4 ,no analogy of known phenomena exists to excuse such a wanton violation of the principle of continuity as such a hypothesis is4 ,in short1 we are logically bound to adopt the ,boscovichian idea that an atom is simply a distribution of component potential energy throughout space1 7this distribution being absolutely rigid17 combined with inertia4 ,the potential energy belongs to two molecules1 and is to be conceived as different between molecules ,a and ,b from what it is between molecules ,a and ,c4 ,the distribution of energy is not necessarily spherical4 ,nay1 a molecule may conceivably have more than one centre2 it may even have a central curve1 returning into itself4 ,but ,i do not think there are any observed facts pointing to such multiple or linear centres4 ,on the other hand1 many facts relating to crystals1 especially those observed by ,voigt1#c go to show that the distribution of energy is harmonical but not concentric4 ,we can easily calculate the forces which such atoms must exert upon one another by considering#d that they are equivalent to aggregations of pairs of electrically positive and negative points infinitely near to one another4 ,about such an atom there would be regions of positive and of negative potential1 and the number and distribution of such regions would determine the valency of the atom1 a number which it is easy to see would in many cases be somewhat indeterminate4 ,i must not dwell further upon this hypothesis1 at present4 ,in another paper1 its consequences will be further considered4 ,i cannot assume that the students of philosophy who read this magazine are thoroughly versed in modern molecular physics1 and therefore it is proper to mention that the governing principle in this branch of science is ,clausius's law of the virial4 ,i will first state the law1 and then explain the peculiar terms of the statement4 ,this statement is that the total kinetic energy of the particles of a system in stationary motion is equal to the total virial4 ,by a system is here meant a number of particles acting upon one another4#e ,stationary motion is a quasi-orbital motion among a system of particles so that none of them are removed to indefinitely great distances nor acquire indefinitely great velocities4 ,the kinetic energy of a particle is the work which would be required to bring it to rest1 independently of any forces which may be acting upon it4 ,the virial of a pair of particles is half the work which the force which actually operates between them would do if1 being independent of the distance1 it were to bring them together4 ,the equation of the virial is 7,transcriber's ,note3 ,italics have been removed from the formul for readability47 mv ,rr4 ,here m is the mass of a particle1 v its velocity1 ,r is the attraction between two particles1 and r is the distance between them4 ,the sign on the left hand side signifies that the values of mv are to be summed for all the particles1 and on the right hand side signifies that the values of ,rr are to be summed for all the pairs of particles4 ,if there is an external pressure ,p 7as from the atmosphere7 upon the system1 and the volume of vacant space within the boundary of that pressure is ,v1 then the virial must be understood as including ,,pv1 so that the equation is mv ,,pv ,rr4 ,there is strong 7if not demonstrative7 reason for thinking that the temperature of any body above the absolute zero 7-#bgc ,c471 is proportional to the average kinetic energy of its molecules1 or say a1 where a is a constant and is the absolute temperature4 ,hence1 we may write the equation a mv ,,pv ,rr where the heavy lines above the different expressions signify that the average values for single molecules are to be taken4 ,in #ahgb1 a student in the ,university of ,leyden1 ,van der ,waals1 propounded in his thesis for the doctorate a specialisation of the equation of the virial which has since attracted great attention4 ,namely1 he writes it a 7,p 7c,v777,v-b74 ,the quantity b is the volume of a molecule1 which he supposes to be an impenetrable body1 and all the virtue of the equation lies in this term which makes the equation a cubic in ,v1 which is required to account for the shape of certain isothermal curves4#f ,but if the idea of an impenetrable atom is illogical1 that of an impenetrable molecule is almost absurd4 ,for the kinetical theory of matter teaches us that a molecule is like a solar system or star-cluster in miniature4 ,unless we suppose that in all heating of gases and vapors internal work is performed upon the molecules1 implying that their atoms are at considerable distances1 the whole kinetical theory of gases falls to the ground4 ,as for the term added to ,p1 there is no more than a partial and roughly approximative justification for it4 ,namely1 let us imagine two spheres described round a particle as their centre1 the radius of the larger being so great as to include all the particles whose action upon the centre is sensible1 while the radius of the smaller is so large that a good many molecules are included within it4 ,the possibility of describing such a sphere as the outer one implies that the attraction of the particles varies at some distances inversely as some higher power of the distance than the cube1 or1 to speak more clearly1 that the attraction multiplied by the cube of the distance diminishes as the distance increases2 for the number of particles at a given distance from any one particle is proportionate to the square of that distance and each of these gives a term of the virial which is the product of the attraction into the distance4 ,consequently unless the attraction multiplied by the cube of the distance diminished so rapidly with the distance as soon to become insensible1 no such outer sphere as is supposed could be described4 ,however1 ordinary experience shows that such a sphere is possible2 and consequently there must be distances at which the attraction does thus rapidly diminish as the distance increases4 ,the two spheres1 then1 being so drawn1 consider the virial of the central particle due to the particles between them4 ,let the density of the substance be increased1 say1 ,n times4 ,then1 for every term1 ,rr1 of the virial before the condensation1 there will be ,n terms of the same magnitude after the condensation4 ,hence1 the virial of each particle will be proportional to the density1 and the equation of the virial becomes a ,,pv c,v4 ,this omits the virial within the inner sphere1 the radius of which is so taken that within that distance the number of particles is not proportional to the number in a large sphere4 ,for ,van der ,waals this radius is the diameter of his hard molecules1 which assumption gives his equation4 ,but it is plain that the attraction between the molecules must to a certain extent modify their distribution1 unless some peculiar conditions are fulfilled4 ,the equation of ,van der ,waals can be approximately true therefore only for a gas4 ,in a solid or liquid condition1 in which the removal of a small amount of pressure has little effect on the volume1 and where consequently the virial must be much greater than ,,pv1 the virial must increase with the volume4 ,for suppose we had a substance in a critical condition in which an increase of the volume would diminish the virial more than it would increase ,,pv4 ,if we were forcibly to diminish the volume of such a substance1 when the temperature became equalised1 the pressure which it could withstand would be less than before1 and it would be still further condensed1 and this would go on indefinitely until a condition were reached in which an increase of volume would increase ,,pv more than it would decrease the virial4 ,in the case of solids1 at least1 ,p may be zero2 so that the state reached would be one in which the virial increases with the volume1 or the attraction between the particles does not increase so fast with a diminution of their distance as it would if the attraction were inversely as the distance4 ,almost contemporaneously with ,van der ,waals's paper1 another remarkable thesis for the doctorate was presented at ,paris by ,amagat4 ,it related to the elasticity and expansion of gases1 and to this subject the superb experimenter1 its author1 has devoted his whole subsequent life4 ,especially interesting are his observations of the volumes of ethylene and of carbonic acid at temperatures from #bj to #ajj and at pressures ranging from an ounce to #ejjj pounds to the square inch4 ,as soon as ,amagat had obtained these results1 he remarked that the 8coefficient of expansion at constant volume10 as it is absurdly called1 that is1 the rate of variation of the pressure with the temperature1 was very nearly constant for each volume4 ,this accords with the equation of the virial1 which gives dpd a,v - d,rrd4 ,now1 the virial must be nearly independent of the temperature1 and therefore the last term almost disappears4 ,the virial would not be quite independent of the temperature1 because if the temperature 7i4 e4 the square of the velocity of the molecules7 is lowered1 and the pressure correspondingly lowered1 so as to make the volume the same1 the attractions of the molecules will have more time to produce their effects1 and consequently1 the pairs of molecules the closest together will be held together longer and closer2 so that the virial will generally be increased by a decrease of temperature4 ,now1 ,amagat's experiments do show an excessively minute effect of this sort1 at least1 when the volumes are not too small4 ,however1 the observations are well enough satisfied by assuming the 8coefficient of expansion at constant volume0 to consist wholly of the first term1 a_/7,v74 ,thus1 ,amagat's experiments enable us to determine the values of a and thence to calculate the virial2 and this we find varies for carbonic acid gas nearly inversely to 7,v74 ,there is1 thus1 a rough approximation to satisfying ,van der ,waals's equation4 ,but the most interesting result of ,amagat's experiments1 for our purpose at any rate1 is that the quantity a1 though nearly constant for any one volume1 differs considerably with the volume1 nearly doubling when the volume is reduced fivefold4 ,this can only indicate that the mean kinetic energy of a given mass of the gas for a given temperature is greater the more the gas is compressed4 ,but the laws of mechanics appear to enjoin that the mean kinetic energy of a moving particle shall be constant at any given temperature4 ,the only escape from contradiction1 then1 is to suppose that the mean mass of a moving particle diminishes upon the condensation of the gas4 ,in other words1 many of the molecules are dissociated1 or broken up into atoms or sub-molecules4 ,the idea that dissociation should be favored by diminishing the volume will be pronounced by physicists1 at first blush1 as contrary to all our experience4 ,but it must be remembered that the circumstances we are speaking of1 that of a gas under fifty or more atmospheres pressure1 are also unusual4 ,that the 8coefficient of expansion under constant volume0 when multiplied by the volumes should increase with a decrement of the volume is also quite contrary to ordinary experience2 yet it undoubtedly takes place in all gases under great pressure4 ,again1 the doctrine of ,arrhenius#g is now generally accepted1 that the molecular conductivity of an electrolyte is proportional to the dissociation of ions4 ,now the molecular conductivity of a fused electrolyte is usually superior to that of a solution4 ,here is a case1 then1 in which diminution of volume is accompanied by increased dissociation4 ,the truth is that several different kinds of dissociation have to be distinguished4 ,in the first place1 there is the dissociation of a chemical molecule to form chemical molecules under the regular action of chemical laws4 ,this may be a double decomposition1 as when iodhydric acid is dissociated1 according to the formula ,,hi ,,hi ,,hh ,,ii2 or1 it may be a simple decomposition1 as when pentachloride of phosphorus is dissociated according to the formula ,p,cl ,p,cl ,cl,cl4 ,all these dissociations require1 according to the laws of thermochemistry1 an elevated temperature4 ,in the second place1 there is the dissociation of a physically polymerous molecule1 that is1 of several chemical molecules joined by physical attractions4 ,this ,i am inclined to suppose is a common concomitant of the heating of solids and liquids2 for in these bodies there is no increase of compressibility with the temperature at all comparable with the increase of the expansibility4 ,but1 in the third place1 there is the dissociation with which we are now concerned1 which must be supposed to be a throwing off of unsaturated sub-molecules or atoms from the molecule4 ,the molecule may1 as ,i have said1 be roughly likened to a solar system4 ,as such1 molecules are able to produce perturbations of one another's internal motions2 and in this way a planet1 i4 e4 a sub-molecule1 will occasionally get thrown off and wander about by itself1 till it finds another unsaturated sub-molecule with which it can unite4 ,such dissociation by perturbation will naturally be favored by the proximity of the molecules to one another4 ,let us now pass to the consideration of that special substance1 or rather class of substances1 whose properties form the chief subject of botany and of zology1 as truly as those of the silicates form the chief subject of mineralogy3 ,i mean the life-slimes1 or protoplasm4 ,let us begin by cataloguing the general characters of these slimes4 ,they one and all exist in two states of aggregation1 a solid or nearly solid state and a liquid or nearly liquid state2 but they do not pass from the former to the latter by ordinary fusion4 ,they are readily decomposed by heat1 especially in the liquid state2 nor will they bear any considerable degree of cold4 ,all their vital actions take place at temperatures very little below the point of decomposition4 ,this extreme instability is one of numerous facts which demonstrate the chemical complexity of protoplasm4 ,every chemist will agree that they are far more complicated than the albumens4 ,now1 albumen is estimated to contain in each molecule about a thousand atoms2 so that it is natural to suppose that the protoplasms contain several thousands4 ,we know that while they are chiefly composed of oxygen1 hydrogen1 carbon1 and nitrogen1 a large number of other elements enter into living bodies in small proportions2 and it is likely that most of these enter into the composition of protoplasms4 ,now1 since the numbers of chemical varieties increase at an enormous rate with the number of atoms per molecule1 so that there are certainly hundreds of thousands of substances whose molecules contain twenty atoms or fewer1 we may well suppose that the number of protoplasmic substances runs into the billions or trillions4 ,professor ,cayley has given a mathematical theory of 8trees10 with a view of throwing a light upon such questions2 and in that light the estimate of trillions 7in the ,english sense7 seems immoderately moderate4 ,it is true that an opinion has been emitted1 and defended among biologists1 that there is but one kind of protoplasm2 but the observations of biologists1 themselves1 have almost exploded that hypothesis1 which from a chemical standpoint appears utterly incredible4 ,the anticipation of the chemist would decidedly be that enough different chemical substances having protoplasmic characters might be formed to account1 not only for the differences between nerve-slime and muscle-slime1 between whale-slime and lion-slime1 but also for those minuter pervasive variations which characterise different breeds and single individuals4 ,protoplasm1 when quiescent1 is1 broadly speaking1 solid2 but when it is disturbed in an appropriate way1 or sometimes even spontaneously without external disturbance1 it becomes1 broadly speaking1 liquid4 ,a moner in this state is seen under the microscope to have streams within its matter2 a slime-mould slowly flows by force of gravity4 ,the liquefaction starts from the point of disturbance and spreads through the mass4 ,this spreading1 however1 is not uniform in all directions2 on the contrary it takes at one time one course1 at another another1 through the homogeneous mass1 in a manner that seems a little mysterious4 ,the cause of disturbance being removed1 these motions gradually 7with higher kinds of protoplasm1 quickly7 cease1 and the slime returns to its solid condition4 ,the liquefaction of protoplasm is accompanied by a mechanical phenomenon4 ,namely1 some kinds exhibit a tendency to draw themselves up into a globular form4 ,this happens particularly with the contents of muscle-cells4 ,the prevalent opinion1 founded on some of the most exquisite experimental investigations that the history of science can show1 is undoubtedly that the contraction of muscle-cells is due to osmotic pressure2 and it must be allowed that that is a factor in producing the effect4 ,but it does not seem to me that it satisfactorily accounts even for the phenomena of muscular contraction2 and besides1 even naked slimes often draw up in the same way4 ,in this case1 we seem to recognise an increase of the surface-tension4 ,in some cases1 too1 the reverse action takes place1 extraordinary pseudopodia being put forth1 as if the surface-tension were diminished in spots4 ,indeed1 such a slime always has a sort of skin1 due no doubt to surface-tension1 and this seems to give way at the point where a pseudopodium is put forth4 ,long-continued or frequently repeated liquefaction of the protoplasm results in an obstinate retention of the solid state1 which we call fatigue4 ,on the other hand repose in this state1 if not too much prolonged1 restores the liquefiability4 ,these are both important functions4 ,the life-slimes have1 further1 the peculiar property of growing4 ,crystals also grow2 their growth1 however1 consists merely in attracting matter like their own from the circumambient fluid4 ,to suppose the growth of protoplasm of the same nature1 would be to suppose this substance to be spontaneously generated in copious supplies wherever food is in solution4 ,certainly1 it must be granted that protoplasm is but a chemical substance1 and that there is no reason why it should not be formed synthetically like any other chemical substance4 ,indeed1 ,clifford has clearly shown that we have overwhelming evidence that it is so formed4 ,but to say that such formation is as regular and frequent as the assimilation of food is quite another matter4 ,it is more consonant with the facts of observation to suppose that assimilated protoplasm is formed at the instant of assimilation1 under the influence of the protoplasm already present4 ,for each slime in its growth preserves its distinctive characters with wonderful truth1 nerve-slime growing nerve-slime and muscle-slime muscle-slime1 lion-slime growing lion-slime1 and all the varieties of breeds and even individual characters being preserved in the growth4 ,now it is too much to suppose there are billions of different kinds of protoplasm floating about wherever there is food4 ,the frequent liquefaction of protoplasm increases its power of assimilating food2 so much so1 indeed1 that it is questionable whether in the solid form it possesses this power4 ,the life-slime wastes as well as grows2 and this too takes place chiefly if not exclusively in its liquid phases4 ,closely connected with growth is reproduction2 and though in higher forms this is a specialised function1 it is universally true that wherever there is protoplasm1 there is1 will be1 or has been a power of reproducing that same kind of protoplasm in a separated organism4 ,reproduction seems to involve the union of two sexes2 though it is not demonstrable that this is always requisite4 ,another physical property of protoplasm is that of taking habits4 ,the course which the spread of liquefaction has taken in the past is rendered thereby more likely to be taken in the future2 although there is no absolute certainty that the same path will be followed again4 ,very extraordinary1 certainly1 are all these properties of protoplasm2 as extraordinary as indubitable4 ,but the one which has next to be mentioned1 while equally undeniable1 is infinitely more wonderful4 ,it is that protoplasm feels4 ,we have no direct evidence that this is true of protoplasm universally1 and certainly some kinds feel far more than others4 ,but there is a fair analogical inference that all protoplasm feels4 ,it not only feels but exercises all the functions of mind4 ,such are the properties of protoplasm4 ,the problem is to find a hypothesis of the molecular constitution of this compound which will account for these properties1 one and all4 ,some of them are obvious results of the excessively complicated constitution of the protoplasm molecule4 ,all very complicated substances are unstable2 and plainly a molecule of several thousand atoms may be separated in many ways into two parts in each of which the polar chemical forces are very nearly saturated4 ,in the solid protoplasm1 as in other solids1 the molecules must be supposed to be moving as it were in orbits1 or1 at least1 so as not to wander indefinitely4 ,but this solid cannot be melted1 for the same reason that starch cannot be melted2 because an amount of heat insufficient to make the entire molecules wander is sufficient to break them up completely and cause them to form new and simpler molecules4 ,but when one of the molecules is disturbed1 even if it be not quite thrown out of its orbit at first1 sub-molecules of perhaps several hundred atoms each are thrown off from it4 ,these will soon acquire the same mean kinetic energy as the others1 and therefore velocities several times as great4 ,they will naturally begin to wander1 and in wandering will perturb a great many other molecules and cause them in their turn to behave like the one originally deranged4 ,so many molecules will thus be broken up1 that even those that are intact will no longer be restrained within orbits1 but will wander about freely4 ,this is the usual condition of a liquid1 as modern chemists understand it2 for in all electrolytic liquids there is considerable dissociation4 ,but this process necessarily chills the substance1 not merely on account of the heat of chemical combination1 but still more because the number of separate particles being greatly increased1 the mean kinetic energy must be less4 ,the substance being a bad conductor1 this heat is not at once restored4 ,now the particles moving more slowly1 the attractions between them have time to take effect1 and they approach the condition of equilibrium4 ,but their dynamic equilibrium is found in the restoration of the solid condition1 which therefore takes place1 if the disturbance is not kept up4 ,when a body is in the solid condition1 most of its molecules must be moving at the same rate1 or1 at least1 at certain regular sets of rates2 otherwise the orbital motion would not be preserved4 ,the distances of neighboring molecules must always be kept between a certain maximum and a certain minimum value4 ,but if1 without absorption of heat1 the body be thrown into a liquid condition1 the distances of neighboring molecules will be far more unequally distributed1 and an effect upon the virial will result4 ,the chilling of protoplasm upon its liquefaction must also be taken into account4 ,the ordinary effect will no doubt be to increase the cohesion and with that the surface-tension1 so that the mass will tend to draw itself up4 ,but in special cases1 the virial will be increased so much that the surface-tension will be diminished at points where the temperature is first restored4 ,in that case1 the outer film will give way and the tension at other places will aid in causing the general fluid to be poured out at those points1 forming pseudopodia4 ,when the protoplasm is in a liquid state1 and then only1 a solution of food is able to penetrate its mass by diffusion4 ,the protoplasm is then considerably dissociated2 and so is the food1 like all dissolved matter4 ,if then the separated and unsaturated sub-molecules of the food happen to be of the same chemical species as sub-molecules of the protoplasm1 they may unite with other sub-molecules of the protoplasm to form new molecules1 in such a fashion that when the solid state is resumed1 there may be more molecules of protoplasm than there were at the beginning4 ,it is like the jack-knife whose blade and handle1 after having been severally lost and replaced1 were found and put together to make a new knife4 ,we have seen that protoplasm is chilled by liquefaction1 and that this brings it back to the solid state1 when the heat is recovered4 ,this series of operations must be very rapid in the case of nerve-slime and even of muscle-slime1 and may account for the unsteady or vibratory character of their action4 ,of course1 if assimilation takes place1 the heat of combination1 which is probably trifling1 is gained4 ,on the other hand1 if work is done1 whether by nerve or by muscle1 loss of energy must take place4 ,in the case of the muscle1 the mode by which the instantaneous part of the fatigue is brought about is easily traced out4 ,if when the muscle contracts it be under stress1 it will contract less than it otherwise would do1 and there will be a loss of heat4 ,it is like an engine which should work by dissolving salt in water and using the contraction during the solution to lift a weight1 the salt being recovered afterwards by distillation4 ,but the major part of fatigue has nothing to do with the correlation of forces4 ,a man must labor hard to do in a quarter of an hour the work which draws from him enough heat to cool his body by a single degree4 ,meantime1 he will be getting heated1 he will be pouring out extra products of combustion1 perspiration1 etc41 and he will be driving the blood at an accelerated rate through minute tubes at great expense4 ,yet all this will have little to do with his fatigue4 ,he may sit quietly at his table writing1 doing practically no physical work at all1 and yet in a few hours be terribly fagged4 ,this seems to be owing to the deranged sub-molecules of the nerve-slime not having had time to settle back into their proper combinations4 ,when such sub-molecules are thrown out1 as they must be from time to time1 there is so much waste of material4 ,in order that a sub-molecule of food may be thoroughly and firmly assimilated into a broken molecule of protoplasm1 it is necessary not only that it should have precisely the right chemical composition1 but also that it should be at precisely the right spot at the right time and should be moving in precisely the right direction with precisely the right velocity4 ,if all these conditions are not fulfilled1 it will be more loosely retained than the other parts of the molecule2 and every time it comes round into the situation in which it was drawn in1 relatively to the other parts of that molecule and to such others as were near enough to be factors in the action1 it will be in special danger of being thrown out again4 ,thus1 when a partial liquefaction of the protoplasm takes place many times to about the same extent1 it will1 each time1 be pretty nearly the same molecules that were last drawn in that are now thrown out4 ,they will be thrown out1 too1 in about the same way1 as to position1 direction of motion1 and velocity1 in which they were drawn in2 and this will be in about the same course that the ones last before them were thrown out4 ,not exactly1 however2 for the very cause of their being thrown off so easily is their not having fulfilled precisely the conditions of stable retention4 ,thus1 the law of habit is accounted for1 and with it its peculiar characteristic of not acting with exactitude4 ,it seems to me that this explanation of habit1 aside from the question of its truth or falsity1 has a certain value as an addition to our little store of mechanical examples of actions analogous to habit4 ,all the others1 so far as ,i know1 are either statical or else involve forces which1 taking only the sensible motions into account1 violate the law of energy4 ,it is so with the stream that wears its own bed4 ,here1 the sand is carried to its most stable situation and left there4 ,the law of energy forbids this2 for when anything reaches a position of stable equilibrium1 its momentum will be at a maximum1 so that it can according to this law only be left at rest in an unstable situation4 ,in all the statical illustrations1 too1 things are brought into certain states and left there4 ,a garment receives folds and keeps them2 that is1 its limit of elasticity is exceeded4 ,this failure to spring back is again an apparent violation of the law of energy2 for the substance will not only not spring back of itself 7which might be due to an unstable equilibrium being reached7 but will not even do so when an impulse that way is applied to it4 ,accordingly1 ,professor ,james says 8the phenomena of habit 444 are due to the plasticity of the 444 materials40 ,now1 plasticity of materials means the having of a low limit of elasticity4 7,see the 8,century ,dictionary10 under solid47 ,but the hypothetical constitution of protoplasm here proposed involves no forces but attractions and repulsions strictly following the law of energy4 ,the action here1 that is1 the throwing of an atom out of its orbit in a molecule1 and the entering of a new atom into nearly1 but not quite the same orbit1 is somewhat similar to the molecular actions which may be supposed to take place in a solid strained beyond its limit of elasticity4 ,namely1 in that case certain molecules must be thrown out of their orbits1 to settle down again shortly after into new orbits4 ,in short1 the plastic solid resembles protoplasm in being partially and temporarily liquefied by a slight mechanical force4 ,but the taking of a set by a solid body has but a moderate resemblance to the taking of a habit1 inasmuch as the characteristic feature of the latter1 its inexactitude and want of complete determinacy1 is not so marked in the former1 if it can be said to be present there1 at all4 ,the truth is that though the molecular explanation of habit is pretty vague on the mathematical side1 there can be no doubt that systems of atoms having polar forces would act substantially in that manner1 and the explanation is even too satisfactory to suit the convenience of an advocate of tychism4 ,for it may fairly be urged that since the phenomena of habit may thus result from a purely mechanical arrangement1 it is unnecessary to suppose that habit-taking is a primordial principle of the universe4 ,but one fact remains unexplained mechanically1 which concerns not only the facts of habit1 but all cases of actions apparently violating the law of energy2 it is that all these phenomena depend upon aggregations of trillions of molecules in one and the same condition and neighborhood2 and it is by no means clear how they could have all been brought and left in the same place and state by any conservative forces4 ,but let the mechanical explanation be as perfect as it may1 the state of things which it supposes presents evidence of a primordial habit-taking tendency4 ,for it shows us like things acting in like ways because they are alike4 ,now1 those who insist on the doctrine of necessity will for the most part insist that the physical world is entirely individual4 ,yet law involves an element of generality4 ,now to say that generality is primordial1 but generalisation not1 is like saying that diversity is primordial but diversification not4 ,it turns logic upside down4 ,at any rate1 it is clear that nothing but a principle of habit1 itself due to the growth by habit of an infinitesimal chance tendency toward habit-taking1 is the only bridge that can span the chasm between the chance-medley of chaos and the cosmos of order and law4 ,i shall not attempt a molecular explanation of the phenomena of reproduction1 because that would require a subsidiary hypothesis1 and carry me away from my main object4 ,such phenomena1 universally diffused though they be1 appear to depend upon special conditions2 and we do not find that all protoplasm has reproductive powers4 ,but what is to be said of the property of feeling8 ,if consciousness belongs to all protoplasm1 by what mechanical constitution is this to be accounted for8 ,the slime is nothing but a chemical compound4 ,there is no inherent impossibility in its being formed synthetically in the laboratory1 out of its chemical elements2 and if it were so made1 it would present all the characters of natural protoplasm4 ,no doubt1 then1 it would feel4 ,to hesitate to admit this would be puerile and ultra-puerile4 ,by what element of the molecular arrangement1 then1 would that feeling be caused8 ,this question cannot be evaded or pooh-poohed4 ,protoplasm certainly does feel2 and unless we are to accept a weak dualism1 the property must be shown to arise from some peculiarity of the mechanical system4 ,yet the attempt to deduce it from the three laws of mechanics1 applied to never so ingenious a mechanical contrivance1 would obviously be futile4 ,it can never be explained1 unless we admit that physical events are but degraded or undeveloped forms of psychical events4 ,but once grant that the phenomena of matter are but the result of the sensibly complete sway of habits upon mind1 and it only remains to explain why in the protoplasm these habits are to some slight extent broken up1 so that according to the law of mind1 in that special clause of it sometimes called the principle of accommodation1#h feeling becomes intensified4 ,now the manner in which habits generally get broken up is this4 ,reactions usually terminate in the removal of a stimulus2 for the excitation continues as long as the stimulus is present4 ,accordingly1 habits are general ways of behavior which are associated with the removal of stimuli4 ,but when the expected removal of the stimulus fails to occur1 the excitation continues and increases1 and non-habitual reactions take place2 and these tend to weaken the habit4 ,if1 then1 we suppose that matter never does obey its ideal laws with absolute precision1 but that there are almost insensible fortuitous departures from regularity1 these will produce1 in general1 equally minute effects4 ,but protoplasm is in an excessively unstable condition2 and it is the characteristic of unstable equilibrium1 that near that point excessively minute causes may produce startlingly large effects4 ,here then1 the usual departures from regularity will be followed by others that are very great2 and the large fortuitous departures from law so produced1 will tend still further to break up the laws1 supposing that these are of the nature of habits4 ,now1 this breaking up of habit and renewed fortuitous spontaneity will1 according to the law of mind1 be accompanied by an intensification of feeling4 ,the nerve-protoplasm is1 without doubt1 in the most unstable condition of any kind of matter2 and consequently1 there the resulting feeling is the most manifest4 ,thus we see that the idealist has no need to dread a mechanical theory of life4 ,on the contrary1 such a theory1 fully developed1 is bound to call in a tychistic idealism as its indispensable adjunct4 ,wherever chance-spontaneity is found1 there1 in the same proportion1 feeling exists4 ,in fact1 chance is but the outward aspect of that which within itself is feeling4 ,i long ago showed that real existence1 or thing-ness1 consists in regularities4 ,so1 that primeval chaos in which there was no regularity was mere nothing1 from a physical aspect4 ,yet it was not a blank zero2 for there was an intensity of consciousness there in comparison with which all that we ever feel is but as the struggling of a molecule or two to throw off a little of the force of law to an endless and innumerable diversity of chance utterly unlimited4 ,but after some atoms of the protoplasm have thus become partially emancipated from law1 what happens next to them8 ,to understand this1 we have to remember that no mental tendency is so easily strengthened by the action of habit as is the tendency to take habits4 ,now1 in the higher kinds of protoplasm1 especially1 the atoms in question have not only long belonged to one molecule or another of the particular mass of slime of which they are parts2 but before that1 they were constituents of food of a protoplasmic constitution4 ,during all this time1 they have been liable to lose habits and to recover them again2 so that now1 when the stimulus is removed1 and the foregone habits tend to reassert themselves1 they do so in the case of such atoms with great promptness4 ,indeed1 the return is so prompt that there is nothing but the feeling to show conclusively that the bonds of law have ever been relaxed4 ,in short1 diversification is the vestige of chance-spontaneity2 and wherever diversity is increasing1 there chance must be operative4 ,on the other hand1 wherever uniformity is increasing1 habit must be operative4 ,but wherever actions take place under an established uniformity1 there so much feeling as there may be takes the mode of a sense of reaction4 ,that is the manner in which ,i am led to define the relation between the fundamental elements of consciousness and their physical equivalents4 ,it remains to consider the physical relations of general ideas4 ,it may be well here to reflect that if matter has no existence except as a specialisation of mind1 it follows that whatever affects matter according to regular laws is itself matter4 ,but all mind is directly or indirectly connected with all matter1 and acts in a more or less regular way2 so that all mind more or less partakes of the nature of matter4 ,hence1 it would be a mistake to conceive of the psychical and the physical aspects of matter as two aspects absolutely distinct4 ,viewing a thing from the outside1 considering its relations of action and reaction with other things1 it appears as matter4 ,viewing it from the inside1 looking at its immediate character as feeling1 it appears as consciousness4 ,these two views are combined when we remember that mechanical laws are nothing but acquired habits1 like all the regularities of mind1 including the tendency to take habits1 itself2 and that this action of habit is nothing but generalisation1 and generalisation is nothing but the spreading of feelings4 ,but the question is1 how do general ideas appear in the molecular theory of protoplasm8 ,the consciousness of a habit involves a general idea4 ,in each action of that habit certain atoms get thrown out of their orbit1 and replaced by others4 ,upon all the different occasions it is different atoms that are thrown off1 but they are analogous from a physical point of view1 and there is an inward sense of their being analogous4 ,every time one of the associated feelings recurs1 there is a more or less vague sense that there are others1 that it has a general character1 and of about what this general character is4 ,we ought not1 ,i think1 to hold that in protoplasm habit never acts in any other than the particular way suggested above4 ,on the contrary1 if habit be a primary property of mind1 it must be equally so of matter1 as a kind of mind4 ,we can hardly refuse to admit that wherever chance motions have general characters1 there is a tendency for this generality to spread and to perfect itself4 ,in that case1 a general idea is a certain modification of consciousness which accompanies any regularity or general relation between chance actions4 ,the consciousness of a general idea has a certain 8unity of the ego10 in it1 which is identical when it passes from one mind to another4 ,it is1 therefore1 quite analogous to a person2 and1 indeed1 a person is only a particular kind of general idea4 ,long ago1 in the ,journal of ,speculative ,philosophy 7,vol4 ,,iii1 p4 #aef71 ,i pointed out that a person is nothing but a symbol involving a general idea2 but my views were1 then1 too nominalistic to enable me to see that every general idea has the unified living feeling of a person4 ,all that is necessary1 upon this theory1 to the existence of a person is that the feelings out of which he is constructed should be in close enough connection to influence one another4 ,here we can draw a consequence which it may be possible to submit to experimental test4 ,namely1 if this be the case1 there should be something like personal consciousness in bodies of men who are in intimate and intensely sympathetic communion4 ,it is true that when the generalisation of feeling has been carried so far as to include all within a person1 a stopping-place1 in a certain sense1 has been attained2 and further generalisation will have a less lively character4 ,but we must not think it will cease4 ,esprit de corps1 national sentiment1 sympathy1 are no mere metaphors4 ,none of us can fully realise what the minds of corporations are1 any more than one of my brain-cells can know what the whole brain is thinking4 ,but the law of mind clearly points to the existence of such personalities1 and there are many ordinary observations which1 if they were critically examined and supplemented by special experiments1 might1 as first appearances promise1 give evidence of the influence of such greater persons upon individuals4 ,it is often remarked that on one day half a dozen people1 strangers to one another1 will take it into their heads to do one and the same strange deed1 whether it be a physical experiment1 a crime1 or an act of virtue4 ,when the thirty thousand young people of the society for ,christian ,endeavor were in ,new ,york1 there seemed to me to be some mysterious diffusion of sweetness and light4 ,if such a fact is capable of being made out anywhere1 it should be in the church4 ,the ,christians have always been ready to risk their lives for the sake of having prayers in common1 of getting together and praying simultaneously with great energy1 and especially for their common body1 for 8the whole state of ,christ's church militant here in earth10 as one of the missals has it4 ,this practice they have been keeping up everywhere1 weekly1 for many centuries4 ,surely1 a personality ought to have developed in that church1 in that 8bride of ,christ10 as they call it1 or else there is a strange break in the action of mind1 and ,i shall have to acknowledge my views are much mistaken4 ,would not the societies for psychical research be more likely to break through the clouds1 in seeking evidences of such corporate personality1 than in seeking evidences of telepathy1 which1 upon the same theory1 should be a far weaker phenomenon8 ,c4 ,s4 ,,peirce4 ,,footnotes3 #a ,i am rejoiced to find1 since my last paper was printed1 that a philosopher as subtle and profound as ,dr4 ,edmund ,montgomery has long been arguing for the same element in the universe4 ,other world-renowned thinkers1 as ,m4 ,renouvier and ,m4 ,delbuf1 appear to share this opinion4 #b ,by a vera causa1 in the logic of science1 is meant a state of things known to exist in some cases and supposed to exist in other cases1 because it would account for observed phenomena4 #c ,wiedemann1 ,annalen1 #ahhg-ahhi4 #d ,see ,maxwell on ,spherical ,harmonics1 in his ,electricity and ,magnetism4 #e ,the word system has three peculiar meanings in mathematics4 7,a47 ,it means an orderly exposition of the truths of astronomy1 and hence a theory of the motions of the stars2 as the ,ptolemaic system1 the ,copernican system4 ,this is much like the sense in which we speak of the ,calvinistic system of theology1 the ,kantian system of philosophy1 etc4 7,b47 ,it means the aggregate of the planets considered as all moving in somewhat the same way1 as the solar system2 and hence any aggregate of particles moving under mutual forces4 7,c47 ,it means a number of forces acting simultaneously upon a number of particles4 #f ,but1 in fact1 an inspection of these curves is sufficient to show that they are of a higher degree than the third4 ,for they have the line ,v #j1 or some line ,v a constant for an asymptote1 while for small values of ,p1 the values of 7d7,p_/7d,v7 are positive4 #g ,anticipated by ,clausius as long ago as #aheg2 and by ,williamson in #ahea4 #h 8,physiologically1 444 accommodation means the breaking up of a habit4444 ,psychologically1 it means reviving consciousness40 ,baldwin1 ,psychology1 ,part ,,iii ch4 i41 #e4 ,,the ,,future ,,of ,,thought ,,in ,,america4 ,history teaches us the nature of the degenerative and destructive agencies in national life4 ,these are of various kinds1 but they may be generally included under the heads of ,physical ,vices1 ,superstitions1 and ,selfish ,ambitions4 ,these have become possible through excess of emotional1 and deficiency of rational states of the mind4 ,when a large part of a population is influenced by emotional rather than by rational modes of thought1 unethical conduct has full opportunity1 and suffering and destruction are sure to follow4 ,all races and nations are subject to such disorders1 if only in some cases during their periods of infancy and of degeneracy4 ,the peoples of ,europe have difficulties and dangers which are due to their own peculiar situation4 ,the people of ,north ,america have to meet certain risks of a somewhat different character1 owing to our peculiar position4 ,in ,europe we see an accumulation of many races who reached their ,ultima ,thule at the coast of the ,atlantic1 and who have had to accommodate themselves to each other as best they could4 ,speaking different languages and having different political organisations1 they have consolidated into separate nations4 ,this result has only been reached after many conflicts1 and the result has been the combination and absorption of smaller states into greater1 such as we find them to-day4 ,this result has not terminated conflicts2 it has reduced their frequency but has increased their scope and importance4 ,to-day the antagonisms of these nations impose great burdens upon them1 but they are at the same time productive of great good4 ,with men as with other animals excellence is the result of use and exercise4 ,with animals this exercise has been compulsory1 and has been due largely to the pressure of hunger4 ,among men intellectual and ethical excellence may be due to compulsion1 or it may result from the capacity to develop lofty ideals4 ,in the former case man is driven2 in the latter case he is led4 ,now the organisation of human society is such1 that if man will not be led1 he is driven4 ,the 8mills of the ,gods0 are ever ready for those who lag behind in the progress of the race4 ,but there are mills and mills1 and no mill has yet appeared in human history better calculated to grind out a good grist from an intellectual point of view1 than western ,eurasia1 or ,europe4 ,the emulations and antagonisms of so many nations have stimulated men to do their best1 and have stimulated governments to aid them in doing it1 for several centuries4 ,the result has been modern art1 modern science pure and applied1 and modern philosophy4 ,to produce all this however1 ,europe has been under pressure1 and the pressure has been in some1 if not all of its countries1 more or less galling4 ,the ,european1 in order to escape local tyranny1 political1 social1 or theological1 or to better his chances of physical living1 has come to ,america4 ,he has taken possession1 and has bettered his condition from a physical point of view1 most successfully4 ,the question that interests us now1 is whether he has bettered himself in any other way1 and whether he is going to continue the mental progress which has so distinguished his history in ,europe4 ,population is rapidly increasing1 and the increasing severity of the 8struggle for existence0 which will follow1 will stimulate men to increased excellence in their methods of obtaining a livelihood1 but will it develop the mind in any other direction8 ,we have before us in the case of ,china1 the effect of close industrial competition in a dense population1 without corresponding intellectual development4 ,what is the outlook for the ,american8 ,will the process of natural selection only1 the 8devil-take-the-hindmost0 doctrine of ,darwin1 be sufficient to develop the higher mental faculties1 or having developed them1 to enable them to survive and to become general1 or not8 ,in the first place we lack in ,america the great stimulus to mental progress already referred to1 international jealousy and emulation4 ,in this respect we are situated very much like the ,chinese1 but if anything less favorably4 ,we practically own the continent4 ,we have no fear of ,tartar invasions from the west nor ,japanese from the north east4 ,the ,canadians are of identical race with ourselves1 and are almost certain to become identical in nationality with us4 ,we are accustomed to boast ourselves of this1 and to look with great satisfaction on our isolated position among nations4 ,but our self-gratulation must be greatly tempered by the reflection that such isolation is only beneficial so long as we can maintain our ideals without external stimulus4 ,and this is something that few nations have so far been able to accomplish4 ,it is true1 however1 that the ,atlantic ocean is not so wide as it was formerly1 and we are truly one of the family of the ,indo-,european nations4 ,but we will miss the effect of the daily stimulus which they afford each other1 and the daily contact which transmits so much from man to man4 ,what is our present intellectual rank among these nations to-day2 meaning by this our status in actual production of intellectual work1 and leaving aside history8 ,without any great competence to speak on many branches of such work1 ,i may be not far from correct2 if ,i summarise as follows3 ,in music and sculpture unproductive2 in painting and literature 7as an art7 good1 but weak in quantity in comparison with our population4 ,in sciences1 feeble in many branches1 but very productive in some others4 ,i refer to pure science4 ,in applied science we stand high4 ,in philosophy as a nation1 weak4 ,but we have the future before us4 ,if there is a demand for the products of pure thought in this country1 the supply will come4 ,much may be expected of our race4 ,we will hope that the demand will grow1 for at present it is not as large as it ought to be4 ,it is of course easy for thought to 8run in accustomed channels10 and many people there are in this as in all other countries1 who believe that sufficient is already known1 and that he who would disturb current opinions is a 8disturber of the peace40 ,strange as it may seem1 in this comparatively new country we have one special inducement to this habit of mind4 ,this is to be found in our political system1 which requires an unhesitating submission to the will of the majority4 99 99 99 99 99 ,here is our second danger4 ,we are apt to confuse mental submission with physical submission4 ,physical submission to the will of the majority is generally necessary for physical reasons1 with which we are all familiar4 ,ballots are simply a peaceful representation of bullets1 and we anticipate the submission to the latter by submission to the former4 ,but the mind should be free4 ,current or popular opinions are not always correct4 ,in fact if they were1 reform or progress would be unnecessary4 ,a proposal for change always begins with a minority1 and much time may often elapse before such change becomes acceptable to the majority4 ,before the majority accepts a new step of progress the progressive idea cannot govern physically4 ,it must be content to be unpopular for a greater or less time4 ,now the politician naturally dreads unpopularity1 for it is political death4 ,and just in proportion as we are politicians do we share in this unfortunate mental attitude4 ,and how many ,americans are not politicians8 ,it is the prevalent ethical disease of ,americans4 ,if it becomes general1 the progress of this country is ended1 and her fate among nations is sealed4 ,her manhood is gone1 and woman may well feel her hand itch to 8,defeat their dirty tricks ,confound their politics40 ,the prevalence of the habit of submission to what we know to be wrong in this country is simply detestable4 ,herbert ,spencer has given us some excellent advice on this subject1 and we will do well to heed it4 ,the habit extends all the way through political1 scientific1 and domestic economy4 ,the unpopularity of the reformer is expressed in the term 8kicker10 which is applied to him among the lower classes in this country4 ,as one of its advocates once said to me1 it is the 8,american ,system10 and there was a strong element of truth in his assertion4 ,with such people1 criticism is identical with quarrelling1 for they cannot conceive of any motive for endeavoring to reform some abuse or correct some error1 but personal rancor4 ,such an attitude is a sure mark of intellectual mediocrity and ethical incapacity1 and it infinitely increases the pains of the reformer1 and readily converts him into a martyr4 ,however1 there are a good many men left in this country1 and there are agencies at work which will probably keep up the supply4 ,in the absence of compulsion in the form of external or civil wars and other disasters1 the churches are doing a good work in keeping ideals before the people1 and in inviting corresponding practical life4 ,it is true that their efforts are more or less retarded by the insistence on erroneous and even absurd opinions about some things1 but they do infinite service in teaching that 8man shall not live by bread alone10 nor by the mere display of physical possessions4 ,they teach that there are ideals of truth and beauty better worth living for1 and that the mind is the greater part of man4 ,it is the churches which make the majority of scientists and philosophers1 as they formerly did of painters4 ,then let the churches flourish4 ,like the nations of ,europe1 their emulations and antagonisms bring out the truth4 ,the ,presbyterians have to solve the knotty questions of biblical inspiration and divine order4 ,the ,methodists will have to study the nature and value of human emotions4 ,the ,friends will know what is to be known of immediate divine influence4 ,the ,catholics have learned how to restrain in some measure the most thoughtless of mankind4 ,the ,unitarians and ,ethical ,culturists are proving that man may retain and live up to high ideals without much or any theology4 ,so long as there is no philosophy or none to speak of in ,america1 the evolution of thought will come from the conflicts of the theologies2 a peaceful war which is far less wasteful than physical wars4 ,theology has been generally in ,europe the parent of philosophy1 and so it will be here4 ,from the various stages and conditions of the agitation will spring science and art4 ,by this method man is led into progress by measures which involve the best attributes of his nature1 instead of being driven by appeals to his lower motives1 or by physical force4 ,in this progress moral courage is not lost1 but it is developed2 and criticism is truth's best weapon1 and is not a cause of offense4 ,that this progress in the churches is real1 is proven by our ,woodrow1 ,mc,queary1 ,briggs1 and others1 and it will go on as long as the love of truth and moral courage exist in those organisations4 ,it is interesting to remember that this struggle of opinions has passed through the same stages in ,europe wherever the love of truth has had an abiding place4 ,this is especially true of ,germany1 where also philosophy has had so large a development in relatively modern times4 ,but we need something more than opinions to counteract the dangers which threaten earnestness of character in this country1 which ,i have pointed out4 ,active organisations are necessary1 which shall resist tendencies to crystallisation from both sides4 ,non-theological people must be stimulated to maintain ethical ideals2 and theological people must be restrained from smothering them under useless and obstructive dogmas and practices4 ,it is too true that while some theological dogmas include high ethical ideals1 other dogmas discredit them by deriving them from incredible sources1 and seeking to sustain them by incredible sanctions4 ,where such dogmas are sincerely held1 true thought is suppressed1 knowledge makes slow progress1 and ethical life is more difficult4 ,as already remarked1 we cannot yet claim to be1 as a nation1 distinguished for profound thinking on the subjects of highest human interest2 nor yet are we the most thoughtless4 ,ignorance of the possibilities of mind is not so general as in some parts of ,europe1 but it is greater than in others4 ,material objects and interests occupy almost as exclusively the minds of the majority of our citizens whom we are accustomed to consider 8intelligent10 as among the unintelligent4 ,hence our proneness to boast of our material greatness1 instead of our intellectual conquests4 ,hence that weakest of all forms of self-praise1 the publication of the dimensions of our country and its rapid growth1 as though these were indications of our superiority as a people or as a race4 ,this is repeated ad nauseam1 while our real merits1 our contributions to the stock of the world's progress in thought1 knowledge1 and mental power1 are passed by in silence4 ,our newspaper press reflects this state of affairs1 since they generally think it their best policy to follow rather than lead public opinion4 ,there are1 however1 noteworthy exceptions to this character of the press both in the east and the west1 which we owe to the superiority of the men who edit and direct them4 ,in the conduct of our schools and of our scientific organisations1 we have a corresponding exhibition of mediocrity or worse1 with a few noble and distinguished exceptions4 ,a mere interest in education and research does not confer competency to direct and sustain them2 yet an interest in such matters is generally the only qualification demanded of the directors of such institutions1 provided they understand how to buy1 sell1 and invest money4 ,it is to be hoped that this state of affairs will some day pass away1 and that men who are influential in such matters will some time know enough themselves to distinguish between the false and the true1 and between men of ability and adventurers who are after the money and position with which our institutions of learning and our scientific enterprises can endow them4 ,this reform will progress exactly in proportion as it is understood how much human happiness depends on true research and on correct thinking1 and how little on revelation and on ancient dogma4 ,it is not1 ,i repeat1 sufficiently understood1 how much human conduct depends on correct thinking4 ,how much financial dishonesty would be averted by a rational thought as to the inevitable consequences8 ,how much social irregularity would be prevented by a similar treatment of the subject8 ,how much hatred and wasteful antagonism would the world lack1 if the ordinary conditions of living were understood and acted on6 ,so the cultivation of the rational mind is of incalculable importance1 and if we wish to prosper as a nation we must bend our energies to the pleasant task this problem presents to us4 ,neglect of our mental powers means degeneracy and decay2 while their cultivation means power and happiness4 ,wealth1 except as a means of attaining this end1 after physical necessities are supplied1 is simply useless4 ,e4 ,d4 ,,cope4 ,,mental ,,mummies4 ,if we should name the most important factor in the changes which have gradually widened the contrast between modern science and the scholasticism of the ,middle ,ages1 we might define it as a 8progressive recognition of hereditary influences40 ,there was a time when each individual of the human race was considered a separate accident1 called into existence by an act of unlimited1 arbitrary power1 and apt to be as suddenly changed1 even unto a complete inversion of his former moral being1 by a merciful1 or revengeful1 caprice of the same power4 ,biology has since taught us to apply the doctrine of evolution to the problems of our own moral and physical nature1 to trace the tendencies of bygone times to their effects in the present age1 to consider individuals the outcome of a long series of precedent influences1 and to recognise the truth that the length of those influences is proportioned to the persistence of the result4 ,intelligent statesmen were the first to appreciate the practical value of those facts4 ,the advisers of ,alexander ,,ii4 did not waste their time in a hopeless attempt to convert the freedom-worshipping natives of the ,caucasus into devotees of ,muscovite despotism1 but at once confronted them with the alternative of exile or death4 ,our ,indian commissioners early realised the impossibility of turning the descendants of a long ancestry of deer-hunters into tillers of the soil1 and transferred the survivors of the long race-war to a territory where they could for better or worse1 indulge their incurable penchant4 ,the ,groot ,fontein penitentiary of the ,transvaal ,republic became the grave of so many ,caffirs that the managers at last abandoned the plan of inuring nomads to the restraints of sedentary occupation1 and saved the lives1 if not the souls of their convicts by sending them about in chain-gangs to mend the irrigation ditches of the border settlements4 ,hereditary influences cannot be obliterated by force of rhetoric or of government edicts and it would solve many riddles if we would apply that principle to phenomena of ethical and religious evolution4 ,how else shall we explain the fact that in less than sixty years the doctrine of ,protestantism spread from central ,germany to the highland hamlets of ,scotland and ,scandinavia1 while in ,spain1 ,portugal1 and ,italy a very decided progress in general intelligence has failed to lead to a similar result8 ,how shall we account for the success of ,christian missionaries in ,tasmania and ,otaheiti and their utter failure in ,burmah and ,hindostan8 ,how for the persecution-proof vitality of ,judaism1 the ready collapse of ,mormonism1 or the revival of crass mystic delusions in the midst of our realistic civilisation8 ,there is no doubt that the average ,spanish sailor1 or village-shopkeeper of to-day possesses a larger stock of general information than the average ,brunswick school-teacher of the sixteenth century4 ,yet one of the least learned of those school-teachers could1 by instinct1 sufficiently appreciate the significance of the ,protestant revolt to celebrate its triumph by a big bonfire and what our western friends would1 call a 8grand war-dance10 on a height near the little town of ,wolfenbttel4 ,why does ,pedro ,gonzales still cross himself at the mention of a heretic1 while ,peter ,jansen would as soon return to the pig-sty hovels of the medival serfs as crawl back under the yoke of ,jesuitry8 ,how could the bogs of foggy ,ireland and the vegas of sunny ,spain nourish equally imperishable roots of a plant that failed to get a firm foot-hold in the sands of ,brandenburgh8 ,the solution of those enigmas can be found in the circumstance that the doctrine of anti-naturalism had extended its influence to the character of many ,european nations1 and that the character-traits of a race are less amenable to rapid changes than its intellectual standards4 ,on the soul-organism of the ,latin races the thousand years influence of monastic tyranny has left traces which the light of science will fail to efface for centuries to come4 ,the propaganda of a manlier creed has thus been defeated1 not only by their ignorance1 but by their aversion to mental efforts1 by their habitual reliance on miracles1 by their incurable indifference to the claims of truth and the merits of intellectual independence1 by their hereditary mistrust in the competence of their natural instinct4 ,to their moral palate a doctrine which nauseates their northern neighbors has become a pleasant narcotic2 they have been forced to swallow the opium of pessimism till a craving for the repetition of the mind-enervating dose has become a second nature2 they hug the cross that has proved a symbol of death to their noblest reformers4 ,against that influence of perverted instincts the logic of mental revelations avails but little4 8,propositions which would appear self-evident to certain mental constitutions10 says ,dr4 ,carpenter1 8are apt to be very differently received by others1 according to their conformity or discordance with that aggregate of preformed opinion which has grown up in the minds of each4 ,for just as we try whether a new piece of furniture which is offered us does or does not fit into a certain recess in our apartment1 and accept or decline it accordingly1 so we try a new proposition which is offered to our mental acceptance4 ,if it either at once fits in or can by argument or discussion be brought to fit in to some recess in our fabrics of thought1 we give our assent to it by admitting it to its appropriate place4 ,but if it neither fits in the first instance nor can by any means be brought to fit1 the mind automatically rejects it40 ,it is true that logical demonstrations may become complete enough to defy dissent1 but even from facts which force themselves upon the acceptance of every rational human being1 different individuals will draw widely different inferences4 ,that the mind of man may become a receptacle for irreconcilable doctrines is strikingly illustrated1 by the simultaneous acceptance of the ,old and ,new ,testament of our heterogeneous scripture1 and in the same way obstinate bigots manage to associate scientific truth and dogmatic absurdities4 ,darwin and ,moses may occupy adjoining quarters in the fabric of the same cosmogony2 the rule of three may become a passive concomitant of ,trinitarian dogmas4 ,the torch of truth may be permitted to flicker in a secluded recess of souls which refuse it the privilege of throwing its rays in certain directions4 ,education may fail to reclaim hereditary bigotry4 ,in the winter of #aeei the rabble of ,madrid assembled to witness the death of ,don ,carlos de ,seso1 a ,spanish nobleman whose ancestors had fought at ,granada and ,toledo4 ,his brother had been the favorite hunting-companion of ,charles ,v42 one of his uncles had sacrificed his life in deciding the victory of ,pavia2 ,don ,carlos himself had acquired renown both as a soldier and a scholar1 but in the latter capacity he had confessed his sympathy with certain doctrines of ,martin ,luther1 and the ,holy ,inquisition had sentenced him to anticipate his doom in the flames of the stake4 ,king ,philip ,,ii4 honored the auto da f with his presence1 and frowned in a way which the condemned freethinker mistook for a disapproval of his sentence4 8,o ,king6 can you thus witness the torture of your subjects80 exclaimed ,de ,seso4 8,deliver us from so cruel a death which even our enemies admit we have not deserved40 8,i would help carrying faggots to burn my own son10 replied the ,king1 8if he had incurred your unspeakable guilt40 ,yet ,philip the ,second was one of the best-educated princes of his century4 ,in mathematics1 astronomy1 ancient and modern languages1 geography1 and history1 he was far better informed than ,landgraf ,philip of ,hessen1 who would have risked his own life to save that of a loyal cavalier4 ,there are mental mummies who cannot be revived by removing their grave-shrouds and clothing them in modern drapery2 the principle of conservatism has penetrated their very veins and the marrow of their bones4 ,it is by no means unconceivable that a popular leader like ,garibaldi or ,porfirio ,diaz should succeed in persuading a million of his countrymen to renounce the yoke of ,rome and build ,protestant chapels1 but the result would be largely limited to a change of nomenclature4 ,before long the dissenters would march in procession with a wonder-working tooth of ,john ,wesley or kiss a shred from the petticoat of the ,holy ,maid of ,kent4 ,they would groan at the mention of ,rome1 but exorcise spooks with the initials of ,ulric ,zwingli1 and abstain from work on the anniversary of every ,protestant martyr4 ,they would try to redeem drunkards by sprinkling them with consecrated water from the holy rivers of ,kansas1 and celebrate ,arbor ,day only by invoking the spirit of ,prof4 ,g4 ,p4 ,marsh1 as a patron-saint of climate-improving forests4 ,under the stimulus of industrial influences1 they might transfer the cross from way-side shrines to telegraph-poles1 but they would persist in the worship of sorrow4 ,the creed which has turned the happiest countries of our globe into a grave of their former prosperity1 is a medley of miraculism and anti-naturalism1 and the experience of the last century has proved that both can survive the repudiation of ,rome and even of ,galilee4 ,the mania of renunciation1 after the abolishment of monasteries and nunneries1 continued its dismal rites in ,quaker-garb and ,shaker temples of celibacy4 ,the miracle-hunger of millions who have learned to scorn the clumsy tricks of the cowled exorcist1 gratifies its appetite in the mystic gloom of the dark cabinet4 ,rustic supernaturalists1 deprived of such luxuries1 indemnify themselves by retailing the marvels of the serpent-charm and joint-snake superstition4 ,a curious psychological problem suggests itself in the question how far the charm of the 8sour-grape philosophy0 may contribute to the persistence of certain forms of moral nihilism4 ,condemned criminals almost invariably 8renounce the vanities0 of a life which the ,court of ,appeals has refused to save1 and in a scaffold-speech1 quoted in ,galignani's ,messenger of ,may #fth1 #ahcg1 the ,english murderer ,joseph ,greenacre expressed his conviction that his crime had been the means of saving his soul1 because 8death on the gibbet was one of the surest passports to heaven40 ,for similar reasons degenerate nations1 after realising the doom of their national welfare1 are apt to renounce the glory of a forfeited world1 and to consider misery1 poverty1 and shame so many stepping-stones to the bliss of a better life beyond the grave4 ,after habitual sins against the health-laws of nature have avenged themselves in cureless diseases1 decrepit bigots may find solace even in that most insane tenet of their dualistic creed which teaches them to despise the body as the enemy of the soul4 ,a natural effect of pessimism may thus1 in course of time1 become one of its perpetuating causes4 ,,felix ,l4 ,,oswald4 ,,the ,,nervous ,,ganglia ,,of ,,insects4 ,i4 ,although the internal structure of the brain of insects has been the object of numerous and important investigations1 among which we must place those of ,dietl1 ,flgel1 ,bellonci1 and ,viallanes 7who have applied the method of sections to the study of this organ71 no attention has as yet been paid to the other nerve-centres of insects1 and in particular to the ganglia of the ventral chain4 ,writers have contented themselves with describing the external form of these ganglia1 and their anatomical relations to the other organic parts2 but nothing has been done to throw light upon their inward structure4 ,all the knowledge which we have on this subject is very meagre and dates far back to the works of the old writers1 who1 like ,newport1 had at their disposal no other means of study than the microscopic examination of organs viewed either transparently or in dilacerated preparations4 ,a method so defective could render but incomplete results1 and indeed in many cases erroneous ones4 ,we have sought to supply this much to be regretted lack of entomological knowledge1 by applying to the ventral ganglia of insects the admirable method of sectional cutting1 which has brought about such marked advances in contemporaneous zology4 ,i need hardly insist on the interest of this research4 ,we shall only remark that all anatomical study bears an unfinished aspect1 up to the moment at which we grasp the meaning of the organs which we describe2 physiology is a necessary complement of anatomy1 it is that which gives to it a meaning4 ,therefore1 when we dissect an organ1 which1 as in the case of an insect's brain1 is endowed with the most complex psychical properties of which these animals are capable1 we find ourselves in the presence of parts whose functions almost entirely escape us4 ,what is1 for example1 that peculiar organ to which we have given the name of the 8pedunculate0 body8 ,anatomists have described with the greatest care its connections and portrayed its external contour2 but we cannot discover1 or even conjecture its uses4 ,it would be necessary to understand the habits of thought and the feelings of an insect1 to be able to assign a rle to parts so complex and so delicate as those contained within its brain4 ,the study of the ventral ganglia seems to us to be capable of conducting us to a better result1 for in everything that concerns these nerve-masses1 physiology is more advanced1 and1 in all cases1 clearer4 ,the ganglia of the thorax1 for example1 are in the main motory centres2 the principal nerves that are sent out from them are to be found in the wings and in the feet2 the study of the terrestrial1 aquatic1 and aerial locomotion of insects has already formed the subject of quite a number of important scientific works2 we are now upon well-known ground1 and we may hope that it will be possible to establish some connection between the anatomical structure of ventral ganglia and the functions which these ganglia control4 ,this hope appears to us to be the more legitimate1 because we can make use of all the resources of comparative anatomy to work out the problem4 ,if we consider any particular function1 for example1 that of flying1 we notice that in species which resemble each other this function is exercised under totally different conditions2 the same organ acquires different uses1 and these variations become singularly instructive when we can trace their relationship to the particular structure of a nerve-ganglion4 ,thus1 one of the large wings of the dragon-fly1 which is almost like a bird in the range and power of its flight1 becomes the elytrum of the beetle2 the elytrum is a stiff wing covered by chitinised matter and serving as a protection to a part of the thorax and abdomen4 ,sometimes the elytrum is used in flying1 as in the case of the cockchafer4 ,in other lamellicorn insects1 in the ,cetonia for instance1 the elytrum is not used in flight2 it merely moves aside so as to allow the second pair of wings to unfold4 ,its rle becomes still less active in the golden carabus1 in ,procrustes1 in ,blaps1 and many other ,coleoptera1 whose two elytra are found on one vertical line1 and form but one single and immovable portion2 then the second pair of wings disappear2 from the physiological point of view1 the animal becomes apterous4 ,in another and different order1 the order ,diptera1 it is the second pair of wings that undergo an important modification2 they cease to be used in flying1 and are transformed into an organ of equipoise3 they are used for maintaining equilibrium4 ,all these physiological variations1 taking place in the self-same organ1 must in all probability have their counterpart in the internal anatomy of the ganglion that governs the organ1 and the comparative study of this ganglion in different species will enable us perhaps to discover the functions of some of its parts4 ,thus1 if we consider by hypothesis1 as the nerve-centre of flight1 some small lobe which is found occupying this or that place in a thoracic ganglion1 the disappearance or modification of this lobe in species not possessing the faculty of flying1 might serve to throw additional light upon such an interpretation4 ,what we have just said with regard to flight is equally applicable to terrestrial locomotion1 which also represents in itself many varieties4 ,the typal insect possesses three pairs of feet1 whence the name of hexapods1 but there are particular species which drop a pair of feet1 for instance1 the ,lepidoptera of the genus ,vanessa2 in others1 the physiological function of the foot varies2 in the case of the carrion-beetle 7a necrophagus coleopter7 it serves as an instrument of tillage1 to dig with2 for the cricket1 the third pair of feet are used for the purpose of leaping2 for the ,dytiscus1 it serves as an oar1 and so on4 ,we must also bear in mind the curious fact that there exists in the larv of certain insects what are called supplementary feet1 having only a transient existence and disappearing at maturity2 the caterpillar1 the larva of the butterfly1 has five pairs of supplementary feet4 ,these notable facts demonstrated by comparative anatomy1 cannot fail to furnish us with valuable information concerning the functions of the complex organs found in the ganglia of the thorax4 ,but this is not all4 ,we have not enumerated all the contributions of comparative anatomy to the problem which we are now about to consider2 we may make use of the method of comparison without bringing the different types into juxtaposition1 but by viewing the nervous system of only a single animal in its entirety4 ,we know in fact that the body of an insect is formed by a definite number of segments1 all constructed on the same fundamental plan and arranged in a linear series4 ,each one of these segments is joined to a nerve-ganglion1 which is all its own and supplies it with sensibility and motility1 the two elementary properties of nervous activity4 ,in the course of development1 these ganglia have the power of changing their positions2 and it is not uncommon to find that the greater number of the abdominal ganglia move up into the thorax2 each one1 nevertheless1 retaining its nerve-relationship to its own segment4 ,now all the segments of an insect's body are not called upon to play the same rle2 a division of labor has been effected among them with regard to the functions which they are found to exercise3 as we have already seen1 the ganglia of the thorax are essentially centres of locomotion2 in the head1 one of the ganglia1 the sub-sophageal1 furnishes the nerves of the buccal portions2 the other one1 the brain1 is connected with particular nerves and becomes the centre of the highest form of psychical activity of which the creature is capable4 ,we have here a number of modifications superadded to the original plan4 ,yet the original plan should again be met with in the ganglia that have been least differentiated1 such as those in the abdominal region2 and the comparison between an abdominal and a thoracic ganglion1 for instance1 is well calculated to show what are the primal and fundamental structures1 and what are the secondary ones which have been superadded and have become necessary for the execution of the more complex functions4 ,the study of embryonic and larval forms so easily observed in insects1 will most probably conduct us to the same result4 ,and thus perhaps by continuous efforts1 all guided by the same governing idea1 we shall ultimately arrive at the analogies that exist between the cerebroid ganglia and the humblest ganglia belonging to the ventral chain1 and thus finally be able to understand the action of the nerve-substance4 ,the importance of this object1 which1 be it clearly understood1 can never be attained except by the united effort of many workers1 is well calculated to command our strenuous exertions and to encourage us in surmounting the difficulties of a study which is as yet almost entirely new4 ,,ii4 ,we shall restrict ourselves in this article to the consideration of one particular case2 we shall describe a single ganglion of the insect4 ,the type we have chosen1 for reasons too lengthy to enumerate1 is a ,coleopter of the family of ,melolonthid2 the ,rhizotrogus solstitialis1 a small beetle very commonly found in the southwest of ,france4 ,we will now proceed to the consideration of the first thoracic ganglion4 ,the prothoracic ganglion in the rhizotrogus is joined by very short connective filaments to the second thoracic ganglion1 and also to the sub-sophageal ganglion2 this latter ganglion1 we must note en passant1 being situated in the thorax4 ,if with a pair of scissors we sever the head of the rhizotrogus1 we find that the remainder of the body contains not only the thoracic ganglia1 but also the sub-sophageal2 a peculiarity which1 from a physiological point of view1 is very interesting4 ,the ganglion of the pro-thorax1 which is greater in width than it is in length1 bears a vague resemblance to a cone the base of which is turned towards the sub-sophageal ganglion1 whilst the apex points towards the second ganglion of the thorax4 ,from the lower part spring two large nerves1 their starting-point being nearer the ventral than the dorsal surface1 a fact clearly comprehended when we find that the fibres of these nerves extend for the most part into the first pair of feet1 that is to say1 into those organs that lie underneath the horizontal plane of the ganglion4 ,the connective filaments which penetrate the ganglion anteriorly enter it nearer the dorsal surface than the ventral1 this last being extremely convex4 ,dissection throws no additional light upon the anatomy of the ganglion4 ,but by means of a series of sections1 we find that it is composed of a mass of fibrillar substance which occupies its centre portion and of a layer of nerve-cells surrounding the fibrillar substance4 ,this fibrillar mass is1 owing to its great volume1 far the most important1 and constitutes in itself alone about four-fifths of the organ4 ,the fibrillary structure can only be satisfactorily analysed by using on it osmic acid1 or other equivalent reagents which dissociate it and admit of its being reduced to a certain number of clearly differentiated elements4 ,whenever osmic acid or a similar reagent has not been employed1 or has not sufficiently penetrated the ganglion1 owing to the obstacle presented by a thick conjunctival covering or envelope1 the fibrillar substance takes on a homogeneous aspect that effectually renders all analysis of it impossible4 ,everything depends on the employment of a good method of preparation4 ,when the ganglion has been properly prepared1 we perceive a very material difference in the appearance of the fibrillar substance when we compare the dorsal with the ventral region of the ganglion4 ,we can do this very satisfactorily by a longitudinal section1 extending through both regions4 ,in such a section close to the median line but not confounded with it 7see ,cut #af7i we perceive that the ventral region is occupied by a cord or string of substance which owing to the action of the osmic acid has become very black1 and which is formed of so dense a tissue1 that we can with difficulty separate it into fibres and fibrill4 ,this cord1 which1 by reason of its position and shape1 ,i propose naming the ventral column1 extends over the ventral surface of the ganglion in a longitudinal direction2 at both its anterior and posterior extremities it is carried on by fibres extending into the ventral columns of the other ganglia1 in such a manner that the entire series of ganglia are united by one continuous ventral cord4 ,if we look at a transverse section 7see ,cut #bf71 the cord1 which is recognised by its dark color and by its position near the ventral surface of the fibrillar substance1 will be seen to have the form of two almost perfect circles4 ,the ventral column thus presents a circular section1 is duplex and symmetrical3 there exist two separate and distinct ventral columns1 separate at least for a certain length2 a fact which must be considered in connection with the primitive duality of the ganglion4 ,in every section where the columns remain distinct from each other1 they are separated either by fibres and conjunctival cells1 or by nerve-fibres emanating from the cells of the ventral region and proceeding in an upward direction between the two columns4 ,at the other points1 the two columns join on the median line4 ,this union is effected in different ways1 either by the two columns coming directly together1 thus merging into a single mass1 or by a commissure which describes the arc of a circle underneath the two columns1 or else by the inferior ventral lobule4 ,we give the name of inferior ventral lobule to a small lobule of fibrillar substance1 situated beneath the ventral column4 ,when looked at in a horizontal section not passing through the median line 7see ,cut #ag71 this lobule presents the appearance of a rounded protuberance1 breaking the almost rectilinear contour of the ventral column4 ,as this characteristic peculiarity is repeated in the internal structure of all the ganglia1 we may use it to ascertain the number of the ganglia1 whenever these present the appearance of being fused into one compact mass2 we may see the practical application of this remark by observing the sub-sophageal ganglion4 ,in a succession of horizontal sections1 the starting point of which is the ventral region1 the first mass of fibrillar substance met with by the knife is the inferior ventral lobule1 which is formed 7see ,cut #a7 by two rounded fasciculi1 placed symmetrically on either side of the median line and joined together by a transverse commissure4 ,in these sections1 we also perceive fibres of the crural nerve1 which1 after having extended over a certain length of the ganglion1 penetrate into the substance of the inferior ventral lobule 7,cut #b74 ,in transverse sections 7,cut #bc7 we find the two ventral lobules placed beneath the two columns which they help to support1 and into which they gradually merge2 and we also perceive the transverse commissure which joins the two4 ,we shall call this the transverse commissure of the inferior ventral lobule4 ,let us now pass on to the examination of the upper surface of the ventral column4 ,this surface is covered by a cluster of very fine fibrils rather sparsely disposed2 we can clearly follow their course by means of a longitudinal section 7,cut #ag72 we see them again in a horizontal section 7,cut #e74 ,to continue the general description of the ganglion we must now consider the dorsal region4 ,it is1 as we have previously stated1 occupied by a fibrillar substance not so dense as that which composes the ventral column1 and we will give the general name of dorsal lobe to this region1 reserving the name ventral lobe for the region which embraces the ventral column and its adjoining parts4 ,the dorsal lobe presents as its distinctive characteristic the feature that it is crossed longitudinally by a succession of connective filaments clearly seen in the longitudinal section of ,cut #af4 ,we have already stated that the ventral column receives fibres issuing from the ganglion in front and sends out others to the ganglia in the rear4 ,we shall call the totality of these fibres the connective ventral filaments1 and shall call the totality of those that traverse the dorsal lobe the dorsal connective filaments4 ,the connective filaments which join the sub-sophageal to the first thoracic ganglion1 and which1 between these two ganglia1 are composed of a dense fasciculus of fibres1 distribute these fibres1 at the point at which they enter the prothoracic ganglia1 in different directions2 one set of fibres proceeds towards the ventral column1 these are the ventral connective filaments2 a second set traverses the dorsal lobe1 and are the dorsal connective filaments4 ,whilst the ventral connective filaments soon merge into the very dense substance of the ventral column1 the dorsal connective filaments1 on the contrary1 remain distinct from the organs which they traverse1 and preserve their individuality throughout4 ,they take directions in three different planes 7see ,cut #af71 consequently they can be subdivided into superior1 medial1 and inferior dorsal connective filaments4 ,newport seems to have observed this distinction of fibres2 and he has given the name of sensory column to this first division1 and that of motor column to the second4 ,unfortunately the drawings and figures he has published1 though schematically correct1 are not clear4 ,we do not adopt his terminology1 in the first place because he designates the organs after their supposed functions1 and we have made it a rule never to use controvertible physiological suppositions to designate anatomical organs2 and besides1 though the name of column is applicable to the connective ventral filaments1 we cannot apply it to the connective dorsal filaments1 which are subdivided into three pairs of fibrous fasciculi and do not in the least resemble a column4 ,in the study of ,melolontha vulgaris1 we have been able to establish in the most absolute manner that there exists a considerable histological difference between the connective filaments of the ventral region and those of the dorsal4 ,though we have not yet noticed this difference in ,rhizotrogus in any marked degree1 nevertheless it has seemed to us needful to point it out here1 because the fact is of such vast importance that it cannot fail to be general4 ,the dorsal connective filaments1 whilst they preserve their individuality in their passage across the dorsal lobe of the ganglion1 penetrate nevertheless into some small masses of dotted substance which are found in the path of their entrance into the ganglion4 ,the mass annexed to the inferior dorsal connective filament1 is above all very important and is directly connected with the ventral column4 ,as the connective filaments are in pairs1 each of these possesses a distinct mass of fibrillar substance and both the masses attached to the same pair of connective filaments are joined by a commissure4 ,let us now say a few words about the nerves which proceed toward the prothoracic ganglion4 ,there exists here but one single pair of nerves1 extremely important and very extensive4 ,this is the crural nerve4 ,to this nerve are attached the organs which are superadded to the primary structure of the ganglion1 such as we have described it1 and which in consequence renders the primitive structure more complex4 ,we shall perceive the importance attached to the idea of a superadded organ1 when we study the abdominal ganglia1 where the organs we are about to describe are either completely wanting or are but imperfectly developed4 ,if now we examine a transversal section taken a little in front of the place from whence the crural nerves emerge 7,cut #ai71 we shall notice that the central part of the ganglion is occupied by the ventral column and the upper part by the dorsal lobe4 ,in addition to this1 in the lateral regions of the ganglion we find two important masses of fibrillar substance4 ,at this point these two masses remain distinct from the parts we have just mentioned1 and on the other hand they are in connection with the crural nerves4 ,the latter send a part1 and unquestionably the greater part1 of their fibres into the lateral lobes4 ,in a section slightly posterior to the preceding one1 also transversal1 a very important change has taken place2 the two lateral lobules1 always connected with the crural nerves1 have also established connections with the centre of the ganglion1 and in the sections further on the fusion is complete4 ,as these lateral lobules possess the characteristics mentioned1 only at the point at which the crural nerves emerge1 we shall call them the crural lobes4 ,thus we find in the prothoracic ganglion three principal lobes3 7#a7 the crural lobe1 which is double1 symmetrical1 and lateral1 7#b7 the dorsal lobe1 7#c7 the ventral lobe4 ,these two last1 in contradistinction to the crural lobe1 will be classed together under the common term central lobe4 ,and now to finish this summary description of the prothoracic ganglion1 we will point out an important disposition of the connective tissue which divides the ganglion into two halves1 one anterior1 the other posterior4 ,we can easily understand this disposition by looking at a longitudinal section passing exactly through the median line4 ,from the dorsal surface of the ganglion1 may be seen descending a bundle of cells and connective fibres1 which1 in the form of a column1 are directed toward the centre of the ganglion2 these cells and fibres do not meet any important organ on their way1 the dorsal connective filaments always taking a lateral course4 ,a fasciculus1 similarly composed of cells and conjunctival fibres1 starting from the ventral surface of the ganglion1 appears to meet this conjunctival column 7,cut #ah74 ,this curious disposition appears to be1 as ,m4 ,henneguy has ingeniously suggested to me1 a trace of the anterior development of the ganglion which had been formed of two distinct portions that have been naturally welded together along the median line2 the connective fasciculi corresponding to the point where the welding has been incomplete1 and representing the survival of a portion of the walls of the two ganglia4 ,,iii4 ,as the ganglion which we have just described contains some structural difficulties not easy of comprehension1 let us proceed with our description under another form1 following the order of our illustrations4 ,figure #a is the first horizontal section1 cut through the ventral region of the ganglion2 the knife has here met the lower ventral lobule1 which at this point shows itself double2 the two halves being joined by a double transversal commissure4 ,section #b1 made at a point a little higher than the preceding one1 shows us at the centre the lower ventral lobule as increased in size2 and in the lateral part of the figure appears a new organ1 the crural lobule1 which is here entirely merged into the lower ventral lobule4 ,the crural lobule is traversed by fibres from the crural nerve1 which instead of being entirely lost in its substance1 proceed still further1 passing into the lower ventral lobule4 ,section #c merely brings into prominence an important transversal commissure4 ,in ,section #d1 the inferior ventral lobule is replaced by the ventral column1 which appears double1 is symmetrical1 and united by a transversal commissure2 this commissure being formed of fibrillar substance4 ,the ventral column is closely connected on each side with the crural lobule2 it is besides crossed by the ventral connective fibres1 which can be seen emerging from its anterior and posterior extremities4 ,section #e allows us to examine thoroughly the disposition of those ventral connective fibres2 we see that while they penetrate the ganglion1 they also pass through two symmetrical masses of fibrillar substance2 these two masses1 which we name the anterior ventral lobules1 are joined together by a transversal commissure4 ,after having traversed the anterior ventral lobules1 to which it appears they give a portion of their fibres1 the ventral connective filaments pass through the ganglion in an antero-posterior direction1 and we see them penetrating the two posterior ventral lobules4 ,the last named lobules1 which remind us by their position and appearance of the anterior lobules1 receive in addition fibres issuing from the crural lobules2 but they do not receive them all1 because we notice quite a number of these fibres advancing directly into the second thoracic ganglion4 ,after emerging from the posterior ventral lobules1 the ventral connective filaments pass into the second thoracic ganglion1 where we see them penetrate into the anterior ventral lobules4 ,with ,figure #f1 we leave the ventral lobe of the ganglion and come to the lower portions of the dorsal lobule4 ,the important filaments crossing this section from the front to the back are called lower dorsal connective filaments4 ,we notice as they proceed some small masses of dotted substance1 and1 in addition to these1 dark colored dots which are the result of the knife having cut crosswise through several fascicles of ascending fibres4 ,we shall find out by means of the sections taken from different parts and placed so as to allow of our better observation1 what these ascending fibres are4 ,the crural lobule1 always exhibits the same characteristics4 ,we have given it a homogeneous aspect in our drawing4 ,as a fact it presents in its sections a vast number of structural details4 ,but these details being very difficult to understand1 we prefer not to dwell upon them4 ,section #g passes through the very midst of the lower dorsal connective filaments2 these filaments being in two pairs1 one external and the other internal4 ,the external pair1 situated somewhat lower1 has here disappeared1 and the inner pair is the only one to be seen4 ,some transversal fibres1 whose direction appears to me difficult to follow1 divide the inside dorsal connective filaments at two different points1 and assume the figure of a square2 this square has two black dots1 produced by the section of the ascending fibres4 ,a little higher1 in ,figure #h1 the lower connective filaments have disappeared and the fibrillar substance of the ganglion is furrowed by long transversal fibres1 of which a part seems to serve the function of joining the two crural lobules1 whilst the remainder1 proceeding towards the black dots before mentioned1 continue their progress with the fasciculi of ascending fibres4 ,these are no other than ascending fibres which1 having changed their direction at the plane of the section1 proceed almost in a horizontal plane4 ,in ,section #i we follow the course of the medial dorsal connective filaments1 separated from the lower connective filaments by the fibres having a transverse direction1 seen in ,figure #h4 ,the medial dorsal connective filaments are four in number1 an outer pair and an inner pair4 ,at the moment when they leave the prothoracic ganglion1 they cross a region where the fibrillar substance is both thicker and darker4 ,in ,figure #aj the medial connective filaments are on the point of disappearing2 they receive certain fibres coming from the crural lobules1 which are now reduced in dimensions4 ,section #aa shows us the lower dorsal connective filaments1 which are the slenderest of all and of which there are but one pair2 the crural lobule now disappears4 ,in the middle of the figure1 we observe a small collection of conjunctival cells which1 as we have supposed1 indicates the point where in the course of development the two symmetrical portions of the ganglion have not been perfectly fused together4 ,finally ,section #ab shows two lateral masses of fibrillar substance1 separated by a strip of conjunctival membrane4 ,we will now take up the series of longitudinal sections1 the study of which will demand very special attention4 ,we shall there meet again with the organs which we have already examined in the horizontal sections2 and we shall perceive that the alterations and modifications presented to us by the difference in our point of observation1 bring out very important changes in the appearance of those organs4 ,the sectional method of examination is also one of analysis4 ,in order to reconstruct an organ in its complete form and to conceive of it in space1 our mind must bring into a single focus what the sections have represented in a fragmentary manner3 we must1 in short1 substitute synthesis for analysis4 ,figure #ac represents the first and exterior longitudinal section2 it hardly touches the ganglion2 in the front we see the starting point of the crural nerve1 and also a portion of the periphery of the crural lobule4 ,the crural nerve exhibits several roots1 the most important of which occupy the ventral region4 ,figure #ad1 though very elementary1 brings out many important points2 we see here the crural lobule1 which has increased in size and extends from the ventral to the dorsal region2 a fact which has already been indicated in the horizontal sections1 the crural lobule having been shown in them at all points4 ,this lobule is almost circular in form4 ,along its ventral region1 we perceive some of the fibres of the crural nerve which do not penetrate into the lobule2 these are the ones we met with in the figures #b and #c3 they are the fibres which pass directly into the lower ventral lobule4 ,with ,section #ae1 we leave the lateral regions of the ganglion and come to the dorsal and ventral regions2 we must notice that the crural lobule is continuous with the central fibrillar mass and has no precise limits4 ,in ,section #ae the ventral column appears1 reduced in size4 ,in the front of it we observe an incisure through which certain nerve-cells send their prolongations into the fibrillar substance4 ,figure #af shows us the complete junction of all the connective filaments traversing the ganglion2 first the ventral column1 with the connective ventral filaments starting from both its extremities2 and then the three dorsal connective filaments1 which preserve their individuality distinct1 while they cross the dorsal lobe of the ganglion4 ,the lower dorsal connective filament is distinguished from the others by a small compact mass of fibrillar substance through which it passes4 ,we must note that the fibrillar substance becomes thicker at the point where the whole series of connective filaments enter the ganglion1 and the same thing is repeated at the place where they leave the first thoracic ganglion to enter into the second4 ,the ventral column is distinguished from the other parts of the ganglion by the dark color which it assumes through the action of the osmic acid2 it presents black granules which1 examined with a strong lens1 show small fasciculi of fibres running in a parallel direction4 ,the cells which line the lower surface of the ventral column do not throw out any prolongations2 they are exceedingly small1 but do not otherwise present any special feature4 ,figure #ag is but very slightly different from the preceding one3 the ventral column is simply strengthened on its lower surface by the lower ventral lobule4 ,the position of this lobule is interesting to note4 ,we have already mentioned that each ganglion is divided into two halves by a column of conjunctival tissue1 one anterior and the other posterior4 ,in ,section #ag we see the granulated projection of the ventral portion of this conjunctival column4 ,in order to simplify it we have shown no conjunctival tissue in our illustration4 ,we may nevertheless notice1 that the nerve-cells at the point marked c4 c4 seem to separate one from the other1 and show a triangular space between them1 filled with conjunctival cells4 ,if the segment had not been cut so obliquely1 7and this obliqueness in the sections is almost unavoidable when dealing with such very small organs17 we should also perceive on the dorsal line of the section the projection of the dorsal part of the conjunctival column2 in fact we shall see this projection in the figure which follows4 ,the presence of the conjunctival column separates1 as we have said1 each ganglion into two parts1 one anterior the other posterior4 ,these portions are not at all symmetrical4 ,we see in ,section #ag that the lower ventral lobule is found only in the anterior part4 ,finally from the ventral column rises an important fasciculus of ascending fibres1 which we have already seen in the horizontal diagrams2 it is difficult for us to ascertain what these fibres are4 ,in the #ahth and last section we approach nearer the median line4 ,the ventral column at this level has the appearance of being divided into two trunks4 ,the ventral connective filaments are clearly seen upon its upper surface4 ,among the dorsal connective filaments the middle one alone remains visible and receives a certain number of fibres from the ascending fasciculus4 ,to complete our description let us glance at the series of transverse sections4 ,in ,figure #ai the two crural lobules have not yet united and are not yet merged into the dorsal-ventral lobe4 ,this junction does not take place until we come to ,figure #bj4 ,here1 at this level1 we see in addition the circular segment of the two ventral columns1 which by their dark color are sharply outlined against the remainder of the fibrillar substance4 ,to the right and left of these two columns we perceive small masses of dotted substance2 we merely call attention to them and shall not describe them4 ,figure #ba furnishes no noteworthy modifications of the preceding4 ,we simply see a few cells of the periphery sending out their prolongations into the fibrillar substance4 ,the point at which they thus penetrate it has already been indicated in ,figure #ae4 ,in ,figure #bb we have a section of several dorsal connective filaments2 among others a lower root of the crural nerve is here seen to pass along the ventral surface of the fibrillar substance without penetrating into the crural lobule4 ,does there exist an upper root of the same nerve1 which follows the upper surface of the dotted substance8 ,we do not dare to decide the question4 ,one thing is certain1 and that is that if the nerve does exist it is accompanied along its path by a great number of widely ramified trache1 of which we see a drawing in tr4 ,in the three figures which follow 7#bc1 #bd1 #be7 the ventral column presents an interesting series of modifications4 ,first of all1 in ,figure #bc1 it is surrounded by the lower ventral lobule1 of which the two masses are in a lateral position1 and whose commissures pass underneath the column4 ,we see in the same ,figure #bc the two lower roots of the crural nerve1 advancing towards the column4 ,in the #bdth section the two roots have reached the column1 and two other nerves cross the crural lobule2 doubtless their destination is the lower dorsal connective filaments1 but of this we have no clear indication4 ,in the #bdth section two other crural roots also enter the lower ventral lobule4 ,this section is very favorable for the examination of the ascending fasciculus which we have already noticed in the longitudinal sections4 ,it seems to us certain that this fasciculus terminates in the middle dorsal connective filament4 ,its origin is more uncertain4 ,it seems to spring from the ventral column1 or else to come from crural roots which1 after having traversed the crural lobule1 reascend towards the dorsal lobe of the ganglion1 describing a curve exteriorily concave4 ,it is possible that this ascending fasciculus has both these origins4 ,the #bfth and last section shows us the ventral column on a larger scale2 the two columns being distinct from each other1 though united at the lower extremity by a commissure4 ,the ensemble of the figure strikingly reminds one of a section of the abdominal ganglion4 ,here our description ends4 ,we have not sought to follow up every fibre in all its details1 nor to describe completely the anatomy of each organ4 ,our intention has merely been to give a synthetic notion of a nervous ganglion4 ,subsequent studies made on other ganglia will demonstrate the general application of this idea4 ,,alfred ,,binet4 ,,footnotes3 #i ,for the cuts1 see the plates in the ,appendix of this number4 ,,hindu ,,monism4 ,,who ,,were ,,its ,,authors1 ,,priests ,,or ,,warriors8 ,among all the forms of government class government is the worst4 ,carthage was governed by merchants1 and the mercantile spirit of its policy led finally to the destruction of the city4 ,sparta was governed by warriors1 and in spite of the glory of ,thermopyl it was doomed to stagnation4 ,india was governed by priests1 and the weal of the nation was sacrificed with reckless indifference to their interests4 ,it appears that for the welfare of the community the harmonious co-operation of all classes is not only desirable but also indispensable4 ,yet it is often claimed that mankind is greatly indebted to nations or states ruled by class government1 for having worked out the particular occupation of the ruling class to a perfection which otherwise it would not have reached4 ,this is at least doubtful4 ,carthage was eager to establish monopolies1 but she contributed little to the higher development of commerce and trade among mankind4 ,sparta raised brave men1 but was not progressive1 even in the science of war1 and was worsted by so weak an adversary as ,thebes4 ,modern strategists could learn something from ,epaminondas1 but little1 if anything1 from the ,lacedmonians4 ,priestcraft has attained to a power in ,india unparalleled in the history of other nations1 and it is no exaggeration to say that priest-rule was the ruin of the country4 ,yet the wisdom of the ,brahmans has become proverbial4 ,their philosophy is praised as original and profound1 and it is well known that the first monistic world-conception was thought out in ancient ,india4 ,but we shall see later on what the real share of the ,brahmans in this great work has been4 ,in the very earliest ages of ,hindu antiquity1 revealed to us in the songs of the ,rig-veda1 we meet with priests who claimed the power of making sacrifices to the gods in a manner especially acceptable to them1 and who thus rose to great power1 influence1 and wealth4 ,to this ancient period of ,hindu history we can trace the origin of the ,hindu castes1 essentially a result of priestly egotism1 and which up to this day has weighed down the ,indian people like a nightmare4 ,the organisation of the priestly class into an exclusive1 privileged body1 as well as the final development of the castes1 did not1 however1 take place until the time represented by the second period of the ancient ,hindu literature2 by the literature1 that is to say1 of the ,yajur-vedas or the ,vedas of the sacrificial formul1 and the ,brhmanas and ,stras1 both of which describe the sacrificial ceremonies1 the former with1 the latter without theological comments4 ,the contents of these works illustrate the origin of the ,hindu hierarchy and castes2 but it is often necessary to read between the lines4 ,the greatest authority on this rich literature1 ,prof4 ,a4 ,weber1 of ,berlin1 in the tenth volume of the series 8,hindu ,studies0 which he edits1 has published his inquiries concerning this subject in a very learned treatise1 entitled 8,collectanea ber die ,kastenverhltnisse in der ,brhmana und ,stra10 of which ,i have made considerable use in the following pages4 ,in these books the ,brahmans assert their claims with startling candor4 ,in several passages--to begin with the most striking feature--they announce themselves as real gods wandering on earth4 8,there are two kinds of gods10 it is said1 8the true gods and the learned ,brahmans1 who recite the ,veda40 8,the ,brahman represents all gods40 8,he is the god of gods40 ,this is perhaps the most remarkable instance of priestly arrogance in all history4 ,thus it cannot at all surprise us that the ,brahmans1 as earthly gods1 placed themselves above king and nobility2 but it appears rather strange that the kings and warriors should have allowed to them the first place in the government4 ,but as a matter of fact1 they did do so and were compelled to do so4 ,from mysterious legends in the great ,hindu epic poem we infer1 that bloody wars have been waged for supremacy1 in which the nobility was defeated4 ,the legends of this epos are thus important additions to the sources with which we are concerned4 ,this struggle1 which the ,brahmans in all likelihood caused to be fought out for them by the great masses of the people1 has been ascribed to the warriors having robbed the priests of the treasures which the latter had acquired by the performance of the sacrifices2 and this part of the legend is so highly probable that we cannot treat it as a pure myth1 especially if we take into consideration the circumstances of those times4 ,it was the first attempt at secularisation in the history of the world1 and the results were very disastrous to those who were then in secular power4 ,the ,brahmans did not establish a social hierarchy or ecclesiastical ranks1 nor did they participate in the government1 except that the king was bound to employ a ,brahman as ,purohita or house-priest1 who occupied as such the position of prime minister4 ,if1 however1 they succeeded in dominating the nobility and the whole people1 it was principally on account of their greater knowledge1 of which they boasted1 and especially on account of the sacrificial arts1 by the proper exercise of which in those times1 all favors could be obtained from the gods4 ,for a duly performed sacrifice1 which would last weeks1 months1 nay1 years1 the ,brahmans charged of course a high fee4 ,a fee of ten thousand oxen was prescribed for a certain ceremony1 a hundred thousand for another one1 and a later teacher of ritualism charged #bdj1jjj for the same service4 ,and this was not yet the climax of priestly avarice1 which--to use an expression of ,professor ,weber--indulges in veritable orgies in these books4 ,after one has gone through the endless description of a ceremony1 one finds at the end the remark that the whole sacrifice has no effect1 unless the proper fee be paid to the priest4 ,and--to use a term of modern life--lest competition should reduce the prices or spoil the business1 a rule was established1 that no one should take a fee which another one had refused4 7,weber1 p4 #ed47 ,the sacrificial rituals1 so trying and tedious for us1 are the only literary production of these dull centuries before the rising of philosophical speculation1 and the great historical importance they possess is simply due to the light they throw on the moral depravity of the ,brahmans as a class4 ,the following fact will fully show to what extent sexual debaucheries were indulged in4 ,the priest was enjoined1 by a special rule1 not to commit adultery with the wife of another during a particularly holy ceremony4 ,but he who could not practice continence1 was allowed to expiate his sin by an offering of milk to ,varuna and ,mitra4 ,numerous passages in the books on ritualism furnish us interesting illustrations of the great indulgence which the ,brahmans had for each other's weaknesses4 ,the officiating priest is taught how to proceed during the sacrifice1 if he wants to wrong the man who employs and pays him1 or how to deviate from the prescribed rules1 if he wants to rob his employer of his seeing1 hearing1 children1 property1 or position4 ,the lack of confidence that resulted is best illustrated by a ceremony1 the introduction of which1 at the beginning of the sacrifice1 became gradually necessary4 ,by a solemn oath the officiating minister and the client bound themselves not to injure each other during the performance of the holy act4 ,consequently1 the strange notions of right1 which the ,brahmans had in those times1 will not surprise us4 8,murder of any one but a ,brahman is no murder40 8,an arbitrator must decide in favor of the ,brahman and not in favor of his opponent1 if the latter is not a ,brahman40 ,such maxims are laid down in the texts with shameless insolence4 ,it is plain that the caste system greatly contributed to increase the power and influence of the priests1 because in a country where the people are divided into classes1 the priest always succeeds in inciting at his wish the one against the other4 ,after the ,brahmans came as second caste the ,kshattriyas 7literally3 the ruling class1 i4 e41 king1 nobility1 soldiers72 and as third caste the ,vaisyas 7the bulk of the people3 farmers1 merchants1 etc474 ,the conquered non-,aryan aborigines were foreordained by the gods to serve the ,aryan castes and especially the ,brahmans4 ,they were called ,sdras 7serfs7 and had neither civil nor religious rights4 8,the ,sdra is the servant of others2 he can be cast out or killed40 ,by this humane maxim were the ,brahmans guided in their conduct towards the aborigines4 ,with such a state of things1 as it appears in the old books1 the priesthood ought to have been well pleased4 ,but the ,brahmans were not2 they desired still greater advantages and carried out the caste system to a most absurd extent4 ,the result is embodied in the famous law-book of ,manu1 the exact date of which we do not yet know1 but which must be placed at the beginning of our era4 ,the condition of things of which ,i shall now speak1 was accordingly developed during the last centuries before ,christ4 ,though we may suppose that some rules of this code have remained a mere theory and have never been carried out1 there remains enough to show the social life of those times in a poor light4 ,kppen1 in the first chapters of his book on ,buddhism1 has severely but justly judged the social organisation1 as it appears in ,manu's law-book2 but as the age of this code was overrated at his time1 he was led to one erroneous conclusion3 he attributes the historical process1 of which we speak1 to the period before ,buddha1 while it really took place after ,buddha3 ,l4 von ,schrder1 in his work 8,indian ,literature and ,history10 in the twenty-ninth lecture1 gives us a good view of those times4 ,different passages in ,manu's code show us that the claim of the ,brahmans to divinity had not decreased in the course of the centuries4 8,the ,brahmans are to be venerated at all times1 as they are the highest divinity40 8,by his very origin the ,brahman is a god1 even to the gods40 ,the many practical privileges they enjoyed were of still greater value4 ,they were exempt from taxation under all circumstances1 8even if the king should starve40 ,for the greatest crimes they could not be executed or chastised1 nor was their property liable to confiscation1 while at the same time the criminal law was very harsh towards the other castes and especially towards the ,sdras4 ,the penalties increased proportionately3 the lower the caste to which the criminal belonged1 the higher the punishment2 and the fines also increased in proportion to the rank of the caste to which the injured man belonged4 ,the money-lender was allowed to exact 7monthly7 two per cent4 of a ,brahman1 three of a ,kshattriya1 four of a ,vaisya1 five of a ,sdra4 ,all these laws show how the ,brahmans understood the art of advancing their interests4 ,the ,sdra was by the code deprived of all rights4 8,the ,brahman may consider him as a slave and is therefore entitled to take his property1 as the property of the slave belongs to the master40 8,the ,sdra shall not acquire wealth1 even if he be in a position to do so1 as such conduct gives offense to the ,brahman40 ,but all these things are harmless when compared with the principles by which the ,brahmans reduced to the most miserable of lives numberless human creatures who had committed no wrong except that their origin did not agree with the political scheme of the priests4 ,formerly it had been lawful for the members of the three ,aryan castes1 after having married a girl of the same caste1 to take other wives of a lower caste besides1 and no disgrace attached to their children4 ,the son of a ,brahman and a ,vaisya--or even of a ,sdra woman--was therefore a ,brahman4 ,but this was no longer the case under the code of ,manu4 ,if the parents belonged to different castes1 the children did not follow either father or mother1 but they formed a mixed caste and the law distinctly regulates their occupations and trades4 ,this theory gave birth to a great number of mixed castes1 who were more or less despised4 ,and the social standing of many of them grew still worse on account of an absurd maxim which degraded the ,indian people to the level of grass and plants4 ,good seed in a bad soil gives of course a poorer return than in good soil2 still the crop is endurable4 ,but weed introduced into good soil produces weed abundantly4 ,according to this theory of the ,brahmans the children were below the father1 if he had married a wife of a higher caste4 ,the lowest and most execrable creature therefore is the son of a ,sdra and a ,brahman woman4 ,the destiny of a ,sdra was of course hard and unhappy1 but the misery of the offspring of such a marriage1 of the ,chandla1 defies all description4 8,he shall live far from the abodes of other men and bear signs by which everybody can recognise and avoid him1 as his contact pollutes4 ,only in daytime shall he be admitted into the villages1 as then people can avoid him4 ,he shall possess but common animals like dogs and donkeys1 eat out of broken plates1 put on the dresses of the dead1 etc4 ,they were compelled to serve as executioners4 ,to the utmost degree of contempt and misery has the proud ,brahman reduced these poor creatures40 7,schrder1 pp4 #dbc-dbd47 ,but the ,chandla was not the last in the ,brahmanic scale1 which suppressed all dignity in human nature2 his offspring1 though he had only a wife of the ,sdra caste1 was necessarily still below him4 ,thus originated a great number of mixed castes1 one more despised than the other1 and despising one another4 ,most of these outcasts take their names from the ,indian aborigines and are thus placed on the same level with the most contemptible tribes4 ,some of the things ,i have cited about the mixed castes1 may have been merely a theory of the ,brahmans2 however1 the actual existence of classes of people reduced by the clergy to a sort of animal life1 has been sufficiently verified by foreign travellers4 ,in modern times the separation of the people has been going on very rapidly2 so much so1 that nearly every trade or profession now forms a caste of its own1 having no social intercourse with1 nor patriotic feelings for the other castes4 ,this condition of things is due to the influence of the ,brahmans1 for it has grown out of the social order they have founded4 ,it is not my task to arraign the ,brahmans for the sins they have committed2 but simply to illustrate to my readers1 how little they cared for and had at heart the interests of their people4 ,one will1 upon the whole1 feel inclined to denounce the selfishness and immorality of the ,brahmans1 but on the other hand will acknowledge with admiration the intellectual work they have done1 and forgive them much for the profound thoughts with which they have enriched their country and the whole world4 ,is it not the wisdom of the ,brahmans that has given to the word ,india a sound that stirs the hearts of all to whom the struggle for the highest truth appears as the highest phenomenon in the history of civilisation8 ,but suppose it can be shown that the greatest of all the wisdom of the ,brahman1 the monistic doctrine of the ,all-in-,one1 which has had the greatest influence on the intellectual life of modern times1 was not discovered by them8 ,before ,i enter on this question1 of the greatest importance from an historical point of view1 ,i will give a short sketch of the period of ,indian history in which this doctrine was established4 ,for centuries the ,brahmans had heaped sacrifice on sacrifice and multiplied symbolical explanations without end4 ,all this distinctly bore the stamp of priestly sophistry4 ,suddenly higher thoughts arise4 ,the learning handed down by tradition and the sacrificial system are1 it is true1 not altogether abandoned2 the mind1 however1 is no longer satisfied with the mysteries of the sacrifices1 but aims at higher and more sublime truth4 ,the age of intellectual darkness is followed by a new era1 the characteristic of which is the ambition to solve the problems of life and to understand the relation of the individual to the absolute4 ,all the efforts of the human mind are now bent on solving the question of the eternal ,unity1 from which all phenomena have emanated and which every one perceives within his own self4 ,it is the age of the ,upanishads1 those famous books1 which1 as soon as they were known in ,europe1 filled all scholars with wild enthusiasm and admiration4 ,i refer only to the old ,upanishads1 that date from the eighth to the sixth century ,b4 ,c41 not to the great number of books of the same name1 but not of the same value--there are over #bjj of them--which appeared after the ,christian era4 ,the ,upanishads reveal the struggle of the mind to reach the highest truth4 ,though they indulge occasionally in strange speculations1 still the idea of ,brahma1 of the universal soul1 of the absolute1 of the thing in itself1 is the ever-recurring subject of their thoughts1 which culminate in the idea that the ,atman1 the inner self of man1 is naught but the eternal and endless ,brahma4 ,a wonderful pathos animates the language of the ,upanishads and testifies to the sublime feelings in which the thinkers of those times sought the great mystery of existence4 ,they look for all kinds of expressions1 metaphors and figures1 in order to couch in words what cannot be described by words4 ,we read for instance in the venerable ,brihadranyaka ,upanishad3 8,that which lives on the earth1 but is different from the earth1 that which is the moving power of the earth1 that is your ,self1 the inner immortal ruler40 ,the same is predicated of water1 fire1 ether1 wind1 sun1 moon1 and stars2 and then the chapter ends as follows3 8,unseen1 he sees2 unheard1 he hears2 unminded1 he minds2 unknown1 he knows4 ,there is none that sees but he2 there is none that hears but he2 there is none that minds but he2 there is none that knows but he4 ,he is thy soul1 the inner ruler4 ,whatever is different from him1 is perishable40 ,in the same celebrated ,upanishad appears a woman1 named ,grg1 and moved by thirst of knowledge she inquires of the wise ,yjnavalkya3 8,that which is beyond the sky and beneath the earth1 and between sky and earth1 that which is1 was1 and shall be1 in what and with what is it interwoven 7that is3 in what does it live and move780 ,yjnavalkya1 in order to try the intellectual power of the woman1 gives an evasive answer3 8,in the ether40 ,but ,grg1 perceiving that this answer did not contain the final truth1 asks3 8,in what is the ether woven80 ,and ,yjnavalkya replied3 8,o ,grg1 that is what the ,brahman calls the ,eternal2 it is neither big1 nor small1 nor large1 nor short1 without connection1 without contact2 by the ,eternal are ruled heaven and earth1 sun and moon1 days and nights2 the power of the ,eternal directs the rivers south or west or to any other point of the compass4 ,whoever parts from this world without having understood the ,eternal1 is miserable40 ,in the ,chndogya ,upanishad1 a book of no less importance1 the same wisdom is taught by a man named ,uddlaka to his son ,shvetaketu in the form of several parables4 ,we see them standing in front of a ,nyagrodha tree1 that kind of fig-tree that everywhere sends roots from the branches down to the ground1 thus producing new trunks1 until in the course of time one tree resembles a green pillared hall4 ,and in front of such a tree1 the most beautiful symbol of ever-youthful nature1 the following conversation takes place between father and son3 8,get me a fruit of this tree40--8,here it is40--8,break it40--8,it is broken40--8,what do you see in it80--8,i see quite small kernels40--8,break one of them40--8,it is broken40--8,what do you see in it80--8,nothing40--,then the father said3 8,the fine matter that you cannot see has produced this big tree1 and believe me1 my dear son1 this same matter1 of which the earth is composed1 is the ,absolute1 the ,universal ,soul1--it is you40 ,the eternal ground of all existence which every one carries in himself1 ,being as it is in itself1 and as it is immediately perceived in thinking1 was1 accordingly recognised as the sole reality1 and all the manifold changes of the phenomenal world were called ,maya1 a sham1 a delusion1 a mockery of the senses4 ,we see1 it is a consistent monism which is taught in the ,upanishads4 ,i do not intend here either to criticise the ,brahman conception of monism or to contrast it with modern forms of monism4 ,all monisms have at least one thing in common1 viz4 they all recognise the paramount importance of consistency of thought as a basic principle in philosophy4 ,and to have propounded a monism for the first time is a feat which cannot be overestimated4 ,what remains of this essay will be devoted to the investigation of the question1 whether this feat is duly or unduly credited to the ,brahmans4 ,it may first be mentioned1 that a few scholars like ,weber1 ,max ,mller1 ,regnaud1 ,deussen1 and ,bhandarkar1 pointed out1 a long time ago1 certain facts which show that another class of the ,hindu nation founded the monistic doctrine of the old ,upanishads4 ,but the attention of the great public has never been called to this subject1 which deserves to be known by all interested in ,indian history4 ,in the second book of the ,brihadranyaka ,upanishad1 of which ,i have already cited two passages1 is found the following story1 of which also the fourth book of ,kaushtaki ,upanishad gives a slightly different version4 ,the proud and learned ,brahman ,blki ,grgya comes on his journey to ,ajtashatru1 prince of ,benares1 and says to him3 8,i will announce you the ,brahma40 ,the king1 highly pleased1 promises him a great reward1 a thousand cows4 ,the ,brahman begins to expound his wisdom3 8,the ,spirit 7that is the power7 in the sun ,i venerate as the ,brahma40 ,but the king interrupted him1 saying that he knew that already4 ,then the ,brahman speaks about the ,spirit in the moon1 in lightning1 ether1 wind1 fire1 water1 but the king knows all that4 ,and whatsoever the ,grgya might say1 is not new to the king4 ,the ,brahman became silent4 ,but ,ajtashatru asked him3 8,is that all80 and ,grgya answered3 8,yes1 that is all40 ,then the king said3 8,your little knowledge is not the ,brahma20 whereupon ,grgya declared that he should like to be one of the king's pupils4 ,ajtashatru replied3 8,it is against nature1 that a ,brahman should learn from a warrior and depend on him for the understanding of the ,brahma1 but ,i will show it you nevertheless40 ,the king took him to a sleeping man and spoke to the latter2 but he did not get up4 ,when the king touched him with his hand1 he arose4 ,the king then asked the ,brahman3 8,while this man was sleeping where was his mind1 and whence did it return now80 ,grgya could not give an answer4 ,then the king explained to him1 that the mind or the ,self of the sleeping man was wandering around in dream1 that all places were open to him1 that he could be a great king or a great ,brahman2 but that there was still a higher condition of felicity1 that is1 absorption in dreamless sleep1 without consciousness4 ,in this condition the ,self of man1 not affected by the outside world1 reposes in his true essence and knows no difference between ,atman and ,brahma4 ,another story1 reported in the fifth book of ,chndogya ,upanishad and in the sixth book of ,brihadranyaka ,upanishad1 is perhaps of still greater importance4 ,the young ,brahman ,shvetaketu comes to a convention1 where the ,king ,pravhana ,jaivli asks him3 8,has your father instructed you80--8,yes1 sir40--8,do you know to what place the dead go80 ,and three more questions he put to the young ,brahman1 who was compelled to admit that he knew nothing about them4 ,discouraged1 he returned to his father and reproached him3 8,although you have not imparted any knowledge to me1 you claim that you have instructed me4 ,a simple king has asked me three questions and ,i could not answer a single one40 ,the father replied3 8,you have known me sufficiently to understand that ,i taught you all ,i knew4 ,come1 let us go to the king and learn from him40 ,the king received the ,brahman with great honors and requested him to select a present4 ,but ,gautama refuses all earthly gifts1 gold1 cows1 horses1 female slaves1 and asks the king to answer the questions he had put to his son4 ,at first the king was unwilling1 but after a while he agreed to it and said1 that no one on earth could give information on those subjects1 except a warrior4 ,and the following words of the king's are very significant3 8,would that neither you nor your ancestors had trespassed on us1 that this truth might never have set up her residence among ,brahmans4 ,but to you1 since you are so inquiring1 ,i will communicate our wisdom40 ,substantially the same story is found at the beginning of the ,kaushtaki ,upanishad1 except that the king appears under the name ,chitra4 ,omitting points of less importance1 ,i shall only give in a brief form the contents of the eleventh and the following chapters of the fifth book of the ,chndogya ,upanishad1 where again a man of the warrior caste1 ,ashvapati1 prince of the ,kekaya1 is shown in possession of the highest wisdom4 ,a number of highly learned ,brahmans were speculating on the following problems3 8,what is our ,self8 ,what is the ,brahma80 and they decided to go to ,uddlaka ,aruni1 who1 as they knew1 was investigating the 8,omnipresent ,self40 ,but ,aruni said to himself3 8,now1 they will ask me and ,i am not able to answer all their questions02 consequently he requested his visitors to go with him to ,ashvapati4 ,the latter receives them with great honors1 invites them to stay with him1 promising them presents as high as their fees for sacrifices4 ,but they replied3 8,a man must communicate what he knows4 ,you are just now seeking the #8,omnipresent ,self'2 disclose to us what it is80 ,the king1 said3 8,i will answer you to-morrow40 ,the following day1 without having received them among his pupils1 that is1 without a ceremonial reception as was usual1 he asked them3 8,what do you venerate as the ,self80 ,they replied3 8,heaven1 sun1 wind1 ether1 water1 earth40 ,the king reminded them that they were all mistaken in considering the ,omnipresent ,self as a finite and limited being2 it was the infinite1 the infinitely small and the infinitely great4 ,the weight of these stories is very plain4 ,whether they refer to real facts or merely reflect the views of those times in the form of legends1 cannot be decided4 ,however1 the question of the historical truth of these stories has no bearing whatever4 ,the fact that they are to be found in genuine ,brahmanic writings1 in books which are considered in ,india as the basis of the ,brahman caste1 speaks a plain language4 ,it shows1 that the thought of claiming the monistic doctrine of the ,brahma-,atman as the inheritance of their caste1 did not occur to the authors of the old ,upanishads1 or that they dared not claim it2 it may be that they did not yet realise the great importance of the same4 ,of course in the following ages this science became the exclusive property of the ,brahmans and was cultivated and developed by them during twenty centuries--but this does not do away with the fact that it originated among the warrior caste4 ,the men of this caste recognised at once the hollowness of the sacrificial system and its absurd symbolical character2 and to them is due the credit of having disclosed a new world of thought and of having accomplished a revolution in the intellectual life of ,ancient ,india4 ,when we learn that the ,brahmans continued the sacrificial system1 even after having adopted the new creed1 and by representing religious ceremonials as the first step to knowledge1 thus combined two wholly heterogeneous elements2 we may justly conclude that things have taken the same course in ,ancient ,india as in other countries4 ,progressive ideas are first opposed by the priesthood1 their born enemy1 until they have become so powerful that they cannot be opposed any longer1 whereupon the priest adopts them and tries to harmonise them with his superstitions4 ,but the ideas mentioned in the preceding paragraphs1 the substance of what is commonly called 8,hindu wisdom10 are not all that the warriors have done for the religion and philosophy of the people4 ,the noble ,gautama of ,kapilavastu1 the best known of all ,hindus1 who established ,buddhism about #ejj years before ,christ1 was also a ,kshattriya1 and according to the more recent tradition1 which alone was formerly known1 the son of a king2 but according to the earlier sources1 disclosed by ,oldenberg1 he was the son of a landed proprietor4 ,buddha1 8the ,enlightened10 under which name he is known all over the world1 most strenuously opposed the sacrificial system and the superstitions of the ,brahmans4 ,the ceremonies and the science of the priesthood seemed to him a perfect fraud1 and the caste system an absurd institution2 he taught that the final beatitude is within the reach of the lowest man1 as well as of the ,brahman and the king2 that every one1 without distinction of birth1 can attain to 8salvation0 by contempt of the world1 self-denial1 and devotion to the welfare of his fellow beings4 ,oldenberg's excellent book on ,buddha1 the newest standard work on this subject1 makes it unnecessary for me to dwell at length on the doctrine of the greatest of all ,hindus2 only in regard to one important point1 which has a direct bearing on the subject under consideration1 do ,i differ from his opinion4 ,according to the oldest sources1 ,buddha's method of teaching is1 to a great extent1 beyond the understanding of the bulk of the people2 not a popular1 but an abstract philosophical one4 ,for intrinsic reasons1 ,i believe that the old sources do not give a correct report of this matter1 and we must not forget that centuries separate them from ,buddha4 ,oldenberg himself raises the point1 whether the dry and tedious ecclesiastical style1 in which ,buddha's thoughts are clothed by those sources1 truly reflects the spoken word4 ,he says on page #aha3 8,whoever reads the words which the sacred books attribute to ,buddha will doubt that the form in which ,buddha taught his precepts is to be identified with that abstract and sometimes abstruse metaphysical language4 ,a youthful1 invigorating spirit1 pervading alike teacher and disciples1 is the true picture of those times1 admitting of no unnatural or artificial features40 ,in spite of this1 he comes to the conclusion that 8the solemn and stern way of speaking1 peculiar to ,buddha1 has been better expressed by tradition than by what we would feel tempted to substitute40 ,i am not of this opinion4 ,in ,india a great success could not have been obtained but by overpowering eloquence and a popular method1 intelligible to all1 and proceeding by parables and metaphors4 ,if ,buddha had only appealed to the intellect of his nearest surroundings1 consisting merely of aristocratic elements1 if he had not found his way to the heart of the people1 his monastery would very likely have shared the destiny of the other religious congregations of his age1 which have all disappeared1 except one4 ,as the doctrines of these monasteries or their founders do not substantially differ from each other1 and as it cannot be ascribed to mere chance that ,buddha's doctrine has developed into a universal religion1 having the greatest number of adherents1 there remains but one hypothesis to account for this fact1 and that is the superiority of ,buddha's way of teaching4 ,the erroneousness of the generally prevailing opinion that ,buddha was in his time the only founder of a new religion1 and that he suddenly revolutionised the social organisation of the ,indian people1 has been clearly established by recent investigations4 ,in fact1 he was a 8primus inter pares10 one of those numerous ascetics who were striving for and preaching 8liberation0 from the eternal transmigration4 ,besides ,buddha's1 only one congregation has survived3 the ,jaina1 having numerous members in the western part of ,india4 ,the principles of the ,jaina are very similar to those of ,buddha2 so much so that until recently it was considered merely as a sect of ,buddhism1 while it is really a religion of its own1 founded by a contemporary or a predecessor of ,buddha1 named ,vardhamna ,jntaputra--in the language of the people1 ,vaddhamna ,ntaputta--in the same part of the country where ,buddha rose4 ,the only difference between the two religions is this3 ,vardhamna lays great stress on castigation2 while the more progressive ,buddha declares it useless--nay1 pernicious4 ,the important point in regard to the object of our essay is this3 that the founder of ,jaina1 which occupies a high place in the history of ,hindu culture1 was also a member of the ,warrior ,caste4 ,we shall now have to consider another production of the ,indian mind1 the very name of which is unknown to most of our readers1 although it offers the most interesting religious problems4 ,i refer to the doctrine of the ,bhgavatas or ,pnchartras4 ,these names1 of which the former is the earlier and original one1 designate a religious sect in ,north ,india1 whose existence in the fourth century ,b4 ,c4 is authentically proved1 but which can be placed with great probability in the time before ,buddha4 ,they professed a common-sense monotheism1 independent of the traditions of the old ,brahmans1 and venerated ,god under different names3 ,bhagavant1 8,the ,sublime10 whence their name is derived2 ,nryana1 8,son of ,man20 ,purashottamma1 8,the ,supreme ,being02 but generally under the name ,krishna ,vsudeva1 8,son of ,vsudeva04 ,the character of their worship produced feelings identical with the ,christian love and devotion to ,god4 ,the ,hindu word for this feeling is ,chakti1 and for him who was penetrated by the same1 ,chakta4 ,as the word ,chakti cannot be found or has not been found in the ,hindu literature earlier than the era of ,christ1 several scholars are inclined to attribute the ,chakti to the influence of ,christianity1 especially ,professor ,weber1 who deserves the highest praise for his researches concerning ,krishna worship4 ,weber has proved in several of his books1 especially in a highly interesting treatise on ,krishna's birth1 that numerous ,christian notions have entered into the later ,krishna legends 7the similarity of the names1 ,krishna and ,christ1 accounts for it73 for instance1 the birth of ,christ among the shepherds1 the story about the stable1 and others of the same kind4 ,in spite of this1 ,i cannot embrace the opinion that the ,chakti has been brought from a foreign country1 because its first appearance belongs to a period in which ,christian influences cannot be found4 ,as ,i cannot go into details without discussing very difficult points1 requiring a great deal of erudition1 ,i will only say that whoever is familiar with the old ,hindu civilisation will easily understand that the ,chakti is of genuine ,hindu origin4 ,monotheistic notions can be traced to the oldest periods of ,hindu antiquity1 and the ,hindu mind has always been animated by a high aspiration towards ,god2 so that it should not surprise us that this feature of the ,hindu character has produced a religion popular and independent of philosophical speculation1 consisting in love and devotion to ,god4 ,the founder of this religion was ,krishna ,vsudeva1 afterwards raised to divine dignity1 or rather identified with the deity2 from his name and from the legends attached to his name1 he was a member of the ,warrior ,caste4 ,as early as the epoch of the ,mahbhrata1 the great ,indian epic poem1 the ,brahmans appropriated to themselves the name and work of ,krishna1 and transformed the venerated hero into the ,god ,vishnu2 thus increasing their strength by adopting a doctrine not of ,brahmanic origin4 ,we have thus found that the profound philosophical monism of the ,upanishads1 the highly moral religions of ,buddha and ,jaina1 and last1 not least1 the creed of the ,bhgavatas1 based on pure devotion to ,god1 did not originate among the ,brahmans4 ,however favorably we may judge of the achievements of the ,brahmans in all branches of science1 and ,i am far from vilifying their merits1 still it is certain that the greatest intellectual performances of ,india1 nay1 all such in ,india that have been beneficial to mankind1 were accomplished by men of the ,warrior ,caste4 ,,richard ,,garbe4 ,,the ,,idea ,,of ,,necessity1 ,,its ,,basis ,,and ,,its ,,scope4 ,the idea of necessity1 although a fundamental concept in philosophy and science1 has not as yet been so clearly defined that all thinkers would agree as to its meaning and significance4 ,necessity is frequently identified with compulsion1 and thus it is supposed to be incompatible with freedom of will4 ,it is also identified with fate1 as if it were a destiny that existed above the will of man and the powers of nature1 similar to the ,moira of the ancients4 ,it is said to exclude chance in every possible conception of the term and to cause the evolution of the world to proceed by a predetermined arrangement1 like the mechanism of a clock4 ,we cannot endorse ,mr4 ,charles ,s4 ,peirce's objection to the doctrine of necessity1 but we side with him when he denounces the mechanical philosophy for considering minds as 8part of the physical world in such a sense that the laws of mechanics determine everything that happens40 ,mr4 ,peirce is right when he rebukes the mechanical philosopher for 8entering consciousness under the head of sundries as a forgotten trifle40 ,in some sense minds are parts of the physical1 i4 e4 the natural1 world1 but they are not parts of that province of nature which constitutes the special domain of physics and mechanics4 ,ideas are not motions and cannot be explained by mechanical laws4 ,having criticised in a former article of ours ,mr4 ,peirce's position1 and having rejected the indeterminism proposed by him1 we shall discuss in the following pages the basis and scope of the idea of necessity4 ,the idea of necessity is based upon the conception of sameness1 and we find that the existence of samenesses is a feature of the world in which we live4 ,the existence of samenesses is a fact of experience1 and upon the presence of this fact depends the possibility of the origin1 the being1 and the development of the thinking mind itself4 ,necessity1 as we understand it1 must be carefully distinguished from the idea of fate4 ,although we accept without reserve the doctrine of determinism1 we do not mean to deny the important part that chance plays in the world--not absolute chance1 which according to ,mr4 ,peirce is exempt from law1 but that same chance of which the throw of a die is a typical instance4 ,and bearing in mind that necessity is not a power outside of nature and above the will of man1 but that it resides in them as the quality of sameness1 we abandon the view that identifies necessity with compulsion2 recognising thus1 that freedom of the will is not incompatible with our view of necessitarianism4 ,i4 ,,the ,,basis ,,of ,,necessity4 ,the standpoint from which we shall treat this subject is that of monistic positivism1--the method which accepts no doctrine1 theory1 or law unless it be a formulation of facts4 ,facts are the bottom-rock to which we can and must dig down4 ,at the same time1 wherever facts appear contradictory to one another1 we should not be satisfied1 but continue to investigate until they are systematised so as to form a unitary entirety4 ,before we begin our inquiry into the existence or non-existence of necessity1 it is advisable to define the meaning of the term4 ,the ,latin word necesse is most probably a compound of the negative ne and the supine cessum from cedere to yield1 to move4 8,necessary10 according to this etymology1 would mean that which does not yield but abides4 ,thus it is the inevitable2 it is that which is or will be4 ,it is in this sense that the word is still used1 or at least ought to be used1 and in this sense we shall also use it4 ,every word naturally acquires by a more or less appropriate application a series of meanings4 ,so 8necessary0 means also that which is needful1 that which is essential1 that which is indispensable and requisite2 it also means that which is done under compulsion4 ,it is understood that we exclude all the other meanings of necessary except the original one1 which is its properly philosophical meaning4 ,the idea of necessity is closely allied to the idea of sameness4 ,in order to understand the former we must be clear concerning the meaning of the latter4 ,,the ,,idea ,,of ,,sameness4 ,there exist a number of synonyms often used indiscriminately2 they are3 identity1 sameness1 equality1 congruity1 similarity1 and likeness4 ,by 8identity0 we generally understand a sameness in every respect1 absolute sameness2 by 8equality01 a sameness that can be expressed in figures4 ,equality is always a measurable sameness1 and refers to quantity1 mass1 size1 length1 height1 age1 etc4 ,likeness and similitude are samenesses of form or of proportion1 albeit not of size4 ,it is often used as a partial sameness of impressions1 not so much as they are in themselves1 but as they appear to the mind4 ,congruity is a synonym of sameness in the province of geometry1 denoting the coincidence of figures when laid upon one another4#aj ,the logical principle of identity1 so-called1 it appears to me1 ought to be named the principle of sameness1 for it has not reference to the absolute sameness of a thing with itself4#aa ,the statement ,a ,a does not mean that this particular thing ,a is itself and that therefore the one ,a is one and the same thing4 ,it is a general statement and means that all ,a1 in so far as they are ,a1 are the same4 ,the statement ,a ,a1 as ,i take it1 presupposes the existence of a number of ,a's2 otherwise it would have no sense1 and it would not only be empty1 7as we know from ,kant that all formal statements are17 but meaningless and useless4 ,it would be of no avail either in logic or in science4 ,in consideration of the fact that the idea of sameness is a fundamental concept in our scientific1 logical1 and philosophical reasoning1 it is astonishing that no satisfactory definition of it is to be found4 ,to define 8same0 as 8one in substance2 not other1 444 of one nature or general character1 of one kind1 degree1 or amount10 as is done in the 8,century ,dictionary10 is no improvement upon 8,webster10 who defines it as 8not different or other2 identical4 ,of like kind1 species1 sort1 dimensions or the like2 not different in character or in the quality or qualities compared2 444 like40 ,however1 dictionaries are not encyclopdias2 and they have perhaps a right to define same as identical1 and identical as same4 ,mr4 ,james ,ward1 in the 8,encyclopdia ,britannica10 7,,xvi1 #ha1 in his excellent article on 8,psychology107 incidentally complains about the ambiguity of the word 8same02 he proposes a distinction between 8material identity0 and 8individual identity10 but this does not solve the difficulty4 ,flemming's 8,vocabulary of ,philosophy0 7#dth ed4 edited by ,calderwood7 contains several articles on 8identical0 and on 8identity0 without discussing in any one of them the meaning of 8same0 or of 8identical40 ,what then is the meaning of same8 ,let us first consider the etymology of the word4 ,the root of 8same0 is found in almost all ,indo-,european languages2 it is preserved in the first syllable of the ,latin 8similis0 and 8simul10 in the second syllable of the ,german 8,zusammen02 in the ,greek 80 and 810 and the ,sanskrit 8sama10 all of which denote a togetherness4 ,thus the etymological meaning seems to signify what is classed in one category4 ,accordingly1 the present meaning as defined by the dictionaries1 as being that which is 8of one nature or not different in character10 has not changed2 at any rate if there is any change1 it is slight4 ,yet it is desirable to bring out and set in a clear light the purport of the word and its essence4 ,what1 then1 is the economic service and function of the idea of 8sameness0 in the household of thought8 8,sameness0 is that feature in two things or states of things1 in two processes or modes of action1 which brings it to pass that the one may be replaced by the other without altering for a certain purpose the state of things or affecting the result of the entire process4 ,popularly expressed1 sameness is the capability of one thing's being substituted for another4 ,there is no need of discussing or proving the truism1 that1 properly speaking1 there is no absolute sameness1 no identity in the strict sense of the term4 ,this was the meaning of ,heraclitus's idea of the perpetual flux of things1 expressed in his 4 ,there are no two moments in time1 no two points in space1 no two atoms of matter actually identical1 and we cannot enter into the identical river twice4 ,cratylus tried to outdo ,heraclitus1 by saying that we cannot even enter once into the identical river1 for while entering1 not only the river changes but also we ourselves2 and ,cratylus is perfectly right4 ,we have purposely substituted in ,heraclitus's proposition 8identical0 for 8same10 because this change is needed to bring out the truth of the idea4 ,heraclitus and ,cratylus cease to be right if we use the word same as above defined4 ,we enter indeed the same river twice4 ,the river of to-day is1 for a certain purpose1 quite the same as the river of yesterday1 in so far namely as the river of to-day and the river of yesterday serve a certain and the same purpose3 for other purposes this same river will perhaps not be the same4 ,the geographer and historian speak of the ,rhine as that stream of water which since time immemorial has flowed down from the ,st4 ,gotthardt to the ,north ,sea4 ,accordingly1 if we stand on the bank of the ,rhine1 it is quite correct to say that this is the same river that was crossed by ,csar4 ,let the purpose of our thoughts be changed1 and we shall no longer be permitted to speak of sameness4 ,suppose we had seen the ,rhine for the first time in its beautiful emerald coloring1 and had come again after a rainy day to admire its beauty1 should we not be justified in exclaiming3 ,this is not the same river6 ,sameness1 accordingly1 depends upon a special purpose4 ,if in a chemical combination a metal is wanted1 it may be all the same whether we use iron1 zinc1 lead1 or gold4 ,that is to say1 it is all the same for bringing about a special result2 yet it is not all the same in other respects4 ,the weight and certain other qualities of the metals are different1 and also the cost4 ,,sameness ,,and ,,mind4 ,sameness depending upon a special purpose1 the question arises1 ,is there any objective sameness in the world1 or is sameness a mere subjective addition to things8 ,is sameness something 8real0 or is it purely mental8 ,this is the old quarrel between the ,nominalists and ,realists among the ,schoolmen4 ,it lies at the bottom of the problem of universals and particulars1 and we should say1 it is only a special form of the question1 8,are relations objective qualities of existence or are they products of the mind80 which was discussed in a former number 7,the ,monist1 ,,ii1 #b1 pp4 #bdj-db74 ,the idea of sameness represents the most important relation that exists2 and if any relation is real1 the relation of sameness must be real also4 ,if sameness depends upon a special purpose1 it appears that there can be no sameness without that purpose2 and the purpose being purely mental1 the sameness also would seem to be purely mental4 ,but this is not so4 ,sameness is an idea1 and it is no exception to other ideas4 ,all ideas are mental symbols formed for a special purpose2 but1 being symbols of something1 ideas are representative of some reality1 or of some feature of a reality1 or of some relation between two or several things4 ,every idea stands for something2 and this quality of the significance of ideas is called their meaning or their import4 ,the question now is1 ,how does the idea of sameness originate in the world where1 as we stated above1 there is no absolute sameness1 no identity8 ,our answer is that sameness1 not identity1 is a general feature of this world of reality1 which impresses itself upon every mind from the very beginning of the mind's origin4 ,we can go farther in our statement and make it more emphatic3 ,mind originates and grows only on the ground of the fact that sameness is a feature of the world1 and is recognised as such by feeling substance4 ,two points or two congruent geometrical figures being in different places are not identical4 ,but they are of such a nature that1 so far as regards the purposes of geometry1 one serves the purposes in question just as well as the other1 or one can be replaced by the other2 and this quality is called their sameness4 ,now as a matter of fact there are no two concrete things in the world in which there cannot be found some sameness4 ,both somehow affect sentiency2 we say they consist of matter4 ,both can be measured in size1 breadth1 and height3 we say1 they are extended4 ,both are at any given moment in a certain relation to other things3 we say1 they are in space4 ,both have a definite form and consist of one or several special structures 7i4 e41 so to say1 inside-forms74 ,all things can in some way or other be classed together under one heading4 ,these samenesses of things go along with differences1 and the degree of sameness in the different things varies greatly4 ,whether there is any sameness and difference at all in the world1 cannot be decided a priori1 but is a problem which can be solved only on the ground of1 first1 an a posteriori statement of the facts1 second1 a systematical arrangement of the facts4 ,if this is accomplished we can venture into a methodical investigation as to the nature of the samenesses as well as the differences that obtain in the universe1 and having arranged them in a system1 we can apply a priori this system to facts with which we are not as yet acquainted4 ,the many samenesses which are experienced are not purely mental additions2 they are not mere subjective imputations transferred upon objective existence4 ,they are real2 i4 e4 there are in the objective things actual features which allow of certain substitutions4 ,a ray of light awakens in some feeling substance the traces left by former rays of light2 and this reawakening is called memory4 ,the perception of sameness is the beginning of mind1 and it involves the perception of difference as a natural consequence4 ,suppose that the stuff of which the world consists were capable of acquiring feeling1 but there were no samenesses whatever2 which would mean that every smallest piece of the world-stuff were a particular thing by itself and in every respect unlike every other piece1 of a different material or of no material at all1 of different size or of no size at all1 and also possessed of a different number of space dimensions4 ,in such a world all the impacts made upon a sentient being would be different2 not one would be like the other1 and all feelings would present a chaos without uniformities1 worse than the most complex crazy-quilt4 ,under such circumstances mind would be impossible3 it would neither originate nor could it develop4 ,on the other hand suppose again that the stuff of which the world consists were capable of acquiring feeling in some certain formation1 and that there were samenesses in the world and in the events of the world4 ,would not mind necessarily originate in such a world8 ,given feeling substance in a world of samenesses and differences1 these samenesses will produce analogous samenesses of impression upon the feeling substance1 which will be perceived as samenesses of feeling4 ,the preservation of the traces left in the feeling substance 7supposing this substance to live on indefinitely7 will in the long run result in the formation of special sense-organs4 ,it will later on1 with the aid of word-symbolism1 lead to the formation of universals1 for universals are nothing but samenesses perceived4 ,it will then create with the assistance of abstraction the realm of scientific thought1 representing the uniformities of the events of the world in exact formulas4 ,,the ,,existence ,,of ,,samenesses ,a ,,fact4 ,the question whether there are samenesses at all in the world1 is in our opinion settled4 ,it is a fact that there are samenesses4 ,the uniformities of the world are a matter of indubitable experience--indubitable because our very existence as thinking beings1 as minds1 is conditioned by this fact4 ,we see the mind of every child develop out of his perception of samenesses4 ,our scientists teach us that the race-soul1 like a great immortal individual1 is the product of the accumulated experience of samenesses2 and all future progress1 in science as well as in civilisation1 in mechanical invention as well as in ethics1 depends upon the trustworthiness of the samenesses stated to exist in the objective world4 ,the question of the ultimate raison d'tre of the samenesses and differences1 is another question2 and it would lead us too far here to discuss it4 ,in several details the problem is not as yet ripe for solution4 ,a full solution of the problem would be tantamount to the exposition of a complete knowledge of the world4 ,suffice it here to say that we have reasons to think of the world-stuff as being of the same nature throughout4 ,the chemical elements seem to be different configurations of one and the same substance4 ,in this way all difference would have to be explained as a difference of form4 ,the form of reality possesses sameness and difference in all its parts4 ,space in its sameness is by experience found to be tri-dimensional1 which means1 it is determinable throughout by three cordinates2 while its differences are due to the position of the points considered4 ,for the purpose of the geometrician space is uniform1 but for the purpose1 say of the architect1 it is not uniform4 ,to the geometrician two congruent triangles1 whether they are in the cellar or in the garret1 are the same4 ,however1 to the architect the position of two congruent triangles in his design of a house is by no means the same4 ,every single point of space has its special and individual qualities4 ,the whole business of science is to systematise the samenesses of experience1 and to present them in such convenient formulas that they can be used for guidance in our actions4 ,the most comprehensive formulation of the sameness of the universe as a whole has found its expression in the law of the conservation of matter and energy4 ,this law rests upon the experience1 corroborated by experiments1 that causation is transformation4 ,it states that the total amount of matter and the total amount of energy remain constant4 ,there is no creation out of nothing and no conversion of something into nothing4 ,,eindeutig ,,bestimmt4 ,after this sketch of the importance of sameness1 7a subject which we have by no means exhausted17 we return to the idea of necessity4 ,the ideas of sameness and necessity are closely related4 ,a world of sameness is a world in which necessity rules1 and necessity means regularity and order4 ,german scientists have a very good expression to denote the formulation of events in a manner which describes them in their necessary course4 ,if they have succeeded in finding the sameness in the instances of a certain class of events1 they say that it is eindeutig bestimmt1 which means1 the sameness is determined in a way that admits of no equivocation2 it is complete1 representing solely and purely that feature upon the presence of which the result depends4 ,whatever is thus eindeutig bestimmt1 is recognised in its necessity4 ,the presence of that feature which makes it eindeutig bestimmt1 determines the event to take place2 and this being determined1 its inevitableness1 the it will be of the process1 is all there is to necessity4 ,all natural phenomena that can be eindeutig bestimmt are necessary in their happening4 ,a world which with regard to the total amount of its matter and energy is the same to-day and yesterday and will be the same to-morrow1 a world whose laws of form possess a sameness throughout1 so that it allows of formulating and applying them in their rigidity to all facts present1 past1 and future1 a world in which all the changes are transformations determinable with the assistance of formal laws1 can be relied upon and the course of its events can be computed4 ,such is the world in which we live2 and taking this ground ,i say1 the world is a cosmos1 it is no chaos2 and noticing that being possessed of sameness is an intrinsic and inalienable feature of the world1 ,i am inclined to add the world never was and never will be a chaos4 ,and this1 if it be true at all1 is true not only in general and as it were wholesale1 but in its minutest details4 ,if there were deficiencies of this order in the unobservable details1 they would not be diminished by being summed up in large and ever larger amounts2 on the contrary1 they would increase2 they would grow in proportion4 ,this not being the case1 we have not the slightest reason to doubt that in those realms of minutest existence into which1 from the grossness and the lack of precision of our organs and instruments of observation1 we cannot penetrate1 the same order and regularity obtains as in those regions which lie open to our investigation4 ,in other words3 ,from this standpoint1 existence is1 so to say1 permeated by law throughout2 every event is determined and any kind of absolute chance is excluded4 ,following ,kant's etymology we understand by a posteriori the sensory elements1 and by a priori the formal elements of our experience4 ,the queer expression 8a priori0 is in so far justified as formal truths 7such as geometrical1 arithmetical1 logical rules7 are formulas expressing the universal samenesses of the form of existence4 ,they contain the laws of form in a shape that is eindeutig bestimmt1 so that an experimenter will know them a priori to be so4 ,a priori means beforehand4 ,an experimenter knows certain things even before he makes his experiments4 ,the a priori elements of experience are by no means innate truths2 nor are they the historical beginning of experience4 ,on the contrary4 ,in their abstract purity they appear as a very late product of man's mental evolution4 ,the a priori systems of thought are not arbitrary constructions2 they are constructions raised out of the recognition of the formal1 i4 e4 the relational1 samenesses that appear in experience4 ,all possibilities of a certain class of relations can be exhausted and formulated in theorems4 ,as such they can be used as references to assist in the explanation and determination of new experiences4 ,we know some part of any new experience with which we are confronted even before we have investigated it4 ,we know certain laws of its form1 and by reference to these known laws we are enabled to reduce the unknown to the known1 to analyse the process and set forth that feature of it which makes eindeutig bestimmt4 ,,ii4 ,,the ,,scope ,,of ,,necessity4 ,mr4 ,peirce objects to necessitarianism1 and classes it together with materialism and the mechanical philosophy1 speaking of the latter as the most logical form of necessitarianism4 ,in consonance with the dictionary-definitions of these words1 he contrasts them to the doctrine of the freedom of the will and also to miracles--the latter1 we must confess1 being a dangerous concession to certain theological conceptions4 ,the 8,century ,dictionary0 defines 8necessitarianism0 as 8,the theory that the will is subject to the general mechanical law of cause and effect40 ,and 8necessitarian0 as 8,one who maintains the doctrine of philosophical necessity1 in opposition to that of the freedom of the will3 opposed to libertarian40 ,the word 8determinism0 is regarded as a synonym of necessitarianism4 ,its first definition in the 8,century ,dictionary0 reads as follows3 8,a term invented by ,sir ,william ,hamilton to denote the doctrine of the necessitarian philosophers1 who hold that man's actions are uniformly determined by motives acting upon his character1 and that he has not the power to choose to act in one way so long as he prefers on the whole to act in another way40 ,hamilton's definition as here presented is puzzling4 ,if the words 8choose0 and 8prefer on the whole0 are not meant to be tautological1 there is no sense in it2 for no determinist denies that a man might 8upon the whole0 prefer to act this way1 while he has the power to choose1 and for special considerations perhaps does choose1 to act in another way4 ,however1 if the words 8choose0 and 8prefer on the whole0 are meant to be tautological1 the self-contradictoriness of the statement is too palpable for a ,hamilton4 ,is there anybody who would maintain that a man who chooses to act in one way can at the same time1 under the very same circumstances1 and he remaining the very same man of the same character and intentions1 choose to act in another way8 ,while we accept determinism and also necessitarianism in the sense that all events 7the actions of willing beings included7 are determined1 we cannot accept either the mechanical philosophy or materialism as the terms are commonly understood4 ,we find materialism defined as 8,the metaphysical doctrine that matter is the only substance1 and that matter and its motions constitute the universe40 78,century ,dictionary10 #b;d sense47 ,the mechanical philosophy is explained sub voce 8atomic0 as 8,the view that from the diverse combination and motions of 444 atoms all things1 including the soul1 were supposed to arise40 ,ibid4 ,determinism is simply the negation of absolute chance4 ,it does not exclude chance in the original sense of the word as an unexpected event1 as something that befalls one without his seeking it or making the event--chance being derived from ,,ml4 cadentia1 i4 e4 the falling1 as in a throw of dice4 ,the 8,century ,dictionary0 defines 8chance0 in sense #i1 as 8,fortuity2 especially the absence of a cause necessitating an event40 ,this is absolute chance1 the existence of which we deny4 ,the 8,century ,dictionary0 adds the following little note3 8,absolute chance1 the 7supposed7 spontaneous occurrence of events undetermined by any general law or by any free volition4 ,according to ,aristotle1 events may come about in three ways3 first1 by necessity or an external compulsion2 second1 by nature or the development of an inward germinal tendency2 and third1 by chance1 without any determining cause or principle whatever1 by lawless1 sporadic originality40#ab ,we understand chance as being1 from certain premisses1 an incalculable coincidence1 either not intended to be calculated1 or1 for certain reasons1 from a given standpoint with a limited and definite amount of knowledge1 not capable of calculation4 ,determinism1 as we understand the term1 does not imply as the 8,century ,dictionary0 has it in its definition of necessitarianism1 that 8the law of cause and effect0 is 8mechanical40 ,it simply asserts that the law of cause and effect holds good universally1 and that there is no effect that is not definitely determined1 according to the nature of the things in action1 by causes and all their circumstances4 ,,necessity ,,and ,,chance4 ,mr4 ,peirce says3 8,all the diversity and specificalness of events is attributable to chance--diversification1 specificalness1 and irregularity of things1 ,i suppose is chance--and this diversity cannot be due to laws that are immutable40 7,p4 #ccb47 ,our world-view leads us to other conclusions2 we say3 ,every specificalness or particularity is such by possessing a certain form and standing in a definite relation 7in time as well as space7 to all other things of the universe4 ,of every concrete thing we can say it is now and here1 or it was then and there4 ,it is or was made up in this special way1 and it stands or it stood in these special relations to its surroundings4 ,proportions1 relations1 forms--these are what account for the diversification and specificalness of all things in the universe2 they are what explain the irregularities of individual cases and of all those events which appear as chance to him who1 although he may be well informed about the nature of a thing1 does not know the relation of its complex surroundings1 exercising according to law their disturbing influence upon its actions which otherwise would be uniform4 ,and since no two spots of space and no two instances of time are the same1 since the relations of every atom are different in every position and at every moment of its existence1 we need not be astonished to find diversity and specificalness in this world of samenesses4 ,we do not believe in absolute chance1 but we believe in chance4 ,what is chance8 ,chance is any event not especially intended1 either not calculated1 or1 with a given and limited stock of knowledge1 incalculable4 ,gunpowder was1 according to the legend1 invented by chance4 ,berthold ,schwartz intended to make gold1 yet when the mixture was ignited1 he began to understand that it was an explosive4 ,when ,i say that ,i met a friend by chance1 ,i mean that the meeting was unintentional4 ,i had not foreseen it and perhaps could not foresee it4 ,when we call a throw of dice pure chance1 we mean that the incidents which condition the turning up of these or those special faces of the dice have not been or cannot be calculated4 ,we do not mean that the law of cause and effect is suspended2 we mean that we are unable to determine the effect4 ,that which would make this or that throw eindeutig bestimmt is either not known to us1 or1 if it were known1 is of such a nature that we cannot produce the desired effect with any certainty4 ,matters are so arranged in the game of dice that the slightest incident changes the result1 and these incidents are either not within our ken or not within the range of our power4 ,chance1 accordingly1 as we understand it1 is no exception to necessity2 it does not happen contrary to law1 and is in each case the strict result of a definite cause under definite circumstances4 ,absolute chance is something quite different4 ,absolute chance is that which is incalculable because of the absence of law4 ,mr4 ,peirce says3 8,another argument1 or convenient commonplace1 is that absolute chance is inconceivable4 ,this word has eight current significations4 ,the #8,century ,dictionary' enumerates six4 ,those who talk like this will hardly be persuaded to say in what sense they mean that chance is inconceivable40 ,absolute chance is 8inconceivable0 as the word is defined by the 8,century ,dictionary0 in the second sense3 ,it is 8unacceptable to the mind because involving a violation of laws believed to be well established by positive evidence40 ,absolute chance is not unthinkable in the sense of unimaginable4 ,we can very well depict a case of absolute chance in our imagination1 just as we can tell and describe in minutest details the fairy tale of ,alladin's lamp2 just as we can in our imagination depict a creation out of nothing4 ,but he who accepts that the world is in its innermost nature a cosmos1 that its events are strictly and throughout regulated by law1 cannot at the same time think that there are nooks and crevices in which the law does not operate4 ,absolute chance actually involves the idea of a creation out of nothing2 and thus it stands in contradiction to the law of the preservation of matter and energy4 ,absolute chance which means that the very same thing under the very same conditions can act in this or in some other way1 that it need not act in exactly the same way1 involves a belief in either the creation of a not existing quality out of nothing1 or the disappearance of existing qualities into nothing4 ,mr4 ,peirce says3 8,it seems to me that every throw of sixes with a pair of dice is a manifest instance of chance40 ,yes1 of chance2 but not of that chance the existence of which ,mr4 ,peirce maintains--not of absolute chance4 ,every throw of dice1 every toss of head or tail1 are exactly determined by circumstances4 ,we call it chance only in so far as we cannot calculate and predetermine the result4 ,suppose you take two large silver coins between your thumb and the first two fingers1 one coin parallel to and a little above the other4 ,suppose tails are up in both4 ,drop the lower coin without an effort just as it would fall1 about twenty inches1 and you may be sure that1 in spite of yourself1 it will turn up head4 ,then drop the upper one and it will not turn1 but plump right down showing tail4 ,there are certain mechanical reasons for the one case as well as for the other4 ,as soon as we know the law and can apply it1 the case ceases to be an instance of chance4 ,dice1 the roulette1 and other games of chance are so arranged1 that the determinating circumstances are too numerous and also too complex1 one interfering with and being disturbed by the others1 to admit of any adequate calculation or predetermination4 ,an arrangement of conditions which in this way eludes the calculation of a definite set of possibilities1 is called by ,professor ,kries gleiche ,spielrume or equal chances4 ,and the province of equal chances is and will remain the proper sphere of the calculus of probabilities4 ,professor ,nitsche objects to ,kries's proposition1 saying that absolutely equal chances are impossible and an equal chance 7ein gleicher ,spielrume7 is nothing but the objectification of a judgment of equal value4#ac ,we find no fault with ,nitsche's objection2 there are no absolutely equal chances2 and what is called 8equal chance0 means that the strength of two or several anticipations is of the same degree2 that our belief and doubt as to the turning up of one1 two1 three1 four1 five1 or six spots of a die are equally justified4 ,the objective conditions which justify such equality of several expectations is what ,kries 7if we understand him correctly7 calls gleiche ,spielrume4 ,but gleiche ,spielrume do not imply absolute chance4 ,we might as well expect that all the six faces of a die should turn up simultaneously in one throw1 as that any one of them should turn up by absolute chance4 ,while absolute chance cannot be admitted1 partly because we are not in need of it1 7since the irregularities of nature can be sufficiently explained otherwise17 and partly because the idea of absolute chance if it were needed1 is incompatible with our world-conception1 we shall1 nevertheless1 have to concede to chance1 as we understand the term1 a very important rle in the evolution of life4 ,the formation of worlds and the history of mankind depend to a great extent upon chances similar to the throws of dice4 ,there are many possibilities1 and now this1 now that1 will1 according to the circumstances1 be realised--of course in each case with strict necessity4 ,let us illustrate this idea by an example4 ,the formation of about seventy elements out of the original world-substance1 which may be supposed to be homogeneous1 does not appear to depend upon chance4 ,their universal appearance in all parts of the universe suggests the hypothesis that their formation is the inevitable result of a gradual condensation of nebular substances4 ,we find everywhere1 according to the stage of condensation1 a gradual appearance1 first of the lighter1 then of the heavier elements4 ,there seems to be no possibility of the formation of other elements than those known to us 7including here the hypothetical elements which are still missing in the ,mendeljeff series and at the same time1 at least1 not excluding a further continuance of the series74 ,these elements or none1 it appears1 must be formed out of the original substance of our world4 ,let us here assume1 for argument's sake1 that it were so beyond question1 and that we knew the nature of the world-substance to be such as to condense1 if it condenses at all1 into no other but these forms1 which we call chemical elements4 ,this would be a limitation of possibilities4 ,exactly so the throws ,of dice are limited4 ,with the dice commonly in use we cannot throw fractions2 nor can we throw either zero1 or seven1 or any other higher number4 ,we can throw only whole numbers1 integrals from one up to six4 ,but while we thus assume that the formation of the elements is limited to those actually existing1 the proportion in which the elements may be distributed in the different nebul and solar systems1 is apparently very different4 ,suppose we had a full knowledge of the intrinsic nature of the world-substance and were standing outside the universe observing the process of world-formations2 we could not from this knowledge alone predict all that would happen4 ,we should on our assumption be able to predict a priori that such elements would be formed4 ,but whether the different elements would be generated in these or in other proportions appears to depend upon the presence of certain conditions1 perhaps the rapidity of motion1 the heat produced by friction1 the temperature of the surrounding cosmic space1 any knowledge of which is not included in our knowledge of the nature of the world-substance4 ,these conditions may vary1 nay1 so far as we can judge they actually do vary2 and any apparently slight variation of them1 or even one of them1 will result in different effects of great consequence4 ,without a detailed knowledge of all these special conditions1 simply from a supposed a priori knowledge of the world-substance1 the idiosyncrasy of this or that particular solar system could not be a priori determined4 ,here it will be such1 and there1 under perhaps slightly different circumstances1 it will be entirely other4 ,here the centre of gravity may be in one great mass1 there again it may be divided in two1 so that the planets circle around two suns4 ,from this point of view we have to call these results products of chance4 ,to a being who not only might be supposed to know the intrinsic nature of existence1 but could have present before his mind every event of the great interacting cosmos in its entire complexity1 this kind of chance would1 of course1 also disappear4 ,to him all states of things would appear throughout as eindeutig bestimmt4 ,yet1 although in this way necessity permeates all events that take place1 we do not intend to deny the irregularity of detail1#ad the specificalness of the particulars1 the diversity of individual incidents and existences4 ,according to our conception of nature they must remain1 and we need not attribute them to absolute chance4 ,to attribute irregularities to absolute chance 7as ,mr4 ,peirce does7 is actually an abandonment of explaining them4 ,the specificalness and particularity of nature can be said to be due to chance in so far only as they do not depend upon and are not determinable by the nature of the things under consideration1 but result 7with strict necessity of course7 from the ever-changing conformations of surrounding circumstances4 ,thus the fate of a man depends mainly upon his character1--the proverb says1 8,every man is the architect of his own fortune0--but not entirely4 ,there are sometimes coincidences determining the fates of men1 and through them the fates of whole nations4 ,and these coincidences do not result from their character4 ,let everybody think of his own fate4 ,part of his life has been what it was because he is such a man as he is2 and we can1 within certain limits1 predict the fate of a youth with whose character we are familiar4 ,but how much of our lives depends upon circumstances which could be foreseen only by an omniscient being1 and which1 as we might properly say1 if we do not misunderstand the term1 is due to chance6 ,,free ,,will4 ,compulsion is generally considered as a synonym of necessity4 ,but the usage of the term necessity in the sense of compulsion is1 in our opinion1 very inappropriate1 because misleading4 ,necessity and compulsion should not be confounded2 for compulsion excludes free will and 8necessity0 does not4 ,a government compels its citizens to obey certain unpopular laws2 the victorious army compels the enemy to surrender4 ,the obedience of the citizens and the surrender of the enemy are acts done under compulsion2 they are not acts of free will4 ,but a man of a certain character wills1 under given circumstances and in the absence of compulsion1 necessarily in the way in which he does4 ,the determination of a free will is not a matter of chance but of necessity4 ,yet the determining factors are not outside but inside2 they are not due to compulsion1 not to the pressure of a foreign power1 but to the nature of the willing being himself4 ,this1 then1 is the definition of 8free03 ,a being is free if it is unrestrained1 so that it acts according to its own nature4 ,as is its nature1 so it wills2 as it wills1 so it acts4 ,if we know the character of a man and the situation in which he is placed1 we can predict his choice as the necessary result of his nature4 ,his decision1 although it is free and not under compulsion1 is not an outcome of chance which might under the same conditions be different1 but is the inevitable result of necessity4 ,if by free will we had to understand that the decisions of the will are the result either of chance or of absolute chance1 the foremost duty of the educator would be to make man unfree1 to insert certain dominant ideas into his mind1 destined to determine his will4 ,the free man according to this definition of free will as being due to chance1 would be a person whose actions are more whimsical than the fancies of lunatics4 ,we reject this conception of the freedom of the will4 ,in our opinion a will is free if it is unrestrained so that it can act according to its nature4 ,our conception of free will does not stand in contradiction to the doctrine of 8determinism0 as defined by the 8,century ,dictionary0 in its second sense3 8,in general1 the doctrine that whatever is or happens is entirely determined by antecedent causes40 ,,the ,,mechanical ,,philosophy4 ,we distinguish between 7#a7 mechanical1 7#b7 physical1 7#c7 chemical1 7#d7 physiological1 and 7#e7 psychical events4 ,a mechanical phenomenon is a change of place which does not involve a change of the constitution of the parts moved4 ,e4 g41 a stone is pushed2 its position is altered1 but the stone remains the same4 ,a physical phenomenon is an event in which the molecular state of the bodies in action is altered4 ,water heated becomes steam1 frozen it becomes ice4 ,the three states have different molecular configurations4 ,chemical phenomena are such in which the constitution of the atoms is altered4 ,the characteristic qualities of hydrogen1 for example1 are different when combined with different elements or when isolated4 ,each combination is a peculiar substance with peculiar qualities and not a mixture or combination of the qualities of the isolated elements4 ,physiological processes are all those changes that take place in the living irritable substance of plants and animals1 such as nutrition1 growth1 and propagation4 ,its characteristic features are 7#a7 hunger or thirst1 i4 e4 the want of certain materials 7food71 7#b7 the reception of the wanted materials by suction or other means1 which in some cases are a quite mechanical or physical process1 not unlike the afflux of oxygen caused by a burning candle or the suction of water by a sponge1 and 7#c7 the assimilation of food4 ,the materials received are distributed in the places wanted1 thus adding to the building up of the living substance according to the nature of its structure4 ,this produces as a natural result 7#d7 the phenomenon of growth with a preservation of form4 7#e7 ,propagation is a special kind of growth2 it is the growth of a part that at some stage of its development becomes an independent individual4 ,psychical phenomena are such in which feelings and the meanings of feelings are the determinant factors4 ,it is apparent that all these terms1 mechanical1 physical1 chemical1 physiological1 and psychical1 are mere abstracts4 ,in describing a mechanical phenomenon1 we limit our attention to the mechanical change4 ,we do not mean to say that the body moved does not possess chemical1 physical1 perhaps physiological1 or even psychical qualities4 ,the calculation of the curve of a jump is a mechanical problem1 although the jumping body may be a human being4 ,however1 the question why did the man jump1 is a psychical question4 ,the motive of the jump is an idea in that class of mental activity characterised as purpose4 ,the man had an end in view4 ,and this idea of an end to be realised is the combined result of special conditions and of the character of the man4 ,the different spheres of mechanical1 physical1 chemical1 physiological1 and psychical actions being abstractions1 it is obvious that science when dealing with so-called purely mechanical phenomena1 has to do with a fiction4 ,there are no purely mechanical phenomena4 ,there are features of reality which are purely mechanical2 and these we call motions4 ,but the world does not consist of motions only4 ,it also possesses other qualities4 ,the mechanical philosopher assumes that the world consists of matter and motion only1 and so he feels warranted in the hope that every event that takes place1 the actions of man included1 can be explained by the laws of motion4 ,yet the premiss is wrong1 and we may anticipate that the conclusion also will prove erroneous4 ,and so it is4 ,the laws of motion are applicable to and will explain all motions2 but they are not applicable to that which is not motion4 ,it is inconceivable how we can hope to explain a feeling by the laws of motion2 and so the fond hope of explaining the problems of the nature of the soul by mechanics is preposterous4 ,no objection can be made to the possibility of explaining the delicate motions in the nervous substance of the brain by the laws of molar or molecular mechanics4 ,but these explanations would throw no light upon the causation that takes place in the mind4 ,the properly psychical phenomena1 the properly intelligent action of thought1 could not be explained in this way4 ,for the world of mentality introduces quite a new factor into the sphere of being4 ,what is this new factor8 ,the nature of mental activity consists in the symbolism of feelings4 ,feelings1 being different under different conditions and the same under same conditions1 become representative of their corresponding causes1 and thus the objects of experience are depicted in feeling symbols4 ,representativeness1 accordingly1 is the nature of mind4 ,the question1 ,how certain brain-structures operate1 is a question of the mechanics of nervous substance1 and further1 the question1 ,how thought-operations take place1 is a question1 so to say1 of logical mechanics4 ,but the question1 ,why a certain idea responds to certain stimuli and not to others1 does not admit of a mechanical explanation or formulation4 ,the answer to this question will be a description of the nature of the idea2 and the nature of the idea is not a motion3 it is the meaning of which the idea is possessed4 ,the action of a mind depends upon the meaning of certain symbols4 ,a written or spoken word has a special meaning1 and this meaning becomes the determinant factor of mind action4 ,the meaning of a word is not a piece of matter1 neither is it a motion4 ,it is something sui generis4 ,i do not say that there is any inexplicable mystery connected with it4 ,on the contrary1 wonderful as the fact is1 it is not mysterious2 it does not stand in contradiction to any other fact of nature4 ,symbols stand for something2 they indicate1 denote1 or signify something4 ,this significance is called their meaning2 and mind is a system of symbols in states of awareness4 ,now1 neither states of awareness are mechanical1 nor is the meaning of words anything mechanical4 ,how can we hope for a mechanical explanation either of the soul or the mind or of any mental action8 ,suppose1 for instance1 a general receives a message containing a few words4 ,he opens the paper1 he reads it1 and all on a sudden1 his mind is in a tumult of excitement4 ,what is it that produces the excitement8 ,is it any motion8 ,yes6 ,in a certain sense1 it is a motion3 it is the reading of the paper4 ,this is the cause4 ,yet not the reading as such excites his consternation4 ,he might read other messages all the day long without any such an effect4 ,plainly1 the causative element of the cause is not the reading1 not the motions of which the reading consists1 not the shape of the written characters and their combinations in groups1 called words4 ,it is something more subtle even than that4 ,it is the significance of the writing4 ,it is the meaning of the written characters4 ,it is the purport that is attached to the word-symbols4 ,the origin of mind accordingly introduces a factor which has nothing to do with mechanics2 and the simplest psychical reflexes1 including those physiological reflexes which we must suppose to have originated by conscious adaptation and then been submerged into unconsciousness1 cannot be explained from mechanical or physical laws alone4 ,,spontaneity4 ,while we thus reject the conception of the mechanical philosophy and also of materialism1 we do not say that there are motions either in the brain or anywhere else which form exceptions to the laws of mechanics4 ,the laws of mechanics hold good for all motions4 ,the laws of mechanics are formal laws3 they do not explain why bodies gravitate2 but they describe how they gravitate2 and the latter is much more useful to know than the former4 ,there is 7as we conceive it7 no deep secret in the problem why bodies gravitate2 they gravitate because they possess a quality which attracts them to each other with a force directly as their masses and inversely as the squares of their distances4 ,in a word1 gravity is the intrinsic nature of masses1 it is an inalienable part of their existence4 ,thus whenever bodies gravitate1 we are confronted with an act of spontaneity4 ,attempts have been made to explain gravitation without the assumption of spontaneity1 by the pressure of an atom-surrounding ether4 ,but that only defers the question2 for the spontaneity1 in that case1 would have to be placed in the ether4 ,whatever be the merits of the explanations of gravitation by a vis a tergo1 we must recognise the fact that no motion can take place in the world1 no pressure can be exercised1 without there being somewhere some spontaneous something that moves or presses4 ,spontaneity is a universal feature of nature4 ,mr4 ,peirce uses the term 8spontaneity0 in a different sense from ours4 ,he identifies spontaneity with absolute chance4 ,he means by it the irregularities that arise without cause1 thus producing departures from law4 ,we call that action spontaneous which is not due to external influence but springs from the nature of the things in action4 ,spontaneous is derived from the ,latin spons1 8will10 which as a noun was obsolete at the classical period of ,roman literature and occurred only in such forms as sponte1 8of one's own will1 of one's own accord40 ,if a man acts of his own will1 free from and not biassed by the influence of other men1 his action is spontaneous4 ,a free man's action is not arbitrary1 unless arbitrariness#ae be the character of the man2 it is not an exception to law2 it is1 if the character of the man is known1 calculable in advance1 for every free action is spontaneous3 it springs immediately from the character of the man2 it is the direct expression of his will2 it reveals the nature of his very being1 thus showing the man himself1 and not something beyond or outside of him4 ,taking the word spontaneity in this sense1 we say3 ,masses gravitate spontaneously2 they are self-moving2 their motion is due to their gravity1 and gravity is their intrinsic nature4 ,exactly as the laws of mechanics explain the 8how0 of motions but not why there is motion at all1 the 8why0 depending upon the nature of each moving body1 so the 8how0 of the brain-motions is explicable by mechanical laws1 but the 8why0 depends upon the nature of the moving material4 ,the brain-atoms are possessed of the same spontaneity as the atoms of a gravitating stone4 ,yet there is present an additional feature2 there are present states of awareness1 and these states of awareness possess meaning1 both of which are items which the chemist cannot find by chemical analysis4 ,neither states of awareness nor their meanings can be weighed on any scales1 be they ever so delicate1 nor are they determinable in foot-pounds4 ,yet while mechanics is not applicable to mental facts1 the realm of mentality is by no means to be surrendered to indeterminism4 ,mr4 ,peirce describes the domain of mind as the absence of law and the prevalence of absolute chance1 of an indetermined and indeterminable sporting4 ,this is not so4 ,while the fact must be recognised that the nature of the mind is not something mechanical1 its action is nevertheless determined by laws--not by mechanical laws1 but by psychical and mental laws4 ,these psychical and mental laws are in one respect of exactly the same nature as mechanical laws2 they describe the samenesses of certain facts of reality4 ,and the facts of the ideal domain of thought1 the facts of subjectivity1 are no less real than the grosser facts of mechanical motion1 which are the facts of objectivity4 ,the term mechanical is often used in the sense of 8lacking life or spirit0 78,century ,dictionary10 p4 #cfgi74 ,this is justifiable in so far only as when we speak of mechanical phenomena we do not mean psychical or any other phenomena4 ,it is true that that which makes this or that idea respond to a certain stimulus is not a mechanical but a mental quality1 but the action itself1 in so far as it is a motion1 is and remains mechanical4 ,thus it happens that the laws of mechanics1 far from being anti-spiritual1 are the means by which we learn to understand and objectively to represent the action of mental phenomena4 ,in this connection attention may be called to the efforts of modern logicians to construct thinking machines which will perform the work of mental operations in a purely mechanical way4 ,you propose the problem by adjusting certain indicators2 then you turn the crank1 and the machine does the rest4 ,the results will come out with unfailing exactness4 ,the attempt made to construct thinking machines cannot as yet be called successful4 ,nevertheless they are not impossibilities4 ,calculating machines of various constructions are in practical use and doing satisfactory work1 not only in addition and subtraction but also in multiplication and division1 and even in extracting roots and in raising numbers to higher powers4 ,calculations are undoubtedly one kind of thought1 and if calculations can be performed by machines1 there is no theoretical reason why we should not be able to construct logical machines1 which shall perform the operations of deductive and even of inductive thought with perfect accuracy4 ,,conclusion4 ,determinism does not make freedom impossible and natural laws do not suppress the spontaneity of nature4 ,natural laws are not a power forcing a certain mode of action upon things2 they are not an oppression of nature4 ,natural laws are simply a description of nature as nature is4 ,there is no 8must0 in nature in the sense of compulsion1 as if there were two things1 7#a7 a master 7i4 e4 the law7 giving a command1 and 7#b7 a slave 7i4 e4 the single facts7 obeying the command4 ,the situation is not dualistic1 but monistic4 ,there is an 8is0 in nature1 and this 8is0 is constant4 ,there is a certain sameness in nature4 ,in spite of all changes it remains the same2 and thus even the apparent irregularities preserve throughout an unvarying consistency4 ,the facts of nature express the character of nature2 they are nature herself4 ,briefly1 the 8is0 of nature 7if we are permitted to personify her7 does not describe that which nature must do1 but that which nature wills to do2 it describes how she acts spontaneously1 of her own free will1 in conformity with her innermost being and consistently with her permanent character4 ,the main difference that obtains between the actions of inanimate nature so-called and rational beings is not the absence and presence of spontaneity1 7for spontaneity is in both17 but the absence and presence of mind3 and mind is not only the subjectivity of existence2 mind is not merely sentiency1 i4 e4 the awareness of feelings2 mind is the representative symbolism of subjectivity4 ,there are sufficient reasons to assume that all objective existence1 which appears to us as matter in motion1 possesses a subjectivity1 the nature of which depends upon the mode of the interaction of its elements4 ,this subjectivity appears in organised substance as feeling and develops naturally into mind4 ,the essence of nature1 accordingly1 is not materiality1 but spirituality4 ,materiality is the character of nature as it affects sentient beings2 but its innermost self1 as it were1 its subjectivity1 its psychical aspect is revealed in the appearance of the spirit-life of rational beings--of minds4 ,while we fully recognise the spirituality of nature as nature's innermost essence and as an ineradicable feature of reality1 we cannot with ,mr4 ,peirce place mind at the beginning of the world4 ,there is a great difference between spirituality and mind4 ,one is the source and condition of the other4 ,one is permanent1 the other is transient4 ,one is the abstract view of a universal quality of the world1 eternal and everlasting1 as much indestructible as matter and energy2 the other is an individual formation that originates1 grows1 and develops2 that can be broken and built again2 that dies with the body and rises again in new generations2 that decays1 as the foliage of the trees falls in winter1 yet reappears1 as the verdure reappears in spring2 for the life of nature is immortal4 ,mr4 ,peirce1 regarding determinism as that view which does not recognise the freedom of will1 has an original and in our conception a wrong view on the one hand of natural laws1 which are to him mere habits acquired by the world1 and on the other hand of chance1 or arbitrary sportiveness1 7i4 e4 that which is not determinable by law17 which he identifies with mind and with the spontaneity of freedom4 ,mind is to him the beginning of all4 ,mind remains mind1 according to his view1 so long as it is irregular1 producing out of its own undetermined being sporadic effects without order or consistency4 ,as soon as mind takes to habits1 it grows mechanical2 by creating regularity it disappears2 and the result is matter in motion according to mechanical laws4 ,matter1 accordingly1 is said to be 8effete mind40 ,law in our view is the divinity of nature2 according to ,mr4 ,peirce it is the termination of nature's irregularities3 it comes to suppress her freedom and to supplant her mentality by mechanicalism4 ,an element of pure chance1 however1 survives1 which1 appears in the free will of man1 in miracles1 and in nature's irregularities1 and this element of pure chance will remain until in the infinitely distant future1 mind becomes crystallised into an absolutely perfect1 rational1 and symmetrical system4 ,such is in brief ,mr4 ,peirce's view of the rle played by mind in the world-process4 ,mr4 ,peirce's views of chance and law seem to come to the rescue of certain theological dogmas1 which represent the world-order as the product of a divine mind4 ,we doubt very much whether ,mr4 ,peirce's position be tenable even from the standpoint of the scientific theologian4 ,for the order of the world1 as it appears in natural laws1 must be1 and is recognised even by the theist1 as part and parcel of ,god's eternal being4 ,the scientist who formulates sub specie aeternitatis certain facts of nature1 say the 8how0 of gravitating bodies1 describes a certain quality of ,god himself2 he describes something that is immutable1 eternal1 everlasting2 it is not the whole of ,god1 but it is certainly one feature of ,jahveh1 of that which is1 was1 and will be as it is4 ,in contradistinction to ,mr4 ,peirce1 we recognise1 that the regularity of the whole is preserved in the specificalness of its individual particulars1 that there are samenesses in this world of changes and diversities1 and that if all reality is regarded as being essentially the same throughout1 all the diversities and apparent irregularities can very well be explained as resulting from peculiar forms1 combinations1 and relations4 ,furthermore1 we recognise that natural laws are compatible with the spontaneity of nature and that the necessity with which a free man acts according to his character1 does not reverse his freedom of will4 ,nature is self-acting throughout2 nature is free2 even inanimate nature is spontaneous4 ,but a higher freedom rises with the appearance of mind4 ,and there are degrees of this higher freedom which can be determined with great exactness1 for they correspond to the range of the mentality of each creature4 ,mentality develops by the observation of samenesses1 and it reaches rationality by the recognition of natural laws4 ,the recognition of natural laws is a view of some natural phenomena in their eternal aspect1 and we call them truths4 ,so much is natural law and freedom interconnected that the recognition of natural laws widens the range of freedom2 and obedience to them raises man out of his dependence upon his surroundings to a state of dominion over the creation in which he becomes the master of natural forces4 ,what a deep significance lies in the saying of the apostle3 8,the truth shall make you free60 ,,editor4 ,,footnotes3 #aj ,the adjective 8like0 is an abbreviation of 8alike02 and 8a-like0 7,m4,e4 alyke1 ,a4,s4 gelic1 ,o4,h4,g4 galih1 ,m4,h4,g4 gelich1 ,m4,g4 gleich7 is a compound of the prefix a with lic body1 shape1 figure4 #aa ,i am satisfied that logical identity is intended to mean sameness4 ,i suppose that the word identity1 being ,latin and a kind of international term1 appeared to logicians preferable to the ,saxon word 8sameness0 or the ,german 8,gleichheit40 ,we need not look for any deeper reason for the adoption of the term4 #ab ,knowing that ,mr4 ,peirce is one of the most prominent contributors to the ,century ,dictionary1 ,i may be pardoned for surmising that1 perhaps with the exception of the parenthesised word 87supposed70 he is the author of this passage and very likely of most of the other quotations of philosophical terms we have adduced from the same source4 #ac ,die ,principien der ,wahrscheinlichkeitsrechnung by ,johannes von ,kries4 ,see also ,meinong's review of the book 7in ,gtt4 gel ,anz41 ,no4 #b1 p4 #ef et seqq47 and ,ad4 ,nitsche's article on the subject 7in ,vierteljahrsschrift fr wiss4 ,phil4 of #ahib4 ,,xvi4 #a1 p4 #bf74 #ad ,by irregularity of detail we understand simply a lack of uniformity1 but not exceptions to law4 ,if irregularity be defined as exception to law1 we should say1 ,there is no irregularity in the world1 while at the same time nothing is uniform3 for every particle of the world is in its time and space relations and otherwise different from every other particle4 #ae ,arbitrary1 as used here1 means capricious1 uncertain1 unreasonable4 ,a man's action is capricious if he is biassed by the present motive alone1 without considering other motives which he would have under other circumstances4 ,a deliberate man equalises1 as it were1 his actions by forming rules of conduct4 ,an arbitrary man does not recognise rules or laws1 made either by himself or by others4 ,,literary ,,correspondence ,i4 ,,recent ,,evolutionary ,,studies ,,in ,,germany4 ,since ,darwin's death1 his theory1 which in ,germany more than elsewhere received its development1 has but few decisive steps in advance to point to1 even though the circle of its adherents has been enlarged and though in many respects and in special directions it has been rendered more complete and placed upon a firmer foundation4 ,it is a gratifying fact1 that most1 if not all1 of the recent discoveries in zoology1 palontology1 and particularly in developmental history1 are easily and completely reconcilable with the principles originally established2 so that the views which we have reached on this subject have lost more and more the characters of a purely hypothetical fabric4 ,but the accurate investigations of developmental history have unquestionably furnished the most important material in proof of the theory in question1 and the principles established in this department1 in the main the results of the labors of ,german investigators 7,e4 von ,baer1 ,fritz ,mller1 ,e4 ,haeckel71 have been verified in a truly surprising manner4 ,it is true that ,darwin himself in no way undervalued the importance of the results of the studies in question1 but how little the facts known at the time of the enunciation of his theory of natural selection sufficed1 is most clearly proved by the fact that ,e4 von ,baer and ,louis ,agassiz1 who at that time were perhaps the greatest authorities in embryology1 assumed a hostile attitude towards the new ,darwinian theory4 ,agassiz's combination of the points of agreement of palontology and embryology1 his explanation of extinct forms as 8prophetic types10 proved a veritable hindrance to the perception of the truth1 and ,carl ,vogt1 who was his co-worker at that time1 appears to have been the last to set up any opposition to the 8fundamental biogenetic principle10 that the development of the individual repeats in an abbreviated form the history of his race4 ,vogt1 formerly the champion of advanced views1 appears to-day as the leader of the small band of the opposition4 ,if we compare the recently published fourth edition of ,haeckel's ,anthropogeny1 #ahia1 and the eighth edition of his ,history of ,creation1 with the early editions1 we cannot help remarking1 with considerable astonishment1 despite the enormous increase of fresh material1 the fact that little in the old plans and principles of the work needs correction4 ,even the bold generalisations1 the inference as to the identity of form of the original beginnings of all of the middle or higher classes of animals1 the 8,gastra ,theory0 of ,haeckel1 at first so violently opposed1 the stress laid upon the equivalence of the blastoderms in the various orders of animals1 nay1 even many of the animal genealogies1 really only asserted as a working hypothesis1 have stood the test beyond all expectation2 although ,du ,bois-,reymond insinuated that the pedigrees of the heroes of ,homer were more worthy of credit4 ,to appreciate the complete victory of these ideas one need but refer to the discourse ,on ,recapitulation in ,embryology with which ,a4 ,milnes ,marshall opened the meeting of the ,biological ,section of the ,british ,natural ,history ,society at ,leeds1 ,september1 #ahij4 ,the very conspicuous irregularities in the formation of organised bodies1 which formerly were regarded as monstrosities1 or as the freaks and riddles of the formative instinct1 the hare-lips1 the cleft palates1 cases of microcephaly1 etc41 or the conspicuous want of symmetry in the physical structure of the plaice and sole1 formerly made use of by ,mivart and ,schimper as unassailable counterproofs of ,darwin's doctrines1 have shaped themselves into the most decisive verifications of his theory2 as in fact1 generally1 a number of the most splendid evidences of the correctness of the theory have1 as the result of exact investigations in organic evolution1 proceeded from the most obstinate of its supposed difficulties4 ,thus1 for example1 as proof that birds are far removed from the other classes of vertebrates1 the circumstance had been cited that certain parts connected with the visual organs are in them situated at the side of the brain1 instead of on the dorsal surface1 as is the case with the other vertebrates4 ,but a more exact observation has shown that this variation in formation is a secondary result1 since in each previous period of development these same organs in the young birds lie1 exactly as in the case of the other vertebrates1 on the dorsal surface1 and only shortly before leaving the egg do they move downward to the sides4 ,in many cases where the development of parts preservable in fossil conditions is under consideration1 as for instance portions of the skeleton1 the hard integuments1 and the teeth1 a direct proof may1 by comparison1 be furnished of the truth of the fact of the correspondence of the embryological formations of living animals with the final and permanent forms of their extinct representatives1 a fact which was indeed acknowledged by ,agassiz and ,vogt1 but completely misunderstood4 ,we need only to recall to mind the exact parallelism which ,alexander ,agassiz and ,neumayer have demonstrated to exist in the case of echinoderms1 ,huxley1 ,marsh1 and others in the formation of the wings of birds1 the pelvis of birds1 or the hoofs of horses1 in order to stamp this view as one that cannot be refuted4 ,nevertheless1 those opposed to this view1 as ,carl ,vogt1 ,his1 ,heufen1 and others1 have not abandoned their position as a hopeless one1 and in recent years have relied particularly upon those cases which ,haeckel1 and before him1 ,fritz ,mller1 characterised as a falsification 7cenogenesis#af7 or a supplementary alteration and abbreviation of the natural process of development4 8,nature is no falsifier10 these opponents proclaim with emphasis1 and everything it does is correct and true1 and 8this false heart alone brings untruth and deceit into the true heaven10 they cry with ,wallenstein4 ,people who rely on verbal sophistries merely betray thereby their want of valid counter-arguments4 ,a mala fides on the part of nature can of course never be the subject of discussion among reasonable beings1 but a deviation in the process of development of certain varieties from the typical path of the development of the remaining varieties of the species1 is felt as a falsification by every investigator who has thoroughly studied the regular processes1 for the reason that it has a tendency to obscure the original facts4 ,thus1 for example1 in the embryos of certain vertebrates the sophagus is temporarily completely closed1 as ,balfour has observed in young sharks1 ,bles and ,marshall in frogs2 and this state of affairs may well be considered as a falsification1 since an animate being with a closed sophagus is a natural contradiction1 which can never have existed and here happens as a supplementary and temporary process4 ,as a rule such deviations from the normal course may be classified as consequences of a prolonged residence of the animal germs in the egg or in the womb1 the result of which is that owing to the presence of an abundant quantity of nourishing yolk1 or through direct connection with the circulatory system of the mother1 they in the early stages of their development are relieved of the necessity of acquiring nourishment through their own efforts1 and therefore all the contrivances necessary to that purpose may be dispensed with4 ,for this reason we find the primitive processes of development1 as ,professor ,sollas has lately shown1 most frequently preserved in marine animals which have never changed nor abandoned their element in the course of the history of their species1 in the case of which1 therefore1 no occasion could ever have arisen for supplementary changes in the process of their development4 ,much more frequently do we meet with this change in the case of fresh-water animals1 for often the rapid currents of their elements1 for example a river1 will not suffer these to leave the egg in any very helpless larval condition1 and in addition fresh water is subject to other unfavorable changes1 as the drying up of streams4 ,also the larv of carnivorous animals1 which from the very beginning of independent life need more strength to acquire their means of existence1 are so completely developed in the richly provisioned eggs in which they take their form1 that they emerge therefrom in an almost perfected state of being1 as1 for example1 young sharks and cephalopods4 ,in this kind of animal life1 as well as in the case of forms which are brought forth alive from the parent1 although they see the light of day much later1 comparatively1 there takes place not only a great abbreviation of the first stages of existence in the entering upon a more direct path of development1 but also changes occur in the form of the original designs because of the limitation of room due to the presence of yolk in the egg1 the reason for which is easy to perceive4 ,in many other cases the mechanical cause of the change in development can be directly recognised2 for example1 in the case of1 the tree-toad of the ,antilles 7,hylodes marticinensis71 which1 owing to the absence of pools lasting through the dry season1 is obliged of necessity to remain in the egg during its tadpole stage1 that is to say1 to skip this stage1 as it were2 for which reason the formation of external gills in its case is entirely omitted4 ,the explanation of the origin of new organs seemed at first to afford an insuperable difficulty to the ,darwinian theory1 since1 as ,mivart objected1 it was not possible to perceive how natural selection could be able to effect the formation of new organs unless they executed corresponding functions from the very beginning4 ,this difficulty1 however1 has been completely overcome by the theory of altered functions 7,functionswechsel7 which was first proposed by ,dorhn1 and particularly in recent years by ,kleinenberg4 ,according to this theory1 in all these cases we have simply to deal with a gradual change in form of already existing organs1 which1 originally being used to perform one set of functions1 are modified so as to perform another4 ,thus the later developed organs of mastication and the feelers of insects were originally organs of locomotion1 legs2 and these in the still earlier stages of creeping motion performed appropriate functions as the crooked appendages of the body-rings4 ,the wings of birds were1 in their progenitors1 forelegs2 the tongue of air-breathing vertebrates originated from the fish-bladder1 which before that was chiefly an organ of swimming4 ,the knowledge thus acquired of the natural connection of the processes of evolution also explains1 according to ,kleinenberg1 why organs which are at present completely useless1 must yet necessarily appear in the formation of the embryo2 for example1 the gill-openings in the higher classes of vertebrates1 which have no functions to perform at any stage of vertebral development1 and which furnished ,meckel the first intimation of the fundamental biogenetic law4 ,but as soon as it was explained that the gill-openings furnished the foundation of the development of later-appearing organs with actual functions to perform1 it was rendered clear why they should continually recur2 namely1 because they form the indispensable links of a chain which extends from the dim past of the type in question down to the present time4 ,there is no doubt that profounder researches in evolutionary history will furnish still more important results3 for instance1 the more perfect elucidation of the pedigree of mammals2 for in this province even our domestic animals are not sufficiently investigated4 ,every new effort in this direction1 for example the recent work of ,klever on the evolution of the teeth of the horse1 and other investigations concerning the formation of special organs1 has invariably shown that much in this field yet remains to be discovered4 ,we have only to recall to mind the recent investigations relating to the development of the pineal gland1 which in the last decennium have also led to the discovery of a rudimentary occipital eye1 which seems to have actually existed and performed functions in numerous early representatives of the vertebrates1 but to-day is simply a fact of history1 and has given rise to an organ which ,descartes considered as the seat of the soul4 ,we may here also refer to the recent investigations concerning the earlier developmental stages of the duckbills1 which have completely confirmed what the theory asserted in advance and required2 namely1 that they fill the vacancy between the egg-laying reptiles and the mammalia which bring forth their young alive4 ,only a few years ago ,carl ,vogt vehemently opposed the opinion of the duckbills being transitional types1 and sought to explain their inferior stage of organisation1 which is also evidenced in their low blood temperature1 as the results of a stunting process 7degeneration1 so called74 ,they formed a degenerated branch of marsupials1 nothing more4 ,later1 the remarkable yet long anticipated fact was revealed by ,haacke and ,caldwell1 #ahhd1 that the duckbills are egg-laying mammals1 a character which certainly could not have been acquired through degeneration1 but which simply shows that they are closely related to extinct reptilian forms4 ,in one other respect1 namely1 with regard to their supply of teeth1 the process of degeneration must indeed be admitted4 ,on this point1 ,poulton and ,thomas discovered a few years ago that in their early stages they really do possess true teeth1 which1 however1 just as in the case of certain carnivorous cetacea1 later completely disappear1 and are replaced by a sort of horny teeth4 ,this1 however1 is really not a true degeneration1 but rather a special adaptation1 doubtless beneficial to the animal in some way or other2 and with as little reason as we may regard birds as a degenerated race in comparison with their progenitors1 because they have lost the numerous teeth which these possessed1 with just as little reason can we hold that the duckbills1 in their general organisation1 have suffered any retrogression worth mentioning4 ,on the contrary1 the recent investigations of ,marsh and ,lemoine concerning the mammals of the ,jurassic and ,cretaceous periods point more and more distinctly to the conclusion1 that there existed among these mammals a very large number which possessed the same degree of organisation as the duckbills of to-day1 now represented by only a few species2 a supposition which the adherents of the theory of evolution made twenty-five years ago4 ,i do not know that the pedigrees of the heroes of ,homer have been so well preserved6 ,in many other directions1 however1 speculation of late years in ,germany has considerably digressed from the facts of experience and from all probability2 especially with reference to the questions of propagation1 variation1 and heredity4 ,here1 first of all1 are to be mentioned the works of ,weismann1 ,ueber die ,continuitt des ,keimplasmas 7#ahhe71 ,die ,bedeutung der sexuellen ,fortpflanzung fr die ,selectionstheorie 7#ahhf71 ,der ,rckschritt in der ,natur 7#ahhf71 ,die ,bedeutung der ,richtungskrperchen fr die ,vererbungstheorie 7#ahhg71 ,die ,hypothese der ,vererbung von ,verletzungen 7#ahhi71 and ,ueber ,amphimixis 7#ahia74 ,if we revert to the beginnings of this movement we shall find that it is intimately connected with the more exact study of the processes of fecundation as perfected through the researches of ,strassburger1 the ,hertwigs1 and other investigators4 ,in connection with the ideas of ,ngeli concerning the so-called idioplasm1 the notion was reached that the matter determinative of heredity was contained in the nucleoli1 and that by the union of the paternal and maternal nucleoli the sum-total of the parental hereditary tendencies is transmitted to the offspring4 ,this view was to a certain degree verified by the experiments of the brothers ,hertwig in removing the nucleoli of the eggs of the sea-urchin2 the result being that eggs containing the nucleoli alone1 furnished1 through artificial impregnation1 results resembling the female parent1 whereas eggs from which the nucleoli had been removed1 furnished germs completely corresponding to the traits of the male parent4 ,other processes of fecundation1 to which we shall soon recur1 had since #ahgf produced the impression in the minds of a number of naturalists that the germ-material led an independent life in the bodies of organisms1 that it possessed only an internal development1 and required from the body nothing but nourishment in order to multiply itself1 and to develop its internal powers uninfluenced by the various vicissitudes of the body4 ,in the year #ahgf ,gustav ,jaeger in ,germany1 and ,francis ,galton1 a cousin of ,darwin1 almost at the same time in ,england1 called attention to the observation made some time previously1 that in certain animals1 particularly in insects1 the development of the egg into the young offspring begins with the withdrawal of a small portion of the germ from the component substance of the embryo1 which remains at first unchanged and only later multiplies4 ,this observation was generalised and accepted4 ,at the commencement of every sexual multiplication the germ-substance1 after impregnation1 is divided into two parts1 according to its future purpose2 an ontogenetic or personal part1 out of which the body is built up1 and a phylogenetic or germinal part1 which at first is stored up unused in the individual1 but later furnishes new germ-cells4 ,this idea led ,weismann to his view of the continuity of the germ-plasm1 which forms an unbroken line of descent from the first beginnings of the species and which is simply nourished by the organisms in which it has its temporary abode4 ,from this germ-plasm spring secondarily the cells that go to make up the body 7soma72 but from these soma-cells no new germ-cells can originate1 and consequently none of its inherent or adscititious qualities are capable of transmission4 ,the somatic cells make up the mortal and perishable forms of life1 while the germ-cells alone insure the further existence and immortality of the race4 ,it is easy to perceive that these views1 if they could be maintained1 would completely transform the ,darwinian theory4 ,since1 if the somatic cells1 that is1 the body-parts of animals and plants1 with all their adaptations to soil and climate1 to definite modes of life1 etc41 are to be deprived of every power to transmit hereditary characters1 then the so-called ,lamarckian theory1 which should really bear the name of ,erasmus ,darwin1 would be deprived of every foundation which it possesses4 ,neither the increase in strength of the members of the body1 acquired by use and practice1 nor their weakness created by their non-use could be inherited2 and in just as small a degree could changes caused by external influences1 bodily injuries1 sickness1 entail consequences which were inheritable4 ,this being the case1 then also all those views would be untenable which seek to explain the important effects of time as the result of the accumulation and augmentation of the minute impressions of the external environment4 ,if the variations which are generated by means of external influences are not capable of transmission1 then the direct adaptation must commence at the beginning in the case of every following generation2 an accumulation is impossible4 ,we can observe1 however1 in every particular case1 the complete harmony in which every living being exists with its surroundings and mode of life2 and observe in closely related species the most various adaptations to the elements in which they live3 climate1 food1 nay1 even to the particular companions with which they associate2 with the result that many plants have shaped the structure of their flowers to conform to the physical anatomy of the insect which ordinarily effects their fertilisation1 and that animals assume the figure and form of some associate who is safe from hostile assaults1 or even completely adopt different modes of life where it is necessary to enter a life-partnership with a strange animal or plant4 ,but1 granting that the most widely extended capability of adaptation is a thing of daily experience1 there still arises the question how we shall explain this quality1 which can only be brought about by slow degrees1 without taking into account the factor of heredity in the transmission of acquired qualities4 ,the theory of ,weismann attempts this1 in that it takes for granted an infinite variability in the germ-formative materials1 and guides the new forms and variations thus begotten into the really true path1 that is1 into the most successful paths1 through the process of natural selection 7that is1 through the survival of the fittest as regards environment and all other things74 ,according to this doctrine1 external circumstances have no direct influence whatever upon the variation of species1 as ,erasmus ,darwin1 ,lamarck1 and the founder of the theory of natural selection and all his followers up to that time supposed1 but we have to have recourse to a pure theory of natural selection1 and call to our aid an1 even now1 rather obscure phenomenon1 occurring in connection with sexual impregnation1 which has been called 8the expulsion of the polar bodies10 an extrusion of minute qualities of germ-plasm from the germ-cells while in union4 ,by the processes of crossing1 which continually recur1 a vast number of the most manifold hereditary tendencies are united in the germ-material4 ,then certain of these are ejected1 so that others acquire supremacy2 and in this manner the way is opened for the origination of a vast number of possible combinations4 ,in this way the path is clear to a theory of perfect mechanical variability1 in which the germ-material has only to transmit the characters which spontaneously arise in it1 and yet affords an investigator endowed with any imagination the possibility of understanding the origin of the great variety and final purpose of the world4 ,it is ,frohschammer's 8principle of the imagination as the creator of the world0 translated into comprehensible formul4 ,the simplicity thus reached by the elimination of all direct influences from the external world1 has won the adherency of many investigators following in ,darwin's steps1 particularly in ,england2 but whilst ,wallace1 ,galton1 ,ray ,lankester1 and others have expressed their full assent to it1 other and not less eminent authorities1 as ,herbert ,spencer1 ,haeckel1 ,fritz ,mller1 and ,virchow1 have emphatically rejected it4 ,the reasons in favor of this assumption are1 as is indeed the whole view itself1 mainly of a theoretical nature2 the arguments of the opposition are divided into philosophical and experiential propositions4 ,the philosophical opposition is mainly based on the fact that1 from the very beginning1 there is assigned to the germ-material1 as it unceasingly continues its existence1 an infinite variety of capacities which the external world cannot affect1 and that all progress and advancement takes place as the result of the loss of the originally endowed powers and tendencies4 ,on this theory a family of acrobats or race-horses would not acquire their powers through the gradual augmentation by practice of their feats of skill and endurance1 but because these powers were originally resident in them1 and every factor incompatible with them was gradually eliminated4 ,on the other hand1 these views approach in a dangerous degree to the theories of predestination and preformation1 the overthrow of which has been justly regarded as one of the greatest advances of science4 ,still more important must be considered the objections of empirical science1 which up to this time was completely convinced of the heredity of acquired qualities4 ,popular experience1 as well as that of physicians1 universally speaks of inherited disease-germs1 and in certain cases1 particularly in mental diseases1 physicians are so thoroughly convinced of their inheritability that the first question put to the relatives of such sufferers usually is whether the disease has ever appeared in the parents or family of the patient4 ,this fact is so deeply grounded in the general belief1 that the modern naturalistic school of novelists1 the school of ,zola1 ,ibsen1 and their associates1 are wont to devote their main efforts to the problem of inherited evils4 ,now the inheritability of certain evil conditions1 even though proved1 would not by any means be an absolute disproof of ,weismann's theory2 for1 inclined as much as we may be to derive diseases from mistakes and sins against a natural mode of life1 such as colds1 drunkenness1 dissipation1 mental and bodily over-exertion1 we yet cannot deny a priori that blastogenic diseases1 or diseases originating in the germ-plasm1 may exist1 which without any doubt would then be transmissible4 ,it also does not lie beyond the realms of possibility that congenital malformations1 such as hare-lips1 supernumerary fingers1 and the defects which show a remarkable disposition to heredity1 fall into this category4 ,these blastogenic germs of disease would then1 of course1 have to be distinguished from the somatogenic diseases 7or the diseases produced in the body by external causes71 which never could be inherited4 ,from this point of view the question as to the hereditary consequences of external injuries has given rise to great efforts to prove experimentally the truth of this belief1 which has existed for centuries4 ,in almost every part of the globe we meet with the assertion that hornless cattle1 such1 for example1 as are bred in ,south ,america1 or the tailless cats of the ,isle of ,man1 or other domestic animals with similar deficiencies1 are descended from a progenitor which lost its horns or its tail through disease or other mishap4 ,since now1 recently1 similar assertions have again been put forward to the effect that tailless cats are found among the descendants of feline progenitors who have been robbed of their posterior ornaments by an act of violence1 and these cases have been discussed in connection with the pangenesis theory of ,darwin1 according to which each part of the body is believed to supply material contributions to the germ-plasm1 ,weismann determined to institute experiments on this point4 ,he started the breeding of white mice whose tails were regularly cut off1 without finding as a result1 from among #hdj young ones derived from such mutilated progenitors1 a single one having a malformation or missing tail4 ,however1 even this experiment cannot be regarded as an absolute proof1 as it at first view might seem1 and the negative result was foreseen by the writer of these lines4 ,it is a clear conclusion that if in the case of many vertebrates1 for example1 salamanders and lizards1 as well as in the case of most invertebrates1 missing limbs and tails are renewed in the course of their lifetime1 it would indeed be very remarkable if their renewal should not take place1 at least in the case of the complete rejuvenation of new birth4 ,darwin himself had concluded1 from his own experience and that of others1 that injuries and similar inflicted acts of violence are the cause of hereditary consequences only in cases where they bring about some long-continued and wasting disease1 and thus produce some permanent effect on the bodily constitution4 ,for this reason1 especially injuries to main nerve-tracts in parts near the centres are readily accompanied by hereditary consequences1 because they interfere with the nutrition of the members supplied by them4 ,brown-,squard has observed in a great number of cases of guinea pigs whose nerve-roots he had severed1 that the offspring of the animals operated upon developed diseases of the eyes1 ears1 and other organs which conformed regularly to the character of the operation1 and could therefore be predicted2 and also noted malformations and deficiencies1 amounting even to the complete disappearance of the eye-balls1 such as never arise or have been observed in these animals without violent interference4 ,his positive results regarding the hereditability of the evil consequences of disturbing operations have a decided advantage in numbers and scope over the negative results of ,weismann2 and it is not clear how the belief in the non-hereditability of somatic conditions will accommodate itself to them4 ,but if conditions of the body produced by such sudden interferences have under certain circumstances entailed hereditary consequences1 how much more should we expect this same result from slowly effected constitutional changes1 which external influences1 working uninterruptedly for hundreds of years1 bring about in an organism which has been transported into a new element1 into new surroundings1 or into a different climate4 ,not at all infrequently does the coming together and union of two new organisms beget hereditary changes which can be explained only through the direct influence of the one upon the other4 ,thus1 for example1 in the case of plants in hot countries which are protected against the assaults of leaf-devouring ants by body-guards of smaller ants1 and also in species of quite different families1 as1 for example1 in ,cecropia of the order ,euphorbiace1 and in some ,triplaris species among the ,polygonace1 we find little chambers1 approachable through small openings in the stems1 which serve the ants protecting the plants as dwelling and breeding places4 ,are we to believe now1 in regard to this fact1 that these plants1 so different in their nature1 have produced through voluntary variations the stems which contain these openings1 or are we to believe we have to deal here with openings acquired through inheritance which originally were bored in the stems by the ants at the most appropriate points8 ,surely the first conclusion1 which would uphold ,weismann's theory1 has but a very slight degree of probability in its favor1 whilst the latter1 which would overthrow his view1 is very highly probable4 ,and such examples could be cited in great numbers4 ,it is also to be remembered that the power of variation is not exhibited solely in sexually created individuals1 as it should be according to ,weismann's theory1 but frequently also in non-sexual multiplication1 where no amphimixis 7mingling7 occurs4 ,it is well known that the majority of the sporting varieties of our trees1 for example1 ,fagus sanguinea1 and the so-called weeping varieties1 that is1 abnormal varieties with pendent twigs1 forms with split1 spotted1 or white leaves1 are wont first to appear on single branches of old trees1 in which the continuity of the protoplasm unquestionably existed1 but no amphimixis or extrusion of the polar bodies took place4 ,it is also the generally received opinion of naturalists that the lowest classes of animal and plant life are universally multiplied by non-sexual means4 ,and if this is so1 it is not clear how higher forms which sexually propagate can be derived from them1 if the latter have originally to furnish the fundamental conditions of variation4 ,the adherents of ,neo-,darwinism will1 accordingly1 have to furnish many additional facts if they wish to invest their theory with any degree of probability4 ,,carus ,,sterne4 ,,footnotes3 #af ,cenogenesis1 from 1 empty1 fruitless 7and 1 birth72 not from 1 common1 the derivatives of which are sometimes written 8ceno40--,,ed4 ,,ii4 ,,france4 ,the study of personality1 from the point of view of pathological psychology1 has already supplied us with numerous books4 ,m4 ,,alfred ,,binet1 in his fine work1 ,les ,altrations de la ,personnalit1 has undertaken to present systematically to us these alterations in their entirety1 while restricting himself to ascertained results1 and avoiding disputed points4 ,he exhibits to us the 8dismemberment of the ego0 in diseased states1 the frequent rupture of that 8unity of consciousness0 which is the principal attribute of the normal individual4 ,clinical observation has established the existence in certain subjects of successive personalities1 and in others that of co-existing personalities2 the experiences of suggestion have at last allowed of analogous morbid phenomena being provoked1 in such a manner that cases may be varied and rendered still more instructive4 ,the simple movements provoked in normal persons in states of distraction1 of which many very curious examples may be found in ,m4 ,binet's book1 are the recognised mark of a subconsciousness2 but it is often possible1 under the same conditions and with the same processes1 to provoke in a hypnotisable hysteric individual an actual sub-personality1 that is to say1 to augment the phenomena which attentive observers have long since remarked in every-day life4 ,it cannot be doubted that1 on the one hand1 it is possible to produce in an insensible limb a great variety of subconscious actions1 and all sorts of reactions2 and when they are recorded by the graphic method1 it is perceived that with the fingers of his insensible hand1 the subject has made movements the form of which varies according to the receiving apparatus 7the dynamograph1 drum1 pencil1 etc474 ,these movements thus exhibit the truly psychological marks of adaptation1 and seem to reveal the existence of an intelligence which is other than that of the ego of the subject1 and which acts without his assistance and even unknown to him4 ,on the other hand1 numerous experiences of very different kinds show that the subject whose ansthetic arm1 for example1 is pricked1 can have an idea of the stimulation1 although he does not perceive it4 ,he does not feel the prickings1 but the excitation calls forth the idea of their number3 he counts them as a normal individual would do2 8only1 in hysterical individuals1 the first part of the process occurs in one consciousness1 and the second in another40#ag ,it can hardly be denied that these different consciousnesses are distinct2 since experience proves that each can have its own perceptions1 its own memory1 and even a moral character4 ,however1 their relative value with respect to each other matters little4 ,we are compelled to consider1 with ,m4 ,ribot1 the ego as a 8cordination0 of states of consciousness1 admitting of infinitely variable groupings4 ,according to the old conception of the ego1 the personality1 with respect to secondary consciousnesses1 was compared to a coachman who had ceased to have control over his horses4 ,this comparison is now insufficient1 since it may happen that the coachman falls asleep on the box1 and that one of the horses then governs the set1 regulating1 more or less perfectly1 the pace of the others by its own gait4 ,spiritualists1 however1 will never consent to put the ego in the place of the coachman4 8,a stone detached from the complex structure of the personality10 ,m4 ,binet now tells us1 8can become the starting point of a new structure1 which rises rapidly by the side of the old4 ,whereupon a disaggregation of the psychological elements is produced40 ,this comparison is certainly more precise and more in accordance with facts4 ,moreover1 there remains to be explained how the mental compound which constitutes the ego has been constructed from its elements4 ,m4 ,binet shows1 propos of this question1 that the association of ideas is powerless to explain the genesis of personality2 associations alone1 as proved by the experiences of suggestion1 are not sufficient to restore forgotten memories4 ,neither is memory the sole factor in personality2 since1 in certain conditions a person may1 while preserving the consciousness and the memory of certain of his mental states1 nevertheless repudiate these mental states and consider them as foreign to himself4 ,this question is still an open one4 ,but there exist certainly some grounds for our seeking in the division of consciousness the key to certain psychological facts1 like unconscious cerebration4 ,such a key would be the action of detached consciousnesses and detached memories1 that afterwards immediately enter the current of general consciousness4 ,finally1 8it is possible10 as ,m4 ,binet says in conclusion1 8that consciousness may be the privilege of certain of our psychic acts2 it is possible also that it exists everywhere in our organism1 and it may be even that it accompanies every manifestation of life40 99 99 99 99 99 ,in his new work1 ,agnosticisme1 ,m4 ,,de ,,roberty studies with special care the position of modern doctrines with regard to the unknown1 the great x of philosophic speculations--,god1 ,idea1 ,matter1 ,noumenon or ,unknowable4 ,although perhaps a little hastily written1 and somewhat obscure1 his book nevertheless enforces conviction4 8,our conception of the world10 says ,m4 de ,roberty1 8embraces solely the things that we know 7feel1 perceive1 imagine1 analyse1 compare1 etc471 and does not comprise the least jot or tittle of what we do not know4 ,for us1 therefore1 there can be no question of any relations except between two classes of known elements3 that which constitutes the object of scientific research1 and that which is outside of science4 ,the latter class represents our unknown1 which is always relative and purely human40 ,here1 indeed1 we have the true point of view1 that which we shall all reach1 though perhaps at first unknown to ourselves2 and ,i shall be much surprised if the philosophers do not at last decide to wipe out the formidable ,unknowable set up by ,spencer as the ultimate entity4 ,we shall speak no more of the fathomless universe1 but of the still unexplored universe2 of the unknown1 not of the unknowable4 ,there is1 however1 another aspect of the question4 ,let us suppose the unknown got rid of2 or to be more precise1--and if we regard with ,m4 de ,roberty the psychic centres as special receivers in which the cosmical energy empties itself1 resolving itself into sensation and idea1 and from whence it spreads itself anew as motion1--let us suppose that we have summed up all the energies received and emitted1 and verified the law which reduces memory to the conservation of energy2 let us suppose in fine that philosophy shall have found in the ego the synthesis of the non-ego1 expressed 8in symbolic abbreviations and in signs10 and shall have realised the 8logical monism0 which reduces things to their ideas3 would the intellect--and would the sensibility--even then be completely satisfied8 ,can we conceive a state in which the curiosity of man as to all that concerns himself will be at rest1 and when he will cease to be disquieted about the cause of suffering and of life8 ,kant long ago propounded this question4 ,but1 according to ,m4 de ,roberty1 the thinker who is 8a prey to the afflux of emotion referred to by ,kant10 the man 8given over to the desire for another kind of knowledge than that of experience10 are1 in the category of intellectual emotions1 diseased and 8perverted0 persons4 8,the sentiments1 so varied in aspect and in strength1 which inspire us10 writes he1 8the contemplation of the unknown1 determine the mental illusion which materialises1 so to say1 our ignorance and transforms the unknown into the unknowable40 ,would it be inconsistent1 however1 to preserve the emotion of the unknown without 8materialising0 it1 without pronouncing any dangerous scientific ignorabimus8 ,m4 de ,roberty does not accept this situation1--which was that of ,littr4 ,i do not know whether any one will discover the 8vaccine10 as he calls it1 8of the pessimist emotion which has produced agnosticism or latent religiosity40 ,if this constitutes a mental malady1 ,i fear much that it will be incurable4 ,as long as there is unhappiness in life1 there will also be unsatisfied curiosity1 and for a very long time to come1 inquietude4 99 99 99 99 99 ,the last publication of ,,lombroso and ,,laschi1 ,le ,crime politique et les ,revolutions1 par rapport au droit1 l'anthropologie criminelle et la science du gouvernement 7,political ,crime and ,revolutions1 in their ,relation to ,law1 ,criminal ,anthropology1 and the ,science of ,government7 of which we here have a ,french translation1 is1 ,i will not say1 the worst written1 but the most confused work imaginable4 ,its arrangement is clear1 but its examples are given without any order whatever4 ,the facts presented are abundant1 but they are taken rather too much at haphazard1 and often too uncritically4 ,the worst is that its very thesis is weak1 badly formulated or elusive in places4 ,what a pity it is that so much erudition should be expended1 and so many valuable data be brought together without better success in displaying to the best advantage these riches1 and also1 let me say1 without so many times having had occasion to appear so clearly in the wrong6 ,m4 ,lombroso remains unmoved1 unfortunately1 in his high sounding and unqualified hypothesis of 8diseased genius40 ,he continues to develop it and to defend it in this latest book of his1 which is replete with instructive details1 and which is undoubtedly the first considerable attempt at an etiology of revolutions and of political crime4 ,the complex doctrine of ,lombroso could be sufficiently summed up1 if ,i am not mistaken1 by uniting word to word--by the mathematical sign of equality--philoneism 7or the love of novelties7 with the revolutionary spirit1 the revolutionary spirit with genius1 genius with insanity1 insanity with criminality1 and criminality1 finally1 with progress4 ,but what a detestable thing progress would then be6 ,we should have to protect ourselves against it as we do against a pestilence4 ,the evolution of societies does not take place without great waste and loss1 as we all know4 ,it should be carefully shown what these losses are4 ,the study of the conditions of social progress ought to be made in greater detail than is here found4 ,the terms of the imagined equation1 which here hovers before our eyes1 should in fine1 if any comparison is to be effected between them1 be subjected to a much more exact quantitative and qualitative analysis4 ,for example1 let us take genius4 ,of what kinds of genius does ,lombroso speak8 ,it seems to be sufficient for him that a man has attracted attention1 and made himself talked about1 to entitle him to be called great1 while perhaps he is only a blusterer1 a braggart1 a servile imitator1 a mere homunculus4 ,in this way the quantity of geniuses and talented individuals he has unearthed is something extraordinary4 ,the result of this is a radical error in his tables of the distribution of geniuses4 ,the superiority that he attributes1 in this respect1 to certain of our southern departments1 as compared with the ,norman departments1 for example1 would have to be reversed if we considered the relative quality and kind of the genius involved4 ,for the same reason1 the relation established between genius and republican modes of government is undoubtedly not so precise and simple as is stated4 ,but the worst of it is that in thus augmenting the number of men of genius1 it is found that we have1 in consequence of the above mentioned equation1 also increased the number of the demented and the degenerate6 ,if1 moreover1 it is true that the conservative mind1 with less genius1 insanity1 and criminality1 is evidence of the senility of the race1 how can we accept the thesis that genius and the spirit of innovation are also absolute evidence of a neurasthenic condition8 ,shall we deny sound nerves to robust and vigorous youth8 ,this1 indeed1 is not what ,lombroso wished to assert4 ,yet the famous thesis always confronts us3 ,latet anguis in herba4 ,the least sign of degeneracy is enough for him to brand a man1 and not only are all geniuses in his eyes unbalanced1 but even the insane are without any ado baptised geniuses2 with the result that all is heaped together in one great mass--genius1 insanity1 and spirit of revolution4 ,i shall not dwell any longer on these criticisms4 ,they are simply intended as an admonition to the learned ,m4 ,lombroso against the allurements of a badly founded theory1 and against the dangers arising from a too hasty preparation of his books4 ,whatever may be its defects1 he has at least brought together in his present book many ideas4 ,i advise all to read with care what he says about women 7and how many will find him misoneistic on this point671 concerning their great influence in rebellions1 which are always barren of results1 and their impotence in revolutions1 which are always productive of good4 ,in the second part of his work1 namely1 in the section entitled ,juridical and ,political ,applications1 nearly all he says is to be commended4 ,i agree with the authors--or ,i do not wish to forget ,m4 ,laschi--as to what they tell us in relation particularly to pettifogging parlementarianism and public instruction4 ,their conclusions are perhaps not connected with the thesis in any very intimate manner4 ,but this is not of much consequence1 as they possess an independent value of their own4 99 99 99 99 99 ,in a previous communication ,i referred to the work of ,savvas-,pacha on ,musulman jurisprudence4 ,i have now to announce a work entitled ,souvenirs du ,monde musulman1 by ,m4 ,,ch4 ,,mismer1 7published by ,hachette17 the fourth and last volume of a valuable series which is greatly deserving of attention4 ,m4 ,mismer1 who has lived a long time in the ,east--at ,constantinople1 in ,crete1 and in ,egypt--and was acquainted with the leading personages of the ,empire1 does not hesitate to return here to the theory which he set forth more than twenty years ago in his ,soires de ,constantinople1 his theory1 namely1 of the social advantages1 and even the superiority1 of ,islamism over ,christianity2 subject however to the special worth of the races which belong to either of these two forms of religion4 ,this opinion is not lightly uttered1 and it will appear the more striking in view of the present crisis of social and moral decomposition which is now spreading throughout the western nations4 ,in the work of ,m4 ,mismer will be found some of the great and striking qualities of the observing and thoughtful mind4 ,in connection with a special problem of great importance in public instruction1 that of heredity1 ,i shall call to the attention of my readers the following statement1 made with reference to the young men of the 8,egyptian ,mission0 in ,france1 directed by ,m4 ,mismer for ten years4 8,the capacity of a pupil10 says he1 8was always found to be intimately connected with the cerebral culture of his ancestors and the faculties constituting the superiorities of his race40 8,it was the same10 adds he1 8from the moral standpoint40 ,undoubtedly1 if ,m4 ,mismer had taken the pains to make a note of the facts summed up in his statement1 and to present the full case of the numerous pupil's that he has had under his care1 he would have been able to furnish science with data of the greatest value4 ,let us at least receive his lessons as he offers them to us4 ,they are the fruit of the experience of a 8man of action10 and it speaks well for an observation that it has rendered good service in practice4 ,,lucien ,,arr,,at4 ,,footnotes3 #ag ,the hypothesis of the division of consciousness explains1 consequently1 much better than that of the motive force of mental images1 the facts of automatic writing 7spiritism74 ,the works of ,binet1 ,roberty1 and ,lombroso are published by ,alcan4 ,,criticisms ,,and ,,discussions4 ,,comte ,,and ,,turgot4 ,to the ,editor of ,the ,monist3 ,your 8note of inquiry0 mentioned on p4 #faa of the last ,monist is answered in full by ,littr in ,auguste ,comte et la ,philosophie ,positive1 where ,turgot's name heads the third chapter4 ,he shows that the latter discovered the law of the three stages1 theological1 metaphysical1 and positive1 by the following quotation from his ,histoire des progrs de l'esprit humain4 8,while the connection between physical effects was yet unknown1 nothing was more natural than to suppose that they were produced by intelligent beings1 invisible and resembling ourselves2 for what else could they have resembled8 ,everything that happened without the intervention of man1 had its god1 whose worship was soon established by fear or hope1 and this worship was conceived in accordance with the deference accorded powerful men2 for the gods were only more powerful men and more or less perfect according as they were the product of an age more or less enlightened as to the true perfections of humanity4 ,when philosophers had recognised the absurdity of these fables1 without however having obtained true light upon natural history1 they imagined an explanation of the causes of phenomena by abstract expressions1 such as essences and faculties3 expressions that nevertheless explained nothing and that were reasoned about as if they had been beings1 new divinities substituted for the old ones4 ,these analogies were followed out1 and faculties were multiplied to account for each effect4 ,it was only very late1 in observing the mechanical action that bodies have upon one another1 that other hypotheses were drawn from this mechanics1 7de cette mcanique7 which mathematics could develop and experience verify40 ,littr calls attention to 8the great sureness of judgment0 that led ,turgot to cite only physical phenomena when he spoke of those that had ceased to be interpreted either theologically or metaphysically4 8,when he wrote this passage1 positivity 7,i use this word1 a necessary creation of ,m4 ,comte's7 was only beginning to reach chemical phenomena and had not yet attained those of biology and sociology40 ,but1 says ,littr1 8after reserving the rights of priority for this eminent thinker1 there is nothing to prevent ,m4 ,comte from keeping all the part that he had made himself and that belongs to him4 ,three principal points mark ,comte's independence of ,turgot4 ,the latter saw in the conception nothing more than an idea to meditate upon2 ,comte saw in it a sociological law2 ,turgot did not attach to it a sketch of human development2 ,comte developed with the aid of this law the whole historical series2 ,turgot did not perceive that he held one of the necessary elements of a philosophy2 ,comte1 in the same flight of thought1 went from history become science to philosophy become positive4 ,the sociological law1 isolated in ,turgot1 makes part1 in ,comte1 of a vast whole3 there were therefore two independent creations4 ,either ,m4 ,comte had not read ,turgot1 or1 more probably1 he had read him at a time when this passage1 which to-day awakens attention1 had no particular significance40 ,the fourth chapter in ,littr's ,life of ,comte has for heading the names of ,kant and ,condorcet4 ,the whole of the former's remarkable sketch of general history is given and reference is made to the letter in chap4 viii1 where ,comte1 in #ahbd1 being twenty-six years old1 says to ,m4 d',eichthal1 his former pupil1 8,i have read and reread with infinite pleasure ,kant's little treatise2 it is prodigious for the epoch1 and if ,i had known it six or seven years sooner it would have saved me trouble4 ,i am delighted that you have translated it2 it can contribute very efficaciously to preparing minds for positive philosophy4 ,its general conception or at least its method is still metaphysical1 but the details show the positive spirit at every instant4 ,i had always regarded ,kant not only as a very strong head1 but as the metaphysician that approaches the nearest to positive philosophy4 ,but this reading has greatly fortified and especially given precision to my conviction in that regard4 ,if ,condorcet had had knowledge of this writing1 which ,i do not believe1 very little merit would remain to him1 since he can pretend only to that of the conception1 which is almost as firm and1 in some respects1 even clearer in ,kant4 ,as for me1 after this reading ,i can find in myself1 up to the present time1 no other value than that of having systematised and fixed the conception that had been sketched by ,kant unknown to me1 which ,i owe chiefly to a scientific education2 and even the most positive and distinct step that ,i have taken after him1 seems to me only the discovery of the law of the passage of human ideas through the three stages1 theological1 metaphysical1 and scientific2 a law that appears to me to be the foundation of the work whose execution ,kant has counselled4 ,i thank my lack of erudition to-day2 for if my work1 such as it is now1 had been preceded by a study of ,kant's treatise1 it would have lost much of its value in my eyes4 ,i conceive now1 as you said1 that1 for the ,german philosophers that are familiar with this treatise1 my work will really have a great effect only with the second part40 ,this work was a short one reprinted in ,saint-,simon's ,catchisme des industriels and called 8,a ,system of ,positive ,politics40 ,it had been inserted two years before1 under the title of 8,a ,plan of the ,work ,necessary for the ,reorganisation of ,society10 in a pamphlet of ,saint-,simon's1 without ,comte's name1 and it was because the latter insisted1 this time1 upon an acknowledgment of his authorship that ,saint-,simon broke with him4 ,the 8second part10 which was to produce the great effect upon the ,german philosophers1 never appeared2 or rather1 it soon grew to be the ,course of ,positive ,philosophy1 begun on the #b;d of ,april1 #ahbf1 before ,humboldt1 ,blainville1 and other celebrated listeners4 ,the term positive philosophy had long been used by ,saint-,simon and his school1 ,comte among the rest1 not in the special sense that the latter now gave it1 but as a 8generic name for the whole of science40 ,the first use of the words as we now understand them is in a letter from ,comte to ,m4 d',eichthal1 dated ,aug4 #e1 #ahbd4 8,i cannot help recalling your judicious reflection upon the influence that social physics1 once formed1 will have upon scientific philosophy4 ,i go even further than you1 for ,i think that it will be only then that a veritable philosophy of the sciences can exist4 ,all the philosophical ideas that are there to-day1 although very precious up to that time1 appear to me to have nothing more than a simply provisory 7provisoire7 character4 ,i shall speak a little about this relation in the general preface that ,i announce to you1 where ,i shall explain that the true title of my work would be positive philosophy1 and that if ,i preferred politics1 it is because that is the most urgent philosophical application and the one that is to found the science1 but that later ,i or you or others will complete this system of ideas by the encyclopedic re-coinage of all our positive cognitions 7connaissances71 which ought really to be conceived as a single mass1 although1 for good culture1 it is indispensable to preserve and to push even1 in one sense1 further than it is1 the division of labor1 so that each special savant can always1 subsequently1 conceive the relation of his branch and even of his twig to the universal trunk40 ,in a letter of about this date ,comte refers to his habit of never rewriting anything4 ,his memory permitted him to look upon a volume as finished when it had been thought out and before a line had been written4 ,but even in his letters we notice some of the disadvantages of this procedure1 which1 while conducive to unity1 sacrifices literary form4 ,it is true that ,comte studied under ,saint-,simon2 but1 according to ,littr1 his purely philosophical dependence was very slight1 while his influence upon his master was important4 8,what forms the distinguishing characteristic of ,saint-,simon at the epoch when he lived1 is the social destination that he assigns without hesitating to the ideas that preoccupy him4 ,he has1 as we have seen1 only the most confused notion of what this philosophy will be2 but1 no matter what it is to be1 he consecrates it in advance to the reorganisation of society40 ,as regards ,condorcet1 ,comte enthusiastically acknowledges his indebtedness to the 8,sketch of an ,historical ,table of the ,progress of the ,human ,mind10 and even goes beyond the facts1 as he did in his praise of ,kant4 ,littr makes a fair division of credit among others as well as those already named1 and concludes as follows3 8,turgot had discovered that human conceptions1 at first theological1 afterwards become metaphysical and end by being positive4 ,kant had known that history is a natural phenomenon1 subjected to a determinate course1 and ,condorcet1 pushed harder than his predecessors by advancing time10 7he had been condemned to death7 8had attempted to trace a table that should put in evidence the enchainment of the progresses of civilisation4 ,these are great things1 but they are still only rudiments2 for neither ,turgot nor his successors make use of the discovered law to found upon this general fact evolution2 ,kant1 who perceives clearly the necessity of conceiving history as regulated by the conditions inherent to humanity1 is unable to base this important notion on anything better than an priori idea0 7the metaphysical principle that nature does nothing in vain1 and that as human faculties do not reach their development in the individual1 who is ephemeral1 they must do so in the species1 which is durable7 8and thus he leaves it incapable of fixing the attention of a century whose tendencies were more and more positive2 lastly ,condorcet has no other guide than the negative philosophy of the eighteenth century in a work to which it could bring only contradiction40 ,john ,stuart ,mill says of ,comte that 8far from pretending to originality when he had really no right to do so1 he was eager to attach his most original thoughts to every germ of a similar idea that he met with among his predecessors40 ,speaking for himself1 ,littr says of the law of the three stages1 8,i do not reject it1 ,i restrain it4 ,as long as we remain in the scientific order and consider the conception of the world first theological1 then metaphysical1 finally positive1 the law of the three stages has its full efficacy in directing the speculations of history4444 ,but in history all is not comprised in the scientific order4 ,m4 ,comte1 who has said somewhere that it is necessary to suppose1 at the beginning of humanity1 certain notions that were neither theological nor metaphysical1 has indicated the germ1 ,i will not say of my objection1 but of my restriction4 ,in fact this law of the three stages comprehends neither industrial1 nor moral1 nor sthetic development4 ,it has however1 the excellent character of being relative to the speculations in which evolution by filiation is most manifest and consequently of giving a positive notion of the march of history40 ,is it true1 as stated on p4 #efe of ,the ,monist for ,july1 that ,stuart ,mill adopted ,hume's 8erroneous conception of causality0 to the extent implied in the following passage8 8,this idea of #8sequence' however was exactly ,hume's mistake1 adopted by ,mr4 ,mill1 and through ,mr4 ,mill popularised among ,english thinkers4 ,if the nature of cause and effect were really constituted by invariable sequence1 then the night might be called the effect of the day because night is invariably consequent upon day40 ,the only authority at hand on the island from which ,i write is ,clemenceau's translation of ,mill's 8,auguste ,comte and ,positivism10 where1 on p4 #fa1 ,i read as follows1 8,the succession of day and night is just as much an invariable succession as the alternate exposition of the earth's two opposite sides to the sun4 ,yet day and night are not the cause of each other2 why8 ,because their succession1 although invariable1 according to our experience1 is not so unconditionally3 these phenomena succeed each other only upon the condition that the presence and the absence of the sun succeed each other2 and if this alternation were to cease1 day and night would not follow each other4 ,there are thus two kinds of uniformities of succession1 one without conditions1 the other dependent on the former3 laws of causation1 and other successions which depend on these laws40 ,in a note ,mill refers to his ,system of ,deductive and ,inductive ,logic4 ,,louis ,,belrose1 ,,jr4 ,,some ,,remarks ,,upon ,,professor ,,james',s ,,discussion ,,of ,,attention4 ,in his recent treatise on psychology ,professor ,james discusses in an interesting and suggestive way the relation of ideation to attention1 maintaining that 8ideational preparation 444 is concerned in all attentive acts40 ,attention is 8anticipatory imagination0 or 8preperception0 which prepares the mind for what it is to experience4 ,thus the schoolboy1 listening for the clock to strike twelve1 anticipates in imagination and is prepared to hear perfectly the very first sound of the striking4 ,it is undoubtedly true that in the form of attention we term expectant1 where we are awaiting some given impression1 there is a representing1 antedating experience1 which may be a preparatory preperception4 ,but with a wrong imaging of what is to be experienced there is hindrance1 as when in a dark quiet room we are led to expect sensation of light but actually receive sensation of sound4 ,very often1 indeed1 our anticipations make us unprepared for experience4 ,further1 the experiments adduced by ,professor ,james from ,wundt and ,helmholtz are in the single form of expectant attention1 and we must remark that in these experiments the reagent is also experimenter1 and this introduces a new attention1 consciousness of consciousness1 and that of a peculiar kind1 which complicates an already complex consciousness4 ,in general we may say that experimentally incited consciousness is artificial1 at least as far as it feels itself as such1 and for certain points like simple attention this tends to vitiate results4 ,self-experimentation or experiment on those conscious of it as such may mislead in certain cases1 and must1 so far as this element of consciousness of experiment is not allowed for4 ,in physical science things always act naturally whether with observation or experiment1 but in psychology observation1 other things being equal1 is more trustworthy than experiment4 ,in all cases of expectant or experimentally expectant attention1 the attention does not1 however1 lie in the expectancy or in the imaging as such1 but it is merely the will effort concerned in these operations4 ,yet as we may expect without effort1 and preconceive without volition1 attention is necessarily involved in neither4 ,a perception or a preperception is an attention only as accomplished by will with effort1 but only an unattention when purely involuntary4 ,professor ,james's use of attention as preperception brings us back to the common idea of attention1 as any consciousness which cognises something4 ,this is so inbred in thought and language that it is most difficult to avoid using the term in this sense4 ,many psychologists like ,mr4 ,james and ,mr4 ,sully frequently mention attention as a will phenomenon but they do not treat it under will1 and they constantly return to the cognition meaning4 ,hffding1 however1 treats attention under psychology of will4 ,attention as the exercise of will in building up and maintaining cognitive activity1 is naturally treated under cognition2 but it is on the whole safer and better to discuss attention under will so as to keep it sharply distinguished from the presentation form which it vitalises4 ,i have endeavored to hold the term strictly to this sense1 yet it is not unlikely ,i may sometimes unwittingly countenance the common confusion1 but trust the instances will be few4 ,when we have1 then1 a case of expectant attention we must distinguish the attention in the imaging from the attention in the actual cognising4 ,it is1 indeed1 true for us almost invariably that cognitive strain without immediate realisation is incentive to ideating4 ,in listening in the night in vain for a sound we hear in imagination many sounds1 and we form preparatory ideas of what we are to hear4 ,sense-adjustments call up a train of sensations in ideal form4 ,but it is obvious that low intelligences which have no power of expectancy or ideation do yet really attend4 ,the very first cognitions and all early cognitions by their very newness and difficulty were attentions long before ideation was evolved4 ,with low organisms1 as cognitive power extends only to the present in time and space1 immediacy of reaction is imperatively demanded1 and every tension of cognitive apparatus is immediately directive of motor apparatus so that suitable motion is at once accomplished4 ,the cognition1 though dim and evanescent factor1 is yet powerfully energised1 and so a true attention4 ,always with lowest sentiencies1 and often with higher1 pain is suddenly realised without anticipation1 followed quickly by attention as strong effort to cognise the nature and quality of the pain-giver and so to effectually get rid of pain-giver and pain4 ,preliminary idea1 then1 cannot occur in early attentions and in late attentions it is by no means necessary4 ,it is said that we see only what we look for1 but it must be answered that seeing commonly happens without any looking for4 ,the kindergarten child1 ,professor ,james to the contrary notwithstanding1 is not confined in his seeing to merely those things which he has been told to see and whose names have been given him4 ,a child continually asks1 ,what is that8 and is quick to discern the absolutely new and strange4 ,he accomplishes a wide variety of attentions without ideas and gives himself almost entirely to immediate presentations4 ,to be sure1 every one sees only what he is prepared to see1 only what is made possible for him by his mental constitution as determined by his own pre-experience and the experience of his ancestors1 but this does not signify ideation4 ,every cognising is conditioned by the past1 but this does not call for a reawakening and projecting in ideal form at every instance of cognitive effort1 before any real cognition is reached4 ,in fact1 many1 if not the most of our attentions1 are merely intensifyings of some present cognition1 of some cognitive psychosis which has simply come or happened4 ,take the instance of attention to marginal retinal images1 this certainly does not always imply preperception1 the forming of an idea of what we are to see1 though in the cases mentioned by ,professor ,james it may4 ,for example1 ,i was writing the above seated with my profile to the window when ,i became suddenly aware1 through the physiological agency of a marginal image1 of a moving object to my right4 ,this perception of bare undefined object was spontaneous1 a pure given2 ,i exercised no will in attaining it1 and so the state of cognition was not an attention4 ,however1 by attending1 by intensifying the cognition by will effort1 ,i perceive that the indefinite object is a man walking on the sidewalk1 who is of a certain height1 clothed in a certain way1 etc4 ,i do not trace the least ideation in the whole process1 the slight attending as act of will did not imply any anterior or posterior idea or representation4 ,the reason for the will act was the intrinsic interest of movement1 and this intrinsic interest arises in the fact that moving objects have had for all life a special pleasure-pain significance1 the moving object is the most dangerous1 and so motion perceived has become ingrained in mind as a special stimulant of attention4 ,this habit of attentiveness to things in motion survives and continues for cases where it is of no use and even of harm2 thus1 in the present instance1 it diverts me from my work4 ,it is obvious that attention often occurs in the same way for other senses without preliminary idea4 ,on the whole we must conclude that attention is a much abused term1 and it is to be hoped that psychologists will for the future keep to the definite and best use of the term2 namely1 to denote cognitive effort in all its degrees and modes4 ,,hiram ,m4 ,,stanley4 ,,is ,,monism ,,arbitrary8 ,in ,vol4 ,,ii1 ,no4 #c1 of ,the ,monist1 a very kind criticism appeared from the pen of ,mr4 ,francis ,c4 ,russell of the doctrine of a double-faced unity of mind and matter4 ,it was said that this doctrine is very far from inducing that final satisfaction which we rightly expect of a competent theory1 and the critic propounded as a possible explanation of mental phenomena the postulate of a conservation of spirit4 ,he calls spirit the elementary basis of consciousness considered as a quality4 ,spirit would be the subjectivity of nature1 the elements of feeling1 or as ,professor ,morgan calls it metakinesis2 and consciousness would originate in the same way as electricity1 i4 e41 by rending spirit asunder into positive and negative spirit so as to produce a tension4 ,this would account for the appearance and disappearance of consciousness in that spiritual 8dynamo0 which is called the nervous system4 ,this proposition seems to be highly acceptable because it stands upon the principle of a conservation of substance and attempts to represent the phenomenon of consciousness as due to a transformation4 ,but does it for that reason remove the difficulties of the doctrine of a double-faced unity of nature1 which1 as ,mr4 ,russell says1 8is open to the charge of being arbitrary and brings no access of insight08 ,is not perhaps the term double-faced unity 7which is none of my invention1 and which ,i have been careful to avoid7 a misleading and unsatisfactory term8 ,why should nature be double-faced8 ,why are feeling and motion the only two attributes of natural phenomena8 ,is this not arbitrary8 ,could nature not be just as well a treble or quadruple-faced unity4 ,nature might possess1 as ,spinoza actually declares1 infinite attributes of which these two only1 viz4 extension and thought1 i4 e4 motion and feeling1 happen to be known to us4 ,it is this apparent arbitrariness which bars our insight and deprives us of the satisfaction that ought to attend the real solution of a problem4 ,but let us avoid the term double-faced unity2 let us speak of the subjectivity and the objectivity of nature1 and the clouds will disappear4 ,the doctrine of a double-faced unity has been criticised as dualism1 and the proposition that nature consists of two radically different attributes--exactly of two1 not more and not less--must most decidedly appear as dualism4 ,but is it dualistic to say that every subject appears to its objects not as a subject but as an object among other objects8 ,certainly not4 ,the relativity of the terms subject and object affords us the key to a comprehension of the situation4 ,this world of ours is a world of relations4 ,the phenomena of nature exhibit an unceasing activity2 they consist of constant changes1 and every change1 every motion1 has a whence and a whither4 ,every transformation is a series of events among which any prior one is called cause and any subsequent one effect4 ,if we regard feeling and motion as two attributes of nature1 we are actually on the brink of dualism1 and we shall understand how ,spinoza1 in order to escape from dualism and arrive at a monistic view1 assumed without any plausible argument the existence of an infinite number of attributes4 ,this assumption however is of no avail1 for the problem would arise3 ,how is it that we know only two of all these infinite attributes8 ,why do we not know any other8 and why are we unable to form even a dim notion of any other8 ,if they exist why do they exhibit no effects upon us8 ,perhaps because we ourselves and this world of ours consist only of two6 ,and if they exhibit no effects upon us and upon our world1 can they be said to exist at all8 ,might we not1 in that case1 consider them as non-existent and count the two known attributes alone as actual realities8 ,thus the dualism would remain2 and ,spinoza's monism is only apparent4 ,the same objection cannot be made if we remain conscious of the fact that feelings are as much abstracts as motions4 ,subjectivity and objectivity are correlative terms4 ,there is as little a duality in the idea1 that subjects presuppose objects as that effects presuppose causes4 ,there are not causes in the world which are nothing but causes1 nor are there effects which are nothing but effects4 ,take for instance an historical event4 ,was ,csar's death a cause or an effect8 ,plainly1 this depends upon the view we take4 ,as the sequence of the wounds which ,csar received from his assassins it was an effect2 as the beginning of the civil war consequent thereupon it was a cause4 ,if ,i look at you1 you are the object and ,i am the subject4 ,if you look at me1 it is the reverse4 ,thus the relation of a certain thing to its surroundings makes of it a subject1 while the surroundings are its objects4 ,subject and object being correlatives1 we can very well understand why there are no 8subjects in themselves02 every subject is at the same time an object in the objective world4 ,we can further understand1 why every subjectivity except our own withdraws itself from direct observation4 ,we can observe the movements of organisms like ourselves and judge by way of analogy that they feel pain or enjoy pleasure4 ,we see their motions which betray certain feelings1 but we can never see the feelings themselves2 and even supposing that we could enter into the brain of a man and that the whole mechanism of brain-action were laid open to our inspection in its minutest details1 we should see motions1 combinations and separations1 integrations and disintegrations1 we should see the oxydation of the gray substance1 which would appear as a great turmoil and excitement1 but we should see 7as ,leibnitz says7 no thoughts1 no perceptions1 no feelings4 ,that it cannot be otherwise is obvious when we consider that our objects will always present to us the character of objectivity4 ,but suppose ,we were an atom of oxygen and entered into the process of brain-action as an active factor1 our subjectivity would soon become absorbed and welded into a higher unity with the subjectivity of the other atoms4 ,we should then1 as a part of that brain's consciousness1 feel these feelings1 perceptions1 and thoughts2 we should1 then1 be the subject which we could not see and which we were searching for in vain in the world of objectivity4 ,this conception of the correlation of subjectivity and objectivity does not only convincingly explain the unity of feeling and motion1 it does not only establish a satisfactory monism1 it throws light also on some other of the questions that puzzle us4 ,how is it that we do not feel our brain-motions to be brain-motions8 ,we feel our feelings only2 and when feeling our feelings we do not so much feel that we feel as what we feel4 ,in other words1 we feel the contents of our feelings2 we feel their import1 their meaning2 we are aware of their significance2 our consciousness is conscious of the object1 the presence of which is indicated by this special feeling4 ,our attention is concentrated upon the messages conveyed by and contained in the different feelings4 ,these messages of certain feelings are the interpretations given either to certain sense-impressions or they are the thought-symbols representing some abstracts1 representing certain features of sense-impressions4 ,how little we feel our brain-motions when we think1 can be learned from the fact that some nations place the seat of thinking in the heart1 others in the stomach or even the bowels1 while even so great a naturalist as ,aristotle regarded the brain as cold and insensible2 he made the observation that man is in possession of the relatively largest brain1 but he understood its function so little that he thought it served to cool the warmth rising from the heart4 ,it is strange that every subjective feeling so long as it remains within itself can neither be localised nor determined4 ,we know nothing whatever of the brain-motion that thinks a certain idea4 ,we can fairly assume that every idea is in its objective existence a peculiar kind of brain motion taking place in a particular part of the brain1 but we are not conscious of the brain-motion as a special and localised motion4 ,we are quite unable to tell the difference that we must suppose to exist between the forms of the brain-structures or combinations of brain-structures and their motions when we think say for instances of virtue and of vice4 ,we are conscious only of the idea and not of their objective correlates4 ,whatever we know of our body1 we know only through sensation2 i4 e41 by the same means by which we know of other things4 ,our body is to us1 and is represented with the assistance of the senses1 as an object in the objective world4 ,as such it is localised and all its relations and activities are determined4 ,whatever subjective feeling we have concerning any state of ourselves1 remains indistinct until with the help of the senses it is made an object to our observation4 ,who has not as yet made the experience that he was unable to localise a toothache4 ,the pain itself gives no information either as to its nature and cause or as to the seat of the suffering4 ,the pain itself is purely subjective4 ,all the objective facts have to be localised with the assistance of the senses4 ,the suspected regions must be made the object of experiments and if any irritation of a certain spot increases the ache1 it will be assumed to be the seat of the pain4 ,and even then how often is a patient mistaken not only almost always as to the nature but often also as to the seat of the pain4 ,these facts appear strange1 but they cease to be strange1 when we consider that the nature of subjectivity is feeling4 ,subjectivity can as little become directly conscious of its own objectivity as an eye can look at itself4 ,however1 an eye can look at its image in the mirror4 ,so the complex of subjective existence1 which is through the interaction of an organism united in what we call a soul1 can and does turn the channels of its own senses back upon itself and thus forms an opinion concerning its own objectivity4 ,man's knowledge of his own objective existence is not due to any internal and direct perception of self1 but solely to the same experience through which he receives information concerning the rest of the world4 ,p4 ,c4 ,a ,,reply ,,to ,a ,,critic4 ,,with ,a ,,discussion ,,of ,,necessary ,,truths4 ,to the ,editor of ,the ,monist3 ,i hope it is not a breach of etiquette to ask you to forward to your reviewer the following remarks in reply to his criticism of my work 7,the ,foundations of ,geometry1 reviewed in ,vol4 ,,ii1 ,no4 #a1 of ,the ,monist74 ,if he is good enough to review my second book also1 ,i think they will clear up some misunderstandings4 ,your reviewer commences with some general remarks1 against which ,i have nothing to say4 ,he then proceeds to consider my 8requirements for a logical definition40 ,here he seems to find a difficulty--which may be due to my not having expressed myself clearly4 ,if so ,i hope he will read what ,i say on the same subject in my ,essay on ,reasoning1 which ,i cannot believe he will find 8indefinite0 or not well 8issuable40 ,but indeed ,i cannot see where his difficulty comes in with my old statement of the case4 ,i state perfectly clearly that requirements 7#c7 and 7#d7 are not logically necessary for a definition1 but are only required if that definition is intended to give a particular meaning to the word4 ,he tries to reduce my argument ad absurdum by giving a definition of 8troft40 ,but so far from being absurd his definition is perfectly good4 ,according to it 8troft0 would include in its denotation all our percepts and concepts4 ,when however he goes on to say 8444 ,these significant names must be so used that the intellectual sensibility shall be excited to perceive that which is intended to be defined10 ,i differ from him entirely4 ,this is only required for a description1 not for a definition 7see ,essay on ,reasoning1 p4 #ec74 ,your reviewer's only solid objection to my 8requirements0 seems to be that the fourth includes all the rest4 ,this is only true if the term proposed for definition has an import which has already been determined2 but even in such a case it is better to consider the requirements separately1 as ,i have given them4 ,for the force of objections under the different headings varies enormously4 ,an objection under heading 7#a71 if established1 would be fatal to any definition whatever4 ,one under heading 7#b7 so far from being fatal would only be a suggestion for the improvement of the definition4 ,objections under either of the headings 7#c7 and 7#d7 would only be to the effect that the term as defined meant something different from what it was desired that it should mean4 ,it is however convenient to consider 7#c7 and 7#d7 separately as it would generally be possible to decide 7#c7 at once1 whereas if a doubt were raised under heading 7#d7 it might lead to a prolonged discussion before it could be laid4 ,i do not however pretend that the 8requirements0 are laid down in my ,foundations of ,geometry in the best possible form4 ,indeed ,i have altered the form in my second essay4 ,there is moreover one requirement for a logical definition which is not included in my heading 7#a7 in the ,foundations of ,geometry1 though it is included in 7#d74 ,this defect is remedied in the ,essay on ,reasoning 7p4 #ee74 ,it is curious that your reviewer should have missed this point1 as it is the very one on which he attacks my definition of 8direction40 ,it is that the assertions in a definition must not be independent of the meaning of the term defined4 ,if they were1 the assertion would be equally true 7or false7 whatever meaning the term might have4 ,the import of the term would therefore be unlimited4 ,in the case of explicit definitions a similar error is called circulus in definiendo4 ,when your reviewer goes on to attack my definition of 8direction0 why does he change his front all at once1 and disregard all the considerations he has just been discussing8 ,why does he not apply my1 or his own1 requirements for a definition to the case in point8 ,the criticism he actually does put forward will not bear a moment's investigation4 ,if my definition is 8circular10 the assertion must be equally true whatever meaning is ascribed to the term4 ,well1 then1 let us try the effect of giving to it the meaning we ordinarily ascribe to 8cheese40 ,is it equally true that 8a cheese may be conceived to be indicated by naming two points1 as the cheese from one to the other08 ,clearly not4 ,but not only does this one assertion out of my definition exclude the import of 8cheese0 from the meaning of 8direction10 but1 more particularly1 it distinguishes between the 8three distinct but closely associated notions0 which your reviewer quite rightly says 8become confused in thought and expression unless the most solicitous care is taken to distinguish them40 ,this is exactly the care which ,i have taken1 by framing my definition4 ,i need not say much about the rest of the criticism4 ,your reviewer's remarks on my definition of 8angle0 are simply due to the fact that he has not read the definition carefully1 and probably has not read the note on the top of page #cf at all4 ,it may make it clearer to him if ,i point out that if 8we imagine a northeast-southwest line cutting an east-west line10 we imagine four different directions and therefore 7#dc7_/7ab7 #f angles4 ,two of these are the straight angles between the opposite directions of each of the two lines4 ,the other four are what ,euclid calls 8the angles between the lines40 ,as an angle1 according to my definition1 has no local habitation in space1 it is1 prima facie1 meaningless to talk of the 8right hand upper angle40 ,but if this is only an abbreviation for 8the angle between the directions upwards and to the right10 then 8the right hand upper angle0 means the same as it would in ,euclid4 ,with the remarks about the nature of the challenge ,i have thrown down ,i heartily agree4 ,may ,i however suggest that ,i have a right to expect that criticism should be1 not only 8competent and candid10 but careful8 ,it is a difficult subject1 and ,i at least am not always able to express myself in such a way that my meaning cannot be misunderstood by any one4 ,i think if your reviewer looks at what ,i have said again1 with the aid of what ,i say further in my ,essay on ,reasoning1 he will see that his criticisms have really originated in misunderstandings1 and perhaps he will alter his judgment that ,i have 8come short of the high result to which ,i aspired40#ah ,but my chief object in writing to you to-day is to bring specially to your notice my ideas on the nature of so-called 8necessary truths40 ,i am not quite clear how far you will find my views harmonise with your own4 ,to a great extent ,i am inclined to think they are simply a further analysis of the views you express in ,the ,monist and in your ,fundamental ,problems4 ,i will briefly sketch my own ideas and you can then judge whether they are yours also or not4 ,in my ,essay on ,reasoning ,i classify assertions as ,truisms 7assertions whose truth depends solely on the definitions of their terms7 and ,real ,assertions1 which convey some real subjective or objective information4 ,i show that the validity of all purely formal knowledge depends on the fact that it is deduced from definitions alone1 which are laid down arbitrarily and that the supposed peculiar certainty of the theorems of pure mathematics is merely due to the fact that they are all truisms4 ,thus1 ,i think it a misnomer to call such theorems 8necessary0 truths4 ,it would be nearer the mark to call them 8arbitrary0 truths4 ,there is no necessity whatever about the theorem 8twice two is four40 8,two0 is defined as #a #a2 8twice10 as the operation of adding a thing to itself4 ,it follows from this that 8twice two0 is #a #a #a #a2 and this1 by definition1 is 8four40 ,if 8four0 were defined as #a #a #a1 7and there is no 8necessary0 reason why it should not be17 then 8twice two0 would not be 8four40 ,the assertion 8twice two is four0 conveys no real information whatever--at best it could only tell us what one of its terms meant if they had not all been previously defined4 ,i cannot insist too strongly on the importance of a proper understanding and use of logical definition4 ,if you desire to know whether a given assertion is true or false1 a priori or a posteriori1 the first step in the investigation ,,must be to find out how its terms were defined4 ,if it turns out that the truth 7or falsehood7 of the assertion can be formally deduced from these definitions1 then the assertion is a truism 7or contradiction in terms73 in either case it can give no real information1 and even if true cannot be a 8necessary0 truth4 ,only if the definitions of the terms are both independent and consistent is it open to discussion how we might come to a knowledge of the fact it expresses4 ,i may briefly indicate here how ,i think the problem ought to be attacked4 8,objective facts0 can only be established by induction4 ,i do not mean by that term necessarily the process described by ,mill1 but some similar process1 based ultimately on inductio per enumerationem simplicem4 ,now no such process can ever lead to a necessary truth4 ,the most fundamental and certain induction which can be made1 that which induces us to believe in the objectivity of our environment1 does not lead to a 8necessary truth02 and much less can any other induction based upon this one do so4 8,objective facts0 then may be established with greater or less probability1 but can never be necessarily true4 ,but all inductions are based on our perceptions1 that is ultimately on our subjective sensations4 ,and a man can1 nay1 must be1 absolutely certain of the reality of his own sensations though he cannot be certain of the interpretations he puts upon them4 ,if ,i have a toothache ,i cannot be absolutely certain that ,i have a tooth1 but1 at least while the pain lasts1 ,i am absolutely certain that ,i have an ache4 ,and so of any subjective sensation4 ,i can similarly be absolutely certain that ,i entertain a given concept1 while that concept is before my mind2 though of course it is possible that if ,i assert the possession of that concept ,i may do so in language which may be misunderstood by the person ,i am addressing4 ,if then a man has certain concepts which he can call up at will1 the reality of those concepts1 qua concepts1 is to him a necessary truth4 ,he may lay down such necessary truths as axioms1 and by their aid he may give real subjective import to a symbolic argument1 and so obtain new and complicated assertions which are also to him necessary truths4 ,this is what ,i do in my subjective theory of geometry4 ,that theory might be regarded as purely symbolic--the axioms might have been left out1 and all its conclusions looked upon as mere truisms4 ,the conclusions of geometry of four or more independent directions can perhaps only be regarded as truisms4 ,but by the aid of the axioms1 geometry of two and three independent directions can be given real subjective import1 and its conclusions therefore regarded as necessary truths1 as long as they are only taken subjectively4 ,they may further be applied objectively by the aid of objective facts established by induction1 but in this case their validity is no greater than that of the primary facts1 the counterparts of the subjective axioms1 which are employed to give the theory objective import4 ,i confess ,i have not studied ,kant sufficiently to say that his views differ1 materially from mine1 though ,i always thought they did until ,i read your interpretations of them4 ,perhaps ,i misunderstood the sense in which ,kant used the term a priori4 ,the term has been used in so many different senses that ,i prefer myself to drop it altogether4 ,if it merely refers to priority in time there can be no practical doubt that1 whether in the case of the human race or of an individual thinker1 a large amount of sense-experience must have preceded even so simple an a priori judgment as 8twice two is four40 ,if the term merely refers to priority in logical validity it seems to me better to say that 8such and such assertions are not dependent upon experience40 ,but ,kant says of the assertion 8#g #e #ab0 that it is not only 8a priori0 but 8synthetic04 ,by the latter term he means that its truth was not deduced from definitions alone1 and that the assertion therefore conveys real information4 ,in this ,i believe he was wrong1 and though he afterwards declares that 8all knowledge a priori is empty and cannot give information about things10 unless the true nature of a priori knowledge is made more clear1 people will inevitably continue to believe the contrary--and to believe moreover that ,kant taught so4 ,any language which seems to imply that there is some dread necessity about mathematical truths--that they could not be otherwise if they would--is very misleading4 ,of course it is necessarily true that if you have seven objects and add five more to them you will have in all twelve objects4 ,but the whole objective difficulty is begged by the supposition4 8,much virtue in if60 ,as ,i understand it the essence of the 8laws0 of pure mathematics is that they are verbal1 that is they are only abbreviated expressions of the results of certain verbal processes4 ,if the processes are repeated and the results similarly expressed1 the results must always be the same4 ,our reason cannot 8inform us about the form of existence0 unless it is first given1 as the data or facts which correspond to the definitions of our symbolic arguments4 ,it is only because our reasoning faculties are limited that symbolic arguments are necessary at all--that it is not evident to us at once that the conclusions of the most intricate mathematical calculations are given to us along with the data4 ,given the data1 then in all possible worlds the conclusions must indeed follow1 but only because they really are already in the data which were given4 ,it may be that you will not only agree with all ,i have said1 but have already said much of it yourself4 ,but there are some passages in your ,fundamental ,problems which seem to imply otherwise4 ,i think the great objection ,i have to urge against ,kant1 and also perhaps against you1 is that you do not distinguish as clearly as ,i could wish between symbolic argument and real1 though subjective1 knowledge4 ,and the only way to distinguish between them is by inquiring into the definitions of the terms4 ,for example1 on p4 #afe of ,fundamental ,problems you say that to four-dimensional beings ,kepler's third law 8would most probably appear as #8the cubes of their times of revolution being proportional to their mean distances to the fourth power4'0 ,now what sort of assertion do you take ,kepler's law to be8 ,originally it was a purely empirical law obtained by pure induction4 ,if the four-dimensional people obtained their law the same way why should the result appear different to them8 ,or do you conceive the law to be deduced from ,newton's theory of gravitation8 ,but even so the law of the inverse square was obtained empirically4 ,if you think that law can be explained 7as the analogous law for the distribution of light can7 by the supposition that the integral of the force over all points at a given distance from the origin is constant1 still this supposition is purely gratuitous unless established by induction from experience4 ,if you grant any one of these suppositions you can by symbolic argument obtain the law corresponding to ,kepler's for a four-dimensional space4 ,but ,i may mention that in no case does the result you anticipate come out4 ,on the first two suppositions the law would be unaltered4 ,on the last supposition the law of gravity would be changed to the inverse cube2 but after that the solution of the problem has nothing to do with four dimensions--it is a two-dimensional problem only4 ,the result is that in general planets could not move in closed orbits at all4 ,they might conceivably revolve in circles1 but such a condition would be unstable1 and if it obtained their periodic times would vary as the squares of their distances4 ,again you say 7p4 #gd7 8the doctrine of the #8conservation of matter and energy1' although it has been discovered with the assistance of experience1 can be proved in its full scope by pure reason alone40 ,i should very much like to see your proof 7which ,i cannot find in ,fundamental ,problems74 ,how do you define the terms of the doctrine8 ,do you deduce the proof from these definitions--that is do you make it a truism8 ,or do you base it upon subjective axioms as ,i do my geometry8 ,or if you base it on objective facts1 how do you prove those facts by pure reason alone8 ,and if it is purely a subjective proof1 how1 can you say the doctrine is proved 8in its full scope08 ,surely objective applications come within its scope8 ,it would not be fair in me to ask you to publish my reply to your reviewer's criticisms1 though if that reply is justified the criticism must have done the prospects of my book some injury1 seeing from what a quarter it comes4 ,but ,i hope you will see your way to publishing the latter part of this letter in ,the ,monist1 together with your reply to it1 if you think it worthy of such a distinction4 ,i have just come across1 in this month's ,nineteenth ,century1 another remarkable instance of reasoning which seems to be rendered entirely nugatory by the want of proper definitions4 ,it is asserted that conceptual thought is impossible without language4 ,at first sight this would certainly appear to be a real assertion4 ,it follows from it that since dogs have no language they have no 8conceptual thought40 ,but it may be plainly shown that dogs do entertain 8general notions10 which in ordinary ,english would be included under the head of 8conceptual thought40 ,the apparent contradiction is however explained when it appears that the author distinguishes general notions as 8concepts0 or 8recepts10 according as they are or are not named4 ,this being his definition of 8conceptual thought0 as opposed to other thought1 it appears that the assertion is only a truism after all1 and conveys no real information whatever4 ,to discuss it further is then mere waste of time4 ,the author of the assertion doubtless wished it to convey some information1 but he did not attend to his definitions and so failed to attain his object4 ,,edward ,t4 ,,dixon4 ,,footnotes3 #ah ,the reviewer of ,mr4 ,dixon's book has read these remarks on his criticism 7,the ,monist1 ,vol4 ,,ii1 ,no4 #a1 p4 #abf7 and has given them what seems to him full consideration4 ,he confesses that he misunderstood what ,mr4 ,dixon meant by 8a direction40 7,see the article 8,logic as ,relation-,lore0 to be published in a subsequent number47 ,in regard to the requirements for a logical definition he must still abide by his former opinion4 ,the need of a definition arises either from the inaccuracy in the application of a term or from a supposed lack of knowledge as to its signification4 ,hence to use the term itself in its own definition is to import into the definition the same vagueness or ignorance which it is the very office of a definition to correct4 ,when ,mr4 ,dixon says that it is requisite for a logical definition that the defining assertions 8must not be independent of the meaning of the term defined10 what is that but to say that the same must be dependent upon that meaning8 which1 unless the reviewer again misunderstands the author1 is to say that we must understand the meaning of the term before we can understand the definition4 4 ,,mathematics ,a ,,description ,,of ,,operations ,,with ,,pure ,,forms4 ,,in ,,reply ,,to ,,mr4 ,,edward ,,dixon4 ,it is true1 as ,mr4 ,dixon says1 that 8,any language which seems to imply that there is some dread necessity about mathematical truths is very misleading40 ,but to say1 as ,mr4 ,dixon does in another passage1 that the truisms of mathematics are arbitrary truths1 is more misleading still4 ,the theorems of the formal sciences are not 8assertions whose truth depends solely on the definition of their terms40 ,they are 8real assertions which convey some real subjective or objective information40 ,mr4 ,dixon objects to ,kant's assertion that #g #e #ab is not only a priori but also synthetic4 ,he declares1 in contradistinction to ,kant1 that it is deduced from definitions alone2 that therefore it is empty1 and cannot give any information about things4 ,this latter proposition1 which is a phrase of ,kant's1 appears in this context as an inconsistency of ,kant's4 ,and it would be an inconsistency1 if it had to be understood in the sense in which ,mr4 ,dixon quotes it4 ,we construe ,kant's phrase that 8the a priori is empty1 and cannot give information about things10 in a different way4 ,we think that ,kant intends to say that the a priori imparts real information concerning relations and forms2 but that it does not impart real information concerning substances or the materiality of things4 ,it is apparent that the assertion #g #e #ab cannot be derived from the definitions of #g or #e4 ,similarly1 the ideas of higher mathematics are not deduced from the few definitions of elementary mathematics that tell what points1 lines1 parallels1 etc41 are4 ,of what1 then1 are these complex theorems of mathematics1 products8 ,they are not derived from sense-experience1 nor from the definitions of their ultimate elements4 ,is their origin mysterious8 ,here ,kant leaves us in the lurch2 he simply declares that formal truth is a priori and transcendental2 and those of his disciples who call themselves1 with preference1 transcendentalists1 have ample occasion to introduce in this lacuna of ,kantian thought1 all the mysticism they please4 ,the problem of the origin of the truths of formal sciences is not so difficult as it is sometimes represented4 ,the theorems of higher mathematics are the products of certain operations performed with the elementary forms described in the definition with which the mathematician starts4 ,these operations are not arbitrary2 they are not merely verbal processes2 they are realities of highest importance4 ,not material realities1 but realities1 nevertheless4 ,they are functions1 and mathematics deals with the products of functions4 ,it is true that we might call twice two by any other name than four2 we might call it vier1 or quatre1 but the operation #a #a #a #a would remain the same1 by whatever name we call its result4 ,mathematical truths1 accordingly1 are not empty in the sense that they are meaningless2 for they are significant in the highest degree4 ,they give real information1 not about things1 but about certain relations that obtain among things4 ,they describe certain operations in which formal relations are traced4 ,and they describe them exhaustively1 so that the result is1 as the ,germans call it1 eindeutig bestimmt1 and the result will1 under all circumstances1 be the same4 ,twice two will always be the same as #a #a #a #a4 ,this 8it will always be10 is called necessary4 ,there is nothing dreadful about it1 nor is there any mystery connected with it4 ,it is not an awful fate that decrees it1 but it is the nature of sameness1 that the same is and will be the same1 so long as it remains the same4 ,it is often overlooked that every number in arithmetic is the result of an operation which is symbolised by a certain figure4 ,numbers are not concrete things2 and as soon as we forget that they are products of a function1 we are liable to lapse into mistakes4 ,this happens most frequently with the numbers 8zero0 and 8infinite40 ,the latter of these two symbols is often looked upon as a concrete thing2 and because the infinite1 with actual reality1 is1 in its completeness1 inconceivable1 it has made1 of every one who stumbled over this stone of offence1 a mystic1 and many a radical1 fearless thinker bows down to worship before the idea of infinitude-function as it would be if it were a real thing4 ,says ,mr4 ,dixon1 8,our reason cannot inform us about the form of existence1 unless it is first given40 ,this is very true4 ,the form is given1 and formal systems such as the numerical system and the lines and figures of mathematics are mental constructions built of the stones quarried out of the relational given in experience4 ,form being given1 we can reason about the form of existence in general4 ,we can have ready in our minds systems of pure forms to apply to all the various cases of our experience4 ,and this will help us in unravelling the problems of reality1 and in extending our knowledge in those fields with which we are little acquainted4 ,far be it from us to consider the definitions1 the operations1 and the results of the formal sciences as purely verbal2 if they were1 mathematics would lose all the great importance which it undeniably possesses1 and become mere verbiage4 ,i confess that ,i do not understand ,mr4 ,dixon when he says3 8,it is only because our reasoning faculties are limited that symbolic arguments are necessary at all40 ,in my opinion all mental activity is symbolic4 ,every idea is a symbol that signifies something4 ,it is not because our reasoning faculties are limited that symbolic arguments are necessary at all1 but symbolism is the nature of our mind1 and symbols are the elements with which our reasoning faculties have to deal4 ,in this sense1 every argument is symbolic4 ,if it symbolises sense-experience1 it represents our knowledge of what may be called the materiality of things4 ,if it symbolises operations with pure forms1 it represents the purely formal relations of mathematics logic1 algebra1 etc4 ,the doctrine of the conservation of matter and energy in reality means nothing more or less than that there is no increase or decrease in the world at large4 ,nothing originates out of1 and nothing disappears into1 nothing4 ,it means that twice #a #a is #a #a #a #a1 neither more nor less2 or1 in other words1 it means that all events are transformations4 ,new things originate1 but their newness consists in their forms4 ,in this sense the law of the conservation of matter and energy would have to be called1 from ,mr4 ,dixon's standpoint1 other differences neglected1 a truism4 ,it is not a truism1 in the sense of being arbitrary1 but in the sense of being a purely formal truth1 as are all mathematical theorems4 ,mr4 ,dixon refers to a passage in ,fundamental ,problems1 in which ,i say that 8,to four-dimensional beings1 ,kepler's third law would most probably appear as the cubes of the times of revolutions of the planets being proportional to their mean distances to the fourth power40 ,his questions1 8,what sort of an assertion do you take ,kepler's law to be80 and 8,why should the result appear different to them80 show that ,mr4 ,dixon has overlooked the condition on which this proposition was made4 ,the first sentence of this paragraph begins with the words1 8,if space inhered1 as ,kant maintains1 in the thinking subject only1 spatial relations and laws would appear different to four-dimensional beings40 ,space relations are not subjective1 in my opinion1 but objective4 ,therefore1 since space relations do not inhere in the thinking subject only1 because they are a feature of the objective world1 and inhere in the thinking subject in so far as it is at the same time an object in the objective world1 ,kepler's law would appear to four-dimensional beings1 if they could exist at all1 just the same as it does to us three-dimensional beings4 ,p4 ,c4 ,,book ,,reviews4 ,,social ,,statics4 ,abridged and ,revised2 together with ,,the ,,man ,,versus ,,the ,,state4 ,by ,herbert ,spencer4 ,new ,york3 ,d4 ,appleton ,co41 #ahib4 ,,justice4 ,being ,part ,,iv of the ,principles of ,ethics4 ,by ,herbert ,spencer4 ,new ,york3 ,d4 ,appleton ,co41 #ahia4 ,among ,mr4 ,spencer's most important books are those entitled ,justice and ,social ,statics4 ,the latter1 which first appeared in #ahej1 has just been republished in about one-half of the original size1 some parts having been transferred to the book on ,justice1 and others omitted altogether4 8,one difference10 as he says1 8is that what there was in my first book of supernaturalistic interpretation has disappeared1 and the interpretation has become exclusively naturalistic--that is1 evolutionary40 ,another change is that a demonstration of the injustice of socialism is substituted for his former arguments1 plainly repudiated in ,justice1 against private ownership of land4 ,equally important is the omission of the chapter asserting 8,the ,right to ,ignore the ,state40 ,the demand for ,woman ,suffrage has also been withdrawn from the new edition of ,social ,statics1 though it retains the original protest against 8the reign of man over woman10 and asserts an 8equality of rights in the married state40 ,here again1 ,spencer's final position must be sought in his ,justice where it is urged that women cannot justly have equal powers with men unless they have equal responsibilities4 ,they cannot serve their country as men do2 and if they take an equal share in the government1 8their position is not one of equality but one of supremacy40 ,even in time of peace1 they are1 he thinks1 too impulsive to vote judiciously1 too sympathetic to oppose 8fostering the worse at the expense of the better10 and too fond of 8a worship of power under all its forms0 to protect individual liberty against the encroachment of authority4 ,this objection seems particularly strong1 because there is still great danger of the growth of state despotism at the expense of personal freedom1 even in republics4 ,many recent instances are given by ,spencer in 8,the ,man versus the ,state10 now reprinted in the same volume with ,social ,statics2 and it is urged in ,justice1 that even in the ,united ,states 8universal suffrage does not prevent an enormous majority of consumers from being heavily taxed by a protective tariff for the benefit of a small minority of manufacturers and artisans40 ,our voters are much too ready to follow hasty impulses and unscrupulous leaders2 and both faults are most common among the most ignorant4 ,how strongly education encourages independence was acknowledged by those slave-holders who said1 8,our negroes shall not learn to read1 for that makes them run away40 ,public schools have found their worst enemies among ,popes and ,czars1 and their best friends in the statesmen most honored by republics4 ,there is no other institution for whose advantages ,americans are practically unanimous4 ,the necessity of popular education at the public cost is acknowledged by ,huxley1 ,mill1 and other advanced thinkers so generally1 that ,spencer's exceptionally hostile opinion ought not to be taken as a self-evident truth4 ,mr4 ,spencer's examination of this subject does not appear to have been so thorough as the occasion demands4 ,in denying that education prevents crime1 he relies mainly on ,joseph ,fletcher1 who1 as stated in both editions of ,social ,statics1 8has entered more elaborately into this question than perhaps any other writer of the day10 and who admits that there is a 8superficial evidence against instruction40 ,spencer takes no notice of ,fletcher's having succeeded completely in breaking down this superficial evidence4 ,in elaborate papers1 published in the tenth1 eleventh1 and twelfth volumes of ,the ,journal of the ,london ,statistical ,society1 and illustrated by many tables and maps1 ,fletcher shows that the proportion to the population1 in various parts of ,england1 of people unable to sign their names1 corresponded everywhere to the proportion of illegitimate births as well as of commitments for crime4 ,separating these latter into classes according to degree of guilt1 he proves that the worst crimes are most common where there is the most ignorance4 ,thus he is enabled to say1 8,the conclusion is therefore irresistible that education is essential to the security of modern society40 ,that this testimony of ,spencer's principal witness is really the truth can be further proved by the statistics in the ,encyclopdia ,britannica1 showing that between #ahda and #ahgf1 while the percentage of illiterates to population in ,england and ,wales was reduced one-half1 that of criminals was reduced to one-third of what it was originally4 7,vol4 ,,viii1 pp4 #bba and #bdi-bea47 ,spencer also refers to the fact that schools have sometimes been carried on in the interest of despotism2 but most kinds of food are easily adulterated2 and education is valuable1 notwithstanding1 as food for liberty4 ,this last consideration disposes completely of his comparison of state-churches with state-schools2 and the fact1 mentioned in the revised but not in the original edition of ,social ,statics1 that opinions differ about the best methods of education1 is really an additional instance of the encouragement given by our system of public schools to independence of thought4 ,spencer's chief objection to this system is that it does not fit his theory that 8the liberty of each1 limited by the like liberties of all1 is the rule in conformity with which society must be organised10 7p4 #de74 ,such a 8law of right social relationships10 7p4 #ee7 would1 he admits1 require us to repeal our laws against indecency1 abolish our ,boards of ,health1 and close our poorhouses1 postoffices1 banks1 and lighthouses1 except in so far as these institutions1 like our streets and roads1 might be cared for by benevolent individuals4 ,he does not tell us how a government1 thus limited to managing the police1 army1 and navy1 could keep up a fire-department1 nor how new streets1 roads1 railways1 or canals could be opened1 in case the owners of land put their prices too high for the projectors2 but the most unfortunate application of his theory would be to close our public schools4 ,there is no danger of this1 however2 and the principal evil likely to result from his pushing his theory so far1 is that he prevents people from seeing its real value1 as indicating the direction in which our race has advanced and must make all further progress4 ,we shall keep on diminishing the power of the state over the man1 as well as that of the man over the child1 but neither authority will ever be abolished entirely4 ,we shall dispense1 sooner or later1 with some of the public institutions which ,spencer condemns2 but our common schools will1 ,i think1 last as long as government itself4 ,the abolitionists helped the slave to freedom by pointing out the ,north ,star2 but they did not advise him to quit solid earth4 ,this mistake1 although we grant that ,spencer shows us our ,north ,star1 is sometimes made in ,social ,statics4 ,timely help1 too1 is given by him1 in a thoroughly practical way1 to those reformers who are passing out from under the cloud with a silver lining into a ,cleveland summer and a fair prospect of a ,harrison fall4 ,among the words best worth putting into actions at once1 are these3 8,the right of exchange is as sacred as any other right1 and exists as much between members of different nations as between members of the same nation4 ,morality knows nothing of geographical boundaries40 444 8,hence1 in putting a veto upon the commercial intercourse of two nations1 or in putting obstacles in the way of that intercourse1 a government trenches upon men's liberties of action1 and by so doing directly reverses its function4 ,to secure for each man the fullest freedom to exercise his faculties1 compatible with the like freedom of all others1 we find to be the state's duty4 ,now trade prohibitions and trade restrictions not only do not secure this freedom1 but they take it away4 ,so that in enforcing them the state is transformed from a maintainer of rights into a violator of rights40 444 8,whether it kills1 or robs1 or enslaves1 or shackles by trade regulations1 its guilt is alike in kind1 and differs only in degree40 7,social ,statics1 ed4 of #ahej1 pp4 #cbf1 #cbg2 ed4 of #ahib1 p4 #acg74 ,f4 ,m4 ,h4 ,,an ,,essay ,,on ,,reasoning4 ,by ,edward ,t4 ,dixon4 ,cambridge 7,eng73 ,deighton1 ,bell1 ,co4 #ahia4 ,pp4 #hh4 ,some years ago the author of this essay made public certain views of his1 on 8,geometry of ,four ,dimensions40 ,he was surprised to find that though his arguments were received with incredulity they were not refuted4 ,this result appeared to him to be due to the fact that he was not understood1 that his views on geometry of even two and three dimensions being different from those commonly entertained1 he had failed of being understood1 because he had not begun his explanation at the beginning4 ,he therefore set to work to analyse those views and ultimately published a book on the subject4 ,this book1 ,the ,foundations of ,geometry1 was reviewed by us in ,the ,monist of ,october1 #ahia4 ,but now again the author regards himself as not understood4 ,he rested the positions and arguments of his book upon certain views of logic and especially of definition1 which depart from the orthodox views1 and he misjudged the fullness of explanation that would therefore become needful4 ,hence this little essay4 ,the proper approach to the views of the author is through his doctrine of definition4 ,usually definition is regarded as finding its main motive and utility in the convenience of social converse4 ,the meaning of any term is regarded as resting not in the choice of him who utters it1 but in the suppositions of those who are addressed4 ,it is true that a license is accorded to any one upon a sufficient occasion to give a special intent to some word1 but only upon condition that that intent shall be made sufficiently express1 in other words well understood by those addressed4 ,hence definition is usually taken to mean the recital or the precision of the meaning of a term by means of language naturally apt for that end4 ,there is no good sense in pretending to effect either one of these ends by language that lacks natural ability on that behalf4 ,now ,mr4 ,dixon holds1 if we understand him1 that conventional usage is of very subordinate consequence in this matter1 that it pertains to the prerogative of an author to throw upon those whom he addresses the task of gathering his meanings as best they can2 that even when he professes to explain his meanings he need not seek and employ any plain1 direct speech1 but may supply his instruction indirectly3 may ask his audience to solve a problem1 or to rightly guess what certain hints mean2 may require them to extract the meaning in question out of a set of assertions that involve the same in a collateral way only4 ,this he calls 8implicit definition40 ,it is analogous1 he tells us1 to an unsolved equation or set of equations in algebra4 ,so far as we are aware no one can claim priority of the author in respect to this expedient4 ,he seems to regard it as of great importance1 and proposes by its aid to overcome the difficulties that environ the fundamentals of geometry4 ,we think that the author is led to put undue confidence in his implicit definition1 by his peculiar views upon propositions4 ,he holds that all propositions can1 without loss or gain in the meanings as originally stated1 be reduced to statements of strict identity4 ,this done1 propositions can1 as he thinks1 be operated upon after the fashion usual with equations4 ,but we submit that between a logical proposition and an algebraic equation there is a difference that is in general irreducible4 ,for example take this proposition1 ,every parent loves children4 ,to alter this to1 ,every parent is identical with some or every person that loves children1 as is1 we think1 the prescription of ,mr4 ,dixon1 will not serve2 for by reading our identity in the reverse order we have3 ,some or every person that loves children is identical with every parent4 ,mr4 ,dixon's views in respect to terms and to the doctrine of denotation and connotation depart as widely from the suppositions usually held1 as do his views regarding propositions and definition4 ,to follow out the consequences of his proposed innovations in any adequate fulness is forbidden to us by lack of space4 ,we feel sure that further reflection will lead him to much modification of his doctrines4 4 ,,outlines ,,of ,a ,,philosophy ,,of ,,religion4 ,by ,hermann ,lotze4 ,edited by ,e4 ,c4 ,conybeare1 ,m4,a4 ,london3 ,swan1 ,sonnenschein1 ,co4 ,new ,york3 ,macmillan ,co4 #ahib4 ,pp4 #agf4 ,this book is an excellent translation of one of the most important works of a prominent philosopher1 who made an unusually strong impression upon the minds of his contemporaries4 ,almost every line of this clean1 accurate1 and charming translation betrays the translator's devotion to the subject1 for he has taken the utmost care to bring out the ideas of the author in the same brilliant style for which ,professor ,lotze is justly famous4 ,the translator says in the preface3 8,i have completed and venture to publish the following translation of ,hermann ,lotze's ,lectures upon the ,philosophy of ,religion in the same hope in which it was undertaken by my late wife1 that it may be of use to some who cannot read the ,german original1 and yet desire a concise statement of the form in which one of the clearest-minded of our later thinkers put to himself those great questions--as to the origin and destiny of the spirit of man1 as to life in general1 and the meaning of the material universe--which occupy us all at some time or another1 many of us as soon as we have won food and shelter for our bodies40 ,we do not share ,mr4 ,conybeare's and his deceased wife's enthusiasm for the author4 ,although we are not blind to the great deserts of ,professor ,lotze1 his amiable personality1 the depth of his religious and emotional nature1 the breadth of his scholarly erudition1 and the brilliancy of his ingenious1 not to say poetical1 presentation of philosophical subjects1 we cannot conceive that his work is come to abide4 ,on the contrary1 we consider his philosophy as antiquated in many respects4 ,he considers problems that originate from a mere confusion of ideas1 as being insolvable in their nature1 and attempts the solution of other problems with inadequate methods4 ,his thoughts still remind us of the ontological spirit of past philosophies1 and his principles are not in agreement with positivism and the methods of scientific research4 ,as an instance1 we quote the following passage3 8,we must ever set aside any attempt to describe in positive terms1 or to construct in thought1 the process by which this absolute being came to be not only one1 and that unconditionally1 but at the same time a many of things which condition one another reciprocally40 ,lotze still believes in an 8absolute unity0 as something prior to the world of reality1 and he declares that 8,we cannot ,know or ,explain how this ,absolute ,unity is also ,many0 7,sec4 ,,xxi72 and even if an unconscious being could be a ,many-in-,one1 yet it could not1 according to ,lotze1 generate consciousness 7,sec4 ,,xxv74 ,we do not believe that this problem is insolvable1 and do not1 as does ,lotze1 feel constrained to fall back on idealism4 ,in fact1 our position is so different from ,lotze's that in spite of the full recognition of his genius1 we feel as much severed from him as if he belonged to ages long gone by4 ,mr4 ,conybeare's translation is most certainly an invaluable work and is indispensable for any ,english student of ,lotze's philosophy4 4 ,,on ,,the ,,perception ,,of ,,small ,,differences1 ,,with ,,special ,,reference ,,to ,,the ,,extent1 ,,force1 ,,and ,,time ,,of ,,movement4 ,by ,george ,stuart ,fullerton and ,james ,mc,keen ,cattell4 ,philadelphia3 ,university of ,pennsylvania ,press4 #ahib4 ,pp4 #aei4 ,this volume of the ,philosophical ,series of ,publications of the ,university of ,pennsylvania gives an account of a large number of experiments made for the purpose of testing the perception of small differences of movement1 of weight1 and of light4 ,the most noticeable conclusion arrived at by the authors1 is that they cannot accept any of the received explanations of ,weber's law4 ,they found from their experiments1 by the method of estimated amount of difference1 that 8we tend to estimate the intensity of sensation as directly proportional to the intensity of the stimulus2 consequently1 in so far as any deduction concerning quantitative relations in sensation can be made from such estimation1 the sensation increases as the stimulus and not as its logarithm10 thus invalidating ,fechner's law4 ,the authors believe also that ,weber's law does not hold for the perception of movement1 as they find that the error of observation usually increases 8as the stimulus is taken greater but more slowly10 and that it is proportional to the square root of the stimulus4 ,accordingly1 they substitute for ,weber's law the following3 8,the error of observation tends to increase as the square root of the magnitude1 the increase being subject to variation1 whose amount and cause must be determined for each special case40 ,it is proper to add1 that ,professor ,fullerton gives only a qualified assent to these conclusions1 on the grounds that mathematicians are not agreed as to the soundness of the theory upon which the law is based1 and that the errors in question may not be independent errors4 ,he considers1 however1 the results obtained by the authors 8as sufficiently in accord with the laws to justify them in holding it tentatively1 and subject to criticism40 ,as ,fechner's law rests on that of ,weber1 and on assumptions which appear to be incorrect1 it also fails1 and it follows that the psycho-physical1 physiological1 and psychological theories put forward to account for the supposed logarithmic relation between mental and physical processes are superfluous4 ,from these conclusions we may judge of the importance of the experiments made by ,professors ,fullerton and ,cattell1 whose work requires to be carefully studied by all those interested in the special questions to which it relates4 4 ,,psychologie ,,du ,,peintre4 ,by ,lucien ,arrat4 ,paris3 ,flix ,alcan4 #ahib4 ,pp4 ,,lix1 #bfd4 ,price1 #e fr4 ,the author of this interesting work informs us that it does not aim at being a natural history of society1 nor is it even a study in professional psychology4 ,this is hardly correct1 however1 as such a study must be based on that of individuals1 and a writer of ,m4 ,arrat's reputation cannot treat of a large group of individuals without throwing light on the psychology of the whole class to which they belong4 ,he very aptly likens artists as a whole to a large family1 the artist in design to a genus of this family1 and painters to a species4 ,this has its varieties1 and it is by the study of these that the author seeks to arrive at a knowledge of the psychology of the painter4 ,believing that there exists a relation between the temperament and the qualities of the mind and that this is influenced by heredity1 he devotes the first part of the work to questions of physiology and heredity4 ,the second part deals with the painter's vocation1 his sthetic sentiments1 his professional memory1 and1 as the evolution of art is connected with the progress of visual analysis1 with his sense of sight4 ,then comes an examination of the general mental qualities of the painter1 his intellectual character1 his various phases of memory and aptitudes1 and the influences which affect his work4 ,the fourth part of the book treats of the painter's character1 his egoistic and sympathetic traits1 his will1 and his moral and social traits4 ,and finally reference is made to questions of pathology1 particularly defects of vision1 and to 8the miseries of genius40 ,on all these subjects ,m4 ,arrat has many acute remarks supported by numerous facts1 often derived from painters themselves1 who thus1 says the author1 will be found 8living and speaking on each page1 just as they are1 and making themselves known by their works1 sympathetic or disagreeable1 indifferent or superior1 but always interesting40 ,it is noticeable1 in connection with the important subject of heredity1 that in a list of about three hundred painters almost two-thirds are sons of painters or of workers in art1 and ,m4 ,arrat thinks that if more complete information were obtainable the proportion would be increased4 ,in the chapter on the miseries of genius1 the author takes exception to the view expressed by ,m4 ,lombroso that the creative inspiration of genius is1 at least in some cases1 the equivalent of epileptic convulsion4 ,that genius may lead to insanity is true2 and ,m4 ,arrat admits that remarkable aptitudes have often appeared in a family at the beginning of its degeneracy4 ,but he adds that painters are for the most part healthy1 and they show hardly any more singularity than other men may have4 ,he concludes his work with the following words3 8,genius makes use of1 as we have sufficiently shown1 faculties which are common to nearly all men1 if they are unequally strong and variously distributed with each4 ,genius1 moreover1 in the most elevated sense that it can be understood1 is an exception among artists themselves1 and even in genius1 the meeting together of several happy gifts is exceptional4 ,but it is willingly attributed to all those1 whatever may be their art1 whose works are able to touch the human cords that vibrate the most profoundly4 ,painters appear to us to compose a well-marked type among such4 ,the reader has seen the characters of it brought together and discussed in this volume3 he will preserve its living image after having closed the book40 ,this in itself furnishes a sufficient recommendation for the perusal of ,m4 ,arrat's work1 which apart from its psychological value1 is a perfect mine of gracefully written information about painters and their peculiarities4 4 ,,physiologie ,,de ,l',,art4 ,by ,georges ,hirth4 ,traduit de l',allemand et prcd d'une ,introduction par ,lucien ,arrat4 ,paris3 ,flix ,alcan4 #ahib4 ,pp4 #bdg4 ,we have now occasion to review a work on a subject much akin to the preceding--a work which has been translated from the ,german by the same author1 ,m4 ,lucien ,arrat1 and supplied by him with a very interesting introduction4 ,this ,introduction is in reality a rsum by ,m4 ,arrat of a series of studies by ,m4 ,hirth on physiological optics4 ,these studies are of great importance and are classed by the ,french editor under the three heads of ,form1 ,illumination1 and ,movement4 ,the first of these comprises the subjects of monocular and binocular vision1 the depth and the bilateral enlargement of the visual field1 perspective and identical points4 ,under the head of illumination the effect of the 8double bath of light0 through the two eyes1 the 8luminous equation10 and the problems connected with optical measurement are considered4 ,we have not space to exhibit fully the author's ideas on these topics1 but we can state what are regarded by ,m4 ,arrat as the two principle propositions which give to them their life and unity4 ,one of these propositions is1 that the first function of our dioptric apparatus consists in furnishing to our central visual organ1 which ,m4 ,hirth terms the internal eye1 material which the latter has to interpret4 ,the other is that it is necessary to get rid of mathematical concepts1 which are much too rigid to be applied to the delicate problems of vision1 and to fall back on visual sensation such as it is4 ,these propositions imply1 moreover1 the admission of an electro chemical process1 8without which the properties of the eye and the marvels of vision remain inexplicable40 ,this last conclusion has a bearing on the nature of memory1 or the recollection of the impressions received by the nerves and brain after the original excitation has disappeared4 ,thus1 ,m4 ,hirth suggests that when we know the physiological procedure in the impregnation of cerebral molecules1 or in their electric charging1 memory will be found to be only the prolongation of the duration of consecutive images4 ,the inquiries of ,m4 ,hirth throw great light on the difference between monocular and binocular vision1 for information as to which and other details of his optical theory we must refer our readers to ,m4 ,arrat's ,introduction4 ,this concludes with a consideration of the perception of light-movement1 the reproduction of which is said to require a special exercise of attention1 direct or indirect4 ,here we have the third degree of attention1 according to the views of ,m4 ,hirth1 who regards it as artistic apperception1 having its end in itself and capable of being reproduced through co-ordination of the movements perceived4 ,a considerable portion of the second and principal part of this work is occupied with the psychology of attention and of the related subject memory4 ,the latter is defined by ,m4 ,hirth as 8a sum of states of perception gradually accumulated by the various organs of sense10 and it is thus not a special faculty of the mind4 ,the mental condition which results from the action of memory is what is known as disposition4 ,this disposition is transmitted from one generation to another1 and becomes innate as the memory of the species4 ,but it is intimately connected with the nervous system1 and with the brain regarded as the electric storehouse of memories4 ,it is in accordance with these ideas that the author explains the transmission of hereditary qualities1 the problem which is at present engaging so much attention4 ,the innate organisation is a conservation of nervous quality or temperaments associated with the anatomical disposition of the nervous system1 and a certain condition of electrical tension among the cerebral molecules4 ,the transmission of ancestral qualities depends1 however1 on the vigor and good condition of the germ1 and as the organisation received from our earliest ancestors is the most persistent1 the primitive 8disposition0 will subsist even without exercise whilst nutrition and circulation assure the continuance of molecular growth4 ,it is with the visual memory that the author is chiefly concerned1 and he affirms that the optical phenomena referred to in the ,introduction compel us to admit the existence in the brain of a central organ1 which he terms the internal eye4 ,in order to determine the position of this organ1 which is the real seat of visual perception1 to the exclusion of the retina1 whose function has been overestimated1 ,m4 ,hirth considers the anatomical and physiological aspects of the question1 and he accepts the conclusion arrived at by ,h4 ,munk in his ,functions de l'corce cerebrale1 that perception is the function of a particular portion of the cerebral cortex4 ,there thus exist two visual centres or 8internal eyes10 one in each convexity of the occipital lobes1 as shown in ,plate ,v4 of the present work4 ,munk's researches would seem to prove1 moreover1 that not only is there a general localisation of visual memories1 but that each memory is fixed in a precise and determined place4 ,the centres of memory and the centres of perception1 which ,m4 ,hirth supposes to be simply a phase of memory1 are the same4 ,moreover attention is connected with perception1 but it is an imperfect state of memory4 ,attention requires the expenditure of force1 while perfect memory acts spontaneously2 and it is only in this form1 8exempt from fatigue1 that it becomes the passive servant of our instincts and sensations1 of our voluntary acts1 of our labor40 ,memory when perfect is automatic1 and according to the theory of ,m4 ,hirth1 who does not accept ,m4 ,ribot's monoideistic theory1 it is accompanied with automatic attention1 which is the result of a gradual transformation of 8energetic0 attention1 and attains in a normal adult an incredible development both in quantity and quality4 ,this latent attention is required by the existence of latent memory1 which is properly spoken of by ,m4 ,hirth as an organic attribute of the highest moment1 seeing that it forms the basis of all individual acquirements4 ,it would seem to answer1 however1 to what is often spoken of as the subconsciousness4 ,we can understand how this doctrine of latent memory and latent attention can have an important bearing on the question of the origin of the artistic sense1 especially as each brain centre may be supposed to have its own memory1 and each fundamental memory its special temperament4 ,the activity of such centres is due in great measure1 as pointed out by ,m4 ,ribot1 to nutrition and blood-circulation but ,m4 ,hirth adds a third factor1 electrical tension4 ,according to his theory1 cerebral activity rests ultimately on electricity1 the invisible currents of which1 maintaining the whole system in a state of tension1 are 8the inferior currents of the latent memory10 the brain centres being electrical accumulators4 ,this idea1 which the author applies also to the explanation of colored visual memories1 is open to strong critical objections4 ,in relation to the particular subject of art1 the author shows that the hereditary transmission of talent depends on the active maintenance of the special temperament of certain fundamental memories and their associations1 and talent itself therefore depends on the existence of such a temperament4 ,we here come in contact with ,m4 ,lombroso's theory of the physiological degeneracy of genius1 which ,m4 ,hirth opposes with much force1 and we think on the whole with success4 ,this discussion occupies the last chapter of a work that1 as our readers will be able to judge from the glance given here at some of its leading topics1 has a scientific value quite apart from the special subject of art which it is intended to illustrate1 and which it goes far towards establishing on a physiological basis4 4 ,,les ,,alt,,rations ,,de ,,la ,,personnalit4 ,by ,alfred ,binet4 ,paris3 ,flix ,alcan #ahib4 ,pp4 #cbc4 ,price1 #f fr4 ,in the present work1 the accomplished director of the laboratory of physiological psychology at the ,sorbonne has brought together and systematised all the most reliable phenomena bearing on one of the most curious subjects of inquiry now engaging attention4 ,notwithstanding the disagreement between different experimenters as to particular facts1 all have arrived at the conclusion that1 under special conditions1 the normal unity of consciousness may be broken1 and that then there is the production of several distinct consciousnesses 8each of which can have its perceptions1 its memory1 and even its moral character40 ,no one is better fitted than ,m4 ,binet to perform the eclectic work he has undertaken of discussing the recent researches on the alteration of personality1 without regard to the special views of particular schools4 ,the subject is considered by him under the three heads of ,successive ,personalities1 ,coexisting ,personalities1 and ,the ,alterations of ,personality in the ,experiences of ,suggestion4 ,the two first parts deal chiefly with phenomena presented by somnambulic and hysteric subjects4 ,in the third part ,m4 ,binet applies the fact of the duplication of personality to the explanation of the phenomena of spiritism1 the term he very properly gives to so-called spiritualism4 ,he regards the supposed spirit agent as the subconscious personality of the medium acting under the influence of suggestion1 a view which undoubtedly meets most of the actual facts of spiritism4 ,notwithstanding the divisibility of the ego1 there can be no doubt of the unity of the personality under normal conditions4 ,the question is as to the nature of this unity1 and the author follows ,m4 ,ribot in affirming that it consists in the cordination of the elements which compose it4 ,he repudiates the idea that memory is the sole foundation of consciousness1 as not only may one memory embrace different states1 but the same individual may have several memories1 several consciousnesses1 and several personalities4 ,for the opinion of ,m4 ,binet on other points we must refer our readers to the work itself1 which forms an important addition to the ,international ,scientific ,library4 4 ,l',,homme ,,dans ,,la ,,nature4 ,by ,paul ,topinard4 ,with #aja ,illustrations in the text4 ,paris3 ,flix ,alcan4 #ahia4 ,pp4 #cej4 ,price1 #f fr4 ,the present is the third work in which ,dr4 ,paul ,topinard1 the well-known pupil and successor of ,m4 ,broca1 the founder of ,french ,anthropology1 has given to the public his general ideas in relation to the science of which he has made so profound a study4 ,in #ahgf he published his ,anthropologie1 which reflected in great measure the teaching of his master1 ,broca4 ,ten years later1 in #ahhf1 appeared his larger and more important work1 ,elments d'anthropologie gnrale1 which treated of the history and methods of anthropology1 with various other subjects4 ,now ,dr4 ,topinard gives us his matured ideas on 8,man in ,nature10 by which is meant physical nature1 the object of the present work being to show the place that man occupies physically among animals1 and his probable origin or descent4 ,it is not surprising that a writer who was the pupil of ,professor de ,quatrefages as well as of ,professor ,broca should declare himself a supporter of the principle of unity of composition1 formulated by ,m4 ,etienne ,geoffroy ,saint-,hilaire1 from which flows that of evolution1 that is the natural derivation of beings from one another4 ,as to the means by which this is brought about1 the author reserves his opinion until the publication of a further work which he has in preparation4 ,dr4 ,topinard devotes the second chapter of the present work to a consideration of the position to be accorded to anthropology in relation to the other sciences4 ,he declares it to be a pure1 concrete science1 essentially anatomical and observatory1 and thus distinguishes it from ethnography1 which has to do with peoples under all their aspects4 ,both alike are branches of the science of man in its broadest sense4 ,if anything can be added to the author's explanation1 it is that anthropology has to do with mankind as a series of individuals1 while ethnography is concerned with the groups into which such individuals are collected4 ,this is not inconsistent with ,dr4 ,topinard's definition of anthropology as the science 8which studies human races1 the human species1 and the place of man in the classification of animals40 ,for all the facts on which it is based are derived from the observation of individuals1 and when races are compared with each other1 they are compared as ideal individuals1 formed by a generalisation of certain prevailing qualities1 just as mankind by a similar process becomes an ideal individual1 a scientific ,adam1 who is compared with other animals4 ,there is an apparent difficulty in relation to psychology which ,dr4 ,topinard claims entirely for anthropology1 but it disappears when we see how closely he associates psychology with physiology4 ,he says1 and we quite agree with him1 that 8characters of a psychological nature1 reduced to their most simple expression1 whether attributed to human races1 or to the general human type1 belong to ordinary physiological characters2 the corresponding anatomical part takes its place by the side of other physical characters2 the theory and explanation of intellectual operations1 of feelings and volitions1 belong to the special physiology of man and to the application of the ideas of general physiology40 ,while accepting as correct the division of anthropology1 in its restricted sense into general and special1 as proposed by ,broca and ,bertillon1 the author thinks it does not conform to the plan which should be adopted if it is desired to proceed1 by the method of analysis and synthesis1 from the known to the unknown4 ,the plan adopted by ,dr4 ,topinard is1 by analogy with the procedures of general zology1 to begin by recalling the general notions applicable to his subject as to the distribution of animals by groups of varying values1 the choice of characters on which they repose1 and the differences between the race1 the species1 the family1 and the order1 these last forming the pivoting point of his views as to the place of man in classification4 ,then commences the study of characteristics1 the mode of ascertaining them1 of putting them to use and of appreciating their value1 accompanied by examples1 drawn from special anthropology1 proper to illustrate the methods employed4 ,finally1 a parallel is drawn between man and animals1 that a conclusion may be arrived at as to the place of man in the series of beings1 and his probable genealogy4 ,all these points are carefully considered by the author1 who has framed a canon of the medium adult man of the ,european type1 a figure based on which forms the frontispiece to the work4 ,the proportions of this figure are derived from a comparison of all the most authentic published measurements1 and the canon framed from them conforms closely to that recognised in artists' studios1 except that in the latter the arm is too short and the neck too long4 ,the most generally interesting subjects discussed by the author are those connected with the relationship of man to other animals1 and particularly the structure of the brain4 ,dr4 ,topinard makes a careful comparison of the cerebral convolutions of various animals and man1 with numerous illustrations1 and he arrives at the conclusion that none of the characters said to distinguish man from the anthropoid apes are absolute2 all are reducible to a question of degree of evolution1 the superior degree being sometimes found among the anthropoids1 and the inferior degree with man4 ,the cerebral type of the anthropoids is a human type not completely developed1 or the cerebral type of man is a developed simian type4 ,man thus undoubtedly belongs to the order of the ,primates4 ,after considering the form and volume of the simian and human brains1 the author remarks that 8man alone has a frontal lobe developed in all its parts1 and filling up a large1 concave1 and deep frontal shell which externally gives place to the forehead1 one of the characteristics of man40 ,connected with the form and volume of the brain is the transformation of the animal skull into the human skull1 and the relation of this transformation to the facial characteristics of man4 ,these points1 and also various questions connected with the bipedal or quadrupedal attitude1 and with the attitude and function of prehension1 are treated in detail1 as are certain other distinctive simian and human characters4 ,a chapter is devoted to a consideration of the important subject of retrogressive anomalies and rudimentary organs4 ,in his concluding chapter ,dr4 ,topinard points out the place of man in animal classification1 and refers to the questions of his single or multiple origin1 his genealogy and his future4 ,in connection with the subject of classification1 the author dwells on the fact that man is not the only relatively perfect animal1 and yet that none of the mammalia1 which we admire for their beauty or for their usefulness1 equal the monkeys in the possession of a brain approaching the human type4 ,the brain1 the hand1 and the attitude are the three characteristics which especially connect man with the monkey1 and particularly with the anthropoids1 and the question has long been agitated whether in these particulars the last named is allied more closely to man or to the other monkeys4 ,dr4 ,topinard affirms that in all these particulars the anthropoids should be classed with the other monkeys1 and therefore that man stands alone4 ,as to the descent of man1 the ,french anthropologist would seem to agree with ,m4 ,vogt that the type from which man has developed was also the source of the monkey and anthropoid types1 and that it first appeared at the commencement of the ,miocene period1 when the earliest monkeys succeeded to the ,lemurian of the preceding ,eocene epoch4 ,dr4 ,topinard remarks that this conclusion is agreeable to that of the eminent ,american palontologist1 ,professor ,cope1 who makes man descend directly from the ,lemurian without passing through the monkeys and the anthropoids1 basing his opinion chiefly on dentition4 ,the question of the descent of man is connected with that of the singleness or multiplicity of his origin1 and on this point the author does not express a decided opinion4 ,he says that all existing types of humanity could be reduced to three1 the ,europo-,semitic1 the ,asiatico-,american1 and the ,negro2 if not to two1 the ,white and the ,negro4 ,he adds that1 nevertheless1 8in losing oneself in the depths of time1 we can conceive the ,negro1 born the first1 giving birth successively to the ,australoid with frizzled hair1 to one of the forms of the ,brown stock with straight or wavy hair1 and finally to the white ,european40 ,probably his actual opinion is to be gathered from his final statement when comparing the order of the ,primates to a tree1 that the ,lemurians are its roots giving birth to several stems1 of which one is that of the monkey1 from which branched the anthropoids1 and another1 whose point of contact with the first is unknown1 gives the actual human branch1 which runs parallel to that of the anthropoids without being connected with it1 and goes beyond it4 ,as to the future of the human race1 ,dr4 ,topinard affirms that the volume of the brain will notably increase1 that dolichocephaly will give place to a universal brachycephaly1 and that the cellules of the brain will be perfected in quality4 ,as the human brain is being thus perfected1 the animals nearest to the human type will disappear1 and then man will really think himself the centre round which the universe gravitates1 the sovereign for whom nature has been created4 ,but even then the anatomist will bring him to himself by uttering the words of ,broca1 8,memento te animalium esse40 ,this work1 which forms volume seventy-three of the ,international ,scientific ,library1 is sure to be widely read1 and it will be indispensable to the student of anthropology1 who will find in it all the information he requires on the methods of the science4 4 ,,die ,,urheimath ,,der ,,indogermanen ,,und ,,das ,,europ,,ische ,,zahlsystem4 ,by ,johannes ,schmidt4 ,berlin1 #ahij4 ,pp4 #ef4 ,this essay is an important contribution to the problem of the place of origin of the ,indo-,germanic languages4 ,the author is confident that while nothing certain was known before1 he has established at least one fact which will give us a clue to the solution of the problem4 ,this fact is the interference of the duodecimal system with the decimal system4 ,the former is of ,babylonian origin1 but its effects are noticeable upon almost all the ,aryan tongues4 ,the duodecimal system is not original with the ,goths or with any of the ,teutons1 which can be proved by the fact that #fj or a ,schock was a round number1 but not twelve1 the etymology of twelve 7twa-lif7 being two above a lif1 which latter means a certain set4 ,thus when the ,gothic hundred as a rule meant #abj1 when for a long time they distinguished between great hundreds 7i4 e4 #abj7 and small hundreds 7i4 e4 #ajj71 this was due to foreign influence4 ,for if twelve had been the basis of their number system1 a lif would have meant twelve and the numerical arrangement would have progressed not in #aj #ab but consistently in #ab #ab or #add4 ,everything points to the supposition that the ,babylonian sossos is still preserved in the ,german ,schock 7#fj74 ,accordingly1 says ,schmidt1 the ,europeans must have been exposed to a strong influence of the sexagesimal system2 they must have been nearer to the centre of ,babylonian civilisation than are the valleys of the ,indus and the ,eastern ,iran4 ,professor ,schmidt considers ,penka as refuted and also all those who regard ,europe as the home of ,indo-,germans4 ,we have to add that the eminent philologist when1 discussing the problem of the cradle of the ,indo-,germanic languages does not touch upon the other problem of the home of the ,aryans1 the latter being mainly an anthropological question4 ,schmidt says 7p4 #ac73 8,i do not intend to enter into the problematic domain of anthropology4 ,the original race-characters of the ,indo-,germanic nations1 their causes and the home in which they were moulded1 also the physical conditions and mixtures of the races which speak our languages1 undoubtedly can be treated with success only by the representatives of physical anthropology4 ,but exactly so the problem of the cradle of the original ,indo-,germanic speech and the evolution of its several languages1 as they are known in history1 can be solved only by philologists40 ,this is very true4 ,perhaps we shall approach the subject with better success if we learn to distinguish between the anthropological problem of the origin of the ,aryan race and the philological one of the origin of the ,aryan languages4 ,a ,european origin of the one might not exclude an ,asiatic origin of the other1 and it still remains possible1 that ,european ,aryans when migrating south and east developed through their intercourse with semitic and other races the beginning of a civilisation which powerfully affected all the ,aryans1 since there is ample evidence that even in olden times a lively commerce took place between them4 ,when ,prussian amber is found in ,pelasgian graves1 why should not the sexagesimal system of the wealthy nations of the south have spread over northern countries8 4 ,,lehrbuch ,,der ,,historisch-,,kritischen ,,einleitung ,,in ,,das ,,neue ,,testament4 ,by ,heinrich ,julius ,holtzmann4 ,dritte verbesserte und vermehrte ,auflage4 ,freiburg1 i4 ,b43 ,j4 ,c4 ,b4 ,mohr4 #ahib4 ,pp4 #ejh4 ,price1 #i ,m4 ,it has been said that the scientific purpose of an academical text-book should be to educate the student to scientific independence1 and its practical purpose to make it available for the adherents of all parties and denominations2 and these two purposes are the surer attained the less the author represents his own conception as that which alone can be justified4 ,this is the principle according to which ,professor ,holtzmann's ,lehrbuch has been written4 ,that he has fully attained his aim1 will not be doubted by those who know his previous and painstaking labors1 in which he proves himself as a theologian fully imbued with the spirit of science and scientific critique4 ,the first edition of this work appeared in #ahhe1 the second in #ahhf1 and the present and third edition can make the just claim of being carefully revised and perfected in every respect1 so that it is to be regarded as a comprehensive1 concise1 and clear review of the critical materials of the ,new ,testament4 ,there is no doubt that the work as it now stands will remain the best book for reference of its kind4 ,professor ,holtzmann in a brief introduction of seventeen pages sketches the history and literature of ,new ,testament criticism4 ,the book is divided into two parts1 the first treating the subject in a general way1 the second entering into its several details4 ,in the first part the author presents us with a history of the text and of its traditions1 explaining the causes of the alterations that were introduced either unintentionally or by mistake2 he reviews the critical apparatus for text-revision and also the history of the printed and revised editions up to the present attempt at emendation4 ,then a history of the canon is given1 from the oldest ,christian literature down to the radical criticisms of the present time4 ,in the second and special part we find a careful compilation of all the criticisms concerning the single books and epistles of the ,new ,testament4 ,the first chapter treats of ,st4 ,paul's epistles to the ,thessalonians1 ,galatians1 ,corinthians1 ,romans1 to ,philemon1 the ,colossians1 ,ephesians1 ,philippians1 the pastoral epistles2 further1 the epistle to the ,hebrews1 which is non-,paulinian1 the two epistles of ,st4 ,peter1 the epistle of ,st4 ,jude1 and that of ,st4 ,james4 ,the second chapter introduces us into the historical books of the synoptic gospels and the ,acts1 where1 in a brief review of fifty-seven pages1 we find the same data presented which are more fully explained in another publication of our author1 reviewed in ,the ,monist1 ,vol ,,ii1 ,no4 #b4 ,a new period in the development of ,christian literature begins with all those writings which go under the name of ,st4 ,john4 ,a discussion of these books is contained in the third chapter1 which treats of the apocalypse1 the fourth gospel1 and ,st4 ,john's epistles4 ,not the least interest attaches to the fourth chapter1 the subject of which is the vast domain of the apocryphal books of the ,new ,testament1 the number of which has1 of late1 been greatly increased by several new discoveries4 ,the subject divides itself naturally into apocryphal gospels 7,chap4 ,,ii71 apocryphical stories about the lives and deeds of the apostles 7,chap4 ,,iii71 apocryphical epistles 7,chap4 ,,iv71 and apocryphical apocalypses 7,chap4 ,v74 4 ,,sammlung ,,von ,,popul,r-,,wissenschaftlichen ,,vortr,,gen ,,ber ,,den ,,bau ,,und ,,die ,,leistungen ,,des ,,gehirns4 ,by ,professor ,theodor ,meynert4 ,vienna and ,leipsic3 ,wilhelm ,braumller4 #ahib4 ,pp4 #bec4 ,this latest publication of ,professor ,meynert's was mentioned in the last number of ,the ,monist by ,mr4 ,christian ,ufer1 in the department 8,literary ,correspondence40 ,since its appearance ,professor ,meynert has died4 ,his name has stood foremost for a great number of years in the ranks of psychiatrical investigators1 and his contributions to the science to which he was devoted1 have1 perhaps more than those of any other1 tended to its permanent advancement4 ,the activity of his life has extended over a great number of years1 and his labors have not only been applied to the theoretical interests of his science alone1 but have also been directed--and this is the most important part of every scientist's work--to bringing the results of his investigations into connection with the great body of knowledge at large1 and especially to putting in popular form1 and bringing within the reach of the general reader1 the facts of the science which he contributed so much to establish4 ,the present lectures date from the year #ahfh4 ,they owe their origin to the identification in later years of the interests of medicine with the interests which every human being has at heart1 of resolving the mysteries of mental operations generally4 ,their main subject is the description and investigation of the structure of the cerebral organs2 and the elucidation in the light of such description of the psychical operations of the brain4 ,the fundamental facts of this province are not difficult4 ,the main thing required is to free ourselves from the impediments which artificial thought on this subject has at all times imported into the consideration of intellectual facts4 ,our knowledge in this domain is founded on observation and introspection2 not upon dialectics4 ,phenomena1 simply1 are presented to observation1 and not the ultimate essences of forces4 ,so1 too1 the apparatus of observation and introspection give only their own phenomena4 ,their contents are the animated external world as it affects conscious beings1 and involves1 besides intuition1 the facts of memory4 ,unpersonal inherited memories1 which take the form of instinct1 are not forthcoming4 ,the present lectures do not pretend to give instruction in the anatomy of the brain per se1 but simply in so far as it is necessary to the understanding of the brain's mechanism4 ,all things viewed1 all things intuited are contents of consciousness1 which in its limitations to the sense-impressions of the individual being1 we term the ego1 or ,i4 ,in so far as the external world is the intuited contents of consciousness1 the extent of the latter is increased1 the ego1 the ,i1 expands into the secondary ego1 or ,i4 ,in this doctrine of a secondary ego the problems which grow out of the behavior of individuals towards the external world are resolved in the single explanation that the ego of each particular group of things seeks to preserve itself by internal and external motions4 ,the ego is simply in the possession of itself in every extension which it acquires2 if such extension consists of a common possession1 its desire and tendency to preserve such is simply explained by the fact that such possession is the ego itself4 ,amongst the intuited objects of the ego are to be classed also as component parts of the secondary ego of every individual1 the other living individualities of the world4 ,from the point of view of this fact1 the ego appears in its social rle4 ,the present lectures consequently extend to the consideration of the interactions of brains in society1 to culture and civilisation1 and seek to establish the phenomena of these domains as facts of physical knowledge4 ,the method of physical inquiry is that of comparison by the alteration of the attendant circumstances in which the psychical mechanism acts4 ,physiology bases it on experiment4 ,nature also supplies experiments with the results that also embrace phenomena of culture4 ,in the directions indicated here1 the diseases of the mind afford a comparative means for the investigation of the phenomena of consciousness1 a doctrine of natural cerebral experiments1 and a foundation for a knowledge of the phenomena of mind4 4 ,,periodicals4 ,,zeitschrift ,f,r ,,psychologie ,,und ,,physiologie ,,der ,,sinnesorgane4 ,,contents3 ,vol4 ,,iii4 ,no4 #e4 ,,ueber ,,ein ,,optisches ,,paradoxon4 ,by ,franz ,brentano4 8,,flatternde ,,herzen40 ,by ,adolf ,szili4 ,,ueber ,,begr,,ndung ,,einer ,,blindenpsychologie ,,von ,,einem ,,blinden4 ,by ,friedrich ,hitschmann4 ,,bemerkungen ,,ber ,,die ,,von ,,lipps ,,und ,,cornelius ,,besprochene ,,nachbilderscheinung4 ,by ,otto ,schwarz4 ,,contents3 ,vol4 ,,iii4 ,no4 #f4 ,,beitr,,ge ,,zur ,,dioptrik ,,des ,,auges4 ,by ,m4 ,tscherning4 ,,optische ,,streitfragen4 ,by ,th4 ,lipps4 ,,contents3 ,vol4 ,,iv4 ,nos4 #a and #b4 ,,ueber ,,die ,,sch,,tzung ,,kleiner ,,zeitgr,,ssen4 ,by ,e ,schumann4 ,,zum ,,begriff ,,der ,,lokalzeichen4 ,by ,c4 ,stumpf4 ,,zur ,,kenntniss ,,des ,,successiven ,,kontrastes4 ,by ,richard ,hilbert4 ,,litteraturbericht4 ,the first article is on an optical paradox4 ,let two equal parallel lines be drawn1 as in the cut below2 then let two small straight lines be drawn from the extremities of these in such a way that in the first they form acute angles with the line and in the second1 obtuse angles4 ,the first1 it will be seen1 appears shorter than the second4 ,what is the explanation of this phenomenon8 ,illustration3 ,cut #a4 ,illustration3 ,cut #b4 ,illustration3 ,cut #c4 ,illustration3 ,cut #d4 ,illustration3 ,cut #e4 ,the author's answer is1 that this phenomenon is a consequence of the well-known fact that we overestimate small angles1 and underestimate large ones4 ,the presence of the lines has nothing to do with the optical illusion1 as the inserted cut1 in which the lines are omitted1 shows4 7,cut #b47 ,the optical illusion is also not present when the lines are rectangularly attached1 as is ,cut #c4 ,these facts prove that angular inclination is the decisive factor4 ,the following cuts show this1 the first in a more and the second in a less marked degree4 7,cuts #d1 #e47 ,the simplest case in which the explanatory factor of this phenomenon is involved1 is that of the estimation of the distance of an isolated point from the extremities of a short straight line4 ,the estimation of this distance is dependent upon our estimation of the angle made by lines drawn from the point to the extremities of a short line4 ,if this estimation is false1 it produces by an exact trigonometrical law1 an error in the estimation of the corresponding distance4 ,this explains all4 ,in our first figure the factor of illusion is eight times presented3 hence its marked character4 ,the second article consists of a rather long series of experiments on the so-called 8flatternde ,herzen0 by ,adolph ,szili4 ,the third article is on the foundations of a psychology of the blind1 by a blind man1 ,friedrich ,hitschmann1 of ,vienna4 ,this article contains a number of interesting facts concerning the sensory1 intellectual1 and emotional life of blind people1 and affords a great many valuable hints for the development of the special psychology which the author has in view4 ,the first article of ,no4 #f of the ,zeitschrift is a very exhaustive one1 some sixty pages in length1 filled with special and technical investigations concerning the dioptrics of the eye4 ,when light passes from one refracting medium into another it is partially reflected at the dividing surface1 and transmits by reflection the objects from which it has proceeded4 ,this is also the case with the human eye1 which is itself a lens4 ,the refracted pictures are the only pictures of importance to the possessor of the eye2 but just as in the construction of optical instruments1 the reflected or 8lost0 images are of supreme importance to the optician in the determination of the properties of his productions1 so these same pictures in the human eye are of supreme importance to the physiologist and the psychologist4 ,this is the subject of ,dr4 ,tscherning's researches4 ,in the second article ,dr4 ,th4 ,lipps discusses some mooted questions of optics4 ,the first part of the article is a reply to ,schwarz's criticism in the preceding number of the ,zeitschrift4 ,the second part is a review of ,franz ,brentano's explanation of the optical paradox1 discussed in the second paragraph of this notice4 ,lipps declares1 that1 though there is some truth in ,brentano's explanation1 it is nevertheless an error to believe that acute angles1 as such1 are overestimated1 and obtuse angles1 as such1 are underestimated4 ,on the contrary1 every time such errors in estimation occur1 there exist particular reasons for it1 the character of which renders the attempt impossible to derive the estimation of distance directly from the estimation of angles4 ,lipps supports his position by actual facts4 ,his chief and most philosophical remark is1 that it is a perilous and improper thing to do to explain isolated optical illusions by isolated and independent hypotheses2 optical illusions are not exceptions3 they constitute a class of phenomena in themselves1 and they should be considered in their natural and logical connection4 7,hamburg and ,leipsic3 ,leopold ,voss474 4 ,,vierteljahrsschrift ,f,r ,,wissenschaftliche ,,philosophie4 ,vol4 ,,xvi4 ,no4 #c4 ,,ueber ,,real- ,,und ,,beziehungs-,,urtheile4 ,by ,j4 v4 ,kries4 ,,was ,,ist ,,logik8 ,by ,a4 ,voigt4 ,,zur ,,psychologie ,,der ,,landschaft4 ,by ,r4 ,wlassak4 ,,des ,,nic4 ,,tetens ,,stellung ,,in ,,der ,,geschichte ,,der ,,philosophie4 ,by ,m4 ,dessoir4 ,the articles of this magazine are usually very rigorous and learned2 and the contents of the present number are in keeping with its reputation4 ,prof4 ,j4 v4 ,kries discusses in an essay1 evoked by the recent articles of ,riehl1 the subject of 8real and relational judgments02 his object is to establish a classification1 and display the logical connection1 of judgments generally4 ,real judgments are predications concerning reality or actual facts2 relational judgments predicate simple relations of concepts1 etc4 ,the first requisite of a scientific exactness of thought1 says ,kries1 is the distinction and determination in any given case of judgments which are real and judgments which are relational4 ,in the second article1 which is long and exhaustive1 ,dr4 ,voigt endeavors to determine the characters and functions of the different kinds of logic4 ,in view of the great prominence into which algebraical logic of late years has come1 this article is one of considerable interest4 ,voigt defines the pretensions and powers of the two opposing systems of philosophical and algebraical logic1 and attempts to set forth the justification of each4 ,voigt1 as opposed to ,husserl1 cordially recommends the study of algebraical logic to philosophers1 that both disciplines may profit by the intercourse4 7,leipsic3 ,o4 ,r4 ,reisland47 4 ,,philosophische ,,monatshefte4 ,vol4 ,,xxviii4 ,nos4 #e to #h4 ,,contents3 ,nos4 #e and #f4 ,,die ,,wirklichkeit ,,als ,,ph,,nomen ,,des ,,geistes4 7,concluded47 ,by ,a4 ,rosinski4 ,,wesen ,,und ,,bedeutung ,,der ,,impersonalien4 ,by ,r4 ,f4 ,kaindl4 ,,zur ,,geschichte ,,und ,,zum ,,problem ,,der ,,aesthetik4 ,by ,e4 ,khnemann4 ,,contents3 ,nos4 #g and #h4 ,,ueber ,,die ,,grundformen ,,der ,,vorstellungsverbindung4 ,psychologische ,studie4 ,by ,m ,offner4 ,,zur ,,geschichte ,,und ,,zum ,,problem ,,der ,,aesthetik4 7,concluded7 ,by ,e4 ,khnemann4 ,,werke ,,zur ,,philosophie ,,der ,,geschichte ,,und ,,des ,,socialen ,,lebens 7,second ,article3 ,g4 de ,greef1 ,introduction la sociologie74 ,by ,f4 ,tnnies4 ,,recensionen4 ,,litteraturbericht4 ,a4 ,rosinski's contribution is a metaphysical essay on reality viewed as a phenomenon of the mind4 ,the results of his discussion are these3 that the world of experience1 with all its laws and phenomena1 and all we assume to exist per se1 is referable wholly to ourselves2 that the primal source and cause of all reality is not a something which lies absolutely outside us1 but is simply our own self1 or ego4 ,in what sense reality is reality1 the author proposes to discuss in future articles4 ,dr4 ,raimund ,friedrich ,kaindl discusses1 in the second article1 the character and meaning of the impersonal verbs4 ,the discussion is made both from the psychologico-logical point of view1 and from the point of view of comparative philology4 ,the ,philosophische ,monatshefte contain1 in each issue1 a very exhaustive bibliography of all the works which have appeared during the month in the provinces connected with philosophy4 ,this department is conducted by ,dr4 ,ascherson1 the librarian of the ,berlin ,university library1 and forms a very important and valuable feature of this magazine4 7,berlin3 ,dr4 ,r4 ,salinger47 4 ,,zeitschrift ,f,r ,,philosophie ,,und ,,philosophische ,,kritik4 ,vol4 #ajj4 ,nos4 #a and #b4 ,this well-known magazine1 formerly edited by ,dr4 ,j4 ,d4 ,fichte and ,dr4 ,ulrici1 is now presided over by ,dr4 ,richard ,falckenberg1 of ,erlangen4 ,it has reached its hundredth volume1 and with the present two numbers begins a new series4 ,its reviews and lists of newly published works are comparatively complete4 ,its articles1 though generally tinged with scholasticism and chiefly treating of philosophico-historical subjects1 deal1 nevertheless1 with some modern and living questions2 for example1 ,dr4 ,max ,schasler's discussion of the proceedings on the recent ,prussian school law2 ,dr4 ,eugene ,dreher's consideration of the law of the conservation of force2 and ,dr4 ,nikolaus von ,seeland's discussion of the deficiencies of the current theory of force4 ,the other articles are contributed by ,a4 ,wreschner1 ,g4 ,frege1 ,j4 ,zahlfleisch1 and ,robert ,schellwien4 7,leipsic3 ,c4 ,e4 ,m4 ,pfeffer47 4 ,,the ,,american ,,journal ,,of ,,psychology4 ,august1 #ahib4 ,vol4 ,,iv4 ,no4 #d4 ,,contents3 ,,the ,,extent ,,of ,,the ,,cortex ,,in ,,man1 ,,as ,,deduced ,,from ,,the ,,study ,,of ,,laura ,,bridgman',s ,,brain4 ,by ,henry ,h4 ,donaldson4 ,,some ,,influences ,,which ,,affect ,,the ,,rapidity ,,of ,,voluntary ,,movements4 ,by ,f4 ,b4 ,dresslar4 ,,experimental ,,research ,,upon ,,the ,,phenomena ,,of ,,attention4 ,by ,james ,r4 ,angell and ,arthur ,h4 ,pierce4 ,,some ,,effects ,,of ,,contrast4 ,by ,a4 ,kirschmann4 ,,report ,,on ,,an ,,experimental ,,test ,,of ,,musical ,,expressiveness4 ,by ,benjamin ,ives ,gilman4 ,,psychological ,,literature4 7,worcester1 ,mass43 ,clark ,university47 ,,mind4 ,new ,series4 ,no4 #c4 ,july1 #ahib4 ,,contents3 ,,lotze',s ,,antithesis ,,between ,,thought ,,and ,,things4 7,i47 ,by ,a4 ,eastwood4 ,,the ,,festal ,,origin ,,of ,,human ,,speech4 ,by ,j4 ,donovan4 ,,the ,,logical ,,calculus4 7,,iii47 ,by ,w4 ,e4 ,johnson4 ,,the ,,field ,,of ,,esthetics ,,psychologically ,,considered4 7,i47 ,by ,h4 ,r4 ,marshall4 ,,discussions3 ,the ,influence of ,muscular ,states on ,consciousness4 ,by ,edmund ,b4 ,delabarre2 ,dr4 ,mnsterberg and his ,critics4 ,by ,e4 ,b4 ,titchener4 ,the ,definition of ,desire4 ,by ,henry ,rutgers ,marshall4 ,feeling1 ,belief1 and ,judgment4 ,by ,j4 ,mark ,baldwin4 ,,critical ,,notices4 7,london3 ,williams ,norgate47 ,,international ,,journal ,,of ,,ethics4 ,july1 #ahib4 ,vol4 ,,ii4 ,no4 #d4 ,,contents3 ,,natural ,,selection ,,in ,,morals4 ,by ,s4 ,alexander4 ,,what ,,should ,,be ,,the ,,attitude ,,of ,,the ,,pulpit ,,to ,,the ,,labor ,,problem8 ,by ,w4 ,l4 ,sheldon4 ,,ethics ,,of ,,the ,,jewish ,,question4 ,by ,charles ,zeublin4 ,,machiavelli',s ,,prince4 ,by ,w4 ,r4 ,thayer4 ,,on ,,the ,,founding ,,of ,a ,,new ,,religion4 ,by ,b4 ,carneri4 ,,an ,,analysis ,,of ,,the ,,idea ,,of ,,obligation4 ,by ,frank ,chapman ,sharp4 ,,reviews4 ,prof4 ,s4 ,alexander1 in his lecture delivered before the ,ethical ,societies of ,cambridge and ,london1 here reproduced1 points out that the growth and change of moral and social ideals are the result of a process of mental conflict4 ,professor ,sheldon thinks only a partial solution of the labor problem is possible until the second coming of men somewhat of the type of ,st4 ,francis of ,assisi1 8who will sacrifice their personal opportunities1 abandon their station in the world1 and go down to apply their gifts and acquirements to the cause of the lower stratum of society40 ,the religious as well as economic opposition to ,judaism1 according to ,mr4 ,charles ,zeublin1 is caused by the exclusiveness of the ,jew1 and his ultimate welfare and that of his neighbors requires a humanitarian treatment within and without ,judaism4 ,mr4 ,william ,r4 ,thayer shows that ,machiavelli merely described things as they were in his time1 and deduced the laws which actually controlled the public deeds of rulers2 and that it is now 8the duty of all men to sweep away the old falsehood that rulers and governments are absolved from paying heed to those ethical principles to which every individual is bound40 ,according to ,mr4 ,b4 ,carneri1 the living at peace with oneself and one's fellow-men is possible only without religion1 8because there is no morality without contentment1 and it is the highest degree of discontent to strive for something beyond this world40 ,mr4 ,frank ,chapman ,sharp concludes that when the element of the good is taken out of the conception of obligation1 this degenerates into mere submission to an arbitrary imperative2 the foundation for the distinction between right and wrong must be sought in something that appeals to us as good1 and its ultimate criterion can be given only by our chosen ideal4 7,philadelphia3 ,international ,journal of ,ethics1 #aah ,s4 ,twelfth ,street47 4 ,,the ,,philosophical ,,review4 ,july1 #ahib4 ,vol4 ,i4 ,no4 #d4 ,,inhibition ,,and ,,freedom ,,of ,,the ,,will4 ,by ,dr4 ,james ,h4 ,hyslop4 ,a ,,classification ,,of ,,cases ,,of ,,association4 ,by ,mary ,w4 ,calkins4 ,,the ,,origin ,,of ,,pleasure ,,and ,,pain4 ,by ,dr4 ,herbert ,nichols4 ,,on ,,primitive ,,consciousness4 ,by ,hiram ,m4 ,stanley4 ,,reviews ,,of ,,books4 ,,summaries ,,of ,,articles4 ,the confusion incident to the old controversy about freedom is due1 says ,dr4 ,james ,h4 ,hyslop1 to a failure to distinguish between the proof of freedom and the conditions of it1 that is1 8the circumstances that are necessary to it1 or the characteristics that constitute it40 ,freedom consists in 8self-initiative and independence of external causes1 whether there be any choice between alternatives or not10 and inhibition and deliberation bring about both of these circumstances4 ,miss ,mary ,w4 ,calkins rejects the ordinary division into association by contiguity and association by similarity1 and gives detailed summaries of the fundamental characteristics of consciousness on which association depends and of the characteristics of association proper2 the ultimate fact of association1 whether it be psychical or physical or both1 we do not understand4 ,dr4 ,herbert ,nichols1 in the first part of his article on the 8,origin of ,pleasure and ,pain10 considers the phenomena of pleasure and pain associated with the action of the senses1 and concludes that there is no 8tangible evidence indicating that pleasures and pains are inseparable attributes of other senses or polar complements of each other10 and that separate sensations of pain and of pleasure are probable4 ,mr4 ,hiram ,m4 ,stanley regards pure pain as primitive mind1 and pleasure as the polar opposite to it1 although they are neither absolutely essential one to the other1 pleasure being traced to 8an intermediary feeling between pain as produced by excess1 and pain from lack as differentiated form40 ,consciousness is fundamentally pain and pleasure as serving the organism in the struggle for existence4 7,boston1 ,new ,york1 ,chicago3 ,ginn ,company47 4 ,,the ,,new ,,world4 ,,contents3 ,vol4 ,i4 ,no4 #b4 ,,the ,,social ,,plaint4 ,by ,e4 ,benjamin ,andrews4 ,,religious ,,evolution4 ,by ,minot ,j4 ,savage4 ,,the ,,origin ,,and ,,meaning ,,of ,,the ,,story ,,of ,,sodom4 ,by ,t4 ,k4 ,cheyne4 ,,the ,,foundation ,,of ,,buddhism4 ,by ,maurice ,bloomfield4 ,,imagination ,,in ,,religion4 ,by ,francis ,tiffany4 ,,the ,,next ,,step ,,in ,,christianity4 ,by ,s4 ,d4 ,mc,connell4 ,,the ,,implications ,,of ,,self-,,consciousness4 ,by ,josiah ,royce4 ,,how ,i ,,came ,,into ,,christianity4 ,by ,nobuta ,kishimoto4 ,,new ,,forms ,,of ,,christian ,,education4 ,by ,mrs4 ,humphry ,ward4 ,,contents3 ,vol4 ,i4 ,no4 #c4 ,,the ,,essence ,,of ,,christianity4 ,by ,otto ,pfleiderer4 ,,ecclesiastical ,,impedimenta4 ,by ,j4 ,macbride ,sterrett4 ,,new ,,testament ,,criticism ,,and ,,religious ,,belief4 ,by ,orello ,cone4 ,,thomas ,,paine4 ,by ,john ,w4 ,chadwick4 ,,social ,,betterment4 ,by ,nicholas ,p4 ,gilman4 ,,the ,r,,le ,,of ,,the ,,history ,,of ,,religions ,,in ,,modern ,,religious ,,education4 ,by ,jean ,rville4 ,a ,,poet ,,of ,,his ,,century4 ,by ,e4 ,cavazza4 ,,divine ,,love ,,and ,,intelligence4 ,by ,james ,c4 ,parsons4 ,,book ,,reviews4 ,,summaries ,,of ,,articles4 7,boston3 ,houghton1 ,mifflin1 ,company47 ,,revue ,,philosophique4 ,,contents3 ,june1 #ahib4 ,no4 #aih4 ,,existence ,,et ,d,,veloppement ,,de ,,la ,,volont4 ,i4 ,existence de la ,volont4 ,by ,a4 ,fouille4 ,,sur ,,quelques ,,id,,es ,,du ,,baron ,d',,holbach4 ,by ,a4 ,lalande4 ,,essai ,,sur ,,la ,,philosophie ,,de ,,proudhon4 ,by ,g4 ,sorel4 ,,travaux ,,du ,,laboratoire ,,de ,,psychologie ,,physiologique4 ,,contents3 ,july1 #ahib4 ,no4 #aii4 ,l',,inconnaissable ,,dans ,,la ,,philosophie ,,moderne4 ,by ,g4 ,fonsegrive4 ,,la ,,musique ,d',,apr,s ,,herbert ,,spencer4 ,by ,j4 ,combarieu4 ,,essai ,,sur ,,la ,,philosophie ,,de ,,proudhon 7concluded74 ,by ,g4 ,sorel4 ,,contents3 ,august1 #ahib4 ,no4 #bjj4 ,,tude ,,critique ,,sur ,,le ,,mysticisme ,,moderne4 ,by ,rosenbach4 ,,le ,d,,veloppement ,,de ,,la ,,volont4 ,by ,a4 ,fouille4 ,,la ,,beaut ,,organique3 ,,tude ,d',,analyse ,,esth,,tique4 ,by ,a4 ,naville4 ,,analyses ,,et ,,comptes ,,rendus4 ,according to ,m4 ,fouille1 the principle which tends to dominate psychology and physiology is the ubiquity of will and of feeling1 and consequently of consciousness4 ,psychology will end by recognising the continuity and the transformation of modes of psychical energy1 as physics recognises the continuity and the transformation of modes of physical energy1 and philosophy will see in physical energy the external expression of will4 ,m4 ,fonsegrive maintains that the rejection of metaphysics as science1 which marks the modern theory of the unknowable1 is the consequence of ,kant's a priori theory as to the origin of our knowledge4 ,the laws of the mind have no real existence prior to experience1 and universal and necessary notions can be discovered only by mental analysis4 ,in this manner the existence1 and even the essence1 of metaphysical beings may be known1 but only of such as experience puts in communication with ourselves4 ,thus we know ,god as the necessary first cause1 although our notion of ,god is one of negation1 of experimental notions4 ,after showing that ,spencer's theory of music had numerous antecedents1 and that its conclusions are unacceptable on various grounds1 ,m4 ,combarieu affirms that the secret of the musical art is the identity of the musical idea with the imitation or expression of the real world4 ,all music contains a double verity2 it is the meeting place of the senses and of the rational world confounded in a unity which is the work of art1 as man is the combination of a soul and a body confounded in the real unity of life4 ,spencer is an excessive simplifier1 and does not see the complexity of certain questions1 which he seeks to resolve by undervaluing them4 ,but he has thrown light on one of the aspects of the musical problem4 ,in this final essay on the philosophy of ,proudhon1 ,m4 ,sorel considers the theory of justice by the light of the notion of free will4 ,he differs somewhat from ,proudhon1 and affirms that 8the just man is the upright man such as our ideal conception of antiquity represents him to us1 but transformed by our consciousness as refined by the influence of ,christianity40 ,in dealing with the real organisation of societies it is necessary to distinguish between matters of justice and those of right1 which includes that of force1 of which war is an application4 ,after showing the connection of the economic contradictions of ,proudhon with the state of war1 and the value of education for the realisation of equilibrium in the state4 ,m4 ,sorel affirms that education ought to be based on manual labor1 for the explanation of which science should be taught2 and that instruction should endure throughout life1 so that men can elevate themselves and that an equilibrium may be obtained between knowledge and industrial needs4 7,paris3 ,flix ,alcan47 4 ,,appendix4 ,,plates ,,belonging ,,to ,,the ,,article 8,,the ,,nervous ,,ganglia ,,of ,,insects40 ,,key ,,to ,,the ,,plates4 col4 ven4--ventral column4 lob4 dors4--dorsal lobe4 lob4 ven4--ventral lobe4 lob4 v4 inf4--inferior or lower ventral lobule4 lob4 cr4--crural lobule4 con4 dors4 sup--superior 7or upper7 dorsal connective filaments4 con4 dors4 moy4--medial dorsal connective filaments4 con4 dors4 inf4--inferior 7or lower7 dorsal connective filaments4 con4 v4--ventral connective filaments4 n4 cr4--crural nerve4 n4 al4--alary nerve4 lob4 al4--alary lobule4 rac4 sup--upper 7or superior7 root4 rac4 moy4--medial root4 rac4 inf4--lower 7or inferior7 root4 fa4 as4--ascending fasciculus4 ,illustration3 ,,plate ,i4 ,rhizotrogus solstitialis4 ,first thoracic ganglion4 7,horizontal sections47 ,illustration3 ,,plate ,,ii4 ,rhizotrogus solstitialis4 ,first thoracic ganglion4 7,horizontal sections47 ,illustration3 ,,plate ,,iii4 ,rhizotrogus solstitialis4 ,first thoracic ganglion4 7,longitudinal sections47 ,illustration3 ,,plate ,,iv4 ,rhizotrogus solstitialis4 ,first thoracic ganglion4 7,transversal sections47 ,,vol4 ,,iii4 ,,january1 #ahic4 ,,no4 #b4 ,,the ,,monist4 ,,the ,,doctrine ,,of ,,auta4 ,in the 8,scientific ,proceedings of the ,royal ,dublin ,society0 7,vol4 ,,vi1 ,part ,,ix1 p4 #dge1 #ahij71 ,dr4 ,johnstone ,stoney1 ,f4 ,r4 ,s41 published an interesting and carefully-reasoned paper 8,on the ,relation between ,natural ,science and ,ontology40 ,the same author had previously 7#ahhe71 in a ,friday evening discourse at the ,royal ,institution of ,london1 discussed the problem1 8,how ,thought ,presents ,itself ,among the ,phenomena of ,nature40 ,dr4 ,stoney's communications have not 7,i venture to think7 received the consideration to which they are entitled alike on the score of their logical consistency1 if his premisses and assumptions be granted1 and by reason of the author's scientific eminence as a physicist4 ,i therefore propose1 first1 to endeavor to set forth his monistic ,doctrine of ,auta2 and secondly1 to offer some criticisms thereon4 ,unfortunately ,dr4 ,stoney's pages bristle with new technical terms1 which1 though no doubt they have been serviceable to him in the attainment of precision of thought1 make his paper hard reading4 ,some of these ,i shall introduce2 others which seem less essential to the argument ,i shall omit4 ,it would be scarcely fair on the reader's teeth or on the author's store to transfer all these hard nuts from ,dublin to ,chicago4 ,no philosophical discussion of a problem involving perception can be regarded as complete without the introduction of an orange4 ,dr4 ,stoney1 indeed1 substitutes a fire2 but this1 though it shows philosophical independence1 cannot for a moment be sanctioned by any good ,berkeleyan4 ,an orange then1 as such1 is a phenomenal object formed1 in a way we need not now consider1 by the synthesis of perceptions4 ,these perceptions1 themselves synthetic1 ,dr4 ,stoney calls 8tekmeria10 since they are signs within my mind that events are happening in a part of the universe that is distinct from my mind4 ,the phenomenal object is supposed by men untrained in inquiries relating to the mind to have a non-egoistic existence--that is1 an existence independent of the percipient mind4 ,but this supposition is found on careful scrutiny to be an error4 ,it is a product of mental synthesis1 and is therefore termed by ,dr4 ,stoney a 8syntheton40 ,it is also termed a 8protheton0 in contradistinction to an 8antitheton10 which we shall come to shortly4 ,now if the phenomenal orange is a 8syntheton0--that is1 a product of perceptual synthesis--it clearly cannot be regarded as the cause of the perceptions1 through and by means of which it is constructed in mental synthesis4 ,here popular thought and ordinary language are apt to mislead us4 ,for ordinary language is throughout built upon the popular belief that the objects of the phenomenal world are non-egoistic or independent existences1 and1 moreover1 that they are the cause of the perceptions which come into existence when we exercise our senses4 ,this is1 however1 8to put the car before the horse40 ,it is to imagine that a structure built up out of the effects of a thing can be the cause of those effects4 ,the phenomenal orange is built up of perceptions instead of being the cause of them4 ,their cause is therefore to be sought elsewhere than in the phenomenal world of objects4 ,the orange1 qua orange1 is therefore a 8syntheton10 and cannot as such be the cause of the perceptions or 8tekmeria10 which go to its synthesis4 ,let us now look at these perceptions or 8tekmeria0 from another point of view4 ,they are states of consciousness3 they are thoughts1 if we use this word in its widest extension to embrace everything of which ,i or my fellow-men or the lower animals are conscious4 ,but my own thoughts are1 so long as they last1 things that exist4 ,they may be representative of something outside me1 but they are also real existences4 ,while they last they constitute a part of the universe of existing things4 ,they are1 in ,dr4 ,stoney's terminology1 auta 7 71 the very things themselves4 ,an auto 7we shall throughout italicise all that belongs to this autic order of existence7 is a thing which really exists1 and in no wise depends on the way we1 human minds1 may happen to regard it4 ,our impressions or beliefs about it may be correct or may be erroneous2 but the term auto means the thing itself4 ,perceptions1 then1 inasmuch as they are thoughts1 are auta4 ,they belong1 moreover1 to that class of real existences which1 since they are woven into the tissue of minds 7my mind and the minds of my fellow-men and of the lower animals7 are termed egoistic auta4 ,they do not remain1 however1 persistent and unchanged2 for perceptions come and go and are modified as they pass like waves over the surface of consciousness4 ,what causes this coming and going1 and these changes in the egoistic auta we call perceptions8 ,not1 as we have already seen1 the world of phenomenal objects6 ,what then1 but other auta1 which1 since they produce effects upon men's minds through their senses1 may be termed sense-compelling auta8 ,the phenomenal orange is thus a 8syntheton0 produced through a synthesis of the effects wrought upon my mind by an autic existence1 called by ,mr4 ,stoney the onto-orange4 ,the phenomenal orange is1 as we have seen1 a 8protheton02 the onto-orange is its antitheton in the universe of real existences4 ,we are now beginning to open up ,dr4 ,johnstone ,stoney's conception of the relation of the autic universe to phenomenal ,nature4 ,nature is the totality of phenomenal objects2 but corresponding with each phenomenal object or 8protheton0 there is an onto-object or antitheton2 and the totality of antitheta constitute the universe4 ,minds1 mine and those of other beings1 constitute the egoistic part of the universe2 the rest of the universe is constituted by sense-compelling auta4 ,we may liken the sense-compelling universe to a great machine in motion1 and the tekmeria or perceptions which it produces within our minds to shadows cast by it4 ,the laws of the movements of the machine are the real laws of the universe--laws of nature are but the laws of the changes which the shadows in consequence undergo4 ,it is these shadow laws alone which natural science can reach3 the real laws of the universe of which these are shadows are beyond its grasp4 ,in ,nature the reflective eye of science sees not only phenomenal objects1 but the relations which they bear to each other4 ,but such relations are themselves phenomenal2 they are protheta of which the onto-relations of the real universe are the antitheta4 ,every space-relation1 therefore1 in ,nature--for instance1 that my foot is at present three yards from the fender--has a real autic relation in the sense-compelling universe1 which is its antitheton2 an onto-relation between the onto-foot and onto-fender1 meaning by these terms the auta which send men the tekmeria which1 when synthesised1 furnish these two phenomenal objects4 ,the space-relations of ,nature are but the shadows cast by the autic relations within the minds of men1 and perhaps some other animals4 ,but among these shadows there can be no efficient causation4 ,when a change takes place in the sense-compelling universe1 the mighty machine will cast one shadow before the change and another after4 ,the second shadow will accordingly succeed the first in orderly sequence1 but the relation between the shadows is not the relation of cause and effect4 ,accordingly1 in the laws of ,nature which have been discovered by scientific investigation1 we find abundant instances of unfailingly concomitant events and of uniformities of sequence1 but not one single instance of cause and effect4 ,there is nothing competent to cause one body to exclude another from the space it occupies4 ,a statement of the fact is one of the laws of ,nature4 ,if a stone be allowed to drop in the vicinity of the earth1 its downward speed is accelerated by a perfectly definite law4 ,this law is one of the ,uniformities of ,nature which scientific inquiry has brought to light4 ,but within the domain of ,physics there is no cause of acceleration4 ,the facts as to what occurs in ,nature can be observed2 the circumstances under which they occur can be investigated2 similar cases can be compared2 and the laws to which the simultaneous or successive events conform may be brought to light4 ,but here our knowledge ends4 ,physical science has said its utmost4 ,now all this is changed when we turn to the only field of observation accessible to us in which we are dealing directly with auta4 ,the thoughts of which ,i consist1 the thoughts which are my mind1 are auta2 a very small group of auta1 no doubt1 in the mighty ,universe1 but still an actual sample1 though a very special and one-sided sample of what auta really are4 ,now in the operations that go on in my mind ,i do find instances1 some few instances1 of causes producing effects4 ,the familiar case of a geometrical demonstration producing in a man's mind a belief in the truth of the conclusion is a case in point4 ,here the understanding of the proof is the efficient cause of the belief in the conclusion which accompanies that understanding4 ,a wish to accomplish something1 and a knowledge of how to go about it1 both of which are thoughts in the mind1 are a part of the efficient cause of subsequent events1 unless counteracted by other causes4 ,a few other examples can be obtained from the same small field of observation2 and this is all that man1 in his isolated position1 has any right to expect2 for the bulk of his thoughts are due1 at least in large part1 to autic causes which lie outside his mind1 and it is there also that those of his thoughts that are known to be causes1 usually exhibit their effects4 ,when perceptions arise in my mind1 the effect indeed is within my mind1 but the cause is beyond it2 and when ,i move my muscles the cause is within my mind1 but it is outside the mind that it operates4 ,the instances are indeed few where the causes and the effects are both within my tiny group of auta1 and it is only in these cases that ,i can have the process of causes producing effects under my inspection4 ,but since cases can be cited1 however few1 they suffice to establish the fact that the relation of cause and effect1 in its full sense1 does exist in some instances in the autic universe2 whereas it has nowhere any place within the domain of physical science4 ,the relation of cause and effect among other auta cannot from the nature of the case be proved4 ,but from its occurrence in that small part of the universe which we do know1 we may fairly assume its occurrence in all parts of that universe4 ,such an assumption is at any rate justifiable by scientific method4 ,we must now pass to another point4 ,the scientific analysis of ,nature by the physicist has led to an hypothesis which may be regarded as the utmost simplification of which the shadows cast within the human mind by the sense-compelling autic universe are susceptible4 ,this ,dr4 ,stoney calls the ,diacrinomenal ,hypothesis2 according to which ,nature is made up of objects each of which consists of almost inconceivably minute and swift motions4 ,the phenomenal orange is a group of molecular motions2 and if ,i bowl it across the table the visible molar motion is a secondary motion of that group of primary molecular motions which constitutes the phenomenal object as such4 ,and not only is the phenomenal object a group of minute and swift motions1 but all the steps between that object and our brain1 all that takes place in the air or ther1 in our organs of sense and nerves1 can also be represented in terms of motion4 ,and finally a change consisting of motions takes place in the brain itself1 whereupon we become conscious of thought4 ,that change which would be appreciated as motions by a bystander who could search into our brains while we are thinking1 we should experience to be thought4 ,thus we find that in certain cases the autic existence that corresponds with motion1 namely in the motions of our own brain molecules1 is thought4 ,and the most probable hypothesis as to the true relation of phenomenal ,nature and the autic universe is that what we have found to be true in some cases is always true1 and that in every case it is thought 7or rather a change in the causal relation in which thought stands to thought7 which is the antitheton of motion2 so that the totality of all actual existences1 the universe1 is in fact identical with the totality of existing thought4 ,of course all this thought1 with the exception of that tiny group that is my mind1 is as much outside my consciousness as are the thoughts of my fellow-men and of the lower animals4 ,under this view the minds of men and of other animals are specialised specks1 as it were1 of a vast ocean of thought1 to which they bear a like inconspicuous proportion to that borne by the few brain motions of which they are the antitheta1 to the totality of motions throughout ,nature4 ,under this view the laws of the universe are the laws of thought4 ,this is a very different thing1 be it noted1 from saying that they are the laws of human thought4 ,the laws of human thought bear to them the same small proportion which the laws of the action of the wheels of a watch upon one another bear to the entire science of dynamics4 ,the science of dynamics could never be evolved from a study of these laws4 ,but perhaps it may not be hopeless for man to attain some sound knowledge of the laws of cosmic thought1 inasmuch as we have some few instances of the way thought acts upon thought open to our investigation in our own minds1 and since this is supplemented by our knowledge of the physical laws of nature1 which are a shadow1 a probably complete shadow1 of all the laws of causation which operate throughout the universe1 throughout the all-embracing ,mind of the great ,autos4 ,such is ,dr4 ,johnstone ,stoney's conception of the relation of ,natural ,science to ,ontology4 ,i have presented it partly in his own words1 partly in mine4 ,it has been my conscientious endeavor to put it in as strong and favorable a light as possible1 and not in any way to weaken the strength of its logical consistency4 ,the main thesis may now be briefly summarised in the following propositions3 ,the phenomenal object is a syntheton or product of mental synthesis4 ,its efficient cause is a real existence or antitheton4 ,nature is the totality of phenomenal syntheta4 ,the universe is the totality of autic antitheta4 ,there is no causation in ,nature2 but the ,uniformities of ,nature are the shadows of the causal ,laws of the ,universe4 ,thought has no place in ,nature3 it is part of the autic universe4 ,the syntheton of which thought is the antitheton is the motion of brain molecules4 ,it is a probable hypothesis that the antitheta of which the motions of ,diacrinomenal ,nature are the syntheta1 are thought4 ,this is the monistic hypothesis1 that there is but one kind of existing thing1 viz4 thought2 in contradistinction to the dualistic hypothesis that there are two kinds of existing things1 thought and motion4 ,i now pass from the attitude of expositor to the attitude of critic4 ,and first ,i will attack a quite outstanding position1 namely ,dr4 ,stoney's assumption that ,clifford's hypothesis which he supports and extends is the monistic hypothesis1 and by implication that it is the only monistic hypothesis4 ,in opposition to this ,i venture to affirm that there are several forms or phases of monism4 ,i have not space to discuss the matter2 and must content myself with a bare enumeration of some of the logically possible forms of ,dualism and of ,monism4 #a7 ,,dualism4 ,a4 ,synthetic ,dualism3 according to which there are two entities1 the mind and the body2 and these a7 either work side by side1 without interaction1 in pre-established harmony 7philosophic dualism71 b7 or interact the one on the other 7empirical dualism74 ,b4 ,analytic ,dualism3 according to which there are two elements as the result of analysis2 motion 7with or without a material basis7 and consciousness2 the two elements being related in such a way that consciousness is inseparably associated with certain complex modes of motion4 #b7 ,,monism4 ,a4 ,synthetic monism3 according to which there is but one entity4 ,and this entity may be3 a7 ,the body1 of which consciousness is a product 7materialistic or physical monism72 b7 ,the mind1 of which the body in common with the world of phenomena is a fiction 7idealistic monism72 c7 ,the conscious organism1 exhibiting certain transformations of energy which are felt as psychical states 7scientific monism74 ,b4 ,analytic monism3 according to which analysis discloses but one element2 and this may be a7 motion1 of which 7or of one phase of which7 consciousness is merely the psychical aspect 7analytic materialism72 b7 consciousness1 of which motion is merely the phenomenal aspect 7analytic psychism72 c7 x 7the unknowable7 of which motion is the physical aspect and consciousness the psychical aspect 7monistic agnosticism74 ,such are some of the forms or phases of monism as compared with those of dualism4 ,it will be seen that ,dr4 ,johnstone ,stoney's speculations fall under the head of what ,i have termed analytic psychism1 according to which the sole ultimate reality disclosed by analysis is consciousness or thought4 ,so far ,i have only reminded my readers that this1 though one form of monism1 is not the only form4 ,to which ,dr4 ,stoney may very possibly reply that it matters not to him whether there are five or fifty-and-five monistic heresies besides the true creed of which he is the prophet4 ,he is only concerned with the establishment of the true monistic faith4 ,and as herein ,i should very heartily agree with him1 ,i will pass on without delay to criticise an assumption that lies close to the heart and centre of his hypothesis4 ,on the first page of ,dr4 ,stoney's essay we read3 8,let us1 for convenience1 call these real existences auta--the very things themselves4 ,an auto is a thing that really exists1 and in no wise depends on the way we1 human minds1 may happen to regard it40 ,and on the second page we read3 8,my own thoughts are1 at all events1 things that exist3 they at least are auta so long as they last4 ,they are1 accordingly1 while they last1 a part of the universe of existing things40 ,no proof is offered of this latter assumption that my thought1 human thought1 is part of the universe of auta4 ,i venture to call this assumption in question4 ,i demand proof of its validity4 ,nay1 ,i am ready to go further and roundly assert that my thoughts are not auta1 and furnish no evidence whatever as to the nature of such auta4 ,i am quite aware that ,i may seem to be giving the lie to a direct deliverance of consciousness2 and that it will be said that it is obviously impossible to deny the existence of thought without at the same time exercising that1 the existence of which is denied--a dictum which contains a very pretty play upon two different uses of the word 8existence40 ,i go back to the orange1 without which as a philosopher ,i am lost4 ,i hold it in my hand1 look steadfastly at it1 and drink in with my nostrils its fragrant aroma4 ,what says consciousness8 ,that the phenomenal object ,i call an orange exists4 ,it says nothing about independent existence1 nothing about auta4 ,the direct deliverance of consciousness is that an object-in-consciousness exists4 ,if a 8plain man0 says that the orange has a real existence1 as such1 independent of consciousness1 he is going beyond the direct deliverance4 ,and if a philosopher says that consciousness has a real existence1 as such1 independent of the object1 he too is going beyond the direct deliverance4 ,and if1 as would seem to be the case1 ,dr4 ,stoney relies on the deliverance of consciousness for the justification of his statement that 8perceptions1 while they last1 are auta1 real existences10 ,i submit that he is relying on a misinterpretation of the deliverance of consciousness4 ,the existence of the object-in-consciousness is the datum from which plain man and philosopher alike must start4 ,on this foundation we must base all our reasonings and speculations4 ,physical science directs its attention to the 8object0 side of the given relation4 ,and it reaches its 8diacrinomenal0 result that the orange may for physical purposes be represented as a group of swift and rapid molecular motions4 ,but can physics at any stage of its analysis shake itself free from the 8consciousness0 side of the relation8 ,assuredly not4 ,all that it can do is to represent the object-in-consciousness we call an orange in terms of other objects-in-consciousness we term molecular motions4 ,psychology directs its attention to the 8consciousness0 side of the given relation4 ,it analyses the object-in-consciousness into percepts1 sensations1 and so forth4 ,but can psychology at any stage of its analysis shake itself free from the 8object0 side of the relation8 ,assuredly not4 ,all that it can do is to represent the consciousness-of-the-object we call an orange1 in terms of the objects-in-consciousness we term sensations1 relations between sensations1 and so forth4 ,the relation of the consciousness-of-an-object to the object-in-consciousness may be made clear by the analogy1 which is something more than an analogy of vision and the visual field4 ,for clear and distinct vision1 a well-illuminated object of vision1 and a healthy organ of vision are necessary as coperating factors4 ,so1 too1 for distinct consciousness a definite object-in-consciousness and a well-defined consciousness-of-the-object are necessary as coperating factors4 ,more than this4 ,unless there be some object of vision1 however vague1 and some organ of vision1 however dim1 no vision at all is possible4 ,the coperation of the two factors is essential4 ,so1 too1 unless there be some object-in-consciousness1 however vague1 and some consciousness-of-the-object1 however dim1 no consciousness at all1 in anything like the human sense of the word 8consciousness10 is possible4 ,here1 again1 the coperation of the two factors is essential4 ,and neither factor is ever given in experience without the other4 ,writing as ,i am1 for readers of ,the ,monist1 ,i need hardly turn aside to explain what ,i mean by an object-in-consciousness4 ,and yet perhaps a few words on the subject may not be out of place1 and may prevent possible misunderstanding4 ,an object-in-consciousness is not necessarily a tangible1 visible object1 like an orange4 ,the yellowness1 the sweetness1 the weight1 the bare existence of the orange1 may each in turn be an object in consciousness4 ,for the physicist the tangible orange may be represented in terms of swift1 infinitesimal motions2 and these1 not less than the phenomenal orange1 are objects in consciousness4 ,a conception of consciousness itself1 an imperfect conception1 but the best we can frame1 may be an object of consciousness1 just as a reflected image of the eye may be to the eye an object of vision4 ,it is generally believed by modern psychologists that all objects-in-consciousness are derivable by processes of abstraction1 generalisation1 and so forth1 from the primitive datum of a perceptual object4 ,and it must be remembered that it is only in abstraction that we distinguish between the object-in-consciousness and the consciousness-of-the-object4 ,the two terms of this1 for us1 inevitable relation are given in inseparable cordination4 ,but in abstract thought we can distinguish the inseparable terms2 distinguish in thought1 that is to say1 what is inseparable in actual experience4 ,to continue the analogy of vision1 we can make the one term focal1 while the other term remains marginal in the field of view4 ,and we can neglect1 for the purposes of our thought and reason1 the marginal term4 ,but we cannot get rid of it4 ,we may deal1 as in physics1 with motion1 neglecting the consciousness in and through which it is appreciated2 but we cannot get rid of this consciousness4 ,or we can deal1 as in psychology1 with the consciousness1 neglecting the object-in-consciousness2 but we cannot get rid of this object4 ,the object-out-of-consciousness and the consciousness-without-an-object1 are alike unknown--or1 if the reader prefers it1 unknowable1 which he may write with as many capital letters as seemeth to him good4 ,the common-sense realist believes in the existence of objects-out-of-consciousness4 ,the analytical psychist believes in the existence of consciousness-without-an-object4 ,both are1 if the views here advocated be sound1 attributing independent existence to that which1 so far as human knowledge is concerned1 has only dependent or relative existence4 ,it is unfortunate that the terms 8real0 and 8reality0 should ever have been applied to the independent existence of so-called things-in-themselves4 ,i think such terms as ,dr4 ,stoney's 8autic0 and 8autic existence0 would be far preferable4 ,for the word 8real0 has a meaning and force which is quite definite4 ,the orange that ,i hold in my hand and see with my eyes is as real as real can be4 ,and if a philosopher steps in and says1 8,my dear sir1 that is not real6 ,the real reality is1 according to some1 mind-stuff or consciousness2 according to others1 motion of--well ,i don't quite know what1 so let us simply call it motion2 and according to others this real reality is unknowable0--,i say if a philosopher steps in and talks like this1 one is reminded of ,lamb's remark on ,coleridge4 ,coleridge had been maundering on1 as was his wont1 on 8subject0 and 8object0 and all the rest of his second-hand ,german metaphysics1 when ,lamb broke in1 with his forcible stammer1 in a stage whisper3 8,n-n-n-never mind ,c-c-c-coleridge2 it's only his f-f-f-fun40 ,i repeat that the orange ,i hold in my hand and see with my eyes is as real as real can be2 and that we have here the standard and criterion of reality not only for plain men but for philosophers4 ,in the perceptual object we have reality given in its clearest1 fullest1 and most forcible form4 ,every step in the analysis of the perceptual object-in-consciousness2 every step in the analysis of the consciousness-of-the-object takes us so far further from reality at its best4 ,the orange as an object-in-consciousness is far more real to me than either the swift infinitesimal motions of the physicist1 or the 8syntheton0 of related and integrated sensations of the psychologist4 ,and when we reach the autic existence which is supposed to underlie both motion and consciousness1 we seem to get just as far as it is possible for the human mind to get from the real orange with which we started4 ,and yet it is to this autic existence that metaphysicians apply the term 8real0 in a different sense4 ,for so far ,i have used the word 8real0 for that which is given in experience4 ,but metaphysically the word 8real0 is used to indicate independence of experience4 ,i repeat that for this independent existence some such word as ,dr4 ,stoney's 8autic0 would be far better and less misleading4 ,it would emphasise the distinction between real1 that is to say given in direct experience1 and autic1 that is to say independent of experience4 ,accepting at any rate for our present purpose this distinction1 we have as cordinate realities the object-in-consciousness and the consciousness-of-the-object4 ,and these two are only different aspects of the one great reality1 the reality of experience4 ,of these two aspects neither is more real than the other4 ,the object-in-consciousness is every bit as real as the consciousness-of-the-object2 the orange as real as our perception thereof4 ,both are intensely and vitally real2 but--here ,i am in opposition to ,dr4 ,stoney--neither is autic4 ,i can find no warranty for such autic existence in direct experience or the so-called deliverance of consciousness4 ,nor am ,i aware of any process of reasoning by which it can be demonstrated4 ,but1 it may be said1 is it not in accordance with scientific method to make an assumption and then see how far such assumption is justified by the results it enables us to reach8 ,assuredly such procedure is allowable and often fruitful4 ,it is not on such grounds1 however1 that ,dr4 ,stoney1 if ,i rightly understand him1 bases his doctrine of the psychical nature of auta4 ,let us1 nevertheless1 pay a moment's attention to this assumption and the correlative assumption of analytic materialism4 ,consciousness and matter-in-motion 7or bare motion perhaps7 are the ultimate elements reached by the psychologist on the one hand and the physicist on the other4 ,neither1 if he knows his business1 pretends by this analysis to have reached autic existence4 ,but it is open to each to make an assumption4 ,the materialist says3 ,i assume that motion is the true autic existence1 of which1 under appropriate conditions1 human consciousness is merely a psychical aspect4 ,the psychist says3 ,i assume that consciousness is the true autic existence1 of which motion is merely the phenomenal aspect4 ,i confess that if ,i were forced to choose one of these two1 7which fortunately ,i am not17 ,i should elect to throw in my lot with the materialists4 ,for if justification by results is to be the criterion1 ,i hold that the results the materialists have to show far outweigh any results which the analytic psychists can produce4 ,but the fact of the matter is that in neither case do the results flow from the autic assumption4 ,all the results are equally valid for the student who holds fast to the relativity of object-in-consciousness to consciousness-of-the-object4 ,since therefore the assumption is valueless so far as practical results are concerned1 and since it is somewhat repugnant to sound reason to assume that either term of a given relationship is the same out of relationship as it is in relation to its fellow1 ,i contend1 as against both materialist and psychist1 that it fails to make good its claim to acceptance4 ,what shall we say then of auta or things in themselves8 ,simply that we do not know anything about them--that they are outside the pale of human knowledge4 ,if we even say they exist we are using the word 8exist0 in an autic and unreal sense4 ,it is phenomenal ,nature which constitutes the real ,universe2 of its autic shadow1 supposing that there be such a shadow1 we know nothing4 ,need we then stay to criticise this unknown shadow8 ,even if we take ,dr4 ,johnstone ,stoney's hypothesis as it stands we find a marked distinction between the sense-compelling auta and the egoistic auta1 or between the sense-compelling aspect of auta and the egoistic or perceptive aspect4 ,how is this distinction to be explained and accounted for8 ,i can see no answer to this question save that the distinction is a matter of experience4 ,why not1 then1 trust experience fully8 ,why go beyond it at all8 ,why not say that both the sense-compelling aspect and the perceptive aspect are part of the relation which is given in experience8 ,if ,dr4 ,stoney could only see his way to this concession and could be led to adopt scientific monism1 which is based on relativity1 he would still secure all that is valuable in his hypothesis1 and at the same time get rid of the difficulties which as it stands encumber it4 ,but it would no longer be a doctrine of auta4 ,for scientific monism is not a doctrine of auta but a doctrine of phenomena--phenomena regarded not only in their physical but also in their psychological aspect4 ,unifying these two diverse aspects1 it contends that the conscious organism is one and indivisible2 that it is a product of evolution2 that in its physical or material aspect this evolution has given rise to the body and brain2 that in its psychical or immaterial aspect it has given rise to the mind and human consciousness2 that these two aspects1 though distinguishable in analytic thought1 are inseparable in phenomenal existence2 that just as the complex modes of energy of the human brain have been evolved from the simpler modes of energy that are found throughout organic and inorganic nature1 so too the complex modes of consciousness of the human mind have been evolved from the simpler modes of infra-consciousness#ai that are associated with merely organic and inorganic modes of energy4 ,the last clause is admittedly hypothetical4 ,but it is submitted that the hypothesis is one that is founded on strictly scientific and in no sense metaphysical or autic analysis4 ,c4 ,,lloyd ,,morgan4 ,,footnotes3 #ai ,see ,mental ,evolution in ,the ,monist1 ,vol4 ,,ii1 ,no4 #b 7,jan4 #ahib71 p4 #afa4 ,,evolutionary ,,love4 ,,at ,,first ,,blush4 ,,counter-,,gospels4 ,philosophy1 when just escaping from its golden pupa-skin1 mythology1 proclaimed the great evolutionary agency of the universe to be ,love4 ,or1 since this pirate-lingo1 ,english1 is poor in such-like words1 let us say ,eros1 the exuberance-love4 ,afterwards1 ,empedocles set up passionate-love and hate as the two cordinate powers of the universe4 ,in some passages1 kindness is the word4 ,but certainly1 in any sense in which it has an opposite1 to be senior partner of that opposite1 is the highest position that love can attain4 ,nevertheless1 the ontological gospeller1 in whose days those views were familiar topics1 made the ,one ,supreme ,being1 by whom all things have been made out of nothing1 to be cherishing-love4 ,what1 then1 can he say to hate8 ,never mind1 at this time1 what the scribe of the apocalypse1 if he were ,john1 stung at length by persecution into a rage unable to distinguish suggestions of evil from visions of heaven1 and so become the ,slanderer of ,god to men1 may have dreamed4 ,the question is rather what the sane ,john thought1 or ought to have thought1 in order to carry out his idea consistently4 ,his statement that ,god is love seems aimed at that saying of ,ecclesiastes that we cannot tell whether ,god bears us love or hatred4 8,nay10 says ,john1 8we can tell1 and very simply6 ,we know and have trusted the love which ,god hath in us4 ,god is love40 ,there is no logic in this1 unless it means1 that ,god loves all men4 ,in the preceding paragraph1 he had said1 8,god is light and in him is no darkness at all40 ,we are to understand1 then1 that as darkness is merely the defect of light1 so hatred and evil are mere imperfect stages of and 1 love and loveliness4 ,this concords with that utterance reported in ,john's ,gospel3 8,god sent not the ,son into the world to judge the world2 but that the world should through him be saved4 ,he that believeth on him is not judged3 he that believeth not hath been judged already4444 ,and this is the judgment1 that the light is come into the world1 and that men loved darkness rather than the light40 ,that is to say1 ,god visits no punishment on them2 they punish themselves1 by their natural affinity for the defective4 ,thus1 the love that ,god is1 is not a love of which hatred is the contrary2 otherwise ,satan would be a cordinate power2 but it is a love which embraces hatred as an imperfect stage of it1 an ,anteros--yea1 even needs hatred and hatefulness as its object4 ,for self-love is no love2 so if ,god's self is love1 that which he loves must be defect of love2 just as a luminary can light up only that which otherwise would be dark4 ,henry ,james1 the ,swedenborgian1 says3 8,it is no doubt very tolerable finite or creaturely love to love one's own in another1 to love another for his conformity to one's self3 but nothing can be in more flagrant contrast with the creative ,love1 all whose tenderness ex vi termini must be reserved only for what intrinsically is most bitterly hostile and negative to itself40 ,this is from 8,substance and ,shadow3 an ,essay on the ,physics of ,creation40 ,it is a pity he had not filled his pages with things like this1 as he was able easily to do1 instead of scolding at his reader and at people generally1 until the physics of creation was well-nigh forgot4 ,i must deduct1 however1 from what ,i just wrote3 obviously no genius could make his every sentence as sublime as one which discloses for the problem of evil its everlasting solution4 ,the movement of love is circular1 at one and the same impulse projecting creations into independency and drawing them into harmony4 ,this seems complicated when stated so2 but it is fully summed up in the simple formula we call the ,golden ,rule4 ,this does not1 of course1 say1 ,do everything possible to gratify the egoistic impulses of others1 but it says1 ,sacrifice your own perfection to the perfectionment of your neighbor4 ,nor must it for a moment be confounded with the ,benthamite1 or ,helvetian1 or ,beccarian motto1 ,act for the greatest good of the greatest number4 ,love is not directed to abstractions but to persons2 not to persons we do not know1 nor to numbers of people1 but to our own dear ones1 our family and neighbors4 8,our neighbor10 we remember1 is one whom we live near1 not locally perhaps1 but in life and feeling4 ,everybody can see that the statement of ,st4 ,john is the formula of an evolutionary philosophy1 which teaches that growth comes only from love1 from--,i will not say self-sacrifice1 but from the ardent impulse to fulfil another's highest impulse4 ,suppose1 for example1 that ,i have an idea that interests me4 ,it is my creation4 ,it is my creature2 for as shown in last ,july's ,monist1 it is a little person4 ,i love it2 and ,i will sink myself in perfecting it4 ,it is not by dealing out cold justice to the circle of my ideas that ,i can make them grow1 but by cherishing and tending them as ,i would the flowers in my garden4 ,the philosophy we draw from ,john's gospel is that this is the way mind develops2 and as for the cosmos1 only so far as it yet is mind1 and so has life1 is it capable of further evolution4 ,love1 recognising germs of loveliness in the hateful1 gradually warms it into life1 and makes it lovely4 ,that is the sort of evolution which every careful student of my essay 8,the ,law of ,mind10 must see that synechism calls for4 ,the nineteenth century is now fast sinking into the grave1 and we all begin to review its doings and to think what character it is destined to bear as compared with other centuries in the minds of future historians4 ,it will be called1 ,i guess1 the ,economical ,century2 for political economy has more direct relations with all the branches of its activity than has any other science4 ,well1 political economy has its formula of redemption1 too4 ,it is this3 ,intelligence in the service of greed ensures the justest prices1 the fairest contracts1 the most enlightened conduct of all the dealings between men1 and leads to the summum bonum1 food in plenty and perfect comfort4 ,food for whom8 ,why1 for the greedy master of intelligence4 ,i do not mean to say that this is one of the legitimate conclusions of political economy1 the scientific character of which ,i fully acknowledge4 ,but the study of doctrines1 themselves true1 will often temporarily encourage generalisations extremely false1 as the study of physics has encouraged necessitarianism4 ,what ,i say1 then1 is that the great attention paid to economical questions1 during our century has induced an exaggeration of the beneficial effects of greed and of the unfortunate results of sentiment1 until there has resulted a philosophy which comes unwittingly to this1 that greed is the great agent in the elevation of the human race and in the evolution of the universe4 ,i open a handbook of political economy1--the most typical and middling one ,i have at hand1--and there find some remarks of which ,i will here make a brief analysis4 ,i omit qualifications1 sops thrown to ,cerberus1 phrases to placate ,christian prejudice1 trappings which serve to hide from author and reader alike the ugly nakedness of the greed-god4 ,but ,i have surveyed my position4 ,the author enumerates 8three motives to human action3 ,the love of self2 ,the love of a limited class having common interests and feelings with one's self2 ,the love of mankind at large40 ,remark1 at the outset1 what obsequious title is bestowed on greed1--8the love of self40 ,love6 ,the second motive is love4 ,in place of 8a limited class0 put 8certain persons10 and you have a fair description4 ,taking 8class0 in the old-fashioned sense1 a weak kind of love is described4 ,in the sequel1 there seems to be some haziness as to the delimitation of this motive4 ,by the love of mankind at large1 the author does not mean that deep1 subconscious passion that is properly so called2 but merely public-spirit1 perhaps little more than a fidget about pushing ideas4 ,the author proceeds to a comparative estimate of the worth of these motives4 ,greed1 says he1 but using1 of course1 another word1 8is not so great an evil as is commonly supposed4444 ,every man can promote his own interests a great deal more effectively than he can promote any one else's1 or than any one else can promote his40 ,besides1 as he remarks on another page1 the more miserly a man is1 the more good he does4 ,the second motive 8is the most dangerous one to which society is exposed40 ,love is all very pretty3 8no higher or purer source of human happiness exists40 7,ahem67 ,but it is a 8source of enduring injury10 and1 in short1 should be overruled by something wiser4 ,what is this wiser motive8 ,we shall see4 ,as for public spirit1 it is rendered nugatory by the 8difficulties in the way of its effective operation40 ,for example1 it might suggest putting checks upon the fecundity of the poor and the vicious2 and 8no measure of repression would be too severe10 in the case of criminals4 ,the hint is broad4 ,but unfortunately1 you cannot induce legislatures to take such measures1 owing to the pestiferous 8tender sentiments of man towards man40 ,it thus appears1 that public-spirit1 or ,benthamism1 is not strong enough to be the effective tutor of love1 7,i am skipping to another page17 which must therefore be handed over to 8the motives which animate men in the pursuit of wealth10 in which alone we can confide1 and which 8are in the highest degree beneficent40#bj ,yes1 in the 8highest degree0 without exception are they beneficent to the being upon whom all their blessings are poured out1 namely1 the ,self1 whose 8sole object10 says the writer in accumulating wealth is his individual 8sustenance and enjoyment40 ,plainly1 the author holds the notion that some other motive might be in a higher degree beneficent even for the man's self to be a paradox wanting in good sense4 ,he seeks to gloze and modify his doctrine2 but he lets the perspicacious reader see what his animating principle is2 and when1 holding the opinions ,i have repeated1 he at the same time acknowledges that society could not exist upon a basis of intelligent greed alone1 he simply pigeonholes himself as one of the eclectics of inharmonious opinions4 ,he wants his mammon flavored with a soupon of god4 ,the economists accuse those to whom the enunciation of their atrocious villainies communicates a thrill of horror of being sentimentalists4 ,it may be so3 ,i willingly confess to having some tincture of sentimentalism in me1 ,god be thanked6 ,ever since the ,french ,revolution brought this leaning of thought into ill-repute1--and not altogether undeservedly1 ,i must admit1 true1 beautiful1 and good as that great movement was1--it has been the tradition to picture sentimentalists as persons incapable of logical thought and unwilling to look facts in the eyes4 ,this tradition may be classed with the ,french tradition that an ,englishman says godam at every second sentence1 the ,english tradition that an ,american talks about 8,britishers10 and the ,american tradition that a ,frenchman carries forms of etiquette to an inconvenient extreme1 in short with all those traditions which survive simply because the men who use their eyes and ears are few and far between4 ,doubtless some excuse there was for all those opinions in days gone by2 and sentimentalism1 when it was the fashionable amusement to spend one's evenings in a flood of tears over a woeful performance on a candle-litten stage1 sometimes made itself a little ridiculous4 ,but what after all is sentimentalism8 ,it is an ism1 a doctrine1 namely1 the doctrine that great respect should be paid to the natural judgments of the sensible heart4 ,this is what sentimentalism precisely is2 and ,i entreat the reader to consider whether to contemn is not of all blasphemies the most degrading4 ,yet the nineteenth century has steadily contemned it1 because it brought about the ,reign of ,terror4 ,that it did so is true4 ,still1 the whole question is one of how much4 ,the reign of terror was very bad2 but now the ,gradgrind banner has been this century long flaunting in the face of heaven1 with an insolence to provoke the very skies to scowl and rumble4 ,soon a flash and quick peal will shake economists quite out of their complacency1 too late4 ,the twentieth century1 in its latter half1 shall surely see the deluge-tempest burst upon the social order1--to clear upon a world as deep in ruin as that greed-philosophy has long plunged it into guilt4 ,no post-thermidorian high jinks then6 ,so a miser is a beneficent power in a community1 is he8 ,with the same reason precisely1 only in a much higher degree1 you might pronounce the ,wall ,street sharp to be a good angel1 who takes money from heedless persons not likely to guard it properly1 who wrecks feeble enterprises better stopped1 and who administers wholesome lessons to unwary scientific men1 by passing worthless checks upon them1--as you did1 the other day1 to me1 my millionaire ,master in glomery1 when you thought you saw your way to using my process without paying for it1 and of so bequeathing to your children something to boast of their father about1--and who by a thousand wiles puts money at the service of intelligent greed1 in his own person4 ,bernard ,mandeville1 in his 8,fable of the ,bees10 maintains that private vices of all descriptions are public benefits1 and proves it1 too1 quite as cogently as the economist proves his point concerning the miser4 ,he even argues1 with no slight force1 that but for vice civilisation would never have existed4 ,in the same spirit1 it has been strongly maintained and is to-day widely believed that all acts of charity and benevolence1 private and public1 go seriously to degrade the human race4 ,the 8,origin of ,species0 of ,darwin merely extends politico-economical views of progress to the entire realm of animal and vegetable life4 ,the vast majority of our contemporary naturalists hold the opinion that the true cause of those exquisite and marvellous adaptations of nature for which1 when ,i was a boy1 men used to extol the divine wisdom is that creatures are so crowded together that those of them that happen to have the slightest advantage force those less pushing into situations unfavorable to multiplication or even kill them before they reach the age of reproduction4 ,among animals1 the mere mechanical individualism is vastly renforced as a power making for good by the animal's ruthless greed4 ,as ,darwin puts it on his title-page1 it is the struggle for existence2 and he should have added for his motto3 ,every individual for himself1 and the ,devil take the hindmost6 ,jesus1 in his sermon on the ,mount1 expressed a different opinion4 ,here1 then1 is the issue4 ,the gospel of ,christ says that progress comes from every individual merging his individuality in sympathy with his neighbors4 ,on the other side1 the conviction of the nineteenth century is that progress takes place by virtue of every individual's striving for himself with all his might and trampling his neighbor under foot whenever he gets a chance to do so4 ,this may accurately be called the ,gospel of ,greed4 ,much is to be said on both sides4 ,i have not concealed1 ,i could not conceal1 my own passionate predilection4 ,such a confession will probably shock my scientific brethren4 ,yet the strong feeling is in itself1 ,i think1 an argument of some weight in favor of the agapastic theory of evolution1--so far as it may be presumed to bespeak the normal judgment of the ,sensible ,heart4 ,certainly1 if it were possible to believe in agapasm without believing it warmly1 that fact would be an argument against the truth of the doctrine4 ,at any rate1 since the warmth of feeling exists1 it should on every account be candidly confessed2 especially since it creates a liability to one-sidedness on my part against which it behooves my readers and me to be severally on our guard4 ,,second ,,thoughts4 ,,irenica4 ,let us try to define the logical affinities of the different theories of evolution4 ,natural selection1 as conceived by ,darwin1 is a mode of evolution in which the only positive agent of change in the whole passage from moner to man is fortuitous variation4 ,to secure advance in a definite direction chance has to be seconded by some action that shall hinder the propagation of some varieties or stimulate that of others4 ,in natural selection1 strictly so called1 it is the crowding out of the weak4 ,in sexual selection1 it is the attraction of beauty1 mainly4 ,the 8,origin of ,species0 was published toward the end of the year #ahei4 ,the preceding years since #ahdf had been one of the most productive seasons1--or if extended so as to cover the great book we are considering1 the most productive period of equal length in the entire history of science from its beginnings until now4 ,the idea that chance begets order1 which is one of the corner-stones of modern physics 7although ,dr4 ,carus considers it 8the weakest point in ,mr4 ,peirce's system107 was at that time put into its clearest light4 ,quetelet had opened the discussion by his 8,letters on the ,application of ,probabilities to the ,moral and ,political ,sciences10 a work which deeply impressed the best minds of that day1 and to which ,sir ,john ,herschel had drawn general attention in ,great ,britain4 ,in #aheg1 the first volume of ,buckle's 8,history of ,civilisation0 had created a tremendous sensation1 owing to the use he made of this same idea4 ,meantime1 the 8statistical method0 had1 under that very name1 been applied with brilliant success to molecular physics4 ,dr4 ,john ,herapath1 an ,english chemist1 had in #ahdg outlined the kinetical theory of gases in his 8,mathematical ,physics02 and the interest the theory excited had been refreshed in #ahef by notable memoirs by ,clausius and ,krnig4 ,in the very summer preceding ,darwin's publication1 ,maxwell had read before the ,british ,association the first and most important of his researches on this subject4 ,the consequence was that the idea that fortuitous events may result in a physical law1 and further that this is the way in which those laws which appear to conflict with the principle of the conservation of energy are to be explained1 had taken a strong hold upon the minds of all who were abreast of the leaders of thought4 ,by such minds1 it was inevitable that the 8,origin of ,species10 whose teaching was simply the application of the same principle to the explanation of another 8non-conservative0 action1 that of organic development1 should be hailed and welcomed4 ,the sublime discovery of the conservation of energy by ,helmholtz in #ahdg1 and that of the mechanical theory of heat by ,clausius and by ,rankine1 independently1 in #ahej1 had decidedly overawed all those who might have been inclined to sneer at physical science4 ,thereafter a belated poet still harping upon 8science peddling with the names of things0 would fail of his effect4 ,mechanism was now known to be all1 or very nearly so4 ,all this time1 utilitarianism1--that improved substitute for the ,gospel1--was in its fullest feather2 and was a natural ally of an individualistic theory4 ,dean ,mansell's injudicious advocacy had led to mutiny among the bondsmen of ,sir ,william ,hamilton1 and the nominalism of ,mill had profited accordingly2 and although the real science that ,darwin was leading men to was sure some day to give a death-blow to the sham-science of ,mill1 yet there were several elements of the ,darwinian theory which were sure to charm the followers of ,mill4 ,another thing3 ansthetics had been in use for thirteen years4 ,already1 people's acquaintance with suffering had dropped off very much2 and as a consequence1 that unlovely hardness by which our times are so contrasted with those that immediately preceded them1 had already set in1 and inclined people to relish a ruthless theory4 ,the reader would quite mistake the drift of what ,i am saying if he were to understand me as wishing to suggest that any of those things 7except perhaps ,malthus7 influenced ,darwin himself4 ,what ,i mean is that his hypothesis1 while without dispute one of the most ingenious and pretty ever devised1 and while argued with a wealth of knowledge1 a strength of logic1 a charm of rhetoric1 and above all with a certain magnetic genuineness that was almost irresistible1 did not appear1 at first1 at all near to being proved2 and to a sober mind its case looks less hopeful now than it did twenty years ago2 but the extraordinarily favorable reception it met with was plainly owing1 in large measure1 to its ideas being those toward which the age was favorably disposed1 especially1 because of the encouragement it gave to the greed-philosophy4 ,diametrically opposed to evolution by chance1 are those theories which attribute all progress to an inward necessary principle1 or other form of necessity4 ,many naturalists have thought that if an egg is destined to go through a certain series of embryological transformations1 from which it is perfectly certain not to deviate1 and if in geological time almost exactly the same forms appear successively1 one replacing another in the same order1 the strong presumption is that this latter succession was as predeterminate and certain to take place as the former4 ,so1 ,ngeli1 for instance1 conceives that it somehow follows from the first law of motion and the peculiar1 but unknown1 molecular constitution of protoplasm1 that forms must complicate themselves more and more4 ,klliker makes one form generate another after a certain maturation has been accomplished4 ,weismann1 too1 though he calls himself a ,darwinian1 holds that nothing is due to chance1 but that all forms are simple mechanical resultants of the heredity from two parents4#ba ,it is very noticeable that all these different sectaries seek to import into their science a mechanical necessity to which the facts that come under their observation do not point4 ,those geologists who think that the variation of species is due to cataclasmic alterations of climate or of the chemical constitution of the air and water are also making mechanical necessity chief factor of evolution4 ,evolution by sporting and evolution by mechanical necessity are conceptions warring against one another4 ,a third method1 which supersedes their strife1 lies enwrapped in the theory of ,lamarck4 ,according to his view1 all that distinguishes the highest organic forms from the most rudimentary has been brought about by little hypertrophies or atrophies which have affected individuals early in their lives1 and have been transmitted to their offspring4 ,such a transmission of acquired characters is of the general nature of habit-taking1 and this is the representative and derivative within the physiological domain of the law of mind4 ,its action is essentially dissimilar to that of a physical force2 and that is the secret of the repugnance of such necessitarians as ,weismann to admitting its existence4 ,the ,lamarckians further suppose that although some of the modifications of form so transmitted were originally due to mechanical causes1 yet the chief factors of their first production were the straining of endeavor and the overgrowth superinduced by exercise1 together with the opposite actions4 ,now1 endeavor1 since it is directed toward an end1 is essentially psychical1 even though it be sometimes unconscious2 and the growth due to exercise1 as ,i argued in my last paper1 follows a law of a character quite contrary to that of mechanics4 ,lamarckian evolution is thus evolution by the force of habit4--,that sentence slipped off my pen while one of those neighbors whose function in the social cosmos seems to be that of an ,interrupter1 was asking me a question4 ,of course1 it is nonsense4 ,habit is mere inertia1 a resting on one's oars1 not a propulsion4 ,now it is energetic projaculation 7lucky there is such a word1 or this untried hand might have been put to inventing one7 by which in the typical instances of ,lamarckian evolution the new elements of form are first created4 ,habit1 however1 forces them to take practical shapes1 compatible with the structures they affect1 and in the form of heredity and otherwise1 gradually replaces the spontaneous energy that sustains them4 ,thus1 habit plays a double part2 it serves to establish the new features1 and also to bring them into harmony with the general morphology and function of the animals and plants to which they belong4 ,but if the reader will now kindly give himself the trouble of turning back a page or two1 he will see that this account of ,lamarckian evolution coincides with the general description of the action of love1 to which1 ,i suppose1 he yielded his assent4 ,remembering that all matter is really mind1 remembering1 too1 the continuity of mind1 let us ask what aspect ,lamarckian evolution takes on within the domain of consciousness4 ,direct endeavor can achieve almost nothing4 ,it is as easy by taking thought to add a cubit to one's stature1 as it is to produce an idea acceptable to any of the ,muses by merely straining for it1 before it is ready to come4 ,we haunt in vain the sacred well and throne of ,mnemosyne2 the deeper workings of the spirit take place in their own slow way1 without our connivance4 ,let but their bugle sound1 and we may then make our effort1 sure of an oblation for the altar of whatsoever divinity its savor gratifies4 ,besides this inward process1 there is the operation of the environment1 which goes to break up habits destined to be broken up and so to render the mind lively4 ,everybody knows that the long continuance of a routine of habit makes us lethargic1 while a succession of surprises wonderfully brightens the ideas4 ,where there is a motion1 where history is a-making1 there is the focus of mental activity1 and it has been said that the arts and sciences reside within the temple of ,janus1 waking when that is open1 but slumbering when it is closed4 ,few psychologists have perceived how fundamental a fact this is4 ,a portion of mind abundantly commissured to other portions works almost mechanically4 ,it sinks to the condition of a railway junction4 ,but a portion of mind almost isolated1 a spiritual peninsula1 or cul-de-sac1 is like a railway terminus4 ,now mental commissures are habits4 ,where they abound1 originality is not needed and is not found2 but where they are in defect1 spontaneity is set free4 ,thus1 the first step in the ,lamarckian evolution of mind is the putting of sundry thoughts into situations in which they are free to play4 ,as to growth by exercise1 ,i have already shown1 in discussing 8,man's ,glassy ,essence10 in last ,october's ,monist1 what its modus operandi must be conceived to be1 at least1 until a second equally definite hypothesis shall have been offered4 ,namely1 it consists of the flying asunder of molecules1 and the reparation of the parts by new matter4 ,it is1 thus1 a sort of reproduction4 ,it takes place only during exercise1 because the activity of protoplasm consists in the molecular disturbance which is its necessary condition4 ,growth by exercise takes place also in the mind4 ,indeed1 that is what it is to learn4 ,but the most perfect illustration is the development of a philosophical idea by being put into practice4 ,the conception which appeared1 at first1 as unitary1 splits up into special cases2 and into each of these new thought must enter to make a practicable idea4 ,this new thought1 however1 follows pretty closely the model of the parent conception2 and thus a homogeneous development takes place4 ,the parallel between this and the course of molecular occurrences is apparent4 ,patient attention will be able to trace all these elements in the transaction called learning4 ,three modes of evolution have thus been brought before us2 evolution by fortuitous variation1 evolution by mechanical necessity1 and evolution by creative love4 ,we may term them tychastic evolution1 or tychasm1 anancastic evolution1 or anancasm1 and agapastic evolution1 or agapasm4 ,the doctrines which represent these as severally of principal importance1 we may term tychasticism1 anancasticism1 and agapasticism4 ,on the other hand the mere propositions that absolute chance1 mechanical necessity1 and the law of love1 are severally operative in the cosmos1 may receive the names of tychism1 anancism1 and agapism4 ,all three modes of evolution are composed of the same general elements4 ,agapasm exhibits them the most clearly4 ,the good result is here brought to pass1 first1 by the bestowal of spontaneous energy by the parent upon the offspring1 and1 second1 by the disposition of the latter to catch the general idea of those about it and thus to subserve the general purpose4 ,in order to express the relation that tychasm and anancasm bear to agapasm1 let me borrow a word from geometry4 ,an ellipse crossed by a straight line is a sort of cubic curve2 for a cubic is a curve which is cut thrice by a straight line2 now a straight line might cut the ellipse twice and its associated straight line a third time4 ,still the ellipse with the straight line across it would not have the characteristics of a cubic4 ,it would have1 for instance1 no contrary flexure1 which no true cubic wants2 and it would have two nodes1 which no true cubic has4 ,the geometers say that it is a degenerate cubic4 ,just so1 tychasm and anancasm are degenerate forms of agapasm4 ,men who seek to reconcile the ,darwinian idea with ,christianity will remark that tychastic evolution1 like the agapastic1 depends upon a reproductive creation1 the forms preserved being those that use the spontaneity conferred upon them in such wise as to be drawn into harmony with their original1 quite after the ,christian scheme4 ,very good6 ,this only shows that just as love cannot have a contrary1 but must embrace what is most opposed to it1 as a degenerate case of it1 so tychasm is a kind of agapasm4 ,only1 in the tychastic evolution progress is solely owing to the distribution of the napkin-hidden talent of the rejected servant among those not rejected1 just as ruined gamesters leave their money on the table to make those not yet ruined so much the richer4 ,it makes the felicity of the lambs just the damnation of the goats1 transposed to the other side of the equation4 ,in genuine agapasm1 on the other hand1 advance takes place by virtue of a positive sympathy among the created springing from continuity of mind4 ,this is the idea which tychasticism knows not how to manage4 ,the anancasticist might here interpose1 claiming that the mode of evolution for which he contends agrees with agapasm at the point at which tychasm departs from it4 ,for it makes development go through certain phases1 having its inevitable ebbs and flows1 yet tending on the whole to a foreordained perfection4 ,bare existence by this its destiny betrays an intrinsic affinity for the good4 ,herein1 it must be admitted1 anancasm shows itself to be in a broad acception a species of agapasm4 ,some forms of it might easily be mistaken for the genuine agapasm4 ,the ,hegelian philosophy is such an anancasticism4 ,with its revelatory religion1 with its synechism 7however imperfectly set forth71 with its 8reflection10 the whole idea of the theory is superb1 almost sublime4 ,yet1 after all1 living freedom is practically omitted from its method4 ,the whole movement is that of a vast engine1 impelled by a vis a tergo1 with a blind and mysterious fate of arriving at a lofty goal4 ,i mean that such an engine it would be1 if it really worked2 but in point of fact1 it is a ,keely motor4 ,grant that it really acts as it professes to act1 and there is nothing to do but accept the philosophy4 ,but never was there seen such an example of a long chain of reasoning1--shall ,i say with a flaw in every link8--no1 with every link a handful of sand1 squeezed into shape in a dream4 ,or say1 it is a pasteboard model of a philosophy that in reality does not exist4 ,if we use the one precious thing it contains1 the idea of it1 introducing the tychism which the arbitrariness of its every step suggests1 and make that the support of a vital freedom which is the breath of the spirit of love1 we may be able to produce that genuine agapasticism1 at which ,hegel was aiming4 ,a ,,third ,,aspect4 ,,discrimination4 ,in the very nature of things1 the line of demarcation between the three modes of evolution is not perfectly sharp4 ,that does not prevent its being quite real2 perhaps it is rather a mark of its reality4 ,there is in the nature of things no sharp line of demarcation between the three fundamental colors1 red1 green1 and violet4 ,but for all that they are really different4 ,the main question is whether three radically different evolutionary elements have been operative2 and the second question is what are the most striking characteristics of whatever elements have been operative4 ,i propose to devote a few pages to a very slight examination of these questions in their relation to the historical development of human thought4 ,i first formulate for the reader's convenience the briefest possible definitions of the three conceivable modes of development of thought1 distinguishing also two varieties of anancasm and three of agapasm4 ,the tychastic development of thought1 then1 will consist in slight departures from habitual ideas in different directions indifferently1 quite purposeless and quite unconstrained whether by outward circumstances or by force of logic1 these new departures being followed by unforeseen results which tend to fix some of them as habits more than others4 ,the anancastic development of thought will consist of new ideas adopted without foreseeing whither they tend1 but having a character determined by causes either external to the mind1 such as changed circumstances of life1 or internal to the mind as logical developments of ideas already accepted1 such as generalisations4 ,the agapastic development of thought is the adoption of certain mental tendencies1 not altogether heedlessly1 as in tychasm1 nor quite blindly by the mere force of circumstances or of logic1 as in anancasm1 but by an immediate attraction for the idea itself1 whose nature is divined before the mind possesses it1 by the power of sympathy1 that is1 by virtue of the continuity of mind2 and this mental tendency may be of three varieties1 as follows4 ,first1 it may affect a whole people or community in its collective personality1 and be thence communicated to such individuals as are in powerfully sympathetic connection with the collective people1 although they may be intellectually incapable of attaining the idea by their private understandings or even perhaps of consciously apprehending it4 ,second1 it may affect a private person directly1 yet so that he is only enabled to apprehend the idea1 or to appreciate its attractiveness1 by virtue of his sympathy with his neighbors1 under the influence of a striking experience or development of thought4 ,the conversion of ,st4 ,paul may be taken as an example of what is meant4 ,third1 it may affect an individual1 independently of his human affections1 by virtue of an attraction it exercises upon his mind1 even before he has comprehended it4 ,this is the phenomenon which has been well called the divination of genius2 for it is due to the continuity between the man's mind and the ,most ,high4 ,let us next consider by means of what tests we can discriminate between these different categories of evolution4 ,no absolute criterion is possible in the nature of things1 since in the nature of things there is no sharp line of demarcation between the different classes4 ,nevertheless1 quantitative symptoms may be found by which a sagacious and sympathetic judge of human nature may be able to estimate the approximate proportions in which the different kinds of influence are commingled4 ,so far as the historical evolution of human thought has been tychastic1 it should have proceeded by insensible or minute steps2 for such is the nature of chances when so multiplied as to show phenomena of regularity4 ,for example1 assume that of the native-born white adult males of the ,united ,states in #ahhj1 one fourth part were below #e feet #d inches in stature and one fourth part above #e feet #h inches4 ,then by the principles of probability1 among the whole population1 we should expect #baf under #d feet #f inches1 #baf above #f feet #f inches4 #dh 0 #d 0 #e 0 #dh 0 #f 0 #g 0 #i 0 #d 0 #d 0 #i 0 #f 0 #h 0 less than #b 0 #d 0 #c 0 less than #b 0 #f 0 #i 0 ,i set down these figures to show how insignificantly few are the cases in which anything very far out of the common run presents itself by chance4 ,though the stature of only every second man is included within the four inches between #e feet #d inches and #e feet #h inches1 yet if this interval be extended by thrice four inches above and below1 it will embrace all our #h millions odd of native-born adult white males 7of #ahhj71 except only #i taller and #i shorter4 ,the test of minute variation1 if not satisfied1 absolutely negatives tychasm4 ,if it is satisfied1 we shall find that it negatives anancasm but not agapasm4 ,we want a positive test1 satisfied by tychasm1 only4 ,now wherever we find men's thought taking by imperceptible degrees a turn contrary to the purposes which animate them1 in spite of their highest impulses1 there1 we may safely conclude1 there has been a tychastic action4 ,students of the history of mind there be of an erudition to fill an imperfect scholar like me with envy edulcorated by joyous admiration1 who maintain that ideas when just started are and can be little more than freaks1 since they cannot yet have been critically examined1 and further that everywhere and at all times progress has been so gradual that it is difficult to make out distinctly what original step any given man has taken4 ,it would follow that tychasm has been the sole method of intellectual development4 ,i have to confess ,i cannot read history so2 ,i cannot help thinking that while tychasm has sometimes been operative1 at others great steps covering nearly the same ground and made by different men independently1 have been mistaken for a succession of small steps1 and further that students have been reluctant to admit a real entitative 8spirit0 of an age or of a people1 under the mistaken and unscrutinised impression that they should thus be opening the door to wild and unnatural hypotheses4 ,i find1 on the contrary1 that1 however it may be with the education of individual minds1 the historical development of thought has seldom been of a tychastic nature1 and exclusively in backward and barbarising movements4 ,i desire to speak with the extreme modesty which befits a student of logic who is required to survey so very wide a field of human thought that he can cover it only by a reconnaisance1 to which only the greatest skill and most adroit methods can impart any value at all2 but1 after all1 ,i can only express my own opinions and not those of anybody else2 and in my humble judgment1 the largest example of tychasm is afforded by the history of ,christianity1 from about its establishment by ,constantine1 to1 say1 the time of the ,irish monasteries1 an era or eon of about #ejj years4 ,undoubtedly the external circumstance which more than all others at first inclined men to accept ,christianity in its loveliness and tenderness1 was the fearful extent to which society was broken up into units by the unmitigated greed and hard-heartedness into which the ,romans had seduced the world4 ,and yet it was that very same fact1 more than any other external circumstance1 that fostered that bitterness against the wicked world of which the primitive ,gospel of ,mark contains not a single trace4 ,at least1 ,i do not detect it in the remark about the blasphemy against the ,holy ,ghost1 where nothing is said about vengeance1 nor even in that speech where the closing lines of ,isaiah are quoted1 about the worm and the fire that feed upon the 8carcasses of the men that have transgressed against me40 ,but little by little the bitterness increases until in the last book of the ,new ,testament1 its poor distracted author represents that all the time ,christ was talking about having come to save the world1 the secret design was to catch the entire human race1 with the exception of a paltry #addjjj1 and souse them all in brimstone lake1 and as the smoke of their torment went up for ever and ever1 to turn and remark1 8,there is no curse any more40 ,would it be an insensible smirk or a fiendish grin that should accompany such an utterance8 ,i wish ,i could believe ,st4 ,john did not write it2 but it is his gospel which tells about the 8resurrection unto condemnation10--that is of men's being resuscitated just for the sake of torturing them2--and1 at any rate1 the ,revelation is a very ancient composition4 ,one can understand that the early ,christians were like men trying with all their might to climb a steep declivity of smooth wet clay2 the deepest and truest element of their life1 animating both heart and head1 was universal-love2 but they were continually1 and against their wills1 slipping into a party spirit1 every slip serving as a precedent1 in a fashion but too familiar to every man4 ,this party feeling insensibly grew until by about ,a4 ,d4 #ccj the lustre of the pristine integrity that in ,st4 ,mark reflects the white spirit of light was so far tarnished that ,eusebius1 7the ,jared ,sparks of that day17 in the preface to his ,history1 could announce his intention of exaggerating everything that tended to the glory of the church and of suppressing whatever might disgrace it4 ,his ,latin contemporary ,lactantius is worse1 still2 and so the darkling went on increasing until before the end of the century the great library of ,alexandria was destroyed by ,theophilus1#bb until ,gregory the ,great1 two centuries later1 burnt the great library of ,rome1 proclaiming that 8,ignorance is the mother of devotion10 7which is true1 just as oppression and injustice is the mother of spirituality17 until a sober description of the state of the church would be a thing our not too nice newspapers would treat as 8unfit for publication40 ,all this movement is shown by the application of the test given above to have been tychastic4 ,another very much like it on a small scale1 only a hundred times swifter1 for the study of which there are documents by the library-full1 is to be found in the history of the ,french ,revolution4 ,anancastic evolution advances by successive strides with pauses between4 ,the reason is that in this process a habit of thought having been overthrown is supplanted by the next strongest4 ,now this next strongest is sure to be widely disparate from the first1 and as often as not is its direct contrary4 ,it reminds one of our old rule of making the second candidate vice-president4 ,this character1 therefore1 clearly distinguishes anancasm from tychasm4 ,the character which distinguishes it from agapasm is its purposelessness4 ,but external and internal anancasm have to be examined separately4 ,development under the pressure of external circumstances1 or cataclasmine evolution1 is in most cases unmistakable enough4 ,it has numberless degrees of intensity1 from the brute force1 the plain war1 which has more than once turned the current of the world's thought1 down to the hard fact of evidence1 or what has been taken for it1 which has been known to convince men by hordes4 ,the only hesitation that can subsist in the presence of such a history is a quantitative one4 ,never are external influences the only ones which affect the mind1 and therefore it must be a matter of judgment for which it would scarcely be worth while to attempt to set rules1 whether a given movement is to be regarded as principally governed from without or not4 ,in the rise of medieval thought1 ,i mean scholasticism and the synchronistic art developments1 undoubtedly the crusades and the discovery of the writings of ,aristotle were powerful influences4 ,the development of scholasticism from ,roscellin to ,albertus ,magnus closely follows the successive steps in the knowledge of ,aristotle4 ,prantl thinks that that is the whole story1 and few men have thumbed more books than ,carl ,prantl4 ,he has done good solid work1 notwithstanding his slap-dash judgments4 ,but we shall never make so much as a good beginning of comprehending scholasticism until the whole has been systematically explored and digested by a company of students regularly organised and held under rule for that purpose4 ,but as for the period we are now specially considering1 that which synchronised the ,romanesque architecture1 the literature is easily mastered4 ,it does not quite justify ,prantl's dicta as to the slavish dependence of these authors upon their authorities4 ,moreover1 they kept a definite purpose steadily before their minds1 throughout all their studies4 ,i am1 therefore1 unable to offer this period of scholasticism as an example of pure external anancasm1 which seems to be the fluorine of the intellectual elements4 ,perhaps the recent ,japanese reception of western ideas is the purest instance of it in history4 ,yet in combination with other elements1 nothing is commoner4 ,if the development of ideas under the influence of the study of external facts be considered as external anancasm1--it is on the border between the external and the internal forms1--it is1 of course1 the principal thing in modern learning4 ,but ,whewell1 whose masterly comprehension of the history of science critics have been too ignorant properly to appreciate1 clearly shows that it is far from being the overwhelmingly preponderant influence1 even there4 ,internal anancasm1 or logical groping1 which advances upon a predestined line without being able to foresee whither it is to be carried nor to steer its course1 this is the rule of development of philosophy4 ,hegel first made the world understand this2 and he seeks to make logic not merely the subjective guide and monitor of thought1 which was all it had been ambitioning before1 but to be the very main-spring of thinking1 and not merely of individual thinking but of discussion1 of the history of the development of thought1 of all history1 of all development4 ,this involves a positive1 clearly demonstrable error4 ,let the logic in question be of whatever kind it may1 a logic of necessary inference or a logic of probable inference1 7the theory might perhaps be shaped to fit either17 in any case it supposes that logic is sufficient of itself to determine what conclusion follows from given premises2 for unless it will do so much1 it will not suffice to explain why an individual train of reasoning should take just the course it does take1 to say nothing of other kinds of development4 ,it thus supposes that from given premises1 only one conclusion can logically be drawn1 and that there is no scope at all for free choice4 ,that from given premises only one conclusion can logically be drawn1 is one of the false notions which have come from logicians' confining their attention to that ,nantucket of thought1 the logic of non-relative terms4 ,in the logic of relatives1 it does not hold good4 ,one remark occurs to me4 ,if the evolution of history is in considerable part of the nature of internal anancasm1 it resembles the development of individual men2 and just as #cc years is a rough but natural unit of time for individuals1 being the average age at which man has issue1 so there should be an approximate period at the end of which one great historical movement ought to be likely to be supplanted by another4 ,let us see if we can make out anything of the kind4 ,take the governmental development of ,rome as being sufficiently long and set down the principal dates4 ,b4 ,c4 #gec1 ,foundation of ,rome4 ,b4 ,c4 #eaj1 ,expulsion of the ,tarquins4 ,b4 ,c4 #bg1 ,octavius assumes title ,augustus4 ,a4 ,d4 #dgf1 ,end of ,western ,empire4 ,a4 ,d4 #ifb1 ,holy ,roman ,empire4 ,a4 ,d4 #adec1 ,fall of ,constantinople4 ,the last event was one of the most significant in history1 especially for ,italy4 ,the intervals are #bdc1 #dhc1 #ejb1 #dhf1 #dia years4 ,all are rather curiously near equal1 except the first which is half the others4 ,successive reigns of kings would not commonly be so near equal4 ,let us set down a few dates in the history of thought4 ,b4 ,c4 #ehe1 ,eclipse of ,thales4 ,beginning of ,greek philosophy4 ,a4 ,d4 #cj1 ,the crucifixion4 ,a4 ,d4 #ebi1 ,closing of ,athenian schools4 ,end of ,greek philosophy4 ,a4 ,d4 #aabe1 7,approximate7 ,rise of the ,universities of ,bologna and ,paris4 ,a4 ,d4 #aedc1 ,publication of the 8,de ,revolutionibus0 of ,copernicus4 ,beginning of ,modern ,science4 ,the intervals are #fae1 #dii1 #eif1 #dah1 years4 ,in the history of metaphysics1 we may take the following3 ,b4 ,c4 #cbb1 ,death of ,aristotle4 ,a4 ,d4 #abgd1 ,death of ,aquinas4 ,a4 ,d4 #ahjd1 ,death of ,kant4 ,the intervals are #aeie and #ecj years4 ,the former is about thrice the latter4 ,from these figures1 no conclusion can fairly be drawn4 ,at the same time1 they suggest that perhaps there may be a rough natural era of about #ejj years4 ,should there be any independent evidence of this1 the intervals noticed may gain some significance4 ,the agapastic development of thought should1 if it exists1 be distinguished by its purposive character1 this purpose being the development of an idea4 ,we should have a direct agapic or sympathetic comprehension and recognition of it1 by virtue of the continuity of thought4 ,i here take it for granted that such continuity of thought has been sufficiently proved by the arguments used in my paper on the 8,law of ,mind0 in ,the ,monist of last ,july4 ,even if those arguments are not quite convincing in themselves1 yet if they are renforced by an apparent agapasm in the history of thought1 the two propositions will lend one another mutual aid4 ,the reader will1 ,i trust1 be too well grounded in logic to mistake such mutual support for a vicious circle in reasoning4 ,if it could be shown directly that there is such an entity as the 8spirit of an age0 or of a people1 and that mere individual intelligence will not account for all the phenomena1 this would be proof enough at once of agapasticism and of synechism4 ,i must acknowledge that ,i am unable to produce a cogent demonstration of this2 but ,i am1 ,i believe1 able to adduce such arguments as will serve to confirm those which have been drawn from other facts4 ,i believe that all the greatest achievements of mind have been beyond the powers of unaided individuals2 and ,i find1 apart from the support this opinion receives from synechistic considerations1 and from the purposive character of many great movements1 direct reason for so thinking in the sublimity of the ideas and in their occurring simultaneously and independently to a number of individuals of no extraordinary general powers4 ,the pointed ,gothic architecture in several of its developments appears to me to be of such a character4 ,all attempts to imitate it by modern architects of the greatest learning and genius appear flat and tame1 and are felt by their authors to be so4 ,yet at the time the style was living1 there was quite an abundance of men capable of producing works of this kind of gigantic sublimity and power4 ,in more than one case1 extant documents show that the cathedral chapters1 in the selection of architects1 treated high artistic genius as a secondary consideration1 as if there were no lack of persons able to supply that2 and the results justify their confidence4 ,were individuals in general1 then1 in those ages possessed of such lofty natures and high intellect8 ,such an opinion would break down under the first examination4 ,how many times have men now in middle life seen great discoveries made independently and almost simultaneously6 ,the first instance ,i remember was the prediction of a planet exterior to ,uranus by ,leverrier and ,adams4 ,one hardly knows to whom the principle of the conservation of energy ought to be attributed1 although it may reasonably be considered as the greatest discovery science has ever made4 ,the mechanical theory of heat was set forth by ,rankine and by ,clausius during the same month of ,february1 #ahej2 and there are eminent men who attribute this great step to ,thomson4#bc ,the kinetical theory of gases1 after being started by ,john ,bernoulli and long buried in oblivion1 was reinvented and applied to the explanation not merely of the laws of ,boyle1 ,charles1 and ,avogadro1 but also of diffusion and viscosity1 by at least three modern physicists separately4 ,it is well known that the doctrine of natural selection was presented by ,wallace and by ,darwin at the same meeting of the ,british ,association2 and ,darwin in his 8,historical ,sketch0 prefixed to the later editions of his book shows that both were anticipated by obscure forerunners4 ,the method of spectrum analysis was claimed for ,swan as well as for ,kirchhoff1 and there were others who perhaps had still better claims4 ,the authorship of the ,periodical ,law of the ,chemical ,elements is disputed between a ,russian1 a ,german1 and an ,englishman2 although there is no room for doubt that the principal merit belongs to the first4 ,these are nearly all the greatest discoveries of our times4 ,it is the same with the inventions4 ,it may not be surprising that the telegraph should have been independently made by several inventors1 because it was an easy corollary from scientific facts well made out before4 ,but it was not so with the telephone and other inventions4 ,ether1 the first ansthetic1 was introduced independently by three different ,new ,england physicians4 ,now ether had been a common article for a century4 ,it had been in one of the pharmacopias three centuries before4 ,it is quite incredible that its ansthetic property should not have been known2 it was known4 ,it had probably passed from mouth to ear as a secret from the days of ,basil ,valentine2 but for long it had been a secret of the ,punchinello kind4 ,in ,new ,england1 for many years1 boys had used it for amusement4 ,why then had it not been put to its serious use8 ,no reason can be given1 except that the motive to do so was not strong enough4 ,the motives to doing so could only have been desire for gain and philanthropy4 ,about #ahdf1 the date of the introduction1 philanthropy was undoubtedly in an unusually active condition4 ,that sensibility1 or sentimentalism1 which had been introduced in the previous century1 had undergone a ripening process1 in consequence of which1 though now less intense than it had previously been1 it was more likely to influence unreflecting people than it had ever been4 ,all three of the ether-claimants had probably been influenced by the desire for gain2 but nevertheless they were certainly not insensible to the agapic influences4 ,i doubt if any of the great discoveries ought1 properly1 to be considered as altogether individual achievements2 and ,i think many will share this doubt4 ,yet1 if not1 what an argument for the continuity of mind1 and for agapasticism is here6 ,i do not wish to be very strenuous4 ,if thinkers will only be persuaded to lay aside their prejudices and apply themselves to studying the evidences of this doctrine1 ,i shall be fully content to await the final decision4 ,,charles ,s4 ,,peirce4 ,,footnotes3 #bj ,how can a writer have any respect for science1 as such1 who is capable of confounding with the scientific propositions of political economy1 which have nothing to say concerning what is 8beneficent10 such brummagem generalisations as this8 #ba ,i am happy to find that ,dr4 ,carus1 too1 ranks ,weismann among the opponents of ,darwin1 notwithstanding his flying that flag4 #bb ,see ,draper's ,history of ,intellectual ,development1 chap4 x4 #bc ,thomson1 himself1 in his article ,heat in the ,encyclopedia ,britannica1 never once mentions the name of ,clausius4 ,,renan4 ,a ,,discourse ,,given ,,at ,,south ,,place ,,chapel1 ,,london1 ,,october1 #i1 #ahib4 8,be calm and resigned10 said ,renan to his weeping wife4 8,we undergo the laws of that nature of which we are manifestations4 ,we perish1 we disappear1 but heaven and earth remain1 and the march of time goes on for ever40 ,it is hard to-day to respond to these last words of the dying philosopher4 ,heaven and earth remain1 but they seem cold and grey when the great heart in which they were united has ceased to beat1 and when our sweet ,english singer has gone silent4 ,by the passing away of the two highest-mounted minds in ,europe this society is especially bereaved4 ,the earliest welcome given to the genius of young ,tennyson came from the pen of ,william ,johnston ,fox1 the first ,minister of this ,chapel2 here has his spiritual pilgrimage been followed1 and its songs here sung as hymns4 ,but for their magnitude ,tennyson and ,renan might have been considered together4 ,they were children of the same spiritual epoch2 the son of the ,catholic ,church1 and the ,english ,rector's son1 were fellow-pilgrims on the painful road of scepticism2 they encountered the same phantoms1 were attended by the same mighty shades1 and found no altar but such as their own genius could raise and their glowing hearts kindle in the wilderness of doubt and denial4 ,alike they distrusted democracy1 and dreamed of the ideal monarch1--as of ,arthur1 8flower of kings10 whom ancient legends of ,britain and ,brittany said would some day return to lead up the ,golden ,year4 ,renan loved to tell the story of how ,tennyson1 roaming in ,brittany1 stopped at an inn in ,lannier1 birthplace of ,renan's mother4 ,in the morning the poet demanded his account1 but the hostess said1 8,there is nothing to pay1 ,monsieur4 ,it is you who have sung of our ,king ,arthur40 ,but the people have a greatness of their own4 ,they enshrine ,tennyson in ,westminster ,abbey1 ,renan in the ,pantheon4 ,the career of ,renan is a triumph of republican ,france4 ,under the ,empire he was deprived of his professorship1 and of his office in the ,imperial ,library1 for writing the 8,life of ,jesus40 ,but the ,republic made him ,president of the ,college of ,france1 gave him every honor1 in life as in death4 ,the national homage to that ex-priest1 that outspoken rationalist1 who flattered not the masses nor fawned on power1 is a high water-mark of civilisation4 ,for it marks the rise of a steady tide of liberty1 and not the mere leap of waves under some tempest of momentary emotion4 ,the great fact is that this unique heretic1 thinker1 and scholar1 has been able1 without compromising his independence1 without help of any sect or school1 to live his life1 think his thought1 and round out his life-work with completeness1 on the scene of a thousand martyrdoms4 ,in ,renan's 8,feuilles ,dtaches10 which appeared last spring but is not yet translated1 there are outbursts of gratitude to his time1 which1 he says1 has been good to him1 and pardoned many faults4 ,he had just finished1 he says1 his 8,history of the ,people of ,israel0--8the serious work of my life40 8,the bridge which it remained to me to build between ,judaism and ,christianism is built4444 ,in the #8,life of ,jesus' ,i tried to exhibit the majestic growth of the ,galilean tree from the stock of its roots to the summit1 where sing the birds of heaven4 ,in the volume just finished ,i have sought to make known the subsoil in which shot the roots of ,jesus4 ,thus my principal duty is accomplished4 ,at the ,academy the work on the ,rabbins also nears conclusion1 and the ,corpus ,inscriptionum ,semiticorum is in excellent hands4 ,so that now1 having paid all my debts1 ,i am free enough to amuse myself a little1 and without scruples to indulge myself with the pleasure of gathering these leaves1 often light enough40 ,so radiant was the author1 at sixty-nine1 having achieved the main schemes of a life which1 at forty1 was threatened with ruin by intolerance4 ,of course it was but a small part of what he would fain have accomplished4 ,last year 7,september #aa7 there was a festival1 in the ,island of ,brhat1 where ,renan was the chief speaker4 ,in the course of his address he said3 8,every year ,i used to come hither with my mother to visit my aunt ,prine1 who loved me much1 for she thought me like my father4 ,here on your rocks1 and in your paths1 ,i formed plans and dreamed dreams1 of which ,i have realised a third or a quarter4 ,that is much2 ,i consider myself fortunate2 ,i hold myself among the privileged ones of life4 ,i have been more sad than now1 for ,i feared ,i might die young 7misfortune notably not arrived7 and never produce what was in my mind4 ,oh certainly1 could ,i live a long time yet1 ,i would know what to do4 ,i have schemes of work for three or four lives4 ,i would write a history of the ,french ,revolution1 showing it an attack of fever1 grand1 strange1 horrible1 and sublime2 the foundation1 let us hope of something better4 ,i would compose a history of ,athens1 almost day by day2 also a history of science and freethought1 telling by what steps man has come to know something of how the world is made2 ,i would write a history of ,brittany in six volumes4 ,i would study ,chinese1 and review critically all the problems of ,chinese history and literature4 ,of all that ,i would make nothing4 ,there is a crowd of things ,i wish to know and shall never know4 ,but why reproach nature for refusing me8 ,let us recognise what she has given us4 ,i have traversed the world at an interesting moment in its development1 and1 after all1 have seen enough4 ,after my time humanity will do surprising things3 ,i can rest content during eternity40 ,the happiness of this venerable author1 conscious that his life is closing1 his work ended1--a happiness not derived from any hope of future reward1 or even existence1--is a salient testimony of our time4 ,in one of these recent addresses ,renan says3 8,let us die calmly1 in the communion of humanity1 the religion of the future40 ,the dying ,voltaire was fed with a wafer1 even while he ridiculed it4 ,renan partakes the communion of humanity1 the religion of the future4 ,it may appear cold comfort to the superstitious1 for they comprehend not that to such a man the communion of humanity implies an eternal life4 ,in one sense ,renan lived not quite threescore years and ten2 in another he lived ages on ages4 ,by his mastery of ,eastern and ,oriental languages and literatures1 by his studies of ancient and modern systems1 he had familiarly dwelt among primitive tribes1 with them set up their sacred dolmens1 knelt at their altars1 travelled with their migrations in ,india1 ,persia1 ,egypt1 ,syria1 shared their pilgrimages from lower to higher beliefs1 listened to their prophets1 visited the home of ,mary and ,joseph1 walked with the disciples1 conversed with ,jesus1 witnessed the crucifixion1 journeyed through the middle ages1 reached the ,renaissance1 passed through ,protestantism1 gathered every spiritual flower of the nineteenth century4 ,such long experience of the past1 such knowledge of the attractions of humanity1--predicting its fulfilments1--carry the thinker equally far into the future4 ,knowing the angles of convergence in time's rising pyramid1 he can calculate the apex1 and look down from it4 ,he is able to rejoice in realisations of ideals now mere tendencies4 ,his immortality is present4 ,such to ,renan meant that communion of humanity1 into which he entered by patient studies1 and by the devotion of his life to the spiritual essence of the world4 ,and this vision sustained him in his last hour4 ,and let me here say1 that ,renan's optimism was not based in any belief in a superhuman providence1 or any dynamic or compulsory destiny in nature4 ,it was his faith in the heart and brain of man4 ,in his last work he reminds youth that their efforts at new abstractions and theologies are idle3 the new notions will follow the old into extinction4 8,dear children10 he says-- 8,dear children1 it is useless to give yourself so much headache to reach only a change of error4 ,let us die calm1 in the communion of humanity1 the religion of the future4 ,the existence of the world is assured for a long time4 ,the future of science is guaranteed1 for in the great scientific book everything adds itself and nothing is lost4 ,error is not deep2 no error lasts long4 ,be tranquil4 ,before a thousand years1 let us hope1 the earth will find means to supply its exhausted coal1 and1 in some degree1 its diminished virtue4 ,the resources of humanity are infinite4 ,eternal works accomplish themselves without loss to the fountain of living forces1 ever rising again to the surface4 ,science1 above all1 will continue to astonish us by its revelations1 substituting the infinite of time and space for a poor creationism that can no longer satisfy the imagination of a child4 ,religion also is true to the infinite4 ,when ,god shall be complete1 he will be just4 ,i am convinced that virtue will find itself one day clearly to have been the better part4 ,the merit is in affirming duty against the apparent evidences4 ,as for the future denying not1 affirming not1 let us hope4 ,let us keep a place at our funerals for the music and the incense40 ,it will be seen that ,renan's deity is the brother of man's divinity4 ,god is as dependent on man as man on ,god4 ,natural evil is ,god's incompleteness3 when man is complete ,god will be complete3 there will be no more injustice4 ,but ,i must warn you that while this is the way in which ,renan impresses me1 he is not a man to be caught or held in any one theory4 ,he is the many-sided man of our time4 ,when ,i heard his lectures in his college1 two years ago1--his ,french was so clear and expressive that even a limping listener could follow him tolerably1--he impressed me as a sort of ,buddha4 ,buddha is supposed by some to have got his large form by sitting so long in contemplation1 by others his size is regarded as a protest against the meagreness of ill-fed ascetics4 ,the unfurrowed serenity of ,buddha's face1 his infantine smile1 were those of ,renan1 also the remembered music of his voice4 ,this association has been extended to ,renan's spiritual nature by a letter of his to a friend1 in his 8,feuilles ,dtaches40 ,he is fascinated by the legends of ,buddha and ,krishna which describe them as multiplying themselves4 ,when ,buddha was born into this world1 ten thousand women entreated to be his nurses1 and ,buddha multiplied himself into ten thousand babies4 ,each woman believed that she alone had nursed the true ,buddha4 ,in the legend of the god ,krishna1 he first appeared to some shepherdesses who were dancing4 ,the beautiful god multiplied himself into as many forms as there were maidens1 so that each believed1 that she alone had danced with ,krishna1 and through life kept her heart sacred to him4 ,writing of these legends1 ,renan says3 8,the ideal loses nothing by dividing itself3 it is entire in each of its parts4 ,we live that part of ,krishna which we assimilate according to our genius4 ,the ideal is for all partakers1 like morsels modified to each taste4 ,each creates his divine dancer4 ,one refinement ,i would introduce into the legend of ,krishna1 should ,i ever make it into a drama1 or1 better1 a philosophic ballet3 at the time when the shepherdesses believed they were singly dancing with ,krishna1 he should find that they were in reality dancing with different ,krishnas4 ,each had made her ,krishna to her fancy1 and when they came to describe to each other their heavenly lover1 they should find their visions in nowise alike2 and nevertheless to each it was always ,krishna40 ,the legend which thus charmed ,renan has many correspondences in religious history2 in ,christianity1 for instance1 where we to-day find a hundred and fifty sects1 each believing that it alone has the true ,christ for partner4 ,but it applies to all great personalities1 and to all spiritual influences4 ,the finest spirits frame no systems1 found no schools4 ,they are akin to the sun and rain which nourish and paint innumerable and diverse growths4 ,it was so with ,emerson4 ,dean ,stanley said that he heard many different preachers in ,america1 but their sermons were generally by ,emerson4 ,it was preminently the case with ,renan4 ,the ,catholic1 the ,protestant1 the idealist1 the sceptic1 the man of the world1 the mystic1 the conservative1 the radical1 provided they are unsophisticated like the shepherdesses1 not champions of some sect or party1 find that ,renan has spoken better for them than they can for themselves2 he knows their secret heart1 is their partner by unbounded sympathies4 ,yet it is always the same ,renan1 full and entire in each and all of his manifestations4 ,some time ago1 when his friend ,littr1 the ,positivist1 was buried by his family with ,catholic rites1 the aspersoir passed round the grave1 and came to ,renan1 who1 like the rest1 sprinkled holy water on the coffin4 ,there were cries of 8,shame0 among the freethinkers present2 but really it was the act of a man less sectarian than themselves4 ,the same tenderness that could not wound the family parting for ever from their beloved1 is visible in the gentleness with which he treats old beliefs1 when it is a question of affection or sentiment1 not of dogma and authority4 ,they have died out of his mind utterly2 he sees the creeds already in their graves2 he no longer fears them1 but is glad to soothe those who cling to their lifeless forms by speaking kindly of their virtues in the past4 ,his 8,life of ,jesus0 is1 in large part1 a wreath of immortelles laid on the tomb of a faith to him utterly dead1--that is1 faith in a supernatural ,christ4 ,he once told me of a little island on the coast of his native ,brittany1 from which some medieval saint was supposed to have driven monstrous serpents1 or worms4 ,to that island the peasants still repair to get a little of the soil to use as a--vermifuge4 ,to similarly small size had shrunk1 in ,renan's view1 the greatest dogmas and superstitions of ,christendom4 ,others might still compliment them with fear and wrath1 but ,renan was tender to them because of their smallness4 ,he was endlessly good-natured with his ignorant opponents1 from whom he often received warning letters4 ,of one who wrote him simply the words1 ,remember1 there is a ,hell1 he said that this monitor did not terrify him as much as he may have supposed4 ,he 7,renan7 would be rather glad to know for certain that there was beyond the grave even a hell4 ,and if he should go there he felt certain that he would be able to address to the deity such subtle arguments to prove that he ought not to remain there1 but to be transferred to paradise2 7only he feared his exhorter's paradise would be very dull17 that he would presently be released4 ,one purpose of the 8,life of ,jesus0 has been mentioned1 but that work had also another and a higher aim4 ,with a love like that of ,mary ,magdalene1 in whose rapt vision ,jesus rose from the tomb1 to be transformed into a supernatural ,christ1 ,renan sought to raise out of the grave of that supernatural ,christ the human ,jesus4 ,he had travelled through ,palestine1 visited every spot associated with the great teacher1 and drew the most realistic portraiture he could of the parents1 home1 friends1 disciples1 and daily life of ,jesus4 ,the outcry against that book was a confession by theology of its utter loss of the human personality of ,jesus4 ,there had been a time when the religious heart loved to dwell on the sweet humanities of ,jesus4 ,in the seventeenth century the poet1 ,thomas ,dekker1 wrote3 8,the best of men ,that e'er wore earth about him was a sufferer2 ,a soft1 meek1 patient1 humble1 tranquil spirit1 ,the first true gentleman that ever breathed40 ,and such remembrance of ,jesus1 in his life among the people1 his friendships1 smiles and tears1 are found in the sermons of ,tillotson1 ,south1 ,jeremy ,taylor4 ,but the descended ,god gradually consumed the humanity4 ,in the last century it became a heresy to consider ,jesus as a man4 ,the man was crucified on a cross of dogmas2 he lay dead and buried under a stony theology1 until ,renan rolled away the stone1 raised him to life1 clothed him with flesh and blood1 invested him with beauty1 and said once more to the ,pharisee1 the sceptic1 the scoffer--,behold the man6 ,for writing that book1--just after ,strauss had shown the ,christ of ,christendom a mythological figure1--the churches should have clasped ,renan's knees4 ,but for it they heaped him with abuse1 declared that ,jewish bankers had bribed him to write it1 drove him from his professorship of ,hebrew1 reduced him to poverty4 ,the ,pope denounced him as 8,the ,european ,blasphemer40 ,he has been terribly avenged in his own country1 where every educated man has abandoned the church4 ,and he lived to see the ,christianity of ,england striving to gain a new hold on the people by following his brave gesture1--rationalising away the supernatural ,christ1 and exalting the humanity of ,jesus as the sign of his divinity4 ,the criticism of that work is not at all so destructive as that of many who have written in the generation that has elapsed since its appearance1--of ,dr4 ,martineau1 for instance1 on whom ,oxford has conferred a doctor's degree4 ,indeed1 in reading ,renan's 8,life of ,jesus0 now1 one is surprised by its concessions4 ,he accepts the four ,gospels as coming from the first century1 a belief which even the learned theologians have abandoned4 ,some newspaper has said that ,renan borrowed from ,strauss2 on the contrary1 the fault of the book is that it did not borrow from ,strauss1 and from ,english authors1 who had proved that the ,gospels are all of the second century4 ,that would have relieved him of the necessity of apologising for ,jesus in some matters of which ,jesus never heard1 of which ,paul in the first century knew nothing1 as when he intimates that ,jesus may have once lent himself to an amiable deception4 ,no miracle was ever ascribed to ,jesus by any writer of his own century4 ,in several other respects ,renan's 8,life of ,jesus10 on its negative side1 is behind the advance of research and criticism4 ,but those are small details compared with the spirit and general purpose of the work4 ,in this moment1 when we are celebrating the discovery of a western world1 we may well pay homage to the scholar who rediscovered and exhumed an eastern world1 long buried under dbris of mythology and rubbish of superstitions4 ,this ,renan has done in his series of works on the 8,origins of ,christianity10 beginning with the 8,life of ,jesus10 dealing with the 8,apostles10 with 8,st4 ,paul10 with 8,antichrist10 and other studies1 leading up to his 8,history of the ,people of ,israel40 ,in all these works there is not a line that is not interesting1 alike to learned and unlearned4 ,as some one has said1 ,renan could make ,hebrew roots blossom with roses and lilies4 ,but that super-fine art of his was carrying the cause of intellectual and religious emancipation4 ,for these works concerned the constitution of ,europe4 ,this ,great ,britain1 with all its physical freedom1 is religiously a mere dependency of ,judea4 ,here men were formerly burnt1 until lately imprisoned1 and even now denied equal advantages1 not in accordance with what ,englishmen think1 but with the opinions of some ancient ,jews4 ,the voice of the ,jews was the voice of ,god4 ,but ,judea1 like the ,grand ,llama1 could rule only while veiled4 ,renan unveiled it4 ,he did it all the more effectually because in the literary and philosophic spirit4 ,all the ages of ,judea1 from the first tribal groups to the movement of ,john the ,baptist and ,jesus1 are assigned their exact place as successive chapters of human history1 the natural origin of their mythology is explained1 ,jehovah takes his seat beside ,jupiter and ,brahma1 ,jesus is revered with ,buddha and ,zoroaster2 and all this is done1 not by mere opinion1 but by impregnable facts1 unwearied researches1 inflexible veracity4 ,it was also done lovingly4 ,a superstition can survive combat1 but not explanation4 ,renan did much to remove ,christianity from the field of militant camps to the quiet province of literary investigation4 ,in the ,republic of ,letters there is no arbitrary authority4 ,the combat is left to salvation armies1--8theirs not to reason why40 ,there is a large ,renan literature4 ,more than three hundred works represent the efforts of theology to get the resuscitated human ,jesus back into his grave again4 ,renan's accessible life-work is represented by about twenty-five volumes1 of which some are philosophic diversions written amid the heavy labours of his ,college1 and while collecting and preserving for scholars the whole body of ,semitic inscriptions4 ,for more than twenty years ,renan has been training the young scholars of ,france--those who are to fashion ,france in the future1 and influence mankind4 ,those acquainted with his larger works can realise his immense service in elevating the standard of criticism1 and establishing the method of exact research and exact thought4 ,but there are other works of ,renan1 notably his ,philosophic ,dramas1 not yet translated1 from which may be better gathered the great variety of his ability1 the poetic play of his genius1 and the charm of his personality1 which some of us have personally felt1 and which so won all hearts that even the priesthood have not raised discordant notes in the homage and emotion with which his nation has laid him in an honored grave4 ,farewell1 great heart1 and great leader6 ,on your coffin ,i laid a wreath of immortelles for friendship1 for the homage of ,america1 and for the sake of this free ,english ,society4 ,for your victory is ours also3 your triumph is that of every independent mind on earth4 ,,moncure ,d4 ,,conway4 ,,intuition ,,and ,,reason4 ,the question whether we act more frequently from intuition or reason1 and the question that follows it1 which faculty is the more noble guide to conduct1 would have no more interest for the general public than any other of the subjects which the metaphysician exercises his ingenuity upon1--than the question1 for instance1 whether we execute a greater number of analytic or of synthetic judgments in the course of the day1--were it not that there is an ancient opinion to the effect that reason and intuition are marks respectively of the manner of working of men's and of women's minds4 ,the opinion is wholly unfounded1 and could only have had its origin at a time when the psychology of the working of the human mind was thoroughly misunderstood4 ,as the very terms in which the opinion is expressed make plain1 it dates from the period when it was the custom to speak of the human mind as having a lot of separate 8faculties0 under its control1 and of calling up now one and now another of them to do its bidding4 ,it is time that the belief in the different quality of men's and of women's minds should follow the whole antiquated machinery of 8faculties0 into the limbo of old and worn-out fashions of thought and of speech4 ,this illusion1 however1 like most of the illusions that have had a firm foot-hold in their day1 has a perfectly comprehensible reason for its existence4 ,it is not true that men's minds and women's minds have a different way of working2 but it is true that upon certain occasions 7and by far1 the greatest number of occasions7 we all--men1 women1 and negroes alike--act from intuition1 and that the circumstances of women's lives have hitherto been such as to make their interests lie somewhat more exclusively in those regions in which conduct is intuitive than in those in which it is long thought out4 ,it is not true that the ,creator has made two separate kinds of mind for men and for women2 but it is true that society1 as at present constituted1 offers two somewhat separate fields of interest for men and for women1 and that the nature of their conduct is of necessity determined by the character of the action which is demanded of them4 ,what is the difference for the psychologist1 between the mental state of a being who acts from reason1 and of one who acts from intuition8 ,it is not a difference of the kind of mind which controls him1 but of the kind of knowledge upon which his present conduct is based4 ,if one individual has got at his command a lot of general propositions bearing upon the case in hand1 and if his familiarity with them is not such that they flow together without conscious effort1 then he must laboriously piece them together1 and think out the conclusions which they necessitate4 ,if another individual1 having led a different life1 has had a lot of experiences which cover just such cases as this1 and if he has been taught by thousands of instances that under these circumstances a certain course of conduct will nearly always lead to good results1 then he can trust to his hands or his feet to execute that course of conduct without a moment's aid from conscious reflection2 he can go on with his novel1 or whatever other pleasant occupation engages his attention1 without the wear and tear of mind which is involved in consciously thinking about the circumstances in question4 ,now the differences in the mental processes of men and women are exactly of this nature4 ,they are differences dependent upon the fact that the knowledge at their command--that is1 the stored up premises upon which action is based--is1 to a certain extent1 of a different kind1 and got from different sources4 ,so far as the knowledge is not of a different kind1 the character of the action is not of a different kind4 ,there is an immense number of conclusions which men and women alike 8jump at10 every hour in the day2 and some of them represent reasoning so fixedly instinctive1 that even the closest attention does not enable us to drag it up into the light of consciousness4 ,how many people know that a certain feeling of strain in the muscles which move the eyes is a sign of a certain distance of an object looked at1 and a different feeling of strain1 a sign of a different distance2 and that when the eyes are fixed upon one point1 objects in the lateral field of view are judged to be nearer or farther away than that point1 according as the two disparate images which they cast upon the two retinas are1 the right-hand one or the left hand one1 the brighter8 ,the common man knows that one object is near and the other far1 but he is not conscious even of the feeling of strain1 nor of the existence of double images2 the physiological psychologist knows the unconscious syllogism by which he must reach his conclusion1 but even he cannot1 by any possibility1 make it cease to be instinctive1--that is1 make himself conscious of its different steps4 ,on the other hand1 no one1 whether man or woman1 can pass from one proposition in geometry to another by a process which is in any sense unconscious1 though one person may be obliged to give a much more strained attention to what he is doing than another4 ,now it is very possible that a greater number of the actions of women have their ground in unconscious causes than of the actions of men4 ,the subjects upon which action is of vital concern to them have been different subjects1 and hence their stored-up stock of knowledge is knowledge about different subjects4 ,to the woman of the past1 who was to a great extent confined to her own home1 the temper of her house-mates was what her happiness depended upon more than anything else in the world4 ,it was impossible that she should not acquire a keen intelligence in interpreting every slightest shade of expression upon the human face4 ,but this sort of knowledge is always instinctive1 whether it is practised by men or by women4 ,if the eyes of the most reasonable man in the world should chance to show him a certain curve of the lip and a certain elevation of the posterior angle of the al of the nostrils on the face of the fair lady to whom he was talking1 would he try to call to mind the pictures in ,sir ,charles ,bell's great work on expression and the general theorems in ,darwin's book on the same subject1 and piecing this and that laboriously together1 would he try to arrive at some just conclusion regarding the contents of the fair lady's mind8 ,would he not1 rather1 instinctively change the subject of conversation1 or even discreetly beat a retreat1 long before he had time to think8 ,women's interests have been so exclusively social that they have developed a sense for the physical expression of emotion which makes society for them a matter of complicated relations1 of delicate susceptibility to play of feeling1 which--except in the hyper-sensitive period of courtship--is not common among men4 ,but there are men who are quite the equals of women in this respect2 and if any man is markedly deficient in these qualities1 we recognise him as belonging to a low and brutal type which is in process of extinction4 ,if a woman on the other hand1 goes into business1 she does not fix the prices of her straw hats each morning in accordance with the feelings which straw hats awaken in her when she first looks at them1 but in accordance with the fluctuations of the market4 ,the ,president of a ,new ,hampshire ,street ,railway did not carry through her improvements by her intuitions1 but by a plain1 common-sense weighing of reasons4 ,nor are all masculine occupations under the guidance of the reasoning faculty4 ,if you go to a stove-man and ask him to mend your smoking chimney1 does he do it by reason8 ,not a bit of it6 ,there may be stove-men who have enough knowledge of the laws which regulate the movements of masses of hot air to be able to apply general principles to particular instances1 but in the course of a long and checkered experience with stove-men1 it has not been my lot to fall in with them4 ,their knowledge of chimneys1 such as it is1 is got by experience and applied by intuition1 and nothing is farther from their minds than any trace of deductive reasoning4 ,it is not that there are men's minds and women's minds1 but that there are theoretical subjects and practical subjects1 and that knowledge is not the same kind of knowledge in both4 ,intuition1 in the sense in which it is used when discussing male and female minds1 is a word of double meaning3 it covers those actions which we go through with by instinct1 or inherited experience ingrained from the beginning in our nervous structure1 and those which we perform automatically1 or by individual experience become so familiar that it can act as a guide without the aid of conscious reflection4 ,the relative distances of objects looked at we know instinctively2 the trained musician with mind intent upon expression1 reads his notes automatically2 the beginner at the piano goes through a painful process of syllogism before each key is struck4 ,all is1 at bottom1 reason2 in one case it is conscious2 in another it is unconscious1 but can be forced into consciousness2 in another1 it is unconscious and cannot by any effort be made conscious4 ,because a woman's interests lie more than a man's in regions in which thought is instinctive and automatic1 it does not follow that she has developed any peculiar powers of intuition4 ,nor is there any possibility that mothers should occasionally transmit their powers of intuition to favored sons1 as ,mr4 ,grant ,allen1 in the course of his apotheosis of the uneducated woman1 has somewhere suggested2 some men have poetic and sthetic minds1 and in regions of poetry and art mental activity is largely of the instinctive kind4 ,it is different with powers of reasoning4 ,good powers of reasoning may be transmitted from mother to son1 but that is merely saying metaphorically that a good firm texture of mind may be transmitted4 ,hume and ,james ,mill are two men who are supposed to owe much to their mothers1 but their peculiar powers are not usually considered to lie in regions of intuition4 ,no mother has ever produced an intuitive mathematician4 ,nor would any one who knew anything about the higher mathematics for a moment suppose that when a great mathematician leaves out intermediate steps in a printed book1 he had jumped at his conclusions by instinct4 ,it is simply that1 with his thorough knowledge of this particular subject1 the intermediate steps have seemed to him too easy to set down4 ,if his book is hard to read1 it is simply because he has assumed a greater amount of learning in his readers than they are in possession of4 ,the question whether intuition or reason is the nobler faculty is an exceedingly meaningless question4 ,all knowledge which finds frequent occasion to be put in practice has a tendency to become first automatic and then instinctive4 ,human progress consists in making conscious action automatic as soon as it can be done with safety1 and in setting free consciousness to attend to more and more complicated combinations of circumstances4 ,after the musician has learned to read his notes mechanically1 shall we urge him to go back to the period of conscious linking of note to key1 because reason is a diviner gift than intuition8 ,is it desirable to turn the act of walking into a conscious fitting of muscular tension to variations in the position of the centre of gravity in order to distinguish ourselves the more effectually from the brutes that perish8 ,reason is merely intuition in its formative stage1 and the sooner all our present reasoned convictions become mechanical1 and conscious thought is set free to bring in more and more far reaching considerations to bear upon our actions 7including in that term our conclusions71 the sooner will a higher form of life be reached4 ,wundt's students have made some experiments in his laboratory in the last two or three years1 which throw a great deal of light upon this question1--they have caught automatism in the very act of formation4 ,it has been noticed that different observers differed very much in the reaction time which they assigned to the several senses1--that is1 the time required1 for instance1 to hear the tap of a bell1 and to press a button in response4 ,wundt's students found that there are two different reaction times1--in one1 time is taken to bring the tap of the bell into the focus of consciousness and to decide consciously what to do in response2 in the other1 the process is unconscious4 ,the first is nearly twice as long as the second1 and both are very constant quantities1 for the same sense4 ,the exact figures are1 in seconds3 ,,full4 ,,short4 ,sound 4#baf 4#abg ,n4 ,lange 0 4#bce 4#aba ,belkin 0 4#bcj 4#abd ,l4 ,lange ,light 4#bij 4#agb ,l4 ,lange 0 4#bia 4#ahb ,martius ,it may be inferred from this that1 even in the simplest matters intuition is very nearly twice as valuable a 8faculty0 as reason1 as far as economy of time is concerned4 7,it would be interesting to determine the difference in fatigue47 ,but the interesting point is that the experimenter can teach himself to give either reaction time at his pleasure4 ,if he thinks of his ears1 he has a feeling of strain in them1 and a long reaction time2 if he directs his attention to his fingers 7or if he thinks of indifferent matters7 he is unconscious of what is going on1 and his reaction time is short4 ,it is plain that the more of these educated brain-reflexes we can produce1 the fuller and more complicated lives we shall be capable of carrying on4 ,it may also be assumed that the ideal human being is the one who has many brain-reflexes1 but who is capable of bringing them all into consciousness upon occasion4 ,connections that we cannot make conscious are a frequent source of illusion4 ,when we move the eye-ball about by the will1 objects seem to remain stationary2 but when1 putting the finger on the under eyelid1 we push the eye-ball up and down in the socket1 we cannot help perceiving that objects are moving up and down4 ,prof4 ,william ,james suggests as a good experiment that some one who has eyes that he is not afraid of injuring should do this pushing several hours a day1 and see if he cannot force conscious reason to do her work and to make him see that the objects are not moving4 ,for perfectly regular circumstances1--that is1 for the world of nature or of human character so far as is governed by fixed laws1--reflex action presents an immense economy of time and work4 ,to provide against extraordinary emergencies1 it would seem to be desirable that we should have the power of interposing consciousness in the chain which begins with stimulus and ends in action4 ,whenever a large number of considerations1 or considerations of an abstract character1 have to be weighed and balanced1 then reason is the only sufficient guide4 ,that women have no deficiency in the power of putting this and that together1 when this and that are pieces of knowledge which are in their possession1 is absolutely proved by a single circumstance4 ,geometry is a branch of learning which is entirely built up out of abstract reason1 pure and undefiled4 ,geometry is studied1 in the ,united ,states1 in high schools1 and it must not be forgotten that there are in this country 7according to the ,report of the ,bureau of ,education7 three times as many girls as boys who take the high school course4 ,it cannot be said1 therefore1 7as is said of girls who go to college7 that the girls who go to the high school are a selected lot2 they are the very bone and fibre of the women who make up the country4 ,now if women could not reason1 we ought to hear a great hue and cry from the teachers of the geometry classes about the difficulty of teaching that subject to girls1 and the girls ought to lament and moan over the impossibility of getting safely through with their demonstrations4 ,is this the case8 ,i have never met with a teacher of geometry who thought his boys did better than his girls1--,i have met with several who thought the reverse4 ,as long ago as #ahfe1 ,her ,majesty's ,inspector of schools1 after travelling through this country1 said3 8,the teachers all tell me that the girls do fully as well as the boys in mathematics1--fully40 ,nor are any sad effects noticeable upon health or spirits4 ,day after day an army of girls goes smiling into the class-room and comes smiling out1 utterly unaware that an unnatural wrench has been given to their delicate minds1 and that they are being rapidly transformed into monstrous products of over-reason4 ,if girls show no defect in reason in the class-room1 neither do boys show any defect in intuition1--in fact1 their intuition about stretched strings and lines on balls are usually better than those of girls4 ,i have kept a record for many years of errors committed by boys and by girls1 and ,i have not been able to detect any difference in their character4 ,it is true that it was a boy who once failed to get a problem in trigonometry for a week1 because it was not expressly stated in the book that the milestones to which the problem related were a mile apart4 ,my intimate acquaintance with the character of his mind prevented me1 however1 from attributing this failure in intuition to his superior reasoning powers4 ,the simple matter is that a good mind has good reasons and good intuitions both4 ,both qualities are summed up in the expressive popular phrase1 8having your wits about you40 ,if you are in full possession of your wits1 you will trust to your instincts1 when you must2 to your acquired reflexes1 when there is no sign of danger2 and to your reason1 when the question requires debate4 ,it would be greatly for the good of the race if the common virtues should become more instinctive in men2 and if women should be put into a position in which they can reflect more wisely upon the virtues which are only just in process of getting known to be such4 ,the only reason that women do not guide themselves by far-reaching principles in their every-day conduct1 is that they have not made themselves acquainted with the doctrines of political economy and of abstract ethics4 ,when women are in full possession of the higher education1 there is no danger that they will not put it into practice1 so far as it leads to practice4 ,the human mind is so constituted that it cannot help taking account of all its knowledge4 ,propositions merely learned by rote1 or the truth of which it is not absolutely convinced of1 it may leave one side1 but not what it really knows4 ,nor is there any danger that woman will lose her powers of intuition4 ,the knowledge and skill which she has acquired in social matters will not desert her because she has made herself familiar with the speculations of philosophers1 and can turn to them for guidance in the intricate questions of conduct which the complexities of modern life give rise to4 ,so long as a woman's highest duty was to please her lord and master1 her task was simple1 but women are now awake to a sense of wider responsibilities4 ,they are now aware that it is their highest duty to be the best possible kind of a human being1 and to do whatever lies within their strength towards making the world the best possible kind of a world to live in4 ,for this end they have urgent need of all the gifts that ,god has given them2 and he who would cripple their reason on the ground that intuition is a pleasing and a poetic guide1 would do them a grievous wrong4 ,,christine ,,ladd ,,franklin4 ,,cruelty ,,and ,,pity ,,in ,,woman4 ,i4 ,,cruelty4 ,spencer says#bd that among savage nations the women are as perverse as the men1 and that if they do not work so much evil it is because they are less able to do so4 ,this is not entirely true2 doubtless women among savages are much more inclined to cruelty than to pity1 but1 generally speaking1 woman even at the very beginnings of human evolution is less cruel than man4 ,,woman ,,and ,,war4 ,woman1 even among savage nations1 is rarely a warrior4 ,in the ,antilles1 the women watched over the safety of the islands whenever their husbands went to war with the neighboring islands2 they were brave1 strong1 courageous1 nearly equalling the men in their cleverness in handling weapons4#be ,amongst the ancient ,bretons1 armies were always commanded by women4 ,in ,dahomey1 the lite of the army is composed of a troop of six or seven thousand ,amazons1 who are very ferocious1 particularly in the mutilation of dead bodies2 women then become tigers1 is a popular saying4 ,among the ancient ,scots1 women followed the army1 and cruelly mutilated the prisoners4 ,among the ,botocudos1 when war breaks out between the tribes1 the men fight the men with sticks1 and the women fight the women1 by scratching and by tearing the botoques 7cylinders of wood7 from their ears and lips4#bf ,but these are all exceptional cases4 ,generally speaking1 the savage woman plays a secondary part in war2 she acts as an auxiliary1 picks up arrows1 throws stones from a distance1 and carries the provisions etc4 ,,revenge4 ,it is above all in revenge1 that feminine cruelty shows itself the most terrible4 ,man is capable of destroying whole families or nations1 to satisfy a particular revenge2 but nothing equals the ingenuity of woman1 in slowly tormenting her victim1 in gloating over his sufferings and lengthening them out in order that her enjoyment of vengeance may endure as long as possible4 ,in ,tasmania1 when the black war broke out between the ,english and the aborigines1 the ,tasmanian women terribly tortured the prisoners1 in order to avenge their companions who had been carried off by the ,english4 ,we must also attribute to the desire for vengeance1 the torments inflicted by the women upon prisoners of war among the ,red ,indians4 ,elizabeth of ,russia1 betrayed by her lover1 obliged him to marry a deformed dwarf1 and to pass his wedding night in an ice palace1 where the furniture and the bed were all of ice4 ,the next morning1 attended by her ,court1 she went to present the newly wedded pair with a bouquet4 ,she found them1 stretched out upon their bed of ice1 nearly frozen4 ,she then banished her rival to ,siberia first causing her ears and nose to be cut off4 ,a wealthy ,russian ,prince1 in love with a very beautiful peasant girl of fifteen1 took her to live with him for five years2 at the end of which time1 wishing to contract an alliance1 he paid her a sum of money in dower and obliged her to marry a peasant4 ,the young girl made no sign for ten years1 until the death of her husband2 but after the lapse of that period1 a rising having taken place among the peasantry against the nobles1 she excited them and led a body of peasants to the castle of her ancient lover1 had him taken and dragged into his izba1 harnessed him to the plough instead of the oxen1 and for three days obliged him thus to work1 lashing him with the whip each time that he fell to the ground4 ,at night she led him to the stable and made him lie down with the oxen2 compelling him to eat fodder with the beasts and making merry over his sorry plight4 ,this amusement lasted for three days1 at the end of which time1 the man fell dead in one of the furrows he was ploughing4#bg ,a ,russian1 an idle and worthless fellow who had let his wife suffer hunger1 proposed to her that she should be sold as a slave to the ,sultan4 ,after some hesitation1 she accepted and they started off2 but when they had gone about half the way1 the husband having fallen asleep intoxicated1 the idea came into her mind to sell him for a slave1 in her place4 ,she then tied him on the horse1 started off again on the road and arriving at the place of rendezvous1 she delivered her husband to the merchant1 and remained to watch the ,turk push the half-awakened man into the boat1 laughing whilst he showered blows upon him4#bh ,a young ,russian peasant woman lived with a small land-owner1 who betrayed her2 at last she took refuge with a band of brigands1 who treated her like a queen4 ,one day she caused two of them to capture her old lover1 and had him brought to the camp where she used him as a kind of living foot-stool3 when she sat down she covered him with a carpet and put her feet upon him1 and when she wanted to go out she made him carry her on his shoulders4 ,,cruelty ,,to ,,the ,,helpless4 ,woman sometimes displays the same amount of ingenuity in tormenting the helpless creatures who may be in her power4 ,i do not know1 says ,bourgavel1 any one more perfidious1 immoral1 or perverse than the ,new ,caledonian woman4 ,in certain portions of ,australia women are mortal foes to each other4 ,when the men wish to punish any one of them1 they turn her over to her companions1 who inflict upon her horrible tortures4#bi ,sitting on her body1 they cut her flesh with sharpened stones4 ,in ,tasmania1 as amongst the ancient ,saxons1 the unfaithful wife was punished by her companions2 she was not killed1 but she was tortured for a long time with sharp pointed stones or knives1 in all parts of her body4 ,women have often been cruel mistresses to their slaves4 ,a lady in ,guiana1 being envious of a very handsome mulatto slave1 had her branded on the mouth1 cheeks and forehead4 ,in the case of another slave1 who was also very beautiful1 she had the tendon of ,achilles cut thus causing her to become a deformed and crippled monster4#cj ,it is a notorious fact that ,roman and ,greek ladies often inflicted most terrible punishments on their slaves1 and that it was more particularly towards the female slaves1 the ancill1 that the cruelty of their mistresses was shown4 ,the ,roman ladies1 if1 while they were having their hair dressed1 they were vexed with their attendants1 used to thrust pins into their arms and breasts4 ,darwin relates that at ,rio ,janeiro1 an old lady possessed a kind of thumb screw which she had had made expressly to crush the fingers of her slaves4 ,,epidemic ,,cruelty4 ,during periods of great national excitement1 such as revolutions1 feminine cruelty shows how far it can go4 ,the women1 writes ,m4 ,du ,camp1 were the fiercest heroines of the ,commune2 it was a woman who incited the assassination of the ,dominicans4 ,when the hostages were shot1 they surpassed the men in cruelty2 they taunted them with not knowing how to kill4 ,when employed to seek out the insurgents they were implacable2 when acting as infirmarians1 they killed the wounded by giving them brandy to drink4 ,at the time of the ,french ,revolution1 on the days of execution1 writes ,m4 ,legouv1#ca the front rows nearest the guillotine were reserved for the women of the political clubs4 ,they even hung on to the boards of the scaffold1 in order the better to witness the death throes of the condemned1 and drowned the cries of the victims by their peals of laughter4 ,,ii4 ,,pity4 ,but again we find a series of contradictory facts1 which bear witness that the sentiment of pity also is much keener in woman than in man4 ,even with animals1 we observe this phenomenon4 ,hens often separate two young cocks who are fighting together4 ,sir ,george ,le ,grand ,jacob has observed females of the wild goat 7,steinbock7 raise with their heads he-goats that had been shot1 support them and help them to escape4 ,romanes relates1 that sometimes the female gibbon1 takes great care of all the members of the troop when they are wounded1 even if they are not related4#cb ,the savage woman also is very often kind and good4 ,it is notorious that the explorers of savage countries have often escaped serious perils1 thanks to the kindness of the native women4 ,australasian women have often revealed to ,european travellers the plots laid against them by the men of their tribe3 they have even risked their own lives for that purpose4#cc ,stanley1 at the island of ,bambyrch1 on the ,nyanza1 was roughly greeted by the natives1 who were desirous of exterminating his expedition2 but a woman came to warn him and to advise him to perform a certain ceremony with the ,king ,shekka by which he would acquire his friendship4 ,in ,senegambia an old woman1 meeting ,mungo ,park1 who was half dead of starvation and had just been despoiled by a negro king1 gave him food1 and went away without waiting to be thanked4 ,another time the same traveller1 being left with nothing but his saddle1 was hospitably entertained by some women1 whom he heard chant these words as he fell asleep3 8,the winds roared and the rain beat1 the poor white man came and sat down under our tree1 he had no mother to give him milk1 no wife to grind him corn4 ,let us take pity on the white man1 he has no mother1 etc41 etc40#cd ,michelet says that woman was the first physician2 and certainly she fulfils the office of infirmarian among many savage peoples1 the ,esquimaux1 the ,mincopies1 etc4 etc4 ,in war the ,samoan woman often interferes to make peace between the belligerents4 ,among the ,khonds1 also1 when two tribes quarrel1 the women sometimes make peace1 calling in the intervention of a third tribe4 ,quite recently1 among the ,montenegrins and ,albanians1 fierce strife broke out between different families1 but in these fights1 if a man took refuge with a woman and she covered him with her apron1 he was safe4 ,among the ,bedouin ,arabs a woman can save the life of the condemned man who implores her protection4 ,so it also was among the ,roman ,vestals1 when in the streets they accidentally met a man condemned to death2 it was required1 however1 that the meeting should be evidently a chance one1 for it was feared that the privilege might be carried too far4 ,among civilised nations this sentiment of pity becomes naturally more developed4 ,christianity owed a great deal of its success among women to the fact1 that it knew how to make use of their pity1 by organising those associations of women which are its greatest ornament4 ,from the earliest years after the death of ,jesus1 in the cenobitic form of society lived by the disciples of the ,messiah1 they made use of the charitable sentiment of childless widows and created the order of ,deaconesses1 which was devoted to the care of the poor and the sick4#ce ,legouv says3 8,women offered their services to ,christianity like a volunteer battalion consecrated to charitable work4 ,in the ,apostles' time their mission was one of sympathy and watchfulness1 a mother's vocation2 in the time of the ,martyrs they remained womanly in their modesty1 while exhibiting a manly courage2 in the time of the ,doctors1 whilst orators speak and learned men write1 women continue to love and console40#cf ,this ,christian tradition has survived and is still powerful1 thanks to the deeply laid sentiment of pity in the heart of woman4 8,private charity in ,paris10 writes ,m4 du ,camp1#cg 8is almost entirely in the hands of women4 ,there are in ,paris women of the world1 young and beautiful1 born for pleasure1 accustomed to every luxury1 who visit the poor1 nurse the sick1 rock little motherless children1 and all this they do simply without a word of self-praise40 ,the society of 8,les ,dames du ,calvaire10 in ,paris1 is composed of widows1 who1 without binding themselves by religious vows1 engage to nurse the sick gathered into the hospitals of the association1 poor outcasts attacked by loathsome diseases--cancer1 for example4 ,women of wealth and belonging to great families often obtain admission to this society4 ,female religious orders are rarely contemplative2 they are nearly always charitable in aim4 8,the ,daughters of ,charity0 possess establishments all over the known world2 they migrate1 says ,m4 du ,camp1 8like benevolent birds1 carrying with them the principle of self-sacrifice and the love of those that suffer4 ,in all countries ,i have visited1 among sects most antagonistic to their religion1 ,i have beheld them at work2 their faces shadowed by the immense cap1 which resembles the wings of a white swan2 instructing children1 visiting the sick1 caring for the plague-stricken1 blessed by our sailors whom they nurse in the ,french hospitals in foreign lands40#ch ,pity in woman is sometimes so powerful a sentiment that it supplies the place in her of a higher faculty1 intelligence4 ,it was thus that a humble servant-maid1 without learning1 who could neither read nor write1 founded one of the most prominent nursing sisterhoods in ,france1 8,les petites ,soeurs des ,pauvres10 which to-day numbers #c1djj sisters1 and possesses #bjg houses1 where more than #be1jjj old men are received and cared for4 ,in the first half of this century there was such misery in ,brittany that the old men were literally abandoned by all4 ,jeanne ,jugau1 whose earnings hardly sufficed to maintain herself1 took in one1 then two1 then a number of them1 without a thought of her own poverty1 slaving might and main for their support4 ,two women1 ,virginie ,tredaniel and ,marie ,catherine1 helped her2 a priest1 ,le ,pailleur1 took the direction of their work1 and in a short time the order was founded1 and grew apace4 ,there1 where genius might have failed1 the love and pity of a servant-maid succeeded4 ,another heroine of charity1 though of a different type1 was ,jeanne ,garnier4 ,she was perpetually haunted by a desire to do good1 to help and succour the unfortunate4 ,m4 du ,camp has portrayed her character in a most graphic manner3 impulsive1 prone from childhood to adopt extreme measures1 while in the convent she was given to rebellious and untractable conduct1 for which she was sent away4 ,when she was twenty years old she married2 the love she bore her husband and two sons was deep and ardent4 ,three years after her marriage she had the unspeakable grief of losing both husband and sons at one fell stroke4 ,after this occurrence her life had but one aim1 ceaselessly and untiringly to succour and help the sorrowful4 ,one day she was told that a woman1 disfigured by a cutaneous disease1 was lying in an attic in ,lyons1 abandoned by every one4 ,she went at once to her1 ministered to her1 and every day went to wash her sores4 ,thus was suggested to her the founding of the association of 8,les ,dames du ,calvaire10 of which we have already spoken1 and the idea of pressing into the service of the sick1 widows who found themselves in the same position as herself4 ,she was not rich1 but being an untiring and determined worker1 capable of attacking the same person ten times a day1 she obtained money4 ,when they had to convey the sick to the new hospital1 there was among them one woman so horribly disfigured by burns that no conveyance could be found whose driver was willing to take her4 ,jeanne ,garnier then took her on her own shoulders and carried her there herself4 ,the association of 8,les ,dames du ,calvaire0 was not the only charitable work which owes its existence to her4 ,she conceived a great many other plans1 of which many were carried out1 for she never ceased working1 up to the moment of her death1 which occurred at forty-two years of age1 of exhaustion4 ,in the ,united ,states1 where woman enjoys much greater freedom than in ,europe1 she makes an excellent use of her liberty4 ,in fact1 all associations of women have a charitable end in view2 and these societies not being subjected to the severe rules of ,catholic religious orders1 and not requiring from their members so absolute a renunciation of the pleasures of life1 exhibit the most perfect and most modern form of charitable associations1 which have been known up to the present day4 ,the first woman's club that was founded in that country1 the ,sorosis1 has for its object the amelioration of the condition of shop-girls3 it has also founded asylums for homeless children4 ,the ,temperance ,union1 founded by women1 seeks to stem the tide of intemperance4 ,the ,women's ,league has obtained the admission of women on commissioners boards for schools and hospitals4 ,the ,college ,settlement ,girls1 composed of female graduates from universities1 carry help into the purlieus of the city4#ci ,,cruelty1 ,,pity1 ,,and ,,the ,,maternal ,,sentiment4 ,is woman kind or cruel8 ,can we reconcile these two series of facts1 so contradictory in themselves8 ,that is the question which now comes before us4 ,let us seek1 first of all1 the origin and the genesis of feminine cruelty4 ,we have seen women exhibiting great ingenuity in torturing2 she does not wish to destroy her enemies1 but to torment and torture them2 she seeks to protract their pain as long as possible1 and to lengthen out her enjoyment of vengeance4 ,on this point woman goes much further than man3 for among savages men do not amuse themselves by prolonging the miseries of their enemies2 they rather wreak their vengeance by killing them at one stroke4 ,savages often make a wholesale carnage1 massacring whole tribes and nations4 ,but it is always the woman who practices the art of killing a man by inches1 over a slow fire1 as it were4 ,thus we find that the redskins give their prisoners of war over to their women4 ,notice1 even at the present day1 the difference between the quarrels of men and women4 ,women scratch each other1 tear out the hair1 fly at the eyes of their adversaries1 trying to inflict some painful wound3 men give blows and stabs2 they strive to disable or stun their enemy1 or to destroy him4 ,there is the same difference but on a smaller scale4 ,this aptitude in inflicting pain is an outgrowth of weakness4 ,we know from the ,darwinian theory of natural selection1 and from the struggle for life1 that every living being must be provided with a certain number of means of defense and offense1 and amongst these means must be classed many instincts and sentiments which spring from natural selection1 adaptation1 and heredity4 ,the cruelty of woman is one of these instincts and sentiments4 ,woman not being powerful enough to destroy her enemies1 had to seek for the means of defending herself1 by wounding their more delicate organs1 by inflicting such acute pain as would serve to disable them4 ,this tendency to protect one's self by such means has become instinctive by heredity2 and so much the more since the woman who was able thus to defend herself1 had at the outset of man's evolution a far better chance of survival4 ,all this is so true1 that we find other weak creatures also to be cruel4 ,children take pleasure in tormenting insects1 birds1 or little dogs1 and are very cruel to each other4 ,i knew a child who used to cut his nails like the teeth of a saw1 in order to inflict more painful scratches on his companions4 ,humming birds1 says ,brehm1 are the smallest and the cruelest of birds4 ,when they are attacked by a more powerful enemy they try to peck out his eyes with their long1 sharp beaks4 ,the struggle for life and natural selection has provided their weakness with this means of defense1 and they are even cruel to each other when they fight1 to such an extent has the sentiment of cruelty in them become instinctive4 ,and now we must seek for the genesis of the other phenomenon1 pity4 ,it is a notorious fact1 that maternity being the great function of woman1 through the whole order of animal life1 with the exception of some few fishes1 it is always the female who is thus the benefactress of the race4 ,maternity is always an altruistic function2 in the inferior orders this altruism is a purely physical act1 and consists merely in a material sacrifice2 7the detaching of a portion of the maternal body1 under the form of bud1 or egg27 in the higher orders1 this altruism becomes psychical and consists in a conscious sacrifice of self and of vitality in the interests of the race4 ,what then is the essential nature of these altruistic sacrifices8 ,maternity is protection given to weakness2 for the infant is above all other created things a being requiring succour4 ,it is thus that1 the images relating to the state of weakness being in great numbers strongly impressed on the mind of woman1 when one of them presents itself to her1 by the law of association it awakens all those maternal sentiments whose function it is to help the weak4 ,at first1 motherhood only extends from a woman's own children to those of others2 this is the first stage of pity1 such as we find it in the animals and among many undeveloped savage peoples4 ,afterwards in a region of higher psychical development the sentiment of pity broadens till it embraces a wider group1 the sick1 the aged1 those condemned to death2 for all those unfortunates who claim the pity of woman are the weak appealing for help to the strong4 ,it is only the weak who can inspire pity4 ,thus pity1 in woman1 is but the outgrowth of the maternal sentiment applied to a larger class of helpless people4 8,woman10 says ,m4 du ,camp1 8may bind herself by the religious vow of chastity2 but she is a born mother and remains a mother1 even though circumstances may have broken the physical law of her sex4 ,the ,little ,sisters of the ,poor1 call their pensioners #8the good little old men1' and themselves #8the good little sisters1' their superior #8the good little mother4' ,with them everybody is good and little2 all these expressions are the reflection of maternal love40 ,we must mention also1 that one cause of a livelier sense of pity in woman1 is her own weakness and her lower intellect4 8,anger10 writes ,a4 ,bain1 8the passion for war1 are bound up with activity and strength2 conditions of weakness and of repose are favorable to the softer sentiments40 ,strong men who display great muscular or mental activity1 and who often experience the satisfactions arising from power1 only realise with extreme difficulty the feelings of the weak2 for1 as ,h4 ,spencer remarks1#dj 8to feel pity for any suffering which we witness1 we must have experienced it ourselves to the same extent or in an approximate degree40 ,thus healthy persons become1 after a serious sickness1 more feeling than they formerly were for those who are suffering2 women are continually in a state of ill-health4 ,besides which women have not been involved in the struggle for life1 as have men during the whole process of evolution3 this struggle for life implying1 as it does1 the necessity of pursuing one's own object irrespective of the ills which it may entail on the unhappy competitors1 and often rendering a man insensible to the sorrows of those around him4 ,to this we add1 that love for man has not been without influence in developing the sense of pity in woman4 ,the main characteristic of the love of woman towards man1 is self-abnegation and devotion2 woman finds her happiness in devotion to the man she loves and in making for him the most painful sacrifices4 ,read the 8,letters of ,heloise10 the 8,life of ,carlyle10 or the 8,life of ,mme4 de ,lespinasse40 ,each woman1 carries hidden in her heart1 an inexhaustible treasure of devotion which heredity has added to through all the centuries1 during which woman has lived in contact with man and sought to win his good-will1 displaying an affection and an ardent zeal in his behalf2 nothing then is easier than to spend this treasure on the unhappy1 when she has not found the man on whom to lavish it4 ,the close relationship between pity1 maternity1 and love1 is also shown by this fact1 that the heroines of charity are almost always widows without sons1 or unmarried women4 ,when a woman has a husband or sons to love and cherish1 she does not feel the same tenderness towards the suffering2 this goes to prove that if these two sentiments are interchangeable1 they are but two different forms of the same thing4 ,,pity ,,and ,,cruelty4 ,we are now in a position to answer the question3 ,is woman kind or cruel8 ,pity and cruelty coexist together in her2 we might call this state in woman a state of unstable equilibrium2 to-day she is kind1 divinely good1 charitable2 to-morrow she will be perverse and cruel4 ,on one side her feebleness renders her cruel1 and her impulsive nature prevents her from repressing the outbursts of anger and of vengeance2 on the other hand1 the gentle habits of maternal affection1 her lower intelligence1 and even the weakness of her nature develop in her kindly sentiments4 ,woman may experience the strongest feelings of maternal affection at the sight of a helpless creature2 but that will not prevent her from cruelly persecuting a rival1 especially if she has been wounded in her sentiments of wife or mother4 ,thus woman1 who is the natural protector of the weak1 treats them oftentimes with a cruelty of which man is totally incapable4 ,woman loves1 hates1 consoles1 inflicts pain1 according as she finds herself in the presence of a friend1 an enemy1 a helpless being1 or of a rival4 ,many of the fiercest heroines of the ,paris ,commune1 had been trained nurses during the war1 and distinguished for their devotion to the sick4 ,there is nothing astonishing in this1 for contradiction in feeling is so often a psychical law that a great ,italian philosopher1 ,robert ,ardig1 has said that man is not a logical being4 ,we have noticed before that weakness is in part the cause of cruelty and partly also of pity1 and this accounts for the co-existence of the two contrary sentiments4 ,they coexist because they have a common origin4 ,but this instability of equilibrium is lessened by evolution1 and pity becomes stronger than cruelty4 ,among civilised nations the cruelty of women has become merely a moral attitude3 the civilised woman1 less powerful than her savage sister1 no more subjects her enemies to physical pain1 does not shed their blood2 she contents herself with slandering them1 turning them into ridicule1 and humiliating them4 ,the diminution of muscular strength is in itself favorable to the softening of female character4 ,furthermore1 sexual selection also helps in this2 in the human race as civilisation advances the male assumes more and more the right of selection1 and man shrinks instinctively from meeting in a woman a high development of the qualities which he himself possesses1 for he wishes to dominate her and to be her superior4 ,this explains to us the singular fact1 which we notice every day1 that of a savant marrying a stupid or unintelligent wife2 this is why the normal man1 as also the vicious1 choose gentle and good women when they desire to found families4 ,if sometimes the choice falls on a wicked woman1 it is because the man desires to form a criminal co-partnership1 such as was perhaps the normal condition of family life during the early days of human evolution4 ,many of the domestic tragedies which we witness to-day can be traced to no other cause than this penchant of the male1 even of the vicious1 to choose the woman who appears to be the most gentle4 ,women with their clear penetration and sure instincts have seized upon this inclination in man and made capital out of it with infinite ability3 do we not see many young women simulate a gentleness1 a sweetness1 and kindness which they do not naturally possess in order to capture the good-will of men8 ,women have thus practised the habit of repressing their evil penchants1 through interested motives1 because they saw that men chose the most gentle among them as wives4 ,besides sexual selection1 physical grace plays a conspicuous part1 as well as those psychical qualities which are associated with it4 ,man having set a high value on graceful demeanour1 woman sought and still seeks with all her strength to adorn herself with it4 ,we know that by the law of association between the emotional states and their outward expression1 which mutually correspond1 each gesture1 each attitude1 and each graceful expression of the countenance has a tendency to throw the mind into some sweet and peaceful condition2 this is why the culture of physical grace has been for woman an exercise of goodness4 ,this fostering of physical beauty has had a beneficial influence on her moral character4 ,we might say that as woman grew in beauty1 she became better4 ,finally woman being in the present day more respected than in former times1 she has less often the occasion to exercise her instinctive cruelty1 which on this account is being gradually obliterated4 ,pity each day becomes more and more the normal state of the feminine mind1 and cruelty the exception4 ,in order to be cruel1 a woman's character must be perverted1 as is the case in female criminals1 whose vice exceeds that of man in similar circumstances4 ,or she must have received some deep provocation1 wounding her profoundly in her deepest and tenderest sentiments1 which has awakened the original cruelty slumbering latent in the depths of her heart4 ,we may thus predict that in the ages to come1 woman will become entirely good4 ,,guillaume ,,ferrero4 ,,footnotes3 #bd ,spencer4 ,principles of ,sociology1 ,,ii41 p4 #cfa4 #be ,irving4 ,hist4 of the ,life and ,voyages of ,chris4 ,columbus1 ,,ii41 p4 #ae4 #bf ,hovelacque4 ,les dbuts de l'humanit4 #bg ,sacher-,masoch4 ,rev4 des ,deux ,mondes4 #bh ,sacher-,masoch4 ,ibid4 #bi ,letourneau4 ,evolution de la ,morale1 p4 #abb4 #cj ,mantegazza4 ,fisiologia etc4 ,milan4 #ahhi4 #ca ,histoire morale des femmes4 #cb ,romanes4 ,animal ,intelligence1 ,vol4 ,,ii4 #cc ,hovelacque4 ,op4 cit4 #cd ,letourneau4 ,la ,sociologie d'aprs l'ethnographie4 ,paris1 #ahhd4 #ce ,renan4 ,les ,aptres4 #cf ,op4 cit4 #cg ,la charit prive ,paris1 #ahhg4 #ch ,op4 cit4 #ci ,the ,forum4 #ahia4 #dj ,spencer4 ,principles of ,psychology1 ,,ii1 p4 #fdh4 ,,panpsychism ,,and ,,panbiotism4 ,i4 ,,professor ,,haeckel',s ,,panpsychism4 ,professor ,haeckel1 in his article 8,our ,monism10#da propounds the theory of ,panpsychism1 which he considers as an essential feature of ,monism4 ,he says3 8,one highly important principle of my monism seems to me to be that ,i regard all matter as ensouled1 that is to say1 as endowed with feeling 7pleasure and pain7 and with motion1 or1 better1 with the power of motion4 ,as elementary 7atomistic7 attraction and repulsion these powers are asserted in every simplest chemical process1 and on them is based also every other phenomenon1 consequently also the highest developed soul-activity of man4 8,simplest example3 sulphur and quicksilver rubbed together form cinnabar1 a new body of entirely different properties4 ,this is possible only on the supposition that the molecules 7or atoms7 of the two elements if brought within the proper distance1 mutually feel each other1 by attraction move toward each other2 on the decomposition of a simple chemical compound the contrary takes place3 repulsion4 7,empedocles's doctrine of #8the love and hatred of atoms4'70 ,not being able to accept ,professor ,haeckel's doctrine of ,panpsychism1 ,i propose what might best be called ,panbiotism1 briefly set forth in the maxim 2 that is1 everything is fraught with life2 it contains life2 it has the ability to live4 ,the word is mostly used by ,greek authors in the negative1 as in the phrase 1 an unlivable life1 in the sense of a life unendurable or not worth living4 ,thus ,sophocles and others4 ,the word is embodied in the term ,panbiotism in its etymological sense of 8livable40 ,i am willing to concede to ,professor ,haeckel that all nature is alive4 ,indeed1 ,i have most emphatically insisted on the doctrine that there is a spontaneity pervading all nature4 7,see 8,fundamental ,problems10 #b;d ed41 pp4 #aaj et seqq47 ,by spontaneity is to be understood that kind of activity which springs from the nature of the being or thing which is active4 ,a motion that is caused by pressure or push is not spontaneous2 but a motion1 the motive power of which resides in the moving object1 is spontaneous4 ,thus a cart rolling down a hill by its own weight performs a spontaneous motion1 but when drawn by horses moves1 or rather is moved1 by pull without any spontaneity4#db ,now everything that exists is possessed of certain qualities2 its existence is of some definite1 peculiar kind1 and this its peculiar kind is the character of the thing4 ,in the character of a thing lies the source of its spontaneous actions4 ,the spontaneous actions of the chemical elements depend upon their qualities1 which always react under certain circumstances in a definite way1 and under the same conditions in the same way4 ,the action of sulphur and quicksilver lies in the nature of these elements4 ,their union is not passive1 but active4 ,they are not combined1 but they do combine4 ,he who observes and studies nature cannot be blind to the fact that an inalienable1 intrinsic power is resident in every thing that exists4 ,this is true not only of organised life1 but also of the chemical elements as well as of gravitating masses4 ,the motion of a falling stone can1 no more than the actions of oxydising substances1 be considered as ultimately due to an extraneous pressure that makes them move by push1 or to a vis a tergo acting upon inert matter4 ,these motions must be spontaneous2 they are due to powers inherent in the nature of reality4 ,they are self-motions1 and in this sense we say that all nature is alive4 ,the term 8life0 is here used in a broader sense than ordinarily4 ,it means spontaneity or self-motion1 while in its common signification the term 8life0 is restricted only to the spontaneous action of organised beings1 i4 e4 of plants and animals4 ,in order to distinguish life in the broader sense from the narrower or common acceptance of the term1 we call the latter 8organised life40 ,it is not impossible1 and ,i consider it even as most probable1 that the difference between ,professor ,haeckel and myself rests on a different usage of the term soul4 ,but a vague or inconsistent usage of the term1 unless we are especially careful in so defining it as to prevent misunderstandings1 will inevitably beget errors4 ,thus the doctrine of ,panpsychism is liable to lead to fantastic ideas1 and to cause great confusion concerning the activity of what is generally called inanimate nature4 ,soul 7as ,i understand the term7 is a system of sentient symbols4 ,the problem of the origin of the soul is solved as soon as we understand how feelings can acquire meaning4 ,suppose we have some sentient substance exposed to the impressions of the surrounding world4 ,the sense-impressions of the surrounding world leave traces in the sentient substance2 these traces1 which are structures of a certain form corresponding exactly to the various impressions1 are preserved and constitute a predisposition to being very easily revived by impressions of the same kind4 ,the revival of feeling in traces left in the sentient structure from former impressions is called memory4 ,if a new impression of the same kind as the traces of the former impressions affects a sentient being1 the new impression already finds a convenient path for its reception prepared4 ,its peculiar vibration fits in the old trace and thus runs along very easily in the memory-grooves of former impressions1 reviving at the same time the feelings perceived at their original formation4 ,the feeling thus caused is composed of several elements1 which naturally melt into one3 first1 there is that kind of feeling which is produced by the present impression2 secondly1 there is the revival of former feelings or memory-sensations2 and thirdly1 there is a feeling of congruence resulting from the combination of these two4 ,this third element is a new and a very important feature4 ,we suppose that it is extremely insignificant in the beginning1 but being a constantly growing factor1 it rapidly increases in importance4 ,the stronger and the more independent the memory-structures become1 the more clearly will their congruence with fresh sense-impressions be felt as a congruence4 ,this feeling of congruence is the simplest form of what psychologists generally call 8recognition40 ,the recognition of a sense-impression1 as being the same as some former sense-impression1 adds to the feeling a new quality2 it imparts meaning to it4 ,this feeling of a special kind will now stand for something4 ,in this way impressions upon sentient substance will1 in the course of their natural development1 simply by the repetition of similar and same impressions1 come to indicate the presence of certain conditions that cause the impression4 ,this act of indicating something1 of symbolising the presence of a reality1 of possessing meaning1 is the birth of soul4 ,sense-impressions that have acquired meaning are called sensations4 ,a sensation standing for a special object symbolises that object4 ,abstract ideas are symbols of a higher degree1 but they remain symbols just the same4 ,and it is the sentient symbols which constitute the soul4 ,those actions which are regulated by the meanings of sentient symbols of which a soul consists should alone1 according to a strict terminology1 be called 8psychical40 ,the falling stone1 the chemical elements1 when combining or separating1 etc41 are alive2 there is a spontaneously acting power even in unorganised nature2 but the actions of unorganised nature are not determined by the meaning of feelings1 and1 in truth1 we have no reason to believe that their feelings--granting that they really do possess feelings of some kind--are freighted with even so much as the slightest inkling of significance4 ,in a word1 there is no soul in the stone2 there is no mind in the water-fall2 and there is nothing psychical in either oxygen or hydrogen4 ,but there is soul wherever meaning can be found as the regulating motive of actions2 there is purpose4 ,and wherever purpose is1 there is mind4 ,,ii4 ,,pleasure ,,and ,,pain4 ,professor ,haeckel goes still farther in the application of his theory of ,panpsychism3 he speaks of the atoms not only as feeling each other1 but also as having pleasure and pain4 ,this indicates either that he is serious in his belief in the psychical nature of all things1 or it proves how dangerous it is to introduce an allegorical expression the allegorical character of which is from the beginning lost sight of4 ,what are pleasure and pain8 ,pleasure and pain are known to us by experience2 they are feelings4 ,pleasure is an agreeable1 pain a disagreeable feeling4 ,pleasure and pain are different from sensation4 ,sensations are representative of certain somethings called objects4 ,pleasures and pains1 however1 are not representative1 they are purely subjective states4 ,there may be pleasurable or painful sensations1 and there may be pain indicating the presence of pain-producing objects1 but that does not concern us now4 ,when speaking of pleasure and pain we do not refer to the representative value of feelings1 but consider a merely subjective aspect1 pleasure being the agreeableness1 pain the disagreeableness of feeling4 ,accordingly pleasure and pain presuppose the existence of an organised system of feelings4 ,an isolated feeling1 we have learned1 is meaningless2 it is still less pleasurable or painful4 ,in order to agree or disagree1 there must be something with which to agree or disagree4 ,therefore1 although pleasure and pain are not symbols indicative of some objective presence1 they can take place only in sentient organisms1 in systems of feelings1 in souls4 ,where these complex conditions1 indicative of the presence of a soul1 are absent1 we have no right to speak of the presence of pleasure and pain4 ,we cannot interpret the phenomena of unorganised nature as being endowed with feelings of pleasure and pain4 ,pleasure and pain are psychical phenomena1 and psychical phenomena can take place in souls only4 ,we might as well speak of the presence of positive and negative electricity in the cataract1 the water-power of which is employed to produce electricity4 ,electricity is1 in such a case1 transformed water-power2 but can we1 for that reason1 say that the motion of water is either positive or negative electricity8 ,all the motions of the objective world must be supposed to have their subjective correlates2 but the simplest forms of objective phenomena cannot have those subjective correlates which1 according to our experience1 appear and have their conditions of appearance only in the most complex and highest developed forms of existence--in organised nature4 99 99 99 99 99 ,the physiological conditions of pleasure and pain are now just beginning to be investigated 7see ,goldscheider's article in ,dubois-,reymond's ,archiv1 #ahia71 and most philosophical theories concerning the nature of pleasure and pain are mere assumptions4 ,almost all the views that are now current attempt an explanation by generalising the idea of pleasure and pain so as to regard the feelings of pleasure and pain as a universal feature of nature4 ,this vicious method of generalisation at the cost of discrimination has produced much confusion in the world2 and its influence is the more pernicious as average minds are easily satisfied with generalities4 ,now1 the theory of making pleasure and pain universal features of existence is a palpably erroneous theory2 it is a wrong generalisation4 ,it is true that sentient beings naturally seek pleasure and avoid pain4 ,but are we allowed1 according to the laws of logic1 to transfer the special feature of the case to the whole class of all processes where a seeking and an avoiding can be observed8 ,certainly not4 ,because sentient beings are repelled by pain and attracted by pleasure1 we cannot say that every repulsion is due to pain and that every attraction is due to pleasure4 ,the theory according to which pleasure and pain alone are the causes of attraction and repulsion we may fairly consider as a poetical license justifiable within certain narrow limits1 and actually justified in so far as there is in every natural process some peculiar feature that is analogous to the feelings of sentient beings4 ,this peculiar feature--viz4 its subjectivity--is1 as we have seen1 not visible1 not observable2 yet it exists3 it is that something which in the course of evolution becomes1 in special combinations1 first feeling and then consciousness4 ,but for that reason it is not as yet either consciousness or feeling4 ,while on the one hand the theories of pleasure and pain that regard pleasure and pain as universal features of natural phenomena1 are arrived at by a wrong method of generalisation1 we find on the other hand they do not agree with facts4 ,they neither explain nor account for the appearance or disappearance of real pleasures and pains such as take place in animal life4 99 99 99 99 99 ,starting from merely theoretical considerations1 ,kant defines pleasure as a feeling of furtherance1 pain1 as a feeling of hindrance of life2 and so prominent a physiologist and psychologist as ,alexander ,bain says that 8,states of pleasure are connected with an increase1 states of pain1 with an abatement of some or of all the vital functions40 ,a consideration of the actual causes of our pleasures and pains will prove the incorrectness of these views1 which are also due to wrong generalisations4 ,an increase of the vital functions and a further growth1 either of the organs or of the whole organism1 is very often accompanied with pain4 ,a growing tooth causes1 as a rule1 as much pain as a decaying tooth4 ,and if by some drug the decay is hastened and the nerve is killed1 there is1 connected with the suppression and sometimes with the mere abatement of the vital function1 an abatement of the pain also4 ,feelings of pleasure and pain presuppose that habits have been formed in a sentient organism4 ,pain is not always a hindrance of life1 nor is every hindrance of life painful4 ,pain is not an abatement of the functions of life1 not a decay1 nor a destruction4 ,but pain is always a disturbance of life and of the habits that have been formed4 ,growth is1 under certain circumstances1 as much a disturbance as is decay4 ,and decay1 if it is simply an abatement or cessation of function1 is not accompanied with pain4 ,while pain is always a disturbance of the functions of an organism1 pleasure is simply the gratification of wants2 functions and wants being formed by habits1 we may briefly say that pleasure is agreement1 pain disagreement1 with habits4 ,there are natural wants and unnatural wants4 ,there are habits beneficial to the furtherance of life1 and there are habits injurious to the furtherance of life4 ,the pleasure connected with the gratification of wants does not depend on its being a furtherance or a hindrance of life1 but solely on the intensity of the want4 ,and the intensity of the want1 again1 depends on the degree to which a habit has become inveterate4#dc 99 99 99 99 99 ,the theory of pleasure and pain which regards pleasure as indicative of the growth1 and pain1 of the decay of life1 leads ultimately to the ethics of hedonism1 which identifies the good with the pleasurable4 ,however1 if our view of pleasure and pain be correct1 it is apparent that the pleasure theory in ethics is wrong in its very foundation4 ,the pleasurable would cease to be a criterion of goodness2 for many things are pleasurable that are bad1 and many things are painful that are good4 ,growth1 development1 progress1 evolution have often been1 nay must mostly be bought with great pain1 tribulation1 anxiety1 and also with the renunciation of pleasures4 ,on the other hand the fulness of pleasure is always a very dangerous symptom for any state of existence4 ,the seeking of pleasure and the avoiding of pain are certainly very questionable guides in determining what right conduct is4 ,in adopting pleasure and pain as the principles of ethics1 we adulterate the nature of morality2 for morality exists and has been called into being simply to counteract the dangerous allurances of that which promises to produce pleasure and to avoid pain4 ,ethics has to teach us how to live1 how to develop1 how to grow1 how to make our lives useful and serviceable4 ,if ethics were simply a method of how to obtain the greatest amount of pleasure1 we might better openly confess that there is no moral goodness but only pleasurableness1 and consequently that morality is a chimera and ethics a farce4 ,a defender of the pleasure theory in ethics writes in reply to this criticism of his view3 8,to seek pleasure and to avoid pain is not wrong4 ,why shall we deprive men of their enjoyments80 ,certainly1 everyone has a right to enjoy himself2 every one has a right to seek pleasure and to avoid pain4 ,but seeking pleasure and avoiding pain is not as yet ethical4 ,under ordinary circumstances it is right enough to follow the natural impulses of seeking pleasure and avoiding pain4 ,but there are cases where seeking pleasure1 be it for ourselves or for others1 and avoiding pain1 be it for ourselves or for others1 become actual wrongs2 not because present pleasures will lead to future pains1 but because certain pleasures are a hindrance to the higher evolution of the soul4 ,it is often said that the renunciation of pleasures is richly made up for by the pleasures which are afforded in a more fully developed life4 ,but this1 in my opinion1 is not true4 ,the adult has rather less pleasures than the child1 and the civilised or highly cultured man does not enjoy himself as much1 as easily1 and as cheaply as does the savage1 the uncultured1 the fool4 ,,iii4 ,,mr4 ,,thomas ,a4 ,,edison',s ,,panpsychism4 ,some time ago ,mr4 ,thomas ,a4 ,edison was interviewed on the question1 8,what is life80 ,mr4 ,edison answered the question2 and his view is quite in accord with ,professor ,haeckel's idea of panpsychism4 ,the article appeared first in a daily newspaper4 ,being remarkable for its coincidence with the views of a great scientist1 and coming from the pen of so interesting a man as the famous inventor of the phonograph1 we deem it best to republish it in full1 with ,mr4 ,edison's permission1 who1 at the same time1 acknowledged the copy we sent him as correct4 ,this is the article3 ,,intelligent ,,atoms4 ,,by ,,thomas ,a4 ,,edison4 ,my mind is not of a speculative order1 it is essentially practical1 and when ,i am making an experiment1 ,i think only of getting something useful1 of making electricity perform work4 ,i don't soar2 ,i keep down pretty close to earth4 ,of course there are problems in life ,i can't help thinking about1 but ,i don't try to study them out4 ,it is necessary that they should be studied1 and men fitted for that work are doing it4 ,i am not fitted for it4 ,i leave the theoretical study of electricity to the physicists1 confining my work to the practical application of the force4 ,it is my belief1 however1 that every atom of matter is intelligent1 deriving energy from the primordial germ4 ,the intelligence of man is1 ,i take it1 the sum of the intelligences of the atoms of which he is composed4 ,every atom has an intelligent power of selection and is always striving to get into harmonious relation with other atoms4 ,the human body is1 ,i think1 maintained in its integrity by the intelligent persistence of its atoms1 or rather by an agreement between the atoms so to persist4 ,when the harmonious adjustment is destroyed the man dies1 and the atoms seek other relations4 ,i cannot regard the odor of decay but as the result of the efforts of the atoms to dissociate themselves2 they want to get away and make new combinations4 ,man1 therefore1 may be regarded in some sort as a microcosm of atoms agreeing to constitute his life as long as order and discipline can be maintained4 ,but1 of course1 there is dissatisfaction1 rebellion and anarchy leading eventually to death1 and through death to new forms of life4 ,for life ,i regard as indestructible4 ,all matter lives1 and everything that lives possesses intelligence4 ,consider growing corn1 for example4 ,an atom of oxygen comes flying along the air4 ,it seeks combination with other atoms and goes to the corn1 not by chance1 but by intention4 ,it is seized by other atoms that need oxygen1 and is packed away in the corn where it can do its work4 ,now carbon1 hydrogen and oxygen enter into the composition of every organic substance in one form of arrangement or another4 ,the formula ,,cho1 in fact1 is almost universal4 ,very well1 then1 why does a free atom of carbon select any particular one out of #ej1jjj or more possible positions unless it wants to8 ,i cannot see how we can deny intelligence to this act of volition on the part of the atom4 ,to say that one atom has an affinity for another is simply to use a big word4 ,the atom is conscious if man is conscious1 is intelligent if man is intelligent1 exercises will-power if man does1 is1 in its own little way1 all that man is4 ,we are told by geologists that in the earliest periods no form of life could exist on the earth4 ,how do they know that8 ,a crystal is devoid of this vital principle1 they say1 and yet certain kinds of atoms invariably arrange themselves in a particular way to form a crystal4 ,they did that in geological periods antedating the appearance of any form of life and have been doing it ever since in precisely the same way4 ,some crystals form in branches like a fern4 ,why is there not life in the growth of a crystal8 ,was the vital principle specially created at some particular period of the earth's history1 or did it exist and control every atom of matter when the earth was molten8 ,i cannot avoid the conclusion that all matter is composed of intelligent atoms and that life and mind are merely synonyms for the aggregation of atomic intelligence4 ,of course there is a source of energy4 ,nature is a perpetual motion machine1 and perpetual motion implies a sustaining and impelling force4 ,when ,i was in ,berlin ,i met ,du ,bois-,reymond1 and1 wagging the end of my finger1 ,i said to him1 8,what is that8 ,what moves that finger80 ,he said he didn't know2 that investigators have for twenty-five years been trying to find out4 ,if anybody could tell him what wagged this finger1 the problem of life would be solved4 ,there are many forms of energy resulting from the combustion of coal under a boiler4 ,some of these forms we know something about in a practical way1 but there may be many others we don't know anything about4 ,perhaps electricity will itself be superseded in time1 who knows8 ,now1 a beefsteak in the human stomach is equivalent to coal under a boiler4 ,by oxidisation it excites energy that does work1 but what form of energy is it8 ,it is not steam pressure4 ,it acts through the nerve-cells1 performs work that can be measured in foot pounds1 and can be transformed into electricity1 but the actual nature of this force which produces this work--which makes effectual the mandate of the will--is unknown4 ,it is not magnetism1 it doesn't attract iron4 ,it is not electricity--at least such a form of electricity as we are familiar with4 ,still1 here it is necessary to be guarded1 because so many different forms of electricity are known to science that it would be rash to say positively that we shall not class vital energy as a form of electrical energy4 ,we cannot argue anything from difference in speed4 ,nerve-force may travel as fast as electricity1 once it gets started4 ,the apparent slowness may be in the brain4 ,it may take an appreciable time for the brain to set the force going4 ,i made an experiment with a frog's leg that indicates something of the kind4 ,i took a leg that was susceptible to galvanic current4 ,the vibration produced a note that was as high as a piccoto4 ,while the leg was alive it responded to the electrical current2 when it was dead it would not respond4 ,after the frog's leg had been lying in the laboratory three days ,i couldn't make it squeal4 ,the experiment was conclusive as to this point3 ,the vital force in the nerves of the leg was capable of acting with speed enough to induce the vibration of the diaphragm necessary to produce sound4 ,certainly this rate of speed is greater than physiologists appear to allow1 and it seems reasonable that there is a close affinity between vital energy and electricity4 ,i do not say they are identical2 on the contrary ,i say they are very like4 ,if one could learn to make vital energy directly without fuel1 that is without beefsteak in the stomach1 and in such manner that the human system could appropriate it1 the elixir of life would no longer be a dream of alchemy4 ,but we have not yet learned to make electricity directly1 without the aid of fuel and steam4 ,i believe this is possible2 indeed1 ,i have been experimenting in this direction for some time past4 ,but until we can learn to make electricity1 like nature1 out of disturbed air1 ,i am afraid the more delicate task of manufacturing vital energy so that it can be bottled and sold at the family grocery store will have to be deferred4 ,electricity1 by the way1 is properly merely a form of energy1 and not a fluid4 ,as for the ether which speculative science supposes to exist1 ,i don't know anything about it4 ,nobody has discovered anything of the kind4 ,in order to make their theories hold together they have1 it seems to me1 created the ether4 ,but the ether imagined by them is unthinkable to me4 ,i don't say ,i disagree with them1 because ,i don't pretend to have any theories of that kind1 and am not competent to dispute with speculative scientists4 ,all ,i can say is1 my mind is unable to accept the theory4 ,the ether1 they say1 is as rigid as steel and as soft as butter4 ,i can't catch on to that idea4 ,i believe that there are only two things in the universe--matter and energy4 ,matter ,i can understand to be intelligent1 for man himself ,i regard as so much matter4 ,energy ,i know can take various forms1 and manifest itself in various ways4 ,i can understand also that it works not only upon1 but through1 matter4 ,what this matter is1 what this energy is1 ,i do not know4 ,however1 it is possible that it is simply matter and energy1 and that any desire to know too much about the whole question should be diagnosed as a disease2 such a disease as ,german doctors are said to have discovered among the students of their universities--the disease of asking questions4 ,,the ,,nature ,,of ,,intelligence4 ,mr4 ,thomas ,a4 ,edison's article is full of suggestions which invite further discussion4 ,we must here limit ourselves solely to those which touch the problem of ,panpsychism and ,panbiotism4 ,any one who has read ,mr4 ,edison's article will be struck with the strange coincidence that obtains between his and ,professor ,haeckel's views4 ,the famous naturalist considers what he calls panpsychism as the corner-stone of his monism3 he says that atoms possess souls2 and in a similar way the famous inventor believes in the intelligence of atoms1 he declares that atoms are endowed with minds4 ,there is certainly a deep truth in this conception of nature2 and yet we cannot accept it in the way it is presented by either ,professor ,haeckel or ,mr4 ,edison4 ,with reference to ,professor ,haeckel's views we have explained why atoms1 the actions of which are not endowed with meaning1 have no soul1 and also why they cannot feel pleasure and pain4 ,it remains for us to explain why atoms are not in possession of intelligence4 ,what is intelligence8 ,that reaction upon a stimulus which takes place in the way it does because of the presence of meaning1 is called mental1 or intelligent action2 and the ability to adjust action to mental representations is intelligence4 ,intelligence is a psychical quality1 and the psychical process which is preparing to act with intelligence is called deliberation4 ,deliberation is the successive revival of several soul-structures1 either of memories of former experiences1 or of rules derived therefrom1 or of advice formerly received1 including also new combinations of these mental structures1 and keeping in view the probable results of the intended action4 ,in a word1 deliberation is thought1 and thought is an interaction among meaning-freighted feelings4 ,among these ideas1 which in so far as they can influence action 7i4 e4 purposive motions7 are called 8motives10 the strongest one will determine the result4 ,now1 any atom of non-organised matter1 say an atom of hydrogen1 acts 7as we said above7 with spontaneity4 ,it is in this sense as much alive as is any ever so complex vegetable or animal substance4 ,it is self-acting1 and its action reveals the innermost nature of its being just as much as the action of the man shows the character of the man4 ,there is1 however1 a great difference between the action of animal beings whose action is regulated by the meanings of their feelings1 which in their totality we call the soul1 and the actions of inorganic matter1 of crystals1 minerals1 gases1 chemical elements1 and gravitating masses1 all of which we comprise under the name 8inanimate nature40 ,the stone's fall does not depend upon any representative feeling2 it depends solely upon that quality of the stone which we popularly call its weight4 ,nor has the falling stone any choice whether to fall or not to fall4 ,under certain circumstances it falls4 ,there is no act of deliberation preceding the fall4 ,nor has it any choice concerning the direction of its fall4 ,the surrounding conditions1 viz41 its position with regard to the centre of the earth together with its mass1 determine the process4 ,the stone's action can satisfactorily be explained without attributing to it psychical qualities4 ,the stone possesses no soul2 it is void of mentality2 and although we believe that everything1 organised or unorganised1 is endowed with subjectivity 7by which we understand the conditions of psychical life1 or the potentiality of feeling and consciousness71 this subjectivity can only be analogous to the blind impulse of the stone's mass4 ,if some other1 psychical or mental1 subjectivity were present1 we should say that it apparently does not enter as a factor in the determination of the event4 ,accordingly such an assumption is gratuitous4 ,there is subjectivity1 but there is no intelligence4 ,there is potentiality of feeling1 but there is no consciousness4 ,there is present the elementary condition of that something which is going to develop into mind1 but there is no mind2 there is no meaning-freighted awareness of the surrounding conditions4 ,says ,mr4 ,edison3 8,the intelligence of man is1 ,i take it1 the sum of the intelligences of the atoms of which he is composed40 ,the sum total of the intelligences of the atoms in a human body 7if1 in this connection1 for the sake of argument1 we grant that atoms are intelligent7 would not as yet make up the intelligence of man4 ,suppose we are contemplating a mosaic picture or inscription4 ,are such compositions really only the sum of the little stones8 ,are they not rather a certain peculiar form in which these colored stones are arranged8 ,it is not the sum of the stones that makes the picture1 but the form of their composition4 ,the picture is not contained in any single one of them1 nor is it the whole number of all the single stones3 it originates through their peculiar combination and consists of the form in which they are combined4 ,mr4 ,edison's explanation of the soul1 applied to this example of a mosaic picture1 would be as follows3 ,every little stone is in itself a little mosaic picture4 ,the whole picture of the mosaic is the sum of the little pictures of the stones of which it is composed4 ,the intelligence of the soul1 however1 is not even as yet the form in which feeling structures combine2 it originates with the representative faculty of the feeling structures4 ,the soul is the organised totality of a set of images and abstract mental symbols representing the qualities1 the influences1 and the interactions of the different objects of the surrounding world1 the thinking subject included4 ,says ,mr4 ,edison3 8,every atom has an intelligent power of selection1 and is always striving to get into harmonious relation with other atoms40 ,the latter is true2 the former is an error4 ,every atom 8is always striving to get into harmonious relation with other atoms02 this is its nature2 and its nature being stable1 consisting of certain inalienable and intrinsic qualities1 the atom acts with consistency4 ,certain atoms1 say atoms of hydrogen1 are of such a nature as to combine with certain other atoms1 say atoms of oxygen1 into molecules that form a certain substance of peculiar properties1 which1 if each atom of oxygen combines with two atoms of hydrogen1 would be ,h,o1 or water4 ,this substance again1 having certain definite qualities1 will in a temperature below freezing point crystallise at a definite angle4 ,the angle of crystallisation being the same for all molecules ,h,o1 the result will necessarily be one of most marvellous regularity4 ,and not being able to observe the atoms in their secret activity1 not knowing all the details of nature's marvellous laboratory1 we are astonished to find such a wonderfully harmonious relation4 ,and yet1 considering the nature of things1 we are urged to confess that it is the result of an inevitable necessity1 which takes place according to strict mathematical laws4 ,although every atom strives1 according to its nature1 to get into harmonious relation with other atoms1 we do not see any 8intelligent power of selection0 in the province of inorganic nature4 ,every atom of inorganic substances acts according to its nature in one and the same way throughout4 ,there is no choice1 no selection1 allowed4 ,choice and selection are faculties that are reserved for the higher domains of psychical life1 which originates in the domain of animal existence when meaning1 conditioned by the presence of sentiency1 rises into being and creates the soul4 ,supposing that through some combination of atoms their subjectivity be combined in such a form as to produce sentiency or feeling1 we can very easily understand how this feeling will in time become representative of the conditions by which it is affected4 ,the soul does not consist of the atoms of its organism1 nor of the sum of the qualities of the atoms4 ,the soul consists of something more subtle than matter3 the soul consists of the meaning that is attached to the different forms of the feelings which obtain in living organisms4 ,,the ,,problem ,,of ,,theism4 ,the problem as to whether or not there is an element of feeling present in the unorganised realm of nature1 is connected also with the problem of theism4 ,the monistic view of the world1 which considers nature as alive throughout1 can neither accept the old supernaturalism1 nor the materialistic theory of atheism4 ,theism1 as it is usually conceived1 believes in a personal creator and ruler of the world4 ,materialism denies the existence of any ,god2 it regards matter and its actions as the only reality4 ,monism does not regard mental phenomena as an incidental by-play of blindly operating forces4 ,it regards mind as a necessary product of reality4 ,mind and the peculiar qualities of mind are characteristic of the world-tree1 of which it is the highest efflorescence we know4 ,from the fruit we can know the root1 from the product we can judge of the factors1 in the creature we see the creator4 ,that great something which has produced us1 the ,all-power in which we live and move and have our being1 and obedience to the laws of which are the conditions of life1 of welfare1 and of an advance to higher life1 is called with a popular religious name 8,god40 ,let us comprise under the name 8theism0 all those views which recognise any conception of ,god1 and reserve the term anthropotheism for that view which regards ,god as a person1 a mind1 a conscious being1 or a world-ego4 ,atheism in that case will be a negation of the existence of ,god in any form1 a negation of the ,all-power of which we are parts and to which we have to conform2 and accordingly atheism will be also a negation of any authority of moral conduct4 ,we call attention to the fact that many who call themselves atheists1 simply because they do not believe in anthropotheism1 are according to this definition not to be classed among the atheists4 ,what has monism to say1 on the problem of the existence of ,god8 ,prof4 ,george ,j4 ,romanes1 in an article which appeared some time ago in the ,contemporary ,review under the title 8,the ,world as an ,eject10 declares that monism has left the problem of theism in the same state it was in before4 ,he says3 8,the views of the late ,professor ,clifford concerning the influence of monism on theism1 are unsound4 ,i am in full agreement with him in believing that monism is destined to become the generally accepted theory of things1 seeing that it is the only theory of things which can receive the sanction of science on the one hand1 and of feeling on the other4 ,but ,i disagree with him in holding that this theory is fraught with implications of an anti-theistic kind4 ,in my opinion1 this theory leaves the question of theism very much where it was before4#dd ,that is to say1 while not furnishing any independent proof of theism1 it likewise fails to furnish any independent disproof4 8,as a matter of methodical reasoning it appears to me that monism alone can only lead to agnosticism4 ,that is to say1 it leaves a clear field of choice as between theism and atheism40#de ,clifford says in the passage referred to by ,professor ,romanes3 8,reason1 intelligence1 and volition are properties of a complex which is made up of elements themselves not rational1 not intelligent1 not conscious40 ,rational1 intelligent1 conscious beings1 so far as their material existence is concerned1 are made up of elements not rational1 not intelligent1 not conscious4 ,but mind1 reason1 intelligence are not at all made up of material elements2 they are neither latent nor germinal and least of all fully developed properties of the single atoms4 ,reason can in our conception never be explained as a complex result of the interaction of absolutely irrational elements4 ,the material elements of the world1 it is true1 are not intelligent1 not conscious2 but the world as a whole 7although not conscious and not endowed with purposive volition7 is at least not irrational and not void of determination4 ,on the contrary the world as a whole is the prototype of all rationality1 and human reason is a mere image of the world-order4 ,what is the reason of a rational being but an incarnation of this world-order8 ,reason is not a thing of matter2 exactly so the world-order is not a thing of matter4 ,but it exists none the less2 it is a reality4 ,on the other hand1 the world-order need neither be a personal being nor the work of a personal being4 ,the order that prevails in the real world and in the laws of nature appears also in the ideal world1 in the laws of formal thought1 in mathematics1 and its kindred sciences2 and the same rationality that obtains in the ideal domain permeates the realms of reality1 the universe of objective existence4 ,the idea that ,god created the world-order and dictated its laws is a fanciful and poetical allegory2 it is as such a pagan notion which belongs in the same category with ,hesiod's ,cosmology1 but it is scientifically and philosophically unthinkable4 ,for ,god is eternal and ,god's being is eternal4 ,god has not created his own attributes and the world-order is simply an attribute of ,god2 it is part and parcel of his nature4 ,or can you think of ,god without that attribute of irrefragable order that appears to science as necessity1 to religion as holiness1 to ethics as justice1 to art as the law of beauty1 to the mystic as the key to all the wonders of existence which though solving all the problems remains most wonderful itself8 ,the world as a whole1 the cosmos1 ,god1 or whatever we call the ,one and ,all1 is the prototype of all reason1 but he is not a mind2 he is not a system of sentient symbols2 he is not a soul4 ,minds are a special kind of ,god's creatures2 but ,god is not a creature3 he is the condition of the existence of creatures1 he is the creator4 ,the objection is made from materialistic quarters3 8,what is the world as a whole but the sum of all atoms60 ,this is an error4 ,the world is not merely the sum of all its atoms2 the universe does not consist of innumerable little particles which in their combination form the ,all4 ,on the contrary3 the world as a whole1 existence in its oneness1 or speaking religiously ,god1 is alone the only true reality2 all other things and beings are parts of him4 ,atoms are abstract concepts2 the existence of an atom and of its actions presupposes the existence of the great whole of which it is a part1 and without which it would have no reality4 ,there are no atoms in themselves4 ,atoms regarded as things in themselves are a scientific superstition4 ,professor ,romanes advances the proposition1 that cosmical events1 being as highly complex as nervous phenomena1 might be possessed of a similar subjectivity4 ,the nervous phenomena which constitute the physiological action of mind in the province of objectivity are1 it is true1 very complex1 but complexity does not constitute that characteristic feature on the presence of which depends the origin of mind4 ,professor ,romanes says3 8,both mind and matter in motion admit of degrees3 first as to quantity1 next as to velocity1 and lastly as to complexity4 ,but the degrees of matter in motion are found1 in point of observable fact1 not to correspond with those of mind1 save in the last particular of complexity1 where there is unquestionably an evident correspondence4 8,now1 if we fix our attention merely on this subject-matter of complexity1 and refuse to be led astray by obviously false analogies of a more special kind1 ,i think that there can be no question that the macrocosm does furnish amply sufficient opportunity1 as it were1 for the presence of subjectivity1 even if it be assumed that subjectivity can only be yielded by an order of complexity analogous to that of a nervous system4 ,for1 considering the natural and dynamical system of the universe as a whole1 it is obvious that the complexity presented is greater than any of its parts4 ,not only is it true that all these parts are included in the whole1 and that even the visible sidereal system alone presents movements of enormous intricacy1 but we find1 for instance1 that even within the limits of this small planet there is presented to actual observation a peculiar form of circumscribed complex1 fully comparable to that of the individual brain1 and yet external to each individual brain4 ,for the so-called #8social organism1' although composed of innumerable individual personalities1 is1 with regard to each of its constituent units1 a part of the objective world--just as the human brain would be1 were each of its constituent cells of a construction sufficiently complex to yield a separate personality40 ,the so-called social organism which is composed of innumerable personalities undoubtedly yields a peculiar spiritual existence1 which cannot be explained solely as the sum of the parts and actions of its constituent individuals4 ,the relations in which the members of society stand to each other are of an analogous importance to the relations of the cells and organs in an organism4 ,it is the form that constitutes this or that kind of an organism1 not the sum of atoms1 nor the intricacy or complexity of their combinations4 ,different forms of perhaps the same material amount1 and of the same intricacy of combination1 yield quite distinct types of individuality1 and every state1 every nation1 every society possesses1 as it were a personality of its own4 ,mind is not constituted by complexity4 ,mind is a system of sentient symbols4 ,wherever we find organisms acting in such a way that their actions depend upon the meanings of certain stimuli1 we have to attribute to them that characteristic feature which we call mind1 or soul4 ,the action of a falling stone is explainable without attributing to it any mentality4 ,there is no representative value1 no meaning in that quality of the stone which1 under certain conditions1 makes the stone fall4 ,however1 if a man acts1 the motive of his action does not consist in the gravity of certain material particles of his brain4 ,it consists in the meaning that resides in certain feelings4 ,without taking into consideration the meaning that dominates the man's motives1 we cannot explain his action1 and it is the meaning of feelings that the soul consists of4 ,only where and when we can discern the presence of meaning as the raison d'tre of actions1 are we justified in calling phenomena mental4 ,when the action that takes place in response to a stimulus depends solely upon the significance of a symbol1 the inference is legitimate1 nay1 it is inevitable and conclusive1 that we have to deal with a mind4 ,the motion of a comet1 which depends perhaps not only upon the gravity of its mass1 but also upon the chemical actions and explosions of its constituent elements during its approach to the sun1 may be ever so intricate2 but this does not in the least justify the assumption of the presence of mind in the comet4 ,the assumption of mind in inorganic nature is not only fantastical1 it is also needless4 ,facts are better explained without this speculation4 ,the world as a whole is not bare of subjectivity4 ,in this we agree with both ,clifford and ,romanes4 ,but we do not identify subjectivity and mind1 the latter being a special and indeed a very complex form of subjectivity4 ,we suppose that subjectivity pervades also all the processes of unorganised nature1 and no less the cosmic events2 but be they ever so much more complex than nervous phenomena1 there is present only a non-mental subjectivity4 ,yet although the phenomena of so-called inanimate nature1 be they motions of celestial bodies or physical and chemical processes1 are non-mental1 there is in every one of them present that grand feature which is as it were the breath of ,god4 ,this feature appears in all the phenomena of nature1 but in none of them more gloriously than in the soul of man4 ,even the cosmical events of marvellous sublimity appear as a mere prelude to the appearance of soul-life1 for in soul-life is focused all the divinity of nature4 ,reason is the reflex of the world-order and thus a rational being is made in the likeness of ,god4 ,illustration ,professor ,romanes presents the problem of the subjectivity of existence by the adjoined diagram1 which he explains as follows3 8,following ,clifford1 ,i will call these inferred subjectivities by the name of #8ejects1' and assign to them the symbol ,y4 ,thus in the following discussion ,x the objective world1 ,y1 the ejective world1 and ,z1 the subjective world4 ,now1 the theory of monism supposes that ,x1 ,y and ,z are all alike in kind1 but presents no definite teaching as to how far they may differ in degree4 ,we may1 however1 at once allow that between the psychological value of ,z and that of ,x1 there is a wide difference of degree1 and also that while the value of ,z is a fixed quantity1 that of ,y varies greatly in the different parts of the area ,y40 ,the deep shading of ,z indicates consciousness1 and consciousness is that form of subjectivity which constitutes our mind4 ,z is not1 as ,professor ,romanes asserts that it is1 a fixed quantity2 it varies greatly1 as every one knows from his own experience4 ,it is lowest in trance or swoon or profound sleep4 ,it is highest in the state of concentrated attention4 ,the ejective element1 which we assume to be present as a correlative concomitant in the objective world1 we assume1 with ,professor ,romanes1 varies greatly in the different parts of the area ,y4 ,like ,professor ,romanes1 we also do not assume the existence of any unshaded ,x4 ,there is no objectivity without its subjective correlate4 ,but1 according to the theory of monism1 the nature of the concomitant subjectivity is not unknowable3 it can be inferred from the nature of objective existence4 ,the subjectivity of the falling stone is most elementary1 and not mental2 its action is not prompted by meaning4 ,that something which impels the stone to fall1 and which science calls gravity1 does not possess any representative element4 ,there is no symbolism involved in gravity4 ,there is no soul in the stone4 ,the stone is not incited to falling by any purpose2 it has no end in view4 ,purpose originates with and through the presence of representative symbols4 ,according to the theory of monism the shading of the surrounding zones is not a matter concerning which we have to suspend our judgment4 ,if monism is true1 we know very well how deeply we have to shade the different phenomena of objective nature4 ,taking this view1 we object to ,professor ,romanes's conclusion when he says3 8,without in any way straining the theory of monism1 we may provisionally shade ,x more deeply than ,z1 and this in some immeasurable degree4 8,monism sanctions the shading of ,x as deeply as we choose2 but the shading which it sanctions is only provisional40 ,while the presence of mind in the phenomena of the stellar universe and of inorganic nature must decidedly be denied1 ,i would not1 for that reason1 declare that monism is atheistic4 ,monism is decidedly theistic although not anthropotheistic4 ,it is monotheistic in so far as it recognises that the all-existence in which we live and move and have our being is the 1 the ,one and ,all4 ,but there is not the slightest reason for the theory1 and there are sufficient reasons against it1 that the universe is possessed of a huge world-ego1 that it is a person or a mind4 ,we maintain on the one hand that the laws of nature are not designs arranged ,with consciously preconceived purposes4 ,yet on the other hand1 we do not forget1 that the world-order possesses quite definite features and that the course of evolution runs in a very unmistakable direction4 ,we can plainly decipher its character1 and the great religious teachers of mankind have with a truly prophetic instinct proclaimed the ethical injunctions to be derived therefrom--injunctions which1 millenniums after them1 science has discovered to be founded in the nature of things4 ,god is no mind1 yet ,god is mentality1 the source of all mind3 ,god is not a spirit1 but he is spirituality4 ,the subjectivity of the universe from which all consciousness rises is part of his being1 and whatever that subjectivity1 considered as a whole1 be or be not1 that much is certain1 that in grandeur it corresponds to the objectivity of the world4 ,it does not think in symbols as a man does2 it is not a mind3 but it exists nevertheless4 ,whatever it is like we learn from the revelation of its appearance in objective existence1 from the cosmic order1 the laws of nature1 and the moral ideas of mankind4 ,knowledge of nature means knowledge of ,god1 for nature is ,god as he appears and the objectivity of being is the revelation of ,god4 ,we would not limit ,god to the subjectivity of nature3 ,god is both subjectivity and objectivity combined4 ,he is that ,all-power that is1 was1 and will be1 thus being the ultimate authority of conduct4 ,god is not a mind1 he is more than a mind2 ,god is not a system of symbols1 he is the reality symbolised in mind4 ,he is not a person1 he is super-personal4 ,he who does not see that the ,god of monism is greater than the ,god of anthropotheism1 had better believe in a personal ,god1 until he appreciates the truth that ,god is not personal but super-personal4 ,for after all anthropotheism is nearer the truth than atheism1 for atheism 7well understood1 the atheism of our definition above7 is a moral nihilism devised to shake off all ethical obligation so as to make the lust of the moment and the pleasure of the individual the supreme rule of action4 ,monism1 accordingly1 does not leave the problem of theism where it was before4 ,monism proves that ,god is not to be conceived in the likeness of man1 but the reverse3 man1 being a system of symbols representing the world1 is to be conceived as having been made or rather as having originated in the likeness of ,god4 ,god is the original1 man is the copy4 ,god is the whole1 man is the part1 in which the whole finds a more or less correct representation4 ,the picture is not perfect1 but the grandest duty a man has is the constant approach to a greater perfection4 ,man is the temporal1 ,god is the eternal4 ,man is limited1 ,god is the infinite4 ,,editor4 ,,footnotes3 #da ,the ,monist1 ,vol4 ,,ii1 ,no4 #d4 #db ,spontaneous motion 7as here defined7 does not mean action without a cause2 nor does the spontaneity of the cart exclude the co-operation of other spontaneities 7e4 g4 the attraction of the earth7 entering as factors in bringing about the final result4 #dc ,this theory of pleasure and pain was first set forth in an editorial article of ,no4 #abj of ,the ,open ,court1 which has been republished in the chapter 8,pleasure and ,pain10 pp4 #cch-cde1 of ,the ,soul of ,man4 ,a correct view of the nature of pleasure and pain is of great importance1 especially in ethics4 ,notwithstanding the palpable erroneousness of the old view1 several articles written by prominent authors have appeared of late1 that continue in the old strain without taking notice of the criticism that overthrows the basis of their theories4 #dd ,italics are ours4 #de ,this same position is maintained with equal vigor in ,professor ,romanes's latest work ,darwin and ,after ,darwin1 pp4 #dab-ddb4 ,the ,open ,court ,publishing ,co41 #ahib4 ,,literary ,,correspondence4 ,i4 ,,france4 ,dr4 ,paul ,sollier has just published1 in the ,bibliothque ,charcot-,debove1#df a new and excellent work1 ,les troubles de la memoire4 ,this work is not identical in its purpose with that of ,m4 ,ribot2 it corrects the latter in certain points1 completes and corroborates it in others4 ,m4 ,sollier set out to discuss this question solely from a medical standpoint1 which was intentionally passed over by ,m4 ,ribot1 but he has also necessarily touched upon its psychological aspects1 and1 as he informs us himself1 he was obliged on the whole to make a medico-psychological study of the question4 ,the subject is a vast one2 one could include in it aphasia and all the weaknesses resulting from the destruction of the brain-centres1 whether those of motion or of sensation4 ,m4 ,sollier has taken the pains to reduce it1 however1 to definite limits4 ,he studies especially the subject of acquired amnesia 7diminutive changes and disaggregations of the memory74 ,he does not consider the subject of congenital amnesia1 which is an absence and not a loss of memory4 ,strictly considered1 the only cases of true amnesia1 or organic amnesia1 are those which result from the destruction of the nerve-centres1 since in this case there is an absolute loss of the power of forming mental images1 and not simply an enfeebling or forgetting of them1 which is characteristic of functional amnesia4 ,from a clinical standpoint amnesia exists only in the last case4 ,though the effect may be the same in both cases1 the causes are not identical4 ,clinical investigation cannot1 however1 overlook the diminutive changes which take place in the memory and which1 as early as #ahag1 were called by ,louyer-,villermay dysmnesia1 and which are always closely allied to organic modifications of the brain4 ,as regards amnesia itself1 it is important to distinguish simple amnesia from retrogressive and progressive amnesia4 ,m4 ,sollier explains the motive causes of these different conditions with great lucidity1 and renders them easy of comprehension by means of ingenious illustrations4 ,i call attention to the information he gives us as to the conditions under which a revival of mental images takes place1 p4 #cj2 to his criticism of ,ribot's opinion1 according to which the power of correctly locating events in the scale of time is the true characteristic of psychical memory3 it is quite enough if it reproduces events as in the past1 that is to say if there exists a conscious knowledge which shows that the mental conception belongs to the past1 or is1 simply1 a remembrance1 p4 #ce and #dj2 to his remarks on the strengthening of mental images due to the repetition of remembrances1 the necessary sequence of which is that a weakening of old memories follows the destruction of accumulated mental images1 p4 #dh2 to his explanation of the processes of retrogressive amnesia 7coming suddenly after an attack of vertigo1 a blow1 etc47 which he bases upon a supposition of a group of mental conceptions in touch with one another1 in such a way that the loss of one leading conception in a group deprives this group of sufficient consistency to form a conscious synthesis1 p4 #gj4 ,as regards the classifications of amnesia ,m4 ,sollier censures that of ,m4 ,ribot as being neither openly psychological nor openly clinical1 and of taking successively as bases the extent of an observed phenomenon1 its evolution1 its location in time4 ,moreover1 from a clinical standpoint it has led to a joining together of totally incongruous disorders4 ,m4 ,sollier therefore rejects it1 and contents himself with adopting first of all1 with ,m4 ,falret1 the natural classification of general amnesia and of partial amnesia4 ,moreover1 in taking account of the systematising of lost remembrances1 he proposes to make a distinction as to the two varieties of systematised 7functional7 and of non-systematised 7organic7 amnesia1 considered from the purely psychological standpoint1 p4 #ei4 ,we should thus have1 firstly1 the classification of general amnesia1 including 7,a7 true organic amnesia 7destruction of the centre of mental images71 and1 under the classification of the systematised1 7,b7 functional1 or apparent1 amnesia 7imperfect performance of the functions of the centres73 this latter subdividing into two groups1 7a7 amnesia with its varieties 7a7 simple1 7b7 retrogressive1 7c7 progressive1 and 7b7 paramnesia3 7a7 that of locality1 7b7 that of exactness2 to which it is proper to add 7c7 dysmnesia1 which is organic-functional4 ,secondly1 the classification of partial amnesia whether systematised or not1 which may be either organic or functional4 ,m4 ,sollier abandons1 moreover1 every pathological or etiological classification as being exceedingly unsatisfactory4 ,in the presence of a patient1 he justly remarks1 the physician can only employ semiology4--,i will not enter here into the details of the inquisitor-like investigation entered upon by the author4 ,i must even proceed without stopping through the observations intended for medical men1 which form the second part of the work1 but ,i judge that every reader will also find therein many facts which may prove of interest4 ,after having read it1 one is more impressed than ever with the importance and delicacy of the motive forces of the memory1 in noting the frequency and the varieties even of its sources of weakness4 ,m4 ,sollier has the credit of pointing them out--in the shape of 8defects in synthetical power0 and in 8will power0--in the sources of weakness where one had not been accustomed to look for them4 ,it would be interesting1 he thinks1 to find out what part amnesia may perhaps take in the pathogeny of certain nervous disorders1 and the influence which it has on their evolution4 ,specialists for the insane might find therein a new subject of study1 and psychology will profit1 on the other hand1 by that which clinical experience offers it4 ,is not its main object to learn to understand life as a unit at the same time that it analyses it as a diversity8 99 99 99 99 99 ,when one passes from a book like that of ,m4 ,sollier to the work of ,m4 l',abb ,,maurice ,,de ,,baets1 ,les bases de la morale et du droit1#dg one is impressed by the change of method4 ,it has become impossible for us to consider pathology as unallied to questions of morality2 and we have accomplished this great object of studying matters pertaining to the moral world1 the evolution of law1 without seeking our base of support in a religious faith or in a metaphysical affirmation4 ,even ,m4 l',abb de ,baets himself declares emphatically that he desires to adopt only one starting point from among those we are acquainted with1--the verification of facts1--and truly he shows a good will and knowledge2 nevertheless the ground which he considers so firm has1 as we believe1 no stability4 ,all seems strange to us1 if ,i may so speak1 in books of this description4 ,the tone which is peculiar to them1 the nature of the facts cited1 the progress of the reasoning1 impeach them just as surely as the blue color of his costume reveals afar off an inhabitant of the ,celestial ,empire4 ,i am not an impassioned adversary of the clergy2 far from it4 ,i appreciate their intentions and esteem their persons as one should1 but ,i am unable to share their opinions1 and ,i consider indeed that they deceive themselves when they think that faith has ever given to the world an absolute assurance4 ,it has not given it because it has not proved sufficient4 ,mankind1 variable and vacillating though it may be1 does not change its beliefs because of fickleness of heart3 its mental evolution takes place too slowly for that1 and is also too painful4 ,the ,catholic church of to-day has adopted as its watch-word the return to ,st4 ,thomas of ,aquinas2 it will gain by this unity of effort1 without succeeding however in leading back the minds of men to its point of view4 ,the diverse ways we follow tend doubtless as a matter of fact toward the same objective point1 and run more or less in the same direction2 but humanity scarcely ever passes back again over the paths which it has once traversed4 99 99 99 99 99 ,we have another little volume by ,m4 ,,lombroso1 ,les applications de l'anthropologie criminelle2 a sequel to ,nouvelles recherches1 which ,i have mentioned before4 ,we find here interesting pages in regard to transportation and reform schools1 and a criticism of the new theories of the penal code 7,garofalo1 ,tarde1 ,sighele1 ,onanoff and ,blorg1 ,ferri7--a part of the question considered in the ,congress4 ,a chapter indeed is devoted to the subject of criminal anthropology in modern literature1 in regard to which it seems to me ,m4 ,lombroso always makes more of a question than is desirable1 but which he well understands how to criticise4 ,then follow several pages on the criminal type in art1 after a work of ,dr4 ,edward ,lefort2 then comes a description of anthropological instruments and methods4 ,i will not affirm that this last work brings us much of novelty2 it is chiefly a new and energetic presentation of his views1 and ,m4 ,lombroso has no doubt whatever that by dint of striking the nail upon the head he will succeed in driving it into the wall of his adversaries4 99 99 99 99 99 ,the work of ,m4 ,b4 ,,bourdon1 ,l'expression des emotions et des tendances dans le langage1 is certainly one of the most curious books one can read4 ,he treats in an original manner of phonetical questions1 which are less rife in ,france than in ,england and ,germany1 as to what sounds signify1 or speech2 what is their worth in intensity1 elevation1 form or quality1 duration2 what phenomena are shown by successions of intensity1 of elevation1 of elementary articulation1 of syllables1 of words1 etc41 of duration2 what are the relations of these phenomena to versification and what comparison one can make between writing and speech3 such are the problems particularly studied1 at times with the aid of very simple but instructive facts culled from experience4 ,these studies--,i need scarcely add that they are comparative ones--are of interest for various reasons4 ,they lead up to new ideas of grammar and of language1 and furnish arguments for a reform in orthography of which ,m4 ,bourdon is a very warm partisan4 ,his readers will not be slow to notice for the matter of that1 that he is in regard to this frankly revolutionary2 and it may seem paradoxical to say to them1 for example1 that 8the distinction between analytical and synthetical languages is absolutely artificial1 and could only be produced through our bad systems of writing40 ,writing1 ,m4 ,bourdon indeed remarks1 introduces separations in places where spoken language makes no pause4 ,the ,english write ,i will go1 they pronounce it ,iwillgo4 ,the analysis which pertains to writing masks the true cohesion of the spoken language1 and 8if in the past all series of articulations had been written as a single word which were in fact pronounced as a single word1 we should not have known the error which consists in opposing certain languages classed as synthetical to others which we class as analytical40 ,the argument is perhaps not a decisive one1 and in the neo-,latin languages1 for example1 one can scarcely deny that the analysis of the written language has conformed to the work of decomposition of the antique forms1 so as to adapt itself to the new groupings of their essential elements1 groupings wherein these elements remain variable because speech separates them effectively1 in many cases by interpolating governing words or others4 ,but it is not my intention to enter into these detailed discussions4 ,i leave ,m4 ,bourdon in further calling attention to his last chapter1 ,ecriture4 ,persons curious as to graphology will find in it some good ideas concerning this method of 8character reading40 ,the author does not tell everything1 and ,i have a suspicion that he greatly despises certain signs valued by the graphologists1 and arrived at empirically1 but we should note what he has actually said4 99 99 99 99 99 ,under the title1 ,le monde physique1 ,essai de conception exprimentale1 ,m4 ,dr4 ,,julien ,,pioger offers to the public a sketch of a world-system4 ,this system is summed up in the expression of 8,universal ,solidarity10 and is based on the idea of infinitely minute matter-particles1 or 8infinitesimals10 the mutual relations of which1 and their equilibrium1 constitute the machinery of the universe4 ,the atomic-mechanical hypothesis1 says ,m4 ,pioger1 is wrong in resolving matter into perfected differential particles and in assigning to its atoms qualities which make of them either true material corpuscules or a real entity1 8a thing in itself40 ,on the contrary1 far from intending to assign a limit to materiality1 the hypothesis of infinitesimals confines itself to limiting the conception which we may have of it4 ,the infinitesimal corresponds to the infinitely small1 that is to say to the non-perfected1 to the non-differentiable1 beyond our cognisance and our perceptivity2 it expresses the most reduced condition of the affinities which constitute matter2 it is the expression of the infinitesimal existence of that which we call motion1 extension1 ponderability1 under the general name of matter4 ,now the most simple thing which can be conceived of in the physical world1 is the couple formed by the essential equipoise of two infinitesimals4 ,in developing the couple it becomes possible to form the universe in all its great variety4 ,the solidarity of the parts in the whole appears as the essential condition of existence of all that which ,is--the necessary condition of all individuality4 ,in conclusion ,i call attention to two new editions1 one the well-known work of ,m4 ,,bernard ,p,,rez1 ,les trois premires annes de l'enfant1 fifth edition1 revised and supplied with an introduction by ,mr4 ,james ,sully2 the other ,les functions du cerveau1 by ,m4 ,,jules ,,soury1 a work highly esteemed1 embodying the most recent researches4 ,,lucien ,,arr,,at4 ,,footnotes3 #df ,rueff1 publisher4 #dg ,this book and the following ones are published by ,f4 ,alcan4 ,,ii4 ,,germany4 ,one of our foremost psychiatrists1 ,professor v4 ,krafft-,ebing of ,vienna1 says in his celebrated text-book on psychiatry3 8,if ,pedagogy made a more serious study of the character of man in his psychopathological relations1 many of the mistakes and severities of our system of education would be removed1 many an unsuitable choice of vocation would be left unmade1 and thus many a psychical existence rescued40 ,any one who is at all familiar with the most important doctrines of the diseased phenomena of mental life1 and who knows how frequently psychical disturbances of a more or less serious nature occur during childhood1 will fully agree with ,krafft-,ebing1 and will only regret that pedagogy1 in this important direction1 has completely neglected its task4 ,although lately the necessity of psychiatric knowledge for the pedagogue has been insisted upon in professional circles1 for instance1 by ,professor ,,struempell in his ,pedagogic ,pathology 7comp4 ,the ,monist ,,ii1 #ajf71 yet instruction in this department occupies a wholly subsidiary place in pedagogic education1 and has not been made as it should have been1 an organic part of the same4 ,the writer of these lines has accordingly discussed this subject in a special treatise1 maintaining that the most important diseased phenomena of mental life might be treated as a part of pedagogic psychology 7comp4 ,the ,monist ,i1 #fai74 ,the demands made were met in different ways4 ,while the ,english and ,american press accepted these demands without reserve 7for instance1 in ,,hall',s ,pedagogical ,seminary1 ,i1 #big71 in ,germany there has been more caution displayed1 inasmuch as the opposing difficulties were regarded as greater than they probably were 7,professor ,,rein',s ,pdagogische ,studien1 #ahib1 ,heft ,i74 ,we have1 however1 simply to call to mind the doctrine which more than twenty years ago ,maudsley in his 8,physiology and ,pathology of the ,mind0 laid such special emphasis upon1 that psychic laws are the same in healthy and diseased phenomena1 only that they do not operate under the same conditions and therefore produce different symptoms4 ,far from its being true1 therefore1 that the introduction of psychopathology into psychology can be opposed by any especially well-founded objections1 such a procedure will1 on the contrary1 be found to be1 just as ,maudsley said1 an appropriate and absolutely indispensable auxiliary of the study of this science4 ,and that which was emphasised by ,maudsley1 and lately also by ,,muensterberg in the treatise already discussed in ,the ,monist 7,,ii1 #bhi71 ,on the ,problems and ,methods of ,psychology 7,leipsic1 #ahia1 ,abel71 ,ziehen has done in his 8,outlines of ,physiological ,psychology0 in a manner which will be full of suggestions for the pedagogue 7comp4 ,the ,monist ,i1 #eih74 ,to be sure1 the work of ,ziehen is very far from supplying all that the pedagogue needs4 ,we have in this work a vast mass of valuable observations1 which will have to be elaborated in a manner that accords with the needs of pedagogy1 if this science is to derive any material profit from psychiatry4 ,for the bibliography of this subject we shall refer the reader to a former correspondence of ours 7,the ,monist ,,ii1 #ajc71 and select at present for examination one province only1--a province which is deserving of especial consideration1 inasmuch as the phenomena which occur in it are phenomena which most frequently confront the pedagogist1 and are most likely to be overlooked by the untrained eye4 ,we refer to the psychopathic subsidiary phenomena of ,,dr4 ,,koch1 by which expression this author comprises all the psychical irregularities1 be they natural or acquired1 affecting the life of the human personality1 which1 though not even in the severest cases amounting to actual mental disorders1 yet in the most favorable instances so affect the persons afflicted that they appear as lacking the full possession of mental normality and capacity4 ,the second part of ,koch's work1 mentioned in ,the ,monist in the place above cited1 has just now appeared4 7,ratisbon1 #ahib1 ,otto ,maier74 ,having discussed in the first part of his work inherited and chronic psychopathic subsidiary phenomena1 the author now proceeds to discuss acquired subsidiary factors1 and holds out the prospect of a third part1 on the appearance of which we shall have occasion again to discuss the entire work from a different point of view4 ,for the present1 only the pedagogic aspect of the question interests us4 ,on many readers1 ,koch's book must have made the impression1--to judge from his concluding remarks1--that the author shares ,lombroso's point of view1 and to very many pedagogues such a position would be1 from the very outset1 a bad recommendation1 for it would necessarily1 in the very nature of the case1 involve the pedagogue in great embarrassment1 in the same way as it has involved the philosophical jurist4 ,but embarrassment is no reason why we should close our ears to the truth1 and if ,lombroso should be right in all his teachings1 pedagogy would also be obliged to accommodate its doctrines to his4 ,upon the whole1 however1 ,koch is opposed to him4 ,thus when he says3 8,what ,i commend ,lombroso for is that he has observed much1 has collected rich materials1 and has been the source of great incentives in many directions1 and has worked suggestively in many ways2 what ,i reproach him with is that he has confounded the healthy with the diseased1 and has brought under one and the same category without sufficient and appropriate tests1 psychotic phenomena and phenomena which are psychopathically merely of a subsidiary order2 what ,i reject is his theory of degeneration and his peculiar views of philosophy40 ,material1 such as ,koch and others offer1 must first be elaborated into a pedagogic psychopathology--or better still into a pedagogic pathopsychology--before pedagogy1 as a whole1 can assume in this direction the proper form4 ,though we consider1 now1 this preparatory work as indispensable1 we can1 nevertheless1 not think of denying the value of works which1 without any profession of far-reaching psychological analysis1 put in effective and available form for pedagogy the diseased phenomena of the mental life of children4 ,the first ,german work of this kind1 so far as we know1 is from the pen of a ,leipsic teacher1 ,,gustav ,,siegert1 and bears the title ,problematische ,kindesnaturen4#dh ,this little work is now followed by a more comprehensive treatise1 published by a ,bremen alienist1 ,dr4 ,,scholz1 already known to the readers of ,the ,monist 7,,ii1 #ajd71 and bearing the title ,die ,characterfehler des ,kindes1 eine ,erziehungslehre fr ,schule und ,haus4#di ,such books are valuable not only for the observations they offer and the isolated explanations and pedagogic advice they present1 but also for the suggestions which the attentive and psychologically cultivated reader can always receive from them4 ,like ,siegert1 ,scholz principally shows us isolated child-types wherein diseased qualities play a more or less pronounced rle4 ,but while the former's presentation is somewhat journalistic in style1 that of the latter is more didactic2 although this tendency is not an absolutely rigid one1 as the author counts mothers as readers of his book4 ,but if the form of presentation leads one to infer greater profundity in ,scholz than in ,siegert1 this is in still higher degree the case with the arrangement of the material4 ,while ,siegert strings his child-pictures loosely together1 ,scholz arranges them according to real psychological points of view1 so that 7remarkable to say7 the faults of children are discussed1 first1 in the province of feeling and sentiment1 then in that of representation1 and finally in that of volition and action4 ,the introductory and concluding chapters show1 also1 that ,scholz attempts to enter more profoundly into the subject than ,siegert proposes1 and we cherish the hope that1 now that this popular work has appeared1 ,scholz will very soon present us with a strictly scientific book1 in which he shall have occasion to deal with some particular points1 such as1 for instance1 falsehood and unchastity1 more comprehensively than was perhaps possible in a book intended for his present circle of readers4 ,with respect1 now1 to all systematic presentations of pedagogy1 psychopathology can1 as we have before indicated1 never attain in them its proper position1 until the above-mentioned preparatory work has been completed4 ,but this fact should not preclude one's calling especial attention to the importance of this province1 at least in some incidental manner4 ,in such a work as the ,allgemeine ,pdagogik of ,,ziller1#ej for instance1 the third edition of which has just been published by ,f4 ,mattes of ,leipsic1 there surely was abundant opportunity to do this--an opportunity which one might say almost amounted to obligation4 ,for ,ziller treats hereditary and acquired characteristics in great detail1 and such treatment remains necessarily a one-sided one1 if abnormal traits are not considered in it4 ,ziller1 with ,herbart1 demands that individuality always be taken as the starting-point4 ,but how many child-individualities are there1 which1 in the different periods of their development1 may be regarded as fully normal6 ,the reason of this omission must be looked for partly in the circumstance1 that ,ziller1 as well as the new editor of this otherwise valuable work1 belongs to the ,herbartian school4 ,if1 namely1 we compare the psychological literature of the ,herbartian school with the publications of ,french1 ,english1 and ,american writers1 or even with the works which in recent times have issued from other philosophical quarters of ,germany1 it will be unmistakably seen that the pathological conditions of the mind have been little considered by the followers of ,herbart4 ,nor have voices been wanting1 that would make ,herbart himself responsible for this error4 ,he did not1 they say1 sufficiently appreciate the importance of the pathological phenomena of mind1 and his pupils were in this respect influenced by him4 ,but this reproach will be found1 on close examination1 to be untenable4 ,herbart1 it is true1 did express himself repeatedly against the overestimation of 8rare and curious phenomena10 unusual mental states and such things1#ea and his warning is applicable also to our epoch1 which produces many psychological works in which remarkable things are to be read but which contribute nothing worth mentioning towards the explanation of even comparatively simple events4 ,herbart holds1 that the psychology of the normal and ordinary states should be the first and principal object of scientific attention2 the explanation of much that is extraordinary will then follow4 ,with regard to this latter point1 he remarks very positively3 8,i do not1 however1 wish by this1 to gainsay the value of any real psychological observation4 ,there must be a welcome place in science for every experience40 ,it will be seen1 therefore1 that ,herbart is not at all far from the point of view of ,maudsley and other investigators4 ,we find1 in fact1 that he mentions repeatedly abnormal mental conditions1 and also systematically treats them1 even quoting such celebrated alienists as ,reil and ,pinel 7,text-book of ,psychology1 #adb-adi74 ,the probability is1 therefore1 that psychopathology would have been properly employed in ,herbart's psychology1 if it had been at all elaborated in his day1 and its influence would through ,herbart have been directly felt in pedagogy1 as no pedagogist has made better or more careful use of psychology than he4 ,but ,herbart's pupils have done no further work in the province pointed out by him4 ,it is true1 his psychology has been made use of by physicians like ,griesinger and ,spielmann1 and recently also to some extent by ,krafft-,ebing1 but the works of these men have had no influence on the psychological text-books of the ,herbartian school1 and consequently the science has up to the present day exerted no noticeable influence on pedagogy1 either in ,waitz1 in ,stoy1 or in ,ziller4 ,in other pedagogic schools1 this has1 it is true1 also been the case2 but in these1 who make no pretensions of relying on the teachings of psychology1 the sin is more easily pardoned4 ,but this is not the only respect in which ,ziller's ,pedagogy is not up to the times4 ,ziller defined pedagogy as the influences1 formed according to ethical points of view1 which are brought to bear on the mind of the pupil1 and would not admit influences brought to bear on the body1 in so far as such should enter into the pedagogic system4 ,this misconception also springs from ,ziller's adherence to the ,herbartian school1 which represents1 as we well know1 a metaphysical pluralism2 but it is in a still higher degree due to the fact1 that in ,ziller's day both the intimate relation between physiological and psychological processes had not been satisfactorily established1 and also were not sufficiently known to him4 ,if it were otherwise1 his pluralism need by no means have necessarily led him into such one-sidedness1 for this metaphysical pluralism does not exclude a monistic conception of phenomena2 even assuming this doctrine1 one may say that motion and feeling are two different but inseparable sides of the same phenomenon4 ,the 8real things0 produce by their interaction1 simultaneously and of necessity1 both an inner side and an outer2 for which reason one of our foremost psychologists1 ,volkmann of ,volkmar1 explicitly terms ,herbart's psychology monistic 7,text-book of ,psychology1 second edition1 ,i1 #fc74 ,a psychologico-physiological work1 from which the new editor of ,ziller's ,pedagogy might have extracted many valuable things1 is the book of the ,italian ,,mosso1 ,on ,fatigue1 which has just been translated into ,german1#eb and which will excite much attention owing to the present active discussion of the question of overwork4 ,supplementary to this work ,i will also mention a little tract by ,,dr4 ,,burgerstein of ,vienna1 entitled ,die ,arbeitskurve einer ,schulstunde4#ec ,this tract is a lecture1 which the author gave at the ,seventh ,international ,congress for ,hygiene and ,demography at ,london1 and in which he seeks to find by statistical methods1 the duration of a 8school-period0--a very laboriously composed treatise and one difficult to read1 but possessed of high interest in psychological and pedagogic respects4 ,from pedagogy to evolution is but a step1 at least it is in ,ziller's development of ,herbart's ideas4 ,it is true1 ,ziller has taken a decided stand against ,darwinism1 for ,ziller works with two contradictory ideas2 but his theory of education possesses points of resemblance and analogy to the ,darwin-,haeckel theory of development4 ,according to ,ziller1 each individual passes1 also intellectually1 through all the stages of development that mankind at large has passed through1 only in a shorter time2 and it is in conformity with such succession that the order of the various courses of a pedagogical system is to be arranged4 ,following ,ziller's precedent1 ,,professor ,,vaihinger1 of ,halle1 in his treatise ,naturforschung und ,schule 7,science and the ,schools71 has taken up the school-reform initiated by ,professor ,preyer1 and has expressly transferred the fundamental law of biogenesis to pedagogy4 ,how instruction is to be arranged under this point of view1 cannot be explained in this letter1 which is already long enough4 ,we shall simply remark that the idea has found in ,germany a large number of both friends and opponents4 ,the opponents have recently been joined by a natural scientist1 ,,dr4 ,,hamann1 professor of zoology in ,gttingen1 who has just published a book under the title ,entwicklungslehre und ,darwinismus 7,evolution and ,darwinism71#ed in which he does not combat the theory of evolution itself1 but simply the ,darwin-,haeckelian form of that theory1 placing himself in the ranks of ,his and ,hensen4 ,the book appeared almost simultaneously with the fourth edition of ,,haeckel',s ,anthropogeny1#ee but the author1 nevertheless1 in his supplementary remarks1 discusses the 8apology0 which ,haeckel subjoined to his work4 ,haeckel's book needs no recommendation in scientific circles2 it will be sufficient to state that the work has been subjected to essential alterations1 but that its fundamental features have remained the same4 ,a new psychology1 on the ,darwinian basis1 by ,prof4 ,,fritz ,,schultze of ,dresden1 is now in course of publication1 entitled ,vergleichende ,seelenkunde 7,comparative ,psychology#ef74 ,the first part1 which treats of the fundamental principles of physiological psychology1 has already appeared4 ,on the completion of the work we shall have occasion to return to it4 ,,chr4 ,,ufer4 ,,footnotes3 #dh ,problematic ,child-natures4 ,leipsic1 #ahij1 ,robert ,vogtlnder4 #di ,faults of ,character in ,children1 ,a ,system of ,instruction for ,school and ,home4 ,leipsic4 ,eduard ,heinrich ,mayer4 #ej ,compare also1 ,the ,educational ,review 7,new ,york71 ,vol4 ,,ii1 page #cj4 #ea ,psychologie als ,wissenschaft1 #e4 #eb ,salomon ,hirzel1 ,leipsic4 #ec ,hamburg1 #ahia1 ,leopold ,voss4 #ed ,jena1 #ahib1 ,hermann ,costenoble4 #ee ,leipsic1 #ahib1 ,engelmann4 #ef ,leipsic1 #ahib4 ,,criticisms ,,and ,,discussions4 ,a ,,letter ,,from ,,mr4 ,,herbert ,,spencer4 ,to the ,editor of ,the ,monist3 ,as ,i feel it a duty to reserve1 for other purposes1 the very small power of work now left to me1 ,i am obliged to decline entering upon a controversy4 ,i must leave readers to examine for themselves--little hoping1 however1 that they will do so4 ,one point only ,i wish to note4 ,the use of the expression 8forms of thought10 instead of 8forms of intuition10 was simply an inadvertence2 as will be manifest on observing that though ,i have used the wrong expression in the note1 ,i have used the right expression in the text 7p4 #bjc71 as also throughout my criticism of ,kant's doctrine in ,the ,principles of ,psychology1 ,part ,,vii1 ,chapter ,,iv1 8,the ,reasonings of ,metaphysicians10 #cii4 ,,herbert ,,spencer4 ,,logic ,,as ,,relation-,,lore4 ,in the ,french ,revue ,philosophique1 in the ,august and ,september #ahia numbers of the same1 ,m4 ,george ,mouret has an essay entitled 8,mathematical ,equality0 in the course of which and as though subsidiary to his ostensible purpose he discourses upon the topics of relations and concepts and upon the fundamental elements of logic in general4 ,his essay is really more important as a contribution to logical doctrine than as a treatment of mathematical equality4 ,the scope of his discourse will be seen by reference to his closing paragraphs in which he sums up what he considers to be the results achieved by him in his essay4 ,therein1 he says that he has 8treated of the general theory of the composition of concepts and relations and set the foundations of the logic of analysis and the logic of definition40 ,i4 ,,the ,,spencerian ,,axiom4 ,the determining factor of every philosophical dissertation is of course some very general supposition which is taken as established and which exercises a controlling influence over all the observations of its author4 ,in this case this determining supposition is found in what ,m4 ,mouret calls his 8axiom of symmetry40 ,the same is thus stated by him 8,two things which have the same symmetrical relations to a third thing have between them that same relation40 ,m4 ,mouret is not one of those scholars that lack hospitality for other writings than those of their own nationality4 ,from this fault so noticeable in the work of so many of the ,french scholars ,m4 ,mouret himself seems to be free4 ,indeed so far as regards the previous work done in the domain he sets himself to examine1 he accords almost exclusive esteem to the writings of ,english thinkers4 ,in fact he declares himself so far as regards his present topic a disciple of ,mr4 ,herbert ,spencer and puts his 8axiom of symmetry0 as an adaptation of that maxim of his said master which is of the tenor as follows1 viz3 8,things which have a definite relation to the same thing have a definite relation to one another40 ,this maxim1 as ,mr4 ,spencer tells us1 was suggested to him by a remark of the late eminent author who is known to the world under the pseudonym of ,george ,eliot1 who herself stated it under the form 8,things that have a constant relation to the same thing have a constant relation to each other40 ,those who are well acquainted with the psychology of ,mr4 ,spencer will recognise that this maxim of his is made by him the very backbone of all his observations upon reasoning4 ,if it has the validity which he imputes to it1 it has an importance which it will be hard to overestimate1 but if on the contrary1 and as we shall submit1 it is in every form in which it has been stated1 certainly unsound and misleading1 it is high time that its virtue should be brought into question4 ,the dicta of the masters whether they first enounce the same or whether they only give currency thereto by their ratification are always proper subjects for special scrutiny4 ,there is always found a disposition to accept them on their mere ipse dixit without any attempt at criticism or independent observation4 ,this is decisively not the scientific mood or mode4 ,the spirit of that modern leaven that is currently referred to under the name of ,science is characteristically a critical one1 and one that is considerably irreverent in regard to the authority of mere personality4 ,in this it is happily distinguished from the spirit that has marked the past history of what may be called the 8regular0 schools of philosophy4 ,m4 ,mouret is not alone in his inadvertent esteem for the maxim in question4 ,in the issue of ,mind for ,october #ahia ,mr4 ,l4 ,t4 ,hobhouse publishes an article entitled 8,induction and ,deduction10 in which he gives an undue appraisal to the worth of the maxim under consideration1 even though the author of the article seems to be well aware that said maxim stands in much need of qualification4 ,we venture to say that this maxim in all its forms has gained whatever currency it has enjoyed in virtue alone of the incompetent comprehension that too generally prevails in regard to the nature and characteristics of that sort of things that are relations4 ,a notable example of this lack of comprehension is supplied in the logical treatise of ,mr4 ,carveth ,read1 a work ostensibly founded upon the significance of the category of relation and yet in which at the very start the author tells us that a relation is something which is indefinable4 ,,ii4 ,,importance ,,of ,,relation-,,lore4 ,this topic of relations is one that is neglected in a degree that reflects no credit upon the pretensions of those who undertake to instruct others in matters logical and philosophical4 ,the thing itself is in the thinking of every one and the term and its derivations are in universal use4 ,they are used as though they imported an idea that no one was liable to misapply or to misunderstand4 ,the truth1 however1 is that of all the stock terms in our graver discourse this very word 8relation0 and its derivatives are the ones that are oftenest heard and read without any lucidity of mind concerning their proper intent as a part of their context4 ,they are used with an assortment of meanings and non-meanings that are quite distracting to try to follow and quite vain to try and reconcile4 ,in particular the difference between relationship and relation1 between the ground or foundation of the relation and the relation itself1 between the plural fact1 whether of tendency1 interaction1 transition1 or status1 that is a co-condition with the relations1 and the relations that co-condition that same plural fact1 is constantly ignored in thinking and in the expression thereof1 to the more or less confusion in1 and inconsequence of1 the whole discourse delivered4 ,it is no slight commendation of the perspicacity of ,m4 ,mouret to observe that he has discovered that the way towards a resolution of the problems he sets himself to work out lies through what to him appears the altogether unexplored regions of relation-lore1 for it is evident that he regards himself as a pioneer in this field4 ,,iii4 ,,works ,,on ,,relation-,,lore ,,in ,,the ,,english ,,language4 ,in observing this we cannot but hold ,m4 ,mouret unfortunate in not having been put upon better lines of inquiry4 ,he seems to have been wholly unaware of the treasures of investigation in this domain that exist in the ,english language and that for many years have been available for the student4 ,his case in this respect is seen in the exaltation which he gives to the semi-popular discourses of ,mr4 ,spencer and ,mr4 ,read1 as contrasted with the profound researches of ,de,morgan and ,boole and their disciples4 ,it is evident that he has judged concerning the comparative quality of the various lines of ,english research not after an examination of his own1 but after the current popular renown4 ,for example1 he speaks of the work of ,de,morgan and ,boole as presenting 8only a simple mode of representing some of the logical laws0 and as being 8surrounded with a formidable and complicated apparel which disguises the value of their tentatives40 ,since ,m4 ,mouret is manifestly an earnest student of the topic of relation-lore this language shows that he has at best only a second or third-hand knowledge of what ,de,morgan and ,boole really did4 ,he ought to have known that in the recondite field of research in question all really competent treatment of the same would be very far from having any 8popular0 quality4 ,for a man to discourse of relation-lore in ignorance of what ,de,morgan1 the very father of the 8,logic of ,relatives10 accomplished is like discoursing of ,darwinism in ignorance of 8,the ,origin of ,species40 ,we opine that when ,m4 ,mouret shall have consulted the great memoir of ,de,morgan in the tenth volume of the 8,cambridge ,philosophical ,transactions0 or better1 when he shall have become acquainted with the more developed work of ,mr4 ,c4 ,s4 ,peirce1 to whom beyond question relation-lore is most indebted for its present state of progress1 he will have a better esteem for the value of the 8tentatives0 of ,de,morgan and ,boole and their disciples4 ,mr4 ,peirce has published three principal papers on the subject in question4 ,the first of these was published in #ahgj in the ninth volume of the 8,memoirs of the ,american ,academy of ,arts and ,sciences40 ,then in #ahhj and in #ahhd1 while ,mr4 ,peirce was lecturer on logic at ,johns ,hopkins ,university1 he published in the ,american ,journal of ,mathematics two papers dealing more or less extensively with relation-lore4 ,one of these his 8,hauptwerk0 as it is called by ,professor ,schroeder of ,carlsruhe1 appears in the third volume of the journal mentioned and the other in the seventh volume of the same4 ,mr4 ,peirce was one of the contributors to our new ,american 8,century ,dictionary10 and in that work under the definitions of ,relation and ,relativity there appears a summary treatment of the subject which is as we take it the work of ,mr4 ,peirce and which might have given to ,m4 ,mouret hints which he would have appreciated4 ,also the editor of this magazine in his article 8,are there ,things in ,themselves80 in the ,january #ahib number thereof incidentally touches upon the topic under consideration in such a way as to correct some of the more inveterate misconceptions4 ,,iv4 ,m4 ,,mouret',s ,,theory ,,of ,,relations4 ,the article of ,m4 ,mouret is in so many points so excellent a discourse that the chief reflection one is inclined to make is that upon its own principles it ought to have been better4 ,he seems to have been widely awake to the primordial nature of relations as philosophical data4 ,he says3 8,every notion or relation is a function of relations more directly known and enters as a relational element into other relations less proximate to the common sources10 and also that 8every concept or notion ought to resolve into a group of relations40 ,by such tokens as these we naturally look to see ,m4 ,mouret making it his very first concern to explain fully the nature of those primordial data that are relations4 ,indeed he seems himself to be fully aware of this natural expectation for he says3 8,what then is a relation2 what is a concept or notion8 ,to this double question an answer is necessary and a precise answer not consisting in the substitution of one form of words for another form of words bearing the same meaning or no meaning at all40 ,we cannot however find that he has done this4 ,instead of it and almost while saying that every concept and notion ought to resolve in a group of relations he announces1 8,what ,i have to examine is the constitution1 the structure of these relation-generating groups40 ,thus he starts with a synthesis when what is needed is analysis4 ,he starts with supposing a group of relational elements indeterminate in number and proceeds to inquire as to the conditions that must subsist with regard to them1 respectively and in combination1 in order that a definite relation may subsist as to a pair of the relational elements4 ,these conditions he finds to be four in number4 ,first1 he finds that-- 8,it is necessary that every one of the terms of the group should be connected one to the other by definite relations2 that between any two terms there must always be intermediate terms that connect them in a continuous way40 ,this he calls the condition of 8,solidarity40 ,secondly1 he finds that there must obtain the condition of ,co-,existence4 ,by co-existence he intends-- 8,not a definite co-existence in time1 that is to say1 a relation of simultaneity or concomitance1 nor yet that established co-existence which constitutes the causal relation1 but an indefinite co-existence independent of the order of its terms and of all consideration of time or duration40 ,having thus supposed his group all well stocked with relations1 he proceeds to relegate most of them to the limbo of inconsequence by invoking a principle which he calls the principle of indetermination4 ,by virtue of this principle in every particular case the particular determinations of all the terms become indeterminate and those of the intermediate terms doubly so4 ,thus the supposed facts of the case become fit for the existence of the ,third condition1 that of ,abstraction1 and for the arising of a general concept or notion4 ,but corresponding to every concept or notion is its negative or opposite concept or notion4 ,as this negative depends necessarily upon certain particular determinations of the same terms that bear the particular determinations and which being singly indeterminate admit of the positive concept or notion1 there necessarily must obtain two systems of singly indeterminate particular determinations relative to but incompatible with one another1 and so relative that the negation of one set entails the obtaining of the other set1 or in other words either set being negated entails the obtaining of the other set4 ,these facts constitute what ,m4 ,mouret calls the principle of incompatibility and involve his ,fourth condition of ,relativity stated by him as follows3 8,all the particular determinations of the extreme terms must not be compatible with the system and the negation of certain relations of the system must entail the negation of the relation which they make between the extreme terms40 ,v4 ,,reflections ,,on ,m4 ,,mouret',s ,,theory4 ,now we cannot regard this as a successful attempt to explain the nature and characteristics of relations1 or to unfold the involutions of relation-lore4 ,we fully realise that if every concept or relation resolves into a group of relations we must in some form or other take what are relations in reality as data to begin with1 but this does not prevent us from taking our datum terms for our turn of explanation as not requiring at present any recognition other than as relational elements4 ,what is needful as a prime requisite on the very start of any research in relation-lore is to obtain a clear idea of what is meant by a relation4 ,meanings are primarily matters of mental status4 ,we have to determine the relation that subsists between the mind and the object through the mediating interpretation of a word1 and the mental affection lies nearest and logically comes first4 ,it may very well be that the mental affection requires correction1 but this cannot take place until its faults are observed1 and these cannot become evident until the mental affection is itself duly understood4 ,the disciples of that school of logic in which ,de,morgan and ,boole1 both eminent mathematicians1 hold so exalted a rank as discoverers1 regard cognition as arising in consequence of brain functioning or mental operation and study the results of this operation as yielding their import in dependence upon and only in dependence upon the proper operation in virtue of which they arise4 ,now no cognition whatever1 even of the most elementary sort1 arises except in connection with and in consequence of that operation of the sensibility which is distinction4 ,distinction is of multitudinous and manifold aspects4 ,in all its phases whether it be passive or active it is naught else than the arising or the assigning of relations4 ,the attempt to posit an unqualifiedly absolute--that is1 an unqualifiedly unrelated--universe of discourse must be futile and blank1 necessarily and insuperably4 ,any form of notation that pretends to express such a universe of discourse1 is only saved1 if at all1 from being unqualifiedly nonsensical1 by standing as antithetical--that is1 by being related to forms of notation that express relation and nothing else than relation4 ,this rigorously prime operation of distinction is not only pure relation-ing but it is of that sort of relation-ing that is at once a distinguishing and a conjoining4 ,the 8,one and the ,many0 are insuperably implicit therein4 ,distinction having operated to various extents1 and thereby various relations having come into view1 we become aware of those items of experience that are objects or facts4 ,each and every one of these objects or facts are in truth distinguished and are therefore in no strict sense indiscernible from each other1 but since no science can possibly obtain in relation to mere particulars we find it useful to disregard various points of distinction that obtain in respect to various objects and facts and to converge our regard upon the points wherein distinction1 not absolutely vanishes1 but tends to vanish4 ,by this operation1 which is abstraction1 various objects and facts become in mental regard fit and useful to be taken as copies of one another and as indifferent for use in most of the turns of mental life4 ,there are indeed various relations1 objects1 and facts1 with respect to which no further operation or operations of distinction than the mere distinctions of the time1 the place1 or the occasion of their various manifestations have been applied nor can without great difficulty be applied4 ,but we are therefore by no means entitled to say that such are in truth irresolvable4 ,contrarily1 and reasoning inductively we are justified in concluding that every relation1 object1 and fact will under analysis of adequate power resolve without limit into other relations1 objects1 and facts4 ,we are not yet prepared to see that the ultimate components of relations1 objects1 and facts resolve into relations1 and nothing but relations1 because we are not yet prepared with an explicit idea of the nature and characteristics of these elementary objects4 ,the study of ,m4 ,mouret since it starts with relations combining them under the conditions of ,solidarity ,co-,existence1 ,abstraction and ,relativity1 7which are nothing else than other relations or compounds of relations17 does not seem to us to advance us at all in the most fundamental requisite4 ,he says no more than to say that in order for the groups of relations to generate further definite relations the relations thus grouped together must be related to one another and then that most of these relations must be disregarded4 ,m4 ,mouret distinguishes1 with respect to a relation three factors1 the ,matter1 or the relational elements grouped together1 the ,form1 or the order in which the relational elements are arrayed1 and the ,foundation4 ,as his study of the topic of relations is professedly for the purpose of enabling him the better to solve the nature of the relation of mathematical equality1 his success may be estimated by reference to his conclusions in regard to that relation4 ,these are as follows3 8,the relation of equality is formed of undetermined matter1 it possesses a binary form1 and has for a condition a relation of indiscernibility between the two elements40 ,such conclusions appear to us to be impotent not to say erroneous4 ,if two things obtain at all1 they obtain as two and not one1 in very virtue of being distinguished the one from the other4 ,except with regard to some more or less arbitrary distinctions1 like the distinction between coincident points1 all distinctions obtain only in virtue of some relation that can be nothing else than a point of discernibility4 ,numbers and other mathematical things are taken as not-different not because they are in truth indiscernible but because for the turn in hand their points of difference are irrelevant4 ,concerning the much mooted question of the proper field of logic as a science ,m4 ,mouret holds it to be the 8science of relations and general concepts40 ,although we hold that logic is particularly concerned with the lore that is more directly related to the phenomena of erroneous thinking and its correction1 the view of ,m4 ,mouret is not unacceptable4 8,reasoning consists in the observation that where certain relations subsist certain others are found10 as ,mr4 ,peirce has remarked4 ,,vi4 ,,concerning ,,meanings ,,and ,,explanations4 ,as preliminary to our account of relations we will make an observation which seems to us of considerable use in connection therewith4 ,it is not without its bearing on the theory of definition or rather upon the broader theory of explanation4 ,with ,m4 ,mouret we hold that every concept and relation resolves into a compound of relations4 ,since relations are data that are absolutely elementary at least so far as we are at present instructed they are of course not subsumable under any other sort of data that are better known4 ,moreover1 whatever explanation we here make must needs be made by means of written words4 ,thus an important question arises as to what method is to be pursued in this special exigency4 ,the theory of definition leads us to the same difficulty1 for although the meanings of many words can be defined in terms that are more proximate to the elementary relations1 we will always come at last to terms that admit of no improved explanation by such a method4 ,there is no device of words that can evade or supersede the ultimate recourse to things4 ,now the significations of words are learned in most cases not so much by definitions and verbal descriptions as by the observation of the various applications of the words4 ,indeed this is the primitive way in which the meanings of words are found out4 ,the child knows nothing of what1 say1 the word horse means until some one shows it an actual horse and may be pointing to it says repeatedly1 horse1 in such a way as to excite the observation of the child to the intended application of the word to the thing4 ,this is because the relation of every general sign to its object subsists only in consequence of a mental association1 and until this mental association is created the sign has no meaning4 ,the methods of evoking these mental associations are at present quite unmethodical and do not receive the attention which their importance merits4 ,one feasible method is to present or to state a number of scenes that shall present the object in various ways in connection with the sign thereof1 and thus to excite attention to the proper application of the sign4 ,the geometer does this by means of his diagrams without which or their mental counterparts all his mere words would be in vain4 ,mr4 ,edward ,t4 ,dixon has lately published a work on the 8,foundations of ,geometry0 in which he would introduce as a fundamental datum what is really an altogether new and exceedingly abstract conception which he calls by an old name1 that of direction4 ,the old term has never been as yet taken in any abstract universal sense because apart from definite right lines showing it as an attribute any abstract universal meaning is wholly unassignable4 ,but the conception that ,mr4 ,dixon would instal is removed in abstractness from such a universal yet one more step in universality4 ,a three-fold infinity of right lines differing in direction can be drawn in ordinary space to each of which pertain two corresponding universals of direction1 one converse to the other4 ,now the conception of direction that ,mr4 ,dixon proposes for service as an elementary geometrical datum is the universal that subsumes all these lower ranking universals as particulars4 ,of course he has difficulty in even trying to explain what he means4 ,realising the impossibility of subsuming it in any way he takes a method which if it were more thoroughly applied1 and wholly emancipated from the lingering notion of definition1 might have been more successful4 ,as he actually left the matter his real meaning can only be drawn from close study of the way in which he applies the term in his discourse in general4 ,owing to its excessive abstractness his conception is wholly unfit for service in elementary geometry4 ,one has to become a good geometer before the conception can even be approached4 ,,vii4 ,,another ,,theory ,,of ,,relations4 ,we shall proceed to explain what we regard as a true and adequate notion of a relation by stating some scenes that display the same4 ,we do not regard it as needful to state many of them and we take for our first one1 the common transaction of making a donation4 ,we have here for relational elements or terms as they are usually called a set of three4 ,separately1 or as not yet brought into relation in virtue of the giving1 there may be1 say ,g an owner of ,w a watch and ,r the intended beneficiary4 ,the plural fact of the giving is the relationship or the foundation of the relations that arise in virtue of said giving4 ,this foundation becomes to be in virtue of the creation of such relations by the giving4 ,either one of the set of three may be taken as the datum of reference and according to the election in this respect1 the relations may differ and the technical names we are about to give will vary in their application4 ,since simplicity will be gained thereby and also our present turn fully subserved we will take ,g as the datum term of reference4 ,so taking it ,g is called the relate and both ,w and ,r are called the correlates4 ,for this present turn and in very virtue of the giving and only in virtue thereof ,g becomes related to ,w and ,r in a certain relation one of the names of which is giver4 ,when ,w or ,r are taken as relates certain other relations appear1 some of the names of which are respectively present and recipient4 ,in relation to the relation of giver the relations of present and recipient are named converse relations1 as are likewise the relations of present and giver to the relation of recipient and the relations of giver and recipient to the relation of present4 ,here are three distinct relations growing out of the same relationship or foundation4 ,as each relational element has its corresponding negation1 the true logical system of a set of three terms involves not less than eight relations4 ,we take for our second scene the case of a boundary4 ,this might be a surface or a point but we will take the special case of a line on a surface4 ,here we have again a set of three1 the spread on one side1 ,a1 the opposite spread1 ,b1 and the line ,l4 ,a has a certain relation1 say above1 to ,l and ,b1 ,b has the certain relation1 below1 to ,a and ,l1 which relation is converse to the relation above3 and ,l has the certain relation1 boundary1 to ,a and ,b which relation is converse to the relations above and below4 ,the two examples now given are cases of the conjugative kind4 ,the relationship is a conjugative one and the relations are conjugative relations4 ,the distinguishing characteristic of a conjugative case is the fact essentially involved of the mediation between relational elements by another certain element1 or in other words the bringing of diverse relational elements into relation by the function of another relational element4 ,without the mediation or function of this conjugating element neither the relationship nor the conjugative relations can exist4 ,there is reason to believe that all conjugative cases can be certified as cases of three relational elements or as compounds of a number of such sets of three4 ,to ordinary uncritical thought which is largely constrained by the trammels of ordinary language the most abundant sort of relations appears to be of that sort that are taken to involve only two relational elements4 ,these are cases of what are called dual relationships and the relations that arise out of them are called dual relations4 ,such are those like father1 son1 husband1 wife1 etc4 ,strictly viewed they ought to be regarded as degenerate relationships and relations just as a pair of lines is regarded as a degenerate conic4 ,,viii4 ,,cautions ,,and ,,applications4 ,now besides the error of confounding relations with relationship1 it is a very common fault to think and speak of a relation as being between two or more terms4 ,this imports into thought the thoroughly misleading idea of an intervening independent existence for relations4 ,relations are attributive predicates of terms and each one of them pertains strictly to its proper term or combination of terms1 in the same sense for this turn 7pro hac vice7 that qualities are held to pertain to their so-called substances4 ,and yet relations so pertain to their proper terms not in virtue of such terms separately but in virtue of their membership in the plural fact which obtains as the relationship or foundation4 ,the notion of a relation as a 8betweenness0 has perhaps been fostered by the exact coincidence of relations pertaining to the several members of the same relationship4 ,when on contemplating the connection1 say of two points1 we observe that the distance of one from the other is apparently indistinguishable from the distance of the other from the one1 we naturally overlook the fact that we are truly to regard the connection as the coincidence of two really distinct relations1 and regarding the pair of relations as one thing and finding it not attributable to one point more than to the other we dissociate it from both4 ,but when we consider a pair of relations that are converse to one another and that arise out of a dual relationship like that of husband and wife we may see that there is no betweenness1 no single relation that interlies1 but two relations1 one the relation of husband and the other the converse relation of wife4 ,an interaction1 say like that of approach under the influence of gravitation1 is a relationship4 ,each body stands in the relation of a puller of the other and the mediating term which we find impossible to argue out of the account we call the attraction of gravitation4 ,in this case the relation of action of the one body is not usually distinguished from the relation of action of the other one4 ,indeed this is the case in all cases of mechanical action and we lay it down as a maxim that action and reaction are equal but they are not alike since their directions are opposite4 ,sensation is a relationship1 since it is our interaction4 ,the object interacts with the brain4 ,as to the conjugating term we are as yet in the dark and so we are in the habit of regarding this case as a dual relation4 ,the relation of the brain to the object is that of a knower and that of the object to the brain that of a stimulater4 ,each character or mark of the object that becomes apparent gives rise to relations and their respective converses each correlative pair of which are respectively so many distinct interactions of detail in the entire interaction4 ,whatever an object as known to us is1 it is in virtue of those relations of brain action and detailed object stimulation1 which are relations and always relations4 ,since consciousness exists only by the arising of relations of distinction1 supposably in consequence of internal brain interaction1 is it presumptuous to allege that consciousness consists of relations or a complex of relations8 ,,ix4 ,,nature ,,of ,,objects4 ,with regard to the object no one can prevent whoever may be so disposed1 from imputing to it various points of possession that do not and cannot interact with the brain4 ,so far as such imputed points are regarded as merely not yet interacting but possible to interact with knowing substance such points in no wise differ in essential nature from the known attributes4 ,they are potential relations and nothing else4 ,but in so far as they are regarded as essentially impossible of ever interacting with knowing substance in any possible stage of its development such regard is pure nonsense and utterly without any assignable meaning4 ,there is no occasion whatever for such an imputation1 for the existence of interaction actual or potential is fully adequate to explain all that will ever present itself to be explained4 ,at this point let us instruct ourselves with an example of the reasonings of a much and deservedly honored philosopher4 ,he says3 8,in the most general predicate which is determined ,being or existence--for all things in the universe are determined beings--we have an evident two-foldness 7a composite nature7 which allows of a further analysis into pure ,being and determination40 ,we will parallel this analysis4 ,for the sake of simplicity we will take a limited right line4 ,it has the determinations straight and long1 not length in the sense of measure1 for length is ambiguous in its intent1 but length in its qualitative sense--its linearity so to speak4 ,now separate from it first its straightness without however giving to it any other determination1 and then its quality of longness4 ,we have then a pure line1 that is neither straight1 nor long1 nor anything else4 ,such is an example of 8,pure ,being40 ,we say however that its very being as a line is absolutely dependent on its determination as a long line2 that such a determination alone constitutes it a line1 is at once its determination and its being1 that there is no two-foldness at all but only two names1 and that as one-fold its determination as long and its being vanish together4 ,what is true of a line is true of all relations and compounds of relations whatever4 ,thus not only all knowledge but all existence so far as that term can ever have any meaning is relative2 relative to all intents and for every possible turn4 ,to those who accept the essentials of this account of relations it will be easy to see what is the nature of an object and that of a concept or notion4 ,an object is a relation or some congeries of relations that usually present themselves as a coherent whole to our sensibility or to consciousness4 ,this is primarily effected in virtue of some efficacy which we cannot appropriate to ourselves1 and so we distinguish our own personality from that manifold that we call the objective world4 ,it is pure self-stultification after having made this most useful distinction to try and abolish it4 ,nothing but an utter abolition of all useful thought can result from so taking the data of experience4 ,x4 ,,nature ,,of ,a ,,concept4 ,but objects are individual and generally found with various points of distinction some of which are irrelevant to most of the turns of mental life4 ,we therefore neglect the irrelevant points and take many objects as copies of one another4 ,this process is not the formation of the concept or notion but it suggests and prompts that formation4 ,we cannot but regard it as an error to take a conception as a sum of individuals4 ,it seems to us to be rather in the nature of a locus4 ,a curve contains an infinity of points and yet the curve is not any sum of points even though it is often allowable to speak of it as the sum of all its points4 ,so any concept1 say1 man1 is not all the men that now live nor yet all the men that eternity both backwards and forwards has contained and will contain4 ,a concept is a manifold and strictly universal and infinite in respect to the particulars it subsumes4 ,we speak of the infinitive mood of a verb because the meaning of the word as thus taken is not put under any modification4 ,in like manner the meaning of any concept though subject to various limitations in its applications is as a concept merely to be regarded as obtaining in a purely infinitive sense4 ,professor ,jevons found a difficulty in classifying what he called material terms1 such as stone1 sand1 water1 etc4 ,other logicians have put such terms as singular terms1 while still others have classed them as general terms4 ,there is a great variety of such terms4 ,potatoes1 wheat1 butter1 ice1 cattle1 water1 hydrogen1 the names of all the elements1 ether1 electricity1 time1 space1 love1 virtue1 etc41 are instances4 ,it seems to us that such terms are the normal types of general terms and that the canonical forms of our universal propositions ought to be unquantified not only as regards the predicates but also as regards the subjects4 ,why not 8man is animal0 just as 8lard is grease0 or 8man is mortal0 just as 8butter is cheap08 ,moreover the distinction between a general concept and one that is called singular is only one of degree and not of kind4 ,every so-called singular term is potentially at least only an individual instance under a possible general or universal concept4 ,a striking example of this potentiality is furnished by the modern generalisations of that formerly singular term1 space4 ,if these observations are well founded1 the universals of thought even though arising out of the facts of experience and rigidly beholden to experience for every last element out of which they are constructed1 form nevertheless a ,formal-,thought-,world1 and the mind of man in virtue of its powers of imaginative construction and generalisation has a constitution that enables it to subsume the actual objective universe as only one particular of a universality of a higher rank4 ,under such a conception of the objective world and the world of thought and their relations the old dispute of realism versus nominalism would take a new aspect4 ,universals in re even though they were admitted to exist would become universals no longer in the higher universe of thought4 ,true universals would only subsist as universals of the world of mind4 ,the laws of ,form and ,formal ,thought would thus become of chief moment in philosophy and no one could be recognised as properly laying claim to the title of philosopher without proficiency therein4 ,,xi4 ,,fallacy ,,of ,,the ,,spencerian ,,axiom4 ,concerning the 8axiom of symmetry0 only a few examples of its fallacy are needful4 ,mutual friendship is certainly a 8symmetrical0 relation1 but ,a and ,c may be mutual friends and ,b and ,c mutual friends also1 but it in no wise follows that ,a and ,b are friends4 ,they may be decidedly unfriendly as we often see the case4 ,take a case of equilibrium the cases of which seem to be favorite ones with ,m4 ,mouret4 ,we suppose that planets may be regarded as in a relation of equilibrium with the sun and yet these mere equilibrations with the sun do not make any equilibrium between them4 ,they do not knock together it is true but this is due to their own direct relations and not their relations of equilibrium with the sun4 ,the distances of points from each other is a 8symmetrical0 relation and yet point ,a may be from point ,c the very same distance that point ,b is from ,c1 but the distance of points ,a and ,b from one another may vary from coincidence to double the distance ,a ,c-,b ,c4 ,,xii4 ,,nature ,,of ,,arithmetical ,,equality4 ,concerning the relation of 8mathematical equality0 there is no single relation that obtains throughout mathematics as such4 ,there is numerical equality upon which the equality in service in numeric algebra is founded1 and there is geometric equality1 the equality of vectors1 etc41 all different from one another4 ,m4 ,mouret seems to have only numeric equality in view4 ,he claims this relation to be not only of a very simple nature but that it is the very foundation of the notions of magnitude and quantity4 ,he even declares that mathematics could not exist without this relation4 ,did he lose sight of the usual proof of ,fourier's celebrated theorem8 ,as we have explained1 things that are distinguished are not really alike but only for certain turns taken to be so4 ,this assimilation of things is of various grades4 ,in arithmetic1 meaning arithmetic in its most general sense1 the only logical comprehension that the various numbers possess is respectively their greater or less partitionability2 m is the same as n means in arithmetic that whatever has the numerical rank of m has also precisely the numerical rank of n no matter what summations or other numerical operations m or n may represent4 ,identity of this sort is arithmetical equality4 ,it seems a simple relation for the reason that its intervention very decisively simplifies our arithmetical comprehensions4 ,it is however a coincidence of two relations that are converse to one another4 ,these relations are 8not less than0 and 8not greater than40 ,it is universally admitted that the more inclusive a notion or concept is in extension1 the more simple and primary it is than any other notion or concept included as an instance under it4 ,now all equality is 8not less than0 but not all 8not less than0 is necessarily equality2 hence1 8not less than0 is a wider and more primary notion than equality4 ,on the same considerations 8not more than0 is in the same case4 ,equality is the limiting case between the variable and logically more simple cases of 8not less than0 and 8not more than40 ,the notion of quantity emerges on comparison however vague between any two objects that have size1 independently of the notion of equality4 ,if this were not true how could we have the notions of infinitely large and infinitely small4 ,it is indeed true that without the notion of equality the theory of numbers and the mathematical analysis could subsist in a rudimentary state only1 but to say that they would not exist at all is rash and not maintainable4 ,the relations 8not less than0 8not more than0 would still allow of some truly mathematical propositions1 operations1 and calculations4 ,in that essentially qualitative notation that is ordinary language the relation that corresponds to equality is of very limited range but a relation that is analogous to 8not less than10 viz41 supersumption1 is very efficient4 ,with a theory of numbers and a mathematical analysis using only the relations 8not less than0 8not more than0 in lieu of the relation of equality the fundamental operations1 addition and substitution1 would find some scope of application and hence the derivative operations1 multiplication1 powering1 etc41 and their inversions1 subtraction1 division1 etc41 would obtain in some fashion and to some extent4 ,this can readily be seen by any one who is familiar with the way in which expressions of inequality are used in modern mathematical analysis4 ,,francis ,c4 ,,russell4 ,,observations ,,on ,,some ,,points ,,in ,,james',s ,,psychology4 ,,ii4 ,,emotion4 ,nothing in ,professor ,james's work will be likely to strike the average reader as more paradoxical than his views on the subject of ,emotion1 which he must be allowed to state in his own words4 ,after premising that he will limit his discussion1 in the first instance1 to what may be called the coarser emotions1 as fear1 grief1 rage1 love1 in which every one recognises a strong organic reverberation1 he goes on to say3 8,our natural way of thinking about these coarser emotions is that the mental perception of some fact excites the mental affection called the emotion1 and that this latter state of mind gives rise to the bodily expression4 ,my theory1 on the contrary1 is that the bodily changes follow directly the perception of the existing fact1 and that our feeling of the same changes1 as they occur1 is the emotion4 ,common sense says1 we lose our fortune1 are sorry and weep2 we meet a bear1 are frightened and run2 we are insulted by a rival1 are angry and strike4 ,the hypothesis here to be defended says that this order of sequence is incorrect1 that the one mental state is not immediately induced by the other1 that the bodily manifestations must first be interposed between1 and that the more rational statement is that we feel sorry because we cry1 angry because we strike1 afraid because we tremble1 and not that we strike1 cry1 or tremble1 because we are sorry1 angry or fearful1 as the case may be4 ,without the bodily state following on the perception1 the latter would be purely cognitive in form1 pale1 colorless1 destitute of emotional warmth4 ,we might then see the bear and judge it best to run1 receive the insult and deem it right to strike1 but we should not actually feel afraid or angry4 8,stated in this crude way1 the hypothesis is pretty sure to meet with immediate disbelief4 ,and yet neither many nor far-fetched considerations are required to mitigate its paradoxical character1 and possibly to produce conviction of its truth4 8,to begin with1 no reader of the last two chapters will be inclined to doubt the fact that objects do excite bodily changes by a preorganised mechanism1 or the farther fact that the changes are so indefinitely numerous and subtle that the entire organism may be called a sounding-board which every change of consciousness1 however slight1 may make reverberate4444 8,the next thing to be noticed is this1 that every one of the bodily changes1 whatsoever it be1 is ,,felt1 acutely or obscurely1 the moment it occurs4444 8,i now proceed to urge the vital point of my whole theory1 which is this3 ,if we fancy some strong emotion1 and then try to abstract from our consciousness of it all the feelings of its bodily symptoms1 we find we have nothing left behind1 no #8mind-stuff' out of which the emotion can be constituted1 and that a cold and neutral state of intellectual perception is all that remains4 ,it is true that1 although most people when asked say that their introspection verifies this statement1 some persist in saying that it does not4 ,many cannot be made to understand the question4 ,when you beg them to imagine away every feeling of laughter and of tendency to laugh from their consciousness of the ludicrousness of an object1 and then to tell you what the feeling of its ludicrousness would be like1 whether it be anything more than the perception that the object belongs to the class #8funny1' they persist in replying that the thing proposed is a physical impossibility and that they always must laugh if they see a funny object4 ,of course the task proposed is not the practical one of seeing a ludicrous object and annihilating one's tendency to laugh4 ,it is the purely speculative one of subtracting certain elements of feeling from an emotional state supposed to exist in all its fulness1 and saying what the residual elements are4 ,i cannot help thinking that all who rightly apprehend this problem will agree with the proposition above laid down4 ,what kind of an emotion of fear would be left if the feeling neither of quickened heart-beats nor of shallow breathing1 neither of trembling lip nor of weakened limbs1 neither of goose-flesh nor of visceral stirrings1 were present1 it is quite impossible for me to think4 ,can one fancy the state of rage and picture no ebullition in the chest1 no flushing of the face1 no dilatation of the nostrils1 no clenching of the teeth1 no impulse to vigorous action1 but in their stead limp muscles1 calm breathing and a placid face8 ,the present writer1 for one1 certainly cannot4 ,the rage is as completely evaporated as the sensation of its so-called manifestations1 and the only thing that can be supposed to take its place is some cold-blooded and dispassionate sentence1 confined entirely to the judicial realm1 to the effect that a certain person or persons merit chastisement for their sins4 ,in like manner of grief3 what would it be without its tears1 its sobs1 its suffocation of the heart1 its pang in the breast-bone8 ,a feelingless recognition that certain circumstances are deplorable1 and nothing more4 ,every passion in turn tells the same story4 ,a purely disembodied human emotion is a non-entity40 7,p4 #ddi seq47 ,it is1 of course1 impossible for me to give all the arguments by which ,professor ,james attempts to establish his position2 the above quotations will make it clear what it is--namely1 that all our 8feelings0 are sensations4 ,before proceeding to consider some of the objections to this view of the matter1 it may be well to notice briefly what seems to be a gap in the author's treatment of it4 ,in adult human beings1 very few1 comparatively1 of what are ordinarily recognised as emotions follow directly upon the perception of their objects1 in the ordinary sense of the word4 ,his theory might perhaps suffice1 without further explanation for such cases as the 8spitting0 of blind kittens at the smell of a dog1 or the rage of a bull at the sight of a red cloth1 or the startled feeling that we experience at a loud and unexpected sound1 if the latter should be called an emotion4 ,but in the immense majority of instances the emotions of which he treats arise in a very different way4 ,some of his own illustrations will serve as well as any to show this4 ,for instance1 neither running nor any other of the symptoms of fear which he enumerates is the necessary result of seeing a bear4 ,a chained or caged bear may excite only feelings of curiosity1 and a well armed hunter might experience only pleasurable feelings at meeting one loose in the woods4 ,it is not1 then1 the perception of the bear that excites the movements of fear4 ,we do not run from the bear unless we suppose him capable of doing us bodily injury4 ,why should the expectation of being eaten1 for instance1 set the muscles of our legs in motion8 8,common sense0 would be likely to say it was because we object to being eaten1 but according to ,professor ,james1 the reason we dislike to be eaten is because we run away4 ,so1 again1 striking is not a reflex act1 following on the hearing of an insult as sneezing does on taking snuff4 ,whether the muscular movements or the emotions are the primary thing1 what both shall be depends on many things besides the words that are spoken4 ,to be accused of drunkenness or unchastity1 for instance1 would dispose some persons to violence1 but others might feel only the stirrings of pride at what they would consider a tribute to their manhood4 ,in those who considered such a charge opprobrious1 it might excite feelings of amusement1 contempt1 pity1 or grief towards the one making it1 according to the estimation in which he was held4 ,to say that if it makes us strike we shall be angry1 if it makes us laugh we shall be amused1 if it makes us weep we shall be grieved1 does not go to the bottom of the matter4 ,according to the theory1 the thought of the estimation in which we are held by others is1 in itself1 entirely indifferent to us1 and only affects our feelings through the muscular movements it excites4 ,in view of the variety of these movements in response to the same physical stimulus in a case like this1 the statement that objects excite bodily changes by a preorganised mechanism explains nothing4 ,we want to know why in one case a given perception excites one set of movements1 and in another an entirely different set4 ,without attempting to decide whether or not a satisfactory explanation can be given on ,professor ,james's hypothesis1 ,i will only say1 that1 so far as ,i can see1 he nowhere attempts it4 ,in his section on 8,the ,genesis of the ,various ,emotions10 7pp4 #dgg seq471 he only discusses the question how the various feelings come to be associated with their respective movements4 ,how the movements come to be associated with the perceptions1 he does not discuss at all4 ,turning now to the considerations which ,professor ,james urges in support of his theory1 quoted above1 the first two--that objects excite bodily changes and that these changes are more or less distinctly felt--may pass unchallenged4 ,i am disposed to go as far with him as to admit that these feelings1 in the cases which he describes1 may properly be considered components of the emotional state4 ,but when he affirms that there is nothing else--that if we subtract our consciousness of peripheral sensations there would be no emotion left--it seems to me that he is going very much too far4 ,i should have no hesitation in saying that such a statement of the case is contradicted by my consciousness1 but as that would be merely setting up my consciousness against his1 without the possibility of an umpire1 ,i will call attention to some other considerations which seem to me to render it improbable4 ,in the first place1 it is to be noticed that the cases he instances in illustration of his position are all of violent emotions4 ,admitting that we cannot have these emotions1 in such degree1 without movements such as he describes1 nor even imagine how they would feel if such a thing were possible1 it does not follow because they cannot be separated that they are identical4 ,we do not reason in this way in regard to those feelings which are not commonly called emotions4 ,i can no more imagine myself in intense bodily pain without a tendency to groan and writhe than deeply grieved without a tendency to weep1 and yet no one1 probably1 would say that the pain consisted solely in my consciousness of the groaning and writhing4 ,if grief is a kind of pain1 it is to be expected that1 in a high degree1 it will produce bodily movements more or less similar to those excited by other sorts of pain4 ,all these emotions1 however1 are capable of infinite gradations in intensity4 ,the fear of losing one's pocket handkerchief is an emotion of the same kind as the fear of losing one's fortune4 ,in ,professor ,james's description of fear1 it is evident that he has abject terror in mind2 ,i hardly think it probable that he has any such sensations1 when he fears1 for instance1 that he will be late to dinner1 and yet he must be differently constituted from many of his fellow-men if his state of mind in such a case is merely a cold1 intellectual cognition of the fact that such a state of affairs would be undesirable4 ,the same is true of the other emotions he mentions4 ,the feeling of the ludicrous is1 perhaps1 the strongest case he cites1 but in my own case slight degrees of amusement do not excite laughter1 or even any conscious disposition to laugh4 ,there is1 at the most1 in such cases1 a tendency to smile1 which may be overpowered by some other emotion1 without in the least impairing my feeling of amusement4 ,it seems to me certain that slight degrees of all the emotions mentioned may be unaccompanied by any distinct consciousness of reflex movements4 ,in such cases it is only by a pretty strong effort of attention that we are able1 if at all1 to determine what the bodily changes are1 although we are distinctly aware of the emotion4 ,again1 it is to be noticed that many actions1 similar in character to those we have been considering1 are not associated with what are commonly called emotions4 ,laughing and sobbing1 for instance1 are spasmodic movements of the muscles of respiration1 not strikingly different from hiccuping1 and there seems no good reason why the consciousness of the former two should usually be felt as strong emotional excitement1 while the latter is not4 ,in some cases1 movements identical with those accompanying particular emotions may occur entirely independently of them4 ,shivering from cold1 for instance1 is the same sort of a movement as may occur in violent fright1 but it does not make us feel frightened4 ,the laughter excited in children and sensitive persons by tickling of the skin is not necessarily accompanied by any mirthful feelings4 ,the act of vomiting may be the accompaniment of the most extreme disgust1 or it may occur without a trace of such emotion4 ,professor ,james himself gives an instance of this sort that can hardly be bettered3 8,the writer well remembers his astonishment1 when a boy of seven or eight1 at fainting when he saw a horse bled4 ,the blood was in a bucket1 with a stick in it1 and if memory does not deceive him1 he stirred it round and saw it drip from the stick with no feeling save that of childish curiosity4 ,suddenly the world grew black before his eyes1 his ears began to buzz1 and he knew no more4 ,he had never heard of the sight of blood producing faintness or sickness1 and he had little repugnance to it1 and so little apprehension of any other sort of danger from it1 that even at that tender age1 as he well remembers1 he could not help wondering how the mere physical presence of a pailful of crimson fluid could occasion in him such formidable bodily effects0 7p4 #deg74 ,here we have a condition such as is sometimes experienced in connection with the most extreme degree of fear or grief unaccompanied by any emotion except astonishment at its occurrence4 ,i presume that if a person should faint on hearing bad news1 ,professor ,james would consider that one of the causes of his intense emotion4 ,why did it have no such effect in this case8 ,assuming that the emotions are the effects and not the causes of what are usually reckoned as their 8expression10 it seems evident that a given movement or set of movements must uniformly1 at least in the same subject1 give rise to the same feeling1 and that in the case of opposite emotions such as joy and grief1 hope and fear1 the more intense the emotion1 the more unlike must be the actions from which it arises4 ,neither of these is the case4 ,on the contrary1 it would seem to be the fact that the actions accompanying emotion tend to become more alike in proportion to its intensity4 ,it is not at all uncommon for people to weep from excess of joy as well as of grief4 ,pallor and trembling are frequent accompaniments of the extremes of hope as well as fear4 ,the naturalist ,wallace gives an account of his feelings on capturing a rare and beautiful butterfly1 which is worth quoting in this connection3 8,the beauty and brilliancy of this insect are indescribable1 and none but a naturalist can understand the intense excitement ,i experienced when ,i at length captured it4 ,on taking it out of the net and opening the glorious wings1 my heart began to beat violently1 the blood rushed to my head1 and ,i felt more like fainting than ,i have done when in prospect of immediate death4 ,i had a headache the rest of the day1 so great was the excitement produced by what will appear to most people a very inadequate cause0 78,malay ,archipelago10 p4 #cdb74 ,here it is evident that a feeling of intense exultation gave rise to sensations very similar1 to say the least1 to those of extreme fear4 ,one other argument brought forward by the author deserves special notice in this connection3 8,the best proof that the immediate cause of emotion is a physical effect on the nerves is furnished by those pathological states in which the emotion is objectless4 ,one of the chief merits1 in fact1 of the view which ,i propose1 seems to be that we can so easily formulate by its means pathological cases and normal cases under a common scheme4 ,in every asylum we find examples of absolutely unmotived fear1 anger1 melancholy1 or conceit1 and others of an equally unmotived apathy1 which persists in spite of the best of outward reasons why it should give way4 ,in the former cases we must suppose the nervous machinery to be so #8labile' in some one emotional direction that almost every stimulus 7however inappropriate7 causes it to upset in that way1 and to engender the particular complex of feelings of which the psychic body of that emotion consists4 ,thus1 to take one special instance1 if inability to draw deep breath1 fluttering of the heart1 and that peculiar epigastric change felt as #8precordial anxiety1' with an irresistible tendency to take a somewhat crouching attitude and to sit still1 and with perhaps other visceral processes not now known1 all spontaneously occur together in a certain person2 his feeling of their combination is the emotion of dread1 and he is the victim of what is known as morbid fear0 7p4 #deh74 ,now1 it is evident1 of course1 in such a case as this1 that such a combination of feelings as is here described is not a fortuitous coincidence of so many independent sensations4 ,they must have a common starting-point1 which cannot well be elsewhere than in the brain4 ,but if this is the case1 it seems to me to be begging the question to assume that the sensations and not the emotion are the primary thing4 ,on the assumption that fear1 in the normal condition1 is the cause of the disturbances of respiration1 circulation1 and the like1 which accompany it1 it is as easy to formulate normal and pathological cases under a common scheme1 by supposing it to be the cause of the like disturbances in cases of morbid fear1 as on the theory of ,professor ,james4 ,it seems to me1 then1 that the theory does not satisfactorily account for the facts1 so far as the involuntary1 reflex accompaniments of motion are concerned4 ,the difficulty is greatly increased when we consider the relations of emotion to voluntary action4 ,we have seen that reflex acts1 similar to1 or identical with those in which ,professor ,james believes emotion to consist1 may occur independently of emotion1 in the ordinary acceptation of the term1 at least4 ,strictly voluntary acts1 on the contrary1 are always the concomitants of emotion of some sort4 ,in the great majority of the ordinary actions of life1 they are the only motor phenomena of which we are aware in this connection4 ,our whole daily conduct1 in our business and pleasure1 our incomings and our outgoings1 our downsittings and uprisings1 is inseparably associated with our likings and dislikings1 our hopes and fears4 ,what is the nature of this association8 ,under the theory we are considering1 two relations of voluntary acts to emotion are possible4 ,they may1 like the involuntary reactions1 constitute the emotion1 or unlike them1 result from it4 ,professor ,james does not express himself on the general question1 but some of his illustrations seem to favor the former view4 ,if the man who meets a bear is frightened because he runs1 or the one who is insulted1 angry because he strikes1 the voluntary acts of running and striking must1 in part1 at least1 constitute the emotions of fear and anger in these cases4 ,let us1 then1 consider this case first4 ,if ,i see a shower coming up1 and run for a shelter1 the emotion is evidently of the same kind1 though perhaps less in degree1 as in the case of the man who runs from the bear4 ,according to ,professor ,james1 ,i am afraid of getting wet because ,i run4 ,but supposing that1 instead of running1 ,i step into a shop and buy an umbrella4 ,the emotion is still the same4 ,i am afraid of getting wet4 ,consequently1 so far as ,i can see1 the fear1 in this case1 consists in buying the umbrella4 ,fear of hunger1 in like manner1 might consist in laying in a store of provisions2 fear of poverty1 in shoveling dirt at a dollar a day1 and so on indefinitely4 ,anger1 again1 may be associated with many other actions than striking4 ,shylock's anger at ,antonio's insults induced him to lend him money4 ,did the anger1 or revengefulness1 or whatever we may call the passion1 consist in the act of lending the money8 ,i hardly think it necessary to multiply instances in illustration of the fact that the same act is often associated with the most contradictory emotions1 and acts which are ordinarily indifferent with the most intense feeling2 that1 in fact1 there is no such uniformity in the associations of emotion with voluntary conduct as the hypothesis would seem to require4 ,i incline to think that most people will believe1 in the cases cited by ,professor ,james1 that the running and the striking are the results1 not the causes of the fear and anger4 ,if we assume such to be the case1 we are no better off under the hypothesis we are considering4 ,excluding voluntary movements1 there is nothing left of the emotion1 according to ,professor ,james1 but the consciousness of involuntary1 reflex acts resulting from perception4 ,the voluntary acts must1 then1 be directly caused by these4 ,now1 in the first place1 it is often difficult1 if not impossible1 to tell what these actions are4 ,what are the involuntary muscular contractions that impel a day-laborer to go to the place of his work1 and keep his voluntary muscular system in strenuous activity all day1 enduring fatigue and all the discomforts of the summer's heat or winter's cold8 ,it would probably puzzle him very much to tell1 although he has a very clear idea of why he does it4 ,i doubt if1 on his own hypothesis1 ,professor ,james himself would find it easy to explain the constituents of the emotions which impel him to go to the class-room at the appointed hour and conduct a recitation4 ,but even in cases in which we are distinctly conscious of involuntary action1 there seems to be no connection between it and the voluntary acts accompanying the emotion4 ,in the case of the man running from the bear1 for instance1 trembling lips1 weakened limbs1 goose-flesh and visceral stirrings have nothing to do with running1 but1 on the contrary1 would rather tend to prevent it4 ,in fact1 it may be said1 in general1 that the two classes of emotional activities are mutually antagonistic4 ,the more involuntary the action1 the less efficient the voluntary activity is apt to be1 as any one knows who has had an attack of the 8buck ague40 ,we should have1 therefore1 diminution of the effect with increase of the cause4 ,it seems1 then1 on the hypothesis1 impracticable to account for the association of voluntary action with emotion either on the supposition that the former is the cause or the result of the latter4 ,a third alternative--that there is no relation of cause and effect in the case1 and that the phenomena of emotion and action1 although constantly associated1 are really independent1 ,i will not discuss1 as it does not commend itself to my mind1 and ,professor ,james1 elsewhere1 expressly repudiates it4 ,it seems to me that the only reasonable conclusion is that emotion is something different from either involuntary or voluntary muscular activity1 and which may be the cause of either or both4 ,professor ,james1 after admitting that the view of the subject which he advocates is only a hypothesis1 and that much is lacking to its definitive proof1 goes on to say3 8,the only way coercively to disprove it1 however1 would be to take some emotion and then exhibit qualities of feeling in it which should be demonstrably additional to all those which could possibly be derived from the organs affected at the time4 ,but to detect with certainty such purely spiritual qualities of feeling would obviously be a task beyond human power4444 8,a positive proof of the theory would1 on the other hand1 be given1 if we could find a subject absolutely ansthetic inside and out1 but not paralytic1 so that emotion-inspiring objects might evoke the usual bodily expressions from him1 but who1 on being consulted1 should say that no subjective emotional affection was felt4 ,such a man would be like one who1 because he eats1 appears to bystanders to be hungry1 but who afterwards confesses that he had no appetite at all40 7,p4 #dee47 ,whether the truth of the first of the above paragraphs is to be conceded or not1 depends1 ,i suppose1 on the strength of proof necessary for coercion4 ,the only way1 for instance1 coercively to disprove the once prevalent theory that 8lunacy0 is due to the influence of the moon would be to abolish the moon4 ,most intelligent people1 however1 at the present day1 accept the fact that there seems to be no coincidence between the moon's phases and the phenomena of insanity as sufficient proof for practical purposes of the incorrectness of that theory4 ,it seems to me that the facts to which ,i have called attention show a somewhat similar lack of correspondence in the case we have been considering4 ,i am1 however1 unable to see why a case of complete ansthesia1 such as is supposed in the second paragraph1 would not answer nearly as well for one side of the question as the other1 according to the presence or absence of emotion4 ,to suppose that cutaneous and visceral sensations are preserved unimpaired for purposes of emotion1 while absolutely abolished for all other purposes1 would be putting a pretty severe strain on the faculty of belief4 ,such cases1 as ,professor ,james says1 are hard to find4 ,he refers to one1 reported by ,strmpell1 in which a boy1 ansthetic within and without1 with the exception of one eye and one ear1 was stated to have manifested shame1 grief1 surprise1 fear1 and anger4 ,he goes on1 however1 to say3 8,in observing him1 however1 no such theory as the present one seems to have been thought of2 and it always remains possible that1 just as he satisfied his natural appetites and necessities in cold blood1 with no inward feeling1 so his emotional expressions may have been accompanied by a quite cold heart40 ,since ,professor ,james's work was published1 two cases have been reported by ,berkley1#eg which1 although not1 perhaps1 conclusive1 are of interest in this connection4 ,in the first1 the patient1 a woman of ,english birth1 age not stated1 had complete loss of sense of pain1 heat and cold1 pressure and equilibrium1 of smell1 taste1 and sight4 ,the sense of touch1 although not completely abolished1 was very greatly impaired4 ,she recognised a hat1 for instance1 only after feeling of it for a long time and then seemed doubtful about it4 ,her sense of the position of the extremities was also very imperfect1 although not entirely abolished2 and there was some deafness1 although not enough to render her incapable of conversation4 ,with regard to her mental state1 ,dr4 ,berkley says3 8,the psychical condition has undergone but slight change1 she is possibly a little apathetic1 with some slight tendency towards a melancholic tone1 but when aroused and induced to converse for some time1 this in great measure passes away4 ,the memory is quite good40 ,dr4 ,berkley was kind enough to give me the following additional information about this patient1 who1 at the time of writing1 was still under observation3 8,since the coming on of the dullness in hearing there has been a considerable degree of apathy manifest4 ,she is no longer conscious of the smaller noises that occur around her1 but is very readily aroused by the voice1 and then takes a lively interest in what is said to her3 for instance a few days ago the resident physician remarked to her that he was going to obtain a pair of crutches for her use2 she laughed heartily at the idea1 and said she would fall and break her leg at the first step40 ,in response to further inquiries1 he writes as follows3 8#a7 ,visceral sensations4 ,the clearest evidence of visceral sensation ,i have noted in my article10 warning of the necessity of evacuating the bowels and bladder by a pricking pain in the lower part of the abdomen1 8no others were sufficiently definite to be described4 ,for two years there has been no feeling of hunger or thirst1 and as the diet has only been a few mouthfuls of milk at a time for nearly that period1 there has been no feeling of repletion4 8#b7 ,when the patient laughs at a joke1 there is a slight flushing of the face1 besides the ordinary contraction of the facial muscles2 she is aware that she is laughing1 but besides acknowledging that she perceives no difference between the act now1 and some years ago1 she is unable to describe the sensation further4 8#c7 ,anger4 ,as ,i think ,i mentioned in my last letter1 the patient has been a person of unusually equal temper2 an outbreak of real passion has never been observed with her4 ,when annoyed or teased by some of the other women1 there is a distinct corrugation of the forehead1 accompanied by an exceedingly slight general movement as if of aversion1 no words1 movement of the chest1 clenching of the hands1 etc4 ,she describes the sensation as one of repulsion4 8,like ,strmpell's case she shows definitely shame1 grief1 surprise1 fear1 and substituting for anger1 repulsion4 8,my own impression derived from observation of the patient is1 that all mental emotional sensibilities are present and only a little less vivid than in the unansthetic state2 and that emotions are approximately natural1 and not at all coldly dispassionate40 ,in the second case1 that of a ,russian woman1 aged thirty-five1 there was complete loss of cutaneous sensibility in all its qualities3 the sense of position 78muscular sense07 was almost completely abolished2 the sense of taste was absent in the anterior two-thirds of the tongue4 ,smell1 sight1 and hearing were preserved4 ,she had left the hospital before the article was written4 ,in regard to her case1 ,dr4 ,berkley writes3 8,while in the most absolute state of ansthesia 7auditory and visual excepted7 there was no departure from a normal psyche2 the woman would sometimes be angered when she did not understand a question1 at others would smile or shake her head1 and would frequently laugh and talk with another ,russian woman in the same ward4 ,there was never the slightest apathy manifest after the first few days of febrile movement40 ,i give these cases for what they are worth4 ,in the first1 it is evidently impossible to entirely exclude the presence of sensations caused by the reflex acts1 and the second1 not having1 apparently1 been examined with special reference to the subjective side of her emotional manifestations1 may be open to the same objection which ,professor ,james makes against ,strmpell's case4 ,to me it seems extremely unlikely that1 if the theory under discussion is correct1 such an amount of ansthesia as existed in these cases would have produced no obvious effect on the emotions4 ,the fact that voluntary acts were performed by both these patients as well as by ,strmpell's case1 seems to me conclusive as to the existence of emotions of some sort in all of them4 ,it seems clear to me1 from the foregoing considerations1 that there are serious difficulties in the way of accepting ,professor ,james's theory as an adequate explanation of all the phenomena of emotion4 ,on the other hand1 ,i think it contains an important truth1 and that1 by calling attention to it1 he has rendered a real service to psychology4 ,in order to make it clear how far ,i agree with him1 it will be necessary to consider just what feelings are to be classed together under the head of emotion4 ,if we touch our fingers to a live coal1 we are conscious of a sensation of heat1 and also of pain4 ,if we take quinine into our mouths1 it tastes bitter1 and also disagreeable4 ,so in regard to a very large proportion of our sensations1 we recognise two elements--one which has to do with the qualities of the object1 and1 another consisting of the pleasurable or painful way in which those qualities affect us4 ,the former may be called the objective element in sensation4 ,we think of the heat as residing in the coal1 whether we are touching it or not1 but it never occurs to us to think of the coal as in pain4 ,the pain is in us--an entirely subjective feeling4 ,doubtless there is no more reason to think of heat1 as it is appreciated by our senses1 as a property of the coal1 than pain1 but that is the way in which we naturally think of it4 ,that these two elements are really distinct is evident from the fact that the different senses furnish them in different proportions4 ,comparatively few sights1 for instance1 give any such sensuous pain to the eye as the sensation produced by getting a grain of sand under the lid1 which gives us very little information in regard to the qualities of the offending substance4 ,in fact1 it is generally true that intensity of pleasurable or painful sensation is a hindrance to exact knowledge of its object4 ,it is further evident from the fact that1 in disease1 one form of sensibility may be abolished while the other is retained4 ,a person may be able to feel the slightest touch1 and to recognise perfectly the size1 shape1 and texture of the objects he handles1 and yet feel no pain when cut1 struck1 nor burned1 or he may have even heightened sensibility to painful impressions with loss of the power to recognise the sensible qualities of objects4 ,now1 although we are accustomed to distinguish between emotions and purely sensuous pleasures and pains1 there are some points1 at least1 at which it is not easy to draw the line4 ,my pleasure in the anticipation of a good dinner is undoubtedly an emotion4 ,is not my pleasure in eating it entitled to the same name1 and does not the latter consist in the reality of the sensations which in the former case were enjoyed in imagination8 ,is not the enjoyment we feel in the smell of mignonette1 the tone of a sweet voice1 the color and form of the rainbow1 emotion8 ,yet it consists largely1 if not entirely1 in the agreeableness of the sensations4 ,most people would probably think it strange to hear hunger and thirst spoken of as emotions but would readily agree that desire of food or drink is as much an emotion as any other desire4 ,is the desire in this case anything more than the hunger or thirst8 ,i am inclined to think that it is proper to call such pleasures and pains as ,i have instanced above emotions1 and if so1 ,i see no reason for denying the name to any sensuous pleasures and pains4 ,if ,professor ,james's view is that all feeling is sensation1 ,i should say that all feeling is emotion4 ,whether this view is correct or not1 ,i do not see how ,professor ,james can consistently refuse to accept it4 ,on his theory1 the emotions which he discusses must owe their pleasurable or painful quality to the pleasurable or painful nature of the sensations in which they consist4 ,i can see no valid ground for saying that some such feelings are emotions and others are not4 ,but the essence of emotion is pleasure or pain4 ,abstracting these qualities1 it would be an indifferent emotion1 which1 ,i think all would agree1 is a contradiction in terms4 ,possibly he might wish to limit the use of the term to those pleasurable and painful feelings1 which arise not directly1 but in a reflex way4 ,he might say1 for instance1 that the disagreeableness to the ear of the creaking of an ungreased axle is not1 but the shudder which it gives a sensitive person is1 emotion4 ,in that case1 it must be admitted that a sneeze is emotion4 ,his contention is that we have no other pleasures or pains than those of sensation4 ,if this be true1 a setting off of some sensations as emotions is1 if not an arbitrary1 a comparatively useless procedure4 ,my own view1 then1 is that the elements of sensation which ,i have spoken of as objective and subjective might1 with equal propriety1 be characterised respectively as intellectual and emotional1 and that in this direction the theory under discussion1 although true as far as it goes1 does not go far enough4 ,however this may be1 the admission or denial that these feelings are emotions does not necessarily affect the question whether or not this is the only origin1 of pleasure and pain4 ,as has already been said1 those feelings to which no one will deny the name of emotions are not usually1 in adult human beings1 at least1 direct reactions on sensation4 ,if it be true that the start we give at the unexpected slamming of a door is a sort of fright1 it is a very rudimentary sort compared with that which one feels when the cry of fire is raised in a crowded theatre4 8,a burnt child dreads the fire40 ,it is not the sight of the fire1 but the thought of the burning1 that arouses the emotion4 ,when a man reads in the newspaper of the death of a friend1 or a rise in the value of property in which he is interested1 it is not the sight of the black marks on the white paper1 but the beliefs which1 through a long and intricate series of associations they call up1 which move his feelings4 ,if he could not read1 he would see the same announcement without any emotion4 ,the usual origin of the emotions par excellence is by way of association4 ,suppose that ,i have taken a nauseous dose1 and made a wry face over it4 ,no one1 ,i presume1 would question that the disagreeableness lay in the unpleasant taste1 and not in the distortion of the countenance4 ,now1 suppose ,i have to repeat the dose1 and my face takes on a similar expression at the anticipation to that which it wore when ,i took it originally4 ,how does this come about8 ,if ,i can trust my own consciousness1 it is because the vivid reproduction1 in memory1 of the unpleasant taste is itself unpleasant4 ,i do not see how it can well be otherwise4 ,professor ,james says 7p4 #fdi7 that 8the first element of memory is the revival in the mind of an image or copy of the original event40 ,how can ,i have a copy in my mind of a pain if it is not painful8 ,take away the painfulness of it and there would be nothing left4 ,i might remember the circumstances under which it occurred1 and judge from them that ,i must have suffered pain1 but ,i could not1 it seems to me1 remember the pain itself4 ,whether that is possible or not1 ,i feel sure that the fact1 in my own case1 is1 that my memory of a pain resembles it in the same way that my memory of the circumstances in which it occurred resembles them4 ,if this be the fact1 what can be more natural than that it should excite the same sort of associated movements that were excited by the original sensation8 ,i cannot make it seem any more credible1 to return to the example mentioned above1 that my repugnance to a repetition of the dose is due to my involuntary movements than that my discomfort in taking it originally was due to the similar movements that occurred then4 ,suppose that a child who has eaten and enjoyed an orange is offered another4 ,the sight of it calls up the recollection of the agreeable taste1 and the expectation of a repetition of the pleasant experience excites expressions of pleasure4 ,if the fruit is snatched away1 the disappointment at the loss of the expected pleasure is distressing1 and very probably may result in his weeping4 ,i hardly think that any one who will consult his own consciousness will say that the reason he likes the taste of an orange is that it makes him laugh or smile to get it4 ,he likes it because it tastes good1 and is sorry to lose it for the same reason4 ,the laughing or weeping is1 ,i think1 unquestionably the result of the pleasure or grief1 not of the mere perception of an object in itself indifferent4 ,it is true that emotions of this sort do not always arise by way of personal association4 ,young children are apt to be afraid of strangers1 of large animals1 and of loud noises4 ,i can remember being frightened at my first sight of a locomotive4 ,here we come upon the questions of inherited experience and natural selection1 which can hardly be discussed in an article like this4 ,the objects of which young children are instinctively afraid1 as a rule1 are either dangerous themselves1 or more or less similar to dangerous objects4 ,i see no more difficulty in supposing that mental pleasure and pain1 on the sight of special objects1 may be a matter of organisation than in the case of the analogous physical sensations4 ,my view of the matter1 then1 is that emotion in the sense in which the word is commonly used bears the same relation to perceptions or beliefs that feelings of physical pleasure or pain do to the objective or intellectual quality of sensations4 ,i am inclined to think it proper to class all pleasurable and painful feelings together as emotions4 ,if this view is correct1 it would1 of course1 include those feelings to which ,professor ,james would confine the term4 ,i should not at all hesitate to admit that the emotional state of a person who trembles and turns pale with fear is different from that of one who preserves his self-possession in the presence of a danger that he realises and dreads4 ,i think it is true that the voluntary actions prompted by an emotion have some tendency to intensify it4 ,but1 so far as ,i can analyse my own feelings1 the pleasures and pains of memory and imagination seem to me just as real as those of sensation1 and not at all to be confounded with them4 ,when ,i try to subtract all motor reactions and resulting sensations from the feeling of fear1 for instance1 there remains not merely the intellectual perception that the event dreaded is not desirable1 but the perfectly distinct emotional consciousness that ,i do not desire it4 ,this view seems to be favored by the analogy between the relations of sensation to reflex movement on the one hand1 and of perception to voluntary movement on the other1 which will1 ,i think1 be found to be very complete4 ,we have reflex acts which are useful1 such as breathing1 the beating of the heart1 swallowing and coughing2 and others1 like groaning1 weeping1 and trembling1 which seem to be useless4 ,in like manner1 emotions of hope or fear may give rise to voluntary acts calculated to enable the subject of the emotion to secure or avoid its object4 ,if ,i burn my fingers1 my hand is involuntarily snatched away4 ,such would not be the case if the burn caused no pain4 ,if ,i see that the house is on fire1 ,i try to escape1 either by extinguishing the fire or by getting out of the house4 ,it seems to me evident that ,i should not do so if the thought of being burned were not painful4 ,such emotions may also occasion useless acts1 more or less similar to those mentioned above4 ,a person who saw no way of escape from a burning house might tremble1 weep1 or groan from fear4 ,on the evolutionary hypothesis1 it seems easy to understand how the reproduction1 by memory or imagination1 of certain feelings might bring about movements like those excited by the original feelings4 ,professor ,james would have us believe that this reproduction is always1 in itself1 indifferent1 that is1 merely intellectual2 but that it is1 nevertheless1 capable of setting up the movements which1 in the case of peripheral stimuli1 are the results of pleasure and pain1 and that the consciousness of these movements is1 in such cases1 the sole cause of the emotional condition4 ,such a reversal of relations seems to me highly improbable4 ,each one must decide for himself which view is more in accordance with the facts of his own consciousness4 ,w4 ,l4 ,,worcester4 ,,footnotes3 #eg ,two ,cases of ,general ,cutaneous and ,sensory ,ansthesia1 without ,marked ,psychical ,implication4 ,by ,henry ,j4 ,berkley1 ,m4 ,d41 ,baltimore4 ,brain1 ,part ,,iv4 #ahia4 ,,professor ,,ernst ,,mach',s ,,term ,,sensation4 ,,supplementary ,,to ,,his ,,controversy ,,with ,,the ,,editor4 ,the ,monist1 ,vol4 ,i1 ,no4 #c1 contains a controversy between ,prof4 ,ernst ,mach and myself on some questions of psycho-physics in which ,professor ,mach1 having reference to an editorial article on 8,feeling and ,motion10 regards sensations as the 8elements of reality10 8while motion10 he says1 8is a mere mental auxiliary1 an artificial expedient40 8,physicists10 we are told1 8have accustomed us to regard the motions of atoms as more real than the green of trees4 ,in the latter ,i see a 7sensory7 fact1 in the former a ,gedankending1 a thing of thought40 ,in contradistinction to ,professor ,mach ,i maintained that our scientific terms1 although abstract concepts and things of thought1 or noumena1 are after all descriptive of actual facts2 they are symbols representing features of reality4 ,motions1 i4 e41 that which is meant by the term motion1 is a reality1 and what the chemist calls atoms is a definite quality of certain facts of experience4 ,atoms are not things in themselves1 as the name seems to suggest1 but rather proportional relations conveniently so expressed as if they were ultimate units or concrete little bodies of a definite mass or weight4 ,what atoms are1 aside from representing the proportions in which elements combine1 we do not know4 ,we may define 8atom0 as the minimal weight in which an element enters into chemical combinations1 but such atoms have never been an object of observation4 ,for aught we know1 they may as little be discrete bodies as a curve consists of discrete straight lines1 which1 as such1 would be unobservable only because infinitesimally small4 ,the infinitely small straight line into which a curve is analysed by mathematicians is a fiction1 wisely devised for calculating the path of the curve4 ,this fiction is as ,professor ,mach says1 an artifice only1 not a reality1 or as ,i say1 an allegoric expression to characterise not whole concrete realities1 but certain features of reality in their abstractness4 ,scientific terms are comparable to myths that contain deep religious truths4 ,the fiction of the myth is only the vehicle of its meaning4 ,the naked meaning in its abstract purity may be difficult to grasp4 ,thus our imagination steps in and completes the picture so as to render it concrete and easily thinkable4 ,now1 when several months ago ,i met ,professor ,mach at ,prague1 our conversation naturally touched upon the problems which had formed the subject of our discussion4 ,professor ,mach assented to my speaking of scientific terms as abstracts4 ,that1 accordingly1 must be considered as the point of agreement4 ,but when ,i proposed that the term sensation also was according to my terminology an abstract term representing one feature of reality only and excluding other features1 ,professor ,mach took exception to it1 saying that he understands by sensation reality itself4 ,very well then1 this is the difference2 and this difference is after all a difference of terms only4 ,i understand by sensation the psychical feature of the data of experience only1 to the exclusion of what may be called its physical aspect4 ,sensation accordingly1 as ,i use the term1 is not the whole of the given reality but only one of its qualities4 ,if1 as ,professor ,mach uses the term1 sensation is another name for reality1 the main difference between our views appears to be removed4 ,p4 ,,carus4 ,,book ,,reviews4 ,,vorlesungen ,,ber ,,die ,,menschen- ,,und ,,thierseele4 ,by ,wilhelm ,wundt4 ,zweite umgearbeitete ,auflage4 ,hamburg and ,leipsic3 ,leopold ,voss4 #ahib4 ,the new edition of ,wundt's ,menschen- und ,thierseele is one of the best existing general introductions to psychology4 ,it preserves nearly the just mean between the purely introspective and abstract treatment and the substitution of physiology for psychology with which recent treatises have familiarised us4 ,the author has completely rewritten the edition of #ahfc1 which he regards as a youthful indiscretion 7,jugendsnde7--retaining only such chapters as could be brought into harmony with his maturer views and with the developed science of psycho-physics that has taken the place of the ,zukunftsprogramm of thirty years ago4 ,he has wisely omitted all the superficial and diffuse chapters on comparative psychology and ethnology which cumbered the original work2 has silently ignored the fantastic speculations as to the identity of electricity and nerve-force 7one of the worst of the aforesaid youthful sins72 and practically abandoned 7perhaps as too esoteric for popular exposition7 the elaborate reduction of sensations and perceptions to unconscious judgments and inferences4 ,the first thirteen or fourteen chapters offer a very clear and interesting rsum of the chief doctrines of the ,physiologische ,psychologie in regard to sensations generally1 their measurements and qualities1 ,weber's and ,fechner's laws1 the special sensations of color1 hearing1 and the muscular sense1 and the problem of space perception4 ,following the plan of the original work in these chapters1 the author aims less at completeness of statement than to present clearly the distinctive doctrines of modern psychology4 ,in the treatment of certain themes1 e4 g4 ,fechner's law1 and the perception of space1 he neglects1 for the sake of clearness1 qualifications of detail which the special student must look for in the larger work4 ,the last sixteen chapters deal with the feelings1 the will1 consciousness1 attention1 association and apperception1 conception1 abnormal and animal psychology and instinct1 concluding with two notable lectures on the 8,freedom of the ,will0 and the 8,immortality of the ,soul40 ,it is to these chapters that we must look for ,wundt's general psychological and philosophical system4 ,profiting by recent criticisms he has here set forth his characteristic doctrines in so clear and definite a final statement that further misconception of them is hardly permissible4 ,the remainder of this notice will be devoted to what is perhaps the most interesting question thus suggested3 ,wundt's relation to the associationist psychology of ,spencer on the one side1 and to the younger ,german school of experimental psychologists on the other4 ,wundt ignores the ,spencerian form of the associationist psychology1 and the young psychologists do injustice to ,wundt1 neither side apparently condescending to read with attention the writings of the other4 ,the debate1 so far as it is not merely verbal1 springs from two real differences of method3 7#a7 ,wundt in his psychological analysis habitually takes account of the problems of the theory of knowledge 7,erkenntnisstheorie71 or ultimate metaphysics1 which the young psychologists endeavor 7not always with success7 systematically to exclude4 7#b7 ,wundt1 gifted with superior powers of introspection1 is more aware than the young psychologists of the infinite complexity and subtlety of mental states4 ,he prefers1 therefore1 to a schematic simplification of the phenomena a terminology and descriptive analysis that reflect in some measure their manifold diversity4 ,and thus while ,wundt finds the pure associationist psychology barren and tautologous1 the young psychologists see in ,wundt's complicated terminology only a shamefaced reversion to the discarded psychology of a substantial soul endowed with autonomous 8faculties40 ,but the analysis of our mental states which ,wundt gives by means of this terminology is really only a subtler restatement of the analysis of ,mill1 ,spencer1 and ,taine1 to which the new psychology has not been able to add anything of moment4 ,it is true that he proclaims the inadequacy of association1 even when translated into the diagrams of a hypothetical cerebral anatomy1 to 8explain0 fully our conscious active mental life4 ,but in this he is at one with ,spencer 7ultimate scientific ideas71 ,j4 ,s4 ,mill 7,examination of ,hamilton71 and ,schopenhauer 7,epiphilosophie74 ,it is gross injustice to stigmatise as an abandonment of the scientific attitude of mind this occasional passing recognition of the seeming ultimate inexplicability of things4 ,in no single concrete instance can it be shown that ,wundt now sacrifices the recognised methods and postulates of modern scientific investigation to the psychological hypostisations which his opponents detect in his terminology4 ,in confirmation of these statements ,i will give a brief summary of ,wundt's doctrine of association and apperception with an occasional indication of its relation to the psychology of ,spencer4 ,wundt distinguishes the totality of mental states which are perceived from the presentation at the focus of consciousness which is apperceived4 ,in this way 7substituting everywhere dunkel bewusst for unbewusst7 he avoids the metaphysics of the unconscious1 while getting the benefit of the entire analysis of its advocates4 ,i do not think the ultimate difficulty can be evaded in this way1 but will not stop to argue the point4 ,a further advantage of this distinction is that it makes possible a dynamic treatment of mental states as 8events0 in place of the crude psychology that deals with the conditions of any mental state as so many ready-made parts externally dovetailed into the completed product4 ,the active side of consciousness is taken into account from the outset4 ,the mental state at any moment is described by indicating the presentation which is then at the focus of consciousness 7apperceived7 and the accompanying faintly conscious presentations that qualify its tone and total effect4 ,the given mental state is 8explained0 by tracing out the dynamic readjustments that brought this particular presentation to the focus1 and grouped the faintly conscious presentations about it4 ,now the bringing of a presentation to the focus of conscious attention is the primitive psychical activity1 the elementary act of will1#eh and since ,wundt places this at the beginning he rejects all evolution of will or instinct from reflex action1 and thus1 it will be said1 here at least puts himself in distinct opposition to advanced scientific thought4 ,let us distinguish4 ,so far as we are dealing with the developed minds we know1 ,wundt's distinction is merely the expression of an observed psychological fact4 ,external volition does go back to internal voluntary attention and this to a focussing of consciousness for which apperception is as good a term as another4 ,such focussing of the attention is for us now the primary reaction of the 8self0 on its received impressions4 ,out of a given group of presentations ,i apperceive by preference one and you another1 because at the time my 8self10 my mind1 differs from yours4 ,this self may be only a convenient shorthand expression for a passive product of external forces4 ,the feeling of the reaction of the self may be an illusion1 and its activity may be merely the mechanical action of a relatively coherent group of presentations when a new presentation is introduced among them1 and the whole process may be explicable in terms of associations4 ,but the feeling exists1 and ,wundt has described and analysed it better than any of his critics4 ,on the other hand1 if the question is of the hypothetical origin of mind1 we are at once brought face to face with an ultimate metaphysical problem which the new psychology impatiently ignores1 which ,spencer grudgingly acknowledges1 but which ,wundt and ,kantians like ,riehl find confronting them at every stage of their analysis4 ,conscious mind cannot conceive of its own origin1 and therefore all psychological theories of development must postulate in some form the elements of consciousness and will4 ,nothing that ,i could add to the dialectics of this question would influence those who feel no difficulty here4 ,they require a long course of ,kantian criticism or its equivalent4 ,at any rate it is not fair polemic to class a thinker as unscientific merely because he recognises this difficulty and gives it expression in his psychology1 instead of contemptuously relegating it to metaphysics4 ,after thus laying the foundations in the doctrine of apperception for the psychology both of cognition and of the will1 ,wundt proceeds to restate the associationist analysis of ,mill and ,spencer in a more elaborate terminology but in substantial agreement with ,spencer till he reaches the 8concept10 when the introduction of apperception gives rise to a seeming difference4 ,spencer distinguishes simultaneous from successive association as carefully as ,wundt4 ,what ,wundt1 after ,herbart calls 8complications10 namely the joint reference to one object of a number of disparate presentations of sense1 is clearly described by ,spencer 78,principles of ,psychology10 #cae-cee72 and ,wundt's 8assimilations0 do not differ appreciably from ,spencer's 8still less conscious0 processes of 8organic classification0 78,principles of ,psychology10 #cbj74 ,into the metaphysics of the ultimate relations of contiguity and similarity as laws of association ,i cannot enter here4 ,similarity will always be recognised as ultimate by those who1 like ,spencer1 approach the problem first from the psychical side1 while a purely materialistic treatment in terms of nervous currents1 such as we find in ,james1 will endeavor to do away altogether with similarity1 which simply cannot be expressed in terms of nerve-structure without reasoning in a circle4 ,wundt retains similarity but endeavors to cordinate it with contiguity4 ,the problem is really identical with the final question of the relations of 8mind0 and 8body10 and cannot be profitably discussed apart from that question4 ,coming now to the concept and the judgment1 we find ,wundt affirming that the different forms of simultaneous and successive association 7as he has defined them7 are not an exhaustive classification of mental processes--that they do not include the concept4 ,well1 he is at liberty to define his own terms1 and before we accuse him of hypostasising a new faculty to account for the concept1 let us scrutinise his meaning4 ,we shall find that he merely repeats1 in a subtler terminology of his own1 the analysis of ,berkeley1 ,mill1 ,taine1 ,spencer1 and ,romanes4 ,these writers treat the concept as a complicated associational group held together by the word4 ,now ,wundt1 while conceding the theoretic admissibility of this form of statement1 holds that such groups present so many distinct characteristics that all delicacy of psychological discrimination is sacrificed by confounding them under one denomination with other associational complexes4 ,he does not1 like ,professor ,james1 bid introspective psychology 8throw up the sponge0 here1 but wishes to carry his analysis into recesses which the instruments of the associationists are too clumsy to explore4 ,in the interests of this analysis he limits the term association to combinations mediated by a limited number of elements4 ,the 7apperceived7 concept1 on the other hand1 is the product of the reaction of the total mind4 ,this distinction 7whatever we may think of its absolute validity7 expresses a finely observed psychological truth4 ,the distinctive quality of a concept consists1 ,wundt says1 8in dem begleitenden ,bewusstsein1 dass die einzelne ,vorstellung einen bloss stellvertretenden ,werth besitze40 ,this feeling he calls the ,begriffsgefhl1 meaning thereby exactly what ,professor ,james means when he says that 8the thoughts by which we know that we mean the same thing are apt to be very different indeed from each other10 and that 8a polyp would be a conceptual thinker if a feeling of #8,hollo6 thingumbob again6' ever flitted through its mind40 ,only1 instead of 8throwing up the sponge10 ,wundt goes on to give a very interesting account of this feeling in its various degrees of clearness between the conceptual polyp and the conceiving man4 ,apperception is invoked only to name and emphasise the feeling of activity of the self that enters into the ,begriffsgefhl1 distinguishing it as a reaction of the total consciousness from the relatively passive associations of what ,romanes would call 8recepts40 ,psychologists1 however1 will continue their fruitless debates on questions of terminology and will still imagine that ,wundt is a belated reactionist4 ,,paul ,,shorey4 ,,beitr,,ge ,,zur ,,experimentellen ,,psychologie4 ,by ,hugo ,mnsterberg4 ,heft #d4 ,freiburg i4 ,b4 #ahib4 ,mnsterberg's fourth ,heft begins with studies in association4 ,if a and b have been independently associated with m1 can a call up b without the appearance in consciousness of m8 ,the affirmative answer of common experience was confirmed by ,scripture's experiments4 ,associating five ,japanese symbols with two series of five ,german words1 he found that a word of one series tended 7without conscious recollection of the ,japanese symbol7 to revive the particular word in the other series that had been associated with the same symbol4 ,mnsterberg1 after repeating and varying the experiment in a number of fields1 denies that any such relation can be observed4 ,he may very well be right on the question of facts4 ,it is a priori improbable that a transitory and arbitrary association of a meaningless symbol could modify appreciably the independent and accidental associative attractions of familiar words and presentations4 ,the philosophic interpretation is another question4 ,for our real knowledge it is a matter of indifference whether we fill out 8missing links0 with 8dunkel bewusst10 8unbewusst10 or 8cerebral processes that have no psychical correlates40 ,and yet how much of contemporary psychologising is a logomachy raging around just this question4 ,mnsterberg's second series of experiments show clearly the part played by such missing links in perception4 ,a word is called out just before a complicated picture is exhibited to the subject4 ,he will usually perceive first in the picture some object naturally associated with the word1 even though the word has aroused no conscious associations4 ,similarly 7,,iii7 a hastily seen misprinted word will be interpreted variously according to the associations of another word called out to the subject in advance4 ,another series of experiments has for result that even the most commonly associated word-couples1 as table and chair1 have no fixed1 unconditional associative attraction for each other in the same or in different minds1 but that the unit of attraction is the 8associative constellation40 ,this is only common sense1 and artificial experiments will never reveal anything in this field that we cannot learn quite as well in the class room4 8,table0 will suggest 8logarithm0 if the boy is fresh from the class in trigonometry4 8,the difference between men is in their principle of association0 said ,emerson long ago4 ,mnsterberg1 who has in his archives records of fifty thousand experiments in verbal associations1 presents a table of the comparative frequency with which substantives are associated with superior 7more general7 or inferior class names1 with adjectives or with verbs to which they stand in the relation of subject or of object4 ,his chief result is that minds which associate a noun with its higher class name 7,ueberordner7 think of it as the subject of a verb and do not associate it with an adjective4 ,the ,unterordner thinks of the noun as object of a verb and associates it with an adjective4 ,the adjective1 then1 is not the higher class to which the substantive belongs1 but a limitation of the substantive4 ,the ,french1 if they please1 may use this conclusion to refute ,spencer's contention that 8white horse0 is a more natural order than cheval blanc4 ,the first topic in 8memory studies0 is the persistence in the psycho-physical mechanism of the disposition to an acquired automatic movement1 even after the memory of the nerve has been seemingly displaced by the habit of its contrary4 ,the experiments were trivial1 such as shifting the position of an inkstand from right to left in alternate months1 or wearing a watch alternately in the right or left fob4 ,the result1 a progressive diminution of the mistakes made after every change1 may plausibly be explained by the stimulated attention and consequent care of the experimenter4 ,the second topic treats of the effect of a time interval on the exactness of our memory of sensations of movement in eyes and limbs4 ,the section on 8chain reactions0 is a methodological study of the various applications of this experimental method4 8,the influence of nervous stimulants on psychic activities0 is rather interesting reading1 but yields no important results4 ,alcohol depresses1 tea and coffee heighten the powers of memory and perception for an hour or two after absorption4 ,but the harmful effect of the alcohol sometimes passes away after the first hour4 ,grssenschtzung is a study of our estimates of distances on a surface1 made by passing the hand over it at arm's length1 at half arm's length1 etc4 ,from experiments as to the estimate of absolute tone-distances 7as distinguished from musical intervals7 ,mnsterberg concludes that pure measurements are not possible with three tones only4 ,experiments with four tones do not1 he says1 confirm the law that distances corresponding to equal differences of vibration are felt as equal4 ,physiologists have assumed that the symmetrical movement of the limbs as in swimming or rowing is the natural one2 and the alternating or independent movements1 as in walking or writing1 are an acquisition involving inhibitions of the natural innervations4 8,even in adult life10 says ,professor ,james1 8there is an instinctive tendency to revert to the bilateral movements of childhood40 ,professor ,mnsterberg was led to doubt this view by observing the unsymmetrical motions of a baby in a warm bath1 and experiment has confirmed his scepticism4 ,complicated joint motions of both hands 7tracing circles or other geometrical figures on a surface7 do not exhibit any tendency1 when the attention is distracted1 to assume the symmetrical form4 ,they rather tend to compensate each other in such a way as to preserve equilibrium with the minimum strain on the other muscles of the body1 and this law leads as often to alternating as to symmetrical movements of the arms or legs4 ,the case is different of course with the muscles of the trunk1 and may be different in birds1 as it would in us if we spent our lives in swimming or rowing4 ,a new method of attacking the problem of localisation is to observe the effect of altering the circulation in different parts of the brain4 ,tentative experiments on one subject seem to show that verbal associations are readiest when the victim lies on his left side1 which is a happy coincidence with the localisation of the speech centres in the left frontal convolutions4 ,if these statistics can be trusted1 it is inadvisable to undertake hard mental labor with the head hanging back over the edge of a chair6 ,in the last chapter1 certain simple experiments in our estimates of voluntary movements in varying conditions of mind and body are made the basis of a far-reaching theory of pleasure1 pain1 and judgment1 the elements of which can be found in ,aristotle1 ,herbert ,spencer1 and ,james4 ,mnsterberg found by repeated experiments that the accuracy of attempted reproduction of a fixed and familiar amount of centripetal or centrifugal movement of finger and thumb along a rod perpendicular to his waistcoat varied with his condition of fatigue1 pleasure1 or pain4 ,in a pleasurable state of consciousness the centrifugal movement was exaggerated while the centripetal fell short4 ,in pain the reverse relation obtained4 ,hence he infers a connection between pain and muscular flexion and pleasure and muscular extension1 or rather1 he distinguishes the mere sensation of pain 7,schmerz7 and pleasure 7,lust7 which may depend on integrations and disintegrations in the nerve-tissue1 from the accompanying feelings of agreeableness 7,wollust7 or disagreeableness 7,unlust7 which are due to sensations aroused at the centres by movements of flexion and extension throughout the body4 ,he thus attaches his special theory of pleasure and pain to ,lange's and ,james's theory of the identity of the emotions with their bodily concomitants--though he protests against the metaphysical implications of the doctrine4 ,the origin of the existing cordination of muscular flexions and extensions with pleasure and pain1 he explains teleologically on the principles of the ,spencerian psychology of evolution4 ,he then proceeds1 after ,sigwart and ,brentano1 to revive the old idea of ,aristotle 7whom he does not mention7 that the judgment 7affirmative or negative7 is rather the assumption of an attitude toward a presentation 7,stellungsnehmende ,akte7 than a mere conjunction of presentations4 ,the affirmative judgment is a faint incipient represented movement of the self towards a suggested conjunction of presentations4 ,the negative judgment is a similar movement in the opposite direction4 ,ontogenetically these inchoate movements are later than the movements of acceptance or rejection called forth by a painful or pleasurable stimulus1 and must therefore be treated as derivative phenomena4 ,but the ,kantians may derive some comfort from ,mnsterberg's final assurance that he too believes that 8,erkenntnisstheoretisch das ,urtheil primr ist40 ,,paul ,,shorey4 ,,the ,,spirit ,,of ,,modern ,,philosophy4 ,by ,josiah ,royce1 ,ph4 ,d4 ,boston and ,new ,york3 ,houghton1 ,mifflin ,co4 ,we are told by ,professor ,royce in the preface to this book1 that we are indebted for it to the lady friend to whom it is gracefully dedicated1 who asked him 8for some account of the more significant spiritual possessions of a few prominent modern thinkers10 to be related 8in comparatively brief and untechnical fashion40 ,the larger portion of the work is taken up with that subject1 exhibiting the general growth of modern philosophical thought beginning with ,spinozism1 and terminating with ,monism as the outcome of the doctrine of ,evolution4 ,the author's purpose is constructive1 however1 as well as expository4 ,he has his own philosophical creed1 suggested by what he knows of the progress and outcome of modern thought1 and the second portion of the work is the expression of his thoughts on the world-conception which he regards as embodying the true spirit of modern philosophy4 ,professor ,royce justly lays stress on the fact that the theory of evolution is the product of a genuine and continuous growth4 ,he dwells particularly1 moreover1 on the distinction between the epistemological sense of idealism1 which 8involves a theory of the nature of our human knowledge10 and its metaphysical sense1 in which it is 8a theory as to the nature of the real world1 however we may come to know that nature40 ,it is in accord with the latter sense that ,fichte1 ,schelling1 ,hegel1 and their allies1 as believing matter to be an expression of the world-spirit1 are referred to as the idealistic school2 and it is in the metaphysical and not the epistemological sense that the term idealism has been used since ,hegel4 ,the opposite of a metaphysical idealist is 8one who maintains the ultimate existence of wholly unspiritual realities at the basis of experience and as the genuine truth of the world--such unspiritual realities for instance as an absolute #8,unknowable1' or1 again1 as what ,hobbes meant by #8,body4'0 ,this is not1 however1 the view of the author1 who thinks that the metaphysical idealist alone is in possession of a successful solution for the epistemological problem4 ,professor ,royce divides modern philosophy into three great periods1 of which the first was one of pure and simple naturalism4 ,the supernatural had then only a secondary interest1 and thought was governed by three ideas--8that nature is a mechanism1 that human reason is competent to grasp the truth of nature1 and that1 since nature's truth is essentially mathematical1 geometry is the model science1 whose precision and necessity philosophy1 too1 must imitate40 ,during the second period of modern philosophy there was a gradual change of thought objectivity4 ,reason was still the instrument1 but it was employed on the mind itself4 ,it came to be recognised that if man is part of nature's mechanism1 he is a knowing mechanism4 ,the age was1 however1 more than one of self-analysis4 ,rousseau introduced a sentimental tendency from which came 8a revival of passion1 of poetry1 and of enthusiasm1 whose influence we shall never outgrow40 ,to it is traceable the ,french ,revolution which overthrew all the mechanical restraints of civilisation1 and 8demonstrated afresh to the world's outer sense the central importance of passion in the whole life of humanity40 ,the period of modern philosophy1 which still continues1 began with the publication of ,kant's 8,critique of ,pure ,reason10 the essential doctrine of which is that man's nature is the real creator of man's world1 that visible nature is the expression of the human spirit1 the inner structure of which is therefore the deepest truth for us4 ,this idea is 8as old as deeper spiritual faith itself10 and yet it is the very soul of all our modern life because it is 8the essentially humane view of reality40 ,for fifty years ,kant's ideas ruled philosophic thought1 and then1 through the progress of science1 the doctrine of evolution received formulation1 and confirmation and 8external nature has once more gained for us an imposing authority which makes us in many ways sympathise afresh with the pure naturalism of the seventeenth century40 ,we are compelled to omit any account of the author's study of the philosophies of ,spinoza1 ,locke1 and ,berkeley1 or the philosophic systems of ,kant and his successors of the ,german ,school of ,idealists4 ,nor can we say anything as to the doctrine of ,evolution1 which ,professor ,royce rightly regards as having had its rise long before ,darwin or ,herbert ,spencer4 ,before proceeding to state his own views1 the author takes a cursory glance at modern empirical monism which he affirms to be rather a suggestion than a philosophy4 ,it is not surprising1 therefore1 that he is not content with it although he makes use of its ideas4 ,let us now see what are the 8,suggestions0 which ,professor ,royce offers as his contribution towards the formation of a world-conception4 ,these occupy the last four chapters of the work1 which are supplemented by a general summary in the appendix1 to the book4 ,for the sake of conciseness we will make use of this summary1 according to which there are two phases of idealistic doctrine1 the ,analytic ,idealism of ,berkeley and the ,synthetic ,idealism of ,kant and his successors4 ,the former shows that if the world is to be knowable at all1 it must be1 in its deepest nature1 a world of ideas1 that is1 it exists 8only in so far as beings with minds actually know it to be40 ,the objection that nobody can know any reality beyond his own self1 is met by the synthetic phase of idealism which shows us that 8there is but one self in the world1 the logos or world-mind4 ,the finite self knows truth beyond its own limitations1 just because it is an organic part of the complete ,self40 ,what are the demands of idealism as thus stated8 ,they have relation1 first1 to the interpretation of the facts of experience1 which must be in terms of the doctrine of the world-mind1 and1 secondly1 to experience itself1 on which we depend 8for the revelation of that truth which1 for us finite beings1 must remain a fast #8outer' truth1 just because it is the content of other mind than our own bits of selfhood1 and is universally true for all intelligences40 ,the philosophy of experience having to do with facts and with the interpretation of facts1 it is necessary to distinguish between what is really 8outer0 and what is 8inner0 about our finite experience4 ,the former embraces the world of facts1 and a fact is something which must be describable in some sort of universal terms4 ,the principle of ordinary realism1 8that you must not be sentimental or otherwise emotional in your account of the truth of things1 but rather exact in your descriptions of what things are10 has a thoroughly idealistic justification4 ,not appreciation1 but description gives us outer truth1 and this is the characteristic presupposition of all natural science1 which is concerned with the universal aspects of things1 as opposed to momentary and transient aspects4 ,that presupposition involves the assumption that the world is essentially describable4 ,but as only the well-knit1 the orderly1 that which conforms to law1 can be described science assumes the universality and rigidity of the laws of nature4 ,it assumes further1 since the most exact descriptions are possible only in the case of processes in ,space and ,time1 of a mechanical type1 that everything including man himself1 is a part of nature's mechanism4 ,a closer analysis1 however1 shows that1 as one can only describe what has been first appreciated1 there must be universal types of appreciation1 and therefore1 that 8,ideals must be deeper than ,mechanism1 so that1 in order to be relatively describable1 nature must embody purposes1 and so be possessed of worth40 ,the author's conclusion is that the natural order is also a moral order1 and that therefore 8the world of absolute self must appear to us as having two aspects1 one a temporal1 the other an eternal aspect1 one of law and one of worth4 ,man then turns out to be at once a part of nature's mechanism1 and a part of the moral order2 at once temporally determined and morally free40 ,the final lecture presents the author's views as to the solution of the problem of evil4 ,professor ,royce believes that all evil is part of a good order1 and hence he agrees with ,hegel1 who declared that life1 however good1 will always be restless1 longing1 suffering1 and who gloried in the paradox as the very essence of spirituality2 rather than with ,schopenhauer1 whose recognition1 in another light1 of the universality of the same truth led him to abandon all hope in life4 ,the justification of the existence of an evil impulse comes just at the instant when it is hated and condemned4 ,thus 8condemning and conquering the evil will1 makes it part of a good will02 as pain and suffering have their compensation in their chastening effect on the spirit4 ,but to the enlightened soul it is not so much the painfulness as 8the blind irrationality of fortune that seems to drive ,god out of our thoughts when we look at our world40 ,it is the capriciousness of life1 arising from human stupidity1 that really makes it seem like an evil dream4 ,what is the explanation of this caprice given by the author8 ,it is to be found in the creed of his idealism1 8,this world is the world of the ,logos40 ,it is 8the suffering ,god1 who is just our own true self1 who actually and in our flesh bears the sins of the world1 and whose natural body is pierced by the capricious wounds that hateful fools inflict upon him40 ,and as our defeats are his1 so his triumph and his eternal peace are ours also4 ,prof4 ,royce in making 8only one more effort to define a #8double-aspect' theory of the relations of the physical and the moral and sthetic worlds10 affirms that our philosophic insight teaches us that the world of matter in motion is simply an external aspect of the appreciable world1 that is1 of the world of the ,logos4 ,of this1 it is such an aspect 8as can be expressed by finite consciousness in terms of the space and time forms1 and of the categories of empirical science4444 ,consequently all its laws1 all its necessity1 its causation1 its uniformity1 belong1 not to its inner nature as such1 but to the external show of this nature40 ,that which actually appears to us is matter in motion1 which furnishes the fact of the double aspect1 the inner intelligibility of which fact is problematical to us1 but not so for the ,logos1 who is our true ,self1 and who 8completes the insight that for us is so fragmentary40 ,this true ,self1 the ,logos1 is the only ,self1 and with it the deeper self of man is identical4 ,that this deeper self is 8the self that knows in unity all truth10 is declared to be no hypothesis1 and therefore the existence of the ,infinite ,self is perfectly sure4 ,this ,self 8infinitely and reflectively transcends our consciousness1 and therefore1 since it includes us1 it is at the very least a person1 and more definitely conscious than we are2 for what it possesses is self-reflecting knowledge40 ,finally1 the true world1 that is the world of appreciation1 is the system of the thoughts of the ,logos1 whose unity we know1 just so far as we ourselves consciously and rationally enter into it and form part of it4 ,therefore 8in so far as we have inner unity of thinking1 in so far as we commune with our fellows1 and in so far as we rightly see significance in the outer universe1 we are in and of the world of appreciation that embodies the thought of the ,logos40 ,ingenious as this theory is1 and notwithstanding the elements of truth it possesses1 we cannot accept it as conclusive4 ,its weakness is revealed in the last line of the paragraph just quoted4 ,if only the world of appreciation embodies the thought of the ,logos1 what becomes of the world of fact8 ,the latter is said to be the outer aspect of the former1 a notion which is apparently derived from the association with man of body and mind4 ,but the existence of mind1 which we must understand by the term ,logos1 in nature1 although declared by ,professor ,royce to be the only thing certain1 is a mere inference1 and even if the analogy of the human organism justifies such an inference2 it would require that if priority has to be given to mind or matter in the universe it must be allowed to the latter4 ,at birth a human being has no mind1 properly so-called1 since it is the result of the activity after birth of the organism1 through the agency of the brain4 ,it is true that the human body possesses from the first the elements of the mind1 or rather of the feeling which thus exhibits itself2 or1 better still1 the organic structure of which feeling is the general function4 ,the utmost that can be properly asserted of the universe1 therefore1 is that it possesses a certain organic arrangement of its parts1 and therewith such a condition of feeling1 or1 what in this relation would be a better term1 sensitiveness1 as is required by its organic character4 ,in relation to such a state of things the terms thought1 consciousness1 reflection1 have no meaning so far as we can judge4 ,that organic aspect of the universe1 moreover1 leaves no room for duality4 ,just as the human organism constitutes a perfect unity1 although it is made up of various organs and exhibits the properties attributed to both mind and matter1 so must the universe be such a perfect unity whatever its nature and attributes4 ,the human organism may1 however1 be strictly described as matter under organic conditions1 a description which is equally applicable to the universe1 without determining what those conditions are4 ,professor ,royce objects to the ,unknowable of ,herbert ,spencer1 but there is very little practical difference between it and his own true ,self1 which1 as the ,absolute1 is unknowable1 although he is known in the inner self of man1 as ,spencer's ,unknowable is known in the human consciousness4 ,both ,absolute and ,unknowable are1 however1 merely names for ,organic ,nature1 which is seen in all things visible and is known by all her operations4 ,these are governed by the laws of her very existence1 and it is the uniformity of which those laws are the expression which constitutes the moral law of the universe1 the breach of whose eternal order1 whether this is established in the world of matter or in the human mind1 must be attended with consequences that are designated by man as evil4 ,we find only a world of description1 which is nevertheless one of moral order4 ,widely as we disagree on the grounds stated with the conclusions of ,professor ,royce's work1 it is undoubtedly a valuable contribution to the discussion of the world-problem4 ,its description of the characteristics of the philosophy of ,kant and of the ,german idealists is clear1 though not intended to do more than exhibit the spirit of their teaching1 and it is written in a style which renders it easy reading4 ,it is a pity1 therefore1 that it is disfigured with such colloquialisms as you'll1 isn't1 can't1 don't1 words which neither sound well1 nor look well in print4 4 ,,die ,,aristotelische ,,auffassung ,,vom ,,verh,,ltnisse ,,gottes ,,zur ,,welt ,,und ,,zum ,,menschen4 ,by ,dr4 ,eugen ,rolfes4 ,berlin3 ,mayer ,mller4 #ahib4 ,this book is a scholastic 8survival40 ,the author believes that ,zeller's interpretation of ,aristotle is wrong1 and in five formal theses he endeavors to prove secundum artem that the philosopher was a theist who taught the creation of the world from nothing1 and the immortality of the soul4 ,in the defence of his theses he manifests some ingenuity and industry1 but no criticism4 ,the work has no scientific significance4 ,p4 ,s4 ,,max ,,stirner ,,und ,,friedrich ,,nietzsche4 ,erscheinungen des modernen ,geistes und das ,wesen des ,menschen4 ,by ,robert ,schellwien4 ,leipsic3 ,c4 ,e4 ,m4 ,pfeffer1 #ahib4 ,price #b m #fj pf4 ,individualism is the spirit of the age1 and among all the champions of individualism the most original1 the most consistent1 the boldest1 are perhaps ,max ,stirner and ,friedrich ,nietzsche4 ,robert ,schellwien1 in sketching their views in great outlines1 partly admires these courageous thinkers who dare to draw the consequences of their principles to the very last even though they will appear absurd to the world1 partly censures the rashness with which they arrive at1 and the superciliousness with which they sometimes state1 their opinions4 ,upon the whole the author succeeds in impressing the reader that there is in these two peculiar geniuses a gigantic strength1 and that their views of truth1 morality1 and justice deserve a greater attention than they have received4 ,the reviewer is no admirer of either ,stirner or ,nietzsche2 he believes nevertheless that a careful analysis of their erratic minds and lives will be very instructive4 ,it will be first of pathological and then even of more than pathological interest4 ,the actual objective value of the ideals truth1 morality1 and justice1 will be best illustrated by showing all the consequences of a consistent individualism4 ,we hope that this pamphlet will grow into a more comprehensive work2 and in that case we should advise the author to add short biographies of his heroes4 4 ,,the ,,sources ,,and ,,development ,,of ,,kant',s ,,teleology4 ,by ,james ,hayden ,tufts4 ,chicago3 ,university ,press4 #ahib4 ,this little tract is an inaugural dissertation presented by ,mr4 ,tufts to the ,university of ,freiburg for the attainment of the doctorate of philosophy4 ,it is written in ,english4 ,mr4 ,tuft's dissertation is wholly historical4 ,he simply seeks to expound ,kant's true views4 ,in this respect the work bears the marks of much research and of a thorough exploitation of ,kant's works4 ,mr4 ,tuft's concluding words are that 8with every new discovery of science1 every advance in the ideals of art and of the conduct of life1 every development in religious faiths1 comes anew the task for philosophy to criticise1 and through criticism to make a fresh attempt to interpret from the unity of reason the manifold of life40 4 ,,distinction ,,and ,,the ,,criticism ,,of ,,beliefs4 ,by ,alfred ,sidgwick4 ,london3 ,longmans1 ,green1 ,co4 #ahib4 ,this work might be described as an inquiry into the conflict between philosophy and common sense1 and its central idea as the continuity of nature4 ,what bearing this idea has on the inquiry is shown by the statement1 that the distinction between philosophy and common sense is only one of degree4 ,and yet1 regarded as methods1 or attempts to follow ideals1 they may be sharply contrasted4 ,this implies the existence of distinctions1 and hence arises the question how far distinction is consistent with continuity in nature4 ,the recognition of such a continuity requires the admission of the unreality of distinctness1 but this fact is not inconsistent with the use of rough distinctions1 which give rise to what the author terms effective ambiguity4 ,here we have the field of the operation of common sense1 which exhibits itself as tact in the use of rough distinctions1 while1 on the other hand1 philosophy may be said to be concerned with the continuity which1 from a superficial glance1 might be supposed to stand in opposition to distinction4 ,the ultimate result which ,mr4 ,sidgwick has in view is the reconciliation of philosophy and common sense1 although it is incidental to his main purpose1 which is the discussion of the best way of dealing with ambiguity1 that is1 of using rough distinctions4 ,the improvement suggested is the substitution of 8reasoned discrimination0 for 8haphazard tact10 and it is based on the doctrine that 8the validity of all distinctions is relative to the purpose for which they are used at the time40 ,this cannot mean that distinction is merely relative1 as it is said that there is no distinction which is quite safe against being broken down4 ,the implication is that a safe distinction is possible1 although difficult to find1 and consistently with that view1 the doctrine has the double aim of repressing excessive belief in distinctions which are1 at least for the moment1 invalid1 and1 on the other hand1 of 8enabling us to justify for a passing purpose1 distinctions which are faulty on the whole40 ,the justification here arises from the use1 and not from the distinctions themselves1 although it is evident there must be some basis for them1 or they would be invalid4 ,the element of truth is derived from the continuity of nature1 with which philosophy is concerned1 and hence the improvement in the method of common sense is to be effected through its regulation by the method of philosophy4 ,the justice of this view may be tested by its consequences1 which are stated by the author in reviewing the chief incidental aims of his book1 as being those which have to do with controversy1 the faults of language1 and the conflict between the rival ideals1 faith and doubt4 8,philosophy10 we are told1 8is doubt1 just as science is knowledge10 7a description which like many other things in this book we cannot endorse17 and the true centre of philosophical interest in regard to rival ideals is 8to harmonise the dispute by seeking how to limit each ideal by its opposite40 ,this is the aim of all real philosophy1 which recognises that every ideal has an element of truth4 ,philosophy is thus explanation1 and ,mr4 ,sidgwick avers one of the great dividing forces in philosophy has always been 8the rivalry between two opposite methods of general explanation--that which explains small things by great ones1 the part by the whole1 the many by the one 7e4 g4 all earthly facts as related to their one cause and substance72 and that which explains great things by small ones1 the whole by its parts1 the one by the many 7e4 g4 the system of nature as a #8concourse of atoms'740 ,thus regarded1 the distinction between philosophy and common sense is simply one of method2 and it may be said to consist in the use by the former of rational doubt based on scientific knowledge1 as distinguished from the belief founded on popular wisdom which distinguishes the latter4 ,both alike1 however1 are the fruit of observation1 pushed further1 nevertheless1 in the one case than in the other1 which is practically the view expressed by the author4 ,in considering the nature of philosophy1 we have given the gist of ,mr4 ,sidgwick's reflections on controversy1 which is treated as the opposition of ideals4 ,this conflict is kept alive chiefly by doubt as to how abstract notions should be applied in concrete cases1 and largely owing to 8the absence of that kind of sharp distinction which is applicable1 not only to the notions themselves1 but to the actual facts to which they pretend to refer40 ,this view is ably enforced1 as well as the necessity of applying to the conflict between ideals the rule laid down as to the purposive validity of distinctions4 ,the operation of this rule would be attended with concession instead of assumption1 there being1 however1 the admission1 which is equivalent to an assumption1 that neither side of any ideal dispute is devoid of some truth as well as some error4 ,this is really required1 if not by the continuity of nature1 yet by continuity in our interpretation of nature4 ,this is continuity in thought1 and hence arises the difficulties connected with language which it is one of the author's incidental aims to point out4 ,he supposes that language acts as a drag on the progress of knowledge1 owing to the clumsiness of words arising from the fact that 8things spoken of are always more full of change and movement than the words we can use in speaking of them40 ,mr4 ,sidgwick insists upon continuity1 yet change itself may be evidence of at least partial discontinuity4 ,our author remarks1 in an appendix note on the continuity of nature1 that every change1 as such1 is a saltus1 however small it may be1 and that the same is true of any gap between the two extremes of nature and the intermediate region4 ,that such an intermediate region exists1 is required by the continuity of nature1 which again is evidence of change1 on the principle that every chain is made up of a series of links4 ,but as in the chain there is no real gap between the links1 so there is no actual discontinuity consequent on change in nature4 ,the two extremes may be regarded as prolongations of the intermediate region1 and the changes to which such prolongation is due may so occur that there may be discontinuity between certain parts1 as between the fibres of which a hempen rope is made1 and yet there be a perfectly continuous whole4 ,we have an example of such a discontinuous continuum in a beam of ordinary light1 which presents not the slightest gap1 and which yet is made up of numberless undulations in different ratios representing the six spectrum colors1 each of which is1 moreover1 spread throughout the whole of the beam4 ,here we see that continuity is quite consistent with distinction4 ,the latter may be regarded as discrimination of the various phases of the former1 and the distinction remains valid or otherwise according to the accuracy of the discrimination or not4 ,but constant change of distinction is required by progress in knowledge which may be regarded as a thought representation1 by discontinuous steps1 of the continuity of nature4 ,as to the conflict between faith and doubt1 the author considers the function of scepticism as the search for grounds of belief1 and thus doubt is said to be 8rather a friend than an enemy to those who remember that there is still some truth1 on any subject1 for fallible men to learn10 as well as to those who are more interested in the discovery of truth than in supporting their own beliefs4 4 ,,vorlesungen ,,ber ,,geometrie1 unter besonderer ,benutzung der ,vortrge von ,alfred ,clebsch4 ,by ,dr4 ,ferdinand ,lindemann4 ,leipsic3 ,b4 ,g4 ,teubner4 #ahia4 ,this first part of the second volume of ,alfred ,clebsch's ,lectures has been arranged and treated by ,professor ,lindemann in the same way as the first1 except perhaps that the editor has extended his independent investigations rather further than before1 owing mainly to the fact that he had in addition to his own notes when attending ,professor ,clebsch's lectures in #ahga-ahgb1 only five folio pages of the late master's manuscript at his disposal4 ,the present volume is divided into three parts4 ,i4 ,the ,point1 ,plane1 and ,straight ,line4 ,,ii4 ,surfaces of the ,second ,order and of the ,second ,class4 ,,iii4 ,fundamental ,conceptions of ,projective and ,metrical ,geometry4 ,historical notices and references are added in foot-notes4 ,considering the prominence of the editor as a mathematician1 it would be a presumption on our part to praise his work4 4 ,,an ,,introduction ,,to ,,general ,,logic4 ,by ,e4 ,e4 ,constance ,jones4 ,london3 ,longmans1 ,green1 ,co4 #ahib4 ,this work is another witness of the great interest now being taken in all that pertains to the methods of knowledge4 ,miss ,jones1 the author1 is lecturer on logic at ,girton ,college1 ,cambridge4 ,during an experience of several years in teaching1 certain difficulties have very forcibly pressed themselves upon her attention4 ,she hopes by her book to aid in removing these difficulties4 ,it is certainly a good augury for women when their intellectual representatives begin to show the disposition to turn towards the 8dry light40 ,logic and mathematics are 8dry0 to be sure2 that is1 they are very apt to be found dry1 very dry1 by beginners1 and always by those who lack that real intellectual robustness which is alone fit to meddle with fundamental problems4 ,hence these sober and severe disciplines find little favor among those who seek merely for 8showy0 attainments1 those to whom whatever is 8uninteresting0 is intolerable1 and those who regard obscurity as inseparable from profundity4 ,when then we find scholarly women manifesting a real relish for this 8dry light10 it gives promise of a coming day when the intellectual appetite will rise above the level of mere entertainment1 the level of the playhouse and the circus1 and take kindly1 and perhaps zealously1 to real edification4 ,miss ,jones makes but very modest claims on behalf of her treatise4 ,she has not undertaken to innovate to any great extent upon the regular scheme4 ,if in her changes there is that which might especially provoke criticism1 it is perhaps in the nomenclature which she adopts4 ,the traditional logic forms a system which has its own proper merits and defects4 ,it is of great historical interest1 and its regular terminology is almost indispensable for the proper illustration of its doctrines4 ,we think also that the author fails to state the case in all its amplitude1 when1 she lays it down as one of the most absolute and ultimate of all logical principles that the self-evident ought to be believed4 ,the truth is1 as we conceive it1 that the self-evident is sure to be believed1 and that in the face of any proposition that truly bears its own justification along with it1 any doctrine of logic is either useless or impertinent4 4 ,,hypnotismus ,,und ,,suggestion4 ,by ,w4 ,wundt4 ,leipsic3 ,wilhelm ,engelmann4 #ahib4 ,a ,greek student translates #8small'2 8,you are thinking of the ,german klein10 says the teacher quickly4 ,another renders 1 #8we are lambs1' misled by a chance cross association with the ,latin agni4 ,every careful self-observer knows that there is no combination of memories1 images1 and resultant incipient acts too absurd for some moments of confusion and mental fatigue4 ,we account for such confusions of thought by citing parallel cases and adding generally that normal associations are liable to disintegration and abnormal recombination in fatigued or excited conditions of the brain4 ,if we seek a causal scientific explanation1 two methods are open to us3 7#a7 we may attempt to map out in detail and describe for all similar cases the pathways of association1 or 7#b7 we may endeavor to define their physiological conditions and accompaniments in the nervous system4 ,the first leads us at once into the metaphysics of the unconscious4 ,the second method1 when we attempt to pass from a general to a specific correspondence1 leads to a hypothetical restatement of the observed psychological facts in terms of the latest cerebral anatomy and physiology ,now all serious scientific thinkers are fast coming to the conclusion 7on which ,wundt's book is based7 that the phenomena of dreams and of hypnotism are to be explained by the general laws of association as revealed especially in the confused and obstructed associations of the normal state4 ,the critical and destructive part of ,wundt's sensible and timely work has two aims3 7#a7 to discriminate the attested phenomena of hypnotism from the alleged phenomena of thought-transference1 telepathy1 and 8possession0 on which no serious student will waste his words2 and 7#b7 to point out the confusions of thought in current explanations of hypnotic phenomena1 which either confine themselves to restatements of the observed facts in terms of a hypothetical anatomy1 or at any rate in ,wundt's opinion base their physiological hypotheses on an inadequate psychological analysis4 ,his own constructive work is an attempt to supply the missing analysis and accompany it with the most plausible physiological theory that our imperfect science allows4 ,dreams and the illusions of the hypnotic subject are doubtless explicable generally as derangements of the associative machinery4 ,but they are specific forms of abnormal association1 the special characteristics of which we wish to define4 ,suggestion1 ,wundt says 7with ,james71 is association accompanied by a 8limitation of consciousness to the images aroused by the association40 ,the scientific problem is3 ,wie entsteht die ,einengung des ,bewusstseins8 ,this narrowing of consciousness manifests itself in a diminished sensibility to all impressions outside of the suggestions4 ,dreams show the same features1 accidental impressions of sense or changes in the nutritive processes here taking the place of direct suggestions from without4 ,but in sleep and dreams the limitation of consciousness is conditioned by general fatigue of the nervous system4 ,in the hypnotic state it results not from fatigue1 but from neuro-dynamic and vaso-motor changes in the distribution of tensions in the brain4 ,hence the superior intensity and vividness of the presentations that are allowed to develop themselves4 ,this altered equilibrium of the forces of the brain is brought about by the suggestions of the operator1 which are generally guided by him to a more or less definite end4 ,the resulting derangements of normal associations are consequently less lawless than is the case in dreams4 ,on these principles ,wundt explains the chief facts of hypnotism as follows3 ,automatic obedience to the commands of the operator results simply from the fact that every idea tends to realise itself in action1 is an incipient act2 and in the narrowed consciousness of the hypnotic subject the idea suggested by the operator finds no competitors in the struggle for existence as a reality4 ,this explanation 7which is really as old as ,spinoza7 accounts also for positive hallucinations--there are no reductors1 as ,taine would say4 ,negative hallucinations 7the non-existence of an existing door7 may be explained sometimes by a contradictory positive hallucination 7as of a curtain covering the door7 more often in the same way as hypnotic analgesia by the familiar analogy of our insensibility to the toothache when the attention is elsewhere strongly engaged4 ,this is favored by the generally diminished sensibility of the hypnotic subject4 ,post-hypnotic suggestions are associations depending on partial memories1 such as we have in the normal state when we merely recall an image or an object without time-and-circumstance localisation4 ,the subject who is to execute a post-hypnotic suggestion at #g o'clock is reminded by the striking of the clock of an image of a thing to be done which the original command of the operator associated with the stroke of seven4 ,all else is forgotten4 ,when the time limit is not thus definitely marked1 the process must be analogous to that whereby some persons are able to waken at a predetermined hour in the morning4 ,a latent association is aroused into full activity by naturally recurring conditions of internal physiological processes or external surroundings4 ,courtesy or prudence are perhaps all that prevent the best explanation of certain extreme cases being the old one3 8the boy lied40 ,wundt rejects the claim that suggestion is the experimental method in psychology par excellence1 for the very sufficient reason that the phenomena experimented with are only very partially in the control of the operator and are furthermore mainly pathological4 ,he is far from disputing the practical efficacy of hypnotic therapeutics in functional disorders1 but he regards the hypnotic sleep as a dangerous remedy1 the employment of which should be limited to trained practitioners4 ,the subjection of the hypnotic subject to the will of the hypnotiser is a priori an immoral relation to obtain between man and man unless justified by superior medical necessities1 but1 quite apart from a priori ethics1 indiscriminate hypnotisation is to be discouraged as a direct cause of nervous degeneration4 ,the book closes as it began ,with a dignified but severe reprobation of those thinkers who in the interests of occultism magnify the psychological significance of hypnotism and disseminate superstition in the name of science4 ,,paul ,,shorey4 ,,der ,,hypnotismus ,,in ,,gemeinfasslicher ,,darstellung4 ,by ,dr4 ,hans ,schmidkunz4 ,stuttgart3 ,a4 ,zimmer 7,e4 ,mohrmann74 #ahib4 ,this book 7#bff pp47 is a popular compendium of hypnotism4 ,the author1 beginning 7,i7 with the hypnosis of common life1 goes over the whole field as follows3 7,,ii7 the phenomena of hypnosis1 7,,iii7 its application1 7,,iv7 the 8beyond0 of hypnotism1 7,v7 the conceptions of hypnotism1 and 7,,vi7 its dangers4 ,the seventh and last chapter is a short history of the subject4 ,dr4 ,schmidkunz1 ,docent of philosophy at the ,university of ,munich1 is one of the few who believe that there is a 8beyond0 in hypnotism4 ,he says on p4 #fe3 8,a hypnotised person was led through a room while sleeping4 ,the experimenter made a few passes over his head and then violently whirled his arm around in a vertical direction before his subject4 ,when the subject approached the marked place1 he recoiled from it crying with pain40 ,our author asks1 8what is this magnetic wall to be regarded as8 ,as a charm1 as an obstacle of occult power1 from which the body recoils as from a wall of stone8 ,if not1 was it the subject's soul that recoiled8 ,was it the hypnotised person's belief which created the wall80 etc4 ,the two interpretations1 the one attributing the effect to a magnetic power1 the other to suggestion are typical4 ,the former is bolder3 he goes 8beyond0 hypnotism4 ,our author is one of those who go beyond hypnotism1 and is not satisfied with the theory that suggestion explains all4 ,we may add that he regards telepathy as a sufficiently established fact4 ,telepathy finds little support among scientists in ,germany1 and ,dr4 ,schmidkunz complains1 in a circular letter to 8,professor ,wundt's and other ,savants' ,critical ,saltomortales0 of the cool and depreciative treatment which his book ,psychologie der ,suggestion received at the hands of men of science4 4 ,l',,hypnotisme ,,devant ,,les ,,chambres ,,legislatives ,,belges4 ,par ,j4 ,delbuf4 ,paris3 ,flix ,alcan4 ,pp4 #hj4 ,in a recent number of ,the ,monist ,prof4 ,j4 ,delbuf gave the reasons which have induced him to come to the conclusion that 8persons in an hypnotic condition preserve at least a sufficient portion of their intelligence1 their reason1 together with freedom of action1 to prevent them from committing deeds that neither their conscience nor their habits approve of40 ,this opinion is entertained by many other hypnotists1 but the more general opinion is that 8suggestion0 may be made use of for criminal purposes3 ,such is the case especially in ,france and in ,belgium2 and acting on that supposition the medical faculty of the latter country promoted in the legislative ,chamber a law interdicting public hypnotic sances1 and reserving the practice of hypnotism as a therapeutic measure exclusively to medical men1 as well as the treatment of insane persons and those under twenty-one years of age4 ,professor ,delbuf1 who is not a medical man1 naturally objects when those who but a few years ago would have classed him and his fellow hypnotists as charlatans1 seek without reason to reserve for themselves the promising field of labor opened up by the researches of others4 ,he maintains that men are born hypnotisers as they are born artists1 and therefore to exclude all but medical men from the application of the hypnotic power will often prevent its use for curative purposes4 ,moreover it is a serious question for those who possess this natural gift4 ,they might perform the most praiseworthy actions and yet be subjected to a legal penalty4 ,professor ,delbuf states that by hypnotism he cured a youth eighteen years of age of a mania for stealing 7la manie du vol71 and thus saved him from unmerited dishonor4 ,on another occasion he had charge of a young wife who was possessed with the idea of murdering her children1 and after all other means had failed he was able to remove the idea by suggestion extending over a period of eight days4 ,he properly asks whether the performance of such actions ought to be treated as criminal4 ,the real question to be considered1 however1 is whether the practice of hypnotism is likely to be made use of for criminal purposes if it is permitted to every one4 ,we much doubt whether any actual case of such an abuse has been legally established1 or whether suggestion could lead to the perpetration of a criminal act unless there was a predisposition in that direction4 ,professor ,delbuf makes use1 however1 of an apparent paradox which would seem to render abortive any such law of prevention as that above referred to4 ,it is that there is in reality no such thing as hypnotism4 ,m4 ,bernheim writes in a letter given in the present work1 8for my part1 in the thousands of hypnotisations ,i have practised1 ,i have never seen the least inconvenience result4 ,undoubtedly very impressionable subjects can1 under the emotional influence of auto-suggestion1 present certain nervous troubles2 but these a prudent operator can always calm by suggestion40 ,professor ,delbuf relates several cases of this kind within his own experience1 which shows that severe nervous pain can be removed by simple assertion that it does not exist4 ,he affirms that 8the so-called hypnotic sleep is only a sign of suggestibility1 and that it is not at all necessary to suggestive therapeutics40 ,we may conclude this notice of a very interesting contribution to the discussion as to the true nature and operation of hypnotism1 by quoting the conclusions arrived at by the author as to the proper mode of regulating its practice4 ,he suggests that representations of hypnotism should be permitted subject to the measures which regulate public spectacles2 that any one should be allowed to become a hypnotiser1 as he can become a shampooer or a truss-maker2 that the hypnotist who gives remedies should be punishable1 since he exercises the art of curing without a diploma2 that he should not be allowed to hypnotise minors without the consent of the family2 and that he should be forbidden to treat a sick person without the written authorisation of a medical man and under his direction4 ,this rule ,professor ,delbuf1 although he disapproves of the law which forbids the practice of medicine to those who have not a diploma1 has always acted on4 ,he thinks that if medical men then studied hypnotism and practised it themselves1 hypnotisers who had no diplomas would soon have nothing to do4 ,this spirited defence by ,professor ,delbuf of his views will be widely read4 ,not the least interesting portion of it is the criticism1 with which it ends1 of 8the affair of the brothers ,vandevoir10 where we read that he is designated by his opponent ,m4 ,masoin 8doux et bon vieillard0 and 8l'homme cheveu06 4 ,,ueber ,,den ,,hautsinn4 ,by ,dr4 phil4 et med4 ,max ,dessoir1 ,privatdocenten an der ,universitt zu ,berlin4 ,separat-,abzug aus ,archiv fr ,anatomie und ,physiologie4 ,physiologische ,abtheilung4 #ahib4 ,this pamphlet1 a reprint from the ,archiv fr ,anatomie und ,physiologie of #ahib1 is an elaborate and careful investigation into the modus operandi of skin sensations4 ,the first part is a discussion of the theory of sensation in general containing 7#a7 an analysis of the ideas ,gefhl1 ,empfindung1 and ,wahrnehmung1 7#b7 a critique of ,johannes ,mller's doctrine of specific energies1 7#c7 an exposition of the objectification of sensations4 ,feeling 7,empfindung71 according to the author1 is1 no magnitude1 its main feature is intensity1 quality becomes important only in sensation 7,wahrnehmung74 ,for the psychology of skin-sensations1 we have to note the great influence of accompanying feelings 7,mitempfindungen74 ,the second part is devoted to the author's investigations of the sense of temperature4 ,dr4 ,dessoir rejects ,blix's point theory2 he regards the idea of two different end-apparatuses for warm and cold sensations as an unfounded assumption1 and claims that the temperature sense is one mode of sensation possessing two qualities4 ,the intensity of temperature sensations depends not only upon the vis viva of the heat in the stimulus2 but also upon five other factors 7#a7 the size of the surface affected1 7#b7 the duration of the affect1 7#c7 the thickness of the epidermis1 7#d7 its conductibility1 and 7#e71 last not least1 its temperature4 4 ,,recherches ,d',,optique ,,physiologique ,,et ,,physique4 ,by ,clmence ,royer4 ,brussels ,imprimerie ,veuve ,monnom4 #ahib4 ,the first part of this brochure consists chiefly of an examination of the theories of ,m4 ,m4 ,hirth and ,chauveau on chromatic sensation4 ,the talented authoress disagrees with the view entertained by ,m4 ,chauveau1 that the sensations of contrast which are fused cerebrally1 so as to give1 when viewed with both eyes1 a white image1 are subjective in an intellectual sense4 ,the result is purely physico-physiological1 as it is even assuming the intervention of ,m4 ,hirth's interior eye4 ,mad4 ,royer regards the eyes organised so as to effect a fusion of the colors and forms depicted on the two retinas1 and she accepts the conclusion of ,m4 ,hirth1 that they lessen the real polychromism of objects1 the inability to perceive the infra-red and the ultra-violet rays concealing from us a considerable part 8of the palette of nature and of its chromatic scale40 ,the authoress refers with approval to the theory of ,m4 ,charpentier that the complementary colors correspond to inverse undulatory phases1 which are destroyed by interference in the field of vision4 ,the second part of ,mad4 ,royer's pamphlet is devoted to a consideration of the photography of colors1 and the theory of light4 ,it points out that the photography of colors1 which has been effected to some extent by ,m4 ,lippmann1 must be a physical and not a chemical process4 ,it is the result of the periodic compressions of the sensitised silver-surface1 due to the shocks it receives from the light undulations of the ether1 which so modify the surfaces of the silver atoms that they reflect colored rays identical with those received from the object photographed4 ,with reference to the propagation of light1 the authoress affirms that the atoms of matter1 as well as those of the ether1 which differs from matter only in being imponderable and without inertia1 are centres of emanation of a continuous and impenetrable fluid1 which is however indefinitely expansible or compressible4 ,the size and form of atoms will thus depend on the compressions they receive1 and they will be able to accommodate themselves to the spaces to which they are confined by the resistance of the atomic groups by which they are surrounded4 ,but the world may be regarded as consisting of three sorts of atoms3 7#a7 those of the ether which possess their primordial unity of expansive force and are endowed with perfect elasticity2 7#b7 those of ponderable matter1 which have lost a portion of their expansive force and elasticity2 7#c7 those which are called vitaliferous1 because they have regained their expansive force1 and are thus capable of autonomous movements necessary to resist the compressions of the ether and to oppose the inertia of matter4 ,they thus answer to the cell-souls of ,haeckel4 4 ,,die ,,bewegung ,,der ,,lebendigen ,,substanz4 ,eine vergleichend-physiologische ,untersuchung der ,contractionserscheinungen4 ,by ,max ,verworn1 ,dr4 med41 ,privatdocent der ,physiologie an der ,universitt ,jena4 ,mit #ai ,abbildungen4 ,jena3 ,gustav ,fischer1 #ahib4 ,the mechanism of muscle contraction and expansion and the motions of amboid substance have been recognised as one and the same problem2 and several naturalists1 foremost among them ,hofmeister1 ,engelmann1 and ,edmund ,montgomery have investigated it1 fully aware of the enormous importance of the subject4 ,the present pamphlet is small1 it contains only #ajc pages1 but it contains the statement of the problem1 a description of the author's experiments1 and his solution so lucidly that one cannot read it without great satisfaction4 ,both processes1 expansion as well as contraction1 are1 according to ,verworn1 spontaneous motions1 and both are to be explained by chemotropy4 ,expansion1 i4 e41 in amba the protrusion of pseudopodia1 is due to the plasma's hunger for the oxygen1 which is contained in the surrounding medium4 ,every irritation 7electric shocks1 concussions1 injuries etc47 causes a chemical decomposition of the oxygenised plasma2 it loses carbon1 hydrogen1 oxygen1 and nitrogen1 7as we know from the waste products1 carbonic acid1 creatine1 lactic acid17 and these substances are exactly those which are most prominent in building up living substance4 ,irritations without exception cause the plasma to return to the nucleus4 ,the chemical change in the plasma makes it hungry for the nuclear substances4 ,the vital process1 accordingly1 is an interaction between the nucleus1 the plasma1 and the medium1 so that in the constant exchange of materials the old structure is preserved2 and the fundamental features of the vital process are first the plasma's chemotropy for oxygen1 causing centrifugal motions1 and then its chemotropy for nuclear substance1 causing centripetal motions4 ,the plasma saturated with nuclear substances1 shows a chemotropy for the oxygen of the medium2 it moves in a centrifugal direction1 and the oxygenised plasma has become so unstable that it breaks down on the slightest provocation4 ,the decomposed plasma exhibits a chemotropy for nuclear substance and thus returns in contripetal motions to the centre4 ,without entering into details we may mention that this accounts also for the fact that dying protoplasm always assumes a globular shape1 until it crumbles to pieces4 ,the rigor mortis is the last vital action of living substance4 ,the plasma seeks once more the nuclear substance1 but not finding sufficient material for being built up again into a substance endowed with a chemotropy for oxygen remains rigid until it decays4 ,the author finds his theory to hold good for the actions of the striated and nonstriated muscles1 and also of ciliated tissues4 ,having shown that the vital functions are due to the same forces that are observable in the retort of the chemist1 he adds3 8,the savage accordingly was not quite wrong when he drew no distinct line1 considering everything moving as alive4 ,life is motion4 ,that old poetical view of all nature being animated with life throughout was in possession of a germ of truth1 and our proud civilisation has actually made a retrogressive step in abandoning this view40 4 ,,graber',s ,,leitfaden ,,der ,,zoologie ,f,r ,,die ,,oberen ,,classen ,,der ,,mittelschulen4 ,vienna and ,prague3 ,f4 ,tempsky4 #ahib4 ,price #a fl4 #fj kr4 ,we had occasion in a recent number of ,the ,monist to review an excellent text-book of physics published by this same house4 ,the present work on zoology is in its second edition1 and is intended1 like the above-mentioned work of ,professor ,mach's1 for high-school instruction4 ,professor ,graber1 its author1 died before the completion of the second edition1 and the work was finished by ,j4 ,mik4 ,graber's ,zoology is unique in its class2 it covers1 within the restricted limits of two hundred and sixty-one pages1 the whole field of elementary biology1 human physiology1 and zoology1 as it is usually exploited in such books1 and thus combines in a single volume what is usually contained in two or three4 ,the human organism 7,part #a7 is made the starting-point of study in the work1 and the explication of the physiological and mechanical functions of animals are thus all grouped about this central figure4 ,in a concise form 7#ee pages7 this book contains about all of human anatomy and physiology that is usually learned in high-schools4 ,part #a also contains1 at the end of the discussions1 brief dietetic suggestions4 8,systematic ,zoology0 is taken up in the ,second ,part4 ,this part is well analysed and arranged4 ,the cuts are also excellent4 ,attached to the book is a 8,picture-,atlas40 ,this atlas contains a number of colored plates1 which depict various physiological and anatomical organs1 and also four beautiful representations of scenes from the ,naples ,aquarium4 ,although this book will not be used by ,english school-students1 it may be recommended to students of scientific ,german who wish a good introduction into the technical vocabulary of ,german biology and zoology1 which to the foreigner is very difficult4 4 ,l',,anthropologie ,,du ,,bengale4 ,by ,paul ,topinard4 ,extracted from ,l',anthropologie for ,may-,june1 #ahib4 ,paris3 ,g4 ,masson4 ,the present contribution to the science of ,anthropology by the ,editor of ,l',anthropologie1 is based on the anthropometric inquiries of ,mr4 ,h4 ,h4 ,risley made under instructions from the government of ,bengal4 ,the conclusions deduced by ,dr4 ,topinard from the large mass of material brought together by ,mr4 ,risley1 and which relates to members of all the castes to be met with in ,bengal1 are of great interest4 ,he finds that the populations are much mixed1 but that they may be divided into three types1 one tall and dolichocephalic1 that of the ,aryans2 another short and brachycephalic1 derived from northern ,asiatics2 and the third short and dolichocephalic1 or that of the native blacks4 ,india is a world by itself1 and most of its inhabitants belong to races of which there is no specimen in ,europe4 ,dr4 ,topinard naturally attaches more importance to physical than to ethnographical characters as evidence of anthropological descent1 and he is justified by ,mr4 ,risley's researches1 of which he speaks very highly2 although he thinks they would have been more fruitful if the anthropometrical instructions prepared by the ,french ,anthropologist had been more strictly adhered to4 ,that they were not so is the more surprising as ,mr4 ,risley's work is dedicated to ,dr4 ,topinard himself4 4 ,,ueber ,,sittliche ,,dispositionen4 ,by ,dr4 ,anton ,oelzelt-,newin1 ,privatdocent an der ,universitt in ,bern4 ,graz3 ,leuschner ,lubensky4 #ahib4 ,price ,mk4 #b #gj ,pf4 ,the main idea of this book is to prove that there are certain innate dispositions forming the elements of morality4 ,the elements of morality are according to ,dr4 ,oelzelt-,newin the attitudes of fear1 anger1 love1 sympathy1 shame1 and pride4 ,conscience is a complex which has developed from these six dispositions4 ,having stated sufficient evidences for the heredity of moral dispositions and illustrated the parallel phenomena of bodily states in their reference to moral alienation1 the author treats the six elements of morality in single chapters1 explaining their causes and the influence of conditions under which they develop either into virtues or crimes4 ,the essay 7#ib pp47 is a contribution to that ethical determinism which regards evil as the necessary result of given factors4 8,religious people should say3 ,not ,only the stone which falls from the roof and kills a just man1 but also the will of a criminal and the punishment of the judge are inscrutable ordinances of ,god4 ,that alone is a true theodicy40 ,as an optimist the author trusts that the evil of the world will be conquered with legal means and enjoins priests to revise in this sense their creed1 jurists their law1 and all men their love of mankind4 4 ,,the ,,beauties ,,of ,,nature4 ,and the ,wonders of the ,world ,we live in4 ,by ,sir ,john ,lubbock4 ,new ,york3 ,macmillan ,co4 #ahib4 #dbi pages4 ,price #a4ej4 ,,natur ,,und ,,kunst4 ,studien zur ,entwicklungsgeschichte der ,kunst4 ,by ,carus ,sterne4 ,berlin3 ,verein fr deutsche ,literatur4 #ahib4 ,the first of these two books is a delightful compilation by ,sir ,john ,lubbock4 ,it is another addition to that series of popular works which this well-known naturalist is now giving to ,english-speaking peoples4 ,it makes no pretension of being scientific3 it simply takes the world which science has revealed and shows us its wonders and its beauties4 ,yet it insinuates many a scientific fact and inculcates many a moral lesson4 ,no one will regret the few hours that can be spent in its perusal1 and the stimulus derived from it will heighten the pleasure which every religiously-minded heart takes in the contemplation of natural grandeur and truth4 ,in the main1 it is intended for unscientific readers4 ,it requires hardly any preparatory knowledge to be understood2 yet it sometimes touches on a truth that even great thinkers overlook4 ,thus1 propos of the capacity for intact divisibility which some life-forms possess1 ,sir ,john remarks that these considerations introduce 8much difficulty into our conception of the idea of an ,individual40 8,in fact10 he says1 8the realisation of the idea of an individual gradually becomes more and more difficult1 and the continuity of existence1 even among the highest animals1 gradually forces itself upon us4 ,i believe that as we become more rational1 as we realise more fully the conditions of existence1 this consideration is likely to have important moral results40 ,the work is divided into the following chapters3 8,animal ,life10 8,plant ,life20 8,woods and ,fields10 8,mountains10 8,water10 8,rivers and ,lakes10 8,the ,sea10 8,the ,starry ,heavens40 ,the second of the two books that head this review is by ,carus ,sterne4 ,few men possess the wide technical knowledge and the same command of the historical literature of his subject1 that this investigator and writer possesses4 ,carus ,sterne unites with a rigorous scientific training the rare qualities of philosophical insight and sound erudition4 ,he possesses the scientific facts on which to base valid judgments1 and he deduces from these facts the inferences that affect the most important problems of life--its culture and morality4 ,we have had occasion before1 to refer to these phases of ,carus ,sterne's activity as an author4 ,in the present work the author of ,werden und ,vergehen discusses the relations which obtain between nature and art4 ,here is not the place to give even a synopsis of the great wealth of material which this book of #cie pages contains2 we are allowed simply to hint at its purport and methods4 ,carus ,sterne defines the artistic impulse in man to be a longing of the mind to rise above the ordinary routine of physical existence4 ,it is a lifting ourselves out of our every-day life4 ,this cannot be accomplished by the simple reproduction of the things of nature2 such reproductions have not in themselves an elevating effect4 ,art is not imitative1 art is creative4 ,it uses color1 form1 space1 merely as a means to give 8local habitation0 to an idea4 ,the imitation of actually existing things is the beginning of art2 but it is its lowest stage4 ,nature must be our guide1 our norm1 not our model4 ,here the middle road is taken between the old and the new idea of art4 ,that was ultra-idealistic1 this is ultra-realistic4 ,the author then proceeds to discuss the notion of beauty in art and nature 7,part ,i7 and finally takes up generally 7,part ,,ii7 the subject of the artistic contemplation and reproduction of the world4 ,all these topics1 with their many subdivisions1 are treated in ,carus ,sterne's best and most fascinating style4 ,the work is well illustrated1 and all interested in the natural history of art will find in it a storehouse of valuable material4 4 ,,footnotes3 #eh ,cf4 ,ward1 ,encyclopdia ,britannica1 ,vol4 ,,xx1 p4 #dd4 ,,periodicals4 ,,zeitschrift ,f,r ,,psychologie ,,und ,,physiologie ,,der ,,sinnesorgane4 ,,contents3 ,vol4 ,,iv4 ,no4 #c4 ,,ueber ,,die ,,sogenannte ,,conscience ,,musculaire 7,,duchenne74 ,by ,a4 ,pick4 ,,eine ,,neue ,,theorie ,,der ,,lichtempfindungen4 ,by ,christine ,ladd-,franklin4 ,,litteraturbericht4 7,hamburg and ,leipsic3 ,leopold ,voss47 ,mrs4 ,christine ,ladd ,franklin 7a contributor to this number of ,the ,monist7 is one of those few women who have actually won a well deserved reputation as a thinker and scientific worker4 ,she is an ,american by birth and the wife of an ,american savant4 ,it is pleasant to find her name in a ,german periodical among whose editorial writers are men so prominent as ,ebbinghaus1 ,knig1 ,exner1 ,helmholtz1 ,hering1 ,kries1 ,lipps1 ,g4 ,e4 ,mller1 ,pelman1 ,preyer1 and ,stumpf4 ,mrs4 ,ladd criticises ,helmholtz and ,hering1 and thinks that the theories of ,donders 7in ,grfe's 8,archiv10 #ahhd7 and ,gller 7in ,du ,bois-,reymond's 8,archiv10 #ahhh7 have not received sufficient attention4 ,in accord with their propositions1 she sets forth an exceedingly simple hypothesis which attempts an explanation of the three main colors by atomic motions in the three different dimensions of space4 ,,philosophische ,,monatshefte4 ,,contents3 ,vol4 ,,xxviii4 ,nos4 #i and #aj4 ,,ueber ,,die ,,grundformen ,,der ,,vorstellungsverbindung4 ,psychologische ,studie4 7,concluded47 ,by ,m4 ,offner4 ,,der ,,begriff ,,der ,,verschmelzung ,,und ,,damit ,,zusammenh,,ngendes ,,in ,,stumpf',s 8,,tonpsychologie10 ,,band ,,ii4 ,by ,th4 ,lipps4 ,,werke ,,zur ,,philosophie ,,der ,,geschichte ,,und ,,des ,,socialen ,,lebens 7,third ,article3 ,j4 ,s4 ,mackenzie1 ,an ,introduction to ,social ,philosophy2 ,j4 ,h4 ,ferguson1 ,the ,philosophy of ,civilisation2 ,w4 ,a4 ,macdonald1 ,humanitism74 ,by ,f4 ,tnnies4 ,,contents3 ,vol4 ,,xxix4 ,no4 #a and #b4 ,,die ,,moderne ,,energetik ,,in ,,ihrer ,,bedeutung ,f,r ,,die ,,erkenntnisskritik4 ,by ,k4 ,lasswitz4 ,,die ,,sittliche ,,frage ,,eine ,,sociale ,,frage 7,i74 ,by ,f4 ,staudinger4 ,,religionsphilosophische ,,thesen4 ,by ,e4 von ,hartmann4 ,,litteraturbericht4 7,berlin3 ,dr4 ,r4 ,salinger47 ,,zeitschrift ,f,r ,,philosophie ,,und ,,philosophische ,,kritik4 ,vol4 #aja4 ,no4 #a4 ,,contents3 ,,psychologische ,,aphorismen4 ,by ,otto ,liebmann4 ,,unterhalb ,,und ,,oberhalb ,,von ,,gut ,,und ,b,,se4 ,by ,eduard von ,hartmann4 ,,jahresbericht ,,ber ,,erscheinungen ,,der ,,anglo-,,amerikanischen ,,litteratur ,,aus ,,der ,,zeit ,,von #ahij-ahia4 ,by ,friedrich ,jodl4 ,,zur ,,begr,,ssung ,,des ,,zweiten ,,hunderts ,,der ,b,,nde ,,dieser ,,zeitschrift4 ,by ,prof4 ,dr4 ,rud4 ,seydel4 ,,recensionen4 7,leipsic3 ,c4 ,e4 ,m4 ,pfeffer47 ,,the ,,american ,,journal ,,of ,,psychology4 ,october1 #ahib4 ,vol4 ,v4 ,no4 #a4 ,,contents3 ,,disturbance ,,of ,,the ,,attention ,,during ,,simple ,,mental ,,processes4 ,by ,edgar ,james ,swift4 ,,pseudo-,,chromesthesia1 ,,or ,,the ,,association ,,of ,,colors ,,with ,,words1 ,,letters1 ,,and ,,sounds4 ,by ,william ,o4 ,krohn1 ,ph4 ,d4 ,,report ,,on ,,an ,,experimental ,,test ,,of ,,musical ,,expressiveness4 7,part ,,ii47 ,by ,benjamin ,ives ,gilman4 ,the present investigation made by ,mr4 ,edgar ,james ,swift shows that a disturbance of the attention through sight is more effective in lengthening the reaction time than when the disturbance comes through the sense of hearing2 but whenever the reaction follows a slight sensation1 the time of choice is less affected by disturbances of the attention than if the excitation is a sound4 ,dr4 ,william ,o4 ,krohn concludes1 after carefully studying several hundred cases of pseudo-chromesthesia1 that a greater per cent4 of them arise from some sort of cerebral work due to the close relation of the cortical centres4 ,mr4 ,gilman concludes from experiments made with various persons1 that musical expressiveness has been overestimated1 and that on the emotional theory of its nature the importance of the art has also been overestimated4 7,worcester3 ,j4 ,h4 ,orpha47 ,,mind4 ,new ,series4 ,no4 #d4 ,october1 #ahib4 ,,contents3 ,,the ,,field ,,of ,,sthetics ,,psychologically ,,considered1 ,,ii4 ,by ,henry ,rutgers ,marshall4 ,,lotze',s ,,antithesis ,,between ,,thought ,,and ,,things1 ,,ii4 ,by ,a4 ,eastwood4 ,,the ,,study ,,of ,,crime4 ,by ,rev4 ,w4 ,d4 ,morrison4 ,,on ,,the ,,properties ,,of ,a ,,one-,,dimensional ,,manifold4 ,by ,benj4 ,ives ,gilman4 ,in his present article ,mr4 ,h4 ,r4 ,marshall finds a basis for the differentiation of sthetics from ,hedonics1 in 8pleasure permanency in revival0 as belonging particularly to the former4 ,mr4 ,eastwood criticises ,lotze's antithesis between thoughts and things which is closely connected with his erroneous opinion that time is a property of things in themselves4 ,the study of crime by ,mr4 ,w4 ,d4 ,morrison discusses crime under the three heads of the movement of crime1 its causes1 and its repression1 of which the last deals with the theory1 the methods1 and the efficacy of punishment4 ,in his discussion of the properties of a one-dimensional manifold1 examples of which are time1 the straight line1 quantity1 intensity1 number1 and pitch1 ,mr4 ,b4 ,i4 ,gilman1 who was a pupil of ,mr4 ,c4 ,s4 ,peirce1 seeks to give a formulation of one-dimensionality in which the general notion of relation and converse relation is substituted for that of greater and less difference4 ,this number of ,mind contains a voluminous note on the blind deaf-mute child1 ,helen ,keller1 by ,prof ,g4 ,c4 ,robertson1 the late editor1 whose death is announced in the same number4 7,london3 ,williams ,norgate47 4 ,,international ,,journal ,,of ,,ethics4 ,october1 #ahib4 ,vol4 ,,iii4 ,no4 #a4 ,,contents3 ,,the ,,national ,,traits ,,of ,,the ,,germans ,,as ,,seen ,,in ,,their ,,religion4 ,by ,prof4 ,otto ,pfleiderer1 ,d4 ,d41 ,university of ,berlin4 ,,philanthropy ,,and ,,morality4 ,by ,father ,huntington4 ,,international ,,quarrels ,,and ,,their ,,settlement4 ,by ,leonard ,h4 ,west1 ,,ll4 ,d41 ,london ,university4 #agib4--,,year #a4 ,by ,david ,g4 ,ritchie1 ,jesus ,college4 ,oxford4 ,,utilitarianism4 ,by ,a4 ,l4 ,hodder4 ,,book ,,reviews4 7,philadelphia3 ,international ,journal of ,ethics1 #aah ,s4 ,twelfth ,street47 ,,the ,,philosophical ,,review4 ,,contents3 ,vol4 ,i4 ,no4 #e4 ,,psychogenesis4 ,by ,president ,david ,j4 ,hill4 ,,the ,,problem ,,of ,,epistemology4 ,by ,professor ,andrew ,seth4 ,,the ,,origin ,,of ,,pleasure ,,and ,,pain1 7,,ii47 ,by ,dr4 ,herbert ,nichols4 ,,discussions3 ,,reality ,,and 8,,idealism40 ,by ,f4 ,c4 ,s4 ,schiller4 ,,reviews ,,of ,,books4 ,,summaries ,,of ,,articles4 ,,contents3 ,vol4 ,i4 ,no4 #f4 ,,green',s ,,theory ,,of ,,the ,,moral ,,motive4 ,by ,prof4 ,john ,dewey4 ,,thought ,,before ,,language4 ,by ,prof4 ,william ,james4 ,,pleasure-,,pain1 ,,and ,,sensation4 ,by ,henry ,rutgers ,marshall4 ,,reviews ,,of ,,books4 ,,summaries ,,of ,,articles4 7,boston4 ,new ,york1 ,chicago3 ,ginn ,company47 ,,the ,,new ,,world4 ,december1 #ahib4 ,vol4 ,i4 ,no4 #d4 ,,contents3 ,,the ,,brahmo ,,somaj4 ,by ,protap ,chunder ,mozoomdar4 ,,the ,,future ,,of ,,christianity4 ,by ,william ,m4 ,salter4 ,,progressive ,,orthodoxy4 ,by ,egbert ,c4 ,smyth4 ,,michael ,,servetus4 ,by ,joseph ,henry ,allen4 ,,the ,,present ,,position ,,of ,,the ,,roman ,,catholic ,,church4 ,by ,g4 ,santayana4 ,,the ,,church ,,in ,,germany ,,and ,,the ,,social ,,question4 ,by ,john ,graham ,brooks4 ,a ,,world ,,outside ,,of ,,science4 ,by ,thomas ,wentworth ,higginson4 ,,the ,,birth ,,and ,,infancy ,,of ,,jesus4 ,by ,albert ,rville4 ,,the ,,monistic ,,theory ,,of ,,the ,,soul4 ,by ,james ,t4 ,bixby4 ,the last article is a criticism to the point1 discriminating and fair4 ,the author takes special notice of ,dr4 ,carus's position1 whose views are recapitulated with accuracy1 but not accepted as convincing4 7,boston3 ,houghton1 ,mifflin1 ,co47 ,,revue ,,philosophique4 ,,contents3 ,september1 #ahib4 ,no4 #bja4 ,,la ,,personnalit ,,dans ,,les ,r,,ves4 ,by ,j4-4,m4 ,guardia4 ,,histoire ,,et ,,philosophie ,,religieuses4 ,by ,m4 ,vernes4 ,,sur ,,la ,,terminologie ,,philosophique4 ,by ,durand 7de ,gros74 ,,comptes ,,rendus ,,et ,,notices ,,bibliographiques4 ,,contents3 ,october1 #ahib4 ,no4 #bjb4 ,,du ,,trouble ,,des ,,facult,s ,,musicales ,,dans ,l',,aphasie4 ,by ,dr4 ,brazier4 ,,le ,d,,veloppement ,,de ,,la ,,volont4 7,concluded47 ,by ,a4 ,fouille4 ,,le ,,mouvement ,p,,dagogique4 ,by ,e4 ,blum4 ,,analyses ,,et ,,comptes ,,rendus4 ,,revues ,,des ,p,,riodiques ,,trangers4 ,,contents3 ,november1 #ahib4 ,no4 #bjc4 ,,la ,,psychologie ,,de ,w4 ,,james4 ,by ,l4 ,marillier4 ,,de ,l',,unit ,,de ,,la ,,science3 ,,les ,,grandes ,,synth,,ses ,,du ,,savoir4 ,by ,e4 de ,roberty4 ,,sur ,,les ,,diverses ,,formes ,,du ,,caract,,re4 ,by ,th4 ,ribot4 ,,vari,t,s4 ,,analyses ,,et ,,comptes ,,rendus4 ,,revue ,,des ,p,,riodiques ,,trangers4 7,paris3 ,flix ,alcan47 ,,philosophisches ,,jahrbuch4 ,vol4 ,v4 ,no4 #d4 ,,contents3 ,,die ,,neueste ,,phase ,,des ,,schopenhauerianismus4 7,concluded47 ,bumker4 ,,die ,,speculativen ,,grundlagen ,,der ,,optischen ,,wellentheorie4 7,concluded47 ,s4 ,j4 ,linsmeier4 ,,religion ,,und ,,entwickelungstheorie4 7,concluded47 ,schanz4 ,,der ,,substanzbegriff ,,bei ,,cartesius ,,im ,,zusammenhang ,,mit ,,der ,,scholastischen ,,und ,,neueren ,,philosophie4 7,continued47 ,s4 ,j4 7,c47 ,ludewig4 ,,recensionen ,,und ,,referate4 7,fulda3 ,fuldaer ,actien-,druckerei47 ,,vol4 ,,iii4 ,,april1 #ahic4 ,,no4 #c4 ,,the ,,monist4 ,,religion ,,and ,,modern ,,science4 ,i4 ,the ancient conflict between religion and science is now1 at the close of the nineteenth century1 more animated than ever before4 ,this conflict has formed the intellectual pivot of civilisation ever since ,christianity first afforded the western peoples of ,europe the inconsistent spectacle of a religion which made abundant use in its dogmatic constructions of the theories of contemporary science1 and yet assumed a hostile attitude towards the fundamental principle of all science1 the spirit of research and unbiassed judgment generally4 ,rightly has one of the acutest modern critics of ,christianity1 ,ludwig ,feuerbach1#ei maintained1 that the ,christian sophistic philosophy is the necessary outcome of this inconsistency1 which proclaims as absolute truth a definite1 historical revelation1 such as is found in the ,bible1 and simply assigns to the reason the subordinate and improper office of harmonising and defending what is there laid down4 ,there are1 it is true1 a great number of people1 who are not disposed to see the bitterness of the conflict now raging4 ,it has become customary for us to look upon the nineteenth century as an age of the comprehension of religion1 and to distinguish it from the eighteenth century1 which is regarded as a period of mere religious criticism4 ,we boast of having rediscovered religion1 and of having secured to it a permanent province in the dominion of the mind4 ,but the facts of our public life stand in curious contradiction to these assertions4 ,in all civilised nations1 in literature1 in parliamentary procedures1 in all questions that relate to religious and moral life or to education1 the attentive observer will find that a profound chasm divides humanity4 ,every one feels the desirableness of bridging over this chasm1 that the members of society may be united in common labor2 but again and again we are made to experience how irreconcilable the respective claims of the opposed parties are4 ,he who has studied the bulls and encyclical letters of the last two popes1 ,pius ,,ix4 and ,leo ,,xiii41 and the commentaries on these utterances in the ,civilt ,cattolica1 the official organ of the curia2 he who is acquainted with the polemical diatribes of the ,french ,catholics against the positivists and freethinkers1 and against the school and church legislation of the third republic2 he who has any knowledge of that mass of controversial literature1 which the proclamation of the doctrine of papal infallibility in the year #ahgj evoked2 he who has followed the eventful and varied history of the so-called 8,culturkampf0 in the ,german ,empire1 from the era of the minister ,falk1 down to the recent bill for a new ,school-law in ,prussia1 defeated amidst the greatest excitement in all parts of ,germany2 he who is the least bit at home in the literary feuds which are being fought out in the domain of historical theology concerning the validity and credibility of the original sources of ,christianity2 he1 finally1 who will place the writings of ,cardinal ,newman or of the ,jesuits ,pesch and ,cathrein by the side of those of ,huxley and ,spencer1 by the side of those of ,du ,bois-,reymond1 ,strauss1 and ,dhring3 he1 ,i say1 who has gone through with a critical spirit all that ,i have cited in the preceding sentences1 will surely not be apt to contradict this assertion of mine that civilised humanity to-day is separated into two groups which no longer understand each other1 which do not speak the same language1 and which live in totally different worlds of thought and sentiment--at least so far as this one critical point is concerned of man's relation to religion4 8,wie ,ja und ,nein sind sie1 ,wie ,sturm und ,regenbogen40 ,have we1 then1 learned nothing and forgotten nothing since the days of rationalism8 ,the tremendous labors which our own century has devoted to the investigation of religion in all its forms1 to the unfolding of its connection with racial mind and sentiment1 and of its relation to civilisation generally1 and finally to the elucidation of the origin and development of the great forms of religion3 has all this had no other result than that we1 after a century of the most laborious research1 again find ourselves in the same attitude of unintelligent hostility towards religion and ,christianity in which the eighteenth century revelled1 and out of which we have only fought our way by the united efforts of a host of profoundly enlightened minds8 ,this argument has been advanced in opposition to the leaders of the rationalistic movement and to the work of the eighteenth century in varying forms1 by the party which seeks to ally the science of the present and the religion of the past4 ,it is seriously said and enjoined that only they who are far behind the science of the times and hold aloof from the true spirit of the age can still assume the repugnant attitude toward religion which was characteristic of the mind of the eighteenth century4 ,it is high time to point out the crude confusion of ideas which lies at the basis of this argument4 ,it confounds the historical understanding of a thing with the philosophical approval of it4 ,but these are two totally distinct things4 ,we understand a phenomenon historically1 when we are clear in our minds concerning the external conditions and habits of thought of humanity from which it sprung2 when its main-springs of action and its purposes1 as well as the effects which have proceeded from it1 are distinctly traceable4 ,the more closely our mental pictures of these things correspond to the facts as they actually were at the origin1 and the more they conduct us from the mere surface of phenomena into the secrets of their psychological and sociological connection1 and teach us to understand these things as products of mind and of society1 the higher will our historical knowledge of them be rated4 ,in this sense the knowledge which the eighteenth century had of religious phenomena was undoubtedly very imperfect4 ,true1 even here great advances beyond the age which preceded1 are noticeable4 ,people had ceased to regard the origin of the ,jewish and ,christian religion as a supernatural event and as the immediate work of ,god2 all religions were placed upon the same footing1 as species of the same kind2 and efforts were made to discover their common characteristics and the law of their origin4 ,but the people of that period were not yet able to arrive at the true essence of religious ideas and sentiments4 ,they were hardly in a position to describe them properly1 let alone to explain them4 ,of the hypotheses devised to throw some light into the darkness that hung over the beginnings of religions1 not one proved itself competent to supply what was hoped for4 ,all that they could derive from these fictions was that notable caricature of religion which their age had directly before its eyes1 and to free themselves from which they strained every nerve4 ,with the keen vision of hate they uncovered all the infirmities of religion1 all the terrors and iniquities which have followed in its train1 all the injurious effects to civilisation which have proceeded from it4 ,they created a negative picture of religion1 which has lost nothing of its partial historical truth by the fact that many of its features are farther withdrawn from our immediate experience than they were from that of the times in question4 ,but it was the nineteenth century that first worked out the true psychology of religious man1 and again came into possession of that spirit of congeniality which is absolutely necessary to our entering into the mental life of far-distant times4 ,to the men of the rationalistic age the history of religion was simply the history of the obscuration of the pure1 natural religion1 which was supposed to be constituted of a rational idea of ,god and a system of humane ethics1 and which was indistinctly conceived at times as the logical1 and at times as the historical1 antecedent of the concrete religions4 ,the latter appeared as the corruption of the natural and simple order of things--a corruption produced by superstition1 by the wily exploitation of human credulity and human needs1 by the scheming machinations of the founders of religions and of priests1 by human delight in the marvellous1 by the falsification of the natural moral sentiments1 and by the stirring into life of fanatical passions4 ,we know to-day that this so-called natural religion is nothing more than a product of late abstraction and reflection2 that the motives and selfish interests above cited have been abundantly at work in religious history1 but are nevertheless unable to explain the internal motive force and tremendous vitality of these spiritual products4 ,we know to-day that religions spring with the same necessity and in conformity with similar laws from the depths of the human mind as language and art1 and that they form an integral constituent part of the structure of civilisation and an important weapon of humanity in the struggle for existence4 ,in symbolical form they embody the highest treasures and highest ideals of national existence2 in its gods humanity beholds the imaginative perfection and explanation of its view of the world2 and in its religious practices1 in its worship1 in prayer1 it strives to realise the wishes and aspirations which seem to lie beyond the reach of its powers4 ,many a riddle still remains to be solved1 as is natural in a domain that extends into the most hidden recesses of the human soul1 and whose obscurity is augmented by the fact that in the majority of cases the most important and significant elements must be collected with infinite pains from the rubbish of fantastic traditions4 ,but upon the whole the active labors of a century which calls itself with pride 8the historical century10 have borne their fruits4 ,with respect to the intrinsic character and the significance of religion for civilisation1 there is now every reason why a unity of opinion should prevail among all who take their stand on the common ground of modern scientific research1 whether they be friends or opponents of religion4 ,but how does a knowledge of what religion has been in the past affect our estimate of it in the present8 ,do we approve of an institution or phenomenon1 because we understand how it was once possible1 nay1 must have existed1 and what it signified8 ,we understand to-day the ,roman law1 the ,ptolemaic astronomy1 the scholastic philosophy1 feudalism1 and absolute monarchy1 thoroughly2 we know the conditions which gave rise to them1 the necessity of their appearance1 and the measure of their performances2 but does it occur to us1 for these reasons1 to perpetuate and make them immortal because they had once an historical significance8 ,what an institution in its essence is1 what in past times it has accomplished1 is an inquiry that must be conducted with quite different means from that whether it is applicable to a definite present set of relations and necessities4 ,the historian can render this task more easy by teaching us to understand the general laws and necessities of national life from the analogies of the past2 but as a prophet he will always be one that looks backwards1 and it is ever to be feared that he1 too1 will see the present in the light of the past4 ,for to him alone does the past lift its obscuring veil1 who1 forgetful of self and unmindful of sacrifices1 can listen to the voices of remote times and peoples1 who with a mind of ,protean cast has the power to transform his intellectual being into that to which1 solely by description1 he seeks to give new life and form4 ,the past becomes a part of him2 he loves it1 he admires it4 ,and from the reanimation of the past in historical pictures to the attempt of a renewal of it in life is but a single step4 ,innumerable are those who have succumbed to this temptation4 ,the entire religious tendency of the nineteenth century exhibits this process on a grand scale4 ,this tendency is based on profound antiquarian studies of the past--on that newly awakened historical interest1 which aims not only to criticise but to understand religion and ecclesiastical institutions4 ,much that in the previous century seemed dead or destined to perish1 had been restored to life by it4 ,the whole historical structure of the ,christian religion1 which at the close of the age of rationalism only existed1 it would seem1 as an artificially preserved ruin1 has received1 through the instrumentality of these methods of thought1 new supports1 and has again been made habitable for the human mind4 ,unmindful of the complaints of churchmen1 the future historian of civilisation will have to characterise the second half of the nineteenth century as a period of religious renaissance4 ,and it is no accident1 but a symptom of deep import1 that this century has completed almost all the great cathedrals which were left unfinished and in partial ruins by the middle ages1 and placed them in their colossal grandeur before the world as lasting monuments of its habits and tendencies of thought4 ,yet the spirit of science has also not been inactive4 ,political progress has freed it from the despotic police supervision which even in the eighteenth century heavily oppressed it4 ,in principle at least1 freedom of thought and inquiry are to-day acknowledged by all governments1 with the single exception of the ,roman curia1 although in practice there are by no means few efforts made1 by influencing its representatives1 to have that proclaimed which it is desired should be proclaimed4 ,infinitely great has the number of workers grown1 the instruments of inquiry1 the confidence of the human mind in itself1 and our power generally4 ,and if formerly people could conceive of no other science than such as stood in the service of the church1 to-day science claims it most emphatically and confidently as its privilege and duty to search and test the logical truth of the most sacred traditions1 and thus to base the thought of future generations1 not on the nave faith of their fathers1 but on the demonstrable truths of actual present knowledge4 ,,ii4 ,between the two groups of modern humanity1 of which the one seeks to retain the ,christian religion in its historical form as the precious1 heritage of the past1 and the other to supplant it by a new ,idealism formed in harmony with the spirit of science1 a third class stands1 which plays the part of a mediator4 ,this class concedes that the traditional forms of religion are in great part unadapted to the modern mind1 and that historical ,christianity is in need of improvement1 but contends that religion is an ineradicable constituent of all higher civilisation1 and must remain so1 and1 particularly1 that ,christianity is the absolute religion1 that is to say1 that in ,christianity as rightly understood and naturally developed all the necessary elements of the true religion of the future are contained4 ,i should like1 in the following pages1 to subject the contentions of this mediatory group to a critical examination1 and to discuss the question whether it is at all possible for one who resolutely takes his stand on the ground of modern scientific thought1 logically to have religion in the historical sense at all4 ,in effecting a mediation between the religious and scientific views of the world1--views which appear to be separated from each other by a profound intellectual abyss1--two ways may1 generally speaking1 be pursued4 ,both have been frequently trodden since the days of rationalism4 ,i shall discuss each separately4 ,the attempt may be made to resume1 in a form more adapted to modern times1 the work of the reformers of the sixteenth century2 to go back even more thoroughly than they did to the original and simplest forms of ,christianity1 to remove in toto the superstructure which has been reared upon it in the course of time1 and to exhibit to humanity 8the pure doctrine of ,christ0 as the source from which to-day1 as a thousand years ago1 true comfort may proceed1 as the simplest1 purest1 and most exalted expression of the divine and human that has ever yet been discovered4 ,many of the most erudite workers in the field of critical theology which this century can show have placed themselves in the service of this idea1 which is preached with particular enthusiasm by the so-called 8free-religious0 and ,unitarian confessions1 and which at times has also exhibited a noble and conciliatory activity in the homiletical work of some mild-minded and liberal clergymen in the evangelical churches4 ,but our special inquiry here must be concerning the logical and scientific foundation of this modernised primitive ,christianity1 and on this point it must be frankly stated that the more faithfully such a ,christianity reflects the biblical character1 the remoter it is from our modern thought1 and the more it is dominated by modern ways of thinking1 the more unhistorical and hence the more unchristian it becomes4 ,the 8pure doctrine of ,christ10 the genuine1 primitive form of ,christianity1 is a ,utopia of biblical criticism4 ,what we actually possess1 in the form of historical documents1 is that conception of the doctrines and life of ,christ which was put in writing several generations after his death1 and which1 from amid a much greater number of contemporaneous attempts1 met by preference with the approbation of the church4 ,it is a hopeless task to attempt from these late records1 which betray the most various intellectual influences1 to derive the authentic doctrines of the oldest form of ,christianity4 ,no method1 subjective prepossession only1 can here render a verdict4 ,the things that appear especially consistent and homogeneous to individual theologians and critics are stamped as the genuine utterances of the ,master4 ,as every time has done1 so ours also constructs its picture of ,christ to conform with its wishes and wants4 ,but granting even that there is nothing objectionable in this1 and that this procedure is perfectly justified1 a number of difficulties still stand in the way of this movement which have stamped the procedure of even the most ingenious of its representatives as the outcome of pure subjective caprice4 ,all the written sources which we possess of the life and teachings of ,christ contain much that is in the highest degree repugnant to the modern mind4 ,i refer particularly to the miracles4 ,the difficulties which they present may be disposed of in various ways2 as1 to give an example1 by the method of the early rationalistic thinkers1 who accepted the miracles as facts1 but sought to give them a rational explanation1 or by that of ,strauss1 who held that they were the mythical and poetical raiment of religious ideas and sentiments4 ,yet no art of interpretation will banish from the world that fact which the poet expressed in the words3 8,das ,wunder ist des ,glaubens liebstes ,kind40 ,the fact that the entire cast of thought and sentiment of early ,christianity is saturated with the belief in the marvellous1 and with the expectations1 nay1 with the actual need of miracles1 and that this is not an adscititious ornament which can be doffed at pleasure1 like a dress which we have outgrown1 but is of the very essence of ,christianity4 ,here is rooted that childlike and simple belief in the limitless and ,god-coercing power of prayer1 for which no natural laws nor force of necessity exists1 which is omnipotent as the ,godhead itself1 and as all-powerful as desire4 ,here is rooted that ardent conviction of the near collapse of the entire world1 of the coming kingdom of perfection which shall proceed1 not from deeds and thought1 but from faith and grace1 and shall crown all human desires with glory4 ,and intimately connected with all this stands the idea1 visible in the background of all the moral prescripts of the gospels1 and painted in the strongest colors1 of a system of punishments and rewards in the world beyond2 which makes of a ,god of love1 a pitiless1 infuriate ,god of vengeance4 ,these things are so intimately interwoven with the modes of thought of the synoptic writers that it is impossible to separate them therefrom without doing violence to the internal connection of their doctrines4 ,they who seek after a more spiritual conception may1 it is true1 find it in the gospel of ,john4 ,but this book is so completely dominated by the metaphysical-religious speculation of the second century1 and by the effort to bring the history of the life and doctrines of the ,nazarene in the service of the ,logos idea1 that the modern mind can only with great difficulty find a common ground of understanding with it4 ,the task of the modern reformers is1 for these reasons1 a very difficult one4 ,they cannot but concede that ,christianity1 even in its purely evangelical form1 contains much that is foreign to us1 and that the elements of which it is composed must in part be excised and in part improved by criticism and interpretation4 ,but the more the critical sense which is brought to bear upon this task is developed in the spirit of modern scientific thought1 the more will historical ,christianity shrink to the form of a mere colorless abstraction1 and ultimately nothing remains of its exuberant yet visionary mental world but the picture of a philanthropic life joined to a strongly developed consciousness of ,god1 which proclaims a popular morality in commandments and parables4 ,but even this latter is inevitably exposed to the same fate as the other ideas4 ,it is dominated throughout by the extremest notions of rewards and punishments1 which the expectation of the doom of the world places in the very immediate future4 ,it is impossible to take the system as a whole1 and it must be made the subject of violent interpretation to acquire any fitness for the needs of modern life4 ,its principles are systematically turned and twisted till they have acquired in some direction practical utility4 ,and who at this day can forget1 that this system of morality1 wherever and whenever attempts have been made literally and faithfully to imitate it in practical life1 has led only to wretched caricatures8 ,moreover1 it is again and again freely remodelled in the spirit of modern ethics1 its offensive elements charitably cloaked1 its useful ones developed to the utmost1 and finally here too a complete set of wholly modern ideas consecrated by the borrowed authority of a venerable antiquity4 ,and therefore ,i repeat my contention1 that the modern reformation1 this modern1 pure1 and scriptural ,christianity1 will1 the honester it is1 all the more surely lead its adherents away from ,scripture and from ,christianity and ultimately bring them to the adoption of a popularly expounded1 but philosophically established1 ethical system4 ,i shall now take up the second of the two methods above mentioned4 ,that which we have just considered was known and affected even by the eighteenth century4 ,the discovery of the second is a merit of the present time4 ,the honor belongs in a pre-eminent degree to the speculative philosophy of ,germany1 and to the intimate relations with theology which this philosophy1 especially in the school of ,hegel and ,schleiermacher1 entered into in the first half of the century4 7,kant's philosophy was not put to similar use until later47 ,all these movements1 whose rich literary ramifications and development may be followed to the present day in ,otto ,pfleiderer's excellent and erudite work1 8,the ,history of ,protestant ,theology in ,germany ,since ,kant10#fj have also begun in recent times1 through ,green1 ,caird1 ,a4 ,seth1 ,j4 ,martineau1 ,r4 ,flint1 and ,f4 ,robertson1 to exert an influence on ,anglo-,american intellectual life4 ,the common fundamental feature of this second movement is1 that it proposes to accept as pure ,christianity1 not only the most ancient forms of ,christian doctrine accessible to us1 but also the entire system of dogmatic thoughts which in the course of the centuries primitive ,christianity has produced4 ,christianity1 these men say1 has historically existed and acted in these maturer notions4 ,it is not permissible arbitrarily to separate them from it1 and to reverse by any authoritative edicts the real historical development4 ,on the contrary1 we now may and must continue the process which1 by the tenor of dogmatic history1 is the process which has continued for centuries1 and give to the dogmas the form which best accords with modern spiritual needs4 ,to-day as in the days of incipient ,christianity1 we see by the side of the nave literal belief1 which takes no offence at incomprehensible things if they only suit the needs of its heart1 a gnosis arise which strives to reconcile faith and knowledge1 religion and intellectual culture2 a gnosis which to the unbelieving sceptic quotes the words of the poet3 8,die ,geisterwelt ist nicht verschlossen2 ,dein ,sinn ist zu2 dein ,herz ist todt6 ,auf6 bade1 ,schler1 unverdrossen ,die ird'sche ,brust im ,morgenroth60 ,it is perhaps even more difficult to give a succinct and comprehensive notion of the ideas of this speculative theology1 than of the results of the ,new ,testament exegesis of which we spoke above4 ,all gradations are here represented1 from tender1 conservative regard for the traditional beliefs of the sects and the needs of the pious heart to the boldest speculative interpretations and critical restrictions of dogma1 which utterly discard the historical form and hold fast only to a central germinal truth4 ,the present inquiry will restrict itself to those representatives of this gnosis1 who as a matter of principle grant the greatest field of action to the rational development of dogma1 and represent its philosophical elaboration in its finest and most complicated form4 ,i shall attempt to signalise the ideas which may to-day be designated as the most spiritualised expression of the ,christian view of the world4 ,and first let us hear a greater mind speak4 ,in ,ludwig ,feuerbach's essays on the nature of religion and ,christianity the following sentences occur3 8,the ,christian religion is the revealed inwardness1 the objectively expressed self of man2 the contents of his highest aspirations2 the essence of man purified and freed from the limitations of individuality2 yet all subjectivised1 that is intuited1 known1 and worshipped as a separate1 independent entity1 wholly distinct from himself4 ,religion is essentially dramatical4 ,god himself is a dramatical creation1 that is to say1 a personal being opposed to man4 ,he who takes from religion this idea1 takes from it the gist of its being1 and holds but the caput mortuum in his hands40 ,these sentences of ,feuerbach express with the greatest generality and precision the innermost nature of the ,christian view of the world4 ,they characterise excellently the point that cannot be given up without destroying the religious view as such4 ,what ,i refer to is dualism1 the dualism of the divine and the human1 of the world beyond1 and the world that is1 of holiness and sin2 dualism conceived not merely as a mode of view and of conceptual distinction1 as a working contrariety in things that by their nature are one1 but as a metaphysical difference1 an actual contraposition of two worlds1 of two kingdoms of existence1 which are totally separate1 no matter how extensive the relations of the one to the other may be4 ,only on such a supposition is that possible which ,feuerbach1 with inimitable aptness1 called 8the dramatic element0 of religion4 ,the history of humanity1 the history of its religious life particularly1 is no monologue of humanity with itself into which life and advancement enter solely through the multitude of the ideas created by individuals within the race itself4 ,it is an action or process in a higher sense1 an interactivity between two worlds1 in which1 it is true1 humanity1 to a certain extent1 shapes its own fortunes and destiny1 but at the same time is also constantly exposed to the interferences of a power which stands beyond and above it and to which it has to accommodate itself4 ,and whatever artifices and care many of the representatives of the modern gnosis may employ to conceal this fundamental assumption1 and to substitute for it the point of view of the immanence of this power in the world1 still any radical breach with it is impossible without endangering the very foundations of the religious sense of humanity itself4 ,the indispensability of this dualistic opposition and separation is equally well exhibited whether we take as our starting-point the existence of the world at large or the individual consciousness of man4 ,the religious mode of view knows of no other way of asserting the rights and activity of the mind in the ,all than by making all existence assume a personal life in an infinite1 self-conscious1 and ethically perfect being4 ,the emotions and experiences of one's heart1 its vacillations between humility and exaltation1 remorse at the consciousness of one's own imperfections1 the inspired flight of the soul to higher realms of existence1 appear as the intercourse of man with some extraneous power1 allied to man and yet above him1 in which the sum of all excellence to which thought and experience have ever led man1 has its eternal source4 ,these ideas constitute the point of view which is decisive of the history of humanity1 particularly in what concerns religion4 ,the history of religion is1 in accordance with these ideas1 conceived as a continuous self-revelation of ,god in the world of man4 ,true1 this view seems to be contradicted by the fact that the self-revelation of this infinitely good power is effected in the case of by far the greater part of mankind in a very insufficient manner--in the form1 namely1 of crude and superstitious notions which stand in need of constant purification by reason4 ,but the explanation of this fact is sought in the idea of a divine pedagogical training of the human race1 and in the theory that religion is not an immediate self-revelation of the absolute1 but passes through the medium of the human mind and consequently must be conditioned by its character4 ,christianity1 now1 especially appears as the highest form of this self-revelation of ,god in humanity1 that is to say as the absolute religion1 which1 in its historical forms1 it is true1 is as little free from adscititious ornaments and transient obscurations as other religions1 yet in its essence can be as little improved as it can be discarded4 ,this innermost essence of ,christianity the majority of the representatives of this modern gnosis declare to be the conviction that all men are from the beginning children of ,god4 ,in this idea two things are contained3 submission to the will of ,god who is conceived as a kind parent and who in pity and love does everything for the best2 and the imitation in our own thought and conduct of the ethical perfection conceived incarnate in ,god4 ,the entering of man into this relation is designated the kingdom of ,god--a notion which constitutes the ideal goal of history4 ,the condition of mind on which the kingdom of ,god rests is prefigured in a typical manner in the founder of the ,christian religion4 ,his person and his life are a guarantee of the possibility of this ideal1 and exhibit at the same time the means of its accomplishment3 namely1 the helping love of ,god1 which has infused into this one individual the whole plenitude of its being1 so far as this is at all possible with human capacities1 that humanity may have in it a direct living picture of the highest fulfilment of its religious and moral destiny4 ,the historical ,christ is the ideal of humanity1 supported and ensouled by the spirit of ,god4 ,the modern gnosis here goes back to the ,paulinian interpretation of the ,christ-idea4 ,the consideration of the speculative difficulties of the idea of the ,trinity is thus rendered superfluous for it4 ,this notion is treated by the majority of its representatives simply as a dogmatic antiquity2 its place is taken by the modern ideas of a distinction between the person of ,jesus and the principle or spirit of ,christianity1 which is synonymous with the contrast of the idea and its revelation1 the eternal and the temporal1 of the inward essence and its historical realisation4 ,that it employs the notions of idea1 principle1 and essence wholly in a ,platonic sense1 as the highest metaphysical realities1 is self-evident4 ,more distant still is the attitude which this speculative theology assumes towards another idea which proceeded from the ,rabbinical school of thought of ,paul3 the notion of salvation or redemption in its connection with the expiatory death of ,christ4 ,from these conceptions of punitive suffering1 of a vicarious atonement of ,god in his own person--conceptions of such juristical refinement as to be wholly unacceptable to modern modes of thought--the modern gnosis has upon the whole resolutely turned away and taken refuge in that more spiritual and more profound idea which in early ,christian times the author of the gospel of ,st4 ,john promulgated4 ,the death of ,christ is redemptive only in the sense in which ,christ's total history is redemptive1 as the direct and prefigurative incarnation of the true religious relation between ,god and man4 ,this is1 it is true1 applicable in a quite special sense to the ,death2 for it was by this that the eternal truth was manifested1 that not only does all salvation accrue to man from the sacrifice of his own self in duteous and patient love1 but that all the life of ,god is an emanation of this self-surrendering excellence1 of this bliss of self-sacrifice4 ,still1 there is one thing that is common to all the representatives of this movement as distinguished from the former1 and that is this3 they do not content themselves with picturing the activity of ,jesus ,christ in general outlines solely as one which is blessed and significant by example and doctrine for humanity1 but they assume a continuous and active presence of the ,christian principle in humanity1 by means of which the moral discord in individuals is overcome1 and in the personal spiritual life of individuals divine and human nature are united4 ,this is the most speculative interpretation we have of the old dogmatic notion of redemption1 which from its original character as a single isolated phenomenon of history has here become the constant activity of a ,christian principle1 and an ever-living precedent of ,christian life4 ,it would be a prolix and wearisome task to go through in this way the whole dogmatism of this speculative theology4 ,the fundamental ideas which we have discussed will suffice to show the manner in which1 on the one hand1 it spiritualised the allegorical notions of popular ,christianity1 but on the other left untouched the gist of the religious view and the dramatical or dualistic opposition of the divine and human4 ,the notions of grace and sanctification1 the notion of the church as a living1 organised instrument of salvation1 spring directly and logically from these fundamental ideas4 ,in the province of ethics this movement has a much easier task than the churches based on the ,new ,testament4 ,as it seeks to establish1 not a primitive ,christianity1 but a modernised ,christianity developed in the spirit of recent times1 there is no necessity of its being incommoded by the ethical crudenesses of early ,christianity1 but it is in the same position to work these crudenesses over critically as it did the asperities of the old dogmas4 ,it can assimilate most of what it needs from modern philosophical ethics1 and content itself with giving to what it has thus borrowed a metaphysically religious background derived from dogmatic traditions4 ,that this modern gnosis is in a constant state of vacillation with respect to the practical things of life1 is a necessary consequence of its fundamental assumptions and of its position towards the doctrines of the church4 ,its foremost representatives acknowledge without any reserve that the true source from which religious emotions and sentiments flow is the symbolic or imaginative faculty of man4 ,the grandly simple pictures in which the ancient ,christian faith found satisfaction are now in the course of time inevitably disintegrated by the critical reason4 ,the speculative theology itself proclaims that its vocation is one of coperation towards this end4 ,but it maintains nevertheless that the fruits of this work1 the speculative interpretation of the dogmas1 their exaltation into the sphere of the ,idea1 are fit only for initiated minds1 and are caviare for the general4 ,the general1 the people1 want and will use religion in the form which its fancy has created1 and it cannot be revealed to it in any other4 ,progressive in its theories1 this gnosis is in its ecclesiastical practice thoroughly conservative4 ,it thinks two kinds of thought1 and speaks two kinds of languages1 according as it finds itself in the pulpit or in the professorial chair4 ,and it is in just this procedure that it assumes a position which it is very difficult to attack4 ,he1 who working for a sound and progressive popular enlightenment on the ground of a unitary view of the world1 opposes the further use of the antiquated and effete allegories of the old religions1 is told that he is behind the times1 and that religion1 nurtured by the spirit of modern science1 has become something different from what it formerly was4 ,in very strict ecclesiastical quarters this gnosis is looked at askance1 and accused of insincerity1 nay1 of secret alliance with unbelief2 but the movement never allowed itself to be led astray by these accusations1 and has never failed to assert its right of coperation in the common work of the ,christian church4 ,for though it pretends to be in the hands of the thinking theologian a means of bringing into harmony the faith which he must confess and the thought which he cannot abandon1 it yet admits1 that with the majority of mankind the allegory will always remain an essential element of religion1 and that therefore the task of scientific theology can never be to destroy these vessels of religion1 but only to exercise a watchful care1 that with the form the spirit also may not be lost4 ,,iii4 ,the question now arises1--and this brings us back to the considerations of the first part of this essay1--,does this rationalised ,christianity of to-day really meet the demands of science1 and if it does not1 is it in the power of the modern scientific world-conception to furnish from its own resources some substitute for the religious views of the past8 ,my answer to this question will be short and concise2 for the existence of ,the ,monist1 the fundamental idea of its management1 and the total character of the efforts which it has hitherto made1 speak with sufficient emphasis4 ,and we may1 therefore1 with the greatest respect for the scientific zeal and the personal ability of many of the representatives of this mediatory theology1 say1 without further ado3 ,this rationalised ,christianity of yours also is myth and symbol2 it still adheres to that 8dramatic0 division of the world which our imaginations produced1 and to the metaphysical dualism of ,god and man2 it cannot lift itself to a rigorous conception of the ,all in ,one1 for which ,god is in the same sense a simple function of human thought as thought is a function of the human organism4 ,the ,god on whom all depends in religion1 the ,god whose name is 8,father10 the ,god of love and goodness1 the ,god from whom all great thoughts and all grand resolves spring1 the ,god who sanctifies us and lifts us above the earth--to displace this ,god from the world in which he has no place1 into the inward being of humanity seems at this day so strange1 nay1 inconceivable1 only because we have accustomed ourselves 7and down to the times of ,mill and ,feuerbach1 even strict monistic thinkers like ,spinoza fell victims to this illusion7 to mingle together in the idea of ,god two wholly distinct ideas--the ideas1 namely1 of nature and of an ethical ideal4 ,to preserve this latter inviolate1 and to secure it from all encroachments of human caprice1 one thing alone seemed to the nave dramatic modes of thought of early times a competent safeguard3 the ideal must in some locality be real2 the highest to which human thought and aspiration can exalt itself must be sought and must exist in some superhuman reality4 ,and what reality could be better adapted to this than one on which even nature was conceived to be dependent8 ,the entire history of the development of the idea of ,god in the ,grco-,roman and ,hebrew worlds1 the confluence of these two streams of thought in ,christian speculation1 exhibit in the clearest possible manner these motives1 which here ,i can only lightly touch upon4 ,but this combination of the law of nature and the law of ethics in the idea of ,god1 although solving some of the difficulties of humanity1 has plunged it into incomparably greater ones4 ,through all the centuries of ,christian thought a succession of desperate attempts may be traced to establish a theodicy1 that is to say1 attempts to demonstrate the existence in nature and in history of a ,god which harmonises with the ethical ideal4 ,even ,kant could undertake to demonstrate the 8necessary failure of all attempts at a theodicy10 and whoever might still have entertained any doubt as to the correctness of this demonstration1 such a one must surely have been convinced of it by the scientific development of the past century4 ,that which was indissolubly welded together in the ,christian idea of ,god is to-day disintegrated into its component elements4 ,the ,lord above nature1 the ,spirit behind nature1 have been rendered inconceivable by the modern notions of the conformity to law of all natural occurrences and of the unity of all existence4 ,the spirit immanent in the ,all no thinker will deny1 for this spirit manifests itself in an indisputable manner in the fact that this ,all is a cosmos1 not a chaos1 that not only the caprice of chance but also the laws of necessity rule in it1 and that the personal self-conscious mind springs from its midst4 ,but from this recognition of mind in the ,all1 there is no bridge that leads to the old idea of ,god4 ,we cannot worship the ,all as a moral ideal4 ,we involve ourselves in absurd complications when we attempt to derive the actions of natural events and their conformity to law from ethical categories1 and it is no less a desperate undertaking to imagine that we can draw impulses for our moral thought and conduct from nature4 ,the adaptation of means to ends1 the teleology1 that rules in the ,all1 is veiled for us in the deepest obscurity4 ,all that we can unravel of it has no resemblance to that which1 according to our notions1 is ethical3 8,denn unfhlend ist die ,natur10 she does not know what love or mercy is2 she knows only the omnipotent power of universal laws2 she knows only the rights of the whole1 to which she sacrifices with unconcern the individual2 she revels in the double pleasure of unceasing creation and unceasing destruction2 she arms unpityingly the strong against the weak2 in crises of annihilation she restores the disturbed equilibrium of things2 but the palm of peace no one has ever seen in her hand4 ,and we8 ,we stand amazed at her might and greatness1 at the plentitude of her powers of creation1 at her myriad play of forces1 at the inexhaustible wealth of the relations with which she binds being to being1 creates and mediates contrarieties1 and amidst the most varied change and alternation1 ever remains one and the same6 ,but our prototype1 our ,god1 she can never be4 ,to him we must look up2 but on nature1 despite her might1 despite her stupendous grandeur1 we look down4 ,she did not whisper in our ears that in us which is best and highest4 ,that did not come to us from heaven2 we ourselves won it by hard struggles1 by terribly severe1 self-imposed discipline4 ,it is not of nature2 it is above nature4 ,through us something has come into the world that before us did not exist--something that the most exuberant creative magic1 or nature's grandest mechanical dreams1 could never replace4 ,the day on which first a human being pressed his weaker fellow-man to his breast and said1 8,brother1 not mine1 but thy will be done2 ,i will give up my desires that thou also mayst be glad02 the day on which man first lifted up his head and said1 8,let us make the world good in the likeness of the picture that has become living in us1 just as it should be02 this is the great and sanctified day in the history of our race on earth1 the ,christmas day on which ,god was born4 ,but not as the religious fancy has expressed it1 the day on which ,god became man1 but the day on which man began to become ,god1 that is the day on which he began to feel spiritual powers in his breast that transcended his animal impulses--powers to which the majority of humanity was still as remote as heaven from earth4 ,this strict anthropological conception of ,god as the ideal which is always newly creating itself in the struggles of humanity1 which is no ,being but a ,becoming1 solves the innumerable difficulties which the idea of ,god has hitherto placed in the way of rigorous scientific knowledge and the construction of a unitary conception of the world4 ,this ,god has nothing to do with the ,all4 ,we need not seek him in the ,all or behind the ,all1 and need not fear that any progress of our knowledge will make his existence a matter of doubt with us4 ,concerning the real validity of this idea we need not bother ourselves with more or less weak and insufficient demonstrations3 the whole history of humanity is evidence of it if we but know how to rightly interpret it1 and the stumbling block of the old theological idea of ,god has become the corner-stone upon which the new scientific conception is built4 ,nature and human history the work of an omnipotent and all-kind being that is mediately and immediately active in all events1 nay1 sacrificed himself in his own person that he might realise in this world his purposes6 ,compare the principle1 the active force of this world-drama1 pictured by the religious fancy as the highest power1 the highest wisdom1 and all-merciful love1 with the real spectacle of the world6 ,is there anywhere a more pronounced contradiction1 an obscurer riddle1 a more inconceivable contrast between purpose and accomplishment8 ,this world of cruelty and woe1 in which one creature feeds on the heart-blood of another1 in which here and there from seas of mud and dirt a form of light springs up1 in which every nobler production must be bought with torrents of blood and tears2 this revelation and self-manifestation of ,god in humanity1 which everywhere appears joined to definite historical suppositions1 which lacks all the conditions of true universality and of indisputable evidence1 so that instead of forming a means of union it has become the source of dreadful contentions2 this work of salvation and sanctification which is so restricted in its effects that 8the kingdom of ,god0 is still a dreamy vision of humanity1 so restricted that we still see the majority of men1 despite the most extraordinary supernatural dispositions1 still remain far behind the simple ideals of natural ethical commandments1 that hate and dissension1 cruelty and selfishness1 perform their unhallowed work--is this the work of infinite power and infinite wisdom8 ,what claims theodicy makes on human thought6 ,and how different the picture is1 the moment we abandon the false theocentric point of view and assume the anthropocentric6 ,instead of a belief which all facts contradict--an idea which elucidates them all4 ,no one can say how we are to interpret facts as the work of a holy and absolutely perfect being2 but it can be shown1 step by step1 how in this1 our human world1 more perfect things spring from imperfect things1 moral and mental laws from the blind play of natural forces and powers1 the conscious energy of will from blind and unreasonable impulse1 law and love of man from the selfishness and warring of all against all1 and the notion of the unity of the race from infinite disruption and disunion4 ,we must not allow ourselves to be led astray or discouraged here by the changing undulations and tremendous crises of this battle for the good4 ,the ideal springs out of a dark abyss4 ,the roots of our being are deep laid in nature1 yet we struggle to exalt ourselves above it4 ,no wonder1 therefore1 that time and again it draws us back4 ,the greatest and sublimest spectacle6 ,a tragical one1 one filled with struggle and suffering1 and yet one infinitely full of hope4 ,for it shows us the inexhaustible grandeur of the human mind2 it shows us the good1 the ideal1 as a tremendous real power1 a power eternally becoming1 surely forming itself out of an infinitude of individual deeds1 a power fully incarnate in no one person1 yet active and living in humanity4 ,not a tangible activity1 and yet one of the realest of facts4 ,a supersensuous1 nay1 if you will1 a supernatural realm of thought2 not the faded reflection or shadow of a grandeur and power beyond us1 but the fruit of the noblest activities and powers of this given1 existing world1 antagonised in life1 but grand and powerful in thought2 imperfect even in its boldest flights1 but bearing within it the germ of greater things to come4 ,here is the true point of union for ,christian dogma and science4 ,here is the ,god in which science also may1 nay1 must1 believe4 ,not humanity in its empirical reality1 but the ideal world developed within the human realm of things--the spirit of humanity4 ,this is the only true object of worship4 ,before it we are humiliated1 and by it we feel ourselves exalted4 ,from it we receive all the good that life bestows upon us2 it gives us light and peace and lucid thought4 ,and what higher1 nobler thing can a life produce than the feeling that it has not been unworthy of this great ancestry1 that it has helped to keep alive this holy fire1 that it has helped1 perhaps1 to fan by its own life this living flame to greater heights8 ,here is the true source of the ideas of accountability and of salvation4 ,we are not responsible to a being outside and above us1 but to our own selves and to humanity1 from which we have received the best that it had to give1 and for which we must return what we ourselves have produced4 ,this consciousness of being thrown utterly on the resources of one's own self1 on one's own powers1 was first created in the human mind by science and the technical arts1 7as that most venerable and most sacred of all myths1 the legend of ,prometheus1 so profoundly indicates17 and this consciousness will1 by the progress of knowledge and power1 be made more and more the dominating one of humanity4 ,this is not a consciousness of omnipotence2 it does not exclude the subjection of man to the inexorable laws of the universe2 but it demands the enlistment of all the powers of the race3 for nature does not give us more than we wrest from her by arduous toil4 ,and as humanity is accountable only to itself1 so do the means of its salvation lie only in itself4 ,not in any one individual1 but in the spirit in it which ever works onward and upward4 ,yet this spirit is not an unpersonal existence2 it must be possessed again and ever again by living men4 ,and no one can serve humanity or augment its spiritual treasures or reincarnate in himself its holiest possessions without first having and feeling within himself the blessing of what he has done4 ,and thus the profoundest significance of human life on earth may be formulated and embraced in that saying of the poet which was throughout conceived in the spirit of our times1 and would have been wholly incomprehensible to the mind of those who gave us our faith--in the words3 8,erlsung dem ,erlser40 ,f4 ,,jodl4 ,,footnotes3 #ei ,wesen des ,christenthums4 ,first edition4 #ahda4 ,pp4 #bhh-bhi4 #fj ,translation published by ,swan1 ,sonnenschein ,co41 ,london1 #ahia4 ,,the ,,religion ,,of ,,science4 ,are religion and science indeed as contrary as they are often represented to be1 and is the proposition to reconcile them a hopeless and futile undertaking8 ,professor ,jodl1 in his article 8,religion and ,modern ,science10 7pp4 #cbi-cea of this number17 says3 8,that civilised humanity to-day is separated into two groups which no longer understand each other1 which do not speak the same language1 and which live in totally different worlds of thought and sentiment40 ,there are those who cling to the old religions and those who supplant it by a new idealism4 ,between both1 he adds3 8,a third class stands which plays the part of a mediator40 ,professor ,jodl does not approve of reconciling the historical forms of religion with science4 ,he rightly says3 8,the #8pure doctrine of ,christ1' the genuine1 primitive form of ,christianity1 is a ,utopia of biblical criticism40 ,we heartily agree with him in his remarks concerning the part which the miraculous and supernatural play in the ,gospels3 8,these things are so intimately interwoven with the modes of thought of the synoptic writers that it is impossible to separate them therefrom without doing violence to the internal connection of their doctrines40 ,we also concur upon the whole with ,professor ,jodl in his criticism of the methods of ,speculative ,theology4 ,no compromising with traditional errors1 no covering or extenuating of the results of historical criticism is allowable merely for the love of tradition and for the preservation of errors that have become dear to a large number of people4 ,we do not condemn the work of any mediator2 on the contrary1 we rather encourage it4 ,we observe with pleasure in the latest phases of the religious evolution of ,speculative ,theology the prevalence of a more modern spirit1 and we follow with a keen interest also the progress of biblical critique in its truly valuable labors3 but we do not expect that either the one or the other will accomplish any regeneration of religion4 ,professor ,jodl knows very well that the editors of ,the ,monist and ,the ,open ,court have not undertaken any work of compromising between the errors of the past and the ideal of the future4 ,our idea of a reconciliation between religion and science is of a different nature4 ,we are not blind to the errors of the old religions1 and we do not mean to gloss them over1 or to make old-fashioned views acceptable by presenting them in a new garment4 ,we do not even stop to bury the dead1 for we have better things to do than to trouble with problems that have been definitely settled4 ,we keep our hands to the plough to accomplish the work needed to-day4 ,while we are not blind to the errors of the old religions1 we recognise at the same time that they contain in the language of parables some great truths which will remain forever4 ,these truths constitute the backbone of religion1 and we regard it as a very important duty of ours to preserve them4 ,these truths must be preserved1 not because they were believed in by our fathers1 nor from any respect for tradition1 nor from any regard for our sentiments1 but simply because they are truths1 because they can be proved to be true according to the methods of scientific inquiry4 ,what is religion8 ,religion consists of all those ideas which regulate our conduct4 ,in the savage these ideas are very crude and superstitious1 and often self-contradictory4 ,the higher a man rises1 the clearer1 the more scientific and consistent do these ideas become1 until they develop into a systematic world-conception4 ,every scientific idea that changes our world-conception will change also our religion and with it our rules of conduct4 ,thus1 for example1 the idea of evolution has become to us an eminently religious idea4 ,in order to indicate that the criterion of truth for religion is the very same thing as the criterion of truth for science1 we have proposed to call the religion we advocate1 8,the ,religion of ,science40 7,for details see the editorial of ,vol4 ,,vii1 ,no4 #a1 of ,the ,open ,court47 ,our procedure appears to many as an annihilation of religion in favor of science4 ,but it is not4 ,and why not8 ,we have learned many truths first from religion1 long before science could ever think of proving them4 ,in several respects science took the lead1 and religion remained at a long distance behind1 awkwardly1 very slowly1 and unwillingly limping onward on the road of progress4 ,instances are1 the acceptance of the ,copernican system and of the evolution theory4 ,but in other respects religion took the lead1 and science was unable to follow its ingenious flight4 ,as instances of this we cite such moral truths as the love of enemies1 which were not preached by scientists as scientific truths1 but by religious teachers1 by ,confucius1 ,buddha1 and ,christ4 ,there are scientists even to-day who regard what we would call 8moral truths0 as maxims that are contrary to the established views of science4 ,professor ,huxley1 for instance1 is very emphatic in his declaration that the facts of nature do not teach morality4#fa ,this leads us to a point in which we disagree with ,professor ,jodl4 ,he speaks of the illusion 8of mingling together in the idea of ,god two wholly distinct ideas--the ideas namely of nature and of an ethical ideal0--an illusion to which 8even strict monistic thinkers like ,spinoza fell victims40 ,professor ,jodl's position reminds us of ,john ,stuart ,mill's 8,essay on ,nature10 in which he exposes the old doctrine naturam sequi in all its absurd meanings and carefully avoids a discussion of the only rational conception of the precept4 ,thus his tirades appear most convincing1 and to be sure they are quite correct--so far as they go4 ,says ,mill3 8,in sober truth1 nearly all the things which men are hanged or imprisoned for doing to one another1 are nature's every-day performances4 ,killing1 the most criminal act recognised by human laws1 ,nature does once to every being that lives4444 8,nature impales men1 breaks them as if on the wheel1 casts them to be devoured by wild beasts1 burns them to death1 crushes them with stones like the first ,christian martyr1 starves them with hunger1 freezes them with cold1 poisons them by the quick or slow venom of her exhalations1 and has hundreds of other hideous deaths in reserve1 such as the ingenious cruelty of a ,nabis or a ,domitian never surpassed40 ,mill must indeed have felt the need of beginning these sentences with the words 8,in sober truth02 otherwise he might be suspected of humor4 ,similarly comical is ,mill's proposition to regard every voluntary action of man as a direct infringement upon nature4 ,man's reason in that case would be the most unnatural phenomenon in the world1 and the term 8nature0 would be confined to the lowest realms of existence exclusively4 ,if the usage of reason were indeed an infringement upon nature1 man's appearance upon earth would mark the beginning of a supernatural realm2 and ,professor ,jodl seems to accept this consequence when he says3 8,it is not of nature1 it is above nature40 ,if man's rationality and his ethics were not born of nature1 if their conditions were not founded in the very existence of nature1 if they were not the natural product of evolution1 then indeed ,i see no escape from a dualistic world-conception1 in which a supernatural ,god introduces the spark of divinity which appears in the soul of man from spheres beyond4 ,we have devoted to these vagaries of ,john ,stuart ,mill an elaborate discussion in another place and do not feel the need of repeating our arguments in this connection4#fb ,we agree with ,professor ,jodl that no rationalising of old dogmas will help us in the establishment of 8a new idealism1 formed in harmony with the spirit of science40 ,we must build our religion anew 7as every generation had to build its religion anew7 out of the best materials which are furnished by the maturest and most reliable knowledge of to-day4 ,says ,professor ,jodl3 8,through us something has come into the world that before us did not exist--something that the most exuberant creative magic1 or nature's grandest mechanical dreams1 could never replace4 ,the day on which first a human being pressed his weaker fellow-man to his breast and said1 8,brother1 not mine1 but thy will be done2 ,i will give up my desires that thou also mayst be glad02 the day upon which man first lifted up his head and said1 8,let us make the world good in the likeness of the picture that has become living in us1 just as it should be02 this is the great and sanctified day in the history of our race on earth1 the ,christmas day on which ,god was born40 ,certainly the origin of man on earth1 and again the evolution of the moral man1 is something quite new1 which before did not exist4 ,but did humanity originate out of nothing1 as sometimes the imaginations of a poet are supposed to be created1 or is there a prototype in whose image man has been created8 ,man's reason1 his ethics1 and his humanity are something that did not exist before1 but there is a feature in existence which makes it possible that rational and moral beings develop4 ,should there be sentient beings on other planets1 and we have little reason to doubt it1 we can be sure that they also will develop rational minds1 and that they also will learn1 perhaps as we did1 through many bitter experiences1 the same truths which constitute our main maxims of morality1#fc including such precepts as the love of enemies4 ,and why are we sure that on other planets not only reason1 but also the fundamental rules of ethics will be the same as with us here on earth8 ,simply because we know that there is a certain feature in reality which creates rational beings and moral beings as naturally as it creates rocks and seas on the surface of planets4 ,man's reason and also man's morality are not original inventions of his1 but the result of many experiences which he had to learn4 ,and the world in which he lives is such that he can acquire reason and morality1 and if a being should acquire a wrong kind of reason or a wrong kind of morality1 it will by and by be blotted out of existence4 ,accordingly there is a prototype of reason and of morality1 and this prototype of the humanity of man is exactly that which in the language of the old religions has received the name 8,god40 ,we must make a distinction between ideals and dreams4 ,those creations of our fancy which are woven without any regard to reality are dreams4 ,they have no value beyond whiling away a leisure hour or pleasing our imagination4 ,but those creations of our mind which construct realisable formations such as machines or clocks or higher conditions of human society1 are not mere dreams1 they are ideals4 ,what1 then1 is the difference between a dream and an ideal8 ,a dream is a useless ebullition of an idle brain composed of ideas to which there is no correspondent reality2 but an ideal is a potent factor in the living presence to shape the future3 it is a combination of ideas which are correct descriptions of actual realities4 ,the moral aspirations of mankind are not empty dreams1 they are true and veritable ideals4 ,there are certain qualities in nature which make their realisation possible and these qualities constitute the ,divinity of nature4 ,professor ,jodl speaks of the origin of morality as of the birth of ,god on earth4 ,truly that is the meaning of ,christianity4 ,but this birth of ,god into the world of human evolution as 8the ,son of ,man0 is possible only because of the existence of the ,god in nature whom ,christian mythology so beautifully calls ,god the ,father4 ,the appearance of the ,son of ,man upon earth1 the birth of morality1 is a revelation of the divinity of nature4 ,true enough1 as ,professor ,jodl says1 that we ourselves won the best and highest we have by hard struggles1 by terribly severe1 self-imposed discipline4 ,as ,prometheus says3 8,hast du nicht alles selbst vollendet1 ,heilig glhend ,herz60 ,that1 too1 is part of the divinity of nature1 that every creature has to work out its very being itself1 and that man must search for the way of salvation with great anxiety1 under bitter tribulations and through extreme afflictions4 ,but he cannot invent a new way of salvation1 he has to find it1 and there is but one that is the right one4 ,the nature of morality is such as it is1 and no other morality could be invented to replace it4 ,and this feature of existence which makes morality quite a determined thing is a real presence in the world1 it is an actual quality of the universe4 ,some of our liberal friends1 foremost among them ,professor ,haeckel1 deny the existence of a personal ,god and then proceed to declare that the ,god of science is nothing but matter and energy4 ,we agree with ,professor ,haeckel in his rejection of anthropotheism2 ,god is no supernatural being nor is he a huge world-ego4 ,but we cannot accept his view of ,god as being only matter and energy4 ,the idea of ,god is and always has been a moral idea4 ,thus we have come to regard all those features of nature as divine which condition the origin and existence of morality and we define ,god as the authority of moral conduct4 ,this authority is not a person1 not a sentient being1 let alone a sentimental philanthropist2 but it is1 nevertheless1 a reality1 and1 indeed1 a stern reality4 ,such is the ,god of science4 ,god is that quality of existence through which we originated as feeling1 thinking1 and aspiring beings4 ,he is the prototype of the human soul1 and the condition under which develop man's reason and morality4 ,obedience to him is indispensable for a continued existence1 for further progress and a higher evolution of the human soul4 ,that these features of reality can by a great number of keen and fearless modern thinkers be supposed to be a non-entity is difficult to understand4 ,this negation of the reality of qualities of existence which are not individual things but intrinsically inherent in all the individual things1 it appears to us1 is an old heirloom of nominalism4 ,the nominalistic philosophy represented by ,roscellinus was suppressed at the council at ,soissons #ajib1 only to rise more powerfully in the fourteenth century in ,william of ,occam1 and finally to exterminate realism with all its rubbish of errors together with the truth contained in these errors4 ,kant marks in many respects the culmination of the victorious movement of nominalism4 ,with all the benefits modern thought derived from the philosophical work of nominalism1 a reaction is needed against its purely negative spirit4 ,there is a truth in the old realism which cannot be neglected with impunity4#fd ,god 7viz41 the name of ,god7 is1 as ,kant said1 a noumenon1 a thing of thought1 an abstraction4 ,god is not a thing1 a concrete object1 or an individual person4 ,all the views of ,god which regard him as an individual being of some kind1 or as a person only of infinite dimensions1 are1 closely considered1 pagan notions which belittle ,god4 ,but the name of ,god as a noumenon1 a thought1 an abstract idea1 has a meaning4 ,abstract ideas are not nonentities1 they represent some real features1 some actual qualities1 or properties1 or relations2 otherwise they would not be ideas1 but unmeaning sounds4 ,some of our abstract ideas are of a very delicate fibre1 so that the coarse mental vision of the average ,philistine is unable to see them in their reality and potency4 ,but it so happens that exactly they are of a more important1 more powerful1 and inevitable presence than the simple generalisations of things that visibly and corporeally surround us4 ,this1 their peculiar nature1 makes such ideas mysterious to those who instinctively feel their reality without being able to point it out and understand it4 ,and the most subtle1 imponderous1 and sublimated of all ideas is the idea of ,god4 ,we have defined ,god as the ultimate authority of conduct1 as the condition of our existence as rational and moral beings1 as the all-power that enforces obedience1 etc42 but we cannot in any one of our definitions exhaust the significance of the idea4 ,we would by no means exclude from the idea of ,god anything without which reality would cease to be real4 ,the qualities of matter and energy constitute that element in the ,god-idea which justify the old religions in speaking of him as omnipotent and everlasting4 ,thus they ought not to be excluded4 ,but these qualities alone are insufficient to characterise his being4 ,the sum-total of matter and energy as such and as such alone does not constitute any moral authority4 ,nature in her immeasurable greatness and oppressive vastness affects us with awe2 but1 after all1 we look down upon her massive sublimity4 ,man is more than the biggest heap of crude matter and unintelligently operating energy4 ,says ,professor ,jodl3 8,we stand amazed at her might and greatness1 at the plentitude of her powers of creation1 at her myriad play of forces1 at the inexhaustible wealth of the relations with which she binds being to being1 creates and mediates contrarieties1 and amidst the most varied change and alternation1 ever remains one and the same6 ,but our prototype1 our ,god1 she can never be40 ,this grandeur of nature is part of her divinity1 but it alone does not constitute the character of ,god4 ,yet1 observe that throughout nature there is an imponderable quality present which makes every atom move in a definite way1 so that the whirl of gaseous masses1 apparently a chaos1 will be recognised as a cosmic whole developing in a certain way and describable in what is generally called natural laws4 ,this subtle quality is the condition of the regularities which are found in all the infinite varieties and innumerable particularities1 and all these regularities conceived in their systematic unity are called the order of the universe4 ,man exists as a thinking being only because the immeasurable universe of which he is a part possesses this quality of order1 and his reason is closely considered only a copy of it4 ,man's reason was shaped into the image of the cosmic order1 and suppose--a supposition which is very difficult to make and regarded by many as impossible or inconceivable--yet suppose that the world-order were radically different from what it actually is1 man's reason would accordingly be different too4 ,further1 suppose that the whole frame and fundamental interrelations of the particles of reality were different from what they are1 would not correspondingly the basic rules of conduct be changed too8 ,the author of this article1 in the eyes of the so-called orthodox ,christian1 is most certainly an atheist4 ,and if theism means the belief in a personal or extramundane ,god he is an atheist indeed4 ,if there is any opprobrium in the name atheism we are willing to accept it2 and certainly1 we do not reject the label of atheism in order to escape any odium attached to that name4 ,we do reject atheism simply because we see a great and potent truth in the idea of ,god which is but too often disregarded4 ,with ,professor ,haeckel and ,professor ,jodl we reject the conception of an anthropomorphic ,deity4 ,the anthropomorphic idol is doomed before the tribunal of science4 ,but we see a deeper meaning in the idea of ,god which has formed through millenniums the very centre of the greatest religions on earth4 ,science has to recognise the reality of an all-presence in existence which is analogous to that which in a religious language is called ,god4 ,considering the fact that humanity owes many great truths to religion1 let us not be hasty in condemning the religions of the past as pure superstition4 ,there are valuable seeds in the chaff4 ,if we discard the wheat together with the tares1 we shall have to rediscover them1 for it is little probable that humanity can for any length of time be satisfied with beautiful phrases or live in its moral aspirations in a realm of mere dreams4 ,,editor4 ,,footnotes3 #fa ,for a discussion of this point see ,fundamental ,problems1 pp4 #bai-bbf4 #fb ,see the article in ,nos4 #bci1 #bda1 and #bdb of ,the ,open ,court3 ,nature and ,morality4 ,an ,examination of the ,ethical ,views of ,john ,stuart ,mill4 ,i4 ,the ,meaning of ,basing ,ethics ,upon ,nature4 ,,ii4 ,the ,ethics ,taught by ,nature4 ,,iii4 ,intelligent ,action and ,moral ,action4 ,,iv4 ,the ,anthropomorphic ,standpoint of ,mill4 #fc ,i purposely do not say all maxims of conduct1 because we can very well imagine that different conditions may produce some very important variations in the rules of conduct2 but the main foundation of morality would be the same4 #fd ,there are two men at present who boldly fly the flag of the old realism again1 both having our full sympathy in their aspirations1 although we cannot agree with many of their teachings4 ,the one is ,mr4 ,charles ,s4 ,peirce1 the other ,dr4 ,francis ,e4 ,abbot4 ,,the ,,superstition ,,of ,,necessity4#fe ,lest my title give such offense as to prejudice unduly my contention1 ,i may say that ,i use the term in the way indicated by its etymology3 as a standing-still on the part of thought2 a clinging to old ideas after those ideas have lost their use1 and hence1 like all superstitions1 have become obstructions4 ,for ,i shall try to show that the doctrine of necessity is a survival2 that it holds over from an earlier and undeveloped period of knowledge2 that as a means of getting out of and beyond that stage it had a certain value1 but1 having done its work1 loses its significance4 ,halting judgment may1 indeed1 at one time have helped itself out of the slough of uncertainty1 vagueness1 and inadequacy on to ground of more solid and complete fact1 by the use of necessity as a crutch2 once upon the ground1 the crutch makes progress slower and1 preventing the full exercise of the natural means of locomotion1 tends to paralyse science4 ,the former support has become a burden1 almost an intolerable one4 ,the beginning of wisdom in the matter of necessity is1 ,i conceive1 in realising that it is a term which has bearing or relevancy only with reference to the development of judgment1 not with reference to objective things or events4 ,i do not mean by this that necessity refers to the compelling force with which we are driven to make a given affirmation3 ,i mean that it refers to the content of that affirmation1 expressing the degree of coherence between its constituent factors4 ,when we say something or other must be so and so1 the 8must0 does not indicate anything in the nature of the fact itself1 but a trait in our judgment of that fact2 it indicates the degree with which we have succeeded in making a whole out of the various elements which have to be taken into account in forming the judgment4 ,more specifically1 it indicates a half-way stage4 ,at one extreme we have two separate judgments1 which1 so far as consciousness is concerned1 have nothing to do with each other2 and at the other extreme we have one judgment into which the contents of the two former judgments have been so thoroughly organised as to lose all semblance of separateness4 ,necessity1 as the middle term1 is the midwife which1 from the dying isolation of judgments1 delivers the unified judgment just coming into life--it being understood that the separateness of the original judgments is not as yet quite negated1 nor the unity of the coming judgment quite attained4 ,the judgment of necessity1 in other words1 is exactly and solely the transition in our knowledge from unconnected judgments to a more comprehensive synthesis4 ,its value is just the value of this transition2 as negating the old partial and isolated judgments--in its backward look--necessity has meaning2 in its forward look--with reference to the resulting completely organised subject-matter--it is itself as false as the isolated judgments which it replaces4 ,its value is in what it rids judgment of4 ,when it has succeeded1 its value is nil4 ,like any go-between1 its service consists in rendering itself uncalled for4 ,all science can ultimately do is to report or describe1 to completely state1 the reality4 ,so far as we reach this standpoint regarding any fact or group of facts1 we do not say that the fact must be such and such1 but simply that it is such and such4 ,there is no necessity attaching to the fact either as whole or as parts4 ,qua whole1 the fact simply is what it is2 while the parts1 instead of being necessitated either by one another or by the whole1 are the analysed factors constituting1 in their complete circuit1 the whole4 ,in stating the whole1 we1 as of course1 state all that enters into it2 if we speak of the various elements as making the whole1 it is only in the sense of making it up1 not of causing it4 ,the fallacy of the necessitarian theory consists in transforming the determinate in the sense of the wholly defined1 into the determined in the sense of something externally made to be what it is4 ,the whole1 although first in the order of reality1 is last in the order of knowledge4 ,the complete statement of the whole is the goal1 not the beginning of wisdom4 ,we begin1 therefore1 with fragments1 which are taken for wholes2 and it is only by piecing together these fragments1 and by the transformation of them involved in this combination1 that we arrive at the real fact4 ,there comes a stage at which the recognition of the unity begins to dawn upon us1 and yet1 the tradition of the many distinct wholes survives2 judgment has to combine these two contradictory conceptions2 it does so by the theory that the dawning unity is an effect necessarily produced by the interaction of the former wholes4 ,only as the consciousness of the unity grows still more is it seen that instead of a group of independent facts1 held together by 8necessary0 ties1 there is one reality1 of which we have been apprehending various fragments in succession and attributing to them a spurious wholeness and independence4 ,we learn 7but only at the end7 that instead of discovering and then connecting together a number of separate realities1 we have been engaged in the progressive definition of one fact4 ,there are certain points upon which there is now practical agreement among all schools4 ,what one school has got at by a logical analysis of science1 another school has arrived at by the road of a psychological analysis of experience4 ,what one school calls the unity of thought and reality1 another school calls the relativity of knowledge4 ,the metaphysical interpretation further given to these respective statements may be quite different1 but1 so far as they go1 they come to the same thing3 that objects1 as known1 are not independent of the process of knowing1 but are the content of our judgments4 ,one school1 indeed1 may conceive of judgment as a mere associative or habitual grouping of sensations1 the other as the correlative diversification and synthesis of the self2 but the practical outcome1 that the 8object0 7anyway as known7 is a form of judgment1 is the same4 ,this point being held in common1 both schools must agree that the progress of judgment is equivalent to a change in the value of objects--that objects as they are for us1 as known1 change with the development of our judgments4 ,if this be so1 truth1 however it be metaphysically defined1 must attach to late rather than to early judgments4 ,i am fortunate in being able to quote from authors1 who may be taken as typical of the two schools4 ,says ,professor ,caird in his article upon 8,metaphysic10 7lately reprinted1 8,essays in ,philosophy and ,literature1073 8,our first consciousness of things is not an immovable foundation upon which science may build1 but rather a hypothetical and self-contradictory starting-point of investigation1 which becomes changed and transformed as we advance40 78,essays10 ,vol4 ,,ii1 p4 #cih47 ,on the other hand1 ,mr4 ,venn writes 7in the first chapter of his 8,empirical ,logic073 8,select what object we please--the most apparently simple in itself1 and the most definitely parted off from others that we can discover--yet we shall find ourselves constrained to admit that a considerable mental process has been passed through before that object could be recognised as being an object1 that is1 as possessing some degree of unity and as requiring to be distinguished from other such unities40 ,he goes on to illustrate by such an apparently fixed and given object as the sun1 pointing out how its unity as a persistent thing involves a continued synthesis of elements very diverse in time and space1 and an analysis1 a selection1 from other elements in very close physical juxtaposition4 ,he goes on to raise the question whether a dog1 for example1 may be said to 8see0 a rainbow at all1 because of the complex analysis and synthesis involved in such an object4 ,the 8mental whole0 7to use ,mr4 ,venn's words1 the 8ideal unity0 as others might term it7 is so extensive and intricate that 8,one might almost as reasonably expect the dog to #8see' the progress of democracy in the place where he lives1 of which course of events the ultimate sensible constituents are accessible to his observation precisely as they are to ours40 ,as ,mr4 ,venn is not discussing just the same point which ,i have raised1 he does not refer to the partial and tentative character of our first judgments--our first objects4 ,it is clear enough1 however1 that there will be all degrees between total failure to analyse and combine 7as1 say1 in the case of the dog and rainbow7 and fairly adequate grouping4 ,the difference between the savage whose synthesis is so limited in scope that he sets up a new sun every day and the scientific man whose object is a unity comprehending differences through thousands of years of time and interactions going on through millions of miles of space is a case in point4 ,the distinction between the respective objects is not simply a superimposition of new qualities upon an old object1 that old object remaining the same2 it is not getting new objects2 it is a continual qualitative reconstruction of the object itself4 ,this fact1 which is the matter under consideration1 is well stated by ,mr4 ,venn1 when he goes on to say3 8,the act of predication1 in its two-fold aspect of affirmation and denial1 really is a process by which we are not only enabled to add to our information about objects1 but is also the process by the continued performance of which the objects had been originally acquired1 or rather produced0 7italics are mine74 ,this statement cannot be admitted at all without recognising that the first judgments do not make the object once for all1 but that the continued process of judging is a continued process of 8producing0 the object4 ,of course the confused and hypothetical character of our first objects does not force itself upon us when we are still engaged in constructing them4 ,on the contrary1 it is only when the original subject-matter has been overloaded with various and opposing predicates that we think of doubting the correctness of our first judgments1 of putting our first objects under suspicion4 ,at the start1 these objects assert themselves as the baldest and solidest of hard facts4 ,the dogmatic and nave quality of the original judgment is in exact proportion to its crudeness and inadequacy4 ,the objects which are the content of these judgments thus come to be identified with reality par excellence2 they are facts1 however doubtful everything else4 ,they hang on obstinately4 ,new judgments1 instead of being regarded as better definitions of the actual fact and hence as displacing the prior object1 are tacked on to the old as best they may be4 ,unless the contradiction is too flagrant1 the new predicates are set side by side with the old as simply additional information2 they do not react into the former qualities4 ,if the contradiction is too obvious to be overlooked the new predicate is used1 if possible1 to constitute another object1 independent of the former4 ,so the savage1 having to deal with the apparently incompatible predicates of light and darkness1 makes two objects2 two suns1 for two successive days4 ,once the ,ptolemaic conception is well rooted1 cycles and epicycles1 almost without end1 are superadded1 rather than reconstruct the original object4 ,here1 then1 is our starting point3 when qualities arise so incompatible with the object already formed that they cannot be referred to that object1 it is easier to form a new object on their basis than it is to doubt the correctness of the old1 involving as that does the surrender of the object 7the fact1 seemingly7 and the formation of another object4 ,it is easier1 ,i say1 for there is no doubt that the reluctance of the mind to give up an object once made lies deep in its economies4 ,i shall have occasion hereafter to point out the teleological character of the notions of necessity and chance1 but ,i wish here to call attention to the fact that the forming of a number of distinct objects has its origin in practical needs of our nature4 ,the analysis and synthesis which is first made is that of most practical importance2 what is abstracted from the complex net-work of reality is some net outcome1 some result which is of value for life4 ,as ,venn says3 8,what the savage mostly wants to do is to produce something or to avert something1 not to account for a thing which has already happened4 ,what interests him is to know how to kill somebody1 not to know how somebody has been killed40 7,p4 #fb of 8,empirical ,logic407 ,and again3 8,what not only the savage1 but also the practical man mostly wants1 is a general result1 say the death of his enemy4 ,it does not matter whether the symptoms1 i4 e41 the qualifying circumstances1 are those attendant on poison1 or a blow from a club1 or on incantation1 provided the death is brought about4 ,but they do desire certainty in respect of this general result40 7,p4 #fd47 ,now it is this 8general result10 the net outcome for practical purposes1 which is the fact1 the object at first4 ,anything else is useless subtlety4 ,that the man is dead--that is the fact2 anything further is at most external circumstances which happen to accompany the fact4 ,that the death is only a bare fraction of a fact2 that the attendant 8circumstances0 are as much constituent factors of the real fact as the mere 8death0 itself 7probably more so from the scientific point of view7--all this is foreign to conception4 ,we pluck the fruit1 and that fruit is the fact4 ,only when practical experience forces upon us the recognition that we cannot get the fruit without heeding certain other 8conditions0 do we consent to return upon our assumed object1 put it under suspicion and question whether it is really what we took it to be4 ,it is1 we may presume1 the savage who in order to get his living1 has to regulate his conduct for long periods1 through changes of seasons1 in some continuous mode1 who first makes the synthesis of one sun going through a recurring cycle of changes--the year4 ,as time goes on1 the series of independent and isolated objects passes through a gradual change4 ,just as the recognition of incompatible qualities has led to setting up of separate things1 so the growing recognition of similar qualities in these disparate objects begins to pull them together again4 ,some relation between the two objects is perceived2 it is seen that neither object is just what it is in its isolation1 but owes some of its meaning to the other objects4 ,while in reality1 7as ,i hope later to point out17 this 8relationship0 and mutual dependence means membership in a common whole1 contribution to one and the same activity1 a midway stage intervenes before this one fact1 including as parts of itself the hitherto separate objects1 comes to consciousness4 ,the tradition of isolation is too strong to give way at the first suggestion of community4 ,this passage-way from isolation to unity1 denying the former but not admitting the latter1 is necessity or determinism4 ,the wall of partition between the two separate 8objects0 cannot be broken at one attack2 they have to be worn away by the attrition arising from their slow movement into one another4 ,it is the 8necessary0 influence which one exerts upon the other that finally rubs away the separateness and leaves them revealed as elements of one unified whole4 ,this done1 the determining influence has gone too4 ,the process may be symbolised as follows3 ,m is the object1 the original synthesis of the elements seen to be of practical importance2 a1 b1 c1 etc41 to h are predicates of constantly growing incompatibility4 ,when the quality i is discovered1 it is so manifestly incompatible with a that all attempt to refer it to the same subject ,m is resisted4 ,two alternatives are now logically open4 ,the subject-matter ,m1 as the synthesis of the qualities a-h1 may be taken up2 it may be asked whether the object is really ,m with these qualities2 whether it is not rather 1 having instead of the predicates a1 b1 etc41 the qualities 1 1 with which the new quality i is quite compatible4 ,but this process goes against the practical grain of our knowledge2 it means not only that we do not know what we thought we knew2 it means that we did not do what we thought we did4 ,such unsettling of action is hardly to be borne4 ,it is easier to erect a new object ,n1 to which the more incompatible predicates are referred4 ,finally1 it is discovered that both ,m and ,n have the same predicates r and s2 that in virtue of this community of qualities there is a certain like element even in the qualities previously considered disparate4 ,this mutual attraction continues until it becomes so marked a feature of the case that there is no alternative but to suppose that the r and s of one produces these qualities in the other1 and thereby influences all the qualities of the other4 ,this drawing together continues until we have the one reconstructed object 1 with the traits 1 1 etc4 ,it is found that there is one somewhat comprehensive synthesis which includes within itself the several separate objects so far produced2 and it is found that this inclusion in the larger whole reacts into the meaning of the several constituting parts--as parts of one whole1 they lose traits which they seemed to possess in their isolation1 and gain new traits1 because of their membership in the same whole4 ,we have now to consider1 more in detail1 how the intermediate idea of necessity grows up and how it gives away upon the discovery of the one inclusive whole4 ,let us continue the illustration of the killing4 ,the 8general result10 the death of the hated enemy1 is at first the fact2 all else is mere accidental circumstance4 ,indeed1 the other circumstances at first are hardly that2 they do not attract attention1 having no importance4 ,not only the savage1 but also the common-sense man of to-day1 ,i conceive1 would say that any attempt to extend the definition of the 8fact0 beyond the mere occurrence of the death is metaphysical refinement2 that the fact is the killing1 the death1 and that that 8fact0 remains quite the same1 however it is brought about4 ,what has been done1 in other words1 is to abstract part of the real fact1 part of this death1 and set up the trait or universal thus abstracted as itself fact1 and not only as fact1 but as the fact1 par excellence1 with reference to which all the factors which constitute the reality1 the concrete fact1 of this death1 are circumstantial and 8accidental40#ff ,a fragment of the whole reality1 of the actual fact individualised and specified with all kind of minute detail1 having been thus hypostatised into an object1 the idea of necessity is in fair way to arise4 ,these deaths in general do not occur4 ,although the mere death of the man1 his removal from the face of the earth1 is the fact1 none the less all actual deaths have a certain amount of detail in them4 ,the savage has to hit his enemy with a club or spear1 or perform a magic incantation1 before he can attain that all-important end of getting rid of him4 ,moreover1 a man with a coat of armor on will not die just the same way as the man who is defenseless4 ,these circumstances have to be taken into account4 ,now1 if the 8fact0 had not been so rigidly identified with the bare practical outcome1 the removal of the hated one1 a coherent interpretation of the need for these further incidents would be open4 ,it could be admitted that the original death was a highly complex affair1 involving a synthesis of a very large number of different factors2 furthermore1 the new cases of murder could be employed to reconstruct the original analysis-synthesis2 to eliminate supposed factors which were not relevant1 and to show the presence of factors at first not suspected4 ,in other words1 the real fact would be under constant process of definition1 of 8production40 ,but the stiff-necked identification of the fragment1 which happened to have practical importance with the real object1 effectually prevents any such reaction and reconstruction4 ,what is to be done1 however1 with these conditions of spear1 of stone1 of armor1 which so obviously have something to do with the real fact1 although1 as it would seem1 they are not the fact8 ,they are considered as circumstances1 accidental1 so far as death in general is concerned2 necessary1 so far as this death is concerned4 ,that is1 wanting simply to get the net result of the removal of my enemy1 so that he will no longer blight the fair face of nature1 it is accidental how ,i do it2 but having1 after all1 to kill a man of certain characteristics and surroundings in life1 having to choose time and place1 etc41 it becomes necessary1 if ,i am to succeed1 that ,i kill him in a certain way1 say1 with poison1 or a dynamite bomb4 ,thus we get our concrete1 individual fact again4 ,consider1 then1 that tortuous path from reality to reality1 via a circuit of unreality1 which calls the thought of necessity into existence4 ,we first mutilate the actual fact by selecting some portion that appeals to our needs2 we falsify1 by erecting this fragment into the whole fact4 ,having the rest of the fact thus left on our hands for disposal1 when we have no need of the concrete fact we consider it accidental1 merely circumstantial2 but we consider it necessary whenever we have occasion to descend from the outcome which we have abstracted back to the real fact1 in all its individuality4 ,necessity is a device by which we both conceal from ourselves the unreal character of what we have called real1 and also get rid of the practical evil consequences of hypostatising a fragment into an independent whole4 ,if the purely teleological character of necessity is not yet evident1 ,i think the following considerations will serve to bring it out4 ,the practical value1 the fruit from the tree1 we pick out and set up for the entire fact so far as our past action is concerned4 ,but so far as our future action is concerned1 this value is a result to be reached2 it is an end to be attained4 ,other factors1 in reality all the time bound up in the one concrete fact or individual whole1 have now to be brought in as means to get this end4 ,although after our desire has been met they have been eliminated as accidental1 as irrelevant1 yet when the experience is again desired their integral membership in the real fact has to be recognised4 ,this is done under the guise of considering them as means which are necessary to bring about the end4 ,thus the idea of the circumstances as external to the 8fact0 is retained1 while we get all the practical benefit of their being not external but elements of one and the same whole4 ,contingent and necessary are thus the correlative aspects of one and the same fact2 conditions are accidental so far as we have abstracted a fragment and set it up as the whole2 they are necessary the moment it is required to pass from this abstraction back to the concrete fact4 ,both are teleological in character--contingency referring to the separation of means from end1 due to the fact that the end having been already reached the means have lost their value for us2 necessity being the reference of means to an end which has still to be got4 ,necessary means needed2 contingency means no longer required--because already enjoyed4 ,note that the necessity of the means has reference to an end still to be attained1 and in so far itself hypothetical or contingent1 while the contingent circumstances are no longer needed precisely because they have resulted in a definite outcome 7which1 accordingly1 is now a fact1 and1 in that sense1 necessary7 and we begin to see how completely necessity and chance are bound up with each other4 ,their correlation may thus be stated3 ,if we are to reach an end we must take certain means2 while so far as we want an undefined end1 an end in general1 conditions which accompany it are mere accidents4 ,whichever way the relationship be stated1 the underlying truth is that we are dealing with only partial phases of fact1 which1 having been unduly separated from each other through their erection into distinct wholes1 have now to be brought back into their real unity4 ,in the first place1 then1 if ,i am to reach an end1 certain means must be used4 ,here the end is obviously postulated2 save as it is begged 7presupposed71 the necessity of the means has no sense4 ,if1 when starving1 ,i am to live ,i must steal a dinner1 but1 having stolen1 the logical but unsympathetic judge may question the relevancy 7that is1 the necessity7 of my end1 and thus cut the ground out from under the necessity of my means4 ,my end requires its justification1 the establishing of its validity1 before the necessity of the means is anything more than hypothetical4 ,the proximate end must be referred to a more ultimate and inclusive end to get any solid ground4 ,here we have our choice3 we may deny the existence of any organic whole in life and keep chasing in a never-ending series1 the progressus ad infinitum1 after an end valid in itself4 ,in this case we never get beyond a hypothetical necessity--something is necessary if we are to have something else1 the necessity being relative to the implied doubt4 ,or1 being convinced that life is a whole and not a series merely1 we may say there is one comprehensive end which gives its own validity to the lesser ends in so far as they constitute it4 ,while1 on the other alternative1 we reach only a hypothetical necessity1 on this we reach none at all4 ,the comprehensive end is no end at all in the sense of something by itself to be reached by means external to it4 ,any such end would be simply one in the infinite series and would be itself hypothetical4 ,whenever minor ends cease to be in turn means to further ends it is because they have become parts1 constituent elements1 of the higher end and thus ceased to be steps towards an end and beyond and outside of themselves4 ,given a final 7i4 e41 inclusive7 end1 eating and drinking1 study and gossip1 play and business1 cease to be means towards an end and become its concrete definition1 its analytic content4 ,the minor activities state the supreme activity in its specific factors4 ,our dilemma is the choice between an end which itself has no existence save upon presupposition of another end1 7is contingent17 and an end which as an end in itself simply is4 ,the externality of means to end is merely a symptom of lack of specification or concreteness in the end itself4 ,if ,i am going to invent some improvement in a type-writer1 the necessity of going through certain preliminary steps is exactly proportionate to the indefiniteness of my conception of what the improvement is to be2 when the end is realised1 the operations which enter into the realisation cease to be means necessary to an end and become the specific content of that end4 ,the improvement is a fact1 having such and such elements defining it4 ,if ,i simply want1 in general1 to get my mail ,i must take this path 7there being but one road72 but if my end is not thus general1 if it is individualised with concrete filling1 the walk to the office may become a part of the end1 a part of the actual fact4 ,in so far1 of course1 it loses all aspect of necessitation4 ,it simply is4 ,and in general1 so far as my end is vague1 or abstract1 so far as it is not specified as to its details1 so far the filling up of its empty schema to give it particularity 7and thus make it fact7 appears as a means necessary to reach an end outside itself4 ,the growth in concreteness of the end itself is transformed into ways of effecting an end already presupposed4 ,or1 to state it in yet one other way1 determination in the sense of definition in consciousness is hypostatised into determination in the sense of a physical making4 ,the point may come out more clearly if we consider it with the emphasis on chance instead of upon necessity4 ,the usual statement that chance is relative to ignorance seems to me to convey the truth though not in the sense generally intended--viz41 that if we knew more about the occurrence we should see it necessitated by its conditions4 ,chance is relative to ignorance in the sense rather that it refers to an indefiniteness in our conception of what we are doing4 ,in our consciousness of our end 7our acts7 we are always making impossible abstractions2 we break off certain phases of the act which are of chief interest to us1 without any regard to whether the concrete conditions of action--that is1 the deed in its whole definition--permits any such division4 ,then1 when in our actual doing the circumstances to which we have not attended thrust themselves into consciousness--when1 that is to say1 the act appears in more of its own specific nature--we dispose of those events1 foreign to our conscious purpose1 as accidental2 we did not want them or intend them--what more proof of their accidental character is needed8 ,the falling of a stone upon a man's head as he walks under a window is 8chance10 for it has nothing to do with what the man proposed to do1 it is no part of his conception of that walk4 ,to an enemy who takes that means of killing him1 it is anything but an accident1 being involved in his conscious purpose4 ,it is 8chance0 when we throw a two and a six2 for the concreteness of the act falls outside of the content of our intention4 ,we intended a throw1 some throw1 and in so far the result is not accidental1 but this special result1 being irrelevant to our conception of what we were to do1 in so far is contingent4 ,the vagueness or lack of determinateness in our end1 the irrelevancy of actual end to conscious intent1 chance1 are all names for the same thing4 ,and if ,i am asked whether a gambler who has a hundred dollars upon the outcome does not intend to throw double sixes1 ,i reply that he has no such intention--unless the dice are loaded4 ,he may hope to make that throw1 but he cannot intend it save as he can define that act--tell how to do it1 tell1 that is1 just what the act is4 ,or1 once more1 if ,i intend to get my mail and there are four paths open to me it is chance which ,i take1 just in proportion to the abstractness of my end4 ,if ,i have not defined it beyond the mere 8general result0 of getting mail1 anything else is extraneous and in so far contingent4 ,if the end is individualised to the extent1 say1 of getting the mail in the shortest possible time1 or with the maximum of pleasant surroundings1 or with the maximum of healthy exercise1 the indifferency of the 8means10 and with it their contingency1 disappears4 ,this or that path is no longer a mere means which may be taken to get a result foreign to its own value2 the path is an intrinsic part of the end4 ,in so far as a man presents to himself an end in general1 he sets up an abstraction so far lacking in detail as 7taken per se7 to exclude the possibility of realisation4 ,in order to exist as concrete or individual 7and of course1 nothing can exist except as individual or concrete7 it must be defined or particularised4 ,but so far as consciousness is concerned the original vague end is the reality2 it is all that the man cares about and hence constitutes his act4 ,the further particularisation of the end1 therefore1 instead of appearing as what it really is1 viz41 the discovery of the actual reality1 presents itself as something outside that end4 ,this externality to the end previously realised in consciousness is1 taken as mere externality1 contingency1 or accident2 taken as none the less so bound up with the desired end that it must be gone through before reaching that end1 it is necessary4 ,chance1 in other words1 stands for the irrelevancy as the matter at first presents itself to consciousness2 necessity is the required1 but partial1 negation of this irrelevancy4 ,let it be complete1 instead of partial1 and we have the one real activity defined throughout4 ,with reference to this reality1 conditions are neither accidental nor necessary1 but simply constituting elements--they neither may be nor must be1 but just are4 ,what is irrelevant is now not simply indifferent2 it is excluded1 eliminated4 ,what is relevant is no longer something required in order to get a result beyond itself2 it is incorporated into the result1 it is integral4 ,it now remains to connect the two parts of our discussion1 the logical and the practical consideration of necessity1 and show that1 as suggested1 logical necessity rests upon teleological--that1 indeed1 it is the teleological read backwards4 ,the logical process of discovering and stating the reality of some event simply reverses the process which the mind goes through in setting up and realising an end4 ,instead of the killing of an enemy as something to be accomplished1 we have the fact of a murder to be accounted for4 ,just as on the practical side1 the end1 as it first arises in consciousness1 is an end in general and thus contrasts with the concrete end which is individualised2 so the fact1 as at first realised in consciousness1 is a bare fact1 and thus contrasts with the actual event with its complete particularisation4 ,the actual fact1 the murder as it really took place1 is one thing2 the fact as it stands in consciousness1 the phases of the actual event which are picked out and put together1 is another thing4 ,the fact of knowledge1 it is safe to say1 is no fact at all2 that is1 if there had been in reality no more particularisation1 no more of detail1 than there is consciousness1 the murder would never have happened4 ,but just as1 practically1 we take the end in general to be the real thing1 7since it is the only thing of any direct interest17 so in knowledge we take the bare fact as abstracted from the actual whole1 as the fact4 ,just as the end of the savage is merely to kill his enemy1 so the 8fact0 is merely the dead body with the weapon sticking in it4 ,the fact1 as it stands in consciousness1 is indeterminate and partial1 but1 since it is in consciousness by itself1 it is taken as a whole and as the certain thing4 ,but as the abstractness of the 8end in general0 is confessed in the fact that means are required in order to make it real--to give it existence--so the unreal character of the 8fact0 is revealed in the statement that the causes which produced it are unknown and have to be discovered4 ,the bare fact thus becomes a result to be accounted for3 in this conception the two sides are combined2 the 8fact0 is at once given a certain reality of its own while at the same time the lack of concreteness is recognised in the reference to external causes4 ,the gradual introduction of further factors1 under the guise of causes accounting for the effect1 defines the original vague 8fact10 until1 at last1 when it is accounted for1 we have before us the one and only concrete reality4 ,this done1 we no longer have an effect to be accounted for1 and causes which produce it1 but one fact whose statement or description is such and such4 ,but intermediate between the isolation and the integration is the stage when necessity appears4 ,we have advanced1 we will suppose1 from the bare fact of the murder to the discovery of a large amount of 8circumstantial0 evidence regarding that fact4 ,we hear of a man who had a quarrel with the deceased2 he cannot account for himself at the time when the murder must have been committed2 he is found to have had a weapon like that with which the murder must have been committed4 ,finally we conclude he must have been the murderer4 ,what do these 8musts0 7the 8must0 of the time1 weapon1 and murderer7 mean8 ,are they not obviously the gradual filling-in of the previously empty judgment1 through bringing things at first unconnected into relation with each other8 ,the existence of the man ,m4 ,n4 is wholly isolated from the 8fact0 of the murder till it is learned that he had a grudge against the murdered man2 this third fact1 also distinct per se1 brought into connection with the others 7the 8fact0 of the murder and of the existence of ,m4 ,n47 compels them to move together2 the result is at first the possibility1 later1 as the points of connection get more and more marked and numerous1 the 8necessity10 that ,m4 ,n4 is the murderer4 ,further1 it is clear that this 8must0 marks not a greater certainty or actuality than a mere 8is0 would indicate1 but rather a doubt1 a surmise or guess gradually gaining in certainty4 ,when the fact is really made out to our satisfaction1 we drop the 8must0 and fall back on the simple is4 ,only so long as there is room for doubt1 and thus for argument do we state that the time and weapon must have been such and such4 ,so when we finally conclude that the murderer must have been ,m4 ,n41 it means that we have woven a large number of facts1 previously discrete1 into such a state of inter-relationship that we do not see how to avoid denying their discreteness and incorporating them all into one concrete whole1 or individual fact4 ,that we still say 8must0 shows1 however1 that we have not quite succeeded in overcoming the partial and indefinite character of the original 8fact40 ,had we succeeded in getting the whole fact before us the judgment would take this form3 ,the murder is a fact of such and such definite nature1 having as its content such and such precise elements4 ,in this comprehensive whole all distinction of effect to be accounted for and causes which produce clean disappears4 ,the idea of necessity1 in a word1 comes in only while we are still engaged in correcting our original error1 but have not surrendered it root and branch2 this error being that the fragment of reality which we grasp is concrete enough to warrant the appellation 8fact40 ,a great deal of attention has been directed to the category of cause and effect4 ,one striking feature of the ordinary consideration is1 that it takes for granted the matter most needing investigation and aims the inquiry at the dependent member of the firm4 ,the effect seems to be so clearly there1 while the cause is so obviously something to be searched for that the category of effect is assumed1 and it is supposed that only the idea of causation is in need of examination4 ,and yet this abstraction of certain phases of fact1 the erection of the parts thus abstracted into distinct entities1 which1 though distinct1 are still dependent in their mode of existence1 is precisely the point needing examination4 ,it is but another instance of the supreme importance of our practical interests4 ,the effect is the end1 the practical outcome1 which interests us2 the search for causes is but the search for the means which would produce the result4 ,we call it 8means and end0 when we set up a result to be reached in the future and set ourselves upon finding the causes which put the desired end in our hands2 we call it 8cause and effect0 when the 8result0 is given1 and the search for means is a regressive one4 ,in either case the separation of one side from the other1 of cause from effect1 of means from end1 has the same origin3 a partial and vague idea of the whole fact1 together with the habit of taking this part 7because of its superior practical importance7 for a whole1 for a fact4 ,i hope now to have made good my original thesis3 that the idea of necessity marks a certain stage in the development of judgment2 that it refers to a residuum1 in our judgments and thus in our objects1 of indeterminateness or vagueness1 which it replaces without wholly negating2 that it is thus relative to 8chance0 or contingency2 that its value consists wholly in the impulse given judgment towards the is1 or the concrete reality defined throughout4 ,the analysis has been long2 the reader may have found it not only tedious1 but seemingly superfluous1 since1 as he may be saying to himself1 no one nowadays regards necessity as anything but a name for fixed uniformities in nature1 and of this view of the case nothing has been said4 ,i hope1 however1 that when we come to a consideration of necessity as equivalent to uniformity1 it will be found that the course of this discussion has not been irrelevant1 but the sure basis for going further4 ,,john ,,dewey4 ,,footnotes3 #fe ,this article1 as the title may indicate1 was suggested by ,mr4 ,peirce's article upon 8,the ,doctrine of ,necessity ,examined40 ,as1 however1 my thought takes finally a different turn1 ,i have deemed it better to let it run its own course from the start1 and so have not referred1 except indirectly1 to ,mr4 ,peirce's argument4 ,i hope this will not be taken as a desire to slur over my indebtedness to him4 #ff ,the reason of this abstraction is in practical nature1 as already indicated4 ,for all the savage cares about it1 the death in general1 is the real fact4 ,it is all that interests him4 ,it is hardly worth while to attempt to persuade the savage2 indeed1 if he were not only a savage1 but also a philosopher1 he might boldly challenge the objector to present any definition of object which should not refer objectivity to man's practical activity2 although he might1 as a shrewd savage1 admit that some one activity 7or self7 to which the object is referred has more content than another4 ,in this case1 ,i1 for one1 should not care about entering the lists against the savage4 ,but when the common-sense philosopher1 who resists all attempts to reconstruct the original object on the ground that a fact is a fact and all beyond that is metaphysics1 is also a case-hardened nominalist 7as he generally is71 it is time to protest4 ,it might be true that the real object is always relative to the value of some action2 but to erect this pure universal into the object1 and then pride one's self on enlightenment in rejecting the 8scholastic figment0 of the reality of universals is a little too much4 ,,the ,,issues ,,of 8,,synechism40 ,in a late number of ,the ,monist1 7,vol4 ,,ii1 ,no4 #d17 there appears a singularly acute and profound article1 from the pen of one of the ablest of ,american logicians and mathematicians1 ,mr4 ,charles ,s4 ,peirce4 ,its subject is 8,the ,law of ,mind0--the idea of continuity4 ,the writer tells us1 7p4 #ecd17 8the tendency to regard continuity1 in the sense in which ,i shall define it1 as an idea of prime importance in philosophy1 may conveniently be termed ,synechism40 ,with this synechistic philosophy1 as applied to mind1 the paper is occupied1 to the exclusion1 for the nonce1 of ,mr4 ,peirce's companion doctrine of ,tychism1#fg which was dealt with1 by him1 in the ,january1 #ahia1 and ,april1 #ahib1 issues of ,the ,monist4 ,these conceptions are1 both of them1 to be viewed as essential to philosophy as a whole1 but the latter is2 for the present1 allowed to drop out of sight1 in order to allow of the due elaboration of the former4#fh ,,the ,,formula ,,of ,,synechism4 ,the formula of ,synechism1 with which the article begins1 is as follows3 8,logical analysis applied to mental phenomena shows that there is but one law of mind1 namely1 that ideas tend to spread continuously1 and to affect certain others which stand to them in a peculiar relation of affectibility4 ,in this spreading they lose intensity1 and especially the power of affecting others1 but gain generality1 and become welded with other ideas40 7,vol4 ,,ii1 ,no4 #d1 p4 #ecd47 ,the individuality and continuity of ideas are1 then1 shown respectively to involve no contradiction2 an idea once past--in the sense of an event in an individual consciousness--is not wholly past1 it is only going--8infinitesimally past1 less past than any assignable past date40 ,thus the conclusion is reached that 8the present is connected with the past by a series of real1 infinitesimal steps40 ,again1 8,we are forced to say that we are immediately conscious through an infinitesimal interval of time4 ,this is all that is requisite40 7,ibid41 pp4 #ece-ecf47 ,all that it is necessary to say at the outset is1 that this view is supported by an elaborate inquiry into the nature of infinity and continuity in general1 into which1 for the purpose of the present paper1 it is not needful to enter4 ,and this for two reasons3 7#a7 ,the synechistic philosophy1 by itself1 does not profess to be monistic4 ,its expounder does not1 even if his ,tychism were not in reserve1 profess to carry it beyond the realm of mind1 with all that is implied in such a reservation4 ,now1 it is the bearing of ,mr4 ,peirce's ,synechism upon a monistic solution of the universe with which the present article is concerned4 ,and 7#b7 ,mr4 ,peirce's method of treatment1 though precise and logical in the direction of its own path1 is too purely technical to be summarised for the general reader's benefit4 ,but withal1 ,synechism is far too fertile1 not so much in respect of what it makes clear1 as suggestively1 and1 if the expression may be allowed1 obliquely1 to be passed over without comment4 ,its excogitator is eminently frank2 he does not conceal the difficulties which1 ever and anon1 occur in his statement4 ,sometimes his theory seems a trifle too wide for the facts encountered1 sometimes rather too scanty to contain them4 ,such phrases as the following3 8,no1 ,i think we can only hold0--p4 #eeb2 8we are driven to perceive0--p4 #eee2 8this obliges me to say0--p4 #eeg2 8the principle with which ,i set out requires me to maintain0--p4 #eeh2 8the only answer that ,i can1 at present1 make is0--p4 #eei1 etc41 etc41 do every credit to the writer's candor1 but they would scarcely occur in an exposition1 which1 in the mind of its author1 made the rough places altogether plain4 ,synechism1 even with ,tychism in the background1 probably does not1 in ,mr4 ,peirce's own mind1 completely solve the world-riddle1 at least1 as yet4 ,still these very pauses themselves1 on the part of a thinker of such ability1 are eminently suggestive4 ,to use his own words3 8the present paper is intended to show what ,synechism is1 and what it leads to40 ,let us emphasise this latter clause1 as likely to be more fruitful than the former4 ,,mr4 ,,peirce',s ,,positivism4 ,mr4 ,peirce1 in spite of his theory of chance1 is1 in his ,synechism1 almost severely a positivist2#fi but his positivism1 like most of that current nowadays1 does not go deep enough4 ,he is positivist1 after he has got externality--fertile in excitations--comfortably disposed around his subject2 and vibrations1 undulations1 attractions1 etc41 ready to play upon the thousand-stringed harp1 but not before4 ,for1 8we must not tax introspection10 he tells us1 p4 #edh1 8to make a phenomenon manifest1 which essentially involves externality10 when the real problem at issue is3 ,is there externality1 in the vulgar sense1 at all1 or is it only that rationalised externality which circumspection1 within the limits of egoity1 reveals8 ,now1 upon this a good deal hinges4 ,at all events the difference in question1 or1 rather1 that there is a difference1 has been mooted1 to say the least4 ,and1 this being the case1 it is a little tedious1 when the really vital point of the spatial extension of feelings is being debated1 to have this illustration brought in1 7p4 #edh173 8,moreover1 our own feelings are focused in attention to such a degree1 that we are not aware that ideas are not brought to an absolute unity4 ,just as nobody1 not instructed by special experiment1 has any idea how very1 very little of the field of vision is distinct40 ,why1 that is reasoning in a circle1 if some systems are true2 and it is a begging of the question1 if they are the reverse4 ,if the system of so-called objective reality were1 at sight1 wholly veracious1 if everything existed just as it seems1 this positivism of ,mr4 ,peirce's might be workable4 ,then no one would seek to go beneath the process of the apparent1 the actually visible1 for a rationale4 ,but modern science teaches1 in its very primer1 that many things are1 and act1 quite otherwise than as they seem to be1 and do4 ,appearances rationalised are alone to be accepted4 ,the sun does not 8rise0 and 8set10 as it seems to do4 ,the earth is not1 as it appears to be1 an immovable plane1 and so on4 ,and1 this once allowed1 where is the principle to end8 ,if the superficial judgment may be thus corrected1 or reversed1 it is liable to revision or reversal ad infinitum1 unless reason be shown to the contrary4 ,it may thus be disputed whether our author is quite in order in writing1 as he does1 and using the statement to support his theory--8,precisely how primary sensations1 as colors and tones1 are excited1 we cannot tell1 in the present state of psychology4444 ,as far as sight and hearing are in question1 we know that they are only excited by vibrations of inconceivable complexity2 and the chemical senses are probably not more simple40 7,p4 #eeg47 ,to argue1 we cannot tell precisely how they are excited1 but we know that they are excited1 is somewhat feminine2 seeing that the said 8excitement0 is not patent on the surface of ordinary perception4 ,and1 this being the case1 the excitement1 or its mode rather1 not being given immediately1 but only mentally annexed1 ,mr4 ,peirce is not consistently positivist4 ,it is equally open to an opponent to 8annex0 something else of his own to the 8given0 thing1 or altogether to deny the necessity of anything whatever being thus annexed4 ,in any case that 7if anything7 which is sought to be annexed must stand the test of positivism2 we must know if such a thing is1 and what it is precisely4 ,and this is just what ,mr4 ,peirce cannot do for us4 ,he cannot tell us exactly what the 8excitant0 of feelings is2 he can only guess what it is 8something like10 viz43 the feelings themselves4 ,hence the following3 8,the principle with which ,i set out that of continuity requires me to maintain that these feelings are communicated to the nerves by continuity1 so that there must be something like them in the excitants themselves4 ,if this seems extravagant1 it is to be remembered that it is the sole possible way of reaching any explanation of sensation1 which otherwise must be pronounced a general fact absolutely inexplicable and ultimate4 ,now absolute inexplicability is a hypothesis which sound logic refuses1 under any circumstances1 to justify40 7,p4 #eeh4--,the italics are not in the original47 ,there must be something like the feelings in the excitants of the feelings4 ,now1 this point is worthy of the closest attention4 ,note that 8the excitant0 alone is mentioned4 ,vibrations excite sight and hearing4 ,yet1 from what follows1 it is plain that ,synechism is not inconsistent with belief in a fixed objective4 8,even the least psychical of peripheral sensations1 that of pressure1 has1 in its excitation1 conditions which1 though apparently simple1 are seen to be complicated enough when we consider the molecules and their attractions10 pp4 #eeg-eeh4 ,can there1 then1 be any doubt that we have here three distinct things3 7#a7 a subjective1 7#b7 an 8excitant10 and 7#c7 an objective2 the middle term being a vehicle of communication between the first and third8 ,it does not affect this presentation of ,mr4 ,peirce's position that1 at an earlier stage of his argument1 he speaks of matter--synonymous1 presumably1 with the objective--as being 8not completely dead1 but merely mind1 hide-bound with habits10 as 8partially deadened0 or 8effete10 mind2 or that the editor of ,the ,monist says that1 with ,mr4 ,peirce1 8mind is the beginning of all40 7,the ,monist1 ,vol4 ,,iii1 ,no4 #a1 p4 #ie47 ,the question1 at present1 is not regarding origins1 but regarding co-existences4 ,so that there is a distinct hiatus here1 arising from the confusion of the stimulant1 or excitant1 of sensation with the objective itself4#gj ,now1 the stimulant of sensation is never the object perceived4 ,hence1 once an objective is admitted1 a trinity of entities is unavoidable1 since still less can the 8stimulant0 be the subject4 ,this special difficulty1 in the present writer's opinion1 is inseparable from dualism in every form4 ,how it besets ,mr4 ,peirce's theory is evident from his hazarded suggestion3 8,there must be something like the feelings in the excitants40 ,he thus uses only two of his cosmical terms1 and gives the third the go-by6 ,all dualism halts1 but surely there is here a palpable stumble4 ,in a recent article in ,the ,open ,court#ga ,i have pointed out the vanity of introducing a vehicle of communication between object and subject1 especially emphasising the fact that1 once this intermediate term is brought in1 the veritable objective disappears4 8,once you bring in vibrations10 ,i remarked1 8you practically provide a second object1 which is really a part of the subject1 and1 in order to do this1 you have taken from the original objective all that composed it40#gb 7,the ,open ,court1 p4 #ccfa47 ,is it any wonder1 then1 that ,mr4 ,peirce should suppose the excitants to be 8something like0 the excited feelings8 ,since he1 practically1 surrenders the objective1 what could more closely resemble the subjective than the subjective itself8 ,if he had adopted the position of ,hume1 and made impressions and ideas all-in-all1 his principle of continuity might hold4 ,but this he does not do1 since 7#a7 he implicitly admits the objective element1 and 7#b7 even if he did not do this1 there must be something other than the idea or feeling in his system1 since1 otherwise1 there could be no ground for the charge of seeming 8extravagance10 which1 he admits1 may be leveled against1 at least one of1 his conclusions4 ,,feelings ,,spatially ,,extended4 ,this leads us to ,mr4 ,peirce's conclusions regarding subjective spatial extension--the spatial extension of feelings--as the result of observation of irritated protoplasm4 ,our attention is directed to an excited mass of protoplasm1--an amba1 or a slime-mould1--which 8does not differ in any radical way from the contents of a nerve-cell1 though its functions may be less specialised40 7,p4 #edg47 ,the irritation is induced when1 say1 the amba is 8quiescent and rigid10 and we note its behaviour under it4 ,that feeling passes from one part of this amorphous continuum of protoplasm to another1 we are led to believe4 ,and this conclusion follows3 8,whatever there is in the whole phenomenon to make us think there is feeling in such a mass of protoplasm1--feeling1 but plainly no personality1--goes logically to show that that feeling has a subjective1 or substantial1 spatial extension1 as the excited state has40 ,this is a chain of reasoning4 ,let us examine its links4 ,we have3 7#a7 ,the behaviour of the amba under immediate1 mechanical irritation--the spread1 or spatial extension1 of the state of irritation4 7#b7 ,we are asked to identify this spread-out irritation1 this field of excitation1 with 8feeling0 on the part of the amba1 because there is 8no doubt that it feels when it is excited40 7#c7 ,from the spatial extension of the irritation1 thus identified with feeling1 we are asked to conclude that the feeling1 in the amba1 has a subjective1 spatial extension as the excited state has1 and1 finally1 passing from the feeling of the amba to our own feelings1 by inference1 we are asked to admit3 7#d7 ,not that we have necessarily a feeling of bigness1 but that 8the feeling inferentially arrived at from the spread-out irritation on the part of the amba as a subject of inhesion is big40 7,p4 #edh47 ,after this1 we are disposed to agree with ,mr4 ,peirce when he says3 8,this is1 no doubt1 a difficult idea to seize02 not1 as he goes on to say1 8for the reason that it is a subjective1 not an objective1 extension10 but on the ground that the reasoning involves1 plainly1 not only the subjective and objective1 but what ,clifford calls the 8ejective10 as well1 and this assumption1 inter alia1 that the last-named lies on the same plane as the former4 ,never1 surely1 was the conclusion that feelings have spatial extension more easily reached4 ,it is only when we find that in 7#a7 we are dealing with the objective pure and simple1 observed phenomena2 that in 7#b7 the connection between irritation or excitation1 and feeling is assumed1 in the object1 because feeling1 subjectively1 is found to accompany irritation2 that 7#c7 as the irritation1 in the amba1 is spread out1 so is the feeling to be viewed2 and 7#d7 that1 as the feeling of the amba1 so is our feeling to be considered1 viz43 that the feeling1 8as a subject of inhesion1 is big10 we are led to say after all this1 that1 by such a process1 anything1 or everything1 could be demonstrated1--the field of spatial extension1 for example1 having no more claim to be assumed than the point at which the irritation admittedly begins4 ,why should the middle stage of the irritation be selected in preference to the initial and final ones8 ,the irritation originates in a point1 spreads1 and then dies out4 ,thus our feeling1 7we purposely use ,mr4 ,peirce's nomenclature17 or idea1 of an elephant1 is unquestionably1 as a subject of inhesion1 8big40 ,but only for a time1 and not at first4 ,really1 our idea1 or feeling--in ,synechism--of an elephant1 must logically commence as a minute speck1 and return to this vanishing-point again4 ,there is no other way out of it4 ,for must not the analogy of the irritated amba be followed throughout1 and if not1 why not8 ,,dualism ,,and ,,the ,,way ,,out4 ,the crux of philosophy1 from the time of ,hume to the present day1 has been1 what may be summarised as1 the consciousness of succession as succession4 ,the hours pass over the mental dial1 but1 though one succeeds the other1 something is needed besides the succession of the terms of the series to give consciousness of the series as a series1 to give the synthesis of the day made up of hours4 ,hume virtually gave up the problem in eviscerating the subjective4 ,prof4 ,t4 ,h4 ,green only missed the point at issue when he placed his eternal consciousness1 which was to 8have and to hold0 the terms of the cosmical series1 as it were in solution1 for the human organism1 out of time altogether4 ,mr4 ,peirce puts the matter boldly when he says3 8,an idea once past is gone forever1 in the sense of an event in an individual consciousness1 and any supposed recurrence of it is another idea40 7,p4 #ecd47 ,in order1 then1 that an idea past may be present really1 and not vicariously1 the notion that consciousness necessarily occupies an interval of 7finite7 time must be given up2 since1 to put it briefly1 a second past is as much past as a year4 ,according to ,mr4 ,peirce then1 and his contention is supported by an elaborate inquiry into the nature of infinity and continuity generally1 8we are immediately conscious through an infinitesimal interval of time40 ,for the complete rationale1 reference must necessarily be made to the article itself4 ,even the above outline1 however1 is sufficient to show that1 here as elsewhere1 ,mr4 ,peirce's dualism is his snare4 ,nothing but this could lead to a disintegration so complete as the following3 8,in this infinitesimal interval1 not only is consciousness continuous in a subjective sense1 that is1 considered as a subject1 or substance1 having the attribute of duration2 but also1 because it is immediate consciousness1 its object is ipso facto continuous40 7,p4 #ecf47 ,this is to admit1 practically1 that there is something in consciousness other than the consciousness itself4 ,and this is evident1 because at one and the same time1 7whether an interval of finite time1 or an infinitesimal interval1--whether an 8instant0 or a 8moment10--does not matter17 these two entities are different4 ,for3 8,this mediate perception is objectively1 or as to the object represented1 spread over the four instants2 but subjectively1 or as itself the subject of duration1 it is completely embraced in the second moment40 7,ibid47 ,but this 8mediate0 and 8immediate0 cannot simultaneously exist1 unless there is something else to which they do so exist4 ,it is only paltering with us in a double sense to speak of 8instant0 and 8moment0 in this connection4 ,the one may pass into the other1 but there is 8a time when0 7it matters not whether the interval be finite or infinitesimal7 they do not coexist4 ,hence1 they are not the same1 but different4 ,according to ,mr4 ,peirce's notation1 for all ordinary purposes we may write1 if a is a finite quantity1 and i an infinitesimal1 a i a4 8,that is to say1 this is so for all purposes of measurement40 ,be it so2 the infinitesimal may be neglected for purposes of calculation4 ,but such a formula can only be experimental4 ,the theory which embodies it cannot avail for a world-scheme2 to admit it would be to grant that a thing is1 and is not1 at one and the same time4 ,surely the most superficial reader will see that1 to put it popularly1 a world-scheme admits of no alternative subject to accept1 or to reject1 a neglectable quantity4 ,and this is not the only instance of dualism in ,mr4 ,peirce's world-scheme as a totality4 ,for have we not ,synechism and ,tychism as well8 ,with the latter ,mr4 ,peirce does not deal in the paper now under consideration4 ,he must1 however1 be credited1 or debited1 with it1 as held in reserve4 ,for our present purpose it is not necessary to examine ,tychism in detail4 ,its alleged existence is sufficient4 ,for1 and here let the significance of what follows be noted1 in ,mr4 ,peirce's view1 as opposed to determinism1 ,tychism exists as a principle4 ,it is1 otherwise it could not be expounded as operative4 ,but it also exists as an idea1 first1 it may be1 in our author's mind1 and subsequently in the minds of his disciples4 ,thus it falls into the synechistic province3 8,as an idea it can only be affected by an idea1 by anything but an idea it cannot be affected at all40 78,the ,law of ,mind10 p4 #eeg47 ,yet to affirm ,tychism thus impotent1 because unaffectible1 outside the synechistic sphere1 is to contradict ,mr4 ,peirce's conclusions1 for if ,tychism is nothing outside the ideal realm1 it is altogether inside it4 ,hence ,synechism is everything practically1 and ,tychism nothing4 ,but that ,mr4 ,peirce will not have4 ,he has a two-fold ,tychism1 that is the fact2 actual and operative on the one hand1 ideal on the other4 ,and this is dualism confessed4 ,mr4 ,peirce's method is quite fertile in duplication of the subjective entity4 ,his latest paper1 8,man's ,glassy ,essence10 7,the ,monist1 ,vol4 ,,iii1 ,no4 #a17 contains some typical instances4 8,viewing a thing from the outside1 considering its relations of action and reaction with other things1 it appears as matter4 ,viewing it from the inside1 looking at its immediate character as feeling1 it appears as consciousness40 7,p4 #bj47 ,this is the strictly empirical view4 ,and it may be possibly defended with the contention that all problems1 to be duly examined1 must1 in the first place1 be viewed from that standpoint4 ,but it must be plainly manifest to any unprejudiced thinker that1 even granted a total cosmical problem made up of separate problems of an individual nature1 the same method of solving the sum cannot be employed which is used in solving its constituents4 ,in the above instance1 considering matter in its totality1 and consciousness in its totality1 what is left to view them indifferently from 8outside10 or 8inside08 ,plainly nothing4 ,still more transparent an example is the following3 8,the consciousness of a habit involves a general idea4 ,in each action of that habit certain atoms get thrown out of their orbit1 and replaced by others4 ,upon all the different occasions it is different atoms that are thrown off1 but they are analogous from a physical point of view1 and there is an inward sense of their being analogous4 ,every time one of the associated feelings recurs1 there is a more or less vague sense that there are others1 that it has a general character1 and of about what this general character is40 7,p4 #bj47 ,this is part of the answer to the query3 ,how do general ideas appear in the molecular theory of protoplasm8 ,now1 without discussing the value of this rationale1 as affecting ,mr4 ,peirce's own theories1 it is not difficult to see what its acceptance would 8lead to40 ,certain atoms of a molecule get thrown out and are replaced by others4 ,this happens repeatedly4 ,on different occasions different atoms come and go4 ,yet they are 8analogous10 and there is 8an inward sense0 of this4 ,upon whose shoulders is the burden of proving the analogy placed1 or of experiencing it even8 ,with whom or what is there 8an inward sense08 ,perhaps it is better not to answer otherwise than to say that if this faculty be not present in the ever changing molecule to begin with1 it cannot be logically reached by any process of multiplying it4 ,,the ,,monistic ,,solution4 ,monism1 as a unitary system of the universe1 does not necessarily commend itself to acceptance simply as monism4 ,to say1 this is dualism1 therefore it cannot be a correct rationale of the universe1 since the only true one must be monistic1 is to start with an unphilosophical prepossession4 ,the true solution may be two-fold1 or it may be manifold4 ,but it is not too much to say1 perhaps1 on the other hand1 that1 even as causes may not be multiplied without necessity1 even so phenomena must not logically be divided into independent groupings without sufficient reason given4 ,preference should be accorded to a monistic1 rather than to a dualistic1 system1 not on the ground alone of the simplicity of the former1 but on the ground that a theory which has one explanation for one set of phenomena and another explanation for a second set1 must first demonstrate that a unitary conception of the universe is1 at least1 improbable1 otherwise it will always be hinted that the dualism in question has not gone deep enough to find a synthetic bond wherewith to unite the apparently diverse4 ,mr4 ,peirce1 throughout his article on ,synechism1 constantly touches1 despite his latent dualism1 the margin of a truth so great as to merit the title of transcendent4 ,as often he misses it4 ,and his concluding words are1 in this connection1 almost wistful3 8,the facts that stand before our face and eyes and stare us in the face1 are far from being1 in all cases1 the ones most easily discerned4 ,that has been remarked from time immemorial40 7,p4 #eei47 ,but though thus 8remarked10 the maxim has1 as immemorially1 been neglected in practice4 ,to none can this remark be more fitly applied than to the excogitator of ,synechism1 himself seeing that1 having arrived at the point of asserting that 8there must be something like the feelings in the excitants themselves10 he does not see that the excitant and the feeling are one and the same2 and that there is no second or third term in the cosmical equation4 ,does this seem 8extravagant08 ,if so1 the reply must be not that it is the only escape from an otherwise inexplicable difficulty1 but that there is really no difficulty at all4 ,what ,mr4 ,peirce's own ,synechism 8leads to0 is that the past1 the present1 and the to-come1 alike of matter and idea1 are not reconciled by 8time and its flow10 or even by the logic of infinitesimals1 subtle though that may be1 but that the contents of each and all1 with all their apparently infinite variety1 resolve into a consistent unity4 ,,the 8,,missing ,,link40 ,pushed to a logical conclusion1 the excitants and the feelings owe their apparent variety to their assigned position in a series1 the correspondence or relation between them being only another link in the self-same chain4 ,vulgar realism never fathoms this explanation4 ,it always harps upon the one string that idealism1 and more especially idealistic monism1 fails to account for variety or difference2 forgetting1 or rather never seeing1 that difference or variety which is its essence1 is only one more added perception on the same plane with ordinary perceptions2 so that given a1 b1 c1 d1--sundry perceptions1--their essential variety may be stated as e4 ,or this may be stated numerically2 variety1 as a whole1 being nothing more than the sum of differences1 which is always something other than the terms differentiated1 but always on the same level with them--the difference between any continuous number1 above unity1 and another number being a third number1 which is different from either4 ,variety in numbers cannot be expressed otherwise than numerically4 ,so1 in the last recess1 the variety of colors is only colorable1 of tones audible1 and so on4 ,the 8vibrations of inconceivable complexity0 which1 according to ,mr4 ,peirce1 8excite sight and hearing10 can be approximately stated numerically1 so that the difference between red and1 say1 yellow1 is a number corresponding to another color1 which may be orange or not2 it being part of the present scientific theory of light that any specific number of ethereal undulations happening between the colors of the ocular spectrum1 corresponds to a possible color1 although the retinal expanse may be insensible to these particular rates of tremor4 ,to ,mr4 ,peirce it may appear 8extravagant10 but the difference between any two colors and tones is another color1 another tone2 just as the difference between any two numbers is a third number4 ,this is the logical outcome of his own ,synechism2 this1 in part1 is what it 8leads to40 ,,time ,,and ,,its 8,,flow0 ,,rationalised4 ,excitants and feelings being unified1 and the element of variety1 hitherto supposed to be the exclusive copyright of vulgar realism1 shown to be nothing but another term added to the series1 or1 numerically1 a concurrent series--so that should a1 b1 c1 d 444 be a series1 the variety of the series may be expressed as e1 or the individual differences as f1 g1 h 444--it only needs an examination of what ,mr4 ,peirce terms 8time and its flow10 to render his system a completely monistic one1 and this although true monism is much more than the negation of determinism1 synechistically expressed4 ,in ,mr4 ,peirce's article under examination1 8,the ,law of ,mind10 the notation of infinitesimals1 which forms the keystone of ,synechism1 is only introduced after a lament over the incapacity1 or unworkableness rather1 of finite time1 when the duration of consciousness is involved4 ,if finite time is to come in as a factor--8an idea once past in the sense of an event in an individual consciousness is gone forever1 and any supposed recurrence of it is another idea0 7p4 #ecd74 ,and the problem which ,mr4 ,peirce sets himself to solve is how in effect to bring back this past idea--not vicariously--but in all its pristine freshness1 into the now-time4 ,this is sought to be accomplished by the explanation that the past idea is 8not wholly past1 it is only going1 less past than any assignable past date0--and so on through the intricacies of ,mr4 ,peirce's infinitesimal theory1 into which we need not enter at present4 ,but the statement of the1 supposed1 difficulty which finite time presents in this connection1--the past idea really past and gone1 and the recurrence of it another idea1--if put in a slightly different form1 hints a solution1 in continuity with the foregoing pages1 without the aid of the infinitesimal at all4 ,that an idea is once past and gone1 any occurrence1 or recurrence1 of this idea1 is another idea4#gc ,but1 in the meantime1 let us see what ,mr4 ,peirce has to say regarding 8time and its flow03 8,one of the most marked features about the law of mind is1 that it makes time to have a definite direction of flow from past to future4 ,the relation of past to future is1 in reference to the law of mind1 different from the relation of future to past4 ,this makes one of the great contrasts between the law of mind and the law of physical force1 where there is no more distinction between the two opposite directions in time than between moving northward1 and moving southward0 7p4 #edf74 ,this for once is not very clear4 ,it is difficult to see how 8the law of physical force0 can be spoken of as 8in time10 to the exclusion of mind2 not easy1 also1 to understand the distinction further insisted upon4 ,but the intention is evident1 viz41 to perpetuate1 if not to originate1 a cosmical duality4 ,time1 it would seem1 marches indifferently in at least two directions1 though it is not very clear how this is accomplished4 ,and then the old fiction follows1 that 8,time1 as the universal form of change1 cannot exist unless there is something to undergo change1 etc40 7p4 #edg47 ,the same notation suits in this case as in the foregoing4 ,time is only another term in the series4 ,if a1 b1 c1 d be a series1 e is the variety1 f the whole time involved1 and g the individual intervals4 ,of course all this is not a simple series1 it is an infinitely complicated one2 the above arrangement is only intended to show that difference1 variety1 time1 etc41 are no mysterious entities pervading events1 acting as their 8form0 or carrying them in their 8flow10 but simply percepts1 or concepts1 on a level with others4 ,this is not patent on the surface1 it may be4 ,time has the appearance of a current in which events float4 ,but this is an illusion dispelled by examination4 ,events cannot be submerged in time4 ,time cannot be the vehicle of events4 ,it is impossible to conceive time as existing simultaneously with an event4 ,it always follows it4 ,what to ,mr4 ,peirce appears as a 8flow10 arises from the foregoing4 ,take events1 percepts1 or concepts1 as a hypothetical series1 a1 b1 c1 d 444 and their times as a1 b1 c1 d 444 the first series contains the event per se1 or as happening2 the 8time when0 is contained in the second series1 practically inseparable from the first1 but the time when necessarily follows--consequently if the first be a1 the second must be1 at least a4 ,but no concept or percept is abstract1 except the concept time itself1 which1 being unconnected1 seems anywhere1 and1 like its fellow-abstract space1 is spread out1 to us1 tri-dimensionally1 as past1 present1 and to come4 ,and1 as in space the position is simply spectral1#gd a question of perspective or adjustment1 so1 in time1 the timal series is adjusted to the substantive idea4 ,but this two-fold spectral succession breeds by comparative intensity 7which is another complex series7 the sense of a flow1 where there is none1 but only the idea of a flowing1 which is another matter4 ,thus1 the so-called 8veil of the future0 is no more a veil than it is a brickbat4 ,it is simply the indeterminateness of an unconnected adjective--as if one should say1 white--and the query arises1 ,what is it that is white8 ,when the noun is supplied you have something definite4 ,just so1 when the future lapses into the present4 ,thus there is never anything without1 at least1 these three additions3 first1 variety or difference2 second1 time2 third1 relation1 spatial or otherwise4 ,these are all terms in a series1 or set of concurrent series4 ,nothing can be1 practically1 isolated1 for everything runs in a series4 ,but this is a much broader theory of continuity than that which ,synechism affords4#ge ,all apparent perplexities vanish4 ,the difficulty no longer exists that to perceive a series we must hold it1 as it were1 in solution4 ,since other than series nothing is4 ,hence the cosmos is an illimitable series or complex of series4 ,but inasmuch as the timal element 7as also the spatial7 occurs through the series having time-term and space-term resident within it1 all difficulty in apprehending it as a series vanishes4 ,the impracticability1 if any1 would be in viewing any term as isolated4 ,,the ,,result ,,re ,,tychism4 ,what a flood of light does such a system shed indirectly upon ,tychism1 since the controversy between the latter and determinism mainly hinges upon the 8must be10 the imperative1 as it were1 of the series6 ,it has been very ably pointed out by ,dr4 ,carus in his article re ,mr4 ,peirce's 8,onslaught on the ,doctrine of ,necessity0 7,the ,monist1 ,vol4 ,,ii1 ,no4 #d1 pp4 #egc-d47 that the formula adopted by ,mr4 ,peirce in his ,tychism1 8chance is first1 law is second1 the tendency of habits is third10 involves its author in the admission of a law in a system professing to be1 in its inception at all events1 chanceful and lawless4 ,mr4 ,peirce's 8,synechism0 professes to be the law of mind4 ,parenthetically1 however1 it may be remarked1 that the distinction as to law1 and lawlessness or 8chance10 narrows itself to the plane of one term more or less in a series1 or even to less than that subordinate place4 ,for1 although1 for convenience sake1 and for facility of contrast1 we have followed ,mr4 ,peirce's figure of a series1 to show more clearly also to what his theory leads1 it is nevertheless plain1 that time and its accompanying relations being placed on their proper level1 that of integral percepts and concepts1 the figure of a series is simply a matter of convenience of arrangement4 ,certainly as the 8time when0 is necessarily annexed to every percept and concept the timal element may be said to follow1 not to precede1 its fellow-term4 ,really1 however1 they may be said to be simultaneous1 since the timal refinements of finite1 infinite1 past1 present1 and future are each of them contained in a percept of its own4 ,,externality ,a ,,serial ,,term4 ,but if the timal element be independent as a separate percept1 the spatial as another1 and so on1 it follows that1 although the terms of the series may1 as it were1 run1 though we cannot conceive them separated1 or as1 in practice1 otherwise than as continuous in their flow1 still1 theoretically1 a series or complex of series it is1 and a series may be interrupted at any term4 ,thus externality itself being a spatial relation1 is but one term more1 non-essential in theory1 to the term preceding4 ,so that when the ,neo-,kantians speak of the 8constitution of the objective0 it ought to be added that it is not only the content of the objective which is thus constituted by consciousness1 but that externality1 all that goes to make up what is termed 8out-sidedness10 is constituted by consciousness also4 ,,the ,,now-,,time4 8,the present is half past1 and half to come10 7p4 #edf7 like the color of a curved boundary line on a particolored surface2 i4 e4 8betwixt and between0 the two4 ,it is here that the theory of ,synechism shows its chief defect4 ,up to this stage we have been dealing with ideas1 feelings1 a1 b1 c1 d 444 successively passing through a point of consciousness e4 ,and the infinitesimal notation suits the required process fairly well4 ,it is complicated enough1 but it is ingenious1 and at least plausible4 ,nothing up to this stage would lead us to suppose that any additional element was to be imported into the rationale which ,mr4 ,peirce presents4 ,as we have seen1 finite time would not serve his purpose4 ,by however minute a finite interval have a1 b1 c or d passed the point e1 all chance of their recovery is hopeless4 ,well1 we have recourse to infinitesimals1 and find 7to put it popularly1 and not in ,mr4 ,peirce's technical terms7 that a past the point of consciousness by an infinitesimal interval heralds b4 ,so that e is simultaneously confronted with the disappearing form of the first and the appearing form of the second1 and the same with b1 and c1 in turn1 and so on4 ,thus the present1 in the sense of ideas successively passing through consciousness1 is half a and half b1 then half b and half c1 this infinitesimal gradation ultimately ensuring the presence of the whole series in the last 8moment40 ,but this will not avail with the concept time itself as distinguished from timed succession4 ,that these two are separate with ,mr4 ,peirce it is impossible to doubt4 ,he says1 e4 g41 8,time with its continuity logically involves some other kind of continuity than its own10 7p4 #edg7 and speaks of 8time and its flow10 and of 8time as the universal form of change40 ,and it is confusing1 to say the least1 when we are shifted without warning from what is practically the perceptual to the conceptual region4 ,granted the ideas1 the feelings1 or what not1 8gliding almost imperceptibly0 7as did the late ,mr4 ,bardell to another sphere7 past the central point of consciousness1 yet not wholly past1 only going1 less past than any assignable past date1 granted this1 the assertion is not consequently warranted that time itself1 the present1 as time1 not as involving the succession of ideas1 is 8half past and half to come40 ,the ideas1 the feelings1 of which ,mr4 ,peirce writes1 successively pass through the stage of being thus half past and half to come1 but that is by no means the same thing as saying that the present is half past1 half to come1 as ,synechism avers4 ,with our theory1 as presented in the foregoing pages there is indeed no such difficulty1 but ,mr4 ,peirce1 on the other hand1 has elected to stand by infinitesimally measuring time1 as applied to ideas etc41 as separate from conceptual time1 and must take the consequences of his decision4 ,he says the present1 not the present idea4 ,now1 in the concept time as a whole1 in its entire range1 a definite point may be selected--to the exclusion of other points--a point having position but not extension1 as the present4 ,is it1 then1--the present1--half past1 half to come1 as a timed idea is8 ,certainly not4 ,there is nothing of the flow of a series in it4 ,further1 this selection of the 8now10 as a point1 does not interfere with its permanence4 8,nowness0 may persist4 ,and the moment it partook1 even infinitesimally1 of the character of the past or of the future1 it would cease to be the present4 ,in the case of a series of ideas in time the difficulty is to get them all in present solution1 as it were1 without detriment to their evident continuity1 but the definition of the present as a point in time presents no such difficulty4 ,the conditions are quite distinct4 ,yet regarding this time point--the present--,mr4 ,peirce assures us that it is 8half past1 half to come10 which is just that of which it is the precise negation1 if words are to have any meaning4 ,again1 ,mr4 ,peirce's rationale shows1 upon the face of it1 that there is 7#a7 finitely divisible time and1 7#b7 time divided infinitesimally1 for what finite time could not do1 in that it had limitations1 the infinitesimal notation readily accomplishes4 ,in its ulterior consequences1 this is somewhat unfortunate for ,synechism1 inasmuch as the consciousness of ideas in continuity being confined to the infinitesimal theory1 where1 it may be asked1 is the place1 in consciousness1 for the succession of finite intervals8 ,consciousness must be practically doubled1 so to speak1 if it is to hold both of these together4 ,this is what comes of making one's world-scheme hang upon a mathematical subtlety--the subtlety in question partaking as a rule1 more or less of the nature of an escape from the difficulties of the vulgar notation1 the vulgar notation remains to be reckoned with1 and both have to be credited to consciousness4 ,as an instance of this take the following from ,mr4 ,peirce's late article1#gf 8,man's ,glassy ,essence0--p4 #ae3 8,in order that a sub-molecule of food may be thoroughly and firmly assimilated into a broken molecule of protoplasm1 it is necessary not only that it should have precisely the right chemical composition1 but also that it should be at precisely the right spot at the right time and should be moving in precisely the right direction with precisely the right velocity4 ,if all these conditions are not fulfilled1 444 it will be in special danger of being thrown out again0 7,the italics are not in the original74 ,now here is a 8time when0 which can be exactly specified in accordance with the conditions4 ,certain results follow unless it is kept to4 ,this is what ,mr4 ,peirce would doubtless consider as a timed physical event1 part and parcel of the regularity of matter1 and yet an event which1 in its own time and way1 goes to account for both feeling and habit-taking--capable1 therefore1 of being stated in terms of finite time1 as happening at a given instant1 and neither before nor after it4 ,but when this same molecule is1 by virtue of keeping its appointment punctually1 safely installed in feeling protoplasm1 the succession of ideas1 or feelings1 of which1 as subject1 it is capable1 obeys another rule--a given instant obtains no longer2 it is the moment which is everything#gg--;a moment half its predecessor1 half its successor4 ,even granted the function of the infinitesimal1 this looks very much like a reduction to absurdity4 ,for1 if the above mentioned timed coalescence of the sub-molecule with the broken molecule were also a matter of subjective feeling1 passed as process through a consciousness1 the conclusion follows that the juncture of the molecules happens at two different times6 ,there is no escape from this4 ,given the instant in the one case1 the moment in the other1 these two cannot possibly be the same point in time4 ,the moment partakes1 however insensibly1 of the preceding and succeeding stages1 the instant does not4 ,hence they are not the same but different times4 ,,otherness4 ,the foregoing has a distinct bearing upon the question of 8other selves0 of which ,mr4 ,peirce writes as follows3 8,the recognition by one person of another's personality takes place by means to some extent identical with the means by which he is conscious of his own personality4 ,the idea of the second personality1 which is as much as to say that second personality itself1 enters within the field of direct consciousness of the first person1 and is as immediately perceived as his ego1 though less strongly4 ,at the same time1 the opposition between the two persons is perceived1 so that the externality of the second is recognised40 78,the ,law of ,mind10 p4 #eeh47 ,this is the scheme of 8otherness0 which1 in the case of the ,neo-,kantians1 particularly the ,french section1 represented by ,m4 ,pillon1 ,m4 ,renouvier1 and others1 has proved such a snare4 ,to these thinkers1 7as indeed to the late ,prof4 ,t4 ,h4 ,green1 of ,oxford1 though in a less degree17 the so-called external world lies in 8other0 thinking subjects--in 8foreign centres of representations40 ,the free-trade doctrine has verily penetrated to the philosophic region--the wholesale admission of foreign wares to the detriment of home products4 ,why should ,i place the content of that so-called external world1 which1 external or internal1 is my very own inalienably1 in a centre of representation other than my own1 thus making my cognition of it rest entirely upon the 8ejective0 plane8 ,it is only when ,i discover1 as ,i must sooner or later1 that there is nothing in the report of an 8outsider0 7or in any number of them7 beyond what ,i credit him or her with in my own consciousness2 and that the outsider is on the same plane as other objects1 it is only then that the mystification is cleared up4 ,i do not cognise1 or recognise1 the external at second-hand4 ,the 8note0 of otherness is simply another term more or less in the cosmical series4 ,it is1 however1 not only with the familiar 8other selves0 of ordinary life that we are confronted in ,synechism4 ,in the creed of animism 8,millions of spiritual creatures walk the earth10 and ,mr4 ,peirce speaks of 8spiritual influences0 7p4 #eei7 as having at least no hindrance presented to them by his doctrine4 ,but he has some other shadowy personalities at command1 which1 it must be confessed1 are well calculated to give us pause4 8,there should be something like#gh personal consciousness in bodies of men who are in intimate and intensely sympathetic communion4444 ,none of us can fully realise which the minds of corporations are4444 ,but the law of mind clearly points to the existence of such personalities40 ,it is probably true that the 8minds of corporations10 must ever present an insoluble riddle of perversity to the suburban dweller1 vexed with the mockery of paving and lighting4 ,but we need not linger over this speculation1 for there are other shades behind4 8,if such a fact is capable of being made out anywhere it should be in the ,church4444 ,surely a personality ought to have developed in that ,church1 in that #8bride of ,christ1' as they call it40 78,man's ,glassy ,essence10 pp4 #ba-bb47 ,a ,,personal ,,creator4 ,bearing our ecclesiastical divisions in mind1 it is difficult to conceive the unity of a 8corporate personality0 of this kind1 but1 to let that pass1 it may be remarked that1 when any one begins to imagine that there are others in the universe besides himself1 he is not1 as a rule1 content with two or three companions of his solitude4 ,they come in battalions4 ,thus1 behind the other selves1 corporate personalities and spiritual influences of ,synechism1 there looms a transcendent personality4 8,a genuine evolutionary philosophy10 we are told1 8444 is so far from being antagonistic to the idea of a personal ,creator1 that it is really inseparable from that idea40 ,and a philosophy of pseudo-evolutionism is 8hostile to all hopes of personal relations to ,god40 78,the ,law of ,mind10 p4 #eeg47 ,mr4 ,peirce thus assigns to his first cause a place in the continuum of ideas1 and says that if there is a personal ,god we must have a direct perception of that person and 8indeed be in personal communication with him40 ,the difficulty1 he admits1 is that if this be so1 how is it possible that the existence of this being should ever have been doubted by anybody4 ,and the only answer he can at present make is1 that 8facts that stand before our face and eyes1 and stare us in the face1 are far from being in all cases the ones most easily discerned4 ,that10 he adds1 8has been remarked from time immemorial40 78,the ,law of ,mind10 pp4 #eeh-eei47 ,one of the ablest of living philosophical writers1 ,professor ,veitch1 of ,glasgow ,university1 puts it somewhat similarly1 though with his own realistic coloring1 when he says3 8,god1 if at all1 must rise above the line of finite regress2 ,he cannot be a cause in that2 ,he cannot be a cause dependent on another cause2 ,he must be somewhere1 or at some point1 in the line of an otherwise endless scientific regress1 there1 above it1 yet related to it1 and in it2 otherwise ,he is nothing for us40 78,knowing and ,being10 p4 #cbj47 ,the parallelism is worth noting4 ,those views embody what has been the contention of the present writer throughout this paper1 with this most notable difference3 that no term of a series may thus transcend the series1 or be other than on a level with the other terms1 being itself only a term1 a link1 in the series itself4 ,and with this falls forever the idea of a cause uncaused4 ,yet am ,i not in the series8 ,for all that is in the series is mine every percept1 every concept2 so that1 8extravagant0 as it may appear1 it is ,i who am the series4 ,in other words1 the ego is the universe-synthesis1 and the universe-synthesis the ego4 ,is ,mr4 ,peirce prepared to take the consequences of that which his ,synechism leads to8 ,g4 ,m4 ,,mccrie4 ,,footnotes3 #fg ,from 1 chance4 #fh ,tychism again comes to the front in the succeeding number of ,the ,monist1 7,vol4 ,,iii1 ,no4 #a17 in an article by ,mr4 ,peirce1 entitled 8,man's ,glassy ,essence40 #fi ,dr4 ,carus1 in his review of ,mr4 ,peirce's doctrines1 7,the ,monist1 ,vol4 ,,ii1 ,no4 #d1 p4 #ege17 notes this positivistic-constructionism4 #gj ,cf4 ,t4 ,h4 ,green1 ,prolegomena to ,ethics1 ,ch4 ,,ii1 p4 #fc4 #ga ,nos4 #beh1 #ei1 #fa1 ,august1 #ahib4 ,miss ,naden's ,world-,scheme4 #gb ,in a note to this passage was appended a quotation from a pamphlet by ,dr4 ,e4 ,cobham ,brewer as a practical instance of the objective being1 on the antiquated subject-object plane1 actually superseded4 ,suppose a very remote star to become extinct1 the 8vibrations0 would continue to 8travel0 towards a spectator situated on our planet for years1 it may be for centuries4 ,so that the spectator1 ultimately1 8sees0 that which does not even exist4 ,dr4 ,brewer's comment1 which cannot be considered any contribution to a satisfactory rationale1 is3 8the objects1 however1 must have existed1 or no messenger could have been sent from their courts40 ,evidently1 in this case1 that which is sent is1 at least1 as good as the sender--is1 in fact1 the self-same thing4 ,only1 in that case1 what of the extinct object8 #gc ,or to put it in another form1 any one idea1 and the timing of this idea are really two ideas1 although1 as we shall see later1 they may be inseparable in practice4 #gd ,cf41 in this connection1 the results of experiments by ,cheselden1 as far back as #agbg on congenitally blind persons1 couched for double cataract4 #ge ,much more inclusive1 also1 than the ,relational ,theory of the ,neo-,kantians4 #gf ,the ,monist1 ,vol4 ,,iii1 ,no4 #a4 #gg ,mr4 ,peirce uses the word 8instant0 to mean a point of time1 and 8moment0 to mean an infinitesimal duration4 #gh ,the phrase1 8something like10 is significant1 when we remember1 7see ante17 that with ,mr4 ,peirce the excitants were 8something like0 the excited feelings4 ,,the ,,fourth ,,dimension4 ,,mathematical ,,and ,,spiritualistic4 ,,introductory4 ,the tendency to generalise long ago led mathematicians to extend the notion of three-dimensional space1 which is the space of sensible representation1 and to define aggregates of points1 or spaces1 of more than three dimensions1 with the view of employing these definitions as useful means of investigation4 ,they had no idea of requiring people to imagine four-dimensional things and worlds1 and they were even still less remote from requiring of them to believe in the real existence of a four-dimensioned space4 ,in the hands of mathematicians this extension of the notion of space was a mere means devised for the discovery and expression1 by shorter and more convenient ways1 of truths applicable to common geometry and to algebra operating with more than three unknown quantities4 ,at this stage1 however1 the spiritualists came in1 and coolly took possession of this private property of the mathematicians4 ,they were in great perplexity as to where they should put the spirits of the dead4 ,to give them a place in the world accessible to our senses was not exactly practicable4 ,they were compelled1 therefore1 to look around after some terra incognita1 which should oppose to the spirit of research inborn in humanity an insuperable barrier4 ,the residence of the spirits had to be a place inaccessible to our senses and full of mystery to the mind4 ,this property the four-dimensioned space of the mathematicians possessed4 ,with an intellectual perversity which science has no idea of1 these spiritualists boldly asserted1 first1 that the whole world was so situated in a four-dimensioned space as a plane might be situated in the space familiar to us1 secondly1 that the spirits of the dead lived in such a four-dimensioned space1 thirdly1 that these spirits could accordingly act upon the world and1 consequently1 upon the human beings resident in it1 exactly as we three-dimensioned creatures can produce effects upon things that are two-dimensional2 for example1 such effects as that produced when we shatter a lamina of ice1 and so influence some possibly existing two-dimensioned ice-world4 ,since spiritualism1 under the leadership of the ,leipsic ,professor ,zllner1 thus proclaimed the existence of a four-dimensioned space1 this notion1 which the mathematicians are thoroughly master of1--for in all their operations with it1 though they have forsaken the path of actual representability1 they have never left that of the truth1--this notion has also passed into the heads of lay persons who have used it as a catchword1 ordinarily without having any clear idea of what they or any one else mean by it4 ,to clear up such ideas and to correct the wrong impressions of cultured people who have not a technical mathematical training1 is the purpose of the following pages4 ,a similar elucidation was aimed at in the tracts which ,schlegel 7,riemann1 ,berlin1 #ahhh7 and ,cranz 7,virchow-,holtzendorff's ,sammlung1 ,nos4 #aab and #aac7 have published on the so-called fourth dimension4 ,both treatises possess indubitable merits1 but their methods of presentation are in many respects too concise to give a lay mind any profound comprehension of the subject4 ,the author1 accordingly1 has been able to add to the reflections which these excellent treatises offer1 a great deal that appears to him necessary for a thorough explanation in the minds of non-mathematicians of the notion of the fourth dimension4 ,i4 ,,the ,,concept ,,of ,,dimension4 ,many text-books of stereometry begin with the words3 8,every body has three dimensions1 length1 breadth1 and thickness40 ,if we should ask the author of a book of this description to tell us the length1 breadth1 and thickness of an apple1 of a sponge1 or of a cloud of tobacco smoke1 he would be somewhat perplexed and would probably say1 that the definition in question referred to something different4 ,a cubical box1 or some similar structure1 whose angles are all right angles and whose bounding surfaces are consequently all rectangles is the only body of which it can at all be unmistakably asserted that there are three principal directions distinguishable in it1 of which any one can be called the length1 any other the breadth1 and any third the thickness4 ,we thus see that the notions of length1 breadth1 and thickness are not sufficiently clear and universal to enable us to derive from them any idea of what is meant when it is said that every body possesses three dimensions1 or that the space of the world is three-dimensional4 ,this distinction may be made sharper and more evident by the following considerations3 ,we have1 let us suppose1 a straight line on which a point is situated1 and the problem is proposed to determine the position of the point on the line in an unequivocal manner4 ,the simplest way to solve this is1 to state how far the point is removed in the one or the other direction from some given fixed point2 just as in a thermometer the position of the surface of the mercury is given by a statement of its distance in the direction of cold or heat from a predetermined fixed point--the point of freezing water4 ,to state1 therefore1 the position of a point on a straight line1 the sole datum necessary is a single number1 for beforehand we have fixed upon some standard line1 like the centimetre1 and some definite point to which we give the value zero1 and have also previously decided in what direction from the zero-point1 points must be situated whose position is expressed by positive numbers1 and also in what direction those must lie whose position is expressed by negative numbers4 ,this last mentioned fact1 that a single number is sufficient to determine the place of a point in a straight line1 is the real reason why we attribute to the straight line or to any part of it a single dimension4 ,more generally1 we call every totality or system1 of infinitely numerous things1 one-dimensional1 in which one number is all that is requisite to determine and distinguish any particular one of these things amidst the entire totality4 ,thus1 time is one-dimensional4 ,we1 as inhabitants of the earth1 have naturally chosen as our unit of time1 the period of the rotation of the earth about its axis1 namely1 the day1 or a definite portion of a day4 ,the zero-point of time is regarded in ,christian countries as the year of the birth of ,christ1 and the positive direction of time is the time subsequent to the birth of ,christ4 ,these data fixed1 all that is necessary to establish and distinguish any definite point of time amid the infinite totality of all the points of time1 is a single number4 ,of course this number need not be a whole number1 but may be made up of the sum of a whole number and a fraction in whose numerator and denominator we may have numbers as great as we please4 ,we may1 therefore1 also say that the totality of all conceivable numerical magnitudes1 or of only such as are greater than one definite number and smaller than some other definite number1 is one-dimensional4 ,we shall add here a few additional examples of one-dimensioned magnitudes presented by geometry4 ,first1 the circumference of a circle is a one-dimensional magnitude1 as is every curved line1 whether it returns into itself or not4 ,further1 the totality of all equilateral triangles which stand on the same base is one-dimensional1 or the totality of all circles that can be described through two fixed points4 ,also1 the totality of all conceivable cubes will be seen to be one-dimensional1 provided they are distinguished1 not with respect to position1 but with respect to magnitude4 ,in conformity with the fundamental ideas by which we define the notion of a one-dimensional manifoldness1 it will be seen that the attribute two-dimensional must be applied to all totalities of things in which two numbers are necessary 7and sufficient7 to distinguish any determinate individual thing amid the totality4 ,the simplest two-dimensioned complex which we know of is the plane4 ,to determine accurately the position of a point in a plane1 the simplest way is to take two axes at right angles to each other1 that is1 fixed straight lines1 and then to specify the distances by which the point in question is removed from each of these axes4 ,this method of determining the position of a point in a plane suggested to the celebrated philosopher and mathematician ,descartes the fundamental idea of analytical geometry1 a branch of mathematics in which by the simple artifice of ascribing to every point in a plane two numerical values1 determined by its distances from the two axes above referred to1 planimetrical considerations are transformed into algebraical4 ,so1 too1 all kinds of curves that graphically represent the dependence of things on time1 make use of the fact that the totality of the points in a plane is two-dimensional4 ,for example1 to represent in a graphical form the increase of the population of a city1 we take a horizontal axis to represent the time1 and a perpendicular one to represent the numbers which are the measures of the population4 ,any two lines1 then1 whose lengths practical considerations determine1 are taken as the unit of time1 which we may say is a year1 and as the unit of population1 which we will say is one thousand4 ,some definite year1 say #ahej1 is fixed upon as the zero point4 ,then1 from all the equally distant points on the horizontal axis1 which points stand for the years1 we proceed in directions parallel to the other axis1 that is1 in the perpendicular direction1 just so much upwards as the numbers which stand for the population of that year require4 ,the terminal points so reached1 or the curve which runs through these terminal points1 will then present a graphic picture of the rates of increase of the population of the town in the different years4 ,the rectangular axes of ,descartes are employed in a similar way for the construction of barometer curves1 which specify for the different localities of a country the amount of variation of the atmospheric pressure during any period of time4 ,immediately next to the plane the surface of the earth will be recognised as a two-dimensional aggregate of points4 ,in this case geographical latitude and longitude supply the two numbers that are requisite accurately to determine the position of a point4 ,also1 the totality of all the possible straight lines that can be drawn through any point in space is two-dimensional1 as we shall best understand if we picture to ourselves a plane which is cut in a point by each of these straight lines and then remember that by such a construction every point on the plane will belong to some one line and1 vice versa1 a line to every point1 whence it follows that the totality of all the straight lines which pass through the point assigned are of the same dimensions as the totality of the points of the imagined plane4 ,the question might be asked1 ,in what way and to what extent in this case is the specification of two numbers requisite and sufficient to determine amid all the rays which pass through the specified point a definite individual ray8 ,to get a clear idea of the problem here involved1 let us imagine the ray produced far into the heavens1 where some quite definite point will correspond to it4 ,now1 the position of a point in the heavens depends1 as does the position of a point on all spherical surfaces1 on two numbers4 ,in the heavens these two numbers are ordinarily supplied by the two angles called altitude1 or the distance above the plane of the horizon1 and azimuth1 or the angular distance between the circle on which the altitude is measured and the meridian of the observer4 ,it will be seen thus that the totality of all the luminous rays that an eye1 conceived as a point1 can receive from the outer world is two-dimensional1 and also that a luminous point emits a two-dimensional group of luminous rays4 ,it will also be observed1 in connection with this example1 that the two-dimensional totality of all the rays that can be drawn through a point in space is something different from the totality of the rays that pass through a point but are required to lie in a given plane4 ,such a group of objects as the last-named one1 is a one-dimensional totality4 ,now that we have sufficiently discussed the attributes that are characteristic of one and two-dimensional aggregates1 we may1 without any further investigation of the subject1 propose the following definition1 that1 generally1 an n-dimensional totality of infinitely numerous things is such1 with respect to which the specification of n numbers is necessary and sufficient to indicate a definite individual amid the totality of all the infinitely numerous individuals of the group4 ,accordingly1 the point-aggregate made up of the world-space which we inhabit1 is a three-dimensional totality4 ,to get true bearings in this space and to define any determinate point in it1 we have therefore to lay through any point which we take as our zero-point three axes at right angles to each other1 one running from right to left1 one backwards and forwards1 and one upwards and downwards4 ,we then join each two of these axes by a plane and are enabled thus to specify the position of every point in space by the three perpendicular distances by which the point in question is removed in a positive or negative sense from these three planes4 ,it is customary to denote the numbers which are the measures of these three distances by x1 y1 and z1 the positive x1 positive y1 and positive z ordinarily being reckoned in the right hand1 the forward1 and the upward directions from the origin4 ,if now1 with direct reference to this fundamental axial system1 any particular specification of x1 y1 and z be made1 there will1 by such an operation1 be cut out and isolated from the three-dimensional manifoldness of all the points of space a totality of less dimensions4 ,if1 for example1 z is equal to seven units or measures1 this is equivalent to a statement that only the two-dimensional totality of the points is meant1 which constitute the plane that can be laid at right angles to the upward-passing z-axis at a distance of seven measures from the zero-point4 ,consequently1 every imaginable equation between x1 y1 and z isolates and defines a two-dimensional aggregate of points4 ,if two different equations obtain between x1 y1 and z1 two such two-dimensional totalities will be isolated from among all the points of space4 ,but as these last must have some one-dimensional totality in common1 we may say that the co-existence of two equations between x1 y1 and z defines a one-dimensional totality of points1 that is to say a straight line1 a line curved in a plane1 or even1 perhaps1 one curved in space4 ,it is evident from this that the introduction of the three axes of reference forms a bridge between the theory of space and the theory of equations involving three variable quantities1 x1 y1 z4 ,the reason that the theory of space cannot thus be brought into connection with algebra in general1 that is1 with the theory of indefinitely numerous equations1 but only with the algebra of three quantities1 x1 y1 z1 is simply to be sought in the fact that space1 as we picture it1 can only have three dimensions4 ,we have now only to supply a few additional examples of n-dimensional totalities4 ,all particles of air are four-dimensional in magnitude when in addition to their position in space we also consider the variable densities which they assume1 as they are expressed by the different heights of the barometer in the different parts of the atmosphere4 ,similarly1 all conceivable spheres in space are four-dimensional magnitudes1 for their centres form a three-dimensional point-aggregate1 and around each centre there may be additionally conceived a one-dimensional totality of spheres1 the radii of which can be expressed by every numerical magnitude from zero to infinity4 ,further1 if we imagine a measuring stick of invariable length to assume every conceivable position in space1 the positions so obtained will constitute a five-dimensional aggregate4 ,for1 in the first place1 one of the extremities of the measuring stick may be conceived to assume a position at every point of space1 and this determines for one extremity alone of the stick a three-dimensional totality of positions2 and secondly1 as we have seen above1 there proceeds from every such position of this extremity a two-dimensional totality of directions1 and by conceiving the measuring-stick to be placed lengthwise in every one of these directions we shall obtain all the conceivable positions which the second extremity can assume1 and consequently1 the dimensions must be #c plus #b or #e4 ,finally1 to find out how many dimensions the totality of all the possible positions of a square1 invariable in magnitude1 possesses1 we first give one of its corners all conceivable positions in space1 and we thus obtain three dimensions4 ,one definite point in space now being fixed for the position of one corner of the square1 we imagine drawn through this point all possible lines1 and on each we lay off the length of the side of the square and thus obtain two additional dimensions4 ,through the point obtained for the position of the second corner of the square we must now conceive all the possible directions drawn that are perpendicular to the line thus fixed1 and we must lay off once more on each of these directions the side of the square4 ,by this last determination the dimensions are only increased by one1 for only one one-dimensional totality of perpendicular directions is possible to one straight line in one of its points4 ,three corners of the square are now fixed and therewith the position of the fourth also is uniquely determined4 ,accordingly1 the totality of all equal squares which only differ from one another by their position in space1 constitutes a manifoldness of six dimensions4 ,,ii4 ,,the ,,introduction ,,of ,,the ,,notion ,,of ,,four-,,dimensional ,,point-,,aggregates1 ,,permissible4 ,in the preceding section it was shown that we can conceive not only of manifoldnesses of one1 two1 and three dimensions1 but also of manifoldnesses of any number of dimensions4 ,but it was at the same time indicated that our world-space1 that is1 the totality of all conceivable points that differ only in respect of position1 cannot in agreement with our notions of things possess more than three dimensions4 ,but the question now arises1 whether1 if the progress of science tends in such a direction1 it is permissible to extend the notion of space by the introduction of point-aggregates of more than three dimensions1 and to engage in the study of the properties of such creations1 although we know that notwithstanding the fact that we may conceptually establish and explore such aggregates of points1 yet we cannot picture to ourselves these creations as we do the spatial magnitudes which surround us1 that is1 the regular three-dimensional aggregates of points4 ,to show the reader clearly that this question must be answered in the affirmative1 that the extension of our notion of space is permissible1 although it leads to things which we cannot perceive by our senses1 ,i may call the reader's attention to the fact that in arithmetic we are accustomed from our youth upwards to extensions of ideas1 which1 accurately viewed1 as little admit of graphic conception as a four-dimensional space1 that is1 a point-aggregate of four dimensions4 ,by his senses man first reaches only the idea of whole numbers--the results of counting4 ,the observation of primitive peoples#gi and of children clearly proves that the essential decisive factors of counting are these three3 ,first1 we abstract1 in the counting of things1 completely from the individual and characteristic attributes of these things1 that is1 we consider them as homogeneous4 ,second1 we associate individually with the things which we count other homogeneous things4 ,these other things are even now1 among uncivilised peoples1 the ten fingers of the two hands4 ,they may1 however1 be simple strokes1 or1 as in the case of dice and dominoes1 black points on a white background4 ,third1 we substitute for the result of this association some concise symbol or word2 for example1 the ,romans substituted for three things counted1 three strokes placed side by side1 namely3 ,,iii2 but for greater numbers of things they employed abbreviated signs4 ,the ,aztecs1 the original inhabitants of ,mexico1 had time enough1 it seems1 to express all the numbers up to nineteen by equal circles placed side by side4 ,they had abbreviated signs only for the numbers #bj1 #djj1 #hjjj1 and so forth4 ,in speaking1 some one same sound might be associated with the things counted2 but this method of counting is nowadays employed only by clocks3 the languages of men since prehistoric times have fashioned concise words for the results of the association in question4 ,from the notion of number1 thus fixed as the result of counting1 man reached the notion of the addition of two numbers1 and thence the notion that is the inverse of the last process1 the notion of subtraction4 ,but at this point it clearly appears that not every problem which may be propounded is soluble2 for there is no number which can express the result of the subtraction of a number from one which is equally large or from one which is smaller than itself4 ,the primary school pupil who says that #h from #e 8won't go0 is perfectly right from his point of view4 ,for there really does not exist any result of counting which added to eight will give five4 ,if humanity had abided by this point of view and had rested content with the opinion that the problem 8#e minus #h0 is not solvable1 the science of arithmetic would never have received its full development1 and humanity would not have advanced as far in civilisation as it has4 ,fortunately1 men said to themselves at this crisis3 8,if #e minus #h won't go1 we'll make it go2 if #e minus #h does not possess an intelligible meaning1 we will simply give it one40 ,as a fact1 things which have not a meaning always afford men a pleasing opportunity of investing them with one4 ,the question is1 then1 what significance is the problem 8#e minus #h0 to be invested with8 ,the most natural and1 therefore1 the most advantageous solution undoubtedly is to abide by the original notion of subtraction as the inverse of addition1 and to make the significance of #e minus #h such1 that for #e minus #h plus #h we shall get our original minuend #e4 ,by such a method all the rules of computation which apply to real differences will also hold good for unreal differences1 such as #e minus #h4 ,but it then clearly appears that all forms expressive of differences in which the number that stands before the minus direction is less by an equal amount than that which follows it may be regarded as equal2 so that the simplest course seems to be to introduce as the common characteristic of all equal differential forms of this description a common sign1 which will indicate at the same time the difference of the two numbers thus associated4 ,thus it came about1 that for #e minus #h1 as well as for every differential form which can be regarded as equal thereto the sign 8-#c0 was introduced4 ,but in calling differential forms of this description numbers1 the notion of number was extended and a new domain was opened up1 namely1 the domain of negative numbers4 ,in the further development of the science of arithmetic1 through the operation of division viewed as the inverse of multiplication1 a second extension of the idea of number was reached1 namely1 the notion of fractional numbers as the outcome of divisions that had led to numbers hitherto undefined4 ,we find1 thus1 that the science of arithmetic throughout its whole development has strictly adhered to the principle of conformity and consistency and has invested every association of two numbers1 which before had no significance1 by the introduction of new numbers1 with a real significance1 such that similar operations in conformity with exactly the same rules could be performed with the new numbers1 viewed as the results of this association1 as with the numbers which were before known and perfectly defined4 ,thus the science proceeded further on its way and reached the notions of irrational1 imaginary1 and complex numbers4 ,the point in all this1 which the reader must carefully note1 is1 that all the numbers of arithmetic1 with the exception of the positive whole numbers1 are artificial products of human thought1 invented to make the language of arithmetic more flexible1 and to accelerate the progress of science4 ,all these numbers lack the attributes of representability4 ,no man in the world can picture to himself 8minus three trees40 ,it is possible1 of course1 to know that when three trees of a garden have been cut down and carried away1 that three are missing1 and by substituting for 8missing0 the inverse notion of 8added10 we may say1 perhaps1 that 8minus three trees0 are added4 ,but this is quite different from the feat of imagining a negative number of trees4 ,we can only picture to ourselves a number of trees that results from actual counting1 that is1 a positive whole number4 ,yet1 notwithstanding all this1 people had not the slightest hesitation in extending the notion of number4 ,exactly so must it be permitted us in geometry to extend the notion of space1 even though such an extension can only be mentally defined and can never be brought within the range of human powers of representation4 ,in mathematics1 in fact1 the extension of any notion is admissible1 provided such extension does not lead to contradictions with itself or with results which are well established4 ,whether such extensions are necessary1 justifiable1 or important for the advancement of science is a different question4 ,it must be admitted1 therefore1 that the mathematician is justified in the extension of the notion of space as a point-aggregate of three dimensions1 and in the introduction of space or point-aggregates of more than three dimensions1 and in the employment of them as means of research4 ,other sciences also operate with things which they do not know exist1 and which1 though they are sufficiently defined1 cannot be perceived by our senses4 ,for example1 the physicist employs the ether as a means of investigation1 though he can have no sensory knowledge of it4 ,the ether is nothing more than a means which enables us to comprehend mechanically the effects known as action at a distance and to bring them within the range of a common point of view4 ,without the assumption of a material which penetrates everything1 and by means of whose undulations impulses are transmitted to the remotest parts of space1 the phenomena of light1 of heat1 of gravitation1 and of electricity would be a jumble of isolated and unconnected mysteries4 ,the assumption of an ether1 however1 comprises in a systematic scheme all these isolated events1 facilitates our mental control of the phenomena of nature1 and enables us to produce these phenomena at will4 ,but it must not be forgotten in such reflections that the ether itself is even a greater problem for man1 and that the ether-hypothesis does not solve the difficulties of phenomena1 but only puts them in a unitary conceptual shape4 ,notwithstanding all this1 physicists have never had the least hesitation in employing the ether as a means of investigation4 ,and as little do reasons exist why the mathematicians should hesitate to investigate the properties of a four-dimensioned point-aggregate1 with the view of acquiring thus a convenient means of research4 ,,iii4 ,,the ,,introduction ,,of ,,the ,,idea ,,of ,,four-,,dimensioned ,,point-,,aggregates ,,of ,,service ,,to ,,research4 ,from the concession that the mathematician has the right to define and investigate the properties of point-aggregates of more than three dimensions1 it does not necessarily follow that the introduction of an idea of this description is of value to science4 ,thus1 for example1 in arithmetic1 the introduction of operations which spring from involution1 as involution and its two inverse operations proceed from multiplication1 is undoubtedly permitted4 ,just as for 8a times a times a0 we write the abbreviated symbol 8a10 7which we read1 a to the third power17 and investigate in detail the operation of involution thus defined1 so we might also introduce some shorthand symbol for 8a to the a power to the a power0 and thus reach an operation of the fourth degree1 which would regard a as a passive number and the number #c1 or any higher number1 as the active number1 that is1 as the number which indicates how often a is taken as the base of a power whose exponent may be a1 or 8a to the a10 or 8a to the a to the a power40 ,but the introduction of such an operation of the fourth degree has proved itself to be of no especial value to mathematics4 ,and the reason is that in the operation of involution the law of commutation does not hold good4 ,in addition1 the numbers to be added may be interchanged and the introduction of multiplication is therefore of great value4 ,so1 also1 in multiplication the numbers which are combined1 that is1 the factors1 may be changed about in any way1 and thus the introduction of involution is of value4 ,but in involution the base and the exponent cannot be interchanged1 and consequently the introduction of any higher operation is almost valueless4 ,but with the introduction of the idea of point-aggregates of multiple dimensions the case is wholly different4 ,the innovation in question has proved itself to be not only of great importance to research1 but the progress of science has irresistibly forced investigators to the introduction of this idea1 as we shall now set forth in detail4 ,in the first place1 algebra1 especially the algebraical theory of systems of equations1 derives much advantage from the notion of multiple dimensioned spaces4 ,if we have only three unknown quantities1 x1 y1 z1 the algebraical questions which arise from the possible problems of this class admit1 as we have above seen1 of geometrical representation to the eye4 ,owing to this possibility of geometrical representation1 some certain simple geometrical ideas like 8moving10 8lying in10 8intersecting10 and so forth1 may be translated into algebraical events4 ,now1 no reason exists why algebra should stop at three variable quantities2 it must in fact take into consideration any number of variable quantities4 ,for purposes of brevity and greater evidentness1 therefore1 it is quite natural to employ geometrical forms of speech in the consideration of more than three variables4 ,but when we do this1 we assume1 perhaps without really intending to do so1 the idea of a space of more than three dimensions4 ,if we have four variable quantities1 x1 y1 z1 u1 we arrive1 by conceiving attributed to each of these four quantities every possible numerical magnitude1 at a four-dimensioned manifoldness of numerical quantities1 which we may just as well regard as a four-dimensioned aggregate of points4 ,two equations which exist on this supposition between x1 y1 z1 and u1 define two three-dimensioned aggregates of points1 which intersect1 as we may briefly say1 in a two-dimensioned aggregate of points1 that is1 in a surface2 and so on4 ,in a somewhat different manner the determination of the contents of a square or a cube by the involution of a number which stands for the length of its sides1 leads to the notion of four-dimensioned structures1 and1 consequently1 to the notion of a four-dimensioned point-space4 ,when we note that a stands for the contents of a square1 and a for the contents of a cube1 we naturally inquire after the contents of a structure which is produced from the cube as the cube is produced from the square and which also will have the contents a4 ,we cannot1 it is true1 clearly picture to ourselves a structure of this description1 but we can1 nevertheless1 establish its properties with mathematical exactness4#hj ,it is bounded by #h cubes just as the cube is bounded by #f squares2 it has #af corners1 #bd squares1 and #cb edges1 so that from every corner #d edges1 #f squares1 and #d cubes proceed1 and from every edge #c squares and #c cubes4 ,yet despite the great service to algebra of this idea of multiple-dimensioned space1 it must be conceded that the conception although convenient is yet not indispensable4 ,it is true1 algebra is in need of the idea of multiple dimensions1 but it is not so absolutely in need of the idea of point-aggregates of multiple dimensions4 ,this notion is1 however1 necessary and serviceable for a profound comprehension of geometry4 ,the system of geometrical knowledge which ,euclid of ,alexandria created about three hundred years before ,christ1 supplied during a period of more than two thousand years a brilliant example of a body of conclusions and truths which were mutually consistent and logical4 ,up to the present century the idea of elementary geometry was indissolubly bound up with the name of ,euclid1 so that in ,england where people adhered longest to the rigid deductive system of the ,grecian mathematician1 the task of 8learning geometry0 and 8reading ,euclid0 were until a few years ago identical4 ,every proposition of this ,euclidian system rests on other propositions1 as one building-stone in a house rests upon another4 ,only the very lowest stones1 the foundations1 were without supports4 ,these are the axioms or fundamental propositions1 truths on which all other truths are1 directly or indirectly1 founded1 but which themselves are assumed without demonstration as self-evident4 ,but the spirit of mathematical research grew in time more and more critical1 and finally asked1 whether these axioms might not possibly admit of demonstration4 ,especially was a rigid proof sought for the eleventh axiom of ,euclid1 which treats of parallels4 ,after centuries of fruitless attempts to prove ,euclid's eleventh axiom1 ,gauss1 and with him ,bolyai and ,lobatschewsky1 ,riemann and ,helmholtz1 finally stated the decisive reasons why any attempt to prove the axiom of the parallels must necessarily be futile4 ,these reasons consist of the fact that though this axiom holds good enough in the world-space such as we do and can conceive it1 yet three-dimensioned spaces are ideally conceivable though not capable of mental representation1 where the axiom does not hold good4 ,the axiom was thus shown to be a mere fact of observation1 and from that time on there could no longer be any thought of a deductive demonstration of it4 ,in view of the intimate connection1 which both in an historical and epistemological point of view exists between the extension of the concept of space and the critical examination of the axioms of ,euclid1 we must enter at somewhat greater length into the discussion of the last mentioned propositions4 ,of the axioms which ,euclid premises to his geometry1 only the following three are really geometrical axioms3 ,eighth axiom3 ,magnitudes which coincide with one another are equal to one another4 ,eleventh axiom3 ,if a straight line meet two straight lines so as to make the two interior angles on the same side of it taken together less than two right angles1 these straight lines1 being continually produced1 shall at length meet on that side on which are the angles which are less than two right angles4 ,twelfth axiom3 ,two straight lines cannot inclose a finite space4 ,the numerous proofs which in the course of time were adduced in demonstration of these axioms1 especially of the eleventh1 all turn out on close examination to be pseudo-proofs4 ,legendre drew attention to the fact that either of the following axioms might be substituted for the eleventh3 a7 ,through a point there can be drawn to a straight line1 within the plane which joins the point with the line1 one and one line only which shall not intersect the first 7parallels7 however far the two lines may be produced2 b7 ,if two parallel lines are cut by a third straight line1 the interior alternate angles will be equal4 c7 ,the sum of the angles of a triangle is equal to two right angles1 that is1 to the angle of a straight line or #ahj4 ,by the aid of any one of these three assertions1 the eleventh axiom of ,euclid may be proved1 and1 vice versa1 by the aid of the latter each of the three assertions may be proved1 of course with the help of the other two axioms1 eight and twelve4 ,the perception that the eleventh axiom does not admit of demonstration without the employment of one of the foregoing substitutes may best be gained from the consideration of congruent figures4 ,every reader will remember from his first instruction in geometry that the congruence of two triangles is demonstrated by the superposition of one triangle on the other and by then ascertaining whether the two completely coincide1 no assumptions being made in the determination except those above mentioned4 ,illustration3 ,fig4 #a4 ,in the case of triangles which are congruent as are ,i and ,,ii in the preceding cut1 this coincidence may be effected by the simple displacement of one of the triangles2 so that even a two-dimensional being1 supposed to be endowed with powers of reasoning1 but only capable of picturing to itself motions within a plane1 also might convince itself that the two triangles ,i and ,,ii could be made to coincide4 ,but a being of this description could not convince itself in like manner of the congruence of triangles ,i and ,,iii4 ,it would discover the equality of the three sides and the three angles1 but it could never succeed in so superposing the two triangles on each other as to make them coincide4 ,a three-dimensioned being1 however1 can do this very easily4 ,it has simply to turn triangle ,i about one of its sides and to shove the triangle1 thus brought into the position of its reflection in a mirror1 into the position of triangle ,,iii4 ,similarly1 triangles ,,ii and ,,iii may be made to coincide by moving either out of the plane of the paper around one of its sides as axis and turning it until it again falls in the plane of the paper4 ,the triangle thus turned over can then be brought into the position of the other4 ,later on we shall revert to these two kinds of congruence3 8congruence by displacement0 and 8congruence by circumversion40 ,for the present we will start from the fact that it is always possible within the limits of a plane to take a triangle out of one position and bring it into another without altering its sides and angles4 ,the question is1 whether this is only possible in the plane1 or whether it can also be done on other surfaces4 ,we find that there are certain surfaces in which this is possible1 and certain others in which it is not4 ,for instance1 it is impossible to move the triangle drawn on the surface of an egg into some other position on the egg's surface without a distension or contraction of some of the triangle's parts4 ,on the other hand1 it is quite possible to move the triangle drawn on the surface of a sphere into any other position on the sphere's surface without a distension or contraction of its parts4 ,the mathematical reason of this fact is1 that the surface of a sphere1 like the plane1 has everywhere the same curvature1 but that the surface of an egg at different places has different curvatures4 ,of a plane we say that it has everywhere the curvature zero2 of the surface of a sphere we say it has everywhere a positive curvature1 which is greater in proportion as the radius is smaller4 ,there are surfaces also which have a constant negative curvature2 these surfaces exhibit at every point in directions proceeding from the same side a partly concave and a partly convex structure1 somewhat like the centre of a saddle4 ,there is no necessity of our entering in any detail into the character and structure of the last-mentioned surfaces4 ,intimately related with the plane1 however1 are all those surfaces1 which1 like the plane1 have the curvature zero2 in this category belong especially cylindrical surfaces and conical surfaces4 ,a sheet of paper of the form of the sector of a circle may1 for example1 be readily bent into the shape of a conical surface4 ,if two congruent triangles1 now1 be drawn on the sheet of paper1 which may by displacement be translated the one into the other1 these triangles will1 it is plain1 also remain congruent on the conical surface2 that is1 on the conical surface also we may displace the one into the other2 for though a bending of the figures will take place1 there will be no distension or contraction4 ,similarly1 there are surfaces which1 like the sphere1 have everywhere a constant positive curvature4 ,on such surfaces also every figure can be transferred into some other position without distension or contraction of its parts4 ,accordingly1 on all surfaces thus related to the plane or sphere1 the assumption which underlies the eighth axiom of ,euclid1 that it is possible to transfer into any new position any figure drawn on such surfaces without distortion1 holds good4 ,the eleventh axiom in its turn also holds good on all surfaces of constant curvature1 whether the curvature be zero or positive2 only in such instances instead of 8straight0 line we must say 8shortest0 line4 ,on the surface of a sphere1 namely1 two shortest lines1 that is1 arcs of two great circles1 always intersect1 no matter whether they are produced in the direction of the side at which the third arc of a great circle makes with them angles less than two right angles1 or1 in the direction of the other side1 where this arc makes with them angles of more than two right angles4 ,on the plane1 however1 two straight lines intersect only on the side where a third straight line that meets them makes with them interior angles less than two right angles4 ,the twelfth axiom of ,euclid1 finally1 only holds good on the plane and on the surfaces related to it1 but not on the sphere or other surfaces which1 like the sphere1 have a constant positive curvature4 ,this also accounts for the fact that one of the three postulates which we regarded as substitutes for the eleventh axiom1 though valid for the plane1 is not true for the surface of a sphere2 namely1 the postulate that defines the sum of the angles of a triangle4 ,this sum in a plane triangle is two right angles2 in a spherical triangle it is more than two right angles1 the spherical triangle being greater1 the greater the excess the sum of its angles is above two right angles4 ,it will be seen1 from these considerations1 that in geometries in which curved surfaces and not fixed planes are studied1 the axioms of ,euclid are either all or partially false4 ,the axioms of geometry thus having been revealed as facts of experience1 the question suggested itself whether in the same way in which it was shown that different two-dimensional geometries were possible1 also different three-dimensional systems of geometry might not be developed2 and consequently what the relations were in which these might stand to the geometry of the space given by our senses and representable to our mind4 ,as a fact1 a three-dimensional geometry can be developed1 which like the geometry of the surface of an egg will exclude the axiom that a figure or body can be transferred from any one part of space to any other and yet remain congruent to itself4 ,of a three-dimensional space in which such a geometry can be developed we say1 that it has no constant measure of curvature4 ,the space which is representable to us1 and which we shall henceforth call the space of experience1 possesses1 as our experiences without exception confirm1 the especial property that every bodily thing can be transferred from any one part of it to any other without suffering in the transference any distension or any contraction4 ,the space of experience1 therefore1 has a constant measure of curvature4 ,the question1 however1 whether this measure of curvature is zero or positive1 that is1 whether the space of experience possesses the properties which in two-dimensioned structures a plane possesses1 or whether it is the three-dimensioned analogon of the surface of a sphere is one which future experience alone can answer4 ,if the space of experience has a constant positive measure of curvature which is different from zero1 be the difference ever so slight1 a point which should move forever onward in a straight line1 or1 more accurately expressed1 in a shortest line1 would sometime1 though perhaps after having traversed a distance which to us is inconceivable1 ultimately have to arrive from the opposite direction at the place from which it set out1 just as a point which moves forever onward in the same direction on the surface of a sphere must ultimately arrive at its starting point1 the distance it traverses being longer the greater the radius of the sphere or the smaller its curvature4 ,it will seem1 at first blush1 almost incredible1 that the space of experience even can have this property4 ,but an example1 which is the historical analogon of this modern transformation of our conceptions1 will render the idea less marvellous4 ,let us transport ourselves back to the age of ,homer4 ,at that time people believed that the earth was a great disc surrounded on all sides by oceans which were conceived to be in all directions infinitely great4 ,indeed1 for the primitive man1 who has never journeyed far from the place of his birth1 this is the most natural conception4 ,but imagine now that some scholar had come1 and had informed the ,homeric hero ,ulysses that if he would travel forever on the earth in the same direction he would ultimately come back to the point from which he started2 surely ,ulysses would have gazed with as much astonishment upon this scholar as we now look upon the mathematician who tells us that it is possible that a point which moves forever onward in space in the same direction may ultimately arrive at the place from which it started4 ,but despite the fact that ,ulysses would have regarded the assertion of the scholar as false because contradictory to his familiar conceptions1 that scholar1 nevertheless1 would have been right2 for the earth is not a plane but a spherical surface4 ,so also the mathematician might be right who bases this more recent strange view on the possible fact that the space of experience may have a measure of curvature which is not exactly zero but slightly greater than zero4 ,if this were really the case1 the volume of the space of experience1 though very large1 would1 nevertheless1 be finite2 just as the real spherical surface of the earth as contrasted with the ,homeric plane surface is finite1 having so and so many square miles4 ,when the objection is here made that a finiteness of space is totally at variance with our modes of thought and conceptions1 two ideas1 8infinitely great0 and 8unlimited10 are confounded4 ,all that is at variance with our practical conceptions is that space can anywhere have a limit2 not that it may possibly be of tremendous but finite magnitude4 ,it will now be asked if we cannot determine by actual observation whether the measure of curvature of experiential space is exactly zero or slightly different therefrom4 ,the theorem of the sum of the angles of a triangle and the conclusions which follow from this theorem do indeed supply us with a means of ascertaining this fact4 ,and the results of observation have been1 that the measure of curvature of space is in all probability exactly equal to zero or if it is slightly different from zero it is so little so that the technical means of observation at our command and especially our telescopes are not competent to determine the amount of the deviation4 ,more1 we cannot with any certainty say4 ,all these reflections1 to which the criticism of the hypotheses that underlie geometry long ago led investigators1 compel us to institute a comparison between the space of experience and other three-dimensioned aggregates of points 7spaces71 which we cannot mentally represent but can in thought and word accurately define and investigate4 ,as soon1 however1 as we are fully involved in the task of accurately investigating the properties of three-dimensional aggregates of points1 we similarly find ourselves forced to regard such aggregates as the component elements of a manifoldness of more than three dimensions4 ,in this way the exact criticism of even ordinary geometry leads us to the abstract assumption of a space of more than three dimensions4 ,and as the extension of every idea gives a clearer and more translucent form to the idea as it originally stood1 here too the idea of multiple-dimensioned aggregates of points and the investigation of their properties has thrown a new light on the truths of ordinary geometry and placed its properties in clearer relief4 ,amid the numerous examples which show how the notion of a space of multiple-dimensions has been of great service to science in the investigation of three-dimensioned space1 we shall give one a place here which is within the comprehension of non-mathematicians4 ,imagine in a plane two triangles whose angles are denoted by pairs of numbers--namely1 by #a-b1 #a-c1 #a-d1 and #b-e1 #c-e1 #d-e4 7,see ,fig4 #b47 ,let the two triangles so lie that the three lines which join the angles #a-b and #b-e1 #a-c and #c-e1 and #a-d and #d-e intersect at a point1 which we will call #a-e4 ,if now we cause the sides of the triangles which are opposite to these angles to intersect1 it will be found that the points of intersection so obtained possess the peculiar property of lying all in one and the same straight line4 ,the point of intersection of the connection #a-c and #a-d with the connection #d-e and #c-e may appropriately be called #c-d4 ,similarly1 the point of intersection #b-d is produced by the meeting of #d-e1 #b-e and #a-b1 #a-d2 and the point of intersection #b-c1 by the meeting of #a-c1 #a-b and #c-e1 #b-e4 ,the statement1 that the three points of intersection #c-d1 #b-d1 #b-c1 thus obtained1 lie in one straight line1 can be proved by the principles of plane geometry only with difficulty and great circumstantiality4 ,but by resorting to the three-dimensional space of experience1 in which the plane of the drawing lies1 the proposition may be rendered almost self-evident4 ,illustration3 ,fig4 #b4 ,to begin with1 imagine any five points in space which may be denoted by the numbers #a1 #b1 #c1 #d1 #e2 then imagine all the possible ten straight lines of junction drawn between each two of these points1 namely1 #a-b1 #a-c 444 #d-e2 and finally1 also1 all the ten planes of junction of every three points described1 namely1 the plane #a-b-c1 #a-b-d1 444 #c-d-e4 ,a spatial figure will thus be obtained1 whose ten straight lines will meet some interposed plane in ten points whose relative positions are exactly those of the ten points above described4 ,thus1 for example1 on this plane the points #a-b1 #a-c1 and #b-c will lie in a straight line1 for through the three spatial points #a1 #b1 #c1 a plane can be drawn which will cut the plane of a drawing in a straight line4 ,the reason1 therefore1 that the three points #c-d1 #b-d1 #b-c1 also must ultimately lie in a straight line1 consists in the simple fact that the plane of the three points #b1 #c1 #d1 must cut the plane of the drawing in a straight line4 ,the figure here considered consists of ten points of which sets of three so lie ten times in a straight line that conversely from every point also three straight lines proceed4 ,illustration3 ,fig4 #c4 ,now1 just as this figure is a section of a complete three-dimensional pentagon1 so another remarkable figure1 of similar properties1 may be obtained by the section of a figure of four-dimensioned space4 ,imagine1 namely1 six points1 #a1 #b1 #c1 #d1 #e1 #f1 situated in this four-dimensioned space1 and every three of them connected by a plane1 and every four of them by a three-dimensioned space4 ,we shall obtain thus twenty planes and fifteen three-dimensioned spaces which will cut the plane in which the figure is to be produced in twenty points and fifteen rays which so lie that each point sends out three rays and every ray contains four points4 7,see ,fig4 #c47 ,figures of this description1 which are so composed of points and rays that an equal number of rays proceed from every point and an equal number of points lie in every ray1 are called configurations4 ,other configurations may1 of course1 be produced1 by taking a different number of points and by assuming that the points taken lie in a space of different or even higher dimensions4 ,the author of this article was the first to draw attention to configurations derived from spaces of higher dimensions4 ,as we see1 then1 the notion of a space of more than three dimensions has performed important work in the investigations of common plane geometry4 ,in conclusion1 ,i should like to add a remark which ,cranz makes regarding the application of the idea of multiple-dimensioned space to theoretical chemistry4 7,see the treatise before cited47 ,in chemistry1 the molecules of a compound body are said to consist of the atoms of the elements which are contained in the body1 and these are supposed to be situated at certain distances from one another1 and to be held in their relative positions by certain forces4 ,at first1 the centres of the atoms were conceived to lie in one and the same plane4 ,but ,wislicenus was led by researches in paralactic acid to explain the differences of isomeric molecules of the same structural formul by the different positions of the atoms in space4 7,compare 8,la chimie dans l'espace0 by van't ,hoff1 #ahge1 preface by ,j4 ,wislicenus74 ,in fact four points can always be so arranged in space that every two of them may have any distance from each other2 and the change of one of the six distances does not necessarily involve the alteration of any other4 ,but suppose our molecule consists of five atoms8 ,four of these may be so placed that the distance between any two of them can be made what we please4 ,but it is no longer possible to give the fifth atom a position such that each of the four distances by which it is separated from the other atoms may be what we please4 ,quite the contrary1 the fourth distance is dependent on the three remaining distances2 for the space of experience has only three dimensions4 ,if1 therefore1 ,i have a molecule which consists of five atoms ,i cannot alter the distance between two of them without at least altering some second distance4 ,but if we imagine the centres of the atoms placed in a four-dimensioned space1 this can be done2 all the ten distances which may be conceived to exist between the five points will then be independent of one another4 ,to reach the same result in the case of six atoms we must assume a five-dimensional space2 and so on4 ,now1 if the independence of all the possible distances between the atoms of a molecule is absolutely required by theoretical chemical research1 the science is really compelled1 if it deals with molecules of more than four atoms1 to make use of the idea of a space of more than three dimensions4 ,this idea is1 in this case1 simply an instrument of research1 just as are1 also1 the ideas of molecules and atoms--means designed to embrace in an obvious and systematic form the phenomena of chemistry and to discover the conditions under which new phenomena can be evoked4 ,whether a four-dimensioned space really exists is a question whose insolubility cannot prevent research from making use of the idea1 exactly as chemistry has not been prevented from making use of the notion of atom1 although no one really knows whether the things we call atoms exist or not4 ,,iv4 ,,refutation ,,of ,,the ,,arguments ,,adduced ,,to ,,prove ,,the ,,existence ,,of ,a ,,four-,,dimensioned ,,space ,,inclusive ,,of ,,the ,,visible ,,world4 ,the considerations of the preceding section will have convinced the cultured non-mathematician of the service which the theory of multiple-dimensioned spaces has done1 and bids fair to do1 for geometrical research4 ,in addition thereto is the consideration that every extension of one branch of mathematical science is a constant source of beneficial and helpful influence to the other branches4 ,the knowledge1 however1 that mathematicians can employ the notion of four-dimensioned space with good results in their researches1 would never have been sufficient to procure it its present popularity2 for every man of intelligence has now heard of it1 and1 in jest or in earnest1 often speaks of it4 ,the knowledge of a four-dimensioned space did not reach the ears of cultured non-mathematicians until the consequences which the spiritualists fancied it was permissible to draw from this mathematical notion were publicly known4 ,but it is a tremendous step from the four-dimensioned space of the mathematicians to the space from which the spirit-friends of the spiritualistic mediums entertain us with rappings1 knockings1 and bad ,english4 ,before taking this step we will first discuss the question of the real existence of a four-dimensional space1 not judging the question whether this space1 if it really does exist1 is inhabited by reasonable beings who consciously act upon the world in which we exist4 ,illustration3 ,fig4 #d4 ,among the reasons which are put forward to prove the existence of a four-dimensional space containing the world1 the least reprehensible are those which are based on the existence of symmetry4 ,we spoke above of two triangles in the same plane which have all their sides and angles congruent1 but which cannot be made to coincide by simple displacement within the plane2 but we saw that this coincidence could be effected by holding fast one side of one triangle and moving it out of its plane until it had been so far turned round that it fell back into its plane4 ,now something similar to this exists in space4 ,cut two figures1 exactly like that of ,fig4 #d41 out of a piece of paper1 and turn the triangle ,,abf about the side ,,ab1 ,,ace about the side ,,ac1 ,,bcd about the side ,,bc1 and in one figure above and in the other below2 then in both cases the points ,d1 ,e1 ,f will meet at a point1 because ,,ae is equal to ,,af1 ,,bf is equal to ,,bd1 ,,cd is equal to ,,ce4 ,in this manner we obtain two pyramids which in all lengths and all angles are congruent1 yet which cannot1 no matter how we try1 be made to coincide1 that is1 be so fitted the one into the other that they shall both stand as one pyramid4 ,but the reflected image of the one could be brought into coincidence with the other4 ,two spatial structures whose sides and angles are thus equal to each other1 and of which each may be viewed as the reflected image of the other1 are called symmetrical4 ,for instance1 the right and the left hand are symmetrical2 or1 a right and a left glove4 ,now just as in two dimensions it is impossible by simple displacement to bring into congruence triangles which like those above mentioned can only be made to coincide by circumversion1 so also in three dimensions it is impossible to bring into congruence two symmetrical pyramids4 ,careful mathematical reflection1 however1 declares1 that this could be effected if it were possible1 while holding one of the surfaces1 to move the pyramid out of the space of experience1 and to turn it round through a four-dimensioned space until it reached a point at which it would return again into our experiential space4 ,this process would simply be the four-dimensional analogon of the three-dimensional circumversion in the above-mentioned case of the two triangles4 ,further1 the interior surfaces in this process would be converted into exterior surfaces1 and vice versa1 exactly as in the circumversion of a triangle the anterior and posterior sides are interchanged4 ,if the structure which is to be converted into its symmetrical counterpart is made of a flexible material1 the interchange mentioned of the interior and exterior surfaces may be effected by simply turning the structure inside out2 for example1 a right glove may thus be converted into a left glove4 ,now from this truth1 that every structure can be converted by means of a four-dimensional space inclusive of the world1 into a structure symmetrical with it1 it has been sought to establish the probability of the real existence of a four-dimensioned space4 ,yet it will be evident1 from the discussions of the preceding section1 that the only inference which we can here make is1 that the idea of a four-dimensioned space is competent1 from a mathematical point of view1 to throw some light upon the phenomena of symmetry4 ,to conclude from these facts that a space of this kind really exists1 would be as daring as to conclude from the fact that the uniform angular velocity of the apparent motions of the fixed stars is explicable from the assumption of an axial motion of the firmament1 that the fixed stars are really rigidly placed in a celestial sphere rotating about its axis4 ,it must not be forgotten that our comprehension of the phenomena of the real world consists of two elements3 first1 of that which the things really are2 and1 second1 of that by which we rationally apprehend the things4 ,this latter element is partly dependent on the sum of the experiences which we have before acquired1 and partly on the necessity1 due to the imperfection of reason1 of our embracing the multitudinous isolated phenomena of the world into categories which we ourselves have formed1 and which1 therefore1 are not wholly derived from the phenomena themselves1 but to a great extent are dependent on us4 ,besides geometrical reasons1 ,zllner has also adduced cosmological reasons to prove the existence of a four-dimensional space4 ,to these reasons belong especially the questions whether the number of the fixed stars is infinitely great1 whether the world is finite or infinite in extension1 whether the world had a beginning or will have an end1 whether the world is not hastening towards a condition of equilibrium or dead level by the universal distribution of its matter and energy2 the problems1 also1 of gravitation and action at a distance2 and finally1 the questions concerning the relations between the phenomena in the world of sense-perception to the unknown things-in-themselves4 ,all these questions which can be decided in no definite sense1 led ,zllner and his followers to the assumption that a four-dimensioned space inclusive of the space of experience must really exist4 ,but more careful reflection will show that this assumption does not dispose of the difficulties but simply displaces them into another realm4 ,furthermore1 even if four-dimensioned space did unravel and make clear all the cosmological problems which have bothered the human mind1 still1 its existence would not be proved thereby2 it would yet remain a mere hypothesis1 designed to render more intelligible to a being who can only make experiences in a three-dimensional space1 the phenomena therein which are full of mystery to it4 ,a four-dimensioned space would in such case possess for the metaphysician a value similar to that which the ether possesses for the physicist4 ,still more convincing than these cosmological reasons to the majority of men is the physio-psychological reason drawn from the phenomena of vision which ,zllner adduces4 ,into this main argument we will enter in more detail4 ,when we 8see0 an object1 as we all know1 the light which proceeds or is reflected therefrom produces an image on the retina of our eye2 this image is conducted to our consciousness by means of the optical nerve1 and our reason draws therefrom an inference respecting the object4 ,when1 now1 we look at a square whose sides are a decimetre in length1 and whose centre is situated at the distance of a metre from the pupil of our eye1 an image is produced on the retina4 ,but exactly the same image will be produced there if we look at a square whose sides are parallel to the sides of the first square but two decimetres in length1 and whose centre is situated at a distance of two metres from the pupil of the eye4 ,proceeding thus further1 we readily discover that an eye can perceive in any length or line only the ratio of its magnitude to the distance at which it is situated from it1 and that generally a three-dimensional world must appear to the eye two-dimensional1 because all points which lie behind each other in the direction outwards from the eye produce on the retina only one image4 ,this is due to the fact that the retinal images are themselves two-dimensional2 for which reason1 ,zllner says1 the world must appear to a child as two-dimensional1 if it be supposed to live in a primitive condition of unconscious mental activity4 ,to such a child two objects which are moving the one behind the other1 must appear as suffering displacement on a surface1 which we conceive behind the objects1 and on which the latter are projected4 ,in all these apparent displacements1 coincidences and changes of form also are effected4 ,all these things must appear puzzling to a human being in the first stages of its development1 and the mind thus finds itself1 as ,zllner further argues1 in the first years of childhood forced to adopt a hypothesis concerning the constitution of space and to assume that the world is three-dimensional1 although the eye can really perceive it as only two-dimensional4 ,zllner then further says1 that in the explanation of the effects of the external world1 man constantly finds this hypothesis of his childish years confirmed1 and that in this way it has become in his mind so profound a conviction that it is no longer possible for him to think it away4 ,consonant with this argumentation1 also1 is ,zllner's remark1 that the same phenomenon has presented itself in astronomical methods of knowledge4 ,to explain the movements of the planets1 which appear to describe regular paths on the surface of a celestial sphere1 we were compelled in the solution of the riddles which these motions presented1 to assume in the structure of the heavens a dimension of 8depth10 and the complicated motions in the two-dimensioned firmament were converted into very simple motions in three-dimensioned space4 ,zllner also contends that our conception of the entire visible world as possessed of three dimensions is a product of our reason1 which the mind was driven to form by the contradictions which would be presented to it on the assumption of only two dimensions by the perspective distortions1 coincidences1 and changes of magnitude of objects4 ,when a child moves its hand before its eyes1 turns it1 brings it nearer1 or pushes it farther away1 this child successively receives the most various impressions on the surface of its retina of one and the same object of whose identity and constancy its feelings offer it a perfect assurance4 ,if the child regarded the changeable projection of the hand on the surface of the retina as the real object1 and not the hand which lies beyond it1 the child would constantly be met with contradictions in its experience1 and to avoid this it makes the hypothesis that the space of experience is three-dimensional4 ,zllner's contention is1 therefore1 that man originally had only a two-dimensional intuition of space1 but was forced by experience to represent to himself the objects which on the retinal surface appeared two-dimensional1 as three-dimensional1 and thus to transform his two-dimensional space-intuition into a three-dimensional one4 ,now1 in exactly the same way1 according to ,zllner's notion1 will man1 by the advancement and increasing exactness of his knowledge of the phenomena of the outer world1 also be compelled to conceive of the material world as a 8shadow cast by a more real four-dimensional world10 so that these conceptions will be just as trivial for the people of the twentieth century as since ,copernicus's time the explanation of the motions of the heavenly bodies by means of a three-dimensional motion has been4 ,zllner's arguments from the phenomena of vision may be refuted as follows3 ,in the first place it is incorrect to say that we see the things of the external world by means of two-dimensional retinal images4 ,the light which penetrates the eye causes an irritation of the optical nerves1 and any such effect which1 though it be not powerful1 is1 nevertheless1 a mechanical one1 can only take place on things which are material4 ,but material things are always three-dimensional4 ,the effect of light on the sensitive plates of photography can with just as little justice be regarded as two-dimensional4 ,our senses can have perception of nothing but three-dimensional things1 and this perception is effected by forces which in their turn act on three-dimensional things1 namely1 our sensory nerves4 ,it is wrong to call an image two-dimensional1 for it is only by abstraction that we can conceive of a thickness so growing constantly smaller and smaller as to admit of our regarding a three-dimensional picture as two-dimensional1 by giving it in mind a vanishingly small thickness4 ,it is also wrong to say1 as ,zllner says1 that when we see the shadow of a hand which is cast upon a wall we see something two-dimensional4 ,what we really perceive is that no light falls upon our eye from the region included by the shadow1 while from the entire surrounding region light does fall on our eye4 ,but this light is reflected from the material particles which form the surface of the wall1 that is1 from three-dimensional particles of matter4 ,we must always remember that our eye communicates to us only three-dimensional knowledge1 and that for the comprehension of anything which has two1 one1 or no dimensions1 a purely intellectual act of abstraction must be added to the act of perception4 ,when we imagine we have made a lead-pencil mark on paper1 we have1 exactly viewed1 simply heaped along side of each other little particles of graphite in such a manner that there are by far fewer graphite particles in the lateral and upward directions than there are in the longitudinal direction1 and thus our reason arrives by abstraction at the notion of a straight line4 ,when we look at an object1 say a cube of wood1 we recognise the object as three-dimensional1 and it is only by abstraction that we can conceive of its two-dimensional surfaces1 of its twelve one-dimensional edges1 and of its eight no-dimensional corners4 ,for we reach the perception of its surface1 for example1 solely by reason of the fact that the material particles which form the cube prevent the transmission of light1 and reflect it1 whereby a part of the light reflected from every material particle strikes our eye4 ,now1 by thinking exclusively of those material particles which are reflected1 in contrariety to the empty space without and the hidden and therefore non-reflected particles within1 we form the notion of a surface4 ,it is evident from this1 that all that we perceive is three-dimensional1 that we cannot come at anything two-dimensional without an intellectual abstraction1 and that1 therefore1 we cannot conceive of anything two-dimensional exerting effects upon material things4 ,but this fact is a refutation of the retinal argument of ,zllner4 ,if vision consisted wholly and exclusively in the creation of a two-dimensioned image1 the things which take place in the world could never come into our consciousness4 ,the child1 therefore1 does not originally apprehend the world1 as ,zllner says1 as two-dimensional2 on the contrary1 it apprehends it either not at all1 or it apprehends it as three-dimensional4 ,of course the child must first 8learn how0 to see4 ,it is found from the observation of children during the first months of their lives1 and of the congenitally blind1 who have suddenly acquired the power of vision by some successful operation1 that seeing does not consist alone in the irritations which arise in the optic nerves1 but also in the correct interpretation of these irritations by reason4 ,this correct interpretation1 however1 can be accomplished only by the accumulation of a considerable stock of experience4 ,especially must the recognition of the distance of the object seen1 be gradually learned4 ,in this1 two things are especially helpful2 first1 the fact that we have two eyes and1 consequently1 that we must feel two irritations of the optic nerves which are not wholly alike2 and secondly1 the fact that we are enabled by our power of motion and our sense of touch to convince ourselves of the distance and form of the bodies seen4 ,the question now arises1 what sort of an intuition of space would a creature have that had only one eye1 that could neither move itself nor its eye1 and also possessed no peripheral nerves4 ,according to ,zllner's view1 this creature could1 owing to its two-dimensional retinal images1 only have a two-dimensional intuition of space4 ,the author's opinion1 however1 is1 that such a creature could not see at all1 as it has no possibility of collecting experiences which are adapted in any way to interpreting the effects of things on its retina4 ,the light which proceeded from the objects roundabout and fell on the retina could produce no other effect on the being than that of a wholly intelligible irritation1 or1 perhaps1 even pain4 ,the reflections presented sufficiently show that neither the phenomena of symmetry nor the retinal images of the objects of vision necessarily force upon us the assumption of a four-dimensioned space4 ,if the material world should ever present problems which could not in the progress of knowledge be solved in a natural way1 the assumption that a four-dimensional space containing the world exists would also be incompetent to resolve the difficulties presented2 it would simply convert these difficulties into others1 and not dispose of the problems but simply displace them to another world4 ,yet the question might be asked1 ,is the existence of a four-dimensional space really impossible8 ,to answer this question1 we must first clearly know what we mean by 8exist40 ,if existence means that the intellectual idea of a thing can be formed and that this idea shall not lead to contradictions with other well-established ideas and with experience1 we have only to say that four-dimensioned space does exist1 as the arguments adduced in sections ,,ii and ,,iii have rendered plain4 ,if1 namely1 the space of four dimensions did not exist as a clear idea in the minds of mathematicians1 mathematicians could certainly not have been led by this idea to results which are recognised by the senses as true1 and which really take place in our own representable space4 ,but if existence means 8material actuality0 we must say that we neither now nor in the future can know anything about it4 ,for we know material actuality only as three-dimensional1 our senses can only make three-dimensional experiences1 and the inferences of our reason1 although they can well abstract from material things1 can never ascend to the point of explaining a four-dimensional materiality4 ,just as little1 therefore1 as we can locally fix the idea of a two-dimensional material world1 as little can we substantiate the notion of a four-dimensioned material existence4 ,v4 ,,examination ,,of ,,the ,,hypothesis ,,concerning ,,the ,,existence ,,of ,,four-,,dimensional ,,spirits4 ,in connection with the belief that the visible world is contained in a four-dimensioned space1 ,zllner and his adherents further hold that this higher space is inhabited by intelligent beings who can act consciously and at will on the human beings who live in experiential space4 ,to invest this opinion with greater strength ,zllner appealed to the fact that the greatest thinkers of antiquity and of modern times were either wholly of this opinion or at least held views from which his contentions might be immediately derived4 ,plato's dialogue between ,socrates and ,glaukon in the seventh book of the ,republic1 is evidence1 says ,zllner1 that this greatest philosopher of antiquity possessed some presentiment of this extension of the notion of space4 ,yet any one who has connectedly studied and understood ,plato's system of philosophy must concede that the so-called 8ideas0 of the ,platonic system denote something wholly different from what ,zllner sees in them or pretends to see4 ,zllner says that these ,platonic ideas are spatial objects of more than three dimensions and represent 8real existence0 in the same sense that the material world1 as contrasted with the images on the retina1 represents it4 ,zllner similarly deals with the ,kantian 8thing-in-itself10 which is also regarded as an object of higher dimensions4 ,to show ,kant in the light of a predecessor1 ,zllner quotes the following passage from the former's 8,trume eines ,geistersehers1 erlutert durch ,trume der ,metaphysik0 7#agff1 ,collected ,works1 ,vol4 ,,vii1 page #cb et seqq473 8,i confess that ,i am very much inclined to assert the existence of immaterial beings in the world1 and to rank my own soul as one of such a class4 ,it appears1 there is a spiritual essence existent which is intimately bound up with matter but which does not act on those forces of the elements by which the latter are connected1 but upon some internal principle of its own condition4 ,it will1 in the time to come--,i know not when or where--be proved1 that the human soul1 even in this life1 exists in a state of uninterrupted connection with all the immaterial natures of the spiritual world2 that it alternately acts on them and receives impressions from them1 of which1 as a human soul1 it is not1 in the normal state of things1 conscious4 ,it would be a great thing1 if some such systematic constitution of the spiritual world1 as we conceive it1 could be deduced1 not exclusively from our general notion of spiritual nature1 which is altogether too hypothetical1 but from some real and universally admitted observations1--or1 for that matter1 if it could even be shown to be probable40 ,what ,kant really asserts here is1 first1 the partly independent and partly dependent existence of the soul1 and of spiritual beings generally1 on matter1 and1 second1 that spiritual beings have some common connection with and mutually influence one another4 ,this contention1 which is that of very many thinkers1 does not1 however1 entail the consequence that the 8transcendental subject of ,kant0 must be four-dimensional1 as ,zllner asserts it does4 ,kant never even hinted at the theory that the psychical features of the world owe their connection with the material features to the fact that they are four-dimensional and1 therefore1 include the three-dimensional4 ,is it a necessary conclusion that if a thing exists and is not three-dimensional1 as is the case with the soul1 that it is therefore four-dimensional8 ,can it not in fact be so constituted that it is wholly meaningless to speak of dimensions at all in connection with it8 ,yet still more strongly than the words of ,plato and ,kant do certain utterances of the mathematicians ,gauss and ,riemann speak in favor of ,zllner's hypothesis4 ,s4 v4 ,waltershausen relates of ,gauss in his 8,gruss zum ,gedchtnis10 7,leipsic1 #ahef17 that ,gauss had often remarked that the three dimensions of space were only a specific peculiarity of the human mind4 ,we can think ourselves1 he said1 into beings who are only conscious of two dimensions2 similarly1 perhaps1 beings who are above and outside our world may look down upon us2 and there were1 he continued1 in a jesting tone1 a number of problems which he had here indefinitely laid aside1 but hoped to treat in a superior state by superior geometrical methods4 ,leaving aside this jest1 which quite naturally suggested itself1 the remarks of ,gauss are quite correct4 ,we possess the power to abstract and can think1 therefore1 what kind of geometry a being that is only acquainted with a two-dimensional world would have2 for instance1 we can imagine that such a being could not conceive of the possibility of making two triangles coincide which were congruent in the sense above explained1 and so on4 ,so1 also1 we can understand that a being who has control of four dimensions can only conceive of a geometry of four-dimensional space1 yet may have the capacity of thinking itself into spaces of other dimensions4 ,but it does not follow from this that a four-dimensional space exists1 let alone that it is inhabited by reasonable beings4 ,riemann1 on the other hand1 speaks directly of a world of spirits4 ,in his 8,neue mathematische ,principien der ,naturphilosophie0 he puts forth the hypothesis that the space of the world is filled with a material that is constantly pouring into the ponderable atoms1 there to disappear from the phenomenal world4 ,in every ponderable atom1 he says1 at every moment of time1 there enters and appears a determinate amount of matter1 proportional to the force of gravitation4 ,the ponderable bodies1 according to this theory1 are the place at which the spiritual world enters and acts on the material world4 ,riemann's world of spirits1 the sole office of which is to explain the phenomenon of gravitation as a force governing matter1 is1 though1 essentially different from the spiritual world of ,zllner1 the function of which is to explain supposed supersensuous phenomena which stand in the most glaring contradiction with the established known laws of the material world4 ,besides this appeal to the testimony of eminent men like ,plato1 ,kant1 ,gauss1 and ,riemann1 the scientific prophet of modern spiritualism also bases his theory on the belief1 which has obtained at all times and appeared in various forms among all peoples1 that there exist in the world forces which at times are competent to evoke phenomena that are exempt from the ordinary laws of nature4 ,we have but to think of the phenomena of table-turning which once excited the ,chinese as much as it has aroused1 during the last few decades1 the ,european and ,american worlds2 or of the divining-rod1 by whose help our forefathers sought for water1 in fact1 as we do now in parts of ,europe and ,america4 ,cranz1 in his essay on the subject1 divides spiritualistic phenomena into physical and intellectual4 ,of the first class he enumerates the following3 the moving of chairs and tables2 the animation of walking-sticks1 slippers1 and broomsticks2 the miraculous throwing of objects2 spirit-rappings 7,luther heard a sound in the ,wartburg1 8as if three score casks were hurled down the stairs072 the ecstatic suspension of persons above the floor2 the diminution of the forces of gravity2 the ordeals of witches2 the fetching of wished-for objects2 the declination of the magnetic needle by persons at a distance2 the untying of knots in a closed string2 insensibility to injury and exemption therefrom when tortured1 as in handling red-hot coals1 carrying hot irons1 etc42 the music of invisible spirits2 the materialisations of spirits or of individual parts of spirits 7the footprints in the experiments of ,slade1 photographed by ,zllner72 the double appearance of the same person2 the penetration of matter 7of closed doors1 windows1 and so forth74 ,as numerous also is the selection presented by ,cranz of intellectual phenomena1 namely3 spirit-writing 7,have's instrument for the facilitation of intercourse with spirits71 the clairvoyance and divination of somnambulists1 of visionary1 ecstatic1 and hypnotised persons1 prompted or controlled by narcotic medicines1 by sleeping in temples1 by music and dancing1 by ascetic modes of life and residence in barren localities1 by the exudations of the soil and of water1 by the contemplation of jewels1 mirrors1 and crystal-pure water1 and by anointing the finger-nails with consecrated oil4 ,also the following additional intellectual phenomena are cited3 increased eloquence or suddenly acquired power of speaking in foreign languages2 spirit-effects at a distance2 inability to move1 transferences of the will1 and so forth4 ,all these phenomena1 presented with the aspect of truth1 and associated more or less with trickery1 self-deception1 and humbug1 are adduced by the spiritualists to substantiate the belief in a world of spirits which consciously and purposely take part in the events of the material world1 and that these phenomena may be sufficiently and consistently explained by the effects of the activity of such a world4 ,it is impossible for us to discuss and put to the test here the explanations of all these supersensuous phenomena4 ,anything and everything can be explained by spirits who act at will upon the world4 ,there are only a few of these phenomena1 namely1 clairvoyance and ,slade's experiments1 whose explanations are so intimately connected with our main theme1 the so-called fourth dimension1 that they cannot be passed over4 ,first1 with respect to clairvoyance1 the ,american visionary ,davis describes the experiences which he claims to have made in this condition1 induced by 8magnetic sleep10 as follows3#ha 8,the sphere of my vision now began to expand4 ,at first1 ,i could only clearly discern the walls of the house4 ,at the start they seemed to me dark and gloomy2 but they soon became brighter and finally transparent4 ,i could now see the objects1 the utensils1 and the persons in the adjoining house as easily as those in the room in which ,i sat4 ,but my perceptions extended further still2 before my wandering glance1 which seemed to control a great semi-circle1 the broad surface of the earth1 for hundreds of miles about me1 grew as transparent as water1 and ,i saw the brains1 the entrails1 and the entire anatomy of the beasts that wandered about in the forests of the eastern hemisphere1 hundreds and thousands of miles from the room in which ,i sat40 ,the belief in the possibility of such states of clairvoyance is by no means new4 ,alexander ,dumas made use of it1 for example1 in his 8,mmoires d'un mdicin10 in which ,count ,balsamo1 afterwards called ,cagliostro1 is said to possess the power of transforming suitable persons into this wonderful condition and thus to find out what other persons at distant places are doing4 ,zllner explains clairvoyance by means of the fourth dimension thus3 ,a man who is accustomed to viewing things on a plain is supposed to ascend to a considerable height in a balloon4 ,he will there enjoy a much more extended prospect than if he had remained on the plain below1 and will also be able to signal to greater distances4 ,the plain1 that is1 the two-dimensioned space1 is accordingly viewed by him from points outside of the plain as 8open0 in all directions4 ,exactly so1 in ,zllner's theory1 must three-dimensioned spaces appear1 when viewed from points in four-dimensioned space1 namely1 as 8open02 and the more so in proportion as the point in question is situated at a greater distance from the place of our body1 or in proportion as the soul ascends to a greater height in this fourth dimension4 ,zllner thus explains clairvoyance as a condition in which the soul has displaced itself out of its three-dimensioned space and reached a point which with respect to this space is four-dimensionally situated and whence it is able to contemplate the three-dimensional world without the interference of intervening obstacles4 ,the following remark is to be made to this explanation4 ,the reason why we have a better and more extended view from a balloon than from places on the earth is simply this1 that between the suspended balloon and the objects seen at a distance nothing intervenes but the air1 and air allows the transmission of light1 whereas1 at the places below on the earth there are all kinds of material things about the observer which prevent the transmission of light and either render difficult or absolutely impossible the sight of things which lie far away4 ,in the same way1 also1 from a point in four-dimensioned space1 a three-dimensional object will be visible only provided there are no obstacles intervening4 ,if1 therefore1 this awareness of a distant object is a real1 actual vision by means of a luminous ray which strikes the eye1 there is contained in the explanation of ,zllner the tacit assumption that the medium with which the four-dimensional world is filled is also pervious to light exactly as the atmosphere is4 ,the theory that there are four-dimensional spirits who produce the phenomena cited by the spiritualists received special support from the experiments which the prestidigitateur ,slade1 who claimed he was a spiritualistic medium1 performed before ,zllner4 ,of these experiments we will speak of the two most important1 the experiment with the glass sphere and the experiment with the knots4 ,to explain the connection of the glass sphere experiment with the fourth dimension1 we must first conceive of two-dimensional reasoning beings1 or1 let us say1 two-dimensional worms1 living and moving in a plane4 ,for a creature of this kind it will be self-evident that there are no other paths between two points of its plane than such as lie within the plane4 ,it must1 accordingly1 be beyond the range of conception of this worm1 how any two-dimensional object which lies within a circle in its space can be brought to any other position in its space outside the circle without the object passing through the barriers formed by the circle's circumference4 ,but if this worm could procure the services of a three-dimensional being1 the transportation of the object from a position within the circle to any position outside it could be effected by the three-dimensional being simply taking the object out of the plane and placing it at the desired point4 ,this object1 therefore1 would1 in an inexplicable manner1 suddenly disappear before the eyes of the worms who were assembled as spectators1 and after the lapse of an interval of time would again appear outside the circle without having passed at any point through the circle's circumference4 ,if now we add another dimension1 we shall derive from this trick1 which is wholly removed from the sense-perception of the flattened worms1 the following experiment1 which is wholly beyond the perception of us human beings4 ,inside a glass sphere1 which is closed all around1 a grain of corn is placed2 the problem is to transport the corn to some place outside the sphere without passing through the glass surface4 ,now we should be able to perform this trick if some four-dimensional being would render us the same aid that we before rendered the two-dimensional worm4 ,for the four-dimensional being could take the grain of corn into his four-dimensional space and then replace it in our space in the desired spot outside of the glass sphere4 ,slade performed this trick before ,zllner4 ,its mere performance sufficed to convince this latter investigator that ,slade had here made use of a four-dimensional agent1 who1 in respect of power of motion1 controlled his four-dimensional space as we do our three-dimensional space4 ,it never occurred to ,zllner that this experiment was the cleverly executed trick of a prestidigitateur1 or1 as it would at once occur to us1 that the whole thing was a sensory illusion4 ,the fact that we cannot explain a trick easily and naturally does not irrevocably prove that it is accomplished by other means than those which the world of matter presents4 ,still better known than this last performance is ,slade's experiments with knots4 ,to explain this in connection with the fourth dimension1 we must resort again to the plane and the flat worm inhabiting it4 ,to two parallel lines in a plane let the two ends of a third line1 which has a double point1 that is1 intersects itself once1 be attached4 ,our flat worm would not be able to untie the loop formed by the doubled third line1 which we will call a string1 because it cannot execute motions in three dimensions4 ,if1 therefore1 a two-dimensional prestidigitateur should appear and accomplish the trick of untying this loop without removing the two ends of the string from the parallel lines1 he will have accomplished for our flat worm a supersensuous experiment4 ,a human being engaged in the service of the prestidigitateur could execute for him the experiment by simply lifting the string a little out of the plane1 pulling it taut1 and placing it back again4 ,this suggests the following analogous experiment for three-dimensional beings4 ,the two ends of a string in which a common knot has been made are sealed to the opposite walls of a room4 ,the problem is to untie this knot without breaking the seals at the two ends of the string4 ,everybody knows that this problem is not soluble1 but it may be calculated mathematically that the knot in the string can be untied as easily by motions in a fourth dimension of space as in the experiment above described the knot in the two-dimensional string was untied by a three-dimensional motion4 ,now as ,slade untied the knot before ,zllner's eyes without apparently making any use of the ends fastened in the walls1 ,zllner was still more strongly confirmed in the view that ,slade had power over spirits who performed the experiments for him4 ,still more far-reaching is the theory of ,carl du ,prel concerning the relations of the material and the four-dimensional world4 7,compare his numerous essays in the spiritualistic magazine ,sphinx47 ,just as the shadows of three-dimensional objects cast on a wall are controlled in their movements by the things whose projections they are1 in the same way it is claimed does there exist back of everything of this sense-perceptible world a real transcendental and four-dimensional 8thing-in itself0 whose projection in the space of experience is what we falsely regard as the independent thing4 ,thus every man besides existing in his terrestrial self also exists in a spiritual or astral self which constantly accompanies him in his walks through life and whose existence is especially proclaimed in states of profound sleep1 of somnambulism1 and in the conditions of mediums4 ,in this way ,du ,prel explains the wonderful feats of somnambulists1 and the aerial journeys of sorcerers and witches4 ,whereas1 ordinarily the separation of the material body from the astral body is only effected at the moment of death2 in the case of somnambulists this separation may take place at any time1 or1 as ,du ,prel says3 8the threshold of feeling may be permanently displaced40 ,in view of the natural relations of such theories to the dogmas of ,christianity it is explainable that theologians also have raised their voices for or against spiritualism4 ,while the ,protestant ,church ,times beheld in the 8repulsive thaumaturgic performances which these coryphi of modern science offer1 a lack of comprehension of real philosophy10 the magazine ,the ,proof of ,faith1 expresses its delight at the discovery of spiritualism in the following manner3 8,every ,christian will surely rejoice at the deep and perhaps mortal wound which these new discoveries have in all probability administered to modern materialism40 ,we shall pass by the childish opinion that the ,bible also speaks of four dimensions1 as both in ,job 7xi1 #h-i7 and in the ,epistle to the ,ephesians 7iii1 #ah7 only breadth1 length1 depth1 and height1 that is1 four directions of extension1 are mentioned4 ,yet we will still add1 as ,cranz has done1 the reflections which ,zllner1 as the most prominent representative of modern spiritualism1 has put forward respecting its relation to the doctrines of ,christianity 7,wissensch4 ,abhandl41 ,vol4 ,,iii74 ,by the foundation of transcendental physics on the basis of spiritualistic phenomena1 the 8new light0 has arisen which is spoken of in the ,new ,testament4 ,the rending of the veil of the ,temple on the crucifixion of ,christ1 the resurrection1 the ascension1 the transfiguration1 the speaking with many tongues on the giving out of the ,holy ,ghost1 all these are in ,zllner's view spiritualistic phenomena4 ,similarly1 he sees a reference to the four-dimensional world of spirits in all those sayings of ,christ in which the latter speaks to his ,apostles of the impossibility of their having any image or notion of the place to which when he disappeared he would go and whence he would return4 7,gospel of ,st4 ,john1 xiii1 #cc1 #cf2 xiv1 #b1 #c1 #bh2 xvi1 #e1 #ac74 ,ulrici1 however1 goes furthest in the mingling of spiritualistic and ,christian beliefs2 for he sees in the doctrine of spiritualism a means of strengthening belief in a supreme moral world-order and in the immortality of the soul4 ,in answer to ,ulrici's tract 8,spiritualism ,so-called1 a ,question of ,science0 7#ahhi7 ,wundt wrote an annihilating reply bearing the title 8,spiritualism1 a ,question of ,science ,so-called40 ,wundt criticises the future condition of our souls according to spiritualistic hypotheses in the following sarcastic yet pertinent words1 which ,cranz also quotes3 87#a7 ,physically1 the souls of the dead come into the thraldom of certain living beings who are called mediums4 ,these mediums are1 for the present1 at least1 a not widely diffused class and they appear to be almost exclusively ,americans4 ,at the command of these mediums1 departed souls perform mechanical feats which possess throughout the character of absolute aimlessness4 ,they rap1 they lift tables and chairs1 they move beds1 they play on the harmonica1 and do other similar things4 7#b7 ,intellectually1 the souls of the dead enter a condition which1 if we are to judge from the productions which they deposit on the slates of the mediums1 must be termed a very lamentable one4 ,these slate-writings belong throughout in the category of imbecility2 they are totally bereft of any contents4 7#c7 ,the most favored1 apparently1 is the moral condition of the soul4 ,according to the testimony which we have1 its character cannot be said to be anything else than that of utter harmlessness4 ,from brutal performances1 such1 for instance1 as the destruction of bed-canopies1 the spirits most politely refrain40 ,wundt then laments the demoralising effect which spiritualism exercises on people who have hitherto devoted their powers to some serious pursuit or even to the service of science4 ,in fact it is a presumptuous and flagrant procedure to forsake the path of exact research1 which slow as it is1 yet always leads to a sure extension of knowledge1 in the hope that some aimless1 foolhardy venture into the realm of uncertainty will carry us further than the path of slow toil1 and that we can ever thus easily lift the veil which hides from man the problems of the world that are yet unsolved4 99 99 99 99 99 ,now that we have presented the opinions of others respecting the existence of a four-dimensional world of spirits1 the author would like to develop one or two ideas of his own on the subject4 ,in the preceding section it was stated that everything that we perceive by our senses is three-dimensional and that everything that possesses four or more dimensions can only be regarded as abstractions or fictions which our reason forms in its constant efforts after an extension and generalisation of knowledge4 ,to speak of a two-dimensional matter is as self-contradictory as the notion of four-dimensional matter4 ,but a two or a four-dimensional world might exist in some other manner than a material manner1 and for all we know in one which to us does not admit of representation4 ,but in such a case1 if it were without the power of affecting the material world1 we should never be able to acquire any knowledge concerning its existence1 and it would be totally indifferent to the people of the three-dimensional world1 whether such a world existed or not4 ,just as an artist during his lifetime produces a number of different works of art1 so also the ,creator might have created a number of different-dimensioned worlds which in no wise interfere with one another4 ,in such a case1 any one world would not be able to know anything of any other1 and we must consequently regard the question whether a four-dimensional world exists which is incapable of affecting ours1 as insoluble4 ,we have only to examine1 therefore1 the question whether the phenomenal world perhaps is a single individual in a great layer of worlds of which every successive one has one more dimension than the preceding and which are so connected with one another that each successive world contains and includes the preceding world1 and1 therefore1 can produce effects in it4 ,for our reason1 which draws its inferences from the phenomena of this world1 tells us1 that if outside the three-dimensional world there exists a second four-dimensional world1 containing ours1 there is no reason why worlds of more or less dimensions should not1 with the same right1 also exist4 ,but if now1 as ,zllner and his adherents maintain1 four-dimensional spirits exist which can act by the mere efforts of their own wills on our world1 there is surely no reason why we three-dimensional beings should not also be able to produce effects on some two-dimensional animated world4 ,whether we have1 generally1 any such influence we do not know1 but we certainly do know that we do not act purposely and consciously on a two-dimensional world4 ,if1 therefore1 ,zllner were right1 the plan of creation would possess the wonderful feature that four-dimensional beings are capable of arbitrarily affecting the three-dimensional world1 but that three-dimensional beings have no right in their turn consciously to affect a two dimensional world4 ,the supporters of ,zllner's hypothesis will perhaps reply to the objection just made1 that the plan of creation might1 after all1 possibly possess this wonderful peculiarity1 that we human beings perhaps1 in some higher condition of culture1 will be able to act consciously on two-dimensional worlds1 and that at any rate it is simply an inference by analogy to conclude from the non-existence of a relation between three and two dimensions that the same relation is also wanting in the case of four and three dimensions4 ,as a matter of fact1 the objection above made is not intended to refute ,zllner's hypothesis1 but only to stamp it as very improbable4 ,but despite this improbability ,zllner would still be right if the phenomena of the material world actually made his hypothesis necessary4 ,that1 however1 is by no means the case4 ,although most of the phenomena to which the spiritualists appeal are probably founded on sense-illusions1 humbug1 and self-deception1 it cannot be denied that there possibly do exist phenomena which cannot be brought into harmony with the natural laws now known4 ,there always have been mysterious phenomena1 and there always will be4 ,yet1 as we have often seen that the progress of science has again and again revealed as natural what former generations held to be supernatural1 it is certainly wholly wrong to bring in for the explanation of phenomena which now seem mysterious an hypothesis like that of ,zllner's1 by which everything in the world can be explained4 ,if we adopt a point of view which regards it as natural for spirits arbitrarily to interfere in the workings of the world1 all scientific investigation will cease1 for we could never more trust or rely upon any chemical or physical experiment1 or any botanical or zological culture4 ,if the spirits are the authors of the phenomena that are mysterious to us1 why should they also not have control of the phenomena which are not mysterious8 ,the existence of mysterious phenomena justifies in no manner or form the assumption that spirits exist which produce them4 ,would it not be much simpler1 if we must have supernatural influences1 to adopt the nave religious point of view1 according to which everything that happens is traceable to the direct1 actual1 and personal interference of a single being which we call ,god8 ,things which formerly stood beyond the sphere of our knowledge and were regarded as marvellous events1 as a storm1 for example1 now stand in the most intimate connection with known natural laws4 ,things that formerly were mysterious are so no longer4 ,if one hundred and fifty years ago some scientists were in the possession of our present knowledge of inductional electricity and had connected ,paris and ,berlin with a wire by whose aid one could clearly interpret in ,berlin what another person had at that very moment said in ,paris1 people would have regarded this phenomenon as supernatural and assumed that the originator of this long-distance speaking was in league with spirits4 ,we recognise1 thus1 that the things which are termed supernatural depend to a great extent on the stage of culture which humanity has reached4 ,things which now appear to us mysterious1 may1 in a very few decades1 be recognised as quite natural4 ,this knowledge1 however1 is not to be obtained by the lazy assumption of bands of spirits as the authors of mysterious phenomena1 but by performing what in physics and chemistry is called experiment4 ,but the first and essential condition of all scientific experimenting is that the experimenter shall be absolutely master of the conditions under which the experiment is or is not to succeed4 ,now1 this criterion of scientific experimenting is totally lacking in all spiritualistic experiments4 ,we can never assign in their case the conditions under which they will or will not succeed4 ,when all the preparations in a spiritualistic sance have been properly made1 but nothing takes place1 the beautiful excuse is always forthcoming that the 8spirits were not willing10 that there were 8too many incredulous persons present10 and so forth4 ,fortunately1 in physical experiments these pretexts are not necessary4 ,by the path of experiment1 and not by that of transcendental speculation1 physics has thus made incredible progress and has piled new knowledge strata on strata upon the old4 ,accordingly1 the prospect is left that the mysteries which the conditions and properties of the human soul still present can be solved more and more by the methods of scientific experiment4 ,to this end1 however1 it is especially necessary that the physio-psychological experiments in question should only be performed by men who possess the critical eye of inquiry1 who are free from the dangers of self-illusion1 and who are competent to keep apart from their experiments all superstition and deception4 ,the history of natural science clearly teaches that it is only by this road that man can arrive at certain and well-established knowledge4 ,if1 therefore1 there really is behind such phenomena as mind-reading1 telepathy1 and similar psychical phenomena something besides humbug and self-illusion1 what we have to do is to study privately and carefully by serious experiments the success or non-success of such phenomena1 and not allow ourselves to be influenced by the public and dramatic performances of psychical artists1 like ,cumberland and his ilk4 ,the high eminence on which the knowledge and civilisation of humanity now stands was not reached by the thoughtless employment of fanciful ideas1 nor by recourse to four-dimensional worlds1 but by hard1 serious labor and slow1 unceasing research4 ,let all men of science1 therefore1 band themselves together and oppose a solid front to methods that explain everything that is now mysterious to us by the interference of independent spirits4 ,for these methods1 owing to the fact that they can explain everything1 explain nothing1 and thus oppose dangerous obstacles to the progress of real research1 to which we owe the beautiful temple of modern knowledge4 ,,hermann ,,schubert4 ,,footnotes3 #gi ,this is discussed at greater length in my tract ,zahl und ,zhlen in ,virchow-,holtzendorff's collection of popular essays1 ,j4 ,f4 ,richter1 #ahhg4 #hj ,victor ,schlegel1 indeed1 has made models of the three-dimensional nets of all the six structures which correspond in four-dimensioned space to the five regular bodies of our space1 in an analogous manner to that by which we draw in a plane the nets of five regular bodies4 ,schlegel's models are made by ,brill of ,darmstadt4 #ha ,quoted by ,cranz4 ,,correspondence4 ,i4 ,,the ,,religious ,,outlook ,,in ,,france4 ,the return of ,mme4 ,hyacinthe ,loyson to ,france after her ,american tour1 undertaken1 ,i understand1 in order to obtain new support for the ,gallican church1 suggests the writing of this article1 which will be a brief survey1 from the point of view of an ,american layman1 of the present religious situation in ,france4 ,as ,pre ,hyacinthe's reform has been made the peg on which to hang this article1 perhaps ,i cannot do better than begin by an examination of the noble but fruitless labors of the eloquent ex-,carmelite4 ,while one cannot help being carried away by the oratory of ,hyacinthe ,loyson and charmed with his personality1 so full of wit1 kindliness1 and gentility2 while one must admire the devotedness and earnestness of ,mme4 ,loyson and feel much sympathy for their studious and promising son ,paul1 one is convinced in spite of one's self that this latter-day ,gallicanism is doomed to failure if indeed it has not already failed4 ,you have simply to visit the poor little church in the ,rue d',arras1 in this city1 to see what a mere handful of followers ,pre ,hyacinthe has been able to collect in this great centre of two million people1 after years of work and after preaching hundreds of magnificent sermons that would fill to overflowing the largest edifice in ,america1 ,sunday after ,sunday1 if delivered with similar eloquence by a divine of no matter what denomination or of no denomination at all4 ,to the practical layman of this practical age no further demonstration is necessary in order to prove that ,pre ,hyacinthe's mission is1 as the ,french say1 un coup dans l'eau1 that is1 an effort which produces no result4 ,whenever ,i leave this humble church and am well out in the narrow1 shabby street in which it is situated and am away from the influence of the preacher's fascination1 ,i cannot help exclaiming1 ,what a waste of power1 ,what a casting of pearls before swine6 ,and all of ,mme4 ,loyson's enthusiastic conversation in private1 her accounts of the encouraging letters received by the ,pre1 furtively of course1 from discontented priests1 and her statements concerning the warm words of sympathy and support from the churchmen of foreign lands1 cannot remove that abiding feeling that this rejuvenated ,gallican church movement is other than a dismal failure2 more than ever one exclaims3 ,c'est un coup dans l'eau4 ,pre ,hyacinthe has always received1 in ,france as abroad1 his greatest support from the ,protestants4 ,but ,protestantism here in ,france is a sickly growth when compared1 for instance1 with its rich and sturdy brother in the ,united ,states4 ,it has1 at most1 only a small band of followers1 nearly lost to view in the vast army of ,catholicism and ,freethought4 ,furthermore1 the ,liberal wing is losing ground and the ,orthodox wing gaining slightly1 not an encouraging sign in these days to those who hope for the final triumph of faith over the growing tendency towards infidelity4 ,the real truth is that about the only strength left in ,french ,protestantism to-day lies in the fact that there is a certain clat associated1 in the eyes of the upper classes1 with the being a ,protestant1 much as is the case in ,america and ,england1 in the same rank1 about being a ,roman ,catholic4 ,it distinguishes you from the multitude1 and in these democratic times human nature1 especially when it is that of the 8upper ten10 is very keen for elimination from 8the vulgar throng40 ,it is difficult for an ,american to comprehend this peculiar little streak of innocent vanity running through certain ,french circles which shows itself in this wish to be known as ,protestants4 ,it is not too much to say that to the impartial outside observer this phase of the ,french ,protestantism of to-day is the one that first strikes the eye2 which goes to prove in a peculiar but significant manner the weak hold1 on the one hand1 which the doctrine of ,luther and ,calvin now has on the ,french nation1 and1 on the other hand1 how universal must be scepticism1 freethought1 and utter indifference to church and religion of every kind4 ,if native ,french ,protestantism exerts so little influence on the nation1 it is easy to imagine the excessive futility of the work of the foreign missionary4 ,there is a great deal said in ,american and religious circles about the labors in ,france of the ,salvation ,army1 the ,mc,all ,mission1 the ,young ,men's ,christian ,association1 etc4 ,i have received more than one letter from would-be subscribers in the ,united ,states asking me if these and other similar organisations were really accomplishing all that they pretend4 ,my reply is invariably that if you regard their labors as charity work some good is being done1 but if money is asked for because of the religious results which have been accomplished1 the demand should be considered to be arrant humbug4 ,if ,pre ,hyacinthe1 a ,frenchman and a ,catholic1 after forty years of labor1 has accomplished next to nothing1 it is easy to imagine how this nation1 so reserved in its relations with the foreigner when he attempts to penetrate into its inner life1 would treat ,scotch and ,yankee missionaries4 ,from a religious standpoint1 therefore1 ,american money and sympathy is absolutely thrown away when it is sent to ,france4 ,if it be answered that much misery and physical suffering is relieved by these foreign missions1 the ,french might well ask if charity does not begin at home4 ,the ,french are a peculiarly thrifty people4 ,few are poor1 beggars are scarce and charitable institutions are rich and numerous4 ,hence devoting ,american dollars to the relief of ,french distress is much like sending coals to ,newcastle1 if it is not a piece of sheer impertinence1 like our protesting to the ,czar against his ,siberian convict system when we have one quite as cruel in full swing in some of our ,southern states4 ,and now1 finally1 a few paragraphs about the great ,roman ,catholic church of ,france1 the only religious institution of any real first-rate importance in this country4 ,while it is true that the ,catholic ,church1 at least as a church1 still has a strong hold on the ,french nation1 it is also quite true that indifference1 infidelity1 free thought1 and atheism are on the increase4 ,matthew ,arnold says1 in his essay on ,tolstoi1 written in #ahhg3 8,between the age of twenty and that of thirty-five he ,tolstoi had lost1 he tells us1 the ,christian belief in which he had been brought up1 a loss of which examples nowadays abound certainly everywhere1 but which in ,russia1 as in ,france1 is among all young men of the upper and cultivated classes more a matter of course1 perhaps1 more universal1 more avowed1 than it is with us40 ,arnold might have enlarged1 at least in the case of ,france1 his limits and stated that in the cities the middle and lower classes1 too1 particularly the male portion1 have abandoned ,rome4 ,one has only to visit a ,paris church to be convinced of the contempt which men feel for the priesthood and religion3 you can count ten female devotees for one of the masculine gender4 ,in the village church1 far away from the great centres1 the priest may still have the large majority of the population1 men and women alike1 as faithful attendants upon service4 ,but even here1 for one man who confesses1 a dozen or score of women will kneel at the chair4 ,then again1 this more general participation in religious ceremonies by the rural population is due in a large measure to the fact that these ,sunday masses and vespers are almost the only break and variety in a very dead and monotonous existence4 ,the church is a sort of meeting place1 where whole families1 babies1 children1 and adults1 congregate4 ,the hum of idle conversation1 the crying of infants1 and the ardent exhortations of the priest are often mingled in a manner that would astonish and shock a pious ,protestant1 accustomed to the highly proper atmosphere of an ,episcopalian or ,presbyterian ,church in the ,united ,states4 ,another sign of the disfavor in which ,french ,catholicism finds itself to-day is seen in the quality of its future priests4 ,you have simply to look into the faces of the seminarists as they pass by you in procession in the streets of ,paris to be convinced of the well-known fact that these young men are1 for the most part1 the faint-hearted and dull-headed sons of the peasantry1 eager to escape the drudgery of farm life and not intelligent enough for business or the petty employments offered by the ,state4 8,anybody can make a priest10 is often heard in ,france4 ,the result is that just as the ,english army is the receptacle for the riff-raff--the ,tommy ,atkinses of ,rudyard ,kipling's 8,barrack-room ,ballads0--of the cities1 so the ,french priesthood draws most of its recruits from the scum of the farming districts4 ,this fact contrasts strongly1 by the way1 with the manner in which the ,protestants fill their pulpits4 ,the young man who becomes a pastor is not looked upon by his friends and companions as a failure and a numskull4 ,quite the contrary2 he is immediately classed among those taking a high moral stand4 ,some of the best families of ,france are descended from1 or have relatives who are1 clergymen1 and they are quite proud of the fact2 another example of that sentiment of halo surrounding ,french ,protestantism to which reference has already been made4 ,another cause of this boycotting of the cloth as a profession by the youth of the lite is due to the ,church having got on the wrong side during the struggle for the foundation of the present ,republic4 ,the ,catholics supported the ,monarchists and ,bonapartists and took an active part in the attempt to prevent the advent of republican institutions and to overthrow these institutions when they had been accepted by a majority of the nation4 ,this unpatriotic course brought the ,church into bad odor among republicans1 so that the having a son in orders1 for example1 would be apt to be an impediment to a father aspiring to political preferment1 especially if the latter belonged to the ,radical or ,socialist wing of the ,republican army4 ,the result is that a whole great political party is1 in its general tendency1 opposed to the ,catholic ,church4 ,nor is the harm occasioned thereby limited to lowering the quality of the seminarists4 ,it makes a vast number of intelligent and influential citizens sworn enemies of religion4 ,thus1 when ,gambetta attended funerals1 he would not enter the church1 but wait outside in the porch4 ,when ,louis ,blanc was buried neither church nor priest participated in the pageant4 ,on the death of ,henri ,martin1 a free-thinking ,protestant clergyman officiated at the burial service4 ,hundreds of other prominent ,republicans1 who have died or been buried since #ahgj1 never entered a church1 perhaps1 except when their bodies were borne there by their families1 acting under the influence of its female members1 or out of respect for public sentiment4 ,one of the shrewdest acts of ,leo ,,xiii4 is his recent declaration in favor of the ,french ,republic4 ,he not only accepts the situation1 but has ordered the faithful1 both ecclesiastical and lay1 in ,france to do likewise4 ,but this demand has not been complied with without a murmur4 ,more than one priest and noble has shown himself more ultramontane than the ,pope4 ,the important fact remains true1 however1 that officially the ,vatican recognises the political change in ,france1 and1 though the ,republicans1 particularly those of the ,radical camp1 are wary of these new converts and still believe with ,gambetta1 that 8le clericalisme1 voil l'ennemi10 yet the mere fact that the ,vatican lays down its arms means a great deal1 even if the hatchet may not be definitively buried4 ,moderate ,republicans1 those who go to church even if they do not believe what is said there1 think they see in this action of the ,holy ,father a new source of strength for the ,republic4 ,and it seems to me that they are right1 and that this view is the soundest4 ,if the priesthood ceases its attacks on the political powers that be1 and if these latter keep a sharp watch1 which will be done while the ,radical and ,socialist elements are so strong in ,chamber and ,senate1 the clerical party can be held in check1 and the ,republic will have so many less enemies1 even if these quondam enemies are but lukewarm friends4 ,,theodore ,,stanton4 ,,ii4 ,,new ,,french ,,books4 ,i am happy to have the opportunity in my present letter to speak of a book of real importance1 ,la pathologie des emotions1 tudes physiologiques et cliniques1 by ,m4 ,,ch4 ,f,r4 ,the name of this learned physician of the ,bictre is sufficiently well known to dispense me from the necessity of speaking of his personality1 so that ,i can devote all that ,i have to say to his work4 ,its great merit is not so much the novelty of the psychological theory which is laid at its foundation1 as the wealth of facts presented and the sureness of the methods pursued4 ,m4 ,fr's mind is of a distinctly positive cast1 and he possesses in a high degree the ability to draw from the thesis which he illustrates and confirms1 the various consequences which from a medical and social point of view this thesis involves4 ,states of intellectual consciousness1 he writes1 citing ,spencer1 cannot be dissociated from emotional states4 ,the emotions are the products of our mental representations of agreeable states or painful states1 and are the stronger according as they contain a greater number of present or nascent sensations competent to recall these states4 ,the emotions1 accordingly1 being simply representations of states of consciousness provoked by external excitations1 it is to be presumed that the physiological conditions of emotions 7of central or cerebral origin7 present a striking analogy1 if not an absolute resemblance1 to the physiological conditions of sensations 7of peripheral origin1 either internal or external72 and this relation should be as prominently marked in pathological as in normal states4 ,the upshot of all this is1 continues ,m4 ,fr1 that physical agents capable of modifying a state of consciousness of peripheral origin 7sensations71 are also capable of modifying states of consciousness of central origin 7emotions74 8,the external signs of these different states of consciousness can be studied by the same methods4 ,psychology is only specialised physiology2 mental medicine only a specialisation of general medicine1 from which it must borrow its methods of research and action--all purely physical4 ,the demonstration of these relations is the object of the present work40 ,the work1 which contains almost six hundred pages1 presents no divisions but that of chapters4 ,but it would not be difficult to group its contents under the four general titles3 7#a7 physiological and pathological effects of physical agents on man2 7#b7 physiological conditions and pathological and curative effects of emotions2 7#c7 psychopathy and morbid emotivity2 7#d7 the consequences to individuals and society of morbid emotivity1 its medical treatment1 prophylaxis and legislation4 ,the entire demonstration of ,m4 ,fr1 ,i might add1 is essentially aimed at the two following propositions3 the first1 that all the symptoms of emotions possess a certain resemblance to those of fatigue or physical pain2 the other1 that the original source of morbid emotivities and their resultant disorders is a state of depression congenital or acquired4 ,m4 ,fr reverts constantly to these fundamental ideas4 ,after having exhibited1 for example1 the reciprocal influences of the emotions1 or disorders of the imagination1 and of disorders which are of physical origin1 he concludes that 8physical disease and moral disease have the same basis40 ,it is thus only in appearance1 he writes1 that the mind has any influence on the functions of the body2 the phenomena of mind are1 quite the reverse1 the necessary effect of certain modifications of the body1 and it is by the intermediary action of the manifestations of the body that the representations of the mind act4 ,it is found convenient to regard the gray matter of the brain as the central organ of the emotions1 and the great sympathetic as the peripheral organ that presides over their 8exteriorisation02 but we have no right to think of the emotions without their external signs1 and we are thus led to the conclusion that 8emotion is essentially a generalised reflex phenomenon the centrifugal path of which is principally the great sympathetic system40 ,a psychological question much debated since ,m4 ,ribot took it up1 the question of attention1 is also treated here1 in an incidental yet very interesting manner 7,chapter ,,iii74 ,m4 ,fr connects attention with the study of the physiological conditions of physical action1 and thus takes sides1 it will be seen1 with the motory theory of attention4 ,james ,sully1 and others1 have denied the existence of muscular phenomena accompanying attention4 ,but physiology is in a position to disclose the existence of these movements2 it can study their qualities1 their energy1 their form1 their precision1 and their rapidity4 ,we will find in ,m4 ,fr's book a number of new experimental facts establishing the thesis that 8muscular tension constitutes the physiological condition of attention40 8,the mistake of many psychologists 7,m4 ,hirth1 for example7 has been1 that they have confounded rest with willed immobility1 which from a mechanical point of view is very far removed from the former2 for immobility of will is precisely the result of very intense muscular activities1 and can only be produced by a general tension of the muscular system1 which throws the subject in a state such that it can react the most quickly and most energetically on any excitation1 whencesoever it may proceed40 ,willed1 or voluntary1 immobility is attention itself2 to produce this state1 well-enervated and well-nourished muscles are necessary4 8,we may say10 declares ,m4 ,fr1 8that the practice of immobility is the most favorable exercise for the development of the mind3 a system of education which should neglect this exercise would suppress attention1 it would be a regressive education40 8,it is lack of attention10 he tells us further on1 8that is the cause of the insensibility of hysterical patients1 and it is instability of attention that is the cause of the variability of their sensory and motory disorders40 ,it is all due to the want of sufficient energy to bring simultaneously into a state of tension the muscular settings of all of the sensory organs4 ,hysterical ansthesia according to him--and how perfectly right he is6--is nothing but a mental and psychical disease1 which may be cured by suggestion2 it is an organic malady1 which cannot be cured without the restoration of the proper organic state4 ,worthy of notice are a few pages on the existence of electrical phenomena1 8which are exaggerated in certain subjects1 but which appear to exist in a more feeble degree in the normal states40 ,the facts here involved might furnish us with a key to the phenomena of transmission1 polarisation1 elective sensibility1 and certain actions at a distance1 whose solution still presents great difficulties4 ,also to be noted are a number of corrections of inductions made by ,darwin1 whom ignorance of physiology often involved in mistakes concerning the true nature of phenomena3 thus ,darwin was often led to attribute an intentional character to actions which are throughout reflex4 ,basing his views on the inevitable correlation of these two orders of phenomena1 the physical and the psychical1 ,m4 ,fr stands in a position of direct hostility to the metaphysics 7of course1 unconscious7 of the great body of alienists4 ,he selects the characteristic disorder of insanity1 namely hallucination1 and sets about to show the existence of physical phenomena concomitant with hallucination4 ,chapter ,,xiii is one of the most instructive of his work and well worth thoughtful perusal4 ,let us add on this point that ,m4 ,fr stoutly combats the doctrine1 held by ,magnan in particular1 that all forms of phobia1 that is to say1 of morbid emotive states1 are the brands of degeneration4 ,he admits1 however1 that a great number are connected with permanent constitutional states1 congenital or acquired4 ,m4 ,fr accepts the pathological and degenerative theory of crime4 ,but he rejects in a measure ,lombroso's thesis of the assimilation of genius to insanity4 ,genius and talent1 he says1 are by no means devoid of intellectual and emotional anomalies1 but it is not true that neuropathic states are the indispensable concomitants of genius1 although susceptibility to impressions is1 when not developed to excess1 one of the physiological conditions of genius4 ,with respect to the social consequences involved1 ,i will simply quote his concise statement that 8physiology is quite in accord with political economy in condemning the intemperate generosity which favors the development and multiplication of emotive personalities40 ,with regard1 finally1 to the question of responsibility1 ,m4 ,fr's position differs1 so far as ,i can see1 in no respect from my own1 which ,i have expounded at sufficient length in a former number of ,the ,monist1 to dispense me from the necessity of reverting to it here4 99 99 99 99 99 ,our next book is also a remarkable one--,les transformations du droit1 by ,m4 ,g4 ,,tarde1 a small volume of some two hundred and twelve pages4 ,m4 ,tarde has again and again declared himself the avowed adversary of ,spencerianism1 and of evolution generally1 at least in so far as the idea of evolution is indiscriminately and unreflectingly employed1 as is the case1 he maintains1 in a great class of social questions which make up the criminal and civil law4 ,everywhere in these domains1 despite apparent uniformity1 which is the simple effect of a perspective that effaces the differences of remote times1 is found diversity4 ,the serial stages of development professedly disclosed1 he rejects as absolutely incompetent in the explanation of criminal law1 procedure1 the status of persons and things1 and obligations4 ,in criminal law1 for example1 we ordinarily regard the system of pecuniary composition as the origin of penal justice1 and the idea of vengeance as necessarily antecedent to the idea of culpability4 ,a mistake1 says ,m4 ,tarde4 ,and he offers on this subject a distinction which is quite curious4 ,he sees the defensive reaction made against criminal acts originally splitting up into two distinct forms of quite unequal scope3 the one moral1 the joint product of indignation and compassion2 the other vindictive1 malevolent1 and ruthless4 ,the first1 according to him1 is exercised within the family and between members of the same social group2 the second is displayed towards the foreigner and the enemy4 ,of these two sources of penality1 the domestic moral punishment is the most important2 the blow-for-blow policy1 or vengeance1 although more apparent1 is a secondary source4 ,i fully admit that the instinct of sympathy1 the primitive condition of all social aggregation1 has never been wholly absent from human relations1 and it might be that the distinction perceived by ,m4 ,tarde is well founded1 although the two sources appear to have become so confounded in the justice of the tribunals that it is difficult to trace them to that point4 ,but ,m4 ,tarde seems to me to be too much disposed to flatter the portrait of the primitive man and to make as 8mild as lambs0 these prehistoric creatures whom we have pictured as 8cruel as tigers10 and to be too much preoccupied with the ideas of penality and moral responsibility1 which he thinks the new theories have compromised4 ,with respect to the status of persons1 he denies the existence of the well-known order of development by which promiscuity1 matriarchy1 and patriarchy are said to succeed each other4 ,the tribe could only have arisen1 he tells us1 from the federation of families1 and the strong family1 the one capable of development1 could only have been patriarchal4 ,it is wrong1 he adds1 to regard uterine filiation1 that is1 the custom of considering a child the son of its mother and not the son of its father1 as a vestige of a pre-existent matriarchy4 8,in a patriarchal society1 polygamy--which is the very reverse of matriarchy--ought in the very necessity of things to give predominance to the custom referred to1 so that children born of the same mother could be distinguished from one another40 ,this1 indeed1 was the idea of the ,greek tragedians4 ,the maxim1 which occurs so often in ,euripides1 that it is not good that a man should have several wives1 is always disclosed as the anxiety of assuring the legitimacy of children2 schylus charges ,minerva to defend the 8cause of her father02 it is one of the aspects of the reaction against the customs of ,asia4 ,the primitive family1 says ,m4 ,tarde1 in summing up1 was quite different in its original forms2 it was here monogamic1 there polygamic1 and in other places polyandrous1 at one time exogamic and at another endogamic1 and so forth4 8,marriage1 therefore1 did not spring from a single typical form1 nor does it1 in its various forms1 make towards such40 ,his criticisms are of equal strength with regard to the status of things and the presumed priority of collective property4 ,contrary to the views of ,m4 de ,laveleye1 he is of opinion that the community of the village could only have arisen on an enlarged model of the community of the family1 8just as the vestal fire of the city could only have been lighted in imitation of the fire of the domestic hearth03 ,the certain effect of the first must in its origin have been to encroach upon1 not to produce1 the second4 ,excessively preoccupied in finding in the present the vestiges of a state of things that is past1 the evolutionists involve themselves1 regardless of consequences1 in many nave and wonderful theories1 which ,m4 ,tarde1 in his keen and pointed style1 has not hesitated to expose4 ,there is much point and a profusion of the granum salis in these instructive pages4 ,with respect to obligations1 he makes a distinction1 as in criminal law1 between internal and external relations4 ,also1 after having asserted with ,sir ,henry ,sumner ,maine1 the non-fusion of the law of nature and the law of nations1 he remarks that here also there exists two sources whose waters have not subsequently flowed together3 the jus natur is conceived to be the generalisation of a type of relations abstracted from the internal relations of the members of the primitive social group2 the jus gentium to be the outcome of relations between men that belong to different groups4 ,is1 then1 this disordered succession of the social data mere chance8 ,the reader will bethink himself of a number of facts which go to disprove this conclusion1 and it is a difficulty moreover which ,m4 ,tarde has also felt4 ,he replies by making a distinction of 8two kinds of laws1 the laws of causation and the supposed laws of evolution40 ,the first1 which in his theory are analogous to the laws of celestial mechanics1 whose formul remain constant no matter what the history of the solar systems distributed throughout the heavens may be1 are the psychological laws2 the second are merely arbitrary formul1 which1 when we come to define them accurately1 do not admit of adaptation even to the majority of cases4 ,the psychological laws of which ,m4 ,tarde here speaks are reducible to imitation#hb--;consequently to invention--and to logic4 ,i certainly do not propose to question the importance of these factors4 ,in a short tract published several years ago ,i pointed out myself that the influences of contact are more efficient than the influences of race or even of climate1 and this implicitly involves the idea of imitation4 ,yet the character of the psychological factor does not1 it seems to me1 exclude a tendency towards a certain arrangement of the data of society1 despite their possible and actual diversity4 8,with respect to the facts of society10 ,i wrote1 8we point out their changes but do not succeed in disclosing the laws of their evolution2 the most we have done is to note amid the totality certain features which appear to predominate40 ,to extricate these features is a task not unworthy of the historian4 ,m4 ,tarde himself admits that results of this character have already been reached1 and he especially points to 8the splendid and commendable movement in advance1 which though not generally noticed#hc has1 nevertheless1 accompanied all juridical evolutions0--namely1 the constant enlargement of the relations of law as the result of a growing sympathy and sociability4 ,to sum up1 the point of view which ,m4 ,tarde has taken does not exclude a class of researches different from his4 ,nothing can be better than to formulate the laws of the psychological agent1 and ,m4 ,tarde1 original mind that he is1 has done this with a superiority and penetration to which ,i yield my unqualified admiration4 ,at bottom1 does not the view of ,auguste ,comte1 despite his contempt for psychology1 involve the preliminary study of the biological individual and the social agent8 ,psychological laws and physical laws undoubtedly meet in the same group of 8laws of causation02 still1 it should not be forgotten that in the social order of things man is the creator of the facts and that his creations react upon him in the proportion in which they are realised4 ,at any rate1 a tangible relation exists between the creations of the agent and the variations of the results1 and it is not forbidden to inquire if there does not also exist a certain order in these creations1 the effect of which would be to produce a recognisable serial succession in the results1 a medial line about which the events of our life oscillate4 ,a difficult investigation--and one in which ,m4 ,tarde has shown himself to be too speedily satisfied1 and in which we should strenuously guard against hasty generalisations4 ,it is unpleasant1 we admit1 to turn topsy-turvy a house in which we have long lived in comfort2 but our contentment returns in an increased measure when we have replaced our things in their proper places1 and swept out the dusty corners4 99 99 99 99 99 ,m4 ,m4 ,,aguil,,ra has just published a work entitled1 ,l'ide du ,droit en ,allemagne4 ,his book is a history of the different schools of law which have arisen in ,germany and lays especial emphasis on the fact that no nation has advanced as far as this in seeking in philosophical ideas the motives and the justification of its acts1 and he sets about showing how the existence of ,germany's special conception of law may be explained4 ,germany1 he writes in his conclusion1 everywhere starts from the idea of force4 ,its peculiar characteristic is to bow before victorious force4 ,and to this must be added1 if we wish to comprehend its aggressive character1 the sentiment of vanity1 which has led it to proclaim 8that incredible formula3 the ideal of ,germany is the ideal of humanity40 ,m4 ,,george ,,lyon gives us a learned historical study1 ,la philosophie de ,hobbes4 ,he points out how everything is interrelated in the work of this philosopher--his conception of the state to his theories of ethics1 his ethical doctrines to his psychological theories1 and the latter to general principles concerning nature1 thought1 and their laws4 ,but he also presents with much force the objections to ,hobbism4 ,he condemns its final consequence1 which is submission to force4 ,he points out finally the inevitable ambiguity which permeates this system in consequence of the struggle 8between individual inspiration1 which is purely ontological1 and the action of an intellectual environment which is eminently empirical4 ,hobbes was the metaphysician of empiricism as ,bacon was its poet40 ,i dismiss for the present all discussion of these subjects2 an occasion will present itself later of dealing with them4 ,in ,les races et les langues ,m4 ,,andr ,,lef,,vre sums up the state of the science of language4 ,the distinguishing characteristic of his work is the non-separation of language from the organism which has produced it1 and the simultaneous presentation of languages with the ethnical groups which speak them4 ,m4 ,lefvre accepts1 let us note at once1 the well-known stages of the linguistic school--monosyllabism1 agglutination1 inflection1 and analysis1 which ,m4 ,tarde1 if he should unexpectedly become a philologist would stigmatise as gratuitous4 ,of the races1 of the places of origin1 and of the migrations of the ancient peoples he tells a great many stories which are somewhat of the fairy-tale order1 but this reservation does not affect in the least the value of his special linguistic researches4 ,in conclusion ,i shall mention ,le problme de la mort1 ses solutions imaginaires et la science positive1 by ,m4 ,l4 ,,bourdeau1 and ,platon1 sa philosophie1 prcd d'un aperu de sa vie et de ses crits1 by ,m4 ,,ch4 ,b,,nard1 a new volume in the series of historical studies by this venerable professor4#hd ,,lucien ,,arr,,at4 ,,footnotes3 #hb ,see his work ,les lois de l'imitation 7,alcan1 ,paris74 #hc ,i have called attention to this in a less definite manner in several passages of my book ,la morale dans le drame1 l'pope et le roman1 in which ,i shall have to incorporate the corrections which the splendid studies of ,m4 ,tarde have suggested4 ,for the citation given a few lines above ,i ask permission to refer the reader to my ,journal d'un philosophe 7,alcan1 ,paris74 #hd ,all the works mentioned are published by ,f4 ,alcan4 ,,book ,,reviews4 ,,einleitung ,,in ,,die ,,philosophie4 ,by ,prof4 ,friedrich ,paulsen4 ,berlin3 ,wilhelm ,hertz4 #ahib4 ,friedrich ,paulsen1 professor at the ,university of ,berlin1 writes this 8,introduction0 not so much for connoisseurs as for students1 whom it may serve as a guide4 ,he discusses in general outlines the various fundamental problems of philosophy1 at the same time indicating his own position1 which1 in more than one respect1 is very similar to the philosophy presented in the columns of ,the ,monist4 ,his own view1 which1 as he trusts1 is the general tendency of modern philosophical thought1 he calls 8idealistic monism40 ,it is opposed1 on the one hand1 to supernatural dualism1 and on the other hand to atomistic materialism2 the former being the traditional doctrine of the schoolmen and of ecclesiasticism1 separating body and soul1 nature and ,god1 etc41 each into two distinct realities1 which are accidentally combined1 the latter being an attempt1 having its beginning in the eighteenth century1 to explain all natural phenomena in a purely mechanical way4 ,paulsen adds3 8,the whole history of modern philosophy can be said to be a continuous attempt to overcome this opposition4444 ,the principle of natural science is the ,natur-,gesetzmssigkeit of all events4444 ,modern materialism derives from this a kind of metaphysics1 represents all reality as a system of blindly operating physical forces4444 ,philosophy undertakes to dispel the opposition of these two doctrines2 its proposition is--and we may say that this is the main-spring of the entire evolution of modern philosophy--to reconcile the religious world-conception with that of natural science4 ,there are many who regard this aspiration as a sort of squaring of the circle1 and we grant that some similitude between the two may exist1 for here as well as there we can attain only to approximations1 here as well as there we can never solve the problem finally and forever4 ,at any rate1 we must recognise the fact that the whole philosophical thought of the last three centuries has been directed towards this goal40 ,professor ,paulsen classes the various philosophies of the present time as follows3 7#a7 ,the phenomenalistic-positivistic philosophy which denies any absolute cognition of reality1 least of all in physics2 the world of objects is a world of phenomena4 7#b7 ,the idealistic monistic philosophy4 ,to define the nature of reality as it is in itself1 we must rely upon the data of our inner experience4 ,the intellectual-historical world is to us the most comprehensible dnouement of reality--in fact1 the only comprehensible one4 ,the ultimate idea to which we are led in tracing out facts1 is this3 ,reality1 which presents itself to our senses in the objective world as a unitary system of motions1 is the appearance of a spiritual all-being1 which must be conceived as the evolution of some unitary idea4 ,in this respect idealistic monism agrees upon the whole with speculative philosophy1 or rather with all idealism since ,plato4 ,the philosophy of the present time is1 further on1 characterised 7#c7 as passing from intellectualism to voluntaryism2 namely1 it allows the will to have its legitimate influence in the construction of a world-view4 ,it is 7#d7 evolutionistic-theological1 which latter tendency meets half way the above-mentioned idealistic monism4 ,both are beginning to permeate ethics1 sociology1 jurisprudence1 and politics4 ,the old formalistic methods are dropped and teleological considerations prevail4 ,purpose is recognised to rule in life4 ,lastly 7#e7 the philosophy of to-day is historical4 ,the older philosophy is mathematical-naturalistic or abstract-rationalistic4 ,speculative philosophy precedes the construction of an intellectual-historical world2 it then attempts also to construct nature historically1 at least in a logico-genetic schematism4 ,natural science has already pursued this course in its cosmical and biological theories of evolution4 ,it is apparent how these tendencies follow the old tradition of harmonising the physical and the intellectual-historical worlds into one unitary conception of the whole4 ,the book is divided into two parts1 with an introduction and conclusion4 ,the introduction defines the relation of philosophy to mythology and to the sciences4 ,philosophy cannot be separated from the sciences4 ,says ,paulsen3 8,figuratively speaking1 reality is a great riddle proposed to man2 all the various sciences determine some parts of it1 and the attempt to solve the whole1 to find the key to the mysterium magnum of being1 is called philosophy40 ,the first book treats1 in two chapters1 of the problems of metaphysics1 viz43 the ontological problem and the cosmo-theological problem4 ,in the former chapter materialism1 panpsychism1 and the nature of the soul are discussed1 while the second chapter is devoted to atomism and teleological theism1 implying such subjects as the theory of evolution1 causality1 pantheism4 ,the second part reviews1 in the first chapter1 the problems of the theory of cognition1 viz43 the idealistic arguments1 the realistic views1 and our knowledge of the outer world4 ,the second chapter presents an expos of the problems regarding the origin of cognition as viewed by rationalism and empiricism1 paying special attention to ,kant's formalistic realism4 ,the conclusion is a brief treatment of some ethical problems4 ,it is impossible to discuss all the details of the #ddd pages of ,paulsen's book1 but a few specimen quotations from the chapter 8,pantheism and ,world-soul0 may be welcome to our readers4 ,our author asks3 ,considering all the tendencies of yearning and willing that appear in the innumerable forms of reality1 is there a unity of inner life corresponding to the unity of the physical world in its universal interaction8 ,the affirmation of this question constitutes the idealistic pantheism4 ,idealistic pantheism is to ,professor ,paulsen the simplest and most obvious construction of the world possible4 ,to other world-views1 the existence of the soul is a problem2 it has even been called an 8absolute problem40 8,i believe10 he adds1 with great truth1 8that there can be no stronger argument against any world-view than that it regards the existence of soul as something absolutely mysterious40 ,there is a power of conviction in idealistic pantheism verified by the astonishing agreement of the testimonies of many various thinkers in the ,orient as well as in the ,occident1 in antiquity no less than in modern times4 7,p4 #bdc47 ,says ,professor ,paulsen3 8,the dayfly may imagine when the sun sinks that all is at an end2 light vanishes forever and the whole world is swallowed up in darkness and death4 ,but man who sees so many suns sink and rise should have learned that in the infinite there are many possibilities which he cannot see at present p4 #bda4 ,the conception of a world-soul1 of a spiritual all-being1 of a mundus intelligibilis appears to our physicists and physiologists in the same light as the conception of anthropomorphic deities--as a childish dream4 ,they have no need of this hypothesis pp4 #bdc-bdd4 ,du ,bois-,reymond declares that a naturalist before admitting the assumption of a world-soul should demand1 #8that we ought to find somewhere in the world neuroglia embedded in warm arterial blood under the proper pressure and provided with appropriate sense-organs1 ganglions1 and fibres1 corresponding to the intellectual capacities of such a soul4' ,an animal10 says ,paulsen1 8needs as a matter of course legs to stand upon and to move with1 a stomach1 teeth1 eyes1 and a central nervous system1 but the ,all is not in need of this2 it needs no legs to stand upon and to move with1 no stomach for alimentary purposes1 no eyes1 no ears1 for there is nothing to be seen or heard outside of it1 and so it can also dispense with a nervous system and a brain40 ,quoting two passages1 one from ,fechner1 the other from ,ngeli1 to the effect that the system of fixed stars might be regarded as a group of molecules in an infinitely larger whole which we should have to conceive of as a unitary organism1 ,paulsen says3 8,indeed1 there is no objection to regarding a planet as a ganglion of the world-brain4 ,is it too large8 ,no4 ,why should not the world-brain have bigger cells than an animal brain4 ,or is its composition inappropriate8 ,why8 ,we find in it the same materials1 carbon1 oxygen1 nitrogen1 iron1 phosphorus1 and so forth1 and also innumerable interactions similar for all we know to those that take place in a ganglion4 ,who knows how striking would be the resemblance of their structures1 if we could but see a ganglion under a sufficiently powerful magnifying glass40 ,these ideas are mere possibilities and are presented as such1 but we cannot attribute to them any philosophical1 scientific1 or religious importance4 ,our idea of 8a world-soul0 or1 better1 of ,god1 is different and we avoid purposely anything that can be constructed upon the basis of a vague hypothesis4 ,we ourselves reject pantheism1 the view which identifies ,god and the ,all for reasons which we need not repeat here4 ,we call our view of ,god entheism1 and in forming our idea of ,god we purposely avoid such fantastical assumptions as considering the possibility of solar systems being molecules in the organism of a huge world-animal4 ,granted the truth of this view1 the mere possibility of which we cannot deny1 this extraordinary creature or world-animal would not be ,god1 its will would not be our moral authority2 it would not be the eternal1 the immutable1 the ground of all being1 the ultimate rule of action1 and the omnipotent universal law of existence3 it would merely be a creature like ourselves1 only immeasurably bigger1 evolving like other animals and subject to the same or analogous or perhaps similar wants1 disappointments1 sufferings1 and joys as ourselves4 ,what a miserable ,god such a world-being would be2 we know nothing of him and he knows nothing of us4 ,his will and aspirations would have even less influence upon our aspirations1 than1 for instance1 the hopes of a man upon the molecular groupings in his tissues1 we being only the parasites upon the crust of an atom of his tissues4 ,we have presented our view of the subject in ,vol4 ,,iii1 ,no4 #b1 pp4 #bdi-beg1 of ,the ,monist1 in the third part of the article 8,panpsychism and ,panbiotism10 with reference to a similar hypothesis incidentally touched upon as a possibility of monistic theism by ,professor ,romanes4 ,we simply state the difference between our position and that of ,professor ,paulsen concerning the nature of a world-soul without intending to make more of it than he does himself2 for1 if we are not mistaken1 it is with him a mere suggestion4 ,we conclude our review with a passage which shows ,professor ,paulsen's attitude toward ,christianity1 which more than anything else proves the general agreement of his work with ours4 ,he says3 8,the ,christian faith is not a philosophical system1 not a theological dogma and still less the residue of an old superstition1 but the immediate and living certainty of the heart concerning the nature of the good and its importance in real life4 ,this faith can be to-day the same as it was in ,luther's1 or ,st4 ,augustine's1 or the apostles' time who saw ,jesus with their own eyes bodily4 ,if ,christianity1 did indeed consist of a number of doctrines and opinions1 it would certainly be true1 as some claim1 that it has been dead a long time1 for doctrines and opinions are not long-lived4 ,if ,christianity really did consist of the belief in the creation of the world five thousand years ago out of nothing1 the rib story of ,eve1 the story of ,eden and the fall1 etc41 etc41 444 then indeed it would be impossible for a thinking man of to-day to be a ,christian4 ,but all that is not the faith of ,christianity1 it is not the religion of ,jesus4 ,and if all the leaders of all the confessions declare that this is the ,christian faith and that he who does not believe all these things can have no part in ,christ1 their proposition must be rejected as untrue4 ,no one can be saved by believing these things2 while the request of the church to believe in certain opinions set forth by men has expelled many an honest man4444 ,in the life and death of ,jesus ,i have learned to understand the meaning of life and ,i call ,god and the revelation of ,god that which makes my life possible and explains to me the significance of my life4444 ,is such a faith compatible with the above-mentioned monistic world-conception8 ,my answer is1 ,by all means40 ,this is ,professor ,paulsen's solution of the problem of a reconciliation of science and religion--and we add that it is ours too4 ,p4 ,c4 ,,first ,,steps ,,in ,,philosophy4 ,by ,william ,mackintire ,salter4 ,chicago3 ,c4 ,h4 ,kerr ,co4 #ahib4 ,price1 #a4jj4 ,pages1 #aee4 ,this little book is divided into two parts3 7#a7 ,physical1 7#b7 ,ethical4 ,in the first1 ,mr4 ,salter discusses the conception of matter2 in the second1 that of duty4 ,mr4 ,salter's philosophical position is epitomised in a sentence which he quotes from ,herbert ,spencer4 ,this sentence states1 that1 8what we are conscious of as properties of matter1 even down to its weight and resistance1 are but subjective affections produced by objective agencies which are unknown and unknowable40 ,mr4 ,salter's philosophical position1 accordingly1 is1 first1 ,idealism1 and1 second1 ,agnosticism4 ,in ethics1 ,mr4 ,salter's view embraces ,utilitarianism1 or ,hedonism1 and ,intuitionism1 both of which1 he says1 are incomplete in themselves1 and must be supplemented by other elements4 ,utilitarianism makes happiness the ultimate end2 ,intuitionism1 virtue2 and ,mr4 ,salter adds1 such an end must embrace the 8realisation of all our capacities40 ,mr4 ,salter's ethical position has been before discussed in our journals4 ,if we study ,mr4 ,salter's philosophical views1 we shall find that his theory is a reproduction of ,berkeley's analysis of the data of knowledge1 embellished by the results of modern physiological psychology4 ,yet ,mr4 ,salter's theory1 although it everywhere shows the traces of a close study of ,berkeley's views1 presents the strange historical anomaly of undoing ,berkeley's work4 ,berkeley's undoubted aim was to place knowledge on a basis of fact and refute1 in a philosophical manner1 the agnosticism1 metaphysicism1 and transcendentalism prevalent in his day4 ,but ,mr4 ,salter adds to ,berkeley's results the very things that ,berkeley sought to overthrow1 and thus renders the latter's analysis 7and consequently his own7 in need of an equivalent analysis4 ,take1 for instance1 the above-quoted sentence from ,herbert ,spencer1 to which ,mr4 ,salter assents4 8,objective agencies10 8unknown and unknowable06 ,is this consistent8 ,all knowledge is a knowledge of sensations1 a knowledge of and in the mind1 says the idealist1 and we cannot1 by any process of ratiocination1 arrive at things 8outside0 the mind4 ,yet he himself1 it seems1 arrives at a knowledge of 8objective agencies0 outside the mind 7pp4 #fe1 #fi71 and1 what is more wonderful1 at agencies that are 8unknown0 and 8unknowable40 ,surely1 this is not abiding by an analysis of the facts of sensation 7,berkeley74 ,it is as unrational a procedure to infer metaphysical objective agencies1 as it is to infer a metaphysical substratum 8matter10 which last is the error of the realist4 ,again1 take the notion of cause4 ,here1 also1 the same unwarrantable abandonment of the facts of sensation1 i4 e4 of all that is1 is evident4 ,at the end of an analysis1 in which he shows that 8all the choir of ,heaven and the furniture of the earth10 and 8all which it inhabit10 retreat and vanish in mind1 ,mr4 ,salter asks3 8,but is there absolutely nothing real and objective left8 ,so far as sensible phenomena are concerned1 we must answer1 ,no1 absolutely nothing is left2 the whole sensible 7material7 world is but an effect upon ourselves4 ,but10 he adds1 8it would be a hasty inference10 on these grounds1 8to say that nothing whatever is left40 ,and when asked 8what is left10 he answers1 8all that causes sensation40 ,we can never know scientifically what these causes are1 but 8we have an inextinguishable faith0 that they are1 8there being no particular thing we are more sure of than that for every event 7and every sensible phenomenon is an event1 viz41 in ourselves7 there is some kind of explanation or cause40 ,to sum up3 ,the theory of 8sensible or physical idealism0#he implies a 8supersensible or metaphysical realism40 ,in the theory of sensible idealism things only exist as sensations2 8only exist1 that is1 save in their supersensible or transcendental causes0--which1 says the author1 we must always add4 ,what is a cause8 ,cause is an abstraction4 ,an abstraction from what8 from a real1 physical world1 or from a metaphysical1 transcendental world8 ,plainly1 from our real world1 from ,mr4 ,salter's world of 8sensible reality40 ,by what philosophical warrant1 then1 is this concept applied to a world from which it has not been derived and to which it surely cannot apply6 ,it is wrong to speak of a cause of the ,all4 ,the ,all has no cause1 just as it has no weight4 ,all these difficulties arise from the notion that there are two kinds of knowledge and two kinds of existences4 ,idealism1 to be consistent1 must be absolute2 ,mr4 ,salter's idealism is not absolute4 ,this is exactly the criticism that the reading of his book at once forces on one4 ,all knowledge is knowledge of sensations1 i4 e4 of reality2 things not accessible to sensation are not real1 they do not exist2 consequently1 all entities transcendental1 metaphysical1 and supersensible do not exist4 ,this is the conclusion to which any philosophy1 idealism1 realism1 or what not must lead4 ,nowadays1 few people dispute the fundamental thesis of idealism 7of course1 expressed in different terms from those of ,mr4 ,spencer's sentence74 ,in a sense1 it is established4 ,its only drawback is1 that its 8establishment0 accomplishes nothing4 ,it leaves the problem of philosophy where it found it4#hf ,reality is still reality4 ,the same difficulties and perplexities exist4 ,the universe still mocks us4 ,and foremost among the riddles that the world opposes to man1 stands that eternal query3 8,what is mind80 ,mr4 ,salter's views of this question will show us what contributions his theory is likely to make to philosophy4 ,mr4 ,salter defines mind as 8that which experiences sensations and thoughts1 or1 more simply1 that which feels and thinks40 ,it is not feeling1 not thinking1 but that which feels and thinks4 ,it is thus an agent1 a subject4 ,it is difficult to understand how this notion of mind is come at1 without self-contradiction4 ,in their origin1 all notions of mind-subjects1 mind-essences1 mind-agencies1 and so forth1 are materialistic4 ,they must be volatilised and stripped of their substantial attributes1 if they are to take a place in an idealistic philosophy1 and then1 as they 8cannot be ranged along with the sensible phenomena of which the mind takes cognisance10 there is but one realm left to exist in1 which is the transcendentalistic4 ,all this comes from carrying the abstraction by which 8mind0 is reached1 to mathematically infinite limits4 ,in this abstraction the world retreats and fades away into nothingness4 ,and what is left8 ,not a single idea or fact by which we can fix our abstraction4 ,mind is all1 and mind is nothing4 ,it is not matter1 not time1 not space--not even a mathematical point1 which we expect it to become in its infinitely contracting perspective4 ,it has no attributes1 no qualities2 it is nothing and nowhere4 ,this conception of mind1 ,mr4 ,salter says1 is only mysterious as we make it so1 by careless and inaccurate thinking4 ,and ,mr4 ,salter is right4 ,it would require much careless thinking to make such a conception mysterious4 ,a thing or notion that cannot be defined1 placed1 or brought into connection with any other thing or notion in the world1 is not mysterious1 but simply does not exist4 ,in that respect1 it is as plain as day4 ,the same confusion exists in the discussion which disposes of the query1 8,where is mind80 ,the idealist1 in ,mr4 ,salter's sense1 does not admit that the mind is in1 or in anywise spatially connected with1 the brain4 ,the question1 where is mind8 he says1 has no meaning1 any more than the question1 what is the color of a pleasure8 ,this is true4 ,mind is an abstraction4 ,in this sense it has no spatial existence4 ,but the phenomena from which this abstraction has produced itself1 are linked with phenomena which have spatial existence1 and in this sense the mental processes are not mysterious nothings and nowheres4 ,when ,i lose that group of sensations called my leg1 ,i know that1 generally1 ,i have lost the feeling of my leg4 ,so1 also1 when a certain part of that group of sensations called my brain is destroyed1 ,i know that ,i shall then have lost my power of memory or of speech or of motion4 ,i may also experiment with other groups of sensations called dogs and cats1 which ,i know have mental powers4 ,in the light of these facts it is not correct1 either in philosophy or common sense1 to say that mental processes are absolutely independent of locality4 ,i know that my thoughts are not connected with the group of sensations ,i call the moon1 and ,i know they are not connected with that group of sensations that ,i call ,mr4 ,smith4 ,i am always aware of them as connected with that group of sensations which ,i call 8myself40 ,mr4 ,salter1 in fact1 half recognises this4 ,he says1 8,the mind is dependent on the body in the sense that our general power of sensation and thought is connected with those sensations we call our body40 ,yet1 8why this should be so is mysterious40 ,indeed6 ,one is inclined to ask ,mr4 ,salter here1 what species of explanation or knowledge he wishes of this phenomenon4 ,is explanation1 or knowledge1 something more than the recognition and seeing of a plain connection between the groups of sensations that constitute reality8 ,in ,mr4 ,salter's analysis1 all the facts of the world are mysterious4 ,why a thing is as it is and is not other than it is1 is mysterious4 ,he utterly fails to understand why the power of perceiving colors is linked with the particular group of sensations he calls his eye1 and why it should not just as well be linked with some other group or no group at all4 ,why do ,i see with my eye8 ,why do ,i not see with my hand or with the hairs of my head1 or why do ,i not eat with my elbow1 instead of my mouth8 ,why do not stones fall upwards8 ,why do not magnets point towards the ,east8 ,why do not the planets move about ,jupiter or ,saturn8 ,mr4 ,salter's question makes a jumble of the whole universe4 ,it is not the object of science or philosophy to find out why things are not what they are1 but to find out what they are4 ,in this inquiry the why and wherefore1 properly understood1 will evolve themselves4 ,science simply concerns itself with the connection of the groups of sensations which the idealist1 and for that matter every one else1 calls reality4 ,it cannot concern itself with anything else4 ,all other things are artificial and self-made existences4 ,nothing exists but reality and the connections of reality4 ,to seek for any other connections than those that exist is absurd and futile4 ,and to seek for any other causes or cause of relations than such as really are is also futile4 ,before we speak of the knowledge of a thing we must analyse and define our notion of knowledge1 and before we speak of the cause of a thing we must analyse and define our notion of cause4 ,in our view1 the relation which ,mr4 ,salter doubts1 is so intimately and inextricably one1 that the causal relation disappears4 ,neither is the cause of the other4 ,we may1 for the purposes of inquiry1 start from either as our general concept1 but we should never go so far as utterly to expel from reality the other4 ,true science and philosophy are neither idealistic nor materialistic1 but real4 ,the two positions are extreme positions1 and each is useful only as a safeguard against the errors of the others4 ,reality is reality2 that is the main thing4 ,whether it is idealistic or materialistic is of minor consequence4 ,besides reality there is nothing2 its negation is non-existence4 ,we do not wish in these criticisms to repudiate all that is in ,mr4 ,salter's book4 ,a great many of its reflections are helpful and suggestive4 ,we may refer1 for example1 to the passages in which the body is regarded as a gradually decreasing wall of separation between that part of reality which is known subjectively and that part which is known objectively4 ,this is really a unitary view4 ,we believe1 however1 that if ,mr4 ,salter would carefully analyse the notions of knowledge1 explanation1 cause1 effect1 and1 therefore1 the notion of reality1 he would not push his philosophy to the mysterious extreme at which it finally arrives1 and he would absolutely reject such unscientific conceptions as supersensible realism1 metaphysical realism1 and supersensible or transcendental causes4 ,these render the reading of his book as a philosophical help unsatisfactory1 and leave the mind even more confused and perplexed than it was before4 ,however1 all discussions of this sort have their value1 and ,mr4 ,salter's book possesses a virtue which few other philosophical productions can boast of3 it is very short4 ,the author's pleasant style will also add to the pleasure of its perusal1 and if read critically the book will evoke much helpful thought4 ,t4 ,j4 ,,mccormack4 ,a ,,review ,,of ,,the ,,systems ,,of ,,ethics ,,founded ,,on ,,the ,,theory ,,of ,,evolution4 ,by ,c4 ,m4 ,williams4 ,new ,york and ,london3 ,macmillan ,co4 #ahic4 ,this is a book1 the perusal of which will leave the earnest student of moral science full of disappointment4 ,not at all that it manifests any lack of ability or information4 ,on the contrary1 it is at once clearly and entertainingly written1 and at the same time packed with notes and comments that are full of interest and instruction4 ,the course of the book may be briefly stated4 ,the first part1 comprising nearly half of its six hundred pages1 is devoted to the statement of the ethical doctrines maintained by thirteen prominent writers1 whose views have been formed more or less under the influence of the theory of evolution1 viz43 ,darwin1 ,wallace1 ,haeckel1 ,spencer1 ,fiske1 ,rolph1 ,baratt1 ,stephen1 ,carneri1 ,hffding1 ,gizycki1 ,alexander1 and ,paul ,ree4 ,the rest of the book is the review of our author4 ,this review is conducted under the topical heads3 ,the ,concepts of ,evolution2 ,intelligence and ,end2 ,the ,will2 ,thought1 ,feeling1 and ,will in ,evolution2 ,egoism and ,altruism in ,evolution2 ,conscience2 ,moral ,progress in ,history2 ,the ,results of ,ethical ,inquiry on an ,evolutional ,basis2 and ,the ,ideal and the ,way of ,its ,attainment4 ,these are all topics of great interest and importance1 and the author has brought to the consideration of them a mind fully stored and entirely competent4 ,but we look in vain for that discourse and criticism which above all other matters relating to moral science those who are interested in human welfare crave from those who tender their reflections upon ethical topics4 ,the great need of moral science is the discovery and certification of its basis4 ,it is a need that far transcends the scope of mere moral science1 for upon its right determination depends the right determination of a multitude of questions that deeply involve the welfare of humanity4 ,it is a need that is not merely crying to be supplied4 ,it is absolutely wailing4 ,could it only be rightly determined1 mankind would fast enough orient itself in the course of evolution and with undissipated energy work out its best possible development4 ,but undiscovered or uncertified it balks all process1 save only that mechanical1 halting1 stumbling process that has hitherto obtained2 a process that is1 as all may observe1 one that has little if any inward cordination1 but is full of inability and cross-purposes4 ,since it was the professed purpose of our author to review a number of the more prominent systems of ethics1 which he esteems to be founded on the theory of evolution1 his failure to notice and to comment upon so conspicuous a feature of moral science would naturally lead a reader1 unversed in the works noticed1 to suppose that those works had altogether slighted this topic4 ,such is1 however1 not the case4 ,with the exception of perhaps ,darwin and ,wallace1 all the writers reviewed by our author have given more or less attention to this matter1 and they have left us in no doubt as to the positions which they severally hold4 ,most of them are ,hedonists of one sort or another4 ,haeckel1 ,carneri1 ,rolph1 and ,alexander are1 we believe1 the only exceptions4 ,but a more serious criticism upon the work under notice is suggested by its very title4 ,that title as much as says that the various works which are reviewed by our author are 8founded0 upon the theory of evolution1 at least in so far as their ethical doctrines are concerned4 ,now1 what is the theory of evolution8 ,what is its essential nature8 ,does not its very form consist in the affirmation of an eternal secular mutation1 in which there is no discontinuity whatever8 ,it says that existence in sum and in every detail is eternal and continuous process4 ,it uncompromisingly forbids all suppositions of any absolute beginning1 or of any absolute end1 or of any absolutely final adjustment4 ,hence1 no system of ethics can with truth be said to be 8founded0 upon the theory of evolution that ignores or forgets this essential character of it4 ,now1 when we turn to the consideration of the various 8systems0 which our author supposes to be 8founded0 upon the theory of evolution1 we find them1 one and all1 occupied more or less with suppositions of ends4 ,all are forecasting some 8ideal0 condition1 which1 being attained1 all chances of retrogression will be foreclosed and all possibilities of betterment will be exhausted4 ,in other words1 they suppose an attainment of death1 or rather an attainment of a death-in-life more utterly horrible than any actual death can possibly be4 ,the very first condition for an ethics that will be truly evolutional must be the fit and full recognition of a boundless horizon to evolution in morals as well as in all else4 ,emerson perceived the truth when he said in 8,the ,sphynx03 8,profounder1 profounder ,man's spirit must dive2 ,to his aye rolling orb ,no goal will arrive4 ,the heavens that now draw him ,with sweetness untold1 ,once found2 for new heavens ,he spurneth the old40 ,and at present1 the most serious efforts to establish a truly clear-sighted ethics of evolution1 with an unequivocal disavowal of any and all ,hedonism1 is made by the editors of ,the ,monist4 ,it1 indeed1 is the key-note of the missionary work that characterises all the publications of ,the ,open ,court ,publishing ,co4 ,any truly evolutional ethics must show itself a doctrine that applies just as well to regress as to progress4 ,evolution is too often confounded with progress1 but degeneration is just as truly evolutional as is the contrary movement1 and1 looking the facts of existence in the face1 mankind has no assurance of any unchangeable course of betterment4 ,the principles of morals are1 however1 not dependent upon the benign action of nature4 ,when the earth's stock of fuel shall become exhausted1 or when the ice age returns1 or when the sun grows cold1 there will be no alteration thereby in the moral law4 ,good and evil must and will be the same under all circumstances1 and no system of ethics is nor can be anything but a temporary makeshift1 that does not as well fit the diastoles as it does the systoles of existence4 ,we must look for a doctrine that shall inform the conduct of men not only for the fore part of the day1 when all is jubilant and bounding and man asks only for some good task to do1 but also for the evening and night1 when man grows weary and craves for rest2 for not only youth and maturity1 but for waning strength1 old age1 and death2 for not only the progressive era of cosmic history1 but for the periods when natural conditions may disfavor mankind1 when1 say1 man may gradually be so reduced in resources that the same will barely suffice for simple life-preservation2 when under the stress of natural conditions the human intellect1 in the course of generations1 becomes step by step eliminated2 when indeed humanity itself tends perhaps slowly1 but with certainty1 towards permanent extinction4 ,they who complacently protest that the theory of evolution leaves the domain of moral science substantially unaffected are surely in great default either in their comprehension of the nature and implications of that theory1 or in their powers of circumspection1 while those who suppose that moral science becomes evolutional simply because of a little application of that theory to some of the subordinate questions that are involved1 show themselves in a plight as bad as the others if not worse4 ,our author notices without dissent1 and even with seeming concurrence1 the various remarks made by many of the writers reviewed by him in discredit of teleology4 ,since as we have before protested the theory of evolution forbids all suppositions of any ends that are absolutely final1 it of course follows that teleology is in the strictness of its meaning inadmissible1 even in ethics4 ,but in dismissing teleology1 let us not pour out the child with the bath4 ,however it ought to be with the interpretation of the order of nature as a speculative exercise1 something that is analogous to teleology is an absolute necessity if ethics is to be anything more than a curious study of human practise4 ,the universe may manifest no purpose1 design or secular tendency1 but man is and can be nothing but a miserable estray on the ocean of existence unless he sails on a course1 instead of merely drifting4 ,to do this he must take something by which to steer1 and any plausible stability is better than no bearings whatever4 ,at any rate man is insuperably drawn to thus mark out his course4 ,if the theory of evolution forbids him to suppose any ends that are absolutely final1 it does not prevent him from ascertaining directions4 ,indeed evolution affords him data of the very first importance for that behoof4 ,instead of ends we have aims and if ethics is to become that counsel and guide to humanity1 which we yearn for so anxiously1 it must ascertain and certify that single paramount aim to which all other tendencies are naturally subsidiary4 ,teleology1 or rather the determination of the aim of evolution1 must prepare the foundation before any evolutional ethics that is worthy the name can be established4 ,again our author with considerable debate notices the remarks of the writers reviewed by him on the old question of free will and necessity1--but like the positing of some end or aim to be subserved1 free will is one of the presuppositions of ethics4 ,when man begins to debate the possibility of rightly ascertaining the true end or aim for his pursuit1 or when he begins to moot the question of free will1 he is debating not any question of ethics proper1 but only whether such a science is possible4 ,unless conditions and events are functions1 as well of man's personality as of his environment2 unless persons count for something in the variations of the course of nature1 it is altogether vain and idle to be troubled with questions of morality4 ,free will and somewhat to be achieved are principles which whether well or ill founded1 ethics proper must take for granted before it has or can have any raison d'tre4 ,as for free will1 however the metaphysicians may have stumbled over their own feet1 the common sense of mankind has never wavered4 ,as a practical question 7and ethics is pre-eminently a matter of practice7 this question is not an open one4 ,but on the question of what is the true paramount aim for man to pursue1 the decision that shall finally satisfy man is yet to be made4 ,the best proof that no satisfactory answer has yet been made is the fact that we are still seeking an answer4 ,as with regard to the needful prime condition for a truly evolutional ethics we found wisdom in the poetical insight1 so again in this exigency we personally find the most profound ethical philosophy in that same insight4 8',tis ,life of which our nerves are scant4 ',tis ,life1 not death for which we pant1 ,more ,life1 and fuller that we want40 ,,francis ,c4 ,,russell4 ,,der ,,pessimismus ,,im ,,lichte ,,einer ,h,,heren ,,weltauffassung4 ,by ,dr4 ,j4 ,friedlnder and ,dr4 ,m4 ,berendt4 ,berlin ,w43 ,s4 ,gerstmann4 #ahic4 ,the authors' aim is the refutation of pessimism and the foundation of a higher world-conception4 ,this latter is a pantheism spiritualised by moral ideals and contrasted to ,darwinism and materialism4 ,natural science is said to be the surrounding walls of the new view1 furnishing 7#a7 negative truths of criticism and 7#b7 a knowledge of the positive features of nature4 ,the negative truths are3 the impossibility of the existence of a personal ,god1 of the efficiency of prayer1 of miracles1 of the immortality of the soul1 of the separate existence of souls without bodies4 ,the positive results of natural science are the unity of nature1 the indestructibility of nature1 the harmony of the ,all1 the indivisibility of nature1 the irrefragable necessity of natural processes according to immutable laws1 and the freedom or independence of nature1 as having its cause in itself1 uncreated and uninfluenced by any extramundane being4 ,natural science alone1 according to the authors1 is not sufficient to constitute the new world-conception4 ,a one-sided view of natural science together with the obsolete conceptions of theism are exactly what has brought forth the philosophical pessimism of our time4 ,natural science1 accordingly1 is not to be regarded as the sole source of truth2 it is to be corrected by pantheism4 ,the former teaches us 8to regard matter and its motion1 so to say1 as a dead inert substance to which motion is attached2 it treats matter as an immediate reality4 ,pantheism1 however1 teaches that matter is to be conceived as the interrelation of the innumerable live acts of will appearing successively in time and side by side in space10 etc4 ,the authors point out that the necessity of law which regulates the mechanical processes of nature does not exclude freedom2 for 8freedom is not arbitrariness but is controlled by an immanent ,gesetzmssigkeit40 ,this summary is sufficient to characterise the ideas of the ,drs4 ,friedlnder and ,berendt4 ,we cannot say that they admit of no criticism1 7e4 g4 their conception of natural science must be pronounced as too narrow if not actually erroneous1 nor should the law of the survival of the fittest be interpreted in the sense that strength means brutal force17 but we can1 nevertheless1 express our sympathy with the aim of the authors as well as with the spirit in which they pursue it4 4 ,,die ,,philosophie ,,und ,,die ,,sociale ,,frage4 ,by ,gustav ,engel4 ,leipsic3 ,c4 ,e4 ,m4 ,pfeffer4 #ahib4 ,,acht ,,abhandlungen1 ,,herrn ,,professor ,,dr4 ,,karl ,,ludwig ,,michelet ,,zum #ij4 ,,geburtstag ,,als ,,festgruss ,,dargereicht ,,von ,,mitgliedern ,,der ,,philosophischen ,,gesellschaft4 ,leipsic3 ,c4 ,e4 ,m4 ,pfeffer4 #ahib4 ,,wie ,,steht ,,es ,,jetzt ,,mit ,,der ,,philosophie1 ,,und ,,was ,,haben ,,wir ,,von ,,ihr ,,zu ,,hoffen8 ,by ,dr4 ,wilhelm ,paszkowski4 ,halle a4 ,s43 ,f4 ,beyer1 #ahib4 ,this lecture by the well-known writer on the science of statistics and its related subjects was read before the ,philosophical ,society of ,berlin on the #cast of ,may1 #ahij4 ,it discusses the problem of socialism1 or rather the aspirations of the ,german social democracy from the philosophical point of view of the lecturer1 which is a modernised ,hegelianism4 ,this lecture drew forth on the evening of its delivery considerable discussion1 which was participated in by ,herr ,kahle1 a socialist1 and ,herr ,runze4 ,the discussions of these gentlemen1 together with ,mr4 ,engel's reply1 are embodied in the pamphlet4 ,the second of these two pamphlets is also a publication of the ,philosophical ,society of ,berlin4 ,it consists of eight treatises1 essays1 or lectures1 which were presented by the members of the society to ,prof4 ,karl ,ludwig ,michelet as a festival gift on his ninetieth natal day4 ,the authors of these eight essays are3 ,adolf ,lasson1 ,august ,cieszkowski1 ,gustav ,engel1 ,friedrich ,kirchner1 ,wilhelm ,paszkowski1 ,max ,runze1 ,georg ,ulrich1 and ,f4 ,zelle4 ,they deal with philosophical subjects1 chiefly such as pertain to the ,hegelian philosophy4 ,appended to the pamphlet is a bibliography of the writings of this ,nestor of the ,philosophical ,society by ,f4 ,ascherson4 ,the author of the third pamphlet complains about the decay of philosophy3 8,metaphysics1 the inner fane in the temple of science1 stands desolate10 and the last disciples of ,hegel can no longer prevent the deluge which sweeps away the idealism of their grand old master4 4 ,,der ,,materialismus1 ,,eine ,,verirrung ,,des ,,menschlichen ,,geistes1 ,,widerlegt ,,durch ,,eine ,,zeitgem,,sse ,,weltanschauung4 ,by ,dr4 ,eugen ,dreher4 ,berlin3 ,s4 ,gerstmann4 #ahib4 ,the author of this pamphlet1 at present a docent at the ,university of ,halle1 feels somewhat oppressed by the materialistic tendencies of our times4 ,his desire is to establish in the world a province of the ideal1 and this domain of idealistic aspirations and hopes1 he says1 must and can be based upon a scientific foundation4 ,to reach this goal1 the author propounds a philosophy which is confessedly dualistic1 and which must be made a kind of religion4 ,descartes's ,cogito1 ergo sum1 is to him the beginning of all philosophy4 ,the existence of the ,all is devoid of sense1 unless there is an ego to think it4 ,this dualism1 if made a religion1 will throw light upon the problems of the labyrinth of life4 ,the aspirations of the author are serious and noble4 ,we cannot1 however1 agree with the results of his reasonings4 ,he does not seem to have considered ,kant's objections to the fallacy of the cogito1 ergo 8ego0 sum4 ,nor is he familiar with ,lichtenberg's famous remark1 that 8we should say by rights #8it thinks1' exactly as we say #8it rains4'0 ,the same moral conclusions at which the author arrives may be reached1 the same province for ideal aspirations in the world may be gained1 the same religious comfort may be found1 without any surrender of the monistic view of the world4 ,materialism is an error of human thought4 ,but the error cannot be cured by dualism4 4 ,,ueber ,,die ,,grundformen ,,der ,,vorstellungsverbindung4 ,psychologische ,studie4 ,by ,max ,offner4 ,marburg3 ,r4 ,friedrich4 #ahib4 ,this little brochure is a carefully worked out study of the phenomena of association4 ,the author's view is summed up in the following statement3 8,the attempt to reduce the phenomena of association1 in conformity with their real nature1 to one single ultimate process cannot be regarded as successful1 and we shall have to control our aspirations after a unitary conception and rest satisfied with reducing the various phenomena of association to two processes which are closely related1 namely3 7#a7 to an association of simultaneity2 and 7#b7 to an association of immediate succession40 ,there is much that is suggestive in the sixty-seven pages of this pamphlet4 4 ,,finite ,,homogeneous ,,strain1 ,,flow1 ,,and ,,rupture ,,of ,,rocks4 ,bulletin of the ,geological ,society of ,america4 ,by ,george ,f4 ,becker4 ,rochester3 ,published by the ,society4 #ahic4 ,this is a purely technical research1 concerning the causes and form of the discontinuity of rock masses4 ,the studies presented are the outgrowth of field-work in the ,sierra ,nevada of ,california4 ,this range is so intersected by false joints1 schistose and slaty cleavages1 that on a scale of one mile to the inch their average separation would be for the most part microscopic4 ,the dynamic manifestations in these regions are very systematic4 ,some of the strains which have produced this phenomenon have been infinitesimal1 and others have been finite4 ,only the latter are here treated4 ,finite strain1 the relations of stress to strain1 the nature of finite shear1 viscosity1 flow1 plasticity1 ductility1 and rupture1 the relation of plastic solids to fluids1 the spacing of fissures formed by inclined pressures1 jointing1 and slaty cleavage1 are the chief subjects discussed4 ,the most important result of the investigation is that jointing1 schistosity1 and slaty cleavage all imply relative movement and are thus as truly orogenic as falls of notable throw4 8,in the light of this conclusion10 says the author1 8it appears that if one could reproduce the orogeny of the ,sierra in a moderate interval of time on a model made to a scale of one mile to the inch1 it would seem to yield to external and bodily forces much like a mass of lard of the same dimensions40 ,this pamphlet is neatly got up1 and reflects credit upon the author and publisher4 4 ,,der ,,echte ,,und ,,der ,,xenophontische ,,sokrates4 ,by ,karl ,jol4 ,volume ,i4 ,berlin3 ,r4 ,gaertner4 #ahic4 ,there are two sources from which we have derived the main bulk of our knowledge concerning ,socrates2 namely1 the writings of ,plato and ,xenophon4 ,the former is generally regarded as an idealiser1 and the latter as an historical biographer2 for ,plato simply uses the impressive figure of ,socrates to expound his own philosophy1 while ,xenophon1 the general1 the politician1 the historian1 is supposed to give in the 8,memorabilia0 a simple and faithful account of what appeared to him worthy of being preserved4 ,as ,xenophon was not a philosopher himself1 it is tacitly assumed that he had no reason to alter1 to suppress1 or to add his own personal views to the historical account of the great master whom he bore in grateful remembrance as a faithful disciple4 ,there are some other sources2 but they are less rich than those of ,plato and ,xenophon4 ,among them must be mentioned several passages in ,aristotle1 especially in 8,magna ,moralia0 ,i1 p4 #aahb1 a #ae4 ,our author urges with good reason that the ,xenophontic ,socrates is radically different from and even opposed to the real ,socrates1 and that we ought to rely more on ,aristotle than on ,xenophon4 ,xenophon's 8,memorabilia10 ,karl ,jol declares1 is not an historical writing but a ,tendenzschrift1 and we have to be on our guard wherever ,xenophon's special tendency comes in4 ,socrates is the representative of the philosophical spirit of ,attica1 and the character of his teachings may in a word be described as a noble and sublimated subjectivism4 ,socrates is a rationalist and as such he opposes the mysticism of the soothsayer and mantic4 ,he goes so far in his rationalism as to identify knowledge and virtue4 ,he cannot understand1 from his point of view1 7which regards the soul as a rational being only and leaves out of sight the existence of impulses17 that a man can knowingly neglect to choose the better thing and choose the worse4 ,plato1 in order to avoid the error of ,socrates1 invented the distinction between the rational and irrational part of the soul and ,aristotle criticises ,socrates saying 4 ,the subjectivism of ,socrates appears in his trust in the 1 the divine voice within his soul1 his rationalism in his constant request to gather information before beginning to act4 ,he exhibits in his talks great irony2 for instance1 when telling a politician that as a shoemaker must know his trade before making shoes1 so he1 the politician1 ought to know his business before undertaking to manage affairs of state4 ,again and again he satirises the bungling levity of men who imagine that in the greatest and gravest things of life they can act without any information4 ,both the subjectivism and rationalism of ,socrates appear in his constant inculcation of the ,delphian motto 8know thyself40 ,what a different character is ,xenophon6 ,he was a convinced believer in manticism4 ,there are more than a hundred passages in his writings in which not rational forethought but the art of the soothsayer is left to decide the most important questions of practical life4 ,when the courageous ten thousand offered him the leadership in their dangerous retreat1 his ambition urged him to accept1 but he first asks the ,god1 and the omens being unfavorable1 he refuses4 ,he did not accept the offer until he had received another more auspicious omen4 ,in the same way ,xenophon acts throughout4 ,all important decisions which prudence would urge1 are made dependent upon sacrifices1 dreams1 or the flight of birds1 and more than once the safety of the army is greatly endangered by a fatal passivity caused through unfavorable omens which prevent ,xenophon's acting with decision at the right moment4 ,it is no exaggeration to say that these ten thousand ,greek soldiers escaped only by good luck the fate of the ,athenian army in ,sicily under ,nikias4 ,and this man1 a zealous believer in manticism1 should be an impartial and reliable historian of the doctrines of ,socrates8 ,the of ,socrates is changed into a mystic power1 a kind of spiritus familiaris4 ,it has ceased to be the divinity of man's inner self as which it appears in ,plato's account1 and is represented by ,xenophon as some peculiarity of ,socrates which was given him as a special favor by the gods4 ,socrates dethroned the old fate that was supposed to rule the affairs of men and pointed out the importance of knowledge1 for through knowledge we can learn to regulate our fate ourselves4 ,the philosopher who thought little of well-being1 of 1 and demanded above all a well-doing1 an 78,memorabilia10 ,,iii1 #i1 #ad1 #ae17 did not recommend asking soothsayers questions where we should better ask ourselves1 although it is probable that he recommended the ,athenians to apply to the ,delphic oracle instead of relying upon omens not so much because he believed in prophesies1 but because he thought that they would be influenced by the authority of this venerable institution whose wisdom and conservative spirit were beyond question1 so that good advice could be expected from it4 ,karl ,jol1 accordingly1 advises us to read the 8,memorabilia0 with an inversion of the points1 viz41 to convert the sentences qualified by 8although0 and 8to be sure0 into the main sentences and vice versa4 ,in this way we shall be able to distinguish between the pagan orthodoxy of ,xenophon and the rationalism of ,socrates4 ,why does ,xenophon not state directly and simply 7#a7 ,socrates advised his friend to ask the oracles in all cases of uncertainty1 7#b7 manticism is indispensable in the economy of a household as well as of a state1 and 7#c7 the gods have not granted us any real knowledge as to a final success and reveal it through special revelations4 ,why must he add long sentences introduced by 8although08 ,he adds to 7#a7 that everybody ought to act solely according to his own conviction1 to 7#b7 that all the trades up to the highest professions had to be learned before practiced1 and to 7#c7 that those who inquired at the oracles for things which could be learned and studied in the usual way are crazy and even blasphemers4 ,this sketch may suffice to characterise the book which is much better than could be anticipated after a perusal of the preface1 which almost induced us to lay it aside unread4 ,it is not the modesty of the author which produces a prejudice but the random talk concerning things which neither a reader nor a reviewer will care to know4 ,the author has apparently no talent for writing prefaces1 and he would be wise to omit them in the future entirely4 ,the book might be very much condensed1 repetitions avoided1 and an alphabetical index certainly should have been added4 ,it contains five hundred and fifty-four pages2 and the author says he is preparing a second volume4 ,we think it would have been better for his views if he had expressed them in a pamphlet4 4 ,a ,,perplexed ,,philosopher4 ,being an examination of ,mr4 ,herbert ,spencer's various utterances on the land question1 with some incidental reference to his synthetic philosophy4 ,by ,henry ,george4 ,new ,york3 ,charles ,l4 ,webster ,company4 #cbj pp4 ,the 8,perplexed ,philosopher0 herein described is ,mr4 ,herbert ,spencer1 and persons who like ginger in their ale will enjoy this book2 for its eloquent invective1 hot from the heart1 cheers us like that stimulating drink4 ,because of this fiery and revengeful attack on ,herbert ,spencer much dignified reproof has been aimed at ,mr4 ,george by those excellent people who religiously forgive the injuries done to others1 and allow only to themselves the luxury of retaliation2 but when we consider the provocation given by ,mr4 ,spencer1 this counter-blow of ,mr4 ,george is mild4 ,mr4 ,spencer had a critic's right severely or tenderly to condemn the doctrines of ,mr4 ,george2 and had he kept himself within his privilege ,mr4 ,george in reply would not have had any right to assail the personal character and motives of ,mr4 ,spencer2 but the older philosopher chose to treat the younger with supercilious disdain1 and this was a personal affront that fully justified a retort personal4 ,scorn is an ignoble argument1 lawful only in return for scorn4 ,apart from the truth or error they contain1 the writings of ,mr4 ,george have achieved a phenomenal popularity2 their influence on social opinion has been in some directions almost revolutionary2 they are to-day the political creed of many men in different parts of the world1 and especially of many thousands in ,america1 ,great ,britain1 and ,australia4 ,they are bold in theories1 attractive in illustration1 and admirable in their literary form4 ,their approval of 8,social ,statics0 was an advertisement that multiplied by hundreds the readers of that book1 and there is no philosopher great enough to affect ignorance of ,mr4 ,george's writings1 or to dismiss them with a sneer4 ,more copies of 8,progress and ,poverty0 have been sold than of any other book on social economics that ever has been written1 and when ,mr4 ,spencer spoke of that book as 8a work which ,i closed after a few minutes on finding how visionary were its ideas10 he put on airs of aggravating superiority which naturally provoked the resentment of ,mr4 ,george4 ,after not reading the book ,mr4 ,spencer condemned its heresies and said3 8,there is the movement for land nationalisation pressed by ,mr4 ,george and his friends with avowed disregard for the just claims of existing owners4444 8,and now this doctrine 7that society as a whole has an absolute right over the possessions of each member7 is being openly proclaimed4 ,mr4 ,george and his friends1 ,mr4 ,hyndman and his friends1 are putting their theory to its logical issue40 ,to that ,mr4 ,george replies as follows3 8,in nothing ,i have ever written or spoken is there any justification for such a characterisation4 ,i am not even a land nationalisationist as the ,english and ,german and ,american nationalisationists well know4444 ,i have been a staunch denier of the assumption of the right of society to the possessions of each member1 and a clearer and more resolute upholder of the rights of property than ,mr4 ,spencer has been40 ,without waiting to inquire whether ,mr4 ,george includes within the 8rights of property0 the right to property in land1 it is enough to say that here at least ,mr4 ,spencer is at a disadvantage4 ,he disarmed himself before going into battle by refusing to read ,mr4 ,george's writings1 and scorning to examine them he accused them of communism1 confiscation1 and land-nationalisation4 ,mr4 ,spencer cannot now strike back for he has thrown his weapons away4 ,he is a prisoner in the hands of ,mr4 ,george1 who couples him with ,parson ,wilbur denouncing a print called the ,liberator1 8whose heresies10 he said1 8,i take every opportunity of combating1 and of which1 ,i thank ,god1 ,i have never read a single line40 ,the parallel is well drawn2 and the lesson of it is this1 never challenge a man and then treat him with contempt2 if you think he is not a foeman worthy of your steel1 let him alone4 ,had ,mr4 ,spencer studied the works of ,mr4 ,henry ,george1 he would have found in them some doctrines having a manifest family likeness to communism1 confiscation1 and land-nationalisation2 but they avail ,mr4 ,spencer nothing1 because he would not condescend to read the chapters where those revolutionary principles are4 ,if he would bend his brow a moment and examine them he might find that in this controversy there are two perplexed philosophers instead of one4 ,in the book before us ,mr4 ,george remarks3 8,it is this confusion of ,mr4 ,spencer as to rent and value that has led him into confusion as to the right of property2 and that1 at first1 at least prevented him from seeing that to secure the equal rights of men to land1 it is not necessary that society should take formal possession of land1 and let it out1 and consequently1 that the difficulties he anticipated in taking possession of improved land were imaginary40 ,but1 in 8,progress and ,poverty10 ,chapter ,,ii1 he said3 8,we should satisfy the law of justice1 we should meet all economic requirements1 by at one stroke abolishing all private titles1 declaring all land public property1 and letting it out to the highest bidders in lots to suit1 under such conditions as would safely guard the right to improvements40 ,the italics are ours1 directing the attention to apparent contradictions which it is for ,mr4 ,george to reconcile4 ,and1 if ,english words have any meaning1 8abolishing all private titles0 means confiscation2 and 8declaring all land public property and letting it out to the highest bidders10 is land-nationalisation2 at least1 the ordinary reader may innocently think so1 yet ,mr4 ,george declares that he is not a land-nationalisationist4 ,as a personal defense and explanation ,mr4 ,george has a right to say that he is not a land-nationalisationist1 or a communist1 or an 8ist0 of any other kind1 and we are bound to take his word for it1 but in this dispute that matter is wholly immaterial4 ,the question before the meeting is this1 ,is ,mr4 ,george's book a land-nationalisationist or is it not8 ,is it a confiscationist or not8 ,in 8,progress and ,poverty0 ,mr4 ,george explains his meaning thus3 8,i do not propose either to purchase or to confiscate property in land4 ,the first would be unjust1 the second needless4 ,let the individuals who now hold it still retain1 if they want to1 possession of what they are pleased to call their land4 ,let them continue to call it their land4 ,let them buy and sell and bequeath and devise it4 ,we may safely leave them the shell if we take the kernel4 ,it is not necessary to confiscate land2 it is only necessary to confiscate rent40 ,the italics are by ,mr4 ,george2 and a little farther on1 he says2 8,that is the first step upon which the practical struggle must be made4 ,when the hare is once caught and killed1 cooking him will follow as a matter of course40 ,and several years afterwards1 in 8,protection or ,free ,trade10 page #cjb1 ,mr4 ,george describes the artful mechanism of the snare by which the hare is to be caught and killed3 8,now it is evident that1 in order to take for the use of the government the whole income arising from land just as effectively as it could be taken by formally appropriating and letting out the land1 it is only necessary to abolish1 one after another1 all taxes now levied1 and to increase the tax on land values till it reaches as near as may be the full annual value of the land40 ,in that paragraph 8government0 is merely another word for 8nation10 and the taking away from private owners all the lands of the country 8for the use of the government0 is land-nationalisation1 whether the taking be done boldly by imperial decree1 or furtively by taxing it up to its 8full value0 and out of the hands of its owners4 ,the discrimination above made must apply to ,herbert ,spencer as well as to ,henry ,george4 ,mr4 ,spencer has a right to qualify and explain as much as he pleases2 he may properly say what he thinks now about the right of land-ownership1 but the question at issue is this1 ,what are the opinions of 8,social ,statics0 upon the land question8 ,are they not in principle1 and very nearly in expression the opinions of 8,progress and ,poverty08 ,it is not to be denied that 8,progress and ,poverty0 found moral support in 8,social ,statics40 ,in fact1 the disciples of ,henry ,george1 whenever their doctrines were assailed1 brought ,herbert ,spencer into the field as a reinforcement4 ,this1 at last1 gave ,mr4 ,spencer great annoyance1 and in a moment of irritation he determined even by a qualified recantation to withdraw the reserve brigade on which 8,progress and ,poverty0 had so long depended for assistance4 ,hence1 his letters to the ,times and the ,st4 ,james's ,gazette1 and the modification of his views which appears in 8,justice40 ,he tried to do this by dropping ,mr4 ,george to the ground1 while endeavoring to stand on consistent feet himself2 and this it is that inspires the vehement criticism of ,mr4 ,george4 ,with a scalpel most logically keen ,mr4 ,george has dissected ,mr4 ,spencer's philosophy of land1 and with almost ,indian exultation he exposes its eccentricities and contradictions4 ,as was inevitable1 for we cannot get along without it1 the old familiar ,galileo moral is brought in by ,mr4 ,george to prove that 8still it moves40 ,he is right2 for if it is ethically and politically true1 as declared by ,mr4 ,spencer in #ahej1 8that equity does not permit property in land10 it will be true forever1 and no extremity of recantation can make it false4 ,the attempt of ,mr4 ,spencer to show by duplicate metaphysics that his later opinions concerning land are not inconsistent with the occult meaning of 8,social ,statics10 is a failure4 ,it cannot stand a moment before the searching analysis and legible comparisons of ,mr4 ,george4 ,the attempt to resolve a concrete subject1 such as government ownership of land1 into abstract terms of justice limited or expanded by the right of some private person to the house on the land1 and the barn1 and the well1 and the fences1 and the apple-trees1 and other appurtenances1 corporeal and incorporeal1 has involved ,mr4 ,george himself1 as well as ,mr4 ,spencer1 in some confusion of thought1 and has entangled both of them in varieties of statement not easy to reconcile4 ,this might be due to obscure definitions and multiplied explanations1 or to changes of opinion1 but ,mr4 ,george asserts that ,mr4 ,spencer's inconsistencies are the result of moral and intellectual dishonesty1 prompting him to explain away his principles to propitiate the landlords and other aristocratic persons who admitted him into their high society after he became eminent1 and before they knew that his philosophy denied the right of private property in land4 ,in his letter to the ,times1 apologising for 8,social ,statics10 ,mr4 ,spencer said3 8,the work referred to--8,social ,statics0--was intended to be a system of ,political ,ethics--absolute political ethics1 or that which ought to be1 as distinguished from relative political ethics1 or that which is at present the nearest practical approach to it40 ,and then the philosopher becomes a politician and frames for the landed and the landless a moral code1 ambidextrous and elastic as a party platform4 ,duty1 justice1 right1 and truth1 lose all their absolute qualities1 and become relative to expediency and our own convenience4 ,he teaches us to oppose wrongs until they become vested rights and then defend them4 ,he makes ethics changeable as our coats1 and the man who can afford two suits of clothes may have two suits of ethics1 an 8absolute0 suit for ,sundays and a 8relative0 suit for every day2 an 8abstract0 suit for wearing about the house1 and a 8practical0 suit for business purposes4 ,he may wear a suit of 8pure0 ethics when buying1 and a suit of 8applied0 ethics when selling2 and so1 at last1 by those harlequin morals1 it happens that what we ought to do has no relation at all to 8that which ought to be40 ,those pure subtleties and applied subterfuges make ,mr4 ,spencer an easy mark for the indignant sarcasm of ,mr4 ,george1 who shows what ,mr4 ,spencer thought of absolute and relative ethics when he said in 8,social ,statics03 8,when a man admits that an act is #8theoretically just1' he admits it to be that which1 in strict duty1 should be done4 ,by #8true to principle' he means in harmony with the conduct decreed for us4 ,the course which he calls #8abstractedly right1' he believes to be the appointed way to human happiness4 ,there is no escape4 ,the expressions mean this or they mean nothing40 ,the book is written in an angry vein1 and the nicknames 8traitor10 8juggler10 8apostate10 and the like1 add nothing to the value of its argument2 they only give bitterness to the censure4 ,they are not to be commended1 although they ought to be excused1 for they sprang out of 8a tempest of provocation40 ,mr4 ,george has been fighting under the banner of ,herbert ,spencer1 and he feels like a soldier whose general deserts him in the battle and then disowns him altogether4 ,the only rational explanation of ,mr4 ,spencer's letters to the ,times and the ,st4 ,james's ,gazette is that he has radically changed his opinions about the private ownership of land3 and his timid1 uncertain1 and equivocal way of saying so makes him look very much like the 8perplexed philosopher0 that ,mr4 ,george describes4 ,at the same time it must be noticed that ,mr4 ,george himself is not so radical in this last book as he was in 8,progress and ,poverty40 ,his principles appear to be the same1 but in the application of remedies he is milder than he was about fourteen years ago4 ,when he reaches ,mr4 ,spencer's age he may be just as conservative and 8perplexed0 as that philosopher is now4 ,m4 ,m4 ,,trumbull4 ,,footnotes3 #he ,mr4 ,salter's name for his theory4 #hf ,says ,mr4 ,salter3 8,idealism 7as here stated7 is not1 however1 itself a solution1 being only a clear statement of what the problem is2 and for all that such idealism can say1 the problem may be insoluble40 ,,periodicals4 ,,zeitschrift ,f,r ,,psychologie ,,und ,,physiologie ,,der ,,sinnesorgane4 ,,contents3 ,vol4 ,,iv4 ,nos4 #d and #e4 ,,die ,,grundempfindungen ,,in ,,normalen ,,und ,,anomalen ,,farbensystemen ,,und ,,ihre ,,itensit,,tsverteilung ,,im ,,spektrum4 ,by ,arthur ,knig and ,conrad ,dieterici4 ,,ist ,,eine ,,cerebrale ,,entstehung ,,von ,,schwebungen ,m,,glich8 ,by ,karl ,l4 ,schaefer4 ,,ueber ,,einige ,,neuere ,,fortschritte ,,in ,,der ,,anatomie ,,und ,,physiologie ,,der ,,arthropodenaugen4 ,by ,sigmund ,fuchs4 ,,litteraturbericht4 ,,contents3 ,vol4 ,,iv4 ,no4 #f4 ,,das ,,tapetum ,,lucidum ,,bei ,,durchleuchtung ,,des ,,auges4 ,by ,ziem4 ,,berichtigung ,,zu ,,professor ,m,,nsterbergs ,,beitr,,gen ,,zur ,,experimentellen ,,psychologie1 ,,heft #d4 ,by ,g4 ,e4 ,mller4 ,,litteraturbericht4 7,hamburg and ,leipsic3 ,leopold ,voss47 ,,philosophische ,,monatshefte4 ,,contents3 ,vol4 ,,xxix4 ,no4 #c and #d4 ,,die ,,lteste ,,fassung ,,von ,,melanchthons ,,ethik4 ,by ,h4 ,heineck4 ,,die ,,moderne ,,energetik ,,in ,,ihrer ,,bedeutung ,f,r ,,die ,,erkenntnisskritik1 ,,ii4 ,by ,k4 ,lasswitz4 ,,die ,,sittliche ,,frage ,,eine ,,sociale ,,frage1 ,,ii4 ,by ,f4 ,staudinger4 ,,johann ,,eduard ,,erdmann4 ,by ,b4 ,erdmann4 ,,litteraturbericht4 7,berlin3 ,dr4 ,r4 ,salinger47 ,,vierteljahrsschrift ,f,r ,,wissenschaftliche ,,philosophie4 ,,contents3 ,vol4 ,,xvi4 ,no4 #d4 ,,die ,,statischen ,,functionen ,,des ,,ohrlabyrinthes ,,und ,,ihre ,,beziehungen ,,zu ,,den ,,raumempfindungen4 7,part ,i47 ,by ,r4 ,wlassak4 ,,ueber ,,verschmelzung ,,und ,,analyse4 ,eine psychologische ,studie4 7,part ,i47 ,by ,h4 ,cornelius4 ,,die ,,wichtigkeit ,,der ,,reproductionsgef,,hle ,f,r ,,die ,,entwicklung ,,und ,,bildung ,,des ,,menschen4 ,by ,j4 ,zahlfleisch4 ,,contents3 ,vol4 ,,xvii4 ,no4 #a4 ,,ueber ,,den ,,begriff ,,der ,,wissenschaft ,,bei ,,galilei4 ,by ,a4 ,riehl4 ,,die ,,statischen ,,functionen ,,des ,,ohrlabyrinthes ,,und ,,ihre ,,beziehungen ,,zu ,,den ,,raumempfindungen4 7,concluded47 ,by ,r4 ,wlassak4 ,,ueber ,,verschmelzung ,,und ,,analyse4 ,eine psychologische ,studie4 7,concluded47 ,by ,h4 ,cornelius4 ,,werththeorie ,,und ,,ethik4 7,part ,i47 ,by ,chr4 ,ehrenfels4 ,a4 ,,voigt',s 8,,elementare ,,logik0 ,,und ,,meine ,,darlegungen ,,zur ,,logik ,,des ,,logischen ,,calculs4 ,by ,e4 ,g4 ,husserl4 7,leipsic3 ,o4 ,r4 ,reisland47 ,,zeitschrift ,f,r ,,philosophie ,,und ,,philosophische ,,kritik4 ,,contents3 ,vol4 ,,ci4 ,no4 #b4 ,,doxographisches ,,zur ,,lehre ,,vom 4 ,by ,a4 ,dring4 ,,ernst ,,platner',s ,,und ,,kant',s ,,erkenntnisstheorie ,,mit ,,besonderer ,,ber,,cksichtigung ,,von ,,tetens ,,und ,,aenesidemus4 ,by ,dr4 ,arthur ,wreschner4 ,,jahresbericht ,,ber ,,erscheinungen ,,der ,,philosophischen ,,litteratur ,,in ,,franz,,sischer ,,sprache ,,aus ,,den ,,jahren #ahhi ,,und #ahij4 ,by ,adolph ,lasson4 ,,recensionen4 7,leipsic3 ,c4 ,e4 ,m4 ,pfeffer47 ,,the ,,american ,,journal ,,of ,,psychology4 ,,contents3 ,vol4 ,v4 ,no4 #b4 ,,on ,,the ,,development ,,of ,,voluntary ,,motor ,,ability4 ,by ,wm4 ,l4 ,bryan4 ,,the ,,training ,,of ,,animals4 ,by ,james ,e4 ,le,rossignol1 ,ph4 ,d4 ,,on ,,the ,,judgment ,,of ,,angles ,,and ,,positions ,,of ,,lines4 ,by ,joseph ,jastrow1 ,ph4 ,d4 ,,statistics ,,of 8,,unconscious ,,cerebration40 ,by ,charles ,m4 ,child4 ,,experimental ,,psychology ,,at ,,wellesley ,,college4 ,by ,mary ,whiton ,calkins4 7,worcester3 ,j4 ,h4 ,orpha47 ,,international ,,journal ,,of ,,ethics4 ,,contents3 ,vol4 ,,iii4 ,no4 #b4 ,,the ,,ethics ,,of ,,social ,,progress4 ,prof4 ,franklin ,h4 ,giddings4 ,,did ,,the ,,romans ,,degenerate8 ,by ,mary ,emily ,case4 ,,political ,,economy ,,and ,,practical ,,life4 ,by ,prof4 ,william ,cunningham4 ,,german ,,character ,,as ,,reflected ,,in ,,the ,,national ,,life ,,and ,,literature4 ,by ,richard ,m4 ,meyer1 ,ph4 ,d4 ,,book ,,reviews4 7,philadelphia3 ,international ,journal of ,ethics1 #aah ,south ,twelfth ,street47 ,,the ,,philosophical ,,review4 ,,contents3 ,vol4 ,,ii4 ,no4 #a4 ,,the ,,philosophy ,,of ,,religion4 ,by ,prof4 ,otto ,pfleiderer4 ,,an ,,ancient ,,pessimist4 ,by ,prof4 ,j4 ,clark ,murray4 ,,the ,,concept ,,of ,,law ,,in ,,ethics4 ,by ,prof4 ,f4 ,c4 ,french4 ,j4 ,h4 ,,lambert4 ,by ,harold ,griffing4 ,,contents3 ,vol4 ,,ii4 ,no4 #b4 ,,kant',s ,,critical ,,problem4 ,by ,j4 ,g4 ,schurman4 ,,epistemology ,,in ,,locke ,,and ,,kant4 ,by ,prof4 ,andrew ,seth4 ,,anthropometry ,,and ,,experimental ,,psychology4 ,by ,prof4 ,e4 ,b4 ,titchener4 ,,discussions3 ,reality and ,idealism4 ,by ,david ,g4 ,ritchie and ,f4 ,c4 ,s4 ,schiller4 ,,book ,,reviews4 7,boston1 ,new ,york1 ,chicago3 ,ginn ,company47 ,,the ,,new ,,world4 ,,contents3 ,vol4 ,,ii4 ,no4 #e4 ,,the ,,place ,,of ,,the ,,fourth ,,gospel ,,in ,,the ,,new ,,testament ,,literature4 ,by ,orello ,cone4 ,,the ,,folk-,,song ,,of ,,israel ,,in ,,the ,,mouth ,,of ,,the ,,prophets4 ,by ,karl ,budde4 ,,cosmopolitan ,,religion4 ,by ,c4 ,a4 ,bartol4 ,,the ,,alleged ,,socialism ,,of ,,the ,,prophets4 ,by ,a4 ,w4 ,benn4 ,,whittier',s ,,spiritual ,,career4 ,by ,john ,w4 ,chadwick4 ,,the ,,personal ,,factor ,,in ,,biblical ,,inspiration4 ,by ,marvin ,r4 ,vincent4 ,,israel ,,in ,,egypt4 ,by ,c4 ,h4 ,toy4 ,,the ,,briggs ,,heresy ,,trial4 ,by ,c4 ,r4 ,gillett4 7,boston3 ,houghton1 ,mifflin ,co47 ,,revue ,,philosophique4 ,,contents3 ,vol4 ,,xvii4 ,no4 #ab4 ,,le ,,mouvement ,,philosophique ,,en ,,russie3 ,,ii4 ,,la ,,philosophie ,,de ,,hegel ,,et ,,les ,,cercles ,,philosophiques4 ,by ,e4 ,lannes4 ,,la ,,composition ,,musicale ,,et ,,les ,,lois ,g,n,,rales ,,de ,,la ,,psychologie4 ,by ,m4 ,paulhan4 ,,la ,,psychologie ,,de ,w4 ,,james 7#bnd article74 ,by ,l4 ,marillier4 ,,analyses ,,et ,,comptes ,,rendus4 ,,contents3 ,vol4 ,,xviii4 ,no4 #a4 ,,la ,,psychologie ,,de ,w4 ,,james 7#c;d article74 ,by ,l4 ,marillier4 ,,la ,,croyance ,m,,taphysique4 ,by ,j4 ,gourd4 ,,la ,,beaut ,,plastique4 ,by ,l4 ,couturat4 ,,analyses ,,et ,,comptes ,,rendus4 ,,contents3 ,vol4 ,,xviii4 ,no4 #b4 ,l',,unit ,,de ,,la ,,philosophie4 ,by ,p4 ,janet4 ,l',,expression ,,objective ,,en ,,musique ,d',,apr,s ,,le ,,langage ,,instinctif4 ,by ,j4 ,combarieu4 ,,la ,,psychologie ,,de ,w4 ,,james4 7,concluded47 ,by ,l4 ,marillier4 ,,revue ,,des ,p,,riodiques ,,trangers4 7,paris3 ,flix ,alcan47 ,,contents3 ,vol4 ,,xviii4 ,no4 #c4 ,,recherches ,,sur ,,la ,,succession ,,des ,,ph,,nom,,nes ,,psychologiques4 ,by ,b4 ,bourdon4 ,l',,amour ,,est-,,il ,,un ,,tat ,,pathologique8 ,by ,g4 ,danville4 ,,sur ,,un ,,effet ,,particulier ,,de ,l',,attention ,,appliqu,e ,,aux ,,images4 ,by ,andr ,lalande4 ,,beaut ,,organique ,,et ,,beaut ,,plastique4 ,by ,a4 ,naville4 ,,revue ,,de ,m,,taphysique ,,et ,,de ,,morale4 ,,contents3 ,vol4 ,i4 ,no4 #a4 ,m,,taphysique ,,et ,,morale4 ,by ,flix ,ravaisson4 ,,le ,,continu ,,math,,matique4 ,by ,h4 ,poincar4 ,,essai ,,sur ,,quelques ,,probl,,mes ,,de ,,philosophie ,,premi,,re4 ,by ,f4 ,rauh4 7,paris3 ,librairie ,hachette et ,cie47 ,,voprosui ,,filosofii ,i ,,psichologii4#hg ,,contents3 ,vol4 ,,iii4 ,no4 #ae4 ,,the ,,aim ,,of ,,human ,,life4 ,by ,w4 ,rosanoff4 ,,the ,,problem ,,of ,,judgment4 ,by ,f4 ,charitonoff4 ,,the ,,positivism ,,of ,,kant4 ,by ,a4 ,kozloff4 ,,the ,,basis ,,of ,,the ,,moral ,,duty4 ,by ,n4 ,grote4 ,a ,,criticism ,,of ,,moral ,,altruism4 ,by ,w4 ,preobrajensky4 ,,the ,,sense ,,of ,,love4 ,by ,w4 ,solowoff4 ,,the ,,founder ,,of ,,transcendental ,,monism4 ,by ,a4 ,wedensky4 ,,the ,,second ,,international ,,congress ,,of ,,experimental ,,psychology ,,in ,,london4 ,by ,w4 ,chige4 ,,the ,,question ,,of ,,zo,,psychology4 ,by ,w4 ,wagner4 ,,the ,,law ,,of ,,perception4 ,by ,n4 ,lange4 7,moscow1 #ahib47 ,,philosophisches ,,jahrbuch4 ,,contents3 ,vol4 ,,vi4 ,no4 #a4 ,,ueber ,,die ,,actuale ,,bestimmtheit ,,des ,,unendlich ,,kleinen4 ,by ,pohle4 ,,gassendi',s ,,skepticismus ,,und ,,seine ,,stellung ,,zum ,,materialismus4 ,by ,kiefl4 ,,der ,,begriff ,,des 8,,wahren40 ,by ,franz ,schmid4 ,,der ,,begriff ,,des ,,unbewussten ,,in ,,psychologischer ,,und ,,erkenntnisstheoretischer ,,hinsicht ,,bei ,,ed4 ,v4 ,,hartmann4 ,by ,achelis4 ,,der ,,substanzbegriff ,,bei ,,cartesius ,,im ,,zusammenhang ,,mit ,,der ,,scholastischen ,,und ,,neueren ,,philosophie4 7,continued47 ,by ,carl ,ludewig1 ,s4 ,j4 7,fulda1 #ahic47 ,,sphinx4 ,,contents3 ,vol4 ,,xv4 ,no4 #hd4 ,,nirwana4 ,by ,menetos4--,,die ,,wiederverk,,rperungslehre ,,im ,,drama4 ,by ,ludwig ,deinhard4--,,die ,,gnade4 ,by ,maria ,janitschek4--,,das ,,fernsehen ,,als ,,funktion ,,des ,,transscendentalen ,,subjekts4 ,by ,carl du ,prel1 ,ph4 ,d4 7,concluded47--,,an ,,carl ,,du ,,prel4 ,by ,martin ,greif4--,,sehen ,,und ,,wahrtr,,umen4 ,by ,hermann ,haug4--,,ueber ,,die ,,spiritistischen ,,ph,,nomene ,,vom ,,physikalischen ,,standpunkt4 ,by ,dr4 ,anton ,lampa4--,,schuld ,,und ,s,,hne4 ,ein ,beitrag zur ,frage der ,telepathie4 ,by ,m4 ,const4 ,hoch4 7,concluded47--,,die ,g,,ttin ,,des ,,genusses4 ,eine ,traumphantasie4 ,by ,karl ,friedr4 ,jordan4--,,fegfeuer4 ,nach ,franois ,coppe4 ,by ,rudolf ,geering4--,,gerettet6 ,by ,raphael von ,koeber1 ,ph4 ,d4--,,melancholie4 ,by ,carl ,vanselow4--,,die ,,sechs ,,schw,,ne4 ,ein ,beitrag zum ,nachweis des ,esoterismus im ,volksbewusstsein4 ,by ,gottschalk ,thorsten4--,,geheimniss4 ,by ,adolf ,k4 ,w4 ,hochenegg4--,,eine ,,geisterstimme4 ,by ,hugo ,gozdawa4--,,der ,,begriff ,,des ,,absoluten4 ,by ,o4 ,plmacher4 ,,contents3 ,vol4 ,,xvi1 ,no4 #he4 ,,lebe ,,deinem ,h,,chsten ,,ideal ,,getreu6--,a-,u-,m4 ,by ,menetos4--,,psalmen4 ,by ,franz ,evers4--,,meister ,,der ,,mystik4 ,by ,wilhelm von ,saintgeorge4--,,aegyptens ,,grosse ,,pyramide4 ,ein ,tempel der ,einweihung in die ,mysterien4 ,by ,eduard ,maitland4--,,die ,,deutsche ,,gesellschaft ,f,r ,,ethische ,,kultur ,,und ,,herr ,,von ,,egidy4 ,by ,hugo von ,gizycki4--,,die ,,mystik ,,des ,,islam4 ,by ,adolf ,engelbach4--,,ein ,,echter ,,diener ,,gottes4 ,by ,dr4 ,raphael von ,koeber4--,,ein ,,gegner ,,des ,,spiritismus4 ,by ,carl du ,prel4--,,die ,,wissenschaft ,,der ,,magier4 ,by ,ludwig ,deinhard4--,,hebe ,,dich ,,weg ,,von ,,mir1 ,,satan6 ,by ,h4 v4 ,m4--,,anna ,,henle4 ,ein ,erlebnis4 ,by ,hbbe-,schleiden4--,,der ,,stern ,,der ,,sintflut4 ,by ,arthur ,stentzel4--,,selige ,,gegenwart4 ,by ,maria ,janitschek4--,,sehnsucht4 ,by ,carl ,vanselow4--,,das ,,elflein1 ,,das ,,ausging1 ,,den ,k,,nig ,,zu ,,suchen4 ,by ,bernhard ,fabler4--,,der ,,blinde ,,passagier4 ,by ,ludwig ,ganghofer4--,,fr,,hlings ,,erwachen4 ,fr ,vter und ,erzieher4 ,by ,o4 ,plmacher4--,,drei ,,knospen4 ,by ,hans von ,mosch4 7,brunswick3 ,c4 ,a4 ,schwetschke ,son47 ,we cannot be accused of having any penchant for ,theosophy or ,spiritualism and find little occasion to praise their productions1 which are usually crude and illiterate4 ,but we must confess that ,hbbe-,schleiden's review1 the ,sphinx1 is greatly superior to anything in this field we have ever seen4 ,there is artistic taste about it2 there is1 so far as its position admits of1 a certain contact with positive science2 there is an attractive popularity without shallowness4 ,all these means are skilfully employed by the editor to impress his ideas1 erroneous though they may be1 upon his public4 ,if the magazine appeared in ,english1 instead of ,german1 it would at once become the recognised leader in its field4 ,,footnotes3 #hg ,questions of ,philosophy and ,psychology4 ,,vol4 ,,iii4 ,,july1 #ahic4 ,,no4 #d4 ,,the ,,monist4 ,,nationalisation ,,of ,,education ,,and ,,the ,,universities4#hh ,a little more than a century ago it was universally believed that1 in the nature of things1 the vitality of a republic and its size stand in an inverse ratio4 ,the inadaptability of a republican system of government to a state of vast territorial expanse and with a very numerous population was considered an almost axiomatic1 i4 e4 self-evident1 truth4 ,when the thirteen ,english colonies in ,north ,america had taken the bold resolution to transform themselves into the ,united ,states of ,america1 many an ardent patriot often asked himself1 not free from anxious foreboding1 whether the ,union was within the limits laid down by irreversible political laws1 as the utmost extent of republics fit to endure4 ,if it had not been for the size of the country1 the doubts as to whether the republican experiment was likely to prove a success1 would never have assumed a character1 which gave sufficient color to the charge of monarchical tendencies1 to make them appear well-founded in the eyes of so many people4 ,when afterwards a new empire was to be added to the ,union by the ,louisiana purchase1 the doubt1 as to whether the republican system of government would be equal to the strain put upon it by such an immense enlargement of the area of the ,united ,states1 played a not unimportant part among the objections of the opposition4 ,that experience has definitively disposed of these ideas1 by proving the apprehensions to be unfounded1 is no reason to think meanly of the political discernment of those who entertained them4 ,it will not be universally admitted1 that experience has thus far proved them to be wholly unfounded also as to consolidated republics4 ,and how can it be wondered at1 that at that time the essential difference was not fully realised and understood1 which exists between a federal and a consolidated republic with regard to the peculiar dangers and evils apt to arise from this specific cause4 ,though republican federations had been known to the world for two thousand years1 no instruction was to be derived from their history on this head4 ,as to the extent of territory1 the consolidated ,roman republic1 which had consumed its vitality with its growth1 could alone be compared with the ,united ,states2 and as to many of the essential features of their political structure1 neither modern nor ancient history furnished an analogy4 ,in the soil of the ,new ,world1 the germs of ,european institutions had--adapting themselves to the new conditions--developed into a new type of commonwealth4 ,it is conceded on all sides that1 next to the capacity of the ,american people for self-government1 the ,united ,states owe it primarily to the happy blending of the principles of ,national ,union and ,state ,independence that1 taking all in all1 hitherto their history has been the most striking and convincing vindication of republican institutions2 and it is hardly questioned that1 but for the happy blending of these two principles1 a republic comprising half the ,north ,american continent and possessed of all the requisites of vitality never would nor could have existed4 ,upon their being 8an indestructible ,union of indestructible ,states10 the vitality of the ,united ,states absolutely depends4 ,that1 with this principle as the foundation1 the domain of a republic can be almost indefinitely extended1 without thereby destroying its vital energies1 has been irrefutably demonstrated4 ,but does that mean1 that the ,united ,states have definitively solved the problem of keeping the vital forces of a republic covering a vast area unimpaired8 ,by no means4 ,only the preliminary question has been settled by them for all time to come1 what the indispensable prerequisite of its solution is1 and they have thus far succeeded in preserving their vitality4 ,but even as to themselves1 the solution of the problem itself has to be repeated over and over again1 not only by generation after generation1 but every year and every day4 ,the hour never will1 never can come1 when the ,american people can1 with impunity1 say3 the task is accomplished2 let us rest and enjoy the fruits4 ,it never can come1 because the problem itself is in a continuous state of transformation4 ,though the changes be so slow1 that they are imperceptible to the keenest eye trying to follow them up from year to year1 they are none the less real1 and if they are not duly heeded1 the penalty will have to be paid some time in one way or another4 ,while the fundamental principle1 the blending of ,national ,union and ,state ,independence1 is irreversible1 the attempt to make its application immutable1 would be fatal4 ,i say the attempt1 for actually to do it1 is1 in the nature of things1 impossible4 ,the ,american people are not only constitutionally a nation4 ,the civil war did not result in the permanent disruption of the ,union1 but in welding it more indissolubly together1 because1 with the single exception of slavery1 the facts coincided with the law4 ,in spite of the tremendous sectionalising influence exercised by slavery1 the nationalisation in feeling1 thinking1 and interests had made such progress under the operation and protection of the law of the land1 that it could stand as severe a test1 as any consolidated ,state can boast of having stood4 ,the causes1 to which it was due1 that the facts were in conformity with the law1 have been ever since unremittingly at work1--the counter-tendencies have disappeared with the abolishment of slavery1--and1 independent of that1 those causes are every year acquiring a greater force4 ,the actual nationalisation1 therefore1 goes steadily on1 whether we like it or not1 and though the constitutional nationalisation be allowed to remain unchanged4 ,while the legal status under the ,constitution may not be altered for ever so long1 we are confronted by constantly changing conditions4 ,if we do not conform in what we do and leave undone to the irrepressible changes of this evolutionary process1 the maintenance of the principle of blending ,national ,union and ,state ,independence will avail us but little4 ,the vital energies will dry up and ebb away1 for while we have kept the form1 we have become strangers to the spirit which renders it a magic force4 ,nor ought the dividing line between political parties to run1 as in days of yore1 on the question of ,state rights and consolidation4 ,all discriminating patriots must be as well ,state rights men as consolidationists1 respectively conscious supporters and promoters of further nationalisation4 ,where and how ought ,state independence to be strengthened1 so as to prevent an over-consolidation by the silent working of those nationalising causes1 which it is impossible to stem8 and3 ,where and how ought consolidation1 respectively nationalisation1 to be promoted1 in order to make the working of those nationalising causes conducive to the true interests of the people and to the invigorating of republican institutions8 ,these are the two questions which the ,american people have constantly to ask themselves4 ,on the discretion and discernment displayed in trying to find the correct answers must it depend1 whether the federative principle will work as well in the future1 as it has done in the past4 ,if these propositions must be admitted1 it can be proved that in no respect is conscious and systematic nationalisation more imperatively needed than in regard to education4 ,at first sight this assertion may seem worse than extravagant4 ,i am1 however1 not afraid to submit my case to the jury of the ,american people1 if ,i am but conceded the legal right of every criminal1 to be heard ere ,i am judged4 ,education is the bed-rock on which this republic rests4 ,however excellent its political institutions be1 its decay and ultimate downfall is inevitable1 if the people fail to do their full duty by themselves in this respect4 ,for1 in a democratic republic1 political institutions are live forces only so far as the people have the mental and moral requirements for working them well1 and these mental and moral requirements can be attained only by education4 ,it is1 therefore1 in the strictest sense of the word1 a vital question for the republic that every one of its sons and daughters receive not only some schooling1 but that the education of all be proper and adequate4 ,that is a tremendous task4 ,it constantly grows in scope and intricacy1 and at the same time1 it becomes of more and more import that it be well accomplished4 ,with the people rests the ultimate decision in everything1 and the problems confronting the commonwealth are assuming more and more a character1 taxing the highest statesmanship to the utmost4 ,thus the claims upon the intelligence and the moral soundness of the people are fast being strained far beyond anything ever known by any former generation in this or any other country4 ,and lack of the required intelligence and moral soundness in any one ,state necessarily affects the whole ,union4 ,a ,state that is derelict to its duty in the education of its people1 wrongs not only itself1 but also the nation4 ,by its share in the federal government1 every ,state is directly instrumental in laying down the law for the whole country4 ,all the ,states are thereby made to participate in the payment of the penalty for its intellectual and moral deficiencies4 ,this is1 however1 by no means the only way in which they are made to suffer by them4 ,what the law does with regard to everything rendered federal by the ,constitution2 commerce1 travel1 and interchange of population do in other respects4 ,they are unremittingly and with ever increasing intensity at work1 multiplying and rendering more close the organic relations between all the parts of the vast domain1 every water-way1 railroad-track1 and telegraph line performing the functions of the veins in the animal organism4 ,if the blood be poisoned in one limb1 the virus cannot be prevented from working its way into the whole system4 ,to admit that education is in the highest degree a national interest1 and to deny its being a national concern1 is1 however1 a self-contradiction4 ,to contest either the right or the duty of a nation to acknowledge every national interest a national concern1 and to deal with it accordingly1 is a palpable absurdity4 ,not as to the ,whether1 but only as to the ,how1 can the people be restricted by the ,constitution4 ,a constitution imposing upon the people an injunction to minister to the needs of the commonwealth1 would be as great a political monstrosity as a constitution providing for the dissolution of the state4 ,this doctrine will not be allowed to pass unchallenged4 ,i shall be asked whether ,i set myself against the universally accepted fundamental principle of ,american constitutional law1 that the federal government has no powers but those granted to it by the ,constitution4 ,i do not4 8,where1 then10 my interlocutor will go on1 8do you find the express grant or the implied power80 ,nowhere4 8,then you advocate a constitutional amendment to the effect indicated by you80 ,i do not4 ,i know that such an amendment could not get the vote of a single state1 and if there were a possibility of its being adopted by the constitutional number of states1 ,i should be found1 to the last1 among those fighting it tooth and nail4 ,i can hardly conceive of a more suicidal measure than the adoption of such an amendment4 ,just because education is the bed-rock on which the republic rests1 is it of vital importance that it does not become a federal affair4 ,self-reliance and responsibility are the main pillars supporting a democratic commonwealth4 ,kill1 in the people of a state and the population of its subdivisions1 the habit of self-reliance and the sense of responsibility in regard to the substratum of the whole political and social structure1 and they will wither and shrivel up in regard to everything else4 ,the compulsion to tax themselves directly for the establishment and maintenance of schools and the being in close touch with those entrusted with the direction of the educational work are an inestimable boon to the people4 ,even if it were economically possible to do without direct taxes1 political reasons would peremptorily forbid their abolishment4 ,on account of their moral effect1 no state could dispense with them1 and least of all a democracy4 ,all indirect taxes are paid more or less unconsciously2 the people1 however1 must be kept conscious that the public purse means their own pockets4 ,the more they lose sight of this1 the wider the door is opened to paternalism1 and paternalism is a more deadly enemy of liberty than despotism and tyranny4 ,these1 if any vitality be left in the people1 ultimately kindle the desire for liberty1 while paternalism acts upon it as an opiate and ends by killing it through the systematic enervation of self-government4 ,if this is to be kept alive not only in form1 but also in essence and in spirit1 the people must constantly be held to teach themselves in illustrating by their own acts the irrefutable truth1 that not the rights1 but the self-imposed duties are the vital principle of true democracy4 ,nothing1 however1 is more apt to drive this all-important fact irresistibly home1 implanting it ineradicably in their whole feeling and in their conscious thinking1 than the necessity to vote1 as directly as possible1 out of their own pockets the money required for preserving intact and in vigor the prerequisite of all that is needed for the preservation of the nation's vitality4 ,if it be not deemed irreverent1 ,i should say that every dollar a man voluntarily votes out of his pocket to provide for the educational needs of the community1 preaches to him a political 8,sermon on the ,mount40 8,liberty and self-government10 it says1 8must be paid for2--state and society are in their very essence ethical conceptions2--they must totter1 fall1 and crumble to pieces1 unless they rest on an ethical foundation2--to preserve1 broaden1 and deepen this foundation1 by providing for the required intellectual and moral equipment of the generations in whose hands the future destinies of the commonwealth will lie1 is the paramount duty of the people2--no one has the right to exempt himself from doing his share in the fulfilment of this duty1 for the heirloom of the past1 enjoyed by the present1 is but a trust to be left1 with accrued interest1 to the future2--the fulfilment of this duty ought to be considered rather a privilege than a sacrifice1 for every farthing paid for the maintenance of the humblest village school is an integral part of the nation's life-insurance premium2--glory in this responsibility to the whole country1 for it constitutes you1 with the wealthiest and mightiest1 a joint builder of its greatness2--glory in thus bearing witness by the fruit of the sweat of your brow1 that you1 too1 are sworn in on the creed that man does not live by bread alone2--glory in and render thanks for being thus held to keep ablaze in your own bosom and help kindle in the bosom of the lowliest child of the community1 the sacred fire of idealism40 ,that by many1 perhaps by most people1 this appeal is not heard in distinct words1 ,i do not contest4 ,but that is no reason to make light of it4 ,utterly lost it never is4 ,something of it sinks into the mind even of the dullest and most hard-hearted1 though it be but in the form of a faint and vague feeling4 ,to make them lose this1 is to deprive them of the best they have4 ,democracy is not a mill-pond1 on which a fragile boat can outride the wildest tempest4 ,it is the open sea1 on which the proudest and stoutest craft is sure to be swamped1 sooner or later1 if it be not properly ballasted4 ,true idealism1 however1 never was a more essential part of the ballast1 than in these times and in this country4 ,it stands more in need of it than any other state1 because its unparalleled opportunities are appallingly powerful incentives to plunge headlong into the materialistic tendencies of the age4 ,therefore1 it is ruthless to lay hands on anything tending to keep alive and foster true idealism in the people4 ,for this reason it would be1 in my opinion1--not in intention1 but in effect1--a dastardly crime1 under any plea whatever1 to release the people from the obligation to provide in their local organisations for the education of their youths4 ,therefore1 ,i even deem it upon the whole more beneficial than detrimental that many of the higher and most of the highest educational institutions of the country are the free gift of high-minded men and women to the people4 ,i have never agreed with those who have contended in this country that the duty of the commonwealth does not extend beyond providing for primary and1 at the most1 to some extent for secondary education1 and that it would not be fair and proper to tax all for the establishment and maintenance of colleges and universities1 which1 in the nature of the case1 only a small minority can frequent4 ,it would be hard to name a more promising sign of the times1 than that this doctrine has of late lost so much of its former hold upon public opinion1 that one would have to search long for an advocate of it in its original rigor4 ,it is eminently in the interest of all1 that there be an ample number of men and women who have received the highest education4 ,therefore1 it is evidently not only justified1 but imperative1 that the commonwealth furnish the means for supplying its want4 ,but if the views held in this respect on the continent of ,europe had prevailed in the ,united ,states1 the ,american people would have been the poorer of one of the vastest and most grateful fields for manifesting idealistic public-spiritedness4 ,an inestimable loss1 for idealistic public-spiritedness is not the least of the causes to which it is due that ,american democracy has stood the test2 and idealistic public-spiritedness1 like every virtue1 grows stronger and more fruitful by being practised4 ,every donation for educational purposes prompts others to follow suit1 and is1 apart from its direct beneficent effects1 a most valuable object-lesson to the whole nation4 ,with equal impressiveness1 the rich and the poor are reminded of the treasures which 8neither moth nor rust doth corrupt40 ,on every educational institution brought into existence in such a way are indelibly inscribed the two magic words to which this country owes it greatness3 ,help yourself1 and ,public ,spirit2 every one of them is a living protest1 as well against paternalism--whether it present itself in the socialistic or in any other garb--as against the setting up of the golden calf as the idol of the republic4 ,therefore1 everything tending to seriously check these manifestations of idealism and public spirit in regard to higher education would be deplorable1 even if it were in itself commendable1 for paternalism and materialism are too rampant to leave anything undone that is calculated to keep them down4 ,to contend that the existing decentralisation in regard to education must be done away with1 would1 for these reasons1 be a truly ,quixotic charge upon windmills3 the venture must result in broken bones4 ,it cannot1 and1 if it could1 ought not to be done1 for this decentralisation is the natural outgrowth of the whole historical development of the commonwealth and in perfect accordance with the underlying principle of its political and social structure4 ,but it would be strange logic to conclude from this that it can have worked no harm1 or that the evil consequences it may have had cannot be remedied4 ,can it be denied that1 apart from the primary schools1 it sounds almost like mockery to speak of an ,american system of education8 ,if we look at the schools of a higher grade1 we are confronted by a bewildering chaos1 and the nearer the top1 the worse the confusion becomes4 ,that the effects of this are not altogether good1 will be universally admitted1 though opinions will differ as to the weight that ought to be attached to the bad consequences in the aggregate and severally4 ,to me1 some of them seem to be of a very serious character1 and ,i hold that they must from year to year become of more consequence4 ,to say that somebody has been through a 8high school10 does not convey sufficiently definite information as to either the kind or the amount of instruction he has received4 ,to know that somebody is a graduate of an 8academy10 a 8college10 a 8university10 means to know next to nothing as to his mental equipment4 ,to gauge our man1 we must inquire1 ,what academy1 what college1 what university8 ,having learned that1 we are in hundreds of cases not a whit wiser than before4 ,we have to ask for the calendar of the institution1 and1 after having read that1 we shall often be still pretty much at sea1 for1 as the ,germans say1 8paper is patient10 and the printing of a first-class programme implies by no means of necessity first-class instruction4 ,this may be considered by some of little or no moment1 because the degrees confer no rights whatever4 ,but they are1 nevertheless1 not senseless gewgaws4 ,if they be deemed such1 their abolishment must be insisted upon1 for then they are as much out of place in this country as orders or other meaningless titles4 ,they are intended to be certificates of knowledge and mental training4 ,if they lose this character1 they are nothing1 or worse than nothing4 ,it is1 however1 self-evident that they must be deprived of this character1 exactly to the extent that the educational institutions bearing the same name and conferring the same degrees differ from each other4 ,do you not think it more than likely that1 if a law were passed making it obligatory to add to the letters indicating a degree the name of the institution by which it was conferred1 an astounding number of ornamental tails to names would be cut off forever8 ,this would not be done1 if the degrees merely failed to be definite and reliable certificates of knowledge and mental training4 ,they do positive harm1 because the institutions conferring them have little more in common than the name1 their educational standard differing in the extremes1 as much as the crippled shrub and the sturdy oak4 ,while the public do not know what value to attach to the degree1 a large percentage of the recipients are betrayed into offensive and pernicious self-deception4 ,upon the official averment of their alma mater1 they lay the flattering unction to their soul that they have received a much better intellectual outfit than they really possess4 ,these institutions practically reverse the precept of the ,greek sage3 not 8know thyself10 but 8deceive thyself0 is the maxim imprinted on their diplomas4 ,and this self-deception is a subtle1 contagious virus4 ,it is at least doubtful1 whether more will take warning by looking through the false pretense1 or be lured by it into the same mistaken notions as to the requirements of genuine higher education4 ,to have practically no fixed standards for the different grades of higher education must as inevitably have mischievous effects upon the intellectual life of a people1 as its economic life must be demoralised by allowing everybody to coin money of the same outward appearance1 but of any alloy he pleases4 ,not that harm has been done by the almost unlimited freedom enjoyed by the educational institutions owing their existence to private munificence1 is to be wondered at2 it is astonishing that the deleterious effects have not been much worse4 ,a premium is offered for sailing under a false flag4 ,if a college may be called a university1 and an academy a college1 it would be more than surprising if the grander name were not frequently preferred1 for it flatters alike the vanity of the donors1 the instructors1 and the pupils1 and will--with more or less reason--be expected to work as a bait4 ,with the name goes the right to confer degrees1 and the exercising of this privilege is to serve the same purposes4 ,but the name renders it necessary to keep up appearances1 and that is an expensive pleasure4 ,the masquerading in a pretentious guise cuts down the allowance of wholesome food4 ,worthless universities instead of good colleges1 inferior colleges instead of satisfactory academies and fitting schools1 are but too often the result4 ,no name will deprive the rose of its sweet scent2 but the buttercup cannot1 with impunity1 call itself a rose4 ,the worst1 however1 is1 that even the best institutions of the higher order are made to pay a heavy penalty for the shortcomings of those of the lower rank4 ,not getting the proper material1 they do not turn out as good work as they in themselves might do4 ,much valuable time1 which ought to be devoted to going on with the building1 must be spent in mending and strengthening the deficient foundation1 which1 after all1 does not acquire the requisite solidity1 because mending is necessarily patchwork4 ,nor is the damage confined to the pupils that have been sent up from inefficient schools4 ,these act as a drag upon those who have come adequately prepared4 ,to render matters worse1 the deficiencies are neither the same with all1 nor is it known beforehand where they will be found and how far they will extend4 ,neither are the curricula the same1 nor is there any guaranty that the same curriculum means the same work done4 ,here so many things have been taught1 that everything has suffered in regard to thoroughness4 ,there1 specialisation has commenced so early1 that the basis is too narrow and too shallow4 ,training for a special purpose has encroached upon education4 ,all these difficulties greatly hamper the institution4 ,but they do more4 ,they exercise a strong pressure upon it to stray from the right path1 for they are powerful incentives to yield to the evil tendency1 more to measure1 than to weigh the work done4 ,this is1 in my opinion1 the most deplorable of all the bad consequences which the lack of a uniform system1 resulting from the decentralisation of education1 has thus far had2 and it is all the more dangerous1 because the measuring principle is so well fitted to be clad in the seductive garb of a lucid and clear-cut system4 ,i do not expect that every one of my propositions will be universally assented to4 ,but can any unprejudiced observer dispute that there is enough truth in what ,i have said to prompt the people seriously to ponder the question1 where this is going to end8 ,if no conscious1 energetic1 and concerted effort be made to counteract the evil effects of decentralisation1 the very fact of higher education having assumed such a kaleidoscopic character renders inevitable its becoming more and more kaleidoscopic4 ,the founders1 boards of trustees1 presidents1 and faculties of new institutions are almost compelled to give their individual notions on higher education1 to a dangerous extent1 free scope4 ,having a hundred different patterns presented to their consideration1 the temptation is well-nigh irresistible not to adopt any one of them1 but to devise a new one4 ,a new experimenting laboratory is set up4 ,that its experiments will be1 positively or negatively1 of some value1 is to be supposed4 ,in most cases1 however1 the public interest would have been better served by a good factory1 renouncing the risky ambition of dabbling with new inventions4 ,a ,european is struck with wonderment that1 considering the extent to which decentralisation in higher education has been carried1 not infinitely more harm has been done1 and that the harm it does1 seems to impress the ,americans comparatively so little4 ,neither can be understood1 unless one fully realises to what a degree the ,american commonwealth is still in its formative period1 and what an astounding educational power there is in ,american life4 ,to the former it is principally due1 that the deleterious effects mentioned are here in fact of much less consequence1 than they would be1 where the advantages of an historical development1 counting by more than centuries1 are paid for by the rigidity of age2 and the latter supplements and corrects the work of the schools so effectively1 that it is not surprising to find even many a keen-sighted and highly accomplished ,american more or less blindfolded as to this4 ,because the ultimate results are satisfactory1 it is taken for granted1 that the educational conditions of the country must be all right1 while a searching critical examination irresistibly forces upon one the question1 whether a good deal is not achieved in spite of them4 ,if this be so1 failure to promptly attend to what is defective in them will surely be punished1 for thanks to the rapidity with which the ,united ,states are being filled up1 their formative period is fast drawing to a close1 and with its close1 the educational power of ,american life will be1 in some important respects1 very sensibly diminished4 ,the peculiar advantages1 they have thus far enjoyed1 are steadily growing weaker1 while intellectually and morally1 the difficulties confronting the whole civilised world1 and difficulties peculiar to them1 are as steadily making greater demands upon the people4 ,growth of population and development of economical life1 with all its attending circumstances1 constantly working at the further nationalisation of the ,american people1 and the problems to be solved growing more and more intricate1 disaster must become inevitable1 if education does not keep abreast of this double movement2 and this it cannot do1 if we do not energetically and systematically go to work to nationalise education without consolidating it4 ,nor have we any time to lose1 for the task is by no means easy4 ,every inch of ground gained will be the price of an arduous and protracted struggle4 ,from the ,federal ,government no direct assistance is to be derived1 for the question is not within the province of its constitutional powers1 and if it were1 we ought not to ask its interference1 because1 as ,i said1 to nationalise education without consolidating it1 is to be the aim4 ,public opinion1 unaided by law1 must effect the reform4 ,public opinion1 however1 is in this country even more powerful than the law4 ,it is sure finally to overcome not only all active1 but even all passive resistance1 which is always much harder to overcome4 ,but is there any possibility of ever inducing public opinion to take the question up in full earnest8 ,i am confident there is1 and at all events it must be tried4 ,the difficulty of the task is no excuse for not undertaking it4 ,it only admonishes us1 not to waste time1 strength1 and enthusiasm in vain attempts to carry the fortress by assault4 ,the works are so extended and so strong that only a methodical siege requiring a great deal of skill1 patience1 and determination1 offers any chance of success4 ,two preliminary questions must1 therefore1 be answered1 ere operations can be commenced3 who is to conduct the campaign1 and by what tactics can the approaches be pushed on the fastest8 ,the answer to be given to the first question is plain4 ,the instructors are to be considered the experts1 if anybody can claim the title4 ,upon them1 therefore1 devolves the duty to take the lead4 ,this they have already commenced to do4 ,the very existence of a ,national ,educational 7,teacher's7 ,association is in itself irrefutable proof that the opinions advanced by me1 have1 in some way and to some extent1 asserted themselves for some time4 ,how this has been done and what has been effected1 ,i do not feel called upon to discuss4 ,i merely state that while ,i appreciate what it has done and expect from it still more in the future1 ,i am firmly convinced that the goal can never be reached if we are to content ourselves with what this organisation is capable of achieving4 ,this will be deemed the less disparaging1 if ,i furthermore state that1 in my opinion1 the end could no more be attained by any other organisation acting singlehanded4 ,hunting for any one device which will as certainly effect a cure as patent medicines claim to cure bodily ailments1 is but to waste time4 ,the evil has to be attacked from many points and in many ways1 if sanitation is to set in4 ,while ,i am fully persuaded of this1 ,i am1 however1 on the other hand as firmly convinced that nothing will be of avail if the ,universities do not step forward1 heading the column of attack and adding compulsion to suasion4 ,the reform has to be worked from the top downward4 ,at present the law is1 to a great extent1 dictated by the schools of the lower grade to those of the higher4 ,this must be reversed4 ,the ,universities must insist upon getting the proper material for doing what in their judgment is the proper work4 ,they must cease fitting themselves to what the schools are pleased to send them4 ,by closing their doors against all applicants whom they do not really deem adequately prepared1 they must compel the schools1 either to take down from their portals the inscription 8fitting school10 or to mend their ways and furnish their pupils the kind and the amount of instruction they ought4 ,a ,university that meekly submits to travel on whatever roads some hundreds of schools1 which all more or less follow their own notions1 happen to think good enough1 never can be a ,university except in name4 ,no institution has a moral right to the proud name of ,university that does not1 consciously and determinately1 do all that is in its power to direct its educational policy solely by what the civilisation of the age and the true interests of the nation require4 ,i wish the old maxim ultra posse nemo obligatur did not compel me to say 8to do all that is in its power10 for ,i am but too well aware how deplorably little that is in many cases4 ,state ,universities are subject to another will1 and this other will is apt to have very much its own notions as to how much a ,university may be allowed to cost1 and to determine the standard of the ,university entirely by the local standard of schools4 ,other ,universities1 though legally their own masters1 are practically restrained as much or even more by implacable facts4 ,no ,university can entirely dispense with students1 and the endowment of more than one ,university forbids its making light of the number of students it can secure4 ,being to some extent dependent upon the students for their maintenance1 they cannot afford to be very fastidious in regard to the standard of schools they try to enlist into their constituency4 ,but there is also a goodly number of ,universities whose position is in absolutely every respect so strong that they can enter the lists without any risk whatever to themselves4 ,whether they stop growing for a while or even decline in numbers for some years does not affect their future in the least4 ,they are so much in quest by students that the fitting schools are sure to make haste to meet their requirements1 if these rise above their curriculum4 ,to move on in wild leaps would1 of course1 be foolish4 ,but so long as these ,universities do not do that they never need to look backward in their onward march2 their whole constituency of schools must follow close upon their heels1 because they cannot afford to bolt and drop out4 ,the more the leading ,universities proceed upon a concerted plan1 the larger the circle would grow1 within which their joint pressure would be irresistible3 the strength of each would be doubled by pressing on1 shoulder to shoulder with the others1 on the same lines4 ,at the same time it will make it correspondingly easier for the weaker ones to follow in their wake4 ,how could it fail to make an impression upon those on whom they depend1 if they can back their pleas by urging the practical unanimity of all the foremost institutions of the country as to the right course to take8 ,the more the leading ,universities are united1 not only as to the scope and method of their own work1 but also as to what is to be considered the proper preparation for ,university work1 the more will deviations from the rules laid down by them come to imply to public opinion inferiority of standard2 and if there is a whip under which ,american communities smart1 it is this4 ,as to this would be added the missionary influences of the alumni sent from the leading ,universities into all parts of the republic1 it would be strange indeed1 if the idea were not constantly to spread and to cast deeper root1 that to adequately provide for the educational needs of the country1 it is necessary consciously to create and systematically to foster a tendency1 by the free action of public opinion1 more and more to harmonise education1 in developing it everywhere and in all its ramifications into a thoroughly organic structure4 ,i am prepared to hear the opinions ,i have ventured to advance strenuously contested and1 perhaps1 even mercilessly ridiculed by many4 ,the open antagonists1 however1 cause me but little uneasiness4 ,i fear only one thing1 i4 e4 that those who more or less endorse my criticisms and agree with me as to what is desirable1 will be induced by the arduousness of the work to persuade themselves that it is impossible to bring about such a reform4 ,to them ,i should say3 ,where there is a will1 there is a way1 and the ,american people must be brought to will this reform1 because every year a portentous word is becoming more true and of greater import3 8the age of perils is past1 but the age of difficulties has set it40 ,h4 ,,von ,,holst4 ,,footnotes3 #hh ,commencement address at the ,nebraska ,state ,university1 ,june #g1 #ahic4 ,,meaning ,,and ,,metaphor4 ,professor ,huxley supposes#hi 8that so long as the human mind exists1 it will not escape its deep-seated instinct to personify its intellectual conceptions40 ,he finds that 8the science of the present day is as full of this particular form of intellectual shadow-worship as is the nescience of ignorant ages40 ,the difference he sees is 8that the philosopher who is worthy of the name knows that his personified hypotheses1 such as law1 and force1 and ether1 and the like1 are merely useful symbols1 while the ignorant and the careless take them for adequate expressions of reality40 ,he then goes on to warn us against dealing with symbols as though they were 8real existences40 ,few indeed are free from reproach in this matter1 so far as reproach is deserved at all in the general unconsciousness of what constitutes the danger4 ,few see the question to be vital or the danger to be urgent2 and even those who do are apt to deny that the search for a remedy can be a crusade worth attempting2 the very idea seems ,utopian or pedantic4 ,on the one hand1 teachers as a rule do not take their own analogies and metaphors seriously4 ,both the literary and scientific1 as well as the philosophic and historical instinct tell against their doing so4 ,in their eyes figures have either faded into indifferent abstractions1 or they are obviously pictorial and merely rhetorical4 ,but the average reader is apt to take them at the foot of the letter4 ,he is usually unaware both of the extent to which he literalises and of the curious inconsistencies which his literalising involves4 ,so he makes his inferences with alight heart1 and wonders1 perhaps1 at the resulting confusion without suspecting its true cause4 ,would that the real state of the case and its practical consequences could be pressed home to all with such force1 that whatever be our line of work or thought or expression we should strive in earnest to mend matters4 ,at least1 we might begin by learning better what part symbolism plays in the rituals of expression1 and ask ourselves what else is language itself but symbolism1 and what it symbolises4 ,we should then examine anew the relations of the 8symbolic0 to the 8real02 of image1 figure1 metaphor1 to what we call literal or actual4 ,for this concerns us all4 ,imagery runs in and out1 so to speak1 from the symbolic to the real world and back again4 ,as matters stand1 we never know where we are because we know so little where our phrases or our words are2 indeed1 perhaps they and we are 8neither here nor there40 ,or1 if we do know where we are1 we cannot be sure that our hearer or reader knows where he is4 ,he1 too1 is probably 8neither here nor there40 ,he often praises or agrees with us in the wrong place or the wrong manner4 ,that is worse than being complained of or differed from2 it is difficult to repudiate approval4 ,nor can we take refuge in lucidity and fancy that the clear must be the true4 ,in the long run and in the cases which signify most1 there is no escape through merely lucid style or method4 ,the 8luminous0 speaker or writer1 the 8forcible0 orator or essayist1 the moment he tries to convey to the public mind a thought which is really new1 will find himself hampered by his very clearness itself4 ,his ideas are controverted on assumptions not really his2 or he himself is misled in subtle ways by what he assumes in others4 ,thus1 by an instructive paradox1 the clearest writer is often the most controversial2 and he wonders at our perverseness as1 while we admire his power and his 8style10 we wonder at the perverseness in him4 ,we possibly agree with him in ways we do not suspect2 he possibly agrees with us in senses he ignores4 ,such a writer may pride himself on a chary use of metaphor1 or on a carefully sharp distinction between 8image0 and 8thing0 or 8object40 ,but he is liable to forget the danger dogging him even here4 ,one is tempted to say that there is only one term more figurative as well as more ambiguous than 8metaphorical10 and that is 8literal40 ,most certainly much that is called 8literal0 is tinged with the figurative in varying degrees1 not always easy to distinguish1 even with the help of context4 ,the word 8literal0 itself is indeed a case in point4 ,it has rarely1 if ever1 any reference to writing4 ,the question is1 whether this state of things is quite so inevitable as most of us seem to think4 ,certainly1 so long as we are content to live in the fool's paradise of supposing that only the perverse1 the prejudiced1 the stupid1 or the ignorant can possibly mistake our meaning1 and that our misreadings of others are simply due to their 8obscurity10 or 8quibbling10 or literary incapacity1 we shall ourselves contribute to the hopelessness of the situation4 ,but this is a subject which cannot be dealt with in an incidental way2 it is rather a hope for the future1 that one of the most practically serviceable of subjects--that of ,meaning1 its conditions and its changes--shall be seriously taken up4 ,then1 indeed1 we may get back to the first of all questions1 and that which is most pregnant of helpful answers2 that which needs asking more than any other if good work is to be done in this day of universal 8unsettlement03--,what do we really mean8 ,on all sides dead calms are stirred and ruffled1 dead levels upheaved or depressed2 nothing 7happily7 can hope to escape the wave of quickening force4 ,so before long we may well be asking this question in good earnest2 and when we do we can but be the better1 even if we must needs submit in some cases where we may have been prematurely positive1 to be content 7for the moment7 with the answer3 ,we do not really know4 ,the fact is1 that we have been postulating an absolute ,plain ,meaning to be thought of1 as it were1 in capital letters4 ,we have been virtually assuming that our hearers and readers all share the same mental background and atmosphere4 ,we have practically supposed that they all look through the same inferential eyes1 that their attention waxes and wanes at the same points1 that their associations1 their halos of memory and circumstance1 their congenital tendencies to symbolise or picture1 are all on one pattern4 ,verily1 we need a 8,critique of ,plain ,meaning06 ,again we quote on the same assumption4 ,unless the language of our author is obviously archaic2 unless his allusions unmistakably betray a different life-context1 a different social 8milieu10 in short1 a different mental world1 we claim him or we repudiate him on the same principle4 ,we take his words1 we take his phrases1 we fill them out with the same content as our own1 we make him mean precisely what we ourselves mean4 ,and be it noted that it is always what we mean now4 ,that this in any way varies from what we meant at some time when1 e4 g41 our attention was differently focussed1 rarely enters our heads4 ,we shall1 ,i suppose1 admit that until lately there was one very good reason for this state of things4 ,only the exceptional mind 7if any72 only the mind which could not make itself fully understood by its contemporaries1 and would risk being reckoned crazy or criminal if it spoke 8plainly10 had any suspicion that this way of looking at things was being gradually invalidated by the general extension of the critical domain4 ,the history of language1 its relation to thought2 the scope of expression and representation1 the function of the figurative and symbolic2 the growth of all means of mental communion from the simplest rudiments of gesture or cry to the highest point of intellectual complexity1--all this was either ignored or taken for granted on radically insecure bases4 ,again1 while the underlying conditions of language must be looked for in the domain of psycho-physics1 that science had not yet come into existence4 ,even now it is but feeling its way and putting forth tentative hypotheses1 warning us1 as it does1 so that they are liable to be constantly modified and occasionally revolutionised4 ,and what does it realise1 first and foremost8 ,that our difficulties on the very threshold of the inquiry are1 as usual1 largely those of language4 ,on all sides we have to use1 as best we may1 modes of expression that inevitably convey ambiguous meanings even to the thoughtful1 even to the trained mind1 which cannot but carry with them a background of outgrown or disproved premises1 vitiating more or less every conclusion that we draw from them4 ,the very phrases which are our only shorthand for the vast oratory of nature and experience betray us in the using4 ,we have taken them as though they were like numerals invariable in meaning1 thus supposing them subject to a permanent uniformity4 ,we have taken them as though they were without a history1 merely fortuitous labels or symbols of unanimous consent2 the accepted sense1 we think1 being easily ascertainable1 always persistent1 and wholly sufficient for practical purposes4 ,in any case we strangely assume that we may safely play upon all the chords of imagery1 reserving without difficulty for serious use a body of terms which are direct expressions of 8fact40 ,but the suggestion now made is that this is precisely one of the most dangerous of presuppositions4 ,it is not the man who has mystified himself1 or who wishes to mystify others2 it is not the man who confounds the reality of the logical with that of the actual2 it is not the man who takes emotion for proof and notion for fact2 it is none of these1 but the man who is clear on such points and sees that they must be drawn out into clues and followed up to the uttermost1 if we would know where we are--who is beginning to see that the paramount need of the moment is the 8torpedo-shock0 of the question1 ,what do we really mean8 ,he knows that the off-hand vagueness and ready-made confusion1 which too often from sheer ignorance usurp the name of common-sense1 are in the long run its most deadly enemies4 ,we may look forward then with a new hope to the rise of a systematic inquiry on the subject of meaning and its changes4 ,this would entail the much-needed work of classifying metaphor1 and might even be found to point to the existence of a third value1 neither wholly literal1 nor wholly figurative1 as that of a large proportion of ordinary expression4 ,from this and like causes1 in this age of rapid changes due mainly to scientific conquest1 we can all readily put to each other questions to which either a 8yes0 or a 8no0 must be equally misleading4 ,and men of science have specially realised this1 since many a time they have been unjustly credited with evasion1 or with untenable or immoral views1 because they either answered to a 8plain question03 8,in one sense1 yes2 in another1 no10 or else gave an answer which could not fail to be misunderstood by a mind which was governed by unconscious survivals4 ,so far as we are in touch with modern culture1 we no longer mean what we must have meant in the days before ,copernicus1 when we say1 for instance1 8the sun rises40 ,when we speak of infection1 we no longer mean what we used to mean before microbes had been heard of4 ,when we talk of 8heat10 we no longer mean what we used to mean even fifty years ago4 ,and when a man says that he believes in the sun1 the planets1 the cosmos1 in the heavens and the earth1 in mind and matter1 in soul and body1 in spirit and flesh1 he cannot1 if he would1 mean just what his forefathers meant1 or indeed anything at all absolutely and finally4 ,whether we will or no1 the meaning of such terms is changing on our very tongues1 and ever swaying between the extremes which we call literal and metaphorical2 8heaven10 e4 g41 ranging in value from sky to human destiny2 8earth10 from soil to the visible ,home of ,man4 ,we may appeal1 and are right to appeal to 8hard1 dry0 facts2 but we perforce put something out of ourselves even into these4 ,they become 8facts0 under the quickening touch of 8mind10 while that emerges from a dim world of prepossession1 bequeathing us many a primitive legacy from pre-intelligent sentience1 and perhaps from little-suspected sources lying yet further back4 ,for instance1 primitive terror in its 8superstitious0 forms tended to represent man as inferior to and dependent on powers of some sort2--and this was true to natural order in the fact that his very world was not self-centred and was dependent for its best boons upon a greater than itself4 ,as language advanced1 he began quite naturally to express his meaning in 8appropriate metaphors02 to use1 e4 g41 the figures of light and then of sight to describe what he had1 as we now say1 8in his mind10 or what sense-messages1 as we now say1 had 8put into his head40 ,for 8something told him0 that light1 as it had been the first pleasure1 was also the great means of life4#ij ,and he 8saw10 in however grotesque a guise1 the unbroken continuity of the organic and the inorganic1 and perhaps even more clearly than most of us yet do1 that of so-called 8matter0 and so-called 8mind40 ,perhaps in some cases1 therefore1 he chose his imagery better than 7after long ages of dualism carried to the splitting-point7 we generally do now4 ,he knew again that the senses after all1 stern masters though they were while life was so hard to live1 had very narrow limits2 and that the world was in some sense fuller and richer of life than it had seemed to be as known directly through them4#ia ,and then he wondered1--and began to ask4 ,he was the first ,questioner4 ,as ,prof4 ,max ,mller says1#ib 8the greater the savagery1 the dullness1 the stupidity with which ,homo sapiens began1 the greater the marvel at what must have been from the first1 though undeveloped1 in him1 and made him in the end what we find him to be in the men of light and leading of our own age40 ,the mere fact of the question is the riddle to be solved4 ,for certainly the beasts had not taught him either to wonder or to ask4 ,and not merely insatiable questioning but something more here rises to challenge our attention and to demand reflection4 ,man is the first critic because he is the first idealist2 the first to be discontented1 to protest1 to see life as a 8ravelled end10 as something which is incomplete and speaks of something more4 ,surely in any case the step of all steps1 the deepest yet the narrowest line to cross is the step from something noticed or found1 from something which happens or appears1 from something which somehow affects us1 excites us1 to its significance4 ,of course in one sense it is impossible to fix any definite moment as that of the advent of this 8significance40 ,animals interpret each other's aspect and gestures1 often indeed with a subtle precision which to some extent we have lost4 ,but interpretation in the intellectual sense becomes1 from our present point of view1 that which makes us really human4 ,our progress1 our ascent1 is mainly marked in this4 ,the root-question to ask in gauging levels of humanity is1 how much can a given man interpret or translate1 of a world that teems with meaning8 ,how much can he truly classify and relate1 how much can he rightly infer and conclude1 how much can he account for1 explain1 and fruitfully apply8 ,for after all1 results must be our tests4 ,claims and credentials are nothing1 unless they can show this warrant2 whereas truth which can use all facts alike is the very means of survival4 ,man begins by doing1 by acting out impulse2 then he learns to 8think0 little by little1 observing1 questioning1 pondering1 testing his way onward and upward4 ,and throughout his patient1 often painful journey1 he is himself perpetually challenged4 ,nature's stimulating appeals rain upon him ceaselessly from every side2 she orders him to master all her meanings4 ,he responds3--at first again1 8blindly10 but ever rising to higher grades of answer4 ,both deficiency and error are no doubt more or less present in all mental response to actual fact--that is1 in all experience4 ,but the essence of sanity from the first lies in corrective power4 ,everywhere there is either absence of notice1 absence of response1 or there is experimental activity 7broadly speaking7 corrected at once2 automatically or by the combined effect of the related organic activities4 ,for instance1 in health1 if in using the hand1 one finger accidentally goes astray1 the cordinating muscles promptly recall it to a 8sense of duty40 ,we know how the same rule works in speech and writing4 ,therefore1 unless 8voluntary0 and 8capricious0 7or 8willing0 and 8wilful07 are synonyms1 the advent of volition ought not to mean the abrogation of this rule4 ,it is1 however1 obvious that 8natural selection0 can only operate in cases where death or sterility is the consequence of failure in adaptation and appropriate reaction1 or segregation the consequence of excessive variation4 ,but the point here is1 why does not a tendency to correction1 thus established1 survive automatically in incipient imagination and therefore in language8 ,it seems almost a burlesque of popular notions of 8free will0 to suppose that the moment the death-penalty is taken off1 the new-born intelligence1 unique in adapting power1 should go astray persistently without let or hindrance4 ,many now merely formal or even jocular customs still prevailing#ic testify1 as legacies from a remote time of danger needing to be averted1 to the strength of tendencies organised during myriads of generations under the pressure of the struggle for life4 ,why does not this apply to language8 ,but sight gives us here perhaps the most suggestive lesson2 for therein the ascending series seems especially gradual and unbroken4 ,the eye1 unlike the other organs of sense is an outgrowth of the very brain itself2 8the retina 444 is in reality a part of the brain40#id ,we may well therefore connect its functions specially with the thought of significance2 it is the main out-post of our central means of interpretation4 ,taking the stages in the evolution of the eye1 and using a short summary of these as a convenient means of testing the value of a conspicuous group of metaphors1 we find 7#a7 a mere dint2 7#b7 this dint deepening into a pit which 7#c7 gradually narrows4 ,hitherto we have had only light and darkness2 now we have an image1 though but a dim one4 7#d7 ,the pit is closed by a transparent membrane2 this is protection1 not obstacle4 7#e7 ,the lens is formed by deposit of cuticle4 ,gain2 increased distinctness and increased brightness4 ,the lens can focus a larger pencil of rays from each part of the object to each part of the retina 7corresponding point74 ,finally1 iris and eyelid protect the perfected eye more completely1 and enable it both to bear more light and to discern more detail4 ,if mental development were in any way comparable to this physiological development1 we should expect to find 7#a7 something which would naturally be described as a vague or dim 8impression02 gradually deepening1 becoming more distinctly localised as the stimulus became more definitely 8impressive40 7#b7 ,we should begin to find 8reality0 and the 8unreal02 8fact0 and 8fancy02 8truth0 and 8falsehood02 knowledge and ignorance1--contrasted as 8light0 and 8darkness40#ie ,and this is what actually happens4#if 7#c7 ,still our mental 8impression0 would not as yet afford us an image2 8imagination0 only now comes upon the scene and begins to work 7though as yet 8dimly07 upon the objects which more and more 8incisively0 8impress0 us4 7#d7 ,our deep 8impression0 is closed in one sense from direct contact with the outward2 mental vision becomes more delicately differentiated from the emotional 8touch10 however this may be specialised and intensified4 ,but what secludes this is transparent2 it is protection1 not obstacle4 ,we rightly speak of mental penetration2 of 8seeing through0 a superficial limit4 ,the mental 8lens0 is formed from that 8continuum0 on which the original 8impression0 was made4 ,the gain now is increased distinctness and brightness4 ,more rays of 8light10 of reality1 of fact1 of truth1 of knowledge1 can now be focussed from each part of a given object 7or group of objects7 of mental attention and interest2 to each part of the responsive 8sensitive plate0 of the mind4 ,finally we have1 so to speak1 increased protective growth4 ,the function of what are called academic culture and scientific method1 with their fastidious standards of fitness and accuracy1 may perhaps represent something not unlike that of iris and eyelid1 enabling the developing mind safely to bear intenser illumination and also to discern more subtle detail4 ,it must be admitted that so far as it goes this is a significant psychological parable4 ,however slender its right to the position even of a working clue to early stages of mind1 it has at least better credentials than many accepted analogies can claim4 ,and throughout its course what most 8impresses0 itself upon one's mind is the steady maintenance of invariable reaction to excitation1 and of protection from unfavorable stimulus4 8,mind10 as ,mr4 ,shadworth ,hodgson tells us1#ig 8is a fiction of the fancy40 ,of course this is open to the retort that so is fancy a fiction of the mind1 or fiction a fancy of the mind4 ,psychology is full of these see-saws of paradox1 depending on vicissitudes of linguistic usage or context4 ,but mind is indeed a fiction of the fancy when we endow it with a fanciful freedom from all ties with what we call physical reality4 ,for this1 however plainly we may recognise its genesis in our own sequences of sense-impression1 does practically through them rule us with an undeviating severity which neither fiction nor fancy can tamper with4 ,therefore1 if we think it absurd to suppose that there may possibly be an undiscovered vein of authentic and really indicative symbol or metaphor running through the arbitrary meshes of fanciful custom or mythical term1 we are in fact implying that all clues from the original interactions of physical energy were entirely lost when what we call 8mind0 issued first in language4 ,but at all events we may be sure that links between the 8physical0 and the 8psychical0 are everywhere drawing closer and emerging clearer1 however buried as yet in a mass of the fantastic or the arbitrary4 ,it will probably be objected that we can never hope to find these4 ,no doubt such an attempt must mean the patient work of many lifetimes1 and at best we could not hope to lay bare the ultimate point of 8origin40 ,but yet it seems worth trying4 ,for after all1 even the results which may appear so scanty in the tracing back of language1 are already rich far beyond what could have been hoped for a few generations back4 ,and if it were once realised that such a line of work might have practical and far-reaching issues2 if we really saw that thus some barren disputes and speculations might cease to bar the way or to waste some precious energies1 we should be more than rewarded4 ,in his 8,dialogues of ,plato0#ih ,professor ,jowett warned us twenty years ago of our linguistic dangers1 repeating his warning with greater emphasis and in fresh forms in the admirable essays added in the edition just published4 ,he urges that the 8greatest lesson which the philosophical analysis of language teaches us is1 that we should be above language1 making words our servants and not allowing them to be our masters40 8,words10 he tells us1 8appear to be isolated but they are really the parts of an organism which is always being reproduced4 ,they are refined by civilisation1 harmonised by poetry1 emphasised by literature1 technically applied in philosophy and art2 they are used as symbols on the border-ground of human knowledge2 they receive a fresh impress from individual genius1 and come with a new force and association to every lively-minded person4 ,they are fixed by the simultaneous utterance of millions and yet are always imperceptibly changing3--not the inventors of language1 but writing and speaking1 and particularly great writers1 or works which pass into the hearts of nations1 ,homer1 ,shakespeare1 ,dante1 the ,german or ,english ,bible1 ,kant and ,hegel1 are the makers of them in later ages4 ,they carry with them the faded recollection of their own past history2 the use of a word in a striking and familiar passage1 gives a complexion to its use everywhere else1 and the new use of an old and familiar phrase has also a peculiar power over us40 ,then he reminds us of what we too often forget2 that 8language is an aspect of man1 of nature1 and of nations1 the transfiguration of the world in thought1 the meeting-point of the physical and mental sciences1 and also the mirror in which they are reflected1 an effect and partly a cause of our common humanity1 present at every moment to the individual and yet having a sort of eternal or universal nature40#ii ,nowadays1 when we feel most scathingly superior1 we often announce that we fail to see and have yet to learn something which1 bringing us1 it may be1 a really fresh idea1 unpleasantly stirs misgiving4 ,let us go on with our greeting1 meaning it in good earnest4 ,for when we honestly and without reservation consent to learn and succeed in seeing some things now waiting for our study we may find more than we look for1 within reach4 ,after all it may be that we have really failed to see and have really yet to learn the part that meaning--whether of language or of conduct--and its change or variations 7successive or simultaneous7 have had throughout the mental history of man4 ,it may be that while the ordinary modern metaphor like the ordinary modern analogy is a mere rhetorical device1 some few images may be found to hail from an altogether deeper and more authentic source4 ,many1 however ancient1 are not of course any the more valid for their antiquity4 ,on the contrary it is obvious that such a figure for instance as 8foundation0 or 8basis0 to express an ultimate necessity1 is a survival from days in which the earth was supposed to require and to possess such fixed and immutable base1 while the analogies1 e4 g4 between the human and the inorganic orders are now reversed4 ,we import the idea of mechanism and invariable sequence into the former instead of exporting conscious intention into the latter2 we level down where our forefathers levelled up4 ,and we have to beware of the subtle atmosphere of fallacy thus introduced4 ,but on the other hand it is conceivable that some may be found to belong to that as yet mysterious energy on which natural selection plays and of which variation is the outcome or the sign4 ,what we find in language may thus be1 as it were1 not merely the 8scarred and weather-worn0 remnant of geogenic strata but sometimes the meteorite1 the calcined fragment of earlier worlds of correspondence1 ultra-earthly1 cosmical4 ,we have no right to do more than ask and seek and knock at the gates of fact in such a matter as this4 ,but until that has been done2 until at least we have tried the experiment2 have looked for grades of validity in metaphor and analogy in the light of modern science1 and still more1 have recognised clearly the powerful though hidden effects upon us of organised mental picture brought in surreptitiously with verbal imagery1 or by comparison2 we cannot know whether such an effort is worth while or no1 or what harvest it may yield4 ,for after all1 whether we like it or no1 we are heliocentric2 the world and all that is in it is cosmically generated4 ,as far as science--and experience--are concerned1 anything which says 8,i don't admit that origin2 ,i claim to have produced myself or to have been originated by and on the earth in a final sense10 must make good its geocentric or self-creating pretensions with overwhelming cogency and rigorous proof4 ,we appeal to the 8light0 of science1 of reason1 of experience1 against the 8darkness0 of superstition1 myth1 and mysticism4 ,and we are thus appealing not to the supersensuous or supernatural but to the ultra-satellitic4 ,not only beyond the earth and touch but beyond the atmosphere and hearing is the home of the light that lightens our small world1 calling forth in us the answer of sight4 ,and the manifold revelations through this sense--in its mental as well as bodily character--press upon us1 with greater and greater insistence1 the wealth of our relations with the universe4 ,in any case1 meaning--in the widest sense of the word--is the only value of whatever 8fact0 presents itself to us4 ,without this1 to observe and record appearances or occurrences would become a worse than wasteful task4 ,significance is the one value of all that consciousness brings1 or that intelligence deals with2 the one value of life itself4 ,but perhaps for this very reason we have taken it too much for granted4 ,it may need a more definite place in psychological inquiries4 ,it may have unsuspected bearings4 ,when we have realised better what manner of gift this is1 we may find answers of which we have prematurely despaired2 answers coming not from the 8mystical0 point of the horizon of experience1 but rather from the neural4 ,and let us beware here of repeating the pre-scientific error of postulating1 for figurative purposes1 a flat earth on which whatever lies beyond 8horizons0 never meets6 ,but1 it may be said1 why not8 ,why should it signify8 ,why1 but because ,man is the one not merely who thinks1 or speaks1 or writes1 or looks upwards1 but the one who means1 the one who is the meaning of much1 and makes the meaning of all2 the one who will not tolerate the unmeaning anywhere in experience4 ,nothing remains but that he should interpret rightly2 that he should apprehend nature and experience in their true sense4 ,it is the glory of science that she puts this aim in the forefront of her labors4 ,she tells us that nothing can be done without assumption and hypothesis as to the meaning of things4 ,but that significance belongs to the very spring to which we owe her dauntless energy and her accumulating triumphs4 ,why should it signify8 ,the very term answers us4 ,to 8signify0 is the one test of the important4 ,the significant is alone worth notice4 ,we inherit a mode of thinking which we are at last becoming able to criticise in the light of knowledge gained by observation and experiment4 ,but if we persist in using1 without warning to hearer or reader1 imagery which has no longer either sense or relevance1 or which tends to call up a false mental picture or to perpetuate an else decaying error1 we shall to that extent forfeit the very gifts which science brings us1 and must not complain of the obstinate persistence of ideas which needlessly divide us4 ,at least1 let us try to realise more clearly what we are losing in this way4 ,the danger even thus must needs be lessened2 detected bogies become powerless for mischief2 but we need not leave their ancient home empty1 swept1 and garnished2 stores of verified analogy are waiting to replace them4 ,the figurative must not indeed be pressed1 still less literalised4 ,but we may see that it conveys a true1 rather than a false impression2 and harmonises with1 instead of contradicting that which we most surely know4#ajj ,it may be said in a true sense that the function of the hero1 the saint1 the poet1 is to bring the world to life4 ,but the function of the devoted servant of science1 the critical scholar1 the true philosopher1 is to bring the world to truth1 in a sense only now becoming possible4 ,through the last discipline alone1 in its most thorough applications1 can we hope fully to master the scope of all significance and the laws of all its workings4 ,then1 indeed1 we may further hope to read with a fresh eye the ,significance of ,life4 ,,victoria ,,welby4 ,,footnotes3 #hi ,the ,nineteenth ,century1 ,april1 #ahhf4 7,reprinted in ,essays on ,controverted ,questions47 #ij 8,light affects the new-born infant at an early stage1 although in this as in other respects individual differences immediately assert themselves4 ,the child seems to take pleasure in an excitation of light and tries 7even on the second day after birth7 to turn towards it in order to retain it40 7,outlines of ,psychology1 ,h4 ,hffding1 p4 #d47 8,under the influence of light the conversion of inorganic matter into more complex organic matter takes place1 more particularly in the green cells of plants40 7,ibid41 p4 #cae47 8,it is certainly necessary to look further back than the visual sensations to understand the great influence of light on all creatures that have sensuous perception4444 ,light is thus one of the most elementary conditions of life40 7,ibid41 p4 #bbi47 #ia ,it must be borne in mind that ,i am using psychological terms in a merely general sense4 ,among many examples of such use ,i may quote ,sachs 7,physiology of ,plants1 p4 #bjj7 and ,f4 ,darwin 7,address to ,biological ,section1 ,brit4 ,assoc1 ,august #ahia71 who speaks of the plant as 8perceiving0 external change1 as 8recognising0 the vertical line1 8knowing0 where the centre of the earth is1 8translating0 stimulus1 etc4 ,see also ,darwin's ,forms of ,flowers1 p4 #ij4 ,again ,prof4 ,m4 ,foster uses the word 8will0 in the same general 7rather than metaphorical7 sense4 7,text ,book of ,phys41 ,part #c1 pp4 #ajei1 #ajfb1 #ajfc47 ,modes of reaction are thus verbally linked with consciousness1 and we must remember that all our terms for the 8mental0 belong first to the 8physical10 and that many are reciprocally used in the two spheres4 #ib ,natural ,religion1 p4 #bdc4 #ic ,see ,dr4 ,tylor's ,primitive ,culture1 ,vol4 ,i1 pp4 #gd-aba2 ,ibid41 ,vol4 ,,ii1 pp4 #big-bih1 #djd-dbh4 #id ,dr4 ,m4 ,foster's ,text-,book of ,physiology1 ,part #d1 p4 #aadb4 #ie ,i am of course merely directing attention to the relative aptness of metaphors of mental process familiarly in use in our own language4 ,it is obvious that before any inference could be made from them as to the value of unconscious analogies of imagery1 we should have to make appeal to comparative philology and embark on a wide inquiry1 for which the ,english-speaking races must wait for ,dr4 ,murray's epoch-making ,dictionary4 #if ,it must be borne in mind that the whole process presupposes the other senses or at least the temperature-sense1 the 8muscular sense0 and that of touch2 that is1 we should have 8felt0 simple stimuli 8emotionally0 before we 8saw0 things intellectually4 ,and hearing is not now in question1 though in that1 too1 we should find the same character of development1 i4 e4 the same prominence of the protective and discriminative factors4 #ig ,brain1 ,june1 #ahia4 ,p4 #ac4 #ih ,vol4 ,i1 pp4 #bhe-bhf1 #bic4 #ii ,the following1 among many pregnant passages between which it is difficult to choose1 may be further quoted3 8,the famous dispute between ,nominalists and ,realists would never have been heard of1 if1 instead of transferring the ,platonic ideas into a crude ,latin phraseology1 the spirit of ,plato had been truly understood and appreciated4 ,upon the term substance at least two celebrated theological controversies appear to hinge1 which would not have existed1 or at least not in their present form1 if we had #8interrogated' the word substance1 as ,plato has the notions of ,unity and ,being4 ,those weeds of philosophy have struck their roots deep into the soil1 and are always tending to reappear1 sometimes in new-fangled forms2 while similar words1 such as development1 evolution1 law1 and the like1 are constantly put in the place of facts1 even by writers who profess to base truth entirely upon fact4 ,in an unmetaphysical age there is probably more metaphysics in the common sense 7i4 e4 more a priori assumption7 than in any other1 because there is more complete unconsciousness that we are resting on our own ideas1 while we please ourselves with the conviction that we are resting on facts4 ,we do not consider how much metaphysics are required to place us above metaphysics1 or how difficult it is to prevent the forms of expression which are ready made for our use from outrunning actual observation and experiment40 7,vol4 ,,iv1 p4 #ci-dj47 8,to have the true use of words we must compare them with things2 in using them we acknowledge that they seldom give a perfect representation of our meaning4 ,in like manner when we interrogate our ideas we find that we are not using them always in the sense which we supposed4 7,ibid41 p4 #da47 8,many erroneous conceptions of the mind derived from former philosophies have found their way into language1 and we with difficulty disengage ourselves from them4 ,mere figures of speech have unconsciously influenced the minds of great thinkers4 ,also there are some distinctions1 as1 for example1 that of the will and of reason1 and of the moral and intellectual faculties1 which are carried further than is justified by experience4 ,any separation of things which we cannot see or exactly define1 though it may be necessary1 is a fertile source of error4 ,the division of the mind into faculties or powers or virtues is too deeply rooted in language to be got rid of1 but it gives a false impression4 ,for if we reflect on ourselves we see that all our faculties easily pass into one another1 and are bound together in a single mind or consciousness2 but this mental unity is apt to be concealed from us by the distinctions of language40 7,ibid41 p4 #aee47 #ajj ,i would gladly forward to any reader interested in a question of such practical bearings1 a small collection of ,witnesses to ,ambiguity gathered from representative sources1 and a pamphlet which was circulated at the ,international ,congress of ,experimental ,psychology1 held in ,london1 ,august1 #ahib1 giving examples of the mischievous confusions suggested by the use1 even among writers of the first rank1 of the metaphor1 ,inner and ,outer4 ,prof4 ,h4 ,sidgwick1 the president1 in his opening address1 expressed the opinion that very important work of this kind remained to be done1 and added1 8,i have much sympathy with the view urged in a pamphlet that ,i have received for distribution among members of the ,congress1 which illustrates forcibly the confusion caused by one established antithesis of terms40 ,professor ,sully and others have expressed themselves strongly in the same sense4 ,,reply ,,to ,,the ,,necessitarians4 ,,rejoinder ,,to ,,dr4 ,,carus4 #a4 ,in ,the ,monist for ,january1 #ahia1 and in the number for ,april1 #ahib1 ,i attacked the doctrine that every event is precisely determined by law4 ,like everybody else1 ,i admit that there is regularity3 ,i go further2 ,i maintain the existence of law as something real and general4 ,but ,i hold there is no reason to think that there are general formul to which the phenomena of nature always conform1 or to which they precisely conform4 ,at the end of my second paper1 the partisans of the doctrine of necessity were courteously challenged and besought to attempt to answer my arguments4 ,this1 so far as ,i can learn1 ,dr4 ,carus alone1 in ,the ,monist of ,july and ,october1 #ahib1 has publicly vouchsafed to do4 ,for this ,i owe him my particular thanks and a careful rejoinder4 #b4 ,i number the paragraphs of his papers consecutively4 ,the following index shows the pages on which those paragraphs commence1 and the numbered sections of this rejoinder in which they are noticed4 ,,dr4 ,,carus ,,rejoinder ,vol4 ,,ii1 p4 #efj #a 0 0 #b #bh 0 0 #c #bi 0 #efa #d #bc4bg 0 0 #e #ba 0 0 #f #ah 0 0 #g #ah 0 #efb #h #ah bis4 0 0 #i #ba 0 0 #aj 0 #efc #aa #ab4ba4bb 0 0 #ab #ai 0 0 #ac #ai 0 #efd #ad #c4ab bis4 #bb 0 0 #ae #h ter1 #af 0 #efe #af #ba 0 0 #ag #c 0 0 #ah #c 0 0 #ai #ac note 0 #eff #bj #ad 0 0 #ba #ac1 #ad 0 0 #bb #c4ab4bb 0 0 #bc #ab 0 0 #bd #c4ac4ad 0 #efg #be #h 0 0 #bf #h 0 0 #bg #h4bb 0 0 #bh #bj4bb 0 0 #bi #ab 0 #efh #cj #bb 0 0 #ca #bb bis 0 0 #cb #bb 0 #efi #cc #bb 0 0 #cd #bb 0 0 #ce #h 0 0 #cf #bi 0 0 #cg 0 #egj #ch 0 0 #ci 0 0 #dj 0 #ega #da 0 0 #db 0 0 #dc 0 #egb #dd #bc 0 0 #de 0 0 #df #e4bc 0 #egc #dg 0 0 #dh #g 0 0 #di #g 0 0 #ej #g 0 #egd #ea #g4be 0 0 #eb 0 0 #ec #be 0 0 #ed 0 0 #ee #be bis 0 #ege #ef #ag 0 0 #eg #ag bis 0 0 #eh #ag4be 0 0 #ei #ag 0 0 #fj #ag 0 #egf #fa #g4ag4be bis 0 0 #fb #ag4ba 0 0 #fc #ag 0 #egg #fd #ag bis 0 0 #fe #bf 0 0 #ff #be 0 0 #fg #be bis 0 #egh #fh #f4g 0 0 #fi #ag 0 #egi #gj #f 0 0 #ga #c 0 #ehj #gb #c 0 0 #gc #c 0 0 #gd #c 0 0 #ge #c 0 #eha #gf #c 0 0 #gg #c4aa 0 0 #gh 0 0 #gi #ba 0 #ehb #hj 0 0 #ha #bi 0 0 #hb #bi 0 0 #hc #bi ,vol4 ,,iii1 #fh #hd #e 0 0 #he #bg 0 0 #hf 0 #fi #hg #ab 0 0 #hh #e4ae bis 0 0 #hi 0 0 #ij 0 0 #ia #e 0 0 #ib #e 0 #gj #ic #e 0 0 #id #e 0 0 #ie #c 0 0 #if #d4aa 0 #ga #ig 0 0 #ih 0 0 #ii 0 0 #ajj 0 #gb #aja 0 0 #ajb #aa 0 0 #ajc #f 0 0 #ajd 0 0 #aje 0 #gc #ajf #aa 0 0 #ajg #f 0 0 #ajh #f 0 0 #aji #f 0 0 #aaj #f 0 0 #aaa #f 0 #gd #aab #f 0 0 #aac #f4aa 0 0 #aad #f 0 0 #aae #f 0 #ge #aaf #f4g 0 0 #aag #f 0 #gf #aah 0 0 #aai #i 0 0 #abj #f4af 0 0 #aba #ad 0 0 #abb #aa 0 #gg #abc #c 0 0 #abd #aj 0 0 #abe #g 0 #gh #abf #h 0 0 #abg #h 0 0 #abh #bi 0 #gi #abi 0 0 #acj 0 0 #aca 0 0 #acb 0 0 #acc #bg 0 0 #acd 0 #hj #ace 0 0 #acf 0 0 #acg #ae 0 0 #ach #ae 0 0 #aci #e4ae 0 #ha #adj #ae 0 0 #ada #ae 0 0 #adb #ae4be 0 0 #adc #ae4bd 0 0 #add #ae bis 0 0 #ade #ae bis 0 0 #adf #ae bis 0 0 #adg #ae ter 0 #hb #adh #ae 0 0 #adi #ab4ae 0 0 #aej #ae bis4 #be 0 #hc #aea #ae4bd 0 0 #aeb #ae4bd 0 0 #aec #ae4bd 0 0 #aed #ae4bd 0 0 #aee #ae4bd 0 #hd #aef #ae bis 0 0 #aeg #ae 0 0 #aeh #ae4bd 0 #he #aei #ae4bd 0 0 #afj #ae4bd 0 #hf #afa #ae bis 0 0 #afb #ae 0 0 #afc #e4ad 0 0 #afd #ad 0 #hg #afe #d4ad 0 0 #aff #ad 0 0 #afg #ad 0 0 #afh #bg 0 0 #afi #bg 0 #hh #agj #bg 0 0 #aga #bg 0 0 #agb #bg 0 0 #agc 0 0 #agd 0 #hi #age #bg 0 0 #agf #bg bis 0 0 #agg #bg 0 0 #agh #bg 0 0 #agi 0 0 #ahj #cj 0 0 #aha 0 0 #ahb 0 #ij #ahc #cj 0 0 #ahd 0 0 #ahe #bg 0 0 #ahf #bg 0 #ia #ahg #bg 0 0 #ahh 0 0 #ahi 0 0 #aij 0 #ib #aia #d 0 0 #aib #bg bis 0 0 #aic #bj4bg bis 0 #ic #aid 0 0 #aie #h 0 0 #aif #h 0 #id #aig 0 0 #aih #f 0 0 #aii #cj 0 0 #bjj 0 0 #bja 0 #ie #bjb 0 0 #bjc #bj4bi 0 0 #bjd #bi 0 #if #bje #bj 0 0 #bjf 0 0 #bjg #c4 ,dr4 ,carus's philosophy is hard to understand4 ,some phrases which he frequently uses lead the reader to imagine that he is listening to an old-fashioned ,knigsberg ,kantian4 ,what1 then1 is our surprise when we find 7 #ad7 that he sneers at the ,kantian1 ,sir ,william ,hamilton 7whom he calls ,mr4 ,hamilton7 as having 8no adequate conception of the a priori40 ,in his 8,ursache1 ,grund und ,zweck0 7#ahhc71 an admirably clear and systematic exposition of much of his thought1 he takes a ,schleiermacherian view of the a priori4 ,he admits it to be founded in the universal conditions of cognition2 but he thinks it is among the objective rather than the subjective conditions4 ,this is an opinion to which ,hamilton is also at times inclined4 ,it is a weak conception1 unless the whole distinction between the inward and the outward world be reformed in the light of agapastic and synechistic ontology4 ,for to deny that the a priori is subjective is to remove its essential character2 and to make it both subjective and objective 7otherwise than in the sense in which ,kant himself makes it objective7 is uncalled for1 and is cut off by ,ockham's razor4 ,but when synechism has united the two worlds1 this view gains new life4 ,another thing which has astonished me is ,dr4 ,carus's extravagant laudation 7 #ag7 of ,venn's highly enlightened and remarkably bright-thinking1 yet blundering little book1 8,the ,logic of ,chance40#aja ,this is the way he speaks of it3 8,this admirable work1 we will make bold to say1 marks a new epoch in the study of logic40 ,he adds that it 8paves the way which ,mr4 ,peirce has actually followed40 ,but the question of the nature of probability had long before that publication engaged the attention of some of the most powerful intellects in ,england2 and my opinion concerning it was fully made up before ,i saw the book4 ,i do not think ,i learned anything from that except a classification of the philosophies of probability4 ,however1 after all his eulogy1 ,dr4 ,carus only uses the book to quote from it ,mill's rewording of ,kant's definition of causation1 which he would better have quoted direct4 ,let me say1 not to ,dr4 ,carus1 but to the younger generation of readers1 that if they imagine that ,hamilton1 because he is antiquated1 is not worth reading1 they are much mistaken4 ,the ,scotistic elements of his philosophy1 and his method in the notes on ,reid are especially worthy of attention4 ,as for ,mill1 though his philosophy was not profound1 it is1 at least in his 8,examination of ,hamilton10 admirably set forth4 ,whoever wishes to appeal to the ,american philosophical mind needs to be quite familiar with the writings of these two men4 ,dr4 ,carus himself accepts all that ,i hold for erroneous in ,kant's definition of causation as universal and necessary sequence4 ,mill merely substitutes the exacter words invariable for 8universal10 and unconditional for 8necessary40#ajb ,in giving his form of the definition1 ,mill shows why it is not applicable to the sequence of day and night1 namely1 that that is not necessary4 ,yet ,dr4 ,carus writes 7 #ah7 of this very same sequence as if it came under ,mill's definition6#ajc ,again1 why should he make it 8the immortal merit of the great ,scotchman0 7 #bb71 that is1 of ,hume1 that he admitted the truth of ,leibniz's principle8 ,the famed puzzle of causation is peculiarly understood by ,dr4 ,carus4 ,the difficulties which the perusal of ,hume suggested to the mind of ,kant1#ajd were such as belonged to all categories1 or general conceptions of the understanding4 ,the precritical ,kant inherited a very decided nominalism from ,leibniz and ,wolf2 and the puzzle for him was simply the usual difficulty that plagues nominalism when it finds itself confronted with a reality which has an element of generality4 ,necessity is1 ,i need hardly say1 but a particular variety of universality4 ,but ,dr4 ,carus 7 #bd7 passes over this1 to dwell upon an entirely different objection to causation1 namely1 that it seems to be a creation out of nothing1 and a miracle4 ,i find myself equally at cross-purposes with him1 when in #ga-gg1 he speaks of the prevalent views of logicians concerning comprehension4 ,this word1 in logic1 measures the amount of predicates or marks attached to a conception2 but ,dr4 ,carus's criticisms seem to be based upon the idea that by comprehension is meant logical breadth1 or the amount of subjects to which the conception is applicable4 ,i am simply gravelled by his remarks 7 #ie7 concerning sundry ,english words4 ,no more do ,i know what to make of his praise 7 #abc7 of the ,german translation of a ,french phrase used in the theory of functions1 meaning univocally determined4 #d4 ,one habit which goes far to obscure ,dr4 ,carus's meaning is that whenever he finds his opinion at variance with a familiar saying1 instead of rejecting that formula1 he retains it and changes the meaning4 ,this is calculated to throw the whole discussion into confusion4 ,thus1 nothing is more certain than that the so-called 8law of identity10 or ,a is ,a1 was intended to express the fact that every term is predicable of itself4 ,but ,dr4 ,carus1 simply because he finds that 8meaningless and useless0 7 #if71 thinks himself authorised to confuse the terminology of logic by making this formula1 ,a ,a1 under the same old name1 mean that things to which the same name is applicable are for some purpose equivalent4 ,in like manner1 he changes the meaning of the word freedom 7 #afe71 so that the distinction between those who maintain and those who oppose the freedom of the will may1 in words1 disappear4 ,it seems scarcely defensible for a thoroughgoing necessitarian1 such as he is1 to fly the flag of ,free ,will4 ,he1 also1 changes the meaning of spontaneity so far that1 according to him1 8masses gravitate spontaneously0 7 #aia71 and so pretends that his doctrine does not suppress the spontaneity of nature6 #e4 ,there are other questions of terminology in which ,i am unable to agree with ,dr4 ,carus4 ,thus1 when ,i define necessitarianism as 8the theory that the will is subject to the general mechanical law of cause and effect10 ,dr4 ,carus 7 #aci7 wishes to delete 8mechanical40 ,but the result would be to define a doctrine to which the advocates of free will would generally subscribe1 as readily as their opponents4 ,in order properly to limit the definition1 it is quite requisite to exclude 8free causation40 ,by 8mechanical0 causation1 ,i mean a causation entirely determinative1 like that of dynamics1 but not necessarily operating upon matter4 ,dr4 ,carus mentions 7 #hd7 that there are several different ideas to which the term necessity is applied4 ,it seems to me that what lies at the bottom of all of them is the experience of reaction against one's will4 ,in the simplest form1 this gives the sense of reality4 ,dr4 ,carus himself admits 7 #df7 that reality involves the idea of inevitable fate4 ,yet philosophical necessity is a special case of universality4 ,but the universality1 or better1 the generality1 of a pure form involves no necessity4 ,it is only when the form is materialised that the distinction between necessity and freedom makes itself plain4 ,these ideas are1 therefore1 as it seems to me1 of a mixed nature4 ,dr4 ,carus 7 #ia-id7 insists that by the necessary1 he wishes to be understood to mean in all cases the inevitable4 ,this is the idea of fate1 and is not the conception which determinists usually attach to the term necessity4 ,yet he does not appear to be quite consistent4 ,at one time 7 #hh71 he carefully distinguishes necessity from fate4 ,at another time 7 #afc71 every element of compulsion is to be excluded from the conception of necessity4 #f4 ,one important key to ,dr4 ,carus's opinions is the recognition of the fact that1 like many other philosophers1 he is a nominalist tinctured with realistic opinions4 ,he says 7 #ajc71 that 8there is no need of discussing the truism that1 properly speaking1 there is no absolute sameness40 ,now1 upon the nominalistic theory1 there is not only no absolute or numerical identity1 but there are not even any real agreements or likenesses between individuals2 for likeness consists merely in the calling of several individuals by one name1 or 7in some systems7 in their exciting one idea4 ,on the other hand1 upon the realistic theory1 the fact that identity is a relation of reason does not in the least prevent it from being real4 ,on that theory1 it is real unless it is false that anything is itself4 ,thus1 upon either theory1 identity is just as real as similarity4 ,but ,dr4 ,carus1 being a nominalist leaning toward realism1 is inclined to make dynamical relations real1 and second-intentional ones unreal4 ,this opinion1 ,i think1 is a transitional one4 ,the declaration 7 #aih7 that 8natural laws are simply a description of nature as nature is10 and that 8the facts of nature express the character of nature10 are nominalistic4 ,but in another place 7 #ajg-aaf71 he says distinctly that uniformities are real4 ,he says 7 #gj71 8,mr4 ,peirce attempts to explain natural laws as if they were concrete and single facts40 ,this is eminently nominalistic4 ,the nominalist alone makes this sharp distinction between the abstract and the concrete1#aje which must not be confounded with ,hegel's distinction for which the same words are used4 ,the nominalist alone falls into the absurdity of talking of 8single facts10 or individual generals4 ,yet ,dr4 ,carus says 7 #fh7 that natural laws describe the facts of nature sub specie aeternitatis4 ,now ,i understand ,spinoza to be a realist4 ,in #aag he considers it 8settled0 8that there are samenesses40 ,this is realistic4 ,but in #abj1 he holds 8the whole business of science to be to systematise the samenesses of experience10 which is nominalistic4 #g4 ,dr4 ,carus seems to be in some doubt as to how far evolutionism ought to be carried4 ,in #dh-ea1 he seems to side with my contention that it should be thoroughgoing4 ,in #aaf1 he makes intellect an evolution from feeling4 ,yet he is sometimes 7 #abe7 8inclined0 to say the world never was a chaos2 he sometimes 7 #fa7 thinks it weak to suppose that real chance begets order2 and he sometimes 7 #fh7 goes so far as to pronounce eternity to be the conditio sine qua non of natural law4 #h4 ,every reader of ,the ,monist knows that our good editor's great word is 8formal law40 ,the clearest statement he has ever made of this doctrine ,i find in the following two sentences 7 #abg73 8,the a priori systems of thought are 444 constructions raised out of the recognition of the formal1 i4 e4 relational samenesses that appear in experience4 ,all possibilities of a certain class of relations can be exhausted and formulated in theorems40#ajf ,this is perspicuous4 ,for example1 of pairs1 we can easily show that there are but two forms ,a3,a and ,a3,b4 ,this proposition1--theorem if you will1--exhausts the possibilities4 ,if we make believe there is no danger of falling into error in mathematical reasoning1--and one danger1 though not1 perhaps1 a very serious one1 is eliminated1--then this proposition is absolutely certain4 ,but ,i will say1 at once1 that such a proposition is not1 in a proper sense1 synthetic4 ,it is a mere corollary from the definition of a pair4 ,moreover1 its application to experience1 or to possible experience1 opens the door to probability1 and shuts out absolute necessity and certainty1 in toto4 ,concerning points like this1 ,dr4 ,carus1 in company with the general body of thinkers1 is laboring under a great disadvantage from not understanding the logic of relatives4 ,it is a subject ,i have been studying for a great many years1 and ,i feel and know that ,i have an important report that ,i ought to make upon it4 ,this branch of logic is1 however1 so abstruse1 that ,i have never been able to find the leisure to translate my conclusions into a form in which their significance would be manifest even to a powerful thinker whose thoughts had not long been turned in that direction4 ,i shall succeed in doing so1 whenever ,i can find myself in a situation where ,i need think of nothing else for months1 and not before4 ,that may not be for thirty years2 but ,i believe it is the intention of providence that it should be4 ,meantime1 ,i will testify1 and the reader can take my testimony for what he thinks it is worth1 that all deductive reasoning1 except that kind which is so childishly simple that acute minds have doubted whether there was any reasoning there1--,i mean non-relative syllogism1--requires an act of choice2 because from a given premise1 several conclusions1--in some cases an infinite number1--can be drawn4 ,hence1 ,dr4 ,carus is altogether too hasty in his confidence 7 #aie1 #aif7 that general thinking machines 8are not impossibilities40 ,an act of original and arbitrary determination would be required2 and it seems almost evident that no machine could perform such an act except within narrow limits1 thought out beforehand and embodied in its construction4 ,moreover1 positive observation is called for in all inference1 even the simplest1--though in deduction it is only observation of an object of imagination4 ,moreover1 a peculiar act which may properly be called abstraction#ajg is usually required1 consisting in seizing evanescent elements of thought and holding them before the mind as 8substantive0 objects1 to borrow a phrase from ,william ,james4 ,at the same time1 the process ,i am describing1 that is1 relative deduction1 is perfectly general and demonstrative1 and depends upon the truth of the assumed premises1 and not1 like inductive reasoning1 upon the manner in which those premises present themselves4 ,but the application of the logic of relatives shows that the propositions of arithmetic1 which ,dr4 ,carus usually adduces as examples of formal law 7 #ae71 are1 in fact1 only corollaries from definitions4 ,they are certain only as applied to ideal constructions1 and in such application1 they are merely analytical4 ,the truth is our ideas about the distinction between analytical and synthetical judgments is much modified by the logic of relatives1 and by the logic of probable inference4 ,an analytical proposition is a definition or a proposition deducible from definitions2 a synthetical proposition is a proposition not analytical4 ,deduction1 or analytical reasoning1 is1 as ,i have shown in my 8,theory of ,probable ,reasoning10 a reasoning in which the conclusion follows 7necessarily1 or probably7 from the state of things expressed in the premises1 in contradistinction to scientific1 or synthetical1 reasoning1 which is a reasoning in which the conclusion follows probably and approximately from the premises1 owing to the conditions under which the latter have been observed1 or otherwise ascertained4 ,the two classes of reasoning present1 besides1 some other contrasts that need not be insisted upon in this place4 ,they also present some significant resemblances4 ,deduction is really a matter of perception and of experimentation1 just as induction and hypothetic inference are2 only1 the perception and experimentation are concerned with imaginary objects instead of with real ones4 ,the operations of perception and of experimentation are subject to error1 and therefore it is only in a ,pickwickian sense that mathematical reasoning can be said to be perfectly certain4 ,it is so1 only under the condition that no error creeps into it3 yet1 after all1 it is susceptible of attaining a practical certainty4 ,so1 for that matter1 is scientific reasoning2 but not so readily4 ,again1 mathematics brings to light results as truly occult#ajh and unexpected as those of chemistry2 only they are results dependent upon the action of reason in the depths of our own consciousness1 instead of being dependent1 like those of chemistry1 upon the action of ,cosmical ,reason1 or ,law4 ,or1 stating the matter under another aspect1 analytical reasoning depends upon associations of similarity1 synthetical reasoning upon associations of contiguity4 ,the logic of relatives1 which justifies these assertions1 shows accordingly that deductive reasoning is really quite different from what it was supposed by ,kant to be2 and this explains how it is that he and others have taken various mathematical propositions to be synthetical which in their ideal sense1 as propositions of pure mathematics1 are in truth only analytical4 ,descending from things ,i can demonstrate to things of which various facts1 in the light of those demonstrations1 fully persuade me1 ,i will say that in my opinion there are many synthetical propositions which1 if not a priori in ,dr4 ,carus's sense1 are1 at least1 innate 7notwithstanding his frequent denials of this1 as in #ae7 though he is quite right in saying that their abstract and distinct formulation comes very late 7 #abf74 ,but turn the facts as ,i will1 ,i cannot see that they afford the slightest reason for thinking that such propositions are ever absolutely universal1 exact1 or necessary in their truth4 ,on the contrary1 the principles of probable inference show this to be impossible4 ,dr4 ,carus adduces the instance of a geometrical proposition1 namely1 8that two congruent regular tetrahedrons1 when put together1 will form a hexahedron40 7 #be47 ,this1 he says1 seems to be 8a very wonderful thing02 for why should not a larger tetrahedron be formed1 just as two heaps of flour make a large heap of flour8 ,yet1 he continues1 the probability that the two tetrahedrons do always make a hexahedron is #a1 8which means certainty0 7 #bg74 ,but as it happens1 the proposition1 in the form stated is quite erroneous4 ,what is true is this4 ,if two tetrahedra are so placed that one face of each is coincident with one face of the other1 while all the other faces are inclined to one another1 and if of the #h faces1 the #b that are coincident are not counted1 there remain to be counted #h-bf faces4 ,but there is nothing more wonderful about this than that #h-bf1 which is an easy corollary from definitions4 ,very few propositions in mathematics that appear 8marvellous0 will hold water2 and those few excite our astonishment only because the real complexity of the conditions are masked in an intuitional presentation of them4 ,dr4 ,carus holds 7 #ae7 that formal knowledge is absolutely universal1 exact1 and necessary4 ,in some cases1 as where he says that1 given the number of dimensions of space1 the entire geometry could be deduced 7 #ce71 the boasted infallibility will prove on examination to be downright error4 ,in all other cases1 the propositions only relate to ideal constructions1 and their applicability to the real world is at the best doubtful1 and1 as ,i think1 false2 while in their ideal purity1 they are not synthetical4 ,thus1 my good friend and antagonist holds that the combination of oxygen and hydrogen to produce water is not 8different in principle0 from that of the tetrahedra to produce a hexahedron 7 #bf74 ,there is all the difference between the ideal and the real2 which to my ,scotistic mind is very important4 ,but this is not the only passage in which he speaks as if form were the principle of individuation4 #i4 ,dr4 ,carus's position is even weaker than that of ,kant1 who makes space1 for example1 a necessary form of thought 7in a broad sense of that term74 ,but ,dr4 ,carus appears to consider space as an absolute reality4 ,for he says 7 #aai7 that 8every single point of space has its special and individual qualities40 ,here again form is made the principle of individuation2 whence the queer phrase1 8individual qualities40 #aj4 ,dr4 ,carus argues that whatever is unequivocally determinate is necessary4 7 #abd47 ,were the determination spoken of real dynamic determination1 this would be a mere truism4 ,but the expression used1 eindeutig bestimmt1 merely expresses a mathematical determination1 and therefore no real necessity ensues4 ,the equation 7,transcriber's ,note3 ,italics have been removed from the formul for readability47 x - #bcx #acb #j determines x to be either #aadgg or #aaebc4 ,in this sense1 x has necessarily one value or the other4 ,the equation x - #abx #f #j determines x to be either #aadgg or #jebc4 ,together1 the two equations uniquely determine x to be #aadgg4 ,this shows how much that argument amounts to4 #aa4 ,by 8sameness10 ,dr4 ,carus means equivalence for a given purpose4 7 #ajb1 #ajf47 ,by the 8idea of sameness10 he means 7 #gg1 #if7 the principle that things having a common character are for some purpose equivalent4 ,this1 he says1 8has a solid basis in the facts of experience40 ,by a 8world of sameness0 7 #aac71 he seems to mean one in which any two given concrete things are in some respect equivalent4 ,he argues 7 #abb7 that a 8world of sameness is a world in which necessity rules40 ,i do not see this4 ,it seems to me so bald a non sequitur1 that ,i cannot but suppose the thought escapes my apprehension4 ,if there were anything in the argument1 it would seem to be a marvellously expeditious way of settling the whole dispute2 and therefore it would have been worth the trouble of stating1 so as to bring it within the purview of minds like mine4 #ab4 ,my candid opponent sometimes endorses emphatically the ,leibnizian principle4 8,necessitarianism must be founded on something other than observation4 ,observation is a posteriori2 it has reference to single facts1 to particulars2 yet the doctrine of necessity 444 is of universal application4 ,the doctrine of necessity 444 is of an a priori nature40 7 #aa47 8,millions of single experiences 444 cannot establish a solid belief in necessity40 7 #ad47 8,no amount of experience is sufficient to constitute causation by a mere synthesis of sequences40 7 #bb47 8,millions of millions of cases0 constitute 8no proof0 that a proposition 8is always so40 7 #bi47 ,nevertheless1 he holds that the law of 8the conservation of matter and energy0 so conclusively proves necessary causation1 that the obstinacy of ,hume1 himself1 could not have withstood the argument4 7 #bc47 ,one wonders1 then1 what is supposed to prove this 8law of the conservation of matter and energy10 if no amount of experience can prove it4 ,but the a priori itself can 8be based on the firm ground of experience40 7 #ad47 ,in that case1 it is not prior to experience1 after all6 8,the idea of necessity is based upon the conception of sameness1 and 444 the existence of sameness is a fact of experience40 7 #hg47 ,if absolute necessity can be irrefragably demonstrated from the fact that two things are alike1 it is a pity ,dr4 ,carus should not state this demonstration in a form1 that ,i1 and men like me1 can understand4 ,that would be more to the purpose than merely saying it can be proved4 ,absolute chance is rejected as 8involving a violation of laws well established by positive evidence40 7 #adi47 ,all these denials that absolute necessity can be established and absolute chance refuted by experiential evidence1 mixed with as clear assertions of the same things1 when taken together1 have the appearance of an attempt1 as the politicians say1 to 8straddle0 the question4 #ac4 ,but the ingenious ,doctor seeks to bolster up necessity by introducing the confused notion of 8causation40 ,i do not know where the idea originated that a cause is an instantaneous state of things1 perfectly determinative of every subsequent state4 ,it seems to be at the bottom of ,kant's discourse on the subject2 yet it accords neither with the original conception of a cause1 nor with the principles of mechanics4 ,the original idea of an efficient cause is that of an agent1 more or less like a man4 ,it is prior to the effect1 in the sense of having come into being before the latter2 but it is not transformed into the effect4 ,in this sense1 it may happen that an event is a cause of a subsequent event2 seldom1 however1 is it the principal cause4 ,far less are events the only causes4 ,the modern mechanical conception1 on the other hand1 is that the relative positions of particles determine their accelerations at the instants when they occupy those positions4 ,in other words1 if the positions of all the particles are given at two instants 7together with the law of force71 then the positions at all other instants may be deduced4#aji ,this doctrine conflicts with ,kant's second analogy of experience1 as interpreted by him1 in no less than four essential particulars4 ,in the first place1 far from involving any principle that could properly be termed generation1 or ,erzeugung1 which is ,kant's word for the sequence of effect from cause1 the modern mechanical doctrine is a doctrine of persistence1 and1 as ,i have repeatedly explained1 positively prohibits any real growth4 ,in the second place1 one state of things 7i4 e4 one configuration of the system7 is not sufficient to determine a second1 it is two that determine a third4 ,to whomsoever may think that this is an inconsiderable divergence of opinions1 let me say1 study the logic of relatives1 and you will think so no longer4 ,in the third place1 the two determining configurations1 according to mechanics1 may be taken at almost any two instants1 and the determined configuration be taken at any third instant we like4 ,there is no mechanical truth in saying that the past determines the future1 rather than the future the past4 ,we habitually follow tradition in continuing to use that form of expression1 but every mathematician knows that it is nothing but a form of expression4 ,we continue1 for convenience1 to talk of mechanical phenomena as if they were regulated1 in the same manner in which our intentions regulate our actions 7which is essentially a determination of the future by the past71 although we are quite aware that it is not really so4 ,remark how ,kant reasons3 8,if it is a necessary law of our sensibility1 and consequently a formal condition of all perceptions1 that the preceding time determines the following1 7since ,i can only come to the following through the preceding17 then is it also an indispensable law of the empirical representation of the time-series that the appearances of the preceding time determine every occurrence in the following40 ,what this leads to is a causality like that of mental phenomena1 where it is the past which determines the future1 and not 7in the same sense7 the reverse2 but the doctrine of the conservation of energy consists precisely in the denial that anything like this occurs in the domain of physics4 ,had ,kant studied the psychological phenomena more attentively and generalised them more broadly1 he would have seen that in the mind causation is not absolute1 but follows such a curve as is traced in my essay towards 8,the ,law of ,mind0 7,the ,monist1 ,vol4 ,,ii1 #eej74 ,does our judicious editor deem it ungracious to find fault with ,kant for not doing so much more than he did1 considering what that hero-like achievement was8 ,we must seem to carp1 as long as thinkers can hold that achievement for sufficient4 ,in the fourth place1 ,kant's 8,analogy0 ignores that continuity which is the life-blood of mathematical thought4 ,he deals with those awkward chunks of phenomenon1 called 8events40 ,he represents one such 8event0 as determined by certain others1 definitely1 while the rest have nothing to do with it4 ,it is impossible to cement such thought as this into hermetic continuity with the refined conceptions of modern dynamics4 ,the statement that every instantaneous state of things determines precisely all subsequent states1 and not at all any previous states1 could1 ,i rather think1 be shown to involve a contradiction4 ,the notion which ,dr4 ,carus holds of a cause seems to be that it is a state1 embracing all the positions and velocities of all the masses at one instant1 the effect being a similar state for any subsequent instant4 7 #ba1 #bd47 ,this breaks at once with common parlance1 with dynamics1 and with philosophical logic4 ,in common parlance1 we do not say that the position and upward velocity of a missile is the cause of its being at a subsequent instant lower down and moving with a greater downward velocity4#aaj ,in dynamics1 it is the fixed force1 gravitation1 or whatever else1 together with those relative positions of the bodies that determine the intensity and direction of the forces1 that is regarded as the cause4 ,but these causes are not previous to1 but simultaneous with1 their effects1 which are the instantaneous accelerations4 ,finally1 logic opposes our calling one of two states which equally determine one another 7as any two states of a system do1 if the velocities are taken to be included in these states7 the determinator1 or cause1 simply because of the circumstance that it precedes the other in time1--a circumstance that is upon the principles of dynamics plainly insignificant and irrelevant4 ,everybody will make slips in the use of words that have been on his lips from before the time when he learned to think2 but the practice which ,i endeavor to follow in regard to the word cause1 is to use it in the ,aristotelian sense of an efficient cause1 in all its crudeness4 ,in short1 ,i refuse to use it at all as a philosophical word4 ,when my conception is of a dynamical character1 ,i endeavor to employ the accepted terminology of dynamics2#aaa and when my idea is a more general and logical one1 ,i prefer to speak of the explanation4 #ad4 ,dr4 ,carus thinks the element of necessity in causation can be demonstrated by considering the process as a transformation4 8,it is a sequence of two states which belong together as an initial and final aspect of one and the same event40 7 #ba4 ,compare #bj1 #bd47 ,he neglects to explain how he brings under this formula the inward causation of the will and character1 as set forth by him in #afc-afg4 ,it is unnecessary for me to reply1 at length1 to an argument so manifestly inconclusive4 ,on the one hand1 it conflicts with the principle that absolute necessity cannot be proved from experience2 and on the other hand1 it leaves room for an imperfect necessity4 ,professor ,tait has done an ill office to thought in countenancing the idea that the conservation of energy is of the same nature as the 8conservation10 or rather perduration1 of matter4 ,dr4 ,carus says 7 #aba7 that 8,the law of the conservation of matter and energy rests upon the experience 7corroborated by experiments7 that causation is transformation4 ,it states that the total amount of matter and the total amount of energy remain constant4 ,there is no creation out of nothing and no conversion of something into nothing40 ,the historical part of this statement contains only a small grain of truth2 but that ,i will not stop to criticise4 ,the point ,i wish to make is that the law of the conservation of energy is here represented under a false aspect4 ,the true substance of the law is that the accelerations1 or rates of change1 of the motions of the particles at any instant depend solely on their relative positions at those instants4 ,the equation which expresses the law under this form is a differential equation of the second order2 that is1 it involves the rates of change of the rates of change of positions1 together with the positions themselves4 ,now1 because of the purely analytic proposition of the differential calculus that ,ds ,d7,ds71 the first integral of the differential equation of the second order1 that is1 the differential equation of the first order which expresses the same state of things1 equates half the sum of the masses1 each multiplied by the square of its velocity1 to a function of the relative positions of the particles plus an arbitrary constant4#aab ,in order to fix our ideas1 let us take a very simple example1 that of a single particle accelerated towards an infinite plane1 at a rate proportional to the n power of its distance from the plane4 ,in this case1 if s be the distance1 the second differential equation will be ,ds -as1 and the first integral of it will be 7,ds7 -77s ,c4 ,by the first law of motion1 and the ,pythagorean proposition1 the part of the velocity-square depending on the horizontal component is also constant4 ,the arbitrary constant1 ,c1 plainly has its genesis in the fact that forces do not determine velocities1 but only accelerations4 ,its value will be fixed as soon as the velocity at any instant is known4 ,this quantity would exist1 just the same1 and be independent of the time1 and would therefore be 8conserved0 whether the forces were 8conservative10 that is1 simply positional1 or not4 ,now1 this constant is the energy2 or rather1 the energy is composed of this constant increased by another which is absolutely indeterminable1 being merely supposed large enough to make the sum positive4 ,thus1 the law of energy does not prescribe that the total amount of energy shall remain constant2 for this would be so in any case by virtue of the second law of motion2 but what it prescribes is that the total energy diminished by the living force shall give a remainder which depends upon the relative positions of the particles and not upon the time or the velocities4 ,it is also to be noticed that the energy has no particular magnitude1 or quantity4 ,furthermore1 in transformations of kinetical energy into positional energy1 and the reverse1 the different portions of energy do not retain their identity1 any more than1 in book-keeping1 the identity of the amounts of different items is preserved4 ,in short1 the conservation of energy1 7,i do not mean the law of conservation17 is a mere result of algebra4 ,very different is it with the 8conservation0 of matter4 ,for1 in the first place1 the total mass is a perfectly definite quantity2 and1 in the second place1 in all its transformations1 not only is the total amount constant1 but all the different parts preserve their identity4 ,to speak1 therefore1 of 8the conservation of matter and energy10 is to assimilate facts of essentially contrary natures2 and to say that the law of the conservation of energy makes the total amount of energy constant is to attribute to this law a phenomenon really due to another law1 and to overlook what this law really does determine1 namely1 that the total energy less the kinetic energy gives a remainder which is exclusively positional4 #ae4 ,dr4 ,carus does not make it clear what he means by chance4 ,he does1 indeed1 say 7 #ade1 #adf73 8,what is chance8 8,chance is any event not especially intended1 either not calculated1 or1 with a given and limited stock of knowledge1 incalculable40 ,this defines what he means by a chance event1 in the concrete2 what he understands by probability1 we are left to conjecture4 ,but from what he says in #adg1 ,i infer that he regards it as dependent upon the state of our ignorance1 and therefore nothing real4 ,i am1 therefore1 much puzzled when ,i find him expressing a conviction 7 #hh1 #aef7 that chance plays an important part in the real world4 ,he explains very distinctly that 8when we call a throw of the dice pure chance1 we mean that the incidents which condition the turning up of these or those special faces of the dice have not been1 or cannot be1 calculated40 7 #adg47 ,this is the commonest1 because the shallowest1 philosophy of chance4 ,even ,venn might teach him better than that4 ,however1 according to that view1 when he writes of 8the important part that chance plays in the world1--not absolute chance 444 but that same chance of which the throw of the die is a typical instance0 7 #hh71 he can be understood to mean no more than that many things happen which we are not in condition to calculate or predict4 ,this is not playing a part in the world1 one would say--at least1 not in the natural world2 it is only playing a part in our ignorance4 ,dr4 ,carus frequently uses phrases which make us suspect he penetrates deeper4 ,thus1 he says1 8we do not believe in absolute chance1 but we believe in chance0 7 #add72 and again1 8,every man is the architect of his own fortune--but not entirely4 ,there are sometimes coincidences determining the fates of men40 7 #afa47 ,but when we remark the consecution of #acg-afb1 we feel pretty sure he really sees no further4 ,to do so would have been to perceive that indefinitely varied specificalness is chance4 ,for a long time1 ,i myself strove to make chance that diversity in the universe which laws leave room for1 instead of a violation of law1 or lawlessness4 ,that was truly believing in chance that was not absolute chance4 ,it was recognising that chance does play a part in the real world1 apart from what we may know or be ignorant of4 ,but it was a transitional belief which ,i have passed through1 while ,dr4 ,carus seems not to have reached it4 ,as for absolute chance1 ,dr4 ,carus makes the momentous admission that it is 8not unimaginable0 7 #aej74 ,if so1 its negation1 or absolute necessity1 cannot be a formal principle4 #af4 ,but it is time for me to leave the consideration of ,dr4 ,carus's system and to take up his strictures upon mine4 ,his philosophy is one eminently enlightened by modern ideas1 which it synthetises to an unusual extent4 ,it is distinguished for its freedom from the vice of one-sidedness1 and displays every facet of the gem of philosophical inquiry1 except the one on which it rests1 the question of absolute law4 ,its prominent faults1 which ,i feel sure must have struck every competent reader1 are that it shows little trace of meditation upon the thoughts of the great idealists1 and that there is a certain want of congruity between different elements of it4 ,how strangely it sounds1 for instance1 to find an apriorian1 and one who is dinging 8formal laws0 so perpetually into our ears1 one who holds that 8in order to weave the woof of the a posteriori elements into coherent cloth1 we want the warp of the a priori0 7 #ae71 to find this man declaring for a positivism 8which accepts no doctrine1 theory1 or law1 unless it be a formulation of facts10 and proclaiming that 8the whole business of science is to systematise the samenesses of experience1 and to present them in convenient formulas0 7 #abj74 ,now there is just one way of bringing such warring elements into harmony1 and curing the greatest defect of the system1--and it is a way which would also bring the whole into far better concordance with natural science4 ,it is to lop off the heads of all absolute propositions ,whose subject is not the ,absolute1 and reduce them to the level of probable and approximate statements4 ,were that defalcation performed1 ,dr4 ,carus's philosophy would1 in its general features1 offer no violent opposition to my opinions4 ,moreover1 the ,doctor has at heart the conciliation of religion and science4 ,i confess such serious concern makes me smile2 for ,i think the atonement he desires is a thing which will come to pass of itself when time is ripe1 and that our efforts to hasten it have just that slight effect that our efforts to hasten the ripening of apples on a tree may have4 ,besides1 natural ripening is the best4 ,let science and religion each have stout faith in itself1 and refuse to compromise with alien and secondary purposes1 but push the development of its own thought on its own line2 and then1 when reconcilement comes1--as come it surely will1--it will have a positive value1 and be an unmixed good4 ,but since our accomplished editor thinks himself called upon to assist in this birth of time1 let me ask him whether of all the conditions of such peace1 the first is not that religious thought should abandon that extravagant absoluteness of assertion which is proper to the state of intellectual infancy1 but which it has so long been too timid to let go8 ,this pragmatical and unneeded absoluteness it is which is most deeply contrary to the method1 the results1 and the whole spirit of science2 and no error can be greater than to fancy that science1 or scientific men1 rest upon it or readily tolerate it4 #ag4 ,dr4 ,carus 7 #ef-fd7 condemns my method of investigation as contrary to that by which science has been advanced2 and holds that a radically different1 and thoroughly positivistic method is requisite1--a method so intensely positivistic as to exclude all originality4 ,i suppose he will not object to my forming an opinion concerning the methods of science4 ,i was brought up in an atmosphere of scientific inquiry1 and have all my life chiefly lived among scientific men4 ,for the last thirty years1 the study which has constantly been before my mind has been upon the nature1 strength1 and history of methods of scientific thought4 ,i have no space here to argue the question4 ,in its logical aspect1 ,i have partly considered it in various publications2 and in its historical aspect1 ,i have long been engaged upon a treatise about it4 ,my critic says 7 #eg7 that #a am 8very positivistic in my logic of science40 ,this is a singular misapprehension4 ,few of the great scientific minds with whom ,i have come into personal contact1 and from whom ,i endeavored to learn were disposed to contemn originality or the ideal part of the mind's work in investigation2 and those few1 it was easy to see1 really breathed an atmosphere of ideas which were so incessantly present that they were unconscious of them4 ,were ,i to name those of my teachers who were most positivistic in theory1 a smile would be excited4 ,my own historical studies1 which have been somewhat minutely critical1 have1 on the whole confirmed the views of ,whewell1 the only man of philosophical power conjoined with scientific training who had made a comprehensive survey of the whole course of science1 that progress in science depends upon the observation of the right facts by minds furnished with appropriate ideas4 ,finally1 my long investigation of the logical process1 of scientific reasoning led me many years ago to the conclusion that science is nothing but a development of our natural instincts4 ,so much for my theory of scientific logic4 ,it is as totally opposed as anything can be to ,dr4 ,carus's theory 7 #fi1 note2 and 8,ursache1 ,grund und ,zweck10 p4 #b7 that originality is out of place in science4 ,but in my practice of scientific reasoning1 ,dr4 ,carus accuses me of being what he calls a 8constructionist02 that is1 a theoriser unguided by indications from observation or accepted facts4 ,to a mind upon whom that celebrated and splendid chapter of ,kant upon the architectonical method failed to make a deep impression1 ,i may appear so2 but travesty is in truth hardly too strong a word to describe the account of my method by ,dr4 ,carus4 ,perhaps exaggeration is not without its value4 ,if so1 let me sum up the method ,dr4 ,carus recommends4 ,eschew originality1 is its pious formula2 do not think for yourself1 nor countenance results obtained by original minds4 ,distrust them2 they are not safe men4 ,leave originality to mathematicians and their breed1 to poets1 and to all those who seek the sad notoriety of having unsettled belief4#aac ,flee all philosophies which smack of this aberrant nineteenth century4#aad ,this theory of ,dr4 ,carus condemns itself2 for it is highly original1 and soars into the free ether untrammelled by historic facts4 ,keppler comes very close to realising my ideal of the scientific method2 and he is one of the few thinkers who have taken their readers fully into their confidence as to what their method really has been4#aae ,i should not feel justified in inflicting upon mine an autobiographical account of my own course of thought2 but some things ,dr4 ,carus's accusation forces me to mention4 ,my method of attacking all problems has ever been to begin with an historical and rational inquiry into the special method adapted to the special problem4 ,this is the essence of my architectonical proceeding upon which ,dr4 ,carus has commented very severely4 ,to look an inch before one's nose involves originality3 therefore1 it is wrong to have a conscious method4 ,but further1 in regard to philosophy1 not only the methods1 but the elementary ideas which are to enter into those methods1 should be subjected to careful preliminary examination4 ,this1 especially1 ,dr4 ,carus finds very unscientific4 7 #fd1 and elsewhere47 ,it is1 undoubtedly1 the most characteristic feature of my procedure4 ,certainly it was not a notion hastily or irreflectively caught up2 but is the maturest fruit of a lifetime of reflection upon the methods of science1 including those of philosophy2 and if it shall be found that one contribution to thought on my part has proved of permanent service1 that1 ,i expect1 will be the one4 ,this method in no wise teaches that the method and materials for thought are not to be modified in the course of the study of the subject-matter4 ,but instead of taking ideas at haphazard1 or being satisfied with those that have been handed down from the good old times1 as a mind keenly alive to the dangers of originality would have done1 ,i have undertaken to make a systematic survey of human knowledge 7a very slight sketch of which composed the substance of my paper on the 8,architecture of ,theories107 in order to find what ideas have1 as a fact1 proved most fruitful1 and to observe the special utilities they have severally fulfilled4 ,a subsidiary object of this survey was to note what the great obstacles are to-day in the way of the further advance of the different branches of science4 ,in my 8,architecture of ,theories10 ,i never professed to do more than make a slight sketch of a small portion of my preliminary studies1 devoting thirteen lines to some hints as to the nature of the results4 ,in the four following papers ,i have given a selection of a few of these results4 ,among those which remain to be reported are some of much more immediate importance than any of those hitherto set forth4 ,if anybody has been surprised to find my subsequent papers developing thoughts which they were unable to foresee from my first1 it is only what ,i warned people from the outset that they would find to happen4 ,nor have the greatest of these surprises yet been reached4#aaf ,the next series of facts reviewed was that of the history of philosophy4 ,i waded right into this fearful slough of 8originality10 in order to gather what seemed to throw a light upon the subject4 ,finally1 ,i reviewed the general facts of the universe4 ,i now found myself forced by a great many different indications to the conclusion that an evolutionary philosophy of some kind must be accepted1--including among such philosophies systems like those of ,aristotle and of ,hegel4 ,from this point the reasoning was more rapid4 ,evolution had been a prominent study for half a generation2 and much light had been thrown upon the conditions for a fruitful evolutionary philosophy4 ,the first question was1 how far shall this evolution go back8 ,what shall we suppose not to be a product of growth8 ,i fancy it is this cautious reflectiveness of my procedure which especially displeases ,dr4 ,carus4 ,it is not positivistic3 it is architectonic4 ,but the answer to the question was not far to seek4 ,if an evolutionary explanation is to be adopted1 philosophy1 logic1 and the economy of research all dictate that in the first essay1 at least1 that style of explanation be carried as far back as explanation is called for4 ,what elements of the universe require no explanation8 ,this was a simple question1 capable of being decided by logic with as much facility and certainty as a suitable problem is solved by differential calculus4 ,being1 and the uniformity in which being consists1 require to be explained4 ,the only thing that does not require it is non-existent spontaneity4 ,this was soon seen to mean absolute chance4 ,the conclusion so reached was clinched by a careful rexamination of the office of chance in science generally1 and especially in the doctrines of evolution4 ,arrived at this point1 the next question was1 what is the principle by which the development is to proceed8 ,it was a difficult inquiry1 and involved researches from different points of view4 ,but ,i will not trouble the reader with further autobiographical details4 ,i have given enough to show that my method has neither been in theory purely empirical1 nor in practice mere brain-spinning2 and that1 in short1 my friend ,dr4 ,carus's account of it has been as incorrect as can be4 #ah4 ,the learned doctor 7 #f1 #g1 #h7 pronounces me to be an imitator of ,david ,hume1 or1 at least1 classes my opinions as closely allied to his4 ,yet be it known that never1 during the thirty years in which ,i have been writing on philosophical questions1 have ,i failed in my allegiance to realistic opinions and to certain ,scotistic ideas2 while all that ,hume has to say is said at the instance and in the interest of the extremest nominalism4 ,moreover1 instead of being a purely negative critic1 like ,hume1 seeking to annul a fundamental conception generally admitted1 ,i am a positive critic1 pleading for the admission to a place in our scheme of the universe for an idea generally rejected4 ,in the first paper of this series1 in which ,i gave a preliminary sketch of such of my ideas as could be so presented1 ,i carefully recorded my opposition to all philosophies which deny the reality of the ,absolute1 and asserted that 8the one intelligible theory of the universe is that of objective idealism1 that matter is effete mind40 ,this is as much as to say that ,i am a ,schellingian1 of some stripe2 so that1 on the whole1 ,i do not think ,dr4 ,carus has made a very happy hit in likening me to ,hume1 to whose whole method and style of philosophising ,i have always been perhaps too intensely averse4 ,yet1 notwithstanding my present disclaimer1 ,i have little doubt apriorians will continue to describe me as belonging to the sceptical school4 ,they have their wonderful ways of arriving at truth1 without stooping to confront their conclusions with facts2 and it is amusing to see how sincerely they are convinced that nobody can have science at heart1 without denying all they uphold4#aag ,my opponent has a habit of throwing out surprising opinions without the least attempt to illuminate them with the effulgence of reason4 ,thus he says 7 #h73 8,if ,kant's answer to ,hume had been satisfactory1 ,mr4 ,peirce would probably not have renewed the attack40 ,what attack8 ,all that ,hume attacked ,i defend1 namely1 law as a reality4 ,how could a defence of that which ,i defend as essential to my position1 cause me to surrender that position1 namely1 that real regularity is imperfect8 ,in any sense in which ,hume could have admitted the possibility of law1 it must be precisely followed2 since its existence could consist only in the conformity of facts unto it4 ,but perhaps ,dr4 ,carus means that if one question had been completely settled1 ,i should probably have confined myself to talking about that1 instead of broaching a new one4 #ai4 ,another misunderstanding of my position on the part of ,dr4 ,carus 7 #ab1 #ac7 is simply due to 8boldly0 having been twice printed where the reading should have been 8baldly10 in my paper on 8,the ,doctrine of ,necessity40 7,the ,monist1 ,vol4 ,,ii1 p4 #ccf1 lines #bj and #be47 ,i wish printers would learn that ,i never use the word bold4 ,i have so little of the quality1 that ,i don't know what it means4 ,as ,i read the 8revise10 as usual1 it was presumably my fault that the erratum occurred4 ,at any rate1 had my meaning been clearly expressed1 the proof-reader would not have been misled by my defective chirography4 ,what ,i was trying to say was1 in substance1 this3 ,absolute chance is a hypothesis2 and1 like every hypothesis1 can only be defended as explaining certain phenomena4#aah ,yet to suppose that an event is brought about by absolute chance is utterly illogical1 since as a hypothesis it could only be admitted on the ground of its explaining observed facts2 now from mere non-law nothing necessarily follows1 and therefore nothing can be explained2 for to explain a fact is to show that it is a necessary1 or1 at least1 a probable1 result from another fact1 known or supposed4 ,why is not this a complete refutation of the theory of absolute chance8 ,answer3 because the existence of absolute chance1 as well as many of its characters1 are not themselves absolute chances1 or sporadic events1 unsubject to general law4 ,on the contrary1 these things are general laws4 ,everybody is familiar with the fact that chance has laws1 and that statistical results follow therefrom4 ,very well3 ,i do not propose to explain anything as due to the action of chance1 that is1 as being lawless4 ,i do not countenance the idea that ,bible stories1 for instance1 show that nature's laws were violated2--though they may help to show that nature's laws are not so mechanical as we are accustomed to think4 ,but ,i only propose to explain the regularities of nature as consequences of the only uniformity1 or general fact1 there was in the chaos1 namely1 the general absence of any1 determinate law4#aai ,in fact1 after the first step is taken1 ,i only use chance to give room for the development of law by means of the law of habits4 #bj4 ,in #bh1 ,i read3 8,mr4 ,peirce does not object to necessity in certain cases2 he objects to necessity being a universal feature of the world40 ,this is correctly stated1 and so it is in #bjc4 ,i object to necessity being universal1 as well as to its ever being exact4 ,in short1 ,i object to absolute universality1 absolute exactitude1 absolute necessity1 being attributed to any proposition that does not deal with the and the 1 in the which ,i do not include any object of ordinary knowledge4 ,but it is careless to write 7 #aic7 that ,i 8describe the domain of mind as the absence of law40 ,is not one of my papers entitled 8,the ,law of ,mind08 ,it is true that ,i make the law of mind essentially different in its mode of action from the law of mechanics1 inasmuch as it requires its own violation2 but it is law1 not chance uncontrolled4 ,that it is not 8an undetermined and indeterminable sporting0 should have been obvious from my expressly stating that its ultimate result must be the entire elimination of chance from the universe4 ,that directly negatives the adjective 8indeterminable10 and hence also the adjective 8undetermined40 ,still more unwarranted is the statement 7 #bje7 that ,i deny 8that there are samenesses in this world40 ,if the slightest excuse for such an accusation can be found in all my writings ,i shall be mightily surprised4 #ba4 ,dr4 ,carus fully admits 7 #i7 the justice of my first reply to the argument that necessity is postulated in all scientific reasoning1 which reply is that to postulate necessity does not make it true4 ,as this reply1 if correct is complete1 ,dr4 ,carus was bound after that admission to drop the postulate-argument in favor of necessity4#abj ,but he takes no notice1 at all1 of my four-page argument to show that scientific reasoning does not postulate absolute universality1 exactitude1 or necessity 7,the ,monist1 ,vol4 ,,ii1 pp4 #cbd-cbg72 but calmly asserts1 four or five times over 7 #e1 #aa1 #af1 #fb1 #gi71 without one scintilla of argumentation1 that that postulate is made1 and uses this as an argument in favor of necessity4 #bb4 ,he also fully admits 7 #aa1 #ad1 #bb7 the justice of my argument that the absoluteness of universality1 exactitude1 and necessity1 cannot be proved1 nor rendered probable1 by arguments from observation4 ,that argument consisted in assuming that all arguments from observation are probable arguments1 and in showing that probable inferences are always affected with probable errors4 ,had ,i deemed it requisite1 ,i might easily have fortified that argument by a more profound analysis of scientific reasoning4 ,such an analysis ,i had formerly given in my 8,theory of ,probable ,inference0 7in 8,studies in ,logic10 ,boston3 ,little and ,brown74 ,but1 notwithstanding his admissions1 ,dr4 ,carus sets up his ipse dixit against my argumentation4 8,we deny most positively10 says the editorial ,elohim1 8that the calculus of probabilities is applicable to the order of the world1 as to whether it may or may not be universal40 7 #bg1 #ca47 ,to support this1 he cites 7 #ca-cd7 four passages from articles written by me sixteen years ago4 ,i hope my mind has not been stationary during all these years2 yet there is little in those old articles which ,i now think positively erroneous1 and nothing in the passages cited4 ,my present views had1 at that time1 already begun to urge themselves on my mind2 but they were not ripe for public avowal4 ,in the first of the passages cited1 ,i express the opinion1 which ,i first uttered in my earlier lectures before the ,lowell ,institute1 in #ahff1 afterwards in the ,popular ,science ,monthly in #ahgg1 in still fuller elaboration in my 8,theory of ,probable ,inference0 in #ahhb1 and maintain now as strongly as ever1 that no definite probability can be assigned to any general arrangement of nature4 ,to speak of an antecedent probability would imply that there was a statistical science of different universes2 and a deduced probability requires an antecedent probability for one of its data4#aba ,this consideration only goes to fortify my present position1 that we cannot conclude from observed facts with any degree of probability1 and therefore a fortiori not with certainty1 that any proposition is absolutely universal1 exact1 or necessary4 ,in the absence of any weight of probability in favor of any particular exact statement1 the formal presumption is altogether against any one out of innumerable possible statements of that kind4 ,the second passage cited is one in which ,i argue that the universe is not a chaos1 or chance-medley4 ,now ,dr4 ,carus admits 7 #bh7 that ,i do not to-day maintain that it is a chance-medley4 ,the third passage cited is this3 8,a contradiction is involved in the very idea of a chance-world40 ,this is in entire harmony with my present position that 8a chaos 444 being without connection or regularity would properly be without existence40 78,architecture of ,theories10 ,the ,monist1 ,vol4 ,i1 p4 #agf47 ,the fourth passage is to the effect that 8the interest which the uniformities of nature have for an animal measures his place in the scale of intelligence40 ,this ,i still believe4 ,so much for my supposed contradictions4 ,if ,i am not mistaken1 our amiable editor1 whose admirable editorship springs so largely out of his amiability1 in copying out these passages was really not half so much intent on showing me to be wrong at present1 as on showing me to have been right formerly4 ,however hard he hits1 he contrives to honey his sockdologers1 and sincerely cares more to make the reader admire his antagonist when he is right than to condemn him when he is wrong4 ,there is a touch of art in this that proclaims the born editor1 and which ,i can hardly hope to imitate4 ,though ,dr4 ,carus admits over and over again that necessity cannot be based on observation1 he often slips back to the idea that it can be so based4 ,he says1 7 #cj7 that 8form is a quality of this world1 not of some samples of it1 but throughout1 so far as we know of existence in even the most superficial way40 ,but does he not see that all we do know1 and all we shall to-morrow1 or at any date know1 is nothing but a sample of our possible experience1--nay1 is but a sample of what we are in the future to have already experienced8 ,i have characterised inductive inference as reasoning from samples2 but the most usual way of sampling a class is by examining all the instances of it that have come under our observation1 or which we can at once collect4 #bc4 ,dr4 ,carus 7 #dd1 #df7 holds that from my social theory of reality1 namely1 that the real is the idea in which the community ultimately settles down1 the existence of something inevitable is to be inferred4 ,i confess ,i never anticipated that anybody would urge that4 ,i thought just the reverse might be objected1 namely1 that all absoluteness was removed from reality by that theory1 and it was many years ago that1 in my 8,theory of ,probable ,inference10 ,i admitted the obvious justice1 as it seemed to me1 of that objection4 ,we cannot be quite sure that the community ever will settle down to an unalterable conclusion upon any given question4 ,even if they do so for the most part1 we have no reason to think the unanimity will be quite complete1 nor can we rationally presume any overwhelming consensus of opinion will be reached upon every question4 ,all that we are entitled to assume is in the form of a hope that such conclusion may be substantially reached concerning the particular questions with which our inquiries are busied4 ,such1 at least1 are the results to which the consideration of the doctrine of probability brings my mind irresistibly4 ,so that1 the social theory of reality1 far from being incompatible with tychism1 inevitably leads up to that form of philosophy4 ,socialistic1 or as ,i prefer to term it1 agapastic ontology seems to me likely to find favor with many minds at an early day1 because it is a natural path by which the nominalist may be led into the realistic ways of thought1 ways toward which many facts and inward forces impel him4 ,it is well1 therefore1 to call attention to the circumstances that the realism to which it leads is a doctrine which declares general truths to be real1--independent of the opinions of any particular collection of minds1--but not to be destined1 in a strictly universal1 exact1 and sure acceptation1 to be so settled1 and established4 ,now to assert that general truths are objectively real1 but to deny that they are strictly universal1 exact1 and certain1 is to embrace the doctrine of absolute chance4 ,thus it is that the agapastic ontologist who endeavors to escape tychism will find himself 8led into0 that 8inextricable confusion0 which ,dr4 ,carus 7 #d7 has taken a contract to show that ,i am led into4 #bd4 ,conservatism is wholesome and necessary2 the most convinced radical must admit the wisdom of it1 in the abstract2 and a conservative will be in no haste to espouse the doctrine of absolute chance4 ,i1 myself1 pondered over it for long years before doing so4 ,but ,i am persuaded1 at length1 that mankind will before very long take up with it2 and ,i do not believe philosophers will be found tagging on to the tail of the general procession4 ,my little dialogue between the tychist and the necessitarian 7,the ,monist1 ,vol4 ,,ii1 pp4 #cca-ccc7 seems to have represented pretty fairly the views of the latter2 for ,dr4 ,carus1 in #aea-aee1 does little more than reiterate them1 without much1 if at all1 reinforcing them4 ,his #aeh-afj merely work out1 in a form perhaps not quite clear1 what is manifest from the elementary principles of dynamics1 and was considered in my dialogue4 ,his arguments in this connection1 apart from those already noticed1 are that absolute chance is something which if it existed would require explanation1 that the manifold specificalness of nature is explained by law without any aid from chance1 and that absolute chance if it existed1 in the sense in which it is supposed to exist in my chaos1 could not possibly breed law as supposed by me4 ,to the consideration of these arguments ,i proceed to apply myself4 #be4 ,one of the architectonic--and1 therefore1 ,i suppose1 by ,dr4 ,carus considered as highly reprehensible--features of my theory1 is that1 instead of saying off-hand what elements strike me as requiring explanation and what as not doing so1 which seems to be his way1 ,i have devoted a long time to the study of the whole logical doctrine of explanation1 and of the history of explanations1 and have based upon the general principles so ascertained my conclusions as to what things do and what do not require to be explained4 ,dr4 ,carus 7 #fg7 defines explanation as a description of a special process of nature in such a way that the process is recognised as a transformation4 ,this ,i cannot quite grant4 ,first1 ,i cannot admit that 8special processes of nature0 are the only things to be explained4 ,for instance1 if ,i were to meet a gentleman who seemed to conform scrupulously to all the usages of good society1 except that he wore to an evening party an emerald satin vest1 that would be a fact calling for explanation1 although it would not be a 8special process of nature40 ,second1 ,i cannot admit that an explanation is a description of the fact explained4 ,it is true that in the setting forth of some explanations1 it is convenient to restate the fact explained1 so as to set it under another aspect2 but even in these cases1 the statement of other facts is essential4 ,in all cases1 it is other facts1 usually hypothetical1 which constitute the explanation2 and the process of explaining is a process by which from those other facts the fact to be explained is shown to follow as a consequence1 by virtue of a general principle1 or otherwise4 ,thus1 a 8special process of nature0 calling for explanation is the circumstance that the planet ,mars1 while moving in a general way from west to east among the fixed stars1 yet retrogrades a part of the time1 so as to describe loops in the heavens4 ,the explanation is that ,mars revolves in one approximate circle and we in another4 ,again1 it has been stated that a warm spring in ,europe is usually followed by a cool autumn1 and the explanation has been offered that so many more icebergs than usual are liberated during a warm spring1 that they subsequently lower sensibly the temperature of ,europe4 ,i care little whether the fact and the explanation are correct or no4 ,the case illustrates1 at any rate1 my point that an explanation is a special fact1 supposed or known1 from which the fact to be explained follows as a consequence4 ,third1 ,i cannot admit that every description which recognises the fact described as a transformation is an explanation2 far less that 8it is complete and exhaustive0 7 #fg74 ,a magician transforms a watch into a dove4 ,recognise it as a transformation and the trick is explained1 is it8 ,this is delightfully facile4 ,describe the change from a caterpillar to a butterfly as a transformation1 and does that explain it8 ,fourth1 ,i cannot admit that every explanation recognises the fact explained as a transformation4 ,the explanation of the loops in the motion of ,mars is not of that nature4 ,but ,i willingly recognise in ,dr4 ,carus's definition an attempt1--more or less successful1--to formulate one of the great offices of scientific inquiry1 that of bridging over the gap between the familiar and the unfamiliar4 ,explanation1 however1 properly speaking1 is the replacement of a complex predicate1 or one which seems improbable or extraordinary1 by a simple predicate from which the complex predicate follows on known principles4 ,in like manner1 a reason1 in one sense1 is the replacement of a multiple subject of an observational proposition by a general subject1 which by the very conditions of the special experience is predicable of the multiple subject4#abb ,such a reason may be called an explanation in a loose sense4 ,accordingly1 that which alone requires an explanation is a coincidence4 ,hence1 ,i say that a uniformity1 or law1 is par excellence1 the thing that requires explanation4 ,and ,dr4 ,carus 7 #ea7 admits that this 8is perfectly true40 ,but ,i cannot imagine anything further from the truth than his statement 7 #ff7 that 8the only thing in the world of which we cannot and need not give account is the existence of facts itself40 ,i should say1 on the contrary1 that the existence of facts is the only thing of which we need give account4 ,forms may indulge in whatever eccentricities they please in the world of dreams1 without responsibility2 but when they attempt that kind of thing in the world of real existence1 they must expect to have their conduct inquired into4 ,but should ,dr4 ,carus reply that ,i mistake his meaning1 that it is only 8being in general0 7 #ff7 that he holds unaccountable1 ,i reply that this is simply expressing scepticism as to the possibility and need of philosophy4 ,in a certain sense1 my theory of reality1 namely that reality is the dynamical reaction of certain forms upon the mind of the community1 is a proposed explanation of being in general2 and be it remarked that the mind of the community1 itself1 is the thing the nature of whose being this explanation first of all puts upon an idealistic footing4 ,chance1 according to me1 or irregularity1--that is1 the absence of any coincidence1--calls for no explanation4 ,if law calls for a particular explanation1 as ,dr4 ,carus admits it does1 surely the mere absence of law calls for no further explanation than is afforded by the mere absence of any particular circumstance necessitating the result4 ,an explanation is the conception of a fact as a necessary result1 thereby accounting for the coincidence it presents4 ,it would be highly absurd to say that the absence of any definite character1 must be accounted for1 as if it were a peculiar phenomenon1 simply because the imperfection of language leads us so to talk of it4 ,quite unfounded1 therefore1 is ,dr4 ,carus's opinion that 8chance needs exactly as much explanation as anything else0 7 #ec72--;an opinion which1 so far as ,i can see1 rests on no defensible principle4 ,equally hasty is his oft repeated objection 7 #ee1 #eh1 #fa7 that my absolute chance is something ultimate and inexplicable4 ,i go back to a chaos so irregular that in strictness the word existence is not applicable to its merely germinal state of being2 and here ,i reach a region in which the objection to ultimate causes loses its force4 ,but ,i do not stop there4 ,even this nothingness1 though it antecedes the infinitely distant absolute beginning of time1 is traced back to a nothingness more rudimentary still1 in which there is no variety1 but only an indefinite specificability1 which is nothing but a tendency to the diversification of the nothing1 while leaving it as nothing as it was before4 ,what objectionable ultimacy is here8 ,the objection to an ultimate consists in its raising a barrier across the path of inquiry1 in its specifying a phenomenon at which questions must stop1 contrary to the postulate1 or hope1 of logic4 ,but what question to which any meaning can be attached am ,i forbidding by my absolute chance8 ,if what is demanded is a theological backing1 or rational antecedent1 to the chaos1 that my theory fully supplies4 ,the chaos is a state of intensest feeling1 although1 memory and habit being totally absent1 it is sheer nothing still4 ,feeling has existence only so far as it is welded into feeling4 ,now the welding of this feeling to the great whole of feeling is accomplished only by the reflection of a later date4 ,in itself1 therefore1 it is nothing2 but in its relation to the end1 it is everything4 ,more unreasonable yet is ,dr4 ,carus's pretension1 that the manifold specificalness1 which is what ,i mean by chance1 is capable of explanation 7 #adb1 #adc7 by his own philosophic method4 ,he may explain one particularity by another1 of course2 but to explain specificalness itself1 would be to show that a specific predicate is a necessary consequence of a generic one1 or that a whole is without ambiguity a part of its part4 ,remark1 reader1 at this point1 that chance1 whether it be absolute or not1 is not the mere creature of our ignorance4 ,it is that diversity and variety of things and events which law does not prevent4 ,such is that real chance upon which the kinetical theory of gases1 and the doctrines of political economy1 depend4 ,to say that it is not absolute is to say that it1--this diversity1 this specificalness1--can be explained as a consequence of law4 ,but this1 as we have seen1 is logically absurd4 ,dr4 ,carus admits that absolute chance is 8not unimaginable0 7 #aej74 ,chance itself pours in at every avenue of sense3 it is of all1 things the most obtrusive4 ,that it is absolute1 is the most manifest of all intellectual perceptions4 ,that it is a being1 living and conscious1 is what all the dullness that belongs to ratiocination's self can scarce muster hardihood to deny4 ,almost as unthinking is the objection 7 #fa7 that absolute chance could never beget order4 ,i have noticed elsewhere the historic oblivescence of this objection4 ,must ,i once again repeat that the tendency to take habits1 being itself a habit1 has eo ipso a tendency to grow2 so that only a slightest germ is needed8 ,a realist1 such as ,i am1 can find no difficulty in the production of that first infinitesimal germ of habit-taking by chance1 provided he thinks chance could act at all4 ,this seems1 at first blush1 to be explaining something as a chance-result4 ,but exact analysis will show it is not so4 ,in like manner1 when the eminent thinker who does me the honor to notice my speculation1 objects that ,i do not1 after all1 escape making law absolute1 since the tendency to take habits which ,i propose to make universal is itself a law1 ,i confess ,i can find only words without ideas in the objection4 ,law is a word found convenient1 ,i grant1 in describing that tendency2 but is there no difference between a law the essence of which is to be inviolable 7which is the nominalistic conception of mechanical law1 whose being1 they say1 lies in its action7 and that mental law the violation of which is so included in its essence that unless it were violated it would cease to exist8 ,in my essay1 8,the ,law of ,mind10 ,i have so described that law4 ,in so describing it1 ,i make it a law1 but not an absolute law2 and thus ,i clearly escape the contradiction attributed to me4 #bf4 ,in my attack on 8,the ,doctrine of ,necessity10 ,i offered four positive arguments for believing in real chance4 ,they were as follows3 #a4 ,the general prevalence of growth1 which seems to be opposed to the conservation of energy4 #b4 ,the variety of the universe1 which is chance1 and is manifestly inexplicable4 #c4 ,law1 which requires to be explained1 and like everything which is to be explained must be explained by something else1 that is1 by non-law or real chance4 #d4 ,feeling1 for which room cannot be found if the conservation of energy is maintained4 ,in a brief conversation ,i had with him1 my friend remarked 7and it was an inconsiderate concession1 ,i certainly do not wish to hold him to it7 that while the theory of tychism had some attractive features1 its weakness consisted in the absence of any positive reasons in its favor4 ,i infer from this that ,i did not properly state the above four arguments4 ,i therefore desire once more to call attention to them1 especially in their relations to one another4 ,mathematicians are familiar with the theorem that if a system of particles is subject only to positional forces1 it is such that if at any instant the velocities were all suddenly reversed1 without being altered in quantity1 the whole previous history of the system would be repeated in inverse succession4 ,hence1 when physicists find themselves confronted with a phenomenon which takes place only in one order of succession and never in the reverse order1--of which no better illustration could be found than the phenomena of growth1 for nobody ever heard of an animal growing back into an egg1--they always take refuge in the laws of probability as preventive of the velocities ever getting so reversed4 ,to understand my argument number #a1 it is necessary to make this method of escape from apparent violations of the law of energy quite familiar to oneself4 ,for example1 according to the law of energy1 it seems to follow 7and by the aid of the accepted theory of light it does follow7 that if a prism1 or a grating1 disperses white light into a spectrum1 then the colors of the spectrum falling upon the prism or grating at the same angles1 and in the same proportions1 will be recombined into white light2 and1 everybody knows that this does in fact happen4 ,nevertheless1 the usual and prevalent effect of prisms and gratings is to produce colored spectra4 ,why8 ,evidently1 because1 by the principles of probability1 it will rarely happen that colored lights converging from different directions will fall at just the right angles and in just the right proportions to be recombined into white light4 ,so1 when physicists meet with the phenomena of frictional and viscous resistance to a body in motion1 although1 according to their doctrine1 if the molecules were to move with the same velocities in opposite directions the moving body would be accelerated1 yet they say that the laws of probability1 applied to the trillions of molecules concerned1 render this practically certain not to occur4 ,i do no more1 then1 than follow the usual method of the physicists1 in calling in chance to explain the apparent violation of the law of energy which is presented by the phenomena of growth3 only instead of chance as they understand it1 ,i call in absolute chance4 ,for many months1 ,i endeavored to satisfy the data of the case with ordinary quasi chance2 but it would not do4 ,i believe that in a broad view of the universe1 a simulation of a given elementary mode of action can hardly be explained except by supposing the genuine mode of action somewhere has place4 ,if it is improbable that colored lights should fall together in just such a way as to give a white ray1 is it not an equally extraordinary thing that they should all be generated in such a way as to produce a white ray8 ,if it is incredible that trillions of molecules in a fluid should strike a solid body moving through it so as to accelerate it1 is it not marvellous that trillions of trillions of molecules all alike should ever have got so segregated as to create a state of things in which they should be practically certain to retard the body8 ,it is far from easy to understand how mere positional forces could ever have brought about those vast congregations of similar atoms which we suppose to exist in every mass of gas1 and by which we account for the apparent violations of the law of energy in the phenomena of the viscosity of the gas4 ,there is no difficulty in seeing how sulphuric acid acting on marble may produce an aggregation of molecules of carbonic anhydride1 because there are similar aggregations in the acid and in the marble1 but how were such aggregations brought about in the first place8 ,i will not go so far as to say that such a result is manifestly impossible with positional forces alone2 but ,i do say that we cannot help suspecting that the simulated violation of the law of energy has a real violation of the same law as its ultimate explanation4 ,now1 growth appears to violate the law of energy4 ,to explain it1 we must1 at least1 suppose a simulated1 or quasi1 chance1 such as ,darwin calls in to produce his fortuitous variations from strict heredity4 ,it may be there is no real violation of the law1 and no real chance2 but even if there be nothing of the sort in the immediate phenomenon1 can the conditions upon which the phenomenon depends have been brought about except by real chance8 ,it is conceivable1 again1 that the law of the conservation of forces is not strictly accurate1 and that1 nevertheless1 there is no absolute chance4 ,but ,i think so much has been done to put the law of the conservation of forces upon the level of the other mechanical laws1 that when one is led to entertain a serious doubt of the exactitude of that1 one will be inclined to question the others4 ,besides1 few psychologists will deny the very intimate connection which seems to subsist between the law1 or quasi-law1 of growth and the law of habit1 which is the principal1 if not 7as ,i hold it to be7 the sole1 law of mental action4 ,now1 this law of habit seems to be quite radically different in its general form from mechanical law1 inasmuch as it would at once cease to operate if it were rigidly obeyed2 since in that case all habits would at once become so fixed as to give room for no further formation of habits4 ,in this point of view1 then1 growth seems to indicate a positive violation of law4 ,let us now consider argument number #c3 and remark how it fortifies number #a4 ,physical laws that appear to be radically different yet present some striking analogies4 ,electrical force appears to be polar4 ,its polarity is explained away by ,franklin's one-fluid theory1 but in that view the force is a repulsion4 ,now1 gravitation is an attraction1 and is1 therefore1 essentially different from electricity4 ,yet both vary inversely as the square of this distance4 ,radiation1 likewise follows the same formula4 ,in this last case1 the formula1 in one aspect of it1 follows from the conservation of energy4 ,in another aspect of it1 it results from the principle of probability1 and does not hold good1 in a certain sense1 when the light is concentrated by a lens free from spherical aberration4 ,but neither the conservation of energy nor the principle of probability seems to afford any possible explanation of the application of this theory to gravitation nor to electricity4 ,how1 then1 are such analogies to be explained8 ,the law of the conservation of energy and that of the perduration of matter present so striking an analogy that it has blinded some powerful intellects to their radically different nature4 ,the law of action and reaction1 again1 has often been stated as the law of the conservation of momentum4 ,yet it is not only an independent law1 but is even of a contrary nature1 inasmuch as it is only the algebraical sum of opposite momenta that is 8conserved40#abc ,how is this striking analogy between three fundamental laws to be explained8 ,consider the still more obvious analogy between space and time4 ,newton argues that the laws of mechanics prove space and time to be absolute entities4 ,leibniz1 on the other hand1 takes them as laws of nature4 ,either view calls for an explanation of the analogy between them1 which no such reflection as the impossibility of motion without that analogy can supply4 ,kant's theory seems to hint at the possibility of an explanation from both being derived from the nature of the same mind4 ,any three orthogonal directions#abd in space are exactly alike1 yet are dynamically independent4 ,these things call for explanation2 yet no explanation of them can be given1 if the laws are fundamentally original and absolute4 ,moreover1 law itself calls for explanation4 ,but how is it to be explained if it is as fundamentally original and absolute as it is commonly supposed to be8 ,yet if it is not so absolute1 there is such a phenomenon as absolute chance4 ,thus1 the chance which growth calls for is now seen to be absolute1 not quasi chance4 ,now consider argument number #b4 ,the variety of the universe so far as it consists of unlikenesses between things calls for no explanation4 ,but so far as it is a general character1 it ought to be explained4 ,the manifold diversity or specificalness1 in general1 which we see whenever and wherever we open our eyes1 constitutes its liveliness1 or vivacity4 ,the perception of it is a direct1 though darkling1 perception of ,god4 ,further explanation in that direction is uncalled for4 ,but the question is1 whether this manifold specificalness was put into the universe at the outset1 whether ,god created the universe in the infinitely distant past and has left it to its own machinery ever since1 or whether there is an incessant influx of specificalness4 ,some of us are evolutionists2 that is1 we are so impressed with the pervasiveness of growth1 whose course seems only here and there to be interrupted1 that it seems to us that the universe as a whole1 so far as anything can possibly be conceived or logically opined of the whole1 should be conceived as growing4 ,but others say1 though parts of the universe simulate growth at intervals1 yet there really is no growth on the whole1--no passage from a simpler to a more complex state of things1 no increasing diversity4 ,now1 my argument is that1 according to the principles of logic1 we never have a right to conclude that anything is absolutely inexplicable or unaccountable4 ,for such a conclusion goes beyond what can be directly observed1 and we have no right to conclude what goes beyond what we observe1 except so far as it explains or accounts for what we observe4 ,but it is no explanation or account of a fact to pronounce it inexplicable or unaccountable1 or to pronounce any other fact so4 ,now1 to say no process of diversification takes place in nature leaves the infinite diversity of nature unaccounted for2 while to say the diversity is the result of a general tendency to diversification is a perfectly logical probable inference4 ,suppose there be a general tendency to diversification2 what would be the consequence8 ,evidently1 a high degree of diversity4 ,but this is just what we find in nature4 ,it does not answer the purpose to say there is diversity because ,god made it so1 for we cannot tell what ,god would do1 nor penetrate his counsels4 ,we see what ,he does do1 and nothing more4 ,for the same reason one cannot logically infer the existence of ,god2 one can only know ,him by direct perception4 ,it is to be noted that a general tendency to diversification does not explain diversity in its specific characters2 nor is this called for4 ,neither can such a tendency explain any specific fact4 ,any attempt to make use of the principle in that manner would be utterly illogical4 ,but it can be used to explain universal facts1 just as quasi-chance is used to explain statistical facts4 ,now1 the diversity of nature is a universal fact4 ,to explain diversity is to go behind the chaos1 to the original undiversified nothing4 ,diversificacity was the first germ4 ,argument ,no4 #d was1 upon its negative side1 sufficiently well presented in my 8,doctrine of ,necessity ,examined40 ,mechanical causation1 if absolute1 leaves nothing for consciousness to do in the world of matter2 and if the world of mind is merely a transcript of that of matter1 there is nothing for consciousness to do even in the mental realm4 ,the account of matters would be better1 if it could be left out of account4 ,but the positive part of the argument1 showing what can be done to reinstate consciousness as a factor of the universe when once tychism is admitted1 is reinforced in the later papers4 ,this ought to commend itself to ,dr4 ,carus1 who shows himself fully alive to the importance of that part of the task of science which consists in bridging gaps4 ,but consciousness1 for the reason just stated1 is not to be so reinstated without tychism2 nor can the work be accomplished by assigning to the mind an occult power1 as in two theories to be considered in the section following this4 ,as might be anticipated1 7and a presumption of this kind is rarely falsified in metaphysics17 to bridge the gap synechism is required4 ,supposing matter to be but mind under the slavery of inveterate habit1 the law of mind still applies to it4 ,according to that law1 consciousness subsides as habit becomes established1 and is excited again at the breaking up of habit4 ,but the highest quality of mind involves a great readiness to take habits1 and a great readiness to lose them2 and this implies a degree of feeling neither very intense nor very feeble4 ,i have noticed above 7 #g7 ,dr4 ,carus's dubious attitude toward the first argument4 ,i considered in the last section his attempted reply to the second4 ,to the third argument1 he replies 7 #fe7 that law ought to be accounted for by the principle of sufficient reason4 ,but1 of course1 that principle cannot recommend itself to me1 a realist2 for it is nothing but the lame attempt of a nominalist to wriggle out of his difficulties4 ,reasons explain nothing1 except upon some theistic hypothesis which may be pardoned to the yearning heart of man1 but which must appear doubtful in the eyes of philosophy1 since it comes to this1 that ,tom1 ,dick1 and ,harry are competent to pry into the counsels of the ,most ,high1 and can invite in their cousins and sweethearts and sweethearts' cousins to look over the original designs of the ,ancient of ,days4 #bg4 ,my fourth argument it is which seems to have made most impression upon ,dr4 ,carus's mind 7 #he71 and his reply is rather elaborate4 ,while embracing unequivocally the necessitarian dogma1 equally for mind and for matter 7 #aic71 ,dr4 ,carus wishes utterly to repudiate materialism and the mechanical philosophy 7 #acc74 ,to facilitate his1 thus1 walking the slack-rope1 he makes 7 #afh7 a division of events into 87#a7 mechanical1 7#b7 physical1 7#c7 chemical1 7#d7 physiological1 and 7#e7 psychical events40 ,the first three 7 #afi-aga7 are merely distinguished by the magnitude of the moving masses1 so that1 for philosophical purposes1 they do not differ at all4 ,as for physiological events1 though he devotes a paragraph 7 #agb7 to their definition1 he utterly fails to distinguish them from the mechanical 7including the physical and chemical7 on the one hand1 or from the psychical on the other4 ,dr4 ,carus seems to think 7 #agf7 that by this division he has separated himself entirely from the materialists2 but this is an illusion1 for nobody denies the existence of feelings4 ,the truth is1 he distinctly enrolls himself in the mechanical army when he asserts that mental laws are of the same necessitarian character as mechanical laws 7 #aic74 ,the only question that remains as to his position is whether he is a materialist or not4 ,he instances 7 #ahe7 the case of a general receiving a written dispatch and being stimulated into great activity by its perusal1 and causing great motions to be made and missiles to be sped in consequence4 ,now1 the dilemma is this4 ,will ,dr4 ,carus1 on the one hand1 say that the motion of those missiles was determined by mechanical laws alone1 in which case1 it would only be necessary to state all the positions and velocities of particles concerned1 a hundred years before1 to determine just how those bullets would move and1 consequently1 whether the guns were to be fired or not1 and this would constitute him a materialist1 or will he say that the laws of motion do not suffice to determine motions of matter1 in which case1 since they formally certainly do so suffice1 they must be violated1 and he will be giving to mind a direct dynamical power which is open to every objection that can be urged against tychism8 ,now admire the decision with which he cuts the ,gordian knot6 8,,there ,,are ,,no ,,purely ,,mechanical ,,phenomena40 7 #age47 ,that is1 8,the laws of motion ,,are applicable to and will explain all motions40 7 #agg47 ,but hold6 8,the mechanical philosopher 444 feels warranted in the hope that 444 the actions of man 444 can be explained by the laws of motion 4444 ,we may anticipate that this conclusion will prove ,,erroneous4 ,and so it is40 7 #agf47 ,at the same time1 8,,no ,,objection ,,can ,,be ,,made to the possibility of explaining the delicate motions in the nervous substance of the brain by the laws of molar or molecular mechanics40 7 #agh47 ,yet1 8,the simplest psychical reflexes1 including those physiological reflexes which we must suppose to have originated by conscious adaptation 444 ,,cannot be explained from mechanical or physical laws alone40 7 #ahf47 ,however1 8,we do ,,not say that there are motions 444 in the brain 444 which form exceptions to the laws of mechanics40 7 #ahg47 ,nevertheless1 8,the brain-atoms are possessed of the same spontaneity as the atoms of a gravitating stone4 ,yet there is present an additional feature2 there are present states of awareness4444 ,neither states of awareness nor their meanings can be weighed on any scales1 be they ever so delicate1 nor are they determinable in foot-pounds40 7 #aib47 ,clearness is the first merit of a philosopher2 and what #aib comes to is crystal-clear4 ,dr4 ,carus wants to have the three laws of motion always obeyed2 but he wishes the forces between the molecules to be varied according to the momentary states of awareness4 ,all right3 he is entitled to suppose whatever he likes1 so long as the supposition is self-consistent1 as this supposition is4 ,it conflicts with the law of energy1 it is true2 for that law is that the forces depend on the situations of the particles alone1 and not on the time4 ,it is liable to give rise to perpetual motion4 ,it was intended1 no doubt1 to be an improvement on my molecular theory of protoplasm1 earlier in the same number4 ,it escapes materialism4 ,it supposes a direct dynamical action between mind and matter1 such as has not been supposed by any eminent philosopher that ,i know of for centuries4 ,i am sorry to say that it shows a dangerous leaning toward originality4 ,the argument for thus rejecting the law of the conservation of energy1 ,i leave to others to be weighed4 ,it seems to suppose a much larger falsification of that law than my doctrine2 but it is a pretty clever attempt to escape my conclusions4 ,it rejects what has to be rejected1 the law of the conservation of energy2 and is far more intelligent than the theory of those 7like ,oliver and ,lodge7 who wish to give to mind a power of deflecting atoms1 which would satisfy the conservation of energy while violating the law of action and reaction4 ,if it can have due consideration1 ,i doubt not it will accelerate the acceptance of my views4 ,meantime1 ,i do not see where that 8inextricable confusion0 into which ,i was to be led is to come in4 7 #d47 #bh4 ,little more requires to be noticed in ,dr4 ,carus's articles4 ,he admits 7 #b7 that indeterminism is the more natural belief1 which is no slight argument in its favor4 #bi4 ,the remarks upon the theological bearings of the theories1 if they are found somewhat wide of the mark1 are explained by the haste of the editor to show just what all the affiliations of my views were1 before ,i had had time to explain what those views are4 ,the remarks to which ,i refer will be found in #c1 #cf1 #ha1 #hb1 #hc1 #abh1 #bjc1 #bjd4 ,they are worth putting together4 #cj4 ,the doctrine of symbolism1 to which ,dr4 ,carus has recourse1 seems to be similar to that of my essay 8,some ,consequences of ,four ,incapacities0 7,journal of ,speculative ,philosophy1 ,,ii47 7 #ahj1 #ahc1 #aii47 ,on this head1 ,i can only approve of his ideas4 #ca4 ,it is true that ,i wrote many definitions for one of the 8encyclopedic lexicons40 ,but they were necessarily rather vaguely expressed1 in order to include the popular use of terms1 and in some cases were modified by proof-readers or editors2 and for reasons not needful here to explain1 they are hardly such as ,i should give in a ,philosophical ,dictionary proper4 ,c4 ,s4 ,,peirce4 ,,footnotes3 #aja ,j4 ,s4 ,mill had in the first edition of his ,logic decisively taken an objective conception of chance and probability2 but in his second edition he had become puzzled and had retracted1 leaving that chapter1 and with it his whole logic1 a melancholy wreck1 over which the qualified reader sighs1 8,and this once seemed intelligible60 ,venn in the first edition of his book set forth the same objective conception with great clearness1 and for that he was entitled to high praise1 notwithstanding his manifest inadequacy to the problems treated4 ,but in his second edition1 he too has fallen away from his first and correct view1 and has adopted a theory which ,i shall some day show to be untenable4 ,venn's whole method in logic1 as well as his system1 is in my opinion of the weakest4 #ajb ,mill often did good service in substituting precise terms for ambiguous ones2 as when in speaking of mathematical conclusions he prefers to say they are legitimate deductions rather than that they are necessary4 #ajc ,in his ,ursache1 ,grund and ,zweck1 ,dr4 ,carus alludes to this passage4 ,but he prefers the treatment of the question by ,reid1 whom he calls ,mill's opponent 7,gegner74 #ajd ,it is of comparatively little consequence what ,hume really meant4 ,the main interest is in what ,kant thought he meant4 #aje ,along with the distinction1 ,i would of course do away with this use of the words abstract and concrete to which no clear idea can be attached1 as far as ,i can see4 #ajf ,i cannot but disapprove of this use of the word 8construction0 to mean a studied theory1 because the word is imperatively required in the theory of cognition to denote a mathematical diagram framed according to a general precept4 #ajg ,i apply this term because it is essentially like the passage from the concrete 8virtuous0 to the abstract 8virtue10 or from the concrete 8white0 7adjective7 to the abstract 8whiteness10 or 8white0 7substantive74 #ajh ,i can never use this word without thinking of the explanation of it given by ,petrus ,peregrinus in his ,epistole de ,magnete4 ,he says that physical properties are occult in the sense that they are only brought out by experimentation1 and are not to be deduced from admixtures of hot and cold1 moist and dry4 #aji ,it follows as a corollary from this that if the positions of the particles at any one instant1 together with the velocities at that instant1 and the law of force1 are given1 the positions at all instants can be calculated4 ,of course1 to give the positions and velocities at one instant1 is a special case of the giving of the positions at two instants4 ,the two instants may be such that there will be more than one solution of the problem2 but this is an insignificant detail4 #aaj ,it would seem to follow from his notion that in uniform motion each minute's motion is the cause of that of the next4 ,yet he says 7 #ai7 8there is no cause that is equal to its effect40 #aaa ,but1 as ,i have elsewhere said1 ,i should like to persuade mathematicians to speak of 8positional energy0 as ,kinetic potency1 the vis viva as ,kinetic energy1 and the total 8energy0 as the ,kinetic entelechy4 #aab ,the differential equation being an ordinary1 not a partial one1 this is an absolute constant1 determined by initial 7or final1 or any instantaneous7 conditions4 #aac ,dr4 ,carus calls attention to the connection between my doctrine of the fixation of opinion and his anti-originalism4 #aad ,dr4 ,carus passes a sweeping judgment on ,post-,kantian philosophy1 as being original4 #aae ,this was a remark of my father's4 #aaf ,a person in the last ,monist1 breaks in upon my series of articles to foretell what the 8issues of synechism0 will be4 ,were he able to do so1 it would certainly be the height of ill-manners thus to take the words out of my mouth4 #aag ,as ,i am writing1 ,i am shown a letter1 in which the writer says3 8,peirce with all his materialistic ideas1 yet10 etc ,i never promulgated a materialistic idea in my life4 ,the writer simply assumes that science is materialistic4 ,as ,i am correcting the proofs1 ,i notice that ,mr4 ,b4 ,c4 ,burt1 in his new ,history of ,modern ,philosophy1 sets me down as sceptical1 though doubtfully4 ,there are a good many inaccuracies in the work4 ,this was inevitable in a first edition4 ,but the ingenious plan of the book admirably adapts it to the wants of just that class of students who cannot understand that no repertory of facts ever can be trusted implicitly4 #aah ,its being hypothetical will not prevent its being established with a very high degree of certainty4 ,thus1 all history is of the nature of hypothesis2 since its facts cannot be directly observed1 but are only supposed to be true to account for the characters of the monuments and other documents4 #aai ,somebody may notice that ,i here admit a proposition as absolutely true4 ,undoubtedly2 because it relates to the ,absolute4 #abj ,indeed1 to admit that reply is all but to admit the non-absolute grade of necessity4 #aba ,i rightly go somewhat further in my ,theory of ,probable ,inference2 but that has no bearing on the present discussion4 #abb ,dr4 ,carus1 in his ,ursache1 ,grund und ,zweck1 well says that reasons are discovered by induction1 in the strict sense4 ,it is often admitted that causes can only be inferred by hypothetic reasoning4 #abc ,the conservation of a vortex1 which consists of the preservation of a certain character of motion by the same particles1 though derived from the coperation of other laws1 is1 in form1 quite different4 #abd ,in speaking of directions1 we assume the ,euclidean hypothesis that the angles of a triangle are equal to two right angles4 ,,the ,,founder ,,of ,,tychism1 ,,his ,,methods1 ,,philosophy1 ,,and ,,criticisms4 ,,in ,,reply ,,to ,,mr4 ,,charles ,s4 ,,peirce4 ,,introductory ,,and ,,personal4 ,soon after ,i had received ,mr4 ,peirce's manuscript he wrote me in a private letter as follows3 8,you have not found1 ,i trust1 that in my rejoinder ,i have anywhere overstepped the limit of amiable disputation4 ,if anything of that kind did1 unconsciously to me1 in the heat of composition1 slip from my pen1 ,i am most anxious to have it pointed out to me1 so that there may be no feeling in the matter of a disagreeable kind4 ,for if you should not mention it1 ,i should at some future time discover it1 and it would be a source of real unhappiness to me40 ,this is a very amiable disposition of mind4 ,mr4 ,peirce presses me very hard in the struggle for truth3 he does not hesitate to take advantage of even the smallest weak point which he espies or rather which he believes he espies4 ,he does not shrink from using plain terms1 such as 8absurd10 8unthinking10 8weak10 8hasty10 8irrational40 ,yet he preserves in the heat of the controversy a friendly spirit towards his antagonist1 which ,i cannot but appreciate and wish publicly to acknowledge4 ,but ,i would not have him change a word or soften the language of his article in the least1 for my sake4 ,if ,mr4 ,peirce is wrong1 ,i will take care of myself2 if he is right1 let the truth come out4 ,we are both1 as it were1 by profession champions of truth2 so we need not mind an occasional fling if in the end the cause of truth be promoted4 ,especially1 in the present case1 ,i need not mind the hard blows which ,mr4 ,peirce deals with such assurance1 for all the points at which he strikes are well protected4 ,the fiercer the onslaught1 the better the test4 ,i feel satisfied that his severe scrutiny only serves to prove the strength of the position which ,i defend4 ,i shall speak my mind as freely and unreservedly as does ,mr4 ,peirce1 and hope he in his turn will resent plain words as little as ,i do4 ,as offense is not intended1 so offense should not be taken4 ,let me add here in these introductory remarks that ,i am always open to conviction4 ,the views which ,i uphold have been well considered and thought out in their most important consequences4 ,they are consistent and well guarded in spite of ,mr4 ,peirce's thinking the contrary1 so that ,i feel no need of changing them4 ,but should some unforeseen difficulty arise which would oblige me to revise the whole system of my ideas1 ,i shall not hesitate publicly to confess it and allow myself to be lead by truth whithersoever it be4 99 99 99 99 99 ,the issue of our controversy is the problem of chance--not of chance as it occurs1 for instance1 in the throw of dice1 but of 8absolute chance10 or perfect lawlessness4 ,mr4 ,peirce makes absolute chance the corner-stone of his philosophy2 he propounds a radical and sweeping indeterminism1 while ,i reject the idea1 not of chance1 but of absolute chance as incompatible with the philosophy of science4 ,i4 ,,differences ,,of ,,method4 ,mr4 ,peirce calls himself a ,scotist and professes to represent medival ,realism1 speaking at the same time of me as a ,nominalist4 ,we find1 however1 that the inverse statement would be nearer the truth4 ,before discussing ,mr4 ,peirce's philosophy itself1 we must examine his methods4 ,difference of method will produce important divergencies of opinion4 #a4 ,,attention ,,to ,,detail4 ,mr4 ,peirce takes up in his rejoinder many incidental points1 which have little or no bearing upon the main issues between us4 ,on the one hand1 things of no consequence1 such as my granting that 8absolute chance0 like the impossibilities of fairy tales1 is not unimaginable1 and my saying that tychism is attractive but weak for lack of arguments1 are adduced as 8momentous admissions10 and 8inconsiderate concessions40 ,on the other hand1 ,mr4 ,peirce catches at straws to prove a lack of information on my part4 ,he cannot forbear calling attention to the little breach of etiquette committed in not giving an ,english baronet his proper title4 ,mr4 ,peirce shows on all these and other occasions a love of the incidental1 and if ,i were to allow myself to follow his example the battle would soon be broken up into innumerable skirmishes4 ,it is noteworthy that ,mr4 ,peirce's procedure appears to be a nominalistic tradition4 ,nominalists1 regarding universals as mere names of many particular things1 have always showed a great preference for the single1 the incidental1 the scattered2 while realists viewing universals as real things were in the habit of laying perhaps too much stress upon universalities and generalities to the neglect of the particular and individual4 ,indeed1 ,mr4 ,peirce's favorite idea1 which is a belief in absolute chance1 is in my opinion the most nominalistic and anti-realistic proposition ,i have ever met with4 ,regularity1 or natural law1 is to him the product of evolution4 ,thus he demolishes the eternity of the universal1 and eternity is only universality in time4 ,now suppose that eternity 7i4 e4 universality in time7 could be proved an error2 then1 the universality of the universal in space also will become illusory4 ,if those abiding features of nature which we call natural laws have indeed originated from a general sporting1 from chance1 from a chaotic lawlessness1 by a gradual habit taking1 who can assure us that nature has not taken different habits in other parts of the universe8 ,i look upon ,mr4 ,peirce as an extreme nominalist1 or1 if he prefers it1 as a nominal realist soaked with nominalistic opinions4 ,he professes to be a realist1 but he rescinds the foundation of realism4 ,like the bear of the hermit ,mr4 ,peirce throws the stone at the fly of necessary connection1 and in doing so kills the philosophy of realism itself4 #b4 ,,originality4 ,originality1 wherever we find it1 is pleasing2 but a hankering after originality is dangerous4 ,experience teaches us to regard a thinker's love of originality as one of the main causes of his going astray4 ,let the poet be original1 but not the scientist1 not the philosopher1 not the searcher for truth4 ,the conceit of being original flatters our vanity1 and original ideas in philosophy are tantamount to original errors4 ,i do not deny the value of originality1 but ,i do deny that it is a criterion of truth4 ,originality consists in the free exercise of our imagination1 and a vivid imagination is very valuable to the thinker4 ,but it so happens that every dreamer cherishes with a mother's love the children of his fancy4 ,and it is1 therefore1 necessary to be especially critical with the offspring of one's own brain4 ,kepler 78who10 ,mr4 ,peirce says1 8comes very close to realising my ideal of the scientific method07 was endowed with an extraordinarily vivid imagination4 ,he invented an extremely original scheme of explanation for the solar system1 and expounded it with great poetical fervor in his 8,mysterium ,cosmographicum40#abe ,kepler at once became famous by his 8,mysterium ,cosmographicum0 and was generally admired for his originality4 ,but his bent for hatching original ideas did not alone make ,kepler what he is to us now in the history of science4 ,a greater quality than his poetical fervor and original imagination was his rigorous self-criticism4 ,he took notice of every little fact that did not agree with his theories1 and for the sake of truth1 of objectively provable truth1 that is1 the agreement of his views with positive facts1 he sternly slew all those creatures of his fancy which he foresaw could not survive4 ,having myself a good deal of imagination1 and having tried myself many original ideas1 ,i can appreciate the self-denial and discipline of ,kepler4 ,i have come to the conclusion that originality is only an important means of attaining truth4 ,our ways of reaching the truth1 our methods of finding it1 may deserve the praise of originality1 but truth itself is never original2 for truth is the faithfulness of a copy which in our representations we make of reality1 and to praise ideas as original is certainly no argument that they are true4 ,there is no need of showing that ,mr4 ,peirce is not just in his statement of my view of originality1 by maintaining that ,i have advised people 8think not for yourself40 ,confessedly he exaggerates1 but in truth he misrepresents4 ,mr4 ,peirce does not relish what ,i have to say on the subject1 and1 to pacify his mind1 he does not tire of praising originality as the high-water mark of genius4 ,mr4 ,peirce's love of originality is a nominalistic feature of his mind4 ,a nominalist who denies the existence of universals cannot understand that everything in science must be sacrificed to truthfulness4 ,the question1 ,does this idea correctly represent its respective reality8 has no sense to a nominalist4 ,the nominalist is only interested in what a thinker makes of things4 ,the subjective conception1 in his opinion1 exhausts the subject4 ,i can understand that a nominalist should be greatly pleased with originality1 but a realist should not allow himself to be seduced by its charms4 ,mr4 ,peirce's penchant for1 and my distrust of1 originality1 have a direct influence upon our respective methods of thought4 ,it naturally makes him bolder and me more cautious4#abf #c4 ,a ,,modern ,,procrustes4 ,there was a man in ancient ,greece named ,procrustes1 who had two beds2 one long1 the other short4 ,he used to lay his tall guests upon the short bed1 and his short guests upon the long bed1 cutting off the limbs of the former and stretching out the bodies of the latter1 until they fitted the size of their unpleasant resting places4 ,in the same way ,mr4 ,peirce treats philosophical views4 ,there is the bed of the materialist and1 as all processes to the materialist are purely mechanical1 necessitarianism is stretched in the materialist's bed to mechanicalism4 ,i plead1 since ideas and feelings are not motions1 that mental processes cannot be explained by the laws of motion1 but can1 for that reason1 be none the less determined2 but ,i plead in vain4 ,that view of necessitarianism does not suit the bed upon which my ,procrustes places me4 ,other views1 however1 are cut down without further ado because they are said to be nominalistic4 ,anything that does not appeal to ,mr4 ,peirce's realistic mind is dismissed with a shrug4 ,i am neither a realist nor a nominalist1 or rather1 ,i am both realist and nominalist4 ,i am convinced that to some extent both sides were right and both sides were wrong1 and regard it as our duty to sift their propositions and accept the truth whether it be nominalistic or realistic4 ,we must follow the principle of hearing both sides1 and not consider at all whether a statement agrees or disagrees with certain party principles4#abg #d4 ,,occam',s ,,razor4 ,the most brilliant disciple of ,duns ,scotus was ,william of ,occam1 whose fame almost rivalled that of his master4 ,occam became an adversary of realism2 he became a nominalist1 and after him was named a method known as ,occam's razor1 especially useful to nominalists in their warfare against realists4 ,occam's razor is expressed in the sentence3 8,entia non sunt multiplicanda prter necessitatem10 which means3 ,only in cases of extremest necessity are we allowed to assume the existence of hypothetical facts4 ,if assumed facts are not absolutely indispensable1 cut them off6 ,occam's razor was invented for a special purpose1 that of cutting off the realistic hypostatisation of abstract ideas4 ,i do not know which is more startling1 that a realist in name1 such as ,mr4 ,peirce1 should use a weapon forged by nominalists against realism1 or that he whom in other respects we found in such a close contact with nominalistic methods1 should not understand how to handle a nominalistic weapon4 ,mr4 ,peirce censures me for making the statement that the formal is subjective as well as objective4 ,this1 he says1 is cut off by ,occam's razor4 ,the formal is subjective1 for our sensation is possessed of form and our mind is in possession of formal thought4 ,it is objective1 for reality is not void of form and the things are such as they are by virtue of their peculiar shape4 ,the proposition that the formal is objective and subjective at the same time is as little cut off by ,occam's razor as1 for instance1 the proposition that there is air inside and outside of us1 viz4 in our lungs and in the surrounding atmosphere4 ,mr4 ,peirce's usage of the beds of ,procrustes is cruel1 but his usage of ,occam's razor is inconsiderate4 ,he should be careful in handling such a sharp knife1 lest he do himself harm4 ,mr4 ,peirce uses ,occam's razor to cut off statements and facts which make his pet theories dispensable2 but he forgets that ,occam's razor cuts off ideas only1 and when it comes in contact with facts its edge is turned4 ,occam's razor is an excellent instrument to dispose of such hypotheses as absolute chance1 for it declares that if their assumption is not quite indispensable1 we must cut them off4 ,now it either is or is not a fact that the formal is objective and subjective at once4 ,it cannot be untrue in my philosophy while it is true in ,mr4 ,peirce's system4 ,my proposition of the formal being at once objective and subjective is1 according to ,mr4 ,peirce1 8cut off by ,occam's razor40 8,but10 adds he1 8when synechism has united the two worlds this view gains new life40 ,so long as ,i say so1 it is wrong2 but should ,i adopt ,mr4 ,peirce's system1 it will pass as right4 #e4 ,,the ,,application ,,of ,,learning4 ,philosophers should make it a rule not to encumber their thoughts unnecessarily with learning4 ,the great problems of philosophy are1 in my opinion1 much simpler than they are generally supposed to be4 ,the art mainly consists in stating them in the simplest possible manner4 ,it is indispensable for a philosopher to be familiar1 at least in a general way1 with all the most important sciences1 especially with psychology1 physiology1 logic1 physics1 mathematics1 and mechanics4 ,but he should not for that reason introduce any more than he can help their complicated details into his expositions4 ,every specialist is inclined to look at things through the spectacles of his own speciality4 ,but the philosopher who takes a higher standpoint should be on his guard4 ,he should always endeavor to simplify matters and avoid introducing into philosophy issues which belong to a special field1 and derive their peculiarities from special conditions4 ,to confound the methods of the various sciences1 or to generalise without sufficient discrimination1 will throw everything into confusion4 ,mr4 ,peirce1 as we well know1 has greatly distinguished himself in logic by valuable discoveries and independent investigations4 ,we have repeatedly taken occasion to pronounce unreservedly our admiration of his achievements in this field4 ,but we cannot approve of his application of certain methods of his speciality to philosophy in general4 ,mr4 ,peirce is inclined to look at the world through the spectacles of that new and extremely specialised branch of logic which he is at present about to invent4 ,one hindrance to properly appreciating his doctrines1 says ,mr4 ,peirce1 lies in my 8laboring under the great disadvantage of not understanding the logic of relatives10 which1 he adds 7p4 #ecc73 8,is a subject ,i have been studying for a great many years1 and ,i feel and know that ,i have an important report that ,i ought to make upon it4 ,this branch of logic is1 however1 so abstruse that ,i have never been able to find the leisure to translate my conclusions into a form in which their significance would be manifest even to powerful thinkers1 whose thoughts had not long been turned in that direction40 ,i shall be glad to sit at ,mr4 ,peirce's feet as an attentive student1 as soon as he has worked out his logic of relatives1 or any other subject4 ,but ,i cannot now accept any of his theories on the credit of some half-developed science1 be it ever so profound or intricate1 until ,i see plainly its connection with the present issues4 ,mr4 ,peirce trusts that his favorite ideas will find support in his peculiar conception of the logic of relatives4 ,judging from the quiddities which he now so confidently propounds as weighty arguments1 we cannot share his sanguine hopes4 ,his arguments1 to be derived from the logic of relatives1 are like promises to pay out of the returns of a gold-mine1 just discovered and boomed by the owners4 ,there may be gold in the mine1 but ,i do not as yet take any stock in it4 ,mr4 ,peirce promises to prove by the logic of relatives what1 if it were true1 he should be able to demonstrate in plain language4 ,i have an idea that the logic of relatives can be worked out into as clear a science as is mathematics or algebra4 ,but what shall we say when told that the logic of relatives is really abstruse1 and that he who labors under the disadvantage of not understanding this abstruse science is not prepared to grasp ,mr4 ,peirce's philosophy8 ,the abstrusity1 in my mind1 counts against ,mr4 ,peirce's philosophy1 as much as against his logic of relatives4 ,in my childhood ,i was much plagued with ,latin1 but as soon as ,i had acquired a smattering of it1 ,i began to talk ,latin to the servants1 and when they did not understand me ,i thought that they were 8laboring under the great disadvantage0 of not speaking ,latin4 ,since then ,i have learned to translate my ,latin into the language of the people with whom ,i have to deal4 ,mr4 ,peirce seems to rely on his learning in proportion to its abstrusity2 he likes to walk on stilts4 ,mr4 ,peirce is scholarly to excess4 ,he has a special talent of rendering issues involved4 ,not even his references to my articles in ,the ,monist are made directly by quoting the pages on which they appear4 ,that method would be too common4 ,he invents a ponderous system1 necessitating the reader to look twice when he wishes to find a passage1--a scheme which is original and very dignified in appearance1 but makes quotation unnecessarily complicated4 ,learning is a virtue1 but even virtues should be used with discretion4 #f4 ,,the ,,principle ,,of ,,positivism4 ,says ,mr4 ,peirce in confirmation of ,whewell 7p4 #edf73 8,progress in science depends upon the observation of the right facts by minds furnished with appropriate ideas40 ,to rely on the observation of facts is1 in my opinion1 a principle of positivism4 ,that facts must be observed 8by minds furnished with appropriate ideas0 is undeniable1 but ideas1 in order to be appropriate1 must be true2 they must be representations of facts4 ,because he relies on facts ,i have characterised ,mr4 ,peirce's method as positivistic4 ,but he indignantly repudiates 8the charge0 as 8totally unfounded40 ,positivism 7which ,i have always carefully distinguished from ,comtism1 the latter being a special kind of positivism#abh7 is not a peculiar philosophy1 but a most important principle of science4 ,mr4 ,peirce seems to use the term positivism in a different sense from that in which ,i use it4 ,be it so4 ,i shall not nominalistically quarrel about words so long as there are more urgent subjects under discussion4 ,noticing that ,mr4 ,peirce does not state that all ideas should be ultimately reducible to facts1 he is to be acquitted4 #g4 ,,lopping ,,off ,,the ,,absolute4 ,mr4 ,peirce thinks that an agreement between us could be arrived at4 ,he says 7p4 #ede73 8,dr4 ,carus's philosophy would1 in its general features1 offer no violent opposition to my opinions0 7 #af74 ,but the condition is 7p4 #ede73 8,to lop off the heads of all absolute propositions whose subject is not the ,absolute40 ,as a matter of fact ,i have lopped off all absolutes4 ,if ,mr4 ,peirce were more familiar with my views he would have known that4 ,thus1 on my part1 ,i had done all ,i could to come to an agreement with him long before he asked me to do it4 ,but ,i fear that having also lopped off the ,absolute itself1 ,i did too much of a good thing1 for ,mr4 ,peirce carefully records his opposition to all philosophies which deny the reality of the ,absolute4 7,see #ah47 ,i wish to improve this occasion for conciliation1 by turning the tables4 ,mr4 ,peirce's views would1 upon the whole1 offer no violent opposition to my opinions if he would only consent to lop off the absolute-property of his absolute chance4 ,i would even swallow his ,absolute if he would promise to designate by that name some real quality of the world1 or the world itself as a whole1 or something that is thinkable without making one's head swim4#abi ,every predication of absolute1 changes a real and useful idea into its caricature4 ,to1 say that a complicated calculation is 8absolutely true10 that is1 true without stipulating the condition that the methods are right1 and that the execution is made without any mistake1 is ridiculous2 and thus the phrase 8in a ,pickwickian sense0 7which we gratefully borrow from ,mr4 ,peirce7 would always form a drastic but adequate substitute for the term absolute4 8,absolutely true0 is 8true in a ,pickwickian sense0 only4 ,there are no absolute truths which are in this sense unconditionally true4 ,in the same way1 8absolute chance0 is different from that real chance known to us in experience and instanced by the throw of the dice4 ,absolute chance is 8chance in a ,pickwickian sense40 ,strange ,mr4 ,peirce speaks of real chance when he means an imaginary absolute chance4 ,he apparently uses the word 8real0 in this connection not to denote something that is a fact of experience but to express the idea of its being perfect or complete4 ,thus we may speak of a 8real0 perpetual motion1 stating at the same time that it is neither real nor realisable4 #h4 ,,the ,,theory ,,of ,,probable ,,inference4 ,mr4 ,peirce applies his theory of probable inference to everything2 also to those cases which are unequivocally determined4 ,he granted in a private conversation that #b #b #d admits of no exception4 ,but of other purely formal statements which are in the same predicament1 for instance1 that the sum of the angles of a triangle in a plane measures #ahj1 he states as probable that they are either somewhat less or somewhat more than #ahj1 adding1 8that they are exactly that amount is what nobody can ever be justified in concluding40 ,to determine the sum of the angles of a plane triangle by measuring the parallaxes of stars rests upon a fundamental misconception of the principles of formal sciences4 ,it would be consistent for ,mr4 ,peirce to say1 that #b #b #d is true only according to the definitions or axioms of arithmetic4 ,but in order to know whether #b #b #d in reality1 we ought to apply the theory of probable inference4 ,until we had verified the statement #b #b #d by applying this formula to the farthest solar systems1 we should not be justified in concluding that it is exactly true4 ,the theory of probable inferences is supposed to help us out of this perplexity1 8and within another century our grandchildren will surely know whether the three angles of a triangle are greater or less than #ahj40acj ,there is always danger in the application of abstract ratiocination2 and the theory of probable inference forms no exception to the rule4 ,on the contrary1 it is especially liable to lead one astray4 ,there is the case of the doctor who said to his patient3 8,i am sure you will be cured1 for ,i had ninety-nine patients who died during the operation1 and statistics prove beyond doubt that one among a hundred will survive it4 ,you are the hundredth40 ,the theory of probable inferences is often misapplied1 but can it be worse misapplied than by introducing it into the province of that which is certain8 ,there is no sense in applying the theory of probabilities to what is certain4 ,we may doubt whether the rays of light travel in exactly straight lines1 but we cannot doubt the straightness of lines in plane geometry4 ,we cannot doubt that all the radii in a circle are equal1 or that the sum of the angles of a ,euclidean triangle are #ahj4 #i4 ,,zweideutig ,,bestimmt4 ,mr4 ,peirce very kindly informs me that the term eindeutig bestimmt is a translation of a ,french phrase4 ,very well1 ,i do not deny it4 ,i know very well that the phrase has a long history1 but ,i do not consider myself bound to present the whole pedigree of every term ,i use4 ,does ,mr4 ,peirce perhaps suppose that the ,french phrase is the original8 ,if we have to go back to the original beginning at all1 why does he not tell us that the ,french univoque is a translation from the medival ,latin univoce1 which was coined and used by the schoolmen in opposition to quivoce4 ,neither the term eindeutig1 as ,mr4 ,peirce asserts1 nor its scholastic original univoce1 is an exclusively mathematical expression4 ,although the term eindeutig is a translation of the ,french univoque1 there is after all a great difference between the ,french term and the ,german term1 and ,i have a good reason to prefer the ,german expression4 ,the ,french term is nominalistic or even vocalistic1 the ,german one is realistic4 ,univoque and univocal mean that there is only one name or one vox1 while eindeutig lays no stress on the name but on the meaning of the name1 denoting that which admits of but one interpretation4 ,this is a sufficient reason for me to prefer it1 and it ought to appeal to ,mr4 ,peirce's realistic mind4#aca ,mr4 ,peirce1 maintaining that eindeutig bestimmt is only a mathematical term1 adduces two equations1 each one of which1 taken singly1 admits1 he says1 of two possible determinations4#acb ,mr4 ,peirce uses these equations as an argument against my application of the term1 adding1 sarcastically3 8,this shows how much that argument amounts to40 ,but his example proves at best only that there are incomplete determinations2 some problems allow of several solutions4 ,in a ,german township in which blue hussars are garrisoned1 children used to propose to another this profound problem3 8,it lies under a plum-tree and is blue2 what is it80 ,if the child questioned argues1 8,it is a plum10 he is corrected 8,no1 it is a hussar40 ,but if he argues1 8,it is a hussar10 he is corrected1 8,no1 it is a plum40 ,so he has no chance of guessing right4 ,the result of ,mr4 ,peirce's first equation1 which may be either #aadgg or #aaebc1 is like the conundrum of the plum-tree3 it amounts to the same1 viz4 to nothing1 and proves only that there are determinations which are zweideutig bestimmt4 #aj4 ,,explanation4 ,the differences of method become very serious when we disagree on the very meaning of 8explanation0 itself4 ,how can two debaters accept or reject one another's arguments1 if their ideas of explanation are radically different8 ,mr4 ,peirce's definition of the term 8explanation0 appears to me very unsatisfactory4 ,he says 7p4 #eg73 8,i cannot admit that explanation is description of the fact explained4 ,it is true that in the setting forth of some explanations it is convenient to restate the fact explained so as to set it under another aspect1 but even in these cases the statement of other facts is essential4 767 ,in all cases it is other facts1 767 usually hypothetical1 which constitute the explanation2 767 and the process of explaining is a process by which from those other facts the fact to be explained is shown to follow as a consequence by virtue of a general principle or otherwise40 8,to explain a fact is to show that it is a necessary or at least a probable result from another fact 767 known or supposed40 ,my definition of 8explanation10 as a description in which the process described is recognised as a transformation is sneered at4 ,says ,mr4 ,peirce 7p4 #eeh73 8,a magician transforms a watch into a dove4 ,recognise it as a transformation and the trick is explained1 is it8 ,this is delightfully facile40 ,indeed1 the magician's trick is explained as soon as we know all the changes that have taken place4 ,take the whole number of objects handled by the magician1 those which he shows and those which he conceals4 ,let us observe how he hides the watch and how he produces the dove1 and the trick is explained4 ,is it not8 ,explanation is1 as the word suggests1 a making plain1 so that we can look over the whole field before us1 and leave nothing hidden from sight4 ,this whole field1 the survey of which is needed for the recognition of the transformation1 is called the system of the explanation4 ,after we have seen how the changes take place1 and after we have described in exact formulas their modes of action1 our desire for explanation is completely satisfied4 ,the instances adduced by ,mr4 ,peirce prove plainly that his objections cannot be maintained4 ,every one of them is an instance of transformation 7with the exception of the emerald vest1 which1 however1 is not stated with sufficient completeness74 ,take1 for instance1 the following example adduced by ,mr4 ,peirce 7p4 #eeg73 8,a #8special process of nature1' calling for explanation1 is the circumstance that the planet ,mars1 while moving in a general way from west to east among the fixed stars1 yet retrogrades a part of the time1 so as to describe loops in the heavens4 ,the explanation is1 that ,mars revolves in one approximate circle and we in another40 ,can any one deny that this explanation is a description8 ,we draw the two orbits as correctly as possible for the required demonstration and combine the points representing the earth with those representing ,mars at their successive positions4 ,considering the fact that we do not perceive the motion of the earth1 we have to construct a diagram in which the directions of these lines are described as viewed from a stationary point4 ,this is a description of changes that take place4 ,it is a portrayal of the transpositions of two bodies1 and the appearance which the change of this relation presents to one of them4 ,mr4 ,peirce has neither the grace nor good-will to1 understand my proposition1 that explanation is always a tracing of form4 ,he says 7p4 #eeh73 8,forms may indulge in whatever eccentricities they please1 in the world of dreams1 without responsibility40 ,in the world of dreams1 yes6 ,but not in the world of reality4 ,and even the irresponsible eccentricities of dreams take place according to law4 ,feeling that he mistakes my position1 ,mr4 ,peirce adds3 8,should ,dr4 ,carus reply that ,i mistake his meaning1 that it is only #8being in general' 7 #ff71 that he holds unaccountable1 ,i reply that this is simply expressing scepticism as to the possibility and need of philosophy40 7,p4 #eeh47 ,of course1 ,i mean 8being in general40 ,as to the scepticism imputed to me1 ,i answer1 that any attempt at explaining how matter and energy1 which ,i take to be eternal1 came into being1 is a wrongly formulated problem4 ,mr4 ,peirce might as well call me a sceptic1 because ,i recognise that we cannot square the circle4 7,compare 8,fundamental ,problems10 #b;d ed41 pp4 #bhc-bhe and #bia47 ,mr4 ,peirce's gravest mistake is his belief that 8,in all cases it is other facts which constitute the explanation40 7,p4 #eeg47 ,the practical application of this mistake becomes fatal to his philosophy4 ,it is by no means necessary to pass beyond that system of facts which contains the phenomenon to be explained4 ,we must1 as a matter of course1 keep completing the facts of a phenomenon until we have acquired a survey of what we call the whole system of the facts1 but we have never to resort to other facts4 ,we are confronted every day with hundreds of facts of which we never see the whole system to which they belong1 but we readily supply these deficiencies from the stock of our experience4 ,we refer the unknown to the known4 ,the single case under observation is referred to something with which we are familiar4 ,those systems of explanation which are known to us serve as patterns for others that are only partially known1 and we fill out1 with their assistance1 the gaps of our observation4 ,the readiness and reliability of our explanation thus depends upon the stock of knowledge we have4 ,the more we know1 the easier shall we conquer the unknown2 the more incomplete our knowledge is1 the greater the number of hypothetical facts that will have to be introduced2 and this always weakens the reliability of our explanations4 ,hypothetical facts should be introduced only in cases of urgent necessity4 ,however1 if they are admitted at all1 they have to be thought of as parts of the system under investigation1 for they have been invented only because we are compelled to assume that without them it would be incomplete4 ,mr4 ,peirce adduces the following example to prove that 8other facts0 are required in an explanation3 8,it has been stated that a warm spring in ,europe is usually followed by a cool autumn1 and the explanation has been offered that so many more icebergs than usual are liberated during a warm spring1 that they subsequently lower sensibly the temperature of ,europe4 ,i care little whether the fact and the explanation are correct or no4 ,the case illustrates1 at any rate1 my point that an explanation is a special fact1 supposed or known1 from which the fact to be explained follows as a consequence40 7,p4 #eeg47 ,when1 as in this instance1 we recognise that one fact is the necessary result of another fact1 we view them both as parts of one set or system of facts in which a transformation is taking place1 and1 unless we see the connection of the two facts as constituting one process of transformation1 we cannot say that the problem is explained4 ,when we observe changes which are the results of transformations taking place beyond the horizon of our knowledge1 we are1 as a matter of course1 unable to give an explanation4 ,mr4 ,peirce had perhaps in mind a special and more complex kind of explanation1 which we define as 8comprehension40 ,he says 7p4 #eeg73 8,the fact to be explained is shown to follow as a consequence1 by virtue of a general principle or otherwise40 ,take as an instance the law of gravitation4 ,there are the facts of falling stones and the motions of celestial bodies4 ,both sets of facts are explained1 according to ,mr4 ,peirce1 8by virtue of a general principle10 i4 e4 gravitation1 while we say1 both sets of facts are comprehended under a common formula4 ,mr4 ,peirce's conception of 8explanation0 rests on the antiquated view that gravitation is a principle behind the gravitating masses which compels the stone to fall4 ,gravitation1 however1 is not 8another fact0 foreign to the facts under consideration4 ,it is not a principle called in from the outside4 ,on the contrary1 it is the essence and extract of the very facts that are to be explained4 ,principles which have not been derived either from the facts to be explained1 or from the additional facts which belong to their system1 do not and cannot explain the phenomena4 99 99 99 99 99 ,comprehension is1 as it were1 an explanation of a higher degree4 ,the term means a grasping together1 and it actually consists in viewing two or several facts in such a way as to recognise their common features4 ,comprehension is a reduction of our patterns of explanation2 it unites two or several of them in one formula4 ,for instance1 it has been observed that certain objects float in water while others sink to the bottom4 ,the observations do not seem to agree1 they present two incoherent facts4 ,when we find out that the weight of a floating body is equal to the weight of water which it displaces1 we understand at once why bodies whose specific gravity is greater than water sink while those of a lighter specific gravity float4 ,comprehension1 in this as in every other case1 is the description of a process which comprises all the facts that belong to a special class in a common formula4 ,the description must be applicable to all single cases however different they may be4 ,this conception of comprehension has a great advantage over ,mr4 ,peirce's view4 ,while he has to bring in some 8other fact0 from the outside1 we need not introduce any foreign element4 ,comprehension1 as we understand it1 can rise from the statement of particular facts to more and more general formulations1 until finally we arrive at universal laws4 ,all the laws thus formulated to satisfy our cravings for comprehension1 are found to belong to one great system of laws1 and our scientists are constantly engaged not only in widening the range of our experience by new discoveries1 but also in revising our statements of the uniformities of nature and1 where they appear to be in collision1 in bringing them into harmony4 ,this conception of comprehension is monistic1 ,mr4 ,peirce's is dualistic4 ,we need not1 in order to explain the facts of existence1 go beyond them into a supernatural realm4 ,mr4 ,peirce must go outside of the world into non-existence when he attempts to understand the world by the principles of his philosophy4 ,it is very doubtful whether explanations1 the 8essential0 nature of which is to consist of 8other facts usually hypothetical10 will be satisfactory to anybody except himself4 ,otherness makes any fact unfit to serve as a factor of an explanation and indeed ,i cannot think of any instance1 real or imaginary1 in which the explanatory facts1 be they real or hypothetical1 do not form parts of the system under consideration4 ,there is only one instance to which ,mr4 ,peirce's method of explanation has been applied1 and ,i am under the impression that it has been invented solely for this purpose4 ,mr4 ,peirce's philosophy is too original to be explained by the usual methods2 it must have an original method of its own4 ,in order to explain 8law0 ,mr4 ,peirce calls in 8chance40 ,his explanation must be an 8other fact0 and the only fact different from law is not-law1 lawlessness1 or absolute chance4 ,according to my idea of explanation1 law can never be explained by chance4 ,according to ,mr4 ,peirce1 it is the only possible thing that can be called in as that 8other fact0 which is supposed to be the essential constituent of an explanation4 ,if ,mr4 ,peirce's method of explanation were sound1 we should have to explain order from chaos1 possibility from impossibility1 and sense from nonsense4 ,,ii4 ,,mr4 ,,peirce',s ,,philosophy4 ,mr4 ,peirce's constant references to scholastic philosophy remind me of happy years long past when ,i was extremely interested in the theories of such men as ,thomas ,aquinas1 ,duns ,scotus1 ,occam1 ,abelard1 ,tauler1 and others4 ,together with my chum1 now a sober ,professor of physics at a ,german ,university1 ,i freely indulged in the construction of various world-theories1 which1 alas6 were quickly overthrown one after another by the slightest puff of wind4 ,i have not lost my interest in the schoolmen1 but it is considerably weakened4 ,mr4 ,peirce's repeated praise of scholastic realism and his condemnation of any theory that he brands as nominalistic1 seems to me like the method of some of our politicians who1 eager to revive toryism1 should censure all evils of the politics of to-day as whiggish4 ,this comparison is not exaggerated1 for there are a few ,hamiltonians who miss the refining influence of an aristocratic class and regret that the historical tradition of toryism has been so completely broken4 ,i would not deny that there is some truth in it1 and there is some truth1 too1 in medival realism1 which has been neglected by the1 first violently suppressed and then triumphant1 nominalism4 ,but in reviving realism the ,scotists should be very careful to avoid a resurrection of its errors4 #a4 ,,duns ,,scotus ,,as ,a ,,philosophical ,,patron ,,saint4 ,johannes ,duns ,scotus1 a ,franciscan1 honored since his successful defense of the ,blessed ,virgin's ,immaculate ,conception by the title ,doctor ,subtilis1 and the very same man after whom1 on account of the narrowness of his later disciples during the time of the ,reformation1 a blockhead is to-day called a dunce1 was one of the most characteristic figures of scholastic philosophy4 ,he lived at the end of the thirteenth ,century when the authority of the philosophy of ,thomas ,aquinas who had died ,march #gth1 #abgd1 was all but universally recognised4 ,scotus appeared as the most powerful opponent of ,thomas4 ,ingenious1 original1 bold1 and buoyant in his attacks he had a short but brilliant career and died comparatively young at ,cologne1 in ,november1 #acjh4 ,while ,thomas1 surnamed ,dr4 ,universalis1 or ,dr4 ,angelicus1 is regarded by his order1 the ,dominicans1 as the greatest authority in philosophical matters1 ,scotus succeeded in impressing his mode of thought upon the ,franciscans2 yet ,thomas is universally regarded in the ,roman church and also among ,protestant theologians as the more orthodox ,christian4 ,almost all the ideas of ,scotus were set forth in opposition to the views of others and mainly of ,thomas4 ,thomas was a determinist1 ,scotus an outspoken indeterminist4 ,thomas says that man's action is necessarily determined by what he thinks is best4 ,scotus avers that man thinks in a certain way because he wills in a certain way4 ,man's ideas are fashioned to suit his character4 ,his motto is1 8voluntas superior est intellectu0 and his idea of will is identified with the indetermined arbitrariness of a perfect liberum arbitrium4 ,according to ,thomas1 ,god commands us to do the good because it is good4 ,scotus calls good that which ,god commands simply because ,god commands it4 ,the will of ,god1 like the will of man is1 in ,scotus's opinion1 undetermined1 it is arbitrary4 ,thus ,god created the world not because his will was determined by some motive1 but because it so pleased him2 and ,christ's passion and death were not really an atonement2 they simply were accepted as such by ,god4 ,without entering into this controversy of anno olim we might say that we side neither with ,thomas nor with ,scotus1 but would modify the statement of the former by the criticism of the latter4 ,thomas goes too far when he says that whatever is recognised as the best will of necessity be done4 ,he overlooks the power of passions4 ,thomas's statement would be right1 if every passion were regarded as a will which has its own and independent but mistaken ideas about good4 ,a soul whose passions are more powerful than rational considerations will necessarily be inclined to obey its irrational impulses4 ,there is something in ,scotus's criticism1 but his view is no improvement4 ,in speaking of will as superior to the intellect1 did he ever ask himself the question1 ,what his own will would be independent of his intellect8 ,further1 when ,god is said to command the good because it is good1 ,thomas separates in a logical consideration two ideas which are identical4 ,scotus is right in defining good as the will of ,god4 ,from our standpoint we should say1 the will of ,god1 viz41 the moral order of the universe1 is of a definite kind which can be ascertained by experience4 ,to speak of the will of ,god as good is an anthropomorphic expression4 ,good is that which agrees with the will of ,god2 bad1 that which opposes it4 ,suppose the moral order of the universe were different1 goodness and badness would change with it4 ,we have sketched the views of ,scotus only to show the points of contact between him and ,mr4 ,peirce4 ,mr4 ,peirce is also an outspoken indeterminist4 ,he identifies feeling with chance1 and his free will is a liberum arbitrium4 ,mr4 ,peirce1 like ,scotus1 also separates theology1 and1 with it1 religion1 from philosophy4#acc ,scotus ridicules those who confound both1 clearly indicating that he is aiming at ,thomas1 to whose fervent faith their conciliation was a matter of momentous and all important consequence4 ,scotus goes so far as to aver that something might be true in philosophy which is wrong in theology 7see ,ed4 8,wadding0 ,fol4 #d1 p4 #hdh7--;a statement that to an honest searcher for truth must almost appear as frivolous4#acd ,how much more imbued with true religiosity was his great namesake ,john ,scotus ,erigena the venerable founder of scholasticism when saying3 8,non est alia philosophia1 i4 e4 sapientiae stadium1 et alia religio40 #b4 ,,mr4 ,,peirce',s ,,original ,,theories4 ,mr4 ,peirce as a controversalist and critic is like ,scotus1 brilliant1 versatile1 and powerful4 ,but he is more2 he is also constructive4 ,mr4 ,peirce's style of architecture reminds us of neo-,platonism1 and this is quite in harmony with ,scotism1 for ,scotus1 through ,avicebron1 derived many of his ideas from the ,neo-,platonists4 ,mr4 ,peirce proposes a modern view of emanation1 which starts the world from that of nothingness which at the same time is the womb of all existence4 ,the primeval state of being1 says ,mr4 ,peirce1 8,was mere nothing from a physical aspect10 but1 if it was not really nothing1 what1 then1 was it8 ,it was chance4 ,here lies the essential difference between ,mr4 ,peirce and the neo-,platonists4 ,the neo-,platonists 7whose speculations1 if they are treated not as philosophy1 but as poetical effusions1 are very profound and thoughtful7 look to the ,logos1 or world-reason1 as the beginning of the world emanation1 while ,mr4 ,peirce shows a certain contempt for reason4 ,to the neo-,platonist1 reasons are explanations1 while to our modern ,scotist1 reasons explain nothing4 ,he says3 8,reasons explain nothing1 except upon some theistic hypothesis which may be pardoned to the yearning heart of man1 but must be doubtful in the eyes of philosophy44440 7,p4 #efg47 ,mr4 ,peirce goes so far as to speak of 8the dullness of ratiocination's self40 ,mr4 ,peirce's gospel would deviate in the very first verse from that of ,st4 ,john1 for it would read 4--,in the ,beginning was ,chance6 ,and this chance which was in the beginning actually is1 to ,mr4 ,peirce1 ,god1 a personal ,god1 an anthropomorphic deity endowed with consciousness4 ,he says3 8,that primeval chaos in which there was no regularity was mere nothing from a physical aspect4 ,yet it was not a blank zero2 for there was an intensity of consciousness there1 in comparison with which all that we ever feel is but as the struggling of a molecule or two to throw off a little of the force of law to an endless and innumerable diversity of chance utterly unlimited40 7,the ,monist1 ,vol4 ,,iii1 ,no4 #a1 p4 #ai47 ,and in another passage he says of chance3 8,that it is a being living and conscious is what all the dullness that belongs to ratiocination's self can scarce muster hardihood to deny40 7,p4 #efj47 ,mr4 ,peirce's argument that all the dullness that belongs to ratiocination's self can scarcely muster hardihood to deny his proposition1 sounds strange in the mouth of a scientist4 ,but it is not strange2 for ,i have found that enthusiastic defenders of improbable theories always fill the holes of their argumentation with abuse of those who dare to discover these holes4 ,call a person who doubts the truth of your statements dull1 and you will frighten many a weak mind into a patient acceptance of your view4 ,we may rest assured that whenever a philosopher scolds he is at his wit's end4 ,for why should he lose patience if he can prove his proposition8 ,thus diatribes are always symptoms that there is some flaw in one's logic and the louder one chides the sorer is the spot4 ,mr4 ,peirce is serious in the statement that chance is a conscious being4 ,he actually identifies chance and feeling4 ,he says3 8,chance is but the outward aspect of that which within itself is feeling40 ,the primordial chance1 the existence of which1 according to ,mr4 ,peirce1 8calls for no explanation10 has 8a primordial habit-taking tendency40 ,whence this tendency gets into the universe of absolute chance1 ,mr4 ,peirce is unable to disclose4 ,the deviations from the mechanical order in the present course of things1 which1 by the by1 are by no means proved1 suggest to him and justify1 in his opinion1 this assumption4 ,thus1 assumes he1 primordial chance ceased to be chance2 it changed by a gradual habit-taking into regularities4 ,consciousness ceased to be consciousness and became crystallised into natural laws4 ,mind ceased to be an arbitrary sporting1 and by becoming effete it begot1 through a summation of minute effects1 this material universe of ours4 ,accordingly1 real existence or thing-ness consists merely in the regularities thus produced1 and 8physical events are but the degraded 444 forms of psychical events40 ,this is in brief ,mr4 ,peirce's cosmogony1 which1 as the prophet of ,tychism1 he reveals to us in axiomatic aphorisms4 ,by gradual habit-taking1 ,mr4 ,peirce declares 7,the ,monist1 ,vol4 ,i1 ,no4 #b1 p4 #agf71 mind will at last be 8crystallised in the infinitely distant future40 ,this rather sad outlook is1 in another passage1 modified by a counter-oracle1 which announces that 8an element of pure chance survives40 ,why1 he does not say4 ,irregularities1 not being entirely suppressed1 can increase again1 and as such they are 8undeveloped forms of psychical events40 ,says ,mr4 ,peirce 7,the ,monist1 ,vol4 ,,iii1 ,no4 #a1 p4 #ah73 8,there are almost insensible fortuitous departures from regularity2 these will produce1 in general1 equally minute effects4444 ,protoplasm is in an excessively unstable condition4444 ,in the protoplasm these habits are to some slight extent broken up1 so that1 according to the law of mind1 444 feeling becomes intensified4 8,this breaking up of habit and renewed fortuitous spontaneity will1 according to the law of mind1 be accompanied by an intensification of feeling40 ,this is the gist of ,mr4 ,peirce's mental philosophy1 which proclaims that 8consciousness is not to be reinstated without tychism40 ,the reappearance of chance is said to explain the origin of mind6 ,our conception of mind is different4 ,we see mind develop out of sentiency by the recognition of the regularities of the surrounding world4 ,reason is almost a synonym of man's ability to form generalisations1 of his having and operating with concepts1 of his thinking ideas4 ,not the arbitrariness of a wilful mind is the properly mental of man's soul1 but his reason2 and man's reason originates under the influence of the uniformities of the surrounding world1 which impress themselves1 in what we call experience1 upon his existence4 ,the more a creature recognises the regularities of existence1 and the more its soul becomes an image of this world-order1 which is the prototype of his reason1 of the divine ,logos1 the higher it rises in the scale of evolution4 ,if chance1 as ,mr4 ,peirce declares1 is but the outward aspect of that which within is feeling1 we should henceforth have to look upon the roulette and dice as sentient beings4 #c4 ,,the ,,four ,,positive ,,arguments ,,of ,,tychism ,,insufficient4 ,mr4 ,peirce adduces four positive arguments for believing in absolute chance4 ,they are3 7#a7 the prevalence of growth2 7#b7 the variety of the universe2 7#c7 the necessity of explaining law2 and 7#d7 the existence of feeling4 ,by growth1 ,mr4 ,peirce does not understand the growth of crystals1 or trees1 or organisms4 ,that kind of growth is a mere transformation4 ,mr4 ,peirce's idea of 8real0 growth is 8opposed to the conservation of energy40 ,it is not an increase of the thing growing through the assimilation of substances taken from the surrounding world2 it is an actual increase of energy1 not a mere change2 it is a growth of the universe itself4 ,granted the possibility of this so-called 8real0 growth1 and we can easily explain the evolution of the world out of the tiniest beginning4 ,but1 of course1 one thing has to go3 either the conservation of energy or 8real growth40 ,mr4 ,peirce lets go the former1 ,i the latter4#ace ,the variety of the universe is1 in my world-conception1 sufficiently explained by the variety of forms1 for form is indeed the principium individuationis2 a doctrine1 which1 but for ,mr4 ,peirce's philosophy1 ,i should regard as almost universally accepted4 ,among its advocates we find also ,mr4 ,peirce's great master1 ,duns ,scotus1 and ,scotus's teacher1 ,avicebron4 ,in so far as various formations are possible1 7exactly as the die can show six different surfaces17 chance plays an important part in the diversification of nature1 but this chance is not to be thought of as a violation of the law1 but appears to be a special case only1 and a true manifestation of the law under complicated conditions4 ,chance and probability are not mere subjective ideas1 creatures of our ignorance1 playing a rle simply in our limited knowledge of the world4 ,the words signify a certain condition of objective existence4 ,for instance1 the probability of throwing #a with one die is #a_/f4 ,this means1 the die is so constructed that it can show six different positions1 one among them being #a2 and these six possibilities are as real a quality of the die1 as its weight or its color4 ,the die has six possible positions4 ,now ,i take a die and throw #c4 ,are we not entitled to believe that the throw was sufficiently determined by all the innumerable conditions which accompany the act8 ,we confidently think so1 and feel no need of assuming any absolute chance4 ,now ,i throw again4 ,what is now the probability of throwing #a8 ,we answer again1 #a_/f4 ,and1 lo6 there it is6 ,it came at the second throw1 and we ask1 was our statement of the probabilities wrong8 ,we say1 no6 it was not wrong1 for it remains true even now4 ,the statement does not mean that we shall throw a #a at each sixth throw1 but that 7supposing the die to be perfect7 #a_/f among all the possible throws will be #a1 so that supposing all the possible throws realised in an infinite series of throws1 the average number of #a's among them will be the one-sixth part of the whole4 ,the enormous importance of chance 7viz41 of that real chance which is no violation of the law7 has been recognised since ,democritus and has received a fresh illustration from the investigations of ,darwin1 which ,i need not here recapitulate4 ,the theory of probabilities teaches1 that whatever can happen in the long course of an infinite number of events1 actually will happen1 and that whatever1 according to the nature of things1 has a greater probability1 will in an infinite number of cases occur with proportionately greater frequency4 ,the lesson which we have to draw from this statement is1 that that which we wish not to happen1 should be made impossible4 ,and this can be done1 perhaps not perfectly1 but approximately4 ,according to ,mr4 ,peirce1 the evolution of mind is due to the reappearance of chance2 we say that the evolution of mind is marked by man's increasing power in the restriction of chance4 ,the identification of chance with feeling1 or even with mind1 is to me an idea so grotesque1 that ,i am inclined to regard it as a relic of gnostic speculations4 ,mr4 ,peirce1 instead of attempting to comprehend laws1 as we do1 seeks to trace their origin4 ,he tries to explain their existence by growth1 as if they were beings that evolve like the forms of planetary systems or the organisms of living creatures4 ,considering the fact that ,mr4 ,peirce is a realist only in name1 and that his philosophy is soaked with nominalistic traditions1 we should say 7and ,mr4 ,peirce will pardon me that ,i quote the expression from him7 that3 8,the puzzle for him is simply the usual difficulty that plagues nominalism when it finds itself confronted with a reality which has an element of generality40 ,the assumption of absolute chance might be used to account for any otherwise inexplicable event1 but ,mr4 ,peirce does not countenance this idea4 ,he warns us to be cautious in its use1 like the druggist who labels his poisons 8handle with care02 8,i only use chance10 he says1 8to give room for the development of law40 ,having used absolute chance to start the world with1 he dismisses it4 ,so ,fiesco discharges his negro after he has done his work3 8,der ,mohr hat seine ,schuldigkeit gethan1 der ,mohr kann gehen40 ,in my criticism of ,mr4 ,peirce's theory ,i said 7,the ,monist1 ,,ii1 p4 #egd73 8,how little1 after all1 we can escape the determinism of law as being a feature of the world1 will be seen from the fact that the explanation for the evolution of law is presented by ,mr4 ,peirce as being itself a law1 i4 e41 a formula describing a regularity supposed to obtain in facts40 ,mr4 ,peirce replies3 8,is there no difference between a law1 the essence of which is to be inviolable 444 and that mental law1 the violation of which is so included in the essence that unless it were violated1 it would cease to exist8444 ,thus ,i clearly escape the contradiction attributed to me40 7,p4 #efa47 ,mr4 ,peirce's escape is like the disappearance of a medium from a room without doors4 ,he must have got out through the fourth dimension4 ,the argument is so subtle that ,i cannot see it1 and ,i feel tempted to retort in a sentence quoted from my profound adversary3 8,i confess1 ,i can find only words without ideas in the objection40 7,p4 #efa47 ,mr4 ,peirce speaks of law as having developed out of chance1 but he himself1 in fact1 after a fashion1 explains the origin of those laws of nature which represent its present uniformities by a law of habit-taking4 ,that the conservation of energy should leave no room for feeling is to me an obscure proposition4 ,the law of the conservation of energy declares only that the sum of all energy in the world1 potential as well as kinetic1 remains constant4 ,if a living and feeling being renews its waste and stores up new energy in its tissues1 it must take it out of the general storehouse of nature2 it must transform it1 and cannot produce it out of nothing4 ,why should feeling become impossible1 if the conservation of energy is true8 ,the identification of chance with feeling is1 to my mind1 a vagary4 ,it is true that feeling develops mind2 mind makes deliberation possible1 and deliberation implies choice4 ,but choice is not chance4 ,the choice which a man makes is determined by his character4 ,there is more resemblance between logical identity and a pun1 than between feeling and chance4 #d4 ,,the ,,negative ,,argument ,a ,,logical ,,fallacy4 ,the four positive arguments for believing in absolute chance are untenable4 ,but ,mr4 ,peirce1 knowing that he had to weather a storm of criticisms1 has taken along a sheet-anchor1 consisting of a negative argument1 which1 if it were true1 would make the four positive arguments redundant4 ,what shall we say to the statement1 that chance need not be explained8 ,mr4 ,peirce says3 8,chance1 according to me1 or irregularity--that is1 the absence of any coincidence1--calls for no explanation4 ,if law calls for explanation1 as ,dr4 ,carus admits it does1 surely the mere absence of law calls for no further explanation than is afforded by the mere absence of any particular circumstance necessitating the result40 7,p4 #eei47 ,mr4 ,peirce is a great logician1 but the logical arguments of his philosophy are not sound4 ,if the absence of law1 of coincidences1 of regularities1 did not require explanation1 the scientist would 7as is but right7 still have to explain the uniformities of nature1 but the miracle monger would have a good time2 for he could tell us boldly that1 according to the rules of modern logic he is not bound to give any explanation4 ,it is true that while everything must be explained1 the absence of everything 7i4 e4 nothing7 need not be explained2 but we cannot use this pattern as a schedule which can be filled out at our pleasure4 ,the ideas 8absence of10 8no10 8no one10 and 8nothing0 play a part in logic analogous to that of zero in mathematics4 ,i need hardly remind the reader of the puzzling demonstration1 that since one cat has one tail more than no cat1 and since no cat has eight tails1 one cat must have nine tails4 ,operations with zero act like death in the realm of human conventionalities4 ,death makes the beggar equal to the king4 ,multiply any equation that is wrong with zero1 and it will be correct4 ,operations with zero render the impossible possible4 ,but let us look closer at ,mr4 ,peirce's proposition4 ,he avers that 8the mere absence of any particular circumstance necessitating the result calls for no explanation40 ,should it ever happen that the absence of any particular circumstance necessitates the result1 ,i do not see why this absence should remain unexplained4 ,say for instance1 a certain stronghold is taken because the enemy discovers the absence of guards in a certain part of the walls4 ,if this absence of guards be counted as an important circumstance helpful in the conquest of the citadel 7and there is no reason why we should not count it as such7 can we say that while the presence of guards on all other spots of the wall has to be and can be explained as an endeavor to secure the place against a coup de main1 the mere absence of guards calls for no explanation8 ,the absence of guards in a particular spot of the ,capitol during the siege by the ,gauls1 was accounted for by the steepness of the place4 ,this particular spot was regarded as safe on account of its inaccessibility4 ,similarly1 the absence of guards in the citadel of the ,messenians is explained by the idea that the ,spartans would make no attack because in that particularly stormy night a cloudburst seemed to prevent all approach4 ,obviously the necessity of explaining a rule1 does not confer the privilege of neglecting to explain its exceptions4 ,it goes without saying that ,mr4 ,peirce's argument 7even if it were formally faultless7 can have no force with a necessitarian4 ,such a one1 after having explained and proved to his satisfaction that ,gesetzmssigkeit 7or regularity such as can be formulated in laws7 is a characteristic feature of the universe1 is not only asked to believe that there are after all exceptions to law1 but is even told that according to some paragraph in ,mr4 ,peirce's unwritten logic of relatives no further argument is needed to prove the non-existence of law4 ,only ,mr4 ,peirce's extreme love of his pet theories can make him blind to such palpable fallacies4 ,but such are the foundations of his philosophical architecture4 ,,iii4 ,,mr4 ,,peirce ,,as ,a ,,critic4 ,a good general1 who has to mask the weak points of his position1 uses the strategem of making demonstrative sallies upon his enemy4 ,mr4 ,peirce1 although apparently quite unconscious of the fact that his basic doctrines are untenable1 instinctively imitates this maxim of warfare4 ,his defence is mostly aggressive4 ,instead of replying to my arguments he endeavors to represent my views as incohesive and contradictory4 ,the present issue is not whether my views are tenable1 but whether ,mr4 ,peirce's are4 ,however1 ,i am glad to have the benefit of the searching criticism of so subtle a thinker as ,mr4 ,peirce4 ,therefore1 ,i willingly appear before his tribunal to expurgate myself of his charges4 #a4 ,,the ,a ,,priori ,,and ,,positivism4 ,mr4 ,peirce is greatly puzzled with my position4 ,he quotes several statements of mine which appear to him contradictory4 ,i said3 7#a7 that millions of single experiences cannot establish a belief in necessity1 7#b7 that necessitarianism must be founded upon the a priori1 and 7#c7 that the a priori must be founded upon experience4#acf ,to him who overlooks the here italicised word 8single0 this may1 indeed1 seem to be a vicious circle4 ,all knowledge begins with experience4 ,we define experience as the effects of events upon sentient beings1 and these effects are sense-impressions of certain forms and interrelations4 ,at an advanced stage of evolution1 the formal and relational are first unconsciously1 as1 for instance1 in counting1 and then consciously1 with scientific deliberation1 abstracted from the sensory4 ,systems of pure forms are constructed out of the purely formal elements1 thus gained from experience by abstraction1 such as our system of numbers and the logical categories4 ,now the laws of these forms of thought are applicable to all formal and relational conditions of reality4 ,the formal and relational of reality are known to us even in those regions of the universe and in those provinces of scientific investigation which have not as yet been explored4 ,the scientist knows them a priori1 even before he investigates objects which he never saw before4 ,he is acquainted with certain of their qualities1 viz41 with the laws of their formal and relational conditions4 ,thus the a priori1 or1 as ,i prefer to call it1 formal thought1 is a product of experience1 and is again applicable to experience4 ,single experiences1 isolated observations1 innumerable particular cases cannot directly yield or reveal the laws of formal thought4 ,so long as they remain single and isolated they will never develop into mental factors2 but such is the nature of reality that the single experiences will be built up and arranged in feeling substance as systematically as1 for instance1 the formation of crystals or the harmonious growth of cells in organisms8 ,when sentient creatures become conscious not only of the sensory element of their experience1 but also of this system of their soul1 of the formal of their psychical existence1 they become rational beings2 and the formal which grows with their sentiency is not an exclusive and peculiar quality of theirs2 it is not purely subjective1 but it has been imparted to them1 piecemeal1 together with the single data of their experience4 ,it constitutes a part of their ,anschauung2 it is found in the objective world and is a general feature of reality4 ,out of the formal elements of our ,anschauungen1 of the facts of experience1 that organ of cognition is developed which ,kant calls 8pure reason40 ,experience is often used to denote sense-experience only2 thus ,kant contrasts experience or sense-perception1 which he calls a posteriori1 with pure reason and formal thought1 which he calls a priori4 ,we use experience in the sense defined above1 so as to include the formal element4 ,i am unable to form a clear conception of ,mr4 ,peirce's view of the a priori4 ,those systems of formal thought which ,i regard as constructions he regards as products of analysis4 ,he says1 8,they are results dependent upon the action of reason in the depths of our own consciousness40 ,he only grants that 8their abstract and distinct formulation comes very late40 ,he still holds that the a priori is innate4 ,in my conception1 mathematical ideas1 like that of the contrivance of logarithms1 are inventions2 and they are constructions as much as the invention of the steam-engine by ,james ,watt4 ,there is one peculiarity about the purely formal which is not found in the sensory elements of experience4 ,our knowledge of the various spheres of the purely formal is of a general nature2 it applies to any form of the same kind4 ,this gives system to our formal conceptions1 and enables us to make statements which are rigidly and unequivocally determined4 ,it is this quality which makes them available as an organ of cognition when dealing with facts of experience4 ,they furnish us with methods1 schedules of reference1 and plans which like blanks have to be filled out4 ,science begins with the application of formal thought1 viz41 with counting1 measuring1 and classifying4 ,only with the assistance of the formal sciences can we master the material of the sensory data of experience2 and thus it happens that the formal is the condition1 not of any kind of experience1 but of every systematic experience4 ,the formal sciences are the tools of cognition4 ,that to which they cannot be applied remains unexplained1 and this is the ultimate reason why processes of nature can be regarded as explained only when recognised as processes of transformation4 ,cognition is the tracing of form4 ,we can understand a change only if it is a change of form4 ,we cannot understand how anything real can disappear into1 or originate out of1 nothing4 ,we have no explanation for any actual increase or decrease either of matter or energy4 ,whenever we see something entirely new we regard it as a new combination1 the elements of which existed before4 ,if there were processes in the universe which could positively be proved not to be transformations we should be confronted with an unfathomable mystery2 and it is a matter of course that we must not be duped so easily by the appearance of problems which cannot be solved at first sight4 ,the advance of science which has resolved so many mysterious phenomena into plain instances of transformation gives us confidence that this method is the only reliable maxim of inquiry4 ,it has helped us so far1 and it will help us in the future4 99 99 99 99 99 ,i call my views positivism1 because like the ,french positivists and also like ,locke and his school ,i maintain that all knowledge is to be derived from the positive facts of experience4 ,but my positivism is not of the old kind2 it is neither sensationalism nor materialism nor ,comtism4 ,it is a new positivism broadened by a study of ,kantian philosophy and ,kant's problem of the a priori2 and this new positivism1 ,i hope1 deserves the attention of the thinkers of mankind4 ,mr4 ,peirce calls it a 8straddling of the question10 by which he means that a man is 8on both sides of the fence10 and has learned so to formulate the issues1 8that both parties can readily subscribe to his propositions40 #b4 ,,determinism ,,and ,,fatalism4 ,fatalism and determinism must not be confounded4 ,we define determinism as that view1 according to which every event is determined by its conditions4 ,the decision of a man whose liberty is not curtailed by any compulsion1 so that he can act as he pleases exactly in agreement with his character1 is determined objectively by the motive and subjectively by his character4 ,a man of a certain character in a given situation will act in a way that is perfectly determinable4 ,determinism1 as ,i take it1 does not exclude free-will4 ,nor does it exclude such chance as is1 for instance1 the incidental turning up of the various faces of a die4 ,determinism is the basis of science1 and also of ethics as a science4 ,if the decision of a free will were merely the result of chance1 why should our teachers and preachers take so much trouble to form character8 ,while determinism is a sound doctrine1 fatalism is a superstition4 ,fatalism excludes the idea of free will4 ,we define fatalism as that view which regards the fate of a man1 whatsoever he may do1 as fixed4 ,for instance1 we call the orthodox ,mohammedan a fatalist2 he looks at the flame without quenching it1 because he argues1 8if it is ,allah's will that my house burn down1 it will burn down1 whatever ,i may do40 ,in my reply to ,mr4 ,peirce 7,the ,monist1 ,vol4 ,,ii1 p4 #egb7 ,i approvingly quoted from him a passage containing the word 8fate10 adding that here 8the word #8fate' must be understood as ,mr4 ,peirce understands it40 ,in spite of this warning1 ,mr4 ,peirce employs this quotation made from his writings as if it were mine1 and calls attention to the inconsistency involved in the different application of the word4 ,this charge of inconsistency is neither judicious nor fair6 ,we define 8necessary0 as 8that which is determined40 ,determined means describable4 ,necessity is that feature of things which makes it possible that we can1 in proportion to our knowledge1 describe beforehand or predict the course of events4 ,kant's definition of 8necessary10 as given in his 8,critique of ,pure ,reason10 is narrower4 ,he says3 8,that the coherence of which with the real is determined according to universal conditions of experience is necessary1 or exists necessarily40 ,this means in our phraseology1 8that feature of the real which is determined by the laws of form40 ,the word 8determinism0 has been inappropriately used in the sense of fatalism1 in which sense it has to be condemned as a superstition4 ,the term is needed1 however1 to denote a basic principle of great value4 8,determinism10 if used in the sense which the word literally indicates1 means 8that view which regards all events as determined by its conditions40 ,determinism does not mean that everything is decreed by some fate1 that some ,deity or other power has determined the course of events4 ,it means that definite conditions produce definite results1 and that the results can be ascertained and described1 if all the conditions are known4 ,fatalism is a peculiar kind of determinism1 and1 indeed1 an obviously erroneous one4 ,fatalism rests upon a dualistic conception1 regarding necessity as a foreign force residing outside and above things and compelling them to act in a special way4 ,it is the ,moira of the ancients and the ,kismet of the ,mohammedans4 ,the monistic view knows nothing of a foreign force or supermundane fatum enacting a special course of affairs4 ,necessity1 in the monistic conception1 simply denotes the determinedness of results by its conditions2 it signifies that ,gesetzmssigkeit1 or regularity according to law1 is a feature of reality4 ,we need not repeat again that the monistic view of determinism excludes neither chance nor free-will4 ,it only excludes 8absolute0 chance and that indeterminable arbitrariness which is sometimes said to be free-will4 ,if events were not determined1 if under the very same conditions the same causes could bring about different results1 so that no regularities formulable in laws existed1 the world would be a chaos and no cosmos1 absolute chance would prevail1 and science would be impossible4 ,mr4 ,peirce not only confounds fate and necessity1 but he also identifies them with resistance1 and with reality4 ,my idea of necessity has as little to do with the experience of1 reaction as1 for instance1 with the idea of density1 or with pleasure and pain4 ,to confound such heterogeneous concepts must be productive of confusion4 ,no wonder that ,mr4 ,peirce makes the confession that these ideas seem to him 8of a mixed nature40 ,that my presentation of the case of ,determinism versus ,free-will results in 8a doctrine to which the advocates of free-will will generally subscribe as readily as their opponents10 is used as a reproach2 but ,i do not take it as such1 for my intention is not to side with one party1 but to bring out the truth of both views4 #c4 ,,natural ,,laws1 ,,descriptions4 ,mr4 ,peirce makes the following allegation of inconsistency4 ,he says of me3 8,the declaration 7 #aih7 that #8natural laws are simply a description of nature as nature is1' and that #8the facts of nature express the character of nature1' are nominalistic4 ,but in another place 7#ajg-aaf7 he says distinctly that uniformities are real40 7,p4 #eca47 ,i am unable to detect any inconsistency in these expressions4 ,the gist of these three statements is this3 the formulas usually called natural laws describe certain uniformities of reality4 ,the expression 8description of nature0 is by no means nominalistic4 ,if law is said to be a description1 it is not a mere name1 but presupposes the existence of some objective reality for the description of which it has been formulated4 #d4 ,,causation4 ,mr4 ,peirce's usage of the word 8cause0 is very unsettled4 ,he says 7p4 #ech73 8,the original idea of an efficient cause is that of an agent1 more or less like man40 ,the original idea of 8cause0 is the struggle of reaching an end or bringing about a certain state of things4 ,the ,latin causa means 8a lawsuit40 ,in a similar way1 the ,german ,ursache does not mean the original thing1 but a 8seeking40 ,sache is the ,english sake and ,gothic sakj1 meaning 8struggle10 or 8quarrel40 ,it is derived from the same root as the verb 8to seek40 ,like causa1 the word ,ursache was used as a legal term4 ,mr4 ,peirce further states3 8,the modern mechanical conception1 on the other hand1 is that the relative positions of particles determine their accelerations at the instants when they occupy those positions40 7,p4 #ech47 8,in dynamics1 it is the fixed force1 gravitation1 or whatever else1 together with those relative positions of the bodies that determine the intensity and direction of the forces1 that is regarded as the cause40 7,p4 #edj47 8,the practice which ,i endeavor to follow in regard to the word cause is1 to use it in the ,aristotelian sense of an efficient cause in all its crudeness40 7,p4 #eda47 8,when my idea is a more general and logical one1 ,i prefer to speak of the explanation40 7,p4 #eda47 ,no wonder that some causes are prior to their effects1 others simultaneous1 and that effects may even be prior to their causes6 ,using the word in various senses1 ,mr4 ,peirce becomes so entangled about causation1 that in mustering the ideas force1 position1 reason1 law1 cause1 and explanation1 he no longer knows which is which4 99 99 99 99 99 ,mr4 ,peirce being unable to bring any consistency into the usage of the term 8cause10 drops it entirely as a philosophical word4 ,this is ,dr4 ,ironbeard's method1 who kills his patient to save him pain4 ,there was a time when ,i felt inclined to follow that plan of dealing with words in this predicament4 ,but ,i found out very soon that there is not one difficult word in philosophical language which is not or was not at some time or other almost universally maltreated by the professional thinkers of mankind4 ,what1 then1 is to be done8 ,shall we eradicate all old terms that are erroneously used and create a philosophical ,volapk1 which will have the advantage of being unincumbered with the errors of a long historical inheritance1 but the disadvantage of being nowhere spoken and nowhere understood1 except by its inventors8 ,dr4 ,ironbeard's method of dealing with terms is radical4 ,it imitates the method of the social reformers who1 on finding something wrong in society generally1 propose to tear down the entire social structure1 and begin the world over again from its beginning4 ,most of the terms which have been in use for centuries and even millenniums1 ,i have found to correspond to a special want of expressing some definite reality or constant group of realities or important relation among realities4 ,the misuse of different words almost invariably has its origin in a consideration of the name alone1 to the neglect of the reality denoted by the name4 ,and misuses can be mended only by carefully investigating the realities themselves for the denotation of which the words have been invented4 ,if we were to make a clean sweep of the 8superstitions10 soul1 ,god1 cause1 natural law1 etc41 because in many minds there are superstitious notions connected with these ideas1 we should soon have to invent new terms for the realities which necessitated the formation of the old ones4 ,the great bulk of religious and philosophical words originated because in each case there was an actual want of a phrase to denote some specific reality4 ,the errors of the various terms arise because our ideas concerning the nature of these realities have not as yet been matured1 and it is the office of the philosopher to contribute his mite toward their clarification4 ,causation1 in my conception1 is transformation4 ,take any system of conditions and let it somehow be changed4 ,the event which starts the change is called the cause1 the new configuration produced1 the effect4 ,the various factors of the system are the conditions or circumstances4 ,taking this view1 ,i do not say that the effect is the cause transformed4 ,the total effect is the cause plus all the circumstances transformed4 ,the effect is something radically different from the cause4 ,the cause is always an event1 that is a motion of some kind2 the effect1 a new arrangement1 a new formation1 a new state of things1 or perhaps the dissolution of an old state of things4 ,while cause and effect are different1 the whole process of causation1 including cause1 circumstances1 and effect1 is to be viewed as one fact1 or1 rather1 as one system of facts2 and a process of causation is explained1 7as we have seen above7 as soon as it is so described that we recognise it as a transformation4#acg ,there is a popular usage which calls the cause of the falling stone gravitation4 ,this kind of cause is not an event1 not a motion1 but a law of nature1 and ,i prefer to call it 8the reason0 for the stone's fall4 ,mr4 ,peirce defines a reason as follows3 8,a reason1 in one sense1 is the replacement of a multiple-subject of an observational proposition by a general subject1 which by the very conditions of the special experience is predicable of the multiple subject40 7,p4 #eeh47 ,this somewhat stilted definition seems upon the whole to agree with what ,i also call 8a reason40 ,all the reasons by which we comprehend nature are formulated in statements which describe those general features of reality which we call 8laws of nature40 ,who does not see that causes 7i4 e41 events which produce effects7 and reasons 7i4 e41 the formulas by which we comprehend the uniformities of nature7 are two radically different ideas1 and who can deny that the denotation of these two radically different ideas1 by one and the same term1 must and actually does bring about lamentable confusion in the minds of philosophers6 ,accordingly1 let us call them by different names2 never mind what we call them1 but let us distinguish them4 ,i regard the usage stated here as the most appropriate4 ,we call 8the cause0 of the stone's fall that event which removed its support2 but when we inquire after the reason why the stone falls1 we want to know the law of nature which describes in a general formula that quality of stones which makes them fall4 #e4 ,,the ,,future ,,in ,,mental ,,causation4 ,it seems as if some evil genius had caused ,mr4 ,peirce to cross my position everywhere1 even where ,i should expect to find him in perfect agreement4 ,concerning mental and mechanical causation he first startles me with an italicised proposition which declares3 8,there is no mechanical truth in saying that the past determines the future rather than the future the past40 7,p4 #eci47 ,mr4 ,peirce apparently intends to discredit the belief that the past determines the future4 ,he adds3 8,we continue1 for convenience1 to talk of mechanical phenomena as if they were regulated1 in the same manner in which our intentions regulate our actions1 7which is essentially a determination of the future by the past17 although we are quite aware that it is not really so40 7,p4 #eci47 ,in other words1 ,mr4 ,peirce contends that our view of mechanical causation is based upon an analogy with mental causation2 the latter being a determination of the future by the past1 we conclude that the former is regulated in the same manner4 ,this is an old error which rests on the supposition that cognition begins with introspection or self-knowledge4 ,the truth is that all cognition begins with objective observation4 ,we have to say1 7#a7 that man's view of mechanical causation has not been fashioned after the model of mental causation1 and 7#b7 that the future actually enters as a factor in mental causation4 ,we do not believe that the future determines the past1 but it does determine the present4 ,should we judge of the causation of mechanical motions from our own mental experience1 we should certainly reach other conclusions than we do1 for the most characteristic feature of mental causation1 that which essentially distinguishes it from mechanical causation1 is the fact that the future actually enters into it as the main factor4 ,we as rational beings1 and the lower animals also on a smaller scale1 do know to some extent the future4 ,we know by experience the effects of certain actions4 ,this fact of the future's being partly known1 makes it possible for the future to enter as a factor in mental causation4 ,i go so far as to maintain that there is no mental causation except some consideration of the future be contained in the motive cause4 ,the presence of a plan1 of an end kept in view1 of an aim to be reached in the future1 is exactly what distinguishes the purposive action of thinking beings from mechanical events4 #f4 ,,mental ,,causation4 ,mr4 ,peirce has discovered in my expositions of mechanical and mental action what he believes to be a flagrant contradiction1 and1 as if it were the exhibition of my scalp1 displays it triumphantly 7 #bg7 in capitals and italics4 8,no objection can be made10 ,i said1 8to the possibility of explaining the motions 444 of the brain by the laws of molar and molecular mechanics40 ,and 8yet the simplest psychical reflexes cannot be explained from mechanical or physical laws alone40 ,is this really a contradiction1 or is it ,mr4 ,peirce's inability to discover the agreement between the two statements8 ,let us see4 ,take a little toy fish of tin with a small iron rod in its snout1 floating in the water1 and push the fish so that it shoots forward with a certain velocity in a straight line4 ,now take a magnet and hold it at a short distance from the prolonged path of the fish4 ,the fish at once changes its course2 it now describes a curve which according to the laws of mechanics is determined 7omitting any other possible modifying circumstances7 by the momentum of the push1 the velocity of which is gradually diminished by the friction of the water1 and the attraction of the magnet4 ,these are the data1 and from these data the motion of the fish is unequivocally determined by the laws of mechanics4 ,now1 when we speak of the motion of the fish1 we mean the motion1 and not the iron rod1 or the qualities of the iron rod1 in its snout4 ,while speaking of motion or the laws of motion1 and while calculating the curve of a motion1 our ideas move in a perfectly defined sphere of abstraction from which all other things and considerations are excluded4 ,this method of abstraction which is the essence of human thought and also of that special kind of human thought called science1 is the way by which alone we are enabled to arrive at clear distinctions and lucid explanations4 ,we have to keep our various abstractions stored in an orderly manner in our mind1 each one in a special box4 ,if we do not distinguish the different spheres of abstraction and their limits1 we shall soon confound all issues in a hopeless chaos4 ,but we find1 on further examination1 that in this limitation of the description to the abstract sphere of pure motion only a part of the process before us is described4 ,the description explains fully1 exhaustively1 and satisfactorily the mechanical aspect of the case1 but it does not explain why the magnet attracts iron4 ,the attraction of the magnet consists in the definite qualities of 7#a7 the magnet1 7#b7 the iron1 and 7#c7 the medium between them4 ,when we inquire after an explanation of the physical qualities of things1 we enter into another sphere of abstraction1 viz41 that of physics4 ,that physics will have to be explained as a domain of molecular mechanics may be mentioned incidentally4 ,take another and simpler instance3 the fall of a stone4 ,the motion of the stone1 its increasing velocity during the fall can be explained according to the laws of mechanics2 but that quality of the stone called gravity1 which is the reason of its fall1 cannot be deduced from the laws of mechanics4 ,the gravity of a mass is treated in mechanics as the given fact or datum1 an investigation into the nature of which is excluded from the sphere of mechanics4 ,he who demands of mechanics an explanation of gravity searches in the wrong box4 ,when we come to the investigation of psychical phenomena1 we strike a feature which is entirely absent in mechanics1 physics1 and chemistry4 ,it is the appearance of feeling4 ,feelings vary according to the various impressions made by surrounding objects4 ,the same objects making the same impressions1 special kinds of feelings come to stand for or to represent their respective kinds of objects1 and thus feelings acquire meaning1 feelings become ideas4 ,this peculiarity of sentiency1 that it has acquired meaning1 is the characteristic feature of 8mind40 ,when speaking of mind ,i refer to all those phenomena of meaning-freighted feelings which ensoul thinking beings2 and the domain of psychology is thus again quite a distinct domain of abstraction4 ,now let us return to the contradiction of which ,mr4 ,peirce accuses me4 ,an idea which physiologically considered is a special brain-structure or combination of brain-structures1 reacts upon a given stimulus1 which1 let us say1 is the sound of a certain word4 ,the word is a sound-symbol and the word possesses a certain meaning4 ,the word spoken having the same meaning as a special idea that is thought1 while its brain-structure is agitated1 possesses a quality comparable to chemical affinities4 ,this peculiar word will serve as a stimulus for this peculiar idea4 ,it will not 7at least not directly7 stimulate other ideas--as little as a chemical that has no affinity for the ingredients of another chemical will cause a reaction4 ,why the motion takes place calls for a psychical explanation1 but the motion itself takes place in strict accord with the laws of mechanics4 ,but are not the laws of mechanics annulled by the laws of physics1 and those of physiology by the laws of psychology8 ,no1 they are not annulled1 but modified4 ,a piece of iron that falls to the ground with the same velocity as a stone of equal weight will be held up by a magnet strong enough to hold it4 ,this is not an annulment of the gravity of the iron2 it is not a reversion of the law of gravitation2 gravitation holds in this case as good as in any other4 ,it is only a modification and a complication4 ,we must remember that the law of gravity does not say1 the non-supported piece of iron or stone will drop1 it says that all bodies are attracted by the earth with a definite force depending upon their mass and position4 ,and this attraction takes place in our example2 the iron supported by the magnet retains all its inherent gravity1 which is constantly asserting itself1 although counteracted by the force of the attraction of the magnet4 ,since the mechanical1 chemical1 psychical1 etc4 qualities represent reality in various abstract aspects1 we should know that there are no purely mechanical1 no purely chemical1 no purely psychical phenomena4 ,every real phenomenon1 i4 e4 the original whole from which the abstractions have been made1 presents a complex state of things of which many various aspects can and must be taken4 ,i repeat now without fear of contradiction or miscomprehension1 that brain-motions are perfectly explainable by the laws of molar and molecular mechanics1 while psychical reflexes1 not being purely mechanical processes1 cannot be explained by mechanical laws4 ,the properly psychical and the properly mental are other elements of an entirely different nature from the mechanical and the physical4 ,they belong to a radically different sphere of abstraction4 ,he who tries to explain the psychical by the mechanical1 looks for his explanation in the wrong box4 ,and he who regards the proposition that the mechanical laws hold good for all motions without any exception1 but that they cannot be called upon to explain that which is not motion1 as a contradiction1 has not as yet learned practically to apply the method of abstraction4 ,it is strange that we have to give this little lesson in the elements of abstraction lore to so prominent a logician as ,mr4 ,peirce4 ,we feel inclined to exclaim3 8,art thou a master of ,israel and knowest not these things80 ,,stray ,,shots4 ,there are a number of incidental comments aimed at scattered points of my position4 ,i call them 8stray shots02 they have exploded without harm4 ,while going over the battle-field ,i shall pick them up and will throw some of them back into ,mr4 ,peirce's camp1 whence they came4 ,mr4 ,peirce is in the habit of calling every approach to his views 8deep10 while divergencies are branded as 8shallow40-- ,hume's scepticism is called ,leibnitz's principle1 by which latter ,mr4 ,peirce apparently means that innumerable single cases of experience alone do not constitute certainty4 ,why ,mr4 ,peirce demands that ,hume's conclusion which ,leibnitz never would have countenanced1 should be identified with ,leibnitz's principle from which it is derived is not apparent4-- ,how easily ,mr4 ,peirce changes his opinion6 ,venn's 8,logic of ,chance10 which ,mr4 ,peirce so much admired formerly1 has become 8a blundering little book40-- ,synechism and agapasticism1 viz41 the principle of continuity and the idea of love as main factors of evolution are nothing new4 ,i have always defended them1 although not in the peculiar way that ,mr4 ,peirce does4#ach ,in his article 8,evolutionary ,love0 he appears to me unjust toward ,darwin4 ,i do not think that ,i should improve my propositions1 which are in their way synechistic as well as agapastic1 by adopting either ,mr4 ,peirce's terms or his presentation of these principles4-- ,mr4 ,peirce says1 he does not doubt that my idea of mental causation was intended to be an improvement on his molecular theory of protoplasm4 ,i can assure ,mr4 ,peirce that ,i had no such intentions4 ,i held my view long before ,i ever had a chance of knowing ,mr4 ,peirce's molecular theory of protoplasm4 ,moreover1 ,i am unable to discover any similarity between his views and mine4-- ,i took pains to explain that1 if we disregard the notion of form1 every transformation1 that is1 every case of causation1 will appear as a most miraculous and inexplicable event4 ,to illustrate my view ,i said that 8supposing we had no idea of the laws of form or only an incoherent and fragmentary knowledge of them10 it would be 8a very wonderful thing0 that two congruent regular tetrahedrons when put together will form a hexahedron--a body which is something new4 ,and ,i added to this statement1 8but the laws of form do perfectly and satisfactorily explain it40 ,how great was my astonishment to see ,mr4 ,peirce with great complacency take up the problem and explain it6 ,indeed1 it is true4 ,that the combination of two congruent regular tetrahedrons will make a hexahedron1 is wonderful only to him who does not understand the laws of form4 ,otherwise1 it is not wonderful4 ,i was amused at ,mr4 ,peirce's ingenuity to prove to me that it is a case of #h-bf4-- ,there is a difference between the combination of two tetrahedrons and of the atoms ,h,o4 ,mr4 ,peirce tells me1 that the one is ideal1 the other real--8a difference which to his ,scotistic mind is very important40 ,did ,mr4 ,peirce think1 indeed1 that ,i was not aware of this difference1 or does he mean to establish a rule never to compare the relations as developed in the sciences of pure forms to the relations that obtain in reality8-- ,says ,mr4 ,peirce in one passage1 there is a difference between the ideal and the real1 which to his ,scotistic mind is very important4 ,in another passage he declares that 8the nominalist alone makes a sharp distinction between the abstract and the concrete40-- ,mr4 ,peirce smiles at the endeavor of reconciling religion with science4 ,for he thinks3 8,it is a thing which will come to pass of itself when time is ripe1 and that our efforts to hasten it have just that slight effect that our efforts to hasten the ripening of apples on a tree may have40 7,p4 #ede47 ,mr4 ,peirce forgets that the religious fruits of the conciliation between religion and science are our own sentiments4 ,he who says that man should be indifferent about working out the truth1 on the plea that truth will take care of itself1 is comparable to the apple-tree1 that refuses to work out the ripening of the apples4 ,the proposition to let religion and science work out their destinies1 one of which is their mutual agreement1 of themselves1 is irreligious and also unscientific4 ,truth will not take care of itself if we do not strain all our efforts to find truth2 and the kingdom of heaven will never come unless 7as ,christ taught1 ,matt4 #aa1 #ab7 8it suffereth violence1 and the violent take it by force40-- ,the same ,mr4 ,peirce who says that our efforts to hasten the conciliation of religion with science are useless1 believes in miracles and proposes a theory that prayer can work miracles4-- ,several philosophers1 such as ,locke and ,hegel1 have complained of the uselessness of the logical law of identity ,a ,a1 and also of its barrenness for any practical purpose4 ,the law of identity has been invented nevertheless1 because there is a want for it2 and this want1 in my opinion1 was felt because the statement of sameness 7as set forth in ,the ,monist1 ,vol4 ,,iii1 p4 #gj1 et seqq47 is one of the most elementary and important forms of reasoning1 being indispensable1 for instance1 in mathematics where it appears as equations4 ,we may simply laugh at the old logicians 8,who whirl in narrow circling trails1 ,like kittens playing with their tails40 ,we may impatiently discard the whole proceeding as empty talk1 yet ,i submit that we had better try to understand the meaning of their unprofitable exertions and the drift of their apparently meaningless argumentations4 ,if we regard the principle of absolute identity as the formula of sameness 7in the sense explained in the quoted passage1 ,the ,monist1 ,vol4 ,,iii1 ,no4 #a1 p4 #gj1 et seqq47 emptied of its contents we shall understand why logicians wasted so much energy on an entirely barren subject4 ,we shall readily condone their mistakes in consideration of the importance of the subject4 ,it is difficult to say how much we have profited by their blunders4-- ,mr4 ,peirce uses the terms analytical and synthetical in a new sense for reasons which he explains at greater length in his 8,theory of ,probable ,inferences40 ,he says1 8analytical reasoning depends upon associations of similarity2 synthetical reasoning upon associations of contiguity40 ,i willingly grant to the scientist and the philosopher the liberty to change the historical meaning of terms if the traditional usage is not helpful in our dealings with the facts which they were invented to describe4 ,however1 we must not change a term without good and sufficient reasons4 ,in the present case1 ,i still prefer the traditional usage of the terms 8analytical0 and 8synthetic40-- ,mr4 ,peirce takes the liberty of changing terms for himself1 but he resents it in others4-- ,mr4 ,peirce disapproves of the usage of the word 8construction0 in the sense of systems of formal thought1 such as the decimal system1 etc41 etc4 8,because10 he says1 8the word is imperatively required in the theory of cognition to denote a mathematical diagram framed according to a general precept40 ,on the strength of this argument we might as well disapprove of calling churches1 mosques1 houses1 cottages1 or any kind of edifice1 8building10 because the word 8building0 is imperatively required to denote business-buildings4-- ,mr4 ,peirce says that according to my statement 7in #afc7 8every element of compulsion is to be excluded from the conception of necessity40 ,having never made such a statement1 ,i looked up the passage1 which is the last but one paragraph in ,the ,monist1 ,vol4 ,,iii1 ,no4 #a1 page #hf1 and find that ,mr4 ,peirce must have misread the sentence1 8compulsion excludes free will1 and necessity does not10 which1 of course1 has an entirely different meaning4-- ,mr4 ,peirce identifies evolution with real growth1 regarding it as opposed to the law of the conservation of energy4 ,he regards everything as a product of such growth1 or ,erzeugung1 and adds1 8,i fancy it is this cautious reflectiveness of my procedure which especially displeases ,dr4 ,carus40 ,mr4 ,peirce does not use the word 8bold40 ,he says1 8cautious reflectiveness40-- ,i did not say that causation is to be explained from the law of the conservation of matter and energy4 ,i said 7,the ,monist1 ,vol4 ,,ii1 ,no4 #d1 p4 #eff7 that the law of the conservation of matter and energy throws light upon the problem of causation4 ,the law of the conservation of matter and energy and the law of causation describe the same thing under two different aspects4 ,if we understand the one1 it will help us to understand the other4-- ,kant's chapter on the ,architectonic of ,pure ,reason is well known to me1 but ,i think that ,kant was possessed of a peculiar love of architectonic which has contributed not a little to rendering the system of his philosophy unnecessarily labyrinthine4-- ,it is surprising to find a man whom ,i always regarded as a ,kant scholar of first degree saying that 8,kant makes space a necessary form of thought40 ,now1 as a matter of fact1 ,kant does not make space a form of thought1 but of ,anschauung or intuition4 ,we cannot understand ,kant unless we understand this distinction4#aci-- ,kant conceives of causation as a necessary sequence4 ,mill1 who objects to the idea of necessity1 replaces ,kant's words 8universal0 and 8necessary0 by 8invariable0 and 8unconditioned10 a substitution which was made with the outspoken intention of radically changing the meaning of the phrase4 ,mill's terms are not 8more exact10 as ,mr4 ,peirce says1 but different4 ,they are worse than less exact to a ,kantian1 and can appear more exact only to those who take ,mill's view1 which is nominalistic4 ,and this substitution of ,mill's is regarded by realistic ,mr4 ,peirce as a mere 8rewording of ,kant's definition06-- ,mr4 ,peirce makes too much of the idea of 8,erzeugung1 which10 as he correctly says1 8is ,kant's word for the sequence of effect from cause40 ,yet ,kant's idea of ,erzeugung does not conflict with 8the modern mechanical doctrine40 ,kant says in that very same chapter1 8,aller ,wechsel 7,succession7 der ,erscheinungen ist nur ,vernderung10 i4 e41 8,all change 7succession7 of phenomena is only transformation40 767 ,does not ,mr4 ,peirce know that ,kant calls every world-conception that stands in contradiction to the mechanical principle 8a philosophy of indolence10 or 8faule ,weltweisheit08-- ,the same ,kant who proposed a mechanical explanation of the evolution of the starry heavens1 objected very strongly to that kind of explanations 8which derive all order from chance02 and speaking of ,epicurus's 8absolute chance0767 he adds3 8,epicurus was even so reckless 7so unverschmt7 as to demand that the atoms should deviate from their straight course without any cause40 ,mr4 ,peirce has either overlooked in ,kant these passages1 or1 if he has read them1 he has never taken them to heart4-- ,mr4 ,peirce objects to my statement that according to his philosophy the domain of mind is characterised by absence of law4 ,he argues3 8,is not one of my papers entitled #8,the ,law of ,mind8'0 ,yet this law of mind1 he states two lines further on1 8requires its own violation40 7,p4 #eeb47-- ,the 8sporting0 of the primeval chance1 ,mr4 ,peirce says on page #eeb of this number1 is 8not undetermined and indeterminable10 because 8its ultimate result must be an entire elimination of chance from the universe40 ,shall we understand that the 8arbitrary sporting0 of the primeval chaos1 with which ,mr4 ,peirce 7according to ,the ,monist1 ,vol4 ,i1 ,no4 #b1 p4 #age7 begins his cosmogony1 was determined8 ,if absolute chance is determined1 why not call such a philosophy 8determined ,indeterminism08 ,we try hard to understand ,mr4 ,peirce1 but sometimes we really have to give it up4-- ,physiology teaches that memory alone changes feeling into consciousness1 but the consciousness of ,mr4 ,peirce's original ,chance is without memory and habit4-- ,chance1 a being living and conscious1 has1 according to ,mr4 ,peirce1 created the world1 but the ultimate result of evolution must be an entire elimination of ,chance from the universe4 ,thus it appears that the creation of the world is an act of divine suicide4 ,the world-process is a slow degeneration of ,god1 finally ending in his complete annihilation4 ,,retrospect4 ,in summing up the result of the whole battle1 we find that there is not a single question on which we have to yield or even modify our position4 ,our position remains the same1 while ,mr4 ,peirce's position has become glaringly untenable4 ,there is one point1 however1 in which justice demands that we should recognise that he is right4 ,i should not have called ,hamilton 8,mr410 but 8,sir ,william40 ,i can1 however1 assure ,mr4 ,peirce that this mistake of mine 7which in all my allusions to ,hamilton occurs only once7 was a mere slip of the pen2 it was not ignorance on my part and still less was it any disregard of the rules of politeness4 ,we are obliged to reject the favorite ideas of ,mr4 ,peirce1 and have only to add that our esteem for him has not been lessened1 in spite of all disagreements1 and notwithstanding the flaws we have detected in his reasoning4 ,on the contrary1 our admiration for him as a dialectitian has been greatly increased1 for1 in truth1 we have never before seen propositions so untenable in their nature1 so odd and almost bizarre1 as those of 8absolute chance10 of 8matter as effete mind10 of 8feeling as being the inner aspect of chance10 and of 8real growth as opposed to the conservation of energy10 defended with greater adroitness4 ,mr4 ,peirce is unusually familiar with certain branches of learning1 of which he has made a specialty1 and also with general philosophy2 but he has original ideas1 and he prizes them too highly4 ,where he makes no use of his originality1 he does extraordinarily good ,work4 ,thus1 most of his papers on logic1 published in sundry magazines1 are1 in their critical as well as constructive parts1 strictly scientific and almost free from apocryphal speculations4 ,only slight hints in them have been a puzzle to me and other readers of his essays4 ,of late1 however1 ,mr4 ,peirce has come out more explicitly with his peculiar philosophy1 and we regret to say that the more he allows his original ideas to enter into his thoughts1 the more warped are his theories4 ,while we regard ,mr4 ,peirce's original ideas as erroneous1 we must say that they are nevertheless highly interesting and stimulating4 ,his propositions are presented so vigorously1 so attractively1 so brilliantly1 that while perusing his articles1 we find them remarkably suggestive2 we enjoy them as we do poetry4 ,they read like a romance of the origin of the world or a fairy-tale of metaphysics4 ,mr4 ,peirce's views should receive the consideration of all earnest students of philosophy2 for he goes to the root of its main problems1 and his very errors are instructive4 ,,editor4 ,,footnotes3 #abe ,kepler's scheme is1 that all the regular solids1 icosahedron1 dodecahedron1 octohedron1 tetrahedron1 and cube should be placed one within the other at such distances that spheres could be described between them so as to touch the corners of each respective interior and the planes of each respective exterior solid4 ,he found1 by placing the sun in the centre and allowing the planets to move in great circles on the spheres1 7making the circle between the icosahedron and dodecahedron equal to the orbit of the earth17 that then the distances between the planets would1 upon the whole1 agree with astronomical observations4 ,this theory is as ingenious1 as fascinating1 and as original as ,mr4 ,peirce's propositions4 ,it has only one little fault2 it does not agree with facts4 ,and ,kepler afterwards abandoned his original theory4 #abf ,like ,mr4 ,peirce1 ,kepler had1 in his days1 too1 thought of the possibility of making the world evolve from chance4 ,when1 in #afjd1 a new and brilliant fixed star suddenly appeared in ,ophiuchos1 he took up the problem of star-evolution4 ,we will let ,kepler tell the story in his own words as it appears in his treatise on the new star3 8,yesterday1 while pondering over the problem1 ,i was called to dinner1 and my young wife served the salad4 #8,do you think1' ,i asked her1 #8if since the origin of creation1 pewter platters1 salad leaves1 oil and vinegar1 and also hard-boiled eggs had been flying in a chaotic mixture through space that ,chance would have been able to collect them to-day in a salad8' #8,certainly not in such a good mixture as this is1' was the reply of my beautiful wife40 ,kepler rejected the idea that the world could have evolved by chance4 #abg ,the philosophical articles of the ,century ,dictionary do not seem to be free of party spirit4 ,an extraordinary amount of praise is given to the medival realists which1 considering the vagaries of their propositions1 they do not deserve4 ,on the other hand1 the blame for the discredit into which scholasticism has fallen is heaped upon the nominalists4 #abh ,i said in ,fundamental ,problems1 page #adb1 8,the introduction of the word positivism into philosophy is the merit of ,m4 ,auguste ,comte4 ,although we cannot accept much of ,m4 ,comte's conception of positivism we gratefully adopt the name40 ,there are plenty of other passages in which my usage of the term positivism1 as distinguished from the ,french positivism1 is set forth1 so that there could be little danger of being misunderstood4 #abi ,my main objection to the term ,absolute is to forestall any hypostatising of a vague abstract notion which can only serve the purpose of mystification4 ,i suffer the term ,absolute in a loose sense when it is understood that it is used loosely4 ,i do not say1 as ,mr4 ,peirce seems to believe1 8absolutely universal0 or 8absolutely necessary40 ,the words universal and necessary are sufficiently significant to me without any additional emphasis4 ,reality is relative throughout4 ,absolute existences are1 if the term is taken seriously1 nonentities2 and the expression 8,the ,absolute0 for the whole of existence or for those features of existence which are universal and necessary is1 to say the least1 misleading4 ,these are my reasons for rejecting the ,absolute as a philosophical term4 ,there is1 of course1 no objection to the term in chemistry1 physics1 mathematics1 and other sciences1 where it has acquired technical meanings4 #acj ,mr4 ,peirce correctly says that the axioms of geometry are now exploded4 ,this1 however1 does not overthrow the reliability of formal mathematics2 on the contrary1 it places it on a safer basis than that of unprovable assumptions1 which must be taken for granted4 ,we look upon the whole system of geometry as a product of mental operations4 ,we perform some operations and note what their products are4 ,we do something and mind the consequences of what we do4 ,the problem of modern geometry is to invent a method by which we can construct in the simplest manner possible a straight line and a plane4 ,euclid still presupposes the existence of the plane and assumes it to be such that parallel lines do not meet4 ,when we are able to construct the plane of ,euclidean geometry1 we can dispense with the axiom of parallels1 for1 in that case1 the plane will possess the qualities it has by construction4 ,we can very well execute other constructions in which parallel lines possess other qualities1 and we shall on the basis of such an altered plan of operation be able to produce entirely different systems of geometry4 ,we must distinguish between the space of our mathematicians and real space4 ,experience teaches us that real space has three dimensions which means that from a given point every other point is determinable by three magnitudes4 ,we might doubt 7although ,i think there is little occasion to do so7 whether the real space of our experience is truly three-dimensional1 but we cannot doubt that the truths developed in the one-dimensional system of numbers1 in the two-dimensional system of plane geometry1 in the three-dimensional system of solid geometry1 and also in n-dimensional systems each in their respective domain are perfectly reliable1 for they are unequivocally determined1 they are eindeutig bestimmt4 ,there is no application of the theory of probabilities in a field where the products are not due to chance but result with certainty4 #aca ,i wonder why the ,century ,dictionary does not mention the scholastic usage of the word univocus as the root of univocal4 ,similarly we are not told that the word incompossibilitas is an invention of the schoolmen4 ,duns ,scotus1 ,mr4 ,peirce's favorite philosopher1 uses the terms univoce and incompossibilitas freely4 #acb ,we accept in this argument ,mr4 ,peirce's solutions1 which1 however1 are his own4 ,a simpler example would have been more appropriate4 #acc ,the belief in a duality of truth appears quite rational from the dualistic standpoint of the middle ages1 and the arguments of ,scotus are cleverly devised1 being based upon the supposition that the fall of man had changed the entire order of the world1 so that the laws of nature prior to the ,fall were different to those which obtain now4 #acd ,duns ,scotus was a very zealous advocate of ecclesiastical supremacy1 even advising1 for instance1 the prosecution of the ,jews in order to convert them4 ,it is a strange irony of fate that the author of the ,fons vit1 upon whose authority ,scotus so largely depends and from whom he derived some of his most important ideas was an ,israelite4 ,scotus did not know that ,avicebron was a pseudonym of the ,spanish ,jew ,salomon ben ,gebirol4 #ace ,i omit here a discussion as to whether or not the conservation of energy is true or not4 ,i need not mention that the views of our physicists1 such men as ,helmholtz1 ,mach1 ,maxwell1 ,tait1 and others differ widely from ,mr4 ,peirce's presentation of the subject4 ,mr4 ,peirce rejects the law of the conservation of energy1 but retains the conservation1 or 7as he prefers to say7 perduration of matter4 ,i waive the question1 whether this is consistent1 and call attention only to another1 most flagrant contradiction4 ,mr4 ,peirce states that1 8not only the total amount of matter remains constant1 but all the different parts preserve their identity02 and yet he says that 8matter is effete mind40 ,thus when mind becomes effete1 the amount of matter increases2 however1 when the habits of matter are broken up1 mind originates1 and the amount of matter decreases4 ,this1 it seems1 would make any perduration of matter and of the identity of its different parts impossible4 #acf ,that my view of the a priori1 as ,mr4 ,peirce claims1 is 8,schleiermacherian0 is new to me4 #acg ,it is a matter of course that frequently several events coperate to bring about an effect4 ,in that case we have our choice1 either to speak of several causes1 or to treat the coperation of all of them as the cause1 or to select one of them to be called the cause1 while the others may be counted among the conditions4 ,the limitation of a system of causation depends entirely upon the purpose of our inquiry1 and we must here1 as in many other things1 use discretion4 ,mr4 ,peirce concludes1 that according to my view of causation we can1 in a relatively uniform motion1 such as the flight of a cannon ball1 regard the motion of every moment as the cause for the motion of the next moment4 ,i say 8relatively10 for absolutely uniform motion does not exist4 ,i grant this1 but ,i do not grant what ,mr4 ,peirce regards as a contradiction of mine1 that in that case the cause would be equal to the effect4 ,a man who knows the artifices of the hair-splitting ,eleates and the other conundrums of logic1 should know that every second of time is different from every other second2 #ab o'clock is different from #a second past #ab4 ,he who denies this1 has only to miss a train in order to be converted4 ,and how much more different than the moments of time are the various moments of real motion1 for in every moment the moving body is in another place1 with changed relations2 and if that does not constitute a difference1 we should have to deny the existence of motion4 #ach ,see my article on 8,the ,continuity of ,evolution0 in ,the ,monist1 ,vol4 ,,ii1 ,no #a2 and also 8,monism and ,meliorism10 p4 #gc1 where 8the struggle for the ideal0 is contrasted with 8the struggle for life40 #aci ,for details see1 in ,the ,monist1 ,vol4 ,,ii1 ,no4 #d1 page #eah1 et seqq41 and #ebg1 et seqq41 my articles1 8,mr4 ,spencer on the ,ethics of ,kant10 heading iv1 and 8,what ,does ,anschauung ,mean80 ,i now forgive ,mr4 ,spencer2 for if a ,kant scholar like ,mr4 ,peirce can fall into this unpardonable mistake1 why should not ,mr4 ,spencer1 whose knowledge of ,kant's writings is1 as he confesses himself1 extremely limited1 have the same privilege8 ,,the ,,foundations ,,of ,,theism4 ,i4 ,,the ,,realism ,,of ,,theism4 ,it is commonly alleged that there is deeply seated in the human mind a belief in the existence of a supreme being1 and that the prevalence of such belief is evidence that it has a basis in supernatural revelation4 ,it is urged in reply to this assertion1 that this belief is not universal1 and that in any case its presence cannot be regarded as satisfactory evidence that is well founded4 ,it is known that the disposition to worship is aroused by grand and beautiful objects2 and as ,darwin well remarks in one of his letters1 the natural sentiments of the sublime and the beautiful easily assume a personal direction4 ,scientific explanations1 moreover1 push a personal source of things ever further from us1 and it is becoming apparently more easy to doubt or deny any such source whatever4 ,prevalent human instincts and intuitions are1 however1 the result of experience imperfectly or perfectly digested1 as the case may be4 ,in most instances they yield to analysis something of value4 ,a more plausible explanation of the theistic instinct is the anthropomorphic one4 ,man knows that he originates many movements1 both of his own body and of other material things1 and he knows of no other real source of such movements4 ,he therefore1 in his primitive state1 before scientific explanations are attained1 naturally refers motions in nature to an original personal source4 ,this1 it may be supposed1 is the natural habit of the unsophisticated mind1 and is at the bottom of theistic belief1 whether as unexplained in consciousness1 and therefore an instinct1 or as a distinctly formulated belief4 ,the phenomena of nature must have originated somehow1 and there is no other conceivable source of motion than a personal one4 ,facts developed by scientific research tend to weaken this anthropomorphism4 ,the indestructibility of matter means that it has never been created4 ,the conservation of energy states that matter has always been in motion4 ,the law of organic evolution is supposed to do away with the necessity for creative intervention in the origination of plants and animals4 ,finally1 the observed facts of the evolution of mind show that this1 the light of the world1 grew like the organic beings which it inhabits4 ,nothing higher than man has been found1 and there seems to be no ground for suspecting the existence of any higher mind4 ,and man himself dies and undergoes dissolution1 like other organic bodies4 ,the result of this use of the facts of science is agnosticism1 at least4 ,we know of nothing beyond what they teach1 and some agnostics go so far as to say1 8ignorabimus10 we shall never know4 ,agnostics1 however1 have their faces set in different directions4 ,some rest in it as a relief from mental toil1 as persons more theologically inclined join a church4 ,others1 believers in the progressive evolution of knowledge as of other phenomena1 set themselves to explore the unknown country1 believing that our opportunities in this direction are practically unlimited4 ,let us look again at this anthropomorphism which is so deeply seated and so widely spread4 ,its essence is the fact that we control our own bodies in a great degree and that our material organs obey the behests of our mind4 ,we do things for1 to us1 satisfactory reasons1 and for satisfactory reasons we leave many things undone1 which we could readily do4 ,what has science done towards explaining this most ordinary phenomenon8 ,we may truthfully say1 absolutely nothing4 ,it remains a fact that a majority1 if not all animals1 move their bodies in their entirety or in part1 because they have sensations4 ,in the lower animals these sensations are merely either sense-impressions from without1 or they are from within1 being produced by their physical condition4 ,we rise but little in the scale1 when effects of memory are evident1 for we find that many actions are due to experience of the result of former actions4 ,with still higher development1 mental organisation becomes more apparent1 and the reasoning and emotional states have more and more distinct outcome in intelligent acts4 ,but the mechanism by which the act is called forth by the mental state1 has never been explained4 ,the difficulty lies here4 ,a sensation1 or a state of mind1 weighs nothing4 ,a material body1 let it be a cell or a mass of cells1 as a muscle1 weighs something4 ,how then can the former move the latter8 ,from a mechanical point of view1 it cannot be done4 ,for that which has no weight to set in motion anything which has weight1 is to violate the law of the conservation and correlation of energy4 ,and this law is not only an a priori necessity1 but it has been demonstrated a posteriori in so many cases that exceptions cannot be thought of4 ,so a school of physiologists say that it is not done4 ,no animal eats because it is hungry1 or drinks because it is thirsty4 ,the man does not direct the muscle of his arm when he writes1 nor those of his tongue when he speaks4 ,but it is easy to see why such a school of physiologists includes but an infinitesimal part of mankind4 ,there is a school of evolutionists who account for the whole matter in harmony with the views of the physiologists above mentioned4 ,i refer to the ,post-,darwinians1 who account for evolution by natural selection exclusively4 ,that is1 animals originally moved aimlessly in all directions4 ,those whose movements were beneficial to them1 survived1 while those whose movements were not beneficial1 or which were injurious1 perished4 ,as frequent motions in a given direction lead to habits1 so were inaugurated movements which were habitually beneficial to the actors1 which have therefore persisted and multiplied4 ,thus were established the multifarious habits of animals and men4 ,consciousness had nothing to do with the process4 ,it merely acted the part of the onlooker1 being simply aware of what went on4 8,like the locomotive whistle10 says ,huxley1 8it made considerable noise1 but did none of the work40 ,to a person familiar with the facts of the evolution of the structures of animals1 this seems like a most inadequate theory4 ,it is a commonplace that no kind of selection1 either artificial or natural1 ever originated anything4 ,selection simply selects between existing alternatives4 ,the fundamental question of evolution is1 ,what is the origin of things8 ,what is the fate of things originated8 is a secondary question4 ,to this first question the ,post-,darwinian reply must be1 that everything possible has originated no one knows yet how1 so that what has survived was necessarily to be found in this embarras de richesse4 ,this is an enormous assumption1 and one to which the history of the life of past and present ages lends no support4 ,no such multifarious and promiscuous variation is known to have occurred in living or in extinct organic beings4 ,but if the variations have not been infinite1 then the chance of the existing one having been hit upon becomes greatly reduced1 and the chance of its having occurred at the same time in individuals of opposite sex is still smaller4 ,finally1 the chance of its not being immediately bred out by the overwhelming numbers of individuals not possessing it1 is indeed infinitesimal4 ,in fact1 it is evident that variations of structure must have appeared in numbers of individuals of a species at the same time1 in order to secure survival4 ,this indicates a common cause of general application4 ,that such causes have existed and been effective at all periods of past and present time is amply proved by the facts of geology and paleontology4 ,the most influential in effecting change of form and structure has been the motion of the body and of its parts necessary to secure its food1 to defend or protect itself from dangers1 and to reproduce its kind4 ,the direct mechanical effects of these motions on all the materials of the body may be traced in the successive stages of the forms of past ages to those of the present time4 ,the objections above made to the theory of multifarious variation of organic forms1 apply with equal force to the theory of multifarious movements of organic beings as furnishing the source of intelligent habits4 ,an additional and especial objection to the latter hypothesis is the fact that it does not recognise the well-known adaptability of animals to new situations and circumstances4 ,if the events of life were a routine moving with mathematical precision1 the theory of origin from multifarious variations would have a better foundation2 but this is not the case4 ,food1 friends1 and enemies do not appear in stated periods1 quantities1 or qualities4 ,emergencies are common1 and variation of circumstance is the rule4 ,without sensation1 uniform habits would but lead to destruction4 ,everything which should not be presented in the habitual form and at the habitual time would be neglected4 ,food and drink would be refused1 or not obtained2 defense and reproduction would not be attempted under the proper conditions4 ,in fact1 the conduct of living beings would be no more intelligent than that of inorganic matter in motion1 were sensation to have no share in the process4 ,but as soon as we believe that the habits of animals are due to hunger1 thirst1 and the perception of temperature1 resistance1 etc41 their acts become intelligible1 and the formation of habits becomes a necessary consequence of memory or the faculty of subsequent recognition of sensations experienced at a previous time4 ,it is1 in this connection1 of great interest to recall the diverse effects on our mental history of sense-impressions1 as compared with the effect of thought4 ,sense-impressions are not remembered in the proper sense of the term4 ,the repetition in memory is always vastly more indistinct than the original state of consciousness2 so much so as to be a very different thing4 ,thought1 on the contrary1 when remembered at all1 is an exact repetition in quality of its first presence4 ,the presentative consciousness has one quality2 the representative and re-representative have another quality4 ,this shows us that the structural arrangement of brain substance concerned in the latter forms of consciousness have a far more permanent quality than that due to the former4 ,they thus constitute more permanent acquisitions1 and this being the case1 must have a most important bearing on evolution4#adj ,this is because it is a representative state which determines action4 ,the process of determination may become so rapid as to be almost instantaneous2 but it had to be learned and the representation was what gave the act its character and which organised the machinery of the automatic or reflex act4 ,i here refer to the low degrees of consciousness sometimes called subconsciousness1 and the expression1 8the subliminal consciousness10 introduced by ,f4 ,meyer4 ,all shades of consciousness intervene between the most distinct forms and the unconsciousness of the reflex state4 ,intelligent subconsciousness is a low stage in this evanescent series4 ,stages on the passage to and from sleep1 and other forms of unconsciousness due to physical causes1 are properly termed subconscious4 ,there are reflexes which are due to mechanisms which we inherit from our animal and human ancestors1 which are sometimes accompanied by consciousness4 ,the amount of intelligence displayed will depend on the function involved4 ,experiments on vertebrate animals show that intelligent adaptation of the movements of the body have been transferred forwards in the brain during the course of evolution4 ,thus1 a fish which retains the medulla only1 will guide itself through the water so as to avoid danger4 ,if the cerebellum and thalami are left to a reptile1 it will avoid destructive acts4 ,but if a mammal is deprived of its hemispheres1 its actions are without design1 and it is incapable of self-preservation4 ,it may be that in the temporary absence of the higher consciousness1 the lower forms which once existed in our ancestors may be revived1 as in some of the elements of our dreams1 and in some forms of cerebral disease1 when much of the blood is withdrawn from the cortex or parts of it4 ,the amount of consciousness necessary to the performance of intelligent acts depends on the novelty of the situation4 ,many of the theories on this subject1 however1 take it for granted that intelligent acts arise in primarily unconscious states4 ,this is only credible on the supposition that such acts have arisen by natural selection only1 a view which ,i have combated on a previous page4 ,some authors use expressions which can only imply unconscious consciousness4 ,this is of course absurd and self-contradictory4 ,no source but sensation can be found for intelligent acts4 ,it is true that there are some movements of organic bodies which have an intelligent appearance1 to which we cannot ascribe consciousness4 ,such are those of the spermatozoids and of the leucocytes4 ,some of the lowest animals and plants cannot be yet proved to be conscious4 ,we cannot now explain the nature of the movements which these forms exhibit1 but they will probably yield to research4 ,enough it is for our present purpose to know that the majority of animals are conscious for a large part of their lives4 ,and we have abundant evidence to show that movements inaugurated in conscious states may be performed1 so soon as learned1 in unconsciousness1 and become part of the mental furniture of the animal4 ,it seems1 then1 that the control of ponderable matter by mental states is not the exclusive prerogative of man1 but is a phenomenon of common observation in the animal kingdom4 ,the facts indicate that it is characteristic of mind to move resistant and tri-dimensional matter under suitable conditions4 ,these conditions are rigid1 but within the limits which they define1 the sequence is definite4 ,it is difficult to believe in anything which is in direct violation of mechanical necessity1 and a mere hypothesis to that effect would not deserve a moment's consideration4 ,but the belief that the body1 or parts of it1 are moved in direct obedience to mental states is founded on more numerous observations than are most of those beliefs which we hold to be true4 ,in fact there is no scientific doctrine better supported by observation and experience than this one4 ,on this ground alone1 then1 we are compelled to believe in something in the universe which is supermechanical1 or extramechanical4 ,we may call this supernaturalism1 or occultism1 or what we like1 but the fact remains4 ,we have in it the germ of theism1 anthropomorphic1 if you will1 but one which grows in importance as we come to examine further into the characteristics of mental action4 ,before going into this part of the subject1 ,i will refer to the part played by mind in evolution4 ,from what has gone before1 it is evident that this part has been an important one4 ,if structures are produced by motions1 it is clear that habits produce structures1 and vice versa2 and that under the law of natural selection only the useful and harmless ones have survived4 ,it follows1 then1 that progressive evolution of form is secured by the presence of consciousness1 and must1 sooner or later1 fail without it4 ,with development of intelligence the progress must become more continuous and rapid4 ,the facts of paleontology confirm such a hypothesis2 since the more intelligent animals 7,mammalia7 have generally supplanted the less intelligent1 7,reptilia and ,batrachia71 whenever brought into conflict with them4 ,the supremacy of the intelligent over the unintelligent ,mammalia is also clearly shown by research into their past history4 ,the modification of type1 or evolution1 has also become more and more rapid as time has advanced and intelligence developed4 ,there is another reason why the intervention of supermechanics into the process has been necessary to secure such results as we observe in the evolution of life4 ,the law of inorganic evolution is1 as ,spencer epitomises it1 8the integration of matter and the dissipation of energy40 ,natural chemical reactions when not interfered with by human intelligence1 produce solids and give out heat4 ,in other words1 they result in death and not in life4 ,to produce life something different from chemical energy has been necessary4 ,and as the case is a parallel one to the evolution of the types of life1 we may suspect that the agency at work has been a related one4 ,it is some form of energy of the vital class which is able to overcome the bonds which hold dead matter in their adamantine grasp2 and it is evident that such an energy could have been organised only in some region where mechanics of a superchemical order prevail4 ,if we take a large view of the universe the alternatives of life and death present themselves clearly before us4 ,the law of the latter is the integration of matter and dissipation of energy4 ,the law of the former is the converse2 the loosing of the bonds of matter1 and the production of mechanism for the raising of the type of energy4 ,the first is catagenesis1 the latter is anagenesis4 ,the end of catagenesis is the extinction of all mind and all life4 ,anagenesis sustains both4 ,the best foundation for our belief in anagenesis is that it exists4 ,catagenesis has not destroyed it1 and this fact must lead us to suspect that it is the product of an agency which is superchemical2 and the only such that we know is consciousness4 ,in the presence of such a far-reaching hypothesis we are called upon to consider more particularly the relations of mind to its physical basis4 ,the essential condition of the existence of mind as we know it1 is metabolism4 ,the substance#ada of the nervous cells must be in a state of decomposition and recomposition2 old material loosing its chemical bonds and giving forth energy1 and new material arriving to undergo the same process4 ,the energy thus produced displays the phenomena of mind1 and as such differs widely from the inorganic energies of heat1 light1 etc4 ,the extent to which it displays habits depends on the part of the nervous structure where it is produced4 ,in the spinal cord it is strictly automatic1 and as we approach the hemispheres the so-called voluntary element becomes more apparent1 until a region is reached where conception1 deliberation1 and judgment have their seat4 ,in this region energy is purely mental in its attributes1 and it unlocks the executive mechanism of the body1 and puts it in action in accordance with the needs of consciousness4 ,so far1 mechanical laws explain the order of events4 ,the supermechanical resides in the mental content and its effects on the outgoing energy4 ,no quantitative relation can be shown to exist between the results of the mental processes of classification1 conception1 judgment1 etc1 and the amount of incoming or outgoing energy4 ,indeed it is plain that none can exist1 if the statement already made be true1 viz41 that thoughts are without weight4 ,this part of the subject requires critical treatment1 but the general result is included in the above statement1 which is sufficient for our present purpose4 ,since consciousness possesses such extraordinary relations to matter we may well suspect that it has a wider distribution than comes within the purview of our present limited ken4 ,why should it not protect and nourish itself under conditions different from those which prevail in our planet8 ,the one condition necessary to it is metabolism--which means free energy4 ,the kind of physical basis cannot be important1 provided it be capable of exhibiting this kind of non-automatic energy4 ,automatism and all its reflex consequences are the death of consciousness1 as every one knows4 ,from such a type of energy all the fixed types of energy must have been derived1 and with them the types of both mental and physical structures4 ,in its freest form it should have as a physical basis a form of matter which should be without habits1 but always ready to undergo a catagenetic change into routine energy and ultimate unconsciousness4 ,such a medium should be unspecialised matter1 and the consciousness inhabiting it would be a creator4 ,such consciousness would be readily transmitted wherever the physical basis should be suitable1 and one such substance is our protoplasm4 ,the probable inferiority of protoplasm as a physical basis is indicated by the long and tedious education which has been necessary to enable beings made of it to attain a high order of intelligence4 ,in such a basis anagenesis is slow1 and catagenesis is easy4 ,other bases might be imagined where the reverse would be the case4 ,no assumption can be made as to a constant and limited amount of consciousness in the universe4 ,that such is the case is supposable2 but it is also supposable that the amount of suitable physical basis may be increased by a process of assimilation of non-conscious matter1 as is done by animals in digestion and reproduction4 ,this process might continue until all matter should be brought into that generalised condition which is necessary to the continuance of consciousness4 ,the entire universe would then be conscious1 and a maximum limit would be reached4 ,in the primitive consciousness1 whatever its extent in space in the ,universe1 we have the ,supreme ,being or ,person4 ,,ii4 ,,the ,,idealism ,,of ,,theism4 ,what ,i mean by the above expression is the theism which is supposed to be demonstrated by idealistic metaphysics4 ,there are two forms of this alleged demonstration1 both of which have for their starting-point the basis of the idealistic philosophy4 ,this basis is the fact that we know nothing of matter excepting as sense-impressions4 ,from this it is inferred that were conscious beings to become extinct1 matter would no longer exist4 ,it is also a consequence of this belief that what we observe of the conduct of matter1 which we call by the name of natural law1 is of purely mental origin4 ,if now the universe consist wholly of mind1 the totality of it1 either as reduced to a body of general laws1 or to a single comprehensive generalisation1 or concept1 is one form of idealistic ,god4 ,the other demonstration is as follows4 ,since matter exists as mental states1 and since these mental states are common to mankind1 who are mortal2 since these mental states reproduce themselves from generation to generation1 it is inferred that a permanent mental state exists1 which possesses the permanent sensations we call matter4 ,and this common mind of humanity is ,god4 ,the difference between these deities is this4 ,in the first case he is an abstraction of the human mind and therefore not a person apart from such men as are capable of the generalisations of which he consists4 ,in the second case he is a person apart from humanity4 ,the validity of either demonstration to the thinker depends on his point of view4 ,to every one but the idealist1 the first proposition is atheism4 ,the evidence for the second is metaphysical anthropomorphism1 and would be a demonstration1 were the theory of idealism well founded4 ,the fact that we only know matter as sense-impressions does not1 in the opinion of realists1 prove that it does not exist as the resistant and extended4 ,resistance of each part to the movements of other parts 7energy71 and extension in space1 are conditions about which we have a great deal of information4 ,our lives are spent in overcoming the one1 and in getting round the other4 ,our methods of dealing with it represent the antithesis of those employed in thought-processes4 ,the latter are best performed in the absence of the muscular exertion which is so necessary in dealing with the former4 ,i have referred to the well-known difference in consciousness between sense-impressions and the representation and re-representation of them4 ,the difference certainly implies a difference in the immediate sources of the respective kinds of consciousness4 ,the one is produced by something different from that which produces the other4 ,in short1 the one is produced by the contact of matter external to our physical basis1 and the other is produced by a modification of brain-structure2 and in the first place by that simplest form of it which is the cause of memory4 ,the effect of such observation is the conviction that matter exists as something outside of consciousness or mind1 in spite of the fact that we only know it in consciousness4 ,in a word1 consciousness and knowledge imply the existence rather than the non-existence of something which is known4 ,the fundamental actualities are1 then1 subject and object2 or1 in popular language1 mind and matter4 ,philosophy includes the sciences which embrace the knowledge of both subject and object2 but the practical philosophy is the science of the mutual relations of the two4 ,it may be said that subject and object are opposite sides of the same reality1 but this form of expression appears to me to be no more accurate than the statement that energy and matter are opposite sides of the same thing4 ,as energy is the motion of matter1 mind is the intelligence of matter2 and both may be called properties of matter with equal propriety1 since both are impossible without a physical basis4 ,mind1 however1 differs from energy in possessing some intrinsic qualities which are in essence independent of the qualities of the physical basis2 and these intrinsic qualities are the forms of logic4 ,these are1 however1 but a part of the totality of mind1 although they underlie or penetrate all its representative activities4 ,while mind then cannot exist without a physical basis1 it remains to be considered whether any other objective world is necessary to its existence4 ,it is sometimes alleged that consciousness could not exist without an objective1 exterior to its physical basis4 ,if1 however1 consciousness is a necessary attribute of free energy1 the latter purely metaphysical speculation has no foundation4 ,the 8intuition of ,being0 7,rosmini7 would exist1 albeit not much specialised1 in the absence of multifarious objects2 but the forms of logic would characterise it nevertheless4 ,it is alleged that we can never know matter as it is1 because our observation is restricted to the mutual relations of its component parts4 ,in this assertion our intelligence necessarily concurs1 but this need not cause us to relax our exertions in the pursuit of knowledge4 ,the practical philosophy is1 as already remarked1 the knowledge of the relations subsisting between mind and matter1 so that our most valuable acquisition will be in the end the laws of a relation4 ,we may well postpone our endeavors after the absolute1 even if we can ever attain a knowledge of it4 ,the realist is content to believe that if we do not know 8things as they are in themselves10 it is because1 of the imperfection of our senses4 ,but we are constantly discovering new aids to research1 and we can put no limit to our power in this direction4 ,the research into the relations of subject and object1 means to theology1 an investigation as to the existence and nature of ,deity1 and as to an existence for conscious beings in other than terrestrial life4 ,the pure idealist reaches an affirmative answer to these problems by a short and easy route1 based on a study of the intrinsic nature of mind alone4 ,the pure realist reaches a negative conclusion by an equally short cut1 by considering the properties of matter alone4 ,not a few thinkers entertain both doctrines at one and the same time1 although they are mutually exclusive and contradictory4 ,no wonder that they reach what ,montgomery well terms 8the puzzle of puzzles40 ,but the rational conclusion from this deadlock must be1 that there is something wrong with the methods of both sides4 ,to the practical mind it seems that the vice in both methods is the failure to harmonise properly with their own1 the facts adduced by the opposite side in the discussion4 ,and it is indeed evident that that cannot be the final philosophy which restricts itself to a consideration of mind alone2 or that which restricts itself to a consideration of matter alone4 ,that men should pursue different lines of research is natural4 ,those whose minds are capable in the fields of conception naturally prefer idealistic studies2 while those whose especial genius lies in the direction of mechanics1 easily pursue-materialistic research4 ,what is needed is a combination of the two fields of ability in the same mind4 ,a considerable class of serious people1 observing the diversities between the schools of philosophy1 regard such studies as useless4 ,since they have not the disposition or ability to solve the question for themselves1 they find it best to rest in uncertainty1 which has optimistic or pessimistic tendencies according to temperament and education4 ,the optimist has faith that all is1 and all will be1 well2 while the pessimist takes the opposite view4 ,both are sustained in their position by those teachers who teach the impotence of our faculties and the uselessness of knowledge4 ,such appeal in support of their position to the facts already cited2 the imperfection of our senses2 the relativity of knowledge2 the inscrutable nature of mind and matter1 etc4 ,this position is1 however1 a plea of avoidance1 and it will be time enough to listen to it when the avenues of the increase of human knowledge are permanently closed4 ,this they are not at present4 ,the key to the position is the doctrine of evolution4 ,here we behold the interaction of subject and object1 both in our own persons and in the inferior beings which are with us1 and which have preceded us on earth4 ,that mind has not sprung full-fledged upon this planet1 is clear2 and that it has made wonderful progress in power1 is equally clear4 ,why did it not appear with all its powers 8in the beginning08 ,the answer obviously is1 8the intractability of matter40 ,why has it progressed in face of this obstacle8 ,the answer is1 the tractability of matter4 ,mind1 through its intrinsic quality1 has corced matter1 in ever increasing degree1 and the limit of its capacity in this direction plainly has not yet been reached4 ,its most important conquest has been that of its own physical basis1 and next to it is the conquest of the world of objects by which it is surrounded4 ,its last conquest will be the knowledge of its destiny1 as a projection of its known past4 ,to this end the knowledge of its own constitution is essential1 but this is not all1 as the pure idealist would have us believe4 ,the knowledge of external relations is also essential1 for we can in no state of being escape them4 ,psychic life is an 8internal adjustment to external relations10 quite as much as is the physical life1 as it is defined by ,spencer in the phrase just quoted4 ,the ,deity of evolution indicated in the first section of this paper1 will not satisfy the pure idealist4 ,he is not an absolute1 since ,he is compelled to respect relations4 ,but we find ,him to be just1 which he evidently is not if absolute4 ,he is anthropomorphic1 and not an abstraction of the human mind4 ,and yet as the seat of rationality1 and as the director of free energy1 ,he possesses the function of creator of whatever is possible4 ,the evolution of independent human minds has been only possible through education1 and here as elsewhere1 teachable students have met with greater success than the stolid4 ,it has been already pointed out that the process of evolution may be either progressive 7,anagenesis7 or retrogressive 7,catagenesis74 ,this is well known to be the case with organic types1 where degenerate phyla are common4 ,it seems1 indeed1 that in the order of things degeneracy has occurred wherever it has been possible2 that is1 under circumstances which permitted vegetative life through lack of stimuli to energetic motion4 ,there has always been 8room at the top02 but only when all the lower fields of existence have been for the time being filled1 has there been room at the top only4 ,the history of mental evolution has accompanied that of general structural evolution1 and for similar reasons4 ,it is well illustrated in human society to-day4 ,these facts suggest that this has been the history of all evolution1 since they harmonise with the order of evolution observed in our solar system1 in which the inorganic has preceded the organic1 or ,catagenesis has preceded ,anagenesis4 ,if the forms of non-vital energy represent a result of ,catagenesis1 we are not bound to look on minerals as in any sense living1 as has been suggested by ,haeckel and others4 ,most1 if not all1 forms of chemical energy have sunk below the vital level1 and certainly far below the possibility of displaying consciousness4 ,we are here looking over unexplored territory1 and one whose elucidation is entirely in the future1 but we may put our ideas in order1 if we do nothing more4 ,besides his relations to the impersonal materials that surround him1 man has essential relations to his fellow-man4 ,the laws of these relations are ethics4 ,much is written and spoken against the utilitarian or evolutionary theory of ethics4 ,i cannot1 however1 escape the conviction that this theory offers the true explanation of the rise of the ethical sentiment in mankind4 ,but to understand it aright1 we must include the growth of the social sentiment1 as well as that of the rational element1 in the evolution of justice or right4 ,the opponents of this view sometimes commit the error common to all those who do not understand the nature of mental evolution4 ,some of them imagine that it is necessary to suppose that1 in harmony with this theory1 every man decides his every act solely in accordance with what appears to him at the time to subserve the lowest form of selfishness of which he is capable4 ,the doctrine1 on the contrary1 maintains that habits of honesty and justice are the result of the education of the ages1 and that men obey such motives according to their developmental status2 that is1 in accordance with the evolution of the habit of preferring the higher to the lower forms of utility4 ,the further question of what it is that has raised the standard of utility1 is answered by what we see going on around us4 ,the fear of the law2 the love of the approbation of our fellows2 the sympathy with our fellow-men2 the fear of their indignation2 all these are educators of great potency1 which have always been active4 ,these motives1 organised as character1 are compulsory1 and it would be strange if they have not been effective in producing results4 ,practical ethics has to do with material beings and their material possessions1 i4 e4 with person and property4 ,without the objective1 the content of ethics is purely ideal1 consisting of love and hate1 and the justice and injustice of opinion which might be the outcome of those sentiments4 ,these sentiments are realities of the subjective1 representing the affections1 as the form of thought constitutes the rational faculties4 ,but if we endeavor in thought to deprive love and hate1 justice and injustice1 of all material consequences and implications1 we deprive those sentiments of much of their value if we do not abolish their occasions altogether4 ,it appears to me at least doubtful whether hate and injustice could exist in a society consisting of disembodied minds1 if such beings could be imagined2 a supposition which ,i cannot entertain4 ,if ethics cannot exist without material expression1 it is clear that1 on the other hand1 they cannot exist without a subjective foundation4 ,thus ethics is the highest expression of the relation between mind and matter4 ,ethics is the practical application of the mental powers to human relations1 and the more complete the evolution of mind1 the more perfect is the ethical practice4 ,thus the evolution of the mind is the guarantee of ethical progress1 and the more intelligent the mind1 the more easy will the evolution be4 ,as in all education1 the laggards experience the severities of compulsion1 while pains and penalties are avoided by those who perceive their approach and do not await their arrival4 ,here we have the utilitarian ground of our numerous ethical and religious organisations4 ,they invite men to a priori subjective theory1 and objective practice1 so as to preserve society from the evils of inferior and painful methods of compulsion1 which lie at the basis of ethical evolution4 ,it is the dread of this method which rouses a natural repugnance in the minds of many men to the doctrine which teaches of it4 ,but it must be remembered that the instruments of evolution change with the thing that is evolving1 and the conditions of progressive ethics are the stages of progress of the mind4 ,what is necessary for the education of the lower mind is no longer necessary for the higher4 ,this is not only a truth of philosophy1 but the fact may be discerned in the religions which men have made for themselves4 ,they describe the ethical state of their authors1 and prescribe the treatment appropriate to it4 ,our knowledge of some parts of evolutionary history is meagre1 and on some of its chapters we are absolutely in the dark4 ,this is especially true of the causes of the appearance of life and consciousness on the earth4 ,spontaneous generation has not been proven1 and the immediate source of sensation is unknown4 ,the conclusions enumerated in the preceding pages are derived from evidence presented in more or less complete fragments4 ,but the thesis remains true that mind possesses a limited control over its physical basis1 but one which is sufficient to account for the main direction of the evolution of those organic forms which possess it4 ,and it is also true that the essential forms of the rational mind are not due to corresponding qualities of the physical basis4 ,these forms are3 the principles of identity1 of abstraction1 and of generalisation or conception4 ,these characteristics constitute the idealistic essence of ,theism4 ,but we look to the realistic element of ,theism for the demonstration of the distinct personality of ,god4 ,e4 ,d4 ,,cope4 ,,footnotes3 #adj ,proceedings of the ,american ,philosophical ,society1 #ahhi1 p4 #die #ada ,recent experiments conducted in the laboratory of the ,johns ,hopkins ,university show that the cytoplasm of cells1 which are exhausted by labor1 is vacuolated4 ,,literary ,,correspondence4 ,,germany4 ,the name of ,cesare ,lombroso is now more and more mentioned in ,germany1 not only in psychiatrical1 juridical1 and sociological works1 written for the learned public1 but also in the newspapers and magazines4 ,by the side of occasional recognition of his doctrine of the born criminal and genius1 we meet--and these are the majority of the cases--with violent attacks on it1 which not seldom exhibit real ignorance of the views of the celebrated ,italian investigator4 ,lombroso himself is partly to blame for this unfortunate circumstance1 for his writings1 with their mountains of undigested material1 are so lacking in unity and perspicuity that misconceptions are very apt to arise4 ,the ,german translator of ,lombroso1 ,,dr4 ,h4 ,,kurella1 psychiatrist in ,kreuzburg1 in ,silesia1 has recently given to the world a synoptical exposition of ,lombroso's theory of the born criminal1 under the title ,cesare ,lombroso und die ,naturgeschichte des ,verbrechers1 ,hamburg1 #ahib1 ,richter4 ,the author not only expounds the doctrines of ,lombroso1 but also deals critically with them1 and1 although upon the whole his sympathies are with the views of the ,italian scientist1 he nevertheless believes that the existence of a fixed type of the delinquente nato1 embracing all special forms of criminality1 is yet a question of doubt4 ,on the other hand1 ,,max ,,nordau1 a widely-read author of ours1 gives unqualified recognition to the theories of ,lombroso1 fully accepting the idea of 8degeneration10 first introduced by ,morel into science and further developed by ,lombroso1 and1 in completion of the work of his master1 extending this idea to art and literature4 ,in his work1 ,entartung1 the first volume of which was recently published by ,carl ,duncker1 of ,berlin1 and is dedicated to ,lombroso1 8his dear1 admired master10 he says3 8,degenerate types are not always criminals1 prostitutes1 anarchists1 and idiots4 ,they are often writers and artists1 and these exhibit the same mental1 and frequently also the same physical1 traits as those members of the same anthropological family that satisfy their diseased instincts by means of the murderer's knife or the cartridge of the dynamitard1 instead of with pen and pencil40 ,people who are acquainted with ,nordau's previous works will perhaps imagine that this latest book of his is simply a mass of journalistic ebullitions which can lay no claim to scientific value4 ,this1 however1 is wrong4 ,nordau is not only well acquainted with the patho-psychological literature of this province--especially with the ,french--but he also turns his knowledge to scientific account1 which psychiatrists like ,pelman and others have publicly admitted4 ,taking it as a whole1 ,nordau has presented in this first volume of his work a good psychology of mysticism--good1 that is1 for all who accept the association psychology4 ,nordau's expositions embrace all the psychological theories which belong in this province1 with their applications to individuals and to the tendencies of modern literature and art4 ,with respect to the first point1 the author is right in saying that he does not offer here anything new to the professional psychologist1 but he is wrong in his theory that psychologists will read this chapter with impatience1 for his exposition is unquestioniably elegantly written4 ,of much greater interest is the second part1 in which a diagnosis of imbecility is rendered upon the ,english pre-,raphaelites1 the ,french symbolists1 the ,tolstois1 and ,richard ,wagners4 ,the chapter on ,richard ,wagner will especially attract attention for its severity4 ,nordau closes it with the words1 8of all the aberrations of the present time1 ,wagnerism is the most widely diffused and the most important4 ,the playhouse at ,bayreuth1 the ,bayreuther ,bltter1 the ,parisian ,revue ,wagnerienne1 are lasting monuments by which the future will measure in wonderment the dimensions of this degeneration and hysteria of our day40 ,nordau throws light upon numerous mooted phenomena of modern art and literature1 pointing out their diseased features4 ,one is really surprised at the extent of his work4 ,all in all1 it may be foreseen that ,koch's doctrine of the 8psychopathical minor factors0--or those psychical factors which constitute the border-line between mental health and disease--will clear up much more extensive fields than they have1 when applied in the direction indicated by ,nordau4 ,,koch has now published the third part of his work1 7which ,i have repeatedly mentioned in ,the ,monist7 and thus completed it4 ,he concludes his last volume with these words3 8,the domain of the #8psychopathical minor factors' is a wide and very interesting one4 ,whosoever enters profoundly into it will learn to look at much in life with different eyes from those with which he began1 will understand many men and many human acts1 which before he did not understand4 ,there are yet many scientific treasures to be unearthed in this field1 and ,i hope that ,i shall win many a coadjutor4 ,i hope1 also1 that qualified men will make this theory of the psychopathical minor factors fruitful in wider fields and for greater problems40 ,it is a common belief that it is pre-eminently in our time that psychical disorders and psychical minor factors play so great a rle4 ,but that in the sense of ,nordau they are not of so recent origin a careful reader will learn from a new work of ,,ludwig ,,geiger1 the well-known historian of literature and civilisation 7,paetel1 ,berlin74 ,its title is3 ,berlin1 #afhh-ahdj3 ,geschichte des geistigen ,lebens der preussischen ,hauptstadt4 ,as yet1 only the first volume has appeared1 which extends to the death of ,frederick the ,great4 ,the reader1 however1 would obtain an entirely wrong impression of the work if he were to believe that psychiatrical points of view are expressly dwelt upon in this book4 ,to find them he must read between the lines4 ,the book is an extraordinarily painstaking history of the civilisation of ,berlin1 taken from the sources1 and giving especial prominence to intellectual factors4 ,we shall reserve the detailed discussion of this important work for another occasion1 perhaps until it is fully completed4 ,,christian ,,ufer4 ,,book ,,reviews4 ,,hand-,,commentar ,,zum ,,neuen ,,testament4 ,,iv4 ,,evangelium1 ,,briefl ,,und ,,offenbarung ,,des ,,johannes4 ,bearbeitet von ,h4 ,j4 ,holtzmann4 ,zweite verbesserte und vermehrte ,auflage4 7,freiburg ,i4 ,b4 and ,leipsic3 #ahic4 ,j4 ,c4 ,b4 ,mohr47 ,the fourth gospel1 of all the sacred writings of the ,new ,testament1 has always been the reviewer's favorite book4 ,its profundity1 its wealth of philosophical ideas1 the fervor of its author's religious sentiment1 and the spiritual grace that pervades the whole book1 exercised an unspeakable charm on my mind4 ,this gospel was the first to rouse my doubts in the belief of literal inspiration1 and it was again the one1 which1 after the severest storms of infidelity had blown over1 reconciled me to the spirit of ,christianity4 ,thus the perusal of ,professor ,holtzmann's commentary again arouses the recollections of former struggles1 and ,i find that even to-day the first chapter of the fourth gospel has lost none of its fascination4 ,it is a wonderful book1 and its author is a man whom ,i always longed to meet and shake hands with1 over a span of almost two millenniums and a world-wide abyss of difference of opinion4 ,only those who are familiar with the difficulties of the ,st4 ,john literature of the ,new ,testament can really appreciate this latest work of ,prof4 ,h4 ,j4 ,holtzmann4 ,he presents in a most clear and concise manner the problems involved1 together with their various solutions1 critically arranged4 ,he carefully avoids obtruding on the reader his own views4 ,he stands before us as a faithful compiler only4 ,i say 8only10 but this 8only0 means a great deal4 ,it does not mean that he suppresses or conceals his own views1 it means that he states the facts with scrupulous impartiality4 ,if there is any partiality apparent in his treatment of the sacred writings1 it is the reverent attitude he preserves whenever love of truth obliges him to accept the negative result of critical investigations4 ,and where is there a theological scholar to-day1 who is orthodox enough to dare to accept the theory that the gospel of ,st4 ,john was written by the apostle8 ,holtzmann carries his impartiality to the extent of not rejecting this old traditional idea1 concerning the authorship of the fourth gospel1 but the evidence against it is overwhelmingly sufficient to satisfy the most narrowminded believer4 ,holtzmann teaches us at the same time to understand the spirit of the first and second century of our era1 and thus excludes from the beginning the old prejudice1 that if the author were not the man whom he impersonated his work must be regarded as a fraud4 ,the historical value of the book lies in the revelations it gives us concerning the religious demands of the times in which it was written4 ,the fourth gospel originated when the ,jewish religiosity of growing ,christianity began to expand into cosmic universality4 ,the author was undoubtedly a ,jew-,christian1 whose home most likely was ,ephesus4 ,ephesus was the place where we find the first beginnings of ,christian ,alexandrianism4 ,here the ,logos-idea was introduced into ,christian thought4 ,philo1 the ,alexandrian ,jew1 had already represented ,moses as the incarnation of the divine ,logos4 ,should not now a ,christian familiar with ,philo's philosophy apply the same method to ,jesus of ,nazareth8 ,some work adapted to satisfy the wants of the time and especially the religious yearnings for knowledge as a means of edification was needed4 ,the ,christ-idea had taken a definite shape in the imagination of the ,christian congregations of ,asia ,minor1 consisting of diaspora ,jews and ,gentiles1 and their ,christ-idea found a worthy expression in the picture of ,jesus of ,nazareth as we have it in the fourth gospel4 ,the fact that the author of the fourth gospel was a ,jew-,christian1 appears from his readiness to explain ,jewish customs4 ,he knows ,judaism1 and is familiar with ,jerusalem as it appeared after the destruction of the temple4 ,the probability is that he wrote his gospel between #abj and #adj4 ,he is comparable to ,matthew in so far as both are greatly interested in the controversy between ,gentiles versus ,jews1 yet ,matthew's ,israel has grown into the world-wide cosmos4 ,the frequent occurrence of the very word 8cosmos0 in the fourth gospel is remarkable4 ,in the same way the ,greek term 7to know7 appears besides the older term 7to believe71 which latter is a translation of a ,jewish conception1 still employed so vigorously by ,st4 ,paul4 ,the author of the fourth gospel is not familiar with ,galilee and does not seem to care for consistency in the details of his accounts1 for he frequently contradicts his own statements4 ,the most important differences between his and the three synoptic gospels are the accounts as to the main field of ,jesus's activity1 which according to ,st4 ,john was ,judea1 according to the synoptic gospels ,galilee1 and the day of ,jesus's death1 which according to ,st4 ,john is the #adth of ,nisan1 according to the synoptic gospels the #aeth of ,nisan1 so that if we follow the latter1 ,jesus would have been tried and condemned1 against all ,jewish customs1 on one of the greatest festival days4 ,holtzmann rightly warns the reader1 that whatever may speak in favor of the synoptic gospels as being1 in general1 historically more correct1 the author of the fourth gospel might have had some special source for this particular fact4-- ,the ,revelation of ,st4 ,john has given more trouble to the ,christian exegesis than any other book1 and light was not shed upon its plan and construction1 until it was found to be one instance only of a whole class of literary productions4 ,when we consider the ,revelation of ,st4 ,john in the same line with other apocalyptic works1 and when we understand the mental disposition of the pious ,jews shortly before and after ,christ1 we have a clew to the enigmatic visions which are unrolled before our eyes4 ,the expectations of the ,jews in the times of the ,maccabees were disappointed again and again4 ,the great events of the world did not justify the national hopes1 and ,god did not seem to care about fulfilling his promises4 ,the last prophet1 who called himself ,malachi1 or 8the messenger of ,god10 proclaimed the message of the ,lord1 8,yet ,i loved ,jacob10 and he comforts the faithful who still endure in all their tribulations1 that 8a book of remembrance is written before him for them that feared the ,lord and that thought upon ,his name40 ,after ,malachi1 a number of revelations appeared1 which1 to the satisfaction of the ,messianic expectations1 explained the events of the world1 and prophesied that those only who should persevere until the end would be called upon to rule1 together with the 8,son of ,man10 who is to come to smite the heathens and to rule them with an iron rod4 ,the first apocalyptic author1 who wrote in #afd ,b4 ,c41 impersonated ,daniel1 the prophet1 who had lived about #djj ,b4 ,c4 ,the powerful nations of the world are represented as beasts1 the fourth and last beast being the ,macedonian empire4 ,it has ten horns1 that is1 rulers1 the last one being ,antiochus ,epiphanes4 ,as soon as his power is broken1 the power over the earth will be given to ,israel1 which is called the ,son of ,man4 ,the power of the tenth horn was broken1 indeed1 yet the ,messianic hopes remained unfulfilled1 and thus new prophecies were wanted1 which should again explain the plans of the ,almighty1 so that the faithful would still endure and hope4 ,thus1 ,henoch was written1 and after ,henoch the ,assumption of ,moses1 the book of ,baruch1 and other revelations4 ,the apocalyptic literature is characterised by ,messianic expectations and eschatological reflections4 ,the end of the present course of affairs is said to be near at hand and a new order will be established in which the faithful shall rule for a whole millennium and the wicked be tormented4 ,the ,revelation of ,st4 ,john represents this spirit of apocalyptic hopes among the early ,christians of ,asia ,minor4 ,it throws much light upon the conditions and the conceptions of a period concerning which we have very little information4 ,we here see ,christianity in its beginnings4 ,the coloring of the ,revelation is still ,jewish4 ,its author stands in a conscious contrast to the ,greek spirit which is about to change the properly ,jewish character of the new doctrine4 ,the author of the ,st4 ,john revelation is a ,jew to the backbone still2 he denounces the antinomistic ,christianity of the ,gentiles as represented by ,nocolaitanes whom1 we are told1 ,god hateth4 ,he does not directly mention the apostle ,st4 ,paul1 but there is little doubt that he is alluded to in ,chap4 ,,ii1 #b1 as one of them 8which say they are apostles and are not40 ,the more powerful the ,greek spirit grew in the church1 the weaker became these original features inherited from the diaspora ,jews until they were dropped forever through the efforts of ,origenes who made a decided and successful opposition to the belief in the millennium4 ,yet it took some time for the traditional view of the ,messiah to change into the purer and more spiritual ,christ-ideal ,there were two parties in the early church who spoke two radically different idioms2 the one still cherished the old chiliasm1 dreaming of the establishment of a millennium on earth4 ,their terminology moved always in the same allegories3 they spoke of green and fat fields and of sulphurous abysses1 of white horses and terrible beasts1 of trees of life1 of golden cities and of war and bloodshed1 while the other party spoke of ,logos1 of the eternal ,son through whom the world had been made1 of 8the dispensation of the fulness of the times in which ,god might gather together in one all things in ,christ1 both which are in heaven and which are on earth10 of the pleroma and of aeons4 ,the ,revelation of ,st4 ,john is an expression of the former party and it was natural that after a complete victory of the latter party1 ,christian teachers knew not what to make of this book which shows ,christian views by the side of an irreconcilable ,judaism1 and a worldly empire in ,jerusalem1 the beloved city with twenty-four ,jewish elders representing the twelve tribes of ,israel4 ,the rest of ,jerusalem is to be finally converted while there is no hope for paganism4 ,the difference between ,israelites and ,gentiles remains a radical one even in the ,holy ,city when the new heaven and the new earth has been created4 ,the ,gentile-,christians appear as citizens of a lower order4 ,the ,israelites alone live in the city while the ,gentiles only walk in the light thereof1 and they shall bring the glory and honor of the nations into it4 ,we have given a few glimpses of the problems of the ,st4 ,john literature only4 ,it is impossible to go over the whole field4 ,nor is it necessary to do so4 ,professor ,holtzmann has given us so complete a presentation that we need but refer to his work which is indispensable to all interested in the literature of the ,new ,testament4 ,it will be the more valuable and welcome as it is furnished with an index1 a feature rarely found in ,german books4 ,p4 ,c4 ,,die ,,willensfreiheit ,,und ,,ihre ,,gegner4 ,by ,dr4 ,constantin ,gutberlet4 ,fulda3 ,fuldaer ,actiendruckerei4 #ahic4 ,dr4 ,constantin ,gutberlet regards the doctrine of free-will as a cardinal doctrine of ,christianity4 ,in the present booklet he endeavors to show that all attacks made upon it by unchristian savants have failed4 ,he criticises ,hffding1 ,lombroso1 ,wundt1 ,mnsterberg1 ,lotze1 ,p4 ,ree1 and ,schopenhauer1 and establishes as his own view a theory of free-will which he calls 8freedom of choice40 ,he says3 8,there is no decision without sufficient reason1 but there may be without rational reason4 ,the sufficient reason is that a greater good may be recognised as possessing #8blind' sides1 that we can do without it and even reject it for the sake of these #8blind' sides4 ,on the other hand1 a lesser good may be given as an object of willing1 and our willing by its own energy conditions the free decision of the will0 7p4 #be74 ,freedom of will is not a reversal of causation1 which latter1 according to ,gutberlet1 is 8an absolutely necessary law0 7p4 #h and passim74 ,it is difficult to understand how ,gutberlet1 taking this view1 can class himself among the indeterminists4 ,from his premises1 we should expect him to take the view which we have defended1 that freedom of will is not contradictory to determinism4 ,if freedom of will means freedom of choice1 in which 8we ourselves1 as the contents of our ideas1 feelings1 and dispositions1 are the cause not only of our activities1 but also of our free decision0 7p4 #ai71 then our decisions are most certainly determined by our character4 ,gutberlet's criticism of ,wundt 7pp4 #afg-aga71 who defends freedom of will and determinism1 is wide of the mark1 and it seems that ,gutberlet is either not clear on this point himself or he does not draw the consequences of his own standpoint4 ,says ,gutberlet3 8,only on the supposition that there is no other than #8mechanical' causation of natural forces1 can the determinist maintain that freedom abolishes the principle of causation4 ,in the application of the principle of ,causation #8what happens has a cause' to natural forces1 the principle can be inverted thus3 #8when all sufficient causes are given1 the effect follows with necessity4' ,yet if there are spiritual agents which stand above the mechanical causation of nature and natural forces1 we cannot a priori declare that their effects follow with the same necessity from their character as is the case with nature4 ,accordingly1 unless we assume the questionable theory that free causation is impossible1 we cannot invert here the principle of causation and use it against free decision0 7p4 #afh74 ,how does this sentence agree with ,mr4 ,gutberlet's statements that causation is an absolutely necessary law and that 8we ourselves 444 are the cause of our free decision40 ,our decisions are determined by 8our ideas1 feelings1 and dispositions10 and yet a sufficient cause determines its effect only if the causation is mechanical1 not if it is spiritual4 ,gutberlet explains the difficulty as follows3 8,certainly1 if we did not reduce the free decision once made 7die eingetretene freie ,entscheidung71 to an adequate cause1 we should sin against logic and psychology4 ,but we understand by #8adequate cause of a decision' not only the influence of motives1 but also the energy of a free will40 ,very well then1 ,mr4 ,gutberlet would be a determinist as much as ,wundt4 ,decisions are determined by two factors3 7#a7 by the motives 7i4 e4 the objects which act as stimuli upon the will7 and 7#b7 by the character of the agent4 ,not everybody is affected by the same stimulus in the same way4 ,one chooses this and another that motive1 and his character determines the choice2 and a man of a certain character1 under definitely given conditions1 will freely and yet necessarily choose a certain motive4 ,dr4 ,gutberlet1 it appears to us1 says yes and no in one breath4 ,dr4 ,gutberlet is the editor of the ,philosophisches ,jahrbuch1 a ,roman ,catholic periodical4 ,he belongs to that class of men who by partisans of free thought are regarded as especially dangerous4 ,he is not as narrow as the common type of defensores fidei4 ,he studies the works of modern savants 8whose intellectual superiority10 as he confesses1 he 8admires in many respects40 ,he is broader than most of his confreres1 and thus he makes the creed of his church appear broader than it practically is4 ,we can see no danger in the appearance of such men4 ,it is true1 he will make converts among the educated1 or at least1 he will keep some wavering elements within the pale of the church2 for the ,roman church is1 upon the whole1 still very hostile to progress4 ,but1 on the other hand1 such a man is in his circles a missionary of science2 he will help to broaden the views of his brethren4 ,he is learning1 and they will learn from him4 ,p4 ,c4 ,,grundz,,ge ,,der ,,physiologischen ,,psychologie4 ,by ,wilhelm ,wundt4 ,leipsic3 ,wilhelm ,engelmann4 #ahic4 ,wundt's 8,physiological ,psychology0 is perhaps justly regarded as his best and most valuable work4 ,we have just received the first part of the fourth edition and may expect that the second part will soon appear4 ,we intend to review the whole work as soon as completed1 and will state here only that this new edition contains1 among many emendations and additions1 an explicit account of the modern methods of psychological investigations1 with descriptions and illustrations of the most important instruments invented for that purpose4 4 ,,vergleichend-,,entwickelungsgeschichtl iche ,,und ,,anatomische ,,studien ,,im ,,bereiche ,,der ,,hirnanatomie4 #c4 ,,riechapparat ,,und ,,ammonshorn4 ,abdruck aus ,anatomischer ,anzeiger4 ,by ,dr4 ,l4 ,edinger4 7,jena3 #ahic4 ,gustav ,fischer47 ,dr4 ,edinger proves in this essay that in the cerebral evolution of animals the cortex makes its first appearance in the formation of the cornu ammonis4 ,this convolution being the centre of smell1 it is more than merely probable that smell sensations1 or something analogous to smell sensations1 were phylogenetically the first psychical functions4 4 ,,tat ,,mental ,,des ,,hyst,,riques ,,les ,,stigmates ,,mentaux4 ,by ,pierre ,janet4 ,paris3 ,rueff ,co4 #ahib4 ,m4 ,pierre ,janet1 one of the most prominent disciples of ,professor ,charcot1 presents in this little volume of two hundred and thirty-three pages a summary of the results of modern psychical research as it is understood at the ,salptrire4 ,charcot himself recommends the book to the medical profession4 ,janet investigates ansthesia 7,chap4 ,i71 amnesia1 abulia1 the diseases of motion1 and the modifications of character4 ,the author proposes to 8describe the phenomena and endeavors to establish a rigorous determinism of their relations4 ,the moral view of a diseased person10 he says1 8ought to constitute a part of the clinical diagnosis while the psychical state must be closely investigated in its connection with physiological facts4 ,this is the only way in which the physician can gain a knowledge of the entire man and understand the diseases which affect his organism40 ,professor ,charcot states that ,professor ,janet's researches on the mental state of hysterical persons were begun long ago and completed under his supervision2 that they were expounded by ,m4 ,janet in the ,spring of #ahib in a few lectures at the ,salptrire2 that they tend to confirm the idea1 often expressed in his own teachings1 that hysteria is upon the whole a mental disease4 ,hypnotism has long enough been regarded not only as harmless but even as a panacea for almost all the ailments of mankind4 ,it would be well to heed ,charcot's warning1 as hysterical diseases may be treated with better success1 if the mystery that still surrounds them disappears before calm and scientific investigation4 4 ,l',,cole ,d',,anthropologie ,,criminelle4 ,by l',abb ,maurice de ,baets4 ,gand3 ,p4 van ,fleteren4 #ahic4 ,dr4 de ,baets1 ,professor of ,philosophy of the ,gregorian ,university of ,rome1 ,italy1 and ,secretary to the ,bishop of ,ghent1 criticises in this elegantly printed little volume the modern school of criminal anthropology4 ,he believes with ,herbert ,spencer that1 if a great number of people accept certain errors1 these errors must contain a kernel of truth4 ,professor de ,baets says that he does not deny crime to be an outgrowth of the organism1 to be inherited1 to be closely connected with insanity1 etc41 but he cannot approve of criminal unaccountableness4 ,the denial of responsibility1 he says1 is the denial of the wrong1 and the denial of the wrong is the denial of morality4 ,he sums up his view in italics on page #dh3 8,man is responsible for his acts in the measure that his acts depend on a free will40 4 ,,against ,,dogma ,,and ,,free-,,will4 ,by ,h4 ,croft ,hiller4 ,london3 ,williams and ,,norgate4 #ahib4 ,the author has much to say against ecclesiasticism and sacerdotalism1 and while he repudiates such men as ,wundt and ,ribot1 he 8begs to thank ,drs4 ,weismann1 ,luys1 and ,ferrier from whose labors the views expressed in this treatise derive that scientific authentication without which they would be worthless40 ,the book is apparently a first venture into the stormy ocean of literary pursuits4 4 ,,the ,,philosophy ,,of ,,individuality1 ,,or ,,the ,,one ,,and ,,the ,,many4 ,by ,antoinette ,brown ,blackwell4 ,new ,york and ,london3 ,g4 ,p4 ,putnam's ,sons4 #ahic4 ,the author trusts that she has 8demonstrated a conscious immortality40 ,in a former book of hers entitled 8,the ,physical ,basis of ,immortality10 #ahgf1 she propounded 8the theory of persistent mind-matter individuals0 which are to be conceived as ultimate atoms4 ,the present volume of five hundred and nineteen pages is written to show that 8this conception of the ultimate atoms could consistently explain and harmonise mental and material phenomena and by cordinated interpretations of the most diverse processes simplify and unify nature and her manifestations40 ,the theory of the correlation of matter and mind is accepted2 8,nature10 the author says1 8is nothing if not mathematical10 and there are many passages to which no monistic thinker would take exception4 ,along with them we find statements1 e4 g4 on the rhythmic motion of atoms1 etc41 which it will be difficult to prove4 ,her peculiar view is characterised in the following sentence3 8,all ultimate individualities may be identical in kind1 but no obvious necessity decides that they must be1 and in an order of things where other varieties are prevalent1 the weight of evidence for the present is on the side of varieties1 even in the ultimate units40 ,the author's theory 7if we rightly understand her7 has been tried before4 ,some suggestions of ,goethe's seem to indicate that he believed in soul-monads1 and the ,german psychologist ,herbart erected on the assumption of material soul-atoms his system of a mathematical psychology in which sound science was curiously mingled with improbable vagaries4 ,the author of 8,the ,philosophy of ,individuality10 although apparently quite well informed otherwise1 has1 strange enough1 not taken notice either of ,goethe or of ,herbart4 ,perhaps she would have abandoned her theory if she had been fully familiar with ,herbartism and the critique which it has received2 for ,herbart's soul-atoms are to-day regarded as a thing of the past4 4 ,,die ,,grundbegriffe ,,der ,,gegenwart4 ,by ,prof4 ,rudolf ,eucken4 ,leipsic3 ,veit ,co4 #ahic4 ,prof4 ,rudolf ,eucken discusses in this volume such topics as 8,subjective--,objective02 8,a priori--,a posteriori02 8,monism--,dualism02 8,idealism1 ,realism1 and ,naturalism02 8,theoretical--,practical10 and so forth4 ,it seems to us that ,eucken has not yet fully succeeded in reconciling his philosophy with natural science4 ,we are glad to notice that he has a critical eye for the shortcomings of naturalists under whose methods of classification and mechanical conceptions the properly spiritual of man would be eliminated4 ,he is judicious in his exposition of the various problems1 but we miss a final solution1 such as would clearly state and recognise the truth in both4 ,nevertheless the book is sound1 full of valuable information1 and its perusal is to be recommended to every student of philosophy4 4 ,,the ,,sthetic ,,element ,,in ,,morality4 ,by ,frank ,chapman ,sharp1 ,ph4,d4 ,new ,york3 ,macmillan ,co4 #ahic4 ,the book contains chapters on3 7#a7 the theory of altruism2 7#b7 the intrinsic worth of character2 7#c7 an analysis of moral beauty2 7#d7 an examination of the sthetic method of ethics2 and 7#e7 the idea of obligation in sthetics and ethics4 ,the author's knowledge of ethical theories appears to be limited4 ,duns ,scotus1 the ,realist1 is called a thoroughgoing ,nominalist4 ,in spite of such defects1 we find much that is good in the book4 ,in the end of his discussion the author says with truth3 8,when the element of the good1 or that which is capable of clothing itself in the form of an ideal1 is taken out of the conception of obligation1 this latter degenerates into what is nothing more than mere submission to an arbitrary imperative4444,prometheus1 chained to the rocks for bringing the gift of fire to the wretched barbarous inhabitants of the earth1 in defiance of the will of the #8,father of gods and men1' is one of the grandest productions of the human imagination1 and were the ,supreme ,being such a one as ,augustine and ,calvin imagined him1 we should despise the wretched slaves that licked the dust at his feet40 4 ,,periodicals4 ,,zeitschrift ,f,r ,,psychologie ,,und ,,physiologie ,,der ,,sinnesorgane4 ,,contents3 ,vol4 ,v4 ,nos4 #a and #b4 ,,die ,,stabilit,t ,,der ,,raumwerte ,,auf ,,der ,,netzhaut4 ,by ,franz ,hillebrand4 ,,ueber ,,ein ,,optisches ,,paradoxon4 7,second ,article47 ,by ,franz ,brentano4 ,,litteraturbericht4 7,hamburg and ,leipsic3 ,leopold ,voss47 ,this second article1 8,on an ,optical ,paradox10 is a rejoinder of ,franz ,brentano of ,vienna to ,th4 ,lipps4 ,we gave an account of this interesting discussion in ,the ,monist1 ,vol4 ,,iii1 ,no4 #a1 p4 #aec et seqq4 ,professor ,brentano insists on explaining the optical illusion concerning distances between two points1 as seen in ,fig4 #a-c1 by an overestimation of small and an underestimation of large angles4 ,he complains of being misunderstood by ,professor ,lipps who substitutes 8acute0 for 8small0 and 8obtuse0 for 8large02 for1 says he1 in comparisons both angles may be obtuse or both may be acute4 ,professor ,brentano adds some more puzzling figures to prove his case2 and1 as in his first article1 his propositions are ingenious and thought-stimulating2 but his arguments do not suffice to convince us of the validity of his theory4 ,we do not exactly intend to deny the general rule as to the overestimation of large and underestimation of small angles1 but are inclined to believe that it will not serve as a sufficient explanation4 ,we reproduce the most important figures devised by ,brentano1 and take the liberty of adding a few remarks and additional figures of our own4 ,illustration3 ,fig4 #a4 ,illustration3 ,fig4 #b4 ,illustration3 ,fig4 #c4 ,fig4 #d represents two right angles1 one of which is divided into nine angles of #aj each4 ,brentano claims that we so overestimate the nine small angles as to take the undivided right angle as an acute one4 ,i can only say that however much ,i have tried1 ,i am not subject to the illusion4 ,illustration3 ,fig4 #d4 ,in ,fig4 #e we have on the straight line ,,ab a series of stations which are connected with a common centre4 ,the line ,,ab is not a curve1 but this figure reminds us of a perspective view of the sector of a circle4 ,the drawing appears as the diagrammatic picture of a shield1 the buckle of which is in ,c4 ,thus ,,ab is conceived as representing a curve4 ,it does not seem that a comparison of the angles has anything to do with the illusion4 ,how much perspective interferes with the optical illusions under discussion1 impresses itself upon my mind1 when ,i think of figure #e as the diagram of a mountain1 rising above the plane ,,ab4 ,if ,i imagine ,i stand below the plane1 which may be a high table-land1 the line ,,ab appears to my eye straight4 ,but when ,i imagine ,i am looking down upon the plane1 the curvature of ,,ab becomes very strongly marked4 ,illustration3 ,fig4 #e4 ,in ,fig4 #f we can detect no optical illusion4 ,the line ,,ab appears straight to us4 ,the drawing reminds us of a sunrise on the ocean4 ,illustration3 ,fig4 #f4 ,the same must be said about ,figure #g4 ,brentano1 in agreement with ,lipps1 claims that we are inclined to regard the distance between the ends of the two lines as larger than between the points4 ,if there is any illusion at all1 it seems to me1 that on the contrary1 the distance between the ends of the lines appears shorter4 ,and why8 ,we measure the distance by allowing our eyes to run from one point to the other and then comparing the measurements4 ,this comparison is geometrically effected by combining the respective starting points1 and thus judging as to the parallelism of these two lines mentally constructed4 ,whether or not the dots appear equidistant1 depends upon the execution of all these operations4 ,while directly measuring the distances between the points1 we have an easier measurement where the lines are attached4 ,the lines give to the points a certain vim2 they almost appear to move with a velocity indicated by the length of the little lines1 while the isolated dots present a very phlegmatic appearance4 ,illustration3 ,fig4 #g4 ,in order to see what effects other positions of the lines produce1 let us compare in ,fig4 #i the several relations by covering the rest4 ,if there is any illusion as to a and b1 we should say that the points of a appear at a greater distance2 as to b and c1 we see the greater distance in c1 as to c and d1 we feel doubtful1 while any comparison with e1 tends strongly to convince us of their equal distance4 ,the reason is obvious4 ,the lines in e assist us in drawing the parallels1 which we consciously or unconsciously construct in order to compare the distances4 ,illustration3 ,fig4 #h4 ,illustration3 ,fig4 #i4 ,a comparison like that of and in ,fig4 #h1 where the equal length of the combining lines is very apparent1 induced ,brentano to regard the illusion which is observed in ,figures #a-c as due to the angles4 ,in our opinion he is mistaken4 ,for the illusion actually takes place in and 2 only it is quickly corrected with the help of the parallels1 which1 as in 1 assist the imagination in making an exact comparison4 ,when we place and either at a sufficient distance1 or are somehow prevented from making use of the parallel lines1 we shall have the same illusion as appears in ,figures #a1 #b1 #c4 ,to prove this1 we have but to bring the figure in a slanting position1 as is shown in 1 and the illusion is so strong that many will find it difficult to believe that is an electrotyped duplicate of 4 ,the mooted illusions are not sense-illusions1 but illusions of judgment2 and we believe that the explanation of these curious phenomena must be sought in the elements which unconsciously enter into the make-up of our judgments4 ,lipps says that lines are felt to be movements4 ,if a line is continued1 albeit with a slight declination1 the motion appears 8free and victorious10 aspiring beyond itself2 while1 if confined in the corner of an acute angle1 it seems cut off and impeded4 ,the victoriously progressive motion is overestimated2 the checked motion is underestimated4 ,brentano1 in order to meet ,lipps's objections1 proposes a few additional figures1 of which we reproduce the most important ones in ,fig4 #aj-ad4 ,illustration3 ,fig4 #aj4 ,illustration3 ,fig4 #aa4 ,illustration3 ,fig4 #ab4 ,illustration3 ,fig4 #ac4 ,illustration3 ,fig4 #ad4 ,it seems to us that the main part which the angles play in these or any other similar figures1 consists in leading our imagination astray4 ,the parallel lines which we attempt to construct for our comparison1 switch slightly off with an inclination toward the angles4 ,but that is not all2 there are other elements that affect our judgment at the very outset4 ,in measuring a distance we do something1 and in looking at a diagram we think something4 ,the diagram is suggestive of some reality to which we compare it4 ,all these ideas1 be they conscious1 subconscious1 or even unconscious1 affect our judgment and are sometimes apt to lead it astray4 ,in addition we have to mention two things1 the influence of which upon our verdict cannot be doubted2 the one is the size of the entire figure1 the other the vacuity of the distance to be measured3 both tend to make the distance appear longer than it really is4 ,to illustrate this1 we add the three ,figures #ae1 #af1 #ag which contain no angles and yet show the same illusions4 ,illustration3 ,fig4 #ae4 ,illustration3 ,fig4 #af4 ,illustration3 ,fig4 #ag4 ,the distance between the points in ,figure #ag appears longer than in ,figure #af1 and in ,figure #af again longer than in ,figure #ae4 ,the fact is1 that before starting on our measurement-journey1 we have in ,figure #ag already traversed a good distance after having noted the extraordinarily lengthened boundary marks4 ,the town ,a may be exactly as far as the town ,b1 yet the journey to ,a will appear longer1 if ,i have to ride an hour before ,i reach the station1 while ,i may live opposite the terminus of the railroad to ,b4 ,when our eyes glide down from one point to the other1 we pass in one case through an empty desert the dreariness of which is not interrupted4 ,we almost lose our way and become lonesome in its monotony4 ,if our way1 however1 is full of variations1 we are pleasantly entertained and regard our journey as so much shorter4 ,the contrast is most obvious in figure #aj4 ,the time-illusions as to the swiftness of hours of work or amusement and the slowness of moments of ennui have become proverbial among all nations4 ,the more dreariness1 the more marked is the lengthening of the distance1 while even a partial accompaniment shortens the traversed road4 4 ,,contents3 ,vol4 ,v4 ,nos4 #c and #d4 ,,theorie ,,des ,,farbensehens4 ,by ,h4 ,ebbinghaus4 ,,ueber ,,den ,,muskelsinn ,,bei ,,blinden4 ,by ,paul ,hocheisen4 ,,litteraturbericht4 7,hamburg and ,leipsic3 ,leopold ,voss47 ,,vierteljahrsschrift ,f,r ,,wissenschaftliche ,,philosophie4 ,,contents3 ,vol4 ,,xvii4 ,no4 #b4 ,,einiges ,,zur ,,grundlegung ,,der ,,sittenlehre4 7,first ,article47 ,by ,j4 ,petzoldt4 ,,kritik ,,der ,,grundanschauungen ,,der ,,sociologie ,h4 ,,spencer',s4 ,by ,p4 ,barth4 ,,werththeorie ,,und ,,ethik4 7,second ,article47 ,by ,chr4 ,ehrenfels4 7,leipsic3 ,o4 ,r4 ,reisland47 ,,the ,,american ,,journal ,,of ,,psychology4 ,,contents3 ,vol4 ,v4 ,no4 #c4 ,,on ,,errors ,,of ,,observation4 ,by ,prof4 ,james ,mc,keen ,cattell4 ,,minor ,,studies ,,from ,,the ,,psychological ,,laboratory ,,of ,,clark ,,university4 ,,on ,,the ,,discrimination ,,of ,,groups ,,of ,,rapid ,,clicks4 ,by ,thaddeus ,l4 ,bolton4 ,,statistics ,,of ,,dreams4 ,by ,mary ,whiton ,calkins4 ,,on ,,the ,,pressure ,,sense ,,of ,,the ,,drum ,,of ,,the ,,ear ,,and 8,,facial ,,vision40 ,by ,f4 ,b4 ,dresslar4 ,,on ,,reaction-,,times ,,when ,,the ,,stimulus ,,is ,,applied ,,to ,,the ,,reacting ,,hand4 ,by ,j4 ,f4 ,reigart and ,edmund ,c4 ,sanford4 ,,experiments ,,upon ,,physiological ,,memory ,,by ,,means ,,of ,,the ,,interference ,,of ,,associations4 ,by ,john ,a4 ,bergstrm4 ,a ,,new ,,instrument ,,for ,,weber',s ,,law2 ,,with ,,indications ,,of ,a ,,law ,,of ,,sense ,,memory4 ,by ,james ,h4 ,leuba4 ,a ,,new ,,pendulum ,,chronograph4 ,by ,edmund ,c4 ,sanford1 ,ph4 ,d4 ,,laboratory ,,course ,,in ,,physiological ,,psychology4 7,fourth ,paper47 ,by ,edmund ,c4 ,sanford1 ,ph4 ,d4 7,worcester1 ,mass43 ,j4 ,h4 ,orpha47 ,,the ,,philosophical ,,review4 ,,contents3 ,vol4 ,,ii4 ,no4 #c4 ,,german ,,kantian ,,bibliography4 ,by ,dr4 ,erich ,adickes4 ,,the ,,epistemology ,,of ,,neo-,,kantism4 ,by ,prof4 ,andrew ,seth4 ,,mental ,,measurement4 ,by ,prof4 ,j4 ,mc,k4 ,cattell4 ,,book ,,reviews4 7,boston1 ,new ,york1 ,chicago3 ,ginn ,,co47 ,,revue ,,philosophique4 ,,contents3 ,vol4 ,,xviii4 ,no4 #e4 ,,psychologie ,,du ,,musicien4 #a4 ,l',,evolution ,,des ,,aptitudes ,,musicales4 ,by ,l4 ,dauriac4 ,,la ,,sociabilit ,,et ,,la ,,morale ,,chez ,,les ,,animaux4 ,by ,houssay4 ,,sur ,,les ,,id,,es ,g,n,,rales4 ,by ,marchesini4 ,,questionnaire ,,sur ,l',,audition ,,color,e1 ,,figur,e ,,et ,,illumin,e4 ,by ,gruber4 ,l',,attention ,,et ,,les ,,images4 ,by ,f4 ,paulhan4 ,,une ,,illusion ,d',,optique4 ,by ,b4 ,bourdon4 ,,science ,,et ,,socialisme4 ,g4 ,sorel4 ,,analyses ,,et ,,comptes ,,rendus4 7,paris3 ,flix ,alcan47 ,,contents3 ,vol4 ,,xviii4 ,no4 #f4 ,,la ,,nouvelle ,,th,,orie ,,de ,l',h,r,,dit ,,de ,,weismann4 ,by ,y4 ,delage4 ,,un ,,calculateur ,,du ,,type ,,visuel4 ,by ,j4-,m4 ,charcot and ,a4 ,binet4 ,,psychologie ,,du ,,musicien4--,,ii4 ,l',,oreille ,,musicale4 ,by ,l4 ,dauriac4 ,,revue ,,de ,m,,taphysique ,,et ,,de ,,morale4 ,,contents3 ,vol4 ,i4 ,no4 #b4 ,,le ,,mouvement ,,et ,,les ,,arguments ,,de ,z,,non ,d',l,e4 ,by ,g4 ,nol4 ,,le ,,probl,,me ,,moral ,,dans ,,la ,,philosophie ,,de ,,spinoza4 ,by ,v4 ,delbos4 ,,le ,,concept ,,du ,,nombre ,,chez ,,les ,,pythagoriciens4 ,by ,g4 ,milhaud4 ,,le ,,dialogue ,,dans ,l',,enseignement ,,de ,,la ,,philosophie4 ,by ,c4 ,mlinand4 7,paris3 ,librairie ,hachette et ,cie47 ,,contents3 ,vol4 ,i4 ,no4 #c4 ,,les ,,pr,,tendus ,,sophismes ,,de ,z,,non ,d',l,e4 ,by ,v4 ,brochard4 ,,spir ,,et ,,sa ,,doctrine4 ,by ,a4 ,penjon4 ,,essai ,,sur ,,le ,,caract,,re ,g,n,,ral ,,de ,,la ,,connaissance4 ,by ,g4 ,remacle4 ,,philosophisches ,,jahrbuch4 ,,contents3 ,vol4 ,,vi4 ,no4 #b4 ,,begriff ,,der ,,philosophie4 ,by ,uebinger4 ,,die ,,objectivit,t ,,und ,,die ,,sicherheit ,,des ,,erkennens4 ,by ,isenkrahe4 ,,der ,,begriff ,,des 8,,warren40 7,concluded47 ,by ,franz ,schmid4 ,,der ,,grundplan ,,der ,,menschlichen ,,wissenschaft4 ,by ,bahlmann1 ,s4 ,j4 ,,handschriftliches ,,zu ,,den ,,werken ,,des ,,alanus4 ,by ,bumker4 7,fulda1 #ahic47