,,the ,,monist ,a ,,quarterly ,,magazine ,,vol4 ,,ii ,,chicago3 ,,the ,,open ,,court ,,publishing ,,co4 #ahia-ahib ,,copyright ,,by ,,the ,,open ,,court ,,publishing ,,co4 #ahia-ahib4 ,,contents ,,of ,,volume ,,ii4 ,,page4 ,,articles4 ,american ,politics4 ,by ,thomas ,b4 ,preston #da ,anschauung1 ,what ,does ---- ,mean8 ,editor #ebg ,artificial ,selection and the ,marriage ,problem4 ,by ,hiram ,m4 ,stanley #ea ,clifford on the ,soul in ,nature1 ,professor4 ,by ,f4 ,c4 ,conybeare #bji ,conservation of ,spirit and the ,origin of ,consciousness1 ,the4 ,by ,francis ,c4 ,russell #ceg ,criminal ,suggestion1 ,on4 ,by ,j4 ,delbuf #cfc ,ethnological ,jurisprudence4 ,by ,albert ,h4 ,post #ca ,evolution1 ,the ,continuity of4 ,the ,science of ,language versus ,the ,science of ,life1 as represented by ,prof4 ,f4 ,max ,mller and ,prof4 ,g4 ,j4 ,romanes4 ,editor #gj ,facts and ,mental ,symbols4 ,by ,ernst ,mach #aih ,littr1 mile4 ,a ,sonnet4 ,by ,louis ,belrose ,jr4 #aaj ,logical ,theory1 ,the ,present ,position of4 ,by ,john ,dewey #a ,magic ,square1 ,the4 ,by ,hermann ,schubert #dhg ,mechanical ,invention1 ,the ,new ,civilisation ,depends on4 ,by ,w4 ,t4 ,harris #agh ,mental ,evolution4 ,an ,old ,speculation in a ,new ,light4 ,by ,c4 ,lloyd ,morgan #afa ,mind1 ,the ,law of4 ,by ,charles ,s4 ,peirce #ecc ,monism1 ,our4 ,the ,principles of a ,consistent1 ,unitary ,world-,view4 ,by ,ernst ,haeckel #dha ,necessity1 ,mr4 ,charles ,s4 ,peirce's ,onslaught on the ,doctrine of4 ,editor #efj ,necessity1 ,the ,doctrine of ---- ,examined4 ,by ,charles ,s4 ,peirce #cba ,psychical ,monism4 ,by ,edmund ,montgomery #cch ,religion and ,progress4 ,interpreted by the ,life and ,last work of ,wathen ,mark ,wilks ,call4 ,by ,moncure ,d4 ,conway #ahc ,spencer1 ,mr41 on the ,ethics of ,kant4 ,editor #eab ,things in themselves1 ,are ,there ----8 ,editor #bbe ,thought and ,language4 ,by ,george ,john ,romanes #ef ,will and ,reason4 ,by ,b4 ,bosanquet #ah ,,literary ,,correspondence4 ,france4 ,by ,lucien ,arrat #bff1 #chf1 #ehc ,france4 ,the ,intellectual ,awakening of the ,langue ,d',oc4 ,by ,theodore ,stanton #ie ,germany4 ,christian ,ufer #ajc1 #bgb1 #cif1 #eic ,,diverse ,,topics4 ,,criticisms ,,and ,,discussions4 ,clergy's ,duty of ,allegiance to ,dogma and the ,struggle between ,world-,conceptions4 ,editor #bgh ,comte and ,turgot4 ,prof4 ,schaarschmidt #faa ,evolution and ,language1 ,comment on the ,discussion on4 ,by ,f4 ,max ,mller #bhf ,haeckel's ,monism1 ,professor4 ,editor #eih ,james's ,psychology1 ,observations on ,some ,points in4 ,by ,w4 ,l4 ,worcester #dag ,littr1 ,a ,defense of4 ,by ,louis ,belrose ,jr4 #djc ,littr's1 mile1 ,positivism4 ,a ,reply4 ,editor #daj ,logical ,theory1 ,the ,future ,position of4 ,edward ,t4 ,dixon #fjf ,mind1 ,the ,nature of ---- and the ,meaning of ,reality4 ,editor #dcd ,monism and ,mechanicalism3 ,comments upon ,prof4 ,ernst ,haeckel's ,position4 ,editor #dch ,peirce1 ,mr4 ,charles ,s41 on ,necessity4 ,editor #ddb ,religion of ,science1 ,the4 ,editor #fjj ,thought and ,language4 ,a letter by ,g4 ,j4 ,romanes #djb ,thought-forms1 ,the ,origin of4 ,editor #aaa ,,book ,,reviews4 ,avenarius1 ,richard4 ,der menschliche ,weltbegriff #dea ,baldwin1 ,james ,mark4 ,handbook of ,psychology #dfg ,bernheim4 ,hypnotisme1 ,suggestion1 ,psychotherapie #dfe ,cornill1 ,c4 ,h4 ,einleitung in das alte ,testament #ddc ,curtis1 ,mattoon ,monroe4 ,an ,outline of ,locke's ,ethical ,philosophy #cjj ,delabarre1 ,edmund ,burke4 ,ueber ,bewegungsempfindungen #big ,delbuf1 ,j4 ,les ,ftes de ,montpellier #aca ,dillmann1 ,edmund4 ,eine neue ,darstellung der ,leibnizischen ,monadenlehre auf ,grund der ,quellen #dfj ,dixon1 ,edward ,t4 ,the ,foundations of ,geometry #abf ,erhardt1 ,franz4 ,der ,satz vom ,grunde als ,prinzip des ,schliessens #fca ,gruber1 ,hermann4 ,der ,positivismus vom ,tode ,august ,comte's bis auf unsere ,tage 7#aheg-ahia7 #acc ,holzmann1 ,h4 ,j4 ,synoptiker4 ,apostelgeschichte #bhg ,hbbe-,schleiden4 ,das ,dasein als ,lust1 ,leid und ,liebe #dfh ,husserl1 ,e4 ,g4 ,philosophie der ,arithmetik #fbg ,koenig1 ,edmund4 ,die ,entwickelung des ,causalproblems in der ,philosophie seit ,kant #deg ,lasswitz1 ,kurd4 ,seifenblasen #dga ,loeb1 ,jacques4 ,untersuchungen zur physiologischen ,morphologie der ,thiere #dfh ,lombroso1 ,c4 ,l4 ,nouvelles ,recherches de ,psychiatrie et ,d',anthropologie ,criminelle #fah ,lyons1 ,daniel4 ,christianity and ,infallibility #fbi ,mach1 ,e4 ,grundriss der ,naturlehre fr die oberen ,classen der ,mittelschulen #fag ,mnsterberg1 ,hugo4 ,schriften der ,gesellschaft fr psychologische ,forschung #bhi ,paszkowski1 ,wilhelm4 ,die ,bedeutung der theologischen ,vorstellungen fr die ,ethik #dec ,pearson1 ,karl4 ,the ,grammar of ,science #fbc ,pellegrini1 ,pietro4 ,diritto ,sociale ,tentativo in ,bozza #bih ,roberty1 ,e4 de4 ,agnosticisme #fca ,roberty1 ,e4 de4 ,la ,philosophie du ,sicle #bic ,romanes1 ,george ,john4 ,darwin and ,after ,darwin #fab ,schmidkunz1 ,hans4 ,psychologie der ,suggestion #dfd ,schrder1 ,ernst4 ,vorlesungen ber die ,algebra der ,logik #fah ,schurmann1 ,jacob ,gould4 ,belief in ,god #aba ,schwarz1 ,hermann4 ,das ,wahrnehmungsproblem vom ,standpunkte des ,physikers1 des ,physiologen und des ,philosophen #dee ,scripture1 ,e4 ,w4 ,ueber den associativen ,verlauf der ,vorstellungen #acg ,seth1 ,andrew4 ,the ,present ,position of the ,philosophical ,sciences #dej ,toy1 ,crawford ,howell4 ,judaism and ,christianity #abc ,van ,bemmelen1 ,p4 ,le ,nihilisme ,scientifique #bih ,whitney1 ,william ,dwight4 ,max ,mller and the ,science of ,language #dfi ,wise1 ,isaac ,m4 ,pronaos to ,holy ,writ #abd ,ziehen1 ,th4 ,leitfaden der physiologischen ,psychologie in #ad ,vorlesungen #dfa ,,periodicals #adj-afj2 #cjc-cbj2 #dgb-dhj2 #fcd-fdj ,,appendix4 ,kant and ,spencer4 ,reprinted articles relative to ,mr4 ,spencer's estimate of ,kant4 7,in ,no4 #d of this volume47 ,,vol4 ,,ii4 ,,october1 #ahia4 ,,no4 #a4 ,,the ,,monist4 ,,the ,,present ,,position ,,of ,,logical ,,theory4 ,the remarkable fact in the intellectual life of to-day is the contradiction in which it is entangled4 ,on one hand we have an enormous development of science1 both in specialisation of method and accumulation of material2 its extension and thorough-going application to all ranges of experience4 ,what we should expect from such a movement1 would seem to be confidence of intelligence in itself2 and a corresponding organisation of knowledge1 giving some guide and support to life4 ,the strange thing is that instead of this we have1 probably1 the greatest apparent disorganisation of authority as to intellectual matters that the world has ever seen2 while the prevalent attitude and creed of scientific men is philosophic agnosticism1 or disbelief in their own method when it comes to fundamental matters4 ,such a typical representative of modern science as ,mr4 ,huxley virtually laughs to scorn the suggestion of ,mr4 ,frederic ,harrison that science should or could become so organised as to give any support1 any authoritative stay1 to life4 ,now ,i do not intend to discuss this apparent contradiction4 ,it seems to me obvious enough that the contradiction is due to the fact that science has got far enough along so that its negative attitude towards previous codes of life is evident1 while its own positive principle of reconstruction is not yet evident4 ,but without urging this view upon the reader1 ,i wish to ask how and where in the prevailing confusion logical theory1 as a synopsis of the methods and typical forms of intelligence1 stands4 ,logical theory at once reflects and transforms the existing status of matters intellectual at any period4 ,it reflects it1 for logical theory is only the express1 the overt consciousness on the part of intelligence of its own attitude1 prevailing spirit4 ,it transforms it1 because this express consciousness makes intelligence know where it stands1 makes it aware of its strength and of its weakness1 and by defining it to itself forces it to take up a new and more adequate place4 ,it is obvious1 then1 that as the prevailing influence in the intellectual world to-day is science1 so the prevailing influence in logical theory must be the endeavor to account for1 to justify1 or at least to reckon with this scientific spirit4 ,and yet if there is such confusion as we have indicated1 then there is also manifested some chaos in logical theory1 as to the true nature and method of science4 ,were it otherwise1 were there at present a logical theory adequate to the specific and detailed practical results of science1 science and scientific men would be conscious of themselves1 and would be confident in their work and attitude4 ,the especial problem of logic1 as the theory of scientific method1 is the relation of fact and thought to each other1 of reality and thought4 ,it is1 however1 differentiated from the metaphysical theory of knowledge4 ,logic does not inquire into the ultimate meaning of fact and thought1 nor into their ultimate relations to one another4 ,it simply takes them from the attitude of science itself1 its business being1 not the justification nor refutation of this attitude1 but its development into explicit doctrine4 ,fact means to logic no more1 but certainly no less1 than it means to the special sciences3 it is the subject-matter under investigation1 under consideration2 it is that which we are trying to make out4 ,thought too means to logic what it means to science3 method4 ,it is the attitude and form which intelligence takes in reference to fact--to its subject-matter1 whether in inquiry1 experiment1 calculation1 or statement4 ,logic1 then1 would have for its essential problem the consideration of the various typical methods and guiding principles which thought assumes in its effort to detect1 master1 and report fact4 ,it is presupposed here that there is some sort of fruitful and intrinsic connection of fact and thought2 that thinking1 in short1 is nothing but the fact in its process of translation from brute impression to lucent meaning4 ,but the moment such a presupposition is stated1 ninety-nine persons out of a hundred think that we have plunged1 ex abrupto1 from the certainty of science into the cloudland of metaphysic4 ,and yet just this conception of the relation of thought 7method7 to fact 7subject-matter7 is taken for granted in every scientific investigation and conclusion4 ,here1 then1 we have in outline the present position of logic4 ,it is that any attempt to state1 in general1 or to work out1 in detail1 the principle of the intrinsic and fruitful relation of fact and thought which science1 without conscious reflection1 constantly employs in practice1 seems 8metaphysical0 or even absurd4 ,why is this8 ,the answer to this question will give the filling-up of the outline just presented4 ,the chief cause is that superstition which still holds enthralled so much of modern thought--,i mean formal logic4 ,and if this seems like applying a hard name to what1 at best and at worst1 is only an intellectual gymnastic1 ,i can only say that formal logic seems to me to be1 at present1 fons et origo malorum in philosophy4 ,it is true enough that nobody now takes the technical subject of formal logic very seriously--unless here and there some belated 8professor40 ,it is true that it is generally relegated to the position of a subject which1 for some unclear reason1 is regarded as 8disciplinary0 in a young man's education2 just as certain other branches are regarded as elegant accomplishments in a young woman's finishing4 ,but while the subject itself as a doctrine or science hardly ranks very high1 the conception of thought which is at the bottom of formal logic still dominates the ,zeitgeist1 and regulates the doctrine and the method of all those who draw their inspiration from the ,zeitgeist4 ,any book of formal logic will tell us what this conception of thought is3 that thought is a faculty or an entity existing in the mind1 apart from facts1 and that it has its own fixed forms1 with which facts have nothing to do--except in so far as they pass under the yoke4 ,jevons puts it this way3 8,just as we thus familiarly recognise the difference of form and substance in common tangible things1 so we may observe in logic1 that the form of an argument is one thing1 quite distinct from the various subjects or matter which may be treated in that form40#a ,professor ,stock varies the good old tune in this way3 8,in every act of thought we may distinguish two things--7#a7 the object thought about1 7#b7 the way in which the mind thinks of it4 ,the first is called the ,matter2 the second the ,form of ,thought4 ,now formal 444 logic is concerned only with the way in which the mind thinks1 and has nothing to do with the particular objects thought about40#b ,it is assumed1 in fine1 that thought has a nature of its own independent of facts or subject-matter2 that this thought1 per se1 has certain forms1 and that these forms are not forms which the facts themselves take1 varying with the facts1 but are rigid frames1 into which the facts are to be set4 ,now all of this conception--the notion that the mind has a faculty of thought apart from things1 the notion that this faculty is constructed1 in and of itself1 with a fixed framework1 the notion that thinking is the imposing of this fixed framework on some unyielding matter called particular objects1 or facts--all of this conception appears to me as highly scholastic1 as the last struggle of medivalism to hold thought in subjection to authority4 ,nothing is more surprising than the fact that while it is fashionable to reject1 with great scorn1 all the results and special methods of scholasticism1 its foundation-stone should still be accepted as the corner-stone of the edifice of modern doctrine4 ,it is still more surprising when we reflect that the foundation-stone is coherent only with the medival superstructure4 ,the scholastics when they held that the method of thought was a faculty pursuing its own method apart from the course of things1 were at least consistent4 ,they did not conceive that thought was free1 that intelligence had rights1 nor that there was possible science independent of data authoritatively laid down4 ,really believing what they professed1--that thought was something in se1--they held that it must be supplied with a fixed body of dogmatic fact1 from tradition1 from revelation--from external authority4 ,they held that thought in its workings is confined to extracting from this dogmatic body of fact what is already contained in it1 and to rearranging the material and its implications4 ,to examine the material1 to test its truth2 to suppose that intelligence could cut loose from this body of authority and go straight to nature1 to history itself1 to find the truth2 to build up a free and independent science--to this point of incoherency medival scholasticism never attained4 ,to proclaim the freedom of thought1 the rejection of all external authority1 the right and the power of thought to get at truth for itself1 and yet continue to define thought as a faculty apart from fact1 was reserved for modern enlightenment6 ,and were it not somewhat out of my present scope1 ,i should like to show that modern culture is thus a prepared victim for the skilful dialectician of the reactionary army4 ,if the modern ,zeitgeist does not fall a prey to the cohorts of the army of external authority1 it is not because it has any recognised methods or any recognised criterion by which it can justify its raising the 8banner of the free spirit40 ,it is simply the obstinate bulwark of outer fact1 built up piecemeal by science1 that protects it4 ,the two main forces1 which have been at work against the formul of formal logic1 are 8inductive0 or empirical logic on one side1 and the so-called 8transcendental0 logic1 on the other4 ,of these two1 the influence of inductive logic in sapping in practical fashion and popular results the authority of syllogistic logic has undoubtedly been much the greater4 ,i propose1 briefly1 to give certain reasons for holding1 however1 that the inductive logic does not furnish us with the needed theory of the relation of thought and fact4 ,to show this adequately would demand the criticism of inductive logic in the detail of its methods1 in order to show where it comes short4 ,as this is impossible1 ,i shall now confine myself to a couple of general considerations4 ,to begin with1 then1 the empirical logic virtually continues the conception of thought as in itself empty and formal which characterizes scholastic logic4 ,it thus has really no theory which differentiates it1 as regards the nature of thought itself1 from formal logic4 ,i cannot see1 for example1 what quarrel the most stringent upholder of formal logic can have with ,mill as to the latter's theory of the syllogism4 ,mill's theory is virtually simply a theory regarding the formation of the major premiss--regarding the process by which we formulate the statement that ,all ,s is ,p4 ,now1 if we once accept the syllogistic position1 this process lies outside the scope and problem of formal logic4 ,it is not an affair of what ,jevons calls the form of argument at all1 but simply of the matter1 the particular facts which make the filling of the argument4 ,i do not see that it is any part of the business of formal logic to tell where the major premiss comes from1 nor how it is got4 ,and1 on the other hand1 when it comes to the manipulation of the data contained in the premiss1 ,mill must fall back upon the syllogistic logic4 ,mill's theory1 so far as the thought-element is concerned1 presupposes the syllogistic theory4 ,and if this theory1 on its side1 does not presuppose something like ,mill's inductive theory1 it is simply because the logician1 as a philosopher1 may prefer 8intuitionalism0 to 8empiricism40 ,he may hold1 that is1 that the content of some major premisses is given by direct 8intuition0 rather than gathered from experience4 ,but in either case1 this consideration of the source of the content of the premiss belongs not to formal logic1 but to metaphysics4 ,if1 then1 the theory of the syllogism is incorrect in its assumptions as to the relation of fact and thought1 the inductive logic must be similarly in error4 ,its great advantage over the old scholastic logic lies not in its logic as such1 but in something back of the logic--in its account of the derivation of the material of judgment4 ,whatever the defects of ,locke's or ,mill's account of experience1 any theory which somehow presupposes a first-hand contact of mind and fact 7though it be only in isolated1 atomic sensations7 is surely preferable to a theory which falls back on tradition1 or on the delivery of dogma irresponsible to any intellectual criticism4 ,but in its account of the derivation of the material of judgment1 inductive logic is still hampered by the scholastic conception of thought4 ,thought1 being confined to the rigid framework in which the material is manipulated after being obtained1 is excluded from all share in the gathering of material4 ,the result is that this material1 having no intrinsic thought-side1 shrinks into a more or less accidental association of more or less shifting and transitory mental states4 ,i shall not stop to argue that1 on this ground1 the 8inductive0 logic deprives science of its most distinctive scientific features--the permanence and objectivity of its truths4 ,i think no one can deny that there is at least an apparent gap between the actual results of concrete science and these results as they stand after the touch of the inductive logic--that the necessity and generality of science seem rather to have been explained away1 than explained4 ,i think most of the inductive logicians themselves 7while endeavoring to account for this apparent necessity as generated through association7 would admit that something of science seems1 at least1 to have been lost1 and that the great reason for putting-up with this loss is that the inductive logic is the sole alternative to a dogmatic intuitionalism and to arbitrary spinning-out of a priori concepts4 ,certainly as long as thought is conceived after the fashion of syllogistic logic1 as a scheme furnished and fixed in itself1 apart from reality1 so long scientific men must protest against allowing thought any part or lot in scientific procedure4 ,so long some such modus operandi as that given by ,mill must be resorted to in order to explain scientific methods and results4 ,but1 on the other hand1 if the scholastic idea of thought as this something having its character apart from fact is once given up1 the cause which at present cramps the logic of science into the logic of sensationalism and empiricism is also given up4 ,and this brings us to the other point in general regarding the inductive or empirical logic4 ,it is not strictly a logic at all but a metaphysic4 ,it does not begin with the fact of science1 the fact of the fruitful inquiry into fact by intelligence1 at all4 ,it does not1 starting from this fact analyse the various methods and types which thought must take upon itself in order to maintain this fruitful inquiry4 ,on the contrary1 it begins with sensations1 and endeavors by a theory of knowledge on the basis of sensationalism to build up the structure of cognition1 ordinary and scientific4 ,i am not concerned here with the truth of sensationalism as a metaphysical theory of knowledge1 nor with the adequacy of the notion of sensation advanced by ,mill4 ,it is enough from the logical point of view to point out that such a theory is not logic--that logic does not deal with something back of the fact of science1 but with the analysis of scientific method as such4 ,and is it forcing matters to indicate that this retreat from logic to metaphysic is also caused by the syllogistic notion of thought8 ,formal thought1 with its formul for simply unfolding a given material1 is of no use in science4 ,there is1 therefore1 the need of some machinery to take the place of thought4 ,and this is found in sensation and in 8experience0 according to the peculiar notion of experience current in the inductive logic4 ,in a word1 then 7without attempting to show the insufficiency of inductive logic as the theory of science by reference to its treatment of specific points7 inductive logic does not meet our needs because it is not a free1 unprejudiced inquiry into the special forms and methods of science1 starting from the actual sciences themselves4 ,it is founded and built up with constant reference to the scholastic notion of thought4 ,where it is not affected positively by it1 it is still affected by its reaction from it4 ,instead of denying once for all validity or even sense to the notion of thinking as a special1 apart process1 and then beginning a free1 unhampered examination with an eye single to the fact of science itself1 it retains this conception of thought as valid in a certain department1 and then sets out to find something to supply the gap in another department4 ,and thus we have the usual division of inductive and deductive logic1 inductive being interpreted as empirical and particular1 deductive as syllogistic and formal4 ,they are counterpart and correlative theories1 the two sides of the notion of the separateness of fact and thought2 they stand and fall together4 8,transcendental0 logic1 while usually conceived as utterly opposed in spirit and in results to inductive logic1 has yet been one with it in endeavoring to abolish formal logic as the sufficient method and criterion of scientific truth4 ,i say this although well aware that inductive logic is usually conceived as specifically 8scientific10 while the transcendental movement is regarded as the especial foe of science--as a belated attempt to restore an a priori scholasticism1 and to find a scheme for evolving truth out of pure thought4 ,this is because when the 8transcendental0 school talks of thought1 of the synthetic and objective character of thought1 of the possibility of attaining absolute truth through thought1 and of the ontological value of thought1 it is understood as meaning thought in the old1 scholastic sense1 a process apart and fixed in itself1 and yet somehow evolving truth out of its own inner being1 out of its own enclosed ruminations4 ,but on the contrary1 the very meaning of 8transcendentalism0 is not only that it is impossible to get valid truth from the evolution of thought in the scholastic sense1 but that there is no such thought at all4 ,processes of intelligence which have their nature fixed in themselves1 apart from fact and having to be externally applied to fact1 are pure myths to his school4 ,types of thought are simply the various forms which reality progressively takes as it is progressively mastered as to its meaning1--that is1 understood4 ,methods of thought are simply the various active attitudes into which intelligence puts itself in order to detect and grasp the fact4 ,instead of rigid moulds1 they are flexible adaptations4 ,methods of thought fit fact more closely and responsively than a worn glove fits the hand4 ,they are only the ideal evolution of the fact1--and by 8ideal0 is here meant simply the evolution of fact into meaning4 ,if this is a fair description of what the 8transcendental0 school means by thought1 it is evident that it is a co-worker with the spirit and intent of 8inductive0 logic4 ,its sole attempt is to get hold of and report the presupposition and rationale of science2 its practical aim is to lay bare and exhibit the method of science so that the true seat of authority--that is1 the authority1 the backing1 of truth--shall be forever manifest4 ,it has simply gone a step further than 8inductive0 logic1 and thrown overboard once for all the scholastic idea of thought4 ,this has enabled it to start anew1 and to form its theory of thought simply by following the principles of the actual processes by which man has1 thus far in history1 discovered and possessed fact4 ,i shall not attempt here any defence of the 8transcendental0 logic2 ,i shall not even attempt to show that the interpretation of it which ,i have given above is correct4 ,it must go1 for the present1 simply as my individual understanding of the matter4 ,simply taking this view of 8transcendental0 logic for granted1 ,i wish1 in order to complete our notion of the present position of logic1 to consider the reasons which have thus far prevented1 say1 the ,hegelian logic from getting any popular hold--from getting recognition from scientific men as1 at least in principle1 a fair statement of their own basic presupposition and method4 ,the first of these reasons is that the popular comprehension of the 8transcendental0 movement is arrested at ,kant and has never gone on to ,hegel4 ,hegel1 it is true1 overshadowed ,kant entirely for a considerable period4 ,but the ,hegelian rgime was partly pyrotechnical rather than scientific in character2 and1 partly1 so far as it was scientific1 it exhausted itself in stimulating various detailed scientific movements--as in the history of politics1 religion1 art1 etc4 ,in these lines1 if we trust even to those who have no faith in the ,hegelian method or principles1 the movement found some practical excuse for being4 ,but the result of the case was--and its present status is--that because the principle of ,hegel was1 for the time1 lost either in display of dialectical fireworks1 or in application to specific subjects1 the principle itself has never met with any general investigation4 ,the immense amount of labor spent on ,kant during the past twenty years has made method and principle familiar1 if not acceptable1 to the body of men calling themselves educated4 ,and thus1 so far as its outcome is concerned1 the transcendental movement still halts with ,kant4 ,now1 at the expense of seeming to plunge myself deeper in absurdity than ,i have already gone1 ,i must say that the ,kantian principle is by far more 8transcendental0 in the usual interpretation of that term--more a priori1 more given to emphasising some special function of some special thought-power--than the ,hegelian4 ,as against the usual opinion that while some compromise between science and ,kant is possible1 the scientific spirit and ,hegel are at antipodes1 it appears to me that it is ,kant who does violence to science1 while ,hegel 7,i speak of his essential method and not of any particular result7 is the quintessence of the scientific spirit4 ,let me endeavor to give some reasons for this belief4 ,kant starts from the accepted scholastic conception of thought4 ,kant never dreams1 for a moment1 of questioning the existence of a special faculty of thought with its own peculiar and fixed forms4 ,he states and restates that thought in itself exists apart from fact and occupies itself with fact given to it from without4 ,kant1 it is true1 gives the death-blow to scholasticism by pointing out that such a faculty of thought is purely analytic--that it simply unfolds the material given1 whether that material be true or false1 having no method of arriving at truth1 and no test for determining truth4 ,this fact once clearly recognised1 dogmatic rationalism1 or the attempt to get truth from the 8logical0 analysis of concepts was forever destroyed4 ,the way was opened for an independent examination of the actual method of science4 ,but while ,kant revealed once for all the impossibility of getting truth1 of laying hold of reality1 by the scholastic method1 he still retained that conception of thought4 ,he denied1 not its existence1 but its worth as relates to truth4 ,what was the result8 ,just this3 when he came to his examination 7criticism7 of knowledge1 it fell apart at once into two separate factors1 an a priori and a posteriori4 ,for if ,kant finds1 as against the dogmatic rationalist1 that formal thought cannot give knowledge1 he also finds1 as against the sceptical empiricist1 that unrelated sensation cannot give knowledge4 ,here too1 instead of denying1 in toto1 the existence of unrelated sensation1 he contented himself with denying its functional value for knowledge4 ,unrelated sensation and formal thought are simply the complementary halves of each other4 ,admit the one1 and the other is its necessary counterpart4 ,kant must now piece together his two separated factors4 ,sensation1 unrelated manifold of sensation1 is there1 thought1 isolated1 analytic thought1 is here4 ,neither is knowledge in itself4 ,what more natural than to put them together1 and hold that knowledge is the union of a matter or stuff1 of sensations1 atomic in themselves1 on one hand1 and a form1 or regulating principle of thought1 empty in itself1 on the other8 ,we have two elements1 both existing in isolation1 and yet both useless for all purposes of knowledge4 ,combine them1 and presto1 there is science4 ,such a 8transcendentalism0 as this may well stick in the crop of scientific men4 ,for consider what is involved in it3 an a priori factor1 on one side1 and an a posteriori1 on the other4 ,kant1 from one point of view1 seems thus to have simply combined the weaknesses of empiricism and rationalism4 ,he still continues to talk of experience itself as particular and contingent1 and denies that it gives a basis for any universal laws4 ,aside from his effort in the 8,kritik der ,urtheilskraft0 to overcome his original separation1 special scientific laws are to him only more or less extensive generalisations from experience--as much so to him as to ,locke1 or ,mill4 ,scientific men indeed1 have accustomed themselves to this derogation of their own methods and results1 and1 as 8inductive0 logicians1 indulge in it quite freely themselves4 ,but an a priori element1 supplied by a thought fixed and separate1 scientific men cannot do away with4 ,nor do ,i know any reason why they should4 ,it is coming short1 in my opinion1 of the full stature of science to treat it as a quantitative and varying generalisation of contingent particulars1 but this1 at least1 leaves what science there is free and unhindered4 ,but a priori elements supplied from outside the fact itself1 a priori elements somehow entering into the fact from without and controlling it--this is to give up the very spirit of science4 ,for if science means anything1 it is that our ideas1 our judgments may in some degree reflect and report the fact itself4 ,science means1 on one hand1 that thought is free to attack and get hold of its subject-matter1 and1 on the other1 that fact is free to break through into thought2 free to impress itself--or rather to express itself--in intelligence without vitiation or deflection4 ,scientific men are true to the instinct of the scientific spirit in fighting shy of a distinct a priori factor supplied to fact from the mind4 ,apriorism of this sort must seem like an effort to cramp the freedom of intelligence and of fact1 to bring them under the yoke of fixed1 external forms4 ,now in ,hegel there is no such conception of thought and of a priori1 as is found in ,kant4 ,kant formulated the conception of thought as objective1 but he interpreted this as meaning that thought subjective in itself becomes objective when synthetic of a given sense-manifold4 ,when ,hegel calls thought objective he means just what he says3 that there is no special1 apart faculty of thought belonging to and operated by a mind existing separate from the outer world4 ,what ,hegel means by objective thought is the meaning1 the significance of the fact itself2 and by methods of thought he understands simply the processes in which this meaning of fact is evolved4 ,there has been1 of late1 considerable discussion of the place and function of 8relations0 in knowledge4 ,this discussion in ,english speculation1 at least1 tends to turn largely about ,thomas ,hill ,green's reconstruction of ,kantianism4 ,i consider it unfortunate that this discussion has taken the form of a debate between empiricism and ,kantianism4 ,the question of knowledge has thus come to be whether or not certain relations are supplied by thought to sensations in order to make an orderly whole out of the latter1 chaotic in themselves4 ,now when ,hegel talks of relations of thought 7not that he makes much use of just this term7 he means no such separate forms4 ,relations of thought are1 to ,hegel1 the typical forms of meaning which the subject-matter takes in its various progressive stages of being understood4 ,and this is what a priori means from a ,hegelian standpoint4 ,it is not some element in knowledge2 some addition of thought to experience4 ,it is experience itself in its skeleton1 in the main features of its framework4 8,refutations0 of ,hegel1 then1 which attempt to show that 8thought0 in itself is empty1 that it waits for content from experience1 that it cannot by any manipulation evolve truth out of itself are1 if taken as having relevance to ,hegel1 simply meaningless4 ,hegel begins where these arguers leave off4 ,accepting all that they can say1 he goes one step further1 and denies that there is any such 8thought0 at all anywhere in existence4 ,the question of the relations or 8categories of thought0 is just the question of the broad and main aspects of fact as that fact comes to be understood4 ,for example1 ,kant would prove the a priori character and validity of the principle of causation by showing that without it science is impossible1 that it helps 8make experience40 ,now1 in terms1 ,hegel's justification of this relation would be the same2 he too would show that the fabric of experience implies and demands the causal relation4 ,but in ,kant's case1 the justification of the principle of causality by reference to the possibility of experience means that thought must continually inject this principle into experience to keep it from disappearing3 that experience must be constantly braced and reinforced by the synthetic action of thought or it will collapse4 ,in short1 the need of experience for this principle of causation means its need for a certain support outside itself4 ,but ,hegel's demonstration of the validity of the causal principle is simply pointing out that the whole supports the part1 while the part helps make the whole4 ,that is to say1 ,hegel's reference is not to some outside action of thought in maintaining fact as an object of knowledge2 it is to the entire structure of fact itself4 ,his contention is simply that the structure of fact itself1 of the subject-matter of knowledge1 is such that in one of its phases it presents necessarily the aspect of causality4 ,and if this word 8necessarily0 gives pause1 it must be remembered what the source of this necessity is4 ,it does not lie in the principle of causation per se2 it lies in the whole fact1 the whole subject-matter of knowledge4 ,it is the same sort of necessity as when we say that a complete man must have an eye2 i4 e41 it is the nature of the human organism to develop and sustain this organ1 while the organ1 in turn1 contributes to and thus helps constitute the organism4 ,it is then evident that the question upon which the 8refutation0 of ,hegel turns is not in showing that formal 8thought0 cannot give birth to truth except through the fructifying touch of experience4 ,the question is simply whether fact--the subject-matter of knowledge--is such as ,hegel presents it4 ,is it1 in general1 a connected system as he holds it to be8 ,and1 if a system1 does it1 in particular1 present such phases 7such relations1 categories7 as ,hegel shows forth8 ,these are objective questions pure and simple2 questions identical1 in kind1 with the question whether the constitution of glucose is what some chemist claims to have found it4 ,this1 then1 is why ,i conceive ,hegel--entirely apart from the value of any special results--to represent the quintessence of the scientific spirit4 ,he denies not only the possibility of getting truth out of a formal1 apart thought1 but he denies the existence of any faculty of thought which is other than the expression of fact itself4 ,his contention is not that 8thought10 in the scholastic sense1 has ontological validity1 but that fact1 reality is significant4 ,even1 then1 if it were shown that ,hegel is pretty much all wrong as to the special meanings which he finds to make up the significance of reality1 his main principle would be unimpeached until it were shown that fact has not a systematic1 or interconnected1 meaning1 but is a mere hodgepodge of fragments4 ,whether the scientific spirit would have any interest in such a hodgepodge may1 at least1 be questioned4 ,having dealt at such length with the first reason why as yet the 8transcendental0 movement has found no overt coalescence with the scientific1 we may deal briefly with the remaining reason4#c ,in the second place1 then1 the rationality of fact had not been sufficiently realised in detail in the early decades of the century to admit of the principle of the 8transcendental0 movement being otherwise than misunderstood4 ,that is to say1 the development and1 more particularly1 the application of science to the specific facts of the world was then comparatively rudimentary4 ,on account of this lack of scientific discovery and application1 the world presented itself to man's consciousness as a blank1 or at least as only stuff for meaning1 and not as itself significant4 ,the result was that ,hegel must be interpreted subjectively4 ,the difficulties in the way of conceiving a world1 upon which science had not yet expended its energies in detail1 as an organism of significant relations and bearings were so great1 that ,hegel's attempt to point out these significant types and functions as immanent in reality was inevitably misconstrued as an attempt1 on ,hegel's part1 to prove that a system of purely 8subjective0 thoughts could somehow be so manipulated as to give objectively valid results4 ,hegel1 in other words1 anticipated somewhat the actual outcome of the scientific movement4 ,however significant fact may be1 however true it may be that an apart faculty of thought is an absurdity1 however certain it may be that there are no real types or methods of thought at all excepting those of the object-matter itself as it comes to be understood1 yet to man this objective significance cannot be real till he has made it out in the details of scientific processes1 and made it applied science in invention4 ,hegel's standpoint was1 therefore1 of necessity obscure4 ,when the significant character of fact was not yet opened up in detail1 a method which worked upon the basis that the only possible thought is the reflection of the significance of fact1 had no chance of fair interpretation44 ,and thus it was 7and largely is7 that when ,hegel speaks of objective thought and its relations1 he is understood as having the ordinary conception of thought 7that is1 of thought as a purely separate and subjective faculty71 and yet as trying to prove that this apart faculty has some mysterious power of evolving truth4 ,the question which now confronts us1 therefore1 as to the present place of logic is just this3 ,has the application of scientific thought to the world of fact gone far enough so that we can speak1 without seeming strained1 of the rationality of fact8 ,when we speak of the rationality1 of the intrinsic meaning of fact1 can these terms be understood in their direct and obvious sense1 and not in any remote1 or merely metaphysical sense8 ,has the theoretical consideration of nature in its detailed study1 has practical invention1 as the manifestation of the rationality of fact1 gone far enough so that this significance has become1 or could become with some effort1 as real and objective a material of study as are molecules and vibrations8 ,it seems to me that we are already at this stage1 or are at the point of getting to it4 ,without arguing this question1 however1 7which1 indeed1 can be proved only by acting upon it1 only ambulando17 ,i would point out that the constant detailed work of science upon the world in theory and in invention1 must in time give that world an evident meaning in human consciousness4 ,what prevents scientific men from now realising this fact1 is that they are still afraid of certain 8transcendent0 entities and forces2 afraid that if they relax their hostility to metaphysic1 some one will spring upon them the old scholastic scheme of external1 supernatural unrealities4 ,to those who take the prevailing agnosticism not as a thing1 but as a symptom1 this agnosticism means just this3 ,the whole set of external1 or non-immanent entities1 is now on the point of falling away1 of dissolving4 ,we got just so far1 popularly1 as holding that they are unknowable4 ,in other words1 they are crowded to the extreme verge4 ,one push more1 and off they go4 ,the popular consciousness will hold not only that they are unknowable1 but that they are not4 ,what then8 ,science freed from its fear of an external and dogmatic metaphysic1 will lose its fear of metaphysic4 ,having unquestioned and free possession of its own domain1 that of knowledge and of fact1 it will also be free to build up the intrinsic metaphysic of this domain4 ,it will be free to ask after the structure of meanings which makes up the skeleton of this world of knowledge4 ,the moment this point is reached1 the speculative critical logic worked out in the development of ,kantian ideas1 and the positive1 specific work of the scientific spirit will be at one4 ,it will be seen that this logic is no revived1 redecked scholasticism1 but a complete abandonment of scholasticism2 that it deals simply with the inner anatomy of the realm of scientific reality1 and has simply endeavored1 with however much of anticipation1 to dissect and lay bare1 at large and in general1 the features of the same subject-matter1 which the positive sciences have been occupying themselves with in particular and in detail4 ,that we are almost at the point of such conflux1 a point where the general1 and therefore somewhat abstract lines of critical logic will run in to the particular1 and therefore somewhat isolated1 lines of positive science1 is1 in my opinion1 the present position of logical theory4 ,,john ,,dewey4 ,,footnotes3 #a ,jevons1 ,elementary ,lessons in ,logic1 p4 #e4 #b ,stock1 ,deductive ,logic1 p4 #c4 #c ,it should be understood that in the previous discussion so far as it relates to ,kant1 ,i have taken him at his lowest terms--those of logical self-consistency4 ,so far as ,kant does not succeed in freeing himself from his original position--the existence of a formal1 or apart1 faculty of thought--so far his emphasis of the a priori in the sense already attributed to him is inevitable4 ,but that the tendency of ,kant is to make the thought-relations a priori simply in the sense of being fact's own anatomy and physiognomy ,i should not deny4 ,,will ,,and ,,reason4 ,it has always been1 ,i think1 the practice in civilised society to speak of reason or good sense as in some way influencing action4 ,and of course it must do so1 if1 as we suppose1 it forms the radical distinction between man and the lower animals4 8,be reasonable10 we say1 in reference to action no less than to speculation4 8,wisdom and blood10 says ,shakespeare1 8combating in so tender a body1 we have ten proofs to one that blood hath the victory40 ,blood here means passion4 ,how does wisdom or knowledge combat passion8 ,i do not say that wisdom and knowledge mean the same thing1 but if they do not1 we should like to know the difference between them4 ,in this prevalent notion of the conflict between reason and desire1 it may be observed that reason is1 as a rule1 supposed to be negative or prohibitive4 8,be reasonable0 generally means 8give up something you want very much40 ,according to one account1 the inward monitor of ,socrates was always negative1 and throughout moral philosophy1 and especially throughout moralising philosophy1 which is not quite the same thing1 you find the point of view that reason conflicts with desire1 and has in fact for its function very much to prevent you doing or caring about whatever you very particularly want to do or incline to care about4 ,this is what gives rise to the state of things satirised in the old saying 8,any young man would rather face an imputation on his moral character than an imputation on his horsemanship40 ,if moral character means a sort of detachment from everything1 this feeling is both natural and justifiable4 ,the popular interpretation of ,aristotle leans in the direction of this idea about reason1 in so far as the conception of the reason seems to be connected with commonplace notions about the evils of excess1 strongly represented in ,greek proverbial philosophy4 ,it was easy to add to these ideas the conception of the evils of defect1 which is little more than a verbal refinement on the other4 ,these quantitative expressions have not much meaning in morality4 ,unquestionably1 ,i think1 the popular aspect of the ,aristotelian doctrine is an idea that you ought not to throw yourself very deeply into anything4 ,reason is1 in short1 according to these moralistic conceptions1 though not according to ,aristotle's fundamental view1 a sort of check upon desire and little more4 ,this negative character of reason will1 ,i hope1 explain itself away as we proceed4 ,the primary point on which ,i want to insist is not why reason is thus treated as negative1 but how it comes that reason can be supposed to conflict with or control desire at all4 ,i speak for the present of ,desire1 not of ,will1 because the meaning of desire is clearer2 whereas it is a doubt1 until we have explained the nature of active reason1 what ,will is1 and whether it is distinguishable from desire4 ,now1 on the other hand1 there is a sentence of ,aristotle 8,intelligence as such moves nothing10 and this seems to come home to us quite as naturally as the idea that reason controls action4 ,all plain or unambiguous instances of reason or reasoning or intelligence1 seem to deal with discovery of fact1 couched in a form which is capable of truth and falsehood4 ,for our purpose we may treat it as elaborate perception1 whether direct or assisted through inference1 such as calculation4 ,calculation is the old meaning of reasoning1 both in ,greek and ,latin4 ,how do we get across from perception or calculation to anything that can interfere with desire8 ,of course there is a meeting-point in the idea that attends desire4 ,human desire1 at least1 is not blind4 ,it is desire of something1 which is before the mind as an idea2 and in the case of desire which issues in action this something must be mentally specified in respect of the particular means needed to bring it about4 ,and also1 the end or purpose which is desired for its own sake1 is1 in the connection of cause and effect1 itself de facto a means to other results ad infinitum1 more or less of which are foreseen by the person who acts4 ,thus the act1 as fully presented to the mind in idea1 is a complication of external circumstances1 which are ideally distinguished1 supposing the act to be reflected on1 as means1 realisation of the purpose1 and foreseen consequences both of the means and of the realisation of the purpose4 ,it is1 ,i think1 all-important to remember1 that these distinctions are distinctions of relation to the acting subject1 drawn very lightly by the acting subject on the shifting surface of a complicated set of results presented in idea1 and are not at all complete distinctions1 and lend themselves very readily to self-deception4 ,we shall see the importance of this remark directly4 ,in the meantime1 here we have one way in which reasonings about fact do help to modify our actions4 ,if we know distinctly what we desire1 say1 a week's holiday1 then it is reasoning about matters of fact that will tell us what we must do to get it1 and1 in part1 what the results will be both of our getting it and of what we do to get it4 ,now for philosophical purposes we need not consider the foreseen consequences separately4 ,they must rank1 morally1 as means4 ,that is to say1 they are something which you have to take into the bargain in order to get what you want4 ,they come in with all the other circumstances in determining whether you like the action or not4 ,now is this connection between action and reason what we have in mind when we say that a person ought to act reasonably1 or that reason combats desire8 ,do we understand by acting reasonably1 that assuming some one part of the imagined circumstances to represent the purpose1 the agent has got all the means to it1 and the foreseen consequences of it1 and the interdependence of the parts of the purpose itself1 set out in a connection which is truly perceived or scientifically inferred8 ,we do sometimes appear to mean this4 ,we say3 it is unreasonable to ask me to be at the station at nine when the train does not start till ten4 ,it is unreasonable1 you may say1 on the ground that the means demanded of me are not1 scientifically speaking1 necessary to the end agreed upon4 ,still more we should pronounce it unreasonable to adopt any means which actually defeats your purpose2 which could only happen1 one would think1 either from moral self-deception1 or in complicated matters where the means are disputable4 ,this second case does not matter to us2 the first carries us a little further1 because it suggests that what you call the means may really contain your purpose1 or one of your purposes1 perhaps inconsistent with another4 ,the hackneyed example of selfish charity is as good a case of this unreasonableness as can be found4 ,the gift1 which is professed to be merely a means to the good of another1 is1 under all the conditions1 a means contrary to that good1 and is given because it gratifies an impulse of the donor4 ,it might seem1 in this case again1 a fair explanation to pronounce such conduct unreasonable merely because the means adopted are scientifically speaking inconsistent with the end proposed4 ,we might bear in mind1 however1 that we seem to have detected here a probable conflict of ends1 not merely of means to an end4 ,admitting1 then1 for the moment1 that we hold conduct to be unreasonable if the perception1 implied in it1 of the relation between means1 ends1 and consequences is flagrantly false1 do we admit conduct to be reasonable simply because the intellectual perception in question is clear and true8 ,taking truth in its ordinary sense1 as truth of simple fact1 we must deny this4 ,i may know perfectly well that so much wine will make me drunk1 and may drink it with that object and with that result1 and yet no one will pronounce this a reasonable action1 though my judgment of facts and results was as true and reasonable as could be4 ,it may be1 however1 that in a larger sense true judgment involves reasonable action4 ,thus it does not seem that truth of perception or correctness of calculation as to the connection of the circumstances which are presented in the idea of an act are sufficient to make the act reasonable1 although serious blunders in the perception or calculation seem to make the act which implies them unreasonable4 ,i even doubt whether the last clause was rightly stated4 ,i was obliged to say flagrant errors1 serious blunders4 ,for it seems doubtful whether a purely intellectual error1 or blunder of perception1 does make an act 8unreasonable10 which owing to such a blunder misses its mark4 ,i incline to think that the reason why we are forced1 in such cases as ,i have instanced1 to lay stress on the flagrancy of the blunder1 is that it makes us suspect self-deception or moral neglect on the part of the agent1 makes us suspect1 in other words1 that the inconsistency between means and ends was not owing to mere intellectual misjudgment1 but was adopted with open or partially open eyes4 ,i do not think that ,i should call my friend unreasonable for wanting to meet at the station an hour before the departure of the train1 if he could show me bona fide grounds which made him imagine that it was necessary to arrive so early4 ,i might in that case think him mistaken1 but should not venture to call him unreasonable1 unless his mistake seemed so obvious that ,i thought it was committed on purpose1 that is1 was not an intellectual mistake at all4 ,when ,i call him unreasonable1 perhaps ,i really suspect he is making a claim on my time to meet some private convenience of his own--to avoid a crowd or to make sure of some particular carriage1 which ,i do not care about--and therefore perhaps it may after all be his purpose that ,i think unreasonable4 ,but there is one great doctrine of reasonableness which does reduce it to a question of means and ends1 and that is1 the doctrine that everything else is a means to pleasure1 whether that of the agent or that of all sentient beings4 ,i do not want to discuss ,hedonism psychologically just now1 ,i only want to use it as an illustration of one way in which intelligence may be alleged to control action4 ,the ultimate theory would then be that this uniform purpose1 pleasure1 is a natural or obvious1 or1 so to speak1 a given purpose1 and that all definite action is or has been prescribed by the intelligence dealing with matter of fact1 as a means to the realisation of this given purpose4 ,then reasonable action would mean what our reasoning and perceptive powers1 dealing with matters of fact1 pronounce to make for pleasure1 and unreasonable action would be all that does not4 ,here1 though ,i wish to avoid hackneyed criticism1 ,i must note that there is a certain difficulty in getting across from the idea of one's own pleasure to that of other people's pleasure as a natural purpose1 and sometimes we find the contention that any person's pleasure is a reasonable purpose to any person1 which1 like several indications before1 takes us out of the connection between reason and the mere calculation of means to an end4 ,apart from this1 ,i have1 for our object1 only to refer back to the suspicion with which we regarded these distinctions between means1 ends1 and consequences1 in the presented idea of an action4 ,the burden of proof lies on those who limit the aspects in and for which activities or results can be or ought to be desired4 ,if we say that the whole complex of our moral life is a means to a partial though necessary incident in it1 it seems to me that we are putting the cart before the horse4 ,if you could really say 8moral life is the means1 and pleasure is the end0 then it would follow that1 should calculation tell you that moral life was not the most effectual means1 you would not prefer it4 ,now this old argument may be pronounced unfair on the ground that it puts an impossible case2 just like the counter-question which is asked by the opposite side1 8,if morality led only to increased pain1 would you prefer it then80 ,still1 if these two questions together bring out the fact that pleasure is an incident of a whole complex of functions and activities which we cannot suppose to be separated from it1 we do get this much result1 that there is no firm ground for distinguishing part of the complex as the end from the rest as the means4 ,and it seems clear1 also1 that we differentiate pleasures in kind according to the activities which they accompany1 just as we have constantly found that the so-called means differentiates and qualifies the so-called purpose4 ,thus ,i do not think that it is possible to represent the reasonableness of action as consisting in its guidance by right calculation of the means to an end1 not even to the alleged simple and universal end of pleasure4 ,at the same time1 this view has one essential element of truth1 that is the recognition that a positive impulse or claim can only be combated or defeated by a positive impulse or claim4 ,the view goes so far indeed as to say that one form of a general impulse can only be combated by another form of that same impulse through the discrepancy of the alternative means to its attainment4 ,however this may be1 so much does seem clear1 viz4 that reasonableness cannot be1 as popular language tends to make it1 something purely negative and prohibitive4 ,its negative aspect must be secondary1 and according to the suggestions furnished by the notions we have been examining1 must arise out of a discrepancy between two sets of means to the same acknowledged or accepted end4 ,this ,i think is solid ground1 so far that we are bound to deduce the negative side of reasonableness from a positive nature1 whether a general relation to one and the same purpose1 or relations to different purposes4 ,we have learnt1 on the other hand1 to distrust the absolute distinction between means and end4 #b4 ,now ,i turn for a moment to what ,i may describe as maxims of reasonableness4 ,i will not call them 8,a priori principles10 because such an expression raises a question about the nature of experience which does not concern the point before us4 ,but ,i do treat them as characteristic of a view which explains reasonableness rather by rules than by purposes2 and it seems to follow from this that the rule must be alleged to be self-evident1 because if they were derivative1 they would most naturally be derivative from purposes4 ,but in the history of speculation of course the same principle may be recommended at one time as analogous to an axiom of the reasoning power1 and at another time as involved in the purposes which are recognised as good4 ,even the same writer may combine both views4 ,now if such principles are supported as constituting the reasonableness of action1 either because connected with the predominance of the speculative intelligence1 or because of an analogy between such principles and any axioms acceptable to the speculative intelligence1 ,i believe that this support of them is due to a sheer confusion4 ,i take two only1 as illustrations1 one of each type ,i have mentioned4 ,plato1 it seems to me1 constantly fails to distinguish between the reasonableness of conduct1 and the reasonableness of abstract reasoning1 that is1 of the scientific intellect4 ,to the moral philosopher1 scientific or theoretical interest and activity are one interest and activity among others2 and the reasonableness of activity is not insured by pursuing an activity of reasonableness4 ,it may be quite unreasonable1 in the moral sense1 to pursue abstract reasoning as a vocation in life4 ,when we say that in every man the reason should be uppermost1 we do not mean that every man should devote himself to intellectual pursuits4 ,plato knows this1 as1 in a sense1 he knows everything2 but he uses all arguments for his purpose1 and among others ,i think he allows it to be supposed that occupation with intellectual matter is in a moral sense a predominance of the reason4 ,i may instance his attempt to prove that intellectual pleasures are the pleasantest1 more especially with reference to his aim in making the attempt1 which is1 ,i suppose1 to recommend intellectual occupation as pre-eminently reasonable in the moral sense4 ,to this ,i say ,no2 if and in as far as the inference is meant to rest upon an identification of scientific with moral reasonableness1 ,i think it a sheer confusion4 ,it is like saying that because a doctor has to do with the promotion of health1 therefore it is a healthy profession to be a doctor4 ,but ,plato's argument shows how strongly this idea appealed to him1 because he even recommends intellectual pleasures on the score of their sheer pleasantness1 implying not only that intellectual occupation is reasonableness in the moral sense1 but that intellectual occupation1 even when chosen by way of self-indulgence1 is still reasonableness in the moral sense4 ,of course the matter is complicated by a substantive connection1 the degree of which is matter of opinion1 between the two things1 like that between being a physician and leading a healthy life4 ,intellectual exercise and ambition have a definite influence on certain capacities concerned in the reasonable will4 ,but it cannot be made out1 that a tendency to the more intellectual occupations is in itself a tendency to moral reasonableness4 ,moral reasonableness must be a general characteristic of moral action1 not guaranteed by the special content of any form of activity4 ,next ,i have to discuss a principle which is advocated as an expression of the morally reasonable1 on the ground of having a sort of analogy to several maxims or axioms of the intellectual world4 ,it used to be said that justice is like a square2 or that the rightness of an action consists in its conformity to certain eternal proportions impressed upon the world by ,god4 ,i take one more modern form of these principles as a type of them all4 ,bentham said1 8,one is only to count for one10 and it is a mere amplification of this when ,mr4 ,sidgwick maintains1 if ,i understand him1 that it is objectively reasonable not to prefer my own interest or pleasure simply because it is my own1 to that of some one else4 ,this principle seems to me a commendable expression of moral judgment1 and ,i do not think that it is needless or empty4 ,there is a famous passage in ,middlemarch where the heroine1 in a matter which acutely touches her own feelings1 thinks to herself1 8,now how should ,i act if ,i could compel my own pain to be silent1 and merely consider what is best for the lives of all the persons concerned in the situation80 ,that ,i suppose is a concrete rendering of what this principle means4 ,but if we look closer1 we see its weak side4 ,it is negative1 and consequently abstract4 ,you are not to heed your own feelings unless they are such that you would heed them if they were some one's else in the same circumstances4 ,this amounts to no more than saying1 8,we believe there is always1 under all circumstances1 a right course40 ,it is strictly parallel to the theoretical principles of ,uniformity or ,causation4 8,we believe that there is an explanation for everything2 that nothing changes without some reason40 ,these are useful maxims if they make us look for the explanation1 and so the other is a useful maxim1 if it makes us look for the right course4 ,but it really falls between two stools4 ,it is not capable1 as intellectual theorems are1 of accurate development and application by measurement and analysis4 ,yet on the other hand it makes no special appeal to any special content1 or tendency of reasonableness embodied in definite ends4 ,it is neither theoretically fertile1 nor is it a description of a practical influence4 ,it is a well-known phenomenon that those who suggest maxims or moral axioms of this kind as defining moral reasonableness are apt to be reduced to assuming a particular impulse1 told off to assist or obey the reason4 ,such are ,plato's 8,spirited0 element in the soul1 ,kant's reverence1 ,mr4 ,sidgwick's general desire to do what is reasonable4 ,this seems to me to be creating a rule which has no positive content1 and therefore has not the character of a human purpose1 and then imagining an impulse to obey it the nature of which is not accounted for in reference to any plan of life1 but must simply be propounded as an isolated fact4 ,it kept suggesting itself to us above that reasonableness could not be thoroughly explained on the basis of a distinction between means and end1 because actual ends are not simple and uniform1 but are obviously qualified by the so-called means1 or context of circumstance4 ,we agreed1 however1 that what is reasonable must be so in virtue of a positive content1 whether as means or perhaps as end1 and that its negative or prohibitive aspect must arise from the conflict of two such positive contents4 ,we have in this section looked at two interpretations of moral reasonableness apparently suggested by analogies with intellectual reasonings or principles1 and we could not deny that each of them had a certain appearance of truth1 but one seemed to confuse the content with the form1 the other to consist of a form without any content4 #c4 ,it suggests itself therefore that moral reasonableness must be a characteristic which we ascribe to purposes of action4 ,then we get a variety of positive content1 without relying on the distinction between means and end2 while the abstract principles which we feel to be reasonable fall into their right place as very general descriptions of a purpose or scheme of life which can be called reasonable4 ,but the idea of a reasonable purpose requires explanation4 ,first1 it is irreconcilable with abstract ,hedonism4 ,you cannot have any relations within a single and uniform purpose1 and reason always involves relations4 ,secondly1 it is not the most intellectual purpose1 the purpose that has most to do with reasoning4 ,i have tried to explain this above4 ,thirdly1 it is such a life or purpose as possesses a self-consistent relation of the parts to the whole4 ,this is the general characteristic of any reasonable totality qua reasonable1 and it is this which forms the general characteristic of reasonable purpose qua reasonable4 ,then what is the meaning of the self-consistent relation of parts to the whole in the case of a human scheme of life8 ,we cannot demand that our specific purposes should be related consciously to the purpose of the universe2 because the universe as a whole is the object of theoretical knowledge only1 and this does not furnish us with the idea of a concrete purpose at all4 ,it seems then that the whole1 by consistency with which human purpose is or is not reasonable1 must be the whole of existing human purpose1 taken of course as moving in a certain direction1 owing to the modification continually introduced through the progressive realisation of purposes4 ,i do not see that more than this can be said without entering upon the analysis of the actual structure of the moral world1 of society and of history4 ,what is important seems to me to be that we cannot construct the reasonable world of morality from a theoretical view of men in general and of nature4 ,we have to take it as it is1 and are then perhaps able to show that it is an organised movement in the direction of self-consistency of purpose4 ,is there not more than one kind or type of self-consistency possible1 as when self-indulgence is restricted simply within the bounds of health and decency8 ,this is the question whether consistency demands completeness1 i4 e4 whether mere omission destroys consistency4 ,it has often been discussed1 and ,i suppose the general answer is that assuming the unity of the total moral movement1 any elements omitted in any portion of the movement must ultimately have their revenge by producing disturbance4 ,then if we ask what after all is the relation of the theoretical reason to the reasonable will or moral reason1 the only answer seems to be that the moral reason1 in the individual or in the race1 is the body of intellectual ideas which are in fact predominant as purposes in either1 having become predominant by the power they have shown of crushing out or adjusting to themselves the active associations of all other ideas4 ,and the power is what might be described as logical power2 that is to say it depends on the range and depth which enables one idea to include in itself as in a system a great variety of minor purposes4 ,the intellect as such is for morality in the first instance simply the medium in which the moral world or content of the moral world exists2 and which therefore conveys to that content its own peculiar character of system and totality4 ,then1 further1 in theoretical reflection on the moral world1 ,i imagine that we notice this predominance of ideas which have organising power1 and we frame to express this predominance such predicates as important1 right1 good4 ,and the whole of these judgments we must call wisdom as opposed to knowledge4 ,but ,i cannot myself see how these or any judgments can be judgments of the moral reason4 ,they seem to me to be1 as judgments1 necessarily judgments of the theoretic reason dealing with the facts of the moral world4 ,but then there is the further complication that these judgments themselves1 forming the content of intellectual ideas1 may1 if they have organising power1 become actively predominant1 and then again they will form a portion of the actual moral world as general ideas or clues1 inciting to the active search for concrete ideas which are concordant with them4 ,in this case they are not acting as judgments1 which are true and false1 but only as dominant contents4 ,it is one thing to judge that there is a right in the moral world1 and another thing to be mastered by the right in one's own mind4 ,if ,i am asked1 what ,i mean by the predominance of dominant ideas1 which ,i allege to form the content of the reasonable will1 ,i start from the position that every idea would produce action if unchecked1 simply by suggestions which through associative reproductions call up the necessary movement4 ,desire may1 ,i believe1 or may not intervene1 as a state of tension between a pain of want and a pleasure produced by an idea4 ,all that is essential1 it appears to me1 is this idea which can suggest an action4 ,in the formed life of a civilised man the organising ideas have long asserted their predominant power1 and in every moment crush out countless intruders each of which has in itself suggestions quite capable of leading to action4 ,in childhood or insanity the yielding to every suggestion is a mark of what is called absence or loss of will2 that is1 not the loss of a general power to check minor suggestions1 but of perfectly definite habitual purposes which check them as a matter of course4 ,this view sounds no doubt like an iron ,determinism1 and ,i am not much concerned to defend it from that imputation4 ,after all1 if we are determined by the content of our own minds1 why then ,i suppose we determine ourselves4 ,and trivial examples of indifferent alternatives such as 8,i can blow out this candle or not as ,i please0 seem to me very poor representatives of the moral will1 compared with the necessary pressure of an over-mastering idea which drives the man up to the point of saying1 8,this is what must be decisive with one like me1 and ,i have no alternative40 ,we feel1 as we say1 that 8we shall have to do it40 ,almost all really serious action1 it seems to me1 is of this type4 ,and if ,i have read at all correctly this lesson of the new psychology which owes its origin largely to ,herbart1 it is an instructive meeting of extremes1 that the most analytic of psychologies should more than ever represent the individual as the incarnation of a progressive order in ideas4 ,b4 ,,bosanquet4 ,,ethnological ,,jurisprudence4#d ,there is in the history of jurisprudence no more significant event than the foundation of the historical school by ,gustav ,hugo and ,carl von ,savigny4 ,jurisprudence1 up to that time1 was not a science1 at least not a science in the modern acceptation of the term4 ,it was an art1 which the practical lawyer learned and employed in strict conformity with practical traditions1 without reflecting on the reasons in virtue of which a legal norm or a social institution existed4 ,the only part of jurisprudence of a scientific tendency was the philosophy of law4 ,this latter branch had1 since ,hugo ,grotius1 emancipated itself from the church1 but it had advanced no farther than to substitute for the will of ,god1 to which formerly right and wrong had been traced1 the principle of human nature1 and to found upon the social instincts of man a system of natural law1--an ideal jurisprudential state by reference to which positive laws were tested in respect of their conformity with the ideally right and the ideally wrong4 ,this fundamental conception of the essential character of law was only slightly modified by the substitution of the human reason for human nature4 ,the rational systems of jurisprudence also derived the state and the law from the individuality of man1 especially from the social traits of this individuality1 and definite notions and principles were thus enunciated from which state and law were deductively constructed4 ,the historical school first introduced a change in all this4 ,it afforded the legal practitioner the possibility of seeing that the law which he applied was the slowly ripened product of a course of development that extended over many centuries1 and it afforded the philosophical juristic inquirer the possibility of understanding1 that the law was not founded on immutable ideas and principles1 but that it was a product of the creative mind of a nation1 that this product was subjected to processes of transformation and development1 and did not admit of regulation by the individual reason of a single philosophical inquirer4 ,but while the history of law has become a universally recognised discipline in the science of jurisprudence1 the application of its underlying principles to the philosophy of law has as yet by no means been universally carried out4 ,on the contrary1 the reason still plays an extensive rle as foundation and evolutionary principle2 and to a great extent the history of law and the philosophy of law still pursue their solitary ways as independent branches of knowledge4 ,in recent times1 through the influence of ethnology1 jurisprudence has entered on a new epoch4 ,a new branch of the science of law has arisen in ,europe1 the so-called ethnological jurisprudence1 and has already found in ,germany1 ,austria1 ,italy1 ,france1 ,belgium1 and ,holland1 enthusiastic supporters4 ,ethnology1 as it is known1 is the science that has for the subject of its investigations the totality of phenomena of social life of all the peoples of the earth1 and which makes use1 in this investigation1 of the methods of inductive inquiry exclusively employed by physical and natural science4 ,after the science of ethnology had advanced to a certain point1 the extension of ethnological inquiry to the domain of jurisprudence followed as of course4 ,to a certain extent the investigations of the history of law had prepared the way for ethnological jurisprudence4 ,the inductive method was common to both4 ,the idea of a history of the development of law was no longer strange to jurisprudence4 ,only the courage was wanting to allow the eye to range over the legal systems of all the peoples of the globe1 instead of1 as before1 restricting it to very narrow limits4 ,the historical investigation of law began in ,europe with the history of the ,roman law4 ,thereupon it was immediately extended to the ,germanic laws of ,europe1 so that now all ,west-,european peoples possess a highly developed history of law of their own4 ,recently1 also1 the history of ,slavonic law has been assiduously treated4 ,whereas in every case here it was a question of the sources of the laws that stood in immediate historical connection with the prevailing systems of ,europe1 jurisprudential investigation was slowly extended to more remote ethnical fields4 ,the first impulse in this direction came from comparative philology4 ,this science had succeeded in tracing the languages of extended groups of peoples back to common primitive tongues4 ,among these primitive tongues the ,aryan1 the common original language of the ,indo-,germanic group of nations1 first occupied the attention of inquirers1 and the law of this group of nations thus became the first object of investigation of a comparative jurisprudence extending beyond the more restricted provinces of the history of law4 ,the provinces of ,grco-,italic1 ,germanic1 ,slavic1 ,celtic1 ,iranic1 and ,indian law were investigated with respect to a common origin1 and various agreements and various deviations were discovered4 ,in very recent times the laws of the ,armenians and the ,ossetes in the ,caucasus have been added to the laws of the ,aryans1 and the laws of the ,afghans will probably soon follow these4 ,a number of more remote provinces of law have also been entered upon1 in connection with theological1 philological1 and connate inquiries4 ,thus1 particularly1 in connection with biblical investigation the ,israelitic law1 in connection with the study of ,arabic the ,islamitic1 in connection with the decipherment of the hieroglyphic writings the ,old-,egyptian1 in connection with the decipherment of the cuneiform inscriptions the ,soumerian and the ,assyrian-,babylonian1 and in connection with sinology the law of ,china4 ,in very recent times the ,japanese law has also been treated4 ,in the laws of all these peoples1 by the side of many peculiarities1 were also found many phenomena of frequent and universal recurrence4 ,after the science of law had so far extended its activity in this direction1 it was a final step only that ethnological jurisprudence took when it declared that the subject of juristic science was the investigation of the laws of all the peoples of the earth4 ,and yet this step was perhaps a more important one than all that had hitherto been taken4 ,for a considerable group of peoples had up to then been entirely neglected by the science of law1 namely the uncivilised peoples1 the so-called primitive peoples or ,naturvlker4 ,and just the laws of these savages furnished the most remarkable disclosures4 ,they exhibited everywhere the most singular parallel phenomena1 and made it possible to open up a complete early history of the law1 and to bring to light periods of jural development of which the history of civilised peoples has preserved but a few unintelligible remains4 ,ethnological jurisprudence is thus able to supply complementary information at a point where the threads of the history of law are lost in the obscurity of early times4 ,the condition of jural life in these primitive periods is very singular4 ,no juristic philosopher has ever lighted on the idea that primitive man could exist with such jural conceptions as he actually does4 ,that which ethnological jurisprudence has brought to light in this connection is something absolutely new and astonishing1 something that no brooding brain could have ever developed out of any idea or principle4 ,indeed1 it is so strange that it could not be conceived at all if we did not have it before our eyes to-day among savage tribes4 ,the collecting of the laws of uncivilised peoples constitutes an independent task of ethnological jurisprudence4 ,in this way the latter science will fill up the gaps which historical jurisprudential inquiry left open in our knowledge of the jural life of man4 ,but more important than all1 perhaps1 will ethnological jurisprudence become for the future development of the philosophy of law4 ,in this connection it goes hand in hand with the sociological tendency which dominates our time and has its surest foundation in ethnology4 ,the prime significance of ethnological jurisprudence lies in the fact that it is an ethnological science4 ,at first ethnology was a purely empirical science4 ,it gathered together all the attainable phenomena of ethnic existence1 and separately1 at first1 among single peoples and tribes4 ,after an extensive store of material had accumulated in this manner1 the discovery was made that in many provinces of ethno-social life1 especially in the provinces of religion1 law1 and morals1 especially also in all provinces of social custom1 phenomena of essentially similar character presented themselves among a great number of peoples in the case of whom neither any original tribal relationship nor any infusion from one nation into the other could be assumed2 and1 curious to say1 these were frequently the most singular phenomena1 of which one would have thought at first that they had sprung from the individuality of a determinate people4 ,this discovery of universal ethnographic parallels was all the more surprising in view of the fact that historical special inquiry1 whose province up to then had been essentially national life1 had placed especial emphasis on outwardly prominent events occurring in a different form in every nation1 whereas phenomena that appeared uniformly among the different nations were little noticed4 ,people had therefore grown accustomed to regard every nation as something existing by itself and peculiar to itself1 and1 particularly1 had also declared it as inadmissible to employ phenomena of the life of one nation to explain corresponding phenomena of the life of another nation4 ,the discovery of ethnographical parallels led to wholly different ideas4 ,it became clear that a great portion of human ethnical existence was not founded in the peculiar character of particular peoples1 but in the character of the human race1 in the universal nature of man4 ,and it became in addition clear that that which repeated itself everywhere on the earth1 which was therefore an expression of the universal human1 was something entirely different from that which previous philosophy had declared to be the actual human4 ,it also became clear1 at the same time1 that the nations thought quite differently from what the individual man did4 ,with this1 however1 the foundation of the entire previous philosophy was shaken4 ,if the axiom of modern ethnology is correct1 namely that it is not we that think1 but it that thinks in us1#e we shall no longer be able to explain our nature from our consciousness1 from our ego1 from our reason1 but we shall have to pursue this momentous 8,it0 that thinks in us1 and since we cannot find it in us we shall have to search for it outside of us in the expressions of the human soul in the life of the race4 ,this is the fundamental idea of modern ethnology4 ,it seeks to collect all the expressions of the human soul in the life of the species1 and from them to derive its inferences as to the nature of man4 ,it regards ethnic existence as the precipitate of human psychical existence1 and not merely of that part of it which is conscious1 but also of that part of it which is unconscious1 that which is inaccessible to introspective observation1 that which is not thought1 but is merely lived4 ,it enlarges accordingly the domain of psychology1 which was restricted hitherto to the analysis of the human consciousness1 by the incorporation of an additional domain unmeasured in extent4 ,these general conceptions of ethnology are also determinative for the science of ethnological jurisprudence1 and from this results its peculiarity as contrasted with the other branches of juristic knowledge4 ,ethnological jurisprudence places the centre of gravity of the science of law not like the previous juristic philosophy in the individual jural consciousness1 but in the law viewed as a province of ethnic existence4 ,it regards the laws of the nations as the precipitates of that which is now active and has been active as jural instinct in the entire human race4 ,it assumes that when all the phenomena of law in the life of the nations have been fixed1 an infinitely more valuable material will be drawn therefrom adapted to the disclosure of the nature of law than could have ever in the world been acquired by an analysis of the individual jural consciousness4 ,it does not regard the individual jural consciousness as something innate in man and exempt from the altering effects of time1 but as a product of the social conditions in which the individual has grown up4 ,it assumes1 therefore1 that the individual jural consciousness changes with a change of the social conditions1 so that a man who grows up under different social conditions possesses a different jural perception4 ,this assumption1 if we compare the expressions of the jural consciousness of races low in the scale of culture with those of civilised peoples1 is one that cannot be escaped4 ,we have only to recall to mind the irresistible force with which the jural sense of peoples that live under clan-constitutions demand vengeance of blood1 whereas this species of retaliation no longer exists in our jural consciousness of to-day4 ,thus there are hundreds and thousands of jural instincts and conceptions which are present at certain stages of civilisation and disappear entirely at others4 ,ethnological jurisprudence therefore assumes1 that the juristic philosopher who lays at the foundation of his system essentially his own jural consciousness1 simply enunciates therewith a system of law that answers perhaps to the current conceptions of his time and his people1 but which can in no sense lay claim to a value beyond that4 ,quite different1 on the other hand1 are matters conditioned when the inquirer has before him the laws of all the peoples of the earth from the lowest to the highest4 ,here he has in his possession a picture of the jural consciousness of the mind of humanity1 which is no longer subject to alteration1 but which1 to the extent that the development of human jural life has advanced1 is complete4 ,for the execution of its task ethnological jurisprudence first requires a collection of the laws of all the peoples of the earth4 ,each one of these laws is of equal value to ethnological jurisprudence in so far as the jural consciousness of humanity has found expression in it in any form4 ,especially deserving of consideration are the laws of the so-called savage peoples that have been so much neglected and contemned hitherto2 since they bring to light the jural consciousness of humanity in its germinal stages1 and since higher formations are invariably best understood when we know their first beginnings4 ,the solidest basis for ethnological jurisprudence would be furnished by a monographic treatment of the law of every single tribe and people of the earth4 ,by such monographic treatments the entire social organisation of a given tribe or people would be exhibited in all its complicated reciprocal relations1 and we should be able to follow the law in all the thousands of minute ramifications that connect it with the remaining provinces of national life4 ,but such a monographic treatment of the law of all the nations of the earth is accompanied with great difficulties1 and this part of the task of the science of law has as yet been undertaken only to a limited extent4 ,the condition of affairs is best in this respect where the nations themselves have collected and compiled their legal customs in books of laws4 ,but such collections are found only among peoples that deserve to some extent the appellation of civilised peoples4 ,among the great majority of peoples the law is simply practised and handed down by oral tradition1 so that here the legal customs must be collected by members of foreign civilised nations1--a very difficult labor and one that can be accomplished only by persons who take up their abode permanently among the races in question and become thoroughly familiar with their language and habits of life4 ,collections of this character we possess unfortunately only to a very limited extent1 and our knowledge accordingly of the law of uncivilised peoples is still very meagre4 ,even the books of law possessed by the various peoples have not all been made available to juristic science4 ,in part they have not yet been printed1 and in part they have not yet been translated into a generally understood language4 ,considerable time will yet be required before the existing material has been made wholly accessible4 ,not before the legal customs of all the peoples of the earth have been collected will ethnological jurisprudence be in a position to furnish a successful solution of the task it has set itself1--the task namely of a causal analysis of all the phenomena of the jural life of the human race4 ,yet to a certain extent this task may be undertaken at present1 even with a relatively limited store of material4 ,the starting-point for the ethno-juristic investigation of the phenomena of jural life is furnished by the ethno-juristic parallels1 legal customs that are found uniformly appearing among the nations1 without there being any reason to assume that one nation has received them from another4 ,legal customs of this character are in part so universally diffused over the earth that they may be characterised as a common possession of mankind2 in part they appear sporadically among unrelated peoples2 in part they are restricted to more limited domains4 ,the most important legal customs are those that have universal dissemination2 for here it may be assumed that they are a necessary emanation of the social side of human life4 ,legal customs that occur only sporadically1 but appear uniformly among unrelated peoples1 must likewise be regarded as the products of the universal nature of man1 yet only as such that can arise under definite conditions of existence4 ,legal customs that occur only in limited ethnological domains will have to be referred to the peculiar character of definite peoples and tribes4 ,legal institutions of universal character are1 for example1 the forms of marriage by capture and purchase of the bride1 blood-vengeance1 the right of refuge1 the systems of composition1 ordeals1 oaths1 and so forth4 ,almost universal are the levirate1 and the betrothal of children4 ,sporadically among unrelated peoples appear3 the seizure of the corpse of the debtor for debt2 execution by fasting1 whereby the creditor brings pressure to bear upon his debtor by having him fast a definite period of time before his dwelling2 the custom of the chief doing combat with his grown up son1 to whom the command of the tribe passes if he conquers his father2 and so forth4#f ,frequently it is the most curious customs that thus recur1 among peoples that are completely separated from each other by oceans and inaccessible mountain ranges and have unquestionably never been in communication with each other4 ,the explanation of these ethno-juristic parallel phenomena is in part not very difficult1 inasmuch as many of them can be traced back to fixed forms of social organisation4 ,thus1 for example1 a whole group of universally recurring legal customs is associated with the peculiar formation of the clan-constitutions and clan-law which regularly appears among uncivilised peoples and characteristically differs from the form of political organisation familiar to the present age4 ,many legal customs are also based on religious conceptions and social customs1 and their explication in such cases is frequently very difficult4 ,a complete explanation of all the legal customs of all the peoples of the earth with respect to their social causes would exhaust the work of ethnological jurisprudence as an ethnological discipline4 ,but in the same way that the acquisitions of ethnology are in their turn utilisable towards the constitution of a universal philosophy1 to which they will impart perhaps an entirely different character1 so will the results of ethnological jurisprudence be in their turn utilisable towards the constitution of a universal science of law and for the philosophy of law1 in which probably1 through its means also1 a powerful change will be inaugurated4 ,these are the ideas1 traced in their most general characters1 that may be regarded as the fundamental ones in 8ethnological jurisprudence40 ,,albert ,,hermann ,,post4 ,,footnotes3 #d ,translated from the manuscript of ,dr4 ,albert ,hermann ,post by ,thomas ,j4 ,mc,cormack4 #e ,bastian4 #f ,the reader will find a brief survey of the ethno-juristic parallels appearing among the various peoples of the earth1 in a treatise of mine entitled ,ueber die ,aufgaben einer allgemeinen ,rechtswissenschaft 7#ahia71 pp4 #bg to #gb4 ,,american ,,politics4 ,nothing in this country appears to the stranger more intricate and inexplicable than our politics4 ,the different parties1 two big ones and several little ones1 the various machines1 county1 state1 and national1 the 8bosses10 8heelers10 and 8workers0 present such a confusion of ideas and a terminology so varied1 that it is only after many years that the foreigner begins to comprehend our system of government and the principles underlying our political movements4 ,indeed1 the majority of ,americans themselves are no better off and have no clear perception of the part they are playing in the administration of affairs or the ethical effects of the ballot which they cast4 ,ask the ordinary voter why he supports the candidates of a certain party and you will find that his reasons are reducible to a few concrete facts1 and are rarely governed by any general principles4 ,in the ,southern states the vast majority of the whites are democrats through opposition to the republican party which fought the war and deprived them of their slaves4 ,the negroes on the other hand are republicans because it is to that party they owe their freedom1 and from it they expect protection for themselves in the exercise of their political rights and the blessings of opportunity for education4 ,the political question there becomes a race question1 utterly regardless of the principles which the two great parties represent4 ,let there be a complete change of platforms and the result would be precisely the same as it has been for the past generation--the ,south would still remain democratic1 and the votes of their presidential electors would still be cast for the candidates of that party4 ,there is a minor race question in the feeling against foreigners1 more especially ,irish1 ,italians1 and ,germans1 influenced to some extent by the fact that a large number of these foreigners are ,roman ,catholics and that there is an uneasy suspicion on the part of some ,americans that the ,catholic church is hostile to the spirit of democracy1 a suspicion not entirely unfounded if one should judge solely by the sayings and doings of some of the prelates of that church for the past forty years4 ,this 8,know-nothing0 sentiment at one time threatened to create a solid foreign vote in opposition4 ,germans and ,irish united under the protecting wings of ,tammany ,hall and1 aided by clergymen who hoped to obtain part of the state educational fund for their private parochial schools1 formed a strong ally to the national democratic party4 ,happily prejudices of race and religion are dying out and neither party can now claim a monopoly of the foreign vote4 ,strange as it may seem1 however1 the ,irish and ,german elements1 so recently the objects of proscription themselves1 have in late years become embittered against the ,chinese4 ,to the patient industry of the ,mongolian immigrants is due the building of the ,pacific railroads1 when it would have been impossible to obtain white labor1 and the cultivation and development of the ,pacific coast states4 ,congress was terrorised into passing the law excluding all ,chinese laborers4 ,it was more than race prejudice which contributed to this hatred of the ,chinese4 ,the chief reason for ,chinese exclusion was an economic one4 ,great masses of laborers feared that the ,chinese by immigrating in vast numbers would deprive them of work by taking their places at lower wages1 and1 having the ballot1 they dictated to ,congress the terms of the ,anti-,chinese ,act4 ,the alien contract labor law is a measure conceived in the same spirit and directed against the hiring of laborers abroad by ,american contractors1 who could thus displace their employs at lower wages by ,hungarians1 or ,poles1 or ,russians1 ignorant of the language of this country and whose compensation could be the more easily reduced to a bare maintenance1 and who in sickness or old age could be turned out on the roads to die without costing the contractor any contraction of his bank account4 ,there was some excuse for this law1 or at least for the feeling which prompted it1 when the miners of a whole section could be evicted and they and their families made to suffer the pangs of slow starvation because the owners of the coal lands found they could obtain human machines at a less cost from abroad4 ,it was natural that the laborers should demand a law which offered some immediate relief even at the risk of meeting wrong with wrong1 rather than that they should attempt to regulate affairs on abstract principles of justice while their stomachs were empty and their wives and children were dying for want of sufficient nourishment4 ,that feeling1 however1 is also vanishing and ,american workingmen are beginning to see that the increase in population1 native-born as well as that imported by contract1 is steadily adding to the number of competitors and lowering the rate of wages4 ,their attention is becoming more and more directed to the opening of new opportunities for work rather than to the restricting of the number of workers4 ,another class of men1 if they vote at all1 do so on no general principle of public welfare1 but solely for their own advantage at the expense of their fellow men4 ,these are to be found among the rich manufacturers1 the coal1 and iron1 and railway kings1 and the manipulators of the crops of the nation4 ,rarely casting a ballot in person1 they give notice to their thousands of employs that if the latter do not support the candidates or the party which they happen to favor1 the employs' places will be given to more pliant servants4 ,these men are as non-partisan as the most ardent reformer could wish4 ,one of them1 a few years ago when questioned by an investigating committee of the ,new ,york state legislature1 said3 8,in a republican district ,i was a strong republican2 in a democratic district ,i was democratic2 and in doubtful districts ,i was doubtful1 but in politics ,i was an ,erie railroad man every time40 ,another famous man of the same type said he had no politics2 that he found it cheaper to buy up one set of legislators after they were elected than to purchase two sets of candidates before election4 ,these corrupt men1 counting their wealth by tens of millions1 influencing state legislatures and the national ,congress1 and throwing their weight into ,presidential campaigns1 constitute the chief 8dangerous class0 in the ,united ,states to-day1 far more threatening to the permanency of free institutions than the anarchists who were hanged at ,chicago4 ,then there are the illy-paid employs of these men who do their bidding at the polls1 voting for the candidates of their masters4 ,promise of office or patronage lures others into the support of one party or the other4 ,lastly come the poorest of the poor who live in the most miserable tenement houses1 or when single hive in the big lodging-houses which are found chiefly in ,new ,york and ,chicago4 ,a ton of coal or a barrel of flour is the bribe to the former1 frequently effected through the medium of the poor wretch's wife who does not care for politics but sees a very material advantage in the food or fuel offered by the ward worker4 ,the lodging-house voters1 paid by drinks of whiskey or dollar bills1 until recently in ,new ,york were marshalled in squads of twenty or thirty early on the morning of election day1 given their ballots and compelled to hold them aloft between the thumb and forefinger of the right hand so that the heeler or paid servant of some political faction might watch them from the moment they took their place in the line of voters until their ballots were handed to the election inspectors and dropped in the box4 ,both parties wink at such frauds and their henchmen directly countenance and assist in them but the party that happens to be in the majority in any locality is usually the one most guilty4 ,the result is that the minority affects great virtue and loudly denounces the corruption of its opponents4 ,among those who do vote on principle are the prohibitionists1 the greenbackers1 the adherents of ephemeral labor parties and the socialists4 ,the anarchists generally refrain from voting because they do not believe in any government by force and say that an enlightened public opinion will lead the people to dispense with such things as the army and navy and police and law courts4 ,the socialists occasionally vote for the men of other parties whom they think represent the worst measures1 in order the sooner1 as they frankly avow1 to produce revolutionary conditions1 which they expect would assist them greatly in their propaganda4 ,the prohibitionists1 greenbackers1 and labor men each take a partial view of political economy4 ,the first see the evils and degradation arising from intemperance and think that everything else must yield to the one consideration of the abolition of the liquor traffic4 ,the panacea of the greenbackers consists in the destruction of the monopoly of the currency now enjoyed by the national banks4 ,the labor men have different shibboleths at different times such as the prevention of child labor in factories1 an eight-hour work-day and the like--measures which might effect some relief but are minor matters compared with the great social problem of the increase of poverty in the midst of the greatest productive energies which the world has ever seen1 a problem which is rapidly coming to the front and overshadowing all others4 ,but these minor movements hardly produce a ripple on the surface of our political waters4 ,there are only two parties worthy of the name in the ,united ,states to-day1 as there have been but two ever since the days of ,thomas ,jefferson and ,alexander ,hamilton4 ,these parties go on forming platforms chiefly on the theory of offending the least number of voters and phrasing their declarations in vague terms which may be explained one way in one part of the country and another way in another part4 ,such is a cursory view of the field of ,american politics to-day4 ,it may seem that ,i have made out a pretty bad indictment of corruption against our politics and that the view of the cynic is correct that ,american politics are desperately wicked and there is no health in them4 ,but the moral forces which are operating in the world are fortunately not dependent upon the changeable methods or the selfish objects of men4 ,it is here in ,america1 perhaps more than anywhere else1 that the natural laws of social development have fullest play4 ,it is here that the evolution of politics is working itself out freely1 untrammelled by tradition or custom4 ,it is here that the ultimate ideal of politics will first be reached4 ,when the framers of the ,declaration of ,independence formulated their proposition that governments derive their just powers from the consent of the governed1 a step in the right direction was taken--a step that was in accordance with our old ,saxon traditions1 yet for the first time in the world's history made on an extended scale1 to base human government on the principles of natural law4 ,and through all the vicissitudes of our country1 its struggle for independence1 its war for the liberation of its commerce1 its civil conflict which would have dismembered any other nation1 or would have left one section the subjugated serfs of the other1 through a disputed presidential election which strained the written constitution to its utmost1 the great moral force of natural law has been working1 now through one party1 now through another1 gathering impetus as it goes and giving promise always of better times to come4 ,it is in this broad view that all the petty thieveries and striving for place and power sink into utter insignificance4 ,the people do still rule4 ,they may sleep for a time but are sure1 sooner or later1 to assert their rights in accordance with the instincts of the human mind1 which are good and not bad4 ,as long as the suffrage shall exist it is reasonably certain that this ,american government1 8of the people1 by the people1 for the people10 shall not perish from the earth4 ,if the wealthy monopolists could control the suffrage1 the prospects might be different4 ,the freedom of the voter has been impaired to a certain extent but the ,american people with quick instincts have awakened to the danger4 ,the ,australian system of voting1 which secures secrecy and freedom from intimidation and almost extinguishes bribery is now becoming very popular4 ,fifteen of the states have adopted it and the other twenty-nine will1 no doubt1 follow their example in a few years4 ,but the introduction of measures for its establishment presented the curious anomaly of being opposed by democrats in some localities and by republicans in others1 both for partisan reasons1 constitutional and high moral pretexts being of course advanced4 ,when it becomes the general law1 it will do more than anything else to purify electoral methods4 ,entirely above the question of methods1 however1 there are certain principles involved in ,american politics which it becomes of the highest importance to comprehend and which furnish the key to the apparently inexplicable confusion4 ,these principles1 it seems to me1 are reducible to two1 which may be likened to the centripetal and centrifugal forces in nature4 ,as both are needed for the stability of the physical universe1 so both the centralising and decentralising tendencies in politics are necessary for the co-ordination of the state4 ,it is in the free play of these forces1 each in its proper sphere1 that lies the assurance of the perpetuity of ,american institutions4 ,but as the ideal has not yet been reached1 the practical result is that one tendency begins to act1 at first legitimately1 then from the aggrandisement of power and the 8cohesive force of public plunder0 the administrators of government attempt to stretch it unduly1 the opposition comes to power and the same story is repeated4 ,in each case the liberal party succeeds the conservative1 acts at first wisely1 then corrupted by the subtle temptations of place and power1 and wishing to retain both1 it becomes opposed to change and begets a new conservatism1 while new liberals arise on a higher plane of evolution to continue the never-ending struggle4 ,and it must be recollected that the conservative party of each generation is far more liberal than the one which it displaced1 thus giving assurance of perpetual progress4 ,this has been the epitome of all ,american history2 each party government1 by whatever name it may have been known1 has been liberal in comparison with its predecessor and conservative as to its successor4 ,when ,washington organised his administration it was no doubt regarded in ,europe as highly revolutionary and anarchistic4 ,but such a class government1 with laws of entail and slavery1 and cruel punishments for petty offences1 as existed then1 would not be tolerated for a single year at the present time4 ,thomas ,jefferson who founded the democratic party1 then called the republican1 was a consistent opponent of aristocracy and personally was a man far in advance of his time1 but most of his followers would be horrified if they should now come back to earth and see the powers possessed by the general government to-day1 necessary1 legitimate powers1 without which the affairs of the nation could not be administered for a single week4 ,the ,united ,states soon got rid of laws of entail and the established churches4 ,the democracy came to power and held it nearly sixty years4 ,long continuance in office endeared its possession to that party while the very growth of the nation1 from five millions to thirty-one millions1 demanded changes in internal policy which were not forthcoming4 ,there were not lacking signs of popular discontent4 ,in #ahdj the democrats met their first defeat1 and for three or four presidential terms the votes vibrated between the democrats and the whigs4 ,but the latter were not united on a consistent policy4 ,they needed a principle4 ,the principle was shaping itself4 ,slavery1 which had been abolished in the ,northern states1 was gradually strengthening in the ,south4 ,the democrats forgot1 or rather most of them never learned1 that true democracy knows no distinction of color4 ,the abolitionists were denounced by press and pulpit as socialists1 as the disturbers of public order1 as blasphemers against the very law of ,god contained in ,holy ,writ4 ,the people1 however1 returned to power these same socialists and the institution of chattel slavery was doomed4 ,that would have been the case in any event1 but the civil war precipitated it1 just as many other unjust wars in history have resulted in disestablishing the very institutions to perpetuate which the wars were made4 ,the republican party grandly and patriotically fulfilled its mission4 ,by degrees1 however1 the enormous destruction of wealth during the war and the heavy debt entailed by it1 created a burdensome system of taxation which substituted self-interest for patriotism4 ,duties were laid upon imports from abroad heavier than those which formed one of the chief causes for the revolt of the colonies against ,great ,britain4 ,these duties enabled ,american manufacturers to make on ,american soil the same class of goods that were imported and charge the same price as the imported goods enhanced by the duty1 of course pocketing for themselves the extra profit which the tariff aided them to obtain from consumers4 ,the quickest way to wealth was to start some manufacture1 get the government to put a tax on similar articles imported and pocket the difference1 or to get an internal revenue measure passed taxing a certain line of domestic goods1 pay the tax in the first instance and then charge it to the consumers with of course a good commission added for patriotic services4 ,as long as the government had work for every man who could shoulder a musket1 the pernicious effect of the system was not clearly seen4 ,but when the war was over and one million men returned to productive avocations1 wages began to fall4 ,then the question of taxation inevitably came to the front and has now become the living issue of the hour4 ,the needle of the suffrage is again vibrating1 the republican party has been deprived of power for four years and the democratic ,president emphasised the issue by pushing the question of tariff reform to the foreground4 ,his re-election was defeated1 but the question is debated with more vigor than ever1 and all signs point to absolute free trade as one of the certainties of the future4 ,judging from the last ,congressional elections1 the people have at last turned their faces in the right direction4 ,it will be noticed that two elements1 which ,i have called the centripetal and the centrifugal1 have been predominant in shaping ,american politics4 ,they may be termed the socialistic and the anarchistic forces4 ,socialism claims the direction of everything by a strong centralised government4 ,anarchists say with the democrats1 8,that government is best which governs least10 and logically argue for the abolition of all government4 ,now1 the right or wrong of these principles depends upon their application4 ,only the most rabid anarchist would object to the ,post ,office1 for instance1 and few socialists would claim that the state has a right to regulate a man's clothing or his religion4 ,it is on the question as to what subjects these principles should be applied that all our ,american parties arise4 ,the early federalists were socialistic in that they believed in a strong central government and in relegating as few things as possible to the states4 ,president ,jefferson introduced the anarchistic or centrifugal principle of decentralisation and individualism4 ,but as the nation grew1 it was seen that this wrought injustice1 especially in the matter of slavery which was a violation of human rights1 however the different states might regard it4 ,then the socialistic or centripetal principle began to act and slavery disappeared4 ,now it seems likely that the individualistic principle will again become dominant in an attempt to abolish all fiscal restrictions upon trade4 ,after this may follow the socialistic principle of state ownership of railways and telegraphs4 ,perhaps this will be the work of the new political forces evidently gathering1 as foreshadowed by the ,farmers' ,alliance1 after the breaking-up of parties and after the democrats1 having given us free trade1 will have resumed their natural position of conservatives4 ,then1 in the remoter future1 may come the anarchistic principle of the removal of the restrictions against female suffrage4 ,and so it will go on1 first one principle acting and fulfilling its mission1 then the other1 each bringing the nation to a higher plane of progress and uniting it more and more closely with the grand upward march of the human race4 ,what is this1 after all8 ,it is not socialism4 ,it is not anarchy4 ,it is neither democracy nor republicanism4 ,it is ,,evolution4 ,it does not depend on the temporary success of party governments for its action4 ,it does not even solely result from our unique position or our independence wrested from ,great ,britain4 ,back of it lie the broad principles of ,british liberty1 of common law1 of ,magna ,charta won from ,king ,john on the plains of ,runnymede4 ,back of it is the great wave of democracy arising out of the darkness of the ,middle ,ages4 ,back of it are the injunctions of ,him of ,galilee who taught the natural law as no man ever taught before4 ,back of it is ,roman jurisprudence and ,greek art and culture and the early efforts of the days when ,cadmus brought the alphabet to ,europe with his ,phnician colony4 ,indeed1 back of it lies the primeval impulse of the first man1 ,god-endowed1 ape-descended1 who stood upon his feet and began to think4 ,we may carry our thoughts still further to the times when the red sunlight first filtered through the thick clouds upon an uninhabited world1 and still further may we go in thought into the ages of eternity1 and assert with fullest confidence that the principles of progress to-day working themselves out in politics are but the reflection of the divine ideals founded in the laws of nature4 ,can the course of such progress be turned back8 ,can we despair of the future in the light of all the past8 ,is not the general movement onward and upward8 ,will not the sneers at ephemeral phases of our ,american politics pass away with the incidents which they justly condemn1 while the principles of progress remain forever8 ,,thomas ,b4 ,,preston4 ,,artificial ,,selection ,,and ,,the ,,marriage ,,problem4#g ,by artificial selection ,i mean all conscious and purposive arrangements between men and women which have in view character of offspring4 ,this is opposed to natural selection which is merely instinctive unteleological union with one of the opposite sex as impelled by animal passion or romantic love4 ,all sexual union among the lower animals is by natural selection2 they do not forecast consequences1 and by conforming to known laws determine consequences4 ,among the lower races of men natural selection is the sole or at least dominant factor in marital matters1 but as civilisation advances artificial selection becomes a more and more powerful element4 ,a truly thoughtful and intelligent man in our day in view of marriage will most carefully consider his own life history and that of his parents and ancestors1 and also that of his intended partner and her ancestors1 as to physical or mental disease1 which might be handed down to the issue of the proposed union4 ,he would not1 for instance1 marry into a family which has a tendency to consumption or insanity1 for this would be a crime against his possible descendants4 ,further1 this growth of artificial selection with the progress of society is manifest not only as regards individual action but by state regulation4 ,even in barbarous states it soon becomes evident to the leaders that if strong healthy men are to be had to defend and maintain the nation1 strict attention must be paid to the character of those who marry4 ,in ,sparta and other ancient states this principle was recognised1 and modern governments seek in many more or less indirect ways to encourage marriage between the most fit1 so that good citizens and warriors may be raised up to serve the state4 ,all this regulation of marriage by either individual or state action which looks to the character of offspring ,i term artificial selection4 ,in the evolution of man as a rational animal artificial selection will more and more prevail1 and human breeding will become a well defined art4 ,man is always artificial1#h and it is his goal to become in all his life unnatural and thoroughly artful4 ,there can ultimately be no laissez-faire policy as to marriage or any other institution4 ,the history of marriage is the history of the gradual retirement of natural selection2 but art has come in here more slowly than in other relations of life owing to tremendous conservatism and the power of human passion4 ,but the time has now come when man must more than ever before attend by artificial selection--that is1 purposed care--to the perpetuation of the species in the line of its true advancement1 spiritual achievement4 ,i do not now see how the necessity of artificial selection can be gainsaid by any one who takes a broad view of the evolution of the race4 ,the methods of artificial selection are either negative1 which restrain the unfit from propagating1 or positive1 which encourage the fit to propagate4 ,the most radical negative method is mutilation1 and is employed by man with the lower animals and with slaves1 but this plan could hardly be used by civilised society for human breeding4 ,imprisonment temporarily restrains some classes of society from perpetuating themselves4 ,prevention of conception is at present mostly a voluntary means1 but accomplishes the elimination of both fit and unfit4 ,celibacy of monk and nun1 of bachelor and maid1 works also in both directions4 ,in many indirect ways society discourages from marriage those whom it supposes to be unfit as tested by wealth1 rank1 or birth4 ,it is not1 however1 so much by the extension of any negative methods1 but rather by positive means that artificial selection may be best employed4 ,i will mention three forms by which human breeding might be materially advanced4 ,by common law and custom the wife surrenders herself physically to submit and morally to obey the husband4 ,this is not for the most part harshly and literally carried out in civilised countries2 still there is a vast deal of oppression which is hidden from all eyes1 and which is often passively received by women as her rightful lot4 ,this again is a subject upon which delicacy--perhaps unwise--forbids free discussion1 but its bearing is manifest4 ,if women have the choice to bear or not to bear1 and she with educated conscience choose by fitness of offspring1 a large and powerful element of artificial selection may be introduced4 ,again all governments have laws concerning marriage which act in general toward encouraging the fit4 ,certain conditions as to age1 etc41 being fulfilled1 the state grants a marriage licence1 and public opinion might easily be led to make the requirements more stringent4 ,as a physician has suggested to me a certificate of health from an approved medical examiner might be required of all applicants for legal marriage4 ,this would certainly be a strong measure of artificial selection1 and would save much misery springing from ignorance and vice4 ,it surely seems scarcely fitting that those who cannot pass an examination for life insurance freely contract marriage with view to issue4 ,but the plan of artificial selection which seems to me most feasible at the present time would be voluntary associations of men and women who bind themselves to learn and apply the laws of heredity in their marriage relations1 to seek for expert guidance1 and in all their life to live not merely purely1 but according to reason and science4 ,heredity societies of this stamp which should favor marriages only between members would ultimately become a rational aristocracy1 and true and good blood would be perpetuated in the best manner4 ,there is much1 indeed1 to be done in the science of heredity1 especially as regards laws of transmission of mental and moral qualities1#i but still we have even now a sufficient basis of knowledge to make the experiment well worth trying4 ,many objections can be raised to such schemes4 ,for instance1 it will be said that they might assure us of obtaining men of talent1 but we should forever lose men of genius4 ,if such societies were in1 vogue in the ,elizabethan period1 we might never have had a ,shakespeare4 ,what likelihood that a scientific expert would advise the marriage of ,john ,shakespeare and ,mary ,arden6 ,i answer that we should have had a dozen ,shakespeares instead of one4 ,the law of the production of geniuses is not beyond human ken4 ,maud ,s4 is truly a genius in horseflesh1 but she came into the world in no fortuitous or instinctive way1 but by scientific breeding4 ,the applicability of similar foresight in breeding men would produce geniuses in abundance4 ,it may not be accomplished in an exactly analogous manner1 an expert leading around eminent men to 8make the season10 but the analogous practical results will nevertheless be obtained4 ,another objection which might be urged is that any such scheme would seriously diminish population4 ,true2 but what thoughtful man applies the numerical test to the progress of the race6 ,it is not quantity of citizens but quality1 which constitutes the true greatness of states4 ,the counting of heads instead of what is in heads1 is a mistake into which democracies are peculiarly apt to fall4 ,were all men exactly equal a census would be a true test1 but considering the tremendous inequalities in humanity it is sheer folly for a country to glory in the number of its adherents1 or a sect in the number of its adherents1 or a city in the number of its citizens4 ,civilisations are weighed down and ultimately crushed by the dead weight of the masses4 ,the barbarian is not without but within the civilisation4 ,by recent inquiries in ,new ,york and ,chicago the slums appear to be five times as prolific as the most aristocratic portions2 and while good may come from the lowest born1 and bad from the highest born1 still the chances are decidedly in favor of the high born4 ,a few rise above the level of their birth1 a few sink below it1 but the great majority of men remain for their lives on the general level of society in which they were born4 ,the ,united ,states would be a greater nation with #aj1jjj1jjj choice inhabitants than with ten times #aj1jjj1jjj of the ill bred and low bred4 ,athens by the vulgar test of numbers was but a small and mean city1 but in true greatness as revealed in far reaching spiritual power1 she stands in the very forefront4 ,again it will be objected that scientific schemes for human breeding would inevitably destroy that beautiful flower of ,christian civilisation1 the poetry and romance of love4 ,sentiment and chivalry would wither1 and brutality and cold calculation would supplant all tender and refined emotion4 ,i should answer that the true refinement which refuses to obtrude the things of sense1 and true purity which refuses to dwell on them salaciously1 are perfectly compatible with the fullest knowledge and the consequent action4 ,lubricity breeds best upon a half knowledge acquired in dubious ways4 ,a serious practical scientific treatment of this subject will not glorify the flesh with the fierce gusto of ,walt ,whitman1 nor1 with the ,zola school1 dwell upon animalism with the morbid detail of a heated imagination2 but it will bring into the clearest light the laws of sex and the rules for the development of the human race into the perfect man4 ,these laws of nature1 which science reveals1 are laws of duty and laws of ,god1 and when once appropriated as such by ,ethics and ,religion1 they will become the basis for all that is high in emotion and chivalrous in action4 ,in that most vital of matters1 human breeding1 man is far behind his progress in all other spheres of action2 but here as elsewhere ,science must enter1 not to destroy but to fulfil1 to build up manhood and womanhood into the perfected relations which can only come from rational action1 illuminated by complete knowledge1 and sanctioned by noblest sentiment4 ,,hiram ,m4 ,,stanley4 ,,footnotes3 #g ,in an article in ,the ,arena for ,june1 #ahij1 ,i endeavored to plainly set forth the renewal of society from its lowest elements as the greatest disease in our social life1 and to show that the remedy lies in a thorough application of science to human breeding4 ,just how this application was to be made ,i did not state1 for ,i did not include this in the scope of my discussion4 ,mr4 ,stead in his ,review of ,reviews for ,july1 #ahij1 and ,mr4 ,wallace in the ,september ,fortnightly ,review and ,october ,popular ,science ,monthly1 #ahij1 have drawn inferences on this point which ,i am not prepared to allow4 ,mr4 ,stead speaks in headlines and in text of 8murder1 mutilation1 or imprisonment0 as the methods which ,i hint at1 and ,mr4 ,wallace remarks upon my views 8that such interference with personal freedom in matters so deeply affecting individual happiness will never be adopted by the majority of any nation1 or if adopted would never be submitted to by the minority without a life-and-death struggle40 ,it seems incumbent then on me to state more clearly what ,i understand by artificial selection1 and what forms of it are most expedient at the present time4 #h ,by artificial ,i understand not what is unnatural or against nature but that which is after conscious deliberation more in accord with the laws of nature4 ,it is a higher degree of the natural4 #i ,see my remarks on this point in ,nature1 ,oct4 #ca1 #ahhi4 ,,thought ,,and ,,language4 ,i have read with interest ,prof4 ,max ,mller's paper on the above subject in the current issue of ,the ,monist1 not only because it is in large part devoted to a consideration of my own work on 8,mental ,evolution10 but still more because the explanations which it supplies touching certain points of disagreement between us appear to show that ,i have not misrepresented his statements1 even if1 as he alleges1 ,i have misapprehended his meanings4 ,the work to which allusion has just been made was published in #ahhh1 and1 as far as ,i am aware1 it is only now that ,prof4 ,max ,mller has sought to meet my views as there expressed4 ,hence we may take it that his answer is1 at all events1 well matured4 ,furthermore1 we may take it1 from the tone in which his answer is conveyed1 that he credits me with having had at least an honest desire to understand1 and accurately to represent1 his meaning in all the places where ,i have ventured to criticise it4 ,it appears1 however1 that at all events in one important respect ,i have betrayed 8a complete misapprehension0 of his meaning--viz4 with reference to his 8theory of the origin of roots0 7,the ,monist1 p4 #ehb72 and it is for the purpose of correcting this misapprehension that he has published the latter half of his present paper4 ,my reply1 therefore1 must take the form of excusing myself for the complete misapprehensions which are alleged4 ,it is desirable at the outset to emphasise a distinction which ,i was careful to draw in my work on 8,mental ,evolution in ,man0--that1 namely1 between philology and philosophy4 ,a man may be an excellent authority on the 8,science of ,language10 and yet but a very indifferent writer on the 8,science of ,thought40 ,on the other hand1 a man may know nothing at first hand touching the special province of a philologist1 and nevertheless be fully capable of criticising what a philologist has published in the way of theoretical deductions from his facts--especially where these deductions quit the sphere of philology1 and soar into that of ,darwinian1 or anti-,darwinian1 speculation4 ,this distinction1 indeed1 between the particular science of philology and the general scope of philosophy1 ,prof4 ,max ,mller himself recognises where he says3 8,while the student of language seems to me to have a perfect right to treat the roots of language as ultimate facts1 it is difficult for the philosopher not to look beyond40 7,the ,monist1 p4 #egi47 ,nevertheless he complains of me because1 while accepting all his philological facts upon his authority as a philologist 7save in so far as they are not accepted by other philologists71 ,i have been obliged to express dissent from not a few of his theoretical deductions--especially1 as ,i have already indicated1 where these have reference to the general doctrine of evolution as applied to the mind of man4 ,but how1 ,i may ask1 could a treatise be written on 8,mental ,evolution in ,man10 or 8,the ,origin of ,human ,faculty10 without considering the results which have been gained by the science of comparative philology8 ,or how can it be maintained that1 in order to deal with these results in relation to the general theory of descent1 a writer must first of all himself become an authority in that particular science8 ,at any rate1 ,i deemed it enough for the only purposes which ,i had in view1 to read attentively all the leading authorities in this science1 and1 after extracting from them the information upon matters of fact which their researches had established1 to show what ,i regarded as the bearing of these facts upon the theory of mental evolution4 ,nor can ,i plead guilty to the charge of arrogant presumption1 which the following words appear to convey3 8,we see in his case how dangerous it is for a man who can claim to speak with authority on his own special subject1 to venture to speak with authority on subjects not his own4 ,professor ,romanes has1 no doubt1 read several books on philology and philosophy1 but he is not sufficiently master of his subject to have the slightest right to speak of men like ,noir1 ,huxley1 ,herbert ,spencer1 to say nothing of ,hobbes1 with an air of superiority4 ,that is entirely out of place40 7,the ,monist1 p4 #chc47 ,now that any such 8air of superiority0 occurs in my book1 ,i must deny--and this is a matter of fact4 ,noir is alluded to only with reference to his theory of the origin of language1 which ,i go further in accepting than does any 8philosopher0 or 8philologist10 with the single exception of ,prof4 ,max ,mller himself4 ,huxley is mentioned in several places as a leading authority on anatomical matters1 where my argument requires an authoritative statement upon them4 ,herbert ,spencer1 curiously enough1 is never mentioned at all2 while ,hobbes is named only once1 and then as sustaining1 by a 8shrewd analysis10 an opinion which ,i am advocating by quotations from recognised authorities in philosophy4 ,truly1 therefore1 it would be well for my critic 8to say nothing of ,hobbes02 and better still if he had looked at my index before condemning my supposed treatment of ,herbert ,spencer1 ,huxley1 and ,noir4 ,as it is1 his allusion to these names 8is entirely out of place40 ,but even apart from this particularly unfortunate allusion1 his more general charge as to my 8venturing to speak authoritatively on subjects not his my own10 is equally out of place4 ,the following is my introduction to the chapter on ,comparative ,philology1 and ,i cannot see that it betokens any 8air of superiority03 8,in now turning to this important branch of my subject1 ,i may remark1 in limine1 that1 like all the sciences1 philology can be cultivated only by those who devote themselves specially to the purpose4 ,my function1 therefore1 will here be that of merely putting together the main results of philological research1 so far as this has hitherto proceeded1 and so far as these results appear to me to have any bearing upon the #8origin of human faculty4' ,being thus myself obliged to rely upon authority1 where ,i find that authorities are in conflict1 ,i will either avoid the points of disagreement1 or else state what has to be said on both sides of the question4 ,but where ,i find that all competent authorities are in substantial agreement1 ,i will not burden my exposition by tautological quotations40 99 99 99 99 99 ,having thus disposed of a merely personal matter1 ,i may pass on to my justification of the 8complete misapprehension0 into which ,i have fallen with respect to ,prof4 ,max ,mller's work on the 8,science of ,thought40 ,in the first place he tells us3 8,on page #bfg ,mr4 ,romanes says that ,i profess1 as a result of more recent researches1 to have reduced the number of ,sanskrit roots to #aba4 ,i wish ,i had4 ,but the number of roots in ,sanskrit stands as yet at about #hjj3 the number #aba of which he speaks is the number of concepts expressed by these roots1 many of them conveying the same1 or nearly the same1 idea40 7,the ,monist1 p4 #ehc47 ,now it is quite true that on page #bfg ,i made the statement which is here challenged2 but as ,i immediately go on to speak repeatedly of the 8number #aba0 as being 8the number of concepts expressed by the roots10--and actually quote at length the whole #aba concepts with ,prof4 ,max ,mller's own heading1--,i am not sure that the point is worth the stress which is now laid upon it4 ,nevertheless1 ,i may explain why in this one passage ,i used the word 8roots10 instead of the word 8concepts40 ,briefly1 the only reason was because1 according to ,prof4 ,max ,mller's theory of the origin of roots1 it seemed to me virtually the same thing1 from a psychological point of view1 whether we speak of the reduction in question as pertaining to roots or to concepts4 ,for1 according to the theory1 8every root embodies a concept10 or is the obverse side of a concept4 ,consequently1 if the ,sanskrit language presents some #hjj roots1 while it is expressive of only #aba concepts1 the balance of the #hjj roots must be concerned in conveying the same1 or nearly the same1 ideas--as ,prof4 ,max ,mller himself expressly asserts in the above quotation from ,the ,monist4 ,indeed1 the whole object of his psychological analysis of linguistic roots was to prove that such is the case2 and1 therefore1 that the #aba roots which serve to convey the #aba concepts are the only roots required for the purposes of communication in ,sanskrit speech4 ,no doubt it would have been better if ,i had stated all this in my book2 but even if its omission led to obscurity1 ,i can scarcely see that on this account there could have been a 8misrepresentation0 where there was certainly no 8misapprehension40 ,for1 as already stated1 ,i spoke of 8#aba roots0 only once1 while ,i alluded to 8#aba concepts0 many times--and usually1 moreover1 in inverted commas4 ,lastly1 it may be observed that1 following his theory concerning the 8origin of roots10 ,prof4 ,max ,mller himself so far identifies roots with concepts as to head one of his lists1 in large capitals--,,roots ,,or ,,concepts4 ,therefore in saying that he professed to have reduced the psychologically efficient elements of ,sanskrit speech to #aba constituents1 it did not appear to me that ,i was departing from his own terminology when in one passage ,i spoke of these #aba constituents as roots1 while everywhere else ,i spoke of them as concepts4 8,give us10 he says1 8about #hjj roots1 and we can explain the largest dictionary2 give us about #aba concepts1 and we can account for the #hjj roots40 78,science of ,thought10 p4 #eea47 ,well1 if this is so1 the #hjj roots 7i4 e4 phonetically separable elements7 have been reduced to the #aba 8concepts or roots0 7i4 e4 psychologically separable elements74 ,my critic cannot both have his cake and eat it4 ,either he must abide by the philological meaning of a root1 as the ultimate result of philological analysis2 or else he must abide by his own philosophical meaning of a root1 as the embodiment of a concept4 ,under the former definition there will be about #hjj roots of ,sanskrit2 under the latter definition1 and according to his analysis1 there will be only #aba4 99 99 99 99 99 ,the next point with regard to which 8complete misapprehension0 is alleged may best be presented by my critic's own words1 thus3 8,professor ,romanes thinks it necessary to remark that #8these concepts do not represent the ideation of primitive man'6 ,i never said they did4 ,i never pretended to be acquainted with the ideation of primitive man4 ,all ,i maintained was that1 making allowance for obscure words1 every thought1 that of the lowest savage as well as of the most minute philosopher1 can be expressed with these #hjj roots1 and traced back to these #aba concepts40 7,the ,monist1 p4 #ehd47 ,now1 it is perhaps needless to say1 ,i am extremely glad to learn that such was the meaning intended2 but ,i trust that the following quotations will furnish a sufficient excuse for my misunderstanding of it3 8,i hope that those who will carefully examine the results at which ,i have arrived1 will admit that they prove by overwhelming evidence that the meanings of roots are really what we expected them to be1 and that they express the primitive social acts of primitive social man1 and the states more or less closely associated with such acts40 78,science of ,thought10 p4 #djc47 ,from this it appears that if ,prof4 ,max ,mller never professed to be acquainted with the ideation of primitive man1 he did profess to have proved1 by overwhelming evidence1 a very large acquaintance1 not only with the ideation1 but also with primitive acts of primitive social man4 ,possibly his acquaintance with both these matters is very much more intimate than mine2 but as ,i have always taken it to be virtually certain that 8primitive man0 was 8social0 in his habits1 ,i should like to learn the reasons which have induced my critic to believe in a still more 8primitive man10 who was addicted to a solitary mode of life4 ,for1 otherwise1 the only distinction on which his criticism appears to rest is a distinction without a difference4 ,again he says3 8,the ,science of ,thought assures us that every thought that ever crossed the mind of man can be traced back to about #aba simple concepts40 7,ibid41 p4 #dah47 ,and that the word 8man0 here is not intended tacitly to exclude 8primitive man0 7whether 8social0 or solitary71 ,i gathered from the fact of the #aba concepts in question being tabulated under the heading1 in large capitals1 ,,the #aba ,,original ,,concepts4 ,for1 if the word 8original0 here was intended to mean original only with reference to the ,sanskrit language1 why did the writer follow it up with his statement about the ,science of ,thought1 assuring us that every thought which had ever crossed the mind of man could be traced back to these #aba original concepts8 ,lastly1 not only by such particular passages was ,i led to suppose that the writer was referring to 8primitive man0 when he was writing about 8primitive social man10 etc42 but still more was ,i led to suppose this by the whole drift and tenor of his work4 ,for what would be the sense of all his disquisitions upon the importance of linguistic science in its relation to the theory of evolution1 if he intended to restrict his inferences to the semi-civilised condition of man1 which 7as he allows7 must have been the condition of the speakers of ,sanskrit8 ,clearly1 if this were his intention1 there would have been no sense in all these disquisitions2 and therefore1 here again1 my critic cannot both preserve his cake and consume it4 ,either let him adopt the position which he takes up in ,the ,monist1 as a philologist pure and simple1 who 8never pretended to be acquainted with the ideation of primitive man10 who refuses to go beyond the 8facts0 of the 8,science of ,language10 or to speculate upon their theoretical relations to the 8,science of ,thought03 or else let him do as he does in his published works--superimpose upon his functions as a 8,student of ,language0 the functions of a 8,philosopher10 freely speculate upon 8the origin of roots10 elaborately argue the whole psychology of 8concepts10 and strenuously endeavor to show that 8language is the ,rubicon of mind10 which not only now1 but at all times1 has separated man from the lower animals1 as a being mysterious in origin1 if not unique in kind4 99 99 99 99 99 ,next we are told3 8,professor ,romanes dwells on what he calls the interesting feature of all roots being verbs4 ,this is simply a contradiction in terms4 ,in giving the meaning of roots scholars generally employ the infinitive or the participle1 8to go10 or 8going02 but they have stated again and again that a root ceases to be a root as soon as it is used in a sentence40 7,the ,monist1 p4 #ehd47 ,now1 by a 8verb0 ,i understand a word that signifies either an action or a state2 and by a 8root0 ,i understand--here agreeing with ,prof4 ,max ,mller himself--8an element of human speech10 so far as this has been hitherto reduced by philological analysis4 ,again1 ,i hold--in this also agreeing with him--that 8as soon as a root is used for predication it becomes a word1 whether outwardly it is changed or not40 78,science of ,thought10 p4 #ddj47 ,well1 if we are agreed upon these points1 ,i do not see how there can be any 8contradiction in terms0 when ,i stated the fact 8of all roots being verbs40 ,in the first place1 if one were to agree with ,prof4 ,max ,mller himself in holding that originally every root was 8something real1 something that was actually used in conversation0 7,ibid4 p4 #dbj71 there can be no contradiction in terms if we translate this into saying that originally every root was a word--for the mere quibble that not until it was spoken did the root become a word does not affect the matter1 any more than if we were to say the same of any word now in use1 which has given birth to a progeny of other words4 ,but even if we disagree with ,prof4 ,max ,mller1 and suppose that roots are merely 8phonetic elements10 or the residual extract of a group of originally allied words1 we should still be correct in saying that the 8concepts0 which they 8embody0 are all concepts which now admit of being expressed in equivalent words4 ,so much for the 8contradiction in terms10 which is alleged to arise if we speak of roots as words4 ,touching the second point1 or the accuracy of saying that the words which roots express are always verbs1 my defence is sufficiently easy4 ,for to say1 as my critic says1 that 8in giving the meaning of roots scholars generally employ the infinitive or the participle10 appears to me a most unphilosophical observation1 since it appears to indicate that in the opinion of its writer the significance of a verb is but conventionally given to a root by the verbal form into which it is thrown by scholars4 ,but the fact is that1 even if they tried1 scholars could rarely deprive a root of its significance as a verb1 no matter into what verbal form they might choose to throw it4 ,take any root at random1 such as ,,ha to go4 ,however much we may ring the changes1 as 8to go10 8going10 8goer10 it is impossible to get rid of the fundamental significance of the root as a verb4 ,and although it is1 of course1 possible to select a root which presents a more equivocal interpretation1 the cases in which this can be done are1 comparatively speaking1 not numerous1 and apparently never such as to exclude the probability of its having primarily conveyed the force of a verb4 ,for instance1 ,,hur to fall1 may be regarded either as a verb or a noun-substantive2 but we cannot say that there is anything to render more probable the view of the root having been originally expressive of a fall than of the act of falling2 and inasmuch as there do not appear to be any roots which can only have originally had the force of nouns or adjectives1 while there are so many which can only have originally had the force of verbs1 we may fairly conclude that in the accidentally more equivocal cases the roots were likewise originally expressive of actions or of states4 ,for1 if not1 why are there not as many roots which convey such meanings as sky1 or blue 7which never can have had equivalents in the forms of verbs71 as there are roots like ,,ha1 where we cannot doubt that the meaning from the first must have been the meaning of a verb8 ,i am the more surprised at this head of ,prof4 ,max ,mller's criticism1 because it belongs to the very essence of his own theory touching 8the origin of roots10 that they must all originally have conveyed the meaning of verbs4 ,therefore from end to end of his own book he constantly alludes to roots as expressive of 8actions02 never as expressive of objects or qualities4 ,for instance3 8,all1 or nearly all1 the roots of ,sanskrit1 or rather of the ,aryan family in general1 express1 as we shall see1 acts1 and more particularly the commonest acts performed by members of a primitive society40 78,science of ,thought10 p4 #bgb47 ,and even in ,the ,monist article itself the same thing is stated thus3 8,let us remember that a most careful psychological analysis had led ,noir to the conclusion that the germs of all conceptional thought were to be found in the consciousness of our own repeated acts4 ,and let us place by the side of this1 the well-ascertained fact that the germs of all conceptional language1 what we call roots1 express with few exceptions the repeated acts of men40 7,the ,monist1 p4 #ehj47 ,again3 8,we begin with the fact that the great bulk of a language consists of words1 derived1 according to the strictest rules1 not from cries1 but from articulate roots4 ,no one denies this4 ,we follow this up with a second fact1 that nearly all the roots express acts of men4 ,no one denies that40 7p4 #ehh47 ,very well then1 ,i submit that the only real distinction between ,prof4 ,max ,mller's rendering of this 8fact10 and my own rendering of it1 consists in my having added 8states0 to 8acts10 and observing that then the comparatively few outstanding roots may be included with the 8nearly all0 under the one category of 8verbs40 ,for the distinction which he draws in ,the ,monist is not a real distinction3 it is merely a verbal distinction4 ,here it is3 8,if ,professor ,romanes approves of my saying that roots stood for any part of speech1 just as the monosyllabic expressions of children do1 ,i can only say that1 if ,i ever said so1 ,i expressed myself incorrectly4 ,a root never stands for any part of speech1 because as soon as it is a part of speech it is no longer a root40 7,the ,monist1 p4 #ehe47 ,this1 as ,i have previously observed1 is merely a quibble4 ,if originally every root was 8something real1 something used in conversation10 originally all roots were words1 in just the same sense as 8the monosyllabic expressions of children0 are words4 ,and if 8nearly all these roots express the acts of man10 while most 7if not all7 the outstanding residuum were apparently expressive of states1 it follows that the roots in question were not only words1 but verbs4 ,and in stating this 8fact0 ,i supposed that ,i was but following ,prof4 ,max ,mller's statement of it1 where he constitutes it the philological basis of his theory on the 8origin of roots0--viz4 that all roots sprang from sounds made by 8primitive social man0 when engaged in their 8social acts40 ,but1 while accepting this fact1 ,i objected to the theory raised upon it1 because the latter did not consider that roots which originally had the force of verbs must have been more likely to have survived1 and so to have come down to us1 than those which may originally have had the significance of any other parts of speech4 ,and it was only in order to supply this further consideration that ,i alluded to the 8fact0 at all4 99 99 99 99 99 ,we come next to some disparaging remarks upon 8babies10 8parrots10 and the lower animals generally 7,the ,monist1 pp4 #ehf-g74 ,prof4 ,max ,mller 8refuses to argue0 with me1 8or any other philosopher1 either in the nursery or the menagerie40 ,so be it4 ,as a philologist1 of course1 he is assuredly right2 no one would expect him so to argue4 ,but as a philosopher1 who has written a large book on the 8,science of ,thought10 he is no less assuredly wrong4 ,and one may be pardoned for wondering at this intentionally ostrich-like attitude on the part of a philosopher--who is 8going beyond the origin of roots0--with respect to the fundamental germs of the sign-making faculty4 ,again1 my critic appears to imagine that ,i am a supporter of the onomatopoetic theory--to the extent of regarding all human language as having originated in imitations of natural sounds4 7,the ,monist1 pp4 #ehf-g47 ,but over and over again ,i have stated that this is not my view4 ,i believe1 indeed1 that there is a very large amount of truth in this theory2 but ,i deem it on all grounds most improbable that the principle of imitation has been the only principle concerned in the origin of speech4 ,i have argued that probably many other principles must have been concerned1 including the 8synergastic0 principle suggested by ,noir1 and enthusiastically adopted by my critic as alone sufficient to explain the whole problem of the origin of speech--and this although it is clearly but a particular branch of the general onomatopoetic theory4 ,hence1 so far as ,i am concerned1 it does not signify one iota whether any given root owed its origin to the principle of imitation1 or to some other of the general principles which ,i believe to have been concerned in the birth of articulate language4 ,and1 if possible1 still less does it signify whether or not in the development of any given word1 such as 8thunder10 the original root-sound has been afterwards imitatively modified1 8from a feeling that it should be so40 ,these matters are no doubt of importance within the four corners of philology2 but in relation to the 8biological theory0 of descent they present no importance at all4 ,yet ,i am told3 8,those who cannot see the difference between a man1 or for all that1 between a mocking-bird1 saying ,cuckoo1 and a whole community fixing on the sound of ,,tan1 as differentiated by various suffixes and prefixes1 and expressing the concept of stretching in such words as tonos1 tone1 tonitru1 thunder1 tanu1 tenuis1 thin1 should not meddle with the ,science of ,language40 7,the ,monist1 pp4 #ehh-i47 ,doubtless4 ,but as no word of this applies to me1 ,i may be permitted to observe that if any one who has read my book can possibly suppose that it does1 he should not meddle with the ,science of ,thought4 99 99 99 99 99 ,in conclusion1 if it be the case that ,i have completely misapprehended ,prof4 ,max ,mller with regard to the points which he has mentioned1--and all of which ,i have now considered1--have ,i not furnished sufficient justification8 ,even now ,i cannot see in what respects it is possible to amend any subsequent edition of my book1 so as to correct the misapprehensions which are alleged4 ,but although my 8mistakes0 are thus far from 8clear10 ,i am glad to have had this opportunity of publicly discussing them with ,prof4 ,max ,mller1 if only for the sake of adding the following remarks4 ,be it observed1 in the first place1 that whatever may be thought of the foregoing 8justification10--whether it be held that the misapprehensions are due to ambiguity on the one side or to obtuseness on the other1--at least it is certain that the misapprehensions complained of all have reference to points of no importance whatsoever as regards the general theory of descent1 even although some of them are not altogether without importance as regards the particular science of philology4 ,thus it is quite immaterial1 so far as the doctrine of ,mental ,evolution is concerned1 whether we say that the roots of ,sanskrit are #hjj1 philologically speaking1 or #aba1 psychologically speaking4 ,again1 as soon as it is explained by ,prof4 ,max ,mller that by his 8#aba original concepts0 he means the number of concepts 8original0 only as regards the ,sanskrit language2 that by 8primitive social man0 he means only the semi-civilised progenitors of the ,indo-,european race2 that by 8every thought that ever crossed the mind of man0 admitting of being 8traced back to about #aba simple concepts10 he means no more than that such is the case as regards the recent and highly evolved ,aryan branch of the human species2--when once all this is explained1 it becomes evident that thus far there can be no difference of opinion between us4 ,for in that case he is not dealing with 8the ,origin of ,human ,faculty10 either in regard to language or to thought3 he is considering merely the higher inflorescence of both4 ,once more1 whether all1 or nearly all1 the roots of ,sanskrit can properly be called words1 and1 if so1 whether we must not go still further and call them verbs1--these are questions of mere terminology4 ,if the roots were originally 8used in conversation10 and if1 as thus used1 they were1 with but few doubtful exceptions1 all expressive of 8acts0 or 8states10 it becomes mere verbal hair-splitting to challenge the propriety of saying that the roots were originally verbs4 ,at all events1 the matter has nothing to do with the general question of man's derivative origin4 ,lastly1 the same has to be said of the purely philological question as to how far the principle of imitation has obtained in the first formation of these archaic 8words10 or 8roots40 ,for1 archaic though they be in a philological sense1 in a phylological sense they are things of yesterday1 and so can scarcely be said to have any direct relation at all to 8the origin of speech10 or the rise of articulate sign-making4 ,this has to be inferred from observations in the 8menagerie10 as distinguished from research in the library2 and the fact that ,prof4 ,max ,mller expressly refuses to give me the pleasure of his company where the best materials for studying the really 8primitive0 condition of the sign-making faculty are to be met with1 merely renders more impossible than ever any real collision between his linguistic studies on the one side1 and my 8biological theory0 on the other4 ,but although it thus appears sufficiently evident that my 8misapprehensions0 of his linguistic conclusions are as unimportant in relation to the theory of descent as they are few--and1 ,i think1 also excusable--in themselves1 it is impossible to doubt that far below the level of ,sanskrit roots1 and far beyond the range of philological science1 there is a wide difference of opinion between us4 ,for when he passes from the 8,science of ,language0 to the 8,science of ,thought10--when he quits his sphere as a philologist to enter that of the philosopher1--he persistently and consistently affirms that what he calls 8the old barrier between man and beast0 remains1 and that he is as yet unable to perceive how it can ever be removed4 ,this barrier of course is predicative language--the obverse side of conceptional thought2 and the firm opinion thus expressed by so eminent a philologist is not only of weight per se1 but is rendered more so on account of the manifest freedom from prejudice with which it is associated4 ,it is on this account that ,i devoted so much space in my book on 8,mental ,evolution0 to a consideration of his views2 and therefore ,i am sorry that his present reply has not been directed to meeting my criticisms on this really important matter of philosophical doctrine1 rather than to indicating 8misapprehensions0 with regard to such merely trivial matters of a purely philological kind as those which ,i have here been dealing with4 ,but perhaps at some future time he may give me the benefit of his criticism upon my work as a whole1 or not merely on the fringes of such details as really have no bearing on the objects of that work4 ,and1 if he should ever see his way to doing this1 ,i am quite sure that the discussion would be one of a friendly character4 ,for the points at issue would all have reference to that large and vague domain of speculative theory touching 8the origin of human faculty10 where it is inevitable--and1 in my judgment1 even desirable--that wide differences of opinion should obtain4 ,we are but at the commencement of a great and obscure problem1 which only in our own generation has been presented by the science of biology to the contemplation of philosophy4 ,therefore it would be folly indeed if any man were to regard his own opinions upon it as other than provisional--and even more foolish if he were to introduce any 8meum and tuum into these discussions40 ,thus ,i invite ,prof4 ,max ,mller to state the grounds of his assertion in ,the ,monist1 that 8all the facts of real language are against0 me as an advocate of what he calls the biological theory of the developmental origin of man4 ,this theory1 he says1 8derives no support whatever from the ,science of ,language40 ,i believe1 on the other hand1 that these are wholly unwarranted statements2 and that the ,science of ,language does support the theory in question to as high a degree as is possible from the nature of the case4 ,on account of this great difference of opinion1 ,i felt1 when writing my book1 that ,i should be doing but scant justice to the matured judgment of so eminent a philologist if ,i did not carefully consider all that he had written upon the subject4 ,and so1 as ,i have said1 ,i devoted more of my book to a consideration of his views than to those of any other philologist2 and while accepting his scientific facts on his authority as a philologist1 ,i nevertheless felt it incumbent on me to show why his philosophical deductions1 where they had reference to the theory of descent1 appeared to me by no means of equivalent value4 ,this distinction1 as ,i observed at the commencement of the present article1 is surely a legitimate distinction2 and ,i should be sorry indeed if anything that ,i have ever said can appear inconsistent with the genuine admiration which is due to ,prof4 ,max ,mller as 8a student of language10 or with the no less genuine esteem which ,i have the best reason for knowing is due to him as a friend4 ,,george ,j4 ,,romanes4 ,,the ,,continuity ,,of ,,evolution4 ,,the ,,science ,,of ,,language ,,versus ,,the ,,science ,,of ,,life1 ,,as ,,represented ,,by ,,prof4 ,f4 ,,max ,m,,ller ,,and ,,prof4 ,,george ,,john ,,romanes4 ,all the sciences form1 or at least ought to form1 one great system1 culminating in the science of sciences4 ,therefore it is more than doubtful how any science could exist without being somehow in contact with other sciences2 and all of them must stand in some relation to philosophy4 ,it is necessary that each science should develop in relative independence of the other sciences4 ,we cannot expect to decide1 for instance1 chemical problems by physical or purely mechanical laws before we have carefully searched the nature and conditions of chemical processes4 ,but as soon as this has been done we can expect that a comparison between the results of two or more sciences will throw new light upon the subject-matter on both sides4 ,solomon says3 8,to everything there is a season and a time to every purpose under the heaven40 ,thus the sciences have to grow1 each one on its own grounds1 and when they have reached a certain state of maturity1 they will coalesce with each other4 ,and two sciences will by their coalescence fertilise the one the other so as to produce a new department which may by and by develop into a special science4 ,now it appears to the uninitiated as if the spiritual world of science were in every respect different from the world of objective realities around us4 ,while in the world of bodily realities the struggle for existence is fought eternal peace is supposed to reign in the sacred halls of intellectual aspirations4 ,says the ,german poet3 8,hrt in dem ,raume stossen sich die ,krper1 ,leicht bei einander wohnen die ,gedanken40 ,this is true only in a very limited sense4 ,ideas are the most intolerant beings imaginable4 ,the struggle for existence is raging as fiercely in the intellectual realm as in the world of realities1 and there also the law that the fittest will survive holds good4 ,far be it from us to denounce this state of general warfare1 for although it is hard on those who succumb1 it is the means by which evolution becomes possible2 and evolution in the domain of science means a nearer approach to truth4 ,if in the evolution of thought two neighboring sciences have developed so far as to meet1 a struggle will ensue4 ,the ideas on the two sides will have to fight before they coalesce4 ,it is natural that different scientists look at things from different standpoints4 ,they have developed a terminology which exactly suits their purpose and thus the representatives of the different sciences are often like people of a different nationality4 ,they do not understand each other because they speak different languages4 ,moreover they have not unfrequently a different religion2 that means1 their ideas about truth and the test of truth appear to be different and sometimes they regard one another as no better than heathens4 ,the battle is unavoidable1 and considering all in all1 the battle is desirable1 it should not be avoided4 ,the fittest to survive being the truest1 the whole progress of science through the struggle for existence among ideas consists in the approach to truth4 ,it may be objected that there are peacemakers who will reconcile the contending parties4 ,true4 ,and it is further true that the aim of every war is peace4 ,but a peacemaker can be successful only if his mind is broad enough to let the whole battle be fought out within himself4 ,the battle itself is and will remain unavoidable4 ,idea stands against idea1 and the mental process of reflection is nothing but a struggle of conflicting ideas which takes place in one and the same mind4 ,the aim of all reflection is the settlement of the conflict1 so that all ideas will agree4 ,the two parties disappear in one2 errors are given up1 and that which is consistent only will remain4 ,in other words ,dualism makes room for ,monism4 ,it is a good sign of the times that a battle has begun to rage between the so-called natural sciences and the science of language4 ,the old ,hegelian distinction between the ,geisteswissenschaften and the ,naturwissenschaften has been surrendered2 and ,prof4 ,f4 ,max ,mller was among the foremost to inculcate the truth that philology is a natural science4 ,if philology is a natural science it cannot be but that its subject of investigation is a part of nature and as such it stands in close relation to other parts of nature4 ,one and the same thing may be the subject of investigation of different sciences4 ,one and the same plant may be an object of observation to the physiologist1 to the botanist1 to the druggist1 to the physician1 and to the chemist4 ,their standpoints and their purposes being different1 they will bring to light very different results1 and if these results are contradictory among each other the conflict is at hand4 ,it cannot be shirked but must be decided by an honest and square fight4 ,we have witnessed of late a conflict between philology and anthropology concerning the origin of the ,aryas and it looks as if this conflict will contribute much to promote our knowledge of the oldest history of mankind1 although the last word has not as yet been spoken3 adhuc sub judice lis est4 ,we are now confronted with a conflict between ,philology and ,biology4 ,the first skirmishes have been fought by two men who are entitled to speak1 each one in behalf of his science4 ,prof4 ,f4 ,max ,mller stands up for philology and ,prof4 ,george ,john ,romanes for biology4 ,professor ,romanes takes it for granted that the rational mind of man has developed gradually from the lower stage of the brute4 ,he says in his book 8,mental ,evolution in ,man10 p4 #bgf3 8,the whole object of these chapters has been to show1 that on psychological grounds it is abundantly intelligible how the conceptual stage of ideation may have been gradually evolved from the receptual--the power of forming general1 or truly conceptual ideas1 from the power of forming particular and generic ideas4 ,but if it could be shown--or even rendered in any degree presumable--that this distinctly human power of forming truly general ideas arose de novo with the first birth of articulate speech1 assuredly my whole analysis would be destroyed3 the human mind would be shown to present a quality different in origin--and1 therefore1 in kind--from all the lower orders of intelligence3 the law of continuity would be interrupted at the terminal phase3 an impassable gulf would be fixed between the brute and the man40 ,and ,prof4 ,max ,mller criticises the position of ,professor ,romanes in an article on ,thought and ,language 7,the ,monist1 ,vol4 ,i4 ,no4 #d1 p4 #ehb72 he says3 8,my learned friend1 ,professor ,romanes1 labors to show that there is an unbroken mental evolution from the lowest animal to the highest man4 ,but he sees very clearly and confesses very honestly that the chief difficulty in this evolution is language and all that language implies4 ,he tries very hard to remove that barrier between beast and man4444 ,professor ,romanes is1 ,i believe1 a most eminent biologist1 and the mantle of ,darwin is said to have fallen on his shoulders4 ,far be it from me to venture to criticise his biological facts4 ,but we see in his case how dangerous it is for a man who can claim to speak with authority on his own special subject1 to venture to speak authoritatively on subjects not his own40 ,it is not at all my intention to appear on the battle-field as a peacemaker between these two generals1 or to settle the problems that arise from the conflict between philology and biology4 ,that will be better done by the parties concerned1 and ,i am rather inclined to speak with ,schiller when he thought of the struggle between the transcendentalist philosopher and the empirical naturalist3 8,enmity be between you6 ,your alliance would not be in time yet4 ,though you may separate now1 ,truth will be found by your search40 ,i look forward with great interest to further discussions which will bring out with more clearness the positions of both parties1 and it is not impossible that both parties as soon as they have better understood each other1 will agree much better than either of them expected4 ,but it may be permitted me to make a few comments upon a proposition that is involved in this conflict1 which1 however1 properly considered1 is neither of a philological nor a biological nature4 ,this is the idea of the continuity of evolution4 ,prof4 ,max ,mller says somewhere that1 if a ,darwinian means an evolutionist1 he had been a ,darwinian long before ,darwin4 8,how a student of the science of language10 he says1 8can be anything but an evolutionist is to me utterly unintelligible40 ,so there is no doubt about his being an evolutionist as much as ,professor ,romanes4 ,but the question is1 ,what means evolutionist8 ,is he an evolutionist who believes in a piecemeal evolution interrupted here and there by acts of special creation8 ,in my conception of the term1 an evolutionist believes in evolution wherever there is life and this involves the wholesale rejection of special-creation acts as well as of the idea that any being or organism 7the organism of language included7 could ever have made its appearance in full growth and maturity or that any phenomenon of life could present a break in the continuity of evolution4 ,the ,greek myth tells us that the ,goddess of ,reason1 the blue-eyed ,pallas ,athene1 was not born like other gods and mortals in the natural way of a slow development4 ,she jumped out of the head of ,zeus full-armed in all her beauty and gifted with the powers of her unusual accomplishments4 ,is this myth true after all8 ,does the ,logos of rational thought present us with an instance in which the development process has been interrupted8 ,if so1 we shall have to abandon the evolution theory as a theory and return to the old-fashioned view of special-creation acts4 ,the difference between these two views is not of degree1 but of kind4 ,he who accepts the principle of evolution as the law of life abandons forever the idea of special and unconnected beginnings as much as that of special-creation acts4 ,he cannot with consistency believe in an evolution with interruptions1 for the theory of evolution is serviceable only if evolution is conceived as continuous4 ,prof4 ,max ,mller of course has a right to define and use the word evolutionist as he sees fit1 but if he excludes continuity from the idea of evolution1 we declare that he has taken out the quintessence of its meaning and the core of its truth4 ,why this is so1 we shall now briefly discuss4 ,the evolution theory has been gradually developed by empirical investigations and it owes its all but universal acceptance to the great mass of a posteriori evidence furnished by the natural sciences4 ,it rests nevertheless upon a better and safer foundation than isolated instances of hap-hazard experience4 ,its foundation is quarried out of another and more reliable material4 ,the evolution theory rests upon the ground of a priori arguments4 ,by a priori we do not understand anything mysterious1 but simply such cognition as possesses universality and necessity4 ,that cognition which is in possession of universality and necessity is also called formal cognition4 ,the formal sciences 7for instance arithmetic1 mathematics1 pure logic1 and pure mechanics7 give us information about such truths as are applicable1 because they are purely formal1 to the formal conditions of anything and everything possible4 ,because we know beforehand that the purely formal laws will hold good under all conditions ,kant called their formulated theorems 8a priori40 ,all the objections to the idea of apriority made by ,john ,stuart ,mill and other empiricists are due to their misinterpretation of the term4#aj ,mr4 ,mill was mistaken when he thought ,kant meant a priori cognitions were innate ideas which came to man from spheres unknown4 ,the very first sentence of ,kant's 8,critique of ,pure ,reason0 proves that ,kant knew of no other knowledge than that which begins with experience4 ,kant says1 8,that all our knowledge begins with experience there can be no doubt40 ,but our knowledge consists of two elements1 viz4 the empirical and the formal4 ,the former bears always the character of the special and incidental1 the latter of the universal and necessary4 ,the former is sensory1 being furnished by the senses1 the latter is properly mental originating in and with the action of the mind in dealing with sense-materials1 in arranging them and bringing them into certain relations4 ,formal knowledge is different in kind from empirical knowledge4 ,the rule 8twice two is four0 will hold good for all possible cases1 but the statement 8,a swan is white0 does not hold good for all possible cases4 ,european swans as a rule are white1 but ,australian swans are black1 and for all we know1 we might find swans that are blue1 or red1 or yellow4 ,empirical knowledge is full of exceptions1 formal knowledge is rigid1 there is no exception to any rule of formal knowledge4 ,all formal knowledge has developed by degrees4 ,the history of the sciences1 of mathematics1 logic1 arithmetic1 and also of the natural sciences furnishes sufficient evidence4 ,the formal part of the natural sciences1 by ,kant called reine ,naturwissenschaft1 consists of such cognitions as the law of cause and effect and the law of the conservation of matter and energy4 ,the formulation of these laws has been accomplished after much and careful empirical investigation4 ,and it could not be otherwise4 ,the latter law was elaborated in its full clearness long after ,kant4 ,the law of causality and the law of the conservation of matter and energy are purely formal1 they are not sense-impressions and do not contain any sensory elements4 ,they are general rules of universal applicability which being rigidly universal and without exceptions are necessary under all conditions4 ,before we make any experiment we can know that they will hold good in the experiment4 ,indeed all our experimenting is based upon the supposition that the law of causation holds good and that there can be neither an increase nor a decrease of matter and energy4 ,the mistake made by the so-called transcendentalists is this1 that they consider formal thought as having an independent existence1 being ready at hand before cognition is possible1 while in fact it is a part of cognition which at least in its germ is present in every actual experience4 ,the theory of evolution is not more and not less a formal principle than the law of causation and the law of the conservation of matter and energy4 ,indeed it is nothing but the same thing applied to a special case4 ,the theory of evolution is the principle of the conservation of matter and energy applied to the province of life4 ,the theory of evolution denies the possibility of special acts of creation4 ,there cannot come something out of nothing4 ,and the new creations that actually originate daily before our eyes are not creations from nothing1 they are simply transformations4 ,there was a time on earth in which no living being existed1 neither plant nor animal4 ,how did life originate8 ,our answer is1 ,it did not originate out of nothing1 but it evolved4 ,non-organised matter organised4 ,that non-organised matter must contain the elementary conditions of organised life is a conclusion which we cannot escape from our point of view2 and which is fully and satisfactorily corroborated by our daily experience that water1 earth1 and air under the sun's influence are changed into wheat2 and wheat is manufactured into the bread which nourishes man and sustains his life4 ,non-organised particles of matter are constantly being organised in living organisms and displace the worn-out materials in their tissues--not one atom of the latter remaining for good in a healthy living body4 ,the theory of evolution may be called an hypothesis1 an assumption1 a presumption4 ,but in that case we must say with ,mill that the rule twice two is four is also a mere assumption4 ,the evidence for the latter is not stronger than that for the former4 ,mill declares that after all twice two might somewhere be five4 ,exactly so and not otherwise evolution might be somewhere interrupted1 so that something would originate out of nothing instead of evolving from other things through transformation4 ,prof4 ,max ,mller speaks very sarcastically about the speechless man1 the homo alalus who is supposed to be the ancestor of the present man4 ,he says 7l4 c41 p4 #ehe73 8,of the ,homo alalus1 the speechless progenitor of ,homo sapiens1 with whom ,professor ,romanes seems so intimately acquainted1 students of human speech naturally know nothing40 ,prof4 ,max ,mller also condemns all efforts of approaching the problem of the origin of language through observation of children and animals4 ,the former he calls 8nursery philology0 the latter 8menagerie psychology40 ,and it is certainly true that the problem of the origin of language cannot be solved from observations of children or animals1 because the problem lies in another field4 ,the problem is not how a ready made language is transferred upon the growing mind of a baby but how speechless beings developed into speaking beings4 ,and all the intelligence of clever animals is still very different from the rational thought of man4 ,this is true1 but it is also true that good observations of animal psychology and also of nursery philology will throw some light upon the evolution of rational thought4 ,prof4 ,max ,mller says3 8,how can we attempt to realise what passes within the mind of an animal8444 ,we can imagine anything we like about what passes in the mind of an animal1--we can know absolutely nothing40 ,we are fully aware of the fact that the problem of the origin of language is quite different from the problems of animal psychology4 ,a solution of the latter1 which are extremely complex and difficult1 would not help us to solve the former4 ,this being conceded we can nevertheless see no reason why animal psychology should be condemned and given up as a hopeless task4 ,it is not true that 8we can know absolutely nothing about what passes in the mind of an animal40 ,it is true we cannot see the animals' feelings and thoughts1 but we can see their actions which reveal their feelings as much as and sometimes even plainer than the speech of our brother man reveals his thoughts4 ,might we not say with the same reason1 8,we see only the printed book of a scientist 7which is an expression of his views as much as the behavior of an animal is of its feelings7 but we can know absolutely nothing about what passes in the mind of that scientist4 ,all we can do is to judge from analogy08 ,and should we on that account give up all reading and studying and also all arguing with others8 ,animal psychology is not only justified as a science1 but we can even hope that correct observations of animal intelligence will assist us in correctly understanding the higher intelligence of human thought4 ,and 8that some useful hints may be taken from watching children is not denied0 by ,prof4 ,max ,mller either1 although this little concession appears only in the shape of a short foot-note4 ,the homo alalus is by no means a merely mythical figure1 for according to the law of evolution man must have developed out of a being lower than the present man4 ,his first ancestor must have been simple life-substance something like that of the amba4 ,he must have passed through a long period in which he was not capable of articulate speech4 ,that we know nothing particular about the homo alalus is no proof against his existence4 ,moreover every infant is an actual real homo alalus1 a speechless man1 or should we according to ,prof4 ,max ,mller class our babies among the brutes8 ,prof4 ,max ,mller says 7,the ,monist1 p4 #ehe73 8,if1 like ,professor ,romanes1 we begin with the #8immense presumption that there has been no interruption in the developmental process in the course of psychological history1' the protest of language counts for nothing2 the very fact that no animal has ever formed a language1 is put aside simply as an unfortunate accident40 ,the theory of evolution rightly understood is no presumption in the usual sense of the word4 ,it is no more a presumption than to say that something cannot come from nothing4 ,and what is 8the protest of language0 which would disprove the continuity of evolution8 ,that rational or human thought is something sui generis1 that it is different in kind and not in degree from brute intelligence2 that language is an impassable barrier between man and brute1 being the ,rubicon which no other animal has crossed4 ,very well4 ,we agree entirely with all these propositions4 ,human reason is different in kind from brute intelligence and human reason has developed such as it is through language only4 ,nay reason is language4 ,noir is right when he says1 ,man thinks because he speaks4 ,but the ,rubicon of language was not an absolutely impassable barrier4 ,the speechless ancestor of man1 whether we call him homo alalus or anthropoid1 or even man-ape1 has crossed it1 and having crossed it he became the ,csar of the animal creation4 ,prof4 ,max ,mller's theory of the identity of language and thought#aa is so valuable because it bridges the gap between the rational sphere of man and the not-yet rational sphere of the brute creation4 ,it explains the origin of reason4 ,the origin of reason in the world of living beings is explained as soon as the origin of language is understood1 for reason develops with language and rational thought is nothing but rational speech4 ,if the origin of language were an unfathomable mystery1 ,prof4 ,max ,mller's view of the identity of language and thought would lose all practical importance4 ,the proposition of the identity of language and thought is a very radical idea2 it is the fundamental idea of monism4 ,in a more general form it was first pronounced by ,giordano ,bruno1 who says somewhere that1 if we could put the soul of a man into the organism of an animal1 say of a snake1 it would cease to be a human soul and become the soul of a snake4 ,speech would be changed into a hissing1 in accordance with the snake's organs for uttering sounds4 ,and in the same way all the feelings1 all the concepts1 all the desires and inclinations--in short the whole psychical life would be that of a snake4 ,thought is the soul of language4 ,as there are no ghost-souls1 so there are no ghost-thoughts4 ,and the soul is not something distinct from the organism1 it is the form of the organism4 ,it happens in fairy-tales that the ,prince is transformed into a frog1 but if a fairy could transform a man into a frog1 his soul would certainly also become a frog-soul4 ,language is the visible organism of the invisible thought1 and as is language1 exactly so is thought4 ,the problem how language has developed was first answered by the onomatopoetic theory1 8the bow-wow theory0 as ,max ,mller calls it4 ,language was conceived as an echo of nature1 as a reflex action that takes place in a living and feeling being4 ,yet this theory had to be abandoned1 because an historical investigation of language proved that words with very few exceptions were not imitations of external sounds4 ,yet the spirit of investigation was not daunted by this defeat1 and the bow-wow theory reappeared in a modified form4 ,language was still considered as a reflex action2 however1 it was conceived to be a reflex which re-echoed the impressions of natural phenomena as they had affected man4 ,this was the exclamation theory which seeks the origin of language in the 8ohs and ahs10 the sighs and shouts of a feeling mind4 ,prof4 ,max ,mller calls this theory 8the pooh-pooh theory40 ,this theory had also to be discarded because it was in conflict with the actual facts of the evolution of language4 ,next ,noir and ,prof4 ,max ,mller came with their theory1 called by ,noir 8the synergastic theory10 which conceives language as the expression of common work1 also called by ,noir the ,logos theory1 the sympathetic theory1 and the causality theory4 ,prof4 ,max ,mller in order to forestall any deriders of this theory suggests calling it 8the yo-he-ho theory10 yo-he-ho being the sailors' song when engaged in some common work as hoisting or hauling4 ,this yo-he-ho theory actually explains the origin of language1 and it is1 so far as we can see1 not in conflict with any historical or philological facts4 ,but in honor of the inventors of the onomatopoetic theory it must be recognised that the main idea of the yo-he-ho theory is the same as that of the bow-wow theory4 ,the main idea is this3 ,language did not originate in man's mind out of itself in some mysterious way representing a break in the continuity of evolution1 but it is a certain reflex-action of living and feeling beings taking place in consequence of external stimuli4 ,this reflex-action however is not direct1 but indirect4 ,it is not that of a single being1 it is the reflex-action of a whole society1 engaged in common work4 ,it developed in consequence of their common activity and through their want of intercommunication4 99 99 99 99 99 ,prof4 ,max ,mller charges against the evolutionist1 that 8the very fact that no animal has ever formed a language is put aside simply as an unfortunate accident40 ,is this a fair reprehension8 ,is not the fact that no animal1 except man1 crossed the ,rubicon of language quite a distinct problem8 ,and accepting ,professor ,noir's theory of the origin of language which considers speech as the product of a common activity accompanied by what may be called clamor concomitans1 ,i see very good reasons why other animals did not develop language4 ,first1 there is no animal1 with the sole exception perhaps of ants and bees1 that lives in societies4 ,some of them live in herds1 but there is a great difference between a herd and a society4 ,this difference is first a difference of degree1 but gradually it becomes a difference of kind4 ,secondly1 animals have no organs to work with1 while man has his hands1 and we may add1 thirdly1 that no animal1 not even the parrot1 has the same power of articulation4 ,prof4 ,ludwig ,noir accepts without equivocation the idea that the speechless ancestor of man became a rational being by developing language and ,i was always under the impression that ,prof4 ,max ,mller agreed with his late friend not only concerning the identity of language and reason1 but also concerning the origin of reason4 ,but if ,prof4 ,max ,mller agrees with ,noir1 why does he object to the continuity of evolution which as he states in a private letter to us is 8only a beautiful postulate08 ,now there are indeed facts which prove that the ,rubicon of reason is not so impassable to animals as ,prof4 ,max ,mller makes us believe4 ,let us hear ,noir on the subject4 ,he explains most logically that man performs his many labors and has become a civilised being only with the help of language1 by naming things and handling them in his mind4 ,noir says3 8,it can be graphically shown1 how ideas may represent for man the rle of things real2 how man has acquired the power of combining in his representative faculty the most remote objects1 and thereby has been able to accomplish the great miracles of human industry and commerce4 ,but all this would be utterly inconceivable without concepts1 which impart to percepts their unity and self-dependence1 bring about and multiply their rational connection4 ,hence also1 no animal can ever advance a single step beyond present perceptive representation1 can never escape from the constraint with which ,nature circumscribes the narrow sphere of its wants4 ,unfortunately1 however1 in apparent contravention of this rule1 ants to the present day carry on a regular and methodical species of agriculture1 keep livestock and domestics like we6 ,nay1 they have been caught in conversations and social entertainments of a quarter of an hour's duration--,god save the mark60#ab ,this passage is full of humor1 and the humor is slightly mingled with a comical anger and self-irony4 ,there is a fine theory excellent in every respect worked out in all its details by the ,professor and now he finds a few trifles of facts which possess the impudence not to adapt themselves to the theory4 8,gott besser's10 sighs ,noir1 for it is not his fault that the ants accomplish things which they ought not to1 and the good ,lord is called upon to adapt nature with more rigidity to the ,professor's theories4 ,is there not an obvious reason why ants stand so high in their performances8 ,are not ants social beings1 more so than any other animal8 ,we are ignorant still of all their means of communication4 ,but that they have some means of communication seems to be an established fact4 ,when ants from different hills but of the same kind give each other battle1 it happens not unfrequently that a warrior attacks another warrior of the same people most fiercely1 but both let go as soon as they touch each other with their feelers4#ac ,i refrain from telling stories about the life of these wonderful creatures partly because one well-authenticated report is sufficient for our purpose and partly because ,i must suppose that most of my readers are familiar with the facts as presented by ,darwin1 ,lubbock1 ,forel1 ,huber1 and many others4 ,i will add only one observation which is so far as ,i know undisputed4 ,if ants of a special kind rob the larv of another kind and educate them as their slaves1 the slaves will in case of war or danger stand by their masters even against their own folks4 ,they evidently speak the language of the hill in which they have been raised4 ,professor ,forel successfully made the experiment1 with the assistance of ant-nurses1 of raising together several kinds of ants from the larv of hostile species4 ,the ferocious ,amazons and the ,sanguine did not show any enmity toward their comrades of the ,pratensis and ,rufa4 ,when set at liberty and transferred to a new residence they remained together and behaved exactly as if they naturally belonged together4 ,and this experiment may be quoted to corroborate the proposition of ,prof4 ,max4 ,mller that 8thought is thicker than blood40#ad ,now it would be a desperate case for ,professor ,noir to maintain his theory in the face of these facts1 if by language we have to understand vocal signs only4 ,yet the idea of his and also of ,prof4 ,max ,mller's theory consists in the truth that thoughts cannot walk about like ghosts in bodiless nudity3 they are a system of notation4 ,as such they are symbolised in signs and are inseparable from their signs4 ,these signs are sounds with men1 and by words we understand usually sound-symbols4 ,but there are other systems of notation besides vocal signs and they are for that reason not less language than speech4 ,we have reason to believe that ants are in possession of symbolical signs and that most of them are communicated through their feelers4 ,professor ,romanes describes the origin of ideas 7in the second chapter of 8,mental ,evolution in ,man10 p4 #bc7 in the following way3 8,just as ,mr4 ,galton's method of superimposing on the same sensitive plate a number of individual images gives rise to a blended photograph1 wherein each of the individual constituents is partially and proportionally represented2 so in the sensitive tablet of memory1 numerous images of previous perceptions are fused together into a single conception1 which then stands as a composite picture1 or class-representation1 of these its constituent images4 ,moreover1 in the case of a sensitive plate it is only those particular images which present more or less numerous points of resemblance that admit of being thus blended into a distinct photograph2 and so in the case of the mind1 it is only those particular ideas which admit of being run together in a class that can go to constitute a clear concept40 ,professor ,romanes calls such a composite picture of sense-impressions as must be supposed to exist in the animal brain 8a recept0 and he distinguishes it from 8the concept0 of man4 ,he says3 8,reception means a taking again4444 ,the word #8recept' is seen to be appropriate to the class of ideas in question1 because in receiving such ideas the mind is passive40 ,by 8concept0 however he understands 8that kind of composite idea which is rendered possible only by the aid of language or by the process of naming abstractions as abstractions40#ae ,we agree with ,professor ,romanes in the main point1 viz4 that the process of evolution must be considered as uninterrupted1 but we cannot agree with him on several minor points4#af ,we must express our doubt concerning the propriety of calling the mind passive when receiving impressions4 ,every single sensation is an active process1 just as much as a reflex motion1 and it may be considered as a reaction that takes place in response to the stimulus of the impression4 ,conception of course is also an active process1 and concepts1 the products of conception1 establish a new department in the mind4 8,noir1 quoted by ,prof4 ,max ,mller1 says3 #8,all trees hitherto seen by me leave in my imagination a mixed image1 a kind of ideal presentation of a tree4 ,quite different from this is my concept1 which is never an image4'0#ag ,and this is true4 ,we have on another occasion explained that sensations are sense-impressions which have acquired meaning4#ah ,rays of light are reflected from an object and fall upon the retina of an eye4 ,here they produce a disturbance of nervous substance which is transmitted to the brain where it is felt as the image say of a tree4 ,now the ether-waves are not sight1 but a certain form of ether-waves corresponds to a certain form of sight1 and the latter comes to stand for the former4 ,the mental picture of a tree becomes a symbol for a special object outside of us and it is projected to the place where experience has taught us to expect that object4 ,in naming objects we repeat the process of expressing by symbols4 ,sensations are symbols1 and names are symbols of symbols4 ,the name and concept tree is not the composite picture of all the trees ,i have seen1 but it is the symbol of this composite picture of sense-impressions4 ,sensations are like the chords of a piano and the concepts are like the keys4 ,the key is different in kind from the chord which belongs to it4 ,when ,i touch the key the chord will sound3 when ,i pronounce a name the composite sensation of all its analogous memories will be awakened4 99 99 99 99 99 ,can there be any question that difference in kind can originate by degrees8 ,professor ,romanes uses the phrase 8different in kind0 as synonymous with 8different in origin0 and therefore declares that human reason and animal intelligence are 8different in degree0 only4 ,the word 8kind10 it is true1 is at least as vague as the word species and a naturalist may often be doubtful where to draw the line4 ,man and monkey are different in kind1 and they are also more different in origin than ,carl ,vogt assumed1 for man is not the descendant of any of the monkey families now existent4 ,but this does not disprove that they are of a still remoter common origin or at least that they originated in the same way in some amboid form as simple life-substance4 ,new formations which originate through combining are as much new creations1 i4 e4 things new in kind1 as if they were produced through special-creation acts of ,god which are said to be creations out of nothing and not mere transformations4 ,man builds houses out of bricks and timbers4 ,is not the house something different in kind from the trees and the clay from which the materials have been taken8 ,is not the boiler of a steam-engine different in purpose and accordingly also different in kind from a tea-kettle8 ,is not every invention something different in kind8 ,and is not the same true of the products of thought8 ,is not a triangle something different in kind from a line8 ,and the origin of the former is not more miraculous than that of the latter4 ,a triangle is more complex than a line1 but its existence in the mind is not more of a mystery than the existence of the line4 ,difference in kind need not include difference of origin4 ,harmony is different in kind from melody4 ,notes in succession produce melody1 while simultaneous notes produce harmony4 ,in either case it is simply a matter of combination4 ,professor ,romanes when speaking of the passivity of sense-impressions seems to think of the unconsciousness of the process4 ,we are not conscious of the transformation of impressions into sensations while we can become aware of our efforts to change the sense-material into concepts4 ,yet the nature of mind is throughout activity4 ,and no one has perhaps insisted more strongly on the activity of mind than ,prof4 ,max ,mller4 ,but ,prof4 ,max ,mller distinguishes between the activity of the mind and the ego which as he supposes performs that activity4 ,he says 78,science of ,thought10 p4 #fc73 8,we think of a mind dwelling in a body1 and we soon find ourselves in the midst of psychological mythology4 ,let it be clearly understood1 therefore1 that by ,mind ,i mean nothing but that working which is going on within1 embracing sensation1 perception1 conception1 and naming1 as well as the various modes of combining and separating the results of these processes for the purpose of new discovery4 8,but if ,mind is to be the name of the work1 what is to be the name of the worker8 ,it is not yet the ,self1 for the ,self1 in the highest sense1 is a spectator only1 not a worker2 but it is what we may call the ,ego1 as personating the ,self2 it is what other philosophers mean by the ,monon1 of which1 as we shall see1 there are many4 ,let us call therefore the worker who does the work of the mind in its various aspects1 the ,monon or the ,ego40 ,and in another passage 7l4 c41 p4 #eeb7 he speaks of the simplicity of the monon3 8,if then the process of thought is so simple as we saw1 not less simple1 at least1 than that of speech1 it follows1 that the complicated apparatus which had been postulated by most philosophers for the performance of thought in its various spheres of manifestation1 must make room for much plainer machinery4 ,instead of intuition1 intellect1 understanding1 mind1 reason1 genius1 judgment1 and all the rest1 we want really nothing but a self-conscious ,monon1 capable of changing all that is supplied by the senses into percepts1 concepts1 and names4 ,these changes may be represented as something very marvellous1 and we may imagine any number of powers and faculties for the performance of them40 8,grant a ,monon conscious of itself1 and conscious therefore of the impacts made upon it or the changes produced in it by other ,mona which it resists1 and we require little more to explain all that we are accustomed to call ,thought40 ,the continuity of evolution naturally holds good according to ,max ,mller for the natural man1 but not for the ,self4 ,how is this8 ,is the monon perhaps conceived as not-natural or outside of nature4 ,hardly4 ,for ,prof4 ,max ,mller speaks of the object also as being a monon4#ai ,if the objects are as much mona as the subjects the same laws must hold good for both1 and the subject-monon must be supposed to be an object-monon if considered in its relation to other object-mona4 ,if ,prof4 ,max ,mller's protest against the continuity of evolution is not based upon the dualism of natural and extra-natural mona1 what can it mean when he says that evolution does not hold good for the ,self8 ,if the ,self is conceived as a monon1 i4 e4 something 8alone0 like an atomic unit1 it can have no evolution4 ,evolution is change of form through the production of new configurations4 ,a monon or an isolated unit considered by itself cannot evolve4 ,it is as it ever has been and will be--a monon4 ,if this is ,prof4 ,max ,mller's meaning1 we must ask1 ,how does he know that the self is a monon and that objects are mona8 ,do they not1 if so conceived1 become highly mysterious entities8 ,new mona are constantly born into this ,world4 ,whence do they come8 ,is every birth of a child the new creation of another monon by the creator1 who so distributes the babes in the world that like babes are given to like parents thus producing the wrong impression of heredity as well as of a continuity of evolution8 ,the idea of explaining all the activities of the mind by the postulate of a conscious monon is very simple indeed1 but the problems which would arise from this postulate are extremely complex1 and it seems to us that after all the proposition of evolution is by far the simplest solution of all the difficulties4#bj ,mind as we conceive it is the product of evolution4 ,mind has been evolved in a world which 7judging from its product7 must be conceived as being freighted not only with energy but also with the potentiality of feeling4 ,mind1 as we know it in experience1 is no monon1 no indivisible unit1 but a unitary system of feelings and thoughts produced through external impressions upon one part of the world by the rest of the world which surrounds it4 ,mind is an abstract term2 it does not denote a part of the world1 but a certain quality of a part of the world1 viz4 the feelings and thoughts of special kinds of organisms4 ,mind is produced through external impressions1 but it does not consist merely of external impressions4 ,mind1 as we have stated before1 is not passive2 it is active4 ,it consists of the reactions which take place in response to impressions and also of the accumulated products of these reactions4 ,thus every mind is the concentrated effect of the whole cosmos upon one special part of the cosmos1 not as it takes place in one moment1 but as it has taken place in a definite and continuous period up to date4 ,the accumulation of these effects makes the mind grow and expand and the system of the growth constitutes its specific character4 ,we can as little think of the mind as appearing suddenly by an act of special creation as we can think that an oak tree can be created out of nothing or that it can exist without previous growth4 ,the law of continuity holds good as much in the realm of the human mind as in the domain of animal and plant-life4 99 99 99 99 99 ,so far we have borne in mind the philosophical and scientific aspect only of the continuity of evolution4 ,there is another aspect however of no less importance1 that is the religious view of the subject4 ,we do not believe that science and religion are two different spheres of thought and that something may be true in science which is not true in religion4 ,since the theory of evolution has revolutionised almost all our sciences1 we ask1 what influence must this change of thought exercise upon religion8 ,is not the religious idea of ,god destroyed and the whole system of religion overturned8 ,we think not4 ,an old and very powerful system of theology which has been considered as orthodox for centuries will become untenable as soon as the idea of evolution and the continuity of evolution are recognised in their sweeping importance2 but religion itself will enter into a new phase of evolution and the idea of ,god will not be cast aside as a mere superstition of the ,dark ,ages1 it will be purified and appear in a greater and sublimer1 in a nobler1 higher1 and in a truer conception than ever before4 ,the idea of ,god is an historical heirloom of past ages4 ,the religious man and the philosopher of all times have tried to put into it their highest1 their best1 their grandest1 and their purest emotions as well as thoughts4 ,and these thoughts were not meaningless1 they were not mere fancies4 ,they contained the quintessence of their conception concerning that feature of reality which has produced us as living1 thinking1 and aspiring beings1 and which still prompts us to aspire to higher aims4 ,the world which has produced other beings and ourselves1 cannot be and is not a meaningless congeries of material particles in motion4 ,it is a living cosmos4 ,it is a grand harmonious universe pregnant with mind1 and nothing in it is suffered to exist for any length of time but that which conforms to its laws2 and that which conforms to its laws we call moral4 ,the idea of ,god1 however1 as it is commonly taught in our schools is full of pagan notions1 and the very paganism of the present ,god-idea is often supposed to be its deepest and holiest meaning4 ,no wonder that atheism increases with the progress of science6 ,and why should not atheism increase1 if it is truer than a superstitious theism8 ,atheism ,i believe will increase more and more until theism is cleansed of its pagan notions4 ,but atheism will not come to stay1 for atheism is a mere negative view and negations have no strength to live4 ,they have power to criticise and they will serve as a leaven in the dough4 ,their purpose is the purification of the positive views4 ,negations will pass away as soon as their purpose is fulfilled4 ,the old pagan conception 7now considered as orthodox7 places ,god in the dark nooks and crevices of our knowledge4 ,wherever science fails and wherever our inquiring mind is entangled in problems which we cannot hope to solve1 wherever the continuity of nature and of the order of nature is hidden from our intellectual sight1 the so-called orthodox believer comes forth and declares3 8,this is a holy place4 ,here is the finger of ,god's special interference60 ,consider what a degrading view of ,god this is6 ,the place of darkness is conceived as an actual break in the order of the world and this break is supposed to be a special revelation of ,god6 ,if we trust in truth1 we need not shun the light of science and the ,god of science--in contradistinction to the pagan notion of ,god--reveals himself in the discoveries of science4 ,god lives not in darkness but in light1 and his existence is proved not through the breaks in nature 7which we can be sure do not exist1 and wherever they appear are due to our ignorance7 but through the order of nature1 for ,god is the order of nature4 ,god is that power through which we exist as living1 thinking1 and aspiring beings1 and to which we have to conform in order to live4 ,when ,darwin speaks of 8life as having been originally breathed into a few forms or into one by the ,creator10 he either uses allegorical language or he means that the beginning of life was an act of special creation4 ,he apparently means the latter and is in this respect not a consistent evolutionist4 ,darwin was great as a reformer of natural science1 but in theology he still stood upon the old standpoint4 ,he calls ,god to rescue where science fails4 ,the ,creator did not originally breathe life into the organism1 but his breath is constantly ensouling all living beings4 ,now suppose there were or there could be exceptions to the law of causation1 to the conservation of matter and energy1 or to the continuity of evolution1 would that not rather be a drawback in nature8 ,are the patches on a coat better proof that it was made by a tailor than the whole coat8 ,any kind of theology which still recognises special-creation acts1 or miracles1 or breaks in evolution1 we do not hesitate to say1 is not yet free from paganism1 for it still sticks to the religious conception of the medicine-man that ,god is a great magician4 ,the ,god of the medicine-man lives in the realm of the unknown and he appears in man's imagination where the light of science fails4 ,the ,god of science however is the ,god of truth1 and evidence of his existence is not found in the darkness of ignorance but in the light of knowledge4 ,god's being is not recognised in the seeming exceptions to natural laws1 but in the natural laws themselves4 ,god's existence is not proved by our inability to trace here or there the order of cause and effect1 as if a disorder in the world made it divine2 on the contrary the only rational ground of a faith in ,god is the irrefragable cosmic order of the universe4 ,it is true that we have to give up the idea of a personal ,god1 but is not a superpersonal ,god greater than the idol which we have made unto our own likeness8 ,the ,god of science is perhaps more in agreement with the biblical ,god than the ,god of dogmatic theology4 ,the interpretations of biblical passages which are at present generally considered as orthodox are 7merely from the standpoint of impartial exegetics7 untenable4 ,the first chapter of ,genesis has not one word about special-creation acts4 ,neither the ,elohim nor the ,jahveh-,adonai account declares that in the beginning there had been ,nothing4 ,both accounts 7,gen4 ,chap4 ,i4 #a to ,,ii4 #c1 and ,,ii4 #c et seqq47 agree that ,god 8shaped0 the world4 ,the word barah 7to shape1 to form1 to make7 is nowhere used in the sense of creating out of nothing4 ,the ,psalmist says1 8,by the word of the ,lord were the heavens made10 which was so interpreted in the ,new ,testament that it meant 8by the logos10 and the gospel of ,st4 ,john adds 1 i4 e4 and the word was ,god4 ,logos means rational speech or reason1 and the world-reason through which the heavens were made can mean only the cosmic order of the universe4 ,this idea of ,st4 ,john's thought out to its ultimate conclusions means monism4 ,there is a common error that scientific progress is dangerous to religion4 ,scientific progress is dangerous to superstition only4 ,religion 7i4 e4 true religion7 is not based upon our ignorance1 but upon our knowledge2 it is not a child of the darkness but of the light1 and faith far from being a mere belief1 i4 e4 the imperfect knowledge of an opinion for which no proof is forthcoming1 is applied knowledge1 it is knowledge plus the confidence that this knowledge can be made the basis of ethics and the supreme rule for regulating our conduct in life4 ,the history of religion has been and is still a constant purification of our religious ideas1 and the crucible in which the religious ideas are purified is science4 ,we are slowly but constantly progressing toward a high religious ideal and this ideal is a cosmical religion free from the pagan notions so severely criticised by ,christ and yet so carefully preserved by the ,christian churches4 ,this cosmical religion will be the religion of science4 ,it will not consist of religious indifference nor of a toleration of any and every opinion as is so often erroneously proclaimed as the ideal of liberalism4 ,on the contrary it will be in a certain sense the most orthodox religion1 for its maxim will be to stand on the truth and nothing but the truth4 ,and the truth is not at all indifferent or tolerant4 ,the truth is extremely intolerant and suffers no error beside it1 although1 as a matter of course1 the truth is very tolerant in so far as it sanctions no violence but employs only the spiritual sword of conviction by argument and logical proof4 ,we have given up the idea of special acts of creation as the calling forth disconnectedly of something out of nothing4 ,we conceive the whole world as an orderly cosmos1 well regulated by laws and evolving the forms of life in agreement with its laws4 ,is there less divinity in a cosmos than in a half chaotic world in which ,god makes exceptions and counteracts his own ordinances8 ,is the idea of creation less religious if it ceases to mean an origination of something out of nothing8 ,is not man at least just as wonderful if evolved step by step out of the dust of the earth through innumerable stages in the long process of evolution as if he were made directly out of clay8 ,and is there less divinity in his soul1 is he any less shaped unto the image of ,god because his growth took place according to natural laws8 ,natural laws1 in the conception of purified religion1 of the religion of science1 are nothing but the ideas of ,god1 eternal and immutable1 and formulated by scientists not on the ground of special revelations but on the ground of the universal and unchangeable1 and throughout consistent revelation of ,god in his works4 99 99 99 99 99 ,the science of language and the science of life are two important highroads to the cognition of truth4 ,that both sciences will be consistent with each other1 that their results will finally be seen to harmonise perfectly is beyond all doubt and also that their bearing upon religious ideas will contribute much to their purification4 ,prof4 ,f4 ,max ,mller and ,prof4 ,george ,john ,romanes are two great scholars1 each one is a leader in his own branch of knowledge1 and where they come in conflict1 it appears to us1 that they rather complement than refute each other4 ,both are strong ,monists1 although emphasising different sides of ,monistic truth and we feel convinced that their very differences will help us to elaborate more fully and clearly and more comprehensively the great truth of ,monism--of that ,monism which will more and more be recognised as the corner-stone of science and also of the religion of science4 ,,editor4 ,,footnotes3 #aj ,compare the article ,the ,origin of ,thought-,forms in the present number1 under the caption 8,diverse ,topics40 #aa ,i should prefer to speak of the oneness or inseparableness of thought and language1 but since ,prof4 ,max ,mller has sufficiently explained himself1 ,i use here his term 8identity0 in the sense of inseparableness as it is used by ,prof4 ,max ,mller4 #ab ,the ,logos ,theory1 by ,ludwig ,noir4 ,translated from the ,german4 ,the ,open ,court1 iii4 p4 #baif4 ,english translations of ,noir's most important articles concerning the origin of language1 have appeared in ,nos4 #cc1 #acg1 #aci1 #ada1 #adb of ,the ,open ,court4 #ac ,that ants communicate with each other through their antenn is an undeniable fact4 ,but ,landois believes that they communicate also through sounds4 ,some ants possess in their stridulation-organ a kind of a rattle the sound of which1 however1 is perceptible to the human ear only in the ,ponera ants4 #ad ,see ,three ,lectures on the ,science of ,language1 p4 #dg4 ,the ,open ,court ,publishing ,co41 ,chicago4 #ae ,prof4 ,lloyd ,morgan introduces several new terms1 which seem well coined4 ,the mental product which is called the object of sense he calls 8construct02 the most prominent feature in a composite sense-image1 he calls the 8predominant02 and if the predominant is named and isolated by abstraction he calls it an 8isolate40 #af ,an impartial criticism of ,professor ,romanes's position has been made by ,prof4 ,lloyd ,morgan in his recent work ,animal ,life and ,intelligence4 #ag ,this quotation is requoted from ,prof4 ,lloyd ,morgan1 ,animal ,life and ,intelligence1 p4 #cbe4 #ah ,the origin of ,mind1 in ,the ,monist1 ,vol4 ,i4 ,no4 ,i4 #ai ,l4 c41 p4 #bha4 8,so much about the subject or the monon4 ,what now about the objects or the mona80 #bj ,prof4 ,max ,mller is a great admirer of ,kant and so am ,i4 ,but it appears to me that we differ greatly in what we accept as the essential teachings of the master2 and ,i grant willingly that ,prof4 ,max ,mller has preserved the doctrines of ,kant more faithfully than ,i4 ,i have attempted to modernise ,kant4 ,if ,i am called a ,kantian 7and ,i do not object to the name1 on the contrary ,i am proud of it7 it is because ,i proceed from ,kant and ,i attempt to preserve the spirit of ,kant's philosophy rather than his doctrines4 ,for the sake of the spirit of ,kantian philosophy ,i have seen myself urged to surrender the idea of the thing-in-itself as something unknowable4 ,prof4 ,max ,mller has preserved in his philosophy 7for such is the ,science of ,thought7 the ,ding-an-sich theory4 ,believing in things-in-themselves he must consistently believe in a self or monon1 for this monon is nothing but the thing-in-itself of the soul4 ,i have limited myself in the present article to the principle of continuity in evolution as a point of divergence between ,prof4 ,max ,mller and the views defended by ,the ,monist4 ,if ,i attempted at present to enter into the philosophical problem of things-in-themselves1 ,i should be obliged to tax too much the patience of my readers4 ,but as ,i am convinced that the reason of our difference with ,prof4 ,max ,mller concerning the continuity of evolution lies deeper still1 ,i intend to treat the subject of things-in-themselves in a future number4 ,,literary ,,correspondence ,i4 ,,france4--,,the ,,intellectual ,,awakening ,,of ,,the ,,langue ,d',,oc4 ,i have never seen mentioned in your periodical publications the ,revue des ,pyrnes2 and perhaps ,i should never have heard of the periodical myself if ,i had not been in this interesting old city1 and if my eye had not chanced on the title of one of the articles of a recent number advertised in a local journal4 8,un ,arigeois snateur des ,etats-,unis d',amrique3 ,pierre ,soul0 was the title that attracted my attention and caused me to procure a copy1 which ,i have found interesting in more ways than one4 ,the publication is a well-printed quarterly of #aej pages1 and has completed some time since the second year of its existence4 ,its full title is as follows3 ,revue des ,pyrnes et de la ,france meridionale1 ,organe de l',association ,pyrnenne et de l'union des ,socits ,savantes du ,midi4 ,the founders of the periodical are the late ,,julien ,,sacaze1 a savant much venerated in these parts1 and ,,dr4 ,f4 ,,garrigou1 its present editor4 ,the ,association ,pyrnenne1 of which1 as we have just seen1 the ,revue is the organ1 is an active and significant organisation4 ,here are some of its aims4 ,while it recognises the greatness of the ,capital1 ,paris1 it advocates decentralisation1 by 8showing that workers living in the provinces are as capable as others1 though enjoying less support and funds1 to aid in the building up of the great scientific edifice of ,france40 ,the importance and boldness of this declaration can scarcely be appreciated by those who have not breathed for some time the excessively monopolistic atmosphere of the ,french capital1 which has been so baneful to so many national interests4 ,the ,association would also act as a means of union between the various learned societies of the ,south1 the ,midi1 and thus render it possible to organise an annual ,congress 8for the discussion and defense of the grand scientific1 industrial1 and commercial questions which concern ,southern ,france40 ,here we see brought out still more precisely that rivalry between the ,south and ,north1 characteristic of most nations1 and which presents such curious aspects in the past and present history of ,france4 ,i never weary of quietly noting1 while in the ,south1 the delightful contempt which the mridionaux show for their ,parisian fellow countrymen4 ,the other day at dinner1 for instance1 ,i heard a learned professor of one of the ,southern ,universities defending the ,southern accent and preferring it to 8the ,parisian accent10 as he put it4 ,but ,i would need pages of your space to develop this line of thought4 ,suffice it to say here that the ,association ,pyrnenne and its organ the ,revue des ,pyrnes intend to prove1 and have succeeded in proving1 if we may judge by this number of the ,revue and by the account of the proceedings of the first ,congress of the ,association1 placed at the head of the number1 that there are creditable savants and sound learning outside of the walls of ,victor ,hugo's 8,ville ,lumire40 ,another object of the ,association would be dear to ,castelar's heart4 ,i give it in full3 8,to remove morally the grand ,pyreneean curtain and to offer the hand of friendship to a nation justly proud of its past1 whose interests touch our own1 and which has the right1 because of the illustrious sons of ,catalonia1 ,aragon1 and ,navarre1 to take part in an intellectual and ,pyreneean association based on science40 ,this is a paraphrase of ,louis ,,xiv's famous remark concerning the ,pyrenees1 when he placed his grandson on the throne of ,spain4 ,nor can one be surprised at the strong affection which binds ,southern ,france to the ,iberian peninsula4 ,the grand mountains1 the 8,pyreneean curtain10 which separate the two countries1 are always in sight1 their snow-capped peaks glittering in the sun2 the various patois1 especially the dialect of ,pau1 resemble the ,spanish more than they do the ,french tongue2 ,spanish money is foisted on you at the shops1 and picturesque ,spanish mountaineers lend a peculiar charm to the country fairs1 while the nation is ever on the eve of a pronunciamento1 destined to give to ,spain the republican institutions of ,france4 ,but to return to ,,pierre ,,soul who is the cause and starting point of this letter4 ,commandant ,trespaill's eulogistic biographical sketch is of slight interest to ,american readers1 who can find elsewhere a fuller and more exact account of the brilliant but rather disappointing career of the once famous ,franco-,louisiana statesman4 ,m4 ,trespaill's reference to 8,old ,hickory0 as 8the immortal ,jackson10 his statement that the ,american people is full of prejudices against the ,french race1 his metamorphosing ,new ,hampshire's only ,president into ,pierre ,francklin1 and some other similar slips can be overlooked1 for this essay offers a striking example of the dominant idea of the ,revue1 the ,association and patriotic ,southerners generally1--the glorification of the great men and great actions of the sunny ,south1 the 8,midi ensoleill40 ,and ,i must admit1 foreigner though ,i am1 that ,i share much of this enthusiasm for persons and things meridional1 and especially for the latter4 ,what a land this is for historical and archological study6 ,take this number of the ,revue des ,pyrnes1 for instance2 it is full of it4 ,here1 for example1 are the titles of three of the papers read at the first ,congress of the ,association ,pyrnenne1 to which ,congress ,i referred above3 8,the ,domitian ,road from ,narbonne to ,perpignan10 8,the ,third ,century ,school of ,sculpture in ,southern ,gaul10 and 8,the ,roman ,road from ,narbonne to ,carcassonne40 ,there are several articles in the ,revue about the ,university of ,toulouse1 which is stated to be the oldest in ,france after that of ,paris1 having been founded in #abbi1 more than two hundred and fifty years before the discovery of ,america4 ,the law school even antedates #abbi and its foundation is lost in the obscurity of the early centuries of the ,christian era4 ,another article begins the publication of a list of the professors at the law school4 ,the first recorded name dates from #abea4 ,when one finds such themes as these on every hand1 ,rome1 ,gaul1 the ,middle ,ages1 and feudalism become almost living realities4 ,and how inexhaustibly rich ,languedoc is in these reminders of the distant past4 ,and the patois or dialects of this part of ,france are not the least ancient and interesting subjects for study4 ,wonder is often expressed that the ,english of ,america differs so slightly from the ,english of ,england1 with three thousand miles of ocean separating the two countries4 ,the wonder increases when you find that here in ,languedoc the same patois differs in some particulars from town to town4 ,let me first mention some big differences and then touch upon some minor ones4 ,if you take the train which leaves ,toulouse at about half past eleven in the morning1 you will arrive at ,pau at half past four4 ,during these five hours on a pretty slow train you have passed from one patois to another4 ,the lower classes of ,toulouse cannot understand the lower classes of ,pau4 ,and if you continue in the same train1 at about half past eight you reach ,maulon1 in the ,french ,basque ,provinces1 where the populace of neither ,toulouse nor ,pau could carry on a conversation with the populace of ,maulon4 ,thus a nine hours' ride of about #age miles on an accommodation train carries you through a region where ,french is the vernacular of the educated classes and is the official language1 but where the great mass of the population is divided into three groups1 each speaking a different dialect4 ,the modifications which the same patois undergoes in neighboring localities is not less curious though of course not so radical4 ,roughly speaking it may be said that the same patois is spoken from ,montpellier to ,bordeaux and from ,toulouse well up into the centre of ,france1 which embraces the region where prevailed the ,langue d'oc from which the present patois is derived4 ,but1 while a peasant could make himself understood throughout this wide territory1 his ear would often be perplexed by more than one strange word and phrase4 ,i was once told on the ,riviera that the patois of ,menton differed considerably from that of ,nice and that this was particularly the case before the construction of the ,corniche road and the railway1 when a denizen of the former place could reach the latter city only by doubling ,cape ,martin under sail4 ,i do not know how true this statement is1 but ,i believe it to be correct1 after a superficial study on these same lines which ,i have just made in the ,department of the ,tarn1 one of the most isolated portions of ,upper ,languedoc4 ,i find that the patois of towns as near together1 as are ,new ,york1 ,newark1 ,patterson1 ,nyack and ,tarrytown1 for example1 differs1 not1 perhaps1 in its construction but in its vocabulary4 ,let me give some examples4 ,thus1 potato1 which is truffet at ,cordes1 becomes truffo at ,castres4 ,patano1 the word employed in the ,south ,east end of the ,department is also heard at ,castres1 but never at ,cordes1 which is in the ,north ,west end of the ,department1 ,castres being about in the centre4 ,dog is cagnot and c at ,cordes1 and gous at ,castres4 7,at ,montpellier1 in a contiguous ,department it is tschi1 while at ,pau they say can1 which approaches very near the ,latin47 ,pig is pourcel at ,castres and tessou at ,cordes4 ,broom engranicro at ,castres and balatso at ,cordes4 ,i have also noted the following difference between the ,tarn patois and that of ,pau4 ,the f of the former always becomes an aspirated h in the latter4 ,thus1 femo1 woman 7,castres7 is henno at ,pau2 fourco1 pitchfork 7,castres7 hourco 7,pau72 foun fountain 7,castres7 houn 7,pau74 ,a comparison of this patois with the ,french as regards the spelling of geographical names reveals a fact that would somewhat dampen the ardor of our friend ,colonel ,shephard1 of ,new ,york1 in his effort to force the gazeteers to give geographical names as they are written in the countries where they are found4 ,one might have thought that such near neighbors as the ,langue d'oil and the ,langue d'oc would have come to some rational understanding on this point and that the ,ile-de-,france would have accepted the spelling of ,languedoc4 ,but not so4 ,the towns and rivers of this part of ,france look as different in ,french and patois printed pages and sound as differently when pronounced by educated and peasant mouths1 as do the towns and rivers of ,italy when seen in ,italian and ,english books or when spoken by ,americans and ,italians4 ,thus ,toulouso became ,toulouse2 ,castros1 ,castres2 ,dourgnos1 ,dourgne2 ,carcassouno1 ,carcassonne2 ,narbouno1 ,narbonne2 ,billofranco1 ,villefranche2 ,labaou1 ,lavaur2 ,bibiers1 ,viviers2 ,boou1 ,vour2 ,abrayrou1 ,aveyron2 ,cordos1 ,cordes1 etc4 ,these patois1 these dialects of the old ,langue d'oc1 are awakening just now increasing interest in the literary circles of the ,midi1 for it is only within recent years that the ,french has appeared to threaten their extinction4 ,the spread of the railroad system and especially the wide development of the primary school since the advent of the ,third ,republic1 are dealing deadly blows at these popular dialects4 ,but they are still far from moribund4 ,i have frequently been told that even to-day one stumbles now and then on old peasants living up in the isolated ,black ,mountain1 a spur of the ,cvennes1 and which divides ,upper from ,lower ,languedoc1 who cling to oc1 although obe or ope1 or the ,french oui and si1 are the common affirmative particles of the patois4 ,it has often happened to me when taking a constitutional to ask my way and discover that ,i am addressing a person who neither understands nor speaks ,french1 though1 as a rule1 all peasants understand ,french and the vast majority can speak the language too1 but after a rather sorry fashion4 ,a foreigner finds at least one comfort in all this3 in ,languedoc he uses the national tongue more correctly than thousands of native born ,frenchmen6 ,nor is the knowledge of patois confined to the peasantry or the working classes of the towns4 ,the bourgeoisie1 with exceedingly rare exceptions1 are quite at home in it1 and the children of the nobility often prattle with their peasant nurse more easily in patois than in the polished speech of their parents4 ,during a political campaign1 it is a very common thing for a would-be deputy to address country voters in their familiar dialect1 thereby gaining the favor not alone of the flibres2 while1 during this same period of electoral excitement1 the local papers publish almost daily editorials written in patois4 ,in hundreds of rural churches the short sermon after early mass is preached in patois1 and many a time ,i have found myself turning with surprise when ,i heard ,french spoken in the streets of ,languedocian towns of considerable size4 ,there was a time when the government and the ruling classes of ,languedoc itself strove to eradicate these dialects and to substitute ,french for them4 ,the aim was a patriotic one2 greater national unity1 it was believed1 would thus be secured4 ,but that period has gone by1 and at present there is a strong tendency to preserve from destruction these linguistic souvenirs of a rapidly fading past4 ,what the enthusiastic flibres would do for ,provenal1 they and their disciples and imitators in ,languedoc would do for the dialects of ,south ,western ,france4 ,at the ,congrs d',etudes ,languedociennes1 held recently at ,montpellier1 one of the members proposed that the ,french language should be taught in the primary schools through the medium of the langue d'oc4 ,the suggestion is not so chimerical as it appears to be at first blush1 for one of the greatest and never-ending difficulties of the country schoolmaster in this part of ,france is to teach his scholars the three ,r's by means of the ,french1 which is a foreign tongue to ninety-nine out of a hundred of them4 ,one is not surprised1 therefore1 to find that one of the resolutions passed by this same ,congress takes up the plan proposed in the paper just referred to1 and declares in favor of 8the utilisation of the langue d'oc for teaching ,french in the primary schools40 ,at a recent sitting of the ,general ,council of the ,bordeaux ,university a resolution was passed calling for the creation of a chair of 8,southern languages40 ,in explanation of this term1 the ,gironde1 the leading ,bordeaux newspaper1 says3 8,besides giving instruction in ,spanish1 one of the labors of the professor would be to teach our ,south ,western dialects in which the most important historical documents of this part of the country were drawn up during several centuries40 ,the editor then goes on to say3 8,if the ,state does not feel able to found this chair1 will not some private individual come forward and imitate the example of ,james ,e4 ,clark1 who recently established at ,worcester1 ,mass41 a university endowed with a capital of #ab1ejj1jjj80 ,speaking of primary schools reminds me of a curious fact which has frequently attracted my attention in ,languedoc this winter4 ,in no other part of ,france perhaps was it so common for a town to grow up around a castle2 for this region was terribly harried by the ,wars of ,religion1 and the poor peasants were forced to seek the protection of some lord4 ,in order to render them more impregnable1 these castles were generally built on some high hill4 ,so now one sees on every hand decaying hamlets surrounding ruined castles left almost deserted on the very crown of some pyramidal mount1 while the busy town of to-day has descended to the more accessible base of the hill4 ,but since the advent of the ,third ,republic and the grand impetus given to primary instruction1 these abandoned castles have taken a new lease of life1 and been converted into school buildings4 ,the other day during an hour's drive in ,upper ,languedoc ,i saw two of these old useless feudal piles consecrated to popular nineteenth century education4 ,what a train of reflections is thus suggested6 ,within the very same walls where some proud ignorant seignior once lorded it over his humble vassals1 the descendants of these serfs1 still speaking the tongue of their oppressed ancestors1 but enjoying all the liberties then usurped by their masters1 are now being instructed in branches of knowledge of which the feudal knight had scarcely an inkling4 ,what a revolution was that of '#hi6 ,,theodore ,,stanton4 ,,ii4 ,,germany4--,,recent ,,publications ,,in ,,the ,,domain ,,of ,,pathological ,,psychology4 ,the science of anthropology claims1 as we know1 to have discovered1 that the various epochs of history are marked not only by characteristic religious1 political1 social1 and literary conditions1 but not unfrequently also by particular forms of disease2 and it is the opinion of eminent medical authorities that nervous and mental diseases constitute the 8pathological feature0 of modern civilisation4 ,this1 of course1 is not to be understood as meaning that diseases of this character have not appeared in previous epochs1 but simply that they occur with unusual frequency at the present day and in unusually grave forms4 ,a book treating of the affliction of the age ought to count on a large circle of readers1 and it will be all the more deserving of such if it thoroughly and skilfully fulfils its purpose of holding up the mirror to the time and of imparting the light and advice required in this matter4 ,this has been done in an excellent manner by the work of the ,bremen alienist ,dr4 ,,scholz1 entitled ,die ,ditetik des ,geistes--,ein ,fhrer zu praktischer ,lebensweisheit1 which has just appeared in its second and enlarged edition1 ,leipsic1 ,e4 ,h4 ,mayer4 ,this book is distinguished from the majority of similar recent publications intended for a greater public by its relative thoroughness4 ,it must be characterised as thorough and comprehensive1 also1 in comparison with the older and more celebrated work1 which its title at once suggests1 ,,feuchterleben',s ,ditetik der ,seele4 ,the character of the book is not 8purely psychological10 overlooking the high importance of the influence of the body1 as was the case with ,beneke2 nor does it lean towards the moralising of a ,heinroth and ,ideler2 nor does the author treat his subject from an exclusively medical point of view3 the work1 in fact1 is anthropological in character4 ,its contents possess chiefly in two respects great interest3 7#a7 from a universal human point of view1 in that it affords us a glance into the awful abysses of life1 in the company of an expert guide who tells us how these depths are to be avoided1 or at least gives consolation to those whose way leads necessarily through them2 and 7#b7 from a pedagogical point of view1 in that it directs attention to the heredity of the morbid constitutions and abnormalities that oppose obstacles to education or may become such if improperly treated4 ,it is obvious that morbid mental dispositions must be taken into account in all work of education and instruction1 if we wish to avoid an egregious violation of the universally recognised requirement to regard individuality4 ,and from this point of view the book of ,dr4 ,scholz will awaken in readers who have anything to do at all with education1 the desire to learn more about the nature of morbid mental life in the young than is presented in this treatise destined for a large public4 ,such a wish would have had to remain unsatisfied six years ago1 when the ,ditetik des ,geistes first appeared4 ,it is true1 ,english physicians particularly1 like ,west1 ,conolly1 ,maudsley1 and others1 had a long time previously directed attention to the morbid phenomena of infant psychic life1 but their work1 like that of their ,french and ,german professional associates1 lies buried in medical magazines and volumes not easily accessible4 ,the first to apply himself to the work needed in this condition of affairs was ,professor ,,emminghaus1 who digested and collected all the material1 thus supplied1 in a compendious work bearing the title ,die psychischen ,strungen des ,kindesalters1 ,tbingen1 ,laupp1 #ahhg4 ,the fact indeed is not to be left unrecognised that the book1 in so far as it may be used by those who have not had a medical training1 possesses two defects1--defects1 however1 for which the author cannot be censured4 ,in the first place1 it is intended for physicians only1 and is therefore1 on account of the many technical terms it uses1 at times not uniformly intelligible4 ,to the serious student1 however1 who possesses the previous psychological and physiological knowledge most indispensable1 it presents no difficulties of too great magnitude4 ,the second defect likewise springs from the purpose of the work4 ,it consists in the fact that1 excepting a few occasional references and hints1 the pedagogical aspect of the question is not considered4 ,pedagogists1 here1 are confronted with a problem which must be solved1 and of which the solution will certainly not be a thankless task4 ,the writer of these lines has approached one aspect of this question in a treatise of his entitled ,nervositt and ,mdchenerziehung1 ,wiesbaden1 #ahij1 in the course of which study he has arrived at the conviction that an important factor is lacking in modern pedagogics and the training of teachers4 ,this conviction he has put into words in another treatise1 ,geistesstrungen in der ,schule1 ,wiesbaden1 #ahia1 with what success it remains for the future to say4 ,two years after the appearance of ,emminghaus's work a translation was published in ,germany of a ,french book of a similar character4 ,der ,irrsin im ,kindesalter1 by ,dr4 ,,paul ,,moreau1 authorised edition by ,dr4 ,demetrio ,galatti1 ,stuttgart1 #ahhi1 ,ferdinand ,enke1 publisher4 ,unfortunately1 ,moreau1 as his own preface reveals1 did not know1 when he wrote his book1 of the existence of the ,german work1--a circumstance that has not been without regrettable consequences4 ,taken in conjunction with the work of ,emminghaus1 however1 ,moreau's book possesses1 on account of the numerous morbid cases it gives1 a high value2 although it cannot bear comparison with the former work in richness of material and familiarity with the literature of the subject1 and much less so in the psychological treatment of the subject1 where ,emminghaus is incomparably subtler and more profound4 ,a treatise that is closely related1 in point of subject-matter1 on the one hand to the works of ,emminghaus and ,moreau1 and on the other to the books of ,preyer 7,die ,seele des ,kindes7 and ,prez 7,les trois premires annes de l'enfant and ,l'enfant de trois sept ans7 on the development of children1 has just been published by a ,leipsic teacher under the title of ,die ,periodicitt in der ,entwickelung der ,kindesnatur1 ,neue ,gesichtspunkte fr ,kinderforschung und ,jugenderziehung1 by ,,gustav ,,siegert1 ,leipsic1 #ahia1 ,r4 ,voigtlnder4 ,the author endeavors1 in a very interesting manner we must admit1 to show that1 in the development of the child1 lasting states in regular alternate succession occur of mental and physical buoyancy on the one hand and depression on the other1 of moral exaltation1 likewise1 and moral subsidence4 ,the fundamental cause of this periodical alternation1 of the general existence of which numerous proofs are adduced1 is supposed to lie in the alternate strengthening and relaxation of the individual's forces of action1 brought on by the expenditure and reproduction of energy2 additional determinative causes1 accelerative as well as retardatory1 are found in intercourse with the world and with other human beings4 ,we may call the former the individual and the latter the social cause of the phenomena of periodicity4 ,in the application of his results to juvenile education the author arrives at some far-reaching propositions of reform1 the consideration of which1 however1 we shall have to leave to the pedagogical press4 ,we shall have to preserve the same attitude with regard to a new work of the well-known ,leipsic professor ,dr4 ,,strumpell--,die pdogogische ,pathologie oder die ,lehre von den ,fehlern der ,kinder1 ,leipsic1 #ahij1 ,verlag von ,georg ,bhme ,nachfolger4 ,we must refer here to this otherwise highly deserving book only in one respect1 where we have occasion for censure4 ,the author does not in his expositions sufficiently take account of the intimate connection between physical and mental phenomena1 and the consequence of this is among other things that he excludes pathological mental conditions 7the physical causes of which he is forced to admit7 as a matter of principle from the pedagogic system and consigns them entirely into the charge of the physician4 ,in our treatise mentioned we have explained why this is not allowable1 as well as1 in addition1 what portion of duty devolves on the teacher in the consideration of these pathological mental conditions4 ,strumpell's mistake springs from the fact that he conceives with ,herbart the essential object of education to be intellectual culture4 ,allowing that ,herbart cannot be taken to task for entertaining this conception1 we may yet demand of ,strumpell the recognition of the results of recent physiological psychology to the extent at least of perceiving that psychical and physical phenomena are one if not the same4 ,even the opponents of ,monism dare not overlook this truth1--a truth moreover that admits very well of reconciliation with the ,herbartian pluralism to which ,strumpell is devoted4 ,we might cite here numerous pathological conditions of mind that very plainly spring from physical causes and to which the instructor has to give attention just as much as the physician4 ,instead1 however1 of citing particular cases1 we will refer to three little treatises that are in the highest degree instructive on this point1 not only for teachers exclusively but also for all who have to do with children4 ,dr4 ,,maximilian ,,bresgen1 specialist in diseases of the nose and throat at ,frankfort on the ,main1 has published at the house of ,leopold ,voss in ,hamburg 7#ahij7 a brochure entitled ,ueber die ,bedeutung behinderter ,nasenathmung nebst besonderer ,bercksichtigung der daraus hervorgehenden ,gedchtniss- und ,geistesschwche4 ,a treatise of like character is that of ,dr4 med4 ,,lenzmann of ,duisburg1 entitled ,ueber den schdlichen ,einfluss der behinderten ,nasenathmung auf die krperliche und geistige ,entwickelung des ,kindes1 ,bielefeld1 #ahij1 ,anders ,verlag4 ,both treatises contain1 among other things not to be considered here1 instructive examples of the rise and disappearance of that morbid mental condition to which ,hack first directed notice in ,germany but which elsewhere became known through the researches of the ,dutch physician ,guye by the name of ,aprosesia nasalis4 ,the third treatise is by ,dr4 med4 ,,ralf ,,wiechmann1 specialist for nervous diseases at ,brunswick1 and bears the title ,eine sogenannte ,veitstanzepidemie in ,wildbad1 ,leipsic1 #ahij1 ,verlag von ,georg ,thieme4 ,by ,st4 ,vitus's dance 7,ger4 ,veitstanz7 we understand the disease of which the well-known symptoms are involuntary muscular twitchings usually accompanied by severe or light psychical disturbances1 known in medicine by the name of chorea minor and chorea rhythmica1 and sometimes occurring in epidemics4 ,at the school in ,wildbad the number of the afflicted children rose in the course of time to twenty-six4 ,wiechmann expatiates at length in his book on the character of the contagion1 and arrives through an exhaustive use of the existing literature on the subject at the result1 that there was present in the individual children attacked substantially a physical predisposition1 an unstable nervous system4 ,as the first children attacked were not removed1 the convulsive motions were seen and perceptually taken up by the other children1 who were just approaching the period of puberty and labored under hereditary predispositions4 8,once these images had entered perceptually into the unstable brain1 they became competent to operate as stimuli and to be translated into involuntary muscular motions40 ,the conclusion of my letter may be taken up with the discussion of a treatise that deserves a somewhat more detailed consideration4 ,the director of the ,royal ,wrtembergian ,state ,insane ,asylum at ,zwiefalten1 ,dr4 ,f4 ,l4 ,a4 ,koch1 who already possesses eminent repute in the domain of psychiatry1 has just published the first part of a new work called ,die psychopathischen ,minderwertigkeiten--,erste2 ,abteilung3 ,einleitung1 ,die angeborenen andauernden psychopathischen ,minderwertigkeiten1 ,ravensburg1 #ahia1 ,verlag von ,otto ,maier4 ,in this work the author extends the development of the ideas he some time previously outlined in his ,rudiments of ,psychiatry1 second edition1 #ahhi4 ,in the expression 8psychopathische ,minderwertigkeiten0 7psychopathical secondary factors7 ,koch embraces all those psychical irregularities1 be they natural or acquired1 affecting the life of the human personality1 which though in the severest cases even not amounting to actual mental disorders1 yet in the most favorable instances so affect the persons afflicted with them that they appear as lacking the full possession of mental normality and capacity4 ,primarily1 of course1 the treatise is intended for physicians1 and the author counts on the gratitude of this profession in so far as he has undertaken to put in independent form the separate facts formerly scattered over the whole domain of psychiatry1 to free them from other neuro- and psycho-pathological subjects1 and to unite them into one special group of pathological states4 ,but the author also counts on his book being used by the representatives of other professions1 by pastors1 tutors1 teachers1 jurists1 sociologists1 historians1 and the like1 and indeed with perfect justice4 ,the savers of souls1 if they had mastered to a slight degree even the comprehension of the psychopathical secondary factors1 would be astonished to see how many people there are in the case of whom medicine is more effective against 8spiritual0 vexations than pastoral advice1 and that often such advice1 being one-sided and starting from false assumptions1 does harm only4 ,they would see in the peculiarity of the religious needs and tribulations of many a man a psycho-pathological abnormality2 they would come to understand how the otherwise unintelligible badness of many another has its source in a pathological basis3 they would not regard and hail as absolutely good1 moreover1 many 8good impulses02--all this they would find out if they had learned to note and comprehend what the import is of such persons being descended from neurotic ancestors1 of their exhibiting palpable indications of degeneration1 and having also perhaps insane1 idiotic1 whimsical1 and epileptical brothers and sisters4 ,they would furthermore perfectly comprehend1 that in the case of people who are descended from healthy parents1 but who from being in times past happy and joyful ,christians are now struggling with distractions of soul1 it were often better first to inquire after the state of their organs of digestion4 ,and they would be able to deal quite differently from formerly with many a soul entrusted to their care1 perhaps also more easily to conquer1 or at least to endure1 some secret burden of their own lives4 ,the import of the book for the educator is easily inferrible from the remarks made4 ,for the jurist1 who has to deal with the problems of accountability and the administering of punishment1 its importance is manifest4 ,sociology1 too1 the deeper it enters into its problems1 will not be able to dispense with psychopathology1 and in this field it is precisely the psychopathical secondary factors that eminently demand attention4 ,in that which concerns its connection with history we need only mention the names of ,lombroso1 ,emminghaus 7,allgemeine ,psychopathologie7 and ,mbius 7,rousseaus ,krankheitsgeschichte71 to point out the importance of a work like that before us4 ,we recommend it without reserve to all whom it touches4 ,,chr4 ,,ufer4 ,altenburg1 ,july1 #ahia4 ,,mile ,,littr4 ,some debts there are that make the debtor proud2 ,so ours to him1 who could philosophise ,with common-sense1 and sweep from starry skies ,the brain-spun webs that darken like a cloud4 ,we loved him1 for his highest thoughts avowed ,our own akin and less than ours allies2 ,born of the common soil but born to rise ,and light the labor of the laurel-browed4 ,justice he traced to truth2 morality1 ,back to the brutish primal needs of man2 ,and stood himself for all the best might be4 ,he wrought in words1 a faithful artisan2 ,and lived to shame their loutish mockery ,whose virtue ended where his own began4 ,,louis ,,belrose1 ,,jr4 ,,diverse ,,topics4 ,,the ,,origin ,,of ,,thought-,,forms4 ,dr4 ,h4 ,potoni1 the editor of the ,naturwissenschaftliche ,wochenschrift1 ,berlin1 advances in one of its recent numbers 7,vol4 vi4 #ae7 the following proposition concerning the origin of the forms of thought3 8,all the forms of thought have originated in the struggle for life not otherwise than the forms of organisms40 ,this is further explained in the following sentence3 8,those conceptions which are called a priori1 are inherited2 they have been necessarily used by the primitive thinking organisms and are now in their disposition immediately present4 ,yet they have been gained by experience4 ,without any knowledge1 for instance1 of space and time1 no action is possible2 accordingly their conception is perhaps the oldest and therefore it appears aprioristic40 ,i4 ,,thought-,,forms ,,and ,,the ,,forms ,,of ,,existence4 ,we agree with ,dr4 ,potoni that thought-forms grow naturally and that they grow such as they are1 of necessity4 ,in our opinion formal thought1 with its so-called a priori theorems1 is derived from the thought-forms by abstraction4 7,see 8,fundamental ,problems0 pp4 #bf-fj1 the chapter ,form and ,formal ,thought47 ,if it had been possible for other thought-forms to have originated together with those which we possess at present1 and it may be parenthetically remarked that we do not consider it as possible2 but if it had been possible1 we do not deny that all the other thought-forms would have gone to the wall1 they would have perished in the struggle for existence and our present thought-forms alone would have survived4 ,in this we agree with ,dr4 ,potoni1 and a naturalist may be satisfied with this statement1 because it suffices for his purposes4 ,the recognition of the objective validity of the laws of formal thought is all that the specialist wants for this or that branch of science4 ,but this recognition is not sufficient for the philosopher4 ,he has to understand the problem why the subjective laws of purely formal thought possess an absolute and an objective validity for the world of real existences4 ,he must understand not only how thought-forms originated1 but also why and on what ground the laws of formal thought are considered as necessary and universal truths4 ,the question of their origin and growth is of secondary importance compared with the question of their rigidity and apriority4 ,mr4 ,herbert ,spencer has made the same proposition as ,dr4 ,potoni and his view briefly expressed is this3 8,the laws of formal thought are a priori to the individual1 but a posteriori to the race40 ,in other words apriority must be explained by heredity4 ,a dog cannot count1 because none of his ancestors have ever counted1 but a child has the faculty to learn counting because innumerable ancestors of his have counted and his brain possesses a predisposition to learn counting easily4 ,concerning our apprehension of space-relations which expressed as mathematical theorems appear to us necessary and are called a priori1 ,mr4 ,spencer says3 8,we cannot think otherwise because during that adjustment between the organism and the environment which evolution has established1 the inner relations have been so moulded upon the outer relations that they cannot by any effort be made not to fit them4 ,just in the same way that an infant's hand1 constructed so as to grasp by bending the fingers inwards1 implies ancestral hands which have thus grasped1 and implies objects in the environment to be thus grasped by this infantine hand when it is developed1 so the various structures fitting the infant for apprehension of space-relations1 imply such apprehensions in the past by its ancestors and in the future by itself40 ,man's ability to learn counting is inherited1 and there may be more or less of it in different people4 ,mathematical talent is inherited just as much as musical talent or other faculties4 ,but the philosophical question concerning the apriority of mathematical theorems has nothing whatever to do with the origin of mathematical talent4 ,when ,mr4 ,spencer declares that apriority is but an inherited aposteriority1 this is equivalent and is intended to be equivalent to an actual denial of all apriority4 ,his very explanation proves that he does not see the real problem1 and in the same way ,dr4 ,potoni overlooks it entirely4 ,the philosophical problem of the apriority is not an historical problem1 it cannot be solved by tracing the evolution of thought-forms4 ,the philosopher does not ask how did thought-forms originate1 but why do we attribute to the laws of formal thought necessity and universality and on what ground can we justify our assumption8 ,mr4 ,spencer compares our apprehension of space-relations to our inherited habit to grasp with our hands and to walk with our feet4 ,this comparison is misleading and inappropriate4 ,that we grasp with our hands and walk with our feet is incidental4 ,there are animals who have developed other limbs for the same purposes4 ,there are monkeys who grasp with their tails and the elephant grasps with his nose4 ,there is no necessity and no universality in our predisposition of grasping with our hands4 ,yet there resides necessity and universality in the laws of formal thought so that wherever animals develop rational thought we are sure that to them twice two will always equal four just as much as it does to us4 ,however they may be different in other respects3 they may be winged creatures or may be somewhat like our ants1 they may have developed other bodily structures than we can dream of1 nevertheless their arithmetic1 their logic1 and their mathematics will in all essentials be exactly the same as ours4 ,there are animals whose thought-forms are not as highly developed as in man1 but there are no animals in whom they are developed differently4 ,we must consider it as impossible even that on other stars rational creatures can be found whose reason differs from ours4 ,to them also twice two will be four4 ,,ii4 ,,the ,,problem ,,of ,,apriority4 ,kant did not call the formal laws a priori in order to characterise them as innate ideas1 but simply to denote that their validity is necessary and universal4 ,if ,i have to walk twice a distance of two miles1 ,i know 8beforehand0 7i4 e4 a priori7 that ,i shall have to walk four miles--even before ,i have made the actual experience4 ,and this wonderful quality of giving information beforehand is characteristic of all the laws of formal thought4 ,it is certain that our ability of applying the laws of formal thought has been acquired by experience in the race as well as in the individual4 ,but their necessity has to do with experience in so far only as its recognition is the indispensable condition of all methodical experience--i4 e4 of science4 ,the laws of formal thought and our recognition of their necessity and universality 7alias1 8apriority07 are the organ of any and all scientific cognition4 ,the methods of the sciences are exact measuring and counting based upon the faith that the laws of measuring and counting are unalterable and unfailingly reliable4 ,we know beforehand that they will hold good for all possible cases4 ,our experience of millenniums suffices to prove that the laws of formal thought agree with the laws of actual existence1 and ,kant's view to consider them as merely subjective and not objective appears to me untenable4 ,we may fairly consider ,kant's subjectivism as a thing of the past4 ,and the agreement of the forms of objectivity with the forms of subjectivity is easily explained when we bear in mind that the thinking subject is a part of the objective world4 ,it is but natural that the forms of existence are impressed upon the thinking subject as forms of thought4 ,yet the question of the necessity and universality of the laws of form remains4 ,can we comprehend why the form of objective reality as well as of subjective thought must be such as they are1 and might they not just as well be different8 ,is this question legitimate and can it be answered8 ,we say ,yes1 the question is legitimate and can be answered4 ,all the laws of formal thought are products of thought-operations which are based on no other principle than that of identity 7,a ,a74 ,as soon as thinking beings have developed to that degree of thought-ability in which they are able to deal with the abstract idea of pure form1 they can make constructions of pure forms4 ,so long as these constructions of pure forms are made consistently and correctly 7i4 e4 in strict agreement with the principle of identity71 they will be found to hold good in reality and we can a priori--before we have made the actual experience--rely on their applicability4 ,the laws of pure forms 7forms of thought as well as forms of existence7 can satisfactorily be proved to anyone who acknowledges the principle of identity4 ,the principle of identity is not an assumption but it is the generalised statement of the simplest thought-operation1 which1 if employed with consistency1 can serve as a rule for other and more complex thought-operations4 ,consistency is the condition of thought4 ,consistency produces order1 and order is the most characteristic feature of thought4 ,we create some pure form in some definite way1 for instance in counting we posit a unit 7we call it 8one074 ,now we create in the same definite way again a pure form1 we again posit a unit 7we again call it 8one074 ,in so far as these two 8ones0 are the product of the same operation they will be the same and we express this truth in the sentence #a #a or ,a ,a4 ,when1 for the sake of assistance in the process of abstract thought1 we use real objects to represent our pure forms1 similarly as an abacus is employed for assisting the young mind of a child in learning arithmetic1 the dissimilarity of the objects is of no account4 ,the proposition of their identity has no reference to the material objects1 but to the operation4 ,two operations being according to some special and definite method exactly the same1 their products are also exactly the same1 and the rest is not to be minded1 because we have in our abstraction purposely excluded everything else4 ,here is not the place to show the palpable advantages of the methods of abstract thought and especially of the abstract thought-operations with pure forms4 ,it is sufficient to characterise its main principle of procedure4 ,we may also parenthetically remark that from our position we are no longer in need of axioms either in mathematics or in any other formal science4 ,the data of formal sciences are certain mental operations1 viz4 positing pure forms1 and combining1 separating1 and recombining them4 ,the subject matter of formal sciences consists in the products of these operations4 ,to formulate some of the simplest products in axioms is a mistake which has been pointed out by ,hermann ,grassmann in his ,ausdehnungslehre4 ,we are struck and overawed with the cosmic order of all natural phenomena which1 as science teaches1 is produced through the rigidity of the formal laws of existence4 ,the planetary system with its regularity of motion which in spite of its many complications has been formulated by ,kepler in most simple laws is an object of wonder to us4 ,this order of nature is the same order as the grand harmony that prevails in mathematics and all the other formal sciences4 ,the most complicated laws of both1 forms of nature and forms of thought1 are nothing but generalisations of special applications of the principle of identity in some kind of action that takes place4 ,while the order of the objective world excites our wonder we can understand the order of the subjective world of thought-forms and know that1 being the product of certain mental operations according to the principle of identity1 it must be a matter of course4 ,thus the intrinsic necessity of the laws of our thought-forms gives us a clue to the intrinsic necessity of the laws of nature4 ,,iii4 ,,conservation ,,of ,,matter ,,and ,,energy1 ,,and ,,causation4 ,the law of the conservation of matter and energy is nothing but an application of the principle of identity to nature as a whole4 ,and the law of cause and effect is again a corollary only of the law of the conservation of matter and energy4 ,the law of causation is a formula which maintains that there is identity in difference4 ,some motion produces a change of form4 ,there is accordingly a different state after the motion than before4 ,yet the total amount of matter and energy remains the same4 ,this is the identity in the change4 ,david ,hume and with him ,john ,stuart ,mill and the empiricists misunderstood the problem of causation4 ,instead of considering cause and effect as one continuous process that should be analysed1 they considered cause and effect separately and attempted a synthesis4 ,in addition to this mistake1 causes as well as effects were defined to be objects4 ,hume says cause and effect are objects following one another4 ,cause however is a process2 it is a motion1 a change that takes place1 an event that happens2 it is not a thing4 ,and effect is the product of such a process4 ,effect is a special form1 a special state of things1 a special configuration1 but not the material of which this configuration consists4 ,a certain poison introduced into the stomach of a living being produces certain motions in the bowels1 called cramps1 which may finally prove fatal4 ,one change produces other changes and their product is a new state of things which is accompanied with pain and ends in death4 ,it is wrong to call strychnine the cause and a dead mouse the effect4 ,but if we call strychnine the cause and a dead mouse the effect1 we must forever despair of solving the problem of causation by a reduction to the principle of identity1 for strychnine is not at all identical with a dead mouse4 ,no cause is the same thing as its effect1 and we can by no means identify cause and effect4 ,and yet the principle of identity holds good4 ,the identity in causation is the conservation of matter and energy in a change of form4 ,it has been maintained that the law of cause and effect could never be proved2 it is either an innate idea prior to experience 7,schopenhauer and ,schopenhauer's interpretation of ,kant7 or it is an assumption derived from experience of which 7since experience is not as yet exhausted7 we cannot know whether it will hold good forever 7,j4 ,s4 ,mill74 ,in contradistinction to these views we maintain1 that the law of cause and effect can satisfactorily be proved to anyone who accepts the principle of identity4 ,so far as the principle of identity is recognised1 all the formal laws are unequivocally determined1 or popularly expressed they are as they are1 they will remain so and cannot be otherwise1 they are necessary4 ,all the determining factors and also the procedure of an operation are set forth1 no unforeseen events are possible1 for the non-formal elements are excluded1 and therefore the result will be in one case just as it is in any other4 ,thus it can a priori be stated that formal laws will always hold good4 ,the question has been raised3 ,whether or not our knowledge of the apriority of formal laws is independent of experience4 ,we answer3 ,in a certain sense it is dependent upon experience1 in another it is not4 ,historically and evolutionarily it is dependent upon experience4 ,a store of innumerable experiences has to be gained before a rational creature will be able to make the abstraction of pure forms4 ,as soon as this stage is attained1 man possesses a world in himself4 ,he can now experiment within himself with mental images1 for instance with numbers3 he can calculate4 ,his mental operations with pure form are called 8pure thought0 and 8pure thought0 is now opposed to 8experience through the senses40 ,the word 8experience0 accordingly is used in two ways2 it has a broad and a narrow meaning4 ,in its broad sense it means any acquisition of knowledge generally1 in its narrow sense it means knowledge acquired through the sense-activity alone4 ,our knowledge of the apriority of formal laws rests upon experience in its broad sense1 but not upon experience in its narrow sense4 ,we can never derive the idea of necessity from sense-impressions4 ,john ,stuart ,mill in rejecting innate ideas saw no other way than to derive the formal laws from experience 7taking here experience in the broad sense74 ,yet he did not make a distinction between formal thought and sense-experience4 ,he considered the nature of sense-experience as typical for all experience4 ,and thus1 again1 taking experience in the narrow sense of the term1 he was from his premises perfectly justified in rejecting the idea of necessity4 ,if the process of cause and effect is really a synthesis of two things represented in two different sense-impressions following each other1 then indeed we have no guarantee that the same sequences will always be observed2 and there may be worlds in which the law of causality does not operate4 ,mill saw all the consequences of his mistake1 he conceded freely that we are not justified in assuming that twice two will always be four3 many thousands of experiences are in its favor1 but we cannot be at all sure that no case will ever happen in which twice two makes five4 ,the ideas of causality and of the conservation of matter and energy are not derived from experience in the narrow sense of the word1 not from sense-experience1 but from experience in the wider sense of the word1 i4 e4 from sense-experience arranged with the assistance of formal laws4 ,we should not forget that mere sense-experience exists only in our abstract thought4 ,in reality all sense-experience is relational1 it is inseparable from its form4 ,form and the laws of form are not something purely mental which is transferred to the world of reality1 form is something real1 it is objective1 it is a quality of the facts and the thought-forms of mind are a part and a product of the formal structure of the universe4 ,the ideas of causation and of the conservation of matter and energy are not prior to experience1 they are a part of experience1 i4 e4 experience in the wider sense4 ,they are not part of the sense-experience1 but the results of our experiments with purely formal thought-operations1 and being the vital instrument or organ of cognition they are the condition of all methodical experience4 ,,iv4 ,,why ,,is ,,mr4 ,,mill',s ,,proposition ,,untenable8 ,in practical life we all expect that #b #b will under all circumstances make #d1 and not #e4 ,we reject ,mr4 ,mill's idea that there may be even a possibility of the latter4 ,is our expectancy really due to a posteriori experience which having been repeated so often in the lives of our ancestors is now so firmly rooted in our minds that we imagine it to be necessary and a priori8 ,no6 certainly not4 ,the experiences of our race in the struggle for life has produced our ability of thought1 but it has nothing to do with the apriority of the products of formal thought-operations4 ,a statement of formal thought such as 8twice two makes four10 cannot be compared to statements of sense-experience such as that sugar has a sweet taste4 ,there may be a moment in which the taste of sugar will be bitter to our tongue4 ,this is quite possible4 ,but to say that twice two might in the future or in any other world1 as ,mr4 ,mill maintains1 make five is nonsensical1 and the possibility of this assumption cannot be placed in one line with the possibilities of extraordinary and exceptional sense-experiences4 ,what does 8twice two makes four0 mean8 ,two means #a #a1 and twice two means #a #a plus #a #a4 ,this sum is called 8four02 and what we call five is #d #a4 ,to maintain that the operation #b #b might produce the result #e1 is to admit conditions which have been excluded4 ,pure forms are not like animals which multiply2 they are and remain such as they have been posited4 ,when we put two ambas into a glass and then add two other ambas1 it is quite possible that in the mean time one of the first set has divided into two4 ,in that case we would have five ambas4 ,but the operation #b #b cannot breed any additional units1 so as to produce a greater number than the sum of #a #a #a #a4 ,nor can we let any of these units disappear into naught1 so as to produce the result #c1 without committing some inconsistency in our thought-operations1 for the products of our thought-operations are rigid and must remain such as they have been posited4 ,they are not animals blessed with fertility but pure forms and nothing but pure forms4 ,how could ,mr4 ,john ,stuart ,mill overlook so palpable a contrast as that between formal knowledge and sense-experience8 ,he was apparently prejudiced against the term 8a priori10 which as we freely confess is a very poor and inadequate expression4 ,mr4 ,mill himself states the cause of his prejudice in his autobiography4 ,he says3 8,there is not any idea1 feeling1 or power1 in the human mind1 which1 in order to account for it1 requires that its origin should be referred to any other source than experience40 ,mr4 ,mill was justly exasperated against anything a priori1 for in his time1 it had become customary among certain philosophers to classify all pet superstitions which could not be proved by experience as a priori4 ,mr4 ,mill continues3 8,whatever may be the practical value of a true philosophy of these matters1 it is hardly possible to exaggerate the mischiefs of a false one4 ,the notion that truths external to the mind may be known by intuition or consciousness1 independently of observation and experience1 is1 ,i am persuaded1 in these times the great intellectual support of false doctrines and bad institutions4 ,by the aid of this theory every inveterate belief and every intense feeling1 of which the origin is not remembered1 is enabled to dispense with the obligation of justifying itself by reason1 and is erected into its own all-sufficient voucher and justification4 ,there never was such an instrument devised for consecrating all deep-seated prejudices40 ,we appreciate the cause of ,mr4 ,mill's prejudice1 but we cannot agree with him4 ,and ,mr4 ,mill is mistaken when he imagines that a rejection of apriority will abolish false doctrines and superstitions4 ,on the contrary4 ,the recognition of absolute necessity based upon the universality of formal thought will alone be a safe basis of science through which we can reject prima facie the wrong pretensions of superstitions and pseudo-science4 ,if we assume with ,mr4 ,mill that all formal knowledge partakes of the nature of sense-experience1 that there is no difference between the two1 no general judgment would be allowable and the idea of necessity would be inadmissible4 ,these consequences are accepted by ,mill4 ,in that case science would lose its value and philosophy would be without foundation4 ,the most absurd superstition could not be rejected off-hand on the ground of being contrary to that which through logic and other formal sciences has been found to be necessary and a condemnation of any superstition on the part of science would be mere arrogance4 ,pseudo-science would have the same right with true science4 ,it is obvious that without being obliged to consider the apriority of formal laws as innate1 we need not accept the consequence of ,mr4 ,mill's philosophy4 ,we can and we do retain the idea of necessity and we consider it as the corner-stone of all science4 ,v4 ,,the ,,meaning ,,of 8,,necessary40 ,we have to be on our guard lest we introduce some mystical element into the idea of necessity4 ,there is nothing mystical about necessity4 ,necessary means that a certain operation1 if it is exactly the same operation as another one1 will produce exactly the same result4 ,when we posit two units twice1 we shall have the same result as when we posit one unit four times2 and we call this result four4 ,we shall reach the same product whenever we repeat the same operation4 ,knowing that we shall always reach the same result1 we can1 a priori 7or beforehand7 and with certainty1 determine the result of certain operations after we have mentally gone through the same operations for all possible cases and under any imaginable conditions4 ,that a perfect apriority with an unfailing certainty is possible only in the domain of formal thought is natural4 ,the reason is that we know our thought-forms exhaustively4 ,they contain nothing but that which has been predicated about them4 ,our sense-experience however is always piecemeal and never exhaustive4 ,comprehension is actually a tracing of form relations and a formulating them in concise statements4 ,the scientist's work is based upon the methods of measuring and counting 7i4 e4 the methods of formal sciences7 and he undertakes to show that certain phenomena1 different in some respects1 are the same in other respects1 that their sameness can be stated in a comprehensive and exact formula4 ,in this way he marks out their determining factors in terms of formal thought 7for instance in numbers71 so that we can compute them and predict them according to their determining factors1 so that we can know1 according to their conditions1 that they will be always as they are4 ,the importance of formal thought is paramount in science and the problem about the necessity which attaches to the laws of formal thought is the fundamental problem of philosophy4 ,there are many philosophers1 still1 troubling themselves to solve the problem in the fashion of ,schopenhauer or of ,mill or looking upon the problem as insolvable4 ,we do not doubt that the solution here presented is the only possible solution which as soon as it is understood will find a general acceptance4 ,must it be added that the solution of this fundamental problem does not involve the ready solutions of all other minor problems8 ,oh no6 ,we all know that the solution of one problem is only a stepping-stone for attacking other problems4 ,the possibilities of progress are as unlimited as the scope of cognition4 ,light on this general subject gives us hope that we shall succeed in throwing light also upon other subjects which are still shrouded to the philosophical inquirer in impenetrable darkness4 ,,vi4 ,,modern ,,logic4 ,the problem of modern logic is at bottom no other problem than that of formal thought and of the origin of thought-forms4 ,professor ,dewey in the excellent essay which appears as the leading article of this number says3 8,any book of logic will tell us what this conception of thought is3 that thought is a faculty or an entity existing in the mind apart from facts and that it has its own fixed forms with which facts have nothing to do--except in so far as they pass under the yoke40 ,this is the old conception of thought1 rightly criticised by ,professor ,dewey1 for1 closely considered1 it turns out to be dualistic4 ,however1 as soon as a proposition is recognised to contain or to rest upon dualism1 it becomes a problem4 ,the problem of modern logic is1 ,how can we arrive at a monistic conception of logic1 how can we rid ourselves of the dualism on the one side of facts not yet rationalised by the method of thought-forms and on the other side of mind with its empty thought-forms assimilating facts to its own nature4 ,our solution of the difficulty has been proposed1 in the sense outlined by ,professor ,dewey1 in 8,fundamental ,problems40 ,professor ,dewey1 according to our opinion1 is right when he says there is no such a thing as transcendental thought1 or pure thought1 thought by itself4 ,and there is no such a thing either as fact1 crude irrational chaotic fact4 ,the world of fact1 indeed1 is a cosmos and no chaos2 there never was a chaos and never will be a chaos1 for the laws of form are an essential and the most characteristic feature of the world4 ,can there be any question how the order found in thought-forms originates in a world in which the inorganic and unfeeling mineral crystallises in a regular shape according to strict mathematical laws1 i4 e4 the laws of form8 ,a world in which the plant grows not otherwise than according to strict mathematical laws building up roots and stem and leaves and petals and stamens and all other organs obedient to a certain plan which will vary according to circumstances1 but throughout consistent with the principles of formal laws8 ,can there be any question that in this world of cosmic harmony thought-forms will develop in feeling beings as a microcosm exhibiting the same regularity and conformity to law as do in this world all other things animate and inanimate8 ,our pure1 i4 e4 merely formal1 thought is an abstraction which serves the purpose of comprehension4 ,and so is the concept 8matter10 being that which produces sense-impressions4 ,there are no such ghosts as pure matter or pure thoughts in reality4 ,modern logic1 so far as we conceive it to be right1 is by no means an overthrow of the old formal ,logic1 generally called ,aristotelian4 ,it is simply an amendment made in order to exclude an erroneous interpretation4 ,and so is modern mathematics not so much a revolution as an extension of the old ,euclidian system4 ,it is a revolution only against a certain unclear conception of mathematics according to which this science is said to rest upon axioms1 these axioms representing absolute truth--unprovable1 incomprehensible1 and mysterious4#ba ,the main truth of monism is that reality forms one indivisible whole and all our concepts are mere abstractions representing certain parts or certain features of the whole4 ,as soon as we try to think of any of them as things in themselves we become involved in inextricable contradictions4 ,it appears as if the formal sciences contained some truths which were absolute and independent of actual reality4 ,but let any one think of any number1 of #b or #c1 and he will soon find that conceived as absolute beings they are meaningless and unthinkable4 ,this is not to say that numbers are phantoms1 but that conceived as absolute beings they are phantoms4 ,numbers and all formal concepts represent something real1 they represent pure forms4 ,and form is as much a part and feature of reality as is matter and energy4 ,p4 ,c4 ,,footnotes3 #ba ,hermann ,grassmann1 one of the founders of modern mathematics1 has called attention to the fact that ,euclid had a clearer conception of the fundamental concepts of mathematics than his ill-informed translators and interpreters4 ,grassmann says in his ,ausdehnungslehre3 8,from the imputation of confounding axioms with assumed concepts ,euclid himself1 however1 is free1 ,euclid incorporated the former among his postulates 77 while he separated the latter as common concepts 7 7--a proceeding which even on the part of his commentators was no longer understood1 and likewise with modern mathematicians1 unfortunately for science1 has met with little imitation4 ,as a matter of fact1 the abstract methods of mathematical science know no axioms at all40--,quoted from ,the ,open ,court1 ,vol4 ,,ii4 ,no4 #gg1 ,a ,flaw in the ,foundation of ,geometry1 by ,hermann ,grassmann1 translated from his ,ausdehnungslehre by 4 ,,book ,,reviews4 ,,belief ,,in ,,god4 ,its ,origin1 ,nature1 and ,basis4 ,being the ,winkley ,lectures of the ,andover ,theological ,seminary for the ,year #ahij4 ,by ,jacob ,gould ,schurmann4 ,new ,york3 ,charles ,scribner's ,sons4 #ahij4 ,the learned ,sage ,professor of ,philosophy in ,cornell ,university1 after tracing the historical origin and development of the belief in ,god1 expresses his conviction that the problem of the modern theist consists in the union of the ,aryan and ,semitic modes of interpreting existence4 ,we shall then have 8a synthesis of the ,father of all spirits with the ground of all nature40 ,this is the hypothesis developed in the course of the lectures delivered by ,professor ,schurmann last year before the ,andover ,theological ,seminary on the ,winkley foundation1 that form the contents of the present volume4 ,the theism embodied in that hypothesis is called by the author anthropocosmic1 because1 while it is based on the facts of the universe and those of human nature1 the universe must be interpreted in the terms of man1 and not man in the terms of the universe4 ,the key to the universe is the self-conscious spirituality which makes us selves and persons4 ,hence anthropocosmic theism is the doctrine of a ,supreme ,being 8who is ground both of nature and of man1 but whose essence is not natural but spiritual40 ,before considering the evidence for this hypothesis1 let us see what the author has to say with reference to the logical character of the belief in ,god4 ,he shows that agnosticism--of which he treats under its three significations as referring to the method of knowledge1 the object of knowledge1 and the subject of knowledge--is not consistent with the insight into nature and the constitution of knowledge gained by the ,newtonian method of hypotheses and verifications4 ,science1 as opposed to pure phenomenalism1 assumes that what has not originated in the percipient subject is objectively real1 and it postulates the universality of law in nature1 a postulate which is the expression of a conviction of 8the unity and universal inner connection of all reality40 ,the objective world cannot be understood without reference to our own conscious experience1 and as the only reality we know from the inside is a spiritual ego1 self-conscious spirit must be ascribed to the one ultimate reality whose existence science assumes1 as that which will alone satisfy the requirement of unity in the midst of change4 ,it might be objected here1 that the existence in man of a spiritual ego requires proof before that of a universal spirit or world-soul can be inferred from it4 ,the author takes the existence of the ego for granted1 a course which is quite allowable from the theistic standpoint1 although1 in the face of what is now known as to the dissolution of the ego under abnormal conditions of the organism1 not scientific4 ,having made that assumption and inferred the existence of ,god from that of the human spirit1 the author explains the nature of the one by reference to that of the other4 ,he tells us1 that the finite spirit is identical1 within the limits of its range1 with the infinite spirit1 because it is an ego1 and that in the ego we have1 not merely a mode of the divine activity1 but a part of the divine essence4 ,such being the case1 the author has no difficulty in inferring the attributes of ,god from the phenomena exhibited by man4 ,thus ,god is a ,god of righteousness because the moral capacity in the human spirit must have its ground in the infinite ,spirit4 ,again universal benevolence or love is the ideal of which human morality is the realisation2 hence we must conceive of the ,spirit of the universe as a ,god of love4 ,we do not think the author's final conclusion1 that 8the phenomena both of the universe and of human life require the thinking mind to postulate a ,supreme ,ground of things which we are entitled to describe as self-conscious ,spirit and loving ,father10 is warranted by his premises4 ,but we can accept the statement that our knowledge of ,god must continue to grow with our knowledge of man and nature4 ,through these alone can we know ,him1 but the difficulty is to interpret the revelation4 ,let it be admitted also that the end of nature is the production of man1 and that what is referred to by the author as the human spirit is 8the organ of that communication of ,god which is the end of the universe40 ,this does not in reality throw any light on the nature of ,god4 ,the utmost that can be said is that1 as man is an organism possessing certain functions1 the universe1 viewed as ,god1 must have an organic existence with functions corresponding to those exhibited by the human organism4 ,the author's reasoning in support of the belief in ,god as cause or ground of the world1 and as realising purpose in the world is very ingenious4 ,he affirms that the creational form of the argument from causality is insufficient4 ,it satisfies the devotional needs of a certain class of worshipers1 but what the religious1 as well as the scientific1 consciousness demands is a ,god 8here in the world1 not there outside of it or making it40 ,it has not yet been shown that the universe has had a beginning in time1 and the argument in favor of the eternity of matter ends with an assurance of the eternity of spirit alone4 ,spirit is the eternal reality1 and nature its eternal manifestation1 the latter being no more separable from the former 8than the spoken word from the thought it symbolises40 ,the causal relation is1 however1 absolutely necessary for our apprehension of the facts of the universe1 and as it cannot be interpreted without contradiction as an action between independent beings1 it must be explained as the eternal dependence of the world upon ,god4 ,this implies that ,god must be volitional as well as self-conscious2 8for without will there could be no activity1 no efficient causation1 no material universe40 ,the universe is thus the eternal expression of the divine will4 ,but what is the purpose realised in creation8 ,the activity of the divine will precludes the notion of a blindly working nature4 ,as creation is the eternal self-revelation of ,god1 the supreme and preconceived end of all things must be the glory of ,god4 ,but man is indispensable for the attainment of ,god's glory1 and therefore the end of nature as a realised scheme of divine ideas is the production of man4 ,the volitional and teleological arguments as thus stated by the author are consistent with the theory of evolution developed by ,darwin1 but they may be combatted on other grounds connected with the conditions of the existence of ,god as one with ,nature4 ,with this observation1 we must leave ,professor ,schurmann's very thoughtful book which1 although for the reasons we have stated1 not conclusive1 presents the theistic argument with great clearness and in its strongest form4 4 ,,judaism ,,and ,,christianity4 ,a ,sketch of the ,progress of ,thought from ,old ,testament to ,new ,testament4 ,by ,crawford ,howell ,toy4 ,boston3 ,little1 ,brown ,co4 #ahij4 ,this work is another contribution to that genuine history which is alone competent to impart any true instruction4 ,in it the author undertakes to give an account of the genesis of ,christianity as a child of ,judaism4 ,it seems to be the thesis of the author that those conceptions and beliefs that characterise any form of religion are rather determined by the social evolution than that the social progress and its features are determined by the evolution of ideas among which the religious ideas are specially influential4 ,in his introduction the author sketches out his view of the general laws of social progress as the same are related to religious thought4 ,he notices in history the tendency of ethnic religions to give way to or to develop into universal religions1 and argues that ,christianity is destined to overcome all its rivals and prevail universally4 ,this kind of a conclusion is a natural one to follow from the theory that the character of thought is determined by social circumstances and progress4 ,but if it be true that the special course of the evolution of thought and its characteristic form at any epoch is determined by causes that are uncontrolled by social conditions1 that as between thought and society thought is the masterful factor1 then quite another conclusion may ensue4 ,but the dubitable nature of the main thesis of the work does not much detract from the great excellence of the work in general4 ,as a history of the evolution of ,jewish religious conceptions and beliefs from the very first until the establishment of ,christianity1 it is in the highest degree interesting and instructive4 ,after a discussion of the literature of the ,jews and the formation of the canon1 the author proceeds to describe in full detail the nature genesis and mutations of the cardinal religious doctrines as they revealed themselves to the ,israelite1 ,jewish1 and early ,christian insight4 ,the entire body of the data are interpreted in consonance with the modern scientific idea of the organic nature of society4 ,jesus is regarded as the master spirit that created the ,christian ,church1 and ,paul whom many would install as the real author of the same is accordingly given only a second place4 ,altogether it may be said that ,professor ,toy has given us a most valuable contribution to religious history and to the scientific interpretation of the same4 4 ,,pronaos ,,to ,,holy ,,writ4 ,establishing1 on ,documentary ,evidence1 the ,authorship1 ,date1 ,form1 and ,contents of each of its ,books1 and the ,authenticity of the ,pentateuch4 ,by ,isaac ,m4 ,wise4 ,cincinnati3 ,robert ,clarke ,co4 #ahia4 ,rabbi ,isaac ,wise1 the president of the ,hebrew ,union ,college of ,cincinnati and the ,nestor of ,orthodox ,judaism in ,america1 presents in the 8,pronaos to ,holy ,writ0 a review of the ,biblical books with comments as to their authenticity and the times in which they were written4 ,having read these 8books and every word thereof in the original for a term of sixty-six years1 i4 e4 from boyhood up to his seventy-second birthday10 and having 8acquainted himself with all the ancient versions and commentaries and a large portion of the modern translations and commentaries of the ,bible10 the author is entitled to be heard4 ,rabbi ,wise is a stern monotheist and he declares3 8,god only did create light out of darkness2 man cannot produce truth out of fiction1 unless in his self-delusion problematic truth satisfies him4 ,all so-called gems of truth buried under the quicksand of fiction and deception are problematic at best1 if not supported by authoritative corroborants40 ,this is true4 ,all truth depends upon verification4 ,we cannot make truth1 but must find it1 we must be able to corroborate it1 and the corroborants of truth are its authority4 ,dr4 ,wise's idea of a corroborant is different from ours1 he says3 8,no one can speak conscientiously of ,bible truth before he knows that the ,bible is true1 and especially in its historical data40 ,this seems to indicate that we must have a belief in the truth of the ,bible before we investigate it and that moral truths1 the ethics1 the philosophy of the ,bible depend upon its historical data4 ,we cannot go so far with the author of the ,pronaos4 ,dr4 ,wise says3 8,the science commonly called ,modern ,biblical ,criticism1 actually ,negative ,criticism which maintains on the strength of unscientific methods that the ,pentateuch is not composed of original ,mosaic material1 no ,psalms are ,davidian1 no ,proverbs ,solomonic1 the historical books are unhistorical1 the prophecies were written post festum1 there was no revelation1 inspiration1 or prophecy1 must also maintain that the ,bible is a compendium of pious or even impious frauds1 wilful deceptions1 unscrupulous misrepresentations40 ,dr4 ,wise thought it necessary to meet ,negative ,criticism with the documentary evidence and for this purpose he wrote his ,pronaos1 which is to be an entrance-hall to the ,temple of ,biblical ,truth4 ,we do not side with the negativism of certain biblical critics1 for we believe that historical investigations have proved large portions of the ,pentateuch to be ,mosaic1 several psalms to be ,davidian1 and the historical books to contain as much history as many old historical books contain4 ,we believe that they have to be judged and searched and commented just as much and in the same spirit of scientific inquiry as our philologists treat ,herodotus or ,livy4 ,but the value of the ,bible1 in our opinion1 does not depend upon the acceptance or rejection of these or those historical data2 nor is it necessary to consider the ,hebrew prophets as special revelations of ,god1 in contradistinction to the divine revelation in nature and the history of mankind in general4 ,it may be true enough that the orthodox ,god-idea of ,monotheism depends upon the belief in special revelation and prophecies1 and it is also true that most of the ,biblical criticism has been destructive and negative4 ,but there is a way possible between both standpoints which may be called positive criticism4 ,this positive criticism attempts to understand the very life and meaning of the old religion1 it attempts to comprehend the belief of the orthodox and construe it in the terms of science--i4 e4 of rational and clear thought4 ,religion is certainly not a mere fraud or a vain illusion1 it is an ideal which developed naturally out of certain needs of man and the conditions of society4 ,that religious ideas1 especially the idea of ,god as the cosmic power which represents the moral authority1 are no mere fictions1 is proved by their survival1 and those who believe in evolution should not be blind to the fact that there is something good1 something true1 something well adapted to surroundings in religion4 ,to find these elements of truth and goodness which constitute the life of religion is not mere negative criticism1 but positive criticism1 and it is not at all necessary for those who aspire in this direction1 to believe in any historical data1 or in special revelations1 or in prophecies1 or in the personality of ,god1 but simply to trust in truth4 ,truth is the only way of salvation even though it may shatter the most sacred idols of a venerable orthodoxy4 ,the contents of the book show that the standpoint of the author does not blind him to the finer traits of the natural development of his religion4 ,so1 for instance1 ,solomon's rationalism is excellently contrasted with the spirit which manifested itself in the ,judges as well as the ,prophets4 ,the author of the ,judges was an outspoken theocratic democrat4 8,he literally pours out his abhorrence of the monarchical anti-theocratic institution in narrating the story of the first usurper ,abimelech1 the son of ,gideon4444 ,entirely different are the language and tendency of the two appendices1 evidently written by another author1 who evinces his animosity to the democratic form of government by saying four times3 #8,in those days there was no king in ,israel1' to which he adds twice #8every man did what seemed right in his sight'0 7p4 #df74 8,the ,solomonic ethics is a commentary on the ,mosaic ethics1 as by reason understood4444 ,man's knowledge of ethical doctrine is identical with his knowledge of ,god's moral attributes1 and all moral obligation has its root in the ,mosaic ,god-idea44440 ,according to ,solomon 8wisdom based upon and rooted in the fear of ,jehovah with the revealed material before them was all-sufficient1 without any further special oracles of any prophets4 ,this peculiar rationalism brought upon him the ire of prophets and rabbis0 7p4 #aaa74 ,some reviewers of ,dr4 ,wise's book will probably find fault with him that he has taken little if any account of the results of modern biblical investigations4 ,and this is a grievous fault in our times where it seems to be essential for a scholar and author to have read the very latest things published on a subject while an acquaintance with the views of the classical old authorities is considered unnecessary4 ,it appears that ,dr4 ,wise did not intend to present his views or criticisms of and his answers to the latest biblical investigations4 ,it may even be that he is not familiar with many of them4 ,granting this to be a fault of his book it is1 nevertheless1 refreshing to us to find an author who has actually read and is excellently familiar with all the old sources of the subject he is writing upon4 4 ,,the ,,foundations ,,of ,,geometry4 ,by ,edward ,t4 ,dixon4 ,cambridge 7,eng473 ,deighton1 ,bell ,co4 #ahia4 ,this work is divided into three parts1 the first containing such doctrines of psychology and logic as the author deems sound and useful for his purposes1 the second exhibiting the author's 8subjective theory of geometry deduced from the two fundamental concepts position and direction10 and the third 8on the applicability of the foregoing subjective geometry to the geometry of material space40 ,in his preface the author expresses his desire that those who criticise his work shall 8consider categorically0 certain questions relating to his theory of definition1 to the definitions and axioms prescribed by him1 to his proofs of propositions and to the 8objective applications0 of his three axioms4 ,geometry may be studied for two distinct purposes1 neither of which necessarily involves the other4 ,unless the aim is mainly the discipline of the logical faculty1 it is plainly a poor method of study to pore over the definitions1 axioms1 postulates1 theorems1 problems1 and demonstrations of ,euclid or any similar text-book4 ,practical resources and geometrical information can be acquired much better and more rapidly by a course of mechanical drawing with here and there a more or less loose explanation of the grounds and reasons that warrant the geometrical doctrines1 than by means of the ,euclidian course4 ,under such a method of instruction the student would rarely feel any real doubt as to the truth of his geometrical knowledge4 ,but where the paramount aim is the training of the reason the ,euclidian rigor is all important4 ,hence the perfection of that method by the discovery and certification of the ultimate grounds on which1 and the principles by which1 it may be unfolded systematically and in necessary and sufficient sequence without presumption or fallacy1 is an object of the most momentous concern to science1 to philosophy1 and to culture in general4 ,for it is well known that however good an account elementary geometry may give of its superstructure the reports given of its foundations are all very far from satisfactory4 ,repeated and strenuous efforts have been made1 and by the most competent of our race1 to discover and certify the true state of the case in respect to the geometrical foundations1 in order that the whole edifice of that science shall display throughout the same thorough-going necessity and sufficiency that distinguishes it in general4 ,the author of the work under review is persuaded that he is now able to perform this so desirable service4 ,he avers his belief that the system of geometry he 8has set forth in this book is logically sound and that consequently the more it is discussed and criticised1 the more firmly will it become established40 ,he takes his stand upon two fundamental concepts1 position and direction1 which he defines not explicitly but 8implicitly40 ,this leads us to consider his first question and his theory of definition4 ,the embarrassments that involve the foundations of elementary geometry are mainly1 if not wholly1 those which involve the general problems of definition4 ,now a definition is the certification of the purport of a name by means of a statement or a conspiracy of statements necessary and sufficient to that end4 ,but names are constituents absolutely necessary for the formation of any statement1 so that the above definition of a definition may be restated thus3 ,a definition is the certification of the purport of one name by means of other names1 necessary and sufficient to certify the purport of the one defined4 ,evidently then1 definition can only lead us from name to name in unending process1 or to some undefinable name1 or to some name that we choose to leave undefined2 and the question arises1 on what sort of names shall we take our stand as ultimate grounds8 ,our author answers this question as follows3 8,the propounder of a scientific theory is not of course expected to teach his readers to speak1 it is only necessary for him to define the terms peculiar to his science1 or those to which he wishes to attach peculiar meanings4 ,he may therefore assume that the meanings of all other words are known to his readers40 ,he then propounds that 8all that is logically required for a definition is one or more assertions with regard to the word to be defined or1 its attributes10 provided 8they are not demonstrably incompatible with each other40 ,although our author conceives that logical competence requires no more than this for a good definition1 he yet goes on to remark1 that 8if the definition is to form the basis of a deductive science it is further advisable that the assertions should be independent10 and that 8where it is required to define a term whose denotation is already known1 it is further necessary not only that the assertions should be commonly accepted as true with respect to it1 but that they should restrict the meaning of the term exactly to its accepted denotation1 neither more nor less1 and should do so in the simplest manner that can be devised40 ,it is upon this theory of definition that our author requests of his critics a 8categorical0 answer to his first question1 8,do you accept the requirements ,i have laid down for a logical definition8 7,if not please state which of them you object to1 why you object to it1 and what you would propose to substitute for it470 ,since it is a 8categorical0 answer that is requested and since also it is the matter of definition that is put in issue1 we wish that our author had been more definite and had made his propositions better issuable1 for we must protest that we regard ourselves obliged to answer to what we can best conceive to be the author's true meanings rather than to what he has explicitly said4 ,we do not conceive that he regards it as necessary to a definition that the defining assertions should be expressed 8in the simplest manner that can be devised40 ,we have also to take his use of the word 8restrict0 as importing completion as well as limitation1 and his use of the word 8requirements0 as intending conditions that together are sufficient as well as necessary4 ,if we are right in our understanding of the meanings of our author he contemplates four cases1 first1 the definition of a name that has no denotation already known and that is not to form the basis of a deductive science1 second1 the definition of a name that has no denotation already known but which is to form the basis of a deductive science1 third1 the definition of a name that has a denotation already known but which is not to form the basis of a deductive science1 and fourth the definition of a name that has a denotation already known and is to form the basis of a deductive science4 ,in this fourth case our author deems it requisite for a logical definition that there shall be made one or more assertions about the subject of definition that are not demonstrably incompatible with one another1 that are independent of one another1 that are commonly accepted as true in respect to the subject defined and that 8restrict0 the meaning of the name under definition exactly to its accepted denotation4 ,it seems to us that this last requirement dispenses with the necessity of all the rest4 ,if we have provided an assertion or a set of assertions that do in fact complete and limit the meaning of the subject of definition exactly to its proper denotation that is a definition in full4 ,it implies that the defining assertions are all consistent with one another1 and in case any assertion is dependent upon one or more of the rest that is a circumstance wholly immaterial4 ,utile per inutile non nocetur4 ,again1 what is it to be commonly accepted as true8 ,does logical competence depend on the altering states of our knowledge or on the fluctuations of opinion8 ,was a whale logically defined as a fish before we learned that it was a mammal8 ,the third case allows of the application of the same comment as that made upon the fourth4 ,but in the first and second cases the doctrines of the author as well as his suppositions are very notable4 ,he supposes the anomaly of names without any known denotation1 by which he may mean those which have no application whatever4 ,in respect to such he propounds that they may be given a logical definition by making one or various consistent assertions as applicable to them or to their attributes4 8,the proof of the pudding will be found in the eating10 as our author says4 ,so let us say that a troft may be perceived whenever our attention is excited1 and that trofts are of multitudinous variety4 ,do these assertions constitute a logical definition8 ,it is a prime requisite for a definition that the defining assertion or assertions shall have a meaning1 which is the same as to say that names must be employed that are already significant4 ,these significant names must be so used that the intellectual sensibility shall be excited to perceive in a determinate way that which is intended to be defined4 ,in other words1 sense and not nonsense must be produced in the mind that considers the definition4 ,perhaps1 however1 our author intends such words as electricity1 or spirit1 or energy4 ,because of the considerations above indicated and others we cannot accept the author's requirements for a logical definition as a whole4 ,some of them are in some of his cases unnecessary1 while taken together they supply no new means whereby to solve the several problems of definition4 ,the author's subjective theory of geometry is plainly the outgrowth of his confidence in the solvent power of the concept of direction as a prime datum of geometry4 ,everything of consequence in his essay depends upon the worth of this concept as a geometrical foundation4 ,considering the disparagement that has been visited upon that concept by numerous writers of good geometrical rank we naturally look for considerations tending to remove the discredit that has befallen that notion4 ,instead however of this we find the most palpable set of circular definitions4 ,direction is defined by direction in the most distracting way1 thus3 87a7 ,a direction may be conceived to be indicated by naming two points as the direction from one to the other40 ,the inaptitude of the term direction for use in geometry is rooted in its ambiguous purport4 ,as commonly used it means at least three distinct but closely associated notions which become confused in thought and expression unless the most solicitous care is taken to distinguish them4 ,when we speak of the direction of one point from another or of the direction from one point to another we mean the straight off-ness or from-ness or to-ness which one bears to the other2 in other words a relation of separation and straight mediation4 ,when again we speak of the direction of a motion we intend the indefinite straight sense of its procession1 which is not a relation but an attribute of the motion4 ,when still again we speak of the direction of a line we mean its straight lay as compared or as comparable with other actual or possible correlates which is again a relation but not necessarily the same relation as that that obtains between two points4 ,in all these meanings the notion of straightness is involved1 and could we say in lieu of straightness first directness and then direction and holding fast in thought this sense of the word1 make a noun of it1 so that a direction would intend the same as a straightness and no more1 it might obtain a useful geometric term and notion4 ,to define it we might first define a line thus3 ,a line is a space boundary that is indefinitely long but not otherwise of any extent4 ,then1 a direction is a line such that between the points that bound any assigned parcel of it no copy of said parcel is possible4 ,but direction purports to our author the second of the meanings above set forth1 namely1 the indefinite straight sense of the procession of a motion4 ,definite parcels of a direction thus understood are identical with vectors4 ,now the notion of straightness is after the notions of point and line the most fundamental one of geometry and the one which is altogether the most prominent and useful4 ,it is the necessary means for any definition of a vector or of the notion which our author deems so important4 ,as straightness is attributable only to lines and long things which a line may represent it makes no difference whether we define straightness or a straight line1 but a masterful performance of this definition is absolutely necessary before the foundations of geometry can be abidingly certified4 ,our author defines a straight line thus3 8,a straight line is a continuous series of points extending from each of them in the same two directions40 ,what kind of a thing a continuous series of points may be we are not told but as a point is defined to be 8a portion of matter so small that for the purpose in hand variations of positions within it may be neglected0 we take it that a straight line is a continuous series of particles of matter4 ,the 8purpose in hand0 in this case must of course be the purpose of geometry4 ,in defining an angle our author first lays down that 8,the difference between two directions is called their inclination to one another0 and then 8,the measure of an inclination is called an angle40 ,considering that it is the doctrine of the author that every straight line has two contrary directions the measure of whose inclination is an angle of one hundred and eighty degrees1 we imagine a northeast southwest line cutting an east west line and wonder if the right hand upper angle is really two angles according to whether or not the directions both pass to the left or both pass to the right or pass one to the left and the other to the right4 ,were this an ordinary work we might regard it as due to the author to notice the many excellencies which characterise it1 in spite of the defects which we notice4 ,but as our author evidently realises1 the eminent dignity of the topic challenges and its singular importance demands unsparing criticism4 ,he who offers to instruct the world on the foundations of geometry draws his sword and throws away the scabbard1 and like a doughty champion he will scorn to accept any favor1 prizing only such success as he shall take at the point of an efficacy of treatment that conquers all competent and candid criticism4 ,stringent as are such terms of contest an author who is a worthy competitor in the field of geometric research can be well content with them in the perception that the very same conditions apply in full force to the comments of his critics4 ,the author is undoubtedly an able man and a close thinker4 ,he has concentrated his mind upon a work that is worth the energy of a lifetime4 ,but we must confess our judgment to be that in spite of his capacity and evident devotion he has come short of the high result to which he has aspired4 4 ,,les ,f,,tes ,,de ,,montpellier4 ,,promenade ,a ,,travers ,,les ,,choses1 ,,les ,,hommes ,,et ,,les ,,idees4 ,by ,j4 ,delbuf4 ,paris3 ,flix ,alcan4 ,we have here a charming narrative by the well-known ,professor at the ,university of ,lige of his visit to the ftes of ,montpellier1 undertaken in great measure to make the personal acquaintance of ,m4 ,dauriac1 the critic in the ,revue ,philosophique of the author's work 8,la matire brute et la matire vivante40 ,the description given of the ftes1 which marked the sixth centenary of the ,university of ,montpellier1 is very entertaining1 as is the account of the journey through the ,south of ,france2 but as ,m4 ,delbuf says that he was more curious to become acquainted with men than with places1 what he tells us about the former will be the more interesting4 ,the author1 with the companions of his tour1 could not pass ,nancy without stopping to see 8the masters in the science of hypnotism0 there4 ,an account of what he saw and heard gives the author the opportunity of repeating 8,that he does not regard forgetfulness on awaking as characteristic of profound hypnosis1 and that experience is against the efficacity of criminal suggestion unless the subject is criminally inclined40 ,the ftes at ,montpellier commenced with a religious service in the ,cathedral1 during which the ,bishop1 ,m4 de ,cabrires1 preached a sermon so liberal in tone1 that ,m4 ,delbuf thinks the time is arriving when the church will demonstrate that ,moses was the precursor of ,darwin4 ,at the ,university reception which followed1 ,m4 ,delbuf sought out among the professors for his friend ,m4 ,dauriac1 whom he had figured when first he heard from him as small1 thin and dark1 but now found1 in accordance with the usual rule in such cases1 that he was tall1 robust and fair4 ,in the course of their subsequent conversations the two ,professors made mutual confidences1 ,m4 ,dauriac confessing that his true vocation was music1 and that he was preparing a work on the psychology of the musician2 while ,m4 ,delbuf informed his friend that he was about to reply to his criticism of 8,la matire brute et la matire vivante10 and that he would throw the greatest light on the origin1 which was still obscure1 of life and death4 ,if the genial ,lige ,professor can do this1 he may be the first to reap the benefit referred to in his own words3 8,the discovery of the cause of death could not fail to assure the immortality of its author and its inspirer1 and sooner or later that of humanity at large40 ,for1 according to a medical adage1 if the cause of a disease is known it is already conquered4 ,montpellier was honored during the ftes with the presence of ,helmholtz1 to whom but for national jealousy would have been confided the part of speaking in the name of the foreign universities4 ,nevertheless he was the true hero of the occasion1 and when at the official reception1 on the ,president of the ,republic shaking his hand and saying a few gracious words someone feebly hissed1 ,helmholtz received in response a perfect ovation of applause4 ,m4 ,delbuf met with a congenial spirit in the ,professor of ,zoology1 ,m4 ,sabatier1 who has a laboratory at ,cette4 ,their views on free-will were in sympathy4 ,they agreed in allowing freedom not only to the superior animals1 and to inferior animals and plants1 but even to so called inorganic matter4 ,m4 ,sabatier is a ,christian and at the same time a convinced transformist2 having arrived at his views from religious considerations4 ,he cited ,m4 ,dauriac as saying1 8,the reign of determinism is not in the objective world2 its empire extends itself over nature only after having been exercised over thought4 ,there is no other necessity than that of logic or mathematics40 ,m4 ,delbuf is evidently an 8indeterminist0 by nature4 ,he heartily sympathised with the students in all their demonstrations of freedom1 although one of them assumed a somewhat serious character4 ,dining in the open air with ,m4 ,milhaud the author of an article in the ,revue ,philosophique on non-,euclidian geometry1 he was prepared to talk mathematics4 ,the surroundings were too much for him1 however1 and in recalling the scene he cries1 8,to the devil with philosophy and mathematics6 ,i cannot recall what we said2 in my remembrances1 ,i see only blooming faces1 ,i hear only the indistinct bursts of gaity40 ,m4 ,delbuf's sympathetic nature is shown in the fact1 which he records1 that wild animals in confinement soon become familiar with him4 ,one of the principal objects of the author's journey was to see ,m4 ,gabriel ,tarde1 8one of the most prolific and original publicists in ,france1 if not in ,europe10 who resides at ,sarlat4 ,after quoting passages from an article of ,m4 ,tarde on ,social ,darwinism1 which appeared in the ,revue ,philosophique1 ,m4 ,delbuf remarks that nothing is more attractive and at the same time more fatiguing than the reading of his works4 ,m4 ,tarde is 8the locomotive that carries you to the end of your journey across countries by turns wild1 agricultural1 industrial1 picturesque2 but without giving you time to regard and admire40 ,referring to ,m4 ,tarde's acute criticisms of ,lombroso and his theories1 the author says1 8,it is not that he strikes the pseudo-thinker with formidable blows1 but he makes him drop gently to the ground40 ,the ,french publicist sees in imitation the source of social life1 and he has been long engaged in developing the idea1 to the great importance of which ,m4 ,delbuf bears witness2 although he objects to the use which ,m4 ,tarde makes of terms taken from mathematics1 physics1 and biology1 to express his sociological views4 ,on the question of free-will there was no agreement4 ,although the latter is a determinist1 he believes in penal responsibility1 on the ground of personal identity2 the diseased person or the madman is no longer himself1 in which they differ from the criminal4 ,we can say nothing of ,m4 ,delbuf's visit to the canons of the ,tarn4 ,here was captured a lizard which displayed1 when compared with a ,spanish lizard in captivity with it1 as much difference in character as could be found between two men chosen at hazard4 ,the author concludes an amusing description of the habits of the two captives by recommending their history to the politicians and the historians of ,france and ,spain1 as likely to throw light on that of the peoples themselves4 ,we leave ,m4 ,delbuf1 whose book of seventy-five pages may be said to be as full of interesting matter as an egg is of meat1 with quoting his postscript3 8,on the day that these lines appear 7,march #ahia7 the ,spanish lizard has finally cast off his savage character and follows in the footsteps of the ,french4 ,effect of imitation40 4 ,,der ,,positivismus ,,vom ,,tode ,,august ,,comte',s ,,bis ,,auf ,,unsere ,,tage 7#aheg-ahia74 ,by ,hermann ,gruber1 ,s4 ,j4 ,freiburg im ,breisgau3 ,herder'sche ,verlagshandlung4 #ahia4 ,this pamphlet of #aid pages is the continuation of another pamphlet on ,august ,comte1 the founder of ,positivism1 which was reviewed in ,the ,open ,court1 ,no4 #acd4 ,the author is a ,jesuit and it is a matter of course that all the facts he relates1 all the doctrines he explains are represented from the standpoint of ,roman ,catholicism4 ,the booklet is of great importance in so far as we learn through it what an erudite ,catholic mind thinks of that recent movement of philosophy which has been called by the collective name ,positivism4 ,the method pursued by ,hermann ,gruber is most recommendable4 ,he states facts and quotes abundantly so as to let the various philosophers speak for themselves4 ,he is economical with the salt of his own opinion1 yet he uses it with such a discretion that ,roman ,catholics can become thoroughly acquainted with infidel views without suffering in their faith4 ,the book consists of two parts3 7,i7 ,the ,positivism of the schools in connection with ,comte and of the ,positivistic movement outside of these schools4 ,the first part begins with a discussion of ,littr4 ,littr1 8the voice1 the spirit and the soul of ,positivism10 as ,bourdon calls him1 is characterised as a philological genius4 ,although he had chosen the medical profession1 which however he abandoned early1 and although he regarded the propaganda of the positive philosophy as his life-work1 all his talents lay in the direction of special investigation in the literary1 historical1 and linguistic fields1 and the editing of the ,french dictionary remains his main achievement4 ,comte had not nominated a successor who should in his place be the ,directeur du positivisme4 ,littr had forfeited this honor on account of his quarrels with ,comte in which he strongly sided with ,madame ,comte against her husband4 ,after ,comte's death ,p4 ,lafitte was elected as a temporary director and he has kept this office ever since1 which he conducts with remarkable devotion and unselfishness4 ,although without property himself he proposed not to use the positivistic funds until he had shown himself through his work worthy of using them4 ,he ekes out a scanty living for himself by giving lessons in mathematics1 and devotes all the rest of his time to the management of and the propaganda for the ,positive ,church4 ,his co-workers are ,audiffrent1 ,antoine1 ,robinet1 and others--all of them as the reviewer thinks strange people1 visionary enthusiasts1 and1 to use an expressive ,americanism1 regular cranks4 ,lack of space prevents us from recapitulating their ceremonies1 their sacraments1 festivals1 pilgrimages1 memorials1 and other forms of service4 ,their whole behavior proves that they are and will remain infidel ,roman ,catholics and it would have been wiser if they had not left the church at all4 ,the positivistic orthodoxy culminates in the positivistic mystery of ,comte's idea of a 8,virgin-,mother0 7,vierge-,mre7 which according to ,lafitte is destined to elevate the intercourse between the sexes1 while ,audiffrent1 ,lagarrigue1 and the ,brasilian ,lemos stick closely to ,comte's view 8to represent positivism as directly conceived under the ,utopia of a virgin-mother40#bb ,general ,lemos goes so far as to say 8,we prefer to be looked upon with ,st4 ,paul for the sake of our faithfulness toward ,comte as fools than to be praised by the contemporary frivolity as sages40 ,and ,audiffrent defends against ,lafitte the diplomatic action of ,comte's with the ,general of the ,jesuits concerning an alliance between ,positivism and ,catholicism4 ,positivism1 he says1 invites all who have ceased to believe in ,god to become positivists1 but it induces all those who still believe in ,god to turn ,catholics1 thus making an alliance possible of the disciplined against the non-disciplined4 ,if the ,jesuit ,general ever has seriously considered the offer1 he would perhaps have accepted it1 for there is no doubt that he would have made the better bargain as all the discipline we should say is on his side4 ,the ,english group of ,comtean ,positivists consists mainly of ,fr4 ,harrison1 ,richard ,congreve1 ,george ,eliot and ,james ,cotter ,morison4 ,the second part of the book which treats of the positivistic movement outside of the positivistic schools in ,england1 ,france1 ,germany and other countries will be less interesting to ,english and ,american readers partly because the subject is better known to them partly because our author is apparently more familiar with his ,french than with his ,english sources4 ,the second part begins with ,john ,stuart ,mill and ,herbert ,spencer4 ,it mentions ,bain1 ,lewes1 ,clifford1 ,maudsley1 ,darwin1 ,sully1 ,romanes1 ,huxley1 ,tyndall4 ,clifford's view is sketched in sixteen lines but in such a way that it appears grotesque4 ,as ,french positivists outside the schools are mentioned ,taine1 ,ribot1 ,fouille1 ,guyau1 ,charles ,richet1 ,j4 ,luys1 ,cl4 ,bernard1 and ,roberty4 ,it is correctly said of ,ribot that his doctrine of personality is most characteristic of his views4 ,the unity of a personality in the ego does not grow from above downwards but from below upwards1 but ,gruber is mistaken in saying of ,charles ,richet1 the editor of the ,revue ,scientifique1 that he represents about the same views as ,th4 ,ribot4 ,richet's publication on telepathic experiments in which he confidently believes1 would never be countenanced by ,ribot4 ,as the first ,german positivist is mentioned ,eugen ,dhring4 ,riehl1 ,laas1 ,lange1 ,vaihinger and ,avenarius are disposed of together in the next following chapter4 ,several pages are devoted to ,wundt4 ,the little chapter headed ,nord-,america 7p4 #aga7 consisting of two and a half pages begins with the words3 8,according to the testimony of ,g4 ,stanley ,hall philosophy in the new world is in its swaddling-clothes still 7in den ,kinderschuhen74 ,philosophers over there are as rare as snakes in ,ireland 7,schlangen in ,norwegen74#bc ,for scientific instruction in the ,united ,states are used as guiding stars ,spencer1 ,lewes1 ,darwin1 ,huxley1 and ,haeckel40 ,as a representative ,atheist is named ,ludeking1 a man unknown to fame1 while ,colonel ,ingersoll is not mentioned at all4 ,it is maintained that ,j4 ,d4 ,bell1 a professor in ,new ,york had proclaimed the same confession of faith as ,comte in ,the ,modern ,thinker--a journal which we have never seen nor ever heard of4 ,the societies for ethical culture are characterised as avowing 8a purely natural religion0 while in fact natural religion1 the religion of science and philosophy1 as a basis of ethics is as rigorously rejected by ,professor ,adler as any dogmatic religion1 and more than half of the two and a half pages is filled with a masonic proclamation of the ,sovereign ,grand ,commander1 ,albert ,pike1 of ,washington1 which preaches the belief in an unknowable ,god and denounces ,atheism4 ,the booklet closes with the following sentences3 8,the full and true positivism is embodied in the ,catholic ,church4 ,the divine revelation which she represents is that which is truly real 444 truly sure 444 truly precise 444 truly organic 444 truly useful4 ,the deepest root1 however1 and the most essential nature of all true positivism 7this is vouched for by reason as well as by revelation7 is not the relative but the absolute40 ,here we conclude our review of the book4 ,we have however to add a few words which concern ,the ,monist as well as all the publications of ,the ,open ,court ,publishing ,co4 ,hermann ,gruber mentions in his book ,the ,open ,court and its editor together with the societies for ethical culture4 ,we have1 ourselves1 characterised our views as positivism and as monism1 but we stated at the same time that our positivism had nothing to do with ,comte or with any one of ,comte's disciples4#bd ,they have 7with the sole exception of ,ribot and ,i should hesitate to call him a ,comtean7 contributed little if anything to the formation of our views4 ,the name ,positivism is a good and expressive word and we have adopted it because taken in its proper meaning it represents the true principle of modern philosophy4 ,however we cannot agree with any of the fundamental tenets either of ,comte or of his most positivistic and most scientific disciple ,littr4#be ,comte as well as ,littr are radical agnostics they repeat again and again that 8,we can know nothing about first and final causes4 ,positive philosophy denies nothing and maintains nothing40 ,according to our view of the subject this attitude is rather negativism than positivism4 ,but it is not even negativism2 it is worse1 it is mere scepticism leading to indifferentism4 ,it sounds very philosophical to speak of the inscrutability of first and final causes but the very terms 8first causes0 and 8final causes0 are most nonsensical and self-contradictory concepts4 7,see 8,fundamental ,problems10 pp4 #hh-ij1 and #aja47 ,comte and ,littr imagine to have conquered metaphysics1 but in fact they are the worst kind of metaphysicians4 ,they believe in the ghosts of metaphysics as strongly as some medival minds believe in devils but are afraid to wrestle with them1 because1 as they maintain these metaphysical ghosts cannot be conquered4 ,comtean ,positivism1 especially as it is represented by ,littr1 consists mainly if not exclusively of the doctrine to 8let metaphysics alone0 7which latter includes the object of religious worship7 and limits science to positive issues4 ,thus the oneness of the sciences1 a unitary world-conception is lost1 for the hierarchy of the sciences which are to serve as a substitute for philosophy is rather a summing up of the stock of knowledge than a system of the sciences exhibiting their organic growth4 ,it is an inventory rather than a plan to guide science in its further evolution4 ,it is an anatomy rather than a physiology1 for the very life and spirit of the sciences is missing4 ,and outside the pale of the hierarchy of the sciences there is looming around an awful something quite different in its nature1 like an infinite ocean surrounding a forlorn island1 the unknowable first and final causes6 ,that which is called by former philosophers 8metaphysics10 which is at the same time the essence of religion1 is by no means either unknowable or indifferent4 ,it is not something beyond1 something extramundane1 it is the very life of the world and our religious and philosophical opinions are not only of a theoretical interest4 ,they are the main factors of our lives which in the long run will determine the direction of our development4 ,that this is so1 has not been sufficiently recognised1 and we would suggest in this connection that a history of the ,united ,states should be written to point out that the political liberty of the country and its republicanism are nothing but the application of its religious principles and of the ,puritan conviction of religious independence4 ,the historic growth of the colonies remained faithful to this maxim4 ,the religion of a man and of a nation is the most important thing4 ,in the same way the structure of a seed predetermines the whole plant1 and the angle of crystallisation together with the shape of the crystal-nucleus from which the process of crystallisation starts1 will determine the formation of the whole crystal4 ,his sceptical attitude led ,littr to what he and his friends call 8tolerance40 ,littr's wife was a devout ,catholic and his daughter was educated in her mother's faith4 ,he had intended to explain to her his views of the subject when she had reached maturity1 and leave the choice to her4 ,but when the moment came1 he declared that 8the experiment was not worth the tears which it would cause40 ,our view of 8tolerance0 is radically different4 ,whatever the truth may be it should be struggled for1 cost it ever so many tears or pains4 ,we cannot sympathise with ,littr's method of constructing ethics upon the nutritive and sexual instincts1 the former producing egotism1 the latter altruism4 ,emotions are1 says ,littr1 as much as ideas1 the result of brain-processes in consequence of external impressions and 8the struggle between both kinds of emotion make up the moral life40 ,littr rejects the evolution theory and its attempts to explain ethics4 7,see ,gruber's book p4 #bj47 ,having explained our views of ethics on other occasions1 it is sufficient here to state that we consider ,littr's attempt as a failure4 ,we cannot even adopt the so-called 8positive method10 of which ,littr says3 8,whoever adopts this method is a positivist and whether he acknowledges the fact or not1 also a disciple of ,comte4 ,whoever employs another method is a metaphysician4 ,it is the surest mark by which a careful mind will discriminate what belongs to the positive philosophy and what is foreign to it40 ,what is this method8 ,says ,littr3 8,it is an acknowledged principle of positive science that nothing real can be stated through reasoning 7raisonnement74 ,the world cannot be guessed40 ,littr is opposed to so-called a priori arguments4 ,hermann ,gruber says in the preface3 8,this positive method is embraced by all the representatives of the lines of thought here discussed4 ,all of them intend to build up their systems with the exclusion of scholastic1 respectively of ,kantian1 ,hegelian1 or any a priori speculations after purely #8scientific' methods upon the foundation of the facts of experience40 ,we certainly intend to build our world conception 8upon the facts of experience0 but the most important facts among them are their formal relations and these formal relations when represented in thought are exactly that element which ,kant called a priori4 ,the sense-element affords us the building stones1 but the a priori element represents the mortar without which we could not build4 ,so much do we oppose this one-sided philosophy which takes its stand upon what is wrongly called the purely scientific method1 that our views have been called the ,philosophy of ,form1 and justly1 for ,form is that feature of the world which makes of it a cosmos and formal thought is the organ of our comprehension4 4 ,,ueber ,,den ,,associativen ,,verlauf ,,der ,,vorstellungen4 ,inaugural-,dissertation4 ,by ,e4 ,w4 ,scripture1 ,m4 ,a41 ,fellow of ,clark ,university4 ,leipzig3 ,wilhelm ,engelmann4 #ahia4 ,this essay of #ajb pages characterises most excellently some of the proceedings and methods of ,professor ,wundt's psychological laboratory4 ,the author1 a disciple of ,wundt1 is a native ,american who studied in ,berlin1 ,zrich1 and ,leipzig1 and took his degree of ,doctor on the ground of this dissertation4 ,the object of the treatise is not so much to solve as to formulate the problem of the associative course of concepts1 and the author hopes that in a future treatise he will be able to propound his theory based upon the facts here related4 ,the experiments were made with the assistance of seven friends1 among them ,german students1 a doctor of philosophy1 a doctor of medicine1 and a teacher4 ,they were of different nationality1 three ,germans1 one ,belgian1 one ,japanese1 one ,englishman from the ,cape1 and two ,americans1 the author included4 ,the apparatus used was so arranged that the person operated upon sat in the dark1 before him was a plate of ground glass intercepting from a camera an image which was exposed for four seconds4 ,pictures of all kinds1 colors1 and plainly printed words were used4 ,for other sense-impressions the observer was also seated in the dark4 ,several instruments for producing sounds were ready on a table4 ,tastes were effected by liquids which the person operated upon had to drink1 and the sense of touch was investigated through handing him cards to which some small objects had been attached4 ,the author was partly operator1 partly observer1 i4 e4 the person operated upon4 ,the ideas evoked through the sense-impressions produced in this way1 are enumerated in tabular form in the order in which they arose4 ,among the experiments made in this way we find one kind which is of special interest4 ,sir ,william ,hamilton made the remark in his ,lectures on ,metaphysics that unconscious ideas may serve as connecting links between two ideas otherwise unassociated4 ,he represented his view in the following way3 ,let ,a1 ,b1 ,c1 be three ideas1 ,a does not suggest ,c1 but both are associated with ,b4 ,it happens that ,a is directly followed by ,c in consciousness4 ,in such a case ,a may recall ,b and ,b may recall ,c1 but ,b being a minimum visibile or minimum audibile does not enter consciousness4 ,thus the idea of the mount ,ben ,lomond called into ,hamilton's mind the system of ,prussian education4 ,subsequent reflection taught him that he had met on ,ben ,lomond a ,german4 ,the recollection of the place was associated with the ideas--a ,german1 ,germany1 ,prussia4 ,these ideas were too weak to enter consciousness yet they reawakened another idea which did enter consciousness1 the system of ,prussian education4 ,this is a mere suggestion of ,hamilton's but ,dr4 ,scripture proved its truth by actual experiment4 ,he took cards containing some simple words1 such as ,,mensch1 ,,gehen1 ,,kommen1 ,,blume1 etc41 and also ,japanese words in ,roman characters ,,hana1 ,,hito1 ,,iuku1 ,,kuru4 ,to every word was attached another ,japanese word in ,japanese characters so that the same character appeared on ,,hana and ,,blume2 ,,hito and ,,mensch2 ,,juku and ,,gehen2 ,,kuru and ,,kommen4 ,the words were shown twice so as to give a stronger impression4 ,the ,japanese gentleman was excluded from these experiments1 and indeed1 the unknown ,japanese characters which were only dimly or not at all remembered1 evoked the corresponding words3 ,,hito--,,mensch2 ,,kuru--,,kommen2 ,,blume--,,hana1 etc4 ,dr4 ,scripture adds3 8,these associations were involuntary1 the observer imagined them to be wrong1 and could find no reason for the involuntary appearance of the words4 ,he had not thought at all of the connecting links40 ,it appears that the links in a chain of concepts need not be all conscious and the result of his experiments in this line is formulated by ,dr4 ,scripture as follows3 ,a concept apperceived can bring another concept into the focus of consciousness although it was never associated with it1 if there are other psychic elements of lower degrees or even outside of consciousness which are connected with both--provided that there are no other elements stronger than these4 ,the effect of the unconscious link however is much weaker than that which was conscious4 ,pages #ga-aja are devoted to the investigations of the after-effect of concepts4 ,the phenomena of ideation being extremely complex1 we cannot assume that the process of a so-called reproduced concept is analogous to the original idea4 ,a sensation changes during its presence with reference to the degree of consciousness of its parts and even the concepts as a whole may be altered4 ,the process is different according to circumstances4 ,the renewed concepts differ from their originals1 7#a7 in the degree of the consciousness of the whole idea1 7#b7 in the degree of the consciousness of its parts among themselves1 7#c7 in form1 color1 relations1 etc41 7#d7 in duration4 ,in order to avoid the metaphysical influence of hypothetical theories we ought to avoid all kinds of terms suggestive of a theory and stick closely to a simple description of facts4 ,therefore ,dr4 ,scripture proposes to discard such words as 8retention1 reproduction1 revival10 etc41 and suggests the term 8after-effect40 ,yet he adds1 quoting from ,wundt1 8these after-effects themselves are as little ideas as the effects produced upon nerves and muscles by exercise can be called actions of will40 ,dr4 ,scripture avoids explaining what he conceives these after-effects to be4 ,we see no reason for disagreement and should say that the result of the after-effects is what generally goes by the name of 8disposition40 ,and a certain disposition is produced according to the law of the conservation of form in living structures4 7,see 8,the ,soul of ,man10 pp4 #dah-dbd47 ,dr4 ,scripture is led by a consideration of his observations to the following statement3 8,each concept is conditioned through the effects of the elements of the present state of consciousness and the after-effects of many 7if not of all7 previous elements of consciousness40 ,this result is not compatible with the theory of reproduction now almost universally accepted by the association-psychology4 ,wundt says3 8,if only certain single concepts were renewed1 we might perhaps explain why in the memory-picture certain elements of a former reproduction are missing3 but we could not explain why the elements of a concept change so often qualitatively as is indeed the case4 ,this1 it appears1 is possible only because a memory-picture and others of a kindred nature affect each other mutually40 ,this will find explanation in the following experiment4 ,the observer sees a dog1 and thinks of a circus1 which he saw a year ago4 ,there is no direct association between the picture of the dog and the special reminiscence of that circus visited a year ago4 ,the association was formed at the moment4 ,former sensations of dogs had their after-effects and this special reminiscence was localised4 ,dr4 ,scripture maintains that ,hffding's association theory contains too many hypothetical elements2 it presupposes faculties of the soul to join like with like and to combine simultaneous or consecutive events4 4 ,,footnotes3 #bb 444 8,a represnter le positivisme comme directement rsumm par l'utopie de la ,vierge-,mre0--,comte to ,audiffrent1 the #hth of ,st4 ,paul #fi 7,may #bh1 #aheg47 #bc ,good philosophers1 it is true1 are rare in ,america1 perhaps rarer than in ,europe4 ,nevertheless the interest in philosophy is exceedingly strong here4 ,there are metaphysical and philosophical clubs all over the country1 and the crop of philosophical dilettanti is at least as great on this side of the ,atlantic as in ,paris4 #bd ,it is a matter of course that we are in strong sympathy with many philosophers and scientists whom ,hermann ,gruber classes among the positivists outside of the positivistic schools1 not only ,th4 ,ribot1 but also ,guyau1 ,fouille1 ,roberty1 and others4 ,how much they were influenced by the ,comte-,littr or the ,comte-,lafitte ,positivism is difficult to say4 ,it is certain that many of them would have accomplished the same work in the same way with or without ,comte4 ,roberty was first a fervid disciple of ,comte1 but he soon combated not only ,comte's law of the three stages 7which latter by the bye was according to ,schaarschmidt first pronounced by ,turgot7 but also his agnosticism1 declaring that ,comte was still entangled in metaphysicism1 and that the last bulwark1 the idea of the unknowable1 had to be conquered also4 #be ,we publish in this number a sonnet by ,louis ,belrose1 ,jr4 to mile ,littr4 ,mr4 ,belrose is a positivist who attended together with ,mr4 ,fred4 ,harrison positivistic lectures in ,france4 ,we publish ,mr4 ,belrose's poem as an expression of his gratitude and admiration toward a master mind but not as an expression of our view of ,littr4 ,,periodicals4 ,,mind4 ,july1 #ahia4 ,no4 ,,lxiii4 ,,contents3 ,,the ,,problem ,,of ,,psychology4 ,by ,e4 ,w4 ,scripture4 ,,the ,,physical ,,basis ,,of ,,pleasure ,,and ,,pain4 ,i4 ,by ,h4 ,r4 ,marshall4 ,,schopenhauer',s ,,criticism ,,of ,,kant4 ,by ,w4 ,caldwell4 ,,discussion3 ,on the ,origin of ,music4 7#a7 ,by ,r4 ,wallaschek2 7#b7 ,by ,prof4 ,j4 ,mc,k4 ,cattell2 ,the ,coefficient of ,external ,reality4 ,by ,prof4 ,j4 ,mark ,baldwin4 ,,critical ,,notices3 ,james's 8,the ,principles of ,psychology02 ,pfleiderer's 8,development of ,theology in ,germany02 ,keynes's 8,scope and ,method of ,political ,economy02 ,lehmann's 8,die ,hypnose und die damit verwandten normalen ,zustnde40 ,as all sciences treat1 to a great extent1 of the same objects1 they can be separated only according to how they treat things4 ,on this principle1 ,mr4 ,scripture divides sciences into ,special ,sciences1 ,general or ,philosophical ,sciences1 and ,didactic ,sciences4 ,the ,special sciences are1 ,i1 the ,mathematical ,sciences1 treating the forms of all experience2 ,,ii1 the ,phenomenal ,sciences1 treating of the contents of all experience2 the second class is divided into the ,physical ,sciences1 which treat experience from its objective side1 and ,mental ,sciences1 which treat experience from its subjective side4 ,the group of ,mental ,sciences is best divided1 according to ,wundt's scheme1 into the sciences of mental processes1 ,psychological ,sciences2 the sciences of mental products1 ,philological ,sciences2 and the ,sciences of mental development1 ,historical ,sciences4 ,psychology as a science of mental phenomena has a two-fold relation to the physical sciences3 it is complementary to them1 a necessary auxiliary2 they are complementary to it1 accessories in psychological investigation4 ,states of mind always remain states of mind2 they cannot be resolved into motions of particles of matter1 and it is a fundamental axiom that mental phenomena cannot influence or be influenced by material phenomena4 ,but we are justified in talking about a nervous stimulation becoming a percept1 a muscular contraction following an act of will1 as long as we remember that these are only substitutes for unknown quantities4 ,physiology investigates nervous changes2 ,psychology1 mental changes2 ,physiological ,psychology1 the relations between the two4 ,mental phenomena are of two kinds1 mental processes and mental products4 ,psychology is the science of mental processes2 it seeks the exact description and explanation of the operations of our inner experience4 ,the relation of ,psychology to ,philosophy is a burning question4 ,metaphysics1 or ,philosophy in the narrower sense1 seeks from the agreement of the results of all other sciences to establish a system of the principles that underlie all existence1 i4 e4 a theory of the universe1 material and mental4 ,after the general principles have been determined by metaphysics1 philosophy has the duty of correcting the special sciences when they set up one-sided hypotheses1 and of helping where they are unable to proceed alone4 ,psychology is considered a part of philosophy1 but as a special science1 treating mental processes from its own standpoint1 it is distinct from psychology as a general science treating mind1 relations of mind and matter1 etc41 from the standpoint of philosophy4 ,the latter should be termed ,philosophical ,psychology4 ,the relation of ,psychology to ,logic depends on what the latter is4 ,logic is a science of thought1 but thought is also a subject of psychology4 ,psychology treats thoughts as we think them2 ,logic1 as we ought to think them4 ,each of the sciences1 ,epistemology1 the doctrine of knowledge1 and ,methodology1 the doctrine of methods1 treats of thought for its own distinct purpose4 ,the former determines what the truth is2 the latter determines how we ought to think4 ,the didactic sciences are of two kinds3 the sciences of the general principles or ends to be obtained1 and the sciences of the means to attain these ends4 ,among the former is ,general ,pedagogy1 which determines the ends to be sought for in education4 ,psychology furnishes the foundation of fact2 the science of general pedagogy judges which of these facts are desirable1 in much the same way as epistemology judges which are true4 ,in a former article 7,mind ,no4 #ef7 ,mr4 ,marshall showed that ,pleasure and ,pain are primitive qualities which1 under proper conditions1 may appear with any psychosis1 whatever be its content4 ,he now finds that all the most notable pleasure-pain theories may in the first instance be placed in four groups1 determined by the emphasis of certain kinds of pleasure or pain4 ,an examination of pleasure-pain theories shows1 first that there is a general agreement1 with but few dissenting voices1 that all pleasure is at bottom the same thing1 and that all pain in its essence is a single psychological phenomenon1 and further that pleasures and pains are unifiable2 second1 that there are certain facts so marked in experience as to have become the basis of the majority of pleasure-pain theories4 ,mr4 ,marshall proceeds to consider the theory that 8the activity of the organ of any content if efficient is pleasurable1 if inefficient is painful40 ,he concludes that pleasures and pains are involved with the nutritive conditions of the active organ1 and lays down the principle that 8all pleasure-pain phenomena are determined by the action in the organs concomitant of the conscious state1 as related to the nutritive conditions of the organs at the time of the action40 ,the difference between the hypernormality of pain and of pleasure1 turns upon the fact that pleasure is obtained where the organ has been rested4 ,rest in an organ which is sometimes active means storage of energy derived from blood supply2 and action after rest means the use of stored energy4 ,but as action of an organ after rest gives a psychic content which is pleasurable1 we have the working hypothesis3 8,pleasure is experienced wherever the physical action which determines the content involves the use of stored force--the resolution of potential into actual energy2 or1 in other words1 whenever the energy involved in the reaction to a stimulus is greater in amount than the energy of the stimulus40 ,by a similar process of reasoning we obtain the hypothesis3 8,pain is experienced whenever the physical action which determines the content is so related to the supply of nutriment that the energy involved in the reaction to the stimulus is less in amount than the energy of the stimulus40 ,we may also say in general1 8,pleasure and pain are primitive qualities of psychic states which are determined by the relation between activity and capacity in the organs1 the activities of which are concomitants of the psychosis40 ,mr4 ,marshall then supplies the psychological interpretation of the physiological phenomena attendant on the pleasures of ,rest and of ,relief1 and of the pain of ,obstruction or hindered activity4 ,he concludes the present article with the statement that the physical concomitants of pleasure-pain phenomena are to be found in general qualities common to all processes which are at the basis of our conscious life2 and that this is corroborated by introspective analysis of pleasures and pains4 ,mr4 ,marshall's idea does not appear to us as a happy solution of the problem4 ,the object of ,mr4 ,caldwell's paper is to explain ,kantism through ,schopenhauer1 who claimed to be ,kant's only true successor in philosophy4 ,schopenhauer came to the conclusion that ,kant's only real discovery1 given in the 8sthetic10 was that ,space and ,time were known by us a priori4 ,the principle of ,causality is the only element of value he finds in the 8,analytic10 and a much simpler account could have been given of it4 ,the 8,dialectic0 represents the ,negative side of the ,critical ,philosophy1 which although conclusive1 might have been stated more simply4 ,in ,ethics ,kant rendered the immortal service of showing1 by his attribution of a noumenal freedom to man1 compensating for his phenomenal necessary determination1 8that the kingdom of virtue is not of this world02 although the ,k4 d4 prakt4 ,v4 is only an application to ethics of the principles already reached in the sphere of the ,pure ,reason4 ,schopenhauer finds the ,k4 d4 ,urtheilskraft to contain the characteristic defect of ,kant's whole ,philosophy--the starting from indirect instead of direct knowledge4 ,lastly1 the criticism of the ,teleological ,judgment only shows what the ,k4 d4 r4 ,v4 already showed1 the subjectivity of what we may call the ontological categories4 ,according to ,schopenhauer1 the chief tendency of the ,kantian philosophy is to establish 8the total diversity of the real and the ideal40 ,the ,ideal he explains as 8the visible1 spatial appearance with the qualities that are perceived on it10 and the ,real as the 8thing-in-and-for-itself10 which is the reality underlying and determining the world of experience1 and1 as such1 a real and not a hypothetical entity4 ,schopenhauer never speaks of it in the plural1 as ,kant does1 and so keeps consistently to a monistic point of view4 ,he says1 8,the way in which ,kant introduced such a thing-in-itself and sought to reconcile it with his philosophy was faulty40 ,this concerns ,kant's method1 against which ,schopenhauer directs the full force of his criticism4 ,the fundamental principle of ,kant's method ,schopenhauer takes to be the starting from indirect reflective knowledge3 ,philosophy is for ,kant a science of conceptions1 while for himself it is a science in conceptions2 philosophy being a conceptualised or generalised statement of our knowledge4 ,schopenhauer sees all ,kant's errors contained in the following sentence from the ,k4 d4 r4 ,v43 8,if ,i take away all thought0 7through the categories71 8from empirical knowledge1 there remains absolutely no knowledge of an object1 for through mere perceptions nothing at all is thought40 ,in endeavoring to construct a philosophy out of pure conceptions ,kant failed to solve the problem1 in having the thing-in-itself left on his hands4 ,this proved to ,schopenhauer that the path of abstract reflection was closed as the path of philosophy4 ,mr4 ,caldwell demurs to ,schopenhauer's statement that the 8sthetic0 is ,kant's only discovery1 yet as the 8sthetic0 shows the tendency to conceptual abstraction1 his view of ,space and ,time is of extreme importance4 ,it is of the 8,logic0 of the ,k4 d4 r4 ,v4 that ,schopenhauer's criticism is materially and formally most radical4 ,he gives a different account of the functions of the ,soul1 rejecting altogether the faculty-distinctions of ,kant3 he associates ,kant's faculty of ,understanding more with ,sense and the category of ,cause with the spatio-temporal or perceptual construction of the world1 and holds the other eleven categories to be mere blind windows put into a scheme through ,kant's love of symmetry2 and1 secondly1 he holds ,kant's account of ,reason to be utterly false1 and substitutes his own doctrine of the thing-in-itself for ,kant's three ,ideas of ,reason4 ,by ,reason ,schopenhauer means the power the mind has of forming general conceptions and of knowing by way of conception or idea1 the matter for conceptions and ideas being of course derived from ,perception4 ,reasoned knowledge is an abstraction from perceived knowledge1 and all knowledge1 as ,schopenhauer says1 is originally and in itself perceptive4 ,the confusion in ,kant's account of the elements entering into knowledge1 is ,schopenhauer's reason for holding that ,kant can only have had the fundamental principle of his method imperfectly present to his mind4 ,his whole difficulty in relating the elements of knowledge to each other arose from the fact that he in his thought likened the categories to conceptions through want of an explicit and persistent recognition of the nature of conception4 ,schopenhauer himself classifies the categories according to the planes or stages of experience they characterise3 the perceptual1 the mathematical1 the logical1 and the ethical in order4 ,the categories are all abstractions1 but not conceptions or notions4 ,conceptions are a particular kind of abstractions1 and so are categories3 to conceptions material entities correspond1 but to categories only relations or forms4 ,knowledge consists in the detection of relations existing between the different planes or sections of the perceptual continuum1 the difference in perceived things being that some are immediately and others only mediately perceived4 ,the true reason of ,schopenhauer's revolt from the method of conceptions is to be found in the difficulties in which he felt himself involved by the theory of ,subjective ,idealism4 ,philosophy1 he says1 is a search for the ,thing-in-itself1 but he tells ,kant that from the idea nothing but the idea follows1 and that the path of ,reflexion or ,knowledge is closed as the path of philosophy4 ,had ,schopenhauer kept more true to his ruling that knowledge is originally and in itself perception1 he would not have maintained that the world is my idea4 ,the ,thing-in-itself is the shadow cast by the ,reflective or ,abstracting ,understanding4 ,with both ,kant and ,schopenhauer it is primarily invented to get rid of the difficulty bred of a belief in an abstraction or unreality1 and as it is a pure mental fiction1 we may safely deny that there is any such thing in reality4 ,mr4 ,wallaschek finds the origin of music in a rhythmical impulse in man4 ,the sense of rhythm arises from the general appetite for exercise1 which recurs in rhythmical form owing to sociological as well as psychological conditions4 ,on the one hand1 there is the social character of primitive music1 compelling a number of performers to act in concert4 ,on the other hand1 our perception of time-relations involves a process of intellection1 by means of which the mind is able to comprehend them as a whole4 ,since music is produced not merely as an auditory impression and expression1 but also in order to evoke reflexion1 it must contain the qualities of time-order and rhythm4 ,mr4 ,herbert ,spencer's theory of the origin of the general appetite for exercise is said to afford the most valid explanation4 ,it is the surplus vigor in more highly evolved organisms1 exceeding what is required for immediate needs1 in which play of all kinds takes its rise4 ,we owe our musical faculty to the time-sense rather than to our sense of hearing4 ,the perception of particular tones and tunes plays a very low part1 if any1 in primitive music4 ,in almost all the examples furnished by ethnology1 we see that music is the expression of emotion1 which is also one of the sources of human language4 ,mr4 ,spencer is said to be wrong1 however1 in thinking that musical modulation originates in the modulations of speech ,music and speech have a reciprocal influence1 and primitive human utterance1 using sound-metaphors and onomatopia1 may resemble primitive musical tones4 ,nevertheless1 an early separation of distinct tones and indistinct sounds seems to have taken place1 not as a transition from the one as prior to the other as succeeding1 but as a divergence from a primitive state which is1 strictly speaking1 neither of the two4 ,professor ,cattell objects that the theories of ,darwin and ,spencer on the origin of music1 describe what probably took place1 rather than explain why it was necessary that it should have taken place4 ,as to ,spencer's explanation of harmony1 he affirms that it amounts to saying that harmony gives pleasure because it is pleasant4 ,after referring to the connection of harmony with the existence of overtones1 ,prof4 ,cattell states that music is not1 as commonly supposed1 a creation of the imagination1 freer than the other arts from a physical basis1 but is rather a discovery and a development4 ,all the combinations of music are latent in the sounds ,of nature1 and the history of music bears witness to the gradual adoption of such as are more remote4 ,the difference in voices rests on the overtones present1 and the immense emotional effects of music are due to the fact that music expresses the emotion of the human voice1 using and developing those combinations of tones which the voice uses when moved by sorrow and joy1 despair and exultation4 ,by the ,coefficient of ,external ,reality1 ,professor ,baldwin means the something which attaches to some presentations in virtue of which we attribute reality to them2 while others1 not having the coefficient1 are discredited4 ,diametrically opposed solutions of this question are held4 ,to one class of writers1 the coefficient of the reality of an image is its independence of the will2 to another class1 the coefficient is subjection to the will4 ,if we make a distinction between a memory-coefficient of reality--that is1 the something about a memory which leads us to believe it represents a real experience--and a sensational coefficient1 that is1 the criterion of present sensational reality1 we see that those two kinds of reality differ in their relation to the will4 ,a present sensible reality is not under the control of any will1 but a memory coefficient is subjected to will1 in the sense that we are able to get the image again as a sensation by repeating the series of voluntary muscular sensations which were associated with it in its first experience4 ,this memory-coefficient of external reality must be distinguished from the coefficient of memory itself2 the latter being the feeling that an image has been in consciousness before1 i4 e4 recognition1 or sense of familiarity4 ,a true memory is an image which ,i can get at will by a train of memory-associates1 and which1 when got1 is further subject to my will4 7,london3 ,williams ,norgate47 ,,international ,,journal ,,of ,,ethics4 ,july1 #ahia4 ,vol4 ,i4 ,,no4 #d4 ,,contents3 ,,the ,,modern ,,conception ,,of ,,the ,,science ,,of ,,religion4 ,by ,prof4 ,edward ,caird4 ,,the ,,functions ,,of ,,ethical ,,theory4 ,by ,prof4 ,james ,h4 ,hyslop4 ,,the ,,morality ,,of ,,nations4 ,by ,prof4 ,w4 ,r4 ,sorley4 ,j4 ,s4 ,,mill',s ,,science ,,of ,,ethology4 ,by ,james ,ward4 ,,vice ,,and ,,immorality4 ,by ,r4 ,w4 ,black4 ,,the ,,progress ,,of ,,political ,,economy ,,since ,,adam ,,smith4 ,by ,francis ,w4 ,newman4 ,,programme ,,of ,,school ,,of ,,applied ,,ethics4 ,,discussions3 ,the ,moral ,aspect of 8,tips0 and 8,gratuities40 ,by ,christine ,ladd ,franklin4 ,ideas and facts1 says ,professor ,caird1 are continually being woven together as warp and woof1 into the web of man's intellectual life4 ,the idea of the unity of mankind has within the last century become an almost instinctive presupposition of all civilised men4 ,it has special application to the history of religion4 ,in a man's religion we have expressed his ultimate attitude to the universe4 ,even atheism or agnosticism involves a definite attitude towards the ultimate problem of human life4 ,the modern ideas of the organic unity and the organic evolution of man inevitably compel us to seek for the one principle of life which is striving towards the full realisation of itself4 ,professor ,hyslop remarks1 that two questions may be asked3 7#a7 ,why is it that any disturbance in ethical speculation at once brings men up in arms about the consequences8 7#b7 ,why is there such a tendency even in speculative ethics to bring its theories into harmony and sympathy with 8practical0 problems8 ,the preliminary answer is the distinction between science and art4 ,the aim of science is to find causes2 the aim of art to produce ends by means of these causes4 ,but art may be divided into productive and practical art4 ,every consideration of the scope and aim of ethics shows it to be both a science and an art4 ,as a science it endeavors to explain something2 as an art1 to realise something4 ,its complications are thus two-fold4 ,ethics may be a science in two distinct relations4 ,first1 it aims to show the general conception which will reduce the various motives actually governing human conduct to unity4 ,secondly1 it aims to show the end that ought ideally to govern conduct1 and this is the supreme object of ethics as a science4 ,in relation to the ,morality of ,nations1 ,professor ,sorley says that the relations of the state1 diplomatic or military1 with other states may be compared with the relations of one individual to another1 but the two sets of relations are not the same4 ,a crime is an act punishable by law1 and it is absurd therefore to speak as if the state1 acting legally1 could commit a crime4 ,but if theft ceased to be a crime it would be as much an offense against morality as before4 ,taxation to which the taxed have not consented and unfair taxation cannot be regarded as theft1 as some suppose4 ,individual morality becomes mixed with national morality when those through whom the state acts act for themselves and for their own interests1 instead of for the common good4 ,within a nation the state is above all individuals1 but there is no corresponding superior power over nations4 ,what remains is a general obligation upon states to observe justice in their dealings with one another4 ,national morality differs from individual morality in that a nation's first duty may be said to be to itself4 ,there is no selfishness1 there is only patriotism1 in its recognising the fact and acting upon it4 ,the intercourse of nations can only reach a full measure of development under a common moral law1 which recognises the rights of one nation as of equal value with the rights of any other4 ,mr4 ,ward points out1 that ,mill1 in his exposition of what he called ,ethology1 or the ,exact ,science of ,human ,nature1 repeated in all the issues of his 8,logic10 remarks that ,ethology must first proceed deductively4 ,the laws of the formation of character 8are derivative laws1 resulting from the general laws of mind1 and are to be obtained by deducing them from those general laws40 ,there was a want of clearness in ,mill's conception of an individual4 ,the notion of a ,self proved1 on his own admission1 8the real stumbling block0 to his psychological theory4 ,in discussing the influence of remarkable men1 ,mill allows that 8whatever depends on the peculiarities of individuals1 combined with the accidents of the positions they hold1 is necessarily incapable of being foreseen40 ,when we attempt to estimate the influence of circumstances on individuals1 we must often know how the circumstances appear to them1--this personal equation so to say is frequently incalculable4 ,in the main1 says ,mr4 ,black1 sin exists intimately in1 or as an inseparable affection or potentiality of1 the person as a whole1 and to discourage it is to discourage the person1 and tantamount1 therefore1 to discouraging his goodness as well4 ,at this point the division of sin into vice and immorality becomes essential to a rational solution4 ,immorality is crime against living moral agents4 ,vice may be defined as the spending of the forces of one's own life to the detriment of its moral capabilities4 ,mr4 ,francis ,w4 ,newman1 who began the study of ,political ,economy seventy years ago1 when he was sixteen1 gives in this article his views on the evils of land tenure in ,england4 ,mrs4 ,franklin thinks 8the subjective feeling of worth and dignity0 which distinguishes the people of this country will be injured by 8giving fees to our inferiors when they perform some service for which they are 7or ought to be7 otherwise well paid40 ,that the matter is not 8absolute ethics0 is apparent from the fact that in ,japan a totally different sentiment prevails4 ,the editor1 ,prof4 ,josiah ,royce 7under the signature of ,j4 ,r47 in commenting on ,mrs4 ,franklin's communication after referring to the evils of the ,german custom of ,trinkgeld as detailed by v4 ,ihering1 says that if it harms the manhood of our writers to 8tip0 them the mischief should be met by organised devices such as v4 ,ihering proposes1 and not by individual action4 7,philadelphia3 ,international ,journal of ,ethics1 #afjb ,chestnut ,street47 4 ,,revue ,,philosophique4 ,,contents3 ,june1 #ahia4 ,no4 #ahf4 ,,les ,,resultats ,,des ,,theories ,,contemporaines ,,sur ,l',,association ,,des ,,idees4 ,by ,b4 ,bourdon4 ,,comment ,,la ,,sensation ,,devient ,,idee4 ,by ,j4 ,payot4 ,,notes ,,et ,,discussions4 ,,qu',,est-,,ce ,,que ,,la ,,physiologie ,,generale8 ,by ,durand 7de ,gros74 ,,contents3 ,july1 #ahia4 ,no4 #ahg4 ,,la ,,notion ,,de ,,limite ,,en ,,mathematiques4 ,by ,g4 ,milhaud4 ,,coup ,d',,oeil ,,sur ,l',,histoire ,,de ,,la ,,philosophie ,,en ,,russie 7,i74 ,by ,f4 ,lannes4 ,,les ,,sources ,,de ,,la ,,philosophie ,,de ,l',,inde4 ,by ,p4 ,regnaud4 ,m4 ,bourdon reviews the modes of association proposed by various psychologists1 and the factors which intervene to give force to associations4 ,wundt alone2 among psychologists has the great merit of not placing ideas and sensations in actual opposition4 ,the laws of ideology are almost the same as those of physics2 and the law of association ought to be true not only for ideas1 but for sensations and for objects4 ,m4 ,bourdon's conclusion is that the theory of the association of ideas has hitherto been treated from a too subjective and idealistic point of view4 ,he would substitute for the theory of association of idea a theory of a society of phenomena1 which conception he thinks better explains the process4 ,in a preceding contribution to the ,revue ,philosophique 7,may1 #ahij7 ,m4 ,payot showed that sensation is the translation into terms of consciousness of that which1 considered from the objective point of view1 is a reaction of the organism1 as a whole1 to an external impression4 ,sensations are the irreducible element of the psychic life4 ,they contribute the materials which the mind modifies1 combines1 and classes according to their relations1 variable or invariable4 ,this is chronologically posterior to sensation1 which has an affective origin4 ,the reactions corresponding to the most frequent sensations become more and more rapid until consciousness1 8which translates only physiological states of a sufficient duration10 has not time to appear4 ,here we have a reflex-act4 ,in an intermediate zone where reactions take a time sufficient for them to be conscious1 the intellectual states1 to which the abstract name of the intellectual faculty has been given1 have birth4 ,differentiation operates between sensible and intellectual facts1 until they seem to belong to two irreducible faculties2 but the intellectual states are grafted on the sensible states1 and although the graft develops so greatly that the sensibility appears like a parasite1 the latter is the primitive trunk and through it the graft exists by a kind of continued creation4 ,sensations are convenient abstractions but nothing more4 ,a sensation never presents itself in the adult consciousness without a crowd of instantaneously evoked relations4 ,there is never absolute exclusion between perception and sensation3 these are two states which dissolve into each other1 which have no difference in nature1 and which are separable only in gross4 ,properly speaking there are no sensations1 only perceptions more or less complex4 ,in sensation the state of mind is considered in itself without reference to its relations2 in perception attention is paid chiefly to the relations4 ,but sensation exists only for consciousness1 as it can never enter directly into intellectual constructions1 but only through the state of remembrance4 ,every sensation so far as we are sensible of it is purely felt1 and we effectuate our mental constructions not with sensations1 but with our remembrances of sensations4 ,but the rle of sensation is still more restricted4 ,however rapid its flight across consciousness it instantaneously provokes the remembrance of numerous sensations of differences and resemblances with anterior sensations4 ,it is an occasion for this1 and nothing more4 ,to be perceived1 a sensation must be followed by sensations different from itself4 ,the mind seizes relations of resemblance between sensations and resemblances between relations3 it classes them1 the chaos unravels and organises itself4 ,the organisation has been progressive1 but at all stages the procedure is alike2 it consists in disengaging remembrances more or less masked by dissimilarities3 this is the universal procedure of the mind and the condition sine qua non of thought4 ,in his article on ,general ,physiology1 ,m4 ,durand 7de ,gros7 in criticism of ,m4 ,ch4 ,richet's article on this subject which appeared in the ,april number of the ,revue ,philosophique1 points out that ,richet in applying the term 8general anatomy0 to the anatomy of the tissues1 and 8special anatomy0 to the anatomy of the organs1 overlooked the fact that generality and speciality when used to express the two opposite sides of a science express relations of abstract1 nominal extension and not real extension4 ,thus1 by general chemistry is intended the consideration of the higher laws governing the molecular actions of bodies1 the one on the other1 whatever that may be1 and the modes of composition which result therefrom for each of them4 ,general physiology should be1 therefore1 the philosophy of the science of the functions of life1 that is to say1 the higher laws embracing all these various particular functions2 special physiology having for its object these particular functions in what is proper to each of them and distinguishes it from the others4 ,physiology has reference1 however1 to the other animals as well as man1 and also to plants1 and hence the term general physiology has been applied to the physiology common to all living beings1 and special physiology to that which concerns the various animal and vegetal species taken separately4 ,but this is in reality comparative physiology1 and thus positive physiologists have made a false use of the term general physiology1 and have left the true general physiology unrecognised and unnamed4 ,in conclusion1 ,m4 ,durand presents his conception of 8organology40 ,in the form of a dialogue ,m4 ,milhaud meets the objections made to the notion of limit in ,mathematics4 ,the question whether to have a limit1 for anything variable1 is not synonymous with attaining a limit1 is considered in connection with ,zeno's problem of ,achilles and the tortoise1 the strict solution of which is1 not that ,achilles will never overtake the tortoise1 but that he will not overtake it on this side of a spot situated at a distance of #aj_/i of a metre from the starting-point1 within a period equal to #aj_/i of a second commencing at the instant of starting4 ,to the objection that by its very nature the limit cannot be attained1 as where the limit and the variable element which indefinitely approaches it are essentially different1 it is replied that when a variable element has a limit1 this element is a quantity and the limit is a quantity of the same kind1 quality being neglected4 ,in the proposition3 the length of the circumference is the limit of the perimeters of the inscribed polygons1 the limit is a quantity of the same kind1 that of length4 ,it is not necessary to know whether the definition accords with reality4 ,m4 ,milhaud then shows by reference to the properties of an unlimited series of inscribed polygons and the corresponding circumscribed polygons1 that two such series of geometrical lengths satisfying the required conditions can always be considered as defining a new length1 superior to all the first and inferior to all the others4 ,as to its existence1 it can be said only that a length exists only as determined1 as limited2 and a state of length1 or a particular length has a right to exist1 provided that the properties of quantity which condition it are not contradictory4 ,the essence of mathematical space1 breadth1 length is only the content of their definitions4 ,mathematics owes its existence to the condition of creating for itself a world of fictions4 ,there is a divergence of opinion as to whether incommensurables should be represented by lengths or by numerical symbols1 but the divergence is a last echo of the endless discussions which the notions of infinity and continuity have raised among mathematicians4 ,philosophic thought1 says ,m4 ,lannes1 presents1 in ,russia1 in its past history1 a very poor condition4 ,philosophy does not exist1 unless that name be given to such moral precepts1 or domestic recommendations as we find in 8the instruction0 of a ,vladimir ,monomaque or in the 8,domostro40 ,the ,russian mind was easily guarded against the liberties of thought1 regarding science and philosophy with contempt and holy dread4 ,there1 as during the ,middle ,ages in the rest of ,europe1 the end to attain1 to which all others were subordinated1 was the safety of the soul4 ,it was only with ,peter the ,great that thought took a freer flight1 notwithstanding the restrictions that it had still to support4 ,the ,little ,russians were the first to turn towards western instruction4 ,in order to meet the ,jesuits1 who appeared in ,russia about the middle of the #afth century1 with the arms they used1 scholastic philosophy was introduced into the college of ,pierre ,mohila1 at ,kief4 ,aristotle was taken as guide and the teaching was in ,latin4 ,under ,alexis ,mikhalovitch1 rational1 natural1 and moral philosophy began to be taught in a formal manner at the ,academy of ,moscow4 ,peter the ,great ordered an important place to be given to rhetoric and dialectics1 and the mention of logic1 psychology1 and metaphysics in the programme of the ,academy4 ,in #agee logic1 metaphysics1 and morality entered into the teaching of philosophy at the ,university4 ,in the #ahth century two currents of ideas manifested themselves1 of which some are connected with mysticism1 others with the influence of ,french philosophy4 ,the former became associated1 through ,novikof and ,schwartz1 with free-masonry1 which was regarded as a means of acquiring a knowledge of ,god1 of nature1 and of man1 of becoming a better ,christian1 a better citizen1 and a better family head4 ,novikof and ,schwartz founded the 8,society of the ,friends of ,instruction10 and through their zeal a mass of moral and religious books were published for distribution in places of instruction4 ,the influence of the ,french 8philosophers0 of the #ahth century was preponderant in ,russia in the second half of the #ahth century4 ,voltaire enjoyed the greatest favor1 and his renown was universal4 ,freethought penetrated the middle classes1 and even conservative and religious men denied miracles in the course of history1 considered religion as a political instrument1 and attacked the ignorance and cupidity of the clergy4 ,on the happening of the ,french revolution ,catherine was frightened and took rigorous measures against those who wished to use freedom of thought4 ,questions of pedagogy held a great place in the thoughts of ,catherine4 ,she confided the care of pedagogic reforms to ,betski1 who showed that true education is that which unites the development of the body1 of the mind1 and of the heart2 but the moral element ought to have the first place4 ,alexander ,i4 re-established philosophic liberalism and sought to excite interest in social1 economic1 and political questions4 ,the university of ,moscow was reorganised1 and one of the faculties included dogmatic and moral theology1 theoretical and practical philosophy1 natural1 political and popular rights4 ,philosophy also established itself in the new universities of ,kharkof1 ,kazan1 and ,petersburg4 ,but minds were possessed with more living ideas and various tendencies1 political1 moral1 religious1 sceptical1 led to the establishment of numerous secret societies whose starting point was the masonic alliance4 ,about #ahaf1 ,schrder had introduced into the foreign lodges a spirit of cosmopolitan humanity4 ,fessler saw in the lodges a means of moral education1 the basis of civic education4 ,in order to be received as a mason1 it was necessary to pass through certain 8consecrations10 to obtain certain 8degrees of knowledge40 ,among those 8consecrated0 by ,fessler was ,spranski who1 notwithstanding his mysticism1 was imbued with the principles of the ,revolution4 ,on the reaction under ,prince ,galitzyn1 the minister of public instruction1 science was given a mystical end1 and religion was declared to be the supreme science4 ,the sciences which could do injury to religion1 as geology1 were either discarded1 or directed to be taught according to the spirit of ,holy ,scripture4 ,as to philosophy1 the teaching of moral philosophy1 which does not separate morality from the faith1 was alone allowed4 ,the treatises of the ,kantian ,jacob were forbidden1 as containing scandalous theories4 ,in general1 in the universities1 during the first year of the nineteenth century the objects of philosophic study were somewhat vague4 ,the utility of the sciences1 of education1 of the individual characters of peoples1 enthusiastic discourses on free will1 on the rights of reason1 on the spirit and forces of nature4 ,fessler and ,vellanski introduced the ,german philosophy and principally that of ,schelling1 which became in some sort the lever which put in movement ideas on the independence and the nationality of civilisation4 ,the most ardent champion of ,schelling's doctrine was ,odoievski1 whose external personality marks curiously the idea entertained of philosophy and philosophers between #ahbj and #ahde4 ,a philosopher was represented as a sort of romantic ,faust1 leading a kind of life different from common mortals4 ,if he occupied himself with physical sciences1 the philosopher was regarded as the equal of a sorcerer with terrible powers4 ,m4 ,lannes concludes his present article with a sketch of the life and philosophy of ,galitch1 who on his return to ,st4 ,petersburg from a three years tour through ,europe wrote a dissertation on philosophy1 in which he explained the development of beings by the double action of activity and passivity1 the one being cause1 the other product4 ,in #ahai ,galitch taught in the ,university logic1 psychology1 and metaphysics1 and later he received authority to teach the history of philosophy1 to which he gave an eclectic character1 in accordance with the instructions of his hierarchical superiors4 ,in his esoteric teaching he initiated his friends into the philosophy of ,schelling4 ,in that year he published a 8,history of ,philosophic ,systems10 the appearance of which was a rare novelty in the ,russian ,scientific ,world4 ,he subsequently published several other works1 but the manuscript of one on the 8,philosophy of the ,history of ,humanity10 which cost him much labor was destroyed by fire4 ,the merit of ,galitch is to have wished to establish in ,russia philosophy as science4 ,he assigned to the study of philosophy the whole encyclopedia of the sciences1 but true philosophic knowledge is the knowledge of the unity from which external phenomena flow4 ,m4 ,lannes gives an analysis of ,galitch's 8,picture of ,man10 where1 before ,m4 ,renouvier1 he says of freedom1 8it can itself begin an entire series of phenomena1 which are then linked together in the relations of dependence1 that is to say are the necessary acts of a voluntary principle40 ,galitch deserves to occupy a small place in the general history of the philosophy of humanity4 ,if there existed before him a science of the relations of the soul and the body1 he was at least one of the first to elaborate a programme of what is called to-day comparative psychology4 ,m4 ,regnaud finds the sources of the philosophy of ,india in ,india itself1 as they appear in all their simplicity and primitive character in the ,rig-,veda1 the very ancient collection of liturgical hymns of the ,brahmans4 ,the whole doctrine implied by both the ,vedic cult and the text of the hymns is resumed in a verse of the ,rig ,veda4 8,each day the same liquid rises and descends2 the rains vivify the earth1 the fires of the sacrifice vivify the sky40 ,the libations destined to feed the fire of sacrifice and which consisted of inflammable liquids1 such as the ghrita or clarified butter1 were poured out each time that the sacrifice was celebrated into the atmosphere 7or the sky7 whose life they maintained1 in like manner as liquid and solid foods sustain the life of man4 ,the whole religious conception of the ,vedic epoch consists then in the idea of an endless circulus1 of a perpetual exchange of the elements of life1 in an immense body which is the universe1 whose arterial centre is the sacrifice1 and the fire the motor1 the distributer1 and so to say the brain4 7,paris3 ,flix ,alcan47 4 ,,revue ,,de ,l',,hypnotisme4 ,april1 #ahia4 ,no4 #aj4 #eth ,,year4 ,,contents3 7#a7 ,,accouchement ,,dans ,l',,hypnotisme4 ,by ,dr4 ,fraipont and ,m4 ,j4 ,delbuf4 7#b7 ,,accouchement ,,pendant ,,le ,,sommeil ,,hypnotique4 ,by ,dr4 ,m4 ,g4 ,kingsbury4 7#c7 ,,memoire ,,relatif ,a ,,certaines ,,radiations ,,perques ,,par ,,lessensitifs4 ,by ,baron de ,reichembach4 7#d7 ,,discussions ,,et ,,polemique3 ,la ,nutrition dans l'hypnotisme4 ,by ,gilles de la ,tourette and ,h4 ,cathelineau4 7#e7 ,,recueil ,,de ,,faits3 ,contribution l'application de la thrapeutique suggestive4 ,by ,dr4 ,p4 ,van ,velsen4 ,huit observations d'accouchement sans douleur sous l'influence de l'hypnotisme4 ,by ,dr4 ,marie ,dobrovosky4 ,,revue ,,bibliographique4 ,dr4 ,fraipont terminates his interesting memoir with the remark that save under very exceptional circumstances1 as when the subject is very sensitive or has before suffered a sort of trance1 hypnotism can scarcely have any practical importance in accouchment4 ,m4 ,delbuf refers in a postscript to the case of a patient described in his writings by the initial ,j4441 and states that her accouchment confirms him in his view of the rle of the brain1 which he regards as a moderating and inhibiting organ1 and consequently in the opinion expressed by him in the ,revue ,philosophique as to the essence of freedom1 which he regards as having an arresting and not an inciting effect4 ,,mm4 de la ,fourette and ,cathelineau confirm the conclusion drawn from researches made by them for ,professor ,charcot1 that nutrition is affected during the hypnotic sleep1 and therefore that hypnotism is a pathological condition4 7,paris3 #agj ,rue ,saint-,antoine47 ,,philosophische ,,monatshefte4 ,vol4 ,,xxvii4 ,nos4 #i and #aj4 ,,contents3 ,,goethes ,,verhaeltniss ,,zu ,,spinoza ,,und ,,seine ,,philosophische ,,weltanschauung4 ,by ,g4 ,schneege4 ,i4 ,,wilhelm ,,wundt',s 8,,system ,,der ,,philosophie40 ,by ,johannes ,volkelt4 ,i4 ,,recensionen3 7#a7 ,a4 ,fouille1 ,l',avenir de la mtaphysique fonde sur l'exprience4 ,by ,c4 ,schaarschmidt4 7#b7 ,th4 von ,varnbler1 ,widerlegung der ,kritik der reinen ,vernunft4 ,by ,e4 ,knig4 7#c7 ,bericht ber neuere ,erscheinungen aus dem ,gebiete der ,geschichte der sthetik4 ,by ,e4 ,khnemann4 7#d7 ,c4 ,baeumker1 ,das ,problem der ,materie in der griechischen ,philosophie4 ,by ,p4 ,natorp4 ,,litteraturbericht4 ,johannes ,volkelt continues his review of ,wilhelm ,wundt's 8,system of ,philosophy40 ,prof4 ,c4 ,schaarschmidt criticises ,fouille's view of a future metaphysics as based upon experience1 from the ,kantian standpoint4 ,dr4 ,e4 ,knig explains with sufficient strength the futility of ,varnbler in his bold attempt of refuting ,kant's 8,critique of ,pure ,reason10 and ,dr4 ,paul ,natorp1 the editor1 devotes an article to ,prof4 ,clemens ,baeumker's book 8,das ,problem der ,materie in der ,griechischen ,philosophie10 in which the author sets forth that the problem of matter is not a limited problem1 but the sum total of all those questions which have reference to the existence of some cause of sensory phenomena which in its nature is different from consciousness4 ,the problems of psycho-physics and of the theory of cognition are modern and were unknown to the ancients4 ,their standpoint remained throughout that of realism4 ,a rsum of the views of ,greek philosophers from ,thales down to the ,new ,platonists follows4 ,the leading article is devoted to ,goethe's relation to ,spinoza and his philosophical world-conception4 ,goethe's philosophical and religious opinions are naturally of the greatest interest1 because ,goethe1 the child of nature in the highest sense of the word1 represents a genius not such as our great contemporary ,cesare ,lombroso conceives him to be1 i4 e4 a species of the abnormal man and a kind of insane person1 but such as genius is conceived by the layman1 i4 e4 an abnormally normal man1 a man whose excellencies lie in a rare harmony of highly developed perfections--not in eccentricities4 ,goethe's eccentricities were not worse or more extended than those of average people1 but he had more sense1 more humor1 more depth1 and more spirit4 ,well1 ,goethe as a son of man and as a type of an unusually perfect man was a poet1 a philosopher1 a scientist1 an historian1 an artist1 a man of the world1 and a man of practical life1 all in one1 and the opinions of this man in the religio-philosophical field show at least that they accord with man as a child of nature4 ,goethe's philosophical views were strongly influenced by ,spinoza yet not so as if ,spinoza had impressed his view upon ,goethe4 ,goethe happened to read ,spinoza's 8,ethics0 while still immature in mind and felt himself powerfully attracted by the spirit of the book4 8,what ,i may have read out of or into that work10 he writes1 8,i could give no account4 ,yet ,i found a pacification of my passions4 ,a great and free vista upon the sensual and moral world seemed to open before my eyes4 ,that strange sentence #8,he who loves ,god must not demand of ,god to love him in return1' with all its premises and conclusions filled all my thoughts4 ,to be unselfish in everything and most so in love and friendship was my highest delight1 my maxim1 my practice1 so that the bold expression of later years #8,if ,i love thee1 it is none of thy business' came right from my heart4 ,in addition to this1 it must be recognised that the most intimate combinations result from contraries4 ,the all-pervading calmness of ,spinoza contrasted with my excited aspirations1 his mathematical method was a counterpart of my poetical thoughts and habits40 ,in ,spinoza's doctrine of necessity ,goethe found comfort concerning man's dependence upon the outer world which caused him so much pain4 ,it is probable that the famous sentence of the liberation from passions through a clear comprehension of them was very sympathetic to ,goethe1 for it is a characteristic feature of his poetry that they were confessions as well as liberations of all that moved and disturbed him4 ,as soon as ,goethe was able to give to himself a clear account concerning that which had affected his soul and as soon as he could give a poetical form to it so that it became something independent and outside of him1 he gained1 in the sense of ,spinoza's doctrine of liberation from passions1 the peace and liberty of his soul4 ,yet ,spinoza's doctrine of necessity was a metaphysical conception4 ,goethe transferred it into the domains of practical ethics1 thus giving rise to his idea of resignation4 ,goethe writes in the beginning of the sixteenth book of 8,wahrheit und ,dichtung03 8,our physical as well as our social life1 customs1 habits1 worldly wisdom1 philosophy1 religion1 even many incidental events1 everything demands of us that we should resign ourselves4 ,so many things which most intrinsically belong to us we are not allowed to develop4 ,that of the outer world which we want as a complement of our nature is taken away and many things which are foreign to us and disagreeable are thrown upon us4 ,we are deprived of everything that we have with difficulty acquired1 of everything that is friendly and before we fully comprehend it we find ourselves obliged to surrender our very personality1 first piecemeal and finally in its entirety40 ,professor ,schneege says that ,goethe's practice of resignation gave him solace when he felt low-spirited concerning the limits of human willing and wishing and hoping1 and his resignation was as a matter of principle a total resignation4 ,a partial resignation leads to the pessimistic outcry 8,all is vanity10 yet the total resignation affords an inner peace and produces that 8air of peace10 die ,friedensluft as ,goethe calls it1 which surrounds us when reading ,spinoza4 ,one of ,goethe's maxims is quite ,spinozistic4 ,goethe says 7,max4 und ,refl4 ,abth4 v473 8,he who declares himself to be free will feel himself at once dependent but he who dares to declare himself dependent1 feels himself free40 ,goethe rejected the idea of a personal and transcendent ,deity which was urged so strongly upon him by ,lavater4 ,rejecting ,lavater's view1 he says 7,wahrh4 und ,dicht4 xiv473 8,i assured him in accord with my ,realism which is inborn as well as acquired that since it had pleased ,god and ,nature to make me as ,i am1 ,i must remain so40 ,the expression 8,god and ,nature0 savors strongly of ,spinoza's 8,deus sive natura40 ,according to ,eckermann 7,gesp4 m4 ,g4 ii1 p4 #afi7 ,holbach's ,systme de la nature had also made a strong impression upon ,goethe4 ,nevertheless he was dissatisfied with the spirit of ,french materialism4 ,he says3 8,how empty and hollow is this sad atheistic twilight1 in which the earth with all its forms and the heaven with all its stars disappear4 ,matter only is said to exist1 being in motion from eternity to eternity1 thus producing to the right and to the left without further ado all the innumerable phenomena of being40 ,goethe's view of 8,god and nature10 did not deny the ,deity as such1 but identified both in the sense of ,spinoza4 ,in this sense ,goethe interpreted the sentence3 ,qui deum amat conari not potest1 ut ,deus ipsum contra amet--si homo id conaretur1 cuperet ergo ut ,deus quem amat1 non esset ,deus4 ,the latter idea1 8if a man wished that ,god should love him in return1 he would wish that ,god be not ,god0 is a corollary only to the impersonal conception of ,spinoza's non-anthropomorphised ,deity4 ,we cannot and we must not think of ,god as a human being who like a monarch makes favorites of those who are faithful not so much to the divine laws of ethics but to ,god personally4 ,goethe agreed in his views of ,spinoza with ,herder1 who in a letter to ,jacobi writes3 8,the 1 my dear ,jacobi1 in all anti-spinozistic systems is that ,god is supposed to be the great ens entium1 the cause of all phenomena1 a cypher1 an abstract idea which we have formulated4 ,however1 that is not so according to ,spinoza2 ,god is to him the most real and active unity which says to itself #8,i am that ,i am1 and shall be in all the changes of my phenomena that which ,i shall be4' ,what you mean1 my dear fellows1 by an existence outside of the world1 ,i do not understand4 ,if ,god does not exist in the world1 and indeed1 everywhere unlimited in his totality and entirety1 he does not exist at all4 ,the limitation of personality does not belong to the infinite being1 since a person originates with us by limitation as a kind of modus or as an aggregate of beings whose activity is endowed with the illusion of unity40 ,a modification of ,spinoza's view consists in the recognition of the creative activity which ,herder attributes to ,god4 ,in another letter to ,jacobi1 ,herder writes3 8,you wish ,god in the shape of man like a friend who thinks of you4 ,consider that in that case he must think humanly of you4 ,if he is partial to you he will be partial against others4 ,explain to me why you need him to be human4 ,he speaks to you1 he affects you through all noble men who are his organs and most so through his organ of organs1 the core of his spiritual creation1 his only begotten4 ,i must confess that this philosophy makes me exceedingly happy4 ,goethe has read ,spinoza since your departure and it is a test case to me that he has conceived him exactly as ,i do40 ,herder was a clergyman and he held the highest position of his church1 being ,superintendent ,general4 ,would the protestant state churches of to-day either in ,england or in ,germany have room for a man like ,herder8 ,goethe concurred with ,herder1 that the idea of an extramundane ,deity has no sense1 an outside ,god is powerless and an immanent ,god alone is a reality4 ,he puts in the mouth of ,faust the following lines3 8,the ,god that in my breast is owned ,can deeply stir the inner sources4 ,the ,god above my powers enthroned ,he cannot change external forces40 ,faust ,i1 ,scene #d1 ,tr4 ,bayard ,taylor4 ,spinoza makes a difference between natura naturans and natura naturata4 ,a similar contrast is made by ,goethe in the following lines which are found among the ,zahme ,xenien1 ,part vii4 8,life dwells in each celestial body ,and on its self-selected roads ,it likes to travel with the others4 ,there are in our earth's deep abodes ,the forces1 shrouded now in night ,and rising up again to light ,if with eternal repetition ,some circles infinitely roam1 ,if thousand stones in strong construction ,together build life's glorious dome1 ,then through all things is pleasure thrilling1 ,the great1 the little1 both are blessed1 ,yet all this yearning1 all this striving ,in ,god the ,lord1 is eternal rest40#bf ,according to ,schneege1 ,goethe was an agnostic4 ,faust says3 8,mysterious even in open day ,nature retains her veil1 despite our clamors4 ,that which she doth not willingly display1 ,cannot be wrenched from her with levers1 screws and hammers40 ,i1 #a4 ,tr4 ,bayard ,taylor4 ,this quotation however expresses ,faust's despair and not ,goethe's philosophical view4 ,it is true that ,goethe has made a few utterances which savor of agnosticism1 but most of them are expressive of the idea that we can never be through with our wisdom2 every new solution proposes new problems4 8,will mich jedoch des ,worts nicht schmen3 ,wir tasten ewig an ,problemen40 ,zahme ,xenien1 vii4 ,will not be ashamed of the confession3 ,we are dealing with problems without intercession4 ,how little ,goethe was in accord with the view of modern agnosticism or phenomenalism1 that we know the outside of nature only and not her inside1 can be learned from his opposition to ,haller's famous lines3 8,nature's ,within from mortal mind ,must ever lie concealed4 ,thrice blessed e'en he1 to whom she has ,her outer shell revealed40 ,in answer to the agnostic sentiment of the famous naturalist1 ,goethe answered with the following verses 7quoted in the translation given in 8,fundamental ,problems10 p4 #adb73 8,nature's #8within' from mortal mind0 ,philistine1 sayest thou1 8,must ever lie concealed80 ,to me1 my friend1 and to my kind ,repeat this not4 ,we trow ,where'er we are that we ,within must always be4 8,thrice blessed e'en he to whom she has ,her outer shell revealed80 ,this saying sixty years ,i heard ,repeated o'er and o'er1 ,and in my soul ,i cursed the word1 ,yet secretly ,i swore4 ,some thousand thousand times or more ,unto myself ,i witness bore3 ,gladly gives ,nature all her store1 ,she knows not kernel1 knows not shell1 ,for she is all in one4 ,but thou1 ,examine thou thine own self well whether thou art kernel or art shell4 ,we ought to bear in mind that ,goethe was no philosopher in the strict sense of the word and did not attempt to have a system that should be free from contradictions4 ,so we read in one place3 8,man is not born to solve the problem of the world1 but to seek for the limit of the incomprehensible and then to remain within the limits of the comprehensible10 and in another place 8,man must hold fast to the belief that what seems incomprehensible is comprehensible1 for otherwise he would cease to investigate40 ,the idea of evolution was the basis of ,goethe's idea of immortality4 ,here also he remains in accord with ,herder who had proposed in his 8,ideas for a ,philosophy of the ,history of ,mankind0 his views of the development of beings by degrees4 ,goethe wrote from ,rome 7,see 8,herder's ,nachlass10 ed4 ,dntzer1 ,frankfort1 #agef1 i1 p4 #ag473 8,how much ,i enjoy ,herder's #8,ideas1' ,i can scarcely express4 ,since ,i expect no ,messiah1 this viz4 the prospect of further evolution is to me the dearest ,gospel40 ,goethe's idea of the soul is not clearly worked out in its philosophical aspect4 ,he speaks of souls as of monads and believes in a migration of the soul4 8,i am sure10 ,goethe said to ,falk1 8,i have been here some thousand times and expect to come again some thousand times40 ,goethe was very decided in practical and ethical respects4 ,goethe deviated from ,spinoza by introducing a strong trait of individualism into ,spinoza's cosmism4 8,zweck sein selbst ist jegliches ,thier40#bg ,every creature has its purpose in itself4 ,and man is the last product of constantly higher evolving ,nature--das letzte ,product der sich immer steigernden ,natur4 ,nature's intention according to ,goethe's view is to produce constantly more perfect creatures4 ,he says3 8,imagine ,nature standing as a gamester before the roulette table constantly shouting au double4 ,with all she has won through all the phases of her activity she continues to play on into infinity4 ,stone1 plant1 animal1 everything is risked in such hazarding ventures again and again1 and who can tell whether man himself is not but a venture for a higher aim40 ,death was to ,goethe no destruction but a dissolution4 ,a destruction or annihilation appeared as an impossibility to him4 ,and his idea of immortality was not one of existence after death but of a continued activity4 ,in the year #ahbe ,goethe declared to ,chancellor von ,mller 78,gesprche m4d4 ,kanzler von ,mller10 p4 #ii71 that he should not know what to do with an immortality in which he would not find new tasks to do and new difficulties to conquer4 7,heidelberg3 ,georg ,weiss47 4 ,,zeitschrift ,f,r ,,psychologie ,,und ,,physiologie ,,der ,,sinnesorgane4 ,vol4 ,,ii4 ,no4 #d4 ,,contents3 ,,zur ,,psychologie ,,der ,,komplexionen ,,und ,,relationen4 ,by ,e4 ,meinong4 ,,wundt',s ,,antikritik4 ,by ,c4 ,stumpf4 ,,ueber ,,die ,,unterschiedsempfindlichkeit ,,fuer ,,kleine ,,zeitgroessen4 ,eine vorlufige ,mitteilung4 ,by ,f4 ,schumann4 ,,litteraturbericht4 ,professor ,a4 ,meinong discusses ,ch4 v4 ,ehrenfels's article 8,ueber ,gestaltqualitten0#bh adding the results of his own investigations suggested to him by this essay4 ,ehrenfels starts from ,professor ,mach's consideration of figure and melody 7see ,mach's ,beitrge zur ,analyse der ,empfindungen7 and proposes the question1 ,what are figure and melody in themselves8 ,are they merely a combination of elements or are they something in contradistinction to their elements1 something entirely new8 ,melodies and figures1 says ,ehrenfels1 can be so transposed that not any one of their original elements will remain4 ,thus the similarity of figures in space as well as of tones is something different from the similarity of their elements2 they must be something different than their mere sum4 ,this is 8the figure-quality0 or ,gestaltsqualitt1 and ,ehrenfels distinguishes between two kinds1 7#a7 those of time 7#b7 those of space1 which he calls 7#a7 ,tongestalten and 7#b7 ,raumgestalten4 ,in addition to these are discussed the figure-qualities of sensations and of inner apperception4 ,ehrenfels proposes the psychological question whether these figure-qualities are immediately given together with their foundations or whether they must be considered as the product of a special activity1 and he decides in favor of the former possibility4 ,professor ,meinong whose work has been in similar lines1 refers to his article 8,phantasievorstellung und ,phantasie0#bi and criticises the term 8figure-quality10 proposing in its stead the words fundierend and fundiert1 using the ,german term ,fundament as a correlative expression of 8relation40 ,there is no relation without complexity and psychological experience has actually to deal with complex facts only4 ,melody and figure are names for the totality of the foundations including their 8founded0 contents4 ,it may be that we are unduly prejudiced in favor of our own terminology1 but it seems to us that the expression 8form0 will prove to be the most appropriate word4 ,form is neither quality nor quantity1 but form can produce qualities4 ,let the same qualities1 say of chemical elements1 combine in different forms1 and we shall obtain substances with different qualities4 ,figure and melody are special kinds of form4 ,forms consist in and originate through combination1 and the unity produced through a special form-combination is actually something new1 as much so as if it were a special-creation act4 ,this wonderful power of form makes the study of form all-important in all branches of science4 ,a neglect of the study of form will lead either to materialism when matter and motion are conceived as the only quality-producing factors1 or to agnosticism as soon as a deeper inquiry proves that matter and motion are not sufficient to explain the most essential properties of the objects of investigation4 ,we cannot judge from the present article how much ,ehrenfels and ,meinong are in sympathy with our standpoint1 but we can see that their efforts are in the same direction4 ,the second article is a rejoinder by ,prof4 ,c4 ,stumpf of ,munich to ,prof4 ,w4 ,wundt's reply to his critic4 ,professor ,stumpf complains of ,wundt that he ignored the points raised in his criticism and that his 8,antikritik0 consisted only of 8a chain of distortions and insinuations40 ,f4 ,schumann publishes his results regarding sensibility for the difference between smallest quantities of time4 ,he employed a chronograph modified in two respects from ,wundt's chronograph4 ,first he replaced the expensive chronometer by a treading-wheel and introduced ,pfeil's time-marker1 which1 as he thinks1 is handier as well as more precise than ,wundt's time-marker4 ,schumann's results agree with the results of ,professor ,mach showing a maximum of #j4c-j4d seconds1 the relation of the perceptible difference to the normal time being in different persons only #j4jbb4 7,hamburg and ,leipsic3 ,l4 ,voss47 4 ,,philosophisches ,,jahrbuch4 ,vol4 ,,iv4 ,no4 #c4 ,,contents3 ,,enthaelt ,,die ,,chemisch-,,physikalische ,,atomtheorie ,,widersprueche8 ,by ,s4 ,j4 ,linsmeier4 ,,noch ,,einmal ,,zu ,,platon',s ,,timaeus p4 #ea ,e-p4 #eb ,b4 ,by ,clemens ,baeumker4 ,,das ,,gesetz ,,von ,,der ,,erhaltung ,,des ,,lebens4 7,zusatz der ,redaction47 ,by ,w4 ,frye4 ,,die ,,logischen ,,gaenge ,,des ,,denkens4 ,by ,dr4 ,g4 ,grupp4 ,w4 ,,wundt',s ,,system ,,der ,,philosophie4 ,by ,c4 ,gutberlet4 ,,recensionen ,,und ,,referate4 ,the publishers and editors of ,the ,monist are not ,roman ,catholics and we suppose that the majority of our readers are not either4 ,but all the more it appears to us necessary to state as a matter of justice that the ,roman ,catholic publications 7i4 e4 those which avowedly and confessedly represent ,roman ,catholic thought7 are far superior to their analogous ,protestant contemporaries4 ,the latter are debating their particular sectarianisms and do not seem to be interested in the progress of their times4 ,they do not heed the discoveries of science or the views of philosophers1 they live in a world of their own4 ,it is different with ,roman ,catholics4 ,the present magazine proves that they have thinkers among them who keep abreast of the time4 ,it is true that there is more discipline in the camp of ,roman ,catholics which shuts their champions out from free enquiry in a certain direction concerning some fundamental tenets1 but with all this discipline goes along a broad-mindedness in attacking the different problems of modern science and philosophy and bringing them into harmony with the ,roman ,catholic faith4 ,the ,philosophisches ,jahrbuch is published by the ,grres-,gesellschaft and edited by ,dr4 ,const4 ,gutberlet4 ,jacob ,joseph ,grres is the well-known champion of the ,catholic ,church 7#aggf-ahdh7--;a restless spirit who began his public career as an enthusiastic defender of the ,french ,revolution for the propagation of which he published a fanatical journal ,das rothe ,blatt4 ,with the rise of ,napoleon he despaired of the cause of liberty1 but he took courage again in the war of independence 7#ahac-ahae74 ,in his journal ,der ,rheinische ,merkur he denounced bitterly those ,germans who still held to the ,french2 he recommended his countrymen to have more love for their language1 customs1 and traditions and exhorted the princes to stand united against the common foe and re-institute the empire4 ,the war over he was persecuted by the ,prussian government on account of his renewed interests in revolutionary affairs 7he had published in #ahbj a pamphlet 8,germany and the ,revolution07 and showing a decided inclination to mysticism 78,emanuel ,schwedenborg1 his ,visions and his ,relation to the ,church10 #ahbg7 he joined the ,ultramontane party in the conviction that his ideals could be realised in the ,roman ,catholic ,church4 ,the rest of his life he remained faithful to ,rome and was the most active1 the most vigorous1 and also the ablest defender of ,roman ,catholic views and interests4 ,the present magazine is a ,quarterly conducted with scholarship and tact1 although as a matter of course not without that prejudice which necessarily results from the principle of giving all thoughts into captivity under a special and foredetermined faith4 ,the last volume 7vol4 iii7 is rich in interesting articles4 ,prof4 ,dr4 ,hayd1 strange enough1 defends the liberty of investigating the authority of faith1 which the editor1 however1 without rejecting the idea off-hand considers as bold 7gewagt74 ,there are articles on the freedom of will1 on the infinite number of possibilities1 mongolian cosmology1 ,pascal's position toward scepticism1 analogies between cognition of ,god and cognition of nature with special reference to ,kant's criticism of the evidences of the existence of ,god4 ,the present number of vol4 iv contains an article on the chemico-physical theory of atoms4 ,the question is proposed whether or not this theory contains contradictions4 ,the author starts from ,dalton's ,definition1 whom he regards together with ,wallaston as the founder of modern atomism4 ,the four weightiest objections are considered1 but the author arrives at the conclusion that all of them are based upon misconceptions4 ,he sums up3 8,chemists and ,physicists do not repudiate eyes and senses when proposing and defending the atomistic theory4 ,on the contrary they use for their view and build it upon an exceedingly richer material of observation than is employed by their antagonists4444 ,this denial of the validity of the most important objections1 however1 does not imply that the atomistic theory is without difficulties1 gaps1 unexplained details1 etc4 ,it is not as yet so certain a fact as for instance the heliocentric world-conception4 ,it is an hypothesis still and will have to remain such for quite a long time4 ,yet we can confidently assert that the difficulties are by far less than those offered to the acceptance of the ,copernican hypothesis at the time of the first condemnation of ,galileo 7#afaf7 which were solved afterward by ,galileo in the year #afcb4 ,we have further to state that the atomistic theory has been developed more and more since ,dalton1 the number and the importance of the explanations offered in it have constantly increased40 ,dr4 ,frye of ,jena discusses ,preyer's latest view of 8,the ,self-,gubernation of ,life--,die ,selbststeuerung des ,lebens0 which appeared in a recent number of the ,naturwissenschaftliche ,wochenschrift 7,berlin74 ,preyer considers his newly discovered law as a corollary to the conservation of matter and energy and maintains that the total amount of life in the world is as much constant as are matter and energy4 ,living mass 7,mz7 plus inanimate mass 7,mn7 are constant 7,c72 ,mz ,mn ,c4 ,so far scientists will agree1 but ,preyer adds that each separate item is constant for itself4 ,he declares that 8the total amount of protoplasm in the world remains unchanged in quantity40 ,it is hardly probable that ,preyer's view will be adopted by science4 ,dr4 ,grupp discusses the logical paths of thought1 and the editor1 ,professor ,dr4 ,gutberlet explains and criticises ,wundt's ,system of ,philosophy4 ,one of the most valuable features for ,catholic readers must be considered the book reviews4 ,here the thoughts of the most advanced thinkers are as it were digested for the ,catholic world4 ,the material is carefully sifted but the exposition of heretic opinions is not evaded4 ,the criticisms from the pen of ,dr4 ,gutberlet are often trenchant and should not be left unheeded by the adversaries of the ,church4 7,fulda3 ,verlag der ,fuldaer ,aktien-,druckerei47 4 ,,rivista ,,italiana ,,di ,,filosofia4 ,july and ,august1 #ahia4 ,,contents3 ,,la ,,scienza ,,dell',,educazione ,,nelle ,,scuole ,e ,,nelle ,,riviste ,,italiane4 ,by ,f4 ,cicchitti-,suriani4 ,,la ,,filosofia ,,di ,,empedocle4 ,by ,s4 ,ferrari4 ,,scienze ,,filosofiche ,e ,,sociali3 ,,relazione ,,sul ,,concorso ,,ai ,,premii ,,ministeriali4 ,by ,a4 ,chiappelli4 ,,alcune ,,considerazioni ,,sull',,eclettismo4 ,by ,l4 ,ferri4 ,,bibliografia1 ,,etc4 ,the ,science of ,education in ,italian ,schools and in ,italian ,reviews4 ,every nation is said to possess a peculiar physiognomy of its own1 through which it is distinguished from every other nation2 and consequently any nation will adopt a system of education that is best suited to its own national genius1 to its racial1 religious1 and historical traditions4 ,this may be true in a purely practical sense2 but on the other hand1 education1 theoretically1 as science or pedagogics1 passes the narrow limits of any state or form of government1 and ought to be ruled by principles and general laws common to the entire human family4 ,historically1 ever since the #afth century1 the educational movements in ,italy have been directly called forth by the ,catholic revival and reaction during and immediately following the period of the renaissance4 ,such was the origin of the ,filippini1 ,ignorantelli1 ,barnabiti1 ,ignaziani1 ,calasanziadi1 ,somaschi1 and of many other religious teaching-bodies that have made ,italy until recently a bustling arena of ecclesiastical educational systems4 ,the ,philosophy of ,empedocles4 ,this first instalment of ,signor ,ferrari's studies deals with the cosmological ideas of the great ,agrigentine poet-philosophers4 ,from the formation of the first elements to the highest functions of the human soul throughout1 we perceive that everything is governed by the same laws1 and that which is best1 all happiness in fact1 is only found in unity and harmony1 evil and pain in disagreement and in separation4 ,the law of evolution1 in the modern sense of the word1 prevails everywhere in the physical system of ,empedocles4 ,yet his philosophy did not exclusively consist in mechanical evolution4 ,to his cosmological doctrines were added moral and religious tenets1 which1 however1 are not evolved continuously with the former4 7,rome4 ,tipografia delle ,terme ,diocleziane di ,g4 ,balbi--#afj ,via ,cavour1 #afb47 4 ,,voprosui ,,filosofii ,i ,,psichologii4 ,vol4 ,,ii4 ,no4 #d4 ,may1 #ahia4 ,,contents3 ,,ethics ,,of ,,life ,,and ,,of ,,the ,,free ,,ideal4 ,by ,k4 ,ventzel4 7,in this article the writer explains and criticises the well-known ethical theories of the late ,french thinker ,m4 ,guyau47 ,,the ,,pessimist ,,theories ,,of ,,knowledge3 ,,criticism1 ,,positivism4 ,by ,e4 de ,roberti4 ,,religious ,,metaphysics ,,of ,,the ,,moslem ,,orient4 7,conclusion47 ,by ,s4 ,umanetz4 ,,letters ,,on ,,count ,,tolsto',s ,,book4 8,on ,life40 7,conclusion47 ,by ,a4 ,kozloff4 7,the writer concludes his letters to ,mr4 ,n4 ,n4 with remarks to the effect that count ,tolsto's philosophy in all its aspects and phases is manifestly characterized by a principle of dualism4 ,in the development of this general principle through the different phases of his system and in his theory of knowledge this dualism might assume the name of rationalism1 in metaphysics1 that of idealism1 and in ethics the name of ascetical1 quietistic eudemonism4 ,,on ,,determinism ,,in ,,connection ,,with ,,mathematical ,,psychology4 ,by ,n4 ,shishkin4 ,lecture delivered before the ,moscow ,psychological ,society4 ,february1 #ahia4 ,,the ,,domain ,,and ,,limits ,,of ,,suggestion4 ,by ,n4 ,bajenoff4 ,lecture delivered at the annual session of the ,moscow ,psychological ,society4 ,january1 #ahia4 ,,anent ,,the ,,fictions ,,of ,,professed ,,christianity4 ,by ,vladimir ,solovieff4 7,this article has appeared in an ,english translation in ,the ,open ,court1 ,nos4 #bjf and #bjh1 under the title 8,christianity3 ,its ,spirit and its ,errors40 ,it is a remarkable contribution to the literature of to-day4 ,professor ,nicolas von ,grote of ,moscow writes about its author3 8,vladimir ,solovieff is at present1 besides the ,count ,tolsto1 our most eminent thinker2 he is a distinguished philosopher as well as theologian4444 ,you ,americans should be familiar with his works on religious and ecclesiastical #8questions'40 ,vladimir ,solovieff is the author of the following works3 8,the ,religious ,foundations of ,life10 8,the ,dogmatic ,development of the ,church10 8,judaism and the ,christian ,question40 7,these titles are translated from the ,russian47 ,other writings of his are 8,l'ide russe10 8,la ,russie et l'glise universelle10 8,geschichte der ,theokratie407 ,,special ,,department4 7#a7 ,hegel's ,ontology4 ,a ,posthumous ,dissertation4 ,by ,n4 ,p4 ,h4 ,platonoff4 7#b7 ,the ,influence of fatigue upon the intuition of special relations4 ,by ,nik4 ,marn4 7#c7 ,fundamental moments in the evolution of the new philosophy4 ,main tendencies of the new philosophy4 ,empiricism and ,naturalism4 ,bacon and ,hobbes4 ,by ,n4 ,grote4 7,moscow47 4 ,,footnotes3 #bf ,specially translated for ,the ,monist4 #bg ,metamorphose der ,thiere4 #bh ,vierteljahrsschr4 f4 wissensch4 ,phil4 #ahij4 #c1 p4 #bdi-bib4 #bi ,zeitschrift fr ,phil4 n4 philos4 ,kritik4 ,vol4 #ie1 p4 #agc4 #ahhi4 ,,vol4 ,,ii4 ,,january1 #ahib4 ,,no4 #b4 ,,the ,,monist4 ,,mental ,,evolution4 ,,an ,,old ,,speculation ,,in ,a ,,new ,,light4 ,the theory of organic evolution1 now generally accepted1 needs to be supplemented by a theory of mental evolution4 ,on a superficial examination of the matter the necessity for such a supplementary theory does not perhaps strike one as obvious1 the mental seeming naturally to arise out of the organic and to be part of one continuous development4 ,but closer investigation and a more rigid and exact treatment bring to light certain important and peculiar features1 and disclose the necessity of some such hypothesis as it is my purpose to set forth briefly in the following pages4 ,by organic evolution ,i mean the natural development1 whether by 8selection0 alone or by this in co-operation with other natural processes1 of the organisms which live upon the surface of this earth2 and by mental evolution ,i mean the natural development of the mental faculties in at least the higher animals among these organisms4 ,now with regard to organic evolution there is no common and general agreement in respect of the first origin of primitive life on the earth4 ,some evolutionists believe that the living was somewhen1 somehow1 and somewhere evolved from the not-living4 ,others do not feel justified in holding this view1 and deem it wiser to restrict their speculations as to natural genesis within the limits of the organic4 ,so too at the other end of the developmental curve2 there is no common and general agreement as to the evolution of the mental faculties or spiritual being of man4 ,some evolutionists believe that both in body and in mind1 man is the product of natural development2 others do not feel justified in holding this view1 and retain unshaken the conviction that man in his spiritual essence is no part nor product of the common elements of nature4 ,seeing then that on either side there is want of agreement1 on the one hand as to the origin of life1 on the other as to the origin of man1 ,i shall deal for the most part with that large area concerning which there is a more unanimous consensus of opinion1 and in the main confine my speculations within the field of mental evolution in animals1 ranging1 say1 from the amba to the dog4 ,few will be found to deny or even to question the fact that our dumb companions and four-footed friends have mental faculties which enable them accurately to adjust their actions to the varied circumstances in the midst of which their lives are passed4 ,even if we see cause to hesitate1 as ,i myself hesitate1 before we ascribe to them self-consciousness and reason1 in the narrower sense in which this word is used2 still we must acknowledge that their instincts are powerful1 their intelligence wonderfully keen and active2 and that they are capable of strong emotional feeling both of affection and of antipathy4 ,should we so welcome them as our companions and friends if we regarded them as unconscious1 insentient automata8 ,but when we turn to the other end of the scale of life1 to the amba and all the myriad minutiae that swarm in ponds and stagnant pools1 we are wont to speak with less confidence4 ,their consciousness1 if so we can call it1 is of so simple an order1 their sentience of so low a grade1 that we can hardly with any accuracy use the phrase 8mental faculties0 with reference to organisms so lowly4 ,we feel uncertain whether in their case unconscious automatism does not after all pretty accurately express the facts4 ,at any rate it would trouble us little or not at all if some one proved their automatism to-morrow4 ,and yet1 on the theory of evolution1 out of such lowly beginnings have sprung the sagacity and affectionate devotion of the dog4 ,but if the amba and his tribe are insentient automata1 at what stage of the development did consciousness creep in8 ,and whence came it8 ,or put what is fundamentally the same question in another way4 ,in the common course of generation the dog is developed from a minute egg-cell1 one hundredth of an inch or less in diameter1 with which a yet more minute sperm has entered into fertile union4 ,supplied with shelter1 warmth1 and nutriment by that maternal self-sacrifice which is a deeply significant fact of organic progress1 this little speck of living stuff passes1 by a process strictly continuous1 though profoundly modified by the catastrophe of birth1 into the dog with its wealth of intelligence and affection4 ,it is surely impossible without extravagance to speak of the fertilised ovum as conscious4 ,where then in the continuous process of development does consciousness come in8 ,how1 and whence8 ,we are not nowadays to be put off with the ambiguous assertion that consciousness and intelligence are 8potentially0 present in the germ4 ,we ask3 ,what is actually present therein as the basis of this potentiality8 ,or are we told that consciousness dawns at or shortly after the catastrophe of birth8 ,then again we ask3 ,whence comes this dawning consciousness1 and by what means does it become associated with the puppy's brain8 ,in yet another form does a question of like general implication suggest itself4 ,granted that in the ovum there is present something which we may call the germ of consciousness somehow associated with the protoplasmic material of which that ovum is constituted4 ,how comes it that1 in the adult dog1 consciousness is associated with the brain8 ,why is the association of consciousness concentrated1 so to speak1 in this one tissue of the many which arise during the differentiation of development8 ,that the association is so concentrated or specialised is now generally admitted to be the fact4 ,we speak indeed of the skin1 the palate1 the nose1 the eye1 the ear1 as each in its kind sensitive4 ,but none the less we believe that the seat of consciousness is the brain or some part of it4 ,only when the nerves running inwards from skin1 palate1 nose1 eye1 or ear1 have conveyed their appropriate stimuli to the brain1 does that organ tingle with the accompaniment of consciousness4 ,there and there only does consciousness 8emerge02 not in peripheral sense-organ or ingoing nerve4 ,but why8 ,how comes it that there is this peculiar association of consciousness with the functioning of a particular organ8 ,perhaps we are told that consciousness is the special product of brain-tissue4 ,but let us note that the word 8product0 is here used in an unwonted sense4 ,we are not likely1 it is to be hoped1 to fall into the crude and demonstrably false materialism expressed in the formula1 8as the liver secretes bile1 so does the brain secrete consciousness40 ,consciousness being immaterial1 the second and fourth terms are incommensurable1 and the formula is sheer nonsense4 ,nor are we likely 7though here there is greater danger7 to fall into the more subtle error of regarding consciousness as a mode of energy4 8,granted10 says ,professor ,tyndall1 8that a definite thought and a definite molecular action of the brain occur simultaneously2 we do not possess the intellectual organ1 nor apparently any rudiment of the organ1 which would enable us to pass by a process of reasoning from the one to the other3 the chasm between the two classes of phenomena would still remain intellectually impassable40 ,consciousness is something sui generis4 ,it is neither matter nor energy4 ,it may accompany the transformations of energy in the dog's brain2 but to the category of these transformations of energy it does not1 and1 for any clear thinker1 can not belong4 ,and if we are told that the word 8product0 is used in the sense implied by ,professor ,huxley when he speaks of phenomena of consciousness being 8called into existence0 by physical processes2 then we must again ask whence they are called into existence4 ,we do not now speak of matter or energy being called into existence from a shadowy nowhere4 ,when a cloud is called into existence on a mountain peak we know that the material particles have only assumed a new form4 ,when the electrical current is called into existence or generated as we phrase it1 we know that we are dealing with one of the many transformations of energy4 ,and when phenomena of consciousness are said to be called into existence1 we have a right to ask3 ,do you mean1 by this phrase1 creation ex nihilo8 ,or do you mean1 origin by transformation8 ,and if the latter1 transformation of what8 ,having thus opened up these several questions1 all of like implication1 let us now endeavor to set forth the answer which seems most philosophical and most closely in accordance with scientific analogies4 ,and to this end let us consider the living dog4 ,his frame is pulsating with life and restless activity1 and somehow associated with the transformations of energy in that brain of his there is consciousness--or what in the dog is the analogue of that consciousness with which alone ,i can claim any acquaintance at first hand1 my own4 ,were his skin and the walls of his skull as transparent as glass2 did the molecular vibrations of his brain lie open to the keenest scrutiny of the physical investigator2 could we trace in detail all the varied and orderly transformations of energy of which that brain is the theatre2 the accompanying consciousness would still be beyond our reach4 ,we might follow the changes of energy2 he alone would feel the states of consciousness4 ,but suppose that the dog dies4 ,his body lies before us stiff with the rigor mortis4 ,if we had weighed it previous to death1 and if we were to weigh it again after death1 the scales would give us no information of the departure of anything material4 ,all signs of consciousness1 however1 are gone4 ,and could we see through skin and skull into the brain1 which during life was the theatre of so complex and orderly a sequence of transformations of energy1 we should find that it was still and motionless4 ,it is true that we cannot actually do this4 ,but we know that1 whereas1 during life1 the functional action of the brain gives rise to certain material products1 at death the production of these substances ceases4 ,we are therefore justified in saying that1 omitting minor qualifications1 the orderly transformations of energy in the brain and the concomitant consciousness cease together at death4 ,closely associated during life1 varying together in health and sickness1 ceasing together at death1 what is the nature of their connection8 ,on the hypothesis of scientific monism it is believed that they are different aspects of the same phenomena3 that what objectively to the physical investigator are transformations of energy in the brain1 are subjectively to the dog states of consciousness8 ,let us look into this hypothesis4 ,let us see whither it will lead us2 and if it will in any way help us over some of our difficulties4 ,but first let us pay a moment's attention to the impatient exclamation which some may feel inclined to interpose1 that this assumption of the ultimate identity of brain-energy and consciousness1 the two being respectively the objective and subjective aspects of the same occurrences1 does not in the least do away with the mystery of the matter4 ,that the same two occurrences should have different aspects1 objective and subjective1 is1 it will be said1 just as mysterious as that two separate existences energy and consciousness should be associated together4 ,of course it is4 ,i should be shallow and pretentious indeed if my object were by any hocus pocus to attempt to hide the so-called mystery4 ,all ultimate facts are mysterious4 ,the fall of a stone to the ground is to-day as mysterious as it was in the days before ,newton2 the phenomena of life1 as mysterious as in the days before ,darwin4 ,our advances in science and in thought may do away with minor mysteries1 but they leave the great ultimate facts of nature as mysterious as before4 ,the end of our explanations is always to bring us face to face with the inexplicable4 ,not1 therefore1 in any hope of doing away with an ultimate mystery do ,i suggest that we look into and follow out some implications of this so called identity hypothesis4 ,let us regard the matter from the objective aspect first1 from the side to which the occurrences present themselves as transformations of energy4 ,the state of consciousness being ex hypothesi accompanied or 8called into existence0 by certain complex and orderly molecular vibrations in the brain or some part thereof1 we have to note that from the physical point of view these molecular vibrations constitute an exceeding complex and orderly mode of energy4 ,it is upon this energy that we must fix our attention2 the material structure of the brain being what we may call the vehicle of its manifestation4 ,i am anxious that the reader should carefully follow me here4 ,we are too apt to regard the structure as the essential thing on which to concentrate our mental gaze1 partly no doubt because1 through the invaluable labors of microscopists1 we know so much that is definite about this structure4 ,but a more penetrating insight enables us to see that the structure is merely the necessary basis of what is the really important thing--the manifestation of energy4 ,the material structure of a steam-engine is of importance4 ,but why8 ,because it is the vehicle for the performance of work4 ,that is the really essential part of the business4 ,in like manner nerve-structure is of importance4 ,but why8 ,because it is the vehicle for what ,professor ,huxley happily termed the neurosis1 the complex and orderly manifestation of energy4 ,the essential importance of looking at the going machine1 at the performance of work1 at the energy of the matter in motion1 not merely the material structure that is moved--the essential importance1 ,i say1 of fixing our attention on this1 being fairly grasped1 we may now proceed to enquire from what the complex and orderly vibrations of the dog's brain have been evolved4 ,in the fertilised ovum from which the dog was developed1 7and the same is true of the amboid ancestor from which1 hypothetically1 the race of dogs has been evolved17 there is certainly nothing approaching the orderly complexity of these molecular vibrations4 ,but there are simpler organic modes of motion from which these complex molecular vibrations have arisen by a continuous process of development4 ,it is from these simpler modes of energy in the simpler organic substance of the ovum that the more complex modes of energy which characterise the workings of the dog's brain have been evolved4 ,in the development of the ovum into the embryo1 and thence into the puppy and the dog1 we may trace step by step all the stages of the evolution of those material structures which are the vehicles of these special manifestations of organic energy4 ,we may watch the further and further differentiation of the nervous tissue1 and the fashioning of the brain and its parts4 ,it is true that we cannot indicate the exact moment when1 in the increasing complexity of the tissues1 the simpler forms of organic energy pass into the higher form of brain energy accompanied by consciousness4 ,but that is just because it is a continuous development1 an evolution4 ,that the passage from the one into the other does actually take place we are bound1 by all the canons of logical reasoning1 to admit4 ,it is only during life1 however1 that neurosis occurs or is possible4 ,a great number of modes of organic energy proceed side by side in the pulsating tissues of the living dog1 their orderly continuance being what we term life4 ,and only in and through their orderly continuance is the maintenance of the structure of the tissues rendered possible4 ,the organic structure is like a spinning top4 ,only so long as it spins and manifests its proper energy is its stability maintained4 ,all around it are forces which tend to make it totter to its fall4 ,but so long as it spins freely it can resist all minor attempts to upset its stability4 ,and when the dog dies2 what happens then8 ,the molecular vibrations of the brain in common with all other forms of organic energy cease4 ,the top no longer spins2 and the structure totters to its fall4 ,decomposition sets in4 ,the orderly organic changes which characterise life1 give place to the destructive changes which characterise decay4 ,but according to the law of the conservation of energy1 although there is decomposition of the tissues of which the body was composed there is no destruction or annihilation of energy4 ,the particular modes of energy through which the body was instinct with life pass away2 but only to give rise to their equivalents in other modes of energy4 ,just as the puddle in the road disappears1 but only to give origin to an equivalent mass of invisible water-vapor2 just as the candle disappears1 but only to give rise to its equivalent mass in the products of combustion2 so throughout life and in death the energy which throbs in the tissues neither appears nor disappears except at the expense of1 or to the gain of1 other modes of energy4 ,life is like a vortex in a rapid stream2 on surrounding energy it is dependent for its continued existence2 into surrounding energy it melts away4 ,and this is true not only of individual life but of life in its entirety4 ,some believe that the vortex had a natural origin1 the organic being evolved from the inorganic4 ,others hold that it was through the direct interposition of the finger of ,god that the tiny vortex of primitive life was set a twirling4 ,be this as it may1 once initiated the vortex of life is dependent on surrounding stores of energy4 ,turning now from the objective aspect to the subjective aspect we pass from neural processes to states of consciousness4 ,in the language of the identity hypothesis1 here provisionally adopted1 the states of consciousness in the dog's mind1 are the subjective aspect of what1 from the objective aspect1 are the molecular vibrations of his brain-tissues4 ,and as in considering the matter objectively1 so now in regarding the mental aspect1 we must ask from what the complex and orderly states of consciousness of the dog's mind have been evolved4 ,in the fertilised ovum from which the dog is developed1 7and the same is true of the amboid ancestor from which1 hypothetically1 the race of dogs has been evolved17 nothing so complex as a state of consciousness is to be found4 ,from what then have the states of consciousness been evolved8 ,do we not seem forced by parity of reasoning to answer3 ,from something more simple than consciousness but of the same order of existence1 which answers subjectively to the simpler organic energy of the fertilised ovum8 ,such1 at any rate1 is the hypothesis which appears to me the most philosophical and the most logically consistent4 ,it requires1 however1 no little effort of thought to conceive the existence of those elementary states from which consciousness may have had its origin4 ,we may be aided in doing so1 perhaps1 if we fix our attention on the close association of brain-energy and states of consciousness1 regarding them as distinguishable but not separable4 ,now the nervous energy of the brain is extraordinarily complex2 and yet we believe that it arises by a process of continuous development from the much less complex energy of the fertilised ovum4 ,in the ovum there is no brain-energy2 there is only the far simpler germinal energy from which it is evolved4 ,so too1 the consciousness in the dog's mind is wonderfully complex2 but if it has arisen by a process of development1 it must have been evolved from something of like nature only indefinitely simpler4 ,may we not fairly suppose1 therefore1 that in the fertilised ovum1 though there is no consciousness1 there are the germinal states from which consciousness may be evolved8 ,or to put the matter tersely1 may we not say3 ,as the complex molecular vibrations of the brain are to the simpler molecular vibrations of the ovum2 so are the complex states of consciousness associated with the former to the simpler states of infra-consciousness1 if we may so call them1 associated with the latter8 ,it is the association of consciousness and infra-consciousness with energy--its objective manifestation--that is the distinguishing feature of the view which ,i am endeavoring to set forth4 ,concomitant with the evolution of higher modes of organic energy from those lowly modes which alone obtain in the ovum or the amba1 is the evolution of consciousness from lowly modes of infra-consciousness4 ,it is true that it is only through the exercise of the conceptual faculty of reason1 never through the senses or by direct perception1 that we can reach this suggested infra-consciousness4 ,but this will hardly be regarded as a valid objection by those who believe in the existence of the ether1 or by those who adopt the atomic theory1 neither of which could be reached by the senses or by perception alone4 ,still less will it be regarded as an objection by those who have grasped the distinction between energy as manifested in the objective world1 and consciousness as inevitably subjective4 ,of no consciousness other than our own have we direct and first-hand experience4 ,and yet certain manifestations of energy as exhibited by other living beings force upon us the conviction that we are not alone in possessing the subjective attribute of consciousness4 ,that not only the dog and the elephant1 but the bee also and the spider are endowed with this attribute and are conscious1 though not self-conscious1 few of us doubt for a moment4 ,but their consciousness is presumably far simpler than ours4 ,carrying this simplification yet farther down the scale of animal life1 we reach in the jelly-fish1 the sea-anemone1 and the sponge1 forms of life which can hardly be said to be conscious at all with a consciousness comparable to our own4 ,yet they would seem to be endowed with the dim foreshadowings of such consciousness4 ,finally in the amba and the monad we have these dim foreshadowings reduced to the lowest terms that are suggested by the study of organic life4 ,if1 then1 in the series of organic forms1 down even to the lowest1 we admit consciousness or its foreshadowing1 though it lies and must ever lie beyond the reach of our senses1 why should we hesitate to generalise our belief in logical and scientific form1 and hold that all organic modes of energy are associated with conscious or infra-conscious states8#cj ,it may perhaps1 be objected that such a view1 carried to its logical conclusion involves the supposition that all the tissues of the body are conscious or at least infra-conscious1 whereas it is a well-established scientific conclusion that consciousness is specially associated with the nervous tissue of the brain4 ,i see no reason1 however1 why this conclusion should not be accepted4 ,if the organic transformations of energy in the ovum are associated with what for lack of a better term ,i have here called infra-consciousness1 then there are two possibilities4 ,either the accompanying consciousness is entirely concentrated in association with the molecular vibrations of the brain2 or it merely becomes dominant in the functioning of that tissue and continues in the dim infra-conscious condition in the other tissues of the body4 ,now to judge from our own experience it is only the dominant molecular vibrations in the brain that are accompanied by the clear light of consciousness4 ,the sub-dominant neural changes are indeed accompanied by a dim sub-consciousness4 ,but there are many molecular changes 7even in the cerebral hemispheres themselves where consciousness is 8called into existence07 which do not rise to the level of consciousness at all or are quite lost in the glare of that consciousness4 ,why this should be so ,i am not prepared to say4 ,it seems to be a law of our mental being4 ,certainly it is convenient that it is so2 and it may have been fostered or established by natural selection4 ,we all know the sense of confusion that arises when1 in certain states of intense nervous excitement1 a host of ideas are crowding up into dominance and jostling each other for supremacy4 ,an organism so constituted that such a state of things was normal1 would1 we may suppose1 stand but a poor chance of survival4 ,hence perhaps there has arisen that due subordination of conscious1 sub-conscious1 and infra-conscious states which characterises the normal life of conscious beings4 ,having regard1 then1 to the cerebral hemispheres where consciousness emerges1 not all the molecular changes there transpiring rise to the level of full consciousness4 ,there is not a little of what ,dr4 ,carpenter used to call unconscious cerebration4 ,we seem forced to admit the existence of submerged states of consciousness2 states which are infra-conscious1 but which may become conscious at any moment by rising into dominance4 ,and if in the cerebral hemispheres there are infra-conscious states1 why should there not be associated with every molecular thrill of the living body yet lower states of infra-consciousness too deeply submerged ever in man to become dominant8 ,it is1 however1 one thing to show that there is no insuperable objection to accepting the existence of such infra-conscious states1 if such existence be otherwise probable1 and another thing to establish this probability4 ,and this leads us back again to the grounds on which their existence may fairly be regarded as probable4 ,we are told that the mental faculties of the dog in common with his physical or organic frame1 have arisen in the course of ages by a process of development4 ,it is clear that such a statement is intended to apply to the living dog with active faculties2 to a going mechanism1 or rather organism which is also conscious4 ,well and good4 ,the material structure has been evolved from lower forms of matter3 the organic modes of energy 7in virtue of which he lives71 from lower forms of energy1 the mental states 7in virtue of which he is conscious71 from--what8 ,i suggest in continuation and conclusion of this sentence--from lower forms of infra-consciousness2 that is to say1 of what is of the same order of existence as consciousness1 but has not yet risen to the level of consciousness4 ,many people will no doubt see no necessity for such a conclusion4 ,it is making an unnecessary bother1 they will say1 about a very simple matter4 ,at some undefined stage of organic evolution--perhaps when nervous tissue had its genesis1 perhaps earlier--consciousness began to dawn and has since developed in clearness and brightness during the evolution of higher and higher organisms4 ,according to this view1 the ascending curve of evolution is divisible at some undefined point into two portions3 of which one represents organic evolution previous to the dawn of consciousness2 the other organic evolution subsequent to the dawn of consciousness4 ,but the question at once suggests itself3 ,from what did consciousness dawn at this undefined point8 ,in answer to which there are some who do not hesitate to reply that the consciousness arose out of the physical conditions2 that when the rhythmic dance of organic molecules reached a certain intensity and intricacy consciousness was developed4 ,there is1 indeed1 a certain class of nerve-physiologists1 or of medical men who write on nerve-physiology1 who1 if they do not hold that states of consciousness are generated from the energy which accompanies the working of the brain-tissues1 at any rate write as if this was their belief4 ,but such a view is quite untenable4 ,if there is one thing clearly established1 both by those who have approached the matter from the scientific side1 and by those who have approached the matter from the metaphysical side1 it is that the distinction between energy and consciousness is radical and absolute4 ,no conceivable increase in the orderly complexity of the molecular vibrations of brain-tissue could give rise to that consciousness which differs toto clo from any manifestation of energy4 ,and yet though stated in a form that is philosophically false1 and therefore misleading1 the conclusions of these earnest students of nerve-physiology are practically sound4 ,grant1 for the moment1 that the states of consciousness in the dog's mind are the subjective aspect of the molecular energy of his brain4 ,then the following diagram 7,fig4 #a47 will represent the ascending curve of development which1 from the objective aspect1 is a development of modes of energy1 and from the subjective aspect is a development of modes of consciousness4 ,illustration3 ,,fig4 #a4 ,now what the nerve-physiologists are sometimes apt to do is1 at some moment of development say a1 to change their point of view1 from the subjective aspect which deals with consciousness to the objective aspect which deals with energy4 ,their conclusions are practically sound because they are still dealing with the same developmental curve4 ,they state these conclusions in language which is philosophically misleading because they suddenly jump from the subjective aspect to the objective aspect and ignore the great distinction between the two4 ,when they say that consciousness emerges from the physical conditions at a1 they presumably mean that at this point we are first justified in speaking of consciousness or the subjective aspect in anything like a human sense4 ,but is it not more logical to hold that1 just as from the objective standpoint the complex energy of the dog's brain has been developed from the simpler energy of the ovum1 so from the subjective standpoint1 the complex consciousness of the dog's mind has been developed from the simpler infra-consciousness of the ovum8 ,and if we do not accept this view1 do we not seem committed to the unevolutionary doctrine that the conscious aspect suddenly makes its appearance1 without those lowly germinal beginnings which it is of the essence of any theory of development to postulate8 ,it will perhaps be said that all this assumes an identity hypothesis1 with its supposed double aspect1 which is not accepted by the majority of men of science4 ,let us look at the matter1 therefore1 from what would seem the only other point of view open to one who accepts the theory of development as applicable alike to the dog's mind and to the dog's body4 ,if states of consciousness and the molecular transactions in the brain are not different aspects of the same occurrences1 they are parallel1 concomitant1 or associated phenomena4 ,our diagram will thus become that given below4 ,illustration3 ,,fig4 #b4 ,here the parallel or associated phenomena occur together at the higher end of the developmental curve1 and1 at a1 the consciousness is supposed to emerge4 ,on this view there is less justification for the nerve-physiologists' assertion that it arises out of physical processes2 for it is not simply another aspect of these processes1 but something wholly different arbitrarily associated with them4 ,even on this view it would seem more logical to suppose that since the association of mental states with the dominant neural energy is of normal occurrence from a onwards1 the consciousness there emerging has been evolved from infra-consciousness parallel and concomitant with the physical processes in the ovum4 ,if this be not so1 we may once more ask3 ,from what has the parallel line to the right of the diagram been evolved8 ,we cannot say from the neural conditions without changing our point of view and ignoring the great distinction between matter and energy on the one hand and consciousness on the other4 ,from what then has the consciousness been evolved1 if not from something of like nature only indefinitely simpler which has here been spoken of as infra consciousness8 ,we must now take a further step1 one however in which all evolutionists will not be prepared to follow us4 ,attention has already been drawn to the fact that those who accept the theory of evolution are not agreed in their faith--for it is on either side a matter rather of belief than of demonstration--with respect to the origin of life4 ,some believe that the primitive organic germs were not produced by natural development nor through any process of evolution4 ,for such1 the hypothesis ,i am advocating must be submitted in the following form--when first the life-energy was started by the direct interposition of the finger of ,god it was endowed with some dim form of infra-consciousness which in the course of evolution developed into consciousness4 ,and presumably those who see in the amba and the fertilised ovum some dim foreshadowings of consciousness may follow me thus far4 ,but for those who believe that the organic has arisen on this earth by process of natural development from the inorganic1 the hypothesis must be more sweeping in its range4 ,we must say that all modes of energy of whatever kind whether organic or inorganic have their conscious or infra-conscious aspect4#ca ,startling as this may sound there is1 ,i believe1 no other logical conclusion possible for the evolutionist pur sang4 ,for where are we to draw the line8 ,the states of consciousness of the higher animals have been evolved from lower forms of infra-consciousness in the amba-like or yet more simple protoplasmic germs in the dawn of life4 ,but if those low forms of organic infra-consciousness were themselves evolved1 from what could they arise if they were not developed from yet more lowly forms of infra-consciousness similar in kind but inferior in degree associated with inorganic transformations of energy8 ,in any case it is here submitted that this doctrine that infra-consciousness is associated with all forms of energy is necessarily implied in the phrase mental evolution for all thinkers who have grasped the distinction between consciousness and energy4 ,and if this be admitted there is disclosed1 by implication1 an answer behind and beyond that ordinarily given to a question which has again and again been asked--the question3--,is there a conservation of consciousness analogous to the conservation of energy8 ,the negative answer generally given to this question results from the fact that the question itself has always been put in a form which does not admit of a satisfactory solution4 ,there is not a conservation of consciousness any more than there is a conservation of neural energy or a conservation of electricity4 ,there is no conservation of neural energy because this is only one mode of energy which may be transformed into other modes4 ,not until we have generalised energy so as to include all its modes can we speak of conservation in reference to it4 ,so too not until we have generalised that universal form of existence1 of which consciousness is only the highest and most developed mode1 so as to include all modes1 can we speak of conservation in reference to it4 ,but so generalised ,i submit that there is a conservation of that form of existence which includes both consciousness and infra-consciousness1 co-ordinate and coextensive with the conservation of energy4#cb ,just as the dominant neural transformations in the dog's brain are like a special vortex in the onward-flowing stream of the world's energy1 so are the states of consciousness in his mind like a special vortex in the onward flowing stream of that mode of existence which1 whether it have risen to the level of consciousness or not1 is still of the conscious order4 ,for the believer in scientific monism there is but one vortex1 objectively presented as energy1 subjectively felt in consciousness4 ,for the dualist there are two vortices1 7#a7 an objective vortex and 7#b7 a subjective vortex associated with the other and 8called into existence0 by it4 ,in either case the vortex is dependent for its continual existence on surrounding stores of that out of which it has arisen2 and in either case the modern tendencies of scientific thought suggest conservation which is but the antithesis of creation ex nihilo4#cc ,in conclusion it should be noted that this hypothesis is but a new presentation of an old speculation4 ,it differs as it here stands from any theory of 8mind-stuff0 in that it regards the question rather from the dynamical than from the statical point of view4 ,not 8mind-stuff0 answering to matter but a universal conscious order or aspect of existence answering to universal energy is the leading idea ,i have sought to develop4 ,in its newer form1 again1 this hypothesis differs from the view that 8all force is will-power10 or the view that 8all matter is conscious10 or the theory of 8intelligent monads10 in endeavoring1 not to carry anything like our consciousness down into association with the simpler manifestations of energy1 but rather to seek in association with these lower manifestations the germinal states indefinitely simpler than consciousness1 from which nevertheless consciousness has been developed4 ,finally the keynote of this newer presentation is that which is the keynote of all modern theories of life and of thought--the doctrine of evolution4 ,c4 ,,lloyd ,,morgan4 ,,footnotes3 #cj ,i have elsewhere 7,animal ,life and ,intelligence1 p4 #dfg7 suggested the term kinesis for the manifestation of energy1 and the term metakinesis for its conscious or infra-conscious aspect4 #ca ,in the phraseology ,i have elsewhere suggested1 there is no kinesis unaccompanied by its metakinetic aspect4 #cb ,that is to say1 a conservation of metakinesis co-ordinate and coextensive with the kinetic conservation of energy4 #cc ,the bearing of this conservation of consciousness and infra-consciousness 7metakinesis7 on ,eastern conceptions of immortality and on transmigration would be an interesting theme to follow out but is beyond the scope of the present paper4 ,,the ,,new ,,civilisation ,,depends ,,on ,,mechanical ,,invention4 ,by reason of his physical nature man is hampered by three wants--he needs food1 clothing1 and shelter4 ,in his first and lowest stage of civilisation man lives in a state of enthrallment to nature4 ,he dreads and worships the cruel forces of matter4 ,but by the aid of science1 and invention which flows from science1 man attains domination or control over things and forces and directs them into the service of humanity for use or for beauty4 ,the soul conquers nature by science and machinery and then it next desires to see this conquest over nature reflected in works of art4 ,hence it creates architecture1 sculpture1 painting1 music1 and poetry1 all of these fine arts portraying man's victory over wants and necessities4 ,if the spectacle of pauperism and crime1 the savagery that still lingers in the slums of our cities1 sternly reminds us of the yet feeble hold which our civilisation has obtained even in cities--if the census of mankind proves that three-fourths are yet counted as below the line that separates the half-civilised from the civilised--yet we are wont to console ourselves by the promise and potency which we can all discern in productive industry aided by the might of science and invention4 ,this view is always hopeful4 ,we see that there is a sort of geometric progress in the conquest over things and forces4 ,the ability of man to create wealth continually accelerates4 ,the more he obtains the more he can obtain4 ,the more each one gets the more his neighbor also can get4 ,even the weakling of society1 the pauper or beggar1 the insane1 and the criminal all fare better in the centres of wealth than they do at a distance from them where there is no wealth to beg or steal and no asylums created and sustained by wealth to shelter and heal their diseased bodies4 ,wealth in the modern sense of the word1 far more than in its ancient sense1 is self-productive4 ,it is capital1 and capital is wealth that generates wealth4 ,capital represents conquered forces and things--conquered for the supply of human wants4 ,capital consists of natural forces yoked and set to work for food1 clothing1 shelter1 and the facilities of human culture4 ,the three physical wants 7food1 clothing1 and shelter7 are produced by nature--they are the chains and fetters whereby nature asserts her right to enslave humanity--to keep man in a state of thralldom4 ,but the ,promethean cunning of man1 realised first in science and next in useful machines1 has succeeded in subduing the powers of nature and imposing on them the task of supplying and gratifying the very needs which nature creates in us4 ,nature had chained man to the task of daily toil for food1 clothing1 and shelter4 ,but man turns back upon nature and compels her to take the place of human drudgery and produce an abundance of these needed supplies and bring them wherever they are needed for consumption4 ,this is accomplished by mechanical combinations that secure the service of steam1 electricity1 and various devices of earth1 air1 fire1 and water4 ,this self-generating wealth that exists in the shape of capital is so much on the increase that it fills all classes of our population with hopes or if not with hopes at least with discontents--and discontent is certainly the product of hope struggling up from the depths of the soul4 ,without the vivid perception of a higher ideal and without the feeling that it is attainable1 there would not be any such thing as discontent4 ,the average production of man1 woman1 and child in the ,united ,states increased in the thirty years between #ahej and #ahhj from about #be cents per day to #dj cents per day--an increase of over #fj per cent4 ,this means the production of far more substantial improvements for human comfort4 ,much more wealth is created that possesses an enduring character and may be handed down to the next generation4 ,finer dwellings1 better roads and streets1 fences for lands1 drainings and levelings1 and the processes necessary to bring wild land under cultivation1 artificial supplies of water and gas1 the warehouses and elevators1 and the appliances of commerce--and finally the buildings and furnishings of culture1 including churches1 schools1 libraries1 museums1 asylums1 and all manner of public buildings4 ,great ,britain1 the leading nation in commerce and manufactures1 according to the returns for #ahhh 7see ,mulhall's 8,dict4 ,statistics10 new edition7 distributed comfortable incomes of #ajjj and upwards to each family of #cj per cent4 of the entire population1 and the remaining #gj per cent4 averaged #dhe per annum 7for each family74 ,france provided incomes of #acjj per annum for #bd per cent4 of its families4 ,this shows what great capitalists are doing for the creation and distribution of wealth4 ,italy showed by its income returns that less than #b per cent4 received incomes of #ajjj and upwards1 while #ih per cent4 of the families averaged less than #cjj income4 ,italy makes little use of steam power and labor saving machines4 ,if science progresses and its concomitant1 useful invention1 progresses as fast for the next hundred years as it has done for the past forty years1 the vision of ,edward ,bellamy of comfort for all will be realised without the necessity of any form of socialism4 ,there will be comfort and even luxury for all who will labor a moderate amount of time4 ,science inventories nature and discovers properties and possible combinations4 ,invention uses these combinations to meet mechanical problems4 ,can any one doubt who looks into the state of science and its continually improving methods that the conquest of nature will be more rapid in the coming century than it has been in the past century8 ,but we are challenged by the question3 ,what is the good of annihilating the necessity for bodily toil8 ,will not man degenerate spiritually as he comes to possess luxury at cheaper and cheaper rates8 ,these material advantages gained by useful invention which create a steady and permanent supply of food1 clothing1 and shelter1 are they not mere sumptuary provisions and do they imply progress in civilisation8 ,to this challenge we reply by pointing out the relation of invention to the communication of intelligence and the diffusion of knowledge by newspaper and book4 ,in the first place it is obvious that the three classes of employments devoted chiefly to the supply of the physical wants--namely agriculture1 manufactures1 and commerce--are undergoing change by aid of mechanic invention in such a manner as to bring the laborer everywhere more and more into relation with his fellow men4 ,in other words commerce increases more and more1 and becomes a part of all employments4 ,in exchanging goods each gets something that he needed more than what he parted with4 ,but the best result of the exchange is the acquaintance formed between producer and consumer4 ,each has learned something of the other's ideas1 modes of looking at the world and habits of action4 ,each one's life is enriched by the addition of the knowledge of the life of the other4 ,man as a spiritual being has for his problem the exploration of the two worlds--the worlds of nature and man4 ,the problem is too great for the individual and he must avail himself of the work of others4 ,each man may inventory a small portion of nature different from all others4 ,each one may live a life different from another's4 ,but the individual gets a very small glimpse of nature by the aid of his own senses4 ,he gets a very small arc of the total of human life in his survey of his own biography4 ,but by intercommunication each one may extend and supplement his own observations of nature and of the experience of life1--he may avail himself of the aid of the sense-perceptions of others and still more of the aid of the thoughts and reflections of others4 ,we see at once that man is man because he possesses and uses this means of re-enforcing his individual observations and reflections by those of the race4 ,man is an individual endowed with the power of absorbing the results of the race4 ,we have with this a definition of civilisation and a standard of measurement by which we may determine the rate of progress4 ,advancement means that there are improved means realised by which each individual can give to the rest of mankind the results of his living and doing and thinking and at the same time share in the lives1 thoughts1 and deeds of others4 ,looked at in the light of this definition we shall be enabled to claim progress in civilisation on substantial grounds4 ,we shall be able to see something more hopeful in the material progress promised us in the coming century than the cheap supply of bodily comforts4 ,we see a progressive increase of intercommunication which will enable each individual to command the results of the rational intelligence of all mankind4 ,man is first a speaking animal and next a writing animal4 ,each word that he uses expresses a general meaning4 ,each word therefore stores up an indefinite amount of experience4 ,all men may pour into it their experience and by it recognise the experience of others4 ,the art of writing at once increases infinitely the possibility of intercommunication because it preserves the experience recorded for persons widely separated in space and far removed in time4 ,it renders every where in some sense a here and every when a now4 ,but mechanic invention comes to the aid of speech and the elementary arts of writing by printing with movable types4 ,printing and gunpowder are two great elementary arts both attributed to the ,germanic race--the two wheels of modern civilisation so to speak4 ,but the ,anglo-,saxon has added the steam engine and the telegraph4 ,the one makes locomotion possible to an increasing degree and the other makes instantaneous intercommunication with all places possible4 ,armed with these instrumentalities our modern civilisation lives in a sort of spiritual border land4 ,it looks across the frontier and is in a constant process of interaction with all other nations4 ,the great instrument of this process is the daily newspaper4 ,our people are becoming from year to year a travelled people--in a short time the per cent4 of the population that has crossed the ocean has doubled4 ,the per cent4 that has visited the western border land has quadrupled4 ,but the number of people who live in constant daily interrelation with all mankind by aid of the daily newspaper has increased a hundred fold within a single generation4 ,the test of a civilisation is its efficiency in re-enforcing the endeavors of each individual so as to give him access to the labors of the world4 ,we are approaching a spiritual civilisation as well as an era of the general distribution of wealth4 ,w4 ,t4 ,,harris4 ,,religion ,,and ,,progress4 ,,interpreted ,,by ,,the ,,life ,,and ,,last ,,work ,,of ,,wathen ,,mark ,,wilks ,,call4 ,on ,august #bj1 #ahij1 died ,wathen ,mark ,wilks ,call1 ,m4 ,a41--a spirit finely touched to fine issues4 ,the posthumous work before me revives the sense of personal bereavement1 but soothes it with the satisfaction of holding another interview with the beloved scholar on themes that through many years engaged our conversation4 ,here is a casket of golden thoughts cast up from the deep where went down the white-winged ship freighted with such treasures4 ,the general world is unconscious that it is poorer2 its ports and marts had little welcome for the dainty wares of this unfamiliar bark4 ,many an ,american thinker will through this specimen of the sunken treasures realise the world's loss when it is irreparable2 and some who used to hover around the silver sail now vanished1 and come ashore laden with its gifts1 have wondered that this writer1 valued by ,mill1 ,george ,eliot1 and the scholarly ,english circle1 should have courted obscurity rather than fame4 ,he was not indolent1 though his published volumes were few3 8,lyra ,hellenica0 7#ahdb71 8,reverberations0 7#ahdi1 second edition #ahgf71 8,golden ,histories0 7#ahga74 ,besides his poems1 his contributions in the reviews1--some1 like 8,the ,nero ,saga0 7,theological ,review1 ,july1 #ahga71 equal to volumes1--would make a substantial and important collection4 ,there is enough thought and learning in his poems and anonymous articles1 to have earned fame for an ambitious and pushing author4 ,why then did the world get so much less than it ought to have got from this fine and active brain1 and why is he so little known8 ,many years ago ,i heard from his own lips the story of his life1 which is partly told in the fifty pages that introduce this book1 under the title 8,a ,chapter from my ,autobiography40 ,it will there be seen that even so late as thirty-six years ago the finest minds and hearts that could not accept creed-dogmas might be almost mortally wounded4 ,from that time he lived and wrote as from a retreat4 ,the actual case1 as he told it me1 was that his sister1 a widow1 left him executor of her last will and testament1 and the guardian of her children4 ,he was tenderly attached to this sister and to her children4 ,she knew his opinions and his doubts4 ,when he went into the court for confirmation of his trust he was confronted by the postscript of a letter he had written to a supposed friend intimating his 8dissent from the creeds of the churches40 ,for this mild and vague heresy he was prevented from acting as the guardian of his sister's children1 and fulfilling a sacred trust4 ,at this time he was a clergyman in the ,church of ,england1 which to-day contains many ministers more unorthodox than ,mr4 ,call was when he received this crushing legal blow4 ,this public disgrace of a sensitive scholar1 the loss of position1 the alienation of friends1 added to the grief of seeing his sister's children carried to strangers1 parted him from the world4 ,he seemed to have no place in it4 ,stunned1 lacerated1 he had no heart to enter on any new profession4 ,but from his retreat came the poems1 pathetic but hopeful1 entitled 8,reverberations10 some of which are sung in the liberal chapels of ,england4 ,deified egotism and vengeance had brought home to him all their heartlessness3 all nature was overcast with this chilling cloud4 ,silently bearing his grief1 he gave himself to the search for truth in those matters which had been predetermined for him by a thousand subtle influences and associations4 ,born in #ahag1 he had graduated at ,cambridge1--the chief poet of its ,magazine1--had passed through his ,shelleyan phase of scepticism1 and entered the church 7#ahde7 through one of the many casuistical blind-ways provided in that old minster for those who hesitate at the main portal4 ,eleven years were occupied in passing from one to another theoretical cloister or tower of the venerated church before he finally discovered that it had no place for him4 ,nor was there any church which he could honestly enter4 ,he must be the hermit of his truth4 ,but in that retreat1 where the lonely scholar must eat his own heart1 the healing hand of a true divinity found him4 ,love found him4 ,he married 7#aheg7 a lady whose beauty was the expression of her genius4 ,her father was ,dr4 ,brabant1 the friend of ,strauss1 and founder of the ,westminster ,review4 ,in early life she married ,c4 ,c4 ,hennell1 author of 8,an ,inquiry into the ,origin of ,christianity10--a work which made a deep impression on ,theodore ,parker1 who made it the subject of an article in the old ,dial4 ,miss ,brabant1 versed in ancient and modern languages1 did excellent work on the ,westminster ,review1 assisted by her friend ,marian ,evans1 afterwards known as 8,george ,eliot40 ,these two ladies1 as ,i have heard1 undertook together the translation of ,strauss's 8,leben ,jesu10 and were more than half through it when ,miss ,brabant married4 ,by a contrivance of ,mrs4 ,hennell the name of ,marian ,evans alone1 and to her regret1 appeared on the title-page4 8,george ,eliot0 thereby gained a reputation helpful to her1 though somewhat embarrassing1 implying as it did a knowledge of ,hebrew and ,greek which she did not possess4 ,mr4 ,call's marriage was most happy4 ,the ,calls were regarded by their circle of kindred spirits as representing the true ideal union4 ,they had together shared the friendship of the finest intellects1 and had moved abreast in intellectual progress1 for more than the life of a generation when parted by death4 ,about seven years ago trouble for the first time entered this almost sacred household4 ,a formidable consumption of one lung set in1 threatening ,mr4 ,call's life4 ,i have always believed that this was the long latent bequest of pious cruelties suffered in earlier life4 ,six years ago the case became hopeless1 in its normal course1 and the physicians said that the only possibility of recovery lay in a rare and difficult operation1 imperilling the few months of life that might remain4 ,the patient and his devoted wife resolved to incur this risk4 ,a tube was inserted through the back2 through it the pus was drained from the ulcerated lung2 and little by little the tube was withdrawn1 by infinitesimal degrees1 as the healing process went on behind it4 ,it was a painful anxious process of many weeks4 ,at this time1 when he was kept motionless1 ,i marvelled at his cheerful spirit2 though the slightest miscarriage in the wearisome operation might prove fatal1 the patient was always serene4 ,one of his physicians1 by no means sure of the result1 approached him on the subject of religion1 and the condition of his soul4 ,soon after ,mr4 ,call gave me an account of the conversation4 ,in religious matters the doctor had dabbled where ,call had dived2 it ended in the physician's being compelled to consider the condition of his own soul1 and why he should be holding the religion of primitive man along with a science almost able to raise the dead4 ,the wonderful operation was perfectly successful4 ,love had healed the young man's broken heart2 science had healed the mature man's dying frame4 ,the real miracles that supplant fictitious ones1 and fulfil their fables1 had been brought home to him4 ,five happy years were added to his life1 during which he wrote the important work to be hereafter considered4 ,on a summer evening last year he passed a pleasant evening at home1 ended with a game of cribbage with his wife4 ,during the night he died painlessly of heart disease2 a post mortem examination proved the lungs quite sound4 ,my friend's body and mind and affections were so combined in organic unity that his very ailments had for me symbolical significance4 ,the unsuspected failure of the heart1 for instance1 seems a last sequel of the spiritual lesion given him by ,dogma as a parting blow3 its counterpart is to me visible in the fact that after writing this work he hardly had heart to publish it4 ,the substance of it was completed in #ahhg2 it was entirely finished in #ahhi2 it lay in his library one year4 ,his wife wished him to publish it--so she told me--but he thought the world would not be interested in his views4 ,so deep had bigotry been able to send this man into the vale of ,humiliation2 and what an intellect was thus discouraged may be partly estimated by those who shall read this book on 8,final ,causes0 published by his widow4 ,in the last generation many young men1 awakened by the song of ,byron and ,shelley1 started out on a new spiritual pilgrimage4 ,their path was at first fringed with poetic flowers1 and in the distance shone the city called ,beautiful4 ,but the path at length became flinty1 the city became more dim with progress towards it1 and many a pilgrim turned back4 ,those who pressed on were unique men1 so that they came to parting ways1 and each had to advance on his individual and lonely path1 albeit they were travelling in the same direction4 ,the records of these pilgrimages1 wherever found1 are chapters in the scriptures of their generation4 ,there is one thing common to them all1--the tenacity with which they have clung to their old faith1 and after it to their old church1 until beaten off by bigotry or by conscience4 8,my ,god1 my ,god1 why hast thou forsaken me80 ,it was no mere cry1 but a question reaching far into the ages1 and stirring innumerable crucified hearts that have found no voice4 ,men do not forsake their ,god2 their ,god forsakes them4 ,they have invested some ancient name with all the pearls of their heart2 they have idealised him as wisdom1 justice1 love1 compassion2 but no sooner do they think an honest thought1 or maintain justice and love against unjust and heartless dogmas1 than their ,good ,shepherd beats such tender lambs with his crook and sets the wolves on them4 ,yet even then1 so long as they can1 they keep in the fold1 and lift their lacerated hands in prayer4 ,they will even practice some self-deception that they may continue the old formulas after the truth has forsaken these4 ,mr4 ,call's youthful scepticism1--a spell wrought by ,byron and ,shelley1--being chiefly the expression of others' experiences1 and with but little root in his own1 carried him no further than the study of philosophy and theology4 ,it was not deep enough to prevent his entering on residence in the ,university of ,cambridge with a view of becoming a clergyman4 ,the struggle being not yet in the arena of his own life and heart1 but a combat for his soul between the ,humes and the ,jeremy ,taylors1 poetic sentiment easily carried the day4 ,his nature clamored for a realised ideal1 and the ,church captivated him4 8,the church1 as the embodiment of celestial truth1 as the aggregate of noble and beautiful spirits1 dead or living1 appeared a sublime conception40 ,when a youth falls in love does he consider whether his beautiful lady's bloom may not be hectic1 or hereditary cancer be hovering near the fair breast8 ,our young scholar weds our ,lady of the ,litany amid the light of stained windows1 and the white-robed choristers4 ,he presently finds that the lovely creature insists on his preaching the doctrine that all who do not yield to her charms are to be burnt at the stake eternally4 8,human philosophy had failed to explain to me the mystery of existence2 ,christian philosophy explained it to be the perpetuation of sin and misery1 intensified by omnipotent intervention40 ,recoiling from this the young clergyman went through years of critical investigation2 he mastered the exegesis of the ,germans and the ,french2 and at length found himself a simple believer in the religion of ,humanity4 ,he1 a clergyman of the ,church of ,england6 ,in the fifty preliminary pages of this posthumous book1 comprising 8,a ,chapter from my ,autobiography10 we have a succinct and useful summary of the crucial criticisms under which biblical authority and supernaturalism have been relegated to professional casuistry4 ,this we will not study here--profoundly interesting as it is--but dwell for a little on the situation in which the scholar found himself4 8,while ,i had thus been working my way through darkness into light--the sober light of sad reality--life had been bringing to all who belonged to me1 as well as to myself1 varied experiences of pain and sorrow4 ,for their sake ,i had already done violence to my better nature4 ,was ,i now to render the previous sacrifice nugatory8 ,was the black shadow of my unbelief to enfold those who had already more than their share of the burden of life to sustain8 ,sympathising friends had early encouraged me to retain my position in the church4 ,a beneficed clergyman1 advanced in years1 whose studies had ended1 like my own1 in the abandonment of dogmatic ,christianity1 had drawn up a statement of the motives which1 as he argued1 justified him in the retention of his preferment4 ,this statement was forwarded to me4 ,a celebrated and venerable ,german professor had sent me a message deprecating the abandonment of a post which1 he thought1 ,i might continue to occupy without dishonor to myself and with profit to others4 ,i had hitherto deferred to the judgment of persons whom ,i regarded as superior to myself in knowledge of life and in ability to determine questions of moral obligation2 but the progress of unbelief and enlarged experience decided me1 at last1 on the adoption of an independent course of thought and action4 ,taking counsel of my own heart1 ,i resolved to terminate a conflict which had become intolerable4 ,painful and singular complications preceded1 accompanied1 and followed my retirement from the ,english ,church40 ,here is the 8,robert ,elsmere0 of real life4 ,since ,mr4 ,call left the ,church of ,england1 thirty-five years ago1 it has become a largely rationalistic institution4 ,legal prosecutions of clergymen for heresy have resulted in proving that the evangelical and orthodox have no more right to the ,church1 in ,law1 than the liberals4 ,they were usurpers of authority not guaranteed by the constitution1 in which there is nothing requiring a clergyman to believe in hell1 or the devil1 or miracles1 or the infallibility of the ,bible4 ,many clergymen are now honestly preaching a simple theistic and humanitarian religion1 and when told they ought to leave the ,church need only reply1 8,if you think so you have a right to prosecute me40 ,the ,english charlatan who calls himself 8,father ,ignatius10 who could only make himself ridiculous as a heresy-hunter abroad1 seems to have found the ,episcopal ,church in ,new ,york provincial enough to take him seriously4 ,he would never venture to suggest the prosecution of a ,broad ,churchman at home4 ,his ignorant tribe have too keen a recollection of their severe falls in grappling with ,bishop ,colenso1 and the authors of 8,essays and ,reviews40 ,we have1 however1 to deal with ,america1 where the sects1 by departure of some of their best brains1 seem falling more and more under control of their illiberal constituents1 though the consecration of ,bishop ,phillips ,brooks show that reactionists will not have it all their own way4 ,the passage ,i have quoted above bears upon a moral problem which has already become urgent among us1 and in the progress of inquiry must inevitably become of very serious importance to large numbers of ministers and their families4 ,i therefore introduce here a little digression on this subject4 ,what is the moral duty of a young minister who finds himself occupying the pulpit of a denomination in whose generally accepted doctrines he has ceased to believe8 ,the ,new ,york ,evening ,post recently declared this to be a plain moral question4 ,if--thus it argues--a man has voluntarily entered the ministry of a church1 and afterwards forms opinions which1 if known1 would have prevented his admission1 he is morally bound to resign4 ,but the question is much more complex than that4 ,in a majority of cases the minister has not entered 8voluntarily10--within the genuine moral scope of that term4 ,his orthodox parents1 abetted by their preacher1 have kept light from him1 repressed his reason1 imprisoned him in ,sunday schools and prayer-meetings2 he has been accorded no free choice2 he has been led as a captive1 before his intellect was capable of judgment1 artificially terrified about his soul1 and the world's danger of damnation1 and at length found himself in the pulpit4 ,when the victim finds himself disabused of these fictions1 what is his duty8 ,in my belief it would be immoral for him to resign without having first secured a public decision of his church on the issue4 ,his paramount obligations are to the community in which he lives4 ,he is morally bound to preach the truth as he sees it1 openly1 honestly1 plainly4 ,he cannot utter the discredited creeds1 prayers1 or dogmas4 ,but he has a right1--nay he is bound1--to throw upon the church which has entrapped him the responsibility of repudiating his principles and doctrines4 ,he should say to his church3 8,you are responsible for the unhappy situation in which ,i find myself4 ,by your zealous propaganda you frightened or persuaded my parents1 my friends1 myself1 into acceptance of dogmas ,i now find false4 ,the logical result of taking you seriously was to turn from all worldly occupations1 and devote my life to the work of saving mankind from a terrible doom4 ,now1 awakened from the nightmare superinduced by you1 ,i find myself past the opportunities of youth1 the time for preparations in other professions irrecoverably lost1 and a family dependent on me4 ,the situation concerns not only you and me1 but others we have involved4 ,for years ,i have been laboring with you to try and persuade other youths into the same situation as my own4 ,something is due to them4 ,i have deceived them and must undeceive them4 ,you say ,i must be true1 but you must be true also4 ,i have innocently reached a position which enables me to compel you to publish to the world exactly where you stand4 ,i will clearly define my convictions3 if you cannot tolerate them in your pulpit the youth will know the precise limits to their freedom they agree to in entering your ministry4 ,if you can tolerate them they will know your liberalism4 ,therefore ,i remain here proclaiming my truth1 and will not help you to cover the truth up by a resignation relieving you of the duty of proclaiming your position with equal clearness4 ,you have got me here1 and if ,i go now you must turn me out4 ,so shall the cause of truth be advanced40 ,while this may be affirmed1 ,i think1 as a general ethical principle1 it is equally true that each case must be judged by itself4 ,the above principle depends on the condition that the ministry has been honestly entered from religious motives1 there being no mental reservations at that time4 ,it will be observed that in the case of ,mr4 ,call the consideration entered that he had passed through a phase of ,shelleyan scepticism in early youth4 ,this had to be weighed1 and perhaps may have had much to do with his determination to retire voluntarily from the ministry4 ,he never concealed his views1 however1 and it is well known that great efforts are made by older preachers to beat down the scepticism that often arises in the minds of young candidates for the ministry4 ,in such case these unwise advisers assume a large share of responsibility for the event1 whether enough to justify the subsequent heretic in compelling a conflict must depend on the minister's conscience4 ,although1 therefore1 ,mr4 ,call decided rightly1 in accordance with his moral consciousness1 it were by no means fair to maintain1 with the author of 8,robert ,elsmere10 that ministers who find themselves more liberal than the majority of preachers in their church should surrender to such mere superiority of physical force without testing its legality and laying on it responsibility for its exercise of power4 ,robert ,elsmere should1 on moral principles1 have remained in the church4 ,by so remaining ,colenso1 ,dean ,stanley1 ,charles ,kingsley1 ,max ,mller1 ,professor ,jowett1 ,matthew ,arnold1 and others1 have revealed the fact that1 in their church1 thought is not delivered up by law to the despotism of a majority4 ,the case1 however1 is somewhat different again where the new opinions adopted by a minister amount to an abandonment of the fundamental doctrines of his church4 ,that may not exonerate him from demanding a formal and public declaration of the church1 but this being secured1 it must affect his relation to the general world4 ,should it be proved that he may be legally tolerated1 he must then consider whether it is his legitimate means of influence1 or whether he would be substituting for his own expression the mask of an extinct faith4 ,the ethical principle above affirmed relates to the first practical step of the minister whose beliefs have changed4 ,the progressive and inquiring mind that continues in a church where it is barely tolerated does so at great peril4 ,where the swift foot agrees to march with the halt the pace must be that of the halt4 ,sceptical minds occupying pulpits even of liberal denominations are likely to discover1 should such engagements end1 that they have been unconsciously arresting their own development in finding a conciliatory modus vivendi with the reactionary brethren4 ,there is1 indeed1 a class of fine intellects1 like the great ,english ,broad ,churchmen already named1 whose comparatively advanced views are the result of larger learning2 they have discovered that two and two are four1 and gathered courage to deny that the amount is five4 ,these constitute the right leaven by which great organisations are raised to higher standards of knowledge and veracity4 ,but there are original and philosophic inquirers whose particular power were only buried in such organisations1 without elevating them4 ,these are due to the corps of pioneers in the direction whither the organisations are advancing4 ,their task is original research4 ,these cannot wisely wear the uniform of any religious or political party4 ,mr4 ,call was such an original mind1 and after he had left the ,english church his course was to the maturity represented in this ripe book on 8,final ,causes40 ,but had he not passed eleven of his best years in the church1 out of his true habitat1 we should have more fruit of this fine flavor4 ,it is therefore a voice from his experience that here reaches us1 as from his grave3 8,scepticism has been vigorously advancing in the nation--,i might say1 in ,europe4 ,and not only has it extended its sphere1 but it includes within that sphere some of the loftiest and profoundest intellects of the age--men renowned for vast and exact erudition1 for scientific research or critical acumen4 ,philosophers1 poets1 historians1 novelists1 openly or silently disavow ,christianity4 ,in palaces1 in lordly mansions1 in college halls1 in secluded homesteads1 and here and there in rectory or vicarage1 scepticism1 if it has not a bold and fearless utterance1 at least expresses itself in a guarded whisper4 ,it becomes doubly a duty1 then1 when notwithstanding the general diffusion of avowed or latent unbelief1 we trace everywhere the presence of a conservatism that conceals and hesitates and trembles at the doubts which it cannot suppress1 that individual dissentients should candidly disclose their theological divergences4 ,christianity1 indeed1 which has had its triumphs in the past1 will long conserve a portion of its power1 and continue to furnish guidance not only for the unreasoning multitude1 but for thousands of excellent men and women who cannot abandon the old religious ideal4 ,but there is no final arrest for the intellectual progress of mankind40 ,we now turn to ,mr4 ,call's work on 8,final ,causes40 ,in an introductory chapter of eight pages he compresses the history of the doctrine of ,design in nature from ,anaxagoras1 ,b4 ,c4 #ejj1 to our own time1 stating its modifications1 criticisms1 denials4 ,in the second chapter a brief account is given of 8,natural ,theology10 whose modern form is found to rest fundamentally on ,newton's generalisation1 that a body at rest continues at rest unless acted upon by some external force2 and on the geometrical order of planetary revolutions4 ,starting anew from this point the human mind has discovered in the varied realms of nature apparent evidences of a supersensuous ,intelligence4 ,kant1 however1 is brought to criticise ,newton4 8,kant notes with delight that the #8harmonical relations which excite the feelings in a more sublime manner than even the contingent beauties of nature originate in the properties of space'2 and this inevitable congruity he refers ultimately1 indeed1 to ,divine ,wisdom1 but directly to a common dependence on a single sovereign ground1 to a unity of possibilities which it is no more difficult to conceive as self-existent than it is to conceive an ,intelligent ,cause as self-existent40 ,matter is not1 then1 naturally inert1 but an aggregate of forms and forces1 and nature a self-adjusting1 self-evolving power4 ,in a chapter on 8,order and ,general ,adaptation0 it is shown that nature contains vast realms of ,disorder2 and alleged 8special adaptations0 are shown too as often as otherwise for cruelty and agony4 8,with what feelings10 asks ,g4 ,h4 ,lewes1 8can we contemplate the destruction of such an organism as that of man for the sake of some microscopic animal made to live upon it8 ,with what feelings can we think of a human being sacrificed to the growth of cancer-cells8 ,what is the contrivance and benevolence here80 ,particular illustrations of design on which teleologists have depended1--the eye1 the bee's cell1 the bird's wing--are examined with critical and scientific care1 and imperfections1 gratuitous and cruel if ascribed to omnipotent wisdom1 found everywhere4 8,to assert that the ,creator of the world is infinitely powerful and infinitely wise were to deny that he is infinitely good40 ,to escape the dilemma just stated1 some theists postulate a 8limited or constitutional deity40 ,dr4 ,martineau's idea of a 8material datum objective to ,god0 is an effort to relieve the deity of responsibility for the evils of nature1 but ,mr4 ,call declares the selection of 8power0 as the limited attribute is arbitrary4 ,we have1 he thinks1 no more logical right to limit the deity's power than his intelligence1 or his benevolence4 7,this is doubtful1 however1 and requires more consideration than is here given it47 8,the ,evolutionary ,god0 is next considered1 and disproved by the uselessness and unfitness of some structures in various organisations1 the often injurious character of others1 7e4g4 the intestinal canal called the vermiform process17 while the moral sense is still offended by the general predatory method of natural selection4 ,the validity of the ,design argument disposed of1 ,mr4 ,call leaves to the theist whatever evidences of a deity he may find in his ideals1 emotions1 aspirations1 intuitions4 ,he points out that the ,designer thus disproved has never been able to satisfy the intellect or heart1 the like being true of the 8,unknowable40 ,the sole sacred ideal left us is that of humanity2 not of the whole race but of the purer1 nobler constituents of it4 8,as ,humanity will be the sole ,ideal ,object to which dutiful obligation and exalted sentiment will be referred1 so the world of ,humanity will be the world revealed1 not by divine inspiration or metaphysical intuition1 but by ,positive ,science ,the shadowy abstractions of the speculative rationalist1 the fanciful conceptions of the theologian1 will gradually pass away4 ,to the ,semitic explanation of the world and of man will succeed that of ,laplace and ,darwin4 ,the great and majestic truths of the stellar universe1 the mysteries of life1 of light1 of heat1 of sound2 the wonders of natural history1 the magic of geologic lore1 the epic of man's progression in time2 the exaltation1 the solace1 the delight which flow from poetry1 music1 painting1 sculpture2 the interest in the arts1 industrial no less than sthetic2 in the fellowship of work which ameliorates the common lot2 in friendships of man and woman1 short of passionate love1 and in the happier profounder affection of wife and husband2 in all home charities and patriotic activities1 and in the identification of personal #8feelings with the entire life of the human race'2--all these incidents of thought and varieties of emotion and action will possess the intellect and fill the heart of future generations1 in a mode and degree which we can now only imperfectly realise1 and which1 in the end1 will leave men but little reason to regret that the raptures of saint or prophet1 or the splendours of ancient theocracy1 or the power and glory of the ,medival ,church1 or the imposing premise of ,hellenic or of ,teutonic speculation1 are as the dreams of a night that has passed forever away40 ,have we1 in this prophetic conclusion1 the afterglow of a faith sunk beneath the horizon8 ,why should we suppose that such beautiful things will come to pass in the future8 ,such prophecies have hitherto been inspired by belief in an overruling and omnipotent ,love4 ,but we are now brought by science and philosophy to the misgiving of ,solomon1 8,we are born at all adventure40 ,things1 the sceptic may say1 will grow better if man compels them so1 otherwise they can as easily grow worse4 ,it appears to me that in the old dogma of ,jehovah's curse on the world and its redemption by ,jesus there is buried1 as in a sarcophagus1 a skeleton of human nature1 and of moral history1 resembling the man of to-day1 and the history we are making4 ,there was an appeal of the human heart from ,jehovah to ,jesus1--from the cursing to the saving deity4 ,the terrible arraignments of nature written by some of the greatest men since ,darwin's discovery have not found any one to answer them4 ,the severest indictment of the world1 perhaps1 is that by the late ,cardinal ,newman1 who declares1 8,either there is no ,creator1 or this living society of men is in a true sense discarded from his presence4444 ,since there is a ,god1 the human race is implicated in some terrible aboriginal calamity40 ,from a deity who having created his own materials1 built up a creation liable to such calamity1 mankind are once more appealing4 ,the ancient case was ,jesus vs4 ,jehovah2 the present case is ,humanity vs4 the ,creator of ,nature4 ,this rebellion of the moral sentiment and of compassionateness is not intellectually conscious2 it goes on1 and for a long time must go on1 with ceremonial respect to the ,final ,cause of all the evils humanity tries to heal2 but it appears to me certain that the heart and enthusiasm which once went out to a personal ,god are again turning to a crucified humanity4 ,the humanitarian movements of our time have arisen simultaneously with the overwhelming evidences of nature's cruelty and imperfections revealed by ,science4 ,the earlier deists appealed from biblical superstitions and ecclesiastical cruelties to the ,god visible in the order and beauty of the universe4 ,with the existence of evil in external nature they never grappled4 ,bishop ,butler's 8,analogy0 first stated the problem4 ,he answered deistic objections to the inhumanities of the ,bible by pointing out the like in nature4 ,instead of answering the deists he set them on a new departure which has ended in results summed up in ,mr4 ,call's book4 ,the omnipotent creator of nature is following the biblical ,jehovah into extinction4 ,but the instincts and aspirations of the human heart and mind remain the same2 the religious sentiment remains4 ,the stream that is dammed up in one direction or another does not lose any force thereby2 it streams into other channels if it can find such1 or floods field and village if it finds none4 ,it will beat earthward as strongly as it once beat heavenward2 it will1 if channels be not provided1 carry away institutions as it has carried away gods and goddesses4 ,it has become therefore of great importance to recognise if possible the lines of least resistance along the mighty stream of religious enthusiasm1 and provide that its energies shall not be destructive but conservative of human welfare4 ,at present the most conservative force in the earth is ignorance3 were the suffering masses of the world to discover1 suddenly and universally1 that the old creeds are fictions1 their evils not providential1 their heavenly hopes vain1 every nation would be filled with convulsions4 ,fortunately the sun is not shot up into the heavens4 ,but enlightenment progresses rapidly1 and we have begun none too soon turning the rising flood of light and fire into the human channels long obstructed by sanctified inhumanities4 ,mr4 ,call's little book1 which ,i hope will find publication and wide circulation in ,america1 sums up succinctly and cogently the present religious situation1 and the steps by which it has been reached4 ,it remains for us all to sweep the new horizon with eye and telescope1 to compare our observations and to catch the first ray of the star that shall point wise men to the new incarnation4 ,to my own mind this book is one of the many signs and promises that the divine will be steadily merged into and identified with the human4 ,not with humanity as an objective and historical entity1 as ,comte believed1 but with the distinctive characteristics of humanity1 the supreme qualities of reason and love3 this will become the ideal of the reasoners and the lovers2 it will then become the creating ,word1 instructing all2 it will finally be made flesh and dwell among us1 and all shall behold in it the glory of the kingdom of ,man4 ,,moncure ,d4 ,,conway4 ,,facts ,,and ,,mental ,,symbols4 ,i perceive from ,dr4 ,carus's answer to my letter in ,no4 #c ,vol4 ,i of ,the ,monist1 that amid all the agreement of our mutual endeavors a material difference of opinion exists between us on an important question of special character4 ,as ,i was not successful in rendering my thought clear on this point1 ,i shall endeavor on the present occasion to explain what it was that forced me to abandon my old position 7#ahfc71 which is very near to that of ,dr4 ,carus1 and to assume a new one4 ,the supposition that our difference of opinion is merely apparent and can be adjusted by a precise agreement as to the terms employed is a very natural one in philosophical discussions4 ,it is hardly tenable1 though1 when the divergent views in question arise subsequently to one another in the same person4 ,i must state1 in starting1 that ,i pursued in my youth physical and philosophical studies1 particularly psychology1 with equal ardor4 ,there was hardly the question at that time of an experimental psychology1 of a relation of psychological to physiological research4 ,no more so did physics at that day think of a psychological analysis of the notions it was constantly employing4 ,how the notions of 8body10 8matter10 8atom10 etc41 were come by1 was not investigated4 ,objects were given of which physicists never questioned the inviolability and with which they unconcernedly pursued their labors4 ,the fields of physical and psychological research thus stood unconciliated the one by the side of the other1 each having its own particular concepts1 methods1 and theories4 ,no one questioned1 indeed1 that the two departments were connected in some way4 ,the way1 however1 appeared an insoluble riddle2 as it yet appears to ,dubois-,reymond4 ,now although this condition of things was not such as to satisfy my mind1 it was nevertheless natural that as a student ,i should seek to acquire tentatively the prevailing views of both provinces and put them into consistent connection with one another4 ,i thus formed provisorily the view that ,nature has two sides--a physical and a psychological side4 ,if psychical life is to be harmonised at all with the theories of physics we are obliged1 ,i thought1 to conceive of the atoms as feeling 7ensouled74 ,the various dynamic phenomena of the atoms would then represent the physical processes1 while the internal states connected therewith would be the phenomena of psychic life4 ,if we accept in faith and seriousness the atomistic speculations of the physicists and of the early psychologists 7on the unity of the soul71 ,i still see hardly any other course to arrive at a half-way supportable monistic conception4 ,it is unnecessary to set forth at length here what a prominent place the artificial scaffolding we employ in the construction of our knowledge assumes in these monadic theories as contradistinguished from the facts that deserve knowledge1 and how poorly such theories satisfy in the long run a vigorous mind4 ,as a fact1 employment with this cumbrous artifice was in my case the means that effected very soon the appearance of my better conviction1 already latently present4#cd ,in the further progress of my physical work ,i soon discovered that it was very necessary sharply to distinguish between what we see and what we mentally supply4 ,when1 for example1 ,i imagine heat as a substance 7a fluid7 that passes from one body into another1 ,i follow with ease the phenomena of conduction and compensation4 ,this idea led ,black1 who established it1 to the discovery of specific heat1 of the latent heat of fusion and vaporisation1 and so forth4 ,this same idea of a constant quantity of heat-substance prevented on the other hand ,black's successors from using their eyes4 ,they no longer mark the fact which every savage knows1 that heat is produced by friction4 ,by the help of his undulatory theory ,huygens follows with ease the phenomena of the reflexion and refraction of light4 ,the same theory prevents him1 for he thinks solely of the longitudinal waves with which he was familiar1 from marking the fact of polarisation which he himself discovered1 but which ,newton on the other hand1 undisturbed by theories1 perceives at once4 ,the conception of fluids acting at a distance on conductors charged with electricity facilitates our view of the behavior of the objects charged1 but it stood in the way of the discovery of the specific inductive capacity1 which was reserved for the eye of ,faraday undimmed by any traditional theories4 ,valuable therefore as the conceptions may be which we mentally 7theoretically7 supply in our pursuit of facts1 bringing to bear1 as they do1 older1 richer1 more general1 and more familiar experiences on facts that stand alone1 thus affording us a broader field of view1 nevertheless1 the same conceptions may1 as classical examples and our own experience demonstrate1 lead us astray4 ,for a theory1 indeed1 always puts in the place of a fact something different1 something more simple1 which is qualified to represent it in some certain aspect1 but for the very reason that it is different does not represent it in other aspects4 ,when in the place of light ,huygens mentally put the familiar phenomenon of sound1 light itself appeared to him as a thing that he knew1 but with respect to polarisation1 which sound-waves lack1 as a thing with which he was doubly unacquainted4 ,our theories are abstractions1 which1 while they place in relief that which is important for certain fixed cases1 neglect almost necessarily1 or even disguise1 what is important for other cases4 ,the law of refraction looks upon rays of light as homogeneous straight lines1 and that is sufficient for the comprehension of the geometrical aspect of the matter4 ,but the propositions that relate to refraction will never lead us to the fact that the rays of light are periodical1 that they interfere4 ,just the contrary1 the favorite and familiar conception of a ray as a smooth straight line will rather render this discovery difficult4 ,only in rare cases will the resemblance between a fact and its theoretical conception extend further than we ourselves postulate4 ,then the theoretical conception may lead to the discovery of new facts1 of which conical refraction1 circular polarisation1 and ,hertz's electric waves furnish examples that stand in opposition to those given above4 ,but as a general rule we have every reason to distinguish sharply between our theoretical conceptions of phenomena and that which we observe4 ,the former must be regarded merely as auxiliary instruments that have been created for a definite purpose and which possess permanent value only with respect to that purpose4 ,no one will seriously imagine for a moment that a real circle with angles and sines actually performs functions in the refraction of light4 ,every one1 on the contrary1 regards the formula sin_/sin n as a kind of geometrical model that imitates in form the refraction of light and takes its place in our mind4 ,in this sense1 ,i take it1 all the theoretical conceptions of physics--caloric1 electricity1 light-waves1 molecules1 atoms1 and energy--must be regarded as mere helps or expedients to facilitate our viewing things4 ,even within the domain of physics itself the greatest care must be exercised in transferring theories from one department to another1 and above all more instruction is not to be expected from a theory than from the facts themselves4 ,but instances were not lacking that demonstrated to me1 how much greater the confusion was which was produced by the direct transference of theories1 methods1 and inquiries that were legitimate in physics1 into the field of psychology4 ,allow me to illustrate this by a few examples4 ,a physicist observes an image on the retina of an excised eye1 notices that it is turned upside down with respect to the objects imaged1 and puts to himself very naturally the question1 ,how does a luminous point situated at the top come to be reflected on the retina at the bottom8 ,he answers this question by the aid of dioptrical studies4 ,if1 now1 this question1 which is perfectly legitimate in the province of physics1 be transferred to the domain of psychology1 only obscurity will be produced4 ,the question why we see the inverted retina-image upright1 has no meaning as a psychological problem4 ,the light-sensations of the separate spots of the retina are connected with sensations of locality from the very beginning1 and we name the places that correspond to the parts down1 up4 ,such a question cannot present itself to the perceiving subject4 ,it is the same with the well-known theory of projection4 ,the problem of the physicist is1 to seek the luminous object-point of a point imaged on the retina of the eye in the backward prolonged ray passing through the point of intersection of the eye4 ,for the perceiving subject this problem does not exist1 as the light-sensations of the retinal spots are connected from the beginning with determinate space-sensations4 ,the entire theory of the psychological origin of the 8external0 world by the projection of sensations outwards is founded in my opinion on a mistaken transference of a physically formulated inquiry into the province of psychology4 ,our sensations of sight and touch are bound up with1 are connected with1 various different sensations of space1 that is to say these sensations have an existence by the side of one another or outside of one another1 exist in other words in a spatial field1 in which our body fills but a part4 ,that table is thus self-evidently outside of my body4 ,a projection-problem does not present itself1 is neither consciously nor unconsciously solved4 ,a physicist 7,mariotte7 makes the discovery that a certain spot on the retina is blind4 ,he is accustomed to associating with every spatial point an imaged point1 and with every imaged point a sensation4 ,hence the question arises1 what do we see at the points that correspond to the blind spots1 and how is the gap in the image filled out8 ,if the unfounded influence of the physicist's method of procedure on the discussion of psychological questions be excluded1 it will be found that no problem exists at all here4 ,we see nothing at the blind spots1 the gap in the image is not filled out4 ,the gap1 moreover1 is not felt1 for the reason that a defect of light-sensation at a spot blind from the beginning can no more be perceived as a gap in the image than the blindness say of the skin of the back can be so perceived4 ,i have chosen intentionally simple and obvious examples1 such as render it clear what unnecessary confusion is caused by the careless transference of a conception or mode of thought which is valid and serviceable in one domain1 into another4 ,in the work of a celebrated ,german ethnographer ,i read recently the following sentence3 8,this tribe of people deeply degraded itself by the practise of cannibalism40 ,by its side lay the book of an ,english inquirer who deals with the same subject4 ,the latter simply puts the question why certain ,south-,sea islanders eat human beings1 finds out in the course of his inquiries that our own ancestors also were once cannibals1 and comes to understand the position the ,hindus take in the matter--a point of view that occurred once to my five-year-old boy who while eating a piece of meat stopped suddenly shocked and cried out1 8,we are cannibals to the animals60 8,thou shalt not eat human beings0 is a very beautiful maxim2 but in the mouth of the ethnographer it sullies the calm and noble lustre of unprepossession by which we so gladly discover the true inquirer4 ,but a step further and we will say1 8,man must not be descended from monkeys10 8,the earth shall not rotate10 8,matter ought not everywhere to fill space10 8,energy must be constant10 and so on4 ,i believe that our procedure differs from that just characterised only in degree and not in kind1 when we transfer views reached in the province of physics with the dictum of sovereign validity into the domain of psychology1 where they should be tested anew with respect to their serviceability4 ,in such cases we are subject to dogma1 if not to that which is forced upon us by a power from without like our scholastic forefathers1 yet to that which we have made ourselves4 ,and what result of research is there that could not become a dogma by long habit of use1 since the very skill which we have acquired in familiar intellectual situations1 deprives us of the freshness and unprepossession which are so requisite in a new situation4 ,now that ,i have set forth in general outlines the position ,i take1 ,i may be able perhaps to establish my opposition to the dualism of feeling and motion4 ,this dualism is to my mind an artificial and an unnecessary one4 ,the way it has arisen is analogous to that in which the imaginary solutions of certain mathematical problems have arisen--by the improper formulation of the questions involved4 ,in the investigation of purely physical processes we generally employ notions so abstract that as a rule we only think cursorily or not at all of the sensations that lie at and constitute their foundation4 ,for example1 when ,i establish the fact that an electric current of #a ,ampre develops #aj cubic centimetres oxyhydrogen gas at #j ,c4 and #gfj mm mercury pressure in a minute1 ,i am easily disposed to attribute to the objects defined a reality wholly independent of my sensations4 ,but ,i am obliged in order to arrive at what ,i have determined to conduct the current through a circular wire having a definite measured radius1 so that the current1 the intensity of terrestrial magnetism being given1 shall turn the magnetic needle at its centre a certain angular distance out of the meridian4 ,the intensity of terrestrial magnetism must have been disclosed by a definite observed period of vibration of a magnetic needle of measured dimensions1 known weight1 and so forth4 ,the determination of the oxyhydrogen gas is no less intricate4 ,the whole statement1 so simple in its appearance1 is based upon an almost unending series of simple sensory observations 7sensations71 particularly so when the observations are added that guarantee the adjustment of the apparatus1 which may have been performed in part long before the actual experiment4 ,now it may easily happen to the physicist who does not study the psychology of his operations1 that he does not 7to reverse a well-known saying7 see the trees for the woods1 and that he slurs over the sensory elements at the foundation of his work4 ,now ,i maintain1 that every physical notion is nothing more than a definite connection of the sensory elements which ,i denote by ,a ,b ,c 4441 and that every physical fact rests therefore on such a connection4 ,these elements--elements in the sense that no further resolution has for the present been effected of them--are the most ultimate building stones of the physical world that we have as yet been able to seize4 ,physiological research also may have a purely physical character4 ,i can follow the course of a physical process as it propagates itself through a sensitive nerve to the spinal column and brain of an animal and returns by various paths to the muscles of the animal1 whose contraction produces further events in the environment of the animal4 ,i need not think1 in so doing1 of any feeling on the part of the animal2 what ,i investigate is a purely physical object4 ,very much is lacking1 it is true1 to our complete comprehension of the details of this process1 and the assurance that it is all motion can neither console me nor deceive me with respect to my ignorance4 ,long before there was any scientific physiology people perceived that the behavior of an animal confronted by physical influences is much better viewed1 that is understood1 by attributing to the animal sensations like our own4 ,to that which ,i see1 to my sensations1 ,i have to supply mentally the sensations of the animal1 which are not to be found in the province of my own sensation4 ,this contrariety appears still more abrupt to the scientific inquirer who is investigating a nervous process by the aid of colorless abstract notions1 and is required for example to add mentally to that process the sensation green4 ,this last can actually appear as something entirely novel1 and we can ask ourselves how it is that this miraculous thing is produced from chemical processes1 electrical currents1 and the like4#ce ,psychological analysis has taught us that this surprise is unjustified1 since the physicist deals with sensations in everything on which he employs himself4 ,this analysis is also able to render it clear to us that the mental addition by analogy of sensations and complexes of sensations which at the time being are not present in the field of sense or cannot even come into it1 is also daily practised by the physicist1 as when for example he imagines the moon an inert heavy mass although he cannot touch the moon but only see it4 ,the totally strange character of the intellectual situation above described is therefore an illusion4 ,the illusion disappears when ,i make observations 7psychologically7 on my own person which are limited to the sensory sphere4 ,before me lies the leaf of a plant4 ,the green 7,a7 of the leaf is united with a certain optical sensation of space 7,b7 and sensation of touch 7,c71 with the visibility of the sun or the lamp 7,d74 ,if the yellow 7,e7 of a sodium flame takes the place of the sun1 the green 7,a7 will pass into brown 7,f74 ,if the chlorophyl granules be removed1--an operation representable like the preceding one by elements1--the green 7,a7 will pass into white 7,g74 ,all these observations are physical observations4 ,but the green 7,a7 is also united with a certain process on my retina4 ,there is nothing to prevent me in principle from physically investigating this process on my own eye in exactly the same manner as in the cases previously set forth1 and from reducing it to its elements ,x ,y ,z4444 ,if this were not possible in the case of my own eye1 it might be accomplished with that of another1 and the gap filled out by analogy exactly as in physical investigations4 ,now in its dependence upon ,b ,c ,d 4441 ,a is a physical element1 in its dependence on ,x ,y ,z 444 it is a sensation4 ,the green 7,a7 however is not altered at all in itself1 whether we direct our attention to the one or to the other form of dependence4 ,i see1 therefore1 no oppositions of physical and psychical1 no duality1 but simply identity4 ,in the sensory sphere of my consciousness everything is at once physical and psychical4 ,the obscurity of this intellectual situation has arisen according to my conviction solely from the transference of a physical prepossession into the domain of psychology4 ,the physicist says3 ,i find everywhere bodies and the motions of bodies only1 no sensations2 sensation therefore must be something entirely different from the physical objects ,i deal with4 ,the psychologist accepts the second portion of this declaration3 ,to him1 it is true1 sensation is given1 but there corresponds to it a mysterious physical something which conformably to physical prepossession must be different from sensation4 ,but what is it that is the really mysterious thing8 ,is it the ,physis or the ,psyche8 or is it perhaps both8 ,it would almost appear so1 as it is now the one and now the other that is intangible4 ,or does the whole reasoning involved rest on a fallacious circle8 ,i believe that the latter is the case4 ,for me the elements designated by ,a ,b ,c 444 are immediately and indubitably given1 and for me they can never afterwards be volatilised away by any considerations which are after all based in every case on their existence4#cf ,to the department of special research having for its subject the sensory1 physical1 and psychical province which is not made superfluous by this general orientation and ,which cannot be forestalled1 the relations of ,a ,b ,c 444 only remain to be ascertained4 ,this may be expressed symbolically by saying that it is the purpose and end of special research to find equations of the form f7,a1 ,b1 ,c1 4447 #j4 ,i hope with this to have designated the point in which ,i am in opposition to ,dr4 ,carus1 with whom ,i agree so much in other respects4 ,i am obliged1 notwithstanding the latter fact1 to regard this point as essential1 inasmuch as my whole mode of thinking and direction of inquiry have been changed by the view it involves1 and because1 moreover1 ,i do not believe that the difference in question can be dissipated by any verbal explanations however exact4 ,this whole train of reasoning has for me simply the significance of negative orientation for the avoidance of pseudo-problems4 ,i restrict myself1 moreover intentionally here1 to the question of sense-perceptions1 for the reason that at the start exact special research will find here alone a safe basis of operations4 ,,ernst ,,mach4 ,,footnotes3 #cd ,a ,greek philosopher to whom change of spatial configuration1 pressure1 and percussion were probably the only natural processes of which he had any intimate knowledge1 thought out the atomistic theory4 ,this theory we retain to-day1 though it be in a modified form4 ,and in fact natural phenomena really do exist that act as if the pressure and impact of very small particles were involved in their production 7the dynamical theory of gases71 phenomena that admit therefore by this conception of being more clearly viewed4 ,however1 this conception1 like that of caloric1 possesses value only in certain fields4 ,we know to-day that pressure and impact are by no means simpler phenomena than are for example the phenomena of gravitation4 ,the contention that in physics everything can be reduced to the motion of smallest particles is1 taken at its best1 a more than improper draft on the future4 ,utterances of this kind afford no assistance to the solution of burning special questions1 but only confound1 and have about the same explanatory value as the utterances of the late physical philosophy of ,oken which prescribe for example with the greatest ease the course of the creation of the world by a division of zero-quantities into a and -a 7#j a -a74 ,the motion of a single body as a totality does indeed appear simpler at first glance than any other process1 and this is the justification of attempts at a physical monadic theory4 ,the thoughts of a single man are connected together2 the thoughts of two different men are not4 ,how can the processes of the different parts of the brain of one man be connected8 ,in order to make the connection very intimate1 we collect everything which requires to be psychically connected in a single point1 although the connection is not explained by this procedure4 ,thus the psychological monadic theory is created on the basis of a motive and of an illusion similar to that on which the physical rests4 ,let us assume for a moment the proposition in the text2 viz41 that the atoms are endowed with feeling4 ,by the space cordinates x1 y1 z1 x1 y1 z 444 of the atoms are determined in the atoms internal conditions 1 1 1 1 1 444 and vice versa4 ,for we feel by our senses our physical environment1 and our physical invasions of our environment are conditioned by our sensations4 ,the idea is then at hand1 1 1 444 alone being directly given1 to set up by the elimination of x1 y1 z 444 equations directly between 1 1 1 1 1 4444 ,this latter point of view would be very near to my present one1 aside from the fact that the latter wholly rejects metaphysical considerations4 #ce ,the following is a legitimate question3 ,to what kind of nervous processes is the sensation green to be mentally added4 ,such questions can be solved only by special inquiry1 and not by a reference in a general way to motion and electric currents4 ,how disadvantageous our remaining satisfied with such general conceptions is1 can be seen from the fact that inquirers have been repeatedly on the brink of abandoning the specific energies1 one of the greatest acquisitions we have made1 simply because they were unable to discover any difference in the currents of different sensory nerves4 ,i was impelled as early as #ahfc in my lectures on psycho-physics to call attention to the fact that the most diverse kinds of nervous processes can conceal themselves in a current4 ,current is an abstraction and places in relief but one feature of the process--the passage of energy though a transverse section4 ,a current in diluted sulphuric acid is something entirely different from a current in copper4 ,we must therefore also expect that a current in the acoustic nerve is something entirely different from a current in the optic nerve4 #cf ,it is the transitoriness of sense-perceptions that so easily leads us to regard them as mere appearances as contrasted with permanent bodies4 ,i have repeatedly pointed out that unconditioned permanent states do not exist in nature1 that permanences of connection only exist4 ,a body is for me the same complex of sight-and-touch-sensations every time that it is placed in the same circumstances of illumination1 position in space1 temperature1 and so forth4 ,the supposed constancy of the body is the constancy of the union of ,a1 ,b1 ,c 444 or the constancy of the equation f7,a1 ,b1 ,c 4447 #j4 ,,professor ,,clifford ,,on ,,the ,,soul ,,in ,,nature4 ,no one can read ,clifford's ,lectures and ,essays1 without feeling that1 if their author is less known and valued as an original thinker than as a master of mathematical analysis1 it is only because having turned the force of his genius onto mathematics first he had time to complete some work in that direction1 whereas his premature death in #ahgi only allowed him to give us an earnest of the philosophical work which he had it in him to perform4 ,the short biography which ,prof4 ,f4 ,pollock contributed to the first edition of his lectures and essays gives an interesting sketch of the phases of opinion through which ,clifford passed4 ,it appears that before he took his degree in #ahfg and for a little time after he was a high churchman2 but1 says ,pollock1 8there was an intellectual and speculative activity about his belief which made it impossible that he should remain permanently at that stage40 8,he never slackened in the pursuit of scientific knowledge and ideas10 and conscious of a hiatus between orthodox views and some of the results of science he yet held that religious beliefs are outside the region of scientific proof and that there is a special theological faculty or insight1 analogous to the scientific1 poetic1 and artistic faculties1 the persons in whom this genius is exceptionally developed being the founders of new religions and religious orders4 ,this is not unlike the solution of religious doubts which ,hume playfully suggested and which ,john ,henry ,newman has seriously adopted1 namely that 8divinity1 or theology1 has a foundation in reason so far as it is supported by experience4 ,but its best and most solid foundation is faith and divine revelation40 8,when or how10 continues his biographer1 8,clifford first came to a clear perception that this position of quasi-scientific ,catholicism was untenable ,i do not exactly know2 but ,i know that the discovery cost him an intellectual and moral struggle1 of which traces may be found here and there in his essays4 ,most readers of these essays would consider that ,clifford is very unfair to the ,christian beliefs which he had abandoned and beyond doubt he felt a certain grudge against them for having so long duped him40#cg ,the theories of ,mr4 ,darwin and ,herbert ,spencer took the place in ,clifford's mind of the old fashioned creed2 ,natural selection was to unriddle the universe1 to yield a new system of ethics and education4 ,we read that ,clifford had an extraordinary power of taking up a theory provisionally1 of throwing himself into it1 accepting it1 applying it1 and of rejecting it in case it was not satisfactory2 and this may account perhaps for his somewhat dogmatic assertion in many cases of crude views4 ,there is one characteristic of ,clifford however which all may emulate1 and that is the candor and fearlessness of his thinking and speaking4 ,let me quote a few words from one of the best and most stirring of these essays3 8,if ,i let myself believe anything on insufficient evidence1 there may be no great harm done by the mere belief2 it may be true after all1 or ,i may never have occasion to exhibit it in outward acts4 ,but ,i cannot help doing this great wrong towards man1 that ,i make myself credulous4 ,the danger to society is not merely that it should believe wrong things1 though that is great enough2 but that it should become credulous1 and lose the habit of testing things and inquiring into them2 for then it must sink back into savagery4444 ,if a man1 holding a belief which he was taught in childhood or persuaded of afterwards1 keeps down and pushes away any doubts which arise about it in his mind1 purposely avoids the reading of books and the company of men that call in question or discuss it1 and regards as impious those questions which cannot easily be asked without disturbing it--the life of that man is one long sin against mankind40 ,the essay on the nature of things in themselves marks the furthest limit at which ,clifford's speculation arrived4 ,in it ,clifford begins by discarding the ordinary distinction between reality and ideas1 eternal object and eternal subject1 of feeling and thing4 ,the distinction is really between two orders of feeling2 there is the subjective or inner order1 in which sorrow succeeds the hearing of bad news1 and the objective or outward in which the feeling of letting go is followed by sight of falling object4 ,it is with the latter order that physical science concerns itself1 and all the inferences of natural science are inferences of my real or possible feeling4 ,since an object is a set of changes in my consciousness and not anything out of it1 is just my feeling real or possible and therefore part of me1 it might seem as if we were shut up in ourselves and excluded from participation in any other reality4 ,so we should be1 says ,clifford1 if we made no other inferences beside those of physical science2 but when ,i come to the conclusion that you are conscious and that you have objects in your consciousness similar to those in mine1 ,i am not inferring any actual or possible feelings of my own1 but your feelings1 which are not and can never be objects in my consciousness4 ,to feelings and consciousness thus inferred to exist in another1 ,clifford gives the name of eject1 because in the very act of inference they are thrown out of my consciousness1 recognised as outside of it1 as not being a part of me4 8,the existence of my conception of you in my consciousness carries with it a belief in the existence of you outside of my consciousness4444 ,how this inference is justified1 how consciousness can testify to the existence of anything outside of itself ,i do not pretend to say2 ,i need not untie a knot which the world has cut for me long ago40 7,vol4 ,,ii1 p4 #gc47 ,thus1 objects in the sense of things presented in my consciousness1 my phenomena1 are not the sole or chief reality2 ejects are equally real and my conviction of your existence as a conscious being like myself is coeval and of equal weight with my belief in my own conscious existence4 ,you and your feelings are strictly speaking the only things which are real outside of myself and my consciousness4 ,for though my objects or phenomena are external to my body they are not outside my consciousness1 but part and parcel thereof4 ,nay1 more than this an individual object1 i4 e4 an object which is mine and mine only1 never exists at all1 according to ,clifford1 in the mind of man2 for with each object as it exists in my mind is bound up the thought of similar objects existing in other men's minds4 ,all the objects in fact of which we are ever conscious are objects of consciousness in general1 are in ,clifford's phrase social objects4 8,a fixed habit causes an object as it is found in my mind to be formed as a social object and insensibly embodies in it a reference to the minds of other men40 ,this belief in ejects is moreover the root of all language and all morals3--of language1 because any sound which1 becoming a sign to my neighbor1 becomes thereby a mark to myself1 must by the nature of the case be a mark of the social object and not of the individual object3 of morals1 because the 8first great commandment1 evolved in the light of day by healthy processes wherever men have lived together1 is1 #8,put yourself in his place4'0 ,so far there is nothing to distinguish ,clifford's theory from ordinary ,idealism1 which denies that the universe is real except as a phenomenon or appearance before a ,self conscious thereof4 ,the future course of ,clifford's argument turns upon two assumptions4 ,one of these1 borrowed from the current physiology of the brain1 is this3 that the changes in my consciousness--ejective facts he calls them--run parallel with the changes in my brain1 which are objective facts4 ,the parallelism between them is one of complexity1 an analogy of structure4 ,the complex ejective facts are the same sort of complication of simple ejects as the complex motions of the brain are of simple molecular movements4 ,clifford illustrates the points from the relation of speech to writing1 the sentence spoken is the same function of the elementary sounds as the same sentence written is of the corresponding letters4 ,in like manner the complex human mind is the same function of simple feelings as the brain is of primary atoms4 ,the other assumption is based upon the current doctrine of evolution4 ,our bodies have been evolved step by step out of inorganic matter1 and we have before our eyes a line of organisms connecting man with the simplest atom of matter4 ,in this series there is no hiatus between one form and another1 no breach of morphological continuity1 but one species arises by insensible gradation out of its predecessors4 ,now in the case of organisms of a certain complexity we cannot help inferring consciousness1 and as we go back along the line we not only see the complexity of the organism and of its nervous system insensibly diminishing1 but for the first part of our course we have reason to think that the complexity of consciousness insensibly diminishes also4#ch ,the conclusion is forced upon us that nature is animate from top to bottom and that the humblest atom has an elementary feeling or eject of its own as simple in comparison with the complex intelligence of man as the atom is itself simple in comparison with his very complex brain4 ,unless we admit this we are in a dilemma4 ,the ejective facts which we cannot help inferring in the case of all animals must extend further down through vegetables to inorganic phenomena1 or else there must be a point at which we could say3 here the object begins to have an inner or ejective fact corresponding to it as my mind corresponds to my body4 ,but the series of objective forms presents no sudden break anywhere1 not even between animals and vegetables1 such as to warrant our supposing that ejective facts extend thus far down in the series and no further4 ,clifford is not quite as explicit about the nature of the elementary ejects1 which answer to moving molecules1 as we should like him to be4 ,of one thing however he is quite certain2 they are elementary feelings which yet are neither modifications of a consciousness nor yet imply a consciousness in which alone they can exist4 ,every feeling may be part of a consciousness1 but it need not be so4 ,consciousness is only a derivative and secondary result1 following on the arrangement of feeling in a particular way and it is evolved at a very late period in the history of the world4 ,in itself a feeling is an absolute ,ding-an-sich1 whose existence is not relative to anything else4 ,sentitur is all that can be said of it4 ,thus strictly speaking it is not consciousness which extends throughout the series of objective forms from man down to the molecule4 ,it is only feeling4 ,consciousness proper only belongs to the later and higher members of the series4 8,if we make a jump from man say to the tunicate mollusks1 we see no reason there to infer the existence of consciousness at all40 ,therefore the doctrine of evolution itself forbids us to regard all ejects as being of the same substant as mind4 ,they are only of like substance not 1 only quasi-mental#ci and not in themselves either rational1 intelligent1 or conscious4#dj ,besides the evolutionist's reason that it is absurd to attribute consciousness and personality to tunicate mollusks there is another reason drawn from human introspection for asserting elementary feelings to be absolute and unrelated existence4 8,a feeling1 at the instance when it exists1 exists an und fr sich and not as my feeling40#da ,the self-perception of the ego1 the sense that in all my various feelings it is ,i who am conscious1 this 8unity of apperception0 does not exist in the instantaneous consciousness which it unites1 but only in subsequent reflection upon it4 ,it consists further in the power of establishing a certain connexion between the memories of any two feelings which we had at the same instant4 ,there is one other point of extreme importance to be noticed in ,clifford's account of the elementary feelings or ejects4 ,they are connected together in their sequence and coexistence by counterparts of the physical laws of matter4 ,were it not so their correspondence with motions of matter could not be kept up4 ,that they should be thus connected with one another militates at first sight with the characteristic of absoluteness above ascribed to them by ,clifford4 ,we must suppose therefore that when ,clifford says that their existence is not relative to anything else1 he means no more than that they are not ultimately related to a personal consciousness4 ,we must suppose that it is these laws of the sequence and coexistence of elementary feelings which1 8when molecules are so combined together as to form the film on the under side of a jelly-fish1 so combine the elements of mind-stuff which go along with them as to form the faint beginnings of sentience4 ,the same laws combine feelings so as to form some kind of consciousness1 when the molecules are so combined as to form the brain and nervous system of a vertebrate0 7p4 #he74 ,we are now after these preliminary explanations in a position to appreciate what is the gist and core of ,clifford's speculations4 ,it is this1 that the reality external to our minds which is represented in our minds as matter is in itself mind-stuff or elementary feelings4 ,the universe consists entirely of mind-stuff4 ,some of this is woven into the complex form of human minds containing imperfect representations of the mind-stuff outside them and of themselves also1 as a mirror reflects its own image in another mirror1 ad infinitum4 ,such an imperfect representation is called a material universe4 ,the two chief points therefore of the doctrine as summed up by ,clifford himself are3 #a7 ,matter is a mental picture in which mind-stuff is the thing represented4 #b7 ,reason1 intelligence1 and volition are properties of a complex which is made up of elements themselves not rational1 not intelligent1 not conscious4 ,we shall do ,clifford an injustice if we interpret the foregoing theory as a dualistic and not as a monistic view1 i4 e4 as a view which postulates two ultimate principles of reality rather than one4 ,clifford however often speaks as if feeling and matter were two cordinate aspects of reality1 irreducible to one another4 ,for example he allows himself to speak of mind-stuff as going along with the material object1 of laws connecting the elements of mind-stuff which are only counterparts of the physical laws of matter and not those laws themselves4 ,again he writes 7p4 #gh7 as follows3 8,the distinction between eject and object1 forbids us to regard the eject1 another man's mind1 as coming into the world of objects in any way1 or as standing in the relation of cause or effect to any changes in that world40 ,such language reminds us of ,spinoza's doctrine that body alone can determine body to move and only thought determine thought to think1 but we must not therefore suppose that for ,clifford as for ,spinoza the two rival kingdoms of thought and extended matter are irreconcilably severed or nominally united by the figment of a single substance of which they are attributes3 ,what ,clifford means is that the thing is a feeling so far as it is anything at all and that1 if things coexist or succeed each other according to laws1 they only coexist and follow as feelings and conformably to laws of feeling4 ,not only is the elementary feeling a thing itself1 but things-in-themselves are elementary feelings4 ,it is incumbent therefore on us to ask if an elementary feeling is equal to the double burden put upon it by this theory of being the real universe of things and of creating the human intelligence4 ,in answering this question we must be careful to divest feelings beforehand of any characteristics which they only possess as gathered up into the unity of a self1 for at the stage in which we are considering reality selves have not yet arisen4 ,it is hard to conceive what is left of feeling after these characteristics have been removed1 nor does introspection help us here1 for1 as ,clifford very truly says1 the fundamental deliverance of consciousness affirms its own complexity and it seems impossible1 as ,i am at present constituted1 to have only one absolutely simple feeling at a time4 ,elementary feelings however could hardly constitute the cosmos without they follow one another1 coexist1 and connect themselves together in their groupings according to certain laws1 i4 e4 by some inherent necessity always take up the same attitudes toward each other1 and this much ,clifford assumes that they do4 ,yet these assumptions will not bear examination4 ,let us examine first the postulate that feelings follow in a fixed order2 call them a b c d1 b succeeds a and precedes c and it makes a difference1 which comes after or before the other4 ,now being absolute feelings1 not only is a past and non-existent before b begins to be1 so b before c1 but each is in turn the entire reality and there is no consciousness before which they pass in procession4 ,the real would thus fall into disconnected and mutually indifferent moments a b c d2 and as each of these in turn exhausts reality and is also unconscious of what goes before and after1 there would be no real succession at all4 ,in a real succession it makes a difference whether b comes before or after a1 but in the case we suppose it could make no difference4 ,in truth there can be no relation of before and after between two terms except for a self1 which takes note of the one disappearing and of the other appearing2 and whenever we speak of things following one another we tacitly presuppose a self before whom the procession passes4 ,it is even more difficult to understand how elementary feelings can be grouped and complicated in a fixed order of coexistence4 ,mind has not yet emerged1 so we must suppose that the grouping takes place in space4 ,in that case one feeling must be right or left1 above or below another4 ,the futility of such speculation will come home to anyone who will try to realise how a feeling of smell can be above or below one of taste4 ,we have next to consider ,clifford's account of the genesis out of elementary feelings of personal consciousness4 ,the hypothesis of mind-stuff1 we must remember1 was framed in order to preserve the same continuity of ejective facts as we see to exist in the case of objective facts1 to provide1 that is1 a gradual development of the human mind out of the simpler feelings of amb and even of atoms4 ,it must be denied however that the hypothesis is a success if we retain the usual meanings of the words continuity and development4 ,properly speaking a thing can only be said to grow or develop when it remains the same with itself all through the process and unfolds therein capacities which were anyhow latent in it to start with4 ,thus a tadpole develops into a frog1 a grub into a butterfly1 and the child grows into the man4 ,but in the series of ejects which begins from atoms and after running through amba and ape finally culminates in the human intelligence there is no point of identity1 no community between the first and last terms4 ,the eject which is the molecule is denied by ,clifford to be either conscious or rational1 nor has it even will1 like the philosophical factotum of ,schopenhauer or ,von ,hartmann4 ,it is a purely negative conception1 the abstract opposite of that mind into which it is to ultimately develop4 ,the hiatus between our intelligence and a thing in itself1 which call it feeling1 or mind-stuff1 or what we will1 is merely all that our intelligence is not1 is none the less of a hiatus1 because it is1 with the help of apes and amb1 spread out thin1 so to speak4 ,it would be better frankly to avow the chasm that exists than to gloss over it with words like evolution and development4 8,when a material organism10 writes ,clifford1 8has reached a certain complexity of nervous structure1 the complex of ejective facts which goes along with its action reaches that mode of complication which is called consciousness4 ,when a stream of feelings is so compacted together that at each instant it consists of 7#a7 new feelings1 7#b7 fainter repetitions of previous ones1 and 7#c7 links connecting these repetitions1 the stream is called a consciousness4 ,consciousness is thus a relative thing1 a mode of complication of certain elements1 and a property of the complex so produced40 ,if we look into this statement we see that it only amounts to this3 that feelings constitute a conscious self when they become the feelings of a conscious self and not before1 for except as gathered up in the unity of a self which has memory and remains the same throughout its differences feelings can be neither new nor repeated nor joined by links4 #a7 ,that a feeling is new means that ,i attend to it1 contrast it with former ones1 and decide that ,i have not felt it before4 #b7 ,that a feeling is a previous feeling now repeated means that ,i recognise it as having already occurred4 #c7 ,if feelings are joined by links of what nature are these links8 ,clifford does not say that they also are feelings1 so presumably they are not2 in that case no link is left save a connecting self4 ,but even if the link is a feeling it cannot be less than a feeling of the togetherness of two other feelings1 but such a feeling would involve memory of those feelings and memory involves self-hood4 ,it is really1 however1 an abuse of words to apply the term feeling in such a case4 ,we might with ,hume ask of this feeling which links other feelings 8,is it a taste1 a smell1 a sound1 an impression of sight or touch80 ,clifford makes a reference to ,haeckel's treatise upon 8,zellseelen und ,seelenzellen40#db ,haeckel's view is that every protoplasmic cell has a soul of its own and that when a number of these are combined under certain conditions1 as in the human brain1 they generate as their resultant the human soul4 ,he helps out his theory by pointing to such phrases as national spirit1 a nation's conscience1 a people's will4 ,nothing1 he contends1 could be more real than these entities1 which are yet only resultants of the wills1 spirits1 and consciences of the separate individuals who compose the nation4 ,this is an interesting speculation1 which it would be a pity to dismiss abruptly merely because it is groundless4 ,no doubt our bodies and brains may be regarded as colonies of protoplasmic units of which each has an independent life of its own1 of which each is born1 nourishes itself1 reproduces itself1 and at last breaks up and dies4 ,the colorless cells especially in our blood are such units and have as good a claim to be called individuals as the amba which we find swimming about by itself in any pond4 ,these units are certainly alike and must be allowed to have inner states of their own4 ,it may also be freely conceded that the existence of certain inward states in these cells of which my brain and nerves are composed is the condition of certain states of feeling and emotion arising in me4 ,but all these admissions fail to advance us a step toward ,haeckel's conclusion4 ,that any number of atoms of protoplasm have souls and soul-states is not enough per se to produce an extra soul which is none of them1 yet like their souls and possessed of a life of its own4 ,even if the molecules of my brain were each in possession of a self-consciousness as ample as my own1 their mere juxtaposition could not give rise to my self-consciousness4 ,from first to last their soul-states remain theirs1 mine remain mine4 ,the reasoning employed by ,haeckel involves a fallacy of composition3--because each of a colony of cells a1 b1 c1 d1 has a soul of its own1 therefore the colony as a whole has a soul of its own1 which is not the soul of any one of them4 ,nor do the analogies ,haeckel invokes help him at all1 for the life of a nation does not exist at all except as the lives of the individuals composing that nation1 nor do we expect to find any traits in our so-called national spirit which are not ultimately contributed by individuals2 ,haeckel however would have us believe that the mere composition of the primitive and simple souls of separate amb results in a human soul with its wealth of intuitions and interests4 ,the utmost we are entitled to say is that given a certain collocation of cells in the brain there may by an entirely new act of the infinite be generated a human soul4 ,it is only by playing fast and loose with words that we can deduce this new soul from an aggregate of other souls either like or unlike itself4 ,it is surprising that ,clifford should have recognised that the reality underlying so-called matter is akin to mind and yet have identified it rather with the quasi-mental facts of an amba or of an atom than with the intelligence of man4 ,the argument by which he arrives at this conclusion is as follows3 ,you as a face1 a voice1 a touch1 as an object to my senses in short1 are a mere phantasm or appearance in my consciousness1 part and parcel of myself and not distinct from me in any way4 ,but ,i cannot help inferring an eject1 to wit feelings and a consciousness like my own1 behind the sensible show of your person2 and this consciousness of yours which ,i address as you1 is the truth of the object or appearance1 which ,i have4 ,you are the reality which ,i really perceive1 so far as ,i perceive anything more than my own feelings4 ,similarly when ,i watch an amba1 what ,i perceive as a somewhat formless mass of protoplasm is really in itself the struggling life within4 ,lastly what ,i handle and perceive as a crystal or metal is really the eject4 ,if here we read force or unconscious will instead of eject or mind-stuff1 ,clifford's view would practically coincide with ,schopenhauer's2 for force is truly an eject in ,clifford's sense1 not an object or appearance to me4 ,now the human intelligence arises late in the history of things and is altogether a secondary and derivative thing4 ,consequently the world is not really what it is for my consciousness4 ,my ,weltanschauung is false in proportion as my mind is complex and derivative4 ,conversely1 the ,weltanschauung of each being approximates to truth and becomes less and less illusive in proportion as the eject which it in reality is approaches the primitive simplicity of mind-stuff4 ,i am really very little of what ,i am consciously4 ,if you want a truer exponent of the truth of things you must go to the amba or lower still4 ,it1 as compared with me1 is consciously most of what it is really4 ,the absolutely simple atom is probably the only being who is quite free from delusions4 ,the conclusion then to which ,clifford conducts us is this3 that the universe is not really such as it appears to our intelligence1 still less1 ,i presume1 such as it would appear to a higher intelligence than ours4 ,it is really such and such only as it would appear to the being whose eject is the lowest rung in the ladder of mind-stuff4 ,our universe spread out in space and time1 with all its splendours and harmonies1 is a delusion2 nay1 more1 the human soul with its sthetic and moral sensibilities1 its fears and aspirations1 is the parent delusion which breeds the delusion of a cosmos4 8,we are such stuff as dreams are made of40 ,the loose way in which ,clifford used the word feeling1 as equivalent to any form of consciousness1 blinded him to the fact that a qualified thing as such is not given in feeling at all and led him to suppose that the universe as we know it would continue to stand in the absence of all complex ejects whatever4 ,mr4 ,green has shown that all theories of the object which ignore the workmanship of thought manifest therein and identify the esse of things with their percipi lead straight to nihilism4 ,to such nihilism ,clifford's doctrine1 like ,hume's which it resembles1 immediately bring us4 ,but ,hume did not take seriously the demolition of reality involved in his theory that things are only real as they are felt and that feelings are 8entirely loose and separate0 7,treatise ,i1 #eei7 while the solid framework of reality is an illusion bred of a propensity of our minds to feign connections and relations where there are none4 ,hume tells us that he regarded his own speculations as 8philosophical melancholy and delirium10 as 8clouds to be dispelled0 7,treatise ,i1 #eja74 ,he writes 8,i dine1 ,i play a game of backgammon1 ,i converse and am merry with my friends2 and when1 after three or four hours' amusement1 ,i would return to these speculations1 they appear so cold1 and strained1 and ridiculous1 that ,i cannot find it in my heart to enter into them any further40 ,but ,clifford1 like ,huxley1 took ,hume au grand serieux1 forgetting that feeling as such does not reveal an object at all4 ,there is a passage in a letter of ,clifford's written to ,professor ,pollock in ,september1 #ahgd1 propos of ,green's introduction to ,hume1 which evinces pretty clearly that ,clifford did not discern the true drift of ,hume's speculations in the way ,hume did himself4 8,i hope10 he writes1 8you have seen ,sidgwick's remarks on the introduction2 he points out that to prove ,hume insufficient is not to do much at the present day4444 ,green1 for instance1 points out that ,hume has no complete theory of the object2--to find fault with ,hume for the omission is like blaming ,newton for not including ,maxwell's electricity in the ,principia40 ,here ,clifford hardly writes as if he saw that his own theory of the object as e4 g4 an unrelated feeling is open to exactly the same criticisms as ,hume's1 as if he understood1 what ,hume had an inkling of1 that1 in proving the ego to be a relative thing instead of the heart and centre of reality1 you dissipate the universe into nothing4 ,there are several other features in ,clifford's doctrine that call for criticism4 ,it should for example be pointed out that the entire view that ejects are the truth of objects is in the first instance a deliverance of consciousness itself4 ,i only transcend my individual feelings1 says ,clifford1 so far as ,i infer a consciousness more or less like my own to underlie them2 and this underlying eject is the sole reality4 8,how this inference is justified1 how consciousness can testify to the existence of anything outside of itself1 ,i do not pretend to say2 ,i need not untie a knot which the world has cut for me long ago40 7,vol4 ,,ii1 p4 #gc47 ,but if consciousness is but the property of a temporary conjunction of unconscious feelings1 what value shall we attach to its assurances8 ,they are certainly not valid except for itself2 they do not hold good for the atomic feelings of which the world ultimately consists4 ,but my belief that the real is in the last resort an atom of feeling is simply an extension of my conviction that ejects are the truth of my feelings4 ,prove this conviction an illusion--and ,clifford does prove it to be such1 when he declares consciousness to be a relative thing--and you prove the entire theory an illusion4 ,thus the tail of ,clifford's theory is bitten off by the head4 ,the hypothesis that feelings can be felt1 without being felt as my feelings1 is a very noteworthy one4 8,a feeling at the instant when it exists1 exists an und fr sich1 and not as my feeling40 ,this is why a ,greek said in the sense of ,i see1 because the act of perception is necessarily over1 when we become conscious of it4 8,when10 continues ,clifford1 8,i remember the feeling as my feeling1 there comes up not merely a faint repetition of the feeling1 but inextricably connected with it a whole set of connections with the general stream of my consciousness40 ,this is very truly and acutely observed but it is an admission that the unrelated feeling is no element in our experience1 that in our cosmos at least there is no whatever1 but that every corner of it is illumined by the presence of a relating self4 ,my consciousness never directly testifies at all to the existence of an absolute feeling4 ,to be my feeling a feeling must already be brought by connections of content into the web of my experience1 but what do ,i know of feelings which are not mine4 ,are not 8absolute feelings0 an inference based on observation of low organisms like the amba1 which we are convinced have no self and yet feel8 ,it should be also noticed that this supposition that we are not directly but only ex post facto conscious of our feelings 4 ,thus ,clifford writes3 8,this memory 7of a feeling which existed an und fr sich as my feeling7 is1 qua memory1 relative to the past feeling1 which it partially recalls2 but in so far as it is itself a feeling1 it is absolute1 ,ding an sich40 ,that is to say1 ,i am not directly but only ex post facto conscious even of what ,i remember4 ,to be conscious of the content of a memory ,i must remember that ,i remember it4 ,surely this new memory in turn cannot be known ex post facto and so ,i must remember that ,i remember that ,i remember et sic ad infinitum1 before ,i become really conscious of anything at all4 ,one other point might be raised4 ,what is the nature and origin of the laws which govern the sequence and coexistence of feelings4 ,we have already seen that feelings as such neither follow nor coexist apart from a self4 8,these laws are counterparts of the laws which govern physical phenomena40 ,clifford in writing thus conducts his speculation ,without prejudice to his common-sense belief in a world of necessarily and rationally related things4 ,he does not see that with the reduction of the real to a feeling physical facts disappear and with these facts the laws to which laws of feeling shall correspond4 ,he is evidently confusing the laws of feeling with the psychological laws of association which depend upon the environment of the individual's senses by a world already real4 ,he does not see that the problem he really imposes on himself is this3 starting from no world at all to arrive at one1 or starting from the world as it may be supposed to picture itself in the feelings of an amba to arrive at it as it exists for the human intelligence4 ,we must not concede to ,clifford any more than to ,hume this postulate of a real cosmical order which shall give the cue to feelings when and how to follow and coexist4 ,huxley only allows it to ,hume1 because not having passed the threshold of ,idealistic philosophy he cannot divest himself of it4 ,if1 however1 this postulate be denied1 then the doctrine that the esse of things lies in their percipi will recommend itself to no one4 ,f4 ,c4 ,,conybeare4 ,,footnotes3 #cg ,on the whole1 however1 it is probable that in dealing such hard blows as he did at priests and dogmas he was actuated by sheer love of truth1 and those who knew him best assure us that he was entirely free from bitterness and from the vanity which sets some people upon beating their grandmother in public by way of showing that they are grown up in their opinions4 #ch ,clifford's ,essays1 ,vol4 ii1 p4 #hc4 #ci ,vol4 ii1 p4 #fa4 #dj ,vol4 ii1 p4 #hg4 #da ,p4 #hj4 #db ,deutsche ,rundschau1 ,july1 #ahgh4 ,,are ,,there ,,things ,,in ,,themselves8 ,the proposition that things in themselves cannot be known1 has often1 and perhaps justly1 been proclaimed as the central idea of ,kant's philosophy4 ,kant concludes the first section of his 8,transcendentale ,elementarlehre0 with this 8critical admonition03 8,that in general nothing which is intuited in space is a thing in itself1 and that space is not a form which belongs as a property to things2 but that objects are quite unknown to us in themselves1 and what we call outward objects are nothing else but mere representations of our sensibility1 whose form is space1 but whose real correlate1 the thing in itself1 is not known by means of these representations1 nor ever can be40 78,kritik d4 r4 ,v40 #d47 ,the term 8thing in itself0 means originally the object as it is1 independent of the thinking subject's cognition4 ,for instance3 ,a rainbow appears in the clouds2 the rainbow is not a thing in itself1 but the appearance of a thing in itself4 ,the rainbow exists in man's sensibility only4 ,the colors of the spectrum1 indeed all colors1 the colors of the sky1 of the clouds1 of trees1 of living beings1 are sensations only2 they are subjective phenomena1 they are certain kinds of feelings representing objective realities1 but they are not these objective realities themselves4 ,they are perceived in the brain and are projected to a place outside the organism4 ,the rainbow1 as it is seen1 is not a thing1 but it is something seen1 it is an appearance only4 ,and this is true of all things seen and heard and perceived by any one of the senses4 ,the sense-pictures are localised in space1 they are projected outside to a spot where the combined experience of the senses has taught a sentient being to expect them4 ,but all the objects of the objective world as they are perceived are and remain subjective sense-perceptions4 ,the world of our senses around us is woven of our sensations4 ,it is mere appearance4 ,this is not a question concerning which there is any doubt1 this is simply a matter of fact4 ,but the question arises1 8,can we know things as they are independent of sensation8 ,can we know things in themselves80 ,the physicist and every scientist is engaged with the problem1 ,what are natural phenomena independent of sensation8 ,light is a sensation of vision1 but what is the objective process that takes place when a human eye perceives light8 ,the physicist answers this problem by eliminating in his mind the sense-element and by describing the facts of the process in terms of matter and motion4 ,his answer is that light1 objectively considered1 is a certain vibration of the ether4 ,if we can rely upon physical science1 the thing in itself of a rainbow would be a certain refraction of ether-waves4 ,these vibrations of the ether-waves are transmitted from the sun1 and being broken in the falling raindrops actually take place independent of cognition1 they are real whether we look at them or not4 ,the ultimate aim of science is a description of the natural phenomena not in terms of sense-elements1 but in terms of form4 ,that feature of a thing which we call its matter1 constitutes its reality1 but the form of a thing1 of a motion1 or of a process makes the thing that which it is2 every act of causation is a change of form1 and the forms of things are determined with the assistance of the operations of purely formal thought1 i4 e4 through measuring or counting4 ,such is science1 not only as it ought to be1 but also as it actually is4 ,all our scientists1 each one in his field1 are consciously or unconsciously working out a solution of this problem4 ,and a solution of this problem means1 in our conception1 the objective cognition of the world--i4 e41 a description of the natural processes as they are independent of sensibility4 ,kant knew very well that a description of things and of natural processes in terms of form was possible4 ,he clung1 nevertheless1 to the proposition that things in themselves are unknowable4 ,and why8 ,a description of things and of natural processes in terms of form was in his opinion not as yet a description of things in themselves1 for--and here we are confronted with the original idea and the fundamental error of ,kantian thought--,kant did not consider the forms of things as an objective quality of theirs1 he maintained that the formal element is purely mental and merely subjective4 ,the thinking mind1 he declared1 attributes them to the object4 ,space and time1 the pure forms of existence1 together with all other forms1 such as causation1 are1 according to ,kant1 not qualities of the objective world1 but of the thinking subject4 ,the thinking subject cannot help viewing the world in the form of its own cognition1 it transfers these forms to the objects4 ,therefore the thing in itself according to ,kant would not be represented in a description of the thing purely in terms of form1 the thing in itself would mean the thing as it would be1 independent of time and space4 ,let us here point out a distinction between the thing in itself and noumenon4 ,noumenon means 8a thing of thought40 ,the noumenal world is the world of thoughts in a thinking being's mind4 ,the noumenon must not be identified with the thing in itself4 ,the two terms are often confounded1 but they have to be distinguished4 ,the idea of reflected ether-vibrations is a 8noumenon10 but the reflected ether-vibrations themselves1 the objective process are a thing1 i4 e4 an objective reality1 and in so far as they are a reality1 considered as being independent of sensation1 we may call them 8a thing in itself40 ,now when ,kant denies the objectivity of time and space1 he must1 implicitly1 also deny the objective validity of a description made in terms of measuring and counting4 ,the pictorial world of our sense-perception is subjective1 it is built up of sensations1 it is not objective2 and the world of thought is the attempt to reduce the subjective world of sense-imagery to terms of objective validity1 i4 e4 to terms of form4 ,but this world of thought is according to ,kant purely mental1 it is purely noumenal1 or1 in other words1 noumena do not represent things independent of cognition1 they represent things as our mind thinks them4 ,the sensory world is mere appearance1 it is a subjective phenomenon1 but the world of thought1 says ,kant1 is no less subjective1 it is a world of thought which describes things in terms of purely mental properties and not in properties of the things themselves4 ,this is tantamount to the proposition1 that things in themselves cannot be known4 ,the term 8thing in itself10 in the sense of a thing as it is independent of sensibility1 would better be called 8the objective thing10 and we shall so call it when we wish to distinguish it from ,kant's thing in itself4 ,the objective thing is the thing1 not expressed in terms of subjective elements1 such as feelings or sensibility1 but in terms of objective elements1 i4 e4 in terms of form4 ,that a description of things in terms of forms is possible has never been denied either by ,kant or by any ,kantian2 but they deny that these descriptions are anything more than mere noumena2 ,kant and the orthodox ,kantians deny that they represent the things as they are in themselves4 ,thus the term thing in itself in the ,kantian sense comes to mean the thing as it is independent of space and time4 ,that every noumenon is a mental sign is a matter of course2 the noumenal world is ideal4 ,but we maintain that these mental signs represent real qualities of the objective world2 they have a meaning2 the things represented by them are actual features of reality4 ,kant denies this4 ,to him the noumenal world is purely noumenal4 ,to ,kant there is no space outside the space-conception1 and so he declares that space is ideal2 it is not an objective quality of things4 ,however1 we maintain1 that our space-conception describes1 i4 e4 depicts1 or represents space1 our space-conception is ideal1 yet space is not ideal but real2 it is an objective quality of the world4 ,kant's view is dualistic1 or at least necessarily leads to dualism1 and it appears to rest on an unpronounced dualistic assumption4 ,kant treats 8the subject0 as something quite distinct and separate from 8the object40 ,if he had borne in mind that the subject is always at the same time an object1 he would have treated both subject as well as object as mere abstractions of one and the same reality4 ,resting upon this erroneous presupposition1 ,kant's most consequential mistake1 in our opinion1 was his conception of what he called 8the ideality of time and space40 ,if time and space were purely ideal1 purely mental1 purely subjective1 then indeed1 the things as they are would forever remain unknown to us1 then indeed the thinking mind would be as if shut up within a hollow globe out of which it could never escape1 then indeed the world would be divided into two parts1 the objective world1 and the subjective world2 and the gap between both could never be bridged over4 ,the thinking mind would have within itself a noumenal world built upon the subjective elements of sense-impressions4 ,this subjective world would possess no objective value1 it would not describe realities1 and the objective world would thus be unknowable1 inscrutable1 and mystical4 ,the idea of a thing in itself found another support in a mistaken conception of the unity of certain things1 especially of organisms4 ,the unity of a combination of parts is not merely the sum of the parts1 it consists in their peculiar combination which makes an harmonious co-operation possible4 ,this unity is an additional element2 it is an entirely new creation which exhibits features not contained in any of its parts4 ,there is no latent watch contained in a heap of little wheels and cogs1 the watch is created through the combination of these wheels and cogs4 ,the unity of a thing is its form1 consisting in a special arrangement of its parts2 and this form although not material is nevertheless real4 ,the materialistic conception overlooks the importance of form2 but the spiritualist and also the transcendentalist materialise it as some spiritual substance1 as entities or independent existences4 ,they are in this way as much materialistic as the materialist4 ,the question has seriously been asked1 ,what is a melody in itself4 ,the question has sense when we understand by it1 ,what are those new qualities which appear through a certain combination of sounds8 ,those qualities are not nothing1 they are something quite peculiar4 ,we call one of them rhythm1 another one is the fixed succession of notes of a different pitch4 ,the qualities of a melody as a whole are not qualities of its separate parts2 yet therefore the melody is not a thing in itself4 ,we might just as well speak of a watch in itself1 meaning thereby that peculiar unity of the combination of its parts which makes of them a watch4 ,but if we thus speak of 8the watch in itself10 we must be aware that this idea has not somewhere in a transcendental fairy-land an independent existence above space and time1 and outside of its parts4 ,the unity of a certain interacting group of parts is1 on the one hand1 no mere addition of the thinking subject1 it is not purely noumenal1 it is real and objective2 on the other hand it is not a thing in itself1 independent of its parts1 it is the product of the relations in which its parts affect one another4 ,is not perhaps the basis of these vagaries a mistaken conception of language8 ,we call a certain sensory picture a tree and we say1 the tree has roots1 a stem1 branches1 leaves1 and fruits4 ,autumn sets in and the wind shakes the leaves off the branches4 ,now we speak of a leafless tree4 ,we cut the tree down and we speak of a rootless tree4 ,we burn the trunk and the branches1 and the tree as a phenomenon is gone1 all its properties are taken away4 ,what remains8 ,the tree in itself is left1 but the tree in itself does not exist4 ,if all the property of a person is taken from him1 the person himself is still left4 ,the properties of a tree1 however1 are not properties in the same sense2 they are qualities4 ,if all the qualities and parts of a tree are gone1 if only the tree in itself is left--then there is left nothing but the empty word tree1 the idea of a tree4 ,,ii4 ,,kant',s ,,view ,,of ,,space ,,and ,,time4 ,let us briefly consider the ground upon which ,kant bases his view of the ideality of space and time4 ,kant asks3 8,what then are time and space8 ,are they real existences8 ,or are they merely relations or determinations of things1 such however as would equally belong to these things in themselves1 though they should never become objects of intuition2 or are they such as belong only to the form of intuition1 and consequently to the subjective constitution of the mind1 without which these predicates of time and space could not be attached to any object80#dc 7,kr4 d4 r4 ,v4 #b2 8,meiklejohn10 p4 #bc47 ,we should say1 to state our opinion briefly1 that space and time are not 8real existences10 i4 e4 they are not concrete objects1 but they are real nevertheless2 they are not material things2 not thingish realities1 yet they are objective properties of things4 ,they are the forms of things and processes1 and belong to the things whether they become objects of cognition or not4 ,in this sense1 they actually belong to the things in themselves1 viz4 to the objective things4 ,kant argues that space and time are not conceptions derived from outward experience2 they have not been abstracted from sense-impressions4 ,they are necessary representations a priori1 they are not discursive ideas or generalisations1 for there is but one space and one time1 space being represented as infinite and time as eternal4 ,from these arguments ,kant draws the conclusions that space and time do not represent qualities of an object but that they are the form of all sensory phenomena1 space being the form of the external1 time of the internal sense4 ,in other words1 space and time belong to the subjective condition of the sensibility and not to the objective world4 ,we answer that our conceptions of space and time are after all derived from experience4 ,space and time are abstractions4 ,there is no time in itself4 ,there is no space in itself4 ,space and time are not directly derived from outward experience1 nor are they derived from the sense-elements of experience4 ,inner experience1 i4 e4 reflection to the exclusion of sense-impression1 the experimenting with pure forms1 will lead to the construction of the concepts of space as well as of time4 ,space and time1 magnitudes and numbers having been constructed in the mind of a thinking subject are applied to practical experience4 ,when counting three trees we do not abstract the number 8three0 from the three trees1 but we apply to them the system of numbers in our possession4 ,says ,kant3 8,we never can imagine or make a representation to ourselves of the non-existence of space1 though we may easily enough think that no objects are found in it4 ,it must therefore be considered as the condition of the possibility of phenomena and by no means as a determination dependent upon them and is a representation a priori1 which necessarily supplies the basis for external phenomena40 ,space being the generalised concept of extended form1 and time that of motion without reference to any contents1 it is naturally impossible to think the non-existence of space and time4 ,thinking is an act1 it is a process2 and any act1 any process1 any event1 is a reality which implies or presupposes the existence of the forms of reality4 ,we can think of matter without reference to form1 i4 e4 we can have the abstract idea of matter2 but we cannot think that there is any matter void of form4 ,this does by no means prove that form has nothing to do with matter4 ,on the contrary1 it proves that form and matter are inseparable4 ,the form of existence need not therefore be called 8the basis0 of existence1 it is simply one universal feature of existence4 ,and the form of existence being bound up with existence itself1 it is necessary that any thinking existence in so far as it is real1 in so far as it is at the same time an object and part of the objective world should also be in possession of the conditions to evolve the idea of form out of itself through inner experience4 ,this inner experience of experimenting with pure forms is also a kind of experience4 ,it is not a purely subjective process2 it is a subjective process to the thinking subject1 which to other subjects1 however1 would appear as an objective process4 ,the laws of pure form as stated in the sciences of purely formal thought1 are not merely subjective2 they possess objective validity4 ,it is true and from our standpoint a matter of course that the laws of form are a priori1 which means1 they hold good for any pure form4 ,modern positivism1 such as we defend it1 is monistic4 ,we consider the entire world as one great whole and do not forget that all noumenal representations of certain features of the world1 of matter1 mind1 form1 even of things and our own souls included1 are mere abstractions4 ,reality itself remains undivided and indivisible4 ,abstract concepts are mental symbols invented to represent certain features of reality4 ,but although we can in our mind separate these features and distinguish them from other features1 in the world of reality they cannot be cut out or thought of as things in themselves4 ,granting the oneness of reality which dawns upon us instinctively before consciousness is fully matured1 we are inevitably led to the conception that there is but one form of reality1 which implies that there is but one space and one time4 ,,iii4 ,,form ,,not ,,imported ,,by ,,the ,,mind ,,into ,,reality4 ,kant says1 and in this we agree with ,kant1 that 8all thought must directly by means of certain signs relate ultimately to ,anschauungen40 ,the word ,anschauung 7the 8onlooking10 generally translated by 8intuition07 means the immediate presence of sense-perception4 ,says ,kant3 8,the effect of an object upon our faculty of representation is called sensation1 and that intuition which refers to an object by means of sensation is called empirical intuition40 ,for instance1 ,i see a rose3 ,the image of the rose which ,i see is the appearance or the phenomenon4 ,kant continues3 8,that which in the phenomenon corresponds to the sensation ,i term its matter1 but that which effects that the contents of the phenomenon can be arranged under certain relations1 ,i call its form40 ,in other words matter is that which affects the senses and form is to be expressed in relations4 ,the difference between the formal and the material is obvious4 ,the formal is of great importance1 nay1 it is of paramount importance1 but the formal is neither anything apart from the material nor is it a substance4 ,both concepts are disparate1 but they have been derived by mental abstraction from the same reality4 ,we fully agree with ,kant when he continues3 8,that in which our sensations are merely arranged1 and by which they are susceptible of assuming a certain form1 cannot be itself sensation40 ,but we do not agree with ,kant when from this proposition he derives the following conclusion3 8,it is1 then1 the matter of all phenomena that is given to us a posteriori2 the form must lie ready a priori for them in the mind1 and consequently can be regarded separately from all sensation40 ,here lies the great fallacy of ,kant1 which rests upon an erroneous statement and an actual distortion of fact4 ,the phenomenon of a rose which ,i see before me is not merely sensory1 but also formal4 ,the phenomenon1 i4 e4 the image of the rose 7die ,anschauung7 is a sensation of a special form4 ,the term sensation as it is generally used implies its having a special form4 ,accordingly the form does not1 at least not from the beginning1 lie ready a priori in the mind2 the form is given together with the sensation4 ,kant speaks of 8that which is annexed to perception by the conceptions of understanding10 as if our understanding added the formal out of the mind to the sensory elements given by experience4 ,what is the mind8 ,the mind is a product of the world2 it is a system of symbols representing the things of the world and their relations including such possible relations as are worthy of aspiring for4 ,in short1 the mind consists of ideas and ideals4#dd ,it has often been said that the mind is the creator of the sensory and noumenal world4 ,this is incorrectly expressed1 for mind is the sensory and noumenal world itself4 ,the sense-pictures1 the thought-symbols1 and the ideals of a man are actual parts of his mind4 ,they are not products but constituents of his mind4 ,their organised totality is his mind itself4 ,the activity which takes place in a mind1 i4 e4 the combining1 the separating1 and recombining of memories1 thoughts1 and ideals are the actual realities1 and if we speak of a man's understanding1 or reason1 or any other so-called faculty1 we have to deal with abstractions4 ,the activity of mentally separating form and matter might be called by the general term understanding4 ,however the faculty of understanding is not a distinct mental organ1 it consists in the single acts of understanding1 and the word understanding is a mental symbol representing them all together as if they were one thing4 ,and certainly these acts of understanding as little import the formal into the world of sensation as the miner carries the metals into the mines4 ,the formal1 the relational1 or the a priori1 is first extracted out of the data of experience not otherwise than iron is gained out of the ores4 ,the ore is not iron but it contains iron1 the phenomenon of a rose is not purely a sense-impression1 it is a sense-impression of a certain form4 ,we are aware of the fact that mind is an entirely new creation different from the non-mental world1 yet at the same time we maintain that the elements from which mind develops are the same as the elements of the non-mental world4 ,nature furnishes the entire raw material and whatever new creation the product of a new development is1 nothing can be added to the raw material1 of which the formal is the most indispensable part4 ,the raw material of sensory phenomena as soon as it is worked out1 and also the activity of working it out are called mind4 ,mind accordingly originates with the appearance of sentient substance as the organisation of feelings and the memories of feelings--these memories being conditioned through the preservation of the form of sentient substance4 ,mind is not something different from the world but must be considered as its product and highest efflorescence4 ,mind is made of the same substance as the universe and the mind-forms are the forms of objective existence4 ,as soon as a system of forms has developed in a sentient being1 thus constituting its mind1 this system can again be referred to the objective forms of things4 ,in this sense we can say with ,kant1 that the understanding imports form into phenomena2 and this re-importation1 this referring the objectively formal to the subjective system of formal thought1 is an essential element in cognition4 ,,iv4 ,,professor ,,jodl',s ,,view ,,of ,,the ,,thing ,,in ,,itself4 ,the idea of a thing in itself independent of space and time and the unknowableness of the thing in itself are the basis of all agnosticism4 ,and an agnostic tendency is at present predominant even among positive workers and thinkers4 ,agnosticism is still the philosophy of the day even among those who have surrendered its basis 7which is ,kant's transcendental idealism7 and accept the monistic world-conception4 ,friedrich ,jodl1 professor at the ,university of ,prague and author of the well-known 8,history of ,ethics10 in answer to a letter of mine formulates in concise terms this modernised view of a thing in itself4 ,he writes3 8,you are right4 ,the thing in itself is a dangerous idea1--one that easily leads astray4 ,but so long as we have no better expression to represent the relation for which it stands we shall have to use it4 ,you also accept the following three momenta3 7#a7 ,objective existence or reality4 7#b7 ,effectiveness of ,reality upon consciousness1 i4 e4 sensation4 7#c7 ,effectiveness of sensation upon consciousness and reproduction of sensation in consciousness1 i4 e4 representation4 ,nobody1 however1 can maintain that in sensation1 and still less in representation1 the whole of reality will appear in consciousness4 ,first we learn from history what progress has been made in the cognition of reality and secondly it is obvious that we are infinitely far from an actual comprehension of reality4 ,we have strong reasons to suspect that there are many processes in reality which in no way affect our sensibility and cannot enter into consciousness1 and we know for sure that we do not comprehend--i4 e4 reconstruct from them assumed causes--many things1 indeed most things1 which we observe in their effects4 ,our cognition of nature1 if we begin to construct1 always leads us to some x4 ,it may be doubted whether this x is an unknown or an unknowable4 ,in my opinion it is both--anyhow we cannot eliminate it4 8,i am convinced that many things which are unknown to-day and appear as unknowable will be known and knowable in a thousand years4 ,but ,i doubt whether the total mass of the ,unknowable has been noticeably diminished4 ,for the ,unknowable is infinite and the infinite if divided by any finite number can never produce a finite number4 ,every solved problem contains new and greater problems4 ,what shall we call this8 ,i believe that the term 8thing in itself0 is after all the best expression4 ,whoever wants to turn a mystic on account of it cannot be prevented4 ,this state of things can be brought out of existence by an act of violence only40 ,it is most certainly true1 as ,professor ,jodl says1 that sensations do not depict the whole of reality4 ,but why should they8 ,cognition is possible only by limiting the attention to a special point4 ,every sense organ is an organ of abstraction4 ,every sense depicts the effects of reality in its own way and in this way alone4 ,it may freely be granted that there are many processes in reality which do not affect our sensibility4 ,yet there is nothing in reality which does not affect something in some way4 ,if it did not1 it could not be said to exist4 ,the chemical rays of light do not affect our eye1 they are invisible and were for that reason not noticed4 ,but these rays are not without any effects4 ,if we cannot observe them directly1 we can invent sensitive plates or other instruments for observing their effects indirectly4 ,indirect observation makes it possible that the limitation of our senses does not result in a limitation of knowledge4 ,says ,professor ,jodl3 8,our cognition of nature if we begin to construct always leads us to some x40 ,this sentence indicates that ,professor ,jodl's and our conception of cognition are different4 ,cognition is not a reconstruction of assumed causes2 it is a unification of our representative sensations or ideas4 ,something is again noticed1 it is re-cognised1 to be the same thing4 ,cognition is adaptation of new facts to our present stock of knowledge2 it is the proper arrangement of new data in our system of mental representations4 ,cognition1 accordingly1 is the reduction of the unknown to terms of the known4 ,how can it ever lead to an x8 ,the positive conception of cognition is1 as ,kirchoff defines1 it 8an exhaustive and most simple description of facts40 ,it is a reconstruction of facts or1 as ,mach says1 ,ein ,nachbilden der ,thatsachen4 ,cognition is based upon ,anschauungen2 it will lead to an ultimate x1 only in case we expect that cognition instead of being a description of facts will have to give us information about how it happens that facts exist1 how they originated out of nothing4 ,professor ,jodl's thing in itself is not outside of ,space and ,time 7as is ,kant's thing in itself7 but it is the overwhelming infinitude of problems to be solved with which we cannot hope to get through even though our life lasted billions of light-years4 ,let me repeat here what ,i said in the second edition of 8,fundamental ,problems10 8,a philosophy which starts from the positive data of experience1 and arranges them in the system of a monistic conception of the world1 will meet with many great problems and in solving them will again and again be confronted with new problems4 ,it will always grapple with something that is not yet known4 ,the unknown seems to expand before us like an infinite ocean upon which the ship of knowledge advances4 ,but the unknown constantly changes into the known4 ,we shall find no real unknowable wherever we proceed4 ,the idea of the unknowable is like the horizon--an optic illusion4 ,the more we advance1 the farther it recedes4 ,the unknowable is no reality2 the unknowable can nowhere prevent knowledge nor can the horizon debar a ship in her voyage1 from further progress40 7p4 #bga47 ,man's knowledge has value as positive information concerning the facts he has to deal with1 and the infinitude of the not known1 the infinitude of other problems and things which he will never face1 is of no consequence whatever4 ,positivism commences and has to commence with the positive facts of the given experience and not with the infinitude of possibilities which lie beyond our horizon4 ,compare knowledge to property and suppose a man is to buy a farm4 ,shall we discourage him with the idea that the whole amount of soil on the surface of the earth and of other planets is infinite1 and this infinitude of all existences if divided by his finite little possession can never result in a finite number4 ,even if it were doubled1 if it were multiplied a thousand times1 it remains as good as nothing in comparison with the rest of the world which he cannot acquire4 ,however1 his possession is something to him1 whatever the relation of infinite possibilities may be in proportion to it4 ,the concept of infinitude serves a good purpose in its place1 but we cannot use it for analogies in other fields or bring it in relation to concrete realities4 ,we produce confusion and drop into mysticism as soon as we handle the idea of infinitude as if it were a positive thing4 ,the infinite is a function which is mathematically expressed by #a_/j 1 and whenever we bring anything in relation to the infinite1 we at once dwarf the greatest number no less than the smallest number into zero4 ,clearness of thought is the indispensable method of sound philosophy for constructing a positive world-conception1 which in great outlines is a description of the facts of reality4 ,by suffering mysticism as a legitimate conception either in science or in philosophy1 we enhance the interests of those who prefer the chiaroscuro of vague notions to clear thought4 ,v4 ,,clifford',s ,,and ,,schopenhauer',s ,,conceptions ,,of ,,the ,,thing ,,in ,,itself4 ,when ,clifford speaks of things in themselves he does not mean ,kant's thing in itself1 he means neither the object independent of the thinking subject nor the thing independent of space and time4 ,he means the thing as it would be if viewed from the thing itself4 ,a man appears to other thinking beings as an active body1 as an organism that is in motion2 but to himself he appears as a feeling being4 ,the subjectivity of things as they appear to the things themselves consists in our own case of states of awareness1 and this subjectivity is called by ,clifford the thing in itself4 ,a certain brain motion is in its subjective aspect a feeling4 ,this feeling is according to ,clifford the thing in itself of the visible1 observable1 and measurable motion4 ,the thing in itself of so-called inanimate beings is not feeling1 but elements of feeling4 ,in other words1 the world-substance is everywhere in itself potentiality of feeling and ,clifford therefore calls it 8mind-stuff40 ,schopenhauer arrives at his conception of the thing in itself practically in the same way4 ,there is the world as it appears to us1 the objective world of motion in space and time4 ,what the kernel of this world may be1 we can know from self-observation4 ,the kernel of ourselves1 ,schopenhauer says1 is ,will2 and the will is also the kernel of things2 the will is the thing in itself4 ,we understand by will the passage into action1 i4 e4 an incipient motion of the organism if accompanied with the psychical element of consciousness1 and this consciousness is a state of awareness of the will including its direction and aim4 ,will1 as the term is generally used1 is always conscious4 ,schopenhauer however speaks of the will as being blind1 i4 e4 without knowledge1 without awareness of itself and its aim4 ,this indicates that he uses the word not in its original but in a figurative meaning4 ,the fall of a stone may be characterised as a blind motion without awareness and without the stone's having a consciousness as to its direction or aim2 and in a similar 7although not in the same7 way ,clifford speaks of the elements of feeling as being not rational4 ,we agree with ,schopenhauer that that factor in a stone which makes it fall when placed in a certain position is as much a natural process as the act of a man1 only of a lower grade and a simpler kind4 ,schopenhauer calls that which both have in common 8will40 ,yet in common language we call the objective aspect of that which both processes have in common1 8motion40 ,what then is the subjective aspect of a falling stone8 ,it is not a state of awareness1 it is no feeling1 but it is the potentiality of a state of awareness1 it is potential feeling4 ,there is a subjective aspect1 but this subjective aspect is so far as we can judge of no account to the stone4 ,that something in the stone which corresponds to man's consciousness1 viz4 the stone's subjectivity1 is not mind1 but it is potential mind4 ,and potential mind is not as ,mr4 ,conybeare expresses it 8mind diluted10 potential mind is no mind at all4 ,the world-substance as it exists in inorganic matter is not mind4 ,but the universe taken as a whole1 the ,all1 is for that reason not less than mind4 ,on the contrary1 it is infinitely more than mind4 ,the ,all is not brute force and inert matter only1 the universe is a cosmos1 and its subjectivity necessarily develops1 according to the laws of form which characterise the cosmos throughout1 into mind4 ,we disagree with ,professor ,clifford most emphatically when he describes the mind-stuff of which according to his terminology the world consists1 as not rational4 ,the world it is true is not rational in its elements1 but the world as a whole1 the entire cosmos with its laws and especially in its formal order1 is the prototype of all rationality4 ,human reason is rational only in so far as it conforms with1 as it reflects1 as it describes the order of the cosmos4 ,the human mind is a microcosm4 ,we do not call the macrocosm1 in whose image the microcosm has been created1 a mind1 because we understand by the term mind not reality itself but reality pictured in symbols of feeling4 ,we understand by mind the individual conception of the world as it is mapped out in the brain of a sentient being1 and not the universe itself1 not the all-being4 ,we understand by mind a creature and not the creator1 a soul and not ,god4 ,the cosmos1 the ,all1 ,god1 that which creates the mind1 is not dead1 not irrational1 and not inferior to mentality4 ,it is the source of all life1 it is the condition of all order1 it is the standard of all morality4 ,all the minds that exist are but parts of it4 ,in it1 with it1 and through it we live and shall live forever4 ,for although we shall die1 our being can never be blotted out4 ,existence knows no annihilation and life knows no death4 ,what we call death is a dissolution of life in a special part1 but the contents of a life1 the thoughts1 the ideas1 and the ideals are preserved and transmitted1 they are implanted into other minds2 the soul continues to live4 ,and this continuance of the life of the soul is not a mere dissolution in the ,all1 it is not the immortality of force and matter2 it is the preservation of its special existence1 of its most characteristic and individual features for an immeasurably long period hence1 which will last as long as the conditions of life remain favorable upon earth4 ,yet even if a whole solar system were broken to pieces1 life will reappear2 mind will be born again to struggle for truth and to aspire to live in conformity with truth4 ,,vi4 ,,things ,,and ,,relations4 ,the proposition that things in themselves are unknowable finds a strong argument in the statement that we can know relations only1 that all knowledge is relative4 ,it is undoubtedly true that all knowledge is relative and knowledge is a knowledge of relations4 ,but what is a relation8 ,when ,i once proposed this question1 ,i was answered3 8,a relation is the connection between two things2 it is that something in which the one stands to the other1 in short1 it is the betwixtness of things40 ,this is exactly what a relation is not4 ,from such a definition of relation agnosticism will necessarily follow4 ,it is a misstatement of the case1 and when we come to follow out the idea1 we shall be led into inextricable contradictions1 and unless we revise the whole argument1 we shall have to confess that we are at our wit's end4 ,the question1 what is a relation8 was one of the issues between the two great medival schools of philosophy1 the ,nominalists and the ,realists4#de ,the ,nominalists answered3 8,a relation is a mere product of the mind10 while the ,realists declared that 8a relation without which the thing cannot be1 is in the thing40 ,both schools relied upon ,aristotle's authority4 ,aristotle had declared that matter is mere possibility of existence 7it is 7 and form is that which makes it real1 the formal is the real1 form is existence or being 774 ,the metal of a statue1 ,aristotle says1 is its matter1 the idea of the statue is its form1 both together make the real statue4 ,the metal having had another form before1 did not exist with the inherent purpose of being this metal of the statue4 ,the metal is the mere potentiality of becoming a statue4#df ,hence1 says ,aristotle1 not the matter but the form constitutes the reality of the statue1 the form is that which is real1 or that which makes actual1 1 it is the being in completeness or actuality1 1 i4 e4 that which makes a thing exist in its purpose 7 74 ,if the formal alone is and makes real1 relations must be real4 ,this is in favor of the ,realists4 ,yet ,aristotle's philosophy is not in every respect clearly worked out4 ,in fact there are two ,aristotles1 the one being a ,platonist1 the other a naturalist1 the one believing in universals1 the other investigating concrete things and taking individuals as real beings4 ,but both ,aristotles and with them both parties of the schoolmen had no clear conception of the nature of ideas1 what they are1 and what they purport1 and how we can discriminate between their subjective and objective elements4 ,ideas have a meaning4 ,is their meaning purely mental or has it an objective value8 ,we say that it has4 ,the same ,aristotle who considered the formal as that which makes real1 denied the objective existence of relations4 ,he said that such qualities as greater1 or smaller1 double or half1 indeed all relations 7the of things7 did not belong to the things1 but were added to them by the thinking subject4 ,ergo relations are mere products of the mind1 they have no objective value4 ,this was in favor of the ,nominalists4 ,now it is true that some relations are purely mental in so far as the comparison upon which they rest is purely imaginary4 ,an answer to the question1 ,who was the greater1 ,alexander or ,csar8 depends upon the standard of measurement which we create for the special purpose4 ,some such relations have no objective value1 they are not facts but a play of imagination dependent on the recognition of the standard of measurement4 ,but how is it1 if we express the relation between the gravity of a stone and the whole mass of the earth as it manifests itself in the stone's fall8 ,is that also a mere product of the mind8 ,certainly ,newton's laws describing gravitation in exact and mathematical formulas are a product of the mind1 but this product of the mind has an objective value1 it has a meaning1 it describes facts1 and these facts are certain relations between certain things4 99 99 99 99 99 ,the fault of the modern misconception of relativity lies in the assumption that the two or more things are considered as things in themselves4 ,we are apt to consider the gravity of two masses1 of a stone and of the earth1 as a relation between two independent things4 ,here is the stone and there is the earth and the relation is considered as some third item1 being the connection in which the one stands to the other4 ,in reality there are not two things and1 in addition to them a betweenness of the two things4 ,the world is not a sum of things1 not even a system of things1 but a whole indivisible entirety and what we call things are abstractions which serve special purposes in the household of cognition4 ,all things consist as it were of innumerable relations to all other things4 ,when we abstract one special process which takes place in the province of what we are wont to call two things1 we have to deal with a relation4 ,there are no relations of themselves and there are no things of themselves4 ,relations describe certain features of reality obtaining between what we call two or more things1 and in this description all other features of which the real things consist are purposely omitted4 ,there is no quality of things but it is at the same time a quality of relation4 ,every quality of a thing characterises it under a certain condition2 it appears as an effect upon something and thus it is actual as a relation4 ,cognition analyses things into bundles of relations and all these relations together make up the things4 ,the modern idea that we can know relations only and that there are things in themselves which are unknowable is an old error inherited from medival scholasticism1 and its roots can be traced back to the philosophy of ,aristotle4 ,the difficulty disappears as soon as we consider the whole world 7ourselves included7 as an interacting whole1 and that the conceptions 8things0 and 8relations0 have been invented for describing certain of its parts and certain of its interactions or interconnections4 ,if we push the idea of things in themselves to the ultimate extreme we arrive at the atomistic conception of the universe4 ,atoms are the things in themselves reduced to the point system4 ,if we consider the world as a heap of innumerable atoms1 we are at a loss how to explain the interaction among these atoms4 ,the atomist universalises the substance-abstraction and will be disappointed afterwards not to be able to deduce from his universalisation other qualities which are found in reality1 such as the relations of things1 their interconnections1 their spontaneity of motion1 the life of organised beings1 and the mind of thinking creatures4 ,ideas are symbols and symbols have a meaning4 ,the whole realm of mental representations may be viewed in their symbolism or in their significance4 ,considering their symbolism1 ideas of things as well as of relations1 are products of the mind1 considering their meaning1 ideas represent realities2 in other words3 their contents or that which they signify is real4 ,it appears that neither ,nominalism nor ,realism is right2 yet if we stretch them only a little1 if we are allowed to interpret them in the light of a monistic world-conception1 both are right4 ,they cease to be contradictory and become complementary4 ,universals are real1 say the ,realists1 i4 e4 the forms and relations of things are actualities4 ,universals are names1 say the ,nominalists1 i4 e4 the relations and forms in which we describe the world are mental symbols4 ,the ,realists had the misfortune to defeat the ,nominalists entirely1 and thus had a chance to insist upon being right in every respect4 ,all opposition having ceased1 the errors of ,realism grew in extraordinary exuberance4 ,nominalism in the mean time raised its head in opposition to the recognised authority of the church as well as the schools1 slowly yet powerfully and irresistibly4 ,the errors and the tyranny of ,realism gave strength to the ,nominalistic movement which reached its height in ,kant's philosophy4 ,the ,realists had gone to the extreme of declaring that universals were things1 real substances1 independent of single and concrete objects1 and the ,nominalists on the other hand1 represented by ,kant1 went so far as to declare that all relations1 time and space included were mere products of the mind4 ,if the relations are mere products of the mind1 all knowledge being a knowledge of relations1 knowledge becomes impossible4 ,that last consequence was drawn by ,kant and is emphatically insisted upon by agnosticism4 ,there is but one world-conception that can dispense with these conclusions3 it is that ,view which conceives of the ,all as a whole2 and of knowledge as a description of its parts1 qualities1 and relations1 ever mindful on the one hand that the parts are parts1 that qualities and relations are certain features only1 not entire realities1 or isolated entities1 and that the symbols thereof frequently overlap each other2 on the other hand that there is nothing absolute1#dg and that there are no things in themselves4 ,the relativity of knowledge1 whether we conceive of it as the relativity of the object to the subject in general or as an appreciation of the fact that all knowledge gives and can give information of relations only1 does not lead to the conclusion that knowledge is impossible4 ,relativity is a fundamental feature of knowledge1 and we shall understand that it must be so if we consider that reality itself is a great system of relations4 99 99 99 99 99 ,the interconnection of all things with all things appears to be so complete1 that if we intended to explain or understand one single fact fully and exhaustively in all its relations1 past1 present1 and future1 we should be obliged to give a complete description of the universe4 ,says ,tennyson3 8,flower in the crannied wall1 ,i pluck you out of the crannies2-- ,hold you here1 root and all1 in my hand1 ,little flower--but if ,i could understand ,what you are1 root and all1 and all in all1 ,i should know what ,god and man is40 ,we might address in the same way anything else1 an atom of hydrogen1 a grain of sand as well as the sun1 the action of a tiny speck of irritable protoplasm as well as the soul of man4 ,,vii4 ,,is ,,the ,,ego ,a ,,thing ,,in ,,itself8 ,prof4 ,lloyd ,morgan in his excellent work 8,animal ,life and ,intelligence0 uses repeatedly the word 8mind0 as if it were a thing in itself4 ,professor ,morgan is a monist and he does not intend the word to mean a thing in itself2 yet such is the influence of language that we1 all of us1 unless we are constantly on our guard1 will inadvertently slip into dualistic expressions4 ,professor ,morgan says1 with reference to certain sensations of animals 7p4 #cji73 #8,from these stippled sensations the mind in all cases elaborates a continuum4' ,the unity which arises out of stippled sensations and which through their interaction becomes a continuum is called mind4 ,to speak of mind as working out the continuum is mythological language1 it is the transformation of the abstract idea 8mind0 into a real and independent thing whose existence is conceived to be independent of the reality from which it has been abstracted4 ,again1 ,professor ,morgan says3 8,our constructs are literally our handiwork40 ,our constructs1 i4 e4 our mental signs constructed to represent realities1 constitute our soul2 they are we ourselves4 ,professor ,morgan1 as ,i understand him1 does not believe in a mind behind the psychical facts of mental activity1 he does not assume the pre-existence of mind to the continuum elaborated4 ,his view of mind appears to be the same as ours4 ,the more noteworthy1 then1 is his usage of the term 8mind40 ,it is a remarkable instance of how language naturally inveigles us into a belief in things in themselves4 ,words seem to denote concrete existences and as soon as we use words in this way we are entangled in dualism4 ,prof4 ,f4 ,max ,mller as well as the late ,prof4 ,thomas ,hill ,green1 the founder of the ,oxford transcendentalist school1 start from this assumption1 that man's mental activity is performed by a something which is quite distinct from it4 ,this something is the thing in itself of the human soul4 ,prof4 ,f4 ,max ,mller says3 8,if mind is the name of the work1 what is the name of the worker8444 ,it is what we may call the ego as personating the self2 it is what other philosophers call the monon4 ,let us call therefore the worker who does the work of the mind in its various aspects1 the ,monon or the ,ego40 ,this conception which asks for the worker of the work is based upon a materialistic view of the human organism4 ,an organism is not a dead machine which must be set a-going by somebody who attends to it4 ,organisms are active and not passive1 they are living and not dead4 ,every part of an organism is a worker and so is the whole4 ,and if we speak of its 8life0 we must bear in mind that 8life0 is an abstract which denotes a certain inseparable quality of the organism4 ,the work and the worker are two abstracts of one and the same thing4 ,the reality from which these terms have been abstracted is 8something working40 ,this something working does not consist of a worker and his work1 but the worker is in every part of his work4 ,the worker of our mental activity is the work itself4 ,both are identical4 ,the objection is made3 8,whence does the activity come which appears in the realm of organised life40 ,the answer is3 ,activity is a universal quality of all existence4 ,there is no such a thing as absolutely inert matter4 ,every chemical element combines with other elements spontaneously1 according to its inherent nature and not through the influence of a worker manipulating its atoms4 ,spontaneity is a universal feature of reality4 ,nature is throughout self-working activity4 ,and this its most remarkable character is preserved in its highest efflorescence in the soul of man4 ,the present number of ,the ,monist contains a lucid presentation of the transcendentalist position by ,mr4 ,f4 ,c4 ,conybeare1 an ,oxford scholar and a personal disciple of ,professor ,green1 with special reference to the views of ,prof4 ,william ,kingdon ,clifford4 ,mr4 ,conybeare1 like ,prof4 ,f4 ,max ,mller1 assumes a ,self independent of the reality from which the idea of self has been abstracted1 and he attempts to prove the existence of this self as follows3 8,in truth there can be no relation of before and after between the two terms except for a self which takes note of the one disappearing and of the other appearing2 and whenever we speak of things following one another we tacitly presuppose a self before whom the procession passes40 ,the transcendentalist adopts1 in the realm of psychology1 the error of atomism4 ,if we accept the view that the world consists of isolated atoms1 we are at a loss how to bring the atoms into relations2 the unity of every group of atoms1 every thing and every system of things will become a mystery4 ,and if we look upon feelings as unrelated things in themselves1 their connection becomes a deep problem4 ,mr4 ,conybeare solves this problem of the connection that obtains among the feelings supposed to be atomical1 by postulating a relation-producing entity1 called the self4 ,he says3 8,no link is left1 save a connecting self40 ,and this assumed entity of a connecting self or ego is taken to be 8the heart and centre of reality40 ,reality1 that which we have to deal with in real life and what is commonly called reality1 appears as a second class of reality in comparison with this assumed thing in itself of our existence4 ,the thing in itself is thus regarded as something realer than real2 it is conceived to be a reality of a higher degree4 ,mr4 ,conybeare is very explicit in the explanation of his transcendental 8self40 ,he says3 8,feelings constitute a conscious self when they become the feelings of a conscious self and not before1 for except as gathered up in the unity of a self which has sic6 memory and remains the same throughout its differences1 feelings can be neither new1 nor repeated1 nor joined by links40 ,what does 8self0 mean8 ,what can it mean8 ,what is the 8unity of the self08 ,these are questions which have not been answered to our satisfaction by the transcendentalists4 ,whenever they speak of the self1 they lose themselves in mysticism4 ,their 8self0 is an assumed entity which they have carefully divested of everything real and actual4 ,their self is transcendental and not a being of the world2 it is a myth4 ,let us describe the simplest possible instance of psychical activity4 ,an irritation takes place in some sentient substance4 ,this irritation produces an extra-commotion4 ,we must say 8extra-commotion0 because all sentient substance is in a state of constant activity4 ,this extra-commotion causes the sentient substance to assume a certain form1 and while it lasts1 a certain and special feeling takes place in some part of the sentient substance4 ,this certain and special feeling ceases1 as soon as the extra-commotion1 caused through the irritation1 abates4 ,there can be no doubt that certain effects of this extra-commotion remain4 ,its trace is left in the sentient substance and this trace is preserved in the constant whirl of the sentient being's normal activity4 ,now1 we suppose that an irritation of the same kind takes place in the same sentient substance4 ,this second irritation finds the substance no longer in the same condition4 ,it finds the sentient substance prepared to receive it4 ,the feeling which now appears is no longer a simple feeling4 ,the second irritation causes a commotion as much as the first1 and this commotion acts as a stimulant upon the trace left by the first irritation4 ,this trace being again in a state of extra-commotion is revived and the same kind of feeling appears4 ,thus the second irritation is accompanied by a state of awareness in which two feelings are blended1 the revival of the former feeling and the feeling of the present irritation4 ,the preservation of traces left in sentient substance is the condition of memory4 ,we understand by memory the psychical aspect thereof1 and the act of reviving1 so that their correspondent feelings will reappear1 is called recollection4 8,memory0 has been the greatest stumbling-block to our psychologists as well as to our philosophers4 ,even modern works written from a positive standpoint treat memory frequently as a mysterious faculty of the mind4 ,mr4 ,conybeare speaks of the self as having memory1 while in fact1 memory is one of the features1 indeed the most important feature1 of mind-activity4 ,says ,mr4 ,conybeare3 8,such a feeling of the togetherness of two feelings would involve memory and memory involves self-hood40 ,memory does not involve any transcendental self-hood4 ,true self-hood1 viz4 that which can reasonably be understood by self-hood1 is not prior to1 not the cause of memory2 self-hood1 i4 e4 the personality of a man1 the organised unity of the psychical aspect of a human organism1 is consequent upon1 it is the effect of1 memory4 ,self-hood is the product of memory4#dh ,the self is also called the ego4 ,what is the ego8 ,the ego is a ,latin term used in philosophical language to denote the pronoun 8,i10 and the pronoun 8,i0 is quite a definite nerve-structure situated in quite a definite place of the centre of language4 ,as all words1 so also the term 8,i0 is a symbol4 ,its general meaning is unequivocal2 it stands for the name of the speaker4 ,it stands for ,mr4 ,brown1 if ,mr4 ,brown speaks of himself1 for ,mr4 ,smith1 if ,mr4 ,smith speaks of himself1 etc4 ,what does ,mr4 ,brown mean when he says1 8,i speak1 ,i act1 ,i will1 ,i feel pain1 ,i feel pleasure1 ,i intend10 etc48 ,when ,mr4 ,brown speaks1 a certain number of word-structures in the centre of language are in a state of commotion1 innervating the muscles of speech4 ,correspondent to this physiological process1 a state of consciousness obtains1 which is an awareness of the situation4 ,when he adds3 8,i say this10 it is again a special nerve-structure that is irritated into action and he might just as well say3 8,mr4 ,brown says this40 ,the idea of ,mr4 ,brown1 viz4 of his own personality1 is just as much an idea as his idea of ,mr4 ,smith4 ,the main difference consists in the fact that the idea of one's own personality is very much more important than the ideas representing other personalities4 ,the nervous structure representing the feeling of the idea 8,i0 must be the centre of innumerable nervous tracts connecting it with all those activities which when performed are thought of as done by ourselves4 ,the 8,i do this0 is almost constantly ready to fill the present state of consciousness and to accompany any action performed through the innervation of other brain structures4 ,sentient substance is not always actually feeling4 ,it is feeling only when in a state of extra-commotion4 ,systems of sentient substance are called organisms2 all its structures are interconnected and most so those structures in which sentiency as well as motory impulses are differentiated--viz4 the nervous structures4 ,the extra-commotions which agitate the different nervous structures1 the memories of former sense-perceptions1 of sounds1 of words1 of ideas depend upon the conditions of the moment4 ,now this and now another structure will represent the summit of commotion and the feeling of the strongest commotion at a given time will under normal conditions appear as the contents of consciousness4 ,it is as it were the focus in which the attention of the whole organism is centralised4 ,that which appears in the focus is clear and distinct1 while the other weaker feelings rapidly disappear into the undistinguishable general feeling of the organism as a whole1 commonly called cnsthesis or ,gemeingefhl4 ,the centre of attention is constantly changing2 yet whenever a thinking creature stops to ask himself1 who is doing this8 ,who is willing this8 ,who is thinking this8 the answer is given3 8,i am doing this2 ,i am willing this2 ,i am thinking this40 ,the structure of the little pronoun 8,i0 seems to be the most ticklish of all2 it is always ready to force itself into the foreground4 ,the answer1 8,i am doing this10 proposes the totum pro parte4 ,the whole personality is supposed to do what a part of it is performing4 ,the hands are executing this work2 these hands of course are innervated from certain regions of the brain4 ,some parts of the personality are in a relative rest and have nothing to do with the work presently on hand4 ,a commotion in a certain number of brain-structures represents the physiological aspect of a deliberation1 perhaps the planning of some action4 ,psychologically considered certain ideas appear successively and sometimes simultaneously in the focus of consciousness4 ,the ideas disagree and other ideas replace them until a combination is formed in which the ideas do agree4 ,this state of agreement brings a temporary peace into the tumult of conflicting ideas2 the plan is ready2 it may pass into action at once1 or1 perhaps1 the ego-structure will appear in consciousness and will quietly think3 8,i will do it40 ,when certain motory nerve-structures are innervated1 they cause under normal conditions their respective muscles to contract1 they produce motion4 ,under normal conditions the nervous process accompanying the idea 8,i will raise my arm0 serves as an irritation upon the cortical centre of arm-raising1 yet it is not the 8,i0 that in some mystical way raises the arm4 ,the idea 8,i0 has as little and as much to do with this discharge of energy as any other idea4 ,the idea 8,i0 is not the power behind the veil that produces the will4 ,what is will8 ,as soon as some plan of action is joined with the idea that it should be executed1 supposing it be not counteracted by any stronger idea that it should not be done1 this combination represents a will4 ,a will accordingly is the psychological aspect of an incipient action1 and it is usually1 or if it is not it can always be accompanied with the thought 8,i will it40 ,but this accompanying thought however is not the energy displayed in the act of willing4 ,the 8,i will it10 or 8,i do it10 or 8,i perceive it0 being always ready to appear together with the strongest idea in the field of consciousness1 the term 8ego0 has acquired a specialised meaning4 ,it means that part of a man's personality which at the time is the contents of the 8,i will10 or 8,i think10 i4 e4 it is his present state of consciousness4 ,every organism is a coherent system and thus all the feelings of an organism naturally blend into a unity4 ,the strongest feeling however appears in the normal state of waking in a distinct clearness thus representing a centre of consciousness4 ,however1 whether we use the term 8ego0 in the sense of the idea 8,i0 meaning the whole personality of the speaker1 or in the sense of the present centre of consciousness1 it designates in either case a definite reality1 the origin and action of which are natural facts and as plain as any other psychological phenomena4 ,neither the ego-idea nor the centre of consciousness are transcendental4 ,the former is as little mystical as are the ideas dog1 horse1 man1 etc42 the latter no less miraculous than any other feeling or display of sentiency4 ,,viii4 ,,the ,,ego-,,centric ,,view ,,abandoned4 ,the contrast between the old and the new psychology appears strongest in their conceptions of the ego4 ,the former believes that the ego is 8the thing in itself0 of man's soul and takes it to be the centre of all psychical phenomena1 while the latter looks upon the ego-idea as one idea among many other co-ordinated ideas and considers the centre of consciousness as the strongest feeling at a given time1 which as such naturally predominates over and eclipses the other feelings of the organism4 ,the new psychology brings about a change of standpoint similar to that effected by the ,copernican system in astronomy4 ,in astronomy the geo-centric1 and in psychology the ego-centric standpoint had to be abandoned4 ,and all things seem to be upset to those who are still accustomed to the old conception4 ,to them the physical and moral world-conceptions appear to become impossible4 ,if the new view were correct1 so they imagine1 the entire universe would break to pieces4 ,all our modes of speech are formed in accord with the old view4 ,we speak of sunset and sunrise1 and so in our daily conversation the little pronoun 8,i0 plays a part which makes it seem as if the ego-idea were the centre of all soul-life and as if this 8,i0 were the active agent in all acts of willing and doing4 ,the advantage of the ,copernican system lies in this1 that we can think of the motions of the sun and the planets in a systematic and unitary conception without being either involved in contradictions or obliged to invent mysterious qualities in the stars for explaining the velocities1 directions1 or other phenomena of the celestial bodies4 ,the most important advantage however is the practical applicability of the new theory4 ,the old theory of the soul necessarily leads to mysticism4 ,fictitious facts of a transcendent character must be invented in addition to the facts observed1 in order to explain the latter4 ,the new theory after abandoning the ego-centric standpoint of the thing in itself of a soul shows the facts of psychic life in an harmonious and unitary conception4 ,all facts agree among themselves and we are not in need of supplementing them with mysterious inventions4 ,it must be emphasised1 at the same time1 that the new conception throws a new light upon ethics2 it shows the error and perversity of all egotism1 for it would be a mistake to act as if the ego were really the centre of soul-life4 ,here the new psychology comes in contact with religion4 ,what is the practical aim of all the great religions of the world but a surrender of the ego1 a renunciation of the self as the centre of our being1 and the acceptance of the moral law as the regulative power of our actions8 ,the new psychology gives a justification and a scientific explanation of ,christian ethics while the latter from the standpoint of the old psychology necessarily appears as mystical and supernatural4 ,,ix4 ,,personality ,,and ,,evolution4 ,the ego1 i4 e4 the centre of consciousness1 is constantly shifting1 while the personality of a man is relatively constant1 certain important ideas being stable and thus lending character to the whole system of thoughts and intentions4 ,the term personality indicating the self-hood of a man is used in several ways4 ,first1 we understand by a man's personality his bodily appearance2 secondly the whole system of his mentality1 viz4 his knowledge1 his temperament1 his character2 thirdly the history of his life1 past1 present1 and future2 fourthly his position in life1 his possessions1 his connections1 his influence1 or at last we mean by it all these four items together4 ,in all these applications the man and his personality are conceived as a unity4 ,and they are a unity4 ,wherever the term unity is applicable1 it is most certainly applicable here4 ,all the many facts of the history of his life are one continuous process2 all the parts of his body are parts of a system1 and the world of his ideas also will under normal conditions bear a certain harmonious character4 ,wherever in any soul the concord among the ideas has been disturbed1 a state of unrest will ensue until the peace of soul is restored in one or another way4 ,but with the same necessity as every water surface tends to present a smooth level1 so the ideas in one and the same soul tend to come to a state of agreement4 ,as every water surface has its ripples so even that mind which has attained an undisturbed peace of soul is constantly confronted with some problems--be they ever so trifling--producing some slight disturbances in his life4 ,the unity of a self1 it is apparent1 is the inevitable consequence of given conditions4 ,it is not something which exists outside the personality and its constituent parts1 it is in the personality and it develops together with it4 ,mr4 ,conybeare supposes that 8the unity of a self remains the same throughout40 ,this is an error1 and this error vitiates ,mr4 ,conybeare's whole conception of growth and evolution4 ,he says3 8,properly speaking a thing can only be said to grow or develop when it remains the same with itself all through the process and unfolds therein capacities which were anyhow latent in it to start with40 ,the truth contained in this proposition may be expressed thus3 ,when a thing develops1 some part of it remains the same during the change1 so that a continuity is preserved4 ,yet every change of a part of an organism--such is the intimate interconnection of all its parts--produces an alteration1 be it ever so small1 of the whole unity4 ,and in the course of evolution the character of the whole thing may be changed4 ,think of the growth of a caterpillar into a butterfly1 or of an egg-cell into a man4 ,however1 the changes in the character of an adult man will become slighter and slighter the stronger certain features of his existence preserve their sameness1 although the most stable personality will1 nevertheless1 be subject to1 at least1 unimportant changes as long as life lasts4 ,mr4 ,conybeare1 like his master ,professor ,green and all the transcendentalists1 is still under the influence of a belief in the thing in itself4 ,the unity of an organism which is the product of the co-operation of its parts1 is not some independent thing whose business it is to gather up their single activities and bring them into relation with one another4 ,the unity of a self is the combination of all those relations which make of its parts a systematised whole1 and this unity is changing together with its constituents2 as a matter of fact1 we have to state that it does not remain constant or the same with itself4 ,mark that ,i do not deny the unity of the soul1 nor do ,i underrate the enormous importance of this unity4 ,but ,i do deny that this unity exists independent of its parts4 ,it is as much immanent in its parts as is a melody in its notes4 ,there is as little a transcendental self-hood as a melody in itself independent of its sounds4 ,the assumption of a transcendental unity which throughout the process of evolution remains the same with itself naturally leads to a wrong conception of what ,mr4 ,conybeare calls 8latent capacities40 ,the terms potential existence and latent qualities are fertile and useful ideas but we must beware not to employ them incorrectly4 ,any heap of iron ore can be called a potential sword4 ,this is a mode of speaking which expresses the possibility that the ore can be changed somehow into a sword4 ,but the sword does not exist at all1 not even as a latent quality of the ore4 ,the ore has no latent qualities of that kind4 ,those qualities of the ore which represent the potential sword are very patent to everybody who knows the art of using them properly and changing them into an actual sword4 ,we may say that the hen's egg contains a potential chick2 but this is a mere mode of speech devised to say that the egg can be changed into a chick under certain conditions4 ,there is no chick at all contained in the egg and nothing that is like a chick4 ,evolution is not1 as the name suggests1 a process of unfolding2 evolution is1 as ,christian ,friedrich ,wolff calls it1 an 8epigenesis10 i4 e4 the process of the additional growth of new formations4 ,the chick is something different in kind from the egg4 ,the unity of the egg-cell organism in the yolk is radically different from the unity of the full-fledged chick4 ,the former shows traces of irritability but not of consciousness1 while the latter exhibits unmistakable symptoms of psychical activity4 ,the formation of the chicken-soul is a new formation as much as the growth of feathers4 ,the feathers of the chick are an additional growth2 there are no latent feathers in the egg4 ,we might express ourselves to the effect that the egg contains the potential existence of feathers1 but with the same logic we might say the egg contains a potential chicken broth4 ,it is however true that something remains constant in the process of growth4 ,there is a preservation of form in the constant change of material particles and this is the physiological basis of memory1 so that a man of eighty may say 8,i remember when ,i was a child10 although not one particle of the substance of which the child consisted is left in him4 ,the continuity produced through this preservation of form makes growth and evolution possible4 ,the preservation of memory-structures constitutes the possibility of reviving the feelings of the past1 it constitutes a preservation of soul4 ,the material parts of the body are thrown out but the form being preserved1 the soul remains4 ,and this preservation of the soul is the basis of its additional growth through new and enlarged experience4 ,the soul of the child is not lost in the man1 it is preserved4 ,it has lost certain features and at the same time it has gained new features1 it has developed1 and the unity of the soul has more or less changed with the development4 ,what is true of the individual is also true of mankind4 ,mankind as a whole is different in the savage and in civilised society4 ,nevertheless the latter has developed from the former4 ,certain traits have been dropped1 other radically new features have appeared4 ,that which was valuable in the soul of primitive man is not lost4 ,the better part of his soul still lives in the highest developed man of to-day2 the continuity is preserved4 ,and to-day all our moral instruction aims at this1 so to live that our souls also will be preserved in the future evolution of humanity4 ,the gist of ethics is to make the soul immortal4#di ,x4 ,,professor ,,mach',s ,,position4 ,the problem1 8,are there things in themselves80 is closely connected with the subject of my discussion with ,professor ,mach4 ,professor ,mach as well as myself are aspiring to arrive at a consistent and harmonious or unitary world-conception4 ,both of us recognise that things in themselves have no room in a monistic philosophy1 both of us recognise that concepts are means only of orientation1 they are the mental tools of living beings developed as an assistance in dealing with the surrounding world4 ,they are symbols in which the processes of nature are copied and imitated and which can serve for planning or modeling and thus predetermining the course of nature4 ,so far we agree1 but then there appears a difference which it is difficult for me to understand or formulate in precise terms4 ,professor ,mach objects to the dualism of motion and feeling1 which he declares he conceives as a unity not as a duality4 ,but so do ,i4 ,it appears to me that we must differ somehow in the method of constructing the unity4 ,i see indeed a contrast of physical and of psychical4 ,this contrast1 however1 in my conception does not belong to the object but to the subject4 ,it is a contrast of our conception of things1 but it is not a contrast existing objectively in the real things themselves4 ,the world is not composed of the psychical and the physical1 but certain features of the world are called physical1 and others psychical4 ,both terms are abstracts4 ,professor ,mach said in his first article and repeats it again in the present article that his former standpoint resembles very closely my present standpoint4 ,when reading ,professor ,mach's lectures of #ahfc1 ,i took pains to look for the similarity1 and finding many things in which ,i could agree ,i dropped the differences taking the agreements as the essential points4 ,in reading1 however1 ,professor ,mach's rsum of his former position as stated in this present article1 ,i find that he attaches prominence to several points which ,i cannot endorse4 ,i do not accept the theory that atoms feel1 that they are endowed with consciousness4 ,i have never spoken of atoms when dealing with psychological problems4 ,the term 8atom0 is a chemical term invented as a help for thinking the equivalence of the weight of the elements which always combine in definite proportions4 ,the term 8atom0 has in my opinion no sense if applied to other phenomena4 ,the term 8atom0 has not been abstracted from psychical phenomena nor has it been invented for describing them4 ,there is accordingly no probability that it can find there any appropriate application4 ,we might as well expect that mathematical terms such as lines1 points1 circles1 etc41 are applicable in psychology4 ,the idea of conscious circles or points can not in my mind be more absurd than that of conscious atoms4 ,the rule must be observed that we can use abstractions made for a special purpose for that purpose only2 they will not serve any other purpose as well4 ,it is true that they are often employed as analogies1 but in such cases1 we must bear in mind that we are dealing with mere analogies4 ,in addition to the impropriety of using the term atoms in psychology1 it appears to me erroneous to attribute feeling or anything like feeling to physical processes of any description4 ,natural processes are so constituted1 that under certain conditions1 such as take place in animal organisms1 they will develop feelings4 ,clifford speaks in this sense of the elements of feeling4 ,lloyd ,morgan calls it metakinesis1 and ,i find that feelings being simply states of awareness represent the subjectivity of natural processes4 ,we have reasons to suppose that in the processes of unorganised nature this subjectivity is neither feeling nor anything like feeling3 but the subjectivity of the natural processes is as it were the stuff out of which our own feelings are formed4 ,i accept all the arguments of ,professor ,mach that our ideas are artificial products2 and ,i am also anxious to distinguish in our ideas between that which describes facts and that which has been added to the description of facts in shape of theories or conjectures4 ,the sense-pictures of objects and ideas also are not things but images and symbols of things created for the purpose of representing things2 they are as ,prof4 ,lloyd ,morgan says1 8constructs40 ,but these constructs are not mere fancy1 they are not air-castles4 ,they are constructed in order to imitate certain realities4 ,now1 in building these constructs as an imitation or a copy of reality1 we are often at a loss how to build them4 ,there is for instance in the objective reality observed1 a something somewhere high in the air1 the basis of which is invisible1 and being limited in our means of acquiring information we are ignorant of the real state of things4 ,so in reconstructing or imitating the facts1 we build scaffolds to support it1 and we are too apt to forget that these scaffolds do not represent objective facts but are artifices to make certain facts1 which we know in parts only1 thinkable1 i4 e4 representable without breaks in mental constructs4 ,,xi4 ,,truth ,,in ,,mythology4 ,there is one point which ,i have emphasised and which it appears to me ,professor ,mach neglects1 namely that our noumenal world of ideas has an objective meaning4 ,the ideal constructs represent realities4 ,they do not consist of scaffolds alone and there is no scaffold which has not been erected to help in building up representations of facts4 ,let us call the representation of facts positive science or simply truth and the scaffolding the mythology of science1 and we shall see that the road to truth leads everywhere through mythology4 ,certain facts of the surrounding world impress themselves upon a sentient being and these impressions come to represent facts4 ,these facts are not seen at once in their causal connection1 they appear unconnected among themselves1 and in the attempt to formulate them1 to represent them1 to construct them in mental images1 we fill out the gaps of our knowledge with such inventions as are supplied by analogy4 ,mythology is1 in religion as well as in science1 the indispensable ladder to truth4 ,we cannot build without scaffolds4 ,so we cannot construct truth without mythology4 ,we have to introduce allegorical expressions in order to fill out gaps with analogies4 ,mythology becomes fatal to the building up of truth1 as soon as we consider it as truth itself4 ,the scaffold is erected simply as an assistance for building and if the building is finished the scaffold should be torn down4 ,the progress of science which is so much helped by mythology has periods of purification in which the mythology is discarded4 ,this is sometimes a difficult task1 because the very terms of science are mostly both at the same time truth and mythology1 building-stones and scaffold4 ,take1 for instance1 the term atom4 ,the chemist observes that the elements always combine in certain proportions and formulates the law of the equivalence of their atomic weights4 ,in order to think this process1 to reconstruct it in mental images1 he imagines that matter consists of infinitely small particles of constant weight4 ,this is a fiction useful for its purpose but it may be just as erroneous as the method employed in the infinitesimal calculus of thinking of a continuous curve as consisting of a broken line of infinitely small parts1 or of thinking of a certain force as being composed of a parallelogram of forces4 ,the parallelogram of forces is a scaffold helpful for representing in mental symbols the coexistence of different abstractions of the same kind 7e4 g4 motions of a different velocity and direction74 ,but this scaffold is not a mere scaffold1 it is not erected without any purpose1 its final aim is the description of facts4 ,the proposition to consider light as rays traveling in straight lines is a scaffold1 it is mythology2 but this analogy contains a truth1 it contains a real building-stone which should not be torn down with the scaffold4 ,this truth is one-sided2 it represents one feature of light and disregards other features4 ,it disregards entirely the transversal oscillations of the ether1 yet it describes another feature--viz41 the transmission and refraction of light for the comprehension of which we need not take into consideration the undulation theory4 ,the physicist calculates with his formula sin_/sin n the angle of refraction4 ,there is certainly neither a sine nor a sine in reality1 but there are certain relations of reality which are described in these expressions and the action of the light has a definite quality which can be determined with the assistance of the formula sin_/sin n4 ,if the scientist succeeds in determining such real qualities of things1 even though it be done with the assistance of mythology1 he discovers a truth4 ,he has with the help of his scaffolds succeeded in placing a building-stone where it belongs4 ,some scaffolds have to be torn down because they hinder further building2 other scaffolds must remain because they assist us in modeling1 and planning1 and predetermining certain processes of nature4 ,they are like staircases which enable us to reach with ease otherwise inaccessible places on towers or domes4 99 99 99 99 99 ,the idea that science is full of mythology appears strange to the non-scientific1 and it is often overlooked by scientists themselves4 ,but the idea that religious mythology in spite of its many irrational superstitions and wrong analogies beams with truth is also little heeded by the many4 ,in fact1 man's method of reaching truth is the same in religion as in science4 ,the religious ideas such as ,god and soul are mental constructs which copy certain realities2 but these very terms1 such as they are used1 are mythological expressions2 they are still surrounded by their scaffolds4 ,many people know by their own experience the usefulness and indispensability of the scaffold4 ,without the scaffold they would never have had an inkling of the truth1 for the representation of which it was built1 and it is natural that they consider the scaffold as the building itself4 ,this is the reason why the narrow-minded orthodox denounce anyone who would lay hand on or tear down any part of the scaffold1 which has become a hindrance to the further development of religious ideals4 ,positivism1 i4 e4 the representation of facts without any admixture of theory or mythology1 is an ideal which in its purity perhaps will never be realised4 ,nevertheless it is no ignis fatuus1 no will-o'-the-wisp that leads us astray4 ,our science is constantly more and more approaching this ideal and the progress of humanity is intimately connected with it4 ,science has not merely a theoretic value1 its aim and purpose consist in its application to practical life4 ,science is throughout ethical4 ,thus ethics has also its mythological phase4 ,in agreement with ,professor ,mach 7p4 #bjd71 we should find it ridiculous if one who presumes to be an ethical teacher of mankind would say3 8,man must not be descended from monkeys10 8,the earth shall not rotate10 8,matter ought not everywhere to fill space10 8,energy must be constant10 and so on4 ,why is it ridiculous8 ,because we cannot prescribe a certain deportment to facts4 ,it is however not ridiculous to let a precise and carefully sifted knowledge of facts determine our own deportment4 ,science has to teach ethics4 ,but here also we should distinguish between positive facts and mythology4 ,ethics based upon mere theories1 upon our interpretations of nature which we add to facts1 is mythological2 positive ethics is simply that deportment which is suggested by a comprehension of the facts themselves4 ,mythological ethics may be quite correct1 just as much so as the application of a mythological theory of science may be within certain limits reliable as a working hypothesis4 ,but it is desirable to understand the nature of mythological ethics in order to distinguish between truth and fiction4 ,when ,professor ,mach speaks of sensations as being the elements of the world and of things as being complexes of these elements he apparently does not use the word sensation in its usual sense4 ,it has ceased to be an abstract term which represents one feature only of a process of nature and has become a symbol for an entire reality4 ,and is not such a usage of terms as if they were not abstracts but the things themselves liable to lead to misconceptions8 ,professor ,mach's 8elements10 it seems to me1 are only elements1 i4 e4 ultimate and unanalysable materials1 if considered as terms of a psychological view of the world2 they are not elements in the domains of other abstractions1 such as are made by physiology or physics4 ,moreover1 although this method eliminates the duality of soul and body1 mind and matter1 feeling and motion1 it does not explain the problem4 ,professor ,mach might answer that the problem as to the duality of mind and matter is a sham problem1 just as much as the problem why do we see things upright when the retina picture of the eye shows the things inverted8 ,but a problem is to him who has solved the problem always a sham problem4 ,every problem disappears as a problem as soon as it is solved4 ,it is true that we see as little with the blind spot of the eye as with the skin of our back4 ,the problem of the blind spot is not why do we not see with the blind spot1 7which is simply a matter of fact17 but why do we not notice1 when using only one eye1 its lack of sight in a spot surrounded with sight-seeing structures8 ,we have to employ artificial means to convince ourselves that we are really blind in that spot6 ,all problems are merely subjective2 they are a conflict between two conceptions and as ,professor ,mach himself says1 the solution of problems consists in the adaptation of thought to facts1 i4 e4 to new facts or new views of facts4 ,by an adaptation of our thought to the enlarged field of vision the problem vanishes2 it has ceased to be a problem4 ,in fact it never existed as an objective phenomenon4 ,there are no problems in nature4 ,there are problems only to the investigating mind4 ,but even the formulation of problems is a problem to be solved1 and perhaps the most difficult and subtle kind of problems is to discover the flaw in wrongly formulated problems4 ,the problem of the duality of body and soul1 matter and mind1 feeling and motion1 ceases to be a problem to him who has worked his way through to a monistic conception1 but to those who have not as yet succeeded in establishing a unitary view of these ideas1 because they take them to be separate and distinct existences1 it is a problem of great importance4 ,,xii4 ,,the ,,oneness ,,of ,,subjectivity ,,and ,,objectivity4 ,the world is not rigid being1 but activity1 not absolute existence but a system of changing relations1 not an abstract ,sein but a concrete ,wirklichkeit--a constant working of cause and effect4 ,there is no dualism in this1 for the ,wirklichkeit is one and undivided4 ,yet every relation admits of two standpoints1 just as the line ,,ab1 which may serve to represent a certain and definite relation1 is determinable from both ends1 ,a as well as ,b4 ,let us call ,a the subject and ,b the object4 ,neither ,a nor ,b is a reality1 a whole complete ,wirklichkeit4 ,a thing in order to be real must be active1 it must work1 it must stand in relation to something else4 ,a is a mere mathematical point1 but ,,ab representing a process does something1 it performs work1 it is real4 ,a thing in itself1 if it could exist at all1 would be tantamount to non-existence1 it would represent a ,sein without being ,wirklichkeit4 ,when bearing this in mind1 it appears natural that the oneness of existence1 representable in such relations as is that of ,,ab -,,ba will admit of two standpoints1 ,,ba representing subjectivity1 and ,,ab representing objectivity4 ,we can consider the relation of the world at large to one special point 7which latter may in its turn stand for a whole system of relations7 or vice versa the relation of this point to the world at large4 ,the former standpoint is that of the microcosm1 or the soul1 the latter that of the macrocosm or the universe2 the former results in awareness1 the latter appears as matter in motion4 ,the former is subjectivity1 the latter objectivity4 ,reality must not be conceived of as being a compound of the elements of feeling and of motion1 of subjectivity and objectivity or of kinesis and metakinesis4 ,i do not think there are atoms one-half of which contains the potentiality of sentience while the other half is freighted with energy4 ,i conceive of reality as being one throughout1 but1 being throughout resolvable in relations1 it will as a matter of course have two sides4 ,what these two sides are like can be known through experience only1 and experience teaches that under certain conditions the subjective side develops into feeling and consciousness1 while the objective side is represented in the feeling of conscious beings as motions4 ,this view explains the duality of our conception of psycho-physical facts1 but it is certainly not dualism4 ,the duality belongs to the scaffold not to the facts themselves4 ,the facts can only be thought of as being one and undivided1 and no conception can stand except it be monistic4 ,subjectivity and objectivity are terms that express relations and not things in themselves4 ,there are1 however1 philosophers who show a great grief unless either the subjectivity of being1 or the objectivity of being1 or the unities in which things or personalities are gathered up1 are considered as things in themselves4 ,all those features of reality which appear to their conception unexplainable1 such as the relations that obtain among things and especially the thoughts of thinking beings are supposed to be the effects of some transcendental entity1 of a thing in itself4 ,and if a philosophy denies the existence of transcendentalistic thought-entities or of any such things in themselves1 which serve as cement to combine the disjecta membra of their world-conception1 it is generally declared to lead straight on to nihilism--not because the world itself but because their world-system would thereby be annihilated4 ,all things that exist1 if considered as separate things1 will pass away2 but if considered as parts of the all-existence of reality1 they are eternal4 ,in fact things are not separate things1 in the sense of isolated1 absolute1 or abstract beings1 although we may speak of them as such for our ephemeral purposes4 ,all things that exist1 the human soul included1 are and will remain parts of the ,one and ,all4 ,this destroys their individuality as little as a brick ceases to be a brick because it serves its part in the building of a dome4 ,the soul of a man if his life be well spent1 is not annihilated in death1 his soul has become a living stone in the temple of humanity4 ,it continues to live and marches on in the general progress of the race4 ,we are parts of a great whole now1 and we shall remain parts of the same great whole forever4 ,we have never been and shall never be transcendental selfhoods or metaphysical egos1 or any kind of things in themselves4 ,our personality is real life1 it is actual being4 ,as such it is bound up in the universal life of the ,one and ,all and no particle of it will be lost4 ,we need not fear death1 for the air we breathe is immortality4 ,,editor4 ,,footnotes3 #dc ,italics are ours4 ,kant affirms the italicised question4 #dd ,the problem of 8,the ,origin of the ,mind0 having been the subject of a former paper need not be discussed here4 ,see ,the ,monist1 ,vol i1 ,no4 #a1 p4 #fi-hf1 and ,the ,soul of ,man1 pp4 #bc-df4 #de ,it is scarcely necessary to mention that medival ,realism is different from modern ,realism4 #df ,aristotle's idea of matter being potential existence is a fiction4 ,fictions of that kind are useful for certain purposes1 but we must not forget that they are fictions4 ,we might just as well introduce any other system of fictions4 ,for instance we might with certainly not less propriety look upon the idea in the mind of an artist as potential reality while its appearance in a material shape is conceived to produce actual reality4 #dg ,the term 8absolute0 is for that reason neither meaningless nor redundant4 ,it denotes a certain method of viewing things1 but is not an objective quality of things4 #dh ,see the chapter 8,soul ,life and the ,preservation of ,form0 in ,the ,soul of ,man1 p4 #dah4 #di ,the abandonment of the ego as a metaphysical being is not1 as it appears to many1 a surrender of the soul or of its immortality4 ,that the immortality of the soul from the standpoint of modern psychology is preserved1 that it appears in a new light1 grander and nobler than before1 and that this conception of immortality is of an enormous practical importance1 have been the main incentives of ,mr4 ,e4 ,c4 ,hegeler in founding ,the ,open ,court and ,the ,monist4 ,,literary ,,correspondence ,i4 ,,france4 ,the recent work of ,m4 ,f4 ,,paulhan1 ,le ,nouveau ,mysticisme1 places us in the presence of a feature of modern life1 if not extremely important1 at least very curious4 ,we assist at the formation of a new spirit4 ,but what is it8 ,what is its value8 ,a reply to this question would exact a long and minute analysis of all social facts4 ,m4 ,paulhan does not flatter himself that he has exhausted it1 and he offers us only portions1 although excellent and instructive1 of the required work4 ,he shows us in rapid review1 the dissolution of the ancient world1 the intellectual and moral anarchy which has to-day reached its highest possible point2 he seeks1 in the ruins amidst which we tread1 the constructive elements of a new order of things1 and makes an effort to foresee what it will be4 8,the scientific mind10 writes he1 8the religious spirit1 pity for suffering1 the sentiment of justice1 social mysticism1 the attraction for mysterious perhaps dangerous facts that we begin to have a glimpse of1 the kind of new power which the knowledge of them can give us1 a general need of universal harmony3 such are the principal characters of the spirit which is forming itself40 ,they are not1 he himself says1 all new4 ,it is not the presence of these elements which is significant1 but rather the singular combination in which they occur1 and we could say1 the precipitate that they give in the particular chemical solution where they find themselves thrown4 ,in every case1 the phenomenon does not affect entirely1 it seems to us1 the same characters1 according to whether we observe it in the philosophic or scientific order1 in the practical order1 or in that of sentiment1 which literature represents4 ,the name of mysticism does not belong to every part of the new spirit equally2 or more exactly1 the spirit which is produced could well not be truly mysticism1 but only a side phenomenon1 and the very evident resurrection of the spirit which is disappearing4 ,m4 ,paulhan1 if ,i do not deceive myself1 sometimes allows himself to be too much influenced by a certain literature1 to which ,i do not allow a very great value1 and of which even the sincerity may be suspected4 ,it represents at first1 to my mind1 individual conditions1 and it evidently impeaches some authors of a morbid diathesis4 ,many of our prophets1 as is known in the ,quartier ,latin1 have or affect vices which exclude by themselves all generating power4 ,then1 it is very difficult1 in our age1 to appreciate exactly the relations of literature to the public mind1 seeing the diversity of romantic books1 and the correlation of one to the other is perhaps not so strict1 so profound as it has been in other junctures of history4 ,in short1 the modern romance is a document the relative value of which needs to be established by a most severe critic4 ,some facts dominate the question1 viewed as a whole4 ,it is necessary to show the work of the scientific mind1 which has the result of creating new mental habits4 ,it is necessary to consider also that the disorder1 the spirit of evil1 so finely analysed by ,m4 ,paulhan1 corresponds chiefly to the interpretations of ignorance1 to the exaggerations of sentiment1 and to the dreams1 more or less monstrous1 of inventive fantasy4 ,it is necessary1 finally1 if they wish to augur of the future1 to endeavor to disengage the laws of construction1 still badly defined1 of our political fabrics4 ,the thought of ,m4 ,paulhan is good at bottom1 and the materials with which he constructs the possible future are taken from the positive conditions of our mental and social life3 in the practical order1 8co-operation0 is added to the social systems already existing1 although disturbed1 such as the family and the nation2 in the ideal order1 the conception1 beyond that of humanity1 of a 8cosmical whole10 and a 8universe10 which1 to repeat it after ,comte1 will be favorable to man1 in a certain sense1 seeing that he causes it to exist4 ,we recommend the reading of this book4 ,one's time is never lost with a thinker of the stamp of ,m4 ,paulhan2 he has the merit this time of disclosing to us in a few pages a vast horizon1 where some points are delineated with clearness4 ,logicism has caused much evil in our country4 ,let us now beware of mysticism6 99 99 99 99 99 ,one of the most curious episodes of this new mysticism is assuredly the ,buddhist preaching1 begun in ,france by a small group of writers4 ,m4 ,,augustin ,,chaboseau1 one of the representatives of this religious tendency1 publishes a work1 ,essai sur la philosophie boudhique1#ej which it is expedient to mention4 ,m4 ,chaboseau has thought it would be of interest to sum up in a volume the results of the studies on ,buddhism1 and to present it 8such as science has proved it1 that is to say very different from what ,christian polemists1 worldly amusers1 theosophic fanatics1 endeavor to disseminate40 ,he has had the ambition to write this volume1 and for my part1 ,i do not refuse him my curiosity4 ,but that ,buddhism truly contains a religious formula capable of attracting to it the souls of our ,occident1 ,i have difficulty in believing4 ,this ,india is very far from us1 and its confused philosophy is behind us4 ,i do not think that the nations of to-day will return to a by-gone mode2 and then1 this doctrine of ,sakya-,muni has something against it1 that ,i hesitate to say1 as it might seem puerile3 its god is too fat4 ,its god or its sage1 as you wish4 ,yes1 that breadth of form1 that opulence of flesh1 taken as a mark of goodness and power1 shocks our artistic taste4 ,do not forget that every religion which claims our will ought to satisfy our sthetic sentiment3 it is one of the essential factors of the religious sentiment1 a compound sentiment where all the emotions of a race ought to find their harmony4 ,the opposition of ,india to us1 so striking in the ideal of the beautiful1 still continues in metaphysical speculation4 ,we are too moderate1 too sober1 for the debauches of imagination in which it delights4 ,buddhism will be to us only a passing excrescence1 and ,i ask myself if it lives well in the souls where it has sincerely penetrated4 ,i should have much to do to speak1 in the briefest manner1 of all the books or treatises1 which in a direct or indirect manner relate either to the war of ,aryanism against ,semitism1 and principally against the ,christianism in which certain authors see the most disastrous conquest of ,semitic genius2 or to the reviving of mystic traditions1 strange dreams1 and monstrous desires2 or to a religious restoration1 of which the most ordinary prejudice is to assure the immortality of the soul and to reopen the beyond to man4 ,these works are in general of slight value2 they are the multiplication of decays1 and we are compelled to consider them as social wastes1 of which the abundance betrays unquestionably the bad health of the organism1 or at least a difficult crisis of its evolution4 99 99 99 99 99 ,but let us return to the works of philosophy properly so-called4 ,what are we to think of that of ,m4 ,f4 ,,rauh8 ,i deceive myself much if his ,essai sur le fondement mtaphysique der la morale is considered of much service in his own circles4 ,m4 ,rauh1 who belongs to the philosophic youth1 the youth of the age1 can be well assured that the partisans of scientific morality will not upbraid him for 8the admiration of high metaphysical thoughts0 with which he does himself honor1 but he can fear lest the metaphysicians accuse him of further compromising metaphysics by the denser obscurities he casts on it4 ,one is stupefied to find again in a modern book a phraseology so made up of abstract words1 of substantives with capitals1 and logical shadows which affect the posture of realities4 ,much study1 much work1 without advancing one step1 and still worse1 in order to throw us again into the culs-de-sac from whence we have had so much difficulty to disengage ourselves4 ,all the profit one can derive from this dialectic is to contemplate at the end the vague shadow of its own body that is perceived on the wall4 ,the metaphysicians of a certain school are not only reluctant to have to accept that morality is a natural formation1 a social product1 an historical fact2 they wish further that the existence even of moral society should depend on the intelligence that they have of it1 or of the explanation that they give of it4 ,they affirm boldly1 and these are the words even of ,m4 ,rauh1 that 8the fate of morality is united to that of metaphysics0--their metaphysics4 ,this is a pretension as exorbitant as would be that of a naturalist who should refer the reality of the animal world to the idea he formed of zological types1 or that of a chemist who should subject the value of the positive results of science to a particular hypothesis as to the constitution of bodies4 99 99 99 99 99 ,there are certain difficulties of language to criticise in the work of ,m4 ,,isidore ,,maus1 barrister in the ,court of ,appeals at ,brussels1 ,de la justice pnale1 tude philosophique sur le droit de punir4 ,a curious spectator1 he tells us1 of the battle waged between the new school of anthropology and the ancient penal jurisprudence1 he seeks to divine the issue of it4 ,it will probably end1 according to him1 in the formation of a medium penal jurisprudence1 which will accept limited responsibilities1 and which1 while protecting society1 will do its best 8to give to punishment all the advantages it can40 ,it would be exaggerated no doubt1 ,i willingly grant it1 to take away from repression every mark of moral reparation1 all weight of 8reformative power02 but ,i am always shocked to hear partial responsibilities spoken of4 ,from the social point of view1 the responsibility remains perfect2 it is united1 indeed1 to the very act of having caused injury1 beyond all appreciation4 ,from the point of view of the individual1 the word responsibility has the grave inconvenience of implying that the quantity of liberty or free-will attributable to the delinquent is measured4 ,it would be less compromising and more exact1 to value simply the quality1 the worth of the delinquent1 according to the totality of his affective1 intellectual1 voluntary1 and pathological character1 according to the nature and the conditions of the act of which he is accused1 etc4 ,we should thus escape contradictions of words which easily become contradictions of fact2 we should no more stumble at this latent difficulty of free-will1 in medium cases--for serious cases are never difficult4 ,words exercise a tyranny which jurists would do well to distrust4 ,is not this1 moreover1 just about what ,m4 ,maus means by his favorite formula--that justice ought 8to individualise as much as possible08 ,it is a pity only that he does not present his conclusions with the requisite clearness4 ,his exposition is not distinct and frank4 ,he has mental habitudes1 subtilities of reasoning1 which are of value at the ,palais1 but which it is suitable to rid oneself of when writing a book3 his would gain much by being entirely remodeled1 made clear and disentangled4 99 99 99 99 99 ,m4 ,e4 ,,de ,,laveleye offers to the public a fourth edition1 revised and considerably augmented1 of his great work1 ,de la proprit et de ses formes primitives4 ,we have not to recall the numerous facts which this work contains and the knowledge of which has become sufficiently general2 nor to commend ,m4 de ,laveleye1 who no longer expects fresh praises for it4 ,i have only to express the regret that he should have retained the theory of property expounded in the last chapter of his book1 or rather the metaphysical conception of right with which he connects it4 ,it seems as if he wished to excuse himself from reducing property to the simple value of a fact1 modifiable in its forms1 by indicating as a fixed point an 8order0 which shall be the best1 which shall be known and wished of ,god1 sought and realised by man4 ,m4 de ,laveleye knows it as well as any one4 ,right is only a rule1 an expression of the relations of men among themselves1 in a determined geographical and historical medium4 ,its changes depend1 in part on external conditions1 in part on the characters of man himself1 the state and variable equilibrium of his passions and of his mentality4 ,if certain forms of right establish themselves proportionally1 in the course of the life of nations1 the fact is explained by the constancy and the universality of certain conditions1 either physical or mental2 the repetition of social arrangements1 which produces ultimately a more stable structure and constitutes a sort of axis of development1 is somewhat analogous1 if we may be permitted this comparison1 to the repetition of the essential elements in all architecture1 or of the primitive forms in all the products of the ceramic art4 ,what is the good of enveloping with mystery the ideal we create ourselves1 and of rendering obscure a notion that we can positively explain8 ,but let us leave here this little quarrel1 for it does not touch the solid groundwork of the book4 ,still to signalise are3 ,premiers principes mtaphysiques de la science de la nature1 translated from ,kant by ,m4 ,m4 ,,ch4 ,,andler and ,,ed4 ,,chavannes1 who have written an interesting introduction ,on the philosophy of nature in ,kant2 and ,l',anne philosophique1 ,i anne #ahij1 published under the direction of ,f4 ,,pillon1 former manager of ,la ,critique philosophique4 ,there will be found in this last volume two profound studies1 one by ,m4 ,renouvier on the phenomenist method1 the other by ,m4 ,pillon on the criticism of the infinite1 an excellent article by ,m4 ,l4 ,dauriac on philosophy and particularly on the sthetics of ,guyau1 finally a bibliography of ,french works which appeared in #ahij4 ,i wish good success to this publication2 it will become valuable1 and it will be still more so1 in my opinion1 if ,m4 ,pillon1 will not recoil before the fatigue1 no doubt sufficiently great1 of adding to the ,bibliography a critical sketch of the review articles published in the course of the year4 ,,lucien ,,arr,,at4 ,,footnotes3 #ej ,georges ,carr1 publisher4 ,the other works mentioned in this article belong to the ,librarie ,alcan4 ,,ii4 ,,recent ,,german ,,works ,,in ,,psychology4 ,a well-known alienist1 ,professor ,pelman of ,bonn1 in a recently published work1 advanced the assertion that the literary taste of the day pointed to a considerable decline of the intellectual health of the present generation4 ,to him who assumes with ,pelman some causal foundation of this state of affairs1 it is indeed an alarming sight to pass in review the show windows of our great book centres ,leipsic and ,berlin and to discover the great number of editions that the products of the literature of a certain class are passing through4 ,among the books that are at present all the vogue1 ,tolsto's 8,kreutzer ,sonata0 stands in the front rank4 ,numberless articles in the newspapers and the magazines have already made this wonderful work the subject of discussion1 both from the sthetical and from the moral point of view4 ,now comes a physician1 who discusses the psychological aspect of the story1 and discusses it in a manner which must claim our interest and to which in the main points it emphasises we cannot deny our assent4 ,dr4 ,h4 ,,beck has published at the house of ,rauert and ,rocco of ,leipsic1 a brochure bearing the title ,des ,grafen ,leo ,tolsto ,kreutzer ,sonate vom ,standpunkte des ,irrenarztes1 and arrives on the basis of a careful analysis at the result that ,tosdnischew is a decidedly neuropathical character4 ,now as ,tolsto1 on his own express declaration in his concluding remarks1 places his own views in ,tosdnischew's mouth1 this judgment respecting the principal character of the story also holds good in great measure of its author4 ,generally1 indeed1 ,beck is very considerate towards ,tolsto's person1 in the expression of his opinions2 but he is nevertheless very plainly outspoken when he says at the conclusion of his little book3 8,let us characterise this monstrous product1 the #8,kreutzer ,sonata1' as that which it appears to every person of sound sentiments--as the emanation1 namely1 of a diseased brain1 of a degenerated ,psyche40 ,the ,munich physician ,dr4 ,puschmann1 who in the year #ahgc in a special treatise represented ,richard ,wagner1 then still alive1 as psychically diseased1 has thus found1 as we see1 in a certain sense a successor in ,dr4 ,beck4 ,but while ,puschmann's pamphlet1 having been occasioned by certain conditions of affairs in ,munich1 was written in a hostile spirit1 and while the little book of ,beck's makes no secret of its author's aversion to ,tolsto and his works1 a notorious representative of unhealthy 8young ,germany10 the novelist ,wilhelm ,walloth1 meets at other hands with an uncommonly tender treatment4 ,there is indeed nothing remarkable in this1 for if anyone is in need of tender treatment it is a man who is sick4 ,but it is very remarkable that the diseased state of a nervous system should be accredited to the writer ,walloth as a great poetic excellence4 ,g4 ,,ludwigs1 the author of the treatise ,wilhelm ,walloth1 ,leipsic1 #ahia1 ,verlag von ,wilhelm ,friedrich1 had in so far the advantage of ,puschmann and ,beck1 that he was not placed under the necessity of originally demonstrating what the actual state of the nervous system of his hero was1 from his works4 ,this condition had already been established by expert physicians in a much talked of trial before the ,district ,court of ,leipsic for circulating obscene publications4 ,ludwigs was able therefore to proceed immediately with his problem of ascertaining the extent to which a diseased state of the nervous system had effect in ,walloth's novels and poems4 ,his discussion of this last question possesses great interest for the psychologist1 although the reader will find considerable difficulty in accommodating his thoughts to ,ludwigs's occasionally very singular style4 ,setting aside the odd expressions of ,ludwigs1 we may say that there is exhibited in a pre-eminent degree in the writings of ,walloth1 first1 what the physicians call hypersthesia1 and by this is meant not only an excessive sensitiveness of the senses but also--a condition that is connected with the last--an extraordinary intensity of the emotional activity4 ,secondly1 are found numberless bold associations of ideas which are much better known to the physician than to the sthetician4 ,unfortunately ,walloth is not the only one of the representatives of 8young ,germany10 in whose works the characters of disease appear in such intensity1 and the circumstance that books of this class are bought in such numbers and read in still greater1 places the tastes and sentiments of a large portion of the educated ,german public in a questionable light4 ,if we turn our glance away from the sensational phenomena of literature to the phenomena of ordinary life1 which are not uncommonly enacted in the halls of justice1 it is in first rank the incorrigible swindlers and sharpers that excite our attention4 ,we have received on this subject from ,dr4 ,,anton ,,delbrueck1 a physician of a ,swiss insane asylum1 an interesting little work bearing the title ,die pathologische ,lge und die psychisch abnormen ,schwindler1 ,stuttgart1 #ahia1 ,verlag von ,ferdinand ,enke4 ,in this book the author makes an investigation of the gradual transition of a normal psychological process into processes exhibiting pathological symptoms1 and shows1 in so doing1 by ample material1 that in every kind of intentional deception the consciousness of intention can exhibit very different degrees of intensity and can imperceptibly sink in a succession of cases to zero4 ,as a matter of course1 ,delbrck's treatise is primarily of interest to medical experts and lawyers1 but it will also be of interest in a secondary degree to all circles that devote their attention to psychological studies generally1 particularly so to educators who have not infrequently to do with pathological lies1 as ,g4 ,stanley ,hall quite recently pointed out in a very instructive article in ,the ,america ,journal of ,psychology on the lying of children1 and as is developed in the work of ,dr4 ,sollier1 before mentioned in ,the ,monist1 entitled ,la psychologie de l'idiot et l'imbcile1 which is also to be had in a very good ,german edition1 translated by ,paul ,brie1 under the title ,der ,idiot und der ,imbecille1 published by ,leopold ,voss of ,hamburg4 ,in the ,german edition of ,sollier's book ,professor ,pelman1 whom we have above mentioned1 has written an introduction in which he speaks of the work in words of praise similar to those expressed by ,lucien ,arrat in ,the ,monist4 8,sollier10 says he1 8has put us into the possession of a psychology of mental imbecility1 in a completeness in which hitherto it was not at our disposal40 ,then follows another passage which we will also quote1 as it forms an important supplement to the remarks of ,arrat4 ,it is this3 8,imbecility had remained the step-child of the science of psychiatry and has not by any means met with the consideration which in view of its social importance is due to it4 ,if we go through the works1 as great in number as they are in voluminousness1 which have been published in the style of ,lombroso on criminals and their peculiar characteristics1 we shall be unable to escape the impression produced in our minds that the characteristics of imbeciles portrayed by ,sollier recur point for point in the typical criminal4 ,here as there1 the same insufficiency of all ethical development1 the same frivolity1 and the same incapacity for being of use in society exist4 ,that which in ,sollier's explanation decides the whole anthropological position of the imbecile--his anti-social1 society-hostile attitude--is emphasised by all writers as the characteristic trait common to all criminals1 and the description of imbeciles and criminals coincides as completely in this respect as if the same individual had sat for both pictures4 ,the conclusions that follow from this can only enlist new adherents in the ranks of the anthropological school1 and this result also ,i should place to the profit-account of the present book40 ,however profitable and necessary employment with the diseased states of the human soul may be1 personally at least it is an unpleasant subject for us1 and we are glad therefore that we may abandon this domain for the present letter4 ,the occasion of this is afforded by a valuable gift from ,prof4 ,w4 ,,preyer1 formerly of ,jena1 now of ,berlin4 ,professor ,preyer has presented us with a rather large volume bearing the title ,wissenschaftliche ,briefe von ,gustav ,theodor ,fechner und ,w4 ,preyer4 ,nebst einem ,briefweschsel zwischen ,k4 von ,vierordt und ,fechner sewie mehreren ,beilagen4 ,mit dem ,bildnisse ,fechner's und vier ,holzschnitten4 ,hamburg und ,leipsic1 #ahij4 ,verlag von ,leopold ,voss4 ,the work contains a correspondence extending from the year #ahgc to the year #ahhc1 in which the two distinguished scientists discuss 7chiefly7 myo-physical and psycho-physical questions1 and will be of great interest to many readers of ,the ,monist1 especially as it makes its appearance simultaneously with the issuing of a new edition of ,fechner's ,elemente der ,psychophysik by ,wilhelm ,wundt4 ,the much fought over and much disputed province of psycho-physics has also been entered on by a younger psychologist1 who has already acquired a considerable name1--by ,hugo ,mnsterberg1 docent at the university of ,freiburg in ,baden4 ,in his ,beitrge zur experimentellen ,psychologie1 which are published in parts at indefinite periods by ,mohr of ,freiburg in ,baden--three parts have already been published--,mnsterberg raises1 in the first place1 a vigorous protest against ,wundt2 repudiating on the basis of the results of independent experiment the apperception hypothesis which has been propounded by the scientist mentioned1 and producing proof that all kinds of so-called apperception are reducible to associations of the representative activity4 ,secondly1 he offers us in the third part a new foundation on which to base psycho-physics4 ,it is1 of course1 impossible1 in so difficult a subject1 to reproduce briefly yet clearly the developments to which ,mnsterberg devotes one hundred and twenty-two pages4 ,but we will at least supply a few hints with regard to what this new foundation of psycho-physics is4 ,in the first place1 ,mnsterberg rejects the notion that prevails with ,fechner and his school1 that a powerful sensation is a multiple of a weaker one1 by which the first can be measured4 ,the stronger sensation is1 says he1 in comparison with the weaker one something wholly new2 for1 accurately considered1 the intensity of a sensation is also of a qualitative nature4 ,however1 we are not by any means at liberty to infer from this that the measurement of psychical quantities is impossible4 ,to appreciate this1 it is first requisite that we should get clear ideas with respect to the psychological foundation of our physical measurements4 ,the only foundation of these last is our muscular feeling1 to this extent1 that all measurement is founded on the measurement of quantities of space1 time1 and mass1 and any estimate of the latter is only possible on the basis of the muscular feeling that enters as a factor in the conceptions involved4 ,all physical measurement rests on the establishment1 and therefore reproduction1 of like muscular sensations2 on exactly the same foundation rests also all measurement of psychical quantities1 of intensities of sensation1 and since this foundation is the same1 for this very reason the same justification is due to the measurement of psychical intensity as is due to physical measurements4 ,this is the foundation on which the psycho-physics of ,mnsterberg is raised1 which for a fuller view must be studied in the third part of the 8,beitrge0 itself4 ,,chr4 ,,ufer4 ,altenburg1 ,november1 #ahia4 ,,diverse ,,topics4 ,,the ,,clergy',s ,,duty ,,of ,,allegiance ,,to ,,dogma ,,and ,,the ,,struggle ,,between ,,world-,,conceptions4 ,a late number of the ,gegenwart of ,berlin 7,vol4 xl1 ,no4 #cj7 contained an article by ,mr4 ,eugene ,schiffer1 a ,german justice1 on the subject 8,world-,conception and the ,office of ,judge10 in which attention was called to the fact that the performance of duties1 not only in the pulpit but in all the professions1 and preminently in the dispensation of justice through the courts1 depends upon and stands in a more or less close connection with some definite world-conception2 thus showing that religion of some kind forms and must form the background of the practical life of society4 ,he says3 8,the ,church demands of its disciples as an indispensable condition of serving her the confession of a certain world-conception2 she requires that every one who intends to take upon himself her rights and duties1 should in his inmost heart agree with her concerning the contents of her faith1 especially concerning the dogmas on eschatology1 on ,god and world1 body and soul1 the origin and end of things2 and this is but a matter of course1 for the essential part and also the foundation of her activity lie in these very doctrines and in their propagation4 ,it is a hard and a severe demand4 ,although on the one hand the morally free fulfilment of her requests contains the germ of an harmonious development of life and promises an extraordinary concentration and elevation of all faculties1 it leads on the other hand to serious conflicts1 of which the pages of history not less than the experiences of our daily life exhibit innumerable and sad instances4 ,we recollect the terrible spiritual struggles in the souls of those who commenced to doubt1 and the outcome is generally a pitiful catastrophe1 either submission and hypocrisy with the weak1 or tribulation1 renunciation1 and ruin with those who thought higher of truth than of their worldly emoluments4 8,most of the other professions and trades know nothing of the indispensability of a certain world-conception4 ,the merchant1 the mechanic1 the lawyer1 the soldier1 the teacher1 the laborer1 can upon the whole think concerning these highest problems of life as they please4 ,an inner and ideal conflict between their views and their calling seems definitely excluded4 ,outer and practical conditions--such as administrative injunctions of a certain kind1 the aspiration of progress1 the ambition to be better off1 etc4--may sometimes produce conflicts4 8,yet this character of indifference concerning a general world-conception which is found in the secular professions and trades does not bear the stamp of permanence4 ,for ultimately the entire doing and achieving of every thinking man1 so far as it rises above the mere vegetative functions1 is intimately connected with that common world-conception which everywhere influences and guides him4 ,this is unnoticeable so long as the harmony of the connection remains undisturbed1 but it manifests itself in consciousness as soon as its harmony is threatened through some important change of any of its parts4 ,even to-day a deep-going change is preparing itself2 even now the struggle about the world-conception is fought more severely and more bitterly than ever and a new doctrine goes far enough to uncover the ultimate roots of our civilisation1 of our position in life1 of our calling2 it attacks and shakes the present world-conception4 8,this implies the possibility of a conflict between the old and the new faith even outside the pale of the church1 and this conflict may influence the choice of a calling4 ,this possibility has become an imminent probability concerning the office of judge1 especially the judge of a criminal court4 8,the dispensation of justice rests to a great extent upon the presupposition of guilt and the criminal law of to-day is almost throughout built upon this idea of guilt4 ,it is true that this view has not always been taken4 ,the ,greek law and the old ,germanic law interfered even in the gravest cases exclusively on account of the objective state of things without taking into consideration the criminal intent of the defendant4 ,but this view was superseded in the former case by the ,roman1 in the latter by the canonical law1 both requiring the conception of a moral and a subjective guilt1 and at present the criminal law of every civilised nation 7with the sole exception of the ,chinese who threaten with capital punishment him who accidentally kills no less than the intentional murderer7 rests upon the foundation of a belief in guilt4 8,but there is no room for guilt in the materialistic world-conception4 ,everything that happens1 the activity of the human soul included is to be explained according to mechanical principles and thus the view that man's will is not free is proposed as one of its fundamental doctrines4 ,while in this way there is no possibility left that a man might have acted differently than he actually did1 this view takes away his responsibility4 ,and this movement which either cancels or weakens the momentum of guilt1 has taken hold of the minds of men far beyond the circle of decided materialists4 8,the foundation of our criminal law stands or falls with the idea of guilt4 ,with it stands and falls also the office of the judge1 whose duty is the dispensation and utilisation of justice4 ,he who does not believe in the possibility of guilt cannot without inconsistency pronounce any one guilty4 ,he who as a matter of principle or at least within certain not well defined limits denies the freedom of the human will can no longer serve as a judge1 certainly not as a criminal judge40 ,justice ,eugene ,schiffer is a conservative man4 ,he demands that for the protection of the old world-conception the office of judge should be carefully guarded against such intruders as are not in sympathy with the present world-conception4 ,he says3 8,exactly as the church1 in order to preserve herself and to guard against her theology being diluted into a watery philosophy of religion1 is bound not to separate the conditions of her life from a definite world-conception1 so also justice1 in order to deserve its name1 should oblige its servants to take a definite position toward the ultimate world-problems4444 ,he who does not accept in his conviction the moral foundations of a certain calling1 must not choose it1 or if he has chosen it1 he must renounce it--or he must in his profession act against his conviction--unless he risks being discharged from his office on account of a neglect of duties40 ,we agree with ,justice ,schiffer in one most important point1 viz41 the intimate connection of religion with practical life and of our world-conception with all our doing and achieving4 ,but we differ from him in another no less important point1 viz41 in the proposition to prevent the present world-conception from undergoing a further growth and higher evolution4 ,his proposition is nothing less than to make humanity and all its institutions stationary4 ,everything that exists has a natural right to defend its existence1 and so has the present world-conception4 ,but that which grows and develops out of the conditions of the present existence has also a natural right to attain existence4 ,the ideal world of the 8is to be0 is not a non-existence1 as it might appear to the unknowing1 but a germ existence1 and if there is no room for both the actual existence of the present state and the germ existence of a new state1 a struggle will ensue4 ,there are at present and always have been many spurious world-conceptions which if they overcame the present world-conception would lead humanity backward to the beginning of civilisation4 ,indeed most propositions of reform are reversals which would undo the results of evolution and reduce mankind to primitive conditions4 ,the fermenting minds of those who still hope to cure all the ills and woes of society by one stroke1 have not yet outgrown the idea of the perfection1 nobility1 and happiness of the so-called original state of nature1 8,when wild in woods the noble savage ran40 ,yet among all the plans of reform there is one which is correct1 answering the wants of the time2 and among all the world-conceptions which struggle to exist there is also one which is the legitimate outcome of the present world-conception4 ,it is the present world-conception enlarged through additional experience and purified of certain errors4 ,and it is an often repeated occurrence in history that the old and the new1 father and son1 have to fight with each other4 ,the heir apparent either does not know that he is the child of his antagonist1 or the latter the defendant of the present state does not know that he fights with his own son4 ,this often repeated fact has found a mythological expression in the old ,teutonic song of ,hildebrand meeting in combat his son ,hadubrand1 a legend which in similar versions appears again in other ,aryan sagas1 the best known of which is the tale of ,rustem's struggle with ,sohrab in ,firdus's great ,iranian epic4 ,can the struggle between the old and the new world-conception be avoided8 ,no1 it cannot and should not1 for the new has to prove its legitimacy by showing its intrinsic strength2 it must show that it has the power to exist4 ,the struggle cannot be avoided1 but the bitterness1 the severity1 the barbarity of the struggle can be avoided4 ,let ,hildebrand and ,hadubrand measure swords in a spiritual encounter1 let the vanquished ideas yield to the stronger ideas1 and they will prepare the gradual change of an evolution instead of the sudden rupture of a revolution4 ,freedom of thought is always the best soil for a peaceful evolution but any system that binds the consciences of men and ties their ideas down to the average level of a certain age will be as dangerous as a boiler without a valve4 ,there are periods of instability in history when the strengthening of the conservative spirit by imposing fetters upon the consciences of men appears useful and almost a condition for the development of some kind of a civilisation4 ,this found expression in the historic legends of ,lycurgus and ,solon1 binding their countrymen by oath not to alter the laws of the state4 ,but these periods are after all ephemeral1 and we ought to know by this time that we cannot bid the sun stand still or check the spirit of progress and the growth of mankind4 ,there are nations which develop slowly because they rush into innovations1 but there are other nations which have gone to the wall because of over-conservatism through which they were induced to suppress the freedom of thought and to deny the right of doubting the absolute validity of the prevailing world-conception4 ,the proposition of ,justice ,schiffer to bind the conscience of the judge by an oath of allegiance to that world-conception which is at present recognised as orthodox1 is actually a law in the constitution of the church1 and conflicts in the consciences of clergymen are of a common occurrence4 ,the opinion that a clergyman who has ceased to believe in certain dogmas of his church has to resign this position is very common among freethinkers as well as orthodox believers4 ,at first sight this seems to be the only choice left to a man of honesty and a lover of truth4 ,i held this opinion myself for a long time4 ,there is nevertheless another view of the subject which caused me to change my opinion entirely1 and ,i am glad to perceive that such a man as ,mr4 ,moncure ,d4 ,conway who held himself a position in the church and having grown more and more liberal has retired from active service1 declares most emphatically that a clergyman who has grown liberal should not resign but stay in the church and wait till the church forces him to leave his position4 ,this is an honest course1 a clergyman has a right to pursue it and he will thereby open the eyes of his fellow-men2 he will further the interests of mankind1 and people will thus be enabled to judge better whether or not it is just to impose these burdens upon the pastors of the church4 ,let us consider the case more closely4 ,first1 the oath which a young clergyman gives at his ordination is a promissory oath1 and like all promissory oaths it holds good on the supposition that all the main conditions remain the same4 ,if a man promises and binds himself by an oath to start to-morrow morning on a journey he does so on the supposition that it will be possible4 ,so far as he can foresee it is possible1 but incidents may happen which will make it impossible to-morrow4 ,a promissory oath will be a weight on the conscience if it has to be broken1 but it has no legal force4 ,thus soldiers swear an oath of allegiance to their king1 and under ordinary circumstances there will be no cause for doubt as to the propriety of remaining faithful to the oath4 ,but many cases of great perplexity will appear when a civil war splits a nation in twain so that brother stands against brother and faithfulness to the king may be the most degrading felony toward one's highest and holiest ideals1 perhaps also toward one's bodily parents and nearest kin4 ,who does not recollect the sad end of ,ludwig ,,ii1 king of ,bavaria4 ,when the mind of the unfortunate monarch was too much deranged to leave him in possession of his royal power1 a commission of several authorised men went to the castle where he resided to place him under the care of a physician4 ,the king refused to receive the commission and ordered his faithful guards by whom he was surrounded to seize the commission1 gouge out their eyes and treat them otherwise in the most outrageous way4 ,the commission not being protected were for a moment in great danger1 but happily the guards perceiving the seriousness of the situation did not execute the king's orders and we might say1--broke their oath4 ,did they really break their oath8 ,no1 they did not1 for when they were sworn to obey their sovereign master and lord1 it was supposed that the king was and would remain in his right mind4 ,he became insane and this changed the situation entirely4 ,the oath of allegiance which the ministers of a church swear at their ordination is made in the bona fide conviction on both sides1--the church on the one side and the man that takes orders on the other side1--that the dogmas to which he pledges his troth are the truth4 ,the oath holds good so long as a minister believes that the dogmas of the church are the truth2 it still holds good so long as he considers it possible that they may be true4 ,but the oath to believe them ceases to bind in the sense in which it was demanded as soon as a minister sees clearly that they are not true and that their truth is an actual impossibility4 ,it ranks in the same category as the oath of allegiance to a sovereign who has become insane4 ,but the case is more complex still4 ,if promissory oaths have no legal force because in certain cases a man would have to act against the letter of the oath1 have these oaths no binding power whatever1 as soon as a minister recognises the incongruity of the church belief with truth8 ,i should say that they have a binding power1 yet this binding power must be sought not in the letter but in the spirit of the oath4 ,one of the most prominent of juridical authorities1 ,prof4 ,rudolf von ,jhering1 has written a book entitled 8,der ,zweck im ,recht40 ,he finds that all laws1 all wills1 all decrees have a purpose1 and this purpose is their spirit4 ,there are laws worded so badly that obedience to the letter of the law would under certain and unforeseen circumstances enforce exactly the contrary of that which the law was made for4 ,instances of this kind are of not an uncommon occurrence especially with regard to wills2 testators and their legal advisors being often unable to formulate their intentions in a logical shape4 ,jhering maintains that a judge in construing a will1 a decree1 or a law has to find out the intention and purpose of the testator1 the magistrate that gave the decree1 or the legislator1 and it is this intention or purpose with which his decisions have to agree4 ,supposing however that this purpose of a will or a law is wrong in itself or nonsensical1 a judge has to construe it so that it will have sense4 ,if the purpose is criminal the whole transaction is illegal1 if it is irrational or illogical1 it has to be interpreted so as to make it rational and logical4 ,if it has reference to antiquated views1 customs or institutions it has to be adapted to the corresponding modern views and to existing conditions4 ,an instance from practical life will explain the last point4 ,there are many institutions in ,northern ,germany which were founded as cloisters or monasteries4 ,the nuns and monks have been engaged partly in teaching1 partly in attending to the sick1 and in other useful purposes4 ,the funds of these institutions exist still1 and serve now those purposes directly which they have served formerly indirectly through the service of nuns and monks4 ,most of them are employed for the maintenance of schools1 some of them as hospitals1 others as homes for unmarried daughters of government officials or for homeless aristocratic ladies without means1 etc4 ,these changes have been wrought by history as the natural consequence of new conditions4 ,many of them were made in actual violation of the letter of the testators' will2 yet they were made bona fide with the intention to remain faithful to its spirit8 ,the question is not what a testator intended his will to be half a millennium ago1 but what he would intend it to be in the living present1 knowing all the changes which the progress of the times have wrought and having progressed with the times4 ,before we answer the question1 ,what is the purpose of the minister's oath8 we should first see clearly1 what is the purpose of the church4 ,is the purpose of the church really to be sought in the propaganda of some absurd dogmas8 ,or does not rather the preaching of these dogmas itself serve a purpose8 ,the dogmas of ,christianity were some time ago supposed to be the indispensable instruments of ethical instruction4 ,all the churches are educational institutions to inculcate the moral ought on the basis of a popular world-conception4 ,the church of ,england for instance is a national institute and it is not true that one church party has the right to impose its religious conception upon the rest of the nation4 ,when the church was founded some crude notions were taken to be absolute truths and no man can at the present time be required to believe these crudities4 ,all institutions are conservative but most conservative are the courts of justice and the church4 ,the conservatism of jurisprudence is characterised in the saying which appears to be its leading principle fiat justicia et pereat mundus4 ,jurisprudence too often forgets that the dispensation of justice serves the purpose of sustaining life1 of promoting the general welfare and enhancing the prosperity of the community2 it overlooks the spirit and clings to the letter4 ,our justices are inclined to believe that if a new world-conception arises1 7which by the bye will as we believe not be materialistic nor will it destroy the idea of moral responsibility1 although it may change our views about guilt17 their whole system of jurisprudence will break down4 ,they are afraid of a pereat justicia et vivat mundus4 ,justice ,schiffer is not at all anxious to prove the truth of the old world-conception1 he is satisfied with proving that the new world-conception is incompatible with the old view of justice4 ,criminal law means punishment and punishment presupposes the idea of guilt4 ,he argues3 8,the question remains whether the conflict between the new and the old world-conception could be avoided by adapting our views of justice to the new world-conception2 yet this question is to be denied1 for the notions of guilt and punishment belong to each other according to logical1 ethical1 and moral principles4 ,to punish without assuming guilt is as nonsensical as it is immoral40 ,it would lead us too far here to show that moral responsibility still subsists on the supposition of a strict determinism and that the criminal law with its punishments will not be abolished in the future4 ,yet there is no doubt that our views of punishment will have to be changed2 indeed they have changed and how much they have changed1 can be learned by a comparison of an execution of to-day with one of a few hundred years ago4 ,the idea of punishment in the sense of inflicting pain as a retribution has gone and it has gone forever4 ,there is no more burning of the criminal with hot irons1 or twitching with hot tongs1 or tearing out his tongue1 or stretching on the wheel4 ,the criminal is executed with as little pain to him as possible4 ,why this change8 ,because a new world-conception has entirely altered our views of punishment and it is going to alter them still more4 ,penology is not to be based upon sentimentality as some so-called philanthropists intend to do2 nevertheless it is to and it will become humane because we have abandoned the old conception of guilt which as ,justice ,schiffer correctly states was a fundamental idea in the old jurisprudence1 and this antiquated conception of guilt has partly but not as yet entirely been overcome4 ,the church is in a position similar to that of the criminal law courts4 ,a change of our world-conception has set in and the church is not as yet adapted to the change4 ,the church having found it necessary for its purpose of preaching ethics to insist on the belief in a world-conception which demonstrates a moral world order1 now attempts to perpetuate certain errors of our ancestors' conception of this moral world-order4 ,the oath of a clergyman having been asked and given bona fide on the supposition that the dogmas of the church were the truth1 holds good still1 but it must be construed as in similar cases a judge would have to construe a faulty will or an ill-worded law4 ,it has to be construed in the spirit and not in the letter4 ,clergymen who have grown liberal should not leave the church4 ,it is their duty to stay in the church and to make their influence felt to broaden the spirit of the church4 ,if the church removes them from their position1 they yield to the authority at present in power1 but they should not yield without a struggle1 to be conducted on their part modestly but firmly1 with reverence toward their authorities1 with tact and decency1 but fearlessly and bravely1 for they are fighting not only for their personal interests but for the progress of mankind1 they are fighting for the holiest treasures of the church--for truth4 ,the abolition of these burdens on the consciences of the clergy would be a natural consequence of repeated struggles4 ,let a pastor be bound to respect his church authorities1 to obey them in all matters of administration1 let him be bound to revere the ecclesiastical traditions of which he should never speak lightly1 but do not prescribe to him a belief of any kind4 ,pledge him to serve the truth1 to speak the truth and to live the truth2 and that simple pledge will have more weight than the requirement to believe dogmas which1 his superiors know but too well can no longer be believed literally but must be taken cum grano salis4 ,christ says concerning the observances insisted upon by the ,scribes and ,pharisees3 8,they bind heavy burdens and grievous to be borne3 and lay them upon men's shoulders40 ,this passage is applicable also to the present system of ordination4 ,christ's saying is read in the churches and it is1 as most of his words are1 as new to-day as it was at his time1 but who thinks of its application to our present system of burdening the consciences of men8 ,p4 ,c4 ,a ,,comment ,,by ,,prof4 ,f4 ,,max ,m,,ller ,,concerning ,,the ,,discussion ,,on ,,evolution ,,and ,,language4 ,to the ,editor of ,the ,monist3 ,i must thank you and ,professor ,romanes for the frank and searching criticism to which you have both subjected my article on 8,thought and ,language10 published in ,the ,monist4 ,you have shown that you care for truth and not for victory1 and you have carefully abstained from any personal remarks which are so apt to embitter scientific controversy and in consequence to render its chief object1 the discovery of more truth1 illusory4 ,we all have the same object1 we all want to know what is true--why then should we not all work together1 listen to friendly criticism1 accept useful advice1 confess our mistakes1 and work as hard as we can in the special field allotted to each of us4 ,as soon as ,i find a little more leisure1 ,i shall not fail to reply fully to both your articles4 ,at present ,i only write to you to defend myself against an undeserved charge brought against me by ,professor ,romanes4 ,i had said that ,professor ,romanes had no right to speak of men like ,noir1 ,huxley1 ,herbert ,spencer1 to say nothing of ,hobbes1 with an air of superiority4 ,professor ,romanes replies that he never mentioned ,mr4 ,herbert ,spencer at all1 that it would have been well for me1 if1 before condemning his supposed treatment of ,herbert ,spencer1 ,huxley1 and ,noir1 ,i had looked at his ,index4 ,this is a serious charge4 ,it would show a want of accuracy unpardonable in a scholar4 ,it is true1 ,mr4 ,herbert ,spencer's name does not occur in the ,index4 ,but on p4 #bcj we read3 8,so here again we meet with additional proof1 were any required1 of the folly of regarding the copula as an essential ingredient of a proposition40 ,now it is well known that it is ,mr4 ,herbert ,spencer who regards the copula as an essential ingredient of a proposition4 ,i have shown that the facts of language are against ,mr4 ,herbert ,spencer1 but ,i should not therefore think it right to charge him with folly4 ,this will show that if ,i wrote without ,index1 ,i did not write without book4 ,yours truly1 ,f4 ,,max ,m,,ller4 ,oxford1 ,oct4 #bh1 #ahia4 ,,book ,,reviews4 ,,synoptiker4 ,,apostelgeschichte4 ,bearbeitet von ,professor ,h4 ,j4 ,holzmann4 ,zweite verbesserte und vermehrte ,auflage4 ,freiburg1 i4 ,b43 ,akademische ,verlagsbuchhandlung von ,j4 ,c4 ,b4 ,mohr4 #ahib4 ,this book is the first volume of the 8,hand-,commentar zum ,neuen ,testament0 edited by the ,professors ,h4 ,holtzmann1 ,r4 ,a4 ,lipsius1 ,p4 ,w4 ,schmiedel1 and ,h4 v4 ,soden4 ,no better man could have been selected for the first part of this great work than ,prof4 ,h4 ,j4 ,holtzmann1 who is not only a theologian of most comprehensive scholarship but also has devoted his energies to this special subject4 ,he has lectured regularly for a number of years at the university of ,strassburg six or eight times weekly on the synoptic gospels and three times weekly on the ,acts4 ,the principle of his method has been laid down in a former work of his1 viz4 8,lehrbuch der historisch-kritischen ,einleitung in das ,neue ,testament40 ,the present book contains an enormously voluminous material condensed into a comparatively small space of #ddh pp4 large octavo4 ,the author being a theologian his attitude toward his subject is naturally reverent1 paying an unreserved homage to the greatness of ,jesus4 ,yet at the same time his investigations are strictly scientific and in accordance with the rules of criticism as employed in any historical investigation4 ,it is no exaggeration to consider ,professor ,holtzmann's work as representative in the highest degree2 it embraces the most complete knowledge at present attainable and that too in a most concise form as a practical handbook with parallel tables and indexes of reference for students of the ,new ,testament4 ,the author first formulates 8the synoptic problem10 which has been solved after innumerable vain attempts by the so-called 8,marcus-,hypothesis10 which is at present considered as satisfactory1 because it alone fulfils every condition and explains all the difficulties4 ,holtzmann regards the figure of ,christ as historical4 ,the impression of his powerful personality was a living presence in the first congregation at ,jerusalem4 ,but all the interest centred in his words4 ,the words of their ,lord were faithfully preserved by oral tradition4 ,sentences so short and yet so pregnant with meaning as 8,blessed are the peacemakers10 or 8,ye are the salt of the earth10 8,but let your communication be1 ,yea1 yea3 ,nay1 nay1 etc410 are so impressive that whoever has heard them once1 will never forget them4 ,the interest in the word was soon complemented by an interest in facts and events which was much later followed by an interest in dogma4 ,the first differences among the ,christians originated through the mission among the heathens4 ,the gentile ,christian became indifferent concerning the ,jewish traditions and clung with all his religious enthusiasm to the ,christ as his saviour4 ,christianity became a cosmic religion while the ,jewish ,christians still looked upon ,christ as the ,messiah of the people of ,israel4 ,the ,jewish view of ,christianity is represented by ,matthew1 the gentile view by ,luke4 ,mark however does not show any development of dogma4 ,according to ,papias1 the ,apostle ,st4 ,peter had whenever it became necessary for an explanation of the words of ,christ1 occasionally told certain events of the life of ,jesus2 which were afterwards written down by ,mark4 ,we find in ,mark1 ,matthew1 and ,luke the same building stones1 but how differently arranged6 ,mark shows evidence of relating real facts of history1 he begins with ,john the ,baptist1 tells us how ,jesus became baptised1 how he preached the kingdom of ,god2 according to ,mark1 ,jesus does not declare himself as the ,messiah from the beginning4 ,his activity grows by degrees1 his disciples increase1 he heals the sick1 and it is from the mouth of these that he was first proclaimed as the ,messiah4 ,he becomes a power among the people and makes himself offensive to the authorities who consider him as dangerous and attempt to take his life4 ,jesus forbids those whom he heals to proclaim that he is the ,messiah4 ,he sends out his disciples not to preach him as the ,messiah1 but to proclaim the kingdom4 ,at last in ,peter the idea dawns that prompts him to declare3 8,thou art the ,christ40 ,yielding before the persecution of his enemies1 ,jesus travels ,north and ,east and here he accustoms himself to the idea of a suffering son of man4 ,his self-confidence increases and he travels courageously to ,jerusalem where1 as he could foresee1 he would meet his fate4 ,the drama of his life culminates in his word 8 0 7#adfb7 in which he reveals his self-consciousness as being the ,messiah4 ,being triumphantly hailed in ,jerusalem by people of ,galilee and such as believed in him he hastened his doom4 ,it is not likely that ,jesus could have publicly been held to be the ,messiah for any length of time1 for the ,roman police was wont to suppress such movements without discrimination4 ,they did not stop to investigate the case as to the character or motive of the movement whether or not it was purely religious or political4 ,they never tolerated any 8son of ,david0 or 8king of ,israel0 who held any influence over large masses of the people4 ,while ,mark still preserves the development of ,jesus's messianic consciousness1 ,luke as well as ,matthew have entirely obliterated it4 ,according to ,mark1 ,jesus proclaims the kingdom2 ,matthew and ,luke make him preach his person4 ,they make ,jesus proclaim himself as the ,messiah from the very beginning and his command not to speak it out openly given to those whom he healed and also to his disciples has no sense here4 ,matthew has a liking for cabalistic numbers1 there are three times seven generations the names of which are not without doing violence to historical facts adjusted to the pattern1 there are three temptations1 seven parables1 etc4 ,throughout we notice reflection1 purposive selection of the material1 and artificial adjustment to a plan4 ,the book has a tendency to show that ,jesus was the ,king of ,israel predicted by the prophets and in the psalms4 ,luke on the other hand has also a dogmatic programme4 ,it is the gospel of gentile ,christianity as founded by ,paul4 ,the critical school finds adversaries among theologians as well as unchristian thinkers1 both of whom are apt to speak of fraud when religious books are written with certain dogmatic tendencies4 ,professor ,holtzmann objects to such a view of the development of ,christianity4 ,he says that a religion which did not rouse sufficient enthusiasm to develop a religious poetry would be very poor and lifeless4 ,even the apocrypha of the ,new ,testament are evidence of the vigor of the new religion1 although we must be aware of the fact that the ,church showed good judgment when adopting its canon to accept those which were full of moral meaning and to reject those which were mere myth without any deeper significance4 ,we have given this abstract of one part of ,holtzmann's work with the omission of all the learned by-work for those not familiar with theological investigation4 ,similar results are obtained by an inquiry into the origin of the ,acts4 ,the apostles were the first and living representatives of the ,christ4 ,out of the interest in the apostles' words grew an interest in their actions and lives1 and there are a great many writings of this subject preserved4 ,one only has been received into the canon4 ,it is impossible to follow ,professor ,holtzmann into the details of his work1 but we can warmly recommend it as the best compendium existing1 not only for the student of theology but for everybody who is interested in the results of the scientific criticism of the synoptic gospels and the ,acts4#ea 4 ,,schriften ,,der ,,gesellschaft ,,fuer ,,psychologische ,,forschung4 ,heft #b4 ,ueber ,aufgaben und ,methoden der ,psychologie4 ,by ,hugo ,mnsterberg4 ,leipsic3 ,ambr4 ,abel4 #ahia4 ,in this monograph ,professor ,mnsterberg prepares the way for greater and more important work4 ,his aim is to define the province of psychology and to investigate the methods which have to be employed4 ,psychology is not philosophy2 accordingly the consideration whether there is a reality of an outside world does not belong here4 ,the psychologist is not bound to wait till this and other metaphysical questions are decided with certainty2 the reality of the outside world has simply to be assumed together with its cognisability4 ,what means #8to explain'8 8,to explain means simply to render clear that which is not clear or to reduce the unknown to the known1 the complex to the simple 7p4 #ajd74444 ,it is an indispensable presupposition of any natural science to consider nature as being capable of explanation 7erklrbar71 and this presupposition means that natural processes can be perfectly separated into most simple mechanical processes4 ,this presumption can be realised to-day only on the basis of the atom-conception4 ,it is accordingly not an experience1 but a postulate of natural science to derive the whole material world-process from the mechanism of atoms4 ,a description becomes an explanation in the measure in which it approaches this aim0 7p4 #aje74 ,the question is1 whether in psychology1 description can be supplanted by explanation1 whether laws can be stated instead of mere rules4 ,professor ,mnsterberg takes that ground in psychology which as it appears to us is the only tenable ground1 viz4 that feelings are not motions and cannot be explained as converted physical processes4 ,professor ,mnsterberg says3 8,a sensation1 a feeling1 a will can never fill even the very smallest space4 ,what is extended in space can never itself be a state of consciousness4 ,to the psychologist this distinction is now a matter of course1 so much so that it is difficult to call to one's mind how much trouble it cost to acquire this insight4 ,the object of psychology accordingly can never be an object in space1 it can never be a process of motion1 accordingly1 even brain-irritation can under no circumstances ever become the object of psychology0 7p4 #ig74 ,psychology has to investigate the psychical phenomena of the individual consciousness 7p4 #ajb71 it has to separate it into its elements1 i4 e4 those ingredients which are no longer divisible2 which being done1 psychology searches for the rules for the combinations of these psychical elements and shows us the different complex contents which are formed in this way by the elements up to that totality of single combinations which is given us as the contents of our spiritual personality 7p4 #ajc74 8,the question is1 7#a7 ,are there psychological processes in us1 the development of which presents itself with immediate certainty as necessary1 and 7#b7 can we reduce all the individual and with them all the spiritual phenomena to such spiritual processes recognised as necessary8 ,the first question can be affirmed1 although only in a limited sense1 and the second question must be unequivocally denied1 thus making an immediate explanation of psychical phenomena impossible0 7p4 #ajg74 ,the first question is to be affirmed in a limited sense1 because 8if certain premises are thought1 the conclusion1 it appears to us as a necessity1 can be thought thus and not otherwise0 7p4 #ajh74 ,but this is 8a logical and not a psychological necessity40 ,to actually think the conclusion depends upon the will to think it4 ,the will actually existing1 the logical necessity becomes a psychological1 for 8the connection between the willing and the willed 7zwischen ,willen und ,gewolltem7 always appears to us as necessary4444 ,where there is inner will there is an inner necessity40 ,now1 in order to make explanations in the physical world1 we supplement that which has been actually observed with not-observed connections4 ,but we cannot1 according to ,mnsterberg1 in an analogous way supplement in the world of psychical phenomena the conscious states with any other kind of states which are not conscious1 thus referring our spiritual life and acts of will to unconscious processes1 for 8the very nature of psychical states is consciousness1 i4 e4 a state of being conscious4 ,ihr ,sein ist das bewusst-sein4444 ,a state of consciousness1 says ,mnsterberg1 which is not conscious1 is comparable not to a body which is not perceived1 but to one which does not exist4 ,accordingly unconscious psychical phenomena do not exist4 ,all psychical phenomena are directly given and the reduction of their combinations in a certain way through hypothetical psychological supplements is once for all excluded0 7p4 #aaj74 ,we agree in all the main positions with ,professor ,mnsterberg1 but in the last mentioned point we disagree4 ,professor ,mnsterberg limits psychical states or feelings to states of consciousness without considering that there are subconscious and even unconscious feelings4 ,by consciousness we understand those feelings alone which are concentrated so as to be connected with the ego1 i4 e4 the present centre of consciousness4 ,we assume that even the spinal ganglions of the brainless frog are feeling if the skin is irritated1 but this feeling can never become conscious1 it can no more be telegraphed to the central station so as to become co-ordinated with other feelings which are registered in the brain4 ,the objection may be raised1 ,we do not know whether the ganglion is feeling2 and ,i should answer1 ,i call feeling anything that is of the same nature as the elements of which consciousness consists1 and we have all reasons to assume that there is such an elementary psychical accompaniment of the ganglionic irritations1 and that consciousness rises from many such elements through their co-ordinate combination in the brain4 ,isolated feelings are never conscious1 and consciousness is a co-operative system of feeling4 ,this distinction between consciousness and feeling is a mere matter of terminology4 ,if we find another terminology more practical we are willing to surrender ours4 ,yet such a distinction between consciousness and feeling seems to be necessary for a proper description of the psychical facts4 ,the assumption of subconscious states and even of unconscious feelings is a great help in explaining the phenomena of consciousness4 ,but unless we are grossly mistaken1 our disagreement is merely apparent1 for ,professor ,mnsterberg1 rejecting the idea of a psychological explanation1 believes in the parallelism of psychical and physical phenomena4 8,the physical acts0 7he says on p4 #abe7 8reducible to mechanical axioms can be explained through causation1 the psychical acts follow one another without inner necessity4 ,if we connect both1 we are enabled to transfer the necessity-connection of the physical upon the psychical and offer thus an explanation where otherwise description only was possible40 ,but in doing this1 have we not supplemented those psychical elements which appear as conscious states by other psychical elements which have not entered into that combination which makes them actually conscious8 ,it is an hypothetical addition for the sake of explanation1 a ,hilfsconstruction just as much as the supposition of the existence of atoms or electric currents or other physical phenomena which are not directly observed1 but indirectly in their effects only4 ,supplements are necessary for explanation wherever the immediate facts do not contain all the elements of a certain process4 ,if an observable phenomenon has not its conditions in observable facts we hypothetically assume unobservable facts as its causes4 ,but we may incidentally remark that description and explanation are not different in kind1 but in degree4 ,explanation is an exhaustive description set forth in its greatest possible simplicity4 ,an exhaustive description enumerates all the determinative factors of a process and it drops everything that is of no account1 so that information is imparted with the greatest economy as well as completeness4 ,an exhaustive description is a reliable guide to preascertain the outcome of a process1 and reveals in this way the identity in the change1 the continuity of the process and the conservation of matter and energy in their transformations1 or1 in other words1 it reveals the necessity of the result4 ,there is perhaps no natural science in which the processes can be exhaustively described without hypothetical supplements and so the science of psychology forms no exception to the general rule4 ,the aim of psychology in its wider sense will be 8to separate all the contents of consciousness into their elements1 to state their laws of combination1 and to seek in an empirical way for the diverse elementary psychical contents1 their correspondent physiological irritations1 in order to explain in this way mediately from the coexistence and succession of physiological irritations the purely psychological laws of combinations which as such are unexplainable0 7p4 #abg74 ,our objection to this view resembles much some of the objections which ,professor ,mnsterberg himself makes when speaking of the availability of the mathematical method so-called4 ,he says3 8,measuring and counting of psychological phenomena have been made repeatedly1 directly as well as indirectly1 and it has been proved that mathematics can be applied to psychology4444 ,nevertheless it would be a misuse of the word if we named these numerical descriptions an #8application of the mathematical method4' ,if an historian of literature counts the poems and dramas of authors1 if he also calculates how long it took them to write their literary products1 who would call his work a mathematical history of literature8 ,even astronomy would be no mathematical science if we counted only the stars in the sky40 ,if the aim of psychological explanation were as ,professor ,mnsterberg here asserts to be reached through the explanation of physiological states only1 we should say1 that the physiological method were alone admissible in psychology1 a principle to which our author rightly objects4 ,psychical states sometimes demand a physiological explanation1 and we cannot understand psychology without having a certain amount of physiological knowledge4 ,nevertheless1 the explanation of psychical states and the necessity of certain connections must be understood mainly from the psychical elements themselves4 ,psychical elements1 i4 e4 feelings1 as has been explained on other occasions1 have acquired and constantly do acquire meaning4 ,this meaning which appears in sensation-symbols and thought-symbols and which is different in the different forms of feeling 7correspondent to different forms of nervous action71 creates a new domain1--the domain of spirit1--and thus psychical states are changed into spiritual facts4 ,suppose for instance that a merchant receives his mail2 he opens a letter containing some important news which sets at once all his nerves into irritation1 makes him neglectful of all other things in order to attend with great haste to one special affair4 ,how can we explain this instance1 or any other spiritual act through a consideration of physiological conditions4 ,is it not the meaning alone which special sense-impressions convey that produces the extraordinary effects8 ,the physiologist would as little be able to detect this meaning through an analysis of the sense-impressions1 as an electrician would be to understand the import of a telegram when measuring the strength of the electric current in the telegraph wires4 ,the combinations of the purely psychical states may after all not be quite unexplainable1 while their physiological concomitants are in many cases insufficient to account for spiritual interconnections4 ,in discussing the methods of psychology ,professor ,mnsterberg rejects the speculative and the mathematical methods2 he claims a great importance 7and we agree with him7 for self-observation4 ,but self-observation is no easy task2 it requires a high degree of training4 8,he who does not understand botany cannot make observations of plant-life4 ,the same things which call into play certain associations in the botanist are also seen by the layman1 but they remain unobserved4 ,self-observation is in a similar way 444 not without its presuppositions2 it is dependent upon a rich store of ready associations0 7p4 #afd74 ,psychological investigations under natural conditions are classified by ,mnsterberg according to their objects1 as those of the normal man1 the child1 the savage1 the insane1 the animal1 etc4 ,in experimental psychology1 psychopetal1 psychofugal1 and psychocentral processes are distinguished4 ,for psycho-physiological investigations we have besides1 7#a7 the immediate experiment in the laboratory1 7#b7 the method of anatomy1 7#c7 of comparative anatomy1 7#d7 and of physiology4 ,professor ,mnsterberg concludes with an appeal to institute special professorships of psychology1 which is at present a mere branch of philosophy4 ,it takes all the energy of one man to keep abreast with the progress of psychological investigation4 8,no medical man1 no lawyer1 no theologian1 or educator should enter into practical life without having passed an examination in psychology 444 the growing generation of children1 the sick1 the criminal1 and the comfort-seeking souls of mankind have to suffer if teachers1 physicians1 judges1 and preachers are ignoramuses in the matter of human soul-life4444 ,but here also the gods have placed sweat before virtue40 4 ,,la ,,philosophie ,,du ,,si,,cle4 ,by ,e4 de ,roberty4 ,paris3 ,flix ,alcan4 ,the author of the present work1 which forms a volume of the ,library of ,contemporary ,philosophy1 is one of those disciples of the founder of ,french positivism who1 while following in his footsteps to a certain point1 do not hesitate to diverge from the beaten track when they think their leader has gone astray in his philosophic quest4 ,m4 de ,roberty speaks of ,comte with reverence as his first guide and his best master1 and he finds in the very contradictions of the ,master the germ of his own conception of the general trend of philosophic development4 ,the fundamental thesis of the present work is that the three contemporaneous philosophic systems1 those of ,criticism1 ,positivism1 and ,evolutionism1 are merely varieties of a single species1 as strictly parallel manifestations of a common stock of beliefs and general hypotheses4 ,the basic identity of the thought of this century is shown by the ever increasing convergence of the great leading ideas1 as exhibited in the prevailing theories of knowledge1 by the preponderance of relativism1 and of agnosticism4 ,it reveals itself1 especially in the similar conceptions formed by the most varied systems1 not only of the essential characters of philosophy1 its method1 and the ends it ought to pursue1 but also of the scientific laws which govern its evolution4 ,we cannot follow the author through his discussion of all these points and we must therefore restrict ourselves to the most salient features of his argument4 ,modern philosophy is represented by three principal schools3 ,criticism which originated with ,kant1 ,positivism founded by ,comte1 and ,evolutionism introduced by ,spencer4 ,these three systems had a common ancestry1 that of sensualism4 ,the critical philosophy is the legitimate heir of sensuous idealism1 and the positive philosophy the immediate descendant of sensuous materialism4 ,the evolution philosophy is itself rooted in sensualism1 but it is really a conciliator of the two great philosophies which preceded it1 ,criticism and ,positivism4 ,this conclusion1 which appears to us just1 is supported by various considerations to which reference here is not necessary4 ,m4 de ,roberty bears testimony to the influence of the philosophy of ,kant over the development of the evolutionist conception1 which could be applied to society only by giving an apparent universality to the mechanical hypothesis4 ,this was accomplished by ,spencer1 as it had been done to some extent by ,comte4 ,the popularity of the evolution philosophy is explained by the author as due to its admixture of agnosticism with a monism which captivates the masses 8by the audacious assertion that it has raised all veils and resolved all enigmas40 ,kant1 ,comte1 and ,spencer have equally seized this characteristic trait of the genius of our century4 ,they each treat1 says ,m4 de ,roberty1 of the most transcendent problems of metaphysics1 and place them carefully under the cover of the experimental method4 ,let us add that they are each different expressions of that genius1 which marks the progress of the mental evolution of mankind4 ,the second part of ,m4 de ,roberty's work deals in the first place with the conceptions of philosophy1 its nature and its end1 framed by the three great modern systems4 ,the confusion generally made between philosophy and science is first pointed out1 the evil of which arises from the fact that allowance is not made for the progress of scientific knowledge4 ,the author is strongly inclined to favor the idea of the general equivalence of science and philosophy1 in the sense that every effect is identified with its cause4 ,but as the effect is always modified with its cause1 neither the content not the general conception of philosophy can remain unchangeable4 ,philosophy becomes thus the co-ordination of the sciences in view of their general and abstract finality--by which is meant simply the last term of an evolution--a conception of the world4 ,in what do the conceptions of philosophy held by the criticist1 the positivist1 and the evolutionist1 differ from that formulated by ,m4 de ,roberty8 ,he affirms that they all entertain certain errors of method derived chiefly from ancient metaphysics4 ,the prototype is found in ,kant1 who says that philosophy is a system of universal acquirements formed of abstract notions1 and that it has for its aim the passage of our understanding from sensible to suprasensible knowledge4 ,the latter is the a priori1 the permanent and verifiable hypothesis1 for each of them4 ,it is the transcendental element which all modern philosophy has derived from the past1 and which forms the bond of alliance between faith and knowledge4 ,of the three postulates of ,spencer1 the universal hypothesis is in the first1 an ,unknowable ,force4 ,the other two belong to psychology1 proving that the ,english evolutionist1 like ,comte1 confounds science with philosophy1 which to him1 as to his predecessors1 is a simple theory of knowledge4 ,philosophy is a method which conducts to a conception of the world4 ,but1 says ,m4 de ,roberty1 modern philosophies fail in that they deal with hypotheses4 ,now1 although hypothesis is the soul of the special sciences1 for philosophy it must always be a purely mental recreation4 ,to render valid the universal hypothesis constructed by philosophers1 it would be necessary that the sum of the final truths of science should include the sum of the phenomena which constitute nature4 ,we cannot follow the author through his ingenious criticisms of ,spencer's great synthetic formula1 to which he devotes the twelfth chapter of the present work1 and which he characterises as the perfect type of the universal unverifiable hypothesis4 ,nor can we do more than give a passing glance at his views of the psychology of the three modern systems of philosophy4 ,he affirms that the metaphysical transformation by criticism of psychology into philosophy left hardly anything to the special science4 ,to positivism is due the conception of psychology as forming an integral part of biology1 which has led to the important psycho-physical experiments of the present day4 ,but the biological analysis of the individual should be followed by social analysis1 the study of mental manifestations in society1 in connection with which should be created a special concrete science to embrace the higher psychology1 as pointed out by the author in his work 8,la ,sociologie40 ,science1 art1 and industry are a projection into the external world of the thinking1 feeling1 acting subject1 and psychology ought also to be thus projected by fusion with biology1 or with biology and sociology1 which it is necessary to study if we would discover psychic laws4 ,in the chapter on the ,supremacy of ,science1 the author affirms that the philosophy which will result from the progress of psychology and sociology will present a striking contrast with all known metaphysical forms1 but it will always remain a world-conception1 and it will have to submit to the law of correlation which explains the character and destinies of its predecessor4 ,agnosticism1 which invites men to bend before the ,deus ignotus of all religions1 marks the fatal termination of ancient anthropomorphism1 influenced by a progressive knowledge1 and thus appears as the final integration of all theology4 ,it also represents1 however1 the condition of incognisance to which the opposite state will succeed when the cycle of abstract sciences is completed and a really scientific psychology formed4 ,then hypotheses as to universal causes will receive their psychological solution1 and it will remain for philosophy only to confront and co-ordinate them with the general results of other sciences4 ,having arrived at this point ,m4 de ,roberty formulates the conclusion that ,philosophy and ,science are terms which connote two principle species in the vast genus designated by the single term knowledge4 ,the most marked trait of future philosophy will be the distinction of these two species1 as their confusion was the most general character of the philosophy of the past4 ,philosophy and science will then be perfectly identified1 but the identity will be general and not specific4 ,thus philosophy will not be positive in the sense of ,comte1 it will never completely identify itself with science4 ,in his last chapter1 entitled 8,the ,intellectual ,series10 ,m4 de ,roberty continues his criticism of the views of ,comte as to the law of the evolution of philosophy4 ,he shows that1 so far from this being the most general law of intellectual evolution1 and therefore the supreme law of all social phenomena1 philosophy is only one of three intermediate terms1 the others being art and industry1 by the aid of which the evolution of scientific ideas acts on the ensemble of the social evolution4 ,the intellectual evolution is the direct consequence of the social fact1 but the social evolution is subject to the laws of intellectual evolution1 which embrace four great classes of conceptions1 answering to the four well recognised groups of facts known as science1 philosophy1 art1 and industry4 ,we have here the same series of special evolutions as those supposed by ,comte1 with the important change1 however1 marked by the inversion of the first two members of the series4 ,in this relation1 the author affirms that ,comte's law of the three states is false so far as concerns the evolution of the sciences1 and is of very secondary importance as regards the evolution of philosophy and the two succeeding evolutions4 ,the author concludes his work with a criticism intended to show that the principal defects of ,comte's system arise from the confusion previously insisted on in relation to the first terms of the intellectual series1 science and philosophy4 ,that confusion is exhibited in the statement that among the ancients philosophy was developed before science and art4 ,m4 de ,roberty1 moreover1 declares ,comte's theory that the industrial development is the point of departure of modern civilisation1 leads to a complete subversion of the logical and historical4 ,instead of the useful or the proper being1 as that theory would require1 the foundation of the good and this1 in its turn1 the germ of the true1 the true is the foundation of the beautiful1 and of the good and the useful4 ,but the true is more complex than supposed by ,comte4 ,it possesses at least two aspects1 science and philosophy1 which may be really distinguished1 although the line which separates them is yet undetermined4 ,we have given a summary of ,m4 de ,roberty's general argument1 instead of referring to particular propositions which may be open to criticism1 because his work appears to us a very valuable contribution towards the elucidation of the important question as to the position of philosophy in relation to science4 ,we shall look with much interest for the appearance of the author's two further works which he announces as supplementary to the present one4 ,that on ,agnosticism is already in the press4 ,the subject of the other work is ,monism1 which ,m4 de ,roberty characterises as 8the chimerical pursuit which has essayed1 through the ages1 to fix the so-called unity of things1 the extra or supralogical identity of phenomena40 ,this hypothetical monism of philosophy is dealt with incidentally in the present work4 ,the 8supralogical identity of phenomena0 is a different kind of monism from that of ,the ,monist4 4 ,,ueber ,,bewegungsempfindungen4 ,inaugural-,dissertation zur ,erlangung der ,doctorwrde vorgelegt der hohen philosophischen ,facultt der ,albert-,ludwigs-,universitt zu ,freiburg i4 ,b4 ,by ,edmund ,burke ,delabarre of ,massachusetts4 ,freiburg in ,baden3 ,hch4 ,epstein1 #ahia4 ,dr4 ,edmund ,burke ,delabarre introduces himself to the world of science with an excellent monograph on motion-sensations1 based upon careful observations which were made in ,professor ,mnsterberg's psychological laboratory at ,freiburg i4 ,b4 ,the subject of the dissertation is of great importance and there is much confusion prevalent at present even among the most prominent authorities4 ,it appears to us that ,dr4 ,delabarre has adopted the right view and he certainly defends it with great ability4 ,professor ,wundt rejects in his ,physiological ,psychology all the theory of the so-called 8muscle-sense0 and admits that there is some truth in the three explanations devised as an explanation of our consciousness of performed motions1 which thus would be a complex of 7#a7 pressure-sensations1 7#b7 specific muscle-sensations1 and 7#c7 innervation-sensations4 ,this third kind of sensations is of a very hypothetical nature4 ,the term signifies that1 when muscles are innervated we are supposed to have a direct sensation of the innervation in the central nerve-organs2 and this view is objected to by ,mnsterberg1 who says that 8a brain irritation which is not accompanied with centripetal effects or central after-effects of former muscular activity has its physiological consequences but excites no conscious states40 ,thus1 according to ,dr4 ,delabarre1 without the motion of the sense-organs1 i4 e4 muscular activity1 there is no consciousness2 all consciousness derives its data from the periphery4 ,dr4 ,delabarre goes over the whole field of the literature of the subject and weighs all pros and cons4 ,he finds that all cases are intelligible without the supposition of central innervation-sensations4 ,he admits that the term muscle-sense is vague1 but he believes that the term having been generally introduced may be retained4 ,he defines it as that complex of sensations which results from muscular activity4 ,the second part of the dissertation contains the reports of the experiments1 describing the instruments used and the methods employed4 ,we are informed that ,dr4 ,delabarre has been appointed to the chair of psychology in ,brown ,university4 4 ,,le ,,nihilisme ,,scientifique4 ,i4 ,dialogue entre le ,doctor ,oudn et ,l',etudiant ,ti son ,neveu4 ,rapport par ,p4 ,van ,bemmelen4 ,leide3 ,e4 ,j4 ,brill1 #ahia4 ,dr4 ,oudn's nephew thus summarises the scientific1 or rather 8philosophic0 views of his uncle3 8,there is no ,god1 but there is the world4 ,in this world there are neither souls1 nor mind1 nor life2 there is only matter and its elementary forces4 ,nevertheless these forces do not exist2 there is only movement1 the sole function of matter1 which is inert4 ,in its turn1 matter has no reality2 it is composed of geometrical points which are susceptible of movement4 ,but as there is neither time nor space1 there is no movement40 ,nothingness is thus reached1 but beyond is illusion1 the maja of the ,hindoos1 which explains all our conceptions of nature including that of our own being4 ,this scientific maja is not the semblance of a real world1 but that of a world which does not exist1 so that illusion and nothingness are the same thing4 ,from which it follows that there is no illusion and no mind to be deceived6 ,mr4 ,van ,bemmelen's opuscule is an ingenious jeu d'esprit1 evidently intended to exhibit a certain phase of speculation as a reductio ad absurdum4 4 ,,diritto ,,sociale ,,tentativo ,,in ,,bozza4 ,dell',avv4 ,pietro ,pellegrini4 ,borga a ,mozzano4 #ahia4 ,there is no denying the activity of the statesmen and scholars of modern ,italy in the cause of radical1 social reconstruction and1 as remarked by a recent traveller in ,italy1 in the 8building up again a ,commonwealth1 founded on high principles of right and equality40 8,diritto ,sociale10 in ,italian jurisprudence1 of course1 relates to municipal and positive law1 in its social-economical and social-political aspects4 ,but1 in a country with the municipal and political traditions of ,italy1 this 8,diritto ,sociale10 even in modern times1 exhibits a tendency to crystallise into a kind of concrete1 social religion4 ,the ,avvocato ,signor ,pietro ,pellegrini1 the learned author of this book1 appears to feel deeply concerning the present condition of this branch of jurisprudence in ,italy4 ,in his preface the author says1 that during the present century legal science has not made any very substantial progress2 that the revolution of the last century1 while asserting the famous rights of man1 forgot the rights of juridic persons1 of corporations1 and law became an individualista--or1 individualiser4 ,on the strength of his juridic personality man thereupon engaged in a struggle for his rights on the vast social field1 but he found himself alone--an individual and nothing more4 ,as such1 he could not form a juridic1 social organism1 but he merely sought to adapt himself to an actual1 external juridic organisation1 differing but slightly from old-time despotism4 ,on this basis the ,state still continues to create municipal and positive laws1 more or less adapts them to the facts of reality1 arbitrarily creating juridic persons and administrative bodies1 such as the mandamenti1 circondarii1 provincie of the modern ,italian kingdom--all of which are only hybrid administrative entia1 that do not in the least satisfy a number of local public needs2 and therefore1 there is no harmony between individual men and the juridic persons1 between the public administrative entia and the ,state1 and there is bloody war among the ,states themselves4 ,the ultimate cause of all this conflict is to be ascribed to the individualism of the law1 in not recognising organic1 juridic relations2 and this1 moreover1 necessarily called forth the reaction of an exaggerated socialism4444 ,person has a much wider significance than individual2 person cannot be isolated1 individual1 because1 juridically1 person implies an exchange of relations with others2 hence1 juridic persons ought to enjoy a greater legal authority than they actually enjoy in our modern jurisprudence4 ,the plasma sociale1 or the original social mould1 is developed by degrees into a vital1 practically real1 organism1 endowed with a physical body1 that needs the material means of nutrition1 in order to live1 to preserve1 and develop itself4 ,these1 however1 do not exist2 because nature furnishes only sufficient means to preserve man in a purely savage1 animal condition4 ,but1 at least1 there exist the sources1 or fountain-heads1 from which it is possible to derive the desired nutritive materials2 on condition of molding or transforming those fountain-heads1 and of assuming their efficacious1 practical direction4 ,in the individualised or individual system there takes place a struggle among the individuals for the possession of that nourishment1 in which case1 however1 the sources themselves are appropriated rather than the nutritive materials they contain4 ,such is the exclusive nature of the social means of nutrition1 present and future1 through which a large number of individuals will be at the mercy of a few1 while the notorious 8rights of man10 remain powerless4444 ,the rights emanating from the organic concept of personality1 together with the physico-economical laws of the fountain-heads of social nourishment1 spontaneously furnish the equitable distribution of the nutritive materials to each organic member1 so that there is no monopolising of those natural fountain-heads1 but a normal nutrition of all the organs1 according to their needs1 and their actual capacity as juridically displayed4444 ,those fountain-heads1 besides being limited1 are scattered through space1 because it is impossible to unite or concentrate them on any particular point of the globe4 ,hence this plasma sociale or social mold is distributed through space according to imperative laws1 that result from the combined capacities of the respective juridic1 that is1 social persons1 with the capacities of the respective sources of social nourishment--of different municipal organisations1 of cities1 townships1 and villages4 ,all these are pre-eminently juridic and social persons1 each one possessing its peculiar functions1 that cannot be exercised by other persons4 ,the present work contains a lengthy but valuable introduction in four chapters1 discussing the general concept of law2 and thereupon the book is divided into three parts1 in which are explained the principles and development of positive law in its respectively civil-social1 social-economical1 and social-political aspects4 ,this work1 throughout1 presents a number of equally important and novel points of view1 through which the author's concept of an organic municipal and social law everywhere becomes the surest means of creating unity and harmony1 not only within the general department of law1 but also within the sphere of practical legislation4 4 ,,an ,,outline ,,of ,,locke',s ,,ethical ,,philosophy4 ,by ,mattoon ,monroe ,curtis1 ,m4 ,a4 ,leipsic3 ,gustav ,fock1 #ahij4 ,this excellent study was presented to the ,university of ,leipsic as the ,inaugural ,dissertation for the degree of ,doctor of ,philosophy1 and it is well deserving of publication1 if for no other reason than the need of such a work4 ,there appears to have been hitherto no complete account of ,locke's ,system of ,ethics1 which does not even find a place in ,mackintosh's 8,dissertation on ,ethical ,philosophy40 ,the author has not been able to discover any trace of the treatise on ,ethics which ,locke proposed to write1 but his published works 8abound in ethical observation and severally took their rise from ethical considerations10 so that there is no deficiency of materials from which to ascertain his ideas on that subject4 ,mr4 ,curtis very justly remarks that it is important to ascertain an author's views before criticising them1 a truism which is not always acted on1 as indeed was the case with ,locke's own critics4 ,he does not1 however1 profess to criticise but1 as the title of his work shows1 to give an outline of ,locke's ,ethical ,philosophy4 ,in his ,preface he states that his author adopted the ,stoic division of ,philosophy into ,physics1 ,ethics1 and ,logic4 ,the object of ,ethics1 is described by ,locke1 in his noted 8,essay10 as the seeking out of those rules and measures of human actions1 which lead to happiness1 and the means to practice them4 ,the end of this1 is not bare speculation1 and the knowledge of truth2 but right1 and a conduct suitable to it4 ,in the application of its principles ,locke may be said to have gone further than any of his predecessors and of most of his successors4 ,as pointed out by ,mr4 ,curtis1 he maintains that the institutions of government1 religion1 and education are1 in essence1 ethical and that all are parts of a system which must be based upon1 and be in harmony with1 the fundamental physiological and psychological principles of human nature4 ,this follows from ,locke's principle that the ,individual1 and not the ,family1 is the real social unit4 ,man is a rational1 social1 religious1 and political being1 and1 therefore1 8in the individual is contained1 potentially1 all institutionalism40 ,it must be noticed1 however1 that to ,locke the moral dynamic in human society is the concept of ,god4 ,he regards this idea 8as a natural1 formal1 necessary and transcendental principle at the root of human nature and institutions1 and consistently declares that the denial of it dissolves all10 as it alone gives a sufficient explanation and sanction to the principles of morality4 ,this brings us to the very foundation of ethics4 ,all depends1 however1 on our conception of ,god4 ,locke maintained that duty 8cannot be understood without a law1 nor a law be known or supposed without a law giver1 or without reward or punishment40 ,his conception of ,god1 therefore1 was that of a law-giver1 and he believed that the existence of ,god could be demonstrated not only by teleological argument1 but also by psychological proof drawn from the being and nature of man4 ,locke was so thoroughly convinced of the dependence of morality on the existence of ,god1 that1 notwithstanding his general liberality of thought1 he excluded atheists from toleration4 ,he writes3 8,promises and ,covenants1 and ,oaths1 which are the bonds of human society1 can have no hold upon an ,atheist40 ,it would be a mistake to suppose that1 because ,locke believed morality to be founded in our conception of ,god1 he considered the moral law referable simply to the divine will1 and therefore to be arbitrary and changeable4 ,so far from this1 he regarded the moral law as eternal and immutable1 and affirmed that its cardinal principles could be discovered and laid hold of by the light of nature4 ,as says ,pfleiderer1 when speaking of ,locke and ,wolff1 8,locke also considers a supernatural revelation to be possible1 and to have actually taken place in ,christianity1 but he insists as strongly as ,wolff does1 and even more logically1 that this revelation must not in any way contradict the natural revelation given us by ,god in our reason40 ,locke expressly declares1 that the reason is natural revelation1 while revelation is natural reason enlarged4 ,the latter he regarded as necessary because1 although reason is sufficient for the virtuous1 penalties must be relied upon for influencing the multitude2 and in revelation the doctrine of immortality with future rewards and punishments is made known4 ,whether this revelation is true or false1 the fear of future punishment has undoubtedly had a restraining influence over the vicious4 ,but reason would not be sufficient for the virtuous without an inclination natural or acquired1 to virtue4 ,it is a question of disposition1 and this will be virtuous or vicious1 according to the conditions under which the individual has come into being and been 8educated10 in the fullest sense of this term4 ,reason forms part of these conditions which1 so far as they are not purely objective1 are dependent on or referable to human nature2 as1 indeed1 must be the supposed revelation of enlarged natural reason4 ,in relation to the ethical life1 ,locke declares that happiness is the only idea which reason takes up out of the sphere of pleasure and pain1 and yet that if we aim directly at happiness1 we shall miss it4 ,what then has to be done is to seek out 8the rules and measures of human actions which lead to happiness40 ,this is the office of ethics1 the end of which is virtue1 and thus happiness and virtue are one4 ,with ,locke moral actions are only those that depend 8upon the choice of an understanding and free agent40 ,the agent here intended is1 as pointed out by ,mr4 ,curtis1 the man1 and not the will4 ,locke says that the proper question in connection with freedom1 is not 8whether the will be free1 but whether the man be free40 ,the will is determined by the mind1 and liberty is 8a power to act1 or not to act1 according as the mind directs40 ,in his 8,thoughts concerning ,education0 ,locke affirms that 8the result of our judgment1 upon examination1 is what ultimately determines the man1 who could not be free1 if his will were determined by anything but his own desire1 guided by his own judgment40 ,the position of ,locke is1 says the author1 that of ,plato and ,kant3 ,reason is given as the governor of the will1 by its sway to constitute it good4 ,thence we may rightly conclude1 that those who are not governed by reason have not true freedom4 ,we have not space to consider the views entertained by ,locke on ,institutional ,ethics1 beyond referring to his doctrine that property rights are given only by labor1 and not by occupation1 and that labor is the source of all values4 ,the latter doctrine cannot now be accepted as sound1 whatever may be said as to the former1 but ,locke deservedly holds a high place as a political economist4 ,he seems indeed to have been a kind of universal genius4 ,mr4 ,curtis refers to the remark made of him 8that no philosopher since ,aristotle has made and recorded so many valuable observations1 or given so great a stimulus to human thought40 ,any fresh light that can be thrown on the opinions entertained by so profound a thinker1 especially on the important question of ethics1 is of value and hence we welcome the present work as an acceptable addition to philosophic literature4 4 99 99 99 99 99 ,n4 ,b4--,owing to lack of space1 reviews of a number of new works have been crowded out of the present number of ,the ,monist2 among which the following will appear in ,no4 #c3 ,die ,entwickelung des ,causalproblems in der ,philosophie seit ,kant1 by ,dr4 ,edmund ,koenig2 ,spinoza's ,erkenntnisslehre in ihrer ,beziehung sur modernen ,naturwissenschaft und ,philosophie1 by ,dr4 ,martin ,berendt and ,dr4 ,julius ,friedlnder2 ,leitfaden der physiologischen ,psychologie1 by ,dr4 ,th4 ,ziehen2 ,handbook of ,psychology1 by ,j4 ,m4 ,baldwin2 ,an ,essay on ,reasoning1 by ,edward ,t4 ,dixon2 ,das ,dasein als ,lust1 ,leid und ,liebe1 by ,hbbe-,schleiden2 ,die ,bedeutung der theologischen ,vorstellungen fr die ,ethik1 by ,wilhelm ,paszkowski2 and ,einleitung in das ,alte ,testament1 by ,prof4 ,c4 ,h4 ,cornill4 ,,footnotes3 #ea ,a companion work on the ,old ,testament has been written by ,professor ,cornill4 ,we shall review it in our next number4 ,,periodicals4 ,,voprosui ,,filosofii ,i ,,psichologii4#eb ,vol4 ,,ii4 ,no4 #f4 ,september1 #ahia4 ,,contents3 ,,positive ,,philosophy ,,and ,,the ,,unity ,,of ,,science4 ,by ,b4 ,tchitcherin4 ,,philosophy ,,of ,,the ,,christian ,,theocracy ,,in ,,the ,,fifth ,,century4 ,the ,cosmic ,views of ,st4 ,augustine in his ,genesis4 ,by ,prince ,e4 ,trubetzkoi4 ,,ethics ,,of ,,life ,,and ,,of ,,the ,,free ,,ideal 7conclusion74 ,by ,k4 ,n4 ,ventzel4 ,,opinions ,,concerning ,l4 ,n4 ,,tolsto4 ,by ,n4 ,strachoff4 ,,from ,,the ,,philosophy ,,of ,,history4 ,by ,vladimir ,solovieff4 ,,special ,,part3 7#a7 ,fundamental ,moments in the ,evolution of the ,new ,philosophy4 ,metaphysical ,philosophy3 ,descartes and ,occasionalists4 ,by ,n4 ,grote4 7#b7 ,measurableness of the ,simplest ,mental ,acts4 ,by ,e4 ,tchelpanoff4 ,,criticism ,,and ,,bibliography4 ,review of ,philosophical ,periodicals4 ,book ,reviews4 ,,appendix3 #a7 ,recent ,publications4 #b7 ,transactions of the ,moscow ,psychological ,society4 ,positive ,philosophy and the ,unity of ,science4 ,this article is made up of extracts from a lengthy competitory dissertation presented by the author to the ,moscow ,psychological ,society4 ,the writer points out the fallacy of the 8fundamental law0 of the ,comtist philosophy--the supposed gradual evolution of human thought through three successive phases1--the theological1 metaphysical1 and positive stage of development4 ,the writer contends1 that the so-called 8positive stage10 as conceived by ,comte1 is really neither positive1 nor even scientific1 if we examine its main foundations4 ,as all the world knows1 ,comte was not satisfied with the results of the particular sciences1 but wished to effect their comprehensive unity4 ,the writer lays stress on the fact that ,comte failed to perceive the inward contradiction of his whole system4 ,his followers1 in order to overcome this difficulty1 were compelled to advance still another step4 ,despite the teaching of ,comte1 they recognised in mathematics the whole of a science that derived its principles from experience4 ,this is shown by ,littr in his criticism of the system of ,comte 7,aug4 ,comte et la ,philosophie positive1 page #efg71 where ,littr refers himself to the analysis of ,stuart ,mill in his ,logic4 ,the author1 in order to reach a definite and satisfactory solution of this important problem1 in his next1 concluding article1 will investigate the nature and alleged solidity of the mathematical principle4 ,the ,philosophy of the ,christian ,clergy in the ,fifth ,century4 ,in analysing the whole literary activity of ,st4 ,augustine1 we observe1 in the evolution of his doctrine1 three stages1 that closely correspond to his own personal struggle against the three heresies of his time--,manicheism1 ,donatism1 and ,pelagianism4 ,yet all of these three stages are characterised by one and the same principle--the ideal unity of the ,christian churches4 ,this ideal aspiration reveals itself as a kind of constructive principle of the universe2 as the supreme principle of a social organisation of humanity1 as the substance and contents of subjective1 human freedom4 ,the ,bishop of ,hippona1--after thus having developed the several aspects of his doctrine against the heresies1--sums up1 and concentrates his teaching1 in its widest bearings1 against the heathen4 ,here this ,christian ideal attains its fullest and final expression1 and is formulated as a ,civitas ,dei1 as the unity of a universal1 divine ,sovereignty4 ,ethics of ,life and of the ,free ,ideal4 ,in concluding his exhaustive reflections on the subject of ,guyau's system of ethics1 in which the writer frequently has occasion to cite the critical parallel views of ,a4 ,fouill and of other ,english and ,russian philosophers1 ,mr4 ,ventzel remarks1 that his aim has been1 not only to introduce ,m4 ,guyau's system of ethics to his ,russian readers1 but also and mainly to show the relations of this system of ethics to moral obligation4 ,the writer wishes to say in conclusion a few words about ,guyau's relation to ethical sanction4 ,guyau rejected any moral sanction1 in the strict sense of the word1 that was distinguished or detached from social sanctions1 as such4 ,in this sense he conceives moral sanction and moral obligation in his ,ethics of ,life1 in his ,equisse d'une ,morale4 ,if life1 of itself1 creates an obligation to work1 simply1 on the strength of our capacity to work1 in such case life also will create its own ethical sanction4 ,even when generously giving itself away1 life will without fail1 again and again1 find itself4 ,no matter how it be cut short1 life will preserve a vivid consciousness of its fulness and significance and will reappear in some other place and under other conditions2 for1 truly1 nothing in this world lives and works in vain4 ,opinions ,concerning ,leon ,n4 ,tolsto4 ,mr4 ,strachoff's psychological study would doubtless possess an additional interest to western readers if the writer had really given an exclusively ,russian estimate of ,tolsto's character and intellectual activity4 ,in this respect1 however1 we must not expect to find any very marked deviation from the well-known current views of the reading public of other nations4 8,the main cause10 ,mr4 ,strachoff observes1 8why people are incensed against ,tolsto1 is to be found in the fact1 that1 of all men1 ,tolsto has most widely deviated from universally received ethical notions1 and that he antagonises his century1 even in certain delicate problems1 that will always be the dearest to mankind4 ,you cannot help feeling this1 when you listen to the clamour1 reproach1 and vituperation1 that have been raised against him throughout the civilised world4 ,for the rest1 it seems rather odd1 that1 at the close of the nineteenth century1 there should have risen such a number of deadly foes against an inoffensive writer and thinker like ,tolsto2 and yet1 long ago1 we had been accustomed to the intemperate utterances of a host of enraged freethinkers1 whom we have endured with patience and meekness4 ,why1 accordingly1 have we all of a sudden lost our patient tolerance1 and why are we almost ready to start a systematic persecution against the thoughts and words of a book like the ,vasnaya ,polyana 7,clear ,field78444 ,it must be admitted1 that there is a certain originality in his writings4 ,every line possesses a freshness and novelty that are entirely his own2 and yet his language is tame1 and the subjects even more common than in other writers4 ,he frequently describes the birth and death of very plain people4 ,he tells us how these same people amuse themselves1 eat1 drink1 and dance on feast-days1 cut the hay1 go to church1 to confession1 and so forth4 ,occasionally he tells how a jealous husband kills his wife1--a fact1 that has been told in so many other literatures4 ,but in anything he relates1 he has the art of throwing a strong1 clear light upon his subject1 so that it seems to us1 as if those time-worn scenes were seen and heard for the first time4 ,in this consists the real originality of ,tolsto's art4 ,and he is the same in his ethical teachings4 ,they strike us by their directness1 vigor1 sincerity2 and for this very reason they powerfully arouse our love and our yearning for those deep1 spiritual cravings that invite man to lead a higher life--8to live a god-like life40 ,here also1 at times1 it appears to us1 that we hear about those lofty aspirations for the first time2 but when you pay close attention1 you will find that his doctrine is really based on the ethics of the past1 and you meet with traits of that self-same ,christian doctrine with which you have been familiar from early childhood40 ,from the ,philosophy of ,history4 ,mr4 ,solovieff1 this time also1 has chosen a title that scarcely conveys a definite idea of the aim and contents of his article1 which describes the specific relations of the ,christian idea to the historical evolution and political ideal of the nations of antiquity4 7,moscow1 #ahia7 4 ,,mind4 ,october1 #ahia4 ,no4 ,,lxiv4 ,,contents3 ,,belief4 ,by ,g4 ,f4 ,stout4 ,,the ,,physical ,,basis ,,of ,,pleasure ,,and ,,pain4 7,,ii47 ,by ,h4 ,r4 ,marshall4 ,,the ,,festal ,,origin ,,of ,,human ,,speech4 ,by ,j4 ,donovan4 ,,induction ,,and ,,deduction4 ,by ,l4 ,t4 ,hobhouse4 ,,discussion3 7#a7 ,dr4 ,mnsterberg and ,experimental ,psychology4 ,by ,e4 ,b4 ,titchener4 7#b7 ,on the ,origin of ,music4 ,by ,h4 ,spencer4 ,,valedictory4 ,under 8,belief0 ,mr4 ,stout includes every mode and degree of assent or dissent4 ,to disbelieve a proposition is to believe its contradictory4 ,doubt is belief in a disjunctive judgment4 ,in a former article he dealt with the 8,genesis of the ,cognition of ,physical ,reality40 ,he now treats of the various kinds of real existence2 as follows4 ,the ,real in ,sensation4 ,the real as immediately apprehended in sensation must not be confounded with the percipient mind4 ,sensation as such is real in so far as it limits and controls the movement of attention1 by restricting the range of subjective selection4 ,the ,real in ,judgments of ,comparison4 ,in and through the peculiar movement of attention in endeavoring to keep it fixed on ,a in the very act of fixing it on ,b1 the points of agreement and difference between ,a and ,b gradually emerge into clear consciousness4 ,objective ,attributes of ,presentation4 ,dr4 ,pikler's theory of the psychology of ,objective ,existence fails to distinguish between the phenomena which are merely observed by voluntary attention and those which are actually produced by it4 ,the act of introspection modifies more or less the mental processes which it examines4 ,their pre-existing strength and mode of operation can be ascertained only by elimination of the peculiar reinforcement or enfeeblement which they acquire by emergence into distinct consciousness4 ,the ,objectivity of ,space and ,spatial ,relations4 ,although we can produce change of place by moving our bodies1 according to our will1 this freedom of selective selection has rigid limits imposed on it by the very nature of space4 ,this control imposed on our freedom by the nature of the object constitutes its objectivity4 ,the constant possibility of transition from one position to another is apprehended as inherent in the very nature of space independently of our will4 ,whenever ,i distinctly attend to the nature of a spatial limit1 ,i must of necessity admit that space is boundless4 ,what has been said about the objectivity of space in general applies mutatis mutandis to the objectivity of space-relations as treated by the geometrician4 ,the psychological conditions of my subjective certitude lie ultimately in the impassable barriers1 arising from the very nature of space1 which confine the freedom of my constructive movement4 ,reality in the ,association of ,ideas4 ,association is a cause of belief4 ,if certain contents of consciousness have once been copresented in a certain relation to each other1 the reproduction of the one tends to bring about the reproduction of the other in the same relation in which they were originally copresented4 ,a comparatively feeble association may command belief merely from the absence of counter-associations4 ,this is the basis of ,bain's doctrine of primitive credulity4 ,subconscious ,conditions of ,belief4 ,the presentations which successively emerge into the forms of consciousness are only fragmentary portions of the total mental system4 ,many1 if not most1 of our beliefs depend on the operation of subconscious elements which1 in massive combination1 co-operate to support a certain connection of ideas which appears in consciousness as an object of attention4 ,but such massive support may arise from the connexion of the belief with practical interests or sthetic enjoyments1 or with some powerful organic sensation4 ,apperception and ,belief4 ,ideal combinations may be separable or inseparable according as this or that apperceptive system happens to be predominant4 ,this is best seen in its pathological exaggeration in the case of suggestible patients4 ,under normal conditions the necessary alternation of different apperceptive masses produces a corresponding variation in the conditions of belief4 ,the ,real in the ,products of ,constructive ,imagination4 ,the work of imagination either imposes an illusion on the mind1 or it does not4 ,in both cases there is a certain reference to reality4 ,illusion is a temporary and often more or less imperfect belief in the product of constructive imagination2 a belief which can be indirectly produced or dissipated at will4 ,the ,real as ,physical ,resistance4 ,in the experience of the irregular interruption of otherwise continuous series of muscular sensation1 which1 apart from this restriction1 are producible at will1 we apprehend real existence4 ,the reality1 however together with that of sensation as such1 being communicated to the interpretations which we are constrained to put both upon sensations and their order1 gives rise by a very complex process to the presentation of a physical world4 ,conclusion4 ,the law of conflict is the psychological counterpart of the logical law of contradiction4 ,in the present paper ,mr4 ,marshall examines in detail his thesis that ,pleasure and ,pain are determined by the relations between the amount of activity in1 and the nutritive conditions of the organ which determines the conscious content 7,mind ,no4 #fc74 ,he states the psychological conditions for ,pleasure to be3 8,a content which appears normally at regular intervals will tend to be indifferent4 ,if it appear with hypernormal intensity or frequency suddenly in the course of the normal regularity1 it will for a relatively short time appear as pleasurable1 but this pleasurableness will soon fall away into indifference40 ,the psychological condition of ,pain is said to be3 8,if a content which has already often appeared in consciousness appear with unusual frequency or exceptional intensity1 it will ordinarily be accompanied at first by pleasure1 which usually will wane until the content appears indifferent4 ,if the hypernormal stimulus continue 7except as after described7 the content will become painful1 and this pain will increase in amount1 and having reached a maximum will decrease gradually until it disappears1 but in general with it will also gradually disappear the content itself1 not to reappear in consciousness for a considerable time1 if ever4 ,in some cases1 however1 if the content be not over intense1 we may look for a gradual decrease of the pain felt at the beginning until a condition of indifference is reached40 ,time is an essential factor in the process of organic repair4 ,for each organ there will be a certain time after action has ceased at which recurrent activity will be most effective4 ,here we have the physical basis of the gratifications obtained through rhythms4 ,there is also a relation of rhythm to pain4 ,the throbbing of acute pain1 so far as it is not directly traceable to pressures of blood-supply1 is probably indirectly traceable to the rhythm of blood-supply4 ,turning to ,psychology proper1 the laws of ,pleasure-,pain may be stated in terms of ,attention4 ,pleasure1 as involving the use of stored force1 implies a continuance of activity in the organ of pleasurable content1 and therefore a tendency to continuance of ,attention upon that content4 ,pain1 on the other hand1 implies a tendency to cessation of activity in the organ of the painful content1 and therefore the disappearance of the content4 ,the notion that pleasure is mere absence of pain is denied by this theory1 which accounts for the connexion1 in a broad way1 between ,pleasure and ,pain and activities respectively advantageous and disadvantageous4 ,in relation to ,ethics this theory teaches that the act of will1 per se1 is pleasurable as the outcome of the conditions of opposition which are anterior to the will-act4 ,further1 action in the direction of the greatest desire is the most pleasant action4 ,but this does not show that the effect of habit may not be such as to lead to action against the strongest desire and away from the greatest pleasure4 ,further1 the object of desire1 whilst it may be1 is not necessarily the attainment of pleasure4 ,a scrutiny of the psychological aspect of musical pleasure1 says ,mr4 ,donovan1 will lead to the conviction that its origin required simpler psychological machinery than the origin of speech1 which was possible only through the aid of that machinery4 ,the ear is superior to the eye in respect of their relative contributions toward making up our mental life and activity4 ,the superiority of the ear rests on its functional passivity4 ,this allowed auditory impressions to force themselves into consciousness in season and out of season4 ,the facts of history and ethnology which may be given a new aspect when regarded in the light of the analysis of music cover a very wide field1 beginning with the first and rudest vestiges of communal sympathy and tribal glorification1 and extending up to the national song or epic4 ,it is peculiar to man to give expression to communal interest in a way which has nothing to do with life-caring instincts4 ,that interest finds its first and rudest expression in bodily play-excitement3 7#a7 bodily play-movements in imitation of actions1 7#b7 rhythmic beating1 7#c7 some approach to song1 and 7#d7 some degree of communal interest1 display themselves as the most constant elements of all festal celebrations4 ,if we start from the generally-accepted explanations of play-movements in animals1 and grasp the ultimate reason why play-excitement became infused with the communal spirit1 there will be no difficulty in tracing evidence of this spirit even where they are most hidden by accompanying habits4 ,success in a common enterprise tends to preserve it4 ,the natural modes of expression of the communal elation follow1 i4 e4 the bodily play-movements in imitation of the successful actions and the rhythmic beating4 ,these movements give to consciousness preservative elements of sensation4 ,every step of tonal development was made in order to prove the effectiveness of the elements of sensation which could preserve the content of consciousness springing out of play-excitement and communal elation4 ,the attention-drawing power a musical tone possessed was enhanced by the conditions of its production which ensured repetition in a persistent temporal succession4 ,animals' excited cries were both before and after the stimulating rhythmic beating--produced tones4 ,the same excitement which impelled to these cries also impelled to rhythmic beating1 and thus produced a persistent auditory model for the cries4 ,the philologist says that roots are elements of words which analysis can reduce no further4 ,the psychologist can trace them back to the musical tones which became reproductive agents of the vague presentative elements of actions as they had been repeatedly held together in consciousness by the psychological machinery of nascent musical pleasure4 ,in a previous article 7,mind1 ,no4 #fb7 ,mr4 ,hobhouse aimed at proving that all reasoning involved generalisation from observed facts1 and that all such generalisation could be shown to proceed on a definite principle4 ,there are two main ways in which ,induction and ,deduction may be distinguished4 ,first we may distinguish the assertion of a universal from its application4 ,the application of a universal to a particular case is represented by the syllogism in which the major is a general judgment and the minor a particular judgment of perception4 ,when two judgments are compared they are found to be 7#a7 ,tautologous--the same assertion of the same fact4 7#b7 ,different statements of the same fact4 7#c7 ,assertions of different facts4 ,a judgment expresses a relation between two terms1 and hence two judgments may be said to assert the same fact when they assert the same relation between the same terms4 ,but if either of the terms or the relation differs1 then they assert different facts4 ,generalisation involves a universal principle connecting different facts4 ,syllogism does not4 ,syllogism appears as simply the opposite side of generalisation4 ,in the latter we assert a universal for the first time1 in the former we apply a universal already asserted4 ,but in both we are dealing with the same relation of universal and particular4 ,whether we assert or apply our universal1 the same ultimate logical fact1 expressed in the axiom of ,induction1 is at the bottom of the process4 ,but a different distinction may be drawn between ,induction and ,deduction4 ,the whole process of bringing particular facts under universals by observation of similar particulars may be called ,induction1 while the combination of several universals in a chain of reasoning is called ,deduction4 ,in the first1 ,generalisation1 we assert a universal on the ground of a particular1 or a particular on the ground of a similar particular4 ,in the second1 ,construction1 we assert a relation between two universals on the ground of the relation of each to one or more intermediate relations4 ,construction involves generalisation at every step1 and is a true reasoning process4 ,the nature of the generalisation may be shown by the typical ,deductive axiom4 ,if1 where two terms are in any way related to a third1 a relation between the two is observed1 then when any other two terms are similarly related to any third1 the relation between these two will be similar to that observed between the first two4 ,the simplest construction on which others rest is that of two relations to the same type1 and this axiom applies to relations so understood4 ,the axioms postulated by ,reasoning lay down the conditions under which facts not presented may be known to exist1 and they are thus distinguished from those principles called the 8,laws of ,thought40 ,mr4 ,titchener severely criticises ,dr4 ,mnsterberg's experimental psychology1 pointing out various errors1 and concludes that 8whether the theories of the ,beitrge stand or fall1 their experimental foundation has very little positive worth40 ,in reply to the criticisms in ,mind1 ,no4 #fc1 ,mr4 ,h4 ,spencer points out that ,dr4 ,wallaschek has overlooked a passage in which the former recognises rhythm as an essential component of music4 ,he does not coincide with ,dr4 ,wallaschek's view1 however1 since it regards music as acquiring its essential character by a trait which it has in common with other things1 instead of by a trait which it has apart from other thing4 ,it is from the emotional element of speech that music is evolved--not from its intellectual element4 ,after referring to the fact that harmony1 as ordinarily understood and as spoken of by him1 is concerned with the fundamental tones and ignores the overtones1 ,mr4 ,spencer states that he cannot accept ,prof4 ,cattell's view that harmony has been developed from melody4 ,to establish the evolution of the one from the other1 there must be found some identifiable transitions between the combinations of tones constituting timbre1 which do not constitute harmony to our perception1 and those combinations of tones which do constitute harmony to our perception4 ,in his ,valedictory on retiring from the ,editorship of ,mind1 ,professor ,robertson refers to the establishment of the ,review in #ahgf1 on the initiative of ,professor ,bain1 by whom it has since been sustained1 and he mentions that most of the experimental research has been contributed by the ,american hands 8that have been or are now organising psychological laboratories over all the breadth of their own land40 7,london3 ,williams and ,norgate47 4 ,,international ,,journal ,,of ,,ethics4 ,october1 #ahia4 ,vol4 ,,ii4 ,no4 ,i4 ,,contents3 ,,the ,,unity ,,of ,,the ,,ethics ,,of ,,ancient ,,greece4 ,by ,prof4 ,leopold ,schmidt4 ,,the ,,problem ,,of ,,unsectarian ,,moral ,,instruction4 ,by ,felix ,adler1 ,ph4 ,d4 ,,the ,,theory ,,of ,,punishment4 ,by ,rev4 ,hastings ,rashdall4 ,,an ,,interpretation ,,of ,,the ,,social ,,movements ,,of ,,our ,,time4 ,by ,prof4 ,henry ,c4 ,adams4 ,,the ,,prevention ,,of ,,crime4 ,by ,dr4 ,ferdinand ,tnnies4 ,,the ,,ethical ,,teaching ,,of ,,sophokles4 ,by ,prof4 ,arthur ,fairbanks4 ,,the ,,right ,,of ,,private ,,property ,,in ,,land4 ,by ,prof4 ,j4 ,platter4 ,,discussions4 ,prof4 ,schmidt's article is a reply to a criticism of his work on the ethics of the ancient ,greeks which had appeared in the ,international ,journal of ,ethics4 ,dr4 ,adler's article is the introductory lecture of his course on ,moral ,instruction before the ,school of ,applied ,ethics at ,plymouth4 ,he refers first to the difficulty in the way of combining moral and religious instruction in the public schools arising from the difference in religious belief of the tax payers1 and to the devices suggested to circumvent the difficulty4 ,the first of these devices is that ,catholics1 ,dissenters1 and ,jews1 shall formulate a common platform of belief4 ,there are two obvious objections to this proposal4 ,it would leave out of account the party of the agnostics and be a gross injustice to them1 and it would never content the really religious minds of any denomination4 ,it would be acceptable only to the comparatively small class of so-called rationalists or theists pure and simple1 and they have no right under the specious plea of reconciling the various creeds1 in effect1 to force their own creed upon the rest of the community4 ,the second device is that religious and moral instruction combined shall be given in the public schools by persons of the several denominations4 ,the high authority of ,germany is invoked in favor of that system but ,dr4 ,adler states that the example of ,germany cannot be quoted as a precedent owing to the relation between the state and the schools in that country4 ,the system1 moreover is not a happy one as1 agreeably to ,professor ,smith's propositions that scientific instruction must be unsectarian and religious instruction must be sectarian1 the latter ought to have no place in state schools1 at least in a country where the separation of church and state is complete4 ,to the third arrangement proposed1 that each sect should build its own schools1 and draw upon the fund supplied by taxation according to the number of children which it educates1 there are two objections4 ,owing to the power of sects and their influence1 direct and indirect1 the rules and regulations prescribed by the state for the schools to conform to would not be enforced4 ,and secondly1 the purpose for which the public school exists would be defeated1 as the sectarian schools tend to prevent the growth of that national unit which it is the very business of the public school to create and foster4 ,the correct answer to the question as to the way in which to impart moral instruction so as to satisfy all parties will be the solution of the problem of unsectarian moral education4 ,the answer is3 ,it is the business of the moral instructor in the school to deliver to his pupil the subject matter of morality1 but not to deal with the sanctions of it2 to give his pupils a clear understanding of what is right and what is wrong1 but not to enter into the question why the right should be done and the wrong avoided4 ,the conscience can be enlightened1 strengthened1 and always without once raising the question why4 ,professor ,adler1 it appears to us1 overlooks the intimate connection between the two questions of what is wrong1 and why is it wrong4 ,with the 8why10 which is the moral sanction so-called1 he excludes the criterion of right and wrong and confines himself to conventional morality4 ,professor ,adler proposes1 that the material for the moral lessons should be 8the stock of moral truths accepted by all good men40 ,this would be a very simple solution of the ethical problem4 ,mankind need no longer remain in doubt as to what good and bad is4 ,we have only to accept the propositions of 8all good men40 ,but where is the judge that shall decide who are to be considered as good men8 ,either ,professor ,adler considers his own views of moral goodness as authoritative and ultimate or his reasoning moves in a vicious circle4 ,professor ,tnnies and the ,rev4 ,hastings ,rashdall discuss punishment as a preventive of crime4 ,professor ,adams finds that the genius of invention established the factory system replacing the old domestic system of industry4 ,the change of a society based upon tools into a society based upon machinery means that the worker has lost control over the conditions of labor which he now tries to regain4 ,arthur ,fairbanks says that according to the ethics of ,sophokles1 conscience was sense of conformity to an sthetic ideal4 ,j4 ,platter of ,zrich rejects ,henry ,george's theory as 8nonsense40 7,philadelphia3 ,international ,journal of ,ethics1 #afjb ,chestnut ,street47 4 ,,rivista ,,italiana ,,di ,,filosofia4 ,september and ,october1 #ahia4 ,,contents3 ,l',,immaginazione ,,nelle ,,sue ,,relazioni ,,normali ,e ,,morbose ,,colla ,,sensibilita4 ,by ,l4 ,ambrosi4 ,l',,origine ,,indiana ,,del ,,pitagorismo ,,secondo ,l4 ,,von ,,schr,,der4 ,by ,p4 ,d',ercole4 ,,luigi ,,vives1 ,,pedagogista ,,del ,,rinascimento4 ,by ,a4 ,piazzi4 ,,la ,,filosofia ,,di ,,empedocle4 ,by ,s4 ,ferrari4 ,imagination in its normal and diseased relations to sensibility4 ,the writer calls our attention to the endless variety of different and apparently contradictory things that are usually attributed to the faculty of imagination4 ,to some this faculty of the human mind is the main cause of human errors1 and with ,montaigne they call it 8la folle du logis02 but to others1 imagination plays a rather important part in the discovery of great scientific theories4 ,all unanimously admit1 that imagination lends fuel to the flames of all kinds of evil passions2 but on the other hand it cannot be denied1 that imagination sustains the will in every work of great stress1 or great sacrifice1 by the vivid representation of an expected final success4 ,all human votaries and possessors of this fleeting1 inconstant mental faculty are by turns 8happy1 unhappy1 sane1 sick1 wealthy or poor2 it makes us believe1 doubt1 or deny reason2 it makes fools and sages40 7,pascal1 ,penses1 ,art4 #c1 #c74 ,yet how can the psychologist reconcile all this2 how can he find the different circumstances1 through which one and the same cause produces such an endless variety and discrepancy of facts8 ,several psychologists1 who have tried to follow the flights of imagination throughout all its different manifestations by the sole aid of style and language1 have been poets rather than true philosophers4 ,such was ,delille in his poem l',imagination2 and such was even ,professor ,mantegazza himself1 in that chapter of his ,physiology of ,pleasure1 which he has dedicated to the 8,gioie della fantasia10 where he describes this faculty with far more enthusiasm than scientific precision4 ,bonstetten1 in his ,recherches sur la nature et lois de l'imagination1 ,genve1 #ahjg1 is supposed to have been the first to give a minute and exclusively psychological analysis of imagination2 but his investigations seem to prove1 that a delicate subject of this kind1 like certain volatile essences1 evaporates at the moment we wish to analyse it1 and cannot be defined by any strict scientific formulas and classifications4 ,and yet1 if we really wish to study the psychology of imagination1 we must not be frightened by these difficulties1 or regard them as insurmountable4 ,we may not be able to reduce all these varied phenomena to very definite and limited categories1 but it does not follow from this1 that we have only to make a simple1 empirical registration of these phenomena4 ,as ,michaut observes 7,l',imagination1 ,introduction73 8,wherever we find a general element1 there also we shall find room for science40 ,despite the inconstancy of the phenomena1 it remains true1 that also in the facts of imagination there is something constant and regular2 that they are subject to laws1 which might be probably severed from the phenomena1 and be reduced to a certain unity and uniformity1 without forgetting1 at the same time1 that this fleeting and delicate subject is not always reducible to absolutely strict classification4 ,how are we1 accordingly1 to obtain that harmony and unity of view1 that will unite and group all those diversified manifestations8 ,mind cannot be conceived as a collection of different states1 but we have to assume1 that within the ,psyche there is something substantial2 there is unity1 constancy in its energy2 and that this side of its being is also the principle of its transitory actions4 ,we recognise therefore the existence of two distinct sources of spiritual energy1 that will better make us understand the diversity of its products3 on the one side1 the soul itself1 with the formal laws of its simple being1 and1 on the other side1 the power or force of its sensible representations1--of its reactions4 ,this distinction1 applied to the present problem1 will on the one hand cause us to consider images as the products of an activity of an inferior order1 called psyche soul1 but we shall behold on the other1 that same soul1 when it has freed itself from the tyranny of the senses1 itself becoming properly what is called mind1 its emancipation rising to the higher function of arranging and organising the images produced by the aid of the senses4 ,hence follows1 that the relations of either conflict or harmony which these products of the soul have among each other1 and to mind proper1 will serve as a criterion of a classification1 in which we have to take note3 7#a7 of the reciprocal action between sensations and images2 7#b7 of that between images and images2 7in both of which instances the power of the products possesses an advantage over the power of mind27 and 7#c7 of the action of mind upon images4 ,by this road it will be possible to follow all the phases of the evolution of mind from the moment when overcome by obstinate images it is reduced to a life of disorder1 incoherency1 or1 as it were1 to death of mind1 until the moment when in its own turn mind takes hold of the numerous images by which it is besieged1 and by subjecting them to its own laws--to laws of unity and harmony--it creates out of that disorderly chaos of images the wonderful synthesis of science and works of art4 ,from that instant we behold mind rise through a series of intermediate stages1 from abject servitude to the loftiest heights of freedom1 from a state of humiliating impotency to an unhampered display of its true1 inward activity1--from folly to genius4 ,in other words1 it is chiefly this psychic activity1 in all its different stages of development and power1 that must be our guiding criterion in the study of the phases and phenomena of imagination4 ,the writer1 thereupon1 seeks to explain the nature of this psychic activity in its application to images4 ,he briefly investigates the origin of images1 their immediate derivation from the sensations1 and their intimate reciprocal connection1 by virtue of which the one cannot be produced without the other2 and whence there arise many different relations1 that not only explain1 but even enable us to classify a large number of facts relating to this mental faculty4 ,the writer concludes with some general remarks on the diseases of imagination4 ,the ,hindu ,origin of ,pythagorism according to ,l4 von ,schroeder4 ,this article was suggested by ,dr4 ,l4 v4 ,schroeder's monograph3 ,pythagoras und die ,inder4 ,eine ,untersuchung ber die ,herkunft und ,abstammung der ,pythagorischen ,lehren4 ,the discussion about the local origin of ,pythagorism began with the ancients themselves1 is being continued in our own time1 and1 from the nature of the subject itself1 bids fair to be protracted for an indefinite period still4 ,in recent times this arduous problem has invaded the domain of comparative ethnology1 comparative religion1 philology1 in brief1 of all the historical sciences1 receiving1 doubtless1 striking and copious illustrations from all these1 yet at the risk of almost losing sight of itself4 ,in ,pythagorism1 as in certain other products of the human mind1 it is difficult to discriminate with absolute historical certainty between 8mine0 and 8thine40 ,the real solution of the problem may perhaps be found in the original unity of the evolution of the ,indo-,european mind4 ,the writer1 however1 views the problem simply as one of comparative religion and the history of philosophy4 ,the ancients advocated the ,italic1 or ,tyrrhenian origin of the ,pythagorean system1 and among modern ,italians1 ,vico and ,gioberti have done the same4 ,the ,chinese origin was defended by ,gladisch4 ,the third1 the ,egyptian origin1 also dates from antiquity1 and in modern times has been ardently defended by ,roth4 ,the fourth1 the supposed ,hellenic origin1 has had the greatest number of followers1 and has been ably championed by ,dr4 ,edw4 ,zeller in his work1 ,die ,philosophie der ,griechen4 ,as regards the last1 the alleged ,hindu origin1 this was suggested of course by the numerous striking analogies found between ,hindu and ,pythagorean doctrine4 ,still1 all that has been said on the subject by ,schroeder1 ,max ,mller1 ,weber1 and others1 has failed to thoroughly convince the writer4 ,in his next article he promises to show1 that everything has induced him to believe that the ,hindus themselves rather borrowed their doctrine of transmigration from the philosophical system of ,pythagoras4 ,luigi ,vives4 ,a ,pedagogist of the ,renaissance4 ,the interesting subject of this article is probably to this day but little understood or appreciated by the pedagogists of northern ,europe4 ,to this day1 many among them seem ignorant of the fact1 or1 perhaps1 are unwilling to frankly admit1 that along with the ,catholic revival1 and the intellectual renaissance of the ,latin nations1 there was initiated the tradition of really humane pedagogics1 founded on the nature of man1 and1 in its aim and workings1 vastly superior to the educational systems of the nations beyond the ,alps4 ,it was an earnest1 liberal1 refining educational system1 that professed an affectionate regard for youth4 ,it banished corporal punishment1 and addressed itself directly to the heart and the intelligence4 ,the ,jesuit maxim3 8debetur pueris maxima reverentia10 still recalls the original spirit of this humane system of education4 ,it is perhaps not an exaggeration to maintain1 that1 in the spirit of the time1 it also aimed at the beautiful in education4 ,it was a declared enemy to any thought1 speech or action in bad form4 ,to the subject of this article1 the ,spanish bishop of ,valencia1 ,louis ,vives1 is due the honor of having been one of the most ardent and successful promoters of this new educational system1 and to have been the ,jean ,jacques ,rousseau of his time4 ,vives was born in the year #adib1 and died in the year #aedj4 ,he had studied at the ,university of ,paris1 and was an intimate friend of ,erasmus of ,rotterdam4 ,he is moreover the author of a number of valuable educational works4 ,bishop ,vives1 however1 must also be regarded as a clergyman1 who in his practical career would at times find it difficult to reconcile his broad-minded scholastic ideals with the duties of his calling1 and with the exaggerated ascetical tendencies by which he was surrounded4 ,as a matter of fact1 in a short time the church is seen practically to override all this liberal educational movement of the renaissance4 ,within the college- and convent-walls1 in the ,latin countries1 the humane paternal pedagogics of the renaissance soon and easily degenerated into oppressive1 injurious1 personal surveillance1 and an odious theocratic tyranny4 ,with all our sincere admiration for the work initiated by men like ,louis ,vives1 we must nevertheless maintain1 that all1 or nearly all1 the ecclesiastic educational systems of the ,latin countries during the following centuries1 can scarcely lay valid claims to a place within the pale of true pedagogical science4 ,the ,philosophy of ,empedocles4 ,in this concluding article the writer exhaustively discusses the religious tenets and ethical precepts of ,empedocles1 as both appear in the ,promium1 in the third book on ,physics1 and in the poem of the 80--or expiatory atonements4 ,bibliography4 ,in this department we notice a lengthy review of ,prof4 ,e4 ,dal ,pozzo di ,mombello's ,lectures on ,monism1 delivered at the ,university of ,perugia4 ,in this number are also contained the ,bollettino ,pedagogico ,filosofico1 ,critical ,notices1 and ,recent ,publications4 7,rome4 ,tipografia delle ,terme ,diocleziane4 #ahia47 4 ,,revue ,,philosophique4 ,november1 #ahia4 ,no4 ,,ii4 ,,contents3 ,,les ,,origines ,,de ,,notre ,,structure ,,intellectuelle ,,et ,c,r,,brale4 ,i4 ,le ,kantisme4 ,by ,a4 ,fouille4 ,,du ,r,,le ,,de ,,la ,,volont ,,dans ,,la ,,croyance4 ,by ,j4 ,j4 ,gourd4 ,in discussing the part of the will played in belief1 ,m4 ,j4 ,j4 ,gourd considers our belief in an ultra-phenomenal reality which he calls 8metaphysical belief40 8,all thought10 he says1 8involves a relation1 viz4 a relation between subject and object4 ,every relation presupposes a comparison of its terms and this comparison is not established if the subject and object belong to different worlds4 ,the subject is undoubtedly found in consciousness1 the object must be there also4 ,all the ingenious arguments to escape this conclusion are vain4 ,accordingly1 one may well believe in the truth of the metaphysical belief1 but this belief is not true40 ,m4 ,g4 ,tarde1 the great criminologist and an opponent of ,professor ,lombroso's school reviews the penological and criminological literature of recent times in ,france1 ,italy1 and ,belgium4 ,alfred ,fouille revises in the article on 8the origin of our intellectual and cerebral structure0 several solutions of the problem of the nature of thought-forms1 especially ,kant's view of the a priori4 ,strongly influenced by ,schopenhauer1 he makes of the great pessimist's will-theory quite an original and peculiar application and finds that the question of 8ides-forces0 is also at the bottom of the question of the origin of ideas4 ,in comparing the origin of ideas to the origin of solar systems1 he says3 8,ideas are the condensation of that which exists everywhere in a nebulous state into luminous centres and conscious focuses4 ,sensation is desire40 ,and he sums up his view in the sentence3 8,nihil est in intellectu quod non prius fuerit in sensu et voluntate40 7,paris3 ,flix ,alcan47 4 ,,zeitschrift ,f,r ,,psychologie ,,und ,,physiologie ,,der ,,sinnesorgane4 ,vol4 ,,ii4 ,no4 #e4 ,,contents3 ,,die ,,sinne ,,der ,,verbrecher4 ,by ,c4 ,lombroso and ,s4 ,ottolenghi4 7,mit #d ,figuren47 ,,ueber ,,vergleichungen ,,von ,,tondistanzen4 ,by ,gustav ,engel4 ,,litteraturbericht4 ,cesare ,lombroso and his assistant ,s4 ,ottolenghi communicate the results of their investigations of the senses of born criminals in a similar way as the former of the two had done in his 8,studies in ,criminal ,anthropology10 ,the ,monist1 ,vol4 i1 ,no4 #b1 p4 #agg et sqq4 ,our authors say3 8,since the days of the famous ,greek sage who said that nothing came into the intellect save through the gateway of the senses1 it could be foreseen that a study of the senses would become the gateway to ethics40 ,and1 it is a fact recognised for some time but not as yet proved by exact methods that a lack of moral sense is often accompanied with an obtusity of the sense-organs4 ,dr4 ,azam's famous ,felida showed an entire absence of the moral sense when she was in a state of analgesia2 ,romanes has pointed out that the sensitiveness to pain is greater in tame animals than in wild beasts1 this is especially noticeable in the dog4 ,it is noteworthy also that savage peoples are almost insensible to pain while civilisation often increases sensibility till it becomes hypersthesia4 ,obtusity of the sense-organs in criminals should not be confounded however with the ansthesia of criminals1 because the rarity of laterality1 the absence of isolated insensible places1 the lack of motory anomalies1 etc41 exclude the supposition of hysteria4 ,our authors found among #ae criminal boys between #aj and #ad years no less than ten cases of absolute analgesia1 which proves that this symptom cannot be the effect of alcoholism1 syphilis1 marasmus1 or overwork of a special trade4 ,several anecdotes are told about the insensibility to pain4 ,an old thief had his leg amputated with the greatest apathy3 the operation done1 he took the limb into his hand and joked about it4 ,an inveterate murderer1 his penal servitude being ended1 was dismissed out of the bagnio of the island ,s4 ,he asked the warden to be retained1 because he did not know how to get food and shelter4 ,his demand being refused1 he opened his bowels with the handle of a spoon1 went to bed as usual1 and died without even a sigh4 ,mandrin1 a criminal1 shortly before his execution allowed himself to be cut in eight places without giving a sign of pain2 criminal ,r4 flayed the skin of his face with a piece of glass4 ,in the penitentiary at ,chatham during the years #ahga and #ahgb1 #hda voluntary wounds and injuries were made4 ,among them #bg convicts had mutilated some limb1 and in #ag cases the limb had to be amputated4 ,this obtusity of the sensory organs in criminals is supposed to be of a cortical origin and being similar to the phenomena of savage life is interpreted as atavism4 ,criminals show deficiencies in the senses of touch1 smell1 taste1 and hearing1 but not of sight4 ,and this is analogous to the savage in whom the sense of sight is naturally very strong1 and no criminal could execute numerous thefts or escape the arm of justice without a high development of the sense of sight4 ,in the second article on comparisons of tone-distances ,gustav ,engel1 ,professor at the ,royal ,high-school of ,music in ,berlin1 takes occasion to explain his views of the subject with reference to the severe criticism of ,c4 ,stumpf on ,carl ,lorenz's theory4 ,wilhelm ,wundt had taken part in the discussion in favor of ,lorenz4 ,the subject of the article lies in the border-land between the physiology of hearing and music2 and ,professor ,engel comes to the conclusion that affinity of tones1 i4 e4 the interval-sense in a melodious succession does not lead to the same accuracy and reliability of hearing as their concord4 ,he objects to the idea of an arithmetical difference as proposed by ,lorenz and ,wundt1 and proves it through the fact that the ,pythagorean tierce in the unaccompanied scale makes a less noticeable disturbance than in a concord1 while the approximately pure tierce 7which is too low only by a small fracture of a comma7 is excellent in the concord while it causes a slight disturbance in the melody4 ,musical intervals are not identical with the geometrical intervals1 yet they are based upon them as a selection made among innumerable possibilities for certain purposes4 ,their acceptance is established only in harmonic music1 but this fact too adds some difficulties to the investigations made in this field1 for if two tones sound together1 we can no longer distinguish them separately1 as would be required for the investigation2 and if we let the one succeed the other their geometrical relation is no longer discerned with the same precision4 7,hamburg and ,leipsic3 ,leopold ,voss47 4 ,,vierteljahrsschrift ,f,r ,,wissenschaftliche ,,philosophie4 ,vol4 ,,xv4 ,nos4 #c and #d4 ,,contents of ,no4 #c3 ,,psychische ,,und ,,physische ,,activit,t4 ,by ,h4 ,hffding4 ,,ueber ,,sprachreflex1 ,,nativismus ,,und ,,absichtliche ,,sprachbildung4 7,achter ,artikel47 ,by ,a4 ,marty4 ,,zur ,,philosophie ,,der ,,mathematik4 ,by ,chr4 v4 ,ehrenfels4 ,,der ,,folgerungscalcul ,,und ,,die ,,inhaltslogik4 ,by ,e4 ,g4 ,husserl4 ,,contents of ,no4 #d3 ,,die ,,gesetzm,,ssigkeit ,,der ,,physischen ,,activit,t4 ,by ,h4 ,hffding4 ,,ethnologie ,,und ,,sthetik4 ,by ,e4 ,grosse4 ,,ueber ,,die ,,fortschreitende ,,entwicklung ,,des ,,menschengeschlechts4 7,erster ,artikel47 ,by ,f4 ,rosenberger4 ,,ueber ,,sprachreflex1 ,,nativismus ,,und ,,absichtliche ,,sprachbildung4 7,neunter ,artikel74 ,by ,a4 ,marty4 ,,ueber ,,fernwirkung ,,und ,,anormale4 ,,wahrnehmungsf,,khigkeit4 ,methodologische ,randglossen4 ,by ,m4 ,offner4 ,prof4 ,h4 ,hffding's article on psychical and physical activity is an answer to a criticism by ,professor ,kroman4 ,professor ,hffding had proposed1 concerning the relation of the psychical to the physical1 a theory which he called the 8identity hypothesis10 according to which the physical and psychical activities are not different in their nature but only in their phenomenal appearance4 ,k4 ,kroman1 a countryman and colleague of ,h4 ,hffding--both are professors at the ,university of ,copenhagen--rejected in his recent work 8,logic and ,psychology0 the identity hypothesis and characterised it as 8,duplicism10 a name against which ,hffding protests4 ,kroman's objections are as follows3 a7 ,natural science knows of no reason to conceive of the relation of the psychical to the material in the way expressed by the identity-hypothesis4 b7 ,on the basis of the identity-hypothesis it remains unexplained how we can know anything about the external world4 c7 ,it is inexplicable how an identity can obtain of two so different things as are the bodily multiplicity and the psychical unity4 ,professor ,hffding investigates these three objections separately and comes to the conclusion that his identity-hypothesis shows the relation between the psychical and material nature in a clear and simple light4 ,it excludes on the one hand materialism and on the other hand spiritualism4 ,the question whether either phenomenon1 spirit or matter1 represents the absolute nature of existence1 cannot1 according to ,hffding1 be answered4 ,it appears to us that ,professor ,hffding's position is sound in all main points and may be considered as that view which is most prevalent among modern psychologists4 ,however1 concerning the question whether spirit or matter represents the absolute nature of existence1 we refer the reader to the editorial article 8,are there ,things in ,themselves80 section ,,xii1 8,the ,oneness of ,subjectivity and ,objectivity40 ,in our opinion the question itself is illegitimate4 ,neither the subjectivity of spirit1 nor the objectivity of matter represents the absolute nature of existence2 both together form the nature of existence2 and we omit here the word 8absolute0 purposely4 ,the question as to which abstract1 matter or spirit1 represents the absolute nature of existence seems to us similar to the question which of the two terms ,a and ,b represents in the relation ,a3,b the absolute nature of the relation4 ,the obvious answer is neither4 ,the eighth article of ,a4 ,marty of ,prague on ,language-reflex is mainly of a controversial nature directed against ,l4 ,tobler's article on the origin of language in the ,zeitschrift fr ,vlker-,psychologie4 ,by ,nativism1 ,marty understands the theory that certain involuntary articulate sounds are associated with certain ideas1 while the so-called empirical theory attempts to explain the origin of the first words without such innate mechanical relations between sounds and concepts4 ,marty represents the empirical solution of the problem and objects to the extreme nativism1 but he grants that ,tobler's modified nativism approaches very much to his own position4 ,the longest article of the present number 7#fc pp47 is an essay full of valuable hints by ,chr4 v4 ,ehrenfels on the ,philosophy of ,mathematics4 ,the epistemological basis of mathematics demands a psychological investigation of its contents4 ,accordingly the author proposes to present a psychological characterisation of the number-conceptions1 from which he derives some conclusions concerning the theory of cognition4 ,he investigates the origin of the unity conception which is generally defined as 8positing a unit0 or as 8conceiving as a unit40 ,we usually believe that we abstract numbers directly from the objects1 when we look for instance at one house with two doors and five windows4 ,but this process of abstraction is not quite so direct as it seems4 ,the number-conception is not taken from external observation1 but carried into the same2 yet this is done involuntarily and inadvertently so that it appears as if they were eo ipso contained in it4 ,what is the origin of the concepts 8unity0 and 8multiplicity08 ,two methods present themselves3 #a7 ,the concentration of attention and 7#b7 the act of bringing into relation4 ,the former produces a unity and1 when successively directed to several objects1 a series of units4 ,the latter appears to be required by the consideration that the conception of a number is conditioned by acts of distinguishing4 ,the number 8two0 requires two acts of distinguishing1 8three0 requires three1 8four0 requires six and the number n requires n_/#b7n-#a7 acts of distinguishing4 ,this explains why we can have clear and direct conceptions only of very low figures4 ,the idea that a combination of both methods will explain the facts is by no means excluded4 ,but there is a third source which may be used to explain the unity conception1 viz4 inner experience4 8,the unity of consciousness10 ,ehrenfels says1 8has been misused in philosophy to demonstrate the substantiality1 simplicity1 and indestructibility of the soul40 ,nevertheless there is some truth in the unity idea1 for the present psychical phenomena present themselves in a peculiar amalgamation1 which admits of a comparison between two elements while it erects a barrier between the ego and the tu4 ,our psychical contents will always appear to us as a unit2 and on this basis we might declare that the unity conception is derived from this source4 ,here ,ehrenfels does not see that the concentration of attention is practically the same as the unity of consciousness1 for attention means consciousness1 and concentration produces unity4 ,number-conceptions originate by counting4 ,we disjoin things2 for instance1 we throw a number of apples into a basket1 or we let the finger slide over the division lines of a measuring stick naming each unit while proceeding in the act4 ,from such processes the function of counting can be abstracted while the details are neglected as unimportant4 ,most of the higher numbers are never directly but only indirectly realised4 ,so for instance twenty is to many that number which will be reached by counting up to twenty1 yet the single units of the number are lost sight of entirely4 ,such number-conceptions belong to the class of 8indirect concepts0 which represent objects not through marks belonging to the object itself1 but originating through its relation to other objects4 ,the basis of such indirect concepts had been called by ,ehrenfels ,gestaltsqualitten1 i4 e4 figure qualities1 and by ,meinong fundierte ,inhalte or founded contents4 ,thus indirect conceptions are parts contingent upon some such basis4 ,number-conceptions are not always clearly thought out and there are some helps to represent higher or more complex numbers4 ,thus we can think of ten as represented by the outside and inside corners of a pentagram1 twelve as the edges of a cube1 etc41 and common among all nations is the usage of the fingers to represent numbers up to ten4 ,such helps are quite different from indirect number-conceptions and may be called figurative number-conceptions4 ,that there are mathematical conceptions of magnitudes which have no objective analogon is quite natural1 for there is even in an indirect conception no warrant for its objective reality2 and we ought to consider how many word- and idea-combinations are possible without their possessing some analogous reality4 ,yet the so-called irrational cannot properly be called a number1 it is the demand of a number which in fractions can sufficiently for certain purposes but never fully be realised4 ,negative numbers always presuppose a contrast and such conditions arise naturally wherever the fundamental ideas imply two opposite directions1 for instance past and future in time1 credit and debit in business1 etc4 ,it is a matter of course that there are in reality as little either positive or negative numbers1 as there are positive or negative colors or sounds4 ,concerning the necessity idea1 ,ehrenfels says3 8,nobody will consider it as possible that five plus seven will in some cases make any other number than twelve4 ,we are confident that the same addition will under all circumstances yield the same sum40 ,ehrenfels grants the psychical certitude of this but not the mathematical1 and thinks that on this point there is a difference of opinion allowable4 ,here we disagree from ,ehrenfels and refer the reader to former articles on kindred subjects in ,the ,monist1 especially the article on 8,the ,origin of ,thought-forms10 ,vol4 ,,ii1 p4 #aaa4 ,we must bear in mind that in mathematics we are moving in a realm of pure forms and the statement #g #e #ab is1 as the ,germans express it1 eindeutig bestimmt1 i4 e4 it is determined exhaustively in one and the only one possible way4 ,the numbers #g and #e being rigid1 their sum and their product will also be rigid4 ,this difference of opinion may be contingent upon a difference of the conception of the a priori4 ,ehrenfels defines as 8a priori0 such judgments which having come into our possession1 are readily accepted without proof4 ,we follow ,grassmann in rejecting the acceptance of anything without proof1 including the idea of mathematical axioms4 ,the a priori in our terminology becomes identical with that which pertains to formal thought3 and it would make no difference whether the instance presented is as simple as #a #a #b or extremely complex as are the differential calculus and logarithms4 ,accordingly we disagree also from ,ehrenfels when he finds even in such additions as for instance #hbe #bag #ajdb vestiges of an a posteriori character4 ,the employment of the logarithms accordingly appears to ,ehrenfels also aposterioristic because the fruits of other peoples' labors are utilised6 ,concerning ,john ,stuart ,mill's view of the subject1 ,ehrenfels says that 8it is still deeply entangled in the errors of that conception which it so bitterly opposes1 viz4 in the formalism of the old purely a priori conception4 ,for only he who adheres to the view that all mathematics are deduced from a few axioms can think of attributing to those axioms the highest degree of plausibility which is assumed for them on the ground of comprehensive deduction40 ,we agree with ,ehrenfels's objection to ,mill1 but we cannot agree with his view that mathematics derives any elements from a posteriori elements1 although we grant that quite new departments are created simply by a different employment of certain functions4 ,accordingly mathematics cannot be derived from a few axioms only but is the products of certain functions4 ,ehrenfels calls attention to the fact that the mathematician operating with symbols often forgets entirely what he has to think of in connection with these symbols4 8,this is not strange10 he adds1 8for thoughtless word-combinations present analogous instances1 yet it is strange that the result almost without exception comes out right2 es stimmt60 ,we object here2 operations with mathematical symbols are not thoughtless combinations1 at least1 they are not meaningless4 ,they are operations not with things1 but with symbols representing certain relations among things4 ,when gamblers play with chips representing real money1 they need not think during the game of the value represented by a chip1 and yet when the account is made1 the result attained with the assistance of the chips will come out right4 ,there is no reason to wonder at it4 ,chips like mathematical symbols might in a certain sense be called thoughtless1 for certainly they do not think2 but they are not thoughtless in the sense that they are meaningless1 that nothing is thought by them4 ,ehrenfels apparently sees a problem where there is none and this is closely connected with another point4 ,he looks upon the mathematician's inability of thinking out in every respect the objective meaning of mathematical symbols as a shortcoming of man's intellect4 ,while it appears that we cannot think anything by many mathematical symbols 7for instance by a #a7 except the symbol itself1 the enormous success of mathematical thought is evidence that they must have some definite meaning although it is to be excogitated only by those beings who will transgress the average intelligence of to-day1 the first germs of whose existence are the mathematical geniuses of the present generation4 ,it appears to us that undoubtedly every mathematical symbol has a definite meaning1 representing the result of some function4 ,that the result will sometimes be unattainable or unrealisable1 that especially all operations with zero make the whole calculation indefinite 7which naturally arises from the nature of zero7 does not alter the truth of this proposition in the least4 ,we have to make one additional remark4 ,the peculiarity of mathematics that we do not throughout our operations think out the meaning of the symbols is not a shortcoming of our intelligence1 but the strength of mathematical science4 ,the advantage of all the formal sciences and especially of mathematics consists in this that we need not think out every detail1 but that we can1 through the assistance of mathematical symbols1 perform the most intricate operations with machine-like exactness4 ,the economy of thought produced in this way is not a deficiency of man's mind1 but a virtue4 ,prof4 ,h4 ,hffding 7in ,no4 #d7 insists upon the causal law as being indispensable in psychology4 ,there are some people and among others his colleague ,professor ,kroman who regard moral motives as an exception4 8,yet10 says ,professor ,hffding1 8should the decisive moment of a decision not be determined by the causal law1 the will could never be determined through a reflection on the possible effects of the action and thus every reason would be missing to attribute to man any responsibility40 ,e4 ,grosse expatiates on the proposition to apply the comparative method of ethnology to sthetics4 ,ferd4 ,rosenberger proposes the following programme3 8,knowledge is power2 activity based upon such power is the cause of happiness4 ,therefore with the increase of knowledge1 there is an increase of happiness1 successful activity however is impossible without virtue4 ,therefore we conclude that an increase of happiness will be accompanied with an increase of virtue40 ,a4 ,marty in this his ninth article blames ,steinthal for having misrepresented the eighteenth century theories of the origin of language4 ,m4 ,offner reviews ,dr4 ,charles ,richet's reports of his telepathic experiments1 but the reviewer cannot assent to ,richet's opinion 8that these facts possess a strange coincidence and that they are1 probably1 the result of a relation and not of pure chance40 7,leipsic3 ,o4 ,r4 ,reisland47 4 ,,philosophische ,,monatshefte4 ,vol4 ,,xxviii4 ,nos4 #a and #b4 ,,contents3 ,,zum ,,begriff ,,der ,,unbewussten ,,vorstellung4 ,by ,e4 v4 ,hartmann4 ,,ueber ,,das ,,gebet4 ,,ein ,,religionsphilosophisches ,,fragment4 ,sendschreiben an ,herrn ,e4 ,renan in ,paris4 ,by ,m4 ,j4 ,monrad4 ,,werke ,,zur ,,philosophie ,,des ,,socialen ,,lebens ,,und ,,der ,,geschichte4 ,erster ,artikel 7,h4 ,spencer1 ,sociologie1 ,bd4 ,,iii74 ,by ,f4 ,tnnies4 ,,recensionen3 ,h4 ,mnsterberg1 ,beitrge zur experimentellen ,psychologie ,no4 #c4 ,neue ,grundlegung der ,psychophysik4 ,by ,th4 ,ziehen4 ,w4 ,enoch ,der ,begriff der ,wahrnehmung4 ,by ,p4 ,natorp4 ,ch4 ,bnard4 ,l'esthtique d',aristote et de ses successeurs4 ,by ,a4 ,dring4 ,,litteraturbericht4 ,the well-known philosopher ,edward von ,hartmann defines his position with reference to the idea of an unconscious representation4 ,granting that there are no unconscious sensations1 perceptions1 conceptions or memories1 because feeling either is conscious or not at all1 he introduces the idea of unconscious representations again as the most adequate determination4 ,he says1 8,either we must renounce all speaking and thinking of non-sensual objects or we must be satisfied with using figurative expressions40 ,m4 ,j4 ,monrad1 a ,norwegian1 argues1 in the second article against ,m4 ,e4 ,renan's theory of prayer1 whom he had visited some years ago in ,paris1 that prayer has after all an effect upon the objective world and it is not limited to a merely subjective and psychological influence4 ,monrad presupposes a belief in ,god1 prayer bringing the individual in unison with ,god1 changes the will of the individual into a co-ordinate willing of ,god and thus renders the individual a co-worker of ,god4 ,this1 however1 should not be conceived to take place by magic and in contradiction to nature1 but through nature1 man using the laws of nature4 ,f4 ,tnnies of ,kiel gives an exposition of ,mr4 ,spencer's social views which are1 briefly expressed1 8the final victory of society over the state40 ,professor ,tnnies answers that 8we all want a higher civilisation1 but the development of a higher civilisation is not conditioned by the final victory of society over the state4 ,on the contrary1 it may be said that it depends upon a victory of the state over society in so far as public rights will supersede private rights4444 ,the truth is that state and society are contingent1 the one upon the other and also limiting each other40 7,berlin3 ,dr4 ,r4 ,salinger47 4 ,,footnotes3 #eb ,questions of ,philosophy and ,psychology4 ,in the ,russian language4 ,,vol4 ,,ii4 ,,april1 #ahib4 ,,no4 #c4 ,,the ,,monist4 ,,the ,,doctrine ,,of ,,necessity ,,examined4 ,in ,the ,monist for ,january1 #ahia1 ,i endeavored to show what elementary ideas ought to enter into our view of the universe4 ,i may mention that on those considerations ,i had already grounded a cosmical theory1 and from it had deduced a considerable number of consequences capable of being compared with experience4 ,this ,comparison is now in progress1 but under existing circumstances must occupy many years4 ,i propose here to examine the common belief that every single fact in the universe is precisely determined by law4 ,it must not be supposed that this is a doctrine accepted everywhere and at all times by all rational men4 ,its first advocate appears to have been ,democritus the atomist1 who was led to it1 as we are informed1 by reflecting upon the 8impenetrability1 translation1 and impact of matter 7 740 ,that is to say1 having restricted his attention to a field where no influence other than mechanical constraint could possibly come before his notice1 he straightway jumped to the conclusion that throughout the universe that was the sole principle of action1--a style of reasoning so usual in our day with men not unreflecting as to be more than excusable in the infancy of thought4 ,but ,epicurus1 in revising the atomic doctrine and repairing its defences1 found himself obliged to suppose that atoms swerve from their courses by spontaneous chance2 and thereby he conferred upon the theory life and entelechy4 ,for we now see clearly that the peculiar function of the molecular hypothesis in physics is to open an entry for the calculus of probabilities4 ,already1 the prince of philosophers had repeatedly and emphatically condemned the dictum of ,democritus 7especially in the 8,physics10 ,book ,,ii1 chapters iv1 v1 vi71 holding that events come to pass in three ways1 namely1 7#a7 by external compulsion1 or the action of efficient causes1 7#b7 by virtue of an inward nature1 or the influence of final causes1 and 7#c7 irregularly without definite cause1 but just by absolute chance2 and this doctrine is of the inmost essence of ,aristotelianism4 ,it affords1 at any rate1 a valuable enumeration of the possible ways in which anything can be supposed to have come about4 ,the freedom of the will1 too1 was admitted both by ,aristotle and by ,epicurus4 ,but the ,stoa1 which in every department seized upon the most tangible1 hard1 and lifeless element1 and blindly denied the existence of every other1 which1 for example1 impugned the validity of the inductive method and wished to fill its place with the reductio ad absurdum1 very naturally became the one school of ancient philosophy to stand by a strict necessitarianism1 thus returning to the single principle of ,democritus that ,epicurus had been unable to swallow4 ,necessitarianism and materialism with the ,stoics went hand in hand1 as by affinity they should4 ,at the revival of learning1 ,stoicism met with considerable favor1 partly because it departed just enough from ,aristotle to give it the spice of novelty1 and partly because its superficialities well adapted it for acceptance by students of literature and art who wanted their philosophy drawn mild4 ,afterwards1 the great discoveries in mechanics inspired the hope that mechanical principles might suffice to explain the universe2 and though without logical justification1 this hope has since been continually stimulated by subsequent advances in physics4 ,nevertheless1 the doctrine was in too evident conflict with the freedom of the will and with miracles to be generally acceptable1 at first4 ,but meantime there arose that most widely spread of philosophical blunders1 the notion that associationalism belongs intrinsically to the materialistic family of doctrines2 and thus was evolved the theory of motives2 and libertarianism became weakened4 ,at present1 historical criticism has almost exploded the miracles1 great and small2 so that the doctrine of necessity has never been in so great vogue as now4 ,the proposition in question is that the state of things existing at any time1 together with certain immutable laws1 completely determine the state of things at every other time 7for a limitation to future time is indefensible74 ,thus1 given the state of the universe in the original nebula1 and given the laws of mechanics1 a sufficiently powerful mind could deduce from these data the precise form of every curlicue of every letter ,i am now writing4 ,whoever holds that every act of the will as well as every idea of the mind is under the rigid governance of a necessity co-ordinated with that of the physical world1 will logically be carried to the proposition that minds are part of the physical world in such a sense that the laws of mechanics determine everything that happens according to immutable attractions and repulsions4 ,in that case1 that instantaneous state of things from which every other state of things is calculable consists in the positions and velocities of all the particles at any instant4 ,this1 the usual and most logical form of necessitarianism1 is called the mechanical philosophy4 ,when ,i have asked thinking men what reason they had to believe that every fact in the universe is precisely determined by law1 the first answer has usually been that the proposition is a 8presupposition0 or postulate of scientific reasoning4 ,well1 if that is the best that can be said for it1 the belief is doomed4 ,suppose it be 8postulated03 that does not make it true1 nor so much as afford the slightest rational motive for yielding it any credence4 ,it is as if a man should come to borrow money1 and when asked for his security1 should reply he 8postulated0 the loan4 ,to 8postulate0 a proposition is no more than to hope it is true4 ,there are1 indeed1 practical emergencies in which we act upon assumptions of certain propositions as true1 because if they are not so1 it can make no difference how we act4 ,but all such propositions ,i take to be hypotheses of individual facts4 ,for it is manifest that no universal principle can in its universality be compromised in a special case or can be requisite for the validity of any ordinary inference4 ,to say1 for instance1 that the demonstration by ,archimedes of the property of the lever would fall to the ground if men were endowed with free-will1 is extravagant2 yet this is implied by those who make a proposition incompatible with the freedom of the will the postulate of all inference4 ,considering1 too1 that the conclusions of science make no pretence to being more than probable1 and considering that a probable inference can at most only suppose something to be most frequently1 or otherwise approximately1 true1 but never that anything is precisely true without exception throughout the universe1 we see how far this proposition in truth is from being so postulated4 ,but the whole notion of a postulate being involved in reasoning appertains to a by-gone and false conception of logic4 ,non-deductive1 or ampliative inference is of three kinds3 induction1 hypothesis1 and analogy4 ,if there be any other modes1 they must be extremely unusual and highly complicated1 and may be assumed with little doubt to be of the same nature as those enumerated4 ,for induction1 hypothesis1 and analogy1 as far as their ampliative character goes1 that is1 so far as they conclude something not implied in the premises1 depend upon one principle and involve the same procedure4 ,all are essentially inferences from sampling4 ,suppose a ship arrives in ,liverpool laden with wheat in bulk4 ,suppose that by some machinery the whole cargo be stirred up with great thoroughness4 ,suppose that twenty-seven thimblefuls be taken equally from the forward1 midships1 and aft parts1 from the starboard1 centre1 and larboard parts1 and from the top1 half depth1 and lower parts of her hold1 and that these being mixed and the grains counted1 four fifths of the latter are found to be of quality ,a4 ,then we infer1 experientially and provisionally1 that approximately four fifths of all the grain in the cargo is of the same quality4 ,i say we infer this experimentally and provisionally4 ,by saying that we infer it experientially1 ,i mean that our conclusion makes no pretension to knowledge of wheat-in-itself1 our 1 as the derivation of that word implies1 has nothing to do with latent wheat4 ,we are dealing only with the matter of possible experience1--experience in the full acceptation of the term as something not merely affecting the senses but also as the subject of thought4 ,if there be any wheat hidden on the ship1 so that it can neither turn up in the sample nor be heard of subsequently from purchasers1--or if it be half-hidden1 so that it may1 indeed1 turn up1 but is less likely to do so than the rest1--or if it can affect our senses and our pockets1 but from some strange cause or causelessness cannot be reasoned about1--all such wheat is to be excluded 7or have only its proportional weight7 in calculating that true proportion of quality ,a1 to which our inference seeks to approximate4 ,by saying that we draw the inference provisionally1 ,i mean that we do not hold that we have reached any assigned degree of approximation as yet1 but only hold that if our experience be indefinitely extended1 and if every fact of whatever nature1 as fast as it presents itself1 be duly applied1 according to the inductive method1 in correcting the inferred ratio1 then our approximation will become indefinitely close in the long run2 that is to say1 close to the experience to come 7not merely close by the exhaustion of a finite collection7 so that if experience in general is to fluctuate irregularly to and fro1 in a manner to deprive the ratio sought of all definite value1 we shall be able to find out approximately within what limits it fluctuates1 and if1 after having one definite value1 it changes and assumes another1 we shall be able to find that out1 and in short1 whatever may be the variations of this ratio in experience1 experience indefinitely extended will enable us to detect them1 so as to predict rightly1 at last1 what its ultimate value may be1 if it have any ultimate value1 or what the ultimate law of succession of values may be1 if there be any such ultimate law1 or that it ultimately fluctuates irregularly within certain limits1 if it do so ultimately fluctuate4 ,now our inference1 claiming to be no more than thus experiential and provisional1 manifestly involves no postulate whatever4 ,for what is a postulate8 ,it is the formulation of a material fact which we are not entitled to assume as a premise1 but the truth of which is requisite to the validity of an inference4 ,any fact1 then1 which might be supposed postulated1 must either be such that it would ultimately present itself in experience1 or not4 ,if it will present itself1 we need not postulate it now in our provisional inference1 since we shall ultimately be entitled to use it as a premise4 ,but if it never would present itself in experience1 our conclusion is valid but for the possibility of this fact being otherwise than assumed1 that is1 it is valid as far as possible experience goes1 and that is all that we claim4 ,thus1 every postulate is cut off1 either by the provisionality or by the experientiality of our inference4 ,for instance1 it has been said that induction postulates that1 if an indefinite succession of samples be drawn1 examined1 and thrown back each before the next is drawn1 then in the long run every grain will be drawn as often as any other1 that is to say postulates that the ratio of the numbers of times in which any two are drawn will indefinitely approximate to unity4 ,but no such postulate is made2 for if1 on the one hand1 we are to have no other experience of the wheat than from such drawings1 it is the ratio that presents itself in those drawings and not the ratio which belongs to the wheat in its latent existence that we are endeavoring to determine2 while if1 on the other hand1 there is some other mode by which the wheat is to come under our knowledge1 equivalent to another kind of sampling1 so that after all our care in stirring up the wheat1 some experiential grains will present themselves in the first sampling operation more often than others in the long run1 this very singular fact will be sure to get discovered by the inductive method1 which must avail itself of every sort of experience2 and our inference1 which was only provisional1 corrects itself at last4 ,again1 it has been said1 that induction postulates that under like circumstances like events will happen1 and that this postulate is at bottom the same as the principle of universal causation4 ,but this is a blunder1 or bevue1 due to thinking exclusively of inductions where the concluded ratio is either #a or #j4 ,if any such proposition were postulated1 it would be that under like circumstances 7the circumstances of drawing the different samples7 different events occur in the same proportions in all the different sets1--a proposition which is false and even absurd4 ,but in truth no such thing is postulated1 the experiential character of the inference reducing the condition of validity to this1 that if a certain result does not occur1 the opposite result will be manifested1 a condition assured by the provisionality of the inference4 ,but it may be asked whether it is not conceivable that every instance of a certain class destined to be ever employed as a datum of induction should have one character1 while every instance destined not to be so employed should have the opposite character4 ,the answer is that in that case1 the instances excluded from being subjects of reasoning would not be experienced in the full sense of the word1 but would be among these latent individuals of which our conclusion does not pretend to speak4 ,to this account of the rationale of induction ,i know of but one objection worth mention3 it is that ,i thus fail to deduce the full degree of force which this mode of inference in fact possesses2 that according to my view1 no matter how thorough and elaborate the stirring and mixing process had been1 the examination of a single handful of grain would not give me any assurance1 sufficient to risk money upon1 that the next handful would not greatly modify the concluded value of the ratio under inquiry1 while1 in fact1 the assurance would be very high that this ratio was not greatly in error4 ,if the true ratio of grains of quality ,a were #j4hj and the handful contained a thousand grains1 nine such handfuls out of every ten would contain from #ghj to #hbj grains of quality ,a4 ,the answer to this is that the calculation given is correct when we know that the units of this handful and the quality inquired into have the normal independence of one another1 if for instance the stirring has been complete and the character sampled for has been settled upon in advance of the examination of the sample4 ,but in so far as these conditions are not known to be complied with1 the above figures cease to be applicable4 ,random sampling and predesignation of the character sampled for should always be striven after in inductive reasoning1 but when they cannot be attained1 so long as it is conducted honestly1 the inference retains some value4 ,when we cannot ascertain how the sampling has been done or the sample-character selected1 induction still has the essential validity which my present account of it shows it to have4 ,i do not think a man who combines a willingness to be convinced with a power of appreciating an argument upon a difficult subject can resist the reasons which have been given to show that the principle of universal necessity cannot be defended as being a postulate of reasoning4 ,but then the question immediately arises whether it is not proved to be true1 or at least rendered highly probable1 by observation of nature4 ,still1 this question ought not long to arrest a person accustomed to reflect upon the force of scientific reasoning4 ,for the essence of the necessitarian position is that certain continuous quantities have certain exact values4 ,now1 how can observation determine the value of such a quantity with a probable error absolutely nil8 ,to one who is behind the scenes1 and knows that the most refined comparisons of masses1 lengths1 and angles1 far surpassing in precision all other measurements1 yet fall behind the accuracy of bank-accounts1 and that the ordinary determinations of physical constants1 such as appear from month to month in the journals1 are about on a par with an upholsterer's measurements of carpets and curtains1 the idea of mathematical exactitude being demonstrated in the laboratory will appear simply ridiculous4 ,there is a recognised method of estimating the probable magnitudes of errors in physics1--the method of least squares4 ,it is universally admitted that this method makes the errors smaller than they really are2 yet even according to that theory an error indefinitely small is indefinitely improbable2 so that any statement to the effect that a certain continuous quantity has a certain exact value1 if well-founded at all1 must be founded on something other than observation4 ,still1 ,i am obliged to admit that this rule is subject to a certain qualification4 ,namely1 it only applies to continuous#ec quantity4 ,now1 certain kinds of continuous quantity are discontinuous at one or at two limits1 and for such limits the rule must be modified4 ,thus1 the length of a line cannot be less than zero4 ,suppose1 then1 the question arises how long a line a certain person had drawn from a marked point on a piece of paper4 ,if no line at all can be seen1 the observed length is zero2 and the only conclusion this observation warrants is that the length of the line is less than the smallest length visible with the optical power employed4 ,but indirect observations1--for example1 that the person supposed to have drawn the line was never within fifty feet of the paper1--may make it probable that no line at all was made1 so that the concluded length will be strictly zero4 ,in like manner1 experience no doubt would warrant the conclusion that there is absolutely no indigo in a given ear of wheat1 and absolutely no attar in a given lichen4 ,but such inferences can only be rendered valid by positive experiential evidence1 direct or remote1 and cannot rest upon a mere inability to detect the quantity in question4 ,we have reason to think there is no indigo in the wheat1 because we have remarked that wherever indigo is produced it is produced in considerable quantities1 to mention only one argument4 ,we have reason to think there is no attar in the lichen1 because essential oils seem to be in general peculiar to single species1 if the question had been whether there was iron in the wheat or the lichen1 though chemical analysis should fail to detect its presence1 we should think some of it probably was there1 since iron is almost everywhere4 ,without any such information1 one way or the other1 we could only abstain from any opinion as to the presence of the substance in question4 ,it cannot1 ,i conceive1 be maintained that we are in any better position than this in regard to the presence of the element of chance or spontaneous departures from law in nature4 ,those observations which are generally adduced in favor of mechanical causation simply prove that there is an element of regularity in nature1 and have no bearing whatever upon the question of whether such regularity is exact and universal1 or not4 ,nay1 in regard to this exactitude1 all observation is directly opposed to it2 and the most that can be said is that a good deal of this observation can be explained away4 ,try to verify any law of nature1 and you will find that the more precise your observations1 the more certain they will be to show irregular departures from the law4 ,we are accustomed to ascribe these1 and ,i do not say wrongly1 to errors of observation2 yet we cannot usually account for such errors in any antecedently probable way4 ,trace their causes back far enough1 and you will be forced to admit they are always due to arbitrary determination1 or chance4 ,but it may be asked whether if there were an element of real chance in the universe it must not occasionally be productive of signal effects such as could not pass unobserved4 ,in answer to this question1 without stopping to point out that there is an abundance of great events which one might be tempted to suppose were of that nature1 it will be simplest to remark that physicists hold that the particles of gases are moving about irregularly1 substantially as if by real chance1 and that by the principles of probabilities there must occasionally happen to be concentrations of heat in the gases contrary to the second law of thermodynamics1 and these concentrations1 occurring in explosive mixtures1 must sometimes have tremendous effects4 ,here1 then1 is in substance the very situation supposed2 yet no phenomena ever have resulted which we are forced to attribute to such chance concentration of heat1 or which anybody1 wise or foolish1 has ever dreamed of accounting for in that manner4 ,in view of all these considerations1 ,i do not believe that anybody1 not in a state of case-hardened ignorance respecting the logic of science1 can maintain that the precise and universal conformity of facts to law is clearly proved1 or even rendered particularly probable1 by any observations hitherto made4 ,in this way1 the determined advocate of exact regularity will soon find himself driven to a priori reasons to support his thesis4 ,these received such a sockdologer from ,stuart ,mill in his ,examination of ,hamilton1 that holding to them now seems to me to denote a high degree of imperviousness to reason2 so that ,i shall pass them by with little notice4 ,to say that we cannot help believing a given proposition is no argument1 but it is a conclusive fact if it be true2 and with the substitution of 8,i0 for 8we10 it is true in the mouths of several classes of minds1 the blindly passionate1 the unreflecting and ignorant1 and the person who has overwhelming evidence before his eyes4 ,but that which has been inconceivable to-day has often turned out indisputable on the morrow4 ,inability to conceive is only a stage through which every man must pass in regard to a number of beliefs1--unless endowed with extraordinary obstinacy and obtuseness4 ,his understanding is enslaved to some blind compulsion which a vigorous mind is pretty sure soon to cast off4 ,some seek to back up the a priori position with empirical arguments4 ,they say that the exact regularity of the world is a natural belief1 and that natural beliefs have generally been confirmed by experience4 ,there is some reason in this4 ,natural beliefs1 however1 if they generally have a foundation of truth1 also require correction and purification from natural illusions4 ,the principles of mechanics are undoubtedly natural beliefs2 but1 for all that1 the early formulations of them were exceedingly erroneous4 ,the general approximation to truth in natural beliefs is1 in fact1 a case of the general adaptation of genetic products to recognisable utilities or ends4 ,now1 the adaptations of nature1 beautiful and often marvellous as they verily are1 are never found to be quite perfect2 so that the argument is quite against the absolute exactitude of any natural belief1 including that of the principle of causation4 ,another argument1 or convenient commonplace1 is that absolute chance is inconceivable4 ,this word has eight current significations4 ,the ,century ,dictionary enumerates six4 ,those who talk like this will hardly be persuaded to say in what sense they mean that chance is inconceivable4 ,should they do so1 it would easily be shown either that they have no sufficient reason for the statement or that the inconceivability is of a kind which does not prove that chance is non-existent4 ,another a priori argument is that chance is unintelligible2 that is to say1 while it may perhaps be conceivable1 it does not disclose to the eye of reason the how or why of things2 and since a hypothesis can only be justified so far as it renders some phenomenon intelligible1 we never can have any right to suppose absolute chance to enter into the production of anything in nature4 ,this argument may be considered in connection with two others4 ,namely1 instead of going so far as to say that the supposition of chance can never properly be used to explain any observed fact1 it may be alleged merely that no facts are known which such a supposition could in any way help in explaining4 ,or again1 the allegation being still further weakened1 it may be said that since departures from law are not unmistakably observed1 chance is not a vera causa1 and ought not unnecessarily to be introduced into a hypothesis4 ,these are no mean arguments1 and require us to examine the matter a little more closely4 ,come1 my superior opponent1 let me learn from your wisdom4 ,it seems to me that every throw of sixes with a pair of dice is a manifest instance of chance4 8,while you would hold a throw of deuce-ace to be brought about by necessity80 ,the opponent's supposed remarks are placed in quotation marks4 ,clearly one throw is as much chance as another4 8,do you think throws of dice are of a different nature from other events80 ,i see that ,i must say that all the diversity and specificalness of events is attributable to chance4 8,would you1 then1 deny that there is any regularity in the world80 ,that is clearly undeniable4 ,i must acknowledge there is an approximate regularity1 and that every event is influenced by it4 ,but the diversification1 specificalness1 and irregularity of things ,i suppose is chance4 ,a throw of sixes appears to me a case in which this element is particularly obtrusive4 8,if you reflect more deeply1 you will come to see that chance is only a name for a cause that is unknown to us40 ,do you mean that we have no idea whatever what kind of causes could bring about a throw of sixes8 8,on the contrary1 each die moves under the influence of precise mechanical laws40 ,but it appears to me that it is not these laws which made the die turn up sixes2 for these laws act just the same when other throws come up4 ,the chance lies in the diversity of throws2 and this diversity cannot be due to laws which are immutable4 8,the diversity is due to the diverse circumstances under which the laws act4 ,the dice lie differently in the box1 and the motion given to the box is different4 ,these are the unknown causes which produce the throws1 and to which we give the name of chance2 not the mechanical law which regulates the operation of these causes4 ,you see you are already beginning to think more clearly about this subject40 ,does the operation of mechanical law not increase the diversity8 8,properly not4 ,you must know that the instantaneous state of a system of particles is defined by six times as many numbers as there are particles1 three for the co-ordinates of each particle's position1 and three more for the components of its velocity4 ,this number of numbers1 which expresses the amount of diversity in the system1 remains the same at all times4 ,there may be1 to be sure1 some kind of relation between the co-ordinates and component velocities of the different particles1 by means of which the state of the system might be expressed by a smaller number of numbers4 ,but1 if this is the case1 a precisely corresponding relationship must exist between the co-ordinates and component velocities at any other time1 though it may doubtless be a relation less obvious to us4 ,thus1 the intrinsic complexity of the system is the same at all times40 ,very well1 my obliging opponent1 we have now reached an issue4 ,you think all the arbitrary specifications of the universe were introduced in one dose1 in the beginning1 if there was a beginning1 and that the variety and complication of nature has always been just as much as it is now4 ,but ,i1 for my part1 think that the diversification1 the specification1 has been continually taking place4 ,should you condescend to ask me why ,i so think1 ,i should give my reasons as follows3 #a7 ,question any science which deals with the course of time4 ,consider the life of an individual animal or plant1 or of a mind4 ,glance at the history of states1 of institutions1 of language1 of ideas4 ,examine the successions of forms shown by paleontology1 the history of the globe as set forth in geology1 of what the astronomer is able to make out concerning the changes of stellar systems4 ,everywhere the main fact is growth and increasing complexity4 ,death and corruption are mere accidents or secondary phenomena4 ,among some of the lower organisms1 it is a moot point with biologists whether there be anything which ought to be called death4 ,races1 at any rate1 do not die out except under unfavorable circumstances4 ,from these broad and ubiquitous facts we may fairly infer1 by the most unexceptionable logic1 that there is probably in nature some agency by which the complexity and diversity of things can be increased2 and that consequently the rule of mechanical necessity meets in some way with interference4 #b7 ,by thus admitting pure spontaneity or life as a character of the universe1 acting always and everywhere though restrained within narrow bounds by law1 producing infinitesimal departures from law continually1 and great ones with infinite infrequency1 ,i account for all the variety and diversity of the universe1 in the only sense in which the really sui generis and new can be said to be accounted for4 ,the ordinary view has to admit the inexhaustible multitudinous variety of the world1 has to admit that its mechanical law cannot account for this in the least1 that variety can spring only from spontaneity1 and yet denies without any evidence or reason the existence of this spontaneity1 or else shoves it back to the beginning of time and supposes it dead ever since4 ,the superior logic of my view appears to me not easily controverted4 #c7 ,when ,i ask the necessitarian how he would explain the diversity and irregularity of the universe1 he replies to me out of the treasury of his wisdom that irregularity is something which from the nature of things we must not seek to explain4 ,abashed at this1 ,i seek to cover my confusion by asking how he would explain the uniformity and regularity of the universe1 whereupon he tells me that the laws of nature are immutable and ultimate facts1 and no account is to be given of them4 ,but my hypothesis of spontaneity does explain irregularity1 in a certain sense2 that is1 it explains the general fact of irregularity1 though not1 of course1 what each lawless event is to be4 ,at the same time1 by thus loosening the bond of necessity1 it gives room for the influence of another kind of causation1 such as seems to be operative in the mind in the formation of associations1 and enables us to understand how the uniformity of nature could have been brought about4 ,that single events should be hard and unintelligible1 logic will permit without difficulty3 we do not expect to make the shock of a personally experienced earthquake appear natural and reasonable by any amount of cogitation4 ,but logic does expect things general to be understandable4 ,to say that there is a universal law1 and that it is a hard1 ultimate1 unintelligible fact1 the why and wherefore of which can never be inquired into1 at this a sound logic will revolt2 and will pass over at once to a method of philosophising which does not thus barricade the road of discovery4 #d7 ,necessitarianism cannot logically stop short of making the whole action of the mind a part of the physical universe4 ,our notion that we decide what we are going to do1 if as the necessitarian says1 it has been calculable since the earliest times1 is reduced to illusion4 ,indeed1 consciousness in general thus becomes a mere illusory aspect of a material system4 ,what we call red1 green1 and violet are in reality only different rates of vibration4 ,the sole reality is the distribution of qualities of matter in space and time4 ,brain-matter is protoplasm in a certain degree and kind of complication1--a certain arrangement of mechanical particles4 ,its feeling is but an inward aspect1 a phantom4 ,for1 from the positions and velocities of the particles at any one instant1 and the knowledge of the immutable forces1 the positions at all other times are calculable2 so that the universe of space1 time1 and matter is a rounded system uninterfered with from elsewhere4 ,but from the state of feeling at any instant1 there is no reason to suppose the states of feeling at all other instants are thus exactly calculable2 so that feeling is1 as ,i said1 a mere fragmentary and illusive aspect of the universe4 ,this is the way1 then1 that necessitarianism has to make up its accounts4 ,it enters consciousness under the head of sundries1 as a forgotten trifle2 its scheme of the universe would be more satisfactory if this little fact could be dropped out of sight4 ,on the other hand1 by supposing the rigid exactitude of causation to yield1 ,i care not how little1--be it but by a strictly infinitesimal amount1--we gain room to insert mind into our scheme1 and to put it into the place where it is needed1 into the position which1 as the sole self-intelligible thing1 it is entitled to occupy1 that of the fountain of existence2 and in so doing we resolve the problem of the connection of soul and body4 #e7 ,but ,i must leave undeveloped the chief of my reasons1 and can only adumbrate it4 ,the hypothesis of chance-spontaneity is one whose inevitable consequences are capable of being traced out with mathematical precision into considerable detail4 ,much of this ,i have done and find the consequences to agree with observed facts to an extent which seems to me remarkable4 ,but the matter and methods of reasoning are novel1 and ,i have no right to promise that other mathematicians shall find my deductions as satisfactory as ,i myself do1 so that the strongest reason for my belief must for the present remain a private reason of my own1 and cannot influence others4 ,i mention it to explain my own position2 and partly to indicate to future mathematical speculators a veritable goldmine1 should time and circumstances and the abridger of all joys prevent my opening it to the world4 ,if now ,i1 in my turn1 inquire of the necessitarian why he prefers to suppose that all specification goes back to the beginning of things1 he will answer me with one of those last three arguments which ,i left unanswered4 ,first1 he may say that chance is a thing absolutely unintelligible1 and therefore that we never can be entitled to make such a supposition4 ,but does not this objection smack of nave impudence8 ,it is not mine1 it is his own conception of the universe which leads abruptly up to hard1 ultimate1 inexplicable1 immutable law1 on the one hand1 and to inexplicable specification and diversification of circumstances on the other4 ,my view1 on the contrary1 hypothetises nothing at all1 unless it be hypothesis to say that all specification came about in some sense1 and is not to be accepted as unaccountable4 ,to undertake to account for anything by saying boldly that it is due to chance would1 indeed1 be futile4 ,but this ,i do not do4 ,i make use of chance chiefly to make room for a principle of generalisation1 or tendency to form habits1 which ,i hold has produced all regularities4 ,the mechanical philosopher leaves the whole specification of the world utterly unaccounted for1 which is pretty nearly as bad as to boldly attribute it to chance4 ,i attribute it altogether to chance1 it is true1 but to chance in the form of a spontaneity which is to some degree regular4 ,it seems to me clear at any rate that one of these two positions must be taken1 or else specification must be supposed due to a spontaneity which develops itself in a certain and not in a chance way1 by an objective logic like that of ,hegel4 ,this last way ,i leave as an open possibility1 for the present2 for it is as much opposed to the necessitarian scheme of existence as my own theory is4 ,secondly the necessitarian may say there are1 at any rate1 no observed phenomena which the hypothesis of chance could aid in explaining4 ,in reply1 ,i point first to the phenomenon of growth and developing complexity1 which appears to be universal1 and which though it may possibly be an affair of mechanism perhaps1 certainly presents all the appearance of increasing diversification4 ,then1 there is variety itself1 beyond comparison the most obtrusive character of the universe3 no mechanism can account for this4 ,then1 there is the very fact the necessitarian most insists upon1 the regularity of the universe which for him serves only to block the road of inquiry4 ,then1 there are the regular relationships between the laws of nature1--similarities and comparative characters1 which appeal to our intelligence as its cousins1 and call upon us for a reason4 ,finally1 there is consciousness1 feeling1 a patent fact enough1 but a very inconvenient one to the mechanical philosopher4 ,thirdly1 the necessitarian may say that chance is not a vera causa1 that we cannot know positively there is any such element in the universe4 ,but the doctrine of the vera causa has nothing to do with elementary conceptions4 ,pushed to that extreme1 it at once cuts off belief in the existence of a material universe2 and without that necessitarianism could hardly maintain its ground4 ,besides1 variety is a fact which must be admitted2 and the theory of chance merely consists in supposing this diversification does not antedate all time4 ,moreover1 the avoidance of hypotheses involving causes nowhere positively known to act--is only a recommendation of logic1 not a positive command4 ,it cannot be formulated in any precise terms without at once betraying its untenable character1--,i mean as rigid rule1 for as a recommendation it is wholesome enough4 ,i believe ,i have thus subjected to fair examination all the important reasons for adhering to the theory of universal necessity1 and have shown their nullity4 ,i earnestly beg that whoever may detect any flaw in my reasoning will point it out to me1 either privately or publicly2 for if ,i am wrong1 it much concerns me to be set right speedily4 ,if my argument remains unrefuted1 it will be time1 ,i think1 to doubt the absolute truth of the principle of universal law2 and when once such a doubt has obtained a living root in any man's mind1 my cause with him1 ,i am persuaded1 is gained4 ,c4 ,s4 ,,peirce4 ,,footnotes3 #ec ,continuous is not exactly the right word1 but ,i let it go to avoid a long and irrelevant discussion4 ,,psychical ,,monism4 ,in modern thought1 ever since ,descartes introduced into the conception of all-comprising nature that perplexing distinction between thinking and extended substance1 the problem of reconciling so radical a dualism has formed the main task of those who have busied themselves with philosophical interpretation4 ,in the light of the ,cartesian system there seemed to exist two entirely disparate1 independent worlds2 the one in individual consciousness1 the other outside of it2 the one made of mental1 the other of material stuff4 ,how to conceive these two antithetical worlds1 as interdependent constituents of one and the same unitary nature is1 after many discarded attempts1 still the principal endeavor of systematic thinking4 ,every student of philosophy knows how ,descartes himself ascribed the evident concordance and intercommunication of the two worlds to the miraculous decree and intervention of the ,deity2 how ,spinoza sought to overcome the distracting dilemma by proving that the two substances are but attributes of one single absolute substance2 how ,leibnitz made both realms1 that of inwardness and that of outwardness1 form a consistent universe and keep consonant time by means of a divinely pre-established harmony2 and how numbers of less illustrious devices likewise failed to gain general acceptance4 ,a more important part in the development of modern thought was played by those other attempts1 which strove to reach a monistic interpretation by showing that nature in all its manifestations is constituted1 either solely by mind and its original endowments2 or1 on the contrary1 solely by matter and its original endowments4 ,thinkers versed in physical science felt inclined to look upon the material world as the matrix of all natural occurrences2 while those versed in psychical science were apt to conceive the mental world as containing within itself all there is of nature4 ,the physical hypothesis has proved its eminent efficiency by leading to a vastly more correct and faithful knowledge of the perceptible universe than had ever been previously attained4 ,still1 from the psychical standpoint it became nevertheless evident beyond contention1 that all so-called qualities of matter1 all that in any way enters into our perception of it1 is composed of nothing but mental constituents4 ,and this means simply1 that1 whatever we are actually conscious of1 must of necessity form part of our own consciousness1 and not of anything outside of it4 ,as to the truth of this fundamental psychological conception there is no longer any dispute among philosophers4 ,but there remains to be solved the all-important question1 whether or not there exists outside this consciousness of ours1 either beyond its peripheral1 perceptual range1 or beyond its central1 conceptual sphere1 another world which it merely symbolically reveals4 ,and in case such another extra-conscious world is found actually to exist1 how it comes to constitute1 together with the world of consciousness1 that unitary system of being of which we mentally and bodily seem to form part4 ,professor ,dewey in a series of articles in ,mind 7,nos4 #da1 #db1 #di1 #eg7 and in one recently published in this journal 7,vol4 ,,ii1 ,no4 #a7 advocates--more profoundly and consistently than has been done before by any ,neo-,kantian or ,neo-,hegelian--the view1 that consciousness itself intuits all phenomena of nature by force of its own intrinsic activity1 imparting to them their significance as knowledge by discriminating their specific position and value within its own all-comprising organic totality of being4 ,he believes thus in no other world than that of self-consciousness2 asserting that neither its perceptual nor its conceptual content are significative of any reality beyond4 ,the editor1 though an ardent defender of cosmic ,monism1 is by no means a convert to such purely psychical monism4 ,he maintains1 on the contrary1 in the same issue of ,the ,monist 7p4 #he71 that1 8,the mental picture of a tree becomes a symbol for a special object outside of us1 and is projected to the place where experience has taught us to expect that object40 ,consequently1 the mental picture refers as knowledge to something outside of us1 to something not forming part of our consciousness4 ,the present writer believes likewise1 that the perceptual tree is merely a mental symbol signalising an extra-mental1 sense-stimulating existent2 and that the value of this symbol as knowledge consists altogether in its implication of the existence of an entity subsisting outside our own being and its consciousness1 and having power to affect our sensibility in definite more or less recognised ways4 ,the editor and the present writer assert then1 that the content of perceptual consciousness forms merely a symbolical representation of a corresponding reality subsisting outside consciousness2 while ,professor ,dewey acknowledges as really existent only self-consciousness1 and nothing outside of it1 either peripherically stimulating the senses1 or centrally imparting universality to individual intelligence4 ,the former view frankly admits duality in nature1 so far as conscious and extra-conscious existence are concerned4 ,and in order to overcome this dualism of ordo idearum and ordo rerum--essentially the same dualism as bequeathed to us by ,descartes--it has to show how the world within consciousness with its 8mental picture10 and the world 8outside of us0 containing the existent symbolically represented2 how these totally disparate worlds come to constitute a unitary nature1 whose divers modes of existence are throughout interdependently connected4 ,it is clear that the reality symbolised by the 8mental picture0--if any such reality actually exists--can be known to us solely as thus mentally symbolised1 and not known to us in any way as it subsists extra-mentally 8outside of us10 as it subsists in itself when not thus symbolically represented by our casual and intermittent perception of it4 ,the mental picture being a mere representative symbol must needs differ toto genere from the non-mental existent symbolised thereby4 ,we know only what as mental representation is forming part of our consciousness4 ,we cannot possibly know anything we are not conscious of4 ,the entity 8outside of us10 the 8thing in itself0--if it at all exists--is therefore as such of necessity unknown to us4 ,this confession of ontological ignorance is unavoidably involved in the acceptance of a symbolised reality 8outside of us40 ,the complex and prodigious difficulties in the way of a monistic interpretation1 when we start with the dualistic presupposition of a conscious and an extra-conscious world1 are all effectively circumvented1 as soon as with ,professor ,dewey we deny altogether the existence of a world of 8things-in-themselves0 or sense-affecting existents1 and roundly assert that consciousness as such constitutes1 comprises1 and has direct knowledge of ultimate reality2 that it is in fact itself the absolute all-sufficient and all-efficient entity4 ,to understand the philosophical strength and influence of a position so strangely at variance with that of current common sense1 which holds as self-evident the existence of body as well as mind1 we have somewhat to probe its deep-laid foundations in the history of modern thought4 ,it was rendered plausible through ,descartes's1 ,locke's1 ,berkeley's1 and ,hume's philosophical argumentation1 that what we are consciously aware of1 what is actually present to us as perception or 8idea10 and therewith as the world at large1 is altogether made up of a more or less complex combination of our own actual and remembered sensations4 ,the conscious content itself was thus necessarily held to constitute the exclusive object of philosophical research4 ,and by starting with sensations as its primordial elements1 and taking all 8ideas10 or facts of memory1 to be but faint reproductions of such elements1 it became the task of investigators 8of the human mind0 to analyse the given content of consciousness into these its assumed elements1 and to discover the 8laws0 or general ways of their combination4 ,proud of its purely experiential method1 concerned about nothing but what is actually found present in consciousness1 this mode of philosophising disclaimed1 in consequence1 all knowledge of any 8power0 giving rise from without to sensorial 8impressions0 and their order of conscious emergence4 ,and it ignored likewise the existence of any 8power0 combining and systematising them from within2 and1 moreover1 of any entity for whom the sensorially constituted experience had intelligent significance4 ,such nominalistic1 sensorial idealism has until lately reigned supreme in ,english philosophy4 ,previous to the new departure introduced by it philosophical interpretation had always followed the method of conceptual evolution1 carried on according to the rules of formal or deductive logic4 ,it took some widely inclusive1 ready-made concepts as its starting points or major premises1 and extracted therefrom all knowledge that seemed to be implicitly contained in them4 ,even ,kant in his younger days had no idea that valid knowledge or truth could possibly be attained in any other way than by logically deducing it from ready-made premises4 ,at a later period he learned from ,hume to distinguish between what he termed analytical and synthetical propositions1 and what had been called by the former thinker connection between vivid impressions or matter of fact on the one side1 and connection between their faint copies or the so-called ideas on the other side4 ,the discovery on the part of ,kant1 that our knowledge of the actual connection of matters of facts has in every instance to be learned from direct experience and cannot be ratiocinatively deduced from ready-made general notions1 was a complete revelation to him4 ,it changed his entire way of thinking1 and became the starting-point of his system of critical or transcendental philosophy4 ,he saw clearly1 that1 if all instructive cognition is gained1 and has always been gained1 solely by means of actual experience1 if it has been synthetically built up bit by bit as directly given to us1 without our being able to construct a valid system of knowledge transcending in any way actual experience2 that reason then as a knowledge-constituting faculty is impotent1 and that metaphysics1 as the science of a realm of intelligible existence1 must be ever more rejected as a pure illusion4 ,kant's thought1 like that of most of our own rationalistic thinkers1 was however predominantly swayed by the belief in an intelligible world1 the veritable home of man's spiritual being1 where it eternally abideth in close communion with a supreme creative intelligence4 ,after a brief attack of ,humian scepticism1 the theologically trained1 though rationally wide-awake and profound thinker1 set out to examine the faculties of reason with a view to discover a philosophically legitimate ingress into that cherished realm of intelligible subsistence4 ,hitherto reason had been effectively used in philosophy only as an analytic instrument4 ,real knowledge being1 however1 as proved by ,hume1 a matter of synthesis1 it would evidently be making proper way toward a rationally conceived intelligible world1 if it could be proved that reason is itself in possession of synthetical powers4 ,after many years of profound meditation in this direction1 ,kant gave its results to the philosophical world4 ,he had become convinced that mathematical truth1 instead of being analytically derived as hitherto believed1 is on the contrary built up synthetically by intelligence itself1 and this without the aid of externally imparted experience2 that intelligence is therefore efficient to form synthetical propositions a priori4 ,it followed1 as a matter of course1 that time and space in which mathematical figurations take shape1 are not conditions of existence outside of us1 but original forms of our own perceptive faculty1 and that intelligence by dint of its synthetical powers constructs mathematical figurations within these perceptual forms4 ,and finally the conclusion was reached that time and space1 the empty forms of perception1 being themselves wholly deficient of any kind of activity1 it must be intelligence alone which possesses synthetical efficiency1 which exercises in fact whatever activity is operative in the conscious world4 ,but though ,kant enthroned intelligence as the creator of pure mathematics1 and endowed it with the exclusive gift of synthetical efficiency1 he did not see his way to constitute it also the creator of the sense-given material that comes experientially to fill the empty and passive forms of perception4 ,against all denunciations of his system as purely idealistic1 he insisted that there exists outside our being and its consciousness a world of things-in-themselves1 having power to affect our sensibility1 so that time and space1 its receptive forms1 become filled with experiential1 though wholly unsynthetised material4 ,reluctantly1 though in faithful adherence to the unbiassed results of his investigation1 he was at last led to declare that intelligence or reason as an instrument of knowledge--called by him theoretical reason in contradistinction to practical reason1 conceived as the leading principle of moral conduct2--that such theoretical reason has power only over sensorially given material1 and is incapable of attaining knowledge of the intelligible sphere4 ,still ,kant regarded his so-called categories or synthetical functions of reason as modes of activity1 belonging not only to individual reason1 but to reason in general4 ,and on the strength of this realistic generalisation he attributed to them the power of imparting necessity to synthetical propositions1 such propositions--otherwise merely subjective or empirical--being rendered thereby objective or universally valid4 ,he showed1 moreover1 that the relation of every kind of knowledge to a common centre of all-inclusive awareness1--that this 8synthetic unity of apperception0 as he called it1--presupposes an intelligible ego1 whose veritable nature becomes however nowise manifest within our time-and-space-conditioned experience4 ,and he taught that an all-comprehending intelligible being had to be hypostatised in order to complete the totality of rational knowledge4 ,thus1 instead of giving us a monistic philosophy1 ,kant's theoretical speculations disclosed1 on the contrary1 a tripartite world4 ,at the centre the non-manifest intelligible ego in communion with a supernatural sphere1 and conceived as the veritable bearer of the synthetical reason4 ,in the median and only known region the synthetical reason itself1 constructing and cognising nature1 by synthetically elaborating the chaotic manifold in time and space4 ,and at the periphery1 beyond our own being and its perception1 an unknowable realm of things-in-themselves affecting our sensibility4 ,so complex an appearance did existence assume under ,kant's critical inspection4 ,contemplative man1 however1 never ceases to hanker after a monistic world-conception4 ,though individualised1 he feels himself one with universal being1 and strenuously strives to understand how those bonds of union are established1 and what part he in verity is playing in this stupendous drama of being and becoming4 ,to most philosophers1 before ,kant1 knowledge seemed to be given to us ready-made1 first conceptually as innate ideas or universal notions2 and then perceptually as the finished image of an outside world4 ,kant has exerted1 and still exerts1 a controlling influence over thinkers by having systematically demonstrated1 that not only knowledge1 but nature itself as we know it1 is constructed by powers inherent in our own being4 ,he taught that we ourselves1 by force of our combining and ordering intellectual organisation1 fashion out of meaningless sense-material the wondrous world we know4 ,and1 moreover1 that by force of our intelligible being we have power to bend the otherwise rigorously mechanical course of nature in compliance with moral injunctions4 ,no wonder that so inspiriting a philosophy electrified to new vigor and valiant self-reliance the dogmatically slumbering life of ,german thought4 ,and it was ,fichte1 above all other followers of ,kant1 who by his fervent exposition kindled in crowds of hearers the vivifying spark of this 8new philosophy0 of all-efficient intelligence4 ,fichte is the real father of such psychical monism as has recently found so proficient an expounder in ,professor ,dewey4 ,fichte understood1 what ,kant failed to see1 that the 8dynamical idealism0 of nature-constituting reason involves1 not merely the elaboration of sense-given material1 but the out and out production within consciousness of the entire world of perception4 ,for perception undeniably takes place within our own being1 and must therefore be1 as regards matter as well as form1 the outcome of powers inherent in ourselves4 ,between a consistent dream and the apperception of reality the difference lies merely in our feeling1 in the latter instance1 compelled in a peculiar manner to perceive what we perceive4 ,but this feeling of compulsion is likewise a constituent of our own consciousness1 and1 moreover1 under the influence of hallucinations even this test of reality fails us4 ,according to ,fichte's matured thought1 our being consists altogether in intellectual activity1 an activity rendering explicit by means of self-consciousness what it already implicitly contains4 ,and it is universal being that becomes thus self-conscious in us4 ,infinite reason1 constituting a system of ideas1 a spiritual organisation1 is the fount and origin of all existence1 its own self-revelation becoming manifest in finite beings4 ,thus1 by force of logical consistency1 was eliminated from ,kantian transcendentalism the world of things-in-themselves as superfluous to all-constituting intelligence4 ,and the unification of individual self-consciousness with universal intelligence was established by considering individual self-consciousness as partaking in the self-revealing activity of universal intelligence4 ,hegel elaborated systematically the psychical or idealistic monism thus foreshadowed in ,fichte's later writings4 ,philosophical interpretation turns principally upon the source and import of consciousness4 ,and from the recognition of the fact1 that all constituents of perception form part of this consciousness of ours1 it obviously follows that objects1 and indeed the entire objective world realised in perception and solely as perception2 that the realisation of this entire world of perceptual objects is in verity realisation of a world contained in our own being or subject4 ,subject and object are therefore1 from this point of view1 at bottom identical2 the objective world--our human bodies included--being a self-revelation of our all-comprehending subject4 ,mind as well as matter1 that which we call mental and that which we call material1 are thus mere abstract terms denoting the subjective and objective sides of one and the same reality4 ,this reality transcendental idealism declares to be 8intellectual activity40 ,it is intellectual activity which--from its point of view--is revealing itself in the conscious content1 becoming thus self-conscious4 ,this process of recognition of one's self as subject-object1 as the unitary essence and completion of both1 is what ,hegel calls the 8,idea40 ,and with him theoretical or logical self-recognition and practical or ethical self-realization coincide as 8,absolute ,idea40 ,for to think absolute truth and to will its realisation are but two sides of one and the same activity4 ,thought1 intelligence1 reason1 knowing itself as in every sense veritable being is thus the absolute ,one and ,all4 ,such out and out psychical monism is the legitimate outcome of a conception which takes the content of consciousness to be ultimate reality1 signifying nothing beyond itself2 and which then constitutes a spiritually conceived entity1 called thought1 intelligence1 or reason1 as the originator and bearer of such consciousness4 ,after a period of glorious triumph the ,hegelian philosophy of self-evolving intelligence became a general laughing-stock at home and abroad4 ,this ignominious fate overtook it1 first in consequence of its fawning prostitution by the master himself to the reactionary service of ,church and ,state2 and then also in consequence of the ridiculous 8pyrotechnical0 abuse of its dialectical method by the 8,young-,hegelians40 ,however1 by 8going back to ,kant10 the teachings of transcendental idealism have in our time once more gained the ascendency1 and have succeeded not only in conquering materialism1 but also in invading and almost supplanting ,english experientialism4 ,in ,germany1 after a season of complete estrangement between science and philosophy1 a re-approachment was effected by the ,neo-,kantian movement4 ,it originated principally in the recognition on the part of science1 that sense-perception is above all a psychical and not a purely physiological process1 a mental not a material fact2 that therefore the effort to arrive at a correct 8theory of knowledge0 is by no means a vain endeavor1 and that psychics as well as physics deserves a place in the hierarchy of sciences4 ,in ,england and ,america the ,neo-,kantian movement owed1 on the other hand1 its success1 above all1 to such theistic rationalism as found popular expression in 8,robert ,elsmere40 ,in ,professor ,caird's words it is said to afford a means for the 8vindication of the religious consciousness40 ,and this it accomplishes 8by an objective or absolute synthesis10 which establishes 8the indivisible unity of the intelligence and the intelligible world10 8the unity of man as spiritual with an absolute spirit40 ,dr4 ,hutchison ,sterling's 8,secret of ,hegel0 gave the first effective impulse to this transcendental mode of thinking among university men of a speculative turn4 ,the late ,thomas ,hill ,green of ,oxford and ,prof4 ,edward ,caird of ,glasgow became its foremost exponents1 and made numerous converts4 ,the former by elaborately disclosing1 by force of ,kant's principle of synthetical reason1 the insufficiency of the sensorial experientialism generally accepted in ,england since ,locke's 8,essay ,concerning ,human ,understanding40 ,the latter by consistently developing the idealistic and transcendental implications of this same principle of synthetical reason4 ,as repeatedly noticed1 and never to be lost sight of1 transcendental idealism derives its convincing force from the undeniable truth1 that whatever we are directly aware of forms part of our own consciousness4 ,this involves the indivisible unity of such fact as we are directly conscious of and the faculty through which we are conscious of it4 ,this unity of the realising self and the realised world1 of object and subject as content of consciousness2 or rather the unity of the objective and subjective factors of it1 this subject-object oneness of conscious states and occurrences is an irrefutable truth1 from which one has to start1 whatever direction one may take4 ,you assert1 then1 that that which exists thus interblended as consciousness is itself ultimate reality1 and you will encounter but little difficulty in deducing therefrom a pretty plausible psychical monism4 ,for the power through which and as which this ultimate reality exists is then immanent in us individually4 ,and when this power is conceived as intelligence or spirit1 and the world at large as existing solely as content of this spirit's consciousness1 or indeed as such consciousness itself1 it is clear that our own self-and-world-awareness must be--according to this view--identical in essence with the spiritual power which is ultimate and universal ,reality4 ,in self-consciousness1 when regarded as a totality of all actual and potential awareness1 our feelings as well as the perceptual objects composed of them constitute an organically completed order4 ,they all stand in definite and interdependent relations to our unitary being4 ,this all-comprising being has time and space as modes of gradual self-realisation1 but is not--according to transcendentalism--itself in time and space4 ,and this is undeniably true1 so far at least as the being that combines all transient events of experience into a unitary system of permanent knowledge cannot possibly itself form part of the ephemeral flux of conscious states experienced by it4 ,still the multifold individuations of the ultimate reality into separate personal self-consciousnesses and deciduous bodily organisms forms the great1 if not insuperable1 obstacle in the way of psychical monism4 ,if1 on the one hand1 we take with ,green and ,professor ,caird individual self-consciousness as a 8reproduction10 and not as a mere phase of universal consciousness2 and on the other hand admit a natural and gradual development 8of man as an animal organism10 instead of proving such natural development to be a misconception of our time and space bound recognition1 we are far from having as yet succeeded in establishing a consistent psychical monism on ,kantian lines4 ,his tripartite world remains ununified4 ,to achieve its unification is1 however1 after a profound study and appreciation of the difficulties to be encountered1 the arduous task ,professor ,dewey has courageously undertaken4 ,to accomplish his purpose he has to show how individual consciousness proves itself to be ultimate reality1 and as such identical with universal consciousness2 how man1 appearing among other perceptible objects in multifold individuated specimens as a gradually developed organism1 is nevertheless in reality a complete1 all-comprising entity1 not essentially subject to time1 space1 or numerical limitations4 ,and he has to make clear how all conscious content1 including the external world as well as the feeling and thinking subject1 has no other existence and significance than in and for consciousness4 ,professor ,dewey maintains that individual consciousness is in reality one with universal consciousness1 because it comprehends within itself subject-and-object-consciousness2 the abiding consciousness of oneself as an ever-changing individual1 and that of the world at large1 though figured in transient groups of sensations4 ,this being so1 that which is thus the bearer and realiser of all being and becoming in nature1 cannot itself form part of this becoming1 but must--according to ,professor ,dewey's view--be eternal and absolute4 ,the all-comprehending consciousness--and there is no existence outside of it--is thus identical with universal intelligence1 identical with that eternally active intelligence which is everlastingly creating the organic synthesis of all being and becoming4 8,consciousness the ultimate fact reveals itself as reason40 ,sensations have no self-existence1 no meaning in themselves4 ,they exist only as intellectually apprehended and for intelligence alone4 ,it is from intellectual interpretation that they receive their entire significance4 ,on solicitation of sensations the ideal content of universal intelligence becomes partially and interruptedly revealed to individual consciousness4 ,the sole office of sensations is to give in us occasion to this self-realisation of the eternal content of intelligence4 ,professor ,dewey establishes his psychical monism by discovering self-consciousness as the ,absolute1 the ,one and ,all4 ,individual idealism or so-called solipsism1 such as expounded by ,fichte in his earlier writings from the side of intellect1 and in the writings of ,english experientialists from the side of sensation1 this individual idealism presents itself likewise as a psychical monism1 but as an absurdly narrow one4 ,professor ,dewey points out how it fails to understand that by constituting mind1 as such1 the ego or subject for which all experience exists1 it artificially divides our unitary consciousness into two separate constituents1 and takes the subjective constituent to be the bearer and realiser of the objective constituent2 while in reality both constituents are but elements of consciousness in general2 are in fact completely unified in eternal and absolute consciousness4 ,now it is perfectly true1 that during conscious awareness object and subject-consciousness are inextricably interblended so as to constitute a unified experience4 ,it is true also1 that the veritable subject that thus consciously experiences1 and that furthermore imparts intelligent meaning to such experience1 cannot itself form part of these its own fragmentary and transient moments of awareness4 ,comprehending them all1 it must evidently be an enduring1 at least a relatively persistent being4 ,it is undoubtedly to such a persistent being or subject that experience gradually accrues1 and in whom it is all retained and organised into more or less systematic order4 ,but is there the least warrant for assuming that this persistent subject1 weaving thus intelligent experience out of its transient conscious states1 is itself 8consciousness0 or 8intelligence08 ,intelligent consciousness is very obviously only one of the functions of the persistent subject1 and by no means its being or essence4 ,and the experience accruing to it1 that at least of the external world1 bears nowise the characteristics of ,platonic reminiscence1 does nowise consist in self-revelation1 in the becoming explicitly aware of what already implicitly existed within itself4 ,we may indeed say1 that our emotions1 when aroused1 constitute such self-revelation4 ,but1 for instance1 yonder visual figuration1 consisting of nothing but colored forms1 though intelligently interpreted as a landscape with plains1 woods1 and creeks2 interpreted thus by the aid of no end of former experience2 this landscape now perceived by me for the first time was certainly not implicitly immanent in my consciousness previous to all my individual experience4 ,its conscious realisation does assuredly not render explicit as objective experience what for ever has been an organic member of my self-consciousness4 ,what is immanent in my being--not in my consciousness--is the sensorial faculty of symbolically picturing whatever sense-affecting agent is placed before me4 ,the conscious picture itself is an evanescent phenomenon1 having no steadfast existence or reality4 ,to assert--as is usually done by transcendentalists and by ,professor ,dewey among them--that our individual experience1 when--as mostly occurs--not actually conscious to ourselves1 exists then nevertheless as conscious content of a universal being2 to venture such an utterly gratuitous assertion1 even when merely hypothetically advanced1 transcends all legitimate inference from given facts4 ,when declared to be positively justified by given facts1 it all too obviously betrays the theological bias by which it is inspired1 the set purpose of vindicating the religious consciousness which has faith in 8the unity of man as spiritual with an absolute spirit40 ,through consciousness we indeed become aware of the divers faculties of our being1 together with their functionally accruing experience4 ,all this1 however1 rises into conscious awareness only at times1 when casually awakened4 ,to give to the vast system of consciously latent being and experience the name of 8consciousness10 to call that 8consciousness0 whose principal distinction is to constitute a persistent subject with an organised system of experience abiding for the most part in extra-conscious latency2 to do this only because all this extra-conscious existence may and does at times become more or less conscious2 this is surely committing the fatal error of denoting a state of things by its outright opposite4 ,there is no denying that most of the content of our being is usually not present in consciousness4 ,consequently1 abiding thus outside consciousness1 it cannot possibly form part of consciousness either individual or universal4 ,nothing could be more to the point than ,professor ,dewey's statement1 that 8only a living actual fact 7let us say existent instead of fact7 can preserve within its unity that organic system of differences in virtue of which it lives and moves and has its being40 ,there is not the least doubt that the subject1 who at times is conscious of more or less of his experience1 is exactly such an existent as here described4 ,but consciousness1 though the medium in which and through which everything is realised1 is itself but an intermittent function of that living actual subject which preserves within its unity the organic system of differences in virtue of which it lives and moves and has its being4 ,the consciousness of the subject conveys information to it only interruptedly and in broken bits4 ,these become organically unified into a more or less consistent totality of experience4 ,but this process of unification takes place1 not in the dream like stuff which makes up consciousness1 but in the persistent1 extra-conscious matrix whence our ever lapsing1 ever renewed moment of conscious awareness emerges ready-made4 ,the subject capable of thought and feeling becomes thinkingly and feelingly manifest to itself1 when its functions through which consciousness arises are in operation2 becomes manifest as bodily active to other sentient beings also1 when its functions through which such activity arises are in operation4 ,but if the real nature of the experiencing subject is not self-consciousness or intelligence1 what then can it be8 ,idealists1 and with them ,professor ,dewey1 become such by believing that the perceptually realised objects are themselves veritable reality1 and not mere symbols of extra-conscious reality4 ,now can they in all sincerity bring themselves to believe that a baby--to use one of ,professor ,dewey's illustrations--which experiences a sensation1 say a pain caused by the prick of a pin1 that this pain-experiencing baby is no other than that colored form within the perceptual consciousness of may be half a dozen spectators2 and that it is the perceptual pin within the consciousness of each of them that has pricked the baby and caused the pain8 ,does the pain-experiencing baby derive its existence from the fact that the intellect of the spectator interprets the perceptual form within his consciousness to signify a baby1 which has forever implicitly formed part of the organic content of his own self-consciousness8 ,surely the pain experienced by the baby is not experienced by the perceptually realised baby1 not by the baby existing as interpreted perception in the consciousness of him who perceives it4 ,the pain experienced by the baby does nowise form part of the consciousness of the perceiver4 ,consequently and incontestably1 the subject that experiences the sensation1 that experiences in fact any kind of feeling or thought1 is itself an extra-conscious being1 a being only casually and symbolically realised in consciousness4 ,and if the perceptual baby is merely a conscious symbol signalising an extra-conscious existent1 then all perceptual existence1 all that constitutes what we perceptually realise as nature1 symbolises likewise an extra-conscious reality1 a reality that has power so to affect our sensibility as to arouse in us perceptual representations of itself and its characteristics4 ,the matter stands then exactly as denied by ,professor ,dewey4 ,it is indeed the 8baby thing-in-itself which is affected10 and it is 8a world thing-in-itself which calls forth the sensation40 ,it is not1 as maintained by ,professor ,dewey the baby known to him as his own perception which experiences the sensation by having been pricked within the beholder's consciousness by a perceptually constituted pin4 ,but if the entity1 which affects the beholder's sensibility and awakens in him the percept of a baby1 exists in verity outside his1 the beholder's1 consciousness1 and is known to him only as thus symbolically pictured by his own percept2 such sense-affecting entity is1 on the other hand1 nowise to be construed as the unknowable 8,first ,cause10 nowise as that protean ,persistent ,force1 which ,mr4 ,spencer imagines capable of assuming every kind of mental or material appearance4 ,the so-called material or physical modes which constitute in the beholder the perceptually realised baby1 and the so-called immaterial or mental modes which are experienced by the baby as his sensations and emotions2 these material and mental modes are in no sense the manifestation of an 8,absolute ,force0 or 8inscrutable ,power10 as our ,spencerians would lead us religiously1 and almost theologically to believe4#ed ,the material modes that constitute the perceptually realised baby are awakened in the beholder by a definite sense-affecting existent1 which is thus revealing not only its bare presence1 but most vividly and minutely also its perceptible and distinguishing characteristics4 ,and in the same manner it makes also known that it is interdependently connected with the vast system of sense-affecting entities1 that constitutes nature in general4 ,all reality is interdependently conditioned4 ,the 8,unconditioned ,reality0 of the ,hamiltons1 ,mansels1 and ,spencers1 has nowhere any existence1 either in consciousness or outside of it4 ,it is altogether a fictitious1 superfluous1 and most misleading conception4 ,as regards the mental modes experienced by the baby1 they are evidently exclusively his own affections as a highly and most specifically organised being1 and not by any means are they modes of appearance of that most empty abstraction 8,the ,unknowable10 that has with so many believers usurped the throne of their former anthropomorphic ,deity4 ,this coiled up thing over there1 is it a rope or a snake8 ,i see it move1 and my intellect interprets it to be a snake4 ,surely the significance of the interpretation does not consist in my realising what was already implicitly contained in my consciousness1 but in knowing that in contact with the being out there1 which forms no part whatever of myself though perceptually realised by me1 ,i shall become affected in certain additional ways taught by former experience4 ,will any unbiassed and competent judge assert that the far-fetched idealistic interpretation is more in accordance with what we really experience1 than the very simple one here given8 ,no doubt the immediate object of physical observation is not the thing-in-itself1 but its perceptual realisation4 ,it is such1 however1 only as symbolical representation of something subsisting outside consciousness1 only as a conscious affection awakened with compulsory force in the observer from without4 ,the observer offers his diversely differentiated and delicately attuned sensibilities to the outside world and carefully notices its specific modes of reaction upon definite modes of stimulation4 ,this in truth is the method of scientific observation1 from which all conclusions regarding the characteristics of nature are drawn4 ,the conscious subject phylogenetically evolved in constant interaction with the medium in which he lives and moves and has his being1 possesses realising faculties so adjusted as to correctly subserve his needs in relation to such a medium4 ,he then furthermore uses these faculties in order to gain a fuller and more accurate knowledge of further perceptible characteristics of this same medium4 ,a monistic interpretation of nature cannot possibly be reached by assuming consciousness or intelligence to be ultimate reality1 and as such the ,one and ,all4 ,it can be reached only by recognising that consciousness is a function of subjects that stand in definite relations to the rest of nature1 and have power along with the other constituents of nature so to affect the sensibility of other sentient beings as to cause to arise therein the symbolical representation of themselves4 ,systematised experience consists in the organised totality of such symbolical representations4 ,and this organised totality of experience exists as potential possession of the subject in extra-conscious latency1 in what we figuratively call memory4 ,emerging on occasion into consciousness it reproduces more or less faithfully the order and connection of the manifold that constitutes the sense-affecting universe4 ,in highly developed sentient subjects self-realisation or the 8inner life10 which arises from the activity of their emotional and above all their social nature1 gains predominant influence over their sensual and perceptual experience1 urging them so to transform the given aspect of the outer world as to render it subservient to the aspirations of that inner life4 ,,edmund ,,montgomery4 ,,footnotes3 #ed ,mr4 ,spencer grapples with the problem of ultimate reality from three different and widely divergent standpoints4 ,first1 by assuming that our out and out conditioned nature and knowledge presupposes the existence of an 8,unconditioned ,reality10 he arrives at the conception of an 8,absolute ,cause40 ,second1 by attributing--in keeping with the principle of the ,conservation of ,energy1 all physical and psychical activity to the interconvertible play of modes of force1 he arrives at the conception of an 8,absolute ,force10 whence all these manifest modes proceed2 hinting1 moreover1 that1 as our experience of force-manifestation is of a psychical nature1 the 8,absolute ,force0 may rather be conceived as psychical than as physical4 ,third1 besides explaining at times that the psychical and physical modes1 instead of being interconvertible1 are only two different aspects of one and the same reality--and contrary to his assumption of the interconvertibility of psychical and physical modes proceeding from an ,absolute ,force1 he advocates in his ,transfigured ,realism the view1 that our perceptual consciousness figures representatively the corresponding characteristics of a world of things-in-themselves4 ,no wonder that ,spencerians are getting somewhat mixed1 as the saying is4 ,,the ,,conservation ,,of ,,spirit ,,and ,,the ,,origin ,,of ,,consciousness4 ,the consideration of the relation that subsists between body and mind is a topic that has led to several theories1 one of which has found favor with many on account of its supposed monistic implications4 ,dr4 ,carus in his work 8,the ,soul of ,man0 seems to adopt that theory1 and his method of explaining the matter is one of notable superiority4 ,he says3 8,matter and mind 7the elements of feeling7 are to be considered as one--not the same1 but one4 ,they are as inseparable as are the two sides of a sheet of paper4 ,if we look at it from the mind side its activity represents itself as elements of feeling and all kinds and degrees of actual feelings4 ,if we look at it from the matter side its activity represents itself as motions or as all kinds of potential and kinetic energy40 ,this doctrine of a double-faced unity has no doubt been favored because it has seemed the best and perhaps the only refuge available against the various forms of dualism4 ,still this same doctrine is very far from inducing that final pacification of mind which we rightly expect from a competent theory4 ,it is open to the charge of being arbitrary1 and it brings no access of insight4 ,the expressions of those whom we must suppose to be well affected towards any doctrine that gives promise of a monistic issue show this to be the case4 ,thus ,tyndall says3 8,i do not think that he 7i4 e4 the materialist7 is entitled to say that his molecular groupings and his molecular motions explain everything4 ,in reality they explain nothing4 ,the utmost that he can affirm is the association of two classes of phenomena of whose real bond of union he is in absolute ignorance4 ,the problem of the connection of body and soul is as insoluble in its modern form as it was in the prehistoric ages40 ,and ,huxley protests that1 8,how anything so remarkable as a state of consciousness comes about as a result of irritating nervous tissue is just as unaccountable as the appearance of the ,djinn when ,alladin rubbed his lamp40 ,in truth those who might be expected to speak with considerable reserve in regard to the inabilities of human attainment have emphasised without due sobriety the insuperable aspects of the problem4 ,the past history of culture should have counseled caution1 especially in view of the certainty that consciousness is somehow dependent upon nerve action4 ,it is submitted that the recent progress of science should induce a hopeful temper of mind on this question4 ,not only have physiology and psychology brought to light more results in the last decades than in centuries past1 but in positive monism and formal thought philosophy has also attained to a clearness of method which will prove beneficial to all special investigations4 ,a clear and concise statement of the new positivism is found in the chapter ,form and ,formal ,thought of 8,fundamental ,problems0 by ,dr4 ,carus4 ,any one who has watched the development of the algebra of thought and the philosophy of logic1 will naturally expect signal aid towards the solution of the world-questions from a proper consideration of form and the laws of form4 ,in ,dr4 ,carus's book and especially in the above mentioned chapter will be found a most popular exposition of that subject4 ,those who hold that form and formal thought is the very constituted means by which our information with respect to real existence may be improved1 ought to regard it a decided step towards the solution of any hitherto apparently inexplicable problem1 if we only but find ourselves able to formulate an idea or process that mediates between the known and the unknown1 and represents to our insight how it is possible to think of a phenomenon in accordance with notions that yield perceptible imagery4 ,riemann in what has been well characterised as his 8stupendous0 essay on 8,the hypotheses that lie at the basis of geometry0 remarks3 8,we are quite at liberty to suppose that the metric relations of space in the infinitely small do not conform to the hypotheses of geometry2 and we ought in fact to suppose it if we can thereby obtain a simpler explanation of phenomena40 ,so also ,jevons in his 8,principles of ,science0 commenting on 8,the ,character of the ,experimentalist0 refers to the audacity of speculation that characterised ,faraday and that was the leading of his efforts towards some of his most brilliant discoveries4 ,he says3 8,we have only to notice the profound conviction in the unity of natural laws1 the active powers of inference and imagination1 the unbounded license of theorising40 ,theory must precede experiment4 ,we must formulate before we can verify4 ,the words of ,faraday3 8,let us encourage ourselves by a little more imagination prior to experiment10 shows us the method he followed4 ,recent developments in connection with the study of electricity supply us with at least an analogy that may instruct us as to how we may suppose the appearance of consciousness as a result of nerve action4 ,the nature of electricity has long been an unformulated thesis4 ,that it may be produced by the motion of matter is proved by every dynamo in operation3 indeed the oldest experiments in static electricity are to the same effect4 ,at the present time it seems to be an acceptable doctrine or at least a good working hypothesis that electricity and magnetism are manifestations of that once hypothetical medium called the ether4 ,prof4 ,g4 ,f4 ,fitzgerald in his opening address before ,section ,a of the ,british ,association for the ,advancement of ,science in #ahhh made these very important remarks3 8,in a presidential address on the borderlands of the known1 delivered from this chair1 the great ,clerk ,maxwell spoke of it as an undecided question whether electro-magnetic phenomena are due to direct action at a distance or are due to the action of an intervening medium4 ,the year #ahhh will ever be memorable as the year in which this great question has been experimentally settled by ,hertz in ,germany4 ,henceforth ,i hope no learner will fail to be impressed with the theory--hypothesis no longer--that electro-magnetic actions are due to a medium pervading all known space40 ,that the ether really exists3 that it is a proved fact and that it is the substantial basis out of which electricity and magnetism arises1 are pretensions too momentous to remain unchallenged if they lacked good evidence in their favor4 ,yet instead of awakening dissent among the critical hosts of science1 these utterances of ,professor ,fitzgerald have not only been received as voicing the convictions of the scientific world but they are confirmed from time to time by the sometimes tacit and sometimes express assent of all who discourse upon the matters involved4 ,prof4 ,oliver ,lodge1 one of the leading scientific men of ,england and an acknowledged authority upon the subject has recently published a work entitled 8,modern ,views of ,electricity40 ,in his preface he says3 8,few things in physical science appear to me more certain than that what has so long been called electricity is a form or rather a mode of manifestation of the ether40 ,he supposes the ether as a compound of two constituents corresponding to positive and negative electricity4 ,each of these constituents has affinities1 cohesions1 or entanglements with the various kinds of matter1 which affinities1 cohesions1 or entanglements are greater or less according to the kind of matter involved1 so that by the motions of certain sorts of matter under proper conditions the two constituents of the ether are torn apart or separated1 or in the language of dynamics1 strained4 ,but at the same time these constituents also tend with unceasing persistence to reunite and saturate one another into a state of absolute neutrality4 ,separate1 these constituents show an existence and an energy towards one another4 ,united neither of them shows any existence at all nor any efficacy whatever4 ,they are as though they did not exist4 ,it is of small moment to the present purpose whether or not this electrical theory is well grounded4 ,in either case its very formulation supplies us with a suggestion as to how it is possible to think of consciousness as a product of nerve action4 ,just as the ether is supposed as the substantial basis out of which in consequence of the motion of matter electricity and magnetism becomes manifest1 so may we suppose an analogous 7perhaps the same7 basis surrounding and permeating all things1 and out of which in consequence of nerve action1 consciousness becomes manifest4 ,why may we not suppose this consciousness basis1 7which suppose we name spirit17 to be the ultimate substance which being variously modified by energy manifests in one case the phenomena of mind1 in another the phenomena of electricity1 magnetism1 etc41 and then again in a third case that phenomenon1 mass1 or inertia1 which is the essential attribute of matter8 ,as with the ether in the absence of any cause that separates it so that electricity and magnetism become manifest1 so spirit may be supposed to be utterly without manifestation and neutral until nerve action modifies its condition1 when like electricity in the one case1 so here1 consciousness becomes manifest4 ,why may we not imagine spirit as composed of two constituents corresponding to feeling and volition which united saturate one another into neutrality1 but which separated by nerve action manifest feeling that tends to pass into volition1 or volition that tends to pass into feeling8 ,this would be in accordance with the phenomena if of reflex action which is supposed to be the elementary type of mentality4 ,this is in harmony with the views of the author of 8,the ,soul of ,man10 for he1 although for other reasons1 also explains the origin of consciousness from tension4 ,he says3 8,consciousness is an intensified state of feeling caused through tension4 ,it lies between a want and its satisfaction4 ,satisfaction not being immediately attainable1 feelings are no longer in a state of equilibrium1 and it is this tension which concentrates and intensifies feeling into consciousness4 8,it appears that consciousness never arises without a certain tension4 ,days spent in an idyllic life flow away almost unconsciously2 there is little friction1 there are no problems to be solved2 there are no unsatisfied wants1 or if there are any1 they are quickly and easily attended to4 ,there is no need of consciousness1 there is not much tension to call it into play1 so life passes dreamlike as a tale that is told4 ,the more life is burdened with problems that demand a man's full care and deliberation1 and the stronger are his attempts to solve the problems of his situation1 the more intense will his consciousness be4 8,it appears to me very doubtful whether conscious beings could exist in a world--if such a world were possible at all--where the struggle for existence was unknown2 for it is the struggle for existence that presents the first and most imperative problems to living and feeling beings40 ,spirit or the elementary basis of consciousness considered as a quantity1 would on this supposition remain the same1 but the forms of its manifestations would change4 ,there would be more or less straining of spirit and accordingly more or less manifestation of consciousness4 ,or to formulate it in one sentence1 we would have to postulate the conservation of spirit4 ,such a supposition or some similar supposition if tolerable would bring our ideas into some sort of accord with scientific customs of explanation1 and would extricate our minds from that state of utter stultification into which they are cast whenever they are confronted with the relations of body and mind4 ,,francis ,c4 ,,russell4 ,,on ,,criminal ,,suggestion4 ,a widely known criminal trial has brought before thoughtful minds1 on both sides of the water1 this question1 viz43 ,whether a subject in a hypnotic condition possesses any free will1 and whether in such a state1 it is possible to transform him into a criminal or at least1 for the time being into becoming an accomplice in crime6 ,it is not the first time that this question has been agitated2 indeed at the very beginning of ,mesmerism1 as it was then called1 this idea was brought forward4 ,it was clearly formulated by ,dr4 ,charpignon1 whose own opinion nevertheless is1 that it was 8much easier to restore moral rectitude to a somnambulist who had fallen therefrom1 than to pervert the integrity of character of a woman of high moral standing40 ,in #ahff ,dr4 ,libeault1 in his work on1 8,sleep and ,kindred ,states of ,being10 of which at that time there were but six copies sold1 coincides entirely with this opinion4 ,the passage is too noticeable1 not to be quoted in its entirety4 7,p4 #ebd47 8,we may postulate1 as a first principle1 that a subject during the state of magnetic sleep1 is at the mercy of the hypnotiser4 ,i have made experiments that have confirmed me in this opinion2 ,i have many a time1 removed the hats of such persons1 searched their pockets1 drawn off the rings from their fingers1 untied their shoes1 etc41 444 without their having noticed the action at all1 or having made the least resistance1 the isolation into which ,i had thrown them1 being the cause of this absence of all consciousness4444 8,how very grave1 the possibilities1 are which may ensue from this state of being1 we may readily conceive6 ,what ,i have advanced here1 is the result of certain experiments which ,i made upon a young girl1 who1 while being very intelligent in her natural waking condition1 became during hypnotic sleep the most cross-grained and wilful person ,i had ever had to deal with4 ,nevertheless ,i always ended by mastering her will4 ,i was able to excite in her mind the most criminal resolves2 ,i roused her passions to a high degree4 ,i was able to cause her to fall into a violent rage with a person1 to fly out upon her with a knife in her hand2 having displaced in her mind the sentiment of friendship1 still armed with that instrument1 ,i sent her to stab her best friend1 whom ,i told her she saw in front of her2 she obeyed1 the knife burying itself in the wall opposite4 ,i almost prevailed upon another young girl1 who was however less under the influence1 to kill her own mother1 and though she wept1 she actually prepared to do the deed4 8,after all1 it has been known for a fact1 that a man1 who1 up to that moment1 was of sound mind1 hearing a voice continually repeating3 #8,kill your wife4 ,kill your children'--has obeyed this command1 incited thereto by an irresistible impulse2 and shall the hypnotic subject already predisposed to hallucination1 escape this same involuntary impulse8 ,i am firmly convinced1 after having made many other experiments1 that a subject to whom is suggested the commission of any bad action1 will carry out the crime after his awakening1 by reason of what has now become in him a fixed idea4 ,the most moral will become vitiated1 the highest-minded perverted4 8,if it has already been found possible to reform a woman of loose morals and bring her to abandon entirely her evil courses1 why cannot the reverse be effected and by the same means8 ,it would be in the power of the magnetiser to suggest to his subject1 not only to become a tale-bearer1 a calumniator1 a thief1 dissolute1 etc41 at some period subsequent to the magnetic sleep1 but1 he might use him1 for example1 as the instrument of his personal vengeance and the poor dreamer1 unmindful of the primary incitement to the criminal action1 would commit on another's account1 instead of on his own1 the evil deed1 prompted and forced on thereto1 by the irresistible suggestion and will1 imposed upon him by another person4 ,and when the crime shall have been consummated1 where shall he find the medical jurist1 who can hold up to ,justice1 the torch which is to throw the ,light of ,truth upon the act1 and challenge the innocency of a man1 who1 up to the moment of the crime never exhibited the slightest sign of insanity1 had shown every mark of a sound mind and yet1 when convicted of the dreadful deed1 states with every apparent sign of good faith1 that he has committed it of his own accord8 ,and who can tell whether such cases have not already taken place40 ,these momentous words passed unnoticed4 ,at that time1 the world did not believe in ,hypnotism4 ,m4 ,m4 ,richot and ,charcot restored it to a place of honor4 ,the ,school of the ,salptrire made its advent1 and saw in ,hypnotism a pathological condition4 ,simultaneously with this school of thought1 there arose the rival one at ,nancy1 which following its leader1 ,dr4 ,libeault1 saw in hypnotism1 only a psychological phenomenon4 ,one of the masters in this school1 ,m4 ,ligeois1 ,professor of the ,faculty of ,law1 in #ahhd1 in his pamphlet on 8,hypnotic ,suggestion1 in relation to ,civil and ,criminal ,law0 also propounded to the public this idea of criminal suggestion4 ,m4 ,ligeois1 like ,m4 ,libeault1 did not confine himself merely to theory4 ,he went on to demonstrate and prove his thesis by conclusive experiments4 ,strange to say1 the ,salptrire took issue on this point1 adopting and defending the opposite opinion4 ,i would now ask permission to raise my own voice in this debate1 and ,i am the more emboldened so to do1 inasmuch as my own personal observations and the study which ,i have brought to bear on this matter1 have caused me to pass1 so to speak1 from one rival camp to the other4 ,the thesis upheld by the ,school at ,nancy1 while it found in me at first an adherent1 finds me to-day an adversary4 ,just a word about myself to the readers of ,the ,monist4 ,i have always been a believer in ,magnetism4 ,at the outset1 and until towards #ahge1 merely on the faith of books1 later1 because ,i had been present at one or two more or less public exhibitions4 ,and it appears singular enough1 that though thus imperfectly trained in the knowledge of it1 ,i should have explained1 as ,i did in #ahfi1 the ecstasies and the stigmata of the celebrated ,louise ,lateau1 as coming simply from auto-suggestion2 and that even to-day1 there should be neither jot nor tittle to subtract from what ,i then wrote1 regarding it4 ,i only began practising magnetism at the commencement of #ahhf4 ,i was returning from a visit to the ,salptrire whither ,i had been attracted by my doubts on this very transference of thought and from which ,i returned with my doubts intensified4 ,i have already recounted1 in a series of articles1 that appeared in less than a year in the ,revue ,philosophique 78,upon ,memory in ,hypnotic ,subjects02 8,on the influence of ,imitation and ,education in ,somnambulism1 as exhibited in the so-called hypnotic sleep02 etc47 my experiences1 observations1 and inductions4 ,not to speak of my contributions to the ,magazines1 and notably to the ,revue de l',hypnotisme1 ,i introduced hypnotism into the science course of the ,royal ,academy of ,belgium by means of two works4 ,one1 on the 8,origin10 the other on the 8,extent of the ,curative ,effects of ,hypnotism0 7#ahhg-ahij74 ,besides many other polemical writings in favor of the liberty of holding public exhibitions 78,letters to ,m4 ,chiriar1 ,representative10 #ahhh4 8,magnetisers and ,physicians10 #ahij74 ,i related at length what ,m4 ,charcot and his pupils had shown me in ,paris1 as well as what ,m4 ,m4 ,libeault1 ,bernheim1 and ,ligeois1 had let me witness at ,nancy 78,a ,visit to the ,salptrire10 #ahhf--8;,a ,visit to the ,school at ,nancy10 #ahhi74 ,at the time then1 that ,i took upon myself to hypnotise1 ,i firmly believed that the subject became the property of the magnetiser2 passing over1 as of no importance1 the manifest resistances that ,i met with at every point and in every form on the part of subjects1 who1 in all other respects ,i found perfectly adapted to such experiments2 as for instance1 one who permitted his tongue to be pierced with a large darning needle by my sceptical colleague1 ,dr4 ,masius2 and to be burned several times1 both with a red hot iron and by thermocautery1 by my colleague1 the surgeon ,von ,winiwarter1 both these experiments having reference to the curative effects of hypnotism4 ,thus1 adhering entirely to the belief of ,m4 ,m4 ,libeault and ,beaunis1 at the close of #ahhf 78,a ,visit to the ,salptrire07 ,i wrote these words3 8,m4 ,beaunis's statement is perfectly exact4 ,the somnambulist1 in the hands of the hypnotiser1 is less than the corpse1 which the perfect disciple of ,loyola should resemble4 ,he is a slave1 with no will other than that of his ruler1 and in order to fulfil the commands laid upon him1 he will push precaution1 prudence1 cunning1 dissimulation and falsehood1 to their extremest limits4 ,he will open and shut doors noiselessly1 walk in his stockings2 will listen and watch1 with what keen sight1 what acute hearing6 ,he will remember anything and everything you want him to1 will forget all you desire him to forget4 ,he will1 in good faith1 accuse a perfectly innocent man before a ,court of justice4 ,he will have seen everything1 that in reality he has never seen1 if you command him so to do2 he will have heard1 what he never could have heard and done everything that he never could have done4 ,he will swear by his ,household ,gods1 that he has acted throughout1 of his own free will1 without any external pressure1 will invent motives if need be1 and will completely protect and cover his hypnotiser4 8,theoretically1 such a power is the most dangerous thing on the face of the earth6 ,i believe though1 that practically1 with the exception of what might relate to physical or moral abuses or tampering with testamentary wills1 there is actually little or no danger4 ,it appears to me the fear of this has been unduly exaggerated40 ,in a foot-note of mine1 while mentioning with highest praise the memoir of ,m4 ,ligeois1 ,i added further3 8,i do not express any alarm that ,i cannot show a good reason for40 ,among other reasons1 ,i pondered on the difficulty1 say rather1 the impossibility there is1 of obtaining from the subject an absolute abnegation of will-power1 whilst at the same time we allow him to retain the necessary free will to cope with any unforeseen accidents which might occur to compromise the fulfilment of the thought and action suggested4 ,two or three months later ,i should not have expressed myself thus2 and hence the remarks that accompany the experiments related in my articles on ,hypnotic ,consciousness1 ,revue ,philosophique1 ,feb41 ,march1 #ahhg1 experiments which took place about a year previous to this 7see the note to the contributed articles1 ,feb4 #ahhg1 p4 #aai74 ,it may there be noticed that my assent is tempered by certain marked reservations4 ,i was even then opposing practice to theory1 i4 e4 ,i narrowed down these apprehensions of danger to two legitimate causes of alarm1 viz4 attempts against morals1 and tampering with testamentary wills4 ,upon these two points ,i am still of the same opinion1 with this exception1 that what ,i then feared probable1 ,i now regard as exceedingly problematic4 ,i mean to say1 that a villain who was contemplating the perpetration of a crime1 would not easily find an accomplice in a subject of good moral standing4 ,and in any case1 ,i still think as ,i thought then1 that such an accomplice would not only be inapt1 but compromising4 ,it is this latter point1 ,i wish to demonstrate to you1 by the following criticism upon an experiment never before published4 ,at the end of ,may1 of last year1 ,i was passing through ,nancy with some friends1 among whom was ,dr4 ,l4 ,frdricq1 ,professor of ,physiology at the ,university of ,lige4 ,we were spending the evening at ,m4 ,beaunis's house together with ,m4 ,m4 ,libeault1 ,bernheim1 and ,ligeois4 ,naturally this question of ,criminal ,suggestion came upon the tapis and was discussed in all its phases1 without advancing one step towards its solution4 ,we made an engagement to meet at the hospital on the following day1 where ,m4 ,bernheim invited me to be present at an experiment1 which he maintained would convince me4 ,i will relate at length the occurrence1 for in such cases1 the slightest details may acquire very great importance4 ,m4 ,bernheim threw into the magnetic sleep a great1 tall fellow1 quite easily influenced1 and whose illness did not prevent him from walking about in the ward4 8,presently1 when you have waked up1 you will go and steal an orange from the patient that you see over there1 in that bed opposite4 ,remember that what you are going to do is very wrong2 it is strictly forbidden by honesty and by the law1 and you will run the risk of being punished40 ,the man is waked4 ,he appears to be collecting his thoughts4 ,he rubs his forehead1 he is visibly meditating something4 8,what is the matter with you8 ,what are you thinking about80 ,i ask him4 8,nothing40 8,you seem preoccupied40 8,well1 yes1 ,i have to do something40 8,what80 8,i am not obliged to render you an account of my actions40 8,ah6 one would almost say you were meditating some mischief1 where are you going80 8,that's no business of yours40 8,oh6 very well then1 ,i shall watch you and follow you40 ,i follow him2 he walks towards his companion's bed1 glances at the orange1 then leaning up against the window1 he calls me to admire some cherries growing on a potted plant4 ,he keeps quite still4 ,why8 ,simply because ,i had told him that ,i intended to watch him1 otherwise my presence would not have troubled him in the least4 ,during this time1 ,m4 ,bernheim had acquainted the other patient with the intended proceeding1 he nevertheless having heard the whole transaction4 8,i do not think he will do it10 said he to the ,doctor1 8he is one of my mates and he wouldn't steal from me40 ,i walk away and join the group of persons present4 ,i say to ,m4 ,beaunis1 that this experiment will prove nothing1 he answers me by a gesture of surprise4 ,the subject1 as soon as he sees me go away and thinks that ,i am not watching him any more1 stretches out his hand1 seizes the orange that is behind his mate's pillow1 the latter meanwhile looking full at him4 ,a score for ,m4 ,bernheim1 but one also for ,m4 ,delbuf6 ,i should need twenty pages at least of commentary on this experiment4 ,but ,i shall only allow myself to point out the essential points4 ,this hypnotised subject then1 or to speak more correctly1 this man to whom a thought has been suggested1 after ,i had warned him that ,i was watching him1 and from whom ,i never took my eye1 goes with the unerringness1 so to speak1 8of the falling stone10 to carry out the suggested action1 not however without a certain distrust of me1 and this only1 because he had been forewarned4 ,and moreover in his dim consciousness1 it is ,i alone1 whom he is watching in that clumsy fashion1 in order to seize upon some momentary forgetfulness on my part4 ,he has never noticed at all1 that his mate is intently watching him and following his every movement with open eyes2 so he steals the orange from under his very nose6 ,let us not forget that it was ,m4 ,bernheim the house physician1 who suggested to him to take the orange4 ,but ,m4 ,frdricq himself would equally well have fulfilled that command1 even preceded as it was by the little homily1 recorded above4 ,why should he have disobliged ,m4 ,bernheim8 ,but indeed1 the logic of my opponents is very weak4 ,if1 say they1 a somnambulist resists criminal suggestion1 it is because he is not a susceptible subject1 or1 that the experiment has been ill conducted1 or1 that the suggestion has not been strong enough4 ,at that rate1 it is useless to continue experimenting1 if failure is always to be explained away4 ,on my side1 ,i might with equal reason1 argue1 that they had been dealing with some licentious mind1 as yet all unknowing its inner self1 or with a born criminal or a latent thief2 and though ,i object to this kind of argument1 it would often prove to be more legitimate reasoning than theirs4 ,who among us is absolutely virtuous8 ,how many actions which the law calls criminal have we committed1 or might we commit1 under the pressure of circumstances1 without a shadow of remorse8 ,but let us further examine this experiment4 ,our subject then put the orange in his trousers' pocket which stuck out very noticeably4 ,this man might be a criminal1 but he was not a dissembler4 ,looking him straight in the face ,i said3 8,what have you been doing80 8,nothing1 ,i have just done my errand40 8,you have stolen60 8,what nonsense60 8,what have you got in your pocket80 8,nothing0 7notice the absurdity of this reply74 8,what do you mean80 8,nothing60 8,what do you call that80 8,why6 it's an orange6 it's a very fine orange6 ,ma foi6 ,i can't imagine how it came there60 ,m4 ,bernheim intervenes3 8,you took it from a fellow-patient1 from a comrade6 ,that was very wrong40 8,yes1 that's so1 but ,i wanted it4 ,look6 did you ever see such a fine orange8 ,i took a fancy to it and ,i determined to have it4 ,besides1 he hadn't seen it767 ,it's not stealing when it isn't missed40 ,then ,i asked3 8,what is that you said80 8,why1 yes1 it is not stealing to take what nobody misses10 answers he1 with a scarce perceptible cunning and significant wink4 ,a few minutes later1 after we had ceased noticing him1 he came up to ,m4 ,frdricq of his own accord laughingly told him that he was in the habit of abstracting tobacco from his companions on this same ground1 that if they never missed it1 it was not stealing4 8,it is all in fun1 you know60 ,i conclude therefore1 that this subject had in him latent tendencies to theft1 or if you prefer it1 to pilfering4 ,and dare any of us1 honestly confess to himself that we have not1 deep down in ourselves1 the germs of any such vices8 ,who among the most upright of us1 does not consider himself perfectly entitled to defraud the government1 or to get the better of a ,railway ,company1 or quietly to appropriate an object which he may casually find8 ,m4 ,ligeois will very likely say to me3 8,we will grant that this experiment has not fulfilled the desired requirements2 the subject has not very high moral qualities1 and he juggled a little4 ,but here now1 are some experiments absolutely unimpeachable40 ,thereupon ,m4 ,ligeois relates the histories of ,miss ,e4441 of ,n4441 of ,mme4 ,g4441 and of ,mme4 ,c444 ,here are the facts as collated by him in the ,gouffe trial4 ,first narrative4 ,m4 ,ligeois believed that he had produced in ,miss ,e444 such absolute automatism1 so complete an annihilation of moral sense and of all liberty of action1 that he caused her1 without moving a muscle1 to place the muzzle of a revolver close to her mother and fire upon her4 ,the youthful criminal appeared completely awake and far calmer than were the witnesses of this scene4 7,take notice of this47 ,her mother1 immediately reproaching her and telling her that she might have killed her1 ,miss ,e444 answers smiling1 with a great deal of common sense3 8,i have not killed you1 since you are speaking to me now40--8,is any one likely to believe that this is merely pretence and acting10 adds ,m4 ,ligeois1 8that a daughter will amuse herself by firing at her mother with a revolver1 which she does not know is not loaded1 simply to deceive the public80 ,well1 shall ,i say it8 ,the hypothesis of simulation1 the simulation which is practised in the hypnotic state appears to me to be the only plausible explanation4 ,the calm1 smiling attitude of ,miss ,e444 is an unanswerable proof of this4 ,i have no doubt that if in a dream she had seen herself firing at her mother1 she would have suffered as in a terrible nightmare4 ,lately1 it was in the beginning of ,january1 ,i dreamed ,i was present at a sale of paintings4 ,among others exposed for sale1 there was a long picture1 nineteen or twenty feet high and less than three feet wide1 representing the assumption of some saint4 ,hardly had the auctioneer mentioned the price1 #f1jjj francs1 than ,i made a sign of assent4 ,it is knocked down to me4 ,i start for home with my purchase1 but on the way ,i am seized with remorse4 ,where shall ,i hang the religious picture8 ,and even if ,i find a place for it on the staircase what will it look like in my house1 with its old black frame and its extraordinary dimensions8 ,and what a price to have paid1 at such a moment when the house bills are pouring in6 ,in the midst of these reflections1 ,i woke up1 my heart was beating tumultuously and during the remainder of the night ,i continued under the most disagreeable impressions4 ,in spite of my knowing that ,i was awake and reasoning with myself1 congratulating myself that it was nothing but a dream1 the enormity of my absurd action weighed upon my mind and ,i kept continually dreading the reproaches of my family1 when they should learn the stupid bargain ,i had made4 ,how widely different is this mental distress from the placid1 smiling condition of ,miss ,e444 and how naturally one is brought to suppose that during the hypnotic state the subject is not even under the sway of the ordinary illusions of dreamland4 ,m4 ,ligeois affirms that ,miss ,e444 was not aware that the pistol was not loaded4 ,i do not believe it4 ,upon what grounds are we to infer that a somnambulist is an imbecile8 ,you and ,i1 and everybody would easily surmise that ,m4 ,ligeois's revolver was not loaded6 ,then why should not ,miss ,e444 surmise the same8 ,is it not for the very reason that he handed it to her1 to fire at her mother1 that she would opine as much8 ,might she not have gathered this from the attitude of the spectators1 full of expectancy unmixed by any apprehension8 and might she not have wished to astonish them by her docility and sang-froid8 ,all sorts of suppositions are both rational and possible4 ,besides all this1 somnambulists who are absorbed in the work in hand1 generally speaking1 show a quicker and surer perspicuity2 their sensibilities are finer1 their quickness1 their memory1 overstep the ordinary limits as exhibited in their normal state4 ,do we not hear of scholars1 who in the hypnotic sleep1 learn their lessons in a very short time and write their essays admirably8 ,i have recorded in the ,revue ,philosophique1 ,august1 #ahhf1 some facts about a subject1 upon whom ,i experimented before one of my classes4 8,the experiment ,i am about to give an account of might serve very well as the explanation of many a miracle4 ,b4#ee is in the hypnotic sleep4 ,we wish to give him some peculiar order1 which he shall execute1 after he is awake1 at a special signal4 ,the signal is to be a knock given by me on the desk2 the action1 to carry a glass of water 7a carafe of water and glass being on a chair7 to the student ,eucher4 ,he does not know any of the fifteen students present1 nor has he yet heard their names4 ,the pupils take their places1 without any special order1 some standing1 some sitting4 ,b4 is awakened4 ,we chat a little4 ,i give the signal4 ,b4 rises1 fills a glass1 and without the slightest sign of hesitation1 carries it to the student mentioned before1 who was sitting on one of the back benches1 beside a fellow student4 ,we looked at each other with stupefaction4 ,the intention of the experiment had been1 to see how he would obey an obscure command4 ,there were in my audience1 certain persons1 with leanings toward belief in second-sight4 ,this result seemed to overthrow all my convictions4 ,i again throw him into the sleep1 and ,i command him to carry a glass of water to the student ,grard2 we are all standing1 awaiting with impatient curiosity what will take place4 ,b4 fills the glass and this time sends a questioning look over all the spectators1 presents the glass first to one1 then to another1 and finally ,i had to point out the student ,grard1 to whom he brought the water and made him drink it4 ,i again put him to sleep1 and asked him to whom he carried the first glass of water4 ,to ,m4 ,eucher--,did you know him8 ,no--,how did you recognise him8--,by his attitude1 he looked as if he wanted to hide away40 ,and this is how the mystery was solved4 ,we had unconsciously prepared the scene1 and it was this preparation which betrayed us4 ,but it is none the less a remarkable example of the perspicuity shown by somnambulists4 ,this goes to prove that hypnosis1 instead of dulling the understanding1 sharpens it4 ,the second of ,m4 ,ligeois's experiments appears to me quite as open to suspicion1 and exactly for the same reasons4 8,i offered ,n4 a white powder1 of the nature of which he is ignorant2 ,i said to him3 #8,pay great attention to what ,i am about to tell you4 ,this paper contains arsenic4 ,you will go presently to such a street to your ,aunt's ,mme4 ,m4 who is here now4 ,you will take a glass of water1 carefully dissolve the arsenic in it and then you will offer it to your ,aunt4' #8,yes ,sir'--,that evening ,i received the following note from ,mme4 ,m43 #8,mme4 ,m4 begs leave to inform ,m4 ,ligeois that the experiment succeeded perfectly4 ,her nephew offered her the poison4' ,the criminal remembered nothing about it1 and it was very difficult to persuade him that he had indeed wished to poison an ,aunt for whom he had a deep affection4 ,the automatism had been complete40 ,i cannot help seeing here an erroneous line of reasoning4 ,they conclude1 from the absence of all remembrance1 that the somnambulist is an automaton1 and from this they go on to deduce that he swallows everything that is said to him4 ,but1 since he listens to the voice of his hypnotiser2 since he knows that to accomplish the behest1 he must do things that have not been expressly pointed out1 though they are understood in the execution of the deed3--such as to get the water from a well or pump--why do they not allow that he is able also to reflect upon the nature of the deed which he is told to do8 ,why is it that ,n4441 who is aware that he is being used in an experiment1 cannot say to himself during his hypnotic state1 that this is only an experiment1 that the paper does not contain arsenic1 that ,m4 ,ligeois never would really want him to poison his aunt1 his aunt who is present at the time1 and who hears every word8 ,i repeat again1 a hypnotic subject is not an idiot--quite the reverse4 ,all the precaution which ,m4 ,ligeois takes to render the experiments reliable and conclusive1 turns against the proof desired4 ,can you imagine the poisoner1 ,dr4 ,castaing1 saying to his servant before ,hypolite ,ballet1 whom he intended to kill1 8,here is some poisoned wine1 you will presently give it to the sick man1 whom you see over there in that bed40 ,if he had done this1 he would not have been condemned to lose his head1 but they would simply have shut him up in a lunatic asylum4 ,and1 as far as that goes1 the servant might easily1 without any suspicion being attached to the action1 have given the poison to ,hypolite ,ballet1 and the latter have drunk it4 ,but we have dallied long enough over these absurd suppositions4 ,let us pass on now to the third narrative3 ,m4 ,ligeois caused ,mme4 ,g444 to fire at ,m4 ,p4441 an ex-magistrate4 ,in order to show clearly that the revolver was loaded1 ,m4 ,ligeois fired a shot in the garden and came in1 showing a piece of card-board1 through which the ball had passed4 8,with absolute unconsciousness and perfect docility ,mme4 ,g444 advances to ,m4 ,p444 and fires4 ,being questioned on the spot by the ,chief ,magistrate 7who was present at the sance7 she avows the crime with entire indifference4 ,she has killed ,m4 ,p444 because he was not pleasing to her767 ,they can arrest her2 she knows quite well what awaits her4 ,if they take away her life1 she will pass into the other world like her victim1 whom she sees stretched out1 and bathed in his own blood4 ,they ask her whether it was not ,i who suggested to her the idea of the murder4 ,she denies it1 and says she did it spontaneously2 that she alone is guilty2 she is resigned to her fate1 she will accept without complaint the consequences of her deed40 ,the more ,i meditate to-day upon these experiments1 the less they appear to me to prove what it is desired they should4 ,this perfect tranquillity of ,mme4 ,g4441 her generosity in not inculpating ,m4 ,ligeois2 her resignation to the fate that awaits her1 establish entirely the fact that she is present in mind and knowledge of events2 and just because of this very attitude1 that she possesses her full presence of mind4 ,she never dreamed for an instant that she would really kill ,m4 ,p4444 ,she plays her part conscientiously1 she faithfully recites a lesson which she has learned by heart and with which she intermingles side play of her own1 childish tricks1 as for instance1 saying that her victim had displeased her4 ,let us recall to mind the patient who stole an orange1 because it was a fine one4 ,that ,mme4 ,g4444 sees ,m4 ,p4444 bathed in his own blood1 is more than doubtful4 ,i can produce numberless proofs of facts that go to prove that fictitious somnambulists are not dupes of the illusions suggested to them2 their calmness proves this4 ,that it is possible to make them commit an action dangerous to themselves or to others1 ,i am not prepared to deny4 ,i will explain myself later upon this point4 ,but from this state1 to that of criminal participation1 there is an incalculable distance4 ,that the somnambulist repeats a lesson that he has learned1 is shown forth by ,m4 ,ligeois's fourth narrative4 8,mme4 ,c4444 was to give some arsenic in a liquid to ,m4 ,d4444 who was thirsty4 ,but ,m4 ,d4444 asked a question that ,i had not foreseen2 he asked what was in the glass4 ,with a frankness that precluded all idea of simulation ,mme4 ,c4444 answered #8,arsenic4' 8,i was then obliged to amend my suggestion1 and ,i said3 #8,if you are asked what is in the glass1 say it is sweetened water4' 8,mme4 ,c4444 answered the question the second time1 #8,sweetened water4' 8,very courageously ,m4 ,d4444 swallowed the supposed poison4 ,questioned by the ,chief ,magistrate ,mme4 ,c4 remembers nothing2 she had seen nothing1 done nothing1 given no drink to any one4 ,she does not know what they are talking about40 ,again all this is proof to me1 that ,mme4 ,c4 feels that she is being told to perform an innocent action4 ,it would have been interesting to have awakened her in the middle of the act1 to see whether she would have remembered her thoughts1 just at the moment when she was giving the drink to ,m4 ,d4444 ,i am not sure but that she would have answered like ,miss ,e444 that she had no doubt the poison was imaginary1 and the scene prearranged4 ,we have seen ,m4 ,d444 ask an unforeseen question1 which upset the carrying out of the crime4 ,we have witnessed ,m4 ,bernheim's patient steal an orange under the nose of its proprietor1 who was looking at him4 ,admitting1 therefore1 that all had been foreseen1 that ,m4 ,ligeois had warned ,mme4 ,c444 of all the possible questions that might be put to her2 that ,m4 ,bernheim had strongly recommended his subject to commit his theft secretly1 and that every possible detail had been perfectly carried out--should we have even then a faithful transcript of a crime8 ,can we have the unerring certitude from these occurrences1 that a subject in the hypnotic sleep1 a bona fide somnambulist will allow himself to be used as an accomplice by a veritable criminal8 99 99 99 99 99 ,in the preceding paragraphs1 ,i carefully analysed the slightest details invalidating experiments1 in which the hypnotic subject acts the part of a criminal1 in a fictitious crime4 ,i was able to show1 that in all these tests1 there had been certain suspicious traits suggesting doubt as to the complete illusion of the actor therein1 and ,i finally added3 ,supposing that everything had worked smoothly1 i4 e4 that everything had been foreseen and that the subject had not been tripped up anywhere1 are we authorised in maintaining that a subject thus far unimpeachable as regards a fictitious crime1 would accomplish this same deed in reality8 ,i answer1 ,no4 ,in order to justify this denial1 it will be necessary for us to enter into the ,psychology of ,hypnosis4 ,a person in the hypnotic sleep1 as well as in the natural sleep1 is not so absolutely withdrawn from the real world about him as is generally supposed4 ,the hypnotic subject even less so1 than the sleeper1 for the former remains in intelligent communication with his magnetiser4 ,if the latter tells him to take a book from a table upon which is an inkstand1 some boxes1 a statuette1 he will pick up the book and not any of the other objects4 ,if he is enjoined to walk straight before him in a room encumbered with chairs he will manage to avoid them1 and even if the illusion is pushed further he may knock up against them1 but the action will be done quite cautiously4 ,and this is why1 in public sances1 he never hurts himself1 in spite of the wildness and apparent excitement of his movements4 ,this is also the reason1 that in experiments intended to demonstrate this absolute automatism1 the preparation for the proposed crime1 the attitude of the spectators1 while the subject is carrying out his part1 the integrity of the person who is suggesting the action1 the calmness of the intended victim2 all these things1 render the suggestion less illusive than even an ordinary dream would be4 ,m4 ,ligeois asks this question at the conclusion of his first narrative3 8,where is the spectator1 who could believe that this scene was only a melodrama with clever acting2 and that a daughter for her amusement1 and solely to deceive an audience1 would fire an unloaded revolver at her mother80 ,to this ,i answer3 ,and why should she not play her part in this melodrama1 when she sees ,m4 ,ligeois devise it1 her mother lend her co-operation1 and the audience watch it with curiosity and interest8 ,here again we find the same fallacy in the argument3 ,because a subject does not reveal what is going on within himself1 and only puts into visible speech what is suggested to him1 it is taken for granted that he is going through a mental process identical with that of his magnetiser4 ,but allow me to ask in my turn3 ,will it be easily credited1 that a daughter1 would1 deliberately and without a trace of feeling1 shoot at her mother1 unless1 she fully believed the action would have no serious consequences1 and that the person who had suggested this impious deed1 was only requiring her to act a part8 ,hypnotic subjects do not take long to realise that they are being used as tests in experiments4 ,some are always gracious in responding to them1 many end by refusing to lend themselves to be used in such fashion1 especially in public sances4 ,all these details go far to prove that in hypnosis1 the subjects retain1 at least a partial independence4 ,if a sleeper1 who dreamed he was murdering his mother1 should behold her terrified1 beseeching1 invoking the pity of her son1 calling for help to the horrified spectators1 he would feel that he was induced to commit this deed by some sort of motive1 which1 absurd or unlikely though it might be1 would still be the controlling power2 in a word1 the dream would be in reality a kind of incoherent and unreal drama1 though composed of very real elements1 in which horror would play a very present part4 ,but if he should see his ostensible victim smiling and conversing with him amidst a company animated only by a sentiment of curiosity1 he might well suspect1 even in his sleep1 that what he sees and what he is doing1 is a pure delusion4 ,and this is exactly what he would say to himself1 should it come into his head to fire upon a magistrate1 and for the reason that his looks displeased him4 ,these prearranged scenes fail in verisimilitude and no more deceive the actors in them1 than they do the spectators or the author4 ,to this you may object3 ,but1 if the pistol had been loaded1 ,miss ,e4 would have shot her mother6 ,this rests upon the supposition that the mother and the spectators1 still believed it to be unloaded1 otherwise1 their terror alone1 would have been quite sufficient to call back the subject to the reality4 ,and even with this assumption1 this murder-test would have borne a greater resemblance to a simple homicide from imprudence4 ,by this ,i mean to say1 that so far as the spectators1 the victim1 and the assassin were concerned1 the act would not have been changed in its character1 simply because the magnetiser1 had by mistake1 given a loaded instead of an unloaded pistol to the subject4 ,i need hardly remark that a real crime would never be perpetrated in this manner4 ,thoroughly convinced though ,i was1 of the impossibility of making experiments that would entirely fathom this question1 circumstances nevertheless1 allowed me once more to make a test which is well adapted to show that it is not as easy as some may think1 to transform an hypnotic subject into a murderous automaton4 ,j444 is that excellent somnambulist to whom my experiments have given a certain notoriety4 ,it is she together with her sister1 whom ,i made use of in my studies on 8,memory in ,hypnosis10 on 8,imitation10 and 8,hypnotic ,consciousness40 ,she it is1 who three several times allowed herself to be experimented upon by blistering on corresponding parts of the body2 and notably in one case where in accordance with suggestion no inflammation took place4#ef ,she is tall1 robust1 intelligent1 industrious1 healthy4 ,she is now married and has had a child4 ,the accouchement took place in the hypnotic sleep4 ,the case being in the hands of ,m4 ,fraipont1 ,professor of ,obstetrics in the ,university of ,lige2 and never was the power of hypnotism more remarkably exhibited4#eg ,in the case of this patient there remained no trace of remembrance whatever1 after awakening4 ,i have gone into these details merely to show the reader that no better subject could have been found for my purpose4 ,i have in another place 7see ,revue ,philosophique1 article on 8,hypnotic ,consciousness07 pointed out certain traits in her case1 which at my dbut1 were strongly calculated to make me a believer in the absolute servility of the hypnotic subject2 traits which ,i shall subsequently recall to your attention and comment upon4 ,to judge more fairly of the value of the experiment1 ,i must further state1 that ,j4 is both resolute and courageous4 ,during several summers she remained in the country in the environs of ,seraing in attendance upon my wife who was in ill-health1 and in whose room she slept4 ,after the summer vacation it often happened that she spent the whole night alone with her4 ,at the head of the bed hung a six-barrelled revolver1 loaded2 a precaution that we had taken on account of the well-known strikes which took place in #ahhf1 amongst the workmen of the numerous factories in our neighborhood4 ,in the summer of #ahhg ,i happened to be absent4 ,a man came one night1 prowling round the garden and fumbling at the lock of the door1 which he even tried to force4 ,the barking of the dogs wakened ,j41 she opened the window1 perceived the man1 took the revolver and went down into the hall watching for the moment in which to fire at the nocturnal visitor4 ,the man hearing the noise slipped away with celerity4 ,and the same year that this occurrence took place1 ,j4 slept on the first floor with her loaded revolver hanging on a nail beside her bed4 ,the #bdth ,feb4 #ahhh1 without communicating my intentions to anybody except to my daughter1 and that only at the very moment of beginning the experiment1 ,i discharged the revolver4 ,it was six o'clock in the evening4 ,a young lady1 7herself an hypnotic subject17 and my daughter1 were seated at a table1 cutting out articles from a newspaper1 which they afterwards tied up in bundles4 ,i called ,j4 and at the moment she opened the door1 ,i hypnotised her by a motion4 ,i said to her in an agitated tone--8,here are some thieves1 who are carrying off papers40--,j4 came quickly forward and turning towards me said3 8,no sir1 they are playing with them--,why sure enough they are taking them40 ,then she walked resolutely up to them and tore the papers out of their hands1 put them on the table in front of her and in an imperious tone said3 8,don't you touch them any more40 ,i--8,you are never going to let those knaves remain in the house--run and fetch the revolver0 7it was in the adjoining room74 ,j4 ran without hesitation4 ,she returned holding the weapon in her hand and stood on the threshold4 8,fire10 cried ,i4 8,sir1 we must not kill them40 8,thieves8 ,why certainly60 8,no sir6 ,i will not kill them40 8,you must40 8,i won't do it40 ,and she walked backwards still holding the revolver1 ,i following her and energetically reiterating my command4 8,i won't4 ,i won't do it4 ,i will not murder40 ,she then placed the revolver on the floor but cautiously4 ,she continued to go backwards1 ,i1 meanwhile insisting and following her4 8,i will not do it40--,having come to a dead stand in the corner of the room1 she repulsed me violently and ,i thought it prudent to awaken her1 upon which she came to herself smiling in her usual pleasant manner4 ,she remembered1 however1 nothing whatever1 although at the sight of the revolver lying on the floor1 she seemed to have a kind of vague recollection4 ,she did not seem at all discomposed in manner4 ,if this scene had taken place in a dream1 she would certainly have exhibited more excitement4 ,this is what we may term conclusive evidence1 that is to say if ever negative evidence can be called so4 ,let us comment now upon these facts4 ,it will be noticed that ,j4 is not the dupe of the hallucination to which she has been subjected4 ,she does not take either of the young ladies for thieves1 nor the newspapers for valuable papers4 ,her first answer is very significant--8,no sir1 they are playing with them40 ,besides which her expression1 her attitude1 the manner in which she looked at the two reputed thieves1 and tore the newspapers out of their hands1 had something so keenly observant1 so prepared1 so theatrical1 that both my witnesses and myself could not possibly believe her actions ingenuous4 ,i have often questioned her about the illusions that ,i suggested to her4 ,i asked her for example1 if1 when ,i appeared to her under another aspect1 for instance under the appearance of a young man1 with clustering locks and a black beard1 she ever perceived anything of my real resemblance4 ,she invariably answered1 that she saw my actual person1 as it were in a cloud1 behind the figure which ,i had called up before her mental vision4 ,it is very probable that she recognised my daughter and her friend in the persons whom ,i pointed out as the robbers4 ,i might have assured myself of this by causing her to recall her thoughts at the time4 ,i am aware that the opponents of this opinion challenge1 and not unreasonably1 tests made in this manner because they have doubts about the suggestion4 ,if then the facts were such as are related1 ,j4 was playing a rle not perhaps strictly in accordance with the rules of ordinary acting1 knowing that she was reciting a part1 but feeling nevertheless that she had a certain part to play and must enter into the spirit of it4 ,it is incontrovertible that the hypnotic subject really does play his part in precisely this fashion4 ,when1 for example1 you extend his arm and defy him to put it down he seems to make an effort to lower it1 but in reality he does not bring the required muscles into play at all4 ,if you bid him keep his hand open1 he never dreams of using the flexor muscles4 ,again1 if the spectators try to change the position of either hand or arm1 they meet with energetic resistance4 ,you will ask me how it was that ,j4 did not carry out her acting all through8 ,why1 after she had gone for the revolver with such deliberation1 she did not fire it8 ,it was because1 the action being so rapid in its development1 she had no time for reflection2 she must have thought and she actually did believe1 that the revolver was loaded as it always was4 ,this is proved by the precaution with which she handled it and put it on the floor4 ,it is evident that she thought it was a dangerous game4 ,if ,i had known how the affair would terminate1 ,i would have taken the pistol and told her that ,i would fire myself1 in order to see what her thought and action would have been4 ,but notwithstanding all this1 supposing she had fired could we have concluded from this1 that she really had latent murderous tendencies8 ,we could not have drawn any legitimate conclusions even yet4 ,for if1 as we have just stated1 ,j4 was not entirely withdrawn from her actual surroundings1 she might naturally suppose that ,i was only joking1 and that ,i should never make her fire on my own child1 and on this account she need not feel any anxiety in fulfilling the order that ,i had given her4 ,the problem is a serious one4 ,it is also a psychological problem4 ,i have already partially disclosed the solution which ,i myself am led to give to it1 and ,i can best translate my thoughts by these words and in the following formula3 ,persons in hypnosis will only execute acts similar to those they would naturally perform in dreams4 ,i have asked a number of persons1 among others1 those connected with the law1 whether they had ever dreamt they committed murders or robberies1 and up to the present time all have answered in the negative4 ,and yet1 lawyers interrogate criminals1 and it would be quite within the realm of possibility through one of those duplications of personality which ,i pointed out in my work on 8,sleep and ,dreams10#eh that they should take up for an instant the rle of an assassin4 ,this is not an impossible supposition4 ,does it ever happen that the novelist or the actor1 in portraying or impersonating an infamous character1 the creation of his imagination1 does so identify himself for the nonce1 with his own invention1 that even in sleep1 for a brief space1 he incorporates himself1 so to speak1 into the fictitious personage he has evoked4 ,there are some very curious investigations to make on this subject4 ,but even if any positive facts could be gathered from this1 we should still be left in doubt1 as to whether by post-hypnotic suggestion the subject would continue to carry out the same rle4 ,doubtless1 an anatomist may dream that he is dissecting a body1 but could we produce an hypnotic condition such as to make him use the knife as freely upon a living body8 ,can ,i make a butcher believe that a child is a sheep8 ,i consider the thing to be perfectly feasible1 yet my thesis is not at all weakened by this concession4 ,we will take it for granted that1 animated by evil designs you proceed to hypnotise beforehand1 the anatomist and the butcher1 and then bring them at a given moment to the victim6 ,and let us further imagine that the combination succeeds perfectly4 ,how will you manage to veil in deepest secrecy all your previous manuvres and cast a semblance of likelihood over the culpability of your accomplices8 ,will not the old adage1 ,cui bono1 be quoted against you8 ,in order to insure perfect impunity1 you would have to overcome such an accumulation of material impedimenta1 the lightest of which would suffice to dissipate all apprehensions in the minds of those in whom chimerical fears have not entirely obliterated their common sense4 ,it is therefore evident that in so far as we know now1 from experiments intended to test this theory and these possibilities of ,criminal ,suggestion1 no positive results can be obtained4 ,these criminal actions1 so appositely named--,laboratory ,crimes--bear no resemblance to actual ones4 ,if this debate is ever to be closed it can only be before a ,criminal ,court when a ,troppman1 a ,pranzini1 or an ,eyraud1 shall have been the operator1 and it shall have been clearly shown1 what interest the assassin had in making use of a so-called1 unconscious and automatic accomplice4 ,then only1 shall we be able to appreciate to what degree hypnotism may become a dangerous enemy to society at large4 ,and even then1 we shall have to remind ourselves that all our medicines are poisons and that they have the power of destroying even more surely1 than that of healing4 ,thus the problem is still unsolved4 ,here is a story told me by ,dr4 ,libeault4 ,he1 or perhaps it was ,m4 ,bernheim1 or both together1 hypnotised a workman and told him to steal a couple of little plaster figures1 that were used as ornaments on the mantel-piece in a house where he was working4 ,he did so4 ,the affair had been forgotten for some time because the suggestion had not been carried out on the spot4 ,about three months after the occurrence1 this same workman was arrested for stealing a pair of trousers from the front of a shop4 ,upon which the previous hypnotic suggestion was remembered4 ,my opinion is that the workman--and how many there are of the same calibre--had a very slight regard for meum and tuum4 ,this reminds us of that hospital patient1 whom we saw pilfering the tobacco from his comrades1 and ,i do not think it was at all necessary to have thrown the workman into the hypnotic sleep in order to make him steal the statuettes4 ,but from another point of view1 this experiment1 which did not prove anything1 might give rise to party arguments from those who deem it desirable to maintain that it was the initiatory suggestion that first gave this man the taste for stealing4 ,to sum up in a few words this portion of my investigation2 the result of my experiments and of my analyses is this3 that the experiments of my opponents prove nothing4 ,for the present ,i shall confine myself to this purely negative conclusion4 ,but there are other grounds besides experiments on which we may examine this question4 ,we can do so by careful observation and minute analysis of the actions of hypnotised persons4 ,i have said before that the degree of morality observable in the dreams of the subject1 gives the measure of what may be expected from him during hypnosis4 ,according to my opinion1 hypnotism is less powerful in inciting to actions of grave moral import1 than the corrupting influence of word or example1 the love of gold1 or the excitement of the passions4 ,all truly scientific experiments have brought into prominence the analogy between physiological and incited dreams1 and to-day we may say that this is the doctrine of the future4 ,thus if an hypnotic subject admits without opposition that he is made of sugar1 or of glass1 that he feels he is melting in the rain1 or being broken to atoms by the awkwardness of the bystanders2 if he thinks he is a lamp1 or allows himself to be trundled along like a wheelbarrow2 if such a subject1 ,i repeat1 refuses to steal a purse1 or to receive an embrace1 the conclusion forces itself upon one that the hypnotic subject has more power over himself than some persons would wish us to believe2 in spite of his docility1 there are some things he absolutely refuses to do4 ,if then1 reasoning by analogy has ever been legitimate1 it is surely so in this case1 when the inference can be drawn that the man who refuses to give a blow will refuse to use a knife2 and that the woman who refuses to give a token of affection will certainly refuse to allow of serious tampering with morals4 ,let us then pay close attention to what observation may teach us4 ,i shall hope to be able to demonstrate by actual facts1 that persons in an hypnotic condition1 preserve at least a sufficient portion of their intelligence1 their reason1 together with freedom of action1 to prevent them from committing deeds that neither their conscience nor their habits approve of4 ,j4 ,,delb,,uf4 ,,footnotes3 #ee ,a lad of about #ae1 very bright4 ,has been one of ,donato's subjects4 ,very susceptible and having been hypnotised in a great many public sances4 #ef ,see my pamphlet on ,the ,origin of ,curative ,effects in ,hypnotism4 #eg ,see ,revue de ,l',hypnotisme4 ,april1 #ahia4 #eh ,sleep and ,dreams1 p4 #bd et seqq4 7,paris3 ,flix ,alcan74 ,,literary ,,correspondence ,i4 ,,france4 ,when1 some ten years ago1 ,m4 de ,roberty published in the ,review of ,positive ,philosophy a series of articles1 under the title of the 8,new and the ,old ,philosophy10 ,i was much impressed by the work4 ,the conception of the three types2 the idealistic1 the materialistic1 and the sensualistic1 under which nomenclature he ranged the various philosophic systems1 seemed to bring order into the history of philosophy4 ,he also proceeded to treat1 after the same manner and in a very happy way1 the 8law of the three states0 of ,auguste ,comte1 by this means rectifying and justifying the latter4 ,the law of the three states1 wrote ,m4 de ,roberty1 corresponds with the present state of philosophy1 which is again explained by science1 so that to whatever measure knowledge may attain to1 it will be equalled by philosophy1 which borrows its types and its characteristics from the sequence of facts1 at the point where it leaves the sphere of explanatory hypotheses4 ,since then ,m4 ,,de ,,roberty has completed by a new study1 his first work on this subject4 ,in the 8,unknown0 he has laid his finger on one of the weak points of modern positivism2 perhaps by dint of searching into details1 he has shown himself a little too severe on ,comte in the book about which ,i am going to speak to-day1 ,the ,philosophy of the ,century 7,la ,philosophie du ,sicle474 ,this book contains a thoughtful criticism of the three doctrines that occupy contemporaneous thought2 and which are3 criticism1 positivism1 and evolutionism4 ,he considers these in conformance to his criterium1 as simply the varieties of one single species and the absolutely identical manifestation of a common fund of beliefs and hypotheses held generally by all4 ,according to him critical philosophy derives its direct origin from idealism4 ,positive philosophy1 from materialism2 and the philosophy of evolution from sensualism4 ,going further still1 he considers critical philosophy as the legitimate outcome of sensualistic idealism2 and positive philosophy1 similarly1 as the product of sensualistic materialism4 ,sensualism is thus the common ancestor2 the three systems inter-penetrating each other4 ,but the promoters of these systems must be judged with equity1 put back into their proper places1 and ranged according to their epochs4 ,in my opinion1 a philosophical doctrine is valuable1 not so much by the clear solutions it affords us1 as by its methods of procedure1 may ,i say1 even by the coloring it gives to thoughtful minds4 ,i do not hesitate to recognise in ,kant1 the strong1 rough-handed workman of modern philosophy2 in ,comte1 the most utilitarian2 in ,spencer the subtlest as well as the most successful4 ,kant possesses the greatest speculative vigor2 ,comte1 the clearest scientific turn of mind2 ,spencer1 the keenest conception of1 and insight into1 psychological subjects4 ,taking these philosophers as a whole1 ,spencer1 in spite of his merits1 appears to me the least original1 the least remarkable of the three4 ,his universal metaphysics has feet of clay4 ,the classification of the sciences that he wished to substitute for that of ,comte is obscure1 devoid of general utility2 in short the influence of ,comte on succeeding generations will be more considerable than ,spencer's1 if indeed there are any philosophers who will be bold enough to avow themselves deliberately as ,comtists4 ,this contradiction should not surprise us4 ,it not seldom happens that the influence of a master continues even when his doctrines have suffered shipwreck4 ,we notice this in the great schools of thought of the present day4 ,we may say with truth1 that the criticists are inclined to dialectics2 the positivists1 to methods and systems2 the evolutionists to facts4 ,the first excel in the analysis of ideas1 but they expose themselves to be lost in abstractions4 ,the second endeavor to reduce to a system all scientific matter1 but they run the risk of being either rigorists or becoming too elementary4 ,the last while making rapid strides in the genesis of the subtler phenomena of life1 incur the danger of accepting arbitrary liaisons1 or of remaining in an inchoate condition4 ,each one possesses most valuable qualities1 which it would be desirable indeed to meet with in the same mind4 ,each has rendered services which it is but just to recognise and which it would be unwise to disregard4 ,the main thing is always to be able to understand one another upon the question of what philosophy means and its relation to science4 ,what ,m4 de ,roberty cares most for1 in all his writings1 is the elucidation of this problem4 ,we must concede1 that it is one which is worth striving after4 ,and it is surely not asking too much if we demand of every philosopher1 that he shall know1 more or less1 what is meant by philosophising4 ,philosophy will be1 in the future1 very much what it has always been in the past1 a general conception of the world4 ,this is a fixed fact for ,m4 de ,roberty4 ,is it true that philosophy preceded science1 or1 that on the contrary it has always been and will continue to be subsidiary to it8 ,many are1 we know1 partisans of the first opinion2 it has seemed to them that the sciences have separated little by little from the hazy and indistinct conglomerate which bore the name of theology1 metaphysics1 in a word1 of philosophy4 ,m4 de ,roberty does not hesitate to adopt the contrary opinion4 ,philosophy1 according to him1 has always sprung from science1 it has always been the equal of science4 ,but though he proclaims this equality as existing between science and philosophy1 this does not in the least oblige him to recognise any equality in their manifestations 8in history40 ,the knowledge of a given science1 implies a certain conception of the world2 this is the supreme law of philosophical evolution4 ,philosophy is an abstract science of general interest1 having for its end1 the integration of the documentary evidence furnished by the various sciences4 ,comte was strongly imbued with this truth4 ,spencer made it his own1 but he makes a more serious mistake than his predecessor1 when he asserts that philosophy is able to 8play an active part0 in scientific discovery4 ,in the opinion of ,m4 de ,roberty1 it is neither the antecedent of science1 nor is it even to be called an art4 ,must it then be called a science8 ,or is it to be comprehended in science8 ,neither the one1 nor the other4 ,he prefers rather to regard it as a link 78un trait d'union07 between these two different kinds of intellectual activity1 science and art4 ,the mental faculties may1 he tells us1 aim at subjugating nature1 either in a direct manner1 the result of which will be called science2 or in an indirect way1 in which case we name it art2 or they may have still a third intention1 taking a kind of middle course between the utility of science and the indirect utility of art1 which while actively participating in both1 facilitates as well the transition from one to the other1 from which springs philosophy4 8,most unmistakably identical10 says he finally1 8are the elements which produce a particular combination1 in the one1 they are called science1 in the other philosophy40 ,but we must not confound the two propositions4 8,if a house is to be built of brick1 does that mean that we are not to distinguish between the materials required in its erection8--that we are to apply to its construction1 the ingredients and the procedures used in the making and firing of bricks8 ,we never should build a house if we acted thus40 ,let us not misunderstand this comparison6 ,the house here spoken of is entirely figurative4 ,the hypothesis which underlies it is universally accepted1 but its primal condition is always wanting--i4 e4 universal knowledge4 ,it would be presumptuous indeed1 to draw1 to-day1 the plans and define the style of architecture which shall be used in our future philosophical habitation1 since we do not yet possess even the materials wherewith to build it4 ,we can only hope to erect such a temporary shelter1 a fort1 that may be swept away in a few hours1 whenever the enemy shall have discovered an explosive powerful enough to blow it into atoms4 ,i do not care very much1 ,i confess1 for the distinction spoken of 8between a direct and an indirect utility0 and the idea of philosophy forming a link between art and science4 ,this way of representing the facts of the case1 seems to me both cumbersome and incomplete4 ,i will not stop here to discuss it4 ,the thoughtful study of ,m4 de ,roberty is not compromised by such a small detail1 and ,i would rather remember the positive teaching which is given in the very striking book that ,i have just been criticising4 8,philosophy and science10 writes the author1 8are terms which define two principal species of the vast genus designated under the one name1--knowledge40 ,the most marked trait of the philosophy of the future1 will be the distinction between the two species1 as confusion was the predominant characteristic of the philosophy of the past4 99 99 99 99 99 ,the work of ,m4 de ,roberty gave us a methodic history of philosophy4 ,that of ,m4 ,f4 ,,picavet1 ,the ,ideologists--,an ,essay on the ,scientific1 ,philosophic1 ,religious1 etc41 ideas and theories in ,france since #aghi1 stretches over a very vast area of descriptive history4 ,his book conducts us from ,condorcet to ,destutt de ,tracy1 and ,cabanis2 from these to ,degrando and ,laromiguire2 it embraces thus nearly the whole of the philosophy of the eighteenth century1 which it carries back to the seventeenth1 from thence following the thread of its history1 through the intervening years1 down to our own times4 ,the name 8,ideologist0 is vague1 as are all the rest of the battle-cries which are used by the leaders of parties1 or that their adversaries may make use of against them4 ,ideology1 in the sense used by ,destutt de ,tracy1 signifies1 that philosophers must confine themselves to psychological research1 more particularly to that which concerns the origin and the formation of ideas1 an immense field1 embracing philology1 ethnology1 etc4 ,with regard to the wrong sense which ,napoleon attached to this word1 it was justified in a certain measure by the pretensions of the philosophers in governing life1 politics1 and law1 by doubtful hypotheses1 which did not often accord with practice4 ,it cannot be denied that since the time of ,rousseau1 we pass much too easily from theory to action1 and that we fall back too readily on our imagination1 to supplement our actual experience4 ,we find in ,m4 ,picavet's book1 new and valuable information about all the men who have contributed to the intellectual life of the ,french nation1 during and since the time of the ,revolution4 ,we can trace there the origin of certain doctrines1 which have appeared to spring up suddenly before our eyes1 and shall often be extremely surprised by what we shall read there4 ,it is a most valuable and important work1 showing an enormous amount of erudition1 fine critical acumen1 and a rare descriptive talent4 ,it is quite voluminous 7more than #fjj pp4 #hvo471 and some might indeed consider that it could have been more condensed4 ,but it is primarily a book of reference1 in whose pages we shall surely not complain of finding a large amount of information1 when we refer to it4 99 99 99 99 99 ,with the book of ,m4 ,,bernard ,p,,rez1 ,le ,caractre1 de l'enfant l'homme1 7,character1 from ,childhood to ,manhood71 we leave the domain of philosophy and history to enter into that of psychology4 ,m4 ,prez modestly disclaims all pretension to founding a science of character4 ,nevertheless1 that which he has given us and produced here1 bears the stamp of originality in a subject in which authors have hitherto only repeated one another4 ,his work is composed of two parts1 of which the second forms the completion of1 or rather a commentary on1 the first4 ,we find here1 to start with1 a classification of characters1 illustrated by portraits which render the developments more tangible2 secondly1 a study on the common combinations of the principle traits of personality4 ,the classification of ,m4 ,prez is founded on movements1 that is to say it is displayed in sufficiently complete groups connected with some distinct mode of expression1 such as rapidity1 slowness1 and energy of movements4 ,it offers the practical advantage of substituting for the four or six temperaments of the old schools1 which are frequently hard to distinguish1 classes more flexible and distinguished by visible gestures which betray1 more or less clearly1 their physiological foundation4 ,m4 ,prez has provisorily established six of these classes4 ,he distinguishes the vivacious1 the vivacious-ardent1 the ardent1 the sluggish1 the sluggish-ardent1 and lastly the balanced type4 ,the last category is in my judgment a sort of utility-box1 apparently designed to receive specimens which we are at a loss where else to put4 ,for one of two things is certainly true1 either this balance is an insignificant trait or it is one that is dominant in the person1 and it is absolutely necessary to state which4 ,many will undoubtedly question this doctrine that the movements of a person express all his character and that consequently they are competent to reveal it to us4 ,we might maintain1 indeed1 that if the movements supply us with the labels of each class1 it is not always to be distinctly seen how the different traits of character and of intelligence 7the author does not separate the two1 and gives his reasons for so doing7 subordinate themselves to one another and vary with the motor sign chosen to express them4 ,there can be no question1 however1 that rapidity1 energy1 or slowness of movement1 do not have certain actual and profound connections with our visceral and cerebral functions1 and that the motor sign is easy to be made use of1 although it does not reach all the facts which it is employed to describe1 and although the explanation of these facts still remains to be sought in the physiological substratum4 ,m4 ,prez has secondly attempted a systematisation of character-traits1 by successively studying the relations of gaiety and sadness1 irascibility and gentleness1 courage and fear1 kindness and malevolence1 self-love and will1 with the principal emotional intellectual and volitional traits of character4 ,he has perceived1 instinctively as it were1 that the pointing out of generic1 specific1 and individual marks does not possess its entire worth except on the condition that we also point out the subordination of the same1 and he has given this factor much prominence in the last chapters of his book4 ,this portion of the work is replete with subtle observations1 and ingenious and profound reflections1 but it is fragmentary in character1 a half-way production1 ,i might say1 between the disconnected literature of the moralist and a reasoned and methodical description such as ethology ought to furnish later on1 after the manner1 if possible1 of the natural sciences4 ,the desiderata which ,i here briefly refer to1 are not set forth to diminish the value of the work of ,m4 ,prez4 ,it will in its present form render great services1 and ,i should not be at all surprised if the terminology which he has invented should pass into the language of the day1 as it is convenient and easily lends itself to the description of character-portraits4 ,even readers who shall find here much to criticise1 will not refuse to accord to it real and solid merit4 99 99 99 99 99 ,after the work of ,m4 ,prez1 a study of my own naturally ranges itself--,la ,psychologie du peintre#ei--;concerning which ,i ask permission to offer a few remarks4 ,i have set myself the problem1 in this work1 of determining a professional type1 and ,i have chosen one of those which are certainly the most distinctly defined4 ,if other authors could give us the psychology of the musician1 of the lawyer1 of the physician1 and of the geometer1 such a task would not be an indifferent performance in what concerns our knowledge of character1 and we should arrive at the construction of a natural history of society from a different point of view and by different methods from those at the disposal of the novelist4 ,we should accomplish1 unquestionably1 the passage from general and abstract psychology1 to concrete psychology4 ,do professional types really exist8 and if they exist1 what are they composed of8 ,the question as ,i view it1 is not bereft of interest for the psychologist4 ,we do1 no doubt1 find among painters1 vivacious1 sluggish1 and ardent individuals1 and we may indeed1 in studying this or that particular painter1 discover in him some one or other of the combinations described by ,m4 ,prez4 ,but that does not stand in the way of the growth and constitution of social types1 and individuals may find a natural place in the different categories of a general classification without ceasing to belong to their professional category in consequence of a natural self-grouping of their intellectual faculties1 and a definite tendency of the traits of their emotional nature4 ,it would be justifiable to say1 at the same time simplifying and enlarging a little the facts1 that originally our viscera form our character but our cerebral organism forms our profession2 and if it is true furthermore that a certain physiological state brings with it a definite intellectual mode of operation1 it is none the less true that the same culture of the mind and the long-continued habits of a profession are apt to impose upon one's personality a definite discipline and mean equilibrium of tendencies and sentiments2 and it is in this sense that it has seemed to me we are at liberty to speak of a professional type without equivocation or violence4 ,those who will not accept this manner of looking at this subject will find1 ,i hope1 some additional interest in my work on the score of the special questions which are treated of there3 the heredity of genius1 memory1 the classification of the sentiments 7implied rather than formulated71 the relations of the will to the design considered as writing1 the evolution of art in its connection with visual analysis1 and so forth4 ,there is here a sufficiently abundant supply of materials capable of being wrought up in social psychology and the criticism of art4 ,but it does not become me to bestow praises on my own work1 and it would be too easy for me to subject it to criticism4 ,my readers will find in it themselves the weak portions1 without my pointing them out to them2 and it would be a source of great pleasure to me to have the same assurance that they will discover in it qualities which ,i do not perceive there4 99 99 99 99 99 ,there remains still to be mentioned ,la ,premire partie d'une tude sur la thorie du droit musulman1#fj by ,,savvas ,,pacha1 one time governor and governor general1 one time minister of public works and foreign secretary of ,turkey4 ,savvas ,pacha--a ,christian of ,greek descent--has held high positions in the ,ottoman ,empire and is esteemed as one of the most learned men in ,islamic law who have ever lived4 ,his book therefore demands the greatest consideration2 it will not possess less interest for philosophers than for statesmen and jurists4 ,in my opinion1 works of this class should be consulted by psychologists as much as by sociologists2 we are too much inclined nowadays to neglect certain social studies which offer us valuable information respecting the genius of races and the conditions of their moral existence4 ,the work of ,savvas ,pacha will undoubtedly contribute much toward the elucidation of some mooted points of very first importance2 ,i should like to mention--the history of creation1 and the exposition of the principles of a law which rules more than a million human beings and is intimately interwoven with their political life2 a more exact knowledge of the ,semitic genius2 an estimate of the relations which have existed between the juridical metaphysics of the ,semitic peoples and that of the schools of ,greece1 between the ,mohammedan law and the ,roman law in provinces once ,romanised but afterwards subjected to the empire of the ,caliphs4 ,it does not seem at all doubtful that the ontology of ,aristotle in particular has exercised an influence on the philosophy of the ,arabian jurisconsults4 ,a second truly remarkable fact1 too1 is not the new ontology which they have produced1 but the use they have made of it in their legislative fabrics4 ,it is impossible to enter into details here2 ,i limit myself to the mere pointing out of the facts4 ,with respect to the originality of the institutions that belong to the period of the first ,abbassids1 the same has been contested by a number of historians4 ,m4 ,renan1 among others has maintained that they are the work of the ,iranian genius4 ,savvas ,pacha refutes this opinion in a peremptory manner1 and we shall no longer be able to deny1 after having read him1 that the ,mohammedan civilisation1 with the corpus juris which stands for its most perfect production1 has really proceeded from the genius of the races that bore the banner of ,islam from the confines of ,china to the ,straits of ,gibraltar4 ,shall ,i add that we may deduce from this work1 so learned and so suggestive1 the elements of an instructive comparison between two grand divisions of human history whose evolution seems still to be pursued on lines wholly apart--that which we call ,christianity and that which has sprung from the teachings of ,mohammed8 ,i fervently hope that ,savvas ,pacha will not delay the publication of the other works which he has promised4 ,when they appear he will have furnished us with the most considerable work which we possess on the institutions of a great division of humanity1 still too little known to us4 ,,lucien ,,arr,,at4 ,,footnotes3 #ei ,all the works so far mentioned are published by ,f4 ,alcan4 #fj ,published by ,marchal et ,billard1 ,paris4 ,,ii4 ,,germany4 ,productions of a literary-historical character are under certain circumstances also entitled to mention in a philosophical magazine1 especially if they present to us the intellectual development and physiognomy of an individual or of a community in a scientific manner1 as is done in the ,essays of ,,karl ,,weigand which have just been published by ,merhoff1 of ,munich4 ,of the larger essays contained in this book we will especially mention those on ,voltaire1 ,rousseau1 ,baudelaire1 and ,taine1 to which in psychological respects a high value is to be accorded1 and which although not exactly easy are nevertheless pleasant reading4 ,viewed from this standpoint the ,history of ,north ,american ,literature by ,,karl ,,knortz 7,berlin1 #ahia1 ,lustender7 hardly admits of consideration2 not even ,edgar ,allen ,poe1 who in the psychological point of view is of unexceptionally great importance1 is in any respect profoundly treated4 ,the work is made up of a series of well written articles which first no doubt were published in newspapers and magazines for the public at large4 ,we deem it proper1 however1 to mention the work in this place1 because it contains a chapter on the philosophical literature of ,north ,america1 in which1 we must admit1 philosophy does not appear to the best advantage4 ,the representatives of philosophy in ,north ,america1 the author says1 are in the main doctors of divinity and securely installed university professors1 and this department of study has therefore no dangerous connections2 the gentlemen calmly wend their way along the ancient and well-trodden path of the aprioristic philosophers and proscribe without any ado all modern innovations1 ,darwinism in particular4 ,as they have not as yet consigned the belief in ,god and immortality and the freedom of the will to the lumber-room of traditional opinions1 and as they are as a rule only superficially acquainted with the results of the exact sciences1 despite the fact that many assure us of the contrary1 they accordingly fancy that they are easily able to solve the imagined chief problem of philosophy1 the reconciliation of religion and science4 ,this judgment may contain much that is true1 but from the little that we personally know of things in ,north ,america1 is to be decidedly restricted4 ,moreover1 we by no means share the low opinion which the author entertains of all attempts to reconcile religion and science4 ,religion is a phenomenon of too great antiquity and its influence in the life of nations is too thoroughly established to entitle us1 on the ground of science with which it is still involved in violent conflict1 summarily to disregard it2 and consequently every attempt at reconciliation is worthy of the best efforts of the noblest4 ,it is of course a question whether we shall ever arrive at the point where we will completely understand all religious things1 but we certainly must with time arrive at a point where religion shall no longer contain inconsistencies1 contain nothing1 that is1 of which the absurdities are patent4 ,there was indeed1 in ,germany also1 a time when the belief was very widely spread that religion as compared with science might be ignored completely2 it was the time when ,ludwig ,bchner and ,karl ,vogt were so much read1 when the magazine ,gartenlaube counted its greatest number of readers4 ,but this time is long since past1 and just as since that time employment with philosophy1 especially with ethics1 has become more comprehensive1 so also the interest in religio-philosophical questions1 which aim at a reconcilement of the two hostile powers1 has been considerably augmented4 ,aside from the ,german productions which have been written in a conciliatory tone1 like the book1 to give an example1 of ,moriz ,carrire on ,christianity and the ,modern ,world ,conception1 foreign works of this same class have also been much read1 particularly ,drummond's ,natural ,law in the ,spiritual ,world1 to which indeed in our judgment no particular value is attributable1 as it does not help us to any real knowledge but contents itself with analogies which scientifically are absolutely worthless4 ,recently the little treatise ,ernste ,gedanken of the ,saxon officer ,,von ,,egidy 7,leipsic1 #ahia1 ,wilh4 ,wigand7 has been much talked about4 ,the reformatory effect of this brochure has1 indeed1 hitherto been very slight and will hardly become more extensive in the future1 but the response that it has met with in the widest circles of the ,german public1 proves that many ardent friends of religion anxiously desire that the dogmatic shackles and integuments shall be stripped from the body of the ,christian beliefs1 and that it shall appear1 in the clearest and purest light1 that which it is1 the religion of love4 ,theological criticism has not taken an exactly favorable attitude towards the little book of ,lieut4 ,egidy1 and even the liberals1 who pay the fullest credit to the good intentions of the author call attention to the fact that the greater part of what ,egidy advances has been said before and said better1 and that there is an almost absolute lack of positive proposals to be adopted4 ,the ,egidy movement will thus probably have1 they conclude1 no lasting effects4 ,we cannot indeed absolutely say that these critics are wrong1 if we are at all conversant with the development of protestant theology4 ,a very instructive and opportune work in this respect is a book of the well-known ,berlin professor ,,otto ,,pfleiderer1 who1 as his religio-philosophical treatises evidence1 himself belongs to the reconcilers of ,christianity and the modern world-conceptions4 ,in the year #ahhi1 at the instigation of the editor of the ,library of ,philosophy issued by ,swan1 ,sonnenschein1 ,co4 of ,london1 he published in the ,english language a work on ,the ,development of ,protestant ,theology since ,kant and in ,great ,britain since #ahbe1 and this same work has now just appeared in ,german 7published by ,mohr of ,freiburg7 in a somewhat more extended form4 ,as its title proclaims1 and as its belonging to the ,library of ,philosophy would signify1 the work is chiefly concerned with the influence which philosophy has exercised on theological thought4 ,to make this influence plain1 the author presents at the start1 in the form of an introduction1 a concise but extremely lucid exposition of the philosophical doctrines that especially demand consideration in this direction4 ,of ,german philosophers1 ,kant1 ,fichte1 ,schelling1 and ,hegel1 and of ,english1 ,herbert ,spencer are treated of at length4 ,in view of the great respect which ,hegel still enjoys in ,america1 it will perhaps interest many of the readers of ,the ,monist if ,i give here an utterance of ,pfleiderer1 which in the point of view of the history of religion is also deserving of consideration1 at least on the part of those who are recognised adherents of evolutionism4 8,no other branch of inquiry10 says ,pfleiderer1 8owes so much to ,hegel as ,history2 the arbitrary construction of details from the philosophical concept which had crept in by ,hegel and his immediate followers1 has of course been discarded by exact historical inquirers1 but there has remained that profounder conception of historical life generally as a development of the common mind of all ages and nations1 conformable to law1 dominated by ideas1 and aiming at necessary general purposes2 there has remained that profounder insight into the intricate play of phenomena1 into the kernel of things and men1 into the dominating ideas that lie as guiding impulses at the foundation of even the apparent disharmony of individual passions2 there has remained that unprepossessed understanding for the necessity of even the contrarieties and struggles1 for the errors and passions of men1 for conflict is the father of all things1 as ,hegel says with ,heraclitus1 and as it is only through the struggle of partial rights and one-sided truths that the whole truth of the idea can force its way into existence2 there has remained finally that intelligent respect for the heroic figures of history in which the genius of a people and of an age have been incarnated1 which as the instruments of a higher power have awakened the thought that slumbered in all souls1 given it clear expression1 and infused in it life by their mighty deeds4 ,neither a ,leopold ,ranke1 nor a ,thomas ,carlyle1 nor a ,ferdinand ,christian ,bauer would be conceivable without ,hegel's philosophy of history40 ,pfleiderer expresses himself here very cautiously concerning ,hegel1 and in other passages his caution is extended further still4 ,nevertheless1 it will seem to many as if that philosopher has been too highly estimated by ,pfleiderer4 ,especially will the followers of ,herbart be dissatisfied1 who was involved in violent combat with ,schelling and ,hegel4 ,it is not the place here to enter minutely into this subject2 but it is to be mentioned that the name of ,herbart does not occur once in this large book4 ,perhaps ,pfleiderer is of ,edward ,zeller's opinion who says in his 8,history of ,modern ,philosophy10 that the philosophy of ,herbart has proved itself unfruitful4 ,it must be confessed1 indeed1 that the philosophy of ,hegel has proved itself for religious doctrine very fruitful2 but whether we should be satisfied with its results is quite a different question4 ,be that however as it may2 still1 after ,schoel has presented ,herbart's ideas concerning religion in a special work1 since men like ,drobisch1 ,thilo1 and ,strumpell have further elaborated these ideas2 since particularly ,ziller in his ,ethics has also profoundly treated religious problems in the sense of ,herbart1 it is no longer allowable to omit the name of ,herbart when we treat of the modern philosophy of religion4 ,in other respects also we are not always in full accord with the author4 ,so1 for example1 in ,hausrath's ,neutestamentliche ,zeitgeschichte1 a work to which we ourselves are very much indebted1 the perfection of the form of the presentment is justly praised1 as is also the merit of having inserted into the greater setting of universal history the development of early ,christianity2 but it is not mentioned that ,hausrath has often allowed himself to be misguided into combinations whose flimsiness cannot escape the notice even of the lay student4 ,but these are only slight deficiencies of a work that is otherwise excellent and full of matter1 closing with the words3 8,this much is certain1 that the labors of the best and wisest of all the theologians of our century1 who have here been passed in review before the eyes of the reader1 however different the paths may be which individually they have entered upon1 have yet been all directed to the one end that ,christianity shall strip itself of its dogmatic coverings and fetters and evince its world-conquering power in the ethical idealism of a love that unites us with ,god and joins together the hands of humanity into the federation of brotherhood40 ,if this aim were universal1 that is if it were also recognised by the theologians1 a not inconsiderable portion of the dispute between religion and science would be done away with1 and the sole question would then turn on the contrariety of theological and philosophical ethics4 ,but even respecting this point a settlement would be much sooner brought about1 if those concerned would evince the same spirit of reconciliation as ,,hans ,,gallwitz1 city pastor of ,sigmaringen1 has recently done in his book ,das ,problem der ,ethik in der ,gegenwart 7,gttingen1 #ahia1 ,vandenhoeck and ,ruprecht74 ,the author1 it is true1 deals critically not only with the philosophical ethics of a ,paulsen and a ,wundt1 but also with the theological ethics of a ,hermann and a ,kaftan2 still the settlement of things with the philosophers forms the bulk of this rather extensive work1 the contents of which we cannot of course give here4 ,gallwitz also speaks in considerable detail of ,kant1 whom he opposes in respect of the psychological questions here involved1 wholly rejecting anything like a transcendental will4 ,if we must agree with him in this respect1 we can nevertheless not follow him in his assumption of a special ethical constitution of the soul4 ,in conclusion let me note the titles of two works to which ,i shall revert in a subsequent letter4 ,on ,the ,psychology in ,kant's ,ethics ,dr4 ,,alfred ,,hegler of ,tbingen presents a meritorious and compendious treatise of #cjj pages 7,freiburg1 #ahia1 ,mohr71 and ,professor ,,hostinsky of ,prague publishes an exposition and interpretation1 based on the sources1 of ,herbart's sthetics1 in which1 as is well known1 ethics and sthetics in the restricted sense are wholly severed from psychology4 ,,chr4 ,,ufer4 ,,criticisms ,,and ,,discussions4 ,,thought ,,and ,,language4 ,to the ,editor of ,the ,monist3 ,,sir--,i am glad to hear that ,prof4 ,max ,mller intends to answer our double-barrelled criticism of his article on the above subject4 ,meanwhile1 however1 ,i should like to say a few words with regard to the point which he selects for immediate response 7see ,the ,monist1 ,jan4 #ahib1 p4 #bhf74 ,and my object in saying these few words is to remove from his mind the idea that with regard to the point in question ,i had the smallest intention of bringing against him 8a serious charge of want of accuracy1 unpardonable in a scholar40 ,on the contrary1 as regards this point ,i was simply defending myself from his charge against me--to wit1 the charge of arrogance4 ,in his article on 8,thought and ,language0 he observed1 8,professor ,romanes has no right to speak of men like ,noir1 ,huxley1 ,herbert ,spencer1 to say nothing of ,hobbes1 with an air of superiority40 ,in answer to this charge ,i stated the bare facts of the case1--viz4 that in my book ,i had alluded to ,noir merely for the sake of stating his theory as to the origin of speech1 and of expressing my large measure of agreement therewith2 that ,i had quoted ,huxley only in places where my argument needed authoritative opinions on matters of comparative anatomy2 that ,i had only once mentioned ,hobbes1 and then in order to back by his authority a philosophical doctrine for which ,i was contending2 and1 lastly1 that ,i had never mentioned ,herbert ,spencer at all4 ,now1 if my critic feels that a mere statement of these facts amounts to a serious charge against him as a scholar1 ,i can only express my regret that he should have imposed on me the necessity of stating them4 ,but what now is his reply to this simple statement of facts8 ,briefly1 he drops his own 8serious charge0 as regards ,noir1 ,huxley1 and ,hobbes1 and takes his stand upon the case of ,herbert ,spencer4 8,it is true10 he says1 8,mr4 ,spencer's name does not occur in the index4 ,but on p4 #bcj we read3 #8,so here again we meet with additional proof1 were any required1 of the folly of regarding the copula as an essential ingredient of a proposition4' ,now it is well known that it is ,herbert ,spencer who regards the copula as an essential ingredient of a proposition40 ,as if it were one man alone who takes this view1 and that man ,herbert ,spencer6 ,or as if ,herbert ,spencer's name were so specially identified with it1 that in calling it a philosophically foolish view ,i expected my readers to understand a disrespectful allusion to him6 ,surely my critic knows as well as ,i do that this question touching the function of the copula is one which has been debated for centuries2 and therefore that with much more show of reason he might accuse me of making an attack on the ,president of the ,united ,states1 on the ground that ,i had expressed a decided opinion in favor of free trade4 ,but more than this4 ,so far is it from being 8well known that it is ,herbert ,spencer who regards the copula as an essential ingredient of a proposition10 that ,i am under the necessity of asking ,prof4 ,max ,mller for references in proof of such a statement4 ,chapters ,x and ,,xi of the 8,principles of ,psychology0 7,vol4 ,,ii7 are those which1 as far as ,i am aware1 most nearly approach the subject4 ,yet the word 8copula0 does not once occur in them4 ,moreover1 with all that ,mr4 ,spencer has there said upon the nature and structure of propositions ,i am1 and always have been1 in full agreement4 ,yours faithfully1 ,,george ,j4 ,,romanes4 ,oxford1 ,feb4 #ab4 ,a ,,defense ,,of ,,littr4 ,to the ,editor of ,the ,monist4 ,if all the readers of ,the ,monist for ,october were acquainted with the life and writings of ,littr ,i should not have to defend him against your criticism1 as everyone could see that there is more truth than poetry in my sonnet4 ,but ,i fear that 8the voice1 the spirit1 and the soul of ,positivism0 is not so well known as he deserves to be1 and ,i venture to ask for space to reply4 ,proceeding in order1 ,i should like to correct the impression left by the following passage3 8,comte had not nominated a successor who should in his place be the ,directeur du positivisme4 ,littr had forfeited this honor on account of his quarrels with ,comte in which he strongly sided with ,madame ,comte against her husband40 ,the misunderstanding between the two men had a more serious origin than these family squabbles and arose from the fact that ,littr would not follow ,comte through the mystic vagaries of the ,politique ,positive4 ,he admits that being under his intellectual ascendency he went too far on the new way1 but he soon found that the master was violating his own method and1 having to choose between them1 he held to the method4 ,littr's refusal to join ,comte in his adhesion to the rgime of the coup d'tat of #ahea was the immediate cause of the rupture4 ,his 8excessive tolerance0 did not extend to the ,bonapartes1 whom he detested cordially4 ,it is characteristic of the man that he continued his yearly subscription to the fund that he had created for his friend's support notwithstanding this break in their relations4 ,as to his tolerance1 ,i think with you that he carried it a little too far in his own family4 ,greater firmness might have spared us the vision of priests bedeviling him in his agony and dragging his body in triumph to holy ground4 ,but the case that you take as an example does not seem to me conclusive4 ,it was not necessary to possess his knowledge of history in order to appreciate the difficulties attendant upon interference with his catholic wife in the education of their daughter1 and as success was impossible he wisely limited his endeavor to fields unobstructed by the 8eternal feminine40 ,seriously1 we admit that ,littr was tolerant to excess1 but not that the attitude of his philosophy is1 as you say1 8mere scepticism leading to indifferentism40 ,in the words of ,m4 ,wyrouboff1 who aided him for many years in editing the magazine called ,la ,philosophie ,positive1 8men1 no matter how superior they may be1 are never abstract formulas interpreting with equal facility all the parts of a mental conception2 they always represent a mixture of strength and weakness in variable proportions4444 ,it seemed as if intellectual activity had absorbed all the living forces of his 7,littr's7 being1 leaving in the place of physical activity only the faculty of passive resistance to the will of others40 ,this refers to the man in his old age but in youth he was an athlete of remarkable strength4 ,renan said of him3 8,while his temperament was calm his mind was revolutionary1 and therefore he never gave way4 ,in ,july #ahcj1 he was in the first line of those who broke into the place du ,carrousel and ,george ,farcy was shot through by his side40 ,i am tempted to quote a little more from this master of words4 8,so great was his love of truth that1 perhaps alone in our century1 he could retract without lessening himself4 ,truth led him like a child4444 ,it is not well to be too perfect4444 ,his apparent negations were only the extreme reserve of a mind that dreads hazardous appreciations4 ,he was so much afraid of going beyond what he saw clearly that he often stopped short of it4 ,hesitation that implies a thousand times more delicate worship of the eternal ideal than the rash solutions that satisfy superficial minds40 ,even in old age there were no signs of 8indifferentism0 in his conduct4 ,in the words of ,pasteur1 8,at the ,mesnil he was consulting physician for the whole village 7always gratuitously74 ,continuing his labors till three o'clock in the morning1 the light of his lamp shone afar during the night like a beacon that reassured the sick4 ,it was known that at the first call1 ,m4 ,littr would leave his work and go wherever his aid was needed40 ,these are the words of men that knew him1 but my first-hand opinion of him was formed solely from his writings and his public acts as senator1 etc42 fancy such a man in our senate6 ,the note in which you say that ,i attended positivistic lectures 7,comte's87 in ,france together with ,mr4 ,frederic ,harrison is a flattering anachronism4 ,littr's father received a sword of honor while in the navy for beating off an ,english ship of superior force1 and the son's philosophy prompts not only to action but to action1 if necessary1 in the good old fashioned positive way4 ,my second objection refers to the line where you say that your positivism 8has nothing to do with ,comte or with any of ,comte's disciples10 and1 leaving ,comte aside1 ,i hope to show that you and ,littr are much better friends than you imagine4 ,a view noted by him on p4 #bg1 ,vol4 #a1 of his magazine1 ,la ,philosophie ,positive1 ought to assure this happy result4 ,in the preface of your valuable work entitled 8,fundamental ,problems0 you draw particular attention to the part that treats of 8,form and ,formal ,thought10 which1 you say1 discusses a subject of fundamental importance4 8,a correct conception of form and the laws of form will clear away many mysteries2 it will afford a satisfactory explanation of causality and shed a new light on all the other problems of philosophy40 ,the part referred to begins thus3 8,in the introduction to his #8,critique of ,pure ,reason1' ,immanuel ,kant proposes the question3 ,how are synthetical ,judgments a priori possible8 on the solution of this problem the whole structure of his philosophy rests1 which he characterises as ,transcendental ,idealism40 78,a priori1 as used in the limited sense by ,kant1 is purely formal knowledge1 while a posteriori is identical with experience407 ,further on ,i read1 8,our own views grew out of a study of ,kant's ,transcendentalism02 and the first words of your 8,conclusion0 are these3 8,although ,kant's ,transcendental ,idealism cannot be considered as a final solution of the basic problem of philosophy1 it nevertheless pursues the right method and has thus actually led us to a solution which1 we hope1 will in time be recognised as final40 ,in looking for the difference between the two solutions to find the part in yours that belongs to you alone1 ,i see on p4 #ej of 8,fundamental ,problems0 that 8,kant thinks it is a strange and wonderful fact that our formal thought 7the rules of arithmetic1 mathematics1 logic1 etc41 which are a priori7 agrees so precisely with the highest 7i4 e4 the most general7 laws of nature1 which can be ascertained and verified by experience4 ,kant sees only two ways of solution4 ,either the laws of pure reason1 he says1 have been gathered by experience from nature1 or1 on the contrary1 the laws of nature have been deduced from our a priori rules4 ,the former solution is impossible1 since the formal sciences are proven to have been formulated with the exclusion of all sensory experience4 #8,therefore1' says ,kant1 #8the second solution only remains4 ,reason dictates its laws to nature'2 i4 e4 444 the sensory impressions are the raw material only from which the well-ordered whole of nature1 as an object of science1 is created by the synthetic faculty of reason4444 ,kant has taken into consideration two ways only4 ,he overlooks the third and most obvious explanation4444 ,the third possibility is that which has been propounded in the foregoing pages4 ,according to our explanation1 the formal 7the highest or most general7 laws of nature and the formal laws of thought are identical4 ,their agreement is not wonderful but inevitable as both are expressions of the forms of existence in general40 ,this then is your 8solution of the basic problem of philosophy40 ,turning back to page #cd1 ,i find under the title 8,the ,origin of the ,a ,priori03 8,kant answers the question #8,how are synthetic judgments a priori possible8' by showing that such synthetic judgments undoubtedly exist40 8,he might have ventured a step further by proposing another question3 #8,what is the origin of the a priori8' ,only by answering this question could he have shown how synthetic judgments a priori are possible4 ,this he did not do1 and the omission has produced great confusion among ,german1 ,french1 and ,english thinkers40 ,on the next page1 #cf1 ,i find 8,according to our view1 form is a property of reality as well as of our cognition4 ,formless matter does not exist4 ,form and matter as they exist in reality1 are inseparable4444 ,knowledge also in its primitive shape1 when it is1 so to say1 natural and crude1 is an intimate combination of sense-perceptions and formal cognition4 ,the sense-perceptions are the real substance of knowledge1 while formal cognition is the principle which arranges and systematises sense-experiences40 444 8,logic does not create order and system in our brain1 but it makes us conscious of the order that naturally grew in our mind40 ,in the division entitled 8,the ,order of ,nature0 you say that 8,formal thought represents the mere laws of thought in their abstractness1 and has been acquired by abstraction4 ,the mere forms of thought exhibit a wonderful regularity4444 ,this regularity of formal thought1 which is expressed in all logical laws1 arithmetical calculations1 and in all mathematical conceptions1 has naturally grown in our mind as the psychical expression of a physical regularity in the arrangement of the various brain-structures and their combinations4 ,the arrangement of brain-structures in certain regular forms has been effected in accordance with the same laws that govern the development of forms generally40 ,this answer to the question1 8,what is the origin of the a priori0 is what you call the corner-stone of your positivism1 which1 you say1 8it is to be hoped1 will prove the only true ,monism40 ,now ,i give my translation of ,littr's view1 which he published in #ahfg1 in an article entitled 8,the ,three ,philosophies40 8,the effective certainty that the mathematical laws of number1 of figure and of motion are at the base of physical phenomena1 and the inductive belief that they are equally at the base of chemical and of biological phenomena induce me to note here a view upon the relation that must be found between subjective phenomena and objective phenomena1 that is to say upon the relation that causes the subject to draw from the object a science and laws4 ,the nervous substance1 which is the organ of all intelligence1 is made up of material elements which arrive with their conditions2 and when this substance becomes capable of thinking1 it passes under the conditions proper to the elements that form it2 which results in 7se traduit par7 a science and its laws4 ,the material work that takes place in the brain while it fulfils its office1 is1 as is known1 a work of nutrition1 which consists of a chemical exchange of molecules4 ,every chemical action is1 in turn1 equivalent to a certain quantity of heat2 and again1 this heat is equivalent to a certain quantity of motion4 ,thus thought1 no matter how we represent to ourselves the relation to nervous substance1 is connected with mathematical modes of which it becomes conscious when it becomes luminous4 ,not that ,i would in any way have it understood that thought is but an equivalent of heat or of motion4 ,far from that1 equivalence is not identity2 and whenever we change from one degree to another in the natural and scientific order we meet a new unknown which is the characteristic of this degree4 ,the induction that leads us to connect thought with mathematical conditions1 leads us also to connect it with physical1 chemical1 and biological conditions1 of which it is necessarily participant4 ,finally1 when1 at the highest point1 it arrives face to face with itself1 it studies itself experimentally like the rest1 and forms its own doctrine4 ,if it attempts to go out metaphysically into space1 it is reduced to combining subjectively its own elements1 turns in a circle without issue and falls back upon itself4 ,if1 on the contrary1 it makes the same attempt towards nature from which it emanates1 then the ways open1 science is established1 and positive philosophy appears4 ,the material constitution of the nervous substance is the point of junction between the human mind and laws or general facts4 ,if ,i had been younger1 ,i should have made a work of this view1 not a paragraph2 but old age must hasten40 ,i have translated more than was necessary so as to give the 8view0 as a whole4 ,does it not contain the answer to your question1 8,what is the origin of the a priori08 ,though ,littr solved your 8basic problem of philosophy0 he did not attach so much importance to this solution as you do because his philosophy is based upon a generalisation from all facts and not upon any one fact1 however important it may be4 8,positive ,philosophy is the conception of the world that results from the systematised ensemble of the positive sciences0 and does not depend upon the solution of any psychological problem1 although it recognises the importance of all psychological facts4 ,your originality lies in your application of ,littr's discovery4 ,the reader has his choice between ,littr's positivism and your neo-,kantism1 but if he side with you he must at least thank ,littr for the solution on which your philosophy is based4 ,you say that 8,comtean ,positivism1 especially as it is represented by ,littr1 consists mainly if not exclusively of the doctrine to #8let metaphysics alone4'0 ,is this fair to the man that solved your 8basic problem of philosophy0 in a paragraph8 ,positivism as represented by ,littr gives due importance to the subjective element4 ,he recognised that three essentials were necessary to the completion of ,comte's philosophy3 a political economy1 a cerebral theory1 and what1 for want of a better name he termed the subjective theory of humanity4 ,this last comprised ethics1 sthetics1 and psychology4 ,speaking of a confusion that obscures the whole discussion relative to psychology1 he says3 8,cerebral theory1 mental or psychological theory are taken in two very different senses1 which are never distinguished4 ,these terms signify sometimes the organic conditions under which intelligence manifests itself1 sometimes the formal conditions under which the intellect operates4 ,as soon as these two significations are separated we perceive the means of settling the debate as to the place of psychology2 for to the question3 ,where should these two orders be studied8 it will be answered that the first should be studied in anatomy1 physiology1 zology1 the evolution of ages1 pathology1 it belongs therefore without contest to biology2 but it will be answered that the second should be studied in the total development of history and in the application to all the modes of cognition2 it belongs incontestably to philosophy4 ,thus there are two psychologies1 one biological1 the other philosophical1 one relating to the individual man1 the other to the collective man1 one furnishing what is necessary in order to pass from biology to sociology1 the other examining the subjective instrument by the light of all positive knowledge4 ,but this complement of philosophy ,i do not call psychology1 ,i call it the subject-theory of humanity2 because while including psychology1 it includes much more40 ,that is to say2 ethics and sthetics4444 8,in the order of the positive method it is at first by means of the object that human knowledge is built up1 and we end with the subject40 8,the theory of the subject is the indispensable complement of the theory of the object40 ,of positive philosophy ,littr says3 8,while it constructs the series of the partial philosophies and thus embraces all objective knowledge1 it constructs at the same time the series of effective methods and thus embraces all logical power4 ,i borrow this expression from ,m4 ,comte1 who so happily named these effective methods the logical powers of the human mind4 ,when it has terminated its first series it is found to have also terminated the second4 ,thus the ensemble of the methods represents the function of the subject2 the ensemble of the partial philosophies1 the function of the object40 ,is this what you call a 8one-sided philosophy08 ,you say that ,littr is the worst kind of a metaphysician because he maintains that we can know nothing about first and final causes2 ,i quote him to show his position3 8,positive philosophy is at the same time a system that comprises all that is known of the world1 of man and of society1 and a general method including all the ways by which things have been learned4 ,what is beyond1 either1 materially1 the depths 7fond7 of boundless space1 or1 intellectually1 the endless enchainment of causes1 is absolutely inaccessible to the human mind4 ,but inaccessible does not mean null or non-existent4 ,immensity1 both material and intellectual1 holds by a narrow tie to what we know and becomes by this alliance a positive idea of the same order2 ,i mean to say that by touching and bordering it1 this immensity appears in its double character1 reality and inaccessibility4 ,it is an ocean that washes our shore1 and for which we have neither bark nor sail1 but whose clear vision is as salutary as it is formidable40 ,aug4 ,comte et la ,phil4 ,pos41 #b;d ,ed41 p4 #eai4 ,as ,littr had found this shore encumbered with the wrecks of expeditions that had started out in search of first causes and final causes1 it is no wonder that he was a little timid4 ,his metaphor needs explanation in the light of other passages1 otherwise it might seem to discourage pursuit of the unknown4 ,he did not discountenance hypotheses but he was very much afraid of our inclination to take guesses for truth2 and this1 by the way1 is the reason why he is not appreciated in this country1 where we are so fond of guessing4 ,what he really did was to discourage those navigators who would go in search of the ,jumping-off-place1 for the best that can befall them is to come back to where they started4 ,the men that know the earth is round are the only men that find new worlds4 ,in answer to your statement that ,littr's philosophy 8is an inventory rather than a plan to guide science in its further evolution0 ,i will only repeat in his words1 what he has shown so well1 that 8positive philosophy is the ensemble of human knowledge1 disposed according to a certain order which enables us to grasp its connections and its unity1 and to draw from it the general directions for each part and for the whole40 ,you say that 8,littr rejects the evolution theory and its attempts to explain ethics40 ,i quote him from ,la ,philosophie ,positive1 ,march1 #ahhj3 8,positive philosophy does not deny the evolution of ethics2 far from doing so1 it maintained and inculcated this evolution long before the utilitarian doctrine made it its ethical pivot404444 8,general morality1 born of the gradual culture of the sentimental basis of the human soul under the social protection of progressive centres1 is entirely disinterested1 and this is what makes its purity and its force40 ,in your philosophy you have a god and a religion1 in his we have the same things1 but as they are so different from what is generally understood by these terms1 we use others4 ,here are some of the ,paroles de ,philosophie ,positive3 8,in the eyes of history1 there are no false religions1 there are only incomplete religions which make their way through time and perfect themselves4444 ,the definition of religion is taken from its office1 which is3 to put education1 and consequently moral life1 en rapport with the conception of the world at each phase of humanity4 ,whoever examines this definition will find that it satisfies all the conditions of religion1 either in the past1 the present1 or the future4 ,it will be perceived that theology is not inherent in the religious idea4 ,it was not always there in the past2 for we cannot give the name of theology to primordial fetichism1 which addressed its worship to neighboring objects1 nor to the religions that adore natural agents1 such as air1 wind1 night1 dawn2 it is with polytheism that theology begins4 ,as for the future1 general science1 conceiving the world differently from the way in which it was conceived during the reigns of the successive religions1 takes an office equivalent to the religious office1 and must in its turn place education and moral life in accord with the universe as it appears to us404444 8,we do not outrage the old doctrine1 whose past is glorious and venerable2 but there is a public for which it is a dead letter2 and it is to this public that we address ourselves and for this public that we labor40 ,is this not aspiration to be in unison with 8the order of the world10 which you call ,god8 ,and when ,littr traces this aspiration back to its organic origin is he not explaining what you affirm8 ,our philosophies are not perfect1 but we must apply them1 such as they are1 to the needs of the day4 ,the most pressing of all these needs1 in my opinion1 is unity of action among those who are animated with the new spirit4 ,let us pull together4 ,very truly yours1 ,,louis ,,belrose1 ,,jr4 ,,mile ,,littr',s ,,positivism4 ,an editor cannot make it a rule to accept criticisms of considerable length which have reference to a remark incidentally made in a book review4 ,the present case1 however1 although it belongs in this category1 is of a peculiar nature4 ,first1 the remark on ,littr was made by the editor himself1 and accordingly he feels personally responsible for it2 secondly1 it contains a brief delineation of ,littr's character as a man and as a philosopher in the way in which he is usually regarded by the most prominent historians of philosophy4 ,mr4 ,belrose presents ,littr in quite a new light and quotes passages in corroboration of his conception of ,littr which are perhaps not generally known1 for they are buried in articles of the positivistic journal ,la ,philosophie ,positive1 and this journal enjoyed neither a long life nor a large circulation2 nor is it to be had in any of the libraries accessible to me4 ,seventeen editorial articles were republished in bookform1 7,la ,science4 ,au point de vue philosophique1 par 4 ,,littr4 ,paris1 #ahgc71 but the article 8,the ,three ,philosophies0 is not among them4 ,if ,mr4 ,belrose's conception of ,littr proves to be true1 ,i shall not only gladly correct my own wrong view of ,littr1 but ,i wish also to call attention to the fact that he has been misrepresented by almost all and certainly by the best and most painstaking philosophical historians4 ,i cannot however in the main points accede to ,mr4 ,belrose's view and will have to sustain my former opinion that ,m4 ,littr was an agnostic4 ,he made it a matter of principle to suspend his opinion on some of the most fundamental philosophical problems1 which he considered as inaccessible4 ,his positivism1 accordingly1 differs toto clo from the positivism presented in ,the ,monist4 ,his philosophy1 like that of ,comte1 is so far as ,i understand it1 a policy of let-metaphysics-alone4 ,it gives up the struggle with metaphysics as a hopeless undertaking4 ,therefore1 ,i should say1 ,littr's positivism has not conquered metaphysics1 and although it lets metaphysics alone1 metaphysics plays an important part in it4 ,littr is an agnostic and like every agnostic that believes in the unknowable1 a metaphysician without knowing it4 ,the doctrine of the three stages of knowledge1 viz41 the theological1 metaphysical1 and positive stages1 appears to me of less importance4 ,the doctrine of the three stages is at the same time not properly a ,comtean idea2 ,comte adopted it from ,turgot1 the great statesman and one of the greatest men as a thinker and also as a character that ever lived and who is too little appreciated as such4 ,the main doctrine of ,comte's positivism is the doctrine that first and final causes cannot be known1 and we must abandon our search for them2 that human knowledge is limited to the middle1 while the two ends are inaccessible4 ,these insoluble questions1 he declares1 have made no progress from the beginning4 ,mr4 ,lewes in his book 8,comte's ,philosophy of the ,sciences0 expresses this agnosticism in the following words 7p4 #ca73 8,our province is to study her nature's laws1 to trace her processes1 and1 thankful that we can so far penetrate the divine significance of the universe1 be content--as ,locke wisely and modestly says--to sit down in quiet ignorance of all transcendent#fa subjects40 ,this idea has so far as ,i am aware never been given up by ,littr2 it remained the basis of his belief in the unknowable and his works abound in expressions that concerning the main problems of life1 8the positive philosophy will neither assert nor deny anything40 ,littr concludes the last article of his volume 8,la ,science0 with the following words3 8,le domaine ultrieur est celui des choses qui ne peuvent pas tre connues4 ,la science positive professe de n'y rien nier1 de n'y rien affirmer2 en un mot1 elle ne connat pas l'inconnaissable1 mais elle en constate l'existence4 ,l est la philosophie suprme2 aller plus loin est chimrique1 aller moin loin est dserter notre destine40 ,this quotation alone1 ,i think1 settles the first main point at issue4 ,now ,i maintain that ,comte's view of causation where he refers to first and final causes is fundamentally wrong2 causation is transformation and causality is the formula under which we comprehend the changes of matter and energy that take place4 ,the expressions first and final causes are misnomers 7see 8,fundamental ,problems10 the chapter ,the ,problem of ,causality74 ,first cause is either the starting point of a series of some longer chain of causes and effects1 or as the term is generally applied or rather misapplied1 stands for the last ground or reason1 i4 e4 the answer given to the ultimate question why81 which is the most general raison d'tre that would explain and contain all the other and less general raisons d'tre regarding the nature of existence4 ,the term final cause1 again1 means either the last cause in a series of causes or 7and so it is generally used7 it is a misnomer for purpose2 and the final cause supposed to be inaccessible to human comprehension is the purpose of the existence of the world at large4 ,i object to there being three kinds of causes4 ,there is one kind of causality only1 and the causes of this causality in all the causal processes with which we are confronted are perfectly intelligible4 ,the problem of the first cause of the origin of our world1 viz4 the solar system and the milky way1 was attacked first by ,kant and later by ,laplace1 and the latter1 without knowing of ,kant's solution1 solved it in the main in the same way4 ,all recent investigations stand upon this ,kant-,laplace hypothesis so called1 having added corrections only as to details4 ,shall we declare that these labors are vain and gratuitous efforts of vague speculations8 ,littr says1 with reference to such speculations1 concerning the past and future states of the world 7le monde73 8,la dissmination primordiale de la matire qui devait le composer1 la dissmination future de la matire qui le compose1 dpassant toute exprience1 dpassent toute conjecture40 ,if ,i misunderstand ,littr1 it appears to me a pardonable mistake4 ,yet is not the problem as to the origin of the world at large1 why matter and energy exist at all1 insolvable8 ,littr says that the positive cosmogonies1 such as the doctrine of evolution do not touch the absolute2 they have nothing to do with first and final causes4 ,he says3 8,les cosmogonies positives la i4 e4 la place des cosmogonies religieuses remplissent1 non pas qu'elles aient la prtention ni le pouvoir de pntrer dans l'absolu et d'embrasser1 les causes premires et finales40--l4 c41 p4 #efj4 ,that kind of causality which is sometimes called 8ontological10 having reference to the existence1 not of single things as transformations from other things1 but of the world at large and formulated in such questions as how did the universe itself1 the world as a whole1 originate1 is properly speaking no causality1 it is not a question concerning a cause1 but concerning a raison d'tre4 ,however without haggling about the words cause and raison d'tre1 this ontological causality so called is by no means beyond human comprehension4 ,the ontological question has found a very definite answer in the formulation of the law of the conservation of matter and energy2 which declares that existence at large did not originate1 the total amount of matter as well as of energy existed always and will exist always4 ,it has not been created2 it is uncreatable and indestructible2 it is eternal4 ,littr is quite explicit in declaring that the positive philosophy lets alone all theological and metaphysical problems4 ,it is neither atheistic nor theistic1 and does not side with either materialism or spiritualism4 ,he says3 8,ni spiritualiste1 ni matrialiste1 la philosophie positive carte de la science gnrale les dbats que la science particulire a depuis long temps et son grand profit rejets40--,preface d'un disciple in ,comte's 8,course de ,phil4 pos40 p4 xxvii4 ,littr characterises as the main object of the positive philosophy1 8to give to philosophy the positive method of the sciences1 to the sciences the idea of the unity of philosophy40 ,he says3 8,ainsi fut accompli ce qu'on doit appeler l'uvre philosophique du dix-neuvime sicle1 donner la philosophie la mthode positive des sciences1 aux sciences l'ide d'ensemble de la philosophie40 ,preface1 p4 viii4 ,i am in perfect agreement with ,littr that this is the object of positivism2 but1 if ,i understand ,littr correctly1 ,i disagree from his conception of the positive method4 ,he limits the positive method to what he calls 8experience10 and excludes every notion of the a priori4 ,littr apparently misunderstood the proper meaning of ,kant's idea of the a priori1 for he used as a matter of course the a priori method wherever it was indispensable1 so for instance in mathematics and in the application of mathematics4 ,mr4 ,belrose says3 ,littr 8solved your basic problem of philosophy i4 e4 what is the origin of the a priori in a paragraph40 ,the problem of the a priori reasoning is the question 8,why can we know certain things before we have tested them by experiment8 ,man has not arrived by experience but by pure reasoning at the conclusion that the sum of the angles of every plane triangle has #ahj degrees4 ,how is he justified in declaring a priori that the angles of a certain plane triangle make up #ahj degrees1 although he has not measured them80 ,this problem is the fundamental problem of the scientific or positive method2 it is the same problem which ,mr4 ,charles ,s4 ,peirce discusses in his article 7see pp4 #cba et seqq4 of the present number of ,the ,monist71 for the problem of apriority is identical with the question of necessity4 ,littr has1 so far as ,i know1 never discussed the problem of apriority and necessity4 ,he has simply rejected the idea of the a priori as the method of a false metaphysics1 which is incompatible with the a posteriori method of positive science4 ,the passage quoted by ,mr4 ,belrose most certainly does not contain a solution of the problem4 ,littr declares therein that every chemical action is equivalent to a certain quantity of heat2 and again this heat is equivalent to a certain quantity of motion4 ,thus1 he says1 thought is connected with mathematical modes of which it becomes conscious4 ,thought1 he adds1 is not an equivalent of heat or motion1 for equivalence is not identity1 but it is connected with mathematical conditions4 ,this means that that kind of brain-action which represents conscious thought1 depends upon definite proportions4 ,but what in all the world has this idea to do with the problem of apriority8 ,the phrase 8mathematical modes0 7which is misleading in this passage7 is an unfortunate expression for 8proportions0 and we must add that ,littr is mistaken when he says that the nervous substance when it becomes luminous1 becomes conscious of these mathematical modes with which it is connected4 ,aside from 8luminous0 being simply an allegorical expression for conscious1 it is wrong to say that the nervous substance becomes conscious of the mathematical modes of heat as they are proportioned in the brain4 ,a sentient being knows through sensation nothing about the mechanism or the mechanical proportions of its own sentient structure4 ,sensation is the act of a becoming conscious not of the sentient structure itself but of the meaning which this sentient structure has acquired1 and a consciousness of the mathematical modes which according to ,comte's hierarchy of the sciences ought to be the beginning of knowledge develops at a very late period4 ,any explanation of the origin of a priori1 be it ever so brief1 would lead us too far away from the points of our controversy4 ,it is sufficient here to point out that the passage quoted by ,mr4 ,belrose1 contains no solution of the problem of our knowledge and certitude of mathematical1 arithmetical1 and other purely formal laws4 ,on the contrary1 this very passage is replete with error2 it is a misstatement of facts and does not even bring to light the difficulties of the problem4 ,littr was prejudiced against the a priori1 and his prejudice induced him to underrate its importance4 ,i read in one of ,littr's passages quoted by ,mr4 ,belrose3 8,if it thought attempts to go out metaphysically into space1 it is reduced to combining subjectively its own elements1 turns in a circle without issue and falls back upon itself40 ,the a priori method of thought subjectively combining its own elements1 is by no means a turning in a circle without issue so that in the end it will fall back upon itself4 ,the a priori method of thought subjectively combining its own elements is employed by arithmetic1 mathematics1 and logic1 and we are confronted with the astonishing fact that rules1 or formulas1 or calculations which were made by pure thought subjectively combining its own elements1 are applicable and hold good as reliable guides in our experiments4 ,if there were no a priori1 how could we foretell or1 what is more still1 how could we predetermine the course of nature8 ,the a priori has been wrongly employed by the so-called metaphysical philosophers to give us information about the substance and essence of the world4 ,but the misapplication of the a priori is no reason for denouncing it as radically wrong4 ,the existence of the a priori is an undeniable fact4 ,kant was right in recognising it in its sweeping importance1 yet he was wrong in his interpretation of the a priori1 which according to his transcendentalism was based exclusively upon a peculiarity of the mind and not upon the nature of things4 ,the positivists in ,france did not only object to the wrong interpretation of the transcendentalists but also denied the existence of the a priori4 ,accepting the principle that every knowledge must ultimately be a statement of facts1 the question ,how is the a priori to be based upon facts8 became in my conception of philosophy the burning problem which was next in order as a conciliation between ,kant and ,comte4 ,the ,french positivists1 foremost among them ,comte and ,littr1 have not given us an explanation of what is true and false in the theological and metaphysical notions of first and final causes1 of the a priori of ,god1 of substance1 of force1 etc42 they have simply abandoned the investigation of these ideas which are after all the most important tools in the household of the human mind for scientific and ethical purposes2 and thus they have1 in spite of their positivism in questions of detail1 retained the metaphysical method of a priori reasoning which is quite legitimate in the formal science but out of place concerning facts4 ,take for instance the following argument concerning the materiality of things3 8,l1 c'est dire dans les sciences positives1 on ne connat aucune proprit sans matire1 non point parce que1 a priori1 on y a l'ide prconue qu'il n'existe aucune substance spirituelle indpendante1 mais parce que1 a posteriori1 on n'a jamais rencontr la gravitation sans corps pesant1 la chaleur sans corps chaud1 l'lectricit sans corps lectrique1 l'affinit sans substances de combinaison1 la vie1 la sensibilit1 la pense1 sans tre vivant1 sentant et pensant40--,la ,science1 p4 #cjg4 ,i do not mean to say that there are immaterial or spiritual substances1 but ,i should say that any purely a posteriori argument in favor of their non-existence is insufficient4 ,would ,littr mean that a ,zulu should declare that ice cannot exist because he has never seen water frozen as hard as a stone8 ,any amount of experience1 i4 e4 all a posteriori evidence1 is in parts and will out of itself never acquire universal validity4 ,how strongly ,littr is still implicated in the metaphysical method of applying a priori ideas to a posteriori experiences can be learned from the following statement3 8,le monde est constitu par la matire et par les forces de la matire3 la matire dont l'origine et l'essence nous sont inaccessible2 les forces qui sont immanentes la matire4 ,au del de ces deux termes1 matire et force1 la science positive ne connat rien40 ,preface1 p4 ix4 ,the metaphysical ideas1 matter and force1 are a priori notions of mystical entities or things in themselves1 and thus it appears natural that experience should know nothing of them4 ,but real matter and actual force are not unknowable existences4 ,they can be known4 ,we know something of them and positive science is engaged in broadening and deepening this knowledge4 ,says ,littr3 8,les proprits physiques sont manifestes en toute substance1 dans quelque tat qu'elle soit1 isole ou non isole1 et s'exercent sur les masses2 les proprits1 n'apparaissent qu'entre deux substances1 ont besoin de la binarit et s'exercent sur les molcules2 enfin les proprits vitales dpassant la binarit1 ne sont compatibles qu'avec un tat molculaire plus compos40 ,preface1 p4 x4 ,one of the fundamental principles of positivism1 as ,i conceive it1 is the definition of knowledge as a description of facts or of their properties4 ,we call certain properties of the facts 7i4 e4 the objects of our experience7 matter and others force4 ,when we say that we do or do not know a certain phenomenon we mean that we have or have not as yet succeeded in placing them properly in that system of thought-symbols of which our mind consists4 ,yet there is no sense in speaking of matter and force as being unknowable while the properties of matter and force are said to be manifest and appearing under certain conditions4 ,i have presented the main reasons why ,i still hold that there is a radical difference between ,littr's view of positivism and my own4 ,littr is an agnostic and he was an agnostic before that name had been invented4 ,his objection to metaphysicism consists in the doctrine not that the object of metaphysics is a chimerical non-existence1 but that the object of metaphysics exists yet it cannot be known4 ,thus ,littr is as much a metaphysician as those philosophers whom he censures for their metaphysical views4 ,he does not censure them for believing that the metaphysical exists1 but for believing that it is knowable and attempting to investigate its nature4 ,as to the hierarchy of the sciences ,i shall simply quote a few extracts from ,eugen ,dhring's criticism of ,comte4 ,dhring says 7,krit4 ,gesch4 der ,phil41 p4 #dhf73 8,if ,comte's positivism were nothing more than what we have here laid down1 its main contents would1 strange enough1 consist in negativity4 ,the criticism of a certain kind of metaphysics1 viz4 of an ontology phantastical to a greater or lesser extent1 would form its most significant character4 ,the other element which consists in presenting a hierarchy and unitary conjunction of some of the sciences which are called positive in the usual sense of the term1 cannot pretend to be philosophy in the higher sense of the word or even to be useful for science4 ,a general view of knowledge1 whether it consists of six or sixty volumes1 does not add the least iota to the contents of our knowledge4444 ,we cannot expect that a specialist should be pleased with a hierarchical sketch of his science1 especially if the delineations are filled out with details of which he would be a better judge40 ,it is true1 and ,i concur in this with the ,french positivists1 that a positive philosophy must be a systematic arrangement of knowledge4 ,but ,i conceive it to be the philosopher's work1 not to take an inventory of the sciences1 but to define the fundamental concepts of scientific enquiry and to elucidate the methods of cognition4 ,such fundamental concepts are the ideas1 truth and criterion of truth1 cause and effect1 mind1 thought1 knowledge1 ethics1 etc4 ,concepts are the tools of thought and the practice of using them correctly has to be learned4 ,positivism is not the original invention of a world-system1 but the systematising of statements of facts so as to produce a world-system4 ,the old philosophers gave us first a world-system1 from which and in accord with which they defined their views of truth1 cognition1 cause1 etc4 ,they began to build their philosophy from the top down4 ,positivism begins from the bottom and is building up to the top with the assistance of the special sciences4 ,a positive philosophy is inseparable from1 but it cannot be replaced by1 the sciences4 ,the field of philosophy is to superintend the method and the plan of building1 so as to compare the details and bear in mind the unity of the whole4 ,in this sense ,dhring says in criticising ,comte 7p4 #dhf73 8,however1 concerning the form of the connections of methodical reflections1 something can be done4 ,yet it must be possible to separate everything of such a kind and also new insights1 so as to constitute a special branch of knowledge4 ,otherwise they will escape the specialists' attention4444 ,not only ,comte but all philosophers given to the idea of systematisation and construction of particular knowledge have made attempts in this direction which at most may range as sketches or popular presentations in a higher sense40 ,concerning ,littr's view of ,comte's religious vagaries ,dhring says 7p4 #dhc73 8,his ,comte's biographer1 the ,academician ,littr of ,paris1 and also ,stuart ,mill are right in considering #8,the ,course of ,positive ,philosophy' as the main and fundamental work which is decisive as a contribution of his and a source of instruction to the world4 ,however1 they are very one-sided when they overlook that the philosopher even in his vagaries exhibited a universality of mind which remains superior to the standpoint of either ,littr or ,mill40 ,i agree with ,mr4 ,belrose that ,comte's religion as he conceived it consists of vagaries1 but the main idea of developing the religions of the past which1 as ,littr says1 are not false but only incomplete religions1 into a religion that shall be in accord with the science of our day is no vagary1 but a great and an important ideal4 ,far be it from me to belittle ,littr because ,i disagree from him in some fundamental questions4 ,he was in his time1 he is still1 and will remain for ever a star of first magnitude in our philosophical galaxy4 ,that which ,i consider as his errors does not detract from his greatness4 ,were not ,kant's mistakes in a similar way closely interwoven with his greatest merits8 ,it is flattering to me that ,mr4 ,belrose finds an agreement between his master's and my views concerning the basic problem of philosophy1 but ,i cannot discover it4 ,yet ,i gladly acknowledge that there exists an agreement of aim1 and this agreement of aim which finds its truest expression in the word 8positivistic0 is perhaps of greater importance than the agreement of views4 ,p4 ,c4 ,,footnotes3 #fa ,italics are not mine4 ,,observations ,,on ,,some ,,points ,,in ,,james',s ,,psychology4#fb ,in calling attention to some objections to the views advanced by ,professor ,james on the subjects of ,belief1 ,emotion1 and ,will1 it is only justice to myself to express the admiration ,i feel for his work as a whole4 ,the thoroughly scientific spirit which pervades it1 the author's candor in admitting and his skill in surmounting difficulties1 his learning and his originality1 his aptness in illustration1 and the energy and vivacity of his style combine to make it full of interest as well as instruction4 ,it is because it should be1 and doubtless will be widely influential1 that it is important that any doubtful positions assumed in it should be subjected to a careful examination4 ,i shall endeavor to avoid any misrepresentation of the views which ,i combat1 but space will not allow me to do full justice to the arguments by which they are supported1 if such a thing is possible for an antagonist4 ,for this1 ,i must refer the interested reader to the original book4 ,if what ,i have to say should have the effect of increasing the number of its readers1 ,i shall not have written altogether in vain1 whether ,i succeed or fail in setting the truth in a clearer light4 ,i4 ,,belief4 ,professor ,james entitles the chapter devoted to this subject 8,the ,perception of ,reality10 and defines belief to be 8the mental state or function of cognising reality40 ,he explains that1 8,as used in the following pages1 #8,belief' will mean every degree of assurance1 including the highest possible certainty and conviction0 7,vol4 ,,ii1 p4 #bhc74 ,according to this definition1 erroneous beliefs1 such1 for instance1 as the belief that the earth is flat1 stationary1 and the centre of the universe1 or the delusion of an insane man that he is ,jesus ,christ1 are cognitions of reality4 ,professor ,james would probably say that they are realities to the mind entertaining them1 and it is true that the feeling of belief is the same1 whether the thing believed be true or false4 ,i think1 however1 that it is more customary to use the verb which he employs in connection with beliefs which agree with the objective facts1 and that the 8feeling0 or 8sense0 of reality would be a better term than 8perception0 or 8cognition40 ,this1 however1 is not1 to my mind1 the most serious objection to the definition4 ,although ,professor ,james does not use the word 8knowledge0 in this connection1 it seems evident1 from the passage quoted above1 and from what he says elsewhere1 that he considers all kinds1 as well as all degrees of certainty to be beliefs4 ,it seems to me evident1 on the other hand1 that many of our cognitions of reality are not properly called beliefs4 ,as an instance1 ,i will quote the illustration with which he opens the discussion of 8,the ,various ,orders of ,reality0 7p4 #bhg74 8,suppose a new-born mind1 entirely blank and waiting for experience to begin4 ,suppose that it begins in the form of a visual impression 7whether faint or vivid is immaterial7 of a lighted candle against a dark background1 and nothing else1 so that whilst this image lasts it constitutes the entire universe to the mind in question4 ,suppose1 moreover 7to simplify the hypothesis71 that the candle is only imaginary1 and that no #8original' of it is recognised by us psychologists outside4 ,will this hallucinatory candle be believed in1 will it have a real existence for the mind8 8,what possible sense 7for that mind7 would a suspicion have that the candle is not real8 ,what would doubt or disbelief of it imply8 ,when we1 the onlooking psychologists1 say the candle is unreal1 we mean something quite definite1 viz4 that there is a world known to us which is real1 and to which we perceive that the candle does not belong2 it belongs exclusively to that individual mind1 has no status anywhere else1 etc4 ,it exists1 to be sure1 in a fashion1 for it forms the content of that mind's hallucination2 but the hallucination itself1 though unquestionably it is a sort of existing fact1 has no knowledge of other facts2 and since those other facts are the realities par excellence for us1 and the only things we believe in1 the candle is simply outside of our reality and belief altogether4 8,by the hypothesis1 however1 the mind which sees the candle can spin no such considerations as these about it1 for of other facts1 actual or possible1 it has no inkling whatever4 ,that candle is its all1 its absolute4 ,its entire faculty of attention is absorbed by it4 ,it is1 it is that2 it is there2 no other possible candle1 or quality of this candle1 no other possible place1 or possible object in the place1 no alternative1 in short1 suggests itself as even conceivable2 so how can the mind help believing the candle real8 ,the supposition that it might possibly not do so is1 under the supposed conditions1 unintelligible40 ,i readily grant that it is1 under the supposed circumstances1 unintelligible that the candle should be thought to be unreal1 but it seems to me equally so that it should be believed to be real4 ,what does ,professor ,james mean by a belief in the reality of the candle under such conditions8 ,nothing more than that the mind is conscious of a sensation which we know1 but it does not1 is like that produced by the sight of a candle4 ,this sensation is certainly a reality1 and the only possible reality to that mind4 ,professor ,james must1 then1 be understood as maintaining that a sensation1 pure and simple1 is a belief in an object exciting the sensation4 ,if1 for instance1 the first consciousness of the supposed mind were the odor of a rose1 or the whistle of a locomotive1 he must admit that the mind would believe in the rose or the locomotive4 ,if ,i have a headache1 or am hungry or tired1 ,i not only have beliefs about these sensations1 but the headache1 the hunger1 the weariness1 are themselves beliefs4 ,now ,i submit that this is contrary to all ordinary use of language4 ,it is1 perhaps1 impossible for an adult1 with his mind full of memories of past experiences1 to have a sensation without some sort of a belief about it1 but although the sensation and the belief may be inseparable1 they are not indistinguishable1 and1 as a matter of fact1 every one does distinguish between his sensations and his beliefs about them4 ,i do not think it would be quite correct to say even of an adult who had never seen or heard of a candle1 that1 on seeing one for the first time1 he would believe in the reality of the candle1 although doubtless he would believe he saw something real--a real flame1 for instance4 ,if it be admitted that sensations are entitled to be called beliefs1 it seems impossible to stop short of the conclusion that all states of consciousness are beliefs4 ,emotions and volitions are as much realities as sensations1 and are known as such by the mind that experiences them4 ,that memory and imagination involve belief1 is too evident to need discussion4 ,but if this be the case1 the chapter on belief could have been very greatly abbreviated--need not in fact1 contain more than four words4 ,to say that all consciousness is belief would perhaps simplify matters1 but it would not advance our knowledge very much1 nor would it accord with the ordinary use of the word1 which has reference to a particular kind of consciousness1 which every one knows1 however hard he may find its definition4 ,it seems to me1 therefore1 that ,professor ,james's definition of belief is defective in two ways4 ,there are beliefs which are not cognitions of reality1 and there are cognitions of reality which are not beliefs4 ,especially in regard to the latter class1 ,i think that the definition confuses a distinction that is real and important1 between different kinds of knowledge4 ,we know our sensations1 emotions and volitions in a way which differs not only in degree but in kind from any usual1 or1 ,i think1 legitimate sense of the word 8,belief40 ,perhaps it would be the safer course to rest content with pointing out the objections to the author's definition without laying myself open to retaliation by attempting one of my own1 but it does not seem to me impossible to give one which will include all that is understood by the term and nothing more4 ,i should say that belief is the sense or feeling of relation between mental objects4 ,that we have belief whenever we have this feeling1 seems to me too plain to require argument1 and ,i am unable1 after a good deal of reflection1 to call to mind any belief that is not included in the definition4 ,if ,i see1 or imagine that ,i see a lighted candle1 it may excite in my mind a great variety of beliefs1 as1 that the flame is hot1 that the light and heat are caused by the chemical union of oxygen with carbon and hydrogen1 that the material of which the candle is composed is wax1 paraffine or tallow1 that it has a cotton wick1 that it is of a certain size1 weight1 and color1 and so on indefinitely4 ,all of these are evidently ideas of relation4 ,to say 8flame10 or 8hot0 does not express a belief1 unless something else is understood1 but to say 8flame is hot0 does so4 ,if ,i say that the color red is equal to the square of the hypothenuse of a right-angled triangle1 ,i fail to express a belief because the mind perceives no relation between the objects1 and the answer to such a statement would be1 not that it is or is not true1 but that it has no meaning4 ,the only cases which occur to me in which it might be plausibly argued that a belief did not involve the feeling of relation are such impersonal expressions as 8it rains10 or1 8it is cold40 ,the exception1 however1 is only apparent1 arising from the erroneous idea that everything which is implied in language must be expressed4 ,when we say1 8it rains10 we mean1 8rain is falling40 ,in either form of language1 the thought conveyed is that of the relation of the drops of water and their motion4 ,the stock-broker1 with his prearranged code1 may communicate the ideas of a long sentence in a single word1 or the ,freemason may do the same to the initiated by a gesture4 ,in such a case1 it would be absurd to contend that no relation is felt or communicated because there is no formal subject or predicate4 ,whatever may be thought of the sufficiency of my definition1 ,i risk the assertion that it includes all beliefs that can be affirmed1 denied or doubted4 ,we never question our sensations1 emotions or volitions--we have them1 are aware of them1 and that is the end of the matter4 ,it is the relations of our sensations to each other1 and to our pleasures and pains1 our choices and rejections1 that involve us in all sorts of perplexities4 ,the whole question of the grounds of belief in general1 and the truth or falsehood of particular beliefs is a question of relations4 ,it is1 then1 in the sense indicated above that ,i shall use the word hereafter4 ,having settled the definition1 it may be worth while to consider for a moment whether this feeling of relation1 which can only be known by experience1 is enough like any other mental states to be classed with them4 ,on this point ,professor ,james says3 8,in its inner nature1 belief1 or the sense of reality1 is a sort of feeling more allied to the emotions than to anything else4 ,mr4 ,bagehot distinctly calls it the #8emotion' of conviction4 ,i just now spoke of it as acquiescence4 ,it resembles more than anything else what in the psychology of volition we know as consent4 ,consent is recognised by all to be a manifestation of our active nature4 ,it would naturally be described by such terms as #8willingness' or the #8turning of our disposition4' ,what characterises both consent and belief is the cessation of theoretic agitation through the advent of an idea which is inwardly stable1 and fills the mind solidly to the exclusion of contradictory ideas4 ,when this is the case1 motor effects are apt to follow4 ,hence the states of consent and belief1 characterised by repose on the purely intellectual side1 are both intimately connected with subsequent practical activity4 ,this inward stability of the mind's content is as characteristic of disbelief as of belief4 ,but we shall presently see that we never disbelieve anything except for the reason that we believe something else that contradicts the first thing4 ,disbelief is thus an incidental complication to belief1 and need not be considered by itself40 7,p4 #bhc74 ,i am unable to satisfy myself whether1 in the above passage1 ,professor ,james has in mind the feeling of belief or other feelings which often accompany it4 ,the 8cessation of theoretic agitation10 8willingness10 8turning of our disposition10 are accompanied by feelings which ,i should say are not only like1 but identical with emotion4 ,in the case of old1 confirmed beliefs1 however1 theoretic agitation ceased1 and the turning of the disposition occurred1 if at all1 long ago1 and ,i am unable to recognise anything resembling emotion in my belief that two and two make four1 that cows eat grass1 that iron is a metal1 and many others that might be mentioned4 ,nor do these beliefs1 at the present time1 give rise to motor effects1 which1 so far as ,i am able to see1 only result from such beliefs as are1 directly or indirectly1 associated with emotion4 ,if such beliefs as ,i have mentioned are not purely intellectual1 as distinguished from emotional phenomena1 ,i should be at a loss to know where the distinction is to be made between 8the head0 and 8the heart40 ,the sense of relation seems to me to be the most purely intellectual of all the mental functions1 and1 although it may give rise to all sorts of emotions1 the more settled1 undisturbed and unquestioning the belief1 the less likely is it to give rise to any but the feeling of calm1 which seems to me to be the antithesis of emotion4 ,i should say that belief is a feeling sui generis1 without enough analogy with any other to justify classing them together4 ,i have already quoted the illustration with which ,professor ,james opens the discussion of the subject of ,reality4 ,after quoting from ,spinoza1 to the same effect1 the supposed case of a horse with wings imagined to be real in the absence of any contradictory thought1 he goes on to say3 8,the sense that anything we think of is unreal can only come1 then1 when that thing is contradicted by some other thing of which we think4 ,any object which remains uncontradicted is ipso facto believed and posited as absolute reality40 7,p4 #bhh74 ,elsewhere he says3 8444 all propositions1 whether attributive or existential1 are believed through the very fact of being conceived1 unless they clash with other propositions believed at the same time1 by affirming that their terms are the same as the terms of those other propositions40 7,p4 #bij74 ,this1 ,i think1 is stated too strongly1 at least1 in the latter quotation4 ,a proposition that is uncontradicted will be believed1 but it is not necessary that the contradictory proposition should be believed in order that the first may fail of belief4 ,i believe nothing1 at present1 contradictory of the proposition that it is now raining in ,boston4 ,i think it not improbable that such may be the case1 but at the same time the contrary proposition is present to my mind1 that it may not be raining in ,boston1 and the result is the state of mind which ,professor ,james very properly regards as the opposite of belief--doubt4 ,but supposing that a proposition is presented to the mind1 which1 being for the time uncontradicted1 is believed1 and that subsequently another1 contrary proposition is presented1 is it certain that the latter will be disbelieved8 ,may not a state of doubt replace belief in this case also8 ,or supposing that two propositions1 which have been believed independently1 are brought into juxtaposition in such a way as to show that they are inconsistent1 how are we to determine which if either1 shall be believed8 ,professor ,james seems to teach that it is a matter of choice4 8,that we can at any moment think of the same thing which at any former moment we thought of is the ultimate law of our intellectual constitution4 ,but when we now think of it incompatibly with our other ways of thinking of it1 then we must choose which way to stand by1 for we cannot continue to think of it in two contradictory ways at once4 ,the whole distinction of real and unreal1 the whole psychology of belief1 disbelief and doubt1 is thus grounded on two mental facts--first1 that we are liable to think differently of the same2 and second1 that when we have done so1 we can choose which way of thinking to adhere to and which to disregard4#fc ,the subjects adhered to become real subjects1 the attributes adhered to real attributes1 the existence adhered to real existence2 while the subjects disregarded become imaginary subjects1 the attributes disregarded erroneous attributes1 and the existence disregarded an existence in no man's land1 in the limbo #8where footless fancies dwell4'0 7,p4 #bij74 ,the doctrine that belief is1 in the last analysis1 a matter of choice is a prominent feature of ,professor ,james's teaching1 to which ,i shall have occasion to refer again4 ,it seems to me to involve him in some inconsistencies4 ,for the present1 it should be noted that he admits the reality of every mental object in its proper relations4 8,if ,i merely dream of a horse with wings1 my horse interferes with nothing else and has not to be contradicted4 ,that horse1 its wings1 and its place are all equally real4 ,that horse exists no otherwise than as winged1 and is moreover really there1 for that place exists no otherwise than as the place of that horse1 and claims as yet no connection with the other places of the world4 ,but if with this horse ,i make an inroad into the world otherwise known1 and say1 for example1 #8,that is my old mare ,maggie1 having grown a pair of wings where she stands in her stall1' the whole case is altered2 for now the horse and place are identified with a horse and place otherwise known1 and what is known of the latter objects is incompatible with what is perceived of the former4 #8,maggie in her stall with wings6 ,never6' ,the wings are unreal1 then1 visionary4 ,i have dreamed a lie about ,maggie in her stall40 7,p4 #bhi74 ,here1 the dream is a reality1 and the winged horse is as really a part of it as the mare ,maggie is of the outside world4 ,the reality of the winged horse in the one case1 and his unreality in the other1 depend on his relations to other mental objects4 ,so1 for instance1 if any one should say that a mermaid was a creature with the portion of a man from the waist up united to the body and limbs of a horse1 ,i should be justified in contradicting him1 and saying that it was not a mermaid but a centaur that he had in mind4 ,it would not be a valid answer to say that there were really no such things as mermaids and centaurs4 ,in mythology1 a centaur has as definite a structure as a giraffe has in zology1 and it is as inexcusable to confound the one as the other with anything else4 ,this point is amplified by the author in a section on 8,the ,many ,worlds10 in which the various objects of thought are found in their proper relations1 and out of which each one selects a world of practical realities1 according to his dominant habits of attention4 ,in the relative sense1 in which we contrast reality with unreality1 or consider one object more real than another1 8,reality means simply relation to our emotional and active life 444 in this sense1 whatever excites and stimulates our interest is real40 7,p4 #bie74 8,whatever things have intimate and continuous connection with my life are things of whose reality ,i cannot doubt40 7,p4 #bih74 ,this power of exciting and stimulating our interest1 ,professor ,james finds to be possessed in a pre-eminent degree by sensations1 which thus become1 directly or indirectly1 our tests of reality1 and among which those which are pleasurable or painful hold the first rank4 ,next to them1 if not of equal power1 are emotions4 8,the greatest proof that a man is sui compos is his ability to suspend belief in the presence of an emotionally exciting idea4 ,to give this power is the highest result of education4 ,in untutored minds the power does not exist4 ,every exciting thought in the natural man carries credence with it4 ,to conceive with passion is eo ipso to affirm40 7,p4 #cjh74 ,professor ,james's account of the grounds of belief seems to me inadequate in that it fails to show the connection between our sensations and emotions and other mental states and our beliefs4 ,why is it that the sight of the heavenly bodies1 for instance1 awakens in different minds such diverse beliefs as the ,ptolemaic and the ,copernican systems of astronomy8 ,what does a man who is frightened believe8 ,what belief would necessarily result from a colic8 ,it is not enough to say that sensations and emotions are connected with belief2 we want to know how they are connected4 ,bearing in mind the definition of belief as the sense of relation between objects1 the question resolves itself into the origin of feelings of relation4 ,as relations are of various kinds1 they may be suggested to the mind by different circumstances4 ,they may1 ,i think1 be divided into three classes3 #a7 ,relations of likeness and unlikeness4 ,these result from the comparison and discrimination of objects4 ,all the beliefs involved in the recognition and classification of objects arise in this way4 ,when1 on seeing a certain object1 ,i say that it is a bay horse1 and will weigh about eleven hundred pounds1 ,i give expression to relations of comparison4 ,the comparison may be immediate1 between objects simultaneously present to the senses1 or alike present only to memory or imagination1 or between a present object and a remembered one1 or mediate1 by comparison of two or more objects with some other4 ,all mathematical truths are of this kind4 #b7 ,relations of cause and effect1 of substance and quality1 of whole and component parts1 of order in time and space1 are due to association4 ,when ,i say of the horse that his movements are caused by muscular contractions1 that he is of a gentle disposition1 that he has a bony skeleton and red blood1 that he is five years old and is harnessed to a carriage1 ,i express relations of association4 ,in his chapter on ,association ,professor ,james says3 8,belief in anything not present to sense is the very lively1 strong1 and steadfast association of the image of that thing with some present sensation1 so that as long as the sensation persists the image cannot be excluded from the mind40 7,vol4 ,i1 p4 #eih74 ,i do not think it is a fact that the image of the thing believed in need be associated with any present sensation4 ,i am not aware1 for instance1 that there is1 at present1 any such association in my belief in the existence of the city of ,constantinople1 or that ,queen ,victoria is reigning in ,england4 ,the associations in these and similar cases are with objects of memory and not with present sensations4 ,on the other hand1 what we mean by belief in a present object always involves memory of the past4 ,when we say that we believe in anything1 we either mean that it is like other things of the same sort of which we have had experience1 or that it stands in some other relation to them4 ,complete loss of memory would not only destroy all our past beliefs1 but1 if it were permanent1 would prevent our ever forming any new ones4 ,the universe1 in such a case1 would be a mere chaos of sensations4 ,in order that things may be associated1 they must first be discriminated1 otherwise1 as ,professor ,james has shown1 in his chapter on ,discrimination and ,comparison1 they are thought of1 not as associated things1 but as one thing4 ,in like manner1 when discriminated things have once been associated1 the tendency is1 in the absence of contrary experience1 to think of them as belonging together4 ,a child1 attracted by the brightness of the teapot1 touches it and burns his fingers4 ,he naturally expects the teapot to be hot the next time he sees it4 ,he is told that his ,christmas gifts were brought down the chimney by ,santa ,claus4 ,until the statement is contradicted1 he believes it4 ,why should he not8 ,or the association of things in the mind may come about without any external suggestion4 ,i remember that the first time that ,i ever heard a person snore1 the thought came into my mind that the strange noise was made by a bear1 and ,i lay awake most of the night1 in fear of being devoured4 ,the tendency is to think of things as related in the way in which they are first presented to the mind1 until they come up in some different relation4 ,this seems to be the explanation of the tendency to 8believe as much as we can10 to 8affirm immediately the reality of all that is conceived10 of which ,professor ,james speaks4 ,with increased experience1 we find that there is a difference in the uniformity of associations1 and accordingly the coincidence of two or more things is associated with the doubt whether or not the association is a constant one4 #c7 ,in addition to the relations considered above1 there are some which1 although expressed in terms of association and comparison1 seem to me to have a different origin4 ,that the whole is greater than any of its parts is a relation of comparison2 that a thing cannot be in two different places at the same time1 that every event has a cause1 that there is an external world1 are relations of association4 ,although they do not arise independently of experience1 they contain more than is given in experience1 and the uniformity and firmness with which they are believed can1 it seems to me1 only be accounted for by the assumption of an innate propensity to look upon things as related in these ways4 ,so far as ,i am able to judge1 beliefs always arise in one or another of these three ways4 ,but a still more interesting question1 from the practical point of view1 than that of the origin of beliefs1 is that of the comparative validity of the various grounds of belief4 ,are they all of equal worth1 and if not1 is there any way of determining which are to be given the preference1 or is belief1 like taste1 a matter about which 8non disputandum08 ,professor ,james does not go very deeply into the discussion of this question4 ,as we have seen1 he assigns to sensation the greatest efficacy in producing belief1 and discusses the comparative power of various sorts of sensations in this respect4 ,emotion he makes a close second4 ,but the question which gives us the more reliable information1 in cases in which they conflict1 he does not discuss at all4 ,as a matter of fact1 there is no doubt that a man under the influence of strong emotion often draws different conclusions from the evidence of his senses from those at which he would arrive in its absence4 ,is he warranted in doing so8 ,would any degree of personal interest warrant a man in believing or disbelieving the doctrine of transubstantiation1 the ,newtonian theory of gravitation1 the ,mosaic or the ,darwinian view of the origin of species8 ,there is no doubt that belief on such subjects as these is influenced by our interest1 real or supposed1 in one or the other view1 and perhaps ,professor ,james would say that he deals with the working of minds as they are1 not as we imagine that they ought to be1 but the general knowledge that a class of considerations is reliable or the reverse is another thing that not only ought to1 but actually does affect our beliefs1 and the question of the method to be pursued in ascertaining the actual relations of things1 of forming true beliefs instead of false ones1 is one which hardly ought to be ignored in a discussion of the subject4 ,referring to the three classes of relations already considered1 it is1 ,i think1 evident that there are differences in the way in which they affect our belief4 ,in comparison1 the essential thing is the accuracy of the observation4 ,one who has once fully comprehended the proof that the sum of the angles of a triangle is equal to two right angles1 is as sure of it as he could be after any amount of experience4 ,in comparing sensible objects1 we may1 it is true1 and our belief confirmed by repetition1 but this is only in case that we doubt whether the comparison was rightly made in the first place4 ,that red does not look like blue1 nor sweet taste like sour1 we are as certain on one trial as a hundred4 ,if we apply a foot measure to an object eight inches long1 nothing can add to our certainty that they are not of the same length4 ,in matters of association1 on the other hand1 a great deal depends on the uniformity of the association--the number of times that we have experienced it without contrary experience4 ,when ,i hear a crow1 for instance1 ,i believe that it is black1 because all the crows that ,i have ever seen have been so4 ,a sheep ,i assume to be white1 but with a less degree of confidence1 because black sheep are more numerous than white crows4 ,in the case of a horse1 ,i have no belief in regard to the color within a certain range1 unless ,i have some means of knowing about the particular animal in question4 ,if ,i were told that my friend had bought a horse1 ,i should have no idea whether it was bay1 or black1 or white1 or some mixture of these colors4 ,if1 however1 ,i were told that the natural color of my friend's horse was green1 ,i should be much more confident that the statement was false than if the same person should tell me he had seen a white crow1 for1 the same reason that ,i should more readily believe in a black sheep than in the latter4 ,in the customary use of the word1 ,i might say ,i knew it was not so4 ,in the case of intuitive judgments experience has little or nothing to do with the strength of belief4 ,the adult man is no more firmly convinced of the existence of something external to himself than the child1 and1 although he may come to doubt it on speculative grounds1 he no more fails than the child to show by his actions that he has a practical faith in it4 ,in many1 if not most of our beliefs1 all of these elements are present4 ,if ,i see an orange1 for instance1 ,i have the intuition of externality1 the comparison with other oranges that ,i have already seen1 and associations of internal structure1 taste1 smell1 and the like4 ,all of these1 and very possibly some emotion1 as1 for instance1 a desire to eat it1 may arise1 simultaneously or so nearly so as not to be distinguished in time1 as parts of a single mental state4 ,there is one kind of association1 of importance enough to deserve mention1 of which ,professor ,james makes no mention4 ,the beliefs1 or alleged beliefs of other people have an influence on our minds which is1 ,i think1 not inferior to that of emotion4 ,the man who can1 without misgiving1 maintain an opinion which contradicts all that he learned in childhood and all that is held by those whose good opinion he most values is1 ,i fancy1 quite as rare as he who can suspend judgment in the presence of an emotionally exciting idea4 ,most of us take our religious1 political1 scientific1 and practical beliefs at second hand1 from the friends with whom we associate or the books and papers we read4 ,take a young man out of his home and put him1 for instance1 in college1 and it will probably work a change in his moral standards1 not necessarily for the better4 ,at home1 if he knew of a theft1 or an assault1 he would very probably be ready to bring the offender to justice1 but if the offender is his classmate1 and the sufferer a member of the succeeding class1 he will very probably think it a more shameful thing to report the wrong than to do it4 ,at the same time1 he doubtless considers it utterly reprehensible that ignorant ,italian peasants should feel in the same way about betraying their neighbors who are guilty of robbery or murder4 ,coming now to the influence of emotion on belief1 it will not1 ,i presume1 be disputed that it comes about by way of association4 ,professor ,james1 as we have seen1 holds that 8every emotionally exciting thought1 in the natural man1 carries credence with it40 ,i suspect that this is true only in the sense that1 in the absence of experience1 not only every exciting thought1 but every thought is believed4 ,however this may be1 in respect to the natural man1 ,i think it is pretty certain that1 in the case of such artificial beings as those who reflect on the causes of their emotions and beliefs1 it will be found that in order for an idea to excite our emotions1 a certain degree of belief is necessary4 ,professor ,james illustrates his position by the fact that a man can walk along a curbstone without any apprehension of falling1 because the thought of falling awakens no emotion of dread1 while on the edge of a precipice the emotion caused by the thought of the consequences of a mis-step may quite overcome his belief in his ability to keep his balance4 ,but a chamois-hunter or an acrobat will pass along the same place without the slightest apprehension1 not because he does not think of what would happen if he should fall1 nor because he has more liking than any one else for being dashed to pieces1 but because he has what the inexperienced man lacks1 entire confidence in his ability to avoid the danger4 ,since ,i began writing the last paragraph1 a number of thoughts have passed through my mind1 any one of which would be sufficiently exciting if ,i believed in them1 as1 that ,i may die within the next half hour2 that ,i may fall heir to a fortune1 and the like1 none of which have produced any emotional disturbance1 because ,i do not believe that there is any probability of their being true4 ,why was it that not only the medical profession but the public in general became so much interested1 recently1 in the announcement that ,dr4 ,koch had discovered a substance that promised to be a cure for tuberculosis8 ,partly on account of the interests involved1 but at least equally because his reputation was such as to inspire confidence in what he said4 ,there are plenty of medicines advertised in the newspapers for which greater claims are made than ,dr4 ,koch made for his discovery1 which fail to arouse any such general interest4 ,these examples are probably enough for illustration of the familiar fact that belief is the most common cause of emotion1 and that a thought that is not believed is apt to leave us unmoved4 ,nevertheless1 it is a notorious fact that emotion has a great deal to do with determining the sort and degree of evidence which is satisfactory to us4 ,love and hate1 respect and contempt1 affect our beliefs in regard to the character of their objects in matters entirely independent of the qualities which originally inspired the feelings4 ,we find it an easy matter to believe that a man whose religious or political opinions we think pernicious is a bad man in matters which have nothing to do with his opinions1 and may find it almost incredible that one whom we like personally should think differently from ourselves on matters in which we are deeply interested4 ,but what particular evil we shall believe of the person whom we dislike1 or good of the one whom we like1 depends entirely on circumstances4 ,a man1 for instance takes a dislike to a stranger on account of some lack of good manners4 ,whether he shall suspect him of being a clergyman or an infidel1 a drinker or a prohibitionist1 a ,sunday-school teacher or a gambler1 or both1 is likely to depend very largely on his own tastes and principles in regard to such matters4 ,so1 on the other hand1 his views in regard to religion1 temperance and gambling1 are probably due in great measure to the practice of the people whom he likes4 ,a woman who has been brought up with a horror of drunkenness hears that a man with whom she is violently in love is a drinker4 ,she will probably disbelieve it at first1 but if she becomes convinced of the truth of the report1 she will very likely come to think that a drunkard need not be such a bad fellow after all4 ,if there is any one thing that more affects our beliefs than what the people we like say1 it is what they do4 ,in like manner1 emotional states without any definite object1 such as we call moods if they are transient1 and disposition or temperament if they are habitual1 color our belief1 not by originating any definite propositions1 but by making us receptive to those that tend to confirm them4 ,it is not when a man is broken in spirit by repeated calamities that he is most ready to believe that 8where there's a will there's a way10 nor in the flush of youth1 health and triumph that the doctrine that 8all is vanity10 comes home to his heart4 ,in whatever way such states of mind come about1 whether as a result of original constitution1 or of experience1 or of disease1 they make the mind inhospitable to whatever does not harmonise with them4 ,in the case of insanity1 this disposition may outweigh the plainest evidence of the senses1 so that a man may believe that he is rolling in wealth and luxury when he is destitute of the ordinary comforts of life1 or that his wife and children are dead when they are present before his eyes4 ,in a lower degree1 most of us probably have experience of something of the sort in 8fits of the blues10 but while the general character of the belief may be decided by the emotional tone of the mind1 its precise form is determined by the man's interests4 ,low spirits would not be likely1 for instance1 to effect a man's opinion as to the probable course of the stock market1 unless he were in some way interested in stocks1 and the view favored by his emotional condition would depend on the side of the market on which his interest lay4 ,beliefs which1 in our ordinary state of mind1 are not associated with any strong feeling1 such as mathematical truths and the physical and chemical laws of matter1 remain unaffected in all kinds and degrees of emotional disturbance4 ,it seems clear1 then1 that1 as a matter of fact1 emotions affect our beliefs through association4 ,it is not difficult to see how this comes about4 ,emotions tend to perpetuate themselves4 ,a man who is in high spirits will laugh at vexations which1 if he were in an irritable frame of mind would seem intolerable4 ,we allow liberties to our friends which would offend us in persons to whom we are indifferent4 ,the same inertia of the mind which is shown in these cases offers a resistance to any thought that tends to disturb it4 ,if ,i like a man and hate dishonesty1 evidence that the man is dishonest calls up at the same time two contrary emotional states1 which cannot subsist together4 ,one of three things must happen2 either the association of the feeling of liking with the person of the man1 or of that of repugnance with dishonesty1 or of the quality of dishonesty with the man must be given up1 or at least impaired4 ,but the feeling of affection for my friend and that of hatred for the alleged fault are old established associations1 while that of dishonesty with his personality is a new one1 which1 in order to find lodgement1 must expel the original inhabitant4 ,although ,i may have formed no definite association of honesty with him1 the difficulty is of precisely the same sort as if ,i had4 ,in either case it is the breaking up of an habitual association4 ,such being the way in which emotion affects belief1 its value as a ground of belief must be determined in the same way as in other cases of association4 ,if any emotion is so exclusively connected with some definite object that the one is never present without the other1 we are warranted in inferring the existence of the object from the presence of the emotion1 as ,robinson ,crusoe inferred from the human footprints on the sand that men had been there4 ,as a matter of fact1 there is comparatively little uniformity in associations of this kind4 ,the same things affect different persons differently1 and the same persons differently at different times4 ,our hopes and fears are sometimes realised and sometimes disappointed1 and people to whom1 on slight acquaintance1 we feel attracted1 often develop qualities of a different kind from what we expected as we come to know them better4 ,if ,i am fond of money1 and also of idleness1 or of friendship1 and also of having my own way at all times1 it does not follow that taking my ease is the way to get rich1 nor that always insisting on my own way is the course to make friends4 ,the most1 ,i think1 that can be said in favor of emotion as a ground of belief is1 that its existence presupposes the existence of some object adapted to excite it4 ,avarice may be said1 in a sense1 to prove the existence of wealth--if there were no wealth there would doubtless be no avarice--but not that a particular avaricious man will be wealthy4 ,fear implies the existence of harm1 but not necessarily that harm is coming upon the one that fears4 ,these are matters in which we can apply the test of experience to our beliefs1 and it seems evident that emotion adds nothing to our knowledge4 ,we know the things independently of the emotions they excite1 and every one recognises that to expect a thing merely because we either desire or fear it is1 in matters which we can test by experience1 utterly fallacious4 ,but there are matters lying outside the range of our experience in regard to which it is often confidently asserted that our desires and fears are sufficient proof of their reality--a view in which ,i cannot agree4 ,if it could be shown that we long for something of an entirely different kind from anything we have known1 that might perhaps be an argument in favor of its existence1 but such is not the case4 ,the wish for immortality1 for instance1 is nothing more than the wish for life4 ,probably there are but few who would not rather have immortality without death than after it1 but experience has at last convinced the most hopeful that this is not to be expected1 and the search for fountains of youth and elixirs of life has few devotees4 ,we want life1 and we have life2 we want happiness1 and we know happiness1 whether we ourselves have it or not1 but to say that the fact that we want more than we get of both is a reason for supposing that we shall ever have all that we want of either is to reason in a way which we should all see to be fallacious if applied to things of every-day life4 ,i conclude1 then1 that the emotions which a belief excites are utterly valueless as a test of its truth1 and that we may expect that1 both with individuals and the race1 emotion will play a smaller and smaller part in belief as true knowledge and culture increase4 ,this is not saying that1 in cases of doubt1 it is unreasonable to hope that things may turn out as we wish4 ,as to innate beliefs1 it is enough to say that we cannot altogether rid our minds of them1 and that they answer perfectly the purpose of working hypotheses4 ,a man may question the reality of an external world to his heart's content1 but if he runs his head against a wall1 or drops a brick on his toe1 it will hurt him just as much as the most thorough-going materialist4 ,the consequence is that such a doubt does not affect our conduct4 ,abstractly1 these beliefs do not all impress us with the same degree of certainty4 ,that the same thing cannot be in two different places at once1 is1 ,i think1 felt to be more absolutely and necessarily true than that there is such a necessity in the order of events as is implied in the idea of causation1 but for all practical purposes we are as sure of the one as of the other4 ,i have already quoted ,professor ,james's assertion of our ability to choose which among different ways of thinking of the same we shall adhere to and which disregard4 ,perhaps the most prominent feature of his teaching on the subject of belief is that it is an active1 not a passive state of the mind--a choice1 not a necessity4 ,one or two more quotations on this point will make this plain4 8,as bare logical thinkers1 without emotional reaction1 we give reality to whatever objects we think of1 for they are really phenomena1 or objects of our passing thought1 if nothing more4 ,but1 as thinkers with emotional reaction1 we give what seems to us a higher degree of reality to whatever things we select and emphasise and turn to ,,with ,a ,,will4 ,these are our living realities1 and not only these1 but all things that are intimately connected with these 7p4 #big74 8,now the important thing to notice is that the difference between the objects of belief and will is entirely immaterial1 as far as the relation of the mind to them goes4 ,all that the mind does is in both cases the same2 it looks at the object and consents to its existence1 espouses it1 says #8it shall be my reality4' ,it turns to it1 in short1 in the interested emotional way0 7p4 #cbj74 ,although the doctrine is stated1 in these and other passages1 without qualification1 it is hard to reconcile it with some other statements4 ,he devotes a chapter to 8,necessary ,truths10 and says3 8,we must attach the predicate #8equal' to the subject #8opposite sides of a parallelogram' if we think those terms together at all0 7p4 #fag74 ,i do not know that it makes much difference whether we say that1 in a case like this1 we cannot think differently of the same1 or that1 having thought so1 we cannot choose which way of thinking to adhere to and which to disregard4 ,the proposition that a horse is a vertebrate animal cannot be called a necessary1 a priori truth1 but ,i find it as impossible to think of a horse that is not a vertebrate animal as of a parallelogram with the opposite sides unequal4 ,a figure with the opposite sides unequal would not be a parallelogram1 and anything that was not animal and vertebrate would not be a horse4 ,whether the difficulty in the two cases is the same or not1 it is clear that1 by ,professor ,james's admission1 here is a restriction of our choice as to what we will believe4 ,again1 he speaks of pleasurable and painful sensations as 8belief-compelling40 ,compulsion1 so far as it exists1 excludes choice1 and if this expression is justified it implies another limitation on the freedom of belief4 ,with regard to painful sensations1 it seems to me that the fact is that they1 and their associations1 force themselves on our attention1 rather than that we 8select1 and emphasise and turn to them with a will40 ,if ,i have a toothache1 ,i may believe that if ,i retain the tooth it will keep me in pain for a long time1 and if ,i have it extracted1 that will also be a painful process4 ,it does not seem to me that the expressions quoted above accurately describe my state of mind in regard to either of these beliefs4 ,according to ,professor ,james1 when a man becomes convinced that he is financially bankrupt1 or that he has lost his good name1 or that he is suffering from an incurable and fatal disease1 it is because he 8espouses0 this view of the matter1 8consents to its existence10 says 8it shall be my reality40 ,this notwithstanding that such a belief may drive him to determine that1 so far as in him lies1 all existence1 all reality shall cease2 to consent to death and espouse the grave4 ,would not the criminal who hears his death-sentence pronounced prefer1 if he could1 to disbelieve his eyes and ears1 and to feel that it was all a bad dream8 ,so far as ,i can judge with regard to many unwelcome beliefs1 they are not like the highwayman who offers the alternative of 8your money or your life10 but like him who throws you down1 binds and robs you without offering any choice4 ,perhaps the most striking example of the view under consideration is found in a foot-note on p4 #cah1 in which1 after quoting1 with approval1 a statement of ,royce that 8,the ultimate motive with men of every-day life is the will to have an external world10 he goes on to say3 8,this immixture of the will appears most flagrantly in the fact that although external matter is doubted often enough1 minds external to our own are never doubted4 ,we need them too much1 are too intensely social to dispense with them4 ,semblances of matter may suffice to react upon1 but not semblances of communing souls4 ,a psychic solipsism is too hideous a mockery of our wants1 and1 so far as ,i know1 has never been seriously entertained40 ,leaving aside the question whether any one who really disbelieved that there was any reality1 outside of his own mind1 in objects of sense1 could believe in the existence of that which he only infers from the conduct of those objects1 it seems to be distinctly stated that the reason of these beliefs is1 not that we cannot help believing so1 but that we choose to believe so1 and not otherwise1 and that we are able1 having so chosen1 to believe as we wish4 ,that there may be no doubt as to the sense in which the term 8,will0 is used1 ,i will quote the explanation with which he opens his chapter on that subject3 8,we desire to feel1 to have1 to do1 all sorts of things which at the moment are not felt1 had1 or done4 ,if with the desire there goes a sense that attainment is not possible1 we simply wish2 but if we believe that the end is in our power1 we will that the desired feeling1 having or doing shall be real2 and real it presently becomes1 either immediately upon the willing or after certain preliminaries have been fulfilled0 7p4 #dhf74 ,now each one must judge for himself whether this1 or anything like this is the way in which he came to believe in an external world4 ,judging from my own experience1 ,i should say that the reason we originally have such a belief is that it arises spontaneously in our minds1 and that1 for a long time1 it never occurs to us that it can be otherwise4 ,however that may be1 ,i am certain that when the contrary possibility was presented to my mind1 it struck me as strange1 rather than dreadful1 and that ,i firmly believe many things that seem to me far more hideous than the doctrine that ,i am the universe4 ,so far as society is concerned1 if ,i can be ,shakespeare and ,milton and ,goethe1 ,plato and ,bacon1 ,newton and ,darwin1 ,luther and ,columbus and ,washington1 as well as all the people of my acquaintance1 it strikes me that ,i can be pretty good company for myself4 ,to use the universality of the belief as a proof of its voluntary nature seems to me very much such an argument as to say that because all bodies attract each other in the ratio of their mass and inversely as the square of the distance1 the falling of a stone must be a purely voluntary matter4 ,i do not see what stronger argument1 in a case like this1 could be made for the necessity of a belief than the alleged fact that no one1 under any circumstances1 is free from it4 ,now1 if we substitute the term 8,propensity0 for 8,will0 in the passage quoted above1 it would seem to me an entirely accurate description of the facts1 and ,i can only understand how the authors quoted could take the ground they do except on the assumption that all propensities1 or at least all which prevail1 are choices or volitions4 ,that such is not the case seems to me clear enough in regard to belief from some of the instances which ,i have already mentioned1 but it will perhaps be still more evident from cases in which belief is not in question4 ,the propensity to remember and constantly think of painful and distressing things1 which we would gladly banish from our thoughts1 or such things as silly rhymes and trifling tunes2 to tremble and lose our presence of mind in danger1 when we have most need of the full use of all our faculties2 to express our emotions by muscular movements when we wish to conceal them1 and many others that might be mentioned1 are examples of the fact that an invincible propensity may be quite the reverse of a choice4 ,that belief is an activity of the mind may be freely admitted4 ,the mind--whatever the substratum of our states of consciousness may be--is not a receptacle1 to hold indifferently whatever may be poured into it nor a sheet of blank paper1 on which this or that may be written by circumstances2 it has a character of its own1 and reacts to its environment4 ,what the reaction shall be depends both on the character of the mind and what is presented to it1 but it seems incorrect to assume that all the dispositions of the mind are of the nature of desires or aversions4 ,in the last analysis of which we are capable1 our character is probably due to our physical constitution1 original and acquired1 and our beliefs may be profoundly affected by a few glasses of whiskey or an attack of fever4 ,whether the reactions of the matter of which our brains are formed are as invariable as those of inorganic matter need not be discussed here2 the present point is that while belief is a sense of the relations of things as they are1 the essence of will is the desire to have them otherwise than as they are4 ,to make belief a matter of choice is the same as to say that ,i may at the same time choose that things shall be as they are and otherwise4 ,professor ,james closes the chapter with a practical observation3 8,if belief consists in an emotional reaction of the entire man on an object1 how can we believe at will8 ,we cannot control our emotions4 ,truly enough1 a man cannot believe at will abruptly4 ,nature sometimes1 and indeed not very infrequently1 produces instantaneous conversions for us4 ,she suddenly puts us in an active connection with objects to which she had till then left us cold4 #8,i realise for the first time1' we then say1 #8what that means6' ,this happens often with moral propositions4 ,we have often heard them2 but now they shoot into our lives2 they move us2 we feel their living force4 ,such instantaneous beliefs are truly enough not to be achieved by will4 ,but gradually our will can lead us to the same results by a very simple method2 we need only in cold blood act as if the thing in question were real1 and keep acting as if it were real1 and it will infallibly end by growing into such a connection with our life that it will become real4 ,it will become so knit with habit and emotion that our interests in it will be those which characterise belief4 ,those to whom ,god and ,duty are now mere names can make them much more than that1 if they make a little sacrifice to them every day4 ,but all this is so well known in moral and religious education that ,i need say no more0 7p4 #cba74 ,the above passage seems to me to illustrate at the same time the force of ,professor ,james's rhetoric and an occasional tendency on his part to be carried away by it into statements that are altogether too sweeping4 ,in an immense proportion of cases1 the method that he recommends is precisely the surest way to convince ourselves that the thing in question is not real4 ,it is the method which the small boy takes to convince himself that the gun is not loaded2 the drunkard and spendthrift to satisfy themselves that their vices will not bring them into poverty and disgrace4 ,a man may sit all day at the fork of the road1 and believe that the broad way does not lead to destruction1 but when he puts his belief in practice he discovers the truth4 ,so far as practical matters1 capable of being brought to the test of experience1 are concerned1 it can only be said that if they are real1 we shall convince ourselves that such is the case by acting as if they were real4 ,doubtless ,professor ,james had not such prosaic things as these in mind when he wrote the passage1 but a method that will not serve us in regard to such questions as whether water will wet us or fire burn us1 can hardly be called infallible4 ,but even in regard to questions that must always remain matters of opinion it is not true in the unqualified sense in which ,professor ,james puts it4 ,probably many men1 brought up in the belief that it was their duty to observe the first day of the week by religious worship because the ,hebrews were required to abstain from labor on the seventh day1 have come to modify their belief without any material change in their practice1 and even the belief in regard to the nature and attributes of ,god may be affected in advance of a change in the conduct based upon it4 ,the law of association in this regard is subject to the same limitations as we have already found to hold in respect to other matters4 ,associations of action with belief have a tendency to strengthen it1 but1 as in the case of emotion1 they may be overcome by other considerations1 and it is entirely possible for a man to go on for the better part of a lifetime in punctilious conformity to usages which in his heart he despises1 and break out in open rebellion at last4 ,from the ethical point of view1 the advice which seems to be implied1 of deliberately choosing a way of setting doubts at rest which is as efficacious on the side of error as of truth1 of vice as of virtue1 seems to me1 to say the least1 of doubtful tendency4 ,we must often act in doubtful cases1 and take the risk1 amongst others1 of thus confirming ourselves in error1 but certainly there can be no more solemn motive for weighing well our beliefs before committing ourselves to them by action than the fact that we may1 by habit1 pervert our moral sense1 blind our judgment and stifle our conscience4 ,to the man who believes that there is a universe1 of which he forms an infinitesimal part1 and that all his interests depend on his attitude toward the power that works in it1 it is of infinitely more interest to know how he can know the truth than how he can convince himself of this or that4 ,shall truth be our master1 to be followed and obeyed1 though he command us to give up all else that we hold dear1 or our servant1 to be employed as suits our passion or caprice1 and dismissed when he will no longer serve our purpose8 ,this is perhaps the most momentous question that we are called on to decide4 ,the man who makes the wrong choice may or may not attain what he seeks1 but though he gain the whole world1 he will lose his own soul4 ,w4 ,l4 ,,worcester4 ,,footnotes3 #fb ,the ,principles of ,psychology1 by ,william ,james1 ,professor of ,psychology in ,harvard ,university4 ,in two volumes4 ,new ,york3 ,henry ,holt ,company1 #ahij4 #fc ,the italics1 in this and my other quotations1 are the author's4 ,,the ,,nature ,,of ,,mind ,,and ,,the ,,meaning ,,of ,,reality4#fd ,professor ,william ,james's supposition of 8an hallucinatory candle0 seen by a 8new born mind entirely blank and waiting for experience to begin0 is an impossible and self-contradictory figment4 ,we might as well speak of the dry ,niagara falls employed in the manufacture of some material goods out of nothing4 ,for1 first1 a mind entirely blank is no mind and1 secondly1 a blank mind if it could exist at all1 would have no hallucinations4 ,an hallucinatory candle can be produced only out of the memories or the combination of memories of former candle-sensations4 ,a blind man sees in his dream no colors1 and a deaf man hears no symphonies4 ,a new-born babe is already in possession of many inherited memories4 ,thus the first sense-impressions after the babe's birth find the organism1 especially its skin1 nerves and muscles predisposed for their reception4 ,the babe's organism accordingly presents an instance of a relative but not of an absolute blank2 an absolute blank of a something that is to develop into mind can mean only a lump of sentient matter at the moment of formation4 ,as soon as it is formed it is exposed in every second of its existence to innumerable impressions which fill the blank with contents and these contents are the mind that is developing4 ,sentient substance is not at rest1 but like a flame it is possessed of an incessant activity4 ,the form of this activity is both extraordinarily plastic and stable4 ,it is plastic1 for every impression together with the reaction of the impression modifies it and leaves a trace3 it is stable for the traces of all the impressions and reactions are preserved4 ,the first sense-impression of a lump of sentient substance produces an irritation which objectively considered is a commotion of the sentient substance and subjectively considered a feeling1 the substance being sentient ex hypothesi4 ,this first and primitive feeling is meaningless1 for it has not1 and cannot have1 any reference to any other feeling1 memory or mind1 and meaning is created through the interaction of feelings with memories of feelings4 ,some later sense-impression of the same kind will not only produce the same irritation but also serve as an irritation to awaken the memory-trace left by the former sense-impression4 ,the new feeling will melt into one with the reawakened memory of the former feeling4 ,in the long run many traces of the same kind which are1 as it were1 deposited in the same place will constitute an organ predisposed to receive the correspondent impressions2 and now a sense-impression received by such an organ may be called a sensation4 ,a sensation is not merely a feeling1 it is a feeling of a special kind and it is felt to be of a special kind4 ,in other words1 a sensation is a feeling that has acquired meaning2 and this meaning is the product of the interaction and coperation of feelings and memories4 ,sensations have become symbols representing the cause of the sense-impression which produced the sensation1 and ideas are symbols of a higher order representing either whole classes of a certain kind of causes of sense-impressions or certain features thereof1 or certain relations among them4 ,thus every mind is a system of sentient symbols4 ,these symbols being as it were pictures intended somehow to represent or allegorically speaking to portray things are called 8ideas10 while the things symbolised are in their totality called objective existence or 8reality40 ,considering the nature of mind1 it is obvious that there cannot be an entirely blank mind4 ,we might as well speak of an entirely blank picture4 ,but an entirely blank picture is a canvas and no picture at all4 ,that a mind which is not as yet a mind can have neither sensations nor hallucinations is almost self-evident4 ,similarly there is no sense in saying that a picture that consists of an utter blank and thus is properly speaking no picture at all but an empty canvas1 either does or does not correctly represent a certain object4 ,the word 8real0 is used in two senses 7#a7 as a name for everything that exists and 7#b7 to signify that kind of existence which is the object of our sensory and mental experience1 i4 e4 the objective world so-called4 ,the former of these two definitions is more comprehensive2 for it includes the realm of mentality1 the ideal world of subjectivity4 ,the latter is used in contrast to the subjective world of mental life and thus expressly excludes the ideal realm of the mind and of mental symbols4 ,the questions as to ,what is reality8 and ,is there anything real at all8 must not be formulated as they are by ,professor ,james1 in terms of belief but in a statement of facts and by defining certain facts as real4 ,an hallucination is real in the first sense of the word2 it is an actual existence2 it is a feeling taking place in the mind of some organism4 ,it is also real in the second sense of the word in so far as it is a vibration of a brain structure4 ,however an hallucination is not real in the second sense of the word in so far as its meaning has not its correspondent analogue4 ,let the meaning of a certain mental symbol be a candle1 under which name we comprise a certain group of experiences1 and let the cerebral structure of this mental symbol be awakened by another stimulus than that which is generally called a candle4 ,those experiences which as a group are called a candle are of a certain kind4 ,if a piece of paper approaches the lighted candle1 it will burn4 ,an hallucinatory candle will leave the paper intact1 although the person who has the hallucination may see the paper burn4 ,thus the ideas or images of objects are built up of experiences which have taught us that under certain conditions certain events happen2 in consequence of certain actions there are constantly certain reactions taking place4 ,reality consists of such facts2 it is the sum total of all reactions2 reality is the nature of objects which react somehow4 ,those who jump at the conclusion that our subjective sensations1 such as colors1 tastes1 sounds1 etc41 must be regarded as objective properties of things1 are grossly mistaken4 ,our sensations are not qualities of things but subjective phenomena3 they do not inform us about the nature of things1 but reveal to us how things affect our senses4 ,those however who deny or doubt objective existence are no less mistaken4 ,the world is not a subjective phenomenon of sensations1 but an objective existence symbolised in sensations4 ,the question is not 8,does reality exist80 but 8,what is ,reality80 or 8,what is the meaning of #8real'80 ,when we say 8,objects are real10 we mean that they resist1 they react1 their presence produces somehow some effect4 ,when we say1 ,we ourselves are real1 we mean that we react upon the objects with which we come in contact1 we mean1 that in our bodily existence we are objects in an objective world4 ,actions and reactions are taking place4 ,this is a fact4 ,he who denies it is like the man who declares that he is not at home2 he contradicts himself3 for the denial of a question is a reaction upon an action4 ,the term reality is the symbol of the nature of actions and reactions in their efficacy1 it denotes the essence of facts and thus the question 8,does reality exist80 has no sense4 ,we denote that which exists1 that which acts and reacts1 that which is a fact1 or howsoever we may express it1 by the word 8reality40 ,we might deny that the reactions of the objective world are constant1 or that a certain idea of a certain reaction is erroneous1 viz4 that the reaction if put to the test would prove to be different from what it was expected--but all these denials and doubts which are of daily occurrence in the domain of science presuppose that there are reactions taking place and reality or objective existence is only a collective name for these reactions and their nature4 ,the name object still preserves the idea of reaction1 for object is that which reacts upon touch1 which resists1 which is objected4 ,we shall lose ourselves in inextricable confusion by making a matter of doubt and belief what is really a statement of facts4 ,to speak of a doubt or belief in the reality of things in general is tantamount to speaking of a belief in our experiences which1 whatever their particular nature may be1 are facts4 ,and to doubt our experiences1 not the correctness of a particular experience1 but experience in general1 i4 e4 the very existence of experience is tantamount to doubting our own being4 ,a consideration of what we mean by an hallucination can best make clear what we mean1 and rationally can only mean1 by reality4 ,a real candle is a mental symbol of something which will under certain conditions react in a certain way4 ,an hallucinatory candle is also a mental symbol1 but the thing which it purports to mean1 does not exist2 i4 e4 there is nothing that will react4 ,the symbol is there1 but not that something the existence of which the symbol of the idea 8candle0 would indicate4 ,this method of dealing with the problem of the old nave realism and the pseudo-critical idealism of former times is not based upon the assumption of the reality of things 7which means1 of the reality of reality72 it is simply a careful formulation of the problem to prevent our being entangled all about with contradictions2 it is the method of rendering clear the basic principle of positivism1 that all knowledge is a description of facts1 which description of facts is made for the purpose of1 dealing with facts4 ,p4 ,c4 ,,footnotes3 #fd ,this article was suggested by ,dr4 ,w4 ,l4 ,worcester's criticism on ,professor ,james's ,psychology4 ,when ,dr4 ,worcester discusses ,professor ,james's supposition of an hallucination in a blank mind1 saying that it would be 8the only possible reality of that mind10 he almost seems to adopt ,professor ,james's views of the subject himself4 ,clearness about such fundamental terms as mind and reality1 are so much needed that the following remarks may not be out of place as a further explanation of the subject4 ,exactness in fundamental and general terms will save much labor in detail work4 ,,monism ,,not ,,mechanicalism4 ,,comments ,,upon ,,prof4 ,,ernst ,,haeckel',s ,,position4 ,prof4 ,ernst ,haeckel's ,anthropogeny1 the fourth edition of which appeared of late1#fe brings again into prominence that conception of monism which identifies the monistic view with mechanicalism4 ,a review of this book has appeared already in ,the ,open ,court1 ,no4 #bca1 in which we called attention to the great merits of a work which has become a household book1 not only for the scientist1 but for every educated reader who is interested in man and the origin of man4 ,our knowledge in ,anthropogeny1 certainly1 will influence not only our general world-conception1 but through our general world-conception it will extend its influence not only over every branch of science but also into the broader fields of man's daily life and his practical morality4 ,professor ,haeckel is the most popular naturalist of to-day and there is no one1 perhaps1 who has made a more effective propaganda for the monistic world-conception than he4 ,so it is almost a matter of course that his definition of monism is generally accepted as the standard4 ,we have formulated our view of monism in a way which in principle and general outlines concurs with the commonly accepted usage of the term1 yet it deviates from it in some important points which are perhaps not merely matters of detail4 ,it will be difficult to say how far we agree and how far we disagree with ,professor ,haeckel's monism because those subjects in which we disagree1 have never been elaborated by him1 and we are inclined to believe that he would modify some of his expressions1 if he devoted a quiet hour's thought to the objections we have to make to his definitions4 ,professor ,haeckel's monism being mechanicalism savors strongly of materialism4 ,he says in the latest edition of his 8,anthropogenie0 which is now before us1 ,vol4 ,,ii1 p4 #hea3 8,there can be no doubt that a thorough consideration and unprejudiced deliberation of these facts will lead to a decisive victory of that philosophical conception which with one word we call monistic or mechanical in opposition to the dualistic and teleological4 ,upon the latter are based most of the philosophical systems of antiquity1 of the medival times1 and also of the present time4 ,the mechanical or monistic philosophy declares that certain and immutable laws obtain everywhere in the phenomena of human life as much as in nature generally1 that a necessary causal connexus obtains everywhere in phenomena and1 accordingly1 that the knowable world forms throughout a unitary whole1 a monon4 ,monism moreover maintains that all phenomena are produced alone through mechanical causes 7caus efficientes7 not through premeditated purposive causes 7caus finales740 ,and in the first lecture 8,the ,history of ,evolution and ,philosophy10 7p4 #ae7 he says3 8,we shall clearly recognise in the following investigations how the most wonderful enigmas of human and animal organisations1 heretofore considered as inaccessible1 have become accessible to a natural solution through ,darwin's reform in the doctrine of evolution by a mechanical explanation of purposeless efficient causes40 ,in agreement with these views1 ,professor ,haeckel regards the terms necessity and mechanicalism as equivalent terms4 ,he rejects any kind of teleology1 any kind of final causes1 and also the freedom of the will4 ,he opposes the so-called moral world-order as contradictory to the idea that the world is regulated by mechanical law and he adopts the latter to the exclusion of the former4 ,all these points come out very strongly and clearly in ,professor ,haeckel's letter to the editor of ,the ,open ,court1 where his view of monism is graphically presented in a concise tabular form4 ,we here reproduce this table from ,no4 #bab of ,the ,open ,court1 for the convenience of our readers3 ,,monism4 ,,fundamental ,,concepts4 ,,dualism4 ---------------------------------------- ------------------------------ ,inseparable4 ,matter and force4 ,as a matter of ,god and world4 principle distinct ,soul and body4 entities4 ---------------------------------------- ------------------------------ ,mechanicalism4 ,life4 ,vitalism4 ,necessary evolution4 ,teleological creation4 ---------------------------------------- ------------------------------ ,universal 7conservation ,immortality4 ,individual4 of energy74 ,freedom of will4 ,a person's will being ,determinism4 absolutely free4 ---------------------------------------- ------------------------------ ,caus efficientes4 ,causation4 ,caus finales4 7,efficient causes47 7,final causes47 ---------------------------------------- ------------------------------ ,regulated by mechanical ,world-order4 ,so-called 8,moral40 law4 ---------------------------------------- ------------------------------ ,inseparable and subject ,inorganic and organic ,as a matter of to the same laws4 nature4 principle distinct and subject to different laws4 ---------------------------------------- ------------------------------ ,now we agree with ,professor ,haeckel in one main point1 viz4 8that certain and immutable laws obtain everywhere in the phenomena of human life as much as in nature generally1 and that the knowable world forms throughout a unitary whole1 a monon40 ,but we cannot agree to his proposition that 8the wonderful enigmas of organised life are accessible to a natural solution by a mechanical explanation of purposeless efficient causes40 ,we grant willingly that mechanical explanations will serve for all motions that take place in the world2 even the motions of the brain take place in strict obedience to the laws of molar and molecular mechanics4 ,but a mechanical explanation is not applicable to that which is not motion4 ,if it were applicable it would not be desirable1 for it would be of no avail4 ,mechanical explanations are to be limited to mechanical phenomena4 ,feeling however is not a mechanical phenomenon1 and an idea1 being a special and a very complex kind of a feeling1 or rather and more accurately expressed1 being the special meaning of a very complex feeling1 is not a mechanical phenomenon either4 ,it is true that when a feeling takes place and when an idea is thought in the brain of an organised being1 that a certain nervous action takes place4 ,the nervous action is a motion and this motion represents a definite amount of energy4 ,there is no theoretical difficulty1 although there are almost insurmountable practical difficulties1 in measuring the definite amount of potential energy that is changed into kinetic energy when a man thinks4 ,yet the brain-motion is not the idea and by a mechanical explanation of the brain-motion we have not even touched the problem of what the nature of the idea is1 why ideas originate and how they act4 ,we know that ,professor ,haeckel when he so vigorously insists on mechanicalism1 opposes those philosophers who believe that there are motions which cannot be explained by mechanical laws4 ,we side with ,professor ,haeckel against any one who maintains that some motions are mechanical 7molar or molecular7 and others are exceptions to the laws of mechanics1 representing a kind of hypermechanics4 ,but we cannot admit the explanation by mechanical laws of non-mechanical phenomena4 ,professor ,haeckel speaks of purposeless efficient causes--zwecklos thtige ,ursachen4 ,he speaks of efficient causes1 as excluding final causes4 ,he is right in his objection to final causes as the term is commonly used4 ,but while there are causes that are zwecklos1 there are no causes that are ziellos4 ,every process of causation takes a definite course1 it has a certain and definable direction4 ,the end of this direction need not be a conscious aim1 but it is an aim whatever it be1 it is a ,ziel4 ,in this sense every efficient cause is at the same time a final cause4 ,the gravitating stone has no purpose1 yet it has an aim4 ,so the evolution of organised life is a natural process having a very definite aim4 ,and this aim of the evolution of organised life is determined by factors of a very complex nature4 ,one of these factors is almost imperceptible at the beginning1 but it is of a constantly and rapidly growing importance2 and this factor is the psychical element that appears with organised life4 ,this factor is nothing supra-natural1 nothing extra-natural1 and yet it is not something material or mechanical4 ,it is this factor which in its highest efflorescence changes aims into purposes1 and with this change it creates again a new factor of evolution which is the purposive aspiration to conform to the world-order and thus to advance the further progress of mankind4 ,this aspiration is in one word called morality4 ,when we speak of a moral world-order we mean that such moral behests as were formulated in prescripts by ,confucius1 by ,buddha1 by ,moses1 by ,jesus1 and other moral teachers of mankind have an objective and immutable foundation in the nature of things4 ,the mechanical law in the province of motions1 the logical law in the realm of thought1 geometrical proportions in mathematics1 the regularity of natural laws1 etc41 form in our world-conception a part of this moral world-order4 ,the laws of social life are not opposed to them but correlative4 ,the purpose of a man's action reveals his character1 and the character of the man is his innermost nature4 ,in an analogous way the aim of evolution and especially the aim of the evolution of organised beings reveals the character1 the innermost nature of the universe4 ,psychic life is absent so far as we can see in the primordial world substance as it appears in the form of a nebula2 it is absent still in the primordial state of planets4 ,it appears with the subjective states of awareness that rise into existence in organised life4 ,the subjectivity of unorganised matter is1 in comparison with man's subjectivity1 to be considered as a blank2 i4 e41 if there is in it a state of awareness1 which we have reasons to doubt1 it is apparently without meaning2 it does not symbolise external objects2 it is no mind2 it is1 as it were1 blind4 ,yet the aim of evolution being the development of psychical life1 shows that the subjectivity of unorganised matter is spiritual in its innermost nature4 ,and the aim of psychical life being the development of moral ideals1 we are very well justified in speaking of the world-order as moral4 ,when speaking of the world-order as moral we mean that the moral prescripts of the great ethical teachers of mankind are founded in and derived from the world-order of nature4 ,there is one objection to calling the world-order moral1 and we therefore dislike to use the phrase4 ,it is this3 ,morality means conformity to a certain standard4 ,the standard is not moral1 but those who do or do not conform to it are moral or immoral4 ,therefore if there is any truth in the idea of ,god it is this that there is a standard for human conduct to conform to1 there is an authority which has to be obeyed and this authority is ,god4 ,to speak of ,god as moral or immoral is anthropomorphism4 ,if 8,god0 means anything1 it means that power of the world-order obedience to which is called morality4 ,if we say ,god is moral1 ,god ceases to be ,god1 the moral authority above him to which he has to conform would be the really true ,god4 ,thus logically the personal conception of ,god leads to a superpersonal conception of ,god4 ,these are in brief our objections to ,professor ,haeckel's definition of monism as being identical with mechanicalism and perhaps also with materialism4 ,my opinion that ,professor ,haeckel may after all accede to our view of monism is based upon an interesting and friendly conversation which ,i enjoyed with him several years ago in ,jena4 ,professor ,haeckel is not the one-sided naturalist that he is often represented to be by orthodox clergymen4 ,he does not see the workings of the natural laws only1 he sees also the moral aspect to which a consideration of the natural laws leads4 ,that his books emphasise the former without entering into the problems of the latter is natural for a scientist1 but he personally is certainly even broader than are his books1 and ,i should say that his very opposition to certain errors which have been foisted by an antiquated dogmatism upon our religious institutions1 show the deeply religious spirit of his character4 ,p4 ,c4 ,,footnotes3 #fe ,anthropogenie oder ,entwickelungsgeschichte des ,menschen4 ,keimes-und ,stammesgeschichte4 ,by ,ernst ,haeckel4 ,mit #bj ,tafeln1 #ddj ,holzschnitten und #be genetischen ,tabellen4 ,vierte1 umgearbeitete und vermehrte ,auflage4 ,leipzig3 ,engelmann4 ,,mr4 ,,charles ,s4 ,,peirce ,,on ,,necessity4 ,mr4 ,charles ,s4 ,peirce is one of those thinkers who in the investigation of a subject go right down to the bottom of the problem4 ,this appears to me the more conspicuously so1 as the result to which his investigations lead stand in a strong contrast to my own views4 ,yet ,i cannot help admiring the boldness of his trenchant critique which finds the difficulties at the point where really the main difficulty of all philosophical inquiry lies buried4 ,it lies buried1 i4 e4 it does not appear on the surface of things4 ,if it lay on the surface1 our most superficial thinkers would naturally light on it2 but most of them walk their way in peace1 unmolested by the question1 ,is there any truth in the idea of necessity4 ,an editorial treatment of this problem may be expected in a forthcoming number of ,the ,monist4 ,p4 ,c4 ,,book ,,reviews4 ,,einleitung ,,in ,,das ,,alte ,,testament4 ,by ,c4 ,h4 ,cornill1 ,professor at the ,university at ,knigsberg4 ,when ,darwin and his followers first gave to the world the astonishing results of their studies1 few were those who at once recognised the importance of the new theories and still fewer those who readily accepted them4 ,but within the last thirty years1 gradually but steadily the number of those who have adopted as virtually true the hypotheses of the new school1 has been increasing until to-day those are in the minority who teach a view different from ,darwin on the origin and evolution of the universe4 ,the history and fate of the new studies in ,biblical criticism bear a striking analogy to the reception accorded to ,darwinian researches4 ,at first they were met with well nigh universal opposition4 ,they were declared to be subversive of the holiest interests of religion4 ,they were held to rob the ,bible of its glory4 ,but by slow degrees the first passion yielded to wiser counsel4 ,curiosity led to the examination of the new positions2 and in consequence in ever widening circles the conviction gained ground that far from taking away from the dignity of the old ,hebrew literature1 these new investigations and the method upon which they footed1 lent new lustre to the collection of ancient writings4 ,and to-day the battle has been won by the school of ,wellhausen and ,kuenen4 ,few are those who to-day urge the old views on the authorship date and historical succession of the several parts composing what is called the ,o4 ,t4 or even on the canonisation of the whole collection4 ,the startling assumptions of ,wellhausen1 ,graf1 and their ,dutch colleagues had their forerunners1 as had ,darwin and ,wallace4 ,but when ,george and ,vatke in the fourth decade of our century and ,reuss1 in his first academic lectures1 virtually anticipated the lines of research of their later successors1 the world was too busy with other matters to give their labors much attention4 7,cfr4 this work1 p4 #h47 ,for all this1 primitive orthodoxy had only few representatives in this domain1 at least in ,germany4 ,while ,hvernick and ,keil and ,hengstenberg1 are ranged on the extreme right of the line defending with all the resources of a vast erudition the traditional views1 the middle ground is occupied by such men as ,ewald1 and ,hitzig1 and the teacher of these ,de-,wette1 a school of critics that to-day yet counts among its protagonists such men as ,dillmann and ,schrader and ,kittel4 ,with ,graf1 a new era may be said to have begun for ,biblical criticism4 ,notwithstanding the violent opposition encountered1 the school has won the day4 ,its greatest triumph was perhaps the acquiescence in its positions shortly before his death by that master of ,biblical science1 ,professor ,delitzsch of ,leipzig4 ,what the cardinal point of contention is between the warring camps1 is well known4 ,it is the relative age and position of what is technically designated as the ,priestly code1 in the ,hexateuch4 ,according to the new school this portion is the capping stone of the edifice1 as it were4 ,for ,dillmann it is pre-exilic2 for ,wellhausen post-exilic4 ,the book before us places itself without equivocation on the standpoint of this latest criticism4 ,it is thus another leaf in the laurel wreath crowning the men of the new dispensation4 ,for the name of the author is guarantee of the scholarly character of the work2 and views which have the endorsement of a man of the renown and the scholarship of ,professor ,cornill carry the presumption of having truth on their side4 ,professor ,cornill is however1 a new-comer in this special field4 ,his life work1 as he himself says1 lies in another province of the vast realm of ,biblical critical studies4 ,his fame is associated with his critical edition of the text of ,ezekiel1 a work which will forever stand as the best guide for all who would venture on the dangerous ground of conjectural textual emendations4 ,for ,cornill was the first to lay down the method which above all must be followed in so venturesome a task and his new version is the classic illustration of the correctness of his method of proceeding4 ,that a man who has established for himself the reputation of being methodic and painstaking almost to a fault1 a man who is dowered with critical acumen of the highest order1 should after going anew over the whole ground cast the weight of his scholarly authority in favor of the views of the new critical school is a fact the significance of which cannot be blinked4 ,we are indeed glad that the publishers entrusted this number of their intended series of manuals for theological students1 to a scholar who had hitherto not written ex cathedra on this particular subject4 ,thus was ensured a new and impartial examination of all the points involved4 ,the ends which this series of manuals is to serve1 decided of course the style and scope of this work4 ,of introductions 7,einleitungen7 to the ,o4 ,t4 there was no scarcity2 but 7see preface7 they were either too bulky and too full and thus did not answer the requirements of the student1 not yet a scholar2 or they were too brief1 mere 8ponies0 as we here in ,america would say1 intended to be learnt by heart for the purpose of passing a good examination4 ,the difficulty thus consisted in combining thoroughness with the necessary brevity without sacrificing lucidity4 ,no mere results on the other hand were to be stated4 ,the student was to be initiated into the course of the investigations1 the reasons for the conclusions and thus his interest was to be awakened and the way prepared for independent research on his own part4 ,that the author has succeeded in carrying out this his programme1 every section of the book confirms4 ,his fear that the full analysis in paragraph #ab1 of the priestly code will be found to be out of place in an 8outline of this kind0 is groundless4 ,we do not hesitate that this very section is the gem of the whole work full as it is of numerous passages which cannot but stir to profitable reflection the student4 ,none can lay this book aside without confessing that he has gained a 8,gesammtanschauung10 an insight into the unity and coherence of the new views1 apt to convince all earnest and unbiased minds of the truth that in this science 7,wissenschaft7 criticism is standing on firm ground4 ,in the selection of the books named at the head of each chapter1 or in the course of the discussion1 the ,professor has displayed most consummate skill4 ,there is scarce one important work which with profit may be consulted but is mentioned2 and what is more in the right connection4 ,this feature is not the least valuable in the whole work2 the student thus has at ready command a bibliography which excludes the chaff and stores the wheat4 ,but let us dwell a little more specifically on the plan and execution and the contents of this book4 ,two plans may suggest themselves to the writer of an 8introduction0 of this kind4 ,he may attempt to give a picture of the rise of literature among the ancient ,hebrews and treat of the different writings which have come down to us1 often the fragments of larger works1 in the order of their composition and at the same time connect with this discussion the reasons for departing from the traditional views as to their dates and so forth and for assigning them to a new age4 ,this would be virtually writing a history of the literature4 ,it is this plan which ,reuss adopted4 ,but according to our ,professor1 investigation has not proceeded far enough to make such a history possible4 ,he even doubts whether it ever will 7p4 #b74 ,perhaps his verdict is justified4 ,at all events he is right when he urges that in such a sequence much which belongs to the branch which he is to teach1 will scarcely find its proper or organic place4 ,and therefore it was a wise conclusion of his to adhere to the second plan1 the traditional1 for such ,einleitungen which treats of the different books in the order of the ,hebrew canon and finally takes up the discussion of such questions as the collection of the canon1 the condition of the text1 the different ancient versions and their value for the reconstruction1 if possible1 of the true original4 ,but what is an ,einleitung8 ,it is that theological 8discipline0 which concerns itself about holy scripture as a book4 ,it is its business to fix the time when and the manner how the several writings were composed1 which now collectively form the holy scriptures1 again it is one of its main objects to understand at what period and under what conditions the several writings were collected and also the manner of the tradition of this collection down to us4 ,the method of this inquiry can be none other but the historic critical4 ,to this definition of the character of this discipline1 to retain this ,german name1 none will take exception4 ,it is both succinct and complete4 ,the second paragraph gives a full survey of the history of the studies in this field4 ,it covers within the brief space of ten pages the results of scholarly labors extending over a period of over fourteen hundred years4 ,it is not a dry enumeration of names and book titles4 ,under each scholar1 the salient element of his contribution is emphasised4 ,the living principle of these studies is thus illustrated in its growth and successive development4 ,take for instance this description of ,wellhausen's method1 and in a similar manner that of all other predecessors or co-laborers is brought out3 8,at the hand of the history of the cultus and that of tradition1 he shows how these two lines of development run parallel to each other1 how the religious process of evolution at every halt and turn finds its expression and at the same time its corroboration in the productions of literature3 ,israel and ,judaism are two concepts radically different from each other2 it is the canon that differentiates ,judaism from old ,israel40 ,paragraph three states the author's reasons for treating the single books first before taking up the discussion of their collection into a canon1 and also why the apocrypha are excluded4 ,these not being in the canon1 are foreign to the purposes of an introduction into the canon books4 ,none will deny that the ,professor's arguments on these points are irrefutable4 ,his inquiry into the age of the art of writing among the ,hebrews concludes this general preliminary4 ,he is of the opinion that as far back as the memory of the ,hebrews goes1 they were acquainted with this art as nowhere there is a sign that among them there was a dim recollection of an analphabetic period4 ,recent finds have made it plain that during the reign of the ,pharaoh of the exodus a lively correspondence was kept up between ,palestine and ,egypt1 while for the reign of ,david the names of his court officials is documentary proof that there were writers at his court4 ,the use of the pen must have been pretty general among the people as is shown by ,judges viii1 a chapter which belongs to the oldest layer of historical compositions4 ,our space is too limited to abstract every chapter of this remarkable book4 ,much as we should like to do this1 and especially as in this manner alone we can hope to do justice to its merits1 we must confine ourselves1 now that we come to the 8special introduction0 to a few selections taken from the discussion of the main points in reference to books which have been the centre of critical study4 ,the ,pentateuch as is natural receives the lion's share of the author's attention4 ,we have no hesitancy in saying that his is the best exposition of the modern views which has yet come under our notice4 ,the ,pentateuch cannot be the work of ,moses2 internal evidence1 as already pointed out by ,aben ,esra1 ,hobbes1 ,peyrerius1 and ,spinoza1 render the traditional assumption of ,mosaic authorship untenable4 ,but the ,pentateuch cannot be the work of one author4 ,the critical labors of one and a half century1 sketched most skillfully1 has made it plain that the ,pentateuch has been 8worked together0 from four independent original writings1 7,quellenschriften7 a yahwistic work1 ,j4 an elohistic1 ,e4 a ,deuteronomistic ,d4 and a priestly which after ,kuenen is denoted as ,p4 ,on this general division the scholars are agreed1 the relative age of the separate parts alone is yet under controversy4 ,in paragraph seven an analysis is given of the first four books as assigned to the three sources4 ,deuteronomy occupies a position of its own4 ,it is characteristically different in language and thought from the others2 it is something essentially new and is in itself homogeneous4 ,in the main ,deuteronomy is the book of the covenant mentioned in ,,ii4 ,kings xxiii2 this original ,d4 is now incorporated in chapters xii1 xiii1 xiv-xvii1 where however certain verses and even parts of verses must be eliminated4 ,perhaps xxviii1 or as ,professor ,cornill argues1 something more succinct but of the same general nature1 a curse1 may have belonged to the original ,d4 ,this must have been the book published under such extraordinary circumstances in #fba4 ,who is its author8 ,it presents itself as the work of ,moses4 ,but this is characteristic of the tendency of the age to take a great man as the father of a new literary production1 a tendency which was perfectly well understood and was far above the level of a literary deception4 ,its early manifestation in ,d4 is merely proof that even then ,moses was among the people the law-giver par excellence4 ,the author of ,d4 must be looked for in the circle of the pious who in consequence of ,manasse's retrogression were bound all the more closely unto each other4 ,in other words among the men of the prophetic party1 who must have had influence also over certain priestly orders1 for ,d4 is a compromise and an alliance between the prophets and the priests4 ,besides these components of original ,d4 the book contains in its present form additions and duplicates which partly are historical and hence are denoted by ,d4h1 partly parenetic1 hence ,d4p2 but again in these are many later interpolations4 ,for the particulars in this regard1 we must refer to the work of ,cornill itself4 ,his analysis displays a keen eye and will on the whole be sure to be accepted as final4 ,the date of ,d4 being #fba1 what is the time of the other great sources of the present ,pentateuch4 ,it is clear that ,d4 is acquainted with the 8book of the covenant0 ,ex4 xx1 #bc4-xxiii1 #cc4 and with both ,decalogues 7874 ,thus it was acquainted with ,,je4 ,p4 on the other hand is totally unknown4 ,the historical portions of ,d4 confirm this deduction from the legislative pieces4 ,,je is clearly known to ,d4 while of a knowledge of ,p4 there is not the least trace4 ,how far back of #fba may we go to fix the date of both ,j4 and ,e48 ,the period of the first kings seem to be the limit1 or more particularly the reign of ,david4 ,but which of the two is the elder1 ,j4 or ,e48 ,there can be no question that ,j4 is4 ,for he is more nave as appears from a comparison among others of chapters ,gen4 xx1 #a-ag1 xxi #bb-cb which belong to ,e41 with chapter ,gen4 xxvi4 #a-cc which is ,j4's4 ,e4 appears to be a theological recasting of ,j4 ,e4 is the work of the ,northern kingdom4 ,joseph always appears as the leader of his brothers and other features confirm this impression4 ,the year #gbb1 when in the ,northern realm national consciousness was at its high water mark may then be supposed to be the terminus ad quem4 ,but is ,e4 as we have it a literary unit8 ,kuenen has proven that it is not4 ,a century after its original composition a second edition so to speak must have been made with a view to meet the requirements and prejudices of the ,judaic population of the ,south4 ,ex4 chapters #cb-cc1 are of great decisive importance in this connection4 ,they are a rebuke for the golden calf worship at ,dan and ,bethel4 ,thus ,e4 is divided again into two ,e4#a and ,e4#b1 to which come yet other later amplifications f4 i4 ,num4 xxi1 #cb-ce4 ,e4#a then belongs to the reign of ,jeroboam ,,ii 7#gej72 and ,e4#b is the work of a later author living in ,judah and under the influence of prophetic ideas4 ,the locality of ,j4 is a point of controversy4 ,cornill sides with those who maintain that his home is the ,southern kingdom of ,judah4 ,the incidents in the ,patriarchal biographies which seem to weaken such an assumption are explained as original traits of tradition which ,j4 had no interest to change4 ,j4 again is not a literary unit2 it compromises ,j4#a1 ,j4#b1 and even ,j4#c4 ,the reasons for these subdivisions are clearly given in the book4 ,j4 must have been composed in its different parts between #hej-fbe4 ,the priestly code occupies a whole paragraph1 the signal merit of which we have noticed above4 ,this is indeed the master-piece of a great critical master4 ,the many points which are involved in the discussion of this mooted problem are treated with a clearness and a calmness which carry conviction to the most sceptical4 ,p4 presents a spiritual unity but not a literary4 ,p4 is the offspring of ,p4#a an old priestly record and ,p4#b a narrative and legislative composition which is as it were the substance and skeleton of ,p4 around which younger accretions have gathered at different times for which ,cornill in order to simplify his symbols proposes the designation of ,p4x4 ,j4 ,s4 ,vater as early as #ahje has proven that in the so-called ,mosaism1 of the influence in literary and legislative respect of our ,p4 there is no evidence before the captivity4 ,wellhausen and ,kayser and ,kuenen have demonstrated what for ,vatke was a dim suspicion4 ,dillmann1 ,kittel1 and ,delitzsch as little as ,baudissin have succeeded in saving the pre-exilic character of ,p4 ,certain it is that before ,esra #deh 7#ddd71 this code had no official recognition4 ,from ,nehemiah we have the proof that our ,p4 corresponds to the 8,book of the ,law of ,moses0 which was read at the great assembly in ,october #ddd4 ,on the other hand the book of ,chronicles is based on ,p4 as it details history1 as it would have been1 if ,p4 had been the law regulating life and liturgy and temple service4 ,had ,p4 been known before ,d4 what reason should the priest have had who promulgated it to substitute for it another code less advantageous for his own order8 ,p4 is clearly a development of ,d4 ,d4 presents itself as something new in all of its demands1 in its insistence on centralisation1 in one sanctuary and in one priestly order on the legitimacy of the tribe of ,levi exclusively4 ,of the tabernacle there is not one syllable in the whole of the pre-exile literature4 ,it is a clear projection into antiquity of the ,deuteronomic ,central sanctuary4 ,the relations of ,p4 to ,ezekiel make this still plainer4 ,this prophet is the link of transition between ,d4 and ,p4 ,the omissions in the festal cycle of ,e4 can only be explained that this prophet-priest was unacquainted with ,p4 ,the captivity is thus the time for the composition of ,p4 in the main4 ,its emphasis on circumcision as the sign of the covenant which decides the connection with the chosen seed and nation1 is proof of this4 ,and the chronology finally corroborates all previous inferences as the chronology of ,genesis which is so important a part of ,p4 is unmistakably a reconstruction after certain principles of the ,babylonian history of the beginnings4 7,oppert47 ,p4 was written during the century from ,ezekiel to ,esra 7#egj-deh74 ,it was not merely ,p4#b that ,esra read before the assembled people4 ,p4#a and ,p4#b seem thus to have been united even at this time4 ,but it is not to be assumed that under ,esra ,p4 was already a part of the other portions of our ,pentateuch4 ,p4 itself contains parts which are later than ,esra4 ,p4x is undoubtedly later and these additions are easily explained on the very assumption of the official introduction of ,p4 ,p4 is not the work of an individual2 it is that of a whole school1 a school which naturally formed in the captivity4 ,besides these 8source-writings10 the ,pentateuch contains smaller pieces of great antiquity mostly of a poetic character which had for a long time an independent existence4 ,such is ,gen4 xlix1 ,exodus xv1 and others4 ,exodus xxi-xxiii1 the so-called book of the covenant1 requires also a treatment by itself4 ,it is characteristic of this book that it ignores totally the ,decalogue4 ,kuenen has solved the difficulties in which this collection of judicial precedents is involved by pointing out that it is the predecessor of ,d4 ,d4 is merely the substitute for this4 ,as it is older than ,e4 and is the precipitate of the unwritten law of the earlier kingly period1 we place its date in the ninth century4 ,lev4 xvii-xxvi while betraying in many regards affinity with ,p4 is still distinct from it4 ,it stands between ,ezekiel and ,p42 it is one of the many priestly ,thoroth which undoubtedly were current among the class whom they concerned4 ,how now did these component parts finally combine8 ,this is elucidated in paragraph fourteen4 ,first ,j4 and ,e4 were put together1 by an editor of ,jehovistic leanings1 whom ,wellhausen has styled ,rj4 7,r4 standing for ,german ,redacteur1 ,editor74 ,this ,rj4 worked over1 and that often decidedly1 his materials in keeping with his own convictions4 ,this ,rj4 probably lived about #fej4 ,his position is pre-deuteronomic4 ,a second editor combined the work of ,rj4 with ,d4 ,he is designated as ,rd4 ,his was the placing of the old book of the covenant near ,sinai in order to gain room for ,deuteronomy4 ,he thus became the cause of much confusion4 ,he lived during the second half of the ,babylonian captivity4 ,,jed4 was finally combined with ,p4 by a third editor 7,rp47 who is characterised by considerable reverence for the old documents4 ,he omitted much to guard against repetition but at the same time where the relations differed he preserved them most faithfully and endeavored to place them into their proper position and connection4 ,rp4 was thus virtually the author of our ,pentateuch4 ,but living after ,esra even with him the ,pentateuch was not yet closed4 ,many younger hands had a share in its final shaping4 ,glosses were added or crept into the text1 as is shown by comparison with the lxx4 ,the book of ,joshuah is a necessary continuation and complement of the ,pentateuch4 ,but here we must stop quoting in detail4 ,much as we should desire to reproduce ,cornill's own words relating to other ,biblical books1 want of space precludes even the attempt4 ,suffice it to say that as in his treatment of the ,pentateuch1 so every question bearing on ,biblical criticism is handled with the skill of the master4 ,at whatever turn we ask information of this book we receive it most abundantly4 ,this is indeed a students book4 ,it stimulates while it instructs4 ,it leads while it describes the road passed over4 ,in the discussion of the critical problems on the ,psalms1 the prophets ,isaiah and ,zechariah1 on the final collection of the canon1 the translation of the ,bible and the relation of the different recensions to each other1 the historical books as distinct from ,chronicles1 and ,esra1 and so forth1 every point is treated with a lucidity of style and a fulness of material which is the rare gift of a man who is saturated with his science and loves it for its own sake4 ,this book is destined to rank among the classics4 ,its earnest study and repeated consultation can therefore be recommended to all who wish to inform themselves about the method and the achievements of the critical schools4 ,the kindred book by ,driver1 recently published will not make a translation into ,english of ,cornill's manual less desirable4 ,we take leave from the author with a feeling of great gratitude for the pleasure and the profit we derived from his contribution to the literature of ,biblical scholarship4 ,the book is well printed and singularly free from typographical errors4 ,,dr4 ,e4 ,g4 ,,hirsch4 ,,the ,,present ,,position ,,of ,,the ,,philosophical ,,sciences4 ,an ,inaugural ,lecture4 ,by ,andrew ,seth1 ,m4 ,a4 ,edinburgh and ,london3 ,william ,blackwood and ,sons4 #ahia4 ,as stated by the author1 this lecture deals1 not with the circle of the philosophical sciences1 but only with the subjects traditionally associated with a ,chair of ,logic and ,metaphysics in ,scotland4 ,these subjects belong to the three-fold classification of logical1 psychological1 and metaphysical1 or philosophical in the strict sense4 ,they therefore embrace the study of the conditions to which valid reasoning must conform1 the investigation1 introspectively and otherwise1 of the phenomena of consciousness1 and the study of the two-fold question of knowing and being1 which as epistemology and metaphysics are included under the designation of ,philosophy4 ,these three lines of learning are cognate1 and the first two are in a measure introductory to the third1 or at least1 says ,professor ,seth1 if we go beneath the surface they lead us into the very heart of philosophical difficulties4 ,the lecturer refers in his sketch of the present outlook in these three departments of science to the marvellous activity displayed in the department of psychology4 ,all the influences at work may be said to meet and come to fruition in ,mr4 ,ward's 8masterly treatise0 in the 8,encyclopdia ,britannica0 and 8the rich and stimulating volumes0 of ,professor ,james1 of ,harvard4 ,experimental psychology is now widely spread in ,germany and has been enthusiastically taken up in ,america1 8where every well-equipped college aims at the establishment of a psychological or psycho-physical laboratory40 ,professor ,seth thinks1 however1 that the experimental psychologists magnify their office overmuch4 ,the field of experiment is necessarily limited to the facts of sensation1 the phenomena of movement1 and the time occupied by the simpler mental processes4 ,the results are often so contradictory as to leave everything in doubt1 and where definite results are obtainable1 their value is often not apparent4 ,moreover1 many of the results are of a purely physiological nature1 and are only by courtesy included in psychological science4 ,we would remark on this1 that without the experiments the results would not have been obtained and that their value will become apparent when the methods of experiment are perfected4 ,after referring to the critical function of philosophy as a doctrine of knowledge1 ,professor ,seth states that as constructive it should lay special stress on a teleological view of the universe4 ,by this is meant1 that philosophical teleology should concentrate itself upon the proof that there is an end of evolution1 8that there is an organic unity or purpose binding the whole process into one and making it intelligible--in one word1 that there is evolution and not merely aimless change10 such as is supposed in a purely mechanical view of the universe4 ,as to the nature of the end1 although the lecturer accepts ,hegel's view that all things are relative to man as rational1 he cannot accept 8the abstraction of the race in place of the living children of men40 4 ,,der ,,menschliche ,,weltbegriff4 ,by ,dr4 ,richard ,avenarius1 ,ord4 ,professor der ,philosophie an der ,universitt ,zrich4 ,leipsic3 ,o4 ,r4 ,reisland4 #ahia4 ,this monograph is as it were a self-confession4 ,the author endeavors to attain clearness in his own philosophical standpoint4 ,he looked back upon the path he has traveled and feels that 8the solution of the problem-attained is fundamentally a personal self-liberation0 7,preface1 ix74 ,this book is most commendable reading to all idealists and agnostics4 ,it is an interesting and instructive little work1 tracing with a keen psychological criticism the vagaries of certain philosophical conceptions1 through which not alone the author but the thinkers of mankind in general have strayed4 ,the philosopher begins with what ,avenarius calls the 8natural world-conception40 ,but this natural world-conception leads to contradictions and the evil spirit of speculation leads us in a circle through the barren fields of idealism4 ,avenarius asks3 8,is the world really of such a nature that it appears unitary and consistent only to the superficial thinker1 while it leads every one astray who attempts to grasp it more precisely in its entirety--the more so the more consistently the thinker proceeds80 7p4 xiii47 ,the author proposes the question3 8,in what consists the inevitableness of the contradiction to which every general world-conception seems to have led8 ,or1 if the world really be unitary what is the evil spirit that leads those astray who hunger and thirst after a true cognition of the world80 ,the author has entirely abandoned the idealistic standpoint1 an inclination to which he showed in his first publication1 8,philosophie als ,denken der ,welt gemss dem ,princip des kleinsten ,kraftmasses40 ,he says3 8,doubt of the correctness of my way heretofore pursued was induced through the barrenness of theoretical idealism in the field of psychology2 and yet cognition and experience should belong to this science as psychological ideas40 ,the author in explaining the development of thought as it takes place in man proceeds in a personal way1 so much so that every idealist ought to be satisfied4 ,there are whole pages which teem with ,,me's and ,i's4 ,the method of notation is what might be called ,american4 ,europeans often complain about our abbreviations1 the ,y4 ,m4 ,c4 ,a41 the ,s4 ,a4 ,s41 the ,c4 ,b4 ,q4 ,ry41 etc41 which are great puzzles to the uninitiated new-comer4 ,in a similar way ,avenarius introduces such algebraic signs as ,r and ,e1 which means reality and the sensations which our fellow-men are supposed to have4 ,m is ,man1 ,t is fellow-man4 ,t is the bodily appearance of ,t1 it is ,r2 while ,t is the ,e of ,t1 i4 e4 his soul or spirit4 ,c is the nervous central organ1 etc4 ,thus ,avenarius says 7p4 #ah73 8,i can in a relative consideration assume ,r to be the condition of changes in the ,e values1 supposed to exist in ,m1 only if ,m and in ,m the system ,c are parts of my supposition10 and in a note 7p4 #aag7 he adds3 8,the skeleton in ,goethe's poem1 #8,the ,dead's ,dance1' scents without an organ of smell1 sees without eyes1 thinks without a brain2 it also moves without muscles4 ,to consider such acts as true is now universally declared to be superstition4 ,the time will come when the assumption of psychical phenomena without the cordination of the system ,c will universally be considered in the same way40 ,the first three chapters remind us very much of ,w4 ,k4 ,clifford's article 8,on the ,nature of ,things in ,themselves40 ,but the article is nowhere mentioned and it is most probable that it is unknown to the author4 ,if ,avenarius had known ,clifford's view1 he might have presented his ideas with more economy of space4 ,but if he did not know ,clifford's article1 the coincidences of procedure and to a great extent also of the result attained are the more remarkable4 ,what ,avenarius calls the ,e values are termed by ,clifford 8ejects10 and the formation of ejects is called by ,avenarius 8introjection40 ,on page #eb we read the following sentence on the three phases of the cognition of the data of experience3 8,the first phase alone1 that of ingenuous empiricism1 cognises1 i4 e4 explains the totality of these facts without the assistance of a non-sensible 444 the second that of ingenuous realism conceives the non-sensible as supersensible1 and the third1 that of ingenuous criticism1 as the pre-sensible4 ,the epithet ingenuous has reference to the foundation1 not to the doctrinary system built upon it4 ,that which makes the said realism and criticism ingenuous is a survival of the ingenuous empiricism40 ,the theory which conceives the external cause of an experience as an object1 effecting in the subject sensations1 passes successively through the following views4 ,the object is said to be 7#a7 not within the range of experience1 7#b7 not within the range of cognition1 7#c7 not-existing4 ,thus it reaches via agnosticism its climax in idealism and 8pure experience becomes a something that is never truly experienced1 it becomes the totality of mere or pure sensations0 7p4 #fb74 ,the third part of the pamphlet is devoted to 8the restitution of the natural world-idea40 ,here the author comes1 at least in some expressions1 very close to the solution editorially upheld in ,the ,monist4 ,avenarius says3 8,the task is 444 to describe the what of my experience so as to make a practical application of it in my dealings with my fellow-men0 7p4 #gi74 ,professor ,avenarius sums up his conclusions in the term 8empirio-critical principal-cordination0 which he defines as the inseparability of the ego-experience from the surrounding experience4 8,the ego and the surrounding belong in the same sense to every experience4 ,it is a co-ordination peculiar to all experience0 7p4 #hc74 ,if we understand ,avenarius correctly he means to say1 to express it in our terms1 that there is no object but there is a subjective aspect of it1 no subject but it appears objectively4 ,thus there is no subjectivity in itself and there is no objectivity in itself4 ,this is exactly our position1 which we call ,monism4 ,the 8introjection0 was according to ,avenarius the evil spirit that led speculation astray4 ,to get rid of this evil spirit the proposition is made to discard 8introjection0 and replace it by the empirio-critical principal-cordination4 ,but closely considered the latter is only an improved modification of the former1 and this plan would better be characterised as discarding the error implied in that kind of introjection theory which assumes that sensations alone are given4 ,the data of experience are not mere feelings1 not mere subjectivity1 as is maintained by the idealist2 nor are they mere objectivity1 as is maintained by the ingenuous realist2 the data of experience are states of subject-objectness1 they are feelings of a certain kind possessing objective significance1 and the ideas subject as well as object are abstractions made in a late stage of mental development from this one inseparable whole of subject-objectness 7see ,the ,monist ,i1 ,no4 #a1 pp4 #gh-gi74 ,avenarius says in a note 7p4 #acb71 8,the question should not be #8,why do we believe in the reality of an external world8' but #8,why did we not believe that the external world is real8'0 ,we should say that neither question is admissible4 ,we should first ask3 ,what do we mean by real8 ,reality is the sum total of our experiences1 including the meaning of sensations and ideas1 and finds its special application in their reliability4 ,the question1 ,is the candle ,i see real8 means1 ,does it react in special ways8 ,every name of a special object signifies a certain group of actions or reactions observable by the subject4 ,this is what we call real and the idealist would have to deny the existence of his own experience to deny the reality of objects in this sense4 ,avenarius's books are not easy reading to the ,english and ,american student1 for his style is sometimes heavy and his constructions are involved4 ,so are his thoughts4 ,but his thoughts show the earnest thinker2 the evolution of his views goes in the right direction and his works deserve the attention of his co-workers in the philosophical field4 4 ,,die ,,bedeutung ,,der ,,theologischen ,,vorstellungen ,f,r ,,die ,,ethik4 ,by ,dr4 ,wilhelm ,paszkowski4 ,berlin3 ,mayer ,mller4 #ahia4 ,religion originates everywhere1 according to the author1 in the self-consciousness of man who feels himself an acting and willing being limited by and dependent upon greater and higher powers4 ,the religious relation consists in the regulation of his actions as well as his will with reference to the ordinances of these powers4 ,dr4 ,paszkowski lets all the best known religions pass in review before our eyes1 tracing in all of them the connection between the properly religious elements and morality and singling out those religious factors which are most effective in determining man's will in a moral way4 ,in the second part of the little volume he endeavors to show in how far the ecclesiastical organisation of religion in dogma and cult have strengthened and in how far they have weakened this result4 ,concerning the most important dogma1 which is the belief in immortality1 ,paszkowski declares that it had its undoubted effects favorable and unfavorable upon the social and moral life of mankind4 ,it has prevented some crimes while it has enhanced others4 ,the question is1 he says1 whether an individual immortality such as the religions usually picture it1 is tenable or not4 ,modern science and anthropology seem to have proved it an illusion4 ,yet1 as ,paulsen says1 the belief in immortality is not a mere imagination4 ,every reality and so also man's life is eternal4 ,it is nonsensical to think of death as a finality4 ,that which has been alive is a necessary1 an eternal and inexpugnable part of reality and can never again be blotted out4 ,through death the continuance of a man's life is cut off1 but the contents of his life can never again be annihilated4 ,the real is in its very nature eternal4 ,paszkowski adds to ,paulsen's remarks that man should find the norm of moral action in his relation to his fellow-men and posterity1 so that morality need not depend upon any religious views4 ,he will also have to act morally after he has resigned the belief in the reality of the beautiful immortality-dream as it is presented by enthusiastic religiosity4 ,it appears to us that if the usual conception of immortality is scientifically untenable it devolves upon the moral teacher to present an immortality conception that is tenable4 ,the true immortality conception will never enhance crimes1 it will always have a favorable effect upon the morality of mankind4 ,furthermore man's relation to mankind and also to the universe is of a religious nature4 ,the social order to which man has to conform is one part of those powers a recognition of which constitute religion4 ,if these powers are conceived to be outside the world we have a supernatural deity1 if they are the highest1 best1 and greatest of1 and in the world itself1 we have an immanent deity and ethics still remains intimately connected with and dependent upon religion4 ,this it appears must be after all the author's meaning1 for he says in prominent print1 p4 #hi3 8,so long as there are men religion will not cease1 for it is one of the constitutional elements of human nature40 8,in the same measure as religion becomes spiritual1 the moral conceptions also will be purified1 the mere ceremonial and the cult-element will lose their importance in religion0 7p4 #ib74 8,to divide the ethical factor from the religious1 as a matter of principle1 will be seen to be impossible4 ,we can only conciliate the one with the other1 both having originated out of the same source of emotions0 7p4 #ij74 4 ,,das ,,wahrnehmungsproblem ,,vom ,,standpunkte ,,des ,,physikers1 ,,des ,,physiologen ,,und ,,des ,,philosophen4 ,beitrge zur ,erkenntnisstheorie und empirischen ,,psychologie4 ,by ,dr4 ,hermann ,schwarz4 ,leipsic3 ,duncker ,humbolt #ahib4 ,dr4 ,hermann ,schwarz treats the most fundamental problem of philosophy--viz4 that of perception4 ,he says in the preface3 8,there is a triple state of facts to which obvious yet strange as it appears to thought1 the attention of the naturalist and the philosopher is drawn3 the physical1 the physiological1 the psychical40 ,the physical is the empire of mechanical motion that can be observed with great accuracy to take place everywhere4 ,the physiological is the fact that when certain impressions produce mechanical effects upon the nerves1 the result consists in certain sense-data2 nervous action is accompanied with sensation4 ,the psychical state of things exhibits the fact that whether or not we want it to be so1 colors1 sounds1 odors1 tastes1 and touches are always referred to external things1 never to the own internal states of the mind4 ,every one of these facts is strange in itself1 for every one represents the contrary of what might be expected a priori4 ,who would expect that the machine-like world of jostling atoms and the glorious world of colors and sounds should have anything in common8 ,and the sense-organs appear to the physiologist as mere physical apparatuses modifying the ether-vibrations somehow4 ,we do not see on the one hand how consciousness can acquire information concerning the external world and on the other hand1 how motions can develop something so heterogeneous as is consciousness4 ,if we were confronted with one set of facts only1 everything would be plain1 but this triple set of facts produces a problem1 it makes an explanation necessary and to this explanation ,dr4 ,schwarz has devoted a careful investigation of some four hundred and odd pages4 ,schwarz distinguishes two elements in what he calls 8ingenuous realism10 7#a7 its methodology and 7#b7 its metaphysics4 ,the methodology of physical science consists in arranging the sense-data1 while the metaphysics assume that the objectivity of the sense-data is correctly represented as 8things1 qualities1 and effects40 ,natural science arrived at a scepsis of the usual metaphysics of nave realism by a correction of the ingenuous-realistic method1 and ,kant by critically investigating the background or frame of its theory of cognition4 ,the question is1 ,what is altered by physical science in the conception of ingenuous realism1 what by physiology1 what by philosophy and why8 ,in the consciousness of an ingenuous realist the data of touch receive a preference over those of the other senses1 which is due to their greater stability4 ,the color of an object disappears1 the sounds cease1 while the objects remain comparatively the same things to the sense of touch4 ,thus they are considered as the real objects having certain qualities which produce the phenomena of the other senses4 ,this view is called by ,schwarz the first methodological dogma of ingenuous realism4 ,the second dogma is the conception that sense-data are considered as relatively permanent4 ,so colors are conceived to exist objectively in the dark1 an error which has been sufficiently explained by ,helmholtz in his 8,physiological ,optics10 #bf4 ,the third dogma completes the second2 it is the view that the relative permanence or disappearance of the qualities of objects depends upon causes4 ,fire is said to be the cause which makes a wire red-hot4 ,the ingenuous realist knows no reciprocal causation1 no action and reaction1 no ,wechselwirkung4 ,he assumes in addition to the objects certain force-beings which are regarded as the causes of all change4 ,the sun is said to produce light4 ,schwarz explains very well how this view of ingenuous realism naturally arises and also how in the progress of thought it naturally corrects itself4 ,suppose there were thinking beings with whom smell took the place of touch and sight1 would not their world-conception be based upon the data of the sense of smell as is ours upon the data of mechanical motions8 ,if the females of a certain butterfly 7,frostspanner7 are caught in the country and placed at a great distance in some house of the city1 the males will be seen on the next morning in great numbers fluttering before the window of the room in which the females are kept4 ,what a perfection of the sense of smell while the senses of touch and sight are very poorly developed6 ,the dog owes his intelligence mainly to the development of the sense of smell4 ,would not beings whose intelligence is mainly due to the sense of hearing rather attempt to hear the world than to grasp or comprehend it1--to behorchen rather than to begreifen8 ,ingenuous realism is not consistent1 and its methodology leads to alterations of its metaphysics4 ,we shall have to attribute either to all the sense-data objective reality or to none of them4 ,the data of touch cannot be treated as exceptions and thus we have the alternative either to return from our scepsis to realism1 not to the ingenuous but to a critically modified view of it1 or to adopt the extremest form of idealism1 be it that of ,berkeley or the subjectivism of ,fichte4 ,the author 7not unlike ,professor ,avenarius in his book 8,der menschliche ,weltbegriff07 takes the former view4 ,he says in the concluding chapter 7,die ,mngel der ,ding-an-sich-,hypothese73 8,this view1 viz4 that of ingenuous realism1 will in the end of our inquiry be seen to be not only the most natural1 and practically considered the most useful metaphysical theory1 but also that conception which is freest from all theoretical obscurities0 7p4 #cha74 ,we believe that the book which contains much valuable material1 would have been more useful than it actually is1 if a chapter had been added containing a summary of the whole inquiry and delineating in great outlines the critically modified form of realism whose most appropriate name we should say is monism--not materialism or mechanicalism which allows all facts to be swallowed up by the conception that the world consists only of matter in motion1 but that monism which is a unitary view of the whole1 mindful of the fact that the sense-data as well as our concepts are one-sided aspects only of the one and all4 ,if we bear this truth in mind we shall avoid from the beginning the three dogmas 7alias errors7 of ingenuous materialism4 4 ,,die ,,entwickelung ,,des ,,causalproblems ,,in ,,der ,,philosophie ,,seit ,,kant4 ,studien zur ,orientirung ber die ,aufgaben der ,metaphysik und ,erkenntnisslehre4 7,part ,,ii47 ,by ,dr4 ,edmund ,koenig4 ,leipsic3 ,otto ,wigand4 ,the present work forms the conclusion of a volume published by ,dr4 ,koenig in #ahhh1 entitled ,die ,entwickelung des ,causalproblems von ,cartesius bis ,kant4 ,this same subject is here pursued in the history of modern philosophy since ,kant4 ,the problem of causality1 according to ,dr4 ,koenig1 has two aspects1 an epistemological and a metaphysical4 ,the pre-,kantian efforts dealt chiefly with the latter1 the post-,kantian more principally with the former4 ,the latter1 the metaphysical question1 is1 ,how do things in the world of reality produce effects in one another8 ,the former1 or that which relates to the theory of knowledge1 is1 7#a7 ,what is the logical foundation of the idea of causality1 what do we imply when we set up two objects as cause and effect1 and 7#b7 ,by what right and to what extent are we justified in imputing to the axiom of causality an objective validity8 ,with respect to the latter1 the epistemological1 point of view1 ,hume and ,kant believed they had established indisputably that experience as given does not furnish sufficient grounds either for the idea or the axiom of causality4 ,on the other hand1 others1 like ,maine de ,biran1 ,schopenhauer1 and ,trendelenburg1 hold1 that causality is given us in experience1 that we apprehend the causal relation subsisting between things1 together with the things4 ,herbart maintains that the idea of the causal relation has been reached by the logical elaboration of experience in conformity with the general laws of logical thought4 ,mill and ,spencer see in this idea an element that goes beyond experience1 but justify it only psychologically1 not logically4 ,according to ,lotze1 ,riehl1 ,wundt1 v4 ,hartmann1 ,volkelt1 the idea is either wholly or partly of intellectual origin4 ,finally1 ,comte and a few modern scientists look upon the idea of causality as logically valueless and scientifically superfluous4 ,this is1 in brief1 the opinions of the greatest thinkers whom ,koenig treats of1 respecting the logical composition of the idea of causality4 ,but another question1 that namely as to the character of the relation in which in the causal judgment the notions of the concrete causes and their effects exist1 is one closely allied with this4 ,some hold1 7,trendelenburg1 ,goering1 ,herbart1 ,hamilton1 ,spencer17 that the relation is one of identity2 others that it is synthetical4 ,this aspect is also developed in connection with the last-named thinkers4 ,with respect to the axiom of causality1 we find diametrically opposed to each other the doctrines of empiricism and apriorism2 but a number of intermediate opinions have also established themselves4 ,of the first1 ,schopenhauer1 ,lotze1 and ,volkelt are representatives1 but only the theory of the first-named is developed at length4 ,the empiricism of ,mill and ,goering meets with exhaustive treatment1 as does the opposed view of ,laas1 ,riehl1 and ,wundt and the conciliatory view of ,spencer4 ,with respect to the metaphysical aspect of the question1 above-mentioned1 we find the modes of conception of phenomenalism and realism opposed4 ,the latter only is1 in the nature of its doctrine1 required to explain ontologically the coming about of the causal relation in reality2 the former does not recognise ,being in itself1 and hence there can be no causal connection of such4 ,schopenhauer's attempt 7the view of the forces of nature as the emanation of a ,universal ,will71 and the splendid ontological theories of ,herbart and ,lotze are regarded by ,dr4 ,koenig as being no more a solution of the problem than were the efforts of their famous predecessors ,spinoza1 ,malebranche1 and ,leibnitz4 ,these dogmatic realists1 as ,koenig calls them1 proceed from the assumption of the knowableness of the absolute2 opposed to them1 in this regard1 are ,spencer1 ,von ,hartmann1 and ,volkelt1 the critical realists1 the first of whom gives an ontology that is a vague and metaphysical rendering of the principle of the conservation of energy1 the two last of whom impute a transcendental ontological significance to the idea of causality4 ,the connection1 ,dr4 ,koenig concludes1 is thus apparent and definite between the metaphysical and epistemological divisions of the question4 ,the ontologist1 unless he proceed dogmatically1 must prove1 that the notion of causality in the form in which critical analysis has established it as a valid and indispensable empirical idea1 calls inevitably for the notion of an absolute reality and of a state of things in that reality corresponding to the forms of the connection given4 ,therefore1 the logical analysis of the idea of causality is in any philosophy1 pre-eminently determinative of its whole position and bearing4 ,on the whole1 then1 in the treatment of the problem forming the subject of this work1 four comparatively independent views are found opposed to one another and considered in this opposition2 viz41 ,sensualism and ,intellectualism1 ,positivism and ,rationalism1 ,empiricism and ,apriorism1 ,realism and ,phenomenalism4 ,the author views the result of his researches to be1 the proof of the untenability of ,sensualism1 ,rationalism1 ,empiricism1 and ,realism1 so far as this1 by an historico-critical analysis1 is possible4 ,this is but a brief sketch of the treatment pursued by the author4 ,the author's own view has been barely hinted at4 ,he is a ,kantian4 ,he calls himself a 8transcendental idealist40 ,dr4 ,koenig's developments1 appreciative1 acute and pointed as they are1 are too detailed and exhaustive to be separately taken into discussion here2 but we may illustrate his point of view by a summary of a few remarks of his on the ontological problem as solved by physics4 ,they are as follows4 ,the natural modes of thought cling irresistibly to the notion of a constant substratum2 this being so1 how does process1 how does change spring from an invariability of existence8 ,physical science answers1 by force2 which exists as a constant potentiality of the substratum1 is now active1 now latent4 ,dr4 ,koenig maintains that in this physical science accomplishes nothing towards the solution of the present problem2 it does not by its notion of force make intelligible the acting of bodies on each other1 for when it comes to define the mode of action of force it involves itself in hopeless difficulties4 ,what is the consequence then1 of this dilemma of science1 where it can neither render plain the 8nature0 of the material substratum1 nor the nature of 8force10 which is1 so to speak1 the source of the activity of the substratum8 ,it is either agnosticism1 which places limits to our knowledge1 and which ,dr4 ,koenig rejects as unbecoming true thought1 or it is that theory which regards the phenomena alone as real and views the concepts of theoretical physics as the mere shifts and helps of thought whereby we bring the phenomena into connection with one another4 ,this latter view also ,dr4 ,koenig cannot accept4 ,his express contention is1 that we can interpret1 ontologically1 the phenomena of reality by the notions of substance1 force1 etc42 he holds that the position of transcendental idealism is the correct theory here1 the position namely that matter and force conceived as transcendent1 independent entities cannot be thought away1 because substantiality and causality are forms of transcendental apperception1 which alone can make nature an object of cognition2 matter and force must1 for purposes of empiric observation1 of necessity possess the same reality as phenomena themselves4 ,in connection with this subject ,dr4 ,koenig contests ,mach's doctrine1 that natural laws are simple economical descriptions of phenomena2 he contends that 8law0 is the foundation of natural science1 and particularly so the law of causality4 ,this1 however1 does not say much4 ,for the formal laws in themselves are empty4 ,the law1 the axiom of causality may1 a priori1 be without exception2 but this circumstance1 the conviction we may call it1 offers us no hold on nature4 ,when we investigate nature we have to perceive definite facts2 about which we formulate particular laws or statements4 ,the law of causality1 however1 does not help us to discern the determinative facts or features of any phenomenon4 ,it simply says that if we have hit upon the determinative facts and formulated a law describing them1 that law holds good throughout all nature4 ,but what is to tell us what the characteristic and determinative features of a given event are and when we have lighted on them8 ,the law of causality8 ,surely not4 ,the law of causality cannot tell us that for falling bodies v gt1 i4 e4 that t is decisive4 ,it simply says that when once this fact has been discerned it holds universally good4 ,but it would have asserted the same thing with regard to ,galileo's first 7false7 assumption1 namely that v ,cs4 ,if1 then1 the law of causality cannot tell us what those features are between which the causal connection is assumed to exist1 what is to tell us8 ,our observation simply1 which must be tested by experience4 ,but our observation has no limits placed to it except this1 that it shall select some fact that represents the phenomenon and best and most easily enables us to represent it4 ,and there is nothing that requires that there should be only one feature or one aspect of an event by which it is representable2 there may be several1 as the development of science proves4 ,accordingly1 what selection we make may depend on arbitrary and historical circumstances4 ,and this1 as we take it1 is ,prof4 ,mach's contention4 ,if it is true1 ,dr4 ,koenig's criticism of ,mach's view does not hold in its whole extent4 ,dr4 ,koenig's treatment of the separate representative thinkers is exhaustive and in an eminent degree scientific4 ,his work is distinguished by accuracy and pointedness of characterisation1 and by special knowledge of great range4 ,it is a valuable contribution which he has given us1 to the study of the theory of knowledge and metaphysics1 and he has been true to his promise1 as we judge1 critically to discuss and not summarily to dispose of the opinions of others4 4 ,,eine ,,neue ,,darstellung ,,der ,,leibnizischen ,,monadenlehre ,,auf ,,grund ,,der ,,quellen4 ,by ,eduard ,dillmann4 ,leipsic3 ,o4 ,r4 ,reisland1 #ahia4 ,the author is an admirer of ,leibnitz's monadology which he considers as 8the most beautiful1 most perfect fruit of philosophic thought and the most glorious system to be found in the history of philosophy40 ,this enthusiasm however is not shown in panegyrics but in a careful investigation of the great master's work and we should scarcely know the attitude of the author toward the philosopher whose thoughts he discusses1 if he did not give vent to his feelings in a few sentences of the concluding chapter4 ,the rest of the book consists of purely critical and historical studies by a sober and cool-headed scholar4 ,leibnitz's system as it is represented in our histories of philosophy and as it is currently conceived lacks a unitary and leading idea1 so that many of its most fundamental propositions appear to be at variance4 ,mr4 ,dillmann maintains that ,leibnitz's philosophy as it really is does not lack this unity2 he has made an extensive and most diligent study of ,leibnitz's works and proves with great plausibility through the assistance of many pertinent quotations the justice of his cause4 ,leibnitz's monadology is according to ,dillmann essentially a conciliatory system4 ,it attempts to reconcile the world-conceptions of his time4 ,the mechanical explanation of nature as it was proposed in modern times and according to which all processes should be conceived as motions of bodies is harmonised with the formalistic views of classical antiquity and of the schoolmen which seeks for the causes of all phenomena in substantial forms4 ,in aiming at such a combination1 he had to show that all single phenomena of bodies and also their qualities had some ground and that the principle of the body itself consisted in a substantial form4 ,this led him to conceive of bodies and of all things not as phenomena of an external world but as representations in the mind1 and thus an entirely new standpoint was gained 7p4 #eaa74 ,representations are the inner states of ,monads 7p4 #cah74 ,monads are substances because representations are units2 for representations are the many expressed in a unity 7p4 #cai74 ,every monad is a concentration of the universe 7p4 #cac74 ,it is as if ,god had multiplied the universe as often as there are souls 7p4 #cad74 ,every substance is a little world in itself1 expressing the great world of the universe4 ,the substance imitates in its little world what ,god does in the universe 7p4 #cac74 ,leibnitz's ,god-idea has suffered most from a misconception of the fundamental idea of his system4 ,dillmann declares that the traditional view1 especially ,fischer's1 is in conflict with the philosopher's own words4 ,while ,fischer says that ,leibnitz's ,god has created the substances and arbitrarily endowed them with their natures1 ,dillmann maintains on the ground of ample quotations that ,leibnitz considers the forms of all possible existences as given3 not even ,god can alter them4 ,god however can and did compare all possible worlds1 and then created that which his wisdom found to be the best world4 8,god10 says ,leibnitz1 8does not select a general ,adam1 but such a one10 i4 e4 an individual ,adam1 8whose perfect representation is found among all the possible beings which exist in the ideas of ,god4 ,the nature of every creature is determined by eternal truths which are in the understanding of ,god independent of his will40 8,god's decree consists alone in the decision arrived at after having compared all possible worlds and having admitted into existence that one which is the best of all40 4 ,,leitfaden ,,der ,,physiologischen ,,psychologie ,,in #ad ,,vorlesungen4 ,by ,dr4 ,th4 ,ziehen1 ,docent in ,jena4 ,mit #ba ,abbildungen im ,text4 ,jena3 ,gustav ,fischer4 #ahia4 ,the merits of these #ad lectures on physiological psychology are thoroughness1 lucidity1 and conciseness2 the whole book is a pamphlet of #agd pp4 only4 ,the method of presentation is in all its detail work positive1 stating the facts as they have been found to be by experience and as they are corroborated by experiment4 ,upon the whole it is a good rsum of the present state of knowledge4 ,a translation would be very desirable and it is to be hoped that some of our psychologists will undertake the work4 ,the contents are briefly as follows3 ,i4 ,contents and scope of psychology4 ,,ii4 ,sensation1 association1 action4 ,,iii4 ,stimulus1 sensation4 ,,iv4 ,taste1 smell1 touch4 ,v4 ,hearing4 ,,vi4 ,vision4 ,,vii4 ,affective aspect of sensation 7pleasure and pain74 ,,viii4 ,sensation1 memory1 concept4 ,,ix4 ,association of ideas4 ,x4 ,judgment and syllogism4 ,,xi4 ,attention1 voluntary thought1 the ego 7,ziehen says3 8psychologically considered the simple ego is a theoretical fiction10 p4 #aci74 ,,xii4 ,diseased thinking1 sleep1 hypnosis4 ,,xiii4 ,action1 expressive motions1 language4 ,,xiv4 ,will1 general conclusions4 ,although ,dr4 ,ziehen's pamphlet is upon the whole an excellent treatise1 we cannot agree with the author in several questions which are of great importance in their consequences4 ,dr4 ,ziehen acknowledges that the specifically nervous processes1 a sensible stimulus and a reaction1 which latter is a motory effect1 cannot be explained from physical laws alone 7p4 #d74 ,yet at the same time he denies that the fact that the reflexes are adapted to a purpose 7,zweckmssigkeit7 proves the presence of a psychical parallelism4 8,pflger10 he says1 8was wrong in attributing for this reason to the spinal cord a spinal-cord-soul40 ,the ,zweckmssigkeit of reflexes 7i4 e4 their being adapted to a purpose7 has originated not otherwise than the ,zweckmssigkeit of the color of the bird's plumage1 i4 e4 through natural selection and inheritance4 ,this argument might be admissible1 if we had not to account for the gradual origin of consciousness also4 ,there was a time when our personal consciousness did not exist1 and there was also a time when no conscious being lived upon the earth4 ,unless we assume that consciousness suddenly appeared1 creating out of its own subjectivity alone the objective world which appears to us as what we call matter in motion1 we shall have to adopt some monistic view of the subject4 ,to consider the psychical states as known and the objectivity of existence as utterly unknown is no monism4 ,dr4 ,ziehen is opposed to the idea of psychical parallelism which he conceives to be dualism1 but he proposes a spiritual monism in its stead1 the difficulties of which he does not explain4 ,it is to be regretted that ,dr4 ,ziehen has not understood the main idea of the parallelism doctrine4 ,he says in a foot-note 7p4 #f73 8,in the most extreme way1 but with quite insufficient reasons ,lewes has maintained the omnipresence of consciousness40 ,this is a misstatement of ,lewes's view1 which by the bye is held by the reviewer also1 although he confesses that the term parallelism is inappropriate and leads to misunderstandings4 ,the theory of parallelism1 7at least as the reviewer holds it7 is not dualistic but monistic4 ,it implies that the subjectivity and objectivity of existence are two different abstractions of one and the same reality4 ,its parallelism is a parallelism of these two sets of abstraction1 while the reality from which they have been derived is one throughout4 ,there exist no subjects that are not objects to other subjects1 and every object admits of a subjective aspect4 ,there is a something supposed to be present throughout nature which under certain conditions appears as consciousness4 ,this certain something is called by ,clifford elements of feeling1 by ,lloyd ,morgan metakinesis1 it has been characterised in the editorials of ,the ,monist as the subjectivity of existence1 and the presence of this something in the spinal cord was called by ,pflger ,rckenmarksseele4 ,it appears to me that if we could explain the well adapted reaction of nervous substance without assuming a psychical element in it1 we could explain the whole process of evolution and the historical development of mankind1 without the assumption of consciousness4 ,yet it is obvious that even the explanation of the color of the bird's plumage by the theory of natural selection and heredity presupposes the presence of psychical elements somewhere4 ,either the bird and his mates show a color sense1 or his enemies do1 whose persecution he escapes1 or the animals upon whom he preys do4 ,man's entire existence1 physical and psychical1 including his feelings of pleasure and pain1 can be explained by the theory of natural selection and heredity2 yet this is no proof that psychical elements do not exist in him4 ,it has become customary at present to define 8psychical0 as that only which appears in states of consciousness1 and to exclude subconscious and unconscious states4 ,dr4 ,ziehen says3 8,everything given in consciousness and that alone is conscious0 7p4 #c74 ,yet he introduces after all the expression 8psychically latent10 8latent memory pictures10 and similar expressions4 ,dr4 ,ziehen says1 8,we cannot even have a conception of that which an unconscious idea can be02 yet what is a latent memory-picture but an unconscious idea8 ,there are two kinds of unconscious ideas3 7#a7 ,latent ideas4 ,every man's brain is full of latent ideas1 i4 e4 of memory-pictures which are at present unconscious but can become conscious at once if their activity is roused by an appropriate stimulus4 7#b7 ,ideas unrelated to the centre of consciousness4 ,those active ideas which1 although at present in a state of activity1 are unrelated to the centre of consciousness that constitutes the ego of the man1 remain unconscious4 ,unconscious cerebration 7which takes place in dreams1 in diseased brains and also in certain phases of healthy brains being1 as it were1 a by-play of their conscious activity7 need not be destitute of feeling4 ,any pain may be lessened when our attention is called away from it4 ,the nervous disorder remains the same1 the feeling substance of the nervous structures in which the pain was perceived also remains the same1 its activity and throbbing pulsations do not cease4 ,yet if we succeed in separating its immediate relation to the centre of consciousness it sinks down into subconsciousness4 ,there is no reason for assuming that the feeling1 no longer perceived1 is wiped out entirely4 ,while ,dr4 ,ziehen's pamphlet is a presentation of the results of positive science1 we were astonished to find in the first chapter the following statement3 8,later on we shall have to investigate whether there are for all psychical phenomena such material parallel processes in the central nervous system1 and our answer will be decidedly in the negative40 ,and again we find in the schedule of psychology a distinction between 7a7 psychical processes not contingent upon cerebral functions 7transcendental psychology71 and 7b7 psychical processes contingent upon cerebral functions 7physiological psychology74 ,these statements are the more perplexing as the author joins the opposition made by ,mnsterberg against ,professor ,wundt's idea of apperception1 which is rejected as metaphysical1 mystical1 and even animistic4 ,while we cannot in all points agree with ,professor ,wundt's theory of apperception1 which received a critical examination by ,professor ,delabarre 7see ,the ,monist ,,ii1 ,no4 #b1 p4 #big71 we can most positively say that ,dr4 ,ziehen in so far as he classes ,wundt's view among the dualistic theories1 misunderstands ,wundt's position4 ,wundt's physico-psychical parallelism cannot be identified with the metaphysical fiction of a subject1 be this subject called ego or soul4#ff ,wundt says in a late publication of his3 8,psychology of to-day1 since ,kant has shown the way1 seeks the nature of the soul again1 as did ,aristotle of yore1 in the facts of the spiritual life themselves and not in an unknowable #8thing in itself'44440 ,deutsche ,rundschau of #ahia1 p4 #bjc4 ,wundt's 8apperception0 is no metaphysical being1 but simply means the focus of perception1 the centre of consciousness4 ,wundt is certainly not infallible and we are inclined to believe that in some details he is mistaken4 ,he is nevertheless one of the very greatest leaders among the investigators of the soul and his monism as well as his antimetaphysical tendencies cannot be doubted4 ,ziehen reaches his monism by considering objective existence1 as it appears to us and which we call matter1 as 8something utterly unknowable40 ,he says1 8,the psychical series alone is given4444 ,thus the psycho-physical dualism or parallelism is apparent only4 ,considering that the psychical series alone is given1 we shall understand1 that we had repeatedly to face in our investigations such factors in which the material foundations are missing4 ,i here remind you of the projection of our sensations into space and time1 for which we could not find a psycho-physical explanation40 ,we hope that ,dr4 ,ziehen will soon find occasion to explain his philosophical views4 ,such an explanation may throw light on his psychological theory4 ,we do not as yet see how he can solve without inconsistency the many difficulties in which his philosophical standpoint will involve his psychology4 4 ,,psychologie ,,der ,,suggestion4 ,by ,dr4 ,hans ,schmidkunz4 ,stuttgart1 #ahib1--pp4 #dbe4 ,large #hvo4 ,the rapidly increasing devotion to the study of ,hypnotism has yielded many valuable results1 both practical and theoretical4 ,its application to the cure of disease--psychotherapeutics--has been most extensively introduced and bids fair to become the representative in scientific form of the germ of truth buried amongst the vast rubbish-heap of suspicious practices and pseudo-scientific 8isms40 ,new light has been thrown on the questions of responsibility and the legal aspects of slightly abnormal states4 ,education and ethics1 it has been more than hinted1 are to find practical aids in hypnotism2 while in the light of modern scientifically recognised phenomena1 many of the events influential in the development of religions find a rationalistic interpretation4 ,but the science which more than all others1 the study of hypnotism is destined to enrich1 is that of ,experimental ,psychology2 and it is this phase of the subject to which ,dr4 ,schmidkunz has devoted his volume4 ,the central core of the whole subject is the fact of suggestion1--a fact so comprehensive that it is almost easier to say what it is not than what it is4 ,if we make allowance for that portion of our conduct that is based upon individual acquisitions and proceeds by logically reasoned steps1 all the rest is more or less the result of suggestions1 of one kind or another4 ,to appreciate the psychology of this process it is necessary to appreciate its varieties and universality4 ,we receive suggestions from things and deeds2 the sight of food makes us hungry2 the sight of our neighbor consulting his watch induces a strong desire to know what time it is4 ,words are powerful implements of suggestion2 we accept those doctrines that we hear about us and are influenced much more frequently than we are convinced4 ,the personal factor in suggestion is important2 to some we feel attracted and accept as leaders1 while others excite repulsion and antagonism4 ,the indirectness of the process of suggestion is to be noted2 in most cases we are quite unconscious of the influences exerted upon us and by which our conduct is guided1 and this ignorance of the motives of our acts1 ,spinoza tells us1 is the cause of the illusion of free will4 ,sympathy1 imitation1 the contagion of masses1 the action of the mind upon the body1 the formation of public sentiment1--all exemplify the process of suggestion and add their testimony to its power and domain4 ,we must recognise1 too1 that our suggestibility is a variable phenomenon2 at some moments we are self-assertive and determined1 at others passive and readily following another's lead4 ,sometimes we take the reins in our own hands1 and again allow the vehicle to find its way as it will4 ,every night we pass into a condition in which conscious control is abandoned and logic gives way to suggestion4 ,a trifling illness1 a dose of medicine may increase our suggestibility1 and place us in a position allied to that of the hypnotic subject4 ,all this prepares the way for recognising as the distinctive characteristic of the hypnotic condition1 an exaggerated suggestibility4 ,not alone is there a ready yielding to every suggestion of the operator1 but functions normally not under volitional control may be appealed to and utilised by the slighter and subtler processes of hypnotic suggestion4 ,the variable threshold between the voluntary and the involuntary is shifted to a surprising extent4 ,that complex interrelation of centres with which the sense of personality is intimately connected yields to the same influences and makes possible an experimental study of this vexed problem4 ,this1 then1 is the ,psychology of ,suggestion1 the contribution that ,hypnotism makes to ,psychology4 ,it lays stress upon the great rle this process plays in every day mental life and thus asks us to see in hypnotism a condition closely allied to the normal1 and simply illustrating in an unusually striking way1 one great factor in our mental composition4 ,it rearranges the hierarchy of mental faculties and finds a more important place for suggestion than has been before accorded to it4 ,from a somewhat obscure and sporadic phenomenon occasionally entering into mental states1 it is raised to the dignity of one of the most frequent1 most important1 most fertile generalisations of scientific psychology4 ,whether one fully agrees with this position or not1 it is certainly a service to have it so comprehensively1 even if at times prolixly stated1 and to be assured that the study of ,psychology is deriving as much benefit from the researches in hypnotism as are the more practical sciences4 ,j4 ,j4 ,,hypnotisme1 ,,suggestion1 ,,psychotheropie4 tudes ,nouvelles par le ,dr4 ,bernheim1 ,professeur la ,facult de mdcine de ,nancy4 ,paris3 #ahia4 ,octave ,doin1 pp4 #eah4 ,the literature of the new science of ,hypnotism continues to increase with unabated pace2 most of the contributions consist of studies of a few cases or a brief exposition of a single point1 in most cases of points relative to the application of hypnotism to disease4 ,the present volume1 however1 is of special importance not alone because of the authority that ,dr4 ,bernheim's name brings with it1--but because of the comprehensiveness and the skill and interest of the exposition4 ,it is supplementary to ,dr4 ,bernheim's former volume1 8,suggestive ,psychotherapeutics10 7#ahhf-hg1 ,english translation1 #ahhi7 and reflects the progress that has resulted from continued and systematic observation4 ,the therapeutic interest in it naturally finds most complete representation and about half the volume is devoted to the description of cases cured or benefited by suggestive treatment4 ,although nervous complaints predominate in these well arranged and well described cases1 yet the method is shown applicable to all the ills that flesh is heir to4 ,while this portion of the volume will be of greatest interest to the medical world1 the psychologist will find most food for reflection in the first and more theoretical half of the book4 ,he will find there an interesting historical sketch illustrating how processes similar to those now studied as hypnotism have been in use from ancient times2 how all the various healers1 and the various processes and agencies used by them1 involve different modes of application of the one principle of suggestion4 8,it is the human imagination that works miracles40 ,suggestion is defined as the act by which an idea is introduced in the brain and accepted by it1 and thus many of the means by which one person influences another under every day1 normal circumstances would be included in the term4 ,hypnotism is simply one of the most important and efficient methods of producing a state of increased suggestibility4 ,in every day life we have abundant evidence of the tendency of ideas to be realised in actions2 with every change in thought and emotion there is associated some motor expression1 too subtle perhaps for analysis and description1 but still present and significant4 ,under excitement and nervous strain these motor accompaniments of thought are increased and serve as the basis of the muscle reader's skill4 ,again the possibility of disbelief and of recognising the illusory character of a sensation involve the control of higher directing powers2 the accumulated experience of the past passes sentence upon the new candidate4 ,if we imagine a condition in which this form of control is abolished1 we should have a subject accepting as real almost any idea or sensation that is suggested to him1 and expressing freely and unreservedly his acceptance of the same4 ,and this it is that hypnotism does4 ,it builds upon the natural credulity which it is the difficult task of reason to shape and control1 and brings into prominence the automatic1 subconscious phases of mental action4 ,it does not endow subjects with new faculties or deprive them of their individuality1 but shows in a strangely perverted perspective the various faculties and processes that go to build the endlessly complex elements of a personality4 ,this 8suggestion0 view of hypnotism is the contribution of the ,nancy ,school1 and is fast becoming the recognised view of science2 one will nowhere find a clearer and more convincing exposition of it than in ,dr4 ,bernheim's pages4 ,it is clearly impossible to summarise the various details that make up the body of the volume2 but all the important topics are discussed and result in conclusions unusually free as well from vagueness as from narrowness4 ,the processes inducing the state1 the proportion of susceptible individuals1 the various kinds and stages of hypnotism1 its relation to sleep and other normal states1 the rle of memory in hypnotism1 the interesting post-hypnotic1 negative and retroactive hallucinations1 its relation to hysteria1 its possible use in crime1--these are some of the chief topics treated4 ,the volume is a valuable contribution to the literature of the subject1 reflects its most recent acquisitions1 and would well merit a presentation in an ,english translation4 ,j4 ,j4 ,,handbook ,,of ,,psychology4 ,in two volumes2 ,senses and ,intellect1 and1 ,feeling and ,will4 ,by ,james ,mark ,baldwin1 ,m4 ,a41 ,ph4 ,d41 ,professor in the ,university of ,toronto4 ,new ,york3 ,henry ,holt ,co41 #ahia4 ,these are two books diligently worked out1 the former of #cdc1 the latter of #cig pp4 ,they cover almost the entire field of psychology excluding however the treatment of such abnormal states as are ,mental ,pathology and ,hypnotism4 ,the author is a disciple of ,dr4 ,mc,cosh1 and is strongly influenced by ,wundt1 of ,leipzig1 and ,rabier1 of ,paris2 yet he has developed an independent view of the nature of the soul which perhaps comes nearest to that of ,prof4 ,william ,james1 of ,harvard4 ,the two books are actually two parts of one work1 the one complementing the other4 ,the former however is not1 as the name suggests1 an exposition of the nature of the senses in their relation to or as the basis of the intellect2 it is an inquisition into consciousness1 sensation1 perception1 association1 imagination1 rational thought1 and kindred subjects4 ,the latter1 after an introduction of #ej pp41 characterising the mechanism of the nervous system1 treats of feeling as sensation1 as pleasure and pain1 as interest and belief1 as emotion1 and passes over to the subject of a motor consciousness1 or will1 ending in a chapter on volition4 ,professor ,baldwin states that 8after we enter consciousness we find a principle of apperception to which there is no analogy in physiological integration10 adding in a foot-note3 8,since the section of the #8,unity of ,composition' theory was written1 ,professor ,james has published an acute criticism in substantial agreement with it1 and the passage quoted makes reference to the sixth chapter of ,professor ,james's ,psychology in which he rejects the so-called #8mind-stuff1' theory1 declaring a self-compounding of mental facts to be inadmissible and proposes at last what he calls #8soul-theory4'0 ,professor ,james in this chapter commits the mistake indicated in the editorial of the last number of ,the ,monist 7p4 #bdh7 that he considers things as things in themselves and then looks for a relation producing principle4 ,he says3 8,in the parallelogram of forces1 the #8forces' themselves do not combine into the diagonal resultant2 a body is needed on which they may impinge1 to exhibit their resultant effect40 8,take a sentence of a dozen words1 and take twelve men and tell to each one word4 ,then stand the men in a row or jam them in a bunch1 and let each think of his word as intently as he will2 nowhere will there be a consciousness of the whole sentence40 ,thus ,professor ,w4 ,james is in need of what he calls a 8medium40 ,he says3 8,all the #8combinations' which we actually know are ,,effects1 wrought by the units said to be #8combined1' ,,upon ,,some ,,entity ,,other ,,than ,,themselves4 ,without this feature of a medium or vehicle1 the notion of combination has no sense40 ,we observe that feelings which originate through the impressions of the outer world upon some sentient organism1 enter into relations to each other1 as naturally as things are in relations1 or under certain circumstances will enter more closely into relations with each other4 ,the 8soul0 accordingly is postulated by ,professor ,james as a medium to combine the effects of the manifold brain processes in order to 8escape the absurdity of supposing feelings which exist separately and then #8fuse together' by themselves4 ,the separateness is in the brain-world1 on this theory1 and the unity in the soul world1 and the only trouble that remains to haunt us is the metaphysical one of understanding how one sort of world or existent thing can affect or influence another at all40 ,this is dualism and we suppose that ,professor ,james is conscious of it4 4 ,,untersuchungen ,,zur ,,physiologischen ,,morphologie ,,der ,,thiere4 ,,ii4 ,,organbildung ,,und ,,wachsthum4 ,by ,dr4 ,jacques ,loeb4 ,mit #b ,tafeln in ,lithographie und #i ,figuren im ,text4 ,wrzburg3 ,georg ,hertz4 #ahib4 ,dr4 ,jacques ,loeb formerly of ,zrich and lately returned from the ,zoological station at ,naples has been appointed ,professor at ,bryn ,mawr ,college1 ,pennsylvania4 ,former publications of his were reviewed in ,the ,monist ,i1 ,no4 #b1 p4 #cjj4 ,the present pamphlet is a continuance of his investigations in physiological morphology4 ,some of his experiments are made with ,antennularia antennina 7a hydroid polyp7 and the author describes how without mutilation1 simply by giving the creature a fixed position he succeeded in making it develop certain organs in certain places1 thus proving gravitation to be an important factor in determining the growth of certain limbs4 ,dr4 ,loeb adds a few articles on the dependence of the longitudinal growth and also of the regeneration of ,tubularia upon the concentration of the salt-water4 ,his experiments with ,ciona intestinalis 7a solitary ascidia7 prove that 7#a7 a section in the side of the oral orifice as well as of the anus will cause the formation of ocelli on the margin of the section1 7#b7 after an extirpation of the central nervous system the reflexes continue although with a higher threshold of the stimulus1 and 7#c7 the ciona is capable of developing the central nervous system again4 4 ,,das ,,dasein ,,als ,,lust1 ,,leid1 ,,und ,,liebe4 ,die altindische ,weltanschauung in neuzeitlicher ,darstellung4 ,ein ,beitrag zum ,darwinismus4 ,mit #b ,tondrucken1 #bd ,zeichnungen und #aj ,tabellen4 ,by ,dr4 ,hbbe-,schleiden4 ,braunschweig3 ,c4 ,a4 ,schwetschke ,sohn1 #ahia4 ,the author of this book is ,dr4 ,hbbe-,schleiden1 editor of ,the ,sphinx1 a monthly magazine published in ,germany which professes to 8lay down historically and experimentally the supersensible ,world-,conception upon a monistic basis40 ,love of ,mysticism is the main feature of ,the ,sphinx as well as ,dr4 ,hbbe-,schleiden's book4 ,the ,sphinx contains reports of cases of telepathy and is quite serious in investigating the spook of a haunted house4 ,the present book contains the author's confession of faith4 ,the symbols by which he depicts his world-conception reveal a cabalistic taste1 and we believe that the illustrations will be rather repugnant to the man of science1 as they give the impression of fantasticism4 ,the main idea of the book is to modernise the old ,hindoo view that 8,kama0 desire or ,lust is the ground of all being1 as is said in the ,brihad-,aranyaka ,upanishad 7,,iv1 #d1 #e73 8,man consists entirely of desire 7,kama72 as is his desire1 so is his will 7,kratu72 as is his will1 so is his life 7,karma1 i4 e41 activity72 as is his life1 so is his fate40 ,dr4 ,hbbe-,schleiden rejects the ,hindoo view of a migration of soul in so far as it suggests the idea of something personal2 he prefers to speak of a transformation of soul4 ,this1 he says1 has been and it may be called 8metaphysical ,darwinism01 and we must confess that the nucleus of the idea touches the most vital point of all the problems of life4 ,we cannot explain ethics and the ethical instinct of man without taking into consideration that man lives and aspires for something that will outlast his individual existence4 ,the author says3 8,why do you strive for something higher1 for perfection1 for completion or whatever your aim may be called8 ,why all that1 if you imagine that your individuality has only this one life upon earth and you can realise only a very small part of what you strive for8 ,why all your trouble1 if the main thing is in vain80 ,we agree with the author that our moral instinct1 our ideals and aspirations which are most powerful realities in life point to a life beyond the grave1 they indicate that death is no finality and evolution teaches us that our souls actually continue to exist4 ,our souls in their individual features are parts only of the whole evolution of our race and these very individual features of our souls can be and will be preserved in the future generations4 ,dr4 ,hbbe-,schleiden's book is characteristic of a strange tendency of our time to combine the results of modern science with the old notions of occultism4 ,there is in it a psychological and ethical truth overgrown with a fanciful imagination4 4 ,,max ,m,,ller ,,and ,,the ,,science ,,of ,,language4 ,a ,criticism4 ,by ,william ,dwight ,whitney1 ,professor in ,yale ,university4 ,new ,york3 ,d4 ,appleton and ,company4 #ahib4 ,the ,professors ,w4 ,d4 ,whitney and ,f4 ,max ,mller are not on good terms4 ,they do not only disagree on several fundamental and many minor points1 concerning the science of language1 but their warfare1 as is well known1 is at the same time of a personal nature4 ,the present little volume is a criticism of the new edition of ,max ,mller's 8,science of ,language40 ,the great ,yale philologist recognising that this work of his antagonistic ,oxford colleague 8is still the principal and most authoritative text-book of that study10 and noting that 8its author has gained no new light from the criticisms that have been made upon his work10 feels called upon to warn the reader that 8it may not be trusted where it is untrustworthy and so do harm to the science which it was intended to help40 ,the title of the book1 according to ,professor ,whitney1 ought to be 8,facts and ,fancies in ,regard to ,language and ,other ,related ,subjects40 ,schleicher says3 8,languages are natural organisms which1 without being determinable by the will of man1 grew and developed themselves in accordance with fixed laws4444 ,its method is on the whole and in general the same with that of the other natural sciences40 ,professor ,whitney censures ,max ,mller for calling the first part of ,schleicher's proposition 8sheer mythology10 and then adopting the inference made therefrom considering the science of language as a physical science4 ,now it is true that the expression 8organism0 must not be taken literally2 languages are not animals or plants1 but they have some quality that is comparable to animals and plants4 ,their life and the development of their life is in many respects analogous to the life of organisms4 ,professor ,whitney regards language as 8a body of conventional signs for ideas0 and protests against ,prof4 ,max ,mller's usage of the word 8conventional0 as if it implied 8a convention of people gathered to discuss and decide on the words and forms by which conceptions should be represented40 ,in contradistinction to ,max ,mller who holds that philology is a physical science1 ,professor ,whitney regards it as an historical science4 8,physical science10 says ,max ,mller1 8deals with the works of ,god1 historical science with the works of man40 ,thus optics is a physical science1 painting an historical science4 ,whitney declares that individuals initiate changes and the community either accepts and uses them1 making them language by its use or rejects and annuls them by refusing to use them4 ,in one word ,max ,mller says language is 1 a product of nature1 and ,whitney says it is 1 an institution of man4 ,we believe that ,professor ,whitney stands almost alone in his conception of language4 ,another no less important point is ,professor ,whitney's objection to ,prof4 ,max ,mller's proposition of the ,identity of ,language and ,thought4 ,here ,professor ,whitney will find many supporters for his case2 but we must add that ,prof4 ,max ,mller does not exactly mean what he says4 ,he means by identity inseparableness4 ,it is not so much ,max ,mller's position that should be attacked as his misleading terminology4 ,concerning the origin of language ,professor ,whitney finds an instructive parallel in the beginnings of writing which were mutually intelligible signs1 or in the written language of mathematics4 8,so we do no longer see10 he says1 8the two and three strokes in our figures #b and #c1 although they are really there disguised from view40 ,this is a good simile1 and undoubtedly cum grano salis true4 ,but it is rather strange that ,professor ,whitney should find ,noir's theory of the origin of language 8utterly fantastic40 ,these are fundamental differences4 ,there are some more1 less important points such as the etymology of king being the ,sanskrit janaka4 ,max ,mller proposes a very improbable reason for the change of meaning in the ,lat4 fagus1 ,o4 ,germ4 boka 7beech71 ,greek phegos1 ,lat4 quercus1 and ,germ4 foraha 7fir74 ,professor ,whitney might have mentioned that a more probable reason for this change has been proposed of late by those who seek the home of the ,aryans in ,europe4 ,a migrating people would naturally have called in their old home the beech1 in their new the oak 8a tree with edible fruit40 ,the same method is applicable to explain the change of meaning in forah-a-quercus which means in northern countries a fir and in ,italy an oak4 ,professor ,whitney sums up his case as follows 7p4 #gg73 he finds 8language study 444 declared on transparently false grounds1 to be a physical science1 and language an existence which man had no part in making and changing2 dialectic growth misunderstood1 families of language regarded as exceptional1 and a #8,turanian' barathrum arranged to catch all little-known varieties of speech2 antecedent unity of dialect taught in one case and denied in another2 a word held to be killed by the least mispronunciation2 conventional explained to mean #8voted by a convention'2 thought and its expression viewed as inseparable1 and even identical2 the origin of language seemingly ascribed to an instinctive ding-dong of the tongue--and so on2 to complete the list would be almost to give a table of principal contents of the two volumes--and a style of discussion used throughout which indicated that the author was playing with his subject rather than investigating it seriously4444 ,the book is not science1 but literature4 ,taken as literature1 it is of high rank1 as the admiration of the public sufficiently testifies2 its author has a special gift for interesting statement and illustration1 for lending a charm to the subjects he discusses2 and he carries captive the judgments of his hearers and of many of his readers4 ,he is a born littrateur40 ,professor ,whitney concludes3 8,now as heretofore1 ,i rest my defense on not the just intent alone1 but the real substantial justice of my criticisms2 if they are unfounded1 ,i deserve reprehension for making them2 if they are right1 then there is nothing1 either in the degree of importance of the subjects to which they relate1 or in the personality against whom they are directed1 to call for their condemnation40 4 ,,seifenblasen4 ,moderne ,mrchen4 ,by ,kurd ,lasswitz4 ,hamburg and ,leipsic3 ,leopold ,voss4 #ahij4 8,mrchen10 in the province of science1 we are inclined to believe are a prize problem for our modern poets4 ,who will solve it8 ,kurd ,lasswitz has made an attempt and considering the great difficulty of the problem1 we are not inclined to criticise him4 ,the author1 who has worked in scientific fields and has proved his ability as a close student1 exhibits in these 8soap-bubbles0 a fertile imagination and poetic invention4 ,most of his sketches fall short of the ideal mrchen of science as we conceive it1 but their reading is suggestive and deserves the attention of those whose disposition favors the creation of a middle ground between science and poetry4 4 ,,footnotes3 #ff ,ziehen declares 7p4 #abi7 that the problem of physiological psychology consists in reducing the different forms of thinking up to the most complex argumentation to simple associations of ideas and its laws4 ,wundt says1 that there are many psychical idea-combinations which cannot be explained simply by association of ideas4 ,so1 ,ziehen continues 7p4 #acj71 ,wundt assumes above idea associations a special faculty of the soul called apperception1 which serves now as attention1 now as will1 but is in either case a metaphysical faculty of the soul1 the active subject which independent of mechanical causality is said to be the cause of these phenomena4--,i do not think that anyone who knows ,wundt will accept this as a fair representation of his views4 ,,periodicals4 ,,revue ,,philosophique4 ,,contents3 ,december1 #ahia4 ,no4 #aib ,,un ,,probl,,me ,d',,acoustique ,,psychologique4 ,by ,l4 ,dauriac4 ,,les ,,origines ,,de ,,notre ,,structure ,,intellectuelle ,,et ,c,r,,brale4 ,,ii4 ,l',,volutionnisme4 ,by ,a4 ,fouille4 ,l,,onard ,,de ,,vinci ,,artiste ,,et ,,savant4 ,by ,g4 ,sailles4 ,,sur ,,les ,,dessins ,d',,enfants4 ,by ,j4 ,passy4 ,,sur ,,un ,,cas ,d',,inhibition ,,psychique4 ,by ,a4 ,binet4 ,,contents3 ,january1 #ahib4 ,no4 #aic4 ,,le ,,probl,,me ,,de ,,la ,,vie4 ,by ,dunan4 ,,la ,,maladie ,,du ,,pessimisme4 ,by ,b4 ,prez4 ,,philosophes ,,espagnols ,,de ,,cuba3 ,f4 ,,varela1 ,j4 ,,de ,,la ,,luz4 ,by ,j4-,m4 ,guardia4 ,,vari,t,s3 ,,le ,,probl,,me ,d',,achille4 ,by ,j4 ,mouret4 ,,contents3 ,february1 #ahib4 ,no4 #aid4 ,,les ,,mouvements ,,de ,,man,,ge ,,chez ,,les ,,insectes4 ,by ,a4 ,binet4 ,,le ,,probl,,me ,,de ,,la ,,vie 7#bnd article74 ,by ,dunan4 ,,philosophes ,,espagnols ,,de ,,cuba 7concluded74 ,j4-,m4 ,guardia4 ,,revue ,g,n,,rale3 ,,justice ,,et ,,socialisme1 ,d',,apr,s ,,les ,,publications ,r,,centes4 ,by ,belot4 ,one of the problems of the unique and great work of ,carl ,stumpf's 8,tonpsychologie0 is the subject of ,l4 ,dauriac's essay4 ,the question is when several sounds enter the ear at the same time1 the plurality of which is not directly known1 do you have your information through an inner sense8 ,does every unit of the irritation correspond to a distinct unit of sensation8 ,is there in consciousness a simultaneousness of sensations similarly as outside of consciousness there is a simultaneousness of vibrations8 ,m4 ,dauriac maintains that ,stumpf's question can be answered only on the ground of metaphysical postulates1 and if preconceived solutions are to be excluded1 it must be considered as insoluble4 ,alfred ,fouille1 in his second article on the origin of our intellectual and cerebral structure1 which treats on evolutionism1 comes to the conclusion that the hypothesis which in the most simple way explains the agreement of thoughts and objects is the doctrine of a radical unity generally called ,monism4 ,j4 ,passy notes certain characteristic and psychologically interesting features of the drawings of children4 ,m4 ,a4 ,binet presents two physiognomical pictures of the same face1 one representing disgust or scorn1 the other a good-humored and happy smile4 ,the upper parts of both faces are exactly alike and yet the eyes of the former look disdainful while the very same eyes of the latter are full of jest and merriment4 ,this is the fact4 ,m4 ,binet psychologically interprets the fact as a phenomenon of automatic inhibition4 ,the fact is interesting1 but its interpretation seems doubtful4 ,charles ,dunan discusses the metaphysical aspect of the problem of life4 ,b4 ,prez's article is a contribution to pathological psychology with special reference to ,m4 ,magalhes's work on the subject4 ,pessimism1 ,m4 ,prez says1 is a disease only if exaggerated1 yet he believes that medico-psychological studies which consider the relation between the physical system and morality are very helpful even if carried too far4 ,m4 ,j4-,m4 ,guardia's article will have a special interest for ,americans4 ,three men arose in ,spain of late1 ,valentin ,almirall1 ,m4 ,l4 ,mallada1 and ,j4-,m4 ,escudor1 who spoke bold and hard words of truth to their country4 ,cuba is the hen that lays golden eggs for ,spain1 but the ,cubans are treated with great contempt in ,spain2 and yet the ,spaniards are by no means their intellectual superiors1 for while ,spain is poor in philosophy1 ,cuba is the only country of ,latin ,america where philosophy has taken root4 ,m4 ,guardia sketches in the first article the history and philosophy of ,don ,flix ,varlay y ,morals who is the harbinger of the other ,spanish-,cuban philosopher1 ,jos de la ,luz4 ,the second article in the ,february number treats of the latter 7#ahjj-ahfb7 whom ,guardia calls the master4 ,george ,mouret with reference to ,frontera's book on ,zeno's argument against motion makes a few remarks concerning the ,eleatic sophism about ,achilles and the tortoise4 ,an injury of a thalamus opticus produces in horses and other animals the effect of their making rotatory movements when intending to walk straight on4 ,forel proved that a similar effect is produced in ants by a lesion of one of their lobes4 ,m4 ,binet publishes in the present essay his experiments on certain water-beetles1 exhibiting diagrams of their normal and abnormal walk4 7,paris3 ,flix ,alcan47 4 ,,zeitschrift ,,fur ,,psychologie ,,und ,,physiologie ,,der ,,sinnesorgane4 ,vols4 ,,ii and ,,iii4 ,,contents3 ,november1 #ahia4 ,no4 #f4 ,,ueber ,,br,,ckes ,,theorie ,,des ,k,,rperlichen ,,sehens4 ,by ,dr4 ,c4 du ,bois-,reymond4 ,,mein ,,schlusswort ,,gegen ,,wundt4 ,by ,c4 ,stumpf4 ,,erwiderung4 ,by ,o4 ,flgel4 ,,litteraturbericht4 ,,contents3 ,december1 #ahia4 ,no4 #a4 ,,versuch1 ,,das ,,psychophysische ,,gesetz ,,auf ,,die ,,farbenunterschiede ,,trichromatischer ,,augen ,,anzuwenden4 ,by ,h4 v4 ,helmholtz4 ,,untersuchungen ,,ber ,,binokulares ,,sehen ,,mit ,,anwendung ,,des ,,heringschen ,,fallversuchs4 ,by ,dr4 ,richard ,greeff4 ,,bemerkungen ,,zu ,,dem ,,aufsatze ,,von ,,dr4 ,,sommer 8,,zur ,,psychologie ,,der ,,sprache40 ,by ,prof4 ,a4 ,pick4 ,,litteraturbericht4 ,dr4 ,c4 du ,bois-,reymond believes that corporeal vision is either produced by one eye running in succession over several places or two eyes viewing two aspects of the object4 ,mach's theory of the influence of shade upon the production of the third dimension in vision which affords quite a new and a better explanation of the phenomenon is not mentioned4 ,stumpf closes his controversy with ,wundt with a few remarks in answer to ,wundt's reply 7in ,philos4 ,studien ,,vii1 pp4 #bih-cbg72 and ,flgel objects to ,professor ,rehmke's proposition made in a criticism of ,flgel's book 8,die ,seelenfrage10 that ,herbart's psychology1 being atomism1 is at bottom materialism4 ,dr4 ,richard ,greeff describes ,hering's apparatus for investigating the cause of binocular vision4 ,wheatstone believes that the perspective of the two retina pictures produces the effect of corporeality while ,brcke declares that it is mainly due to muscle-sensations4 ,hering sides with ,wheatstone1 and the experiments as described by ,greeff prove that the third dimension is unfailingly perceived whenever the ocular axes diverge1 while in other cases the same result is not attained4 ,dr4 ,sommer had presented in a former article the facts of an interesting case of aphasia1 7see ,the ,monist1 ,vol4 ,i1 ,no4 #d1 p4 #fbi7 where the patient1 his name is ,voit1 could remember and pronounce words only when writing them4 ,prof4 ,a4 ,pick objects to ,dr4 ,sommer's regarding the case as contrary to our present experience and following two ,french authorities ,ballet and ,bernard1 adduces cases of ,aphasia by right-sided hemiphlegia where patients could read only when they were able to write or represent to themselves the writing motions of their hand4 ,thus one patient of ,charcot could only read print1 and not written words 8because10 as he said1 8it was easier for him to reproduce in his mind the written letter40 ,this reminds one of the case a deaf-mute who said3 8,i feel whenever ,i think of the motions of my fingers although they are perfectly at rest4 ,i see internally an image of my moving fingers40 ,professor ,pick concludes that the case ,voit is a good argument against ,max ,mller's proposition of the identity of language and thought4 ,max ,mller however includes in his conception of word any symbol of an idea4 ,the finger motion of a deaf-mute is a word1 and the writing motion of ,voit is also a word1 according to ,professor ,max ,mller's theory4 ,prof4 ,h4 v4 ,helmholtz publishes the tables of his experiments in applying the psycho-physical law upon color differences of trichromatic eyes1 and presents the three fundamental colors diagrammatically in an equilateral triangle in the centre of which lies white4 ,a curve winding round this centre shows the relation of the rainbow spectrum in the system of three fundamental colors4 ,the results do not as yet agree with the investigations of ,a4 ,knig and ,c4 ,diterici who make similar inquiries with bichromatic eyes4 7,leipsic3 ,o4 ,r4 ,reisland47 4 ,,vierteljahrsschrift ,f,r ,,wissenschaftliche ,,philosophie4 ,vol4 ,,xvi4 ,no4 #a4 ,,contents3 ,,beitr,,ge ,,zur ,,logik4 7,erster ,artikel47 ,by ,a4 ,riehl4 ,,die ,,dimensionen ,,der ,,wahrscheinlichkeit ,,und ,,die ,,evidenz ,,der ,,ungewissheit4 ,by ,ad4 ,nitsche4 ,,ueber ,,die ,,fortschreitende ,,entwicklung ,,des ,,menschengeschlechts4 ,,ii4 ,by ,f4 ,rosenberger4 ,,ernst ,,platner',s ,,wissenschaftliche ,,stellung ,,zu ,,kant ,,in ,,erkenntnisstheorie ,,und ,,moralphilosophie4 ,i4 ,by ,b4 ,seligkowitz4 ,,ueber ,,sprachreflex1 ,,nativismus ,,und ,,absichtliche ,,sprachbildung4 ,x4 ,by ,a4 ,marty4 ,prof4 ,a4 ,riehl begins in this number a series of articles on logic4 ,the first two chapters are 7#a7 concepts and definitions4 ,riehl distinguishes between a definition and a predicating sentence 7,aussage71 for instance1 8,space has three dimensions10 is a mere definition1 but 8,space is the form of our intuition10 is an ,aussage4 7#b7 ,conceptual sentences and judgments4 ,the former are merely representative and cannot as the latter be said to combine or separate ideas4 ,ad4 ,nitsche criticises ,johannes v4 ,kries's idea that the calculus of probabilities is admissible only if the chances are equivalent4 ,equivalent ,chances 7gleiche ,spielrume71 he objects1 are apparently impossible1 yet he admits that upon the degree of a knowledge of the conditions will depend the reliability of the probability4 ,the ,object of ,b4 ,seligkowitz's article is to rescue from oblivion a philosopher who especially as a critic of ,kant deserves to be better known than he is1 ,ernst ,platner 7#agdd-ahah47 ,the tenth and concluding article of ,a4 ,marty on the origin of language reviews ,paul ,regnaud's work ,origine et philosophie du langage4 7,leipsic3 ,o4 ,r4 ,reisland47 4 ,,the ,,american ,,journal ,,of ,,psychology4 ,december1 #ahia4 ,vol4 ,,iv4 ,no4 #b4 ,,contents3 ,a ,,sketch ,,of ,,the ,,history ,,of ,,psychology ,,among ,,the ,,greeks4 ,by ,charles ,a4 ,strong4 ,,studies ,,from ,,the ,,laboratory ,,of ,,experimental ,,psychology ,,of ,,the ,,university ,,of ,,wisconsin4 ,by ,prof4 ,joseph ,jastrow1 ,ph4 ,d4 ,,the ,,size ,,of ,,several ,,cranial ,,nerves ,,in ,,man ,,as ,,indicated ,,by ,,the ,,areas ,,of ,,their ,,cross-,,sections4 ,by ,henry ,h4 ,donaldson1 ,ph4 ,d4 ,,visualisation ,,as ,a ,,chief ,,source ,,of ,,the ,,psychology ,,of ,,hobbes1 ,,locke1 ,,berkeley1 ,,and ,,hume4 ,by ,alexander ,fraser1 ,b4 ,a4 ,,anatomical ,,observations ,,on ,,the ,,brain ,,and ,,several ,,sense-,,organs ,,of ,,the ,,blind ,,deaf-,,mute1 ,,laura ,,dewey ,,bridgman4 ,,ii4 ,by ,henry ,h4 ,donaldson1 ,ph4 ,d4 ,,psychological ,,literature4 ,i4 ,nervous ,system4 ,by ,prof4 ,h4 ,h4 ,donaldson4 ,a ,,laboratory ,,course ,,in ,,physiological ,,psychology4 ,,ii4 ,by ,e4 ,c4 ,sanford4 ,,psychiatry4 ,,psychoses ,,following ,,acute ,,surgical ,,and ,,mental ,,affections ,,and ,,in ,,multiple ,,neuritis4 ,by ,william ,noyes1 ,m4 ,d4 ,the post mortem examination of ,laura ,bridgman shows a brain in which the olfactory bulbs and nerves1 the optic nerves1 the auditory nerves1 and possibly the glossopharyngeal1 had all been more or less destroyed at their peripheral ends4 ,this destruction caused a degeneration--most marked in the optic nerves--which extended towards the centres and involved them indirectly4444 ,this case represents a maximum loss in these defective senses with a minimum amount of central disturbance1 thus offering the very best sort of opportunity for education by way of the surviving senses4444 ,mental association was for ,laura ,bridgman limited to various phases of the dermal sensations and the minor and imperfect senses of taste and smell4444 ,the motor centre there had lost some1 but not all its associative connections4 7,clark ,university1 ,worcester1 ,mass47 4 ,,international ,,journal ,,of ,,ethics4 ,january1 #ahib4 ,vol4 ,,ii4 ,,no4 #b4 ,,contents3 ,,the ,,ethical ,,aspects ,,of ,,the ,,papal ,,encyclical4 ,by ,brother ,azarias4 ,,the ,,three ,,religions4 ,by ,j4 ,s4 ,mackenzie1 ,m4 ,a4 ,,the ,,ethics ,,of ,,hegel4 ,by ,rev4 ,j4 ,macbride ,sterrett4 ,a ,,palm ,,of ,,peace ,,from ,,german ,,soil4 ,by ,fanny ,hertz4 ,,authority ,,in ,,the ,,sphere ,,of ,,conduct ,,and ,,intellect4 ,by ,prof4 ,h4 ,nettleship1 ,oxford4 ,,discussions ,,and ,,reviews4 ,brother ,azarias paraphrases and praises the ethics of the ,papal ,encyclical4 ,j4 ,s4 ,mackenzie starts from ,kant's famous remarks that two things fill our minds with reverence1 the starry1 heavens above and the moral law within4 ,the worship of these two separately and the worship of them in combination are set forth as the three great religions of the world4 ,fanny ,hertz pleads for the abolishment of war4 ,she quotes largely from ,bertha ,suttner's novel1 8,die ,waffen nieder10 and from ,friederich's letters4 ,authority1 according to ,professor ,nettleship1 is 8the power which in the sphere of conduct1 in the long run determines our practice and in the sphere of intellect in the long run determines our assent40 ,there are roughly speaking four kinds of authority3 7#a7 the authority of law1 7#b7 the authority of religious bodies1 7#c7 the authority of society or public opinion and 7#d7 the authority of great men4 ,where is the seat of authority8 8,for each individual10 ,professor ,nettleship maintains1 8the absolute guide can1 in the long run be no other than his own conscience40 ,the origin of conscience and the criterion whether the voice of conscience be true or not are not explained4 7,philadelphia3 ,international ,journal of ,ethics1 #aah ,s4 ,twelfth ,street47 4 ,,mind4 ,new ,series4 ,no4 #a4 ,january1 #ahib4 ,,contents3 ,,prefatory ,,remarks4 ,the ,editor4 ,,the ,,logical ,,calculus4 7#a7 ,general ,principles4 ,by ,w4 ,e4 ,johnson4 ,,the ,,idea ,,of ,,value4 ,by ,s4 ,alexander4 ,,the ,,changes ,,of ,,method ,,in ,,hegel',s ,,dialectic4 7#a7 ,by ,j4 ,ellis ,mc,taggart4 ,,the ,,law ,,of ,,psychogenesis4 ,by ,prof4 ,c4 ,lloyd ,morgan4 ,,discussions3 ,the ,feeling-,tone of ,desire and ,aversion4 ,by ,prof4 ,h4 ,sidgwick4 ,sur la ,distinction entre les ,lois ou ,axiomes et les ,notions4 ,by ,george ,mouret4 ,,critical ,,notices4 ,w4 ,e4 ,johnson says3 8,as a material machine is an instrument for economising the exertion of force1 so a symbolic calculus is an instrument for economising the exertion of intelligence4 ,and1 employing the same analogy1 the more perfect the calculus1 the smaller would be the amount of intelligence applied as compared with the results produced40 ,he continues3 8,but as the exertion of some force is necessary for working the machine1 so the exertion of some intelligence is necessary for working the calculus40 ,here we feel inclined to stop our author4 ,that which makes of a certain amount of metal1 brass1 and wood a machine1 is the form in which they are composed1 and this form is instrumental in using a certain amount of energy for doing a certain kind of work4 ,intelligence is not analogous to force but to the form of force4 ,not intelligence is necessary to run the instrument of intelligence1 but some power1 some force1 some energy1 and this power needed for running the instrument of intelligence1 as it exists in man1 is generally called will4 ,so we are at variance with ,mr4 ,w4 ,s4 ,johnson from the outset4 ,mr4 ,johnson from his standpoint considers it 8important to examine the kind and degree of intelligence that are demanded in the employment of any symbolic calculus4 ,it will appear that the logical calculus stands in a unique relation to intelligence2 for it aims at exhibiting1 in a non-intelligent form1 those same intelligent principles that are actually required for working it40 ,we abstain here from discussing the details of this highly suggestive article which contains much that is of interest to logicians4 ,the author claims especially with regard to his interpretation of the universal and particular that his results exactly correspond with the interpretation given by ,dr4 ,venn and ,mr4 ,peirce1 and worked out by ,dr4 ,keynes4 ,the ,germans distinguish between ,urtheil and ,beurtheilung1 the first being judgment in general1 the latter a judgment that declares something to possess value from the view of truth1 beauty or goodness4 ,in this sense ,mr4 ,s4 ,alexander deals with the idea of value4 ,he states two main principles4 7#a7 ,that value is 8the efficiency of a conscious agent to promote the efficiency of society0 and this1 the author says1 was maintained indirectly in opposition to the view that value was determined by pleasure4 7#b7 ,that value is itself no something separable from other mental facts by a wide gulf1 but was itself a fact of a purely natural order4 8,sollen0 is one kind of 8,sein40 ,mr4 ,j4 ,ellis ,mc,taggart in discussing the changes of method in ,hegel's ,dialectic arrives at a conclusion which according to the author must be admitted to be quite un-,hegelian4 ,hegel apparently regarded the procession of the categories with its advance through oppositions and reconciliations as presenting absolute truth4 ,from this the author dissents1 8for10 he says3 8the true process of thought is one in which each category springs out of the one before it1 and not by contradicting it1 but as the expression of its deepest nature1 while it1 in its turn1 is seen to have its deepest reality in again passing on to the one after it4 ,there is no contradiction no opposition1 and consequently no reconciliation4 ,there is only development1 the rendering explicit what was implicit1 the growth of the seed to the plant4 ,in the actual course of the dialectic this is never attained4 ,it is an ideal which is never quite realised1 and from the nature of the case never can be quite realised4 ,in the dialectic there is always opposition1 and therefore always reconciliation4 ,we do not go straight onward1 but more or less from side to side4 ,it seems inevitable1 therefore1 to conclude that the dialectic does not completely and perfectly express the nature of thought40 ,prof4 ,c4 ,lloyd ,morgan starting from the proposition that 8the business of consciousness is the control of action0 shows that 8we identify ourselves rather with the action of our control centres than with our lower animal instincts4 ,through experience we learn1 and habits being formed by individual repetition become innate40 ,professor ,morgan reviews use-inheritance natural selection1 sexual selection1 the law of beauty1 and conduct and verification with regard to psychogenesis4 8,our nature10 he says1 8is intellectual1 sthetic1 moral1 and sensitive03 8,the false is rejected as incongruous to our nature as intellectual2 the ugly is avoided as incongruous to our nature as sthetic2 the wrong is shunned as incongruous to our nature as moral2 so is the painful1 so far as possible1 avoided as incongruous to our nature as sensitive4444 ,the guidance of pleasure and pain is of great importance--so great that some are found to argue that in moral matters we are influenced solely by considerations of happiness4444 ,only by extending the meaning of the words pleasure and pain so as to be coextensive with what ,i have here termed congruous and incongruous can it be said that our actions and our thoughts are determined by pleasure and pain40 7,london3 ,williams ,norgate47 4 ,,the ,,philosophical ,,review4 ,vol4 ,i1 ,no4 #a4 ,january1 #ahib4 ,,contents of ,no4 #a4 ,,prefatory ,,note4 ,,the ,,critical ,,philosophy ,,and ,,idealism4 ,by ,prof4 ,john ,watson4 ,,psychology ,,as ,,so-,,called 8,,natural ,,science40 ,by ,prof4 ,george ,t4 ,ladd4 ,,on ,,some ,,psychological ,,aspects ,,of ,,the ,,chinese ,,musical ,,system4 ,by ,benj4 ,ives ,gilman4 ,,reviews ,,of ,,books ,,and ,,summaries ,,of ,,articles4 ,,contents of ,no4 #b3 ,,psychology1 ,,epistemology1 ,,and ,,metaphysics4 ,by ,prof4 ,andrew ,seth4 ,a ,,plea ,,for ,,psychology ,,as ,a 8,,natural ,,science40 ,by ,prof4 ,william ,james4 ,,on ,,some ,,psychological ,,aspects ,,of ,,the ,,chinese ,,musical ,,system4 ,,ii4 ,by ,benj4 ,ives ,gilman4 ,,discussions3 ,dr4 ,mnsterberg's ,theory of ,mind and ,body and its ,consequences4 ,by ,charles ,a4 ,strong4 ,,reviews ,,of ,,books ,,and ,,summaries ,,of ,,articles4 ,this is a new magazine which will be an additional proof that the philosophical interest in ,america is by no means so poor as the inhabitants of the old world generally suppose it to be4 ,the character of the journal1 it is to be expected1 will be in harmony with the publications of its scholarly editor1 ,prof4 ,j4 ,g4 ,schurmann1 whose position is clearly set forth in a little volume of his 8,belief in ,god10 in which he conceives ,god in three ways 7#a7 as the cause or ground of the world 7#b7 as the realising purpose of the world1 and 7#c7 as the father of spirits4 ,professor ,watson reviews in an elaborate article ,edward ,caird's work 8,the ,critical ,philosophy of ,emanuel ,kant40 8,the philosophy of ,kant10 says ,watson1 8was accepted at first by submissive disciples1 but it had afterwards to submit to a severe process of criticism which culminated in the ,absolute ,idealism of ,hegel4 ,the synthesis of ,kant1 as based upon an untenable opposition of the phenomenal and the real1 was weighed and found wanting4444 ,we must be grateful to any one who helps us1 not merely to see ,kant1 but to see beyond him4 ,this is the task which ,professor ,caird1 in his exhaustive work on the ,critical ,philosophy1 has set himself to perform10 and adds ,watson1 8he has done it in a way that leaves nothing to be desired40 ,professor ,ladd criticises ,professor ,james's ,psychology as so-called natural science4 8,what we wish to have in the name of cerebral psychology1 is a description1 in terms of a comprehensible theory of molecular physics2 and1 also1 a statement of the formul which define the relations between the molecular changes and the #8corresponding' orders of mental phenomena4 ,but this is precisely what ,professor ,james avoids doing1 even to the extent which so-called #8nerve-physiology' makes possible4 ,and1 nothing worthy of the name #8science' is possible for any one in this branch of cerebral psycho-physics40 ,professor ,james replies to the criticism in the second number of ,the ,philosophical ,review4 ,he says3 8,psychology is to-day hardly more than what physics was before ,galileo1 what chemistry was before ,lavoisier4 ,it is a mass of phenomenal description1 gossip1 and myth1 including1 however1 real material enough to justify one in the hope that its study may become worthy of the name of natural science at no very distant day4 ,i wished1 by treating ,psychology like a natural science1 to help her to become one40 ,professor ,ladd is a transcendentalist and ,professor ,james has great expectations of the work inaugurated by the ,society for ,psychical ,research4 ,theoretically they stand much nearer than practically1 as well indicated by ,professor ,james's remark3 8,in ,professor ,ladd's own book on #8,physiological ,psychology1' that #8real being1 proceeding to unfold powers that are sui generis1 according to laws of its own1' for whose recognition he contends1 plays no organic part in the work1 and has proved a mere stumbling block to his biological reviewers40 ,he adds in a foot-note3 8,i mean that such a being is quite barren of particular consequences4 ,its character is only known by its reactions on the signals which the nervous system gives1 and these must be gathered by observation after the fact4 ,if only it were subject to successive reincarnations1 as the theosophists say it is1 so that we might guess what sort of a body it would unite with next1 or what sort of persons it had helped to constitute previously1 those would be great points gained4 ,but even those gains are denied us2 and the real being is1 for practical purposes1 an entire superfluity1 which a practical psychology can perfectly well do without40 ,andrew ,seth1 the well-known coryphus of philosophy and psychology at ,edinburgh1 presses the importance of distinguishing the different standpoints of psychology1 epistemology1 and metaphysics4 ,locke1 ,berkeley1 ,hume and other ,english as well as ,continental thinkers 8speak sometimes from one point of view1 sometimes from the other without being aware that the two points of view are different40 8,psychology1 assuming the existence of a subject or medium of consciousness1 seeks to explain1 mainly by the help of association or processes practically similar1 how out of the come-and-go of conscious states1 there are evolved such subjective facts as perceptions1 the belief in an independent real world1 and the idea of the ,ego or subject himself4444 ,metaphysics has to do with the ultimate nature of the reality which reveals itself alike in the consciousness which knows and the world which is known4444 ,the epistemological thing-in-itself to be identified with the metaphysical essence4444 ,the problem of knowledge and the ,real1 is the question which ,epistemology has to face40 7,boston1 ,new ,york1 ,chicago3 ,ginn ,co47 4 ,,voprosui ,,filosofii ,i ,,psichologii4#fg ,vol4 ,,iii4 ,no4 #aa4 ,january1 #ahib4 ,,contents3 ,,positive ,,philosophy ,,and ,,the ,,unity ,,of ,,science4 ,part ,v4 ,sociology4 ,by ,b4 ,tchitcherin4 ,,count ,,giacomo ,,leopardi ,,and ,,his ,,pessimism4 ,part ,,iv4 ,continued from ,no4 #aj of this review4 7,conclusion47 ,by ,v4 ,stein4 ,,an ,,historical ,,sketch ,,of ,,the ,,conceptions ,,of ,,nature4 7,conclusion47 ,by ,m4 ,menzhir4 ,j4 ,v4 ,,kiryebskii ,,and ,,the ,,origin ,,of ,,muscovite ,,slavophilism4 ,public lecture delivered ,november #bj1 #ahia1 for the benefit of the rural districts suffering from the bad harvests4 ,by ,paul ,vinogradoff4 ,,fouill ,,and ,,the ,,metaphysics ,,of ,,the ,,future4 ,part ,,iii4 ,general estimate of ,fouill's views4 ,continued from ,no4 #aj of this review4 7,conclusion7 ,by ,aleksei ,vnedenskii4 ,,telepathy4 ,to be concluded in the next number4 ,by ,m4 ,petrovo-,solovo4 ,this is a review of the publications of and the work done by the ,society for ,psychical ,research in ,england4 ,,special ,,part3 7#a7 ,wundt's ,system of ,philosophy4 ,by ,k4 ,ventzel4 7#b7 ,hegel's ,ontology4 ,by ,n4 ,p4 ,hilyaroff-,platonoff4 ,new ,researches on ,plato4 ,by ,a4 ,kozloff4 ,,criticism ,,and ,,bibliography4 ,review of ,russian and ,foreign ,periodicals4 ,book ,reviews4 ,bibliographical ,index of recent ,philosophical works4 ,answer to an anonymous letter received by ,n4 ,strachoff on the subject of his article3 8,opinions concerning ,l4 ,n4 ,tolsto40 ,by ,n4 ,strachoff4 ,transactions of the ,moscow ,psychological ,society4 7,moscow1 #ahib47 ,,footnotes3 #fg ,questions of ,philosophy and ,psychology4 ,,vol4 ,,ii4 ,,july1 #ahib4 ,,no4 #d4 ,,the ,,monist4 ,,our ,,monism4 ,,the ,,principles ,,of ,a ,,consistent1 ,,unitary ,,world-,,view4 ,the question1 ,what are the essential features of ,monism8 was brought home to me when ,i read in the last number of ,the ,monist the critical remarks made with reference to the new edition of my 8,anthropogeny40 ,i shall here endeavor briefly to draw up the outlines of my conception of the world in a manner which will indicate the most characteristic features of my views4 ,thus both the agreements with and the divergences from the position editorially upheld in ,the ,monist will plainly appear4 ,as is the case with the majority of philosophical differences1 so also in the present instance ,i find that the divergences which exhibit themselves in our respective unitary conceptions of the world are in part only apparent and in part occasioned by the divergent significances of our fundamental ideas4 ,but this will1 perhaps1 be made clearer by the following methodically arranged eight theses4 ,i4 ,,monism4 ,like all general concepts of fundamental scope1 that of monism also is liable to different definitions and divergent modifications1--the natural result of individual differences of subjective conception4 ,in the determinate sense in which monism is at present employed by the majority of philosophers and physical inquirers1 the sense which ,i believe ,i was the first to establish in #ahff in my 8,general ,morphology0 7,vol4 ,i1 p4 #aje71 it denotes a unitary or natural conception of the world1 in opposition to a supernatural or mystical one1 that is1 in opposition to dualism4 ,for us1 accordingly1 there exists 7in the sense of ,goethe7 no opposition whatsoever between nature and mind1 between ,world and ,god4 ,mental existences1 8spirits10 outside nature1 or in opposition to nature1 do not exist4 ,what are commonly termed the 8mental sciences10--for example1 philology1 history1 and philosophy1--are in reality simply a part of physical philosophy1 of ,natur-philosophie4 ,the latter discipline embraces1 in our opinion1 the entire body of human knowledge2 it is based upon empiricism1 on the experiences1 the observations1 and the experiments of physical inquiry2 but it does not become philosophy until it has brought together and united its empiric products1 abstracted general laws from its isolated experiential facts1 and synthetised the isolated results which analysis has empirically ascertained4 ,,ii4 ,,mechanicalism4 ,since an early date1 this important fundamental concept has frequently been used in three different and divergent senses1 namely3 ,a4 ,in its widest sense1 as synonymous with monism2 wherein mechanical causes 7caus efficientes71 in the sense of ,kant1 are assumed as the sole effective causes and are placed in opposition to the teleological causes 7caus finales7 in the sense of dualism4 8,mechanical conception of the world0 is in this sense synonymous with 8monistic conception of the world40 ,b4 ,in its more restricted sense1 as a universal motion-principle of physics1 so that1 for example1 the postulated ether-vibrations of optics1 of electricity1 and so forth1 as well as the grosser material oscillations of acoustics1 heat1 and so forth1 are designated as mechanical processes subject to definite laws4 8,mechanical natural philosophy10 in this sense1 is identical with physics4 ,c4 ,in its narrowest sense1 as that branch of physics which deals with the grosser and visible processes of motion2 as gravitation1 locomotion1 and the phoronomy of organisms4 ,mechanics1 in this the most restricted sense1 is viewed as opposed to optics1 acoustics1 etc41 as the usages of the schools indicate4 ,since1 now1 the phrases 8mechanical laws0 and 8mechanical explanation10 at the present day even1 are frequently understood in these three distinct senses1 no end of misunderstandings arise4 ,such misunderstandings may be best avoided1 perhaps1 by retaining the notion of mechanics in its narrowest 7,c7 sense1 and by substituting physics for the next narrower sense 7,b7 and monism for its most extended sense 7,a74 ,,iii4 ,,psychism4 ,in exactly the same way as the idea of mechanicalism1 so also that of psychism is employed in a three-fold divergent sense4 ,as in the former case motion1 so here feeling is conceived1 now as a universal world-principle1 now simply as a vital activity of all organisms1 now simply as the particular mental activity of man4 ,a4 ,in its widest sense3 ,panpsychism4 ,all matter is ensouled1 because all natural bodies known to us possess determinate chemical properties1 that is to say react uniformly and by law when subjected to the determinate chemical 7i4 e4 molecular-mechanical7 influences of other bodies3 chemical affinity4 ,simplest example3 sulphur and quicksilver rubbed together form cinnabar1 a new body of entirely different properties4 ,this is possible only on the supposition that the molecules 7or atoms7 of the two elements if brought within the proper distance1 mutually feel each other1 by attraction move towards each other2 on the decomposition of a simple chemical compound the contrary takes place3 repulsion4 7,empedocles's doctrine of the 8love and hatred of atoms407 ,b4 ,in its more restricted sense3 ,biopsychism4 ,the organisms alone are regarded as 8ensouled10 because here the chemical processes are more complicated and more striking 7producing motions in cyclically repeated succession7 than in the case of the so-called 8dead matter0 of the inorganic bodies4 ,in particular does organic 8irritability0 appear here as a higher form of the physical reaction called 8,auslsung0 the setting free1 disengagement1 and 8soul-activity0 7reflexes7 again as a higher form of irritability4 ,however1 all the phenomena of organic life ultimately admit of being reduced to 8mechanical0 7or 8physico-chemical07 processes that differ from the processes of the inorganic world only in point of degree or quantitatively1 not qualitatively4 78,general ,morphology10 ,i1 ,chap4 ,v2 ,,vii1 pp4 #aji-bch4 8,natural ,creation10 ,,viii1 ,first ,edition1 ,lecture ,,xv47 ,c4 ,in its narrowest sense3 ,zoopsychism4 ,irritability1 or universal organic soul-activity1 such as is the attribute of all organisms1 7identical with 8life107 reaches a higher stage through abstraction1 through the formation of ideas4 ,feeling and will become more distinctly separated4 ,this real soul-life1 which is the attribute only of the higher animals1 passes through a long succession of different stages of development1 the most perfect of which is the soul of man4 ,the so-called 8freedom of the will0 is apparent only1 as each single volitional action is determined by a chain of precedent actions which ultimately rest either upon heredity 7propagation7 or upon adaptation 7nutrition74 ,as these last are 78mechanically07 reducible to molecular motions1 the same also holds true of the former4 ,,iv4 ,,theism4 ,the idea of god that alone appears to be logically compatible with monism1 is pantheism 7or 8cosmotheism07 in the sense of ,goethe and ,spinoza4 ,god according to this view is identical with the sum-total of the force of the universe1 which is inseparable from the sum-total of the matter of the universe4 ,in opposition to this view stands anthropotheism4 ,this is the outcome of dualism1 which places ,god as a personal being in opposition to the 8world0 created by him1 and consequently is always forced in its reasonings to resort to anthropomorphic expedients4 ,v4 ,,materialism4 ,the most important differences of form in which this much misunderstood and variously interpreted movement of philosophy has presented itself1 may be classed as follows3 ,a4 ,in its most extended sense3 as synonymous with monism 7or with mechanicalism74 ,all the phenomena of the world are founded upon material processes1 upon motions 7mechanicalism7 or upon feelings 7psychism71 both of which1 as fundamental qualities1 are inseparable from matter4 ,immaterial forces or immaterial 8spirits0 7minds7 are unknown to us4 ,as ,goethe once said1 8,mind can never exist and act without matter1 matter never without mind40 ,b4 ,in its more restricted sense3 originally matter alone exists and creates secondarily force 7or 8mind074 ,the fallacy of this view lies in its regarding the two things 8matter and force0 as disjoint and separate4 ,according to our view the two are inseparably connected1--united in each atom from the very first4 ,,vi4 ,,spiritualism4 ,this phase also of the world-conception has been the subject of the same misunderstandings and perverted conceptions as its apparent opposite1 materialism4 ,a4 ,in its most extended sense1 spiritualism is susceptible of identification with psychism--consequently also with monism4 ,for feeling 7pleasure and pain7 is just as much a thoroughly universal and fundamental property of matter 7of each atom67 as is motion 7attraction and repulsion74 ,every single 8spirit0 is inseparably united with some 8matter40 ,b4 ,in its more restricted sense3 originally force alone exists and creates secondarily matter4 ,this view1 which is very old and very widely spread 78creation of the world071 is just as false and as one-sided as its contrary 7#e ,b74 ,,vii4 ,,immortalism4 ,the 8belief in immortality0 is scientifically 7critically7 tenable only as a general proposition1 and is in this case identical with the most universal law of physics1 the conservation of energy 7coincidently1 of course1 the conservation of matter74 ,on the other hand1 the widely disseminated dogmatic belief in a personal immortality1 a belief supported by the mass of the ecclesiastical religions1 and of utmost importance as the consciously or unconsciously assumed base-axiom of a great number of philosophical systems1 is1 scientifically1 absolutely untenable4 ,the 8human soul0 7i4 e4 the sum-total of the individual life-activity3 feeling1 motion1--will1--and idea7 is simply a transient developmentary phenomenon--a very highly developed 8vertebrate-soul40 ,,viii4 ,,cosmism4 ,the determinate1 and1 as ,i believe1 logical1 form of the conception of the world1 the principles of which ,i have advocated for thirty years1 and whose most important aspects have been briefly outlined in the preceding paragraphs1 may also be designated cosmism1 to the extent that it proceeds from the fundamental idea that cosmogeny or the 8world-process10 as world-development1 is1 within certain limits1 7within the limits namely of a reduction to the basic notions3 matter and its two inseparable fundamental qualities motion and feeling17 a knowable natural process4 ,cosmism is opposed1 thus1 to agnosticism4 99 99 99 99 99 ,one highly important principle of my monism seems to me to be1 that ,i regard all matter as ensouled1 that is to say as endowed with feeling 7pleasure and pain7 and with motion1 or1 better1 with the power of motion4 ,as elementary 7atomistic7 attraction and repulsion these powers are asserted in every simplest chemical process1 and on them is based also every other phenomenon1 consequently also the highest-developed soul-activity of man4 ,for the comprehension of this graduated psychical development of matter perhaps my three stages will be useful3 ,,iii ,a4 7,panpsychism71 ,,iii ,b4 7,biopsychism71 ,,iii ,c4 7,zoopsychism74 ,so too consciousness1 as the highest psychical action and the one most difficult to be explained1 is in my views imply a higher stage of brain-activity1 based upon the association1 the abstraction1 and centralisation of groups of ideas4 ,perhaps ,i have expressed myself poorly in these expositions1 as ,i am little accustomed to dealing with philosophical axioms abstractly1 and am too exclusively engaged in the concrete activity of my own special department4 ,i cherish the hope1 however1 of being able within two or three years to devote more of my time to purely philosophical labors2 when my work with the ,challenger material1 which has now absorbed twelve years of unremitting toil1 is ended1 my special zoological activity will have been completed2 and ,i shall then find the opportunity of contributing more frequently to your highly valued magazines ,the ,monist and ,the ,open ,court4 ,,ernst ,,haeckel4 ,,the ,,magic ,,square4 ,i4 ,,introductory4 ,among the philosophies of modern times there is no other which emphasises so much the importance of form and formal thought as the monism of ,the ,monist4 ,an expression thereof is found in the following passages3 8,the order that prevails among the facts of reality is due to the laws of form4 ,upon the order of the world depends its cognisability4 8444 ,the laws of form are no less eternal than are matter and energy and #8,verily ,i say unto you1 till heaven and earth pass1 one jot or one tittle shall in no wise pass from the law6' 8,the laws of form and their origin have been a puzzle to all philosophers4 #8,ay1 there's the rub6' ,the difficulties of ,hume's problem of causation1 of ,kant's a priori1 of ,plato's ideas1 of ,mill's method of deduction1 etc41 etc41 all arise from a one-sided view of form and the laws of form and formal thought40 ,considering the great results which engineering and other applied sciences accomplish through the assistance of mathematics1 we must confess that the forms of thought are wonderful indeed1 and it is not at all astonishing that the primitive thinkers of mankind when the importance of the laws of formal thought in some way or another first dawned on their minds1 attributed magic powers to numbers and geometrical figures4 ,we shall devote the following pages to a brief review of magic squares1 the consideration of which has made many a man believe in mysticism4 ,and yet there is no mysticism about them unless we either consider everything mystical1 even that twice two is four1 or join the sceptic in his exclamation that we can truly not know whether twice two might not be five in other spheres of the universe4 ,illustration3 ,,albert ,d,,rer',s ,,engraving ,,melancholy ,,or ,,the ,,genius ,,of ,,the ,,industrial ,,science ,,of ,,mechanics ,the author of the short article on 8,magic ,squares0 in the ,english ,cyclopdia 7,vol4 ,,iii1 p4 #dae71 presumably ,prof4 ,de,morgan1 says3 8,though the question of magic squares be in itself of no use1 yet it belongs to a class of problems which call into action a beneficial species of investigation4 ,without laying down any rules for their construction1 we shall content ourselves with destroying their magic quality1 and showing that the non-existence of such squares would be much more surprising than their existence40 ,this is the point4 ,there obtains a symphonic harmony in mathematics which is the more startling the more obvious and self-evident it appears to him who understands the laws that produce this symphonic harmony4 99 99 99 99 99 ,on the wood-cut named 8,melancholia0#fh of the famous ,nuremberg painter1 ,albrecht ,drer1 is found among a number of other emblems1 which the reader will notice in our reproduction of the cut1 the subjoined square4 ,this arrangement of the sixteen natural numbers from #a to #af possesses the remarkable property that the same sum #cd will always be obtained whether we add together the four figures of any of the horizontal rows or the four of any vertical row or the four which lie in either of the two diagonals4 ,such an arrangement of numbers is termed a magic square1 and the square which we have reproduced above is the first magic square which is met with in the ,christian ,occident4 ,illustration3 ,fig4 #a4 -------- #aadae #d -------- #ab #g #f #i -------- #haaaj #e -------- #ac #b #caf -------- ,like chess and many of the problems founded on the figure of the chess-board1 the problem of constructing a magic square also probably traces its origin to ,indian soil4 ,from there the problem found its way among the ,arabs1 and by them it was brought to the ,roman ,orient4 ,finally1 since ,albrecht ,drer's time1 the scholars of ,western ,europe also have occupied themselves with methods for the construction of squares of this character4 ,the oldest and the simplest magic square consists of the quadratic arrangement of the nine numbers from #a to #i in such a manner that the sum of each horizontal1 vertical1 or diagonal row1 always remains the same1 namely #ae4 ,this square is the adjoined4 ,illustration3 ,fig4 #b4 --- #bgf --- #iea --- #dch --- ,here1 we will find1 #ae always comes out whether we add #b and #g and #f1 or #i and #e and #a1 or #d and #c and #h1 or #b and #i and #d1 or #g and #e and #c1 or #f and #a and #h1 or #b and #e and #h1 or #f and #e and #d4 ,the question naturally presents itself1 whether this condition of the constant equality of the added sum also remains fulfilled when the numbers are assigned different places4 ,it may be easily shown however that #e necessarily must occupy the middle place1 and that the even numbers must stand in the corners4 ,this being so1 there are but #g additional arrangements possible1 which differ from the arrangement above given and from one another only in the respect that the rows at the top1 at the left1 at the bottom1 and at the right1 exchange places with one another and that in addition a mirror be imagined present with each arrangement4 ,so too from ,drer's square of #d times #d places1 by transpositions1 a whole set of new correct squares may be formed4 ,a magic square of the #d times #d numbers from #a to #af is formed in the simplest manner as follows4 ,we inscribe the numbers from #a to #af in their natural order in the squares1 thus3 ,illustration3 ,fig4 #c4 -------- #a #b #c #d -------- #e #f #g #h -------- #iajaaab -------- #acadaeaf -------- ,we then leave the numbers in the four corner-squares1 viz4 #a1 #d1 #ac1 #af1 as well also as the numbers in the four middle-squares1 viz4 #f1 #g1 #aj1 #aa1 in their original places2 and in the place of the remaining eight numbers1 we write the complements of the same with respect to #ag3 thus #ae instead of #b1 #ad instead of #c1 #ab instead of #e1 #i instead of #h1 #h instead of #i1 #e instead of #ab1 #c instead of #ad1 and #b instead of #ae4 ,we obtain thus the magic square ,illustration3 ,fig4 #d4 #cd #cd _/ -------- #aaead #dcd -------- #ab #f #g #icd -------- #hajaa #ecd -------- #ac #c #bafcd -------- #cd #cd #cd #cd from which the same sum #cd always results4 ,it is an interesting property of this square that any four numbers which form a rectangle or square about the centre also always give the same sum #cd2 for example1 #a1 #d1 #ac1 #af1 or #f1 #g1 #aj1 #aa1 or #ae1 #ad1 #c1 #b1 or #ab1 #i1 #e1 #h1 or #ae1 #h1 #b1 #i1 or #ad1 #ab1 #c1 #e4 ,we may easily convince ourselves that this square is obtainable from the square of ,drer by interchanging with one another the two middle vertical rows4 ,,ii4 ,,early ,,methods ,,for ,,the ,,construction ,,of ,,odd-,,numbered ,,squares4 ,since early times rules have also been known for the construction of magic squares of more than #c times #c1 or #d times #d spaces4 ,in the first place1 it is easy to calculate the sum which in the case of any given number of cells must result from the addition of each row4 ,we take the determinate number of cells in each side of the square which we have to fill1 multiply that number by itself1 add #a1 again multiply the number thus obtained by the number of the cells in each side1 and1 finally1 divide the product by #b4 ,thus1 with #d times #d cells or squares1 we get3 #d times #d are #af1 #af and #a are #ag1 and one half of #ag times #d is #cd4 ,similarly1 with #e times #e squares1 we get3 #e times #e are #be1 and #a makes #bf1 and the half of #bf times #e is #fe4 ,analogously1 for #f times #f squares the summation #aaa is obtained1 for #g times #g squares #age1 for #h times #h squares #bfj1 for #i times #i squares #cfi1 for #aj times #aj squares #eje1 and so on4 ,the ,hindu rule for the construction of magic squares whose roots are odd1 may be enunciated as follows3 ,to start with1 write #a in the centre of the topmost row1 then write #b in the lowest space of the vertical column next adjacent to the right1 and then so inscribe the remaining numbers in their natural order in the squares diagonally upwards towards the right1 that on reaching the right-hand margin the inscription shall be continued from the left-hand margin in the row just above1 and on reaching the upper margin shall be continued from the lower margin in the column next adjacent to the right1 noting that whenever we are arrested in our progress by a square already occupied we are to fill out the square next beneath the one we have last filled4 ,in this manner1 for example1 the last preceding square of #g times #g cells is formed1 in which the reader is requested to follow the numbers in their natural sequence 7,fig4 #e74 ,illustration3 ,fig4 #e4 #age #age _/ --------------------- #cj #ci #dh #a #aj #ai #bh #age --------------------- #ch #dg #g #i #ah #bg #bi #age --------------------- #df #f #h #ag #bf #ce #cg #age --------------------- #e #ad #af #be #cd #cf #de #age --------------------- #ac #ae #bd #cc #db #dd #d #age --------------------- #ba #bc #cb #da #dc #c #ab #age --------------------- #bb #ca #dj #di #b #aa #bj #age --------------------- #age #age #age #age #age #age #age ,for the next further advancements of the theory of magic squares and of the methods for their construction we are indebted to the ,byzantian ,greek1 ,moschopulus1 who lived in the fourteenth century2 also1 after ,albrecht ,drer who lived about the year #aejj1 to the celebrated arithmetician ,adam ,riese1 and to the mathematician ,michael ,stifel1 which two last lived about #aeej4 ,in the seventeenth century ,bachet de ,mziriac1 and ,athanasius ,kircher employed themselves on magic squares4 ,about #agjj1 finally1 the ,french mathematicians ,de la ,hire and ,sauveur made considerable contributions to the theory4 ,in recent times mathematicians have concerned themselves much less about magic squares1 as they have indeed about mathematical recreations generally4 ,but quite recently the ,brunswick mathematician ,scheffler has put forth his own and other's studies on this subject in an elegant form4 ,illustration3 ,fig4 #f4 #g #f #ad #e #ac #ba #d #ab #bj #bh -------------------- #c #aa #ai #bg #ce -------------------------- #b #aj #ah #bf #cd #db ------------------------------- #a #i #ag #be #cc #da #di ------------------------------- #h #af #bd #cb #dj #dh -------------------------- #ae #bc #ca #ci #dg -------------------- #bb #cj #ch #df #bi #cg #de #cf #dd #dc ,the best known of the various methods of constructing magic squares of an odd number of cells is the following4 ,first write the numbers in diagonal succession as in the preceding diagram 7,fig4 #f74 ,after #be cells of the square of #di cells which we have to fill out1 have thus been occupied1 transfer the six figures found outside each side of the square1 without changing their configuration1 into the empty cells of the side directly opposite4 ,by this method1 which we owe to ,bachet de ,mziriac1 we obtain the following magic square of the numbers from #a to #di3 ,illustration3 ,fig4 #g4 -------------- #dbiabcgbjdebh -------------- #ceaacfaiddbg #c -------------- #ajdbahdcbf #bcd -------------- #daagdibe #acc #i -------------- #afdhbd #gcb #hdj -------------- #dgbc #fcaadciae -------------- #bb #ecjacchbadf -------------- ,,iii4 ,,modern ,,modes ,,of ,,construction ,,of ,,odd-,,numbered ,,squares4 ,the reader will justly ask whether there do not exist other correct magic squares which are constructed after a different method from that just given1 and whether there do not exist modes of construction which will lead to all the imaginable and possible magic squares of a definite number of cells4 ,a general mode of construction of this character was first given for odd-numbered squares by ,de la ,hire1 and recently perfected by ,professor ,scheffler4 ,to acquaint ourselves with this general method1 let us select as our example a square of #e4 ,first we form two auxiliary squares4 ,in the first we write the numbers from #a to #e five times2 and in the second1 five times1 the following multiples of five1 viz43 #j1 #e1 #aj1 #ae1 #bj4 ,it is clear now that by adding each of the numbers of the series from #a to #e with each of the numbers #j1 #e1 #aj1 #ae1 #bj1 we shall get all the #be numerals from #a to #be4 ,all that additionally remains to be done therefore1 is1 so to inscribe the numbers that by the addition of the two numbers in any two corresponding cells each combination shall come out once and only once2 and further that in each horizontal1 vertical1 and diagonal row in each auxiliary square each number shall once appear4 ,then the required sum of #fe must necessarily result in every case1 because the numbers from #a to #e added together make #ae1 and the numbers #j1 #e1 #aj1 #ae1 #bj make #ej4 ,we effect the required method of inscription by imagining the numbers #a1 #b1 #c1 #d1 #e 7or #j1 #e1 #aj1 #ae1 #bj7 arranged in cyclical succession1 that is #a immediately following upon #e1 and1 starting from any number whatsoever1 by skipping each time either none or one or two or three etc4 figures4 ,cycles are thus obtained of the first1 the second1 the third etc4 orders2 for example #c #d #e #a #b is a cycle of the first order1 #b #d #a #c #e is a cycle of the second order1 #a #e #d #c #b is a cycle of the fourth order1 etc4 ,the only thing then to be looked out for in the two auxiliary squares is1 that the same 8cycle0 order be horizontally preserved in all the rows1 that the same also happens for the vertical rows1 but that the cycle order in the horizontal and vertical rows is different4 ,finally we have only additionally to take care that to the same numbers of the one auxiliary square not like numbers but different numbers correspond in the other auxiliary square1 that is lie in similarly situated cells4 ,the following auxiliary squares are1 for example1 thus possible3 ,illustration3 ,fig4 #h4 ---------- #c #d #e #a #b ---------- #e #a #b #c #d ---------- #b #c #d #e #a ---------- #d #e #a #b #c ---------- #a #b #c #d #e ---------- and ,illustration3 ,fig4 #i4 ---------- #jajbj #eae ---------- #eae #jajbj ---------- #ajbj #eae #j ---------- #ae #jajbj #e ---------- #bj #eae #jaj ---------- ,adding in pairs the numbers which occupy similarly situated cells1 we obtain the following correct magic square3 ,illustration3 ,fig4 #aj4 ---------- #cadbe #fag ---------- #ajaf #bacbd ---------- #abbc #ibj #a ---------- #ai #eaabb #h ---------- #ba #gah #dae ---------- ,it will be seen that we are able thus to construct a very large number of magic squares of #e times #e spaces by varying in every possible manner the numbers in the two auxiliary squares4 ,furthermore1 the squares thus formed possess the additional peculiarity1 that every #e numbers which fill out two rows that are parallel to a diagonal and lie on different sides of the diagonal also give the constant sum of #fe4 ,for example3 #c and #g1 #aa1 #bj1 #bd2 or #aj1 #ad and #ah1 #bb1 #a4 ,altogether then the sum #fe is produced out of #bj rows or pairs of rows4 ,on this peculiarity is dependent the fact that if we imagine an unlimited number of such squares placed by the side of1 above1 or beneath an initial one1 we shall be able to obtain as many quadratic cells as we choose1 so arranged that the square composed of any #be of these cells will form a correct magic square1 as the following figure will show3 ,illustration3 ,fig4 #aa4 #bacbdajaf #bacbdajaf #b ---------------------- #ibj #aabbc #ibj #aabbc #i ------------ #aabb #hai #eaabb #hai #eaa ---------------------- #ah #daeba #gah #daeba #gah ---------------------- #be #fag #cadbe #fag #cadbe ---------------------- #bacbdajaf #bacbdajaf #b ------------ #ibj #aabbc #ibj #aabbc #i ------------ #aabb #hai #eaabb #hai #eaa ---------------------- #ah #daeba #gah #daeba #gah ---------------------- #be #fag #cadbe #fag #cadbe ---------------------- #bacbdajaf #bacbdajaf #b ------------ #ibj #aabbc #ibj #aabbc #i ---------------------- #aabb #hai #eaabb #hai #eaa ,every square of every #be of these numbers1 as for example the two dark-bordered ones1 possesses the property that the addition of the horizontal1 vertical1 and diagonal rows gives each the same sum1 #fe4 ,as an example of a higher number of cells we will append here a magic square of #aa times #aa spaces formed by the general method of ,de la ,hire from the two auxiliary squares of ,figs4 #ab and #ac4 ,from these two auxiliary squares we obtain by the addition of the two numbers of every two similarly situated cells1 the magic square1 exhibited in ,diagram #ad1 in which each row gives the same sum #fga4 ,illustration3 ,fig4 #ab4 --------------------------------- #a #b #c #d #e #f #g #h #i #aj #aa --------------------------------- #c #d #e #f #g #h #i #aj #aa #a #b --------------------------------- #e #f #g #h #i #aj #aa #a #b #c #d --------------------------------- #g #h #i #aj #aa #a #b #c #d #e #f --------------------------------- #i #aj #aa #a #b #c #d #e #f #g #h --------------------------------- #aa #a #b #c #d #e #f #g #h #i #aj --------------------------------- #b #c #d #e #f #g #h #i #aj #aa #a --------------------------------- #d #e #f #g #h #i #aj #aa #a #b #c --------------------------------- #f #g #h #i #aj #aa #a #b #c #d #e --------------------------------- #h #i #aj #aa #a #b #c #d #e #f #g --------------------------------- #aj #aa #a #b #c #d #e #f #g #h #i --------------------------------- ,illustration3 ,fig4 #ac4 --------------------------------- #j #aa #bb #cc #dd #ee #ff #gg #hh #iiaaj --------------------------------- #cc #dd #ee #ff #gg #hh #iiaaj #j #aa #bb --------------------------------- #ff #gg #hh #iiaaj #j #aa #bb #cc #dd #ee --------------------------------- #iiaaj #j #aa #bb #cc #dd #ee #ff #gg #hh --------------------------------- #aa #bb #cc #dd #ee #ff #gg #hh #iiaaj #j --------------------------------- #dd #ee #ff #gg #hh #iiaaj #j #aa #bb #cc --------------------------------- #gg #hh #iiaaj #j #aa #bb #cc #dd #ee #ff --------------------------------- #aaj #j #aa #bb #cc #dd #ee #ff #gg #hh #ii --------------------------------- #bb #cc #dd #ee #ff #gg #hh #iiaaj #j #aa --------------------------------- #ee #ff #gg #hh #iiaaj #j #aa #bb #cc #dd --------------------------------- #hh #iiaaj #j #aa #bb #cc #dd #ee #ff #gg --------------------------------- ,illustration3 ,fig4 #ad4 --------------------------------- #a #ac #be #cg #di #fa #gc #he #igajiaba --------------------------------- #cf #dh #fj #gb #hd #ifajhabj #aa #ab #bd --------------------------------- #ga #hc #ieajgaai #aj #bb #bc #ce #dg #ei --------------------------------- #ajfaah #i #ba #cc #cd #df #eh #gj #hb #id --------------------------------- #bj #cb #dd #de #eg #fi #ha #icajeaag #h --------------------------------- #ee #ef #fh #hj #ibajdaaf #g #ai #ca #dc --------------------------------- #gi #iaajcaae #f #ah #cj #db #ed #ff #fg --------------------------------- #aad #e #ag #bi #da #ec #fe #gg #gh #ijajb --------------------------------- #bh #dj #eb #fd #gf #hh #hiajaaac #d #af --------------------------------- #fc #ge #hg #iiajjaab #c #ae #bg #ci #ea --------------------------------- #ihaajaaa #b #ad #bf #ch #ej #fb #gd #hf --------------------------------- ,,iv4 ,,even-,,numbered ,,squares4 ,of magic squares having an even number of places we have hitherto had to deal only with the square of #d4 ,to construct squares of this description having a higher even number of places1 different and more complicated methods must be employed than for squares of odd numbers of places4 ,however1 in this case also1 as in dealing with the square of #d1 we start with the natural sequence of the numbers and must then find the complements of the numbers with respect to some other certain number 7as #ag in the square of #d7 and also effect certain exchanges of the numbers with one another4 ,to form1 for example1 a magic square of #f times #f places1 we inscribe in the #ab diagonal cells the numbers that in the natural sequence of inscription fall into these places1 then in the remaining cells the complements of the numbers that belong therein with respect to #cg1 and finally effect the following six exchanges1 viz4 of the numbers #cc and #c1 #be and #g1 #bj and #ad1 #ah and #ac1 #aj and #i1 and #e and #b4 ,in this way the following magic square is obtained4 ,illustration3 ,fig4 #ae4 ------------ #acecd #ccb #f ------------ #cj #hbhbgaa #g ------------ #bdbcaeafadai ------------ #acagbabbbjah ------------ #abbf #iajbibe ------------ #ca #b #dcc #ecf ------------ ,this square may also be constructed by the method of ,de la ,hire1 from two auxiliary squares with the numbers #a1 #b1 #c1 #d1 #e1 #f and #j1 #f1 #ab1 #ah1 #bd1 #cj respectively4 ,in this case1 however1 the vertical rows of the one square and the horizontal rows of the other must each so contain two same numbers thrice repeated that the summation shall always remain #ba and #ij respectively4 ,in this manner we get the magic square last given above from the two following auxiliary squares3 ,illustration3 ,fig4 #af4 ------------ #a #e #d #c #b #f ------------ #f #b #d #c #e #a ------------ #f #e #c #d #b #a ------------ #a #e #c #d #b #f ------------ #f #b #c #d #e #a ------------ #a #b #d #c #e #f ------------ and ,illustration3 ,fig4 #ag4 ------------ #jcjcj #jcj #j ------------ #bd #fbdbd #f #f ------------ #ahahabababah ------------ #ababahahahab ------------ #fbd #f #fbdbd ------------ #cj #j #jcj #jcj ------------ ,it is to be noted in connection with this example that here also as in the case of odd-numbered squares1 it is possible so to inscribe six times the numbers from #a to #f that each number shall appear once and only once in each horizontal1 vertical1 and diagonal row2 for example1 in the following manner3 ,illustration3 ,fig4 #ah4 ------------ #a #b #c #d #e #f ------------ #b #d #f #a #c #e ------------ #c #f #e #b #a #d ------------ #e #c #a #f #d #b ------------ #f #e #d #c #b #a ------------ #d #a #b #e #f #c ------------ ,but if we attempt so to insert1 in a like manner1 the other set of numbers #j1 #f1 #ab1 #ah1 #bd1 #cj in a second auxiliary square1 that each number of the first auxiliary square shall stand once and once only in a corresponding cell with each number of the second square1 all the attempts we may make to fulfil coincidently the last named condition will result in failure4 ,it is therefore necessary to select auxiliary squares like the two given above4 ,it is noteworthy1 that the fulfilment of the second condition is impossible only in the case of the square of #f1 but that in the case of the square of #d or of the square of #h1 for example1 two auxiliary squares1 such as the method of ,de la ,hire requires1 are possible4 ,thus1 taking the square of #d we get ,illustration3 ,fig4 #ai4 -------- #a #b #c #d -------- #d #c #b #a -------- #b #a #d #c -------- #c #d #a #b -------- and ,illustration3 ,fig4 #bj4 -------- #j #d #hab -------- #hab #j #d -------- #ab #h #d #j -------- #d #jab #h -------- ,the reader may form for himself the magic square which these give4 ,the existence of these two auxiliary squares furnishes a key to the solution of a pretty problem at cards4 ,if we replace1 namely1 the numbers #a1 #b1 #c1 #d by the ,ace1 the ,king1 the ,queen1 and the ,knave1 and the numbers #j1 #d1 #h1 #ab by the four suits1 clubs1 spades1 hearts1 and diamonds1 we shall at once perceive that it is possible1 and must be so necessarily1 quadratically to arrange in such a manner the four ,aces1 the four ,kings1 the ,four ,queens1 and the four ,knaves1 that in each horizontal1 vertical1 and diagonal row1 each one of the four suits and each one of the four denominations shall appear once and once only4 ,the auxiliary squares above given furnish the appended solution of this problem3 ,illustration3 ,fig4 #ba4 -------------------------------- ,,clubs ,,spades ,,hearts ,,diamonds ,,ace ,,king ,,queen ,,knave -------------------------------- ,,hearts ,,diamonds ,,clubs ,,spades ,,knave ,,queen ,,king ,,ace -------------------------------- ,,diamonds ,,hearts ,,spades ,,clubs ,,king ,,ace ,,knave ,,queen -------------------------------- ,,spades ,,clubs ,,diamonds ,,hearts ,,queen ,,knave ,,ace ,,king -------------------------------- ,to fix the solution of the problem in the memory1 observe that1 starting from the several corners1 each suit and each denomination must be placed in the spots of the move of a ,knight4 ,if we fix the positions of the four cards of any one row1 there will be only two possibilities left of so placing the other cards that the required condition of having each suit and each denomination once and only once in each row shall be fulfilled4 ,of magic squares of an even number of places we have up to this point examined only the squares of #d and of #f4 ,for the sake of completeness we append here one of #h and one of #aj places4 ,the mode of construction of these squares is similar to the method above discussed for the lower even numbers4 ,illustration3 ,fig4 #bb4 ---------------- #afcfb #d #eeieh #h ---------------- #efajaaecebadaedi ---------------- #dhahaideddbbbcda ---------------- #becichbhbicecdcb ---------------- #cccacjcfcgbgbfdj ---------------- #bddbdcbabjdfdgag ---------------- #afejeaacabedee #i ---------------- #eg #g #ffjfa #c #bfd ---------------- ,illustration3 ,fig4 #bc4 ------------------------------ #a #ii #c #ig #if #e #id #h #ib #aj ------------------------------ #ij #ab #hh #ad #hf #he #ag #hc #ai #aa ------------------------------ #hj #gi #bc #gg #be #bf #gd #bh #bb #ga ------------------------------ #ca #fi #fh #cd #ff #fe #cg #cc #fb #dj ------------------------------ #fj #db #eh #eg #de #df #dd #ec #di #ea ------------------------------ #ej #eb #dc #dg #ee #ef #ed #dh #ei #da ------------------------------ #fa #cb #ch #fd #cf #ce #fg #fc #ci #gj ------------------------------ #ba #bi #gc #bg #ge #gf #bd #gh #gb #cj ------------------------------ #bj #hb #ah #hd #ae #af #hg #ac #hi #ha ------------------------------ #ia #i #ic #d #f #ie #g #ih #b #ajj ------------------------------ ,the magic squares of even numbers thus constructed are not the only possible ones4 ,on the contrary1 there are very many others possible1 which obey different laws of formation4 ,it has been calculated1 for example1 that with the square of #d it is possible to construct #hhj1 and with the square of #f1 several million1 different magic squares4 ,the number of odd-numbered magic squares constructible by the method of ,de la ,hire is also very great4 ,with the square of #g1 the possible constructions amount to #cfc1iaf1hjj4 ,with the squares of higher numbers the multitude of the possibilities increases in the same enormous ratio4 ,v4 ,,magic ,,squares ,,whose ,,summation ,,gives ,,the ,,number ,,of ,a ,,year4 ,the magic squares which we have so far considered contain only the natural numbers from #a upwards4 ,it is possible1 however1 easily to deduce from a correct magic square other squares in which a different law controls the sequence of the numbers to be inscribed4 ,of the squares obtained in this manner1 we shall devote our attention here only to such in which1 although formed by the inscription of successive numbers1 the sum obtained from the addition of the rows is a determinate number which we have fixed upon beforehand1 as the number of a year4 ,in such a case we have simply to add to the numbers of the original square a determinate number so to be calculated1 that the required sum shall each time appear4 ,if this sum is divisible by #c1 magic squares will always be obtainable with #c times #c spaces which shall give this sum4 ,in such a case we divide the sum required by #c and subtract #e from the result in order to obtain the number which we have to add to each number of the original square4 ,if the sum desired is even but not divisible by #d1 we must then subtract from it #cd and take one fourth of the result1 to obtain the number which in this case is to be added in each place4 ,if1 for example1 we wish to obtain the number of the year #ahij as the resulting sum of each row1 we shall have to add to each of the numbers of an ordinary magic square of #d times #d spaces the number #dfd2 in other words1 instead of the numbers from #a to #af we have to insert in the squares the numbers from #dfe to #dhj4 ,as the number of the present year #ahib is divisible by #aa1 it must be possible to deduce from the magic square constructed by us at the conclusion of ,section ,,iii a second magic square in which each row of #aa cells will give the number of the year #ahib4 ,to do this1 we subtract from #ahib the sum of the original square1 namely #fga1 and divide the remainder by #aa1 whereby we get #aaa and thus perceive that the numbers from #aab to #bcb are to be inscribed in the cells of the square required4 ,we get in this way the preceding square1 from which one and the same sum1 namely #ahib1 can be obtained #dd times1 first from each of the #aa horizontal rows1 secondly from each of the #aa vertical rows1 thirdly from each of the two diagonal rows1 and fourthly twenty additional times from each and every pair of any two rows that lie parallel to a diagonal1 have together #aa cells1 and lie on different sides of the diagonal1 as for example1 #aif1 #abb1 #aeh1 #bje1 #aca1 #afg1 #bad1 #adj1 #ahg1 #bbc1 #adi4 ,illustration3 ,fig4 #bd4 ---------------------------------------- ---- #aab #abd #acf #adh #afj #agb #ahd #aif #bjh #bbj #bcb #ahib ---------------------------------------- ----------- #adg #aei #aga #ahc #aie #bjg #bai #bca #abb #abc #ace #ahib ---------------------------------------- ----------- #ahb #aid #bjf #bah #bcj #aba #acc #acd #adf #aeh #agj #ahib ---------------------------------------- ----------- #bag #bbi #abj #acb #add #ade #aeg #afi #aha #aic #bje #ahib ---------------------------------------- ----------- #aca #adc #aee #aef #afh #ahj #aib #bjd #baf #bbh #aai #ahib ---------------------------------------- ----------- #aff #afg #agi #aia #bjc #bae #bbg #aah #acj #adb #aed #ahib ---------------------------------------- ----------- #aij #bjb #bad #bbf #aag #abi #ada #aec #afe #agg #agh #ahib ---------------------------------------- ----------- #bbe #aaf #abh #adj #aeb #afd #agf #ahh #ahi #bja #bac #ahib ---------------------------------------- ----------- #aci #aea #afc #age #ahg #aii #bjj #bab #bbd #aae #abg #ahib ---------------------------------------- ----------- #agd #ahf #aih #baj #baa #bbc #aad #abf #ach #aej #afb #ahib ---------------------------------------- ----------- #bji #bba #bbb #aac #abe #acg #adi #afa #agc #ahe #aig #ahib ---------------------------------------- ---- #ahib #ahib #ahib #ahib #ahib #ahib #ahib #ahib #ahib #ahib #ahib ,,vi4 ,,concentric ,,magic ,,squares4 ,the acuteness of the mathematicians has also discovered magic squares which possess the peculiar property that if one row after another be taken away from each side1 the smaller inner squares remaining will still be magical squares1 that is to say1 all their rows when added will give the same sum4 ,it will be sufficient to give two examples here of such squares1 7the laws for their construction being somewhat more complicated17 of which the first has #g times #g and the second #h times #h places4 ,the numbers within each of the dark-bordered frames form with respect to the centre smaller squares which in their own turn are magical4 ,illustration3 ,fig4 #be4 ------------------ #d #e #f #dcci #ch #dj ---- #diae #afcccj #ca #a -------- #dhcgbbbgbfac #b -------------- #dgcfbibebaad #c -------------- #hahbdbcbhcbdb -------- #iai #cdagbj #ceda ---- #aj #de #dd #gaa #ab #df ------------------ ,illustration3 ,fig4 #bf4 ------------------------ #a #ef #ee #aa #ec #ac #ad #eg ------ #fcae #dg #bb #db #bdde #b ---------- #fbdibe #dj #cdcaaf #c -------------------- #d #dhbh #cg #cecjag #fa -------------------- #e #ddci #bf #cbccba #fj -------------------- #eiaich #bg #bicfdf #f ---------- #ehbj #ah #dc #bc #daej #g ------ #h #i #aj #ed #ab #eb #ea #fd ------------------------ ,in the first of these two squares the internal square of #c times #c places contains the numbers from #ba to #bi in such a manner that each row gives when added the sum of #ge4 ,this square lies within a larger one of #e times #e spaces1 which contains the numbers from #ac to #cg in such a manner that each row gives the sum of #abe4 ,finally1 this last square forms part of a square of #g times #g places which contains the numbers from #a to #di so that each row gives the sum of #age4 ,in the second square the inner central square of #d times #d places contains the numbers from #be to #dj in such a manner that each row gives the sum of #acj4 ,this square is the middle of a square of #f times #f places which so contains the numbers from #ae to #ej that each row gives the sum #afe4 ,finally1 this last square is again the middle of an ordinary magic square composed of the numbers from #a to #fd4 ,,vii4 ,,magical ,,squares ,,with ,,magical ,,parts4 ,if we divide a square of #h times #h places by means of the two middle lines parallel to its sides into #d parts containing each #d times #d spaces1 we may propound the problem of so inserting the numbers from #a to #fd in these spaces that not only the whole shall form a magic square1 but also that each of the #d parts individually shall be magical1 that is to say1 give the same sum for each row4 ,this problem also has been successfully solved1 as the following diagram will show4 ,illustration3 ,fig4 #bg4 ---------------- #a #dfcfb #e #heieh ---------------- #fdfa #b #cfjeg #f #g ---------------- #dbdcbdbacdcecbbi ---------------- #bcbbdaddcacjcccf #acafeaej #iabeeed ---------------- #ebdiadaeefecajaa ---------------- #chcibhbedfdgbjag ---------------- #bgbfcgdjaiahdedh ---------------- ,the #d numbers in each row of any one of the sub-squares here1 gives #acj2 so that the sum of each one of the rows of the large square will be #bfj4 ,finally1 in further illustration of this idea1 we will submit to the consideration of our readers a very remarkable square of the numbers from #a to #ha4 ,this square1 which will be found on the following page 7,fig4 #bh71 is divided by parallel lines into #i parts1 of which each contains #i consecutive numbers that severally make up a magic square by themselves4 ,illustration3 ,fig4 #bh4 --------------------------- #ca #cf #bi #gf #ha #gd #ac #ah #aa --------------------------- #cj #cb #cd #ge #gg #gi #ab #ad #af --------------------------- #ce #bh #cc #hj #gc #gh #ag #aj #ae #bb #bg #bj #dj #de #ch #eh #fc #ef --------------------------- #ba #bc #be #ci #da #dc #eg #ei #fa --------------------------- #bf #ai #bd #dd #cg #db #fb #ee #fj #fg #gb #fe #d #i #b #di #ed #dg --------------------------- #ff #fh #gj #c #e #g #dh #ej #eb --------------------------- #ga #fd #fi #h #a #f #ec #df #ea --------------------------- ,wonderful as the properties of this square may appear1 the law by which the author constructed it is equally simple4 ,we have simply to regard the #i parts as the #i cells of a magic square of the numbers from ,i to ,,ix and then to inscribe by the magic prescript in the square designated as ,i the numbers from #a to #i1 in the square designated as ,,ii the numbers from #aj to #ah1 and so on4 ,in this way the square above given is obtained from the following base-square3 ,illustration3 ,fig4 #bi4 ------------ ,,iv ,,ix ,,ii ------------ ,,iii ,v ,,vii ------------ ,,viii ,i ,,vi ------------ ,,viii4 ,,magic ,,squares ,,that ,,involve ,,the ,,move ,,of ,,the ,,chess-,,knight4 ,what one of our readers does not know the problems contained in the recreation columns of our magazines1 the requirements of which are to compose into a verse #h times #h quadratically arranged syllables1 of which every two successive syllables stand on spots so situated with respect to each other that a chess-knight can move from the one to the other8 ,if we replace in such an arrangement the #fd successive syllables by the #fd numbers from #a to #fd1 we shall obtain a knight-problem made up of numbers4 ,methods also exist indeed for the construction of such dispositions of numbers1 which then form the foundation of the construction of the problems in the newspapers4 ,but the majority of knight-problems of this class are the outcome of experiment rather than the product of methodical creation4 ,if however it is a severe test of patience to form a knight-problem by experiment1 it stands to reason that it is a still severer trial to effect at the same time the additional result that the #fd numbers which form the knight-problem shall also form a magic square4 ,this trial of endurance was undertaken several decades ago1 by a pensioned ,moravian officer named ,wenzelides1 who was spending the last days of his life in the country4 ,after a series of trials which lasted years he finally succeeded in so inscribing in the #fd squares of the chess-board the numbers from #a to #fd that successive numbers1 as well also as the numbers #fd and #a1 were always removed from one another in distance and direction by the move of a knight1 and that in addition thereto the summation of the horizontal and the vertical rows always gave the same sum #bfj4 ,ultimately he discovered several squares of this description1 which were published in the ,berlin ,chess ,journal4 ,one of these is here appended3 ,illustration3 ,fig4 #cj4 ---------------- #dgajbcfddi #bei #f ---------------- #bbfcdh #ifj #eej #c ---------------- #aadffabd #aeb #geh ---------------- #fbbaabde #heg #dea ---------------- #aicfbedjacddeccj ---------------- #bfcibjccefbiaddc ---------------- #ceahcgbhdaafcaed ---------------- #chbgcdagcbeedbae ---------------- ,the move of the knight and the equality of the summation of the horizontal and vertical rows1 therefore1 are the facts to be noted here4 ,the diagonal rows do not give the sum #bfj4 ,perhaps some one among our readers who possesses the time and patience will be tempted to outdo ,wenzelides1 and to devise a numeral knight-problem of this kind which will give #bfj not only in the horizontal and vertical but also in the two diagonal rows4 ,,ix4 ,,magical ,,polygons4 ,so far we have only considered such extensions of the idea underlying the construction of the magic square in which the figure of the square was retained4 ,we may however contrive extensions of the idea in which instead of a square1 a rectangle1 a triangle1 or a pentagon1 and the like1 appear4 ,without entering into the consideration of the methods for the construction of such figures1 we will give here of magical polygons simply a few examples1 all supplied by ,professor ,scheffler3 #a7 ,the numbers from #a to #cb admit of being written in a rectangle of #d #h in such a manner that the long horizontal rows give the sum of #acb and the short vertical rows the sum of #ff2 thus3 ,illustration3 ,fig4 #ca4 ---------------- #aajaabibhaiahaf ---------------- #i #bcjabbjbg #gbe ---------------- #bdca #cbaac #fbf #h ---------------- #cbbcbb #d #eadaeag ---------------- #b7 ,the numbers from #a to #bg admit of being so arranged in three regular triangles about a point which forms a common centre1 that each side of the outermost triangle will present #f numbers of the total summation #if and each side of the middle triangle #d numbers whose sum is #fa2 as the following figure shows3 ,illustration3 ,fig4 #cb4 #bf #c #f #aj #bd #bg #bj #i #aa #ba #ah #b #af #ag #ae #h #bb #e #ab #g #ac #d #bc #ai #a #ad #be #c7 ,the numbers from #a to #hj admit of being formed about a point as common centre into #d pentagons1 such that each side of the first pentagon from within contains two numbers1 each side of the second pentagon four numbers1 each of the third six numbers1 and each side of the fourth1 outermost pentagon eight numbers4 ,the sum of the numbers of each side of the second pentagon is #abb1 the sum of those of each side of the third pentagon is #bdh1 and that of those of each side of the fourth pentagon #bed4 ,furthermore1 the sum of any four corner numbers lying in the same straight line with the centre1 is also the same2 namely1 #ib4 ,illustration3 ,fig4 #cc4 #a #bf #ed #ca #di #aj #ae #hj #gf #cf #dd #i #ej #gj #gb #cb #ee #ga #af #ff #bg #e #de #be #fe #cg #b #aa #fa #fj #bd #ad #cj #bj #ag #ec #dj #ef #ei #dc #ce #ba #fd #dh #fi #eg #eh #gc #f #gi #gg #ge #fb #bc #fg #h #df #da #ai #bb #fc #ah #ch #cc #ea #ab #ci #fh #gd #db #ac #bh #d #bi #cd #g #gh #dg #eb #c #d7 ,the numbers from #a to #gc admit of being arranged about a centre1 in which the number #cg is written1 into three hexagons which contain respectively #c1 #e1 and #g numbers in each side and possess the following pretty properties4 ,each hexagon always gives the same sum1 not only when the summation is made along its six sides1 but also when it is made along the six diameters that join its corners and along the six that are constructed at right angles to its sides2 this sum1 for the first hexagon from within1 is #aaa1 for the second #ahe1 and for the third #bei4 ,illustration3 ,fig4 #cd4 #a #e #f #gj #fj #ei #eh #fc #h #fb #ai #ec #df #bb #de #i #fa #bj #bd #fd #b #dh #ca #db #ch #di #eg #c #dg #ci #dj #dd #ef #fg #ea #da #cg #cc #bc #g #ff #ej #cd #ce #ed #aa #fe #be #cf #cb #dc #bf #ab #aj #cj #bg #ac #ag #bi #ba #bh #eb #ee #gb #ah #ga #af #fi #fh #d #ad #ae #gc ,x4 ,,magic ,,cubes4 ,several inquirers1 particularly ,kochansky 7#afhf71 ,sauveur 7#agaj71 ,hugel 7#ahei71 and ,scheffler 7#ahhb71 have extended the principle of the magic squares of the plane to three-dimensioned space4 ,imagine a cube divided by planes parallel to its sides and equidistant from one another1 into cubical compartments4 ,the problem is then1 so to insert in these compartments the successive natural numbers that every row from the right to the left1 every row from the front to the back1 every row from the top to the bottom1 every diagonal of a square1 and every principal diagonal passing through the centre of the cube shall contain numbers whose sum is always the same4 ,for #c times #c times #c compartments1 a magic cube of this description is not constructible4 ,for #d times1 #d times #d compartments a cube is constructible such that any row parallel to an edge of the cube and every principal diagonal give the sum of #acj4 ,to obtain a magic cube of #fd compartments1 imagine the numbers which belong in the compartments written on the upper surface of the same and the numbers then taken off in layers of #af from the top downwards4 ,we obtain thus #d squares of #af cells each1 which together make up the magic cube2 as the following diagrams will show3 ,illustration3 ,first ,layer ,second ,layer ,third ,layer ,fourth ,layer from the ,top4 from the ,top4 from the ,top4 from the ,top4 -------- -------- -------- -------- #adhcbdi #fcahcdae #fbaicead #ddebieb -------- -------- -------- -------- #fjbacgab #fdcbged #gdbbfee #egbddj #i -------- -------- -------- -------- #efbeda #h #ajcibceh #aachbbbi #ecbhdd #e -------- -------- -------- -------- #accfbjfa #eacjdf #c #ejcadg #b #afccagfd -------- -------- -------- -------- ,the same sum #acj here comes out not less than #eb times2 viz4 in the first place from the #af rows from left to right1 secondly from the #af rows from the front to the back1 thirdly from the #af rows counting from the top to the bottom1 and lastly from the #d rows which join each two opposite corners of the cube1 namely from the rows3 #a1 #dc1 #bb1 #fd2 #di1 #bg1 #ch1 #af2 #ac1 #ci1 #bf1 #eb2 #fa1 #bc1 #db1 #d4 ,for a cube with #e compartments in each edge the arrangement of the figures can so be made that all the #ge rows parallel to any and every edge1 all the #cj rows lying in any diagonal of a square1 and all the #d rows forming any principal diagonal shall have one and the same summation1 #cae4 ,just as the magic squares of an odd number of cells could be formed with the aid of two auxiliary squares1 so also odd-numbered magic cubes can be constructed with the help of three auxiliary cubes4 ,illustration3 ,first ,layer from ,top4 ,second ,layer from ,top4 ,third ,layer from ,top4 --------------- --------------- --------------- #aba #bg #hc #ad #gj #b #ehaad #de #if #cc #hi #bj #gaajb --------------- --------------- --------------- #aj #faaag #dh #gi #cf #ib #bc #edaaj #fgabc #bi #he #aa --------------- --------------- --------------- #ddajj #a #egaac #geaja #cb #hh #ai #gf #g #fcaai #ej --------------- --------------- --------------- #ecaji #dj #ia #bb #hd #ae #ffabb #bh #aae #da #ig #c #ei --------------- --------------- --------------- #hg #ah #gdaje #ca #aah #di #hj #f #fb #bd #eeajf #cg #ic --------------- --------------- --------------- ,fourth ,layer from ,top4 ,lowest ,layer4 --------------- --------------- #fdabj #df #gg #h #ie #ba #ebajh #ci --------------- --------------- #ih #d #fjaaa #db #ajd #ce #hf #ag #gc --------------- --------------- #ajg #ch #id #be #ea #ac #fiabe #bf #hb --------------- --------------- #af #gbajc #cd #ij #dg #gh #i #feaaf --------------- --------------- #cj #ha #ab #fhabd #efaab #dc #ii #e --------------- --------------- ,in this manner the preceding magic cube of #e times #e times #e compartments is formed1 in which1 it may be additionally noticed1 the middle number between #a and #abe1 namely #fc1 is placed in the central compartment2 by which arrangement the attainment of the sum of #cae is assured in the four principal diagonals and the #cj sub-diagonals4 ,the condition attained in the magic squares1 that the diagonal-pairs parallel to the sub-diagonals also shall give the sum #cae is not attainable in this case but is so in the case of higher numbers of compartments4 ,,conclusion4 ,musing on such problems as are the magic squares is fascinating to thinkers of a mathematical turn of mind4 ,we take delight in discovering a harmony that abides as an intrinsic quality in the forms of our thought4 ,the problems of the magic squares are playful puzzles1 invented as it seems for mere pastime and sport4 ,but there is a deeper problem underlying all these little riddles1 and this deeper problem is of a sweeping significance4 ,it is the philosophical problem of the world-order4 ,the formal sciences are creations of the mind4 ,we build the sciences of mathematics1 geometry1 and algebra with our conception of pure forms which are abstract ideas4 ,and the same order that prevails in these mental constructions permeates the universe1 so that an old philosopher1 overwhelmed with the grandeur of law1 imagined he heard its rhythm in a cosmic harmony of the spheres4 ,h4 ,,schubert4 ,,footnotes3 #fh ,the term melancholy meant in ,drer's time1 as it did also in ,shakespeare's and ,milton's1 8thought or thoughtfulness40 ,says ,milton in ,il ,penseroso3 8,hail1 thou ,goddess1 sage and holy1 ,hail divinest melancholy ,whose saintly visage is too bright ,to hit the sense of human sight1 ,and therefore to our weaker view ,o'erlaid with black1 staid ,wisdom's hue40--,i1 #ab4 ,thought that does not lead to action produces a gloomy state of mind4 ,thoughtfulness which cannot find a way out of itself is that melancholy which engenders weakness1--a truth which is illustrated in ,hamlet4 ,shakespeare still uses the words thought and melancholy as synonyms1 saying3 8,the native hue of resolution ,is sicklied o'er with the pale cast of thought40 ,drer's melancholy does not represent the gloominess of thought1 but the power of invention4 ,soberness and even a certain sadness are considered only as an element of this melancholy1 but on the whole the genius of thought appears bright1 self-possessed1 and strong4 ,drer represents the ,science of ,mechanical ,invention as a winged female figure musing over some problem4 ,scattered on the floor around her lie some of the simple tools used in the sixteenth century4 ,a ladder leans against the house1 that assists in climbing otherwise inaccessible heights4 ,a scale1 an hour-glass1 a bell1 and the magic square are hanging on the wall behind her4 ,at a distance a bat-like creature1 being the gloom of melancholy1 hovers in the air like a dark cloud1 but the sun rises above the horizon1 and at the happy middle between these two extremes stands the rainbow of serene hope and cheerful confidence4 ,,mr4 ,,spencer ,,on ,,the ,,ethics ,,of ,,kant4 ,mr4 ,herbert ,spencer published in the ,fortnightly ,review for ,july #ahhh and in the ,popular ,science ,monthly for ,august of the same year an article on 8,the ,ethics of ,kant0 in which he so strangely misrepresents ,kant's position that ,kant to any uninitiated reader must appear not only as superficial and shallow1 but even as palpably nonsensical4 ,mr4 ,spencer's article on 8,the ,ethics of ,kant0 is a severe criticism mainly of the nonsensical idea1 erroneously imputed to ,kant1 of a will that has no end4 ,at the same time ,mr4 ,spencer reproaches ,kant with assuming the simplicity of conscience and believing in a non-evolutionary origin of the minds of living beings4 ,in reply to ,mr4 ,spencer an editorial article appeared in ,the ,open ,court under the caption 8,herbert ,spencer on the ,ethics of ,kant0 7,nos4 #ea and #eb71 which was supplemented by another article entitled 8,kant on ,evolution0 7,no4 #aeh71 the latter being elicited by a renewed attack of ,mr4 ,spencer upon ,kant's views 7which appeared in ,mind1 ,no4 ,,lix1 p4 #cac74 ,mr4 ,spencer has republished his article 8,the ,ethics of ,kant0 together with many other older articles in a work of three volumes entitled 8,essays ,scientific1 ,political1 and ,speculative10 #ahia1 in which he repeats the following sentence3 8,thus the basis of the argument by which ,kant attempts to justify his assumption that there exists a good will apart from a good end1 disappears utterly2 and leaves his dogma in all its naked unthinkableness40 ,to this sentence he adds the following foot-note as a reply to my criticisms3 8,i find that in the above three paragraphs ,i have done ,kant less than justice and more than justice--less1 in assuming that his evolutionary view was limited to the genesis of our sidereal system1 and more1 in assuming that he had not contradicted himself4 ,my knowledge of ,kant's writings is extremely limited4 ,in #ahdd a translation of his #8,critique of ,pure ,reason' 7then ,i think lately published7 fell into my hands1 and ,i read the first few pages enunciating his doctrine of ,time and ,space3 my peremptory rejection of which caused me to lay the book down4 ,twice since then the same thing has happened2 for1 being an impatient reader1 when ,i disagree with the cardinal propositions of a work ,i can go no further4 ,one other thing ,i knew4 ,by indirect references ,i was made aware that ,kant had propounded the idea that celestial bodies have been formed by the aggregation of diffused matter4 ,beyond this my knowledge of his conceptions did not extend2 and my supposition that his evolutionary conception had stopped short with the genesis of sun1 stars1 and planets1 was due to the fact that his doctrine of ,time and ,space1 as forms of thought anteceding experience1 implied a supernatural origin inconsistent with the hypothesis of natural genesis4 ,dr4 ,paul ,carus1 who1 shortly after the publication of this article in the ,fortnightly ,review for ,july1 #ahhh1 undertook to defend the ,kantian ethics in the ,american journal which he edits1 ,the ,open ,court1 has now 7,sept4 #d1 #ahij71 in another defensive article1 translated sundry passages from ,kant's #8,critique of ,judgment1' his #8,presumable ,origin of ,humanity1' and his work #8,upon the different ,races of ,mankind1' showing that ,kant was1 if not fully1 yet partially1 an evolutionist in his speculations about living beings4 ,there is1 perhaps1 some reason for doubting the correctness of ,dr4 ,carus's rendering of these passages into ,english4 ,when1 as in the first of the articles just named1 he failed to distinguish between consciousness and conscientiousness1 and when1 as in this last article1 he blames the ,english for mistranslating ,kant1 since they have said #8,kant maintained that ,space and ,time are intuitions1' which is quite untrue1 for they have everywhere described him as maintaining that ,space and ,time are forms of intuition1 one may be excused for thinking that possibly ,dr4 ,carus has read into some of ,kant's expressions1 meanings which they do not rightly bear4 ,still1 the general drift of the passages quoted makes it tolerably clear that ,kant must have believed in the operation of natural causes as largely1 though not entirely1 instrumental in producing organic forms3 extending this belief 7which he says #8can be named a daring venture of reason'7 in some measure to the origin of ,man himself4 ,he does not1 however extend the theory of natural genesis to the exclusion of the theory of supernatural genesis4 ,when he speaks of an organic habit #8which in the wisdom of nature appears to be thus arranged in order that the species shall be preserved'2 and when1 further1 he says #8we see1 moreover1 that a germ of reason is placed in him1 whereby1 after the development of the same1 he is destined for social intercourse1' he implies divine intervention4 ,and this shows that ,i was justified in ascribing to him the belief that ,space and ,time1 as forms of thought1 are supernatural endowments4 ,had he conceived of organic evolution in a consistent manner1 he would necessarily have regarded ,space and ,time as subjective forms generated by converse with objective realities4 8,beyond showing that ,kant had a partial1 if not a complete1 belief in organic evolution 7though with no idea of its causes71 the passages translated by ,dr4 ,carus show that he entertained an implied belief which it here specially concerns me to notice as bearing on his theory of #8a good will4' ,he quotes approvingly ,dr4 ,moscati's lecture showing #8that the upright walk of man is constrained and unnatural1' and showing the imperfect visceral arrangements and consequent diseases which result3 not only adopting1 but further illustrating1 ,dr4 ,moscati's argument4 ,if here1 then1 there is a distinct admission1 or rather assertion1 that various human organs are imperfectly adjusted to their functions1 what becomes of the postulate above quoted #8that no organ for any purpose will be found in it but what is also the fittest and best adapted for that purpose'8 ,and what becomes of the argument which sets out with this postulate8 ,clearly1 ,i am indebted to ,dr4 ,carus for enabling me to prove that ,kant's defence of his theory of #8a good will' is1 by his own showing1 baseless40 ,mr4 ,spencer's reply to my criticisms is surprising in more than one respect4 ,first1 without even mentioning the objections ,i make he discredits my arguments by throwing doubt upon the correctness of the translations of the quoted passages4 ,secondly1 he alleges1 with a view of justifying his doubt1 that in the first of my articles ,i 8failed to distinguish between consciousness and conscientiousness40#fi ,thirdly1 ,mr4 ,spencer declares that ,i had 8read into some of ,kant's expressions1 meanings which they do not rightly bear40 ,fourthly1 ,mr4 ,spencer bases this opinion upon a double mistake3 he blames me for not distinguishing between the ,kantian phrases that 8,space and ,time are intuitions0 and that they are 8forms of intuition40 ,fifthly1 acknowledging after all that ,kant had at least 8a partial belief in organic evolution10 ,mr4 ,spencer accuses him of inconsistency4 ,sixthly1 several statements concerning ,kant's views are made not because ,kant held them but because ,mr4 ,spencer assumes for trivial reasons that he is 8justified in ascribing them to him40 ,seventhly1 these statements so vigorously set forth are accompanied by ,mr4 ,spencer's remarkably frank confession of unfamiliarity with the subject under discussion4 ,it may be added that ,mr4 ,spencer calls my criticisms 8defensive articles40 ,he says that 8,i undertook to defend the ,kantian ethics02 while1 in fact1 my articles are aggressive4 ,kant needs no defense for being misunderstood1 and it would not be my business to defend him1 for ,i am not a ,kantian in the sense that ,i adopt any of the main doctrines of ,kant4 ,on the contrary ,i dissent from him on almost all fundamental questions4 ,in ethics ,i object to ,kant's views in so far as they can be considered as pure formalism4#gj ,i am a ,kantian only in the sense that ,i respect ,kant as one of the most eminent philosophers1 that ,i revere him as that teacher of mine whose influence upon me was greatest1 and ,i consider the study of ,kant's works as an indispensable requisite for understanding the problems of the philosophy of our time4 ,far from defending ,kant's position1 ,i only undertook to inform ,mr4 ,spencer of what ,kant had really maintained1 so that instead of denouncing absurdities which ,kant had never thought of1 he might criticise the real ,kant4 99 99 99 99 99 ,i shall now take up the details of ,mr4 ,spencer's reply3 ,i4 ,i am sorry to see that ,mr4 ,spencer1 instead of frankly acknowledging his errors1 has taken refuge in discrediting the translations1 which might very easily have been examined either by himself or by friends of his2 especially as the ,german original of the most important passages1 wherever any doubt might arise1 and also of those expressions on the misconception of which ,mr4 ,spencer bases his unfavorable opinion of ,kant1 were added in foot-notes4 ,,ii4 ,but ,mr4 ,spencer adduces1 as if it were a fact1 an instance of my grave mistakes4 ,he says that ,i failed to distinguish between 8consciousness0 and 8conscientiousness40 ,mr4 ,spencer makes much of a small matter1 which1 if it were as he assumes1 would have to be considered as a misprint4 ,mr4 ,spencer's statement is so positive that it must make on any reader the impression of being indubitably true4 ,however1 in the whole first article of mine1 and indeed in both articles1 8conscientiousness0 is nowhere mentioned and it would be wrong to replace the word 8consciousness0 in any of the passages in which it occurs by 8conscientiousness40 ,i should be glad if ,mr4 ,spencer would kindly point out to me the passage which he had in mind when making his statement1 for since there is not even so much as an occasion for confounding consciousness and conscientiousness1 ,i stand here before a psychological problem4 ,mr4 ,spencer's statement is a perfect riddle to me4 ,either ,i have a negative hallucination1 as psychologists call it1 so that ,i do not see what is really there1 or ,mr4 ,spencer must have had a positive hallucination4 ,that which ,mr4 ,spencer has read into my article1 was never written and it is not there4 ,the alleged fact to which he refers1 does not exist4 ,this kind of erroneous reference into which ,mr4 ,spencer has inadvertently fallen is a very grievous mistake4 ,it appears more serious than a simple slip of the pen1 when we consider that ,mr4 ,spencer uses the statement for the purpose of incrimination4 ,he justifies upon this exceedingly slender basis his doubt concerning the correctness of the translations of the quoted passages1 and ,mr4 ,spencer's doubt concerning the correctness of these translations is his main argument for rejecting my criticisms in toto4 ,it is not impossible1 indeed it is probable1 that ,mr4 ,spencer meant 8conscience0 instead of 8conscientiousness40 ,there is one passage in which a superficial reader might have expected 8conscience0 in place of 8consciousness40 ,however that does not occur in any of the translations1 but in a paragraph where ,i speak on my own account4 ,this passage appears in the appended reprint on page #bc1 line #ad4 ,whatever anybody might have expected in that passage1 ,i certainly intended to say 8consciousness10 and only a hasty reader1 only he who might merely read the first line of the paragraph1 would consider the word 8consciousness0 a mistake4 ,to avoid any equivocation1 however1 even to hasty readers1 and to guard against a misconstruction such as ,mr4 ,spencer possibly has given to the sentence1 ,i propose to alter the passage by adding a few words as follows3 8,it is quite true that not only conscience1 but every state of consciousness is a feeling10 etc4 ,the italicised words are inserted1 simply to show that here ,i mean 8consciousness10 and not 8conscience40 ,for the rest1 they do not alter in the least the sense of the sentence4 ,in this passage as throughout the whole article the terms 8consciousness10 and 8conscience0 have been used properly4 99 99 99 99 99 ,observing that ,mr4 ,spencer appears to have committed the same mistake for which he erroneously blames me1 ,i do not mean to say that he 8failed to distinguish between0 conscientiousness and conscience4 ,i should rather regard it as trifling on my part if ,i drew this inference from what is either a slip of the pen or an oversight in proof-reading4 ,but it strikes me that that knavish rogue among the fairies whom ,shakespeare calls ,puck and scientists define as chance or coincidence played in a fit of anger and perhaps from a sentiment of pardonable irony a humorous trick upon ,mr4 ,spencer4 ,the moral of it is that when an author censures his fellow authors with undue severity for things that might be mere misprints1 he should keep a close eye on his own printer's devil4 ,,iii4 ,mr4 ,spencer discredits my knowledge of ,kant4 ,he says of me3 8,one may be excused for thinking that possibly ,dr4 ,carus has read into some of ,kant's expressions1 meanings which they do not rightly bear40 ,i did not give ,mr4 ,spencer any occasion for making this personal reflection4 ,i do not boast of any extraordinary familiarity with ,kant's writings4 ,there are innumerable ,german and also ,english and ,american scholars and philosophers who know ,kant almost by heart4 ,but the question at issue is not what ,i conceive ,kant's ideas to be1 but what ,kant has really said1 and ,i was very careful in letting ,kant speak for himself4 ,my criticism of ,mr4 ,spencer's conception of ,kant consisted almost exclusively in collating and contrasting ,mr4 ,spencer's views of ,kant with quotations from ,kant's works4 ,how can ,i read anything into some of ,kant's expressions1 if ,i present translations of the expressions themselves1 adding thereto in foot-notes the original whenever doubts could arise8 ,and the general drift of the quotations alone suffices to overthrow ,mr4 ,spencer's conception of ,kant4 ,the truth is that ,mr4 ,spencer committed the mistake himself1 for which he censures me unjustly4 8,mr4 ,spencer has read into some of ,kant's expressions meanings which they do not rightly bear40 ,,iv4 ,but ,mr4 ,spencer adduces a fact1 which1 if it were as ,mr4 ,spencer represents it1 would show an inability on my part of making important distinctions4 ,he says of me3 8,he blames the ,english for mistranslating ,kant1 since they have said #8,kant maintained that ,space and ,time are intuitions1' which is quite untrue1 for they have everywhere described him as maintaining that ,space and ,time are forms of intuition40 ,this is a double mistake3 7#a7 ,kant and his translators did not make the distinction of which ,mr4 ,spencer speaks1 and 7#b7 the quotation ,mr4 ,spencer makes from my article is represented to mean something different from what it actually means in the context4 ,before ,i speak for myself as to what ,i actually said1 let us state the facts concerning ,kant's usage of the terms 8intuitions0 and 8forms of intuition40 ,kant defines in #a of his 8,critique of ,pure ,reason0 what he understands by 8,transcendental sthetic40 ,he distinguishes between 8empirical intuition0 7empirische ,anschauung7 and 8pure intuition0 7reine ,anschauung74 ,he says3 8,that sort of intuition which relates to an object by means of sensation1 is called an empirical intuition40 ,representations contain besides that which belongs to sensation some other elements4 ,kant says3 8,that which effects that the content of the phenomenon can be arranged under certain relations1 ,i call its form40 ,and later on he continues3 8,this pure form of sensibility ,i shall call pure intuition40 ,these are ,kant's phrases in ,j4 ,m4 ,d4 ,meiklejohn's well known translation4 ,the term 8pure intuition0 is repeated again and again1 and we find frequently added by way of explanation the phrases 8as a mere form of sensibility10 8the mere form of phenomena10 8forms of sensuous intuition10 and also 7as ,mr4 ,spencer emphasises as the only correct way7 8forms of intuition40 ,kant says3 #a7 8,diese reine ,form der ,sinnlichkeit wird auch selber reine ,anschauung heissen4 #a4 #b7 8,zweitens worden wir von dieser 7der empirischen ,anschauung7 noch alles abtrennen1 damit nichts als reine ,anschauung und die blosse ,form der ,erscheinungen brig bleibe4 #a4 #c7 8,raum 444 muss ursprnglich ,anschauung sein4 #c4 #d7 8,der ,raum ist nichts anderes als nur die ,form aller ,erscheinungen usserer ,sinne4 #c4 #e7 8,der ,raum aber betrifft nur die reine ,form der ,anschauung4 7,this passage appears in the first edition only1 the paragraph containing it is omitted in the second edition47 #c4 #f7 8,die ,zeit ist 444 eine reine ,form der sinnlichen ,anschauung4444 #d4 #g7 8,es muss ihr#ga unmittelbare ,anschauung zum ,grunde liegen4 #d4 #h7 8,die ,zeit ist nichts anderes als die ,form des inneren ,sinnes4 #f4 #i7 8444 dass die ,vorstellung der ,zeit selbst ,anschauung sei4 #f4 #aj7 8,wir haben nun 444 reine ,anschauung a priori1 ,raum und ,zeit4 #aj4 ,beschluss der transcendentalen sthetik40 ,these quotations do not pretend to be exhaustive1 nor is that necessary for the present purpose4 ,kant1 as we learn from these quotations1 makes no distinction between reine ,anschauung and ,form der ,anschauung4 ,he uses most frequently the term reine ,anschauung and designates in several places ,space and ,time simply as ,anschauung4 7,see the quotations #c1 #g1 and #i47 ,so far as ,i can gather from a renewed perusal1 the expression proposed by ,mr4 ,spencer1 8form of intuition10 ,form der ,anschauung1 occurs only once and that too in a passage omitted in the second edition4 ,it is almost redundant to add that the ,english translators and interpreters of ,kant follow the original pretty closely4 ,accordingly it is actually incorrect 8that they have everywhere767 described ,kant as maintaining that ,space and ,time are forms of intuition40 ,in addition to the quotations from ,meiklejohn1 ,i call ,mr4 ,spencer's attention to ,william ,flemming's 8,vocabulary of ,philosophy0 7#dth ed41 edited by ,henry ,calderwood7 which reads sub voce 8,intuition10 p4 #bbh with reference to ,kant's view3 8,space and time are intuitions of sense40 ,to say 8,time and ,space are forms of intuition0 is quite correct according to ,kantian terminology4 ,no objection can be made to ,mr4 ,spencer on that ground4 ,but to say 8,time and ,space are intuitions0 is also quite correct1 and ,mr4 ,spencer is wrong in censuring the expression4 ,why does ,mr4 ,spencer rebuke me so severely on a point which is of no consequence8 ,he appears confident that ,i have betrayed an unpardonable misconception of ,kant's philosophy4 ,but having pointed out by quotations from ,kant that this is not so1 ,i shall now proceed to explain why the quotation which ,mr4 ,spencer makes from my article1 although the eight words in quotation marks are literally quoted1 is a misquotation4 ,it is torn out of its context4 ,i did not blame the ,english translators of ,kant at all1 but ,i blamed his interpreters1 among whom the ,english interpreters 7not all ,english interpreters1 but certainly some of them7 are the worst1 for 8mutilating ,kant's best thoughts1 so that this hero of progress appears as a stronghold of antiquated views02 and as an instance ,i called attention to the misconception of ,kant's term ,anschauung1 saying3 8,how different is ,kant's philosophy1 for instance1 if his position with reference to time and space is mistaken6 #8,time and ,space are our ,anschauung1' ,kant says4 ,but his ,english translators declare #8,kant maintained that space and time are intuitions4' ,what a difference it makes if intuition is interpreted in the sense applied to it by the ,english intuitionalist school instead of its being taken in the original meaning of the word ,anschauung40 ,the word 8intuition0 implies something mysterious2 the word ,anschauung denotes that which is immediately perceived1 simply1 as it were1 by looking at it4 ,so especially the sense-perceptions of the things before us are ,anschauungen4 ,mr4 ,spencer1 believing that he had caught me in making unawares a blunder1 tears the passage out of its context1 ignores its purport1 makes a point of an antithesis which had nothing in the world to do with the topic under discussion1 only to throw on me the opprobrium of incompetence4 ,even if ,mr4 ,spencer's antithesis of 8intuition0 and 8forms of intuition0 were of any consequence 7as1 unfortunately for ,mr4 ,spencer1 it is not71 it would count for nothing against me because ,i did not speak of 8forms0 in the passage referred to1 ,i simply alluded to one misinterpretation of the term ,anschauung1 which is quite common among ,english ,kantians4 ,it was not required by the purpose ,i had in view1 to enter into any details as to what kind of ,anschauung ,i meant1 and an allusion to 8form0 or to any other subject would have served only to confound the idea which ,i intended to set forth in the paragraph from which ,mr4 ,spencer quotes4 ,misquotation of this kind1 into which ,mr4 ,spencer was inveigled by a hasty reading1 should be avoided with utmost care1 for it involves an insinuation4 ,it leads away from the main point under discussion to side issues1 and it misrepresents the author from whom the quotation is made4 ,it insinuates a meaning which the passage does not bear and which was not even thought of in the context out of which it is torn4 ,mr4 ,spencer quotes the passage as if ,i had preferred the term 8intuition0 to the term 8form of intuition10 or at least1 as if ,i had no idea that ,kant conceives ,time and ,space as 8forms40 ,yet ,mr4 ,spencer in trying to make out a point against me betrays his own lack of information4 ,kant insisted most emphatically on calling the forms of our sensibility 7i4 e4 space and time7 8,anschauungen40 ,but ,mr4 ,spencer's case is worse still4 ,while he insists upon the statement that according to the translators of ,kant space and time are 8forms of intuition10 which is at least correct1 he uses twice in the very same paragraph the expression that according to ,kant 8space and time are forms of thought10 which is incorrect4 ,the forms of thought according to ,kantian terminology are not space and time but the domain of the transcendental logic4 ,anyone who confounds the two terms 8forms of intuition0 and 8forms of thought0 proves himself unable to form a correct opinion on ,kant's philosophy4 ,that is just characteristic of ,kant that he regards time and space not as thought1 nor as forms of thought1 but as ,anschauungen and in contradistinction to sense-intuitions 7i4 e4 sensations7 he calls them reine ,anschauungen or ,formen der ,anschauung4 ,v4 ,mr4 ,spencer commenting upon his criticism of ,kant's idea of a ,good ,will1 says3 8,i find that in the above three paragraphs ,i have done ,kant less than justice and more than justice--less1 in assuming that his evolutionary view was limited to the genesis of our sidereal system1 and more1 in assuming that he had not contradicted himself4 8,clearly1 ,i am indebted to ,dr4 ,carus for enabling me to prove that ,kant's defence of his theory of #8a good will' is1 by his own showing1 baseless40 ,kant's idea of a good will has nothing to do with evolution1 and we can abstain here from discussing whether or not ,kant was an evolutionist4 ,whether evolution is true or not1 what difference does it make to the proposition1 that a good will is the only thing which can be called good without further qualification 7ohne ,einschrnkung78 ,pleasure is good1 but it is not absolutely good1 there are cases in which pleasure is a very bad thing4 ,we must qualify our statement and limit it to special cases4 ,a good will1 however1 says ,kant1 is in itself good under all circumstances4 ,did ,mr4 ,spencer prove the baselessness of ,kant's proposition by proving evolution8 ,is it inconsistent to believe in evolution and at the same time to regard a good will as absolutely good1 as good without reserve or limitation8 ,i think not6 ,,vi4 ,mr4 ,spencer in admitting that 8the general drift of the passages quoted makes it tolerably clear that ,kant must have believed in the operation of natural causes 444 in producing organic forms10 adds3 8,he does not1 however1 extend the theory of natural genesis to the exclusion of the theory of supernatural genesis40 ,how does ,mr4 ,spencer prove his statement8 ,does he quote a passage from ,kant which expresses his belief in supernaturalism8 ,no1 ,mr4 ,spencer does not quote ,kant1 and it would be difficult to find a passage to suit that purpose4 ,mr4 ,spencer adduces a few unmeaning phrases gleaned at random and torn out of their context1 and from these phrases he concludes that ,kant believed in the supernatural4 ,kant spoke somewhere of 8the wisdom of nature0 who has things so arranged that the species might be preserved4 ,if the wisdom of nature in preserving the species is to be taken literally1 the phrase might prove that ,kant believed nature to be a wise old woman4 ,kant spoke further of 8the germ of reason placed in man whereby he is destined to social intercourse40 ,does the usage of the word 8destined0 really 8imply divine intervention10 as ,mr4 ,spencer says8 ,mr4 ,spencer adds3 8,and this viz4 ,kant's usage of these phrases shows that ,i was justified in ascribing to him the belief that ,space and ,time1 as forms of thought sic61 are supernatural endowments40 ,what might we not prove by this kind of loose argumentation6 ,kant did not introduce any supernatural explanations2 on the contrary1 he proposed to exclude 8supernatural genesis40 ,he says e4 g4 in a passage of the 8,critique of ,judgment0 quoted on page #da of the appendix3 8,if we assume occasionalism for the production of organised beings1 nature is thereby wholly discarded 444 therefore it cannot be supposed that this system is accepted by anyone who has had to do with philosophy40 ,and furthermore ,kant rejects the partial admission of the supernatural1 saying3 8,as though it were not the same to make the required forms arise in a supernatural manner at the beginning of the world as during its progress40 ,mr4 ,spencer charges ,kant with inconsistency4 ,we do not intend to say that ,kant was in all the phases of his development consistent with himself4 ,but we do say that the charge of ,mr4 ,spencer against ,kant consists in this3 the real ,kant has said things which are incompatible with ,mr4 ,spencer's view of ,kant4 ,this settles the sixth point4 ,,vii4 ,mr4 ,spencer's reply to my criticism is a very strange piece of controversy and ,i have actually been at a loss1 how to account for it4 ,the situation can be explained only by assuming that ,mr4 ,spencer1 being an impatient reader1 when finding out that he disagreed with my propositions1 could go no further and wrote his reply to me without having read my articles4 ,this is very hard on a critic who1 carefully avoiding everything that might look like fault-finding1 is painstakingly careful in giving to the author criticised every means of investigating the truth himself and helps him in a friendly way to correct his errors4 ,there is only one consolation for me1 which is1 that ,i am in good company4 ,the great thinker of ,koenigsberg is very severely censured in almost all of ,mr4 ,spencer's writings for ideas which he never held4 ,and now ,mr4 ,spencer confesses openly and with ingenuous sincerity1 that his knowledge of ,kant's writings is extremely limited4 ,but why he condemns a man of whom he knows so little ,mr4 ,spencer does not tell us4 ,mr4 ,spencer says3 8,my knowledge of ,kant's writings is extremely limited4 ,in #ahdd a translation of his 8,critique of ,pure ,reason0 7then ,i think lately published7 fell into my hands1 and ,i read the first few pages enunciating his doctrine of ,time and ,space3 my peremptory rejection of which caused me to lay the book down4 8,twice since then the same thing has happened2 for1 being an impatient reader1 when ,i disagree with the cardinal propositions of a work ,i can go no further4 8,one other thing ,i knew4 ,by indirect references ,i was made aware that ,kant had propounded the idea that celestial bodies have been formed by the aggregation of diffused matter4 ,beyond this my knowledge of his conceptions did not extend2 and my supposition that his evolutionary conception had stopped short with the genesis of sun1 stars1 and planets was due to the fact that his doctrine of ,time and ,space1 as forms of thought sic anteceding experience1 implied a supernatural origin inconsistent with the hypothesis of natural genesis40 ,kant has been a leader in thought for the last century4 ,it is very important to criticise his ideas wherever they are wrong1 but his errors cannot be conquered by ex cathedra denunciations4 ,darwin's habits in investigating and weighing the pro and con of a question were very different from ,mr4 ,spencer's1 and ,darwin's success is in no small degree due to the sternness with which he adhered to certain rules of reading and studying4 ,we find in his 8,autobiography0 certain reminiscences labeled 8important0 from which the following is most instructive3 8,i had also1 during many years1 followed a golden rule1 namely1 that whenever a published fact1 a new observation or a thought1 came across me1 which was opposed to my general results1 to make a memorandum of it without fail1 for ,i had found by experience that such facts and thoughts were far more apt to escape from the memory than favorable ones40 ,experience teaches that we can learn most from those authors with whom we do not agree4 ,the ethics of reading and studying demand other habits than laying a book down when we disagree with its cardinal propositions4 ,such habits prevent progress and create prejudices4 99 99 99 99 99 ,mr4 ,spencer has not answered my criticism at all4 ,mr4 ,spencer did not even take into consideration the passages quoted from ,kant4 ,he republished all the false statements of ,kant's views1 so inconsiderately made1 together with all the perverse opinions based upon them4 ,the assurance with which ,mr4 ,spencer makes statements which have no foundation whatever is really perplexing even to a man who is well informed on the subject1 and it will go far to convince the unwary reader4 ,what1 however1 shall become of the general tenor of philosophical criticism and controversy if a man of ,mr4 ,spencer's reputation is so indifferent about being informed concerning the exact views of his adversary1 if he is so careless in presenting them1 if he makes positively erroneous statements on confessedly mere 8supposition10 and finally1 if in consequence thereof he is flagrantly unjust in censuring errors which arise only from his own too prolific imagination8 ,we feel confident that ,mr4 ,spencer will explain his side of the question satisfactorily4 ,his mistakes being undeniable1 we do not believe that he will seek to deny them4 ,yet we trust that ,mr4 ,spencer as soon as he finds himself at fault1 will not even make an attempt at palliation1 that he will not blink the frank acknowledgment of his misstatements and also of having treated ,kant with injustice4 ,a man who has devoted his life to the search for truth will not suffer any blot to remain on his escutcheon4 ,,editor4 ,,footnotes3 #fi ,this article 8,herbert ,spencer on the ,ethics of ,kant0 was electrotyped at the time it appeared in ,the ,open ,court4 ,it is appended to this number of ,the ,monist as documentary evidence of the fact1 that there is not even so much as an occasion in the article for confounding 8consciousness0 and 8conscientiousness40 #gj ,see ,fundamental ,problems1 pp4 #aig-bjf2 and ,the ,ethical ,problem1 p4 #cb1 seq41 especially p4 #cc1 lines #ah-bj4 #ga ,second edition reads 8ihnen0 in place of 8ihr10 viz4 der ,zeit4 ,the word 8ihnen0 refers to ,theilvorstellungen der ,zeit4 ,,what ,,does ,,anschauung ,,mean8 ,mr4 ,spencer's erroneous statement that ,kant conceives space and time as forms of thought instead of forms of intuition induces me to make a few explanatory remarks concerning the term ,anschauung4 ,kant means that space and time are immediately given in experience and not inferences drawn from the data of experience2 they are not thoughts1 but objects of direct perception4 ,sense-impressions are data1 they are prior to ideas1 the latter being constructions made out of sense-impressions4 ,sense-impressions are facts1 but ideas are of an inferential nature2 they are 7to use ,lloyd ,morgan's excellent term7 constructs4 ,now ,kant claims that space and time are in the same predicament3 they also are immediately given1 they also are ,anschauungen4 ,kant did not trouble himself much to prove that they are forms2 he seems to have taken that for granted4 ,but he was very careful to show that they are not ideas1 not thoughts1 not abstractions1 not generalisations1 but that they are as direct data as are sense-impressions and he calls the knowledge which man has by directly facing the object of knowledge 8,anschauung40 ,the conclusion which ,kant draws from this may be characterised as follows3 ,sensations are not things but appearances2 they are subjective1 not objective1 they are not the objects themselves but what our sensibility makes of objects4 ,space and time being ,anschauungen1 ,kant argues that they are of the same kind as the sense-data of knowledge1 that they are inherent in our nature4 ,thus ,kant maintains3 8,sensations are the products of our sensibility1 and space and time are the forms of our sensibility40 ,the word ,anschauung has been a crux interpretum since translations have been made from ,kant1 and it is quite true that no adequate word to express it1 exists in ,english4 ,i enjoyed of late a discussion on the subject with ,mr4 ,francis ,c4 ,russell who called my attention to several notes in ,the ,journal of ,speculative ,philosophy4 ,the following is from the pen of ,dr4 ,w4 ,t4 ,harris 7,vol4 ,,ii1 p4 #aia73 8,through a singular chance1 the present number of the journal contains two notes from two contributors on the proper translation of the ,german word ,anschauung4 ,mr4 ,kroeger holds that the word ,anschauung1 as used by ,fichte and also by ,kant1 denotes an act of the ,ego which the ,english word ,intuition does not at all express1 but for which the ,english word #8contemplation' is an exact equivalent4 ,mr4 ,peirce suggests that no person whose native tongue is ,english will translate ,anschauung by another word than ,intuition4 ,whether there is a failure to understand ,english on the one hand or ,german on the other1 the ,editor does not care to inquire4 ,it is certain that while intuition has been adopted generally as an equivalent for the word under consideration both by ,english and ,french translators1 yet it was a wide departure from the ordinary ,english use of the term4 ,besides this1 we have no ,english verb intuite 7at least in the ,dictionaries71 and the reader will find that the verb used by ,meiklejohn 7in the translation of ,kant's ,kritik7 for it1 is contemplate1 and the same rendering is given by ,smith in his excellent translation of ,fichte's ,popular ,works 7,london1 #ahdi740 ,mr4 ,charles ,s4 ,peirce says3 8,no person whose native tongue is ,english will need to be informed that contemplation is essentially 7#a7 protracted 7#b7 voluntary1 and 7#c7 an action1 and that it is never used for that which is set forth to the mind in this act4 ,a foreigner can convince himself of this by the proper study of ,english writers4 ,thus1 ,locke 7,essay concerning ,human ,understanding1 ,book ,,ii41 chap4 #ai1 #a7 says1 #8,if it an idea be held there in view long under attentive consideration1 'tis contemplation02 and again1 7,ibid41 ,book ,,ii41 chap4 #aj1 #a7 #8,keeping the ,idea1 which is brought into it the mind for some time actually in view1 which is called ,contemplation4' ,this term is therefore unfitted to translate ,anschauung2 for this latter does not imply an act which is necessarily protracted or voluntary1 and denotes most usually a mental presentation1 sometimes a faculty1 less often the reception of an impression in the mind1 and seldom1 if ever1 an action4 8,to the translation of ,anschauung by intuition1 there is1 at least1 no such insufferable objection4 ,etymologically the two words precisely correspond4 ,the original philosophical meaning of intuition was a cognition of the present manifold in that character2 and it is now commonly used1 as a modern writer says1 #8to include all the products of the perceptive 7external or internal7 and imaginative faculties2 every act of consciousness1 in short1 of which the immediate object is an individual1 thing1 act1 or state of mind1 presented under the condition of distinct existence in space and time4' ,finally1 we have the authority of ,kant's own example for translating his ,anschauung by ,intuitus2 and1 indeed1 this is the common usage of ,germans writing ,latin4 ,moreover1 intuitiv frequently replaces anschauend or anschaulich4 ,if this constitutes a misunderstanding of ,kant1 it is one which is shared by himself and nearly all his countrymen0 7ibid4 p4 #aeb et seqq474 ,mr4 ,peirce adds the following explanation concerning the term intuition in another note 7ibid4 p4 #ajc73 8,the word intuitus first occurs as a technical term in ,st4 ,anselm's ,monologium4 ,he wished to distinguish between our knowledge of ,god and our knowledge of finite things 7and1 in the next world1 of ,god1 also72 and thinking of the saying of ,st4 ,paul1 ,videmus nunc per speculum in nigmate3 tunc autem facie ad faciem1 he called the former speculation and the latter intuition4 ,this use of #8speculation' did not take root1 because that word already had another exact and widely different meaning4 8,in the middle ages1 the term #8intuitive cognition' had two principal senses1 #ast1 as opposed to abstractive cognition1 it meant the knowledge of the present as present1 and this is its meaning in ,anselm2 but #b;d1 as no intuitive cognition was allowed to be determined by a previous cognition1 it came to be used as the opposite of discursive cognition 7see ,scotus1 ,in sentent4 lib4 #b1 dist4 #c1 qu4 #i71 and this is nearly the sense in which ,i employ it4 ,this is also nearly the sense in which ,kant uses it1 the former distinction being expressed by his sensuous and non-sensuous4 7,see ,werke1 herausg4 ,rosenkrantz1 ,thl4 #b1 ,s4 #gac1 #ca1 #da1 #ajj1 u4 s4 w47 8,an enumeration of six meanings of intuition may be found in ,hamilton's ,reid p4 #gei40 ,if we have to choose between the two translations 8intuition0 and 8contemplation10 we should with ,mr4 ,peirce decidedly prefer the word 8intuition40 ,the word contemplation corresponds to the ,german ,betrachtung and all that ,mr4 ,peirce says against it holds good4 ,but we must confess that the term intuition 7as ,mr4 ,peirce himself seems to grant7 is not a very good translation either4 ,the term intuition has other meanings which interfere with the correct meaning of ,anschauung and was actually productive of much confusion4 ,the ,english term intuition is strongly tinged with the same meaning that is attached to the ,german word ,intuition4 ,it means an inexplicable kind of direct information from some supernatural sources1 which mystics claim to possess as the means of their revelations4 ,in this sense ,goethe characterises it satirically in ,faust 7,scene ,,xiv74 ,mephistopheles describes the process as follows3 ,a blessing drawn from supernatural fountain6 ,in night and dew to lie upon the mountains2 ,all ,heaven and ,earth in rapture penetrating2 ,thyself to ,godhood haughtily inflating2 ,to grub with yearning force through ,earth's dark marrow1 ,compress the six days' work within thy bosom narrow1-- ,to taste1 ,i know not what1 in haughty power1 ,thine own ecstatic life on all things shower1 ,thine earthly self behind thee cast1 ,and then the lofty intuition with a gesture at last4 ,the satire is good on ,intuition but it would not apply to ,anschauung1 for the latter word excludes rigidly any mysticism or supernaturalism which the former essentially involves4 ,to employ the term 8intuition0 for both ideas must necessarily weaken the meaning of ,anschauung4 ,besides we should bear in mind that the ,german ,anschauung is vernacular and should find a correspondent ,saxon word4 ,such ,latin words as intuition convey in ,english as much as in ,german the impression of being terms denoting something very abstract4 ,vernacular terms much more strongly indicate the immediateness and directness which is implied in ,anschauung4 ,in my conversation with ,mr4 ,russell1 we tried to coin a new word that should cover the meaning of ,anschauung as an act of 8atlooking0 and the word 8atsight0 readily suggested itself4 ,the word 8atsight0 is an exact ,english equivalent of the ,german ,anschauung4 ,it describes the looking at an object in its immediate presence4 ,at the same time the word is readily understood1 while philologically considered1 its formation is fully justified by the existence of the words 8insight and foresight40 99 99 99 99 99 ,one of the most important of ,kant's doctrines is the proposition that all thought must ultimately have reference to ,anschauung1 i4 e4 to atsight4 ,through atsight only the objects of experience can be given us4 ,all speculations not founded upon this bottom rock of knowledge are mere dreams4 ,this is the maxim of positivism and it is the basis of all sound philosophy4 ,says ,kant in the 8,anhang0 to his ,prolegomena 7in reply to a critic who had misunderstood his idealism7 as a summary statement of his views3 8,der ,satz aller echten ,idealisten1 von der eleatischen ,schule an bis zum ,bischof ,berkley1 ist in dieser ,formel enthalten3 #8alle ,erkenntnis durch ,sinne und ,erfahrung ist nichts als lauter ,schein1 und nur in den ,ideen des reinen ,verstandes und ,vernunft ist ,wahrheit4' 8,der ,grundsatz1 der meinen ,idealismus durchgngig regiert und bestimmt1 ist dagegen3 #8,alles ,erkenntnis von ,dingen1 aus blossem reinen ,verstande oder reiner ,vernunft1 ist nichts als lauter ,schein1 und nur in der ,erfahrung ist ,wahrheit4'0 8,the doctrine of all genuine idealists from the ,eleatic ,school down to ,bishop ,berkeley is contained in this formula3 ,all cognition through the senses and experience is nothing but illusion2 and in the ideas of the pure understanding and reason alone is truth4 8,the principle1 however1 that rules and determines my idealism throughout is this3 ,all cognition out of pure understanding or pure reason is nothing but mere illusion and in experience alone is truth40 ,kant then proposes in order to avoid equivocation to call his views 8formal or critical idealism10 adding that his idealism made any other idealism impossible4 ,criticism truly is the beginning of philosophy as an objective science4 ,it gives the coup de grace to those worthless declamations which still pass among many as philosophy4 ,says ,kant3 8,so viel ist gewiss3 wer einmal ,kritik gekostet hat1 den ekelt auf immer alles dogmatische ,gewsche40 8,that much is certain3 ,he who has once tasted critique will be forever disgusted with all dogmatic twaddle40 ,it is strange that in spite of ,kant's explicit declaration1 which leaves no doubt about the positive spirit that pervades the principles of his philosophy1 he is still misunderstood by his opponents no less than by those who profess to be his disciples4 99 99 99 99 99 ,there is no occasion now to treat the subject exhaustively1 but it may be permitted to add a few remarks on ,kant's proposition that space and time are atsights4 ,we must distinguish three things3 #a7 ,objective space4 #b7 ,space as atsight1 and #c7 ,space-conception4 ,space as atsight is the datum4 ,it is the immediate presence of relations among the sensory impressions4 ,this1 however1 is not as yet that something which we generally call space4 ,that which generally goes by the name of space is a construction built out of the relational data that obtain in experience and we propose to call it space-conception4 ,our space-conception1 accordingly1 7and here ,i include the mathematician's space-conception7 is based upon space as atsight1 but it is more than atsight4 ,it is an inference made therefrom1 it is the product of experience4 ,space-conception1 however1 is as are all legitimate noumena1 no mere subjective illusion1 it possesses objective validity2 it describes some real existence and this real existence represented in space-conception is what may be called objective space4 ,objective space is the form of reality4 ,space as atsight is the form of sensibility4 ,space as space-conception is a construct of an abstract nature and serves as a description or plan of the form of reality4 ,the same is true of ,time4 ,time as atsight is the relation of succession obtaining in the changes of experience4 ,time as time-conception is the noumenon constructed out of these data to represent that feature of reality which may for lack of a better term be called objective time4 ,briefly3 ,space and ,time are not things1 not essences1 not entities1 but certain features of existence4 ,they are the forms of reality4 ,when existence finds a representation in the feelings of a sentient being1 time and space appear as their forms1 and these forms furnish the material out of which are built the conceptions of ,space and ,time4 ,,editor4 ,,the ,,law ,,of ,,mind4 ,in an article published in ,the ,monist for ,january #ahia1 ,i endeavored to show what ideas ought to form the warp of a system of philosophy1 and particularly emphasised that of absolute chance4 ,in the number of ,april #ahib1 ,i argued further in favor of that way of thinking1 which it will be convenient to christen tychism 7from 1 chance74 ,a serious student of philosophy will be in no haste to accept or reject this doctrine2 but he will see in it one of the chief attitudes which speculative thought may take1 feeling that it is not for an individual1 nor for an age1 to pronounce upon a fundamental question of philosophy4 ,that is a task for a whole era to work out4 ,i have begun by showing that tychism must give birth to an evolutionary cosmology1 in which all the regularities of nature and of mind are regarded as products of growth1 and to a ,schelling-fashioned idealism which holds matter to be mere specialised and partially deadened mind4 ,i may mention1 for the benefit of those who are curious in studying mental biographies1 that ,i was born and reared in the neighborhood of ,concord1--,i mean in ,cambridge1--at the time when ,emerson1 ,hedge1 and their friends were disseminating the ideas that they had caught from ,schelling1 and ,schelling from ,plotinus1 from ,boehm1 or from ,god knows what minds stricken with the monstrous mysticism of the ,east4 ,but the atmosphere of ,cambridge held many an antiseptic against ,concord transcendentalism2 and ,i am not conscious of having contracted any of that virus4 ,nevertheless1 it is probable that some cultured bacilli1 some benignant form of the disease was implanted in my soul1 unawares1 and that now1 after long incubation1 it comes to the surface1 modified by mathematical conceptions and by training in physical investigations4 ,the next step in the study of cosmology must be to examine the general law of mental action4 ,in doing this1 ,i shall for the time drop my tychism out of view1 in order to allow a free and independent expansion to another conception signalised in my first ,monist-paper as one of the most indispensable to philosophy1 though it was not there dwelt upon2 ,i mean the idea of continuity4 ,the tendency to regard continuity1 in the sense in which ,i shall define it1 as an idea of prime importance in philosophy may conveniently be termed synechism4 ,the present paper is intended chiefly to show what synechism is1 and what it leads to4 ,i attempted1 a good many years ago1 to develop this doctrine in the ,journal of ,speculative ,philosophy 7,vol4 ,,iii472 but ,i am able now to improve upon that exposition1 in which ,i was a little blinded by nominalistic prepossessions4 ,i refer to it1 because students may possibly find that some points not sufficiently explained in the present paper are cleared up in those earlier ones4 ,,what ,,the ,,law ,,is4 ,logical analysis applied to mental phenomena shows that there is but one law of mind1 namely1 that ideas tend to spread continuously and to affect certain others which stand to them in a peculiar relation of affectibility4 ,in this spreading they lose intensity1 and especially the power of affecting others1 but gain generality and become welded with other ideas4 ,i set down this formula at the beginning1 for convenience2 and now proceed to comment upon it4 ,,individuality ,,of ,,ideas4 ,we are accustomed to speak of ideas as reproduced1 as passed from mind to mind1 as similar or dissimilar to one another1 and1 in short1 as if they were substantial things2 nor can any reasonable objection be raised to such expressions4 ,but taking the word 8idea0 in the sense of an event in an individual consciousness1 it is clear that an idea once past is gone forever1 and any supposed recurrence of it is another idea4 ,these two ideas are not present in the same state of consciousness1 and therefore cannot possibly be compared4 ,to say1 therefore1 that they are similar can only mean that an occult power from the depths of the soul forces us to connect them in our thoughts after they are both no more4 ,we may note1 here1 in passing that of the two generally recognised principles of association1 contiguity and similarity1 the former is a connection due to a power without1 the latter a connection due to a power within4 ,but what can it mean to say that ideas wholly past are thought of at all1 any longer8 ,they are utterly unknowable4 ,what distinct meaning can attach to saying that an idea in the past in any way affects an idea in the future1 from which it is completely detached8 ,a phrase between the assertion and the denial of which there can in no case be any sensible difference is mere gibberish4 ,i will not dwell further upon this point1 because it is a commonplace of philosophy4 ,,continuity ,,of ,,ideas4 ,we have here before us a question of difficulty1 analogous to the question of nominalism and realism4 ,but when once it has been clearly formulated1 logic leaves room for one answer only4 ,how can a past idea be present8 ,can it be present vicariously8 ,to a certain extent1 perhaps2 but not merely so2 for then the question would arise how the past idea can be related to its vicarious representation4 ,the relation1 being between ideas1 can only exist in some consciousness3 now that past idea was in no consciousness but that past consciousness that alone contained it2 and that did not embrace the vicarious idea4 ,some minds will here jump to the conclusion that a past idea cannot in any sense be present4 ,but that is hasty and illogical4 ,how extravagant1 too1 to pronounce our whole knowledge of the past to be mere delusion6 ,yet it would seem that the past is as completely beyond the bonds of possible experience as a ,kantian thing-in-itself4 ,how can a past idea be present8 ,not vicariously4 ,then1 only by direct perception4 ,in other words1 to be present1 it must be ipso facto present4 ,that is1 it cannot be wholly past2 it can only be going1 infinitesimally past1 less past than any assignable past date4 ,we are thus brought to the conclusion that the present is connected with the past by a series of real infinitesimal steps4 ,it has already been suggested by psychologists that consciousness necessarily embraces an interval of time4 ,but if a finite time be meant1 the opinion is not tenable4 ,if the sensation that precedes the present by half a second were still immediately before me1 then1 on the same principle the sensation preceding that would be immediately present1 and so on ad infinitum4 ,now1 since there is a time1 say a year1 at the end of which an idea is no longer ipso facto present1 it follows that this is true of any finite interval1 however short4 ,but yet consciousness must essentially cover an interval of time2 for if it did not1 we could gain no knowledge of time1 and not merely no veracious cognition of it1 but no conception whatever4 ,we are1 therefore1 forced to say that we are immediately conscious through an infinitesimal interval of time4 ,this is all that is requisite4 ,for1 in this infinitesimal interval1 not only is consciousness continuous in a subjective sense1 that is1 considered as a subject or substance having the attribute of duration2 but also1 because it is immediate consciousness1 its object is ipso facto continuous4 ,in fact1 this infinitesimally spread-out consciousness is a direct feeling of its contents as spread out4 ,this will be further elucidated below4 ,in an infinitesimal interval we directly perceive the temporal sequence of its beginning1 middle1 and end1--not1 of course1 in the way of recognition1 for recognition is only of the past1 but in the way of immediate feeling4 ,now upon this interval follows another1 whose beginning is the middle of the former1 and whose middle is the end of the former4 ,here1 we have an immediate perception of the temporal sequence of its beginning1 middle1 and end1 or say of the second1 third1 and fourth instants4 ,from these two immediate perceptions1 we gain a mediate1 or inferential1 perception of the relation of all four instants4 ,this mediate perception is objectively1 or as to the object represented1 spread over the four instants2 but subjectively1 or as itself the subject of duration1 it is completely embraced in the second moment4 ,the reader will observe that ,i use the word instant to mean a point of time1 and moment to mean an infinitesimal duration4 ,if it is objected that1 upon the theory proposed1 we must have more than a mediate perception of the succession of the four instants1 ,i grant it2 for the sum of the two infinitesimal intervals is itself infinitesimal1 so that it is immediately perceived4 ,it is immediately perceived in the whole interval1 but only mediately perceived in the last two thirds of the interval4 ,now1 let there be an indefinite succession of these inferential acts of comparative perception2 and it is plain that the last moment will contain objectively the whole series4 ,let there be1 not merely an indefinite succession1 but a continuous flow of inference through a finite time2 and the result will be a mediate objective consciousness of the whole time in the last moment4 ,in this last moment1 the whole series will be recognised1 or known as known before1 except only the last moment1 which of course will be absolutely unrecognisable to itself4 ,indeed1 even this last moment will be recognised like the rest1 or1 at least be just beginning to be so4 ,there is a little elenchus1 or appearance of contradiction1 here1 which the ordinary logic of reflection quite suffices to resolve4 ,,infinity ,,and ,,continuity1 ,,in ,,general4 ,most of the mathematicians who during the last two generations have treated the differential calculus have been of the opinion that an infinitesimal quantity is an absurdity2 although1 with their habitual caution1 they have often added 8or1 at any rate1 the conception of an infinitesimal is so difficult1 that we practically cannot reason about it with confidence and security40 ,accordingly1 the doctrine of limits has been invented to evade the difficulty1 or1 as some say1 to explain the signification of the word 8infinitesimal40 ,this doctrine1 in one form or another1 is taught in all the text-books1 though in some of them only as an alternative view of the matter2 it answers well enough the purposes of calculation1 though even in that application it has its difficulties4 ,the illumination of the subject by a strict notation for the logic of relatives had shown me clearly and evidently that the idea of an infinitesimal involves no contradiction1 before ,i became acquainted with the writings of ,dr4 ,georg ,cantor 7though many of these had already appeared in the ,mathematische ,annalen and in ,borchardt's ,journal1 if not yet in the ,acta ,mathematica1 all mathematical journals of the first distinction71 in which the same view is defended with extraordinary genius and penetrating logic4 ,the prevalent opinion is that finite numbers are the only ones that we can reason about1 at least1 in any ordinary mode of reasoning1 or1 as some authors express it1 they are the only numbers that can be reasoned about mathematically4 ,but this is an irrational prejudice4 ,i long ago showed that finite collections are distinguished from infinite ones only by one circumstance and its consequences1 namely1 that to them is applicable a peculiar and unusual mode of reasoning called by its discoverer1 ,de,morgan1 the 8syllogism of transposed quantity40 ,balzac1 in the introduction of his ,physiologie du mariage1 remarks that every young ,frenchman boasts of having seduced some ,frenchwoman4 ,now1 as a woman can only be seduced once1 and there are no more ,frenchwomen than ,frenchmen1 it follows1 if these boasts are true1 that no ,french women escape seduction4 ,if their number be finite1 the reasoning holds4 ,but since the population is continually increasing1 and the seduced are on the average younger than the seducers1 the conclusion need not be true4 ,in like manner1 ,de,morgan1 as an actuary1 might have argued that if an insurance company pays to its insured on an average more than they have ever paid it1 including interest1 it must lose money4 ,but every modern actuary would see a fallacy in that1 since the business is continually on the increase4 ,but should war1 or other cataclysm1 cause the class of insured to be a finite one1 the conclusion would turn out painfully correct1 after all4 ,the above two reasonings are examples of the syllogism of transposed quantity4 ,the proposition that finite and infinite collections are distinguished by the applicability to the former of the syllogism of transposed quantity ought to be regarded as the basal one of scientific arithmetic4 ,if a person does not know how to reason logically1 and ,i must say that a great many fairly good mathematicians1--yea1 distinguished ones1--fall under this category1 but simply uses a rule of thumb in blindly drawing inferences like other inferences that have turned out well1 he will1 of course1 be continually falling into error about infinite numbers4 ,the truth is such people do not reason1 at all4 ,but for the few who do reason1 reasoning about infinite numbers is easier than about finite numbers1 because the complicated syllogism of transposed quantity is not called for4 ,for example1 that the whole is greater than its part is not an axiom1 as that eminently bad reasoner1 ,euclid1 made it to be4 ,it is a theorem readily proved by means of a syllogism of transposed quantity1 but not otherwise4 ,of finite collections it is true1 of infinite collections false4 ,thus1 a part of the whole numbers are even numbers4 ,yet the even numbers are no fewer than all the numbers2 an evident proposition since if every number in the whole series of whole numbers be doubled1 the result will be the series of even numbers4 #a1 #b1 #c1 #d1 #e1 #f1 etc4 #b1 #d1 #f1 #h1 #aj1 #ab1 etc4 ,so for every number there is a distinct even number4 ,in fact1 there are as many distinct doubles of numbers as there are of distinct numbers4 ,but the doubles of numbers are all even numbers4 ,in truth1 of infinite collections there are but two grades of magnitude1 the endless and the innumerable4 ,just as a finite collection is distinguished from an infinite one by the applicability to it of a special mode of reasoning1 the syllogism of transposed quantity1 so1 as ,i showed in the paper last referred to1 a numerable collection is distinguished from an innumerable one by the applicability to it of a certain mode of reasoning1 the ,fermatian inference1 or1 as it is sometimes improperly termed1 8mathematical induction40 ,as an example of this reasoning1 ,euler's demonstration of the binomial theorem for integral powers may be given4 ,the theorem is that 7xy71 where n is a whole number1 may be expanded into the sum of a series of terms of which the first is xy and each of the others is derived from the next preceding by diminishing the exponent of x by #a and multiplying by that exponent and at the same time increasing the exponent of y by #a and dividing by that increased exponent4 ,now1 suppose this proposition to be true for a certain exponent1 n ,m1 then it must also be true for n ,m #a4 ,for let one of the terms in the expansion of 7xy7 be written ,axy4 ,then1 this term with the two following will be ,transcriber's ,note3 ,unicode has no subscript q character1 so the ,greek subscript phi character is used in these formul to represent it4 ,italics have been removed for readability4 ,axy ,a77xy ,a7777xy ,now1 when 7xy7 is multiplied by xy to give 7xy71 we multiply first by x and then by y instead of by x and add the two results4 ,when we multiply by x1 the second of the above three terms will be the only one giving a term involving xy and the third will be the only one giving a term in xy2 and when we multiply by y the first will be the only term giving a term in xy1 and the second will be the only term giving a term in xy4 ,hence1 adding like terms1 we find that the coefficient of xyin the expansion of 7xy7 will be the sum of the coefficients of the first two of the above three terms1 and that the coefficient of xy will be the sum of the coefficients of the last two terms4 ,hence1 two successive terms in the expansion of 7xy7 will be ,a#a77xy ,a77#a77xy ,a77xy ,a774 77xy4 ,it is1 thus1 seen that the succession of terms follows the rule4 ,thus if any integral power follows the rule1 so also does the next higher power4 ,but the first power obviously follows the rule4 ,hence1 all powers do so4 ,such reasoning holds good of any collection of objects capable of being ranged in a series which though it may be endless1 can be numbered so that each member of it receives a definite integral number4 ,for instance1 all the whole numbers constitute such a numerable collection4 ,again1 all numbers resulting from operating according to any definite rule with any finite number of whole numbers form such a collection4 ,for they may be arranged in a series thus4 ,let ,f be the symbol of operation4 ,first operate on #a1 giving ,f7#a7 ,then1 operate on a second #a1 giving ,f7#a1a74 ,next1 introduce #b1 giving #crd1 ,f7#b72 #dth1 ,f7#b1a72 #eth1 ,f7#a1b72 #fth1 ,f7#b1b74 ,next use a third variable giving #gth1 ,f7#a1a1a72 #hth1 ,f7#b1a1a72 #ith1 ,f7#a1b1a72 #ajth1 ,f7#b1b1a72 #aath1 ,f7#a1a1b72 #abth1 ,f7#b1a1b72 #acth1 ,f7#a1b1b72 #adth1 ,f7#b1b1b74 ,next introduce #c1 and so on1 alternately introducing new variables and new figures2 and in this way it is plain that every arrangement of integral values of the variables will receive a numbered place in the series4#gb ,the class of endless but numerable collections 7so called because they can be so ranged that to each one corresponds a distinct whole number7 is very large4 ,but there are collections which are certainly innumerable4 ,such is the collection of all numbers to which endless series of decimals are capable of approximating4 ,it has been recognised since the time of ,euclid that certain numbers are surd or incommensurable1 and are not exactly expressible by any finite series of decimals1 nor by a circulating decimal4 ,such is the ratio of the circumference of a circle to its diameter1 which we know is nearly #c4adaeibf4 ,the calculation of this number has been carried to over #gjj figures without the slightest appearance of regularity in their sequence4 ,the demonstrations that this and many other numbers are incommensurable are perfect4 ,that the entire collection of incommensurable numbers is innumerable has been clearly proved by ,cantor4 ,i omit the demonstration2 but it is easy to see that to discriminate one from some other would1 in general1 require the use of an endless series of numbers4 ,now if they cannot be exactly expressed and discriminated1 clearly they cannot be ranged in a linear series4 ,it is evident that there are as many points on a line or in an interval of time as there are of real numbers in all4 ,these are1 therefore1 innumerable collections4 ,many mathematicians have incautiously assumed that the points on a surface or in a solid are more than those on a line4 ,but this has been refuted by ,cantor4 ,indeed1 it is obvious that for every set of values of cordinates there is a single distinct number4 ,suppose1 for instance1 the values of the cordinates all lie between #j and #a4 ,then if we compose a number by putting in the first decimal place the first figure of the first cordinate1 in the second the first figure of the second cordinate1 and so on1 and when the first figures are all dealt out go on to the second figures in like manner1 it is plain that the values of the cordinates can be read off from the single resulting number1 so that a triad or tetrad of numbers1 each having innumerable values1 has no more values than a single incommensurable number4 ,were the number of dimensions infinite1 this would fail2 and the collection of infinite sets of numbers having each innumerable variations1 might1 therefore1 be greater than the simple innumerable collection1 and might be called endlessly infinite4 ,the single individuals of such a collection could not1 however1 be designated1 even approximately1 so that this is indeed a magnitude concerning which it would be possible to reason only in the most general way1 if at all4 ,although there are but two grades of magnitudes of infinite collections1 yet when certain conditions are imposed upon the order in which individuals are taken1 distinctions of magnitude arise from that cause4 ,thus1 if a simply endless series be doubled by separating each unit into two parts1 the successive first parts and also the second parts being taken in the same order as the units from which they are derived1 this double endless series will1 so long as it is taken in that order1 appear as twice as large as the original series4 ,in like manner the product of two innumerable collections1 that is1 the collection of possible pairs composed of one individual of each1 if the order of continuity is to be maintained1 is1 by virtue of that order1 infinitely greater than either of the component collections4 ,we now come to the difficult question1 ,what is continuity8 ,kant confounds it with infinite divisibility1 saying that the essential character of a continuous series is that between any two members of it a third can always be found4 ,this is an analysis beautifully clear and definite2 but unfortunately1 it breaks down under the first test4 ,for according to this1 the entire series of rational fractions arranged in the order of their magnitude1 would be an infinite series1 although the rational fractions are numerable1 while the points of a line are innumerable4 ,nay1 worse yet1 if from that series of fractions any two with all that lie between them be excised1 and any number of such finite gaps he made1 ,kant's definition is still true of the series1 though it has lost all appearance of continuity4 ,cantor defines a continuous series as one which is concatenated and perfect4 ,by a concatenated series1 he means such a one that if any two points are given in it1 and any finite distance1 however small1 it is possible to proceed from the first point to the second through a succession of points of the series each at a distance from the preceding one less than the given distance4 ,this is true of the series of rational fractions ranged in the order of their magnitude4 ,by a perfect series1 he means one which contains every point such that there is no distance so small that this point has not an infinity of points of the series within that distance of it4 ,this is true of the series of numbers between #j and #a capable of being expressed by decimals in which only the digits #j and #a occur4 ,it must be granted that ,cantor's definition includes every series that is continuous2 nor can it be objected that it includes any important or indubitable case of a series not continuous4 ,nevertheless1 it has some serious defects4 ,in the first place1 it turns upon metrical considerations2 while the distinction between a continuous and a discontinuous series is manifestly non-metrical4 ,in the next place1 a perfect series is defined as one containing 8every point0 of a certain description4 ,but no positive idea is conveyed of what all the points are3 that is definition by negation1 and cannot be admitted4 ,if that sort of thing were allowed1 it would be very easy to say1 at once1 that the continuous linear series of points is one which contains every point of the line between its extremities4 ,finally1 ,cantor's definition does not convey a distinct notion of what the components of the conception of continuity are4 ,it ingeniously wraps up its properties in two separate parcels1 but does not display them to our intelligence4 ,kant's definition expresses one simple property of a continuum2 but it allows of gaps in the series4 ,to mend the definition1 it is only necessary to notice how these gaps can occur4 ,let us suppose1 then1 a linear series of points extending from a point1 ,a1 to a point1 ,b1 having a gap from ,b to a third point1 ,c1 and thence extending to a final limit1 ,d2 and let us suppose this series conforms to ,kant's definition4 ,then1 of the two points1 ,b and ,c1 one or both must be excluded from the series2 for otherwise1 by the definition1 there would be points between them4 ,that is1 if the series contains ,c1 though it contains all the points up to ,b1 it cannot contain ,b4 ,what is required1 therefore1 is to state in non-metrical terms that if a series of points up to a limit is included in a continuum the limit is included4 ,it may be remarked that this is the property of a continuum to which ,aristotle's attention seems to have been directed when he defines a continuum as something whose parts have a common limit4 ,the property may be exactly stated as follows3 ,if a linear series of points is continuous between two points1 ,a and ,d1 and if an endless series of points be taken1 the first of them between ,a and ,d and each of the others between the last preceding one and ,d1 then there is a point of the continuous series between all that endless series of points and ,d1 and such that every other point of which this is true lies between this point and ,d4 ,for example1 take any number between #j and #a1 as #j4a2 then1 any number between #j4a and #a1 as #j4aa2 then any number between #j4aa and #a1 as #j4aaa2 and so on1 without end4 ,then1 because the series of real numbers between #j and #a is continuous1 there must be a least real number1 greater than every number of that endless series4 ,this property1 which may be called the ,aristotelicity of the series1 together with ,kant's property1 or its ,kanticity1 completes the definition of a continuous series4 ,the property of ,aristotelicity may be roughly stated thus3 a continuum contains the end point belonging to every endless series of points which it contains4 ,an obvious corollary is that every continuum contains its limits4 ,but in using this principle it is necessary to observe that a series may be continuous except in this1 that it omits one or both of the limits4 ,our ideas will find expression more conveniently if1 instead of points upon a line1 we speak of real numbers4 ,every real number is1 in one sense1 the limit of a series1 for it can be indefinitely approximated to4 ,whether every real number is a limit of a regular series may perhaps be open to doubt4 ,but the series referred to in the definition of ,aristotelicity must be understood as including all series whether regular or not4 ,consequently1 it is implied that between any two points an innumerable series of points can be taken4 ,every number whose expression in decimals requires but a finite number of places of decimals is commensurable4 ,therefore1 incommensurable numbers suppose an infinitieth place of decimals4 ,the word infinitesimal is simply the ,latin form of infinitieth2 that is1 it is an ordinal formed from infinitum1 as centesimal from centum4 ,thus1 continuity supposes infinitesimal quantities4 ,there is nothing contradictory about the idea of such quantities4 ,in adding and multiplying them the continuity must not be broken up1 and consequently they are precisely like any other quantities1 except that neither the syllogism of transposed quantity1 nor the ,fermatian inference applies to them4 ,if ,a is a finite quantity and i an infinitesimal1 then in a certain sense we may write ,a i ,a4 ,that is to say1 this is so for all purposes of measurement4 ,but this principle must not be applied except to get rid of all the terms in the highest order of infinitesimals present4 ,as a mathematician1 ,i prefer the method of infinitesimals to that of limits1 as far easier and less infested with snares4 ,indeed1 the latter1 as stated in some books1 involves propositions that are false2 but this is not the case with the forms of the method used by ,cauchy1 ,duhamel1 and others4 ,as they understand the doctrine of limits1 it involves the notion of continuity1 and therefore contains in another shape the very same ideas as the doctrine of infinitesimals4 ,let us now consider an aspect of the ,aristotelical principle which is particularly important in philosophy4 ,suppose a surface to be part red and part blue2 so that every point on it is either red or blue1 and1 of course1 no part can be both red and blue4 ,what1 then1 is the color of the boundary line between the red and the blue8 ,the answer is that red or blue1 to exist at all1 must be spread over a surface2 and the color of the surface is the color of the surface in the immediate neighborhood of the point4 ,i purposely use a vague form of expression4 ,now1 as the parts of the surface in the immediate neighborhood of any ordinary point upon a curved boundary are half of them red and half blue1 it follows that the boundary is half red and half blue4 ,in like manner1 we find it necessary to hold that consciousness essentially occupies time2 and what is present to the mind at any ordinary instant1 is what is present during a moment in which that instant occurs4 ,thus1 the present is half past and half to come4 ,again1 the color of the parts of a surface at any finite distance from a point1 has nothing to do with its color just at that point2 and1 in the parallel1 the feeling at any finite interval from the present has nothing to do with the present feeling1 except vicariously4 ,take another case3 the velocity of a particle at any instant of time is its mean velocity during an infinitesimal instant in which that time is contained4 ,just so my immediate feeling is my feeling through an infinitesimal duration containing the present instant4 ,,analysis ,,of ,,time4 ,one of the most marked features about the law of mind is that it makes time to have a definite direction of flow from past to future4 ,the relation of past to future is1 in reference to the law of mind1 different from the relation of future to past4 ,this makes one of the great contrasts between the law of mind and the law of physical force1 where there is no more distinction between the two opposite directions in time than between moving northward and moving southward4 ,in order1 therefore1 to analyse the law of mind1 we must begin by asking what the flow of time consists in4 ,now1 we find that in reference to any individual state of feeling1 all others are of two classes1 those which affect this one 7or have a tendency to affect it1 and what this means we shall inquire shortly71 and those which do not4 ,the present is affectible by the past but not by the future4 ,moreover1 if state ,a is affected by state ,b1 and state ,b by state ,c1 then ,a is affected by state ,c1 though not so much so4 ,it follows1 that if ,a is affectible by ,b1 ,b is not affectible by ,a4 ,if1 of two states1 each is absolutely unaffectible by the other1 they are to be regarded as parts of the same state4 ,they are contemporaneous4 ,to say that a state is between two states means that it affects one and is affected by the other4 ,between any two states in this sense lies an innumerable series of states affecting one another2 and if a state lies between a given state and any other state which can be reached by inserting states between this state and any third state1 these inserted states not immediately affecting or being affected by either1 then the second state mentioned immediately affects or is affected by the first1 in the sense that in the one the other is ipso facto present in a reduced degree4 ,these propositions involve a definition of time and of its flow4 ,over and above this definition they involve a doctrine1 namely1 that every state of feeling is affectible by every earlier state4 ,,that ,,feelings ,,have ,,intensive ,,continuity4 ,time with its continuity logically involves some other kind of continuity than its own4 ,time1 as the universal form of change1 cannot exist unless there is something to undergo change1 and to undergo a change continuous in time1 there must be a continuity of changeable qualities4 ,of the continuity of intrinsic qualities of feeling we can now form but a feeble conception4 ,the development of the human mind has practically extinguished all feelings1 except a few sporadic kinds1 sound1 colors1 smells1 warmth1 etc41 which now appear to be disconnected and disparate4 ,in the case of colors1 there is a tridimensional spread of feelings4 ,originally1 all feelings may have been connected in the same way1 and the presumption is that the number of dimensions was endless4 ,for development essentially involves a limitation of possibilities4 ,but given a number of dimensions of feeling1 all possible varieties are obtainable by varying the intensities of the different elements4 ,accordingly1 time logically supposes a continuous range of intensity in feeling4 ,it follows1 then1 from the definition of continuity1 that when any particular kind of feeling is present1 an infinitesimal continuum of all feelings differing infinitesimally from that is present4 ,,that ,,feelings ,,have ,,spatial ,,extension4 ,consider a gob of protoplasm1 say an amba or a slime-mould4 ,it does not differ in any radical way from the contents of a nerve-cell1 though its functions may be less specialised4 ,there is no doubt that this slime-mould1 or this amba1 or at any rate some similar mass of protoplasm feels4 ,that is to say1 it feels when it is in its excited condition4 ,but note how it behaves4 ,when the whole is quiescent and rigid1 a place upon it is irritated4 ,just at this point1 an active motion is set up1 and this gradually spreads to other parts4 ,in this action1 no unity nor relation to a nucleus1 or other unitary organ can be discerned4 ,it is a mere amorphous continuum of protoplasm1 with feeling passing from one part to another4 ,nor is there anything like a wave-motion4 ,the activity does not advance to new parts1 just as fast as it leaves old parts4 ,rather1 in the beginning1 it dies out at a slower rate than that at which it spreads4 ,and while the process is going on1 by exciting the mass at another point1 a second quite independent state of excitation will be set up4 ,in some places1 neither excitation will exist1 in others each separately1 in still other places1 both effects will be added together4 ,whatever there is in the whole phenomenon to make us think there is feeling in such a mass of protoplasm1--feeling1 but plainly no personality1--goes logically to show that that feeling has a subjective1 or substantial1 spatial extension1 as the excited state has4 ,this is1 no doubt1 a difficult idea to seize1 for the reason that it is a subjective1 not an objective1 extension4 ,it is not that we have a feeling of bigness2 though ,professor ,james1 perhaps rightly1 teaches that we have4 ,it is that the feeling1 as a subject of inhesion1 is big4 ,moreover1 our own feelings are focused in attention to such a degree that we are not aware that ideas are not brought to an absolute unity2 just as nobody not instructed by special experiment has any idea how very1 very little of the field of vision is distinct4 ,still1 we all know how the attention wanders about among our feelings2 and this fact shows that those feelings that are not co-ordinated in attention have a reciprocal externality1 although they are present at the same time4 ,but we must not tax introspection to make a phenomenon manifest which essentially involves externality4 ,since space is continuous1 it follows that there must be an immediate community of feeling between parts of mind infinitesimally near together4 ,without this1 ,i believe it would have been impossible for minds external to one another1 ever to become cordinated1 and equally impossible for any cordination to be established in the action of the nerve-matter of one brain4 ,,affections ,,of ,,ideas4 ,but we are met by the question what is meant by saying that one idea affects another4 ,the unravelment of this problem requires us to trace out phenomena a little further4 ,three elements go to make up an idea4 ,the first is its intrinsic quality as a feeling4 ,the second is the energy with which it affects other ideas1 an energy which is infinite in the here-and-nowness of immediate sensation1 finite and relative in the recency of the past4 ,the third element is the tendency of an idea to bring along other ideas with it4 ,as an idea spreads1 its power of affecting other ideas gets rapidly reduced2 but its intrinsic quality remains nearly unchanged4 ,it is long years now since ,i last saw a cardinal in his robes2 and my memory of their color has become much dimmed4 ,the color itself1 however1 is not remembered as dim4 ,i have no inclination to call it a dull red4 ,thus1 the intrinsic quality remains little changed2 yet more accurate observation will show a slight reduction of it4 ,the third element1 on the other hand1 has increased4 ,as well as ,i can recollect1 it seems to me the cardinals ,i used to see wore robes more scarlet than vermilion is1 and highly luminous4 ,still1 ,i know the color commonly called cardinal is on the crimson side of vermilion and of quite moderate luminosity1 and the original idea calls up so many other hues with it1 and asserts itself so feebly1 that ,i am unable any longer to isolate it4 ,a finite interval of time generally contains an innumerable series of feelings2 and when these become welded together in association1 the result is a general idea4 ,for we have just seen how by continuous spreading an idea becomes generalised4 ,the first character of a general idea so resulting is that it is living feeling4 ,a continuum of this feeling1 infinitesimal in duration1 but still embracing innumerable parts1 and also1 though infinitesimal1 entirely unlimited1 is immediately present4 ,and in its absence of boundedness a vague possibility of more than is present is directly felt4 ,second1 in the presence of this continuity of feeling1 nominalistic maxims appear futile4 ,there is no doubt about one idea affecting another1 when we can directly perceive the one gradually modified and shaping itself into the other4 ,nor can there any longer be any difficulty about one idea resembling another1 when we can pass along the continuous field of quality from one to the other and back again to the point which we had marked4 ,third1 consider the insistency of an idea4 ,the insistency of a past idea with reference to the present is a quantity which is less the further back that past idea is1 and rises to infinity as the past idea is brought up into coincidence with the present4 ,here we must make one of those inductive applications of the law of continuity which have produced such great results in all the positive sciences4 ,we must extend the law of insistency into the future4 ,plainly1 the insistency of a future idea with reference to the present is a quantity affected by the minus sign2 for it is the present that affects the future1 if there be any effect1 not the future that affects the present4 ,accordingly1 the curve of insistency is a sort of equilateral hyperbola4 ,see the figure4 ,such a conception is none the less mathematical1 that its quantification cannot now be exactly specified4 ,illustration ,now consider the induction which we have here been led into4 ,this curve says that feeling which has not yet emerged into immediate consciousness is already affectible and already affected4 ,in fact1 this is habit1 by virtue of which an idea is brought up into present consciousness by a bond that had already been established between it1 and another idea while it was still in futuro4 ,we can now see what the affection of one idea by another consists in4 ,it is that the affected idea is attached as a logical predicate to the affecting idea as subject4 ,so when a feeling emerges into immediate consciousness1 it always appears as a modification of a more or less general object already in the mind4 ,the word suggestion is well adapted to expressing this relation4 ,the future is suggested by1 or rather is influenced by the suggestions of1 the past4 ,,ideas ,,cannot ,,be ,,connected ,,except ,,by ,,continuity4 ,that ideas can nowise be connected without continuity is sufficiently evident to one who reflects upon the matter4 ,but still the opinion may be entertained that after continuity has once made the connection of ideas possible1 then they may get to be connected in other modes than through continuity4 ,certainly1 ,i cannot see how anyone can deny that the infinite diversity of the universe1 which we call chance1 may bring ideas into proximity which are not associated in one general idea4 ,it may do this many times4 ,but then the law of continuous spreading will produce a mental association2 and this ,i suppose is an abridged statement of the way the universe has been evolved4 ,but if ,i am asked whether a blind cannot bring ideas together1 first ,i point out that it would not remain blind4 ,there being a continuous connection between the ideas1 they would infallibly become associated in a living1 feeling1 and perceiving general idea4 ,next1 ,i cannot see what the mustness or necessity of this would consist in4 ,in the absolute uniformity of the phenomenon1 says the nominalist4 ,absolute is well put in2 for if it merely happened so three times in succession1 or three million times in succession1 in the absence of any reason1 the coincidence could only be attributed to chance4 ,but absolute uniformity must extend over the whole infinite future2 and it is idle to talk of that except as an idea4 ,no2 ,i think we can only hold that wherever ideas come together they tend to weld into general ideas2 and wherever they are generally connected1 general ideas govern the connection2 and these general ideas are living feelings spread out4 ,,mental ,,law ,,follows ,,the ,,forms ,,of ,,logic4 ,the three main classes of logical inference are ,deduction1 ,induction1 and ,hypothesis4 ,these correspond to three chief modes of action of the human soul4 ,in deduction the mind is under the dominion of a habit or association by virtue of which a general idea suggests in each case a corresponding reaction4 ,but a certain sensation is seen to involve that idea4 ,consequently1 that sensation is followed by that reaction4 ,that is the way the hind legs of a frog1 separated from the rest of the body1 reason1 when you pinch them4 ,it is the lowest form of psychical manifestation4 ,by induction1 a habit becomes established4 ,certain sensations1 all involving one general idea1 are followed each by the same reaction2 and an association becomes established1 whereby that general idea gets to be followed uniformly by that reaction4 ,habit is that specialisation of the law of mind whereby a general idea gains the power of exciting reactions4 ,but in order that the general idea should attain all its functionality1 it is necessary1 also1 that it should become suggestible by sensations4 ,that is accomplished by a psychical process having the form of hypothetic inference4 ,by hypothetic inference1 ,i mean1 as ,i have explained in other writings1 an induction from qualities4 ,for example1 ,i know that the kind of man known and classed as a 8mugwump0 has certain characteristics4 ,he has a high self-respect and places great value upon social distinction4 ,he laments the great part that rowdyism and unrefined good-fellowship play in the dealings of ,american politicians with their constituency4 ,he thinks that the reform which would follow from the abandonment of the system by which the distribution of offices is made to strengthen party organisations and a return to the original and essential conception of office-filling would be found an unmixed good4 ,he holds that monetary considerations should usually be the decisive ones in questions of public policy4 ,he respects the principle of individualism and of laisser-faire as the greatest agency of civilisation4 ,these views1 among others1 ,i know to be obtrusive marks of a 8mugwump40 ,now1 suppose ,i casually meet a man in a railway-train1 and falling into conversation find that he holds opinions of this sort2 ,i am naturally led to suppose that he is a 8mugwump40 ,that is hypothetic inference4 ,that is to say1 a number of readily verifiable marks of a mugwump being selected1 ,i find this man has these1 and infer that he has all the other characters which go to make a thinker of that stripe4 ,or let us suppose that ,i meet a man of a semi-clerical appearance and a sub-pharisaical sniff1 who appears to look at things from the point of view of a rather wooden dualism4 ,he cites several texts of scripture and always with particular attention to their logical implications2 and he exhibits a sternness1 almost amounting to vindictiveness1 toward evildoers1 in general4 ,i readily conclude that he is a minister of a certain denomination4 ,now the mind acts in a way similar to this1 every time we acquire a power of cordinating reactions in a peculiar way1 as in performing any act requiring skill4 ,thus1 most persons have a difficulty in moving the two hands simultaneously and in opposite directions through two parallel circles nearly in the medial plane of the body4 ,to learn to do this1 it is necessary to attend1 first1 to the different actions in different parts of the motion1 when suddenly a general conception of the action springs up and it becomes perfectly easy4 ,we think the motion we are trying to do involves this action1 and this1 and this4 ,then1 the general idea comes which unites all those actions1 and thereupon the desire to perform the motion calls up the general idea4 ,the same mental process is many times employed whenever we are learning to speak a language or are acquiring any sort of skill4 ,thus1 by induction1 a number of sensations followed by one reaction become united under one general idea followed by the same reaction2 while by the hypothetic process1 a number of reactions called for by one occasion get united in a general idea which is called out by the same occasion4 ,by deduction1 the habit fulfils its function of calling out certain reactions on certain occasions4 ,,uncertainty ,,of ,,mental ,,action4 ,the inductive and hypothetic forms of inference are essentially probable inferences1 not necessary2 while deduction may be either necessary or probable4 ,but no mental action seems to be necessary or invariable in its character4 ,in whatever manner the mind has reacted under a given sensation1 in that manner it is the more likely to react again2 were this1 however1 an absolute necessity1 habits would become wooden and ineradicable1 and no room being left for the formation of new habits1 intellectual life would come to a speedy close4 ,thus1 the uncertainty of the mental law is no mere defect of it1 but is on the contrary of its essence4 ,the truth is1 the mind is not subject to 8law10 in the same rigid sense that matter is4 ,it only experiences gentle forces which merely render it more likely to act in a given way than it otherwise would be4 ,there always remains a certain amount of arbitrary spontaneity in its action1 without which it would be dead4 ,some psychologists think to reconcile the uncertainty of reactions with the principle of necessary causation by means of the law of fatigue4 ,truly for a law1 this law of fatigue is a little lawless4 ,i think it is merely a case of the general principle that an idea in spreading loses its insistency4 ,put me tarragon into my salad1 when ,i have not tasted it for years1 and ,i exclaim 8,what nectar is this60 ,but add it to every dish ,i taste for week after week1 and a habit of expectation has been created2 and in thus spreading into habit1 the sensation makes hardly any more impression upon me2 or1 if it be noticed1 it is on a new side from which it appears as rather a bore4 ,the doctrine that fatigue is one of the primordial phenomena of mind ,i am much disposed to doubt4 ,it seems a somewhat little thing to be allowed as an exception to the great principle of mental uniformisation4 ,for this reason1 ,i prefer to explain it in the manner here indicated1 as a special case of that great principle4 ,to consider it as something distinct in its nature1 certainly somewhat strengthens the necessitarian position2 but even if it be distinct1 the hypothesis that all the variety and apparent arbitrariness of mental action ought to be explained away in favor of absolute determinism does not seem to me to recommend itself to a sober and sound judgment1 which seeks the guidance of observed facts and not that of prepossessions4 ,,restatement ,,of ,,the ,,law4 ,let me now try to gather up all these odds and ends of commentary and restate the law of mind1 in a unitary way4 ,first1 then1 we find that when we regard ideas from a nominalistic1 individualistic1 sensualistic way1 the simplest facts of mind become utterly meaningless4 ,that one idea should resemble another or influence another1 or that one state of mind should so much as be thought of in another is1 from that standpoint1 sheer nonsense4 ,second1 by this and other means we are driven to perceive1 what is quite evident of itself1 that instantaneous feelings flow together into a continuum of feeling1 which has in a modified degree the peculiar vivacity of feeling and has gained generality4 ,and in reference to such general ideas1 or continua of feeling1 the difficulties about resemblance and suggestion and reference to the external1 cease to have any force4 ,third1 these general ideas are not mere words1 nor do they consist in this1 that certain concrete facts will every time happen under certain descriptions of conditions2 but they are just as much1 or rather far more1 living realities than the feelings themselves out of which they are concreted4 ,and to say that mental phenomena are governed by law does not mean merely that they are describable by a general formula2 but that there is a living idea1 a conscious continuum of feeling1 which pervades them1 and to which they are docile4 ,fourth1 this supreme law1 which is the celestial and living harmony1 does not so much as demand that the special ideas shall surrender their peculiar arbitrariness and caprice entirely2 for that would be self-destructive4 ,it only requires that they shall influence and be influenced by one another4 ,fifth1 in what measure this unification acts1 seems to be regulated only by special rules2 or1 at least1 we cannot in our present knowledge say how far it goes4 ,but it may be said that1 judging by appearances1 the amount of arbitrariness in the phenomena of human minds is neither altogether trifling nor very prominent4 ,,personality4 ,having thus endeavored to state the law of mind1 in general1 ,i descend to the consideration of a particular phenomenon which is remarkably prominent in our own consciousnesses1 that of personality4 ,a strong light is thrown upon this subject by recent observations of double and multiple personality4 ,the theory which at one time seemed plausible that two persons in one body corresponded to the two halves of the brain will1 ,i take it1 now be universally acknowledged to be insufficient4 ,but that which these cases make quite manifest is that personality is some kind of cordination or connection of ideas4 ,not much to say1 this1 perhaps4 ,yet when we consider that1 according to the principle which we are tracing out1 a connection between ideas is itself a general idea1 and that a general idea is a living feeling1 it is plain that we have at least taken an appreciable step toward the understanding of personality4 ,this personality1 like any general idea1 is not a thing to be apprehended in an instant4 ,it has to be lived in time2 nor can any finite time embrace it in all its fulness4 ,yet in each infinitesimal interval it is present and living1 though specially colored by the immediate feelings of that moment4 ,personality1 so far as it is apprehended in a moment1 is immediate self-consciousness4 ,but the word cordination implies somewhat more than this2 it implies a teleological harmony in ideas1 and in the case of personality this teleology is more than a mere purposive pursuit of a predeterminate end2 it is a developmental teleology4 ,this is personal character4 ,a general idea1 living and conscious now1 it is already determinative of acts in the future to an extent to which it is not now conscious4 ,this reference to the future is an essential element of personality4 ,were the ends of a person already explicit1 there would be no room for development1 for growth1 for life2 and consequently there would be no personality4 ,the mere carrying out of predetermined purposes is mechanical4 ,this remark has an application to the philosophy of religion4 ,it is that a genuine evolutionary philosophy1 that is1 one that makes the principle of growth a primordial element of the universe1 is so far from being antagonistic to the idea of a personal creator1 that it is really inseparable from that idea2 while a necessitarian religion is in an altogether false position and is destined to become disintegrated4 ,but a pseudo-evolutionism which enthrones mechanical law above the principle of growth1 is at once scientifically unsatisfactory1 as giving no possible hint of how the universe has come about1 and hostile to all hopes of personal relations to ,god4 ,,communication4 ,consistently with the doctrine laid down in the beginning of this paper1 ,i am bound to maintain that an idea can only be affected by an idea in continuous connection with it4 ,by anything but an idea1 it cannot be affected at all4 ,this obliges me to say1 as ,i do say1 on other grounds1 that what we call matter is not completely dead1 but is merely mind hide-bound with habits4 ,it still retains the element of diversification2 and in that diversification there is life4 ,when an idea is conveyed from one mind to another1 it is by forms of combination of the diverse elements of nature1 say by some curious symmetry1 or by some union of a tender color with a refined odor4 ,to such forms the law of mechanical energy has no application4 ,if they are eternal1 it is in the spirit they embody2 and their origin cannot be accounted for by any mechanical necessity4 ,they are embodied ideas2 and so only can they convey ideas4 ,precisely how primary sensations1 as colors and tones1 are excited1 we cannot tell1 in the present state of psychology4 ,but in our ignorance1 ,i think that we are at liberty to suppose that they arise in essentially the same manner as the other feelings1 called secondary4 ,as far as sight and hearing are in question1 we know that they are only excited by vibrations of inconceivable complexity2 and the chemical senses are probably not more simple4 ,even the least psychical of peripheral sensations1 that of pressure1 has in its excitation conditions which1 though apparently simple1 are seen to be complicated enough when we consider the molecules and their attractions4 ,the principle with which ,i set out requires me to maintain that these feelings are communicated to the nerves by continuity1 so that there must be something like them in the excitants themselves4 ,if this seems extravagant1 it is to be remembered that it is the sole possible way of reaching any explanation of sensation1 which otherwise must be pronounced a general fact absolutely inexplicable and ultimate4 ,now absolute inexplicability is a hypothesis which sound logic refuses under any circumstances to justify4 ,i may be asked whether my theory would be favorable or otherwise to telepathy4 ,i have no decided answer to give to this4 ,at first sight1 it seems unfavorable4 ,yet there may be other modes of continuous connection between minds other than those of time and space4 ,the recognition by one person of another's personality takes place by means to some extent identical with the means by which he is conscious of his own personality4 ,the idea of the second personality1 which is as much as to say that second personality itself1 enters within the field of direct consciousness of the first person1 and is as immediately perceived as his ego1 though less strongly4 ,at the same time1 the opposition between the two persons is perceived1 so that the externality of the second is recognised4 ,the psychological phenomena of intercommunication between two minds have been unfortunately little studied4 ,so that it is impossible to say1 for certain1 whether they are favorable to this theory or not4 ,but the very extraordinary insight which some persons are able to gain of others from indications so slight that it is difficult to ascertain what they are1 is certainly rendered more comprehensible by the view here taken4 ,a difficulty which confronts the synechistic philosophy is this4 ,in considering personality1 that philosophy is forced to accept the doctrine of a personal ,god2 but in considering communication1 it cannot but admit that if there is a personal ,god1 we must have a direct perception of that person and indeed be in personal communication with him4 ,now1 if that be the case1 the question arises how it is possible that the existence of this being should ever have been doubted by anybody4 ,the only answer that ,i can at present make is that facts that stand before our face and eyes and stare us in the face are far from being1 in all cases1 the ones most easily discerned4 ,that has been remarked from time immemorial4 ,,conclusion4 ,i have thus developed as well as ,i could in a little space the synechistic philosophy1 as applied to mind4 ,i think that ,i have succeeded in making it clear that this doctrine gives room for explanations of many facts which without it are absolutely and hopelessly inexplicable2 and further that it carries along with it the following doctrines3 #ast1 a logical realism of the most pronounced type2 #bnd1 objective idealism2 #crd1 tychism1 with its consequent thorough-going evolutionism4 ,we also notice that the doctrine presents no hindrances to spiritual influences1 such as some philosophies are felt to do4 ,c4 ,s4 ,,peirce4 ,,footnotes3 #gb ,this proposition is substantially the same as a theorem of ,cantor1 though it is enunciated in a much more general form4 ,,mr4 ,,charles ,s4 ,,peirce',s ,,onslaught ,,on ,,the ,,doctrine ,,of ,,necessity4 ,the problem of necessity lurks at the bottom of all problems1 and according as we accept or reject the idea of necessity we shall be led to two entirely different world-conceptions4 ,the conception of indeterminism generally offers itself first to the doubting mind2 and it is apparently a pleasant idea4 ,it promises freedom1 it leaves room for the imagination1 it makes the world and its possibilities wide1 much wider than it could be on the plan of determinism4 ,determinism is at first sight an oppressive notion and we naturally shrink from it4 ,it seems to destroy the freedom of the will and all moral responsibility4 ,from infinite possibilities it narrows the world down to one single actuality2 and thus it seems to destroy all the charms of life4 ,the former view may be represented as conceiving the all-power of the whole in which and through which we live as a well meaning and yielding ruler or a kind-hearted parent who if strongly plied with prayer1 will for a trifle in order to please an importune favorite change his decisions4 ,the dispensations of his government will be full of exceptions1 of private cabinet decrees1 of counter orders and irregularities4 ,the latter view1 however1 would represent the entirety of the ,all as an inexorable and uncompromising sovereign1 or as a severe educator1 a stern father who unfalteringly clings to his principles4 ,he leaves full independence to his children1 he does not prevent their mistakes1 yet rigidly lets them bear the consequences of their actions4 ,he never answers prayers except that the prayer itself has its educating effects upon him who prays2 but he never alters objective facts for the sake of him who requests his interference1 and he never makes exceptions either in favor or disfavor of anybody4 ,in brief2 the ,god of him who accepts the former view1 will be ,chance1 while the ,god of him who accepts the latter view will be ,law4 ,the choice between the two views seems to remind us of the choice left to the heroes of our fairy tales4 ,he who chooses that which appears pleasant will be led into inextricable confusion1 he who chooses that which appears rigid and oppressive will be led on a path where in spite of many difficulties he will be able to make firm and certain steps and will arrive at clearness as well as moral freedom4 ,it is not the golden casket that contains ,portia's picture4 ,science constantly operates on the basis of the maxim that there is no chance1 that everything that happens1 happens as it does with necessity4 ,the question is1 ,is this maxim a mere assumption1 a non-verifiable working hypothesis2 or is there any reliable evidence in its favor8 ,is it true1 and if it is1 how can it be proved8 ,i4 ,,david ,,hume ,,redivivus4 ,mr4 ,charles ,s4 ,peirce's article entitled 8,the ,doctrine of ,necessity ,examined10 which appeared in the last number of ,the ,monist1 must have been a surprise to many thinking readers4 ,it must have affected them in a somewhat similar manner as ,hume's 8,treatise of ,human ,nature0 affected ,kant4 ,it roused him from his dogmatic slumber3 ,he abandoned dogmatism but nevertheless did not accept ,hume's skepticism2 he remained positive2 yet he propounded a better positive view than was the old dogmatism2 he established in philosophy the method of critique4 ,the parallelism between ,david ,hume1 who doubted the validity of our conception of causation1 and ,mr4 ,charles ,s4 ,peirce who denies the universality of the doctrine of necessity1 is very marked in more than one respect4 ,it is1 in spite of many differences1 a case of close analogy1 and the answer which we shall have to give to either1 will in many respects be suited to both4 ,both shake the ultimate ground of scientific research at its very root4 ,both call in question the most fundamental concept upon which all our methods of investigation and philosophy rest4 ,both challenge the reliability of an idea of which few would hesitate to say that it is all but universally accepted4 ,in fact the ideas 8causation0 and 8necessity0 are more than kin4 ,if analysed1 many of their elements will be found to be actually identical4 ,thus the one cannot be either established or doubted without establishing or doubting the other4 ,accordingly ,mr4 ,peirce1 in some respect1 repeats ,david ,hume's onslaught upon the current conception of the basis of human knowledge with the more formidable weapons which a century of close thought and scientific investigation have furnished him4 ,if ,kant's answer to ,hume had been satisfactory1 ,mr4 ,peirce probably would not have renewed the attack or he would have had to modify it considerably4 ,kant1 however1 whom we both1 ,mr4 ,peirce as much as ,i myself1 admire as a master of philosophic thought1 did not solve the question satisfactorily4 ,yet ,kant pointed out the way of solving it1 which was the middle way between dogmatism and scepticism1 called by him and his followers 8,criticism10 and it is this way on which we trust is safest travelling4 ,mr4 ,peirce is right that the doctrine of necessity cannot be 8postulated10 for 8to postulate a proposition is no more than to hope it will be true40 ,the doctrine of necessity is1 indeed1 usually treated as a postulate1 and ,mr4 ,peirce's attack appears formidable because he shows the weakness of the arguments which are commonly brought forward in its favor and which we grant to be insufficient4 ,mr4 ,peirce says 7,the ,monist1 ,,ii1 #c1 p4 #ccj73 8,in view of all these considerations1 ,i do not believe that anybody1 not in a state of case-hardened ignorance respecting the logic of science1 can maintain that the precise and universal conformity of facts to law is clearly proved1 or even rendered particularly probable1 by any observations hitherto made4 ,in this way1 the determined advocate of exact regularity will soon find himself driven to a priori reasons to support his thesis4 ,these received such a sockdologer from ,stuart ,mill in his ,examination of ,hamilton1 that holding to them now seems to me to denote a high degree of imperviousness to reason2 so that ,i shall pass them by with little notice40 ,mr4 ,peirce is right when saying that necessitarianism must be founded on something other than observation4 ,observation is a posteriori2 it has reference only to single facts1 to particulars2 yet the doctrine of necessity1 if there is anything in it at all1 is of universal application4 ,the doctrine of necessity1 let us not be afraid to pronounce it clearly1 is of an a priori nature4 ,the scientist assumes a priori1 i4 e4 even before he makes his observations or experiments1 as a general law applicable to every process which takes place1 that1 whatever happens1 happens of necessity in consequence of a cause and in conformity to law1 so that the same cause under the same circumstances will produce the same effects4 ,if all the a priori reasons1 as ,mr4 ,peirce maintains1 received a sockdologer from ,stuart ,mill1 then indeed we shall have to abandon the idea of necessity as the superstition of a past and erroneous philosophy and we shall have to start the world of science over again4 ,mr4 ,peirce denies the strict regularity of natural law and introduces an element of chance4 ,he says 7ibid4 p4 #ccf73 8,to undertake to account for anything by saying boldly that it is due to chance would1 indeed1 be futile4 ,but this ,i do not do4 ,i make use of chance chiefly to make room for a principle of generalization1 or tendency to form habits1 which ,i hold has produced all regularities4#gc ,the mechanical philosopher leaves the whole specification of the world utterly unaccounted for1 which is pretty nearly as bad as to boldly attribute it to chance4 ,i attribute it altogether to chance1 it is true1 but to chance in the form of a spontaneity which is to some degree regular40 ,mr4 ,peirce is the pathfinder of a new and as yet untried road4 ,he strikes out boldly into the tumultuous ocean of chance1 hoping to find in his journey the connection between the ,east and the ,west1 between contrasts that seem to him otherwise unconnectible4 ,the confidence of the bold discoverer is set forth in the warnings he gives to all seafaring people4 ,he attempts to frighten the ill-informed minds who might innocently venture out in other directions2 and he will thus naturally prevent many from falling either into the ,charybdis of doubting the propriety of applying the logic of probabilities to the problem of necessity and causation in general1 or1 worse still1 into the ,scylla of the a priori4 ,the former1 he tells us denotes 8a state of case-hardened ignorance respecting the logic of science10 the latter 8a high degree of imperviousness to reason40 ,mr4 ,peirce is well known as one of the keenest logicians now living4 ,considering this fact ,i am slow to take up arms against him in defending a case which he so strongly brands beforehand4 ,i must from the beginning plead guilty to a belief in necessity1 and having critically revised my view once more ,i cannot help upholding it4 ,i am fully conscious of the fact that hundreds1 thousands1 and millions of single experiences 7which in ,kantian terminology are called a posteriori arguments7 cannot establish a solid belief in necessity1 nor can any imaginable number of sequences prove the rigidity of causation1 and ,i confess freely that ,i support my thesis with a priori reasons4 ,yet at the same time attention must be called to the fact that neither ,mr4 ,hamilton nor ,mr4 ,mill had any adequate conception of the a priori1 and ,mr4 ,mill's sockdologer does not disturb in the least the assurance of my view2 for the a priori can1 in my opinion1 be based upon the firm ground of experience4 ,all the many sense-experiences at our command1 if considered singly1 cannot constitute knowledge4 ,in order to weave the woof of the a posteriori into coherent cloth we want the warp of the a priori1 and ,i do not see how we can do without it4 ,but the a priori is not that mystical hocus-pocus of absolute truth with its impertinent assumptions such as it is presented by pseudo-,kantians and justly denounced by ,mill2 it is not as ,mr4 ,peirce brands it an 8,i cannot help believing10 it is not a 8natural belief10 nor is it as others conceive it an innate idea4 ,it is1 briefly described1 simply and solely formal knowledge1 such as #b #b #d1 to which we attribute universality and necessity and with the assistance of which we are enabled to predict and predetermine certain results beforehand 7i4 e4 a priori74 ,we might invent a new name for the a priori1 the latter having become odious through the denunciations of its enemies and worse still1 having been distorted beyond recognition through the misuse to which it was put by its defenders and suppositional friends4 ,yet that would be another question1 and the idea of the a priori1 i4 e4 of formal knowledge involving universality and necessity would remain the same4 ,the universality and necessity of formal knowledge are as a rule taken for granted by scientists4 ,but philosophy can take nothing for granted1 and the problem rises3 ,how is the belief in the universality and necessity of formal knowledge to be justified8 ,mr4 ,peirce's onslaught on the doctrine of necessity is a challenge to answer this question4 ,,ii4 ,,causation ,,not ,,mere ,,sequence4 ,mr4 ,john ,venn published some twenty-five or six years ago an excellent treatise called 8,the ,logic of ,chance40 ,this work opened the eyes of many to the great importance of the calculus of probabilities as a method of science which was of much wider application than had before been suspected4 ,this admirable work we may boldly say marks a new epoch in the study of logic1 it opened new vistas1 and many expectations created by it have since been realised4 ,yet it is to be regretted that the author adopts ,hume's erroneous conception of causality and thus implicitly paves the way which ,mr4 ,peirce has actually followed and which leads to a denial of the doctrine of necessity4 ,concerning 8the doctrine of universal causation0 ,mr4 ,venn says1 in ,chapter ,,xiv3 8,we will employ the word simply in the sense which is becoming almost universally adopted by scientific men1 viz4 that of invariable unconditional sequence4 8,it is in this sense that the word cause is used by ,mr4 ,mill4444 8,this meaning of the term is rapidly becoming the popular1 or rather1 the popular scientific one40 ,this idea of 8sequence0 however was exactly ,hume's mistake1 adopted by ,mr4 ,mill and through ,mr4 ,mill popularised among ,english thinkers4 ,if the nature of cause and effect were really constituted by invariable sequence1 then the night might be called the effect of the day because night is invariably consequent upon day4 ,hume1 taking the ground that cause and effect constitute a sequence1 attempted a synthesis of both2 he searched for a proof of their identity and failed4 ,and it was natural that he failed1 for cause and effect are so radically different that we cannot bring them into the formula of an equation as 8cause effect40 ,there is no cause that is equal to its effect4 ,hume should have considered causation as one single process1 and instead of attempting a synthesis1 he should have made an analysis4 ,the analysis would have shown that cause and effect are two abstract and correlative terms of one whole and inseparable event4 ,cause is not identical with effect1 but the whole event is identical with itself4 ,if my finger touches a key of the piano1 a chord is struck2 the chord swings and produces certain air-vibrations4 ,in this process from the beginning to the end all the energy employed and the mass of the material particles remain in amount the same1 yet there is a change of form taking place4 ,causation is not mere sequence1 but a sequence of quite a special kind4 ,it is a sequence of two states which belong together as an initial and a final aspect of one and the same event4 ,so long as we know of two events simply that they follow one another1 although the sequence may in every case be invariable and unexceptional1 we are not justified in calling them cause and effect4 ,no amount of experience is sufficient to constitute causation by a mere synthesis of sequences1 and to have appreciated this truth is the immortal merit of the great ,scotchman who boldly took the consequence of the argument and acquiesced in scepticism4 ,the problem1 however1 is not so desperate as ,hume thought4 ,if ,hume could have considered his argument in the light which the law of the conservation of matter and energy sheds upon it1 he would most likely have abandoned his scepticism2 for causality is perfectly intelligible if conceived not as a synthesis of two radically different events1 but as a process of transformation1 of which the prior state is called cause and the final one effect4 ,that two radically different events1 which are not thought of as transformation1 invariably follow each other without our being able to discover any connection between them1 will naturally appear as a mystery2 but that two forms are radically different things1 although they may be forms of the same amount of matter and energy1 is no mystery4 ,the effect is1 or may be1 something entirely new4 ,the configuration of things as it appears in the effect1 did not exist before4 ,but for that reason1 it is no creation out of nothing1 it is not an incomprehensible event1 it is no miracle4 ,it is a very wonderful thing that two congruent regular tetrahedrons1 when put together1 will form a hexahedron1 but the laws of form do perfectly and satisfactorily explain it4 ,supposing we had no idea of the laws of form or only an incoherent and fragmentary knowledge of them1 should we not look upon the result of this combination as a strange and incomprehensible mystery4 ,two heaps of flour one poured upon the other will give one heap of the same kind and shape but of a larger size4 ,however1 the combination of the two four-sided bodies does not produce another four-sided body doubly as large as any of the two four-sided bodies4 ,nor does it produce an eight-sided body4 ,it produces a six-sided body1 which is something quite new4 ,the result is not contained in the conditions singly1 for no one can say that six-sidedness is a quality implicitly contained in four-sided bodies4 ,the process of combining hydrogen with oxygen into water 7,h,o7 is an immensely more complex case1 and the qualities resulting from a difference of density as well as configuration are entirely unknown to us4 ,there is nevertheless no reason whatever to consider the process as different in principle2 it is a case of transformation in which the amount of matter and energy remains the same4 ,whatever the value of the logic of chance may be for scientific reasoning in establishing gradations of certainty and formulating the reliability of a certain belief1 we deny most positively its applicability to the principle of causation in general4 ,if we ask what the chance is of a combination of two congruent tetrahedrons becoming a hexahedron1 we must answer that the probability is exactly #a1 which means certainty1 and certainty is but another name for necessity4 ,mr4 ,peirce does not object to necessity in certain cases1 he objects to necessity being a universal feature of the world4 ,he objects to the rigidity of causation in so far only as to allow a trifle of chance to enter into nature4 ,one or two cases or even a hundred1 and a thousand1 nay millions of millions of cases in which causation is explicable as transformation is no proof that this must always be so4 ,mr4 ,peirce may grant and most likely he does grant that causation in a definite set of experiences is transformation1 yet what guarantee do we have for saying that it is the only kind of causation4 ,might there not be room in this world for another causation which for lack of a full comprehension of its nature1 we may call the causation of chance8 ,we answer that form is a quality of this world1 not of some samples of it1 but throughout1 so far as we know of existence even in the most superficial way1 and thus we know beforehand or a priori that the laws of form hold good so far as our telescopes sweep through space4 ,we are ignorant as to the qualities dependent upon special forms of matter or energy1 and we can acquire any knowledge thereof only through experience2 but that is no reason to doubt the validity of causation in general1 or to surmise the probability of there being somewhere a different arrangement of nature4 ,thus we come to the conclusion that the calculus of probabilities is not applicable to the order of the world as to whether it may or may not be universal4 ,and in corroboration of this our position we quote the following passage from a high authority in the science of logic1 who is no less than ,mr4 ,charles ,s4 ,peirce himself4 8,illustrations of the ,logic of ,science10 7,popular ,science ,monthly1 #ahgg1 p4 #gad73 8,the relative probability of this or that arrangement of ,nature is something which we should have a right to talk about if universes were as plenty as blackberries1 if we could put a quantity of them in a bag1 shake them well up1 draw out a sample1 and examine them to see what proportion of them had one arrangement and what proportion another4 ,but1 even in that case1 a higher universe would contain us1 in regard to whose arrangements the conception of probability could have no applicability40 ,mr4 ,peirce is still more emphatic in another passage which reads 7ib4 #ahgh1 p4 #bje73 8,if any one has ever maintained that the universe is a pure throw of the dice1 the theologians have abundantly refuted him4 #8,how often1' says ,archbishop ,tillotson1 #8might a man1 after he had jumbled a set of letters in a bag1 fling them out upon the ground before they would fall into an exact poem1 yea1 or so much as make a good discourse in prose6 ,and may not a little book be as easily made by chance as this great volume of the world8' ,the chance world here shown to be so different from that in which we live would be one in which there were no laws1 the characters of different things being entirely independent2 so that1 should a sample of any kind of objects ever show a prevalent character1 it could only be by accident1 and no general proposition could ever be established4 ,whatever further conclusions we may come to in regard to the order of the universe1 thus much may be regarded as solidly established1 that the world is not a mere chance-medley40 ,here follows a close reasoning of several pages which ends 7on p4 #bjg7 with a paragraph beginning with the words3 8,this shows that a contradiction is involved in the very idea of a chance world40 ,and a long paragraph on p4 #bjh winds up with these sentences3 8,the actual world is almost a chance-medley to the mind of a polyp4 ,the interest which the uniformities of ,nature have for an animal measures his place in the scale of intelligence40 ,this is exactly the position which ,i defend4 ,if universes were as plenty as blackberries we might talk about the order of other universes4 ,they might be four- or five- or n-dimensional4 ,yet even in all these cases they would not be void of form4 ,the four-dimensional universe would have another arrangement1 but its laws would be none the less orderly1 none the less regular1 and a higher universe would contain them all4 ,supposing there were four- or five-dimensional space somewhere1 we could state with absolute precision all the formal laws by which bodies of so many dimensions were governed4#gd ,the order of form and the rigidity of formal laws is as universal and omnipresent as ,god4 ,they encompass our path and our lying down1 they have beset our behind and before4 ,if we ascend up into heaven they are there1 if we make our beds in hell1 behold they are there4 ,if we take the wings of the morning and dwell in the uttermost parts of the sea1 even there they shall lead us and hold us4 ,,iii4 ,,mr4 ,,peirce',s ,,logic ,,of ,,science4 ,in spite of the fundamental difference that obtains between ,mr4 ,peirce's and our own world-conception1 we must state that there are many most important points of agreement4 ,mr4 ,peirce says in his article 8,illustrations of the ,logic of ,science10 7ibid4 p4 #c and #g73 8,the object of reasoning is to find out1 from the consideration of what we already know1 something else which we do not know4444 8,the settlement of opinion is the sole object of inquiry40 ,there are according to ,peirce several methods of settling opinion1 which swayed humanity in an historic succession3 7#a7 ,the method of tenacity4 ,doubt being an uneasy and dissatisfied state1 we cling tenaciously not merely to believing1 but to believing just what we do believe4 7#b7 ,the method of authority1 which is that of the ,roman ,church and of all great political and religious institutions of the past4 7#c7 ,the a priori method1 by which ,mr4 ,peirce understands the fixing of belief agreeably to reason1 i4 e4 to the subjective conviction of the individual thinker4 ,all these methods have their merits1 says ,mr4 ,peirce 7ibid4 p4 #ac73 8,the a priori method is distinguished for its comfortable conclusions4 ,it is the nature of the process to adopt whatever belief we are inclined to1 and there are certain flatteries to the vanity of man which we all believe by nature1 until we are awakened from our pleasing dream by some rough facts4 ,the method of authority will always govern the mass of mankind4444 ,but most of all ,i admire the method of tenacity for its strength1 simplicity1 and directness40 ,it is apparent that the merit of the a priori method so called is really a vice4 ,the a priori method so called is the basis of agnosticism4 ,if according to my reason this1 and according to your reason that1 may be the truth1 where does truth remain8 ,if truth is purely subjective1 truth becomes impossible4 ,the method of settling belief agreeably to our individual tempers is the death of objective truth1 of science and philosophy4 ,mr4 ,peirce fully recognises the practical importance of thought4 ,he says3 8,the production of belief is the sole function of thought0 7ibid4 p4 #bhi74 8,our beliefs guide our desires and shape our actions0 7ibid4 p4 #e74 8,what is belief8 ,first1 it is something that we are aware of2 second1 it appeases the irritation of doubt2 and third1 it involves the establishment in our nature of a rule of action1 or1 say for short1 a habit0 7ibid4 p4 #bia74 8,thus1 we come down to what is tangible and practical1 as the root of every real distinction of thought1 no matter how subtile it may be2 and there is no distinction of meaning so fine as to consist in anything but a possible difference of practice0 7ibid4 p4 #bic74 ,mr4 ,peirce is very far from considering philosophy as a mere matter of speculation or theory without practical importance4 ,he says3 8,what sort of a conception we ought to have of the universe1 how to think of the ensemble of things1 is a fundamental problem in the theory of reasoning40 ,the a priori method1 so called by ,mr4 ,peirce1 translated into practical life is not only the death of truth but also of morality4 ,the objective criterion of truth is gone1 and with it goes the objective standard of right and wrong4 ,if that is true which seems so to my individual reason1 then that is right which pleases me best4 ,what is right to me might be wrong to you4 ,thus this method leads either to moral indifference1 or to basing ethics upon the greatest amount of pleasure attainable1 7,hedonism1 as represented by ,mr4 ,h4 ,spencer1 ,prof4 ,harald ,hffding1 ,professor ,gizycki1 and others17 or to relying upon the individual conscience as an absolute and ultimate authority4#ge ,the method of settling opinion agreeably to individual reason is at present the most fashionable and widely spread conception1 and it shows its influence in the almost universal acceptation of agnosticism to-day4 ,is that the final decision with which we have to rest satisfied8 ,if it were1 we would better return to the method of authority or tenacity4 ,no1 it is not the sum of all wisdom4 ,the a priori method so called represents a period of transition1 which1 if persistently pursued1 will lead to the bankruptcy of thought1 the desperate appearance of which is well disguised in the big sounding and modesty-parading term agnosticism4 ,and here we return to the exposition of ,mr4 ,peirce's views4 ,mr4 ,peirce does not accept the a priori method1 he believes in 8the logic of science40 ,mr4 ,peirce says3 8,to satisfy our doubts1 therefore1 it is necessary that a method should be found by which our beliefs may be caused by nothing human1 but by some external permanency--by something upon which our thinking has no effect4444 ,the method must be such that the ultimate conclusion of every man shall be the same4 ,such is the method of science0 7ibid4 p4 #aa47 8,that whose characters are independent of how you or ,i think is an external reality0 7ibid4 p4 #bih74 8,all the followers of science are fully persuaded that the processes of investigation1 if only pushed far enough1 will give one certain solution to every question to which they can be applied4444 ,they may at first obtain different results1 but1 as each perfects his method and his processes1 the results will move steadily together toward a destined centre4444 ,the opinion which is fated to be ultimately agreed to by all who investigate1 is what we mean by the truth1 and the object represented in this opinion is the real0 7ibid4 pp4 #bii-cjj74 ,the word 8fated0 must be understood as ,mr4 ,peirce understands it4 ,he adds in a foot-note3 8,fate means merely that which is sure to come true1 and cannot be avoided40 ,,iv4 ,,necessity ,,in ,,thought ,,presupposes ,,necessity ,,in ,,facts4 ,i have thus outlined ,mr4 ,peirce's views1 not only because his line of reasoning#gf is admirable and deserves to be universally known and recognised1 but also because it seems to me to have some bearing upon the question at issue4 ,if the ultimate conclusion of every man concerning reality shall be the same1 there must be some truth in the idea of necessity4 ,if there is an opinion 8fated to be ultimately agreed to10 we are confronted in our representation of reality with something that is inevitable4 ,shall there be necessity in thought but not in that of which all our ideas are but images and symbols8 ,we can conceive of the necessity in the ideal realm of thought only as a reflection of that necessity which pervades the original and prototype of our thought1 which lives in reality4 ,v4 ,,mr4 ,,peirce',s ,,evolutionism4 ,i have tried to find an explanation of ,mr4 ,peirce's position which appears to me self-contradictory and ,i believe ,i have found the key that will explain it4 ,i read somewhere a stray remark of ,mr4 ,peirce's in which he demanded that evolutionism should be thorough-going4 ,the conception of evolution in vogue at present1 he said1 stops short at a certain point1 and substitutes for an explanation the unknowable4 ,mr4 ,peirce says3 8,does not space call for some explanation8 ,is not that a half-way philosophy which in these our days does not explain1 or at least hold out some promise of explaining1 why space is continuous1 why it has such a wonderful uniformity in all its parts1 why there are neither more nor less than three dimensions everywhere1 why every closed curve can1 by a continuous change of position1 size1 and form1 be brought into coincidence with every other1 and why the three angles of a triangle make exactly one hundred and eighty degrees1 or at least so very closely so that we cannot tell whether they make more or less80 ,mr4 ,peirce does not intend to halt before these problems1 but to explain them and carries the principle of evolution to its ultimate conclusions1 so as to explain from it not only the forms of living organisms but also the laws of nature including the laws of space4 ,mr4 ,peirce declares in his article 8,the ,architecture of ,theories0 7,the ,monist1 ,vol4 ,i1 ,no4 #b1 p4 #afe73 8,uniformities are precisely the sort of facts that need to be accounted for4444 ,law is par excellence the thing that wants a reason40 ,and what he means by it is further elucidated in his article 8,the ,doctrine of ,necessity ,examined0 7,the ,monist1 ,vol4 ,,ii1 ,no4 #c1 p4 #ccd73 8,that single events should be hard and unintelligible1 logic will permit without difficulty3 we do not expect to make the shock of a personally experienced earthquake appear natural and reasonable by any amount of cogitation4 ,but logic does expect things general to be understandable4 ,to say that there is a universal law1 and that it is a hard1 ultimate1 unintelligible fact1 the why and wherefore of which can never be inquired into1 at this a sound logic will revolt2 and will pass over at once to a method of philosophising which does not thus barricade the road of discovery40 ,it is perfectly true that 8law is par excellence the thing that wants a reason10 and any explanation that explains it by the assumption of an unknowable is unphilosophical4 ,i agree with ,mr4 ,peirce that we must not halt here2 but ,i have no confidence in his method of explanation4 ,mr4 ,peirce's original idea1 then1 and ,i should add1 his main mistake1 is that he proposes to explain the origin of natural law by evolution4 ,in his legitimate anxiety to explain law1 ,mr4 ,peirce declares chance to be exempt therefrom4 ,he says3 8,that a pitched coin should sometimes turn up heads and sometimes tails calls for no particular explanation40 7,the ,monist1 ,vol4 ,i1 ,no4 #b1 p4 #afe47 ,but chance in our opinion needs exactly as much explanation as anything else4 ,mr4 ,peirce very improperly identifies 8that which cannot be accounted for0 with 8that which need not be accounted for40 ,absolute chance1 if it existed1 would not so much not call for a particular explanation as actually be unexplainable1 and being incapable of explanation1 it would have to be considered as an unintelligible fact1 as inscrutable1 incomprehensible1 and mystical4 ,on the assumption that chance need not be accounted for1 ,mr4 ,peirce builds the architecture of his theory4 ,he says3 8,chance is first1 law is second1 the tendency of habits is third40 ,the application of this general statement is set forth in the following passage3 8,in psychology ,feeling is ,first1 ,sense of reaction ,second1 ,general conception ,third1 or mediation4 ,in biology1 the idea of arbitrary sporting is first1 heredity is second1 the process whereby the accidental characters become fixed is third40 ,how little after all we can escape the determinism of law as being a feature of the world will be seen from the fact1 that the explanation for the evolution of law is presented by ,mr4 ,peirce as being itself a law1 i4 e4 a formula describing a regularity supposed to obtain in facts4 ,does not ,mr4 ,peirce's formula1 supposing it to be true1 deserve the same reproach which he casts upon natural law in general1 viz41 that it is 8a hard1 ultimate1 unintelligible fact1 the why and wherefore of which can never be inquired into08 ,,vi4 ,,world-,,constructions4 ,there are two methods of philosophising1 one starts with ideas which are supposed not to need any explanation1 the other starts from facts and uses facts as data4 ,the former is the method of the constructionist or ontologist1 the latter that of the positivist4 ,the constructionist attempts to beget a world-theory in the same way that ,god was supposed to have created the world2 he attempts to bring it into being either out of a real nothing or out of something like nothing4 ,he constructs a world-theory out of the self-evident1 out of the absolute1 out of the indubitable1 or out of that the contrary of which is inconceivable4 ,the positivist1 however1 employs facts as the given material1 which he works out into a consistent and systematic whole4 ,the former view is synthetic and constructive1 the latter is analytic and descriptive4 ,the former view is the method of ,hegel1 ,oken1 and also of ,mr4 ,spencer1 the latter is the method of all scientists and the ideal of the positive philosophy4 ,mr4 ,peirce although very positivistic in his logic of science1 must in philosophy still be counted among the constructionists4 ,chance is to ,mr4 ,peirce as much absolute as was to ,hegel the idea of 8abstract being10 which as such1 ,hegel said1 is equivalent to 8non-being40 ,non-being need not be accounted for4 ,so ,hegel starts with this idea1 and finding that 8becoming0 is the oscillation between being and non-being launches his abstract thought upon the terra firma of reality4 ,in the same way and with similar ingenious ingenuity ,oken starts the world with zero4 ,zero or non-being need not be accounted for4 ,its existence calls for no particular reasons4 ,what is zero8 ,we can conceive it as 8#j #a - #a40 ,thus we have 8#a0 and 8-#a10 two units4 ,the whole world1 according to ,oken1 is only a disintegration of ,nothing1 an equation of enormous complexity but always equal to zero4 ,and that explains the world6 ,mr4 ,spencer1 adopts 8the principle of setting out with propositions of which the negations are unconceivable10 without being aware that any inveterate belief or prejudice can be defended from that standpoint4 ,the principle is purely subjective4 ,it does not admit of any objective verification and limits knowledge to individual conception4 ,if ,mr4 ,spencer's principle were admissible1 we could not refute the adversaries of the ,copernican system1 when they declare that the rotation of the earth up on which we stand is inconceivable4 ,the maxim that that proposition is most certain the negation of which is inconceivable might after all1 and it actually did very often1 come into conflict with facts4 ,many propositions are now confidently accepted which were formerly declared to be positively inconceivable4 ,mr4 ,peirce1 ,i say1 starts the world with an abstract idea of a something of which he assumes we need not give any account1 as did the great ontologists of former times4 ,he constructs1 agreeably to his reason1 a theory of the way in which the world might have originated1 and thus he falls into the mistake criticised by himself as the a priori method4 ,yet the weakest point of ,mr4 ,peirce's system is that his 8absolute chance0 begets order2 irregularity becomes law by practice1 as if by a sufficiently prolonged shaking the dice would by and by acquire the habit of turning up the same faces each time4 ,the present world-conception of the scientist regards natural laws as eternal4 ,the order that prevails in these laws constitutes the principle of evolution and changes the chaos of a nebula into a well-arranged planetary system4 ,thus the original chaos is properly speaking no chaos4 ,it is in all its parts regulated by law and only appears chaotic in comparison with more advanced stages of evolution4 ,desirous to account for the regularities of nature ,mr4 ,peirce proposes the idea that nature in the beginning was a real1 true chaos1 without order1 without laws1 the single actions of reality taking place irregularly and in a sportive manner4 ,absolute chance prevailed4 ,everything was undetermined1 exactly as much so as a man is undetermined in his action before his belief is settled4 ,yet a man1 by and by1 forms a belief and acts accordingly1 not once or twice1 but often1 until a habit is formed4 ,thus ,mr4 ,peirce assumes1 ,nature's actions are first undetermined1 they may be of this kind or of another kind4 ,the same particle of reality may under the same conditions act in different ways1 yet it acts somehow2 it acts again1 and repeats a certain kind of action more frequently than others1 thus forming habits4 ,laws according to ,mr4 ,peirce are the habits acquired by nature4 ,the proposition of ,mr4 ,peirce's logic of science points out another method of constructing a world-conception4 ,the recognition of reality in the sense as he conceives it1 admonishes us that our world-conception should be a picturing1 a mirroring1 an imitation of the objective world of facts4 ,it should not be the architecture of a theory1 but first an analysis and then a reconstruction of experience2 it should be a description of facts1 methodically arranged4 ,,vii4 ,,facts ,,and ,,laws4 ,that which we call natural law is not the description of a certain special and concrete form of existence which is now or then and here or there1 but of some general quality of facts which is everywhere and always4 ,the former1 i4 e4 every special and concrete form of existence1 can be explained by evolution1 the latter1 i4 e4 natural law1 cannot4 ,the former has to be accounted for by the law of causation1 the latter by the principle of sufficient reason4 ,and it is this distinction between cause and reason which ,mr4 ,peirce does not seem to have regarded4 ,every special form of existence must1 at least theoretically1 be traceable as the effect of some cause and every law of nature must be explainable by showing its connection with other natural laws4 ,the only thing in the world of which we cannot and need not give account is the existence of facts itself1 or being in general1 which is the stubborn presence of reality in us ourselves and also outside of us1 objected to our own being as an independent power to which we have to adapt our conduct4 ,we need not prove its existence1 for it exists4 ,if anything is ultimate1 facts are ultimate2 and cognition is nothing but the reconstruction of facts for the purpose of orientation among them1 it is a methodical description of reality in the symbols of the feelings that exist in sentient beings4 ,a scientist having observed a special process of nature1 describes it1 if possible1 in such a way that it is recognised as a transformation4 ,a description of this kind is called an explanation4 ,it renders the process intelligible to us2 it is complete and exhaustive4 ,in order to make such a description available for comprehending other cases of the same or similar kind1 we have to introduce another principle1 which is that of economy4 ,we must single out those features which are common to a certain class and remove all diversity and specificalness4 ,all specificalness and diversity are transient features due to special conditions2 they disappear with these special conditions4 ,thus the notion of natural law involves as an essential characteristic and fundamental quality the absence of the incidental and the temporal4 ,natural laws describe the facts of nature sub specie aeternitatis4 ,they cease to be natural laws in the proper sense of the word as soon as they are conceived1 like legal laws1 as products of evolutions1 which have appeared in time and may disappear again4 ,eternity is the characteristic feature of a natural law1 it is its backbone1 the essence of its being1 its conditio sine qua non4 ,thus in considering a natural phenomenon we are led to distinguish between its cause and its reason3 ,its cause is something special1 it is an individual event1 happening in time1 and accordingly being transient2 it is an occurrence of some kind1 it is a single and definite fact4 ,however its reason is not anything special1 it is something general2 it is not a single and definite fact1 but it is a law of universal application2 it is not transient1 but a conception of things in which the incidental and temporal are eliminated4 ,a reason is applicable to all cases of the same kind and also to all cases of any time4 ,a cause1 i4 e4 a fact1 if it truly exists1 is real 7not true72 a law1 i4 e4 a reason1 if it really obtains in nature1 is true 7not real71 and any attempt at explaining natural laws as a product of evolution1 being based upon the view that regards them as causes not as reasons1 as real not as true1 as a description of temporal existences1 not as viewing facts sub specie aeternitatis1 must from the outset be a failure4#gg ,mr4 ,peirce attempts to explain natural laws as if they were single and concrete facts4 ,where we have to look for reasons he evidently employs the method of searching for causes4 ,he treats that which in its very nature is eternal1 as if it were temporal4 ,he regards the everlasting1 the imperishable1 the immutable as if it had originated1 as if it were transient1 as if it were the product of a development4 ,,viii4 ,,laws ,,not ,,inexplicable4 ,but is not ,mr4 ,peirce justified in declaring that law remains unexplained8 ,is law really as he says 8hard1 ultimate1 inexplicable1 immutable08 ,law is to be regarded as immutable but not as ultimate or inexplicable1 and thus ,mr4 ,peirce's denunciation of natural law is not justified4 ,all natural laws must be conceived as forming one system ascending from the lower to the higher1 from the more special to the more general4 ,and the more comprehensive law represents in each case the reason for the less comprehensive law which is comprised in it4 ,thus we must finally reach the most general or all-comprehensive law1 which is a description of that which is a universal quality of existence4 ,there is wrong notion prevalent among many thinkers that the most comprehensive description 7law or reason7 of a certain kind should1 as in a nutshell1 contain and immediately explain all that which it embraces1 so that if once in its possession1 we should be omniscient as to all the rest4 ,the most universal law is looked upon as the centre of existence--das ,innerste der ,welt4 ,if we could but get there1 we should solve all the world-problems by mere intuition4 ,this is the old error of the students of magic1 whose hope is expressed by ,faust when he says3 8,dass ich erkenne1 was die ,welt ,im ,innersten zusammenhlt40 ,that ,i may detect the inmost force ,which binds the world and shapes its course4--,bayard ,taylor4 ,comprehension is not attained simply by finding out and stating the most general feature of a certain class of facts2 comprehension does not alone consist of generalisation but also of discrimination4 ,the differences among less general laws must be recognised as results of special conditions4 ,and any knowledge of a general law reveals nothing about the special conditions under the influence of which the same law will work differently4 ,it is but too often overlooked that the more general a statement is1 the less it will contain1 the vaguer it will appear1 the emptier it must be4 ,there is no royal road to cognition and mere generalisation is of no avail4 ,we shall have to investigate the details of every case and view it in its relation to the general law4 ,the general law must be viewed under those conditions which will invariably produce the same special modifications4 ,but do not the most general reasons remain uncomprehended8 ,do we not at last arrive at an ultimate law which1 then1 must be hard and inexplicable8 ,those laws which appear in every respect to be universal are the formal laws of mathematics1 arithmetic1 and their kindred sciences4 ,and all these formal sciences are not only not mystical1 unintelligible1 and inexplicable1 but they are the most perspicuous1 most reliable1 and most certain knowledge we possess4 ,all their theorems admit of the most rigid demonstration1 and the last shadow of mysticism has been removed by ,hermann ,grassmann4 ,owing to his searching investigations we are no longer in need of axioms which were formerly supposed to be the indispensable basis of mathematics4 ,there is however a basis of formal thought left which we cannot dispense with2 that is the idea of sameness1 generally formulated as the law of identity4 ,is perhaps the law of identity by which all the regularities of nature are to be accounted for1 inexplicable8 ,hardly6 ,the idea of sameness has a solid basis in the facts of experience4#gh ,,ix4 ,,conclusion4 ,the contrast between ,determinism and ,indeterminism is old1 yet ,mr4 ,peirce has worked out quite a new aspect of ,indeterminism and places it upon a basis that appears to be a more solid foundation than it ever before possessed4 ,at the same time he succeeds in making some of its consequences so plausible1 that in this new garb it will appeal more strongly than before to scientifically trained minds4 ,with all deference to the logical acuteness of ,mr4 ,peirce and with all admiration for the originality and depth of his thought1 we cannot1 however1 accede to the new philosophy which he proposes4 ,mr4 ,peirce's propositions go to the core of all problems1 they upset everything that has heretofore been considered as firm ground1 they question the most fundamental concepts of the world-conception upon which all scientific reasoning and the methods of the positive philosophy rest4 ,thus they set us a-thinking and will help us to attain greater clearness on points which are to all of us of greater concern than may at first sight appear4 ,for the fundamental problems of philosophy have a deep practical importance4 ,their importance is less noticeable1 less obvious1 but at the same time more sweeping the more fundamental they are4 ,let us here in concluding this article consider only one1 but the most striking one1 of the consequences to which both views lead4 ,indeterminism leads to a conception of ,god which although we may call it 8mind0 and place it at the beginning of the world1 is pure chance or the indeterminateness of an arbitrary sporting4 ,determinism on the other hand leads to a recognition of ,god as that something in nature that is as it is1 that has been and will be4 ,science1 whose method of cognising the truth is and can only be to know in parts1 attempts to describe the partial qualities of this something in natural laws4 ,it is of great consequence in practical life whether ,god is what the name ,jahveh intends to convey1 eternal and unalterable being1 immutable sameness in the perpetual flux1 irrefragable law in the changes of evolution1 or whether it is the of the pagans1 i4 e4 indeterminable and absolute chance1 unaccountable1 irregular1 capricious1 and uncertain4 ,the ,god-idea is the basis of ethics4 ,it matters little whether we use or avoid the name ,god1 for the atheist has also a ,god-idea in his conception of that existence in which he lives and moves and has his being4 ,this ,god-idea is always the ground from which we derive our rules of conduct2 and whenever we change1 not our terminology but our idea of ,god1 we shall as a matter of consistency have to change our views of ethics also4 ,,editor4 ,,footnotes3 #gc ,italics are ours4 #gd ,see ,fundamental ,problems1 p4 #ee4 #ge ,this is the position of the ,societies for ,ethical ,culture which are not confessedly but practically agnostics4 ,professor ,adler's position is characterised in ,the ,monist1 ,vol4 ,i1 ,no4 #d1 p4 #efg1 #eii1 and ,the ,open ,court ,nos4 #bbe and #bcd4 ,mr4 ,salter bases ethics upon 8the immovable rock of conscience40 7,see his ,ethical ,religion1 p4 #bie47 #gf ,ernst ,schroeder in his great work ,vorlesungen ber die ,algebra der ,logik adopts in the main the results of ,peirce4 ,a sketch of ,mr4 ,peirce's line of thought1 7his ,gedankengang1 as ,schroeder calls it17 is found in the ,einleitung1 pp4 #ajg-aah4 #gg ,i laid down my views on the subject in a short monograph of only #hb pages1 entitled ,ursache1 ,grund und ,zweck1 eine philosophische ,abhandlung zur ,klrung der ,begriffe 7,dresden3 ,r4 von ,grumbkow1 ,hof4 ,verlag1 #ahhc74 ,in all main points ,i maintain the same standpoint still4 ,see also ,fundamental ,problems1 the chapter on ,causality1 pp4 #gi-ia and #if-aji4 ,since the publication of my ,german pamphlet my confidence that we can1 7not only in the special sciences such as chemistry1 mineralogy1 botany1 etc41 but also in philosophy7 arrive at truth1 has rather been confirmed than shaken4 ,we can create a common ground on which all philosophers agree1 as much as mathematicians agree concerning the ,pythagorean theorem4 ,but in order to achieve this ideal1 philosophers must abandon all attempts at originality4 ,the hankering after originality is an inherited evil in the family of philosophers4 ,the first philosophers were poets1 priests1 and prophets2 later on in the natural evolution of human culture1 a differentiation of their combined functions took place4 ,originality is a virtue in the poet but a vice in his brother1 the philosopher4 ,the philosopher's ideal must be to free himself of all individualism1 subjectivity1 and original conceptions2 he must become strictly objective4 ,he must renounce his personal likes and dislikes1 and make his soul a mirror of nature1 faithfully and correctly to represent the facts and nothing but the facts4 ,this is the ethics of philosophical inquiry1 and the philosophy that takes its stand on this principle we call positivism4 ,almost all divergencies of importance in the different philosophical systems can be traced to different conceptions or rather misconceptions of causation4 ,this last century since ,kant has been the most fertile age of original world-theories1 all different in style and manner of construction1 but all alike in so far as the author of each system had strained his utmost efforts to be original4 ,thus all these world-theories were so many beautiful poems on ontology1 they were so many grand air-castles produced by the magic wand of a fairy-tale causation4 ,the philosopher's aspiration must not be to present original ideas but to reach that one solution which any other unbiassed thinker must find1 to express that truth which in the end will have to be recognised universally1 to formulate facts in objective exactness4 ,the degree of originality in philosophic thought marks the degree of aberration from the common aim of the one sole solution1 and the greatest source of original ideas is the confusion of cause and reason1 of ,ursache and ,grund1 of event and law1 of fact and truth4 #gh ,i expect to discuss the problems of sameness1 of chance1 of mechanicalism1 and the freedom of will in the next number of ,the ,monist under the caption ,the ,doctrine of ,necessity3 ,its ,basis and its ,scope4 ,,literary ,,correspondence ,i4 ,,france4 ,professor ,lombroso is unremitting in bringing up new facts in support of his doctrines4 ,his ,nouvelles ,recherches de ,psychiatrie et d',anthropologie criminelle 7,new ,researches in ,psychiatry and ,criminal ,anthropology7 comprise a good many1 gathered from the latest works relating to criminality4 ,in adding psychiatry to anthropology in the title to this volume1 writes the learned author1 8,i return to my starting point and to the true source of these studies1 which is only a clinical demonstration1 but a more perfect one1 of what is called in old psychiatry1 moral insanity and masked epilepsy40 ,lombroso may be reproached with a certain exaggeration1 a certain haste1 in his views respecting criminal man3 yet can we conceive of an opinionated inquirer who would not have faith in his work1 and who could resist the desire to generalise from the facts already obtained8 ,but ,i have little doubt that the works of his school will end in producing a precise conception1 which will force itself on the attention of legislators and jurists4 ,i say precise1 because one has a glimpse of the truth in criticising the evidence offered to us in such variety1 though what one perceives sometimes vanishes4 ,how can we conceive of the criminal type8 ,this is a prime question on which it is not useless to insist4 ,crime1 as ,m4 ,tarde tells us1 has become a real profession in our modern societies4 ,although there is some truth in it1 we must not allow ourselves to be deceived by the subtle form of this paradox4 ,there is no want of delinquents carrying on a business2 the army of crime recruits itself from all classes1 it includes peasants and workmen1 chemists and physicians1 lawyers and merchants1 soldiers and poets1 that is to say1 subjects possessing some one at least of the aptitudes which form a calling4 ,we have here1 then1 on the one side1 wretches destitute of all aptitude for a trade1 and on the other men who do not adhere to the exercise of their profession1 although capable of making use of it4 ,the delinquent appears to us1 in short1 as stricken with some degree of professional incapacity1 and if crime has become a profession in some sort1 the criminals of every category first represent1 if ,i may thus say1 a professional or social waste4 ,the study of the causes and the signs of this waste is just what has been undertaken4 ,the social causes of crime have often been put in prominence4 ,they are numerous1 and persons unacquainted with these questions are inclined to attribute the largest proportion of crimes and offences to distress and misery4 ,but1 according to the inquiries of ,morrison1 for example--and by the confession also of ,m4 ,troal1 of whom ,i shall speak immediately--misery rarely produces crime1 and if we examine carefully1 one after the other1 the social causes of crime1 we shall soon be convinced that poverty1 drunkenness1 etc41 feed criminality by producing degeneracy of the race1 rather than that they directly arouse the criminal4#gi ,we are compelled then to seek the immediate reason for a crime in the criminal himself1 and to learn to distinguish the delinquent by means of the methods fixed upon by anthropologists and physicians4 ,at first1 as we know1 ,lombroso recognised only one criminal type4 ,he has since found that there are many4 ,the distinction between the thief and the murderer is classical4 ,benedikt has described the born vagabond2 ,brouardel1 the feminine type4 ,it is always necessary in describing a type to resort to the methods of natural history1 to pass in review the emotional and intellectual characters1 the physiological or functional characters1 the anatomical or morphological characters1 and endeavor to seize certain constant correlations between the signs one has been successful in observing4 ,the delinquent may be described as abnormal from the emotional standpoint1 and as deficient or perverted from the intellectual point of view4 ,we could then begin by describing exactly certain intellectual and emotional types1 and it is no exaggeration to say that experienced magistrates in their way have done so1 those even who1 with ,m4 ,proal1 we shall see to be the most hostile to anthropological theories4 ,but they are reluctant to admit any relations between the moral agent and physical nature1 whereas the new school1 on the contrary1 makes every effort to discover and determine them4 ,how far is it successful8 ,that is the question4 ,if we take the ensemble of the emotional and intellectual characters1 we shall affirm with ,professor ,pelman 7whose opinion ,mr4 ,christian ,ufer has made known in ,the ,monist7 that the portrait of the imbecile traced by ,sollier corresponds strongly to that of the born criminal of ,lombroso4 ,we shall aver also that this portrait does not answer equally well for all kinds of delinquents1 and that we pass gradually from the malignant imbecile to the average or mediocre man4 ,the same observation applies when we study the physiognomical characters of which the little book of ,lombroso furnishes a great variety4 ,we shall have evidently to consider1 with respect to physiognomical characters and physical marks1 a strong type 7certainly inborn71 a weak type1 and1 ,i would add1 an acquired type4 ,if we take functional anomalies--those of touch1 sight1 etc4--we shall be struck with their number as well as with their importance1 and1 ,i may say in passing1 the alienist physicians who continue to be the adversaries of ,lombroso discover every day fresh examples of them1 which could give to the conception of the type1 the reality they still deny it to possess4 ,the latest discovery1 and certainly one of the most striking1 is that which ,ottolenghi has just made1 in the clinic of ,lombroso himself1 respecting the visual field of epileptics and of the morally insane4 ,according to the researches of ,ottolenghi1 the visual field will be remarkably limited1 both with epileptics not in paroxysms1 and with born delinquents1 but more often with the latter4 ,they present a partial hemiopia1 vertical and heteronymous2 the periphery of the field is sinuous and irregular4 ,this discovery tends1 then1 to confirm the analogy of epilepsy with criminal tendencies2 it will furnish a sign of the first order for a well marked category of delinquents4 ,let us pass on to morphological characters4 ,the abundance of evidence is truly extraordinary1 and one cannot abstain from remarking1 in this relation1 that a certain number of the anomalies designated ought to be found1 and indeed are found1 in morally healthy subjects1 and that therefore they do not alone suffice to furnish a ground of distinction from the medium normal type4 ,as certain functional anomalies are not wanting either in many subjects whose morality remains perfect1 it would be necessary to aim1 it seems to me1 at establishing an approximate quantum for the criminal type1 or rather for the kinds which ought to lead1 by sensible gradations1 from the most pronounced type to that which is the least so4 ,some scattered elements of this work will be found in the book of ,lombroso2 the studies of ,clouston on the palate 7deformation of the palate existed in #ai per cent4 of the general population1 #fa per cent4 of imbeciles1 #ce per cent4 of criminals1 and #cc per cent4 of madmen72 the monographs of ,ottolenghi and ,roncoroni on the pathological anomalies of #ajj criminals1 with an indication of the number and the nature of the anomalies1 etc4 ,in short1 it cannot be questioned that the new school holds its ground well1 since it circumscribes and makes more and more precise the object of its researches4 ,in my humble opinion1 it is of importance for it to get rid of hazardous or useless explanations1 for it to tell us as little as possible of remote atavism--for if heredity is constant1 it is not possible to trace it link by link as far as the deluge6--and finally for pure anthropologists and psychiatrists to beware of themselves drawing practical conclusions from their doctrines4 ,the applications concern jurists1 and constitute a question of another kind1 into which other considerations also enter4 99 99 99 99 99 ,in the juridical domain1 a ,french magistrate1 ,m4 ,,louis ,,proal1 has just published a considerable work1 ,le ,crime et la ,peine 7,crime and ,punishment7 which is truly the performance of an adversary1 but not of such an adversary as ,m4 ,tarde4 ,m4 ,proal is an irreconcilable1 and all his dialectic--charged a little too much with citations of which many are useless or prove nothing--turns on the absolute affirmation of free-will4 ,he flatters himself to have demonstrated freedom1 in which he is wrong4 ,it is a matter of faith1 as criticists have very well perceived4 ,human science can know only determinism2 it proves only what it finds4#hj ,m4 ,proal claims then to found on free-will the two principles of the moral responsibility of the delinquent1 and the moral character of punishment1 in opposition to the purely social point of view in which the new criminalists place themselves4 ,the physical anomaly of the criminal seems to him a chimera1 and he goes so far as to deny1 or falls little short of it1 the relations of frenzied impulsion with degeneracy4 ,willingly1 perhaps1 he would accept as truly mad and irresponsible only the insane1 those who are shut up forever in the asylums6 ,certainly1 ,m4 ,proal possesses the experience of the magistrate1 he has erudition and triumphs easily1 in details1 by the defects and deficiencies of the doctrine he combats4 ,his objections1 nevertheless1 do not touch the general conception which connects crime1 in a great number of cases1 with the disorders of the living machine4 ,he is not willing for the criminal to differ from the honest man otherwise than by his inclinations and will1 as though will and inclinations had no dependence on the state of our organs1 and as though heredity entered for nothing into the 8personal factor0 of character6 ,he is not averse to saying that moral and physical decadence is always the effect of criminality1 as though it was never its cause6 ,he allows with that attenuations of moral responsibility1 resulting from physiological and physical influences1 as though a weakened responsibility was a true moral responsibility in the sense he understands1 and as though the judge had the means of deciding at what moment morbid evolution involves irresponsibility6 ,these absolute principles once established1 he defines an offense 8the violation of a social duty10 and he grants that the judge 8ought to take account of the importance of the social evil resulting from the crime40 ,it is sufficient for him that the intention and the responsibility is appreciated1 in order to attach the penalty to morality4 ,in default of which1 writes he1 there would be no more justice4 ,it is a noble solicitude1 that of wishing to justify punishment in the eyes of the guilty person himself1 and to inflict it on him as an expiation of the evil he has committed4 ,but here an error is fallen into1 which is1 in my opinion1 to suppose that the law punishes 8morally40 ,the law has not the power to inflict moral chastisement4 ,it strikes the delinquent materially1 in his goods1 in his person2 the rest depends not on the judge who applies the law1 but on the judge who is in ourselves1 the avenger more or less severe according to the complex incidences of education and heredity4 ,moral chastisement can exist only in the conscience of the delinquent1 and1 if this conscience is wanting1 or nearly so1 all the affirmations of the judge cannot cause the punishment to have the quality of moral expiation for the guilty4 ,the criminal will submit to it through force1 and the magistrate will apply it by necessity4 ,such is1 ,i think1 the true situation4 ,the new school of criminology will introduce reforms in the practice of the tribunals and in the administration of the penal laws2 it will not change justice and could not compromise morality4 ,and now pardon me for adding to these some further remarks1 in connection with the books of which ,i have still to speak4 99 99 99 99 99 ,the interests and the passions of men1 habits too long acquired to alter1 can be considered as the immediate and constant motives of societies1 the vis tergo of their evolution4 ,political theories work on a pre-existing social matter1 and more or less in the direction of the tendencies which have produced the state of things that they aspire to reform or overturn4 ,in a general manner1 they possess then neither the power necessary to create1 attributed to them by utopists1 nor the power to destroy1 which makes them appear so formidable to conservatives4 ,without denying all efficiency to the intellectual ideal1 it is permissible to say that its action has a bearing purely conditional1 and that the revolutions of growth of social organisms never absolutely depend on the theorist who establishes its diagnosis1 and endeavors to regulate its march4 ,we behold1 in a word1 history making itself1 rather than that we make it ourselves and according to our inclination4 ,it is hardly possible for us to foresee the remote effects of our inventions1 of our discoveries4 ,in sociology as well as in physics1 man remains the servant and the interpreter of nature4 ,there is in this1 if ,i am not deceived1 a reason for reassuring ourselves concerning certain alarming predictions as to the future of our civilisation4 ,in his book ,la ,civilisation et la ,croyance 7,civilisation and ,belief71 the second edition of which has just appeared1 ,m4 ,,charles ,,secr,,tan estimates that our societies will sink down1 at least that they will neither return to a purified ,christianity--a ,christianity that has never yet been practised--nor restore the great principles of the free soul and of ,god4 ,m4 ,secrtan is a brilliant writer and has a noble heart1 and his book contains at least one truth of the first order1 always good to repeat1 which is that nothing durable is founded on hatred4 ,he dare not flatter himself1 however1 that his warnings will be listened to1 his lessons observed4 ,perhaps he exaggerates the real dangers which menace us1 because he enlarges1 unknown to himself1 the rle of philosophic doctrines1 and attributes to the mind a kind of discretionary power over the sentiments and the interests of mankind4 ,here we have the intellectualist mistake4 ,it appears chiefly in the revolutionist propaganda which agitates our ,europe1 and of which ,m4 ,j4 ,,bourdeau makes known the ideas and the progress1 in a clear and interesting manner1 in his work ,le ,socialisme allemand et le ,nihilisme russe 7,german ,socialism and ,russian ,nihilism74 ,it is a fact well worthy of remark1 that the genial promoter of the theories of ,fourier1 ,st4 ,simon1 and others--,i refer to ,j4 ,j4 ,rousseau--had had the conjecture of a social physiology3 fragments of his that have been published show well that he did not regard the age of gold as one of savagery1 and that he foresaw the part that human nature had to do in our calculations of government4 ,what is found just in his writings could even well be intimately connected with this naturalist point of view4 ,but he lived in the century par excellence of rationalism1 where such ideas could be neither developed nor understood2 he constructed the political world according to reasoning1 and ,i shall not be far wrong in thinking that socialism represents in its turn1 definitively1 at least in its essential features1 a last offshoot from this rational school which has already1 a hundred years ago1 made us the villainous present of ,jacobinism4 ,absolute communism has no chance of ever realising itself4 ,neither ,karl ,marx1 nor ,engels1 has ventured even to indicate the possible form of the society of which they dream4 ,the action of the socialists1 in turn1 could have as its result the substitution for our rgime of excessive individualism and of disordered democracy1 a rgime of corporations and of more regular co-operation1 by one of those reversions to institutions anciently delineated that history presents to us1 and which respond to a sort of 8law of oscillation0 of social phenomena4 ,there is no occasion1 however1 to give it long consideration to establish that these returns do not exclude novelty1 for the apparent form of social arrangements is of less moment than the nature of the ideas and of the relations which sustain them1 and here is what ,i would readily call a 8law of progressive repetition40 ,as to the exact sense of the evolution which there manifests itself1 the great task of disengaging it falls to the sociologists4 ,but the school of ,marx has wished to see things only from one side1 and his theory1 which is too simple1 does not embrace the complexity of the phenomena4#ha ,without any pretension to renew the face of the world and to interpret economic phenomena in favor of an arbitrary thesis1 ,m4 ,,ad4 ,,costa1 in his opuscule ,alcoholisme ou pargne 7,alcoholism or ,thrift7 places before us the truly immediate question of socialism1 in the presence of this 8social dilemma0 which reformers willingly mask in their discourses3 on one side1 alcoholism1 life from day to day1 the unreasonable and momentary illusion that one imbibes with stimulants1 the wasting of daily resources1 finally the pauperism which leads to social servitude2 on the other side1 thrift under all its forms1 a provident life ordered with intelligence1 abstention from dangerous stimulants1 progressive comfort and increasing happiness1 more and more freedom4 ,yes1 here are the two issues between which the workers have to choose4 ,those who read this little book can learn there1 both what milliards of salaries alcohol has devoured1 and what misery both physical and moral it engenders1 and the degradation that it brings to those who give themselves up to it4 ,to many this may be only the small side of a great problem4 ,without thrift and the qualities which render it possible1 there is neither family nor morality4 ,how can a man pretend to possess instruments of labor when he deteriorates the chief of all1 his own living machine8 ,how can a social class have the illusion to believe that a revolution ever profits him who is neither able nor capable of preparing and conducting it8 99 99 99 99 99 ,the last work of ,m4 ,e4 ,,de ,,laveleye1 ,le ,gouvernement dans la ,dmocratie 7,democratic ,government71#hb published a few months before his death1 treats chiefly of the organisation of public powers4 ,this question has importance to-day1 writes the learned author1 only in relation to the great questions which will agitate the world of to-morrow1 the social question and the religious question4 ,conservatives make use of government as a brake2 revolutionists seek to seize hold of it as a lever4 ,the fact is that our ,europe marches towards democracy4 ,but will democracy give us freedom8 ,on what conditions can it form an acceptable rgime and one compatible with high culture8 ,it is not necessary for me to explain here the reasonings and conclusions of ,m4 de ,laveleye4 ,his book1 to speak the truth1 is less a book than a collection of ,review articles and historical sketches4 ,the politics of action will find in it too much theory1 and philosophers will regret the absence of master-ideas4 ,it is well to read this work for its practical advice and the rich details that it contains2 we must not look there for a real historical or social conception4 ,the sentiment which is dominant1 finally1 in all the writings of which ,i have just spoken is inquietude1 and unfortunately it is only too well justified4 ,we see1 in our ,occident1 alcoholism increasing with salaries1 the hatred of classes with wealth1 immorality with enfranchisement1 public burdens with political progress1 the aggregation of individuals with great industry1 criminality even with education4 ,the wealth acquired is compensated for by new evils2 it seems that all our conquests have the result of putting social order in peril1 and that the civilisation of which we are so proud is bound1 in a short time1 to become bankrupt4 ,we have1 nevertheless1 a weighty capital with which to restore ourselves1 and it is only right to say that it is beginning to be applied4 ,but we must give up some errors as to which it is good time to open one's eyes4 ,one of the gravest1 certainly1 is always to place instruction before education1 and the mind before the heart4 ,we have allowed to drop1 at the same time with religion1 the difficult task of forming moral habits4 ,let us understand in a word that1 in a society1 the most valuable thing is neither the steam engine1 nor the bank note1 but the man himself1 and that in the man even it is not ability or special knowledge but character4 ,,lucien ,,arr,,at4 ,,footnotes3 #gi ,i reserve1 as well understood1 the question of education1 in order to simplify matters here4 #hj ,a ground of mutual understanding would be supplied by accepting the distinction proposed by ,p4 ,carus between constraint1 which alone excludes freedom1 and necessity1 which leaves our will free within the limits of our character4 ,already ,plotinus had written3 8,how can it be said of this being 7he who obeys his nature7 that he obeys1 if he is not constrained to follow something external80 7#fth ,enn4 lib4 viii47--,i recommend to the curious on these questions the book of ,m4 ,,bertauld1 ,mthode ,spiritualiste1 ,esprit et ,libert4 ,m4 ,bertauld places freedom in autonomy1 which is perfectly reconcilable with psychological determinism2 there is on the contrary1 he declares1 no radical contradiction between determinism and free-will1 and indeterminism is an absurd conception4 ,the work is well written1 and ,i do not intend to belittle it by mentioning it in a simple note4 #ha ,in this relation1 ,i will particularly refer to the great work1 in course of publication1 of ,m4 ,b4 ,,malon1 ,le ,socialisme intgral1 and ,i recommend at the same time the article ,justice and ,socialism of ,m4 ,belot1 which has been much spoken of1 in the number for ,february last of the ,revue ,philosophique4 #hb ,all the works mentioned in this article are published by ,f4 ,alcan4 ,,ii4 ,,germany4 ,in the ,january number of ,the ,monist ,i mentioned a treatise written by ,g4 ,ludwigs1 in which the novels of ,wilhelm ,walloth were criticised1 and expressed my surprise that in the work discussed a personality unquestionably diseased was stamped as a poet of almost the first order4 ,much that then struck me as strange and was unclear to me1 was later rendered plain and intelligible2 and the explanation was not long in forthcoming4 ,as the newspapers shortly afterwards announced1 ,ludwigs was simply the pseudonym of a sixteen year old gymnasium student of ,darmstadt1 who had already attracted the attention of wider circles by the poems he had written4 ,it happens at times that individualities of this description bear out in the advanced years of their life the promise of their youth4 ,extraordinary things were to be expected1 though ,i cannot say hoped1 of ,ludwigs2 but the expectation was not fulfilled4 ,he1 an instance of real decadence1 yet a boy in years1 voluntarily took his own life1 deeply mourned by his literary associates1 the 8,young ,germans10 in whose magazine ,die ,gesellschaft a brother of the deceased is now publishing biographical notes and literary remains--novels and poems--all more of a psychological than literary interest4 ,the biographical notes plainly mark out a personality smitten with psychosis and suffering in a marked degree with hypersthesia1 and the literary remains reflect this mental condition2 light-sensations especially playing an important rle4 ,his nervous system was too weak to assert itself permanently against the outer world4 ,this pressure1 which objectively considered was not at all a powerful one1 did not admit of the rise of a powerful sense of life2 and especially oppressive to the precocious youth was the life of the school in the most varied ways1 and in an unexpected moment the flame of his life went out4 ,as psychologists1 we should find considerable interest in the study of this phenomenon of ,ludwigs4 ,we must admire his abilities and his capacity for work1 which not only enabled him to perform his duties as a student of the gymnasium1 but also left him time enough1 in addition to his literary work1 to employ himself with the psychological writings of ,wundt and ,mnsterberg1 which he desired to turn to account in the field of poetry4 ,we must mourn too his sad fate4 ,but we have no reason to glorify such a diseased personality1 as is done on many sides in the ,april number of ,die ,gesellschaft4 ,but this is a peculiar characteristic of the ,young-,german writers and their confrres abroad1 that they make the diseased take the place of the sound1 and the ugly of the beautiful1 and thus help greatly to undermine the health of the common mind4 ,there are it is true a goodly number of trusting souls who believe that we may regard with security and composure1 the endeavors and tendencies of the naturalistic apostles1 as our taste in literature and art--a few cases excepted--can surely not be reversed into its opposite4 ,on this point1 perhaps1 those who so think are not wrong4 ,but the stage may easily be reached where literary taste no longer remains determinative1 and the place of the sthetical interest in things is taken by the scientific1 before whose judgment-seat no difference of the beautiful and the hideous exists4 ,this view is the direct outcome of philosophical materialism4 ,the latter doctrine may at present1 it is true1 be regarded in all its main points as definitively overthrown1 so far as philosophy is concerned2 but in the domain of belles lettres--a term not quite allowable here--the wave which it has created still sweeps mightily onward4 ,two new works seek to break its force1 which have been published in the series ,gegen den ,materialismus edited by ,dr4 ,schmidkunz 7,stuttgart3 ,krabbe74 ,the first treatise bears the title ,materialismus und sthetik and has no less a person as author than ,,moriz ,,carri,,re2 the second treats of ,materialism in ,literature and is the production of the northerner ,,ola ,,hansson4 ,i am unable to say that these two treatises have especially satisfied me4 ,both authors look at the subject too one-sidedly from the point of view of sthetics1 and have not by far given a sufficient recognition to the psychological aspect of the subject4 ,i recognise indeed with ,carrire1 in spite of all the apparent mutability of taste1 a normative sthetics2 but that man bears within him an ideal of life1 as the seed does the plant with its blossom and its fruit1 ,i am unable for psychological reasons to concede4 ,i grant that ,i find with ,ola ,hansson psychology is so far poorly represented in the naturalistic literature as the growth and evolution of character is made to appear a much too simple process2 and ,i concede furthermore that the evolution of character in the individual case is very far removed from anything like resemblance to an example in mathematics1 inasmuch as quantities may be lacking us in such a case which are absolutely necessary to be taken account of for a correct solution of the problem2 but these missing quantities need not for that reason be at all matters of mystery1 in their true nature wholly unknown to us4 ,to what limits the domain of mystery has shrunk and to how great an extent its expressions may be made intelligible and to a certain degree even may be 8regulated10 provided1 equipped with thorough knowledge1 we courageously look the things in the face1 is exemplified in a marked degree by a voluminous work of the above mentioned ,dr4 ,schmidkunz4 ,the so-called ,suggestion passed for a long time as something wonderful and had to rest its defence in the hands of the representatives of a psycho-physical mysticism as opposed to a 8surface0-psychology which in the words of ,du ,prels occupied itself exclusively with surface work without penetrating to the depths4 ,,schmidkunz now points out in his ,psychologie der ,suggestion 7,stuttgart1 #ahib3 ,ferdinand ,enke7 in a very comprehensive manner what others had very plainly hinted at before him1 namely1 that in the case of a very great number of phenomena we have1 exactly viewed1 to deal only with some very simple and quite explainable things which unite in the composition of what is commonly called suggestion4 ,the contents of the work1 however1 are not exhausted with this2 under the influence of a tremendous scope of reading1 the author treats the whole domain of suggestion1 and if he understood more perfectly the art of good writing1 he would have earned a much greater gratitude than that which in any event is his due4 ,schmidkunz touches repeatedly in his work upon a domain which still belongs to the most obscure of the history of civilisation1 namely witchcraft and the trials of witches4 ,this topic1 likewise viewed from a psychological point of view1 forms the subject of a special treatise by ,,snell1 entitled ,hexenprocesse und ,geistesstrung 7,munich1 #ahia3 ,j4 ,f4 ,lehmann74 ,in this book no rle is ascribed to suggestion1 but as the title indicates the treatment centres about the question of what significance mental disorders generally may have possessed in the trials of witches4 ,the author concedes that demented persons became the victims of the trials for witchcraft either because they had rendered themselves by their character open to the suspicion of a compact with the devil1 or because they had by self-obtrusion directly drawn upon themselves this persecution1 but asserts nevertheless1 that the number of demented persons that fell victims to the trials for witchcraft1 was comparatively very small4 ,mental disorder however played in so far a great rle in the trials for witchcraft as demented persons1 especially such as suffered from hysteria1 became false witnesses and brought sound and healthy people into the hands of the persecuting judges4 ,as ,i am now treading the province of psychiatry1 ,i will mention1 that ,,wilhelm ,,griesinger',s celebrated work ,pathologie und ,therapie der psychischen ,krankheiten has just been published in its fifth edition under the direction of ,dr4 ,levinstein-,schlegel1 the director of the ,maison de ,sant in ,schneberg 7,berlin3 ,august ,hirschwald74 ,i do not of course specify this work solely for the sake of the physicians who may be readers of ,the ,monist1 but am rather impelled to the act by a universal psychological consideration1 for ,griesinger in the first edition of the work also made a name for himself as a psychologist4 ,it appeared originally in #ahde1 and possessed a compass of #cif pages2 the fifth edition numbers #aajj pages and has increased considerably in size as compared with the fourth4 ,whether the augmentations have added anything to the value of the work is a question which must first be submitted for answer to our physicians4 ,in psychological respects its value has in so far been very much increased as the experiential data have assumed much greater proportions3 the psychological analysis however has been somewhat neglected4 ,psychological analysis in fact is not the strong side of the majority of our psychiatrists4 ,what ,griesinger and still more so ,spielmann sought after in this direction1 has been greatly forced in the background4 ,as a general rule our inquirers content themselves with a description of symptoms and the construction of a more than copious nomenclature1 in the midst of which the connections are ,very easy to be overlooked4 ,among the commendable exceptions is to be named in this respect the well-known ,vienna professor ,,theodor ,,meynert4 ,in addition to his extensive psychiatrical works he has also published a considerable number of lectures and discourses partly in magazines and partly in separate brochures4 ,these discourses are now presented in collected form in a book entitled ,sammlung von populrwissenschaftlichen ,vortrgen ber den ,bau una die ,leistungen des ,gehirns 7,vienna1 #ahib1 ,wilhelm ,braumller74 ,the most noticeable discourses are the following3 ,the ,significance of the ,brain for the ,world of our ,ideas2 ,the ,mechanics of the ,cerebral ,structure2 ,on the ,feelings2 ,on ,illusion2 ,on the ,significance of the ,development of the ,forehead2 ,the ,mechanics of ,physiognomy2 ,brain and ,culture2 ,the ,co-operation of the ,parts of the ,brain2 ,on ,artificial ,disturbances of the ,psychic ,equilibrium4 ,no words need be wasted in the recommendation of the book of ,meynert4 ,,chr4 ,,ufer4 ,,diverse ,,topics4 ,,professor ,,haeckel',s ,,monism4 ,there are two ,latin proverbs which are both good rules for controversialists who seek for the truth on different roads4 ,the one reads3 ,in verbis simus faciles dummodo conveniamus in re1 the other reads3 ,in verbis simus difficiles ut conveniamus in re4 ,a difference of terms often prevents two thinkers from noticing that they actually agree4 ,therefore let us be lenient in terms and never lose sight of their meaning and purport4 ,on the other hand terms are not indifferent1 and the selection of terms should not be regarded as arbitrary4 ,in order to arrive at a solid and permanent agreement1 permanent because it is based upon objectively demonstrable truth1 we have to be scrupulously careful with our terminology2 and we must not allow the arbitrary employment of terms where they are inappropriate4 ,an inappropriate usage of terms will lead us astray and involve us in confusion and error4 ,says ,professor ,haeckel3 8,the divergences which exhibit themselves in our respective unitary conceptions of the world are in part only apparent and in part occasioned by the divergent significances of our fundamental ideas40 ,this seems to me very true and1 indeed1 ,i have very good evidence that it is true4 ,professor ,haeckel writes in his letter to me3 8,i have marked in red those passages of your kind review of my #8,anthropogeny' in which ,i agree with you and in blue those in which ,i differ40 ,now ,i find all those passages where ,i should have anticipated an objection on ,professor ,haeckel's part marked red1 while a blue mark appears where in my opinion there is only a difference of terminology4 ,it is the following sentence on page #dda3 8,psychic life is absent so far as we can see in the primordial world-substance as it appears in the form of a nebula2 it is absent still in the primordial state of planets4 ,it appears with the subjective states of awareness that rise into existence in organised life4 ,the subjectivity of unorganised matter is1 in comparison with man's subjectivity1 to be considered as a blank2 i4 e41 if there is in it a state of awareness1 which we have reasons to doubt1 it is apparently without meaning2 it does not symbolise external objects2 it is no mind2 it is1 as it were1 blind4 ,yet the aim of evolution being the development of psychical life1 shows that the subjectivity of unorganised matter is spiritual in its innermost nature40 ,this difference is probably a difference of terminology only1 for ,i insist most strongly on the doctrine that all nature is alive4 ,however1 ,i make a difference between 8life0 and 8soul40 ,nature is alive throughout1 but it is not ensouled2 the action of chemical elements and of the falling stone are no psychical actions4#hc ,another blue stroke appears at the following passage3 8,we grant willingly that mechanical explanations will serve for all motions that take place in the world2 even the motions of the brain take place in strict obedience to the laws of molar and molecular mechanics4 ,but a mechanical explanation is not applicable to that which is not motion4 ,if it were applicable it would not be desirable1 for it would be of no avail4 ,mechanical explanations are to be limited to mechanical phenomena4 ,feeling however is not a mechanical phenomenon1 and an idea1 being a special and a very complex kind of a feeling1 or rather and more accurately expressed1 being the special meaning of a very complex feeling1 is not a mechanical phenomenon either40 ,the subsequent sentences are again approved by ,professor ,haeckel2 they are marked red3 8,it is true that when a feeling takes place and when an idea is thought in the brain of an organised being1 that a certain nervous action takes place4 ,the nervous action is a motion and this motion represents a definite amount of energy4 ,there is no theoretical difficulty1 although there are almost insurmountable practical difficulties1 in measuring the definite amount of potential energy that is changed into kinetic energy when a man thinks4 ,yet the brain-motion is not the idea and by a mechanical explanation of the brain-motion we have not even touched the problem of what the nature of the idea is1 why ideas originate and how they act40 ,we do not understand how ,professor ,haeckel can object to the view that ideas and feelings are no motions4 ,we fully grant that the nervous action that takes place when an idea is thought is a motion1 and that1 considered as a brain-action1 it is mechanically explainable4 ,but by feeling we understand not the brain-action but a state of awareness1 and states of awareness are not objective phenomena1 they are subjective phenomena2 whereby we do not at all deny that there are no feelings which must not in their objective existence at the same time be supposed to be brain-motions4 ,feelings are not motions but ideas are still less motions4 ,ideas are the meanings which certain feelings that are representative of certain sets of experiences have acquired4 ,is the meaning of a word a motion8 ,can the significance of words be mechanically explained8 ,the meaning of ideas1 the significance of words1 the representativeness of feelings are phenomena which have nothing to do with motions but constitute a domain of their own4 ,professor ,haeckel in our opinion can mean only that there are no feelings in themselves1 but all our feelings are at the same time brain-motions1 and as such they are mechanical phenomena4 ,we have to add1 however1 that an explanation of the mechanism of brain-action does not as yet explain the significance of mental operations4 ,professor ,haeckel insists so strongly upon his view of monism as being mechanicalism that this seems to mark a difference in our conceptions which might be of consequence4 ,i was very glad to notice the long strokes of red along the passages which contain my proposition that 8the evolution of organised life is a natural process having a definite aim02 further1 along the paragraphs concerning the world-order as being moral in so far as the world-order is the basis of morality1 and also those which represent ,god as being that power of the world-order obedience to which is called morality4 ,professor ,haeckel's agreement with these passages indicates that those expressions of his to which we should take exception1 and which he employs again in his article of the present number1 might not be regarded as divergences4 ,professor ,haeckel's definition of ,god appears to us insufficient1 and also his definition of immortality4 ,god is not only the sum-total of matter and force1 ,god is also that quality of the world which the naturalist describes in natural laws4 ,god is the life of the world1 he is that feature of existence which makes mind and knowledge possible4 ,in addition he is that which men call progress1 the ideal of the future that lives in our souls and the principle of evolution in nature4 ,there is a deeper truth too in the doctrine of immortality4 ,there is a conservation of matter and energy1 but there is also a preservation of soul4 ,says ,professor ,haeckel1 8the human soul is a very highly developed vertebral soul40 ,if that is so1 the soul of our fossil ancestors continues to live in us4 ,this soul has been altered1 it is true1 but the alterations are not so much a loss as a gain4 ,the alterations consist in the additional growth of new powers and represent a higher development4 ,all that which was worth preserving has been preserved4 ,and as it has been in the past1 so we can confidently expect that it will be in the future4 ,all that is worth preserving of our souls will be preserved in the ages to come4 ,our souls will live and develop to higher possibilities4 ,they will be transmitted from generation to generation1 advancing on the unlimited path of evolutionary progress4 ,p4 ,c4 ,,footnotes3 #hc ,we intend to express our views more fully in a special article to be published in a subsequent number of ,the ,monist4 ,,the ,,religion ,,of ,,science4 ,there was during the last winter great excitement in ,germany1 concerning a new school-bill proposed by the chancellor ,caprivi1 and the late ,prussian minister of cultus1 ,zedlitz-,trtzschler4 ,this school-bill proposed to take the direction of the public schools out of the hands of scientific men and transfer it to the clergy4 ,the idea of the ,emperor was to let the education of the young be guided in a religious spirit4 ,he intended to wage a war against atheism4 ,among the pamphlets which were written during the crisis1 is especially noteworthy the monograph of the late minister of cultus1 ,herr von ,gosler1 whom we should count among the most conservative of ,prussian officials4 ,his opposition1 accordingly1 is the more remarkable1 and his objections had much weight with the ,emperor4 ,the ,emperor has withdrawn the bill4 ,nevertheless1 the spirit of ultra-conservatism1 which shows itself in an outspoken hostility against science1 still remains strong enough1 and new onslaughts upon the progressive policy in school and church1 may be expected in the future4 ,the question is timely still and will remain timely until there be a common agreement concerning the principles of education1 so that our school politics may no longer be decided by and subjected to partisan strife4 ,attacks that are made upon the very spirit of the institution of our civilisation and the political crises following thereupon are beneficial in one respect4 ,they make people pause2 they make them reconsider the principles by which they allow their conduct to be regulated4 ,they make men conscious of the maxims that ought to underlie their lives and which generally are accepted by the majority without much reflection4 ,the ,prussian school-bill has indeed exercised a wholesome influence1 for it called attention to the importance of principles and roused the ,german nation from religious indifference4 ,during the conflict many scientists and professors of universities1 who as a rule interfere little with politics1 have raised their voice in warning1 and many valuable ideas were expressed that found a strong echo in the heart of the people4 ,there are two articles written by ,german professors which have commanded very wide attention inside and outside of ,germany4 ,the one article was written by ,professor ,haeckel of ,jena1 in the ,freie ,bhne1 the most important passages of which appeared at the time in ,the ,open ,court1 ,no4 #bdc4 ,the other article was written by ,friedrich ,jodl1 of ,prague4 ,it appeared first in the ,augsburger ,allgemeine ,zeitung1 and was republished in pamphlet form by ,cotta1 in ,stuttgart4 ,the former is an enthusiastic appeal to let science1 which is the basis of our civilisation1 remain the basis of our educational maxims in schools and universities4 ,the latter discusses the philosophical principles of the conflict4 ,we are greatly in sympathy with the spirit in which ,professor ,jodl has treated his subject4 ,nay1 more1 we substantially agree with him concerning all main facts1 and also concerning the sense in which our future development should be directed4 ,nevertheless there are points of disagreement1 which we consider of sufficient importance to point out and explain4 ,the ultra-conservative party stands upon the platform that there can be no morality without religion1 and no religion without dogmatism4 ,for this reason dogmatism should rule supreme in the schools1 and science should be subservient to religious creed4 ,that this means curtailment of the freedom of investigation1 and the suppression of the liberty of science1 is understood by all the parties concerned4 ,the liberals so apprehend it1 and the ultra-conservatives do not deny it4 ,in the face of this situation ,professor ,jodl proposes the question1 8,is there a humanitarian morality possible80 7p4 #h of the pamphlet 8,moral1 ,religion1 und ,schule407 ,he says3 8,a mere glance into the numerous anthologies of the moral wisdom of all times and centuries1 shows that the agreement concerning moral ideas and norms is much greater1 and it recedes much more into the dim past than is usually assumed4 ,the writings of ,laotse and ,confutse1 the popular literature of ,buddhism1 the fragments of old ,egyptian law1 the didactic poetry of ,islam1 contain a great wealth of moral wisdom1 and treasures of the noblest ethical sentiment which the ,christian ,occident likes to regard as its own exclusive property4 ,especially the ancients1 whose civilisation1 in spite of much opposition1 is still the basis of our civilisation1 furnish us with a series of the most beautiful moral types and ideals1 and there we find1 beside many valuable features of ,christian ethics1 other no less valuable gems which we seek for in vain in the old ,christian morality1 and which were not recognised until ,christianity came into contact with the ,teutonic nations of northern ,europe4 ,our ultra-conservatives argue that without catechisms humanity would stand helpless before the question of what is right and wrong1 and what the growing generation should be taught in order to make them useful and honorable members of society40 ,in opposition to these views ,professor ,jodl urges that 8,if society of to-day can at all tolerate that such doctrines as ,christian morality are taught in our schools as the foundation of practical conduct of life1 this is possible only because the ethics of the old biblical ,christianity has1 in the course of centuries1 grown to be something quite different from what it was in the beginning4 ,the throughout communistic1 labor-abhorring1 world-hating1 miracle-infatuated morality of original ,christianity1 constantly dreaming of the collapse of the world near at hand1 and suited only to the demands of the paupers of the time1 could only be changed and adapted to the conditions of later periods of radically different conditions1 with great difficulty4 ,the ,catholic church has done much to accomplish this purpose1 and in a still higher degree ,protestantism has made many concessions to humanitarian ethics and practical reason4 ,these concessions1 however1 must appear from the historical standpoint1 as adulterations of the ,christian ideas4 ,exactly in the degree that ,christian morality in modern times has remained a living power1 it has ceased to remain ,christian in the historical sense4444 ,the tendency of the whole development of the modern world is to conceive the moral norms as natural conditions of human society1 and to understand them in their connection of the individual with the whole4 ,this thought and sentiment must become in the child a living power1 and morality cannot expect in this respect help from religion4 ,religion knows only the relation of the individual to ,god1 as it is expressed in the mystical ideas of sin and mercy4 ,religion knows no duties and goals for humanity1 but only for the egotistic desire of salvation for the individual4 ,religion knows no progress1 no evolution1 but only eternal life or eternal damnation4 ,the civilised nations of ,europe had to go through with many hard struggles in order to arrive at the idea that there is a humanitarian1 and a natural1 morality1 in comparison with which all religious dogmatism must be considered as indifferent additions4 ,only on the basis of this conviction is it possible that there exist to-day so many religious confessions of faith1 and among them also those who are religious without having any special confession4 ,here lies the great duty of our time for enlightened legislation1 for our schools1 to take care that the universal ,christian be developed from the narrow dogmatism1 and1 further1 the universal human ideal1 from the universal ,christian4 ,to expect this of the clergy of the different religious societies1 would be a mistake4444 ,the theological spirit and the principle of free investigation1 are irreconcilable adversaries4 ,every religion1 of whatever denomination it may be1 is stable in its very nature4 ,it pretends to be eternal truth1 and whenever it compromises with the idea of progress1 it does so reluctantly1 and in the form of concessions40 ,we agree with ,professor ,jodl in his opinion that our present dogmatic religions are entirely unfit to understand the demands of the present4 ,and it is true that the humanitarian ideas of morality have been slowly developed from the crude and immature notions of the apostolic times4 ,the aim of our moral development must be humanitarian ethics4 ,but we disagree with professor ,jodl that we cannot expect a further evolution of our moral ideas from the clergy4 ,it seems to me that here lies the important difference between the old and the new world4 ,conditions favor religious progress in ,america1 while the conditions in ,europe cut off all hope and produce an ominous stagnancy4 ,the clergy of the old world1 in ,germany as well as in ,england1 and in all ,catholic countries1 are appointed only on the condition of being ultra-conservative in religious matters1 as well as otherwise4 ,no young man whose enthusiasm would carry him so far as to suggest reforms on broader humanitarian principles1 would be admitted in the church as ministers4 ,and if he had been admitted by mistake1 he would meet with a fate similar to that of the ,abb ,lamennais1 whose experiences are admirably described by ,george ,julian ,harney1 in ,no4 #bac of ,the ,open ,court4 ,the situation is greatly different in ,america4 ,our clergymen1 our congregations1 our churches1 are perhaps more orthodox in many respects1 and especially in their belief1 than those of ,europe4 ,nevertheless1 they are more liberal in principles1 and they are less obstinate concerning dogma4 ,most of our churches here do not even possess dogmatic creeds1 or confessions of faith4 ,the clergy of the ,baptists1 the ,congregationalists1 the ,unitarians1 are not bound by oath before taking orders2 to believe in sundry articles and to preach certain doctrines which are supposed to be absolute truth4 ,the ,baptists1 it is true1 are as a rule very orthodox and very dogmatic1 but they are liberal in spite of it1 open to conviction1 and not averse to going onward with the times4 ,this attitude of the ,american clergy must appear inconsistent to ,europeans who can1 in ecclesiastical affairs1 only judge from their own experiences4 ,and it may be that their position is as much inconsistent as was for instance that of ,newton1 who considered the trash he wrote on some theological questions concerning the apocalypse as infinitely superior to his mathematical and astronomical works and did not see that the recognition of the law of gravitation would go far toward freeing humanity from many of those nonsensical ideas which he cherished so highly4 ,in former times ,i was inclined to blame the clergy for the lack of progressiveness in the churches1 but ,i have come to the conclusion that not the clergy are to be blamed for retarding the broadening of the religious spirit1 but the lay-members of the churches4 ,i am personally acquainted with several clergymen of different denominations1 ,christian as well as ,jewish1 who conceive it their duty to point out the way of progress and to further the spirit of a scientific world-conception in religious matters4 ,they advance exactly as quickly and exactly as far as they can in working out of the narrow dogmatism of the religious views of their flock the ideas of a broad humanitarianism4 ,it has often happened that clergymen1 encouraged by their congregations1 have grown too broad in the opinion of their narrower brethren1 and it was customary1 in former years1 to cast them out according to the old fashion of dealing with heretics1 which is still customary in ,european churches4 ,the churches have become more careful here1 for1 whenever such a case happened1 these liberal clergymen were1 as a rule1 not deserted by their congregations4 ,thus every act of removing a clergyman usually led to a schism1 and it seems that1 at least to some extent1 the churches have of late given up their policy of removing heretics within their ranks4 ,this much is certain1 that many among the ,american clergy are ready to progress with the times1 and to accept the truth wherever they find it4 ,in ,europe religion is dictated to the people from above by government and church authority4 ,the clergymen are servants of these authorities4 ,their consciences are not bound1 as they ought to be1 to teach the truth and nothing but the truth1 but to teach the doctrines which their employers bid them teach4 ,and this policy is still considered right and natural1 even among liberal minded people4 ,in ,america the clergy are exponents of the views of their congregations4 ,in ,europe the congregations are separated from their pastors by a deep gap3 there is no gap between the congregation and the clergy in ,america4 ,both are in the closest contact4 ,our congregations are more orthodox than ,european congregations2 therefore our clergy is more sincerely orthodox1 and more honestly narrow1 than the ,european clergy4 ,the ,european clergy are more scholarly1 yet at the same time there may be more hypocrites among them in ,europe who know better than they preach4 ,but there is no doubt that with a further development of intellectuality and scientific insight1 our congregations will become broader and more liberal and more humanitarian1 and1 with the congregations1 our clergy are bound to develop in the same lines4 ,european theology is much superior to ,american theology in scholarly critique1 in historical investigation1 and in philosophical depth4 ,nevertheless1 we must not hope from ,european theologians that they will undertake the great work of reform that is so much needed in our churches1 which is nothing less than to reconcile religion with science2 to let religion develop into a religion of science1 preaching boldly and unreservedly those humanitarian ethics which stand upon the principles of truth2 that is1 of scientifically proved truth1 which finds the sanction of the moral 8ought0 in the facts of experience4 ,professor ,jodl says3 8,the main objection of the supporters of dogmatism in school politics is this3 ,they propose it is not so much religion that is needed in education2 not the contents of ecclesiastical doctrines1 but to give to morality a foundation2 to give it what science calls the sanction of ethical rules4444 ,from this standpoint1 every attempt that is liable to weaken the ethics of religious sanction must appear equivalent to the attempt of abolishing criminal law and penal institutes1 and to deliver the peaceful citizens into the hands of murderers and robbers40 ,professor ,jodl continues3 8,the nature of religious sanction consists in this3 that the moral rules are conceived as the behests of an all-powerful1 omniscient being1 that promises to immortal man for their fulfilment1 eternal rewards1 and for their non-fulfilment eternal punishment in the life beyond40 ,in opposition to this view ,professor ,jodl maintains that 8,man's morality1 on the one hand1 has never been preserved from error by an outlook into the beyond of heaven and hell1 and1 on the other hand1 there have never been missing those impulses that originate in the depths of human nature working in the line of moral ideas40 ,these impulses are1 according to ,professor ,jodl1 the purely moral sanction of conscience4 ,and conscience is represented as1 and in another place called1 8the natural sanction of morality40 ,this view of regarding conscience as the natural sanction of morality does not appear to us as a happy expression1 and it seems to us that ,professor ,jodl did not intend it as it might be understood4 ,for ,professor ,jodl speaks in another passage of 8the natural impulses of morality as having their sanction in experience40 ,if that be so1 conscience would not be the ultimate authority1 but conscience would have to be regulated and corrected by a rationalised experience4 ,if 8the natural impulses of morality have their sanction in experience10 the ultimate authority would be the facts represented in experience2 and the facts of experience1 in their totality1 are nothing more or less than the whole universe with its natural laws and conceived in its cosmical order4 ,the universe1 the ,all1 nature1 or whatever you call it1 is indeed an omnipotent reality which man cannot resist1 and in which he can live only by adapting himself to its laws4 ,if this ultimate authority of the natural laws be called by the religious term 8,god10 we shall see at once that the old dogmatic religions express a very deep truth in mythological language4 ,the ultimate sanction of morality is not our conscience1 but that omnipotent power which resides in the objective world of realities1 in the cosmical order of the universe4 ,we might as well say that everybody shall regard his watch as the ultimate standard of time as to make his conscience the criterion of morality4 ,may everybody use his watch wisely and regulate it well4 ,and so may everybody revise his conscience and investigate diligently whether it agrees with the laws of that all-power of which we are a small part and through which alone we exist4 ,professor ,jodl praises very highly the ,french institution of a so-called purely moral instruction in the public schools4 ,father ,h4 ,gruber1 however1 points out some serious shortcomings in this system of moral education1 resulting from a lack of principle4 7,see ,stimmen aus ,maria-,laach1 ,freiburg i4 ,b41 #ahib1 ,no4 #d47 ,it is apparent that moral commands cannot be based upon purely subjective notions or ideals1 they must be based upon some objective authority which is a power that enforces obedience4 ,such a power exists4 ,it is the world in which we live4 ,it is that ,all-being of which we are a part4 ,and that feature of nature which enforces that conduct which we call moral is named ,god in the terminology of religious language4 ,a consideration like this points out the way to a reconciliation between science and religion4 ,there is a truth in the old religions1 and this truth need only be purified from the errors that cluster about it1 hiding its grandeur1 beauty1 and importance4 ,let the church and its authorities recognise science and the principle of free investigation2 let them be ready to accept the scientific methods of research2 let them be willing to accept truth as it can be proved by arguments and verified by experience as well as by experiments2 and we need no longer worry about dogmatism and the narrowness of their sectarian doctrines4 ,all these accidental features of religion will1 then1 pass away1 and we shall have a religion which the scientist and the philosopher can embrace4 ,this is what we call the ,religion of ,science2 and the ,religion of ,science is bound to be the religion of the future4 ,the ,religion of ,science will not abolish the religions of the past1 but it will develop them1 broaden them1 perfect them1 into the cosmical religion of humanitarianism4 ,to teach an ethics that either has no sanction1 or whose sanction is built upon the diverging opinions of individuals1 will not do4 ,ethics must be based upon the sanction of some objective authority1 and the recognition of an objective authority1 of a power which enforces a certain kind of conduct1 being religion1 we say that no ethics can be without a religious basis4 ,the problem at present is not how to teach irreligious ethics--all such attempts are failures at the start2 but to change the mythology of the old religions into a clear1 scientific conception of the natural conditions which demand of man that he should observe those rules which we are wont to call moral4 ,p4 ,c4 ,,the ,,future ,,position ,,of ,,logical ,,theory4 ,in last ,october's number of ,the ,monist1 ,professor ,john ,dewey gives a sketch of what in his view is 8the present position of logical theory40 ,according to this the basis of the position seems to be that 8the only possible thought is the reflection of the significance of fact10 and that therefore logic1 which is the science of the laws of thought1 rests in reality on an objective basis4 ,he supports ,hegel in denying 8the existence of any faculty of thought which is other than the expression of fact itself40 ,now it is doubtless the case that this is the position at present taken up by a large number of logicians1 but as this position seems to me to be fundamentally erroneous ,i should like to put before your readers what ,i hope will be 8the future position of logical theory40 ,i have elsewhere worked out in some detail a theory of reasoning which differs from that commonly accepted chiefly in this1 that it recognises not two1 but three kinds of reasoning1 which ,i call ,objective1 ,subjective1 and ,symbolic4 ,reasoning is commonly divided into two branches1 denoted by various pairs of terms1 such as ,objective and ,subjective1 ,inductive and ,deductive1 ,empirical and ,formal4 ,the lines of division indicated by these various pairs of terms are not quite identical2 but they none of them indicate what seems to me the most important distinction of all1 namely that between real1 and symbolic argument4 ,there does exist 7,i will not say a 8faculty of thought10 but7 a method of argument which 8is other than the expression of fact itself10 whether of objective or of subjective fact4 ,the term 8formal reasoning0 is indeed often used to denote this kind of argument1 but this is a bad name to give it1 since it seems to imply1 and frequently is held to imply1 that it deals with the forms of objective or subjective facts1 whereas in reality it deals only with symbols1 which are arbitrarily defined1 and which do not necessarily correspond to any things whatever1 whether objective or subjective4 ,that this kind of argument not only exists1 but flourishes is evident as soon as it is grasped that pure mathematics is nothing but a branch of symbolic logic4 ,it may be that there exists somewhere a fact of which any conceivable mathematical formula might be regarded as the reflexion1 but it must surely be evident that it was not to the reflexion of such facts that mathematical formul in general owe their existence or validity4 ,it may perhaps be true 8that fact1 reality is significant10 and even that thoughts are themselves such significant realities1 but it is the thoughts that are given to us first1 or rather sensations which are the elements of thoughts1 and we can only infer the realities from them1 and not vice versa4 ,the essence of my theory of logic may be briefly stated thus4 ,the meaning of a logical term contains two parts1 its denotation and its connotation4 ,either of these parts may be laid down arbitrarily as its definition1 leaving the other part which ,i call its import to be found out by experience4 ,to understand both parts of the meaning of any term is therefore to possess real knowledge4 ,pure symbolic reasoning deals only with the definitions of terms1 and is not therefore founded on real knowledge1 nor can it alone ever lead to real knowledge4 ,thus if in any proposition the definitions of the terms are deducible from one another1 the proposition may be proved symbolically and is what ,i call a truism3 it gives no real information4 ,but if the definitions of the terms are independent of each other1 and yet not inconsistent1 the proposition can only be intended to assert the identity of the imports of the terms2 it therefore ascribes import to the terms and gives real information1 whether true or false4 ,if any terms in a symbolic argument are however known to have real import1 it may be ascribed to them in real propositions1 and any conclusions of the argument which contain only such terms will ipso facto be made to yield real information1 which may be new in the sense that it was not before recognised1 though it was of course implied in the real assertion or assertions which ascribed import to the terms of the symbolic argument4 ,it is in this way possible to separate any science into two branches1 one of which consists purely of symbolic argument founded on definitions alone1 while the other may be expressed in a series of propositions1 the definitions of whose terms are independent of each other1 and which ascribe real import 7whether objective or subjective7 to the terms of the symbolic science1 or some of them4 ,this is as far as pure logic can go4 ,the question how the truth of any real propositions comes to be known is not1 in my opinion1 any part of logical theory1 but belongs to metaphysics4 ,however that is no reason for not discussing it here1 especially as it is the chief question discussed in ,professor ,dewey's paper4 8,truth0 means some sort of consistency in a proposition4 ,we may compare a symbolic argument to a game with counters1 the rules of which are laid down arbitrarily1 and to say that a given conclusion of such an argument is true only means that the game has been 8played fair40 ,but the truth of a real proposition does not depend on any arbitrary rules4 ,it expresses a consistency between two real facts1 either that two named groups of things possess certain common attributes1 or that certain of the things possessing named groups of attributes are identical4 ,the essential element of all real knowledge is then a connecting link between a thing and an attribute1 such as is afforded by a well-understood word4 ,now the only 8things0 which we can apprehend directly are our subjective sensations and conceptions4 ,we can compare two or more sensations or conceptions1 and recognise in them common attributes4 ,thus ,i can say of my own knowledge that the sensations ,i denote by 8the taste of sugar0 and 8the taste of lead acetate0 have a common attribute1 which ,i call 8sweetness40 ,this is a real assertion1 for its truth is not deducible from the definitions of its terms1 and yet ,i know1 by direct apprehension1 that it is true4 ,but it is only a subjective truth4 ,the corresponding objective assertion would be sugar and acetate of lead both produce1 when tasted1 the sensation of sweetness4 ,and ,i have no direct apprehension of this fact4 ,that the tastes referred to in the former proposition were produced by objective things denoted by the terms sugar and acetate of lead1 can only be inferred by the process called induction1 which can never lead to a positive or necessary truth4 ,thus we may from a pure symbolic science proceed one step further1 to a subjective science1 by the aid of direct apprehension1 and the results of such a subjective science may in certain cases attain the position of absolute1 or necessary truths4 ,but on the other hand1 all objective sciences must rest on induction4 ,now the true nature of induction is1 ,i am persuaded1 commonly misapprehended1 because it is not realised sufficiently clearly that the prime data of induction are not themselves objective1 but subjective facts4 ,an 8objective fact0 is really only an hypothesis1 postulated to account for certain of our subjective sensations4 ,the only justification for making such an hypothesis is that it actually does explain certain sensations1 and the measure of its probability 7for we can never assert it as a necessary certainty7 is the number and complexity of the sensations which it accounts for4 ,the first of all such objective hypotheses is that we have an objective environment to whose action our sensations1 or some of them1 are due4 ,this suggests at once a more general hypothesis1 commonly known as the law of causation1 namely that the conditions obtaining in the objective universe at any one moment are the effective causes of those obtaining at the next1 and so at any subsequent moment4 ,these two hypotheses1 together with certain subsidiary ones1 do suffice to account for an enormous number1 if not all1 of our sensations1 and so we are justified in entertaining them4 ,but to leave out the notion of effective causation1 and to substitute a mere rule of sequence1 is to remove the only justification we have for assuming the hypothesis of causation at all4 ,it is perhaps conceivable that the hypothesis may be false1 that our sensations are not 8caused by0 an objective environment but if so what reason remains for believing in that environment at all8 ,i can never know anything whatever about an objective universe1 unless some of my sensations about which alone ,i know anything directly1 are caused by that universe4 ,it is perhaps thinkable that there should be an objective universe in which events occur which in no sense cause my subjective sensations1 but to which those sensations nevertheless happen to correspond2 but if this is so the sensations afford me no ground whatever for believing in the occurrence of the events1 or the objectivity of the universe4 ,well then1 the essence of induction is the assumption of an hypothesis to account for observed facts--first of all of directly observed sensations1 and then of facts assumed to be objective in virtue of the primary hypothesis4 ,that this account of induction is the true one is ,i think particularly enforced by the consideration of those cases to which at first sight it does not seem to apply4 ,a common example of induction is afforded by our belief that the sun will rise to-morrow4 ,that it has risen every morning for the last four thousand years or more is no reason whatever for believing that it will rise to-morrow1 unless it is held to point to some explanatory hypothesis4 ,such an hypothesis has actually been framed by astronomers1 and no one would now pretend to found his belief in the sun's rising to-morrow on the mere fact that it has often risen before1 but would go on to explain that it must rise unless the earth were to stop revolving1 etc4 ,if at ,monte ,carlo the red turned up ten times running1 would that be any reason for expecting it to turn up again1 the eleventh time8 ,no1 it would not unless the succession of reds seemed to point to some explanatory hypothesis1 such as a defect in the roulette4 ,again1 the fact that in the last fifty years the death rate in ,london has been about twenty-eight per thousand would be no reason for believing that it will be about that figure this year except on the assumption that the constancy of the death rate indicated certain constant causes1 which we have no reason to believe have been altered this year4 ,having once assumed that our environment is objective1 and as a corollary the hypothesis of causation1 the whole of physical science follows1 step by step4 ,subsidiary hypotheses are introduced at each stage and justified by the way they account for observed results4 ,to show how a single hypothesis is capable of explaining a large number of observed results1 the full meaning of the hypothesis is elucidated by symbolic reasoning4 ,by such reasoning it is for example shown that the same hypothesis1 of universal gravitation1 is capable of accounting1 not only for the movements of the stars1 but for the tides1 the flow of rivers1 the falling of unsupported bodies1 the rising of balloons1 the movements of the balance in ,cavendish's experiment1 and so on4 ,that such wide extensions of an hypothesis are possible tends greatly to confirm1 not only the hypothesis itself1 but the fundamental hypotheses of objectivity and causation also4 ,but it does not prove either the one or the others4 ,we cannot know anything about the objective universe with absolute certainty1 but we may reasonably believe a certain hypothesis about it with any degree of conviction we think suitable2 that is we may 7and of course we actually do7 act on all occasions as if we knew absolutely that they were true4 ,we may then believe1 and ,i for one do believe1 not only in the objectivity of the universe1 but that even my own subjective sensations are mere bye-products of that universe4 ,i believe that objective facts are1 if ,i may so express it1 more real than subjective sensations2 that in fact the objective universe might have existed1 and might exist again without any subjective element in it anywhere4 ,but ,i cannot know this1 it is with me a matter of faith4 ,thus ,i cannot agree with ,hegel1 that 8all possible thought is the reflexion of the significance of fact0 7except perhaps in the sense that thought is the reflexion of the significance of certain changes in the grey matter of the brain7 for this would seem to imply that stupid or contradictory thoughts reflected stupid or contradictory significance in certain facts4 ,but ,i believe that men of science are gradually evolving a system of thought which will more and more faithfully reflect the significance of fact1 and that thus science is actually building up truth4 ,but all science must begin with1 and be founded upon1 subjective knowledge1 and therefore any theory of positivism contradicts itself for it must be founded on faith4 ,science is thus founded on faith1 faith in things not directly apprehended1 just as truly as religion is4 ,it is only because we unconsciously acquire this faith in our infancy1 and that it is in most cases amply justified by subsequent experience1 that we do not even recognise the fact that it is faith1 in exactly the same sense that belief in ,god is4 ,but just as men have sometimes lost their faith in ,god1 so it may happen to a man to loose his faith in reality1 and logic is quite as incapable of shaking a man out of the one position as out of the other4 ,this ,i take it is the key to the agnosticism of such men of science as ,mr4 ,huxley4 ,i do not for a moment suppose that ,mr4 ,huxley believes less than most men2 he probably has good grounds for believing a great deal more4 ,only he rightly refuses to say that he knows facts of which he can have had no direct apprehension and which he can only infer more or less probably1 to be true4 ,hypotheses which as we push our investigations are shown to be capable of explaining more and more facts1 that is1 ultimately1 more and more sensations1 will in the end come to be believed in without doubt or hesitation4 ,if a man says he knows the law of gravitation to be true1 he commits a logical blunder2 but there is nothing to prevent a scientific man from believing in any miracle or prodigy1 so long as the account he gives of it does not contradict itself4 ,not only may two equally reasonable men form very different estimates of the probability of the same event1 even with the same evidence before them1 but one man may put his faith to a proposition with admittedly much lower degree of probability than would be required to convince another4 ,only1 a scientific man will always distinguish between what he knows and what he believes1 and will admit that though he has made up his mind to act as if he knew to be true the propositions he only believes to be so1 yet another man may reasonably take a different view of any one of them4 ,,edward ,t4 ,,dixon4 ,trin4 ,coll41 ,cambridge1 ,jan4 #h1 #ahib4 ,,comte ,,and ,,turgot4 ,on page #daj of the last number of ,the ,monist1 it was stated that the doctrine of the three stages of knowledge was not properly a ,comtean idea but belonged to ,turgot4 ,the following letter from ,professor ,schaarschmidt of ,bonn informs us of the passages in ,turgot where the statement of the doctrine is found3 ,to the ,editor of ,the ,monist3 ,to your note of inquiry of the #bb;d of last month ,i have the honor to reply1 that the ,comtean theory of the trois tats may be traced back to utterances of ,turgot made by him in his ,second discours sur les progrs successifs de l'esprit humain prononc le #bme dcembre #agej--namely in the ,sorbonne4 ,you will find the discourse referred to in the edition of the works of ,turgot which ,i now have before me1 namely that of ,guillaumin1 ,paris1 #ahdd1 in ,vol4 ,,ii1 at pages #eig et seqq4 ,the passage in question is found at p4 #fjj-fja4 ,however1 it is highly probable that the so-called loi des trois tats was directly transmitted to ,comte by ,st4 ,simon1 who reproduced the idea of ,turgot in his ,introduction aux travaux scientifiques du ,x,i,xme ,sicle1 at pages #fb-fc4 ,for ,comte was dependent in many respects on ,st4 ,simon1 while it is probable that he had never studied ,turgot4 ,to ,st4 ,simon1 in fact1 is due the expression 8philosophie positive10 as well as the germ-notion of the division of the ,sciences1 which ,comte further elaborated4 ,,schaarschmidt4 ,,book ,,reviews4 ,,darwin ,,and ,,after ,,darwin4 ,i4 ,,the ,,darwinian ,,theory4 ,by ,george ,john ,romanes1 ,m4 ,a41 ,,ll4 ,d41 ,f4 ,r4 ,s4 ,london3 ,longmans1 ,green ,co4 ,chicago3 ,the ,open ,court ,publishing ,co4 #ahib4 ,in the present work by ,professor ,romanes1 who may be regarded as the special exponent of ,darwin's theory of organic evolution1 we have a complete and systematic presentation of 8,darwinism according to ,darwin40 ,it is the outcome of a course of lectures delivered by the author in #ahhi before the ,royal ,institution1 ,london1 and forms only part of a much more extensive treatise on the ,darwinian theory1 embracing the early history of biology1 and a discussion of the further developments of the theory subsequent to the death of the great naturalist who gave it birth4 ,the present part is limited to what is distinctly ,darwinian1 dealing with it and with the main objections raised against the general theory of organic evolution it enforces4 ,the subject naturally divides into two parts1 and ,professor ,romanes accordingly deals with it in two sections1 in the first of which he considers organic evolution as a fact1 stating the main evidences in support of the doctrine1 while in the second section he furnishes 8the evidences which thus far have been brought to light touching the causes of organic evolution considered as a process40 ,the author points out in his introductory remarks1 that in order to establish a theory of a continuous transmutation of species1 which is what is meant by organic evolution1 it is not necessary to furnish proof of all the natural causes which have been at work4 ,the issue is between the theory of a supernatural cause1 as operating immediately in numberless acts of special creation1 and the theory of 8natural causes as a whole whether these happen1 or do not happen1 to have been hitherto discovered40 ,moreover1 the discussion is concerned only with the origin of species1 and not with that of life1 as to which the author says with truth1 8although in the opinion of most biologists it is a question which we may well hope will some day fall within the range of science to answer1 at present1 it must be confessed1 science is not in a position to furnish so much as any suggestion upon the subject2 and therefore our wisdom as men of science is frankly to acknowledge that such is the case40 ,the idea of evolution implies continuity1 and the author refers to the fact that the uniformity of nature's method in the production of phenomena to which continuity is due1 recognised in other fields of science1 strongly recommended the theory of organic evolution for acceptance on merely antecedent grounds4 ,there is another important fact1 from the antecedent point of view1 to which ,professor ,romanes draws attention4 ,he states it in the words of ,mr4 ,wallace1 who lays down as a general law that 8every species has come into existence coincident both in space and time with a pre-existing and closely allied species40 ,this is a necessary consequence of natural evolution1 but no reason can be assigned for it on the theory of special creation1 and the existence of such a correlation may be regarded as a test-question between the two theories4 ,the direct evidence in favor of organic evolution brought together in the first section of the present work is considered under the several heads of classification1 ,morphology1 ,embryology1 ,palontology1 and ,geographical ,distribution4 ,as to the first of these subjects1 the object of classification has been the arranging of organisms in accordance with their natural affinities4 ,organisms have been compared for the purpose of ascertaining which of the constituent organs are of the most invariable occurrence1 and therefore of the most typical significance1 and the author shows that 8all the general principles and particular facts appertaining to the natural classification of plants and animals1 are precisely what they ought to be according to the theory of genetic descent2 while no one of them is such as might be--and indeed1 used1 to be--expected upon the theory of special creation40 ,in connection with the important subject of ,morphology1 the author1 after showing that the theory of descent with continued adaptive modification fully explains all the known cases of divergence from the typical structure which an organism presents1 devotes himself especially to the argument from rudimentary structures4 ,these are of such general occurrence that they are found in every species1 and such obsolescent or vestigial structures1 as the author terms them1 are of great value as evidence for the theory of evolution1 particularly those found in adult man4 ,to human vestigial structures the author pays particular attention1 his observations being accompanied by excellent illustrations from nature4 ,it is noteworthy that he abandons the flattening of the tibia in man1 and the disposition of valves in human veins1 as arguments in support of man's natural origin1 which is abundantly supported1 however1 by reference to other rudimentary organs4 ,the science of ,embryology is of special importance1 on account of the history it affords of the process of evolution1 and thus supplying evidence of the fact1 although the author remarks1 8the foreshortening of developmental history which takes place in the individual lifetime may be expected often to take place1 not only in the way of condensation1 but also in the way of excision40 ,to understand the argument from embryology it is necessary to trace the first beginning of individual life in the ovum1 and for this purpose to consider the phenomena of reproduction in their most simple form4 ,in connection with this subject1 ,professor ,romanes1 after examining the features in which the cell-division of protozoa differs from that of metazoa1 and after considering the grounds on which it may be concluded that there is a physiological continuity between growth and sexual reproduction1 points out that the constructive argument in favor of evolution derived from embryology commences with the fertilisation of the metazoal ovum4 ,as this first stage has not been adequately treated by any other writer1 the author deals with it at considerable length4 ,the later stages of individual development1 including that of the vertebrata1 on the lines of ,haeckel's ideal primitive vertebrate1 are more concisely treated4 ,the science of embryology1 covers the whole field of animal life1 and it is not surprising therefore that it is considered by the author and other evolutionists as furnishing the strongest support to the theory of evolution4 ,as to the palontological evidence1 ,professor ,romanes does not ascribe to it the paramount importance which it has in popular judgment4 ,nevertheless he asserts that1 not only is no positive proof against the theory of descent to be drawn from a study of palontology1 but it proves two very important general facts in favor of it4 ,these are that from the earliest to the latest times there has been a constant and progressive increase in the diversity of types both of animals and plants1 and that 8through all these branching lines of ever-multiplying types1 from the first appearance of each of them to their latest known conditions1 there is overwhelming evidence of one great law of organic nature--the law of gradual advance from the general to the special1 from the low to the high1 from the simple to the complex40 ,these general facts are supported by detailed consideration of fossil horns1 bones1 teeth and shells1 which supply four special lines of evidence4 ,the evolution of mammalian limbs with particular reference to the hoofed animals is treated with a fulness its importance requires4 ,as the geological argument is concerned with the distribution of species in time1 so that based on the present geographical distribution of animal and plant species is concerned with their distribution in space4 ,this1 although not regarded by the author as a crucial test between the rival theories of creation and evolution1 is declared to be one of the strongest lines of evidence in favor of the latter4 ,the general facts relied on are1 the discontinuity of distribution of certain species1 the absence of any constant correlation between habitats and animals or plants suited to live upon them1 and the presence in every biological region of species related to other species in genera1 and usually also genera related to other genera in families2 this correlation between a geographically restricted habitat and the affinities of its fauna and flora being repeated over and over again throughout the earth's surface4 ,but further1 the correlation between habitats and their animals and plants is not limited to the now existing species1 that is1 the dead and living species are allied1 showing that the latter are modified descendants of the former4 ,moreover1 where the areas of distribution are not restricted1 through species wandering away from their native homes1 the course of their wanderings is marked by the origination en route of new species4 ,another important consideration is that a double correlation exists in the geographical distribution of organic types4 ,that between the geographical restriction and natural affinity among inhabitants of the same areas has already been mentioned4 ,the second is the correlation between degrees of geographical restriction and degrees of natural affinity4 ,this is consonant with the theory of descent with modification1 as 8the more distant the affinity1 and therefore1 ex hypothesi1 the larger and the older the original group of organisms1 the greater must be the chance of dispersal40 ,these general considerations are supported by detailed illustrations drawn from the distribution of aquatic and terrestrial organisms4 ,the author shows that an examination of the faunas and floras of oceanic islands establishes the general law 8that wherever there is evidence of land-areas having been for a long time separated from other land-areas1 there we meet with a more or less extraordinary profusion of unique species1 often running up into unique genera40 ,there is1 moreover1 a constant correlation between the degree of this peculiarity1 and the time during which the fauna and flora have been isolated4 ,the author concludes this part of his argument by the forcible observation that 8if the doctrine of special creation is taken to be true1 then it must be further taken that the one and only principle which has been consistently followed in the geographical disposition of species1 is that of so depositing them as to make it everywhere appear that they were not thus deposited at all1 but came into existence where they now occur by way of genetic descent with perpetual migration and correlative modification40 ,the second part of this work1 that which treats of selection1 under the two heads of ,natural ,selection and ,sexual ,selection1 although in some respects the most important1 does not need to be noticed so fully as that which deals with the facts of natural evolution4 ,after stating the theory of natural selection1 the author notices various fallacies connected with it which are largely prevalent among the adherents of ,darwinianism1 although nowhere fallen into by ,darwin himself1 and the still greater fallacies found in the writings of his opponents4 ,in the two following chapters ,professor ,romanes1 after stating the main arguments in favor of the theory of natural selection1 reviews the main objections which have been urged against it4 ,the first argument is that1 as a matter of observation1 8the struggle for existence in nature does lead to the extermination of forms less fitted for the struggle1 and thus makes room for forms more fitted40 ,the second argument1 which the author considers of overwhelming significance1 is that there is not a single instance1 in either the vegetable or the animal kingdom1 of a structure or an instinct which is developed for the exclusive benefit of another species4 ,its importance may be judged by the fact that ,darwin considered that a single instance to the contrary would invalidate the whole theory of natural selection4 ,the third argument is based on the facts connected with the variation of animals and plants under domestication4 ,ocular evidence of the value of this argument is furnished by a series of drawings prepared for the present work representing varieties of pigeons1 and of eight other animals4 ,as special illustrations of natural selection the author considers the subjects of protective colouring1 warning colours1 and mimicry4 ,in referring to his treatment of the criticisms of the natural selection theory1 in the course of which he deals with the main objections1 we cannot do more than mention that based on the possession by the skate of an electric organ1 which1 owing to the weakness of its discharges1 cannot apparently be of any use to the animal4 ,this difficulty seems to be unexplainable according to the principles of natural selection1 and ,professor ,romanes1 in admitting the fact1 remarks that it is of a magnitude and importance 8altogether unequalled by that of any other single case--or any series of cases--which has hitherto been encountered by the theory40 ,the last chapter of the work is devoted to the consideration of the theory of ,sexual ,selection1 which was suggested by ,mr4 ,darwin to furnish a scientific explanation of the wide generality of beauty in organic structures4 ,it is an observed fact that sexual selection does take place among the higher animals1 and it is inferred that1 the selection has reference to an sthetic taste on the part of the animals themselves2 and that this cause is adequate to explain the phenomena of beauty presented by such animals4 ,after stating the evidence in favor of these conclusions1 the author considers at length ,mr4 ,wallace's views on the subject4 ,these constitute the objections urged against the theory of sexual selection1 of the truth of which1 however1 ,darwin shortly before his death expressed himself as remaining firmly convinced4 ,professor ,romanes concludes his present volume with a few general remarks on the philosophical relations of ,darwinism to the facts of adaptation on the one hand and to those of beauty on the other4 ,in none of these1 says the author1 do we meet with any independent evidence of supernatural design1 although there is abundant evidence throughout organic nature of natural causation4 ,and yet natural causation furnishes no disproof of the existence of a ,supreme ,being4 ,the whole of organic and inorganic nature is made subject to one rule of government1 but 8the ulterior and ultimate question touching the nature of this government as mental or non-mental1 personal or impersonal1 remains exactly where it was40 ,moreover1 if there be an intelligent ,first ,cause1 of whose ,will all secondary causes are the expression1 their operation must be uniform1 so far as the ,will is consistent1 and therefore it must appear as what we call mechanical4 ,thus according to the pure logic of the matter1 8the proof of organic evolution amounts to nothing more than the proof of a natural process40 ,in an appendix to ,chapter ,v1 ,professor ,romanes offers suggestions as to the imperfection of the geological record1 and meets various objections against the theory of organic evolution on that ground4 ,but we must now leave this excellent work1 which will undoubtedly answer the expectation with which it was prepared1 of being 8a compendium1 or handbook1 adapted to the requirements of a general reader or biological student1 as distinguished from those of a professed naturalist40 ,it is enriched by a very good portrait of ,darwin1 in whose footsteps the author has sought to tread by 8avoiding dogmatism on the one hand1 and undue timidity as regards general reasoning on the other40 ,in his introductory observations he dwells on the remarkable influence exercised by ,darwin over the method of investigation of organic nature1 by treating the discovery or accumulation of facts1 not as an end1 but as a means for generalisation1 thus bringing natural history into a line with other inductive sciences4 ,the value of the work is materially increased by the addition of numerous well executed original illustrations1 besides various plates derived from ,haeckel's works and other sources1 some of them ,american4 ,it has also a good ,index which will add much to its usefulness4 4 ,,grundriss ,,der ,,naturlehre ,f,r ,,die ,,oberen ,,classen ,,der ,,mittelschulen4 ,von ,dr4 ,e4 ,mach4 ,ausgabe fr ,gymnasien4 ,mit #ceh ,abbildungen4 #cae pp4 ,vienna and ,prague3 ,f4 ,tempsky4 ,leipsic3 ,g4 ,freytag4 ,the principles that have guided ,professor ,mach in the preparation of these outlines of ,physics1 are in the main as follows3 ,the concepts and notions of physical science should not be set forth dogmatically1 but should be presented as much as possible under the influence of the actual natural facts that lead to them4 ,hypotheses and theories should be employed only when actually necessary4 ,long mathematical developments and pages of formul only impede the scholar's total view of his subject and afford of themselves no insight4 ,logical finish should not be sought after in elementary presentations2 the method of the inculcation of truths should1 so to speak1 be psychological3 the method of their acquisition4 ,from the brief statement of these guiding principles1 the reader will observe that ,professor ,mach's conception of the proper form of an elementary text-book1 differs greatly from that usually entertained4 ,the method of presentation is not the dogmatic1 the 8logical10 which sets forth a science as a ready-made and perfected1 mystically created1 product2 but the genetic1 the historical1 the natural4 ,we are constantly made aware1 in the study of this book1 of what knowledge really means and what it does not4 ,we are not treated1 in its introductory chapter1 as we are in most of the text-books of ,physics1 to disquisitions on the insolubility of the questions ,what is ,matter1 ,what is ,energy1 ,what is ,force1 and to like professions of metaphysical ignorance1 which make us wonder how people can request us to read hundreds of pages about things it is impossible to have knowledge of2 but we are presented throughout with a simple statement and description1 in terms of facts1 of what our fundamental1 as well as our derived1 notions are1 and what their import4 ,it is unnecessary to say that the need of such a book is very great4 ,and it is pleasant1 constantly to discover how well its idea has been executed4 ,concise1 unburdened by unnecessary and self-evident developments1 it is in our judgment a model of elementary exposition4 ,with characteristic modesty1 ,professor ,mach disclaims all pretension to having fully realised his conception1 and views his performance simply as an attempt4 ,the book was submitted1 before publication1 to a number of competent educators1 whose advice in regard to alterations was frequently acted upon4 4 ,,nouvelles ,,recherches ,,de ,,psychiatrie ,,et ,d',,anthropologie ,,criminelle4 ,by ,c4 ,lombroso4 ,paris3 ,flix ,alcan4 #ahib4 ,prof4 ,c4 ,lombroso's activity reaches a climax that is almost superhuman4 ,he contributed to the ,italian ,archives of ,psychiatry two articles1 one of which proves that1 at least in ,italy1 the sense of touch is weaker in women than in men2 it is still weaker and more irregular in criminal women than in normal women4 7,archiv4 di4 ,psichiatr4 ,sc4 pen4 ed4 ,antrop4 ,vol4 ,,xii1 #ahia1 p4 #a-f74 ,the other article 7l4 c4 p4 #eh-ajh7 is an inquiry concerning thought-transmission1 which contains besides a critical review of the usual rubbish of so-called telepathic phenomena two strange observations4 ,the first is the case of a low-bred hysterical lad who does not possess the faculty claimed by him to understand telepathically the intentions of whosoever employs him1 but strange enough1 if sufficiently charged with whiskey1 is able to read any writing through the envelope with closed eyes4 ,the other case is a somnambulistic compositor1 who sets type correctly in the state of somnambulism4 ,blindfolded he draws the figures drawn behind his back upon a slate1 and hypnotised he guesses the numbers which the experimenter thinks4 ,lombroso is one of our greatest psychologists1 but these experiments perhaps with the same subjects should be repeated by other psychologists so as to make sure of their correctness4 ,lombroso concludes that there seems to be some foundation in thought-transmission4 ,the present little volume of new researches applies ,lombroso's theories concerning morphological abnormalities of the criminal type in the anthropological field4 ,it appears natural that the criminal type should show abnormal features1 but sometimes ,lombroso's eagerness to discover abnormal features1 even in political criminals such as ,charlotte ,corday1 is exaggerated4 ,at least we must confess that many abnormalities appear very frequently among peaceful and law-abiding citizens4 ,the ,corday skull1 although a trifle platycephalic1 is beautifully rounded and normal4 ,m4 ,topinard finds no abnormal features but ,lombroso maintains that its platycephaly is doubly abnormal and he adds3 8,the capacity of the skull is #a4cfj cubic centimeters while those of ,parisian women is #a4ccg4 ,must we not conclude that its capacity exceeds the average80 ,we read on p4 #abd and sq43 8,the more our women will be forced to enter the economical struggle for existence1 the more will they become criminals4444 ,the result 7of letting them enter public life7 will be to lower the nature of women40 ,the booklet is very instructive even to those who disagree with the professor1 for it is full of facts and valuable observations4 4 ,,vorlesungen ,,ber ,,die ,,algebra ,,der ,,logik4 7,exakte ,logik47 ,by ,dr4 ,ernst ,schrder4 ,erster ,band mit viel ,figuren im ,texte4 ,leipsic3 ,b4 ,g4 ,teubner4 #ahij4 ,professor ,mach says1 8,the essence of science is economy of thought40 ,if that is so1 there is no discipline more imbued with the spirit of science than algebra4 ,when operating with algebraic symbols we cease to think out the whole calculation at every stage1 and we are enabled to keep track of the different factors1 and of their mutual relations during the operation from the beginning to the end4 ,in common arithmetic these factors are lost like rivers in an ocean of homogeneous numbers which increase and decrease without betraying the way by which they were reached4 ,algebraic symbols generalise calculation1 and thus we have the advantage of calculating from the resultant formula any particular example with machine-like exactness and without the trouble of going over the whole operation again4 ,the ease with which we can operate with symbols brings it about that we sometimes out-run our thought and the correct result may be obtained by an operator who only partially understands the operation1 just as an engineer is able to run a machine the mechanism of which he but partially understands4 ,mathematics having gained so great advantages through the introduction of algebraic symbols1 the question suggests itself whether the same method might not with some advantage be introduced into the other provinces of formal science1 especially in the domain of logic4 ,the first logicians who borrowed signs from algebra and introduced them into logic by generalising their meanings1 were two ,germans1 ,gottfried ,ploucquet and ,johann ,heinrich ,lambert4 ,ploucquet wrote 8,principia de substantiis et phaenomenis1 accedit methodus calculandi in logicis ab ipso inventa1 cui praemittitur commentatio de arte characteristica universali10 ,frankfort and ,leipsic1 #agec1 ed4 ,,ii4 #agfd4hd ,lambert's investigations on the subject are found in his 8,logische ,abhandlungen40 ,prof4 ,venn1 in his 8,symbolic ,logic10 p4 xxxii1 says of ,lambert1 8,he fully recognised that the four algebraic operations of addition1 subtraction1 multiplication1 and division1 have each an analogue in ,logic2 that they may here be respectively termed aggregation1 separation1 determination1 abstraction1 and be symbolised by 1 -1 1 34 ,he also perceived the inverse nature of the second and fourth as compared with the first and third2 and no one could state more clearly that we must not confound the mathematical with the logical signification40 ,the algebra of logic which through the work of these ingenious men1 had received so favorable a start1 was very soon neglected2 yet it was revived after some time in ,england by ,boole1 ,de,morgan1 and ,jevons4 ,it remained for quite a while the almost exclusive property of the ,english where at the present time ,prof4 ,venn may be considered as the greatest ,english authority on the subject4 ,venn's works were rivalled by an ,american scholar1 ,mr4 ,charles ,s4 ,peirce1 the same who has contributed several articles to ,the ,monist4 ,the algebra of logic which had been so long neglected in ,germany1 is now reviving in the country of its first birth4 ,the author of the work1 the first volume of which lies now before us for review1 is ,professor of ,mathematics at the ,polytechnicum of ,karlsruhe in ,baden4 ,the second volume is not yet worked out in detail1 but its publication may be expected in one or two years4 ,the whole work1 when completed1 will be the most comprehensive treatise on the algebra of logic that has as yet appeared4 ,the plan and treatment of ,professor ,schrder's 8,vorlesungen ber die ,algebra der ,logik0 exhibit that uncommon thoroughness and exhaustiveness1 for which ,german scholars are justly famous4 ,the book1 in one word1 will be the standard work on the algebra of logic for a long time to come4 ,it would lead us here too far to review or to sketch the main contents of ,professor ,schrder's work1 which1 it seems to us1 is difficult to explain without entering into the details and thus going beyond the scope of mere review4 ,but we shall briefly set forth the chief foundations upon which ,schrder builds his algebra of logic4 ,professor ,schrder has inscribed two mottos on the title page of his book1 but we confess that we suspect at least one of them is intended to be ironical2 it certainly seems to have been selected when the author was in a mood of humor4 ,being conscious of the great value of theoretical speculation1 he quotes from ,goethe the following ,mephistophelian sentiment3 8,i say to thee1 a speculative wight ,is like a beast on moorlands lean1 ,led circling there by some malicious sprite ,while all around lie pastures fair and green40 ,there are two kinds of speculation3 first1 that which attempts to find out by pure thought a substantial extension of knowledge2 and secondly1 that which investigates the methods of inquiry4 ,the former is futile1 the latter is fruitful4 ,the former is that which ,goethe censures4 ,to censure the latter would be a grave mistake4 ,the man who would try to forge bread out of iron must meet with disappointment1 but the smith who invented and shaped the plow did more for the production of bread than many thousand farmers taken together1 although it may be he did not raise a blade of wheat4 ,speculation that attempts to find out things by mere brooding is prima facie wrong2 but speculation that constructs the methods of investigation is the basis of all progress in science4 ,the other motto of ,schrder's book is ,goethe's saying3 8,man is not born to solve the problem of the world1 but to seek for the point where the problem begins and then to keep within the limits of the comprehensible40 ,it would be well to compare this saying of ,goethe's with another one by the same author which is 8,man should hold fast to the belief that that which seems incomprehensible1 is comprehensible4 ,otherwise1 he would not investigate40 ,schrder follows rather the spirit of the second than that of the first quotation4 ,he says on p4 #aje of the recent volume1 with reference to some critical remarks made by the late ,professor ,lotze of ,gttingen1 who was more brilliant and ingenious than exact in his philosophical views and who showed an undisguised dislike for any severe method that has recourse to numbers1 figures1 schedules1 or classifications1 as does the algebra of logic3 8,if ,lotze concludes his logic with the wish that ,german philosophy should rise to the attempt at comprehending the course of the world instead of merely calculating it1 we should answer1 ,could we first calculate it1 then we should certainly comprehend it so far as comprehension on earth is possible40 ,but how is it possible8 ,simply by properly limiting and defining the field of investigation2 and here we can see that the first saying of ,goethe's should not be construed in such a way as to appear contradictory to the second4 ,every thinker starts with certain limits of comprehension1 but he extends them so that the stock of knowledge increases in every generation1 and there is no probability that we shall ever reach the limits of an absolutely incomprehensible4 ,there is no solid progress to be made by making wild raids in the domain of the unknown1 a method which is pursued only by dreamers and metaphysicians4 ,we must start from the boundary of the present stock of knowledge1 and let our progress be confined to single well defined and limited problems4 ,how a solution of the world-problem is possible in this sense1 is explained by ,schrder on p4 #ajc3 8,the answer is given in the old parable of the bundle of arrows1 which resists all attempts at breaking it4 ,as a whole it withstood1 but it yielded to him who untied the bundle and broke the arrows singly4 ,the difficulties which present themselves to the progress of knowledge can also only be overcome singly1 and in their one-sidedness4 ,in the division of labor thus produced1 lies exactly the advantage and the strength of the diverse disciplines1--qui trop embrasse1 mal treint40 ,professor ,schrder advertises his book with the following words3 8,from the title the reader will observe that here the deductive or formal logic alone is treated4 ,the calculative treatment of the deductive logic1 through which this discipline is redeemed from the fetters by which through the power of habit1 word-language has bound the human mind1 should deserve1 more than anything else the name #8,exact ,logic'6 ,this method alone can give to the laws of valid inference1 their most pregnant1 concise1 and clear expression1 and is thus enabled to reveal numerous and important gaps1--why not mistakes1--in the older presentations of the subject40 8,since the appearance of the author's #8,operationskreis des ,logikkalkuls1' this method of treatment has made progress of highest importance1 especially through the works of the ,americans1 ,mr4 ,charles ,s4 ,peirce and his school4 ,to ,mr4 ,peirce1 more than to anybody else1 is due the merit of having built a bridge from the older and purely verbal treatment of our discipline to the new calculative method2 a bridge which the professional philosophers rightly found lacking and to which lack is well to be ascribed the fact that the new method received only a partial and bewildered attention4 ,through ,mr4 ,peirce's works1 upon which also the author has had some influence1 the theory is now so far developed and perfected that for the first and main part of its whole system1 a final presentation and arrangement may be obtained40 8,endeavoring to offer so far as possible such a final and comprehensive presentation1 the author desires to offer at the same time and in a systematic way a handbook of the most valuable materials of the literature of the subject which especially in the ,english language1 is quite considerable40 ,the book addresses two kinds of readers which are of a greatly different turn of mind1 and it will go far in reconciling the methods of both1 the mathematicians and the philosophers4 ,in the preface ,schrder says1 8,in consideration of the formul which appear in the book1 it may be wise to state1 that no mathematical training or any specific knowledge is presupposed to be known by the reader4 ,we might repeat the words of ,dedekind1 prefixed to one of his books3 #8,everybody can understand this work who is in possession of what is generally called1 common-sense4' ,but we may add another saying from another author3 #8,the beaux esprits certainly1 who are not accustomed to the severe demands of thought1 will very soon turn away from it4'0 ,the introduction is comparatively long1 comprising no less than #abe pages4 ,but1 considering that it is more than an introduction1 that it explains the foundation on which the whole work rests1 it is not too long1 for it forms an essential and indeed the most important part of the book4 ,schrder discusses in it the character and the limitation of his problem4 ,he explains induction1 deduction1 contradiction and valid inference4 ,he considers the nature of signs and names4 ,he says1 on p4 #ch3 8,humanity1 it appears1 does not rise above the absolute zero of civilisation and the level of animal life1 until it develops the activity of denotation and symbolising4 ,and there is indeed nothing to which the human mind owes so much for its progress as to the signs of things4 8,the sign which speaks in attitude and gesture to emotion1 speaks in word and sentence to the intellect4 ,and it possesses1 in accordance with the laws of the association of ideas1 the power of producing in the person addressed certain ideas4 8,while the sign coalesces with the idea1 it reacts upon thought itself4 ,through signs the ideas which otherwise would remain confused and vague1 are analysed and they become as separate elements1 a permanent possession over which the thinking mind has forthwith free control4 ,through the sign we distinguish1 we fix differences and make them ready for new peculiar combinations4 ,the sign1 is as it were1 the handle by which we take hold of the objects of thought4 ,through the sign only1 the idea is liberated from the elements of sense1 which are attached to it1 and is enabled to rise into the sphere of generalisation4 ,thus thinking is on the one hand liberated1 on the other determined by the sign4 8,further1 through the sign alone which makes it possible that the same idea the same purpose can live in many1 there is one will1 one soul1 and a community of human aspirations exists upon which is based the life of mankind as a life of individuals in society4 ,and this again is the basis of our morality and civilisation4 8,the efficacy of the sign spoken is considerably increased by the invention of writing40 ,professor ,schrder discusses those two methods of logic which are known by the names3 the ,logic of ,intension and the ,logic of ,extension4 7,logik des ,inhaltes1 and ,logik des ,umfangs47 ,this leads to a discussion of definition1 the categories1 and conceptual writing which would find its ideal in a system of pasigraphy1 or universal language1 for the perfection of which an algebra of logic would be indispensable4 ,the symbols employed by ,schrder are borrowed to a great extent from ,peirce1 but they are considerably improved and it is probable that ,schrder's innovations will be universally accepted4 ,we purposely refrain here from discussing the particulars of ,schrder's work1 stating only in a general way that his proposition of a new symbol for subsumption1 7he proposes to replace the old symbol symbol by symbol to signify 8equal to or subsumed under071 his treatment of the symbols #j and #a1 the former representing an absence of certain marks1 or as it has been called their 8incompossibility10 as being excluded by the presence of other marks2 the other the universe of the whole subject under discussion1 and all the other problems which he separately treats in his lectures are admirably presented and command almost throughout the reader's consent4 ,we now conclude our review with the quotation of the last paragraph of ,schrder's introduction on p4 #abe4 ,having declared that 8logical inquiry should not be judged from the short-sighted or narrow-minded1 not to say born1 utilitarian standpoint10 he points out the great practical importance of his science1 saying3 8,similarly1 as with other sciences1 so logic also may be expected to realise and produce undreamed of results1 which may incidentally bring about1 in a most surprising way1 incalculable advantages4 ,let me only point out one thing4 ,since the impulse which this science has of late received1 there have been already constructed three logical machines which although we grant1 scarcely deserve their name1 because their efficacy remains still very rudimentary1 may be compared to ,papin's pot that in a more advanced state became the steam-engine4 ,indeed1 nobody can presage whether after all a thinking machine might not be constructed1 which would be analogous to1 but more perfect than the calculating machines4 ,the latter have relieved man of a considerable portion of much fatiguing thought-work1 just as the steam-engine has been successful in relieving him from physical labor4 8,to be sure we must not expect to reap while we are still sowing1 and least so in such a case as this where the harvest is to be expected from trees40 4 ,,the ,,grammar ,,of ,,science4 ,by ,karl ,pearson1 ,m4 ,a4 ,with #be figures in the text4 ,london3 ,walter ,scott1 #bd ,warwick ,lane4 ,imported by ,charles ,scribner's ,sons1 ,new ,york4 ,we are greatly in sympathy with the methods and principles of ,professor ,karl ,pearson's 8,grammar of ,science40 ,the work is a comparatively popular and also brief exposition of the modern ideal of scientific inquiry4 8,the goal of science is clear--it is nothing short of the complete interpretation of the universe4 ,but that goal10 adds the author1 8is an ideal one--it marks the direction in which we move and strive40 ,the best part of the book is in our opinion the introductory chapter which sets forth 8the scope and method of science0 and shows the need of a 8,grammar of ,science40 ,says the author in the summary of this chapter3 8,the scope of science is to ascertain truth in every possible branch of knowledge4 ,there is no sphere of inquiry which lies outside the legitimate field of science4 ,to draw a distinction between the scientific and philosophical methods is obscurantism40 ,the present generation is in a state of fermentation4 ,while one man finds a restlessness1 a distrust of all authority1 a questioning of the basis of all social institutions and long established methods1 another pictures for us a golden age in the near future4 ,one teacher propounds what is flatly contradicted by a second4 ,we require some guide in the determination of our actions1 and not for our own private but also our public duties4 8,every citizen is thrust into an appalling maze of social and educational problems2 and if his tribal conscience has any stuff in it1 he feels that these problems ought not to be settled1 so far as he has the power of settling them1 by his own personal interests1 by his individual prospects of profit or loss4 ,he is called upon to form a judgment apart from his own feelings and emotions if it possibly may be--a judgment in what he conceives to be the interests of society at large4 8,how is such a judgment to be formed80 ,the answer is by science4 ,such a judgment can only be based on a clear knowledge of facts1 on an appreciation of their sequence and relative significance4 ,the judgment based upon them ought to be independent of the individual mind which examines them1 and this frame of mind which is that of the scientist is an essential of good citizenship4 ,not as if the scientist were eo ipso a good citizen1 but society has an interest in the propagation of the methods of modern science4 ,sound citizenship will be promoted by training the mind to an exact and impartial analysis of facts4 ,how much a grammar of science is needed can be learned from the confusion that prevails concerning the fundamental concepts of science4 ,says ,pearson3 8,anything more hopelessly illogical than the statements with regard to force and matter current in elementary text-books of science1 it is difficult to imagine2 and the author1 as a result of some ten years' teaching and examining1 has been forced to the conclusion that these works possess little1 if any1 educational value2 they do not encourage the growth of logical clearness or form any exercise in scientific method4 8,the views expressed in this ,grammar on the fundamental concepts of science1 especially on those of force and matter1 have formed part of the author's teaching since he was first called upon to think how the elements of dynamical science could be presented free from metaphysics to young students40 ,professor ,pearson calls attention to the danger that arises from two modes of thought1 viz4 that of the metaphysician and that of the agnostic4 ,he says3 8,the poet is a valued member of the community1 for he is known to be a poet2 his value will increase as he grows to recognise the deeper insight into nature with which modern science provides him4 ,the metaphysician is a poet1 often a very great one1 but fortunately he is not known to be a poet1 because he clothes his poetry in the language of apparent reason1 and hence it follows that he is liable to be a dangerous member of the community4 ,the danger at the present time that metaphysical dogmas may check scientific research is1 perhaps1 not very great40 ,fortunately the danger that arises from metaphysicism is past4 8,for10 adds ,pearson1 8,the day has gone by when the ,hegelian philosophy threatened to strangle infant science in ,germany2--that it begins to languish at ,oxford is a proof that it is practically dead in the country of its birth4 ,the day has gone by when philosophical or theological dogmas of any kind can throw back1 even for generations1 the progress of scientific investigation40 ,the scientist will1 it is true1 often have to confess3 8,there ,i am ignorant40 ,but it would be absurd to restrict science to the limited field of thought which it occupies to-day4 ,professor ,pearson continues3 8,it is true that this view is not held by several leading scientists1 both in this country and ,germany4 ,they are not content with saying1 #8,we are ignorant1' but they add1 with regard to certain classes of facts1 #8,mankind must always be ignorant4' ,thus in ,england ,professor ,huxley has invented the term ,agnostic1 not so much for those who are ignorant as for those who limit the possibility of knowledge in certain fields4 ,in ,germany ,professor ,e4 du ,bois-,reymond has raised the cry3 #8,ignorabimus'--#8,we shall be ignorant1' and both his brother and he have undertaken the difficult task of demonstrating that with regard to certain problems human knowledge is impossible4 ,we must1 however1 note that in these cases we are not concerned with the limitation of the scientific method1 but with the denial of the possibility that any method whatever can lead to knowledge4 ,now ,i venture to think that there is great danger in this cry3 #8,we shall be ignorant4' ,to cry #8,we are ignorant1' is safe and healthy1 but the attempt to demonstrate an endless futurity of ignorance appears a modesty which approaches despair4 ,conscious of the past great achievements and the present restless activity of science1 may we not do better to accept as our watchword that of ,galilei3 #8,who is willing to set limits to the human intellect8'--interpreting it by what evolution has taught us of the continual growth of man's intellectual powers40 ,the introductory chapter presents the general plan of ,professor ,pearson's book4 ,the following chapters contain the detailed work of the plan4 ,the headings of these chapters are3 ,,ii1 ,the ,facts of ,science2 ,,iii1 ,the ,scientific ,law2 ,,iv1 ,cause and ,effect--,probability2 ,v1 ,space and ,time2 ,,vi1 ,the ,geometry of ,motion2 ,,vii1 ,matter2 ,,viii1 ,the ,laws of ,motion2 ,,ix1 ,life2 ,x1 ,the ,classification of the ,sciences4 ,professor ,pearson follows ,professor ,ernst ,mach in his expositions 7especially in ,chap4 ,,ii7 very closely1 and especially refers to the latter's contributions to ,the ,monist4 ,pearson emphasises with ,mach the distinction between the conceptual and perceptual1 between ideas or noumena and sensations4 ,he rejects1 as does ,professor ,mach1 the assumption of unknowables beyond our groups of sense-impressions1 saying3 8,it is idle to postulate shadowy unknowables behind that real world of sense-impression in which we live0 7p4 #hh71 and yet he says in another passage on p4 #acd3 8,there is mystery enough in the chaos of sensations and in its capacity for containing those little corners of consciousness which project their own products1 of order and law and reason1 into an unknown and unknowable world40 ,it appears to us that the deeper reason of this apparent inconsistency can be traced to the author's conception of the import of knowledge4 ,he follows ,kirchhoff in the acceptance of the theory that scientific law is a brief description of facts in mental shorthand4 ,but at the same time he follows ,clifford and ,mach too closely2 the former in the respect that we can know the 8how0 only and not the 8why10 and the latter in overlooking the fact that concepts are symbols which stand for something and have a meaning4 ,pearson says on p4 #ade1 8,science describes how they motions take place1 but the why remains a mystery40 ,but should we not1 we ask1 rather supplant the old and metaphysical conception of the 8why0 7the sense of it as here implied7 by a better and more correct conception8 ,the metaphysical 8why0 is not so much a mystery as it is the incorporation of an illegitimate problem4 ,the 8why0 of positive science demands as answer an exhaustive description of those conditions which as the outcome of a definite transformation inevitably produce a certain phenomenon4 ,but here we must criticise ,professor ,pearson's view of 8description10 as well also as his view of causation4 ,cause and effect are to him1 as they were to ,mill1 mere sequences2 necessity belongs exclusively to the conceptual realm1 and is 8illogically transferred to the world of perceptions40 ,an exhaustive description will trace the process of causation1 and whenever we succeed in this we have answered the question 8why0 in the only sensible meaning it possesses4 ,sense-impressions do not1 as ,professor ,pearson expresses it1 8shut us in10 so that the beyond remains a mystery to us4 ,sense-impressions represent the beyond of reality and they represent it in such a way as to enable us to deal with it properly4 ,this representation is knowledge and thus the world is not unknowable4 ,the world is full of mystery1 but knowledge itself is not mysterious4 ,having sense-impressions and interpreting them in our conceptual inferences we know something of the world4 ,we are not prepared to accept ,professor ,pearson's views that 8change is perceptual1 motion conceptual10 and also that 8we are not compelled to postulate a space outside of self for phenomena0 7p4 #aif74 ,we should say that our concepts1 the concepts motion and space included1 represent certain features of reality4 ,we might give a special name to those features of reality which are represented by the terms motion and space1 but we could not deny their objective reality without at the same time denying the validity of the concepts4 ,says ,professor ,pearson1 8,all things move--but only in conception0 7p4 #che74 8,what moves in conception is a geometrical ideal1 and it moves because we conceive it to move40 ,these propositions have no meaning if pronounced from our standpoint4 ,observe also that ,professor ,pearson inculcates the conceptuality of motion by unnecessarily repeating the word in the formula on page #cda which begins as follows3 8,every corpuscle in the conceptual model of the universe must be conceived as moving44440 ,when we conceive something as moving we mean that not only in the conceptual model1 but also in reality there is an action taking place which we represent by the concept motion4 ,to say that we have knowledge only of changes but that we do not know whether those changes which we describe as mechanical are really motions1 appears to us idle subtlety4 ,the point is whether this method of describing those events enables us to deal with them properly4 ,if it does it answers the purpose4 ,in spite of all our disagreements we feel ourselves in close contact with the author of 8,the ,grammar of ,science10 for we agree with respect to the principles of science and we certainly can leave the settlement of our differences to a common test on the basis of these principles4 ,moreover1 the attitude of the author seems to us very much like that which we take ourselves4 ,we quote from a former publication of his1 the following passage#he3 8,i set out from the standpoint that the mission of ,freethought is no longer to batter down old faiths2 that has been long ago effectively accomplished1 and ,i1 for one1 am ready to put a railing round the ruins1 that they may be preserved from desecration and serve as a landmark4 ,indeed ,i confess to have yawned over a recent vigorous inditement of ,christianity1 and ,i promptly disposed of my copy to a young gentleman who was anxious that ,i should read a work entitled3 ,natural ,law in the ,spiritual ,world1 which he told me had given quite a new width to the faith of his childhood40 4 ,,philosophie ,,der ,,arithmetik4 ,psychologische und logische ,untersuchungen4 ,by ,dr4 ,e4 ,g4 ,husserl4 ,erster ,band4 ,halle-,saale3 ,c4 ,e4 ,m4 ,pfeffer4 #ahia4 ,the present volume does not pretend to be a complete system of the philosophy of arithmetic1 but it attempts to prepare1 in a series of psychological and logical investigations1 the scientific foundation for a future construction of this discipline1 which would be of equal value to the mathematician and philosopher4 ,the first volume which is now before us analyses in its first part the ideas plurality1 unity1 and number1 so far as they are directly given us and not in their indirect symbolisation4 ,the second part considers the symbolical representations of plurality and number1 and the author attempts to show that the fact of our being almost throughout limited to symbolical ideas of number determines the meaning and the purpose of that view which the author calls 8,anzahlenarithmetik40 ,the author criticises several theories which in different ways explain the origin of plurality and unity4 ,there is one theory which explains the origin of the unit from the unity of consciousness2 there is another one which explains the origin of number from a succession in time4 ,f4 ,a4 ,lange bases his theory of number upon space-conception and ,bauman declares there is something mathematical in the external world which corresponds to the mathematical in us4 ,the theory of difference held by ,jevons1 ,schuppe1 and ,sigwart1 is declared to be superior to all others1 but even that is rejected by the author4 ,jevons says1 8,number is but another name for diversity4 ,exact identity is unity1 and with difference rises plurality4444 ,abstract number then1 is the empty form of difference40 ,dr4 ,husserl objects3 if numbers are all empty forms of difference1 what makes the difference between two1 three1 four1 etc48 ,the contents of these numbers are very different4 ,the inability of defining this difference shows the imperfection of the theory of difference4 ,dr4 ,husserl proposes what he calls 8collection0 as a special method of combination by which unities are formed4 ,although the book contains many valuable suggestions1 it is very hard reading4 ,the author's views are not at all clearly set forth4 ,neither is the table of contents so systematically arranged as to give us a clue to the plan of the book1 nor is there any index that might give us assistance in finding out the most characteristic passages4 ,the reader is supposed to read the book right through1 in order to understand detached chapters or even sentences4 ,and even then we are not sure whether or not we have understood the author's propositions the consistency of which is not as apparent as it might be expected4 ,for1 after having criticised so many attempts at explaining and analysing the ideas1 plurality1 unity and number1 and after having proposed definitions1 explanations1 and analyses of his own1 we find on p4 #acj a passage where these ideas are incidentally declared to be incapable of definition4 ,speaking of ,frege's theory1 ,dr4 ,husserl says1 8,as soon as we come down to elementary concepts1 all definition has an end4 ,such concepts as quality1 intensity1 place1 time1 etc41 cannot be defined4 ,the same is true of elementary relations1 and of those concepts upon which they are founded4 ,equality1 similarity1 gradation1 whole and part1 plurality and unity1 etc41 are concepts which are utterly incapable of a formal-logical definition4 ,all we can do in such cases is to produce the concrete phenomena from which they have been abstracted1 and to explain the method of this process of abstraction4 ,one can1 where it is necessary1 exactly fence in 7umgrenzen7 by diverse circumscriptions1 the concepts in question1 and thus prevent confusion with kindred concepts40 ,we must confess that we do not understand the author's idea2 what is an act of defining if not an 8umgrenzen10 a fencing in of the concept8 ,the book contains many similar passages1 which1 it seems to us1 are not properly thought out by the author4 ,but the subject is a difficult one1 and1 as the author says in the preface1 8,a work of this kind should1 with regard to the difficulties of the problem it treats1 be judged with leniency40 4 ,,christianity ,,and ,,infallibility4 ,both or ,neither4 ,by the ,rev4 ,daniel ,lyons4 ,new ,york3 ,longmans1 ,green ,co41 #ahia4 ,chicago3 ,a4 ,c4 ,mc,clurg ,co4 ,this little book of ,dr4 ,lyons's is got up in a much more substantial and prepossessing form than the majority of the works that come from ,catholic quarters4 ,it contains #bhd pages and is supplied with the ,nihil obstat of a ,catholic 8censor deputatus0 and with the ,imprimatur of the ,bishop of ,denver4 ,in this book1 therefore1 the reader may be sure that he possesses a correct exposition of ,catholic doctrine4 ,the purpose of ,dr4 ,lyons is to establish the thesis1--a thesis always insisted upon by the ,catholic church1--8that ,christianity1 to maintain its rightful hold on the reason and conscience of men1 needs a living1 infallible ,witness to its truths and principles2 a living1 infallible ,guardian of its purity and integrity1 and a living1 infallible ,interpreter of its meaning40 ,by ,christianity ,dr4 ,lyons means 8that body of sacred truths which the ,almighty revealed through the ministry of ,christ and ,his ,apostles40 ,we italicise the word 8ministry10 for on this word hinges in our judgment the main and unmistakable argument of ,dr4 ,lyons's advocacy4 ,if the results of modern ,biblical criticism are at all true1 the 8,church10 so-called1 must have existed before the ,new ,testament4 ,and in establishing the authority of the church1 the ,catholic theologians regard and use the ,bible merely as an 8historical narrative1 whose trustworthiness 7at least in the parts quoted7 can be proved in the same way as that of any other history1 sacred or profane40 ,they take their argument 8for the institution1 mission1 and authority of the ,church from the ,bible as a mere human record of the sayings and doings of our ,divine ,lord and ,his ,apostles40 ,what is the mission of the church8 8,and he said unto them4 ,go ye into all the world1 and preach the ,gospel to every creature4 ,he that believeth and is baptised shall be saved1 but he that believeth not shall be damned40 ,these are awful powers1 and awful are the sanctions placed by the same ,divine letter-patent in the hands of the institution that dispenses them4 ,and in the face of the great complexity and peculiar nature of the ,holy writings1 in view of their recognised liability to manifold and multifarious interpretation1 does not such a great and fearful commission of power as this necessarily and logically imply a concession of ,infallibility--of infallibility1 let us add1 as technically understood4 8,who can suppose that ,god would formally commission anybody to teach in his name and command all to hear and accept ,his teaching under the severest of penalties1 and at the same time not secure that teacher against the possibility of teaching error for truth8 ,suppose the ,church thus commissioned by ,god did actually teach error1 even then would not all 7there is no exception made71 by reason of the divine command1 be bound to believe8 ,and in that case would not ,god ,himself be accountable for the erroneous belief8 ,i conclude1 therefore1 that the formal commission to teach the ,gospel in ,god's name1 and by ,his authority1 joined to the express command to believe carries with it a pledge of the divine assistance of ,infallibility as a guarantee to all men that in yielding the obedience of faith1 they are perfectly secure against all danger of error40 ,this inference is incorporated in a dogma1 a 8,catholic dogma10 of infallibility1 which is this3 8that the ,pope1 by virtue of a special supernatural assistance of the ,holy ,spirit of ,truth promised to him1 in and through ,st4 ,peter1 is exempt from all liability to err when1 in the discharge of his ,apostolic ,office of ,supreme ,teacher of the ,universal ,church1 he defines or declares1 in matters of or appertaining to ,christian faith or morals1 what is to be believed and held1 or what is to be rejected and condemned by the faithful throughout the world4 ,this definition substantially embodies the whole ,catholic teaching on the subject of ,infallibility40 ,dr4 ,lyons's arguments are well put and well reasoned out4 ,he sees clearly where the vulnerable point of the present condition of the ,christian churches lies1--which the majority of ,protestant theologians do not see4 ,he sees clearly1 though he does not say it1 that the rococo superstructure of neo-,christian dogmatism was long and long ago undermined by science and that it is now toppling in the minds of the unscientific generally2 and he justly advises all who have set their hearts on the preservation of the subtle and irrelevant externalities of religion1 to forsake their ancient dwelling-place and seek a safe and easy abode in the grandly simple and grandly spacious1 ,roman temple of ,papal infallibility4 ,that edifice is safe against the artillery of science4 ,it has by one simple act placed itself beyond the reach of all scientific attacks4 ,for science1 or rather the method of science1 directly owes its origin to the consciousness of our individual liability to error and the consequent aspiration of man to establish an objective criterion of truth4 ,if it attempted to demolish doctrines of infallibility of any kind1 it would simply seek to justify its own foundations1 which it has long ago done4 ,in so far as the doctrine of infallibility is the only logical outcome of a dilemma in which the ,christian church has1 discreetly or indiscreetly1 implicated itself1 science has no objection to it2 or for that matter to any other conclusion that logically results from premisses it does not grant4 ,the question really most worthy of the attention of the 8thoughtful10 8truth-seeking10 and 8religious0 mind1 as ,dr4 ,lyons styles it1 is not the doctrine of infallibility1 but the questions1 ,what is religion1 ,what is ,god1 etc41 etc42 and such questions the truth-seeking mind will find it impossible to answer arbitrarily3 it must1 perforce1 answer them in conformity with that objective criterion of truth called science4 ,and such subjects are as much the object of science as are motion and matter4 4 ,,der ,,satz ,,vom ,,grunde ,,als ,,prinzip ,,des ,,schliessens4 ,by ,dr4 ,franz ,erhardt4 ,halle a4 ,s43 ,c4 ,e4 ,m4 ,pfeffer4 #ahia4 ,this little pamphlet of fifty-six pages1 written and published to acquire for the author the venia legendi at the philosophical faculty of the ,university of ,jena1 treats the several figures of the syllogism from the standpoint that the middle term of the premisses is1 logically considered1 the consequence 7,folge7 of the subject and the reason 7,grund7 of the predicate in the conclusion4 ,a few remarks are added on induction and analogy1 without1 however1 entering into the problem as to the rle which the method of induction plays in the evolution of the method of deduction4 4 ,,agnosticisme4 ,essai sur quelques ,thories pessimistes de la ,connaissance4 ,by ,e4 de ,roberty4 ,paris3 ,flix ,alcan4 ,by the publication of this little book ,m4 de ,roberty redeems a promise made in his larger work1 on the philosophy of the present century1 already reviewed in ,the ,monist 7,january1 #ahib74 ,the pessimist theories of knowledge of which he treats are the three systems1 those of ,criticism1 ,positivism1 and ,evolutionism1 to which he reduces contemporaneous philosophy4 ,as these systems are regarded as parallel manifestations of a common stock of beliefs and general hypotheses1 they must equally adopt the doctrine of ,agnosticism4 ,it is the aim of the present work to point out the several forms assumed by this doctrine and to show its falsity by an examination of the principles on which it is based4 ,the author properly insists on the importance of distinguishing between the affirmation of the unknown and that of the unknowable4 ,the recognition of the former is essential to all progress in knowledge1 but the latter is 8the direct negation of all possibility whatever of utilising the deficiencies of knowledge10 and leads infallibly to the worship of ignorance4 ,the best definition of the mental phenomenon of agnosticism1 says ,m4 de ,roberty is the pessimism of the theory of knowledge1 and it is not for nothing therefore that ,kant preceded ,schopenhauer in the development of idealism4 ,modern agnosticism is based on the old notion of the separation of the phenomenon from the noumenon1 and it was ,kant who cleared it from its early theological and metaphysical conceptions4 ,he affirmed the reality of the 8thing in itself0 as a fundamental postulate1 and then declared that we can know nothing of things considered in themselves4 ,among the conceptions formed by the human mind through the exercise of its imaginative faculty are three which exhaust the entire content of the ,unknowable4 ,thus it may be reduced to the idea of a reality other than that of which we are sensible2 to the idea of a subject which perceives in a different manner from the real subject2 and finally to the idea that our cerebral organisation reveals the world to us under delusive colors1 all of which ,m4 de ,roberty declares to be simple fiction4 ,his own ideas on the subject will appear later on4 ,positivism stands towards materialism in the same relation as criticism stands towards idealism1 whose noumenon becomes the unknowable thing in itself2 as the simple matter of materialism becomes the unknown existence about which positivism says we can neither affirm nor deny anything4 ,modern agnosticism may be regarded thus as representing the long sought synthesis of the purest materialism and the most transcendent spiritualism1 and it offers a striking demonstration of the fundamental equivalence of the hypotheses hitherto formulated as to the origin and essence of things4 ,it proves also1 says ,m4 de ,roberty1 that the great law of the identity of contraries is applicable directly to all our very general conceptions4 ,contradictory as they seem to be1 universal postulates must1 by virtue of that law1 be fundamentally identical4 ,this introduces a discussion of the antinomies1 developed but not invented by modern criticism1 which found in them ample justification for its conclusion of the reality of the unknowable4 ,the double antinomy of time and space is regarded by the author as always presenting itself under the aspect of a long chain of contradictions which are manifestly merely verbal4 ,the opposition between finite and infinite may be resolved into the distinction between concrete and abstract1 between particular and general1 if infinity is taken as synonymous with1 or the perfect substitute for1 general and abstract quantity1 the universal attribute of things isolated from the things themselves4 ,as to the problems connected with the ideas of a vacuum1 matter1 force and motion1 ,m4 de ,roberty supposes them to have a purely psychological solution4 ,such ideas go beyond the 8conceptive0 capacity of mechanics and belong to psychology considered1 not as a branch of philosophy1 or as philosophy itself1 but as a science of abstract concepts4 ,the philosophy of evolution1 although monistic in the sense that it recognises the law of the identity of opposites1 shows itself not to be so in reality by its doctrine of the unknowable4 ,in this monism and agnosticism contradict each other1 as it is contrary to reason 8to affirm at the same time the identity of every phenomenon and their unknowability4 ,the first marks the supreme term of the second4 ,identity in general serves to define knowableness4 ,so that1 if we remain on the elevated summits of pure abstraction too long1 we run the danger anticipated by the law of identity of contraries4 ,we fall directly into the error of taking the apparent negation of identity or of pure knowledge1 the unknowable1 for something really distinct1 really separated from the knowable40 ,this is the illusion of ,spencer and of all the philosophers who have undertaken the difficult task of applying monism as a corrective of agnosticism4 ,m4 de ,roberty concludes the present work with a discussion of the relation between idea and reality1 the thought and the object thought of1 in which he gives us his opinion on that disputed point4 ,he says that what philosophy calls 8the object0 is composed essentially of external nature1 in which is included our own organism4 ,very complicated systems of motions are transmitted to the grey nuclei or opto-striated bodies of the central regions of the brain4 ,here these motions determine new motions of which the totality is described in psycho-physics by the term 8unconscious ideation40 ,but this internal motion1 continually tending to become again an initial or external motion1 gives rise to unconscious reflex activity4 ,the motion passes by the white nerve-fibres to the cortical periphery of the brain which becomes 8the seat of a phenomenon1 an excitation1 a motion which prolongs or repeats the immediately preceding phenomenon1 excitation1 or motion1 while giving it a shorter and more steady action40 ,the sensations and the reflex-actions derived from them traverse the opto-striated nuclei without retardation and without giving rise to any system of ideas2 while consciousness resides in the systemisation or union of the same sensations and reflex-actions4 ,the notion of the ego results from the union or memory of certain ideas1 sensations1 and actions1 which before their union and preservation by the cerebral cortex were unconscious4 ,but before becoming unconscious ideas1 those 8intellectual virtualities0 were in every other part of the organism1 and in all the media which surround it1 as1 8manifestations of energy or of motion1 it may be objective phenomena40 ,thus1 says ,m4 de ,roberty1 if the universe is composed of two parts1 the ego and the non-ego1 it can be affirmed that they form an uninterrupted circuit4 ,he supposes that when the cosmical energy has produced the phenomena of unconscious mentality in the brain-centres1 it is divided into two currents1 one of which returns to its source and becomes directly cosmic energy again1 and this will be the fate of the other current also when the life of the organism ceases4 ,this view the author supports by a consideration of the morphological and functional difference supposed to exist between the facts which constitute the notion of the 8ego0 and the primordial facts of unconsciousness comprised under the generic denomination of the 8non-ego40 ,he regards conscious ideas as the telegraphic alphabet1 the stenographic writing of the cosmos4 ,consciousness serves to cordinate the incoherent crowd of events which at each instant invades the normal brain4 ,in these we may see effects of the cause called 8universe10 and therefore its representatives and substitutes1 which they could not be unless there was identity between the two4 ,thus the 8ego0 could be defined as the final synthesis of the 8symbolic abridgments10 of the micrographical abbreviations1 of the 8non-ego40 ,thus the ego serves only for the purpose of concentrating or condensing1 so to say the non-ego1 which it represents in a manner more or less durable and efficient4 ,this monistic theory gets rid of the unknowable and therefore is a great improvement on that of the materialist or of the idealist4 ,nevertheless it requires further elaboration4 ,there is no difficulty in understanding that cosmic motion may become transformed within the organism into a feeling4 ,this still1 however1 leaves unaccounted for the existence of the organism itself4 ,a true monism will1 therefore1 require that the organism must be in some way identifiable with the cosmos4 ,this is the true problem that has to be solved1 and its solution will be greatly aided by the overthrow of agnosticism1 against which ,m4 de ,roberty has made so vigorous and successful an attack in the present volume4 4 ,,footnotes3 #hd ,see ,aug4 ,friedr4 ,bck4 ,sammlung von ,schriften1 welche den logischen ,calcul des ,prof4 ,pl4 betreffen1 ,frankfort and ,leipsic1 #agff4 #he ,the book from which we quote1 namely ,the ,ethic of ,freethought1 like the book here under discussion1 contains much detail matter in which we differ most emphatically from the author2 7he is1 for instance1 in our opinion very unjust to ,martin ,luther27 but it seems to us that he pursues an aim that we have in common with him4 ,,periodicals4 ,,zeitschrift ,f,r ,,psychologie ,,und ,,physiologie ,,der ,,sinnesorgane4 ,vol4 ,,iii4 ,nos4 #b and #c4 ,,ueber ,,die ,,empfindlichkeit ,,des ,,gr,,nblinden ,,und ,,des ,,normalen ,,auges ,,gegen ,,farben,,nderung ,,im ,,spektrum4 ,by ,e4 ,brodhun4 ,k,,rzeste ,,linien ,,im ,,farbensystem4 ,by ,h4 v4 ,helmholtz4 ,,die ,,raumanschauungen ,,und ,,die ,,augenbewegungen4 ,by ,th4 ,lipps4 ,,eine ,,beobachtung ,,ber ,,das ,,indirekte ,,sehen4 ,by ,th4 ,wertheim4 ,,ueber ,,einige ,,eigent,,mlichkeiten ,,des ,,tastsinns4 ,by ,g4 ,sergi4 ,,beitr,,ge ,,zur ,,vergleichenden ,,psychologie4 ,i4 ,das ,verhalten wirbelloser ,tiere auf der ,drehscheibe4 ,by ,k4 ,l4 ,schaefer4 ,,gegenantwort ,,auf ,,die ,,erwiderung ,,von ,o4 ,,fl,,gel4 ,by ,j4 ,rehmke4 ,,litteraturbericht4 ,the value of the first article on the sensitiveness of the green-blind and the normal eye in perceiving color-variations in the spectrum consists mainly in the three diagrams that exhibit the results obtained in the author's experiments4 ,professor ,h4 v4 ,helmholtz published in a former number his attempt at propounding 8a formula which should play the same part in the province of color-sensations as the formula of the length of the linear element plays in geometry40444 ,as geometry begins with the concept of a shortest line between two points1 so our fundamental formula in this subject shall enable us to find that series of transitions between two given colors for which the sum of the perceptible differences is a minimum4 ,helmholtz proposes to call them 8shortest color-lines0 and comes to the conclusion that the whole domain of these apparently irregular phenomena are easily subsumed under a generalised formulation of ,fechner's law4 ,professor ,th4 ,lipps criticises ,wundt with regard to the latter's theory of measuring the visual field by ocular motion4 ,wundt's theory1 he declares1 is in need of several auxiliary hypotheses1 such as the assumption that certain ocular motions are supposed to be more difficult than others3 the visual field is said to possess the form of a spherical surface1 etc4 ,the author maintains that ocular motions do contribute to the construction of our space-conception1 but in a different way than ,wundt assumes4 ,the most interesting part of the article appears to be the discussion of the genesis of the third dimension which is not given in the data of sensation but added to them as a judgment concerning these data4 ,it is an interpretation of the data4 ,there are still psychologists who regard the third dimension as immediately given4 ,professor ,lipps refers as an instance to ,prof4 ,william ,james's article 8,the ,perception of ,space0 in 7,mind1 ,vol4 ,,xii71 where the latter declares that 8no arguments in the world can prove a feeling which actually exists1 to be impossible40 ,while ,wundt says that to the resting eye the form of the visual field is spherical because the sky appears to us as spherical2 ,lipps declares that we might just as well say that the visual field of the resting eye is a plane1 because the earth appears to us as a level surface4 ,we attribute to the visual field the form which certain reasons prompt us to4 ,certain convergences of the eyes induce us to place certain points at certain distances4 ,we read1 as it were1 the distances out of the convergences of the ocular axes4 ,accordingly1 when we cease to feel any difference in our feeling of convergency we cannot help attributing the same 8depth0 throughout to all the things with respect to which such feeling is wanting1 and we place all objects beyond a certain range upon a spherical surface4 ,thus ,lipps interprets the spherical form of the firmament as the result of our using both eyes1 which use from habit has become the form of monocular vision also1 and not as ,wundt does from the spherical form of each visual field1 which by habit has been transferred to binocular vision4 ,there is a strange fact that distances on the left side are overestimated in comparison with those on the right side2 and this fact is also claimed by ,professor ,lipps to be incompatible with ,professor ,wundt's theory1 but in favor of his own views4 ,th4 ,wertheim has made an observation which tends to prove that positive as well as negative fluctuations of light-intensity1 cause the disappearance of objects indirectly seen4 ,g4 ,sergi publishes the results of his investigations concerning the sense of touch made in the ,institute for ,anthropology and ,experimental ,psychology at the ,university of ,rome4 ,karl ,l4 ,schaefer's results of experiments with invertebrate animals upon the rotatory table show that in the beginning a counter-rotation takes place1 but not in all animals4 ,it does not take place in some caterpillars2 it does take place in black beetles1 ants1 flies1 earwigs1 provided they are at the time in actual motion4 ,there is no after-affect from the rotation and thus they are not subject to vertigo as are the vertebrates4 7,hamburg and ,leipsic3 ,leopold ,voss47 4 ,,vierteljahrsschrift ,f,r ,,wissenschaftliche ,,philosophie4 ,vol4 ,,xvi4 ,no4 #b4 ,,beitr,,ge ,,zur ,,logik4 7,zweiter ,artikel4 ,schluss47 ,by ,a4 ,riehl4 ,,ernst ,,platner',s ,,wissenschaftliche ,,stellung ,,zu ,,kant ,,in ,,erkenntnisstheorie ,,und ,,moralphilosophie4 7,zweiter ,artikel4 ,schluss47 ,by ,b4 ,seligkowitz4 ,,ueber ,,begriff ,,und ,,gegenstand4 ,by ,g4 ,frege4 ,,bemerkungen ,,zu ,,richard ,,avenarius',s 8,,kritik ,,der ,,reinen ,,erfahrung40 ,by ,r4 ,willy4 ,a4 ,riehl discusses in the second instalment of his 8,contributions to ,logic0 the forms of judgment and the different kinds of conclusion4 ,b4 ,seligkowitz concludes his article on ,ernst ,platner's relation to ,kant1 setting forth the former's criticism of the latter's views of synthetic judgments a priori1 his moral theology1 his psychological ideas1 and moral philosophy4 ,g4 ,frege explains his view of 8concept and object0 with reference to the idea of ,benno ,kerry1 who does not recognise between the two any absolute difference4 7,leipsic3 ,reisland47 4 ,,philosophische ,,monatshefte4 ,vol4 ,,xxviii4 ,nos4 #c and #d4 ,,contents3 ,april1 #ahib4 ,no4 #c4 ,,die ,,wirklichkeit ,,als ,,ph,,nomen ,,des ,,geistes4 ,by ,a4 ,rosinski4 ,,recensionen4 ,,litteraturbericht4 ,,contents3 ,may1 #ahib4 ,no4 #d4 ,,ueber ,,das ,,absolute ,,geh,r4 ,by ,j4 v4 ,kries4 ,,die ,,zweiten ,,purkinjeschen ,,bilder ,,im ,,schematischen ,,und ,,im ,,wirklichen ,,auge4 ,by ,l4 ,matthiessen4 ,,besprechungen4 ,,litteraturbericht4 ,adolf ,rosinski describes reality as a phenomenon of the mind and1 following ,qubicker1 he regards 8the real as belonging to that complex which is given us in appearance4 ,being 7,wesen7 is not behind or beyond appearance2 ,being1 being that which exists1 existence is appearance4 ,appearance shows nothing but that which is in ,being1 and there is in ,being nothing which is not manifested40 7,berlin3 ,dr4 ,r4 ,salinger47 ,there are but few musicians who are able to recognise directly and without reference to another note1 the pitch of a sound4 ,this ability is called by musicians 8absolutes ,gehr40 ,professor ,kries investigates in a long article1 the conditions of this absolute musical ear so called1 exhibiting the difficulties of an explanation without arriving at a definite result1 which1 however1 may be expected from further investigations of the subject4 ,mr4 ,matthiessen's article on the second ,perkinje-pictures1 in the ideal and the real eye1 consists exclusively of measurements and calculations of the curvature of the lens4 ,the same number contains an appreciative and long 7#cg pp47 review of ,prof4 ,w4 ,james's 8,principles of ,psychology40 7,hamburg and ,leipsic3 ,leopold ,voss47 4 ,,the ,,american ,,journal ,,of ,,psychology4 ,april1 #ahib4 ,vol4 ,,iv4 ,no4 #c4 ,,on ,,certain ,,peculiarities ,,of ,,the ,,knee-,,jerk ,,in ,,sleep ,,in ,a ,,case ,,of ,,terminal ,,dementia4 ,by ,william ,noyes1 ,m4 ,d4 ,,the ,,growth ,,of ,,memory ,,in ,,school ,,children4 ,by ,t4 ,l4 ,bolton1 ,a4 ,b4 ,,studies ,,from ,,the ,,laboratory ,,of ,,experimental ,,psychology ,,of ,,the ,,university ,,of ,,wisconsin4 ,by ,prof4 ,joseph ,jastrow1 ,ph4 ,d4 ,,the ,,psychological ,,foundation ,,of ,,realism4 ,by ,alexander ,fraser1 ,a4 ,b4 ,,psychological ,,literature3 ,i4 ,nervous ,system4 ,by ,prof4 ,h4 ,h4 ,donaldson1 ,clark ,university2 ,,ii4 ,association1 ,reaction4 ,by ,prof4 ,j4 ,mc,k4 ,cattell1 ,columbia ,college2 ,,iii4 ,hypnotism and ,suggestion4 ,by ,prof4 ,joseph ,jastrow1 ,university of ,wisconsin2 ,,iv4 ,sight4 ,,letters ,,and ,,notes4 ,dr4 ,noyes's investigations seem to corroborate the theory that not only the lower but also 8the higher activities of the brain are also subject to a rhythmic rise and fall synchronous with vascular dilatation and contraction40 ,mr4 ,bolton publishes the results of his examination of the span of memory in the ,grammar ,schools of ,worcester1 ,mass4 ,the memory span measuring the power of concentrated and prolonged attention1 increases with age rather than with the growth of intelligence4 ,the girls have better memories than the boys4 ,memory can be increased by practice4 ,the tests made before and after school do not show that the pupils suffer fatigue from the day's work4 ,memory-images before they are completely lost first suffer a confusion of order1 then a loss of certain of its elements which are often replaced by similar elements4 ,previous ideas being one of the factors of confusion4 ,professor ,jastrow's article presents a description of a series of experiments made in his psychological laboratory4 ,he reproduces the ,zllner figures1 briefly summarising their different interpretations by ,zllner1 ,hering1 ,aubert1 ,classen1 ,lipps1 ,hoppe1 ,wundt1 ,pisco1 and ,helmholtz4 ,he further presents a study of involuntary movements of the hand on the glass plate apparatus1 and describes the experiments of time measurement in classifying ideas1 and in finding a given object within a given field4 ,mr4 ,fraser defends the ,natural ,realism of the ,scotch school1 making the tactumotor sense the ultimate test of reality4 7,worcester1 ,mass43 ,clark ,university47 4 ,,revue ,,philosophique4 ,,contents3 ,april1 #ahib4 ,no4 #aif4 ,,les ,,processus ,,nerveux ,,dans ,l',,attention ,,et ,,la ,,volition4 ,by ,charlton ,bastian4 ,,la ,,responsabilit4 ,by ,f4 ,paulhan4 ,,revue ,g,n,,rale3 ,,le ,,spiritisme ,,contemporain4 ,by ,janet 7,pierre74 ,,analyses ,,et ,,comptes ,,rendus3 ,der ,positivismus vom ,tode ,august ,comte's bis auf unsere ,tage4 ,by ,h4 ,gruber4 ,die ,psychologie der ,suggestion4 ,by ,h4 ,schmidkunz4 ,,travaux ,,du ,,laboratoire ,,de ,,psychologie ,,physiologique3 ,etude exprimentale sur deux cas d'audition colore4 ,by ,beaunis and ,binet4 ,etude sur un nouveau cas d'audition colore4 ,by ,binet and ,philippe4 ,,contents3 ,may1 #ahib4 ,no4 #aig4 ,,du ,,sens ,,de ,l',,in,,galit4 ,by ,g4 ,mauret4 ,,la ,,responsabilit 7concluded74 ,by ,f4 ,paulhan4 ,,le ,,probl,,me ,,de ,,la ,,vie 7third and last article74 ,by ,dunan4 ,,analyses ,,et ,,comptes ,,rendus3 ,leons cliniques sur l'hystrie et l'hypnotisme ,by ,pitres4 ,corps et me4 ,essais sur la philosophie de ,st4 ,thomas4 ,by ,j4 ,gardair4 ,agnosticisme4 ,by ,e4 de ,roberty4 ,la physique de ,straton de ,lampsaque4 ,by ,rodier4 ,das ,wahrnehmungsproblem vom ,standpunkte des ,physikers1 des ,physiologen und des ,philosophen4 ,by ,h4 ,schwarz4 ,,revue ,,des ,p,,riodiques ,,trangers3 ,vierteljahrsschrift fr wissenschaftliche ,philosophie4 ,,correspondance ,,et ,,informations4 ,the processes of attention and volition lie at the basis of all our mental and physical activities4 ,mr4 ,charlton ,bastian discusses their nervous condition and comes to the conclusion ,voluntas et intellectus unum et idem sunt4 ,m4 ,paulhan treats the problem of responsibility under healthy and morbid conditions1 in two consecutive articles4 ,m4 ,mouret1 whose former articles on relations will be reviewed in a future number by ,mr4 ,f4 ,c4 ,russell1 treats in a long article of the sense of inequality4 ,m4 ,ch4 ,dunan concludes his essay on the problem of life1 viewing the subject from a rather metaphysical standpoint4 ,m4 ,pierre ,janet presents us with a very accurate review of the importance of the contemporary spiritism and spiritualism4 ,he calls attention to the fact that modern psychology owes to the researches of the spiritualists1 many new1 startling1 and interesting facts4 ,he does not share their standpoint1 yet his review is kind and sympathetic4 7,paris3 ,flix ,alcan47 4 ,,voprosui ,,filosofii ,i ,,psichologii4#hf ,vol4 ,,iii4 ,no4 #ab4 ,march1 #ahib4 ,,positive ,,philosophy ,,and ,,the ,,unity ,,of ,,science4 7,continuation74 ,by ,b4 ,n4 ,tchitcherin4 ,article crowned by the ,psychological ,society of ,moscow4 ,,how ,,does ,,the ,,ministration ,,to ,,the ,,general ,,good ,,of ,,all ,,relate ,,to ,,the ,,care ,,for ,,the ,,salvation ,,of ,,our ,,own ,,soul8 ,a letter to the ,editor4 ,by the ,archimandrite ,antonii4 ,,huxley ,,as ,,representative ,,of ,,the ,,modern ,,scientific ,,theory ,,of ,,the ,,world4 ,,telepathy4 7,concluded47 ,by ,petrovo-,solovo4 ,,the ,,basis ,,of ,,ethical ,,obligation4 ,by ,n4 ,grote4 ,,special ,,department4 ,about ,ethical ,fragments from ,democritus4 ,by ,j4 ,radloff4 ,one of the ,possible ,cosmic ,theories4 ,a ,study4 ,by ,a4 ,wilkins4 ,,criticism ,,and ,,bibliography4 ,i4 ,review of ,periodicals4 ,,ii4 ,review of ,recent ,publications4 ,transactions of the ,moscow ,psychological ,society4 7,moscow1 #ahib47 ,,mind4 ,new ,series4 ,no4 #b4 ,april1 #ahib4 ,,pleasure ,,and ,,pain4 ,by ,a4 ,bain4 ,,the ,,changes ,,of ,,method ,,in ,,hegel',s ,,dialectic4 ,,ii4 ,by ,j4 ,ellis ,mc,taggart4 ,,the ,,leipsic ,,school ,,of ,,experimental ,,psychology4 ,by ,e4 ,bradford ,titchener4 ,,the ,,logical ,,calculus4 ,,ii4 ,by ,w4 ,e4 ,johnson4 ,,discussions3 ,dr4 ,mnsterberg and his ,critics4 ,by ,s4 ,alexander4 ,,critical ,,notices4 ,prof4 ,a4 ,bain criticises ,mr4 ,h4 ,r4 ,marshall's theory of pleasure and pain as being determined by the relation between the energy given out and the energy received1 saying that it leaves a very large region untouched and inexplicable4 ,j4 ,ellis ,mc,taggart defends the ,hegelian dialectic system which1 he declares1 8is not so wonderful or mystic as it has been represented to be4 ,it makes no attempt10 he says1 8to deduce existence from essence2 it does not even attempt to eliminate the element of immediacy1 in experience1 and to produce a self-sufficient and self-mediating thought40 ,e4 ,bradford ,titchener gives a general survey of the researches carried out in ,wundt's ,institute1 and of the other psychological contents of the ,philosophische ,studien1 from the date of ,professor ,cattell's paper on 8,the ,psychological ,laboratory at ,leipsic0 to the present time4 ,w4 ,e4 ,johnson1 in his paper on 8,the ,logical ,calculus10 brings out some of the underlying principles and assumptions which belong equally to the ordinary ,formal ,logic1 to ,symbolic ,logic1 and to the so-called ,logic of ,relatives4 ,prof4 ,s4 ,alexander takes issue with ,mr4 ,titchener's criticism of ,professor ,mnsterberg's psychological investigations4 ,mr4 ,titchener's article which appeared in the ,october number of ,mind1 #ahia1 leaves the impression that the whole of the work under review is valueless4 8,many of his objections10 however1 says ,professor ,alexander1 8refer to unimportant points1 and the graver theoretical ones are really groundless10 and thus the critic 8has contrived to give a one-sided judgment by neglecting the other considerations which give ,dr4 ,mnsterberg's work its value and significance40 7,london3 ,williams ,norgate47 4 ,,three ,,american ,,magazines4 ,,international ,,journal ,,of ,,ethics4 ,april1 #ahib4 ,vol4 ,,ii4 ,no4 #c4 ,,economic ,,reform ,,short ,,of ,,socialism4 ,by ,e4 ,benj4 ,andrews4 ,,pleasure ,,and ,,pain ,,in ,,education4 ,by ,miss ,m4 ,s4 ,gilliland1 ,london4 ,,the ,,essentials ,,of ,,buddhist ,,doctrine ,,and ,,ethics4 ,by ,prof4 ,maurice ,bloomfield4 ,,the ,,three ,,religions4 7,concluded47 ,by ,j4 ,s4 ,mackenzie1 ,m4 ,a4 ,,discussions ,,and ,,reviews4 ,,the ,,school ,,of ,,applied ,,ethics4 ,,the ,,philosophical ,,review4 ,vol4 ,i4 ,no4 #c4 ,may1 #ahib4 ,,herbert ,,spencer',s ,,animal ,,ethics4 ,by ,prof4 ,henry ,calderwood4 ,,the ,,ultimate ,,ground ,,of ,,authority4 ,by ,prof4 ,j4 ,macbride ,sterrett4 ,,what ,,is ,,reality8 ,by ,david ,g4 ,ritchie4 ,,natural ,,science ,,and ,,the ,,philosophy ,,of ,,nature4 ,by ,dr4 ,b4 ,c4 ,burt4 ,a ,,mathematical ,,view ,,of ,,free ,,will4 ,by ,prof4 ,j4 ,e4 ,oliver4 ,,discussions3 ,professor ,ladd's ,criticism of ,james's ,psychology4 ,by ,prof4 ,j4 ,p4 ,gordy4 ,,reviews ,,of ,,books ,,and ,,summaries ,,of ,,articles4 ,,the ,,new ,,world4 ,vol4 ,i4 ,no4 #a4 ,march1 #ahib4 ,,the ,,evolution ,,of ,,christianity4 ,by ,lyman ,abbott4 ,,the ,,historic ,,and ,,the ,,ideal ,,christ4 ,by ,charles ,carroll ,everett4 ,,the ,,future ,,of ,,liberal ,,religion ,,in ,,america4 ,by ,j4 ,g4 ,schurmann4 ,,the ,,common1 ,,the ,,commonplace ,,and ,,the ,,romantic4 ,by ,william ,rounseville ,alger4 ,,abraham ,,kuenen4 ,by ,crawford ,howell ,toy4 ,,the ,,theistic ,,evolution ,,of ,,buddhism4 ,by ,j4 ,estlin ,carpenter4 8,,between ,,the ,,testaments40 ,by ,thomas ,r4 ,slicer4 ,,the ,,new ,,orthodoxy4 ,by ,edward ,h4 ,hall4 ,,theological ,,aspects ,,of ,,the ,,philosophy ,,of ,,thomas ,,hill ,,green4 ,by ,charles ,b4 ,upton4 ,,introductory ,,note4 ,,book ,,reviews4 ,there have sprung up within the last two years not less than four ,american magazines of progressive thought1 which now compete in the proposition of their religious and philosophical conceptions to the world4 ,these four magazines are1 in the chronological order in which they were founded1 ,the ,monist1 ,the ,international ,journal of ,ethics1 ,the ,philosophical ,review1 and ,the ,new ,world4 ,the ,monist represents that world-conception which takes its stand upon facts and systematises facts into a unitary view4 ,thus it recognises the methods of science as the methods of all knowledge1 to the exclusion of supernatural revelation1 or intuitionalism1 or any kind of mysticism4 ,but ,the ,monist does not rest satisfied with this4 ,the ,monist preaches a religion2 and the prophets of this religion are not only the great ethical teachers of mankind1 but everybody who reveals truth1 ,kant and ,comte1 ,kepler1 ,copernicus1 ,darwin1 and all living representatives of scientific inquiry4 ,thus ,the ,monist is a magazine that points out the religious import of science and philosophy4 ,the ,international ,journal of ,ethics follows in the same line in so far only as it has nothing to say to the old orthodox conceptions of religion4 ,it tries to teach a higher morality1 but in establishing ethics it pursues quite another course4 ,it is the organ of the ,ethical ,societies and the leaders of the ,ethical ,societies are confident that they can have ethics not only without theology but also without religion1 science1 or philosophy4 ,they consider the world-conception of a man as something indifferent1 or unessential1 in ethics1 and by proposing a non-committal policy with respect to religious and philosophical views1 they expect to be the better fitted to preach good conduct4 7,philadelphia3 ,international ,journal of ,ethics1 #aah ,s4 ,twelfth ,street47 ,the ,philosophical ,review represents a philosophical conception which has still a strong hold upon the ,universities on this side of the ,atlantic4 ,transcendentalism1 metaphysicism1 and that theological philosophy which still operates with supernatural quantities1 or at least has not discarded the dualistic features of supernaturalism1 are represented in its columns4 ,certainly they are well represented and by their best upholders of the present time1 and authors of more modern and positivistic views are not excluded4 ,exactly so in ,the ,monist1 the representatives of metaphysicism and those who still believe in the dual existence of man1 in his self1 or ego1 and his transcendental existence are welcome2 but there is nevertheless a fundamental difference in the world-conception of the two magazines4 7,boston1 ,new ,york1 ,chicago3 ,ginn ,co47 ,the ,new ,world is the latest new-comer in the field of magazine literature1 and we welcome its appearance most cordially4 ,there are strongly marked differences between ,the ,new ,world and ,the ,monist1 for the former is a theological magazine that deepens religion with the assistance of philosophy while the latter1 rather the reverse1 is a philosophical magazine that widens philosophy and applies it to practical life so as to become a religion4 ,but for that very reason ,the ,new ,world seems to meet ,the ,monist half way4 ,the ,new ,world is an offshoot of modern theology4 ,its contributors come largely from the ranks of the maturest unitarian thinkers4 ,they practically accept the principles of criticism and scientific inquiry and thus they are approaching rapidly that common goal of human thought1 which ,the ,monist propounds as the leading maxim of philosophy and religion1 namely1 to regard nature as the only revelation and experience as our guide in life2 to base religion upon and to derive ethics from a critically-sifted statement of facts4 7,boston3 ,houghton1 ,mifflin ,co47 4 ,,footnotes3 #hf ,questions of ,philosophy and ,psychology4 ,,appendix ,,to ,,the ,,monist1 ,,vol4 ,,ii1 ,,no4 #d ,,kant ,,and ,,spencer ,,two ,,articles ,,reprinted ,,from ,,nos4 #ea1 #eb1 ,,and #aeh ,,of ,,the ,,open ,,court #a4 ,,the ,,ethics ,,of ,,kant #b4 ,,kant ,,on ,,evolution ,,by ,,dr4 ,,paul ,,carus ,,chicago3 ,,the ,,open ,,court ,,publishing ,,company ,,the ,,ethics ,,of ,,kant4 ,,in ,,criticism ,,of ,,mr4 ,,herbert ,,spencer',s ,,presentation ,,of ,,kantism4 ,mr4 ,herbert ,spencer has published in ,the ,popular ,science ,monthly for ,august1 an essay on the ,ethics of ,kant2 a translation of this article had appeared in the ,july ,number of the ,revue ,philosophique1 and it cannot fail to have been widely noticed4 ,it is to be regretted that unfamiliarity with the ,german language and perhaps also with ,kant's terminology has led ,mr4 ,spencer into errors to which attention is called in the following discussion4#hg ,mr4 ,spencer says3 8,if1 before ,kant uttered that often-quoted saying in which1 with the stars of ,heaven he coupled the conscience of ,man1 as being the two things that excited his awe1 he had known more of ,man than he did1 he would probably have expressed himself somewhat otherwise40 ,kant1 in his famous dictum that two things excited his admiration1 the starry heaven above him and the conscience within him1 contrasted two kinds of sublimity4#hh ,the grandeur of the ,universe is that of size and extension1 while the conscience of man commands respect for its moral dignity4 ,the universe is wonderful in its expanse and in its order of mechanical regularity2 the conscience of man is grand1 being intelligent volition that aspires to be in harmony with universal laws4 ,mr4 ,spencer continues3 8,not1 indeed1 that the conscience of ,man is not wonderful enough1 whatever be its supposed genesis2 but the wonderfulness of it is of a different kind according as we assume it to have been supernaturally given or infer that it has been naturally evolved4 ,the knowledge of ,man in that large sense which ,anthropology expresses1 had made1 in ,kant's day1 but small advances4 ,the books of travel were relatively few1 and the facts which they contained concerning the human mind as existing in different races1 had not been gathered together and generalized4 ,in our days1 the conscience of ,man as inductively known has none of that universality of presence and unity of nature which ,kant's saying tacitly assumes40 ,mr4 ,spencer apparently supposes that ,kant believed in a supernatural origin of the human conscience4 ,this1 however1 is erroneous4 ,mr4 ,spencer's error is excusable in consideration of the fact that some disciples of ,kant have fallen into a similar error4 ,professor ,adler1 of ,new ,york1 who attempts in the ,societies for ,ethical ,culture to carry into effect the ethics of ,pure ,reason1 maintains that the commandments of the ought and 8the light that shines through them come from beyond1 but its beams are broken as they pass through our terrestrial medium1 and the full light in all its glory we can never see40 ,ethics based on an unknowable power1 is mysticism2 and mysticism does not essentially differ from dualism and supernaturalism4 ,kant's reasoning is far from mysticism and from supernaturalism4 ,he was fully convinced that civilized man with his moral and intellectual abilities had naturally evolved from the lower state of an animal existence4 ,we read in his essay1 8,presumable ,origin of the ,history of ,mankind0 7,muthmasslicher ,anfang der ,menschengeschichte4 ,editio ,hartenstein1 ,vol4 ,,iv1 p4 #cba73 8,from this conception of the primitive history of mankind it follows that the departure of man from the paradise represented to him by his reason as the earliest place of sojourn of his race1 has been nothing else than the transition from the rude condition of a purely animal existence to the condition of a human being2 a transition from the leading-strings of instinct to direction by reason1 in a word1 from the protectorate of nature to a status of freedom40 ,the view that the conscience of man is innate1 in the sense of a non-natural1 of a mysterious1 or even of a supernatural origin1 is untenable4 ,those disciples of ,kant who entertain such views have certainly misinterpreted their great master1 and the passages adduced by ,mr4 ,spencer from so many sources are sufficient evidence of the fact that 8there are widely different degrees0 we should rather say kinds 8of conscience in the different races40 ,mr4 ,spencer continues3 8,had ,kant had these and kindred facts before him1 his conception of the human mind1 and consequently his ethical conception1 would scarcely have been what they were4 ,believing1 as he did1 that one object of his awe--the stellar ,universe--has been evolved1#hi he might by evidence like the foregoing have been led to suspect that the other object of his awe--the human conscience--has been evolved2 and has consequently a real nature unlike its apparent nature40 444 8,if1 instead of assuming that conscience is simple because it seems simple to careless introspection he had entertained the hypothesis that it is perhaps complex--a consolidated product of multitudinous experiences received mainly by ancestors and added to by self--he might have arrived at a consistent system of ,ethics40 444 8,in brief1 as already implied1 had ,kant1 instead of his incongruous beliefs that the celestial bodies have had an evolutionary origin1 but that the minds of living beings on them1 or at least on one of them1 have had a non-evolutionary origin1 entertained the belief that both have arisen by ,evolution1 he would have been saved from the impossibilities of his ,metaphysics1 and the untenabilities of his ,ethics40 ,mr4 ,spencer believes that ,kant had assumed conscience to be 8simple1 because it seems simple to careless introspection40 ,but there is no evidence in ,kant's works for this assumption4 ,on the contrary1 ,kant reversed the old view of so-called 8rational psychology0 which considered conscience as innate and which was based on the error that consciousness is simple4 ,des ,cartes's syllogism cogito ergo sum is based on this idea1 which at the same time served as a philosophical evidence for the indestructibility and immortality of the ego4 ,the simplicity of consciousness had been considered as an axiom1 until ,kant came and showed that it was a fallacy1 a paralogism of pure reason4 ,dr4 ,noah ,porter has written1 from an apparently dualistic standpoint1 a sketch entitled 8,the ,ethics of ,kant10 in which he says3 8,the skepticism and denials of ,kant's speculative theory in respect to noumena1 both material and psychical1 had unfortunately cut him off from the possibility of recognizing the personal ego as anything more than a logical fiction40 ,kant says in his 8,critique of ,pure ,reason03#ij 8,in the internal intuition there is nothing permanent1 for the ,ego is but the consciousness of my thought4444 ,from all this it is evident that rational psychology has its origin in a mere misunderstanding4 ,the unity of consciousness1 which lies at the basis of the categories1 is considered to be an intuition of the subject as an object2 and the category of substance is applied to the intuition4 ,but this unity is nothing more than the unity in thought1 by which no object is given2 to which therefore the category of substance cannot be applied40#ia ,concerning the statement that ,kant had believed in the non-evolutionary origin of living beings1 we quote from his essay on ,the ,different ,races of ,men1 ,chap4 ,,iii1 where ,kant speaks of 8the immediate causes of the origin of these different races40 ,he says3 8,the conditions 7,grnde7 which1 inhering in the constitution of an organic body1 determine a certain evolutionary process 7,auswickelung#ib7 are called1 if this process is concerned with particular parts1 germs2 if1 on the other hand1 it touches only the size or the relation of the parts to one another1 ,i call it natural capabilities 7natrliche ,anlagen740#ic ,and in a foot-note ,kant makes the following remark3 8,ordinarily we accept the terms natural science 7,naturbeschreibung7 and natural history in one and the same sense4 ,but it is evident that the knowledge of natural phenomena1 as they now are1 always leaves to be desired the knowledge of that which they have been before now and through what succession of modifications they have passed in order to have arrived1 in every respect1 to their present state4 ,natural ,history1 which at present we almost entirely lack1 would teach us the changes that have affected the form of the earth1 likewise1 the changes in the creatures of the earth 7plants and animals71 that they have suffered by natural transformations and1 arising therefrom1 the departures from the prototype of the original species1 that they have experienced4 ,it would probably trace a great number of apparently different varieties back to species of one and the same kind and would convert the present so intricate school-system of ,natural ,science into a natural system in conformity with reason40#id ,kant has nowhere1 so far as we know1 made any objection to the idea of evolution4 ,but he opposed the theory that all life should have originated from one single kind4 ,in reviewing and epitomizing ,joh4 ,gottfr4 ,herder's work1 8,ideen zur ,geschichte der ,menschheit10 ,kant says3 444 8,book ,,ii1 treats of organized matter on the earth4444 ,the beginnings of vegetation4444 ,the changes suffered by man and beast through climatic influences4444 ,in them all we find one prevailing form and a similar osseous structure4444 ,these transitional links render it not at all impossible that in marine animals1 in plants1 and1 indeed1 possibly in so-called inanimate substances1 one and the same fundamental principle of organization may prevail1 although infinitely cruder and more complex in operation4 ,in the sight of eternal being1 which beholds all things in one connection1 it is possible that the structure of the ice-particle1 while receiving form1 and of the snowflake1 while being crystallized1 bears an analogous relation to the formation of the embryo in a mother's womb4444 ,the third book compares the structure of animals and plants with the organization of man4444 ,it was not because man was ordained to be a rational creature that upright stature was given him for using his limbs according to reason2 on the contrary he acquired his reason as a consequence of his upright stature4444 ,from stone to crystals1 from crystals to metals1 from metals to plant-creation1 from thence to the animal1 and ultimately to man1 we have seen the form of organization advancing1 and with it the faculties and instincts of creatures becoming more diversified1 until at last they all became united in the human form1 in so far as the latter could comprise them4444 ,as the body increases by food1 so does the mind by ideas2 indeed1 we notice here the same laws of assimilation1 of growth1 and of generation4 ,in a word1 an inner spiritual man is being formed within us1 which has a nature of its own and which employs the body as an instrument merely4444 ,our humanity is merely a preliminary training1 the bud of a blossom to come4 ,step by step does nature cast off the ignoble and the base1 while it builds and adds to the spiritual and continues to fashion the pure and refined with increasing niceness2 thus are we in a position to hope from the artist-hand of nature that in that other existence our bud of humanity will also appear in its real and true form of divine manhood40 444 ,herder's idea of evolution would stand on the whole if his conception of 8the spiritual0 did not imply a preternatural agent4 8,the present state of man is probably the link of junction between two worlds4444 ,yet man is not to investigate himself in this future state2 he is to believe himself into it40 ,kant makes no objection whatever to the evolutionary ideas of ,herder4 ,but ,herder was not free from supernaturalism and from fantastic ideas in reference to the future development of man4 ,he had not yet dropped the dualistic conception of the #8duplicity' of man and believed in the immortality of a distinct spiritual individual within his body4 ,kant's objection1 therefore1 is two-fold2 #a7 against ,herder's supernaturalism which leads him beyond this world2 and1 #b7 against the descent of all species from one and the same genus4 ,he says3 8,in the gradation between the different species and individuals of a natural kingdom1 nature shows us nothing else than the fact that it abandons individuals to total destruction and preserves the species alone4444 ,as concerns that invisible kingdom of active and independent forces1 we fail to see why the author1 after having believed he could confidently infer from organized beings1 the existence of the rational principle in man did not rather attribute this principle directly to him merely as spiritual nature1 instead of lifting it out of chaos through the structural form of organised matter4444 ,as to the gradation of organized beings1 our author is not to be too severely reproached1 if the scheme has not met the requirements of his conception1 which extends so far beyond the limits of this world2 for its application even to the natural kingdoms here on earth leads to nothing4 ,the slight differences exhibited when species are compared with reference to their common points of resemblance1 are1 where there is such great multiplicity1 a necessary consequence of just this multiplicity4 ,the assumption of common kinship between them1 inasmuch as one kind would have to spring from another and all from one original and primitive species1 or from one and the same creative source 7,mutterschoss7--the assumption of such a common kinship would lead to ideas so strange that reason shrinks from them1 and we cannot attribute this idea to the author without doing him injustice4 ,concerning his suggestions in comparative anatomy through all species down to plants1 the workers in natural science must judge for themselves whether the hints given for new observations1 will be useful and whether they are justified4444 ,it is desirable that our ingenious author who in the continuation of his work will find more terra firma1 may somewhat restrain his bright genius1 and that philosophy 7which consists rather in pruning than in fostering luxuriant growth7 may lead him to the perfection of his labors not through hints but through definite conceptions1 not by imagination but by observation1 not by a metaphysical or emotional phantasy but by reason1 broad in its plan but careful in its work40 ,kant rejected certain conceptions of evolution1 but he did not at all show himself averse to the idea in general4 ,he touched upon the subject only incidentally and it is certain that he did not especially favor or entertain the belief in a non-evolutionary origin of living beings4 ,before proceeding to the main points of his criticism1 ,mr4 ,spencer calls attention to what he designates as ,kant's abnormal reasoning4 ,mr4 ,spencer says3 8,something must be said concerning abnormal reasoning as compared with normal reasoning40 444 8,instead of setting out with a proposition of which the negation is inconceivable1 it sets out with a proposition of which the affirmation is inconceivable1 and therefrom proceeds to draw conclusions0 444 8,the first sentence in ,kant's first chapter runs thus3 #8,nothing can possibly be conceived in the world1 or even out of it1 which can be called good without qualification1 except a ,good ,will4'0 444 8,most fallacies result from the habit of using words without fully rendering them into thoughts--passing them by with recognitions of their meanings as ordinarily used1 without stopping to consider whether these meanings admit of being given to them in the cases named4 ,let us not rest satisfied with thinking vaguely of what is understood by #8a ,good ,will1' but let us interpret the words definitely4 ,will implies the consciousness of some end to be achieved4 ,exclude from it every idea of purpose1 and the conception of ,will disappears4 ,an end of some kind being necessarily implied by the conception of ,will1 the quality of the ,will is determined by the quality of the end contemplated4 ,will itself1 considered apart from any distinguishing epithet1 is not cognizable by ,morality at all4 ,it becomes cognizable by ,morality only when it gains its character as good or bad by virtue of its contemplated end as good or bad40 444 8,kant tells us that a good will is one that is good in and for itself without reference to ends40 ,it is unfortunate that ,mr4 ,spencer misunderstood the first sentence of ,kant's book 7,grundlegung zur ,metaphysik der ,sitten74 ,kant does not speak of 8a good will without qualification10 nor does the expression 8without qualification0 refer to 8a will without reference to ends40 ,kant speaks of good will in opposition to other good things4 ,nothing1 he says1 can without qualification 7ohne ,einschrnkung7 be called good1 except a good will4#ie ,dr4 ,porter sums up the first page of ,kant's essay in the following words3 8,the first section of the treatise opens with the memorable and often-quoted utterance1 that #8nothing can be possibly conceived in the world1 or even out of it1 which can be called good without qualification1 except a good will4' ,if character is compared with gifts of nature1 as intelligence1 courage1 and gifts of fortune1 as riches1 health1 or contentment1 all these are defective1 #8if there is not a good will to correct their possible perversion and to rectify the whole principle of acting1 and adapt it to its end4'#if ,a man who is endowed with every other good can never give pleasure to an impartial1 rational spectator unless he possesses a good will4 #8,thus a good will appears to constitute the indispensable condition of being worthy of happiness4' 444 #8,moreover1 a good will is good not for what it effects but for what it intends1 even when it fails to accomplish its purposes1 444 as when the man wills the good of another and is impotent to promote it1 or actually effects just the opposite of what he proposes or wills4'0 ,in the passages quoted by ,dr4 ,porter1 ,kant speaks of 8the end to which good will adapts other goods02 and in another passage of the same book1 ,kant directly declares that 8it is the end that serves the will as the objective ground of its self-determination40 ,mr4 ,spencer must have overlooked these sentences4 ,kant says3 8,the will is conceived as a power of determining itself to action in accordance with the conception of certain laws4 ,and such a power can only be met with in rational beings4 ,now it is the ,,end that serves the will as the objective ground of its self-determination1 and this end1 if fixed by reason alone1 must hold equally good for all rational creatures40 99 99 99 99 99 ,mr4 ,spencer interrupts his essay on the ,ethics of ,kant by a digression on ,kant's conception of time and space4 ,it would lead us too far at present if we would follow ,mr4 ,spencer on this ground also4 ,a comparison of ,spencer's remarks on the subject with ,kant's 8,critique of ,pure ,reason0 will show that ,kant's view of space and time is radically different from that view which ,mr4 ,spencer represents as the ,kantian conception of time and space4 99 99 99 99 99 ,kant rejects the idea that happiness is the end and purpose of life and at the same time he declares that ethics must be based not on the pursuit of happiness but on the categorical imperative or more popularly expressed on our sense of duty4 ,mr4 ,spencer argues3 8,one of the propositions contained in ,kant's first chapter is that #8we find that the more a cultivated reason applies itself with deliberate purpose to the enjoyment of life and happiness1 so much the more does the man fail of true satisfaction4'0 444 8,that which ,kant should have said is that the exclusive pursuit of what are distinguished as pleasures and amusements is disappointing40 444 8,it is not1 as ,kant says1 guidance by #8a cultivated reason1' which leads to disappointment1 but guidance by an uncultivated reason40 ,the passage quoted by ,mr4 ,spencer from ,kant1 reads in its context as follows3 8,in the physical constitution of an organized being we take it for granted#ig that no organ for any purpose will be found in it but such as is also the fittest and best adapted for that purpose4 ,if in a being possessing reason and will1 the preservation1 the prosperity1 in a word1 the happiness of that being1 constituted the actual purpose of nature1 nature had certainly adopted an extremely unwise expedient to this end1 had it made the reason of that being the executive agent of its purposes in this matter4 ,for all actions that it had to perform with this end in view1 and the whole rule of its conduct1 would have been far more exactly prescribed by instinct1 and this end would have been far more safely attained by this means than can ever take place through the instrumentality of reason40 444 8,as a matter of fact we find that the more a cultivated reason occupies itself with the purpose of enjoying life and happiness1 the farther does the person possessing it recede from the state of true contentment2 and hence there arises in the case of many1 and pre-eminently in the case of those most experienced in the exercise of reason1 if they are only frank enough to confess it1 a certain degree of misology or hate of reason2 for after weighing every advantage that they derive1 ,i will not say from the invention of all arts facilitating ordinary luxury1 but even from the sciences1 7which after all are in their eyes a luxury of the intellect17 they still discover that virtually they have burdened themselves more with toil and trouble than they have gained in point of happiness1 and thus1 in the end1 they are more apt to envy than contemn the commoner type of men who are more immediately subject to the guidance of natural instinct alone1 and who do not suffer their reason to influence in any great degree their acts and omissions40 ,kant uses the expression 8cultivated reason0 not in opposition to 8uncultivated reason10 but to 8instinct0 as that inherited faculty which teaches a being to live in accordance with nature and its natural conditions1 without the interference of thought and reflection4 ,that uncultivated reason would lead to disappointment1 ,kant never would have denied4 ,he would have added3 8,it does more1 it leads to a speedy ruin40 ,but if reason does not produce happiness1 what then is the use of reason8 ,kant answers1 reason produces in man the good will4 ,it is reason which enables man to form abstractions1 to think in generalizations and to conceive the import of universal laws4 ,when his will deliberately and consciously conforms to universal laws1 it is good4 ,kant says3 8,thus will 7viz4 the good will7 can not be the sole and whole ,good1 but it must still be the highest ,good and the condition necessary to everything else1 even to all desire of happiness40 444 8,to know what ,i have to do in order that my volition be good1 requires on my part no far-reaching sagacity4 ,unexperienced in respect of the course of nature1 unable to be prepared for all the occurrences transpiring therein1 ,i simply ask myself3 ,can'st thou so will1 that the maxim of thy conduct may become a universal law8 ,where it can not become a universal law1 there the maxim of thy conduct is reprehensible1 and that1 too1 not by reason of any disadvantage consequent thereupon to thee or even others1 but because it is not fit to enter as a principle into a possible enactment of universal laws40 ,if a maxim of conduct is fit to enter as a principle into a possible enactment of universal laws1 it will be found in harmony with the cosmical laws2 if not1 it must come in conflict with the order of things in the universe4 ,it then cannot stand1 and will1 if persistently adhered to1 lead 7perhaps slowly but inevitably7 to certain ruin4 ,concerning the proposition that happiness may be regarded as the purpose of life ,kant in his review of ,herder's 8,ideen zur ,philosophie der ,geschichte der ,menschheit0 7,ed4 ,h4 ,,iv1 p4 #aij71 speaks of the relativity of happiness and its insufficiency as a final aim of life3 444 8,first of all the happiness of an animal1 then that of a child and of a youth1 and lastly that of man6 ,in all epochs of human history1 as well as among all classes and conditions of the same epoch1 that happiness has obtained which was in exact conformity with the individual's ideas and the degree of his habituation to the conditions amid which he was born and raised4 ,indeed1 it is not even possible to form a comparison of the degree of happiness nor to give precedence to one class of men or to one generation over another4444 ,if this shadow-picture of happiness 444 were the actual aim of ,providence1 every man would have the measure of his own happiness within him4444 ,does the author 7,herder7 think perhaps that1 if the happy inhabitants of ,otaheite had never been visited by more civilized peoples and were ordained to live in peaceful indolence for thousands of years to come--that we could give a satisfactory answer to the question why they should exist at all and whether it would not have been just as well that this island should be occupied by happy sheep and cattle as that it should be inhabited by men who are happy only through pure enjoyment80 ,concerning the mission or purpose of humanity and its ultimate realization1 ,kant interprets ,herder's views as follows3 8,it involves no contradiction to say that no individual member of all the offspring of the human race1 but that only the species1 fully attains its mission 7,bestimmung74 ,the mathematician may explain the matter in his way4 ,the philosopher would say3 the mission of the human race as a whole is unceasing progress1 and the perfection 7,vollendung7 of this mission is a mere idea 7although in every aspect a quite useful one7 of the aim towards which1 in conformity with the design of providence1 we are to direct our endeavors40 ,we learn from the passages quoted from ,kant that his idea of good will is neither mystical and supernatural1 nor is it vague4 ,it is a conception as logically and definitely defined as any mathematical definition4 ,good will in the sense in which ,kant defines it1 is only possible in a reasonable being by the power of its reason4 ,the good will is the intention of conforming to universal principles and thus of being in harmony with the ,all4 ,this good will is the corner-stone of ,kant's ethics2 it appears as the categoric imperative of duty1 so to act that the maxim of one's conduct may be fit to become a universal law4 ,it is formulated in another passage3 8,act so as if the maxim of thy conduct by thy volition were to become a natural law40 ,it is easily seen that1 in ,kant's conception1 the ought of morals 7viz4 of the categoric imperative7 does not stand in contradiction to the must of natural laws4 ,kant's conception is monistic1 not dualistic4 ,kant says3 8,the moral ought is man's inner1 necessary volition as being a member of an intelligible world and is conceived by him as an ought only in so far as he considers himself also as a member of the sensory world40#ih ,our way of explaining it would be3 ,man feels in his activity the categoric imperative as an ought4 ,so the snow crystal1 if it were possessed of sensation1 would feel its formation as an 8ought40 ,but both are1 and to an outside observer will appear1 as a 8must40 99 99 99 99 99 ,in the ,spencerian system of ethics1 which is utilitarianism1 the moral maxim or the idea of duty is not distinguished from the feeling of pleasure or pain that accompanies ethical thoughts and acts1 and their consequences4 ,this lack of distinction induces ,mr4 ,spencer to consider man's pursuit of happiness as the basis of ethics4 ,accordingly the aim of ethics1 he maintains1 is not the performance of duty1 not the realization of the good2 to the utilitarian this is only the means4 ,the end of ethics is the greatest happiness of the greatest number4 ,it is strange that ,mr4 ,spencer's essay contains a passage which1 although intended as a point of objection to ,kant1 is a corroboration of ,kant's ethics1 and a refutation of ,mr4 ,spencer's own views4 ,while denying the statement that 8a cultivated reason1 if applied with deliberate purpose to the enjoyment of life and happiness1 will fail to produce true satisfaction10 ,mr4 ,spencer says3 8,i assert that it is untrue on the strength of personal experiences4 ,in the course of my life there have occurred many intervals1 averaging a month each1 in which the pursuit of happiness was the sole object1 and in which happiness was successfully pursued4 ,how successfully may be judged from the fact that ,i would gladly live over again each of those periods without change1 an assertion which ,i certainly cannot make of any portions of my life spent in the daily discharge of duties40 ,this statement1 if it proves anything1 proves that happiness is one thing and duty is another2 it proves that ,kant's theory of ethics1 which is based on the discharge of duty and not on the pursuit of happiness1 is correct1 and that ,mr4 ,spencer's theory which identifies duty with the pursuit of happiness1 is wrong4 ,however1 we must in this place express our opinion that ,mr4 ,spencer's statement cannot be quite correct4 ,the discharge of duty1 unpleasant though the drudgery part of it may have been1 was undoubtedly accompanied and followed by a certain satisfaction1 which perhaps was less in quantity1 but certainly higher in quality than the pleasure derived from the mere pursuit of happiness4 ,and in the valuation of the intrinsic and of the moral worth of pleasures1 the quality alone should be taken into consideration1 not the quantity4 ,in this sense only can an ethical hedonism or utilitarianism be acceptable4 ,the man whose pleasures and pains are of a higher kind1 of a nobler form1 and of a better quality1 is morally and generally the more evolved man4 ,and then1 the basis of ethics would be1 not so much pleasure or happiness as the quality of pleasure or happiness2 it would be an aspiration to evolve toward a higher plane of life1 to shape our lives in nobler forms1 and to enjoy nobler1 greater1 and more spiritual pleasures1 or1 as ,kant says1 8unceasing progress40 ,mr4 ,spencer's assertion1 if taken in the sense in which it stands1 is a contradiction of his ethical theory4 ,but even if ,mr4 ,spencer had declared that the discharge of duty affords a kind of happiness or satisfaction1 as it truly does1 there would still remain a deep gap between his and ,kant's ethics4 ,mr4 ,spencer reduces ethics to mere worldly prudence2 he says that we must do the good in order to be happy1 and for the sake of its utility1 and ,kant says we must act so as to be in agreement with universal law4 ,mr4 ,spencer says3 8,but now1 supposing we accept ,kant's statement in full1 what is its implication8 ,that happiness is the thing to be desired1 and1 in one way or another1 the thing to be achieved40 444 8,an illustration will best show how the matter stands4 ,to a tyro in archery the instructor says3 #8,sir1 you must not point your arrow directly at the target2 if you do1 you will inevitably miss it2 you must aim high above the target1 and you may then possibly pierce the bull's-eye4' ,what now is implied by the warning and the advice8 ,clearly that the purpose is to hit the target4 ,otherwise there is no sense in the remark that it will be missed if directly aimed at2 and no sense in the remark that to be hit1 something higher must be aimed at4 ,similarly with happiness4 ,there is no sense in the remark that happiness will not be found if it is directly sought1 unless happiness is a thing to be somehow or other obtained40 444 8,so that in this professed repudiation of happiness as an end1 there lies the inavoidable implication that it is the end40 ,the pursuit of happiness is by no means repudiated by ,kant as wrong or immoral2 it is only maintained to be insufficient as a foundation of ethics4 ,kant's remark that happiness will not be found if it is directly sought has no reference to his own ethics4 ,kant1 speaking from the standpoint of one who takes the view of utilitarianism1 says that if a cultivated reason applies itself to the sole purpose of enjoying life and happiness1 it will meet with a failure4#ii ,any other explanation of the moral ought than that from the ,good ,will1 ,kant declares to be heteronomy4 ,will would no longer be itself1 and the principle of action would lie in something foreign to the will4 ,kant says3 8,will in such a case would not be a law to itself2 but the object by its relation to the will would impose the law upon the will4444 ,this would admit of hypothetical imperatives only3 #8,i ought to do a certain thing1 because ,i want something else4' ,the moral and therefore categorical imperative1 on the contrary1 says3 #8,i ought to act so or so1 even if ,i had nothing else in view4' ,for instance3 the hypothetical imperative of heteronomy says3 #8,i ought not to lie1 if ,i ever wish to preserve my honor4' ,the categorical imperative says3 #8,i ought not to lie even if it would not in the least bring me to shame4'0 ,mr4 ,spencer quotes the following passage from ,kant3 8,i omit here all actions which are already recognized as inconsistent with duty1 although they may be useful for this or that purpose1 for with these the question whether they are done from duty can not arise at all1 since they even conflict with it4 ,i also set aside those actions which really conform to duty1 but to which men have no direct inclination1 performing them because they are impelled thereto by some other inclination4 ,for in this case we can readily distinguish whether the action which agrees with duty is done from duty1 or from a selfish view4 ,it is much harder to make this distinction when the action accords with duty1 and the subject has besides a direct inclination to it4 ,for example1 it is always a matter of duty that a dealer should not overcharge an inexperienced purchaser1 and wherever there is much commerce the prudent tradesman does not overcharge1 but keeps a fixed price for every one1 so that a child buys of him as well as any other4 ,men are thus honestly served2 but this is not enough to make us believe that the tradesman has so acted from duty and from principles of honesty3 his own advantage required it2 it is out of the question in this case to suppose that he might besides have a direct inclination in favor of the buyers1 so that1 as it were1 from love he should give no advantage to one over another64 ,accordingly the action was done neither from duty nor from direct inclination1 but merely with a selfish view4 8,on the other hand1 it is a duty to maintain one's life1 and1 in addition1 every one has also a direct inclination to do so4 ,but on this account the often anxious care which most men take for it has no intrinsic worth1 and their maxim has no moral import4 ,they preserve their life as duty requires1 no doubt1 but not because duty requires4 ,on the other hand1 if adversity and hopeless sorrow have completely taken away the relish for life2 if the unfortunate one1 strong in mind1 indignant at his fate rather than desponding or dejected1 wishes for death1 and yet preserves his life without loving it--not from inclination or fear1 but from duty--then his maxim has a moral worth4 8,to be beneficent when we can is a duty2 and besides this1 there are many minds so sympathetically constituted that without any other motive of vanity or self-interest1 they find a pleasure in spreading joy around them1 and can take delight in the satisfaction of others so far as it is their own work4 ,but ,i maintain that in such a case an action of this kind1 however proper1 however amiable it may be1 has nevertheless no true moral worth1 but is on a level with other inclinations40 7pp4 #ag-ai7 ,kant's metaphysics of ethics is to practical ethics what pure mathematics is to applied mathematics1 or what logic is to grammar4 ,kant's method of reasoning in abstracto everywhere shows the mathematical bent of his mind4 ,in a foot-note 7,editio ,hartenstein1 ,,iv71 p4 #beh1 he says3 8,as pure mathematics is distinguished from applied mathematics and pure logic from applied logic1 so may the pure philosophy 7the metaphysics7 of ethics be distinguished from the applied philosophy of ethics1 that is1 as applied to human nature4 ,by this distinction of terms it at once appears that ethical principles are not based upon the peculiarities of human nature but that they must be existent by themselves a priori1--whence1 for human nature1 just as well as for any rational nature1 practical rules can be derived40 ,schleiermacher says3 8,a good is any agreement 78unity07 of definite sides certain aspects of reason and nature4444 ,the end of ethical praxis is the highest good1 i4 e41 the sum of all unions of nature and reason4444 ,the moral law may be compared to the algebraic formula which 7in analytical geometry7 determines the course path of a curve2 the highest good may be compared to the curve itself1 and virtue1 or moral power1 to an instrument arranged for the purpose of constructing the curve according to the formula40 7,quoted from a translation of ,ueberweg47 ,kant declares in other passages that in examples taken from practical life1 it will be difficult to separate clearly and unmistakably the sense of duty as the real moral motive from other motives1 inclinations1 habits1 etc4 ,but such a distinction must be made1 if the moral value of motives is to be considered in abstracto4 ,this is necessary for a clear conception of the essential features of morality4 ,mr4 ,spencer has on other occasions highly praised the power of generalization1 which indeed is fundamentally the same faculty1 as thinking in abstracto2 here1 however1 he does not follow ,kant's argument1 but declares 8that the assumed distinction between sense of duty and inclination is untenable40 ,he says3 8,the very expression sense of duty implies that the mental state signified is a feeling2 and if a feeling it must1 like other feelings1 be gratified by acts of one kind and offended by acts of an opposite kind4 ,if we take the name conscience1 which is equivalent to sense of duty1 we see the same thing4 ,the common expressions #8a tender conscience1' #8a seared conscience1' indicate the perception that conscience is a feeling--a feeling which has its satisfactions and dissatisfactions1 and which inclines a man to acts which yield the one and avoid the other--produces an inclination10 7p4 #dgf74 ,it is quite true that every state of consciousness is a feeling1 but we can and must discriminate between consciousness or feeling and the idea or thought which becomes conscious1 in which the feeling appears1 and which is1 so to speak1 the special form of a certain feeling4 ,the consciousness and its special form1 the feeling and the mental object of feeling1 are in reality one and the same4 ,yet they are different and must in abstracto be well distinguished4 ,mr4 ,spencer's method is that of generalization1 but generalizing can lead to no satisfactory results1 if it is not constantly accompanied by discrimination4 ,we must generalize and discriminate4 ,if a certain group of states of consciousness takes the form of a logical syllogism1 it must not be expected that logic will find its explanation in feeling1 although it cannot be denied that all the states of consciousness are feelings4 ,not the feeling in this case is to be explained1 but logic4 ,in our generalizations we must discriminate in abstracto between the feeling and the idea which feels4 ,we must positively abstract from feeling and cannot consider whether the feeling of logical arguments is pleasant or unpleasant4 ,mr4 ,spencer's method of explaining ethics1 if applied to logic1 would be as follows3 8,man's logical sense is a very complex feeling and has developed from simple percepts such as can be observed in the lowest animals2 percepts are a higher evolved form of reactions against irritations such as take place in protoplasm4 ,the old method of explaining logic is that of deduction1 modern logic will be inductive4 ,formerly pure logic was considered as a science a priori2 but the evolution-philosophy shows that logic is developed by steps1 it appears a priori to the individual now1 but it is in reality a consolidated product of multitudinous experiences received mainly by ancestors and added to by self4 ,logical sense accordingly finds its explanation in most simple feelings4 ,our conceptions of logically incorrect feelings will be more and more avoided because they will ultimately be found to be unpleasant2 logical correctness is striven for because of the feeling of satisfaction that accompanies the conception of a logically correct conclusion40 ,sense is feeling1 there can be no doubt4 ,logical sense and mathematical sense are feelings and if a person thinks a mathematical axiom or a logical syllogism or an ethical maxim1 he has a feeling4 ,logical sense of reason is the product of evolution1 and it cannot be denied either that one man has a more logical or mathematical or moral sense than another4 ,but it does not follow that an explanation of mathematics1 or logic1 or ethics1 must be derived from feeling pleasure and pain1 or happiness4 ,on the contrary we must abstract from feeling altogether and concern ourselves with the object of feeling only1 which is the idea or the special form in which and as which feeling appears4 ,states of consciousness 7never mind whether they are painful or pleasurable7 must be considered as moral if their mental object1 i4 e41 the idea1 the thought1 the motive1 the form in which feeling becomes manifest1 is in harmony with the universal order of things4 99 99 99 99 99 ,mr4 ,spencer declares that the world would be intolerable 8if ,kant's conception of moral worth were displayed universally in men's acts40 ,and it must be acknowledged that ,kant's ethics in their logical and irrefutable rigidity not only impressed the literary world of his time with the grandeur and sublimity of ethics2 ,kant's ethics also astounded1 and overwhelmed his readers with awe4 ,virtue no longer appeared to be the fervid enthusiasm of sentiments2 it congealed into the cold idea of duty which can be fixed in abstract rules and will operate like the correctly calculated gear of a machine4 ,objections have been raised by some of ,kant's own disciples2 but it must be known that the ,kantian view of ethics does not suppress feelings1 emotions and inclinations1 it excludes them only from an estimation of the moral worth of actions4 ,kant gave the coup de grace to all sentimentality which had taken the lead in ethical questions too long4 ,mr4 ,spencer says3 8,if those acts only have moral worth which are done from a sense of duty 444 we must say that a man's moral worth is greater in proportion as the strength of his sense of duty is such that he does the right thing not only apart from inclination but against inclination4 ,according to ,kant1 then1 the most moral man is the man 444 who says of another that which is true though he would like to injure him by a falsehood2 who lends money to his brother though he would prefer to see him in distress40 ,schiller1 although an admirer of ,kant1 makes in his ,xenions a similar objection to this corollary of the ethics of pure reason4 ,he says3 8,willingly serve ,i my friends2 but 'tis pity1 ,i do it with pleasure4 ,and ,i am really vexed1 that there's no virtue in me60 ,and he answers in a second distich3 8,there is no other advice than that you try to despise friends1 ,and1 with disgust1 you will do what such a duty demands40 ,the difficulty is removed under the following consideration3 ,a man with good inclinations is less exposed to temptation than a man with bad inclinations4 ,if both act morally under conditions otherwise the same1 the latter has shown greater strength of moral purpose than the former4 ,the former's character 7viz41 his inherited inclinations and habits which represent the sum total of the moral energies of his ancestors17 is more moral than that of the latter4 ,but the latter deserves more credit than the former for overcoming the temptation2 he has in this special act shown more moral strength of will than his more fortunate and morally higher advanced fellow-man4 ,to those who have accepted the ,kantian view1 ,mr4 ,spencer's and ,schiller's objection can serve as a warning1 not to lose sight of emotions altogether4 ,man is not only a reasonable being1 he is at the same time a feeling creature4 ,the instinctive faculties of man1 the so-called subconscious states1 are the basis of his consciousness4 ,they form the roots of his soul from which spring the clear conceptions of his reason4 ,the more man's habits and inclinations agree with morals1 the more strength of purpose is left for further ethical advancement and moral progress4 ,similar objections have also been made to ,kant's mechanical explanation of the origin of the planetary systems and milky ways4 ,it seemed as if the divinity of nature were replaced by the rigid law of gravity4 ,in his poem 8,the ,god's of ,greece10 ,schiller complains3 8,fhllos selbst fr ihres ,knstlers ,ehre1 ,gleich dem todten ,schlag der ,pendeluhr1 ,dient sie knechtisch dem ,gesetz der ,schwere1 ,die entgtterte ,natur40 8,dead even to her ,master's praise1 ,like lifeless pendulum's vibration1 ,lo1 godless ,nature now obeys1 ,slave-like1 the law of gravitation40#ajj ,such objections are always raised when a scientific explanation destroys the mystic view that a spirit or at least something unexplainable is the supposed cause of certain phenomena4 ,our sentiments are so closely connected and intimately interwoven with our errors that truth appears hostile to sentiment1 and it becomes difficult to part with errors sanctified by emotion4 ,sentimentality always complains that clear thought is an enemy of romanticism1 and romanticism is the only possible poetry to the taste of the sentimental4 ,now it cannot be denied that a one-sided knowledge not only appears rigid1 it truly is so1 and will be destructive of such emotions as reverence1 awe1 sthetic taste1 religion and art4 ,criticism is a most essential feature of science and philosophy1 and how negative1 how desolate and melancholy appear the results of criticism6 ,but the pruning process of criticism is very wholesome1 and true science will only profit by discarding the vagueness of indistinct conceptions4 ,alpine lakes that are really deep can only gain by lucidity4 ,thus the clearness of genuine science and broad philosophy will only show the depth of truth into which by all its lucidity our emotions can plunge without ever finding it shallow or fathoming it in all its profundity4 ,kant's doctrine of ethics is a truth that can stand the severest test4 ,ethics1 in the sense of the word as used by ,kant1 can be found in man only1 in so far as he is a reasonable being4 ,a truly reasonable being does not allow himself to be guided by impulses but is led by maxims4 ,inclinations and habits are remnants of instinct4 ,not he who in instinctive good-naturedness acts morally1 is the ethical man1 but he who deliberately and consciously considers himself a representative of the general order of things4 ,the man1 who adopts such maxims as can become universal principles1 identifies his will with the laws of the universe4 ,man's moral dignity must not be sought in vague feelings or in instinctive inspirations2 it is based upon his reason and is developed in so far only as he makes use of his reason4 ,,footnotes3 #hg ,quotations from ,mr4 ,spencer's essay will be distinguished by quotation-marks1 while those from ,kant will appear in hanging indentations4 #hh ,kant distinguishes two kinds of sublimity3 #a7 the mathematical1 and #b7 the dynamical4 ,his definitions are3 #a7 sublime is that in comparison with which everything else is small2 and #b7 sublime is that the mere ability to conceive which shows a power of emotion 7,gemth71 the latter transcending any measurement by the senses4 #a7 ,erhaben ist1 mit welchem im ,vergleich alles andere klein ist4 #b7 ,erhaben ist1 was auch nur denken zu knnen ein ,vermgen des ,gemths beweist1 das jeden ,maasstab der ,sinne bertrifft4 ,editio ,hartenstein1 ,vol4 ,v1 pp4 #beg1 #beh4 #hi ,the stellar ,universe1 of course1 has not been evolved2 ,mr4 ,spencer means that according to ,kant's mechanical explanation the planetary systems and milky ways of the stellar ,universe are in a state of constant evolution4 #ij ,translation by ,j4 ,m4 ,d4 ,meiklejohn1 pp4 #bdd1 #bdi4 #ia ,compare also ,kant's 8,prol4 zu jeder knftigen ,metaphysik10 #df4 #ib ,we call attention to ,kant's peculiar expression1 in this passage1 of ,auswickelung which has now yielded to the term ,entwickelung4 #ic ,die in der ,natur eines organischen ,krpers 7,gewchses oder ,thieres7 liegenden ,grnde einer bestimmten ,auswickelung heissen1 wenn diese ,auswickelung besondere ,theile betrifft1 ,keime2 betrifft sie aber nur die ,grsse oder das ,verhltniss der ,theile unter einander1 so nenne ich sie natrliche ,anlagen4 #id ,wir nehmen die ,benennungen ,naturbeschreibung und ,naturgeschichte gemeiniglich in einerlei ,sinne4 ,allein es ist klar1 dass die ,kenntniss der ,naturdinge1 wie sie jetzt sind1 immer noch die ,erkenntniss von demjenigen wnschen lasse1 was sie ehedem gewesen sind und durch welche ,reihe von ,vernderungen sie durchgegangen1 um an jedem ,ort in ihren gegenwrtigen ,zustand zu gelangen4 ,die ,naturgeschichte1 woran es uns noch fast gnzlich fehlt1 wrde uns die ,vernderung der ,erdgestalt1 imgleichen die der ,erdgeschpfe 7,pflanzen und ,thiere71 die sie durch natrliche ,wanderungen 7sic6 ,i take it as a misprint for ,wandelungen7 erlitten haben1 und ihre daraus entsprungenen ,abartungen von dem ,urbilde der ,stammgattung lehren4 ,sie wrde vermuthlich eine grosse ,menge scheinbar verschiedener ,arten zu ,racen ebenderselben ,gattung zurckfhren1 und das jetzt so weitluftigte ,schulsystem der ,naturbeschreibung in ein physisches ,system fr den ,verstand verwandeln4 #ie ,the original of the first sentence reads3 8,es ist berall nichts in der ,welt1 ja berhaupt auch ausser derselben zu denken mglich1 was ohne ,einschrnkung fr gut knnte gehalten werden1 als allein ein guter ,wille40 #if ,italics are ours4 #ig ,the phrase 8we take it for granted0 7in the original 8nehmen wir es als ,grundsatz an70 reads in the translation quoted by ,mr4 ,spencer3 8we take it as a fundamental principle40 ,mr4 ,spencer objects to the passage declaring that there are many organs 7such as rudimentary organs7 in the construction of organized beings which serve no purpose4 ,this however does not stand in contradiction to ,kant's assumption that organs of organized beings serve a special purpose4 ,the rudimentary organs have under other conditions served a purpose for which they then were fit and well adapted and are disappearing now because no longer used4 #ih ,das moralische ,sollen ist also ein eigenes nothwendiges ,wollen als ,gliedes einer intelligiblen ,welt1 und wird nur sofern von ihm als ,sollen gedacht1 als er sich zugleich wie ein ,glied der ,sinnenwelt betrachtet4 ,ed4 ,hartenstein vol4 ,,iv4 p4 #cjc4 #ii ,the passage referred to is quoted in full on page #af4 #ajj ,slightly altered from ,b4 ,w4 ,,ball',s translation in ,,the ,,open ,,court1 p4 #hc4 ,,kant ,,on ,,evolution4 ,,in ,,criticism ,,of ,,mr4 ,,herbert ,,spencer',s ,,presentation ,,of ,,kantism4 ,it is very strange that ,mr4 ,herbert ,spencer will again and again attack the philosophy and ethics of ,kant for views which ,kant never held4#aja ,it is possible that there are disciples of ,kant who deny the theory of evolution4 ,yet it is certain that ,kant himself is not guilty of this mistake4 ,thinkers who reject the theory of evolution are in this respect as little entitled to call themselves disciples of ,kant as1 for instance1 the ,sadducees were to call themselves followers of ,christ4 ,kantian philosophy was foremost in the recognition of the need of evolution1 and that at a time when public interest was not as yet centered upon it4 ,mr4 ,spencer's merits in the propagation of the theory of evolution are undeniable1 and he deserves our warmest respect and thanks for the indefatigable zeal he has shown in the performance of this great work1 for the labors he has undergone1 and the sacrifices he has made for it4 ,yet recognising all that ,mr4 ,spencer has done1 we should not be blind to the fact that ,kant's conception of evolution is even at the present day more in conformity with the facts of natural science than ,mr4 ,spencer's philosophy1 although the latter commonly goes by the name of the philosophy of evolution4 ,it is painful to note that in many places where ,mr4 ,spencer refers to ,kant's philosophy1 he does it slightingly1 as though ,kant were one of the most irrational of thinkers4 ,kant's reasoning is denounced as 8abnormal0 and 8vicious40 ,i find such phrases as1 8,it is a vice of ,kant's philosophy 44410 8,if ,kant had known more of ,man than he did 44410 etc4 ,mr4 ,spencer characterises ,kant's method as follows3 8,instead of setting out with a proposition of which the negative is inconceivable1 it sets out with a proposition of which the affirmation is inconceivable1 and proceeds to draw conclusions therefrom40 ,these attacks of ,mr4 ,spencer on ,kant are not justifiable4 ,kant is not guilty of the faults for which he is arraigned by ,mr4 ,spencer4 99 99 99 99 99 ,it is1 however1 fair to state that these misunderstandings appear excusable if the difficulties are borne in mind with which the ,english student of ,kant is confronted4 ,first1 ,kant cannot be understood without taking into consideration the historical development of his philosophy1 and1 secondly1 most translations of the fundamental terms1 he employs1 are so misleading that errors can scarcely be avoided4 ,kant's philosophy is by no means a perfected system2 it rather represents 7as perhaps necessarily all philosophies do7 the development of a thinker's mind4 ,the 8,critique of ,pure ,reason0 especially shows traces of the state of ,kant's mind at different periods1 and thus it is that we discover passages which closely considered will be found to be contradictory4 ,when reading this remarkable work we feel like travelers walking over the petrified relics of a powerful eruption4 ,there are strata of ideas of the oldest formation close to the thoughts of a recent date4 ,there are also vestiges of intermediate phases4 ,here they stand in the petrification of printed words1 peacefully side by side1 as memorials of a great revolution in the development of human thought4 ,it is this state of things which more than anything else makes of ,kant's writings such difficult reading4 ,at the same time it is obvious that we cannot simply take the results of ,kant's philosophy2 we must follow him in the paths by which he arrived at any given proposition4 ,there is no philosopher that has been worse misinterpreted than ,kant2 and the ,english interpreters of ,kant have succeeded in mutilating his best thoughts so that this hero of progress appears as a stronghold of antiquated views4 ,mistranslations or misconceptions of his terms are to a great extent the cause of this singular fate4 ,as an instance we mention the errors that attach to ,kant's term ,anschauung4 ,anschauung is the present object of our senses2 it is the impression a man has from looking at a thing and might have been translated by 8perception0 or perhaps 8sensation40 ,it is usually translated by 8intuition40 ,the ,anschauung of objects comprises the data of knowledge1 and they are previous to our reflection upon them4 ,an intuition in the sense of the ,english ,intuitionalists is defined as 8a presentation which can be given previously to all thought10 yet this presentation is supposed to be a kind of revelation1 a knowledge that comes to us without our contemplation1 a cognition the character of which is immediate as well as mysterious2 in short something that is supernatural4 ,how different is ,kant's philosophy1 for instance1 if his position with reference to time and space is mistaken6 8,time and ,space are our ,anschauung10 ,kant says4 ,but his ,english translators declare3 8,kant maintained that space and time are intuitions40 ,what a difference it makes if intuition is interpreted in the sense applied to it by the ,english ,intuitionalist ,school instead of its being taken in the original meaning of the word ,anschauung4 99 99 99 99 99 ,any one who knows ,kant through ,mr4 ,spencer's representations only1 must look upon him as having the most perverse mind that could possibly exist2 and yet it is ,kant from whom ,spencer has indirectly derived the most characteristic feature of his philosophy4 ,what is ,mr4 ,spencer's agnosticism but a popularisation of ,kant's view that things in themselves are unknowable8 ,we conclude from the animosity which ,mr4 ,spencer shows toward ,kant that he does not know how much in this respect he agrees with ,kant1 how much he has unconsciously imbibed from the ,zeitgeist which in part was formed under the influence of this huge error of the great philosopher4 ,i feel confident that any clear thinker who studies ,kant and arrives along with him at the 8thing in itself0 will soon free himself from this error of ,kantian thought4 ,kant himself suggests to us the method by which we are to find the way out of agnosticism4 ,as a proof ,i quote the views of two independent thinkers2 both influenced by ,kant's criticism but neither a blind follower4 ,professor ,mach says3 8,i have always felt it as a special good fortune1 that early in my life1 at about the age of fifteen1 ,i happened to find in the library of my father ,kant's #8,prolegomena to ,any ,future ,metaphysic4' ,the book made at that time a powerful1 ineffaceable impression upon me that ,i never afterwards experienced to the same degree in any of my philosophical reading4 ,some two or three years later ,i suddenly discovered the superfluous rle that #8the thing in itself' plays40 ,the ,monist1 ,vol4 ,i1 ,no4 #a1 pp4 #fe and #ff4 ,and ,schiller guided by similar considerations says in one of his ,xenions3 8,since ,metaphysics1 of late1 without heirs to her fathers was gathered3 ,under the hammer are now #8things in themselves' to be sold40 ,the latest attack of ,mr4 ,spencer upon ,kantism is in the article 8,our ,space-,consciousness10 in ,mind1 written in reply to ,professor ,watson4 ,mr4 ,spencer there repeats his misconception of ,kantism1 so that ,i feel urged to utter a few words of protest against his gross misrepresentation of ,kant's views4 ,i shall confine myself mainly to quotations from ,kant's works--and the passages quoted will speak for themselves4 ,should there indeed be any disciples of ,kant who are1 as ,mr4 ,spencer says1 8profoundly averse to that evolutionary view which contemplates mind as having had a genesis conforming to laws like those conformed to by the genesis of the body10 these quotations will suffice to prove that they have misconstrued the views of their master4 ,philosophers hostile to the theory of evolution had better select another patron for their ideas4 ,kant is too radical a mind to protect those men who in the domains of thought give the signal for retreat4 ,mr4 ,spencer adopted the evolution theory as it was presented by ,von ,baer1 who explains 8,entwickelung0 as a progress from the homogeneous to the heterogeneous4 ,baer's 8,developmental ,history of ,animals0 was published in #ahbh4 ,mr4 ,spencer adopted the theory in #ahed4 ,but the history of the theory of evolution is older than ,von ,baer's book4 ,professor ,baer concludes his work with a few corollaries among which near the end we find the following passage3 8,if we survey the contents of the whole ,scholia1 there follows from them a general result4 ,we found that the effect of generation continues to advance from a part to a whole ,schol4 #b42 that in development1 self-dependence increases in correspondence with its environment ,schol4 #b41 as well as the determinateness of its structure ,schol4 #a42 that in the internal development special parts shape themselves forth from the more general1 and their differentiation increases ,schol4 #c42 that the individual1 as the possessor of a fixed organic form1 changes by degrees from more general forms into more special ,schol4 #e44 8,the general result of our inquiry and consideration can now well be declared as follows3 8,that the developmental history of the individual is the history of increasing individuality in every relation2 that is1 ,individualisation4 8,this general conclusion is1 indeed1 so plain1 that it needs no proof from observation1 but seems evident a priori4 ,but we believe that this evidentness is merely the stamp of truth1 and therefore is its guarantee4 ,had the history of development from the outset been perceived as just expressed1 it could and should have been inferred1 that the individual of a determinate animal type attains to this by changing from a general into a special form4 ,but experience teaches everywhere1 that deductions are always safer if their results are discovered beforehand by observation4 ,mankind would have obtained a still greater intellectual possession than it really has1 had this been otherwise4 8,but if this general conclusion has truth and contents1 it is one fundamental idea which runs through all forms and degrees of animal development1 and governs every single relation4 ,it is the same idea that collected in space the distributed particles into spheres and united them in solar systems2 which caused the disintegrated dust on the surface of our metallic planet to grow up into living forms2 but this idea is nothing else than life itself1 and the words and syllables in which it expresses itself1 are the different forms of life40 ,these corollaries were not inserted by ,baer because he intended to proclaim a new truth1 but simply to excite a popular interest in a strictly scientific work1 in order to extend the circle of its readers4 ,baer says in the preface3 8,so much about the first part4 ,in order to procure for the work readers and buyers1 ,i have added a second part in which ,i make some general remarks under the title of ,scholia and ,corollaries4 ,they are intended to be sketches of the confession of my scientific faith concerning the development of animals1 as it was formed from the observation of the chick and by other investigations40 99 99 99 99 99 ,the 8,encyclopdia ,britannica0 says of ,baer that he 8prepared the way for ,mr4 ,spencer's generalisation of the law of organic evolution as the law of all evolution40#ajb ,baer declares that individualisation is 8the one fundamental idea that goes through all the forms of cosmic and animal development40 ,the generality of the law of evolution is clearer in the language employed by ,baer1 in the full context of the ,scholia than appears from the short statement of the 8,encyclopdia ,britannica40 ,nevertheless it is clear enough in the quoted passage that ,baer made a statement of universal application4 ,how can such a universal statement be made more general8 ,we must add here that ,mr4 ,spencer and his disciples overvalue the importance of generalisation4 ,it is not the power of generalisation that makes the philosopher and the scientist but the power of discrimination4 ,the habit of generalising whatever comes under our observation is very common among the uneducated and uncivilised1 and almost nine tenths of human errors arise from unwarranted generalisations4 ,in ,kant's time the interest in the theory of evolution was confined to a few minds4 ,it is well known that ,goethe was one of its most enthusiastic supporters4#ajc ,in the middle of the eighteenth century there were three views proposed to explain the origin and the development of organised beings3 7#a7 ,occasionalism1 7#b7 the theory of ,evolution1 and 7#c7 the theory of ,epigenesis4 ,occasionalism maintained that ,god created on each new occasion a new animal4 ,the word evolution was used in a different sense from that in which it is now understood3 evolutionism1 as maintained by ,bonnet1 ,haller1 and others1 was the view that the sperma contained a very small specimen of the animal that was to grow from it4 ,the hen's egg was supposed to contain an excessively minute but complete chicken4 ,the theory of epigenesis1 however1 propounded in #agei by ,caspar ,friedrich ,wolff in his 8,theoria ,generationis10 explained development by additional growth1 and it is this theory of epigenesis which later on1 after the total defeat of the old evolutionism1 was called 7but improperly7 the evolution theory4 ,the word 8evolution0 has thus again admitted the erroneous idea of an unfolding4 ,in ,kant's time the battle between the occasionalists1 the evolutionists1 and the adherents of the epigenesis theory was hot indeed2 and ,kant unquestionably gave preference to the epigenesis theory4 ,the most important passage on the subject appears in his 8,critique of ,judgment40 ,it is as follows3 8,if now the teleological principle of the generation of organised beings be accepted1 as it would be1 we can account for their internally adapted form either by ,occasionalism or by ,prestabilism4#ajd ,according to the first1 the supreme world-cause would1 in agreement with its idea1 on the occasion of every coition directly give the proper organic form to the material thereby blended2 according to the second1 it would have implanted into the original products of its designing wisdom merely the power by means of which an organic being produces its like and the species itself is constantly maintained and likewise the death of individuals is continually replaced by their own nature1 which is operating at the same time for their destruction4 8,if we assume occasionalism for the production of organised beings1 nature is thereby wholly discarded1 and with it the use of reasoning in determining the possibility of such kinds of products2 therefore1 it cannot be supposed that this system is accepted by any one who has had to do with philosophy40 8,as to ,prestabilism1 it can proceed in a two-fold manner1 namely1 it considers every organic being produced by its like1 either as the educt or as the product of the first4 ,the system which considers generated beings as mere educts is called that of individual preformation1 or also the theory of evolution2 that which makes generated beings products is named the system of epigenesis4 ,the latter can also be called a system of generic preformation1 because the productive power of those generating was virtually preformed to agree with the internal adapted arrangements that fell to the lot of their race4 ,the opposing theory to this view should be named that of individual preformation1 or still better1 the theory of evolution40 8,the defenders of the theory of evolution1 who exempt each individual from the formative power of nature1 in order to derive the same directly from the hand of the ,creator1 would not dare to permit this to happen in accordance with the hypothesis of occasionalism1 so that coition would be a mere formality1 a supreme national world-cause having decided to form every particular ftus by direct interference1 and to resign to the mother only its development and nourishment4 ,they declared themselves in favor of preformation1 as though it were not the same to make the required forms arise in a supernatural manner at the beginning of the world1 as during its progress2 and as if a great multitude of supernatural arrangements would not rather be dispensed with through occasional creation which were necessary in order that the embryo formed at the beginning of the world should1 throughout the long period up to its development1 not suffer from the destructive forces of nature1 but endure and maintain itself intact2 moreover1 an immensely greater number of such preformed beings would be made than ever would be developed1 and with them as many creations be thus rendered unnecessary and purposeless4 ,they still1 however1 resign at least something to nature1 in order not to fall in with complete hyperphysics1 which can dispense with explanation from nature4 ,they still held fast indeed1 to their hyperphysics2 even finding in monsters 7which it must be impossible to regard as designs of nature7 cases of adaptation which call for admiration1 although the only purpose of that adaptedness might be to make an anatomist take offence at it as a purposeless adaptedness1 and have a sense of melancholy admiration4 ,yet they could not well fit the generation of hybrids into the system of preformation1 but were obliged still further to endow the sperm of male creatures with a designedly acting power1 whereas they had otherwise accorded it nothing except mechanical force to serve as the first means of nourishment of the embryo2 yet this designedly acting force1 in the case of the products of generation between two creatures of the same kind1 they would grant to neither of them4 8,if on the contrary the great advantage was not at once recognised which the theory of epigenesis possessed over the former in view of the experimental foundation on which the proof of it rested2 yet reason would be especially favorably predisposed from the outset for this mode1 of explanation1 inasmuch as it regards nature--with reference to the things which originally can be conceived as possible only in accordance with the theory of causality and design1 at least so far as propagation is concerned--as self-producing and not merely as developing1 and thus with the least possible employment of the supernatural1 leaves all that comes afterwards1 from the very beginning on1 to nature3 without concerning itself with the original beginning1 with regard to the explanation of which physics in general miscarries1 try with what chain of causes it may40 ,kant recognises neither the stability of species nor any fixed limits between them4 ,and this one maxim alone suffices to prove that he was of the same opinion as the great biologist who wrote the 8,origin of ,species40 ,kant says 7,ed4 ,hart4 ,,iii4 p4 #ddd73 8,non datur vacuum formarum1 that is1 there are not different original and primitive species1 which were1 so to say1 isolated and separated by an empty space from one another1 but all the manifold species are only divisions of a single1 chief1 and general species2 and from this principle results again this immediate inference3 datur continuum formarum1 that is1 all differences of species border on each other1 and allow no transition to one another by a leap1 but only through very small degrees of difference1 by which we can arrive at one from another2 in one word1 there are no species or sub-species which1 according to reason1 would be next each other in affinity1 but intermediate species are always possible1 whose difference from the first and second is less than their difference from one another40 ,in ,kant's 8,critique of ,judgment0 74 #hj7 we find the following passage3 8,the agreement of so many species of animals1 with reference to a definite1 common scheme1 which appears not only to be at the foundation of their bony structure1 but also of the arrangement of their other parts1 in which1 by abridgment of one and prolongation of another1 by envelopment of this and unfolding of that1 a wonderful simplicity of plan has been able to produce so great a diversity of species--this agreement casts a ray of hope1 although a weak one1 in the mind1 that here1 indeed1 something might be accomplished with the principle of the mechanism of nature1 without which in general there can be no physical science4 8,this analogy of forms1 so far as they appear1 notwithstanding all their diversity1 to be produced after the model of a common prototype1 strengthens the conjecture of a real relationship between the same by generation from a common ancestral source1 through the gradual approach of one animal species to another1 from man1 in whom the principle of design appears to be best proved1 to the polyp1 from this to the moss and lichen1 and finally to the lowest stage of nature perceptible to us1 to crude matter1 from which and its forces1 according to mechanical laws 7like those which work in the production of crystals71 the whole technic of nature 7which is so incomprehensible to us in organised beings that we imagine another principle is necessitated for their explanation7 appears to be derived4#aje 8,the ,archologist of nature is now free to make that great family of beings 7for such we must conceive it1 if the uninterrupted relationship is to have a foundation7 arise out of the extant vestiges of the oldest revolutions1 following every mechanism known to him or which he can suppose40 ,kant adds in a foot-note3 8,an hypothesis of such a kind can be named a daring venture of reason1 and there may be few of the most sagacious naturalists1 through whose minds it has not sometimes passed4 ,for it is not absurd1 as the generatio equivoca1 by which is understood the production of an organised being through the mechanical action of crude unorganised matter4 ,but it would still be generatio univoca in the common understanding of the word1 in so far only as something organic was produced out of another organic body1 although specifically distinguished from it2 for instance1 if certain aquatic animals by and by formed into amphibia1 and from these after some generations into land animals4 ,a priori this does not contradict the judgment of pure reason4 ,only experience shows no example thereof2 according to it1 rather1 all generation which we know is generatio homonyma 7not mere univoca in opposition to production out of unorganised material71 that is1 the bringing forth of a product homogeneous in organisation1 with the generator2 and generatio heteronyma1 so far as our actual experience of nature goes is nowhere met with40 ,the treatise 8,presumable ,origin of ,humanity10 ,kant sums up in the following sentence3 8,from this representation of the earliest human history it results1 that the departure of man from what1 as the first abode of his kind1 his judgment represented as ,paradise1 was no other than the transition of mere animal creatures out of barbarism into man1 out of the leading-strings of instinct into the guidance of reason1 in a word1 out of the guardianship of nature into the state of freedom40 ,in his work 8,upon the ,different ,races of ,mankind10 ,kant discusses the origin of the species of man in a way which would do honor to a follower of ,darwin4 ,it is written in a spirit which recognises the difference of conditions as the causes that produce different species4 ,we select a few passages from this work4 ,in a foot-note we read3 8,ordinarily we accept the terms natural science 7,naturbeschreibung7 and natural history in one and the same sense4 ,but it is evident that the knowledge of natural phenomena1 as they now are1 always leaves to be desired the knowledge of that which they have been before now1 and through what succession of modifications they have passed in order to have arrived1 in every respect1 at their present state4 ,natural ,history1 which at present we almost entirely lack1 would teach us the changes that have effected the form of the earth1 likewise1 the changes in the creatures of the earth 7plants and animals7 that they have suffered by natural transformations and1 arising therefrom1 the departures from the prototype of the original species that they have experienced4 ,it would probably trace a great number of apparently different varieties back to a species of one and the same kind1 and would convert the present so intricate school-system of ,natural ,science into a natural system in conformity with reason40 ,we adduce another passage1 no less remarkable in clearness1 which proves that ,kant has a very definite idea1 not only of the gradual evolution of man1 but also of the survival of the fittest3 8,the cry which a child scarcely born utters1 has not the tone of misery1 but of irritation1 and violent rage2 not the result of pain1 but of vexation about something2 probably for the reason that it wishes to move itself and feels its incapacity1 like a captive when freedom is taken from him4 ,what purpose can nature have in providing that a child shall come with a loud cry into the world1 which for it and the mother is1 in the rude natural state1 full of danger8 ,since a wolf1 a pig even1 would in the absence of the mother1 or through her feebleness owing to her delivery1 be thus attracted to devour it4 ,but no animal except man as he now is announces with noise its new-born existence2 which in the wisdom of nature appears to be arranged in order that the species shall be preserved4 ,we must also assume that in what was an early epoch of nature for this class of animals 7namely in the period of barbarism7 this outcry of the child at its birth did not exist2 consequently only later on a second epoch appeared1 after both parents had arrived at that degree of civilisation which was required for home-life2 yet without knowing how and by what interweaving causes nature arranges such a development4 ,this remark leads us far2 for example1 to the thought whether after the same epoch1 still a third did not follow accompanied by great natural revolutions1 during which an orang-outang or a chimpanzee perfected the organs which serve for walking1 for feeling objects1 and for speech1 and thus evolved the limb-structure of man2 in which animals was contained an organ for the exercise of the function of reason1 which by social cultivation was gradually perfected and developed40 ,kant's view concerning the origin of the biped man from quadruped animal ancestors is most unequivocally stated4 ,in a review of ,dr4 ,moscati's ,lecture upon the difference of structure in animals and in men1 ,kant says3 8,dr4 ,moscati proves that the upright walk of man is constrained and unnatural2 that he is indeed so constructed that he may be able to maintain and move in this position1 but that1 although by needful and constant habit he formed himself thus1 inconvenience and disease arise therefrom1 which sufficiently prove1 that he was misled by reason and imitation to deviate from the first animal arrangement4 ,man is not constructed internally different from other animals that go on all fours4 ,when now he raises himself his intestines1 particularly the embryo of pregnant individuals1 come into a pendulous situation and a half reversed condition1 which1 if it often alternates with the lying position or that on all-fours1 cannot precisely produce specially evil consequences1 but1 by constant continuance1 causes deformities and numerous diseases4 ,thus1 for example1 the heart1 because it is compelled to hang free1 elongates the blood vessels to which it is attached1 assumes an oblique position since it is supported by the diaphragm and slides with its end against the left side--a position wherein man1 especially at full growth1 differs from all other animals1 and thereby receives an inevitable inclination to aneurism1 palpitation1 asthma1 chest-dropsy1 etc41 etc4 ,with the upright position of man the mesentery1 pulled down by the weight of the intestines1 sinks perpendicularly thereunder1 is elongated and weakened1 and prepared for numerous ruptures4 ,in the mesenteric vein which has no valves1 the blood moves slowly and with greater difficulty 7it having to ascend against the course of gravity7 than would happen with the horizontal position of the trunk44440 8,we could add considerably to the reasons just adduced to show that our animal nature is really quadrupedal4 ,among all four-footed animals there is not a single one that could not swim if it accidentally fell into the water4 ,man alone drowns1 except in cases where he has learned to swim4 ,the reason is because he has laid aside the habit of going on all-fours2 for it is by this motion that he would keep himself up in the water without the exercise of any art1 and by which all four-footed creatures1 who otherwise shun the water1 swim44440 8,it will be seen1 accordingly1 that the first care of nature was that man should be preserved as animal for himself and his species1 and for that end the position best adapted to his internal structure1 to the lay of the ftus1 and to his preservation in danger1 was the quadrupedal position2 we see1 moreover1 that a germ of reason is placed in him1 whereby1 after the development of the same1 he is destined for social intercourse1 and by the aid of which he assumes the position which is in every case the most fitted for this1 namely1 the bipedal position1--thus gaining upon the one hand infinite advantages over animals1 but also being obliged to put up with many inconveniences that result from his holding his head so proudly above his old companions40 #ajf ,in the double-leaded quotation on pages #dc and #dd ,kant speaks about the explanation of organised life from man down to the polyp 8according to mechanical laws like those which work in the production of crystals10 and he adds1 in organised beings the whole technic of nature is so incomprehensible to us 8that we imagine another principle is necessitated for their explanation40 ,this 8other principle0 would be the principle of design1 or the teleological explanation of phenomena4 ,in his old age ,kant inclined more to teleology than in his younger years1 and it is for this reason that ,professor ,ernst ,haeckel accuses ,kant of inconsistency4 ,after having pointed out that 8,kant is one of the few philosophers that combine a well-founded knowledge of the natural sciences with extraordinary precision and depth of speculation0 and further that 8he was the first who taught #8the principle of the struggle for existence' and #8the theory of selection4'0 ,haeckel says in his 8,natrliche ,schpfungsgeschichte10 #hth edition1 p4 #ia3 8,wir wrden daher unbedingt in der ,geschichte der ,entwickelungslehre unserem gewaltigen ,knigsberger ,philosophen den ersten ,platz einrumen mssen1 wenn nicht leider diese bewundernswrdigen monistischen ,ideen des jungen ,kant spter durch den berwltigenden ,einfluss der dualistisch christlichen ,weltanschauung ganz zurckgedrngt worden wren40 ,this 8influence of the dualistic ,christian world-conception0 is according to ,haeckel1 ,kant's recognition of a teleological causation in the realm of organised life4 ,haeckel says on the same place3 8,er behauptet1 dass sich im ,gebiete der anorganischen ,natur unbedingt smmtliche ,erscheinungen aus mechanischen ,ursachen1 aus bewegenden ,krften der ,materie selbst1 erklren lassen1 im ,gebiete der anorganischen ,natur dagegen nicht40 ,haeckel does not stand alone in denouncing the old ,kant4 ,schopenhauer distinguishes between the author of the first and the author of the second edition of the 8,critique of ,pure ,reason10 regarding the former only as the real ,kant4 ,these accusations are not without foundation1 but we believe with ,max ,mller that they have been unduly exaggerated4 ,as to teleology for which ,kant's preference appears to be more strongly marked in his later than in his younger years we should say that it is a problem that should1 in an historical investigation1 as to whether or not ,kant was a consistent evolutionist1 be treated independently4 ,no one can deny that there is an adaptation to ends in the domain of organised life4 ,it is not so much required to deny teleology in the domain of organised nature as to purify and critically sift our views of teleology4 ,there is a kind of teleology which does not stand in contradiction to the causation of efficient causes so called4 ,mr4 ,spencer's denunciations of ,kant would have some foundation1 if he had reference to the old ,kant alone4 ,but everyone who censures ,kant for the errors of his later period is bound to qualify his statement1 and indeed whenever such strictures of ,kantism appear ,i find them expressly stated as having reference to 8the old ,kant40 ,that ,kant who is a living power even to-day is the young ,kant1 it is the author of the first edition of the 8,critique of ,pure ,reason40 ,he is generally called 8the young ,kant10 although he was not young2 he was1 as we say1 in his best years4 ,the old ,kant who proclaimed that he 8must abolish knowledge in order to make room for faith0 is a dead weight in our colleges and universities4 ,the young ,kant is positive1 the old ,kant is agnostic4 ,the young ,kant was an investigator and naturalist of the first degree2 he gave an impetus to investigation that it had never before received from philosophy4 ,the old ,kant1 ,i should not exactly say reverted but certainly1 neglected the principles of his younger years and thus became the leader of a reactionary movement from which sprang two offshoots very unlike each other but children of the same father2 the ,oxford transcendentalism as represented by ,green and the ,english agnosticism as represented by ,mr4 ,spencer4 ,it is strange that ,mr4 ,spencer has so little knowledge concerning the evolution of the views he holds4 ,if he were more familiar with the history of the idea 8that the world-problem is insolvable10 he would show more reverence toward the old ,kant and his mystical inclinations2 for ,kant1 whatever ,mr4 ,spencer may say against it1 is the father of modern agnosticism4#ajg 99 99 99 99 99 ,the history of ,mr4 ,spencer's philosophical development shows that the first idea which took possession of his mind and formed the centre of crystalisation for all his later views was ,m4 ,condorcet's optimism4 ,condorcet believed in progress2 he was convinced that in spite of all the tribulations and anxieties of the present1 man would at last arrive at a state of perfection4 ,he saw a millennium in his prophetic mind1 which alas6--if the law of evolution be true--can never be realised4 ,condorcet died a martyr to his ideals4 ,he poisoned himself in #agii to escape death by the ,guillotine4 ,the influence of ,condorcet's work ,esquisse d'un tableau historique des progrs de l'esprit humain is traceable not only in ,mr4 ,spencer's first book1 8,social ,statics10 published in #ahej1 but in all his later writings4 ,how can a true evolutionist believe in the ,utopia of a state of perfect adaptation8 ,does not each progress demand new adaptations8 ,take as an instance the change from walking on four feet to an upright gait4 ,did not this progress itself involve man in new difficulties1 to which he had to adapt himself8 ,let a labor-saving machine be invented1 how many laborers lose their work and how many others are in demand6 ,the transition from one state to the other is not easy1 and as soon as it is perfected new wants have arisen which inexorably drive humanity onward on the infinite path of progress which can never be limited by any state of perfection4 ,there is a constant readjustment necessary1 and if we really could reach a state of perfect adaptation human life would drop into the unconsciousness of mere reflex motions4 ,any one who understands the principle of evolution and its universal applicability1 will recognise that there can be no standstill in the world1 no state of perfect adaptation4 ,our solar system has evolved1 as ,kant explained in his 8,general ,cosmogony and ,theory of the ,heavens10 out of a nebula1 and is going to dissolve again into a nebular state4 ,so our social development consists in a constant realisation of ideals4 ,we may think that if we but attain our next and dearest ideal1 humanity will be satisfied forever4 ,but as soon as we have realised that ideal1 we quickly get accustomed to its benefits4 ,it becomes a matter of course and another ideal higher still than that just realised appears before our mental gaze4 ,herder1 in his 8,ideas for a ,philosophy of the ,history of ,mankind10 not unlike ,mr4 ,spencer1 was also under the spell of the ,utopian ideal1 that humanity will reach at last a state of perfect happiness4 ,kant1 in his review of ,herder's book1 discusses the relativity of happiness and its insufficiency as a final aim of life4 ,he says3 8,first of all the happiness of an animal1 then that of a child and of a youth1 and lastly that of man6 ,in all epochs of human history1 as well as among all classes and conditions of the same epoch1 that happiness has obtained which was in exact conformity with the individual's ideas and the degree of his habituation to the conditions amid which he was born and raised4 ,indeed1 it is not even possible to form a comparison of the degree of happiness nor to give precedence to one class of men or to one generation over another4444 ,if this shadow-picture of happiness 444 were the actual aim of ,providence1 every man would have the measure of his own happiness within him4444 ,does the author 7,herder7 think perhaps that1 if the happy inhabitants of ,otaheiti had never been visited by more civilised peoples and were ordained to live in peaceful indolence for thousands of years to come--that we could give a satisfactory answer to the question why they should exist at all1 and whether it would not have been just as well that this island should be occupied by happy sheep and cattle as that it should be inhabited by men who are happy only through pure enjoyment80 8,it involves no contradiction to say that no individual member of all the offspring of the human race1 but that only the species1 fully attains its mission 7,bestimmung74 ,the mathematician may explain the matter in his way4 ,the philosopher would say3 the mission of the human race as a whole is unceasing progress1 and the perfection 7,vollendung7 of this mission is a mere idea 7although in every aspect a very useful one7 of the aim towards which1 in conformity with the design of providence1 we are to direct our endeavors40 ,it is indubitable that ,kant's views of evolution agree better with the present state of scientific investigation1 than does ,mr4 ,spencer's philosophy1 which has never been freed from ,condorcet's ingenuous optimism4 ,the assumption of a final state of perfection by absolute adaptation is irreconcilable with the idea of unceasing progress1 which must be true1 if evolution is a universal law of nature4 ,,footnotes3 #aja ,see ,mr4 ,spencer's article in ,mind1 ,no4 ,,lix1 p4 #cac4 #ajb ,the passage in the ,encyclopdia ,britannica on ,baer runs as follows3 8,in his ,entwickelungsgeschichte der ,thiere1 p4 #bfd1 he distinctly tells us that the law of growing individuality is #8the fundamental thought which goes through all forms and degrees of animal development and all single relations4 ,it is the same thought which collected in the cosmic space solar systems2 the same which caused the weather-beaten dust on the surface of our metallic planet to spring forth living beings4' ,von ,baer thus prepared the way for ,mr4 ,spencer's generalisation of the law of organic evolution as the law of all evolution40 #ajc ,see ,haeckel1 ,goethe on ,evolution1 ,no4 #aca of ,the ,open ,court4 #ajd ,prstabilismus1 that is1 the theory that the phenomena of nature are the result of pre-established law4 #aje ,the proposition that ,kant is no easy reading found an unexpected and strong opposition4 ,immediately after the publication of this article1 ,sept4 #dth1 #ahij1 ,mr4 ,charles ,s4 ,peirce made the following incidental remark in a letter to the author dated ,sept4 #fth1 #ahij3 8,i have heard too much of ,kant's being hard reading4 ,i think he is one of the easiest of philosophers2 for he generally knows what he wants to say1 which is more than half the battle1 and he says it in terms which are very clear4 ,of course1 it is quite absurd to try to read ,kant without preliminary studies of ,leibnizian and ,english philosophers1 as well as of the terminology of which ,kant's is a modification or transmogrification4 ,but there is a way of making out what he meant1 while such writers as ,hume and ,j4 ,s4 ,mill1 the more you study them the more they puzzle you40 #ajf ,this passage on pages #dh1 #di1 and #ej which is enclosed in brackets did not appear in ,the ,open ,court4 ,it has been added since and is published here for the first time4 #ajg ,in this connection we call attention to a book1 ,kant und ,darwin1 ein ,beitrag zur ,geschichte der ,entwickelungslehre1 ,jena1 #ahge1 by ,fritz ,schultze1 formerly ,privat docent in ,jena1 now ,professor of philosophy at the ,polytechnic ,institute in ,dresden4 ,this little book is a collection of the most important passages of ,kant's views concerning evolution1 the struggle for existence1 and the theory of selection1 and it is astonishing to find how much ,kant had to say on the subject and how strongly he agrees with and anticipates ,darwin4 ,if ,kant had not lived before ,darwin one might be tempted to conclude that he was familiar with his ,origin of ,species and ,the ,descent of ,man4