---------------------------------------- -------------------------------- ,transcriber's ,note3 ,this version of the text cannot represent certain typographical effects4 ,the many instances of italic text are delimited with the #8' character as italic4 ,title page use of blackletter text uses the #8' as a delimiter4 ,marginal sidenotes1 which served as section and topic aids1 were often repeated on each page4 ,the repetitive notes have been removed4 ,minor errors1 attributable to the printer1 have been corrected4 ,please see the transcriber's note at the end of this text for details regarding the handling of any textual issues encountered during its preparation4 ,,the ,,english ,,works ,,of ,,thomas ,,hobbes4 ---------------------------------------- -------------------------------- ,,the ,,english ,,works ,,of ,,thomas ,,hobbes ,,of ,,malmesbury2 ,,now ,,first ,,collected ,,and ,,edited ,,by ,,sir ,,william ,,molesworth1 ,,bart4 --- ,,vol4 ,v4 --- ,,london3 ,,john ,,bohn1 ,,henrietta ,,street1 ,,covent ,,garden4 --- ,,mdcccxli4 ,,london3 ,c4 ,,richards1 ,,printer1 ,,st4 ,,martin',s ,,lane4 ,,the ,,questions ,,concerning ,,liberty1 ,,necessity1 ,,and ,,chance1 ,,clearly ,,stated ,,and ,,debated ,,between ,,dr4 ,,bramhall1 ,,bishop ,,of ,,derry1 ,,and ,,thomas ,,hobbes ,,of ,,malmesbury4 ,,to ,,the ,,reader4 ------- ,you shall find in this little volume the questions concerning necessity1 freedom1 and chance1 which in all ages have perplexed the minds of curious men1 largely and clearly discussed1 and the arguments on all sides1 drawn from the authority of ,scripture1 from the doctrine of the ,schools1 from natural reason1 and from the consequences pertaining to common life1 truly alleged and severally weighed between two persons1 who both maintain that men are free to do as they will and to forbear as they will4 ,the things they dissent in are1 that the one holdeth1 that it is not in a man's power now to choose the will he shall have anon2 that chance produceth nothing2 that all events and actions have their necessary causes2 that the will of ,god makes the necessity of all things4 ,the other on the contrary maintaineth1 that not only the man is free to choose what he will do1 but the will also to choose what it shall will2 that when a man willeth a good action1 ,god's will concurreth with his1 else not2 that the will may choose whether it will will1 or not2 that many things come to pass without necessity1 by chance2 that though ,god foreknow a thing shall be1 yet it is not necessary that that thing shall be1 inasmuch as ,god seeth not the future as in its causes1 but as present4 ,in sum1 they adhere both of them to the ,scripture2 but one of them is a learned ,school-divine1 the other a man that doth not much admire that kind of learning4 ,this is enough to acquaint you withal in the beginning2 which also shall be more particularly explained by and by in the stating of the question1 and dividing of the arguments into their several heads4 ,the rest you shall understand from the persons themselves1 when they enter4 ,fare ye well4 ,t4 ,h4 ------- ,,the ,,questions ,,concerning ,,liberty1 ,,necessity1 ,,and ,,chance4 ,whether whatsoever comes to pass proceed from necessity1 or some things from chance1 has been a question disputed amongst the old philosophers long time before the incarnation of our ,saviour1 without drawing into argument on either side the almighty power of the ,deity4 ,but the third way of bringing things to pass1 distinct from necessity and chance1 namely1 freewill1 is a thing that never was mentioned amongst them1 nor by the ,christians in the beginning of ,christianity4 ,for ,st4 ,paul1 that disputes that question largely and purposely1 never useth the term of freewill2 nor did he hold any doctrine equivalent to that which is now called the doctrine of freewill2 but deriveth all actions from the irresistible will of ,god1 and nothing from the will of him that runneth or willeth4 ,but for some ages past1 the doctors of the ,roman ,church have exempted from this dominion of ,god's will the will of man2 and brought in a doctrine1 that not only man1 but also his will is free1 and determined to this or that action1 not by the will of ,god1 nor necessary causes1 but by the power of the will itself4 ,and though by the reformed ,churches instructed by ,luther1 ,calvin1 and others1 this opinion was cast out1 yet not many years since it began again to be reduced by ,arminius and his followers1 and became the readiest way to ecclesiastical promotion2 and by discontenting those that held the contrary1 was in some part the cause of the following troubles2 which troubles were the occasion of my meeting with the ,bishop of ,derry at ,paris1 where we discoursed together of the argument now in hand2 from which discourse we carried away each of us his own opinion1 and for aught ,i remember1 without any offensive words1 as blasphemous1 atheistical1 or the like1 passing between us2 either for that the ,bishop was not then in passion1 or suppressed his passion1 being then in the presence of my ,lord of ,newcastle4 ,but afterwards the ,bishop sent to his ,lordship his opinion concerning the question in writing1 and desired him to persuade me to send an answer thereunto likewise in writing4 ,there were some reasons for which ,i thought it might be inconvenient to let my answer go abroad2 yet the many obligations wherein ,i was obliged to him1 prevailed with me to write this answer1 which was afterwards not only without my knowledge1 but also against my will1 published by one that found means to get a copy of it surreptitiously4 ,and thus you have the occasion of this controversy4 ------- ,,the ,,state ,,of ,,the ,,question4 ,the question in general is stated by the ,bishop himself1 7towards the end of ,no4 ,,iii471 in these words3 8,whether all events1 natural1 civil1 moral1 7for we speak not now of the conversion of a sinner1 that concerns not this question71 be predetermined extrinsically and inevitably1 without their own concurrence2 so as all the actions and events which either are or shall be1 cannot but be1 nor can be otherwise after any other manner or in any other place1 time1 number1 measure1 order1 nor to any other end than they are4 ,and all this in respect of the supreme cause1 or a concourse of extrinsical causes1 determining them to one40 ,which though drawn up to his advantage1 with as much caution as he would do a lease1 yet 7excepting that which is not intelligible7 ,i am content to admit4 ,not intelligible is1 first1 8that the conversion of a sinner concerns not the question40 ,if he mean1 that the conversion of a sinner is from necessity1 and predetermined1 then he is1 for so much as the question concerns religion1 of the same mind that ,i am2 and what he can mean else by that exception1 ,i cannot guess4 ,secondly1 these words1 8without their own concurrence10 are insignificant1 unless he mean that the events themselves should concur to their production3 as that fire doth not necessarily burn without the concurrence of burning1 as the words properly import3 or at least without concurrence of the fuel4 ,those two clauses left out1 ,i agree with him in the state of the question as it is put universally4 ,but when the question is put of the necessity of any particular event1 as of the will to write1 or the like1 then it is the stating of that particular question3 but it is decided in the decision of the question universal4 ,he states the same question again in another place thus3 8,this is the very question where the water sticks between us1 whether there be such a liberty free from necessitation and extrinsical determination to one1 or not40 ,and ,i allow it also for well stated so4 ,again he says1 8,in a word1 so great difference there is between natural and moral efficacy1 as there is between his opinion and mine in this question40 ,so that the state of the question is reduced to this1 8,whether there be a moral efficacy which is not natural80 ,i say there is not3 he says there is4 ,again he writes thus3 8,and therefore as it were ridiculous to say1 that the object of sight is the cause of seeing2 so it is to say1 that the proposing of the object by the understanding to the will1 is the cause of willing40 ,here also the question is brought to this issue1 8,whether the object of sight be the cause that it is seen80 ,but for these words1 8proposing of the object by the understanding to the will10 ,i understand them not4 ,again1 he often useth such words as these3 8,the will willeth2 the will suspendeth its act1 7,rid est1 the will willeth not72 the understanding proposeth2 the understanding understandeth40 ,herein also lyeth the whole question4 ,if they be true1 ,i1 if false1 he is in error4 ,again1 the whole question is decided1 when this is decided1 8,whether he that willingly permitteth a thing to be done1 when without labour1 danger1 or diversion of mind1 he might have hindered it1 do not will the doing of it80 ,again the whole question of free-will is included in this1 8,whether the will determine itself80 ,again1 it is included in this1 8,whether there be an universal grace1 which particular men can take without a particular grace to take it80 ,lastly1 there be two questions2 one1 8,whether a man be free in such things as are within his power1 to do what he will20 another1 8,whether he be free to will40 ,which is as much as to say 7because will is appetite71 it is one question1 whether he be free to eat that has an appetite1 and another1 whether he be free to have an appetite8 ,in the former1 8whether a man be free to do what he will10 ,i agree with the ,bishop4 ,in the latter1 8whether he be free to will10 ,i dissent from him4 ,and1 therefore1 all the places of ,scripture that he allegeth to prove that a man hath liberty to do what he will1 are impertinent to the question4 ,if he has not been able to distinguish between these two questions1 he has not done well to meddle with either3 if he has understood them1 to bring arguments to prove that a man is free to do if he will1 is to deal uningenuously and fraudulently with his readers4 ,and thus much for the state of the question4 ------- ,,the ,,fountains ,,of ,,argument ,,in ,,this ,,question4 ,the arguments by which this question is disputed1 are drawn from four fountains4 #a4 ,from authorities4 #b4 ,from the inconveniences consequent to either opinion4 #c4 ,from the attributes of ,god4 #d4 ,from natural reason4 ,the authorities are of two sorts1 divine and human4 ,divine are those which are taken from the holy ,scriptures4 ,human also are of two sorts2 one1 the authorities of those men that are generally esteemed to have been learned1 especially in this question1 as the ,fathers1 ,schoolmen1 and old ,philosophers3 the other1 are the vulgar and most commonly received opinions in the world4 ,his reasons and places of ,scripture ,i will answer the best ,i am able2 but his human authorities ,i shall admit and receive as far as to ,scripture and reason they be consonant1 and no further4 ,and for the arguments derived from the attributes of ,god1 so far forth as those attributes are argumentative1 that is1 so far forth as their significations be conceivable1 ,i admit them for arguments2 but where they are given for honour only1 and signify nothing but an intention and endeavour to praise and magnify as much as we can ,almighty ,god1 there ,i hold them not for arguments1 but for oblations2 not for the language1 but 7as the ,scripture calls them7 for the calves of our lips2 which signify not true nor false1 nor any opinion of our brain1 but the reverence and devotion of our hearts2 and therefore they are no sufficient premises to infer truth or convince falsehood4 ,the places of ,scripture that make for me are these4 ,first1 7,gen4 xlv4 #e73 ,joseph saith to his brethren that had sold him1 ,be not grieved nor angry with yourselves1 that ye sold me hither3 for ,god did send me before you to preserve life4 ,and again 7verse #h71 ,so now it was not you that sent me hither1 but ,god4 ,and concerning ,pharaoh1 ,god saith1 7,exod4 vii4 #c73 ,i will harden ,pharaoh's heart4 ,and concerning ,sihon ,king of ,heshbon1 ,moses saith1 7,deut4 ii4 #cj73 ,the ,lord thy ,god hardened his spirit1 and made his heart obstinate4 ,and of ,shimei that did curse ,david1 ,david himself saith1 7#b ,sam4 xvi4 #aj73 ,let him curse1 because the ,lord hath said unto him1 curse ,david4 ,and 7#a ,kings1 xii4 #ae73 ,the ,king hearkened not to the people1 for the curse was from the ,lord4 ,and ,job1 disputing this very question1 saith1 7,job xii4 #ad73 ,god shutteth man1 and there can be no opening3 and verse #af3 ,the deceived and the deceiver are his3 and verse #ag3 ,he maketh the ,judges fools3 and verse #bd3 ,he taketh away the heart of the chief of the people of the earth1 and causeth them to wander in a wilderness where there is no way3 and verse #be3 ,he maketh them to stagger like a drunken man4 ,and of the ,king of ,assyria1 ,god saith1 ,i will give him a charge to take the spoil1 and to take the prey1 and to tread them down like the mire of the streets4 7,isaiah x4 #f47 ,and ,jeremiah saith1 7,jer4 x4 #bc73 ,o ,lord1 ,i know that the way of man is not in himself1 it is not in man that walketh to direct his steps4 ,and to ,ezekiel1 whom ,god sent as a watchman to the house of ,israel1 ,god saith thus3 ,when a righteous man doth turn from his righteousness1 and commit iniquity1 and ,i lay a stumbling block before him1 he shall die2 because thou hast not given him warning1 he shall die in his sin4 7,ezek4 iii4 #bj47 ,note here1 ,god lays the stumbling block1 yet he that falleth dieth in his sin3 which shows that ,god's justice in killing dependeth not on the sin only4 ,and our ,saviour saith1 7,john vi4 #dd73 ,no man can come to me1 except the ,father which hath sent me draw him4 ,and ,st4 ,peter1 concerning the delivering of ,christ to the ,jews1 saith thus1 7,acts ii4 #bc73 ,him being delivered by the determinate counsel and foreknowledge of ,god1 ye have taken1 c4 ,and again1 those ,christians to whom ,peter and ,john resorted after they were freed from their troubles about the miracle of curing the lame man1 praising ,god for the same1 say thus3 ,of a truth against the holy child ,jesus whom thou hast anointed1 both ,herod and ,pontius ,pilate1 with the ,gentiles and the people of ,israel1 were gathered together for to do whatsoever thy hand and thy counsel determined before to be done4 7,acts iv4 #bg1 #bh47 ,and ,st4 ,paul1 ,rom4 ix4 #af3 ,it is not of him that willeth1 nor of him that runneth1 but of ,god that sheweth mercy3 and verse #ah1 #ai1 #bj3 ,therefore hath he mercy on whom he will have mercy1 and whom he will he hardeneth4 ,thou wilt say unto me1 why doth he yet find fault2 for who hath resisted his will8 ,nay but1 ,o man1 who art thou that disputest against ,god8 ,shall the thing formed say to him that formed it1 why hast thou made me thus8 ,and again1 7#a ,cor4 iv #g73 ,who maketh thee differ from another8 and what hast thou that thou hast not received8 and #a ,cor4 xii4 #f3 ,there are diversities of operations1 but it is the same ,god that worketh all in all3 and ,eph4 ii4 #aj3 ,we are his workmanship created in ,jesus ,christ unto good works1 which ,god hath before ordained that we should walk in them3 and ,philip4 ii4 #ac3 ,it is ,god that worketh in you both to will and to do1 of his good pleasure4 ,to these places may be added all the places that make ,god the giver of all graces1 that is to say1 of all good habits and inclinations2 and all the places wherein men are said to be dead in sin4 ,for by all these it is manifest1 that although a man may live holily if he will1 yet to will is the work of ,god1 and not eligible by man4 ,a second sort of places there be1 that make equally for the ,bishop and me2 and they be such as say that a man hath election1 and may do many things if he will1 and also if he will he may leave them undone2 but not that ,god ,almighty naturally or supernaturally worketh in us every act of the will1 as in my opinion2 nor that he worketh it not1 as in the ,bishop's opinion2 though he use those places as arguments on his side4 ,the places are such as these1 7,deut4 xxx4 #ai73 ,i call heaven and earth to record this day against you1 that ,i have set before you life and death1 blessing and cursing4 ,therefore choose life1 that both thou and thy seed may live3 and 7,ecclesiasticus xv4 #ad73 ,god in the beginning made man1 and left him in the hand of his counsel3 and verse #af1 #ag3 ,he hath set fire and water before thee1 stretch forth thy hand to whither thou wilt4 ,before man is life and death1 and whether him liketh shall be given him4 ,and those places which the ,bishop citeth3 ,if a wife make a vow1 it is left to her husband's choice1 either to establish it1 or to make it void1 7,numb4 xxx4 #ac73 and 7,josh4 xxiv4 #ae73 ,chuse ye this day whom you will serve1 c4 ,but ,i and my house will serve the ,lord3 and 7#b ,sam4 xxiv4 #ab73 ,i offer thee three things1 choose which of them ,i shall do3 and 7,isaiah vii4 #af73 before the child shall know to refuse the evil and choose the good4 ,and besides these very many other places to the same effect4 ,the third sort of texts are those which seem to make against me4 ,as ,isaiah v4 #d3 ,what could have been done more to my vineyard1 that ,i have not done in it8 ,and ,jeremiah xix4 #e3 ,they have also built the high places of ,baal1 to burn their sons with fire for burnt offerings unto ,baal2 which ,i commanded not1 nor spake it1 neither came it into my mind4 ,and ,hosea xiii4 #i3 ,o ,israel1 thy destruction is from thyself1 but in me is thy help4 ,and #a ,tim4 ii4 #d3 ,who will have all men to be saved1 and to come to the knowledge of truth4 ,and ,eccl4 xv4 #aa1 #ab3 ,say not thou1 it is through the ,lord ,i fell away2 for thou oughtest not to do the things that he hateth4 ,say not thou1 he hath caused me to err2 for he hath no need of thee1 sinful man4 ,and many other places to the like purpose4 ,you see how great the apparent contradiction is between the first and the third sort of texts1 which being both ,scripture1 may and must be reconciled and made to stand together2 which unless the rigour of the letter be on one or both sides with intelligible and reasonable interpretations mollified1 is impossible4 ,the ,schoolmen1 to keep the literal sense of the third sort of texts1 interpret the first sort thus2 the words of ,joseph1 ,it was not you that sent me hither1 but ,god2 they interpret in this manner3 ,it was you that sold me into ,egypt1 ,god did but permit it2 it was ,god that sent me and not you2 as if the selling were not the sending4 ,this is ,suarez2 of whom and the ,bishop ,i would know1 whether the selling of ,joseph did infallibly and inevitably follow that permission4 ,if it did1 then that selling was necessitated beforehand by an eternal permission4 ,if it did not1 how can there be attributed to ,god a foreknowledge of it1 when by the liberty of human will it might have been frustrated8 ,i would know also whether the selling of ,joseph into ,egypt were a sin8 ,if it were1 why doth ,joseph say1 ,be not grieved nor angry with yourselves that ye sold me hither8 ,ought not a man to be grieved and angry with himself for sinning8 ,if it were no sin1 then treachery and fratricide is no sin4 ,again1 seeing the selling of him consisted in these acts1 binding1 speaking1 delivering1 which are all corporeal motions1 did ,god will they should not be1 how then could they be done8 ,or doth he permit barely1 and neither will nor nill corporeal and local motions8 ,how then is ,god the first mover and cause of all local motion8 ,did he cause the motion1 and will the law against it1 but not the irregularity8 ,how can that be1 seeing the motion and law being existent1 the contrariety of the motion and law is necessarily coexistent8 ,so these places1 ,he hardened ,pharaoh's heart1 he made ,sihon's heart obstinate1 they interpret thus3 8,he permitted them to make their own hearts obstinate40 ,but seeing that man's heart without the grace of ,god1 is uninclinable to good1 the necessity of the hardness of heart1 both in ,pharaoh and in ,sihon1 is as easily derived from ,god's permission1 that is1 from his withholding his grace1 as from his positive decree4 ,and whereas they say1 ,he wills godly and free actions conditionally and consequently1 that is1 if the man will them1 then ,god wills them1 else not2 and wills not evil actions1 but permits them2 they ascribe to ,god nothing at all in the causation of any action either good or bad4 ,now to the third sort of places1 that seem to contradict the former1 let us see if they may not be reconciled with a more intelligible and reasonable interpretation1 than that wherewith the ,schoolmen interpret the first4 ,it is no extraordinary kind of language1 to call the commandments and exhortations and other significations of the will1 by the name of will2 though the will be an internal act of the soul1 and commands are but words and signs external of that internal act4 ,so that the will and the word are diverse things2 and differ as the thing signified1 and the sign4 ,and hence it comes to pass1 that the ,word and ,commandment of ,god1 namely1 the holy ,scripture1 is usually called by ,christians ,god's will1 but his revealed will2 acknowledging the very will of ,god1 which they call his counsel and decree1 to be another thing4 ,for the revealed will of ,god to ,abraham was1 that ,isaac should be sacrificed2 but it was his will he should not4 ,and his revealed will to ,jonas1 that ,nineveh should be destroyed within forty days2 but not his decree and purpose4 ,his decree and purpose cannot be known beforehand1 but may afterwards by the event2 for from the event we may infer his will4 ,but his revealed will1 which is his word1 must be foreknown1 because it ought to be the rule of our actions4 ,therefore1 where it is said that ,god will have all men to be saved1 it is not meant of his will internal1 but of his commandments or will revealed2 as if it had been said1 8,god hath given commandments1 by following of which all men may be saved40 ,so where ,god says1 ,o ,israel1 how often would ,i have gathered thee1 c41 as a hen doth her chickens1 but thou wouldest not1 it is thus to be understood3 8,how oft have ,i by my prophets given thee such counsel1 as1 being followed1 thou hadst been gathered10 c4 ,and the like interpretations are to be given to the like places4 ,for it is not ,christian to think1 if ,god had the purpose to save all men1 that any man could be damned2 because it were a sign of want of power to effect what he would4 ,so these words1 ,what could have been done more to my vineyard1 that ,i have not done3 if by them be meant the ,almighty power1 might receive this answer3 8,men might have been kept by it from sinning40 ,but when we are to measure ,god by his revealed will1 it is as if he had said1 8,what directions1 what laws1 what threatenings could have been used more1 that ,i have not used80 ,god doth not will and command us to inquire what his will and purpose is1 and accordingly to do it2 for we shall do that1 whether we will or not2 but to look into his commandments1 that is1 as to the ,jews1 the law of ,moses2 and as to other people1 the laws of their country4 ,o ,israel1 thy destruction is from thyself1 but in me is thy help3 or as some ,english translations have it1 ,o ,israel1 thou hast destroyed thyself1 c41 is literally true1 but maketh nothing against me2 for the man that sins willingly1 whatsoever be the cause of his will1 if he be not forgiven1 hath destroyed himself1 as being his own act4 ,where it is said1 ,they have offered their sons unto ,baal1 which ,i commanded not1 nor spake it1 nor came it into my mind2 these words1 nor came it into my mind1 are by some much insisted on1 as if they had done it without the will of ,god4 ,for whatsoever is done comes into ,god's mind1 that is1 into his knowledge1 which implies a certainty of the future action1 and that certainty an antecedent purpose of ,god to bring it to pass4 ,it cannot therefore be meant ,god did not will it1 but that he had not the will to command it4 ,but by the way it is to be noted1 that when ,god speaks to men concerning his will and other attributes1 he speaks of them as if they were like to those of men1 to the end he may be understood4 ,and therefore to the order of his work1 the world1 wherein one thing follows another so aptly as no man could order it by design1 he gives the name of will and purpose4 ,for that which we call design1 which is reasoning1 and thought after thought1 cannot be properly attributed to ,god2 in whose thoughts there is no fore nor after4 ,but what shall we answer to the words in ,ecclesiasticus3 ,say not thou1 it is through the ,lord ,i fell away2 say not thou1 he hath caused me to err4 ,if it had not been1 say not thou1 but 8think not thou10 ,i should have answered that ,ecclesiasticus is ,apocrypha1 and merely human authority4 ,but it is very true that such words as these are not to be said2 first1 because ,st4 ,paul forbids it3 ,shall the thing formed1 saith he1 say to him that formed it1 why hast thou made me so8 ,yet true it is1 that he did so make him4 ,secondly1 because we ought to attribute nothing to ,god but what we conceive to be honourable1 and we judge nothing honourable but what we count so amongst ourselves2 and because accusation of man is not honourable1 therefore such words are not to be used concerning ,god ,almighty4 ,and for the same cause it is not lawful to say that any action can be done1 which ,god hath purposed shall not be done2 for it is a token of want of the power to hinder it4 ,therefore neither of them is to be said1 though one of them must needs be true4 ,thus you see how disputing of ,god's nature which is incomprehensible1 driveth men upon one of these two rocks4 ,and this was the cause ,i was unwilling to have my answer to the ,bishop's doctrine of liberty published4 ,and thus much for comparison of our two opinions with the ,scriptures2 which whether it favour more his or mine1 ,i leave to be judged by the reader4 ,and now ,i come to compare them again by the inconveniences which may be thought to follow them4 ,first1 the bishop says1 that this very persuasion1 that all things come to pass by necessity1 is able to overthrow all societies and commonwealths in the world4 ,the laws1 saith he1 are unjust which prohibit that which a man cannot possibly shun4 ,secondly1 that it maketh superfluous and foolish all consultations1 arts1 arms1 books1 instruments1 teachers1 and medicines1 and which is worst1 piety and all other acts of devotion4 ,for if the event be necessary1 it will come to pass whatsoever we do1 and whether we sleep or wake4 ,this inference1 if there were not as well a necessity of the means as there is of the event1 might be allowed for true4 ,but according to my opinion1 both the event and means are equally necessitated4 ,but supposing the inference true1 it makes as much against him that denies as against him that holds this necessity4 ,for ,i believe the ,bishop holds for as certain a truth1 what shall be1 shall be1 as what is1 is1 or what has been1 has been4 ,and then the ratiocination of the sick man1 8,if ,i shall recover1 what need ,i this unsavoury potion8 if ,i shall not recover1 what good will it do me80 is a good ratiocination4 ,but the ,bishop holds1 that it is necessary he shall recover or not recover4 ,therefore it follows from an opinion of the ,bishop's1 as well as from mine1 that medicine is superfluous4 ,but as medicine is to health1 so is piety1 consultation1 arts1 arms1 books1 instruments1 and teachers1 every one to its several end4 ,out of the ,bishop's opinion it follows as well as from mine1 that medicine is superfluous to health4 ,therefore from his opinion as well as from mine1 it followeth1 7if such ratiocination were not unsound71 that piety1 consultation1 c4 are also superfluous to their respective ends4 ,and for the superfluity of laws1 whatsoever be the truth of the question between us1 they are not superfluous1 because by the punishing of one1 or of a few unjust men1 they are the cause of justice in a great many4 ,but the greatest inconvenience of all that the ,bishop pretends may be drawn from this opinion1 is1 8that ,god in justice cannot punish a man with eternal torments for doing that which it was never in his power to leave undone40 ,it is true1 that seeing the name of punishment hath relation to the name of crime1 there can be no punishment but for crimes that might have been left undone2 but instead of punishment if he had said affliction1 may not ,i say that ,god may afflict1 and not for sin8 ,doth he not afflict those creatures that cannot sin8 ,and sometimes those that can sin1 and yet not for sin1 as ,job1 and the man in the gospel that was born blind1 for the manifestation of his power which he hath over his creature1 no less but more than hath the potter over his clay to make of it what he please8 ,but though ,god have power to afflict a man and not for sin without injustice1 shall we think ,god so cruel as to afflict a man1 and not for sin1 with extreme and endless torment8 ,is it not cruelty8 ,no more than to do the same for sin1 when he that so afflicteth might without trouble have kept him from sinning4 ,but what infallible evidence hath the ,bishop1 that a man shall be after this life eternally in torments and never die8 ,or how is it certain there is no second death1 when the ,scripture saith there is8 ,or where doth the ,scripture say that a second death is an endless life8 ,or do the ,doctors only say it8 ,then perhaps they do but say so1 and for reasons best known to themselves4 ,there is no injustice nor cruelty in him that giveth life1 to give with it sickness1 pain1 torments1 and death2 nor in him that giveth life twice1 to give the same miseries twice also4 ,and thus much in answer to the inconveniences that are pretended to follow the doctrine of necessity4 ,on the other side from this position1 that a man is free to will1 it followeth that the prescience of ,god is quite taken away4 ,for how can it be known beforehand what man shall have a will to1 if that will of his proceed not from necessary causes1 but that he have in his power to will or not will8 ,so also those things which are called future contingents1 if they come not to pass with certainty1 that is to say1 from necessary causes1 can never be foreknown2 so that ,god's foreknowing shall sometimes be of things that shall not come to pass1 which is as much to say1 that his foreknowledge is none2 which is a great dishonour to the all-knowing power4 ,though this be all the inconvenient doctrine that followeth free-will1 forasmuch as ,i can now remember2 yet the defending of this opinion hath drawn the ,bishop and other patrons of it into many inconvenient and absurd conclusions1 and made them make use of an infinite number of insignificant words2 whereof one conclusion is in ,suarez1 that ,god doth so concur with the will of man1 that if man will1 then ,god concurs2 which is to subject not the will of man to ,god1 but the will of ,god to man4 ,other inconvenient conclusions ,i shall then mark out1 when ,i come to my observations upon the ,bishop's reply4 ,and thus far concerning the inconveniences that follow both opinions4 ,the attribute of ,god which he draweth into argument is his justice1 as that ,god cannot be just in punishing any man for that which he was necessitated to do4 ,to which ,i have answered before1 as being one of the inconveniences pretended to follow upon the doctrine of necessity4 ,on the contrary1 from another of ,god's attributes1 which is his foreknowledge1 ,i shall evidently derive1 that all actions whatsoever1 whether they proceed from the will or from fortune1 were necessary from eternity4 ,for whatsoever ,god foreknoweth shall come to pass1 cannot but come to pass1 that is1 it is impossible it should not come to pass1 or otherwise come to pass than it was foreknown4 ,but whatsoever was impossible should be otherwise1 was necessary2 for the definition of necessary is1 that which cannot possibly be otherwise4 ,and whereas they that distinguish between ,god's prescience and his decree1 say the foreknowledge maketh not the necessity without the decree2 it is little to the purpose4 ,it sufficeth me1 that whatsoever was foreknown by ,god1 was necessary3 but all things were foreknown by ,god1 and therefore all things were necessary4 ,and as for the distinction of foreknowledge from decree in ,god ,almighty1 ,i comprehend it not4 ,they are acts co-eternal1 and therefore one4 ,and as for the arguments drawn from natural reason they are set down at large in the end of my discourse to which the ,bishop maketh his reply2 which how well he hath answered1 shall appear in due time4 ,for the present1 the actions which he thinketh proceed from liberty of will1 must either be necessitated1 or proceed from fortune1 without any other cause2 for certainly to will is impossible without thinking on what he willeth4 ,but it is in no man's election what he shall at any named time hereafter think on4 ,and this ,i take to be enough to clear the understanding of the reader1 that he may be the better able to judge of the following disputation4 ,i find in those that write of this argument1 especially in the ,schoolmen and their followers1 so many words strangers to our language1 and such confusion and inanity in the ranging of them1 as that a man's mind in the reading of them distinguisheth nothing4 ,and as things were in the beginning before the ,spirit of ,god was moved upon the abyss1 tohu and bohu1 that is to say1 confusion and emptiness2 so are their discourses4 ------- 8,,to ,,the ,,right ,,honourable ,,the ,,marquis ,,of ,,newcastle1 ,,etc4 8,,sir1-- 8,if ,i pretended to compose a complete treatise upon this subject1 ,i should not refuse those large recruits of reasons and authorities which offer themselves to serve in this cause1 for ,god and man1 religion and policy1 ,church and ,commonwealth1 7a7 against the blasphemous1 desperate1 and destructive opinion of fatal destiny4 ,but as 7b7 mine aim1 in the first discourse1 was only to press home those things in writing1 which had been agitated between us by word of mouth1 7a course much to be preferred before verbal conferences1 as being freer from passions and tergiversations1 less subject to mistakes and misrelations1 wherein paralogisms are more quickly detected1 impertinences discovered1 and confusion avoided71 so my present intention is only to vindicate that discourse1 and together with it1 7c7 those lights of the ,schools1 who were never slighted but where they were not understood4 ,how far ,i have performed it1 ,i leave to the judicious and impartial reader1 resting for mine own part well contented with this1 that ,i have satisfied myself4 ,your ,lordship's most obliged1 to love and serve you1 8,j4 ,d40 ,,animadversions ,,upon ,,the ,,bishop',s ,,epistle ,,to ,,my ,,lord ,,of ,,newcastle4 7a7 8,against the blasphemous1 desperate1 and destructive opinion of fatal destiny40 ,this is but choler1 such as ordinarily happeneth unto them who contend against greater difficulties than they expected4 7b7 8,my aim in the first discourse was only to press home those things in writing1 which had been agitated between us by word of mouth3 a course much to be preferred before verbal conferences1 as being freer from passions1 c40 ,he is here1 ,i think1 mistaken2 for in our verbal conference there was not one passionate word1 nor any objecting of blasphemy or atheism1 nor any other uncivil word2 of which in his writing there are abundance4 7c7 8,those lights of the ,schools1 who were never slighted but where they were not understood40 ,i confess ,i am not apt to admire every thing ,i understand not1 nor yet to slight it4 ,and though the ,bishop slight not the ,schoolmen so much as ,i do1 yet ,i dare say he understands their writings as little as ,i do4 ,for they are in most places unintelligible4 ------- ,,to ,,the ,,reader4 8,christian reader1 this ensuing treatise was 7a7 neither penned nor intended for the press1 but privately undertaken1 that by the ventilation of the question truth might be cleared from mistakes4 ,the same was ,mr4 ,hobbes' desire at that time1 as appeareth by four passages in his book1 wherein he requesteth and beseecheth that it may be kept private4 ,but either through forgetfulness or change of judgment1 he hath now caused or permitted it to be printed in ,england1 without either adjoining my first discourse1 to which he wrote that answer1 or so much as mentioning this reply1 which he hath had in his hands now these eight years4 ,so wide is the date of his letter1 in the year #afeb1 from the truth1 and his manner of dealing with me in this particular from ingenuity1 7if the edition were with his own consent74 ,howsoever1 here is all that passed between us upon this subject1 without any addition1 or the least variation from the original4 8,concerning the nameless author of the preface1 who takes upon him to hang out an ivy-bush before this rare piece of sublimated stoicism to invite passengers to purchase it1 as ,i know not who he is1 so ,i do not much heed it1 nor regard either his ignorant censures or hyperbolical expressions4 ,the ,church of ,england is as much above his detraction1 as he is beneath this question4 ,let him lick up the spittle of ,dionysius by himself1 as his servile flatterers did1 and protest that it is more sweet than nectar2 we envy him not2 much good may it do him4 ,his very frontispiece is a sufficient confutation of his whole preface1 wherein he tells the world1 as falsely and ignorantly as confidently1 that #8all controversy concerning predestination1 election1 free-will1 grace1 merits1 reprobation1 c41 is fully decided and cleared4' ,thus he accustometh his pen to run over beyond all limits of truth and discretion1 to let us see that his knowledge in theological controversies is none at all1 and into what miserable times we are fallen1 when blind men will be the only judges of colours4 ,quid tanto dignum feret hic promissor hiatu4 8,there is yet one thing more1 whereof ,i desire to advertise the reader1 7b7 ,whereas ,mr4 ,hobbes mentions my objections to his book ,de ,cive1 it is true that ten years since ,i gave him about sixty exceptions1 the one-half of them political1 the other half theological1 to that book1 and every exception justified by a number of reasons1 to which he never yet vouchsafed any answer4 ,nor do ,i now desire it1 for since that1 he hath published his ,leviathan1 ,monstrum horrendum1 informe1 ingens1 cui lumen ademptum1 which affords much more matter of exception2 and ,i am informed that there are already two1 the one of our own ,church1 the other a stranger1 who have shaken in pieces the whole fabric of his city1 that was but builded in the air1 and resolved that huge mass of his seeming ,leviathan into a new nothing2 and that their labours will speedily be published4 ,but if this information should not prove true1 ,i will not grudge upon his desire1 ,god willing1 to demonstrate1 that his principles are pernicious both to piety and policy1 and destructive to all relations of mankind1 between prince and subject1 father and child1 master and servant1 husband and wife2 and that they who maintain them obstinately1 are fitter to live in hollow trees among wild beasts1 than in any ,christian or political society4 ,so ,god bless us40 ------- ,,animadversions ,,upon ,,the ,,bishop',s ,,epistle ,,to ,,the ,,reader4 7a7 8,neither penned nor intended for the press1 but privately undertaken1 that by the ventilation of the question truth might be cleared4 ,the same was ,mr4 ,hobbes' desire at that time1 as appeareth by four passages in his book1 c40 ,it is true that it was not my intention to publish any thing in this question4 ,and the ,bishop might have perceived1 by not leaving out those four passages1 that it was without my knowledge the book was printed2 but it pleased him better to take this little advantage to accuse me of want of ingenuity4 ,he might have perceived also1 by the date of my letter1 #afeb1 which was written #afdf1 7which error could be no advantage to me71 that ,i knew nothing of the printing of it4 ,i confess1 that before ,i received the bishop's reply1 a ,french gentleman of my acquaintance in ,paris1 knowing that ,i had written something of this subject1 but not understanding the language1 desired me to give him leave to get it interpreted to him by an ,english young man that resorted to him2 which ,i yielded to4 ,but this young man taking his opportunity1 and being a nimble writer1 took a copy of it for himself1 and printed it here1 all but the postscript1 without my knowledge1 and 7as he knew7 against my will2 for which he since hath asked me pardon4 ,but that the ,bishop intended it not for the press1 is not very probable1 because he saith he writ it to the end 8that by the ventilation of the question1 truth might be cleared from mistakes20 which end he had not obtained by keeping it private4 7b7 8,whereas ,mr4 ,hobbes mentions my objections to his book ,de ,cive3 it is true that ten years since1 ,i gave him about sixty exceptions10 c4 ,i did indeed intend to have answered those exceptions as finding them neither political nor theological1 nor that he alleged any reasons by which they were to be justified4 ,but shortly after1 intending to write in ,english1 and publish my thoughts concerning ,civil ,doctrine in that book which ,i entitled ,leviathan1 ,i thought his objections would by the clearness of my method fall off without an answer4 ,now this ,leviathan he calleth 8,monstrum horrendum1 informe1 ingens1 cui lumen ademptum40 ,words not far fetched1 nor more applicable to my ,leviathan1 than to any other writing that should offend him4 ,for allowing him the word monstrum1 7because it seems he takes it for a monstrous great fish71 he can neither say it is informe2 for even they that approve not the doctrine1 allow the method4 ,nor that it is ingens2 for it is a book of no great bulk4 ,nor cui lumen ademptum2 for he will find very few readers that will not think it clearer than his scholastic jargon4 ,and whereas he saith there are two of our own ,church 7as he hears say7 that are answering it2 and that 8he himself10 if ,i desire it1 8will demonstrate that my principles are pernicious both to piety and policy1 and destructive to all relations10 c43 my answer is1 that ,i desire not that he or they should so misspend their time2 but if they will needs do it1 ,i can give them a fit title for their book1 ,behemoth against ,leviathan4 ,he ends his epistle with 8so ,god bless us40 ,which words are good in themselves1 but to no purpose here2 but are a buffoonly abusing of the name of ,god to calumny4 ------- ,a ,,vindication ,,of ,,true ,,liberty ,,from ,,antecedent ,,and ,,extrinsical ,,necessity4 ------- ,j4 ,d4 8,either ,i am free to write this discourse for liberty against necessity1 or ,i am not free4 ,if ,i be free1 ,i have obtained the cause1 and ought not to suffer for the truth4 ,if ,i be not free1 yet ,i ought not to be blamed1 since ,i do it not out of any voluntary election1 but out of an inevitable necessity40 ,t4 ,h4 ,right ,honourable1 ,i had once resolved to answer ,j4 ,d4's objections to my book ,de ,cive in the first place1 as that which concerns me most2 and afterwards to examine this ,discourse of ,liberty and ,necessity1 which1 because ,i never had uttered my opinion of it1 concerned me the less4 ,but seeing it was both your ,lordship's and ,j4 ,d4's desire that ,i should begin with the latter1 ,i was contented so to do4 ,and here ,i present and submit it to your ,lordship's judgment4 ,j4 ,d4 8,the first day that ,i did read over ,t4 ,h4's defence of the necessity of all things1 was ,april #bjth1 #afdf4 ,which proceeded not out of any disrespect to him2 for if all his discourses had been geometrical demonstrations1 able not only to persuade1 but also to compel assent1 all had been one to me1 first my journey1 and afterwards some other trifles which we call business1 having diverted me until then4 ,and then my occasions permitting me1 and an advertisement from a friend awakening me1 ,i set myself to a serious examination of it4 ,we commonly see those who delight in paradoxes1 if they have line enough1 confute themselves2 and their speculatives and their practices familiarly interfere one with another4 7b7 ,the very first words of ,t4 ,h4's defence trip up the heels of his whole cause2 #8,i had once resolved4' ,to resolve presupposeth deliberation4 ,but what deliberation can there be of that which is inevitably determined by causes without ourselves1 before we do deliberate8 ,can a condemned man deliberate whether he should be executed or not8 ,it is even to as much purpose1 as for a man to consult and ponder with himself whether he should draw in his breath1 or whether he should increase in stature4 ,secondly1 7c7 to resolve implies a man's dominion over his own actions1 and his actual determination of himself4 ,but he who holds an absolute necessity of all things1 hath quitted this dominion over himself2 and 7which is worse7 hath quitted it to the second extrinsical causes1 in which he makes all his actions to be determined4 ,one may as well call again yesterday1 as resolve or newly determine that which is determined to his hand already4 7d7 ,i have perused this treatise1 weighed ,t4 ,h4's answers1 considered his reasons1 and conclude that he hath missed1 and misled the question1 that the answers are evasions1 that his arguments are paralogisms1 that the opinion of absolute and universal necessity is but a result of some groundless and ill-chosen principles1 and that the defect is not in himself1 but that his cause will admit no better defence2 and therefore1 by his favour1 ,i am resolved to adhere to my first opinion4 ,perhaps another man reading this discourse with other eyes1 judgeth it to be pertinent and well-founded4 ,how comes this to pass8 ,the treatise is the same1 the exterior causes are the same2 yet the resolution is contrary4 ,do the second causes play fast and loose8 ,do they necessitate me to condemn1 and necessitate him to maintain8 ,what is it then8 ,the difference must be in ourselves1 either in our intellectuals1 because the one sees clearer than the other2 or in our affections1 which betray our understandings1 and produce an implicit adherence in the one more than in the other4 ,howsoever it be1 the difference is in ourselves4 ,the outward causes alone do not chain me to the one resolution1 nor him to the other resolution4 ,but ,t4 ,h4 may say1 that our several and respective deliberations and affections are in part the causes of our contrary resolutions1 and do concur with the outward causes to make up one total and adequate cause to the necessary production of this effect4 ,if it be so1 he hath spun a fair thread1 to make all this stir for such a necessity as no man ever denied or doubted of4 ,when all the causes have actually determined themselves1 then the effect is in being2 for though there be a priority in nature between the cause and the effect1 yet they are together in time4 ,and the old rule is1 7e7 #8whatsoever is1 when it is1 is necessarily so as it is4' ,this is no absolute necessity1 but only upon supposition1 that a man hath determined his own liberty4 ,when we question whether all occurrences be necessary1 we do not question whether they be necessary when they are1 nor whether they be necessary in sensu composito1 after we have resolved and finally determined what to do2 but whether they were necessary before they were determined by ourselves1 by or in the precedent causes before ourselves1 or in the exterior causes without ourselves4 ,it is not inconsistent with true liberty to determine itself1 but it is inconsistent with true liberty to be determined by another without itself4 8,t4 ,h4 saith further #8that upon your ,lordship's desire and mine1 he was contented to begin with this discourse of ,liberty and ,necessity1' that is1 to change his former resolution4 7f7 ,if the chain of necessity be no stronger1 but that it may be snapped so easily insunder2 if his will was no otherwise determined without himself1 but only by the signification of your ,lordship's desire and my modest entreaty1 then we may easily conclude that human affairs are not always governed by absolute necessity2 that a man is lord of his own actions1 if not in chief1 yet in mean1 subordinate to the ,lord paramount of heaven and earth2 and that all things are not so absolutely determined in the outward and precedent causes1 but that fair entreaties and moral persuasions may work upon a good nature so far1 as to prevent that which otherwise had been1 and to produce that which otherwise had not been4 ,he that can reconcile this with an antecedent necessity of all things1 and a physical or natural determination of all causes1 shall be great ,apollo to me4 8,whereas ,t4 ,h4 saith that he had never uttered his opinion of this question1 ,i suppose he intends in writing2 my conversation with him hath not been frequent1 yet ,i remember well that when this question was agitated between us two in your ,lordship's chamber by your command1 he did then declare himself in words1 both for the absolute necessity of all events1 and for the ground of this necessity1 the flux or concatenation of the second causes40 ,,animadversions ,,upon ,,the ,,bishop',s ,,reply ,,no4 ,i4 7a7 8,the first day that ,i did read over ,t4 ,h4's defence of necessity10 c4 ,his deferring the reading of my defence of necessity1 he will not1 he saith1 should be interpreted for disrespect4 ',tis well2 though ,i cannot imagine why he should fear to be thought to disrespect me4 8,he was diverted10 he saith1 8by trifles called business40 ,it seems then he acknowledgeth that the will can be diverted by business4 ,which1 though said on the by1 is contrary ,i think to the main1 that the will is free2 for free it is not1 if anything but itself can divert it4 7b7 8,the very first words of ,t4 ,h4's defence1 trip up the heels of his whole cause1 c40 ,how so8 8,i had once10 saith he1 8resolved4 ,to resolve presupposeth deliberation4 ,but what deliberation can there be of that which is inevitably determined without ourselves80 ,there is no man doubts but a man may deliberate of what himself shall do1 whether the thing be impossible or not1 in case he know not of the impossibility2 though he cannot deliberate of what another shall do to him4 ,therefore his examples of the man condemned1 of the man that breatheth1 and of him that groweth1 because the question is not what they shall do1 but what they shall suffer1 are impertinent4 ,this is so evident1 that ,i wonder how he that was before so witty as to say1 my first words tripped up the heels of my cause1 and that having line enough ,i would confute myself1 could presently be so dull as not to see his argument was too weak to support so triumphant a language4 ,and whereas he seemeth to be offended with paradoxes1 let him thank the ,schoolmen1 whose senseless writings have made the greatest number of important truths seem paradox4 7c7 ,this argument that followeth is no better4 8,to resolve10 saith he1 8implies a man's dominion over his actions1 and his actual determination of himself10 c4 ,if he understand what it is to resolve1 he knows that it signifies no more than after deliberation to will4 ,he thinks1 therefore1 to will is to have dominion over his own actions1 and actually to determine his own will4 ,but no man can determine his own will1 for the will is appetite2 nor can a man more determine his will than any other appetite1 that is1 more than he can determine when he shall be hungry and when not4 ,when a man is hungry1 it is in his choice to eat or not eat2 this is the liberty of the man2 but to be hungry or not hungry1 which is that which ,i hold to proceed from necessity1 is not in his choice4 ,besides these words1 8dominion over his own actions10 and 8determination of himself10 so far as they are significant1 make against him4 ,for over whatsoever things there is dominion1 those things are not free1 and therefore a man's actions are not free2 and if a man determine himself1 the question will still remain1 what determined him to determine himself in that manner4 7d7 8,i have perused this treatise1 weighed ,t4 ,h4's answers1 considered his reasons10 c4 ,this and that which followeth1 is talking to himself at random1 till he come to allege that which he calleth an old rule1 which is this3 7e7 8,whatsoever is1 when it is1 is necessarily so as it is4 ,this is no absolute necessity1 but only upon supposition that a man hath determined his own liberty10 c4 ,if the bishop think that ,i hold no other necessity than that which is expressed in that old foolish rule1 he neither understandeth me1 nor what the word necessary signifieth4 ,necessary is that which is impossible to be otherwise1 or that which cannot possibly otherwise come to pass4 ,therefore necessary1 possible1 and impossible have no signification in reference to time past or time present1 but only time to come4 ,his necessary1 and his in sensu composito1 signify nothing2 my necessary is a necessary from all eternity2 and yet not inconsistent with true liberty1 which doth not consist in determining itself1 but in doing what the will is determined unto4 ,this 8dominion over itself10 and this sensus compositus1 and this1 8determining itself10 and this1 8necessarily is when it is10 are confused and empty words4 7f7 8,if the chain of necessity be no stronger but that it may be snapped so easily asunder1 c4 by the signification of your lordship's desire1 and my modest entreaty1 then we may safely conclude that human affairs10 c4 ,whether my ,lord's desire and the ,bishop's modest entreaty were enough to produce a will in me to write an answer to his treatise1 without other concurrent causes1 ,i am not sure4 ,obedience to his ,lordship did much1 and my civility to the ,bishop did somewhat1 and perhaps there were other imaginations of mine own that contributed their part4 ,but this ,i am sure of1 that altogether they were sufficient to frame my will thereto2 and whatsoever is sufficient to produce any thing1 produceth it as necessarily as the fire necessarily burneth the fuel that is cast into it4 ,and though the ,bishop's modest entreaty had been no part of the cause of my yielding to it1 yet certainly it would have been cause enough to some civil man1 to have requited me with fairer language than he hath done throughout this reply4 ,,no4 ,,ii4 ,t4 ,h4 ,and first ,i assure your ,lordship1 ,i find in it no new argument1 neither from ,scripture nor from reason1 that ,i have not often heard before1 which is as much as to say1 that ,i am not surprised4 ,j4 ,d4 7a7 8,though ,i be so unhappy that ,i can present no novelty to ,t4 ,h41 yet ,i have this comfort1 that if he be not surprised1 then in reason ,i may expect a more mature answer from him2 and where he fails1 ,i may ascribe it to the weakness of his cause1 not to want of preparation4 ,but in this cause ,i like ,epictetus's counsel well1 that 7b7 the sheep should not brag how much they have eaten1 or what an excellent pasture they do go in1 but shew it in their lamb and wool4 ,opposite answers and downright arguments advantage a cause4 ,to tell what we have heard or seen is to no purpose4 ,when a respondent leaves many things untouched1 as if they were too hot for his fingers1 and declines the weight of other things1 and alters the true state of the question1 it is a shrewd sign either that he hath not weighed all things maturely1 or else that he maintains a desperate cause40 ,,animadversions ,,upon ,,his ,,reply ,,no4 ,,ii4 7a7 8,though ,i be so unhappy that ,i can present no novelty to ,t4 ,h4 yet ,i have this comfort1 that if he be not surprised1 then in reason ,i may expect a more mature answer from him10 c4 ,though ,i were not surprised1 yet ,i do not see the reason for which he saith he may expect a more mature answer from me2 or any further answer at all4 ,for seeing ,i wrote this at his modest request1 it is no modest expectation to look for as many answers as he shall be pleased to exact4 7b7 8,the sheep should not brag how much they have eaten1 but shew it in their lamb and wool40 ,it is no great bragging1 to say ,i was not surprised2 for whosoever chanceth to read ,suarez's ,opuscula1 where he writeth of free-will and of the concourse of ,god with man's will1 shall find the greatest part1 if not all1 that the ,bishop hath urged in this question4 ,but that which the ,bishop hath said of the reasons and authorities which he saith in his epistle do offer themselves to serve in this cause1 and many other passages of his book1 ,i shall1 ,i think1 before ,i have done with him1 make appear to be very bragging1 and nothing else4 ,and though he say it be ,epictetus's counsel1 that sheep should shew what they eat in their lamb and wool1 it is not likely that ,epictetus should take a metaphor from lamb and wool2 for it could not easily come into the mind of men that were not acquainted with the paying of tithes4 ,or if it had1 he would have said lambs in the plural1 as laymen use to speak4 ,that which follows of my leaving things untouched1 and altering the state of the question2 ,i remember no such thing1 unless he require that ,i should answer1 not to his arguments only1 but also to his syllables4 ,,no4 ,,iii4 ,t4 ,h4 ,the preface is a handsome one1 but it appears even in that1 that he hath mistaken the question2 for whereas he says thus1 8if ,i be free to write this discourse1 ,i have obtained the cause10 ,i deny that to be true4 ,for it is not enough to his freedom of writing that he had not written it1 unless he would himself2 if he will obtain the cause1 he must prove that1 before he wrote it1 it was not necessary he should write it afterwards4 ,it may be he thinks it all one to say1 8,i was free to write it10 and 8it was not necessary ,i should write it40 ,but ,i think otherwise2 for he is free to do a thing1 that may do it if he have the will to do it1 and may forbear if he have the will to forbear4 ,and yet if there be a necessity that he shall have the will to do it1 the action is necessarily to follow2 and if there be a necessity that he shall have the will to forbear1 the forbearing also will be necessary4 ,the question1 therefore1 is not whether a man be a free agent1 that is to say1 whether he can write or forbear1 speak or be silent1 according to his will2 but whether the will to write1 and the will to forbear1 come upon him according to his will1 or according to any thing else in his own power4 ,i acknowledge this liberty1 that ,i can do if ,i will3 but to say1 ,i can will if ,i will1 ,i take to be an absurd speech4 ,wherefore ,i cannot grant him the cause upon this preface4 ,sidenote3 ,the ,bishop's reply4 ,j4 ,d4 8,tacitus speaks of a close kind of adversaries1 which evermore begin with a man's praise4 ,the crisis or the catastrophe of their discourse is when they come to their but2 as1 he is a good natured man1 but he hath a naughty quality2 or1 he is a wise man1 but he hath committed one of the greatest follies2 so here1 #8the preface is a handsome one1 but it appears even in this that he hath mistaken the question4' ,this is to give an inch1 that one may take away an ell without suspicion2 to praise the handsomeness of the porch1 that he may gain credit to the vilifying of the house4 ,whether of us hath mistaken the question1 ,i refer to the judicious reader4 7a7 ,thus much ,i will maintain1 that that is no true necessity1 which he calls necessity2 nor that liberty1 which he calls liberty2 nor that the question1 which he makes the question4 8,first for liberty1 that which he calls liberty1 is no true liberty4 8,for the clearing whereof1 it behoveth us to know the difference between these three1 necessity1 spontaneity1 and liberty4 8,necessity and spontaneity may sometimes meet together2 so may spontaneity and liberty2 but real necessity and true liberty can never meet together4 ,some things are necessary and not voluntary or spontaneous2 some things are both necessary and voluntary2 some things are voluntary and not free2 some things are both voluntary and free2 but those things which are truly necessary can never be free1 and those things which are truly free can never be necessary4 ,necessity consists in an antecedent determination to one2 spontaneity consists in a conformity of the appetite1 either intellectual or sensitive1 to the object2 true liberty consists in the elective power of the rational will2 that which is determined without my concurrence1 may nevertheless agree well enough with my fancy or desires1 and obtain my subsequent consent2 but that which is determined without my concurrence or consent1 cannot be the object of mine election4 ,i may like that which is inevitably imposed upon me by another1 but if it be inevitably imposed upon me by extrinsical causes1 it is both folly for me to deliberate1 and impossible for me to choose1 whether ,i shall undergo it or not4 ,reason is the root1 the fountain1 the original of true liberty1 which judgeth and representeth to the will1 whether this or that be convenient1 whether this or that be more convenient4 ,judge then what a pretty kind of liberty it is which is maintained by ,t4 ,h41 such a liberty as is in little children before they have the use of reason1 before they can consult or deliberate of any thing4 ,is not this a childish liberty2 and such a liberty as is in brute beasts1 as bees and spiders1 which do not learn their faculties as we do our trades1 by experience and consideration8 ,this is a brutish liberty1 such a liberty as a bird hath to fly when her wings are clipped1 or to use his own comparison1 such a liberty as a lame man1 who hath lost the use of his limbs1 hath to walk4 ,is not this a ridiculous liberty8 ,lastly1 7which is worse than all these71 such a liberty as a river hath to descend down the channel4 ,what6 will he ascribe liberty to inanimate creatures also1 which have neither reason1 nor spontaneity1 nor so much as sensitive appetite8 ,such is ,t4 ,h4's liberty4 7b7 8,his necessity is just such another1 a necessity upon supposition1 arising from the concourse of all the causes1 including the last dictate of the understanding in reasonable creatures4 ,the adequate cause and the effect are together in time1 and when all the concurrent causes are determined1 the effect is determined also1 and is become so necessary that it is actually in being2 but there is a great difference between determining1 and being determined4 ,if all the collateral causes concurring to the production of an effect1 were antecedently determined what they must of necessity produce1 and when they must produce it1 then there is no doubt but the effect is necessary4 7c7 ,but if these causes did operate freely or contingently2 if they might have suspended or denied their concurrence1 or have concurred after another manner1 then the effect was not truly and antecedently necessary1 but either free or contingent4 ,this will be yet clearer by considering his own instance of casting ambs-ace1 though it partake more of contingency than of freedom4 ,supposing the positure of the parties' hand who did throw the dice1 supposing the figure of the table and of the dice themselves1 supposing the measure of force applied1 and supposing all other things which did concur to the production of that cast1 to be the very same they were1 there is no doubt but in this case the cast is necessary4 ,but still this is but a necessity of supposition2 for if all these concurrent causes1 or some of them1 were contingent or free1 then the cast was not absolutely necessary4 ,to begin with the caster1 he might have denied his concurrence1 and not have cast at all2 he might have suspended his concurrence1 and not have cast so soon2 he might have doubled or diminished his force in casting1 if it had pleased him2 he might have thrown the dice into the other table4 ,in all these cases what becomes of his ambs-ace8 ,the like uncertainties offer themselves for the maker of the tables1 and for the maker of the dice1 and for the keeper of the tables1 and for the kind of wood1 and ,i know not how many other circumstances4 ,in such a mass of contingencies1 it is impossible that the effect should be antecedently necessary4 ,t4 ,h4 appeals to every man's experience4 ,i am contented4 ,let every one reflect upon himself1 and he shall find no convincing1 much less constraining reason1 to necessitate him to any one of these particular acts more than another1 but only his own will or arbitrary determination4 ,so ,t4 ,h4's necessity is no absolute1 no antecedent1 extrinsical necessity1 but merely a necessity upon supposition4 7d7 8,thirdly1 that which ,t4 ,h4 makes the question1 is not the question4 #8,the question is not1' saith he1 #8whether a man may write if he will1 and forbear if he will1 but whether the will to write or the will to forbear come upon him according to his will1 or according to any thing else in his own power4' ,here is a distinction without a difference4 ,if his will do not come upon him according to his will1 then he is not a free1 nor yet so much as a voluntary agent1 which is ,t4 ,h4's liberty4 ,certainly all the freedom of the agent is from the freedom of the will4 ,if the will have no power over itself1 the agent is no more free than a staff in a man's hand4 ,secondly1 he makes but an empty show of a power in the will1 either to write or not to write4 7e7 ,if it be precisely and inevitably determined in all occurrences whatsoever1 what a man shall will1 and what he shall not will1 what he shall write1 and what he shall not write1 to what purpose is this power8 ,god and nature never made any thing in vain2 but vain and frustraneous is that power which never was and never shall be deduced into act4 ,either the agent is determined before he acteth1 what he shall will1 and what he shall not will1 what he shall act1 and what he shall not act1 and then he is no more free to act than he is to will2 or else he is not determined1 and then there is no necessity4 ,no effect can exceed the virtue of its cause2 if the action be free to write or to forbear1 the power or faculty to will or nill1 must of necessity be more free4 ,quod efficit tale1 illud magis est tale4 ,if the will be determined1 the writing or not writing is likewise determined1 and then he should not say1 #8he may write or he may forbear1' but he must write or he must forbear4 ,thirdly1 this answer contradicts the sense of all the world1 that the will of man is determined without his will1 or without any thing in his power4 ,why do we ask men whether they will do such a thing or not8 ,why do we represent reasons to them8 ,why do we pray them8 ,why do we entreat them8 ,why do we blame them1 if their will come not upon them according to their will4 ,wilt thou be made clean8 said our ,saviour to the paralytic person 7,john v4 #f72 to what purpose1 if his will was extrinsically determined8 ,christ complains1 7,matth4 xi4 #ag73 ,we have piped unto you1 and ye have not danced4 ,how could they help it1 if their wills were determined without their wills to forbear8 ,and 7,matth4 xxiii4 #cg73 ,i would have gathered your children together as the hen gathereth her chickens under her wings1 but ye would not4 ,how easily might they answer1 according to ,t4 ,h4's doctrine1 #8,alas6 blame not us2 our wills are not in our own power or disposition2 if they were1 we would thankfully embrace so great a favour4' ,most truly said ,st4 ,austin1 #8,our will should not be a will at all1 if it were not in our power4' 7f7 ,this is the belief of all mankind1 which we have not learned from our tutors1 but is imprinted in our hearts by nature2 we need not turn over any obscure books to find out this truth4 ,the poets chaunt it in the theatres1 the shepherds in the mountains1 the pastors teach it in their churches1 the doctors in the universities1 the common people in the markets1 and all mankind in the whole world do assent unto it1 except an handful of men who have poisoned their intellectuals with paradoxical principles4 ,fourthly1 this necessity which ,t4 ,h4 hath devised1 which is grounded upon the necessitation of a man's will without his will1 is the worst of all others1 and is so far from lessening those difficulties and absurdities which flow from the fatal destiny of the ,stoics1 that it increaseth them1 and rendereth them unanswerable4 7g7 ,no man blameth fire for burning whole cities2 no man taxeth poison for destroying men2 but those persons who apply them to such wicked ends4 ,if the will of man be not in his own disposition1 he is no more a free agent than the fire or the poison4 ,three things are required to make an act or omission culpable4 ,first1 that it be in our power to perform it or forbear it2 secondly1 that we be obliged to perform it1 or forbear it1 respectively2 thirdly1 that we omit that which we ought to have done1 or do that which we ought to have omitted4 7h7 ,no man sins in doing those things which he could not shun1 or forbearing those things which never were in his power4 ,t4 ,h4 may say1 that besides the power1 men have also an appetite to evil objects1 which renders them culpable4 ,it is true2 but if this appetite be determined by another1 not by themselves1 or if they have not the use of reason to curb or restrain their appetites1 they sin no more than a stone descending downward1 according to its natural appetite1 or the brute beasts who commit voluntary errors in following their sensitive appetites1 yet sin not4 7i7 ,the question then is not whether a man be necessitated to will or nill1 yet free to act or forbear4 ,but saving the ambiguous acception of the word free1 the question is plainly this1 whether all agents1 and all events natural1 civil1 moral1 7for we speak not now of the conversion of a sinner1 that concerns not this question71 be predetermined extrinsically and inevitably without their own concurrence in the determination2 so as all actions and events which either are or shall be1 cannot but be1 nor can be otherwise1 after any other manner1 or in any other place1 time1 number1 measure1 order1 nor to any other end1 than they are4 ,and all this in respect of the supreme cause1 or a concourse of extrinsical causes determining them to one4 7k7 8,so my preface remains yet unanswered4 ,either ,i was extrinsically and inevitably predetermined to write this discourse1 without any concurrence of mine in the determination1 and without any power in me to change or oppose it1 or ,i was not so predetermined4 ,if ,i was1 then ,i ought not to be blamed1 for no man is justly blamed for doing that which never was in his power to shun4 ,if ,i was not so predetermined1 then mine actions and my will to act1 are neither compelled nor necessitated by any extrinsical causes1 but ,i elect and choose1 either to write or to forbear1 according to mine own will and by mine own power4 ,and when ,i have resolved and elected1 it is but a necessity of supposition1 which may and doth consist with true liberty1 not a real antecedent necessity4 ,the two horns of this dilemma are so straight1 that no mean can be given1 nor room to pass between them4 ,and the two consequences are so evident1 that instead of answering he is forced to decline them4 ,,animadversions ,,upon ,,his ,,reply ,,no4 ,,iii4 7a7 8,thus much ,i will maintain1 that this is no true necessity1 which he calleth necessity2 nor that liberty which he calleth liberty2 nor that the question1 which he makes the question10 c4 8,for the clearing whereof1 it behoveth us to know the difference between these three1 necessity1 spontaneity1 and liberty40 ,i did expect1 that for the knowing of the difference between necessity1 spontaneity1 and liberty1 he would have set down their definitions4 ,for without these1 their difference cannot possibly appear4 ,for how can a man know how things differ1 unless he first know what they are8 which he offers not to shew4 ,he tells us that necessity and spontaneity may meet together1 and spontaneity and liberty2 but necessity and liberty never2 and many other things impertinent to the purpose4 ,for which1 because of the length1 ,i refer the reader to the place4 ,i note only this1 that spontaneity is a word not used in common ,english2 and they that understand ,latin1 know it means no more than appetite1 or will1 and is not found but in living creatures4 ,and seeing1 he saith1 that necessity and spontaneity may stand together1 ,i may say also1 that necessity and will may stand together1 and then is not the will free1 as he would have it1 from necessitation4 ,there are many other things in that which followeth1 which ,i had rather the reader would consider in his own words1 to which ,i refer him1 than that ,i should give him greater trouble in reciting them again4 ,for ,i do not fear it will be thought too hot for my fingers1 to shew the vanity of such words as these1 intellectual appetite1 conformity of the appetite to the object1 rational will1 elective power of the rational will2 nor understand ,i how reason can be the root of true liberty1 if the ,bishop1 as he saith in the beginning1 had the liberty to write this discourse4 ,i understand how objects1 and the conveniences and the inconveniences of them may be represented to a man1 by the help of his senses2 but how reason representeth anything to the will1 ,i understand no more than the ,bishop understands how there may be liberty in children1 in beasts1 and inanimate creatures4 ,for he seemeth to wonder how children may be left at liberty2 how beasts in prison may be set at liberty2 and how a river may have a free course2 and saith1 8,what6 will he ascribe liberty to inanimate creatures1 also80 ,and thus he thinks he hath made it clear how necessity1 spontaneity1 and liberty differ from one another4 ,if the reader find it so1 ,i am contented4 7b7 8,his necessity is just such another2 a necessity upon supposition1 arising from the concourse of all the causes1 including the last dictate of the understanding in reasonable creatures10 c4 ,the ,bishop might easily have seen1 that the necessity ,i hold1 is the same necessity that he denies2 namely1 a necessity of things future1 that is1 an antecedent necessity derived from the very beginning of time2 and that ,i put necessity for an impossibility of not being1 and that impossibility as well as possibility are never truly said but of the future4 ,i know as well as he that the cause1 when it is adequate1 as he calleth it1 or entire1 as ,i call it1 is together in time with the effect4 ,but for all that1 the necessity may be and is before the effect1 as much as any necessity can be4 ,and though he call it a necessity of supposition1 it is no more so than all other necessity is4 ,the fire burneth necessarily2 but not without supposition that there is fuel put to it4 ,and it burneth the fuel1 when it is put to it1 necessarily2 but it is by supposition1 that the ordinary course of nature is not hindered2 for the fire burnt not the three children in the furnace4 7c7 8,but if these causes did operate freely or contingently1 if they might have suspended or denied their concurrence1 or have concurred after another manner1 then the effect was not truly and antecedently necessary1 but either free or contingent40 ,it seems by this he understands not what these words1 free and contingent1 mean4 ,a little before1 he wondered ,i should attribute liberty to inanimate creatures1 and now he puts causes amongst those things that operate freely4 ,by these causes it seems he understandeth only men1 whereas ,i shewed before that liberty is usually ascribed to whatsoever agent is not hindered4 ,and when a man doth any thing freely1 there be many other agents immediate1 that concur to the effect he intendeth1 which work not freely1 but necessarily2 as when the man moveth the sword freely1 the sword woundeth necessarily1 nor can suspend or deny its concurrence2 and consequently if the man move not himself1 the man cannot deny his concurrence4 ,to which he cannot reply1 unless he say a man originally can move himself2 for which he will be able to find no authority of any that have but tasted of the knowledge of motion4 ,then for contingent1 he understandeth not what it meaneth4 ,for it is all one to say it is contingent1 and simply to say it is2 saving that when they say simply it is1 they consider not how or by what means2 but in saying it is contingent1 they tell us they know not whether necessarily or not4 ,but the ,bishop thinking contingent to be that which is not necessary1 instead of arguing against our knowledge of the necessity of things to come1 argueth against the necessity itself4 ,again1 he supposeth that free and contingent causes might have suspended or denied their concurrence4 ,from which it followeth1 that free causes1 and contingent causes1 are not causes of themselves1 but concurrent with other causes1 and therefore can produce nothing but as they are guided by those causes with which they concur4 ,for it is strange he should say1 they might have concurred after another manner2 for ,i conceive not how1 when this runneth one way1 and that another1 that they can be said to concur1 that is1 run together4 ,and this his concurrence of causes contingent1 maketh1 he saith1 the cast of ambs-ace not to have been absolutely necessary4 ,which cannot be conceived1 unless it had hindered it2 and then it had made some other cast necessary1 perhaps deux-ace1 which serveth me as well4 ,for that which he saith of suspending his concurrence1 of casting sooner or later1 of altering the caster's force1 and the like accidents1 serve not to take away the necessity of ambs-ace1 otherwise than by making a necessity of deux-ace1 or other cast that shall be thrown4 7d7 8,thirdly1 that which ,t4 ,h4 makes the question1 is not the question10 c4 ,he hath very little reason to say this4 ,he requested me to tell him my opinion in writing concerning free-will4 ,which ,i did1 and did let him know a man was free1 in those things that were in his power1 to follow his will2 but that he was not free to will1 that is1 that his will did not follow his will4 ,which ,i expressed in these words3 8,the question is1 whether the will to write1 or the will to forbear1 come upon a man according to his will1 or according to any thing else in his own power40 ,he that cannot understand the difference between free to do if he will1 and free to will1 is not fit1 as ,i have said in the stating of the question1 to hear this controversy disputed1 much less to be a writer in it4 ,his consequence1 8if a man be not free to will1 he is not a free nor a voluntary agent10 and his saying1 8the freedom of the agent is from the freedom of the will10 is put here without proof2 nor is there any considerable proof of it through the whole book hereafter offered4 ,for why8 ,he never before had heard1 ,i believe1 of any distinction between free to do and free to will2 which makes him also say1 8if the will have not power over itself1 the agent is no more free1 than a staff in a man's hand40 ,as if it were not freedom enough for a man to do what he will1 unless his will also have power over his will1 and that his will be not the power itself1 but must have another power within it to do all voluntary acts4 7e7 8,if it be precisely and inevitably determined in all occurrences whatsoever1 what a man shall will1 and what he shall not will1 and what he shall write1 and what he shall not write1 to what purpose is this power80 c4 ,it is to this purpose1 that all those things may be brought to pass1 which ,god hath from eternity predetermined4 ,it is therefore to no purpose here to say1 that ,god and nature hath made nothing in vain4 ,but see what weak arguments he brings next1 which1 though answered in that which is gone before1 yet1 if ,i answer not again1 he will say they are too hot for my fingers4 ,one is3 8,if the agent be determined what he shall will1 and what he shall act1 then he is no more free to act than he is to will20 as if the will being necessitated1 the doing of what we will were not liberty4 ,another is3 8,if a man be free to act1 he is much more free to will2 because quod efficit tale1 illud magis est tale20 as if he should say1 8if ,i make him angry1 then ,i am more angry2 because quod efficit10 c4 ,the third is3 8,if the will be determined1 then the writing is determined1 and he ought not to say he may write1 but he must write40 ,it is true1 it followeth that he must write1 but it doth not follow ,i ought to say he must write1 unless he would have me say more than ,i know1 as himself doth often in this reply4 ,after his arguments come his difficult questions4 8,if the will of man be determined without his will1 or without any thing in his power1 why do we ask men whether they will do such a thing or not80 ,i answer1 because we desire to know1 and cannot know but by their telling1 nor then neither1 for the most part4 8,why do we represent reasons to them8 ,why do we pray them8 ,why do we entreat them80 ,i answer1 because thereby we think to make them have the will they have not4 8,why do we blame them80 ,i answer1 because they please us not4 ,i might ask him1 whether blaming be any thing else but saying the thing blamed is ill or imperfect8 ,may we not say a horse is lame1 though his lameness came from necessity8 or that a man is a fool or a knave1 if he be so1 though he could not help it8 8,to what purpose did our ,saviour say to the paralytic person1 wilt thou be made clean1 if his will were extrinsically determined80 ,i answer1 that it was not because he would know1 for he knew it before2 but because he would draw from him a confession of his want4 8,we have piped unto you1 and ye have not danced2 how could they help it80 ,i answer they could not help it4 8,i would have gathered your children as the hen gathereth her chickens under her wings1 but ye would not4 ,how easily might they answer1 according to ,t4 ,h4's doctrine1 ,alas6 blame not us1 our wills are not in our own power80 ,i answer1 they are to be blamed though their wills be not in their own power4 ,is not good good1 and evil evil1 though they be not in our power8 and shall not ,i call them so8 and is not that praise and blame8 ,but it seems the ,bishop takes blame1 not for the dispraise of a thing1 but for a pretext and colour of malice and revenge against him he blameth4 ,and where he says our wills are in our power1 he sees not that he speaks absurdly2 for he ought to say1 the will is the power2 and through ignorance detecteth the same fault in ,st4 ,austin1 who saith1 8our will should not be a will at all1 if it were not in our power20 that is to say1 if it were not in our will4 7f7 8,this is the belief of all mankind1 which we have not learned from our tutors1 but is imprinted in our hearts by nature10 c4 ,this piece of eloquence is used by ,cicero in his defence of ,milo1 to prove it lawful for a man to resist force with force1 or to keep himself from killing2 which the ,bishop1 thinking himself able to make that which proves one thing prove any thing1 hath translated into ,english1 and brought into this place to prove free-will4 ,it is true1 very few have learned from tutors1 that a man is not free to will2 nor do they find it much in books4 ,that they find in books1 that which the poets chant in their theatres and the shepherds in the mountains1 that which the pastors teach in the churches and the doctors in the universities1 and that which the common people in the markets1 and all mankind in the whole world do assent unto1 is the same that ,i assent unto1 namely1 that a man hath freedom to do if he will2 but whether he hath freedom to will1 is a question which it seems neither the ,bishop nor they ever thought on4 7g7 8,no man blameth fire for burning cities1 nor taxeth poison for destroying men10 c4 ,here again he is upon his arguments from blame1 which ,i have answered before2 and we do as much blame them as we do men4 ,for we say fire hath done hurt1 and the poison hath killed a man1 as well as we say the man hath done unjustly2 but we do not seek to be revenged of the fire and of poison1 because we cannot make them ask forgiveness1 as we would make men to do when they hurt us4 ,so that the blaming of the one and the other1 that is1 the declaring of the hurt or evil action done by them1 is the same in both2 but the malice of man is only against man4 7h7 8,no man sins in doing those things which he could not shun40 ,he may as well say1 no man halts which cannot choose but halt2 or stumbles1 that cannot choose but stumble4 ,for what is sin1 but halting or stumbling in the way of ,god's commandments8 7i7 8,the question then is not1 whether a man be necessitated to will or nill1 yet free to act or forbear4 ,but1 saving the ambiguous acceptions of the word free1 the question is plainly this10 c4 ,this question1 which the ,bishop stateth in this place1 ,i have before set down verbatim and allowed3 and it is the same with mine1 though he perceive it not4 ,but seeing ,i did nothing1 but at his request set down my opinion1 there can be no other question between us in this controversy1 but whether my opinion be the truth or not4 7k7 8,so my preface remains yet unanswered4 ,either ,i was extrinsically and inevitably predetermined to write this discourse10 c4 ,that which he saith in the preface is1 8that if he be not free to write this discourse1 he ought not to be blamed2 but if he be free1 he hath obtained the cause40 ,the first consequence ,i should have granted him1 if he had written it rationally and civilly2 the latter ,i deny1 and have shown that he ought to have proved that a man is free to will4 ,for that which he says1 any thing else whatsoever would think1 if it knew it were moved1 and did not know what moved it4 ,a wooden top that is lashed by the boys1 and runs about sometimes to one wall1 sometimes to another1 sometimes spinning1 sometimes hitting men on the shins1 if it were sensible of its own motion1 would think it proceeded from its own will1 unless it felt what lashed it4 ,and is a man any wiser1 when he runs to one place for a benefice1 to another for a bargain1 and troubles the world with writing errors and requiring answers1 because he thinks he doth it without other cause than his own will1 and seeth not what are the lashings that cause his will8 ,,no4 ,,iv4 ,sidenote3 ,the ,bishop's reply4 ,j4 ,d4 8,and so to fall in hand with the question without any further proems or prefaces1 by liberty1 ,i do neither understand a liberty from sin1 nor a liberty from misery1 nor a liberty from servitude1 nor a liberty from violence1 but ,i understand a liberty from necessity1 or rather from necessitation2 that is1 an universal immunity from all inevitability and determination to one2 whether it be of exercise only1 which the ,schools call a liberty of contradiction1 and is found in ,god and in the good and bad angels1 that is1 not a liberty to do both good and evil1 but a liberty to do or not to do this or that good1 this or that evil1 respectively2 or whether it be a liberty of specification and exercise also1 which the ,schools call liberty of contrariety1 and is found in men endowed with reason and understanding1 that is1 a liberty to do and not to do good and evil1 this or that4 ,thus the coast being cleared10 c4 ,t4 ,h4 ,in the next place he maketh certain distinctions of liberty1 and says1 he means not liberty from sin1 nor from servitude1 nor from violence1 but from necessity1 necessitation1 inevitability1 and determination to one4 ,it had been better to define liberty1 than thus to distinguish2 for ,i understand never the more what he means by liberty4 ,and though he says he means liberty from necessitation1 yet ,i understand not how such a liberty can be1 and it is a taking of the question without proof4 ,for what else is the question between us1 but whether such a liberty be possible or not8 ,there are in the same place other distinctions1 as a liberty of exercise only1 which he calls a liberty of contradiction1 namely1 of doing not good or evil simply1 but of doing this or that good1 or this or that evil1 respectively3 and a liberty of specification and exercise also1 which he calls a liberty of contrariety1 namely1 a liberty not only to do or not to do good or evil1 but also to do or not to do this or that good or evil4 ,and with these distinctions1 he says1 he clears the coast1 whereas in truth he darkeneth his meaning1 not only with the jargon of exercise only1 specification also1 contradiction1 contrariety1 but also with pretending distinction where none is4 ,for how is it possible for the liberty of doing or not doing this or that good or evil1 to consist1 as he saith it doth in ,god and ,angels1 without a liberty of doing or not doing good or evil8 ,j4 ,d4 7a7 8,it is a rule in art1 that words which are homonymous1 of various and ambiguous significations1 ought ever in the first place to be distinguished4 ,no men delight in confused generalities1 but either sophisters or bunglers4 ,vir dolosus versatur in generalibus1 deceitful men do not love to descend to particulars2 and when bad archers shoot1 the safest way is to run to the mark4 ,liberty is sometimes opposed to the slavery of sin and vicious habits1 as 7,romans vi4 #bb73 ,now being made free from sin4 ,sometimes to misery and oppression1 7,isaiah lviii4 #f73 ,to let the oppressed go free4 ,sometimes to servitude1 as 7,leviticus xxv4 #aj73 ,in the year of jubilee ye shall proclaim liberty throughout the land4 ,sometimes to violence1 as 7,psalms cv4 #bj73 ,the prince of his people let him go free4 ,yet none of all these is the liberty now in question1 but a liberty from necessity1 that is1 a determination to one1 or rather from necessitation1 that is1 a necessity imposed by another1 or an extrinsical determination4 ,these distinctions do virtually imply a description of true liberty1 which comes nearer the essence of it1 than ,t4 ,h4's roving definition1 as we shall see in due place4 ,and though he say that #8he understands never the more what ,i mean by liberty1' yet it is plain1 by his own ingenuous confession1 both that he doth understand it1 and that this is the very question where the water sticks between us1 whether there be such a liberty free from all necessitation and extrinsical determination to one4 ,which being but the stating of the question1 he calls it amiss #8the taking of the question4' ,it were too much weakness to beg this question1 which is so copious and demonstrable4 7b7 ,it is strange to see with what confidence1 now-a-days1 particular men slight all the ,schoolmen1 and ,philosophers1 and classic authors of former ages1 as if they were not worthy to unloose the shoe-strings of some modern author1 or did sit in darkness and in the shadow of death1 until some third ,cato dropped down from heaven1 to whom all men must repair1 as to the altar of ,prometheus1 to light their torches4 ,i did never wonder to hear a raw divine out of the pulpit declare against ,school ,divinity to his equally ignorant auditors4 ,it is but as the fox in the fable1 who1 having lost his own tail by a mischance1 would have persuaded all his followers to cut off theirs1 and throw them away as unprofitable burthens4 ,but it troubles me to see a scholar1 one who hath been long admitted into the innermost closet of nature1 and seen the hidden secrets of more subtle learning1 so far to forget himself as to style ,school-learning no better than a plain jargon1 that is1 a senseless gibberish1 or a fustian language1 like the chattering noise of sabots4 ,suppose they did sometimes too much cut truth into shreds1 or delight in abstruse expressions1 yet certainly this distinction of liberty into liberty of contrariety and liberty of contradiction1 or which is all one1 of exercise only1 or exercise and specification jointly1 which ,t4 ,h4 rejects with so much scorn1 is so true1 so necessary1 so generally received1 that there is scarce that writer of note1 either divine or philosopher1 who did ever treat upon this subject1 but he useth it4 8,good and evil are contraries1 or opposite kinds of things4 ,therefore to be able to choose both good and evil1 is a liberty of contrariety1 or of specification4 ,to choose this1 and not to choose this1 are contradictory1 or which is all one1 an exercise or suspension of power4 ,therefore to be able to do or forbear to do the same action1 or to choose or not choose the same object1 without varying of the kind1 is a liberty of contradiction1 or of exercise only4 ,now a man is not only able to do or forbear to do good only1 or evil only1 but he is able both to do and to forbear to do both good and evil4 ,so he hath not only a liberty of the action1 but also a liberty of contrary objects2 not only a liberty of exercise1 but also of specification2 not only a liberty of contradiction1 but also of contrariety4 ,on the other side1 ,god and the good angels can do or not do this or that good2 but they cannot do and not do both good and evil4 ,so they have only a liberty of exercise or contradiction1 but not a liberty of specification or contrariety4 ,it appears then plainly1 that the liberty of man is more large in the extension of the object1 which is both good and evil1 than the liberty of ,god and the good angels1 whose object is only good4 ,but withal the liberty of man comes short in the intention of the power4 ,man is not so free in respect of good only1 as ,god or the good angels1 because 7not to speak of ,god1 whose liberty is quite of another nature7 the understandings of the angels are clearer1 their power and dominion over their actions is greater1 they have no sensitive appetites to distract them1 no organs to be disturbed4 ,we see1 then1 this distinction is cleared from all darkness4 8,and where ,t4 ,h4 demands1 how it is possible for the liberty of doing or not doing this or that good or evil1 to consist in ,god and angels1 without a liberty of doing or not doing good or evil8 the answer is obvious and easy1 referendo singula singulis1 rendering every act to its right object respectively4 ,god and good angels have a power to do or not to do this or that good1 bad angels have a power to do or not to do this or that evil2 so both1 jointly considered1 have power respectively to do good or evil4 ,and yet1 according to the words of my discourse1 ,god and good and bad angels1 being singly considered1 have no power to do good or evil1 that is1 indifferently1 as man hath40 ,,animadversions ,,upon ,,the ,,bishop',s ,,reply ,,no4 ,,iv4 ,he intendeth here to make good the distinctions of liberty of exercise1 and liberty of contradiction2 liberty of contrariety1 and liberty of specification and exercise4 ,and he begins thus3 7a7 8,it is a rule in art1 that words which are homonymous1 or of various and ambiguous significations1 ought ever in the first place to be distinguished10 c4 ,i know not what art it is that giveth this rule4 ,i am sure it is not the art of reason1 which men call logic4 ,for reason teacheth1 and the example of those who only reason methodically1 7which are the mathematicians71 that a man1 when he will demonstrate the truth of what he is to say1 must in the first place determine what he will have to be understood by his words2 which determination is called definition2 whereby the significations of his words are so clearly set down1 that there can creep in no ambiguity4 ,and therefore there will be no need of distinctions2 and consequently his rule of art1 is a rash precept of some ignorant man1 whom he and others have followed4 ,the ,bishop tells us that liberty is sometimes opposed to sin1 to oppression1 to servitude2 which is to tell us1 that they whom he hath read in this point1 are inconsistent in the meaning of their own words2 and1 therefore1 they are little beholden to him4 ,and this diversity of significations he calls distinctions4 ,do men that by the same word in one place mean one thing1 and in another another1 and never tell us so1 distinguish8 ,i think they rather confound4 ,and yet he says1 that 8these distinctions do virtually imply a description of true liberty1 which cometh nearer the essence of it1 than ,t4 ,h4's roving definition20 which definition of mine was this3 8liberty is when there is no external impediment40 ,so that in his opinion a man shall sooner understand liberty by reading these words1 7,romans vi4 #bb73 ,being made free from sin2 or these words1 7,isaiah lviii4 #f73 ,to let the oppressed go free2 or by these words1 7,leviticus xxv4 #aj73 ,you shall proclaim liberty throughout the land1 than by these words of mine3 8liberty is the absence of external impediments to motion40 ,also he will face me down1 that ,i understand what he means by his distinctions of liberty of contrariety1 of contradiction1 of exercise only1 of exercise and specification jointly4 ,if he mean ,i understand his meaning1 in one sense it is true4 ,for by them he means to shift off the discredit of being able to say nothing to the question2 as they do that1 pretending to know the cause of every thing1 give for the cause of why the load-stone draweth to it iron1 sympathy1 and occult quality2 making they cannot tell1 7turned now into occult71 to stand for the real cause of that most admirable effect4 ,but that those words signify distinction1 ,i constantly deny4 ,it is not enough for a distinction to be forked2 it ought to signify a distinct conception4 ,there is great difference between duade distinctions and cloven feet4 7b7 8,it is strange to see with what confidence now-a-days particular men slight all the ,schoolmen1 and philosophers1 and classic authors of former ages10 c4 ,this word1 particular men1 is put here1 in my opinion1 with little judgment1 especially by a man that pretendeth to be learned4 ,does the ,bishop think that he himself is1 or that there is any universal man8 ,it may be he means a private man4 ,does he then think there is any man not private1 besides him that is endued with sovereign power8 ,but it is most likely he calls me a particular man1 because ,i have not had the authority he has had1 to teach what doctrine ,i think fit4 ,but now1 ,i am no more particular than he2 and may with as good a grace despise the ,schoolmen and some of the old ,philosophers1 as he can despise me1 unless he can shew that it is more likely that he should be better able to look into these questions sufficiently1 which require meditation and reflection upon a man's own thoughts1 he that hath been obliged most of his time to preach unto the people1 and to that end to read those authors that can best furnish him with what he has to say1 and to study for the rhetoric of his expressions1 and of the spare time 7which to a good pastor is very little7 hath spent no little part in seeking preferment and increasing of riches2 than ,i1 that have done almost nothing else1 nor have had much else to do but to meditate upon this and other natural questions4 ,it troubles him much that ,i style ,school-learning jargon4 ,i do not call all ,school-learning so1 but such as is so2 that is1 that which they say in defending of untruths1 and especially in the maintenance of free-will1 when they talk of liberty of exercise1 specification1 contrariety1 contradiction1 acts elicite and exercite and the like2 which1 though he go over again in this place1 endeavouring to explain them1 are still both here and there but jargon1 or that 7if he like it better7 which the ,scripture in the first chaos calleth ,tohu and ,bohu4 ,but because he takes it so heinously1 that a private man should so hardly censure ,school-divinity1 ,i would be glad to know with what patience he can hear ,martin ,luther and ,philip ,melancthon speaking of the same8 ,martin ,luther1 that was the first beginner of our deliverance from the servitude of the ,romish clergy1 had these three articles censured by the ,university of ,paris4 ,the first of which was3 8,school-theology is a false interpretation of the ,scripture1 and ,sacraments1 which hath banished from us true and sincere theology40 ,the second is3 8,at what time ,school-theology1 that is1 mock-theology1 came up1 at the same time the theology of ,christ's ,cross went down40 ,the third is3 8,it is now almost three hundred years since the ,church has endured the licentiousness of ,school-,doctors in corrupting of the ,scriptures40 ,moreover1 the same ,luther in another place of his work saith thus2 8,school-theology is nothing else but ignorance of the truth1 and a block to stumble at laid before the ,scriptures40 ,and of ,thomas ,aquinas in particular he saith1 that 8it was he that did set up the kingdom of ,aristotle1 the destroyer of godly doctrine40 ,and of the philosophy whereof ,st4 ,paul biddeth us beware1 he saith it is ,school-theology4 ,and ,melancthon1 a divine once much esteemed in our ,church1 saith of it thus3 8,it is known that that profane scholastic learning1 which they will have to be called ,divinity1 began at ,paris2 which being admitted1 nothing is left sound in the ,church1 the ,gospel is obscured1 faith extinguished1 the doctrine of works received1 and instead of ,christ's people1 we are become not so much as the people of the law1 but the people of ,aristotle's ethics ,these were no raw divines1 such as he saith preached to their equally ignorant auditors4 ,i could add to these the slighting of ,school-divinity by ,calvin and other learned ,protestant ,doctors2 yet were they all but private men1 who1 it seems to the ,bishop1 had forgot themselves as well as ,i4 ,,no4 ,v4 ,j4 ,d4 8,thus the coast being cleared1 the next thing to be done1 is to draw out our forces against the enemy2 and because they are divided into two squadrons1 the one of ,christians1 the other of heathen philosophers1 it will be best to dispose ours also into two bodies1 the former drawn from ,scripture1 the latter from reason40 ,t4 ,h4 ,the next thing he doth1 after the clearing of the coast1 is the dividing of his forces1 as he calls them1 into two squadrons1 one of places of ,scripture1 the other of reasons1 which allegory he useth1 ,i suppose1 because he addresses the discourse to your ,lordship1 who is a military man4 ,all that ,i have to say touching this1 is1 that ,i observe a great part of those his forces do look and march another way1 and some of them do fight among themselves4 ,j4 ,d4 8,if ,t4 ,h4 could divide my forces1 and commit them together among themselves1 it were his only way to conquer them4 ,but he will find that those imaginary contradictions1 which he thinks he hath espied in my discourse1 are but fancies1 and my supposed impertinences will prove his own real mistakings40 ,in this fifth number there is nothing of his or mine1 pertinent to the question1 therefore nothing necessary to be repeated4 ,,proofs ,,of ,,liberty ,,out ,,of ,,scripture4--,,no4 ,,vi4 ,sidenote3 ,the ,bishop's reply4 ,j4 ,d4 8,first1 whosoever have power of election1 have true liberty2 for the proper act of liberty is election4 ,a spontaneity may consist with determination to one1 as we see in children1 fools1 madmen1 brute beasts1 whose fancies are determined to those things which they act spontaneously1 as the bees make honey1 the spiders webs4 ,but none of these have a liberty of election1 which is an act of judgment and understanding1 and cannot possibly consist with a determination to one4 ,he that is determined by something before himself or without himself1 cannot be said to choose or elect1 unless it be as the junior of the mess chooseth in ,cambridge1 whether he will have the least part or nothing4 ,and scarcely so much4 8,but men have liberty of election4 ,this is plain1 7,numbers xxx4 #ac73 ,if a wife make a vow it is left to her husband's choice1 either to establish it or to make it void4 ,and 7,joshua xxiv4 #ae73 ,choose you this day whom you will serve1 c4 ,but ,i and my house will serve the ,lord4 ,he makes his own choice1 and leaves them to the liberty of their election4 ,and 7#b ,samuel xxiv4 #ab73 ,i offer thee three things1 choose thee which of them ,i shall do4 ,if one of these three things was necessarily determined1 and the other two impossible1 how was it left to him to choose what should be done8 ,therefore we have true liberty40 ,t4 ,h4 ,and the first place of ,scripture taken from ,numbers xxx4 #ac1 is one of them that look another way4 ,the words are1 ,if a wife make a vow it is left to her husband's choice1 either to establish it or make it void4 ,for it proves no more but that the husband is a free or voluntary agent1 but not that his choice therein is not necessitated or not determined to what he shall choose by precedent necessary causes4 ,j4 ,d4 8,my first argument from ,scripture is thus formed4 8,whosoever have a liberty or power of election1 are not determined to one by precedent necessary causes4 8,but men have liberty of election4 8,the assumption or minor proposition is proved by three places of ,scripture1 7,numbers xxx4 #ac2 ,joshua xxiv4 #ae2 #b ,samuel xxiv4 #ab47 ,i need not insist upon these1 because ,t4 ,h4 acknowledgeth #8that it is clearly proved that there is election in man4' 8,but he denieth the major proposition1 because1 saith he1 #8man is necessitated or determined to what he shall choose by precedent necessary causes4' ,i take away this answer three ways4 8,first1 by reason4 ,election is evermore either of things possible1 or at least of things conceived to be possible1 that is1 efficacious election1 when a man hopeth or thinketh of obtaining the object4 ,whatsoever the will chooseth1 it chooseth under the notion of good1 either honest1 or delightful1 or profitable4 ,but there can be no real goodness apprehended in that which is known to be impossible4 ,it is true1 there may be some wandering pendulous wishes of known impossibilities1 as a man also that hath committed an offence may wish he had not committed it4 ,but to choose efficaciously an impossibility1 is as impossible as an impossibility itself4 ,no man can think to obtain that which he knows impossible to be obtained2 but he who knows that all things are antecedently determined by necessary causes1 knows that it is impossible for anything to be otherwise than it is2 therefore to ascribe unto him a power of election to choose this or that indifferently1 is to make the same thing to be determined to one1 and to be not determined to one1 which are contradictories4 ,again1 whosoever hath an elective power1 or a liberty to choose1 hath also a liberty or power to refuse2 7,isaiah vii4 #af73 ,before the child shall know to refuse the evil and choose the good4 ,he who chooseth this rather than that1 refuseth that rather than this4 ,as ,moses 7,hebrews xi4 #be71 choosing to suffer affliction with the people of ,god1 did thereby refuse the pleasures of sin4 ,but no man hath any power to refuse that which is necessarily predetermined to be1 unless it be as the fox refused the grapes which were beyond his reach4 ,when one thing of two or three is absolutely determined1 the others are made thereby simply impossible4 7a7 8,secondly1 ,i prove it by instances1 and by that universal notion which the world hath of election4 ,what is the difference between an elective and hereditary kingdom1 but that in an elective kingdom1 they have power or liberty to choose this or that man indifferently2 but in an hereditary kingdom1 they have no such power nor liberty8 ,where the law makes a certain heir1 there is a necessitation to one2 where the law doth not name a certain heir1 there is no necessitation to one1 and there they have power or liberty to choose4 ,an hereditary prince may be as grateful and acceptable to his subjects1 and as willingly received by them 7according to that liberty which is opposed to compulsion or violence71 as he who is chosen3 yet he is not therefore an elective prince4 ,in ,germany all the nobility and commons may assent to the choice of the emperor1 or be well pleased with it when it is concluded2 yet none of them elect or choose the emperor1 but only those six princes who have a consultative1 deliberative1 and determinative power in his election2 and if their votes or suffrages be equally divided1 three to three1 then the ,king of ,bohemia hath the casting voice4 ,so likewise in corporations or commonwealths1 sometimes the people1 sometimes the common-council1 have power to name so many persons for such an office1 and the supreme magistrate1 or senate1 or lesser council respectively1 to choose one of those4 ,and all this is done with that caution and secresy1 by billets or other means1 that no man knows which way any man gave his vote1 or with whom to be offended4 ,if it were necessarily and inevitably predetermined1 that this individual person1 and no other1 shall and must be chosen1 what needed all this circuit and caution1 to do that which is not possible to be done otherwise1 which one may do as well as a thousand1 and for doing of which no rational man can be offended1 if the electors were necessarily predetermined to elect this man and no other4 ,and though ,t4 ,h4 was pleased to pass by my ,university instance1 yet ,i may not1 until ,i see what he is able to say unto it4 ,the junior of the mess in ,cambridge divides the meat in four parts2 the senior chooseth first1 then the second and third in their order4 ,the junior is determined to one1 and hath no choice left1 unless it be to choose whether he will take that part which the rest have refused1 or none at all4 ,it may be this part is more agreeable to his mind than any of the others would have been2 but for all that he cannot be said to choose it1 because he is determined to this one4 ,even such a liberty of election is that which is established by ,t4 ,h42 or rather much worse in two respects4 ,the junior hath yet a liberty of contradiction left1 to choose whether he will take that part1 or not take any part2 but he who is precisely predetermined to the choice of this object1 hath no liberty to refuse it4 ,secondly1 the junior1 by dividing carefully1 may preserve to himself an equal share2 but he who is wholly determined by extrinsical causes1 is left altogether to the mercy and disposition of another4 8,thirdly1 ,i prove it by the texts alleged4 7,numb4 xxx4 #ac73 ,if a wife make a vow1 it is left to her husband's choice1 either to establish it or make it void4 ,but if it be predetermined that he shall establish it1 it is not in his power to make it void4 ,if it be predetermined that he shall make it void1 it is not in his power to establish it4 ,and howsoever it be determined1 yet being determined1 it is not in his power indifferently1 either to establish it1 or to make it void at his pleasure4 ,so 7,joshua xxiv4 #ae73 ,choose you this day whom ye will serve3 but ,i and my house will serve the ,lord4 ,it is too late to choose that this day1 which was determined otherwise yesterday4 ,whom ye will serve1 whether the ,gods whom your fathers served1 or the ,gods of the ,amorites4 ,where there is an election of this or that1 these ,gods1 or those ,gods1 there must needs be either an indifferency to both objects1 or at least a possibility to either4 ,i and my house will serve the ,lord4 ,if he were extrinsically predetermined1 he should not say ,i will serve1 but ,i must serve4 ,and 7#b ,samuel xxiv4 #ab73 ,i offer thee three things1 choose thee which of them ,i shall do4 ,how doth ,god offer three things to ,david's choice1 if he had predetermined him to one of the three by a concourse of necessary extrinsical causes8 ,if a sovereign prince should descend so far as to offer a delinquent his choice1 whether he would be fined1 or imprisoned1 or banished1 and had underhand signed the sentence of his banishment1 what were it else but plain drollery or mockery8 ,this is the argument which in ,t4 ,h4's opinion looks another way4 ,if it do1 it is as the ,parthians used to fight1 flying4 ,his reason follows next to be considered40 ,,animadversions ,,upon ,,the ,,bishop',s ,,reply ,,no4 ,,vi4 ,in this number he hath brought three places of ,scripture to prove freewill4 ,the first is1 ,if a wife make a vow1 it is left to her husband's choice either to establish it or to make it void4 ,and1 ,choose you this day whom ye will serve1 c4 ,but ,i and my house will serve the ,lord4 ,and1 ,i offer thee three things1 choose thee which of them ,i shall do4 ,which in the reply he endeavoureth to make good2 but needed not1 seeing they prove nothing but that a man is free to do if he will1 which ,i deny not4 ,he ought to prove he is free to will1 which ,i deny4 7a7 ,secondly1 8,i prove it by instances1 and by that universal notion which the world hath of election40 ,his instances are1 first1 the difference between an hereditary kingdom and an elective2 and then the difference between the senior and junior of the mess taking their commons2 both which prove the liberty of doing what they will1 but not a liberty to will4 ,for in the first case1 the electors are free to name whom they will1 but not to will2 and in the second1 the senior having an appetite1 chooseth what he hath an appetite to2 but chooseth not his appetite4 ,,no4 ,,vii4 ,t4 ,h4 ,for if there came into the husband's mind greater good by establishing than abrogating such a vow1 the establishing will follow necessarily4 ,and if the evil that will follow thereon in the husband's opinion outweigh the good1 the contrary must needs follow4 ,and yet in this following of one's hopes and fears consisteth the nature of election4 ,so that a man may both choose this1 and cannot but choose this4 ,and consequently choosing and necessity are joined together4 ,sidenote3 ,the ,bishop's reply4 ,j4 ,d4 7a7 8,there is nothing said with more show of reason in this cause by the patrons of necessity and adversaries of true liberty than this1 that the will doth perpetually and infallibly follow the last dictate of the understanding1 or the last judgment of right reason4 ,and in this1 and this only1 ,i confess ,t4 ,h4 hath good seconds4 ,yet the common and approved opinion is contrary1 and justly4 8,for first1 this very act of the understanding is an effect of the will1 and a testimony of its power and liberty4 ,it is the will1 which affecting some particular good1 doth engage and command the understanding to consult and deliberate what means are convenient for attaining that end4 ,and though the will itself be blind1 yet its object is good in general1 which is the end of all human actions4 ,therefore it belongs to the will1 as to the general of an army1 to move the other powers of the soul to their acts1 and among the rest the understanding also1 by applying it and reducing its power into act4 ,so as whatsoever obligation the understanding doth put upon the will1 is by the consent of the will1 and derived from the power of the will1 which was not necessitated to move the understanding to consult4 ,so the will is the lady and mistress of human actions2 the understanding is her trusty counsellor1 which gives no advice but when it is required by the will4 ,and if the first consultation or deliberation be not sufficient1 the will may move a review1 and require the understanding to inform itself better and take advice of others1 from whence many times the judgment of the understanding doth receive alteration4 8,secondly1 for the manner how the understanding doth determine the will1 it is not naturally but morally4 ,the will is moved by the understanding1 not as by an efficient having a causal influence into the effect1 but only by proposing and representing the object4 ,and therefore1 as it were ridiculous to say that the object of the sight is the cause of seeing1 so it is to say that the proposing of the object by the understanding to the will is the cause of willing2 and therefore the understanding hath no place in that concourse of causes1 which according to ,t4 ,h4 do necessitate the will4 8,thirdly1 the judgment of the understanding is not always practice practicum1 nor of such a nature in itself as to oblige and determine the will to one4 ,sometimes1 the understanding proposeth two or three means equally available to the attaining of one and the same end4 ,sometimes1 it dictateth that this or that particular good is eligible or fit to be chosen1 but not that it is necessarily eligible or that it must be chosen4 ,it may judge this or that to be a fit means1 but not the only means to attain the desired end4 ,in these cases no man can doubt but that the will may choose1 or not choose1 this or that indifferently4 ,yea1 though the understanding shall judge one of these means to be more expedient than another1 yet forasmuch as in the less expedient there is found the reason of good1 the will in respect of that dominion which it hath over itself1 may accept that which the understanding judgeth to be less expedient1 and refuse that which it judgeth to be more expedient4 8,fourthly1 sometimes the will doth not will the end so efficaciously1 but that it may be1 and often is deterred from the prosecution of it by the difficulty of the means2 and notwithstanding the judgment of the understanding1 the will may still suspend its own act4 8,fifthly1 supposing1 but not granting1 that the will did necessarily follow the last dictate of the understanding1 yet this proves no antecedent necessity1 but coexistent with the act2 no extrinsical necessity1 the will and the understanding being but two faculties of the same soul2 no absolute necessity1 but merely upon supposition4 ,and therefore the same authors who maintain that the judgment of the understanding doth necessarily determine the will1 do yet much more earnestly oppugn ,t4 ,h4's absolute necessity of all occurrences4 ,suppose the will shall apply the understanding to deliberate and not require a review4 ,suppose the dictate of the understanding shall be absolute1 not this or that indifferently1 nor this rather than that comparatively1 but this positively2 nor this freely1 but this necessarily4 ,and suppose the will do will efficaciously1 and do not suspend its own act4 ,then here is a necessity indeed1 but neither absolute nor extrinsical1 nor antecedent1 flowing from a concourse of causes without ourselves1 but a necessity upon supposition1 which we do readily grant4 ,so far ,t4 ,h4 is wide from the truth1 whilst he maintains1 either that the apprehension of a greater good doth necessitate the will1 or that this is an absolute necessity4 7b7 8,lastly1 whereas he saith1 that #8the nature of election doth consist in following our hopes and fears1' ,i cannot but observe that there is not one word of art in this whole treatise which he useth in the right sense2 ,i hope it doth not proceed out of an affectation of singularity1 nor out of a contempt of former writers1 nor out of a desire to take in sunder the whole frame of learning and new mould it after his own mind4 ,it were to be wished that at least he would give us a new dictionary1 that we might understand his sense4 ,but because this is but touched here sparingly1 and upon the by1 ,i will forbear it until ,i meet with it again in its proper place4 ,and for the present it shall suffice to say1 that hopes and fears are common to brute beasts1 but election is a rational act1 and is proper only to man1 who is sanctius his animal1 mentisque capacius alt4 ,t4 ,h4 ,the second place of ,scripture is ,joshua xxiv4 #ae2 the third is #b ,samuel xxiv4 #ab2 whereby it is clearly proved1 that there is election in man1 but not proved that such election was not necessitated by the hopes1 and fears1 and considerations of good and bad to follow1 which depend not on the will nor are subject to election4 ,and therefore one answer serves all such places1 if they were a thousand4 ,j4 ,d4 8,this answer being the very same with the former1 word for word1 which hath already sufficiently been shaken in pieces1 doth require no new reply4 ,,animadversions ,,upon ,,the ,,bishop',s ,,reply ,,no4 ,,vii4 7a7 8,there is nothing said with more show of reason in this cause by the patrons of necessity than this1 #8that the will doth perpetually and infallibly follow the last dictate of the understanding1 or the last judgment of right reason1' c4 ,yet the common and approved opinion is contrary1 and justly2 for1 first1 this very act of the understanding is an effect of the will1 c40 ,i note here1 first1 that the ,bishop is mistaken in saying that ,i or any other patron of necessity1 are of opinion that the will follows always the last judgment of right reason4 ,for it followeth as well the judgment of an erroneous as of a true reasoning2 and the truth in general is that it followeth the last opinion of the goodness or evilness of the object1 be the opinion true or false4 ,secondly1 ,i note1 that in making the understanding to be an effect of the will1 he thinketh a man may have a will to that which he not so much as thinks on4 ,and in saying1 that 8it is the will which1 affecting some particular good1 doth engage and command the understanding to consult10 c1 that he not only thinketh the will affecteth a particular good1 before the man understands it to be good2 but also he thinketh that these words 8doth command the understanding10 and these1 8for it belongs to the will as to the general of an army1 to move the other powers of the soul to their acts10 and a great many more that follow1 are sense1 which they are not1 but mere confusion and emptiness3 as1 for example1 8the understanding doth determine the will1 not naturally1 but morally10 and 8the will is moved by the understanding10 is unintelligible4 8,moved not as by an efficient10 is nonsense4 ,and where he saith1 that 8it is ridiculous to say the object of the sight is the cause of seeing10 he showeth so clearly that he understandeth nothing at all of natural philosophy1 that ,i am sorry ,i had the ill fortune to be engaged with him in a dispute of this kind4 ,there is nothing that the simplest countryman could say so absurdly concerning the understanding1 as this of the ,bishop1 8the judgment of the understanding is not always practice practicum40 ,a countryman will acknowledge there is judgment in men1 but will as soon say the judgment of the judgment1 as the judgment of the understanding4 ,and if practice practicum had been sense1 he might have made a shift to put it into ,english4 ,much more followeth of this stuff4 7b7 8,lastly1 whereas he saith1 #8that the nature of election doth consist in following our hopes and fears1' ,i cannot but observe that there is not one word of art in this whole treatise which he useth in the right sense4 ,i hope it doth not proceed out of an affectation of singularity1 nor out of a contempt of former writers10 c4 ,he might have said1 there is not a word of jargon nor nonsense2 and that it proceedeth from an affectation of truth1 and contempt of metaphysical writers1 and a desire to reduce into frame the learning which they have confounded and disordered4 ,,no4 ,,viii4 ,t4 ,h4 ,supposing1 it seems1 ,i might answer as ,i have done1 that necessity and election might stand together1 and instance in the actions of children1 fools1 and brute beasts1 whose fancies1 ,i might say1 are necessitated and determined to one3 before these his proofs out of ,scripture1 he desires to prevent that instance1 and therefore says1 that the actions of children1 fools1 madmen1 and beasts1 are indeed determined1 but that they proceed not from election1 nor from free1 but from spontaneous agents4 ,as for example1 that the bee1 when it maketh honey1 does it spontaneously2 and when the spider makes his web1 he does it spontaneously1 and not by election4 ,though ,i never meant to ground any answer upon the experience of what children1 fools1 madmen1 and beasts do1 yet that your ,lordship may understand what can be meant by spontaneous1 and how it differs from voluntary1 ,i will answer that distinction1 and show that it fighteth against its fellow arguments4 ,your ,lordship therefore is to consider1 that all voluntary actions1 where the thing that induceth the will is not fear1 are called also spontaneous1 and said to be done by a man's own accord4 ,as when a man giveth money voluntarily to another for merchandise1 or out of affection1 he is said to do it of his own accord1 which in ,latin is sponte1 and therefore the action is spontaneous2 though to give one's money willingly to a thief to avoid killing1 or throw it into the sea to avoid drowning1 where the motive is fear1 be not called spontaneous4 ,but every spontaneous action is not therefore voluntary2 for voluntary presupposes some precedent deliberation1 that is to say1 some consideration and meditation of what is likely to follow1 both upon the doing and abstaining from the action deliberated of2 whereas many actions are done of our own accord1 and are therefore spontaneous2 of which nevertheless1 as he thinks1 we never consulted nor deliberated in ourselves1 as when making no question nor any the least doubt in the world but that the thing we are about is good1 we eat1 or walk1 or in anger strike or revile1 which he thinks spontaneous1 but not voluntary nor elective actions4 ,and with such kind of actions he says necessitation may stand1 but not with such as are voluntary1 and proceed upon election and deliberation4 ,now if ,i make it appear to you that even these actions which he says proceed from spontaneity1 and which he ascribes only to fools1 children1 madmen1 and beasts1 proceed from deliberation and election1 and that actions inconsiderate1 rash and spontaneous1 are ordinarily found in those that are1 by themselves and many more1 thought as wise or wiser than ordinary men are2 then his argument concludeth1 that necessity and election may stand together1 which is contrary to that which he intendeth by all the rest of his arguments to prove4 ,and first1 your ,lordship's own experience furnishes you with proof enough1 that horses1 dogs1 and other brute beasts1 do demur oftentimes upon the way they are to take3 the horse1 retiring from some strange figure he sees1 and coming on again to avoid the spur4 ,and what else doth man that deliberateth1 but one while proceed toward action1 another while retire from it1 as the hope of greater good draws him1 or the fear of greater evil drives him8 ,a child may be so young as to do all which it does without all deliberation1 but that is but till it chance to be hurt by doing somewhat1 or till it be of age to understand the rod2 for the actions wherein he hath once a check1 shall be deliberated on a second time4 ,fools and madmen manifestly deliberate no less than the wisest men1 though they make not so good a choice1 the images of things being by diseases altered4 ,for bees and spiders1 if he had so little to do as to be a spectator of their actions1 he would have confessed not only election1 but also art1 prudence1 and policy in them1 very near equal to that of mankind4 ,of bees ,aristotle says1 their life is civil4 ,he is deceived1 if he think any spontaneous action1 after once being checked in it1 differs from an action voluntary and elective1 for even the setting of a man's foot in the posture of walking1 and the action of ordinary eating1 was once deliberated1 how and when it should be done2 and though it afterwards became easy and habitual1 so as to be done without fore-thought1 yet that does not hinder but that the act is voluntary and proceeds from election4 ,so also are the rashest actions of choleric persons voluntary and upon deliberation4 ,for who is there1 but very young children1 that has not considered when and how far he ought1 or safely may1 strike or revile4 ,seeing then he agrees with me that such actions are necessitated1 and the fancy of those that do them is determined to the actions they do1 it follows out of his own doctrine1 that the liberty of election does not take away the necessity of electing this or that individual thing4 ,and thus one of his arguments fights against another4 ,sidenote3 ,the ,bishop's reply4 ,j4 ,d4 8,we have partly seen before how ,t4 ,h4 hath coined a new kind of liberty1 a new kind of necessity1 a new kind of election2 and now in this section a new kind of spontaneity1 and a new kind of voluntary actions4 ,although he say that here is nothing new to him1 yet ,i begin to suspect that either here are many things new to him1 or otherwise his election is not the result of a serious mature deliberation4 7a7 ,the first thing that ,i offer1 is1 how often he mistakes my meaning in this one section4 ,first1 ,i make voluntary and spontaneous actions to be one and the same2 he saith1 ,i distinguish them1 so as spontaneous actions may be necessary1 but voluntary actions cannot4 ,secondly1 7b7 ,i distinguish between free acts and voluntary acts4 ,the former are always deliberate1 the latter may be indeliberate2 all free acts are voluntary1 but all voluntary acts are not free4 ,but he saith ,i confound them and make them the same4 7c7 ,thirdly1 he saith1 ,i ascribe spontaneity only to fools1 children1 madmen1 and beasts2 but ,i acknowledge spontaneity hath place in rational men1 both as it is comprehended in liberty1 and as it is distinguished from liberty4 7d7 8,yet ,i have no reason to be offended at it2 for he deals no otherwise with me than he doth with himself4 ,here he tells us that #8voluntary presupposeth deliberation4' ,but 7,no4 ,,xxv47 he tells us contrary1 #8that whatsoever followeth the last appetite is voluntary1 and where there is but one appetite1 that is the last3' and that #8no action of a man can be said to be without deliberation1 though never so sudden4' ,so 7,no4 ,,xxxiii47 he tells us1 that #8by spontaneity is meant inconsiderate proceeding1 or else nothing is meant by it3' yet here he tells us1 that #8all voluntary actions which proceed not from fear1 are spontaneous1' whereof many are deliberate1 as that wherein he instanceth himself1 #8to give money for merchandise4' ,thirdly1 when ,i said that children1 before they have the use of reason1 act spontaneously1 as when they suck the breast1 but do not act freely1 because they have not judgment to deliberate or elect1 here ,t4 ,h4 undertakes to prove that they do deliberate and elect2 and yet presently after confesseth again1 that #8a child may be so young1 as to do what it doth without all deliberation4' 8,besides these mistakes and contradictions1 he hath other errors also in this section4 ,as this1 that no actions proceeding from fear are spontaneous4 ,he who throws his goods into the sea to avoid drowning1 doth it not only spontaneously1 but even freely4 ,he that wills the end1 wills the means conducing to that end4 ,it is true that if the action be considered nakedly without all circumstances1 no man willingly or spontaneously casts his goods into the sea4 ,but if we take the action1 as in this particular case1 invested with all the circumstances1 and in order to the end1 that is1 the saving of his own life1 it is not only voluntary and spontaneous1 but elective and chosen by him1 as the most probable means for his own preservation4 ,as there is an antecedent and a subsequent will1 so there is an antecedent and a subsequent spontaneity4 ,his grammatical argument1 grounded upon the derivation of spontaneous from sponte1 weighs nothing2 we have learned in the rudiments of logic1 that conjugates are sometimes in name only1 and not in deed4 ,he who casts his goods into the sea1 may do it of his own accord in order to the end4 ,secondly1 he errs in this also1 that nothing is opposed to spontaneity but only fear4 ,invincible and antecedent ignorance doth destroy the nature of spontaneity or voluntariness1 by removing that knowledge which should and would have prohibited the action4 ,as a man thinking to shoot a wild beast in a bush1 shoots his friend1 which if he had known1 he would not have shot4 ,this man did not kill his friend of his own accord4 8,for the clearer understanding of these things1 and to know what spontaneity is1 let us consult awhile with the ,schools about the distinct order of voluntary or involuntary actions4 ,some acts proceed wholly from an extrinsical cause2 as the throwing of a stone upwards1 a rape1 or the drawing of a ,christian by plain force to the idol's temple2 these are called violent acts4 ,secondly1 some proceed from an intrinsical cause1 but without any manner of knowledge of the end1 as the falling of a stone downwards2 these are called natural acts4 ,thirdly1 some proceed from an internal principle1 with an imperfect knowledge of the end1 where there is an appetite to the object1 but no deliberation nor election2 as the acts of fools1 children1 beasts1 and the inconsiderate acts of men of judgment4 ,these are called voluntary or spontaneous acts4 ,fourthly1 some proceed from an intrinsical cause1 with a more perfect knowledge of the end1 which are elected upon deliberation4 ,these are called free acts4 ,so then the formal reason of liberty is election4 ,the necessary requisite to election is deliberation4 ,deliberation implyeth the actual use of reason4 ,but deliberation and election cannot possibly subsist with an extrinsical predetermination to one4 ,how should a man deliberate or choose which way to go1 who knows that all ways are shut against him and made impossible to him1 but only one8 ,this is the genuine sense of these words voluntary and spontaneous in this question4 ,though they were taken twenty other ways vulgarly or metaphorically1 as we say spontaneous ulcers1 where there is no appetite at all1 yet it were nothing to this controversy1 which is not about words1 but about things2 not what the words voluntary or free do or may signify1 but whether all things be extrinsically predetermined to one4 8,these grounds being laid for clearing the true sense of the words1 the next thing to be examined is1 that contradiction which he hath espied in my discourse1 or how this argument fights against his fellows4 #8,if ,i1' saith ,t4 ,h41 #8make it appear1 that the spontaneous actions of fools1 children1 madmen1 and beasts1 do proceed from election and deliberation1 and that inconsiderate and indeliberate actions are found in the wisest men1 then this argument concludes that necessity and election may stand together1 which is contrary to his assertion4' ,if this could be made appear as easily as it is spoken1 it would concern himself much1 who1 when he should prove that rational men are not free from necessity1 goes about to prove that brute beasts do deliberate and elect1 that is as much as to say1 are free from necessity4 ,but it concerns not me at all2 it is neither my assertion nor my opinion1 that necessity and election may not meet together in the same subject2 violent1 natural1 spontaneous1 and deliberate or elective acts may all meet together in the same subject4 ,but this ,i say1 that necessity and election cannot consist together in the same act4 ,he who is determined to one1 is not free to choose out of more than one4 ,to begin with his latter supposition1 #8that wise men may do inconsiderate and indeliberate actions1' ,i do readily admit it4 ,but where did he learn to infer a general conclusion from particular premises2 as thus1 because wise men do some indeliberate acts1 therefore no act they do is free or elective8 ,secondly1 for his former supposition1 #8that fools1 children1 madmen1 and beasts1 do deliberate and elect1' if he could make it good1 it is not ,i who contradict myself1 nor fight against mine own assertion1 but it is he who endeavours to prove that which ,i altogether deny4 ,he may well find a contradiction between him and me2 otherwise to what end is this dispute8 ,but he shall not be able to find a difference between me and myself4 ,but the truth is1 he is not able to prove any such thing2 and that brings me to my sixth consideration1 that neither horses1 nor bees1 nor spiders1 nor children1 nor fools1 nor madmen do deliberate or elect4 8,his first instance is in the horse1 or dog1 but more especially the horse4 ,he told me that ,i divided my argument into squadrons1 to apply myself to your ,lordship1 being a military man2 and ,i apprehend that for the same reason he gives his first instance of the horse1 with a submission to your own experience4 ,so far well1 but otherwise very disadvantageously to his cause4 ,men used to say of a dull fellow1 that he hath no more brains than a horse4 ,and the ,prophet ,david saith1 7,psalm xxxii4 #i73 ,be not like the horse and mule1 which have no understanding4 ,how do they deliberate without understanding8 ,and 7,psalm xlix4 #bj71 he saith the same of all brute beasts3 ,man being in honour had no understanding1 but became like unto the beasts that perish4 ,the horse #8demurs upon his way4' ,why not8 ,outward objects1 or inward fancies1 may produce a stay in his course1 though he have no judgment either to deliberate or elect4 #8,he retires from some strange figure which he sees1 and comes on again to avoid the spur4' ,so he may2 and yet be far enough from deliberation4 ,all this proceeds from the sensitive passion of fear1 which is a perturbation arising from the expectation of some imminent evil4 ,but he urgeth1 #8what else doth a man that deliberateth8' ,yes1 very much4 ,the horse feareth some outward object1 but deliberation is a comparing of several means conducing to the same end4 ,fear is commonly of one1 deliberation of more than one2 fear is of those things which are not in our power1 deliberation of those things which are in our power2 fear ariseth many times out of natural antipathies1 but in these disconveniences of nature deliberation hath no place at all4 ,in a word1 fear is an enemy to deliberation1 and betrayeth the succours of the soul4 ,if the horse did deliberate1 he should consult with reason1 whether it were more expedient for him to go that way or not2 he would represent to himself all the dangers both of going and staying1 and compare the one with the other1 and elect that which is less evil2 he should consider whether it were not better to endure a little hazard1 than ungratefully and dishonestly to fail in his duty towards his master1 who did breed him and doth feed him4 ,this the horse doth not2 neither is it possible for him to do it4 ,secondly1 for children1 ,t4 ,h4 confesseth that they may be so young that they do not deliberate at all2 afterwards1 as they attain to the use of reason by degrees1 so by degrees they become free agents4 ,then they do deliberate2 before they do not deliberate4 ,the rod may be a means to make them use their reason1 when they have power to exercise it1 but the rod cannot produce the power before they have it4 ,thirdly1 for fools and madmen1 it is not to be understood of such madmen as have their lucida intervalla1 who are mad and discreet by fits2 when they have the use of reason1 they are no madmen1 but may deliberate as well as others2 nor yet of such fools as are only comparative fools1 that is1 less wise than others4 ,such may deliberate1 though not so clearly1 nor so judiciously as others2 but of mere madmen1 and mere natural fools1 to say that they1 who have not the use of reason1 do deliberate or use reason1 implies a contradiction4 ,but his chiefest confidence is in his bees and spiders1 #8of whose actions1' he saith1 #8if ,i had been a spectator1 ,i would have confessed1 not only election1 but also art1 prudence1 policy1 very near equal to that of mankind1 whose life1 as ,aristotle saith1 is civil4' ,truly ,i have contemplated their actions many times1 and have been much taken with their curious works2 yet my thoughts did not reflect so much upon them1 as upon their ,maker1 who is sic magnus in magnis1 that he is not minor in parvis2 so great in great things1 that he is not less in small things4 ,yes1 ,i have seen those silliest of creatures1 and seeing their rare works ,i have seen enough to confute all the bold-faced atheists of this age1 and their hellish blasphemies4 ,i saw them1 but ,i praised the marvellous works of ,god1 and admired that great and first intellect1 who hath both adapted their organs1 and determined their fancies to these particular works4 ,i was not so simple as to ascribe those rarities to their own invention1 which ,i knew to proceed from a mere instinct of nature4 ,in all other things they are the dullest of creatures4 ,naturalists write of bees1 that their fancy is imperfect1 not distinct from their common-sense1 spread over their whole body1 and only perceiving things present4 ,when ,aristotle calls them political or sociable creatures1 he did not intend it really that they lived a civil life1 but according to an analogy1 because they do such things by instinct as truly political creatures do out of judgment4 ,nor when ,i read in ,st4 ,ambrose of their hexagons or sexangular cells1 did ,i therefore conclude that they were mathematicians4 ,nor when ,i read in ,crespet1 that they invoke ,god to their aid when they go out of their hives1 bending their thighs in form of a cross1 and bowing themselves2 did ,i therefore think that this was an act of religious piety1 or that they were capable of theological virtues1 whom ,i see in all other things in which their fancies are not determined1 to be the silliest of creatures1 strangers not only to right reason1 but to all resemblances of it4 8,seventhly1 concerning those actions which are done upon precedent and passed deliberations2 they are not only spontaneous1 but free acts4 ,habits contracted by use and experience1 do help the will to act with more facility and more determinately1 as the hand of the artificer is helped by his tools4 ,and precedent deliberations1 if they were sad and serious1 and proved by experience to be profitable1 do save the labour of subsequent consultations2 frustra fit per plura1 quod fieri potest per pauciora4 ,yet nevertheless the actions which are done by virtue of these formerly acquired habits1 are no less free1 than if the deliberation were coexistent with this particular action4 ,he that hath gained an habit and skill to play such a lesson1 needs not a new deliberation how to play every time that he plays it over and over4 ,yet ,i am far from giving credit to him in this1 that walking or eating universally considered1 are free actions1 or proceed from true liberty2 not so much because they want a particular deliberation before every individual act1 as because they are animal motions and need no deliberation of reason1 as we see in brute beasts4 ,and nevertheless the same actions1 as they are considered individually1 and invested with their due circumstances1 may be and often are free actions subjected to the liberty of the agent4 8,lastly1 whereas ,t4 ,h4 compareth the first motions or rash attempts of choleric persons with such acquired habits1 it is a great mistake4 ,those rash attempts are voluntary actions1 and may be facilitated sometimes by acquired habits4 ,but yet for as much as actions are often altered and varied by the circumstances of time1 place1 and person1 so as that act which at one time is morally good1 at another time may be morally evil2 and for as much as a general precedent deliberation how to do this kind of action1 is not sufficient to make this or that particular action good or expedient1 which being in itself good1 yet particular circumstances may render inconvenient or unprofitable to some persons1 at some times1 in some places3 therefore a precedent general deliberation how to do any act1 as for instance1 how to write1 is not sufficient to make a particular act1 as my writing this individual reply1 to be freely done1 without a particular and subsequent deliberation4 ,a man learns ,french advisedly2 that is a free act4 ,the same man in his choler and passion reviles his friend in ,french1 without any deliberation2 this is a spontaneous act1 but it is not a free act4 ,if he had taken time to advise1 he would not have reviled his friend4 ,yet as it is not free1 so neither is it so necessary as the bees making honey1 whose fancy is not only inclined1 but determined1 by nature to that act4 ,so every way he fails4 ,and his conclusion1 that the liberty of election doth not take away the necessity of electing this or that individual thing1 is no consequent from my doctrine1 but from his own4 ,neither do my arguments fight one against another1 but his private opinions fight both against me and against an undoubted truth4 ,a free agent endowed with liberty of election1 or with an elective power1 may nevertheless be necessitated in some individual acts1 but those acts wherein he is necessitated1 do not flow from his elective power1 neither are those acts which flow from his elective power necessitated40 ,,animadversions ,,upon ,,the ,,bishop',s ,,reply ,,no4 ,,viii4 7a7 8,the first thing that ,i offer is1 how often he mistakes my meaning in this one section4 ,first1 ,i make voluntary and spontaneous actions to be one and the same4 ,he saith1 ,i distinguish them10 c4 ,it is very possible ,i may have mistaken him2 for neither he nor ,i understand him4 ,if they be one1 why did he without need bring in this strange word1 spontaneous8 ,or rather1 why did the ,schoolmen bring it in1 if not merely to shift off the difficulty of maintaining their tenet of free-will8 7b7 8,secondly1 he saith ,i distinguish between free acts and voluntary acts2 but he saith1 ,i confound them and make them the same40 ,in his reply ,no4 ,,ii1 he saith1 that for the clearing of the question1 we are to know the difference between these three1 necessity1 spontaneity1 and liberty2 and because ,i thought he knew that it could not be cleared without understanding what is will1 ,i had reason to think that spontaneity was his new word for will4 ,and presently after1 8some things are necessary1 and not voluntary or spontaneous2 some things are both necessary and voluntary40 ,these words1 voluntary and spontaneous1 so put together1 would make any man believe spontaneous were put as explicative of voluntary2 for it is no wonder in the eloquence of the ,schoolmen4 ,therefore1 presently after1 these words1 8spontaneity consists in a conformity of the appetite1 either intellectual or sensitive10 signify that spontaneity is a conformity or likeness of the appetite to the object2 which to me soundeth as if he had said1 that the appetite is like the object2 which is as proper as if he had said1 the hunger is like the meat4 ,if this be the bishop's meaning1 as it is the meaning of the words1 he is a very fine philosopher4 ,but hereafter ,i will venture no more to say his meaning is this or that1 especially where he useth terms of art4 7c7 8,thirdly1 he saith1 ,i ascribe spontaneity only to fools1 children1 madmen1 and beasts4 ,but ,i acknowledge spontaneity hath place in rational men10 c4 ,i resolve to have no more to do with spontaneity4 ,but ,i desire the reader to take notice1 that the common people1 on whose arbitration dependeth the signification of words in common use1 among the ,latins and ,greeks did call all actions and motions whereof they did perceive no cause1 spontaneous and 3 ,i say1 not those actions which had no causes2 for all actions have their causes2 but those actions whose causes they did not perceive4 ,so that spontaneous1 as a general name1 comprehended many actions and motions of inanimate creatures2 as the falling of heavy things downwards1 which they thought spontaneous1 and that if they were not hindered1 they would descend of their own accord4 ,it comprehended also all animal motion1 as beginning from the will or appetite2 because the causes of the will and appetite being not perceived1 they supposed1 as the ,bishop doth1 that they were the causes of themselves4 ,so that which in general is called spontaneous1 being applied to men and beasts in special1 is called voluntary4 ,yet the will and appetite1 though the very same thing1 use to be distinguished in certain occasions4 ,for in the public conversation of men1 where they are to judge of one another's will1 and of the regularity and irregularity of one another's actions1 not every appetite1 but the last is esteemed in the public judgment for the will3 nor every action proceeding from appetite1 but that only to which there had preceded or ought to have preceded some deliberation4 ,and this ,i say is so1 when one man is to judge of another's will4 ,for every man in himself knoweth that what he desireth or hath an appetite to1 the same he hath a will to1 though his will may be changed before he hath obtained his desire4 ,the ,bishop1 understanding nothing of this1 might1 if it had pleased him1 have called it jargon4 ,but he had rather pick out of it some contradictions of myself4 ,and therefore saith3 7d7 8,yet ,i have no reason to be offended at it1 7meaning such contradictions71 for he dealeth no otherwise with me than he doth with himself40 ,it is a contradiction1 he saith1 that having said that 8voluntary presupposeth deliberation10 ,i say in another place1 8that whatsoever followeth the last appetite1 is voluntary1 and where there is but one appetite1 that is the last40 ,not observing that voluntary presupposeth deliberation1 when the judgment1 whether the action be voluntary or not1 is not in the actor1 but in the judge2 who regardeth not the will of the actor1 where there is nothing to be accused in the action of deliberate malice2 yet knoweth that though there be but one appetite1 the same is truly will for the time1 and the action1 if it follow1 a voluntary action4 ,this also he saith is a contradiction1 that having said1 8no action of a man can be said to be without deliberation1 though never so sudden10 ,i say afterward that 8by spontaneity is meant inconsiderate proceeding40 ,again he observes not1 that the action of a man that is not a child1 in public judgment how rash1 inconsiderate1 and sudden soever it be1 it is to be taken for deliberation2 because it is supposed1 he ought to have considered and compared his intended action with the law2 when1 nevertheless1 that sudden and indeliberate action was truly voluntary4 ,another contradiction which he finds is this1 that having undertaken to prove 8that children before they have the use of reason do deliberate and elect10 ,i say by and by after a 8child may be so young as to do what he doth without all deliberation40 ,i yet see no contradiction here2 for a child may be so young1 as that the appetite thereof is its first appetite1 but afterward and often before it come to have the use of reason1 may elect one thing and refuse another1 and consider the consequences of what it is about to do4 ,and why not as well as beasts1 which never have the use of reason2 for they deliberate1 as men do8 ,for though men and beasts do differ in many things very much1 yet they differ not in the nature of their deliberation4 ,a man can reckon by words of general signification1 make propositions1 and syllogisms1 and compute in numbers1 magnitudes1 proportions1 and other things computable2 which being done by the advantage of language1 and words of general significations1 a beast that hath not language cannot do1 nor a man that hath language1 if he misplace the words1 that are his counters4 ,from hence to the end of this number1 he discourseth again of spontaneity1 and how it is in children1 madmen1 and beasts2 which1 as ,i before resolved1 ,i will not meddle with2 let the reader think and judge of it as he pleaseth4 ,,no4 ,,ix4 ,sidenote3 ,the ,bishop's reply4 ,j4 ,d4 8,secondly1 7a7 they who might have done1 and may do1 many things which they leave undone2 and they who leave undone many things which they might do1 are neither compelled nor necessitated to do what they do1 but have true liberty4 ,but we might do many things which we do not1 and we do many things which we might leave undone1 as is plain1 7#a ,kings iii4 #aa73 ,because thou hast asked this thing1 and hast not asked for thyself long life1 neither hast asked riches for thyself1 nor hast asked the life of thine enemies c4 ,god gave ,solomon his choice4 ,he might have asked riches1 but then he had not asked wisdom1 which he did ask4 ,he did ask wisdom1 but he might have asked riches1 which yet he did not ask4 ,and 7,acts v4 #d73 ,after it was sold1 was it not in thine own power8 ,it was in his own power to give it1 and it was in his own power to retain it4 ,yet if he did give it1 he could not retain it2 and if he did retain it1 he could not give it4 ,therefore we may do1 what we do not4 ,and we do not1 what we might do4 ,that is1 we have true liberty from necessity40 ,t4 ,h4 ,the second argument from ,scripture consisteth in histories of men that did one thing1 when1 if they would1 they might have done another4 ,the places are two2 one is in #a ,kings iii4 #aa1 where the history says1 ,god was pleased that ,solomon1 who might1 if he would1 have asked riches or revenge1 did nevertheless ask wisdom at ,god's hands4 ,the other is the words of ,st4 ,peter to ,ananias1 7,acts v4 #d73 ,after it was sold1 was it not in thine own power8 ,to which the answer is the same with that ,i answered to the former places3 that they prove that there is election1 but do not disprove the necessity which ,i maintain of what they so elect4 8,we have had the very same answer twice before4 ,it seemeth that he is well-pleased with it1 or else he would not draw it in again so suddenly by head and shoulders to no purpose1 if he did not conceive it to be a panchreston1 a salve for all sores1 or dictamnum1 sovereign dittany1 to make all his adversaries' weapons to drop out of the wounds of his cause1 only by chewing it1 without any application to the sore4 ,i will not waste the time to show any further1 how the members of his distinction do cross one another1 and one take away another4 ,to make every election to be of one thing imposed by necessity1 and of another thing which is absolutely impossible1 is to make election to be no election at all4 ,but ,i forbear to press that at present4 ,if ,i may be bold to use his own phrase1 his answer looks quite another way from mine argument4 ,my second reason was this3 #8,they who may do1 and might have done many things which they leave undone1 and who leave undone many things which they might do1 are not necessitated1 nor precisely and antecedently determined to what they do4' 8,but we might do many things which we do not1 and we do many things which we might leave undone1 as appears evidently by the texts alleged4 ,therefore we are not antecedently and precisely determined1 nor necessitated to do all things which we do4 ,what is here of election in this argument8 ,to what proposition1 to what term doth ,t4 ,h4 apply his answer8 ,he neither affirms1 nor denieth1 nor distinguisheth of any thing contained in my argument4 ,here ,i must be bold to call upon him for a more pertinent answer40 ,,animadversions ,,upon ,,the ,,bishop',s ,,reply ,,no4 ,,ix4 ,the ,bishop1 for the proving of free-will1 had alleged this text3 ,because thou hast asked this thing1 and hast not asked for thyself long life1 c4 ,and another1 7,acts v4 #d73 ,after it was sold1 was it not in thine own power8 ,out of which he infers1 there was no necessity that ,solomon should ask wisdom rather than long life1 nor that ,ananias should tell a lie concerning the price for which he sold his land3 and my answer1 that they prove election1 but disprove not the necessity of election1 satisfieth him not2 because1 saith he1 7a7 8they who might have done what they left undone1 and left undone what they might have done1 are not necessitated40 ,but how doth he know 7understanding power properly taken7 that ,solomon had a real power to ask long life8 ,no doubt ,solomon knew nothing to the contrary2 but yet it was possible that ,god might have hindered him4 ,for though ,god gave ,solomon his choice1 that is1 the thing which he should choose1 it doth not follow1 that he did not also give him the act of election4 ,and for the other text1 where it is said1 that the price of the land was in ,ananias's power1 the word power signifieth no more than the word right1 that is1 the right to do with his own what he pleased1 which is not a real and natural power1 but a civil power made by covenant4 ,and therefore the former answer is sufficient1 that though such places are clear enough to prove election1 they have no strength at all to take away necessity4 ,,no4 ,x4 ,sidenote3 ,the ,bishop's reply4 ,j4 ,d4 8,thirdly1 if there be no true liberty1 but all things come to pass by inevitable necessity1 then what are all those interrogations1 and objurgations1 and reprehensions1 and expostulations1 which we find so frequently in holy ,scriptures1 7be it spoken with all due respect71 but feigned and hypocritical exaggerations8 ,hast thou eaten of the tree1 whereof ,i commanded that thou shouldst not eat8 7,gen4 iii4 #aa47 ,and 7verse #ac7 he saith to ,eve1 ,why hast thou done this8 ,and 7,gen4 iv4 #f7 to ,cain1 ,why art thou wroth1 and why is thy countenance cast down8 ,and1 7,ezech4 xviii4 #ca73 ,why will ye die1 ,o house of ,israel8 ,doth ,god command openly not to eat1 and yet secretly by himself or by the second causes necessitate him to eat8 ,doth he reprehend him for doing that1 which he hath antecedently determined that he must do8 ,doth he propose things under impossible conditions8 ,or were not this plain mockery and derision8 ,doth a loving master chide his servant because he doth not come at his call1 and yet knows that the poor servant is chained and fettered1 so as he cannot move1 by the master's own order1 without the servant's default or consent8 ,they who talk here of a twofold will of ,god1 secret and revealed1 and the one opposite to the other1 understand not what they say4 ,these two wills concern several persons4 ,the secret will of ,god1 is what he will do himself2 the revealed will of ,god1 is what he would have us to do2 it may be the secret will of ,god to take away the life of the father1 yet it is ,god's revealed will that his son should wish his life and pray for his life4 ,here is no contradiction1 where the agents are distinct4 ,but for the same person to command one thing1 and yet to necessitate him that is commanded to do another thing2 to chide a man for doing that1 which he hath determined inevitably and irresistibly that he must do2 this were 7,i am afraid to utter what they are not afraid to assert7 the highest dissimulation4 ,god's chiding proves man's liberty40 ,t4 ,h4 ,to the third and fifth arguments1 ,i shall make but one answer4 ,j4 ,d4 7a7 8,certainly distinct arguments1 as the third and fifth are1 the one drawn from the truth of ,god1 the other from the justice of ,god1 the one from his objurgations and reprehensions1 the other from his judgments after life1 did require distinct answers4 ,but the plain truth is1 that neither here1 nor in his answer to the fifth argument1 nor in this whole treatise1 is there one word of solution or satisfaction to this argument1 or to any part of it4 ,all that looks like an answer is contained1 ,no4 ,,xii3 #8,that which he does is made just by his doing2 just1 ,i say1 in him1 not always just in us by the example2 for a man that shall command a thing openly1 and plot secretly the hinderance of the same1 if he punish him whom he commanded so for not doing it1 is unjust4' 7b7 ,i dare not insist upon it1 ,i hope his meaning is not so bad as the words intimate and as ,i apprehend1 that is1 to impute falsehood to ,him that is truth itself1 and to justify feigning and dissimulation in ,god1 as he doth tyranny1 by the infiniteness of his power and the absoluteness of his dominion4 ,and therefore1 by his leave1 ,i must once again tender him a new summons for a full and clear answer to this argument also4 ,he tells us1 that he was not surprised4 ,whether he were or not1 is more than ,i know4 ,but this ,i see plainly1 that either he is not provided1 or that his cause admits no choice of answers4 ,the ,jews dealt ingeniously1 when they met with a difficult knot which they could not untie1 to put it upon ,elias3 ,elias will answer it when he comes4 ,,animadversions ,,upon ,,the ,,bishop',s ,,reply ,,no4 ,x4 ,the ,bishop argued thus3 8,thirdly1 if there be no true liberty1 but all things come to pass by inevitable necessity1 then what are those interrogations we find so frequently in holy ,scriptures1 7be it spoken with all due respect71 but feigned and hypocritical exaggerations80 ,here putting together two repugnant suppositions1 either craftily or 7be it spoken with all due respect7 ignorantly1 he would have men believe1 because ,i hold necessity1 that ,i deny liberty1 ,i hold as much that there is true liberty as he doth1 and more1 for ,i hold it as from necessity1 and that there must of necessity be liberty2 but he holds it not from necessity1 and so makes it possible there may be none4 ,his expostulations were1 first1 ,hast thou eaten of the tree whereof ,i commanded thee that thou shouldst not eat8 ,secondly1 ,why hast thou done this8 ,thirdly1 ,why art thou wroth1 and why is thy countenance cast down8 ,fourthly1 ,why will ye die1 ,o house of ,israel8 ,these arguments requiring the same answer which some other do1 ,i thought fit to remit them to their fellows4 ,but the ,bishop will not allow me that4 ,for he saith1 7a7 8,certainly1 distinct arguments1 as the third and fifth are1 c4 did require distinct answers40 ,i am therefore to give an account of the meaning of the aforesaid objurgations and expostulations2 not of the end for which ,god said1 ,hast thou eaten of the tree1 c41 but how those words may be taken without repugnance to the doctrine of necessity4 ,these words1 ,hast thou eaten of the tree whereof ,i commanded that thou shouldst not eat1 convince ,adam that1 notwithstanding ,god had placed in the garden a means to keep him perpetually from dying in case he should accommodate his will to obedience of ,god's commandment concerning the tree of knowledge of good and evil1 yet ,adam was not so much master of his own will as to do it4 ,whereby is signified1 that a mortal man1 though invited by the promise of immortality1 cannot govern his own will1 though his will govern his actions2 which dependence of the actions on the will1 is that which properly and truly is called liberty4 ,and the like may be said of the words to ,eve1 ,why hast thou done this8 and of those to ,cain1 ,why art thou wroth8 c4 and to ,israel1 ,why will ye die1 ,o house of ,israel8 ,but the ,bishop here will say die signifieth not die1 but live eternally in torments2 for by such interpretations any man may answer anything4 ,and whereas he asketh1 8,doth ,god reprehend him for doing that which he hath antecedently determined him that he must do80 ,i answer1 no2 but he convinceth and instructeth him1 that though immortality was so easy to obtain1 as it might be had for the abstinence from the fruit of one only tree1 yet he could not obtain it but by pardon1 and by the sacrifice of ,jesus ,christ3 nor is there here any punishment1 but only a reducing of ,adam and ,eve to their original mortality1 where death was no punishment but a gift of ,god4 ,in which mortality he lived near a thousand years1 and had a numerous issue1 and lived without misery1 and ,i believe shall at the resurrection obtain the immortality which then he lost4 ,nor in all this is there any plotting secretly1 or any mockery or derision1 which the ,bishop would make men believe there is4 ,and whereas he saith1 that 8they who talk here of a twofold will of ,god1 secret and revealed1 and the one opposite to the other1 understand not what they say30 the ,protestant doctors1 both of our and other ,churches1 did use to distinguish between the secret and revealed will of ,god2 the former they called voluntas bene placiti1 which signifieth absolutely his will1 the other voluntas signi1 that is1 the signification of his will1 in the same sense that ,i call the one his will1 the other his commandment1 which may sometimes differ4 ,for ,god's commandment to ,abraham was1 that he should sacrifice ,isaac1 but his will was1 that he should not do it4 ,god's denunciation to ,nineveh was1 that it should be destroyed within forty days1 but his will was1 that it should not4 7b7 8,i dare not insist upon it1 ,i hope his meaning is not so bad1 as the words intimate1 and as ,i apprehend2 that is1 to impute falsehood to ,him that is truth itself10 c4 ,what damned rhetoric and subtle calumny is this8 ,god1 ,i said1 might command a thing openly1 and yet hinder the doing of it1 without injustice2 but if a man should command a thing to be done1 and then plot secretly the hinderance of the same1 and punish for the not doing it1 it were injustice4 ,this it is which the ,bishop apprehends as an imputation of falsehood to ,god ,almighty4 ,and perhaps if the death of a sinner were1 as he thinks1 an eternal life in extreme misery1 a man might as far as ,job hath done1 expostulate with ,god ,almighty2 not accusing him of injustice1 because whatsoever he doth is therefore just because done by him2 but of little tenderness and love to mankind4 ,and this expostulation will be equally just or unjust1 whether the necessity of all things be granted or denied4 ,for it is manifest that ,god could have made man impeccable1 and can now preserve him from sin1 or forgive him if he please2 and therefore1 if he please not1 the expostulation is as reasonable in the cases of liberty as of necessity4 ,,no4 ,,xi4 ,sidenote3 ,the ,bishop's reply4 ,j4 ,d4 8,fourthly1 if either the decree of ,god1 or the foreknowledge of ,god1 or the influence of the stars1 or the concatenation of causes1 or the physical or moral efficacy of objects1 or the last dictate of the understanding1 do take away true liberty1 then ,adam before his fall had no true liberty4 ,for he was subjected to the same decrees1 the same prescience1 the same constellations1 the same causes1 the same objects1 the same dictates of the understanding4 ,but1 quicquid ostendes mihi sic1 incredulus odi2 the greatest opposers of our liberty1 are as earnest maintainers of the liberty of ,adam4 ,therefore none of these supposed impediments take away true liberty40 ,t4 ,h4 ,the fourth argument is to this effect3 8,if the decree of ,god1 or his foreknowledge1 or the influence of the stars1 or the concatenation of causes1 or the physical or moral efficacy of causes1 or the last dictate of the understanding1 or whatsoever it be1 do take away true liberty1 then ,adam before his fall had no true liberty4 ,quicquid ostendes mihi sic1 incredulus odi40 ,that which ,i say necessitateth and determineth every action1 7that he may no longer doubt of my meaning71 is the sum of all those things1 which being now existent1 conduce and concur to the production of that action hereafter1 whereof if any one thing now were wanting1 the effect could not be produced4 ,this concourse of causes1 whereof every one is determined to be such as it is by a like concourse of former causes1 may well be called 7in respect they were all set and ordered by the eternal cause of all things1 ,god ,almighty7 the decree of ,god4 ,but that the foreknowledge of ,god should be a cause of any thing1 cannot be truly said2 seeing foreknowledge is knowledge1 and knowledge dependeth on the existence of the things known1 and not they on it4 ,the influence of the stars is but a small part of the whole cause1 consisting of the concourse of all agents4 ,nor doth the concourse of all causes make one simple chain or concatenation1 but an innumerable number of chains joined together1 not in all parts1 but in the first link1 ,god ,almighty2 and consequently the whole cause of an event does not always depend upon one single chain1 but on many together4 ,natural efficacy of objects does determine voluntary agents1 and necessitates the will1 and consequently the action2 but for moral efficacy1 ,i understand not what he means by it4 ,the last dictate of the judgment concerning the good or bad that may follow on any action1 is not properly the whole cause1 but the last part of it2 and yet may be said to produce the effect necessarily1 in such manner as the last feather may be said to break an horse's back1 when there were so many laid on before as there wanted but that to do it4 ,now for his argument1 that if the concourse of all the causes necessitate the effect1 that then it follows1 ,adam had no true liberty4 ,i deny the consequence2 for ,i make not only the effect1 but also the election of that particular effect to be necessary1 inasmuch as the will itself1 and each propension of a man during his deliberation1 is as much necessitated1 and depends on a sufficient cause1 as any thing else whatsoever4 ,as for example1 it is no more necessary that fire should burn1 than that a man1 or other creature1 whose limbs be moved by fancy1 should have election1 that is1 liberty to do what he has a fancy to1 though it be not in his will or power to choose his fancy1 or choose his election or will4 ,this doctrine1 because he says he hates1 ,i doubt had better been suppressed2 as it should have been1 if both your ,lordship and he had not pressed me to an answer4 ,j4 ,d4 7a7 8,this argument was sent forth only as an espy to make a more full discovery1 what were the true grounds of ,t4 ,h4's supposed necessity4 ,which errand being done1 and the foundation whereupon he builds being found out1 which is1 as ,i called it1 a concatenation of causes1 and1 as he calls it1 a concourse of necessary causes2 it would now be a superfluous and impertinent work in me to undertake the refutation of all those other opinions1 which he doth not undertake to defend4 ,and therefore ,i shall waive them at the present1 with these short animadversions4 7b7 8,concerning the eternal decree of ,god1 he confounds the decree itself with the execution of his decree4 ,and concerning the foreknowledge of ,god1 he confounds that speculative knowledge1 which is called the knowledge of vision1 7which doth not produce the intellective objects1 no more than the sensitive vision doth produce the sensible objects71 with that other knowledge of ,god1 which is called the knowledge of approbation1 or a practical knowledge1 that is1 knowledge joined with an act of the will1 of which divines do truly say1 that it is the cause of things1 as the knowledge of the artist is the cause of his work4 ,john i43 ,god made all things by his word2 that is1 by his wisdom4 ,concerning the influence of the stars1 ,i wish he had expressed himself more clearly4 ,for as ,i do willingly grant1 that those heavenly bodies do act upon these sublunary things1 not only by their motion and light1 but also by an occult virtue1 which we call influence1 as we see by manifold experience in the loadstone and shell-fish1 c43 so if he intend that by these influences they do naturally or physically determine the will1 or have any direct dominion over human counsels1 either in whole or in part1 either more or less1 he is in an error4 ,concerning the concatenation of causes1 whereas he makes not one chain1 but an innumerable number of chains1 7,i hope he speaks hyperbolically1 and doth not intend that they are actually infinite71 the difference is not material whether one or many1 so long as they are all joined together1 both in the first link1 and likewise in the effect4 ,it serves to no end but to shew what a shadow of liberty ,t4 ,h4 doth fancy1 or rather what a dream of a shadow4 ,as if one chain were not sufficient to load poor man1 but he must be clogged with innumerable chains4 ,this is just such another freedom as the ,turkish galley-slaves do enjoy4 ,but ,i admire that ,t4 ,h41 who is so versed in this question1 should here confess that he understands not the difference between physical or natural1 and moral efficacy3 and much more that he should affirm1 that outward objects do determine voluntary agents by a natural efficacy4 ,no object1 no second agent1 angel or devil1 can determine the will of man naturally1 but ,god alone1 in respect of his supreme dominion over all things4 ,then the will is determined naturally1 when ,god ,almighty1 besides his general influence1 whereupon all second causes do depend1 as well for their being as for their acting1 doth moreover at some times1 when it pleases him in cases extraordinary1 concur by a special influence1 and infuse something into the will1 in the nature of an act1 or an habit1 whereby the will is moved and excited1 and applied to will or choose this or that4 ,then the will is determined morally1 when some object is proposed to it with persuasive reasons and arguments to induce it to will4 ,where the determination is natural1 the liberty to suspend its act is taken away from the will1 but not so where the determination is moral4 ,in the former case1 the will is determined extrinsically1 in the latter case intrinsically2 the former produceth an absolute necessity1 the latter only a necessity of supposition4 ,if the will do not suspend1 but assent1 then the act is necessary2 but because the will may suspend1 and not assent1 therefore it is not absolutely necessary4 ,in the former case1 the will is moved necessarily and determinately2 in the latter1 freely and indeterminately4 ,the former excitation is immediate2 the latter is mediate mediante intellectu1 and requires the help of the understanding4 ,in a word1 so great a difference there is between natural and moral efficacy1 as there is between his opinion and mine in this question4 8,there remains only the last dictate of the understanding1 which he maketh to be the last cause that concurreth to the determination of the will1 and to the necessary production of the act1 #8as the last feather may be said to break an horse's back1 when there were so many laid on before that there wanted but that to do it4' ,i have shewed 7,no4 ,,vii47 that the last dictate of the understanding is not always absolute in itself1 nor conclusive to the will2 and when it is conclusive1 yet it produceth no antecedent nor extrinsical necessity4 ,i shall only add one thing more at present1 that by making the last judgment of right reason to be of no more weight than a single feather1 he wrongs the understanding as well as he doth the will2 and endeavours to deprive the will of its supreme power of application1 and to deprive the understanding of its supreme power of judicature and definition4 ,neither corporeal agents and objects1 nor yet the sensitive appetite itself1 being an inferior faculty and affixed to the organ of the body1 have any direct or immediate dominion or command over the rational will4 ,it is without the sphere of their activity4 ,all the access which they have unto the will1 is by the means of the understanding1 sometimes clear and sometimes disturbed1 and of reason1 either right or misinformed4 ,without the help of the understanding1 all his second causes were not able of themselves to load the horse's back with so much weight as the least of all his feathers doth amount unto4 ,but we shall meet with his horseload of feathers again1 ,no4 ,,xxiii4 8,these things being thus briefly touched1 he proceeds to his answer4 ,my argument was this3 if any of these or all these causes formerly recited1 do take away true liberty1 7that is1 still intended from necessity71 then ,adam before his fall had no true liberty4 8,but ,adam before his fall had true liberty4 8,he mis-recites the argument1 and denies the consequence1 which is so clearly proved1 that no man living can doubt of it4 ,because ,adam was subjected to all the same causes as well as we1 the same decree1 the same prescience1 the same influences1 the same concourse of causes1 the same efficacy of objects1 the same dictates of reason4 ,but it is only a mistake2 for it appears plainly by his following discourse1 that he intended to deny1 not the consequence1 but the assumption4 ,for he makes ,adam to have had no liberty from necessity before his fall1 yea1 he proceeds so far as to affirm that all human wills1 his and ours1 and each propension of our wills1 even during our deliberation1 are as much necessitated as anything else whatsoever2 that we have no more power to forbear those actions which we do1 than the fire hath power not to burn4 ,though ,i honour ,t4 ,h4 for his person and for his learning1 yet ,i must confess ingenuously1 ,i hate this doctrine from my heart4 ,and ,i believe both ,i have reason so to do1 and all others who shall seriously ponder the horrid consequences which flow from it4 ,it destroys liberty1 and dishonours the nature of man4 ,it makes the second causes and outward objects to be the rackets1 and men to be but the tennis-balls of destiny4 ,it makes the first cause1 that is1 ,god ,almighty1 to be the introducer of all evil and sin into the world1 as much as man1 yea1 more than man1 by as much as the motion of the watch is more from the artificer1 who did make it and wind it up1 than either from the spring1 or the wheels1 or the thread1 if ,god1 by his special influence into the second causes1 did necessitate them to operate as they did4 ,and if they1 being thus determined1 did necessitate ,adam inevitably1 irresistibly1 not by an accidental1 but by an essential subordination of causes to whatsoever he did1 then one of these two absurdities must needs follow3 either that ,adam did not sin1 and that there is no such thing as sin in the world1 because it proceeds naturally1 necessarily1 and essentially from ,god2 or that ,god is more guilty of it1 and more the cause of evil than man1 because man is extrinsically1 inevitably determined1 but so is not ,god4 ,and in causes essentially subordinate1 the cause of the cause is always the cause of the effect4 ,what tyrant did ever impose laws that were impossible for those to keep1 upon whom they were imposed1 and punish them for breaking those laws1 which he himself had necessitated them to break1 which it was no more in their power not to break1 than it is in the power of the fire not to burn8 ,excuse me if ,i hate this doctrine with a perfect hatred1 which is so dishonourable both to ,god and man2 which makes men to blaspheme of necessity1 to steal of necessity1 to be hanged of necessity1 and to be damned of necessity4 ,and therefore ,i must say and say again1 quicquid ostendes mihi sic1 incredulus odi4 ,it were better to be an atheist1 to believe no ,god2 or to be a ,manichee1 to believe two ,gods1 a ,god of good and a ,god of evil2 or with the heathens1 to believe thirty thousand ,gods3 than thus to charge the true ,god to be the proper cause and the true author of all the sins and evils which are in the world40 ,,animadversions ,,upon ,,the ,,bishop',s ,,reply ,,no4 ,,xi4 7a7 8,this argument was sent forth only as an espy1 to make a more full discovery1 what were the true grounds of ,t4 ,h4's supposed necessity40 ,the argument which he sendeth forth as an espy1 is this3 8,if either the decree of ,god1 or the foreknowledge of ,god1 or the influence of the stars1 or the concatenation 7which he says falsely ,i call a concourse7 of causes1 of the physical or moral efficacy of objects1 or the last dictate of the understanding1 do take away true liberty1 then ,adam before his fall had no true liberty40 ,in answer whereunto ,i said1 that all the things now existent were necessary to the production of the effect to come2 that the foreknowledge of ,god causeth nothing1 though the will do2 that the influence of the stars is but a small part of that cause which maketh the necessity2 and that this consequence1 8if the concourse of all the causes necessitate the effect1 then ,adam had no true liberty10 was false4 ,but in his words1 if these do take away true liberty1 then ,adam before his fall had no true liberty1 the consequence is good2 but then ,i deny that necessity takes away liberty2 the reason whereof1 which is this1 liberty is to choose what we will1 not to choose our will1 no inculcation is sufficient to make the ,bishop take notice of1 notwithstanding he be otherwhere so witty1 and here so crafty1 as to send out arguments for spies4 ,the cause why ,i denied the consequence was1 that ,i thought the force thereof consisted in this1 that necessity in the ,bishop's opinion destroyed liberty4 7b7 8,concerning the eternal decree of ,god10 c4 ,here begins his reply4 ,from which if we take these words2 8knowledge of approbation20 8practical knowledge20 8heavenly bodies act upon sublunary things1 not only by their motion1 but also by an occult virtue1 which we call influence20 8moral efficacy20 8general influence20 8special influence20 8infuse something into the will20 8the will is moved20 8the will is induced to will20 8the will suspends its own act20 which are all nonsense1 unworthy of a man1 nay1 and if a beast could speak1 unworthy of a beast1 and can befal no creature whose nature is not depraved by doctrine2 nothing at all remaineth to be answered4 ,perhaps the word1 occult virtue1 is not to be taxed as unintelligible4 ,but then ,i may tax therein the want of ingenuity in him that had rather say1 that heavenly bodies do work by an occult virtue1 than that they work he knoweth not how2 which he would not confess1 but endeavours to make occult be taken for a cause4 ,the rest of this reply is one of those consequences1 which ,i have answered in the beginning1 where ,i compare the inconveniences of both opinions1 that is1 8that either ,adam did not sin1 or his sin proceeded necessarily from ,god20 which is no stronger a consequence than if out of this1 8that a man is lame necessarily10 one should infer1 that either he is not lame1 or that his lameness proceeded necessarily from the will of ,god4 ,to the end of this number there is nothing more of argument4 ,the place is filled up with wondering and railing4 ,,no4 ,,xii4 ,sidenote3 ,the ,bishop's reply4 ,j4 ,d4 8,fifthly1 if there be no liberty1 there shall be no day of doom1 no last judgment1 no rewards nor punishments after death4 ,a man can never make himself a criminal1 if he be not left at liberty to commit a crime4 ,no man can be justly punished for doing that which was not in his power to shun4 ,to take away liberty hazards heaven1 but undoubtedly it leaves no hell40 ,t4 ,h4 ,the arguments of greatest consequence are the third and fifth1 and fall both into one3 namely1 if there be a necessity of all events1 that it will follow that praise and reprehension1 reward and punishment1 are all vain and unjust3 and that if ,god should openly forbid1 and secretly necessitate the same action1 punishing men for what they could not avoid1 there would be no belief among them of heaven or hell4 ,to oppose hereunto1 ,i must borrow an answer from ,st4 ,paul 7,rom4 ix471 from the eleventh verse of the chapter to the eighteenth1 is laid down the very same objection in these words3 ,when they 7meaning ,esau and ,jacob7 were yet unborn1 and had done neither good nor evil1 that the purpose of ,god according to election1 not by works1 but by him that calleth1 might remain firm1 it was said to her 7viz4 to ,rebecca7 that the elder shall serve the younger4 ,and what then shall we say1 is there injustice with ,god8 ,god forbid4 ,it is not therefore in him that willeth1 nor in him that runneth1 but in ,god that showeth mercy4 ,for the ,scripture saith to ,pharaoh1 ,i have stirred thee up1 that ,i may show my power in thee1 and that my name may be set forth in all the earth4 ,therefore whom ,god willeth he hath mercy on1 and whom he willeth he hardeneth4 ,thus1 you see1 the case put by ,st4 ,paul is the same with that of ,j4 ,d41 and the same objection in these words following 7verse #ai73 ,thou wilt ask me then1 why will ,god yet complain2 for who hath resisted his will8 ,to this therefore the apostle answers1 not by denying it was ,god's will1 or that the decree of ,god concerning ,esau was not before he had sinned1 or that ,esau was not necessitated to do what he did2 but thus 7verse #bj1 #ba73 ,who art thou1 ,o man1 that interrogatest ,god8 ,shall the work say to the workman1 why hast thou made me thus8 ,hath not the potter power over the clay1 of the same stuff to make one vessel to honour1 another to dishonour8 ,according therefore to this answer of ,st4 ,paul1 ,i answer ,j4 ,d4's objection1 and say1 the power of ,god alone1 without other help1 is sufficient justification of any action he doth4 ,that which men make among themselves here by pacts and covenants1 and call by the name of justice1 and according whereunto men are counted and termed rightly just and unjust1 is not that by which ,god ,almighty's actions are to be measured or called just1 no more than his counsels are to be measured by human wisdom4 ,that which he does is made just by his doing2 just ,i say in him1 not always just in us by the example2 for a man that shall command a thing openly1 and plot secretly the hindrance of the same1 if he punish him he so commanded for not doing it1 is unjust4 ,so also his counsels1 they be therefore not in vain1 because they be his1 whether we see the use of them or not4 ,when ,god afflicted ,job1 he did object no sin to him1 but justified that afflicting him by telling him of his power4 ,hast thou 7says ,god7 an arm like mine8 ,where wast thou1 when ,i laid the foundations of the earth8 and the like4 ,so our ,saviour1 concerning the man that was born blind1 said1 it was not for his sin1 nor his parents' sin1 but that the power of ,god might be shown in him4 ,beasts are subject to death and torment1 yet they cannot sin4 ,it was ,god's will it should be so4 ,power irresistible justified all actions really and properly1 in whomsoever it be found4 ,less power does not4 ,and because such power is in ,god only1 he must needs be just in all his actions4 ,and we1 that not comprehending his counsels1 call him to the bar1 commit injustice in it4 ,i am not ignorant of the usual reply to this answer1 by distinguishing between will and permission4 ,as1 that ,god ,almighty does indeed permit sin sometimes1 and that he also foreknoweth that the sin he permitteth shall be committed2 but does not will it1 nor necessitate it4 ,i know also they distinguish the action from the sin of the action1 saying1 ,god ,almighty doth indeed cause the action1 whatsoever action it be1 but not the sinfulness or irregularity of it1 that is1 the discordance between the action and the law4 ,such distinctions as these dazzle my understanding4 ,i find no difference between the will to have a thing done1 and the permission to do it1 when he that permitteth it can hinder it1 and knows it will be done unless he hinder it4 ,nor find ,i any difference between an action that is against the law1 and the sin of that action4 ,as for example1 between the killing of ,uriah1 and the sin of ,david in killing ,uriah4 ,nor when one is cause both of the action and of the law1 how another can be cause of the disagreement between them1 no more than how one man making a longer and shorter garment1 another can make the inequality that is between them4 ,this ,i know1 ,god cannot sin1 because his doing a thing makes it just1 and consequently no sin3 and because whatsoever can sin is subject to another's law1 which ,god is not4 ,and therefore it is blasphemy to say1 ,god can sin4 ,but to say1 that ,god can so order the world as a sin may be necessarily caused thereby in a man1 ,i do not see how it is any dishonour to him4 ,howsoever1 if such or other distinctions can make it clear that ,st4 ,paul did not think ,esau's or ,pharaoh's actions proceeded from the will and purpose of ,god1 or that proceeding from his will could not therefore without injustice be blamed or punished1 ,i will1 as soon as ,i understand them1 turn unto ,j4 ,d4's opinion4 ,for ,i now hold nothing in all this question between us1 but what seemeth to me not obscurely1 but most expressly said in this place by ,st4 ,paul4 ,and thus much in answer to his places of ,scripture4 ,j4 ,d4 ,t4 ,h4 thinks to kill two birds with one stone1 and satisfy two arguments with one answer1 whereas in truth he satisfieth neither4 ,first1 for my third reason4 7a7 ,though all he say here were as true as an oracle2 though punishment were an act of dominion1 not of justice in ,god2 yet this is no sufficient cause why ,god should deny his own act1 or why he should chide or expostulate with men1 why they did that which he himself did necessitate them to do1 and whereof he was the actor more than they1 they being but as the stone1 but he the hand that threw it4 ,notwithstanding anything which is pleaded here1 this stoical opinion doth stick hypocrisy and dissimulation close to ,god1 who is truth itself4 8,and to my fifth argument1 which he changeth and relateth amiss1 as by comparing mine with his may appear1 his chiefest answer is to oppose a difficult place of ,st4 ,paul 7,rom4 ix4 #aa47 ,hath he never heard1 that to propose a doubt is not to answer an argument3 nec bene respondet qui litem lite resolvit8 ,but ,i will not pay him in his own coin4 ,wherefore to this place alleged by him1 ,i answer1 the case is not the same4 ,the question moved there is1 how ,god did keep his promise made to ,abraham1 to be the ,god of him and of his seed1 if the ,jews who were the legitimate progeny of ,abraham were deserted4 ,to which the apostle answers 7vers4 #f1 #g1 #h71 that that promise was not made to the carnal seed of ,abraham1 that is1 the ,jews1 but to his spiritual sons1 which were the heirs of his faith1 that is1 to the believing ,christians2 which answer he explicateth1 first by the allegory of ,isaac and ,ishmael1 and after in the place cited of ,esau and ,jacob4 ,yet neither does he speak there so much of their persons as of their posterities4 ,and though some words may be accommodated to ,god's predestination1 which are there uttered1 yet it is not the scope of that text1 to treat of the reprobation of any man to hell fire4 ,all the posterity of ,esau were not eternally reprobated1 as holy ,job and many others4 ,but this question which is now agitated between us1 is quite of another nature1 how a man can be a criminal who doth nothing but that which he is extrinsically necessitated to do1 or how ,god in justice can punish a man with eternal torments for doing that which it was never in his power to leave undone2 or why he who did imprint the motion in the heart of man1 should punish man1 who did only receive the impression from him4 ,so his answer looks another way4 8,but because he grounds so much upon this text1 that if it can be cleared he is ready to change his opinion1 ,i will examine all those passages which may seem to favour his cause4 ,first1 these words 7ver4 #aa73 being not yet born1 neither having done any good or evil1 upon which the whole weight of his argument doth depend1 have no reference at all to those words 7verse #ac71 ,jacob have ,i loved1 and ,esau have ,i hated2 for those words were first uttered by the prophet ,malachi1 many ages after ,jacob and ,esau were dead 7,mal4 i4 #b1 #c71 and intended of the posterity of ,esau1 who were not redeemed from captivity as the ,israelites were4 ,but they are referred to those other words 7verse #ab71 the elder shall serve the younger1 which indeed were spoken before ,jacob or ,esau were born4 7,gen4 xxv4 #bc47 ,and though those words of ,malachi had been used of ,jacob and ,esau before they were born1 yet it had advantaged his cause nothing3 for hatred in that text doth not signify any reprobation to the flames of hell1 much less the execution of that decree1 or the actual imposition of punishment1 nor any act contrary to love4 ,god saw all that he had made1 and it was very good4 ,goodness itself cannot hate that which is good4 ,but hatred there signifies comparative hatred1 or a less degree of love1 or at the most a negation of love4 ,as 7,gen4 xxix4 #ca71 when the ,lord saw that ,leah was hated1 we may not conclude thence that ,jacob hated his wife2 the precedent verse doth fully expound the sense 7verse #cj73 ,jacob loved ,rachel more than ,leah4 ,so 7,matth4 vi4 #bd71 ,no man can serve two masters1 for either he will hate the one and love the other4 ,so 7,luke xiv4 #bf71 ,if any man hate not his father and mother1 c4 he cannot be my disciple4 ,st4 ,matthew 7x4 #cg7 tells us the sense of it3 ,he that loveth father or mother more than me1 is not worthy of me4 8,secondly1 those words 7ver4 #ae7 ,i will have mercy on whom ,i will have mercy1 do prove no more but this1 that the preferring of ,jacob before ,esau1 and of the ,christians before the ,jews1 was not a debt from ,god either to the one or to the other1 but a work of mercy4 ,and what of this8 ,all men confess that ,god's mercies do exceed man's deserts1 but ,god's punishments do never exceed man's misdeeds4 ,as we see in the parable of the labourers 7,matth4 xx4 #ac-ae73 ,friend1 ,i do thee no wrong4 ,did not ,i agree with thee for a penny8 ,is it not lawful for me to do with mine own as ,i will8 ,is thy eye evil1 because ,i am good8 ,acts of mercy are free1 but acts of justice are due4 8,that which follows 7verse #ag7 comes something nearer the cause4 ,the ,scripture saith unto ,pharaoh1 for this same purpose ,i have raised thee up1 7that is1 ,i have made thee a king1 or ,i have preserved thee71 that ,i might show my power in thee4 ,but this particle1 that1 doth not always signify the main end of an action1 but sometimes only a consequent of it1 as ,matth4 ii4 #ae3 ,he departed into ,egypt1 that it might be fulfilled which was spoken by the prophet1 out of ,egypt have ,i called my son4 ,without doubt ,joseph's aim or end of his journey was not to fulfil prophecies1 but to save the life of the child4 ,yet because the fulfilling of the prophecy was a consequent of ,joseph's journey1 he saith1 that it might be fulfilled4 ,so here1 ,i have raised thee up1 that ,i might show my power4 ,again1 though it should be granted that this particle that1 did denote the intention of ,god to destroy ,pharaoh in the ,red ,sea1 yet it was not the antecedent intention of ,god1 which evermore respects the good and benefit of the creature1 but ,god's consequent intention upon the prevision of ,pharaoh's obstinacy1 that since he would not glorify ,god in obeying his word1 he should glorify ,god undergoing his judgments4 ,hitherto we find no eternal punishments1 nor no temporal punishment without just deserts4 8,it follows1 7ver4 #ah71 whom he will he hardeneth4 ,indeed hardness of heart is the greatest judgment that ,god lays upon a sinner in this life1 worse than all the plagues of ,egypt4 ,but how doth ,god harden the heart8 ,not by a natural influence of any evil act or habit into the will1 nor by inducing the will with persuasive motives to obstinacy and rebellion 7,james i4 #ac1 #ad73 ,for ,god tempteth no man1 but every man is tempted when he is drawn away of his own lust and enticed4 ,then ,god is said to harden the heart three ways2 first1 negatively1 and not positively2 not by imparting wickedness1 but by not imparting grace2 as the sun descending to the tropic of ,capricorn1 is said with us to be the cause of winter1 that is1 not by imparting cold1 but by not imparting heat4 ,it is an act of mercy in ,god to give his grace freely1 but to detain it is no act of injustice4 ,so the apostle opposeth hardening to shewing of mercy4 ,to harden is as much as not to shew mercy4 8,secondly1 ,god is said to harden the heart occasionally and not causally1 by doing good1 7which incorrigible sinners make an occasion of growing worse and worse71 and doing evil2 as a master by often correcting of an untoward scholar1 doth accidentally and occasionally harden his heart1 and render him more obdurate1 insomuch as he grows even to despise the rod4 ,or as an indulgent parent by his patience and gentleness doth encourage an obstinate son to become more rebellious4 ,so1 whether we look upon ,god's frequent judgments upon ,pharaoh1 or ,god's iterated favours in removing and withdrawing those judgments upon ,pharaoh's request1 both of them in their several kinds were occasions of hardening ,pharaoh's heart1 the one making him more presumptuous1 the other more desperately rebellious4 ,so that which was good in it was ,god's2 that which was evil was ,pharaoh's4 ,god gave the occasion1 but ,pharaoh was the true cause of his own obduration4 ,this is clearly confirmed1 ,exodus viii4 #ae3 ,when ,pharaoh saw that there was respite1 he hardened his heart4 ,and ,exodus ix4 #cd3 ,when ,pharaoh saw that the rain and the hail and the thunders were ceased1 he sinned yet more1 and hardened his heart1 he and his servants4 ,so ,psalm cv4 #be3 ,he turned their hearts1 so that they hated his people1 and dealt subtly with them4 ,that is1 ,god blessed the children of ,israel1 whereupon the ,egyptians did take occasion to hate them1 as is plain1 ,exodus i4 #g1 #h1 #i1 #aj4 ,so ,god hardened ,pharaoh's heart1 and ,pharaoh hardened his own heart4 ,god hardened it by not shewing mercy to ,pharaoh1 as he did to ,nebuchadnezzar1 who was as great a sinner as he1 or ,god hardened it occasionally2 but still ,pharaoh was the true cause of his own obduration1 by determining his own will to evil1 and confirming himself in his obstinacy4 ,so are all presumptuous sinners1 7,psalm xcv4 #h73 ,harden not your hearts as in the provocation1 or as in the day of temptation in the wilderness4 8,thirdly1 ,god is said to harden the heart permissively1 but not operatively1 nor effectively1 as he who only lets loose a greyhound out of the slip1 is said to hound him at the hare4 ,will you see plainly what ,st4 ,paul intends by hardening8 ,read ,rom4 ix4 #bb1 #bc3 ,what if ,god1 willing to shew his wrath and to make his power known 7that is1 by a consequent will1 which in order of nature follows the prevision of sin71 endured with much long-suffering the vessels of wrath fitted to destruction4 ,and that he might make known the riches of his glory on the vessels of mercy1 c4 ,there is much difference between enduring and impelling1 or inciting the vessels of wrath4 ,he saith of the vessels of mercy1 that ,god prepared them unto glory4 ,but of the vessels of wrath1 he saith only that they were fitted to destruction1 that is1 not by ,god1 but by themselves4 ,st4 ,paul saith1 that ,god doth endure the vessels of wrath with much long-suffering4 ,t4 ,h4 saith1 that ,god wills and effects by the second causes all their actions good and bad1 that he necessitateth them1 and determineth them irresistibly to do those acts which he condemneth as evil1 and for which he punisheth them4 ,if doing willingly1 and enduring1 if much long-suffering1 and necessitating1 imply not a contrariety one to another1 reddat mihi minam ,diogenes1 let him that taught me logic1 give me my money again4 8,but ,t4 ,h4 saith1 that this distinction between the operative and permissive will of ,god1 and that other between the action and the irregularity1 do dazzle his understanding4 ,though he can find no difference between these two1 yet others do2 ,st4 ,paul himself did 7,acts xiii4 #ah73 ,about the time of forty years suffered he their manners in the wilderness4 ,and 7,acts xiv4 #af73 ,who in times past suffered all nations to walk in their own ways4 ,t4 ,h4 would make suffering to be inciting1 their manners to be ,god's manners1 their ways to be ,god's ways4 ,and 7,acts xvii4 #cj73 ,the times of this ignorance ,god winked at4 ,it was never heard that one was said to wink or connive at that which was his own act4 ,and 7#a ,cor4 x4 #ac73 ,god is faithful1 who will not suffer you to be tempted above that you are able4 ,to tempt is the devil's act2 therefore he is called the tempter4 ,god tempts no man to sin1 but he suffers them to be tempted4 ,and so suffers1 that he could hinder ,satan1 if he would4 ,but by ,t4 ,h4's doctrine1 to tempt to sin1 and to suffer one to be tempted to sin when it is in his power to hinder it1 is all one4 ,and so he transforms ,god 7,i write it with horror7 into the devil1 and makes tempting to be ,god's own work1 and the devil to be but his instrument4 ,and in that noted place1 7,rom4 ii4 #d1 #e73 ,despisest thou the riches of his goodness and forbearance and long-suffering1 not knowing that the goodness of ,god leadeth thee to repentance2 but after thy hardness and impenitent heart treasurest up unto thyself wrath against the day of wrath1 and revelation of the righteous judgment of ,god8 ,here are as many convincing arguments in this one text against the opinion of ,t4 ,h4 almost as there are words4 ,here we learn that ,god is rich in goodness1 and will not punish his creatures for that which is his own act2 secondly1 that he suffers and forbears sinners long1 and doth not snatch them away by sudden death as they deserve4 ,thirdly1 that the reason of ,god's forbearance is to bring men to repentance4 ,fourthly1 that hardness of heart and impenitency is not causally from ,god1 but from ourselves4 ,fifthly1 that it is not the insufficient proposal of the means of their conversion on ,god's part1 which is the cause of men's perdition1 but their own contempt and despising of these means4 ,sixthly1 that punishment is not an act of absolute dominion1 but an act of righteous judgment1 whereby ,god renders to every man according to his own deeds1 wrath to them and only to them who treasure up wrath unto themselves1 and eternal life to those who continue patiently in well-doing4 ,if they deserve such punishment who only neglect the goodness and long-suffering of ,god1 what do they who utterly deny it1 and make ,god's doing and his suffering to be all one8 ,i do beseech ,t4 ,h4 to consider what a degree of wilfulness it is1 out of one obscure text wholly misunderstood to contradict the clear current of the whole ,scripture4 ,of the same mind with ,st4 ,paul was ,st4 ,peter1 7#a ,peter iii4 #bj73 ,the long-suffering of ,god waited once in the days of ,noah4 ,and #b ,peter iii4 #ae3 ,account that the long-suffering of the ,lord is salvation4 ,this is the name ,god gives himself1 7,exod4 xxxiv4 #f73 ,the ,lord1 the ,lord ,god1 merciful and gracious1 long-suffering1 c4 7b7 8,yet ,i do acknowledge that which ,t4 ,h4 saith to be commonly true1 that he who doth permit any thing to be done1 which it is in his power to hinder1 knowing that if he do not hinder it1 it will be done1 doth in some sort will it4 ,i say in some sort1 that is1 either by an antecedent will1 or by a consequent will1 either by an operative will1 or by a permissive will1 or he is willing to let it be done1 but not willing to do it4 ,sometimes an antecedent engagement doth cause a man to suffer that to be done1 which otherwise he would not suffer4 ,so ,darius suffered ,daniel to be cast into the lion's den1 to make good his rash decree2 so ,herod suffered ,john ,baptist to be beheaded1 to make good his rash oath4 ,how much more may the immutable rule of justice in ,god1 and his fidelity in keeping his word1 draw from him the punishment of obstinate sinners1 though antecedently he willeth their conversion8 ,he loveth all his creatures well1 but his own justice better4 ,again1 sometimes a man suffereth that to be done1 which he doth not will directly in itself1 but indirectly for some other end1 or for the producing of some greater good2 as a man willeth that a putrid member be cut off from his body1 to save the life of the whole4 ,or as a judge1 being desirous to save a malefactor's life1 and having power to reprieve him1 doth yet condemn him for example's sake1 that by the death of one he may save the lives of many4 ,marvel not then if ,god suffer some creatures to take such courses as tend to their own ruin1 so long as their sufferings do make for the greater manifestation of his glory1 and for the greater benefit of his faithful servants4 ,this is a most certain truth1 that ,god would not suffer evil to be in the world unless he knew how to draw good out of evil4 ,yet this ought not to be understood1 as if we made any priority or posteriority of time in the acts of ,god1 but only of nature4 ,nor do we make the antecedent and consequent will to be contrary one to another2 because the one respects man pure and uncorrupted1 the other respects him as he is lapsed4 ,the objects are the same1 but considered after a diverse manner4 ,nor yet do we make these wills to be distinct in ,god2 for they are the same with the divine essence1 which is one4 ,but the distinction is in order to the objects or things willed4 ,nor1 lastly1 do we make this permission to be a naked or a mere permission4 ,god causeth all good1 permitteth all evil1 disposeth all things1 both good and evil4 7c7 8,t4 ,h4 demands how ,god should be the cause of the action and yet not be the cause of the irregularity of the action4 ,i answer1 because he concurs to the doing of evil by a general1 but not by a special influence4 ,as the earth gives nourishment to all kinds of plants1 as well to hemlock as to wheat2 but the reason why the one yields food to our sustenance1 the other poison to our destruction1 is not from the general nourishment of the earth1 but from the special quality of the root4 ,even so the general power to act is from ,god4 ,in him we live1 and move1 and have our being4 ,this is good4 ,but the specification1 and determination of this general power to the doing of any evil1 is from ourselves1 and proceeds from the free-will of man4 ,this is bad4 ,and to speak properly1 the free-will of man is not the efficient cause of sin1 as the root of the hemlock is of poison1 sin having no true entity or being in it1 as poison hath2 but rather the deficient cause4 ,now no defect can flow from him who is the highest perfection4 7d7 ,wherefore ,t4 ,h4 is mightily mistaken1 to make the particular and determinate act of killing ,uriah to be from ,god4 ,the general power to act is from ,god1 but the specification of this general and good power to murder1 or to any particular evil1 is not from ,god1 but from the free-will of man4 ,so ,t4 ,h4 may see clearly if he will1 how one may be the cause of the law1 and likewise of the action in some sort1 that is1 by general influence2 and yet another cause concurring1 by special influence and determining this general and good power1 may make itself the true cause of the anomy or the irregularity4 ,and therefore he may keep his longer and shorter garments for some other occasion4 ,certainly1 they will not fit this subject1 unless he could make general and special influence to be all one4 8,but ,t4 ,h4 presseth yet further1 that the case is the same1 and the objection used by the ,jews1 7verse #ai73 ,why doth he yet find fault2 who hath resisted his will8 is the very same with my argument2 and ,st4 ,paul's answer1 7verse #bj37 ,o man1 who art thou that repliest against ,god8 ,shall the thing formed say unto him that formed it1 why hast thou made me thus8 ,hath not the potter power over his clay8 c41 is the very same with his answer in this place1 drawn from the irresistible power and absolute dominion of ,god1 which justifieth all his actions4 ,and that the apostle in his answer doth not deny that it was ,god's will1 nor that ,god's decree was before ,esau's sin4 8,to which ,i reply1 first1 that the case is not at all the same1 but quite different1 as may appear by these particulars2 first1 those words1 before they had done either good or evil1 are not1 cannot be referred to those other words1 ,esau have ,i hated4 ,secondly1 if they could1 yet it is less than nothing1 because before ,esau had actually sinned1 his future sins were known to ,god4 ,thirdly1 by the potter's clay1 here is not to be understood the pure mass1 but the corrupted mass of mankind4 ,fourthly1 the hating here mentioned is only a comparative hatred1 that is1 a less degree of love4 ,fifthly1 the hardening which ,st4 ,paul speaks of1 is not a positive1 but a negative obduration1 or a not imparting of grace4 ,sixthly1 ,st4 ,paul speaketh not of any positive reprobation to eternal punishment1 much less doth he speak of the actual inflicting of punishment without sin1 which is the question between us1 and wherein ,t4 ,h4 differs from all that ,i remember to have read1 who do all acknowledge that punishment is never actually inflicted but for sin4 ,if the question be put1 why ,god doth good to one more than to another1 or why ,god imparteth more grace to one than to another1 as it is there1 the answer is just and fit1 because it is his pleasure1 and it is sauciness in a creature in this case to reply1 7,matthew xx4 #ae73 ,may not ,god do what he will with his own8 ,no man doubteth but ,god imparteth grace beyond man's desert4 7e7 ,but if the case be put1 why ,god doth punish one more than another1 or why he throws one into hell-fire1 and not another1 which is the present case agitated between us2 to say with ,t4 ,h41 that it is because ,god is omnipotent1 or because his power is irresistible1 or merely because it is his pleasure1 is not only not warranted1 but is plainly condemned by ,st4 ,paul in this place4 ,so many differences there are between those two cases4 ,it is not therefore against ,god that ,i reply1 but against ,t4 ,h4 ,i do not call my ,creator to the bar1 but my fellow-creature2 ,i ask no account of ,god's counsels1 but of man's presumptions4 ,it is the mode of these times to father their own fancies upon ,god1 and when they cannot justify them by reason1 to plead his omnipotence1 or to cry1 ,o altitudo1 that the ways of ,god are unsearchable4 ,if they may justify their drowsy dreams1 because ,god's power and dominion is absolute2 much more may we reject such phantastical devices which are inconsistent with the truth and goodness and justice of ,god1 and make him to be a tyrant1 who is the ,father of ,mercies and the ,god of all consolation4 ,the unsearchableness of ,god's ways should be a bridle to restrain presumption1 and not a sanctuary for spirits of error4 8,secondly1 this objection contained ver4 #ai1 to which the apostle answers ver4 #bj1 is not made in the person of ,esau or ,pharaoh1 as ,t4 ,h4 supposeth1 but of the unbelieving ,jews1 who thought much at that grace and favour which ,god was pleased to vouchsafe unto the ,gentiles1 to acknowledge them for his people1 which honour they would have appropriated to the posterity of ,abraham4 ,and the apostle's answer is not only drawn from the sovereign dominion of ,god1 to impart his grace to whom he pleaseth1 as hath been shewed already1 but also from the obstinacy and proper fault of the ,jews1 as appeareth verse #bb3 ,what if ,god1 willing 7that is1 by a consequent will7 to shew his wrath1 and to make his power known1 endureth with much long-suffering the vessels of wrath fitted to destruction4 ,they acted1 ,god endured2 they were tolerated by ,god1 but fitted to destruction by themselves2 for their much wrong-doing1 here is ,god's much long-suffering4 ,and more plainly1 verse #ca1 #cb3 ,israel hath not attained to the law of righteousness4 ,wherefore8 ,because they sought it not by faith1 but as it were by the works of the law4 ,this reason is set down yet more emphatically in the next chapter 7,rom4 x4 #c73 ,they 7that is1 the ,israelites7 being ignorant of ,god's righteousness1 7that is1 by faith in ,christ71 and going about to establish their own righteousness1 7that is1 by the works of the law71 have not submitted themselves unto the righteousness of ,god4 ,and yet most expressly 7chap4 xi4 #bj73 ,because of unbelief they were broken off1 but thou standest by faith4 ,neither was there any precedent binding decree of ,god1 to necessitate them to unbelief1 and consequently to punishment4 ,it was in their own power by their concurrence with ,god's grace to prevent these judgments1 and to recover their former estate2 verse #bc3 ,if they 7that is1 the unbelieving ,jews7 abide not still in unbelief they shall be grafted in4 ,the crown and the sword are immovable1 7to use ,st4 ,anselm's comparison71 but it is we that move and change places4 ,sometimes the ,jews were under the crown1 and the ,gentiles under the sword2 sometimes the ,jews under the sword1 and the ,gentiles under the crown4 8,thirdly1 though ,i confess that human pacts are not the measure of ,god's justice1 but his justice is his own immutable will1 whereby he is ready to give every man that which is his own1 as rewards to the good1 punishments to the bad2 so nevertheless ,god may oblige himself freely to his creature4 ,he made the covenant of works with mankind in ,adam2 and therefore he punisheth not man contrary to his own covenant1 but for the transgression of his duty4 ,and divine justice is not measured by omnipotence or by irresistible power1 but by ,god's will4 ,god can do many things according to his absolute power1 which he doth not4 ,he could raise up children to ,abraham of stones1 but he never did so4 ,it is a rule in theology1 that ,god cannot do anything which argues any wickedness or imperfection3 as ,god cannot deny himself 7#b ,timothy ii4 #ac72 he cannot lie 7,titus i4 #b74 ,these and the like are the fruits of impotence1 not of power4 ,so ,god cannot destroy the righteous with the wicked 7,genesis xviii4 #be47 ,he could not destroy ,sodom whilst ,lot was in it1 7,genesis xix4 #bb72 not for want of dominion or power1 but because it was not agreeable to his justice1 nor to that law which himself had constituted4 ,the apostle saith 7,hebrews vi4 #aj71 ,god is not unrighteous to forget your work4 ,as it is a good consequence to say1 this is from ,god1 therefore it is righteous2 so is this also1 this thing is unrighteous1 therefore it cannot proceed from ,god4 ,we see how all creatures by instinct of nature do love their young1 as the hen her chickens2 how they will expose themselves to death for them4 ,and yet all these are but shadows of that love which is in ,god towards his creatures4 ,how impious is it then to conceive1 that ,god did create so many millions of souls to be tormented eternally in hell1 without any fault of theirs except such as he himself did necessitate them unto1 merely to shew his dominion1 and because his power is irresistible8 ,the same privilege which ,t4 ,h4 appropriates here to power absolutely irresistible1 a friend of his1 in his book ,de ,cive1 cap4 ,,vi41 ascribes to power respectively irresistible1 or to sovereign magistrates1 whose power he makes to be as absolute as a man's power is over himself2 not to be limited by any thing1 but only by their strength4 ,the greatest propugners of sovereign power think it enough for princes to challenge an immunity from coercive power1 but acknowledge that the law hath a directive power over them4 ,but ,t4 ,h4 will have no limits but their strength4 ,whatsoever they do by power1 they do justly4 8,but1 saith he1 ,god objected no sin to ,job1 but justified his afflicting him by his power4 ,first1 this is an argument from authority negatively1 that is to say1 worth nothing4 ,secondly1 the afflictions of ,job were no vindicatory punishments to take vengeance of his sins1 7whereof we dispute71 but probatory chastisements to make trial of his graces4 ,thirdly1 ,job was not so pure1 but that ,god might justly have laid greater punishments upon him1 than those afflictions which he suffered4 ,witness his impatience1 even to the cursing of the day of his nativity 7,job iii4 #c74 ,indeed ,god said to ,job1 7,job xxxviii4 #d73 ,where wast thou1 when ,i laid the foundations of the earth8 that is1 how canst thou judge of the things that were done before thou wast born1 or comprehend the secret causes of my judgments8 ,and 7,job xl4 #i73 ,hast thou an arm like ,god8 ,as if he should say1 why art thou impatient2 dost thou think thyself able to strive with ,god8 ,but that ,god should punish ,job without desert1 here is not a word4 8,concerning the blind man mentioned ,john ix1 his blindness was rather a blessing to him than a punishment1 being the means to raise his soul illuminated1 and to bring him to see the face of ,god in ,jesus ,christ4 ,the sight of the body is common to us with ants and flies1 but the sight of the soul with the blessed angels4 ,we read of some who have put out their bodily eyes1 because they thought they were an impediment to the eye of the soul4 ,again1 neither he nor his parents were innocent1 being conceived and born in sin and iniquity 7,psalm li4 #e74 ,and in many things we offend all 7,james iii4 #b74 ,but our ,saviour's meaning is evident by the disciples' question1 ,john ix4 #b4 ,they had not so sinned1 that he should be born blind2 or they were not more grievous sinners than other men1 to deserve an exemplary judgment more than they2 but this corporal blindness befel him principally by the extraordinary providence of ,god1 for the manifestation of his own glory in restoring him to his sight4 ,so his instance halts on both sides2 neither was this a punishment1 nor the blind man free from sin4 ,his third instance of the death and torments of beasts1 is of no more weight than the two former4 ,the death of brute beasts is not a punishment of sin1 but a debt of nature4 ,and though they be often slaughtered for the use of man1 yet there is a vast difference between those light and momentary pangs1 and the unsufferable and endless pains of hell2 between the mere depriving of a creature of temporal life1 and the subjecting of it to eternal death4 ,i know the philosophical speculations of some1 who affirm1 that entity is better than non-entity1 that it is better to be miserable and suffer the torments of the damned1 than to be annihilated and cease to be altogether4 ,this entity which they speak of1 is a metaphysical entity abstracted from the matter1 which is better than non-entity1 in respect of some goodness1 not moral nor natural1 but transcendental1 which accompanies every being4 ,but in the concrete it is far otherwise1 where that saying of our ,saviour often takes place1 7,matthew xxvi4 #bd73 ,woe unto that man by whom the ,son of ,man is betrayed4 ,it had been good for that man1 that he had not been born4 ,i add1 that there is an analogical justice and mercy due even to the brute beasts4 ,thou shalt not muzzle the mouth of the ox that treadeth out the corn4 ,and1 a just man is merciful to his beast4 7f7 8,but his greatest error is that which ,i touched before1 to make justice to be the proper result of power4 ,power doth not measure and regulate justice1 but justice measures and regulates power4 ,the will of ,god1 and the eternal law which is in ,god himself1 is properly the rule and measure of justice4 ,as all goodness1 whether natural or moral1 is a participation of divine goodness1 and all created rectitude is but a participation of divine rectitude1 so all laws are but participations of the eternal law from whence they derive their power4 ,the rule of justice then is the same both in ,god and us3 but it is in ,god1 as in him that doth regulate and measure2 in us1 as in those who are regulated and measured4 ,as the will of ,god is immutable1 always willing what is just and right and good2 so his justice likewise is immutable4 ,and that individual action which is justly punished as sinful in us1 cannot possibly proceed from the special influence and determinative power of a just cause4 ,see then how grossly ,t4 ,h4 doth understand that old and true principle1 that the will of ,god is the rule of justice2 as if by willing things in themselves unjust1 he did render them just by reason of his absolute dominion and irresistible power1 as fire doth assimilate other things to itself1 and convert them into the nature of fire4 ,this were to make the eternal law a ,lesbian rule4 ,sin is defined to be that which is done1 or said1 or thought1 contrary to the eternal law4 ,but by this doctrine nothing is done1 nor said1 nor thought1 contrary to the will of ,god4 ,st4 ,anselm said most truly1 #8then the will of man is good1 and just1 and right1 when he wills that which ,god would have him to will4' ,but according to this doctrine1 every man always wills that which ,god would have him to will4 ,if this be true1 we need not pray1 ,thy will be done in earth as it is in heaven4 ,t4 ,h4 hath devised a new kind of heaven upon earth4 ,the worst is1 it is an heaven without justice4 ,justice is a constant and perpetual act of the will1 to give every one his own2 but to inflict punishment for those things which the judge himself did determine and necessitate to be done1 is not to give every one his own2 right punitive justice is a relation of equality and proportion between the demerit and the punishment4 ,but supposing this opinion of absolute and universal necessity1 there is no demerit in the world4 ,we use to say1 that right springs from law and fact2 as in this syllogism1 every thief ought to be punished1 there is the law2 but such an one is a thief1 there is the fact2 therefore he ought to be punished1 there is the right4 ,but this opinion of ,t4 ,h4 grounds the right to be punished1 neither upon law1 nor upon fact1 but upon the irresistible power of ,god4 ,yea1 it overturneth1 as much as in it lies1 all law2 first1 the eternal law1 which is the ordination of divine wisdom1 by which all creatures are directed to that end which is convenient for them1 that is1 not to necessitate them to eternal flames2 then the law participated1 which is the ordination of right reason1 instituted for the common good1 to show unto man what he ought to do1 and what he ought not to do4 ,to what purpose is it1 to show the right way to him who is drawn and haled a contrary way by adamantine bonds of inevitable necessity8 7g7 8,lastly1 howsoever ,t4 ,h4 cries out1 that ,god cannot sin1 yet in truth he makes him to be the principal and most proper cause of all sin4 ,for he makes him to be the cause1 not only of the law and of the action1 but even of the irregularity itself1 and the difference between the action and the law1 wherein the very essence of sin doth consist4 ,he makes ,god to determine ,david's will1 and necessitate him to kill ,uriah4 ,in causes physically and essentially subordinate1 the cause of the cause is evermore the cause of the effect4 ,these are those deadly fruits which spring from the poisonous root of the absolute necessity of all things2 which ,t4 ,h4 seeing1 and that neither the sins of ,esau1 nor ,pharaoh1 nor any wicked person do proceed from the operative1 but from the permissive will of ,god1 and that punishment is an act of justice1 not of dominion only1 ,i hope that according to his promise he will change his opinion4 ,,animadversions ,,upon ,,the ,,bishop',s ,,reply ,,no4 ,,xii4 ,the ,bishop had argued in this manner3 8,if there be no liberty1 there shall be no last judgment1 no rewards nor punishments after death40 ,to this ,i answered1 that though ,god cannot sin1 because what he doth1 his doing maketh just1 and because he is not subject to another's law1 and that therefore it is blasphemy to say that ,god can sin2 yet to say1 that ,god hath so ordered the world that sin may be necessarily committed1 is not blasphemy4 ,and ,i can also further say1 though ,god be the cause of all motion and of all actions1 and therefore unless sin be no motion nor action1 it must derive a necessity from the first mover2 nevertheless it cannot be said that ,god is the author of sin1 because not he that necessitateth an action1 but he that doth command and warrant it1 is the author4 ,and if ,god own an action1 though otherwise it were a sin1 it is now no sin4 ,the act of the ,israelites in robbing the ,egyptians of their jewels1 without ,god's warrant had been theft4 ,but it was neither theft1 cozenage1 nor sin2 supposing they knew the warrant was from ,god4 ,the rest of my answer to that inconvenience1 was an opposing to his inconveniences the manifest texts of ,st4 ,paul1 ,rom4 ix4 ,the substance of his reply to my answer is this4 7a7 8,though punishment were an act of dominion1 not of justice1 in ,god2 yet this is no sufficient cause why ,god should deny his own act1 or why he should chide or expostulate with men1 why they did that which he himself did necessitate them to do40 ,i never said that ,god denied his act1 but that he may expostulate with men2 and this may be 7,i shall never say directly1 it is7 the reason of that his expostulation1 viz4 to convince them that their wills were not independent1 but were his mere gift2 and that to do1 or not to do1 is not in him that willeth1 but in ,god that hath mercy on1 or hardeneth whom he will4 ,but the ,bishop interpreteth hardening to be a permission of ,god4 ,which is to attribute to ,god in such actions no more than he might have attributed to any of ,pharaoh's servants1 the not persuading their master to let the people go4 ,and whereas he compares this permission to the indulgence of a parent1 that by his patience encourageth his son to become more rebellious1 which indulgence is a sin2 he maketh ,god to be like a sinful man4 ,and indeed it seemeth that all they that hold this freedom of the will1 conceive of ,god no otherwise than the common sort of ,jews did1 that ,god was like a man1 that he had been seen by ,moses1 and after by the seventy elders 7,exod4 xxiv4 #aj72 expounding that and other places literally4 ,again he saith1 that ,god is said to harden the heart permissively1 but not operatively2 which is the same distinction with his first1 namely negatively1 not positively1 and with his second1 occasionally1 and not causally4 ,so that all his three ways how ,god hardens the heart of wicked men1 come to this one of permission2 which is as much as to say1 ,god sees1 looks on1 and does nothing1 nor ever did anything1 in the business4 ,thus you see how the ,bishop expoundeth ,st4 ,paul4 ,therefore ,i will leave the rest of his commentary upon ,rom4 ix4 to the judgment of the reader1 to think of the same as he pleaseth4 7b7 8,yet ,i do acknowledge that which ,t4 ,h4 saith1 #8that he who doth permit anything to be done1 which it is in his power to hinder1 knowing that if he do not hinder it1 it will be done1 doth in some sort will it2' ,i say in some sort1 that is either by an antecedent will1 or by a consequent will2 either by an operative will1 or by a permissive will2 or he is willing to let it be done1 but not willing to do it40 ,whether it be called antecedent1 or consequent1 or operative1 or permissive1 it is enough for the necessity of the thing that the heart of ,pharaoh should be hardened2 and if ,god were not willing to do it1 ,i cannot conceive how it could be done without him4 7c7 8,t4 ,h4 demands how ,god should be the cause of the action1 and yet not be the cause of the irregularity of the action8 ,i answer1 because he concurs to the doing of evil by a general1 but not by a special1 influence40 ,i had thought to pass over this place1 because of the nonsense of general and special influence4 ,seeing he saith that ,god concurs to the doing of evil1 ,i desire the reader would take notice1 that if he blame me for speaking of ,god as of a necessitating cause1 and as it were a principal agent in the causing of all actions1 he may with as good reason blame himself for making him by concurrence an accessory to the same4 ,and indeed1 let men hold what they will contrary to the truth1 if they write much1 the truth will fall into their pens4 ,but he thinks he hath a similitude1 which will make this permissive will a very clear business4 8,the earth10 saith he1 8gives nourishment to all kinds of plants1 as well to hemlock as to wheat2 but the reason why the one yields food to our sustenance1 the other poison to our destruction1 is not from the general nourishment of the earth1 but from the special quality of the root40 ,it seemeth by this similitude1 he thinketh1 that ,god doth1 not operatively1 but permissively will that the root of hemlock should poison the man that eateth it1 but that wheat should nourish him he willeth operatively2 which is very absurd2 or else he must confess that the venomous effects of wicked men are willed operatively4 7d7 8,wherefore ,t4 ,h4 is mightily mistaken1 to make the particular and determinate act of killing ,uriah to be from ,god4 ,the general power to act1 is from ,god2 but the specification of this general and good power1 to murder1 or to any particular evil1 is not from ,god1 but from the free will of man40 ,but why am ,i so mightily mistaken8 ,did not ,god foreknow that ,uriah in particular1 should be murdered by ,david in particular8 ,and what ,god foreknoweth shall come to pass1 can that possibly not come so to pass8 ,and that which cannot possibly not come to pass1 doth not that necessarily come to pass8 ,and is not all necessity from ,god8 ,i cannot see this great mistake4 8,the general power10 saith he1 8to act is from ,god1 but the specification to do this act upon ,uriah1 is not from ,god1 but from free-will40 ,very learnedly4 ,as if there were a power that were not the power to do some particular act2 or a power to kill1 and yet to kill nobody in particular4 ,if the power be to kill1 it is to kill that which shall be by that power killed1 whether it be ,uriah or any other2 and the giving of that power1 is the application of it to the act2 nor doth power signify anything actually1 but those motions and present acts from which the act that is not now1 but shall be hereafter1 necessarily proceedeth4 ,and therefore this argument is much like that which used heretofore to be brought for the defence of the divine right of the bishops to the ordination of ministers4 ,they derive not1 say they1 the right of ordination from the civil sovereign1 but from ,christ immediately4 ,and yet they acknowledge that it is unlawful for them to ordain1 if the civil power do forbid them4 ,but how have they right to ordain1 when they cannot do it lawfully8 ,their answer is1 they have the right1 though they may not exercise it2 as if the right to ordain1 and the right to exercise ordination1 were not the same thing4 ,and as they answer concerning right1 which is legal power1 so the ,bishop answereth concerning natural power1 that ,david had a general power to kill ,uriah from ,god1 but not a power of applying this power in special to the killing of ,uriah from ,god1 but from his own free will2 that is1 he had a power to kill ,uriah1 but not to exercise it upon ,uriah1 that is to say1 he had a power to kill him1 but not to kill him1 which is absurd4 7e7 8,but if the case be put why ,god doth punish one more than another1 or why he throws one into hell fire1 and not another1 which is the present case between us2 to say with ,t4 ,h41 that it is because ,god is omnipotent1 or because his power is irresistible1 or merely because it is his pleasure1 is not only not warranted1 but is plainly condemned by ,st4 ,paul in this place40 ,i note first1 that he hath no reason to say1 the case agitated between us is1 whether the cause why ,god punisheth one man more than another1 be his irresistible power1 or man's sin4 ,the case agitated between us is1 whether a man can now choose what shall be his will anon1 or at any time hereafter4 ,again1 it is not true that he says1 it is my opinion that the irresistible power of ,god is the cause why he punisheth one more than another4 ,i say only that when he doth so1 the irresistible power is enough to make it not unjust4 ,but that the cause why ,god punisheth one more than another1 is many times the will he hath to show his power1 is affirmed in this place by ,st4 ,paul1 ,shall the thing formed1 say to him that formed it1 c4 ,and by our ,saviour in the case of him that was born blind1 where he saith1 ,neither hath this man sinned nor his parents2 but that the works of ,god may be made manifest4 ,and by the expostulation of ,god with ,job4 ,this endeavour of his to bring the text of ,st4 ,paul to his purpose1 is not only frustrate1 but the cause of many insignificant phrases in his discourse2 as this3 8,it was in their own power1 by their concurrence with ,god's grace1 to prevent these judgments1 and to recover their former estates10 which is as good sense1 as if he should say1 that it is in his own power1 with the concurrence of the sovereign power of ,england1 to be what he will4 ,and this1 that 8,god may oblige himself freely to his creature40 ,for he that can oblige1 can also1 when he will1 release2 and he that can release himself when he will1 is not obliged4 ,besides this1 he is driven to words ill-becoming him that is to speak of ,god ,almighty2 for he makes him unable to do that which hath been within the ordinary power of men to do4 8,god10 he saith1 8cannot destroy the righteous with the wicked20 which nevertheless is a thing ordinarily done by armies3 and 8,he could not destroy ,sodom while ,lot was in it20 which he interpreteth1 as if he could not do it lawfully4 ,one text is ,genesis xviii4 #bc1 #bd1 #be4 ,there is not a word that ,god could not destroy the righteous with the wicked4 ,only ,abraham saith 7as a man73 ,shall not the ,judge of all the earth do right8 ,another is ,genesis #bb73 ,haste thee1 escape thither2 for ,i cannot do any thing till thou be come thither4 ,which is an ordinary phrase1 in such a case where ,god had determined to burn the city and save a particular man1 and signifieth not any obligation to save ,lot more than the rest4 ,likewise concerning ,job1 who1 expostulating with ,god1 was answered only with the explication of the infinite power of ,god1 the ,bishop answereth1 that there is never a word of ,job's being punished without desert2 which answer is impertinent4 ,for ,i say not that he was punished without desert1 but that it was not for his desert that he was afflicted2 for punished1 he was not at all4 ,and concerning the blind man1 7,john ix471 who was born blind1 that the power of ,god might be shewn in him2 he answers that it was not a punishment1 but a blessing4 ,i did not say it was a punishment2 certainly it was an affliction4 ,how then doth he call it a blessing8 ,reasonably enough3 8because10 saith he1 8it was the means to raise his soul illuminated1 and to bring him to see the face of ,god in ,jesus ,christ4 ,the sight of the body is common to us with ants and flies1 but the sight of the soul1 with the blessed angels40 ,this is very well said2 for no man doubts but some afflictions may be blessings2 but ,i doubt whether the ,bishop1 that says he reads of some who have put out their bodily eyes1 because they thought they were an impediment to the eye of the soul1 think that they did well4 ,to that where ,i say that brute beasts are afflicted which cannot sin1 he answereth1 that 8there is a vast difference between those light and momentary pangs1 and the unsufferable and endless pains of hell40 ,as if the length or the greatness of the pain1 made any difference in the justice or injustice of the inflicting it4 7f7 8,but his greatest error is that which ,i touched before1 to make justice to be the proper result of power40 ,he would make men believe1 ,i hold all things to be just1 that are done by them who have power enough to avoid the punishment4 ,this is one of his pretty little policies1 by which ,i find him in many occasions to take the measure of his own wisdom4 ,i said no more1 but that the power1 which is absolutely irresistible1 makes him that hath it above all law1 so that nothing he doth can be unjust4 ,but this power can be no other than the power divine4 ,therefore let him preach what he will upon his mistaken text1 ,i shall leave it to the reader to consider of it1 without any further answer4 7g7 8,lastly1 howsoever ,t4 ,h4 cries out that ,god cannot sin1 yet in truth he makes him to be the principal and most proper cause of all sin4 ,for he makes him to be the cause not only of the law1 and of the action1 but even of the irregularity itself1 c4 wherein the very essence of sin doth consist40 ,i think there is no man but understands1 no1 not the ,bishop himself1 but that where two things are compared1 the similitude or dissimilitude1 regularity or irregularity1 that is between them1 is made in and by the making of the things themselves that are compared4 ,the ,bishop1 therefore1 that denies ,god to be the cause of the irregularity1 denies him to be the cause both of the law and of the action4 ,so that by his doctrine1 there shall be a good law whereof ,god shall be no cause1 and an action1 that is1 a local motion that shall depend upon another first mover that is not ,god4 ,the rest of this number is but railing4 ,,proofs ,,of ,,liberty ,,drawn ,,from ,,reason4 ,,no4 ,,xiii4 ,sidenote3 ,the ,bishop's reply4 ,j4 ,d4 8,the first argument is ,herculeum or baculinum1 drawn from that pleasant passage between ,zeno and his man4 ,the servant had committed some petty larceny1 and the master was cudgelling him well for it4 ,the servant thinks to creep under his master's blind side1 and pleads for himself that #8the necessity of destiny did compel him to steal4' ,the master answers1 #8the same necessity of destiny compels me to beat thee4' ,he that denies liberty1 is fitter to be refuted with rods than with arguments1 until he confess that it is free for him that beats him1 either to continue striking1 or to give over1 that is1 to have true liberty40 ,t4 ,h4 ,of the arguments from reason1 the first is that which he saith is drawn from ,zeno's beating of his man1 which is therefore called argumentum baculinum1 that is to say1 a wooden argument4 ,the story is this4 ,zeno held that all actions were necessary4 ,his man therefore1 being for some fault beaten1 excused himself upon the necessity of it4 ,to avoid this excuse1 his master pleaded likewise the necessity of beating him4 ,so that not he that maintained1 but he that derided the necessity of things1 was beaten2 contrary to that he would infer2 and the argument was rather withdrawn1 than drawn1 from the story4 ,j4 ,d4 8,whether the argument be withdrawn from the story1 or the answer withdrawn from the argument1 let the reader judge4 ,t4 ,h4 mistakes the scope of the reason1 the strength whereof doth not lie1 neither in the authority of ,zeno1 a rigid ,stoic1 which is not worth a button in this cause2 nor in the servant's being an adversary to stoical necessity4 ,for it appears not out of the story1 that the servant did deride necessity1 but rather that he pleaded it in good earnest for his own justification4 ,now in the success of the fray1 we were told even now1 that no power doth justify an action1 but only that which is irresistible4 ,such was not ,zeno's4 ,and therefore it advantageth neither of their causes1 neither that of ,zeno1 nor this of ,t4 ,h4 ,what if the servant had taken the staff out of his master's hand1 and beaten him soundly1 would not the same argument have served the man as well as it did the master1 that the necessity of destiny did compel him to strike again8 ,had not ,zeno smarted justly for his paradox8 ,and might not the spectators well have taken up the judge's apothegm1 concerning the dispute between ,corax and his scholar1 #8an ill egg of an ill bird'8 ,but the strength of this argument lies partly in the ignorance of ,zeno1 that great champion of necessity1 and the beggarliness of his cause1 which admitted no defence but with a cudgel4 ,no man1 saith the servant1 ought to be beaten for doing that which he is compelled inevitably to do3 but ,i am compelled inevitably to steal4 ,the major is so evident1 that it cannot be denied4 ,if a strong man shall take a weak man's hand per force1 and do violence with it to a third person1 he whose hand is forced1 is innocent1 and he only culpable who compelled him4 ,the minor was ,zeno's own doctrine2 what answer made the great patron of destiny to his servant8 very learnedly he denied the conclusion1 and cudgelled his servant2 telling him in effect1 that though there was no reason why he should be beaten1 yet there was a necessity why he must be beaten4 ,and partly in the evident absurdity of such an opinion1 which deserves not to be confuted with reasons1 but with rods4 ,there are four things1 said the philosopher1 which ought not to be called into question4 ,first1 such things whereof it is wickedness to doubt2 as whether the soul be immortal1 whether there be a ,god1 such an one should not be confuted with reasons1 but cast into the sea with a mill-stone about his neck1 as unworthy to breathe the air1 or to behold the light4 ,secondly1 such things as are above the capacity of reason2 as among ,christians1 the mystery of the ,holy ,trinity4 ,thirdly1 such principles as are evidently true2 as that two and two are four1 in arithmetic2 that the whole is greater than the part1 in logic4 ,fourthly1 such things as are obvious to the senses2 as whether the snow be white4 ,he who denied the heat of the fire1 was justly sentenced to be scorched with fire2 and he that denied motion1 to be beaten until he recanted4 ,so he who denies all liberty from necessitation1 should be scourged until he become an humble suppliant to him that whips him1 and confess that he hath power1 either to strike1 or to hold his hand40 ,t4 ,h4 ,in this ,number ,,xiii4 which is about ,zeno and his man1 there is contained nothing necessary to the instruction of the reader4 ,therefore ,i pass it over4 ,,no4 ,,xiv4 ,sidenote3 ,the ,bishop's reply4 ,j4 ,d4 8,secondly1 this very persuasion that there is no true liberty1 is able to overthrow all societies and commonwealths in the world4 ,the laws are unjust1 which prohibit that which a man cannot possibly shun4 ,all consultations are vain1 if every thing be either necessary or impossible4 ,who ever deliberated whether the sun should rise to-morrow1 or whether he should sail over mountains8 ,it is to no more purpose to admonish men of understanding than fools1 children1 or madmen1 if all things be necessary4 ,praises and dispraises1 rewards and punishments1 are as vain as they are undeserved1 if there be no liberty4 ,all counsels1 arts1 arms1 books1 instruments1 are superfluous and foolish1 if there be no liberty4 ,in vain we labour1 in vain we study1 in vain we take physic1 in vain we have tutors to instruct us1 if all things come to pass alike1 whether we sleep or wake1 whether we be idle or industrious1 by unalterable necessity4 ,but it is said1 that though future events be certain1 yet they are unknown to us3 and therefore we prohibit1 deliberate1 admonish1 praise1 dispraise1 reward1 punish1 study1 labour1 and use means4 ,alas6 how should our not knowing of the event1 be a sufficient motive to us to use the means1 so long as we believe the event is already certainly determined1 and can no more be changed by all our endeavours1 than we can stay the course of heaven with our finger1 or add a cubit to our stature8 ,suppose it be unknown1 yet it is certain4 ,we cannot hope to alter the course of things by our labours2 let the necessary causes do their work1 we have no remedy but patience1 and shrug up the shoulders4 ,either allow liberty1 or destroy all societies40 ,t4 ,h4 ,the second argument is taken from certain inconveniences which he thinks would follow such an opinion4 ,it is true that ill use may be made of it1 and therefore your ,lordship and ,j4 ,d4 ought1 at my request1 to keep private that ,i say here of it4 ,but the inconveniences are indeed none2 and what use soever be made of truth1 yet truth is truth2 and now the question is1 not what is fit to be preached1 but what is true4 ,the first inconvenience he says is this1 that laws which prohibit any action are then unjust4 ,the second1 that all consultations are vain4 ,the third1 that admonitions to men of understanding1 are of no more use than to fools1 children1 and madmen4 ,the fourth1 that praise1 dispraise1 reward1 and punishment1 are in vain4 ,the fifth1 that counsels1 arts1 arms1 books1 instruments1 study1 tutors1 medicines1 are in vain4 ,to which argument1 expecting ,i should answer by saying1 that the ignorance of the event were enough to make us use means1 he adds 7as it were a reply to my answer foreseen7 these words3 8,alas1 how should our not knowing of the event be a sufficient motive to make us use the means80 ,wherein he saith right2 but my answer is not that which he expecteth4 ,i answer1 ,first1 that the necessity of an action doth not make the law which prohibits it unjust4 ,to let pass1 that not the necessity1 but the will to break the law1 maketh the action unjust1 because the law regardeth the will1 and no other precedent causes of action2 and to let pass1 that no law can be possibly unjust1 in as much as every man makes1 by his consent1 the law he is bound to keep1 and which1 consequently1 must be just1 unless a man can be unjust to himself3 ,i say1 what necessary cause soever precedes an action1 yet1 if the action be forbidden1 he that doth it willingly1 may justly be punished4 ,for instance1 suppose the law on pain of death prohibit stealing1 and there be a man who by the strength of temptation is necessitated to steal1 and is thereupon put to death3 does not this punishment deter others from theft8 ,is it not a cause that others steal not8 ,doth it not frame and make their will to justice8 ,to make the law is therefore to make a cause of justice1 and to necessitate justice2 and consequently it is no injustice to make such a law4 ,the institution of the law is not to grieve the delinquent for that which is passed and not to be undone2 but to make him and others just1 that else would not be so3 and respecteth not the evil act past1 but the good to come4 ,insomuch as without this good intention of future1 no past act of a delinquent could justify his killing in the sight of ,god4 ,but1 you will say1 how is it just to kill one man to amend another1 if what was done were necessary8 ,to this ,i answer1 that men are justly killed1 not for that their actions are not necessitated1 but that they are spared and preserved1 because they are not noxious2 for where there is no law1 there no killing1 nor any thing else can be unjust4 ,and by the right of nature we destroy1 without being unjust1 all that is noxious1 both beasts and men4 ,and for beasts1 we kill them justly1 when we do it in order to our own preservation4 ,and yet ,j4 ,d4 confesseth1 that their actions1 as being only spontaneous and not free1 are all necessitated and determined to that one thing which they shall do4 ,for men1 when we make societies or commonwealths1 we lay down our right to kill1 excepting in certain cases1 as murder1 theft1 or other offensive actions4 ,so that the right which the commonwealth hath1 to put a man to death for crimes1 is not created by the law1 but remains from the first right of nature1 which every man hath to preserve himself2 for the law doth not take that right away1 in case of criminals1 who were by law excepted4 ,men are not therefore put to death or punished1 for that their theft proceedeth from election2 but because it was noxious and contrary to men's preservation1 and the punishment conducing to the preservation of the rest3 inasmuch as to punish those that do voluntary hurt1 and none else1 frameth and maketh men's wills1 such as men would have them4 ,and thus it is plain1 that from the necessity of a voluntary action cannot be inferred the injustice of the law that forbiddeth it1 or of the magistrate that punisheth it4 ,secondly1 ,i deny that it makes consultations to be in vain2 it is the consultation that causeth a man1 and necessitateth him1 to choose to do one thing rather than another4 ,so that unless a man say that cause to be in vain1 which necessitateth the effect1 he cannot infer the superfluousness of consultation out of the necessity of the election proceeding from it4 ,but it seems he reasons thus3 ,if ,i must needs do this rather than that1 then ,i shall do this rather than that1 though ,i consult not at all2 which is a false proposition1 a false consequence1 and no better than this3 ,if ,i shall live till to-morrow1 ,i shall live till to-morrow1 though ,i run myself through with a sword to-day4 ,if there be a necessity that an action shall be done1 or that any effect shall be brought to pass1 it does not therefore follow that there is nothing necessarily required as a means to bring it to pass4 ,and therefore1 when it is determined that one thing shall be chosen before another1 it is determined also for what cause it shall be chosen2 which cause1 for the most part1 is deliberation or consultation4 ,and therefore consultation is not in vain2 and indeed the less in vain1 by how much the election is more necessitated4 ,the same answer is to be given to the third supposed inconvenience2 namely1 that admonitions are in vain2 for admonitions are parts of consultations2 the admonitor being a counsellor1 for the time1 to him that is admonished4 ,the fourth pretended inconvenience is1 that praise and dispraise1 reward and punishment1 will be in vain4 ,to which ,i answer1 that for praise and dispraise1 they depend not at all on the necessity of the action praised or dispraised4 ,for1 what is it else to praise1 but to say a thing is good8 ,good1 ,i say1 for me1 or for somebody else1 or for the state and commonwealth4 ,and what is it to say an action is good1 but to say1 it is as ,i would wish1 or as another would have it1 or according to the will of the state1 that is to say1 according to law8 ,does ,j4 ,d4 think1 that no action can please me or him1 or the commonwealth1 that should proceed from necessity8 ,things may be therefore necessary and yet praiseworthy1 as also necessary and yet dispraised1 and neither of both in vain2 because praise and dispraise1 and likewise reward and punishment1 do by example make and conform the will to good or evil4 ,it was a very great praise1 in my opinion1 that ,velleius ,paterculus gives ,cato1 where he says1 he was good by nature1 et quia aliter esse non potuit4 ,to his fifth and sixth inconvenience1 that counsels1 arts1 arms1 books1 instruments1 study1 medicines1 and the like1 would be superfluous1 the same answer serves that to the former2 that is to say1 that this consequence1 if the effect shall necessarily come to pass1 then it shall come to pass without its cause1 is a false one4 ,and those things named1 counsels1 arts1 arms1 c41 are the causes of those effects4 ,j4 ,d4 8,nothing is more familiar with ,t4 ,h4 than to decline an argument4 ,but ,i will put it into form for him4 7a7 ,the first inconvenience is thus pressed4 ,those laws are unjust and tyrannical1 which do prescribe things absolutely impossible in themselves to be done1 and punish men for not doing of them4 ,but supposing ,t4 ,h's opinion of the necessity of all things to be true1 all laws do prescribe absolute impossibilities to be done1 and punish men for not doing of them4 ,the former proposition is so clear that it cannot be denied4 ,just laws are the ordinances of right reason2 but those laws which prescribe absolute impossibilities1 are not the ordinances of right reason4 ,just laws are instituted for the public good2 but those laws which prescribe absolute impossibilities1 are not instituted for the public good4 ,just laws do show unto a man what is to be done1 and what is to be shunned2 but those laws which prescribe impossibilities1 do not direct a man what he is to do1 and what he is to shun4 ,the minor is as evident4 ,for if his opinion be true1 all actions1 all transgressions are determined antecedently inevitably to be done by a natural and necessary flux of extrinsical causes4 ,yea1 even the will of man1 and the reason itself is thus determined4 ,and therefore whatsoever laws do prescribe any thing to be done1 which is not done1 or to be left undone which is done1 do prescribe absolute impossibilities1 and punish men for not doing of impossibilities4 ,in all his answer there is not one word to this argument1 but only to the conclusion4 ,he saith1 that #8not the necessity1 but the will to break the law makes the action unjust4' ,i ask what makes the will to break the law2 is it not his necessity8 ,what gets he by this8 ,a perverse will causeth injustice1 and necessity causeth a perverse will4 ,he saith1 #8the law regardeth the will1 but not the precedent causes of action4' ,to what proposition1 to what term is this answer8 ,he neither denies nor distinguisheth4 ,first1 the question here is not what makes actions to be unjust1 but what makes laws to be unjust4 ,so his answer is impertinent4 ,it is likewise untrue4 ,for first1 that will which the law regards1 is not such a will as ,t4 ,h4 imagineth4 ,it is a free will1 not a determined necessitated will2 a rational will1 not a brutish will4 ,secondly1 the law doth look upon precedent causes1 as well as the voluntariness of the action4 ,if a child1 before he be seven years old or have the use of reason1 in some childish quarrel do willingly stab another1 whereof we have seen experience1 yet the law looks not upon it as an act of murder2 because there wanted a power to deliberate1 and consequently true liberty4 ,manslaughter may be as voluntary as murder1 and commonly more voluntary2 because being done in hot blood there is the less reluctation4 ,yet the law considers1 that the former is done out of some sudden passion without serious deliberation1 and the other out of prepensed malice and desire of revenge2 and therefore condemns murder1 as more wilful and more punishable than manslaughter40 7b7 8,he saith1 #8that no law can possibly be unjust2' and ,i say1 that this is to deny the conclusion1 which deserves no reply4 ,but to give him satisfaction1 ,i will follow him in this also1 if he intended no more but that unjust laws are not genuine laws1 nor bind to active obedience1 because they are not the ordinations of right reason1 not instituted for the common good1 nor prescribe that which ought to be done2 he said truly1 but nothing at all to his purpose4 ,but if he intend1 as he doth1 that there are no laws de facto1 which are the ordinances of reason erring1 instituted for the common hurt1 and prescribing that which ought not to be done1 he is much mistaken4 ,pharaoh's law1 to drown the male children of the ,israelites 7,exod4 i4 #bb72 ,nebuchadnezzar's law1 that whosoever did not fall down and worship the golden image which he had set up1 should be cast into the fiery furnace 7,dan4 iii4 #d-f72 ,darius's law1 that whosoever should ask a petition of any ,god or man for thirty days1 save of the king1 should be cast into the den of lions 7,dan4 vi4 #g72 ,ahasuerus's law1 to destroy the ,jewish nation1 root and branch 7,esther iii4 #ac72 the ,pharisees' law1 that whosoever confesseth ,christ1 should be excommunicated 7,john ix4 #bb72 were all unjust laws4 7c7 8,the ground of this error is as great an error itself 7such an art he hath learned of repacking paradoxes72 which is this1 #8that every man makes by his consent the law which he is bound to keep4' ,if this were true1 it would preserve them1 if not from being unjust1 yet from being injurious4 ,but it is not true4 ,the positive law of ,god1 contained in the ,old and ,new ,testament2 the law of nature1 written in our hearts by the finger of ,god2 the laws of conquerors1 who come in by the power of the sword2 the laws of our ancestors1 which were made before we were born2 do all oblige us to the observation of them2 yet to none of all these did we give our actual consent4 ,over and above all these exceptions1 he builds upon a wrong foundation1 that all magistrates at first were elective4 ,the first governors were fathers of families2 and when those petty princes could not afford competent protection and security to their subjects1 many of them did resign their several and respective interests into the hands of one joint father of the country4 8,and though his ground had been true1 that all first legislators were elective1 which is false2 yet his superstructure fails3 for it was done in hope and trust that they would make just laws4 ,if magistrates abuse this trust1 and deceive the hopes of the people by making tyrannical laws1 yet it is without their consent4 ,a precedent trust doth not justify the subsequent errors and abuses of a trustee4 ,he who is duly elected a legislator1 may exercise his legislative power unduly4 ,the people's implicit consent doth not render the tyrannical laws of their legislators to be just4 7d7 8,but his chiefest answer is1 that #8an action forbidden1 though it proceed from necessary causes1 yet if it were done willingly1 it may be justly punished2' which1 according to his custom1 he proves by an instance4 #8,a man necessitated to steal by the strength of temptation1 yet if he steal willingly1 is justly put to death4' ,here are two things1 and both of them untrue4 8,first1 he fails in his assertion4 ,indeed we suffer justly for those necessities1 which we ourselves have contracted by our own fault2 but not for extrinsical antecedent necessities1 which were imposed upon us without our fault4 ,if that law do not oblige to punishment1 which is not intimated1 because the subject is invincibly ignorant of it2 how much less that law which prescribes absolute impossibilities3 unless perhaps invincible necessity be not as strong a plea as invincible ignorance4 ,that which he adds1 #8if it were done willingly1' though it be of great moment1 if it be rightly understood1 yet in his sense1 that is1 if a man's #8will be not in his own disposition1' and #8if his willing do not come upon him according to his will1 nor according to anything else in his power1' it weighs not half so much as the least feather in all his horse-load4 ,for if that law be unjust and tyrannical which commands a man to do that which is impossible for him to do1 then that law is likewise unjust and tyrannical1 which commands him to will that which is impossible for him to will4 8,secondly1 his instance supposeth an untruth1 and is a plain begging of the question4 ,no man is extrinsically1 antecedently1 and irresistibly necessitated by temptation to steal4 ,the devil may solicit us1 but he cannot necessitate us4 ,he hath a faculty of persuading1 but not a power of compelling4 ,nos ignem habemus1 spiritus flammam ciet2 as ,gregory ,nazianzen1 he blows the coals1 but the fire is our own4 ,mordet duntaxat sese in fauces illius objicientem2 as ,st4 ,austin1 he bites not1 until we thrust ourselves into his mouth4 ,he may propose1 he may suggest1 but he cannot move the will effectively4 ,resist the devil1 and he will flee from you 7,james iv4 #g74 ,by faith we are able to quench all the fiery darts of the wicked 7,ephes4 vi4 #af74 ,and if ,satan1 who can both propose the object1 and choose out the fittest times and places to work upon our frailties1 and can suggest reasons1 yet cannot necessitate the will1 7which is most certain72 then much less can outward objects do it alone4 ,they have no natural efficacy to determine the will4 ,well may they be occasions1 but they cannot be causes of evil4 ,the sensitive appetite may engender a proclivity to steal1 but not a necessity to steal4 ,and if it should produce a kind of necessity1 yet it is but moral1 not natural2 hypothetical1 not absolute2 coexistent1 not antecedent from ourselves1 nor extrinsical4 ,this necessity1 or rather proclivity1 was free in its causes2 we ourselves by our own negligence in not opposing our passions when we should and might1 have freely given it a kind of dominion over us4 ,admit that some sudden passions may and do extraordinarily surprise us2 and therefore we say1 motus primo primi1 the first motions are not always in our power1 neither are they free3 yet this is but very rarely1 and it is our own fault that they do surprise us4 ,neither doth the law punish the first motion to theft1 but the advised act of stealing4 ,the intention makes the thief4 ,but of this more largely ,no4 ,,xxv4 7e7 8,he pleads moreover1 #8,that the law is a cause of justice1' that #8it frames the wills of men to justice1' and #8that the punishment of one doth conduce to the preservation of many4' ,all this is most true of a just law justly executed4 ,but this is no ,god-a-mercy to ,t4 ,h4's opinion of absolute necessity4 ,if all actions and all events be predetermined naturally1 necessarily1 extrinsically1 how should the law frame men morally to good actions8 ,he leaves nothing for the law to do1 but either that which is done already1 or that which is impossible to be done4 ,if a man be chained to every individual act which he doth1 and from every act which he doth not1 by indissolvable bonds of inevitable necessity1 how should the law either deter him or frame him8 ,if a dog be chained fast to a post1 the sight of a rod cannot draw him from it4 ,make a thousand laws that the fire shall not burn1 yet it will burn4 ,and whatsoever men do1 according to ,t4 ,h41 they do it as necessarily as the fire burneth4 ,hang up a thousand thieves1 and if a man be determined inevitably to steal1 he must steal notwithstanding4 7f7 8,he adds1 that #8the sufferings imposed by the law upon delinquents1 respect not the evil act passed1 but the good to come1 and that the putting of a delinquent to death by the magistrate for any crime whatsoever1 cannot be justified before ,god1 except there be a real intention to benefit others by his example4' ,the truth is1 the punishing of delinquents by law1 respecteth both the evil act passed and the good to come4 ,the ground of it1 is the evil act passed1 the scope or end of it1 is the good to come4 ,the end without the ground cannot justify the act4 ,a bad intention may make a good action bad2 but a good intention cannot make a bad action good4 ,it is not lawful to do evil that good may come of it1 nor to punish an innocent person for the admonition of others2 that is to fall into a certain crime for fear of an uncertain4 ,again1 though there were no other end of penalties inflicted1 neither probatory1 nor castigatory1 nor exemplary1 but only vindicatory1 to satisfy the law out of a zeal of justice by giving to every one his own1 yet the action is just and warrantable4 ,killing1 as it is considered in itself1 without all undue circumstances1 was never prohibited to the lawful magistrate1 who is the vice-gerent or lieutenant of ,god1 from whom he derives his power of life and death4 8,t4 ,h4 hath one plea more4 ,as a drowning man catcheth at every bulrush1 so he lays hold on every pretence to save a desperate cause4 ,but first1 it is worth our observation to see how oft he changeth shapes in this one particular4 7g7 ,first1 he told us1 that it was the irresistible power of ,god that justifies all his actions1 though he command one thing openly1 and plot another thing secretly1 though he be the cause not only of the action1 but also of the irregularity2 though he both give man power to act1 and determine this power to evil as well as good2 though he punish the creatures1 for doing that which he himself did necessitate them to do4 ,but being pressed with reason1 that this is tyrannical1 first to necessitate a man to do his will1 and then to punish him for doing of it1 he leaves this pretence in the plain field1 and flies to a second2 that therefore a man is justly punished for that which he was necessitated to do1 because the act was voluntary on his part4 ,this hath more show of reason than the former1 if he did make the will of man to be in his own disposition2 but maintaining that the will is irresistibly determined to will whatsoever it doth will1 the injustice and absurdity is the same1 first to necessitate a man to will1 and then to punish him for willing4 ,the dog only bites the stone which is thrown at him with a strange hand1 but they make the first cause to punish the instrument for that which is his own proper act4 ,wherefore not being satisfied with this1 he casts it off and flies to his third shift4 #8,men are not punished1' saith he1 #8therefore1 because their theft proceeded from election1' 7that is1 because it was willingly done1 for to elect and will1 saith he1 are both one2 is not this to blow hot and cold with the same breath87 #8but because it was noxious and contrary to men's preservation4' ,thus far he saith true1 that every creature by the instinct of nature seeks to preserve itself3 cast water into a dusty place1 and it contracts itself into little globes1 that is to preserve itself4 ,and those who are noxious in the eye of the law1 are justly punished by them to whom the execution of the law is committed2 but the law accounts no persons noxious1 but those who are noxious by their own fault4 ,it punisheth not a thorn for pricking1 because it is the nature of the thorn1 and it can do no otherwise1 nor a child1 before it have the use of reason4 ,if one should take my hand perforce and give another a box on the ear with it1 my hand is noxious1 but the law punisheth the other who is faulty4 ,and therefore he hath reason to propose the question1 #8how it is just to kill one man to amend another1 if he who killed did nothing but what he was necessitated to do4' ,he might as well demand1 how it is lawful to murder a company of innocent infants1 to make a bath of their lukewarm blood for curing the leprosy4 ,it had been a more rational way1 first to have demonstrated that it is so1 and then to have questioned why it is so4 ,his assertion itself is but a dream1 and the reason which he gives of it why it is so1 is a dream of a dream4 8,the sum of it is this2 #8that where there is no law1 there no killing or any thing else can be unjust2 that before the constitution of commonwealths1 every man had power to kill another1 if he conceived him to be hurtful to him2 that at the constitution of commonwealths1 particular men lay down this right in part1 and in part reserve it to themselves1 as in case of theft or murder2 that the right which the commonwealth hath to put a malefactor to death1 is not created by the law1 but remaineth from the first right of nature which every man hath to preserve himself2 that the killing of men in this case is as the killing of beasts in order to our own preservation4' ,this may well be called stringing of paradoxes4 8,but first1 7h7 there never was any such time when mankind was without governors and laws1 and societies4 ,paternal government was in the world from the beginning1 and the law of nature4 ,there might be sometimes a root of such barbarous thievish brigands1 in some rocks or deserts1 or odd corners of the world2 but it was an abuse and a degeneration from the nature of man1 who is a political creature4 ,this savage opinion reflects too much upon the honour of mankind4 8,secondly1 there never was a time when it was lawful1 ordinarily1 for private men to kill one another for their own preservation4 ,if ,god would have had men live like wild beasts1 as lions1 bears1 or tigers1 he would have armed them with horns1 or tusks1 or talons1 or pricks2 but of all creatures man is born most naked1 without any weapon to defend himself1 because ,god had provided a better means of security for him1 that is1 the magistrate4 8,thirdly1 that right which private men have to preserve themselves1 though it be with the killing of another1 when they are set upon to be murdered or robbed1 is not a remainder or a reserve of some greater power which they have resigned1 but a privilege which ,god hath given them1 in case of extreme danger and invincible necessity1 that when they cannot possibly have recourse to the ordinary remedy1 that is1 the magistrate1 every man becomes a magistrate to himself4 8,fourthly1 nothing can give that which it never had4 ,the people1 whilst they were a dispersed rabble1 7which in some odd cases might happen to be71 never had justly the power of life and death1 and therefore they could not give it by their election4 ,all that they do is to prepare the matter1 but it is ,god ,almighty that infuseth the soul of power4 8,fifthly and lastly1 ,i am sorry to hear a man of reason and parts to compare the murdering of men with the slaughtering of brute beasts4 ,the elements are for the plants1 the plants for the brute beasts1 the brute beasts for man4 ,when ,god enlarged his former grant to man1 and gave him liberty to eat the flesh of his creatures for his sustenance1 7,gen4 ix4 #c71 yet man is expressly excepted 7verse #f73 ,whoso sheddeth man's blood1 by man shall his blood be shed4 ,and the reason is assigned1 for in the image of ,god made he man4 ,before sin entered into the world1 or before any creatures were hurtful or noxious to man1 he had dominion over them as their lord and master4 ,and though the possession of this sovereignty be lost in part1 for the sin of man1 which made not only the creatures to rebel1 but also the inferior faculties to rebel against the superior1 from whence it comes that one man is hurtful to another2 yet the dominion still remains4 ,wherein we may observe how sweetly the providence of ,god doth temper this cross2 that though the strongest creatures have withdrawn their obedience1 as lions and bears1 to shew that man hath lost the excellency of his dominion1 and the weakest creatures1 as flies and gnats1 to shew into what a degree of contempt he is fallen2 yet still the most profitable and useful creatures1 as sheep and oxen1 do in some degree retain their obedience4 7i7 8,the next branch of his answer concerns consultations1 #8which1' saith he1 #8are not superfluous1 though all things come to pass necessarily1 because they are the cause which doth necessitate the effect1 and the means to bring it to pass4' ,we were told 7,no4 ,,xi47 #8that the last dictate of right reason was but as the last feather which breaks the horse's back4 ,it is well yet1 that reason hath gained some command again1 and is become at least a quarter-master4 ,certainly if any thing under ,god have power to determine the will1 it is right reason4 ,but ,i have shewed sufficiently1 that reason doth not determine the will physically1 nor absolutely1 much less extrinsically1 and antecedently2 and therefore it makes nothing for that necessity which ,t4 ,h4 hath undertaken to prove4 7k7 8,he adds further1 that #8as the end is necessary1 so are the means2 and when it is determined that one thing shall be chosen before another1 it is determined also for what cause it shall be so chosen4' ,all which is truth1 but not the whole truth2 for as ,god ordains means for all ends1 so he adapts and fits the means to their respective ends1 free means to free ends1 contingent means to contingent ends1 necessary means to necessary ends1 whereas ,t4 ,h4 would have all means1 all ends1 to be necessary4 ,if ,god hath so ordered the world1 that a man ought to use1 and may freely use1 those means of ,god1 which he doth neglect1 not by virtue of ,god's decree1 but by his own fault2 if a man use those means of evil1 which he ought not to use1 and which by ,god's decree he had power to forbear2 if ,god have left to man in part the free managery of human affairs1 and to that purpose hath endowed him with understanding3 then consultations are of use1 then provident care is needful1 then it concerns him to use the means4 ,but if ,god have so ordered this world1 that a man cannot1 if he would1 neglect any means of good1 which by virtue of ,god's decree it is possible for him to use1 and that he cannot possibly use any means of evil1 but those which are irresistibly and inevitably imposed upon him by an antecedent decree2 then not only consultations are vain1 but that noble faculty of reason itself is vain4 ,do we think that we can help ,god ,almighty to do his proper work8 ,in vain we trouble ourselves1 in vain we take care to use those means1 which are not in our power to use1 or not to use4 ,and this is that which was contained in my prolepsis or prevention of his answer1 though he be pleased both to disorder it1 and to silence it4 ,we cannot hope by our labours1 to alter the course of things set down by ,god2 let him perform his decree1 let the necessary causes do their work4 ,if we be those causes1 yet we are not in our own disposition2 we must do what we are ordained to do1 and more we cannot do4 ,man hath no remedy but patience1 and to shrug up the shoulders4 ,this is the doctrine that flows from this opinion of absolute necessity4 ,let us suppose the great wheel of the clock which sets all the little wheels going1 to be as the decree of ,god1 and that the motion of it were perpetually infallible from an intrinsical principle1 even as ,god's decree is infallible1 eternal1 all-sufficient4 ,let us suppose the lesser wheels to be the second causes1 and that they do as certainly follow the motion of the great wheel1 without missing or swerving in the least degree1 as the second causes do pursue the determination of the first cause4 ,i desire to know in this case1 what cause there is to call a council of smiths1 to consult and order the motion of that which was ordered and determined before to their hands8 ,are men wiser than ,god8 ,yet all men know1 that the motion of the lesser wheels is a necessary means to make the clock strike4 7l7 8,but he tells me in great sadness1 that #8my argument is just like this other2 if ,i shall live till to-morrow1 ,i shall live till to-morrow1 though ,i run myself through with a sword to-day2 which1 saith he1 is a false consequence1 and a false proposition4' ,truly1 if by running through1 he understands killing1 it is a false1 or rather a foolish proposition1 and implies a contradiction4 ,to live till to-morrow1 and to die to-day1 are inconsistent4 ,but by his favour1 this is not my consequence1 but this is his own opinion4 ,he would persuade us1 that it is absolutely necessary that a man shall live till to-morrow1 and yet that it is possible that he may kill himself to-day4 ,my argument is this3 if there be a liberty and possibility for a man to kill himself to-day1 then it is not absolutely necessary that he shall live till to-morrow2 but there is such a liberty1 therefore no such necessity4 ,and the consequence which ,i make here1 is this3 if it be absolutely necessary1 that a man shall live till to-morrow1 then it is vain and superfluous for him to consult and deliberate whether he should die to-day1 or not4 ,and this is a true consequence4 ,the ground of his mistake is this1 that though it be true1 that a man may kill himself to-day1 yet upon the supposition of his absolute necessity1 it is impossible4 ,such heterogeneous arguments and instances he produceth1 which are half builded upon our true grounds1 and the other half upon his false grounds4 7m7 8,the next branch of my argument concerns admonitions1 to which he gives no new answer1 and therefore ,i need not make any new reply1 saving only to tell him1 that he mistakes my argument4 ,i say not only1 if all things be necessary1 then admonitions are in vain2 but if all things be necessary1 then it is to no more purpose to admonish men of understanding than fools1 children1 or madmen4 ,that they do admonish the one and not the other1 is confessedly true2 and no reason under heaven can be given for it but this1 that the former have the use of reason and true liberty1 with a dominion over their own actions1 which children1 fools1 and madmen have not4 8,concerning praise and dispraise1 he enlargeth himself4 ,the scope of his discourse is1 that #8things necessary may be praiseworthy4' ,there is no doubt of it2 but withal their praise reflects upon the free agent1 as the praise of a statue reflects upon the workman who made it4 #8,to praise a thing1' saith he1 #8is to say it is good4' 7n7 ,true1 but this goodness is not a metaphysical goodness2 so the worst of things1 and whatsoever hath a being1 is good3 nor a natural goodness2 the praise of it passeth wholly to the ,author of nature2 ,god saw all that he had made1 and it was very good3 but a moral goodness1 or a goodness of actions rather than of things4 ,the moral goodness of an action is the conformity of it with right reason4 ,the moral evil of an action is the deformity of it1 and the alienation of it from right reason4 ,it is moral praise and dispraise which we speak of here4 ,to praise anything morally1 is to say1 it is morally good1 that is1 conformable to right reason4 ,the moral dispraise of a thing is to say1 it is morally bad1 or disagreeing from the rule of right reason4 ,so moral praise is from the good use of liberty1 moral dispraise from the bad use of liberty2 but if all things be necessary1 then moral liberty is quite taken away1 and with it all true praise and dispraise4 ,whereas ,t4 ,h4 adds1 that #8to say a thing is good1 is to say1 it is as ,i would wish1 or as another would wish1 or as the state would have it1 or according to the law of the land2' he mistakes infinitely4 ,he1 and another1 and the state1 may all wish that which is not really good1 but only in appearance4 ,we do often wish what is profitable or delightful1 without regarding so much as we ought what is honest4 ,and though the will of the state where we live1 or the law of the land1 do deserve great consideration1 yet it is no infallible rule of moral goodness4 ,and therefore to his question1 #8whether nothing that proceeds from necessity can please me1' ,i answer1 yes4 ,the burning of the fire pleaseth me1 when ,i am cold2 and ,i say1 it is good fire1 or a creature created by ,god for my use and for my good4 ,yet ,i do not mean to attribute any moral goodness to the fire1 nor give any moral praise to it1 as if it were in the power of the fire itself either to communicate its heat or to suspend it2 but ,i praise first the ,creator of the fire1 and then him who provided it4 ,as for the praise which ,velleius ,paterculus gives ,cato1 that he was good by nature1 et quia aliter esse non potuit2 it hath more of the orator1 than either of the theologian or philosopher in it4 ,man in the state of innocency did fall and become evil2 what privilege hath ,cato more than he8 ,no1 by his leave4 ,narratur et divi ,catonis spe mero caluisse virtus4 ,but the true meaning is1 that he was naturally of a good temper1 not so prone to some kinds of vice as others were4 ,this is to praise a thing1 not an action1 naturally1 not morally4 ,socrates was not of so good a natural temper1 yet proved as good a man2 the more his praise1 by how much the difficulty was the more to conform his disorderly appetite to right reason4 8,concerning reward and punishment1 he saith not a word1 but only that they frame and conform the will to good1 which hath been sufficiently answered4 ,they do so indeed2 but if his opinion were true1 they could not do so4 ,but because my aim is not only to answer ,t4 ,h41 but also to satisfy myself1 7o7 though it be not urged by him1 yet ,i do acknowledge that ,i find some improper and analogical rewards and punishments used to brute beasts1 as the hunter rewards his dog1 the master of the decoy-duck whips her when she returns without company4 ,and if it be true1 which he affirmeth a little before that ,i have confessed1 #8that the actions of brute beasts are all necessitated and determined to that one thing which they shall do1' the difficulty is increased4 8,but first1 my saying is misalleged4 ,i said1 that some kinds of actions which are most excellent in brute beasts1 and make the greatest show of reason1 as the bees working their honey1 and the spiders weaving their webs1 are yet done without any consultation or deliberation1 by a mere instinct of nature1 and by a determination of their fancies to these only kinds of works4 ,but ,i did never say1 ,i could not say1 that all their individual actions are necessary1 and antecedently determined in their causes1 as what days the bees shall fly abroad1 and what days and hours each bee shall keep in the hive1 how often they shall fetch in thyme on a day1 and from whence4 ,these actions and the like1 though they be not free1 because brute beasts want reason to deliberate1 yet they are contingent1 and therefore not necessary4 8,secondly1 ,i do acknowledge1 that as the fancies of some brute creatures are determined by nature to some rare and exquisite works2 so in others1 where it finds a natural propension1 art1 which is the imitator of nature1 may frame and form them according to the will of the artist to some particular actions and ends1 as we see in setting-dogs1 and coy-ducks1 and parrots2 and the principal means whereby they effect this1 is by their backs or by their bellies1 by the rod or by the morsel1 which have indeed a shadow or resemblance of rewards and punishments4 ,but we take the word here properly1 not as it is used by vulgar people1 but as it is used by divines and philosophers1 for that recompense which is due to honest and dishonest actions4 ,where there is no moral liberty1 there is neither honesty nor dishonesty1 neither true reward nor punishment4 8,thirdly1 7p7 when brute creatures do learn any such qualities1 it is not out of judgment1 or deliberation1 or discourse1 by inferring or concluding one thing from another1 which they are not capable of4 ,neither are they able to conceive a reason of what they do1 but merely out of memory or out of a sensitive fear or hope4 ,they remember that when they did after one manner1 they were beaten2 and when they did after another manner1 they were cherished2 and accordingly they apply themselves4 ,but if their individual actions were absolutely necessary1 fear or hope could not alter them4 ,most certainly1 if there be any desert in it1 or any praise due unto it1 it is to them who did instruct them4 ,lastly1 concerning arts1 arms1 books1 instruments1 study1 physic1 and the like1 he answereth not a word more than what is already satisfied4 ,and therefore ,i am silent4 ,,animadversions ,,upon ,,the ,,bishop',s ,,reply ,,no4 ,,xiv4 7a7 8,the first inconvenience is thus pressed4 ,those laws are unjust and tyrannical1 which do prescribe things absolutely impossible in themselves to be done1 and punish men for not doing of them40 ,i have already1 in the beginning1 where ,i recite the inconveniences that follow the doctrine of necessity1 made clear that the same inconveniences follow not the doctrine of necessity1 any more than they follow this truth1 whatsoever shall be1 shall be1 which all men must confess2 the same also followeth upon this1 that whatsoever ,god foreknows1 cannot but come to pass in such time and manner as he hath foreknown it4 ,it is therefore evident that these inconveniences are not rationally deduced from those tenets4 ,again1 it is a truth manifest to all men1 that it is not in a man's power to-day1 to choose what will he shall have to-morrow1 or an hour1 or any time after4 ,intervening occasions1 business1 which the ,bishop calls trifles1 7trifles of which the ,bishop maketh here a great business71 do change the will4 ,no man can say what he will do to-morrow1 unless he foreknow1 which no man can1 what shall happen before to-morrow4 ,and this being the substance of my opinion1 it must needs be that when he deduceth from it1 that counsels1 arts1 arms1 medicines1 teachers1 praise1 prayer1 and piety1 are in vain1 that his deduction is false1 and his ratiocination fallacy4 ,and though ,i need make no other answer to all that he can object against me1 yet ,i shall here mark out the causes of his several paralogisms4 8,those laws10 he saith1 8are unjust and tyrannical1 which do prescribe things absolutely impossible to be done1 and punish men for not doing of them40 ,in which words this is one absurdity1 that a law can be unjust2 for all laws are divine or civil1 neither of which can be unjust4 ,of the first there is no doubt4 ,and as for civil laws1 they are made by every man that is subject to them2 because every one of them consenteth to the placing of the legislative power4 ,another is this1 in the same words1 that he supposeth there may be laws that are tyrannical2 for if he that maketh them have the sovereign power1 they may be regal1 but not tyrannical2 if tyrant signify not ,king1 as he thinks it doth not4 ,another is in the same words1 8that a law may prescribe things absolutely impossible in themselves to be done40 ,when he says impossible in themselves1 he understands not what himself means4 ,impossible in themselves are contradictions only1 as to be and not to be at the same time1 which the divines say is not possible to ,god4 ,all other things are possible at least in themselves4 ,raising from the dead1 changing the course of nature1 making of a new heaven1 and a new earth1 are things possible in themselves2 for there is nothing in their nature able to resist the will of ,god4 ,and if laws do not prescribe such things1 why should ,i believe they prescribe other things that are more impossible4 ,did he ever read in ,suarez of any tyrant that made a law commanding any man to do and not to do the same action1 or to be and not to be at the same place in one and the same moment of time4 ,but out of the doctrine of necessity1 it followeth he says1 that 8all laws do prescribe absolute impossibilities to be done40 ,here he has left out in themselves1 which is a wilful fallacy4 ,he further says that 8just laws are the ordinances of right reason20 which is an error that hath cost many thousands of men their lives4 ,was there ever a ,king1 that made a law which in right reason had been better unmade8 ,and shall those laws therefore not be obeyed8 ,shall we rather rebel8 ,i think not1 though ,i am not so great a divine as he4 ,i think rather that the reason of him that hath the sovereign authority1 and by whose sword we look to be protected both against war from abroad and injuries at home1 whether it be right or erroneous in itself1 ought to stand for right to us that have submitted ourselves thereunto by receiving the protection4 ,but the ,bishop putteth his greatest confidence in this1 that whether the things be impossible in themselves1 or made impossible by some unseen accident1 yet there is no reason that men should be punished for not doing them4 ,it seems he taketh punishment for a kind of revenge1 and can never therefore agree with me1 that take it for nothing else but for a correction1 or for an example1 which hath for end the framing and necessitating of the will to virtue2 and that he is no good man1 that upon any provocation useth his power1 though a power lawfully obtained1 to afflict another man without this end1 to reform the will of him or others4 ,nor can ,i comprehend1 as having only humane ideas1 that that punishment which neither intendeth the correction of the offender1 nor the correction of others by example1 doth proceed from ,god4 7b7 8,he saith that no law can possibly be unjust10 c4 ,against this he replies that the law of ,pharaoh1 to drown the male children of the ,israelites2 and of ,nebuchadnezzar1 to worship the golden image2 and of ,darius1 against praying to any but him in thirty days2 and of ,ahasuerus1 to destroy the ,jews2 and of the ,pharisees1 to excommunicate the confessors of ,christ2 were all unjust laws4 ,the laws of these kings1 as they were laws1 have relation only to the men that were their subjects2 and the making of them1 which was the action of every one of those kings1 who were subjects to another king1 namely1 to ,god ,almighty1 had relation to the law of ,god4 ,in the first relation1 there could be no injustice in them2 because all laws made by him to whom the people had given the legislative power1 are the acts of every one of that people2 and no man can do injustice to himself4 ,but in relation to ,god1 if ,god have by a law forbidden it1 the making of such laws is injustice4 ,which law of ,god was to those heathen princes no other but salus populi1 that is to say1 the properest use of their natural reason for the preservation of their subjects4 ,if therefore those laws were ordained out of wantonness1 or cruelty1 or envy1 or for the pleasing of a favourite1 or out of any other sinister end1 as it seems they were1 the making of those laws was unjust4 ,but if in right reason they were necessary for the preservation of those people of whom they had undertaken the charge1 then was it not unjust4 ,and for the ,pharisees1 who had the same written law of ,god that we have1 their excommunication of the ,christians1 proceeding1 as it did1 from envy1 was an act of malicious injustice4 ,if it had proceeded from misinterpretation of their own ,scriptures1 it had been a sin of ignorance4 ,nevertheless1 as it was a law to their subjects 7in case they had the legislative power1 which ,i doubt of71 the law was not unjust4 ,but the making of it was an unjust action1 of which they were to give account to none but ,god4 ,i fear the ,bishop will think this discourse too subtile2 but the judgment is the reader's4 7c7 8,the ground of this error10 c41 8is this3 that every man makes by his consent the law which he is bound to keep10 c4 ,the reason why he thinketh this an error1 is because the positive law of ,god1 contained in the ,bible1 is a law without our assent2 the law of nature was written in our hearts by the finger of ,god without our assent2 the laws of conquerors1 who come in by the power of the sword1 were made without our assent2 and so were the laws of our ancestors1 which were made before we were born4 ,it is a strange thing that he that understands the nonsense of the ,schoolmen1 should not be able to perceive so easy a truth as this which he denieth4 ,the ,bible is a law4 ,to whom8 ,to all the world8 ,he knows it is not4 ,how came it then to be a law to us8 ,did ,god speak it viva voce to us8 ,have we then any other warrant for it than the word of the prophets8 ,have we seen the miracles8 ,have we any other assurance of their certainty than the authority of the ,church8 ,and is the authority of the ,church any other than the authority of the commonwealth1 or that of the commonwealth any other than that of the head of the commonwealth1 or hath the head of the commonwealth any other authority than that which hath been given him by the members8 ,else1 why should not the ,bible be canonical as well in ,constantinople as in any other place8 ,they that have the legislative power make nothing canon1 which they make not law1 nor law1 which they make not canon4 ,and because the legislative power is from the assent of the subjects1 the ,bible is made law by the assent of the subjects4 ,it was not the ,bishop of ,rome that made the ,scripture law without his own temporal dominions2 nor is it the clergy that make it law in their dioceses and rectories4 ,nor can it be a law of itself without special and supernatural revelation4 ,the ,bishop thinks because the ,bible is law1 and he is appointed to teach it to the people in his diocese1 that therefore it is law to whomsoever he teach it2 which is somewhat gross1 but not so gross as to say that conquerors who come in by the power of the sword1 make their laws also without our assent4 ,he thinks1 belike1 that if a conqueror can kill me if he please1 ,i am presently obliged without more ado to obey all his laws4 ,may not ,i rather die1 if ,i think fit8 ,the conqueror makes no law over the conquered by virtue of his power2 but by virtue of their assent1 that promised obedience for the saving of their lives4 ,but how then is the assent of the children obtained to the laws of their ancestors8 ,this also is from the desire of preserving their lives1 which first the parents might take away1 where the parents be free from all subjection2 and where they are not1 there the civil power might do the same1 if they doubted of their obedience4 ,the children therefore1 when they be grown up to strength enough to do mischief1 and to judgment enough to know that other men are kept from doing mischief to them by fear of the sword that protecteth them1 in that very act of receiving that protection1 and not renouncing it openly1 do oblige themselves to obey the laws of their protectors2 to which1 in receiving such protection1 they have assented4 ,and whereas he saith1 the law of nature is a law without our assent1 it is absurd2 for the law of nature is the assent itself that all men give to the means of their own preservation4 7d7 8,but his chiefest answer is1 that an action forbidden1 though it proceed from necessary causes1 yet if it were done willingly1 may be justly punished10 c4 ,this the ,bishop also understandeth not1 and therefore denies it4 ,he would have the judge condemn no man for a crime1 if it were necessitated2 as if the judge could know what acts are necessary1 unless he knew all that hath anteceded1 both visible and invisible1 and what both every thing in itself1 and altogether1 can effect4 ,it is enough to the judge1 that the act he condemneth be voluntary4 ,the punishment whereof may1 if not capital1 reform the will of the offender2 if capital1 the will of others by example4 ,for heat in one body doth not more create heat in another1 than the terror of an example createth fear in another1 who otherwise were inclined to commit injustice4 ,some few lines before1 he hath said that ,i built upon a wrong foundation1 namely1 8that all magistrates were at first elective20 ,i had forgot to tell you1 that ,i never said nor thought it4 ,and therefore his reply1 as to that point1 is impertinent4 ,not many lines after1 for a reason why a man may not be justly punished when his crime is voluntary1 he offereth this3 8that law is unjust and tyrannical1 which commands a man to will that which is impossible for him to will40 ,whereby it appears1 he is of opinion that a law may be made to command the will4 ,the style of a law is do this1 or do not this2 or1 if thou do this1 thou shalt suffer this2 but no law runs thus1 will this1 or will not this2 or1 if thou have a will to this1 thou shalt suffer this4 ,he objecteth further1 that ,i beg the question1 because no man's will is necessitated4 ,wherein he mistakes2 for ,i say no more in that place1 but that he that doth evil willingly1 whether he be necessarily willing1 or not necessarily1 may be justly punished4 ,and upon this mistake he runneth over again his former and already answered nonsense1 saying1 8we ourselves1 by our own negligence in not opposing our passions when we should and might1 have freely given them a kind of dominion over us20 and again1 motus primo primi1 the first motions are not always in our power4 ,which motus primo primi1 signifies nothing2 and 8our negligence in not opposing our passions10 is the same with 8our want of will to oppose our will10 which is absurd2 and 8that we have given them a kind of dominion over us10 either signifies nothing1 or that we have a dominion over our wills1 or our wills a dominion over us1 and consequently either we or our wills are not free4 7e7 8,he pleads moreover that the law is a cause of justice10 c4 8,all this is most true1 of a just law justly executed40 ,but ,i have shown that all laws are just1 as laws1 and therefore not to be accused of injustice by those that owe subjection to them2 and a just law is always justly executed4 ,seeing then that he confesseth that all that he replieth to here is true1 it followeth that the reply itself1 where it contradicteth me1 is false4 7f7 8,he addeth that the sufferings imposed by the law upon delinquents1 respect not the evil act passed1 but the good to come2 and that the putting of a delinquent to death by the magistrate for any crime whatsoever1 cannot be justified before ,god1 except there be a real intention to benefit others by his example40 ,this he neither confirmeth nor denieth1 and yet forbeareth not to discourse upon it to little purpose2 and therefore ,i pass it over4 7g7 8,first he told us1 that it was the irresistible power of ,god that justifies all his actions2 though he command one thing openly1 and plot another thing secretly2 though he be the cause not only of the action1 but also of the irregularity1 c40 ,to all this1 which hath been pressed before1 ,i have answered before2 but that he says ,i say1 8having commanded one thing openly1 he plots another thing secretly10 it is not mine1 but one of his own ugly phrases4 ,and the force it hath1 proceeded out of an apprehension he hath1 that affliction is not ,god's correction1 but his revenge upon the creatures of his own making2 and from a reasoning he useth1 8because it is not just in a man to kill one man for the amendment of another1 therefore neither is it so in ,god20 not remembering that ,god hath1 or shall have killed all the men in the world1 both nocent and innocent4 ,my assertion1 he saith1 8is a dream1 and the sum of it this2 that where there is no law1 there no killing or anything else can be unjust2 that before the constitution of commonwealths1 every man had power to kill another10 c41 and adds1 that 8this may well be called stringing of paradoxes40 ,to these my words he replies3 7h7 8,there was never any time when mankind was without governors1 laws1 and societies40 ,it is very likely to be true1 that since the creation there never was a time in which mankind was totally without society4 ,if a part of it were without laws and governors1 some other parts might be commonwealths4 ,he saw there was paternal government in ,adam2 which he might do easily1 as being no deep consideration4 ,but in those places where there is a civil war at any time1 at the same time there is neither laws1 nor commonwealth1 nor society1 but only a temporal league1 which every discontented soldier may depart from when he pleases1 as being entered into by each man for his private interest1 without any obligation of conscience3 there are therefore almost at all times multitudes of lawless men4 ,but this was a little too remote from his understanding to perceive4 ,again1 he denies1 that ever there was a time when one private man might lawfully kill another for his own preservation2 and has forgotten that these words of his 7,no4 ,,ii471 8this is the belief of all mankind1 which we have not learned from our tutors1 but is imprinted in our hearts by nature2 we need not turn over any obscure books to find out this truth10 c42 which are the words of ,cicero in the defence of ,milo1 and translated by the ,bishop to the defence of free-will1 were used by ,cicero to prove this very thing1 that it is and hath been always lawful for one private man to kill another for his own preservation4 ,but where he saith it is not lawful ordinarily1 he should have shown some particular case wherein it is unlawful4 ,for seeing it is a 8belief imprinted in our hearts10 not only ,i1 but many more are apt to think it is the law of nature1 and consequently universal and eternal4 ,and where he saith1 this right of defence where it is1 8is not a remainder of some greater power which they have resigned1 but a privilege which ,god hath given them in case of extreme danger and invincible necessity10 c42 ,i also say it is a privilege which ,god hath given them1 but we differ in the manner how2 which to me seems this1 that ,god doth not account such killing sin4 ,but the ,bishop it seems would have it thus3 ,god sends a bishop into the pulpit to tell the people it is lawful for a man to kill another man when it is necessary for the preservation of his own life2 of which necessity1 that is1 whether it be invincible1 or whether the danger be extreme1 the bishop shall be the judge after the man is killed1 as being a case of conscience4 ,against the resigning of this our general power of killing our enemies1 he argues thus3 8,nothing can give that which it never had2 the people whilst they were a dispersed rabble1 which in some odd cases might happen to be1 never had justly the power of life and death1 and therefore they could not give it by their election10 c4 ,needs there much acuteness to understand1 what number of men soever there be1 though not united into government1 that every one of them in particular having a right to destroy whatsoever he thinketh can annoy him1 may not resign the same right1 and give it to whom he please1 when he thinks it conducible to his preservation8 ,and yet it seems he has not understood it4 ,he takes it ill that ,i compare the 8murdering of men with the slaughtering of brute beasts30 as also a little before1 he says1 8my opinion reflects too much upon the honour of mankind3 the elements are for the plants1 the plants for the brute beasts1 and the brute beasts for man40 ,i pray1 when a lion eats a man1 and a man eats an ox1 why is the ox more made for the man1 than the man for the lion8 8,yes10 he saith1 8,god gave man liberty 7,gen4 ix4 #c7 to eat the flesh of the creatures for his sustenance40 ,true1 but the lion had the liberty to eat the flesh of man long before4 ,but he will say1 no2 pretending that no man of any nation1 or at any time1 could lawfully eat flesh1 unless he had this licence of holy ,scripture1 which it was impossible for most men to have4 ,but how would he have been offended1 if ,i had said of man as ,pliny doth3 8quo nullum est animal neque miserius1 neque superbius80 ,the truth is1 that man is a creature of greater power than other living creatures are1 but his advantages do consist especially in two things3 whereof one is the use of speech1 by which men communicate one with another1 and join their forces together1 and by which also they register their thoughts that they perish not1 but be reserved1 and afterwards joined with other thoughts1 to produce general rules for the direction of their actions4 ,there be beasts that see better1 others that hear better1 and others that exceed mankind in other senses4 ,man excelleth beasts only in making of rules to himself1 that is to say1 in remembering1 and in reasoning aright upon that which he remembereth4 ,they which do so1 deserve an honour above brute beasts4 ,but they which mistaking the use of words1 deceive themselves and others1 introducing error1 and seducing men from the truth1 are so much less to be honoured than brute beasts1 as error is more vile than ignorance4 ,so that it is not merely the nature of man1 that makes him worthier than other living creatures1 but the knowledge that he acquires by meditation1 and by the right use of reason in making good rules of his future actions4 ,the other advantage a man hath1 is the use of his hands for the making of those things which are instrumental to his well-being4 ,but this advantage is not a matter of so great honour1 but that a man may speak negligently of it without offence4 ,and for the dominion that a man hath over beasts1 he saith1 8it is lost in part for the sin of man1 because the strongest creatures1 as lions and bears1 have withdrawn their obedience2 but the most profitable and useful creatures1 as sheep and oxen1 do in some degree retain their obedience40 ,i would ask the ,bishop1 in what consisteth the dominion of man over a lion or a bear4 ,is it in an obligation of promise1 or of debt8 ,that cannot be2 for they have no sense of debt or duty4 ,and ,i think he will not say1 that they have received a command to obey him from authority4 ,it resteth therefore that the dominion of man consists in this1 that men are too hard for lions and bears1 because1 though a lion or a bear be stronger than a man1 yet the strength1 and art1 and especially the leaguing and societies of men1 are a greater power than the ungoverned strength of unruly beasts4 ,in this it is that consisteth this dominion of man4 ,and for the same reason when a hungry lion meeteth an unarmed man in a desert1 the lion hath the dominion over the man1 if that of man over lions1 or over sheep and oxen1 may be called dominion1 which properly it cannot2 nor can it be said that sheep and oxen do otherwise obey us1 than they would do a lion4 ,and if we have dominion over sheep and oxen1 we exercise it not as dominion1 but as hostility2 for we keep them only to labour1 and to be killed and devoured by us2 so that lions and bears would be as good masters to them as we are4 ,by this short passage of his concerning dominion and obedience1 ,i have no reason to expect a very shrewd answer from him to my ,leviathan4 7i7 8,the next branch of his answer concerns consultations1 which1 saith he1 #8are not superfluous1 though all things come to pass necessarily2 because they are the cause which doth necessitate the effect1 and the means to bring it to pass4'0 ,his reply to this is1 that he hath 8showed sufficiently1 that reason doth not determine the will physically10 c4 ,if not physically1 how then8 ,as he hath told us in another place1 morally4 ,but what it is to determine a thing morally1 no man living understands4 ,i doubt not but he had therefore the will to write this reply1 because ,i had answered his treatise concerning true liberty4 ,my answer therefore was1 at least in part1 the cause of his writing2 yet that is the cause of the nimble local motion of his fingers4 ,is not the cause of local motion physical8 ,his will therefore was physically1 and extrinsically1 and antecedently1 and not morally caused by my writing4 7k7 8,he adds further that #8as the end is necessary1 so are the means1 and when it is determined that one thing shall be chosen before another1 it is determined also for what cause it shall be so chosen4' ,all which is truth1 but not the whole truth10 c4 ,is it not enough that it is truth8 ,must ,i put all the truth ,i know into two or three lines8 ,no4 ,i should have added1 that ,god doth adapt and fit the means to their respective ends1 free means to free ends1 contingent means to contingent ends1 necessary means to necessary ends4 ,it may be ,i would have done so1 but for shame4 ,free1 contingent and necessary are not words that can be joined to means or ends1 but to agents and actions2 that is to say1 to things that move or are moved3 a free agent being that whose motion or action is not hindered or stopped1 and a free action1 that which is produced by a free agent4 ,a contingent agent is the same with an agent simply4 ,but1 because men for the most part think those things are produced without cause1 whereof they do not see the cause1 they use to call both the agent and the action contingent1 as attributing it to fortune4 ,and therefore1 when the causes are necessary1 if they perceive not the necessity1 they call those necessary agents and actions1 in things that have appetite1 free2 and in things inanimate1 contingent4 ,the rest of his reply to this point is very little of it applied to my answer4 ,i note only that where he says1 8but if ,god have so ordered the world1 that a man cannot1 if he would1 neglect any means of good1 c420 he would fraudulently insinuate that it is my opinion1 that a man is not free to do if he will1 and to abstain if he will4 ,whereas from the beginning ,i have often declared that it is none of my opinion2 and that my opinion is only this1 that he is not free to will1 or which is all one1 he is not master of his future will4 ,after much unorderly discourse he comes in with 8this is the doctrine that flows from this opinion of absolute necessity20 which is impertinent2 seeing nothing flows from it more than may be drawn from the confession of an eternal prescience4 7l7 8,but he tells me in great sadness1 that #8my argument is no better than this2 if ,i shall live till to-morrow1 ,i shall live till to-morrow1 though ,i run myself through with a sword to-day2 which1 saith he1 is a false consequence1 and a false proposition4' ,truly1 if by running through1 he understand killing1 it is a false or rather a foolish proposition40 ,he saith right4 ,let us therefore see how it is not like to his4 ,he says1 8if it be absolutely necessary that a man shall live till to-morrow1 then it is vain and superfluous for him to consult whether he should die to-day or not40 8,and this10 he says1 8is a true consequence40 ,i cannot perceive how it is a better consequence than the former2 for if it be absolutely necessary that a man should live till to-morrow1 and in health1 which may also be supposed1 why should he not1 if he have the curiosity1 have his head cut off to try what pain it is4 ,but the consequence is false2 for if there be a necessity of his living1 it is necessary also that he shall not have so foolish a curiosity4 ,but he cannot yet distinguish between a seen and an unseen necessity1 and that is the cause he believeth his consequence to be good4 7m7 8,the next branch of my argument concerns admonitions10 c4 ,which he says is this3 8,if all things be necessary1 then it is to no more purpose to admonish men of understanding1 than fools1 children1 or madmen2 but that they do admonish the one and not the other1 is confessedly true2 and no reason under heaven can be given for it but this1 that the former have the use of reason and true liberty1 with a dominion over their own actions1 which children1 fools1 and madmen have not40 ,the true reason why we admonish men and not children1 c41 is because admonition is nothing else but telling a man the good and evil consequences of his actions4 ,they who have experience of good and evil1 can better perceive the reasonableness of such admonition1 than they that have not2 and such as have like passions to those of the admonitor1 do more easily conceive that to be good or bad which the admonitor saith is so1 than they who have great passions1 and such as are contrary to his4 ,the first1 which is want of experience1 maketh children and fools unapt2 and the second1 which is strength of passion1 maketh madmen unwilling to receive admonition2 for children are ignorant1 and madmen in an error1 concerning what is good or evil for themselves4 ,this is not to say children and madmen want true liberty1 that is1 the liberty to do as they will1 nor to say that men of judgment1 or the admonitor himself hath a dominion over his own actions1 more than children or madmen1 7for their actions are also voluntary71 or that when he admonisheth he hath always the use of reason1 though he have the use of deliberation1 which children1 fools1 madmen1 and beasts also have4 ,there be1 therefore1 reasons under heaven which the ,bishop knows not of4 ,whereas ,i had said1 that things necessary may be praiseworthy1 and to praise a thing is to say it is good1 he distinguisheth and saith3 7n7 8,true1 but this goodness is not a metaphysical goodness2 so whatsoever hath a being is good2 nor a natural goodness2 the praise of it passeth wholly to the ,author of nature1 c42 but a moral goodness1 or a goodness of actions1 rather than of things4 ,the moral goodness of an action is the conformity of it to right reason10 c4 ,there hath been in the ,schools derived from ,aristotle's ,metaphysics1 an old proverb rather than an axiom3 ens1 bonum1 et verum convertuntur4 ,from hence the ,bishop hath taken this notion of a metaphysical goodness1 and his doctrine that whatsoever hath a being is good2 and by this interpreteth the words of ,gen4 i4 #ca3 ,god saw all that he had made1 and it was very good4 ,but the reason of those words is1 that good is relative to those that are pleased with it1 and not of absolute signification to all men4 ,god therefore saith1 that all that he had made was very good1 because he was pleased with the creatures of his own making4 ,but if all things were absolutely good1 we should be all pleased with their being1 which we are not1 when the actions that depend upon their being are hurtful to us4 ,and therefore1 to speak properly1 nothing is good or evil but in regard of the action that proceedeth from it1 and also of the person to whom it doth good or hurt4 ,satan is evil to us1 because he seeketh our destruction1 but good to ,god1 because he executeth his commandments4 ,and so his metaphysical goodness is but an idle term1 and not the member of a distinction4 ,and as for natural goodness and evilness1 that also is but the goodness and evilness of actions2 as some herbs are good because they nourish1 others evil because they poison us2 and one horse is good because he is gentle1 strong1 and carrieth a man easily2 another bad1 because he resisteth1 goeth hard1 or otherwise displeaseth us2 and that quality of gentleness1 if there were no more laws amongst men than there is amongst beasts1 would be as much a moral good in a horse or other beast as in a man4 ,it is the law from whence proceeds the difference between the moral and the natural goodness3 so that it is well enough said by him1 that 8moral goodness is the conformity of an action with right reason02 and better said than meant2 for this right reason1 which is the law1 is no otherwise certainly right than by our making it so by our approbation of it and voluntary subjection to it4 ,for the law-makers are men1 and may err1 and think that law1 which they make1 is for the good of the people sometimes when it is not4 ,and yet the actions of subjects1 if they be conformable to the law1 are morally good1 and yet cease not to be naturally good2 and the praise of them passeth to the ,author of nature1 as well as of any other good whatsoever4 ,from whence it appears that moral praise is not1 as he says1 from the good use of liberty1 but from obedience to the laws2 nor moral dispraise from the bad use of liberty1 but from disobedience to the laws4 ,and for his consequence1 8if all things be necessary1 then moral liberty is quite taken away1 and with it all true praise and dispraise01 there is neither truth in it1 nor argument offered for it2 for there is nothing more necessary than the consequence of voluntary actions to the will4 ,and whereas ,i had said1 that to say a thing is good1 is to say it is as ,i or another would wish1 or as the state would have it1 or according to the law of the land1 he answers1 that 8,i mistake infinitely04 ,and his reason is1 because 8we often wish what is profitable or delightful1 without regarding as we ought what is honest04 ,there is no man living that seeth all the consequences of an action from the beginning to the end1 whereby to weigh the whole sum of the good with the whole sum of the evil consequence4 ,we choose no further than we can weigh4 ,that is good to every man1 which is so far good as he can see4 ,all the real good1 which we call honest and morally virtuous1 is that which is not repugnant to the law1 civil or natural2 for the law is all the right reason we have1 and1 7though he1 as often as it disagreeth with his own reason1 deny it71 is the infallible rule of moral goodness4 ,the reason whereof is this1 that because neither mine nor the ,bishop's reason is right reason fit to be a rule of our moral actions1 we have therefore set up over ourselves a sovereign governor1 and agreed that his laws shall be unto us1 whatsoever they be1 in the place of right reason1 to dictate to us what is really good4 ,in the same manner as men in playing turn up trump1 and as in playing their game their morality consisteth in not renouncing1 so in our civil conversation our morality is all contained in not disobeying of the laws4 ,to my question1 8whether nothing could please him1 that proceeded from necessity01 he answers3 8yes2 the fire pleaseth him when he is cold1 and he says it is good fire1 but does not praise it morally04 ,he praiseth1 he says1 first the ,creator of the fire1 and then him who provided it4 ,he does well2 yet he praiseth the fire when he saith it is good1 though not morally4 ,he does not say it is a just fire1 or a wise1 or a well-mannered fire1 obedient to the laws2 but these attributes it seems he gives to ,god1 as if justice were not of his nature1 but of his manners4 ,and in praising morally him that provided it1 he seems to say1 he would not say the fire was good1 if he were not morally good that did provide it4 ,to that which ,i had answered concerning reward and punishment1 he hath replied1 he says1 sufficiently before1 and that that which he discourseth here1 is not only to answer me1 but also to satisfy himself1 and saith3 7o7 8,though it be not urged by him1 yet ,i do acknowledge that ,i find some improper and analogical rewards and punishments1 used to brute beasts1 as the hunter rewards his dog10 c4 ,for my part1 ,i am too dull to perceive the difference between those rewards used to brute beasts1 and those that are used to men4 ,if they be not properly called rewards and punishments1 let him give them their proper name4 ,it may be he will say1 he has done it in calling them analogical2 yet for any thing that can be understood thereby1 he might have called them paragogical1 or typical1 or topical1 if he had pleased4 ,he adds further1 that whereas he had said that the actions of bees and spiders were done without consultation1 by mere instinct of nature1 and by a determination of their fancies1 ,i misallege him1 and say he made their individual actions necessary4 ,i have only this to answer1 that1 seeing he says that by instinct of nature their fancies were determined to special kinds of works1 ,i might justly infer they were determined every one of them to some work2 and every work is an individual action2 for a kind of work in the general1 is no work4 ,but these their individual actions1 he saith1 8are contingent1 and therefore not necessary02 which is no good consequence3 for if he mean by contingent1 that which has no cause1 he speaketh not as a ,christian1 but maketh a ,deity of fortune2 which ,i verily think he doth not4 ,but if he mean by it1 that whereof he knoweth not the cause1 the consequence is nought4 ,the means whereby setting-dogs1 and coy-ducks1 and parrots1 are taught to do what they do1 8is by their backs1 by their bellies1 by the rod1 or by the morsel1 which have indeed a shadow or resemblance of rewards and punishments3 but we take the word here properly1 not as it is used by vulgar people1 but as it is used by divines and philosophers10 c4 ,does not the ,bishop know that the belly hath taught poets1 and historians1 and divines1 and philosophers1 and artificers1 their several arts1 as well as parrots8 ,do not men do their duty with regard to their backs1 to their necks1 and to their morsels1 as well as setting-dogs1 coy-ducks1 and parrots8 ,why then are these things to us the substance1 and to them but the shadow or resemblance of rewards or punishments8 7p7 8,when brute creatures do learn any such qualities1 it is not out of judgment or deliberation or discourse1 by inferring or concluding one thing from another1 which they are not capable of2 neither are they able to conceive a reason of what they do10 c43 but 8they remember that when they did after one manner1 they were beaten1 and when they did after another manner1 they were cherished2 and accordingly they apply themselves40 ,if the ,bishop had considered the cogitations of his own mind1 not then when he disputeth1 but then when he followed those businesses which he calleth trifles1 he would have found them the very same which he here mentioneth2 saving instead of beating1 7because he is exempt from that71 he is to put in damage4 ,for1 setting aside the discourse of the tongue in words of general signification1 the ideas of our minds are the same with those of other living creatures1 created from visible1 audible1 and other sensible objects to the eyes and other organs of sense1 as their's are4 ,for as the objects of sense are all individual1 that is1 singular1 so are all the fancies proceeding from their operations2 and men reason not but in words of universal signification1 uttered or tacitly thought on4 ,but perhaps he thinketh remembrance of words to be the ideas of those things which the words signify2 and that all fancies are not effected by the operation of objects upon the organs of our senses4 ,but to rectify him in those points is greater labour 7unless he had better principles7 than ,i am willing1 or have at this time leisure1 to undergo4 ,lastly1 whereas he says1 8if their individual actions were absolutely necessary1 fear or hope could not alter them03 that is true4 ,for it is fear and hope1 that makes them necessarily what they are4 ,,no4 ,,xv4 ,sidenote3 ,the ,bishop's reply4 ,j4 ,d4 8,thirdly1 let this opinion be once radicated in the minds of men1 that there is no true liberty1 and that all things come to pass inevitably1 and it will utterly destroy the study of piety4 ,who will bewail his sins with tears8 ,what will become of that grief1 that zeal1 that indignation1 that holy revenge1 which the ,apostle speaks of1 if men be once thoroughly persuaded that they could not shun what they did8 ,a man may grieve for that which he could not help2 but he will never be brought to bewail that as his own fault1 which flowed not from his own error1 but from antecedent necessity4 ,who will be careful or solicitous to perform obedience1 that believeth there are inevitable bounds and limits set to all his devotions1 which he can neither go beyond1 nor come short of8 ,to what end shall he pray ,god to avert those evils which are inevitable1 or to confer those favours which are impossible8 ,we indeed know not what good or evil shall happen to us3 but this we know1 that if all things be necessary1 our devotions and endeavours cannot alter that which must be4 ,in a word1 the only reason why those persons1 who tread in this path of fatal destiny1 do sometimes pray1 or repent1 or serve ,god1 is because the light of nature1 and the strength of reason1 and the evidence of ,scripture1 do for that present transport them from their ill-chosen grounds1 and expel those stoical fancies out of their heads4 ,a complete ,stoic can neither pray1 nor repent1 nor serve ,god to any purpose4 ,either allow liberty1 or destroy ,church as well as commonwealth1 religion as well as policy40 ,t4 ,h4 ,his third argument consisteth in other inconveniences which he saith will follow1 namely1 impiety and negligence of religious duties1 repentance and zeal to ,god's service4 ,to which ,i answer1 as to the rest1 that they follow not4 ,i must confess1 if we consider the far greatest part of mankind1 not as they should be1 but as they are1 that is1 as men whom either the study of acquiring wealth or preferments1 or whom the appetite of sensual delights1 or the impatience of meditating1 or the rash embracing of wrong principles1 have made unapt to discuss the truth of things1 that the dispute of this question will rather hurt than help their piety4 ,and therefore1 if he had not desired this answer1 ,i would not have written it4 ,nor do ,i write it1 but in hope your ,lordship and he will keep it private4 ,nevertheless1 in very truth1 the necessity of events does not of itself draw with it any impiety at all4 ,for piety consisteth only in two things2 one1 that we honour ,god in our hearts1 which is1 that we think of his power as highly as we can3 for to honour any thing1 is nothing else but to think it to be of great power4 ,the other1 that we signify that honour and esteem by our words and actions1 which is called cultus or worship of ,god4 ,he therefore1 that thinketh that all things proceed from ,god's eternal will1 and consequently are necessary1 does he not think ,god omnipotent8 does he not esteem of his power as highly as is possible2 which is to honour ,god as much as can be in his heart8 ,again1 he that thinketh so1 is he not more apt by external acts and words to acknowledge it1 than he that thinketh otherwise8 ,yet is this external acknowledgment the same thing which we call worship4 ,so this opinion fortifieth piety in both kinds1 externally and internally1 and therefore is far from destroying it4 ,and for repentance1 which is nothing but a glad returning into the right way after the grief of being out of the way1 though the cause that made him go astray were necessary1 yet there is no reason why he should not grieve2 and again1 though the cause why he returned into the way were necessary1 there remain still the causes of joy4 ,so that the necessity of the actions taketh away neither of those parts of repentance1 grief for the error1 nor joy for the returning4 ,and for prayer1 whereas he saith that the necessity of things destroys prayer1 ,i deny it4 ,for though prayer be none of the causes that move ,god's will1 his will being unchangeable1 yet since we find in ,god's word1 he will not give his blessings but to those that ask them1 the motive to prayer is the same4 ,prayer is the gift of ,god1 no less than the blessings4 ,and the prayer is decreed together in the same decree wherein the blessing is decreed4 ,it is manifest1 that thanksgiving is no cause of the blessing passed2 and that which is passed1 is sure and necessary4 ,yet even amongst men1 thanks are in use as an acknowledgment of the benefit past1 though we should expect no new benefit for our gratitude4 ,and prayer to ,god ,almighty is but thanksgiving for his blessings in general2 and though it precede the particular thing we ask1 yet it is not a cause or means of it1 but a signification that we expect nothing but from ,god1 in such manner as ,he1 not as we will4 ,and our ,saviour by word of mouth bids us pray1 8thy will1 not our will be done02 and by example teaches us the same2 for he prayed thus3 ,father1 if it be thy will1 let this cup pass1 c4 ,the end of prayer1 as of thanksgiving1 is not to move1 but to honour ,god ,almighty1 in acknowledging that what we ask can be effected by ,him only4 ,j4 ,d4 8,i hope ,t4 ,h4 will be persuaded in time1 that it is not the coveteousness1 or ambition1 or sensuality1 or sloth1 or prejudice of his readers1 which render this doctrine of absolute necessity dangerous1 but that it is1 in its own nature1 destructive to true godliness2 7a7 and though his answer consist more of oppositions than of solutions1 yet ,i will not willingly leave one grain of his matter unweighed4 7b7 ,first1 he errs in making inward piety to consist merely in the estimation of the judgment4 ,if this were so1 what hinders but that the devils should have as much inward piety as the best ,christians8 ,for they esteem ,god's power to be infinite1 and tremble4 ,though inward piety do suppose the act of the understanding1 yet it consisteth properly in the act of the will1 being that branch of justice which gives to ,god the honour which is due unto him4 ,is there no love due to ,god1 no faith1 no hope8 7c7 ,secondly1 he errs in making inward piety to ascribe no glory to ,god1 but only the glory of his power or omnipotence4 ,what shall become of all other the ,divine attributes1 and particularly of his goodness1 of his truth1 of his justice1 of his mercy1 which beget a more true and sincere honour in the heart than greatness itself8 ,magnos facile laudamus1 bonos lubenter4 7d7 ,thirdly1 this opinion of absolute necessity destroys the truth of ,god1 making him to command one thing openly1 and to necessitate another privately2 to chide a man for doing that which he hath determined him to do2 to profess one thing1 and to intend another4 ,it destroys the goodness of ,god1 making him to be a hater of mankind1 and to delight in the torments of his creatures2 whereas the very dogs licked the sores of ,lazarus1 in pity and commiseration of him4 ,it destroys the justice of ,god1 making him to punish the creatures for that which was his own act1 which they had no more power to shun1 than the fire hath power not to burn4 ,it destroys the very power of ,god1 making him to be the true author of all the defects and evils which are in the world4 ,these are the fruits of impotence1 not of omnipotence4 ,he who is the effective cause of sin1 either in himself or in the creature1 is not almighty4 ,there needs no other devil in the world to raise jealousies and suspicions between ,god and his creatures1 or to poison mankind with an apprehension that ,god doth not love them1 but only this opinion1 which was the office of the serpent 7,gen4 iii4 #e74 ,fourthly1 for the outward worship of ,god2 7e7 how shall a man praise ,god for his goodness1 who believes him to be a greater tyrant than ever was in the world2 who creates millions to burn eternally1 without their fault1 to express his power8 ,how shall a man hear the word of ,god with that reverence1 and devotion1 and faith1 which is requisite1 who believeth that ,god causeth his gospel to be preached to the much greater part of ,christians1 not with any intention that they should be converted and saved1 but merely to harden their hearts1 and to make them inexcusable8 ,how shall a man receive the blessed sacrament with comfort and confidence1 as a seal of ,god's love in ,christ1 who believeth that so many millions are positively excluded from all fruit and benefit of the passions of ,christ1 before they had done either good or evil8 ,how shall he prepare himself with care and conscience1 who apprehendeth that eating and drinking unworthily is not the cause of damnation1 but1 because ,god would damn a man1 therefor he necessitates him to eat and drink unworthily8 ,how shall a man make a free vow to ,god without gross ridiculous hypocrisy1 who thinks he is able to perform nothing but as he is extrinsically necessitated8 ,fifthly1 for repentance1 how shall a man condemn and accuse himself for his sins1 who thinks himself to be like a watch which is wound up by ,god1 and that he can go neither longer nor shorter1 faster nor slower1 truer nor falser1 than he is ordered by ,god8 ,if ,god sets him right1 he goes right2 if ,god sets him wrong1 he goes wrong4 ,how can a man be said to return into the right way1 who never was in any other way but that which ,god himself had chalked out for him8 ,what is his purpose to amend1 who is destitute of all power1 but as if a man should purpose to fly without wings1 or a beggar who hath not a groat in his purse1 purpose to build hospitals8 8,we use to say1 admit one absurdity1 and a thousand will follow4 ,to maintain this unreasonable opinion of absolute necessity1 he is necessitated 7but it is hypothetically1 he might change his opinion if he would7 to deal with all ancient writers as the ,goths did with the ,romans1 who destroyed all their magnificent works1 that there might remain no monument of their greatness upon the face of the earth4 ,therefore he will not leave so much as one of their opinions1 nor one of their definitions1 nay1 not one of their terms of art standing4 7f7 ,observe what a description he hath given us here of repentance3 #8it is a glad returning into the right way1 after the grief of being out of the way'4 ,it amazed me to find gladness to be the first word in the description of repentance4 ,his repentance is not that repentance1 nor his piety that piety1 nor his prayer that kind of prayer1 which the ,church of ,god in all ages hath acknowledged4 ,fasting1 and sackcloth1 and ashes1 and tears1 and humicubations1 used to be companions of repentance4 ,joy may be a consequent of it1 not a part of it4 7g7 ,it is a returning3 but whose act is this returning8 ,is it ,god's alone1 or doth the penitent person concur also freely with the grace of ,god8 ,if it be ,god's alone1 then it is his repentance1 not man's repentance4 ,what need the penitent person trouble himself about it8 ,god will take care of his own work4 ,the ,scriptures teach us otherwise1 that ,god expects our concurrence 7,revel4 iii4 #ai1 #bj73 ,be zealous and repent3 behold ,i stand at the door and knock2 if any man hear my voice1 and open the door1 ,i will come in to him4 ,it is a #8glad returning into the right way'4 ,why dare any man call that a wrong way1 which ,god himself hath determined8 ,he that willeth and doth that which ,god would have him to will and to do1 is never out of his right way4 ,it follows in his description1 after the grief1 c4 ,it is true1 a man may grieve for that which is necessarily imposed upon him2 but he cannot grieve for it as a fault of his own1 if it never was in his power to shun it4 ,suppose a writingmaster shall hold his scholar's hand in his1 and write with it2 the scholar's part is only to hold still his hand1 whether the master write well or ill2 the scholar hath no ground either of joy or sorrow1 as for himself2 no man will interpret it to be his act1 but his master's4 ,it is no fault to be out of the right way1 if a man had not liberty to have kept himself in the way4 8,and so from repentance he skips quite over new obedience to come to prayer1 which is the last religious duty insisted upon by me here4 ,but according to his use1 without either answering or mentioning what ,i say2 which would have showed him plainly what kind of prayer ,i intend1 not contemplative prayer in general1 as it includes thanksgiving1 but that most proper kind of prayer which we call petition1 which used to be thus defined1 to be an act of religion by which we desire of ,god something which we have not1 and hope that we shall obtain it by him2 quite contrary to this1 ,t4 ,h4 tells us1 7h7 that prayer #8is not a cause nor a means of ,god's blessing1 but only a signification that we expect it from him'4 ,if he had told us only1 that prayer is not a meritorious cause of ,god's blessings1 as the poor man by begging an alms doth not deserve it1 ,i should have gone along with him4 ,but to tell us1 that it is not so much as a means to procure ,god's blessing1 and yet with the same breath1 that #8,god will not give his blessings but to those who pray'1 who shall reconcile him to himself8 ,the ,scriptures teach us otherwise1 7,john xvi4 #bc73 ,whatsoever ye shall ask the ,father in my name1 he will give it you3 7,matth4 vii4 #g73 ,ask1 and it shall be given you1 seek1 and ye shal find1 knock1 and it shall be opened unto you4 ,st4 ,paul tells the ,corinthians 7#b ,cor4 i4 #aa71 that he was helped by their prayers3 that is not all2 that the gift was bestowed upon him by their means4 ,so prayer is a means4 ,and ,st4 ,james saith 7chap4 v4 #af73 ,the effectual fervent prayer of a righteous man availeth much4 ,if it be effectual1 then it is a cause4 ,to show this efficacy of prayer1 our ,saviour useth the comparison of a father towards his child1 of a neighbour towards his neighbour2 yea1 of an unjust judge1 to shame those who think that ,god hath not more compassion than a wicked man4 ,this was signified by ,jacob's wrestling and prevailing with ,god4 ,prayer is like the tradesman's tools1 wherewithal he gets his living for himself and his family4 ,but1 saith he1 #8,god's will is unchangeable'4 ,what then8 ,he might as well use this against study1 physic1 and all second causes1 as against prayer4 ,he shows even in this1 how little they attribute to the endeavours of men4 ,there is a great difference between these two3 mutare voluntatem1 to change the will2 7which ,god never doth1 in whom there is not the least shadow of turning by change2 his will to love and hate was the same from eternity1 which it now is and ever shall be2 his love and hatred are immovable1 but we are removed2 non tellus cymbam1 tellurem cymba reliquit72 and velle mutationem1 to will a change2 which ,god often doth4 ,to change the will1 argues a change in the agent2 but to will a change1 only argues a change in the object4 ,it is no inconstancy in a man to love or to hate as the object is changed4 ,prsta mihi omnia eadem1 et idem sum4 ,prayer works not upon ,god1 but us2 it renders not him more propitious in himself1 but us more capable of mercy4 ,he saith this1 #8that ,god doth not bless us1 except we pray1 is a motive to prayer'4 ,why talks he of motives1 who acknowledgeth no liberty1 nor admits any cause but absolutely necessary8 ,he saith1 #8prayer is the gift of ,god1 no less than the blessing which we pray for1 and contained in the same decree with the blessing'4 ,it is true1 the spirit of prayer is the gift of ,god4 ,will he conclude from thence1 that the good employment of one talent1 or of one gift of ,god1 may not procure another8 ,our ,saviour teacheth us otherwise3 ,come thou good and faithful servant1 thou hast been faithful in little1 ,i will make thee ruler over much4 ,too much light is an enemy to the sight1 and too much law is an enemy to justice4 ,i could wish we wrangled less about ,god's decrees1 until we understood them better4 ,but1 saith he1 #8thanksgiving is no cause of the blessing past1 and prayer is but a thanksgiving'4 ,he might even as well tell me1 that when a beggar craves an alms1 and when he gives thanks for it1 it is all one4 ,every thanksgiving is a kind of prayer1 but every prayer1 and namely petition1 is not a thanksgiving4 ,in the last place he urgeth1 that #8in our prayers we are bound to submit our wills to ,god's will4' ,who ever made any doubt of this8 ,we must submit to the preceptive will of ,god1 or his commandments2 we must submit to the effective will of ,god1 when he declares his good pleasure by the event or otherwise4 ,but we deny1 and deny again1 either that ,god wills things ad extra1 without himself1 necessarily1 or that it is his pleasure that all second causes should act necessarily at all times2 which is the question1 and that which he allegeth to the contrary comes not near it4 ,,animadversions ,,upon ,,the ,,bishop',s ,,reply ,,no4 ,,xv4 7a7 8,and though his answer consist more of oppositions than of solutions1 yet ,i will not willingly leave one grain of his matter unweighed40 ,it is a promise of great exactness1 and like to that which is in his ,epistle to the ,reader3 8,here is all that passed between us upon this subject1 without any addition or the least variation from the original10 c43 which promises were both needless1 and made out of gallantry2 and therefore he is the less pardonable in case they be not very rigidly observed4 ,i would therefore have the reader to consider1 whether these words of mine3 8our ,saviour bids us pray1 thy will1 not our will1 be done1 and by example teaches us the same2 for he prayed thus3 ,father1 if it be thy will let this cup pass10 c43 which seem at least to imply that our prayers cannot change the will of ,god1 nor divert him from his eternal decree3 have been weighed by him to a grain1 according to his promise4 ,nor hath he kept his other promise any better2 for 7,no4 ,,viii47 replying to these words of mine1 8if he had so little to do as to be a spectator of the actions of bees and spiders1 he would have confessed not only election1 but also art1 prudence1 and policy in them10 c41 he saith1 8yes1 ,i have seen those silliest of creatures1 and seeing their rare works ,i have seen enough to confute all the bold-faced atheists of this age1 and their hellish blasphemies04 ,this passage is added to that which passed between us upon this subject2 for it is not in the copy which ,i have had by me1 as himself confesseth1 these eight years2 nor is it in the body of the copy he sent to the press1 but only in the margin1 that is to say1 added out of anger against me1 whom he would have men think to be one of the bold-faced atheists of this age4 ,in the rest of this reply he endeavoureth to prove1 that it followeth from my opinion1 that there is no use of piety4 ,my opinion is no more than this1 that a man cannot so determine to-day1 the will which he shall have to the doing of any action to-morrow1 as that it may not be changed by some external accident or other1 as there shall appear more or less advantage to make him persevere in the will to the same action1 or to will it no more4 ,when a man intendeth to pay a debt at a certain time1 if he see that the detaining of the money for a little longer may advantage himself1 and seeth no other disadvantage equivalent likely to follow upon the detention1 he hath his will changed by the advantage1 and therefore had not determined his will himself2 but when he foreseeth discredit or perhaps imprisonment1 then his will remaineth the same1 and is determined by the thoughts he hath of his creditor1 who is therefore an external cause of the determination of the debtor's will4 ,this is so evident to all men living1 though they never studied school-divinity1 that it will be very strange if he draw from it the great impiety he pretends to do4 ,again1 my opinion is only this3 that whatsoever ,god foreknows shall come to pass1 it cannot possibly be that that shall not come to pass2 but that which cannot possibly not come to pass1 that is said by all men to come to pass necessarily2 therefore all events that ,god foreknows shall come to pass1 shall come to pass necessarily4 ,if therefore the ,bishop draw impiety from this1 he falleth into the impiety of denying ,god's prescience4 ,let us see now how he reasoneth4 7b7 8,first1 he errs in making inward piety to consist merely in the estimation of the judgment4 ,if this were so1 what hinders but that the devils should have as much inward piety as the best ,christians2 for they esteem ,god's power to be infinite1 and tremble80 ,i said1 that two things concurred to piety2 one1 to esteem his power as highly as is possible2 the other1 that we signify that estimation by our words and actions1 that is to say1 that we worship him4 ,this latter part of piety he leaveth out2 and then1 it is much more easy to conclude as he doth1 that the devils may have inward piety4 ,but neither so doth the conclusion follow4 ,for goodness is one of ,god's powers1 namely1 that power by which he worketh in men the hope they have in him2 and is relative2 and therefore1 unless the devil think that ,god will be good to him1 he cannot esteem him for his goodness4 ,it does not therefore follow from any opinion of mine1 that the devil may have as much inward piety as a ,christian4 ,but how does the ,bishop know how the devils esteem ,god's power2 and what devils does he mean8 ,there are in the ,scripture two sorts of things1 which are in ,english translated devils4 ,one1 is that which is called ,satan1 ,diabolus1 and ,abaddon1 which signifies in ,english1 an enemy1 an accuser1 and a destroyer of the ,church of ,god4 ,in which sense1 the devils are but wicked men4 ,how then is he sure that they esteem ,god's power to be infinite8 ,for1 trembling infers no more than that they apprehend it to be greater than their own4 ,the other sort of devils are called in the ,scripture dmonia1 which are the feigned ,gods of the heathen1 and are neither bodies nor spiritual substances1 but mere fancies1 and fictions of terrified hearts1 feigned by the ,greeks and other heathen people1 and which ,st4 ,paul calleth nothings2 for an idol1 saith he1 is nothing4 ,does the ,bishop mean1 that these nothings esteem ,god's power to be infinite and tremble8 ,there is nothing that has a real being1 but ,god1 and the world1 and the parts of the world2 nor has anything a feigned being1 but the fictions of men's brains4 ,the world and the parts thereof are corporeal1 endued with the dimensions of quantity1 and with figure4 ,i should be glad to know1 in what classes of entities which is a word that schoolmen use1 the ,bishop ranketh these devils1 that so much esteem ,god's power1 and yet not love him nor hope in him1 if he place them not in the rank of those men who are enemies to the people of ,god1 as the ,jews did4 7c7 8,secondly1 he errs in making inward piety to ascribe no glory to ,god1 but only the glory of his power or omnipotence4 ,what shall become of all other the ,divine attributes1 and particularly of his goodness1 of his truth1 of his justice1 of his mercy10 c4 ,he speaketh of ,god's goodness and mercy1 as if they were no part of his power4 ,is not goodness1 in him that is good1 the power to make himself beloved1 and is not mercy goodness8 ,are not1 therefore1 these attributes contained in the attribute of his omnipotence8 ,and justice in ,god1 is it anything else1 but the power he hath1 and exerciseth in distributing blessings and afflictions8 ,justice is not in ,god as in man1 the observation of the laws made by his superiors4 ,nor is wisdom in ,god1 a logical examination of the means by the end1 as it is in men2 but an incomprehensible attribute given to an incomprehensible nature1 for to honour him4 ,it is the ,bishop that errs1 in thinking nothing to be power but riches and high place1 wherein to domineer and please himself1 and vex those that submit not to his opinions4 7d7 8,thirdly1 this opinion of absolute necessity destroys the truth of ,god1 making him to command one thing openly1 and to necessitate another privately1 c4 ,it destroys the goodness of ,god1 making him to be a hater of mankind1 c4 ,it destroys the justice of ,god1 making him to punish the creatures for that which was his own act1 c4 ,it destroys the very power of ,god1 making him to be the true author of all the defects and evils which are in the world40 ,if the opinion of absolute necessity do all this1 then the opinion of ,god's prescience does the same2 for ,god foreknoweth nothing1 that can possibly not come to pass2 but that which cannot possibly not come to pass1 cometh to pass of necessity4 ,but how doth necessity destroy the truth of ,god1 by commanding and hindering what he commandeth8 ,truth consisteth in affirmation and negation1 not in commanding and hindering2 it does not therefore follow1 if all things be necessary that come to pass1 that therefore ,god hath spoken an untruth2 nor that he professeth one thing1 and intendeth another4 ,the ,scripture1 which is his word1 is not the profession of what he intendeth1 but an indication of what those men shall necessarily intend1 whom he hath chosen to salvation1 and whom he hath determined to destruction4 ,but on the other side1 from the negation of necessity1 there followeth necessarily the negation of ,god's prescience2 which is in the ,bishop1 if not ignorance1 impiety4 ,or how 8destroyeth it the goodness of ,god1 or maketh him to be a hater of mankind1 and to delight in the torments of his creatures1 whereas the very dogs licked the sores of ,lazarus in pity and commiseration of him08 ,i cannot imagine1 when living creatures of all sorts are often in torments as well as men1 that ,god can be displeased with it3 without his will1 they neither are nor could be at all tormented4 ,nor yet is he delighted with it2 but health1 sickness1 ease1 torments1 life and death1 are without all passion in him dispensed by him2 and he putteth an end to them then when they end1 and a beginning when they begin1 according to his eternal purpose1 which cannot be resisted4 ,that the necessity argueth a delight of ,god in the torments of his creatures1 is even as true1 as that it was pity and commiseration in the dogs that made them lick the sores of ,lazarus4 ,or how doth the opinion of necessity 8destroy the justice of ,god1 or make him to punish the creatures for that which was his own act08 ,if all afflictions be punishments1 for whose act are all other creatures punished which cannot sin8 ,why may not ,god make the affliction1 both of those men that he hath elected1 and also of those whom he hath reprobated1 the necessary causes of the conversion of those he hath elected2 their own afflictions serving therein as chastisements1 and the afflictions of the rest as examples8 ,but he may perhaps think it no injustice to punish the creatures that cannot sin with temporary punishments1 when nevertheless it would be injustice to torment the same creatures eternally4 ,this may be somewhat to meekness and cruelty1 but nothing at all to justice and injustice3 for in punishing the innocent1 the injustice is equal1 though the punishments be unequal4 ,and what cruelty can be greater than that which may be inferred from this opinion of the ,bishop2 that ,god doth torment eternally1 and with the extremest degree of torment1 all those men which have sinned1 that is to say1 all mankind from the creation to the end of the world which have not believed in ,jesus ,christ1 whereof very few1 in respect of the multitude of others1 have so much as heard of his name2 and this1 when faith in ,christ is the gift of ,god himself1 and the hearts of all men in his hands to frame them to the belief of whatsoever he will have them to believe8 ,he hath no reason therefore1 for his part1 to tax any opinion1 for ascribing to ,god either cruelty or injustice4 ,or how doth it 8destroy the power of ,god1 or make him to be the author of all the defects and evils which are in the world08 ,first1 he seemeth not to understand what author signifies4 ,author1 is he which owneth an action1 or giveth a warrant to do it4 ,do ,i say1 that any man hath in the ,scripture1 which is all the warrant we have from ,god for any action whatsoever1 a warrant to commit theft1 murder1 or any other sin8 ,does the opinion of necessity infer that there is such a warrant in the ,scripture8 ,perhaps he will say1 no1 but that this opinion makes him the cause of sin4 ,but does not the ,bishop think him the cause of all actions8 ,and are not sins of commission actions8 ,is murder no action8 ,and does not ,god himself say1 non est malum in civitate quod ego non feci2 and was murder not one of those evils8 ,whether it were or not1 ,i say no more but that ,god is the cause1 not the author1 of all actions and motions4 ,whether sin be the action1 or the defect1 or the irregularity1 ,i mean not to dispute4 ,nevertheless ,i am of opinion1 that the distinction of causes into efficient and deficient is bohu1 and signifies nothing4 7e7 8,how shall a man praise ,god for his goodness1 who believes him to be a greater tyrant than ever was in the world2 who creates millions to burn eternally without their fault1 to express his power80 ,if tyrant signify1 as it did when it came first in use1 a king1 it is no dishonour to believe that ,god is a greater tyrant than ever was in the world2 for he is the ,king of all kings1 emperors1 and commonwealths4 ,but if we take the word1 as it is now used1 to signify those kings only1 which they that call them tyrants1 are displeased with1 that is1 that govern not as they would have them1 the ,bishop is nearer the calling him a tyrant1 than ,i am2 making that to be tyranny1 which is but the exercise of an absolute power2 for he holdeth1 though he see it not1 by consequence1 in withdrawing the will of man from ,god's dominion1 that every man is a king of himself4 ,and if a man cannot praise ,god for his goodness1 who creates millions to burn eternally without their fault2 how can the ,bishop praise ,god for his goodness1 who thinks he hath created millions of millions to burn eternally1 when he could have kept them so easily from committing any fault8 ,and to his 8how shall a man hear the word of ,god with that reverence1 and devotion1 and faith1 which is requisite1 who believeth that ,god causeth his gospel to be preached to the much greater part of ,christians1 not with any intention that they should be converted and saved10 c42 ,i answer1 that those men who so believe1 have faith in ,jesus ,christ1 or they have not faith in him4 ,if they have1 then shall they1 by that faith1 hear the word of ,god with that reverence1 and devotion1 and faith1 which is requisite to salvation4 ,and for them that have no faith1 ,i do not think he asketh how they shall hear the word of ,god with that reverence1 and devotion1 and faith1 which is requisite2 for he knows they shall not1 until such time as ,god shall have given them faith4 ,also he mistakes1 if he think that ,i or any other ,christian believe1 that ,god intendeth1 by hardening any man's heart1 to make that man inexcusable1 but to make his elect the more careful4 ,likewise to his question1 8how shall a man receive the sacrament with comfort1 who believeth that so many millions are positively excluded from the benefit of ,christ's passion1 before they had done either good or evil02 ,i answer as before1 by faith1 if he be of ,god's elect2 if not1 he shall not receive the sacrament with comfort4 ,i may answer also1 that the faithful man shall receive the sacrament with comfort1 by the same way that the bishop receiveth it with comfort4 ,for he also believeth that many millions are excluded from the benefit of ,christ's passion1 7whether positively or not positively is nothing to the purpose1 nor doth positively signify any thing in this place72 and that1 so long before they had either done good or evil1 as it was known to ,god before they were born that they were so excluded4 ,to his 8how shall he prepare himself with care and conscience1 who apprehendeth that eating and drinking unworthily is not the cause of damnation1 but because ,god would damn a man1 therefore he necessitates him03 ,i answer1 that he that eateth and drinketh unworthily1 does not believe that ,god necessitates him to eat and drink unworthily1 because he would damn him2 for neither does he think he eats and drinks unworthily1 nor that ,god intends to damn him2 for he believeth no such damnation1 nor intendeth any preparation4 ,the belief of damnation is an article of ,christian faith2 so is also preparation to the sacrament4 ,it is therefore a vain question1 how he that hath no faith shall prepare himself with care and conscience to the receiving of the sacrament4 ,but to the question1 how they shall prepare themselves1 that shall at all prepare themselves2 ,i answer1 it shall be by faith1 when ,god shall give it them4 ,to his 8how shall a man make a free vow to ,god1 who thinks himself able to perform nothing1 but as he is extrinsically necessitated03 ,i answer1 that if he make a vow1 it is a free vow1 or else it is no vow2 and yet he may know1 when he hath made that vow1 though not before1 that it was extrinsically necessitated2 for the necessity of vowing before he vowed1 hindered not the freedom of his vow1 but made it4 ,lastly1 to 8how shall a man condemn and accuse himself for his sins1 who thinks himself to be like a watch which is wound up by ,god10 c43 ,i answer1 though he think himself necessitated to what he shall do1 yet1 if he do not think himself necessitated and wound up to impenitence1 there will follow upon his opinion of necessity no impediment to his repentance4 ,the ,bishop disputeth not against me1 but against somebody that holds a man may repent1 that believes at the same time he cannot repent4 7f7 8,observe what a description he has given us here of repentance3 #8,it is a glad returning into the right way1 after the grief of being out of the way4' ,it amazed me to find gladness to be the first word in the description of repentance40 ,i could never be of opinion that ,christian repentance could be ascribed to them1 that had as yet no intention to forsake their sins and to lead a new life4 ,he that grieves for the evil that hath happened to him for his sins1 but hath not a resolution to obey ,god's commandments better for the time to come1 grieveth for his sufferings1 but not for his doings2 which no divine1 ,i think1 will call ,christian repentance4 ,but he that resolveth upon amendment of life1 knoweth that there is forgiveness for him in ,christ ,jesus2 whereof a ,christian cannot possibly be but glad4 ,before this gladness there was a grief preparative to repentance1 but the repentance itself was not ,christian repentance till this conversion1 till this glad conversion4 ,therefore ,i see no reason why it should amaze him to find gladness to be the first word in the description of repentance1 saving that the light amazeth such as have been long in darkness4 ,and 8for the fasting1 sackcloth1 and ashes01 they were never parts of repentance perfected1 but signs of the beginning of it4 ,they are external things2 repentance is internal4 ,this doctrine pertaineth to the establishing of ,romish penance2 and being found to conduce to the power of the clergy1 was by them wished to be restored4 7g7 8,it is a returning2 but whose act is this returning8 ,if it be ,god's alone1 then it is his repentance1 not man's repentance2 what need the penitent person trouble himself about it80 ,this is ill argued2 for why is it ,god's repentance1 when he gives man repentance1 more than it is ,god's faith1 when he gives man faith4 ,but he labours to bring in a concurrence of man's will with ,god's will2 and a power in ,god to give repentance1 if man will take it2 but not the power to make him take it4 ,this concurrence he thinks is proved by ,revel4 iii4 #ai1 #bj3 8,be zealous1 and repent4 ,behold1 ,i stand at the door1 and knock4 ,if any man hear my voice1 and open the door1 ,i will come in to him04 ,here is nothing of concurrence1 nor of anything equivalent to it1 nor mention at all of the will or purpose1 but of the calling or voice by the minister4 ,and as ,god giveth to the minister a power of persuading1 so he giveth also many times a concurrence of the auditor with the minister in being persuaded4 ,here is therefore somewhat equivalent to a concurrence with the minister1 that is1 of man with man2 but nothing of the concurrence of man1 whose will ,god frameth as he pleaseth1 with ,god that frameth it4 ,and ,i wonder how any man can conceive1 when ,god giveth a man a will to do anything whatsoever1 how that will1 when it is not1 can concur with ,god's will to make itself be4 ,the next thing he excepteth against is this1 that ,i hold1 7h7 8that prayer is not a cause1 nor a means of ,god's blessing1 but only a signification that we expect it from him40 ,first1 instead of my words1 8a signification that we expect nothing but from him10 he hath put 8a signification that we expect it from him04 ,there is much difference between my words and his1 in the sense and meaning2 for in the one1 there is honour ascribed to ,god1 and humility in him that prayeth2 but in the other1 presumption in him that prayeth1 and a detraction from the honour of ,god4 ,when ,i say1 prayer is not a cause nor a means1 ,i take cause and means in one and the same sense2 affirming that ,god is not moved by any thing that we do1 but has always one and the same eternal purpose1 to do the same things that from eternity he hath foreknown shall be done2 and methinks there can be no doubt made thereof4 ,but the ,bishop allegeth 7#b ,cor4 i4 #aa73 that 8,st4 ,paul was helped by their prayers1 and that the gift was bestowed upon them by their means20 and 7,james v4 #af73 8,the effectual and fervent prayer of a righteous man availeth much04 ,in which places1 the words means1 effectual1 availeth1 do not signify any causation2 for no man nor creature living can work any effect upon ,god1 in whom there is nothing1 that hath not been in him eternally heretofore1 nor that shall not be in him eternally hereafter2 but do signify the order in which ,god hath placed men's prayers and his own blessings4 ,and not much after1 the ,bishop himself saith1 8prayer works not upon ,god1 but us04 ,therefore1 it is no cause of ,god's will1 in giving us his blessings1 but is properly a sign1 not a procuration of his favour4 ,the next thing he replieth to is1 that ,i make prayer to be a kind of thanksgiving2 to which he replies1 8he might even as well tell me1 that when a beggar craves an alms1 and when he gives thanks for it1 it is all one40 ,why so8 ,does not a beggar move a man by his prayer1 and sometime worketh in him a compassion not without pain1 and as the ,scripture calls it1 a yearning of the bowels2 which is not so in ,god1 when we pray to him8 ,our prayer to ,god is a duty2 it is not so to man4 ,therefore1 though our prayers to man be distinguished from our thanks1 it is not necessary it should be so in our prayers and thanks to ,god ,almighty4 ,to the rest of his reply1 in this ,no4 ,,xv1 there needs no further answer4 ,,no4 ,,xvi4 ,sidenote3 ,the ,bishop's reply4 ,j4 ,d4 8,fourthly1 the order1 beauty1 and perfection of the world doth require that in the universe should be agents of all sorts1 some necessary1 some free1 some contingent4 ,he that shall make1 either all things necessary1 guided by destiny2 or all things free1 governed by election2 or all things contingent1 happening by chance3 doth overthrow the beauty and the perfection of the world40 ,t4 ,h4 ,the fourth argument from reason1 is this4 ,the order1 beauty1 and perfection of the world requireth that in the universe there should be agents of all sorts1 some necessary1 some free1 some contingent4 ,he that shall make all things necessary1 or all things free1 or all things contingent1 doth overthrow the beauty and perfection of the world4 ,in which argument ,i observe1 first1 a contradiction4 ,for seeing he that maketh anything1 in that he maketh it1 he maketh it to be necessary1 it followeth1 that he that maketh all things1 maketh all things necessary to be4 ,as if a workman make a garment1 the garment must necessarily be4 ,so if ,god make every thing1 every thing must necessarily be4 ,perhaps the beauty of the world requireth1 though we know it not1 that some agents should work without deliberation1 which he calls necessary agents2 and some agents with deliberation1 and those both he and ,i call free agents2 and that some agents should work1 and we not know how2 and those effects we both call contingent4 ,but this hinders not1 but that he that electeth1 may have his election necessarily determined to one by former causes2 and that which is contingent1 and imputed to fortune1 be nevertheless necessary1 and depend on precedent necessary causes4 ,for by contingent1 men do not mean that which hath no cause1 but which hath not for cause any thing which we perceive4 ,as for example2 when a traveller meets with a shower1 the journey had a cause1 and the rain had a cause1 sufficient enough to produce it2 but because the journey caused not the rain1 nor the rain the journey1 we say1 they were contingent one to another4 ,and thus you see1 though there be three sorts of events1 necessary1 contingent1 and free1 yet they may be all necessary1 without the destruction of the beauty or perfection of the universe4 ,j4 ,d4 8,the first thing he observes in mine argument1 is contradiction1 as he calls it2 but in truth1 it is but a deception of the sight1 as one candle sometimes seems to be two1 or a rod in the water shows to be two rods2 quicquid recipitur1 recipitur ad modum recipientis4 ,but what is this contradiction8 ,because ,i say1 he who maketh all things1 doth not make them necessary4 ,what6 a contradiction and but one proposition6 ,that were strange4 ,i say1 ,god hath not made all agents necessary2 he saith1 ,god hath made all agents necessary4 ,here is a contradiction indeed2 but it is between him and me1 not between me and myself4 ,but though it be not a formal contradiction1 yet perhaps it may imply a contradiction in adjecto4 ,wherefore to clear the matter1 and dispel the mist which he hath raised1 it is true1 that everything when it is made1 it is necessary that it be made so as it is1 that is1 by a necessity of infallibility1 or supposition1 supposing that it be so made2 but this is not that absolute1 antecedent necessity1 whereof the question is between him and me4 ,as to use his own instance3 before the garment be made1 the tailor is free to make it either of the ,italian1 ,spanish1 or ,french fashion indifferently2 but after it is made1 it is necessary that it be of that fashion whereof he hath made it1 that is1 by a necessity of supposition4 ,but this doth neither hinder the cause from being a free cause1 nor the effect from being a free effect2 but the one did produce freely1 and the other was freely produced4 ,so the contradiction is vanished40 8,in the second part of his answer1 7a7 he grants2 that there are some free agents1 and some contingent agents1 and that perhaps the beauty of the world doth require it2 but like a shrewd cow1 which after she hath given her milk casts it down with her foot1 in the conclusion he tells us1 that nevertheless they are all necessary4 ,this part of his answer is a mere logomachy1 as a great part of the controversies in the world are1 or a contention about words4 ,what is the meaning of necessary1 and free1 and contingent actions8 ,i have showed before what free and necessary do properly signify2 but he misrecites it4 ,he saith1 ,i make all agents which want deliberation1 to be necessary2 but ,i acknowledge that many of them are contingent4 7b7 ,neither do ,i approve his definition of contingents1 though he say ,i concur with him1 that they are #8such agents as work we know not how'4 ,for1 according to this description1 many necessary actions should be contingent1 and many contingent actions should be necessary4 ,the loadstone draweth iron1 the jet chaff1 we know not how2 and yet the effect is necessary2 and so it is in all sympathies and antipathies or occult qualities4 ,again1 a man walking in the streets1 a tile falls down from a house1 and breaks his head4 ,we know all the causes1 we know how this came to pass4 ,the man walked that way1 the pin failed1 the tile fell just when he was under it2 and yet this is a contingent effect3 the man might not have walked that way1 and then the tile had not fallen upon him4 ,neither yet do ,i understand here in this place by contingents1 such events as happen beside the scope or intention of the agents2 as when a man digging to make a grave1 finds a treasure2 though the word be sometimes so taken4 ,but by contingents1 ,i understand all things which may be done and may not be done1 may happen or may not happen1 by reason of the indetermination or accidental concurrence of the causes4 ,and those same things which are absolutely contingent1 are yet hypothetically necessary4 ,as supposing the passenger did walk just that way1 just at that time1 and that the pin did fail just then1 and the tile fall2 it was necessary that it should fall upon the passenger's head4 ,the same defence will keep out his shower of rain4 ,but we shall meet with his shower of rain again1 ,no4 ,,xxxiv2 whither ,i refer the further explication of this point40 ,,animadversions ,,upon ,,the ,,bishop',s ,,reply ,,no4 ,,xvi4 ,in this number he would prove that there must be free agents and contingent agents1 as well as necessary agents1 from the order1 beauty1 and perfection of the world4 ,i that thought that the order1 beauty1 and perfection of the world required that which was in the world1 and not that which the ,bishop had need of for his argument1 could see no force of consequence to infer that which he calls free and contingent4 ,that which is in the world1 is the order1 beauty1 and perfection which ,god hath given the world2 and yet there are no agents in the world1 but such as work a seen necessity1 or an unseen necessity2 and when they work an unseen necessity in creatures inanimate1 then are those creatures said to be wrought upon contingently1 and to work contingently2 and when the necessity unseen is of the actions of men1 then it is commonly called free1 and might be so in other living creatures2 for free and voluntary are the same thing4 ,but the ,bishop in his reply hath insisted most upon this1 that ,i make it a contradiction to say that 8he that maketh a thing1 doth not make it necessary01 and wonders how a contradiction can be in one proposition1 and yet within two or three lines after found it might be4 ,and therefore1 to clear the matter1 he saith that such necessity is not antecedent1 but a necessity of supposition3 which1 nevertheless1 is the same kind of necessity which he attributeth to the burning of the fire1 where there is a necessity that the thing thrown into it shall be burned2 though yet it be but burning1 or but departing from the hand that throws it in2 and1 therefore1 the necessity is antecedent4 ,the like is in making a garment2 the necessity begins from the first motion towards it1 which is from eternity1 though the tailor and the ,bishop are equally insensible of it4 ,if they saw the whole order and conjunction of causes1 they would say it were as necessary as any thing else can possibly be2 and therefore ,god that sees that order and conjunction1 knows it is necessary4 ,the rest of his reply is to argue a contradiction in me2 for he says1 7a7 8,i grant that there are some free agents1 and some contingent agents1 and that perhaps the beauty of the world doth require it2 but like a shrewd cow1 which1 after she hath given her milk1 casts it down with her foot1 in the conclusion ,i tell him1 that nevertheless they are all necessary40 ,it is true that ,i say some are free agents1 and some contingent2 nevertheless they may be all necessary4 ,for according to the significations of the words necessary1 free1 and contingent1 the distinction is no more but this4 ,of agents1 some are necessary1 some are contingent1 and some are free agents2 and of agents1 some are living creatures1 and some are inanimate2 which words are improper1 but the meaning of them is this4 ,men call necessary agents1 such as they know to be necessary1 and contingent agents1 such inanimate things as they know not whether they work necessarily or no1 and free agents1 men whom they know not whether they work necessarily or no4 ,all which confusion ariseth from that presumptuous men take for granted1 that that is not1 which they know not4 7b7 8,neither do ,i approve his definition of contingents2 that they are such agents as work we know not how40 ,the reason is1 because it would follow that many necessary actions should be contingent1 and many contingent actions necessary4 ,but that which followeth from it really is no more but this3 that many necessary actions would be such as we know not to be necessary1 and many actions which we know not to be necessary1 may yet be necessary2 which is a truth4 ,but the ,bishop defineth contingents thus3 8all things which may be done and may not be done1 may happen or may not happen1 by reason of the indetermination or accidental concurrence of the causes04 ,by which definition1 contingent is nothing1 or it is the same that ,i say it is4 ,for there is nothing can be done and not be done1 nothing can happen and not happen1 by reason of the indetermination or accidental concurrence of the causes4 ,it may be done or not done for aught he knows1 and happen or not happen for any determination he perceiveth2 and that is my definition4 ,but that the indetermination can make it happen or not happen1 is absurd2 for indetermination maketh it equally to happen or not to happen1 and therefore both2 which is a contradiction4 ,therefore indetermination doth nothing2 and whatsoever causes do1 is necessary4 ,,no4 ,,xvii4 ,sidenote3 ,the ,bishop's reply4 ,j4 ,d4 8,fifthly1 take away liberty1 and you take away the very nature of evil1 and the formal reason of sin4 ,if the hand of the painter were the law of painting1 or the hand of the writer the law of writing1 whatsoever the one did write1 or the other paint1 must infallibly be good4 ,seeing therefore that the first cause is the rule and law of goodness1 if it do necessitate the will or the person to evil1 either by itself immediately1 or mediately by necessary flux of second causes1 it will no longer be evil4 ,the essence of sin consists in this1 that one commit that which he might avoid4 ,if there be no liberty to produce sin1 there is no such thing as sin in the world4 ,therefore it appears1 both from ,scripture and reason1 that there is true liberty40 ,t4 ,h4 ,to the fifth argument from reason1 which is1 that if liberty be taken away1 the nature and formal reason of sin is taken away1 ,i answer by denying the consequence4 ,the nature of sin consisteth in this1 that the action done proceed from our will1 and be against the law4 ,a judge1 in judging whether it be sin or not which is done against the law1 looks at no higher cause of the action than the will of the doer4 ,now when ,i say the action was necessary1 ,i do not say it was done against the will of the doer1 but with his will1 and so necessarily2 because man's will1 that is1 every act of the will1 and purpose of man had a sufficient1 and therefore a necessary cause1 and consequently every voluntary action was necessitated4 ,an action therefore may be voluntary and a sin1 and nevertheless be necessary4 ,and ,god may afflict by right derived from his omnipotency1 though sin were not4 ,and the example of punishment on voluntary sinners1 is the cause that produceth justice1 and maketh sin less frequent2 for ,god to punish such sinners1 as ,i have shewed before1 is no injustice4 ,and thus you have my answer to his objections1 both out of ,scripture and reason4 ,sidenote3 ,the ,bishop's reply4 ,j4 ,d4 8,scis tu simulare cupressum4 ,quid hoc80 ,it was shrewd counsel which ,alcibiades gave to ,themistocles1 when he was busy about his accounts to the state2 that he should rather study how to make no accounts4 ,so it seems ,t4 ,h4 thinks it a more compendious way1 to baulk an argument1 than to satisfy it4 ,and if he can produce a ,rowland against an ,oliver1 if he can urge a reason against a reason1 he thinks he hath quitted himself fairly4 ,but it will not serve his turn4 ,and that he may not complain of misunderstanding it1 as those who have a politic deafness to hear nothing but what liketh them1 ,i will first reduce mine argument into form1 and then weigh what he saith in answer1 or rather in opposition to it4 7a7 ,that opinion which takes away the formal reason of sin1 and by consequence1 sin itself1 is not to be approved2 this is clear1 because both reason and religion1 nature and ,scripture1 do prove1 and the whole world confesseth1 that there is sin4 ,but this opinion1 of the necessity of all things by reason of a conflux of second causes1 ordered and determined by the first cause1 doth take away the very formal reason of sin4 ,this is proved thus4 ,that which makes sin itself to be good1 and just1 and lawful1 takes away the formal cause1 and destroys the essence of sin2 for if sin be good1 and just1 and lawful1 it is no more evil1 it is no sin1 no anomy4 ,but this opinion of the necessity of all things1 makes sin to be very good1 and just1 and lawful2 for nothing can flow essentially by way of physical determination from the first cause1 which is the law and rule of goodness and justice1 but that which is good1 and just1 and lawful4 ,but this opinion makes sin to proceed essentially by way of physical determination from the first cause1 as appears in ,t4 ,h4's whole discourse4 ,neither is it material at all whether it proceed immediately from the first cause1 or mediately1 so as it be by a necessary flux of second and determinate causes1 which produce it inevitably4 ,to these proofs he answers nothing1 but only by denying the first consequence1 as he calls it1 and then sings over his old song1 #8that the nature of sin consisteth in this1 that the action proceed from our will1 and be against the law'1 which1 in our sense1 is most true1 if he understand a just law1 and a free rational will4 7b7 ,but supposing1 as he doth1 that the law enjoins things impossible in themselves to be done1 then it is an unjust and tyrannical law2 and the transgression of it is no sin1 not to do that which never was in our power to do4 ,and supposing1 likewise as he doth1 that the will is inevitably determined by special influence from the first cause1 then it is not man's will1 but ,god's will1 and flows essentially from the law of goodness4 7c7 8,that which he adds of a judge1 is altogether impertinent as to his defence4 ,neither is a civil judge the proper judge1 nor the law of the land the proper rule of sin4 ,but it makes strongly against him2 for the judge goes upon a good ground2 and even this which he confesseth1 that #8the judge looks at no higher cause than the will of the doer'1 proves that the will of the doer did determine itself freely1 and that the malefactor had liberty to have kept the law1 if he would4 ,certainly1 a judge ought to look at all material circumstances1 and much more at all essential causes4 ,whether every sufficient cause be a necessary cause1 will come to be examined more properly1 ,no4 ,,xxxi4 ,for the present it shall suffice to say1 that liberty flows from the sufficiency1 and contingency from the debility of the cause4 7d7 ,nature never intends the generation of a monster4 ,if all the causes concur sufficiently1 a perfect creature is produced2 but by reason of the insufficiency1 or debility1 or contingent aberration of some of the causes1 sometimes a monster is produced4 ,yet the causes of a monster were sufficient for the production of that which was produced1 that is a monster3 otherwise a monster had not been produced4 ,what is it then8 ,a monster is not produced by virtue of that order which is set in nature1 but by the contingent aberration of some of the natural causes in their concurrence4 ,the order set in nature is1 that every like should beget its like4 ,but supposing the concurrence of the causes to be such as it is in the generation of a monster1 the generation of a monster is necessary2 as all the events in the world are when they are1 that is1 by an hypothetical necessity4 7e7 ,then he betakes himself to his old help1 that ,god may punish by right of omnipotence1 though there were no sin4 ,the question is not now what ,god may do1 but what ,god will do1 according to that covenant which he hath made with man1 fac hoc et vives1 do this and thou shalt live4 ,neither doth ,god punish any man contrary to this covenant 7,hosea xiii4 #i73 ,o ,israel1 thy destruction is from thyself2 but in me is thy help4 ,he that wills not the death of a sinner1 doth much less will the death of an innocent creature4 ,by death or destruction in this discourse the only separation of soul and body is not intended1 which is a debt of nature1 and which ,god1 as ,lord of life and death1 may justly do1 and make it not a punishment1 but a blessing to the party2 but we understand1 the subjecting of the creature to eternal torments4 ,lastly1 he tells of that benefit which redounds to others from exemplary justice2 which is most true1 but not according to his own grounds4 ,for neither is it justice to punish a man for doing that which it was impossible always for him not to do2 neither is it lawful to punish an innocent person1 that good may come of it4 ,and if his opinion of absolute necessity of all things were true1 the destinies of men could not be altered1 either by examples or fear of punishment40 ,,animadversions ,,upon ,,the ,,bishop',s ,,reply ,,no4 ,,xvii4 ,whereas he had in his first discourse made this consequence3 8if you take away liberty1 you take away the very nature of evil1 and the formal reason of sin03 ,i denied that consequence4 ,it is true1 he who taketh away the liberty of doing1 according to the will1 taketh away the nature of sin2 but he that denieth the liberty to will1 does not so4 ,but he supposing ,i understood him not1 will needs reduce his argument into form1 in this manner4 7a7 8,that opinion which takes away the formal reason of sin1 and by consequence1 sin itself1 is not to be approved40 ,this is granted4 8,but the opinion of necessity doth this40 ,this ,i deny2 he proves it thus3 8this opinion makes sin to proceed essentially1 by way of physical determination from the first cause4 ,but whatsoever proceeds essentially by way of physical determination from the first cause1 is good1 and just1 and lawful4 ,therefore this opinion of necessity maketh sin to be very good1 just1 and lawful40 ,he might as well have concluded1 whatsoever man hath been made by ,god1 is a good and just man4 ,he observeth not that sin is not a thing really made4 ,those things which at first were actions1 were not then sins1 though actions of the same nature with those which were afterwards sins2 nor was then the will to anything a sin1 though it were a will to the same thing1 which in willing now1 we should sin4 ,actions became sins then first1 when the commandment came2 for1 as ,st4 ,paul saith1 without the law sin is dead2 and sin being but a transgression of the law1 there can be no action made sin but by the law4 ,therefore this opinion1 though it derive actions essentially from ,god1 it derives not sins essentially from him1 but relatively and by the commandment4 ,and consequently the opinion of necessity taketh not away the nature of sin1 but necessitateth that action which the law hath made sin4 ,and whereas ,i said the nature of sin consisteth in this1 that #8it is an action proceeding from our will and against the law'1 he alloweth it for true2 and therefore he must allow also1 that the formal reason of sin lieth not in the liberty or necessity of willing1 but in the will itself1 necessary or unnecessary1 in relation to the law4 ,and whereas he limits this truth which he allowed1 to this1 that the law be just1 and the will a free rational will1 it serves to no purpose2 for ,i have shown before1 that no law can be unjust4 ,and it seemeth to me that a rational will1 if it be not meant of a will after deliberation1 whether he that deliberateth reasoneth aright or not1 signifieth nothing4 ,a rational man is rightly said2 but a rational will1 in other sense than ,i have mentioned1 is insignificant4 7b7 8,but supposing1 as he doth1 that the law enjoins things impossible in themselves to be done1 then it is an unjust and tyrannical law1 and the transgression of it no sin10 c4 8,and supposing likewise1 as he doth1 that the will is inevitably determined by special influence from the first cause1 then it is not man's will1 but ,god's will40 ,he mistakes me in this4 ,for ,i say not the law enjoins things impossible in themselves2 for so ,i should say it enjoined contradictories4 ,but ,i say the law sometimes1 the law-makers not knowing the secret necessities of things to come1 enjoins things made impossible by secret and extrinsical causes from all eternity4 ,from this his error he infers1 that the laws must be unjust and tyrannical1 and the transgression of them no sin4 ,but he who holds that laws can be unjust and tyrannical1 will easily find pretence enough1 under any government in the world1 to deny obedience to the laws1 unless they be such as he himself maketh1 or adviseth to be made4 ,he says also1 that ,i suppose the will is inevitably determined by special influence from the first cause4 ,it is true2 saving that senseless word influence1 which ,i never used4 ,but his consequence1 8then it is not man's will1 but ,god's will01 is not true2 for it may be the will both of the one and of the other1 and yet not by concurrence1 as in a league1 but by subjection of the will of man to the will of ,god4 7c7 8,that which he adds of a judge1 is altogether impertinent as to his defence4 ,neither is a civil judge the proper judge1 nor the law of the land a proper rule of sin40 ,a judge is to judge of voluntary crimes4 ,he has no commission to look into the secret causes that make them voluntary4 ,and because the ,bishop had said the law cannot justly punish a crime that proceedeth from necessity1 it was no impertinent answer to say1 8the judge looks at no higher cause than the will of the doer04 ,and even this1 as he saith1 is enough to prove1 that 8the will of the doer did determine itself freely1 and that the malefactor had liberty to have kept the law if he would04 ,to which ,i answer1 that it proves indeed that the malefactor had liberty to have kept the law if he would2 but it proveth not that he had the liberty to have a will to keep the law4 ,nor doth it prove that the will of the doer did determine itself freely2 for1 nothing can prove nonsense4 ,but here you see what the ,bishop pursueth in this whole reply1 namely1 to prove that a man hath liberty to do if he will1 which ,i deny not2 and thinks when he hath done that1 he hath proved a man hath liberty to will1 which he calls the will's determining of itself freely4 ,and whereas he adds1 8a judge ought to look at all essential causes02 it is answer enough to say1 he is bound to look at no more than he thinks he can see4 7d7 8,nature never intends the generation of a monster4 ,if all the causes concur sufficiently1 a perfect creature is produced2 but by reason of the insufficiency1 or debility1 or contingent aberration of some of the causes1 sometimes a monster is produced40 ,he had no sooner said this1 but finding his error he retracteth it1 and confesseth that 8the causes of a monster were sufficient for the production of that which was produced1 that is1 of a monster2 otherwise a monster had not been produced20 which is all that ,i intended by sufficiency of the cause4 ,but whether every sufficient cause be a necessary cause or not1 he meaneth to examine in ,no4 ,,xxxi4 ,in the meantime he saith only1 that liberty flows from the sufficiency1 and contingency from the debility of the cause2 and leaves out necessity1 as if it came from neither4 ,i must note also1 that where he says nature never intends the generation of a monster1 ,i understand not whether by nature he means the ,author of nature1 in which meaning he derogates from ,god2 or nature itself1 as the universal work of ,god2 and then it is absurd2 for the universe1 as one aggregate of things natural1 hath no intention4 ,his doctrine that followeth concerning the generation of monsters1 is not worth consideration2 therefore ,i leave it wholly to the judgment of the reader4 7e7 8,then he betakes himself to his old help1 that ,god may punish by right of omnipotence1 though there were no sin4 ,the question is not1 now what ,god may do1 but what ,god will do1 according to that covenant which he hath made with man1 ,fac hoc et vives1 do this and thou shalt live40 ,it is plain 7to let pass that he puts punishment where ,i put affliction1 making a true sentence false7 that if a man do this he shall live1 and he may do this if he will4 ,in this the ,bishop and ,i disagree not4 ,this therefore is not the question2 but whether the will to do this1 or not to do this1 be in a man's own election4 ,whereas he adds1 #8he that wills not the death of a sinner1 doth much less will the death of an innocent creature'2 he had forgot for awhile1 that both good and evil men are by the will of ,god all mortal2 but presently corrects himself1 and says1 he means by death1 eternal torments1 that is to say1 eternal life1 but in torments2 to which ,i have answered once before in this book1 and spoken much more amply in another book1 to which the ,bishop hath inclination to make an answer1 as appeareth by his epistle to the reader4 ,that which followeth to the end of this number1 hath been urged and answered already divers times2 ,i therefore pass it over4 ,,no4 ,,xviii4 ,sidenote3 ,the ,bishop's reply4 ,j4 ,d4 8,but the patrons of necessity being driven out of the plain field with reason1 have certain retreats or distinctions which they fly unto for refuge4 ,first1 they distinguish between ,stoical necessity and ,christian necessity1 between which they make a threefold difference4 8,first1 say they1 the ,stoics did subject ,jupiter to destiny1 but we subject destiny to ,god4 ,i answer1 that the ,stoical and ,christian destiny are one and the same2 ,fatum1 quasi effatum ,jovis4 ,hear ,seneca3 ,destiny is the necessity of all things and actions depending upon the disposition of ,jupiter1 c4 ,i add1 that the ,stoics left a greater liberty to ,jupiter over destiny1 than these stoical ,christians do to ,god over his decrees1 either for the beginnings of things1 as ,euripides1 or for the progress of them1 as ,chrysippus1 or at least of the circumstances of time and place1 as all of them generally4 ,so ,virgil3 ,sed trahere et moras ducere1 c4 ,so ,osyris in ,apuleius1 promiseth him to prolong his life1 ultra fato constituta tempora1 beyond the times set down by the destinies4 8,next1 they say1 that the ,stoics did hold an eternal flux and necessary connexion of causes2 but they believed that ,god doth act prter et contra naturam1 besides and against nature4 ,i answer1 that it is not much material whether they attribute necessity to ,god1 or to the stars1 or to a connexion of causes1 so as they establish necessity4 ,the former reasons do not only condemn the ground or foundation of necessity1 but much more necessity itself upon what ground soever4 ,either they must run into this absurdity1 that the effect is determined1 the cause remaining undetermined2 or else hold such a necessary connexion of causes as the ,stoics did4 8,lastly1 they say1 the ,stoics did take away liberty and contingence1 but they admit it4 ,i answer1 what liberty or contingence was it they admit but a titular liberty and an empty shadow of contingence1 who do profess stiffly that all actions and events1 which either are or shall be1 cannot but be1 nor can be otherwise1 after any other manner1 in any other place1 time1 number1 order1 measure1 nor to any other end1 than they are2 and that in respect of ,god determining them to one4 ,what a poor ridiculous liberty or contingency is this6 8,secondly1 they distinguish between the first cause1 and the second causes2 they say1 that in respect of the second causes many things are free1 but in respect of the first cause all things are necessary4 ,this answer may be taken away two ways4 8,first1 so contraries shall be true together2 the same thing at the same time shall be determined to one1 and not determined to one2 the same thing at the same time must necessarily be1 and yet may not be4 ,perhaps they will say1 not in the same respect4 ,but that which strikes at the root of this question is this1 if all the causes were only collateral1 this exception might have some colour3 but where all the causes being joined together1 and subordinate one to another1 do make but one total cause1 if any one cause 7much more the first7 in the whole series or subordination of causes be necessary1 it determines the rest1 and without doubt makes the effect necessary4 ,necessity or liberty is not to be esteemed from one cause1 but from all the causes joined together4 ,if one link in a chain be fast1 it fastens all the rest4 8,secondly1 ,i would have them tell me whether the second causes be predetermined by the first cause1 or not4 ,if it be determined1 then the effect is necessary1 even in respect of the second causes4 ,if the second cause be not determined1 how is the effect determined1 the second cause remaining undetermined8 ,nothing can give that to another which it hath not itself4 ,but say they1 nevertheless the power or faculty remaineth free4 ,true1 but not in order to the act1 if it be once determined4 ,it is free1 in sensu diviso1 but not in sensu composito4 ,when a man holds a bird fast in his hand1 is she therefore free to fly where she will1 because she hath wings8 ,or a man imprisoned or fettered1 is he therefore free to walk where he will1 because he hath feet and a locomotive faculty8 ,judge without prejudice1 what a miserable subterfuge is this which many men confide so much in4 ,,certain ,,distinctions ,,which ,,he ,,supposing ,,may ,,be ,,brought ,,to ,,his ,,arguments1 ,,are ,,by ,,him ,,removed4 ,t4 ,h4 ,he saith1 8a man may perhaps answer1 that the necessity of things held by him is not a ,stoical necessity1 but a ,christian necessity10 c41 but this distinction ,i have not used1 nor indeed have ever heard before4 ,nor do ,i think any man could make ,stoical and ,christian two kinds of necessities1 though they may be two kinds of doctrine4 ,nor have ,i drawn my answer to his arguments from the authority of any sect1 but from the nature of the things themselves4 ,but here ,i must take notice of certain words of his in this place1 as making against his own tenet4 8,where all the causes01 saith he1 8being joined together1 and subordinate one to another1 do make but one total cause1 if any one cause1 much more the first1 in the whole series of subordination of causes be necessary1 it determines the rest1 and without doubt maketh the effect necessary40 ,for that which ,i call the necessary cause of any effect1 is the joining together of all causes subordinate to the first1 into one total cause4 ,if any one of those1 saith he1 especially the first1 produce its effect necessarily1 then all the rest are determined1 and the effect also necessary4 ,now1 it is manifest1 that the first cause is a necessary cause of all the effects that are next and immediate to it2 and therefore by his own reason1 all effects are necessary4 ,nor is that distinction of necessary in respect of the first cause1 and necessary in respect of second causes1 mine2 it does1 as he well noteth1 imply a contradiction4 ,j4 ,d4 8,because ,t4 ,h4 disavows these two distinctions1 ,i have joined them together in one paragraph4 ,he likes not the distinction of necessity1 or destiny1 into ,stoical and ,christian2 no more do ,i4 ,we agree in the conclusion1 but our motives are diverse4 ,my reason is1 because ,i acknowledge no such necessity either as the one or as the other2 and because ,i conceive that those ,christian writers1 who do justly detest the naked destiny of the ,stoics1 as fearing to fall into those gross absurdities and pernicious consequences which flow from thence1 do yet privily1 though perhaps unwittingly1 under another form of expression introduce it again at the back-door1 after they had openly cast it out at the fore-door4 ,but ,t4 ,h4 rusheth boldly without distinctions1 which he accounts but jargon1 and without foresight1 upon the grossest destiny of all others1 that is1 that of the ,stoics4 ,he confesseth1 that 8they may be two kinds of doctrine40 ,may be8 ,nay1 they are2 without all peradventure4 ,and he himself is the first who bears the name of a ,christian1 that ,i have read1 that hath raised this sleeping ghost out of its grave1 and set it out in its true colours4 ,but yet he likes not the names of ,stoical and ,christian destiny4 ,i do not blame him1 though he would not willingly be accounted a ,stoic4 ,to admit the thing1 and quarrel about the name1 is to make ourselves ridiculous4 ,why might not ,i first call that kind of destiny which is maintained by ,christians1 ,christian destiny3 and that other maintained by ,stoics1 ,stoical destiny8 ,but ,i am not the inventor of the term4 ,if he had been as careful in reading other men's opinions1 as he is confident in setting down his own1 he might have found not only the thing1 but the name itself often used4 ,but if the name of fatum ,christianum do offend him1 let him call it with ,lipsius1 fatum verum2 who divides destiny into four kinds3 #a4 mathematical or astrological destiny3 #b4 natural destiny3 #c4 ,stoical or violent destiny3 and #d4 true destiny2 which he calls1 ordinarily1 nostrum1 our destiny1 that is1 of ,christians2 and fatum pium1 that is1 godly destiny2 and defines it just as ,t4 ,h4 doth his destiny1 to be 7a7 a series or order of causes depending upon the divine counsel 7,de ,constantia1 lib4 #a4 cap4 xvii4 xviii4 xix74 ,though he be more cautelous than ,t4 ,h4 to decline those rocks which some others have made shipwreck upon1 yet the divines thought he came too near them2 as appears by his ,epistle to the ,reader in a later edition1 and by that note in the margin of his twentieth chapter1 #8,whatsoever ,i dispute here1 ,i submit to the judgment of the wise1 and being admonished ,i will convert it2 one may convince me of error1 but not of obstinacy4' ,so fearful was he to over-shoot himself2 and yet he maintained both true liberty and true contingency4 ,t4 ,h4 saith1 #8he hath not sucked his answer from any sect'2 and ,i say1 so much the worse4 ,it is better to be the disciple of an old sect1 than the ring-leader of a new4 7b7 8,concerning the other distinction1 of liberty in respect of the first cause1 and liberty in respect of the second causes2 though he will not see that which it concerned him to answer1 like those old ,lami1 which could put out their eyes when they list2 as1 namely1 that the faculty of willing1 when it is determined in order to the act1 7which is all the freedom that he acknowledgeth71 is but like the freedom of a bird when she is first in a man's hand1 c43 yet he hath espied another thing wherein ,i contradict myself1 because ,i affirm1 that if any one cause in the whole series of causes1 much more the first cause1 be necessary1 it determineth the rest4 ,but1 saith he1 #8it is manifest that the first cause is a necessary cause of all the effects that are next'4 ,i am glad2 yet it is not ,i who contradict myself1 but it is some of his manifest truths which ,i contradict2 that #8the first cause is a necessary cause of all effects'2 which ,i say is a manifest falsehood4 ,those things which ,god wills without himself1 he wills freely1 not necessarily4 ,whatsoever cause acts or works necessarily1 doth act or work all that it can do1 or all that is in its power4 ,but it is evident that ,god doth not all things without himself1 which he can do1 or which he hath power to do4 ,he could have raised up children unto ,abraham of the very stones which were upon the banks of ,jordan 7,luke iii4 #h72 but he did not4 ,he could have sent twelve legions of angels to the succour of ,christ1 7,matth4 xxvi4 #ec72 but he did not4 ,god can make ,t4 ,h4 live the years of ,methuselah2 but it is not necessary that he shall do so1 nor probable that he will do so4 ,the productive power of ,god is infinite1 but the whole created world is finite4 ,and1 therefore ,god might still produce more1 if it pleased him4 ,but thus it is1 when men go on in a confused way1 and will admit no distinctions4 ,if ,t4 ,h4 had considered the difference between a necessary being1 and a necessary cause1 or between those actions of ,god which are immanent within himself1 and the transient works of ,god which are extrinsical without himself2 he would never have proposed such an evident error for a manifest truth4 ,qui pauca considerat1 facile pronuntiat40 ,,animadversions ,,upon ,,the ,,bishop',s ,,reply ,,no4 ,,xviii4 ,the ,bishop1 supposing ,i had taken my opinion from the authority of the ,stoic philosophers1 not from my own meditation1 falleth into dispute against the ,stoics3 whereof ,i might1 if ,i pleased1 take no notice1 but pass over to ,no4 ,,xix4 ,but that he may know ,i have considered their doctrine concerning fate1 ,i think fit to say thus much1 that their error consisteth not in the opinion of fate1 but in feigning of a false ,god4 ,when therefore they say1 fatum est effatum ,jovis1 they say no more but that fate is the word of ,jupiter4 ,if they had said it had been the word of the true ,god1 ,i should not have perceived anything in it to contradict2 because ,i hold1 as most ,christians do1 that the whole world was made1 and is now governed by the word of ,god1 which bringeth a necessity of all things and actions to depend upon the ,divine disposition4 ,nor do ,i see cause to find fault with that1 as he does1 which is said by ,lipsius1 that 7a7 fate is a series or order of causes depending upon the ,divine counsel2 though the divines thought he came too near the rocks1 as he thinks ,i do now4 ,and the reason why he was cautelous1 was1 because being a member of the ,romish ,church he had little confidence in the judgment and lenity of the ,romish clergy2 and not because he thought he had over-shot himself4 7b7 8,concerning the other distinction1 of liberty in respect of the first cause1 and liberty in respect of the second causes1 though he will not see that which it concerned him to answer1 c401 8as1 namely1 that the faculty of willing1 c40 ,i answer1 that distinction he allegeth1 not to be mine1 but the ,stoics'2 and therefore ,i had no reason to take notice of it2 for he disputeth not against me1 but others4 ,and whereas he says1 it concerned me to make that answer which he hath set down in the words following2 ,i cannot conceive how it concerneth me 7whatsoever it may do somebody else7 to speak absurdly4 ,i said that the first cause is a necessary cause of all the effects that are next and immediate to it2 which cannot be doubted1 and though he deny it1 he does not disprove it4 ,for when he says1 8those things which ,god wills without himself1 he wills freely and not necessarily02 he says rashly1 and untruly4 ,rashly1 because there is nothing without ,god1 who is infinite1 in whom are all things1 and in whom we live1 move1 and have our being2 and untruly1 because whatsoever ,god foreknew from eternity1 he willed from eternity1 and therefore necessarily4 ,but against this he argueth thus3 8,whatsoever cause acts or works necessarily1 doth work or act all that it can do1 or all that is in its power2 but it is evident that ,god doth not all things which he can do10 c4 ,in things inanimate1 the action is always according to the extent of its power2 not taking in the power of willing1 because they have it not4 ,but in those things that have will1 the action is according to the whole power1 will and all4 ,it is true1 that ,god doth not all things that he can do if he will2 but that he can will that which he hath not willed from all eternity1 ,i deny2 unless that he can not only will a change1 but also change his will1 which all divines say is immutable2 and then they must needs be necessary effects1 that proceed from ,god4 ,and his texts1 ,god could have raised up children unto ,abraham1 c42 and sent twelve legions of angels1 c41 make nothing against the necessity of those actions1 which from the first cause proceed immediately4 ,,no4 ,,xix4 ,sidenote3 ,the ,bishop's reply4 ,j4 ,d4 8,thirdly1 they distinguish between liberty from compulsion1 and liberty from necessitation4 ,the will1 say they1 is free from compulsion1 but not free from necessitation4 ,and this they fortify with two reasons4 ,first1 because it is granted by all divines1 that hypothetical necessity1 or necessity upon a supposition1 may consist with liberty4 ,secondly1 because ,god and the good angels do good necessarily1 and yet are more free than we4 ,to the first reason1 ,i confess that necessity upon a supposition may sometimes consist with true liberty1 as when it signifies only an infallible certitude of the understanding in that which it knows to be1 or that it shall be4 ,but if the supposition be not in the agent's power1 nor depend upon anything that is in his power2 if there be an exterior antecedent cause which doth necessitate the effect2 to call this free1 is to be mad with reason4 8,to the second reason1 ,i confess that ,god and the good angels are more free than we are1 that is1 intensively in the degree of freedom1 but not extensively in the latitude of the object2 according to a liberty of exercise1 but not of specification4 ,a liberty of exercise1 that is1 to do or not to do1 may consist well with a necessity of specification1 or a determination to the doing of good4 ,but a liberty of exercise1 and a necessity of exercise1 a liberty of specification1 and a necessity of specification1 are not compatible1 nor can consist together4 ,he that is antecedently necessitated to do evil1 is not free to do good4 ,so this instance is nothing at all to the purpose40 ,t4 ,h4 ,but the distinction of free1 into free from compulsion1 and free from necessitation1 ,i acknowledge4 ,for to be free from compulsion1 is to do a thing so as terror be not the cause of his will to do it4 ,for a man is then only said to be compelled1 when fear makes him willing to it2 as when a man willingly throws his goods into the sea to save himself1 or submits to his enemy for fear of being killed4 ,thus all men that do anything from love1 or revenge1 or lust1 are free from compulsion2 and yet their actions may be as necessary as those which are done upon compulsion4 ,for sometimes other passions work as forcibly as fear2 but free from necessitation ,i say nothing can be4 ,and it is that which he undertook to disprove4 ,this distinction1 he says1 useth to be fortified by two reasons4 ,but they are not mine4 ,the first1 he says1 is1 8that it is granted by all divines1 that an hypothetical necessity1 or necessity upon supposition1 may stand with liberty04 ,that you may understand this1 ,i will give you an example of hypothetical necessity4 ,if ,i shall live1 ,i shall eat2 this is an hypothetical necessity4 ,indeed1 it is a necessary proposition2 that is to say1 it is necessary that that proposition should be true1 whensoever uttered2 but it is not the necessity of the thing1 nor is it therefore necessary1 that the man shall live1 or that the man shall eat4 ,i do not use to fortify my distinctions with such reasons4 ,let him confute them as he will1 it contents me4 ,but ,i would have your ,lordship take notice hereby1 how an easy and plain thing1 but withal false1 may be1 with the grave usage of such words as hypothetical necessity1 and necessity upon supposition1 and such like terms of ,schoolmen1 obscured and made to seem profound learning4 ,the second reason that may confirm the distinction of free from compulsion1 and free from necessitation1 he says1 is that #8,god and good angels do good necessarily1 and yet are more free than we'4 ,this reason1 though ,i had no need of it1 yet ,i think it so far forth good1 as it is true that ,god and good angels do good necessarily1 and yet are free4 ,but because ,i find not in the articles of our faith1 nor in the decrees of our ,church1 set down in what manner ,i am to conceive ,god and good angels to work by necessity1 or in what sense they work freely1 ,i suspend my sentence in that point2 and am content that there may be a freedom from compulsion1 and yet no freedom from necessitation1 as hath been proved in that1 that a man may be necessitated to some actions without threats and without fear of danger4 ,but how he can avoid the consisting together of freedom and necessity1 supposing ,god and good angels are freer than men and yet do good necessarily1 that we must now examine4 8,i confess10 saith he1 8that ,god and good angels are more free than we1 that is1 intensively in degree of freedom1 not extensively in the latitude of the object1 according to a liberty of exercise1 not of specification40 ,again we have here two distinctions that are no distinctions1 but made to seem so by terms invented1 by ,i know not whom1 to cover ignorance1 and blind the understanding of the reader4 ,for it cannot be conceived that there is any liberty greater than for a man to do what he will1 and to forbear what he will4 ,one heat may be more intensive than another1 but not one liberty than another4 ,he that can do what he will1 hath all liberty possible2 and he that cannot1 has none at all4 ,also liberty 7as he says the ,schools call it7 of exercise1 which is1 as ,i have said before1 a liberty to do or not to do1 cannot be without a liberty1 which they call of specification2 that is to say1 a liberty to do or not to do this or that in particular4 ,for how can a man conceive1 that he has liberty to do any thing1 that hath not liberty to do this1 or that1 or somewhat in particular8 ,if a man be forbidden in ,lent to eat this1 and that1 and every other particular kind of flesh1 how can he be understood to have a liberty to eat flesh1 more than he that hath no license at all8 ,you may by this again see the vanity of distinctions used in the ,schools2 and ,i do not doubt but that the imposing of them by authority of doctors in the ,church1 hath been a great cause that men have laboured1 though by sedition and evil courses1 to shake them off2 for1 nothing is more apt to beget hatred1 than the tyrannising over man's reason and understanding1 especially when it is done1 not by the ,scripture1 but by pretence of learning1 and more judgment than that of other men4 ,j4 ,d4 8,he who will speak with some of our great undertakers about the grounds of learning1 had need either to speak by an interpreter1 or to learn a new language 7,i dare not call it jargon or canting7 lately devised1 not to set forth the truth1 but to conceal falsehood4 ,he must learn a new liberty1 a new necessity1 a new contingency1 a new sufficiency1 a new spontaneity1 a new kind of deliberation1 a new kind of election1 a new eternity1 a new compulsion1 and in conclusion1 a new nothing4 7a7 ,this proposition1 the will is free1 may be understood in two senses2 either that the will is not compelled1 or that the will is not always necessitated2 for if it be ordinarily1 or at any time free from necessitation1 my assertion is true1 that there is freedom from necessity4 ,the former sense1 that the will is not compelled1 is acknowledged by all the world as a truth undeniable3 voluntas non cogitur4 ,for if the will may be compelled1 then it may both will and not will the same thing at the same time1 under the same notion2 but this implies a contradiction4 ,yet this author1 like the good woman whom her husband sought up the stream when she was drowned upon pretence that when she was living she used to go contrary courses to all other people1 holds1 that true compulsion and fear may make a man will that which he doth not will1 that is1 in his sense may compel the will3 8as when a man willingly throws his goods into the sea to save himself1 or submits to his enemy for fear of being killed04 ,i answer1 that ,t4 ,h4 mistakes sundry ways in this discourse4 7b7 8,first1 he erreth in this1 to think that actions proceeding from fear are properly compulsory actions3 which in truth are not only voluntary1 but free actions2 neither compelled1 nor so much as physically necessitated4 ,another man1 at the same time1 in the same ship1 in the same storm1 may choose1 and the same individual man otherwise advised might choose not1 to throw his goods overboard4 ,it is the man himself1 who chooseth freely this means to preserve his life4 ,it is true1 that if he were not in such a condition1 or if he were freed from the grounds of his present fears1 he would not choose neither the casting of his goods into the sea1 nor the submitting to his enemy4 ,but considering the present exigence of his affairs1 reason dictates to him1 that of two inconveniences the less is to be chosen1 as a comparative good4 ,neither doth he will this course as the end or direct object of his desires1 but as the means to attain his end4 ,and what fear doth in these cases1 love1 hope1 hatred1 c4 may do in other cases2 that is1 may occasion a man to elect those means to obtain his willed end1 which otherwise he would not elect4 ,as ,jacob1 to serve seven years more1 rather than not to enjoy his beloved ,rachel4 ,the merchant1 to hazard himself upon the rough seas in hope of profit4 ,passions may be so violent1 that they may necessitate the will1 that is1 when they prevent deliberations2 but this is rarely1 and then the will is not free4 ,but they never properly compel it4 ,that which is compelled1 is against the will2 and that which is against the will1 is not willed4 7c7 8,secondly1 ,t4 ,h4 errs in this also1 where he saith1 that #8a man is then only said to be compelled1 when fear makes him willing to an action'3 as if force were not more prevalent with a man1 than fear4 ,we must know therefore1 that this word compelled is taken two ways3 sometimes improperly1 that is1 when a man is moved or occasioned by threats or fear1 or any passion1 to do that which he would not have done1 if those threats or that passion had not been4 ,sometimes it is taken properly2 when we do any thing against our own inclination1 moved by an external cause1 the will not consenting nor concurring1 but resisting as much as it can4 ,as in a rape1 or when a ,christian is drawn or carried by violence to the idol's temple4 ,or as in the case of ,st4 ,peter 7,john xxi4 #ah73 ,another shall gird thee1 and carry thee whither thou wouldest not4 ,this is that compulsion1 which is understood when we say1 the will may be letted1 or changed1 or necessitated1 or that the imperate actions of the will1 that is the actions of the inferior faculties which are ordinarily moved by the will1 may be compelled3 but that the immanent actions of the will1 that is1 to will1 to choose1 cannot be compelled2 because it is the nature of an action properly compelled1 to be done by an extrinsical cause1 without the concurrence of the will4 7d7 8,thirdly1 the question is not1 whether all the actions of a man be free1 but whether they be ordinarily free4 ,suppose some passions are so sudden and violent1 that they surprise a man1 and betray the succours of the soul1 and prevent deliberation2 as we see in some motus primo primi1 or antipathies1 how some men will run upon the most dangerous objects1 upon the first view of a loathed creature1 without any power to contain themselves4 ,such actions as these1 as they are not ordinary1 so they are not free2 because there is no deliberation nor election4 ,but where deliberation and election are1 as when a man throws his goods overboard to save the ship1 or submits to his enemy to save his life1 there is always true liberty4 8,though ,t4 ,h4 slight the two reasons which ,i produce in favour of his cause1 yet they who urged them deserved not to be slighted1 unless it were because they were ,school-men4 ,the former reason is thus framed3 a necessity of supposition may consist with true liberty4 ,but that necessity which flows from the natural and extrinsical determination of the will1 is a necessity of supposition4 ,to this1 my answer is in effect1 that 7e7 a necessity of supposition is of two kinds4 ,sometimes the thing supposed is in the power of the agent to do1 or not to do4 ,as for a ,romish priest to vow continence1 upon supposition that he be a ,romish priest1 is necessary2 but because it was in his power to be a priest or not to be a priest1 therefore his vow is a free act4 ,so supposing a man to have taken physic1 it is necessary that he keep at home2 yet because it was in his power to take a medicine or not to take it1 therefore his keeping at home is free4 ,again1 sometimes the thing supposed is not in the power of the agent to do1 or not to do4 ,supposing a man to be extremely sick1 it is necessary that he keep at home2 or supposing that a man hath a natural antipathy against a cat1 he runs necessarily away so soon as he sees her3 because this antipathy1 and this sickness1 are not in the power of the party affected1 therefore these acts are not free4 ,jacob blessed his sons1 ,balaam blessed ,israel2 these two acts being done1 are both necessary upon supposition4 ,but it was in ,jacob's power1 not to have blessed his sons2 so was it not in ,balaam's power1 not to have blessed ,israel 7,numb4 xxii4 #ch74 ,jacob's will was determined by himself2 ,balaam's will was physically determined by ,god4 ,therefore ,jacob's benediction proceeded from his own free election2 and ,balaam's from ,god's determination4 ,so was ,caiphas' prophecy 7,john xi4 #ea73 therefore the text saith1 he spake not of himself4 ,to this ,t4 ,h4 saith nothing2 but only declareth by an impertinent instance1 what hypothetical signifies2 and then adviseth your ,lordship1 to take notice how errors and ignorance may be cloaked under grave scholastic terms4 ,and ,i do likewise intreat your ,lordship to take notice1 that the greatest fraud and cheating lurks commonly under the pretence of plain dealing4 ,we see jugglers commonly strip up their sleeves1 and promise extraordinary fair dealing1 before they begin to play their tricks4 8,concerning the second argument drawn from the liberty of ,god and the good angels2 as ,i cannot but approve his modesty1 in #8suspending his judgment concerning the manner how ,god and the good angels do work necessarily or freely1 because he finds it not set down in the ,articles of our faith1 or the decrees of our ,church'1 especially in this age1 which is so full of atheism1 and of those scoffers which ,st4 ,peter prophesied of1 7#b ,pet4 iii4 #c71 who neither believe that there is ,god or angels1 or that they have a soul1 but only as salt1 to keep their bodies from putrifaction2 so ,i can by no means assent unto him in that which follows1 that is to say1 that he hath proved that liberty and necessity of the same kind may consist together1 that is1 a liberty of exercise with a necessity of exercise1 or a liberty of specification with a necessity of specification4 ,those actions which he saith are necessitated by passion1 are for the most part dictated by reason1 either truly or apparently right1 and resolved by the will itself4 ,but it troubles him1 that ,i say that ,god and the good angels are more free than men1 intensively in the degree of freedom1 but not extensively in the latitude of the object1 according to a liberty of exercise1 but not of specification3 which he saith are no distinctions1 but terms invented to cover ignorance4 ,good words4 ,doth he only see8 ,are all other men stark blind8 ,by his favour1 they are true and necessary distinctions2 and if he alone do not conceive them1 it is because distinctions1 as all other things1 have their fates1 according to the capacities or prejudices of their readers4 ,but he urgeth two reasons4 #8,one heat1' saith he1 #8may be more intensive than another1 but not one liberty than another4' ,why not1 ,i wonder8 ,nothing is more proper to a man than reason2 yet a man is more rational than a child1 and one man more rational than another1 that is1 in respect of the use and exercise of reason4 ,as there are degrees of understanding1 so there are of liberty4 ,the good angels have clearer understandings than we1 and they are not hindered with passions as we1 and by consequence they have more use of liberty than we4 7f7 ,his second reason is3 #8he that can do what he will1 hath all liberty1 and he that cannot do what he will1 hath no liberty'4 ,if this be true1 then there are no degrees of liberty indeed4 ,but this which he calls liberty1 is rather an omnipotence than a liberty to do whatsoever he will4 ,a man is free to shoot1 or not to shoot1 although he cannot hit the white whensoever he would4 ,we do good freely1 but with more difficulty and reluctance than the good spirits4 ,the more rational1 and the less sensual the will is1 the greater is the degree of liberty4 ,his other exception against liberty of exercise1 and liberty of specification1 is a mere mistake1 which grows merely from not rightly understanding what liberty of specification1 or contrariety is4 ,a liberty of specification1 saith he1 is a liberty to do or not to do this or that in particular4 ,upon better advice he will find1 that this which he calls a liberty of specification1 is a liberty of contradiction1 and not of specification1 nor of contrariety4 ,to be free to do or not to do this or that particular good1 is a liberty of contradiction2 so likewise1 to be free to do or not to do this or that particular evil4 ,but to be free to do both good and evil1 is a liberty of contrariety1 which extends to contrary objects or to diverse kind of things4 ,so his reason to prove that a liberty of exercise cannot be without a liberty of specification1 falls flat to the ground3 and he may lay aside his lenten licence for another occasion4 ,i am ashamed to insist upon these things1 which are so evident that no man can question them who doth understand them4 7g7 8,and here he falls into another invective against distinctions and scholastical expressions1 and the #8doctors of the ,church1 who by this means tyrannized over the understandings of other men4' ,what a presumption is this1 for one private man1 who will not allow human liberty to others1 to assume to himself such a licence to control so magistrally1 and to censure of gross ignorance and tyrannising over men's judgments1 yea1 as causes of the troubles and tumults which are in the world1 the doctors of the ,church in general1 who have flourished in all ages and all places1 only for a few necessary and innocent distinctions4 ,truly1 said ,plutarch1 that a sore eye is offended with the light of the sun4 7h7 ,what then1 must the logicians lay aside their first and second intentions1 their abstracts and concretes1 their subjects and predicates1 their modes and figures1 their method synthetic and analytic1 their fallacies of composition and division1 c48 ,must the moral philosopher quit his means and extremes1 his principia congenita et acquisita1 his liberty of contradiction and contrariety1 his necessity absolute and hypothetical1 c48 ,must the natural philosopher give over his intentional species1 his understanding agent and patient1 his receptive and eductive power of the matter1 his qualities infus or influx1 symbol or dissymbol1 his temperament ad pondus and ad justitiam1 his parts homogeneous and heterogeneous1 his sympathies and antipathies1 his antiperistasis1 c48 ,must the astrologer and the geographer leave their apogum and perigum1 their artic and antartic poles1 their equator1 zodiac1 zenith1 meridian1 horizon1 zones1 c48 ,must the mathematician1 the metaphysician1 and the divine1 relinquish all their terms of art and proper idiotisms1 because they do not relish with ,t4 ,h4's palate8 ,but he will say1 they are obscure expressions4 ,what marvel is it1 when the things themselves are more obscure8 ,let him put them into as plain ,english as he can1 and they shall be never a whit the better understood by those who want all grounds of learning4 ,nothing is clearer than mathematical demonstration3 yet let one who is altogether ignorant in mathematics hear it1 and he will hold it to be as ,t4 ,h4 terms these distinctions1 plain fustian or jargon4 ,every art or profession hath its proper mysteries and expressions1 which are well known to the sons of art1 not so to strangers4 ,let him consult with military men1 with physicians1 with navigators2 and he shall find this true by experience4 ,let him go on shipboard1 and the mariners will not leave their starboard and larboard1 because they please not him1 or because he accounts it gibberish4 ,no1 no3 it is not the ,school divines1 but innovators and seditious orators1 who are the true causes of the present troubles of ,europe4 7i7 ,t4 ,h4 hath forgotten what he said in his book1 ,de ,cive1 cap4 ,,xii43 #8that it is a seditious opinion1 to teach that the knowledge of good and evil belongs to private persons'3 and cap4 ,,xvii4 #8that in questions of faith1 the civil magistrates ought to consult with ecclesiastical doctors1 to whom ,god's blessing is derived by imposition of hands so as not to be deceived in necessary truths1 to whom our ,saviour hath promised infallibility4' ,these are the very men whom he traduceth here4 ,there he ascribes infallibility to them2 here he accuseth them of gross superstitious ignorance4 ,there he attributes too much to them2 here he attributes too little4 ,both there and here he takes too much upon him2 7#a ,cor4 xiv4 #cb73 ,the spirits of the prophets are subject to the prophets40 ,,animadversions ,,upon ,,the ,,bishop',s ,,reply ,,no4 ,,xix4 7a7 8,this proposition1 the will is free1 may be understood in two senses2 either that the will is not compelled1 or that the will is not always necessitated1 c4 ,the former sense1 that the will is not compelled1 is acknowledged by all the world as a truth undeniable40 ,i never said the will is compelled1 but do agree with the rest of the world in granting that it is not compelled4 ,it is an absurd speech to say it is compelled1 but not to say it is necessitated1 or a necessary effect of some cause4 ,when the fire heateth1 it doth not compel heat2 so likewise when some cause maketh the will to anything1 it doth not compel it4 ,many things may compel a man to do an action1 in producing the will2 but that is not a compelling of the will1 but of the man4 ,that which ,i call necessitation1 is the effecting and creating of that will which was not before1 not a compelling of a will already existent4 ,the necessitation or creation of the will1 is the same thing with the compulsion of the man1 saving that we commonly use the word compulsion1 in those actions which proceed from terror4 ,and therefore this distinction is of no use2 and that raving which followeth immediately after it1 is nothing to the question1 whether the will be free1 though it be to the question1 whether the man be free4 7b7 8,first he erreth in this1 to think that actions proceeding from fear are properly compulsory actions2 which in truth are not only voluntary1 but free actions40 ,i never said nor doubted1 but such actions were both voluntary and free2 for he that doth any thing for fear1 though he say truly he was compelled to it1 yet we deny not that he had election to do or not to do1 and consequently that he was a voluntary and free agent4 ,but this hinders not1 but that the terror might be a necessary cause of his election of that which otherwise he would not have elected1 unless some other potent cause made it necessary he should elect the contrary4 ,and therefore1 in the same ship1 in the same storm1 one man may be necessitated to throw his goods overboard1 and another man to keep them within the ship2 and the same man in a like storm be otherwise advised1 if all the causes be not like4 ,but that the same individual man1 as the ,bishop says1 that chose to throw his goods overboard1 might chose not to throw his goods overboard1 ,i cannot conceive2 unless a man can choose to throw overboard and not to throw overboard1 or be so advised and otherwise advised1 all at once4 7c7 8,secondly1 ,t4 ,h4 errs in this also1 where he saith1 that #8a man is then only said to be compelled1 when fear makes him willing to an action4' ,as if force were not more prevalent with a man than fear10 c4 ,when ,i said fear1 ,i think no man can doubt but the fear of force was understood4 ,i cannot see therefore what quarrel he could justly take1 at saying that a man is compelled by fear only2 unless he think it may be called compulsion when a man by force1 seizing on another man's limbs1 moveth them as himself1 not as the other man pleaseth4 ,but this is not the meaning of compulsion3 neither is the action so done1 the action of him that suffereth1 but of him that useth the force4 ,but this1 as if it were a question of the propriety of the ,english tongue1 the ,bishop denies2 and says when a man is moved by fear1 it is improperly said he is compelled4 ,but when a man is moved by an external cause1 the will resisting as much as it can1 then he says1 he is properly said to be compelled2 as in a rape1 or when a ,christian is drawn or carried by violence to the idol's temple4 ,insomuch as by this distinction it were very proper ,english to say1 that a stone were compelled when it is thrown1 or a man when he is carried in a cart4 ,for my part1 ,i understand compulsion to be used rightly of living creatures only1 which are moved only by their own animal motion1 in such manner as they would not be moved without the fear4 ,but of this dispute the ,english and well-bred reader is the proper judge4 7d7 8,thirdly1 the question is not1 whether all the actions of a man be free1 but whether they be ordinarily free40 ,is it impossible for the ,bishop to remember the question1 which is whether a man be free to will8 ,did ,i ever say1 that no actions of a man are free8 ,on the contrary1 ,i say that all his voluntary actions are free1 even those also to which he is compelled by fear4 ,but it does not therefore follow but that the will1 from whence those actions and their election proceed1 may have necessary causes1 against which he hath never yet said anything4 ,that which followeth immediately1 is not offered as a proof1 but as explication1 how the passions of a man surprise him2 therefore ,i let it pass1 noting only that he expoundeth motus primo primi1 which ,i understood not before1 by the word antipathy4 7e7 8,a necessity of supposition is of two kinds2 sometimes a thing supposed1 is in the power of the agent to do or not to do1 c42 sometimes a thing supposed1 is not in the power of the agent to do or not to do10 c4 ,when the necessity is of the former kind of supposition1 then1 he says1 freedom may consist with this necessity1 in the latter sense that it cannot4 ,and to use his own instances1 to vow continence in a ,romish priest1 upon supposition that he is a ,romish priest1 is a necessary act1 because it was in his power to be a priest or not4 ,on the other side1 supposing a man having a natural antipathy against a cat2 because this antipathy is not in the power of the party affected1 therefore the running away from the cat is no free act4 ,i deny not but that it is a free act of the ,romish priest to vow continence1 not upon the supposition that he was a ,romish priest1 but because he had not done it unless he would2 if he had not been a ,romish priest1 it had been all one to the freedom of his act4 ,nor is his priesthood anything to the necessity of his vow1 saving that if he would not have vowed he should not have been made a priest4 ,there was an antecedent necessity in the causes extrinsical2 first1 that he should have the will to be a priest1 and then consequently that he should have the will to vow4 ,against this he allegeth nothing4 ,then for his cat1 the man's running from it is a free act1 as being voluntary1 and arising from a false apprehension 7which nevertheless he cannot help7 of some hurt or other the cat may do him4 ,and therefore the act is as free as the act of him that throweth his goods into the sea4 ,so likewise the act of ,jacob in blessing his sons1 and the act of ,balaam in blessing ,israel1 are equally free and equally voluntary1 yet equally determined by ,god1 who is the author of all blessings1 and framed the will of both of them to bless1 and whose will1 as ,st4 ,paul saith1 cannot be resisted4 ,therefore both their actions were necessitated equally2 and1 because they were voluntary1 equally free4 ,as for ,caiphas' his prophecy1 which the text saith he spake not of himself1 it was necessary2 first1 because it was by the supernatural gift of ,god to the high-priests1 as sovereigns of the commonwealth of the ,jews1 to speak to the people as from the mouth of ,god1 that is to say1 to prophecy2 and secondly1 whensoever he did speak not as from ,god1 but as from himself1 it was nevertheless necessary he should do so1 not that he might not have been silent if he would1 but because his will to speak was antecedently determined to what he should speak from all eternity1 which he hath yet brought no argument to contradict4 ,he approveth my modesty in suspending my judgment concerning the manner how the good angels do work1 necessarily or freely1 because ,i find it not set down in the articles of our faith1 nor in the decrees of our ,church4 ,but he useth not the same modesty himself4 ,for whereas he can apprehend neither the nature of ,god nor of angels1 nor conceive what kind of thing it is which in them he calleth will1 he nevertheless takes upon him to attribute to them liberty of exercise1 and to deny them a liberty of specification2 to grant them a more intensive liberty than we have1 but not a more extensive2 using1 not incongruously1 in the incomprehensibility of the subject incomprehensible terms1 as liberty of exercise and liberty of specification1 and degrees of intension in liberty2 as if one liberty1 like heat1 might be more intensive than another4 ,it is true that there is greater liberty in a large than in a straight prison1 but one of those liberties is not more intense than the other4 7f7 8,his second reason is1 he that can do what he will1 hath all liberty1 and he that cannot do what he will1 hath no liberty4 ,if this be true1 then there are no degrees of liberty indeed4 ,but this which he calls liberty1 is rather an omnipotence than a liberty40 ,it is one thing to say a man hath liberty to do what he will1 and another thing to say he hath power to do what he will4 ,a man that is bound1 would say readily he hath not the liberty to walk2 but he will not say he wants the power4 ,but the sick man will say he wants the power to walk1 but not the liberty4 ,this is1 as ,i conceive1 to speak the ,english tongue3 and consequently an ,englishman will not say1 the liberty to do what he will1 but the power to do what he will1 is omnipotence4 ,and therefore either ,i or the ,bishop understand not ,english4 ,whereas he adds that ,i mistake the meaning of the words liberty of specification1 ,i am sure that in that way wherein ,i expound them1 there is no absurdity4 ,but if he say1 ,i understand not what the ,schoolmen mean by it1 ,i will not contend with him2 for ,i think they know not what they mean themselves4 7g7 8,and here he falls into another invective against distinctions and scholastical expressions1 and the doctors of the ,church1 who by this means tyrannized over the understanding of other men4 ,what a presumption is this1 for one private man10 c4 ,that he may know ,i am no enemy to intelligible distinctions1 ,i also will use a distinction in the defence of myself against this his accusation4 ,i say therefore that some distinctions are scholastical only1 and some are scholastical and sapiential also4 ,against those that are scholastical only1 ,i do and may inveigh4 ,but against those that are scholastical and sapiential also1 ,i do not inveigh4 ,likewise some doctors of the ,church1 as ,suarez1 ,johannes ,duns1 and their imitators1 to breed in men such opinions as the ,church of ,rome thought suitable to their interest1 did write such things as neither other men nor themselves understood4 ,these ,i confess ,i have a little slighted4 ,other doctors of the ,church1 as ,martin ,luther1 ,philip ,melancthon1 ,john ,calvin1 ,william ,perkins1 and others1 that did write their sense clearly1 ,i never slighted1 but always very much reverenced and admired4 ,wherein1 then1 lieth my presumption8 ,if it be because ,i am a private man1 let the ,bishop also take heed he contradict not some of those whom the world worthily esteems1 lest he also 7for he is a private man7 be taxed of presumption4 7h7 8,what then1 must the logicians lay aside their first and second intentions1 their abstracts and concretes c43 must the moral philosopher quit his means and extremes1 his principia congenita et acquisita1 his liberty of contradiction and contrariety1 his necessity absolute and hypothetical1 c43 must the natural philosopher give over his intentional species1 c43 because they do not relish with ,t4 ,h4's palate80 ,i confess that among the logicians1 ,barbara1 ,celarent1 ,darii1 ,ferio1 c4 are terms of art4 ,but if the ,bishop think that words of first and second intention1 that abstract and concrete1 that subjects and predicates1 moods and figures1 method synthetic and analytic1 fallacies of composition and division1 be terms of art1 ,i am not of his opinion4 ,for these are no more terms of art in logic1 than lines1 figures1 squares1 triangles1 c4 in the mathematics4 ,barbara1 ,celarent1 and the rest that follow1 are terms of art1 invented for the easier apprehension of young men1 and are by young men understood4 ,but the terms of the ,school with which ,i have found fault1 have been invented to blind the understanding1 and cannot be understood by those that intend to learn divinity4 ,and to his question whether the moral philosopher must quit his means and extremes1 ,i answer1 that though they are not terms of art1 he ought to quit them when they cannot be understood2 and when they can1 to use them rightly4 ,and therefore1 though means and extremes be terms intelligible1 yet ,i would have them quit the placing of virtue in the one1 and of vice in the other4 ,but for his liberty of contradiction and contrariety1 his necessity absolute and hypothetical1 if any moral philosopher ever used them1 then away with them2 they serve for nothing but to seduce young students4 ,in like manner1 let the natural philosopher no more mention his intentional species1 his understanding agent and patient1 his receptive and eductive power of the matter1 his qualities infus or influx1 symbol or dissymbol1 his temperament ad pondus and ad justitiam4 ,he may keep his parts homogeneous and heterogeneous2 but his sympathies and antipathies1 his antiperistasis and the like names of excuses rather than of causes1 ,i would have him fling away4 ,and for the astrologer1 7unless he means astronomer71 ,i would have him throw away his whole trade4 ,but if he mean astronomer1 then the terms of apogum and perigum1 artic1 antartic1 equator1 zodiac1 zenith1 meridian1 horizon1 zones1 c4 are no more terms of art in astronomy1 than a saw or a hatchet in the art of a carpenter4 ,he cites no terms of art for geometry2 ,i was afraid he would have put lines1 or perhaps equality or inequality1 for terms of art4 ,so that now ,i know not what be those terms he thinks ,i would cast away in geometry4 ,and lastly1 for his metaphysician1 ,i would have him quit both his terms and his profession1 as being in truth 7as ,plutarch saith in the beginning of the life of ,alexander the ,great7 not at all profitable to learning1 but made only for an essay to the learner2 and the divine to use no word in preaching but such as his auditors1 nor in writing but such as a common reader1 may understand4 ,and all this1 not for the pleasing of my palate1 but for the promotion of truth4 7i7 8,t4 ,h4 hath forgotten what he said in his book1 ,de ,cive1 cap4 ,,xii41 that it is #8a seditious opinion to teach that the knowledge of good and evil belongs to private persons'3 and cap4 ,,xvii1 that #8in questions of faith the civil magistrates ought to consult with the ecclesiastical doctors1 to whom ,god's blessing is derived by imposition of hands1 so as not to be deceived in necessary truths1' c4 ,there he attributes too much to them1 here he attributeth too little2 both there and here he takes too much upon him4 ,the spirits of the prophets are subject to the prophets40 ,he thinks he hath a great advantage against me from my own words in my book ,de ,cive1 which he would not have thought if he had understood them4 ,the knowledge of good and evil is judicature1 which in ,latin is cognitio causarum1 not scientia4 ,every private man may do his best to attain a knowledge of what is good and evil in the action he is to do2 but to judge of what is good and evil in others1 belongs not to him1 but to those whom the sovereign power appointeth thereunto4 ,but the ,bishop not understanding1 or forgetting1 that cognoscere is to judge1 as ,adam did of ,god's commandment1 hath cited this place to little purpose4 ,and for the infallibility of the ecclesiastical doctors by me attributed to them1 it is not that they cannot be deceived1 but that a subject cannot be deceived in obeying them when they are our lawfully constituted doctors4 ,for the supreme ecclesiastical doctor1 is he that hath the supreme power3 and in obeying him no subject can be deceived1 because they are by ,god himself commanded to obey him4 ,and what the ecclesiastical doctors1 lawfully constituted1 do tell us to be necessary in point of religion1 the same is told us by the sovereign power4 ,and therefore1 though we may be deceived by them in the belief of an opinion1 we cannot be deceived by them in the duty of our actions4 ,and this is all that ,i ascribe to the ecclesiastical doctors4 ,if they think it too much1 let them take upon them less4 ,too little they cannot say it is1 who take it1 as it is1 for a burthen4 ,and for them who seek it as a worldly preferment1 it is too much4 ,i take1 he says1 too much upon me4 ,why so8 ,because the spirits of the prophets are subject to the prophets4 ,this is it that he finds fault with in me1 when he says that ,i am a private man1 that is to say1 no prophet1 that is to say1 no bishop4 ,by which it is manifest1 that the ,bishop subjecteth not his spirit but to the ,convocation of bishops4 ,i admit that every man ought to subject his spirit to the prophets4 ,but a prophet is he that speaketh unto us from ,god2 which ,i acknowledge none to do1 but him that hath due authority so to do4 ,and no man hath due authority so to do immediately1 but he that hath the supreme authority of the commonwealth2 nor mediately1 but they that speak such things to the people1 as he that hath the supreme authority alloweth of4 ,and as it is true in this sense1 that the spirits of the prophets are subject to the prophets2 so it is also true that we ought not to believe every spirit1 but to try the spirits1 whether they are of ,god2 because many false prophets are gone out into the world 7#a ,john iv4 #a74 ,therefore ,i that am a private man1 may examine the prophets2 which to do1 ,i have no other means but to examine whether their doctrine be agreeable to the law2 which theirs is not1 who divide the commonwealth into two commonwealths1 civil and ecclesiastical4 ,,no4 ,,xx4 ,sidenote3 ,the ,bishop's reply4 ,j4 ,d4 8,now to the distinction itself1 ,i say1 first1 that the proper act of liberty is election1 and election is opposed1 not only to coaction1 but also to coarctation1 or determination to one4 ,necessitation or determination to one1 may consist with spontaneity1 but not with election or liberty2 as hath been showed4 ,the very ,stoics did acknowledge a spontaneity4 ,so our adversaries are not yet gone out of the confines of the ,stoics4 8,secondly1 to rip up the bottom of this business1 this ,i take to be the clear resolution of the ,schools4 ,there is a double act of the will3 the one more remote1 called imperatus1 that is1 in truth the act of some inferior faculty1 subject to the command of the will1 as to open or shut one's eyes2 without doubt these actions may be compelled4 ,the other act is nearer1 called actus elicitus1 an act drawn out of the will1 as to will1 to choose1 to elect4 ,this may be stopped or hindered by the intervening impediment of the understanding1 as a stone lying on a table is kept from its natural motion2 otherwise the will should have a kind of omnipotence4 ,but the will cannot be compelled to an act repugnant to its inclination1 as when a stone is thrown upwards into the air2 for that is both to incline and not to incline to the same object at the same time1 which implies a contradiction4 ,therefore to say the will is necessitated1 is to say1 the will is compelled so far as the will is capable of compulsion4 ,if a strong man holding the hand of a weaker1 should therewith kill a third person1 hc quidem vis est1 this is violence2 the weaker did not willingly perpetrate the fact1 because he was compelled4 ,but now suppose this strong man had the will of the weaker in his power as well as the hand1 and should not only incline1 but determine it secretly and insensibly to commit this act3 is not the case the same8 ,whether one ravish ,lucretia by force1 as ,tarquin1 or by amatory potions and magical incantations not only allure her1 but necessitate her to satisfy his lust1 and incline her effectually1 and draw her inevitably and irresistibly1 to follow him spontaneously1 ,lucretia in both these conditions is to be pitied4 ,but the latter person is more guilty1 and deserves greater punishment1 who endeavours also1 so much as in him lies1 to make ,lucretia irresistibly partake of his crime4 ,i dare not apply it1 but thus only3 take heed how we defend those secret and invincible necessitations to evil1 though spontaneous and free from coaction4 8,these are their fastnesses40 ,t4 ,h4 ,in the next place1 he bringeth two arguments against distinguishing between being free from compulsion1 and free from necessitation4 ,the first is1 that election is opposite1 not only to coaction or compulsion1 but also to necessitation or determination to one4 ,this is it he was to prove from the beginning1 and therefore bringeth no new argument to prove it4 ,and to those brought formerly1 ,i have already answered2 and in this place ,i deny again1 that election is opposite to either4 ,for when a man is compelled1 for example1 to subject himself to an enemy or to die1 he hath still election left in him1 and a deliberation to bethink which of these two he can better endure2 and he that is led to prison by force1 hath election1 and may deliberate1 whether he will be haled and trained on the ground1 or make use of his feet4 ,likewise when there is no compulsion1 but the strength of temptation to do an evil action1 being greater than the motives to abstain1 necessarily determines him to the doing of it1 yet he deliberates whilst sometimes the motives to do1 sometimes the motives to forbear1 are working on him1 and consequently he electeth which he will4 ,but commonly1 when we see and know the strength that moves us1 we acknowledge necessity2 but when we see not1 or mark not the force that moves us1 we then think there is none1 and that it is not causes1 but liberty that produceth the action4 ,hence it is that they think he does not choose this1 that of necessity chooseth it2 but they might as well say fire does not burn1 because it burns of necessity4 ,the second argument is not so much an argument1 as a distinction1 to show in what sense it may be said that voluntary actions are necessitated1 and in what sense not4 ,and therefore he allegeth1 as from the authority of the ,schools and that which 8rippeth up the bottom of the question01 that there is a double act of the will4 ,the one1 he says1 is actus imperatus1 an act done at the command of the will by some inferior faculty of the soul1 as to open or shut one's eyes3 and this act may be compelled4 ,the other1 he says1 is actus elicitus1 an act allured1 or an act drawn forth by allurement out of the will1 as to will1 to choose1 to elect3 this1 he says1 cannot be compelled4 ,wherein letting pass that metaphorical speech of attributing command and subjection to the faculties of the soul1 as if they made a commonwealth or family among themselves1 and could speak one to another1 which is very improper in searching the truth of the question3 you may observe first1 that to compel a voluntary act is nothing else but to will it4 ,for it is all one to say1 my will commands the shutting of mine eyes or the doing of any other action1 and to say1 ,i have the will to shut mine eyes4 ,so that actus imperatus here1 might as easily have been said in ,english1 a voluntary action1 but that they that invented the term understood not any thing it signified4 ,secondly you may observe1 that actus elicitus is exemplified by these words1 to will1 to elect1 to choose1 which are all one2 and so to will is here made an act of the will2 and indeed1 as the will is a faculty or power of a man's soul1 so to will is an act of it according to that power4 ,but as it is absurdly said1 that to dance is an act allured or drawn by fair means out of the ability to dance2 so it is also to say1 that to will is an act allured or drawn out of the power to will1 which power is commonly called the will4 ,howsoever it be1 the sum of his distinction is1 that a voluntary act may be done on compulsion1 that is to say1 by foul means2 but to will that or any act cannot be but by allurement or fair means4 ,now1 seeing fair means1 allurements1 and enticements1 produce the action which they do produce as necessarily as threatening and foul means1 it follows1 that to will may be made as necessary as any thing that is done by compulsion4 ,so that the distinction of actus imperatus1 and actus elicitus1 are but words1 and of no effect against necessity4 ,j4 ,d4 8,in the next place follow two reasons of mine own against the same distinction1 the one taken from the former grounds1 that election cannot consist with determination to one4 ,to this1 he saith1 he hath answered already4 ,no2 truth is founded upon a rock4 ,he hath been so far from prevailing against it1 that he hath not been able to shake it4 7a7 ,now again he tells us1 that #8election is not opposite to either'1 necessitation or compulsion4 ,he might even as well tell us1 that a stone thrown upwards moves naturally2 or that a woman can be ravished with her own will4 ,consent takes away the rape4 ,this is the strangest liberty that ever was heard of1 that a man is compelled to do what he would not1 and yet is free to do what he will4 ,and this he tells us upon the old score1 that #8he who submits to his enemy for fear of death1 chooseth to submit'4 ,but we have seen formerly1 that this which he calls compulsion1 is not compulsion properly1 nor that natural determination of the will to one1 which is opposite to true liberty4 ,he who submits to an enemy for saving his life1 doth either only counterfeit1 and then there is no will to submit2 7this disguise is no more than a stepping aside to avoid a present blow72 or else he doth sincerely will a submission1 and then the will is changed4 ,there is a vast difference between compelling and changing the will4 ,either ,god or man may change the will of man1 either by varying the condition of things1 or by informing the party otherwise3 but compelled it cannot be1 that is1 it cannot both will this and not will this1 as it is invested with the same circumstances2 though1 if the act were otherwise circumstantiated1 it might nill that freely which now it wills freely4 7b7 ,wherefore this kind of actions are called mixed actions1 that is partly voluntary1 partly involuntary4 ,that which is compelled in a man's present condition or distress1 that is not voluntary nor chosen4 ,that which is chosen1 as the remedy of its distress1 that is voluntary4 ,so hypothetically1 supposing a man were not in that distress1 they are involuntary2 but absolutely without any supposition at all1 taking the case as it is1 they are voluntary4 7c7 ,his other instance of #8a man forced to prison1 that he may choose whether he will be haled thither upon the ground1 or walk upon his feet1' is not true4 ,by his leave1 that is not as he pleaseth1 but as it pleaseth them who have him in their power4 ,if they will drag him1 he is not free to walk2 and if they give him leave to walk1 he is not forced to be dragged4 7d7 ,having laid this foundation1 he begins to build upon it1 that #8other passions do necessitate as much as fear'4 ,but he errs doubly2 first1 in his foundation4 ,fear doth not determine the rational will naturally and necessarily4 ,the last and greatest of the five terrible things is death2 yet the fear of death cannot necessitate a resolved mind to do a dishonest action1 which is worse than death4 ,the fear of the fiery furnace could not compel the three children to worship an idol1 nor the fear of the lions necessitate ,daniel to omit his duty to ,god4 ,it is our frailty1 that we are more afraid of empty shadows than of substantial dangers1 because they are nearer our senses2 as little children fear a mouse or a visard more than fire or weather4 ,but as a fit of the stone takes away the sense of the gout for the present1 so the greater passion doth extinguish the less4 ,the fear of ,god's wrath and eternal torments doth expel corporeal fear3 fear not them who kill the body1 but fear him who is able to cast both body and soul into hell 7,luke xii4 #d74 7e7 ,da veniam imperator2 tu carcerem1 ille gehennam minatur4--,excuse me1 ,o emperor1 thou threatenest men with prison1 but he threatens me with hell4 7f7 ,secondly1 he errs in his superstruction also4 ,there is a great difference1 as to this case of justifying1 or not justifying an action1 between force and fear1 and other passions4 ,force doth not only lessen the sin1 but takes it quite away4 ,he who forced a betrothed damsel was to die2 #8but unto the damsel1' saith he1 #8thou shalt do nothing1 there is in her no fault worthy of death' 7,deut4 xxii4 #bf74 ,tamar's beauty1 or ,ammon's love1 did not render him innocent2 but ,ammon's force rendered ,tamar innocent4 ,but fear is not so prevalent as force4 ,indeed if fear be great and justly grounded1 such as may fall upon a constant man1 though it do not dispense with the transgression of the negative precepts of ,god or nature1 because they bind to all times1 yet it diminisheth the offence even against them1 and pleads for pardon4 ,but it dispenseth in many cases with the transgression of the positive law1 either divine or human2 because it is not probable that ,god or the law would oblige man to the observation of all positive precepts1 with so great damage as the loss of his life4 ,the omission of circumcision was no sin1 whilst the ,israelites were travelling through the wilderness4 ,by ,t4 ,h4's permission1 7g7 ,i will propose a case to him4 ,a gentleman sends his servant with money to buy a dinner2 some ,russians meet him by the way1 and take it from him by force2 the servant cried for help1 and did what he could to defend himself1 but all would not serve4 ,the servant is innocent1 if he were to be tried before a court of ,areopagites4 ,or suppose the ,russians did not take it from him by force1 but drew their swords and threatened to kill him except he delivered it himself2 no wise man will conceive1 that it was either the master's intention or the servant's duty to hazard his life or limbs for saving of such a trifling sum4 ,but on the other side1 suppose this servant1 passing by some cabaret or tennis-court where his comrades were drinking or playing1 should stay with them1 and drink or play away his money1 and afterwards plead1 as ,t4 ,h4 doth here1 that he was overcome by the mere strength of temptation4 ,i trow1 neither ,t4 ,h4 nor any man else would admit of this excuse1 but punish him for it3 because neither was he necessitated by the temptation1 and what strength it had was by his own fault1 in respect of that vicious habit which he had contracted of drinking or gaming3 7,james i4 #ad73 ,every man is tempted1 when he is drawn away of his own lust and enticed4 ,disordered passions of anger1 hatred1 lust1 if they be consequent 7as the case is here put by ,t4 ,h47 and flow from deliberation and election1 they do not only not diminish the fault1 but they aggravate it1 and render it much greater4 7h7 8,he talks much of the #8motives to do and motives to forbear1 how they work upon and determine a man'2 as if a reasonable man were no more than a tennis-ball1 to be tossed to and fro by the rackets of the second causes2 as if the will had no power to move itself1 but were merely passive1 like an artificial popingay removed hither and thither by the bolts of the archers1 who shoot on this side and on that4 ,what are motives1 but reasons or discourses framed by the understanding1 and freely moved by the will8 ,what are the will and the understanding1 but faculties of the same soul8 ,and what is liberty but a power resulting from them both8 ,to say that the will is determined by these motives1 is as much as to say that the agent is determined by himself4 ,if there be no necessitation before the judgment of right reason doth dictate to the will1 then there is no antecedent1 no extrinsical necessitation at all4 7i7 ,all the world knows1 that when the agent is determined by himself1 then the effect is determined likewise in its cause4 ,but if he determined himself freely1 then the effect is free4 ,motives determine not naturally1 but morally2 which kind of determination may consist with true liberty4 ,but if ,t4 ,h4's opinion were true1 that the will were naturally determined by the physical and special influence of extrinsical causes1 not only motives were vain1 but reason itself and deliberation were vain4 ,no1 saith he1 they are not vain1 because they are the means4 ,yes1 if the means be superfluous1 they are vain4 ,what needed such a circuit of deliberation to advise what is fit to be done1 when it is already determined extrinsically what must be done8 7k7 8,he saith1 #8that the ignorance of the true causes and their power1 is the reason why we ascribe the effect to liberty2 but when we seriously consider the causes of things1 we acknowledge a necessity'4 ,no such thing1 but just the contrary4 ,the more we consider1 and the clearer we understand1 the greater is the liberty1 and the more the knowledge of our own liberty4 ,the less we consider1 and the more incapable that the understanding is1 the lesser is the liberty1 and the knowledge of it4 ,and where there is no consideration nor use of reason1 there is no liberty at all1 there is neither moral good nor evil4 ,some men1 by reason that their exterior senses are not totally bound1 have a trick to walk in their sleep4 ,suppose such a one in that case should cast himself down a pair of stairs or from a bridge1 and break his neck or drown himself2 it were a mad jury that would find this man accessary to his own death4 ,why8 ,because it was not freely done1 he had not then the use of reason4 7l7 8,lastly1 he tells us1 that #8the will doth choose of necessity1 as well as the fire burns of necessity'4 ,if he intend no more but this1 that election is the proper and natural act of the will as burning is of the fire1 or that the elective power is as necessarily in a man as visibility1 he speaks truly1 but most impertinently2 for1 the question is not now of the elective power1 in actu primo1 whether it be an essential faculty of the soul1 but whether the act of electing this or that particular object1 be free and undetermined by any antecedent and extrinsical causes4 ,but if he intend it in this other sense1 that as the fire hath no power to suspend its burning1 nor to distinguish between those combustible matters which are put unto it1 but burns that which is put unto it necessarily1 if it be combustible2 so the will hath no power to refuse that which it wills1 nor to suspend its own appetite3 he errs grossly4 ,the will hath power either to will or nill1 or to suspend1 that is1 neither to will nor nill the same object4 ,yet even the burning of the fire1 if it be considered as it is invested with all particular circumstances1 is not otherwise so necessary an action as ,t4 ,h4 imagineth4 7m7 ,two things are required to make an effect necessary4 ,first1 that it be produced by a necessary cause1 such as fire is2 secondly1 that it be necessarily produced4 ,protagoras1 an atheist1 began his book thus3 #8,concerning the ,gods1 ,i have nothing to say1 whether they be or they be not'3 for which his book was condemned by the ,athenians to be burned4 ,the fire was a necessary agent1 but the sentence or the application of the fire to the book was a free act2 and therefore the burning of his book was free4 ,much more the rational will is free1 which is both a voluntary agent1 and acts voluntarily4 7n7 8,my second reason against this distinction1 of liberty from compulsion but not from necessitation1 is new1 and demonstrates clearly that to necessitate the will by a physical necessity1 is to compel the will so far as the will is capable of compulsion2 and that he who doth necessitate the will to evil after that manner1 is the true cause of evil1 and ought rather to be blamed than the will itself4 ,but ,t4 ,h41 for all he saith he is not surprised1 can be contented upon better advise to steal by all this in silence4 ,and to hide this tergiversation from the eyes of the reader1 he makes an empty shew of braving against that famous and most necessary distinction1 between the elicite and imperate acts of the will2 first1 because the terms are improper2 secondly1 because they are obscure4 ,what trivial and grammatical objections are these1 to be used against the universal current of divines and philosophers4 ,verborum ut nummorum1 it is in words as it is in money3 use makes them proper and current4 ,a tyrant at first signified a lawful and just prince2 now1 use hath quite changed the sense of it1 to denote either a usurper or an oppressor4 ,the word prmunire is now grown a good word in our ,english laws1 by use and tract of time2 and yet at first it was merely mistaken for a prmonere4 ,the names of ,sunday1 ,monday1 ,tuesday1 were derived at first from those heathenish deities1 the ,sun1 the ,moon1 and the warlike god of the ,germans4 ,now we use them for distinction sake only1 without any relation to their first original4 ,he is too froward1 that will refuse a piece of coin that is current throughout the world1 because it is not stamped after his own fancy4 ,so is he that rejects a good word1 because he understands not the derivation of it4 ,we see foreign words are daily naturalized and made free denizens in every country4 ,but why are the terms improper8 #8,because1' saith he1 #8it attributes command1 and subjection to the faculties of the soul1 as if they made a commonwealth or family among themselves1 and could speak one to another4' ,therefore1 he saith1 7o7 they who invented this term of actus imperatus1 understood not anything what it signified4 ,no2 why not8 ,it seemeth to me1 they understood it better than those who except against it4 ,they knew there are mental terms1 which are only conceived in the mind1 as well as vocal terms1 which are expressed with the tongue4 ,they knew1 that howsoever a superior do intimate a direction to his inferior1 it is still a command4 ,tarquin commanded his son by only striking off the tops of the poppies1 and was by him both understood and obeyed4 ,though there be no formal commonwealth or family either in the body or in the soul of man1 yet there is a subordination in the body1 of the inferior members to the head2 there is a subordination in the soul1 of the inferior faculties to the rational will4 ,far be it from a reasonable man so far to dishonour his own nature1 as to equal fancy with understanding1 or the sensitive appetite with the reasonable will4 ,a power of command there is1 without all question2 though there be some doubt in what faculty this command doth principally reside1 whether in the will or in the understanding4 ,the true resolution is1 that the directive command or counsel is in the understanding2 and the applicative command1 or empire for putting in execution of what is directed1 is in the will4 ,the same answer serves for his second impropriety1 about the word elicite4 ,for saith he1 #8as it is absurdly said1 that to dance is an act allured1 or drawn by fair means1 out of the ability to dance2 so is it absurdly said1 that to will or choose1 is an act drawn out of the power to will'4 ,his objection is yet more improper than the expression4 ,the art of dancing rather resembles the understanding than the will4 ,that drawing which the ,schools intend1 is clear of another nature from that which he conceives4 ,by elicitation1 he understands a persuading or enticing with flattering words1 or sweet alluring insinuations1 to choose this or that4 ,but that elicitation which the ,schools intend1 is a deducing of the power of the will into act2 that drawing which they mention1 is merely from the appetibility of the object1 or of the end4 ,as a man draws a child after him with the sight of a fair apple1 or a shepherd draws his sheep after him with the sight of a green bough3 so the end draws the will to it by a metaphorical motion4 ,what he understands here by an ability to dance1 is more than ,i know1 or any man else1 until he express himself in more proper terms2 whether he understand the locomotive faculty alone1 or the art or acquired habit of dancing alone1 or both of these jointly4 ,it may be said aptly without any absurdity1 that the act of dancing is drawn out 7elicitur7 of the locomotive faculty helped by the acquired habit4 ,he who is so scrupulous about the received phrases of the ,schools1 should not have let so many improper expressions have dropt from his pen2 as in this very passage1 he confounds the compelling of a voluntary action1 with the commanding of a voluntary action1 and willing with electing1 which1 he saith1 #8are all one'4 ,yet to will properly respects the end1 to elect the means4 7p7 8,his other objection against this distinction of the acts of the will into elicite and imperate1 is obscurity4 #8,might it not1' saith he1 #8have been as easily said in ,english1 a voluntary action4' ,yes1 it might have been said as easily1 but not as truly1 nor properly4 ,whatsoever hath its original from the will1 whether immediately or mediately1 whether it be a proper act of the will itself1 as to elect1 or an act of the understanding1 as to deliberate1 or an act of the inferior faculties or of the members1 is a voluntary action3 but neither the act of reason1 nor of the senses1 nor of the sensitive appetite1 nor of the members1 are the proper acts of the will1 nor drawn immediately out of the will itself2 but the members and faculties are applied to their proper and respective acts by the power of the will4 8,and so he comes to cast up the total sum of my second reason with the same faith that the unjust steward did make his accounts 7,luke xvi74 #8,the sum of ,j4 ,d4's distinction is1' saith he1 #8that a voluntary act may be done on compulsion1' 7just contrary to what ,i have maintained71 #8that is to say1 by foul means3 but to will that or any act1 cannot be but by allurement or fair means4' ,i confess the distinction is mine1 because ,i use it2 as the sun is mine1 or the air is mine1 that is common to me with all who treat of this subject4 7q7 ,but his mistakes are so thick1 both in relating my mind and his own1 that the reader may conclude he is wandered out of his known way4 ,i will do my duty to show him the right way4 ,first1 no acts which are properly said to be compelled1 are voluntary4 ,secondly1 acts of terror1 7which he calls foul means71 which are sometimes in a large improper sense called compulsory actions1 may be1 and for the most part are1 consistent with true liberty4 ,thirdly1 actions proceeding from blandishments or sweet persuasions1 7which he calls fair means71 if they be indeliberated1 as in children who want the use of reason1 are not presently free actions4 ,lastly1 the strength of consequent and deliberated desires doth neither diminish guilt1 nor excuse from punishment1 as just fears of extreme and imminent dangers threatened by extrinsical agents often do2 because the strength of the former proceeds from our own fault1 and was freely elected in the causes of it2 but neither desires nor fears1 which are consequent and deliberated1 do absolutely necessitate the will4 ,,animadversions ,,upon ,,the ,,bishop',s ,,reply ,,no4 ,,xx4 7a7 8,now again he tells us1 that election is not opposite to either necessitation or compulsion4 ,he might even as well tell us1 that a stone thrown upwards moves naturally1 or that a woman can be ravished with her own will4 ,consent takes away the rape10 c4 ,if that which ,i have told him again1 be false1 why shows he not why it is false8 ,here is not one word of argument against it4 ,to say1 ,i might have said as well that a stone thrown upwards moves naturally1 is no refutation1 but a denial4 ,i will not dispute with him1 whether a stone thrown up move naturally or not4 ,i shall only say to those readers whose judgments are not defaced with the abuse of words1 that as a stone moveth not upwards of itself1 but by the power of the external agent who giveth it a beginning of that motion2 so also when the stone falleth1 it is moved downward by the power of some other agent1 which1 though it be imperceptible to the eye1 is not imperceptible to reason4 ,but because this is not proper discourse for the ,bishop1 and because ,i have elsewhere discoursed thereof expressly1 ,i shall say nothing of it here4 ,and whereas he says1 #8consent takes away the rape'2 it may perhaps be true1 and ,i think it is2 but here it not only inferreth nothing1 but was also needless1 and therefore in a public writing is an indecent instance1 though sometimes not unnecessary in a spiritual court4 ,in the next place1 he wonders how 8a man is compelled1 and yet free to do what he will02 that is to say1 how a man is made to will1 and yet free to do what he will4 ,if he had said1 he wondered how a man can be compelled to will1 and yet be free to do that which he would have done if he had not been compelled1 it had been somewhat2 as it is1 it is nothing4 ,again he says1 8he who submits to an enemy for saving his life1 doth either only counterfeit1 or else his will is changed10 c43 all which is true4 ,but when he says he doth counterfeit1 he doth not insinuate that he may counterfeit lawfully2 for that would prejudice him hereafter1 in case he should have need of quarter4 ,but how this maketh for him1 or against me1 ,i perceive not4 8,there is a vast difference10 saith he1 8between compelling and changing the will4 ,either ,god or man may change the will of man1 either by varying the condition of things1 or by informing the party otherwise2 but compelled it cannot be10 c4 ,i say the same2 the will cannot be compelled2 but the man may be1 and is then compelled1 when his will is changed by the fear of force1 punishment1 or other hurt from ,god or man4 ,and when his will is changed1 there is a new will formed1 7whether it be by ,god or man71 and that necessarily2 and consequently the actions that flow from that will1 are both voluntary1 free1 and necessary1 notwithstanding that he was compelled to do them4 ,which maketh not for the ,bishop1 but for me4 7b7 8,wherefore this kind of actions are called mixed actions1 that is partly voluntary1 partly involuntary1 c4 ,so supposing a man were not in that distress1 they are involuntary40 ,that some actions are partly voluntary1 partly involuntary1 is not a new1 but a false opinion4 ,for one and the same action can never be both voluntary and involuntary4 ,if therefore parts of an action be actions1 he says no more but that some actions are voluntary1 some involuntary2 or that one multitude of actions may be partly voluntary1 partly involuntary4 ,but that one action should be partly voluntary1 partly involuntary1 is absurd4 ,and it is the absurdity of those authors which he unwarily gave credit to4 ,but to say1 supposing the man had not been in distress1 that then the action had been involuntary1 is to say1 that the throwing of a man's goods into the sea1 supposing he had not been in a storm1 had been an involuntary action2 which is also an absurdity2 for he would not have done it1 and therefore it had been no action at all4 ,and this absurdity is his own4 7c7 8,his other instance of a man forced to prison1 that he may choose whether he will be haled thither upon the ground or walk upon his feet1 is not true4 ,by his leave1 that is not as he pleaseth1 but as it pleaseth them who have him in their power40 ,it is enough for the use ,i make of that instance1 that a man when in the necessity of going to prison1 though he cannot elect nor deliberate of being prisoner in the jail1 may nevertheless deliberate sometimes1 whether he shall walk or be haled thither4 7d7 8,having laid this foundation1 he begins to build upon it1 that other passions do necessitate as much as fear4 ,but he errs doubly10 c4 ,first1 he says1 ,i err in this1 that ,i say that fear determines the rational will naturally and necessarily4 ,and first1 ,i answer1 that ,i never used that term of rational will4 ,there is nothing rational but ,god1 angels1 and men4 ,the will is none of these4 ,i would not have excepted against this expression1 but that every where he speaketh of the will and other faculties as of men1 or spirits in men's bellies4 ,secondly1 he offereth nothing to prove the contrary4 ,for that which followeth3 8the last and greatest of five terrible things is death2 yet the fear of death cannot necessitate a resolved mind to a dishonest action2 the fear of the fiery furnace could not compel the three children to worship an idol1 nor the fear of the lions necessitate ,daniel to omit his duty to ,god10 c43 ,i grant him that the greatest of five 7or of fifteen1 for he had no more reason for five than fifteen7 terrible things doth not always necessitate a man to do a dishonest action1 and that the fear of the fiery furnace could not compel the three children1 nor the lions ,daniel1 to omit their duty2 for somewhat else1 namely1 their confidence in ,god1 did necessitate them to do their duty4 ,that the fear of ,god's wrath doth expel corporeal fear1 is well said1 and according to the text he citeth3 and proveth strongly1 that fear of the greater evil may necessitate in a man a courage to endure the lesser evil4 7e7 8,da veniam imperator2 tu carcerem1 ille gehennam minatur3--,excuse me1 ,o ,emperor2 thou threatenest men with prison1 but ,god threatens me with hell40 ,this sentence1 and that which he saith ,no4 ,,xvii1 that neither the civil judge is the proper judge1 nor the law of the land is the proper rule of sin1 and divers other sayings of his to the same effect1 make it impossible for any nation in the world to preserve themselves from civil wars4 ,for all men living equally acknowledging1 that the ,high and ,omnipotent ,god is to be obeyed before the greatest emperors2 every one may pretend the commandment of ,god to justify his disobedience4 ,and if one man pretendeth that ,god commands one thing1 and another man that he commands the contrary1 what equity is there to allow the pretence of one more than of another8 ,or what peace can there be1 if they be all allowed alike8 ,there will therefore necessarily arise discord and civil war1 unless there be a judge agreed upon1 with authority given to him by every one of them1 to show them and interpret to them the ,word of ,god2 which interpreter is always the emperor1 king1 or other sovereign person1 who therefore ought to be obeyed4 ,but the ,bishop thinks that to shew us and interpret to us the ,word of ,god1 belongeth to the clergy2 wherein ,i cannot consent unto him4 ,excuse me1 ,o ,bishop1 you threaten me with that you cannot do2 but the emperor threateneth me with death1 and is able to do what he threateneth4 7f7 8,secondly1 he errs in his superstruction also4 ,there is a great difference1 as to this case of justifying or not justifying an action1 between force and fear1 c4 ,force doth not only lessen the sin1 but takes it quite away1 c40 ,i know not to what point of my answer this reply of his is to be applied4 ,i had said1 the actions of men compelled are1 nevertheless1 voluntary4 ,it seems that he calleth compulsion force2 but ,i call it a fear of force1 or of damage to be done by force1 by which fear a man's will is framed to somewhat to which he had no will before4 ,force taketh away the sin1 because the action is not his that is forced1 but his that forceth4 ,it is not always so in compulsion2 because1 in this case1 a man electeth the less evil under the notion of good4 ,but his instances of the betrothed damsel that was forced1 and of ,tamar1 may1 for anything there appeareth in the text1 be instances of compulsion1 and yet the damsel and ,tamar be both innocent4 ,in that which immediately followeth1 concerning how far fear may extenuate a sin1 there is nothing to be answered4 ,i perceive in it he hath some glimmering of the truth1 but not of the grounds thereof4 ,it is true1 that just fear dispenseth not with the precepts of ,god or nature2 for they are not dispensable2 but it extenuateth the fault1 not by diminishing anything in the action1 but by being no transgression4 ,for if the fear be allowed1 the action it produceth is allowed also4 ,nor doth it dispense in any case with the law positive1 but by making the action itself lawful2 for the breaking of a law is always sin4 ,and it is certain that men are obliged to the observation of all positive precepts1 though with the loss of their lives1 unless the right that a man hath to preserve himself make it1 in case of a just fear1 to be no law4 8,the omission of circumcision was no sin10 he says1 8whilst the ,israelites were travelling through the wilderness40 ,it is very true1 but this has nothing to do with compulsion4 ,and the cause why it was no sin1 was this3 they were ready to obey it1 whensoever ,god should give them leisure and rest from travel1 whereby they might be cured2 or at least when ,god1 that daily spake to their conductor in the desert1 should appoint him to renew that sacrament4 7g7 8,i will propose a case to him10 c4 ,the case is this4 ,a servant is robbed of his master's money by the highway1 but is acquitted because he was forced4 ,another servant spends his master's money in a tavern4 ,why is he not acquitted also1 seeing he was necessitated8 8,would10 saith he1 8,t4 ,h4 admit of this excuse80 ,i answer1 no3 but ,i would do that to him1 which should necessitate him to behave himself better another time1 or at least necessitate another to behave himself better by his example4 7h7 8,he talks much of the motives to do1 and the motives to forbear1 how they work upon and determine a man2 as if a reasonable man were no more than a tennis-ball1 to be tossed to and fro by the rackets of the second causes10 c4 ,may not great things be produced by second causes1 as well as little2 and a foot-ball as well as a tennis-ball8 ,but the ,bishop can never be driven from this1 that the will hath power to move itself2 but says it is all one to say1 that 8an agent can determine itself10 and that 8the will is determined by motives extrinsical04 ,he adds1 that 8if there be no necessitation before the judgment of right reason doth dictate to the will1 then there is no antecedent nor extrinsical necessitation at all04 ,i say indeed1 the effect is not produced before the last dictate of the understanding2 but ,i say not1 that the necessity was not before2 he knows ,i say1 it is from eternity4 ,when a cannon is planted against a wall1 though the battery be not made till the bullet arrive1 yet the necessity was present all the while the bullet was going to it1 if the wall stood still3 and if it slipped away1 the hitting of somewhat else was necessary1 and that antecedently4 7i7 8,all the world knows1 that when the agent is determined by himself1 then the effect is determined likewise in its cause40 ,yes1 when the agent is determined by himself1 then the effect is determined likewise in its cause2 and so anything else is what he will have it4 ,but nothing is determined by itself1 nor is there any man in the world that hath any conception answerable to those words4 ,but 8motives10 he says1 8determine not naturally1 but morally04 ,this also is insignificant2 for all motion is natural or supernatural4 ,moral motion is a mere word1 without any imagination of the mind correspondent to it4 ,i have heard men talk of a motion in a court of justice2 perhaps this is it which he means by moral motion4 ,but certainly1 when the tongue of the judge and the hands of the clerks are thereby moved1 the motion is natural1 and proceeds from natural causes2 which causes also were natural motions of the tongue of the advocate4 ,and whereas he adds1 that if this were true1 then 8not only motives1 but reason itself and deliberation were vain02 it hath been sufficiently answered before1 that therefore they are not vain1 because by them is produced the effect4 ,i must also note1 that oftentimes in citing my opinion he puts in instead of mine1 those terms of his own1 which upon all occasions ,i complain of for absurdity2 as here he makes me to say1 that which ,i did never say1 8special influence of extrinsical causes04 7k7 8,he saith1 that #8the ignorance of the true causes and their power1 is the reason why we ascribe the effect to liberty2 but when we seriously consider the causes of things1 we acknowledge a necessity4' ,no such thing1 but just the contrary40 ,if he understand the authors which he readeth upon this point1 no better than he understands what ,i have here written1 it is no wonder he understandeth not the truth of the question4 ,i said not1 that when we consider the causes of things1 but when we see and know the strength that moves us1 we acknowledge necessity4 8,no such thing10 says the ,bishop1 8but just the contrary2 the more we consider1 and the clearer we understand1 the greater is the liberty10 c4 ,is there any doubt1 if a man could foreknow1 as ,god foreknows1 that which is hereafter to come to pass1 but that he would also see and know the causes which shall bring it to pass1 and how they work1 and make the effect necessary8 ,for necessary it is1 whatsoever ,god foreknoweth4 ,but we that foresee them not1 may consider as much as we will1 and understand as clearly as we will1 but are never the nearer to the knowledge of their necessity2 and that1 ,i said1 was the cause why we impute those events to liberty1 and not to causes4 7l7 8,lastly1 he tells us1 that the will doth choose of necessity1 as well as the fire burns of necessity4 ,if he intend no more but this1 that election is the proper and natural act of the will1 as burning is of the fire c41 he speaks truly1 but most impertinently2 for the question is not now of the elective power1 in actu primo1 c40 ,here again he makes me to speak nonsense4 ,i said1 8the man chooseth of necessity02 he says ,i say1 8the will chooseth of necessity04 ,and why3 but because he thinks ,i ought to speak as he does1 and say as he does here1 that 8election is the act of the will04 ,no3 election is the act of a man1 as power to elect is the power of a man4 ,election and will are all one act of a man2 and the power to elect1 and the power to will1 one and the same power of a man4 ,but the ,bishop is confounded by the use of calling by the name of will1 the power of willing in the future2 as they also were confounded1 that first brought in this senseless term of actus primus4 ,my meaning is1 that the election ,i shall have of anything hereafter1 is now as necessary1 as that the fire1 that now is and continueth1 shall burn any combustible matter thrown into it hereafter3 or to use his own terms1 the will hath no more power to suspend its willing1 than the burning of the fire to suspend its burning3 or rather more properly1 the man hath no more power to suspend his will1 than the fire to suspend its burning4 ,which is contrary to that which he would have1 namely1 that a man should have power to refuse what he wills1 and to suspend his own appetite4 ,for to refuse what one willeth1 implieth a contradiction2 the which also is made much more absurd by his expression4 ,for he saith1 the will hath power to refuse what it wills1 and to suspend its own appetite3 whereas the will1 and the willing1 and the appetite is the same thing4 ,he adds that 8even the burning of the fire1 if it be considered as it is invested with all particular circumstances1 is not so necessary an action as ,t4 ,h4 imagineth04 ,he doth not sufficiently understand what ,i imagine4 ,for ,i imagine1 that of the fire which shall burn five hundred years hence1 ,i may truly say now1 it shall burn necessarily2 and of that which shall not burn then1 7for fire may sometimes not burn the combustible matter thrown into it1 as in the case of the three children71 that it is necessary it shall not burn4 7m7 8,two things are required to make an effect necessary3 first that it be produced by a necessary cause1 c43 secondly1 that it be necessarily produced1 c40 ,to this ,i say nothing1 but that ,i understand not how a cause can be necessary1 and the effect not be necessarily produced4 7n7 8,my second reason against this distinction of liberty from compulsion1 but not from necessitation1 is new1 and demonstrates clearly1 that to necessitate the will by a physical necessity1 is to compel the will1 so far as the will is capable of compulsion2 and that he who doth necessitate the will to evil after that manner1 is the true cause of evil1 c40 ,by this second reason1 which he says is new1 and demonstrates1 c1 ,i cannot find what reason he means4 ,for there are but two1 whereof the latter is in these words3 8,secondly1 to rip up the bottom of this business1 this ,i take to be the clear resolution of the ,schools2 there is a double act of the will2 the one more remote1 called imperatus1 c42 the other act is nearer1 called actus elicitus10 c4 ,but ,i doubt whether this be it he means1 or no4 ,for this being the resolution of the ,schools1 is not new2 and being a distinction only1 is no demonstration2 though perhaps he may use the word demonstration1 as every unlearned man now-a-days does1 to signify any argument of his own4 ,as for the distinction itself1 because the terms are ,latin1 and never used by any author of the ,latin tongue1 to shew their impertinence ,i expounded them in ,english1 and left them to the reader's judgment to find the absurdity of them himself4 ,and the ,bishop in this part of his reply endeavours to defend them4 ,and first1 he calls it a trivial and grammatical objection1 to say they are improper and obscure4 ,is there anything less beseeming a divine or a philosopher1 than to speak improperly and obscurely1 where the truth is in question8 ,perhaps it may be tolerable in one that divineth1 but not in him that pretendeth to demonstrate4 ,it is not the universal current of divines and philosophers1 that giveth words their authority1 but the generality of them who acknowledge that they understand them4 ,tyrant and prmunire1 though their signification be changed1 yet they are understood2 and so are the names of the days1 ,sunday1 ,monday1 ,tuesday4 ,and when ,english readers not engaged in ,school divinity1 shall find imperate and elicit acts as intelligible as those1 ,i will confess ,i had no reason to find fault4 ,but my braving against that famous and most necessary distinction1 between the elicit and imperate acts of the will1 he says was only to hide from the eyes of the reader a tergiversation in not answering this argument of his2 #8he who doth necessitate the will to evil1 is the true cause of evil2 but ,god is not the cause of evil2 therefore he does not necessitate the will to evil'4 ,this argument is not to be found in this ,no4 ,,xx41 to which ,i here answered2 nor had ,i ever said that the will was compelled4 ,but he1 taking all necessitation for compulsion1 doth now in this place1 from necessitation simply1 bring in this inference concerning the cause of evil1 and thinks he shall force me to say that ,god is the cause of sin4 ,i shall say only what is said in the ,scripture1 non est malum1 quod ego non feci4 ,i shall say what ,micaiah saith to ,ahab1 7#a ,kings xxii4 #bc73 ,behold1 the ,lord hath put a lying spirit into the mouth of all these thy prophets4 ,i shall say that that is true1 which the prophet ,david saith 7#b ,sam4 xvi4 #aj73 ,let him curse2 because the ,lord hath said unto him1 curse ,david4 ,but that which ,god himself saith of himself 7#a ,kings xii4 #ae73 ,the king hearkened not to the people1 for the cause was from the ,lord3 ,i will not say1 least the ,bishop exclaim against me2 but leave it to be interpreted by those that have authority to interpret the ,scriptures4 ,i say further1 that to cause sin is not always sin1 nor can be sin in him that is not subject to some higher power2 but to use so unseemly a phrase1 as to say that ,god is the cause of sin1 because it soundeth so like to saying that ,god sinneth1 ,i can never be forced by so weak an argument as this of his4 ,luther says1 we act necessarily2 necessarily by necessity of immutability1 not by necessity of constraint3 that is in plain ,english1 necessarily1 but not against our wills4 ,zanchius says1 7,tract4 ,theol4 cap4 ,,vi4 ,thes4 ,i473 ,the freedom of our will doth not consist in this1 that there is no necessity of our sinning2 but in this1 that there is no constraint4 ,bucer 7,lib4 de ,concordia73 ,whereas the ,catholics say1 man has free will1 we must understand it of freedom from constraint1 and not freedom from necessity4 ,calvin 7,inst4 cap4 ,,ii4 sec4 ,,vi473 ,and thus shall man be said to have free will1 not because he hath equal freedom to do good and evil1 but because he does the evil he does1 not by constraint1 but willingly4 ,monsr4 du ,moulin1 in his ,buckler of the ,faith 7art4 ,,ix73 ,the necessity of sinning is not repugnant to the freedom of the will4 ,witness the devils1 who are necessarily wicked1 and yet sin freely without constraint4 ,and the ,synod of ,dort3 ,liberty is not opposite to all kinds of necessity and determination4 ,it is indeed opposite to the necessity of constraint3 but standeth well enough with the necessity of infallibility4 ,i could add more3 for all the famous doctors of the ,reformed ,churches1 and with them ,st4 ,augustin1 are of the same opinion4 ,none of these denied that ,god is the cause of all motion and action1 or that ,god is the cause of all laws2 and yet they were never forced to say1 that ,god is the cause of sin4 7o7 8#8,they who invented this term of actus imperatus1 understood not'1 he saith1 #8any thing what it signified4' ,no8 ,why not8 ,it seemeth to me1 they understood it better than those who except against it4 ,they knew there are mental terms1 which are only conceived in the mind1 as well as vocal terms1 which are expressed with the tongue1 c40 ,in this place the ,bishop hath discovered the ground of all his errors in philosophy1 which is this2 that he thinketh1 when he repeateth the words of a proposition in his mind1 that is1 when he fancieth the words without speaking them1 that then he conceiveth the things which the words signify3 and this is the most general cause of false opinions4 ,for men can never be deceived in the conceptions of things1 though they may be1 and are most often deceived by giving unto them wrong terms or appellations1 different from those which are commonly used and constituted to signify their conceptions4 ,and therefore they that study to attain the certain knowledge of the truth1 do use to set down beforehand all the terms they are to express themselves by1 and declare in what sense they shall use them constantly4 ,and by this means1 the reader having an idea of every thing there named1 cannot conceive amiss4 ,but when a man from the hearing of a word hath no idea of the thing signified1 but only of the sound and of the letters whereof the word is made1 which is that he here calleth mental terms1 it is impossible he should conceive aright1 or bring forth any thing but absurdity2 as he doth here1 when he says1 8that when ,tarquin delivered his commands to his son by only striking off the tops of the poppies1 he did it by mental terms02 as if to strike off the head of a poppy1 were a mental term4 ,it is the sound and the letters1 that maketh him think elicitus and imperatus somewhat4 ,and it is the same thing that makes him say1 for think it he cannot1 that to will or choose1 is drawn1 or allured1 or fetched out of the power to will4 ,for drawing cannot be imagined but of bodies2 and therefore to will1 to speak1 to write1 to dance1 to leap1 or any way to be moved1 cannot be said intelligibly to be drawn1 much less to be drawn out of a power1 that is to say1 out of an ability2 for whatsoever is drawn out1 is drawn out of one place into another4 ,he that can discourse in this manner in philosophy1 cannot probably be thought able to discourse rationally in any thing4 7p7 8,his other objection against this distinction of the acts of the will into elicit and imperate1 is obscurity4 #8,might it not1' saith he1 #8have been as easily said in ,english1 a voluntary action8' ,yes it might have been said as easily1 but not as truly1 nor as properly40 ,he says1 actus imperatus is when a man opens or shuts his eyes at the command of the will4 ,i say1 when a man opens and shuts his eyes according to his will1 that it is a voluntary action2 and ,i believe we mean one and the same thing4 ,whether of us speak more properly or more truly1 let the reader judge4 7q7 8,but his mistakes are so thick1 c41 ,i will do my duty to shew him the right way4 ,first1 no acts which are properly said to be compelled1 are voluntary4 ,secondly1 acts of terror1 c40 ,this is nothing but ,tohu and ,bohu4 ,,no4 ,,xxi4 ,sidenote3 ,the ,bishop's reply4 ,j4 ,d4 8,the rest are umbrages quickly dispelled4 ,first1 the astrologer steps up1 and subjects liberty to the motions of heaven1 to the aspects and ascensions of the stars3 ----,plus etenim fati valet hora benigni1 ,quam si nos ,veneris commendet epistola ,marti4 8,i stand not much upon them1 who cannot see the fishes swimming beside them in the rivers1 yet believe they see those which are in heaven2 who promise great treasures to others1 and beg a groat for themselves4 ,the stars at the most do but incline1 they cannot necessitate4 8,secondly1 the physician subjects liberty to the complexion and temperature of the body4 ,but yet this comes not home to a necessity4 ,socrates1 and many others1 by assiduous care have corrected the pernicious propensions1 which flowed from their temperatures40 ,t4 ,h4 ,in the rest of his discourse he reckoneth up the opinions of certain professions of men1 touching the causes wherein the necessity of things1 which they maintain1 consisteth4 ,and first1 he saith1 the astrologer deriveth his necessity from the stars4 ,secondly1 that the physician attributeth it to the temper of the body4 ,for my part1 ,i am not of their opinion2 because neither the stars alone1 nor the temperature of the patient alone is able to produce any effect without the concurrence of all other agents4 ,for there is hardly any one action1 how casual soever it seem1 to the causing whereof concur not whatsoever is in rerum natura4 ,which1 because it is a great paradox1 and depends on many antecedent speculations1 ,i do not press in this place4 ,j4 ,d4 8,towards the latter end of my discourse1 ,i answered some specious pretences against liberty4 ,the two first were of the astrologer and the physician3 the one subjecting liberty to the motions and influences of the heavenly bodies2 the other to the complexions of men4 7a7 ,the sum of my answer was1 that the stars and complexions do incline1 but not at all necessitate the will3 to which all judicious astronomers and physicians do assent4 ,and ,t4 ,h4 himself doth not dissent from it4 ,so as to this part1 there needs no reply4 7b7 8,but whereas he mentions a #8great paradox of his own1 that there is hardly any one action to the causing of which concurs not whatsoever is in rerum natura'2 ,i can but smile to see with what ambition our great undertakers do affect to be accounted the first founders of strange opinions1 as if the devising of an ill-grounded paradox were as great an honour as the invention of the needle1 or the discovery of the new world4 ,and as to this paradox in particular1 ,i meddle not with natural actions1 because the subject of my discourse is moral liberty4 ,but if he intend not only the kinds of things1 but every individual creature1 and not only in natural but voluntary actions1 ,i desire to know how ,prester ,john1 or the great ,mogul1 or the king of ,china1 or any one of so many millions of their subjects1 do concur to my writing of this reply4 ,if they do not1 among his other speculations concerning this matter ,i hope he will give us some restrictions4 ,it were hard to make all the negroes accessary to all the murders that are committed in ,europe40 ,,animadversions ,,upon ,,the ,,bishop',s ,,reply ,,no4 ,,xxi4 ,there is not much in this part of his reply that needeth animadversion4 ,but ,i must observe1 where he saith1 7a7 8the sum of my answer was1 that the stars and complexions do incline1 but not at all necessitate the will30 he answereth nothing at all to me1 who attribute not the necessitation of the will to the stars and complexions1 but to the aggregate of all things together that are in motion4 ,i do not say1 that the stars or complexions of themselves do incline men to will2 but when men are inclined1 ,i must say that that inclination was necessitated by some causes or other4 7b7 8,but whereas he mentions #8a great paradox of his own2 that there is hardly any one action1 to the causing of which concurs not whatsoever is in rerum natura'2 ,i can but smile to see with what ambition our great undertakers do affect to be accounted the first founders of strange opinions1 c40 ,the ,bishop speaks often of paradoxes with such scorn or detestation1 that a simple reader would take a paradox either for felony or some other heinous crime1 or else for some ridiculous turpitude2 whereas perhaps a judicious reader knows what the word signifies2 and that a paradox1 is an opinion not yet generally received4 ,christian religion was once a paradox2 and a great many other opinions which the ,bishop now holdeth1 were formerly paradoxes4 ,insomuch as when a man calleth an opinion a paradox1 he doth not say it is untrue1 but signifieth his own ignorance2 for if he understood it1 he would call it either a truth or an error4 ,he observes not1 that but for paradoxes we should be now in that savage ignorance1 which those men are in that have not1 or have not long had laws and commonwealth1 from whence proceedeth science and civility4 ,there was not long since a scholar that maintained1 that if the least thing that had weight should be laid down upon the hardest body that could be1 supposing it an anvil of diamant1 it would at the first access make it yield4 ,this ,i thought1 and much more the ,bishop would have thought1 a paradox4 ,but when he told me1 that either that would do it1 or all the weight of the world would not do it1 because if the whole weight did it1 every the least part thereof would do its part1 ,i saw no reason to dissent4 ,in like manner when ,i say1 #8there is hardly any one action to the causing of which concurs not whatsoever is in rerum natura2' it seems to the ,bishop a great paradox2 and if ,i should say that all action is the effect of motion1 and that there cannot be a motion in one part of the world1 but the same must also be communicated to all the rest of the world1 he would say that this were no less a paradox4 ,but yet if ,i should say1 that if a lesser body1 as a concave sphere or tun1 were filled with air1 or other liquid matter1 and that any one little particle thereof were moved1 all the rest would be moved also1 he would conceive it to be true1 or if not he1 a judicious reader would4 ,it is not the greatness of the tun that altereth the case2 and therefore the same would be true also1 if the whole world were the tun2 for it is the greatness of this tun that the ,bishop comprehendeth not4 ,but the truth is comprehensible enough1 and may be said without ambition of being the founder of strange opinions4 ,and though a grave man may smile at it1 he that is both grave and wise will not4 ,,no4 ,,xxii4 ,sidenote3 ,the ,bishop's reply4 ,j4 ,d4 8,thirdly1 the moral philosopher tells us how we are haled hither and thither with outward objects4 ,to this ,i answer1 8,first1 that the power which outward objects have over us1 is for the most part by our own default1 because of those vicious habits which we have contracted4 ,therefore though the actions seem to have a kind of violence in them1 yet they were free and voluntary in their first originals4 ,as a paralytic man1 to use ,aristotle's comparison1 shedding the liquor deserves to be punished1 for though his act be unwilling1 yet his intemperance was willing1 whereby he contracted this infirmity4 8,secondly ,i answer1 that concupiscence1 and custom1 and bad company1 and outward objects do indeed make a proclivity1 but not a necessity4 ,by prayers1 tears1 meditations1 vows1 watchings1 fastings1 humi-cubations1 a man may get a contrary habit1 and gain the victory1 not only over outward objects1 but also over his own corruptions1 and become the king of the little world of himself4 ,si metuis1 si prava cupis1 si duceris ir1 ,servitii patiere jugum1 tolerabis iniquas ,interius leges4 ,tunc omnia jure tenebis1 ,cum poteris rex esse tui4 8,thirdly1 a resolved mind1 which weighs all things judiciously and provides for all occurrences1 is not so easily surprised with outward objects4 ,only ,ulysses wept not at the meeting with his wife and son4 ,i would beat thee1 said the philosopher1 but that ,i am angry4 ,one spake lowest1 when he was most moved4 ,another poured out the water1 when he was thirsty4 ,another made a covenant with his eyes4 ,neither opportunity nor enticement could prevail with ,joseph4 ,nor the music nor the fire1 with the three children4 ,it is not the strength of the wind1 but the lightness of the chaff1 which causeth it to be blown away4 ,outward objects do not impose a moral1 much less a physical necessity2 they may be dangerous1 but cannot be destructive to true liberty40 ,t4 ,h4 ,thirdly1 he disputeth against the opinion of them that say1 external objects presented to men of such and such temperatures1 do make their actions necessary2 and says1 the power1 that such objects have over us1 proceeds from our own fault4 ,but that is nothing to the purpose1 if such fault of ours proceedeth from causes not in our own power4 ,and therefore that opinion may hold true1 for all this answer4 ,further1 he saith1 prayer1 fasting1 c41 may alter our habits4 ,it is true3 but when they do so1 they are causes of the contrary habit1 and make it necessary2 as the former habit had been necessary1 if prayer1 fasting1 c41 had not been4 ,besides we are not moved1 nor disposed to prayer or any other action1 but by outward objects1 as pious company1 godly preachers1 or something equivalent4 ,in the next place he saith1 a resolved mind is not easily surprised4 ,as the mind of ,ulysses1 who1 when others wept1 he alone wept not4 ,and of the philosopher that abstained from striking1 because he found himself angry4 ,and of him that poured out the water1 when he was thirsty2 and the like4 ,such things ,i confess have1 or may have been done2 and do prove only that it was not necessary for ,ulysses then to weep1 nor for the philosopher to strike1 nor for that other man to drink3 but it does not prove that it was not necessary for ,ulysses then to abstain1 as he did1 from weeping2 nor the philosopher to abstain1 as he did1 from striking2 nor the other man to forbear drinking4 ,and yet that was the thing he ought to have proved4 ,lastly1 he confesseth that the disposition of objects may be dangerous to liberty1 but cannot be destructive4 ,to which ,i answer1 it is impossible2 for liberty is never in any other danger than to be lost4 ,and if it cannot be lost1 which he confesseth1 ,i may infer it can be in no danger at all4 ,j4 ,d4 7a7 8,the third pretence was out of moral philosophy misunderstood1 that outward objects do necessitate the will4 ,i shall not need to repeat what he hath omitted1 but only to satisfy his exceptions4 7b7 ,the first is1 that #8it is not material1 'though the power of outward objects do proceed from our own faults1 if such faults of ours proceed not from causes in our own power'4 ,well1 but what if they do proceed from causes that are in our own power1 as in truth they do8 ,then his answer is a mere subterfuge4 ,if our faults proceed from causes that are not1 and were not in our own power1 then they are not our faults at all4 ,it is not a fault in us1 not to do those things which never were in our power to do3 but they are the faults of these causes from whence they do proceed4 7c7 ,next he confesseth1 that it is in our power1 by good endeavours1 to alter those vicious habits which we had contracted1 and to get the contrary habit4 #8,true1' saith he1 #8but then the contrary habit doth necessitate the one way1 as well as the former habit did the other way4' ,by which very consideration it appears1 that that which he calls a necessity1 is no more but a proclivity4 ,if it were a true necessity1 it could not be avoided nor altered by our endeavours4 ,the truth is1 acquired habits do help and assist the faculty2 but they do not necessitate the faculty4 ,he who hath gotten to himself an habit of temperance1 may yet upon occasion commit an intemperate act4 ,and so on the contrary4 ,acts are not opposed to habits1 but other habits4 7d7 ,he adds1 #8that we are not moved to prayer or any other action1 but by outward objects1 as pious company1 godly preachers1 or something equivalent'4 ,wherein are two other mistakes3 first1 to make godly preachers and pious company to be outward objects2 which are outward agents3 secondly1 to affirm that the will is not moved but by outward objects4 ,the will is moved by itself1 by the understanding1 by the sensitive passions1 by angels good and bad1 by men2 and most effectually by acts or habits infused by ,god1 whereby the will is excited extraordinarily indeed1 but efficaciously and determinately4 ,this is more than equivalent with outward objects4 8,another branch of mine answer was1 that a resolved and prepared mind is able to resist both the appetibility of objects1 and the unruliness of passions3 as ,i showed by example4 7e7 ,he answers1 that ,i prove ,ulysses was not necessitated to weep1 nor the philosopher to strike2 but ,i do not prove that they were not necessitated to forbear4 ,he saith true4 ,i am not now proving1 but answering4 ,yet my answer doth sufficiently prove that which ,i intend2 that the rational will hath power1 both to slight the most appetible objects1 and to control the most unruly passions4 ,when he hath given a clear solution to those proofs which ,i have produced1 then it will be time for him to cry for more work4 8,lastly1 whereas ,i say1 that outward objects may be dangerous1 but cannot be destructive to true liberty2 he catcheth at it1 7f7 and objects1 that #8liberty is in no danger but to be lost2 but ,i say it cannot be lost1 therefore'1 he infers that1 #8it is in no danger at all4' ,i answer1 first1 that liberty is in more danger to be abused1 than to be lost4 ,many more men do abuse their wits1 than lose them4 ,secondly1 liberty is in danger likewise to be weakened or diminished2 as when it is clogged by vicious habits contracted by ourselves1 and yet it is not totally lost4 ,thirdly1 though liberty cannot be totally lost out of the world1 yet it may be totally lost to this or that particular man1 as to the exercise of it4 ,reason is the root of liberty2 and though nothing be more natural to a man than reason1 yet many by excess of study1 or by continual gormandizing1 or by some extravagant passion which they have cherished in themselves1 or by doting too much upon some affected object1 do become very sots1 and deprive themselves of the use of reason1 and consequently of liberty4 ,and when the benefit of liberty is not thus universally lost1 yet it may be lost respectively to this or that particular occasion4 ,as he who makes choice of a bad wife1 hath lost his former liberty to choose a good one40 ,,animadversions ,,upon ,,the ,,bishop',s ,,reply ,,no4 ,,xxii4 7a7 8,the third pretence was out of moral philosophy misunderstood1 that outward objects do necessitate the will40 ,i cannot imagine how the question1 whether outward objects do necessitate or not necessitate the will1 can any way be referred to moral philosophy4 ,the principles of moral philosophy are the laws2 wherewith outward objects have little to do1 as being for the most part inanimate1 and which follow always the force of nature without respect to moral laws4 ,nor can ,i conceive what purpose he had to bring this into his reply to my answer1 wherein ,i attribute nothing in the action of outward objects to morality4 7b7 8,his first exception is1 that #8it is not material that the power of outward objects do proceed from our own faults1 if such faults of ours proceed not from causes in our own power'4 ,well1 but what if they do proceed from causes that are in our own power1 as in truth they do8 ,then his answer is a mere subterfuge40 ,but how proves he that in truth they do8 #8,because else1' saith he1 #8they are not our faults at all4' ,very well reasoned4 ,a horse is lame from a cause that was not in his power3 therefore the lameness is no fault in the horse4 ,but his meaning is1 it is no injustice unless the causes were in his own power4 ,as if it were not injustice1 whatsoever is willingly done against the law2 whatsoever it be1 that is the cause of the will to do it4 7c7 8,next he confesseth1 that it is in our power by good endeavours to alter those vicious habits which we had contracted1 and to get the contrary habits40 ,there is no such confession in my answer4 ,i said1 prayer1 fasting1 c41 may alter our habits4 ,but ,i never said that the will to pray1 fast1 c4 is in our own power4 8#8,true1' saith he1 #8but then the contrary habit doth necessitate the one way1 as well as the former habit did the other way4' ,by which very consideration it appears1 that that which he calls a necessity1 is no more but a proclivity4 ,if it were a true necessity1 it could not be avoided1 nor altered by our endeavours40 ,again he mistakes3 for ,i said that prayer1 fasting1 c4 when they alter our habits1 do necessarily cause the contrary habits2 which is not to say1 that the habit necessitates1 but is necessitated4 ,but this is common with him1 to make me say that which out of reading1 not out of meditation1 he useth to say himself4 ,but how doth it appear1 that prayer and fasting1 c4 make but a proclivity in men to do what they do8 ,for if it were but a proclivity1 then what they do they do not4 ,therefore they either necessitate the will1 or the will followeth not4 ,i contend for the truth of this only1 that when the will followeth them1 they necessitate the will2 and when a proclivity followeth1 they necessitate the proclivity4 ,but the ,bishop thinks ,i maintain1 that that also is produced necessarily1 which is not produced at all4 7d7 8,he adds1 #8that we are not moved to prayer or any other action1 but by outward objects1 as pious company1 and godly preachers1 or something equivalent'4 ,wherein are two other mistakes3 first1 to make godly preachers and pious company to be outward objects1 which are outward agents2 secondly1 to affirm that the will is not moved but by outward objects4 ,the will is moved by itself1 c04 ,the first mistake1 he urgeth that ,i call preachers and company objects4 ,is not the preacher to the hearer the object of his hearing8 ,no1 perhaps he will say1 it is the voice which is the object2 and that we hear not the preacher1 but his voice2 as before he said1 the object of sight was not the cause of sight4 ,i must therefore once more make him smile with a great paradox1 which is this2 that in all the senses1 the object is the agent2 and that it is1 when we hear a preacher1 the preacher that we hear2 and that his voice is the same thing with the hearing and a fancy in the hearer1 though the motion of the lips and other organs of speech be his that speaketh4 ,but of this ,i have written more largely in a more proper place4 ,my second mistake1 in affirming that the will is not moved but by outward objects1 is a mistake of his own4 ,for ,i said not1 the will is not moved1 but we are not moved3 for ,i always avoid attributing motion to any thing but body4 ,the will is produced1 generated1 formed1 and created in such sort as accidents are effected in a corporeal subject2 but moved it cannot be1 because it goeth not from place to place4 ,and whereas he saith1 8the will is moved by itself10 if he had spoken properly as he ought to do1 and said1 the will is made or created by itself1 he would presently have acknowledged that it was impossible4 ,so that it is not without cause men use improper language1 when they mean to keep their errors from being detected4 ,and because nothing can move that is not itself moved1 it is untruly said that either the will or any thing else is moved by itself1 by the understanding1 by the sensitive passions1 or by acts or habits2 or that acts or habits are infused by ,god4 ,for infusion is motion1 and nothing is moved but bodies4 7e7 8,he answers1 that ,i prove ,ulysses was not necessitated to weep1 nor the philosopher to strike1 but ,i do not prove that they were not necessitated to forbear4 ,he saith true2 ,i am not now proving1 but answering40 ,by his favour1 though he be answering now1 he was proving then4 ,and what he answers now1 maketh nothing more toward a proof than was before4 ,for these words1 8the rational will hath power to slight the most appetible objects1 and to control the most unruly passions10 are no more1 being reduced into proper terms1 than this3 the appetite hath power to be without appetite towards most appetible objects1 and to will contrary to the most unruly will2 which is jargon4 7f7 8,he objects that #8liberty is in no danger1 but to be lost2 but ,i say it cannot be lost2 therefore'1 he infers1 #8that it is in no danger at all4' ,i answer1 first1 that liberty is in more danger to be abused1 than lost1 c42 secondly1 liberty is in danger likewise to be weakened by vicious habits2 thirdly1 it may be totally lost40 ,it is true that a man hath more liberty one time than another1 and in one place than another2 which is a difference of liberty as to the body4 ,but as to the liberty of doing what we will1 in those things we are able to do it cannot be greater one time than another4 ,consequently outward objects can no ways endanger liberty1 further than it destroyeth it4 ,and his answer1 that liberty is in more danger to be abused than lost1 is not to the question1 but a mere shift to be thought not silenced4 ,and whereas he says liberty is diminished by vicious habits1 it cannot be understood otherwise than that vicious habits make a man the less free to do vicious actions2 which ,i believe is not his meaning4 ,and lastly1 whereas he says that 8liberty is lost1 when reason is lost2 and that they who by excess of study1 or by continual gormandising1 or by extravagant passion1 c41 do become sots1 have consequently lost their liberty03 it requireth proof4 ,for1 for any thing that ,i can observe1 mad men and fools have the same liberty that other men have1 in those things that are in their power to do4 ,,no4 ,,xxiii4 ,sidenote3 ,the ,bishop's reply4 ,j4 ,d4 8,fourthly1 the natural philosopher doth teach1 that the will doth necessarily follow the last dictate of the understanding4 ,it is true indeed the will should follow the direction of the understanding2 but ,i am not satisfied that it doth evermore follow it4 ,sometimes this saying hath place3 video meliora proboque1 deteriora sequor4 ,as that great ,roman said of two suitors1 that the one produced the better reasons1 but the other must have the office4 ,so reason often lies dejected at the feet of affection4 ,things nearer to the senses move more powerfully4 ,do what a man can1 he shall sorrow more for the death of his child1 than for the sin of his soul2 yet appreciatively in the estimation of judgment1 he accounts the offence of ,god a greater evil than any temporal loss4 8,next1 ,i do not believe that a man is bound to weigh the expedience or inexpedience of every ordinary trivial action to the least grain in the balance of his understanding2 or to run up into his watch-tower with his perspective to take notice of every jackdaw that flies by1 for fear of some hidden danger4 ,this seems to me to be a prostitution of reason to petit observations as concerning every rag that a man wears1 each drop of drink1 each morsel of bread that he eats1 each pace that he walks4 ,thus many steps must he go1 not one more nor one less1 under pain of mortal sin4 ,what is this but a rack and a gibbet to the conscience8 ,but ,god leaves many things indifferent3 though man may be so curious1 he will not4 ,a good architect will be sure to provide sufficient materials for his building2 but what particular number of stones or trees1 he troubles not his head4 ,and suppose he should weigh each action thus1 yet he doth not2 so still there is liberty4 ,thirdly1 ,i conceive it is possible in this mist and weakness of human apprehension1 for two actions to be so equally circumstantiated1 that no discernible difference can appear between them upon discussion4 ,as suppose a chirurgeon should give two plaisters to his patient1 and bid him apply either of them to his wound2 what can induce his reason more to the one than to the other1 but that he may refer it to chance whether he will use8 ,but leaving these probable speculations1 which ,i submit to better judgments1 ,i answer the philosopher briefly thus3 admitting that the will did necessarily follow the last dictate of the understanding1 as certainly in many things it doth3 yet1 first1 this is no extrinsical determination from without1 and a man's own resolution is not destructive to his own liberty1 but depends upon it4 ,so the person is still free4 8,secondly1 this determination is not antecedent1 but joined with the action4 ,the understanding and the will1 are not different agents1 but distinct faculties of the same soul4 ,here is an infallibility1 or an hypothetical necessity as we say1 quicquid est1 quando est1 necesse est esse3 a necessity of consequence1 but not a necessity of consequent4 ,though an agent have certainly determined1 and so the action be become infallible1 yet if the agent did determine freely1 the action likewise is free40 ,t4 ,h4 ,the fourth opinion which he rejecteth1 is of them that make the will necessarily to follow the last dictate of the understanding2 but it seems he understands that tenet in another sense than ,i do4 ,for he speaketh as if they that held it1 did suppose men must dispute the sequel of every action they do1 great and small1 to the least grain2 which is a thing that he thinks with reason to be untrue4 ,but ,i understand it to signify1 that the will follows the last opinion or judgment1 immediately preceding the action1 concerning whether it be good to do it or not2 whether he hath weighed it long before1 or not at all4 ,and that ,i take to be the meaning of them that hold it4 ,as for example3 when a man strikes1 his will to strike follows necessarily that thought he had of the sequel of his stroke1 immediately before the lifting of his hand4 ,now if it be understood in that sense1 the last dictate of the understanding does certainly necessitate the action1 though not as the whole cause1 yet as the last cause3 as the last feather necessitates the breaking of a horse's back1 when there are so many laid on before1 as there needeth but the addition of that one to make the weight sufficient4 ,that which he allegeth against this1 is first1 out of a poet1 who in the person of ,medea says1 video meliora proboque1 deteriora sequor4 ,but the saying1 as pretty as it is1 is not true4 ,for though ,medea saw many reasons to forbear killing her children1 yet the last dictate of her judgment was that the present revenge on her husband outweighed them all2 and thereupon the wicked action followed necessarily4 ,then the story of the ,roman1 that of two competitors said one had the better reasons1 but the other must have the office3 this also maketh against him4 ,for the last dictate of his judgment that had the bestowing of the office1 was this2 that it was better to take a great bribe1 than reward a great merit4 ,thirdly1 he objects1 that things nearer the senses move more powerfully than reason4 ,what followeth thence but this2 that the sense of the present good is commonly more immediate to the action1 than the foresight of the evil consequents to come8 ,fourthly1 whereas he says1 that do what a man can1 he shall sorrow more for the death of his son1 than for the sin of his soul3 it makes nothing to the last dictate of the understanding2 but it argues plainly1 that sorrow for sin is not voluntary4 ,and by consequence1 repentance proceedeth from causes4 ,j4 ,d4 8,the fourth pretence alleged against liberty was1 that the will doth necessarily follow the last dictate of the understanding4 ,this objection is largely answered before in several places of this reply1 and particularly ,no4 ,,vii4 ,in my former discourse ,i gave two answers to it3 the one certain and undoubted1 that 7a7 supposing the last dictate of the understanding did always determine the will1 yet this determination being not antecedent in time1 nor proceeding from extrinsical causes1 but from the proper resolution of the agent1 who had now freely determined himself1 it makes no absolute necessity1 but only hypothetical1 upon supposition that the agent hath determined his own will after this or that manner4 ,which being the main answer1 ,t4 ,h4 is so far from taking it away1 that he takes no notice of it4 ,the other part of mine answer was probable2 that it is not always certain that the will doth always actually follow the last dictate of the understanding1 though it always ought to follow it4 7b7 ,of which ,i gave then three reasons4 ,one was1 that actions may be so equally circumstantiated1 or the case so intricate1 that reason cannot give a positive sentence1 but leaves the election to liberty or chance4 ,to this he answers not a word4 ,another of my reasons was1 because reason doth not weigh1 nor is bound to weigh the convenience or inconvenience of every individual action to the uttermost grain in the balance of true judgment4 ,the truth of this reason is confessed by ,t4 ,h42 though he might have had more abetters in this than in the most part of his discourse1 that nothing is indifferent2 that a man cannot stroke his beard on one side1 but it was either necessary to do it1 or sinful to omit it4 ,from which confession of his it follows1 that in all those actions wherein reason doth not define what is most convenient1 there the will is free from the determination of the understanding2 and by consequence the last feather is wanting to break the horse's back4 ,a third reason was1 because passions and affections sometimes prevail against judgment3 as ,i proved by the example of ,medea and ,csar1 by the nearness of the objects to the senses1 and by the estimation of a temporal loss more than sin4 ,against this reason his whole answer is addressed4 ,and first1 7c7 he explaineth the sense of the assertion by the comparison of the last feather2 wherewith he seems to be delighted1 seeing he useth it now the second time4 ,but let him like it as he will1 it is improper1 for three reasons4 ,first1 the determination of the judgment is no part of the weight1 but is the sentence of the trier4 ,the understanding weigheth all things1 objects1 means1 circumstances1 convenience1 inconvenience2 but itself is not weighed4 ,secondly1 the sensitive passion1 in some extraordinary cases1 may give a counterfeit weight to the object1 if it can detain or divert reason from the balance3 but ordinarily the means1 circumstances1 and causes concurrent1 they have their whole weight from the understanding2 so as they do not press the horse's back at all1 until reason lay them on4 ,thirdly1 he conceives that as each feather has a certain natural weight1 whereby it concurs not arbitrarily1 but necessarily towards the overcharging of the horse2 so all objects and causes have a natural efficiency1 whereby they do physically determine the will2 which is a great mistake4 ,his objects1 his agents1 his motives1 his passions1 and all his concurrent causes1 ordinarily do only move the will morally1 not determine it naturally4 ,so as it hath in all ordinary actions a free dominion over itself4 8,his other example1 of a man that strikes1 #8whose will to strike followeth necessarily that thought he had of the sequel of his stroke1 immediately before the lifting up of his hand'3 as it confounds passionate1 indeliberate thoughts1 with the dictates of right reason1 so it is very uncertain2 for between the cup and the lip1 between the lifting up of the hand and the blow1 the will may alter1 and the judgment also4 ,and lastly1 it is impertinent2 for that necessity of striking proceeds from the free determination of the agent1 and not from the special influence of any outward determining causes4 ,and so it is only a necessity upon supposition4 8,concerning ,medea's choice1 the strength of the argument doth not lie either in the fact of ,medea1 which is but a fiction1 or in the authority of the poet1 who writes things rather to be admired than believed1 but in the experience of all men3 who find it to be true in themselves1 that sometimes reason doth shew unto a man the exorbitancy of his passion1 that what he desires is but a pleasant good1 that what he loseth by such a choice is an honest good1 that that which is honest is to be preferred before that which is pleasant2 yet the will pursues that which is pleasant1 and neglects that which is honest4 ,st4 ,paul 7,rom4 vii4 #ae7 saith as much in earnest1 as is feigned of ,medea3 that he approved not that which he did1 and that he did that which he hated4 ,the ,roman story is mistaken3 there was no bribe in the case but affection4 ,whereas ,i urge1 that those things which are nearer to the senses do move more powerfully1 he lays hold on it2 and without answering to that for which ,i produced it1 infers1 #8that the sense of present good1 is more immediate to the action than the foresight of evil consequents'3 which is true2 but it is not absolutely true by any antecedent necessity4 ,let a man do what he may do1 and what he ought to do1 and sensitive objects will lose that power which they have by his own fault and neglect4 ,antecedent or indeliberate concupiscence doth sometimes1 but rarely1 surprise a man1 and render the action not free4 ,but consequent and deliberated concupiscence1 which proceeds from the rational will1 doth render the action more free1 not less free1 and introduceth only a necessity upon supposition4 8,lastly1 he saith1 that #8a man's mourning more for the loss of his child than for his sin1 makes nothing to the last dictates of the understanding'4 ,yes1 very much4 ,reason dictates that a sin committed is a greater evil than the loss of a child1 and ought more to be lamented for3 yet we see daily how affection prevails against the dictate of reason4 ,that which he infers from hence1 that #8sorrow for sin is not voluntary1 and by consequence that repentance proceedeth from causes'2 is true as to the latter part of it1 but not in his sense4 ,the causes from whence repentance doth proceed1 are ,god's grace preventing1 and man's will concurring4 ,god prevents freely1 man concurs freely4 ,those inferior agents1 which sometimes do concur as subordinate to the grace of ,god1 do not1 cannot1 determine the will naturally4 ,and therefore the former part of his inference1 that sorrow for sin is not voluntary1 is untrue1 and altogether groundless4 ,that is much more truly and much more properly said to be voluntary1 which proceeds from judgment and from the rational will1 than that which proceeds from passion and from the sensitive will4 ,one of the main grounds of all ,t4 ,h4's errors in this question is1 that he acknowledgeth no efficacy but that which is natural4 ,hence is this wild consequence2 #8repentance hath causes'1 and therefore #8it is not voluntary'4 ,free effects have free causes1 necessary effects necessary causes3 voluntary effects have sometimes free1 sometimes necessary causes40 ,,animadversions ,,upon ,,the ,,bishop',s ,,reply ,,no4 ,,xxiii4 7a7 8,supposing the last dictate of the understanding did always determine the will1 yet this determination1 being not antecedent in time1 nor proceeding from extrinsical causes1 but from the proper resolution of the agent1 who had now freely determined himself1 makes no absolute necessity1 but only hypothetical1 c40 ,this is the ,bishop's answer to the necessity inferred from that1 that the will necessarily followeth the last dictate of the understanding2 which answer he thinks is not sufficiently taken away1 because the last act of the understanding is in time together with the will itself1 and therefore not antecedent4 ,it is true1 that the will is not produced but in the same instant with the last dictate of the understanding2 but the necessity of the will1 and the necessity of the last dictate of the understanding1 may have been antecedent4 ,for that last dictate of the understanding was produced by causes antecedent1 and was then necessary though not yet produced2 as when a stone is falling1 the necessity of touching the earth is antecedent to the touch itself4 ,for all motion through any determined space1 necessarily makes a motion through the next space1 unless it be hindered by some contrary external motion2 and then the stop is as necessary1 as the proceeding would have been4 ,the argument therefore from the last dictate of the understanding1 sufficiently inferreth an antecedent necessity1 as great as the necessity that a stone shall fall when it is already falling4 ,as for his other answer1 that 8the will does not certainly follow the last dictate of the understanding1 though it always ought to follow it01 he himself says it is but probable2 but any man that speaks not by rote1 but thinks of what he says1 will presently find it false2 and that it is impossible to will anything that appears not first in his understanding to be good for him4 ,and whereas he says the will ought to follow the last dictate of the understanding1 unless he mean that the man ought to follow it1 it is an insignificant speech2 for duties are the man's not the will's duties3 and if he means so1 then it is false2 for a man ought not to follow the dictate of the understanding1 when it is erroneous4 7b7 8,of which ,i gave then three reasons4 ,one was1 that actions may be so equally circumstantiated1 that reason cannot give a positive sentence1 but leaves the election to liberty or chance4 ,to this he answers not a word40 ,there was no need of answer3 for he hath very often in this discourse contradicted it himself1 in that he maketh 8reason to be the true root of liberty1 and men to have more or less liberty1 as they have more or less reason04 ,how then can a man leave that to liberty1 when his reason can give no sentence8 ,and for his leaving it to chance2 if by chance he mean that which hath no causes1 he destroyeth ,providence2 and if he mean that which hath causes1 but unknown to us1 he leaveth it to necessity4 ,besides1 it is false that 8actions may be so equally circumstantiated1 that reason cannot give a positive sentence04 ,for though in the things to be elected there may be an exact equality3 yet there may be circumstances in him that is to elect1 to make him resolve upon that of the two which he considereth for the present2 and to break off all further deliberation for this cause1 that he must not 7to use his own instance7 by spending time in vain1 apply neither of the plaisters1 which the chirurgeon gives him1 to his wound4 8,another of his reasons was1 because reason doth not weigh every individual action to the uttermost grain40 ,true2 but does it therefore follow1 a man gives no sentence8 ,the will therefore may follow the dictate of the judgment1 whether the man weigh or not weigh all that might be weighed4 8,his third reason was1 because passions and affections sometimes prevail against judgment40 ,i confess they prevail often against wisdom1 which is it he means here by judgment4 ,but they prevail not against the dictate of the understanding1 which he knows is the meaning of judgment in this place4 ,and the will of a passionate and peevish fool doth no less follow the dictate of that little understanding he hath1 than the will of the wisest man followeth his wisdom4 7c7 8,he explaineth the sense of the assertion by the comparison of the last feather3 wherewith he seems to be delighted1 seeing he useth it now the second time4 ,but let him like it as he will1 it is improper1 for three reasons40 ,to me this comparison seemeth very proper2 and therefore ,i made no scruple 7though not much delighted with it1 as being no new comparison7 to use it again1 when there was need again4 ,for in the examination of truth1 ,i search rather for perspicuity than elegance4 ,but the ,bishop with his ,school-terms is far from perspicuity4 ,how near he is to elegance1 ,i shall not forget to examine in due time4 ,but why is this comparison improper8 8,first1 because the determination of the judgment is no part of the weight3 for the understanding weigheth all things1 objects1 means1 circumstances1 convenience1 inconvenience2 but itself is not weighed40 ,in this comparison1 the objects1 means1 c1 are the weights1 the man is the scale1 the understanding of a convenience or inconvenience is the pressure of those weights1 which incline him now one way1 now another2 and that inclination is the will4 ,again1 the objects1 means1 c1 are the feathers that press the horse1 the feeling of that pressure is understanding1 and his patience or impatience the will to bear them1 if not too many1 or if too many1 to lie down under them4 ,it is therefore to little purpose that he saith1 the understanding is not weighed4 8,secondly01 he says the comparison is improper1 8because ordinarily1 the means1 circumstances1 and causes concurrent1 have their whole weight from the understanding2 so as they do not press the horse's back at all1 until reason lay them on40 ,this1 and that which followeth1 8that my objects1 agents1 motives1 passions1 and all my concurrent causes1 ordinarily do only move the will morally1 not determine it naturally1 so as it hath in all ordinary actions a free dominion over itself10 is all nonsense4 ,for no man can understand1 that the understanding maketh any alteration in the object in weight or lightness2 nor that reason lays on objects upon the understanding2 nor that the will is moved1 nor that any motion is moral2 nor that these words1 the will hath a free dominion over itself1 signify anything4 ,with the rest of this reply ,i shall trust the reader2 and only note the last words1 where he makes me say1 repentance hath causes1 and therefore it is not voluntary4 ,but ,i said1 repentance hath causes1 and that it is not voluntary2 he chops in1 and therefore1 and makes an absurd consequence1 which he would have the reader believe was mine1 and then confutes it with these senseless words3 8,free effects have free causes1 necessary effects necessary causes2 voluntary effects have sometimes free1 sometimes necessary causes04 ,can any man but a ,schoolman think the will is voluntary8 ,but yet the will is the cause of voluntary actions4 ,,no4 ,,xxiv4 ,sidenote3 ,the ,bishop's reply4 ,j4 ,d4 8,fifthly and lastly1 the divine labours to find out a way how liberty may consist with the prescience and decrees of ,god4 ,but of this ,i had not very long since occasion to write a full discourse1 in answer to a treatise against the prescience of things contingent4 ,i shall for the present only repeat these two things4 ,first1 we ought not to desert a certain truth1 because we are not able to comprehend the certain manner4 ,god should be but a poor ,god1 if we were able perfectly to comprehend all his actions and attributes4 ,secondly1 in my poor judgment1 which ,i ever do and ever shall submit to better1 the readiest way to reconcile contingence and liberty with the decrees and prescience of ,god1 and most remote from the altercations of these times1 is to subject future contingents to the aspect of ,god1 according to that presentiality which they have in eternity4 ,not that things future1 which are not yet existent1 are co-existent with ,god3 but because the infinite knowledge of ,god1 incircling all times in the point of eternity1 doth attain to their future being1 from whence proceeds their objective and intelligible being4 ,the main impediment which keeps men from subscribing to this way1 is because they conceive eternity to be an everlasting succession1 and not one indivisible point4 ,but if they consider1 that whatsoever is in ,god is ,god2 that there are no accidents in him1 7for that which is infinitely perfect cannot be further perfected72 that as ,god is not wise1 but wisdom itself1 not just1 but justice itself1 so he is not eternal1 but eternity itself3 they must needs conclude1 that therefore this eternity is indivisible1 because ,god is indivisible2 and therefore not successive1 but altogether an infinite point1 comprehending all times within itself40 ,t4 ,h4 ,the last part of this discourse containeth his opinion about reconciling liberty with the prescience and decrees of ,god1 otherwise than some divines have done2 against whom he had formerly written a treatise1 out of which he only repeateth two things4 ,one is1 that 8we ought not to desert a certain truth1 for not being able to comprehend the certain manner of it04 ,and ,i say the same2 as for example1 that he ought not to desert this certain truth3 that there are certain and necessary causes1 which make every man to will what he willeth1 though he do not yet conceive in what manner the will of man is caused4 ,and yet ,i think the manner of it is not very hard to conceive3 seeing that we see daily1 that praise1 dispraise1 reward1 punishment1 good and evil sequels of men's actions retained in memory1 do frame and make us to the election of whatsoever it be that we elect2 and that the memory of such things proceeds from the senses1 and sense from the operation of the objects of sense1 which are external to us1 and governed only by ,god ,almighty2 and by consequence1 all actions1 even of free and voluntary agents1 are necessary4 ,the other thing he repeateth is1 that 8the best way to reconcile contingency and liberty with the prescience and decrees of ,god1 is to subject future contingents to the aspect of ,god04 ,the same is also my opinion1 but contrary to what he hath all this while laboured to prove4 ,for hitherto he held liberty and necessity1 that is to say1 liberty and the decrees of ,god1 irreconcilable2 unless the aspect of ,god 7which word appeareth now the first time in this discourse7 signify somewhat else besides ,god's will and decree1 which ,i cannot understand4 ,but he adds1 that we must subject them 8according to that presentiality which they have in eternity02 which he says cannot be done by them that conceive eternity to be an everlasting succession1 but only by them that conceive it an indivisible point4 ,to this ,i answer1 that as soon as ,i can conceive eternity to be an indivisible point1 or any thing but an everlasting succession1 ,i will renounce all ,i have written on this subject4 ,i know ,st4 ,thomas ,aquinas calls eternity nunc stans1 an ever abiding now2 which is easy enough to say1 but though ,i fain would1 ,i never could conceive it2 they that can1 are more happy than ,i4 ,but in the mean time he alloweth hereby all men to be of my opinion1 save only those that conceive in their minds a nunc stans2 which ,i think are none4 ,i understand as little1 how it can be true that 8,god is not just1 but justice itself1 not wise but wisdom itself1 not eternal but eternity itself03 nor how he concludes thence that 8eternity is a point indivisible1 and not a succession03 nor in what sense it can be said1 that an 8infinite point10 c1 wherein is no succession1 can 8comprehend all times10 though time be successive4 ,these phrases ,i find not in the ,scripture4 ,i wonder therefore what was the design of the ,schoolmen to bring them up2 unless they thought a man could not be a true ,christian1 unless his understanding be first strangled with such hard sayings4 ,and thus much in answer to his discourse2 wherein ,i think not only his squadrons1 but also his reserves of distinctions are defeated4 ,and now your ,lordship shall have my doctrine concerning the same question1 with my reasons for it1 positively and briefly as ,i can1 without any terms of art1 in plain ,english4 ,j4 ,d4 7a7 8,that poor discourse which ,i mention1 was not written against any divines1 but in way of examination of a ,french treatise1 which your ,lordship's brother did me the honour to show me at ,york4 7b7 ,my assertion is most true1 that we ought not to desert a certain truth because we are not able to comprehend the certain manner4 ,such a truth is that which ,i maintain1 that the will of man in ordinary actions is free from extrinsical determination3 a truth demonstrable in reason1 received and believed by all the world4 ,and therefore1 though ,i be not able to comprehend or express exactly the certain manner how it consists together with ,god's eternal prescience and decrees1 which exceed my weak capacity1 yet ,i ought to adhere to that truth which is manifest4 ,but ,t4 ,h4's opinion1 of the absolute necessity of all events by reason of their antecedent determination in their extrinsical and necessary causes1 is no such certain truth1 but an innovation1 a strange paradox1 without probable grounds1 rejected by all authors1 yea1 by all the world4 ,neither is the manner how the second causes do operate1 so obscure1 or so transcendent above the reach of reason1 as the eternal decrees of ,god are4 ,and therefore in both these respects1 he cannot challenge the same privilege4 ,i am in possession of an old truth1 derived by inheritance or succession from mine ancestors4 ,and therefore1 though ,i were not able to clear every quirk in law1 yet ,i might justly hold my possession until a better title were showed for another4 ,he is no old possessor1 but a new pretender1 and is bound to make good his claim by evident proofs3 not by weak and inconsequent suppositions or inducements1 such as those are which he useth here1 of #8praises1 dispraises1 rewards1 punishments1 the memory of good and evil sequels and events'2 which may incline the will1 but neither can nor do necessitate the will3 nor by uncertain and accidental inferences1 such as this2 #8the memory of praises1 dispraises1 rewards1 punishments1 good and evil sequels1 do make us' 7he should say1 dispose us7 #8to elect what we elect2 but the memory of these things is from the sense1 and the sense from the operation of the external objects1 and the agency of external objects is only from ,god2 therefore all actions1 even of free and voluntary agents1 are necessary'4 7c7 ,to pass by all the other great imperfections which are to be found in this sorite1 it is just like that old sophistical piece3 ,he that drinks well sleeps well1 he that sleeps well thinks no hurt1 he that thinks no hurt lives well2 therefore he that drinks well lives well4 7d7 8,in the very last passage of my discourse ,i proposed mine own private opinion1 how it might be made appear1 that the eternal prescience and decrees of ,god are consistent with true liberty and contingency4 ,and this ,i set down in as plain terms as ,i could1 or as so profound a speculation would permit3 which is almost wholly misunderstood by ,t4 ,h41 and many of my words wrested to a wrong sense4 ,as first1 where ,i speak of the aspect of ,god1 that is1 his view1 his knowledge1 by which the most free and contingent actions were manifest to him from eternity1 7,heb4 iv4 #ac1 all things are naked and open to his eyes71 and this not discursively1 but intuitively1 not by external species1 but by his internal essence2 he confounds this with the will and the decrees of ,god2 though he found not the word aspect before in this discourse1 he might have found prescience4 7e7 ,secondly1 he chargeth me1 that hitherto ,i have maintained that #8liberty and the decrees of ,god are irreconcilable4' ,if ,i have said any such thing1 my heart never went along with my pen4 ,no1 but his reason why he chargeth me on this manner is1 because ,i have maintained that #8liberty and the absolute necessity of all things' are irreconcilable4 ,that is true indeed4 ,what then8 #8,why1' saith he1 #8necessity and ,god's decrees are all one4' ,how all one8 ,that were strange indeed4 ,necessity may be a consequent of ,god's decrees2 it cannot be the decree itself4 7f7 ,but to cut his argument short3 ,god hath decreed all effects which come to pass in time2 yet not all after the same manner1 but according to the distinct natures1 capacities1 and conditions of his creatures1 which he doth not destroy by his decree2 some he acteth1 with some he co-operateth by special influence1 and some he only permitteth4 ,yet this is no idle or bare permission2 seeing he doth concur both by way of general influence1 giving power to act2 and also by disposing all events necessary1 free1 and contingent to his own glory4 7g7 ,thirdly1 he chargeth me1 that ,i #8allow all men to be of his opinion1 save only those that conceive in their minds a nunc stans1 or how eternity is an indivisible point1 rather than an everlasting succession'4 ,but ,i have given no such allowance4 ,i know there are many other ways proposed by divines1 for reconciling the eternal prescience and decrees of ,god with the liberty and contingency of second causes2 some of which may please other judgments better than this of mine4 ,howsoever1 though a man could comprehend none of all these ways1 yet remember what ,i said1 that a certain truth ought not to be rejected1 because we are not able1 in respect of our weakness1 to understand the certain manner or reason of it4 ,i know the loadstone hath an attractive power to draw the iron to it2 and yet ,i know not how it comes to have such a power4 8,but the chiefest difficulty which offers itself in this section is1 whether eternity be an indivisible point1 as ,i maintain it2 or an everlasting succession1 as he would have it4 ,according to his constant use1 he gives no answer to what was urged by me1 but pleads against it from his own incapacity4 #8,i never could conceive1' saith he1 #8how eternity should be an indivisible point4' ,i believe1 that neither we nor any man else can comprehend it so clearly as we do these inferior things4 ,the nearer that anything comes to the essence of ,god1 the more remote it is from our apprehension4 ,but shall we therefore make potentialities1 and successive duration1 and former and later1 or a part without a part1 as they say1 to be in ,god8 ,because we are not able to understand clearly the divine perfection1 we must not therefore attribute any imperfection to him4 7h7 8,he saith moreover1 that #8he understands as little how it can be true which ,i say1 that ,god is not just but justice itself1 not eternal but eternity itself4' ,it seems1 howsoever he be versed in this question1 that he hath not troubled his head overmuch with reading ,school-divines or metaphysicians1 if he make faculties or qualities to be in ,god really distinct from his essence4 ,god is a most simple or pure act1 which can admit no composition of substance and accidents4 ,doth he think1 that the most perfect essence of ,god cannot act sufficiently without faculties and qualities8 ,the infinite perfection of the ,divine essence excludes all passive or receptive powers1 and cannot be perfected more than it is by any accidents4 ,the attributes of ,god are not divers virtues or qualities in him1 as they are in the creatures2 but really one and the same with the ,divine essence1 and among themselves4 ,they are attributed to ,god to supply the defect of our capacity1 who are not able to understand that which is to be known of ,god under one name1 or one act of the understanding4 8,furthermore he saith1 that #8he understands not how ,i conclude from hence1 that eternity is an indivisable point1 and not a succession'4 7i7 ,i will help him4 ,the ,divine substance is indivisible2 but eternity is the ,divine substance4 ,the major is evident1 because ,god is actus simplicissimus1 a most simple act2 wherein there is no manner of composition1 neither of matter and form1 nor of subject and accidents1 nor of parts1 c2 and by consequence no divisibility4 ,the minor hath been clearly demonstrated in mine answer to his last doubt1 and is confessed by all men that whatsoever is in ,god1 is ,god4 8,lastly1 he saith1 he conceives not #8how it can be said1 that an infinite point1 wherein is no succession1 can comprehend all time which is successive'4 ,i answer1 that it doth not comprehend it formally1 as time is successive2 but eminently and virtually1 as eternity is infinite4 ,to-day all eternity is co-existent with this day3 to-morrow all eternity will be co-existent with to-morrow3 and so in like manner with all the parts of time1 being itself without parts4 ,he saith1 #8he finds not these phrases in the ,scripture'4 ,no1 but he may find the thing in the ,scripture1 that ,god is infinite in all his attributes1 and not capable of any imperfection4 8,and so to show his antipathy against the ,schoolmen1 that he hath no liberty or power to contain himself when he meets with any of their phrases or tenets1 he falls into another paroxism or fit of inveighing against them2 and so concludes his answer with a plaudite to himself1 because he had defeated both my squadrons of arguments and reserves of distinctions ,dicite ,io pan1 et ,io bis dicite pan4 8,but because his eyesight was weak1 and their backs were towards him1 he quite mistook the matter4 ,those whom he saw routed and running away1 were his own scattered forces40 ,,animadversions ,,upon ,,the ,,bishop',s ,,reply1 ,,no4 ,,xxiv4 7a7 8,that poor discourse which ,i mention1 was not written against any divines1 but in way of examination of a ,french treatise1 c04 ,this is in reply to those words of mine1 8this discourse containeth his opinion about reconciling liberty with the prescience and decrees of ,god1 otherwise than some divines have done1 against whom he had formerly written a treatise04 ,if the ,french treatise were according to his mind1 what need was there that the examination should be written8 ,if it were not to his mind1 it was in confutation of him1 that is to say1 written against the author of it3 unless perhaps the ,bishop thinks that he writes not against a man1 unless he charge him with blasphemy and atheism1 as he does me4 7b7 8,my assertion is most true1 that we ought not to desert a certain truth1 because we are not able to comprehend the certain manner40 ,to this ,i answered1 that it was true2 and as he alleged it for a reason why he should not be of my opinion1 so ,i alleged it for a reason why ,i should not be of his4 ,but now in his reply he saith1 that his opinion is 8a truth demonstrable in reason1 received and believed by all the world4 ,and therefore1 though he be not able to comprehend or express exactly the certain manner how this liberty of will consists with ,god's eternal prescience and decrees1 yet he ought to adhere to that truth which is manifest40 ,but why should he adhere to it1 unless it be manifest to himself8 ,and if it be manifest to himself1 why does he deny that he is able to comprehend it8 ,and if he be not able to comprehend it1 how knows he that it is demonstrable8 ,or why says he that so confidently1 which he does not know8 ,methinks that which ,i have said1 namely1 that 8that which ,god foreknows shall be hereafter1 cannot but be hereafter1 and at the same time that he foreknew it should be2 but that which cannot but be1 is necessary2 therefore what ,god foreknows1 shall be necessarily1 and at the time foreknown03 this ,i say looketh somewhat liker to a demonstration1 than any thing that he hath hitherto brought to prove free will4 ,another reason why ,i should be of his opinion1 is that he is 8in possession of an old truth derived to him by inheritance or succession from his ancestors04 ,to which ,i answer1 first1 that ,i am in possession of a truth derived to me from the light of reason4 ,secondly1 that whereas he knoweth not whether it be the truth that he possesseth1 or not2 because he confesseth he knows not how it can consist with ,god's prescience and decrees2 ,i have sufficiently shewn that my opinion of necessity not only agrees with1 but necessarily followeth from the eternal prescience and decrees of ,god4 ,besides1 it is an unhandsome thing for a man to derive his opinion concerning truth by succession from his ancestors2 for our ancestors1 the first ,christians1 derived not therefore their truth from the ,gentiles1 because they were their ancestors4 7c7 8,to pass by all the other great imperfections which are to be found in this sorite1 it is just like an old philosophical piece3 he that drinks well1 sleeps well2 he that sleeps well1 thinks no hurt2 he that thinks no hurt1 lives well2 therefore he that drinks well1 lives well40 ,my argument was thus3 8election is always from the memory of good and evil sequels2 memory is always from the sense2 and sense always from the action of external bodies2 and all action from ,god2 therefore all actions1 even of free and voluntary agents1 are from ,god1 and consequently necessary04 ,let the ,bishop compare now his scurrilous argumentation with this of mine2 and tell me1 whether he that sleeps well1 doth all his lifetime think no hurt4 7d7 8,in the very last passage of my discourse ,i proposed my own private opinion1 how it might be made appear that the eternal prescience and decrees of ,god are consistent with true liberty and contingency1 c40 ,if he had meant by liberty1 as other men do1 the liberty of action1 that is1 of things which are in his power to do which he will1 it had been an easy matter to reconcile it with the prescience and decrees of ,god2 but meaning the liberty of will1 it was impossible4 ,so likewise1 if by contingency he had meant simply coming to pass1 it had been reconcilable with the decrees of ,god2 but meaning coming to pass without necessity1 it was impossible4 ,and therefore though it be true he says1 that 8he set it down in as plain terms as he could01 yet it was impossible to set it down in plain terms4 ,nor ought he to charge me with misunderstanding him1 and wresting his words to a wrong sense4 ,for the truth is1 ,i did not understand them at all1 nor thought he understood them himself2 but was willing to give them the best interpretation they would bear2 which he calls wresting them to a wrong sense4 ,and first1 ,i understood not what he meant by the aspect of ,god4 ,for if he had meant his foreknowledge1 which word he had often used before2 what needed he in this one place only to call it aspect8 ,or what need he here call it his view8 ,or say that all things are open to the eyes of ,god not discursively1 but intuitively2 which is to expound eyes in that text1 ,hebr4 iv4 #ac1 not figuratively but literally1 nevertheless excluding external species1 which the ,schoolmen say are the cause of seeing8 ,but it was well done to exclude such insignificant speeches1 upon every occasion whatsoever4 ,and though ,i do not hold the foreknowledge of ,god to consist in discourse2 yet ,i shall be never driven to say it is by intuition1 as long as ,i know that even a man hath foreknowledge of all those things which he intendeth himself to do1 not by discourse1 but by knowing his own purpose2 saving that man hath a superior power over him1 that can change his purpose2 which ,god hath not4 ,and whereas he says1 ,i confound this aspect with the will and decrees of ,god1 he accuseth me wrongfully4 ,for how could ,i so confound it1 when ,i understood not what it meant8 7e7 8,secondly1 he chargeth me1 that hitherto ,i have maintained that #8liberty and the decrees of ,god are irreconcileable'04 ,and the reason why ,i do so is1 because he maintained that liberty and the absolute necessity of all things are irreconcileable4 ,if liberty cannot stand with necessity1 it cannot stand with the decrees of ,god1 of which decrees necessity is a consequent4 ,i needed not to say1 nor did say1 that necessity and ,god's decrees are all one3 though if ,i had said it1 it had not been without authority of learned men1 in whose writings are often found this sentence1 voluntas ,dei1 necessitas rerum4 7f7 8,but to cut his argument short3 ,god hath decreed all effects which come to pass in time1 yet not all after the same manner1 but according to the distinct natures1 capacities1 and conditions of his creatures2 which he doth not destroy by his decree3 some he acteth40 ,hitherto true4 ,then he addeth3 8with some he co-operateth by special influence2 and some he only permitteth2 yet this is no idle or bare permission04 ,this is false4 ,for nothing operateth by its own original power1 but ,god himself4 ,man operateth not but by special power1 7,i say special power1 not special influence71 derived from ,god4 ,nor is it by ,god's permission only1 as ,i have often already shown1 and as the ,bishop here contradicting his former words confesseth4 ,for to permit only1 and barely to permit1 signify the same thing4 ,and that which he says1 that ,god concurs by way of general influence1 is jargon4 ,for every concurrence is one singular and individual concurrence2 and nothing in the world is general1 but the signification of words and other signs4 7g7 8,thirdly1 he chargeth me1 that #8,i allow all men to be of his opinion1 save only those that conceive in their minds a nunc stans1 or how eternity is an indivisible point1 rather than an everlasting succession4' ,but ,i have given no such allowance40 ,surely if the reason wherefore my opinion is false1 proceed from this1 that ,i conceive not eternity to be nunc stans1 but an everlasting succession1 ,i am allowed to hold my opinion till ,i can conceive eternity otherwise3 at least he allows men not till then to be of his opinion4 ,for he hath said1 8that the main impediment which keeps men from subscribing to that way of his1 is because they conceive eternity to be an everlasting succession1 and not one indivisible point04 ,as for the many other ways which he says are 8proposed by divines for reconciling the eternal prescience and decrees of ,god with the liberty and contingency of second causes01 if they mean such liberty and contingency as the ,bishop meaneth1 they are proposed in vain2 for truth and error can never be reconciled4 ,but 8however10 saith he1 8though a man could comprehend none of all these ways1 yet we must remember that a certain truth ought not to be rejected1 because we are not able to understand the reason of it40 ,for 8he knows10 he says1 8the loadstone hath an attractive power to draw the iron to it1 and yet he knoweth not how it cometh to have such a power40 ,i know the load-stone hath no such attractive power2 and yet ,i know that the iron cometh to it1 or it to the iron2 and therefore wonder not1 that the ,bishop knoweth not how it cometh to have that power4 ,in the next place he saith1 ,i bring nothing to prove that eternity is not an indivisible point1 but my own incapacity 8that ,i cannot conceive it04 ,the truth is1 ,i cannot dispute neither for nor against 7as he can do7 the positions ,i understand not4 ,nor do ,i understand what derogation it can be to the divine perfection1 to attribute to it potentiality1 that is 7in ,english7 power1 and successive duration2 for such attributes are often given to it in the ,scripture4 7h7 8,he saith moreover1 that #8he understands as little how it can be true which ,i say1 that ,god is not just1 but justice itself1 nor eternal1 but eternity itself'4 ,it seems1 howsoever he be versed in this question1 that he hath not troubled his head over-much with reading ,school-divines1 or metaphysicians40 ,they are unseemly words to be said of ,god3 ,i will not say1 blasphemous and atheistical1 which are the attributes he gives to my opinions1 because ,i do not think them spoken out of an evil mind1 but out of error3 they are1 ,i say1 unseemly words to be said of ,god1 that he is not just1 that he is not eternal1 and 7as he also said7 that he is not wise2 and cannot be excused by any following but1 especially when the but is followed by that which is not to be understood4 ,can any man understand how justice is just1 or wisdom wise8 and whereas justice is an accident1 one of the moral virtues1 and wisdom another2 how ,god is an accident or moral virtue8 ,it is more than the ,schoolmen or metaphysicians can understand2 whose writings have troubled my head more than they should have done1 if ,i had known that amongst so many senseless disputes1 there had been so few lucid intervals4 ,but ,i have considered since1 where men will undertake to reason out of natural philosophy of the incomprehensible nature of ,god1 that it is impossible they should speak intelligibly1 or in other language than metaphysic1 wherein they may contradict themselves1 and not perceive it2 as he does here1 when he says1 8the attributes of ,god are not diverse virtues or qualities in him1 as they are in the creatures1 but really one and the same with the divine essence and amongst themselves1 and attributed to ,god to supply the defect of our capacity04 ,attributes are names2 and therefore it is a contradiction1 to say they are really one and the same with the divine essence4 ,but if he mean the virtues signified by the attributes1 as justice1 wisdom1 eternity1 divinity1 c2 so also they are virtues1 and not one virtue1 7which is still a contradiction72 and we give those attributes to ,god1 not to shew that we apprehend how they are in him1 but to signify how we think it best to honour him4 7i7 8#8,in the next place he will help me to understand1' he says1 #8how eternity is an indivisible point4' ,the divine substance is indivisible2 but eternity is the divine substance4 ,the major is evident1 because ,god is actus simplicissimus2 the minor hath been clearly demonstrated in my answer to his last doubt1 and is confessed by all men1 that whatsoever is attributed to ,god is ,god40 ,the major is so far from being evident1 that actus simplicissimus signifieth nothing4 ,the minor is said by some men1 thought by no man2 for whatsoever is thought1 is understood4 ,and all that he hath elsewhere and here dilated upon it1 is as perfect nonsense1 as any man ever writ on purpose to make merry with4 ,and so is that whereby he answers to my objection1 that a point cannot comprehend all time1 which is successive2 namely1 his distinction1 that 8a point doth not comprehend all time formally1 as time is successive2 but eminently and virtually1 as eternity is infinite04 ,and this1 8to-day all eternity is co-existent with this day1 and to-morrow all eternity will be co-existent with to-morrow04 ,it is well that his eternity is now come from a nunc stans to be a nunc fluens1 flowing from this day to the next1 and so on4 ,this kind of language is never found in the ,scripture4 ,no1 but the thing1 saith he1 is found there1 namely1 that ,god is infinite in all his attributes4 ,i would he could shew me the place where ,god is said to be infinite in all his attributes4 ,there be places enough to shew that ,god is infinite in power1 in wisdom1 mercy1 c3 but neither is he said to be infinite in names 7which is the ,english of attributes71 nor that he is an indivisible point1 nor that a point doth comprehend time eminently and virtually2 nor that to-day all eternity is co-existent with to-day1 c4 ,and thus much in answer to his reply upon my answer4 ,that which remaineth1 is my reply upon his answer to my positive doctrine on this subject4 ,,my ,,opinion ,,about ,,liberty ,,and ,,necessity ,,no4 ,,xxv4 ,t4 ,h4 ,first1 ,i conceive that when it cometh into a man's mind to do or not to do some certain action1 if he have no time to deliberate1 the doing or abstaining necessarily followeth the present thought he had of the good or evil consequence thereof to himself4 ,as for example1 in sudden anger the action shall follow the thought of revenge1 in sudden fear the thought of escape4 ,also when a man hath time to deliberate1 but deliberates not1 because never anything appeared that could make him doubt of the consequence1 the action follows his opinion of the goodness or harm of it4 ,these actions ,i call voluntary4 ,he1 if ,i understand him aright1 calls them spontaneous4 ,i call them voluntary1 because those actions that follow immediately the last appetite1 are voluntary4 ,and here1 where there is one only appetite1 that one is the last4 ,besides1 ,i see it is reasonable to punish a rash action2 which could not be justly done by man1 unless the same were voluntary4 ,for no action of a man can be said to be without deliberation1 though never so sudden2 because it is supposed he had time to deliberate all the precedent time of his life1 whether he should do that kind of action or not4 ,and hence it is1 that he that killeth in a sudden passion of anger1 shall nevertheless be justly put to death3 because all the time wherein he was able to consider whether to kill were good or evil1 shall be held for one continual deliberation2 and consequently the killing shall be judged to proceed from election4 ,sidenote3 ,the ,bishop's reply4 ,j4 ,d4 8,this part of ,t4 ,h4's discourse hangs together like a sick man's dreams4 7a7 ,even now he tells us1 that #8a man may have time to deliberate1 yet not deliberate'4 ,by and by he saith1 that #8no action of a man1 though never so sudden1 can be said to be without deliberation'4 ,he tells us1 ,no4 ,,xxxiii41 that #8the scope of this section is to show what is spontaneous'4 ,howbeit he showeth only what is voluntary2 7b7 so making voluntary and spontaneous to be all one2 whereas before he had told us1 that #8every spontaneous action is not voluntary1 because indeliberate2 nor every voluntary action spontaneous1 if it proceed from fear4' 7c7 ,now he tells us1 that #8those actions which follow the last appetite1 are voluntary2 and where there is one only appetite1 that is the last'4 ,but before he told us1 that #8voluntary presupposeth some precedent deliberation and meditation of what is likely to follow1 both upon the doing and abstaining from the action'4 7d7 ,he defines liberty1 ,no4 ,,xxix41 to be #8the absence of all extrinsical impediments to action'4 ,and yet in his whole discourse he laboureth to make good1 that whatsoever is not done1 is therefore not done1 because the agent was necessitated by extrinsical causes not to do it4 ,are not extrinsical causes1 which determine him not to do it1 extrinsical impediments to action8 ,so no man shall be free to do any thing but that which he doth actually4 ,he defines a free agent to be #8him who hath not made an end of deliberating' 7,no4 ,,xxviii474 ,and yet defines liberty to be #8an absence of outward impediments'4 ,there may be outward impediments1 even whilst he is deliberating4 ,as a man deliberates whether he shall play at tennis3 and at the same time the door of the tennis-court is fast locked against him4 ,and after a man hath ceased to deliberate1 there may be no outward impediments3 as when a man resolves not to play at tennis1 because he finds himself ill-disposed1 or because he will not hazard his money4 ,so the same person1 at the same time1 should be free and not free1 not free and free4 ,and as he is not firm to his own grounds1 so he confounds all things1 the mind and the will1 the estimative faculty and the understanding1 imagination with deliberation1 the end with the means1 human will with the sensitive appetite1 rational hope or fear with irrational passions1 inclinations with intentions1 a beginning of being with a beginning of working1 sufficiency with efficiency4 ,so as the greatest difficulty is to find out what he aims at4 ,so as ,i had once resolved not to answer this part of his discourse2 yet upon better advice ,i will take a brief survey of it also2 and show how far ,i assent unto1 or dissent from that which ,i conceive to be his meaning4 8,and first1 concerning sudden passions1 as anger or the like4 7e7 ,that which he saith1 that #8the action doth necessarily follow the thought'1 is thus far true2 that those actions which are altogether undeliberated and do proceed from sudden and violent passions1 or motus primo primi1 which surprise a man1 and give him no time to advise with reason1 are not properly and actually in themselves free1 but rather necessary actions2 as when a man runs away from a cat or a custard out of a secret antipathy4 7f7 8,secondly1 as for those actions #8wherein actual deliberation seems not necessary1 because never anything appeared that could make a man doubt of the consequence'3 ,i do confess1 that actions done by virtue of a precedent deliberation1 without any actual deliberation in the present1 when the act is done1 may notwithstanding be truly both voluntary and free acts1 yea1 in some cases and in some sense1 more free than if they were actually deliberated of in present4 ,as one who hath acquired by former deliberation and experience a habit to play upon the virginals1 needs not deliberate what man or what jack he must touch1 nor what finger of his hand he must move to play such a lesson2 yea1 if his mind should be fixed1 or intent to every motion of his hand1 or every touch of a string1 it would hinder his play1 and render the action more troublesome to him4 ,wherefore ,i believe1 that not only his playing in general1 but every motion of his hand1 though it be not presently deliberated of1 is a free act1 by reason of his precedent deliberation4 ,so then 7saving improprieties of speech1 as calling that voluntary which is free1 and limiting the will to the last appetite2 and other mistakes1 as that no act can be said to be without deliberation7 we agree also for the greater part in this second observation4 7g7 8,thirdly1 whereas he saith1 that #8some sudden acts proceeding from violent passions1 which surprise a man1 are justly punished'2 ,i grant they are so sometimes2 but not for his reason1 because they have been formerly actually deliberated of2 but because they were virtually deliberated of1 or because it is our fault that they were not actually deliberated of1 whether it was a fault of pure negation1 that is1 of not doing our duty only1 or a fault of bad disposition also1 by reason of some vicious habit which we had contracted by our former actions4 ,to do a necessary act is never a fault1 nor justly punishable1 when the necessity is inevitably imposed upon us by extrinsical causes4 ,as if a child1 before he had the use of reason1 shall kill a man in his passion2 yet because he wanted malice to incite him to it1 and reason to restrain him from it1 he shall not die for it in the strict rules of particular justice1 unless there be some mixture of public justice in the case4 7h7 8,but if the necessity be contracted by ourselves1 and by our own faults1 it is justly punishable4 ,as he who by his wanton thoughts in the day-time doth procure his own nocturnal pollution3 a man cannot deliberate in his sleep1 yet it is accounted a sinful act1 and consequently1 a free act1 that is1 not actually free in itself1 but virtually free in its causes2 and though it be not expressly willed and chosen1 yet it is tacitly and implicitly willed and chosen1 when that is willed and chosen from whence it was necessarily produced4 ,by the ,levitical law1 if a man digged a pit and left it uncovered1 so that his neighbour's ox or his ass did fall into it1 he was bound to make reparation2 not because he did choose to leave it uncovered on purpose that such a mischance might happen1 but because he did freely omit that which he ought to have done1 from whence this damage proceeded to his neighbour4 ,lastly1 there is great difference between the first motions1 which sometimes are not in our power1 and subsequent acts of killing or stealing1 or the like1 which always are in our power if we have the use of reason1 or else it is our own fault that they are not in our power4 ,yet to such hasty acts done in hot blood the law is not so severe1 as to those which are done upon long deliberation and prepensed malice1 unless1 as ,i said1 there be some mixture of public justice in it4 ,he that steals a horse deliberately1 may be more punishable by the law than he that kills the owner by chance-medley3 yet the death of the owner was more noxious1 7to use his phrase71 and more damageable to the family1 than the stealth of the horse4 ,so far was ,t4 ,h4 mistaken in that also1 that the right to kill men doth proceed merely from their being noxious 7,no4 ,,xiv740 ,,animadversions ,,upon ,,the ,,bishop',s ,,answer ,,to ,,my ,,opinion ,,about ,,liberty ,,and ,,necessity ,,no4 ,,xxv4 7a7 8,even now he tells us1 that #8a man may have time to deliberate1 yet not deliberate'4 ,by and by he saith1 that #8no action of a man1 though never so sudden1 can be said to be without deliberation'40 ,he thinks he hath here caught me in a contradiction2 but he is mistaken2 and the cause is1 that he observed not that there may be a difference between deliberation and that which shall be construed for deliberation by a judge4 ,for a man may do a rash act suddenly without deliberation2 yet because he ought to have deliberated1 and had time enough to deliberate whether the action were lawful or not1 it shall not be said by the judge that it was without deliberation1 who supposeth that after the law known1 all the time following was time of deliberation4 ,it is therefore no contradiction1 to say a man deliberates not1 and that he shall be said to deliberate by him that is the judge of voluntary actions4 7b7 8,again1 where he says1 #8he maketh voluntary and spontaneous actions to be all one'1 whereas before he had told us that #8every spontaneous action is not voluntary1 because indeliberate2 nor every voluntary action spontaneous1 if it proceed from fear'40 ,he thinks he hath espied another contradiction4 ,it is no wonder if speaking of spontaneous1 which signifieth nothing else in ,latin 7for ,english it is not7 but that which is done deliberately or indeliberately without compulsion1 ,i seem to the ,bishop1 who hath never given any definition of that word1 not to use it as he would have me4 ,and it is easy for him to give it any signification he please1 as the occasion shall serve to charge me with contradiction4 ,in what sense ,i have used that word once1 in the same ,i have used it always1 calling that spontaneous which is without co-action or compulsion by terror4 7c7 8,now he tells us1 that #8those actions which follow the last appetite are voluntary1 and where there is one only appetite1 that is the last'4 ,but before he told us1 that #8voluntary presupposeth some precedent deliberation and meditation of what is likely to follow1 both upon the doing and abstaining from the action'40 ,this is a third contradiction he supposeth he hath found1 but is again mistaken4 ,for when men are to judge of actions1 whether they be voluntary or not1 they cannot call that action voluntary1 which followed not the last appetite4 ,but the same men1 though there were no deliberation1 shall judge there was1 because it ought to have been1 and that from the time that the law was known to the time of the action itself4 ,and therefore both are true1 that voluntary may be without1 and yet presupposed in the law not to be without deliberation4 7d7 8,he defines liberty 7,no4 ,,xxix47 to be #8the absence of all extrinsical impediments to action'4 ,and yet in his whole discourse he laboureth to make good1 that whatsoever is not done1 is therefore not done1 because the agent was necessitated by extrinsical causes not to do it4 ,are not extrinsical causes which determine him not to do it1 extrinsical impediments to action80 ,this definition of liberty1 that it is 8the absence of all extrinsical impediments to action01 he thinks he hath sufficiently confuted by asking whether the extrinsical causes1 which determine a man not to do an action1 be not extrinsical impediments to action4 ,it seems by his question he makes no doubt but they are2 but is deceived by a too shallow consideration of what the word impediment signifieth4 ,for impediment or hinderance signifieth an opposition to endeavour4 ,and therefore if a man be necessitated by extrinsical causes not to endeavour an action1 those causes do not oppose his endeavour to do it1 because he has no such endeavour to be opposed2 and consequently extrinsical causes that take away endeavour1 are not to be called impediments2 nor can any man be said to be hindered from doing that1 which he had no purpose at all to do4 ,so that this objection of his proceedeth only from this1 that he understandeth not sufficiently the ,english tongue4 ,from the same proceedeth also that he thinketh it a contradiction1 to call a free agent him that hath not yet made an end of deliberating1 and to call liberty an absence of outward impediments4 8,for10 saith he1 8there may be outward impediments1 even while he is deliberating40 ,wherein he is deceived4 ,for though he may deliberate of that which is impossible for him to do2 as in the example he allegeth of him that deliberateth whether he shall play at tennis1 not knowing that the door of the tennis-court is shut against him2 yet it is no impediment to him that the door is shut1 till he have a will to play2 which be hath not till he hath done deliberating whether he shall play or not4 ,that which followeth of my confounding mind and will2 the estimative faculty and the understanding2 the imagination and deliberation2 the end and the means2 the human will and the sensitive appetite2 rational hope or fear1 and irrational passions2 inclinations and intentions2 a beginning of being and a beginning of working2 sufficiency and efficiency3 ,i do not find in anything that ,i have written1 any impropriety in the use of these or any other ,english words2 nor do ,i doubt but an ,english reader1 who hath not lost himself in ,school-divinity1 will very easily conceive what ,i have said4 ,but this ,i am sure1 that ,i never confounded beginning of being with beginning of working1 nor sufficiency with efficiency2 nor ever used these words1 sensitive appetite1 rational hope1 or rational fear1 or irrational passions4 ,it is therefore impossible ,i should confound them4 ,but the ,bishop is either mistaken1 or else he makes no scruple to say that which he knows to be false1 when he thinks it will serve his turn4 7e7 8,that which he saith1 that #8the action doth necessarily follow the thought'1 is thus far true2 that those actions which are altogether undeliberated1 and do proceed from violent passions1 c1 are not properly1 and actually in themselves free1 but rather necessary actions1 as when a man runs away from a cat or a custard40 ,thus far he says is true4 ,but when he calls sudden passions motus primo primi1 ,i cannot tell whether he says true or not1 because ,i do not understand him2 nor find how he makes his meaning ever the clearer by his example of a cat and a custard1 because ,i know not what he means by a secret antipathy4 ,for what that antipathy is he explaineth not by calling it secret1 but rather confesseth he knows not how to explain it4 ,and because he saith1 it is thus far true1 ,i expect he should tell me also how far it is false4 7f7 8,secondly1 as for those actions wherein actual deliberation seems not necessary1 #8because never anything appeared that could make a man doubt of the consequence'2 ,i do confess that actions done by virtue of a precedent deliberation1 without any actual deliberation for the present1 may notwithstanding be truly voluntary and free acts40 ,in this he agrees with me4 ,but where he adds1 8yea1 in some cases1 and in some sense more free1 than if they were actually deliberated of in present01 ,i do not agree with him4 ,and for the instance he bringeth to prove it1 in the man that playeth on an instrument with his hand it maketh nothing for him4 ,for it proveth only1 that the habit maketh the motion of his hand more ready and quick2 but it proveth not that it maketh it more voluntary1 but rather less2 because the rest of the motions follow the first by an easiness acquired from long custom2 in which motion the will doth not accompany all the strokes of the hand1 but gives a beginning to them only in the first4 ,here is nothing1 as ,i expected1 of how far that which ,i had said1 namely1 that the action doth necessarily follow the thought1 is false2 unless it be 8improprieties of speech1 as calling that voluntary which is free1 and limiting the will to the last appetite2 and other mistakes1 as that no act can be said to be without deliberation04 ,for improprieties of speech1 ,i will not contend with one that can use motus primo primi1 practice practicum1 actus elicitus1 and many other phrases of the same kind4 ,but to say that free actions are voluntary2 and that the will which causeth a voluntary action1 is the last appetite2 and that that appetite was immediately followed by the action2 and that no action of a man can be said in the judgment of the law1 to be without deliberation3 are no mistakes1 for anything that he hath proved to the contrary4 7g7 8,thirdly1 whereas he saith1 that #8some sudden acts1 proceeding from violent passions which surprise a man1 are justly punished'2 ,i grant they are so sometimes1 but not for his reason1 c40 ,my reason was1 8because he had time to deliberate from the instant that he knew the law1 to the instant of his action1 and ought to have deliberated01 that therefore he may be justly punished4 ,the ,bishop grants they are justly punished1 and his reason is1 8because they were virtually deliberated of01 or1 8because it is our fault they were not actually deliberated of04 ,how a man does deliberate1 and yet not actually deliberate1 ,i understand not4 ,if virtual deliberation be not actual deliberation1 it is no deliberation4 ,but he calleth virtual deliberation1 that which ought to have been1 and was not2 and says the same that he condemns in me4 ,and his other reason1 namely1 because it is our fault that we deliberated not1 is the same that ,i said1 that we ought to have deliberated1 and did not4 ,so that his reprehension here1 is a reprehension of himself1 proceeding from that the custom of ,school-language hath made him forget the language of his country4 ,and to that which he adds1 8that a necessary act is never a fault1 nor justly punishable1 when the necessity is inevitably imposed upon us by extrinsical causes01 ,i have sufficiently answered before in diverse places2 shewing that a fault may be necessary from extrinsical causes1 and yet voluntary2 and that voluntary faults are justly punishable4 7h7 8,but if the necessity be contracted by ourselves1 it is justly punishable4 ,as he who by his wanton thoughts in the day time1 doth procure his own nocturnal pollution40 ,this instance1 because it maketh not against anything ,i have held1 and partly also because it is a stinking passage1 7for surely if1 as he that ascribes eyes to the understanding1 allows me to say it hath a nose1 it stinketh to the nose of the understanding72 this sentence ,i pass over1 observing only the canting terms1 not actually free in itself1 but virtually free in its causes4 ,in the rest of his answer to this ,no4 ,,xxv1 ,i find nothing alleged in confutation of anything ,i have said1 saving that his last words are1 that 8,t4 ,h4 is mistaken in that also1 that the right to kill men doth proceed merely from their being noxious0 7,no4 ,,xiv474 ,but to that ,i have in the same ,no4 ,,xiv4 already answered4 ,i must not pass over1 that a little before he hath these words3 8,if a child1 before he have the use of reason1 shall kill a man in his passion1 yet because he wanted malice to incite him to it1 and reason to restrain him from it1 he shall not die for it1 in the strict rules of particular justice1 unless there be some mixture of public justice in the case04 ,the ,bishop would make but an ill judge of innocent children1 for such are they that1 for want of age1 have not use enough of reason to abstain from killing4 ,for the want of reason proceeding from want of age1 does therefore take away the punishment1 because it taketh away the crime1 and makes them innocent4 ,but he introduceth another justice1 which he calleth public2 whereas he called the other particular4 ,and by this public justice1 he saith1 the child though innocent may be put to death4 ,i hope we shall never have the administration of public justice in such hands as his1 or in the hands of such as shall take counsel from him4 ,but the distinction he makes is not by himself understood4 ,there are public causes1 and private causes4 ,private are those1 where the parties to the cause are both private men4 ,public are those1 where one of the parties is the commonwealth1 or the person that representeth it1 and the cause criminal4 ,but there is no distinction of justice into public and private4 ,we may read of men that1 having sovereign power1 did sometimes put an innocent to death1 either upon a vow2 as ,jepthah did in sacrificing his daughter2 or when it hath been thought fit that an innocent person should be put to death to save a great number of people4 ,but to put to death a child1 not for reason of state1 which he improperly calls public justice1 but for killing a man1 and at the same time to acknowledge such killing to be no crime1 ,i think was never heard of4 ,,no4 ,,xxvi4 ,t4 ,h4 ,secondly1 ,i conceive when a man deliberates whether he shall do a thing or not do a thing1 that he does nothing else but consider whether it be better for himself to do it or not to do it4 ,and to consider an action1 is to imagine the consequences of it1 both good and evil4 ,from whence is to be inferred1 that deliberation is nothing but alternate imagination of the good and evil sequels of an action1 or 7which is the same thing7 alternate hope and fear1 or alternate appetite to do or acquit the action of which he deliberateth4 ,sidenote3 ,the ,bishop's reply4 ,j4 ,d4 7a7 8,if ,i did not know what deliberation was1 ,i should be little relieved in my knowledge by this description4 ,sometimes he makes it to be a consideration1 or an act of the understanding2 sometimes an imagination1 or an act of the fancy2 sometimes he makes it to be an alternation of passions1 hope and fear4 ,sometimes he makes it concern the end1 sometimes to concern the means4 ,so he makes it ,i know not what4 ,the truth is this in brief3 #8,deliberation is an inquiry made by reason1 whether this or that1 definitely considered1 be a good and fit means1 or1 indefinitely1 what are good and fit means to be chosen for attaining some wished end4'0 ,,animadversions ,,upon ,,the ,,answer ,,to ,,no4 ,,xxvi4 7a7 8,if ,i did not know what deliberation was1 ,i should be little relieved in my knowledge by this description4 ,sometimes he makes it to be a consideration1 or an act of the understanding1 sometimes an imagination1 or an act of the fancy1 c4 ,so he makes it ,i know not what40 ,if the ,bishop had observed what he does himself1 when he deliberates1 reasons1 understands1 or imagines1 he would have known what to make of all that ,i have said in this ,number4 ,he would have known that consideration1 understanding1 reason1 and all the passions of the mind1 are imaginations4 ,that to consider a thing1 is to imagine it2 that to understand a thing1 is to imagine it2 that to hope and fear1 are to imagine the things hoped for and feared4 ,the difference between them is1 that when we imagine the consequence of anything1 we are said to consider that thing2 and when we have imagined anything from a sign1 and especially from those signs we call names1 we are said to understand his meaning that maketh the sign2 and when we reason1 we imagine the consequence of affirmations and negations joined together2 and when we hope or fear1 we imagine things good or hurtful to ourselves3 insomuch as all these are but imaginations diversely named from different circumstances3 as any man may perceive as easily as he can look into his own thoughts4 ,but to him that thinketh not himself upon the things whereof1 but upon the words wherewith he speaketh1 and taketh those words on trust from puzzled ,schoolmen1 it is not only hard1 but impossible to be known4 ,and this is the reason that maketh him say1 ,i make deliberation he knows not what4 ,but how is deliberation defined by him8 8,it is01 saith he1 8an inquiry made by reason1 whether this or that definitely considered1 be a good and fit means2 or indefinitely1 what are good and fit means to be chosen for attaining some wished end40 ,if it were not his custom to say1 the understanding understandeth1 the will willeth1 and so of the rest of the faculties1 ,i should have believed that when he says deliberation is an inquiry made by reason1 he meaneth an inquiry made by the man that reasoneth2 for so it will be sense4 ,but the reason which a man useth in deliberation1 being the same thing that is called deliberation1 his definition that deliberation is an inquiry made by reason1 is no more than if he had said1 deliberation is an inquiry made by deliberation2 a definition good enough to be made by a ,schoolman4 ,nor is the rest of the definition altogether as it should be2 for there is no such thing as an 8indefinite consideration of what are good and fit means02 but a man imagining first one thing1 then another1 considereth them successively and singly each one1 whether it conduceth to his ends or not4 ,,no4 ,,xxvii4 ,t4 ,h4 ,thirdly1 ,i conceive1 that in all deliberations1 that is to say1 in all alternate succession of contrary appetites1 the last is that which we call the will1 and is immediately before the doing of the action1 or next before the doing of it become impossible4 ,all other appetites to do and to quit1 that come upon a man during his deliberation1 are usually called intentions and inclinations1 but not wills2 there being but one will1 which also in this case may be called last will1 though the intention change often4 ,sidenote3 ,the ,bishop's reply4 ,j4 ,d4 7a7 8,still here is nothing but confusion2 he confounds the faculty of the will with the act of volition2 he makes the will to be the last part of deliberation2 he makes the intention1 which is a most proper and elicit act of the will1 or a willing of the end1 as it is to be attained by certain means1 to be no willing at all1 but only some antecedaneous inclination or propension4 ,he might as well say1 that the uncertain agitation of the needle hither and thither to find out the pole1 and the resting or fixing of itself directly towards the pole1 were both the same thing4 ,but the grossest mistake is1 that he will acknowledge no act of man's will1 to be his will1 but only the last act1 which he calls the last will4 ,if the first were no will1 how comes this to be the last will8 ,according to his doctrine1 the will of a man should be as unchangeable as the will of ,god1 at least so long as there is a possibility to effect it4 7b7 ,according to this doctrine1 concupiscence with consent should be no sin2 for that which is not truly willed is not a sin2 or rather should not be at all1 unless either the act followed1 or were rendered impossible by some intervening circumstances4 ,according to this doctrine no man can say1 this is my will1 because he knows not yet whether it shall be his last appeal4 ,the truth is1 there be many acts of the will1 both in respect of the means and of the end4 ,but that act which makes a man's actions to be truly free1 is election2 which is the deliberate choosing or refusing of this or that means1 or the acceptation of one means before another1 where divers are represented by the understanding4 ,,animadversions ,,upon ,,the ,,answer ,,to ,,no4 ,,xxvii4 7a7 8,still here is nothing but confusion2 he confounds the faculty of the will with the act of volition2 he makes the will to be the last part of deliberation2 he makes the intention1 which is a most proper and elicit act of the will1 to be no willing at all1 but only some antecedaneous 7he might as well have said1 antecedent7 inclination40 ,to confound the faculty of the will with the will1 were to confound a will with no will2 for the faculty of the will is no will2 the act only which he calls volition1 is the will4 ,as a man that sleepeth hath the power of seeing1 and seeth not1 nor hath for that time any sight2 so also he hath the power of willing1 but willeth nothing1 nor hath for that time any will4 ,i must therefore have departed very much from my own principles1 if ,i have confounded the faculty of the will with the act of volition4 ,he should have done well to have shown where ,i confounded them4 ,it is true1 ,i make the will to be the last part of deliberation2 but it is that will which maketh the action voluntary1 and therefore needs must be the last4 ,but for the preceding variations of the will to do and not to do1 though they be so many several wills1 contrary to and destroying one another1 they usually are called intentions2 and therefore they are nothing to the will1 of which we dispute1 that maketh an action voluntary4 ,and though a man have in every long deliberation a great many wills and nills1 they use to be called inclinations1 and the last only will which is immediately followed by the voluntary action4 ,but nevertheless1 both he that hath those intentions1 and ,god that seeth them1 reckoneth them for so many wills4 7b7 8,according to this doctrine1 concupiscence with consent should be no sin2 for that which is not truly willed1 is not a sin40 ,this is no consequent to my doctrine3 for ,i hold that they are1 in the sight of ,god1 so many consents1 so many willings1 which would have been followed by actions1 if the actions had been in their power4 ,it had been fitter for a man in whom is required gravity and sanctity more than ordinary1 to have chosen some other kind of instance4 ,but what meaneth he by concupiscence with consent8 ,can there be concupiscence without consent8 ,it is the consent itself4 ,there may be also a lawful concupiscence with consent4 ,for concupiscence makes not the sin1 but the unlawfulness of satisfying such concupiscence2 and not the consent1 but the will and design to prosecute that which a man knoweth to be unlawful4 ,an appetite to another man's bread1 is concupiscence2 and though it be with consent to eat1 it is no sin2 but the design to take it from the other1 notwithstanding that he may fail in his design1 that is the sin4 ,and this instance might have served his turn as well as the other2 and for consent1 if he had understood the truth1 he might have put design4 ,,no4 ,,xxviii4 ,t4 ,h4 ,fourthly1 that those actions which man is said to do upon deliberation1 are said to be voluntary1 and done upon choice and election4 ,so that voluntary action1 and action proceeding from election1 is the same thing4 ,and that of a voluntary agent1 it is all one to say he is free1 and to say he hath not made an end of deliberating4 ,sidenote3 ,the ,bishop's reply4 ,j4 ,d4 7a7 8,this short section might pass without an animadversion1 but for two things4 ,the one is1 that he confounds a voluntary act with a free act4 ,a free act is only that which proceeds from the free election of the rational will after deliberation2 but every act that proceeds from the sensitive appetite of man or beast1 without deliberation or election1 is truly voluntary4 7b7 ,the other thing observable is his conclusion1 that #8it is all one to say a man is free1 and to say he hath not made an end of deliberating'2 which confession of his overturns his whole structure of absolute necessity4 ,for if every agent be necessitated to act what he doth act by a necessary and natural flux of extrinsical causes1 then he is no more free before he deliberates1 or whilst he deliberates1 than he is after2 but by ,t4 ,h4's confession here1 he is more free whilst he deliberates1 than he is after4 ,and so after all his flourishes1 for an absolute or extrinsical necessity1 he is glad to set himself down1 and rest contented with an hypothetical necessity1 which no man ever denied or doubted of2 ascribing the necessitation of a man in free acts to his own deliberation1 and in indeliberate acts to his last thought1 ,no4 ,,xxv4 ,what is this to a natural and special influence of extrinsical causes8 7c7 8,again1 #8liberty'1 saith he1 #8is an absence of extrinsical impediments'2 but deliberation doth produce no new extrinsical impediment2 therefore let him choose which part he will1 either he is free after deliberation1 by his own doctrine1 or he was not free before4 ,our own deliberation1 and the direction of our own understanding1 and the election of our own will1 do produce an hypothetical necessity1 that the event be such as the understanding hath directed1 and the will elected4 ,but for as much as the understanding might have directed otherwise1 and the will have elected otherwise1 this is far from an absolute necessity4 ,neither doth liberty respect only future acts1 but present acts also4 ,otherwise ,god did not freely create the world4 ,in the same instant wherein the will elects1 it is free1 according to a priority of nature1 though not of time1 to elect otherwise4 ,and so in a divided sense1 the will is free1 even whilst it acts2 though in a compounded sense it be not free4 ,certainly1 deliberation doth constitute1 not destroy liberty4 ,,animadversions ,,upon ,,the ,,answer ,,to ,,no4 ,,xxviii4 7a7 8,this short section might pass1 but for two things2 one is1 that he confounds a voluntary act with a free act40 ,i do indeed take all voluntary acts to be free1 and all free acts to be voluntary2 but withal that all acts1 whether free or voluntary1 if they be acts1 were necessary before they were acts4 ,but where is the error8 #8,a free act'1 saith he1 #8is only that which proceeds from the free election of the rational will1 after deliberation2 but every act that proceeds from the sensitive appetite of man or beast1 without deliberation or election1 is truly voluntary4' ,so that my error lies in this1 that ,i distinguish not between a rational will and a sensitive appetite in the same man4 ,as if the appetite and will in man or beast were not the same thing1 or that sensual men and beasts did not deliberate1 and choose one thing before another1 in the same manner that wise men do4 ,nor can it be said of wills1 that one is rational1 the other sensitive2 but of men4 ,and if it be granted that deliberation is always 7as it is not7 rational1 there were no cause to call men rational more than beasts4 ,for it is manifest by continual experience1 that beasts do deliberate4 7b7 8,the other thing observable is his conclusion1 that #8it is all one to say1 a man is free1 and to say1 he hath not made an end of deliberating'3 which confession of his overturns his whole structure of absolute necessity40 ,why so8 #8,because'1 saith he1 #8if every agent be necessitated to act what he doth act by extrinsical causes1 then he is no more free before he deliberates1 or whilst he deliberates1 than he is after'4 ,but this is a false consequence2 he should have inferred thus3--8then he is no less necessitated before he deliberates than he is after02 which is true1 and yet nevertheless he is more free4 ,but taking necessity to be inconsistent with liberty1 which is the question between us3 instead of necessitated he puts in not free4 ,and therefore to say #8a man is free till he hath made an end of deliberating'1 is no contradiction to absolute and antecedent necessity4 ,and whereas he adds presently after1 that ,i ascribe the necessitation of a man in free acts to his own deliberation1 and in indeliberate acts to his last thoughts3 he mistakes the matter4 ,for ,i ascribe all necessity to the universal series or order of causes1 depending on the first cause eternal3 which the ,bishop understandeth1 as if ,i had said in his phrase1 to a special influence of extrinsical causes2 that is1 understandeth it not at all4 7c7 8,again1 #8liberty1' saith he1 #8is an absence of extrinsical impediments'3 but deliberation doth produce no new extrinsical impediment2 therefore either he is free after deliberation1 or he was not free before40 ,i cannot perceive in these words any more force of inference1 than of so many other words whatsoever put together at adventure4 ,but be his meaning what he will1 ,i say not that deliberation produceth any impediments3 for there are no impediments but to the action1 whilst we are endeavouring to do it1 which is not till we have done deliberating4 ,but during the deliberation there arise thoughts in him that deliberateth1 concerning the consequence of the action whereof he deliberateth1 which cause the action following2 which are not impediments to that action which was not done1 but the causes of that which was done4 ,that which followeth in this ,number is not intelligible1 by reason of the insignificance of these words1 8understanding directeth2 will electeth2 hypothetical necessity02 which are but jargon1 and his 8divided sense0 and 8compounded sense01 nonsense4 ,and this also1 8liberty respecteth not future acts only1 but present acts also01 is unintelligible4 ,for how can a man have liberty to do or not to do that which is at the same instant already done4 ,for where he addeth1 8otherwise ,god did not freely create the world01 it proves nothing2 because he had the liberty to create it1 before it was created4 ,besides1 it is a profaning of the name of ,god1 to make instances of his incomprehensible working in a question as this is1 merely natural4 ,,no4 ,,xxix4 ,t4 ,h4 ,fifthly1 ,i conceive liberty to be rightly defined in this manner3--,liberty is the absence of all the impediments to action1 that are not contained in the nature1 and in the intrinsical quality of the agent4 ,as for example1 the water is said to descend freely1 or to have liberty to descend by the channel of the river1 because there is no impediment that way2 but not across1 because the banks are impediments4 ,and though water cannot ascend1 yet men never say it wants the liberty to ascend1 but the faculty or power2 because the impediment is in the nature of the water and intrinsical4 ,so also we say1 he that is tied wants the liberty to go1 because the impediment is not in him1 but in his bonds2 whereas we say not so of him that is sick or lame1 because the impediment is in himself4 ,sidenote3 ,the ,bishop's reply4 ,j4 ,d4 7a7 8,how that should be a right definition of liberty1 which comprehends neither the genus nor the difference1 neither the matter nor form of liberty1 which doth not so much as accidentally describe liberty by its marks and tokens2 how a real faculty or the elective power should be defined by a negation1 or by an absence1 is past my understanding1 and contrary to all the rules of right reason which ,i have learned4 ,negatives cannot explicate the nature of things defined4 ,by this definition1 a stone hath liberty to ascend into the air1 because there is no outward impediment to hinder it2 and so a violent act may be a free act4 ,just like his definition are his instances of the liberty of the water to descend down the channel1 and a sick or lame man's liberty to go4 ,the latter is an impotence1 and not a power or a liberty4 ,the former is so far from being a free act1 that it is scarce a natural act4 ,certainly the proper natural motion of water1 as of all heavy bodies1 is to descend directly downwards towards the centre2 as we see in rain1 which falls down perpendicularly4 ,though this be far from a free act1 which proceeds from a rational appetite2 yet it is a natural act1 and proceeds from a natural appetite1 and hath its reason within itself4 ,so hath not the current of the river in its channel1 which must not be ascribed to the proper nature of the water1 but either to the general order of the universe1 for the better being and preservation of the creatures3 7otherwise the waters should not move in seas and rivers as they do1 but cover the face of the earth1 and possess their proper place between the air and the earth1 according to the degree of their gravity73 or to an extrinsical principle1 whilst one particle of water thrusteth and forceth forward another1 and so comes a current1 or at least so comes the current to be more impetuous2 to which motion the position of the earth doth contribute much1 both by restraining that fluid body with its banks from dispersing itself1 and also by affording way for a fair and easy descent by its proclivity4 ,he tells us sadly1 that 8the water wants liberty to go over the banks1 because there is an extrinsical impediment2 but to ascend up the channel1 it wants not liberty1 but power04 ,why8 ,liberty is a power2 if it want power to ascend1 it wants liberty to ascend4 ,but he makes the reason why the water ascends not up the channel1 to be intrinsical1 and the reason why it ascends not over the banks1 to be extrinsical2 as if there were not a rising of the ground up the channel1 as well as up the banks1 though it be not so discernible1 nor always so sudden4 ,the natural appetite of the water is as much against the ascending over the banks1 as the ascending up the channel4 ,and the extrinsical impediment is as great1 ascending up the channel1 as over the banks2 or rather greater1 because there it must move1 not only against the rising soil1 but also against the succeeding waters1 which press forward the former4 ,either the river wants liberty for both1 or else it wants liberty for neither4 ,but to leave his metaphorical faculties1 and his catachrestical liberty3 how far is his discourse wide from the true moral liberty2 which is the question between us8 ,his former description of a free agent1 that is1 #8he who hath not made an end of deliberating'1 though it was wide from the mark1 yet it came much nearer the truth than this definition of liberty2 unless perhaps he think that the water hath done deliberating whether it will go over the banks1 but hath not done deliberating whether it will go up the channel04 ,,animadversions ,,upon ,,the ,,answer ,,to ,,no4 ,,xxix4 7a7 8,how that should be a right definition of liberty1 which comprehends neither the genus nor the difference1 neither the matter nor the form of liberty1 c3 how a real faculty or the elective power1 should be defined by a negation or by an absence3 is past my understanding1 and contrary to all the rules of right reason which ,i have learned40 ,a right definition is that which determineth the signification of the word defined1 to the end that in the discourse where it is used1 the meaning of it may be constant and without equivocation4 ,this is the measure of a definition1 and intelligible to an ,english reader4 ,but the ,bishop1 that measures it by the genus and the difference1 thinks1 it seems1 though he write ,english1 he writes not to an ,english reader unless he also be a ,schoolman4 ,i confess the rule is good1 that we ought to define1 when it can be done1 by using first some more general term1 and then by restraining the signification of that general term1 till it be the same with that of the word defined4 ,and this general term the ,school calls genus1 and the restraint difference4 ,this1 ,i say1 is a good rule where it can be done2 for some words are so general1 that they cannot admit a more general in their definition4 ,but why this ought to be a law of definition1 ,i doubt it would trouble him to find the reason2 and therefore ,i refer him 7he shall give me leave sometimes to cite1 as well as he17 to the fourteenth and fifteenth articles of the sixth chapter of my book ,de ,corpore4 ,but it is to little purpose that he requires in a definition so exactly the genus and the difference1 seeing he does not know them when they are there4 ,for in this my definition of liberty1 the genus is absence of impediments to action2 and the difference or restriction is that they be not contained in the nature of the agent4 ,the ,bishop therefore1 though he talk of genus and difference1 understands not what they are1 but requires the matter and form of the thing in the definition4 ,matter is body1 that is to say1 corporeal substance1 and subject to dimension1 such as are the elements1 and the things compounded of the elements4 ,but it is impossible that matter should be part of a definition1 whose parts are only words2 or to put the name of matter into the definition of liberty1 which is immaterial4 8,how a real faculty can be defined by an absence1 is01 saith he1 8past my understanding40 ,unless he mean by real faculty a very faculty1 ,i know not how a faculty is real4 ,if he mean so1 then a very absence is as real as a very faculty4 ,and if the word defined signify an absence or negation1 ,i hope he would not have me define it by a presence or affirmation4 ,such a word is liberty2 for it signifieth freedom from impediments1 which is all one with the absence of impediments1 as ,i have defined it4 ,and if this be contrary to all the rules of right reason1 that is to say1 of logic1 that he hath learned1 ,i should advise him to read some other logic than he hath yet read1 or consider better those he did read when he was a young man and could less understand them4 ,he adds1 that 8by this definition1 a stone hath liberty to ascend into the air1 because there is no outward impediment to hinder it04 ,how knows he whether there be impediments to hinder it or not8 ,certainly if a stone were thrown upwards1 it would either go upwards eternally1 or it must be stopped by some outward impediment1 or it must stop itself4 ,he hath confessed1 that nothing can move itself2 ,i doubt not therefore that he will confess also1 that it cannot stop itself4 ,but stopped we see it is2 it is therefore stopped by impediments external4 ,he hath in this part of his answer ventured a little too far in speaking of definition1 and of impediments1 and motion2 and bewrayed too much his ignorance in logic and philosophy2 and talked so absurdly of the current of rivers1 and of the motion of the seas1 and of the weight of water1 that it cannot be corrected otherwise than by blotting it all out4 ,,no4 ,,xxx4 ,t4 ,h4 ,sixthly1 ,i conceive nothing taketh beginning from itself1 but from the action of some other immediate agent without itself3 and that therefore when first a man had an appetite or will to something1 to which immediately before he had no appetite nor will1 the cause of his will is not the will itself1 but something else not in his own disposing4 ,so that1 whereas it is out of controversy that of voluntary actions the will is a necessary cause2 and by this which is said1 the will is also caused by other things whereof it disposeth not2 it followeth that voluntary actions have all of them necessary causes1 and therefore are necessitated4 ,sidenote3 ,the ,bishop's reply4 ,j4 ,d4 8,this sixth point doth not consist in explicating of terms1 as the former2 but in two proofs1 that voluntary actions are necessitated4 ,the former proof stands thus3 #8,nothing takes beginning from itself1 but from some agent without itself1 which is not in its own disposing therefore1 c'4 ,concedo omnia2 7a7 ,i grant all he saith4 ,the will doth not take beginning from itself4 ,whether he understand by will the faculty of the will1 which is a power of the reasonable soul1 it takes not beginning from itself1 but from ,god1 who created and infused the soul into man1 and endowed it with this power3 or whether he understand by will the act of willing1 it takes not beginning from itself1 but from the faculty or from the power of willing1 which is in the soul4 ,this is certain2 finite and participated things cannot be from themselves1 nor be produced by themselves4 ,what would he conclude from hence8 ,that therefore the act of willing takes not its beginning from the faculty of the will8 ,or that the faculty is always determined antecedently1 extrinsically1 to will that which it doth will8 ,he may as soon draw water out of a pumice1 as draw any such conclusion out of these premises4 ,secondly1 for his 8taking a beginning01 either he understands a beginning of being1 or a beginning of working and acting4 ,if he understand a beginning of being1 he saith most truly1 that nothing hath a beginning of being in time from itself4 ,but this is nothing to his purpose3 the question is not between us1 whether the soul of man or the will of man be eternal4 ,but if he understand a beginning of working or moving actually1 it is a gross error4 ,all men know that when a stone descends1 or fire ascends1 or when water1 that hath been heated1 returns to its former temper2 the beginning or reason is intrinsical1 and one and the same thing doth move and is moved in a diverse respect4 ,it moves in respect of the form1 and it is moved in respect of the matter4 ,much more man1 who hath a perfect knowledge and prenotion of the end1 is most properly said to move himself4 ,yet ,i do not deny but that there are other beginnings of human actions1 which do concur with the will3 some outward1 as the first cause by general influence1 which is evermore requisite1 angels or men by persuading1 evil spirits by tempting1 the object or end by its appetibility1 the understanding by directing4 ,so passions and acquired habits4 ,but ,i deny that any of these do necessitate or can necessitate the will of man by determining it physically to one1 except ,god alone1 who doth it rarely1 in extraordinary cases4 ,and where there is no antecedent determination to one1 there is no absolute necessity1 but true liberty4 7b7 8,his second argument is ex concessis3 #8,it is out of controversy'1 saith he1 #8that of voluntary actions the will is a necessary cause'4 ,the argument may be thus reduced3 necessary causes produce necessary effects2 but the will is a necessary cause of voluntary actions4 ,i might deny his major4 ,necessary causes do not always produce necessary effects1 except they be also necessarily produced2 as ,i have shewed before in the burning of ,protagoras's book4 ,but ,i answer clearly to the minor1 that the will is not a necessary cause of what it wills in particular actions4 ,it is without controversy indeed1 for it is without all probability4 ,that it wills when it wills1 is necessary2 but that it wills this or that1 now or then1 is free4 ,more expressly1 the act of the will may be considered three ways2 either in respect of its nature1 or in respect of its exercise1 or in respect of its object4 ,first1 for the nature of the act3 that which the will wills1 is necessarily voluntary1 because the will cannot be compelled4 ,and in this sense1 #8it is out of controversy1 that the will is a necessary cause of voluntary actions'4 ,secondly1 for the exercise of its acts1 that is not necessary3 the will may either will or suspend its act4 ,thirdly1 for the object1 that is not necessary1 but free3 the will is not extrinsically determined to its objects4 ,as for example3 the cardinals meet in the conclave to choose a ,pope2 whom they choose1 he is necessarily ,pope4 ,but it is not necessary that they shall choose this or that day4 ,before they were assembled1 they might defer their assembling2 when they are assembled1 they may suspend their election for a day or a week4 ,lastly1 for the person whom they will choose1 it is freely in their own power2 otherwise if the election were not free1 it were void1 and no election at all4 ,so that which takes its beginning from the will1 is necessarily voluntary2 but it is not necessary that the will shall will this or that in particular1 as it was necessary that the person freely elected should be ,pope3 but it was not necessary either that the election should be at this time1 or that this man should be elected4 ,and therefore voluntary acts in particular have not necessary causes1 that is1 they are not necessitated40 ,,animadversions ,,upon ,,the ,,answer ,,to ,,no4 ,,xxx4 ,i had said1 that nothing taketh beginning from itself1 and that the cause of the will is not the will itself1 but something else which it disposeth not of4 ,answering to this1 he endeavours to shew us the cause of the will4 7a7 8,i grant01 saith he1 8that the will doth not take beginning from itself1 for that the faculty of the will takes beginning from ,god1 who created the soul1 and poured it into man1 and endowed it with this power2 and for that the act of willing takes not beginning from itself1 but from the faculty or from the power of willing1 which is in the soul4 ,this is certain2 finite and participated things cannot be from themselves1 nor be produced by themselves4 ,what would he conclude from hence8 ,that therefore the act of willing takes not its beginning from the faculty of the will80 ,it is well that he grants finite things 7as for his participated1 it signifies nothing here7 cannot be produced by themselves4 ,for out of this ,i can conclude that the act of willing is not produced by the faculty of willing4 ,he that hath the faculty of willing1 hath the faculty of willing something in particular4 ,and at the same time he hath the faculty of nilling the same4 ,if therefore the faculty of willing be the cause he willeth anything whatsoever1 for the same reason the faculty of nilling will be the cause at the same time of nilling it3 and so he shall will and nill the same thing at the same time1 which is absurd4 ,it seems the ,bishop had forgot1 that matter and power are indifferent to contrary forms and contrary acts4 ,it is somewhat besides the matter1 that determineth it to a certain form2 and somewhat besides the power1 that produceth a certain act3 and thence it is1 that is inferred this that he granteth1 that nothing can be produced by itself2 which nevertheless he presently contradicteth1 in saying1 that 8all men know when a stone descends1 the beginning is intrinsical01 and that 8the stone moves in respect of the form04 ,which is as much as to say1 that the form moveth the matter1 or that the stone moveth itself2 which before he denied4 ,when a stone ascends1 the beginning of the stone's motion was in itself1 that is to say1 intrinsical1 because it is not the stone's motion1 till the stone begins to be moved2 but the motion that caused it to begin to ascend1 was a precedent and extrinsical motion of the hand or other engine that threw it upward4 ,and so when it descends1 the beginning of the stone's motion is in the stone2 but nevertheless1 there is a former motion in the ambient body1 air or water1 that causeth it to descend4 ,but because no man can see it1 most men think there is none2 though reason1 wherewith the ,bishop 7as relying only upon the authority of books7 troubleth not himself1 convince that there is4 7b7 8,his second argument is1 ex concessis3 #8,it is out of controversy1 that of voluntary actions the will is a necessary cause'4 ,the argument may be thus reduced3 necessary causes produce necessary effects2 but the will is a necessary cause of voluntary actions4 ,i might deny his major2 necessary causes do not always produce necessary effects1 except they be also necessarily produced40 ,he has reduced the argument to nonsense1 by saying necessary causes produce not necessary effects4 ,for necessary effects1 unless he mean such effects as shall necessarily be produced1 is insignificant4 ,let him consider therefore with what grace he can say1 necessary causes do not always produce their effects1 except those effects be also necessarily produced4 ,but his answer is chiefly to the minor1 and denies that the will is not a necessary cause of what it wills in particular actions4 ,that it wills when it wills1 saith he1 is necessary2 but that it wills this or that1 is free4 ,is it possible for any man to conceive1 that he that willeth1 can will anything but this or that particular thing8 ,it is therefore manifest1 that either the will is a necessary cause of this or that or any other particular action1 or not the necessary cause of any voluntary action at all4 ,for universal actions there be none4 ,in that which followeth1 he undertaketh to make his doctrine more expressly understood by considering the act of the will three ways3 8in respect of its nature1 in respect of its exercise1 and in respect of its object04 ,for the nature of the act1 he saith1 that 8that which the will wills1 is necessarily voluntary01 and that in this sense he grants it is out of controversy1 that the will is a necessary cause of voluntary actions4 ,instead of 8that which the will wills01 to make it sense1 read that which the man wills2 and then if the man's will be1 as he confesseth1 a necessary cause of voluntary actions1 it is no less a necessary cause that they are actions1 than that they are voluntary4 ,for the exercise of the act1 he saith that 8the will may either will1 or suspend its act04 ,this is the old canting1 which hath already been sufficiently detected4 ,but to make it somewhat1 let us read it thus3 the man that willeth1 may either will or suspend his will3 and thus it is intelligible1 but false2 for how can he that willeth1 at the same time suspend his will8 ,and for the object he says1 that 8it is not necessary but free01 c4 ,his reason is1 because1 he says1 it was not necessary1 for example1 in choosing a ,pope1 to choose him this or that day1 or to choose this or that man4 ,i would be glad to know1 by what argument he can prove the election not to have been necessitated3 for it is not enough for him to say1 ,i perceive no necessity in it2 nor to say1 they might have chosen another1 because he knows not whether they might or not2 nor to say if he had not been freely elected1 the election had been void or none4 ,for though that be true1 it does not follow that the election was not necessary2 for there is no repugnance to necessity1 either in election or in freedom4 ,and whereas he concludeth1 8therefore voluntary acts in particular1 are not necessitated02 ,i would have been glad he had set down what voluntary acts there are1 not particular1 which by his restricting of voluntary acts he grants to be necessitated4 ,,no4 ,,xxxi4 ,t4 ,h4 ,seventhly1 ,i hold that to be a sufficient cause1 to which nothing is wanting that is needful to the producing of the effect4 ,the same is also a necessary cause3 for if it be possible that a sufficient cause shall not bring forth the effect1 then there wanted somewhat which was needful to the producing of it2 and so the cause was not sufficient4 ,but if it be impossible that a sufficient cause should not produce the effect1 then is a sufficient cause a necessary cause3 for that is said to produce an effect necessarily1 that cannot but produce it4 ,hence it is manifest1 that whatsoever is produced1 is produced necessarily3 for whatsoever is produced1 hath had a sufficient cause to produce it1 or else it had not been4 ,and therefore also voluntary actions are necessitated4 ,sidenote3 ,the ,bishop's reply4 ,j4 ,d4 8,this section contains a third argument to prove that all effects are necessary2 for clearing whereof1 it is needful to consider how a cause may be said to be sufficient or insufficient4 8,first1 several causes singly considered may be insufficient1 and the same taken conjointly be sufficient to produce an effect4 ,as 7a7 two horses jointly are sufficient to draw a coach1 which either of them singly is insufficient to do4 ,now to make the effect1 that is1 the drawing of the coach necessary1 it is not only required that the two horses be sufficient to draw it1 but also that their conjunction be necessary1 and their habitude such as they may draw it4 ,if the owner of one of these horses will not suffer him to draw2 if the smith have shod the other in the quick1 and lamed him2 if the horse have cast a shoe1 or be a resty jade1 and will not draw but when he list2 then the effect is not necessarily produced1 but contingently more or less1 as the concurrence of the causes is more or less contingent4 7b7 8,secondly1 a cause may be said to be sufficient1 either because it produceth that effect which is intended1 as in the generation of a man2 or else1 because it is sufficient to produce that which is produced1 as in the generation of a monster4 ,the former is properly called a sufficient cause1 the latter a weak and insufficient cause4 ,now1 if the debility of the cause be not necessary1 but contingent1 then the effect is not necessary1 but contingent4 ,it is a rule in logic1 that the conclusion always follows the weaker part4 ,if the premises be but probable1 the conclusion cannot be demonstrative4 ,it holds as well in causes as in propositions4 ,no effect can exceed the virtue of its cause4 ,if the ability or debility of the causes be contingent1 the effect cannot be necessary4 8,thirdly1 that which concerns this question of liberty from necessity most nearly1 is that 7c7 a cause is said to be sufficient in respect of the ability of it to act1 not in respect of its will to act4 ,the concurrence of the will is needful to the production of a free effect4 ,but the cause may be sufficient1 though the will do not concur4 ,as ,god is sufficient to produce a thousand worlds2 but it doth not follow from thence1 either that he hath produced them1 or that he will produce them4 ,the blood of ,christ is a sufficient ransom for all mankind2 but it doth not follow therefore1 that all mankind shall be actually saved by virtue of his blood4 ,a man may be a sufficient tutor1 though he will not teach every scholar1 and a sufficient physician1 though he will not administer to every patient4 ,for as much therefore as the concurrence of the will is needful to the production of every free effect1 and yet the cause may be sufficient in sensu diviso1 although the will do not concur2 it follows evidently1 that the cause may be sufficient1 and yet something which is needful to the production of the effect1 may be wanting2 and that every sufficient cause is not a necessary cause4 8,lastly1 if any man be disposed to wrangle against so clear light1 and say1 that though the free agent be sufficient in sensu diviso1 yet he is not sufficient in sensu composito1 to produce effect without the concurrence of the will1 he saith true3 but first1 he bewrays the weakness and the fallacy of the former argument1 which is a mere trifling between sufficiency in a divided sense1 and sufficiency in a compounded sense4 ,and seeing the concurrence of the will is not predetermined1 there is no antecedent necessity before it do concur2 and when it hath concurred1 the necessity is but hypothetical1 which may consist with liberty40 ,,animadversions ,,upon ,,the ,,answer ,,to ,,no4 ,,xxxi4 ,in this place he disputeth against my definition of a sufficient cause1 namely1 that cause to which nothing is wanting needful to the producing of the effect4 ,i thought this definition could have been misliked by no man that had ,english enough to know that a sufficient cause1 and cause enough1 signifieth the same thing4 ,and no man will say that that is cause enough to produce an effect1 to which any thing is wanting needful to the producing of it4 ,but the ,bishop thinks1 if he set down what he understands by sufficient1 it would serve to confute my definition3 and therefore says3 7a7 8,two horses jointly are sufficient to draw a coach1 which either of them singly is insufficient to do4 ,now to make the effect1 that is1 the drawing of the coach necessary1 it is not only required that the two horses be sufficient to draw it1 but also that it be necessary they shall be joined1 and that the owner of the horses will let them draw1 and that the smith hath not lamed them1 and they be not resty1 and list not to draw but when they list3 otherwise the effect is contingent04 ,it seems the ,bishop thinks two horses may be sufficient to draw a coach1 though they will not draw1 or though they be lame1 or though they be never put to draw2 and ,i think they can never produce the effect of drawing1 without those needful circumstances of being strong1 obedient1 and having the coach some way or other fastened to them4 ,he calls it a sufficient cause of drawing1 that they be coach horses1 though they be lame or will not draw4 ,but ,i say they are not sufficient absolutely1 but conditionally1 if they be not lame nor resty4 ,let the reader judge1 whether my sufficient cause or his1 may properly be called cause enough4 7b7 8,secondly1 a cause may be said to be sufficient1 either because it produceth that effect which is intended1 as in the generation of a man2 or else1 because it is sufficient to produce that which is produced1 as in the generation of a monster3 the former is properly called a sufficient cause1 the latter a weak and insufficient cause40 ,in these few lines he hath said the cause of the generation of a monster is sufficient to produce a monster1 and that it is insufficient to produce a monster4 ,how soon may a man forget his words1 that doth not understand them4 ,this term of insufficient cause1 which also the ,school calls deficient1 that they may rhyme to efficient1 is not intelligible1 but a word devised like hocus pocus1 to juggle a difficulty out of sight4 ,that which is sufficient to produce a monster1 is not therefore to be called an insufficient cause to produce a man2 no more than that which is sufficient to produce a man1 is to be called an insufficient cause to produce a monster4 7c7 8,thirdly1 a cause is said to be sufficient in respect to the ability of it to act1 not in respect of its will to act1 c4 ,as ,god is sufficient to produce a thousand worlds40 ,he understands little1 when men say1 ,god is sufficient to produce many worlds1 if he understand not the meaning to be1 that he is sufficient to produce them if he will4 ,without this supposition1 if he will1 a man is not sufficient to produce any voluntary action1 not so much as to walk1 though he be in health and at liberty4 ,the will is as much a sufficient cause without the strength to do1 as the strength without the will4 ,to that which he adds1 that my definition is 8a mere trifling between a sufficiency in a divided sense1 and a sufficiency in a compounded sense01 ,i can make no answer2 because ,i understand no more what he means by sufficiency in a divided sense1 and sufficiency in a compounded sense1 than if he had said sufficiency in a divided nonsense1 and sufficiency in a compounded nonsense4 ,,no4 ,,xxxii4 ,t4 ,h4 ,lastly1 ,i hold that the ordinary definition of a free agent1 namely1 that a free agent is that1 which when all things are present which are needful to produce the effect1 can nevertheless not produce it1 implies a contradiction1 and is nonsense2 being as much as to say1 the cause may be sufficient1 that is1 necessary1 and yet the effect not follow4 ,sidenote3 ,the ,bishop's reply4 ,j4 ,d4 8,this last point is but a corollary1 or an inference from the former doctrine1 that #8every sufficient cause produceth its effect necessarily'2 which pillar being taken away the superstructure must needs fall to the ground1 having nothing left to support it4 #8,lastly1 ,i hold'1 saith he4 ,what he is able to prove1 is something3 so much reason1 so much trust4 ,but what he holds1 concerns himself1 not others4 ,but what holds he8 #8,i hold'1 saith he1 #8that the ordinary definition of a free agent implies a contradiction1 and is nonsense4' ,that which he calls the #8ordinary definition' of liberty1 is the very definition which is given by the much greater part of ,philosophers and ,schoolmen4 ,and doth he think that all these spake nonsense3 or had no more judgment than to contradict themselves in a definition8 ,he might much better suspect himself1 than censure so many4 ,let us see the definition itself3 #8,a free agent is that1 which when all things are present that are needful to produce the effect1 can nevertheless not produce it4' ,i acknowledge the old definition of liberty1 with little variation4 ,but ,i cannot see this nonsense1 nor discover this contradiction4 ,for 7a7 in these words1 #8all things needful'1 or #8all things requisite'1 the actual determination of the will is not included4 ,but by all things needful or requisite1 all necessary power either operative or elective1 all necessary instruments and adjuments extrinsical and intrinsical1 and all conditions are intended4 ,as he that hath pen1 and ink1 and paper1 a table1 a desk1 and leisure1 the art of writing1 and the free use of his hand1 hath all things requisite to write if he will2 and yet he may forbear if he will4 ,or as he that hath men1 and money1 and arms1 and munition1 and ships1 and a just cause1 hath all things requisite for war2 yet he may make peace if he will4 ,or as the king proclaimed in the gospel 7,matth4 xxii4 #d73 ,i have prepared my dinner1 my oxen and my fatlings are killed1 all things are ready2 come unto the marriage4 ,according to ,t4 ,h4's doctrine1 the guests might have told him that he said not truly1 for their own wills were not ready4 7b7 ,and indeed if the will were 7as he conceives it is7 necessitated extrinsically to every act of willing1 if it had no power to forbear willing what it doth will1 nor to will what it doth not will2 then if the will were wanting1 something requisite to the producing of the effect was wanting4 ,but now when science and conscience1 reason and religion1 our own and other men's experience doth teach us1 that the will hath a dominion over its own acts to will or nill without extrinsical necessitation1 if the power to will be present in actu primo1 determinable by ourselves1 then there is no necessary power wanting in this respect to the producing of the effect4 8,secondly1 these words1 #8to act or not to act1 to work or not to work1 to produce or not to produce'1 have reference to the effect1 not as a thing which is already done or doing1 but as a thing to be done4 ,they imply not the actual production1 but the producibility of the effect4 ,but when once the will hath actually concurred with all other causes and conditions and circumstances1 then the effect is no more possible nor producible1 but it is in being1 and actually produced4 ,thus he takes away the subject of the question4 ,the question is1 whether effects producible be free from necessity4 ,he shuffles out #8effects producible'1 and thrusts in their places #8effects produced'1 or which are in the act of production4 ,wherefore ,i conclude1 that it is neither nonsense nor contradiction to say that a free agent1 when all things requisite to produce the effect are present1 may nevertheless not produce it4 ,,animadversions ,,upon ,,the ,,answer ,,to ,,no4 ,,xxxii4 ,the question is here whether these words #8a free agent is that1 which when all things needful to the production of the effect are present1 can nevertheless not produce it'1 imply a contradiction2 as ,i say it does4 ,to make it appear no contradiction1 he saith3 7a7 8,in these words1 #8all things needful'1 or #8all things requisite'1 the actual determination of the will is not included03 as if the will were not needful nor requisite to the producing of a voluntary action4 ,for to the production of any act whatsoever1 there is needful1 not only those things which proceed from the agent1 but also those that consist in the disposition of the patient4 ,and to use his own instance1 it is necessary to writing1 not only that there be pen1 ink1 paper1 c42 but also a will to write4 ,he that hath the former1 hath all things requisite to write if he will1 but not all things necessary to writing4 ,and so in his other instances1 he that hath men and money1 c4 7without that which he putteth in for a requisite71 hath all things requisite to make war if he will1 but not simply to make war4 ,and he in the ,gospel that had prepared his dinner1 had all things requisite for his guests if they came1 but not all things requisite to make them come4 ,and therefore 8all things requisite01 is a term ill defined by him4 7b7 8,and indeed if the will were 7as he conceives it is7 necessitated extrinsically to every act of willing2 if it had no power to forbear willing what it doth will1 nor to will what it does not will2 then if the will were wanting1 something requisite to the producing of the effect were wanting4 ,but now when science and conscience1 reason and religion1 our own and other men's experience doth teach us1 that the will hath a dominion over its own acts to will or nill without extrinsical necessitation1 if the power to will be present in actu primo1 determinable by ourselves1 then there is no necessary power wanting in this respect to the producing of the effect40 ,these words1 8the will hath power to forbear willing what it doth will02 and these1 8the will hath a dominion over its own acts02 and these1 8the power to will is present in actu primo1 determinable by ourselves02 are as wild as ever were any spoken within the walls of ,bedlam3 and if science1 conscience1 reason1 and religion teach us to speak thus1 they make us mad4 ,and that which followeth is false3 8to act or not to act1 to work or not to work1 to produce or not to produce1 have reference to the effect1 not as a thing which is already done or doing1 but as a thing to be done04 ,for to act1 to work1 to produce1 are the same thing with to be doing4 ,it is not the act1 but the power that hath reference to the future3 for act and power differ in nothing but in this1 that the former signifieth the time present1 the latter the time to come4 ,and whereas he adds1 that ,i shuffle out effects producible1 and thrust into their places effects produced2 ,i must take it for an untruth1 till he cite the place wherein ,i have done so4 ,,no4 ,,xxxiii4 ,t4 ,h4 ,for my first five points2 where it is explicated1 first1 what spontaneity is2 secondly1 what deliberation is2 thirdly1 what will1 propension1 and appetite is2 fourthly1 what a free agent is2 fifthly1 what liberty is3 there can be no other proof offered but every man's own experience1 by reflecting on himself1 and remembering what he useth to have in his mind1 that is1 what he himself meaneth1 when he saith1 an action is spontaneous1 a man deliberates1 such is his will1 that agent or that action is free4 ,now1 he that so reflecteth on himself1 cannot but be satisfied1 that deliberation is the considering of the good and evil sequels of the action to come2 that by spontaneity is meant inconsiderate proceeding2 for else nothing is meant by it2 that will is the last act of our deliberation2 that a free agent1 is he that can do if he will and forbear if he will2 and that liberty is the absence of external impediments4 ,but to those that out of custom speak not what they conceive1 but what they hear1 and are not able or will not take the pains to consider what they think1 when they hear such words1 no argument can be sufficient2 because experience and matter of fact is not verified by other men's arguments1 but by every man's own sense and memory4 ,for example1 how can it be proved1 that to love a thing and to think it good are all one1 to a man that does not mark his own meaning by those words8 ,or how can it be proved that eternity is not nunc stans1 to a man that says these words by custom1 and never considers how he can conceive the thing itself in his mind8 ,also the sixth point1 that a man cannot imagine any thing to begin without a cause1 can no other way be made known but by trying how he can imagine it4 ,but if he try1 he shall find as much reason1 if there be no cause of the thing1 to conceive it should begin at one time as another1 that is1 he hath equal reason to think it should begin at all times1 which is impossible4 ,and therefore he must think there was some special cause1 why it began then rather than sooner or later2 or else1 that it began never1 but was eternal4 ,sidenote3 ,the ,bishop's reply4 ,j4 ,d4 8,now at length he comes to his main proofs2 he that hath so confidently censured the whole current of ,schoolmen and ,philosophers of nonsense1 had need to produce strong evidence for himself4 ,so he calls his reasons1 ,no4 ,,xxxvi41 demonstrative proofs4 ,all demonstrations are either from the cause or the effect1 not from private notions and conceptions which we have in our minds4 ,that which he calls a demonstration1 deserves not the name of an intimation4 ,he argues thus3 #8that which a man conceives in his mind by these words1 spontaneity1 deliberation1 c42 that they are'4 ,this is his proposition1 which ,i deny4 7a7 ,the true natures of things are not to be judged by the private ideas1 or conceptions of men1 but by their causes and formal reasons4 ,ask an ordinary person what upwards signifies1 and whether our antipodes have their heads upwards or downwards2 and he will not stick to tell you1 that if his head be upwards1 theirs must needs be downwards4 ,and this is because he knows not the formal reason thereof2 that the heavens encircle the earth1 and what is towards heaven is upwards4 ,this same erroneous notion of upwards and downwards1 before the true reason was fully discovered1 abused more than ordinary capacities2 as appears by their arguments of penduli homines1 and pendul arbores4 ,again1 what do men conceive ordinarily by this word empty1 as when they say an empty vessel1 or by this word body1 as when they say1 there is no body in that room8 ,they intend not to exclude the air1 either out of the vessel or out of the room3 yet reason tells us1 that the vessel is not truly empty1 and that the air is a true body4 ,i might give a hundred such like instances4 ,he who leaves the conduct of his understanding to follow vulgar notions1 shall plunge himself into a thousand errors2 like him who leaves a certain guide to follow an ignus fatuus1 or a will-with-the-wisp4 ,so his proposition is false4 7b7 ,his reason1 #8that matter of fact is not verified by other men's arguments1 but by every man's own sense and memory'1 is likewise maimed on both sides4 ,whether we hear such words or not1 is matter of fact2 and sense is the proper judge of it3 but what these words do1 or ought truly to signify1 is not to be judged by sense but by reason4 ,secondly1 reason may1 and doth oftentimes correct sense1 even about its proper object4 ,sense tells us that the sun is no bigger than a good ball2 but reason demonstrates1 that it is many times greater than the whole globe of the earth4 ,as to his instance3 #8how can it be proved1 that to love a thing and to think it good is all one1 to a man that doth not mark his own meaning by these words'1 ,i confess it cannot be proved2 for it is not true4 ,beauty1 and likeness1 and love1 do conciliate love as much as goodness1 cos amoris amor4 ,love is a passion of the will2 but to judge of goodness is an act of the understanding4 ,a father may love an ungracious child1 and yet not esteem him good4 ,a man loves his own house better than another man's2 yet he cannot but esteem many others better than his own4 ,his other instance1 #8how can it be proved that eternity is not nunc stans1 to a man that says these words by custom1 and never considers how he can conceive the thing itself in his mind'1 is just like the former1 not to be proved by reason1 but by fancy1 which is the way he takes4 ,and it is not unlike the counsel which one gave to a novice about the choice of his wife1 to advise with the bells3 as he fancied so they sounded1 either take her or leave her4 7c7 8,then for his assumption1 it is as defective as his proposition1 that by those words spontaneity1 c1 men do understand as he conceives4 ,no rational man doth conceive a spontaneous action and an indeliberate action to be all one4 ,every indeliberate action is not spontaneous2 the fire considers not whether it should burn1 yet the burning of it is not spontaneous4 ,neither is every spontaneous action indeliberate2 a man may deliberate what he will eat1 and yet eat it spontaneously4 7d7 ,neither doth deliberation properly signify1 the considering of the good and evil sequels of an action to come1 but the considering whether this be a good and fit means1 or the best and fittest means for obtaining such an end4 ,the physician doth not deliberate whether he should cure his patient1 but by what means he should cure him4 ,deliberation is of the means1 not of the end4 7e7 ,much less doth any man conceive with ,t4 ,h4 that deliberation is an imagination1 or an act of fancy not of reason1 common to men of discretion with madmen1 and natural fools1 and children1 and brute beasts4 7f7 ,thirdly1 neither doth any understanding man conceive1 or can conceive1 that #8the will is an act of our deliberation'2 7the understanding and the will are two distinct faculties72 or that #8only the last appetite is to be called our will'4 ,so no man should be able to say1 this is my will1 because he knows not whether he shall persevere in it or not4 7g7 ,concerning the fourth point we agree1 that #8he is a free agent that can do if he will1 and forbear if he will'4 ,but ,i wonder how this dropped from his pen4 ,what is now become of his absolute necessity of all things1 if a man be free to do and to forbear anything8 ,will he make himself guilty of the nonsense of the ,schoolmen1 and run with them into contradictions for company8 ,it may be he will say1 he can do if he will1 and forbear if he will1 but he cannot will if he will4 ,this will not serve his turn2 for if the cause of a free action1 that is1 the will to do it be determined1 then the effect1 or the action itself is likewise determined2 a determined cause cannot produce an undetermined effect2 either the agent can will and forbear to will1 or else he cannot do and forbear to do4 7h7 ,but we differ wholly about the fifth point4 ,he who conceives liberty aright1 conceives both a liberty in the subject to will or not to will1 and a liberty to the object to will this or that1 and a liberty from impediments4 ,t4 ,h4 by a new way of his own cuts off the liberty of the subject2 as if a stone was free to ascend or descend1 because it hath no outward impediment3 and the liberty towards the object2 as if the needle touched with the loadstone were free to point either towards the north or towards the south1 because there is not a barricado in its way to hinder it4 ,yea1 he cuts off the liberty from inward impediments also2 as if a hawk were at liberty to fly when her wings are plucked1 but not when they are tied4 ,and so he makes liberty from extrinsical impediments to be complete liberty2 so he ascribes liberty to brute beasts1 and liberty to rivers1 and by consequence makes beasts and rivers to be capable of sin and punishment4 ,assuredly ,xerxes1 who caused the ,hellespont to be beaten with so many stripes1 was of this opinion4 ,lastly1 ,t4 ,h4's reason1 that #8it is custom1 or want of ability1 or negligence1 which makes a man conceive otherwise'1 is but a begging of that which he should prove4 ,other men consider as seriously as himself1 with as much judgment as himself1 with less prejudice than himself1 and yet they can apprehend no such sense of these words4 ,would he have other men feign they see fiery dragons in the air1 because he affirms confidently that he sees them1 and wonders why others are so blind as not to see them8 7i7 8,the reason for the sixth point is like the former1 a fantastical or imaginative reason4 #8,how can a man imagine anything to begin without a cause1 or if it should begin without a cause1 why it should begin at this time rather than at that time8' ,he saith truly1 nothing can begin without a cause1 that is1 to be2 but it may begin to act of itself without any other cause4 ,nothing can begin without a cause2 but many things may begin1 and do begin without necessary causes4 ,a free cause may as well choose his time when he will begin1 as a necessary cause be determined extrinsically when it must begin4 ,and although free effects cannot be foretold1 because they are not certainly predetermined in their causes2 yet when the free causes do determine themselves1 they are of as great certainty as the other4 ,as when ,i see a bell ringing1 ,i can conceive the cause of it as well why it rings now1 as ,i know the interposition of the earth to be the cause of the eclipse of the moon1 or the most certain occurrent in the nature of things4 7k7 8,and now that ,i have answered ,t4 ,h4's arguments drawn from the private conceptions of men concerning the sense of words1 ,i desire him seriously without prejudice to examine himself1 and those natural notions which he finds in himself1 7not of words1 but of things2 these are from nature1 those are by imposition71 whether he doth not find by experience1 that he doth many things which he might have left undone if he would1 and omits many things which he might have done if he would2 whether he doth not some things out of mere animosity and will1 without either regard to the direction of right reason or serious respect of what is honest or profitable1 only to show that he will have a dominion over his own actions2 as we see ordinarily in children1 and wise men find at some times in themselves by experience2 7and ,i apprehend this very defence of necessity against liberty to be partly of that kind72 whether he is not angry with those who draw him from his study1 or cross him in his desires2 7if they be necessitated to do it1 why should he be angry with them1 any more than he is angry with a sharp winter1 or a rainy day that keeps him at home against his antecedent will872 whether he doth not sometimes blame himself1 and say1 #8,o what a fool was ,i to do thus and thus'1 or wish to himself1 #8,o that ,i had been wise'1 or1 #8,o that ,i had not done such an act'4 ,if he have no dominion over his actions1 if he be irresistibly necessitated to all things that he doth1 he might as well wish1 #8,o that ,i had not breathed1' or blame himself for growing old1 #8,o what a fool was ,i to grow old'40 ,,animadversions ,,upon ,,the ,,answer ,,to ,,no4 ,,xxxiii4 ,i have said in the beginning of this number1 that to define what spontaneity is1 what deliberation is1 what will1 propension1 appetite1 a free agent1 and liberty is1 and to prove they are well defined1 there can be no other proof offered1 but every man's own experience and memory of what he meaneth by such words4 ,for definitions being the beginning of all demonstration1 cannot themselves be demonstrated1 that is1 proved to another man2 all that can be done1 is either to put him in mind what those words signify commonly in the matter whereof they treat1 or if the words be unusual1 to make the definitions of them true by mutual consent in their signification4 ,and though this be manifestly true1 yet there is nothing of it amongst the ,schoolmen1 who use to argue not by rule1 but as fencers teach to handle weapons1 by quickness only of the hand and eye4 ,the ,bishop therefore boggles at this kind of proof2 and says1 7a7 8the true natures of things are not to be judged by the private ideas or conceptions of men1 but by their causes and formal reasons4 ,ask an ordinary person what upwards signifies10 c4 ,but what will he answer1 if ,i should ask him1 how he will judge of the causes of things1 whereof he hath no idea or conception in his own mind8 ,it is therefore impossible to give a true definition of any word without the idea of the thing which that word signifieth1 or not according to that idea or conception4 ,here again he discovereth the true cause why he and other ,schoolmen so often speak absurdly4 ,for they speak without conception of the things1 and by rote1 one receiving what he saith from another by tradition1 from some puzzled divine or philosopher1 that to decline a difficulty speaks in such manner as not to be understood4 ,and where he bids us ask an ordinary person what upwards signifieth1 ,i dare answer for that ordinary person he will tell us as significantly as any scholar1 and say it is towards heaven2 and as soon as he knows the earth is round1 makes no scruple to believe there are antipodes1 being wiser in that point than were those which he saith to have been of more than ordinary capacities4 ,again1 ordinary men understand not1 he saith1 the words empty and body2 yes1 but they do1 just as well as learned men4 ,when they hear named an empty vessel1 the learned as well as the unlearned mean and understand the same thing1 namely1 that there is nothing in it that can be seen2 and whether it be truly empty1 the ploughman and the ,schoolman know alike4 8,i might give01 he says1 8a hundred such like instances40 ,that is true2 a man may give a thousand foolish and impertinent instances of men ignorant in such questions of philosophy concerning emptiness1 body1 upwards1 and downwards1 and the like4 ,but the question is not whether such and such tenets be true1 but whether such and such words can be well defined without thinking upon the things they signified2 as the ,bishop thinks they may1 when he concludeth with these words1 8so his proposition is false04 7b7 8,his reason1 #8that matter of fact is not verified by other men's arguments1 but by every man's own sense and memory'1 is likewise maimed on both sides4 ,whether we hear such words or not1 is matter of fact1 and sense is the proper judge of it2 but what these words do1 or ought truly to signify1 is not to be judged by sense1 but by reason40 ,a man is born with a capacity after due time and experience to reason truly2 to which capacity of nature1 if there be added no discipline at all1 yet as far as he reasoneth he will reason truly2 though by a right discipline he may reason truly in more numerous and various matters4 ,but he that hath lighted on deceiving or deceived masters1 that teach for truth all that hath been dictated to them by their own interest1 or hath been cried up by other such teachers before them1 have for the most part their natural reason1 as far as concerneth the truth of doctrine1 quite defaced or very much weakened1 becoming changelings through the enchantments of words not understood4 ,this cometh into my mind from this saying of the ,bishop1 that matter of fact is not verified by sense and memory1 but by arguments4 ,how is it possible that1 without discipline1 a man should come to think that the testimony of a witness1 which is the only verifier of matter of fact1 should consist not in sense and memory1 so as he may say he saw and remembers the thing done1 but in arguments or syllogisms8 ,or how can an unlearned man be brought to think the words he speaks1 ought to signify1 when he speaks sincerely1 anything else but that which himself meant by them8 ,or how can any man without learning take the question1 8whether the sun be no bigger than a ball1 or bigger than the earth01 to be a question of fact8 ,nor do ,i think that any man is so simple1 as not to find that to be good which he loveth2 good1 ,i say1 so far forth1 as it maketh him to love it4 ,or is there any unlearned man so stupid1 as to think eternity is this present instant of time standing still1 and the same eternity to be the very next instant after2 and consequently that there be so many eternities as there can be instants of time supposed8 ,no1 there is scholastic learning required in some measure to make one mad4 7c7 8,then for his assumption1 it is as defective as his proposition1 that by these words1 spontaneity1 c4 men do understand as he conceives1 c4 ,no rational man doth conceive a spontaneous action and an indeliberate action to be all one2 every indeliberate action is not spontaneous1 c40 ,not every spontaneous action indeliberate8 ,this ,i get by striving to make sense of that which he strives to make nonsense4 ,i never thought the word spontaneity ,english4 ,yet because he used it1 ,i make such meaning of it as it would bear1 and said it 8meant inconsiderate proceeding1 or nothing04 ,and for this my too much officiousness1 ,i receive the reward of being thought by him not to be a rational man4 ,i know that in the ,latin of all authors but ,schoolmen1 actio spontanea signifies that action1 whereof there is no apparent cause derived further than from the agent itself2 and is in all things that have sense the same with voluntary1 whether deliberated or not deliberated4 ,and therefore where he distinguished it from voluntary1 ,i thought he might mean indeliberate4 ,but let it signify what it will1 provided it be intelligible1 it would make against him4 7d7 8,neither doth deliberation properly signify #8the considering of the good and evil sequels of an action to come'2 but the considering whether this be a good and fit means1 or the best and fittest means1 for obtaining such an end40 ,if the ,bishop's words proceeded not from hearing and reading of others1 but from his own thoughts1 he could never have reprehended this definition of deliberation1 especially in the manner he doth it2 for he says1 it is the considering whether this or that be a good and fit means for obtaining such an end2 as if considering whether a means be good or not1 were not all one with considering whether the sequel of using those means be good or evil4 7e7 8,much less doth any man conceive with ,t4 ,h4 that #8deliberation is an act of fancy'1 not of reason1 common to men of discretion with madmen1 natural fools1 children1 and brute beasts04 ,i do indeed conceive that deliberation is an act of imagination or fancy2 nay more1 that reason and understanding also are acts of the imagination1 that is to say1 they are imaginations4 ,i find it so by considering my own ratiocination2 and he might find it so in his1 if he did consider his own thoughts1 and not speak as he does by rote2 by rote ,i say1 when he disputes2 not by rote1 when he is about those trifles he calleth business2 then when he speaks1 he thinks of1 that is to say1 he imagines1 his business2 but here he thinks only upon the words of other men that have gone before him in this question1 transcribing their conclusions and arguments1 not his own thoughts4 7f7 8,thirdly1 neither doth any understanding man conceive1 or can conceive1 either #8that the will is an act of our deliberation' 7the understanding and the will are two distinct faculties72 or #8that only the last appetite is to be called our will'40 ,though the understanding and the will were two distinct faculties1 yet followeth it not that the will and the deliberation are two distinct faculties4 ,for the whole deliberation is nothing else but so many wills alternatively changed1 according as a man understandeth or fancieth the good and evil sequels of the thing concerning which he deliberateth whether he shall pursue it1 or of the means whether they conduce or not to that end1 whatsoever it be1 he seeketh to obtain4 ,so that in deliberation there be many wills1 whereof not any is the cause of a voluntary action but the last2 as ,i have said before1 answering this objection in another place4 7g7 8,concerning the fourth point we agree1 that #8he is a free agent1 that can do if he will and forbear if he will'4 ,but ,i wonder how this dropped from his pen8 c4 ,it may be he will say he can do if he will and forbear if he will1 but he cannot will if he will40 ,he has no reason to wonder how this dropped from my pen4 ,he found it in my answer ,no4 ,,iii1 and has been all this while about to confute it1 so long indeed that he had forgot ,i said it2 and now again brings another argument to prove a man is free to will1 which is this3 8,either the agent can will and forbear to will1 or else he cannot do and forbear to do04 ,there is no doubt a man can will one thing or other1 and forbear to will it4 ,for men1 if they be awake1 are always willing one thing or other4 ,but put the case1 a man has a will to-day to do a certain action to-morrow2 is he sure to have the same will to-morrow1 when he is to do it8 ,is he free to-day1 to choose to-morrow's will8 ,this is it that is now in question1 and this argument maketh nothing for the affirmative or negative4 7h7 8,but we differ wholly about the fifth point4 ,he who conceives liberty aright1 conceives both a #8liberty in the subject'1 to will or not to will1 and a #8liberty to the object' to will this or that1 and a #8liberty from impediments'4 ,t4 ,h41 by a new way of his own1 cuts off the #8liberty of the subject'1 as if a stone were free to ascend or descend because it hath no outward impediment2 and the #8liberty towards the object'1 as if the needle touched with the loadstone were free to point either towards the north or towards the south1 because there is not a barricado in its way40 ,how does it appear1 that he who conceives liberty aright1 conceives a liberty in the subject to will or not to will2 unless he mean liberty to do if he will1 or not to do if he will not1 which was never denied8 ,or how does it follow1 that a stone is as free to ascend as descend1 unless he prove there is no outward impediment to its ascent2 which cannot be proved1 for the contrary is true8 ,or how proveth he1 that there is no outward impediment to keep that point of the loadstone1 which placeth itself towards the north1 from turning to the south8 ,his ignorance of the causes external is not a sufficient argument that there are none4 ,and whereas he saith1 that according to my definition of liberty1 8a hawk were at liberty to fly when her wings are plucked1 but not when they are tied02 ,i answer that she is not at liberty to fly when her wings are tied2 but to say1 when her wings are plucked that she wanted the liberty to fly1 were to speak improperly and absurdly2 for in that case1 men that speak ,english use to say she cannot fly4 ,and for his reprehension of my attributing liberty to brute beasts and rivers2 ,i would be glad to know whether it be improper language1 to say a bird or beast may be set at liberty from the cage wherein they were imprisoned or to say that a river1 which was stopped1 hath recovered its free course2 and how it follows1 that a beast or river recovering this freedom must needs therefore 8be capable of sin and punishment08 7i7 8,the reason for the sixth point is like the former1 a phantastical or imaginative reason3 #8,how can a man imagine anything to begin without a cause2 or if it should begin without a cause1 why it should begin at this time1 rather than at that time8' ,he saith truly1 nothing can begin without a cause1 that is to be2 but it may begin to act of itself without any other cause4 ,nothing can begin without a cause2 but many things may begin without a necessary cause40 ,he granteth nothing can begin without a cause2 and he hath granted formerly that nothing can cause itself4 ,and now he saith1 it may begin to act of itself4 ,the action therefore begins to be without any cause1 which he said nothing could do1 contradicting what he had said but in the line before4 ,and for that that he saith1 that 8many things may begin not without a cause1 but without a necessary cause02 it hath been argued before2 and all causes have been proved1 if entire and sufficient causes1 to be necessary4 ,and that which he repeateth here1 namely1 that 8a free cause may choose his time when he will begin to work02 and that 8although free effects cannot be foretold1 because they are not certainly predetermined in their causes1 yet when the free causes do determine themselves1 they are of as great certainty as the other02 it has been made appear sufficiently before that it is but jargon1 the words free cause and determining themselves being insignificant1 and having nothing in the mind of man answerable to them4 7k7 8,and now that ,i have answered ,t4 ,h4's arguments1 drawn from the private conceptions of men concerning the sense of words1 ,i desire him seriously to examine himself1 c40 ,one of his interrogatories is this1 8whether ,i find not by experience1 that ,i do many things which ,i might have left undone if ,i would04 ,this question was needless1 because all the way ,i have granted him that men have liberty to do many things if they will1 which they left undone because they had not the will to do them4 ,another interrogatory is this1 8whether ,i do not some things without regard to the direction of right reason1 or serious respect of what is honest or profitable04 ,this question was in vain1 unless he think himself my confessor4 ,another is1 8whether ,i writ not this defence against liberty1 only to show ,i will have a dominion over my own actions04 ,to this ,i answer1 no3 but to show ,i have no dominion over my will1 and this also at his request4 ,but all these questions serve in this place for nothing else1 but to deliver him of a jest he was in labour withal3 and therefore his last question is1 8whether ,i do not sometimes say1 #8,oh1 what a fool was ,i to do thus and thus6' or1 #8,oh1 that ,i had been wise6' or1 #8,oh1 what a fool was ,i to grow old6'0 ,subtle questions1 and full of episcopal gravity6 ,i would he had left out charging me with blasphemous1 desperate1 destructive1 and atheistical opinions4 ,i should then have pardoned him his calling me fool2 both because ,i do many things foolishly1 and because1 in this question disputed between us1 ,i think he will appear a greater fool than ,i4 ,,no4 ,,xxxiv4 ,t4 ,h4 ,for the seventh point1 that all events have necessary causes1 it is there proved in that they have sufficient causes4 ,further1 let us in this place also suppose any event never so casual1 as for example1 the throwing ambs-ace upon a pair of dice2 and see if it must not have been necessary before it was thrown4 ,for1 seeing it was thrown1 it had a beginning1 and consequently a sufficient cause to produce it2 consisting partly in the dice1 partly in the outward things1 as the posture of the party's hand1 the measure of force applied by the caster1 the posture of the parts of the table1 and the like4 ,in sum1 there was nothing wanting that was necessarily requisite to the producing of that particular cast2 and consequently1 that cast was necessarily thrown4 ,for if it had not been thrown1 there had wanted somewhat requisite to the throwing of it2 and so the cause had not been sufficient4 ,in the like manner it may be proved that every other accident1 how contingent soever it seem1 or how voluntary soever it be1 is produced necessarily2 which is that ,j4 ,d4 disputes against4 ,the same also may be proved in this manner4 ,let the case be put for example1 of the weather4 ,it is necessary1 that to-morrow it shall rain or not rain4 ,if therefore it be not necessary it shall rain1 it is necessary it shall not rain4 ,otherwise it is not necessary that the proposition1 it shall rain or it shall not rain1 should be true4 ,i know there are some that say1 it may necessarily be true1 that one of the two shall come to pass1 but not singly1 that it shall rain or it shall not rain4 ,which is as much as to say1 one of them is necessary1 yet neither of them is necessary4 ,and therefore1 to seem to avoid that absurdity1 they make a distinction1 that neither of them is true determinate1 but indeterminate4 ,which distinction either signifies no more than this3 one of them is true1 but we know not which1 and so the necessity remains1 though we know it not3 or if the meaning of the distinction be not that1 it has no meaning4 ,and they might as well have said1 one of them is true tytyrice1 but neither of them tupatulice4 ,sidenote3 ,the ,bishop's reply4 ,j4 ,d4 7a7 8,his former proof1 that all sufficient causes are necessary causes1 is answered before 7,no4 ,,xxxi74 7b7 ,and his two instances of casting ambs-ace1 and raining to-morrow1 are altogether impertinent to the question now agitated between us1 for two reasons4 ,first1 our present controversy is concerning free actions1 which proceed from the liberty of man's will3 both his instances are of contingent actions1 which proceed from the indetermination or contingent concurrence of natural causes4 ,first1 that there are free actions which proceed merely from election1 without any outward necessitation1 is a truth so evident as that there is a sun in the heavens2 and he that doubteth of it1 may as well doubt whether there be a shell without the nut1 or a stone within the olive4 ,a man proportions his time each day1 and allots so much to his devotions1 so much to his study1 so much to his diet1 so much to his recreations1 so much to necessary or civil visits1 so much to his rest2 he who will seek for ,i know not what causes of all this without himself1 except that good ,god who hath given him a reasonable soul1 may as well seek for a cause of the ,egyptian pyramids among the crocodiles of ,nilus4 7c7 ,secondly1 for mixed actions which proceed from the concurrence of free and natural agents1 though they be not free1 yet they are not necessary4 ,as1 to keep my former instance1 a man walking through a street of a city to do his occasions1 a tile falls from a house and breaks his head4 ,the breaking of his head was not necessary1 for he did freely choose to go that way without any necessitation2 neither was it free1 for he did not deliberate of that accident2 therefore it was contingent1 and by undoubted consequence1 there are contingent actions in the world which are not free4 ,most certainly by the concurrence of free causes1 as ,god1 the good and bad angels1 and men1 with natural agents1 sometimes on purpose and sometimes by accident1 many events happen1 which otherwise had never happened2 many effects are produced1 which otherwise had never been produced4 ,and admitting such things to be contingent1 not necessary1 all their consequent effects1 not only immediate1 but mediate1 must likewise be contingent1 that is to say1 such as do not proceed from a continued connexion and succession of necessary causes2 which is directly contrary to ,t4 ,h4's opinion4 7d7 8,thirdly1 for the actions of brute beasts1 though they be not free1 though they have not the use of reason to restrain their appetites from that which is sensitively good by the consideration of what is rationally good1 or what is honest1 and though their fancies be determined by nature to some kinds of work2 yet to think that every individual action of theirs1 and each animal motion of theirs1 even to the least murmur or gesture1 is bound by the chain of unalterable necessity to the extrinsical causes or objects1 ,i see no ground for it4 ,christ saith1 one of these sparrows doth not fall to the ground without your heavenly ,father1 that is1 without an influence of power from him1 or exempted from his disposition2 he doth not say1 which your heavenly ,father casteth not down4 ,lastly1 for the natural actions of inanimate creatures1 wherein there is not the least concurrence of any free or voluntary agents1 the question is yet more doubtful4 ,for many things are called contingent in respect of us1 because we know not the cause of them1 which really and in themselves are not contingent1 but necessary4 ,also many things are contingent in respect of one single cause1 either actually hindered1 or in possibility to be hindered1 which are necessary in respect of the joint concurrence of all collateral causes4 7e7 ,but whether there be a necessary connexion of all natural causes from the beginning1 so as they must all have concurred as they have done1 and in the same degree of power1 and have been deficient as they have been in all events whatsoever1 would require a further examination1 if it were pertinent to this question of liberty2 but it is not4 ,it is sufficient to my purpose1 to have showed that all elective actions are free from absolute necessity3 and moreover1 that the concurrence of voluntary and free agents with natural causes1 both upon purpose and accidentally1 hath helped them to produce many effects1 which otherwise they had not produced1 and hindered them from producing many effects1 which otherwise they had produced3 and that if this intervention of voluntary and free agents had been more frequent than it hath been1 as without doubt it might have been1 many natural events had been otherwise than they are4 ,and therefore he might have spared his instance of casting ambs-ace and raining to-morrow4 ,and first1 for his casting ambs-ace3 if it be thrown by a fair gamester with indifferent dice1 it is a mixed action2 the casting of the dice is free1 but the casting of ambs-ace is contingent4 ,a man may deliberate whether he will cast the dice or not2 but it were folly to deliberate whether he will cast ambs-ace or not1 because it is not in his power1 unless he be a cheater that can cog the dice1 or the dice be false dice2 and then the contingency1 or degree of contingency1 ceaseth accordingly as the caster hath more or less cunning1 or as the figure or making of the dice doth incline them to ambs-ace more than to another cast1 or necessitate them to this cast and no other4 ,howsoever1 so far as the cast is free or contingent1 so far it is not necessary3 and where necessity begins1 there liberty and contingency do cease to be4 ,likewise his other instance of raining or not raining to-morrow1 is not of a free elective act1 nor always of a contingent act4 ,in some countries1 as they have their stati venti1 their certain winds at set seasons2 so they have their certain and set rains4 ,the ,ethiopian rains are supposed to be the cause of the certain inundation of ,nilus4 ,in some eastern countries they have rain only twice a year1 and those constant2 which the ,scriptures call the former and the later rain4 ,in such places not only the causes do act determinately and necessarily1 but also the determination or necessity of the event is foreknown to the inhabitants4 ,in our climate1 the natural causes celestial and sublunary do not produce rain so necessarily at set times2 neither can we say so certainly and infallibly1 it will rain to-morrow1 or it will not rain to-morrow4 ,nevertheless1 it may so happen that the causes are so disposed and determined1 even in our climate1 that this proposition1 it will rain to-morrow or it will not rain to-morrow1 may be necessary in itself2 and the prognostics1 or tokens1 may be such in the sky1 in our own bodies1 in the creatures1 animate and inanimate1 as weather glasses1 c41 that it may become probably true to us that it will rain to-morrow1 or it will not rain to-morrow4 ,but ordinarily1 it is a contingent proposition to us2 whether it be contingent also in itself1 that is1 whether the concurrence of the causes were absolutely necessary1 whether the vapours or matter of the rain may not yet be dispersed1 or otherwise consumed1 or driven beyond our coast1 is a speculation which no way concerns this question4 ,so we see one reason why his two instances are altogether impertinent2 because they are of actions which are not free1 nor elective1 nor such as proceed from the liberty of man's will4 8,secondly1 our dispute is about absolute necessity2 his proofs extend only to hypothetical necessity4 ,our question is1 whether the concurrence and determination of the causes were necessary before they did concur1 or were determined4 ,he proves that the effect is necessary after the causes have concurred1 and are determined4 ,the freest actions of ,god or man are necessary1 by such a necessity of supposition1 and the most contingent events that are1 as ,i have showed plainly1 ,no4 ,,iii1 where his instance of ambs-ace is more fully answered4 ,so his proof looks another way from his proposition4 ,his proposition is1 #8that the casting of ambs-ace was necessary before it was thrown'4 ,his proof is1 that it was necessary when it was thrown4 ,examine all his causes over and over1 and they will not afford him one grain of antecedent necessity4 ,the first cause is in the dice3 true1 if they be false dice there may be something in it2 but then his contingency is destroyed3 if they be square dice1 they have no more inclination to ambs-ace1 than to cinque and quatre1 or any other cast4 ,his second cause is #8the posture of the party's hand'3 but what necessity was there that he should put his hands into such a posture8 ,none at all4 ,the third cause is #8the measure of the force applied by the caster'4 ,now for the credit of his cause let him but name1 ,i will not say a convincing reason nor so much as a probable reason1 but even any pretence of reason1 how the caster was necessitated from without himself to apply just so much force1 and neither more nor less4 ,if he cannot1 his cause is desperate1 and he may hold his peace for ever4 ,his last cause is the posture of the table4 ,but tell us in good earnest1 what necessity there was why the caster must throw into that table rather than the other1 or that the dice must fall just upon that part of the table1 before the cast was thrown3 he that makes these to be necessary causes1 ,i do not wonder if he make all effects necessary effects4 ,if any one of these causes be contingent1 it is sufficient to render the cast contingent2 and now that they are all so contingent1 yet he will needs have the effect to be necessary4 ,and so it is when the cast is thrown2 but not before the cast was thrown1 which he undertook to prove4 ,who can blame him for being so angry with the ,schoolmen1 and their distinctions of necessity into absolute and hypothetical1 seeing they touch his freehold so nearly8 8,but though his instance of raining to-morrow be impertinent1 as being no free action1 yet because he triumphs so much in his argument1 ,i will not stick to go a little out of my way to meet a friend4 ,for ,i confess the validity of the reason had been the same1 if he had made it of a free action1 as thus3 either ,i shall finish this reply to-morrow1 or ,i shall not finish this reply to-morrow1 is a necessary proposition4 ,but because he shall not complain of any disadvantage in the alteration of his terms1 ,i will for once adventure upon his shower of rain4 ,and first1 ,i readily admit his major1 that this proposition1 either it will rain to-morrow or it will not rain to-morrow1 is necessarily true3 for of two contradictory propositions1 the one must of necessity be true1 because no third can be given4 ,but his minor1 that #8it could not be necessarily true1 except one of the members were necessarily true'1 is most false4 ,and so is his proof likewise1 that #8if neither the one nor the other of the members be necessarily true1 it cannot be affirmed that either the one or the other is true'4 ,a conjunct proposition may have both parts false1 and yet the proposition be true2 as1 if the sun shine it is day1 is a true proposition at midnight4 ,and ,t4 ,h4 confesseth as much1 ,no4 ,,xix4 #8,if ,i shall live ,i shall eat1 is a necessary proposition1 that is to say1 it is necessary that that proposition should be true whensoever uttered4 ,but it is not the necessity of the thing1 nor is it therefore necessary that the man shall live or that the man shall eat'4 ,and so ,t4 ,h4 proceeds3 #8,i do not use to fortify my distinctions with such reasons'4 ,but it seemeth he hath forgotten himself1 and is contented with such poor fortifications4 ,and though both parts of a disjunctive proposition cannot be false2 because if it be a right disjunction1 the members are repugnant1 whereof one part is infallibly true2 yet vary but the proposition a little to abate the edge of the disjunctions1 and you shall find in that which ,t4 ,h4 saith to be true1 that it is not the necessity of the thing which makes the proposition to be true4 ,as for example1 vary it thus3 ,i know that either it will rain to-morrow or that it will not rain to-morrow1 is a true proposition3 but it is not true that ,i know it will rain to-morrow1 neither is it true that ,i know it will not rain to-morrow2 wherefore the certain truth of the proposition doth not prove that either of the members is determinately true in present4 ,truth is a conformity of the understanding to the thing known1 whereof speech is an interpreter4 ,if the understanding agree not with the thing1 it is an error2 if the words agree not with the understanding1 it is a lie4 ,now the thing known1 is known either in itself or in its causes4 ,if it be known in itself as it is1 then we express our apprehension of it in words of the present tense2 as the sun is risen4 ,if it be known in its cause1 we express ourselves in words of the future tense2 as to-morrow will be an eclipse of the moon4 ,but if we neither know it in itself1 nor in its causes1 then there may be a foundation of truth1 but there is no such determinate truth of it that we can reduce it into a true proposition4 ,we cannot say it doth rain to-morrow1 or it doth not rain to-morrow2 that were not only false but absurd4 ,we cannot positively say it will rain to-morrow1 because we do not know it in its causes1 either how they are determined or that they are determined4 ,wherefore the certitude and evidence of the disjunctive proposition is neither founded upon that which will be actually to-morrow1 for it is granted that we do not know that2 nor yet upon the determination of the causes1 for then we would not say indifferently either it will rain or it will not rain1 but positively it will rain1 or positively it will not rain4 ,but it is grounded upon an undeniable principle1 that of two contradictory propositions the one must necessarily be true4 7f7 ,and therefore to say1 either this or that will infallibly be1 but it is not yet determined whether this or that shall be1 is no such senseless assertion that it deserved a tytyrice tupatulice1 but an evident truth which no man that hath his eyes in his head can doubt of4 7g7 8,if all this will not satisfy him1 ,i will give one of his own kind of proofs2 that is1 an instance4 ,that which necessitates all things1 according to ,t4 ,h4 7,no4 ,,xi71 is the decree of ,god1 or that order which is set to all things by the eternal cause4 ,now ,god himself1 who made this necessitating decree1 was not subjected to it in the making thereof2 neither was there any former order to oblige the first cause necessarily to make such a decree2 therefore this decree being an act ad extra1 was freely made by ,god without any necessitation4 ,yet nevertheless this disjunctive proposition is necessarily true3 either ,god did make each a decree1 or he did not make such a decree4 ,again1 though ,t4 ,h4's opinion were true1 that all events are necessary1 and that the whole ,christian world are deceived who believe that some events are free from necessity2 yet he will not deny1 but if it had been the good pleasure of ,god1 he might have made some causes free from necessity2 seeing that it neither argues any imperfection1 nor implies any contradiction4 ,supposing therefore that ,god had made some second causes free from any such antecedent determination to one2 yet the former disjunction would be necessarily true3 either this free undetermined cause will act after this manner1 or it will not act after this manner4 ,wherefore the necessary truth of such a disjunctive proposition doth not prove that either of the members of the disjunction singly considered1 is determinately true in present2 but only that the one of them will be determinately true to-morrow4 ,,animadversions ,,upon ,,the ,,answer ,,to ,,no4 ,,xxxiv4 7a7 8,his former proof1 that all sufficient causes are necessary causes1 is answered before 7,no4 ,,xxxi740 ,when he shall have read my animadversions upon that answer of his1 he will think otherwise1 whatsoever he will confess4 7b7 8,and his two instances of casting ambs-ace1 and of raining to-morrow1 are altogether impertinent to the question1 for two reasons40 ,his first reason is1 8because01 saith he1 8our present controversy is concerning free actions1 which proceed from the liberty of man's will2 and both his instances are of contingent actions1 which proceed from the indetermination1 or contingent concurrence of natural causes04 ,he knows that this part of my discourse1 which beginneth at ,no4 ,,xxv1 is no dispute with him at all1 but a bare setting down of my opinion concerning the natural necessity of all things2 which is opposite1 not only to the liberty of will1 but also to all contingence that is not necessary4 ,and therefore these instances were not impertinent to my purpose2 and if they be impertinent to his opinion of the liberty of man's will1 he does impertinently to meddle with them4 ,and yet for all he pretends here1 that the question is only about liberty of the will2 yet in his first discourse 7,no4 ,,xvi71 he maintains that 8the order1 beauty1 and perfection of the world doth require that in the universe should be agents of all sorts1 some necessary1 some free1 some contingent04 ,and my purpose here is to show by those instances1 that those things which we esteem most contingent are nevertheless necessary4 ,besides1 the controversy is not whether free actions which proceed from the liberty of man's will1 be necessary or not2 for ,i know no action which proceedeth from the liberty of man's will4 ,but the question is1 whether those actions which proceed from the man's will1 be necessary4 ,the man's will is something1 but the liberty of his will is nothing4 ,again1 the question is not whether contingent actions which proceed from the indetermination or contingent concurrence of natural causes1 7for there is nothing that can proceed from indetermination71 but whether contingent actions be necessary before they be done2 or whether the concurrence of natural causes1 when they happen to concur1 were not necessitated so to happen2 or whether whatsoever chanceth1 be not necessitated so to chance4 ,and that they are so necessitated1 ,i have proved already with such arguments as the ,bishop1 for aught ,i see1 cannot answer4 ,for to say1 as he doth1 that 8there are free actions which proceed merely from election1 without any outward necessitation1 is a truth so evident as that there is a sun in the heavens01 is no proof4 ,it is indeed as clear as the sun1 that there are free actions proceeding from election2 but that there is election without any outward necessitation1 is dark enough4 7c7 8,secondly1 for mixed actions1 which proceed from the concurrence of free and natural agents1 though they be not free1 yet they are not necessary1 c40 ,for proof of this he instanceth in a tile1 that falling from a house breaks a man's head1 neither necessarily nor freely1 and therefore contingently4 ,not necessarily1 8for01 saith he1 8he did freely choose to go that way without any necessitation04 ,which is as much as taking the question itself for a proof4 ,for what is else the question1 but whether a man be necessitated to choose what he chooseth8 8,again01 saith he1 8it was not free1 because he did not deliberate whether his head should be broken or not02 and concludes 8therefore it was contingent2 and by undoubted consequence1 there are contingent actions in the world which are not free04 ,this is true1 and denied by none2 but he should have proved1 that such contingent actions are not antecedently necessary by a concurrence of natural causes2 though a little before he granteth they are4 ,for whatsoever is produced by a concurrence of natural causes1 was antecedently determined in the cause of such concurrence1 though1 as he calls it1 contingent concurrence2 not perceiving that concurrence and contingent concurrence are all one1 and suppose a continued connection and succession of causes which make the effect necessarily future4 ,so that hitherto he hath proved no other contingence than that which is necessary4 7d7 8,thirdly1 for the actions of brute beasts1 c1 to think each animal motion of theirs is bound by the chain of unalterable necessity1 ,i see no ground for it40 ,it maketh nothing against the truth1 that he sees no ground for it4 ,i have pointed out the ground in my former discourse1 and am not bound to find him eyes4 ,he himself immediately citeth a place of ,scripture that proveth it1 where ,christ saith1 one of these sparrows doth not fall to the ground without your heavenly ,father2 which place1 if there were no more1 were a sufficient ground for the assertion of the necessity of all those changes of animal motion in birds and other living creatures1 which seem to us so uncertain4 ,but when a man is dizzy with influence of power1 elicit acts1 permissive will1 hypothetical necessity1 and the like unintelligible terms1 the ground goes from him4 ,by and by after he confesseth that 8many things are called contingent in respect of us1 because we know not the cause of them1 which really and in themselves are not contingent1 but necessary02 and errs therein the other way2 for he says in effect1 that many things are1 which are not2 for it is all one to say1 they are not contingent1 and they are not4 ,he should have said1 there be many things1 the necessity of whose contingence we cannot or do not know4 7e7 8,but whether there be a necessary connexion of all natural causes from the beginning1 so as they must all have concurred as they have done1 c1 would require a further examination1 if it were pertinent to this question of liberty2 but it is not4 ,it is sufficient to my purpose to have showed1 c40 ,if there be a necessary connexion of all natural causes from the beginning1 then there is no doubt but that all things happen necessarily1 which is that that ,i have all this while maintained4 ,but whether there be or no1 he says1 it requires a further examination4 ,hitherto therefore he knows not whether it be true or no1 and consequently all his arguments hitherto have been of no effect1 nor hath he showed anything to prove1 what he purposed1 that elective actions are not necessitated4 ,and whereas a little before he says1 that to my arguments to prove that sufficient causes are necessary1 he hath already answered2 it seemeth he distrusteth his own answer1 and answers again to the two instances of casting ambs-ace1 and raining or not raining to-morrow2 but brings no other argument to prove the cast thrown not to be necessarily thrown1 but this1 that he does not deliberate whether he shall throw that cast or not4 ,which argument may perhaps prove that the casting of it proceedeth not from free will1 but proves not anything against the antecedent necessity of it4 ,and to prove that it is not necessary that it should rain or not rain to-morrow2 after telling us that the ,ethiopian rains cause the inundation of ,nilus3 that in some eastern countries they have rain only twice a year1 which the ,scripture1 he saith1 calleth the former and the latter rain2 7,i thought he had known it by the experience of some travellers1 but ,i see he only gathereth it from that phrase in ,scripture of former and latter rain72 ,i say1 after he has told us this1 to prove that it is not necessary it should rain or not rain to-morrow he saith that 8in our climate the natural causes1 celestial and sublunary1 do not produce rain so necessarily at set times1 as in the eastern countries2 neither can we say so certainly and infallibly1 it will rain to-morrow1 or it will not rain to-morrow04 ,by this argument a man may take the height of the ,bishop's logic4 8,in our climate the natural causes do not produce rain so necessarily at set times1 as in some eastern countries4 ,therefore they do not produce rain necessarily in our climate1 then when they do produce it04 ,and again1 8we cannot say so certainly and infallibly1 it will rain to-morrow or it will not rain to-morrow2 therefore it is not necessary either that it should rain1 or that it should not rain to-morrow03 as if nothing were necessary the necessity whereof we know not4 ,another reason1 he saith1 why my instances are impertinent1 is because 8they extend only to an hypothetical necessity01 that is1 that the necessity is not in the antecedent causes2 and thereupon challengeth me for the credit of my cause to name some reason1 8how the caster was necessitated from without himself to apply just so much force to the cast1 and neither more nor less2 or what necessity there was why the caster must throw into that table rather than the other1 or that the dice must fall just upon that part of the table1 before the cast was thrown04 ,here again1 from our ignorance of the particular causes that concurring make the necessity he inferreth1 that there was no such necessity at all2 which indeed is that which hath in all this question deceived him1 and all other men that attribute events to fortune4 ,but ,i suppose he will not deny that event to be necessary1 where all the causes of the cast1 and their concurrence1 and the cause of that concurrence are foreknown1 and might be told him1 though ,i cannot tell him4 ,seeing therefore ,god foreknows them all1 the cast was necessary2 and that from antecedent causes from eternity2 which is no hypothetical necessity4 ,and whereas to my argument to prove1 that #8raining to-morrow if it shall then rain1 and not raining to-morrow if it shall then not rain'1 was therefore necessary1 because #8otherwise this disjunctive proposition1 it shall rain or not rain to-morrow1 is not necessary'1 he answereth that 8a conjunct proposition may have both parts false1 and yet the proposition be true2 as1 if the sun shine it is day1 is a true proposition at midnight03 what has a conjunct proposition to do with this in question1 which is disjunctive8 ,or what be the parts of this proposition1 if the sun shine1 it is day8 ,it is not made of two propositions1 as a disjunctive is2 but is one simple proposition1 namely1 this1 the shining of the sun is day4 ,either he has no logic at all1 or thinks they have no reason at all that are his readers4 ,but he has a trick1 he saith1 to abate the edge of the disjunction1 by varying ther proposition thus1 8,i know that it will rain to-morrow1 or that it will not rain to-morrow1 is a true proposition02 and yet saith he1 8it is neither true that ,i know it will rain to-morrow1 neither is it true that ,i know it will not rain to-morrow04 ,what childish deceit1 or childish ignorance is this2 when he is to prove that neither of the members is determinately true in a disjunctive proposition1 to bring for instance a proposition not disjunctive8 ,it had been disjunctive if it had gone thus1 ,i know that it will rain to-morrow1 or ,i know that it will not rain to-morrow2 but then he had certainly known determinately one of the two4 7f7 8,and therefore to say1 either this or that will infallibly be1 but it is not yet determined whether this or that shall be1 is no such senseless assertion that it deserved a tytyrice tupatulice04 ,but it is a senseless assertion1 whatsoever it deserve1 to say that this proposition1 it shall rain or not rain1 is true indeterminedly1 and neither of them true determinedly2 and little better1 as he hath now qualified it1 8that it will infallibly be1 though it be not yet determined whether it shall be or no04 7g7 8,if all this will not satisfy him1 ,i will give him one of his own kinds of proof1 that is1 an instance4 ,that which necessitates all things1 according to ,t4 ,h4 is the decree of ,god1 c40 ,his instance is1 8that ,god himself made this necessitating decree1 and therefore this decree1 being an act ad extra1 was freely made by ,god1 without any necessitation04 ,i do believe the ,bishop himself believeth that all the decrees of ,god have been from all eternity1 and therefore he will not stand to this1 that ,god's decrees were ever made2 for whatsoever hath been made1 hath had a beginning4 ,besides1 ,god's decree is his will2 and the ,bishop hath said formerly1 that the will of ,god is ,god1 the justice of ,god1 ,god1 c4 ,if therefore ,god made a decree1 according to the ,bishop's opinion ,god made himself4 ,by which we may see1 what fine stuff it is that proceedeth from disputing of incomprehensibles4 ,again he says1 8if it had been the good pleasure of ,god1 he might have made some causes free from necessity2 seeing that it neither argues any imperfection1 nor implies any contradiction04 ,if ,god had made either causes or effects free from necessity1 he had made them free from his own prescience2 which had been imperfection4 ,perhaps he will say1 that in these words of his1 the decree1 being an act ad extra1 was freely made by ,god1 ,i take no notice of that act ad extra1 as being too hot for my fingers4 ,therefore now ,i take notice of it1 and say that it is neither ,latin1 nor ,english1 nor sense4 ,,no4 ,,xxxv4 ,t4 ,h4 ,the last thing1 in which also consisteth the whole controversy1 namely1 that there is no such thing as an agent1 which1 when all things requisite to action are present1 can nevertheless forbear to produce it1 or 7which is all one7 that there is no such thing as freedom from necessity2 is easily inferred from that which hath been before alleged4 ,for if it be an agent1 it can work2 and if it work1 there is nothing wanting of what is requisite to produce the action2 and consequently the cause of the action is sufficient2 and if sufficient1 then also necessary1 as hath been proved before4 ,sidenote3 ,the ,bishop's reply4 ,j4 ,d4 8,i wonder that ,t4 ,h4 should confess1 that the whole weight of this controversy doth rest upon this proposition3 #8that there is no such thing as an agent1 which1 when all things requisite to action are present1 can nevertheless forbear to act'2 and yet bring nothing but such poor bullrushes to support it4 7a7 #8,if it be an agent'1 saith he1 #8it can work'2 what of this8 ,a posse ad esse non valet argumentum3 from can work to will work1 is a weak inference4 ,and from will work to doth work upon absolute necessity1 is another gross inconsequence4 ,he proceeds thus3 #8if it work1 there is nothing wanting of what is requisite to produce the action'4 ,true1 there wants nothing to produce that which is produced2 but there may want much to produce that which was intended4 ,one horse may pull his heart out1 and yet not draw the coach whither it should be1 if he want the help or concurrence of his fellows4 #8,and consequently'1 saith he1 #8the cause of the action is sufficient'4 ,yes1 sufficient to do what it doth1 though perhaps with much prejudice to itself2 but not always sufficient to do what it should do1 or what it would do4 ,as he that begets a monster1 should beget a man1 and would beget a man if he could4 ,the last link of his argument follows3 7b7 #8and if sufficient1 then also necessary'4 ,stay there2 by his leave1 there is no necessary connexion between sufficiency and efficiency2 otherwise ,god himself should not be all-sufficient4 ,thus his argument is vanished4 ,but ,i will deal more favourably with him1 and grant him all that which he labours so much in vain to prove1 that every effect in the world hath sufficient causes2 yea more1 that supposing the determination of the free and contingent causes1 every effect in the world is necessary4 7c7 ,but all this will not advantage his cause the black of a bean3 for still it amounts but to an hypothetical necessity1 and differs as much from that absolute necessity1 which he maintains1 as a gentleman who travels for his pleasure1 differs from a banished man1 or a free subject from a slave40 ,,animadversions ,,upon ,,the ,,answer ,,to ,,no4 ,,xxxv4 7a7 8#8,if it be an agent1' saith he1 #8it can work'4 ,what of this8 ,a posse ad esse non valet argumentum2 from can work to will work1 is a weak inference4 ,and from will work to doth work upon absolute necessity1 is another gross inconsequence40 ,here he has gotten a just advantage2 for ,i should have said1 if it be an agent it worketh1 not it can work4 ,but it is an advantage which profiteth little to his cause4 ,for if ,i repeat my argument again in this manner3 that which is an agent1 worketh2 that which worketh1 wanteth nothing requisite to produce the action or the effect it produceth1 and consequently is thereof a sufficient cause2 and if a sufficient cause1 then also a necessary cause3 his answer will be nothing to the purpose4 ,for whereas to these words1 #8that which worketh1 wanteth nothing requisite to produce the action or the effect it produceth1' he answereth1 8it is true1 but there may want much to produce that which was intended01 it is not contrary to any thing that ,i have said4 ,for ,i never maintained1 that whatsoever a man intendeth1 is necessarily performed2 but this1 whatsoever a man performeth1 is necessarily performed1 and what he intendeth1 necessarily intended1 and that from causes antecedent4 ,and therefore to say1 as he doth1 that the cause is sufficient to do what it doth1 but not always sufficient to do what a man should or would do1 is to say the same that ,i do4 ,for ,i say not1 that the cause that bringeth forth a monster1 is sufficient to bring forth a man2 but that every cause is sufficient to produce only the effect it produceth2 and if sufficient1 then also necessary4 7b7 8#8,and if sufficient1 then also necessary'4 ,stay there2 by his leave1 there is no necessary connexion between sufficiency and efficiency2 otherwise ,god himself should not be all-sufficient40 ,all-sufficiency signifieth no more1 when it is attributed to ,god1 than omnipotence2 and omnipotence signifieth no more1 than the power to do all things that he will4 ,but to the production of any thing that is produced1 the will of ,god is as requisite as the rest of his power and sufficiency4 ,and consequently1 his all-sufficiency signifieth not a sufficiency or power to do those things he will not4 ,but he will deal1 he says1 so favourably with me1 as to grant me all this1 which ,i labour1 he saith1 so much in vain to prove3 and adds1 7c7 8,but all this will not advantage his cause the black of a bean2 for still it amounts but to an hypothetical necessity04 ,if it prove no more1 it proves no necessity at all2 for by hypothetical necessity he means the necessity of this proposition1 the effect is1 then when it is2 whereas necessity is only said truly of somewhat in future4 ,for necessary is that which cannot possibly be otherwise2 and possibility is always understood of some future time4 ,but seeing he granteth so favourably that sufficient causes are necessary causes1 ,i shall easily conclude from it1 that whatsoever those causes do cause1 are necessary antecedently4 ,for if the necessity of the thing produced1 when produced1 be in the same instant of time with the existence of its immediate cause2 then also that immediate cause was in the same instant with the cause by which it was immediately produced2 the same may be said of the cause of this cause1 and so backward eternally4 ,from whence it will follow1 that all the connexion of the causes of any effect from the beginning of the world1 were altogether existent in one and the same instant2 and consequently1 all the time from the beginning of the world1 or from eternity to this day1 is but one instant1 or a nunc stans2 which he knows by this time is not so4 ,,no4 ,,xxxvi4 ,t4 ,h4 ,and thus you see how the inconveniences1 which he objecteth must follow upon the holding of necessity1 are avoided1 and the necessity itself demonstratively proved4 ,to which ,i could add1 if ,i thought it good logic1 the inconvenience of denying necessity2 as that it destroys both the decrees and prescience of ,god ,almighty4 ,for whatsoever ,god hath purposed to bring to pass by man as an instrument1 or foreseeth shall come to pass1 a man1 if he have liberty1 such as he affirmeth from necessitation1 might frustrate and make not to come to pass3 and ,god should either not foreknow it and not decree it1 or he should foreknow such things shall be as shall never be1 and decree that which shall never come to pass4 ,sidenote3 ,the ,bishop's reply4 ,j4 ,d4 8,thus he hath laboured in vain to satisfy my reasons1 and to prove his own assertion4 ,but for demonstration1 there is nothing like it among his arguments4 ,now he saith1 7a7 he could add other arguments1 if he thought it good logic4 ,there is no impediment in logic1 why a man may not press his adversary with those absurdities which flow from his opinion2 argumentum ducens ad impossibile or ad absurdum1 is a good form of reasoning4 ,but there is another reason of his forbearance1 though he be loath to express it4 ,hret lateri lthalis arundo4 ,the arguments drawn from the attributes of ,god do stick so close in the sides of his cause1 that he hath no mind to treat of that subject4 ,by the way1 take notice of his own confession1 that #8he could add other reasons1 if he thought it good logic'4 ,if it were predetermined in the outward causes1 that he must make this very defence and no other1 how could it be in his power to add or subtract any thing3 just as if a blind man should say in earnest1 ,i could see if ,i had mine eyes8 ,truth often breaks out whilst men seek to smother it4 7b7 ,but let us view his argument3 #8if a man have liberty from necessitation1 he may frustrate the decrees of ,god1 and make his prescience false'4 ,first1 for the decrees of ,god1 this is his decree that man should be a free agent2 if he did consider ,god as a most simple act1 without priority or posteriority of time1 or any composition2 he would not conceive of his decrees1 as of the laws of the ,medes and ,persians1 long since enacted and passed before we were born1 but as coexistent with ourselves1 and with the acts which we do by virtue of those decrees4 ,decrees and attributes are but notions to help the weakness of our understanding to conceive of ,god4 ,the decrees of ,god are ,god himself1 and therefore justly said to be before the foundation of the world was laid3 and yet coexistent with ourselves1 because of the infinite and eternal being of ,god4 ,the sum is this1 the decree of ,god1 or ,god himself eternally1 constitutes or ordains all effects which come to pass in time1 according to the distinct natures or capacities of his creatures4 ,an eternal ordination is neither past nor to come1 but always present4 ,so free actions do proceed as well from the eternal decree of ,god1 as necessary2 and from that order which he hath set in the world4 8,as the decree of ,god is eternal1 so is his knowledge4 ,and therefore to speak truly and properly1 there is neither fore-knowledge nor after-knowledge in him4 ,the knowledge of ,god comprehends all times in a point1 by reason of the eminence and virtue of its infinite perfection4 ,and yet ,i confess1 that this is called fore-knowledge in respect of us4 ,but this fore-knowledge doth produce no absolute necessity4 ,things are not therefore1 because they are foreknown2 but therefore they are foreknown1 because they shall come to pass4 ,if any thing should come to pass otherwise than it doth1 yet ,god's knowledge could not be irritated by it2 for then he did not know that it should come to pass1 as now it doth4 ,because every knowledge of vision necessarily presupposeth its object1 ,god did know that ,judas should betray ,christ2 but ,judas was not necessitated to be a traitor by ,god's knowledge4 ,if ,judas had not betrayed ,christ1 then ,god had not fore-known that ,judas should betray him4 ,the case is this3 a watchman standing on the steeple's-top1 as it is the use in ,germany1 gives notice to them below1 who see no such things1 that company are coming1 and how many2 his prediction is most certain1 for he sees them4 ,what a vain correction were it for one below to say1 what if they did not come1 then a certain prediction may fail4 ,it may be urged1 that there is a difference between these two cases4 ,in this case1 the coming is present to the watchman2 but that which ,god fore-knows1 is future4 ,god knows what shall be2 the watchman only knows what is4 ,i answer1 that this makes no difference at all in the case1 by reason of that disparity which is between ,god's knowledge and ours4 ,as that coming is present to the watchman1 which is future to them who are below3 so all those things which are future to us1 are present to ,god1 because his infinite and eternal knowledge doth reach to the future being of all agents and events4 ,thus much is plainly acknowledged by ,t4 ,h4 ,no4 ,,xi3 that #8fore-knowledge is knowledge1 and knowledge depends on the existence of the things known1 and not they on it'4 ,to conclude1 the prescience of ,god doth not make things more necessary than the production of the things themselves2 but if the agents were free agents1 the production of the things doth not make the events to be absolutely necessary1 but only upon supposition that the causes were so determined4 ,god's prescience proveth a necessity of infallibility1 but not of antecedent extrinsical determination to one4 ,if any event should not come to pass1 ,god did never foreknow that it would come to pass4 ,for every knowledge necessarily presupposeth its object4 ,,animadversions ,,upon ,,the ,,answer ,,to ,,no4 ,,xxxvi4 7a7 8#8,he could add'1 he saith1 #8other arguments1 if he thought it good logic1' c4 ,there is no impediment in logic1 why a man may not press his adversary with those absurdities which flow from his opinion40 ,here he misrecites my words2 which are1 #8,i could add1 if ,i thought it good logic1 the inconvenience of denying necessity2 as that it destroys both the decrees and prescience of ,god ,almighty'4 ,but he makes me say ,i could add other arguments2 then infers1 that there is no impediment in logic1 why a man may not press his adversary with the absurdities that flow from his opinion1 because argumentum ducens ad impossibile is a good form of reasoning2 making no difference between absurdities1 which are impossibilities1 and inconveniences1 which are not only possible but frequent4 ,and though it be a good form of reasoning to argue from absurdities1 yet it is no good form of reasoning to argue from inconveniences2 for inconvenience may stand well enough with truth4 7b7 8,but let us view his argument3 #8,if a man have liberty from necessitation1 he may frustrate the decrees of ,god1 and make his prescience false'4 ,this is his decree1 that man should be a free agent4 ,if he did consider ,god as a most simple act1 without priority or posteriority of time1 or any composition1 he would not conceive of his decrees as long since enacted1 but as coexistent with ourselves04 ,here again he would have me conceive eternity to be nunc stans1 that is1 an instant of time1 and that instant of time to be ,god2 which neither he nor ,i can conceive1 nor can without impiety say1 as he doth here1 that the decrees of ,god are ,god4 ,in which consisteth all the rest of his answer to this ,number1 saving that he putteth in sometimes1 that 8the foreknowledge of ,god produceth not necessity01 which is granted him2 but that anything can be foreknown which shall not necessarily come to pass1 which was not granted1 he proveth no otherwise than by his assertion1 8that every instant of time is ,god02 which is denied him4 ,,no4 ,,xxxvii4 ,t4 ,h4 ,this is all that hath come into my mind touching this question1 since ,i last considered it4 ,and ,i humbly beseech your ,lordship to communicate it only to ,j4 ,d4 ,and so praying ,god to prosper your ,lordship in all your designs1 ,i take leave1 and am1 my most noble and obliging ,lord1 ,your most humble servant1 ,t4 ,h4 ,sidenote3 ,the ,bishop's reply4 ,j4 ,d4 8,he is very careful to have this discourse kept secret1 as appears in this section1 and in the ,x,i,vth and ,x,vth sections4 ,if his answer had been kept private1 ,i had saved the labour of a reply4 ,but hearing that it was communicated1 ,i thought myself obliged to vindicate both the truth and myself4 ,i do not blame him to be cautious2 for in truth1 this assertion is of desperate consequence1 and destructive to piety1 policy1 and morality4 7a7 ,if he had desired to have it kept secret1 the way had been to have kept it secret himself4 ,it will not suffice to say1 as ,no4 ,,xiv1 that #8truth is truth'3 ,this is the common plea of all men4 ,neither is it sufficient for him to say1 as ,no4 ,,xv1 that #8it was desired by me'1 long before that he had discovered his opinion by word of mouth4 ,and my desire was to let some of my noble friends see the weakness of his grounds1 and the pernicious consequences of that opinion4 7b7 ,but if he think that this ventilation of the question between us two may do hurt1 truly ,i hope not4 ,the edge of his discourse is so abated1 that it cannot easily hurt any rational man1 who is not too much possessed with prejudice40 ,,animadversions ,,upon ,,the ,,answer ,,to ,,no4 ,,xxxvii4 ,in this place ,i said nothing1 but that ,i would have my ,lord of ,newcastle to communicate it only to the ,bishop4 ,and in his answer he says1 7a7 8if ,i had desired to have it kept secret1 the way had been to have kept it secret myself04 ,my desire was1 it should not be communicated by my ,lord of ,newcastle to all men indifferently4 ,but ,i barred not myself from showing it privately to my friends2 though to publish it was never my intention1 till now provoked by the uncivil triumphing of the ,bishop in his own errors to my disadvantage4 7b7 8,but if he think that this ventilation of the question may do hurt1 truly ,i hope not4 ,the edge of his discourse is so abated1 that it cannot easily hurt any rational man1 who is not too much possessed with prejudice40 ,it is confidently said2 but not very pertinently to the hurt ,i thought might proceed from a discourse of this nature4 ,for ,i never thought it could do hurt to a rational man1 but only to such men as cannot reason in those points which are of difficult contemplation4 ,for a rational man will say with himself1 they whom ,god will bring to a blessed and happy end1 those he will put into an humble1 pious1 and righteous way2 and of those whom he will destroy1 he will harden the hearts3 and thereupon examining himself whether he be in such a way or not1 the examination itself would1 if elected1 be a necessary cause of working out his salvation with fear and trembling4 ,but the men who ,i thought might take hurt thereby1 are such as reason erroneously1 saying with themselves1 if ,i shall be saved1 ,i shall be saved whether ,i walk uprightly or no3 and consequently thereunto1 shall behave themselves negligently1 and pursue the pleasant way of the sins they are in love with4 ,which inconvenience is not abated by this discourse of the ,bishop2 because they understand not the grounds he goeth on1 of nunc stans1 motus primo primi1 elicit acts1 imperate acts1 and a great many other such unintelligible words4 ,,no4 ,,xxxviii4 ,t4 ,h4 ,postscript4 ,arguments seldom work on men of wit and learning1 when they have once engaged themselves in a contrary opinion4 ,if anything do it1 it is the shewing of them the causes of their errors1 which is this4 ,pious men attribute to ,god ,almighty1 for honour sake1 whatsoever they see is honourable in the world1 as seeing1 hearing1 willing1 knowing1 justice1 wisdom1 c43 but deny him such poor things as eyes1 ears1 brains1 and other organs1 without which we worms neither have nor can conceive such faculties to be3 and so far they do well4 ,but when they dispute of ,god's actions philosophically1 then they consider them again as if he had such faculties1 and in that manner as we have them4 ,this is not well2 and thence it is they fall into so many difficulties4 ,we ought not to dispute of ,god's nature2 he is no fit subject of our philosophy4 ,true religion consisteth in obedience to ,christ's lieutenants1 and in giving ,god such honour1 both in attributes and actions1 as they in their several lieutenancies shall ordain4 ,sidenote3 ,the ,bishop's reply4 ,j4 ,d4 8,though sophistical captions do seldom work on men of wit and learning1 because by constant use they have their senses exercised to discern both good and evil 7,heb4 v4 #ad71 yet 7a7 solid and substantial reasons work sooner upon them than upon weaker judgments4 ,the more exact the balance is1 the sooner it discovers the real weight that is put into it2 especially if the proofs be proposed without passion or opposition4 ,let sophisters and seditious orators apply themselves to the many-headed multitude1 because they despair of success with men of wit and learning4 ,those whose gold is true1 are not afraid to have it tried by the touch4 ,since the former way hath not succeeded1 ,t4 ,h4 hath another to shew as the causes of our errors1 which he hopes will prove more successful4 ,when he sees he can do no good by sight1 he seeks to circumvent us under colour of courtesy3 ,fistula dulce canit1 volucrem dum decipit auceps4 ,as they who behold themselves in a glass1 take the right hand for the left1 and the left for the right 7,t4 ,h4 knows the comparison72 so we take our own errors to be truths1 and other men's truths to be errors1 7b7 ,if we be in an error in this1 it is such an error as we sucked from nature itself1 such an error as is confirmed in us by reason and experience1 such an error as ,god himself in his sacred ,word hath revealed1 such an error as the ,fathers and ,doctors of the ,church in all ages have delivered1 such an error wherein we have the concurrence of all the best philosophers1 both natural and moral1 such an error as bringeth to ,god the glory of justice1 and wisdom1 and goodness1 and truth1 such an error as renders men more devout1 more pious1 more industrious1 more humble1 more penitent for their sins4 ,would he have us resign up all these advantages1 to dance blindfold after his pipe8 ,no1 he persuades us too much to our loss4 ,but let us see what is the imaginary cause of our imaginary error4 ,forsooth1 because #8we attribute to ,god whatsoever is honourable in the world1 as seeing1 hearing1 willing1 knowing1 justice1 wisdom2 but deny him such poor things as eyes1 ears1 brains'2 and so far1 he saith #8we do well4' ,he hath reason1 for since we are not able to conceive of ,god as he is1 the readiest way we have1 is by removing all that imperfection from ,god1 which is in the creatures2 so we call him infinite1 immortal1 independent3 or by attributing to him all those perfections which are in the creatures1 after a most eminent manner2 so we call him best1 greatest1 most wise1 most just1 most holy4 7c7 ,but saith he1 #8,when they dispute of ,god's actions philosophically1 then they consider them again1 as if he had such faculties1 and in that manner as we have them'4 8,and is this the cause of our error8 ,that were strange indeed2 for they who dispute philosophically of ,god1 do neither ascribe faculties to him in that manner that we have them1 nor yet do they attribute any proper faculties at all to ,god4 ,god's understanding and his will is his very essence1 which1 for the eminency of its infinite perfection1 doth perform all those things alone in a most transcendant manner1 which reasonable creatures do perform imperfectly by distinct faculties4 ,thus to dispute of ,god with modesty and reverence1 and to clear the ,deity from the imputation of tyranny1 injustice1 and dissimulation1 which none do throw upon ,god with more presumption than those who are the patrons of absolute necessity1 is both comely and ,christian4 8,it is not the desire to discover the original of a supposed error1 which draws them ordinarily into these exclamations against those who dispute of the ,deity4 ,for some of themselves dare anatomize ,god1 and publish his eternal decrees with as much confidence1 as if they had been all their lives of his cabinet council4 ,but it is for fear lest those pernicious consequences which flow from that doctrine essentially1 and reflect in so high a degree upon the supreme goodness1 should be laid open to the view of the world2 just as the ,turks do first establish a false religion of their own devising1 and then forbid all men upon pain of death to dispute upon religion2 or as the priests of ,moloch1 the abomination of the ,ammonites1 did make a noise with their timbrels all the while the poor infants were passing through the fire in ,tophet1 to keep their pitiful cries from the ears of their parents4 ,so 7d7 they make a noise with their declamations against those who dare dispute of the nature of ,god1 that is1 who dare set forth his justice1 and his goodness1 and his truth1 and his philanthropy1 only to deaf the ears and dim the eyes of the ,christian world1 lest they should hear the lamentable ejulations and howlings1 or see that rueful spectacle of millions of souls tormented for evermore 7e7 in the flames of the true ,tophet1 that is1 hell1 only for that which1 according to ,t4 ,h4's doctrine1 was never in their power to shun1 but which they were ordered and inevitably necessitated to do1 only to express the omnipotence and dominion1 and to satisfy the pleasure of ,him1 who is in truth the ,father of all mercies1 and the ,god of all consolation4 7f7 ,this is life eternal 7saith our ,saviour71 to know the only true ,god1 and ,jesus ,christ whom he hath sent 7,john xvii4 #c474 ,pure religion1 and undefiled before ,god and the ,father1 is this1 to visit the fatherless and widows in their affliction1 and to keep himself unspotted from the world1 saith ,st4 ,james 7,james i4 #bg474 ,fear ,god and keep his commandments2 for this is the whole duty of man1 saith ,solomon 7,eccles4 xii4 #ac474 ,but ,t4 ,h4 hath found out a more compendious way to heaven3 #8,true religion'1 saith he1 #8consisteth in obedience to ,christ's lieutenants1 and giving ,god such honour1 both in attributes and actions1 as they in their several lieutenancies shall ordain'4 ,that is to say1 be of the religion of every ,christian country where you come4 ,to make the civil magistrate to be ,christ's lieutenant upon earth1 for matters of religion1 and to make him to be supreme judge in all controversies1 whom all must obey1 is a doctrine so strange1 and such an uncouth phrase to ,christian ears1 that ,i should have missed his meaning1 but that ,i consulted with his book1 ,de ,cive1 c4 ,,xv4 sect4 #af1 and c4 ,,xvii4 sect4 #bh4 ,what if the magistrate shall be no ,christian himself8 ,what if he shall command contrary to the law of ,god or nature8 ,must we obey him rather than ,god8 7,acts iv4 #ai47 ,is the civil magistrate become now the only ground and pillar of truth8 ,i demand then1 why ,t4 ,h4 is of a different mind from his sovereign1 and from the laws of the land1 concerning the attributes of ,god and his decrees8 ,this is a new paradox1 and concerns not this question of liberty and necessity4 ,wherefore ,i forbear to prosecute it further1 and so conclude my reply with the words of the ,christian poet1 ,jussum est ,csaris ore ,galieni1 ,quod princeps colit ut colamus omnes4 ternum colo ,principem1 dierum ,factorem1 ,dominumque ,galieni4,a ----- ,footnote ,a3 ,prudentius4 4 ,hymn4 vi4 ----- ,,animadversions ,,upon ,,the ,,answer ,,to ,,the ,,postscript ,,no4 ,,xxxviii4 ,he taketh it ill that ,i say that arguments do seldom work on men of wit and learning1 when they have once engaged themselves in a contrary opinion4 ,nevertheless it is not only certain by experience1 but also there is reason for it1 and that grounded upon the natural disposition of mankind4 ,for it is natural to all men to defend those opinions1 which they have once publicly engaged themselves to maintain2 because to have that detected for error1 which they have publicly maintained for truth1 is never without some dishonour1 more or less2 and to find in themselves that they have spent a great deal of time and labour in deceiving themselves1 is so uncomfortable a thing1 as it is no wonder if they employ their wit and learning1 if they have any1 to make good their errors4 ,and1 therefore1 where he saith1 7a7 8solid and substantial reasons work sooner upon them1 than upon weaker judgments2 and that the more exact the balance is1 the sooner it discovers the real weight that is put into it03 ,i confess1 the more solid a man's wit is1 the better will solid reasons work upon him4 ,but if he add to it that which he calls learning1 that is to say1 much reading of other men's doctrines without weighing them with his own thoughts1 then their judgments become weaker1 and the balance less exact4 ,and whereas he saith1 8that they whose gold is true1 are not afraid to have it tried by the touch02 he speaketh as if ,i had been afraid to have my doctrine tried by the touch of men of wit and learning2 wherein he is not much mistaken1 meaning by men of learning 7as ,i said before7 such as had read other men1 but not themselves4 ,for by reading others1 men commonly obstruct the way to their own exact and natural judgment1 and use their wit both to deceive themselves with fallacies1 and to requite those1 who endeavour at their own entreaty to instruct them1 with revilings4 7b7 8,if we be in an error1 it is such an error as is sucked from nature2 as is confirmed by reason1 by experience1 and by ,scripture2 as the ,fathers and ,doctors of the ,church of all ages have delivered2 an error1 wherein we have the concurrence of all the best philosophers1 an error that bringeth to ,god the glory of justice1 c42 that renders men more devout1 more pious1 more humble1 more industrious1 more penitent for their sins40 ,all this is but said2 and what heretofore hath been offered in proof for it1 hath been sufficiently refuted1 and the contrary proved2 namely1 that it is an error contrary to the nature of the will2 repugnant to reason and experience2 repugnant to the ,scripture2 repugnant to the doctrine of ,st4 ,paul1 7and 'tis pity the ,fathers and ,doctors of the ,church have not followed ,st4 ,paul therein72 an error not maintained by the best philosophers1 7for they are not the best philosophers1 which the ,bishop thinketh so72 an error that taketh from ,god the glory of his prescience1 nor bringeth to him the glory of his other attributes2 an error that maketh men1 by imagining they can repent when they will1 neglect their duties2 and that maketh men unthankful for ,god's graces1 by thinking them to proceed from the natural ability of their own will4 7c7 8#8,but1' saith he1 #8when they dispute of ,god's actions philosophically1 then they consider them again as if he had such faculties1 and in such manner as we have them4' ,and is this the cause of our error8 ,that were strange indeed2 for they who dispute philosophically of ,god1 do neither ascribe faculties to him1 in that manner that we have them1 nor yet do they attribute any proper faculties at all to ,god4 ,god's understanding and his will is his very essence1 c40 ,methinks he should have known at these years1 that to dispute philosophically is to dispute by natural reason1 and from principles evident by the light of nature1 and to dispute of the faculties and proprieties of the subject whereof they treat4 ,it is therefore unskilfully said by him1 that they who dispute philosophically of ,god1 ascribe unto him no proper faculties4 ,if no proper faculties1 ,i would fain know of him what improper faculties he ascribes to ,god4 ,i guess he will make the understanding and the will1 and his other attributes1 to be in ,god improper faculties1 because he cannot properly call them faculties2 that is to say1 he knows not how to make it good that they are faculties1 and yet he will have these words1 8,god's understanding and his will are his very essence01 to pass for an axiom of philosophy4 ,and whereas ,i had said1 we ought not to dispute of ,god's nature1 and that ,he is no fit subject of our philosophy1 he denies it not1 but says ,i say it4 7d7 8,with a purpose to make a noise with declaiming against those who dare dispute of the nature of ,god1 that is1 who dare set forth his justice and his goodness1 c40 ,the ,bishop will have much ado to make good1 that to dispute of the nature of ,god1 is all one with setting forth his justice and his goodness4 ,he taketh no notice of these words of mine1 #8pious men attribute to ,god ,almighty for honour's sake1 whatsoever they see is honourable in the world'2 and yet this is setting forth ,god's justice1 goodness1 c1 without disputing of ,god's nature4 7e7 8,in the flames of the true ,tophet1 that is hell40 ,the true ,tophet was a place not far from the walls of ,jerusalem1 and consequently on the earth4 ,i cannot imagine what he will say to this in his answer to my ,leviathan1 if there he find the same1 unless he say1 that in this place by the true ,tophet1 he meant a not true ,tophet4 7f7 8,this is life eternal 7saith our ,saviour7 to know the only true ,god1 and ,jesus ,christ1 c40 ,this which followeth to the end of his answer and of the book1 is a reprehension of me1 for saying that #8true religion consisteth in obedience to ,christ's lieutenants'4 ,if it be lawful for ,christians to institute amongst themselves a commonwealth and magistrates1 whereby they may be able to live in peace one with another1 and unite themselves in defence against a foreign enemy2 it will certainly be necessary to make to themselves some supreme judge in all controversies1 to whom they ought all to give obedience4 ,and this is no such strange doctrine1 nor so uncouth a phrase to ,christian ears1 as the ,bishop makes it1 whatsoever it be to them that would make themselves judges of the ,supreme ,judge himself4 ,no2 but1 saith he1 ,christ is the ,supreme ,judge1 and we are not to obey men rather than ,god4 ,is there any ,christian man that does not acknowledge that we are to be judged by ,christ1 or that we ought not to obey him rather than any man that shall be his lieutenant upon earth8 ,the question therefore is1 not of who is to be obeyed1 but of what be his commands4 ,if the ,scripture contain his commands1 then may every ,christian know by them what they are4 ,and what has the ,bishop to do with what ,god says to me when ,i read them1 more than ,i have to do with what ,god says to him when he reads them1 unless he have authority given him by him whom ,christ hath constituted his lieutenant8 ,this lieutenant upon earth1 ,i say1 is the supreme civil magistrate1 to whom belongeth the care and charge of seeing that no doctrine may be taught the people1 but such as may consist with the general peace of them all1 and with the obedience that is due to the civil sovereign4 ,in whom would the ,bishop have the authority reside of prohibiting seditious opinions1 when they are taught 7as they are often7 in divinity books and from the pulpit8 ,i could hardly guess1 but that ,i remember that there have been books written to entitle the bishops to a divine right1 underived from the civil sovereign4 ,but because he maketh it so heinous a matter1 that the supreme civil magistrate should be ,christ's lieutenant upon earth1 let us suppose that a bishop1 or a synod of bishops1 should be set up 7which ,i hope never shall7 for our civil sovereign2 then that which he objecteth here1 ,i could object in the same words against himself4 ,for ,i could say in his own words1 ,this is life eternal1 to know the only true ,god1 and ,jesus ,christ 7,john xvii4 #c474 ,pure religion1 and undefiled before ,god is this1 to visit the fatherless1 c4 7,james i4 #bg47 ,fear ,god and keep his commandments 7,eccles4 xii4 #ac474 ,but the ,bishop hath found a more compendious way to heaven1 namely1 that true religion consisteth in obedience to ,christ's lieutenants2 that is 7now by supposition71 to the bishops4 ,that is to say1 that every ,christian of what nation soever1 coming into the country which the bishops govern1 should be of their religion4 ,he would make the civil magistrate to be ,christ's lieutenant upon earth for matters of religion1 and supreme judge in all controversies1 and say they ought to be obeyed by all2 how strange soever and uncouth it seem to him now1 the sovereignty being in others4 ,and ,i may say to him1 what if the magistrate himself 7,i mean by supposition the bishops7 should be wicked men2 what if they should command as much contrary to the law of ,god or nature1 as ever any ,christian king did1 7which is very possible72 must we obey them rather than ,god8 ,is the civil magistrate become now the only ground and pillar of truth8 ,no3 ,synedri jussum est voce episcoporum1 ,ipsum quod colit ut colamus omnes4 ternum colo ,principem1 dierum ,factorem1 ,dominumque episcoporum4 ,and thus the ,bishop may see1 there is little difference between his ,ode and my ,parode to it2 and that both of them are of equal force to conclude nothing4 ,the ,bishop knows that the kings of ,england1 since the time of ,henry ,,viii1 have been declared by act of ,parliament supreme governors of the ,church of ,england1 in all causes both civil and ecclesiastical1 that is to say1 in all matters both ecclesiastical and civil1 and consequently of this ,church supreme head on earth2 though perhaps he will not allow that name of head4 ,i should wonder therefore1 whom the ,bishop would have to be ,christ's lieutenant here in ,england for matters of religion1 if not the supreme governor and head of the ,church of ,england1 whether man or woman whosoever he be1 that hath the sovereign power1 but that ,i know he challenges it to the ,bishops1 and thinks that ,king ,henry ,,viii4 took the ecclesiastical power away from the ,pope1 to settle it not in himself1 but them4 ,but he ought to have known1 that what jurisdiction1 or power of ordaining ministers1 the ,popes had here in the time of the king's predecessors till ,henry ,,viii1 they derived it all from the king's power1 though they did not acknowledge it2 and the kings connived at it1 either not knowing their own right1 or not daring to challenge it2 till such time as the behaviour of the ,roman clergy had undeceived the people1 which otherwise would have sided with them4 ,nor was it unlawful for the king to take from them the authority he had given them1 as being ,pope enough in his own kingdom without depending on a foreign one3 nor is it to be called schism1 unless it be schism also in the head of a family to discharge1 as often as he shall see cause1 the school-masters he entertaineth to teach his children4 ,if the ,bishop and ,dr4 ,hammond1 when they did write in the defence of the ,church of ,england against imputation of schism1 quitting their own pretences of jurisdiction and jus divinum1 had gone upon these principles of mine1 they had not been so shrewdly handled as they have been1 by an ,english ,papist that wrote against them4 ,and now ,i have done answering to his arguments1 ,i shall here1 in the end of all1 take that liberty of censuring his whole book1 which he hath taken in the beginning1 of censuring mine4 #8,i have'1 saith he1 7,no4 ,i47 #8perused ,t4 ,h4's answers1 considered his reasons1 and conclude he hath missed and mislaid the question2 that his answers are evasions1 that his arguments are paralogisms1 and that the opinion of absolute and universal necessity is but a result of some groundless and ill chosen principles4' ,and now it is my turn to censure4 ,and first1 for the strength of his discourse and knowledge of the point in question1 ,i think it much inferior to that which might have been written by any man living1 that had no other learning besides the ability to write his mind2 but as well perhaps as the same man would have done it if to the ability of writing his mind he had added the study of ,school-divinity4 ,secondly1 for the manners of it1 7for to a public writing there belongeth good manners71 it consisteth in railing and exclaiming and scurrilous jesting1 with now and then an unclean and mean instance4 ,and lastly1 for his elocution1 the virtue whereof lieth not in the flux of words1 but in perspicuity1 it is the same language with that of the kingdom of darkness4 ,one shall find in it1 especially where he should speak most closely to the question1 such words as these3 divided sense1 compounded sense1 hypothetical necessity1 liberty of exercise1 liberty of specification1 liberty of contradiction1 liberty of contrariety1 knowledge of approbation1 practical knowledge1 general influence1 special influence1 instinct1 qualities infused1 efficacious election1 moral efficacy1 moral motion1 metaphorical motion1 practice practicum1 motus primo primi1 actus eliciti1 actus imperati1 permissive will1 consequent will1 negative obduration1 deficient cause1 simple act1 nunc stans2 and other like words of nonsense divided3 besides many propositions such as these3 the will is the mistress of human actions1 the understanding is her counsellor1 the will chooseth1 the will willeth1 the will suspends its own act1 the understanding understandeth1 7,i wonder how he missed saying1 the understanding suspendeth its own act17 the will applies the understanding to deliberate2 the will requires of the understanding a review2 the will determines itself2 a change may be willed without changing of the will2 man concurs with ,god in causing his own will2 the will causeth willing2 motives determine the will not naturally1 but morally2 the same action may be both future and not future2 ,god is not just but justice1 not eternal but eternity2 eternity is nunc stans2 eternity is an infinite point which comprehendeth all time1 not formally1 but eminently2 all eternity is co-existent with to-day1 and the same co-existent with to-morrow3 and many other like speeches of nonsense compounded1 which the truth can never stand in need of4 ,perhaps the ,bishop will say1 these terms and phrases are intelligible enough2 for he hath said in his reply to ,no4 ,,xxiv1 that his opinion is demonstrable in reason1 though he be not able to comprehend1 how it consisteth together with ,god's eternal prescience2 and though it exceed his weak capacity1 yet he ought to adhere to that truth which is manifest4 ,so that to him that truth is manifest1 and demonstrable by reason1 which is beyond his capacity2 so that words beyond capacity are with him intelligible enough4 ,but the reader is to be judge of that4 ,i could add many other passages that discover1 both his little logic1 as taking the insignificant words above recited1 for terms of art2 and his no philosophy in distinguishing between moral and natural motion1 and by calling some motions metaphorical1 and by his blunders at the causes of sight and of the descent of heavy bodies1 and his talk of the inclination of the load-stone1 and divers other places in his book4 ,but to make an end1 ,i shall briefly draw up the sum of what we have both said4 ,that which ,i have maintained is1 that no man hath his future will in his own present power4 ,that it may be changed by others1 and by the change of things without him2 and when it is changed1 it is not changed nor determined to any thing by itself2 and that when it is undetermined1 it is no will2 because every one that willeth1 willeth something in particular4 ,that deliberation is common to men with beasts1 as being alternate appetite1 and not ratiocination2 and the last act or appetite therein1 and which is immediately followed by the action1 is the only will that can be taken notice of by others1 and which only maketh an action in public judgment voluntary4 ,that to be free is no more than to do if a man will1 and if he will to forbear2 and consequently that this freedom is the freedom of the man1 and not of the will4 ,that the will is not free1 but subject to change by the operation of external causes4 ,that all external causes depend necessarily on the first eternal cause1 ,god ,almighty1 who worketh in us both to will and to do1 by the mediation of second causes4 ,that seeing neither man nor any thing else can work upon itself1 it is impossible that any man in the framing of his own will should concur with ,god1 either as an actor or as an instrument4 ,that there is nothing brought to pass by fortune as by a cause1 nor any thing without a cause1 or concurrence of causes1 sufficient to bring it so to pass2 and that every such cause1 and their concurrence1 do proceed from the providence1 good pleasure1 and working of ,god2 and consequently1 though ,i do with others call many events contingent1 and say they happen1 yet because they had every of them their several sufficient causes1 and those causes again their former causes1 ,i say they happen necessarily4 ,and though we perceive not what they are1 yet there are of the most contingent events as necessary causes as of those events whose causes we perceive2 or else they could not possibly be foreknown1 as they are by him that foreknoweth all things4 ,on the contrary1 the ,bishop maintaineth3 that the will is free from necessitation2 and in order thereto that the judgment of the understanding is not always practice practicum1 nor of such a nature in itself as to oblige and determine the will to one1 though it be true that spontaneity and determination to one may consist together4 ,that the will determineth itself1 and that external things1 when they change the will1 do work upon it not naturally1 but morally1 not by natural motion1 but by moral and metaphorical motion4 ,that when the will is determined naturally1 it is not by ,god's general influence1 whereon depend all second causes1 but by special influence1 ,god concurring and pouring something into the will4 ,that the will when it suspends not its act1 makes the act necessary2 but because it may suspend and not assent1 it is not absolutely necessary4 ,that sinful acts proceed not from ,god's will1 but are willed by him by a permissive will1 not an operative will1 and that he hardeneth the heart of man by a negative obduration4 ,that man's will is in his own power1 but his motus primo primi not in his own power1 nor necessary save only by a hypothetical necessity4 ,that the will to change1 is not always a change of will4 ,that not all things which are produced1 are produced from sufficient1 but some things from deficient causes4 ,that if the power of the will be present in actu primo1 then there is nothing wanting to the production of the effect4 ,that a cause may be sufficient for the production of an effect1 though it want something necessary to the production thereof2 because the will may be wanting4 ,that a necessary cause doth not always necessarily produce its effect1 but only then when the effect is necessarily produced4 ,he proveth also1 that the will is free1 by that universal notion which the world hath of election3 for when of the six ,electors the votes are divided equally1 the ,king of ,bohemia hath a casting voice4 ,that the prescience of ,god supposeth no necessity of the future existence of the things foreknown1 because ,god is not eternal but eternity1 and eternity is a standing now1 without succession of time2 and therefore ,god foresees all things intuitively by the presentiality they have in nunc stans1 which comprehendeth in it all time past1 present1 and to come1 not formally1 but eminently and virtually4 ,that the will is free even then when it acteth1 but that is in a compounded1 not in a divided sense4 ,that to be made1 and to be eternal1 do consist together1 because ,god's decrees are made1 and are nevertheless eternal4 ,that the order1 beauty1 and perfection of the world doth require that in the universe there should be agents of all sorts1 some necessary1 some free1 some contingent4 ,that though it be true1 that to-morrow it shall rain or not rain1 yet neither of them is true determinate4 ,that the doctrine of necessity is a blasphemous1 desperate1 and destructive doctrine4 ,that it were better to be an ,atheist1 than to hold it2 and he that maintaineth it1 is fitter to be refuted with rods than with arguments4 ,and now whether this his doctrine or mine be the more intelligible1 more rational1 or more conformable to ,god's word1 ,i leave it to the judgment of the reader4 ,but whatsoever be the truth of the disputed question1 the reader may peradventure think ,i have not used the ,bishop with that respect ,i ought1 or without disadvantage of my cause ,i might have done2 for which ,i am to make a short apology4 ,a little before the last parliament of the late king1 when every man spake freely against the then present government1 ,i thought it worth my study to consider the grounds and consequences of such behaviour1 and whether it were conformable or contrary to reason and to the ,word of ,god4 ,and after some time ,i did put in order and publish my thoughts thereof1 first in ,latin1 and then again the same in ,english2 where ,i endeavoured to prove both by reason and ,scripture1 that they who have once submitted themselves to any sovereign governor1 either by express acknowledgment of his power1 or by receiving protection from his laws1 are obliged to be true and faithful to him1 and to acknowledge no other supreme power but him in any matter or question whatsoever1 either civil or ecclesiastical4 ,in which books of mine1 ,i pursued my subject without taking notice of any particular man that held any opinion contrary to that which ,i then wrote2 only in general ,i maintained that the office of the clergy1 in respect of the supreme civil power1 was not magisterial1 but ministerial2 and that their teaching of the people was founded upon no other authority than that of the civil sovereign2 and all this without any word tending to the disgrace either of episcopacy or of presbytery4 ,nevertheless ,i find since1 that divers of them1 whereof the ,bishop of ,derry is one1 have taken offence especially at two things2 one1 that ,i make the supremacy in matters of religion to reside in the civil sovereign2 the other1 that being no clergyman1 ,i deliver doctrines1 and ground them upon words of the ,scripture1 which doctrines they1 being by profession divines1 have never taught4 ,and in this their displeasure1 divers of them in their books and sermons1 without answering any of my arguments1 have not only exclaimed against my doctrine1 but reviled me1 and endeavoured to make me hateful for those things1 for which 7if they knew their own and the public good7 they ought to have given me thanks4 ,there is also one of them1 that taking offence at me for blaming in part the discipline instituted heretofore1 and regulated by the authority of the ,pope1 in the universities1 not only ranks me amongst those men that would have the revenue of the universities diminished1 and says plainly ,i have no religion1 but also thinks me so simple and ignorant of the world as to believe that our universities maintain ,popery4 ,and this is the author of the book called ,vindici ,academiarum4 ,if either of the universities had thought itself injured1 ,i believe it could have authorised or appointed some member of theirs1 whereof there be many abler men than he1 to have made their vindication4 ,but this ,vindex1 7as little dogs to please their masters use to bark1 in token of their sedulity1 indifferently at strangers1 till they be rated off71 unprovoked by me hath fallen upon me without bidding4 ,i have been publicly injured by many of whom ,i took no notice1 supposing that that humour would spend itself2 but seeing it last1 and grow higher in this writing ,i now answer1 ,i thought it necessary at last to make of some of them1 and first of this ,bishop1 an example4 ,,end ,,of ,,vol4 ,v4 ---------------------------------------- -------------------------------- ,transcriber's ,note ,there were two kinds of sidenote in this volumn4 ,at the top of each page1 the section number1 along with either 8,animadversions upon the ,bishop's reply0 or 8,the ,bishop's ,reply01 is repeated4 ,the former have been removed as they are redundant with the section title4 ,the 8,bishop's ,reply0 notes are positioned before each paragraph beginning 8,j4 ,d0 to mark where the 8,bishop's0 voice resumes4 ,the sidenote on p4 #ha mistakenly referred to 8,animadversions4440 rather than the expected 8,the ,bishop's reply40 ,other errors deemed most likely to be the printer's have been corrected1 and are noted here4 ,the references are to the page and line in the original4 #e4aa to do what he will10 ,added4 #aj4ac ,o ,israel1 thy destruction ,restored4 #be4h ,so ,god bless us40 ,added4 #cc4h of the second causes40 ,added4 #ch4ag that one may take away an ell ,restored4 #fb4be between l_/duade distinctions cloven feet4 ,restored 7probable74 #he4bf 8_/#8that wise men may do ,replaced4 #he4bg actions10_/' ,replaced4 #he4cc 8_/#8that fools1 children1 ,replaced4 #he4cd and elect10_/' ,replaced4 #abf4cd but his own justice better4 ,restored4 #acg4c would have him to will4' ,added4 #adb4a 8,wherefore ,t4 ,h4 is mightily mistaken ,added4 #ade4a ,another is ,genesis xix4 #bb73 ,removed4 #aea4ad that all consultations are vain4 ,restored4 #aee4cc for the public good1_/4 ,replaced4 #ahe4g when it is necesssary ,removed4 #bbi4bc ,quid hoc80 ,added4 #caj4ag choose a good one40 ,added4 #caf4cj and so the the action be become ,removed4 #cbd4aa and if he means so ,inserted4 #ccf4e 8,but because his eyesight was weak ,added4 #dje4bh was ,i to grow old6'0 ,added4 #dbe4f forbear to act0_/'2 ,replaced4 #dcd4ae not too much possessed with prejudice40 ,added4 #dcg4bd such poor things as eyes1 ears1 brains' ,added4 #dci4cc the religion of every ,christian country ,inserted4 #ddg4cj persused ,t4 ,h4's answers ,removed4 #ded4i whereof the the ,bishop of ,derry is one ,removed4