,transcriber's ,note    ,bold           
surrounding text2 italics surrounding   
text4    ,there are two types of        
sidenote in this book4 ,the sidenotes in
 italics  are the original page headers1
 and have been preserved as a guide to  
the  conversation 7they sometimes repeat
 from page to page74 ,the sidenotes not 
in italics are the 8marginal analyses0  
referred to on the title page1  which   
were printed in the margins alongside   
the text4 ,they have been  joined       
together into complete sentences where  
necessary4 ,all sidenotes  have been    
placed at the nearest paragraph break4  
,note on changes made to the text is at 
the end4              ,,the             
,,dialogues ,,of ,,plato        ,,jowett
        ,,vol4 ,,ii4              ,,the 
,,dialogues ,,of ,,plato                
,,translated ,,into ,,english           
,,with ,,analyses ,,and ,,introductions 
,,by        ,b4 ,,jowett1 ,m4,a4        
,,master ,,of ,,balliol ,,college       
,,regius ,,professor ,,of ,,greek ,,in  

,,the ,,university ,,of ,,oxford        
,,doctor ,,in ,,theology ,,of ,,the     
,,university ,,of ,,leyden        ,,in  
,,five ,,volumes        ,,vol4 ,,ii     
,,third ,,edition        ,,revised ,,and
 ,,corrected ,,throughout1 ,,with       
,,marginal ,,analyses      ,,and ,,an   
,,index ,,of ,,subjects ,,and ,,proper  
,,names        ,,oxford ,,university    
,,press      ,,american ,,branch        
,,new ,,york3 #ia ,,and #ic1 ,,fifth    
,,avenue      ,,london3 ,,henry ,,frowde
      #ahib        ,,copyright1 #ahib1  
,,by ,,macmillan  ,,co4      ,printed at
 the ,de ,vinne ,press4                 
,,contents4                             
,,page        ,,meno                    
#a        ,,euthyphro                #fe
        ,,apology                  #ie  
,,crito                   #acg          
,,phaedo                  #aeg          
,,gorgias                 #bfg          
,,appendix ,i3--            ,,lesser    
,,hippias      #dcc                     
,,alcibiades ,i        #deg             

,,menexenus           #eaa              
,,appendix ,,ii3--                      
,,alcibiades ,,ii       #ece            
,,eryxias             #eee              
,,meno4      ,,introduction4            
,sidenote3 ,meno4    ,sidenote3         
,,analysis4        ,this ,dialogue      
begins abruptly with a question of      
,meno1 who ,steph4 #gj      asks        
#8whether virtue can be taught4'        
,socrates replies that      he does not 
as yet know what virtue is1 and has     
never known         #ga      any one who
 did4 #8,then he cannot have met        
,gorgias when he was      at ,athens4'  
,yes1 ,socrates had met him1 but he has 
a bad      memory1 and has forgotten    
what ,gorgias said4 ,will ,meno tell    
him his own notion1 which is probably   
not very different from      that of    
,gorgias8 #8,o yes--nothing easier3     
there is the virtue         #gb      of 
a man1 of a woman1 of an old man1 and of
 a child2 there is      a virtue of     
every age and state of life1 all of     

which may be easily      described4'    
,socrates reminds ,meno that this is    
only an enumeration of the       #gc    
virtues and not a definition of the     
notion which is common to      them all4
 ,in a second attempt ,meno defines     
virtue to be #8the      power of        
command4' ,but to this1 again1          
exceptions are taken4      ,for there   
must be a virtue of those who obey1 as  
well as of those      who command2 and  
the power of command must be justly or  
not      unjustly exercised4 ,meno is   
very ready to admit that justice is     
virtue3 #8,would you say virtue or a    
virtue1 for there are other             
virtues1 such as courage1 temperance1   
and the like2 just as round   #gd       
is a figure1 and black and white are    
colours1 and yet there are      other   
figures and other colours4 ,let ,meno   
take the examples      of figure and    
colour1 and try to define them4' ,meno  
confesses      his inability1 and after 
a process of interrogation1 in which    

,socrates      explains to him the      
nature of a #8simile in multis1'        
,socrates        #ge      himself       
defines figure as #8the accompaniment of
 colour4' ,but      some one may object 
that he does not know the meaning of the
      word #8colour2' and if he is a    
candid friend1 and not a mere           
disputant1 ,socrates is willing to      
furnish him with a simpler and      more
 philosophical definition1 into which no
 disputed word is      allowed to       
intrude3 #8,figure is the limit of      
form4' ,meno imperiously #gf            
insists that he must still have a       
definition of colour4      ,some        
raillery follows2 and at length         
,socrates is induced to reply1          
#8that colour is the effluence of form1 
sensible1 and in due proportion      to 
the sight4' ,this definition is exactly 
suited to the taste      of ,meno1 who  
welcomes the familiar language of       
,gorgias and      ,empedocles4 ,socrates
 is of opinion that the more abstract or

      dialectical definition of figure  
is far better4    ,sidenote3 ,analysis  
#gh-ha4        ,now that ,meno has been 
made to understand the nature of      a 
general definition1 he answers in the   
spirit of a ,greek gentleman1      and  
in the words of a poet1 #8that virtue is
 to delight in           #gg      things
 honourable1 and to have the power of   
getting them4'      ,this is a nearer   
approximation than he has yet made to a 
complete      definition1 and1 regarded 
as a piece of proverbial or popular     
morality1 is not far from the truth4    
,but the objection is urged1      #8that
 the honourable is the good1' and as    
every one equally desires      the good1
 the point of the definition is         
contained in the words1    #gh          
#8the power of getting them4' #8,and    
they must be got justly or      with    
justice4' ,the definition will then     
stand thus3 #8,virtue is the      power 
of getting good with justice4' ,but     
justice is a part of       #gi          

virtue1 and therefore virtue is the     
getting of good with a part of          
virtue4 ,the definition repeats the word
 defined4      ,meno complains that the 
conversation of ,socrates has the effect
     #hj      of a torpedo's shock upon 
him4 ,when he talks with other          
persons he has plenty to say about      
virtue2 in the presence of              
,socrates1 his thoughts desert him4     
,socrates replies that he is      only  
the cause of perplexity in others1      
because he is himself      perplexed4   
,he proposes to continue the enquiry4   
,but how1      asks ,meno1 can he       
enquire either into what he knows or    
into      what he does not know8 ,this  
is a sophistical puzzle1 which1         
#ha      as ,socrates remarks1 saves a  
great deal of trouble to him who        
accepts it4 ,but the puzzle has a real  
difficulty latent under it1      to     
which ,socrates will endeavour to find a
 reply4 ,the difficulty      is the     
origin of knowledge3--    ,sidenote3    

,analysis #ha-ic4        ,he has heard  
from priests and priestesses1 and from  
the poet      ,pindar1 of an immortal   
soul which is born again and again in   
successive periods of existence1        
returning into this world when      she 
has paid the penalty of ancient crime1  
and1 having wandered      over all      
places of the upper and under world1 and
 seen and known      all things at one  
time or other1 is by association out of 
one thing      capable of recovering    
all4 ,for nature is of one kindred2 and 
every soul has a seed or germ which may 
be developed into all       #hb         
knowledge4 ,the existence of this latent
 knowledge is further      proved by the
 interrogation of one of ,meno's slaves1
 who1 in      the skilful hands of      
,socrates1 is made to acknowledge some  
elementary relations of geometrical     
figures4 ,the theorem that      the     
square of the diagonal is double the    
square of the side--that #hc-he         
famous discovery of primitive           

mathematics1 in honour of which      the
 legendary ,pythagoras is said to have  
sacrificed a hecatomb--is      elicited 
from him4 ,the first step in the process
 of teaching      has made him conscious
 of his own ignorance4 ,he has had the  
#8torpedo's shock' given him1 and is the
 better for the operation4      ,but    
whence had the uneducated man this      
knowledge8 ,he had            #hf       
never learnt geometry in this world2 nor
 was it born with him2      he must     
therefore have had it when he was not a 
man4 ,and      as he always either was  
or was not a man1 he must have always   
had it4 7,cp4 ,phaedo1 #gc ,b47         
,after ,socrates has given this specimen
 of the true nature of      teaching1   
the original question of the            
teachableness of virtue is      renewed4
 ,again he professes a desire to know   
#8what virtue is'      first4 ,but he is
 willing to argue the question1 as      
mathematicians   #hg      say1 under an 
hypothesis4 ,he will assume that if     

virtue is knowledge1      then virtue   
can be taught4 7,this was the stage of  
the               #hh      argument at  
which the ,protagoras concluded47       
,sidenote3 ,analysis #ic-ajj4           
,socrates has no difficulty in showing  
that virtue is a good1      and that    
goods1 whether of body or mind1 must be 
under the      direction of knowledge4  
,upon the assumption just made1 then1   
virtue is teachable4 ,but where are the 
teachers8 ,there are          #hi       
none to be found4 ,this is extremely    
discouraging4 ,virtue is no      sooner 
discovered to be teachable1 than the    
discovery follows that      it is not   
taught4 ,virtue1 therefore1 is and is   
not teachable4      ,in this dilemma an 
appeal is made to ,anytus1 a respectable
 and      #ij      well-to-do citizen of
 the old school1 and a family friend of 
,meno1      who happens to be present4  
,he is asked #8whether ,meno shall      
#ia      go to the ,sophists and be     
taught4' ,the suggestion throws him into

   #ib      a rage4 #8,to whom1 then1   
shall ,meno go8' asks ,socrates4 ,to    
#ic      any ,athenian gentleman--to the
 great ,athenian statesmen of past      
times4 ,socrates replies here1 as       
elsewhere 7,laches #agi ,c foll42       
,prot4 #cai foll471 that ,themistocles1 
,pericles1 and other great men1 #id     
had sons to whom they would surely1 if  
they could have done so1      have      
imparted their own political wisdom2 but
 no one ever heard      that these sons 
of theirs were remarkable for anything  
except      riding and wrestling and    
similar accomplishments4 ,anytus is     
angry at the imputation which is cast on
 his favourite statesmen1      and on a 
class to which he supposes himself to   
belong 7cp4      #ie ,a72 he breaks off 
with a significant hint4 ,the mention of
        #ie      another opportunity of 
talking with him 7#ii ,e71 and the      
suggestion      that ,meno may do the   
,athenian people a service by pacifying 
him 7#ajj71 are evident allusions to the

 trial of ,socrates4        ,socrates   
returns to the consideration of the     
question #8whether      virtue is       
teachable1' which was denied on the     
ground that there      are no teachers  
of it3 7for the ,sophists are bad       
teachers1 and the  #if      rest of the 
world do not profess to teach74 ,but    
there is another      point which we    
failed to observe1 and in which ,gorgias
 has never      instructed ,meno1 nor   
,prodicus ,socrates4 ,this is the nature
 of      right opinion4 ,for virtue may 
be under the guidance of right          
#ig      opinion as well as of          
knowledge2 and right opinion is for     
practical      purposes as good as      
knowledge1 but is incapable of being    
taught1      and is also liable1 like   
the images of ,daedalus1 to #8walk off1'
     #ih      because not bound by the  
tie of the cause4 ,this is the sort of  
instinct which is possessed by          
statesmen1 who are not wise or          
knowing persons1 but only inspired or   

divine4 ,the higher virtue1    #ii      
which is identical with knowledge1 is an
 ideal only4 ,if the statesman      had 
this knowledge1 and could teach what he 
knew1 he would      be like ,tiresias in
 the world below1--#8he alone has       
wisdom1         #ajj      but the rest  
flit like shadows4'           99        
99       99       99       99           
,sidenote3 ,,introduction4    ,this     
,dialogue is an attempt to answer the   
question1 ,can virtue be taught8  ,no   
one would either ask or answer such a   
question in modern times4 ,but  in the  
age of ,socrates it was only by an      
effort that the mind could rise  to a   
general notion of virtue as distinct    
from the particular virtues of  courage1
 liberality1 and the like4 ,and when a  
hazy conception of this  ideal was      
attained1 it was only by a further      
effort that the question of  the        
teachableness of virtue could be        
resolved4    ,sidenote3 ,virtue1        
knowledge1 and true opinion4    ,the    

answer which is given by ,plato is      
paradoxical enough1 and seems  rather   
intended to stimulate than to satisfy   
enquiry4 ,virtue is  knowledge1 and     
therefore virtue can be taught4 ,but    
virtue is not taught1  and therefore in 
this higher and ideal sense there is no 
virtue and no  knowledge4 ,the teaching 
of the ,sophists is confessedly         
inadequate1 and  ,meno1 who is their    
pupil1 is ignorant of the very nature of
 general  terms4 ,he can only produce   
out of their armoury the sophism1 #8that
 you  can neither enquire into what you 
know nor into what you do not know2' to 
which ,socrates replies by his theory of
 reminiscence4    ,to the doctrine that 
virtue is knowledge1 ,plato has been    
constantly  tending in the previous     
,dialogues4 ,but the new truth is no    
sooner found  than it vanishes away4    
#8,if there is knowledge1 there must be 
teachers2  and where are the teachers8' 
,there is no knowledge in the higher    
sense  of systematic1 connected1        

reasoned knowledge1 such as may one day 
be  attained1 and such as ,plato himself
 seems to see in some far off vision  of
 a single science4 ,and there are no    
teachers in the higher sense of  the    
word2 that is to say1 no real teachers  
who will arouse the spirit  of enquiry  
in their pupils1 and not merely instruct
 them in rhetoric or  impart to them    
ready-made information for a fee of     
#8one' or of #8fifty  drachms4' ,plato  
is desirous of deepening the notion of  
education1 and  therefore he asserts the
 paradox that there are no educators4   
,this  paradox1 though different in     
form1 is not really different from the  
remark which is often made in modern    
times by those who would depreciate     
either the methods of education commonly
 employed1 or the standard              
attained--that #8there is no true       
education among us4'    ,there remains  
still a possibility which must not be   
overlooked4 ,even  if there be no true  
knowledge1 as is proved by #8the        

wretched state of  education1' there may
 be right opinion1 which is a sort of   
guessing or  divination resting on no   
knowledge of causes1 and incommunicable 
to  others4 ,this is the gift which our 
statesmen have1 as is proved by the     
circumstance that they are unable to    
impart their knowledge to their  sons4  
,those who are possessed of it cannot be
 said to be men of science  or          
philosophers1 but they are inspired and 
divine4    ,sidenote3 ,reminiscence and 
immortality4    ,there may be some trace
 of irony in this curious passage1 which
 forms  the concluding portion of the   
,dialogue4 ,but ,plato certainly does   
not  mean to intimate that the          
supernatural or divine is the true basis
 of  human life4 ,to him knowledge1 if  
only attainable in this world1 is of all
  things the most divine4 ,yet1 like    
other philosophers1 he is willing to    
admit that #8probability is the guide of
 life#a2' and he is at the same  time   
desirous of contrasting the wisdom which

 governs the world with a  higher       
wisdom4 ,there are many instincts1      
judgments1 and anticipations of  the    
human mind which cannot be reduced to   
rule1 and of which the grounds  cannot  
always be given in words4 ,a person may 
have some skill or latent  experience   
which he is able to use himself and is  
yet unable to teach  others1 because he 
has no principles1 and is incapable of  
collecting  or arranging his ideas4 ,he 
has practice1 but not theory2 art1 but  
not  science4 ,this is a true fact of   
psychology1 which is recognized by      
,plato  in this passage4 ,but he is far 
from saying1 as some have imagined1 that
  inspiration or divine grace is to be  
regarded as higher than knowledge4  ,he 
would not have preferred the poet or man
 of action to the philosopher1  or the  
virtue of custom to the virtue based    
upon ideas4    ,also here1 as in the    
,ion and ,phaedrus1 ,plato appears to   
acknowledge an  unreasoning element in  
the higher nature of man4 ,the          

philosopher only has  knowledge1 and yet
 the statesman and the poet are         
inspired4 ,there may be  a sort of irony
 in regarding in this way the gifts of  
genius4 ,but there  is no reason to     
suppose that he is deriding them1 any   
more than he is  deriding the phenomena 
of love or of enthusiasm in the         
,symposium1 or of  oracles in the       
,apology1 or of divine intimations when 
he is speaking of  the daemonium of     
,socrates4 ,he recognizes the lower form
 of right opinion1  as well as the      
higher one of science1 in the spirit of 
one who desires  to include in his      
philosophy every aspect of human life2  
just as he  recognizes the existence of 
popular opinion as a fact1 and the      
,sophists  as the expression of it4     
,sidenote3 ,some lesser traits of the   
,dialogue4    ,this ,dialogue probably  
contains the first intimation of the    
doctrine of  reminiscence and of the    
immortality of the soul4#b ,the proof is
 very  slight even slighter than in the 

,phaedo and ,republic4 ,because men had 
abstract ideas in a previous state1 they
 must have always had them1 and  their  
souls therefore must have always existed
 7#hf ,a74 ,for they must  always have  
been either men or not men4 ,the fallacy
 of the latter words  is transparent4   
,and ,socrates himself appears to be    
conscious of their  weakness2 for he    
adds immediately afterwards1 #8,i have  
said some things  of which ,i am not    
altogether confident4' 7,cp4 ,phaedo    
#aad ,d1 #aae ,d47 ,it  may be observed1
 however1 that the fanciful notion of   
pre-existence  is combined with a true  
but partial view of the origin and unity
 of  knowledge1 and of the association  
of ideas4 ,knowledge is prior to any    
particular knowledge1 and exists not in 
the previous state of the  individual1  
but of the race4 ,it is potential1 not  
actual1 and can only be  appropriated by
 strenuous exertion4    ,the idealism of
 ,plato is here presented in a less     
developed form than  in the ,phaedo and 

,phaedrus4 ,nothing is said of the      
pre-existence of  ideas of justice1     
temperance1 and the like4 ,nor is       
,socrates positive of  anything but the 
duty of enquiry 7#hf ,b74 ,the doctrine 
of reminiscence  too is explained more  
in accordance with fact and experience  
as arising  out of the affinities of    
nature 7     74  ,modern philosophy says
 that all things in nature are dependent
 on one  another2 the ancient           
philosopher had the same truth latent in
 his mind  when he affirmed that out of 
one thing all the rest may be recovered4
 ,the  subjective was converted by him  
into an objective2 the mental phenomenon
  of the association of ideas 7cp4      
,phaedo #gc foll47 became a real chain  
of  existences4 ,the germs of two       
valuable principles of education may    
also  be gathered from the #8words of   
priests and priestesses3' 7#a7 that true
  knowledge is a knowledge of causes    
7cp4 ,aristotle's theory of 72  and 7#b7
 that the process of learning consists  

not in what is brought to  the learner1 
but in what is drawn out of him4        
,some lesser points of the dialogue may 
be noted1 such as 7#a7 the  acute       
observation that ,meno prefers the      
familiar definition1 which is           
embellished with poetical language1 to  
the better and truer one 7#gf  ,d72 or  
7#b7 the shrewd reflection1 which may   
admit of an application to  modern as   
well as to ancient teachers1 that the   
,sophists having made  large fortunes1  
this must surely be a criterion of their
 powers of  teaching1 for that no man   
could get a living by shoemaking who was
 not  a good shoemaker 7#ia ,c72 or 7#c7
 the remark1 conveyed almost in a word1 
that the verbal sceptic is saved the    
labour of thought and enquiry      1    
7#hj ,e74 ,characteristic also of the   
temper of  the ,socratic enquiry is1    
7#d7 the proposal to discuss the        
teachableness  of virtue under an       
hypothesis1 after the manner of the     
mathematicians  7#hg ,a72 and 7#e7 the  

repetition of the favourite doctrine    
which occurs  so frequently in the      
earlier and more ,socratic ,dialogues1  
and gives a  colour to all of them--that
 mankind only desire evil through       
ignorance  7#gg1 #gh foll472 7#f7 the   
experiment of eliciting from the        
slave-boy the  mathematical truth which 
is latent in him1 and 7#g7 the remark   
7#hd ,b7 that  he is all the better for 
knowing his ignorance4    ,sidenote3    
,characters of ,meno and ,anytus4       
,the character of ,meno1 like that of   
,critias1 has no relation to the  actual
 circumstances of his life4 ,plato is   
silent about his treachery  to the ,ten 
,thousand ,greeks1 which ,xenophon has  
recorded1 as he is also  silent about   
the crimes of ,critias4 ,he is a        
,thessalian ,alcibiades1  rich and      
luxurious--a spoilt child of fortune1   
and is described as the  hereditary     
friend of the great king4 ,like         
,alcibiades he is inspired  with an     
ardent desire of knowledge1 and is      

equally willing to learn  of ,socrates  
and of the ,sophists4 ,he may be        
regarded as standing in  the same       
relation to ,gorgias as ,hippocrates in 
the ,protagoras to the  other great     
,sophist4 ,he is the sophisticated youth
 on whom ,socrates  tries his           
cross-examining powers just as in the   
,charmides1 the ,lysis1  and the        
,euthydemus1 ingenuous boyhood is made  
the subject of a similar  experiment4   
,he is treated by ,socrates in a        
half-playful manner suited to  his      
character2 at the same time he appears  
not quite to understand the  process to 
which he is being subjected4 ,for he is 
exhibited as ignorant  of the very      
elements of dialectics1 in which the    
,sophists have failed  to instruct their
 disciple4 ,his definition of virtue as 
#8the power  and desire of attaining    
things honourable1' like the first      
definition  of justice in the ,republic1
 is taken from a poet4 ,his answers have
 a  sophistical ring1 and at the same   

time show the sophistical incapacity to 
grasp a general notion4    ,anytus is   
the type of the narrow-minded man of the
 world1 who is  indignant at innovation1
 and equally detests the popular teacher
 and  the true philosopher4 ,he seems1  
like ,aristophanes1 to regard the new   
opinions1 whether of ,socrates or the   
,sophists1 as fatal to ,athenian        
greatness4 ,he is of the same class as  
,callicles in the ,gorgias1 but of  a   
different variety2 the immoral and      
sophistical doctrines of ,callicles  are
 not attributed to him4 ,the moderation 
with which he is described is           
remarkable1 if he be the accuser of     
,sidenote3 ,relation of the ,meno to    
other ,dialogues4    ,socrates1 as is   
apparently indicated by his parting     
words4 ,perhaps ,plato  may have been   
desirous of showing that the accusation 
of ,socrates was  not to be attributed  
to badness or malevolence1 but rather to
 a tendency  in men's minds4 ,or he may 
have been regardless of the historical  

truth  of the characters of his         
dialogue1 as in the case of ,meno and   
,critias4  ,like ,chaerephon 7,apol4    
#ba7 the real ,anytus was a democrat1   
and had joined  ,thrasybulus in the     
conflict with the ,thirty4    ,the      
,protagoras arrived at a sort of        
hypothetical conclusion1 that if        
#8virtue is knowledge1 it can be        
taught4' ,in the ,euthydemus1 ,socrates 
himself offered an example of the manner
 in which the true teacher  may draw out
 the mind of youth2 this was in contrast
 to the quibbling  follies of the       
,sophists4 ,in the ,meno the subject is 
more developed2 the  foundations of the 
enquiry are laid deeper1 and the nature 
of knowledge  is more distinctly        
explained4 ,there is a progression by   
antagonism of  two opposite aspects of  
philosophy4 ,but at the moment when we  
approach  nearest1 the truth doubles    
upon us and passes out of our reach4 ,we
 seem  to find that the ideal of        
knowledge is irreconcilable with        

experience4 ,in  human life there is    
indeed the profession of knowledge1 but 
right opinion  is our actual guide4     
,there is another sort of progress from 
the general  notions of ,socrates1 who  
asked simply1 #8what is friendship8'    
#8what is  temperance8' #8what is       
courage8' as in the ,lysis1 ,charmides1 
,laches1  to the transcendentalism of   
,plato1 who1 in the second stage of his 
philosophy1 sought to find the nature of
 knowledge in a prior and future  state 
of existence4    ,the difficulty in     
framing general notions which has       
appeared in this and  in all the        
previous ,dialogues recurs in the       
,gorgias and ,theaetetus as  well as in 
the ,republic4 ,in the ,gorgias too the 
statesmen reappear1 but  in stronger    
opposition to the philosopher4 ,they are
 no longer allowed to  have a divine    
insight1 but1 though acknowledged to    
have been clever men  and good speakers1
 are denounced as #8blind leaders of the
 blind4' ,the  doctrine of the          

immortality of the soul is also carried 
further1 being  made the foundation not 
only of a theory of knowledge1 but of a 
doctrine  of rewards and punishments4   
,in the ,republic the relation of       
knowledge to  virtue is described in a  
manner more consistent with modern      
distinctions4  ,the existence of the    
virtues without the possession of       
knowledge in the  higher or             
philosophical sense is admitted to be   
possible4 ,right opinion  is again      
introduced in the ,theaetetus as an     
account of knowledge1 but is  rejected  
on the ground that it is irrational 7as 
here1 because it is not  bound by the   
tie of the cause71 and also because the 
conception of false  opinion is given up
 as hopeless4 ,the doctrines of ,plato  
are necessarily  different at different 
times of his life1 as new distinctions  
are  realized1 or new stages of thought 
attained by him4 ,we are not therefore  
justified1 in order to take away the    
appearance of inconsistency1 in         

attributing to him hidden meanings or   
remote allusions4    ,sidenote3 ,date of
 the ,dialogue4    ,there are no        
external criteria by which we can       
determine the date of the  ,meno4 ,there
 is no reason to suppose that any of the
 ,dialogues of ,plato  were written     
before the death of ,socrates2 the      
,meno1 which appears to be  one of the  
earliest of them1 is proved to have been
 of a later date by  the allusion of    
,anytus 7#id ,e1 #ie ,a4 ,cp4 also #hj  
,b1 #ajj ,b74    ,we cannot argue that  
,plato was more likely to have written1 
as he has  done1 of ,meno before than   
after his miserable death2 for we have  
already  seen1 in the examples of       
,charmides and ,critias1 that the       
characters in  ,plato are very far from 
resembling the same characters in       
history4 ,the  repulsive picture which  
is given of him in the ,anabasis of     
,xenophon 7ii4  #f71 where he also      
appears as the friend of ,aristippus    
#8and a fair youth  having lovers1' has 

no other trait of likeness to the ,meno 
of ,plato4    ,the place of the ,meno in
 the series is doubtfully indicated by  
internal  evidence4 ,the main character 
of the ,dialogue is ,socrates2 but to   
the  #8general definitions' of ,socrates
 is added the ,platonic doctrine of     
reminiscence4 ,the problems of virtue   
and knowledge have been discussed in    
the ,lysis1 ,laches1 ,charmides1 and    
,protagoras2 the puzzle about knowing   
and learning has already appeared in the
 ,euthydemus4 ,the doctrines of         
immortality and pre-existence are       
carried further in the ,phaedrus and    
,phaedo2 the distinction between opinion
 and knowledge is more fully  developed 
in the ,theaetetus4 ,the lessons of     
,prodicus1 whom he facetiously  calls   
his master1 are still running in the    
mind of ,socrates4 ,unlike  the later   
,platonic ,dialogues1 the ,meno arrives 
at no conclusion4 ,hence  we are led to 
place the ,dialogue at some point of    
time later than the  ,protagoras1 and   

earlier than the ,phaedrus and ,gorgias4
 ,the place which  is assigned to it in 
this work is due mainly to the desire to
 bring  together in a single volume all 
the ,dialogues which contain allusions  
to  the trial and death of ,socrates4   
,on the ,ideas of ,plato4    ,sidenote3 
,the popular notion of the ideas of     
,plato4    ,plato's doctrine of ideas   
has attained an imaginary clearness and 
definiteness which is not to be found in
 his own writings4 ,the popular  account
 of them is partly derived from one or  
two passages in his  ,dialogues         
interpreted without regard to their     
poetical environment4 ,it  is due also  
to the misunderstanding of him by the   
,aristotelian school2  and the erroneous
 notion has been further narrowed and   
has become fixed  by the realism of the 
schoolmen4 ,this popular view of the    
,platonic ideas  may be summed up in    
some such formula as the following3     
#8,truth consists  not in particulars1  
but in universals1 which have a place in

 the mind of  ,god1 or in some far-off  
heaven4 ,these were revealed to men in a
 former  state of existence1 and are    
recovered by reminiscence 77 or         
association from sensible things4 ,the  
sensible things are not realities1  but 
shadows only1 in relation to the truth4'
 ,these unmeaning propositions  are     
hardly suspected to be a caricature of a
 great theory of knowledge1  which      
,plato in various ways and under many   
figures of speech is seeking  to unfold4
 ,poetry has been converted into dogma2 
and it is not remarked  that the        
,platonic ideas are to be found only in 
about a third of ,plato's  writings and 
are not confined to him4 ,the forms     
which they assume are  numerous1 and if 
taken literally1 inconsistent with one  
another4 ,at one  time we are in the    
clouds of mythology1 at another among   
the abstractions  of mathematics or     
metaphysics2 we pass imperceptibly from 
one to the  other4 ,reason and fancy are
 mingled in the same passage4 ,the ideas

 are  sometimes described as many1      
coextensive with the universals of sense
  and also with the first principles of 
ethics2 or again they are absorbed  into
 the single idea of good1 and           
subordinated to it4 ,they are not more  
certain than facts1 but they are equally
 certain 7,phaedo #ajj ,a74 ,they  are  
both personal and impersonal4 ,they are 
abstract terms3 they are also  the      
causes of things2 and they are even     
transformed into the demons or  spirits 
by whose help ,god made the world4 ,and 
the idea of good 7,rep4 vi4  #eje ff47  
may without violence be converted into  
the ,supreme ,being1 who  #8because ,he 
was good' created all things 7,tim4 #bi 
,e74    ,sidenote3 ,many modes of       
describing the ideas1    ,it would be a 
mistake to try and reconcile these      
differing modes of  thought4 ,they are  
not to be regarded seriously as having a
 distinct  meaning4 ,they are parables1 
prophecies1 myths1 symbols1 revelations1
  aspirations after an unknown world4   

,they derive their origin from a deep   
religious and contemplative feeling1 and
 also from an observation of  curious   
mental phenomena4 ,they gather up the   
elements of the previous  philosophies1 
which they put together in a new form4  
,their great  diversity shows the       
tentative character of early endeavours 
to think4  ,they have not yet settled   
down into a single system4 ,plato uses  
them1  though he also criticises them2  
he acknowledges that both he and others 
are always talking about them1          
especially about the ,idea of ,good2 and
  that they are not peculiar to himself 
7,phaedo #ajj ,b2 ,rep4 vi4 #eje2       
,soph4 #bdh ff474 ,but in his later     
writings he seems to have laid aside    
the old forms of them4 ,as he proceeds  
he makes for himself new modes of       
expression more akin to the             
,aristotelian logic4    ,yet amid all   
these varieties and incongruities1 there
 is a common meaning  or spirit which   
pervades his writings1 both those in    

which he treats of  the ideas and those 
in which he is silent about them4 ,this 
is the spirit  of idealism1 which in the
 history of philosophy has had many     
names and  taken many forms1 and has in 
a measure influenced those who seemed to
  be most averse to it4 ,it has often   
been charged with inconsistency and     
fancifulness1 and yet has had an        
elevating effect on human nature1 and   
has exercised a wonderful charm and     
interest over a few spirits who have    
been lost in the thought of it4 ,it has 
been banished again and again1  but has 
always returned4 ,it has attempted to   
leave the earth and soar  heavenwards1  
but soon has found that only in         
experience could any solid  foundation  
of knowledge be laid4 ,it has           
degenerated into pantheism1  but has    
again emerged4 ,no other knowledge has  
given an equal stimulus  to the mind4   
,it is the science of sciences1 which   
are also ideas1 and  under either aspect
 require to be defined4 ,they can only  

be thought  of in due proportion when   
conceived in relation to one another4   
,they  are the glasses through which the
 kingdoms of science are seen1 but at  a
 distance4 ,all the greatest minds1     
except when living in an age of         
reaction against them1 have             
unconsciously fallen under their power4 
,sidenote3 but a common meaning or      
spirit in them4    ,the account of the  
,platonic ideas in the ,meno is the     
simplest and  clearest1 and we shall    
best illustrate their nature by giving  
this first  and then comparing the      
manner in which they are described      
elsewhere1 e4  g4 in the ,phaedrus1     
,phaedo1 ,republic2 to which may be     
added the criticism  of them in the     
,parmenides1 the personal form which is 
attributed to them  in the ,timaeus1 the
 logical character which they assume in 
the ,sophist  and ,philebus1 and the    
allusion to them in the ,laws 7xii4     
#ifd74 ,in the  ,cratylus they dawn upon
 him with the freshness of a            

newly-discovered  thought 7#dci74       
,the ,meno 7#ha ff47 goes back to a     
former state of existence1 in which men 
did and suffered good and evil1 and     
received the reward or punishment  of   
them until their sin was purged away and
 they were allowed to return  to earth4 
,this is a tradition of the olden time1 
to which priests and  poets bear        
witness4 ,the souls of men returning to 
earth bring back a  latent memory of    
ideas1 which were known to them in a    
former state4 ,the  recollection is     
awakened into life and consciousness by 
the sight of the  things which resemble 
them on earth4 ,the soul evidently      
possesses such  innate ideas before she 
has had time to acquire them4 ,this is  
proved by  an experiment tried on one of
 ,meno's slaves1 from whom ,socrates    
elicits  truths of arithmetic and       
geometry1 which he had never learned in 
this  world4 ,he must therefore have    
brought them with him from another4     
,the notion of a previous state of      

existence is found in the verses of     
,empedocles and in the fragments of     
,heracleitus4 ,it was the natural answer
  to two questions1 #8,whence came the  
soul8 ,what is the origin of evil8' and 
prevailed far and wide in the ,east4 ,it
 found its way into ,hellas probably    
though the medium of ,orphic and        
,pythagorean rites and mysteries4 ,it   
was  easier to think of a former than of
 a future life1 because such a life  has
 really existed for the race though not 
for the individual1 and all  men come   
into the world1 if not #8trailing clouds
 of glory1' at any rate  able to enter  
into the inheritance of the past4 ,in   
the ,phaedrus 7#bde  ff471 as well as in
 the ,meno1 it is this former rather    
than a future life  on which ,plato is  
disposed to dwell4 ,there the ,gods1 and
 men following  in their train1 go forth
 to contemplate the heavens1 and are    
borne round  in the revolutions of them4
 ,there they see the divine forms of    
justice1  temperance1 and the like1 in  

their unchangeable beauty1 but not      
without  an effort more than human4 ,the
 soul of man is likened to a charioteer 
and two steeds1 one mortal1 the other   
immortal4 ,the charioteer and the       
mortal steed are in fierce conflict2 at 
length the animal principle is  finally 
overpowered1 though not extinguished1 by
 the combined energies of  the          
passionate and rational elements4 ,this 
is one of those passages in  ,plato     
which1 partaking both of a philosophical
 and poetical character1  is necessarily
 indistinct and inconsistent4 ,the      
magnificent figure under  which the     
nature of the soul is described has not 
much to do with the  popular doctrine of
 the ideas4 ,yet there is one little    
trait in the  description which shows   
that they are present to ,plato's mind1 
namely1  the remark that the soul1 which
 had seen truths in the form of the     
universal 7#bdh ,c1 #bdi ,c71 cannot    
again return to the nature of an animal4
    ,sidenote3 ,the conception of them  

in ,meno1 ,phaedrus1 ,phaedo1    ,in the
 ,phaedo1 as in the ,meno1 the origin of
 ideas is sought for in a  previous     
state of existence4 ,there was no time  
when they could have been  acquired in  
this life1 and therefore they must have 
been recovered from  another4 ,the      
process of recovery is no other than the
 ordinary law of  association1 by which 
in daily life the sight of one thing or 
person  recalls another to our minds1   
and by which in scientific enquiry from 
any  part of knowledge we may be led on 
to infer the whole4 ,it is also argued  
that ideas1 or rather ideals1 must be   
derived from a previous state of        
existence because they are more perfect 
than the sensible forms of them  which  
are given by experience 7#gd ff474 ,but 
in the ,phaedo the doctrine of  ideas is
 subordinate to the proof of the        
immortality of the soul4 #8,if the  soul
 existed in a previous state1 then it   
will exist in a future state1  for a law
 of alternation pervades all things4'   

,and1 #8,if the ideas exist1  then the  
soul exists2 if not1 not4' ,it is to be 
observed1 both in the  ,meno and the    
,phaedo1 that ,socrates expresses       
himself with diffidence4  ,he speaks in 
the ,phaedo 7#aad ,d1 #aae ,d7 of the   
words with which he has  comforted      
himself and his friends1 and will not be
 too confident that the  description    
which he has given of the soul and her  
mansions is exactly  true1 but he       
#8ventures to think that something of   
the kind is true4'  ,and in the ,meno1  
after dwelling upon the immortality of  
the soul1 he  adds1 #8,of some things   
which ,i have said ,i am not altogether 
confident'  7cp4 #hf ,c1 and ,apology1  
pp4 #dj ff42 ,gorgias #ebg ,b74 ,from   
this class of  uncertainties he exempts 
the difference between truth and        
appearance1 of  which he is absolutely  
convinced 7#ih ,b74    ,sidenote3 in the
 ,republic and ,timaeus4    ,in the     
,republic the ideas are spoken of in two
 ways1 which though not  contradictory  

are different4 ,in the tenth book 7#eif 
ff47 they are  represented as the genera
 or general ideas under which           
individuals having  a common name are   
contained4 ,for example1 there is the   
bed which the  carpenter makes1 the     
picture of the bed which is drawn by the
 painter1  the bed existing in nature of
 which ,god is the author4 ,of the      
latter  all visible beds are only the   
shadows or reflections4 ,this and       
similar  illustrations or explanations  
are put forth1 not for their own sake1  
or  as an exposition of ,plato's theory 
of ideas1 but with a view of showing    
that poetry and the mimetic arts are    
concerned with an inferior part  of the 
soul and a lower kind of knowledge4 ,on 
the other hand1 in the  #fth and #gth   
books of the ,republic we reach the     
highest and most perfect  conception1   
which ,plato is able to attain1 of the  
nature of knowledge4  ,the ideas are now
 finally seen to be one as well as many1
 causes as well  as ideas1 and to have a

 unity which is the idea of good and the
 cause  of all the rest4 ,they seem1    
however1 to have lost their first aspect
  of universals under which individuals 
are contained1 and to have been         
converted into forms of another kind1   
which are inconsistently regarded  from 
the one side as images or ideals of     
justice1 temperance1 holiness  and the  
like2 from the other as hypotheses1 or  
mathematical truths or  principles4     
,in the ,timaeus1 which in the series of
 ,plato's works immediately follows  the
 ,republic1 though probably written some
 time afterwards1 no mention  occurs of 
the doctrine of ideas4 ,geometrical     
forms and arithmetical  ratios furnish  
the laws according to which the world is
 created4 ,but  though the conception of
 the ideas as genera or species is      
forgotten or  laid aside1 the           
distinction of the visible and          
intellectual is as firmly  maintained as
 ever 7#cj1 #cg74 ,the idea of good     
likewise disappears and  is superseded  

by the conception of a personal ,god1   
who works according to  a final cause or
 principle of goodness which he himself 
is4 ,no doubt is  expressed by ,plato1  
either in the ,timaeus or in any other  
dialogue1 of  the truths which he       
conceives to be the first and highest4  
,it is not the  existence of ,god or the
 idea of good which he approaches in a  
tentative  or hesitating manner1 but the
 investigations of physiology4 ,these he
  regards1 not seriously1 as a part of  
philosophy1 but as an innocent          
recreation 7,tim4 #ei ,d74    ,sidenote3
 ,the ideas in the ,parmenides1         
,sophist1 ,philebus1 ,laws4    ,passing 
on to the ,parmenides 7#abh-acf71 we    
find in that dialogue not  an exposition
 or defence of the doctrine of ideas1   
but an assault upon  them1 which is put 
into the mouth of the veteran           
,parmenides1 and might be  ascribed to  
,aristotle himself1 or to one of his    
disciples4 ,the doctrine  which is      
assailed takes two or three forms1 but  

fails in any of them to  escape the     
dialectical difficulties which are urged
 against it4 ,it is  admitted that there
 are ideas of all things1 but the manner
 in which  individuals partake of them1 
whether of the whole or of the part1 and
  in which they become like them1 or how
 ideas can be either within or  without 
the sphere of human knowledge1 or how   
the human and divine can  have any      
relation to each other1 is held to be   
incapable of explanation4  ,and yet1 if 
there are no universal ideas1 what      
becomes of philosophy8  7,parmenides    
#acj-ace74 ,in the ,sophist the theory  
of ideas is spoken of as  a doctrine    
held not by ,plato1 but by another sect 
of philosophers1 called  #8the ,friends 
of ,ideas1' probably the ,megarians1 who
 were very distinct  from him1 if not   
opposed to him 7,sophist #bdb ff474 ,nor
 in what may be  termed ,plato's        
abridgement of the history of philosophy
 7,soph4 #bda ff471  is any mention made
 such as we find in the first book of   

,aristotle's  ,metaphysics1 of the      
derivation of such a theory or of any   
part of it from  the ,pythagoreans1 the 
,eleatics1 the ,heracleiteans1 or even  
from ,socrates4  ,in the ,philebus1     
probably one of the latest of the       
,platonic ,dialogues1  the conception of
 a personal or semi-personal deity      
expressed under the  figure of mind1 the
 king of all1 who is also the cause1 is 
retained4 ,the  one and many of the     
,phaedrus and ,theaetetus is still      
working in the mind  of ,plato1 and the 
correlation of ideas1 not of #8all with 
all1' but of  #8some with some1' is     
asserted and explained4 ,but they are   
spoken of in  a different manner1 and   
are not supposed to be recovered from a 
former  state of existence4 ,the        
metaphysical conception of truth passes 
into  a psychological one1 which is     
continued in the ,laws1 and is the final
  form of the ,platonic philosophy1 so  
far as can be gathered from his own     
writings 7see especially ,laws v4 #gbg  

ff474 ,in the ,laws he harps once more  
on the old string1 and returns to       
general notions3--these he acknowledges 
to be many1 and yet he insists that they
 are also one4 ,the guardian must  be   
made to recognize the truth1 for which  
he has contended long ago in  the       
,protagoras1 that the virtues are four1 
but they are also in some  sense one    
7,laws xii4 pp4 #ife-iff2 cp4           
,protagoras #cbi74    ,so various1 and  
if regarded on the surface only1        
inconsistent1 are the  statements of    
,plato respecting the doctrine of ideas4
 ,if we attempted to  harmonize or to   
combine them1 we should make out of     
them1 not a system1  but the caricature 
of a system4 ,they are the ever-varying 
expression  of ,plato's ,idealism4 ,the 
terms used in them are in their         
substance  and general meaning the same1
 although they seem to be different4    
,they pass from the subject to the      
object1 from earth 7diesseits7 to       
heaven 7jenseits71 without regard to the

 gulf which later theology and          
philosophy have made between them4 ,they
 are also intended to supplement  or    
explain each other4 ,they relate to a   
subject of which ,plato himself  would  
have said that #8he was not confident of
 the precise form of his  own           
statements1 but was strong in the belief
 that something of the kind  was true4' 
,it is the spirit1 not the letter1 in   
which they agree--the  spirit which     
places the divine above the human1 the  
spiritual above the  material1 the one  
above the many1 the mind before the     
body4           99       99       99    
99       99    ,sidenote3 ,ancient and  
modern philosophy4    ,the stream of    
ancient philosophy in the ,alexandrian  
and ,roman times  widens into a lake or 
sea1 and then disappears underground to 
reappear  after many ages in a distant  
land4 ,it begins to flow again under new
  conditions1 at first confined between 
high and narrow banks1 but finally      
spreading over the continent of ,europe4

 ,it is and is not the same with        
ancient philosophy4 ,there is a great   
deal in modern philosophy which is      
inspired by ancient4 ,there is much in  
ancient philosophy which was #8born  out
 of due time' and before men were       
capable of understanding it4 ,to  the   
fathers of modern philosophy1 their own 
thoughts appeared to be new  and        
original1 but they carried with them an 
echo or shadow of the past1  coming back
 by recollection from an elder world4   
,of this the enquirers  of the          
seventeenth century1 who to themselves  
appeared to be working out              
independently the enquiry into all      
truth1 were unconscious4 ,they stood  in
 a new relation to theology and natural 
philosophy1 and for a time  maintained  
towards both an attitude of reserve and 
separation4 ,yet the  similarities      
between modern and ancient thought are  
greater far than the  differences4 ,all 
philosophy1 even that part of it which  
is said to be  based upon experience1 is

 really ideal2 and ideas are not only   
derived  from facts1 but they are also  
prior to them and extend far beyond     
them1  just as the mind is prior to the 
senses4    ,sidenote3 ,modern philosophy
 has a reminiscence of ancient2         
,early ,greek speculation culminates in 
the ideas of ,plato1 or rather in  the  
single idea of good4 ,his followers1 and
 perhaps he himself1 having  arrived at 
this elevation1 instead of going        
forwards went backwards from  philosophy
 to psychology1 from ideas to numbers4  
,but what we perceive  to be the real   
meaning of them1 an explanation of the  
nature and origin  of knowledge1 will   
always continue to be one of the first  
problems of  philosophy4    ,plato also 
left behind him a most potent           
instrument1 the forms of  logic--arms   
ready for use1 but not yet taken out of 
their armoury4 ,they  were the late     
birth of the early ,greek philosophy1   
and were the only  part of it which has 
had an uninterrupted hold on the mind of

 ,europe4  ,philosophies come and go2   
but the detection of fallacies1 the     
framing  of definitions1 the invention  
of methods still continue to be the main
  elements of the reasoning process4    
,sidenote3 begins with simple ideas3    
,descartes4    ,modern philosophy1 like 
ancient1 begins with very simple        
conceptions4  ,it is almost wholly a    
reflection on self4 ,it might be        
described  as a quickening into life of 
old words and notions latent in the     
semi-barbarous ,latin1 and putting a new
 meaning into them4 ,unlike ancient     
philosophy1 it has been unaffected by   
impressions derived from outward        
nature3 it arose within the limits of   
the mind itself4 ,from the time of      
,descartes to ,hume and ,kant it has had
 little or nothing to do with facts  of 
science4 ,on the other hand1 the ancient
 and mediaeval logic retained  a        
continuous influence over it1 and a form
 like that of mathematics was  easily   
impressed upon it2 the principle of     

ancient philosophy which is  most       
apparent in it is scepticism2 we must   
doubt nearly every traditional  or      
received notion1 that we may hold fast  
one or two4 ,the being of ,god  in a    
personal or impersonal form was a mental
 necessity to the first  thinkers of    
modern times3 from this alone all other 
ideas could be  deduced4 ,there had been
 an obscure presentiment of #8cogito1   
ergo sum'  more than #bjjj years        
previously4 ,the ,eleatic notion that   
being and  thought were the same was    
revived in a new form by ,descartes4    
,but now it  gave birth to consciousness
 and self-reflection3 it awakened the   
#8ego'  in human nature4 ,the mind naked
 and abstract has no other certainty but
  the conviction of its own existence4  
#8,i think1 therefore ,i am2' and this  
thought is ,god thinking in me1 who has 
also communicated to the reason of  man 
his own attributes of thought and       
extension--these are truly imparted  to 
him because ,god is true 7cp4 ,rep4 ii4 

#chb ff474 ,it has been often  remarked 
that ,descartes1 having begun by        
dismissing all presuppositions1         
introduces several3 he passes almost at 
once from scepticism to  dogmatism4 ,it 
is more important for the illustration  
of ,plato to observe  that he1 like     
,plato1 insists that ,god is true and   
incapable of deception  7,rep4 ii4      
#chb7--that he proceeds from general    
ideas1 that many elements  of           
mathematics may be found in him4 ,a     
certain influence of mathematics  both  
on the form and substance of their      
philosophy is discernible in  both of   
them4 ,after making the greatest        
opposition between thought and          
extension1 ,descartes1 like ,plato1     
supposes them to be reunited for a      
time1 not in their own nature but by a  
special divine act 7cp4 ,phaedrus  #bdf 
,c71 and he also supposes all the parts 
of the human body to meet  in the pineal
 gland1 that alone affording a principle
 of unity in the  material frame of man4

 ,it is characteristic of the first     
period of modern  philosophy1 that      
having begun 7like the ,presocratics7   
with a few general  notions1 ,descartes 
first falls absolutely under their      
influence1 and then  quickly discards   
them4 ,at the same time he is less able 
to observe facts1  because they are too 
much magnified by the glasses through   
which they  are seen4 ,the common logic 
says #8the greater the extension1 the   
less the  comprehension1' and we may put
 the same thought in another way and say
 of  abstract or general ideas1 that the
 greater the abstraction of them1 the   
less are they capable of being applied  
to particular and concrete natures4     
,sidenote3 ,parallels of ancient and    
modern philosophy4    ,not very         
different from ,descartes in his        
relation to ancient philosophy  is his  
successor ,spinoza1 who lived in the    
following generation4 ,the  system of   
,spinoza is less personal and also less 
dualistic that than  of ,descartes4 ,in 

this respect the difference between them
 is like that  between ,xenophanes and  
,parmenides4 ,the teaching of ,spinoza  
might be  described generally as the    
,jewish religion reduced to an          
abstraction  and taking the form of the 
,eleatic philosophy4 ,like ,parmenides1 
he is  overpowered and intoxicated with 
the idea of ,being or ,god4 ,the        
greatness  of both philosophies consists
 in the immensity of a thought which    
excludes all other thoughts2 their      
weakness is the necessary separation  of
 this thought from actual existence and 
from practical life4 ,in neither  of    
them is there any clear opposition      
between the inward and outward  world4  
,the substance of ,spinoza has two      
attributes1 which alone are  cognizable 
by man1 thought and extension2 these are
 in extreme opposition  to one another1 
and also in inseparable identity4 ,they 
may be regarded as  the two aspects or  
expressions under which ,god or         
substance is unfolded  to man4 ,here a  

step is made beyond the limits of the   
,eleatic philosophy4  ,the famous       
theorem of ,spinoza1 #8,omnis           
determinatio est negatio1' is  already  
contained in the #8negation is relation'
 of ,plato's ,sophist4 ,the  grand      
description of the philosopher in       
,republic vi1 as the spectator  of all  
time and all existence1 may be          
paralleled with another famous          
expression of ,spinoza1 #8,contemplatio 
rerum sub specie eternitatis4'          
,according to ,spinoza finite objects   
are unreal1 for they are conditioned  by
 what is alien to them1 and by one      
another4 ,human beings are included  in 
the number of them4 ,hence there is no  
reality in human action and no  place   
for right and wrong4 ,individuality is  
accident4 ,the boasted freedom  of the  
will is only a consciousness of         
necessity4 ,truth1 he says1 is the      
direction of the reason towards the     
infinite1 in which all things repose2   
and herein lies the secret of man's     

well-being4 ,in the exaltation of the   
reason or intellect1 in the denial of   
the voluntariness of evil 7,timaeus  #hf
 ,c1 ,d2 ,laws1 ix4 #hfj71 ,spinoza     
approaches nearer to ,plato than in  his
 conception of an infinite substance4   
,as ,plato1 following ,socrates1  said  
that virtue is knowledge1 so ,spinoza   
would have maintained that  knowledge   
alone is good1 and what contributes to  
knowledge1 useful4 ,both  are equally   
far from any real experience or         
observation of nature4 ,and  the same   
difficulty is found in both when we seek
 to apply their ideas to  life and      
practice4 ,there is a gulf fixed between
 the infinite substance  and finite     
objects or individuals of ,spinoza1 just
 as there is between  the ideas of      
,plato and the world of sense4          
,removed from ,spinoza by less than a   
generation is the philosopher           
,leibnitz1 who after deepening and      
intensifying the opposition between     
mind and matter1 reunites them by his   

preconcerted harmony 7cp4 again         
,phaedrus #bdf ,c74 ,to him all the     
particles of matter are living beings   
which reflect on one another1 and in the
 least of them the whole is  contained4 
,here we catch a reminiscence both of   
the  or similar  particles of           
,anaxagoras1 and of the world-animal of 
the ,timaeus4    ,sidenote3 ,spinoza1   
,leibnitz1 ,bacon1 ,locke1 ,berkeley1   
,hume4    ,in ,bacon and ,locke we have 
another development in which the mind of
  man is supposed to receive knowledge  
by a new method and to work by          
observation and experience4 ,but we may 
remark that it is the idea of           
experience1 rather than experience      
itself1 with which the mind is filled4  
,it is a symbol of knowledge rather than
 the reality which is vouchsafed  to us4
 ,the ,organon of ,bacon is not much    
nearer to actual facts than the         
,organon of ,aristotle or the ,platonic 
idea of good4 ,many of the old rags  and
 ribbons which defaced the garment of   

philosophy have been stripped  off1 but 
some of them still adhere4 ,a crude     
conception of the ideas of  ,plato      
survives in the #8forms' of ,bacon4 ,and
 on the other hand1 there  are many     
passages of ,plato in which the         
importance of the investigation  of     
facts is as much insisted upon as by    
,bacon4 ,both are almost equally        
superior to the illusions of language1  
and are constantly crying out  against  
them1 as against other idols4    ,locke 
cannot be truly regarded as the author  
of sensationalism any  more than of     
idealism4 ,his system is based upon     
experience1 but with  him experience    
includes reflection as well as sense4   
,his analysis and  construction of ideas
 has no foundation in fact2 it is only  
the dialectic  of the mind #8talking to 
herself4' ,the philosophy of ,berkeley  
is but the  use of one word instead of  
two1 which have the same meaning with   
it4 ,for  objects of sense he would     
substitute sensations4 ,he imagines     

himself  to have changed the relation of
 the human mind towards ,god and nature2
  they remain the same as before1 though
 he has drawn the imaginary line  by    
which they are divided at a different   
point4 ,he has annihilated the  outward 
world1 but it instantly reappears       
governed by the same laws and  described
 under the same names4    ,sidenote3    
,philosophy and the history of          
philosophy4    ,a like remark applies to
 ,david ,hume1 of whose philosophy the  
central  principle is the denial of the 
relation of cause and effect4 ,he would 
deprive men of a familiar term which    
they can ill afford to lose2 but he     
seems not to have observed that this    
alteration is merely verbal and does    
not in any degree affect the nature of  
things4 ,still less did he remark  that 
he was arguing from the necessary       
imperfection of language against  the   
most certain facts4 ,and here1 again1 we
 may find a parallel with the  ancients4
 ,he goes beyond facts in his           

scepticism1 as they did in their        
idealism4 ,like the ancient ,sophists1  
he relegates the more important         
principles of ethics to custom and      
probability4 ,but crude and unmeaning   
as this philosophy is1 it exercised a   
great influence on his successors1  not 
unlike that which ,locke exercised upon 
,berkeley and ,berkeley upon  ,hume     
himself4 ,all three were both sceptical 
and ideal in almost equal  degrees4     
,neither they nor their predecessors had
 any true conception  of language or of 
the history of philosophy4 ,hume's      
paradox has been  forgotten by the      
world1 and did not any more than the    
scepticism of the  ancients require to  
be seriously refuted4 ,like some other  
philosophical  paradoxes1 it would have 
been better left to die out4 ,it        
certainly could  not be refuted by a    
philosophy such as ,kant's1 in which1 no
 less than  in the previously mentioned 
systems1 the history of the human mind  
and  the nature of language are almost  

wholly ignored1 and the certainty of    
objective knowledge is transferred to   
the subject2 while absolute truth  is   
reduced to a figment1 more abstract and 
narrow than ,plato's ideas1 of  #8thing 
in itself1' to which1 if we reason      
strictly1 no predicate can be  applied4 
,sidenote3 ,possibility of a new method4
    ,the question which ,plato has      
raised respecting the origin and nature 
of  ideas belongs to the infancy of     
philosophy2 in modern times it would no 
longer be asked4 ,their origin is only  
their history1 so far as we know  it2   
there can be no other4 ,we may trace    
them in language1 in philosophy1  in    
mythology1 in poetry1 but we cannot     
argue  priori about them4 ,we  may      
attempt to shake them off1 but they are 
always returning1 and in  every sphere  
of science and human action are tending 
to go beyond facts4  ,they are thought  
to be innate1 because they have been    
familiar to us  all our lives1 and we   
can no longer dismiss them from our     

mind4 ,many of  them express relations  
of terms to which nothing exactly or    
nothing at  all in rerum natur          
corresponds4 ,we are not such free      
agents in the  use of them as we        
sometimes imagine4 ,fixed ideas have    
taken the most  complete possession of  
some thinkers who have been most        
determined to  renounce them1 and have  
been vehemently affirmed when they could
 be least  explained and were incapable 
of proof4 ,the world has often been led 
away  by a word to which no distinct    
meaning could be attached4 ,abstractions
  such as #8authority1' #8equality1'    
#8utility1' #8liberty1' #8pleasure1'    
#8experience1' #8consciousness1'        
chance1' #8substance1' #8matter1'       
#8atom1'  and a heap of other           
metaphysical and theological terms1 are 
the source of  quite as much error and  
illusion and have as little relation to 
actual  facts as the #8ideas' of ,plato4
 ,few students of theology or philosophy
  have sufficiently reflected how       

quickly the bloom of a philosophy passes
  away2 or how hard it is for one age to
 understand the writings of  another2 or
 how nice a judgment is required of     
those who are seeking to  express the   
philosophy of one age in the terms of   
another4 ,the #8eternal  truths' of     
which metaphysicians speak have hardly  
ever lasted more than  a generation4 ,in
 our own day schools or systems of      
philosophy which have  once been famous 
have died before the founders of them4  
,we are still1 as  in ,plato's age1     
groping about for a new method more     
comprehensive than  any of those which  
now prevail2 and also more permanent4   
,and we seem to  see at a distance the  
promise of such a method1 which can     
hardly be any  other than the method of 
idealized experience1 having roots which
 strike  far down into the history of   
philosophy4 ,it is a method which does  
not  divorce the present from the past1 
or the part from the whole1 or the      
abstract from the concrete1 or theory   

from fact1 or the divine from the       
human1 or one science from another1 but 
labours to connect them4 ,along  such a 
road we have proceeded a few steps1     
sufficient1 perhaps1 to make  us reflect
 on the want of method which prevails in
 our own day4 ,in  another age1 all the 
branches of knowledge1 whether relating 
to ,god or  man or nature1 will become  
the knowledge of #8the revelation of a  
single  science' 7,symp4 #baj1 #baa71   
and all things1 like the stars in       
heaven1 will  shed their light upon one 
another4      ,,meno4    ,,persons ,,of 
,,the ,,dialogue4    ,,meno4 ,a ,,slave 
,,of ,,meno4 ,,socrates4 ,,anytus4      
,sidenote3 ,meno4        ,meno4 ,can you
 tell me1 ,socrates1 whether virtue is  
acquired      by teaching or by         
practice2 or if neither by teaching     
nor by practice1 then whether it comes  
to man by nature1 or      in what other 
way8    ,sidenote3 ,meno asks ,socrates 
#8,how virtue can be acquired8' ,before 
giving  an answer ,socrates must enquire

 #8,what is virtue8'        ,socrates4  
,o ,meno1 there was a time when the     
,thessalians      were famous among the 
other ,hellenes only for their riches   
and their riding2 but now1 if ,i am not 
mistaken1 they are      equally famous  
for their wisdom1 especially at ,larisa1
 which      is the native city of your  
friend ,aristippus4 ,and this is        
,gorgias' doing2 for when he came there1
 the flower of the      ,aleuadae1 among
 them your admirer ,aristippus1 and the 
other chiefs of the ,thessalians1 fell  
in love with his wisdom4      ,and he   
has taught you the habit of answering   
questions in a      grand and bold      
style1 which becomes those who know1 and
      is the style in which he himself  
answers all comers2 and any             
,hellene who likes may ask him anything4
 ,how different is      our lot6 my dear
 ,meno4 ,here at ,athens there is a     
dearth    ,steph4 #ga      of the       
commodity1 and all wisdom seems to have 
emigrated      from us to you4 ,i am    

certain that if you were to ask any     
,athenian whether virtue was natural or 
acquired1 he would      laugh in your   
face1 and say3 #8,stranger1 you have far
 too      good an opinion of me1 if you 
think that ,i can answer      your      
question4 ,for ,i literally do not know 
what virtue is1      and much less      
whether it is acquired by teaching or   
not4'      ,and ,i myself1 ,meno1 living
 as ,i do in this region of poverty1    
am as poor as the rest of the world2 and
 ,i confess with      shame that ,i know
 literally nothing about virtue2 and    
when ,i do not know the #8quid' of      
anything how can ,i      know the       
#8quale'8 ,how1 if ,i knew nothing at   
all of ,meno1      could ,i tell if he  
was fair1 or the opposite of fair2 rich 
and      noble1 or the reverse of rich  
and noble8 ,do you think that      ,i   
could8    ,sidenote3 ,the definition of 
virtue4        ,men4 ,no1 indeed4 ,but  
are you in earnest1 ,socrates1 in       
saying that you do not know what virtue 

is8 ,and am ,i      to carry back this  
report of you to ,thessaly8             
,sidenote3 ,he does not know1 and never 
met with any one who did4        ,soc4  
,not only that1 my dear boy1 but you may
 say further      that ,i have never    
known of any one else who did1 in my    
judgment4        ,men4 ,then you have   
never met ,gorgias when he was      at  
,athens8        ,soc4 ,yes1 ,i have4    
,men4 ,and did you not think that he    
knew8        ,soc4 ,i have not a good   
memory1 ,meno1 and therefore ,i         
cannot now tell what ,i thought of him  
at the time4 ,and      ,i dare say that 
he did know1 and that you know what he  
said3 please1 therefore1 to remind me of
 what he said2 or1 if      you would    
rather1 tell me your own view2 for ,i   
suspect that      you and he think much 
alike4        ,men4 ,very true4         
,soc4 ,then as he is not here1 never    
mind him1 and do you      tell me3 ,by  
the gods1 ,meno1 be generous1 and tell  
me what      you say that virtue is2 for

 ,i shall be truly delighted to find    
that ,i have been mistaken1 and that you
 and ,gorgias do      really have this  
knowledge2 although ,i have been just   
saying      that ,i have never found    
anybody who had4    ,sidenote3 ,meno    
describes the different kinds of virtue1
 but is unable to  give a common notion 
of them4        ,men4 ,there will be no 
difficulty1 ,socrates1 in answering     
your question4 ,let us take first the   
virtue of a man--he      should know how
 to administer the state1 and in the    
administration      of it to benefit his
 friends and harm his enemies2      and 
he must also be careful not to suffer   
harm himself4      ,a woman's virtue1 if
 you wish to know about that1 may also  
be easily described3 her duty is to     
order her house1 and      keep what is  
indoors1 and obey her husband4 ,every   
age1      every condition of life1 young
 or old1 male or female1 bond      or   
free1 has a different virtue3 there are 
virtues numberless1      #gb      and no

 lack of definitions of them2 for virtue
 is relative      to the actions and    
ages of each of us in all that we do4   
,and      the same may be said of vice1 
,socrates#c4    ,sidenote3 ,the nature  
of definition4    ,sidenote3 ,meno1 not 
without difficulty and by help of many  
illustrations1 is made to understand the
 nature of common notions4        ,soc4 
,how fortunate ,i am1 ,meno6 ,when ,i   
ask you for      one virtue1 you present
 me with a swarm of them#d1 which are   
in your keeping4 ,suppose that ,i carry 
on the figure of the      swarm1 and ask
 of you1 ,what is the nature of the bee8
 and      you answer that there are many
 kinds of bees1 and ,i reply3      ,but 
do bees differ as bees1 because there   
are many and      different kinds of    
them2 or are they not rather to be      
distinguished      by some other        
quality1 as for example beauty1 size1   
or shape8 ,how would you answer me8     
,men4 ,i should answer that bees do not 
differ from one      another1 as bees4  

,soc4 ,and if ,i went on to say3 ,that  
is what ,i desire to      know1 ,meno2  
tell me what is the quality in which    
they      do not differ1 but are all    
alike2--would you be able to            
answer8        ,men4 ,i should4         
,soc4 ,and so of the virtues1 however   
many and different      they may be1    
they have all a common nature which     
makes      them virtues2 and on this he 
who would answer the question1          
#8,what is virtue8' would do well to    
have his eye fixed3 ,do      you        
understand8        ,men4 ,i am beginning
 to understand2 but ,i do not as yet    
take hold of the question as ,i could   
wish4        ,soc4 ,when you say1 ,meno1
 that there is one virtue of      a man1
 another of a woman1 another of a child1
 and so on1      does this apply only to
 virtue1 or would you say the same of   
health1 and size1 and strength8 ,or is  
the nature of health      always the    
same1 whether in man or woman8          
,men4 ,i should say that health is the  

same1 both in man and      woman4       
,sidenote3 ,health and strength1 and    
virtue and temperance and justice are   
the same both in men and women4         
,soc4 ,and is not this true of size and 
strength8 ,if a      woman is strong1   
she will be strong by reason of the same
      form and of the same strength     
subsisting in her which      there is in
 the man4 ,i mean to say that strength1 
as      strength1 whether of man or     
woman1 is the same4 ,is there      any  
difference8        ,men4 ,i think not4  
,sidenote3 ,the sameness of virtue4     
,soc4 ,and will not virtue1 as virtue1  
be the same1 whether         #gc      in
 a child or in a grown-up person1 in a  
woman or in a      man8        ,men4 ,i 
cannot help feeling1 ,socrates1 that    
this case is      different from the    
others4        ,soc4 ,but why8 ,were you
 not saying that the virtue of a        
man was to order a state1 and the virtue
 of a woman was to      order a house8  
,men4 ,i did say so4        ,soc4 ,and  

can either house or state or anything be
 well      ordered without temperance   
and without justice8        ,men4       
,certainly not4        ,soc4 ,then they 
who order a state or a house temperately
      or justly order them with         
temperance and justice8        ,men4    
,certainly4        ,soc4 ,then both men 
and women1 if they are to be good       
men and women1 must have the same       
virtues of temperance      and justice8 
,men4 ,true4        ,soc4 ,and can      
either a young man or an elder one be   
good1      if they are intemperate and  
unjust8        ,men4 ,they cannot4      
,soc4 ,they must be temperate and just8 
,men4 ,yes4        ,soc4 ,then all men  
are good in the same way1 and by        
participation      in the same virtues8 
,men4 ,such is the inference4           
,soc4 ,and they surely would not have   
been good in the      same way1 unless  
their virtue had been the same8         
,men4 ,they would not4    ,sidenote3    
,then what is virtue8 ,gorgias and ,meno

 reply1 #8,the power of  governing      
mankind4'        ,soc4 ,then now that   
the sameness of all virtue has been     
proven1 try and remember what you and   
,gorgias say that      virtue is4       
,men4 ,will you have one definition of  
them all8        ,soc4 ,that is what ,i 
am seeking4        ,men4 ,if you want to
 have one definition of them all1 ,i    
know      not what to say1 but that     
virtue is the power of governing        
mankind4    ,sidenote3 ,the nature of   
definition4        ,soc4 ,and does this 
definition of virtue include all virtue8
      ,is virtue the same in a child and
 in a slave1 ,meno8 ,can      the child 
govern his father1 or the slave his     
master2 and      would he who governed  
be any longer a slave8    ,sidenote3    
,but this cannot apply to all persons4  
,men4 ,i think not1 ,socrates4          
,soc4 ,no1 indeed2 there would be small 
reason in that4      ,yet once more1    
fair friend2 according to you1 virtue is
 #8the      power of governing2' but do 

you not add #8justly and not            
unjustly'8        ,men4 ,yes1 ,socrates2
 ,i agree there2 for justice is virtue4 
,soc4 ,would you say #8virtue1' ,meno1  
or #8a virtue'8        ,men4 ,what do   
you mean8        ,soc4 ,i mean as ,i    
might say about anything2 that a round1 
for example1 is #8a figure' and not     
simply #8figure1' and ,i      should    
adopt this mode of speaking1 because    
there are other      figures4           
,men4 ,quite right2 and that is just    
what ,i am saying about                 
virtue--that there are other virtues as 
well as justice4        ,soc4 ,what are 
they8 tell me the names of them1 as ,i  
would         #gd      tell you the     
names of the other figures if you asked 
me4    ,sidenote3 ,meno names the       
virtues1 but is unable to get at the    
common  notion of them4        ,men4    
,courage and temperance and wisdom and  
magnanimity      are virtues2 and there 
are many others4        ,soc4 ,yes1     
,meno2 and again we are in the same     

case3 in      searching after one virtue
 we have found many1 though not in      
the same way as before2 but we have been
 unable to find the      common virtue  
which runs through them all4            
,men4 ,why1 ,socrates1 even now ,i am   
not able to follow      you in the      
attempt to get at one common notion of  
virtue as of      other things4         
,soc4 ,no wonder2 but ,i will try to get
 nearer if ,i can1 for      you know    
that all things have a common notion4   
,suppose      now that some one asked   
you the question which ,i asked         
before3 ,meno1 he would say1 what is    
figure8 ,and if you      answered       
#8roundness1' he would reply to you1 in 
my way of      speaking1 by asking      
whether you would say that roundness is 
#8figure' or #8a figure2' and you would 
answer #8a figure4'        ,men4        
,certainly4        ,soc4 ,and for this  
reason--that there are other figures8   
,men4 ,yes4        ,soc4 ,and if he     
proceeded to ask1 ,what other figures   

are      there8 you would have told him4
    ,sidenote3 ,illustrations4          
,men4 ,i should4        ,soc4 ,and if he
 similarly asked what colour is1 and you
 answered      whiteness1 and the       
questioner rejoined1 ,would you      say
 that whiteness is colour or a colour8  
you would reply1 ,a      colour1 because
 there are other colours as well4       
,men4 ,i should4        ,soc4 ,and if he
 had said1 ,tell me what they are8--you 
would have told him of other colours    
which are colours just      as much as  
whiteness4        ,men4 ,yes4           
,sidenote3 ,he has a similar difficulty 
about the nature of ,figure4            
,soc4 ,and suppose that he were to      
pursue the matter in my      way1 he    
would say3 ,ever and anon we are landed 
in particulars1      but this is not    
what ,i want2 tell me then1 since you   
call      them by a common name1 and say
 that they are all figures1      even   
when opposed to one another1 what is    
that common      nature which you       

designate as figure--which contains     
straight      as well as round1 and is  
no more one than the other--that        
would be your mode of speaking8         
,men4 ,yes4        ,soc4 ,and in        
speaking thus1 you do not mean to say   
that the      round is round any more   
than straight1 or the straight any      
more straight than round8        ,men4  
,certainly not4        ,soc4 ,you only  
assert that the round figure is not more
      a figure than the straight1 or the
 straight than the round8        ,men4  
,very true4        ,soc4 ,to what then  
do we give the name of figure8 ,try     
and answer4 ,suppose that when a person 
asked you this      question either     
about figure or colour1 you were to     
reply1      ,man1 ,i do not understand  
what you want1 or know what you         
#ge      are saying2 he would look      
rather astonished and say3 ,do      you 
not understand that ,i am looking for   
the #8simile in      multis'8 ,and then 
he might put the question in another    

form3 ,meno1 he might say1 what is that 
#8simile in multis'      which you call 
figure1 and which includes not only     
round and      straight figures1 but    
all8 ,could you not answer that         
question1      ,meno8 ,i wish that you  
would try2 the attempt will be      good
 practice with a view to the answer     
about virtue4        ,men4 ,i would     
rather that you should answer1          
,socrates4        ,soc4 ,shall ,i       
indulge you8        ,men4 ,by all means4
    ,sidenote3 ,definition of colour and
 figure4        ,soc4 ,and then you will
 tell me about virtue8        ,men4 ,i  
will4        ,soc4 ,then ,i must do my  
best1 for there is a prize to be won4   
,men4 ,certainly4    ,sidenote3 ,figure 
is defined by ,socrates to be that which
 always follows  colour4        ,soc4   
,well1 ,i will try and explain to you   
what figure is4      ,what do you say to
 this answer8--,figure is the only thing
      which always follows colour4 ,will
 you be satisfied with it1      as ,i am

 sure that ,i should be1 if you would   
let me have      a similar definition of
 virtue8        ,men4 ,but1 ,socrates1  
it is such a simple answer4        ,soc4
 ,why simple8        ,men4 ,because1    
according to you1 figure is that which  
always follows colour4        7,soc4    
,granted74        ,men4 ,but if a person
 were to say that he does not know      
what colour is1 any more than what      
figure is--what sort of      answer     
would you have given him8        ,soc4  
,i should have told him the truth4 ,and 
if he were      a philosopher of the    
eristic and antagonistic sort1 ,i should
      say to him3 ,you have my answer1  
and if ,i am wrong1 your      business  
is to take up the argument and refute   
me4 ,but if      we were friends1 and   
were talking as you and ,i are now1     
,i should reply in a milder strain and  
more in the dialectician's      vein2   
that is to say1 ,i should not only speak
 the truth1 but ,i      should make use 
of premisses which the person           

interrogated      would be willing to   
admit4 ,and this is the way in which    
,i shall endeavour to approach you4 ,you
 will acknowledge1      will you not1   
that there is such a thing as an end1 or
      termination1 or extremity8--all   
which words ,i use in the      same     
sense1 although ,i am aware that        
,prodicus might draw      distinctions  
about them3 but still you1 ,i am sure1  
would speak      of a thing as ended or 
terminated--that is all which ,i am     
saying--not anything very difficult4    
,men4 ,yes1 ,i should2 and ,i believe   
that ,i understand your      meaning4   
,soc4 ,and you would speak of a surface 
and also of a solid1        #gf      as 
for example in geometry4        ,men4   
,yes4        ,soc4 ,well then1 you are  
now in a condition to understand      my
 definition of figure4 ,i define figure 
to be that in which      the solid ends2
 or1 more concisely1 the limit of solid4
        ,men4 ,and now1 ,socrates1 what 
is colour8    ,sidenote3 ,the           

imperiousness of ,meno4    ,sidenote3   
,and now1 what is colour8        ,soc4  
,you are outrageous1 ,meno1 in thus     
plaguing a poor      old man to give you
 an answer1 when you will not take      
the trouble of remembering what is      
,gorgias' definition of      virtue4    
,men4 ,when you have told me what ,i    
ask1 ,i will tell you1      ,socrates4  
,soc4 ,a man who was blindfolded has    
only to hear you      talking1 and he   
would know that you are a fair creature 
and      have still many lovers4        
,men4 ,why do you think so8        ,soc4
 ,why1 because you always speak in      
imperatives3 like      all beauties when
 they are in their prime1 you are       
tyrannical2      and also1 as ,i        
suspect1 you have found out that ,i have
 a      weakness for the fair1 and      
therefore to humour you ,i must         
answer4        ,men4 ,please do4        
,soc4 ,would you like me to answer you  
after the manner of      ,gorgias1 which
 is familiar to you8        ,men4 ,i    

should like nothing better4             
,sidenote3 ,meno1 ,gorgias1 and         
,empedocles are all agreed that colour  
is an  effluence of existence1          
proportioned to certain passages4       
,soc4 ,do not he and you and ,empedocles
 say that there are      certain        
effluences of existence8        ,men4   
,certainly4        ,soc4 ,and passages  
into which and through which the        
effluences      pass8        ,men4      
,exactly4        ,soc4 ,and some of the 
effluences fit into the passages1 and   
some of them are too small or too large8
        ,men4 ,true4        ,soc4 ,and  
there is such a thing as sight8         
,men4 ,yes4        ,soc4 ,and now1 as   
,pindar says1 #8read my                 
meaning3'--colour      is an effluence  
of form1 commensurate with sight1 and   
palpable      to sense4        ,men4    
,that1 ,socrates1 appears to me to be an
 admirable      answer4    ,sidenote3   
,the definition of virtue4        ,soc4 
,why1 yes1 because it happens to be one 

which you      have been in the habit of
 hearing3 and your wit will have        
discovered1 ,i suspect1 that you may    
explain in the same way      the nature 
of sound and smell1 and of many other   
similar      phenomena4        ,men4    
,quite true4        ,soc4 ,the answer1  
,meno1 was in the orthodox solemn vein1 
and therefore was more acceptable to you
 than the other      answer about       
figure4        ,men4 ,yes4        ,soc4 
,and yet1 ,o son of ,alexidemus1 ,i     
cannot help thinking      that the other
 was the better2 and ,i am sure that you
 would      be of the same opinion1 if  
you would only stay and be              
initiated1 and were not compelled1 as   
you said yesterday1 to      go away     
before the mysteries4        ,men4 ,but 
,i will stay1 ,socrates1 if you will    
give me many      such answers4         
#gg    ,sidenote3 ,virtue1 according to 
,meno1 is the desire of the honourable  
and  the good4 ,his definition is       
analysed by ,socrates4        ,soc4     

,well then1 for my own sake as well as  
for yours1 ,i will      do my very best2
 but ,i am afraid that ,i shall not be  
able to      give you very many as good3
 and now1 in your turn1 you are      to 
fulfil your promise1 and tell me what   
virtue is in the      universal2 and do 
not make a singular into a plural1 as   
the      facetious say of those who     
break a thing1 but deliver virtue to    
me whole and sound1 and not broken into 
a number of pieces3      ,i have given  
you the pattern4        ,men4 ,well     
then1 ,socrates1 virtue1 as ,i take it1 
is when he1      who desires the        
honourable1 is able to provide it for   
himself2      so the poet says1 and ,i  
say too--        #8,virtue is the desire
 of things honourable and the power of  
attaining them4'        ,soc4 ,and does 
he who desires the honourable also      
desire      the good8        ,men4      
,certainly4        ,soc4 ,then are there
 some who desire the evil and others    
who desire the good8 ,do not all men1 my

 dear sir1 desire      good8            
,men4 ,i think not4        ,soc4 ,there 
are some who desire evil8        ,men4  
,yes4        ,soc4 ,do you mean that    
they think the evils which they         
desire1 to be good2 or do they know that
 they are evil and      yet desire them8
    ,sidenote3 ,the desire of good and  
evil4        ,men4 ,both1 ,i think4     
,soc4 ,and do you really imagine1 ,meno1
 that a man knows      evils to be evils
 and desires them notwithstanding8      
,men4 ,certainly ,i do4        ,soc4    
,and desire is of possession8           
,men4 ,yes1 of possession4    ,sidenote3
 ,men desire evil1 but not what they    
think to be evil4        ,soc4 ,and does
 he think that the evils will do good to
 him      who possesses them1 or does he
 know that they will do him      harm8  
,men4 ,there are some who think that the
 evils will do them      good1 and      
others who know that they will do them  
harm4        ,soc4 ,and1 in your        
opinion1 do those who think that they   

will do them good know that they are    
evils8        ,men4 ,certainly not4     
,soc4 ,is it not obvious that those who 
are ignorant of their      nature do not
 desire them2 but they desire what they 
suppose      to be goods although they  
are really evils2 and if they are       
mistaken and suppose the evils to be    
goods they really desire      goods8    
,men4 ,yes1 in that case4        ,soc4  
,well1 and do those who1 as you say1    
desire evils1 and      think that evils 
are hurtful to the possessor of them1   
know      that they will be hurt by     
them8        ,men4 ,they must know it4  
,soc4 ,and must they not suppose that   
those who are hurt            #gh       
are miserable in proportion to the hurt 
which is inflicted upon      them8      
,men4 ,how can it be otherwise8         
,soc4 ,but are not the miserable        
ill-fated8        ,men4 ,yes1 indeed4   
,soc4 ,and does any one desire to be    
miserable and ill-fated8        ,men4 ,i
 should say not1 ,socrates4        ,soc4

 ,but if there is no one who desires to 
be miserable1      there is no one1     
,meno1 who desires evil2 for what is    
misery      but the desire and          
possession of evil8        ,men4 ,that  
appears to be the truth1 ,socrates1 and 
,i admit      that nobody desires evil4 
,soc4 ,and yet1 were you not saying just
 now that virtue      is the desire and 
power of attaining good8        ,men4   
,yes1 ,i did say so4    ,sidenote3 ,the 
self-contradiction of ,meno4            
,sidenote3 ,the desire of good is really
 common to all of them4        ,soc4    
,but if this be affirmed1 then the      
desire of good is common      to all1   
and one man is no better than another in
 that      respect8        ,men4 ,true4 
,soc4 ,and if one man is not better than
 another in desiring      good1 he must 
be better in the power of attaining it8 
,men4 ,exactly4    ,sidenote3 ,virtue is
 the power of attaining good with       
justice4        ,soc4 ,then1 according  
to your definition1 virtue would appear 

to be the power of attaining good8      
,men4 ,i entirely approve1 ,socrates1 of
 the manner in which      you now view  
this matter4        ,soc4 ,then let us  
see whether what you say is true from   
another point of view2 for very likely  
you may be right3--,you      affirm     
virtue to be the power of attaining     
goods8        ,men4 ,yes4        ,soc4  
,and the goods which you mean are such  
as health and      wealth and the       
possession of gold and silver1 and      
having      office and honour in the    
state--those are what you would         
call goods8        ,men4 ,yes1 ,i should
 include all those4        ,soc4 ,then1 
according to ,meno1 who is the          
hereditary      friend of the great     
king1 virtue is the power of getting    
silver      and gold2 and would you add 
that they must be gained      piously1  
justly1 or do you deem this to be of no 
consequence8      ,and is any mode of   
acquisition1 even if unjust or          
dishonest1      equally to be deemed    

virtue8        ,men4 ,not virtue1       
,socrates1 but vice4        ,soc4 ,then 
justice or temperance or holiness1 or   
some other      part of virtue1 as would
 appear1 must accompany the acquisition1
      and without them the mere         
acquisition of good will not      be    
virtue4        ,men4 ,why1 how can there
 be virtue without these8        ,soc4  
,and the non-acquisition of gold and    
silver in a dishonest      manner for   
oneself or another1 or in other words   
the      want of them1 may be equally   
virtue8        ,men4 ,true4        ,soc4
 ,then the acquisition of such goods is 
no more virtue      than the            
non-acquisition and want of them1 but   
whatever is      accompanied by justice 
or honesty is virtue1 and whatever      
is devoid of justice is vice4           
#gi    ,sidenote3 ,the whole cannot be  
defined by a part4    ,sidenote3 ,but   
this definition repeats the thing       
defined3--virtue  the  power of         
attaining good with a part of virtue4   

,men4 ,it cannot be otherwise1 in my    
judgment4        ,soc4 ,and were we not 
saying just now that justice1           
temperance1      and the like1 were each
 of them a part of virtue8        ,men4 
,yes4        ,soc4 ,and so1 ,meno1 this 
is the way in which you mock me4        
,men4 ,why do you say that1 ,socrates8  
,soc4 ,why1 because ,i asked you to     
deliver virtue into my      hands whole 
and unbroken1 and ,i gave you a pattern 
according      to which you were to     
frame your answer2 and you have         
forgotten already1 and tell me that     
virtue is the power of      attaining   
good justly1 or with justice2 and       
justice you acknowledge      to be a    
part of virtue4        ,men4 ,yes4      
,soc4 ,then it follows from your own    
admissions1 that virtue      is doing   
what you do with a part of virtue2 for  
justice and      the like are said by   
you to be parts of virtue4    ,sidenote3
 ,but if we do not know the nature of   
virtue as a whole1 how can  we know what

 a part of virtue is8        ,men4 ,what
 of that8        ,soc4 ,what of that6   
,why1 did not ,i ask you to tell me the 
nature of virtue as a whole8 ,and you   
are very far from      telling me this2 
but declare every action to be virtue   
which is      done with a part of       
virtue2 as though you had told me and ,i
      must already know the whole of    
virtue1 and this too when      frittered
 away into little pieces4 ,and1         
therefore1 my dear      ,meno1 ,i fear  
that ,i must begin again and repeat the 
same      question3 ,what is virtue8 for
 otherwise1 ,i can only say1 that       
every action done with a part of virtue 
is virtue2 what else      is the meaning
 of saying that every action done with  
justice      is virtue8 ,ought ,i not to
 ask the question over again2 for       
can any one who does not know virtue    
know a part of      virtue8        ,men4
 ,no2 ,i do not say that he can4        
,soc4 ,do you remember how1 in the      
example of figure1 we      rejected any 

answer given in terms which were as yet 
unexplained      or unadmitted8         
,men4 ,yes1 ,socrates2 and we were quite
 right in doing so4        ,soc4 ,but   
then1 my friend1 do not suppose that we 
can      explain to any one the nature  
of virtue as a whole through      some  
unexplained portion of virtue1 or       
anything at all in that      fashion2 we
 should only have to ask over again the 
old      question1 ,what is virtue8 ,am 
,i not right8        ,men4 ,i believe   
that you are4        ,soc4 ,then begin  
again1 and answer me1 ,what1 according  
to      you and your friend ,gorgias1 is
 the definition of virtue8    ,sidenote3
 ,the torpedo's shock4    ,sidenote3    
,meno compares ,socrates to a torpedo   
whose touch has taken away  his sense   
and speech4        ,men4 ,o ,socrates1  
,i used to be told1 before ,i knew you1 
that      you were always doubting      
yourself and making others doubt2       
#hj      and now you are casting your   
spells over me1 and ,i am simply        

getting bewitched and enchanted1 and am 
at my wits' end4      ,and if ,i may    
venture to make a jest upon you1 you    
seem      to me both in your appearance 
and in your power over others      to be
 very like the flat torpedo fish1 who   
torpifies those who      come near him  
and touch him1 as you have now torpified
 me1      ,i think4 ,for my soul and my 
tongue are really torpid1 and ,i      do
 not know how to answer you2 and though 
,i have been      delivered of an       
infinite variety of speeches about      
virtue before      now1 and to many     
persons--and very good ones they were1  
as      ,i thought--at this moment ,i   
cannot even say what virtue is4         
,and ,i think that you are very wise in 
not voyaging and going      away from   
home1 for if you did in other places as 
you do      in ,athens1 you would be    
cast into prison as a magician4         
,soc4 ,you are a rogue1 ,meno1 and had  
all but caught me4        ,men4 ,what do
 you mean1 ,socrates8        ,soc4 ,i   

can tell why you made a simile about me4
        ,men4 ,why8    ,sidenote3       
,socrates is the cause of dulness in    
others because he is  himself dull4     
,soc4 ,in order that ,i might make      
another simile about you4      ,for ,i  
know that all pretty young gentlemen    
like to have pretty      similes made   
about them--as well they may--but ,i    
shall not      return the compliment4   
,as to my being a torpedo1 if the       
torpedo      is torpid as well as the   
cause of torpidity in others1 then      
indeed ,i am a torpedo1 but not         
otherwise2 for ,i perplex      others1  
not because ,i am clear1 but because ,i 
am utterly perplexed      myself4 ,and  
now ,i know not what virtue is1 and you 
seem to be in the same case1 although   
you did once perhaps      know before   
you touched me4 ,however1 ,i have no    
objection      to join with you in the  
enquiry4        ,men4 ,and how will you 
enquire1 ,socrates1 into that which     
you do not know8 ,what will you put     

forth as the subject of      enquiry8   
,and if you find what you want1 how will
 you ever      know that this is the    
thing which you did not know8           
,sidenote3 ,pindar and the poets4       
,sidenote3 ,how can you enquire about   
what you do not know1 and if you  know  
why should you enquire8        ,soc4 ,i 
know1 ,meno1 what you mean2 but just see
 what      a tiresome dispute you are   
introducing4 ,you argue that      a man 
cannot enquire either about that which  
he knows1 or      about that which he   
does not know2 for if he knows1 he has  
no need to enquire2 and if not1 he      
cannot2 for he does not      know the   
very subject about which he is to       
enquire#e4        ,men4 ,well1          
,socrates1 and is not the argument      
sound8               #ha        ,soc4 ,i
 think not4        ,men4 ,why not8      
,soc4 ,i will tell you why3 ,i have     
heard from certain wise      men and    
women who spoke of things divine that-- 
,men4 ,what did they say8        ,soc4  

,they spoke of a glorious truth1 as ,i  
conceive4        ,men4 ,what was it8 and
 who were they8    ,sidenote3 ,the      
ancient poets tell us that the soul of  
man is immortal and  has a recollection 
of all that she has ever known in former
 states of  being4        ,soc4 ,some of
 them were priests and priestesses1 who 
had      studied how they might be able 
to give a reason of their               
profession3 there have been poets also1 
who spoke of these      things by       
inspiration1 like ,pindar1 and many     
others who were      inspired4 ,and they
 say--mark1 now1 and see whether their  
words are true--they say that the soul  
of man is immortal1      and at one time
 has an end1 which is termed dying1 and 
at another time is born again1 but is   
never destroyed4 ,and      the moral is1
 that a man ought to live always in     
perfect holiness4      #8,for in the    
ninth year ,persephone sends the souls  
of      those from whom she has received
 the penalty of ancient crime      back 

again from beneath into the light of the
 sun above1 and      these are they who 
become noble kings and mighty men and   
great      in wisdom and are called     
saintly heroes in after ages#f4' ,the   
soul1 then1 as being immortal1 and      
having been born again      many times1 
and having seen all things that exist1  
whether      in this world or in the    
world below1 has knowledge of them      
all2 and it is no wonder that she should
 be able to call to      remembrance all
 that she ever knew about virtue1 and   
about      everything2 for as all nature
 is akin1 and the soul has learned      
all things1 there is no difficulty in   
her eliciting or as men say             
learning1 out of a single recollection  
all the rest1 if a man is      strenuous
 and does not faint2 for all enquiry and
 all learning      is but recollection4 
,and therefore we ought not to listen   
to this sophistical argument about the  
impossibility of enquiry3      for it   
will make us idle1 and is sweet only to 

the      sluggard2 but the other saying 
will make us active and inquisitive4    
,in that confiding1 ,i will gladly      
enquire with you      into the nature of
 virtue4    ,sidenote3 ,the crucial     
experiment4        ,men4 ,yes1          
,socrates2 but what do you mean by      
saying that      we do not learn1 and   
that what we call learning is only a    
process      of recollection8 ,can you  
teach me how this is8        ,soc4 ,i   
told you1 ,meno1 just now that you were 
a rogue1 and      now you ask whether ,i
 can teach you1 when ,i am saying that  
there is no teaching1 but only          
recollection2 and thus you           #hb
      imagine that you will involve me  
in a contradiction4        ,men4        
,indeed1 ,socrates1 ,i protest that ,i  
had no such intention4      ,i only     
asked the question from habit2 but if   
you can prove      to me that what you  
say is true1 ,i wish that you would4    
,sidenote3 ,a ,greek slave is           
introduced1 from whom certain           

mathematical  conclusions which he has  
never learned are elicited by ,socrates4
        ,soc4 ,it will be no easy       
matter1 but ,i will try to please       
you to the utmost of my power4 ,suppose 
that you call      one of your numerous 
attendants1 that ,i may demonstrate     
on him4        ,men4 ,certainly4 ,come  
hither1 boy4        ,soc4 ,he is ,greek1
 and speaks ,greek1 does he not8        
,men4 ,yes1 indeed2 he was born in the  
house4        ,soc4 ,attend now to the  
questions which ,i ask him1 and         
observe whether he learns of me or only 
remembers4        ,men4 ,i will4        
,soc4 ,tell me1 boy1 do you know that a 
figure like this      is a square8      
,boy4 ,i do4        ,soc4 ,and you know 
that a square figure has these four     
lines equal8        ,boy4 ,certainly4   
,soc4 ,and these lines which ,i have    
drawn through the      middle of the    
square are also equal8        ,boy4     
,yes4        ,soc4 ,a square may be of  
any size8        ,boy4 ,certainly4      

,soc4 ,and if one side of the figure be 
of two feet1 and the      other side be 
of two feet1 how much will the whole be8
 ,let      me explain3 if in one        
direction the space was of two feet1    
and in the other direction of one foot1 
the whole would      be of two feet     
taken once8        ,boy4 ,yes4          
,sidenote3 ,socrates and the boy4       
,soc4 ,but since this side is also of   
two feet1 there are twice      two feet8
        ,boy4 ,there are4        ,soc4  
,then the square is of twice two feet8  
,boy4 ,yes4        ,soc4 ,and how many  
are twice two feet8 count and tell me4  
,boy4 ,four1 ,socrates4        ,soc4    
,and might there not be another square  
twice as large      as this1 and having 
like this the lines equal8        ,boy4 
,yes4        ,soc4 ,and of how many feet
 will that be8        ,boy4 ,of eight   
feet4        ,soc4 ,and now try and tell
 me the length of the line which        
forms the side of that double square3   
this is two feet--what      will that   

be8        ,boy4 ,clearly1 ,socrates1 it
 will be double4    ,sidenote3 ,he is   
partly guessing4        ,soc4 ,do you   
observe1 ,meno1 that ,i am not teaching 
the      boy anything1 but only asking  
him questions2 and now      he fancies  
that he knows how long a line is        
necessary in      order to produce a    
figure of eight square feet2 does he    
not8        ,men4 ,yes4        ,soc4    
,and does he really know8        ,men4  
,certainly not4        ,soc4 ,he only   
guesses that because the square is      
double1      the line is double4        
,men4 ,true4        ,soc4 ,observe him  
while he recalls the steps in regular   
order4 7,to the ,boy47 ,tell me1 boy1 do
 you assert that a           #hc        
double space comes from a double line8  
,remember that      ,i am not speaking  
of an oblong1 but of a figure equal     
every      way1 and twice the size of   
this--that is to say of eight feet2     
and ,i want to know whether you still   
say that a double      square comes from

 a double line8        ,boy4 ,yes4      
,soc4 ,but does not this line become    
doubled if we add      another such line
 here8        ,boy4 ,certainly4         
,soc4 ,and four such lines will make a  
space containing      eight feet8       
,boy4 ,yes4    ,sidenote3 ,socrates and 
the boy4        ,soc4 ,let us describe  
such a figure3 ,would you not say       
that this is the figure of eight feet8  
,illustration        ,boy4 ,yes4        
,soc4 ,and are there not these four     
divisions in the figure1      each of   
which is equal to the figure of four    
feet8        ,boy4 ,true4        ,soc4  
,and is not that four times four8       
,boy4 ,certainly4        ,soc4 ,and four
 times is not double8        ,boy4 ,no1 
indeed4        ,soc4 ,but how much8     
,boy4 ,four times as much4        ,soc4 
,therefore the double line1 boy1        
has given a space1 not twice1 but four  
times as much4        ,boy4 ,true4      
,soc4 ,four times four are sixteen--are 
they not8        ,boy4 ,yes4            

,soc4 ,what line would give you a space 
of eight feet1 as      this gives one of
 sixteen feet2--do you see8        ,boy4
 ,yes4        ,soc4 ,and the space of   
four feet is made from this half        
line8        ,boy4 ,yes4        ,soc4   
,good2 and is not a space of eight feet 
twice the      size of this1 and half   
the size of the other8        ,boy4     
,certainly4        ,soc4 ,such a space1 
then1 will be made out of a line greater
      than this one1 and less than that 
one8        ,boy4 ,yes2 ,i think so4    
,soc4 ,very good2 ,i like to hear you   
say what you think4      ,and now tell  
me1 is not this a line of two feet and  
that of      four8        ,boy4 ,yes4   
,sidenote3 ,he has now learned to       
realize his own ignorance1 and therefore
  will endeavour to remedy it4          
,soc4 ,then the line which forms the    
side of eight feet      ought to be more
 than this line of two feet1 and less   
than      the other of four feet8       
,boy4 ,it ought4        ,soc4 ,try and  

see if you can tell me how much it will 
be4        ,boy4 ,three feet4           
,sidenote3 ,the progress of the boy's   
education4        ,soc4 ,then if we add 
a half to this line of two1 that will be
      the line of three4 ,here are two  
and there is one2 and on      the other 
side1 here are two also and there is    
one3 and that      makes the figure of  
which you speak8        ,boy4 ,yes4     
,soc4 ,but if there are three feet this 
way and three feet      that way1 the   
whole space will be three times three   
feet8        ,boy4 ,that is evident4    
,soc4 ,and how much are three times     
three feet8        ,boy4 ,nine4         
,soc4 ,and how much is the double of    
four8        ,boy4 ,eight4        ,soc4 
,then the figure of eight is not made   
out of a line of      three8            
,boy4 ,no4        ,soc4 ,but from what  
line8--tell me exactly2 and if you      
#hd      would rather not reckon1 try   
and show me the line4        ,boy4      
,indeed1 ,socrates1 ,i do not know4     

,soc4 ,do you see1 ,meno1 what advances 
he has made in his      power of        
recollection8 ,he did not know at first1
 and he      does not know now1 what is 
the side of a figure of eight feet3     
but then he thought that he knew1 and   
answered confidently      as if he knew1
 and had no difficulty2 now he has a    
difficulty1      and neither knows nor  
fancies that he knows4        ,men4     
,true4        ,soc4 ,is he not better   
off in knowing his ignorance8           
,men4 ,i think that he is4        ,soc4 
,if we have made him doubt1 and given   
him the #8torpedo's      shock1' have we
 done him any harm8        ,men4 ,i     
think not4        ,soc4 ,we have        
certainly1 as would seem1 assisted him  
in      some degree to the discovery of 
the truth2 and now he will      wish to 
remedy his ignorance1 but then he would 
have been      ready to tell all the    
world again and again that the double   
space should have a double side4        
,men4 ,true4        ,soc4 ,but do you   

suppose that he would ever have enquired
      into or learned what he fancied   
that he knew1 though he      was really 
ignorant of it1 until he had fallen into
 perplexity      under the idea that he 
did not know1 and had desired to        
know8        ,men4 ,i think not1        
,socrates4        ,soc4 ,then he was the
 better for the torpedo's touch8        
,men4 ,i think so4    ,sidenote3        
,construction of the figure of eight    
feet square4    ,sidenote3 ,the boy     
arrives at another true conclusion3     
which is1 that the  square of the       
diagonal is double the square of the    
side4        ,soc4 ,mark now the farther
 development4 ,i shall only ask         
him1 and not teach him1 and he shall    
share the enquiry with      me3 and do  
you watch and see if you find me telling
 or      explaining anything to him1    
instead of eliciting his opinion4       
,tell me1 boy1 is not this a square of  
four feet which ,i have      drawn8     
,boy4 ,yes4        ,soc4 ,and now ,i add

 another square equal to the former     
one8        ,boy4 ,yes4        ,soc4    
,and a third1 which is equal to either  
of them8        ,boy4 ,yes4        ,soc4
 ,suppose that we fill up the vacant    
corner8        ,boy4 ,very good4        
,soc4 ,here1 then1 there are four equal 
spaces8        ,boy4 ,yes4        ,soc4 
,and how many times larger is this space
 than this      other8        ,boy4     
,four times4        ,soc4 ,but it ought 
to have been twice only1 as you will    
remember4        ,boy4 ,true4           
,soc4 ,and does not this line1 reaching 
from corner to corner1      bisect each 
of these spaces8                        
#he        ,boy4 ,yes4        ,soc4 ,and
 are there not here four equal lines    
which contain      this space8          
,boy4 ,there are4        ,soc4 ,look and
 see how much this space is4            
,boy4 ,i do not understand4        ,soc4
 ,has not each interior line cut off    
half of the four      spaces8           
,boy4 ,yes4        ,soc4 ,and how many  

such spaces are there in this section8  
,boy4 ,four4        ,soc4 ,and how many 
in this8        ,boy4 ,two4             
,sidenote3 ,the doctrine of             
reminiscence4        ,soc4 ,and four is 
how many times two8        ,boy4 ,twice4
        ,soc4 ,and this space is of how 
many feet8        ,boy4 ,of eight feet4 
,soc4 ,and from what line do you get    
this figure8        ,boy4 ,from this4   
,soc4 ,that is1 from the line which     
extends from corner to      corner of   
the figure of four feet8        ,boy4   
,yes4        ,soc4 ,and that is the line
 which the learned call the diagonal4   
,and if this is the proper name1 then   
you1 ,meno's      slave1 are prepared to
 affirm that the double space is the    
square of the diagonal8        ,boy4    
,certainly1 ,socrates4        ,soc4     
,what do you say of him1 ,meno8 ,were   
not all these      answers given out of 
his own head8        ,men4 ,yes1 they   
were all his own4        ,soc4 ,and yet1
 as we were just now saying1 he did not 

know8        ,men4 ,true4        ,soc4  
,but still he had in him those notions  
of his--had he      not8        ,men4   
,yes4        ,soc4 ,then he who does not
 know may still have true      notions  
of that which he does not know8         
,men4 ,he has4    ,sidenote3 ,at present
 he is in a dream2 he will soon grow    
clearer4        ,soc4 ,and at present   
these notions have just been stirred up 
in him1 as in a dream2 but if he were   
frequently asked the      same          
questions1 in different forms1 he would 
know as well as      any one at last8   
,men4 ,i dare say4        ,soc4 ,without
 any one teaching him he will recover   
his      knowledge for himself1 if he is
 only asked questions8        ,men4     
,yes4        ,soc4 ,and this spontaneous
 recovery of knowledge in him is        
recollection8        ,men4 ,true4       
,soc4 ,and this knowledge which he now  
has must he not      either have        
acquired or always possessed8           
,men4 ,yes4    ,sidenote3 ,socrates is  

more confident of some things than of   
others4    ,sidenote3 ,either this      
knowledge was acquired by him in a      
former state of  existence1 or was      
always known to him4        ,soc4 ,but  
if he always possessed this knowledge he
 would      always have known2 or if he 
has acquired the knowledge he      could
 not have acquired it in this life1     
unless he has been      taught geometry2
 for he may be made to do the same with 
all geometry and every other branch of  
knowledge4 ,now1      has any one ever  
taught him all this8 ,you must know     
about      him1 if1 as you say1 he was  
born and bred in your house4            
,men4 ,and ,i am certain that no one    
ever did teach him4        ,soc4 ,and   
yet he has the knowledge8        ,men4  
,the fact1 ,socrates1 is undeniable4    
,soc4 ,but if he did not acquire the    
knowledge in this life1      then he    
must have had and learned it at some    
other time8            #hf        ,men4 
,clearly he must4        ,soc4 ,which   

must have been the time when he was not 
a      man8        ,men4 ,yes4          
,soc4 ,and if there have been always    
true thoughts in him1      both at the  
time when he was and was not a man1     
which only      need to be awakened into
 knowledge by putting questions to      
him1 his soul must have always possessed
 this knowledge1 for      he always     
either was or was not a man8            
,men4 ,obviously4        ,soc4 ,and if  
the truth of all things always existed  
in the      soul1 then the soul is      
immortal4 ,wherefore be of good         
cheer1 and try to recollect what you do 
not know1 or rather      what you do not
 remember4        ,men4 ,i feel1        
somehow1 that ,i like what you are      
saying4    ,sidenote3 ,better to enquire
 than to fancy that there is no such    
thing as  enquiry and no use in it4     
,soc4 ,and ,i1 ,meno1 like what ,i am   
saying4 ,some things ,i      have said  
of which ,i am not altogether confident4
 ,but that      we shall be better and  

braver and less helpless if we think    
that we ought to enquire1 than we should
 have been if we      indulged in the   
idle fancy that there was no knowing and
 no      use in seeking to know what we 
do not know2--that is a      theme upon 
which ,i am ready to fight1 in word and 
deed1 to      the utmost of my power4   
,men4 ,there again1 ,socrates1 your     
words seem to me      excellent4        
,soc4 ,then1 as we are agreed that a man
 should enquire      about that which he
 does not know1 shall you and ,i make an
      effort to enquire together into   
the nature of virtue8    ,sidenote3 ,the
 nature of hypothesis4        ,men4 ,by 
all means1 ,socrates4 ,and yet ,i would 
much      rather return to my original  
question1 ,whether in seeking to        
acquire virtue we should regard it as a 
thing to be taught1 or      as a gift of
 nature1 or as coming to men in some    
other way8    ,sidenote3 ,socrates      
cannot enquire whether virtue can be    
taught until he  knows what virtue is1  

except upon an hypothesis1 such as      
geometricians  sometimes employ3 e4 g4  
can a triangle of given area be         
inscribed in a  given circle1 if when   
the side of it is produced this or that 
consequence  follows8 ,the hypothesis   
appears to be rather trivial and to have
 no  mathematical value4    ,sidenote3  
,upon the hypothesis #8that virtue is   
knowledge1' can it be  taught8          
,soc4 ,had ,i the command of you as well
 as of myself1      ,meno1 ,i would not 
have enquired whether virtue is given by
      instruction or not1 until we had  
first ascertained #8what it is4'        
,but as you think only of controlling me
 who am your slave1      and never of   
controlling yourself1--such being your  
notion of      freedom1 ,i must yield to
 you1 for you are irresistible4 ,and    
therefore ,i have now to enquire into   
the qualities of a thing of      which  
,i do not as yet know the nature4 ,at   
any rate1 will you      condescend a    
little1 and allow the question          

#8,whether virtue is      given by      
instruction1 or in any other way1' to be
 argued upon      hypothesis8 ,as the   
geometrician1 when he is asked #gwhether
        #hg      a certain triangle is  
capable of being inscribed in a certain 
circle#g1 will reply3 #8,i cannot tell  
you as yet2 but ,i will offer      a    
hypothesis which may assist us in       
forming a conclusion3 ,if      the      
figure be such that #hwhen you have     
produced a given side      of it#h1 the 
given area of the triangle falls short  
by an area      #i;corresponding to the 
part produced#i1 then one consequence   
follows1 and if this is impossible then 
some other2 and therefore      ,i wish  
to assume a hypothesis before ,i tell   
you whether      this triangle is       
capable of being inscribed in the       
circle3'--that      is a geometrical    
hypothesis4 ,and we too1 as we know not 
the nature and qualities of virtue1 must
 ask1 whether virtue is      or is not  
taught1 under a hypothesis3 as thus1 if 

virtue is of      such a class of mental
 goods1 will it be taught or not8 ,let  
the first hypothesis be that virtue is  
or is not knowledge1--in      that case 
will it be taught or not8 or1 as we were
 just now      saying1 #8remembered'8   
,for there is no use in disputing       
about the name4 ,but is virtue taught or
 not8 or rather1      does not every one
 see that knowledge alone is taught8    
,men4 ,i agree4        ,soc4 ,then if   
virtue is knowledge1 virtue will be     
taught8        ,men4 ,certainly4        
,sidenote3 ,virtue and knowledge4       
,soc4 ,then now we have made a quick end
 of this question3      if virtue is of 
such a nature1 it will be taught2 and if
 not1 not8        ,men4 ,certainly4     
,sidenote3 #8,of course4'        ,soc4  
,the next question is1 whether virtue is
 knowledge or      of another species8  
,men4 ,yes1 that appears to be the      
question which comes      next in order4
    ,sidenote3 ,but is virtue knowledge8
        ,soc4 ,do we not say that virtue

 is a good8--,this is a      hypothesis 
which is not set aside4        ,men4    
,certainly4    ,sidenote3 ,virtue is a  
good1 and profitable3 and all profitable
 things  are either profitable or the   
reverse according as they are or are not
  under the guidance of knowledge4      
,soc4 ,now1 if there be any sort of good
 which is distinct      from knowledge1 
virtue may be that good2 but if         
knowledge      embraces all good1 then  
we shall be right in thinking that      
virtue is knowledge8        ,men4 ,true4
        ,soc4 ,and virtue makes us good8
        ,men4 ,yes4        ,soc4 ,and if
 we are good1 then we are profitable2   
for all      good things are profitable8
        ,men4 ,yes4        ,soc4 ,then  
virtue is profitable8        ,men4 ,that
 is the only inference4        ,soc4    
,then now let us see what are the things
 which      severally profit us4 ,health
 and strength1 and beauty and           
wealth--these1 and the like of these1 we
 call profitable8        ,men4 ,true4   

,soc4 ,and yet these things may also    
sometimes do us                #hh      
harm3 would you not think so8           
,men4 ,yes4        ,soc4 ,and what is   
the guiding principle which makes them  
profitable or the reverse8 ,are they not
 profitable when they      are rightly  
used1 and hurtful when they are not     
rightly used8        ,men4 ,certainly4  
,soc4 ,next1 let us consider the goods  
of the soul3 they      are temperance1  
justice1 courage1 quickness of          
apprehension1      memory1 magnanimity1 
and the like8        ,men4 ,surely4     
,soc4 ,and such of these as are not     
knowledge1 but of      another sort1 are
 sometimes profitable and sometimes     
hurtful2      as1 for example1 courage  
wanting prudence1 which is only      a  
sort of confidence8 ,when a man has no  
sense he is      harmed by courage1 but 
when he has sense he is profited8       
,sidenote3 ,virtue is knowledge4        
,men4 ,true4        ,soc4 ,and the same 
may be said of temperance and quickness 

of apprehension2 whatever things are    
learned or done      with sense are     
profitable1 but when done without sense 
they      are hurtful8        ,men4     
,very true4        ,soc4 ,and in        
general1 all that the soul attempts or  
endures1      when under the guidance of
 wisdom1 ends in happiness2      but    
when she is under the guidance of folly1
 in the      opposite8        ,men4     
,that appears to be true4    ,sidenote3 
,and so all virtue must be a sort of    
wisdom or knowledge4        ,soc4 ,if   
then virtue is a quality of the soul1   
and is admitted      to be profitable1  
it must be wisdom or prudence1 since    
none      of the things of the soul are 
either profitable or hurtful in         
themselves1 but they are all made       
profitable or hurtful by      the       
addition of wisdom or of folly2 and     
therefore if virtue is      profitable1 
virtue must be a sort of wisdom or      
prudence8        ,men4 ,i quite agree4  
,soc4 ,and the other goods1 such as     

wealth and the like1 of      which we   
were just now saying that they are      
sometimes good      and sometimes evil1 
do not they also become profitable or   
hurtful1 accordingly as the soul guides 
and uses them rightly      or wrongly2  
just as the things of the soul herself  
are benefited      when under the       
guidance of wisdom and harmed by folly8 
,men4 ,true4        ,soc4 ,and the wise 
soul guides them rightly1 and the       
foolish      soul wrongly8        ,men4 
,yes4        ,soc4 ,and is not this     
universally true of human nature8       
,all other things hang upon the soul1   
and the things of the      soul herself 
hang upon wisdom1 if they are to be     
good2 and          #hi      so wisdom is
 inferred to be that which profits--and 
virtue1 as      we say1 is profitable8  
,men4 ,certainly4    ,sidenote3 ,virtue 
is either wholly or partly wisdom4      
,soc4 ,and thus we arrive at the        
conclusion that virtue is      either   
wholly or partly wisdom8        ,men4 ,i

 think that what you are saying1        
,socrates1 is very      true4           
,sidenote3 ,can virtue be taught8       
,soc4 ,but if this is true1 then the    
good are not by nature      good8       
,men4 ,i think not4    ,sidenote3 ,if   
this is true1 virtue must be taught2 but
 then where are the  teachers8          
,soc4 ,if they had been1 there would    
assuredly have been      discerners of  
characters among us who would have known
      our future great men2 and on their
 showing we should have      adopted    
them1 and when we had got them1 we      
should have      kept them in the       
citadel out of the way of harm1 and set 
a stamp upon them far rather than upon a
 piece of gold1 in      order that no   
one might tamper with them2 and when    
they      grew up they would have been  
useful to the state8        ,men4 ,yes1 
,socrates1 that would have been the     
right way4        ,soc4 ,but if the good
 are not by nature good1 are they       
made good by instruction8        ,men4  

,there appears to be no other           
alternative1 ,socrates4      ,on the    
supposition that virtue is knowledge1   
there can be no      doubt that virtue  
is taught4        ,soc4 ,yes1 indeed2   
but what if the supposition is          
erroneous8        ,men4 ,i certainly    
thought just now that we were right4    
,soc4 ,yes1 ,meno2 but a principle which
 has any soundness      should stand    
firm not only just now1 but always4     
,men4 ,well2 and why are you so slow of 
heart to believe      that knowledge is 
virtue8        ,soc4 ,i will try and    
tell you why1 ,meno4 ,i do not retract  
the assertion that if virtue is         
knowledge it may be taught2      but ,i 
fear that ,i have some reason in        
doubting whether virtue      is         
knowledge3 for consider now and say     
whether virtue1      and not only virtue
 but anything that is taught1 must not  
have      teachers and disciples8       
,men4 ,surely4        ,soc4 ,and        
conversely1 may not the art of which    

neither      teachers nor disciples     
exist be assumed to be incapable of     
being taught8        ,men4 ,true2 but do
 you think that there are no teachers of
      virtue8    ,sidenote3 ,the appeal 
to ,anytus4    ,sidenote3 ,can ,anytus  
tell us who they are8        ,soc4 ,i   
have certainly often enquired whether   
there were any1      and taken great    
pains to find them1 and have never      
succeeded2      and many have assisted  
me in the search1 and they were      the
 persons whom ,i thought the most likely
 to know4      ,here at the moment when 
he is wanted we fortunately             
#ij      have sitting by us ,anytus1 the
 very person of whom we      should make
 enquiry2 to him then let us repair4 ,in
 the      first place1 he is the son of 
a wealthy and wise father1              
,anthemion1 who acquired his wealth1 not
 by accident or gift1      like         
,ismenias the ,theban 7who has recently 
made himself as      rich as            
,polycrates71 but by his own skill and  

industry1 and      who is a             
well-conditioned1 modest man1 not       
insolent1 or overbearing1      or       
annoying2 moreover1 this son of his has 
received      a good education1 as the  
,athenian people certainly      appear  
to think1 for they choose him to fill   
the highest offices4      ,and these are
 the sort of men from whom you are      
likely to      learn whether there are  
any teachers of virtue1 and who they    
are4 ,please1 ,anytus1 to help me and   
your friend ,meno in      answering our 
question1 ,who are the teachers8        
,consider      the matter thus3 ,if we  
wanted ,meno to be a good physician1    
to whom should we send him8 ,should we  
not send him to      the physicians8    
,any4 ,certainly4        ,soc4 ,or if we
 wanted him to be a good cobbler1 should
 we      not send him to the cobblers8  
,any4 ,yes4        ,soc4 ,and so forth8 
,any4 ,yes4    ,sidenote3 ,the arts are 
taught by the professors of them4 ,and  
have we not  heard of those who profess 

to teach virtue at a fixed price8       
,soc4 ,let me trouble you with one more 
question4 ,when      we say that we     
should be right in sending him to the   
physicians      if we wanted him to be a
 physician1 do we mean that      we     
should be right in sending him to those 
who profess the      art1 rather than to
 those who do not1 and to those who     
demand payment for teaching the art1 and
 profess to teach it      to any one who
 will come and learn8 ,and if these were
 our      reasons1 should we not be     
right in sending him8        ,any4 ,yes4
        ,soc4 ,and might not the same be
 said of flute-playing1 and      of the 
other arts8 ,would a man who wanted to  
make      another a flute-player refuse 
to send him to those who profess      to
 teach the art for money1 and be        
plaguing other persons to      give him 
instruction1 who are not professed      
teachers and who      never had a single
 disciple in that branch of knowledge   
which      he wishes him to             

acquire--would not such conduct be the  
height of folly8    ,sidenote3 ,anytus  
attacks1 ,socrates defends1 the         
,sophists4        ,any4 ,yes1 by ,zeus1 
and of ignorance too4        ,soc4 ,very
 good4 ,and now you are in a position to
 advise           #ia      with me about
 my friend ,meno4 ,he has been telling  
me1      ,anytus1 that he desires to    
attain that kind of wisdom and virtue   
by which men order the state or the     
house1 and honour their      parents1   
and know when to receive and when to    
send away      citizens and strangers1  
as a good man should4 ,now1 to whom     
should he go in order that he may learn 
this virtue8 ,does      not the previous
 argument imply clearly that we should  
send      him to those who profess and  
avouch that they are the common         
teachers of all ,hellas1 and are ready  
to impart instruction      to any one   
who likes1 at a fixed price8            
,any4 ,whom do you mean1 ,socrates8     
,soc4 ,you surely know1 do you not1     

,anytus1 that these are      the people 
whom mankind call ,sophists8            
,sidenote3 ,anytus inveighs against the 
corrupting influence of the  ,sophists4 
,any4 ,by ,heracles1 ,socrates1 forbear6
 ,i only hope that      no friend or    
kinsman or acquaintance of mine1 whether
 citizen      or stranger1 will ever be 
so mad as to allow himself to be        
corrupted      by them2 for they are a  
manifest pest and corrupting            
influence to those who have to do with  
them4    ,sidenote3 ,why surely they    
cannot really be corrupters8 ,see what  
fortunes  they make1 and what an        
excellent reputation many of them bear6 
,soc4 ,what1 ,anytus8 ,of all the people
 who profess that      they know how to 
do men good1 do you mean to say that    
these are the only ones who not only do 
them no good1 but      positively       
corrupt those who are entrusted to them1
 and in      return for this disservice 
have the face to demand money8          
,indeed1 ,i cannot believe you2 for ,i  

know of a single man1      ,protagoras1 
who made more out of his craft than the 
illustrious      ,pheidias1 who created 
such noble works1 or any ten other      
statuaries4 ,how could that be8 ,a      
mender of old shoes1 or      patcher up 
of clothes1 who made the shoes or       
clothes worse      than he received     
them1 could not have remained thirty    
days      undetected1 and would very    
soon have starved2 whereas      during  
more than forty years1 ,protagoras was  
corrupting all      ,hellas1 and sending
 his disciples from him worse than he   
received them1 and he was never found   
out4 ,for1 if ,i am not      mistaken1  
he was about seventy years old at his   
death1 forty      of which were spent in
 the practice of his profession2 and    
during all that time he had a good      
reputation1 which to this      day he   
retains3 and not only ,protagoras1 but  
many others are      well spoken of2    
some who lived before him1 and others   
who      are still living4 ,now1 when   

you say that they deceived and          
#ib      corrupted the youth1 are they  
to be supposed to have corrupted        
them consciously or unconsciously8 ,can 
those who      were deemed by many to be
 the wisest men of ,hellas have         
been out of their minds8    ,sidenote3  
,the rage of ,anytus at the ,sophists4  
,sidenote3 ,the wisest men in ,hellas   
could not have been out of their  minds8
 ,no3--the people who gave their money  
to them were out of their  minds4       
,any4 ,out of their minds6 ,no1         
,socrates2 the young men      who gave  
their money to them were out of their   
minds1 and      their relations and     
guardians who entrusted their youth to  
the      care of these men were still   
more out of their minds1 and      most  
of all1 the cities who allowed them to  
come in1 and did      not drive them    
out1 citizen and stranger alike4        
,soc4 ,has any of the ,sophists wronged 
you1 ,anytus8      ,what makes you so   
angry with them8        ,any4 ,no1      

indeed1 neither ,i nor any of my        
belongings has      ever had1 nor would 
,i suffer them to have1 anything to do  
with them4        ,soc4 ,then you are   
entirely unacquainted with them8        
,any4 ,and ,i have no wish to be        
acquainted4    ,sidenote3 ,how can      
,anytus know that they are bad1 if he   
does not know  them at all8        ,soc4
 ,then1 my dear friend1 how can you know
 whether a      thing is good or bad of 
which you are wholly ignorant8          
,any4 ,quite well2 ,i am sure that ,i   
know what manner of      men these are1 
whether ,i am acquainted with them or   
not4    ,sidenote3 ,then who will teach 
,meno virtue8        ,soc4 ,you must be 
a diviner1 ,anytus1 for ,i really cannot
      make out1 judging from your own   
words1 how1 if you are not              
acquainted with them1 you know about    
them4 ,but ,i am not      enquiring of  
you who are the teachers who will       
corrupt ,meno      7let them be1 if you 
please1 the ,sophists72 ,i only ask you 

to      tell him who there is in this   
great city who will teach him how       
to become eminent in the virtues which  
,i was just now describing4      ,he is 
the friend of your family1 and you will 
oblige      him4        ,any4 ,why do   
you not tell him yourself8        ,soc4 
,i have told him whom ,i supposed to be 
the teachers      of these things2 but  
,i learn from you that ,i am utterly at 
fault1 and ,i dare say that you are     
right4 ,and now ,i wish      that you1  
on your part1 would tell me to whom     
among the      ,athenians he should go4 
,whom would you name8    ,sidenote3 ,the
 lesson taught by the example of        
,themistocles4    ,sidenote3 ,any       
,athenian gentleman who has learned of a
 previous  generation of gentlemen4     
,any4 ,why single out individuals8 ,any 
,athenian gentleman1      taken at      
random1 if he will mind him1 will do far
 more      good to him than the         
,sophists4        ,soc4 ,and did those  
gentlemen grow of themselves2 and       

without having been taught by any one1  
were they nevertheless      able to     
teach others that which they had never  
learned              #ic                
themselves8        ,any4 ,i imagine that
 they learned of the previous generation
      of gentlemen4 ,have there not been
 many good men in this city8            
,soc4 ,yes1 certainly1 ,anytus2 and many
 good statesmen also      there always  
have been and there are still1 in the   
city of      ,athens4 ,but the question 
is whether they were also good          
teachers of their own virtue2--not      
whether there are1 or have      been1   
good men in this part of the world1 but 
whether virtue      can be taught1 is   
the question which we have been         
discussing4      ,now1 do we mean to say
 that the good men of our own and of    
other times knew how to impart to others
 that virtue which      they had        
themselves2 or is virtue a thing        
incapable of being      communicated or 
imparted by one man to another8 ,that is

      the question which ,i and ,meno   
have been arguing4 ,look at      the    
matter in your own way3 ,would you not  
admit that      ,themistocles was a good
 man8        ,any4 ,certainly2 no man   
better4    ,sidenote3 ,good men may not 
have been good teachers4 ,there never   
was a  better man than ,themistocles3   
but he did not make much of his own son4
        ,soc4 ,and must not he then have
 been a good teacher1 if      any man   
ever was a good teacher1 of his own     
virtue8        ,any4 ,yes1              
certainly1--if he wanted to be so4      
,soc4 ,but would he not have wanted8 ,he
 would1 at any      rate1 have desired  
to make his own son a good man and a    
gentleman2 he could not have been       
jealous of him1 or have                 
intentionally abstained from imparting  
to him his own virtue4      ,did you    
never hear that he made his son         
,cleophantus a      famous horseman2 and
 had him taught to stand upright on     
horseback and hurl a javelin1 and to do 

many other marvellous      things2 and  
in anything which could be learned from 
a master      he was well trained8 ,have
 you not heard from our elders      of  
him8        ,any4 ,i have4        ,soc4 
,then no one could say that his son     
showed any want      of capacity8       
,any4 ,very likely not4        ,soc4    
,but did any one1 old or young1 ever say
 in your hearing      that ,cleophantus1
 son of ,themistocles1 was a wise or    
good      man1 as his father was8       
,sidenote3 ,aristides1 ,pericles1       
,thucydides the son of ,melesias4       
,sidenote3 ,he had him taught           
accomplishments because there was no one
 to  teach virtue4        ,any4 ,i have 
certainly never heard any one say so4   
,soc4 ,and if virtue could have been    
taught1 would his father                
,themistocles have sought to train him  
in these minor accomplishments1      and
 allowed him who1 as you must remember1 
was      his own son1 to be no better   
than his neighbours in those            

qualities in which he himself excelled8 
,any4 ,indeed1 indeed1 ,i think not4    
,soc4 ,here was a teacher of virtue whom
 you admit to be      among the best men
 of the past4 ,let us take              
another1--,aristides1     #id      the  
son of ,lysimachus3 would you not       
acknowledge      that he was a good man8
        ,any4 ,to be sure ,i should4    
,sidenote3 ,aristides was also a good   
man1 and ,pericles and                  
,thucydides3--they made their sons good 
horsemen1 and wrestlers1 and the  like1 
but they did not have them taught to be 
good1 because virtue cannot  be taught4 
,soc4 ,and did not he train his son     
,lysimachus better than      any other  
,athenian in all that could be done for 
him by the      help of masters8 ,but   
what has been the result8 ,is he a bit  
better than any other mortal8 ,he is an 
acquaintance of      yours1 and you see 
what he is like4 ,there is ,pericles1   
again1      magnificent in his wisdom2  
and he1 as you are aware1 had      two  

sons1 ,paralus and ,xanthippus4         
,any4 ,i know4        ,soc4 ,and you    
know1 also1 that he taught them to be   
unrivalled      horsemen1 and had them  
trained in music and gymnastics      and
 all sorts of arts--in these respects   
they were on a      level with the      
best--and had he no wish to make good   
men of      them8 ,nay1 he must have    
wished it4 ,but virtue1 as ,i suspect1  
could not be taught4 ,and that you may  
not suppose the      incompetent        
teachers to be only the meaner sort of  
,athenians      and few in number1      
remember again that ,thucydides had two 
sons1 ,melesias and ,stephanus1 whom1   
besides giving them a      good         
education in other things1 he trained in
 wrestling1 and      they were the best 
wrestlers in ,athens3 one of them he    
committed      to the care of ,xanthias1
 and the other of ,eudorus1 who      had
 the reputation of being the most       
celebrated wrestlers of      that day4  
,do you remember them8        ,any4 ,i  

have heard of them4        ,soc4 ,now1  
can there be a doubt that ,thucydides1  
whose      children were taught things  
for which he had to spend money1        
would have taught them to be good men1  
which would have      cost him nothing1 
if virtue could have been taught8 ,will 
you reply that he was a mean man1 and   
had not many friends      among the     
,athenians and allies8 ,nay1 but he was 
of a great      family1 and a man of    
influence at ,athens and in all ,hellas1
      and1 if virtue could have been    
taught1 he would have found      out    
some ,athenian or foreigner who would   
have made good      men of his sons1 if 
he could not himself spare the time from
      cares of state4 ,once more1 ,i    
suspect1 friend ,anytus1 that           
virtue is not a thing which can be      
taught8    ,sidenote3 ,the sophists     
again4        ,any4 ,socrates1 ,i think 
that you are too ready to speak         
evil of men3 and1 if you will take my   
advice1 ,i would recommend      you to  

be careful4 ,perhaps there is no city in
 which      it is not easier to do men  
harm than to do them good1 and      this
 is certainly the case at ,athens1 as ,i
 believe that you         #ie      know4
    ,sidenote3 ,anytus gives an angry   
warning to ,socrates4        ,soc4 ,o   
,meno1 ,i think that ,anytus is in a    
rage4 ,and he      may well be in a     
rage1 for he thinks1 in the first place1
 that ,i      am defaming these         
gentlemen2 and in the second place1 he  
is      of opinion that he is one of    
them himself4 ,but some day      he will
 know what is the meaning of defamation1
 and if he      ever does1 he will      
forgive me4 ,meanwhile ,i will return to
      you1 ,meno2 for ,i suppose that   
there are gentlemen in your      region 
too8        ,men4 ,certainly there are4 
,soc4 ,and are they willing to teach the
 young8 and do      they profess to be  
teachers8 and do they agree that virtue 
is      taught8    ,sidenote3 ,the      
,thessalian gentry are not agreed about 

the possibility of  teaching virtue4    
,men4 ,no indeed1 ,socrates1 they are   
anything but agreed2      you may hear  
them saying at one time that virtue can 
be      taught1 and then again the      
reverse4        ,soc4 ,can we call those
 teachers who do not acknowledge        
the possibility of their own vocation8  
,men4 ,i think not1 ,socrates4          
,soc4 ,and what do you think of these   
,sophists1 who are the      only        
professors8 ,do they seem to you to be  
teachers of      virtue8    ,sidenote3  
,the ,sophists no teachers of virtue4   
,sidenote3 ,gorgias professes to teach  
rhetoric1 but laughs at those who       
pretend to teach virtue4        ,men4 ,i
 often wonder1 ,socrates1 that ,gorgias 
is never heard      promising to teach  
virtue3 and when he hears others        
promising      he only laughs at them2  
but he thinks that men should be        
taught to speak4        ,soc4 ,then do  
you not think that the ,sophists are    
teachers8        ,men4 ,i cannot tell   

you1 ,socrates2 like the rest of the    
world1      ,i am in doubt1 and         
sometimes ,i think that they are        
teachers      and sometimes not4        
,soc4 ,and are you aware that not you   
only and other politicians      have    
doubts whether virtue can be taught or  
not1 but      that ,theognis the poet   
says the very same thing8        ,men4  
,where does he say so8    ,sidenote3    
,theognis implies in one passage that   
virtue can1 and in  another that it     
cannot1 be taught4        ,soc4 ,in     
these elegiac verses#aj3--              
#8,eat and drink and sit with the       
mighty1 and make yourself               
agreeable to them2 for from the good you
 will learn what        is good1 but if 
you mix with the bad you will lose the  
intelligence which you already have4'   
,do you observe that here he seems to   
imply that virtue can      be taught8   
,men4 ,clearly4        ,soc4 ,but in    
some other verses he shifts about and   
says#aa3--          #8,if understanding 

could be created and put into a man1    
then        they' who were able to      
perform this feat #8would have          
obtained great rewards4'        ,and    
again3--          #8,never would a bad  
son have sprung from a good sire1 for   
#if        he would have heard the voice
 of instruction2 but not by             
teaching will you ever make a bad man   
into a good one4'        ,and this1 as  
you may remark1 is a contradiction of   
the other4        ,men4 ,clearly4       
,sidenote3 ,how can they be teachers who
 are so inconsistent with  themselves8  
,soc4 ,and is there anything else of    
which the professors are      affirmed  
not only not to be teachers of others1  
but to be ignorant      themselves1 and 
bad at the knowledge of that which they 
are professing to teach8 or is there    
anything about which even      the      
acknowledged #8gentlemen' are sometimes 
saying that      #8this thing can be    
taught1' and sometimes the opposite8    
,can      you say that they are teachers

 in any true sense whose ideas      are 
in such confusion8        ,men4 ,i      
should say1 certainly not4        ,soc4 
,but if neither the ,sophists nor the   
gentlemen are      teachers1 clearly    
there can be no other teachers8         
,men4 ,no4        ,soc4 ,and if there   
are no teachers1 neither are there      
disciples8        ,men4 ,agreed4        
,sidenote3 ,knowledge and ,opinion4     
,soc4 ,and we have admitted that a thing
 cannot be taught of      which there   
are neither teachers nor disciples8     
,men4 ,we have4    ,sidenote3 ,if there 
are no teachers and no scholars1 virtue 
cannot be  taught4        ,soc4 ,and    
there are no teachers of virtue to be   
found anywhere8        ,men4 ,there are 
not4        ,soc4 ,and if there are no  
teachers1 neither are there scholars8   
,men4 ,that1 ,i think1 is true4         
,soc4 ,then virtue cannot be taught8    
,men4 ,not if we are right in our view4 
,but ,i cannot believe1      ,socrates1 
that there are no good men3 ,and if     

there are1 how      did they come into  
existence8    ,sidenote3 ,but were we   
not mistaken in our view8 ,there may be 
another  guide to good action as well as
 knowledge4        ,soc4 ,i am afraid1  
,meno1 that you and ,i are not good for 
much1 and that ,gorgias has been as poor
 an educator of you      as ,prodicus   
has been of me4 ,certainly we shall have
 to      look to ourselves1 and try to  
find some one who will help      in some
 way or other to improve us4 ,this ,i   
say1 because      ,i observe that in the
 previous discussion none of us remarked
      that right and good action is     
possible to man under other             
guidance than that of knowledge 772--and
 indeed if      this be denied1 there is
 no seeing how there can be any good    
men at all4        ,men4 ,how do you    
mean1 ,socrates8        ,soc4 ,i mean   
that good men are necessarily useful or 
profitable4 ,were we not right in       
admitting this8 ,it must            #ig 
be so4        ,men4 ,yes4        ,soc4  

,and in supposing that they will be     
useful only if they      are true guides
 to us of action--there we were also    
right8        ,men4 ,yes4        ,soc4  
,but when we said that a man cannot be a
 good guide      unless he have         
knowledge 771 in this we were wrong4    
,men4 ,what do you mean by the word     
#8right'8        ,soc4 ,i will explain4 
,if a man knew the way to ,larisa1 or   
anywhere else1 and went to the place and
 led others thither1      would he not  
be a right and good guide8        ,men4 
,certainly4        ,soc4 ,and a person  
who had a right opinion about the way1  
but had never been and did not know1    
might be a good guide      also1 might  
he not8        ,men4 ,certainly4        
,soc4 ,and while he has true opinion    
about that which the      other knows1  
he will be just as good a guide if he   
thinks the      truth1 as he who knows  
the truth8        ,men4 ,exactly4       
,sidenote3 ,the images of ,daedalus4    
,sidenote3 ,right opinion is as good a  

guide to action as knowledge4           
,soc4 ,then true opinion is as good a   
guide to correct action      as         
knowledge2 and that was the point which 
we omitted in      our speculation about
 the nature of virtue1 when we said that
      knowledge only is the guide of    
right action2 whereas there is      also
 right opinion4        ,men4 ,true4     
,soc4 ,then right opinion is not less   
useful than knowledge8        ,men4 ,the
 difference1 ,socrates1 is only that he 
who has      knowledge will always be   
right2 but he who has right      opinion
 will sometimes be right1 and sometimes 
not4        ,soc4 ,what do you mean8    
,can he be wrong who has      right     
opinion1 so long as he has right        
opinion8        ,men4 ,i admit the      
cogency of your argument1 and therefore1
      ,socrates1 ,i wonder that         
knowledge should be preferred to        
right opinion--or why they should ever  
differ4        ,soc4 ,and shall ,i      
explain this wonder to you8        ,men4

 ,do tell me4        ,soc4 ,you would   
not wonder if you had ever observed the 
images of ,daedalus#ab2 but perhaps you 
have not got them in      your country8 
,men4 ,what have they to do with the    
question8        ,soc4 ,because they    
require to be fastened in order to keep 
them1 and if they are not fastened they 
will play truant and      run away4     
,men4 ,well1 what of that8    ,sidenote3
 ,recapitulation of the argument4       
,sidenote3 ,but right opinions are apt  
to walk away1 like the images of        
,daedalus4        ,soc4 ,i mean to say  
that they are not very valuable         
possessions      if they are at liberty1
 for they will walk off like            
runaway slaves2 but when fastened1 they 
are of great value1      for they are   
really beautiful works of art4 ,now this
 is an      illustration of the nature  
of true opinions3 while they abide      
#ih      with us they are beautiful and 
fruitful1 but they run away out      of 
the human soul1 and do not remain long1 

and therefore      they are not of much 
value until they are fastened by the    
tie of the cause2 and this fastening of 
them1 friend ,meno1      is             
recollection1 as you and ,i have agreed 
to call it4 ,but      when they are     
bound1 in the first place1 they have the
      nature of knowledge2 and1 in the  
second place1 they are      abiding4    
,and this is why knowledge is more      
honourable      and excellent than true 
opinion1 because fastened by a chain4   
,men4 ,what you are saying1 ,socrates1  
seems to be very      like the truth4   
,soc4 ,i too speak rather in ignorance2 
,i only conjecture4      ,and yet that  
knowledge differs from true opinion is  
no      matter of conjecture with me4   
,there are not many things      which ,i
 profess to know1 but this is most      
certainly one      of them4        ,men4
 ,yes1 ,socrates2 and you are quite     
right in saying so4        ,soc4 ,and am
 ,i not also right in saying that true  
opinion      leading the way perfects   

action quite as well as knowledge8      
,men4 ,there again1 ,socrates1 ,i think 
that you are right4        ,soc4 ,then  
right opinion is not a whit inferior to 
knowledge1      or less useful in       
action2 nor is the man who has right    
opinion      inferior to him who has    
knowledge8        ,men4 ,true4          
,soc4 ,and surely the good man has been 
acknowledged by      us to be useful8   
,men4 ,yes4        ,soc4 ,seeing then   
that men become good and useful to      
states1 not only because they have      
knowledge1 but because      they have   
right opinion1 and that neither         
knowledge nor      right opinion is     
given to man by nature or acquired by   
him--7do you imagine either of them to  
be given by nature8        ,men4 ,not   
,i47        ,soc4 ,then if they are not 
given by nature1 neither are the        
good by nature good8        ,men4       
,certainly not4        ,soc4 ,and nature
 being excluded1 then came the question 
whether virtue is acquired by teaching8 

,men4 ,yes4        ,soc4 ,if virtue was 
wisdom or knowledge1 then1 as we        
thought1 it was taught8        ,men4    
,yes4        ,soc4 ,and if it was taught
 it was wisdom8        ,men4 ,certainly4
    ,sidenote3 ,diviners and divine men4
        ,soc4 ,and if there were        
teachers1 it might be taught2 and       
if there were no teachers1 not8         
,men4 ,true4        ,soc4 ,but surely we
 acknowledged that there were no        
teachers of virtue8        ,men4 ,yes4  
,soc4 ,then we acknowledged that it was 
not taught1 and      was not wisdom8    
,men4 ,certainly4        ,soc4 ,and yet 
we admitted that it was a good8         
#ii        ,men4 ,yes4        ,soc4 ,and
 the right guide is useful and good8    
,men4 ,certainly4    ,sidenote3 ,if     
virtue and knowledge cannot be taught1  
the only right  guides of men are true  
opinions4        ,soc4 ,and the only    
right guides are knowledge and true     
opinion--these are the guides of man2   
for things which      happen by chance  

are not under the guidance of man3 but  
the guides of man are true opinion and  
knowledge4        ,men4 ,i think so too4
        ,soc4 ,but if virtue is not     
taught1 neither is virtue knowledge4    
,men4 ,clearly not4        ,soc4 ,then  
of two good and useful things1 one1     
which is      knowledge1 has been set   
aside1 and cannot be supposed to      be
 our guide in political life4           
,men4 ,i think not4        ,soc4 ,and   
therefore not by any wisdom1 and not    
because      they were wise1 did        
,themistocles and those others of whom  
,anytus spoke govern states4 ,this was  
the reason why they      were unable to 
make others like themselves--because    
their      virtue was not grounded on   
knowledge4        ,men4 ,that is        
probably true1 ,socrates4    ,sidenote3 
,right opinion is in politics what      
divination is in religion2  diviners1   
prophets1 poets1 statesmen1 may all be  
truly called #8divine  men4'            
,soc4 ,but if not by knowledge1 the only

 alternative which      remains is that 
statesmen must have guided states by    
right      opinion1 which is in politics
 what divination is in religion2        
for diviners and also prophets say many 
things truly1 but      they know not    
what they say4        ,men4 ,so ,i      
believe4        ,soc4 ,and may we not1  
,meno1 truly call those men #8divine'   
who1 having no understanding1 yet       
succeed in many a grand      deed and   
word8        ,men4 ,certainly4          
,sidenote3 ,the conclusion4        ,soc4
 ,then we shall also be right in calling
 divine those      whom we were just now
 speaking of as diviners and prophets1  
including the whole tribe of poets4     
,yes1 and statesmen      above all may  
be said to be divine and illumined1     
being      inspired and possessed of    
,god1 in which condition they say       
many grand things1 not knowing what they
 say4        ,men4 ,yes4        ,soc4   
,and the women too1 ,meno1 call good men
 divine--do      they not8 and the      

,spartans1 when they praise a good      
man1 say #8that he is a divine man4'    
,men4 ,and ,i think1 ,socrates1 that    
they are right2 although      very      
likely our friend ,anytus may take      
offence at the word4        ,soc4 ,i do 
not care2 as for ,anytus1 there will be 
another      opportunity of talking with
 him4 ,to sum up our enquiry--the       
result seems to be1 if we are at all    
right in our view1 that      virtue is  
neither natural nor acquired1 but an    
instinct given      by ,god to the      
virtuous4 ,nor is the instinct          
accompanied            #ajj      by     
reason1 unless there may be supposed to 
be among statesmen      some one who is 
capable of educating statesmen4 ,and    
if there be such an one1 he may be said 
to be among the      living what ,homer 
says that ,tiresias was among the dead1 
#8he alone has understanding2 but the   
rest are flitting shades2'      and he  
and his virtue in like manner will be a 
reality among      shadows4        ,men4

 ,that is excellent1 ,socrates4         
,sidenote3 ,virtue comes by the gift of 
,god4        ,soc4 ,then1 ,meno1 the    
conclusion is that virtue comes to      
the virtuous by the gift of ,god4 ,but  
we shall never know      the certain    
truth until1 before asking how virtue is
 given1      we enquire into the actual 
nature of virtue4 ,i fear that      ,i  
must go away1 but do you1 now that you  
are persuaded      yourself1 persuade   
our friend ,anytus4 ,and do not let him 
be      so exasperated2 if you can      
conciliate him1 you will have done      
good service to the ,athenian people4   
,,footnotes    #a ,butler's ,analogy4   
#b ,cp4 infra p4 #ab1 ad fin4    #c ,cp4
 ,arist4 ,pol4 i4 #ac1  #aj4    #d ,cp4 
,theaet4 #adf ,d4    #e ,cp4 ,aristot4  
,post4 ,anal4 ,i4 i4 #f4    #f ,pindar1 
,frag4 #ih 7,boeckh74    #g ,or1 whether
 a certain area is capable of being     
inscribed as a  triangle in a certain   
circle4    #h ,or1 when you apply it to 
the given line1 i4 e4 the diameter of   

the  circle 774    #i ,or1 similar to   
the area so applied4    #aj ,theog4 #cc 
ff4    #aa ,theog4 #dce ff4    #ab ,cp4 
,euthyphro #aa ,b4          ,,euthyphro4
      ,,introduction4    ,sidenote3     
,euthyphro4    ,sidenote3               
,,introduction4    ,in the ,meno1       
,anytus had parted from ,socrates with  
the significant  words3 #8,that in any  
city1 and particularly in the city of   
,athens1 it is  easier to do men harm   
than to do them good' 7#id ,e72 and     
,socrates was  anticipating another     
opportunity of talking with him 7#ii    
,e74 ,in the  ,euthyphro1 ,socrates is  
awaiting his trial for impiety4 ,but    
before the  trial begins1 ,plato would  
like to put the world on their trial1   
and  convince them of ignorance in that 
very matter touching which ,socrates is 
accused4 ,an incident which may perhaps 
really have occurred in the family  of  
,euthyphro1 a learned ,athenian diviner 
and soothsayer1 furnishes the  occasion 
of the discussion4           99       99

       99       99       99             
,sidenote3 ,,analysis4        ,this     
,euthyphro and ,socrates are represented
 as meeting in the      porch of the    
,king ,archon4 7,cp4 ,theaet4 sub fin47 
,both have  ,steph4 #b      legal       
business in hand4 ,socrates is defendant
 in a suit for impiety      which       
,meletus has brought against him 7it is 
remarked by the         #c      way that
 he is not a likely man himself to have 
brought a suit      against another72   
and ,euthyphro too is plaintiff in an   
action for      murder1 which he has    
brought against his own father4 ,the    
latter      #d      has originated in   
the following manner3--,a poor dependant
 of      the family had slain one of    
their domestic slaves in ,naxos4 ,the   
guilty person was bound and thrown into 
a ditch by the command      of          
,euthyphro's father1 who sent to the    
interpreters of religion      at ,athens
 to ask what should be done with him4   
,before the      messenger came back the

 criminal had died from hunger and      
exposure4    ,sidenote3 ,analysis #e-i4 
,this is the origin of the charge of    
murder which ,euthyphro      brings     
against his father4 ,socrates is        
confident that before he      could have
 undertaken the responsibility of such a
 prosecution1      he must have been    
perfectly informed of the nature of     
piety and      #e      impiety2 and as  
he is going to be tried for impiety     
himself1 he      thinks that he cannot  
do better than learn of ,euthyphro 7who 
will      be admitted by everybody1     
including the judges1 to be an          
unimpeachable      authority7 what piety
 is1 and what is impiety4 ,what         
then is piety8        ,euthyphro1 who1  
in the abundance of his knowledge1 is   
very      willing to undertake all the  
responsibility1 replies3 ,that piety is 
doing as ,i do1 prosecuting your father 
7if he is guilty7 on a charge      of   
murder2 doing as the gods do--as ,zeus  
did to ,cronos1 and      ,cronos to     

,uranus4        ,socrates has a dislike 
to these tales of mythology1 and he     
fancies   #f      that this dislike of  
his may be the reason why he is charged 
with      impiety4 #8,are they really   
true8' #8,yes1 they are2' and ,euthyphro
      will gladly tell ,socrates some   
more of them4 ,but ,socrates      would 
like first of all to have a more        
satisfactory answer to the              
question1 #8,what is piety8' #8,doing as
 ,i do1 charging a father with          
murder1' may be a single instance of    
piety1 but can hardly be      regarded  
as a general definition4                
,euthyphro replies1 that #8,piety is    
what is dear to the gods1          #g   
and impiety is what is not dear to      
them4' ,but may there not      be       
differences of opinion1 as among men1 so
 also among the      gods8 ,especially1 
about good and evil1 which have no fixed
      rule2 and these are precisely the 
sort of differences which      give rise
 to quarrels4 ,and therefore what may be

 dear to one         #h      god may not
 be dear to another1 and the same action
 may      be both pious and impious2 e4 
g4 your chastisement of your            
father1 ,euthyphro1 may be dear or      
pleasing to ,zeus 7who inflicted      a 
similar chastisement on his own father71
 but not      equally pleasing to       
,cronos or ,uranus 7who suffered at the 
hands of their sons74        ,euthyphro 
answers that there is no difference of  
opinion1 either      among gods or men1 
as to the propriety of punishing a      
murderer4      ,yes1 rejoins ,socrates1 
when they know him to be a murderer2 but
      you are assuming the point at     
issue4 ,if all the circumstances of     
the case are considered1 are you able to
 show that your father       #i      was
 guilty of murder1 or that all the gods 
are agreed in approving      of our     
prosecution of him8 ,and must you not   
allow that what      is hated by one god
 may be liked by another8 ,waiving this 
last1      however1 ,socrates proposes  

to amend the definition1 and say that   
#8what all the gods love is pious1 and  
what they all hate is impious4'      ,to
 this ,euthyphro agrees4    ,sidenote3  
,analysis #i-ae4        ,socrates       
proceeds to analyze the new form of the 
definition4        #aj      ,he shows   
that in other cases the act precedes the
 state2 e4 g4      the act of being     
carried1 loved1 c4 precedes the state of
 being      carried1 loved1 c41 and     
therefore that which is dear to the gods
 is      dear to the gods because it is 
first loved of them1 not loved of       
them because it is dear to them4 ,but   
the pious or holy is loved      by the  
gods because it is pious or holy1 which 
is equivalent to      saying1 that it is
 loved by them because it is dear to    
them4 ,here      then appears to be a   
contradiction1--,euthyphro has been     
giving an    #aa      attribute or      
accident of piety only1 and not the     
essence4 ,euthyphro      acknowledges   
himself that his explanations seem to   

walk away      or go round in a circle1 
like the moving figures of ,daedalus1   
the ancestor of ,socrates1 who has      
communicated his art to his             
descendants4        ,socrates1 who is   
desirous of stimulating the indolent    
intelligence  #ab      of ,euthyphro1   
raises the question in another manner3  
#8,is all the      pious just8' #8,yes4'
 #8,is all the just pious8' #8,no4'     
#8,then what      part of justice is    
piety8' ,euthyphro replies that piety is
 that      part of justice which        
#8attends' to the gods1 as there is     
another      part of justice which      
#8attends' to men4 ,but what is the     
meaning     #ac      of #8attending' to 
the gods8 ,the word #8attending1' when  
applied      to dogs1 horses1 and men1  
implies that in some way they are made  
better4 ,but how do pious or holy acts  
make the gods any better8               
,euthyphro explains that he means by    
pious acts1 acts of service      or     
ministration4 ,yes2 but the             

ministrations of the husbandman1        
the physician1 and the builder have an  
end4 ,to what end do      we serve the  
gods1 and what do we help them to       
accomplish8          #ad      ,euthyphro
 replies1 that all these difficult      
questions cannot be      resolved in a  
short time2 and he would rather say     
simply that      piety is knowing how to
 please the gods in word and deed1 by   
prayers and sacrifices4 ,in other words1
 says ,socrates1 piety is #8a           
science of asking and giving'--asking   
what we want and giving        #ae      
what they want2 in short1 a mode of     
doing business between gods      and    
men4 ,but although they are the givers  
of all good1 how can      we give them  
any good in return8 #8,nay1 but we give 
them      honour4' ,then we give them   
not what is beneficial1 but what is     
pleasing or dear to them2 and this is   
the point which has been      already   
disproved4    ,sidenote3 ,religion of   
the letter and of the spirit4           

,socrates1 although weary of the        
subterfuges and evasions of             
,euthyphro1 remains unshaken in his     
conviction that he must know      the   
nature of piety1 or he would never have 
prosecuted his old      father4 ,he is  
still hoping that he will condescend to 
instruct him4      ,but ,euthyphro is in
 a hurry and cannot stay4 ,and          
,socrates' last     #af      hope of    
knowing the nature of piety before he is
 prosecuted for      impiety has        
disappeared4 ,as in the ,euthydemus the 
irony is      carried on to the end4    
99       99       99       99       99  
,sidenote3 ,,introduction4    ,the      
,euthyphro is manifestly designed to    
contrast the real nature of piety  and  
impiety with the popular conceptions of 
them4 ,but when the popular  conceptions
 of them have been overthrown1 ,socrates
 does not offer any  definition of his  
own3 as in the ,laches and ,lysis1 he   
prepares the way  for an answer to the  
question which he has raised2 but true  

to his own  character1 refuses to answer
 himself4    ,euthyphro is a            
religionist1 and is elsewhere spoken of1
 if he be the  same person1 as the      
author of a philosophy of names1 by     
whose #8prancing  steeds' ,socrates in  
the ,cratylus is carried away 7p4 #cif74
 ,he has the  conceit and               
self-confidence of a ,sophist2 no doubt 
that he is right in  prosecuting his    
father has ever entered into his mind4  
,like a ,sophist  too1 he is incapable  
either of framing a general definition  
or of  following the course of an       
argument4 ,his wrong-headedness1        
one-sidedness1  narrowness1             
positiveness1 are characteristic of his 
priestly office4 ,his  failure to       
apprehend an argument may be compared to
 a similar defect  which is observable  
in the rhapsode ,ion4 ,but he is not a  
bad man1 and he  is friendly to         
,socrates1 whose familiar sign he       
recognizes with interest4  ,though      
unable to follow him he is very willing 

to be led by him1 and  eagerly catches  
at any suggestion which saves him from  
the trouble of  thinking4 ,moreover he  
is the enemy of ,meletus1 who1 as he    
says1 is  availing himself of the       
popular dislike to innovations in       
religion in  order to injure ,socrates2 
at the same time he is amusingly        
confident  that he has weapons in his   
own armoury which would be more than a  
match  for him4 ,he is quite sincere in 
his prosecution of his father1 who has  
accidentally been guilty of homicide1   
and is not wholly free from blame4  ,to 
purge away the crime appears to him in  
the light of a duty1 whoever  may be the
 criminal4    ,sidenote3 ,the three     
definitions of piety4    ,thus begins   
the contrast between the religion of the
 letter1 or of the  narrow and          
unenlightened conscience1 and the higher
 notion of religion  which ,socrates    
vainly endeavours to elicit from him4   
#8,piety is doing as  ,i do' is the idea
 of religion which first occurs to him1 

and to many  others who do not say what 
they think with equal frankness4 ,for   
men are  not easily persuaded that any  
other religion is better than their own2
  or that other nations1 e4 g4 the      
,greeks in the time of ,socrates1 were  
equally serious in their religious      
beliefs and difficulties4 ,the chief    
difference between us and them is1 that 
they were slowly learning what  we are  
in process of forgetting4 ,greek        
mythology hardly admitted of the        
distinction between accidental homicide 
and murder3 that the pollution  of blood
 was the same in both cases is also the 
feeling of the ,athenian  diviner4 ,he  
had not as yet learned the lesson1 which
 philosophy was  teaching1 that ,homer  
and ,hesiod1 if not banished from the   
state1 or  whipped out of the assembly1 
as ,heracleitus more rudely proposed1 at
 any  rate were not to be appealed to as
 authorities in religion2 and he is     
ready to defend his conduct by the      
examples of the gods4 ,these are the    

very tales which ,socrates cannot abide2
 and his dislike of them1 as he         
suspects1 has branded him with the      
reputation of impiety4 ,here is one     
answer to the question1 #8,why ,socrates
 was put to death1' suggested by the    
way4 ,another is conveyed in the words1 
#8,the ,athenians do not care about  any
 man being thought wise until he begins 
to make other men wise2 and  then for   
some reason or other they are angry3'   
which may be said to be  the rule of    
popular toleration in most other        
countries1 and not at ,athens  only4 ,in
 the course of the argument 7#g ,a1 ,b7 
,socrates remarks that the              
controversial nature of morals and      
religion arises out of the difficulty   
of verifying them4 ,there is no measure 
or standard to which they can be        
referred4    ,the next definition1      
#8,piety is that which is loved of the  
gods1' is  shipwrecked on a refined     
distinction between the state and the   
act1  corresponding respectively to the 

adjective 77 and the participle  771 or 
rather perhaps to the participle and the
 verb  7 and 74 ,the act is prior to the
 state 7as in ,aristotle  the  precedes 
the 72 and the state of being loved is  
preceded by the act of being loved4 ,but
 piety or holiness is preceded  by the  
act of being pious1 not by the act of   
being loved2 and therefore  piety and   
the state of being loved are different4 
,through such subtleties  of dialectic  
,socrates is working his way into a     
deeper region of thought  and feeling4  
,he means to say that the words #8loved 
of the gods' express  an attribute only1
 and not the essence of piety4          
,sidenote3 ,genuineness of the          
,dialogue4    ,then follows the third   
and last definition1 #8,piety is a part 
of  justice4' ,thus far ,socrates has   
proceeded in placing religion on a      
moral foundation4 ,he is seeking to     
realize the harmony of religion and     
morality1 which the great poets schylus1
 ,sophocles1 and ,pindar had            

unconsciously anticipated1 and which is 
the universal want of all men4  ,to this
 the soothsayer adds the ceremonial     
element1 #8attending upon the  gods4'   
,when further interrogated by ,socrates 
as to the nature of this  #8attention to
 the gods1' he replies1 that piety is an
 affair of business1  a science of      
giving and asking1 and the like4        
,socrates points out the                
anthropomorphism of these notions4 7,cp4
 ,symp4 #bjb ,e2 ,rep4 ii4 #cfe ,e2     
,statesman #bij ,c1 ,d47 ,but when we   
expect him to go on and show that the   
true service of the gods is the service 
of the spirit and the cooperation  with 
them in all things true and good1 he    
stops short2 this was a lesson  which   
the soothsayer could not have been made 
to understand1 and which  every one must
 learn for himself4    ,there seem to be
 altogether three aims or interests in  
this little  ,dialogue3 7#a7 the        
dialectical development of the idea of  
piety2 7#b7 the  antithesis of true and 

false religion1 which is carried to a   
certain  extent only2 7#c7 the defence  
of ,socrates4    ,sidenote3 ,date of the
 ,dialogue4    ,the subtle connection   
with the ,apology and the ,crito2 the   
holding back of  the conclusion1 as in  
the ,charmides1 ,lysis1 ,laches1        
,protagoras1 and other  ,dialogues2 and 
deep insight into the religious world2  
the dramatic power  and play of the two 
characters2 the inimitable irony1 are   
reasons for  believing that the         
,euthyphro is a genuine ,platonic       
writing4 ,the spirit  in which the      
popular representations of mythology are
 denounced recalls  ,republic ,,ii 7#cgh
 ff47 ,the virtue of piety has been     
already mentioned  as one of five in the
 ,protagoras1 but is not reckoned among 
the four  cardinal virtues of ,republic 
,,iv 7#dbh ff474 ,the figure of         
,daedalus 7#ae ,c7  has occurred in the 
,meno 7#ig ,d72 that of ,proteus 7#ae   
,d7 in the ,euthydemus  7#bhh ,b7 and   
,io 7#eda ,e74 ,the kingly science has  

already appeared in the  ,euthydemus1   
and will reappear in the ,republic and  
,statesman4 ,but neither  from these nor
 any other indications of similarity or 
difference1 and  still less from        
arguments respecting the suitableness of
 this little work  to aid ,socrates at  
the time of his trial or the reverse1   
can any evidence  of the date be        
obtained4      ,,euthyphro4    ,,persons
 ,,of ,,the ,,dialogue4    ,,socrates4  
,,euthyphro4    ,,scene3--,the ,porch of
 the ,king ,archon4    ,sidenote3       
,euthyphro4    ,sidenote3 ,euthyphro and
 ,socrates meet at the ,porch of the    
,king ,archon4  ,both have legal        
business on hand4        ,euthyphro4    
,why have you left the ,lyceum1         
,socrates8      and what are you doing  
in the ,porch of the ,king ,archon8     
,steph4 #b      ,surely you cannot be   
concerned in a suit before the ,king1   
like myself8        ,socrates4 ,not in a
 suit1 ,euthyphro2 impeachment is the   
word which the ,athenians use4          

,euth4 ,what6 ,i suppose that some one  
has been prosecuting      you1 for ,i   
cannot believe that you are the         
prosecutor      of another4        ,soc4
 ,certainly not4        ,euth4 ,then    
some one else has been prosecuting you8 
,soc4 ,yes4        ,euth4 ,and who is   
he8        ,soc4 ,a young man who is    
little known1 ,euthyphro2 and ,i        
hardly know him3 his name is ,meletus1  
and he is of the deme      of ,pitthis4 
,perhaps you may remember his           
appearance2 he      has a beak1 and long
 straight hair1 and a beard which is ill
      grown4        ,euth4 ,no1 ,i do   
not remember him1 ,socrates4 ,but what  
is      the charge which he brings      
against you8    ,sidenote3 ,the ways of 
the ,athenian people4    ,sidenote3     
,meletus has brought a charge against   
,socrates4        ,soc4 ,what is the    
charge8 ,well1 a very serious charge1   
which shows a good deal of character in 
the young man1 and      for which he is 
certainly not to be despised4 ,he says  

he      knows how the youth are         
corrupted and who are their corruptors4 
,i fancy that he must be a wise man1 and
 seeing      that ,i am the reverse of a
 wise man1 he has found me out1      and
 is going to accuse me of corrupting his
 young friends4      ,and of this our   
mother the state is to be the judge4 ,of
 all      our political men he is the   
only one who seems to me to      begin  
in the right way1 with the cultivation  
of virtue in youth2      like a good    
husbandman1 he makes the young shoots   
his first          #c      care1 and    
clears away us who are the destroyers of
 them4      ,this is only the first     
step2 he will afterwards attend to the  
elder branches2 and if he goes on as he 
has begun1 he will be      a very great 
public benefactor4        ,euth4 ,i hope
 that he may2 but ,i rather fear1       
,socrates1 that      the opposite will  
turn out to be the truth4 ,my opinion is
 that      in attacking you he is simply
 aiming a blow at the foundation      of

 the state4 ,but in what way does he say
 that you corrupt      the young8       
,sidenote3 ,the nature of the charge    
against ,socrates4        ,soc4 ,he     
brings a wonderful accusation against   
me1 which      at first hearing excites 
surprise3 he says that ,i am a poet or  
maker of gods1 and that ,i invent new   
gods and deny the      existence of old 
ones2 this is the ground of his         
indictment4        ,euth4 ,i understand1
 ,socrates2 he means to attack you      
about the familiar sign which           
occasionally1 as you say1 comes      to 
you4 ,he thinks that you are a          
neologian1 and he is going      to have 
you up before the court for this4 ,he   
knows that      such a charge is readily
 received by the world1 as ,i myself    
know too well2 for when ,i speak in the 
assembly about      divine things1 and  
foretell the future to them1 they laugh 
at      me and think me a madman4 ,yet  
every word that ,i say is      true4    
,but they are jealous of us all2 and we 

must be brave      and go at them4      
,soc4 ,their laughter1 friend           
,euthyphro1 is not a matter of      much
 consequence4 ,for a man may be thought 
wise2 but      the ,athenians1 ,i       
suspect1 do not much trouble themselves 
about him until he begins to impart his 
wisdom to others2      and then for some
 reason or other1 perhaps1 as you say1  
from      jealousy1 they are angry4     
,euth4 ,i am never likely to try their  
temper in this way4        ,soc4 ,i dare
 say not1 for you are reserved in your  
behaviour1      and seldom impart your  
wisdom4 ,but ,i have a benevolent       
habit of pouring out myself to          
everybody1 and would even      pay for a
 listener1 and ,i am afraid that the    
,athenians may      think me too        
talkative4 ,now if1 as ,i was saying1   
they would      only laugh at me1 as you
 say that they laugh at you1 the time   
might pass gaily enough in the court2   
but perhaps they may      be in earnest1
 and then what the end will be you      

soothsayers      only can predict4      
,sidenote3 ,euthyphro charges his father
 with murder4        ,euth4 ,i dare say 
that the affair will end in nothing1    
,socrates1 and that you will win your   
cause2 and ,i think      that ,i shall  
win my own4        ,soc4 ,and what is   
your suit1 ,euthyphro8 are you the      
pursuer or the defendant8        ,euth4 
,i am the pursuer4        ,soc4 ,of     
whom8        ,euth4 ,you will think me  
mad when ,i tell you4                   
#d        ,soc4 ,why1 has the fugitive  
wings8        ,euth4 ,nay1 he is not    
very volatile at his time of life4      
,soc4 ,who is he8        ,euth4 ,my     
father4        ,soc4 ,your father6 my   
good man8        ,euth4 ,yes4           
,soc4 ,and of what is he accused8       
,euth4 ,of murder1 ,socrates4           
,sidenote3 ,the irony of ,socrates4     
,soc4 ,by the powers1 ,euthyphro6 how   
little does the common      herd know of
 the nature of right and truth4 ,a man  
must be an extraordinary man1 and have  

made great strides      in wisdom1      
before he could have seen his way to    
bring such      an action4        ,euth4
 ,indeed1 ,socrates1 he must4           
,sidenote3 ,the murderer murdered4      
,sidenote3 ,euthyphro is under a sacred 
obligation to prosecute a  homicide1    
even if he be his own father4           
,soc4 ,i suppose that the man whom your 
father murdered      was one of your    
relatives--clearly he was2 for if he had
 been      a stranger you would never   
have thought of prosecuting him4        
,euth4 ,i am amused1 ,socrates1 at your 
making a distinction      between one   
who is a relation and one who is not a  
relation2      for surely the pollution 
is the same in either case1 if you      
knowingly associate with the murderer   
when you ought to      clear yourself   
and him by proceeding against him4 ,the 
real      question is whether the       
murdered man has been justly slain4     
,if justly1 then your duty is to let the
 matter alone2 but if      unjustly1    

then even if the murderer lives under   
the same roof      with you and eats at 
the same table1 proceed against him4    
,now the man who is dead was a poor     
dependant of mine who      worked for us
 as a field labourer on our farm in     
,naxos1 and      one day in a fit of    
drunken passion he got into a quarrel   
with      one of our domestic servants  
and slew him4 ,my father bound      him 
hand and foot and threw him into a      
ditch1 and then sent      to ,athens to 
ask of a diviner what he should do with 
him4      ,meanwhile he never attended  
to him and took no care about      him1 
for he regarded him as a murderer2 and  
thought that no      great harm would be
 done even if he did die4 ,now this was 
just what happened4 ,for such was the   
effect of cold and      hunger and      
chains upon him1 that before the        
messenger      returned from the        
diviner1 he was dead4 ,and my father and
      family are angry with me for      
taking the part of the murderer      and

 prosecuting my father4 ,they say that  
he did not kill      him1 and that if he
 did1 the dead man was but a murderer1  
and ,i ought not to take any notice1 for
 that a son is impious      who         
prosecutes a father4 ,which shows1      
,socrates1 how little      they know    
what the gods think about piety and     
impiety4        ,soc4 ,good heavens1    
,euthyphro6 and is your knowledge of    
religion and of things pious and impious
 so very exact1 that1      supposing the
 circumstances to be as you state them1 
you are      not afraid lest you too may
 be doing an impious thing in           
bringing an action against your father8 
,euth4 ,the best of ,euthyphro1 and that
 which distinguishes      him1          
,socrates1 from other men1 is his exact 
knowledge of all         #e      such   
matters4 ,what should ,i be good for    
without it8    ,sidenote3 ,socrates1 who
 is accused of false theology1 thinks   
that he  cannot do better than become   
the disciple of so great a theologian as

  ,euthyphro4        ,soc4 ,rare friend6
 ,i think that ,i cannot do better than 
be      your disciple4 ,then before the 
trial with ,meletus comes on      ,i    
shall challenge him1 and say that ,i    
have always had a      great interest in
 religious questions1 and now1 as he    
charges      me with rash imaginations  
and innovations in religion1 ,i have    
become your disciple4 ,you1 ,meletus1 as
 ,i shall say to him1      acknowledge  
,euthyphro to be a great theologian1 and
 sound      in his opinions2 and if you 
approve of him you ought to      approve
 of me1 and not have me into court2 but 
if you disapprove1      you should begin
 by indicting him who is my teacher1    
and who will be the ruin1 not of the    
young1 but of the old2      that is to  
say1 of myself whom he instructs1 and of
 his old      father whom he admonishes 
and chastises4 ,and if ,meletus         
refuses to listen to me1 but will go on1
 and will not shift the      indictment 
from me to you1 ,i cannot do better than

 repeat      this challenge in the      
court4        ,euth4 ,yes1 indeed1      
,socrates2 and if he attempts to indict 
me ,i am mistaken if ,i do not find a   
flaw in him2 the court      shall have a
 great deal more to say to him than to  
me4    ,sidenote3 ,socrates becomes the 
disciple of ,euthyphro4    ,sidenote3   
,he asks1 #8,what is piety8'            
,soc4 ,and ,i1 my dear friend1 knowing  
this1 am desirous of      becoming your 
disciple4 ,for ,i observe that no one   
appears      to notice you--not even    
this ,meletus2 but his sharp eyes       
have found me out at once1 and he has   
indicted me for      impiety4 ,and      
therefore1 ,i adjure you to tell me the 
nature      of piety and impiety1 which 
you said that you knew so well1      and
 of murder1 and of other offences       
against the gods4      ,what are they8  
,is not piety in every action always the
      same8 and impiety1 again--is it   
not always the opposite      of piety1  
and also the same with itself1 having1  

as impiety1      one notion which       
includes whatever is impious8           
,sidenote3 ,piety is doing as ,i am     
doing2--like ,zeus1 ,i am proceeding    
against my father4        ,euth4 ,to be 
sure1 ,socrates4        ,soc4 ,and what 
is piety1 and what is impiety8          
,euth4 ,piety is doing as ,i am doing2  
that is to say1 prosecuting      any one
 who is guilty of murder1 sacrilege1 or 
of any      similar crime--whether he be
 your father or mother1 or      whoever 
he may be--that makes no difference2 and
 not to      prosecute them is impiety4 
,and please to consider1 ,socrates1     
what a notable proof ,i will give you of
 the truth of my      words1 a proof    
which ,i have already given to          
others3--of      the principle1 ,i mean1
 that the impious1 whoever he may       
be1 ought not to go unpunished4 ,for do 
not men regard      ,zeus as the best   
and most righteous of the gods8--and    
#f      yet they admit that he bound his
 father 7,cronos7 because      he       

wickedly devoured his sons1 and that he 
too had punished      his own father    
7,uranus7 for a similar reason1 in a    
nameless      manner4 ,and yet when ,i  
proceed against my father1 they      are
 angry with me4 ,so inconsistent are    
they in their way      of talking when  
the gods are concerned1 and when ,i am  
concerned4    ,sidenote3 ,does          
,euthyphro believe these amazing stories
 about the gods8        ,soc4 ,may not  
this be the reason1 ,euthyphro1 why ,i  
am      charged with impiety--that ,i   
cannot away with these stories          
about the gods8 and therefore ,i suppose
 that people think      me wrong4 ,but1 
as you who are well informed about      
them approve of them1 ,i cannot do      
better than assent to      your superior
 wisdom4 ,what else can ,i say1         
confessing      as ,i do1 that ,i know  
nothing about them8 ,tell me1 for       
the love of ,zeus1 whether you really   
believe that they are      true4        
,sidenote3 ,what is piety8        ,euth4

 ,yes1 ,socrates2 and things more       
wonderful still1 of      which the world
 is in ignorance4        ,soc4 ,and do  
you really believe that the gods fought 
with      one another1 and had dire     
quarrels1 battles1 and the like1      as
 the poets say1 and as you may see      
represented in the      works of great  
artists8 ,the temples are full of them2 
and notably the robe of ,athene1 which  
is carried up to      the ,acropolis at 
the great ,panathenaea1 is embroidered  
with them4 ,are all these tales of the  
gods true1 ,euthyphro8    ,sidenote3    
,yes1 and things more amazing still4    
,euth4 ,yes1 ,socrates2 and1 as ,i was  
saying1 ,i can tell you1      if you    
would like to hear them1 many other     
things about the      gods which would  
quite amaze you4        ,soc4 ,i dare   
say2 and you shall tell me them at some 
other      time when ,i have leisure4   
,but just at present ,i would rather    
hear from you a more precise answer1    
which you have not as      yet given1 my

 friend1 to the question1 ,what is      
#8piety'8      ,when asked1 you only    
replied1 ,doing as you do1 charging     
your father with murder4        ,euth4  
,and what ,i said was true1 ,socrates4  
,soc4 ,no doubt1 ,euthyphro2 but you    
would admit that there      are many    
other pious acts8        ,euth4 ,there  
are4        ,soc4 ,remember that ,i did 
not ask you to give me two      or three
 examples of piety1 but to explain the  
general idea      which makes all pious 
things to be pious4 ,do you not         
recollect that there was one idea which 
made the impious      impious1 and the  
pious pious8        ,euth4 ,i remember4 
,soc4 ,tell me what is the nature of    
this idea1 and then      ,i shall have a
 standard to which ,i may look1 and by  
which      ,i may measure actions1      
whether yours or those of any one       
else1 and then ,i shall be able to say  
that such and such an      action is    
pious1 such another impious4            
,euth4 ,i will tell you1 if you like4   

,sidenote3 ,a more correct              
definition3--,piety is that which is    
dear to the  gods4        ,soc4 ,i      
should very much like4        ,euth4    
,piety1 then1 is that which is dear to  
the gods1 and      impiety is that which
 is not dear to them4        ,soc4 ,very
 good1 ,euthyphro2 you have now given me
 the               #g      sort of      
answer which ,i wanted4 ,but whether    
what you say      is true or not ,i     
cannot as yet tell1 although ,i make no 
doubt      that you will prove the truth
 of your words4    ,sidenote3 ,the      
quarrels of the gods4        ,euth4 ,of 
course4        ,soc4 ,come1 then1 and   
let us examine what we are saying4      
,that thing or person which is dear to  
the gods is pious1 and      that thing  
or person which is hateful to the gods  
is impious1      these two being the    
extreme opposites of one another4 ,was  
not that said8        ,euth4 ,it was4   
,soc4 ,and well said8        ,euth4     
,yes1 ,socrates1 ,i thought so2 it was  

certainly said4        ,soc4 ,and       
further1 ,euthyphro1 the gods were      
admitted to      have enmities and      
hatreds and differences8        ,euth4  
,yes1 that was also said4    ,sidenote3 
,differences about numbers and figures  
create no ill-will  because they can be 
settled by a sum or by a weighing       
machine1 but  enmities about the just   
and unjust are the occasions of         
quarrels1 both  among gods and men4     
,soc4 ,and what sort of difference      
creates enmity and anger8      ,suppose1
 for example1 that you and ,i1 my good  
friend1 differ      about a number2 do  
differences of this sort make us enemies
      and set us at variance with one   
another8 ,do we not go at      once to  
arithmetic1 and put an end to them by a 
sum8        ,euth4 ,true4        ,soc4  
,or suppose that we differ about        
magnitudes1 do we      not quickly end  
the difference by measuring8            
,euth4 ,very true4        ,soc4 ,and we 
end a controversy about heavy and light 

by      resorting to a weighing machine8
        ,euth4 ,to be sure4        ,soc4
 ,but what differences are there which  
cannot be thus      decided1 and which  
therefore make us angry and set us      
at enmity with one another8 ,i dare say 
the answer does      not occur to you at
 the moment1 and therefore ,i will      
suggest      that these enmities arise  
when the matters of difference are      
the just and unjust1 good and evil1     
honourable and dishonourable4      ,are 
not these the points about which men    
differ1 and about which when we are     
unable satisfactorily      to decide our
 differences1 you and ,i and all of us  
quarrel1      when we do quarrel#ac8    
,euth4 ,yes1 ,socrates1 the nature of   
the differences about      which we     
quarrel is such as you describe4        
,sidenote3 ,would all the gods approve  
of ,euthyphro's conduct8        ,soc4   
,and the quarrels of the gods1 noble    
,euthyphro1 when      they occur1 are of
 a like nature8        ,euth4 ,certainly

 they are4        ,soc4 ,they have      
differences of opinion1 as you say1     
about      good and evil1 just and      
unjust1 honourable and dishonourable3   
there would have been no quarrels among 
them1 if there had      been no such    
differences--would there now8           
,euth4 ,you are quite right4            
,sidenote3 ,men and gods alike love the 
things which they deem noble and  just1 
but they are not agreed what these are4 
,soc4 ,does not every man love that     
which he deems noble      and just and  
good1 and hate the opposite of them8    
,euth4 ,very true4        ,soc4 ,but1 as
 you say1 people regard the same things1
 some      as just and others as        
unjust1--about these they dispute2 and  
so there arise wars and fightings among 
them4                        #h         
,euth4 ,very true4        ,soc4 ,then   
the same things are hated by the gods   
and loved by the gods1 and are both     
hateful and dear to      them8          
,euth4 ,true4        ,soc4 ,and upon    

this view the same things1 ,euthyphro1  
will      be pious and also impious8    
,euth4 ,so ,i should suppose4           
,soc4 ,then1 my friend1 ,i remark with  
surprise that you      have not answered
 the question which ,i asked4 ,for ,i   
certainly did not ask you to tell me    
what action is both pious      and      
impious3 but now it would seem that what
 is loved      by the gods is also hated
 by them4 ,and therefore1 ,euthyphro1   
in thus chastising your father you may  
very likely      be doing what is       
agreeable to ,zeus but disagreeable to  
,cronos or ,uranus1 and what is         
acceptable to ,hephaestus but           
unacceptable to ,her1 and there may be  
other gods who      have similar        
differences of opinion4        ,euth4   
,but ,i believe1 ,socrates1 that all the
 gods would be      agreed as to the    
propriety of punishing a murderer3 there
      would be no difference of opinion 
about that4        ,soc4 ,well1 but     
speaking of men1 ,euthyphro1 did you    

ever      hear any one arguing that a   
murderer or any sort of evil-doer       
ought to be let off8    ,sidenote3 ,or  
condemn his father's8        ,euth4 ,i  
should rather say that these are the    
questions      which they are always    
arguing1 especially in courts of law3   
they commit all sorts of crimes1 and    
there is nothing which      they will   
not do or say in their own defence4     
,soc4 ,but do they admit their guilt1   
,euthyphro1 and yet say      that they  
ought not to be punished8        ,euth4 
,no2 they do not4        ,soc4 ,then    
there are some things which they do not 
venture      to say and do3 for they do 
not venture to argue that the guilty    
are to be unpunished1 but they deny     
their guilt1 do they not8        ,euth4 
,yes4        ,soc4 ,then they do not    
argue that the evil-doer should not     
be punished1 but they argue about the   
fact of who the evil-doer      is1 and  
what he did and when8        ,euth4     
,true4    ,sidenote3 ,neither ,god nor  

man will say that the doer of evil is   
not to  be punished1 but they are       
doubtful about particular acts4 ,what   
proof is  there that all the gods       
approve of the prosecution of your      
father8        ,soc4 ,and the gods are  
in the same case1 if as you assert      
they quarrel about just and unjust1 and 
some of them say      while others deny 
that injustice is done among them4 ,for 
surely neither ,god nor man will ever   
venture to say that the      doer of    
injustice is not to be punished8        
,euth4 ,that is true1 ,socrates1 in the 
main4        ,soc4 ,but they join issue 
about the particulars--gods and      men
 alike2 and1 if they dispute at all1    
they dispute about some      act which  
is called in question1 and which by some
 is affirmed      to be just1 by others 
to be unjust4 ,is not that true8        
,euth4 ,quite true4        ,soc4 ,well  
then1 my dear friend ,euthyphro1 do tell
 me1 for          #i      my better     
instruction and information1 what proof 

have you      that in the opinion of all
 the gods a servant who is guilty of    
murder1 and is put in chains by the     
master of the dead man1      and dies   
because he is put in chains before he   
who bound him      can learn from the   
interpreters of the gods what he ought  
to      do with him1 dies unjustly2 and 
that on behalf of such an one      a son
 ought to proceed against his father and
 accuse him of      murder4 ,how would  
you show that all the gods absolutely   
agree in approving of his act8 ,prove to
 me that they do1 and      ,i will      
applaud your wisdom as long as ,i live4 
,euth4 ,it will be a difficult task2 but
 ,i could make the matter      very     
clear indeed to you4        ,soc4 ,i    
understand2 you mean to say that ,i am  
not so quick      of apprehension as the
 judges3 for to them you will be sure to
      prove that the act is unjust1 and 
hateful to the gods4    ,sidenote3 ,the 
priority of the act to the state4       
,euth4 ,yes indeed1 ,socrates2 at least 

if they will listen to me4    ,sidenote3
 ,let us say then that what all the gods
 approve is pious and  holy4            
,soc4 ,but they will be sure to listen  
if they find that you are      a good   
speaker4 ,there was a notion that came  
into my mind      while you were        
speaking2 ,i said to myself3 #8,well1   
and what      if ,euthyphro does prove  
to me that all the gods regarded the    
death of the serf as unjust1 how do ,i  
know anything more of      the nature of
 piety and impiety8 for granting that   
this action      may be hateful to the  
gods1 still piety and impiety are not   
adequately defined by these             
distinctions1 for that which is         
hateful to the gods has been shown to be
 also pleasing and      dear to them4'  
,and therefore1 ,euthyphro1 ,i do not   
ask you      to prove this2 ,i will     
suppose1 if you like1 that all the gods 
condemn and abominate such an action4   
,but ,i will amend      the definition  
so far as to say that what all the gods 

hate is      impious1 and what they love
 pious or holy2 and what some of        
them love and others hate is both or    
neither4 ,shall this be      our        
definition of piety and impiety8        
,euth4 ,why not1 ,socrates8        ,soc4
 ,why not6 certainly1 as far as ,i am   
concerned1      ,euthyphro1 there is no 
reason why not4 ,but whether this       
admission will greatly assist you in the
 task of instructing me      as you     
promised1 is a matter for you to        
consider4        ,euth4 ,yes1 ,i should 
say that what all the gods love is      
pious and holy1 and the opposite which  
they all hate1 impious4        ,soc4    
,ought we to enquire into the truth of  
this1 ,euthyphro1      or simply to     
accept the mere statement on our own    
authority      and that of others8 ,what
 do you say8        ,euth4 ,we should   
enquire2 and ,i believe that the        
statement      will stand the test of   
enquiry4    ,sidenote3 ,but does the    
state follow the act1 or the act the    

state8        ,soc4 ,we shall know      
better1 my good friend1 in a little     
while4 ,the point which ,i should first 
wish to understand is      whether the  
pious or holy is beloved by the gods    
because it         #aj      is holy1 or 
holy because it is beloved of the gods4 
,euth4 ,i do not understand your        
meaning1 ,socrates4        ,soc4 ,i will
 endeavour to explain3 we speak of      
carrying and      we speak of being     
carried1 of leading and being led1      
seeing      and being seen4 ,you know   
that in all such cases there is a       
difference1 and you know also in what   
the difference lies8        ,euth4 ,i   
think that ,i understand4    ,sidenote3 
,the priority of the act to the state4  
,soc4 ,and is not that which is beloved 
distinct from that      which loves8    
,euth4 ,certainly4        ,soc4 ,well2  
and now tell me1 is that which is       
carried in this      state of carrying  
because it is carried1 or for some other
      reason8        ,euth4 ,no2 that is

 the reason4        ,soc4 ,and the same 
is true of what is led and of what is   
seen8        ,euth4 ,true4        ,soc4 
,and a thing is not seen because it is  
visible1 but conversely1      visible   
because it is seen2 nor is a thing led  
because      it is in the state of being
 led1 or carried because it is in the   
state of being carried1 but the converse
 of this4 ,and now ,i      think1       
,euthyphro1 that my meaning will be     
intelligible2 and      my meaning is1   
that any state of action or passion     
implies      previous action or passion4
 ,it does not become because it is      
becoming1 but it is in a state of       
becoming because it becomes2            
neither does it suffer because it is in 
a state of suffering1 but      it is in 
a state of suffering because it suffers4
 ,do you not      agree8        ,euth4  
,yes4        ,soc4 ,is not that which is
 loved in some state either of          
becoming or suffering8        ,euth4    
,yes4    ,sidenote3 ,the latter is the  

truer account1 and therefore we can only
 say  that what is loved by all the gods
 is in a state to be loved by them2 but 
holiness has a wider meaning than this4 
,soc4 ,and the same holds as in the     
previous instances2 the      state of   
being loved follows the act of being    
loved1 and not the      act the state4  
,euth4 ,certainly4        ,soc4 ,and    
what do you say of piety1 ,euthyphro3 is
 not      piety1 according to your      
definition1 loved by all the gods8      
,euth4 ,yes4        ,soc4 ,because it is
 pious or holy1 or for some other       
reason8        ,euth4 ,no1 that is the  
reason4        ,soc4 ,it is loved       
because it is holy1 not holy because it 
is      loved8        ,euth4 ,yes4      
,soc4 ,and that which is dear to the    
gods is loved by them1      and is in a 
state to be loved of them because it is 
loved of      them8    ,sidenote3 ,the  
essence and the attribute4        ,euth4
 ,certainly4        ,soc4 ,then that    
which is dear to the gods1 ,euthyphro1  

is      not holy1 nor is that which is  
holy loved of ,god1 as you      affirm2 
but they are two different things4      
,euth4 ,how do you mean1 ,socrates8     
,soc4 ,i mean to say that the holy has  
been acknowledged      by us to be loved
 of ,god because it is holy1 not to be  
holy      because it is loved4          
,euth4 ,yes4        ,soc4 ,but that     
which is dear to the gods is dear to    
them      because it is loved by them1  
not loved by them because it is         
dear to them4        ,euth4 ,true4      
,sidenote3 ,what is the essential       
meaning of holiness or piety8           
,soc4 ,but1 friend ,euthyphro1 if that  
which is holy is the      same with that
 which is dear to ,god1 and is loved    
because it      is holy1 then that which
 is dear to ,god would have been        
#aa      loved as being dear to ,god2   
but if that which is dear to ,god       
is dear to him because loved by him1    
then that which is holy      would have 
been holy because loved by him4 ,but now

 you      see that the reverse is the   
case1 and that they are quite           
different from one another4 ,for one 77 
is of a kind to      be loved because it
 is loved1 and the other 77 is loved    
because it is of a kind to be loved4    
,thus you appear to me1      ,euthyphro1
 when ,i ask you what is the essence of 
holiness1      to offer an attribute    
only1 and not the essence--the attribute
      of being loved by all the gods4   
,but you still refuse to      explain to
 me the nature of holiness4 ,and        
therefore1 if you      please1 ,i will  
ask you not to hide your treasure1 but  
to tell      me once more what holiness 
or piety really is1 whether dear      to
 the gods or not 7for that is a matter  
about which we will      not quarrel72  
and what is impiety8        ,euth4 ,i   
really do not know1 ,socrates1 how to   
express what      ,i mean4 ,for somehow 
or other our arguments1 on whatever     
ground we rest them1 seem to turn round 
and walk away      from us4             

,sidenote3 ,socrates #8a greater than   
,daedalus4'        ,soc4 ,your words1   
,euthyphro1 are like the handiwork of my
      ancestor ,daedalus2 and if ,i were
 the sayer or propounder of      them1  
you might say that my arguments walk    
away and will      not remain fixed     
where they are placed because ,i am a   
descendant of his4 ,but now1 since these
 notions are your      own1 you must    
find some other gibe1 for they          
certainly1 as      you yourself allow1  
show an inclination to be on the move4  
,euth4 ,nay1 ,socrates1 ,i shall still  
say that you are the      ,daedalus who 
sets arguments in motion2 not ,i1       
certainly1      but you make them move  
or go round1 for they would never       
have stirred1 as far as ,i am concerned4
        ,soc4 ,then ,i must be a greater
 than ,daedalus3 for whereas      he    
only made his own inventions to move1 ,i
 move those of      other people as     
well4 ,and the beauty of it is1 that ,i 
would      rather not4 ,for ,i would    

give the wisdom of ,daedalus1 and       
the wealth of ,tantalus1 to be able to  
detain them and keep      them fixed4   
,but enough of this4 ,as ,i perceive    
that you are      lazy1 ,i will myself  
endeavour to show you how you might     
instruct me in the nature of piety2 and 
,i hope that you will      not grudge   
your labour4 ,tell me1 then1--,is not   
that which is      pious necessarily    
just8        ,euth4 ,yes4    ,sidenote3 
,all which is pious is just3--is        
therefore all which is just  pious8     
,soc4 ,and is1 then1 all which is just  
pious8 or1 is that which is      pious  
all just1 but that which is just1 only  
in part and not all1   #ab      pious8  
,euth4 ,i do not understand you1        
,socrates4        ,soc4 ,and yet ,i know
 that you are as much wiser than ,i am1 
as you are younger4 ,but1 as ,i was     
saying1 revered friend1      the        
abundance of your wisdom makes you lazy4
 ,please to      exert yourself1 for    
there is no real difficulty in          

understanding      me4 ,what ,i mean ,i 
may explain by an illustration of what  
,i do not mean4 ,the poet 7,stasinus7   
sings--        #8,of ,zeus1 the author  
and creator of all these things1        
,you will not tell3 for where there is  
fear there is also reverence4'          
,now ,i disagree with this poet4 ,shall 
,i tell you in what      respect8       
,euth4 ,by all means4    ,sidenote3 ,we 
may say1 e4 g41 that wherever there is  
reverence there will  be fear1 but not  
that wherever there is fear there will  
be reverence4        ,soc4 ,i should not
 say that where there is fear there is  
also      reverence2 for ,i am sure that
 many persons fear poverty and          
disease1 and the like evils1 but ,i do  
not perceive that they      reverence   
the objects of their fear4        ,euth4
 ,very true4        ,soc4 ,but where    
reverence is1 there is fear2 for he who 
has      a feeling of reverence and     
shame about the commission of any       
action1 fears and is afraid of an ill   

reputation4    ,sidenote3 ,euthyphro in 
the hands of ,socrates4        ,euth4   
,no doubt4        ,soc4 ,then we are    
wrong in saying that where there is fear
      there is also reverence2 and we   
should say1 where there is              
reverence there is also fear4 ,but there
 is not always reverence      where     
there is fear2 for fear is a more       
extended notion1      and reverence is a
 part of fear1 just as the odd is a part
 of      number1 and number is a more   
extended notion than the odd4      ,i   
suppose that you follow me now8         
,euth4 ,quite well4        ,soc4 ,that  
was the sort of question which ,i meant 
to raise      when ,i asked whether the 
just is always the pious1 or the        
pious always the just2 and whether there
 may not be justice      where there is 
not piety2 for justice is the more      
extended      notion of which piety is  
only a part4 ,do you dissent8           
,euth4 ,no1 ,i think that you are quite 
right4        ,soc4 ,then1 if piety is a

 part of justice1 ,i suppose that we    
should enquire what part8 ,if you had   
pursued the enquiry      in the previous
 cases2 for instance1 if you had asked  
me what      is an even number1 and what
 part of number the even is1 ,i         
should have had no difficulty in        
replying1 a number which      represents
 a figure having two equal sides4 ,do   
you not      agree8        ,euth4 ,yes1 
,i quite agree4    ,sidenote3 ,piety or 
holiness is that part of justice which  
attends upon  the gods4        ,soc4 ,in
 like manner1 ,i want you to tell me    
what part of      justice is piety or   
holiness1 that ,i may be able to tell   
,meletus      not to do me injustice1 or
 indict me for impiety1 as ,i am now    
adequately instructed by you in the     
nature of piety or holiness1      and   
their opposites4        ,euth4 ,piety or
 holiness1 ,socrates1 appears to me to  
be that      part of justice which      
attends to the gods1 as there is the    
other      part of justice which attends

 to men4        ,soc4 ,that is good1    
,euthyphro2 yet still there is a little 
#ac      point about which ,i should    
like to have further information1       
,what is the meaning of #8attention'8   
,for attention can      hardly be used  
in the same sense when applied to the   
gods as      when applied to other      
things4 ,for instance1 horses are said  
to require attention1 and not every     
person is able to attend      to them1  
but only a person skilled in            
horsemanship4 ,is it      not so8       
,euth4 ,certainly4    ,sidenote3 ,what  
is the meaning of attention8            
,soc4 ,i should suppose that the art of 
horsemanship is the      art of         
attending to horses8        ,euth4 ,yes4
        ,soc4 ,nor is every one         
qualified to attend to dogs1 but only   
the huntsman8        ,euth4 ,true4      
,soc4 ,and ,i should also conceive that 
the art of the huntsman      is the art 
of attending to dogs8        ,euth4     
,yes4        ,soc4 ,as the art of the   

oxherd is the art of attending to       
oxen8        ,euth4 ,very true4         
,soc4 ,in like manner holiness or piety 
is the art of attending      to the     
gods8--that would be your meaning1      
,euthyphro8        ,euth4 ,yes4         
,sidenote3 ,attention to others is      
designed to benefit and improve them4   
,but how are the gods benefited or      
improved by the holy acts of men8       
,soc4 ,and is not attention always      
designed for the good or      benefit of
 that to which the attention is given8  
,as in the      case of horses1 you may 
observe that when attended to by the    
horseman's art they are benefited and   
improved1 are they not8        ,euth4   
,true4        ,soc4 ,as the dogs are    
benefited by the huntsman's art1 and    
the oxen by the art of the oxherd1 and  
all other things are      tended or     
attended for their good and not for     
their hurt8        ,euth4 ,certainly1   
not for their hurt4        ,soc4 ,but   
for their good8        ,euth4 ,of       

course4        ,soc4 ,and does piety or 
holiness1 which has been defined to     
be the art of attending to the gods1    
benefit or improve them8      ,would you
 say that when you do a holy act you    
make any of      the gods better8       
,euth4 ,no1 no2 that was certainly not  
what ,i meant4        ,soc4 ,and ,i1    
,euthyphro1 never supposed that you did4
 ,i      asked you the question about   
the nature of the attention1            
because ,i thought that you did not4    
,euth4 ,you do me justice1 ,socrates2   
that is not the sort of      attention  
which ,i mean4    ,sidenote3 ,euthyphro 
grows impatient of the argument4        
,sidenote3 ,the attention to the gods   
called piety is such as servants  show  
their masters4        ,soc4 ,good3 but  
,i must still ask what is this attention
 to the      gods which is called piety8
        ,euth4 ,it is such1 ,socrates1  
as servants show to their      masters4 
,soc4 ,i understand--a sort of          
ministration to the gods4        ,euth4 

,exactly4        ,soc4 ,medicine is also
 a sort of ministration or service1     
having in view the attainment of some   
object--would you      not say of       
health8        ,euth4 ,i should4        
,soc4 ,again1 there is an art which     
ministers to the ship-builder      with 
a view to the attainment of some result8
        ,euth4 ,yes1 ,socrates1 with a  
view to the building of a ship4         
,soc4 ,as there is an art which         
ministers to the house-builder      with
 a view to the building of a house8     
,euth4 ,yes4    ,sidenote3 ,but in what 
way do men help the work of ,god8       
,soc4 ,and now tell me1 my good friend1 
about the art which      ministers to   
the gods3 what work does that help to   
accomplish8      ,for you must surely   
know if1 as you say1 you are of      all
 men living the one who is best         
instructed in religion4        ,euth4   
,and ,i speak the truth1 ,socrates4     
,soc4 ,tell me then1 oh tell me--what is
 that fair work which      the gods do  

by the help of our ministrations8       
,euth4 ,many and fair1 ,socrates1 are   
the works which they do4        ,soc4   
,why1 my friend1 and so are those of a  
general4 ,but           #ad      the    
chief of them is easily told4 ,would you
 not say that      victory in war is the
 chief of them8        ,euth4           
,certainly4        ,soc4 ,many and fair1
 too1 are the works of the husbandman1  
if ,i am not mistaken2 but his chief    
work is the production of      food from
 the earth8        ,euth4 ,exactly4     
,soc4 ,and of the many and fair things  
done by the gods1      which is the     
chief or principal one8        ,euth4 ,i
 have told you already1 ,socrates1 that 
to learn all      these things          
accurately will be very tiresome4 ,let  
me simply      say that piety or        
holiness is learning how to please the  
gods in word and deed1 by prayers and   
sacrifices4 ,such      piety is the     
salvation of families and states1 just  
as the      impious1 which is unpleasing

 to the gods1 is their ruin and         
destruction4    ,sidenote3 ,piety a     
science of asking and giving4           
,soc4 ,i think that you could have      
answered in much fewer      words the   
chief question which ,i asked1          
,euthyphro1 if you      had chosen4 ,but
 ,i see plainly that you are not        
disposed to      instruct me--clearly   
not3 else why1 when we reached the      
point1 did you turn aside8 ,had you only
 answered me ,i      should have truly  
learned of you by this time the nature  
of piety4 ,now1 as the asker of a       
question is necessarily      dependent  
on the answerer1 whither he leads ,i    
must follow2      and can only ask      
again1 what is the pious1 and what is   
piety8      ,do you mean that they are a
 sort of science of praying and         
sacrificing8        ,euth4 ,yes1 ,i do4 
,soc4 ,and sacrificing is giving to the 
gods1 and prayer is      asking of the  
gods8        ,euth4 ,yes1 ,socrates4    
,soc4 ,upon this view1 then1 piety is a 

science of asking and      giving8      
,euth4 ,you understand me capitally1    
,socrates4        ,soc4 ,yes1 my friend2
 the reason is that ,i am a votary      
of your science1 and give my mind to it1
 and therefore      nothing which you   
say will be thrown away upon me4 ,please
      then to tell me1 what is the      
nature of this service to the      gods8
 ,do you mean that we prefer requests   
and give gifts      to them8            
,euth4 ,yes1 ,i do4        ,soc4 ,is not
 the right way of asking to ask of them 
what we      want8        ,euth4        
,certainly4    ,sidenote3 ,men give to  
the gods1 and the gods give to men2 they
 do  business with one another4         
,soc4 ,and the right way of giving is to
 give to them in      return what they  
want of us4 ,there would be no meaning  
in an art which gives to any one that   
which he does not      want4            
,euth4 ,very true1 ,socrates4           
,soc4 ,then piety1 ,euthyphro1 is an art
 which gods and men      have of doing  

business with one another8        ,euth4
 ,that is an expression which you may   
use1 if you      like4        ,soc4 ,but
 ,i have no particular liking for       
anything but the      truth4 ,i wish1   
however1 that you would tell me what    
benefit      accrues to the gods from   
our gifts4 ,there is no doubt about     
what they give to us2 for there is no   
good thing which they         #ae       
do not give2 but how we can give any    
good thing to them in      return is far
 from being equally clear4 ,if they give
 everything      and we give nothing1   
that must be an affair of business      
in which we have very greatly the       
advantage of them4    ,sidenote3        
,euthyphro is fairly puzzled4           
,euth4 ,and do you imagine1 ,socrates1  
that any benefit      accrues to the    
gods from our gifts8        ,soc4 ,but  
if not1 ,euthyphro1 what is the meaning 
of gifts      which are conferred by us 
upon the gods8        ,euth4 ,what else1
 but tributes of honour2 and1 as ,i was 

just now saying1 what pleases them8     
,soc4 ,piety1 then1 is pleasing to the  
gods1 but not beneficial      or dear to
 them8        ,euth4 ,i should say that 
nothing could be dearer4        ,soc4   
,then once more the assertion is        
repeated that piety is      dear to the 
gods8        ,euth4 ,certainly4         
,sidenote3 ,again1 the argument walks   
away4        ,soc4 ,and when you say    
this1 can you wonder at your      words 
not standing firm1 but walking away8    
,will you accuse      me of being the   
,daedalus who makes them walk away1 not 
perceiving that there is another and far
 greater artist than      ,daedalus who 
makes them go round in a circle1 and he 
is      yourself2 for the argument1 as  
you will perceive1 comes      round to  
the same point4 ,were we not saying that
 the holy      or pious was not the same
 with that which is loved of the        
gods8 ,have you forgotten8        ,euth4
 ,i quite remember4        ,soc4 ,and   
are you not saying that what is loved of

 the gods      is holy2 and is not this 
the same as what is dear to them--do    
you see8        ,euth4 ,true4           
,soc4 ,then either we were wrong in our 
former assertion2      or1 if we were   
right then1 we are wrong now4           
,euth4 ,one of the two must be true4    
,sidenote3 ,nevertheless1 ,socrates is  
confident that ,euthyphro knows the     
truth1 but will not tell him4           
,soc4 ,then we must begin again and ask1
 ,what is piety8      ,that is an       
enquiry which ,i shall never be weary of
 pursuing      as far as in me lies2 and
 ,i entreat you not to scorn me1 but    
to apply your mind to the utmost1 and   
tell me the truth4      ,for1 if any man
 knows1 you are he2 and therefore ,i    
must      detain you1 like ,proteus1    
until you tell4 ,if you had not         
certainly known the nature of piety and 
impiety1 ,i am confident      that you  
would never1 on behalf of a serf1 have  
charged      your aged father with      
murder4 ,you would not have run         

such a risk of doing wrong in the sight 
of the gods1 and you      would have had
 too much respect for the opinions of   
men4      ,i am sure1 therefore1 that   
you know the nature of piety and        
impiety4 ,speak out then1 my dear       
,euthyphro1 and do not      hide your   
knowledge4    ,sidenote3 ,euthyphro     
departs4    ,sidenote3 ,euthyphro is in 
a hurry to depart1 and finally leaves   
,socrates  to his fate4        ,euth4   
,another time1 ,socrates2 for ,i am in a
 hurry1 and      must go now4           
,soc4 ,alas6 my companion1 and will you 
leave me in      despair8 ,i was hoping 
that you would instruct me in the       
nature of piety and impiety2 and then ,i
 might have cleared      myself of      
,meletus and his indictment4 ,i would   
have told      him that ,i had been     
enlightened by ,euthyphro1 and had      
#af      given up rash innovations and  
speculations1 in which ,i      indulged 
only through ignorance1 and that now ,i 
am about      to lead a better life4    

,,footnotes    #ac ,cp4 #a ,alcib4 #aaa 
foll4          ,,apology4               
,,introduction4    ,sidenote3 ,apology4 
,sidenote3 ,,introduction4    ,in what  
relation the ,apology of ,plato stands  
to the real defence of  ,socrates1 there
 are no means of determining4 ,it       
certainly agrees in  tone and character 
with the description of ,xenophon1 who  
says in the  ,memorabilia 7iv4 #d1 #d7  
that ,socrates might have been acquitted
 #8if in any  moderate degree he would  
have conciliated the favour of the      
dicasts2'  and who informs us in another
 passage 7iv4 #h1 #d71 on the testimony 
of  ,hermogenes1 the friend of          
,socrates1 that he had no wish to live2 
and  that the divine sign refused to    
allow him to prepare a defence1 and also
  that ,socrates himself declared this  
to be unnecessary1 on the ground  that  
all his life long he had been preparing 
against that hour4 ,for the  speech     
breathes throughout a spirit of         
defiance1 #8ut non supplex aut reus  sed

 magister aut dominus videretur esse    
judicum' 7,cic4 de ,orat4 i4 #ed72  and 
the loose and desultory style is an     
imitation of the #8accustomed  manner'  
in which ,socrates spoke in #8the agora 
and among the tables of  the            
money-changers4' ,the allusion in the   
,crito 7#de ,b7 may1 perhaps1 be        
adduced as a further evidence of the    
literal accuracy of some parts 7#cg  ,c1
 ,d74 ,but in the main it must be       
regarded as the ideal of ,socrates1     
according to ,plato's conception of him1
 appearing in the greatest and  most    
public scene of his life1 and in the    
height of his triumph1 when  he is      
weakest1 and yet his mastery over       
mankind is greatest1 and his  habitual  
irony acquires a new meaning and a sort 
of tragic pathos in the  face of death4 
,the facts of his life are summed up1   
and the features of  his character are  
brought out as if by accident in the    
course of the  defence4 ,the            
conversational manner1 the seeming want 

of arrangement1 the  ironical           
simplicity1 are found to result in a    
perfect work of art1 which  is the      
portrait of ,socrates4    ,sidenote3    
,the ,platonic defence of ,socrates4    
,yet some of the topics may have been   
actually used by ,socrates2 and the     
recollection of his very words may have 
rung in the ears of his disciple4  ,the 
,apology of ,plato may be compared      
generally with those speeches of        
,thucydides in which he has embodied his
 conception of the lofty character  and 
policy of the great ,pericles1 and which
 at the same time furnish a  commentary 
on the situation of affairs from the    
point of view of the  historian4 ,so in 
the ,apology there is an ideal rather   
than a literal  truth2 much is said     
which was not said1 and is only ,plato's
 view of the  situation4 ,plato was not1
 like ,xenophon1 a chronicler of facts2 
he does  not appear in any of his       
writings to have aimed at literal       
accuracy4 ,he  is not therefore to be   

supplemented from the ,memorabilia and  
,symposium  of ,xenophon1 who belongs to
 an entirely different class of writers4
  ,the ,apology of ,plato is not the    
report of what ,socrates said1 but an   
elaborate composition1 quite as much so 
in fact as one of the ,dialogues4  ,and 
we may perhaps even indulge in the fancy
 that the actual defence of  ,socrates  
was as much greater than the ,platonic  
defence as the master was  greater than 
the disciple4 ,but in any case1 some of 
the words used by  him must have been   
remembered1 and some of the facts       
recorded must have  actually occurred4  
,it is significant that ,plato is said  
to have been  present at the defence    
7,apol4 #ch ,b71 as he is also said to  
have been  absent at the last scene in  
the ,phaedo 7#ei ,b74 ,is it fanciful to
 suppose  that he meant to give the     
stamp of authenticity to the one and not
 to  the other8--especially when we     
consider that these two passages are the
  only ones in which ,plato makes       

mention of himself4 ,the circumstance   
that  ,plato was to be one of his       
sureties for the payment of the fine    
which he  proposed has the appearance of
 truth4 ,more suspicious is the         
statement  that ,socrates received the  
first impulse to his favourite calling  
of  cross-examining the world from the  
,oracle of ,delphi2 for he must already 
have been famous before ,chaerephon went
 to consult the ,oracle 7,riddell1  i4  
p4 xvi71 and the story is of a kind     
which is very likely to have been       
invented4 ,on the whole we arrive at the
 conclusion that the ,apology is  true  
to the character of ,socrates1 but we   
cannot show that any single  sentence in
 it was actually spoken by him4 ,it     
breathes the spirit of  ,socrates1 but  
has been cast anew in the mould of      
,plato4    ,sidenote3 ,analysis #ag-ai4 
,there is not much in the other         
,dialogues which can be compared with   
the  ,apology4 ,the same recollection of
 his master may have been present to the

  mind of ,plato when depicting the     
sufferings of the ,just in the ,republic
  7ii4 #cfa foll41 vi4 #ejj ,a74 ,the   
,crito may also be regarded as a sort of
  appendage to the ,apology1 in which   
,socrates1 who has defied the judges1   
is nevertheless represented as          
scrupulously obedient to the laws4 ,the 
idealization of the sufferer is carried 
still further in the ,gorgias 7#dgf     
foll471 in which the thesis is          
maintained1 that #8to suffer is better  
than to do evil2' and the art of        
rhetoric is described as only useful    
for the purpose of self-accusation4 ,the
 parallelisms which occur in the        
so-called ,apology of ,xenophon are not 
worth noticing1 because the writing  in 
which they are contained is manifestly  
spurious4 ,the statements of  the       
,memorabilia 7i4 #b2 iv4 #h7 respecting 
the trial and death of ,socrates  agree 
generally with ,plato2 but they have    
lost the flavour of ,socratic  irony in 
the narrative of ,xenophon4    ,the     

,apology or ,platonic defence of        
,socrates is divided into three  parts3 
#ast4 ,the defence properly so called2  
#bnd4 ,the shorter address in           
mitigation of the penalty2 #crd4 ,the   
last words of prophetic rebuke and      
exhortation4           99       99      
99       99       99        ,the first  
part commences with an apology for his  
colloquial style2      he is1 as he has 
always been1 the enemy of rhetoric1 and 
,steph4 #ag      knows of no rhetoric   
but truth2 he will not falsify his      
character      by making a speech4 ,then
 he proceeds to divide his accusers into
    #ah      two classes2 first1 there  
is the nameless accuser--public opinion4
      ,all the world from their earliest
 years had heard that he was      a     
corrupter of youth1 and had seen him    
caricatured in the ,clouds      of      
,aristophanes4 ,secondly1 there are the 
professed accusers1 who      are but the
 mouth-piece of the others4 ,the        
accusations of both      might be summed

 up in a formula4 ,the first say1       
#8,socrates is an      evil-doer and a  
curious person1 searching into things   
under the      earth and above the      
heaven2 and making the worse appear the 
better cause1 and teaching all this to  
others4' ,the second1      #8,socrates  
is an evil-doer and corrupter of the    
youth1 who does      not receive the    
gods whom the state receives1 but       
introduces other      new divinities4'  
,these last words appear to have been   
the actual      indictment 7cp4 ,xen4   
,mem4 i4 #a72 and the previous formula1 
which      is a summary of public       
opinion1 assumes the same legal style4  
,sidenote3 ,analysis #ai-bc4        ,the
 answer begins by clearing up a         
confusion4 ,in the representations      
of the ,comic poets1 and in the opinion 
of the multitude1            #ai      he
 had been identified with the teachers  
of physical science and      with the   
,sophists4 ,but this was an error4 ,for 
both of them      he professes a respect

 in the open court1 which contrasts with
 his      manner of speaking about them 
in other places4 7,cp4 for ,anaxagoras1 
,phaedo #ih ,b1 ,laws xii4 #ifg2 for the
 ,sophists1 ,meno #ie ,d1      ,rep4 vi4
 #dib1 ,tim4 #ai ,e1 ,theaet4 #aed ,e1  
,soph4 #bfe foll41 etc47 ,but      at   
the same time he shows that he is not   
one of them4 ,of natural      philosophy
 he knows nothing2 not that he despises 
such pursuits1      but the fact is that
 he is ignorant of them1 and never says 
a word      about them4 ,nor is he paid 
for giving instruction--that is another 
mistaken notion3--he has nothing to     
teach4 ,but he commends           #bj   
,evenus for teaching virtue at such a   
#8moderate' rate as five      minae4    
,something of the #8accustomed irony1'  
which may perhaps      be expected to   
sleep in the ear of the multitude1 is   
lurking      here4    ,sidenote3        
,analysis #bc-cj4        ,he then goes  
on to explain the reason why he is in   
such an evil      name4 ,that had arisen

 out of a peculiar mission which he had 
taken upon himself4 ,the enthusiastic   
,chaerephon 7probably in        #ba     
anticipation of the answer which he     
received7 had gone to      ,delphi and  
asked the oracle if there was any man   
wiser than      ,socrates2 and the      
answer was1 that there was no man wiser4
      ,what could be the meaning of     
this--that he who knew nothing1      and
 knew that he knew nothing1 should be   
declared by the oracle      to be the   
wisest of men8 ,reflecting upon the     
answer1 he determined      to refute it 
by finding #8a wiser2' and first he went
 to the      politicians1 and then to   
the poets1 and then to the craftsmen1   
but  #bb      always with the same      
result--he found that they knew nothing1
 or      hardly anything more than      
himself2 and that the little advantage  
which in some cases they possessed was  
more than counter-balanced      by their
 conceit of knowledge4 ,he knew nothing1
 and      knew that he knew nothing3    

they knew little or nothing1 and        
imagined that they knew all things4     
,thus he had passed his          #bc    
life as a sort of missionary in         
detecting the pretended wisdom      of  
mankind2 and this occupation had quite  
absorbed him and      taken him away    
both from public and private affairs4   
,young      men of the richer sort had  
made a pastime of the same pursuit1     
#8which was not unamusing4' ,and hence  
bitter enmities had      arisen2 the    
professors of knowledge had revenged    
themselves      by calling him a        
villainous corrupter of youth1 and by   
repeating      the commonplaces about   
atheism and materialism and sophistry1  
which are the stock-accusations against 
all philosophers when       #bd         
there is nothing else to be said of     
them4        ,the second accusation he  
meets by interrogating ,meletus1 who    
is present and can be interrogated4     
#8,if he is the corrupter1 who      is  
the improver of the citizens8' 7,cp4    

,meno #ia ,c47 #8,all men               
everywhere4' ,but how absurd1 how       
contrary to analogy is this6       #be  
,how inconceivable too1 that he should  
make the citizens worse      when he has
 to live with them4 ,this surely cannot 
be intentional2      and if             
unintentional1 he ought to have been    
instructed by ,meletus1  #bf      and   
not accused in the court4        ,but   
there is another part of the indictment 
which says that he      teaches men not 
to receive the gods whom the city       
receives1 and      has other new gods4  
#8,is that the way in which he is       
supposed to      corrupt the youth8'    
#8,yes1 it is4' #8,has he only new gods1
 or none      at all8 #8,none at all4'  
#8,what1 not even the sun and moon8'    
#8,no2 why1 he says that the sun is a   
stone1 and the moon earth4'      ,that1 
replies ,socrates1 is the old confusion 
about ,anaxagoras2      the ,athenian   
people are not so ignorant as to        
attribute to the      influence of      

,socrates notions which have found their
 way into the      drama1 and may be    
learned at the theatre4 ,socrates       
undertakes      to show that ,meletus   
7rather unjustifiably7 has been         
compounding    #bg      a riddle in this
 part of the indictment3 #8,there are no
 gods1 but      ,socrates believes in   
the existence of the sons of gods1 which
 is      absurd4'        ,leaving       
,meletus1 who has had enough words spent
 upon him1           #bh      he returns
 to the original accusation4 ,the       
question may be      asked1 ,why will he
 persist in following a profession which
 leads      him to death8 ,why8--because
 he must remain at his post where       
the god has placed him1 as he remained  
at ,potidaea1 and ,amphipolis1      and 
,delium1 where the generals placed him4 
,besides1 he is           #bi      not  
so overwise as to imagine that he knows 
whether death is      a good or an evil2
 and he is certain that desertion of his
 duty      is an evil4 ,anytus is quite 

right in saying that they should never  
#cj      have indicted him if they meant
 to let him go4 ,for he will certainly  
obey ,god rather than man2 and will     
continue to preach to      all men of   
all ages the necessity of virtue and    
improvement2 and      if they refuse to 
listen to him he will still persevere   
and reprove      them4 ,this is his way 
of corrupting the youth1 which he will  
not      cease to follow in obedience to
 the god1 even if a thousand deaths     
await him4    ,sidenote3 ,analysis      
#cj-ce4        ,he is desirous that they
 should let him live--not for his own   
sake1 but for theirs2 because he is     
their heaven-sent friend 7and   #ca     
they will never have such another71 or1 
as he may be ludicrously      described1
 he is the gadfly who stirs the generous
 steed into      motion4 ,why then has  
he never taken part in public affairs8  
,because the familiar divine voice has  
hindered him2 if he had      been a     
public man1 and had fought for the      

right1 as he would      certainly have  
fought against the many1 he would not   
have lived1      and could therefore    
have done no good4 ,twice in public     
matters      #cb      he has risked his 
life for the sake of justice--once at   
the trial      of the generals2 and     
again in resistance to the tyrannical   
commands      of the ,thirty4           
,but1 though not a public man1 he has   
passed his days in instructing      the 
citizens without fee or reward--this was
 his mission4      ,whether his         
disciples have turned out well or ill1  
he cannot justly      be charged with   
the result1 for he never promised to    
teach them     #cc      anything4 ,they 
might come if they liked1 and they might
 stay      away if they liked3 and they 
did come1 because they found an         
amusement in hearing the pretenders to  
wisdom detected4 ,if      they have been
 corrupted1 their elder relatives 7if   
not themselves7      might surely come  
into court and witness against him1 and 

there      is an opportunity still for  
them to appear4 ,but their fathers      
#cd      and brothers all appear in     
court 7including #8this' ,plato71 to    
witness on his behalf2 and if their     
relatives are corrupted1      at least  
they are uncorrupted2 #8and they are my 
witnesses4      ,for they know that ,i  
am speaking the truth1 and that ,meletus
      is lying4'        ,this is about  
all that he has to say4 ,he will not    
entreat the      judges to spare his    
life2 neither will he present a         
spectacle of      weeping children1     
although he1 too1 is not made of #8rock 
or oak4'   #ce      ,some of the judges 
themselves may have complied with this  
practice on similar occasions1 and he   
trusts that they will not be      angry 
with him for not following their        
example4 ,but he feels      that such   
conduct brings discredit on the name of 
,athens3 he      feels1 too1 that the   
judge has sworn not to give away        
justice2 and      he cannot be guilty of

 the impiety of asking the judge to     
break his      oath1 when he is himself 
being tried for impiety4    ,sidenote3  
,analysis #cf-da4        ,as he         
expected1 and probably intended1 he is  
convicted4 ,and         #cf      now the
 tone of the speech1 instead of being   
more conciliatory1      becomes more    
lofty and commanding4 ,anytus proposes  
death      as the penalty3 and what     
counter-proposition shall he make8      
,he1 the benefactor of the ,athenian    
people1 whose whole life has      been  
spent in doing them good1 should at     
least have the ,olympic      victor's   
reward of maintenance in the ,prytaneum4
 ,or why             #cg      should he 
propose any counter-penalty when he does
 not know      whether death1 which     
,anytus proposes1 is a good or an evil8 
and he is certain that imprisonment is  
an evil1 exile is an evil4      ,loss of
 money might be no evil1 but then he has
 none to give2      perhaps he can make 
up a mina4 ,let that be the penalty1 or1

         #ch      if his friends wish1  
thirty minae2 for which they will be    
excellent      securities4    ,he is    
condemned to death4        ,he is an old
 man already1 and the ,athenians will   
gain nothing      but disgrace by       
depriving him of a few years of life4   
,perhaps he      could have escaped1 if 
he had chosen to throw down his arms and
      entreat for his life4 ,but he does
 not at all repent of the manner      of
 his defence2 he would rather die in his
 own fashion than live      in theirs4  
,for the penalty of unrighteousness is  
swifter than       #ci      death2 that 
penalty has already overtaken his       
accusers as death      will soon        
overtake him4        ,and now1 as one   
who is about to die1 he will prophesy to
 them4      ,they have put him to death 
in order to escape the necessity of     
giving an account of their lives4 ,but  
his death #8will be the seed'      of   
many disciples who will convince them of
 their evil ways1 and      will come    

forth to reprove them in harsher terms1 
because they      are younger and more  
inconsiderate4    ,sidenote3 ,analysis  
#da-db4        ,he would like to say a  
few words1 while there is time1 to those
     #dj      who would have acquitted  
him4 ,he wishes them to know that       
the divine sign never interrupted him in
 the course of his defence2      the    
reason of which1 as he conjectures1 is  
that the death to      which he is going
 is a good and not an evil4 ,for either 
death is      a long sleep1 the best of 
sleeps1 or a journey to another world in
      which the souls of the dead are   
gathered together1 and in which         
there may be a hope of seeing the heroes
 of old--in which1 too1      #da        
there are just judges2 and as all are   
immortal1 there can be no      fear of  
any one suffering death for his         
opinions4        ,nothing evil can      
happen to the good man either in life or
 death1      and his own death has been 
permitted by the gods1 because it was   

better for him to depart2 and therefore 
he forgives his judges      because they
 have done him no harm1 although they   
never meant      to do him any good4    
,he has a last request to make to       
them--that they will trouble        #db 
his sons as he has troubled them1 if    
they appear to prefer riches      to    
virtue1 or to think themselves something
 when they are      nothing4            
99       99       99       99       99  
,sidenote3 ,,introduction4    #8,few    
persons will be found to wish that      
,socrates should have defended  himself 
otherwise1'--if1 as we must add1 his    
defence was that with which  ,plato has 
provided him4 ,but leaving this         
question1 which does not admit  of a    
precise solution1 we may go on to ask   
what was the impression which  ,plato in
 the ,apology intended to give of the   
character and conduct of  his master in 
the last great scene8 ,did he intend to 
represent him 7#a7  as employing        
sophistries2 7#b7 as designedly         

irritating the judges8 ,or  are these   
sophistries to be regarded as belonging 
to the age in which he  lived and to his
 personal character1 and this apparent  
haughtiness as  flowing from the natural
 elevation of his position8    ,for     
example1 when he says that it is absurd 
to suppose that one man  is the         
corrupter and all the rest of the world 
the improvers of the  youth2 or1 when he
 argues that he never could have        
corrupted the men  with whom he had to  
live2 or1 when he proves his belief in  
the gods  because he believes in the    
sons of gods1 is he serious or jesting8 
,it  may be observed that these sophisms
 all occur in his cross-examination  of 
,meletus1 who is easily foiled and      
mastered in the hands of the great      
dialectician4 ,perhaps he regarded these
 answers as good enough for his         
accuser1 of whom he makes very light4   
,also there is a touch of irony in      
them1 which takes them out of the       
category of sophistry4 7,cp4 ,euthyph4  

#b47    ,that the manner in which he    
defends himself about the lives of his  
disciples is not satisfactory1 can      
hardly be denied4 ,fresh in the memory  
of the ,athenians1 and detestable as    
they deserved to be to the newly        
restored democracy1 were the names of   
,alcibiades1 ,critias1 ,charmides4 ,it  
is obviously not a sufficient answer    
that ,socrates had never professed  to  
teach them anything1 and is therefore   
not justly chargeable with  their       
crimes4 ,yet the defence1 when taken out
 of this ironical form1 is  doubtless   
sound3 that his teaching had nothing to 
do with their evil  lives4 ,here1 then1 
the sophistry is rather in form than in 
substance1  though we might desire that 
to such a serious charge ,socrates had  
given a  more serious answer4           
,sidenote3 ,character of the defence4   
,truly characteristic of ,socrates is   
another point in his answer1 which  may 
also be regarded as sophistical4 ,he    
says that #8if he has corrupted  the    

youth1 he must have corrupted them      
involuntarily4' ,but if1 as  ,socrates  
argues1 all evil is involuntary1 then   
all criminals ought to be  admonished   
and not punished4 ,in these words the   
,socratic doctrine of the               
involuntariness of evil is clearly      
intended to be conveyed4 ,here again1   
as in the former instance1 the defence  
of ,socrates is untrue practically1  but
 may be true in some ideal or           
transcendental sense4 ,the commonplace  
reply1 that if he had been guilty of    
corrupting the youth their relations    
would surely have witnessed against him1
 with which he concludes this  part of  
his defence1 is more satisfactory4      
,again1 when ,socrates argues that he   
must believe in the gods because he     
believes in the sons of gods1 we must   
remember that this is a refutation  not 
of the original indictment1 which is    
consistent enough--#8,socrates  does not
 receive the gods whom the city         
receives1 and has other new             

divinities'--but of the interpretation  
put upon the words by ,meletus1 who  has
 affirmed that he is a downright        
atheist4 ,to this ,socrates fairly      
answers1 in accordance with the ideas of
 the time1 that a downright  atheist    
cannot believe in the sons of gods or in
 divine things4 ,the  notion that demons
 or lesser divinities are the sons of   
gods is not  to be regarded as ironical 
or sceptical4 ,he is arguing #8ad       
hominem'  according to the notions of   
mythology current in his age4 ,yet he   
abstains  from saying that he believed  
in the gods whom the ,state approved4   
,he  does not defend himself1 as        
,xenophon has defended him1 by appealing
  to his practice of religion4 ,probably
 he neither wholly believed1 nor        
disbelieved1 in the existence of the    
popular gods2 he had no means of        
knowing about them4 ,according to ,plato
 7cp4 ,phaedo #aah ,b2 ,symp4 #bbj ,d71 
as well as ,xenophon 7,mem4 i4 #a1 #cj71
 he was punctual in the performance  of 

the least religious duties2 and he must 
have believed in his own  oracular sign1
 of which he seemed to have an internal 
witness4 ,but the  existence of ,apollo 
or ,zeus1 or the other gods whom the    
,state approves1  would have appeared to
 him both uncertain and unimportant in  
comparison  of the duty of              
self-examination1 and of those          
principles of truth and  right which he 
deemed to be the foundation of religion4
 7,cp4 ,phaedr4 #bcj2  ,euthyph4 #f1 #g2
 ,rep4 ii4 #cgc ff47    ,sidenote3 ,did 
,socrates intend to irritate his judges8
    ,the second question1 whether ,plato
 meant to represent ,socrates as braving
  or irritating his judges1 must also be
 answered in the negative4 ,his  irony1 
his superiority1 his audacity1          
#8regarding not the person of man1'     
necessarily flow out of the loftiness of
 his situation4 ,he is not acting  a    
part upon a great occasion1 but he is   
what he has been all his life  long1 #8a
 king of men4' ,he would rather not     

appear insolent1 if he could  avoid it 7
    74 ,neither is he desirous of       
hastening his own end1 for life and     
death are simply indifferent to  him4   
,but such a defence as would be         
acceptable to his judges and might      
procure an acquittal1 it is not in his  
nature to make4 ,he will not say  or do 
anything that might pervert the course  
of justice2 he cannot have  his tongue  
bound even #8in the throat of death4'   
,with his accusers he  will only fence  
and play1 as he had fenced with other   
#8improvers of  youth1' answering the   
,sophist according to his sophistry all 
his life  long4 ,he is serious when he  
is speaking of his own mission1 which   
seems  to distinguish him from all other
 reformers of mankind1 and originates   
in an accident4 ,the dedication of      
himself to the improvement of his       
fellow-citizens is not so remarkable as 
the ironical spirit in which he  goes   
about doing good only in vindication of 
the credit of the oracle1  and in the   

vain hope of finding a wiser man than   
himself4 ,yet this  singular and almost 
accidental character of his mission     
agrees with the  divine sign which1     
according to our notions1 is equally    
accidental and  irrational1 and is      
nevertheless accepted by him as the     
guiding principle  of his life4         
,socrates is nowhere represented to us  
as a freethinker or  sceptic4 ,there is 
no reason to doubt his sincerity when he
 speculates  on the possibility of      
seeing and knowing the heroes of the    
,trojan  war in another world4 ,on the  
other hand1 his hope of immortality is  
uncertain2--he also conceives of death  
as a long sleep 7in this respect        
differing from the ,phaedo71 and at last
 falls back on resignation to the       
divine will1 and the certainty that no  
evil can happen to the good man  either 
in life or death4 ,his absolute         
truthfulness seems to hinder him  from  
asserting positively more than this2 and
 he makes no attempt to  veil his       

ignorance in mythology and figures of   
speech4 ,the gentleness  of the first   
part of the speech contrasts with the   
aggravated1 almost  threatening1 tone of
 the conclusion4 ,he characteristically 
remarks  that he will not speak as a    
rhetorician1 that is to say1 he will not
  make a regular defence such as ,lysias
 or one of the orators might have       
composed for him1 or1 according to some 
accounts1 did compose for him4  ,but he 
first procures himself a hearing by     
conciliatory words4 ,he does  not attack
 the ,sophists2 for they were open to   
the same charges as  himself2 they were 
equally ridiculed by the ,comic poets1  
and almost  equally hateful to ,anytus  
and ,meletus4 ,yet incidentally the     
antagonism  between ,socrates and the   
,sophists is allowed to appear4 ,he is  
poor and  they are rich2 his profession 
that he teaches nothing is opposed to   
their readiness to teach all things2 his
 talking in the market-place to  their  
private instructions2 his tarry-at-home 

life to their wandering  from city to   
city4 ,the tone which he assumes towards
 them is one of  real friendliness1 but 
also of concealed irony4 ,towards       
,anaxagoras1 who  had disappointed him  
in his hopes of learning about mind and 
nature1 he  shows a less kindly feeling1
 which is also the feeling of ,plato in 
other  passages 7,laws xii4 #ifg ,b74   
,but ,anaxagoras had been dead thirty   
years1  and was beyond the reach of     
persecution4    ,sidenote3 ,socrates and
 the ,sophists4    ,it has been remarked
 that the prophecy of a new generation  
of teachers  who would rebuke and exhort
 the ,athenian people in harsher and    
more  violent terms was1 as far as we   
know1 never fulfilled4 ,no inference    
can be drawn from this circumstance as  
to the probability of the words         
attributed to him having been actually  
uttered4 ,they express the  aspiration  
of the first martyr of philosophy1 that 
he would leave behind  him many         
followers1 accompanied by the not       

unnatural feeling that they  would be   
fiercer and more inconsiderate in their 
words when emancipated  from his        
control4    ,sidenote3 ,is the ,apology 
the real speech of ,socrates8    ,the   
above remarks must be understood as     
applying with any degree of  certainty  
to the ,platonic ,socrates only4 ,for1  
although these or similar  words may    
have been spoken by ,socrates himself1  
we cannot exclude the  possibility1 that
 like so much else1 e4 g4 the wisdom of 
,critias1 the  poem of ,solon1 the      
virtues of ,charmides1 they may have    
been due only to  the imagination of    
,plato4 ,the arguments of those who     
maintain that the  ,apology was composed
 during the process1 resting on no      
evidence1 do not  require a serious     
refutation4 ,nor are the reasonings of  
,schleiermacher1  who argues that the   
,platonic defence is an exact or nearly 
exact  reproduction of the words of     
,socrates1 partly because ,plato would  
not  have been guilty of the impiety of 

altering them1 and also because many    
points of the defence might have been   
improved and strengthened1 at all  more 
conclusive4 7,see ,english ,translation1
 p4 #acg47 ,what effect the death  of   
,socrates produced on the mind of       
,plato1 we cannot certainly determine2  
nor can we say how he would or must have
 written under the circumstances4  ,we  
observe that the enmity of ,aristophanes
 to ,socrates does not prevent  ,plato  
from introducing them together in the   
,symposium engaged in friendly          
intercourse4 ,nor is there any trace in 
the ,dialogues of an attempt to  make   
,anytus or ,meletus personally odious in
 the eyes of the ,athenian  public4     
,,apology4    ,sidenote3 ,apology4      
,sidenote3 ,socrates begs to be allowed 
to speak in his accustomed manner4      
,how you1 ,o ,athenians1 have been      
affected by my accusers1   ,steph4 #ag  
,i cannot tell2 but ,i know that they   
almost made me forget      who ,i       
was--so persuasively did they speak2 and

 yet they      have hardly uttered a    
word of truth4 ,but of the many         
falsehoods      told by them1 there was 
one which quite amazed me2--,i      mean
 when they said that you should be upon 
your guard      and not allow yourselves
 to be deceived by the force of my      
eloquence4 ,to say this1 when they were 
certain to be detected      as soon as  
,i opened my lips and proved myself to  
be anything      but a great speaker1   
did indeed appear to me most            
shameless--unless      by the force of  
eloquence they mean the force of        
truth2 for if such is their meaning1 ,i 
admit that ,i am eloquent4      ,but in 
how different a way from theirs6 ,well1 
as ,i was      saying1 they have        
scarcely spoken the truth at all2 but   
from me      you shall hear the whole   
truth3 not1 however1 delivered after    
their manner in a set oration duly      
ornamented with words and      phrases4 
,no1 by heaven6 but ,i shall use the    
words and arguments      which occur to 

me at the moment2 for ,i am confident   
in the justice of my cause#ad3 at my    
time of life ,i ought not to      be    
appearing before you1 ,o men of ,athens1
 in the character      of a juvenile    
orator--let no one expect it of me4 ,and
 ,i must      beg of you to grant me a  
favour3--,if ,i defend myself in my     
accustomed manner1 and you hear me using
 the words which      ,i have been in   
the habit of using in the agora1 at the 
tables of      the money-changers1 or   
anywhere else1 ,i would ask you not to  
be surprised1 and not to interrupt me on
 this account4 ,for      ,i am more than
 seventy years of age1 and appearing now
 for      the first time in a court of  
law1 ,i am quite a stranger to the      
language of the place2 and therefore ,i 
would have you regard      me as if ,i  
were really a stranger1 whom you would  
excuse if         #ah      he spoke in  
his native tongue1 and after the fashion
 of his      country3--,am ,i making an 
unfair request of you8 ,never      mind 

the manner1 which may or may not be     
good2 but think      only of the truth  
of my words1 and give heed to that3 let 
the      speaker speak truly and the    
judge decide justly4    ,sidenote3      
,socrates and his accusers4             
,sidenote3 ,the judges must excuse      
,socrates if he defends himself in his  
own fashion4    ,sidenote3 ,he has to   
meet two sorts of accusers4        ,and 
first1 ,i have to reply to the older    
charges and to my      first accusers1  
and then ,i will go on to the later     
ones4 ,for of      old ,i have had many 
accusers1 who have accused me falsely   
to you during many years2 and ,i am more
 afraid of them than      of ,anytus and
 his associates1 who are dangerous1 too1
 in their      own way4 ,but far more   
dangerous are the others1 who began     
when you were children1 and took        
possession of your minds      with their
 falsehoods1 telling of one ,socrates1 a
 wise man1 who      speculated about the
 heaven above1 and searched into the    

earth beneath1 and made the worse appear
 the better cause4      ,the            
disseminators of this tale are the      
accusers whom ,i dread2      for their  
hearers are apt to fancy that such      
enquirers do not      believe in the    
existence of the gods4 ,and they are    
many1 and      their charges against me 
are of ancient date1 and they were      
made by them in the days when you were  
more impressible      than you are      
now--in childhood1 or it may have been  
in youth--and      the cause when heard 
went by default1 for there was      none
 to answer4 ,and hardest of all1 ,i do  
not know and      cannot tell the names 
of my accusers2 unless in the chance    
case of a ,comic poet4 ,all who from    
envy and malice have      persuaded     
you--some of them having first convinced
 themselves--all      this class of men 
are most difficult to deal with2        
for ,i cannot have them up here1 and    
cross-examine them1 and      therefore  
,i must simply fight with shadows in my 

own defence1      and argue when there  
is no one who answers4 ,i will ask you  
then to assume with me1 as ,i was       
saying1 that my opponents      are of   
two kinds2 one recent1 the other        
ancient3 and ,i hope      that you will 
see the propriety of my answering the   
latter first1      for these accusations
 you heard long before the others1 and  
much oftener4        ,well1 then1 ,i    
must make my defence1 and endeavour to  
clear          #ai      away in a short 
time1 a slander which has lasted a long 
time4      ,may ,i succeed1 if to       
succeed be for my good and yours1 or    
likely to avail me in my cause6 ,the    
task is not an easy one2      ,i quite  
understand the nature of it4 ,and so    
leaving the event      with ,god1 in    
obedience to the law ,i will now make my
 defence4    ,sidenote3 ,the ,clouds of 
,aristophanes4    ,sidenote3 ,there is  
the accusation of the theatres3 which   
declares that  he is a student of       
natural philosophy4        ,i will begin

 at the beginning1 and ask what is the  
accusation      which has given rise to 
the slander of me1 and in fact has      
encouraged ,meletus to prefer this      
charge against me4 ,well1      what do  
the slanderers say8 ,they shall be my   
prosecutors1      and ,i will sum up    
their words in an affidavit3 #8,socrates
 is an      evil-doer1 and a curious    
person1 who searches into things        
under the earth and in heaven1 and he   
makes the worse      appear the better  
cause2 and he teaches the aforesaid     
doctrines      to others4' ,such is the 
nature of the accusation3 it is         
just what you have yourselves seen in   
the comedy of ,aristophanes#ae1      who
 has introduced a man whom he calls     
,socrates1      going about and saying  
that he walks in air1 and talking a     
deal of nonsense concerning matters of  
which ,i do not pretend      to know    
either much or little--not that ,i mean 
to speak      disparagingly of any one  
who is a student of natural philosophy4 

,i should be very sorry if ,meletus     
could bring so grave      a charge      
against me4 ,but the simple truth is1 ,o
 ,athenians1      that ,i have nothing  
to do with physical speculations4 ,very 
many of those here present are witnesses
 to the truth of this1      and to them 
,i appeal4 ,speak1 then1 you who have   
heard me1      and tell your neighbours 
whether any of you have ever known      
me hold forth in few words or in many   
upon such matters4444      ,you hear    
their answer4 ,and from what they say of
      this part of the charge you will  
be able to judge of the truth      of   
the rest4    ,sidenote3 ,there is the   
report that he is a ,sophist who        
receives money4    ,sidenote3 ,evenus   
the ,parian4    ,sidenote3 ,the ironical
 question which ,socrates put to        
,callias4        ,as little foundation  
is there for the report that ,i am a    
teacher1 and take money2 this accusation
 has no more truth      in it than the  
other4 ,although1 if a man were really  

able to      instruct mankind1 to       
receive money for giving instruction    
would1 in my opinion1 be an honour to   
him4 ,there is      ,gorgias of         
,leontium1 and ,prodicus of ,ceos1 and  
,hippias      of ,elis1 who go the round
 of the cities1 and are able to         
persuade the young men to leave their   
own citizens by whom      they might be 
taught for nothing1 and come to them    
whom             #bj      they not only 
pay1 but are thankful if they may be    
allowed to      pay them4 ,there is at  
this time a ,parian philosopher         
residing in ,athens1 of whom ,i have    
heard2 and ,i came to      hear of him  
in this way3--,i came across a man who  
has      spent a world of money on the  
,sophists1 ,callias1 the son of         
,hipponicus1 and knowing that he had    
sons1 ,i asked him3      #8,callias1' ,i
 said1 #8if your two sons were foals or 
calves1      there would be no          
difficulty in finding some one to put   
over      them2 we should hire a trainer

 of horses1 or a farmer probably1       
who would improve and perfect them in   
their own      proper virtue and        
excellence2 but as they are human       
beings1      whom are you thinking of   
placing over them8 ,is there any        
one who understands human and political 
virtue8 ,you must      have thought     
about the matter1 for you have sons2 is 
there      any one8' #8,there is1' he   
said4 #8,who is he8' said ,i2 #8and     
of what country8 and what does he       
charge8' #8,evenus the      ,parian1' he
 replied2 #8he is the man1 and his      
charge is five      minae4' ,happy is   
,evenus1 ,i said to myself1 if he really
 has      this wisdom1 and teaches at   
such a moderate charge4 ,had ,i      the
 same1 ,i should have been very proud   
and conceited2 but      the truth is    
that ,i have no knowledge of the kind4  
,sidenote3 ,the ,god of ,delphi4        
,sidenote3 ,the accusations against me  
have arisen out of a sort of wisdom     
which ,i practise4    ,sidenote3 ,my    

practice of it arose out of a           
declaration of the ,delphian  ,oracle   
that ,i was the wisest of men4        ,i
 dare say1 ,athenians1 that some one    
among you will reply1      #8,yes1      
,socrates1 but what is the origin of    
these accusations      which are brought
 against you2 there must have been      
something      strange which you have   
been doing8 ,all these rumours      and 
this talk about you would never have    
arisen if you had      been like other  
men3 tell us1 then1 what is the cause of
 them1      for we should be sorry to   
judge hastily of you4' ,now ,i regard   
this as a fair challenge1 and ,i will   
endeavour to explain to you      the    
reason why ,i am called wise and have   
such an evil fame4      ,please to      
attend then4 ,and although some of you  
may think      that ,i am joking1 ,i    
declare that ,i will tell you the entire
 truth4      ,men of ,athens1 this      
reputation of mine has come of a certain
      sort of wisdom which ,i possess4  

,if you ask me what kind of      wisdom1
 ,i reply1 wisdom such as may perhaps be
 attained by      man1 for to that      
extent ,i am inclined to believe that ,i
 am      wise2 whereas the persons of   
whom ,i was speaking have      a        
superhuman wisdom1 which ,i may fail to 
describe1 because      ,i have it not   
myself2 and he who says that ,i have1   
speaks      falsely1 and is taking away 
my character4 ,and here1 ,o men      of 
,athens1 ,i must beg you not to         
interrupt me1 even if ,i seem      to   
say something extravagant4 ,for the word
 which ,i will      speak is not mine4  
,i will refer you to a witness who is   
worthy of credit2 that witness shall be 
the ,god of ,delphi--he      will tell  
you about my wisdom1 if ,i have any1 and
 of what      sort it is4 ,you must have
 known ,chaerephon2 he was early      a 
friend of mine1 and also a friend of    
yours1 for he shared in      #ba        
the recent exile of the people1 and     
returned with you4 ,well1               

,chaerephon1 as you know1 was very      
impetuous in all his      doings1 and he
 went to ,delphi and boldly asked the   
oracle to      tell him whether--as ,i  
was saying1 ,i must beg you not to      
interrupt--he asked the oracle to tell  
him whether any one      was wiser than 
,i was1 and the ,pythian prophetess     
answered1      that there was no man    
wiser4 ,chaerephon is dead himself2     
but his brother1 who is in court1 will  
confirm the truth of what      ,i am    
saying4    ,sidenote3 ,i went about     
searching after a man who was wiser than
 myself3  at first among the            
politicians2 then among the             
philosophers2 and found  that ,i had an 
advantage over them1 because ,i had no  
conceit of knowledge4        ,why do ,i 
mention this8 ,because ,i am going to   
explain      to you why ,i have such an 
evil name4 ,when ,i heard the           
answer1 ,i said to myself1 ,what can the
 god mean8 and what      is the         
interpretation of his riddle8 for ,i    

know that ,i have      no wisdom1 small 
or great4 ,what then can he mean when   
he says that ,i am the wisest of men8   
,and yet he is a      god1 and cannot   
lie2 that would be against his nature4  
,after      long consideration1 ,i      
thought of a method of trying the       
question4 ,i reflected that if ,i could 
only find a man wiser      than myself1 
then ,i might go to the god with a      
refutation in      my hand4 ,i should   
say to him1 #8,here is a man who is     
wiser      than ,i am2 but you said that
 ,i was the wisest4' ,accordingly       
,i went to one who had the reputation of
 wisdom1 and observed      him--his name
 ,i need not mention2 he was a          
politician whom      ,i selected for    
examination--and the result was as      
follows3      ,when ,i began to talk    
with him1 ,i could not help thinking    
that he was not really wise1 although he
 was thought wise by      many1 and     
still wiser by himself2 and thereupon ,i
 tried to      explain to him that he   

thought himself wise1 but was not       
really wise2 and the consequence was    
that he hated me1 and      his enmity   
was shared by several who were present  
and      heard me4 ,so ,i left him1     
saying to myself1 as ,i went away3      
,well1 although ,i do not suppose that  
either of us knows      anything really 
beautiful and good1 ,i am better off    
than he is1--for      he knows nothing1 
and thinks that he knows2 ,i neither    
know nor think that ,i know4 ,in this   
latter particular1 then1      ,i seem to
 have slightly the advantage of him4    
,then ,i went      to another who had   
still higher pretensions to wisdom1 and 
my conclusion was exactly the same4     
,whereupon ,i made      another enemy of
 him1 and of many others besides him4   
,sidenote3 ,socrates goes on his way    
asking questions4    ,sidenote3 ,i found
 that the poets were the worst possible 
interpreters of  their own writings4    
,then ,i went to one man after another1 
being not unconscious      of the enmity

 which ,i provoked1 and ,i lamented and 
feared this3 but necessity was laid upon
 me1--the word of      ,god1 ,i thought1
 ought to be considered first4 ,and ,i  
said to      myself1 ,go ,i must to all 
who appear to know1 and find out        
the meaning of the oracle4 ,and ,i swear
 to you1 ,athenians1           #bb      
by the dog ,i swear6--for ,i must tell  
you the truth--the result      of my    
mission was just this3 ,i found that the
 men most in      repute were all but   
the most foolish2 and that others less  
esteemed were really wiser and better4  
,i will tell you the      tale of my    
wanderings and of the #8,herculean'     
labours1 as ,i      may call them1 which
 ,i endured only to find at last the    
oracle      irrefutable4 ,after the     
politicians1 ,i went to the poets2      
tragic1      dithyrambic1 and all sorts4
 ,and there1 ,i said to myself1 you     
will be instantly detected2 now you will
 find out that you are      more        
ignorant than they are4 ,accordingly1 ,i

 took them some      of the most        
elaborate passages in their own         
writings1 and      asked what was the   
meaning of them--thinking that they     
would      teach me something4 ,will you
 believe me8 ,i am almost      ashamed  
to confess the truth1 but ,i must say   
that there is      hardly a person      
present who would not have talked better
      about their poetry than they did  
themselves4 ,then ,i knew      that not 
by wisdom do poets write poetry1 but by 
a sort of      genius and inspiration2  
they are like diviners or soothsayers   
who also say many fine things1 but do   
not understand the      meaning of them4
 ,the poets appeared to me to be much in
      the same case2 and ,i further     
observed that upon the strength of      
their poetry they believed themselves to
 be the wisest of men      in other     
things in which they were not wise4 ,so 
,i departed1      conceiving myself to  
be superior to them for the same reason 
that ,i was superior to the politicians4

    ,sidenote3 ,why he was so greatly   
disliked3    ,sidenote3 ,the artisans   
had some real knowledge1 but they had   
also a  conceit that they knew things   
which were beyond them4        ,at last 
,i went to the artisans1 for ,i was     
conscious that ,i      knew nothing at  
all1 as ,i may say1 and ,i was sure that
 they      knew many fine things2 and   
here ,i was not mistaken1 for      they 
did know many things of which ,i was    
ignorant1 and in      this they         
certainly were wiser than ,i was4 ,but  
,i observed      that even the good     
artisans fell into the same error as the
      poets2--because they were good    
workmen they thought that      they also
 knew all sorts of high matters1 and    
this defect in      them overshadowed   
their wisdom2 and therefore ,i asked    
myself on behalf of the oracle1 whether 
,i would like to be as      ,i was1     
neither having their knowledge nor their
 ignorance1 or      like them in both2  
and ,i made answer to myself and to the 

oracle that ,i was better off as ,i was4
    ,sidenote3 ,the oracle was intended 
to apply1 not to ,socrates1 but to all  
men who know that their wisdom is worth 
nothing4        ,this inquisition has   
led to my having many enemies of        
the worst and most dangerous kind1 and  
has given occasion           #bc        
also to many calumnies4 ,and ,i am      
called wise1 for my      hearers always 
imagine that ,i myself possess the      
wisdom      which ,i find wanting in    
others3 but the truth is1 ,o men      of
 ,athens1 that ,god only is wise2 and by
 his answer he      intends to show that
 the wisdom of men is worth little or   
nothing2 he is not speaking of          
,socrates1 he is only using      my name
 by way of illustration1 as if he said1 
,he1 ,o men1 is      the wisest1 who1   
like ,socrates1 knows that his wisdom is
      in truth worth nothing4 ,and so ,i
 go about the world1      obedient to   
the god1 and search and make enquiry    
into the      wisdom of any one1 whether

 citizen or stranger1 who appears       
to be wise2 and if he is not wise1 then 
in vindication of      the oracle ,i    
show him that he is not wise2 and my    
occupation      quite absorbs me1 and ,i
 have no time to give either      to any
 public matter of interest or to any    
concern of my      own1 but ,i am in    
utter poverty by reason of my devotion  
to      the god4    ,sidenote3 ,meletus1
 ,anytus1 and ,lycon4    ,sidenote3     
,there are my imitators who go about    
detecting pretenders1 and  the enmity   
which they arouse falls upon me4        
,there is another thing3--young men of  
the richer classes1      who have not   
much to do1 come about me of their own  
accord2 they like to hear the pretenders
 examined1 and they      often imitate  
me1 and proceed to examine others2 there
 are      plenty of persons1 as they    
quickly discover1 who think that        
they know something1 but really know    
little or nothing2 and      then those  
who are examined by them instead of     

being      angry with themselves are    
angry with me3 ,this confounded         
,socrates1 they say2 this villainous    
misleader of youth6--and      then if   
somebody asks them1 ,why1 what evil does
 he      practise or teach8 they do not 
know1 and cannot tell2      but in order
 that they may not appear to be at a    
loss1 they      repeat the ready-made   
charges which are used against all      
philosophers about teaching things up in
 the clouds and      under the earth1   
and having no gods1 and making the worse
      appear the better cause2 for they 
do not like to confess that      their  
pretence of knowledge has been          
detected--which is      the truth2 and  
as they are numerous and ambitious and  
energetic1 and are drawn up in battle   
array and have persuasive      tongues1 
they have filled your ears with their   
loud      and inveterate calumnies4 ,and
 this is the reason why my      three   
accusers1 ,meletus and ,anytus and      
,lycon1 have set      upon me2 ,meletus1

 who has a quarrel with me on behalf    
of the poets2 ,anytus1 on behalf of the 
craftsmen and politicians2      ,lycon1 
on behalf of the rhetoricians3 and as ,i
 said                 #bd      at the   
beginning1 ,i cannot expect to get rid  
of such a mass      of calumny all in a 
moment4 ,and this1 ,o men of ,athens1 is
      the truth and the whole truth2 ,i 
have concealed nothing1      ,i have    
dissembled nothing4 ,and yet1 ,i know   
that my      plainness of speech makes  
them hate me1 and what is their         
hatred but a proof that ,i am speaking  
the truth8--,hence      has arisen the  
prejudice against me2 and this is the   
reason      of it1 as you will find out 
either in this or in any future         
enquiry4    ,sidenote3 ,the second class
 of accusers4        ,i have said enough
 in my defence against the first class  
of      my accusers2 ,i turn to the     
second class4 ,they are headed      by  
,meletus1 that good man and true lover  
of his country1      as he calls        

himself4 ,against these1 too1 ,i must   
try to make      a defence3--,let their 
affidavit be read3 it contains something
      of this kind3 ,it says that       
,socrates is a doer of evil1 who        
corrupts the youth2 and who does not    
believe in the gods of      the state1  
but has other new divinities of his own4
 ,such is      the charge2 and now let  
us examine the particular counts4       
,he says that ,i am a doer of evil1 and 
corrupt the youth2 but      ,i say1 ,o  
men of ,athens1 that ,meletus is a doer 
of evil1 in      that he pretends to be 
in earnest when he is only in jest1     
and is so eager to bring men to trial   
from a pretended zeal      and interest 
about matters in which he really never  
had the      smallest interest4 ,and the
 truth of this ,i will endeavour to     
prove to you4        ,come hither1      
,meletus1 and let me ask a question of  
you4      ,you think a great deal about 
the improvement of youth8    ,sidenote3 
,meletus is cross-examined by ,socrates4

    ,sidenote3 ,all men are discovered  
to be improvers of youth with the       
single exception of ,socrates4          
,yes1 ,i do4        ,tell the judges1   
then1 who is their improver2 for you    
must      know1 as you have taken the   
pains to discover their corrupter1      
and are citing and accusing me before   
them4 ,speak1 then1      and tell the   
judges who their improver is4--,observe1
 ,meletus1      that you are silent1 and
 have nothing to say4 ,but is not this  
rather disgraceful1 and a very          
considerable proof of what      ,i was  
saying1 that you have no interest in the
 matter8 ,speak      up1 friend1 and    
tell us who their improver is4          
,the laws4        ,but that1 my good    
sir1 is not my meaning4 ,i want to      
know who the person is1 who1 in the     
first place1 knows      the laws4       
,the judges1 ,socrates1 who are present 
in court4        ,what1 do you mean to  
say1 ,meletus1 that they are able       
to instruct and improve youth8          

,certainly they are4        ,what1 all  
of them1 or some only and not others8   
,all of them4        ,by the goddess    
,her1 that is good news6 ,there are     
plenty of improvers1 then4 ,and what do 
you say of the      audience1--do they  
improve them8                           
#be        ,yes1 they do4        ,and   
the senators8        ,yes1 the senators 
improve them4        ,but perhaps the   
members of the assembly corrupt         
them8--or      do they too improve them8
        ,they improve them4        ,then
 every ,athenian improves and elevates  
them2 all      with the exception of    
myself2 and ,i alone am their corrupter8
      ,is that what you affirm8         
,that is what ,i stoutly affirm4        
,sidenote3 ,but this rather unfortunate 
fact does not accord with the  analogy  
of the animals4        ,i am very       
unfortunate if you are right4 ,but      
suppose ,i ask      you a question3 ,how
 about horses8 ,does one man do         
them harm and all the world good8 ,is   

not the exact opposite      the truth8  
,one man is able to do them good1 or at 
least      not many2--the trainer of    
horses1 that is to say1 does them       
good1 and others who have to do with    
them rather injure      them8 ,is not   
that true1 ,meletus1 of horses1 or of   
any other      animals8 ,most assuredly 
it is2 whether you and ,anytus      say 
yes or no4 ,happy indeed would be the   
condition of      youth if they had one 
corrupter only1 and all the rest of     
the world were their improvers4 ,but    
you1 ,meletus1 have      sufficiently   
shown that you never had a thought about
 the      young3 your carelessness is   
seen in your not caring about      the  
very things which you bring against me4 
,sidenote3 ,meletus is checkmated by    
,socrates4        ,and now1 ,meletus1 ,i
 will ask you another question--by      
,zeus ,i will3 ,which is better1 to live
 among bad citizens1 or      among good 
ones8 ,answer1 friend1 ,i say2 the      
question      is one which may be easily

 answered4 ,do not the good      do     
their neighbours good1 and the bad do   
them evil8        ,certainly4           
,and is there any one who would rather  
be injured than      benefited by those 
who live with him8 ,answer1 my good     
friend1 the law requires you to         
answer--does any one like to      be    
injured8        ,certainly not4         
,sidenote3 ,when ,i do harm to my       
neighbour ,i must do harm to myself3 and
  therefore ,i cannot be supposed to    
injure them intentionally4        ,and  
when you accuse me of corrupting and    
deteriorating      the youth1 do you    
allege that ,i corrupt them             
intentionally or      unintentionally8  
,intentionally1 ,i say4        ,but you 
have just admitted that the good do     
their neighbours      good1 and the evil
 do them evil4 ,now1 is that a truth    
which your superior wisdom has          
recognized thus early in life1      and 
am ,i1 at my age1 in such darkness and  
ignorance as not      to know that if a 

man with whom ,i have to live is        
corrupted      by me1 ,i am very likely 
to be harmed by him2 and yet ,i         
corrupt him1 and intentionally1 too--so 
you say1 although      neither ,i nor   
any other human being is ever likely to 
be      convinced by you4 ,but either ,i
 do not corrupt them1 or                
#bf      ,i corrupt them                
unintentionally2 and on either view of  
the      case you lie4 ,if my offence is
 unintentional1 the law has no          
cognizance of unintentional offences3   
you ought to have      taken me         
privately1 and warned and admonished me2
 for      if ,i had been better advised1
 ,i should have left off doing what     
,i only did unintentionally--no doubt ,i
 should2 but you      would have nothing
 to say to me and refused to teach me4  
,and now you bring me up in this court1 
which is a place not      of            
instruction1 but of punishment4         
,sidenote3 ,he neither knows nor cares  
about the interests of youth4        ,it

 will be very clear to you1 ,athenians1 
as ,i was saying1      that ,meletus has
 no care at all1 great or small1 about  
the      matter4 ,but still ,i should   
like to know1 ,meletus1 in what      ,i 
am affirmed to corrupt the young4 ,i    
suppose you mean1      as ,i infer from 
your indictment1 that ,i teach them not 
to      acknowledge the gods which the  
state acknowledges1 but      some other 
new divinities or spiritual agencies in 
their      stead4 ,these are the lessons
 by which ,i corrupt the youth1      as 
you say4        ,yes1 that ,i say       
emphatically4    ,sidenote3 ,socrates is
 declared by ,meletus to be an atheist  
and to  corrupt the religion of the     
young4        ,then1 by the gods1       
,meletus1 of whom we are speaking1 tell 
me and the court1 in somewhat plainer   
terms1 what you mean6      for ,i do not
 as yet understand whether you affirm   
that ,i teach      other men to         
acknowledge some gods1 and therefore    
that ,i do      believe in gods1 and am 

not an entire atheist--this you do not  
lay to my charge1--but only you say that
 they are not the      same gods which  
the city recognizes--the charge is that 
they      are different gods4 ,or1 do   
you mean that ,i am an atheist          
simply1 and a teacher of atheism8       
,i mean the latter--that you are a      
complete atheist4        ,what an       
extraordinary statement6 ,why do you    
think so1      ,meletus8 ,do you mean   
that ,i do not believe in the god-head  
of the sun or moon1 like other men8     
,i assure you1 judges1 that he does not3
 for he says that      the sun is stone1
 and the moon earth4    ,sidenote3      
,meletus has confounded ,socrates with  
,anaxagoras2 and he has  contradicted   
himself in the indictment4              
,friend ,meletus1 you think that you are
 accusing ,anaxagoras3      and you have
 but a bad opinion of the judges1 if you
      fancy them illiterate to such a   
degree as not to know that      these   
doctrines are found in the books of     

,anaxagoras the      ,clazomenian1 which
 are full of them4 ,and so1 forsooth1   
the      youth are said to be taught    
them by ,socrates1 when there      are  
not unfrequently exhibitions of them at 
the theatre#af      7price of admission 
one drachma at the most72 and they      
might pay their money1 and laugh at     
,socrates if he pretends      to father 
these extraordinary views4 ,and so1     
,meletus1 you      really think that ,i 
do not believe in any god8    ,sidenote3
 ,meletus is again checkmated by        
,socrates4        ,i swear by ,zeus that
 you believe absolutely in none at all4 
,nobody will believe you1 ,meletus1 and 
,i am pretty sure      that you do not  
believe yourself4 ,i cannot help        
thinking1      men of ,athens1 that     
,meletus is reckless and impudent1 and  
that he has written this indictment in a
 spirit of mere wantonness      and     
youthful bravado4 ,has he not compounded
 a                       #bg            
riddle1 thinking to try me8 ,he said to 

himself3--,i shall      see whether the 
wise ,socrates will discover my         
facetious      contradiction1 or whether
 ,i shall be able to deceive him and    
the rest of them4 ,for he certainly does
 appear to me to      contradict himself
 in the indictment as much as if he said
      that ,socrates is guilty of not   
believing in the gods1 and yet      of  
believing in them--but this is not like 
a person who is in      earnest4        
,i should like you1 ,o men of ,athens1  
to join me in examining      what ,i    
conceive to be his inconsistency2 and do
      you1 ,meletus1 answer4 ,and ,i    
must remind the audience      of my     
request that they would not make a      
disturbance if      ,i speak in my      
accustomed manner3    ,sidenote3 ,how   
can ,socrates believe in divine agencies
 and not believe in  gods8        ,did  
ever man1 ,meletus1 believe in the      
existence of human      things1 and not 
of human beings8444 ,i wish1 men of     
,athens1      that he would answer1 and 

not be always trying to get up an       
interruption4 ,did ever any man believe 
in horsemanship1      and not in horses8
 or in flute-playing1 and not in        
flute-players8      ,no1 my friend2 ,i  
will answer to you and to the           
court1 as you refuse to answer for      
yourself4 ,there is no      man who ever
 did4 ,but now please to answer the next
      question3 ,can a man believe in   
spiritual and divine agencies1      and 
not in spirits or demigods8        ,he  
cannot4        ,how lucky ,i am to have 
extracted that answer1 by the           
assistance of the court6 ,but then you  
swear in the indictment      that ,i    
teach and believe in divine or spiritual
      agencies 7new or old1 no matter   
for that72 at any rate1 ,i      believe 
in spiritual agencies1--so you say and  
swear in the      affidavit2 and yet if 
,i believe in divine beings1 how can ,i 
help      believing in spirits or       
demigods2--must ,i not8 ,to be sure     
,i must2 and therefore ,i may assume    

that your silence gives      consent4   
,now what are spirits or demigods8 are  
they not      either gods or the sons of
 gods8        ,certainly they are4      
,sidenote3 ,the example of ,achilles4   
,but this is what ,i call the facetious 
riddle invented by      you3 the        
demigods or spirits are gods1 and you   
say first that      ,i do not believe in
 gods1 and then again that ,i do believe
 in      gods2 that is1 if ,i believe in
 demigods4 ,for if the demigods      are
 the illegitimate sons of gods1 whether 
by the nymphs      or by any other      
mothers1 of whom they are said to be the
      sons--what human being will ever  
believe that there are      no gods if  
they are the sons of gods8 ,you might as
 well      affirm the existence of      
mules1 and deny that of horses and      
asses4 ,such nonsense1 ,meletus1 could  
only have been intended      by you to  
make trial of me4 ,you have put this    
into      the indictment because you had
 nothing real of which to      accuse   

me4 ,but no one who has a particle of   
understanding      will ever be         
convinced by you that the same men can  
believe      in divine and superhuman   
things1 and yet not believe that        
there are gods and demigods and heroes4 
#bh        ,i have said enough in answer
 to the charge of ,meletus3      any    
elaborate defence is unnecessary2 but ,i
 know only too      well how many are   
the enmities which ,i have incurred1 and
      this is what will be my           
destruction if ,i am destroyed2--not    
,meletus1 nor yet ,anytus1 but the envy 
and detraction of the      world1 which 
has been the death of many good men1 and
 will      probably be the death of many
 more2 there is no danger of      my    
being the last of them4    ,sidenote3   
,let no man fear death or fear anything 
but disgrace4        ,some one will say3
 ,and are you not ashamed1 ,socrates1 of
      a course of life which is likely  
to bring you to an untimely      end8   
,to him ,i may fairly answer3 ,there you

 are mistaken3      a man who is good   
for anything ought not to calculate the 
chance of living or dying2 he ought only
 to consider whether      in doing      
anything he is doing right or           
wrong--acting the part      of a good   
man or of a bad4 ,whereas1 upon your    
view1 the      heroes who fell at ,troy 
were not good for much1 and the son     
of ,thetis above all1 who altogether    
despised danger in comparison      with 
disgrace2 and when he was so eager to   
slay      ,hector1 his goddess mother   
said to him1 that if he avenged      his
 companion ,patroclus1 and slew ,hector1
 he would die      himself--#8,fate1'   
she said1 in these or the like words1   
#8waits      for you next after         
,hector2' he1 receiving this warning1   
utterly despised danger and death1 and  
instead of fearing      them1 feared    
rather to live in dishonour1 and not to 
avenge      his friend4 #8,let me die   
forthwith1' he replies1 #8and be        
avenged of my enemy1 rather than abide  

here by the beaked      ships1 a        
laughing-stock and a burden of the      
earth4' ,had      ,achilles any thought 
of death and danger8 ,for wherever      
a man's place is1 whether the place     
which he has chosen or      that in     
which he has been placed by a commander1
 there he      ought to remain in the   
hour of danger2 he should not think     
of death or of anything but of disgrace4
 ,and this1 ,o men of      ,athens1 is a
 true saying4    ,sidenote3 ,the motives
 of ,socrates explained by himself4     
,sidenote3 ,socrates1 who has often     
faced death in battle1 will not make    
any condition in order to save his own  
life2 for he does not know whether      
death is a good or an evil4             
,sidenote3 ,he must always be a preacher
 of philosophy4    ,sidenote3           
#8,necessity is laid upon me3' #8,i must
 obey ,god rather than  man4'           
,strange1 indeed1 would be my conduct1  
,o men of ,athens1      if ,i who1 when 
,i was ordered by the generals whom you 

chose to command me at ,potidaea and    
,amphipolis and      ,delium1 remained  
where they placed me1 like any other    
man1      facing death--if now1 when1 as
 ,i conceive and imagine1 ,god          
orders me to fulfil the philosopher's   
mission of searching into      myself   
and other men1 ,i were to desert my post
 through fear         #bi      of death1
 or any other fear2 that would indeed be
 strange1      and ,i might justly be   
arraigned in court for denying the      
existence of the gods1 if ,i disobeyed  
the oracle because ,i was      afraid of
 death1 fancying that ,i was wise when  
,i was not      wise4 ,for the fear of  
death is indeed the pretence of         
wisdom1 and not real wisdom1 being a    
pretence of knowing      the unknown2   
and no one knows whether death1 which   
men      in their fear apprehend to be  
the greatest evil1 may not be      the  
greatest good4 ,is not this ignorance of
 a disgraceful      sort1 the ignorance 
which is the conceit that a man knows   

what he does not know8 ,and in this     
respect only ,i believe      myself to  
differ from men in general1 and may     
perhaps claim      to be wiser than they
 are3--that whereas ,i know but little  
of      the world below1 ,i do not      
suppose that ,i know3 but ,i do         
know that injustice and disobedience to 
a better1 whether      ,god or man1 is  
evil and dishonourable1 and ,i will     
never fear      or avoid a possible good
 rather than a certain evil4 ,and       
therefore if you let me go now1 and are 
not convinced by      ,anytus1 who said 
that since ,i had been prosecuted ,i    
must be      put to death2 7or if not   
that ,i ought never to have been        
prosecuted at all72 and that if ,i      
escape now1 your sons will      all be  
utterly ruined by listening to my       
words--if you say to      me1 ,socrates1
 this time we will not mind ,anytus1 and
 you      shall be let off1 but upon one
 condition1 that you are not to         
enquire and speculate in this way any   

more1 and that if you      are caught   
doing so again you shall die2--if this  
was the      condition on which you let 
me go1 ,i should reply3 ,men of         
,athens1 ,i honour and love you2 but ,i 
shall obey ,god rather      than you1   
and while ,i have life and strength ,i  
shall never      cease from the practice
 and teaching of philosophy1 exhorting  
any one whom ,i meet and saying to him  
after my manner3      ,you1 my          
friend1--a citizen of the great and     
mighty and wise      city of            
,athens1--are you not ashamed of heaping
 up the      greatest amount of money   
and honour and reputation1 and          
caring so little about wisdom and truth 
and the greatest      improvement of the
 soul1 which you never regard or heed at
      all8 ,and if the person with whom 
,i am arguing1 says3      ,yes1 but ,i  
do care2 then ,i do not leave him or let
 him go at      once2 but ,i proceed to 
interrogate and examine and             
cross-examine      him1 and if ,i think 

that he has no virtue in him1 but       
only says that he has1 ,i reproach him  
with undervaluing the      greater1 and 
overvaluing the less4 ,and ,i shall     
repeat the           #cj      same words
 to every one whom ,i meet1 young and   
old1      citizen and alien1 but        
especially to the citizens1 inasmuch as 
they are my brethren4 ,for know that    
this is the command      of ,god2 and ,i
 believe that no greater good has ever  
happened in the state than my service to
 the ,god4 ,for ,i do      nothing but  
go about persuading you all1 old and    
young alike1      not to take thought   
for your persons or your properties1    
but first and chiefly to care about the 
greatest improvement      of the soul4  
,i tell you that virtue is not given by 
money1      but that from virtue comes  
money and every other good      of man1 
public as well as private4 ,this is my  
teaching1      and if this is the       
doctrine which corrupts the youth1 ,i am
      a mischievous person4 ,but if any 

one says that this is not      my       
teaching1 he is speaking an untruth4    
,wherefore1 ,o men      of ,athens1 ,i  
say to you1 do as ,anytus bids or not as
 ,anytus      bids1 and either acquit me
 or not2 but whichever you do1          
understand that ,i shall never alter my 
ways1 not even if ,i      have to die   
many times4    ,sidenote3 ,the          
disinterestedness of ,socrates4         
,sidenote3 ,neither you nor ,meletus can
 ever injure me4        ,men of ,athens1
 do not interrupt1 but hear me2 there   
was      an understanding between us    
that you should hear me to the      end3
 ,i have something more to say1 at which
 you may be      inclined to cry out2   
but ,i believe that to hear me will be  
good for you1 and therefore ,i beg that 
you will not cry out4      ,i would have
 you know1 that if you kill such an one 
as ,i am1      you will injure          
yourselves more than you will injure me4
      ,nothing will injure me1 not      
,meletus nor yet ,anytus--they          

cannot1 for a bad man is not permitted  
to injure a better than      himself4 ,i
 do not deny that ,anytus may1 perhaps1 
kill him1      or drive him into exile1 
or deprive him of civil rights2 and     
he may imagine1 and others may imagine1 
that he is inflicting      a great      
injury upon him3 but there ,i do not    
agree4 ,for the      evil of doing as he
 is doing--the evil of unjustly taking  
away      the life of another--is       
greater far4    ,sidenote3 ,i am the    
gadfly of the ,athenian people1 given to
 them by ,god1  and they will never have
 another1 if they kill me4        ,and  
now1 ,athenians1 ,i am not going to     
argue for my own      sake1 as you may  
think1 but for yours1 that you may not  
sin      against the ,god by condemning 
me1 who am his gift to you4      ,for if
 you kill me you will not easily find a 
successor to me1      who1 if ,i may use
 such a ludicrous figure of speech1 am a
      sort of gadfly1 given to the state
 by ,god2 and the state is      a great 

and noble steed who is tardy in his     
motions owing to      his very size1 and
 requires to be stirred into life4 ,i am
 that      gadfly which ,god has        
attached to the state1 and all day long 
#ca      and in all places am always    
fastening upon you1 arousing and        
persuading and reproaching you4 ,you    
will not easily find      another like  
me1 and therefore ,i would advise you to
 spare      me4 ,i dare say that you may
 feel out of temper 7like a      person 
who is suddenly awakened from sleep71   
and you think      that you might easily
 strike me dead as ,anytus advises1 and 
then you would sleep on for the         
remainder of your lives1 unless         
,god in his care of you sent you another
 gadfly4 ,when      ,i say that ,i am   
given to you by ,god1 the proof of my   
mission      is this3--if ,i had been   
like other men1 ,i should not have      
neglected all my own concerns or        
patiently seen the neglect      of them 
during all these years1 and have been   

doing yours1      coming to you         
individually like a father or elder     
brother1      exhorting you to regard   
virtue2 such conduct1 ,i say1 would     
be unlike human nature4 ,if ,i had      
gained anything1 or if my               
exhortations had been paid1 there would 
have been some      sense in my doing   
so2 but now1 as you will perceive1 not  
even the impudence of my accusers dares 
to say that ,i have      ever exacted or
 sought pay of any one2 of that they    
have no      witness4 ,and ,i have a    
sufficient witness to the truth of what 
,i say--my poverty4    ,sidenote3 ,his  
fearlessness in the performance of      
public duties4    ,sidenote3 ,the       
internal sign always forbade him to     
engage in politics2  and if he had done 
so1 he would have perished long ago4    
,some one may wonder why ,i go about in 
private giving      advice and busying  
myself with the concerns of others1 but 
do not venture to come forward in public
 and advise the      state4 ,i will tell

 you why4 ,you have heard me speak at   
sundry times and in divers places of an 
oracle or sign which      comes to me1  
and is the divinity which ,meletus      
ridicules in      the indictment4 ,this 
sign1 which is a kind of voice1 first   
began to come to me when ,i was a child2
 it always forbids      but never       
commands me to do anything which ,i am  
going to      do4 ,this is what deters  
me from being a politician4 ,and        
rightly1 as ,i think4 ,for ,i am        
certain1 ,o men of ,athens1 that      if
 ,i had engaged in politics1 ,i should  
have perished long ago1      and done no
 good either to you or to myself4 ,and  
do not      be offended at my telling   
you the truth3 for the truth is1 that   
no man who goes to war with you or any  
other multitude1      honestly striving 
against the many lawless and unrighteous
      deeds which are done in a state1  
will save his life2 he who         #cb  
will fight for the right1 if he would   
live even for a brief space1      must  

have a private station and not a public 
one4    ,sidenote3 ,he had shown that he
 would sooner die than commit injustice 
at  the trial of the generals and under 
the tyranny of the ,thirty4        ,i   
can give you convincing evidence of what
 ,i say1 not      words only1 but what  
you value far more--actions4 ,let me    
relate to you a passage of my own life  
which will prove to you      that ,i    
should never have yielded to injustice  
from any fear of      death1 and that   
#8as ,i should have refused to yield' ,i
 must have      died at once4 ,i will   
tell you a tale of the courts1 not very 
interesting perhaps1 but nevertheless   
true4 ,the only office      of state    
which ,i ever held1 ,o men of ,athens1  
was that of      senator3 the tribe     
,antiochis1 which is my tribe1 had the  
presidency      at the trial of the     
generals who had not taken up the       
bodies of the slain after the battle of 
,arginusae2 and you      proposed to try
 them in a body1 contrary to law1 as you

 all      thought afterwards2 but at the
 time ,i was the only one of the        
,prytanes who was opposed to the        
illegality1 and ,i gave my      vote    
against you2 and when the orators       
threatened to impeach      and arrest   
me1 and you called and shouted1 ,i made 
up      my mind that ,i would run the   
risk1 having law and justice      with  
me1 rather than take part in your       
injustice because ,i      feared        
imprisonment and death4 ,this happened  
in the days      of the democracy4 ,but 
when the oligarchy of the ,thirty was   
in power1 they sent for me and four     
others into the rotunda1      and bade  
us bring ,leon the ,salaminian from     
,salamis1 as they      wanted to put him
 to death4 ,this was a specimen of the  
sort      of commands which they were   
always giving with the view of          
implicating as many as possible in their
 crimes2 and then ,i      showed1 not in
 word only but in deed1 that1 if ,i may 
be      allowed to use such an          

expression1 ,i cared not a straw for    
death1 and that my great and only care  
was lest ,i should do      an           
unrighteous or unholy thing4 ,for the   
strong arm of that      oppressive power
 did not frighten me into doing wrong2  
and      when we came out of the rotunda
 the other four went to      ,salamis   
and fetched ,leon1 but ,i went quietly  
home4 ,for      which ,i might have lost
 my life1 had not the power of the      
,thirty shortly afterwards come to an   
end4 ,and many will      witness to my  
words4    ,sidenote3 ,the reason why    
people delight in talking to him4       
,sidenote3 ,he is always talking to the 
citizens1 but he teaches nothing2  he   
takes no pay and has no secrets4        
,sidenote3 ,the parents and kinsmen of  
those whom he is supposed to have       
corrupted do not come forward and       
testify against him4        ,now do you 
really imagine that ,i could have       
survived all      these years1 if ,i had
 led a public life1 supposing that like 

a      good man ,i had always maintained
 the right and had made      justice1 as
 ,i ought1 the first thing8 ,no indeed1 
men of      ,athens1 neither ,i nor any 
other man4 ,but ,i have been            
#cc      always the same in all my      
actions1 public as well as private1     
and never have ,i yielded any base      
compliance to those who      are        
slanderously termed my disciples1 or to 
any other4 ,not      that ,i have any   
regular disciples4 ,but if any one likes
 to      come and hear me while ,i am   
pursuing my mission1 whether      he be 
young or old1 he is not excluded4 ,nor  
do ,i converse      only with those who 
pay2 but any one1 whether he be rich or 
poor1 may ask and answer me and listen  
to my words2 and      whether he turns  
out to be a bad man or a good one1      
neither      result can be justly       
imputed to me2 for ,i never taught or   
professed      to teach him anything4   
,and if any one says that he      has   
ever learned or heard anything from me  

in private which      all the world has 
not heard1 let me tell you that he is   
lying4    ,sidenote3 ,who are his       
accusers8        ,but ,i shall be asked1
 ,why do people delight in continually  
conversing with you8 ,i have told you   
already1 ,athenians1      the whole     
truth about this matter3 they like to   
hear the      cross-examination of the  
pretenders to wisdom2 there is amusement
      in it4 ,now this duty of          
cross-examining other men has been      
imposed upon me by ,god2 and has been   
signified to me by      oracles1        
visions1 and in every way in which the  
will of divine      power was ever      
intimated to any one4 ,this is true1 ,o 
,athenians2 or1 if not true1 would be   
soon refuted4 ,if ,i am or      have    
been corrupting the youth1 those of them
 who are now      grown up and have     
become sensible that ,i gave them bad   
advice in the days of their youth should
 come forward as      accusers1 and take
 their revenge2 or if they do not like  

to      come themselves1 some of their  
relatives1 fathers1 brothers1 or        
other kinsmen1 should say what evil     
their families have      suffered at my 
hands4 ,now is their time4 ,many of them
 ,i      see in the court4 ,there is    
,crito1 who is of the same age and      
of the same deme with myself1 and there 
is ,critobulus his son1      whom ,i    
also see4 ,then again there is ,lysanias
 of ,sphettus1      who is the father of
 ,aeschines--he is present2 and also    
there      is ,antiphon of ,cephisus1   
who is the father of ,epigenes2 and     
there are the brothers of several who   
have associated with me4      ,there is 
,nicostratus the son of ,theosdotides1  
and the brother      of ,theodotus 7now 
,theodotus himself is dead1 and         
therefore      he1 at any rate1 will not
 seek to stop him72 and there is        
,paralus the son of ,demodocus1 who had 
a brother ,theages2      and ,adeimantus
 the son of ,ariston1 whose brother     
,plato is           #cd      present2   

and ,aeantodorus1 who is the brother of 
,apollodorus1      whom ,i also see4 ,i 
might mention a great many others1 some 
of whom ,meletus should have produced as
 witnesses in the      course of his    
speech2 and let him still produce them1 
if he has      forgotten--,i will make  
way for him4 ,and let him say1 if he    
has any testimony of the sort which he  
can produce4 ,nay1      ,athenians1 the 
very opposite is the truth4 ,for all    
these are      ready to witness on      
behalf of the corrupter1 of the injurer 
of      their kindred1 as ,meletus and  
,anytus call me2 not the corrupted      
youth only--there might have been a     
motive for that--but      their         
uncorrupted elder relatives4 ,why should
 they too      support me with their    
testimony8 ,why1 indeed1 except for     
the sake of truth and justice1 and      
because they know that ,i      am       
speaking the truth1 and that ,meletus is
 a liar4    ,sidenote3 ,he will not     
demean himself by entreaties4           

,sidenote3 ,he is flesh and blood1 but  
he will not appeal to the pity of  his  
judges3 or make a scene in the court    
such as he has often witnessed4         
,well1 ,athenians1 this and the like of 
this is all the defence      which ,i   
have to offer4 ,yet a word more4        
,perhaps there      may be some one who 
is offended at me1 when he calls to     
mind how he himself on a similar1 or    
even a less serious      occasion1      
prayed and entreated the judges with    
many tears1      and how he produced his
 children in court1 which was a         
moving spectacle1 together with a host  
of relations and      friends2 whereas  
,i1 who am probably in danger of my     
life1      will do none of these things4
 ,the contrast may occur to his         
mind1 and he may be set against me1 and 
vote in anger      because he is        
displeased at me on this account4 ,now  
if there      be such a person among    
you1--mind1 ,i do not say that there    
is1--to him ,i may fairly reply3 ,my    

friend1 ,i am a man1 and      like other
 men1 a creature of flesh and blood1 and
 not #8of      wood or stone1' as ,homer
 says2 and ,i have a family1 yes1       
and sons1 ,o ,athenians1 three in       
number1 one almost a man1      and two  
others who are still young2 and yet ,i  
will not bring      any of them hither  
in order to petition you for an         
acquittal4      ,and why not8 ,not from 
any self-assertion or want of respect   
for you4 ,whether ,i am or am not afraid
 of death is      another question1 of  
which ,i will not now speak4 ,but1      
having      regard to public opinion1 ,i
 feel that such conduct would be        
discreditable to myself1 and to you1 and
 to the whole state4      ,one who has  
reached my years1 and who has a name for
 wisdom1      ought not to demean       
himself4 ,whether this opinion of       
me be deserved or not1 at any rate the  
world has decided that      ,socrates is
 in some way superior to other men4 ,and
 if those         #ce      among you who

 are said to be superior in wisdom and  
courage1 and any other virtue1 demean   
themselves in this      way1 how        
shameful is their conduct6 ,i have seen 
men of      reputation1 when they have  
been condemned1 behaving in the         
strangest manner3 they seemed to fancy  
that they were going      to suffer     
something dreadful if they died1 and    
that they could      be immortal if you 
only allowed them to live2 and ,i think 
that such are a dishonour to the state1 
and that any stranger      coming in    
would have said of them that the most   
eminent men      of ,athens1 to whom the
 ,athenians themselves give honour      
and command1 are no better than women4  
,and ,i say that      these things ought
 not to be done by those of us who have 
a      reputation2 and if they are done1
 you ought not to permit      them2 you 
ought rather to show that you are far   
more disposed      to condemn the man   
who gets up a doleful scene and makes   
the city ridiculous1 than him who holds 

his peace4    ,sidenote3 ,the judge     
should not be influenced by his         
feelings1 but  convinced by reason4     
,sidenote3 ,the reward which ,socrates  
truly merits4        ,but1 setting aside
 the question of public opinion1 there  
seems to be something wrong in asking a 
favour of a judge1      and thus        
procuring an acquittal1 instead of      
informing and convincing      him4 ,for 
his duty is1 not to make a present of   
justice1      but to give judgment2 and 
he has sworn that he will judge         
according to the laws1 and not according
 to his own good      pleasure2 and we  
ought not to encourage you1 nor should  
you allow yourselves to be encouraged1  
in this habit of perjury--there      can
 be no piety in that4 ,do not then      
require me to      do what ,i consider  
dishonourable and impious and wrong1    
especially now1 when ,i am being tried  
for impiety on the      indictment of   
,meletus4 ,for if1 ,o men of ,athens1 by
 force of      persuasion and entreaty  

,i could overpower your oaths1 then     
,i should be teaching you to believe    
that there are no gods1      and in     
defending should simply convict myself  
of the charge      of not believing in  
them4 ,but that is not so--far          
otherwise4      ,for ,i do believe that 
there are gods1 and in a sense higher   
than that in which any of my accusers   
believe in them4 ,and      to you and to
 ,god ,i commit my cause1 to be         
determined by      you as is best for   
you and me4           99       99       
99       99       99        ,there are  
many reasons why ,i am not grieved1 ,o  
men of      ,athens1 at the vote of     
condemnation4 ,i expected it1 and am    
#cf      only surprised that the votes  
are so nearly equal2 for ,i had         
thought that the majority against me    
would have been far      larger2 but    
now1 had thirty votes gone over to the  
other side1      ,i should have been    
acquitted4 ,and ,i may say1 ,i think1   
that      ,i have escaped ,meletus4 ,i  

may say more2 for without the           
assistance of ,anytus and ,lycon1 any   
one may see that he      would not have 
had a fifth part of the votes1 as the   
law      requires1 in which case he     
would have incurred a fine of a         
thousand drachmae4    ,sidenote3        
,socrates accepts his fate4             
,sidenote3 ,socrates all his life long  
has been seeking to do the greatest     
good to the ,athenians4    ,sidenote3   
,should he not be rewarded with         
maintenance in the ,prytaneum8          
,and so he proposes death as the        
penalty4 ,and what shall      ,i propose
 on my part1 ,o men of ,athens8 ,clearly
 that      which is my due4 ,and what is
 my due8 ,what return shall be      made
 to the man who has never had the wit to
 be idle during      his whole life2 but
 has been careless of what the many care
      for--wealth1 and family interests1
 and military offices1 and      speaking
 in the assembly1 and magistracies1 and 
plots1 and      parties4 ,reflecting    

that ,i was really too honest a man to  
be a politician and live1 ,i did not go 
where ,i could do no      good to you or
 to myself2 but where ,i could do the   
greatest      good privately to every   
one of you1 thither ,i went1 and sought 
to persuade every man among you that he 
must look to himself1      and seek     
virtue and wisdom before he looks to his
 private      interests1 and look to the
 state before he looks to the interests 
of the state2 and that this should be   
the order which he      observes in all 
his actions4 ,what shall be done to such
 an      one8 ,doubtless some good      
thing1 ,o men of ,athens1 if he      has
 his reward2 and the good should be of a
 kind suitable to      him4 ,what would 
be a reward suitable to a poor man who  
is your benefactor1 and who desires     
leisure that he may      instruct you8  
,there can be no reward so fitting as   
maintenance      in the ,prytaneum1 ,o  
men of ,athens1 a reward which      he  
deserves far more than the citizen who  

has won the prize      at ,olympia in   
the horse or chariot race1 whether the  
chariots      were drawn by two horses  
or by many4 ,for ,i am in want1      and
 he has enough2 and he only gives you   
the appearance of      happiness1 and ,i
 give you the reality4 ,and if ,i am to 
estimate      the penalty fairly1 ,i    
should say that maintenance in the      
,prytaneum  #cg      is the just return4
    ,sidenote3 ,the consciousness of    
innocence gives him confidence4         
,sidenote3 ,he has not deserved         
imprisonment4    ,sidenote3 ,and if he  
is exiled1 how wretched will be his     
fate6    ,sidenote3 ,the penalty--death4
    ,sidenote3 ,he cannot be silent1 and
 he will be driven from city to city4   
,perhaps you think that ,i am braving   
you in what ,i am      saying now1 as in
 what ,i said before about the tears and
      prayers4 ,but this is not so4 ,i  
speak rather because ,i am              
convinced that ,i never intentionally   
wronged any one1      although ,i cannot

 convince you--the time has been too    
short2 if there were a law at ,athens1  
as there is in other      cities1 that a
 capital cause should not be decided in 
one      day1 then ,i believe that ,i   
should have convinced you4 ,but      ,i 
cannot in a moment refute great         
slanders2 and1 as ,i am      convinced  
that ,i never wronged another1 ,i will  
assuredly not      wrong myself4 ,i will
 not say of myself that ,i deserve any  
evil1 or propose any penalty4 ,why      
should ,i8 ,because ,i      am afraid of
 the penalty of death which ,meletus    
proposes8      ,when ,i do not know     
whether death is a good or an evil1 why 
should ,i propose a penalty which would 
certainly be an evil8      ,shall ,i say
 imprisonment8 ,and why should ,i live  
in prison1      and be the slave of the 
magistrates of the year--of the ,eleven8
      ,or shall the penalty be a fine1  
and imprisonment until the fine      is 
paid8 ,there is the same objection4 ,i  
should have to lie      in prison1 for  

money ,i have none1 and cannot pay4 ,and
 if ,i      say exile 7and this may     
possibly be the penalty which you will  
affix71 ,i must indeed be blinded by the
 love of life1 if ,i am so              
irrational as to expect that when you1  
who are my own      citizens1 cannot    
endure my discourses and words1 and have
      found them so grievous and odious 
that you will have no      more of them1
 others are likely to endure me4 ,no    
indeed1      men of ,athens1 that is not
 very likely4 ,and what a life          
should ,i lead1 at my age1 wandering    
from city to city1 ever      changing my
 place of exile1 and always being driven
 out6      ,for ,i am quite sure that   
wherever ,i go1 there1 as here1 the     
young men will flock to me2 and if ,i   
drive them away1 their      elders will 
drive me out at their request2 and if ,i
 let them      come1 their fathers and  
friends will drive me out for their     
sakes4    ,sidenote3 ,money he has none1
 or he would propose a fine4 ,his       

friends bid  him offer #cj minae on     
their security4        ,some one will   
say3 ,yes1 ,socrates1 but cannot you    
hold      your tongue1 and then you may 
go into a foreign city1 and no      one 
will interfere with you8 ,now ,i have   
great difficulty in      making you     
understand my answer to this4 ,for if ,i
 tell you      that to do as you say    
would be a disobedience to the ,god1    
and therefore that ,i cannot hold my    
tongue1 you will not      believe that  
,i am serious2 and if ,i say again that 
daily to         #ch      discourse     
about virtue1 and of those other things 
about which      you hear me examining  
myself and others1 is the greatest      
good of man1 and that the unexamined    
life is not worth      living1 you are  
still less likely to believe me4 ,yet ,i
 say what      is true1 although a thing
 of which it is hard for me to persuade 
you4 ,also1 ,i have never been          
accustomed to think that      ,i deserve
 to suffer any harm4 ,had ,i money ,i   

might have      estimated the offence at
 what ,i was able to pay1 and not have  
been much the worse4 ,but ,i have none1 
and therefore ,i      must ask you to   
proportion the fine to my means4 ,well1 
perhaps ,i could afford a mina1 and     
therefore ,i propose that      penalty3 
,plato1 ,crito1 ,critobulus1 and        
,apollodorus1 my      friends here1 bid 
me say thirty minae1 and they will be   
the      sureties4 ,let thirty minae be 
the penalty2 for which sum      they    
will be ample security to you4          
99       99       99       99       99  
,sidenote3 ,they will be accused of     
killing a wise man4    ,sidenote3 ,the  
prophecy of ,socrates4    ,sidenote3    
,why could they not wait a few years8   
,not much time will be gained1 ,o       
,athenians1 in return for      the evil 
name which you will get from the        
detractors of the      city1 who will   
say that you killed ,socrates1 a wise   
man2 for      they will call me wise1   
even although ,i am not wise1 when      

they want to reproach you4 ,if you had  
waited a little while1      your desire 
would have been fulfilled in the course 
of nature4      ,for ,i am far advanced 
in years1 as you may perceive1 and      
not far from death4 ,i am speaking now  
not to all of you1 but      only to     
those who have condemned me to death4   
,and ,i have      another thing to say  
to them3 ,you think that ,i was         
convicted      because ,i had no words  
of the sort which would have procured   
my acquittal--,i mean1 if ,i had thought
 fit to leave      nothing undone or    
unsaid4 ,not so2 the deficiency which   
led to my conviction was not of         
words--certainly not4 ,but ,i      had  
not the boldness or impudence or        
inclination to address      you as you  
would have liked me to do1 weeping and  
wailing      and lamenting1 and saying  
and doing many things which you         
have been accustomed to hear from       
others1 and which1 as ,i      maintain1 
are unworthy of me4 ,i thought at the   

time that ,i      ought not to do       
anything common or mean when in danger3 
nor do ,i now repent of the style of my 
defence2 ,i would      rather die having
 spoken after my manner1 than speak in  
your manner and live4 ,for neither in   
war nor yet at law      ought ,i or any 
man to use every way of escaping death4 
#ci      ,often in battle there can be  
no doubt that if a man will throw       
away his arms1 and fall on his knees    
before his pursuers1      he may escape 
death2 and in other dangers there are   
other      ways of escaping death1 if a 
man is willing to say and do anything4  
,the difficulty1 my friends1 is not to  
avoid death1 but      to avoid          
unrighteousness2 for that runs faster   
than death4 ,i      am old and move     
slowly1 and the slower runner has       
overtaken      me1 and my accusers are  
keen and quick1 and the faster          
runner1 who is unrighteousness1 has     
overtaken them4 ,and      now ,i depart 
hence condemned by you to suffer the    

penalty      of death1--they too go     
their ways condemned by the truth       
to suffer the penalty of villainy and   
wrong2 and ,i must abide      by my     
award--let them abide by theirs4 ,i     
suppose that these      things may be   
regarded as fated1--and ,i think that   
they are      well4    ,sidenote3 ,the  
silence of his familiar spirit4         
,sidenote3 ,they are about to slay      
,socrates because he has been their     
accuser2 other accusers will rise up and
 denounce them more vehemently4         
,and now1 ,o men who have condemned me1 
,i would fain      prophesy to you2 for 
,i am about to die1 and in the hour of  
death men are gifted with prophetic     
power4 ,and ,i prophesy      to you who 
are my murderers1 that immediately after
 my      departure punishment far       
heavier than you have inflicted on      
me will surely await you4 ,me you have  
killed because you      wanted to escape
 the accuser1 and not to give an account
 of      your lives4 ,but that will not 

be as you suppose3 far otherwise4       
,for ,i say that there will be more     
accusers of you than      there are now2
 accusers whom hitherto ,i have         
restrained3      and as they are younger
 they will be more inconsiderate with   
you1 and you will be more offended at   
them4 ,if you think      that by killing
 men you can prevent some one from      
censuring      your evil lives1 you are 
mistaken2 that is not a way of escape   
which is either possible or honourable2 
the easiest and the      noblest way is 
not to be disabling others1 but to be   
improving      yourselves4 ,this is the 
prophecy which ,i utter before my       
departure to the judges who have        
condemned me4    ,sidenote3 ,he believes
 that what is happening to him will be  
good1  because the internal oracle gives
 no sign of opposition4        ,friends1
 who would have acquitted me1 ,i would  
like also      to talk with you about   
the thing which has come to pass1 while 
the magistrates are busy1 and before ,i 

go to the place at      which ,i must   
die4 ,stay then a little1 for we may as 
well talk      with one another while   
there is time4 ,you are my friends1     
#dj      and ,i should like to show you 
the meaning of this event which      has
 happened to me4 ,o my judges--for you  
,i may truly call      judges--,i should
 like to tell you of a wonderful        
circumstance4      ,hitherto the divine 
faculty of which the internal oracle is 
the      source has constantly been in  
the habit of opposing me even      about
 trifles1 if ,i was going to make a slip
 or error in any      matter2 and now as
 you see there has come upon me that    
which may be thought1 and is generally  
believed to be1 the last      and worst 
evil4 ,but the oracle made no sign of   
opposition1      either when ,i was     
leaving my house in the morning1 or when
      ,i was on my way to the court1 or 
while ,i was speaking1 at anything      
which ,i was going to say2 and yet ,i   
have often been      stopped in the     

middle of a speech1 but now in nothing  
,i either      said or did touching the 
matter in hand has the oracle opposed   
me4 ,what do ,i take to be the          
explanation of this silence8      ,i    
will tell you4 ,it is an intimation that
 what has happened      to me is a good1
 and that those of us who think that    
death is      an evil are in error4 ,for
 the customary sign would surely        
have opposed me had ,i been going to    
evil and not to good4    ,sidenote3     
,death either a good or nothing3  a     
profound sleep4    ,sidenote3 ,the      
,homeric heroes4    ,sidenote3 ,how     
blessed to have a just judgment passed  
on us2 to converse  with ,homer and     
,hesiod2 to see the heroes of ,troy1 and
 to continue the  search after knowledge
 in another world6        ,let us       
reflect in another way1 and we shall see
 that there      is great reason to hope
 that death is a good2 for one of two   
things--either death is a state of      
nothingness and utter                   

unconsciousness1 or1 as men say1 there  
is a change and      migration of the   
soul from this world to another4 ,now if
      you suppose that there is no      
consciousness1 but a sleep like      the
 sleep of him who is undisturbed even by
 dreams1 death      will be an          
unspeakable gain4 ,for if a person were 
to select      the night in which his   
sleep was undisturbed even by dreams1   
and were to compare with this the other 
days and nights      of his life1 and   
then were to tell us how many days and  
nights he had passed in the course of   
his life better and      more pleasantly
 than this one1 ,i think that any man1  
,i      will not say a private man1 but 
even the great king will      not find  
many such days or nights1 when compared 
with      the others4 ,now if death be  
of such a nature1 ,i say that to        
die is gain2 for eternity is then only a
 single night4 ,but if      death is the
 journey to another place1 and there1 as
 men say1      all the dead abide1 what 

good1 ,o my friends and judges1      can
 be greater than this8 ,if indeed when  
the pilgrim      arrives in the world   
below1 he is delivered from the         
professors     #da      of justice in   
this world1 and finds the true judges   
who are said to give judgment there1    
,minos and ,rhadamanthus      and       
,aeacus and ,triptolemus1 and other sons
 of      ,god who were righteous in     
their own life1 that pilgrimage         
will be worth making4 ,what would not a 
man give if he      might converse with 
,orpheus and ,musaeus and ,hesiod       
and ,homer8 ,nay1 if this be true1 let  
me die again and      again4 ,i myself1 
too1 shall have a wonderful interest in 
there meeting and conversing with       
,palamedes1 and ,ajax      the son of   
,telamon1 and any other ancient hero who
 has      suffered death through an     
unjust judgment2 and there will      be 
no small pleasure1 as ,i think1 in      
comparing my own      sufferings with   
theirs4 ,above all1 ,i shall then be    

able to      continue my search into    
true and false knowledge2 as in this    
world1 so also in the next2 and ,i shall
 find out who is wise1      and who     
pretends to be wise1 and is not4 ,what  
would not      a man give1 ,o judges1 to
 be able to examine the leader of       
the great ,trojan expedition2 or        
,odysseus or ,sisyphus1 or              
numberless others1 men and women too6   
,what infinite      delight would there 
be in conversing with them and asking   
them questions6 ,in another world they  
do not put a man      to death for      
asking questions3 assuredly not4 ,for   
besides      being happier than we are1 
they will be immortal1 if what is       
said is true4    ,sidenote3 ,the last   
word4        ,wherefore1 ,o judges1 be  
of good cheer about death1 and      know
 of a certainty1 that no evil can happen
 to a good man1      either in life or  
after death4 ,he and his are not        
neglected      by the gods2 nor has my  
own approaching end happened      by    

mere chance4 ,but ,i see clearly that   
the time had arrived      when it was   
better for me to die and be released    
from      trouble2 wherefore the oracle 
gave no sign4 ,for which      reason1   
also1 ,i am not angry with my           
condemners1 or with      my accusers2   
they have done me no harm1 although they
      did not mean to do me any good2   
and for this ,i may gently      blame   
them4    ,sidenote3 ,do to my sons as ,i
 have done to you4        ,still ,i have
 a favour to ask of them4 ,when my sons 
are      grown up1 ,i would ask you1 ,o 
my friends1 to punish them2      and ,i 
would have you trouble them1 as ,i have 
troubled you1      if they seem to care 
about riches1 or anything1 more than    
about virtue2 or if they pretend to be  
something when they      are really     
nothing1--then reprove them1 as ,i have 
reproved      you1 for not caring about 
that for which they ought to care1      
and thinking that they are something    
when they are really      nothing4 ,and 

if you do this1 both ,i and my sons will
 have           #db      received       
justice at your hands4        ,the hour 
of departure has arrived1 and we go our 
ways--,i      to die1 and you to live4  
,which is better ,god only knows4       
,,footnotes    #ad ,or1 ,i am certain   
that ,i am right in taking this course4 
#ae ,aristoph41 ,clouds1 #bbe ff4    #af
 ,probably in allusion to ,aristophanes 
who caricatured1 and to  ,euripides who 
borrowed the notions of ,anaxagoras1 as 
well as to other  dramatic poets4       
,,crito4      ,,introduction4           
,sidenote3 ,crito4    ,sidenote3        
,,introduction4    ,the ,crito seems    
intended to exhibit the character of    
,socrates in one  light only1 not as the
 philosopher1 fulfilling a divine       
mission and  trusting in the will of    
heaven1 but simply as the good citizen1 
who  having been unjustly condemned is  
willing to give up his life in          
obedience to the laws of the state4444  
99       99       99       99       99  

,sidenote3 ,,analysis4        ,the days 
of ,socrates are drawing to a close2 the
 fatal     ,steph4 #dc      ship has    
been seen off ,sunium1 as he is informed
 by his aged      friend and            
contemporary ,crito1 who visits him     
before the dawn has      broken2 he     
himself has been warned in a dream that 
on the      third day he must depart4   
,time is precious1 and ,crito has come  
#dd      early in order to gain his     
consent to a plan of escape4 ,this      
can be easily accomplished by his       
friends1 who will incur no      danger  
in making the attempt to save him1 but  
will be disgraced     #de      for ever 
if they allow him to perish4 ,he should 
think of his      duty to his children1 
and not play into the hands of his      
enemies4      ,money is already provided
 by ,crito as well as by ,simmias and   
others1 and he will have no difficulty  
in finding friends in        #df        
,thessaly and other places4             
,sidenote3 ,analysis #dg-ed4            

,socrates is afraid that ,crito is but  
pressing upon him the      opinions of  
the many3 whereas1 all his life long he 
has followed      the dictates of reason
 only and the opinion of the one wise or
      skilled man4 ,there was a time    
when ,crito himself had allowed      the
 propriety of this4 ,and although some  
one will say #8the many      can kill   
us1' that makes no difference2 but a    
good life1 in other      words1 a just  
and honourable life1 is alone to be     
valued4 ,all      considerations of loss
 of reputation or injury to his children
      should be dismissed3 the only     
question is whether he would be         
right in attempting to escape4 ,crito1  
who is a disinterested        #dg       
person not having the fear of death     
before his eyes1 shall answer      this 
for him4 ,before he was condemned they  
had often held discussions1      in     
which they agreed that no man should    
either do evil1             #dh      or 
return evil for evil1 or betray the     

right4 ,are these principles      to be 
altered because the circumstances of    
,socrates are altered8        ,crito    
admits that they remain the same4 ,then 
is his escape          #di              
consistent with the maintenance of them8
 ,to this ,crito is unable      or      
unwilling to reply4        ,socrates    
proceeds3--,suppose the ,laws of ,athens
 to come               #ej      and     
remonstrate with him3 they will ask     
#8,why does he seek      to overturn    
them8' and if he replies1 #8they have   
injured him1'      will not the ,laws   
answer1 #8,yes1 but was that the        
agreement8      ,has he any objection to
 make to them which would justify him in
     #ea      overturning them8 ,was he 
not brought into the world and educated 
by their help1 and are they not his     
parents8 ,he might               #eb    
have left ,athens and gone where he     
pleased1 but he has lived      there for
 seventy years more constantly than any 
other citizen4'      ,thus he has       

clearly shown that he acknowledged the  
agreement1      which he cannot now     
break without dishonour to himself and  
danger to his friends4 ,even in the     
course of the trial he might      have  
proposed exile as the penalty1 but then 
he declared that he      preferred death
 to exile4 ,and whither will he direct  
his footsteps8      ,in any well-ordered
 state the ,laws will consider him as   
#ec      an enemy4 ,possibly in a land  
of misrule like ,thessaly he may be     
welcomed at first1 and the unseemly     
narrative of his escape will      be    
regarded by the inhabitants as an       
amusing tale4 ,but if he      offends   
them he will have to learn another sort 
of lesson4 ,will      he continue to    
give lectures in virtue8 ,that would    
hardly be      decent4 ,and how will his
 children be the gainers if he takes    
them into ,thessaly1 and deprives them  
of ,athenian citizenship8      #ed      
,or if he leaves them behind1 does he   
expect that they will be      better    

taken care of by his friends because he 
is in ,thessaly8      ,will not true    
friends care for them equally whether he
 is alive      or dead8    ,sidenote3   
,did ,socrates do well to die8          
,finally1 they exhort him to think of   
justice first1 and of life      and     
children afterwards4 ,he may now depart 
in peace and      innocence1 a sufferer 
and not a doer of evil4 ,but if he      
breaks      agreements1 and returns evil
 for evil1 they will be angry with him  
while he lives2 and their brethren the  
,laws of the world below      will      
receive him as an enemy4 ,such is the   
mystic voice which      is always       
murmuring in his ears4           99     
99       99       99       99           
,sidenote3 ,,introduction4    ,that     
,socrates was not a good citizen was a  
charge made against him during  his     
lifetime1 which has been often repeated 
in later ages4 ,the crimes of           
,alcibiades1 ,critias1 and ,charmides1  
who had been his pupils1 were still     

recent in the memory of the now restored
 democracy4 ,the fact that he had  been 
neutral in the death-struggle of ,athens
 was not likely to conciliate  popular  
good-will4 ,plato1 writing probably in  
the next generation1  undertakes the    
defence of his friend and master in this
 particular1 not  to the ,athenians of  
his day1 but to posterity and the world 
at large4    ,whether such an incident  
ever really occurred as the visit of    
,crito and  the proposal of escape is   
uncertain3 ,plato could easily have     
invented  far more than that 7,phaedr4  
#bge ,b72 and in the selection of       
,crito1 the  aged friend1 as the fittest
 person to make the proposal to         
,socrates1 we  seem to recognize the    
hand of the artist4 ,whether any one who
 has been  subjected by the laws of his 
country to an unjust judgment is right  
in  attempting to escape1 is a thesis   
about which casuists might disagree4    
,shelley 7,prose ,works1 p4 #gh7 is of  
opinion that ,socrates #8did well to    

die1' but not for the #8sophistical'    
reasons which ,plato has put into his   
mouth4 ,and there would be no difficulty
 in arguing that ,socrates should  have 
lived and preferred to a glorious death 
the good which he might  still be able  
to perform4 #8,a rhetorician would have 
had much to say upon  that point' 7#ej  
,b74 ,it may be observed however that   
,plato never intended  to answer the    
question of casuistry1 but only to      
exhibit the ideal of  patient virtue    
which refuses to do the least evil in   
order to avoid the  greatest1 and to    
show his master maintaining in death the
 opinions which  he had professed in his
 life4 ,not #8the world1' but the #8one 
wise man1'  is still the paradox of     
,socrates in his last hours4 ,he must be
 guided  by reason1 although her        
conclusions may be fatal to him4 ,the   
remarkable  sentiment that the many can 
do neither good nor evil is true1 if    
taken in  the sense1 which he means1 of 
moral evil2 in his own words1 they      

cannot  make a man wise or foolish4'    
,sidenote3 ,the personification of the  
,laws4    ,this little dialogue is a    
perfect piece of dialectic1 in which    
granting  the #8common principle' 7#di  
,d71 there is no escaping from the      
conclusion4  ,it is anticipated at the  
beginning by the dream of ,socrates and 
the  parody of ,homer4 ,the             
personification of the ,laws1 and of    
their brethren  the ,laws in the world  
below1 is one of the noblest and boldest
 figures of  speech which occur in      
,plato4      ,,crito4    ,,persons ,,of 
,,the ,,dialogue4    ,,socrates4        
,,crito4    ,,scene3--,the ,prison of   
,socrates4    ,sidenote3 ,crito4        
,sidenote3 ,crito appears at break of   
dawn in the prison of ,socrates1 whom   
he finds asleep4        ,socrates4 ,why 
have you come at this hour1 ,crito8 it  
must      be quite early8               
,steph4 #dc        ,crito4 ,yes1        
certainly4        ,soc4 ,what is the    
exact time8        ,cr4 ,the dawn is    

breaking4        ,soc4 ,i wonder that   
the keeper of the prison would let      
you in4        ,cr4 ,he knows me1       
because ,i often come1 ,socrates2       
moreover1      ,i have done him a       
kindness4        ,soc4 ,and are you only
 just arrived8        ,cr4 ,no1 ,i came 
some time ago4        ,soc4 ,then why   
did you sit and say nothing1 instead of 
at      once awakening me8        ,cr4  
,i should not have liked myself1        
,socrates1 to be in such      great     
trouble and unrest as you are--indeed ,i
 should not3 ,i      have been watching 
with amazement your peaceful slumbers2  
and for that reason ,i did not awake    
you1 because ,i wished to      minimize 
the pain4 ,i have always thought you to 
be of a      happy disposition2 but     
never did ,i see anything like the easy1
      tranquil manner in which you bear 
this calamity4        ,soc4 ,why1       
,crito1 when a man has reached my age he
 ought      not to be repining at the   
approach of death4        ,cr4 ,and yet 

other old men find themselves in similar
 misfortunes1      and age does not     
prevent them from repining4             
,sidenote3 ,the vision of ,socrates4    
,soc4 ,that is true4 ,but you have not  
told me why you      come at this early 
hour4        ,cr4 ,i come to bring you a
 message which is sad and painful2      
not1 as ,i believe1 to yourself1 but to 
all of us who are      your friends1 and
 saddest of all to me4    ,sidenote3    
,the ship from ,delos is expected4      
,soc4 ,what8 ,has the ship come from    
,delos1 on the arrival      of which ,i 
am to die8        ,cr4 ,no1 the ship has
 not actually arrived1 but she will     
probably      be here to-day1 as persons
 who have come from ,sunium      tell me
 that they left her there2 and therefore
 to-morrow1 ,socrates1      will be the 
last day of your life4        ,soc4     
,very well1 ,crito2 if such is the will 
of ,god1 ,i am      willing2 but my     
belief is that there will be a delay of 
a day4        ,cr4 ,why do you think so8

                                        
#dd        ,soc4 ,i will tell you4 ,i am
 to die on the day after the arrival    
of the ship4        ,cr4 ,yes2 that is  
what the authorities say4    ,sidenote3 
,a vision of a fair woman who prophesies
 in the language of  ,homer that        
,socrates will die on the third day4    
,soc4 ,but ,i do not think that the ship
 will be here until to-morrow2      this
 ,i infer from a vision which ,i had    
last night1 or      rather only just    
now1 when you fortunately allowed me to 
sleep4        ,cr4 ,and what was the    
nature of the vision8        ,soc4      
,there appeared to me the likeness of a 
woman1 fair      and comely1 clothed in 
bright raiment1 who called to me and    
said3 ,o ,socrates1          #8,the     
third day hence to fertile ,phthia shalt
 thou go#ag4'        ,cr4 ,what a       
singular dream1 ,socrates6        ,soc4 
,there can be no doubt about the        
meaning1 ,crito1 ,i      think4         
,sidenote3 ,the devotion of his friends4

        ,cr4 ,yes2 the meaning is only  
too clear4 ,but1 oh6 my beloved         
,socrates1 let me entreat you once more 
to take my      advice and escape4 ,for 
if you die ,i shall not only lose a     
friend who can never be replaced1 but   
there is another evil3      people who  
do not know you and me will believe that
 ,i might      have saved you if ,i had 
been willing to give money1 but that    
,i did not care4 ,now1 can there be a   
worse disgrace than      this--that ,i  
should be thought to value money more   
than the      life of a friend8 ,for the
 many will not be persuaded that ,i     
wanted you to escape1 and that you      
refused4        ,soc4 ,but why1 my dear 
,crito1 should we care about the        
opinion of the many8 ,good men1 and they
 are the only      persons who are worth
 considering1 will think of these things
      truly as they occurred4           
,sidenote3 ,crito by a variety of       
arguments tries to induce ,socrates to  
make his escape4 ,the means will be     

easily provided and without danger to   
any one4        ,cr4 ,but you see1      
,socrates1 that the opinion of the many 
must be regarded1 for what is now       
happening shows that they      can do   
the greatest evil to any one who has    
lost their good      opinion4           
,soc4 ,i only wish it were so1 ,crito2  
and that the many      could do the     
greatest evil2 for then they would also 
be able      to do the greatest         
good--and what a fine thing this would  
be6      ,but in reality they can do    
neither2 for they cannot make a      man
 either wise or foolish2 and whatever   
they do is the result      of chance4   
,cr4 ,well1 ,i will not dispute with    
you2 but please to tell me1             
,socrates1 whether you are not acting   
out of regard to me and      your other 
friends3 are you not afraid that if you 
escape from      prison we may get into 
trouble with the informers for having   
stolen you away1 and lose either the    
whole or a great part of      our       

property2 or that even a worse evil may 
happen to us8           #de      ,now1  
if you fear on our account1 be at ease2 
for in order to      save you1 we ought 
surely to run this1 or even a greater   
risk2 be persuaded1 then1 and do as ,i  
say4        ,soc4 ,yes1 ,crito1 that is 
one fear which you mention1 but by      
no means the only one4    ,sidenote3    
,the arguments of ,crito4        ,cr4   
,fear not--there are persons who are    
willing to get      you out of prison at
 no great cost2 and as for the          
informers1      they are far from being 
exorbitant in their demands--a little   
money will satisfy them4 ,my means1     
which are certainly      ample1 are at  
your service1 and if you have a scruple 
about      spending all mine1 here are  
strangers who will give you the      use
 of theirs2 and one of them1 ,simmias   
the ,theban1 has      brought a large   
sum of money for this very purpose2 and 
,cebes and many others are prepared to  
spend their money in      helping you to

 escape4 ,i say1 therefore1 do not      
hesitate on      our account1 and do not
 say1 as you did in the court#ah1 that  
you      will have a difficulty in      
knowing what to do with yourself        
anywhere      else4 ,for men will love  
you in other places to which      you   
may go1 and not in ,athens only2 there  
are friends of      mine in ,thessaly1  
if you like to go to them1 who will     
value and      protect you1 and no      
,thessalian will give you any trouble4  
,sidenote3 ,he is not justified in      
throwing away his life2 he will be      
deserting his children1 and will bring  
the reproach of cowardice on his        
friends4        ,nor can ,i think that  
you are at all justified1 ,socrates1 in 
betraying your own life when you might  
be saved2 in acting      thus you are   
playing into the hands of your enemies1 
who      are hurrying on your           
destruction4 ,and further ,i should say 
that you are deserting your own         
children2 for you might      bring them 

up and educate them2 instead of which   
you go      away and leave them1 and    
they will have to take their chance2    
and if they do not meet with the usual  
fate of orphans1 there      will be     
small thanks to you4 ,no man should     
bring children      into the world who  
is unwilling to persevere to the end in 
their nurture and education4 ,but you   
appear to be choosing      the easier   
part1 not the better and manlier1 which 
would have      been more becoming in   
one who professes to care for virtue    
in all his actions1 like yourself4 ,and 
indeed1 ,i am ashamed      not only of  
you1 but of us who are your friends1    
when ,i reflect      that the whole     
business will be attributed entirely to 
our want      of courage4 ,the trial    
need never have come on1 or might       
have been managed differently2 and this 
last act1 or crowning      folly1 will  
seem to have occurred through our       
negligence and      cowardice1 who might
 have saved you1 if we had been good for

        #df      anything2 and you might
 have saved yourself1 for there was     
no difficulty at all4 ,see now1         
,socrates1 how sad and discreditable    
are the consequences1 both to us and    
you4 ,make up      your mind then1 or   
rather have your mind already made up1  
for the time of deliberation is over1   
and there is only one      thing to be  
done1 which must be done this very      
night1 and if      we delay at all will 
be no longer practicable or possible2 ,i
      beseech you therefore1 ,socrates1 
be persuaded by me1 and do      as ,i   
say4    ,sidenote3 ,socrates is one of  
those who must be guided by reason4     
,sidenote3 ,the answer of ,socrates4    
,sidenote3 ,ought he to follow the      
opinion of the many or of the few1 of   
the wise or of the unwise8        ,soc4 
,dear ,crito1 your zeal is invaluable1  
if a right one2 but      if wrong1 the  
greater the zeal the greater the danger2
 and      therefore we ought to consider
 whether ,i shall or shall not do       

as you say4 ,for ,i am and always have  
been one of those      natures who must 
be guided by reason1 whatever the reason
      may be which upon reflection      
appears to me to be the best2      and  
now that this chance has befallen me1 ,i
 cannot repudiate      my own words3 the
 principles which ,i have hitherto      
honoured      and revered ,i still      
honour1 and unless we can at once find  
other and better principles1 ,i am      
certain not to agree with you2      no1 
not even if the power of the multitude  
could inflict many      more            
imprisonments1 confiscations1 deaths1   
frightening us like      children with  
hobgoblin terrors#ai4 ,what will be the 
fairest      way of considering the     
question8 ,shall ,i return to your      
old argument about the opinions of      
men8--we were saying      that some of  
them are to be regarded1 and others not4
      ,now were we right in maintaining 
this before ,i was condemned8      ,and 
has the argument which was once good    

now proved to be talk for the sake of   
talking--mere childish      nonsense8   
,that is what ,i want to consider with  
your help1      ,crito3--whether1 under 
my present circumstances1 the argument  
appears to be in any way different or   
not2 and is to be      allowed by me or 
disallowed4 ,that argument1 which1 as ,i
      believe1 is maintained by many    
persons of authority1 was to      the   
effect1 as ,i was saying1 that the      
opinions of some men are      to be     
regarded1 and of other men not to be    
regarded4 ,now      you1 ,crito1 are not
 going to die to-morrow--at least1 there
 is no    #dg      human probability of 
this--and therefore you are             
disinterested      and not liable to be 
deceived by the circumstances in which  
you are placed4 ,tell me then1 whether  
,i am right in saying      that some    
opinions1 and the opinions of some men  
only1 are to      be valued1 and that   
other opinions1 and the opinions of     
other      men1 are not to be valued4 ,i

 ask you whether ,i was right in        
maintaining this8        ,cr4           
,certainly4        ,soc4 ,the good are  
to be regarded1 and not the bad8        
,cr4 ,yes4        ,soc4 ,and the        
opinions of the wise are good1 and the  
opinions of the unwise are evil8        
,cr4 ,certainly4        ,soc4 ,and what 
was said about another matter8 ,is the  
pupil who devotes himself to the        
practice of gymnastics      supposed to 
attend to the praise and blame and      
opinion of      every man1 or of one man
 only--his physician or trainer1        
whoever he may be8    ,sidenote3 ,first 
principles4        ,cr4 ,of one man     
only4        ,soc4 ,and he ought to fear
 the censure and welcome the      praise
 of that one only1 and not of the many8 
,cr4 ,clearly so4        ,soc4 ,and he  
ought to act and train1 and eat and     
drink in      the way which seems good  
to his single master who has            
understanding1 rather than according to 
the opinion of all      other men put   

together8        ,cr4 ,true4            
,soc4 ,and if he disobeys and disregards
 the opinion and      approval of the   
one1 and regards the opinion of the many
      who have no understanding1 will he
 not suffer evil8        ,cr4 ,certainly
 he will4        ,soc4 ,and what will   
the evil be1 whither tending and what   
affecting1 in the disobedient person8   
,cr4 ,clearly1 affecting the body2 that 
is what is destroyed      by the evil4  
,sidenote3 ,the opinion of the one wise 
man is to be followed4        ,soc4     
,very good2 and is not this true1       
,crito1 of other      things which we   
need not separately enumerate8 ,in      
questions of just and unjust1 fair and  
foul1 good and evil1      which are the 
subjects of our present consultation1   
ought we      to follow the opinion of  
the many and to fear them2 or the       
opinion of the one man who has          
understanding8 ought we      not to fear
 and reverence him more than all the    
rest of the      world3 and if we desert

 him shall we not destroy and injure    
that principle in us which may be       
assumed to be improved      by justice  
and deteriorated by injustice2--there is
 such a      principle8        ,cr4     
,certainly there is1 ,socrates4         
,soc4 ,take a parallel instance3--if1   
acting under the advice      of those   
who have no understanding1 we destroy   
that which      is improved by health   
and is deteriorated by disease1 would   
life be worth having8 ,and that which   
has been destroyed      is--the body8   
,cr4 ,yes4        ,soc4 ,could we live1 
having an evil and corrupted body8      
,cr4 ,certainly not4    ,sidenote3 ,the 
application of them to the present case4
        ,soc4 ,and will life be worth   
having1 if that higher part of      man 
be destroyed1 which is improved by      
justice and depraved      by injustice8 
,do we suppose that principle1 whatever 
it      may be in man1 which has to do  
with justice and injustice1 to       #dh
      be inferior to the body8          

,cr4 ,certainly not4        ,soc4 ,more 
honourable than the body8        ,cr4   
,far more4    ,sidenote3 ,no matter what
 the many say of us4        ,soc4 ,then1
 my friend1 we must not regard what the 
many      say of us3 but what he1 the   
one man who has understanding      of   
just and unjust1 will say1 and what the 
truth will say4      ,and therefore you 
begin in error when you advise that we  
should regard the opinion of the many   
about just and unjust1      good and    
evil1 honourable and                    
dishonourable4--#8,well1'      some one 
will say1 #8but the many can kill us4'  
,cr4 ,yes1 ,socrates2 that will clearly 
be the answer4    ,sidenote3 ,not life1 
but a good life1 to be chiefly valued4  
,soc4 ,and it is true3 but still ,i find
 with surprise that the      old        
argument is unshaken as ever4 ,and ,i   
should like to      know whether ,i may 
say the same of another                 
proposition--that      not life1 but a  
good life1 is to be chiefly valued8     

,cr4 ,yes1 that also remains unshaken4  
,soc4 ,and a good life is equivalent to 
a just and honourable      one--that    
holds also8        ,cr4 ,yes1 it does4  
,sidenote3 ,admitting these principles1 
ought ,i to try and escape or not8      
,soc4 ,from these premisses ,i proceed  
to argue the question      whether ,i   
ought or ought not to try and escape    
without the      consent of the         
,athenians3 and if ,i am clearly right  
in      escaping1 then ,i will make the 
attempt2 but if not1 ,i will            
abstain4 ,the other considerations which
 you mention1 of      money and loss of 
character and the duty of educating     
one's      children1 are1 ,i fear1 only 
the doctrines of the multitude1 who     
would be as ready to restore people to  
life1 if they were able1      as they   
are to put them to death--and with as   
little reason4      ,but now1 since the 
argument has thus far prevailed1 the    
only      question which remains to be  
considered is1 whether we      shall do 

rightly either in escaping or in        
suffering others to      aid in our     
escape and paying them in money and     
thanks1      or whether in reality we   
shall not do rightly2 and if the        
latter1 then death or any other calamity
 which may ensue      on my remaining   
here must not be allowed to enter into  
the      calculation4        ,cr4 ,i    
think that you are right1 ,socrates2 how
 then shall      we proceed8            
,sidenote3 ,first principles4           
,soc4 ,let us consider the matter       
together1 and do you      either refute 
me if you can1 and ,i will be convinced2
 or else      cease1 my dear friend1    
from repeating to me that ,i ought to   
escape against the wishes of the        
,athenians3 for ,i highly      value    
your attempts to persuade me to do so1  
but ,i may not      be persuaded against
 my own better judgment4 ,and now       
please to consider my first position1   
and try how you can           #di       
best answer me4        ,cr4 ,i will4    

,sidenote3 ,may we sometimes do evil    
that good may come8        ,soc4 ,are we
 to say that we are never intentionally 
to do      wrong1 or that in one way we 
ought and in another way we      ought  
not to do wrong1 or is doing wrong      
always evil and      dishonourable1 as  
,i was just now saying1 and as has been 
already acknowledged by us8 ,are all our
 former admissions      which were made 
within a few days to be thrown          
away8 ,and have we1 at our age1 been    
earnestly discoursing      with one     
another all our life long only to       
discover that we      are no better than
 children8 ,or1 in spite of the opinion 
of      the many1 and in spite of       
consequences whether better or          
worse1 shall we insist on the truth of  
what was then said1      that injustice 
is always an evil and dishonour to him  
who      acts unjustly8 ,shall we say so
 or not8        ,cr4 ,yes4        ,soc4 
,then we must do no wrong8        ,cr4  
,certainly not4        ,soc4 ,nor when  

injured injure in return1 as the many   
imagine2 for we must injure no one at   
all#bj8        ,cr4 ,clearly not4       
,soc4 ,again1 ,crito1 may we do evil8   
,cr4 ,surely not1 ,socrates4            
,sidenote3 ,may we render evil for evil8
        ,soc4 ,and what of doing evil in
 return for evil1 which is the          
morality of the many--is that just or   
not8        ,cr4 ,not just4        ,soc4
 ,for doing evil to another is the same 
as injuring      him8        ,cr4 ,very 
true4    ,sidenote3 ,the address of the 
,laws4    ,sidenote3 ,or is evil always 
to be deemed evil8 ,are you of the same 
mind  as formerly about all this8       
,soc4 ,then we ought not to retaliate or
 render evil for evil      to any one1  
whatever evil we may have suffered from 
him4      ,but ,i would have you        
consider1 ,crito1 whether you really    
mean what you are saying4 ,for this     
opinion has never been      held1 and   
never will be held1 by any considerable 
number of      persons2 and those who   

are agreed and those who are not        
agreed upon this point have no common   
ground1 and can      only despise one   
another when they see how widely they   
differ4 ,tell me1 then1 whether you     
agree with and assent to      my first  
principle1 that neither injury nor      
retaliation nor      warding off evil by
 evil is ever right4 ,and shall that be 
the      premiss of our argument8 ,or do
 you decline and dissent      from this8
 ,for so ,i have ever thought1 and      
continue to      think2 but1 if you are 
of another opinion1 let me hear what    
you have to say4 ,if1 however1 you      
remain of the same mind      as         
formerly1 ,i will proceed to the next   
step4    ,sidenote3 ,crito assents4     
,cr4 ,you may proceed1 for ,i have not  
changed my mind4    ,sidenote3 ,then    
ought ,socrates to desert or not8       
,soc4 ,then ,i will go on to the next   
point1 which may be      put in the form
 of a question3--,ought a man to do what
 he      admits to be right1 or ought he

 to betray the right8        ,cr4 ,he   
ought to do what he thinks right4       
,soc4 ,but if this is true1 what is the 
application8 ,in      leaving the prison
 against the will of the ,athenians1 do 
,i          #ej      wrong any8 or      
rather do ,i not wrong those whom ,i    
ought      least to wrong8 ,do ,i not   
desert the principles which were        
acknowledged by us to be just--what do  
you say8        ,cr4 ,i cannot tell1    
,socrates2 for ,i do not know4          
,sidenote3 ,the ,laws come and argue    
with him4--,can a ,state exist in which 
law is set aside8        ,soc4 ,then    
consider the matter in this             
way3--,imagine that      ,i am about to 
play truant 7you may call the proceeding
 by      any name which you like71 and  
the laws and the government      come   
and interrogate me3 #8,tell us1         
,socrates1' they say2      #8what are   
you about8 are you not going by an act  
of yours      to overturn us--the laws1 
and the whole state1 as far as in       

you lies8 ,do you imagine that a state  
can subsist and not      be overthrown1 
in which the decisions of law have no   
power1      but are set aside and       
trampled upon by individuals8' ,what    
will be our answer1 ,crito1 to these and
 the like words8      ,any one1 and     
especially a rhetorician1 will have a   
good deal      to say on behalf of the  
law which requires a sentence to be     
carried out4 ,he will argue that this   
law should not be set      aside2 and   
shall we reply1 #8,yes2 but the state   
has injured us      and given an unjust 
sentence4' ,suppose ,i say that8        
,sidenote3 ,the address of the ,laws4   
,cr4 ,very good1 ,socrates4             
,sidenote3 ,has he any fault to find    
with them8    ,sidenote3 ,no man has any
 right to strike a blow at his country  
any more  than at his father or mother4 
,soc4 #8,and was that our agreement with
 you8' the law      would answer2 #8or  
were you to abide by the sentence of the
      state8' ,and if ,i were to express

 my astonishment at their      words1   
the law would probably add3 #8,answer1  
,socrates1      instead of opening your 
eyes--you are in the habit of asking    
and answering questions4 ,tell          
us1--,what complaint have      you to   
make against us which justifies you in  
attempting to      destroy us and the   
state8 ,in the first place did we not   
bring you into existence8 ,your father  
married your mother      by our aid and 
begat you4 ,say whether you have any    
objection      to urge against those of 
us who regulate marriage8'      ,none1  
,i should reply4 #8,or against those of 
us who after      birth regulate the    
nurture and education of children1 in   
which you also were trained8 ,were not  
the laws1 which      have the charge of 
education1 right in commanding your     
father to train you in music and        
gymnastic8' ,right1 ,i      should      
reply4 ,well then1 since you were       
brought into the      world and nurtured
 and educated by us1 can you deny in the

      first place that you are our child
 and slave1 as your fathers      were   
before you8 ,and1 if this is true you   
are not on equal      terms with us2 nor
 can you think that you have a right to 
do      to us what we are doing to you4 
,would you have any right      to strike
 or revile or do any other evil to your 
father or your      master1 if you had  
one1 because you have been struck or    
reviled by him1 or received some other  
evil at his hands8--you      would not  
say this8 ,and because we think right to
                   #ea      destroy you1
 do you think that you have any right to
 destroy      us in return1 and your    
country as far as in you lies8 ,will    
you1 ,o professor of true virtue1       
pretend that you are justified      in  
this8 ,has a philosopher like you failed
 to discover that      our country is   
more to be valued and higher and holier 
far      than mother or father or any   
ancestor1 and more to be regarded       
in the eyes of the gods and of men of   

understanding8      also to be soothed1 
and gently and reverently entreated when
      angry1 even more than a father1   
and either to be persuaded1      or if  
not persuaded1 to be obeyed8 ,and when  
we are      punished by her1 whether    
with imprisonment or stripes1 the       
punishment is to be endured in silence2 
and if she lead us      to wounds or    
death in battle1 thither we follow as is
 right2      neither may any one yield  
or retreat or leave his rank1 but       
whether in battle or in a court of law1 
or in any other place1      he must do  
what his city and his country order him2
 or he      must change their view of   
what is just3 and if he may do no       
violence to his father or mother1 much  
less may he do      violence to his     
country4' ,what answer shall we make to 
this1 ,crito8 ,do the laws speak truly1 
or do they not8        ,cr4 ,i think    
that they do4    ,sidenote3 #8,listen to
 us1 ,socrates4'    ,sidenote3 ,the     
,laws argue that he has made an implied 

agreement with them  which he is not at 
liberty to break at his pleasure4       
,soc4 ,then the laws will say3          
#8,consider1 ,socrates1 if we      are  
speaking truly that in your present     
attempt you are      going to do us an  
injury4 ,for1 having brought you into   
the world1 and nurtured and educated    
you1 and given you      and every other 
citizen a share in every good which we  
had      to give1 we further proclaim to
 any ,athenian by the liberty      which
 we allow him1 that if he does not like 
us when he has      become of age and   
has seen the ways of the city1 and made 
our acquaintance1 he may go where he    
pleases and take his      goods with    
him4 ,none of us laws will forbid him or
 interfere      with him4 ,any one who  
does not like us and the city1 and      
who wants to emigrate to a colony or to 
any other city1 may      go where he    
likes1 retaining his property4 ,but he  
who has      experience of the manner in
 which we order justice and             

administer the state1 and still remains1
 has entered into an      implied       
contract that he will do as we command  
him4 ,and      he who disobeys us is1 as
 we maintain1 thrice wrong2 first1      
because in disobeying us he is          
disobeying his parents2      secondly1  
because we are the authors of his       
education2      thirdly1 because he has 
made an agreement with us that he       
will duly obey our commands2 and he     
neither obeys them              #eb     
nor convinces us that our commands are  
unjust2 and we do      not rudely impose
 them1 but give him the alternative of  
obeying or convincing us2--that is what 
we offer1 and he      does neither4     
,sidenote3 ,the address of the ,laws4   
#8,these are the sort of accusations to 
which1 as we were      saying1 you1     
,socrates1 will be exposed if you       
accomplish      your intentions2 you1   
above all other ,athenians4' ,suppose   
now ,i ask1 why ,i rather than anybody  
else8 they will      justly retort upon 

me that ,i above all other men have     
acknowledged the agreement4 #8,there is 
clear proof1'      they will say1       
#8,socrates1 that we and the city were  
not displeasing      to you4 ,of all    
,athenians you have been the most       
constant resident in the city1 which1 as
 you never leave1 you      may be       
supposed to love#ba4 ,for you never went
 out of the      city either to see the 
games1 except once when you went to     
the ,isthmus1 or to any other place     
unless when you were on      military   
service2 nor did you travel as other men
 do4 ,nor      had you any curiosity to 
know other states or their laws3        
your affections did not go beyond us and
 our state2 we were      your special   
favourites1 and you acquiesced in our   
government      of you2 and here in this
 city you begat your children1          
which is a proof of your satisfaction4  
,moreover1 you might      in the course 
of the trial1 if you had liked1 have    
fixed the      penalty at banishment2   

the state which refuses to let you go   
now would have let you go then4 ,but you
 pretended that you      preferred death
 to exile#bb1 and that you were not     
unwilling to      die4 ,and now you have
 forgotten these fine sentiments1       
and pay no respect to us the laws1 of   
whom you are the      destroyer2 and are
 doing what only a miserable slave would
      do1 running away and turning your 
back upon the compacts      and         
agreements which you made as a citizen4 
,and first of      all answer this very 
question3 ,are we right in saying that  
you agreed to be governed according to  
us in deed1 and      not in word only8  
,is that true or not8' ,how shall we    
answer1 ,crito8 ,must we not assent8    
,cr4 ,we cannot help it1 ,socrates4     
,sidenote3 ,this agreement he is now    
going to break4        ,soc4 ,then will 
they not say3 #8,you1 ,socrates1 are    
breaking      the covenants and         
agreements which you made with us at    
your leisure1 not in any haste or under 

any compulsion or      deception1 but   
after you have had seventy years to     
think      of them1 during which time   
you were at liberty to leave      the   
city1 if we were not to your mind1 or if
 our covenants      appeared to you to  
be unfair4 ,you had your choice1 and    
might have gone either to ,lacedaemon or
 ,crete1 both which      states are     
often praised by you for their good     
government1      or to some other       
,hellenic or foreign state4 ,whereas    
you1            #ec      above all other
 ,athenians1 seemed to be so fond of the
 state1      or1 in other words1 of us  
her laws 7and who would care about      
a state which has no laws871 that you   
never stirred out of her2      the halt1
 the blind1 the maimed were not more    
stationary      in her than you were4   
,and now you run away and forsake       
your agreements4 ,not so1 ,socrates1 if 
you will take our      advice2 do not   
make yourself ridiculous by escaping out
 of      the city4    ,sidenote3        

#8,listen to us1 ,socrates4'            
,sidenote3 ,if he does he will injure   
his friends and will disgrace  himself4 
#8,for just consider1 if you transgress 
and err in this sort of      way1 what  
good will you do either to yourself or  
to your      friends8 ,that your friends
 will be driven into exile and          
deprived of citizenship1 or will lose   
their property1 is      tolerably       
certain2 and you yourself1 if you fly to
 one of the      neighbouring cities1   
as1 for example1 ,thebes or ,megara1    
both of which are well governed1 will   
come to them as an      enemy1          
,socrates1 and their government will be 
against you1      and all patriotic     
citizens will cast an evil eye upon you 
as      a subverter of the laws1 and you
 will confirm in the minds of      the  
judges the justice of their own         
condemnation of you4      ,for he who is
 a corrupter of the laws is more than   
likely to      be a corrupter of the    
young and foolish portion of mankind4   

,will you then flee from well-ordered   
cities and virtuous      men8 and is    
existence worth having on these terms8  
,or      will you go to them without    
shame1 and talk to them1      ,socrates8
 ,and what will you say to them8 ,what  
you      say here about virtue and      
justice and institutions and laws       
being the best things among men8 ,would 
that be decent      of you8 ,surely not4
 ,but if you go away from well-governed 
states to ,crito's friends in ,thessaly1
 where there      is great disorder and 
licence1 they will be charmed to hear   
the tale of your escape from prison1 set
 off with ludicrous      particulars of 
the manner in which you were wrapped in 
a      goatskin or some other disguise1 
and metamorphosed as the      manner is 
of runaways2 but will there be no one to
 remind      you that in your old age   
you were not ashamed to violate      the
 most sacred laws from a miserable      
desire of a little more      life8      
,perhaps not1 if you keep them in a good

 temper2 but      if they are out of    
temper you will hear many degrading     
things2 you will live1 but how8--as the 
flatterer of all men1      and the      
servant of all men2 and doing           
what8--eating and      drinking in      
,thessaly1 having gone abroad in order  
that you      may get a dinner4 ,and    
where will be your fine sentiments      
about justice and virtue8 ,say that you 
wish to live for the         #ed        
sake of your children--you want to bring
 them up and      educate them--will you
 take them into ,thessaly and deprive   
them of ,athenian citizenship8 ,is this 
the benefit which      you will confer  
upon them8 ,or are you under the        
impression      that they will be better
 cared for and educated      here if you
 are still alive1 although absent from  
them2 for      your friends will take   
care of them8 ,do you fancy that if     
you are an inhabitant of ,thessaly they 
will take care of them1      and if you 
are an inhabitant of the other world    

that they      will not take care of    
them8 ,nay2 but if they who call        
themselves friends are good for         
anything1 they will--to be      sure    
they will4    ,sidenote3 ,there is no   
answer4    ,sidenote3 ,let him think of 
justice first1 and of life and children 
afterwards4        #8,listen1 then1     
,socrates1 to us who have brought you   
up4      ,think not of life and children
 first1 and of justice afterwards1      
but of justice first1 that you may be   
justified before the      princes of the
 world below4 ,for neither will you nor 
any      that belong to you be happier  
or holier or juster in this life1       
or happier in another1 if you do as     
,crito bids4 ,now you      depart in    
innocence1 a sufferer and not a doer of 
evil2 a      victim1 not of the laws but
 of men4 ,but if you go forth1          
returning evil for evil1 and injury for 
injury1 breaking the      covenants and 
agreements which you have made with us1 
and wronging those whom you ought least 

of all to wrong1      that is to say1   
yourself1 your friends1 your country1   
and us1      we shall be angry with you 
while you live1 and our brethren1       
the laws in the world below1 will       
receive you as an enemy2      for they  
will know that you have done your best  
to destroy      us4 ,listen1 then1 to us
 and not to ,crito4'    ,sidenote3 ,the 
mystic voice4        ,this1 dear ,crito1
 is the voice which ,i seem to hear     
murmuring      in my ears1 like the     
sound of the flute in the ears of       
the mystic2 that voice1 ,i say1 is      
humming in my ears1 and      prevents me
 from hearing any other4 ,and ,i know   
that      anything more which you may   
say will be vain4 ,yet speak1      if   
you have anything to say4        ,cr4 ,i
 have nothing to say1 ,socrates4        
,soc4 ,leave me then1 ,crito1 to fulfil 
the will of ,god1 and to      follow    
whither he leads4      ,,footnotes      
#ag ,homer1 ,il4 ix4 #cfc4    #ah ,cp4  
,apol4 #cg ,c1 ,d4    #ai ,cp4 ,apol4   

#cj ,c4    #bj e4 g4 cp4 ,rep4 i4 #cce  
,e4    #ba ,cp4 ,phaedr4 #bcj ,c4    #bb
 ,cp4 ,apol4 #cg ,d4          ,,phaedo4 
,,introduction4    ,sidenote3 ,phaedo4  
,sidenote3 ,,analysis4        ,after an 
interval of some months or years1 and at
 ,phlius1  ,steph4 #eg      a town of   
,peloponnesus1 the tale of the last     
hours of ,socrates      is narrated to  
,echecrates and other ,phliasians by    
,phaedo the      #8beloved disciple4'   
,the ,dialogue necessarily takes the    
form of a      narrative1 because       
,socrates has to be described acting as 
well as   #eh      speaking4 ,the       
minutest particulars of the event are   
interesting      to distant friends1 and
 the narrator has an equal interest in  
them4    ,sidenote3 ,analysis #fj-fd4   
,during the voyage of the sacred ship to
 and from ,delos1 which      has        
occupied thirty days1 the execution of  
,socrates has been      deferred4 7,cp4 
,xen4 ,mem4 iv4 #h4 #b47 ,the time has  
been passed by      him in conversation 

with a select company of disciples4 ,but
 now     #ei      the holy season is    
over1 and the disciples meet earlier    
than usual      in order that they may  
converse with ,socrates for the last    
time4      ,those who were present1 and 
those who might have been      expected 
to be present1 are mentioned by name4   
,there are      ,simmias and ,cebes     
7,crito #de ,b71 two disciples of       
,philolaus whom      ,socrates #8by his 
enchantments has attracted from ,thebes'
 7,mem4      iii4 #aa4 #ag71 ,crito the 
aged friend1 the attendant of the       
prison1 who      is as good as a        
friend--these take part in the          
conversation4      ,there are present   
also1 ,hermogenes1 from whom ,xenophon  
derived his information about the trial 
of ,socrates 7,mem4 iv4 #h4 #d71        
the #8madman' ,apollodorus 7,symp4 #agc 
,d71 ,euclid and ,terpsion      from    
,megara 7cp4 ,theaet4 sub init471       
,ctesippus1 ,antisthenes1               
,menexenus1 and some other less-known   

members of the ,socratic      circle1   
all of whom are silent auditors4        
,aristippus1 ,cleombrotus1      and     
,plato are noted as absent4 ,almost as  
soon as the friends of     #fj          
,socrates enter the prison ,xanthipp and
 her children are sent      home in the 
care of one of ,crito's servants4       
,socrates himself has      just been    
released from chains1 and is led by this
 circumstance to      make the natural  
remark that #8pleasure follows pain4'   
7,observe      that ,plato is preparing 
the way for his doctrine of the         
alternation      of opposites47 #8,aesop
 would have represented them in a fable 
as      a creature with two bodies and a
 single head4' ,the mention of ,aesop   
reminds ,cebes of a question which had  
been asked by ,evenus      the poet 7cp4
 ,apol4 #bj ,a73 #8,why ,socrates1 who  
was not a      poet1 while in prison had
 been putting ,aesop into               
verse8'--#8,because      several times  
in his life he had been warned in dreams

 that         #fa      he should        
practise music2 and as he was about to  
die and was not      certain of what was
 meant1 he wished to fulfil the         
admonition in      the letter as well as
 in the spirit1 by writing verses as    
well as by      cultivating philosophy4 
,tell this to ,evenus2 and say that ,i  
would      have him follow me in death4'
 #8,he is not at all the sort of man to 
comply with your request1 ,socrates4'   
#8,why1 is he not a philosopher8'       
#8,yes4' #8,then he will be willing to  
die1 although he      will not take his 
own life1 for that is held to be        
unlawful4'        ,cebes asks why       
suicide is thought not to be right1 if  
death is to   #fb      be accounted a   
good8 ,well1 7#a7 according to one      
explanation1      because man is a      
prisoner1 who must not open the door of 
his      prison and run away--this is   
the truth in a #8mystery4' ,or 7#b7     
rather1 because he is not his own       
property1 but a possession of      the  

gods1 and has no right to make away with
 that which does      not belong to him4
 ,but why1 asks ,cebes1 if he is a      
possession of      the gods1 should he  
wish to die and leave them8 for he is   
under      their protection2 and surely 
he cannot take better care of himself   
than they take of him4 ,simmias explains
 that ,cebes is really        #fc       
referring to ,socrates1 whom they think 
too unmoved at the      prospect of     
leaving the gods and his friends4       
,socrates answers      that he is going 
to other gods who are wise and good1 and
      perhaps to better friends2 and he 
professes that he is ready to           
defend himself against the charge of    
,cebes4 ,the company shall      be his  
judges1 and he hopes that he will be    
more successful in      convincing them 
than he had been in convincing the      
court4    ,sidenote3 ,analysis #fd-gc4  
,the philosopher desires death--which   
the wicked world will           #fd     
insinuate that he also deserves3 and    

perhaps he does1 but not in      any    
sense which they are capable of         
understanding4 ,enough of      them3 the
 real question is1 ,what is the nature  
of that death      which he desires8    
,death is the separation of soul and    
body--and      the philosopher desires  
such a separation4 ,he would like to    
be freed from the dominion of bodily    
pleasures and of the senses1      which 
are always perturbing his mental vision4
 ,he wants to get      #fe      rid of  
eyes and ears1 and with the light of the
 mind only to      behold the light of  
truth4 ,all the evils and impurities and
      necessities of men come from the  
body4 ,and death separates him from #ff 
these corruptions1 which in life he     
cannot wholly lay aside4 ,why      then 
should he repine when the hour of       
separation arrives8          #fg        
,why1 if he is dead while he lives1     
should he fear that other death1        
through which alone he can behold wisdom
 in her purity8             #fh         

,besides1 the philosopher has notions of
 good and evil unlike      those of     
other men4 ,for they are courageous     
because they are      afraid of greater 
dangers1 and temperate because they     
desire        #fi      greater          
pleasures4 ,but he disdains this        
balancing of pleasures      and pains1  
which is the exchange of commerce and   
not of virtue4      ,all the virtues1   
including wisdom1 are regarded by him   
only as      purifications of the soul4 
,and this was the meaning of the        
founders of the mysteries when they     
said1 #8,many are the wand-bearers      
but few are the mystics4' 7,cp4 ,matt4  
xxii4 #ad3 #8,many are      called1 but 
few are chosen4'7 ,and in the hope that 
he is one of      these mystics1        
,socrates is now departing4 ,this is his
 answer to      any one who charges him 
with indifference at the prospect of    
leaving the gods and his friends4       
,still1 a fear is expressed that the    
soul upon leaving the body      #gj     

may vanish away like smoke or air4      
,socrates in answer appeals      first  
of all to the old ,orphic tradition that
 the souls of the dead      are in the  
world below1 and that the living come   
from them4      ,this he attempts to    
found on a philosophical assumption that
      all opposites--e4 g4 less1        
greater2 weaker1 stronger2 sleeping1    
#ga      waking2 life1 death--are       
generated out of each other4 ,nor can   
the process of generation be only a     
passage from living to dying1      for  
then all would end in death4 ,the       
perpetual sleeper 7,endymion7   #gb     
would be no longer distinguished from   
the rest of      mankind4 ,the circle of
 nature is not complete unless the      
living      come from the dead as well  
as pass to them4    ,sidenote3 ,analysis
 #gc-hj4        ,the ,platonic doctrine 
of reminiscence is then adduced as a    
confirmation of the pre-existence of the
 soul4 ,some proofs of      this        
doctrine are demanded4 ,one proof given 

is the same as that     #gc      of the 
,meno 7#hb foll471 and is derived from  
the latent knowledge of                 
mathematics1 which may be elicited from 
an unlearned person      when a diagram 
is presented to him4 ,again1 there is a 
power of      association1 which from   
seeing ,simmias may remember ,cebes1 or 
from seeing a picture of ,simmias may   
remember ,simmias4 ,the          #gd    
lyre may recall the player of the lyre1 
and equal pieces of wood      or stone  
may be associated with the higher notion
 of absolute      equality4 ,but here   
observe that material equalities fall   
short of      the conception of absolute
 equality with which they are compared1 
and which is the measure of them4 ,and  
the measure or      standard must be    
prior to that which is measured1 the    
idea of       #ge      equality prior to
 the visible equals4 ,and if prior to   
them1 then      prior also to the       
perceptions of the senses which recall  
them1 and      therefore either given   

before birth or at birth4 ,but all men  
have   #gf      not this knowledge1 nor 
have any without a process of           
reminiscence2      which is a proof that
 it is not innate or given at birth1    
unless indeed it was given and taken    
away at the same instant4      ,but if  
not given to men in birth1 it must have 
been given before      birth--this is   
the only alternative which remains4 ,and
 if we had      ideas in a former state1
 then our souls must have existed and   
must have had intelligence in a former  
state4 ,the pre-existence     #gg       
of the soul stands or falls with the    
doctrine of ideas4        ,it is        
objected by ,simmias and ,cebes that    
these arguments only      prove a former
 and not a future existence4 ,socrates  
answers this      objection by recalling
 the previous argument1 in which he had 
shown that the living come from the     
dead4 ,but the fear that the      soul  
at departing may vanish into air        
7especially if there is a wind          

blowing at the time7 has not yet been   
charmed away4 ,he proceeds3    #gh      
,when we fear that the soul will vanish 
away1 let us ask      ourselves what is 
that which we suppose to be liable to   
dissolution8      ,is it the simple or  
the compound1 the unchanging or      the
 changing1 the invisible idea or the    
visible object of sense8      ,clearly  
the latter and not the former2 and      
therefore not the soul1  #gi      which 
in her own pure thought is unchangeable1
 and only when      using the senses    
descends into the region of change4     
,again1 the      soul commands1 the body
 serves3 in this respect too the soul is
     #hj      akin to the divine1 and   
the body to the mortal4 ,and in every   
point of view the soul is the image of  
divinity and immortality1      and the  
body of the human and mortal4 ,and      
whereas the body is      liable to      
speedy dissolution1 the soul is almost  
if not quite      indissoluble4 7,cp4   
,tim4 #da ,a47 ,yet even the body may be

 preserved      for ages by the         
embalmer's art3 how unlikely1 then1 that
 the soul      will perish and be       
dissipated into air while on her way to 
the      good and wise ,god6 ,she has   
been gathered into herself2 holding     
aloof from the body1 and practising     
death all her life long1 and she #ha    
is now finally released from the errors 
and follies and passions of      men1   
and for ever dwells in the company of   
the gods4    ,sidenote3 ,analysis       
#hj-he4        ,but the soul which is   
polluted and engrossed by the corporeal1
      and has no eye except that of the 
senses1 and is weighed down      by the 
bodily appetites1 cannot attain to this 
abstraction4 ,in her      fear of the   
world below she lingers about the       
sepulchre1 loath to      leave the body 
which she loved1 a ghostly apparition1  
saturated      with sense1 and therefore
 visible4 ,at length entering into some 
animal of a nature congenial to her     
former life of sensuality or    #hb     

violence1 she takes the form of an ass1 
a wolf or a kite4 ,and of      these    
earthly souls the happiest are those who
 have practised      virtue without     
philosophy2 they are allowed to pass    
into gentle      and social natures1    
such as bees and ants4 7,cp4 ,rep4 x4   
#fai ,c1      ,meno #ajj ,a47 ,but only 
the philosopher who departs pure is     
permitted to enter the company of the   
gods4 7,cp4 ,phaedrus #bdi47      ,this 
is the reason why he abstains from      
fleshly lusts1 and not      because he  
fears loss or disgrace1 which is the    
motive of other      men4 ,he too has   
been a captive1 and the willing agent of
 his        #hc      own captivity4 ,but
 philosophy has spoken to him1 and he   
has      heard her voice2 she has gently
 entreated him1 and brought him      out
 of the #8miry clay1' and purged away   
the mists of passion and      the       
illusions of sense which envelope him2  
his soul has escaped      from the      
influence of pleasures and pains1 which 

are like nails      fastening her to the
 body4 ,to that prison-house she will   
not        #hd      return2 and         
therefore she abstains from bodily      
pleasures--not      from a desire of    
having more or greater ones1 but because
 she      knows that only when calm and 
free from the dominion of the      body 
can she behold the light of truth4      
,sidenote3 ,analysis #he-ic4            
,simmias and ,cebes remain in doubt2 but
 they are unwilling      to raise       
objections at such a time4 ,socrates    
wonders at their      reluctance4 ,let  
them regard him rather as the swan1 who1
      having sung the praises of ,apollo
 all his life long1 sings at his   #he  
death more lustily than ever4 7,cp4 #fj 
,d47 ,simmias acknowledges      that    
there is cowardice in not probing truth 
to the bottom4      #8,and if truth     
divine and inspired is not to be had1   
then let a man      take the best of    
human notions1 and upon this frail bark 
let him      sail through life4' ,he    

proceeds to state his difficulty3 ,it   
has     #hf      been argued that the   
soul is invisible and incorporeal1 and  
therefore immortal1 and prior to the    
body4 ,but is not the soul              
acknowledged to be a harmony1 and has   
she not the same      relation to the   
body1 as the harmony--which like her is 
invisible--has      to the lyre8 ,and   
yet the harmony does not survive the    
lyre4 ,cebes has also an objection1     
which like ,simmias he expresses      in
 a figure4 ,he is willing to admit that 
the soul is more      lasting than the  
body4 ,but the more lasting nature of   
the soul      #hg      does not prove   
her immortality2 for after having worn  
out many      bodies in a single life1  
and many more in successive births and  
deaths1 she may at last perish1 or1 as  
,socrates afterwards restates      the  
objection1 the very act of birth may be 
the beginning of her      death1 and her
 last body may survive her1 just as the 
coat of an      old weaver is left      

behind him after he is dead1 although a 
man is   #hh      more lasting than his 
coat4 ,and he who would prove the       
immortality      of the soul1 must prove
 not only that the soul outlives        
one or many bodies1 but that she        
outlives them all4        ,the audience1
 like the chorus in a play1 for a moment
 interpret      the feelings of the     
actors2 there is a temporary depression1
 and    #hi      then the enquiry is    
resumed4 ,it is a melancholy reflection 
that      arguments1 like men1 are apt  
to be deceivers2 and those who      have
 been often deceived become distrustful 
both of arguments      and of friends4  
,but this unfortunate experience should 
not make      us either haters of men or
 haters of arguments4 ,the want of      
#ij      health and truth is not in the 
argument1 but in ourselves4             
,socrates1 who is about to die1 is      
sensible of his own weakness2     #ia   
he desires to be impartial1 but he      
cannot help feeling that he has      too

 great an interest in the truth of the  
argument4 ,and therefore      he would  
have his friends examine and refute him1
 if they think      that he is in error4
    ,sidenote3 ,analysis #ic-ih4        
,at his request ,simmias and ,cebes     
repeat their objections4      ,they do  
not go to the length of denying the     
pre-existence of        #ib      ideas4 
,simmias is of opinion that the soul is 
a harmony of the      body4 ,but the    
admission of the pre-existence of ideas1
 and      therefore of the soul1 is at  
variance with this4 7,cp4 a parallel    
difficulty in ,theaet4 #bjc1 #bjd47 ,for
 a harmony is an effect1        #ic     
whereas the soul is not an effect1 but a
 cause2 a harmony follows1      but the 
soul leads2 a harmony admits of degrees1
 and the soul      has no degrees4      
,again1 upon the supposition that the   
soul is      a harmony1 why is one soul 
better than another8 ,are they more     
or less harmonized1 or is there one     
harmony within another8      ,but the   

soul does not admit of degrees1 and     
cannot therefore be     #id      more or
 less harmonized4 ,further1 the soul is 
often engaged in      resisting the     
affections of the body1 as ,homer       
describes ,odysseus      rebuking his   
heart4' ,could he have written this     
under the idea      #ie      that the   
soul is a harmony of the body8 ,nay     
rather1 are we not      contradicting   
,homer and ourselves in affirming       
anything of the      sort8        ,the  
goddess ,harmonia1 as ,socrates         
playfully terms the argument      of    
,simmias1 has been happily disposed of2 
and now an      answer has to be given  
to the ,theban ,cadmus4 ,socrates       
recapitulates      the argument of      
,cebes1 which1 as he remarks1 involves  
#if      the whole question of natural  
growth or causation2 about this he      
proposes to narrate his own mental      
experience4 ,when he was      young he  
had puzzled himself with physics3 he had
 enquired      into the growth and decay

 of animals1 and the origin of thought1 
until at last he began to doubt the     
self-evident fact that growth      is   
the result of eating and drinking2 and  
so he arrived at the      conclusion    
that he was not meant for such          
enquiries4 ,nor was      he less        
perplexed with notions of comparison and
 number4 ,at      first he had imagined 
himself to understand differences of    
greater      and less1 and to know that 
ten is two more than eight1 and the     
like4 ,but now those very notions       
appeared to him to contain a            
contradiction4 ,for how can one be      
divided into two8 or two be       #ig   
compounded into one8 ,these are         
difficulties which ,socrates      cannot
 answer4 ,of generation and destruction 
he knows nothing4      ,but he has a    
confused notion of another method in    
which matters      of this sort are to  
be investigated4 7,cp4 ,rep4 iv4 #dce   
,d2 vii4      #ecc ,a2 ,charm4 #agj     
foll47    ,sidenote3 ,analysis #ih-ajb4 

,then he heard some one reading out of a
 book of ,anaxagoras1      that mind is 
the cause of all things4 ,and he said to
 himself3 ,if      mind is the cause of 
all things1 surely mind must dispose    
them all      for the best4 ,the new    
teacher will show me this #8order of the
       #ih      best' in man and nature4
 ,how great had been his hopes and how  
great his disappointment6 ,for he found 
that his new friend was      anything   
but consistent in his use of mind as a  
cause1 and that he      soon introduced 
winds1 waters1 and other eccentric      
notions4 7,cp4      ,arist4 ,metaph4 i4 
#d1 #e47 ,it was as if a person had said
 that ,socrates      is sitting here    
because he is made up of bones and      
muscles1         #ii      instead of    
telling the true reason--that he is here
 because the      ,athenians have       
thought good to sentence him to death1  
and he has      thought good to await   
his sentence4 ,had his bones and muscles
      been left by him to their own     

ideas of right1 they would long ago     
have taken themselves off4 ,but surely  
there is a great confusion      of the  
cause and condition in all this4 ,and   
this confusion also      leads people   
into all sorts of erroneous theories    
about the position      and motions of  
the earth4 ,none of them know how much  
stronger      than any ,atlas is the    
power of the best4 ,but this #8best' is 
still      undiscovered2 and in         
enquiring after the cause1 we can only  
hope      to attain the second best4    
,now there is a danger in the           
contemplation of the nature of things1  
as there is a danger in looking at the  
sun during an eclipse1      #ajj        
unless the precaution is taken of       
looking only at the image reflected     
in the water1 or in a glass4 7,cp4 ,laws
 x4 #hig ,d2 ,rep4 vii4 #eaf foll47     
#8,i was afraid1' says ,socrates1 #8that
 ,i might injure the eye of the         
soul4 ,i thought that ,i had better     
return to the old and safe method       

of ideas4 ,though ,i do not mean to say 
that he who contemplates      existence 
through the medium of ideas sees only   
through a glass      darkly1 any more   
than he who contemplates actual         
effects4'        ,if the existence of   
ideas is granted to him1 ,socrates is of
 opinion      that he will then have no 
difficulty in proving the immortality of
      the soul4 ,he will only ask for a 
further admission3--that beauty      is 
the cause of the beautiful1 greatness   
the cause of the great1      smallness  
of the small1 and so on of other things4
 ,this is a safe  #aja      and simple  
answer1 which escapes the contradictions
 of greater      and less 7greater by   
reason of that which is smaller671 of   
addition      and subtraction1 and the  
other difficulties of relation4 ,these  
subtleties he is for leaving to wiser   
heads than his own2 he prefers      to  
test ideas by the consistency of their  
consequences1 and1 if      asked to give
 an account of them1 goes back to some  

higher idea or      hypothesis which    
appears to him to be the best1 until at 
last he      arrives at a resting-place4
 7,rep4 vi4 #eaj foll42 ,phil4 #af      
foll47    ,sidenote3 ,analysis #ajb-ajg4
        ,the doctrine of ideas1 which   
has long ago received the assent of     
#ajb      the ,socratic circle1 is now  
affirmed by the ,phliasian auditor to   
command the assent of any man of sense4 
,the narrative is continued2            
,socrates is desirous of explaining how 
opposite ideas may      appear to       
co-exist but do not really co-exist in  
the same thing or      person4 ,for     
example1 ,simmias may be said to have   
greatness      and also smallness1      
because he is greater than ,socrates and
 less      than ,phaedo4 ,and yet       
,simmias is not really great and also   
small1      but only when compared to   
,phaedo and ,socrates4 ,i use the       
illustration1 says ,socrates1 because ,i
 want to show you not only      that    
ideal opposites exclude one another1 but

 also the opposites in      us4 ,i1 for 
example1 having the attribute of        
smallness remain small1      and cannot 
become great3 the smallness which is in 
me drives out      greatness4           
#ajc        ,one of the company here    
remarked that this was inconsistent     
with the old assertion that opposites   
generated opposites4 ,but      that1    
replies ,socrates1 was affirmed1 not of 
opposite ideas either in      us or in  
nature1 but of opposition in the        
concrete--not of life and      death1   
but of individuals living and dying4    
,when this objection      has been      
removed1 ,socrates proceeds3 ,this      
doctrine of the mutual      exclusion of
 opposites is not only true of the      
opposites themselves1      but of things
 which are inseparable from them4 ,for  
example1      cold and heat are opposed2
 and fire1 which is inseparable from    
heat1 cannot co-exist with cold1 or     
snow1 which is inseparable      from    
cold1 with heat4 ,again1 the number     

three excludes the      number four1    
because three is an odd number and four 
is an even      number1 and the odd is  
opposed to the even4 ,thus we are able  
to    #ajd      proceed a step beyond   
#8the safe and simple answer4' ,we may  
say1 not only that the odd excludes the 
even1 but that the number      three1   
which participates in oddness1 excludes 
the even4 ,and in    #aje      like     
manner1 not only does life exclude      
death1 but the soul1 of      which life 
is the inseparable attribute1 also      
excludes death4 ,and      that of which 
life is the inseparable attribute is by 
the force of the      terms             
imperishable4 ,if the odd principle were
 imperishable1 then   #ajf      the     
number three would not perish but       
remove1 on the approach      of the even
 principle4 ,but the immortal is        
imperishable2 and      therefore the    
soul on the approach of death does not  
perish but      removes4        ,thus   
all objections appear to be finally     

silenced4 ,and now the     #ajg         
application has to be made3 ,if the soul
 is immortal1 #8what manner      of     
persons ought we to be8' having regard  
not only to time but to      eternity4  
,for death is not the end of all1 and   
the wicked is not      released from his
 evil by death2 but every one carries   
with him      into the world below that 
which he is or has become1 and that     
only4    ,sidenote3 ,analysis #ajg-aab4 
,for after death the soul is carried    
away to judgment1 and when      she has 
received her punishment returns to earth
 in the course of      ages4 ,the wise  
soul is conscious of her situation1 and 
follows the #ajh      attendant angel   
who guides her through the windings of  
the world      below2 but the impure    
soul wanders hither and thither without 
companion or guide1 and is carried at   
last to her own place1 as the      pure 
soul is also carried away to hers4 #8,in
 order that you may      understand     
this1 ,i must first describe to you the 

nature and      conformation of the     
earth4'        ,now the whole earth is a
 globe placed in the centre of the      
heavens1 and is maintained there by the 
perfection of balance4     #aji         
,that which we call the earth is only   
one of many small hollows1      wherein 
collect the mists and waters and the    
thick lower air2 but      the true earth
 is above1 and is in a finer and subtler
 element4      ,and if1 like birds1 we  
could fly to the surface of the air1 in 
the      same manner that fishes come to
 the top of the sea1 then we should     
behold the true earth and the true      
heaven and the true stars4 ,our  #aaj   
earth is everywhere corrupted and       
corroded2 and even the land1      which 
is fairer than the sea1 for that is a   
mere chaos or waste of      water and   
mud and sand1 has nothing to show in    
comparison of      the other world4 ,but
 the heavenly earth is of divers        
colours1      sparkling with jewels     
brighter than gold and whiter than any  

snow1      having flowers and fruits    
innumerable4 ,and the inhabitants       
#aaa      dwell some on the shore of the
 sea of air1 others in #8islets of the  
blest1' and they hold converse with the 
gods1 and behold the sun1      moon and 
stars as they truly are1 and their other
 blessedness is of      a piece with    
this4    ,sidenote3 ,analysis #aab-aaf4 
,the hollows on the surface of the globe
 vary in size and shape      from that  
which we inhabit3 but all are connected 
by passages      and perforations in the
 interior of the earth4 ,and there is   
one      huge chasm or opening called   
,tartarus1 into which streams of fire   
and water and liquid mud are ever       
flowing2 of these small portions        
find their way to the surface and form  
seas and rivers and         #aab        
volcanoes4 ,there is a perpetual        
inhalation and exhalation of the        
air rising and falling as the waters    
pass into the depths of the      earth  
and return again1 in their course       

forming lakes and rivers1      but never
 descending below the centre of the     
earth2 for on either      side the      
rivers flowing either way are stopped by
 a precipice4      ,these rivers are    
many and mighty1 and there are four     
principal      ones1 ,oceanus1 ,acheron1
 ,pyriphlegethon1 and ,cocytus4 ,oceanus
      is the river which encircles the  
earth2 ,acheron takes an opposite       
direction1 and after flowing under the  
earth through desert places1      at    
last reaches the ,acherusian lake1--this
 is the river at which the #aac         
souls of the dead await their return to 
earth4 ,pyriphlegethon is a      stream 
of fire1 which coils round the earth and
 flows into the      depths of          
,tartarus4 ,the fourth river1 ,cocytus1 
is that which is      called by the     
poets the ,stygian river1 and passes    
into and forms the      lake ,styx1 from
 the waters of which it gains new and   
strange      powers4 ,this river1 too1  
falls into ,tartarus4        ,the dead  

are first of all judged according to    
their deeds1 and      those who are     
incurable are thrust into ,tartarus1    
from which they      never come out4    
,those who have only committed venial   
sins are      first purified of them1   
and then rewarded for the good which    
they      have done4 ,those who have    
committed crimes1 great indeed1 but     
#aad      not unpardonable1 are thrust  
into ,tartarus1 but are cast forth at   
the end of a year by way of             
,pyriphlegethon or ,cocytus1 and these  
carry them as far as the ,acherusian    
lake1 where they call upon      their   
victims to let them come out of the     
rivers into the lake4 ,and      if they 
prevail1 then they are let out and their
 sufferings cease3 if      not1 they are
 borne unceasingly into ,tartarus and   
back again1      until they at last     
obtain mercy4 ,the pure souls also      
receive their      reward1 and have     
their abode in the upper earth1 and a   
select few      in still fairer         

#8mansions4'        ,socrates is not    
prepared to insist on the literal       
accuracy of this      description1 but  
he is confident that something of the   
kind is true4      ,he who has sought   
after the pleasures of knowledge and    
rejected      the pleasures of the body1
 has reason to be of good hope at the   
approach of death2 whose voice is       
already speaking to him1 and      who   
will one day be heard calling all men4  
,sidenote3 ,analysis #aag-aah4          
,the hour has come at which he must     
drink the poison1 and not       #aae    
much remains to be done4 ,how shall they
 bury him8 ,that is a      question     
which he refuses to entertain1 for they 
are burying1 not      him1 but his dead 
body4 ,his friends had once been        
sureties that    #aaf      he would     
remain1 and they shall now be sureties  
that he has run      away4 ,yet he would
 not die without the customary          
ceremonies of      washing and burial4  
,shall he make a libation of the poison8

 ,in     #aag      the spirit he will1  
but not in the letter4 ,one request he  
utters in      the very act of death1   
which has been a puzzle to after ages4  
,with      a sort of irony he remembers 
that a trifling religious duty is       
#aah      still unfulfilled1 just as    
above 7#fj ,e7 he desires before he     
departs to compose a few verses in order
 to satisfy a scruple about      a      
dream--unless1 indeed1 we suppose him to
 mean1 that he was now      restored to 
health1 and made the customary offering 
to ,asclepius      in token of his      
recovery4           99       99       99
       99       99    ,sidenote3        
,,introduction4    #a4 ,the doctrine of 
the immortality of the soul has sunk    
deep into the  heart of the human race2 
and men are apt to rebel against any    
examination  of the nature or grounds of
 their belief4 ,they do not like to     
acknowledge  that this1 as well as the  
other #8eternal ideas' of man1 has a    
history  in time1 which may be traced in

 ,greek poetry or philosophy1 and also  
in  the ,hebrew ,scriptures4 ,they      
convert feeling into reasoning1 and     
throw a  network of dialectics over that
 which is really a deeply-rooted        
instinct4  ,in the same temper which    
,socrates reproves in himself 7#ia ,b7  
they are  disposed to think that even   
fallacies will do no harm1 for they will
  die with them1 and while they live    
they will gain by the delusion4 ,and    
when they consider the numberless bad   
arguments which have been pressed  into 
the service of theology1 they say1 like 
the companions of ,socrates1  #8,what   
argument can we ever trust again8' ,but 
there is a better and higher  spirit to 
be gathered from the ,phaedo1 as well as
 from the other writings  of ,plato1    
which says that first principles should 
be most constantly  reviewed 7,phaedo   
#ajg ,b1 and ,crat4 #dcf71 and that the 
highest subjects  demand of us the      
greatest accuracy 7,rep4 vi4 #ejd ,e72  
also that we must  not become           

misologists because arguments are apt to
 be deceivers4    ,sidenote3 ,the       
immortality of the soul4    #b4 ,in     
former ages there was a customary rather
 than a reasoned belief in  the         
immortality of the soul4 ,it was based  
on the authority of the ,church1  on the
 necessity of such a belief to morality 
and the order of society1  on the       
evidence of an historical fact1 and also
 on analogies and figures  of speech    
which filled up the void or gave an     
expression in words to a  cherished     
instinct4 ,the mass of mankind went on  
their way busy with the  affairs of this
 life1 hardly stopping to think about   
another4 ,but in our  own day the       
question has been reopened1 and it is   
doubtful whether the  belief which in   
the first ages of ,christianity was the 
strongest motive  of action can survive 
the conflict with a scientific age in   
which the  rules of evidence are        
stricter and the mind has become more   
sensitive  to criticism4 ,it has faded  

into the distance by a natural process  
as it  was removed further and further  
from the historical fact on which it has
  been supposed to rest4 ,arguments     
derived from material things such as the
  seed and the ear of corn or           
transitions in the life of animals from 
one  state of being to another 7the     
chrysalis and the butterfly7 are not    
#8in  pari materia' with arguments from 
the visible to the invisible1 and are   
therefore felt to be no longer          
applicable4 ,the evidence to the        
historical  fact seems to be weaker than
 was once supposed3 it is not consistent
 with  itself1 and is based upon        
documents which are of unknown origin4  
,the  immortality of man must be proved 
by other arguments than these if it  is 
again to become a living belief4 ,we    
must ask ourselves afresh why we  still 
maintain it1 and seek to discover a     
foundation for it in the nature  of ,god
 and in the first principles of         
morality4    #c4 ,at the outset of the  

discussion we may clear away a          
confusion4 ,we  certainly do not mean by
 the immortality of the soul the        
immortality of  fame1 which whether     
worth having or not can only be ascribed
 to a very  select class of the whole   
race of mankind1 and even the interest  
in these  few is comparatively          
short-lived4 ,to have been a benefactor 
to the world1  whether in a higher or a 
lower sphere of life and thought1 is a  
great  thing3 to have the reputation of 
being one1 when men have passed out of  
the sphere of earthly praise or blame1  
is hardly worthy of consideration4  ,the
 memory of a great man1 so far from     
being immortal1 is really limited  to   
his own generation3--so long as his     
friends or his disciples are alive1  so 
long as his books continue to be read1  
so long as his political or  military   
successes fill a page in the history of 
his country4 ,the praises  which are    
bestowed upon him at his death hardly   
last longer than the  flowers which are 

strewed upon his coffin or the          
#8immortelles' which are  laid upon his 
tomb4 ,literature makes the most of its 
heroes1 but the true  man is well aware 
that far from enjoying an immortality of
 fame1 in a  generation or two1 or even 
in a much shorter time1 he will be      
forgotten  and the world will get on    
without him4    ,sidenote3 ,the         
immortality of the soul4    #d4 ,modern 
philosophy is perplexed at this whole   
question1 which is  sometimes fairly    
given up and handed over to the realm of
 faith4 ,the  perplexity should not be  
forgotten by us when we attempt to      
submit the  ,phaedo of ,plato to the    
requirements of logic4 ,for what idea   
can we form  of the soul when separated 
from the body8 ,or how can the soul be  
united  with the body and still be      
independent8 ,is the soul related to the
 body  as the ideal to the real1 or as  
the whole to the parts1 or as the       
subject  to the object1 or as the cause 
to the effect1 or as the end to the     

means8  ,shall we say with ,aristotle1  
that the soul is the entelechy or form  
of  an organized living body8 or with   
,plato1 that she has a life of her own8 
,is the ,pythagorean image of the       
harmony1 or that of the monad1 the truer
  expression8 ,is the soul related to   
the body as sight to the eye1 or as  the
 boatman to his boat8 7,arist4 de ,anim4
 ii4 #a1 #aa1 #ab47 ,and in another     
state of being is the soul to be        
conceived of as vanishing into infinity1
  hardly possessing an existence which  
she can call her own1 as in the         
pantheistic system of ,spinoza8 or as an
 individual informing another  body and 
entering into new relations1 but        
retaining her own character8  7,cp4     
,gorgias1 #ebd ,b1 ,c47 ,or is the      
opposition of soul and body a mere      
illusion1 and the true self neither soul
 nor body1 but the union of the  two in 
the #8,i' which is above them8 ,and is  
death the assertion of this             
individuality in the higher nature1 and 

the falling away into nothingness  of   
the lower8 ,or are we vainly attempting 
to pass the boundaries of human         
thought8 ,the body and the soul seem to 
be inseparable1 not only in fact1  but  
in our conceptions of them2 and any     
philosophy which too closely  unites    
them1 or too widely separates them1     
either in this life or in  another1     
disturbs the balance of human nature4   
,no thinker has perfectly  adjusted     
them1 or been entirely consistent with  
himself in describing  their relation to
 one another4 ,nor can we wonder that   
,plato in the  infancy of human thought 
should have confused mythology and      
philosophy1  or have mistaken verbal    
arguments for real ones4    ,sidenote3  
,the immortality of the soul4    #e4    
,again1 believing in the immortality of 
the soul1 we must still ask the         
question of ,socrates1 #8,what is that  
which we suppose to be immortal8'  ,is  
it the personal and individual element  
in us1 or the spiritual and  universal8 

,is it the principle of knowledge or of 
goodness1 or the union  of the two8 ,is 
it the mere force of life which is      
determined to be1 or  the consciousness 
of self which cannot be got rid of1 or  
the fire of  genius which refuses to be 
extinguished8 ,or is there a hidden     
being  which is allied to the ,author of
 all existence1 who is because he is    
perfect1 and to whom our ideas of       
perfection give us a title to belong8   
,whatever answer is given by us to these
 questions1 there still remains  the    
necessity of allowing the permanence of 
evil1 if not for ever1 at  any rate for 
a time1 in order that the wicked #8may  
not have too good a  bargain4' ,for the 
annihilation of evil at death1 or the   
eternal duration  of it1 seem to involve
 equal difficulties in the moral        
government of  the universe4 ,sometimes 
we are led by our feelings1 rather than 
by our  reason1 to think of the good and
 wise only as existing in another life4 
,why should the mean1 the weak1 the     

idiot1 the infant1 the herd of men  who 
have never in any proper sense the use  
of reason1 reappear with  blinking eyes 
in the light of another world8 ,but our 
second thought is  that the hope of     
humanity is a common one1 and that all  
or none will be  partakers of           
immortality4 ,reason does not allow us  
to suppose that we  have any greater    
claims than others1 and experience may  
often reveal  to us unexpected flashes  
of the higher nature in those whom we   
had  despised4 ,why should the wicked   
suffer any more than ourselves8 had we  
been placed in their circumstances      
should we have been any better than     
they8 ,the worst of men are objects of  
pity rather than of anger to the        
philanthropist2 must they not be equally
 such to divine benevolence8  ,even more
 than the good they have need of another
 life2 not that they  may be punished1  
but that they may be educated4 ,these   
are a few of the  reflections which     
arise in our minds when we attempt to   

assign any form  to our conceptions of a
 future state4    ,there are some other 
questions which are disturbing to us    
because we  have no answer to them4     
,what is to become of the animals in a  
future  state8 ,have we not seen dogs   
more faithful and intelligent than men1 
and men who are more stupid and brutal  
than any animals8 ,does their  life     
cease at death1 or is there some        
#8better thing reserved' also for  them8
 ,they may be said to have a shadow or  
imitation of morality1 and  imperfect   
moral claims upon the benevolence of man
 and upon the justice  of ,god4 ,we     
cannot think of the least or lowest of  
them1 the insect1 the  bird1 the        
inhabitants of the sea or the desert1 as
 having any place  in a future world1   
and if not all1 why should those who are
 specially  attached to man be deemed   
worthy of any exceptional privilege8    
,when we  reason about such a subject1  
almost at once we degenerate into       
nonsense4  ,it is a passing thought     

which has no real hold on the mind4 ,we 
may argue  for the existence of animals 
in a future state from the attributes of
  ,god1 or from texts of ,scripture     
7#8,are not two sparrows sold for one   
farthing8' c471 but the truth is that we
 are only filling up the void  of       
another world with our own fancies4     
,again1 we often talk about the  origin 
of evil1 that great bugbear of          
theologians1 by which they frighten  us 
into believing any superstition4 ,what  
answer can be made to the old           
commonplace1 #8,is not ,god the author  
of evil1 if he knowingly permitted1  but
 could have prevented it8' ,even if we  
assume that the inequalities of  this   
life are rectified by some transposition
 of human beings in another1  still the 
existence of the very least evil if it  
could have been avoided1  seems to be at
 variance with the love and justice of  
,god4 ,and so we  arrive at the         
conclusion that we are carrying logic   
too far1 and that  the attempt to frame 

the world according to a rule of divine 
perfection  is opposed to experience and
 had better be given up4 ,the case of   
the  animals is our own4 ,we must admit 
that the ,divine ,being1 although       
perfect  himself1 has placed us in a    
state of life in which we may work      
together  with him for good1 but we are 
very far from having attained to it4    
,sidenote3 ,the immortality of the soul4
    #f4 ,again1 ideas must be given     
through something2 and we are always    
prone to argue about the soul from      
analogies of outward things which  may  
serve to embody our thoughts1 but are   
also partly delusive4 ,for we  cannot   
reason from the natural to the          
spiritual1 or from the outward  to the  
inward4 ,the progress of physiological  
science1 without bringing  us nearer to 
the great secret1 has tended to remove  
some erroneous  notions respecting the  
relations of body and mind1 and in this 
we have  the advantage of the ancients4 
,but no one imagines that any seed of   

immortality is to be discerned in our   
mortal frames4 ,most people have  been  
content to rest their belief in another 
life on the agreement of  the more      
enlightened part of mankind1 and on the 
inseparable connection  of such a       
doctrine with the existence of a        
,god--also in a less degree on  the     
impossibility of doubting about the     
continued existence of those whom  we   
love and reverence in this world4 ,and  
after all has been said1 the  figure1   
the analogy1 the argument1 are felt to  
be only approximations in  different    
forms to an expression of the common    
sentiment of the human  heart4 ,that we 
shall live again is far more certain    
than that we shall  take any particular 
form of life4    ,sidenote3 ,the        
immortality of the soul4    #g4 ,when we
 speak of the immortality of the soul1  
we must ask further  what we mean by the
 word immortality4 ,for of the duration 
of a living  being in countless ages we 
can form no conception2 far less than a 

three  years' old child of the whole of 
life4 ,the naked eye might as well try  
to  see the furthest star in the        
infinity of heaven4 ,whether time and   
space  really exist when we take away   
the limits of them may be doubted2 at   
any  rate the thought of them when      
unlimited is so overwhelming to us as to
  lose all distinctness4 ,philosophers  
have spoken of them as forms of the     
human mind1 but what is the mind without
 them8 ,as then infinite time1  or an   
existence out of time1 which are the    
only possible explanations  of eternal  
duration1 are equally inconceivable to  
us1 let us substitute  for them a       
hundred or a thousand years after death1
 and ask not what  will be our          
employment in eternity1 but what will   
happen to us in that  definite portion  
of time2 or what is now happening to    
those who passed  out of life a hundred 
or a thousand years ago4 ,do we imagine 
that the  wicked are suffering torments1
 or that the good are singing the       

praises  of ,god1 during a period longer
 than that of a whole life1 or of ten   
lives of men8 ,is the suffering physical
 or mental8 ,and does the worship  of   
,god consist only of praise1 or of many 
forms of service8 ,who are the  wicked1 
and who are the good1 whom we venture to
 divide by a hard and  fast line2 and in
 which of the two classes should we     
place ourselves  and our friends8 ,may  
we not suspect that we are making       
differences of  kind1 because we are    
unable to imagine differences of        
degree8--putting  the whole human race  
into heaven or hell for the greater     
convenience of  logical division8 ,are  
we not at the same time describing them 
both in  superlatives1 only that we may 
satisfy the demands of rhetoric8 ,what  
is that pain which does not become      
deadened after a thousand years8 or     
what is the nature of that pleasure or  
happiness which never wearies by        
monotony8 ,earthly pleasures and pains  
are short in proportion as they  are    

keen2 of any others which are both      
intense and lasting we have no          
experience1 and can form no idea4 ,the  
words or figures of speech which we  use
 are not consistent with themselves4    
,for are we not imagining ,heaven  under
 the similitude of a church1 and ,hell  
as a prison1 or perhaps a  madhouse or  
chamber of horrors8 ,and yet to beings  
constituted as we are1  the monotony of 
singing psalms would be as great an     
infliction as the  pains of hell1 and   
might be even pleasantly interrupted by 
them4 ,where  are the actions worthy of 
rewards greater than those which are    
conferred  on the greatest benefactors  
of mankind8 ,and where are the crimes   
which  according to ,plato's merciful   
reckoning1--more merciful1 at any rate1 
than the eternal damnation of so-called 
,christian teachers1--for every  ten    
years in this life deserve a hundred of 
punishment in the life to  come8 ,we    
should be ready to die of pity if we    
could see the least of the  sufferings  

which the writers of ,infernos and      
,purgatorios have attributed  to the    
damned4 ,yet these joys and terrors seem
 hardly to exercise an  appreciable     
influence over the lives of men4 ,the   
wicked man when old1 is  not1 as ,plato 
supposes 7,rep4 i4 #ccj ,d1 ,e71 more   
agitated by the terrors  of another     
world when he is nearer to them1 nor the
 good in an ecstasy at  the joys of     
which he is soon to be the partaker4    
,age numbs the sense of  both worlds2   
and the habit of life is strongest in   
death4 ,even the dying  mother is       
dreaming of her lost children as they   
were forty or fifty years  before1      
#8pattering over the boards1' not of    
reunion with them in another  state of  
being4 ,most persons when the last hour 
comes are resigned to the  order of     
nature and the will of ,god4 ,they are  
not thinking of ,dante's  ,inferno or   
,paradiso1 or of the ,pilgrim's         
,progress4 ,heaven and hell are  not    
realities to them1 but words or ideas2  

the outward symbols of some  great      
mystery1 they hardly know what4 ,many   
noble poems and pictures have  been     
suggested by the traditional            
representations of them1 which have     
been fixed in forms of art and can no   
longer be altered4 ,many sermons  have  
been filled with descriptions of        
celestial or infernal mansions4 ,but    
hardly even in childhood did the thought
 of heaven and hell supply the  motives 
of our actions1 or at any time seriously
 affect the substance of  our belief4   
,sidenote3 ,the immortality of the soul4
    #h4 ,another life must be described1
 if at all1 in forms of thought and not 
of sense4 ,to draw pictures of heaven   
and hell1 whether in the language  of   
,scripture or any other1 adds nothing to
 our real knowledge1 but may  perhaps   
disguise our ignorance4 ,the truest     
conception which we can form  of a      
future life is a state of progress or   
education--a progress from evil  to     
good1 from ignorance to knowledge4 ,to  

this we are led by the analogy  of the  
present life1 in which we see different 
races and nations of  men1 and different
 men and women of the same nation1 in   
various states  or stages of            
cultivation2 some more and some less    
developed1 and all of  them capable of  
improvement under favourable            
circumstances4 ,there are  punishments  
too of children when they are growing up
 inflicted by their  parents1 of elder  
offenders which are imposed by the law  
of the land1 of  all men at all times of
 life1 which are attached by the laws of
 nature  to the performance of certain  
actions4 ,all these punishments are     
really  educational2 that is to say1    
they are not intended to retaliate on   
the  offender1 but to teach him a       
lesson4 ,also there is an element of    
chance  in them1 which is another name  
for our ignorance of the laws of nature4
  ,there is evil too inseparable from   
good 7cp4 ,lysis #bbj ,e72 not always   
punished here1 as good is not always    

rewarded4 ,it is capable of being       
indefinitely diminished2 and as         
knowledge increases1 the element of     
chance may more and more disappear4     
,sidenote3 ,the immortality of the soul4
    ,for we do not argue merely from the
 analogy of the present state of this   
world to another1 but from the analogy  
of a probable future to which we  are   
tending4 ,the greatest changes of which 
we have had experience as yet  are due  
to our increasing knowledge of history  
and of nature4 ,they have  been produced
 by a few minds appearing in three or   
four favoured nations1  in a            
comparatively short period of time4 ,may
 we be allowed to imagine  the minds of 
men everywhere working together during  
many ages for the  completion of our    
knowledge8 ,may not the science of      
physiology transform  the world8 ,again1
 the majority of mankind have really    
experienced some  moral improvement2    
almost every one feels that he has      
tendencies to good1  and is capable of  

becoming better4 ,and these germs of    
good are often  found to be developed by
 new circumstances1 like stunted trees  
when  transplanted to a better soil4    
,the differences between the savage and 
the  civilized man1 or between the      
civilized man in old and new countries1 
may  be indefinitely increased4 ,the    
first difference is the effect of a few 
thousand1 the second of a few hundred   
years4 ,we congratulate ourselves  that 
slavery has become industry2 that law   
and constitutional government  have     
superseded despotism and violence2 that 
an ethical religion has  taken the place
 of ,fetichism4 ,there may yet come a   
time when the many may  be as well off  
as the few2 when no one will be weighed 
down by excessive  toil2 when the       
necessity of providing for the body will
 not interfere  with mental improvement2
 when the physical frame may be         
strengthened and  developed2 and the    
religion of all men may become a        
reasonable service4    ,sidenote3 ,the  

immortality of the soul4    ,nothing    
therefore1 either in the present state  
of man or in the  tendencies of the     
future1 as far as we can entertain      
conjecture of  them1 would lead us to   
suppose that ,god governs us            
vindictively in this  world1 and        
therefore we have no reason to infer    
that he will govern us  vindictively in 
another4 ,the true argument from analogy
 is not1 #8,this  life is a mixed state 
of justice and injustice1 of great      
waste1 of  sudden casualties1 of        
disproportionate punishments1 and       
therefore the  like inconsistencies1    
irregularities1 injustices are to be    
expected  in another2' but #8,this life 
is subject to law1 and is in a state of 
progress1 and therefore law and progress
 may be believed to be the  governing   
principles of another4' ,all the        
analogies of this world would  be       
against unmeaning punishments inflicted 
a hundred or a thousand  years after an 
offence had been committed4 ,suffering  

there might be as  a part of education1 
but not hopeless or protracted2 as there
 might be  a retrogression of           
individuals or of bodies of men1 yet not
 such as to  interfere with a plan for  
the improvement of the whole 7cp4 ,laws1
 x4 #ijc74    #i4 ,but some one will    
say3 ,that we cannot reason from the    
seen to the  unseen1 and that we are    
creating another world after the image  
of this1  just as men in former ages    
have created gods in their own likeness4
 ,and  we1 like the companions of       
,socrates1 may feel discouraged at      
hearing  our favourite #8argument from  
analogy' thus summarily disposed of4    
,like  himself1 too1 we may adduce other
 arguments in which he seems to have    
anticipated us1 though he expresses them
 in different language4 ,for we  feel   
that the soul partakes of the ideal and 
invisible2 and can never  fall into the 
error of confusing the external         
circumstances of man with  his higher   
self2 or his origin with his nature4 ,it

 is as repugnant to us  as it was to him
 to imagine that our moral ideas are to 
be attributed  only to cerebral forces4 
,the value of a human soul1 like the    
value of a  man's life to himself1 is   
inestimable1 and cannot be reckoned in  
earthly  or material things4 ,the human 
being alone has the consciousness of    
truth  and justice and love1 which is   
the consciousness of ,god4 ,and the soul
  becoming more conscious of these1     
becomes more conscious of her own       
immortality4    ,sidenote3 ,the         
immortality of the soul4    #aj4 ,the   
last ground of our belief in            
immortality1 and the strongest1  is the 
perfection of the divine nature4 ,the   
mere fact of the existence  of ,god does
 not tend to show the continued         
existence of man4 ,an evil  ,god or an  
indifferent ,god might have had the     
power1 but not the will1  to preserve   
us4 ,he might have regarded us as fitted
 to minister to  his service by a       
succession of existences1--like the     

animals1 without  attributing to each   
soul an incomparable value4 ,but if he  
is perfect1  he must will that all      
rational beings should partake of that  
perfection  which he himself is4 ,in the
 words of the ,timaeus1 he is good1 and 
therefore he desires that all other     
things should be as like himself as     
possible4 ,and the manner in which he   
accomplishes this is by permitting      
evil1 or rather degrees of good1 which  
are otherwise called evil4 ,for all     
progress is good relatively to the past1
 and yet may be comparatively  evil when
 regarded in the light of the future4   
,good and evil are relative  terms1 and 
degrees of evil are merely the negative 
aspect of degrees  of good4 ,of the     
absolute goodness of any finite nature  
we can form no  conception2 we are all  
of us in process of transition from one 
degree  of good or evil to another4 ,the
 difficulties which are urged about the 
origin or existence of evil are mere    
dialectical puzzles1 standing in  the   

same relation to ,christian philosophy  
as the puzzles of the ,cynics  and      
,megarians to the philosophy of ,plato4 
,they arise out of the tendency  of the 
human mind to regard good and evil both 
as relative and absolute2  just as the  
riddles about motion are to be explained
 by the double  conception of space or  
matter1 which the human mind has the    
power of  regarding either as continuous
 or discrete4    ,in speaking of divine 
perfection1 we mean to say that ,god is 
just and  true and loving1 the author of
 order and not of disorder1 of good and 
not of evil4 ,or rather1 that he is     
justice1 that he is truth1 that he is   
love1 that he is order1 that he is the  
very progress of which we were          
speaking2 and that wherever these       
qualities are present1 whether in the   
human soul or in the order of nature1   
there is ,god4 ,we might still see  him 
everywhere1 if we had not been          
mistakenly seeking for him apart from   
us1 instead of in us2 away from the laws

 of nature1 instead of in them4  ,and we
 become united to him not by mystical   
absorption1 but by partaking1  whether  
consciously or unconsciously1 of that   
truth and justice and love  which he    
himself is4    ,sidenote3 ,the          
immortality of the soul4    ,thus the   
belief in the immortality of the soul   
rests at last on the  belief in ,god4   
,if there is a good and wise ,god1 then 
there is a progress  of mankind towards 
perfection2 and if there is no progress 
of men towards  perfection1 then there  
is no good and wise ,god4 ,we cannot    
suppose that  the moral government of   
,god of which we see the beginnings in  
the world  and in ourselves will cease  
when we pass out of life4    #aa4       
,considering the #8feebleness of the    
human faculties and the  uncertainty of 
the subject1' we are inclined to believe
 that the fewer  our words the better4  
,at the approach of death there is not  
much said2  good men are too honest to  
go out of the world professing more than

 they  know4 ,there is perhaps no       
important subject about which1 at any   
time1  even religious people speak so   
little to one another4 ,in the fulness  
of  life the thought of death is mostly 
awakened by the sight or recollection   
of the death of others rather than by   
the prospect of our own4 ,we must  also 
acknowledge that there are degrees of   
the belief in immortality1 and  many    
forms in which it presents itself to the
 mind4 ,some persons will say  no more  
than that they trust in ,god1 and that  
they leave all to ,him4 ,it  is a great 
part of true religion not to pretend to 
know more than we do4  ,others when they
 quit this world are comforted with the 
hope #8,that they  will see and know    
their friends in heaven4' ,but it is    
better to leave  them in the hands of   
,god and to be assured that #8no evil   
shall touch  them4' ,there are others   
again to whom the belief in a divine    
personality  has ceased to have any     
longer a meaning2 yet they are satisfied

 that the  end of all is not here1 but  
that something still remains to us1     
#8and  some better thing for the good   
than for the evil4' ,they are persuaded1
  in spite of their theological         
nihilism1 that the ideas of justice and 
truth and holiness and love are         
realities4 ,they cherish an enthusiastic
  devotion to the first principles of   
morality4 ,through these they see1 or   
seem to see1 darkly1 and in a figure1   
that the soul is immortal4    ,sidenote3
 ,the immortality of the soul4    ,but  
besides differences of theological      
opinion which must ever prevail  about  
things unseen1 the hope of immortality  
is weaker or stronger in men  at one    
time of life than at another2 it even   
varies from day to day4 ,it  comes and  
goes2 the mind1 like the sky1 is apt to 
be overclouded4 ,other  generations of  
men may have sometimes lived under an   
#8eclipse of faith1'  to us the total   
disappearance of it might be compared to
 the #8sun falling  from heaven4' ,and  

we may sometimes have to begin again and
 acquire the  belief for ourselves2 or  
to win it back again when it is lost4   
,it is  really weakest in the hour of   
death4 ,for ,nature1 like a kind mother 
or  nurse1 lays us to sleep without     
frightening us2 physicians1 who are the 
witnesses of such scenes1 say that under
 ordinary circumstances there is  no    
fear of the future4 ,often1 as ,plato   
tells us1 death is accompanied  #8with  
pleasure4' 7,tim4 #ha ,d47 ,when the end
 is still uncertain1 the cry  of many a 
one has been1 #8,pray1 that ,i may be   
taken4' ,the last thoughts  even of the 
best men depend chiefly on the accidents
 of their bodily  state4 ,pain soon     
overpowers the desire of life2 old age1 
like the child1  is laid to sleep almost
 in a moment4 ,the long experience of   
life will  often destroy the interest   
which mankind have in it4 ,so various   
are the  feelings with which different  
persons draw near to death2 and still   
more  various the forms in which        

imagination clothes it4 ,for this       
alternation  of feeling cp4 the ,old    
,testament1--,psalm vi4 #e1 xvi4 #aj1   
xc42 ,isaiah  xxxviii4 #ah2 ,eccles4    
viii4 #h ff41 iii4 #ai1 iv4 #b4    #ab4 
,when we think of ,god and of man in his
 relation to ,god2 of the  imperfection 
of our present state and yet of the     
progress which is  observable in the    
history of the world and of the human   
mind2 of the  depth and power of our    
moral ideas which seem to partake of the
 very  nature of ,god ,himself2 when we 
consider the contrast between the       
physical  laws to which we are subject  
and the higher law which raises us above
  them and is yet a part of them2 when  
we reflect on our capacity of  becoming 
the #8spectators of all time and all    
existence1' and of framing  in our own  
minds the ideal of a perfect ,being2    
when we see how the human  mind in all  
the higher religions of the world1      
including ,buddhism1  notwithstanding   
some aberrations1 has tended towards    

such a belief--we  have reason to think 
that our destiny is different from that 
of animals2  and though we cannot       
altogether shut out the childish fear   
that the soul  upon leaving the body may
 #8vanish into thin air1' we have still1
 so far  as the nature of the subject   
admits1 a hope of immortality with which
 we  comfort ourselves on sufficient    
grounds4 ,the denial of the belief takes
  the heart out of human life2 it lowers
 men to the level of the material4  ,as 
,goethe also says1 #8,he is dead even in
 this world who has no belief in        
another4'    ,sidenote3 ,the immortality
 of the soul4    #ac4 ,it is well also  
that we should sometimes think of the   
forms of  thought under which the idea  
of immortality is most naturally        
presented  to us4 ,it is clear that to  
our minds the risen soul can no longer  
be  described1 as in a picture1 by the  
symbol of a creature half-bird1         
half-human1 nor in any other form of    
sense4 ,the multitude of angels1 as  in 

,milton1 singing the ,almighty's        
praises1 are a noble image1 and may     
furnish a theme for the poet or the     
painter1 but they are no longer an      
adequate expression of the kingdom of   
,god which is within us4 ,neither is    
there any mansion1 in this world or     
another1 in which the departed can  be  
imagined to dwell and carry on their    
occupations4 ,when this earthly         
tabernacle is dissolved1 no other       
habitation or building can take them    
in3 it is in the language of ideas only 
that we speak of them4    ,first of all 
there is the thought of rest and freedom
 from pain2  they have gone home1 as the
 common saying is1 and the cares of this
  world touch them no more4 ,secondly1  
we may imagine them as they were  at    
their best and brightest1 humbly        
fulfilling their daily round of         
duties--selfless1 childlike1 unaffected 
by the world2 when the eye was  single  
and the whole body seemed to be full of 
light2 when the mind was  clear and saw 

into the purposes of ,god4 ,thirdly1 we 
may think of them  as possessed by a    
great love of ,god and man1 working out 
,his will at a  further stage in the    
heavenly pilgrimage4 ,and yet we        
acknowledge that  these are the things  
which eye hath not seen nor ear heard   
and therefore  it hath not entered into 
the heart of man in any sensible manner 
to  conceive them4 ,fourthly1 there may 
have been some moments in our own  lives
 when we have risen above ourselves1 or 
been conscious of our truer  selves1 in 
which the will of ,god has superseded   
our wills1 and we have  entered into    
communion with ,him1 and been partakers 
for a brief season  of the ,divine truth
 and love1 in which like ,christ we have
 been inspired  to utter the prayer1    
#8,i in them1 and thou in me1 that we   
may be all made  perfect in one4' ,these
 precious moments1 if we have ever known
 them1 are  the nearest approach which  
we can make to the idea of immortality4 
,sidenote3 ,the immortality of the soul4

    #ad4 ,returning now to the earlier  
stage of human thought which is         
represented by the writings of ,plato1  
we find that many of the same  questions
 have already arisen3 there is the same 
tendency to materialism2  the same      
inconsistency in the application of the 
idea of mind2 the same  doubt whether   
the soul is to be regarded as a cause or
 as an effect2  the same falling back on
 moral convictions4 ,in the ,phaedo the 
soul is  conscious of her divine nature1
 and the separation from the body which 
has been commenced in this life is      
perfected in another4 ,beginning in     
mystery1 ,socrates1 in the intermediate 
part of the ,dialogue1 attempts to      
bring the doctrine of a future life into
 connection with his theory of          
knowledge4 ,in proportion as he succeeds
 in this1 the individual seems  to      
disappear in a more general notion of   
the soul2 the contemplation  of ideas   
#8under the form of eternity' takes the 
place of past and  future states of     

existence4 ,his language may be compared
 to that of  some modern philosophers1  
who speak of eternity1 not in the sense 
of  perpetual duration of time1 but as  
an ever-present quality of the soul4    
,yet at the conclusion of the ,dialogue1
 having #8arrived at the end of the     
intellectual world' 7,rep4 vii4 #ecb    
,b71 he replaces the veil of mythology1 
and describes the soul and her attendant
 genius in the language of the          
mysteries or of a disciple of           
,zoroaster4 ,nor can we fairly demand of
  ,plato a consistency which is wanting 
among ourselves1 who acknowledge  that  
another world is beyond the range of    
human thought1 and yet are  always      
seeking to represent the mansions of    
heaven or hell in the colours  of the   
painter1 or in the descriptions of the  
poet or rhetorician4    ,sidenote3 ,the 
immortality of the soul4    #ae4 ,the   
doctrine of the immortality of the soul 
was not new to the ,greeks  in the age  
of ,socrates1 but1 like the unity of    

,god1 had a foundation in  the popular  
belief4 ,the old ,homeric notion of a   
gibbering ghost flitting  away to       
,hades2 or of a few illustrious heroes  
enjoying the isles of the  blest2 or of 
an existence divided between the two2 or
 the ,hesiodic1 of  righteous spirits1  
who become guardian angels1--had given  
place in the  mysteries and the ,orphic 
poets to representations1 partly        
fanciful1 of a  future state of rewards 
and punishments4 7,laws ix4 #hgj47 ,the 
reticence  of the ,greeks on public     
occasions and in some part of their     
literature  respecting this             
#8underground' religion1 is not to be   
taken as a measure  of the diffusion of 
such beliefs4 ,if ,pericles in the      
funeral oration  is silent on the       
consolations of immortality1 the poet   
,pindar and the  tragedians on the other
 hand constantly assume the continued   
existence of  the dead in an upper or   
under world4 ,darius and ,laius are     
still alive2  ,antigone will be dear to 

her brethren after death2 the way to the
 palace  of ,cronos is found by those   
who #8have thrice departed from evil4'  
,the  tragedy of the ,greeks is not     
#8rounded' by this life1 but is deeply  
set  in decrees of fate and mysterious  
workings of powers beneath the earth4   
,in the caricature of ,aristophanes     
there is also a witness to the common   
sentiment4 ,the ,ionian and ,pythagorean
 philosophies arose1 and some new       
elements were added to the popular      
belief4 ,the individual must find an    
expression as well as the world4 ,either
 the soul was supposed to exist in  the 
form of a magnet1 or of a particle of   
fire1 or of light1 or air1 or  water2 or
 of a number or of a harmony of number2 
or to be or have1 like  the stars1 a    
principle of motion 7,arist4 de ,anim4  
i4 #a1 #b1 #c74 ,at length  ,anaxagoras1
 hardly distinguishing between life and 
mind1 or between mind  human and divine1
 attained the pure abstraction2 and     
this1 like the other  abstractions of   

,greek philosophy1 sank deep into the   
human intelligence4  ,the opposition of 
the intelligible and the sensible1 and  
of ,god to the  world1 supplied an      
analogy which assisted in the separation
 of soul and  body4 ,if ideas were      
separable from phenomena1 mind was also 
separable  from matter2 if the ideas    
were eternal1 the mind that conceived   
them was  eternal too4 ,as the unity of 
,god was more distinctly acknowledged1  
the  conception of the human soul became
 more developed4 ,the succession1 or    
alternation of life and death1 had      
occurred to ,heracleitus4 ,the ,eleatic 
,parmenides had stumbled upon the modern
 thesis1 that #8thought and being  are  
the same4' ,the ,eastern belief in      
transmigration defined the sense of     
individuality2 and some1 like           
,empedocles1 fancied that the blood     
which  they had shed in another state of
 being was crying against them1 and     
that for thirty thousand years they were
 to be #8fugitives and vagabonds  upon  

the earth4' ,the desire of recognizing a
 lost mother or love or  friend in the  
world below 7,phaedo #fh7 was a natural 
feeling which1 in  that age as well as  
in every other1 has given distinctness  
to the hope  of immortality4 ,nor were  
ethical considerations wanting1 partly  
derived  from the necessity of punishing
 the greater sort of criminals1 whom no 
avenging power of this world could      
reach4 ,the voice of conscience1 too1   
was heard reminding the good man that he
 was not altogether innocent4  7,rep4 i4
 #ccj47 ,to these indistinct longings   
and fears an expression was  given in   
the mysteries and ,orphic poets3 a      
#8heap of books' 7,rep4 ii4 #cfd  ,e71  
passing under the names of ,musaeus and 
,orpheus in ,plato's time1 were  filled 
with notions of an under-world4         
,sidenote3 ,the immortality of the soul4
    #af4 ,yet after all the belief in   
the individuality of the soul after     
death had but a feeble hold on the      
,greek mind4 ,like the personality of   

,god1 the personality of man in a future
 state was not inseparably bound  up    
with the reality of his existence4 ,for 
the distinction between the  personal   
and impersonal1 and also between the    
divine and human1 was  far less marked  
to the ,greek than to ourselves4 ,and as
 ,plato readily  passes from the notion 
of the good to that of ,god1 he also    
passes almost  imperceptibly to himself 
and his reader from the future life of  
the  individual soul to the eternal     
being of the absolute soul4 ,there has  
been a clearer statement and a clearer  
denial of the belief in modern  times   
than is found in early ,greek           
philosophy1 and hence the comparative   
silence on the whole subject which is   
often remarked in ancient writers1  and 
particularly in ,aristotle4 ,for ,plato 
and ,aristotle are not further  removed 
in their teaching about the immortality 
of the soul than they are  in their     
theory of knowledge4    #ag4 ,living in 
an age when logic was beginning to mould

 human thought1  ,plato naturally cast  
his belief in immortality into a logical
 form4 ,and  when we consider how much  
the doctrine of ideas was also one of   
words1  it is not surprising that he    
should have fallen into verbal          
fallacies3  early logic is always       
mistaking the truth of the form for the 
truth  of the matter4 ,it is easy to see
 that the alternation of opposites is   
not the same as the generation of them  
out of each other2 and that the         
generation of them out of each other1   
which is the first argument in  the     
,phaedo1 is at variance with their      
mutual exclusion of each other1  whether
 in themselves or in us1 which is the   
last4 ,for even if we admit  the        
distinction which he draws at p4 #ajc1  
between the opposites and the  things   
which have the opposites1 still         
individuals fall under the latter       
class2 and we have to pass out of the   
region of human hopes and fears to  a   
conception of an abstract soul which is 

the impersonation of the ideas4  ,such a
 conception1 which in ,plato himself is 
but half expressed1 is  unmeaning to us1
 and relative only to a particular stage
 in the history  of thought4 ,the       
doctrine of reminiscence is also a      
fragment of a former  world1 which has  
no place in the philosophy of modern    
times4 ,but ,plato  had the wonders of  
psychology just opening to him1 and he  
had not the  explanation of them which  
is supplied by the analysis of language 
and  the history of the human mind4 ,the
 question1 #8,whence come our abstract  
ideas8' he could only answer by an      
imaginary hypothesis4 ,nor is it        
difficult to see that his crowning      
argument is purely verbal1 and is but   
the expression of an instinctive        
confidence put into a logical           
form3--#8,the  soul is immortal because 
it contains a principle of              
imperishableness4'  ,nor does he himself
 seem at all to be aware that nothing is
 added to  human knowledge by his #8safe

 and simple answer1' that beauty is the 
cause  of the beautiful2 and that he is 
merely reasserting the ,eleatic being   
#8divided by the ,pythagorean numbers1' 
against the ,heracleitean doctrine  of  
perpetual generation4 ,the answer to the
 #8very serious question' of  generation
 and destruction is really the denial of
 them4 ,for this he  would substitute1  
as in the ,republic1 a system of ideas1 
tested1 not  by experience1 but by their
 consequences1 and not explained by     
actual  causes1 but by a higher1 that   
is1 a more general notion4 ,consistency 
with  themselves is the only test which 
is to be applied to them4 7,rep4 vi4    
#eaj  foll41 and ,phaedo #aja foll47    
,sidenote3 ,the immortality of the soul4
    #ah4 ,to deal fairly with such      
arguments1 they should be translated as 
far as possible into their modern       
equivalents4 #8,if the ideas of men are 
eternal1 their souls are eternal1 and if
 not the ideas1 then not the  souls4'   
,such an argument stands nearly in the  

same relation to ,plato and  his age1 as
 the argument from the existence of ,god
 to immortality among  ourselves4 #8,if 
,god exists1 then the soul exists after 
death2 and if there  is no ,god1 there  
is no existence of the soul after       
death4' ,for the ideas  are to his mind 
the reality1 the truth1 the principle of
 permanence1 as  well as of intelligence
 and order in the world4 ,when ,simmias 
and ,cebes  say that they are more      
strongly persuaded of the existence of  
ideas than  they are of the immortality 
of the soul1 they represent fairly      
enough  the order of thought in ,greek  
philosophy4 ,and we might say in the    
same  way that we are more certain of   
the existence of ,god than we are of the
  immortality of the soul1 and are led  
by the belief in the one to a belief  in
 the other4 ,the parallel1 as ,socrates 
would say1 is not perfect1 but  agrees  
in as far as the mind in either case is 
regarded as dependent on  something     
above and beyond herself4 ,the analogy  

may even be pressed a  step further3    
#8,we are more certain of our ideas of  
truth and right than  we are of the     
existence of ,god1 and are led on in the
 order of thought  from one to the      
other4' ,or more correctly3 #8,the      
existence of right and  truth is the    
existence of ,god1 and can never for a  
moment be separated  from ,him4'        
,sidenote3 ,the immortality of the soul4
    #ai4 ,the main argument of the      
,phaedo is derived from the existence of
  eternal ideas of which the soul is a  
partaker2 the other argument of the     
alternation of opposites is replaced by 
this4 ,and there have not been  wanting 
philosophers of the idealist school who 
have imagined that the  doctrine of the 
immortality of the soul is a theory of  
knowledge1 and  that in what has        
preceded ,plato is accommodating himself
 to the popular  belief4 ,such a view   
can only be elicited from the ,phaedo by
 what may be  termed the transcendental 
method of interpretation1 and is        

obviously  inconsistent with the        
,gorgias and the ,republic4 ,those who  
maintain it are  immediately compelled  
to renounce the shadow which they have  
grasped1  as a play of words only4 ,but 
the truth is1 that ,plato in his        
argument  for the immortality of the    
soul has collected many elements of     
proof  or persuasion1 ethical and       
mythological as well as dialectical1    
which  are not easily to be reconciled  
with one another2 and he is as much in  
earnest about his doctrine of           
retribution1 which is repeated in all   
his  more ethical writings1 as about his
 theory of knowledge4 ,and while we  may
 fairly translate the dialectical into  
the language of ,hegel1 and the         
religious and mythological into the     
language of ,dante or ,bunyan1 the      
ethical speaks to us still in the same  
voice1 and appeals to a common  feeling4
    #bj4 ,two arguments of this ethical 
character occur in the ,phaedo4 ,the    
first may be described as the aspiration

 of the soul after another state  of    
being4 ,like the ,oriental or ,christian
 mystic1 the philosopher is  seeking to 
withdraw from impurities of sense1 to   
leave the world and the  things of the  
world1 and to find his higher self4     
,plato recognizes in  these aspirations 
the foretaste of immortality2 as ,butler
 and ,addison in  modern times have     
argued1 the one from the moral          
tendencies of mankind1  the other from  
the progress of the soul towards        
perfection4 ,in using  this argument    
,plato has certainly confused the soul  
which has left the  body1 with the soul 
of the good and wise4 7,cp4 ,rep4 x4    
#faa ,c47 ,such a  confusion was        
natural1 and arose partly out of the    
antithesis of soul  and body4 ,the soul 
in her own essence1 and the soul        
#8clothed upon' with  virtues and       
graces1 were easily interchanged with   
one another1 because on  a subject which
 passes expression the distinctions of  
language can hardly  be maintained4     

,sidenote3 ,the immortality of the soul4
    #ba4 ,the other ethical proof of the
 immortality of the soul is derived     
from the necessity of retribution4 ,the 
wicked would be too well off  if their  
evil deeds came to an end4 ,it is not to
 be supposed that an  ,ardiaeus1 an     
,archelaus1 an ,ismenias could ever have
 suffered the penalty  of their crimes  
in this world4 ,the manner in which this
 retribution is  accomplished ,plato    
represents under the figures of         
mythology4 ,doubtless  he felt that it  
was easier to improve than to invent1   
and that in  religion especially the    
traditional form was required in order  
to give  verisimilitude to the myth4    
,the myth too is far more probable to   
that age  than to ours1 and may fairly  
be regarded as #8one guess among many'  
about  the nature of the earth1 which he
 cleverly supports by the indications of
  geology4 ,not that he insists on the  
absolute truth of his own particular    
notions3 #8no man of sense will be      

confident in such matters2 but he will  
be confident that something of the kind 
is true' 7#aad ,d74 ,as in other        
passages 7,gorg4 #ebg ,a1 ,tim4 #bi ,d2 
cp4 ,crito1 #ajg ,b71 he wins belief for
  his fictions by the moderation of his 
statements2 he does not1 like ,dante  or
 ,swedenborg1 allow himself to be       
deceived by his own creations4          
99       99       99       99       99  
,the ,dialogue must be read in the light
 of the situation4 ,and first of  all we
 are struck by the calmness of the      
scene4 ,like the spectators at  the     
time1 we cannot pity ,socrates2 his mien
 and his language are so  noble and     
fearless4 ,he is the same that he ever  
was1 but milder and  gentler1 and he has
 in no degree lost his interest in      
dialectics2 he will  not forego the     
delight of an argument in compliance    
with the jailer's  intimation that he   
should not heat himself with talking4   
,at such a time  he naturally expresses 
the hope of his life1 that he has been a

 true  mystic and not a mere routineer  
or wand-bearer3 and he refers to        
passages  of his personal history4 ,to  
his old enemies the ,comic poets1 and to
 the  proceedings on the trial1 he      
alludes playfully2 but he vividly       
remembers  the disappointment which he  
felt in reading the books of            
,anaxagoras4  ,the return of ,xanthipp  
and his children indicates that the     
philosopher  is not #8made of oak or    
rock4' ,some other traits of his        
character may be  noted2 for example1   
the courteous manner in which he        
inclines his head to  the last objector1
 or the ironical touch1 #8,me already1  
as the tragic poet  would say1 the voice
 of fate calls2' or the depreciation of 
the arguments  with which #8he comforted
 himself and them2' or his fear of      
#8misology2' or  his references to      
,homer2 or the playful smile with which 
he #8talks like  a book' about greater  
and less2 or the allusion to the        
possibility of  finding another teacher 

among barbarous races 7cp4 ,polit4 #bfb 
,d72 or the  mysterious reference to    
another science 7mathematics87 of       
generation and  destruction for which he
 is vainly feeling4 ,there is no change 
in him2  only now he is invested with a 
sort of sacred character1 as the prophet
  or priest of ,apollo the ,god of the  
festival1 in whose honour he first of   
all composes a hymn1 and then like the  
swan pours forth his dying lay4         
,perhaps the extreme elevation of       
,socrates above his own situation1 and  
the ordinary interests of life 7compare 
his jeu d'esprit about his  burial1 in  
which for a moment he puts on the       
#8,silenus mask'71 create in  the mind  
of the reader an impression stronger    
than could be derived from  arguments   
that such a one has in him #8a principle
 which does not admit of  death4'       
99       99       99       99       99  
,sidenote3 ,socrates and his friends4   
,the other persons of the ,dialogue may 
be considered under two heads3 7#a7     

private friends2 7#b7 the respondents in
 the argument4    ,first there is       
,crito1 who has been already introduced 
to us in the  ,euthydemus and the       
,crito2 he is the equal in years of     
,socrates1 and  stands in quite a       
different relation to him from his      
younger disciples4  ,he is a man of the 
world who is rich and prosperous 7cp4   
the jest in the  ,euthydemus1 #cjd ,c71 
the best friend of ,socrates1 who wants 
to know his  commands1 in whose presence
 he talks to his family1 and who        
performs  the last duty of closing his  
eyes4 ,it is observable too that1 as in 
the  ,euthydemus1 ,crito shows no       
aptitude for philosophical discussions4 
,nor  among the friends of ,socrates    
must the jailer be forgotten1 who seems 
to have been introduced by ,plato in    
order to show the impression made  by   
the extraordinary man on the common4    
,the gentle nature of the man  is       
indicated by his weeping at the         
announcement of his errand and then     

turning away1 and also by the words of  
,socrates to his disciples3 #8,how      
charming the man is6 since ,i have been 
in prison he has been always  coming to 
me1 and is as good as could be to me4'  
,we are reminded too that  he has       
retained this gentle nature amid scenes 
of death and violence by  the contrasts 
which he draws between the behaviour of 
,socrates and of  others when about to  
die4    ,sidenote3 ,phaedo3 ,simmias3   
,cebes4    ,another person who takes no 
part in the philosophical discussion is 
the  excitable ,apollodorus1 the same   
who1 in the ,symposium1 of which he is  
the  narrator1 is called #8the madman1' 
and who testifies his grief by the most 
violent emotions4 ,phaedo is also       
present1 the #8beloved disciple' as he  
may be termed1 who is described1 if not 
#8leaning on his bosom1' as seated  next
 to ,socrates1 who is playing with his  
hair4 ,he too1 like ,apollodorus1  takes
 no part in the discussion1 but he loves
 above all things to hear  and speak of 

,socrates after his death4 ,the calmness
 of his behaviour1  veiling his face    
when he can no longer restrain his      
tears1 contrasts  with the passionate   
outcries of the other4 ,at a particular 
point the  argument is described as     
falling before the attack of ,simmias4  
,a sort of  despair is introduced in the
 minds of the company4 ,the effect of   
this is  heightened by the description  
of ,phaedo1 who has been the eye-witness
  of the scene1 and by the sympathy of  
his ,phliasian auditors who are         
beginning to think #8that they too can  
never trust an argument again4' ,and    
the intense interest of the company is  
communicated not only to the first      
auditors1 but to us who in a distant    
country read the narrative of their     
emotions after more than two thousand   
years have passed away4    ,the two     
principal interlocutors are ,simmias and
 ,cebes1 the disciples of  ,philolaus   
the ,pythagorean philosopher of ,thebes4
 ,simmias is described  in the ,phaedrus

 7#bdb ,b7 as fonder of an argument than
 any man living2  and ,cebes1 although  
finally persuaded by ,socrates1 is said 
to be the  most incredulous of human    
beings4 ,it is ,cebes who at the        
commencement  of the ,dialogue asks why 
#8suicide is held to be unlawful1' and  
who  first supplies the doctrine of     
recollection in confirmation of the     
pre-existence of the soul4 ,it is ,cebes
 who urges that the pre-existence  does 
not necessarily involve the future      
existence of the soul1 as is  shown by  
the illustration of the weaver and his  
coat4 ,simmias1 on the  other hand1     
raises the question about harmony and   
the lyre1 which is  naturally put into  
the mouth of a ,pythagorean disciple4   
,it is ,simmias1  too1 who first remarks
 on the uncertainty of human knowledge1 
and only at  last concedes to the       
argument such a qualified approval as is
 consistent  with the feebleness of the 
human faculties4 ,cebes is the deeper   
and more  consecutive thinker1 ,simmias 

more superficial and rhetorical2 they   
are  distinguished in much the same     
manner as ,adeimantus and ,glaucon in   
the  ,republic4    ,sidenote3 ,place of 
the ,dialogue in the series4    ,other  
persons1 ,menexenus1 ,ctesippus1 ,lysis1
 are old friends2 ,evenus  has been     
already satirized in the ,apology2      
,aeschines and ,epigenes  were present  
at the trial2 ,euclid and ,terpsion will
 reappear in the  ,introduction to the  
,theaetetus1 ,hermogenes has already    
appeared in  the ,cratylus4 ,no         
inference can fairly be drawn from the  
absence of  ,aristippus1 nor from the   
omission of ,xenophon1 who at the time  
of  ,socrates' death was in ,asia4 ,the 
mention of ,plato's own absence seems   
like an expression of sorrow1 and may1  
perhaps1 be an indication that the      
report of the conversation is not to be 
taken literally4    ,the place of the   
,dialogue in the series is doubtful4    
,the doctrine of  ideas is certainly    
carried beyond the ,socratic point of   

view2 in no other  of the writings of   
,plato is the theory of them so         
completely developed4  ,whether the     
belief in immortality can be attributed 
to ,socrates or not is  uncertain2 the  
silence of the ,memorabilia1 and of the 
earlier ,dialogues  of ,plato1 is an    
argument to the contrary4 ,yet in the   
,cyropaedia ,xenophon  7viii4 #g1 #ai   
foll47 has put language into the mouth  
of the dying ,cyrus  which recalls the  
,phaedo1 and may have been derived from 
the teaching of  ,socrates4 ,it may be  
fairly urged that the greatest religious
 interest of  mankind could not have    
been wholly ignored by one who passed   
his life in  fulfilling the commands of 
an oracle1 and who recognized a ,divine 
plan in  man and nature4 7,xen4 ,mem4   
,i1 #d47 ,and the language of the       
,apology and of  the ,crito confirms    
this view4    ,sidenote3 ,contents of   
the ,dialogue4    ,the ,phaedo is not   
one of the ,socratic ,dialogues of      
,plato2 nor1 on the  other hand1 can it 

be assigned to that later stage of the  
,platonic  writings at which the        
doctrine of ideas appears to be         
forgotten4 ,it  belongs rather to the   
intermediate period of the ,platonic    
philosophy1  which roughly corresponds  
to the ,phaedrus1 ,gorgias1 ,republic1  
,theaetetus4  ,without pretending to    
determine the real time of their        
composition1 the  ,symposium1 ,meno1    
,euthyphro1 ,apology1 ,phaedo may be    
conveniently read by  us in this order  
as illustrative of the life of          
,socrates4 ,another chain  may be formed
 of the ,meno1 ,phaedrus1 ,phaedo1 in   
which the immortality  of the soul is   
connected with the doctrine of ideas4   
,in the ,meno the  theory of ideas is   
based an the ancient belief in          
transmigration1 which  reappears again  
in the ,phaedrus as well as in the      
,republic and ,timaeus1  and in all of  
them is connected with a doctrine of    
retribution4 ,in  the ,phaedrus the     
immortality of the soul is supposed to  

rest on the  conception of the soul as a
 principle of motion1 whereas in the    
,republic  the argument turns on the    
natural continuance of the soul1 which1 
if not  destroyed by her own proper     
evil1 can hardly be destroyed by any    
other4  ,the soul of man in the ,timaeus
 7#db foll47 is derived from the        
,supreme  ,creator1 and either returns  
after death to her kindred star1 or     
descends  into the lower life of an     
animal4 ,the ,apology expresses the same
 view  as the ,phaedo1 but with less    
confidence2 there the probability of    
death  being a long sleep is not        
excluded4 ,the ,theaetetus also         
describes1 in a  digression1 the desire 
of the soul to fly away and be with     
,god--#8and to  fly to him is to be like
 him' 7#agf ,b74 ,the ,symposium may be 
observed to  resemble as well as to     
differ from the ,phaedo4 ,while the     
first notion of  immortality is only in 
the way of natural procreation or of    
posthumous  fame and glory1 the higher  

revelation of beauty1 like the good in  
the  ,republic1 is the vision of the    
eternal idea4 ,so deeply rooted in      
,plato's  mind is the belief in         
immortality2 so various are the forms of
 expression  which he employs4          
,sidenote3 ,the ,dialogue a ,drama4     
,as in several other ,dialogues1 there  
is more of system in the ,phaedo  than  
appears at first sight4 ,the succession 
of arguments is based on  previous      
philosophies2 beginning with the        
mysteries and the ,heracleitean         
alternation of opposites1 and proceeding
 to the ,pythagorean harmony and        
transmigration2 making a step by the aid
 of ,platonic reminiscence1 and  a      
further step by the help of the  of     
,anaxagoras2 until at last we  rest in  
the conviction that the soul is         
inseparable from the ideas1  and belongs
 to the world of the invisible and      
unknown4 ,then1 as in  the ,gorgias or  
,republic1 the curtain falls1 and the   
veil of mythology  descends upon the    

argument4 ,after the confession of      
,socrates that he  is an interested     
party1 and the acknowledgment that no   
man of sense  will think the details of 
his narrative true1 but that something  
of the  kind is true1 we return from    
speculation to practice4 ,he is himself 
more confident of immortality than he is
 of his own arguments2 and  the         
confidence which he expresses is less   
strong than that which his  cheerfulness
 and composure in death inspire in us4  
,difficulties of two kinds occur in the 
,phaedo--one kind to be explained  out  
of contemporary philosophy1 the other   
not admitting of an entire  solution4   
7#a7 ,the difficulty which ,socrates    
says that he experienced  in explaining 
generation and corruption2 the          
assumption of hypotheses  which proceed 
from the less general to the more       
general1 and are tested  by their       
consequences2 the puzzle about greater  
and less2 the resort to  the method of  
ideas1 which to us appear only abstract 

terms1--these are  to be explained out  
of the position of ,socrates and ,plato 
in the history  of philosophy4 ,they    
were living in a twilight between the   
sensible and  the intellectual world1   
and saw no way of connecting them4 ,they
 could  neither explain the relation of 
ideas to phenomena1 nor their           
correlation  to one another4 ,the very  
idea of relation or comparison was      
embarrassing  to them4 ,yet in this     
intellectual uncertainty they had a     
conception of a  proof from results1 and
 of a moral truth1 which remained       
unshaken amid  the questionings of      
philosophy4 7#b7 ,the other is a        
difficulty which is  touched upon in the
 ,republic as well as in the ,phaedo1   
and is common to  modern and ancient    
philosophy4 ,plato is not altogether    
satisfied with his  safe and simple     
method of ideas4 ,he wants to have      
proved to him by facts  that all things 
are for the best1 and that there is one 
mind or design  which pervades them all4

 ,but this #8power of the best' he is   
unable to  explain2 and therefore takes 
refuge in universal ideas4 ,and are not 
we  at this day seeking to discover that
 which ,socrates in a glass darkly      
foresaw8    ,sidenote3 ,artistic beauty 
of the ,dialogue4    ,some resemblances 
to the ,greek drama may be noted in all 
the ,dialogues  of ,plato4 ,the ,phaedo 
is the tragedy of which ,socrates is the
 protagonist  and ,simmias and ,cebes   
the secondary performers1 standing to   
them in the  same relation as to        
,glaucon and ,adeimantus in the         
,republic4 ,no ,dialogue  has a greater 
unity of subject and feeling4 ,plato has
 certainly fulfilled  the condition of  
,greek1 or rather of all art1 which     
requires that scenes  of death and      
suffering should be clothed in beauty4  
,the gathering of  the friends at the   
commencement of the ,dialogue1 the      
dismissal of  ,xanthipp1 whose presence 
would have been out of place at a       
philosophical  discussion1 but who      

returns again with her children to take 
a final  farewell1 the dejection of the 
audience at the temporary overthrow of  
the argument1 the picture of ,socrates  
playing with the hair of ,phaedo1  the  
final scene in which ,socrates alone    
retains his composure--are  masterpieces
 of art4 ,and the chorus at the end     
might have interpreted the  feeling of  
the play3 #8,there can no evil happen to
 a good man in life or  death4'         
#8,the art of concealing art' is nowhere
 more perfect than in those  writings of
 ,plato which describe the trial and    
death of ,socrates4 ,their  charm is    
their simplicity1 which gives them      
verisimilitude2 and yet  they touch1 as 
if incidentally1 and because they were  
suitable to the  occasion1 on some of   
the deepest truths of philosophy4 ,there
 is nothing  in any tragedy1 ancient or 
modern1 nothing in poetry or history    
7with  one exception71 like the last    
hours of ,socrates in ,plato4 ,the      
master  could not be more fitly occupied

 at such a time than in discoursing of  
immortality2 nor the disciples more     
divinely consoled4 ,the arguments1      
taken in the spirit and not in the      
letter1 are our arguments2 and          
,socrates by anticipation may be even   
thought to refute some #8eccentric      
notions' current in our own age4 ,for   
there are philosophers among  ourselves 
who do not seem to understand how much  
stronger is the power of  intelligence1 
or of the best1 than of ,atlas1 or      
mechanical force4 ,how far  the words   
attributed to ,socrates were actually   
uttered by him we forbear  to ask2 for  
no answer can be given to this question4
 ,and it is better to  resign ourselves 
to the feeling of a great work1 than to 
linger among  critical uncertainties4   
,,phaedo4    ,,persons ,,of ,,the       
,,dialogue4    ,,phaedo1 who is the     
narrator of the ,dialogue to ,echecrates
 of ,phlius4  ,,socrates4 ,,attendant   
,,of ,,the ,,prison4 ,,apollodorus4     
,,simmias4 ,,cebes4 ,,crito4            

,,scene3--,the ,prison of ,socrates4    
,,place ,,of ,,the                      
,,narration3--,phlius4    ,sidenote3    
,phaedo4        ,echecrates4 ,were you  
yourself1 ,phaedo1 in the prison        
,steph4 #eg      with ,socrates on the  
day when he drank the poison8           
,phaedo4 ,yes1 ,echecrates1 ,i was4     
,ech4 ,i should so like to hear about   
his death4 ,what did      he say in his 
last hours8 ,we were informed that he   
died      by taking poison1 but no one  
knew anything more2 for no              
,phliasian ever goes to ,athens now1 and
 it is a long time      since any       
stranger from ,athens has found his way 
hither2      so that we had no clear    
account4        ,phaed4 ,did you not    
hear of the proceedings at the trial8   
#eh        ,ech4 ,yes2 some one told us 
about the trial1 and we could      not  
understand why1 having been condemned1  
he should      have been put to death1  
not at the time1 but long afterwards4   
,what was the reason of this8           

,sidenote3 ,the death of ,socrates was  
deferred by the holy season of the      
mission to ,delos4        ,phaed4 ,an   
accident1 ,echecrates3 the stern of the 
ship      which the ,athenians send to  
,delos happened to have been            
crowned on the day before he was tried4 
,ech4 ,what is this ship8    ,sidenote3 
,the narrative of ,phaedo4              
,phaed4 ,it is the ship in which1       
according to ,athenian      tradition1  
,theseus went to ,crete when he took    
with him the      fourteen youths1 and  
was the saviour of them and of himself4 
,and they are said to have vowed to     
,apollo at the time1 that      if they  
were saved they would send a yearly     
mission to      ,delos4 ,now this custom
 still continues1 and the whole         
period of the voyage to and from ,delos1
 beginning when the      priest of      
,apollo crowns the stern of the ship1 is
 a holy      season1 during which the   
city is not allowed to be polluted      
by public executions2 and when the      

vessel is detained by      contrary     
winds1 the time spent in going and      
returning is      very considerable4 ,as
 ,i was saying1 the ship was crowned    
on the day before the trial1 and this   
was the reason why      ,socrates lay in
 prison and was not put to death until  
long      after he was condemned4       
,ech4 ,what was the manner of his death1
 ,phaedo8 ,what      was said or done8  
,and which of his friends were with     
him8 ,or did the authorities forbid them
 to be present--so      that he had no  
friends near him when he died8          
,phaed4 ,no2 there were several of them 
with him4    ,sidenote3 ,phaedo is      
requested by ,echecrates to give an     
account of the  death of ,socrates4     
,ech4 ,if you have nothing to do1 ,i    
wish that you would      tell me what   
passed1 as exactly as you can4          
,phaed4 ,i have nothing at all to do1   
and will try to gratify      your wish4 
,to be reminded of ,socrates is always  
the      greatest delight to me1 whether

 ,i speak myself or hear      another   
speak of him4        ,ech4 ,you will    
have listeners who are of the same mind 
with you1 and ,i hope that you will be  
as exact as you      can4    ,sidenote3 
,he describes his noble and fearless    
demeanour4        ,phaed4 ,i had a      
singular feeling at being in his        
company4      ,for ,i could hardly      
believe that ,i was present at the death
 of      a friend1 and therefore ,i did 
not pity him1 ,echecrates2 he      died 
so fearlessly1 and his words and bearing
 were so noble      and gracious1 that  
to me he appeared blessed4 ,i thought   
that in going to the other world he     
could not be without      a divine call1
 and that he would be happy1 if any man 
ever          #ei      was1 when he     
arrived there2 and therefore ,i did not 
pity      him as might have seemed      
natural at such an hour4 ,but ,i        
had not the pleasure which ,i usually   
feel in philosophical      discourse    
7for philosophy was the theme of which  

we spoke74      ,i was pleased1 but in  
the pleasure there was also a strange   
admixture of pain2 for ,i reflected that
 he was soon to die1 and      this      
double feeling was shared by us all2 we 
were laughing      and weeping by turns1
 especially the excitable               
,apollodorus--you      know the sort of 
man8    ,sidenote3 ,the last morning3   
,xanthipp4        ,ech4 ,yes4           
,phaed4 ,he was quite beside himself2   
and ,i and all of us      were greatly  
moved4        ,ech4 ,who were present8  
,sidenote3 ,the ,socratic circle3--the  
absence of ,plato is noted4             
,phaed4 ,of native ,athenians there     
were1 besides ,apollodorus1             
,critobulus and his father ,crito1      
,hermogenes1 ,epigenes1      ,aeschines1
 ,antisthenes2 likewise ,ctesippus of   
the      deme of ,paeania1 ,menexenus1  
and some others2 ,plato1 if ,i      am  
not mistaken1 was ill4        ,ech4     
,were there any strangers8              
,phaed4 ,yes1 there were2 ,simmias the  

,theban1 and ,cebes1      and           
,phaedondes2 ,euclid and ,terpsion1 who 
came from      ,megara4        ,ech4    
,and was ,aristippus there1 and         
,cleombrotus8        ,phaed4 ,no1 they  
were said to be in ,aegina4        ,ech4
 ,any one else8        ,phaed4 ,i think 
that these were nearly all4        ,ech4
 ,well1 and what did you talk about8    
,sidenote3 ,the meeting at the prison4  
,sidenote3 ,the friends are denied      
admission while the ,eleven are with    
,socrates4        ,phaed4 ,i will begin 
at the beginning1 and endeavour to      
repeat the entire conversation4 ,on the 
previous days we      had been in the   
habit of assembling early in the morning
 at      the court in which the trial   
took place1 and which is not far        
from the prison4 ,there we used to wait 
talking with one      another until the 
opening of the doors 7for they were not 
opened very early72 then we went in and 
generally passed      the day with      
,socrates4 ,on the last morning we      

assembled      sooner than usual1 having
 heard on the day before when      we   
quitted the prison in the evening that  
the sacred ship      had come from      
,delos2 and so we arranged to meet very 
early at the accustomed place4 ,on our  
arrival the jailer who      answered the
 door1 instead of admitting us1 came out
 and      told us to stay until he      
called us4 #8,for the ,eleven1' he said1
      #8are now with ,socrates2 they are
 taking off his chains1 and      giving 
orders that he is to die to-day4' ,he   
soon returned      and said that we     
might come in4 ,on entering we found    
#fj      ,socrates just released from   
chains1 and ,xanthipp1 whom      you    
know1 sitting by him1 and holding his   
child in her arms4      ,when she saw us
 she uttered a cry and said1 as women   
will3      #8,o ,socrates1 this is the  
last time that either you will converse 
with your friends1 or they with you4'   
,socrates turned      to ,crito and     
said3 #8,crito1 let some one take her   

home4'    ,sidenote3 ,socrates1 whose   
chains have now been taken off1 is led  
by the  feeling of relief to remark on  
the curious manner in which pleasure and
  pain are always conjoined4            
,some of ,crito's people accordingly led
 her away1 crying out      and beating  
herself4 ,and when she was gone1        
,socrates1      sitting up on the couch1
 bent and rubbed his leg1 saying1 as    
he was rubbing3 ,how singular is the    
thing called pleasure1      and how     
curiously related to pain1 which might  
be thought      to be the opposite of   
it2 for they are never present to a man 
at the same instant1 and yet he who     
pursues either is generally             
compelled to take the other2 their      
bodies are two1 but they      are joined
 by a single head4 ,and ,i cannot help  
thinking      that if ,aesop had        
remembered them1 he would have made a   
fable about ,god trying to reconcile    
their strife1 and how1      when he     
could not1 he fastened their heads      

together2 and      this is the reason   
why when one comes the other follows3   
as ,i know by my own experience now1    
when after the pain      in my leg which
 was caused by the chain pleasure       
appears to      succeed4    ,sidenote3  
,evenus the poet4        ,upon this     
,cebes said3 ,i am glad1 ,socrates1 that
 you have      mentioned the name of    
,aesop4 ,for it reminds me of a         
question which has been asked by many1  
and was asked of      me only the day   
before yesterday by ,evenus the poet--he
      will be sure to ask it again1 and 
therefore if you would like      me to  
have an answer ready for him1 you may as
 well tell me      what ,i should say to
 him3--he wanted to know why you1 who   
never before wrote a line of poetry1 now
 that you are in      prison are turning
 ,aesop's fables into verse1 and also   
composing      that hymn in honour of   
,apollo4    ,sidenote3 ,having been told
 in a dream that he should compose      
music1 in  order to satisfy a scruple   

about the meaning of the dream he has   
been  writing verses while he was in    
prison4    ,sidenote3 ,philolaus of     
,thebes4    ,sidenote3 ,evenus the poet 
had been curious to know why he had done
 so1  and ,socrates gives him the       
explanation1 bidding him be of good     
cheer1 and  come after him4 #8,but he   
will not come4'        ,tell him1       
,cebes1 he replied1 what is the         
truth--that ,i had      no idea of      
rivalling him or his poems2 to do so1 as
 ,i knew1      would be no easy task4   
,but ,i wanted to see whether ,i could  
purge away a scruple which ,i felt about
 the meaning of      certain dreams4 ,in
 the course of my life ,i have often had
      intimations in dreams #8that ,i   
should compose music4' ,the      same   
dream came to me sometimes in one form1 
and sometimes      in another1 but      
always saying the same or nearly the    
same words3 #8,cultivate and make       
music1' said the dream4      ,and       
hitherto ,i had imagined that this was  

only intended to      exhort and        
encourage me in the study of philosophy1
 which      has been the pursuit of my  
life1 and is the noblest and best       
#fa      of music4 ,the dream was       
bidding me do what ,i was already       
doing1 in the same way that the         
competitor in a race is      bidden by  
the spectators to run when he is already
 running4      ,but ,i was not certain  
of this2 for the dream might have       
meant music in the popular sense of the 
word1 and being      under sentence of  
death1 and the festival giving me a     
respite1      ,i thought that it would  
be safer for me to satisfy the scruple1 
and1 in obedience to the dream1 to      
compose a few verses before      ,i     
departed4 ,and first ,i made a hymn in  
honour of the god      of the festival1 
and then considering that a poet1 if he 
is      really to be a poet1 should not 
only put together words1 but      should
 invent stories1 and that ,i have no    
invention1 ,i took      some fables of  

,aesop1 which ,i had ready at hand and  
which      ,i knew--they were the first 
,i came upon and turned them      into  
verse4 ,tell this to ,evenus1 ,cebes1   
and bid him be of      good cheer2 say  
that ,i would have him come after me if 
he      be a wise man1 and not tarry2   
and that to-day ,i am likely      to be 
going1 for the ,athenians say that ,i   
must4        ,simmias said3 ,what a     
message for such a man6 having      been
 a frequent companion of his ,i should  
say that1 as far as      ,i know him1 he
 will never take your advice unless he  
is      obliged4        ,why1 said      
,socrates1--is not ,evenus a            
philosopher8        ,i think that he is1
 said ,simmias4        ,then he1 or any 
man who has the spirit of philosophy1   
will be willing to die2 but he will not 
take his own life1 for      that is held
 to be unlawful4        ,here he changed
 his position1 and put his legs off the 
couch on to the ground1 and during the  
rest of the conversation      he        

remained sitting4        ,why do you    
say1 enquired ,cebes1 that a man ought  
not to      take his own life1 but that 
the philosopher will be ready to        
follow the dying8    ,sidenote3         
,socrates replies that a philosopher    
like ,evenus should be  ready to die1   
though he must not take his own life4   
,socrates replied3 ,and have you1 ,cebes
 and ,simmias1 who      are the         
disciples of ,philolaus1 never heard him
 speak of this8    ,sidenote3 ,cebes    
speaking in his native dialect4         
,yes1 but his language was obscure1     
,socrates4        ,my words1 too1 are   
only an echo2 but there is no reason    
why ,i should not repeat what ,i have   
heard3 and indeed1 as      ,i am going  
to another place1 it is very meet for me
 to be      thinking and talking of the 
nature of the pilgrimage which ,i       
am about to make4 ,what can ,i do better
 in the interval      between this and  
the setting of the sun8        ,then    
tell me1 ,socrates1 why is suicide held 

to be unlawful8      as ,i have         
certainly heard ,philolaus1 about whom  
you      were just now asking1 affirm   
when he was staying with us at          
,thebes2 and there are others who say   
the same1 although ,i      have never   
understood what was meant by any of     
them4    ,sidenote3 ,this incidental    
remark leads to a discussion on suicide4
        ,do not lose heart1 replied     
,socrates1 and the day may come         
#fb      when you will understand4 ,i   
suppose that you wonder why1      when  
other things which are evil may be good 
at certain      times and to certain    
persons1 death is to be the only        
exception1      and why1 when a man is  
better dead1 he is not      permitted to
 be his own benefactor1 but must wait   
for the      hand of another4           
,fery true1 said ,cebes1 laughing gently
 and speaking in      his native        
,boeotian4    ,sidenote3 ,man is a      
prisoner who has no right to run away2  
and he is also  a possession of the gods

 and must not rob his masters4        ,i
 admit the appearance of inconsistency  
in what ,i am      saying2 but there may
 not be any real inconsistency after    
all4      ,there is a doctrine whispered
 in secret that man is a      prisoner  
who has no right to open the door and   
run away2      this is a great mystery  
which ,i do not quite understand4       
,yet ,i too believe that the gods are   
our guardians1 and that      we men are 
a possession of theirs4 ,do you not     
agree8        ,yes1 ,i quite agree1 said
 ,cebes4        ,and if one of your own 
possessions1 an ox or an ass1 for       
example1 took the liberty of putting    
himself out of the way      when you had
 given no intimation of your wish that  
he      should die1 would you not be    
angry with him1 and would you      not  
punish him if you could8                
,certainly1 replied ,cebes4             
,then1 if we look at the matter thus1   
there may be reason in      saying that 
a man should wait1 and not take his own 

life until      ,god summons him1 as he 
is now summoning me4    ,sidenote3 ,and 
why should he wish to leave the best of 
services8        ,yes1 ,socrates1 said  
,cebes1 there seems to be truth in what 
you say4 ,and yet how can you reconcile 
this seemingly true      belief that    
,god is our guardian and we his         
possessions1 with      the willingness  
to die which you were just now          
attributing to      the philosopher8    
,that the wisest of men should be       
willing      to leave a service in which
 they are ruled by the gods who      are
 the best of rulers1 is not reasonable2 
for surely no wise      man thinks that 
when set at liberty he can take better  
care of      himself than the gods take 
of him4 ,a fool may perhaps      think  
so--he may argue that he had better run 
away from      his master1 not          
considering that his duty is to remain  
to the      end1 and not to run away    
from the good1 and that there      would
 be no sense in his running away4 ,the  

wise man will      want to be ever with 
him who is better than himself4 ,now    
this1 ,socrates1 is the reverse of what 
was just now said2 for      upon this   
view the wise man should sorrow and the 
fool      rejoice at passing out of     
life4        ,the earnestness of ,cebes 
seemed to please ,socrates4             
#fc      ,here1 said he1 turning to us1 
is a man who is always enquiring1       
and is not so easily convinced by the   
first thing which      he hears4        
,sidenote3 ,simmias and ,cebes4         
,sidenote3 ,you yourself1 ,socrates1 are
 too ready to run away4        ,and     
certainly1 added ,simmias1 the objection
 which he is      now making does appear
 to me to have some force4 ,for         
what can be the meaning of a truly wise 
man wanting to fly      away and lightly
 leave a master who is better than      
himself8      ,and ,i rather imagine    
that ,cebes is referring to you2 he     
thinks that you are too ready to leave  
us1 and too ready to      leave the gods

 whom you acknowledge to be our good    
masters4        ,yes1 replied ,socrates2
 there is reason in what you say4       
,and so you think that ,i ought to      
answer your indictment as      if ,i    
were in a court8        ,we should like 
you to do so1 said ,simmias4            
,sidenote3 ,socrates replies that he is 
going to other gods who are wise  and   
good4        ,then ,i must try to make a
 more successful defence before      you
 than ,i did before the judges4 ,for ,i 
am quite ready to      admit1 ,simmias  
and ,cebes1 that ,i ought to be grieved 
at      death1 if ,i were not persuaded 
in the first place that ,i am      going
 to other gods who are wise and good 7of
 which ,i am      as certain as ,i can  
be of any such matters71 and secondly   
7though ,i am not so sure of this last7 
to men departed1 better      than those 
whom ,i leave behind2 and therefore ,i  
do not      grieve as ,i might have     
done1 for ,i have good hope that there  
is yet something remaining for the dead1

 and as has been      said of old1 some 
far better thing for the good than for  
the      evil4    ,sidenote3 ,the       
gaoler's importunity4        ,but do you
 mean to take away your thoughts with   
you1      ,socrates8 said ,simmias4     
,will you not impart them to us8--for   
they are a benefit in which we too are  
entitled to share4      ,moreover1 if   
you succeed in convincing us1 that will 
be an      answer to the charge against 
yourself4        ,i will do my best1    
replied ,socrates4 ,but you must first  
let      me hear what ,crito wants2 he  
has long been wishing to say            
something to me4        ,only this1     
,socrates1 replied ,crito3--the         
attendant who is      to give you the   
poison has been telling me1 and he wants
 me      to tell you1 that you are not  
to talk much2 talking1 he says1         
increases heat1 and this is apt to      
interfere with the action      of the   
poison2 persons who excite themselves   
are sometimes      obliged to take a    

second or even a third dose4            
,then1 said ,socrates1 let him mind his 
business and be prepared      to give   
the poison twice or even thrice if      
necessary2      that is all4        ,i  
knew quite well what you would say1     
replied ,crito2 but ,i      was obliged 
to satisfy him4        ,never mind him1 
he said4    ,sidenote3 ,the true        
philosopher is always dying3--why then  
should he avoid  the death which he     
desires8        ,and now1 ,o my judges1 
,i desire to prove to you that the      
real philosopher has reason to be of    
good cheer when he is      about to die1
 and that after death he may hope to    
obtain the        #fd      greatest good
 in the other world4 ,and how this may  
be1      ,simmias and ,cebes1 ,i will   
endeavour to explain4 ,for ,i      deem 
that the true votary of philosophy is   
likely to be      misunderstood by other
 men2 they do not perceive that he      
is always pursuing death and dying2 and 
if this be so1 and      he has had the  

desire of death all his life long1 why  
when      his time comes should he      
repine at that which he has been        
always pursuing and desiring8           
,sidenote3 #8,how the world will laugh  
when they hear this6'        ,simmias   
said laughingly3 ,though not in a       
laughing      humour1 you have made me  
laugh1 ,socrates2 for ,i cannot         
help thinking that the many when they   
hear your words will      say how truly 
you have described philosophers1 and our
      people at home will likewise say  
that the life which philosophers        
desire is in reality death1 and that    
they have found      them out to be     
deserving of the death which they       
desire4    ,sidenote3 ,simmias and      
,socrates4    ,sidenote3 ,yes1 they do  
not understand the nature of death1 or  
why the  philosopher desires or deserves
 it4        ,and they are right1        
,simmias1 in thinking so1 with the      
exception of the words #8they have found
 them out2' for they      have not found

 out either what is the nature of that  
death      which the true philosopher   
deserves1 or how he deserves or         
desires death4 ,but enough of them3--let
 us discuss the      matter among       
ourselves4 ,do we believe that there is 
such a      thing as death8        ,to  
be sure1 replied ,simmias4        ,is it
 not the separation of soul and body8   
,and to be      dead is the completion  
of this2 when the soul exists in        
herself1 and is released from the body  
and the body is      released from the  
soul1 what is this but death8           
,just so1 he replied4    ,sidenote3     
,life is best when the soul is most     
freed from the concerns of  the body1   
and is alone and by herself4            
,there is another question1 which will  
probably throw light      on our present
 enquiry if you and ,i can agree about  
it3--,ought      the philosopher to care
 about the pleasures--if they      are  
to be called pleasures--of eating and   
drinking8        ,certainly not1        

answered ,simmias4        ,and what     
about the pleasures of love--should he  
care for      them8        ,by no means4
        ,and will he think much of the  
other ways of indulging the      body1  
for example1 the acquisition of costly  
raiment1 or      sandals1 or other      
adornments of the body8 ,instead of     
caring about them1 does he not rather   
despise anything more      than nature  
needs8 ,what do you say8        ,i      
should say that the true philosopher    
would despise them4        ,would you   
not say that he is entirely concerned   
with the      soul and not with the     
body8 ,he would like1 as far as he      
can1 to get away from the body and to   
turn to the soul4        ,quite true4   
,in matters of this sort philosophers1  
above all other men1      may be        
observed in every sort of way to        
dissever the soul           #fe         
from the communion of the body4         
,very true4        ,whereas1 ,simmias1  
the rest of the world are of opinion    

that to him who has no sense of pleasure
 and no part in      bodily pleasure1   
life is not worth having2 and that he   
who is      indifferent about them is as
 good as dead4        ,that is also     
true4    ,sidenote3 ,the doctrine of    
ideas4    ,sidenote3 ,the senses are    
untrustworthy guides3 they mislead the  
soul in  the search for truth4          
,what again shall we say of the actual  
acquirement of      knowledge8--is the  
body1 if invited to share in the        
enquiry1      a hinderer or a helper8 ,i
 mean to say1 have sight and            
hearing any truth in them8 ,are they    
not1 as the poets are      always       
telling us1 inaccurate witnesses8 and   
yet1 if even they      are inaccurate   
and indistinct1 what is to be said of   
the other      senses8--for you will    
allow that they are the best of them8   
,certainly1 he replied4        ,then    
when does the soul attain truth8--for in
 attempting      to consider anything in
 company with the body she is           

obviously deceived4        ,true4       
,then must not true existence be        
revealed to her in thought1      if at  
all8        ,yes4        ,and thought is
 best when the mind is gathered into    
herself      and none of these things   
trouble her--neither sounds nor         
sights nor pain nor any pleasure1--when 
she takes leave of      the body1 and   
has as little as possible to do with it1
 when she      has no bodily sense or   
desire1 but is aspiring after true      
being8        ,certainly4    ,sidenote3 
,and therefore the philosopher runs away
 from the body4        ,and in this the 
philosopher dishonours the body2 his    
soul      runs away from his body and   
desires to be alone and by      herself8
        ,that is true4    ,sidenote3    
,another argument4 ,the absolute truth  
of justice1 beauty1  and other ideas is 
not perceived by the senses1 which only 
introduce a  disturbing element4        
,well1 but there is another thing1      
,simmias3 ,is there or is      there not

 an absolute justice8        ,assuredly 
there is4        ,and an absolute beauty
 and absolute good8        ,of course4  
,but did you ever behold any of them    
with your eyes8        ,certainly not4  
,or did you ever reach them with any    
other bodily sense8--and      ,i speak  
not of these alone1 but of absolute     
greatness1      and health1 and         
strength1 and of the essence or true    
nature of      everything4 ,has the     
reality of them ever been perceived by  
you through the bodily organs8 or       
rather1 is not the nearest      approach
 to the knowledge of their several      
natures made by      him who so orders  
his intellectual vision as to have the  
most      exact conception of the       
essence of each thing which he          
considers8    ,sidenote3 ,the bodily    
nature4        ,certainly4        ,and  
he attains to the purest knowledge of   
them who goes      to each with the mind
 alone1 not introducing or intruding in 
the act of thought sight or any other   

sense together with      reason1 but    
with the very light of the mind in her  
own clearness    #ff      searches into 
the very truth of each2 he who has got  
rid1 as far as he can1 of eyes and ears 
and1 so to speak1 of the      whole     
body1 these being in his opinion        
distracting elements      which when    
they infect the soul hinder her from    
acquiring      truth and knowledge--who1
 if not he1 is likely to attain to the  
knowledge of true being8        ,what   
you say has a wonderful truth in it1    
,socrates1 replied      ,simmias4       
,sidenote3 ,the soul in herself must    
perceive things in themselves4          
,and when real philosophers consider all
 these things1 will      they not be led
 to make a reflection which they will   
express      in words something like the
 following8 #8,have we not found1'      
they will say1 #8a path of thought which
 seems to bring us and      our argument
 to the conclusion1 that while we are in
 the      body1 and while the soul is   

infected with the evils of the body1    
our desire will not be satisfied8 and   
our desire is of the truth4      ,for   
the body is a source of endless trouble 
to us by reason of      the mere        
requirement of food2 and is liable also 
to diseases      which overtake and     
impede us in the search after true      
being3      it fills us full of loves1  
and lusts1 and fears1 and fancies of all
      kinds1 and endless foolery1 and in
 fact1 as men say1 takes      away from 
us the power of thinking at all4 ,whence
 come      wars1 and fightings1 and     
factions8 whence but from the body      
and the lusts of the body8 ,wars are    
occasioned by the love      of money1   
and money has to be acquired for the    
sake and in      the service of the     
body2 and by reason of all these        
impediments      we have no time to give
 to philosophy2 and1 last and      worst
 of all1 even if we are at leisure and  
betake ourselves to      some           
speculation1 the body is always breaking

 in upon us1      causing turmoil and   
confusion in our enquiries1 and so      
amazing us that we are prevented from   
seeing the truth4      ,it has been     
proved to us by experience that if we   
would have      pure knowledge of       
anything we must be quit of the         
body--the      soul in herself must     
behold things in themselves3 and        
then we shall attain the wisdom which we
 desire1 and of      which we say that  
we are lovers2 not while we live1 but   
after      death2 for if while in       
company with the body1 the soul         
cannot have pure knowledge1 one of two  
things follows--either      knowledge is
 not to be attained at all1 or1 if at   
all1 after      death4 ,for then1 and   
not till then1 the soul will be parted  
#fg      from the body and exist in     
herself alone4 ,in this present         
life1 ,i reckon that we make the nearest
 approach to knowledge      when we have
 the least possible intercourse or      
communion      with the body1 and are   

not surfeited with the bodily           
nature1 but keep ourselves pure until   
the hour when ,god      himself is      
pleased to release us4 ,and thus having 
got rid of      the foolishness of the  
body we shall be pure and hold converse 
with the pure1 and know of ourselves the
 clear light      everywhere1 which is  
no other than the light of truth4' ,for 
the impure are not permitted to approach
 the pure4 ,these      are the sort of  
words1 ,simmias1 which the true lovers  
of      knowledge cannot help saying to 
one another1 and thinking4      ,you    
would agree2 would you not8             
,sidenote3 ,the hope of the departing   
soul4        ,undoubtedly1 ,socrates4   
,but1 ,o my friend1 if this be true1    
there is great reason to      hope that1
 going whither ,i go1 when ,i have come 
to the end      of my journey1 ,i shall 
attain that which has been the pursuit  
of my life4 ,and therefore ,i go on my  
way rejoicing1 and not      ,i only1 but
 every other man who believes that his  

mind has      been made ready and that  
he is in a manner purified4             
,certainly1 replied ,simmias4           
,sidenote3 ,purification is the         
separation of the soul from the body4   
,and what is purification but the       
separation of the soul      from the    
body1 as ,i was saying before2 the habit
 of the soul      gathering and         
collecting herself into herself from all
 sides      out of the body2 the        
dwelling in her own place alone1 as in  
another life1 so also in this1 as far as
 she can2--the release      of the soul 
from the chains of the body8            
,very true1 he said4        ,and this   
separation and release of the soul from 
the body      is termed death8          
,to be sure1 he said4        ,and the   
true philosophers1 and they only1 are   
ever seeking      to release the soul4  
,is not the separation and release of   
the      soul from the body their       
especial study8        ,that is true4   
,sidenote3 ,the true philosopher4       

,and1 as ,i was saying at first1 there  
would be a ridiculous      contradiction
 in men studying to live as nearly as   
they can in      a state of death1 and  
yet repining when it comes upon them4   
,clearly4    ,sidenote3 ,and therefore  
the true philosopher who has been always
 trying  to disengage himself from the  
body will rejoice in death4        ,and 
the true philosophers1 ,simmias1 are    
always occupied      in the practice of 
dying1 wherefore also to them least of  
all      men is death terrible4 ,look at
 the matter thus3--if they      have    
been in every way the enemies of the    
body1 and are      wanting to be alone  
with the soul1 when this desire of      
theirs      is granted1 how inconsistent
 would they be if they trembled      and
 repined1 instead of rejoicing at their 
departure to that      place where1 when
 they arrive1 they hope to gain that    
which      in life they desired--and    
this was wisdom--and at the same        
#fh      time to be rid of the company  

of their enemy4 ,many a man      has    
been willing to go to the world below   
animated by the      hope of seeing     
there an earthly love1 or wife1 or son1 
and      conversing with them4 ,and will
 he who is a true lover of      wisdom1 
and is strongly persuaded in like manner
 that only      in the world below he   
can worthily enjoy her1 still repine at 
death8 ,will he not depart with joy8    
,surely he will1 ,o my      friend1 if  
he be a true philosopher4 ,for he will  
have a firm      conviction that there1 
and there only1 he can find wisdom in   
her purity4 ,and if this be true1 he    
would be very absurd1 as      ,i was    
saying1 if he were afraid of death4     
,he would indeed1 replied ,simmias4     
,and when you see a man who is repining 
at the approach      of death1 is not   
his reluctance a sufficient proof that  
he is not      a lover of wisdom1 but a 
lover of the body1 and probably      at 
the same time a lover of either money or
 power1 or both8        ,quite so1 he   

replied4        ,and is not courage1    
,simmias1 a quality which is specially  
characteristic of the philosopher8      
,certainly4    ,sidenote3 ,he alone     
possesses the true secret of virtue1    
which in  ordinary men is merely based  
on a calculation of lesser and greater  
evils4        ,there is temperance      
again1 which even by the vulgar is      
supposed to consist in the control and  
regulation of the      passions1 and in 
the sense of superiority to them--is not
      temperance a virtue belonging to  
those only who despise the      body1   
and who pass their lives in philosophy8 
,most assuredly4        ,for the courage
 and temperance of other men1 if you    
will      consider them1 are really a   
contradiction4    ,sidenote3 ,the       
exchange of virtue4        ,how so8     
,well1 he said1 you are aware that death
 is regarded by      men in general as a
 great evil4        ,very true1 he said4
        ,and do not courageous men face 
death because they are      afraid of   

yet greater evils8        ,that is quite
 true4    ,sidenote3 ,ordinary men are  
courageous only from cowardice2         
temperate  from intemperance4           
,then all but the philosophers are      
courageous only from      fear1 and     
because they are afraid2 and yet that a 
man should      be courageous from fear1
 and because he is a coward1 is         
surely a strange thing4        ,very    
true4        ,and are not the temperate 
exactly in the same case8      ,they are
 temperate because they are             
intemperate--which      might seem to be
 a contradiction1 but is nevertheless   
the sort      of thing which happens    
with this foolish temperance4 ,for      
there are pleasures which they are      
afraid of losing2 and in      their     
desire to keep them1 they abstain from  
some pleasures1      because they are   
overcome by others and although to be   
conquered by pleasure is called by men  
intemperance1 to             #fi        
them the conquest of pleasure consists  

in being conquered      by pleasure4    
,and that is what ,i mean by saying     
that1 in a      sense1 they are made    
temperate through intemperance4         
,such appears to be the case4           
,sidenote3 ,true virtue is inseparable  
from wisdom4    ,sidenote3 ,the         
incredulity of ,cebes4    ,sidenote3    
,the thyrsus-bearers and the mystics4   
,yet the exchange of one fear or        
pleasure or pain for      another fear  
or pleasure or pain1 and of the greater 
for the      less1 as if they were      
coins1 is not the exchange of virtue4 ,o
      my blessed ,simmias1 is there not 
one true coin for which all      things 
ought to be exchanged8--and that is     
wisdom2 and      only in exchange for   
this1 and in company with this1 is      
anything      truly bought or sold1     
whether courage or temperance      or   
justice4 ,and is not all true virtue the
 companion of      wisdom1 no matter    
what fears or pleasures or other similar
      goods or evils may or may not     

attend her8 ,but the virtue      which  
is made up of these goods1 when they are
 severed      from wisdom and exchanged 
with one another1 is a shadow      of   
virtue only1 nor is there any freedom or
 health or truth in      her2 but in the
 true exchange there is a purging away  
of all      these things1 and           
temperance1 and justice1 and courage1   
and      wisdom herself are the         
purgation of them4 ,the founders of     
the mysteries would appear to have had a
 real meaning1 and      were not talking
 nonsense when they intimated in a      
figure      long ago that he who passes 
unsanctified and uninitiated into       
the world below will lie in a slough1   
but that he who arrives      there after
 initiation and purification will dwell 
with the      gods4 ,for #8many1' as    
they say in the mysteries1 #8are the    
thyrsus-bearers1 but few are the        
mystics1'--meaning1 as ,i      interpret
 the words1 #8the true philosophers4'   
,in the number      of whom1 during my  

whole life1 ,i have been seeking1       
according      to my ability1 to find a 
place2--whether ,i have sought in      a
 right way or not1 and whether ,i have  
succeeded or not1 ,i      shall truly   
know in a little while1 if ,god will1   
when ,i myself      arrive in the other 
world--such is my belief4 ,and therefore
      ,i maintain that ,i am right1     
,simmias and ,cebes1 in not             
grieving or repining at parting from you
 and my masters      in this world1 for 
,i believe that ,i shall equally find   
good      masters and friends in another
 world4 ,but most men do      not       
believe this saying2 if then ,i succeed 
in convincing you      by my defence    
better than ,i did the ,athenian judges1
 it will      be well4    ,sidenote3    
,fears are entertained lest the soul    
when she dies should be  scattered to   
the winds4        ,cebes answered3 ,i   
agree1 ,socrates1 in the greater part of
      what you say4 ,but in what        
concerns the soul1 men are apt          

#gj      to be incredulous2 they fear   
that when she has left the body      her
 place may be nowhere1 and that on the  
very day of death      she may perish   
and come to an end--immediately on her  
release      from the body1 issuing     
forth dispersed like smoke or      air  
and in her flight vanishing away into   
nothingness4 ,if      she could only be 
collected into herself after she has    
obtained      release from the evils of 
which you were speaking1 there          
would be good reason to hope1 ,socrates1
 that what you say      is true4 ,but   
surely it requires a great deal of      
argument and      many proofs to show   
that when the man is dead his soul      
yet exists1 and has any force or        
intelligence4        ,true1 ,cebes1 said
 ,socrates2 and shall ,i suggest that we
      converse a little of the          
probabilities of these things8        ,i
 am sure1 said ,cebes1 that ,i should   
greatly like to know      your opinion  
about them4    ,sidenote3 ,the          

discussion suited to the occasion4      
,i reckon1 said ,socrates1 that no one  
who heard me now1      not even if he   
were one of my old enemies1 the ,comic  
poets1      could accuse me of idle     
talking about matters in which ,i       
have no concern3--,if you please1 then1 
we will proceed with      the enquiry4  
,sidenote3 ,the alternation of all      
existence4        ,suppose we consider  
the question whether the souls of men   
after death are or are not in the world 
below4 ,there comes      into my mind an
 ancient doctrine which affirms that    
they      go from hence into the other  
world1 and returning hither1 are        
born again from the dead4 ,now if it be 
true that the living      come from the 
dead1 then our souls must exist in the  
other      world1 for if not1 how could 
they have been born again8      ,and    
this would be conclusive1 if there were 
any real evidence      that the living  
are only born from the dead2 but if this
 is not      so1 then other arguments   

will have to be adduced4        ,very   
true1 replied ,cebes4    ,sidenote3 ,all
 things which have opposites are        
generated out of  opposites4            
,then let us consider the whole         
question1 not in relation to      man   
only1 but in relation to animals        
generally1 and to plants1      and to   
everything of which there is generation1
 and the proof      will be easier4 ,are
 not all things which have opposites    
generated out of their opposites8 ,i    
mean such things as      good and evil1 
just and unjust--and there are          
innumerable      other opposites which  
are generated out of opposites4 ,and ,i 
want to show that in all opposites there
 is of necessity a      similar         
alternation2 ,i mean to say1 for        
example1 that anything      which       
becomes greater must become greater     
after being      less4        ,true4    
,and that which becomes less must have  
been once greater      and then have    
become less4                            

#ga        ,yes4        ,and the weaker 
is generated from the stronger1 and the 
swifter from the slower4        ,very   
true4        ,and the worse is from the 
better1 and the more just is from       
the more unjust4        ,of course4     
,and is this true of all opposites8 and 
are we convinced      that all of them  
are generated out of opposites8         
,yes4    ,sidenote3 ,life and death like
 waking and sleeping4    ,sidenote3 ,and
 there are intermediate processes or    
passages into and  out of one another1  
such as increase and diminution1        
division and  composition1 and the like4
        ,and in this universal          
opposition of all things1 are there not 
also two intermediate processes which   
are ever going on1 from      one to the 
other opposite1 and back again2 where   
there is a      greater and a less there
 is also an intermediate process of     
increase and diminution1 and that which 
grows is said to      wax1 and that     
which decays to wane8        ,yes1 he   

said4        ,and there are many other  
processes1 such as division and         
composition1 cooling and heating1 which 
equally involve a      passage into and 
out of one another4 ,and this           
necessarily      holds of all opposites1
 even though not always expressed in    
words--they are really generated out of 
one another1 and      there is a passing
 or process from one to the other of    
them8        ,very true1 he replied4    
,well1 and is there not an opposite of  
life1 as sleep is the      opposite of  
waking8        ,true1 he said4          
,and what is it8        ,death1 he      
answered4        ,and these1 if they are
 opposites1 are generated the one       
from the other1 and have their two      
intermediate processes      also8       
,of course4        ,now1 said ,socrates1
 ,i will analyze one of the two pairs of
      opposites which ,i have mentioned 
to you1 and also its intermediate       
processes1 and you shall analyze the    
other to me4      ,one of them ,i term  

sleep1 the other waking4 ,the state of  
sleep is opposed to the state of waking1
 and out of sleeping      waking is     
generated1 and out of waking1 sleeping2 
and the      process of generation is in
 the one case falling asleep1 and in    
the other waking up4 ,do you agree8     
,i entirely agree4    ,sidenote3 ,life  
is opposed to death1 as waking is to    
sleeping1 and in  like manner they are  
generated from one another4             
,then1 suppose that you analyze life and
 death to me in the      same manner4   
,is not death opposed to life8          
,yes4        ,and they are generated one
 from the other8        ,yes4           
,what is generated from the living8     
,the dead4        ,and what from the    
dead8        ,i can only say in         
answer--the living4        ,then the    
living1 whether things or persons1      
,cebes1 are      generated from the     
dead8    ,sidenote3 ,the circle of      
nature4        ,that is clear1 he       
replied4        ,then the inference is  

that our souls exist in the world       
below8        ,that is true4        ,and
 one of the two processes or generations
 is visible--for      surely the act of 
dying is visible8        ,surely1 he    
said4        ,what then is to be the    
result8 ,shall we exclude the           
opposite process8 and shall we suppose  
nature to walk on      one leg only8    
,must we not rather assign to death some
      corresponding process of          
generation8        ,certainly1 he       
replied4        ,and what is that       
process8        ,return to life4        
,and return to life1 if there be such a 
thing1 is the birth      of the dead    
into the world of the living8           
#gb        ,quite true4        ,then    
here is a new way by which we arrive at 
the conclusion      that the living come
 from the dead1 just as the dead        
come from the living2 and this1 if true1
 affords a most certain      proof that 
the souls of the dead exist in some     
place out of      which they come again4

        ,yes1 ,socrates1 he said2 the   
conclusion seems to flow                
necessarily out of our previous         
admissions4    ,sidenote3 ,if there were
 no compensation or return in nature1   
all things  would pass into the state of
 death4        ,and that these          
admissions were not unfair1 ,cebes1 he  
said1      may be shown1 ,i think1 as   
follows3 ,if generation were in a       
straight line only1 and there were no   
compensation or circle      in nature1  
no turn or return of elements into their
 opposites1      then you know that all 
things would at last have the same      
form and pass into the same state1 and  
there would be no      more generation  
of them4        ,what do you mean8 he   
said4    ,sidenote3 ,the doctrine of    
recollection4    ,sidenote3 ,the        
sleeping ,endymion would be unmeaning in
 a world of  sleepers4        ,a simple 
thing enough1 which ,i will illustrate  
by the case      of sleep1 he replied4  
,you know that if there were no         

alternation      of sleeping and waking1
 the tale of the sleeping      ,endymion
 would in the end have no meaning1      
because all      other things would be  
asleep too1 and he would not be         
distinguishable      from the rest4 ,or 
if there were composition      only1 and
 no division of substances1 then the    
chaos of      ,anaxagoras would come    
again4 ,and in like manner1 my      dear
 ,cebes1 if all things which partook of 
life were to die1      and after they   
were dead remained in the form of death1
 and      did not come to life again1   
all would at last die1 and nothing      
would be alive--what other result could 
there be8 ,for if the      living spring
 from any other things1 and they too    
die1 must      not all things at last be
 swallowed up in death8#bc        ,there
 is no escape1 ,socrates1 said ,cebes2  
and to me your      argument seems to be
 absolutely true4        ,yes1 he said1 
,cebes1 it is and must be so1 in my     
opinion2      and we have not been      

deluded in making these admissions2     
but ,i am confident that there truly is 
such a thing as living      again1 and  
that the living spring from the dead1   
and that the      souls of the dead are 
in existence1 and that the good souls   
have a better portion than the evil4    
,sidenote3 ,the doctrine of recollection
 implies a previous existence4          
,cebes added3 ,your favourite doctrine1 
,socrates1 that      knowledge is simply
 recollection1 if true1 also necessarily
      implies a previous time in which  
we have learned that which      we now  
recollect4 ,but this would be impossible
 unless our      soul had been in some  
place before existing in the form of    
#gc      man2 here then is another proof
 of the soul's immortality4        ,but 
tell me1 ,cebes1 said ,simmias1         
interposing1 what arguments      are    
urged in favour of this doctrine of     
recollection4 ,i      am not very sure  
at the moment that ,i remember them4    
,sidenote3 ,you put a question to a     

person1 and he answers out of his own   
mind4        ,one excellent proof1 said 
,cebes1 is afforded by questions4       
,if you put a question to a person in a 
right way1 he will give      a true     
answer of himself1 but how could he do  
this unless      there were knowledge   
and right reason already in him8        
,and this is most clearly shown when he 
is taken to a diagram      or to        
anything of that sort#bd4        ,but   
if1 said ,socrates1 you are still       
incredulous1 ,simmias1 ,i      would ask
 you whether you may not agree with me  
when you      look at the matter in     
another way2--,i mean1 if you are still 
incredulous as to whether knowledge is  
recollection8        ,incredulous ,i am 
not1 said ,simmias2 but ,i want to have 
this doctrine of recollection brought to
 my own recollection1      and1 from    
what ,cebes has said1 ,i am beginning to
 recollect      and be convinced3 but ,i
 should still like to hear what you     
were going to say4        ,this is what 

,i would say1 he replied3--,we should   
agree1      if ,i am not mistaken1 that 
what a man recollects he must      have 
known at some previous time4            
,very true4    ,sidenote3 ,the          
association of ideas4    ,sidenote3 ,a  
person may recollect what he has never  
seen together with  what he has seen4   
,how is this8        ,and what is the   
nature of this knowledge or             
recollection8      ,i mean to ask1      
,whether a person who1 having seen or   
heard      or in any way perceived      
anything1 knows not only that1 but      
has a conception of something else which
 is the subject1 not      of the same   
but of some other kind of knowledge1 may
 not be      fairly said to recollect   
that of which he has the conception8    
,what do you mean8        ,i mean what  
,i may illustrate by the following      
instance3--,the      knowledge of a lyre
 is not the same as the knowledge of    
a man8        ,true4    ,sidenote3      
,recollection is the knowledge of some  

person or thing derived  from some other
 person or thing which may be either    
like or unlike them4        ,and yet    
what is the feeling of lovers when they 
recognize      a lyre1 or a garment1 or 
anything else which the beloved has     
been in the habit of using8 ,do not     
they1 from knowing the      lyre1 form  
in the mind's eye an image of the youth 
to whom      the lyre belongs8 ,and this
 is recollection4 ,in like manner       
any one who sees ,simmias may remember  
,cebes2 and there      are endless      
examples of the same thing4             
,endless1 indeed1 replied ,simmias4     
,and recollection is most commonly a    
process of recovering      that which   
has been already forgotten through time 
and      inattention4        ,very true1
 he said4        ,well2 and may you not 
also from seeing the picture of a       
horse or a lyre remember a man8 and from
 the picture of      ,simmias1 you may  
be led to remember ,cebes4        ,true4
        ,or you may also be led to the  

recollection of ,simmias      himself8  
,quite so4                              
#gd        ,and in all these cases1 the 
recollection may be derived      from   
things either like or unlike8        ,it
 may be4        ,and when the           
recollection is derived from like       
things1 then      another consideration 
is sure to arise1 which is--whether the 
likeness in any degree falls short or   
not of that which is      recollected8  
,sidenote3 ,the ideal equality and the  
material equals4        ,very true1 he  
said4        ,and shall we proceed a    
step further1 and affirm that there     
is such a thing as equality1 not of one 
piece of wood or stone      with        
another1 but that1 over and above this1 
there is absolute      equality8 ,shall 
we say so8        ,say so1 yes1 replied 
,simmias1 and swear to it1 with all the 
confidence in life4        ,and do we   
know the nature of this absolute        
essence8        ,to be sure1 he said4   
,sidenote3 ,the imperfect equality of   

pieces of wood or stone suggests the    
perfect idea of equality4        ,and   
whence did we obtain our knowledge8 ,did
 we not      see equalities of material 
things1 such as pieces of wood and      
stones1 and gather from them the idea of
 an equality which is      different    
from them8 ,for you will acknowledge    
that there      is a difference4 ,or    
look at the matter in another way3--,do 
not the same pieces of wood or stone    
appear at one time      equal1 and at   
another time unequal8        ,that is   
certain4        ,but are real equals    
ever unequal8 or is the idea of equality
      the same as of inequality8        
,impossible1 ,socrates4        ,then    
these 7so-called7 equals are not the    
same with the idea      of equality8    
,i should say1 clearly not1 ,socrates4  
,and yet from these equals1 although    
differing from the idea      of         
equality1 you conceived and attained    
that idea8        ,very true1 he said4  
,which might be like1 or might be unlike

 them8        ,yes4        ,but that    
makes no difference3 whenever from      
seeing one      thing you conceived     
another1 whether like or unlike1 there  
must surely have been an act of         
recollection8        ,very true4        
,but what would you say of equal        
portions of wood and      stone1 or     
other material equals8 and what is the  
impression      produced by them8 ,are  
they equals in the same sense in        
which absolute equality is equal8 or do 
they fall short of      this perfect    
equality in a measure8        ,yes1 he  
said1 in a very great measure too4      
,sidenote3 ,but if the material equals  
when compared to the ideal equality     
fall short of it1 the ideal equality    
with which they are compared must be    
prior to them1 though only known through
 the medium of them4        ,and must we
 not allow1 that when ,i or any one1    
looking at      any object1 observes    
that the thing which he sees aims at    
being some other thing1 but falls short 

of1 and cannot be1 that      other      
thing1 but is inferior1 he who makes    
this observation      must have had a   
previous knowledge of that to which the 
other1 although similar1 was inferior8  
,sidenote3 ,the ideal equality4         
,certainly4        ,and has not this    
been our own case in the matter of      
equals      and of absolute equality8   
,precisely4        ,then we must have   
known equality previously to the time   
when we first saw the material equals1  
and reflected that all       #ge        
these apparent equals strive to attain  
absolute equality1 but      fall short  
of it8        ,very true4        ,and we
 recognize also that this absolute      
equality has only      been known1 and  
can only be known1 through the medium of
      sight or touch1 or of some other  
of the senses1 which are all      alike 
in this respect8        ,yes1 ,socrates1
 as far as the argument is concerned1   
one of      them is the same as the     
other4        ,from the senses then is  

derived the knowledge that all          
sensible things aim at an absolute      
equality of which they fall      short8 
,yes4        ,then before we began to   
see or hear or perceive in any      way1
 we must have had a knowledge of        
absolute equality1 or      we could not 
have referred to that standard the      
equals which      are derived from the  
senses8--for to that they all aspire1   
and      of that they fall short4       
,no other inference can be drawn from   
the previous statements4        ,and did
 we not see and hear and have the use of
 our other      senses as soon as we    
were born8        ,certainly4           
,sidenote3 ,that higher sense of        
equality must have been known to us     
before we were born1 was forgotten at   
birth1 and was recovered by the use  of 
the senses4        ,then we must have   
acquired the knowledge of equality at   
some previous time8        ,yes4        
,that is to say1 before we were born1 ,i
 suppose8        ,true4    ,sidenote3   

,the two alternatives4        ,and if we
 acquired this knowledge before we were 
born1      and were born having the use 
of it1 then we also knew before      we 
were born and at the instant of birth   
not only the equal or      the greater  
or the less1 but all other ideas2 for we
 are not      speaking only of equality1
 but of beauty1 goodness1 justice1      
holiness1 and of all which we stamp with
 the name of essence      in the        
dialectical process1 both when we ask   
and when we      answer questions4 ,of  
all this we may certainly affirm that   
we acquired the knowledge before birth8 
,we may4        ,but if1 after having   
acquired1 we have not forgotten what    
in each case we acquired1 then we must  
always have come      into life having  
knowledge1 and shall always continue to 
know      as long as life lasts--for    
knowing is the acquiring and retaining  
knowledge and not forgetting4 ,is not   
forgetting1 ,simmias1      just the     
losing of knowledge8        ,quite true1

 ,socrates4    ,sidenote3 ,what is      
called learning therefore is only a     
recollection of  ideas which we         
possessed in a previous state4          
,but if the knowledge which we acquired 
before birth was      lost by us at     
birth1 and if afterwards by the use of  
the senses      we recovered what we    
previously knew1 will not the process   
which we call learning be a recovering  
of the knowledge      which is natural  
to us1 and may not this be rightly      
termed      recollection8        ,very  
true4        ,so much is clear--that    
when we perceive something1 either      
#gf      by the help of sight1 or       
hearing1 or some other sense1 from      
that perception we are able to obtain a 
notion of some other      thing like or 
unlike which is associated with it but  
has been      forgotten4 ,whence1 as ,i 
was saying1 one of two alternatives     
follows3--either we had this knowledge  
at birth1 and continued      to know    
through life2 or1 after birth1 those who

 are      said to learn only remember1  
and learning is simply recollection4    
,yes1 that is quite true1 ,socrates4    
,and which alternative1 ,simmias1 do you
 prefer8 ,had we      the knowledge at  
our birth1 or did we recollect the      
things      which we knew previously to 
our birth8        ,i cannot decide at   
the moment4        ,at any rate you can 
decide whether he who has knowledge     
will or will not be able to render an   
account of his knowledge8      ,what do 
you say8        ,certainly1 he will4    
,sidenote3 ,the pre-existence of the    
soul4        ,but do you think that     
every man is able to give an account    
of these very matters about which we are
 speaking8        ,would that they      
could1 ,socrates1 but ,i rather fear    
that      to-morrow1 at this time1 there
 will no longer be any one      alive   
who is able to give an account of them  
such as ought      to be given4         
,then you are not of opinion1 ,simmias1 
that all men know      these things8    

,certainly not4        ,they are in     
process of recollecting that which they 
learned      before8        ,certainly4 
,but when did our souls acquire this    
knowledge8--not since      we were born 
as men8        ,certainly not4          
,and therefore1 previously8        ,yes4
    ,sidenote3 ,but if so1 our souls    
must have existed before they were in   
the  form of man2 or if not the souls1  
then not the ideas4        ,then1       
,simmias1 our souls must also have      
existed without      bodies before they 
were in the form of man1 and must have  
had intelligence4        ,unless indeed 
you suppose1 ,socrates1 that these      
notions are      given us at the very   
moment of birth2 for this is the only   
time which remains4        ,yes1 my     
friend1 but if so1 when do we lose them8
 for they      are not in us when we are
 born--that is admitted4 ,do we         
lose them at the moment of receiving    
them1 or if not at what      other time8
        ,no1 ,socrates1 ,i perceive that

 ,i was unconsciously talking           
nonsense4        ,then may we not say1  
,simmias1 that if1 as we are always     
repeating1 there is an absolute beauty1 
and goodness1 and      an absolute      
essence of all things2 and if to this1  
which is now      discovered to have    
existed in our former state1 we refer   
all      our sensations1 and with this  
compare them1 finding these ideas       
to be pre-existent and our inborn       
possession--then our souls      must    
have had a prior existence1 but if not1 
there would be no      force in the     
argument8 ,there is the same proof that 
these      ideas must have existed      
before we were born1 as that our        
souls existed before we were born2 and  
if not the ideas1 then      not the     
souls4    ,sidenote3 ,simmias and ,cebes
 are not quite satisfied4        ,yes1  
,socrates2 ,i am convinced that there is
 precisely the      same necessity for  
the one as for the other2 and the       
argument      retreats successfully to  

the position that the existence         
#gg      of the soul before birth cannot
 be separated from the existence      of
 the essence of which you speak4 ,for   
there is      nothing which to my mind  
is so patent as that beauty1 goodness1  
and the other notions of which you were 
just now speaking1      have a most real
 and absolute existence2 and ,i am      
satisfied with the proof4        ,well1 
but is ,cebes equally satisfied8 for ,i 
must convince      him too4             
,sidenote3 ,simmias and ,cebes are      
agreed in thinking that the previous    
existence of the soul is sufficiently   
proved1 but not the future  existence4  
,i think1 said ,simmias1 that ,cebes is 
satisfied3 although he      is the most 
incredulous of mortals1 yet ,i believe  
that he is      sufficiently convinced  
of the existence of the soul before     
birth4 ,but that after death the soul   
will continue to exist is      not yet  
proven even to my own satisfaction4 ,i  
cannot get      rid of the feeling of   

the many to which ,cebes was            
referring--the      feeling that when   
the man dies the soul will be dispersed1
      and that this may be the          
extinction of her4 ,for      admitting  
that she may have been born elsewhere1  
and      framed out of other elements1  
and was in existence before             
entering the human body1 why after      
having entered in and      gone out     
again may she not herself be destroyed  
and come      to an end8        ,very   
true1 ,simmias1 said ,cebes2 about half 
of what was      required has been      
proven2 to wit1 that our souls existed  
before we were born3--that the soul will
 exist after death as      well as      
before birth is the other half of which 
the proof is      still wanting1 and has
 to be supplied2 when that is given     
the demonstration will be complete4     
,sidenote3 ,but if the soul passes from 
death to birth1 she must exist  after   
death as well as before birth4          
,but that proof1 ,simmias and ,cebes1   

has been already      given1 said       
,socrates1 if you put the two arguments 
together--,i      mean this and the     
former one1 in which we admitted        
that everything living is born of the   
dead4 ,for if the soul      exists      
before birth1 and in coming to life and 
being born can      be born only from   
death and dying1 must she not after     
death      continue to exist1 since she 
has to be born again8--,surely      the 
proof which you desire has been already 
furnished4      ,still ,i suspect that  
you and ,simmias would be glad to probe 
the argument further4 ,like children1   
you are haunted with      a fear that   
when the soul leaves the body1 the wind 
may      really blow her away and       
scatter her2 especially if a man        
should happen to die in a great storm   
and not when the sky      is calm4      
,sidenote3 #8,the child within us4'     
,cebes answered with a smile3 ,then1    
,socrates1 you must      argue us out of
 our fears--and yet1 strictly speaking1 

they      are not our fears1 but there  
is a child within us to whom      death 
is a sort of hobgoblin3 him too we must 
persuade not      to be afraid when he  
is alone in the dark4    ,sidenote3 ,the
 fear that the soul will vanish into air
 must be charmed  away4        ,socrates
 said3 ,let the voice of the charmer be 
applied      daily until you have       
charmed away the fear4        ,and where
 shall we find a good charmer of our    
fears1                #gh               
,socrates1 when you are gone8           
,hellas1 he replied1 is a large place1  
,cebes1 and has      many good men1 and 
there are barbarous races not a few3    
seek for him among them all1 far and    
wide1 sparing      neither pains nor    
money2 for there is no better way of    
spending your money4 ,and you must seek 
among yourselves      too2 for you will 
not find others better able to make     
the search4        ,the search1 replied 
,cebes1 shall certainly be made4 ,and   
now1 if you please1 let us return to the

 point of the argument      at which we 
digressed4        ,by all means1 replied
 ,socrates2 what else should ,i         
please8        ,very good4    ,sidenote3
 ,what is the element which is liable to
 be scattered8--,not the  simple and    
unchangeable1 but the composite and     
changing4        ,must we not1 said     
,socrates1 ask ourselves what that is   
which1 as we imagine1 is liable to be   
scattered1 and about      which we fear8
 and what again is that about which we  
have      no fear8 ,and then we may     
proceed further to enquire      whether 
that which suffers dispersion is or is  
not of the      nature of soul--our     
hopes and fears as to our own souls will
      turn upon the answers to these    
questions4        ,very true1 he said4  
,now the compound or composite may be   
supposed to be      naturally capable1  
as of being compounded1 so also of being
      dissolved2 but that which is      
uncompounded1 and that only1      must  
be1 if anything is1 indissoluble4       

,yes2 ,i should imagine so1 said ,cebes4
    ,sidenote3 ,the seen and the unseen4
        ,and the uncompounded may be    
assumed to be the same      and         
unchanging1 whereas the compound is     
always changing      and never the same4
        ,i agree1 he said4    ,sidenote3
 ,the soul and the ideas belong to the  
class of the unchanging1  which is also 
the unseen4        ,then now let us     
return to the previous discussion4 ,is  
that idea or essence1 which in the      
dialectical process we      define as   
essence or true existence--whether      
essence of      equality1 beauty1 or    
anything else--are these essences1 ,i   
say1      liable at times to some degree
 of change8 or are they each      of    
them always what they are1 having the   
same simple self-existent      and      
unchanging forms1 not admitting of      
variation at      all1 or in any way1 or
 at any time8        ,they must be      
always the same1 ,socrates1 replied     
,cebes4        ,and what would you say  

of the many beautiful--whether      men 
or horses or garments or any other      
things which are      named by the same 
names and may be called equal or        
beautiful1--are they all unchanging and 
the same always1 or      quite the      
reverse8 ,may they not rather be        
described as      almost always changing
 and hardly ever the same1 either       
with themselves or with one another8    
,the latter1 replied ,cebes2 they are   
always in a state of      change4       
,and these you can touch and see and    
perceive with the               #gi     
senses1 but the unchanging things you   
can only perceive      with the         
mind--they are invisible and are not    
seen8        ,that is very true1 he     
said4        ,well then1 added          
,socrates1 let us suppose that there are
      two sorts of existences--one seen1
 the other unseen4        ,let us       
suppose them4        ,the seen is the   
changing1 and the unseen is the         
unchanging8        ,that may be also    

supposed4        ,and1 further1 is not  
one part of us body1 another part       
soul8        ,to be sure4        ,and to
 which class is the body more alike and 
akin8        ,clearly to the seen--no   
one can doubt that4        ,and is the  
soul seen or not seen8        ,not by   
man1 ,socrates4        ,and what we mean
 by #8seen' and #8not seen' is that     
which      is or is not visible to the  
eye of man8    ,sidenote3 ,the nature of
 the soul4        ,yes1 to the eye of   
man4        ,and is the soul seen or not
 seen8        ,not seen4        ,unseen 
then8        ,yes4        ,then the soul
 is more like to the unseen1 and the    
body to      the seen8        ,that     
follows necessarily1 ,socrates4         
,sidenote3 ,the soul which is unseen1   
when she makes use of the bodily        
senses1 is dragged down into the region 
of the changeable1 and must  return into
 herself before she can attain to true  
wisdom4        ,and were we not saying  
long ago that the soul when using       

the body as an instrument of perception1
 that is to say1 when      using the    
sense of sight or hearing or some other 
sense 7for      the meaning of          
perceiving through the body is          
perceiving      through the             
senses7--were we not saying that the    
soul too is      then dragged by the    
body into the region of the changeable1 
and wanders and is confused2 the world  
spins round her1      and she is like a 
drunkard1 when she touches change8      
,very true4        ,but when returning  
into herself she reflects1 then she     
passes into the other world1 the region 
of purity1 and      eternity1 and       
immortality1 and unchangeableness1 which
 are      her kindred1 and with them she
 ever lives1 when she is      by herself
 and is not let or hindered2 then she   
ceases      from her erring ways1 and   
being in communion with the unchanging  
is unchanging4 ,and this state of the   
soul is      called wisdom8        ,that
 is well and truly said1 ,socrates1 he  

replied4        ,and to which class is  
the soul more nearly alike and akin1    
as far as may be inferred from this     
argument1 as well as      from the      
preceding one8    ,sidenote3 ,the soul  
is of the nature of the unchangeable1   
the body of the  changing2 the soul     
rules1 the body serves2 the soul is in  
the likeness of  the divine1 the body of
 the mortal4        ,i think1 ,socrates1
 that1 in the opinion of every one who  
follows the argument1 the soul will be  
infinitely more like      the           
unchangeable--even the most stupid      
person will not      deny that4         
,and the body is more like the changing8
        ,yes4    ,sidenote3 ,the passing
 of the soul4        ,yet once more     
consider the matter in another light3   
,when the soul and the body are united1 
then nature orders           #hj        
the soul to rule and govern1 and the    
body to obey and serve4      ,now which 
of these two functions is akin to the   
divine8      and which to the mortal8   

,does not the divine appear to      you 
to be that which naturally orders and   
rules1 and the      mortal to be that   
which is subject and servant8           
,true4        ,and which does the soul  
resemble8        ,the soul resembles the
 divine1 and the body the mortal--there 
can be no doubt of that1 ,socrates4     
,then reflect1 ,cebes3 of all which has 
been said is not this      the          
conclusion8--that the soul is in the    
very likeness of the      divine1 and   
immortal1 and intellectual1 and uniform1
 and      indissoluble1 and             
unchangeable2 and that the body is in   
the      very likeness of the human1 and
 mortal1 and unintellectual1      and   
multiform1 and dissoluble1 and          
changeable4 ,can this1      my dear     
,cebes1 be denied8        ,it cannot4   
,but if it be true1 then is not the body
 liable to speedy      dissolution8 and 
is not the soul almost or altogether    
indissoluble8        ,certainly4        
,sidenote3 ,even from the body something

 may be learned about the soul2  for the
 corpse of a man lasts for some time1   
and when embalmed1 in a  manner for     
ever4        ,and do you further        
observe1 that after a man is dead1 the  
body1 or visible part of him1 which is  
lying in the visible      world1 and is 
called a corpse1 and would naturally be 
dissolved      and decomposed and       
dissipated1 is not dissolved or         
decomposed at once1 but may remain for  
some time1 nay      even for a long     
time1 if the constitution be sound at   
the      time of death1 and the season  
of the year favourable8 ,for      the   
body when shrunk and embalmed1 as the   
manner is in      ,egypt1 may remain    
almost entire through infinite ages2 and
      even in decay1 there are still    
some portions1 such as the      bones   
and ligaments1 which are practically    
indestructible3--,do      you agree8    
,yes4    ,sidenote3 ,how unlikely then  
that the soul should at once pass away6 
,and is it likely that the soul1 which  

is invisible1 in passing      to the    
place of the true ,hades1 which like her
 is invisible1      and pure1 and noble1
 and on her way to the good and wise    
,god1 whither1 if ,god will1 my soul is 
also soon to go1--that      the soul1 ,i
 repeat1 if this be her nature and      
origin1 will be      blown away and     
destroyed immediately on quitting the   
body1 as the many say8 ,that can never  
be1 my dear      ,simmias and ,cebes4   
,the truth rather is1 that the soul     
which is pure at departing and draws    
after her no bodily      taint1 having  
never voluntarily during life had       
connection with      the body1 which she
 is ever avoiding1 herself gathered into
      herself2--and making such         
abstraction her perpetual study--which  
means that she has been a true disciple 
of philosophy2              #ha      and
 therefore has in fact been always      
engaged in      the practice of dying8  
,for is not philosophy the study of     
death8--        ,certainly--            

,sidenote3 ,rather when free from bodily
 impurity she departs to the seats  of  
the blessed4        ,that soul1 ,i say1 
herself invisible1 departs to the       
invisible      world--to the divine and 
immortal and rational3 thither          
arriving1 she is secure of bliss and is 
released from the error      and folly  
of men1 their fears and wild passions   
and all      other human ills1 and for  
ever dwells1 as they say of the         
initiated1 in company with the gods#be4 
,is not this true1      ,cebes8         
,yes1 said ,cebes1 beyond a doubt4      
,sidenote3 ,the impure soul made        
corporeal4        ,but the soul which   
has been polluted1 and is impure at the 
time of her departure1 and is the       
companion and servant of      the body  
always1 and is in love with and         
fascinated by the      body and by the  
desires and pleasures of the body1 until
 she      is led to believe that the    
truth only exists in a bodily form1     
which a man may touch and see and taste1

 and use for the      purposes of his   
lusts1--the soul1 ,i mean1 accustomed to
 hate      and fear and avoid the       
intellectual principle1 which to the    
bodily eye is dark and invisible1 and   
can be attained only by                 
philosophy2--do you suppose that such a 
soul will depart      pure and          
unalloyed8        ,impossible1 he       
replied4        ,she is held fast by the
 corporeal1 which the continual         
association and constant care of the    
body have wrought into      her nature4 
,very true4    ,sidenote3 ,but the souls
 of the wicked are dragged down by the  
corporeal  element4        ,and this    
corporeal element1 my friend1 is heavy  
and      weighty and earthy1 and is that
 element of sight by which      a soul  
is depressed and dragged down again into
 the visible      world1 because she is 
afraid of the invisible and of the world
      below--prowling about tombs and   
sepulchres1 near which1      as they    
tell us1 are seen certain ghostly       

apparitions of souls      which have not
 departed pure1 but are cloyed with     
sight and      therefore visible#bf4    
,sidenote3 ,transmigration of men into  
animals4        ,that is very likely1   
,socrates4        ,yes1 that is very    
likely1 ,cebes2 and these must be the   
souls1 not of the good1 but of the evil1
 which are compelled      to wander     
about such places in payment of the     
penalty of      their former evil way of
 life2 and they continue to wander      
until through the craving after the     
corporeal which never      leaves them1 
they are imprisoned finally in another  
body4      ,and they may be supposed to 
find their prisons in the same          
natures which they have had in their    
former lives4        ,what natures do   
you mean1 ,socrates8    ,sidenote3 ,they
 wander into the bodies of the animals  
or of birds which  are of a like nature 
with themselves4        ,what ,i mean is
 that men who have followed after       
gluttony1      and wantonness1 and      

drunkenness1 and have had no thought    
of avoiding them1 would pass into asses 
and animals of that      sort4 ,what do 
you think8                              
#hb        ,i think such an opinion to  
be exceedingly probable4        ,and    
those who have chosen the portion of    
injustice1 and      tyranny1 and        
violence1 will pass into wolves1 or into
 hawks      and kites2--whither else can
 we suppose them to go8        ,yes1    
said ,cebes2 with such natures1 beyond  
question4        ,and there is no       
difficulty1 he said1 in assigning to all
 of      them places answering to their 
several natures and propensities8       
,there is not1 he said4        ,some are
 happier than others2 and the happiest  
both in      themselves and in the place
 to which they go are those who         
have practised the civil and social     
virtues which are called      temperance
 and justice1 and are acquired by habit 
and attention      without philosophy   
and mind#bg4    ,sidenote3 ,the         

deliverance of the soul by philosophy4  
,why are they the happiest8             
,because they may be expected to pass   
into some gentle      and social kind   
which is like their own1 such as bees or
 wasps      or ants1 or back again into 
the form of man1 and just and           
moderate men may be supposed to spring  
from them4        ,very likely4         
,no one who has not studied philosophy  
and who is not      entirely pure at the
 time of his departure is allowed to    
enter      the company of the ,gods1 but
 the lover of knowledge only4      ,and 
this is the reason1 ,simmias and ,cebes1
 why the true      votaries of          
philosophy abstain from all fleshly     
lusts1 and hold      out against them   
and refuse to give themselves up to     
them1--not      because they fear       
poverty or the ruin of their families1  
like the lovers of money1 and the world 
in general2 nor like      the lovers of 
power and honour1 because they dread the
 dishonour      or disgrace of evil     

deeds4        ,no1 ,socrates1 that would
 not become them1 said ,cebes4          
,no indeed1 he replied2 and therefore   
they who have any      care of their own
 souls1 and do not merely live moulding 
and      fashioning the body1 say       
farewell to all this2 they will not     
walk in the ways of the blind3 and when 
philosophy offers      them purification
 and release from evil1 they feel that  
they      ought not to resist her       
influence1 and whither she leads they   
turn and follow4        ,what do you    
mean1 ,socrates8    ,sidenote3 ,why the 
philosopher is temperate4    ,sidenote3 
,the new consciousness which is awakened
 by philosophy4    ,sidenote3 ,the      
philosopher considers not only the      
consequences of  pleasures and pains1   
but1 what is far worse1 the false lights
 in which  they show objects4        ,i 
will tell you1 he said4 ,the lovers of  
knowledge are conscious      that the   
soul was simply fastened and glued to   
the      body--until philosophy received

 her1 she could only view real          
existence through the bars of a prison1 
not in and through      herself2 she was
 wallowing in the mire of every sort of 
ignorance1 and by reason of lust had    
become the principal      accomplice in 
her own captivity4 ,this was her        
original              #hc      state2   
and then1 as ,i was saying1 and as the  
lovers of      knowledge are well aware1
 philosophy1 seeing how terrible        
was her confinement1 of which she was to
 herself the cause1      received and   
gently comforted her and sought to      
release her1      pointing out that the 
eye and the ear and the other senses    
are full of deception1 and persuading   
her to retire from them1      and       
abstain from all but the necessary use  
of them1 and be      gathered up and    
collected into herself1 bidding her     
trust in      herself and her own pure  
apprehension of pure existence1 and     
mistrust whatever comes to her through  
other channels      and is subject to   

variation2 for such things are visible  
and      tangible1 but what she sees in 
her own nature is intelligible      and 
invisible4 ,and the soul of the true    
philosopher thinks      that she ought  
not to resist this deliverance1 and     
therefore abstains      from pleasures  
and desires and pains and fears1 as far 
as she is able2 reflecting that when a  
man has great joys or      sorrows or   
fears or desires1 he suffers from them1 
not merely      the sort of evil which  
might be anticipated--as for example1   
the loss of his health or property which
 he has sacrificed to      his          
lusts--but an evil greater far1 which is
 the greatest and      worst of all     
evils1 and one of which he never thinks4
        ,what is it1 ,socrates8 said    
,cebes4        ,the evil is that when   
the feeling of pleasure or pain is      
most intense1 every soul of man imagines
 the objects of this      intense       
feeling to be then plainest and truest3 
but this is not      so1 they are really

 the things of sight4        ,very true4
        ,and is not this the state in   
which the soul is most enthralled       
by the body8        ,how so8            
,why1 because each pleasure and pain is 
a sort of nail      which nails and     
rivets the soul to the body1 until she  
becomes      like the body1 and believes
 that to be true which the      body    
affirms to be true2 and from agreeing   
with the body      and having the same  
delights she is obliged to have the same
      habits and haunts1 and is not     
likely ever to be pure at her           
departure to the world below1 but is    
always infected by the      body2 and so
 she sinks into another body and there  
germinates      and grows1 and has      
therefore no part in the communion      
of the divine and pure and simple4      
,most true1 ,socrates1 answered ,cebes4 
,and this1 ,cebes1 is the reason why the
 true lovers of      knowledge are      
temperate and brave2 and not for the    
reason      which the world gives4      

,certainly not4                         
#hd    ,sidenote3 ,the first great      
argument concluded4    ,sidenote3 ,the  
soul which has been emancipated from    
pleasures and pains  will not be blown  
away at death4        ,certainly not6   
,the soul of a philosopher will reason  
in      quite another way2 she will not 
ask philosophy to release      her in   
order that then released she may deliver
 herself up      again to the thraldom  
of pleasures and pains1 doing a work    
only to be undone again1 weaving instead
 of unweaving her      ,penelope's web4 
,but she will calm passion1 and follow  
reason1 and dwell in the contemplation  
of her1 beholding the      true and     
divine 7which is not matter of opinion71
 and thence      deriving nourishment4  
,thus she seeks to live while she       
lives1 and after death she hopes to go  
to her own kindred      and to that     
which is like her1 and to be freed from 
human      ills4 ,never fear1 ,simmias  
and ,cebes1 that a soul which has       

been thus nurtured and has had these    
pursuits1 will at her      departure    
from the body be scattered and blown    
away by the      winds and be nowhere   
and nothing4    ,sidenote3 ,simmias and 
,cebes have their doubts1 but think that
 this is  not the time to express them4 
,when ,socrates had done speaking1 for a
 considerable time      there was       
silence2 he himself appeared to be      
meditating1 as      most of us were1 on 
what had been said2 only ,cebes and     
,simmias spoke a few words to one       
another4 ,and ,socrates      observing  
them asked what they thought of the     
argument1      and whether there was    
anything wanting8 ,for1 said he1        
there are many points still open to     
suspicion and attack1 if      any one   
were disposed to sift the matter        
thoroughly4 ,should      you be         
considering some other matter ,i say no 
more1 but if      you are still in doubt
 do not hesitate to say exactly what you
      think1 and let us have anything   

better which you can suggest2      and  
if you think that ,i can be of any use1 
allow me to      help you4              
,simmias said3 ,i must confess1         
,socrates1 that doubts did      arise in
 our minds1 and each of us was urging   
and inciting      the other to put the  
question which we wanted to have        
answered but which neither of us liked  
to ask1 fearing that      our           
importunity might be troublesome at such
 a time4    ,sidenote3 ,socrates rebukes
 their want of confidence in him4       
,sidenote3 ,what is the meaning of the  
swans' singing8    ,sidenote3 ,simmias  
and ,cebes have still their             
difficulties4    ,sidenote3 ,they do not
 lament1 as men suppose1 at their       
approaching  death2 but they rejoice    
because they are going to the ,god1     
whose servants  they are4    ,sidenote3 
,socrates1 who is their fellow-servant1 
will not leave the  world less cheerily4
        ,socrates replied with a smile3 
,o ,simmias1 what are you      saying8  

,i am not very likely to persuade other 
men that      ,i do not regard my       
present situation as a misfortune1 if ,i
      cannot even persuade you that ,i  
am no worse off now than at      any    
other time in my life4 ,will you not    
allow that ,i have as      much of the  
spirit of prophecy in me as the swans8  
,for      they1 when they perceive that 
they must die1 having sung all          
their life long1 do then sing more      
lustily than ever1 rejoicing      in the
 thought that they are about to go away 
to the god            #he      whose    
ministers they are4 ,but men1 because   
they are themselves      afraid of      
death1 slanderously affirm of the swans 
that      they sing a lament at the     
last1 not considering that no bird      
sings when cold1 or hungry1 or in pain1 
not even the nightingale1      nor the  
swallow1 nor yet the hoopoe2 which are  
said      indeed to tune a lay of       
sorrow1 although ,i do not believe this 
to be true of them any more than of the 

swans4 ,but because      they are sacred
 to ,apollo1 they have the gift of      
prophecy1      and anticipate the good  
things of another world2 wherefore      
they sing and rejoice in that day more  
than ever they did      before4 ,and ,i 
too1 believing myself to be the         
consecrated      servant of the same    
,god1 and the fellow-servant of the     
swans1 and thinking that ,i have        
received from my master      gifts of   
prophecy which are not inferior to      
theirs1 would not      go out of life   
less merrily than the swans4 ,never mind
      then1 if this be your only        
objection1 but speak and ask anything   
which you like1 while the eleven        
magistrates of ,athens      allow4      
,sidenote3 ,simmias insists that they   
must probe truth to the bottom4         
,very good1 ,socrates1 said ,simmias2   
then ,i will tell you my                
difficulty1 and ,cebes will tell you    
his4 ,i feel myself 7and ,i      daresay
 that you have the same feeling71 how   

hard or rather      impossible is the   
attainment of any certainty about       
questions      such as these in the     
present life4 ,and yet ,i should deem   
him a coward who did not prove what is  
said about them to      the uttermost1  
or whose heart failed him before he had 
examined      them on every side4 ,for  
he should persevere until      he has   
achieved one of two things3 either he   
should discover1      or be taught the  
truth about them2 or1 if this be        
impossible1 ,i would have him take the  
best and most irrefragable      of human
 theories1 and let this be the raft upon
      which he sails through life--not  
without risk1 as ,i admit1 if      he   
cannot find some word of ,god which will
 more surely and      safely carry him4 
,and now1 as you bid me1 ,i will venture
 to      question you1 and then ,i shall
 not have to reproach myself            
hereafter with not having said at the   
time what ,i think4 ,for      when ,i   
consider the matter1 either alone or    

with ,cebes1 the      argument does     
certainly appear to me1 ,socrates1 to be
 not      sufficient4    ,sidenote3 ,the
 doubt of ,simmias4        ,socrates    
answered3 ,i dare say1 my friend1 that  
you may      be right1 but ,i should    
like to know in what respect the        
argument      is insufficient4          
,sidenote3 ,the harmony does not survive
 the lyre2 how then can the soul1  which
 is also a harmony1 survive the body8   
,in this respect1 replied               
,simmias3--,suppose a person to      use
 the same argument about harmony and the
 lyre--might      he not say that       
harmony is a thing invisible1           
incorporeal1      perfect1 divine1      
existing in the lyre which is           
harmonized1 but      #hf      that the  
lyre and the strings are matter and     
material1 composite1      earthy1 and   
akin to mortality8 ,and when some one   
breaks the lyre1 or cuts and rends the  
strings1 then he who      takes this    
view would argue as you do1 and on the  

same      analogy1 that the harmony     
survives and has not perished--you      
cannot imagine1 he would say1 that the  
lyre without the      strings1 and the  
broken strings themselves which are     
mortal      remain1 and yet that the    
harmony1 which is of heavenly      and  
immortal nature and kindred1 has        
perished--perished      before the      
mortal4 ,the harmony must still be      
somewhere1      and the wood and strings
 will decay before anything      can    
happen to that4 ,the thought1 ,socrates1
 must have      occurred to your own    
mind that such is our conception of the 
soul2 and that when the body is in a    
manner strung and      held together by 
the elements of hot and cold1 wet and   
dry1      then the soul is the harmony  
or due proportionate admixture      of  
them4 ,but if so1 whenever the strings  
of the body are      unduly loosened or 
overstrained through disease or other   
injury1 then the soul1 though most      
divine1 like other harmonies      of    

music or works of art1 of course        
perishes at once2      although the     
material remains of the body may last   
for a      considerable time1 until they
 are either decayed or burnt4      ,and 
if any one maintains that the soul1     
being the harmony      of the elements  
of the body1 is first to perish in that 
which is      called death1 how shall we
 answer him8        ,socrates looked    
fixedly at us as his manner was1 and    
said      with a smile3 ,simmias has    
reason on his side2 and why does        
not some one of you who is better able  
than myself answer      him8 for there  
is force in his attack upon me4 ,but    
perhaps1      before we answer him1 we  
had better also hear what ,cebes        
has to say that we may gain time for    
reflection1 and when      they have both
 spoken1 we may either assent to them1  
if      there is truth in what they say1
 or if not1 we will maintain      our   
position4 ,please to tell me then1      
,cebes1 he said1 what      was the      

difficulty which troubled you8          
,sidenote3 ,the doubt of ,cebes4        
,sidenote3 ,a weaver may outlive many   
coats and himself be outlived by the    
last3 so the soul which has passed      
through many bodies may in the end be   
worn out4        ,cebes said3 ,i will   
tell you4 ,my feeling is that the       
argument      is where it was1 and open 
to the same objections which      were  
urged before2 for ,i am ready to admit  
that the existence       #hg      of the
 soul before entering into the bodily   
form has      been very ingeniously1    
and1 if ,i may say so1 quite            
sufficiently      proven2 but the       
existence of the soul after death is    
still1 in      my judgment1 unproven4   
,now my objection is not the same       
as that of ,simmias2 for ,i am not      
disposed to deny that the      soul is  
stronger and more lasting than the body1
 being of      opinion that in all such 
respects the soul very far excels the   
body4 ,well then1 says the argument to  

me1 why do you      remain              
unconvinced8--,when you see that the    
weaker continues      in existence after
 the man is dead1 will you not admit    
that the more lasting must also survive 
during the same      period of time8    
,now ,i will ask you to consider whether
      the objection1 which1 like        
,simmias1 ,i will express in a figure1  
is of any weight4 ,the analogy which ,i 
will adduce is that      of an old      
weaver1 who dies1 and after his death   
somebody      says3--,he is not dead1 he
 must be alive2--see1 there is the      
coat which he himself wove and wore1 and
 which remains      whole and undecayed4
 ,and then he proceeds to ask of some   
one who is incredulous1 whether a man   
lasts longer1 or the      coat which is 
in use and wear2 and when he is answered
      that a man lasts far longer1      
thinks that he has thus certainly       
demonstrated the survival of the man1   
who is the more      lasting1 because   
the less lasting remains4 ,but that1    

,simmias1      as ,i would beg you to   
remark1 is a mistake2 any one can see   
that he who talks thus is talking       
nonsense4 ,for the truth is1      that  
the weaver aforesaid1 having woven and  
worn many      such coats1 outlived     
several of them2 and was outlived by the
      last2 but a man is not therefore  
proved to be slighter and      weaker   
than a coat4 ,now the relation of the   
body to the      soul may be expressed  
in a similar figure2 and any one may    
very fairly say in like manner that the 
soul is lasting1 and the      body weak 
and short-lived in comparison4 ,he may  
argue in      like manner that every    
soul wears out many bodies1 especially  
if a man live many years4 ,while he is  
alive the body      deliquesces and     
decays1 and the soul always weaves      
another      garment and repairs the    
waste4 ,but of course1 whenever      the
 soul perishes1 she must have on her    
last garment1 and      this will survive
 her2 and then at length1 when the soul 

is      dead1 the body will show its    
native weakness1 and quickly            
decompose and pass away4 ,i would       
therefore rather not      rely on the   
argument from superior strength to prove
 the      continued existence of the    
soul after death4 ,for granting         
#hh      even more than you affirm to be
 possible1 and acknowledging      not   
only that the soul existed before birth1
 but also that the      souls of some   
exist1 and will continue to exist after 
death1      and will be born and die    
again and again1 and that there is a    
natural strength in the soul which will 
hold out and be born      many          
times--nevertheless1 we may be still    
inclined to think      that she will    
weary in the labours of successive      
births1 and      may at last succumb in 
one of her deaths and utterly perish2   
and this death and dissolution of the   
body which brings      destruction to   
the soul may be unknown to any of us1   
for no      one of us can have had any  

experience of it3 and if so1 then       
,i maintain that he who is confident    
about death has but a      foolish      
confidence1 unless he is able to prove  
that the soul is      altogether        
immortal and imperishable4 ,but if he   
cannot      prove the soul's            
immortality1 he who is about to die will
      always have reason to fear that   
when the body is disunited1      the    
soul also may utterly perish4           
,sidenote3 ,the dejection of the        
audience4    ,sidenote3 ,the despair of 
the audience at hearing the overthrow of
 the  argument4        ,all of us1 as we
 afterwards remarked to one another1 had
      an unpleasant feeling at hearing  
what they said4 ,when we      had been  
so firmly convinced before1 now to have 
our faith      shaken seemed to         
introduce a confusion and uncertainty1  
not      only into the previous         
argument1 but into any future one2      
either we were incapable of forming a   
judgment1 or there      were no grounds 

of belief4        ,ech4 ,there ,i feel  
with you--by heaven ,i do1 ,phaedo1 and 
when you were speaking1 ,i was beginning
 to ask myself the      same question3  
,what argument can ,i ever trust again8 
,for      what could be more convincing 
than the argument of ,socrates1         
which has now fallen into discredit8    
,that the soul is a harmony      is a   
doctrine which has always had a         
wonderful attraction      for me1 and1  
when mentioned1 came back to me at once1
      as my own original conviction4    
,and now ,i must begin again      and   
find another argument which will assure 
me that when      the man is dead the   
soul survives4 ,tell me1 ,i implore     
you1 how did ,socrates proceed8 ,did he 
appear to share      the unpleasant     
feeling which you mention8 or did he    
calmly      meet the attack8 ,and did he
 answer forcibly or feebly8             
,narrate what passed as exactly as you  
can4    ,sidenote3 ,socrates comes to   
the rescue4    ,sidenote3 ,the wonderful

 manner in which ,socrates soothes his  
disappointed hearers and rehabilitates  
the argument4        ,phaed4 ,often1    
,echecrates1 ,i have wondered at        
,socrates1      but never more than on  
that occasion4 ,that he should be       
#hi      able to answer was nothing1 but
 what astonished me was1      first1 the
 gentle and pleasant and approving      
manner in which      he received the    
words of the young men1 and then his    
quick      sense of the wound which had 
been inflicted by the argument1      and
 the readiness with which he healed it4 
,he might be      compared to a general 
rallying his defeated and broken        
army1 urging them to accompany him and  
return to the field      of argument4   
,ech4 ,what followed8        ,phaed4    
,you shall hear1 for ,i was close to him
 on his right      hand1 seated on a    
sort of stool1 and he on a couch which  
was      a good deal higher4 ,he stroked
 my head1 and pressed the      hair upon
 my neck--he had a way of playing with  

my hair2      and then he said3         
,to-morrow1 ,phaedo1 ,i suppose that    
these      fair locks of yours will be  
severed4        ,yes1 ,socrates1 ,i     
suppose that they will1 ,i replied4     
,not so1 if you will take my advice4    
,what shall ,i do with them8 ,i said4   
,to-day1 he replied1 and not to-morrow1 
if this argument dies      and we cannot
 bring it to life again1 you and ,i will
 both      shave our locks3 and if ,i   
were you1 and the argument got      away
 from me1 and ,i could not hold my      
ground against      ,simmias and ,cebes1
 ,i would myself take an oath1 like the 
,argives1 not to wear hair any more     
until ,i had renewed the      conflict  
and defeated them4        ,yes1 ,i said2
 but ,heracles himself is said not to be
 a match      for two4        ,summon me
 then1 he said1 and ,i will be your     
,iolaus until      the sun goes down4   
,i summon you rather1 ,i rejoined1 not  
as ,heracles summoning      ,iolaus1 but
 as ,iolaus might summon ,heracles4     

,that will do as well1 he said4 ,but    
first let us take care      that we     
avoid a danger4    ,sidenote3 ,we must  
not become misologists4        ,of what 
nature8 ,i said4    ,sidenote3 ,the     
danger of becoming haters of ideas      
greater than of  becoming haters of men4
        ,lest we become misologists1 he 
replied3 no worse thing      can happen 
to a man than this4 ,for as there are   
misanthropists      or haters of men1   
there are also misologists or           
haters of ideas1 and both spring from   
the same cause1 which      is ignorance 
of the world4 ,misanthropy arises out of
 the too      great confidence of       
inexperience2--you trust a man and think
      him altogether true and sound and 
faithful1 and then in a      little     
while he turns out to be false and      
knavish2 and then      another and      
another1 and when this has happened     
several      times to a man1 especially 
when it happens among those      whom he
 deems to be his own most trusted and   

familiar      friends1 and he has often 
quarrelled with them1 he at last        
hates all men1 and believes that no one 
has any good in him      at all4 ,you   
must have observed this trait of        
character8        ,i have4    ,sidenote3
 ,there are few very bad or very good   
men2 7although bad  arguments may be    
more numerous than bad men72 the main   
point is that he  who has been often    
deceived by either is apt to lose faith 
in them4        ,and is not the feeling 
discreditable8 ,is it not obvious       
that such an one having to deal with    
other men1 was clearly      without any 
experience of human nature2 for         
experience      would have taught him   
the true state of the case1 that few are
      the good and few the evil1 and    
that the great majority are in       #ij
      the interval between them4        
,what do you mean8 ,i said4        ,i   
mean1 he replied1 as you might say of   
the very large and      very small--that
 nothing is more uncommon than a very   

large or very small man2 and this       
applies generally to all      extremes1 
whether of great and small1 or swift and
 slow1 or      fair and foul1 or black  
and white3 and whether the instances    
you select be men or dogs or anything   
else1 few are the      extremes1 but    
many are in the mean between them4 ,did 
you      never observe this8            
,yes1 ,i said1 ,i have4        ,and do  
you not imagine1 he said1 that if there 
were a competition      in evil1 the    
worst would be found to be very few8    
,yes1 that is very likely1 ,i said4     
,yes1 that is very likely1 he replied2  
although in this      respect arguments 
are unlike men--there ,i was led on by  
you to say more than ,i had intended2   
but the point of comparison      was1   
that when a simple man who has no skill 
in      dialectics believes an argument 
to be true which he afterwards          
imagines to be false1 whether really    
false or not1 and then      another and 
another1 he has no longer any faith     

left1 and      great disputers1 as you  
know1 come to think at last that they   
have grown to be the wisest of mankind2 
for they alone perceive      the utter  
unsoundness and instability of all      
arguments1      or indeed1 of all       
things1 which1 like the currents in the 
,euripus1 are going up and down in      
never-ceasing ebb and      flow4        
,sidenote3 ,avoid scepticism4           
,that is quite true1 ,i said4           
,yes1 ,phaedo1 he replied1 and how      
melancholy1 if there be      such a     
thing as truth or certainty or          
possibility of knowledge--that      a   
man should have lighted upon some       
argument or      other which at first   
seemed true and then turned out to be   
false1 and instead of blaming himself   
and his own want of      wit1 because he
 is annoyed1 should at last be too glad 
to      transfer the blame from himself 
to arguments in general3 and      for   
ever afterwards should hate and revile  
them1 and lose      truth and the       

knowledge of realities4        ,yes1    
indeed1 ,i said2 that is very           
melancholy4    ,sidenote3 ,socrates1 who
 is soon to die1 has too much at stake  
on the  argument to be a fair judge4    
,simmias and ,cebes must help him to    
consider  the matter impartially4       
,let us then1 in the first place1 he    
said1 be careful of allowing      or of 
admitting into our souls the notion that
 there is no      health or soundness in
 any arguments at all4 ,rather say that 
we have not yet attained to soundness in
 ourselves1 and that      we must       
struggle manfully and do our best to    
gain health of      mind--you and all   
other men having regard to the whole of 
your future life1 and ,i myself in the  
prospect of death4 ,for      at this    
moment ,i am sensible that ,i have not  
the temper of          #ia      a       
philosopher2 like the vulgar1 ,i am only
 a partisan4 ,now      the partisan1    
when he is engaged in a dispute1 cares  
nothing      about the rights of the    

question1 but is anxious only to        
convince      his hearers of his own    
assertions4 ,and the difference         
between him and me at the present moment
 is merely this--that      whereas he   
seeks to convince his hearers that what 
he      says is true1 ,i am rather      
seeking to convince myself2 to          
convince my hearers is a secondary      
matter with me4 ,and      do but see how
 much ,i gain by the argument4 ,for if  
what ,i      say is true1 then ,i do    
well to be persuaded of the truth2 but  
if there be nothing after death1 still1 
during the short time      that remains1
 ,i shall not distress my friends with  
lamentations1      and my ignorance will
 not last1 but will die with me1        
and therefore no harm will be done4     
,this is the state of      mind1        
,simmias and ,cebes1 in which ,i        
approach the argument4      ,and ,i     
would ask you to be thinking of the     
truth and not of      ,socrates3 agree  
with me1 if ,i seem to you to be        

speaking the      truth2 or if not1     
withstand me might and main1 that ,i may
      not deceive you as well as myself 
in my enthusiasm1 and like      the bee1
 leave my sting in you before ,i die4   
,sidenote3 ,simmias and ,cebes reassured
 and answered4    ,sidenote3 ,simmias   
and ,cebes are inclined to fear that the
 soul  may perish before the body1 but  
they still hold to the doctrine of      
reminiscence4        ,and now let us    
proceed1 he said4 ,and first of all let 
me      be sure that ,i have in my mind 
what you were saying4      ,simmias1 if 
,i remember rightly1 has fears and      
misgivings      whether the soul1       
although a fairer and diviner thing than
      the body1 being as she is in the  
form of harmony1 may not      perish    
first4 ,on the other hand1 ,cebes       
appeared to grant      that the soul was
 more lasting than the body1 but he said
 that      no one could know whether the
 soul1 after having worn out      many  
bodies1 might not perish herself and    

leave her last      body behind her2 and
 that this is death1 which is the       
destruction not of the body but of the  
soul1 for in the body      the work of  
destruction is ever going on4 ,are not  
these1      ,simmias and ,cebes1 the    
points which we have to consider8       
,they both agreed to this statement of  
them4        ,he proceeded3 ,and did you
 deny the force of the whole            
preceding argument1 or of a part only8  
,of a part only1 they replied4          
,and what did you think1 he said1 of    
that part of the      argument in which 
we said that knowledge was recollection1
      and hence inferred that the soul  
must have previously      existed       
somewhere else before she was enclosed  
in the               #ib      body8     
,cebes said that he had been wonderfully
 impressed by that      part of the     
argument1 and that his conviction       
remained      absolutely unshaken4      
,simmias agreed1 and added that he      
himself could hardly imagine the        

possibility of his ever      thinking   
differently4    ,sidenote3 ,the elements
 of harmony are prior to harmony1 but   
the body is  not prior to the soul4     
,but1 rejoined ,socrates1 you will have 
to think differently1      my ,theban   
friend1 if you still maintain that      
harmony is a      compound1 and that the
 soul is a harmony which is made out    
of strings set in the frame of the body2
 for you will surely      never allow   
yourself to say that a harmony is prior 
to the      elements which compose it4  
,sidenote3 ,harmony not prior to the    
elements of harmony4        ,never1     
,socrates4        ,but do you not see   
that this is what you imply when you    
say that the soul existed before she    
took the form and body      of man1 and 
was made up of elements which as yet had
 no      existence8 ,for harmony is not 
like the soul1 as you      suppose2 but 
first the lyre1 and the strings1 and the
 sounds      exist in a state of        
discord1 and then harmony is made last  

of      all1 and perishes first4 ,and   
how can such a notion of the      soul  
as this agree with the other8           
,not at all1 replied ,simmias4          
,and yet1 he said1 there surely ought to
 be harmony in a      discourse of which
 harmony is the theme8        ,there    
ought1 replied ,simmias4        ,but    
there is no harmony1 he said1 in the two
 propositions      that knowledge is    
recollection1 and that the soul is a    
harmony4      ,which of them will you   
retain8    ,sidenote3 ,simmias          
acknowledges that his argument does not 
harmonize with  the proposition that    
knowledge is recollection4        ,i    
think1 he replied1 that ,i have a much  
stronger faith1      ,socrates1 in the  
first of the two1 which has been fully  
demonstrated to me1 than in the latter1 
which has not been      demonstrated at 
all1 but rests only on probable and     
plausible      grounds2 and is therefore
 believed by the many4 ,i know      too 
well that these arguments from          

probabilities are impostors1      and   
unless great caution is observed in the 
use of      them1 they are apt to be    
deceptive--in geometry1 and in          
other things too4 ,but the doctrine of  
knowledge and recollection      has been
 proven to me on trustworthy grounds3   
and      the proof was that the soul    
must have existed before she      came  
into the body1 because to her belongs   
the essence of      which the very name 
implies existence4 ,having1 as ,i am    
convinced1 rightly accepted this        
conclusion1 and on sufficient           
grounds1 ,i must1 as ,i suppose1 cease  
to argue or allow others      to argue  
that the soul is a harmony4        ,let 
me put the matter1 ,simmias1 he said1 in
 another point      of view3 ,do you    
imagine that a harmony or any other     
#ic      composition can be in a state  
other than that of the elements1        
out of which it is compounded8          
,certainly not4        ,or do or suffer 
anything other than they do or suffer8  

,he agreed4        ,then a harmony does 
not1 properly speaking1 lead the        
parts or elements which make up the     
harmony1 but only      follows them4    
,sidenote3 ,harmony is an effect1 not a 
cause4        ,he assented4        ,for 
harmony cannot possibly have any motion1
 or sound1      or other quality which  
is opposed to its parts4        ,that   
would be impossible1 he replied4        
,and does not the nature of every       
harmony depend upon      the manner in  
which the elements are harmonized8      
,i do not understand you1 he said4      
,sidenote3 ,harmony admits of degrees1  
but in the soul there are no  degrees2  
and therefore there cannot be a soul or 
harmony within a soul4        ,i mean to
 say that a harmony admits of degrees1  
and is      more of a harmony1 and more 
completely a harmony1 when      more    
truly and fully harmonized1 to any      
extent which is      possible2 and less 
of a harmony1 and less completely a     
harmony1 when less truly and fully      

harmonized4        ,true4        ,but   
does the soul admit of degrees8 or is   
one soul in the      very least degree  
more or less1 or more or less           
completely1 a      soul than another8   
,not in the least4        ,yet surely of
 two souls1 one is said to have         
intelligence      and virtue1 and to be 
good1 and the other to have folly and   
vice1 and to be an evil soul3 and this  
is said truly8        ,yes1 truly4      
,but what will those who maintain the   
soul to be a harmony      say of this   
presence of virtue and vice in the      
soul8--will      they say that here is  
another harmony1 and another discord1   
and that the virtuous soul is           
harmonized1 and herself being      a    
harmony has another harmony within her1 
and that the      vicious soul is       
inharmonical and has no harmony within  
her8        ,i cannot tell1 replied     
,simmias2 but ,i suppose that something 
of the sort would be asserted by those  
who say that      the soul is a harmony4

        ,and we have already admitted   
that no soul is more a soul      than   
another2 which is equivalent to         
admitting that harmony      is not more 
or less harmony1 or more or less        
completely a      harmony8        ,quite
 true4        ,and that which is not    
more or less a harmony is not more      
or less harmonized8        ,true4       
,sidenote3 ,the soul not a harmony4     
,and that which is not more or less     
harmonized cannot      have more or less
 of harmony1 but only an equal harmony8 
,yes1 an equal harmony4        ,then one
 soul not being more or less absolutely 
a soul      than another1 is not more or
 less harmonized8        ,exactly4      
,and therefore has neither more nor less
 of discord1 nor      yet of harmony8   
,she has not4        ,and having neither
 more nor less of harmony or of discord1
      one soul has no more vice or      
virtue than another1 if      vice be    
discord and virtue harmony8        ,not 
at all more4        ,or speaking more   

correctly1 ,simmias1 the soul1 if she is
 a          #id      harmony1 will never
 have any vice2 because a harmony1      
being absolutely a harmony1 has no part 
in the inharmonical4        ,no4        
,sidenote3 ,if the soul is a harmony1   
all souls must be equally good4         
,and therefore a soul which is          
absolutely a soul has no      vice8     
,how can she have1 if the previous      
argument holds8        ,then1 if all    
souls are equally by their nature souls1
 all      souls of all living creatures 
will be equally good8        ,i agree   
with you1 ,socrates1 he said4           
,and can all this be true1 think you8 he
 said2 for these      are the           
consequences which seem to follow from  
the assumption      that the soul is a  
harmony8        ,it cannot be true4     
,once more1 he said1 what ruler is there
 of the elements of      human nature   
other than the soul1 and especially the 
wise      soul8 ,do you know of any8    
,indeed1 ,i do not4        ,and is the  

soul in agreement with the affections of
 the      body8 or is she at variance   
with them8 ,for example1 when      the  
body is hot and thirsty1 does not the   
soul incline us      against drinking8  
and when the body is hungry1 against    
eating8 ,and this is only one instance  
out of ten thousand of      the         
opposition of the soul to the things of 
the body4        ,very true4            
,sidenote3 ,enough of ,harmonia4        
,but we have already acknowledged that  
the soul1 being a      harmony1 can     
never utter a note at variance with the 
tensions      and relaxations and       
vibrations and other affections of the  
strings out of which she is composed2   
she can only follow1      she cannot    
lead them8        ,it must be so1 he    
replied4    ,sidenote3 ,the soul leads  
and does not follow4 ,she constrains and
  reprimands the passions4        ,and  
yet do we not now discover the soul to  
be doing the      exact                 
opposite--leading the elements of which 

she is believed      to be composed2    
almost always opposing and coercing them
      in all sorts of ways throughout   
life1 sometimes more violently      with
 the pains of medicine and gymnastic2   
then again more      gently2 now        
threatening1 now admonishing the        
desires1      passions1 fears1 as if    
talking to a thing which is not herself1
      as ,homer in the ,odyssey         
represents ,odysseus doing in the       
words--          #8,he beat his breast1 
and thus reproached his heart3          
,endure1 my heart2 far worse hast thou  
endured6'        ,do you think that     
,homer wrote this under the idea that   
the      soul is a harmony capable of   
being led by the affections of      the 
body1 and not rather of a nature which  
should lead and      master             
them--herself a far diviner thing than  
any harmony8        ,yes1 ,socrates1 ,i 
quite think so4        ,then1 my friend1
 we can never be right in saying that   
the      soul is a harmony1 for we      

should contradict the divine            
#ie      ,homer1 and contradict         
ourselves4        ,true1 he said4       
,thus much1 said ,socrates1 of          
,harmonia1 your ,theban      goddess1   
who has graciously yielded to us2 but   
what shall ,i      say1 ,cebes1 to her  
husband ,cadmus1 and how shall ,i make  
peace with him8        ,i think that you
 will discover a way of propitiating    
him1      said ,cebes2 ,i am sure that  
you have put the argument with          
,harmonia in a manner that ,i could     
never have expected4      ,for when     
,simmias was mentioning his difficulty1 
,i quite      imagined that no answer   
could be given to him1 and therefore    
,i was surprised at finding that his    
argument could not      sustain the     
first onset of yours1 and not impossibly
 the other1      whom you call ,cadmus1 
may share a similar fate4    ,sidenote3 
,recapitulation of the argument of      
,cebes4    ,sidenote3 ,let us now       
proceed to the ,theban ,cadmus4         

,nay1 my good friend1 said ,socrates1   
let us not boast1 lest      some evil   
eye should put to flight the word which 
,i am about      to speak4 ,that1       
however1 may be left in the hands of    
those      above2 while ,i draw near in 
,homeric fashion1 and try the           
mettle of your words4 ,here lies the    
point3--,you want to      have it proven
 to you that the soul is imperishable   
and immortal1      and the philosopher  
who is confident in death appears       
to you to have but a vain and foolish   
confidence1 if he believes      that he 
will fare better in the world below than
 one who has      led another sort of   
life1 unless he can prove this3 and you 
say that the demonstration of the       
strength and divinity of      the soul1 
and of her existence prior to our       
becoming men1      does not necessarily 
imply her immortality4 ,admitting the   
soul to be longlived1 and to have known 
and done much in a      former state1   
still she is not on that account        

immortal2 and      her entrance into the
 human form may be a sort of disease    
which is the beginning of dissolution1  
and may at last1 after      the toils of
 life are over1 end in that which is    
called death4      ,and whether the soul
 enters into the body once only or      
many times1 does not1 as you say1 make  
any difference in      the fears of     
individuals4 ,for any man1 who is not   
devoid of      sense1 must fear1 if he  
has no knowledge and can give no        
account of the soul's immortality4      
,this1 or something like      this1 ,i  
suspect to be your notion1 ,cebes2 and  
,i designedly      recur to it in order 
that nothing may escape us1 and that    
you may1 if you wish1 add or subtract   
anything4        ,but1 said ,cebes1 as  
far as ,i see at present1 ,i have       
nothing      to add or subtract3 ,i mean
 what you say that ,i mean4             
,socrates paused awhile1 and seemed to  
be absorbed in      reflection4 ,at     
length he said3 ,you are raising a      

tremendous      question1 ,cebes1       
involving the whole nature of           
generation and corruption1 about which1 
if you like1 ,i will         #if        
give you my own experience2 and if      
anything which ,i say is      likely to 
avail towards the solution of your      
difficulty you may      make use of it4 
,i should very much like1 said ,cebes1  
to hear what you have      to say4      
,sidenote3 ,the speculations of         
,socrates about physics made him forget 
the  commonest things4    ,sidenote3    
,socrates incapable of enquiring into   
nature4        ,then ,i will tell you1  
said ,socrates4 ,when ,i was young1     
,cebes1 ,i had a prodigious desire to   
know that department of      philosophy 
which is called the investigation of    
nature2 to      know the causes of      
things1 and why a thing is and is       
created or destroyed appeared to me to  
be a lofty profession2      and ,i was  
always agitating myself with the        
consideration      of questions such as 

these3--,is the growth of      animals  
the result of some decay which the hot  
and cold      principle contracts1 as   
some have said8 ,is the blood the       
element with which we think1 or the air1
 or the fire8 or      perhaps nothing of
 the kind--but the brain may be the     
originating power of the perceptions of 
hearing and sight      and smell1 and   
memory and opinion may come from them1  
and science may be based on memory and  
opinion when they      have attained    
fixity4 ,and then ,i went on to examine 
the      corruption of them1 and then to
 the things of heaven and      earth1   
and at last ,i concluded myself to be   
utterly and absolutely      incapable of
 these enquiries1 as ,i will            
satisfactorily      prove to you4 ,for  
,i was fascinated by them to such a     
degree      that my eyes grew blind to  
things which ,i had seemed to           
myself1 and also to others1 to know     
quite well2 ,i forgot what      ,i had  
before thought self-evident truths2 e4  

g4 such a fact as      that the growth  
of man is the result of eating and      
drinking2      for when by the digestion
 of food flesh is added to flesh and    
bone to bone1 and whenever there is an  
aggregation of congenial      elements1 
the lesser bulk becomes larger and the  
small      man great4 ,was not that a   
reasonable notion8        ,yes1 said    
,cebes1 ,i think so4    ,sidenote3      
,difficulty of explaining relative      
notions4        ,well2 but let me tell  
you something more4 ,there was a        
time when ,i thought that ,i understood 
the meaning of greater      and less    
pretty well2 and when ,i saw a great man
 standing      by a little one1 ,i      
fancied that one was taller than the    
other by      a head2 or one horse would
 appear to be greater than      another 
horse3 and still more clearly did ,i    
seem to perceive      that ten is two   
more than eight1 and that two cubits are
 more      than one1 because two is the 
double of one4        ,and what is now  

your notion of such matters8 said       
,cebes4        ,i should be far enough  
from imagining1 he replied1 that ,i     
knew the cause of any of them1 by heaven
 ,i should2 for ,i      cannot satisfy  
myself that1 when one is added to one1  
the one      to which the addition is   
made becomes two1 or that the two       
#ig      units added together make two  
by reason of the addition4 ,i           
cannot understand how1 when separated   
from the other1 each      of them was   
one and not two1 and now1 when they are 
brought together1 the mere juxtaposition
 or meeting of them      should be the  
cause of their becoming two3 neither can
 ,i      understand how the division of 
one is the way to make two2      for    
then a different cause would produce the
 same effect1--as      in the former    
instance the addition and juxtaposition 
of one      to one was the cause of two1
 in this the separation and subtraction 
of one from the other would be the      
cause4 ,nor am      ,i any longer       

satisfied that ,i understand the reason 
why one      or anything else is either 
generated or destroyed or is at all1    
but ,i have in my mind some confused    
notion of a new      method1 and can    
never admit the other4    ,sidenote3    
,the inconsistency of ,anaxagoras4      
,sidenote3 ,the great expectations which
 ,socrates had from the doctrine of     
,anaxagoras1 that all was ,mind4        
,then ,i heard some one reading1 as he  
said1 from a book      of ,anaxagoras1  
that mind was the disposer and cause of 
all1      and ,i was delighted at this  
notion1 which appeared quite            
admirable1 and ,i said to myself3 ,if   
mind is the disposer1      mind will    
dispose all for the best1 and put each  
particular in      the best place2 and  
,i argued that if any one desired to    
find      out the cause of the          
generation or destruction or existence  
of      anything1 he must find out what 
state of being or doing or              
suffering was best for that thing1 and  

therefore a man had only      to        
consider the best for himself and       
others1 and then he      would also know
 the worse1 since the same science      
comprehended      both4 ,and ,i rejoiced
 to think that ,i had found in          
,anaxagoras a teacher of the causes of  
existence such as ,i desired1      and  
,i imagined that he would tell me first 
whether the      earth is flat or round2
 and whichever was true1 he would       
proceed to explain the cause and the    
necessity of this being      so1 and    
then he would teach me the nature of the
 best and      show that this was best2 
and if he said that the earth was in    
the centre1 he would further explain    
that this position was      the best1   
and ,i should be satisfied with the     
explanation      given1 and not want any
 other sort of cause4 ,and ,i thought   
#ih      that ,i would then go on and   
ask him about the sun and moon      and 
stars1 and that he would explain to me  
their comparative      swiftness1 and   

their returnings and various states1    
active and      passive1 and how all of 
them were for the best4 ,for ,i could   
not imagine that when he spoke of mind  
as the disposer of      them1 he would  
give any other account of their being as
 they      are1 except that this was    
best2 and ,i thought that when he       
had explained to me in detail the cause 
of each and the      cause of all1 he   
would go on to explain to me what was   
best      for each and what was good for
 all4 ,these hopes ,i would      not    
have sold for a large sum of money1 and 
,i seized the      books and read them  
as fast as ,i could in my eagerness to  
know the better and the worse4          
,sidenote3 ,confusion of the causes and 
conditions of actions4    ,sidenote3    
,the greatness of his disappointment4   
,what expectations ,i had formed1 and   
how grievously was      ,i disappointed6
 ,as ,i proceeded1 ,i found my          
philosopher      altogether forsaking   
mind or any other principle of order1   

but having recourse to air1 and ether1  
and water1 and other                    
eccentricities4 ,i might compare him to 
a person who began      by maintaining  
generally that mind is the cause of the 
actions of ,socrates1 but who1 when he  
endeavoured to explain      the causes  
of my several actions in detail1 went on
 to      show that ,i sit here because  
my body is made up of bones      and    
muscles2 and the bones1 as he would say1
 are hard and      have joints which    
divide them1 and the muscles are        
elastic1      and they cover the bones1 
which have also a covering or           
environment of flesh and skin which     
contains them2 and as      the bones are
 lifted at their joints by the          
contraction or      relaxation of the   
muscles1 ,i am able to bend my limbs1   
and      this is why ,i am sitting here 
in a curved posture--that is      what  
he would say2 and he would have a       
similar explanation      of my talking  
to you1 which he would attribute to     

sound1 and      air1 and hearing1 and he
 would assign ten thousand other        
causes of the same sort1 forgetting to  
mention the true cause1      which is1  
that the ,athenians have thought fit to 
condemn me1      and accordingly ,i have
 thought it better and more right to    
remain here and undergo my sentence2 for
 ,i am inclined to      think that these
 muscles and bones of mine would have   
gone          #ii      off long ago to  
,megara or ,boeotia--by the dog they    
would1      if they had been moved only 
by their own idea of what was      best1
 and if ,i had not chosen the better and
 nobler part1      instead of playing   
truant and running away1 of enduring any
      punishment which the state        
inflicts4 ,there is surely a            
strange confusion of causes and         
conditions in all this4 ,it      may be 
said1 indeed1 that without bones and    
muscles and the      other parts of the 
body ,i cannot execute my purposes4 ,but
      to say that ,i do as ,i do because

 of them1 and that this is the      way 
in which mind acts1 and not from the    
choice of the best1      is a very      
careless and idle mode of speaking4 ,i  
wonder that      they cannot distinguish
 the cause from the condition1 which    
the many1 feeling about in the dark1 are
 always mistaking      and misnaming4   
,and thus one man makes a vortex all    
round1 and steadies the earth by the    
heaven2 another gives      the air as a 
support to the earth1 which is a sort of
 broad      trough4 ,any power which in 
arranging them as they are      arranges
 them for the best never enters into    
their minds2      and instead of finding
 any superior strength in it1 they      
rather      expect to discover another  
,atlas of the world who is stronger     
and more everlasting and more containing
 than the good2--of      the obligatory 
and containing power of the good they   
think      nothing2 and yet this is the 
principle which ,i would fain      learn
 if any one would teach me4 ,but as ,i  

have failed either      to discover     
myself1 or to learn of any one else1 the
 nature of      the best1 ,i will       
exhibit to you1 if you like1 what ,i    
have found      to be the second best   
mode of enquiring into the cause4       
,i should very much like to hear1 he    
replied4    ,sidenote3 ,the power of the
 best4    ,sidenote3 ,the eye of the    
soul4    ,sidenote3 ,the abstract as    
plain or plainer than the concrete4     
,socrates proceeded3--,i thought that as
 ,i had failed in the      contemplation
 of true existence1 ,i ought to be      
careful that ,i      did not lose the   
eye of my soul2 as people may injure    
their      bodily eye by observing and  
gazing on the sun during an             
eclipse1 unless they take the precaution
 of only looking at      the image      
reflected in the water1 or in some      
similar medium4      ,so in my own case1
 ,i was afraid that my soul might be    
blinded altogether if ,i looked at      
things with my eyes or tried      to    

apprehend them by the help of the       
senses4 ,and ,i thought      that ,i had
 better have recourse to the world of   
mind and      seek there the truth of   
existence4 ,i dare say that the simile  
#ajj      is not perfect--for ,i am very
 far from admitting that he who         
contemplates existences through the     
medium of thought1 sees      them only  
#8through a glass darkly1' any more than
 he who      considers them in action   
and operation4 ,however1 this was       
the method which ,i adopted3 ,i first   
assumed some principle      which ,i    
judged to be the strongest1 and then ,i 
affirmed as      true whatever seemed to
 agree with this1 whether relating to   
the cause or to anything else2 and that 
which disagreed ,i regarded      as     
untrue4 ,but ,i should like to explain  
my meaning      more clearly1 as ,i do  
not think that you as yet understand    
me4        ,no indeed1 replied ,cebes1  
not very well4    ,sidenote3 ,the ideas4
    ,sidenote3 ,if the ideas have an    

absolute existence1 the soul is         
immortal4        ,there is nothing new1 
he said1 in what ,i am about to tell    
you2 but only what ,i have been always  
and everywhere      repeating in the    
previous discussion and on other        
occasions3      ,i want to show you the 
nature of that cause which has          
occupied my thoughts4 ,i shall have to  
go back to those      familiar words    
which are in the mouth of every one1 and
 first      of all assume that there is 
an absolute beauty and goodness      and
 greatness1 and the like2 grant me this1
 and ,i hope to be      able to show you
 the nature of the cause1 and to prove  
the      immortality of the soul4       
,cebes said3 ,you may proceed at once   
with the proof1 for      ,i grant you   
this4        ,well1 he said1 then ,i    
should like to know whether you         
agree with me in the next step2 for ,i  
cannot help thinking1      if there be  
anything beautiful other than absolute  
beauty      should there be such1 that  

it can be beautiful only in so far      
as it partakes of absolute beauty--and  
,i should say the same      of          
everything4 ,do you agree in this notion
 of the cause8        ,yes1 he said1 ,i 
agree4    ,sidenote3 ,all things exist  
by participation in general ideas4      
,he proceeded3 ,i know nothing and can  
understand      nothing of any other of 
those wise causes which are alleged2    
and if a person says to me that the     
bloom of colour1 or form1      or any   
such thing is a source of beauty1 ,i    
leave all that1      which is only      
confusing to me1 and simply and singly1 
and      perhaps foolishly1 hold and am 
assured in my own mind that      nothing
 makes a thing beautiful but the        
presence and      participation of      
beauty in whatever way or manner        
obtained2      for as to the manner ,i  
am uncertain1 but ,i stoutly contend    
that by beauty all beautiful things     
become beautiful4 ,this      appears to 
me to be the safest answer which ,i can 

give1      either to myself or to       
another1 and to this ,i cling1 in the   
persuasion that this principle will     
never be overthrown1 and      that to   
myself or to any one who asks the       
question1 ,i may safely      reply1     
,that by beauty beautiful things become 
beautiful4 ,do      you not agree with  
me8        ,i do4        ,and that by   
greatness only great things become great
 and      greater greater1 and by       
smallness the less become less8         
,true4    ,sidenote3 ,we thus escape    
certain contradictions of relation4     
,sidenote3 ,the puzzles of relation4    
,then if a person were to remark that ,a
 is taller by a head      than ,b1 and  
,b less by a head than ,a1 you would    
refuse to           #aja      admit his 
statement1 and would stoutly contend    
that what      you mean is only that the
 greater is greater by1 and by          
reason of1 greatness1 and the less is   
less only by1 and by      reason of1    
smallness2 and thus you would avoid the 

danger      of saying that the greater  
is greater and the less less by the     
measure of the head1 which is the same  
in both1 and would      also avoid the  
monstrous absurdity of supposing that   
the      greater man is greater by      
reason of the head1 which is small4     
,you would be afraid to draw such an    
inference1 would      you not8          
,indeed1 ,i should1 said ,cebes1        
laughing4        ,in like manner you    
would be afraid to say that ten         
exceeded eight by1 and by reason of1    
two2 but would      say by1 and by      
reason of1 number2 or you would say     
that two cubits exceed one cubit not by 
a half1 but by      magnitude8--for     
there is the same liability to error in 
all      these cases4        ,very true1
 he said4        ,again1 would you not  
be cautious of affirming that the       
addition of one to one1 or the division 
of one1 is the cause of      two8 ,and  
you would loudly asseverate that you    
know of no      way in which anything   

comes into existence except by          
participation      in its own proper    
essence1 and consequently1 as far       
as you know1 the only cause of two is   
the participation in      duality--this 
is the way to make two1 and the         
participation in      one is the way to 
make one4 ,you would say3 ,i will let   
alone puzzles of division and           
addition--wiser heads than      mine may
 answer them2 inexperienced as ,i am1   
and ready to      start1 as the proverb 
says1 at my own shadow1 ,i cannot afford
      to give up the sure ground of a   
principle4 ,and if any one      assails 
you there1 you would not mind him1 or   
answer him1      until you had seen     
whether the consequences which follow   
agree with one another or not1 and when 
you are further      required to give an
 explanation of this principle1 you     
would      go on to assume a higher     
principle1 and a higher1 until you      
found a resting-place in the best of the
 higher2 but you      would not confuse 

the principle and the consequences in   
your reasoning1 like the ,eristics--at  
least if you wanted to      discover    
real existence4 ,not that this confusion
 signifies to      them1 who never care 
or think about the matter at all1 for   
they have the wit to be well pleased    
with themselves however      great may  
be the turmoil of their ideas4 ,but you1
 if you are       #ajb      a           
philosopher1 will certainly do as ,i    
say4    ,sidenote3 ,the effect of the   
argument on the company4        ,what   
you say is most true1 said ,simmias and 
,cebes1 both      speaking at once4     
,ech4 ,yes1 ,phaedo2 and ,i do not      
wonder at their assenting4      ,any one
 who has the least sense will           
acknowledge the      wonderful clearness
 of ,socrates' reasoning4        ,phaed4
 ,certainly1 ,echecrates2 and such was  
the feeling      of the whole company at
 the time4        ,ech4 ,yes1 and       
equally of ourselves1 who were not of   
the      company1 and are now listening 

to your recital4 ,but what              
followed8        ,phaed4 ,after all this
 had been admitted1 and they had        
agreed that ideas exist1 and that other 
things participate in      them and     
derive their names from them1 ,socrates1
 if ,i      remember rightly1 said3--   
,sidenote3 ,there may still remain the  
contradiction of the same person  being 
both greater and less1 but this is only 
because he has greatness or  smallness  
relatively to another person4           
,this is your way of speaking2 and yet  
when you say that      ,simmias is      
greater than ,socrates and less than    
,phaedo1 do      you not predicate of   
,simmias both greatness and smallness8  
,yes1 ,i do4        ,but still you allow
 that ,simmias does not really exceed   
,socrates1 as the words may seem to     
imply1 because he is      ,simmias1 but 
by reason of the size which he has2 just
 as      ,simmias does not exceed       
,socrates because he is ,simmias1       
any more than because ,socrates is      

,socrates1 but because      he has      
smallness when compared with the        
greatness of      ,simmias8             
,true4        ,and if ,phaedo exceeds   
him in size1 this is not because        
,phaedo is ,phaedo1 but because ,phaedo 
has greatness relatively      to        
,simmias1 who is comparatively smaller8 
,that is true4        ,and therefore    
,simmias is said to be great1 and is    
also      said to be small1 because he  
is in a mean between them1              
exceeding the smallness of the one by   
his greatness1 and      allowing the    
greatness of the other to exceed his    
smallness4      ,he added1 laughing1 ,i 
am speaking like a book1 but ,i         
believe that what ,i am saying is true4 
,simmias assented4    ,sidenote3        
,greatness absolute and relative4       
,sidenote3 ,the idea of greatness can   
never be small2 and the greatness in  us
 drives out smallness4        ,i speak  
as ,i do because ,i want you to agree   
with me in      thinking1 not only that 

absolute greatness will never be        
great and also small1 but that greatness
 in us or in the concrete      will     
never admit the small or admit of being 
exceeded3      instead of this1 one of  
two things will happen1 either the      
greater will fly or retire before the   
opposite1 which is the      less1 or at 
the approach of the less has already    
ceased to      exist2 but will not1 if  
allowing or admitting of smallness1 be  
changed by that2 even as ,i1 having     
received and admitted      smallness    
when compared with ,simmias1 remain just
 as ,i      was1 and am the same small  
person4 ,and as the idea of             
greatness cannot condescend ever to be  
or become small1 in      like manner the
 smallness in us cannot be or become    
great2      nor can any other opposite  
which remains the same ever      be or  
become its own opposite1 but either     
passes away or           #ajc           
perishes in the change4        ,that1   
replied ,cebes1 is quite my notion4     

,sidenote3 ,yet the greater comes from  
the less1 and the less from the         
greater4        ,hereupon one of the    
company1 though ,i do not exactly       
remember which of them1 said3 ,in       
heaven's name1 is not      this the     
direct contrary of what was admitted    
before--that      out of the greater    
came the less and out of the less the   
greater1 and that opposites were simply 
generated from      opposites2 but now  
this principle seems to be utterly      
denied4    ,sidenote3                   
,distinguish3--,the things in which the 
opposites inhere generate  into and out 
of one another3 never the opposites     
themselves4        ,socrates inclined   
his head to the speaker and listened4 ,i
      like your courage1 he said1 in    
reminding us of this4 ,but      you do  
not observe that there is a difference  
in the two      cases4 ,for then we were
 speaking of opposites in the           
concrete1 and now of the essential      
opposite which1 as is      affirmed1    

neither in us nor in nature can ever be 
at variance      with itself2 then1 my  
friend1 we were speaking of things in   
which opposites are inherent and which  
are called after      them1 but now     
about the opposites which are inherent  
in      them and which give their name  
to them2 and these      essential       
opposites will never1 as we maintain1   
admit of      generation into or out of 
one another4 ,at the same time1         
turning to ,cebes1 he said3 ,are you at 
all disconcerted1      ,cebes1 at our   
friend's objection8        ,no1 ,i do   
not feel so1 said ,cebes2 and yet ,i    
cannot deny      that ,i am often       
disturbed by objections4        ,then we
 are agreed after all1 said ,socrates1  
that the opposite      will never in any
 case be opposed to itself8             
,sidenote3 ,a seeming contradiction     
solved4        ,to that we are quite    
agreed1 he replied4    ,sidenote3 ,snow 
may be converted into water at the      
approach of heat1 but  not cold into    

heat4        ,yet once more let me ask  
you to consider the question      from  
another point of view1 and see whether  
you agree with      me3--,there is a    
thing which you term heat1 and another  
thing which you term cold8              
,certainly4        ,but are they the    
same as fire and snow8        ,most     
assuredly not4        ,heat is a thing  
different from fire1 and cold is not the
      same with snow8        ,yes4      
,and yet you will surely admit1 that    
when snow1 as was      before said1 is  
under the influence of heat1 they will  
not      remain snow and heat2 but at   
the advance of the heat1 the      snow  
will either retire or perish8           
,very true1 he replied4        ,and the 
fire too at the advance of the cold will
 either      retire or perish2 and when 
the fire is under the influence of      
the cold1 they will not remain as       
before1 fire and cold4        ,that is  
true1 he said4        ,and in some cases
 the name of the idea is not only       

attached to the idea in an eternal      
connection1 but anything      else      
which1 not being the idea1 exists only  
in the form of the      idea1 may also  
lay claim to it4 ,i will try to make    
this      clearer by an example3--,the  
odd number is always called      by the 
name of odd8        ,very true4         
,but is this the only thing which is    
called odd8 ,are there      not other   
things which have their own name1 and   
yet are            #ajd      called odd1
 because1 although not the same as      
oddness1 they      are never without    
oddness8--that is what ,i mean to       
ask--whether      numbers such as the   
number three are not of the      class  
of odd4 ,and there are many other       
examples3 would      you not say1 for   
example1 that three may be called by its
      proper name1 and also be called   
odd1 which is not the same      with    
three8 and this may be said not only of 
three but also      of five1 and of     
every alternate number--each of them    

without      being oddness is odd2 and  
in the same way two and four1      and  
the other series of alternate numbers1  
has every number      even1 without     
being evenness4 ,do you agree8          
,sidenote3 ,essential opposites and     
things which admit opposites4        ,of
 course4    ,sidenote3 ,not only        
essential opposites1 but some concrete  
things which  contain opposites1 exclude
 each other4        ,then now mark the  
point at which ,i am aiming3--not       
only do essential opposites exclude one 
another1 but also      concrete things1 
which1 although not in themselves       
opposed1      contain opposites2 these1 
,i say1 likewise reject the idea        
which is opposed to that which is       
contained in them1 and      when it     
approaches them they either perish or   
withdraw4      ,for example2 ,will not  
the number three endure annihilation    
or anything sooner than be converted    
into an even number1      while         
remaining three8        ,very true1 said

 ,cebes4        ,and yet1 he said1 the  
number two is certainly not opposed     
to the number three8        ,it is not4 
,then not only do opposite ideas repel  
the advance of one      another1 but    
also there are other natures which repel
 the      approach of opposites4        
,very true1 he said4        ,suppose1 he
 said1 that we endeavour1 if possible1  
to determine      what these are4       
,by all means4    ,sidenote3 ,that is to
 say the opposites which give an impress
 to other  things4        ,are they not1
 ,cebes1 such as compel the things of   
which      they have possession1 not    
only to take their own form1 but        
also the form of some opposite8         
,what do you mean8        ,i mean1 as ,i
 was just now saying1 and as ,i am sure 
that      you know1 that those things   
which are possessed by the      number  
three must not only be three in number1 
but must      also be odd4        ,quite
 true4        ,and on this oddness1 of  
which the number three has the          

impress1 the opposite idea will never   
intrude8        ,no4        ,and this   
impress was given by the odd principle8 
,yes4        ,and to the odd is opposed 
the even8        ,true4        ,then the
 idea of the even number will never     
arrive at      three8        ,no4       
,sidenote3 ,recapitulation4        ,then
 three has no part in the even8         
,none4        ,then the triad or number 
three is uneven8        ,very true4     
,sidenote3 ,natures may not be opposed1 
and yet may not admit of  opposites2 e4 
g4 three is not opposed to two1 and yet 
does not admit the  even any more than  
two admits of the odd4        ,to return
 then to my distinction of natures which
 are      not opposed1 and yet do not   
admit opposites--as1 in the             
instance given1 three1 although not     
opposed to the even1      does not any  
the more admit of the even1 but always  
brings      the opposite into play on   
the other side2 or as two does not      
receive the odd1 or fire the cold--from 

these examples 7and          #aje       
there are many more of them7 perhaps you
 may be able to      arrive at the      
general conclusion1 that not only       
opposites will      not receive         
opposites1 but also that nothing which  
brings the      opposite will admit the 
opposite of that which it brings1 in    
that to which it is brought4 ,and here  
let me recapitulate--for      there is  
no harm in repetition4 ,the number five 
will      not admit the nature of the   
even1 any more than ten1 which      is  
the double of five1 will admit the      
nature of the odd4 ,the      double has 
another opposite1 and is not strictly   
opposed to      the odd1 but            
nevertheless rejects the odd altogether4
 ,nor      again will parts in the ratio
 #c3b1 nor any fraction in which        
there is a half1 nor again in which     
there is a third1 admit      the notion 
of the whole1 although they are not     
opposed to      the whole3 ,you will    
agree8        ,yes1 he said1 ,i entirely

 agree and go along with you in that4   
,sidenote3 ,the merely verbal truth may 
be replaced by a higher one4        ,and
 now1 he said1 let us begin again2 and  
do not you      answer my question in   
the words in which ,i ask it3 let me    
have not the old safe answer of which ,i
 spoke at first1 but      another       
equally safe1 of which the truth will be
 inferred by      you from what has been
 just said4 ,i mean that if any one     
asks you #8what that is1 of which the   
inherence makes the      body hot1' you 
will reply not heat 7this is what ,i    
call the      safe and stupid answer71  
but fire1 a far superior answer1        
which we are now in a condition to give4
 ,or if any one      asks you #8why a   
body is diseased1' you will not say from
      disease1 but from fever2 and      
instead of saying that oddness      is  
the cause of odd numbers1 you will say  
that the monad is      the cause of     
them3 and so of things in general1 as ,i
 dare      say that you will understand 

sufficiently without my adducing        
any further examples4    ,sidenote3     
,application of the argument to the     
soul4        ,yes1 he said1 ,i quite    
understand you4        ,tell me1 then1  
what is that of which the inherence will
      render the body alive8            
,sidenote3 ,we may now say1 not life    
makes alive1 but the soul makes  alive2 
and the soul has a life-giving power    
which does not admit of death  and is   
therefore immortal4        ,the soul1 he
 replied4        ,and is this always the
 case8        ,yes1 he said1 of course4 
,then whatever the soul possesses1 to   
that she comes      bearing life8       
,yes1 certainly4        ,and is there   
any opposite to life8        ,there is1 
he said4        ,and what is that8      
,death4        ,then the soul1 as has   
been acknowledged1 will never           
receive the opposite of what she brings4
        ,impossible1 replied ,cebes4    
,and now1 he said1 what did we just now 
call that principle      which repels   

the even8        ,the odd4        ,and  
that principle which repels the musical 
or the just8        ,the unmusical1 he  
said1 and the unjust4        ,and what  
do we call that principle which does not
 admit      of death8        ,the       
immortal1 he said4        ,and does the 
soul admit of death8        ,no4        
,then the soul is immortal8        ,yes1
 he said4        ,and may we say that   
this has been proven8        ,yes1      
abundantly proven1 ,socrates1 he        
replied4    ,sidenote3 ,illustrations4  
,supposing that the odd were            
imperishable1 must not three            
#ajf      be imperishable8        ,of   
course4        ,and if that which is    
cold were imperishable1 when the        
warm principle came attacking the snow1 
must not the snow      have retired     
whole and unmelted--for it could never  
have      perished1 nor could it have   
remained and admitted the heat8         
,true1 he said4        ,again1 if the   
uncooling or warm principle were        

imperishable1      the fire when        
assailed by cold would not have perished
      or have been extinguished1 but    
would have gone away unaffected8        
,certainly1 he said4    ,sidenote3 ,the 
mortal and immortal principles4         
,and the same may be said of the        
immortal3 if the immortal      is also  
imperishable1 the soul when attacked by 
death cannot      perish2 for the       
preceding argument shows that the soul  
will      not admit of death1 or ever be
 dead1 any more than three or      the  
odd number will admit of the even1 or   
fire1 or the heat in      the fire1 of  
the cold4 ,yet a person may say3 #8,but 
although      the odd will not become   
even at the approach of the even1       
why may not the odd perish and the even 
take the place of      the odd8' ,now to
 him who makes this objection1 we cannot
      answer that the odd principle is  
imperishable2 for this has      not been
 acknowledged1 but if this had been     
acknowledged1      there would have been

 no difficulty in contending that at the
      approach of the even the odd      
principle and the number three      took
 their departure2 and the same argument 
would have      held good of fire and   
heat and any other thing4        ,very  
true4    ,sidenote3 ,the immortal is    
imperishable1 and therefore the soul is 
imperishable4        ,and the same may  
be said of the immortal3 if the immortal
      is also imperishable1 then the    
soul will be imperishable as well       
as immortal2 but if not1 some other     
proof of her imperishableness      will 
have to be given4        ,no other proof
 is needed1 he said2 for if the         
immortal1 being      eternal1 is liable 
to perish1 then nothing is imperishable4
        ,yes1 replied ,socrates1 and yet
 all men will agree that ,god1      and 
the essential form of life1 and the     
immortal in general1      will never    
perish4        ,yes1 all men1 he        
said--that is true2 and what is more1   
gods1 if ,i am not mistaken1 as well as 

men4        ,seeing then that the       
immortal is indestructible1 must not    
the soul1 if she is immortal1 be also   
imperishable8        ,most certainly4   
,then when death attacks a man1 the     
mortal portion of him      may be       
supposed to die1 but the immortal       
retires at the      approach of death   
and is preserved safe and sound8        
,true4    ,sidenote3 ,at death the soul 
retires into another world4             
,then1 ,cebes1 beyond question1 the soul
 is immortal and      imperishable1 and 
our souls will truly exist in another   
#ajg      world6    ,sidenote3          
,revelation in a myth4        ,i am     
convinced1 ,socrates1 said ,cebes1 and  
have nothing      more to object2 but if
 my friend ,simmias1 or any one else1   
has any further objection to make1 he   
had better speak out1      and not keep 
silence1 since ,i do not know to what   
other      season he can defer the      
discussion1 if there is anything which  
he wants to say or to have said4        

,but ,i have nothing more to say1       
replied ,simmias2 nor can      ,i see   
any reason for doubt after what has been
 said4 ,but ,i      still feel and      
cannot help feeling uncertain in my own 
mind1      when ,i think of the         
greatness of the subject and the        
feebleness      of man4        ,yes1    
,simmias1 replied ,socrates1 that is    
well said3 and ,i      may add that     
first principles1 even if they appear   
certain1      should be carefully       
considered2 and when they are           
satisfactorily      ascertained1 then1  
with a sort of hesitating confidence    
in human reason1 you may1 ,i think1     
follow the course of the      argument2 
and if that be plain and clear1 there   
will be no      need for any further    
enquiry4        ,very true4             
,sidenote3 #8,wherefore1 seeing all     
these things1 what manner of persons    
ought we to be8'        ,but then1 ,o my
 friends1 he said1 if the soul is really
 immortal1      what care should be     

taken of her1 not only in respect       
of the portion of time which is called  
life1 but of eternity6      ,and the    
danger of neglecting her from this point
 of view does      indeed appear to be  
awful4 ,if death had only been the end  
of all1 the wicked would have had a good
 bargain in dying1      for they would  
have been happily quit not only of their
 body1      but of their own evil       
together with their souls4 ,but now1    
inasmuch as the soul is manifestly      
immortal1 there is no      release or   
salvation from evil except the          
attainment of the      highest virtue   
and wisdom4 ,for the soul when on her   
progress      to the world below takes  
nothing with her but nurture      and   
education2 and these are said greatly to
 benefit or      greatly to injure the  
departed1 at the very beginning of his  
journey thither4    ,sidenote3 ,the     
attendant genius of each brings him     
after death to the  judgment4           
,sidenote3 ,the purgation of souls4     

,sidenote3 ,the different destinies of  
pure and impure souls4        ,for after
 death1 as they say1 the genius of each 
individual1      to whom he belonged in 
life1 leads him to a certain place in   
which the dead are gathered together1   
whence after judgment      has been     
given they pass into the world below1   
following      the guide1 who is        
appointed to conduct them from this     
world to the other3 and when they have  
there received their      due and       
remained their time1 another guide      
brings them back      again after many  
revolutions of ages4 ,now this way to   
the      other world is not1 as schylus 
says in the ,telephus1 a            #ajh
      single and straight path--if that 
were so no guide would be      needed1  
for no one could miss it2 but there are 
many partings      of the road1 and     
windings1 as ,i infer from the rites and
      sacrifices which are offered to   
the gods below in places where          
three ways meet on earth4 ,the wise and 

orderly soul follows      in the        
straight path and is conscious of her   
surroundings2      but the soul which   
desires the body1 and which1 as ,i was  
relating before1 has long been          
fluttering about the lifeless      frame
 and the world of sight1 is after many  
struggles and      many sufferings      
hardly and with violence carried away by
      her attendant genius2 and when she
 arrives at the place      where the    
other souls are gathered1 if she be     
impure and      have done impure deeds1 
whether foul murders or other           
crimes which are the brothers of these1 
and the works of      brothers in       
crime--from that soul every one flees   
and turns      away2 no one will be her 
companion1 no one her guide1 but        
alone she wanders in extremity of evil  
until certain times are      fulfilled1 
and when they are fulfilled1 she is     
borne irresistibly      to her own      
fitting habitation2 as every pure and   
just soul      which has passed through 

life in the company and under the       
guidance of the gods has also her own   
proper home4    ,sidenote3 ,description 
of the divers regions of earth4         
,now the earth has divers wonderful     
regions1 and is indeed      in nature   
and extent very unlike the notions of   
geographers1      as ,i believe on the  
authority of one who shall be nameless4 
,what do you mean1 ,socrates8 said      
,simmias4 ,i have      myself heard many
 descriptions of the earth1 but ,i do   
not      know1 and ,i should very much  
like to know1 in which of these      you
 put faith4        ,and ,i1 ,simmias1   
replied ,socrates1 if ,i had the art of 
,glaucus would tell you2 although ,i    
know not that the art of      ,glaucus  
could prove the truth of my tale1 which 
,i myself      should never be able to  
prove1 and even if ,i could1 ,i fear1   
,simmias1 that my life would come to an 
end before the argument      was        
completed4 ,i may describe to you1      
however1 the      form and regions of   

the earth according to my conception of 
them4        ,that1 said ,simmias1 will 
be enough4    ,sidenote3 ,the lower     
regions of earth4    ,sidenote3 ,the    
earth is a round body kept in her place 
by equipoise and  the equability of the 
surrounding element4        ,well then1 
he said1 my conviction is1 that the     
earth is a      round body in the centre
 of the heavens1 and therefore has      
no need of air or of any similar force  
to be a support1 but is     #aji        
kept there and hindered from falling or 
inclining any way by      the equability
 of the surrounding heaven and by her   
own      equipoise4 ,for that which1    
being in equipoise1 is in the           
centre of that which is equably         
diffused1 will not incline any      way 
in any degree1 but will always remain in
 the same state      and not deviate4   
,and this is my first notion4           
,which is surely a correct one1 said    
,simmias4    ,sidenote3 ,the earth seen 
from above4    ,sidenote3 ,mankind lives

 only in a small portion of the earth at
 a  distance from the surface4          
,sidenote3 ,if1 like fishes who now and 
then put their heads out of the  water1 
we could rise to the top of the         
atmosphere1 we should behold the  true  
heaven and the true earth4        ,also 
,i believe that the earth is very vast1 
and that we who      dwell in the region
 extending from the river ,phasis to the
      ,pillars of ,heracles inhabit a   
small portion only about the sea1       
like ants or frogs about a marsh1 and   
that there are other inhabitants      of
 many other like places2 for everywhere 
on the      face of the earth there are 
hollows of various forms and sizes1     
into which the water and the mist and   
the lower air collect4      ,but the    
true earth is pure and situated in the  
pure heaven--there      are the stars   
also2 and it is the heaven which is     
commonly      spoken of by us as the    
ether1 and of which our own      earth  
is the sediment gathering in the hollows

 beneath4 ,but      we who live in these
 hollows are deceived into the notion   
that      we are dwelling above on the  
surface of the earth2 which is      just
 as if a creature who was at the bottom 
of the sea were to      fancy that he   
was on the surface of the water1 and    
that the sea      was the heaven through
 which he saw the sun and the other     
stars1 he having never come to the      
surface by reason of his      feebleness
 and sluggishness1 and having never     
lifted up his      head and seen1 nor   
ever heard from one who had seen1 how   
much purer and fairer the world above is
 than his own4 ,and      such is exactly
 our case3 for we are dwelling in a     
hollow of      the earth1 and fancy that
 we are on the surface2 and the air     
we call the heaven1 in which we imagine 
that the stars move4      ,but the fact 
is1 that owing to our feebleness and    
sluggishness      we are prevented from 
reaching the surface of the air3 for if 
any man could arrive at the exterior    

limit1 or take the wings      of a bird 
and come to the top1 then like a fish   
who puts his      head out of the water 
and sees this world1 he would see a     
world beyond2 and1 if the nature of man 
could sustain the      sight1 he would  
acknowledge that this other world was   
the      place of the true heaven and   
the true light and the true earth4      
,for our earth1 and the stones1 and the 
entire region which         #aaj        
surrounds us1 are spoilt and corroded1  
as in the sea all things      are       
corroded by the brine1 neither is there 
any noble or      perfect growth1 but   
caverns only1 and sand1 and an endless  
slough of mud2 and even the shore is not
 to be compared to      the fairer      
sights of this world4 ,and still less is
 this our world      to be compared with
 the other4 ,of that upper earth which  
is      under the heaven1 ,i can tell   
you a charming tale1 ,simmias1          
which is well worth hearing4        ,and
 we1 ,socrates1 replied ,simmias1 shall 

be charmed to      listen to you4       
,sidenote3 ,the upper earth is in every 
respect far fairer than the lower4      
,there is gold and purple1 and pure     
light1 and trees and flowers lovelier   
far than our own1 and all the stones are
 more precious than our precious        
stones4    ,sidenote3 ,the blessed gods 
dwell there and hold converse with the  
inhabitants4        ,the tale1 my       
friend1 he said1 is as follows3--,in the
 first      place1 the earth1 when      
looked at from above1 is in appearance  
streaked like one of those balls which  
have leather      coverings in twelve   
pieces1 and is decked with various      
colours1 of which the colours used by   
painters on earth are      in a manner  
samples4 ,but there the whole earth is  
made      up of them1 and they are      
brighter far and clearer than ours3     
there is a purple of wonderful lustre1  
also the radiance of      gold1 and the 
white which is in the earth is whiter   
than any      chalk or snow4 ,of these  

and other colours the earth is      made
 up1 and they are more in number and    
fairer than the      eye of man has ever
 seen2 the very hollows 7of which ,i was
      speaking7 filled with air and     
water have a colour of their      own1  
and are seen like light gleaming amid   
the diversity of      the other colours1
 so that the whole presents a single and
      continuous appearance of variety  
in unity4 ,and in this fair      region 
everything that grows--trees1 and       
flowers1 and fruits--are      in a like 
degree fairer than any here2 and there  
are      hills1 having stones in them in
 a like degree smoother1 and      more  
transparent1 and fairer in colour than  
our highly-valued      emeralds and     
sardonyxes and jaspers1 and other       
gems1 which are but minute fragments of 
them3 for there all      the stones are 
like our precious stones1 and fairer    
still#bh4 ,the      reason is1 that they
 are pure1 and not1 like our precious   
stones1 infected or corroded by the     

corrupt briny elements      which       
coagulate among us1 and which breed     
foulness and      disease both in earth 
and stones1 as well as in animals and   
plants4 ,they are the jewels of the     
upper earth1 which also      shines with
 gold and silver and the like1 and they 
are set in      #aaa      the light of  
day and are large and abundant and in   
all      places1 making the earth a     
sight to gladden the beholder's         
eye4 ,and there are animals and men1    
some in a middle      region1 others    
dwelling about the air as we dwell about
 the      sea2 others in islands which  
the air flows round1 near the           
continent2 and in a word1 the air is    
used by them as the      water and the  
sea are by us1 and the ether is to them 
what      the air is to us4 ,moreover1  
the temperament of their      seasons is
 such that they have no disease1 and    
live much      longer than we do1 and   
have sight and hearing and smell1       
and all the other senses1 in far greater

 perfection1 in the same      proportion
 that air is purer than water or the    
ether than      air4 ,also they have    
temples and sacred places in which the  
gods really dwell1 and they hear their  
voices and receive      their answers1  
and are conscious of them and hold      
converse      with them2 and they see   
the sun1 moon1 and stars as they        
truly are1 and their other blessedness  
is of a piece with this4    ,sidenote3  
,the chasm of ,tartarus4    ,sidenote3  
,description of the interior of the     
earth and of the  subterranean seas and 
rivers4        ,such is the nature of   
the whole earth1 and of the things      
which are around the earth2 and there   
are divers regions in      the hollows  
on the face of the globe everywhere1    
some of      them deeper and more       
extended than that which we inhabit1    
others deeper but with a narrower       
opening than ours1 and      some are    
shallower and also wider4 ,all have     
numerous      perforations1 and there   

are passages broad and narrow in        
the interior of the earth1 connecting   
them with one another2      and there   
flows out of and into them1 as into     
basins1 a vast      tide of water1 and  
huge subterranean streams of perennial  
rivers1 and springs hot and cold1 and a 
great fire1 and great      rivers of    
fire1 and streams of liquid mud1 thin or
 thick 7like      the rivers of mud in  
,sicily1 and the lava streams which     
follow them71 and the regions about     
which they happen to      flow are      
filled up with them4 ,and there is a    
swinging or      see-saw in the interior
 of the earth which moves all this up   
and down1 and is due to the following   
cause3--,there is      a chasm which is 
the vastest of them all1 and pierces    
right      through the whole earth2 this
 is that chasm which ,homer             
#aab      describes in the words1--     
#8,far off1 where is the inmost depth   
beneath the earth2'    ,sidenote3 ,the  
four rivers of the world below4         

and which he in other places1 and many  
other poets1 have      called ,tartarus4
 ,and the see-saw is caused by the      
streams      flowing into and out of    
this chasm1 and they each have the      
nature of the soil through which they   
flow4 ,and the reason      why the      
streams are always flowing in and out1  
is that the      watery element has no  
bed or bottom1 but is swinging and      
surging up and down1 and the surrounding
 wind and air do      the same2 they    
follow the water up and down1 hither and
      thither1 over the earth--just as  
in the act of respiration the      air  
is always in process of inhalation and  
exhalation2--and      the wind swinging 
with the water in and out produces      
fearful and irresistible blasts3 when   
the waters retire with a      rush into 
the lower parts of the earth1 as they   
are called1      they flow through the  
earth in those regions1 and fill them   
up like water raised by a pump1 and then
 when they leave      those regions and 

rush back hither1 they again fill the   
hollows here1 and when these are filled1
 flow through subterranean      channels
 and find their way to their several    
places1 forming seas1 and lakes1 and    
rivers1 and springs4      ,thence they  
again enter the earth1 some of them     
making a      long circuit into many    
lands1 others going to a few places     
and not so distant2 and again fall into 
,tartarus1 some at a      point a good  
deal lower than that at which they rose1
 and      others not much lower1 but all
 in some degree lower than      the     
point from which they came4 ,and some   
burst forth      again on the opposite  
side1 and some on the same side1 and    
some wind round the earth with one or   
many folds like the      coils of a     
serpent1 and descend as far as they can1
 but always      return and fall into   
the chasm4 ,the rivers flowing in either
      direction can descend only to the 
centre and no further1 for      opposite
 to the rivers is a precipice4          

,sidenote3 ,oceanus1 ,acheron1          
,pyriphlegethon1 and ,styx 7or          
,cocytus74    ,sidenote3 ,the geography 
of the world below4        ,now these   
rivers are many1 and mighty1 and        
diverse1 and      there are four        
principal ones1 of which the greatest   
and outermost      is that called       
,oceanus1 which flows round the earth in
      a circle2 and in the opposite     
direction flows ,acheron1 which         
passes under the earth through desert   
places into the              #aac       
,acherusian lake3 this is the lake to   
the shores of which the      souls of   
the many go when they are dead1 and     
after waiting      an appointed time1   
which is to some a longer and to some a 
shorter time1 they are sent back to be  
born again as animals4      ,the third  
river passes out between the two1 and   
near the place      of outlet pours into
 a vast region of fire1 and forms a lake
      larger than the ,mediterranean    
,sea1 boiling with water and      mud2  

and proceeding muddy and turbid1 and    
winding about      the earth1 comes1    
among other places1 to the extremities  
of      the ,acherusian lake1 but       
mingles not with the waters of the      
lake1 and after making many coils about 
the earth plunges      into ,tartarus at
 a deeper level4 ,this is that          
,pyriphlegethon1      as the stream is  
called1 which throws up jets of fire in 
different parts of the earth4 ,the      
fourth river goes out on      the       
opposite side1 and falls first of all   
into a wild and savage      region1     
which is all of a dark blue colour1 like
 lapis lazuli2      and this is that    
river which is called the ,stygian      
river1 and      falls into and forms the
 ,lake ,styx1 and after falling into the
      lake and receiving strange powers 
in the waters1 passes      under the    
earth1 winding round in the opposite    
direction1 and      comes near the      
,acherusian lake from the opposite side 
to      ,pyriphlegethon4 ,and the water 

of this river too mingles      with no  
other1 but flows round in a circle and  
falls into      ,tartarus over against  
,pyriphlegethon2 and the name of the    
river1 as the poets say1 is ,cocytus4   
,sidenote3 ,the judgment of the dead4   
,sidenote3 ,the mansions of the blessed4
        ,such is the nature of the other
 world2 and when the dead      arrive at
 the place to which the genius of each  
severally      guides them1 first of    
all1 they have sentence passed upon     
them1 as they have lived well and       
piously or not4 ,and      those who     
appear to have lived neither well nor   
ill1 go to      the river ,acheron1 and 
embarking in any vessels which      they
 may find1 are carried in them to the   
lake1 and there      they dwell and are 
purified of their evil deeds1 and having
      suffered the penalty of the wrongs
 which they have done to      others1   
they are absolved1 and receive the      
rewards of their      good deeds1 each  
of them according to his deserts4 ,but  

those who appear to be incurable by     
reason of the greatness      of their   
crimes--who have committed many and     
terrible      deeds of sacrilege1       
murders foul and violent1 or the        
like--such      are hurled into         
,tartarus which is their suitable       
destiny1 and they never come out4 ,those
 again who have      committed crimes1  
which1 although great1 are not          
irremediable--who      in a moment of   
anger1 for example1 have      done some 
violence to a father or a mother1 and   
have      repented for the remainder of 
their lives1 or1 who have taken         
#aad      the life of another under the 
like extenuating circumstances--these   
are plunged into ,tartarus1 the pains of
 which they      are compelled to       
undergo for a year1 but at the end of   
the      year the wave casts them       
forth--mere homicides by way of         
,cocytus1 parricides and matricides by  
,pyriphlegethon--and      they are borne
 to the ,acherusian lake1 and there they

 lift up      their voices and call upon
 the victims whom they have slain       
or wronged1 to have pity on them1 and to
 be kind to them1      and let them come
 out into the lake4 ,and if they        
prevail1      then they come forth and  
cease from their troubles2 but if       
not1 they are carried back again into   
,tartarus and from      thence into the 
rivers unceasingly1 until they obtain   
mercy      from those whom they have    
wronged3 for that is the sentence       
inflicted upon them by their judges4    
,those too who      have been           
pre-eminent for holiness of life are    
released from      this earthly prison1 
and go to their pure home which is      
above1 and dwell in the purer earth2 and
 of these1 such as      have duly       
purified themselves with philosophy live
 henceforth      altogether without the 
body1 in mansions fairer still1         
which may not be described1 and of which
 the time would      fail me to tell4   
,wherefore1 ,simmias1 seeing all these  

things1 what ought      not we to do    
that we may obtain virtue and wisdom in 
this      life8 ,fair is the prize1 and 
the hope great6    ,sidenote3 ,these    
descriptions are not true to the letter1
 but something  like them is true4      
,a man of sense ought not to say1 nor   
will ,i be very confident1      that the
 description which ,i have given of the 
soul and      her mansions is exactly   
true4 ,but ,i do say that1 inasmuch     
as the soul is shown to be immortal1 he 
may venture to      think1 not          
improperly or unworthily1 that something
 of the      kind is true4 ,the venture 
is a glorious one1 and he ought to      
comfort himself with words like these1  
which is the reason      why ,i lengthen
 out the tale4 ,wherefore1 ,i say1 let a
 man be      of good cheer about his    
soul1 who having cast away the          
pleasures and ornaments of the body as  
alien to him and      working harm      
rather than good1 has sought after the  
pleasures      of knowledge2 and has    

arrayed the soul1 not in some foreign   
attire1 but in her own proper jewels1   
temperance1 and justice1      and       
courage1 and nobility1 and truth--in    
these adorned she          #aae      is 
ready to go on her journey to the world 
below1 when her      hour comes4 ,you1  
,simmias and ,cebes1 and all other men1 
will depart at some time or other4 ,me  
already1 as a tragic      poet would    
say1 the voice of fate calls4 ,soon ,i  
must drink      the poison2 and ,i think
 that ,i had better repair to the bath  
first1 in order that the women may not  
have the trouble of      washing my body
 after ,i am dead4    ,sidenote3 ,the   
last words of ,socrates and his friends4
        ,when he had done speaking1     
,crito said3 ,and have you      any     
commands for us1 ,socrates--anything to 
say about your      children1 or any    
other matter in which we can serve you8 
,nothing particular1 ,crito1 he replied3
 only1 as ,i have      always told you1 
take care of yourselves2 that is a      

service      which you may be ever      
rendering to me and mine and to      all
 of us1 whether you promise to do so or 
not4 ,but if you      have no thought   
for yourselves1 and care not to walk    
according      to the rule which ,i have
 prescribed for you1 not now for the    
first time1 however much you may profess
 or promise at the      moment1 it will 
be of no avail4        ,we will do our  
best1 said ,crito3 ,and in what way     
shall we      bury you8    ,sidenote3   
,the dead body which remains is not the 
true ,socrates4        ,in any way that 
you like2 but you must get hold of me1  
and take care that ,i do not run away   
from you4 ,then he      turned to us1   
and added with a smile3--,i cannot make 
,crito      believe that ,i am the same 
,socrates who have been talking      and
 conducting the argument2 he fancies    
that ,i am the other      ,socrates whom
 he will soon see1 a dead body--and he  
asks1      ,how shall he bury me8 ,and  
though ,i have spoken many      words in

 the endeavour to show that when ,i have
 drunk the      poison ,i shall leave   
you and go to the joys of the           
blessed1--these      words of mine1 with
 which ,i was comforting you and        
myself1 have had1 as ,i perceive1 no    
effect upon ,crito4 ,and      therefore 
,i want you to be surety for me to him  
now1 as      at the trial he was surety 
to the judges for me3 but let      the  
promise be of another sort2 for he was  
surety for me      to the judges that ,i
 would remain1 and you must be my       
surety to him that ,i shall not remain1 
but go away and      depart2 and then he
 will suffer less at my death1 and not  
be      grieved when he sees my body    
being burned or buried4 ,i      would   
not have him sorrow at my hard lot1 or  
say at the      burial1 ,thus we lay out
 ,socrates1 or1 ,thus we follow him to  
the grave or bury him2 for false words  
are not only evil in      themselves1   
but they infect the soul with evil4 ,be 
of good      cheer then1 my dear ,crito1

 and say that you are burying my        
body only1 and do with that whatever is 
usual1 and what you        #aaf         
think best4    ,sidenote3 ,socrates is  
ready to depart4    ,sidenote3 ,he takes
 leave of his family4        ,when he   
had spoken these words1 he arose and    
went      into a chamber to bathe2      
,crito followed him and told us to      
wait4 ,so we remained behind1 talking   
and thinking of the      subject of     
discourse1 and also of the greatness of 
our sorrow2      he was like a father of
 whom we were being bereaved1 and       
we were about to pass the rest of our   
lives as orphans4      ,when he had     
taken the bath his children were brought
 to      him--7he had two young sons and
 an elder one72 and the      women of   
his family also came1 and he talked to  
them and      gave them a few directions
 in the presence of ,crito2 then      he
 dismissed them and returned to us4     
,sidenote3 ,the humanity of the jailer4 
,now the hour of sunset was near1 for a 

good deal of time      had passed while 
he was within4 ,when he came out1 he sat
      down with us again after his bath1
 but not much was said4      ,soon the  
jailer1 who was the servant of the      
,eleven1 entered      and stood by him1 
saying3--,to you1 ,socrates1 whom ,i    
know      to be the noblest and gentlest
 and best of all who ever came      to  
this place1 ,i will not impute the angry
 feelings of other      men1 who rage   
and swear at me1 when1 in obedience to  
the      authorities1 ,i bid them drink 
the poison--indeed1 ,i am sure      that
 you will not be angry with me2 for     
others1 as you are      aware1 and not  
,i1 are to blame4 ,and so fare you well1
 and      try to bear lightly what must 
needs be--you know my      errand4 ,then
 bursting into tears he turned away and 
went out4        ,socrates looked at him
 and said3 ,i return your good          
wishes1 and will do as you bid4 ,then   
turning to us1 he said1      ,how       
charming the man is3 since ,i have been 

in prison he      has always been coming
 to see me1 and at times he would       
talk to me1 and was as good to me as    
could be1 and now see      how          
generously he sorrows on my account4 ,we
 must do as      he says1 ,crito2 and   
therefore let the cup be brought1 if the
      poison is prepared3 if not1 let   
the attendant prepare some4             
,sidenote3 ,crito would detain ,socrates
 a little while4        ,yet1 said      
,crito1 the sun is still upon the       
hill-tops1 and ,i      know that many a 
one has taken the draught late1 and     
after      the announcement has been    
made to him1 he has eaten and           
drunk1 and enjoyed the society of his   
beloved2 do not hurry--there      is    
time enough4    ,sidenote3 ,the closing 
scene4    ,sidenote3 ,socrates thinks   
that there is nothing to be gained by   
delay4        ,socrates said3 ,yes1     
,crito1 and they of whom you speak      
are right in so acting1 for they think  
that they will be      gainers by the   

delay2 but ,i am right in not following 
their      example1 for ,i do not think 
that ,i should gain anything by         
drinking the poison a little later2 ,i  
should only be ridiculous    #aag       
in my own eyes for sparing and saving a 
life which is already      forfeit4     
,please then to do as ,i say1 and not to
 refuse me4    ,sidenote3 ,the poison is
 brought4    ,sidenote3 ,he drinks the  
poison4    ,sidenote3 ,the company of   
friends are unable to control           
themselves4        ,crito made a sign to
 the servant1 who was standing by2      
and he went out1 and having been absent 
for some time1      returned with the   
jailer carrying the cup of poison4      
,socrates      said3 ,you1 my good      
friend1 who are experienced in these    
matters1 shall give me directions how ,i
 am to proceed4 ,the      man answered3 
,you have only to walk about until your 
legs      are heavy1 and then to lie    
down1 and the poison will act4 ,at      
the same time he handed the cup to      

,socrates1 who in the      easiest and  
gentlest manner1 without the least fear 
or change      of colour or feature1    
looking at the man with all his eyes1   
,echecrates1 as his manner was1 took the
 cup and said3 ,what      do you say    
about making a libation out of this cup 
to any      god8 ,may ,i1 or not8 ,the  
man answered3 ,we only prepare1         
,socrates1 just so much as we deem      
enough4 ,i understand1      he said3 but
 ,i may and must ask the gods to prosper
      my journey from this to the other 
world--even so--and so be      it       
according to my prayer4 ,then raising   
the cup to his lips1      quite readily 
and cheerfully he drank off the poison4 
,and      hitherto most of us had been  
able to control our sorrow2 but      now
 when we saw him drinking1 and saw too  
that he had      finished the draught1  
we could no longer forbear1 and in spite
      of myself my own tears were       
flowing fast2 so that ,i covered      my
 face and wept1 not for him1 but at the 

thought of my own      calamity in      
having to part from such a friend4 ,nor 
was ,i the      first2 for ,crito1 when 
he found himself unable to restrain his 
tears1 had got up1 and ,i followed2 and 
at that moment1      ,apollodorus1 who  
had been weeping all the time1 broke out
 in      a loud and passionate cry which
 made cowards of us all4    ,sidenote3  
,says ,socrates1 #8,a man should die in 
peace4'    ,sidenote3 ,the debt to      
,asclepius4        ,socrates alone      
retained his calmness3 ,what is this    
strange      outcry8 he said4 ,i sent   
away the women mainly in order      that
 they might not misbehave in this way1  
for ,i have been      told that a man   
should die in peace4 ,be quiet then1 and
      have patience4 ,when we heard his 
words we were ashamed1      and         
refrained our tears2 and he walked about
 until1 as he      said1 his legs began 
to fail1 and then he lay on his back1   
according to the directions1 and the man
 who gave him the      poison now and   

then looked at his feet and legs2 and   
after a      while he pressed his foot  
hard1 and asked him if he could         
feel2 and he said1 ,no2 and then his    
leg1 and so upwards and        #aah     
upwards1 and showed us that he was cold 
and stiff4 ,and he      felt them       
himself1 and said3 ,when the poison     
reaches the      heart1 that will be the
 end4 ,he was beginning to grow cold    
about the groin1 when he uncovered his  
face1 for he had      covered himself   
up1 and said--they were his last        
words--he      said3 ,crito1 ,i owe a   
cock to ,asclepius2 will you remember   
to pay the debt8 ,the debt shall be     
paid1 said ,crito2 is      there        
anything else8 ,there was no answer to  
this question2      but in a minute or  
two a movement was heard1 and the       
attendants uncovered him2 his eyes were 
set1 and ,crito      closed his eyes and
 mouth4    ,sidenote3 ,the end4         
,such was the end1 ,echecrates1 of our  
friend2 concerning      whom ,i may     

truly say1 that of all the men of his   
time whom ,i      have known1 he was the
 wisest and justest and best4           
,,footnotes    #bc ,but cp4 ,rep4 x4    
#faa ,a4    #bd ,cp4 ,meno #hc ff4      
#be ,cp4 ,apol4 #dj ,e4    #bf ,compare 
,milton1 ,comus1 #dfc foll43--          
#8,but when lust1      ,by unchaste     
looks1 loose gestures1 and foul talk1   
,but most by lewd and lavish act of sin1
      ,lets in defilement to the inward 
parts1      ,the soul grows clotted by  
contagion1      ,imbodies1 and imbrutes1
 till she quite lose1      ,the divine  
property of her first being4      ,such 
are those thick and gloomy shadows damp 
,oft seen in charnel vaults and         
sepulchres1      ,lingering1 and sitting
 by a new made grave1      ,as loath to 
leave the body that it lov'd1      ,and 
linked itself by carnal sensuality      
,to a degenerate and degraded state4'   
#bg ,cp4 ,rep4 x4 #fai ,c4    #bh ,cp4  
,rev41 esp4 c4 xxi4 v4 #ah ff4          
,,gorgias4      ,,introduction4         

,sidenote3 ,gorgias4    ,sidenote3      
,,introduction4    ,in several of the   
dialogues of ,plato1 doubts have arisen 
among his  interpreters as to which of  
the various subjects discussed in them  
is the  main thesis4 ,the speakers have 
the freedom of conversation2 no severe  
rules of art restrict them1 and         
sometimes we are inclined to think1     
with one of the dramatis personae in the
 ,theaetetus 7#agg ,c71 that the        
digressions have the greater interest4  
,yet in the most irregular of the       
dialogues there is also a certain       
natural growth or unity2 the beginning  
is not forgotten at the end1 and        
numerous allusions and references are   
interspersed1 which form the loose      
connecting links of the whole4 ,we  must
 not neglect this unity1 but neither    
must we attempt to confine  the         
,platonic dialogue on the ,procrustean  
bed of a single idea4 7,cp4             
,introduction to the ,phaedrus47    ,two
 tendencies seem to have beset the      

interpreters of ,plato in this  matter4 
,first1 they have endeavoured to hang   
the dialogues upon one  another by the  
slightest threads2 and have thus been   
led to opposite and  contradictory      
assertions respecting their order and   
sequence4 ,the mantle  of               
,schleiermacher has descended upon his  
successors1 who have applied his  method
 with the most various results4 ,the    
value and use of the method has  been   
hardly1 if at all1 examined either by   
him or them4 ,secondly1 they  have      
extended almost indefinitely the scope  
of each separate dialogue2  in this way 
they think that they have escaped all   
difficulties1 not  seeing that what they
 have gained in generality they have    
lost in truth  and distinctness4        
,metaphysical conceptions easily pass   
into one another2  and the simpler      
notions of antiquity1 which we can only 
realize by an  effort1 imperceptibly    
blend with the more familiar theories of
 modern  philosophers4 ,an eye for      

proportion is needed 7his own art of    
measuring7  in the study of ,plato1 as  
well as of other great artists4 ,we may 
readily  admit that the moral antithesis
 of good and pleasure1 or the           
intellectual  antithesis of knowledge   
and opinion1 being an appearance1 are   
never far  off in a ,platonic           
discussion4 ,but because they are in the
 background1  we should not bring them  
into the foreground1 or expect to       
discern them  equally in all the        
dialogues4    ,sidenote3 ,the subject of
 the ,dialogue4    ,there may be some   
advantage in drawing out a little the   
main outlines  of the building2 but the 
use of this is limited1 and may be      
easily  exaggerated4 ,we may give ,plato
 too much system1 and alter the natural 
form and connection of his thoughts4    
,under the idea that his dialogues  are 
finished works of art1 we may find a    
reason for everything1 and lose  the    
highest characteristic of art1 which is 
simplicity4 ,most great works  receive a

 new light from a new and original mind4
 ,but whether these new  lights are true
 or only suggestive1 will depend on     
their agreement with  the spirit of     
,plato1 and the amount of direct        
evidence which can be urged  in support 
of them4 ,when a theory is running away 
with us1 criticism does  a friendly     
office in counselling moderation1 and   
recalling us to the  indications of the 
text4    ,like the ,phaedrus1 the       
,gorgias has puzzled students of ,plato 
by the  appearance of two or more       
subjects4 ,under the cover of rhetoric  
higher  themes are introduced2 the      
argument expands into a general view of 
the  good and evil of man4 ,after making
 an ineffectual attempt to obtain  a    
sound definition of his art from        
,gorgias1 ,socrates assumes the         
existence of a universal art of flattery
 or simulation having several           
branches2--this is the genus of which   
rhetoric is only one1 and not the       
highest species4 ,to flattery is opposed

 the true and noble art of life  which  
he who possesses seeks always to impart 
to others1 and which at  last triumphs1 
if not here1 at any rate in another     
world4 ,these two  aspects of life and  
knowledge appear to be the two leading  
ideas of  the dialogue4 ,the true and   
the false in individuals and states1 in 
the  treatment of the soul as well as of
 the body1 are conceived under the      
forms of true and false art4 ,in the    
development of this opposition there    
arise various other questions1 such as  
the two famous paradoxes of  ,socrates  
7paradoxes as they are to the world in  
general1 ideals as they  may be more    
worthily called73 7#a7 that to do is    
worse than to suffer  evil2 and 7#b7    
that when a man has done evil he had    
better be punished  than unpunished2 to 
which may be added 7#c7 a third         
,socratic paradox or  ideal1 that bad   
men do what they think best1 but not    
what they desire1  for the desire of all
 is towards the good4 ,that pleasure is 

to be  distinguished from good is proved
 by the simultaneousness of pleasure and
  pain1 and by the possibility of the   
bad having in certain cases pleasures   
as great as those of the good1 or even  
greater4 ,not merely rhetoricians1  but 
poets1 musicians1 and other artists1 the
 whole tribe of statesmen1  past as well
 as present1 are included in the class  
of flatterers4 ,the  true and false     
finally appear before the judgment-seat 
of the gods below4    ,sidenote3 ,the   
character of the ,dialogue4    ,the     
dialogue naturally falls into three     
divisions1 to which the three           
characters of ,gorgias1 ,polus1 and     
,callicles respectively correspond2 and 
the form and manner change with the     
stages of the argument4 ,socrates is    
deferential towards ,gorgias1 playful   
and yet cutting in dealing with the     
youthful ,polus1 ironical and sarcastic 
in his encounter with ,callicles4  ,in  
the first division the question is      
asked--,what is rhetoric8 ,to this      

there is no answer given1 for ,gorgias  
is soon made to contradict himself  by  
,socrates1 and the argument is          
transferred to the hands of his disciple
  ,polus1 who rushes to the defence of  
his master4 ,the answer has at last  to 
be given by ,socrates himself1 but      
before he can even explain his  meaning 
to ,polus1 he must enlighten him upon   
the great subject of shams  or          
flatteries4 ,when ,polus finds his      
favourite art reduced to the level  of  
cookery1 he replies that at any rate    
rhetoricians1 like despots1 have  great 
power4 ,socrates denies that they have  
any real power1 and hence  arise the    
three paradoxes already mentioned4      
,although they are strange  to him1     
,polus is at last convinced of their    
truth2 at least1 they seem  to him to   
follow legitimately from the premises4  
,thus the second act  of the dialogue   
closes4 ,then ,callicles appears on the 
scene1 at first  maintaining that       
pleasure is good1 and that might is     

right1 and that law  is nothing but the 
combination of the many weak against the
 few strong4  ,when he is confuted he   
withdraws from the argument1 and leaves 
,socrates  to arrive at the conclusion  
by himself4 ,the conclusion is that     
there  are two kinds of statesmanship1 a
 higher and a lower--that which makes   
the people better1 and that which only  
flatters them1 and he exhorts           
,callicles to choose the higher4 ,the   
dialogue terminates with a mythus of  a 
final judgment1 in which there will be  
no more flattery or disguise1  and no   
further use for the teaching of         
rhetoric4    ,sidenote3 ,contrast of    
,gorgias and ,polus4    ,the characters 
of the three interlocutors also         
correspond to the parts  which are      
assigned to them4 ,gorgias is the great 
rhetorician1 now  advanced in years1 who
 goes from city to city displaying his  
talents1 and  is celebrated throughout  
,greece4 ,like all the ,sophists in the 
dialogues  of ,plato1 he is vain and    

boastful1 yet he has also a certain     
dignity1  and is treated by ,socrates   
with considerable respect4 ,but he is no
 match  for him in dialectics4 ,although
 he has been teaching rhetoric all his  
life1 he is still incapable of defining 
his own art4 ,when his ideas  begin to  
clear up1 he is unwilling to admit that 
rhetoric can be wholly  separated from  
justice and injustice1 and this         
lingering sentiment of  morality1 or    
regard for public opinion1 enables      
,socrates to detect him  in a           
contradiction4 ,like ,protagoras1 he is 
described as of a generous  nature2 he  
expresses his approbation of ,socrates' 
manner of approaching a  question2 he is
 quite #8one of ,socrates' sort1 ready  
to be refuted as well  as to refute1'   
and very eager that ,callicles and      
,socrates should have the  game out4 ,he
 knows by experience that rhetoric      
exercises great influence  over other   
men1 but he is unable to explain the    
puzzle how rhetoric can  teach          

everything and know nothing4    ,polus  
is an impetuous youth1 a runaway        
#8colt1' as ,socrates describes  him1   
who wanted originally to have taken the 
place of ,gorgias under  the pretext    
that the old man was tired1 and now     
avails himself of the  earliest         
opportunity to enter the lists4 ,he is  
said to be the author of  a work on     
rhetoric 7#dfb ,c71 and is again        
mentioned in the ,phaedrus 7#bfg  ,b71  
as the inventor of balanced or double   
forms of speech 7cp4 ,gorg4  #ddh ,c1   
#dfg ,c2 ,symp4 #ahe ,c74 ,at first he  
is violent and ill-mannered1  and is    
angry at seeing his master overthrown4  
,but in the judicious  hands of         
,socrates he is soon restored to        
good-humour1 and compelled  to assent to
 the required conclusion4 ,like         
,gorgias1 he is overthrown  because he  
compromises2 he is unwilling to say that
 to do is fairer or  more honourable    
than to suffer injustice4 ,though he is 
fascinated by the  power of rhetoric1   

and dazzled by the splendour of success1
 he is not  insensible to higher        
arguments4 ,plato may have felt that    
there would be  an incongruity in a     
youth maintaining the cause of injustice
 against  the world4 ,he has never heard
 the other side of the question1 and he 
listens to the paradoxes1 as they appear
 to him1 of ,socrates with evident      
astonishment4 ,he can hardly understand 
the meaning of ,archelaus being         
miserable1 or of rhetoric being only    
useful in self-accusation4 ,when the    
argument with him has fairly run out1   
,sidenote3 ,callicles1 the man of the   
world4    ,callicles1 in whose house    
they are assembled1 is introduced on the
 stage3  he is with difficulty convinced
 that ,socrates is in earnest2 for if   
these  things are true1 then1 as he says
 with real emotion1 the foundations of  
society are upside down4 ,in him another
 type of character is represented2  he  
is neither sophist nor philosopher1 but 
man of the world1 and an  accomplished  

,athenian gentleman4 ,he might be       
described in modern language  as a cynic
 or materialist1 a lover of power and   
also of pleasure1 and  unscrupulous in  
his means of attaining both4 ,there is  
no desire on his  part to offer any     
compromise in the interests of morality2
 nor is any  concession made by him4    
,like ,thrasymachus in the ,republic1   
though he is  not of the same weak and  
vulgar class1 he consistently maintains 
that  might is right4 ,his great motive 
of action is political ambition2 in this
  he is characteristically ,greek4 ,like
 ,anytus in the ,meno1 he is the enemy  
of the ,sophists2 but favours the new   
art of rhetoric1 which he regards as  an
 excellent weapon of attack and defence4
 ,he is a despiser of mankind as  he is 
of philosophy1 and sees in the laws of  
the state only a violation  of the order
 of nature1 which intended that the     
stronger should govern  the weaker 7cp4 
,rep4 ii4 #ceh-cfj74 ,like other men of 
the world who are of  a speculative turn

 of mind1 he generalizes the bad side of
 human nature1  and has easily brought  
down his principles to his practice4    
,philosophy  and poetry alike supply him
 with distinctions suited to his view of
 human  life4 ,he has a good will to    
,socrates1 whose talents he evidently   
admires1  while he censures the puerile 
use which he makes of them4 ,he         
expresses  a keen intellectual interest 
in the argument4 ,like ,anytus1 again1  
he  has a sympathy with other men of the
 world2 the ,athenian statesmen of  a   
former generation1 who showed no        
weakness and made no mistakes1 such  as 
,miltiades1 ,themistocles1 ,pericles1   
are his favourites4 ,his ideal of  human
 character is a man of great passions   
and great powers1 which he has          
developed to the utmost1 and which he   
uses in his own enjoyment and in  the   
government of others4 ,had ,critias been
 the name instead of ,callicles1  about 
whom we know nothing from other sources1
 the opinions of the man  would have    

seemed to reflect the history of his    
life4    ,sidenote3 ,the representation 
of ,socrates in the ,gorgias4    ,and   
now the combat deepens4 ,in ,callicles1 
far more than in any sophist or         
rhetorician1 is concentrated the spirit 
of evil against which ,socrates is      
contending1 the spirit of the world1 the
 spirit of the many contending  against 
the one wise man1 of which the          
,sophists1 as he describes them in  the 
,republic1 are the imitators rather than
 the authors1 being themselves  carried 
away by the great tide of public        
opinion4 ,socrates approaches his       
antagonist warily from a distance1 with 
a sort of irony which touches  with a   
light hand both his personal vices      
7probably in allusion to some  scandal  
of the day7 and his servility to the    
populace4 ,at the same time1  he is in  
most profound earnest1 as ,chaerephon   
remarks4 ,callicles soon  loses his     
temper1 but the more he is irritated1   
the more provoking and  matter of fact  

does ,socrates become4 ,a repartee of   
his which appears  to have been really  
made to the #8omniscient' ,hippias1     
according to the  testimony of ,xenophon
 7,mem4 iv4 #d1 #f1 #aj71 is introduced 
7#dij ,e74 ,he is  called by ,callicles 
a popular declaimer1 and certainly shows
 that he has  the power1 in the words of
 ,gorgias1 of being #8as long as he     
pleases1' or  #8as short as he pleases' 
7cp4 ,protag4 #ccf ,d74 ,callicles      
exhibits great  ability in defending    
himself and attacking ,socrates1 whom he
 accuses  of trifling and               
word-splitting2 he is scandalized 7p4   
#did7 that the  legitimate consequences 
of his own argument should be stated in 
plain  terms2 after the manner of men of
 the world1 he wishes to preserve the   
decencies of life4 ,but he cannot       
consistently maintain the bad sense  of 
words2 and getting confused between the 
abstract notions of better1  superior1  
stronger1 he is easily turned round by  
,socrates1 and only  induced to continue

 the argument by the authority of       
,gorgias4 ,once1 when  ,socrates is     
describing the manner in which the      
ambitious citizen has to  identify      
himself with the people1 he partially   
recognizes the truth of  his words4     
,the ,socrates of the ,gorgias may be   
compared with the ,socrates of the      
,protagoras and ,meno4 ,as in other     
dialogues1 he is the enemy of the       
,sophists and rhetoricians2 and also of 
the statesmen1 whom he regards as       
another variety of the same species4    
,his behaviour is governed by that  of  
his opponents2 the least forwardness or 
egotism on their part is met  by a      
corresponding irony on the part of      
,socrates4 ,he must speak1 for          
philosophy will not allow him to be     
silent4 ,he is indeed more ironical  and
 provoking than in any other of ,plato's
 writings3 for he is #8fooled  to the   
top of his bent' by the worldliness of  
,callicles4 ,but he is also  more deeply
 in earnest4 ,he rises higher than even 

in the ,phaedo and  ,crito3 at first    
enveloping his moral convictions in a   
cloud of dust and  dialectics1 he ends  
by losing his method1 his life1 himself1
 in them4  ,as in the ,protagoras and   
,phaedrus1 throwing aside the veil of   
irony1 he  makes a speech1 but1 true to 
his character1 not until his adversary  
has  refused to answer any more         
questions4 ,the presentiment of his own 
fate is  hanging over him4 ,he is aware 
that ,socrates1 the single real teacher 
of  politics1 as he ventures to call    
himself1 cannot safely go to war with   
the whole world1 and that in the courts 
of earth he will be condemned4  ,but he 
will be justified in the world below4   
,then the position of  ,socrates and    
,callicles will be reversed2 all those  
things #8unfit for ears  polite' which  
,callicles has prophesied as likely to  
happen to him in this  life1 the        
insulting language1 the box on the ears1
 will recoil upon his  assailant4       
7,compare ,rep4 x4 #fac1 ,d1 ,e1 and the

 similar reversal of the  position of   
the lawyer and the philosopher in the   
,theaetetus1 #agc-agf47    ,sidenote3   
,the representation of ,socrates in the 
,gorgias4    ,there is an interesting   
allusion to his own behaviour at the    
trial of the  generals after the battle 
of ,arginusae1 which he ironically      
attributes  to his ignorance of the     
manner in which a vote of the assembly  
should be  taken 7#dgc ,e74 ,this is    
said to have happened #8last year' 7,b4 
,c4 #djf71 and  therefore the assumed   
date of the dialogue has been fixed at  
#dje ,b4 ,c41  when ,socrates would     
already have been an old man4 ,the date 
is clearly  marked1 but is scarcely     
reconcilable with another indication of 
time1  viz4 the #8recent' usurpation of 
,archelaus1 which occurred in the year  
#dac  7#dgj ,d72 and still less with the
 #8recent' death 7#ejc ,b7 of ,pericles1
 who  really died twenty-four years     
previously 7#dbi ,b4 ,c47 and is        
afterwards  reckoned among the statesmen

 of a past age 7cp4 #eag ,a72 or with   
the  mention of ,nicias1 who died in    
#dac1 and is nevertheless spoken of as a
  living witness 7#dgb ,a1 ,b74 ,but we 
shall hereafter have reason to observe1 
that although there is a general        
consistency of times and persons in  the
 ,dialogues of ,plato1 a precise        
dramatic date is an invention of his    
commentators 7,preface to ,republic1 p4 
ix74    ,sidenote3 ,socrates the only   
true politician4    ,the conclusion of  
the ,dialogue is remarkable1 7#a7 for   
the truly  characteristic declaration of
 ,socrates 7p4 #eji ,a7 that he is      
ignorant of  the true nature and bearing
 of these things1 while he affirms at   
the same  time that no one can maintain 
any other view without being ridiculous4
  ,the profession of ignorance reminds  
us of the earlier and more  exclusively 
,socratic ,dialogues4 ,but neither in   
them1 nor in the ,apology1  nor in the  
,memorabilia of ,xenophon1 does         
,socrates express any doubt of  the     

fundamental truths of morality4 ,he     
evidently regards this #8among  the     
multitude of questions' which agitate   
human life #8as the principle  which    
alone remains unshaken' 7#ebg ,b74 ,he  
does not insist here1 any more  than in 
the ,phaedo1 on the literal truth of the
 myth1 but only on the  soundness of the
 doctrine which is contained in it1 that
 doing wrong is  worse than suffering1  
and that a man should be rather than    
seem2 for the  next best thing to a     
man's being just is that he should be   
corrected and  become just2 also that he
 should avoid all flattery1 whether of  
himself  or of others2 and that rhetoric
 should be employed for the maintenance 
of  the right only4 ,the revelation of  
another life is a recapitulation of the 
argument in a figure4    7#b7 ,socrates 
makes the singular remark1 that he is   
himself the only true  politician of his
 age4 ,in other passages1 especially in 
the ,apology1 he  disclaims being a     
politician at all4 ,there he is         

convinced that he or  any other good man
 who attempted to resist the popular    
will would be  put to death before he   
had done any good to himself or others4 
,here he  anticipates such a fate for   
himself1 from the fact that he is #8the 
only  man of the present day who        
performs his public duties at all' 7#eba
 ,d74  ,the two points of view are not  
really inconsistent1 but the difference 
between them is worth noticing3         
,socrates is and is not a public man4   
,not  in the ordinary sense1 like       
,alcibiades or ,pericles1 but in a      
higher one2  and this will sooner or    
later entail the same consequences on   
him4 ,he  cannot be a private man if he 
would2 neither can he separate morals   
from  politics4 ,nor is he unwilling to 
be a politician1 although he foresees   
the dangers which await him2 but he must
 first become a better and  wiser man1  
for he as well as ,callicles is in a    
state of perplexity and  uncertainty    
7#ebg ,d1 ,e74 ,and yet there is an     

inconsistency3 for should not  ,socrates
 too have taught the citizens better    
than to put him to death  7#eai78       
,and now1 as he himself says 7#ejf ,d71 
we will #8resume the argument from  the 
beginning4'           99       99       
99       99       99    ,sidenote3      
,,analysis4    ,sidenote3 ,analysis     
#ddg-dea4        ,socrates1 who is      
attended by his inseparable disciple1   
,steph4 #ddg      ,chaerephon1 meets    
,callicles in the streets of ,athens4   
,he is      informed that he has just   
missed an exhibition of ,gorgias1 which 
he      regrets1 because he was         
desirous1 not of hearing ,gorgias       
display      his rhetoric1 but of       
interrogating him concerning the nature 
of his      art4 ,callicles proposes    
that they shall go with him to his own  
house1 where ,gorgias is staying4 ,there
 they find the great      rhetorician   
and his younger friend and disciple     
,polus4             #ddh        ,soc4   
,put the question to him1 ,chaerephon4  

,ch4 ,what question8      ,soc4 ,who is 
he8--such a question as would elicit    
from a man the      answer1 #8,i am a   
cobbler4' ,polus suggests that ,gorgias 
may be      tired1 and desires to answer
 for him4 #8,who is ,gorgias8' asks     
,chaerephon1 imitating the manner of his
 master ,socrates4 #8,one of      the   
best of men1 and a proficient in the    
best and noblest of      experimental   
arts1' etc41 replies ,polus1 in         
rhetorical and balanced      phrases4   
,socrates is dissatisfied at the length 
and unmeaningness of      the answer2 he
 tells the disconcerted volunteer that  
he has mistaken      the quality for the
 nature of the art1 and remarks to      
,gorgias1 that      ,polus has learnt   
how to make a speech1 but not how to    
answer a      question4 ,he wishes that 
,gorgias would answer him4 ,gorgias is  
willing enough1 and replies to the      
question asked by ,chaerephon1--that    
he is a rhetorician1 and in ,homeric    
language1 #8boasts      himself to be a 

good one4' ,at the request of ,socrates 
he promises  #ddi      to be brief2 for 
#8he can be as long as he pleases1 and  
as short as      he pleases4' ,socrates 
would have him bestow his length on     
others1 and proceeds to ask him a number
 of questions1 which are      answered  
by him to his own great satisfaction1   
and with a brevity      which excites   
the admiration of ,socrates4 ,the result
 of the      discussion may be summed up
 as follows3--    ,sidenote3 ,analysis  
#dea-def4        ,rhetoric treats of    
discourse2 but music and medicine1 and  
#dej      other particular arts1 are    
also concerned with discourse2 in what  
way then does rhetoric differ from them8
 ,gorgias draws a      distinction      
between the arts which deal with words1 
and the arts      which have to do with 
external actions4 ,socrates extends this
      distinction further1 and divides  
all productive arts into two            
classes3 7#a7 arts which may be carried 
on in silence2 and 7#b7 arts      which 

have to do with words1 or in which words
 are coextensive      with action1 such 
as arithmetic1 geometry1 rhetoric4 ,but 
still      ,gorgias could hardly have   
meant to say that arithmetic was the    
#dea      same as rhetoric4 ,even in the
 arts which are concerned with          
words there are differences4 ,what then 
distinguishes rhetoric      from the    
other arts which have to do with words8 
#8,the words      which rhetoric uses   
relate to the best and greatest of human
      things4' ,but tell me1 ,gorgias1  
what are the best8 #8,health first1     
beauty next1 wealth third1' in the words
 of the old song1 or how      would you 
rank them8 ,the arts will come to you in
 a body1 each     #deb      claiming    
precedence and saying that her own good 
is superior to      that of the         
rest--,how will you choose between them8
 #8,i should      say1 ,socrates1 that  
the art of persuasion1 which gives      
freedom to      all men1 and to         
individuals power in the state1 is the  

greatest    #dec      good4' ,but what  
is the exact nature of this             
persuasion8--is the      persevering    
retort3 ,you could not describe ,zeuxis 
as a painter1      or even as a painter 
of figures1 if there were other painters
 of      figures2 neither can you define
 rhetoric simply as an art of           
persuasion1 because there are other arts
 which persuade1 such as                
arithmetic1 which is an art of          
persuasion about odd and even           
numbers4 ,gorgias is made to see the    
necessity of a further      limitation1 
and he now defines rhetoric as the art  
of persuading   #ded      in the law    
courts1 and in the assembly1 about the  
just and unjust4      ,but still there  
are two sorts of persuasion3 one which  
gives      knowledge1 and another which 
gives belief without knowledge2      and
 knowledge is always true1 but belief   
may be either true or     #dee          
false1--there is therefore a further    
question3 which of the two      sorts of

 persuasion does rhetoric effect in     
courts of law and      assemblies8      
,plainly that which gives belief and not
 that which      gives knowledge2 for no
 one can impart a real knowledge of such
      matters to a crowd of persons in a
 few minutes4 ,and there is      another
 point to be considered3--when the      
assembly meets to      advise about     
walls or docks or military expeditions1 
the rhetorician      is not taken into  
counsel1 but the architect1 or the      
general4 ,how      would ,gorgias       
explain this phenomenon8 ,all who intend
 to      become disciples1 of whom there
 are several in the company1 and        
not ,socrates only1 are eagerly         
asking3--,about what then will          
rhetoric teach us to persuade or advise 
the state8    ,sidenote3 ,analysis      
#def-dfa4        ,gorgias illustrates   
the nature of rhetoric by adducing the  
example of ,themistocles1 who persuaded 
the ,athenians to build      their docks
 and walls1 and of ,pericles1 whom      

,socrates himself has      heard        
speaking about the middle wall of the   
,piraeus4 ,he adds       #def      that 
he has exercised a similar power over   
the patients of his      brother        
,herodicus4 ,he could be chosen a       
physician by the      assembly if he    
pleased1 for no physician could compete 
with a      rhetorician in popularity   
and influence4 ,he could persuade the   
multitude of anything by the power of   
his rhetoric2 not that the              
rhetorician ought to abuse this power   
any more than a boxer      should abuse 
the art of self-defence4 ,rhetoric is a 
good thing1    #deg      but1 like all  
good things1 may be unlawfully used4    
,neither is the      teacher of the art 
to be deemed unjust because his pupils  
are      unjust and make a bad use of   
the lessons which they have learned     
from him4        ,socrates would like to
 know before he replies1 whether        
,gorgias      will quarrel with him if  
he points out a slight inconsistency    

into      which he has fallen1 or       
whether he1 like himself1 is one who    
loves      to be refuted4 ,gorgias      
declares that he is quite one of his    
sort1  #deh      but fears that the     
argument may be tedious to the company4 
,the      company cheer1 and ,chaerephon
 and ,callicles exhort them to          
proceed4 ,socrates gently points out the
 supposed inconsistency      into which 
,gorgias appears to have fallen1 and    
which he is      inclined to think may  
arise out of a misapprehension of his   
own4      ,the rhetorician has been     
declared by ,gorgias to be more         
persuasive #dei      to the ignorant    
than the physician1 or any other expert4
      ,and he is said to be ignorant1   
and this ignorance of his is            
regarded by ,gorgias as a happy         
condition1 for he has escaped the       
trouble of learning4 ,but is he as      
ignorant of just and unjust as he       
is of medicine or building8 ,gorgias is 
compelled to admit that if  #dfj      he

 did not know them previously he must   
learn them from his      teacher as a   
part of the art of rhetoric4 ,but he who
 has learned      carpentry is a        
carpenter1 and he who has learned music 
is a      musician1 and he who has      
learned justice is just4 ,the           
rhetorician      then must be a just    
man1 and rhetoric is a just thing4 ,but 
,gorgias      has already admitted the  
opposite of this1 viz4 that rhetoric may
      be abused1 and that the           
rhetorician may act unjustly4 ,how is   
the      inconsistency to be explained8 
#dfa    ,sidenote3 ,analysis #dfa-dfd4  
,the fallacy of this argument is        
twofold2 for in the first place1      a 
man may know justice and not be         
just--here is the old confusion      of 
the arts and the virtues2--nor can any  
teacher be      expected to counteract  
wholly the bent of natural character2   
and      secondly1 a man may have a     
degree of justice1 but not sufficient   
to prevent him from ever doing wrong4   

,polus is naturally      exasperated at 
the sophism1 which he is unable to      
detect2 of      course1 he says1 the    
rhetorician1 like every one else1 will  
admit      that he knows justice 7how   
can he do otherwise when pressed by     
the interrogations of ,socrates871 but  
he thinks that great want of            
manners is shown in bringing the        
argument to such a pass4      ,socrates 
ironically replies1 that when old men   
trip1 the young set #dfb      them on   
their legs again2 and he is quite       
willing to retract1 if he      can be   
shown to be in error1 but upon one      
condition1 which is      that ,polus    
studies brevity4 ,polus is in great     
indignation at not      being allowed to
 use as many words as he pleases in the 
free      state of ,athens4 ,socrates   
retorts1 that yet harder will be his own
      case1 if he is compelled to stay  
and listen to them4 ,after some         
altercation they agree 7cp4 ,protag4    
#cch71 that ,polus shall ask and        

,socrates answer4    ,sidenote3         
,analysis #dfd-dgb4        #8,what is   
the art of ,rhetoric8' says ,polus4 ,not
 an art at all1      replies ,socrates1 
but a thing which in your book you      
affirm to      have created art4 ,polus 
asks1 #8,what thing8' and ,socrates     
answers1 ,an experience or routine of   
making a sort of delight      or        
gratification4 #8,but is not rhetoric a 
fine thing8' ,i have not      yet told  
you what rhetoric is4 ,will you ask me  
another question--,what      is cookery8
 #8,what is cookery8' ,an experience or 
routine of making a sort of delight or  
gratification4 ,then they      are the  
same1 or rather fall under the same     
class1 and rhetoric    #dfc      has    
still to be distinguished from cookery4 
#8,what is rhetoric8'      asks ,polus  
once more4 ,a part of a not very        
creditable whole1      which may be     
termed flattery1 is the reply4 #8,but   
what part8' ,a      shadow of a part of 
politics4 ,this1 as might be expected1  

is      wholly unintelligible1 both to  
,gorgias and ,polus2 and1 in order      
#dfd      to explain his meaning to     
them1 ,socrates draws a distinction     
between shadows or appearances and      
realities2 e4 g4 there is real          
health of body or soul1 and the         
appearance of them2 real arts and       
sciences1 and the simulations of them4  
,now the soul and body      have two    
arts waiting upon them1 first the art of
 politics1 which      attends on the    
soul1 having a legislative part and a   
judicial part2      and another art     
attending on the body1 which has no     
generic      name1 but may also be      
described as having two divisions1 one  
of      which is medicine and the other 
gymnastic4 ,corresponding with          
these four arts or sciences there are   
four shams or simulations of      them1 
mere experiences1 as they may be termed1
 because they      give no reason of    
their own existence4 ,the art of        
dressing up is      the sham or         

simulation of gymnastic1 the art of     
cookery1 of medicine2      rhetoric is  
the simulation of justice1 and sophistic
 of            #dfe      legislation4   
,they may be summed up in an            
arithmetical formula3--        ,tiring 3
 gymnastic 33 cookery 3 medicine 33     
sophistic 3 legislation4        ,and1   
,cookery 3 medicine 33 rhetoric 3 the   
art of justice4        ,and this is the 
true scheme of them1 but when measured  
only by      the gratification which    
they procure1 they become jumbled       
together      and return to their       
aboriginal chaos4 ,socrates apologizes  
for the      length of his speech1 which
 was necessary to the explanation of    
#dff      the subject1 and begs ,polus  
not unnecessarily to retaliate on him4  
#8,do you mean to say that the          
rhetoricians are esteemed               
flatterers8' ,they are not esteemed at  
all4 #8,why1 have they not      great   
power1 and can they not do whatever they
 desire8' ,they have  #dfg      no      

power1 and they only do what they think 
best1 and never what      they desire2  
for they never attain the true object of
 desire1 which      is the good4 #8,as  
if you1 ,socrates1 would not envy the   
possessor      of despotic power1 who   
can imprison1 exile1 kill any one whom  
he      pleases4' ,but ,socrates replies
 that he has no wish to put any one     
-#dfi      to death2 he who kills       
another1 even justly1 is not to be      
envied1      and he who kills him       
unjustly is to be pitied2 it is better  
to suffer      than to do injustice4 ,he
 does not consider that going about with
      a dagger and putting men out of   
the way1 or setting a house on          
fire1 is real power4 ,to this ,polus    
assents1 on the ground that     #dgj    
such acts would be punished1 but he is  
still of opinion that      evil-doers1  
if they are unpunished1 may be happy    
enough4 ,he      instances ,archelaus1  
son of ,perdiccas1 the usurper of       
,macedonia4      ,does not ,socrates    

think him happy8--,socrates would like  
to          #dga      know more about   
him2 he cannot pronounce even the great 
king      to be happy1 unless he knows  
his mental and moral condition4         
,polus explains that ,archelaus was a   
slave1 being the son of a      woman who
 was the slave of ,alcetas1 brother of  
,perdiccas king      of ,macedon--and   
he1 by every species of crime1 first    
murdering      his uncle and cousin and 
then his half-brother1 obtained the     
kingdom4 ,this was very wicked1 and yet 
all the world1 including      ,socrates1
 would like to have his place4 ,socrates
 dismisses the     #dgb      appeal to  
numbers2 ,polus1 if he will1 may summon 
all the rich      men of ,athens1       
,nicias and his brothers1 ,aristocrates1
 the house of      ,pericles1 or any    
other great family--this is the kind of 
evidence      which is adduced in courts
 of justice1 where truth depends upon   
numbers4 ,but ,socrates employs proof of
 another sort2 his      appeal is to one

 witness only1--that is to say1 the     
person with      whom he is speaking2   
him he will convict out of his own      
mouth4      ,and he is prepared to show1
 after his manner1 that ,archelaus      
cannot be a wicked man and yet happy4   
#dgc    ,sidenote3 ,analysis #dgb-dge4  
,the evil-doer is deemed happy if he    
escapes1 and miserable if      he       
suffers punishment2 but ,socrates thinks
 him less miserable if      he suffers  
than if he escapes4 ,polus is of opinion
 that such a paradox      as this hardly
 deserves refutation1 and is at any rate
 sufficiently      refuted by the fact4 
,socrates has only to compare the lot of
 the      successful tyrant who is the  
envy of the world1 and of the wretch    
who1 having been detected in a criminal 
attempt against the state1      is      
crucified or burnt to death4 ,socrates  
replies1 that if they are      both     
criminal they are both miserable1 but   
that the unpunished is      the more    
miserable of the two4 ,at this ,polus   

laughs outright1 which      leads       
,socrates to remark that laughter is a  
new species of refutation4      ,polus  
replies1 that he is already refuted2 for
 if he will take the      votes of the  
company1 he will find that no one agrees
 with him4    #dgd      ,to this        
,socrates rejoins1 that he is not a     
public man1 and      7referring to his  
own conduct at the trial of the generals
 after the      battle of ,arginusae7 is
 unable to take the suffrages of any    
company1      as he had shown on a      
recent occasion2 he can only deal with  
one      witness at a time1 and that is 
the person with whom he is arguing4     
,but he is certain that in the opinion  
of any man to do is worse      than to  
suffer evil4        ,polus1 though he   
will not admit this1 is ready to        
acknowledge      that to do evil is     
considered the more foul or             
dishonourable of the      two4 ,but what
 is fair and what is foul2 whether the  
terms are      applied to bodies1       

colours1 figures1 laws1 habits1 studies1
 must      they not be defined with     
reference to pleasure and utility8      
,polus  #dge      assents to this latter
 doctrine1 and is easily persuaded that 
the      fouler of two things must      
exceed either in pain or in hurt4 ,but  
the      doing cannot exceed the        
suffering of evil in pain1 and therefore
      must exceed in hurt4 ,thus doing  
is proved by the testimony of           
,polus himself to be worse or more      
hurtful than suffering4    ,sidenote3   
,analysis #dgf-dhb4        ,there       
remains the other question3 ,is a guilty
 man better off      when he is punished
 or when he is unpunished8 ,socrates    
replies1    #dgf      that what is done 
justly is suffered justly3 if the act is
 just1 the      effect is just2 if to   
punish is just1 to be punished is just1 
and      therefore fair1 and therefore  
beneficent2 and the benefit is that the 
soul is improved4 ,there are three evils
 from which a man may       #dgg        

suffer1 and which affect him in estate1 
body1 and soul2--these are1             
poverty1 disease1 injustice2 and the    
foulest of these is injustice1 the      
evil of the soul1 because that brings   
the greatest hurt4 ,and there are       
three arts which heal these             
evils--trading1 medicine1 justice--and  
#dgh      the fairest of these is       
justice4 ,happy is he who has never     
committed      injustice1 and happy in  
the second degree he who has been       
#dgi      healed by punishment4 ,and    
therefore the criminal should himself   
go to the judge as he would to the      
physician1 and purge away his   #dhj    
crime4 ,rhetoric will enable him to     
display his guilt in proper             
colours1 and to sustain himself and     
others in enduring the necessary        
penalty4 ,and similarly if a man has an 
enemy1 he will desire not   #dha      to
 punish him1 but that he shall go       
unpunished and become worse      and    
worse1 taking care only that he does no 

injury to himself4      ,these are at   
least conceivable uses of the art1 and  
no others have      been discovered by  
us4        ,here ,callicles1 who has    
been listening in silent amazement1 asks
      ,chaerephon whether ,socrates is  
in earnest1 and on receiving the        
assurance that he is1 proceeds to ask   
the same question of ,socrates          
himself4 ,for if such doctrines are     
true1 life must have been turned        
upside down1 and all of us are doing the
 opposite of what we ought      to be   
doing4    ,sidenote3 ,analysis #dhb-dhf4
        ,socrates replies in a style of 
playful irony1 that before men can      
understand one another they must have   
some common feeling4      ,and such a   
community of feeling exists between     
himself and      ,callicles1 for both of
 them are lovers1 and they have both a  
pair of      loves2 the beloved of      
,callicles are the ,athenian ,demos and 
,demos   #dhb      the son of           
,pyrilampes2 the beloved of ,socrates   

are ,alcibiades      and philosophy4    
,the peculiarity of ,callicles is that  
he can never      contradict his loves2 
he changes as his ,demos changes in all 
his      opinions2 he watches the       
countenance of both his loves1 and      
repeats their sentiments1 and if any one
 is surprised at his sayings      and   
doings1 the explanation of them is1 that
 he is not a free agent1      but must  
always be imitating his two loves4 ,and 
this is the      explanation of         
,socrates' peculiarities also4 ,he is   
always repeating      what his mistress1
 ,philosophy1 is saying to him1 who1    
unlike his      other love1 ,alcibiades1
 is ever the same1 ever true4 ,callicles
 must      refute her1 or he will never 
be at unity with himself2 and discord   
in life is far worse than the discord of
 musical sounds4        ,callicles      
answers1 that ,gorgias was overthrown   
because1 as ,polus      said1 in        
compliance with popular prejudice he had
 admitted that if      his pupil did not

 know justice the rhetorician must teach
 him2 and      ,polus has been similarly
 entangled1 because his modesty led him 
to admit that to suffer is more         
honourable than to do injustice4 ,by    
custom #8yes1' but not by nature1 says  
,callicles4 ,and ,socrates is   #dhc    
always playing between the two points of
 view1 and putting one in      the place
 of the other4 ,in this very argument1  
what ,polus only      meant in a        
conventional sense has been affirmed by 
him to be a      law of nature4 ,for    
convention says that #8injustice is     
dishonourable1'      but nature says    
that #8might is right4' ,and we are     
always      taming down the nobler      
spirits among us to the conventional    
level4      ,but sometimes a great man  
will rise up and reassert his original  
rights1 trampling under foot all our    
formularies1 and then the     #dhd      
light of natural justice shines forth4  
,pindar says1 #8,law1 the king      of  
all1 does violence with high hand2' as  

is indeed proved by the      example of 
,heracles1 who drove off the oxen of    
,geryon and never      paid for them4   
,this is the truth1 ,socrates1 as you   
will be convinced1 if you leave         
philosophy and pass on to the real      
business of life4 ,a little             
philosophy is an excellent thing2 too   
much is the ruin of a man4 ,he      who 
has not #8passed his metaphysics' before
 he has grown up to      manhood will   
never know the world4 ,philosophers are 
ridiculous      when they take to       
politics1 and ,i dare say that          
politicians are      equally ridiculous 
when they take to philosophy3 #8,every  
man1' as      ,euripides says1 #8is     
fondest of that in which he is best4'   
#dhe      ,philosophy is graceful in    
youth1 like the lisp of infancy1 and    
should be cultivated as a part of       
education2 but when a grown-up      man 
lisps or studies philosophy1 ,i should  
like to beat him4 ,none      of those   
over-refined natures ever come to any   

good2 they avoid      the busy haunts of
 men1 and skulk in corners1 whispering  
to a few      admiring youths1 and never
 giving utterance to any noble          
sentiments4    ,sidenote3 ,analysis     
#dhf-dia4        ,for you1 ,socrates1 ,i
 have a regard1 and therefore ,i say to 
you1      as ,zethus says to ,amphion in
 the play1 that you have #8a noble soul 
#dhf      disguised in a puerile        
exterior4' ,and ,i would have you       
consider      the danger which you and  
other philosophers incur4 ,for you      
would not know how to defend yourself if
 any one accused you in      a          
law-court1--there you would stand1 with 
gaping mouth and dizzy      brain1 and  
might be murdered1 robbed1 boxed on the 
ears with      impunity4 ,take my       
advice1 then1 and get a little common   
sense2      leave to others these       
frivolities2 walk in the ways of the    
wealthy      and be wise4               
,socrates professes to have found in    
,callicles the philosopher's            

touchstone2 and he is certain that any  
opinion in which they both      agree   
must be the very truth4 ,callicles has  
all the three qualities      which are  
needed in a critic--knowledge1          
good-will1 frankness2      #dhg         
,gorgias and ,polus1 although learned   
men1 were too modest1 and      their    
modesty made them contradict themselves4
 ,but ,callicles is      well-educated2 
and he is not too modest to speak out   
7of this he      has already given      
proof71 and his good-will is shown both 
by his      own profession and by his   
giving the same caution against         
philosophy      to ,socrates1 which     
,socrates remembers hearing him give    
long ago to his own clique of friends4  
,he will pledge himself to   #dhh       
retract any error into which he may have
 fallen1 and which ,callicles      may  
point out4 ,but he would like to know   
first of all what he and      ,pindar   
mean by natural justice4 ,do they       
suppose that the rule of      justice is

 the rule of the stronger or of the     
better8 #8,there is no      difference4'
 ,then are not the many superior to the 
one1 and the      opinions of the many  
better8 ,and their opinion is that      
justice is      equality1 and that to do
 is more dishonourable than to suffer   
wrong4      ,and as they are the        
superior or stronger1 this opinion of   
theirs   #dhi      must be in accordance
 with natural as well as conventional   
justice4      #8,why will you continue  
splitting words8 ,have ,i not told you  
that      the superior is the better8'  
,but what do you mean by the better8    
,tell me that1 and please to be a little
 milder in your language1 if      you do
 not wish to drive me away4 #8,i mean   
the worthier1 the        #dij           
wiser4' ,you mean to say that one man of
 sense ought to rule      over ten      
thousand fools8 #8,yes1 that is my      
meaning4' ,ought the      physician then
 to have a larger share of meats and    
drinks8 or      the weaver to have more 

coats1 or the cobbler larger shoes1 or  
the      farmer more seed8 #8,you are   
always saying the same things1          
#dia      ,socrates4' ,yes1 and on the  
same subjects too2 but you are never    
saying the same things4 ,for1 first1 you
 defined the superior to be      the    
stronger1 and then the wiser1 and now   
something else2--what      do you mean8 
#8,i mean men of political ability1 who 
ought to      govern and to have more   
than the governed4' ,than themselves8   
#8,what do you mean8' ,i mean to say    
that every man is his own      governor4
 #8,i see that you mean those dolts1 the
 temperate4 ,but      my doctrine is1   
that a man should let his desires grow1 
and take      the means of satisfying   
them4 ,to the many this is impossible1  
#dib      and therefore they combine to 
prevent him4 ,but if he is a king1      
and has power1 how base would he be in  
submitting to them6 ,to      invite the 
common herd to be lord over him1 when he
 might have      the enjoyment of all   

things6 ,for the truth is1 ,socrates1   
that      luxury and self-indulgence are
 virtue and happiness2 all the rest     
is mere talk4'    ,sidenote3 ,analysis  
#dia-did4        ,socrates compliments  
,callicles on his frankness in saying   
what      other men only think4         
,according to his view1 those who want  
nothing are not happy4 #8,why1' says    
,callicles1 #8if they were1      stones 
and the dead would be happy4' ,socrates 
in reply is led      into a             
half-serious1 half-comic vein of        
reflection4 #8,who knows1' as           
,euripides says1 #8whether life may not 
be death1 and death life8'      ,nay1   
there are philosophers who maintain that
 even in life we are  #dic      dead1   
and that the body 77 is the tomb 77 of  
the soul4 ,and      some ingenious      
,sicilian has made an allegory1 in which
 he represents      fools as the        
uninitiated1 who are supposed to be     
carrying      water to a vessel1 which  
is full of holes1 in a similarly holey  

sieve1      and this sieve is their own 
soul4 ,the idea is fanciful1 but        
nevertheless is a figure of a truth     
which ,i want to make you               
acknowledge1 viz4 that the life of      
contentment is better than the life     
of indulgence4 ,are you disposed to     
admit that8 #8,far otherwise4'          
,then hear another parable4 ,the life of
 self-contentment and                   
self-indulgence may be represented      
respectively by two men1 who are        
filling jars with streams of wine1      
honey1 milk1--the jars of the one       
are sound1 and the jars of the other    
leaky2 the first fills his jars1        
and has no more trouble with them2 the  
second is always filling    #did        
them1 and would suffer extreme misery if
 he desisted4 ,are you      of the same 
opinion still8 #8,yes1 ,socrates1 and   
the figure expresses      what ,i mean4 
,for true pleasure is a perpetual       
stream1 flowing in      and flowing out4
 ,to be hungry and always eating1 to be 

thirsty      and always drinking1 and to
 have all the other desires and to      
satisfy them1 that1 as ,i admit1 is my  
idea of happiness4' ,and to be          
itching and always scratching8 #8,i do  
not deny that there may be              
happiness even in that4' ,and to indulge
 unnatural desires1 if they      are    
abundantly satisfied8 ,callicles is     
indignant at the introduction      of   
such topics4 ,but he is reminded by     
,socrates that they are      introduced1
 not by him1 but by the maintainer of   
the identity of   #die      pleasure and
 good4 ,will ,callicles still maintain  
this8 #8,yes1 for      the sake of      
consistency1 he will4' ,the answer does 
not satisfy      ,socrates1 who fears   
that he is losing his touchstone4 ,a    
profession      of seriousness on the   
part of ,callicles reassures him1 and   
they      proceed with the argument4    
,pleasure and good are the same1        
but knowledge and courage are not the   
same either with pleasure      or good1 

or with one another4 ,socrates disproves
 the first of these      statements by  
showing that two opposites cannot       
co-exist1 but must      alternate with  
one another--to be well and ill together
 is          #dif      impossible4 ,but 
pleasure and pain are simultaneous1 and 
the cessation      of them is           
simultaneous2 e4 g4 in the case of      
drinking and thirsting1      whereas    
good and evil are not simultaneous1 and 
do not cease       #dig                 
simultaneously1 and therefore pleasure  
cannot be the same as      good4        
,sidenote3 ,analysis #did-eja4          
,callicles has already lost his temper1 
and can only be persuaded      to go on 
by the interposition of ,gorgias4       
,socrates1 having already      guarded  
against objections by distinguishing    
courage and knowledge      from pleasure
 and good1 proceeds3--,the good are good
 by      the presence of good1 and the  
bad are bad by the presence of evil4    
,and the brave and wise are good1 and   

the cowardly and foolish      #dih      
are bad4 ,and he who feels pleasure is  
good1 and he who feels      pain is bad1
 and both feel pleasure and pain in     
nearly the same      degree1 and        
sometimes the bad man or coward in a    
greater degree4      ,therefore the bad 
man or coward is as good as the brave or
 may     #dii      be even better4      
,callicles endeavours now to avert the  
inevitable absurdity by      affirming  
that he and all mankind admitted some   
pleasures to be      good and others    
bad4 ,the good are the beneficial1 and  
the bad      are the hurtful1 and we    
should choose the one and avoid the     
other4      ,but this1 as ,socrates     
observes1 is a return to the old        
doctrine of      himself and ,polus1    
that all things should be done for the  
sake of      the good4    ,sidenote3    
,analysis #eja-ejf4        ,callicles   
assents to this1 and ,socrates1 finding 
that they are     #ejj      agreed in   
distinguishing pleasure from good1      

returns to his old      division of     
empirical habits1 or shams1 or          
flatteries1 which study #eja            
pleasure only1 and the arts which are   
concerned with the higher      interests
 of soul and body4 ,does ,callicles     
agree to this division8      ,callicles 
will agree to anything1 in order that he
 may get through      the argument4     
,which of the arts then are flatteries8 
,flute-playing1      harp-playing1      
choral exhibitions1 the dithyrambics of 
,cinesias are all equally condemned on  
the ground that they give      pleasure 
only2 and ,meles the harp-player1 who   
was the father of    #ejb               
,cinesias1 failed even in that4 ,the    
stately muse of ,tragedy is bent        
upon pleasure1 and not upon improvement4
 ,poetry in general is      only a      
rhetorical address to a mixed audience  
of men1 women1 and      children4 ,and  
the orators are very far from speaking  
with a view      to what is best2 their 
way is to humour the assembly as if they

      were children4        ,callicles  
replies1 that this is only true of some 
of them2 others      have a real regard 
for their fellow-citizens4 ,granted2    
then there      are two species of      
oratory2 the one a flattery1 another    
which has      a real regard for the    
citizens4 ,but where are the orators    
among      whom you find the latter8    
,callicles admits that there are none   
#ejc      remaining1 but there were such
 in the days when ,themistocles1        
,cimon1 ,miltiades1 and the great       
,pericles were still alive4 ,socrates   
replies that none of these were true    
artists1 setting before      themselves 
the duty of bringing order out of       
disorder4 ,the good    #ejd      man and
 true orator has a settled design1      
running through his      life1 to which 
he conforms all his words and actions2  
he desires      to implant justice and  
eradicate injustice1 to implant all     
virtue      and eradicate all vice in   
the minds of his citizens4 ,he is the   

#eje      physician who will not allow  
the sick man to indulge his appetites   
with a variety of meats and drinks1 but 
insists on his exercising               
self-restraint4 ,and this is good for   
the soul1 and better than the           
unrestrained indulgence which ,callicles
 was recently approving4        ,here   
,callicles1 who had been with difficulty
 brought to this      point1 turns      
restive1 and suggests that ,socrates    
shall answer his      own questions4    
#8,then1' says ,socrates1 #8one man must
 do for      two2' and though he had    
hoped to have given ,callicles an       
#8,amphion'      in return for his      
#8,zethus1' he is willing to proceed2 at
 the       #ejf      same time1 he hopes
 that ,callicles will correct him1 if he
 falls      into error4 ,he             
recapitulates the advantages which he   
has already      won3--    ,sidenote3   
,analysis #ejf-eaa4        ,the pleasant
 is not the same as the good--,callicles
 and ,i are      agreed about that1--but

 pleasure is to be pursued for the sake 
of      the good1 and the good is that  
of which the presence makes us          
good2 we and all things good have       
acquired some virtue or other4      ,and
 virtue1 whether of body or soul1 of    
things or persons1 is      not attained 
by accident1 but is due to order and    
harmonious      arrangement4 ,and the   
soul which has order is better than the 
soul  #ejg      which is without order1 
and is therefore temperate and is       
therefore      good1 and the intemperate
 is bad4 ,and he who is temperate       
is also just and brave and pious1 and   
has attained the perfection of          
goodness and therefore of happiness1 and
 the intemperate whom      you approve  
is the opposite of all this and is      
wretched4 ,he      therefore who would  
be happy must pursue temperance and     
avoid      intemperance1 and if possible
 escape the necessity of punishment1    
but if he have done wrong he must endure
 punishment4 ,in this      way states   

and individuals should seek to attain   
harmony1 which1   #ejh      as the wise 
tell us1 is the bond of heaven and      
earth1 of gods and      men4 ,callicles 
has never discovered the power of       
geometrical      proportion in both     
worlds2 he would have men aim at        
disproportion      and excess4 ,but if  
he be wrong in this1 and if self-control
 is the      true secret of happiness1  
then the paradox is true that the only  
use of rhetoric is in self-accusation1  
and ,polus was right in saying      that
 to do wrong is worse than to suffer    
wrong1 and ,gorgias was      right in   
saying that the rhetorician must be a   
just man4 ,and you      were wrong in   
taunting me with my defenceless         
condition1 and in      saying that ,i   
might be accused or put to death or     
boxed on the      ears with impunity4   
,for ,i may repeat once more1 that to   
strike is      worse than to be         
stricken--to do than to suffer4 ,what ,i
 said then   #eji      is now made fast 

in adamantine bonds4 ,i myself know not 
the      true nature of these things1   
but ,i know that no one can deny my     
words and not be ridiculous4 ,to do     
wrong is the greatest of evils1      and
 to suffer wrong is the next greatest   
evil4 ,he who would        #eaj         
avoid the last must be a ruler1 or the  
friend of a ruler2 and to be      the   
friend he must be the equal of the      
ruler1 and must also resemble      him4 
,under his protection he will suffer no 
evil1 but will      he also do no evil8 
,nay1 will he not rather do all the evil
 which      he can and escape8 ,and in  
this way the greatest of all evils will 
#eaa      befall him4 #8,but this       
imitator of the tyrant1' rejoins        
,callicles1      #8will kill any one who
 does not similarly imitate him4'       
,socrates      replies that he is not   
deaf1 and that he has heard that        
repeated      many times1 and can only  
reply1 that a bad man will kill a good  
one4 #8,yes1 and that is the provoking  

thing4' ,not provoking to a      man of 
sense who is not studying the arts which
 will preserve      him from danger2 and
 this1 as you say1 is the use of        
rhetoric in      courts of justice4 ,but
 how many other arts are there which    
also      save men from death1 and are  
yet quite humble in their               
pretensions--such as the art of         
swimming1 or the art of the pilot8      
,does not the pilot do men at least as  
much service as the      rhetorician1   
and yet for the voyage from ,aegina to  
,athens he does      not charge more    
than two obols1 and when he disembarks  
is quite      unassuming in his         
demeanour8 ,the reason is that he is not
 certain  #eab      whether he has done 
his passengers any good in saving them  
from      death1 if one of them is      
diseased in body1 and still more if he  
is      diseased in mind--who can say8  
,the engineer too will often      save  
whole cities1 and yet you despise him1  
and would not      allow your son to    

marry his daughter1 or his son to marry 
yours4      ,but what reason is there in
 this8 ,for if virtue only means the    
saving of life1 whether your own or     
another's1 you have no right to         
despise him or any practiser of saving  
arts4 ,but is not virtue      something 
different from saving and being saved8  
,i would have      #eac      you rather 
consider whether you ought not to       
disregard length of      life1 and think
 only how you can live best1 leaving all
 besides to      the will of ,heaven4   
,for you must not expect to have        
influence      either with the ,athenian
 ,demos or with ,demos the son of       
,pyrilampes1      unless you become like
 them4 ,what do you say to this8        
,sidenote3 ,analysis #eaa-eae4          
#8,there is some truth in what you are  
saying1 but ,i do not      entirely     
believe you4'    ,sidenote3 ,analysis   
#eae-ebj4        ,that is because you   
are in love with ,demos4 ,but let us    
have a      little more conversation4   

,you remember the two processes--one    
which was directed to pleasure1 the     
other which was directed to      making 
men as good as possible4 ,and those who 
have the care      of the city should   
make the citizens as good as possible4  
,but who  #ead      would undertake a   
public building1 if he had never had a  
teacher      of the art of building1 and
 had never constructed a building       
before8      or who would undertake the 
duty of state-physician1 if he had      
never cured either himself or any one   
else8 ,should we not      examine him   
before we entrusted him with the office8
 ,and as      ,callicles is about to    
enter public life1 should we not examine
      him8 ,whom has he made better8    
,for we have already admitted that      
#eae      this is the statesman's proper
 business4 ,and we must ask the         
same question about ,pericles1 and      
,cimon1 and ,miltiades1 and             
,themistocles4 ,whom did they make      
better8 ,nay1 did not ,pericles         

make the citizens worse8 ,for he gave   
them pay1 and at first he      was very 
popular with them1 but at last they     
condemned him to      death4 ,yet surely
 he would be a bad tamer of animals who1
          #eaf      having received them
 gentle1 taught them to kick and butt1  
and      man is an animal2 and ,pericles
 who had the charge of man only         
made him wilder1 and more savage and    
unjust1 and therefore he      could not 
have been a good statesman4 ,the same   
tale might      be repeated about       
,cimon1 ,themistocles1 ,miltiades4 ,but 
the      charioteer who keeps his seat  
at first is not thrown out when he      
#eag      gains greater experience and  
skill4 ,the inference is1 that the      
statesmen of a past age were no better  
than those of our own4      ,they may   
have been cleverer constructors of docks
 and harbours1      but they did not    
improve the character of the citizens4  
,i have      told you again and again   
7and ,i purposely use the same images7  

that the soul1 like the body1 may be    
treated in two ways--there is      the  
meaner and the higher art4 ,you seemed  
to understand what       #eah      ,i   
said at the time1 but when ,i ask you   
who were the really good      statesmen1
 you answer--as if ,i asked you who were
 the good      trainers1 and you        
answered1 ,thearion1 the baker1         
,mithoecus1 the      author of the      
,sicilian cookery-book1 ,sarambus1 the  
vintner4 ,and      you would be         
affronted if ,i told you that these are 
a parcel of      cooks who make men fat 
only to make them thin4 ,and those      
whom they have fattened applaud them1   
instead of finding fault      with them1
 and lay the blame of their subsequent  
disorders on      their physicians4 ,in 
this respect1 ,callicles1 you are like  
them2      you applaud the statesmen of 
old1 who pandered to the vices of the   
citizens1 and filled the city with docks
 and harbours1 but neglected      virtue
 and justice4 ,and when the fit of      

illness comes1 the         #eai         
citizens who in like manner applauded   
,themistocles1 ,pericles1 and           
others1 will lay hold of you and my     
friend ,alcibiades1 and you will        
suffer for the misdeeds of your         
predecessors4 ,the old story is always  
being repeated--#8after all his         
services1 the ungrateful city banished  
him1 or condemned him to death4' ,as if 
the statesman should not      have      
taught the city better6 ,he surely      
cannot blame the state for      having  
unjustly used him1 any more than the    
sophist or teacher      can find fault  
with his pupils if they cheat him4 ,and 
the sophist  #ebj      and orator are in
 the same case2 although you admire     
rhetoric      and despise sophistic1    
whereas sophistic is really the higher  
of the      two4 ,the teacher of the    
arts takes money1 but the teacher of    
virtue or politics takes no money1      
because this is the only kind of        
service which makes the disciple        

desirous of requiting his teacher4      
,sidenote3 ,analysis #ebj-ebd4          
,socrates concludes by finally asking1  
to which of the two modes      of       
serving the state ,callicles invites    
him3--#8to the inferior and             
ministerial one1' is the ingenuous      
reply4 ,that is the only way of  #eba   
avoiding death1 replies ,socrates2 and  
he has heard often enough1      and     
would rather not hear again1 that the   
bad man will kill the      good4 ,but he
 thinks that such a fate is very likely 
reserved for      him1 because he       
remarks that he is the only person who  
teaches      the true art of politics4  
,and very probably1 as in the case which
  #ebb      he described to ,polus1 he  
may be the physician who is tried by a  
jury of children4 ,he cannot say that he
 has procured the citizens      any     
pleasure1 and if any one charges him    
with perplexing them1 or      with      
reviling their elders1 he will not be   
able to make them      understand that  

he has only been actuated by a desire   
for their      good4 ,and therefore     
there is no saying what his fate may be4
 #8,and      do you think that a man who
 is unable to help himself is in a good 
condition8' ,yes1 ,callicles1 if he have
 the true self-help1 which is      never
 to have said or done any wrong to      
himself or others4 ,if ,i      had not  
this kind of self-help1 ,i should be    
ashamed2 but if ,i die      for want of 
your flattering rhetoric1 ,i shall die  
in peace4 ,for      death is no evil1   
but to go to the world below laden with 
offences      is the worst of evils4 ,in
 proof of which ,i will tell you a      
tale3--        ,under the rule of       
,cronos1 men were judged on the day of  
their      #ebc      death1 and when    
judgment had been given upon them they  
departed--the      good to the islands  
of the blest1 the bad to the house of   
vengeance4      ,but as they were still 
living1 and had their clothes on at     
the time when they were being judged1   

there was favouritism1 and      ,zeus1  
when he came to the throne1 was obliged 
to alter the mode      of procedure1 and
 try them after death1 having first sent
 down      ,prometheus to take away from
 them the foreknowledge of death4       
,minos1 ,rhadamanthus1 and ,aeacus were 
appointed to be the           #ebd      
judges2 ,rhadamanthus for ,asia1 ,aeacus
 for ,europe1 and ,minos      was to    
hold the court of appeal4 ,now death is 
the separation of      soul and body1   
but after death soul and body alike     
retain their      characteristics2 the  
fat man1 the dandy1 the branded slave1  
are all      distinguishable4 ,some     
prince or potentate1 perhaps even the   
great      king himself1 appears before 
,rhadamanthus1 and he instantly         
detects him1 though he knows not who he 
is2 he sees the scars of   #ebe         
perjury and iniquity1 and sends him away
 to the house of torment4    ,sidenote3 
,analysis #ebd-ebg4        ,for there   
are two classes of souls who undergo    

punishment--the      curable and the    
incurable4 ,the curable are those who   
are      benefited by their punishment2 
the incurable are such as ,archelaus1   
who benefit others by becoming a warning
 to them4 ,the      latter class are    
generally kings and potentates2 meaner  
persons1      happily for themselves1   
have not the same power of doing        
injustice4      ,sisyphus and ,tityus1  
not ,thersites1 are supposed by         
,homer to be undergoing everlasting     
punishment4 ,not that there      is     
anything to prevent a great man from    
being a good one1 as is      shown by   
the famous example of ,aristeides1 the  
son of ,lysimachus4  #ebf      ,but to  
,rhadamanthus the souls are only known  
as good or      bad2 they are stripped  
of their dignities and preferments2 he  
despatches the bad to ,tartarus1        
labelled either as curable or           
incurable1 and looks with love and      
admiration on the soul of some      just
 one1 whom he sends to the islands of   

the blest4 ,similar is      the practice
 of ,aeacus2 and ,minos overlooks them1 
holding a      golden sceptre1 as       
,odysseus in ,homer saw him             
#8,wielding a sceptre of gold1 and      
giving laws to the dead4'        ,my    
wish for myself and my fellow-men is1   
that we may present      our souls      
undefiled to the judge in that day2 my  
desire in life is      to be able to    
meet death4 ,and ,i exhort you1 and     
retort upon you    #ebg      the        
reproach which you cast upon me1--that  
you will stand before      the judge1   
gaping1 and with dizzy brain1 and any   
one may box you      on the ear1 and do 
you all manner of evil4        ,perhaps 
you think that this is an old wives'    
fable4 ,but you1      who are the three 
wisest men in ,hellas1 have nothing     
better to      say1 and no one will ever
 show that to do is better than to      
suffer      evil4 ,a man should study to
 be1 and not merely to seem4 ,if he     
is bad1 he should become good1 and avoid

 all flattery1 whether of      the many 
or of the few4        ,follow me1 then2 
and if you are looked down upon1 that   
will do      you no harm4 ,and when we  
have practised virtue1 we will betake   
ourselves to politics1 but not until we 
are delivered from the      shameful    
state of ignorance and uncertainty in   
which we are at      present4 ,let us   
follow in the way of virtue and justice1
 and not in      the way to which you1  
,callicles1 invite us2 for that way is  
nothing      worth4           99        
99       99       99       99           
,sidenote3 ,the logic and dialectic of  
the ,dialogue4    ,sidenote3            
,,introduction4    ,we will now consider
 in order some of the principal points  
of the  dialogue4 ,having regard 7#a7 to
 the age of ,plato and the ironical     
character of his writings1 we may       
compare him with himself and with  other
 great teachers1 and we may note in     
passing the objections of his  critics4 
,and then 7#b7 casting one eye upon him1

 we may cast another upon  ourselves1   
and endeavour to draw out the great     
lessons which he teaches  for all time1 
stripped of the accidental form in which
 they are enveloped4    7#a7 ,in the    
,gorgias1 as in nearly all the other    
dialogues of ,plato1 we are  made aware 
that formal logic has as yet no         
existence4 ,the old difficulty  of      
framing a definition recurs4 ,the       
illusive analogy of the arts and the    
virtues also continues4 ,the ambiguity  
of several words1 such as nature1       
custom1 the honourable1 the good1 is not
 cleared up4 ,the ,sophists are  still  
floundering about the distinction of the
 real and seeming4 ,figures  of speech  
are made the basis of arguments4 ,the   
possibility of conceiving  a universal  
art or science1 which admits of         
application to a particular             
subject-matter1 is a difficulty which   
remains unsolved1 and has not           
altogether ceased to haunt the world at 
the present day 7cp4 ,charmides1  #aff  

ff474 ,the defect of clearness is also  
apparent in ,socrates himself1  unless  
we suppose him to be practising on the  
simplicity of his opponent1  or rather  
perhaps trying an experiment in         
dialectics4 ,nothing can be more        
fallacious than the contradiction which 
he pretends to have discovered  in the  
answers of ,gorgias 7see ,analysis74    
,the advantages which he gains  over    
,polus are also due to a false          
antithesis of pleasure and good1 and  to
 an erroneous assertion that an agent   
and a patient may be described by       
similar predicates2--a mistake which    
,aristotle partly shares and partly     
corrects in the ,nicomachean ,ethics1   
,v4 i4 #d2 xi4 #b4 ,traces of a #8robust
  sophistry' are likewise discernible in
 his argument with ,callicles 7pp4      
#dij1 #dif1 #eaf74    ,sidenote3 ,the   
ideal of suffering virtue4    7#b7      
,although ,socrates professes to be     
convinced by reason only1 yet the       
argument is often a sort of dialectical 

fiction1 by which he conducts  himself  
and others to his own ideal of life and 
action4 ,and we may  sometimes wish that
 we could have suggested answers to his 
antagonists1  or pointed out to them the
 rocks which lay concealed under the    
ambiguous  terms good1 pleasure1 and the
 like4 ,but it would be as useless to   
examine  his arguments by the           
requirements of modern logic1 as to     
criticise this  ideal from a merely     
utilitarian point of view4 ,if we say   
that the ideal  is generally regarded as
 unattainable1 and that mankind will by 
no means  agree in thinking that the    
criminal is happier when punished than  
when  unpunished1 any more than they    
would agree to the stoical paradox that 
a  man may be happy on the rack1 ,plato 
has already admitted that the world  is 
against him4 ,neither does he mean to   
say that ,archelaus is tormented  by the
 stings of conscience2 or that the      
sensations of the impaled  criminal are 
more agreeable than those of the tyrant 

drowned in luxurious  enjoyment4        
,neither is he speaking1 as in the      
,protagoras1 of virtue as a  calculation
 of pleasure1 an opinion which he       
afterwards repudiates in  the ,phaedo4  
,what then is his meaning8 ,his meaning 
we shall be able to  illustrate best by 
parallel notions1 which1 whether        
justifiable by logic  or not1 have      
always existed among mankind4 ,we must  
remind the reader that  ,socrates       
himself implies that he will be         
understood or appreciated by  very few4 
,he is speaking not of the consciousness
 of happiness1 but of the idea of       
happiness4 ,when a martyr dies in a good
 cause1 when a soldier falls in  battle1
 we do not suppose that death or wounds 
are without pain1 or that  their        
physical suffering is always compensated
 by a mental satisfaction4  ,still we   
regard them as happy1 and we would a    
thousand times rather have  their death 
than a shameful life4 ,nor is this only 
because we believe  that they will      

obtain an immortality of fame1 or that  
they will have  crowns of glory in      
another world1 when their enemies and   
persecutors will  be proportionably     
tormented4 ,men are found in a few      
instances to do what  is right1 without 
reference to public opinion or to       
consequences4 ,and we  regard them as   
happy on this ground only1 much as      
,socrates' friends in  the opening of   
the ,phaedo are described as regarding  
him2 or as was said  of another1 #8they 
looked upon his face as upon the face of
 an angel4' ,we  are not concerned to   
justify this idealism by the standard of
 utility or  public opinion1 but merely 
to point out the existence of such a    
sentiment  in the better part of human  
nature4    ,sidenote3 ,plato's theory of
 punishment4    ,the idealism of ,plato 
is founded upon this sentiment4 ,he     
would maintain  that in some sense or   
other truth and right are alone to be   
sought1  and that all other goods are   
only desirable as means towards these4  

,he  is thought to have erred in        
#8considering the agent only1 and making
  no reference to the happiness of      
others1 as affected by him4' ,but the   
happiness of others or of mankind1 if   
regarded as an end1 is really quite  as 
ideal and almost as paradoxical to the  
common understanding as ,plato's        
conception of happiness4 ,for the       
greatest happiness of the greatest      
number may mean also the greatest pain  
of the individual which will  procure   
the greatest pleasure of the greatest   
number4 ,ideas of utility1  like those  
of duty and right1 may be pushed to     
unpleasant consequences4  ,nor can      
,plato in the ,gorgias be deemed purely 
self-regarding1 considering  that       
,socrates expressly mentions the duty of
 imparting the truth when  discovered to
 others4 ,nor must we forget that the   
side of ethics which  regards others is 
by the ancients merged in politics4     
,both in ,plato and  ,aristotle1 as well
 as in the ,stoics1 the social          

principle1 though taking  another form1 
is really far more prominent than in    
most modern treatises  on ethics4       
,the idealizing of suffering is one of  
the conceptions which have  exercised   
the greatest influence on mankind4 ,into
 the theological import  of this1 or    
into the consideration of the errors to 
which the idea may  have given rise1 we 
need not now enter4 ,all will agree that
 the ideal of  the ,divine ,sufferer1   
whose words the world would not receive1
 the man of  sorrows of whom the ,hebrew
 prophets spoke1 has sunk deep into the 
heart  of the human race4 ,it is a      
similar picture of suffering goodness   
which  ,plato desires to pourtray1 not  
without an allusion to the fate of his  
master ,socrates4 ,he is convinced that1
 somehow or other1 such an one must  be 
happy in life or after death4 ,in the   
,republic1 he endeavours to show  that  
his happiness would be assured here in a
 well-ordered state4 ,but  in the actual
 condition of human things the wise and 

good are weak and  miserable2 such an   
one is like a man fallen among wild     
beasts1 exposed to  every sort of wrong 
and obloquy4    ,sidenote3 ,plato's     
theory of punishment4    ,plato1 like   
other philosophers1 is thus led on to   
the conclusion1 that  if #8the ways of  
,god' to man are to be #8justified1' the
 hopes of another  life must be         
included4 ,if the question could have   
been put to him1  whether a man dying in
 torments was happy still1 even if1 as  
he suggests  in the ,apology 7#dj ,c71  
#8death be only a long sleep1' we can   
hardly tell  what would have been his   
answer4 ,there have been a few1 who1    
quite  independently of rewards and     
punishments or of posthumous reputation1
 or  any other influence of public      
opinion1 have been willing to sacrifice 
their lives for the good of others4 ,it 
is difficult to say how far in  such    
cases an unconscious hope of a future   
life1 or a general faith in  the victory
 of good in the world1 may have         

supported the sufferers4 ,but  this     
extreme idealism is not in accordance   
with the spirit of ,plato4 ,he  supposes
 a day of retribution1 in which the good
 are to be rewarded and  the wicked     
punished 7#ebb ,e74 ,though1 as he says 
in the ,phaedo1 no man of  sense will   
maintain that the details of the stories
 about another world  are true1 he will 
insist that something of the kind is    
true1 and will  frame his life with a   
view to this unknown future4 ,even in   
the ,republic  he introduces a future   
life as an afterthought1 when the       
superior  happiness of the just has been
 established on what is thought to be an
  immutable foundation4 ,at the same    
time he makes a point of determining    
his main thesis independently of remoter
 consequences 7x4 #fab ,a74    7#c7     
,plato's theory of punishment is partly 
vindictive1 partly corrective4  ,in the 
,gorgias1 as well as in the ,phaedo and 
,republic1 a few great  criminals1      
chiefly tyrants1 are reserved as        

examples4 ,but most men  have never had 
the opportunity of attaining this       
pre-eminence of evil4  ,they are not    
incurable1 and their punishment is      
intended for their  improvement4 ,they  
are to suffer because they have sinned2 
like sick men1  they must go to the     
physician and be healed4 ,on this       
representation of  ,plato's the         
criticism has been made1 that the       
analogy of disease and  injustice is    
partial only1 and that suffering1       
instead of improving men1  may have just
 the opposite effect4    ,like the      
general analogy of the arts and the     
virtues1 the analogy  of disease and    
injustice1 or of medicine and justice1  
is certainly  imperfect4 ,but ideas must
 be given through something2 the nature 
of the  mind which is unseen can only be
 represented under figures derived from 
visible objects4 ,if these figures are  
suggestive of some new aspect under     
which the mind may be considered1 we    
cannot find fault with them for  not    

exactly coinciding with the ideas       
represented4 ,they partake of the       
imperfect nature of language1 and must  
not be construed in too strict  a       
manner4 ,that ,plato sometimes reasons  
from them as if they were not  figures  
but realities1 is due to the defective  
logical analysis of his  age4           
,sidenote3 ,plato's theory of           
punishment4    ,nor does he distinguish 
between the suffering which improves and
 the  suffering which only punishes and 
deters4 ,he applies to the sphere of    
ethics a conception of punishment which 
is really derived from criminal  law4   
,he does not see that such punishment is
 only negative1 and supplies  no        
principle of moral growth or            
development4 ,he is not far off the     
higher notion of an education of man to 
be begun in this world1 and to  be      
continued in other stages of existence1 
which is further developed  in the      
,republic4 ,and ,christian thinkers1 who
 have ventured out of the  beaten track 

in their meditations on the #8last      
things1' have found a  ray of light in  
his writings4 ,but he has not explained 
how or in what  way punishment is to    
contribute to the improvement of        
mankind4 ,he has  not followed out the  
principle which he affirms in the       
,republic 7ii4  #chj71 that #8,god is   
the author of evil only with a view to  
good1' and  that #8they were the better 
for being punished4' ,still his doctrine
 of  a future state of rewards and      
punishments may be compared favourably  
with that perversion of ,christian      
doctrine which makes the everlasting    
punishment of human beings depend on a  
brief moment of time1 or even on  the   
accident of an accident4 ,and he has    
escaped the difficulty which has  often 
beset divines1 respecting the future    
destiny of the meaner sort of  men      
7,thersites and the like71 who are      
neither very good nor very bad1 by  not 
counting them worthy of eternal         
damnation4    ,we do ,plato violence in 

pressing his figures of speech or chains
 of  argument2 and not less so in asking
 questions which were beyond the        
horizon of his vision1 or did not come  
within the scope of his design4  ,the   
main purpose of the ,gorgias is not to  
answer questions about a  future world1 
but to place in antagonism the true and 
false life1 and  to contrast the        
judgments and opinions of men with      
judgment according  to the truth4 ,plato
 may be accused of representing a       
superhuman or  transcendental virtue in 
the description of the just man in the  
,gorgias1  or in the companion portrait 
of the philosopher in the ,theaetetus2  
and at  the same time may be thought to 
be condemning a state of the world which
  always has existed and always will    
exist among men4 ,but such ideals act   
powerfully on the imagination of        
mankind4 ,and such condemnations are not
  mere paradoxes of philosophers1 but   
the natural rebellion of the higher     
sense of right in man against the       

ordinary conditions of human life4 ,the 
greatest statesmen have fallen very far 
short of the political ideal1 and  are  
therefore justly involved in the general
 condemnation4    ,sidenote3 ,good and  
pleasure4    ,subordinate to the main   
purpose of the dialogue are some other  
questions1  which may be briefly        
considered3--    a4 ,the antithesis of  
good and pleasure1 which as in other    
dialogues is  supposed to consist in the
 permanent nature of the one compared   
with the  transient and relative nature 
of the other4 ,good and pleasure1       
knowledge  and sense1 truth and opinion1
 essence and generation1 virtue and     
pleasure1 the real and the apparent1 the
 infinite and finite1 harmony or  beauty
 and discord1 dialectic and rhetoric or 
poetry1 are so many pairs  of opposites1
 which in ,plato easily pass into one   
another1 and are seldom  kept perfectly 
distinct4 ,and we must not forget that  
,plato's conception  of pleasure is the 
,heracleitean flux transferred to the   

sphere of human  conduct4 ,there is some
 degree of unfairness in opposing the   
principle  of good1 which is objective1 
to the principle of pleasure1 which is  
subjective4 ,for the assertion of the   
permanence of good is only based  on the
 assumption of its objective character4 
,had ,plato fixed his mind1  not on the 
ideal nature of good1 but on the        
subjective consciousness of  happiness1 
that would have been found to be as     
transient and precarious  as pleasure4  
b4 ,the arts or sciences1 when pursued  
without any view to truth1  or the      
improvement of human life1 are called   
flatteries4 ,they are  all alike        
dependent upon the opinion of mankind1  
from which they are  derived4 ,to ,plato
 the whole world appears to be sunk in  
error1 based on  self-interest4 ,to this
 is opposed the one wise man hardly     
professing  to have found truth1 yet    
strong in the conviction that a virtuous
 life  is the only good1 whether        
regarded with reference to this world or

 to  another4 ,statesmen1 ,sophists1    
rhetoricians1 poets1 are alike brought  
up  for judgment4 ,they are the parodies
 of wise men1 and their arts are the    
parodies of true arts and sciences4 ,all
 that they call science is merely  the  
result of that study of the tempers of  
the ,great ,beast1 which he  describes  
in the ,republic4    ,sidenote3         
,relation of the ,gorgias to the other  
,dialogues4    c4 ,various other points 
of contact naturally suggest themselves 
between  the ,gorgias and other         
dialogues1 especially the ,republic1 the
 ,philebus1  and the ,protagoras4 ,there
 are closer resemblances both of spirit 
and language in the ,republic than in   
any other dialogue1 the verbal          
similarity tending to show that they    
were written at the same period of      
,plato's life4 ,for the ,republic       
supplies that education and training of 
which the ,gorgias suggests the         
necessity4 ,the theory of the many weak 
combining against the few strong in the 

formation of society 7which is  indeed a
 partial truth71 is similar in both of  
them1 and is expressed  in nearly the   
same language4 ,the sufferings and fate 
of the just man1  the powerlessness of  
evil1 and the reversal of the situation 
in another  life1 are also points of    
similarity4 ,the poets1 like the        
rhetoricians1  are condemned because    
they aim at pleasure only1 as in the    
,republic they  are expelled the ,state1
 because they are imitators1 and        
minister to the  weaker side of human   
nature4 ,that poetry is akin to rhetoric
 may be  compared with the analogous    
notion1 which occurs in the ,protagoras1
 that  the ancient poets were the       
,sophists of their day4 ,in some other  
respects  the ,protagoras rather offers 
a contrast than a parallel4 ,the        
character  of ,protagoras may be        
compared with that of ,gorgias1 but the 
conception  of happiness is different in
 the two dialogues2 being described in  
the  former1 according to the old       

,socratic notion1 as deferred or        
accumulated  pleasure1 while in the     
,gorgias1 and in the ,phaedo1 pleasure  
and good are  distinctly opposed4       
,this opposition is carried out from a  
speculative point of view in the        
,philebus4 ,there neither pleasure nor  
wisdom are allowed to be the chief      
good1 but pleasure and good are not so  
completely opposed as in the  ,gorgias4 
,for innocent pleasures1 and such as    
have no antecedent pains1  are allowed  
to rank in the class of goods4 ,the     
allusion to ,gorgias'  definition of    
rhetoric 7,philebus1 #eh ,a1 ,b2 cp4    
,gorg4 #deb ,d1 ,e71 as the  art of     
persuasion1 of all arts the best1 for to
 it all things submit1  not by          
compulsion1 but of their own free       
will--marks a close and perhaps         
designed connection between the two     
dialogues4 ,in both the ideas of        
measure1 order1 harmony1 are the        
connecting links between the beautiful  
and the good4    ,sidenote3 ,some minor 

points4    ,in general spirit and       
character1 that is1 in irony and        
antagonism to  public opinion1 the      
,gorgias most nearly resembles the      
,apology1 ,crito1  and portions of the  
,republic1 and like the ,philebus1      
though from another  point of view1 may 
be thought to stand in the same relation
 to ,plato's  theory of morals which the
 ,theaetetus bears to his theory of     
knowledge4    d4 ,a few minor points    
still remain to be summed up3 7#a7 ,the 
extravagant  irony in the reason which  
is assigned for the pilot's modest      
charge  7p4 #eab72 and in the proposed  
use of rhetoric as an instrument of     
self-condemnation 7p4 #dhj72 and in the 
mighty power of geometrical  equality in
 both worlds 7p4 #ejh74 7#b7 ,the       
reference of the mythus to  the previous
 discussion should not be overlooked3   
the fate reserved for  incurable        
criminals such as ,archelaus 7p4 #ebe72 
the retaliation of the  box on the ears 
7p4 #ebg72 the nakedness of the souls   

and of the judges  who are stript of the
 clothes or disguises which rhetoric and
 public  opinion have hitherto provided 
for them 7p4 #ebc2 cp4 ,swift's notion  
that  the universe is a suit of clothes1
 ,tale of a ,tub1 section #b74 ,the     
fiction  seems to have involved ,plato  
in the necessity of supposing that the  
soul  retained a sort of corporeal      
likeness after death 7p4 #ebd74 7#c7    
,the  appeal to the authority of ,homer1
 who says that ,odysseus saw ,minos in  
his  court #8holding a golden sceptre1' 
which gives verisimilitude to the tale  
7p4 #ebf74    ,it is scarcely necessary 
to repeat that ,plato is playing #8both 
sides of  the game1' and that in        
criticising the characters of ,gorgias  
and ,polus1  we are not passing any     
judgment on historical individuals1 but 
only  attempting to analyze the         
#8dramatis personae' as they were       
conceived by  him4 ,neither is it       
necessary to enlarge upon the obvious   
fact that ,plato  is a dramatic writer1 

whose real opinions cannot always be    
assumed to be  those which he puts into 
the mouth of ,socrates1 or any other    
speaker who  appears to have the best of
 the argument2 or to repeat the         
observation  that he is a poet as well  
as a philosopher2 or to remark that he  
is not  to be tried by a modern         
standard1 but interpreted with reference
 to his  place in the history of thought
 and the opinion of his time4           
,sidenote3 ,the irony of ,socrates4     
,it has been said that the most         
characteristic feature of the ,gorgias  
is  the assertion of the right of       
dissent1 or private judgment4 ,but this 
mode  of stating the question is really 
opposed both to the spirit of ,plato and
  of ancient philosophy generally4 ,for 
,plato is not asserting any abstract    
right or duty of toleration1 or         
advantage to be derived from freedom  of
 thought2 indeed1 in some other parts of
 his writings 7e4 g4 ,laws1  x71 he has 
fairly laid himself open to the charge  

of intolerance4 ,no  speculations had as
 yet arisen respecting the #8liberty of 
prophesying2'  and ,plato is not        
affirming any abstract right of this    
nature3 but he is  asserting the duty   
and right of the one wise and true man  
to dissent from  the folly and falsehood
 of the many4 ,at the same time he      
acknowledges the  natural result1 which 
he hardly seeks to avert1 that he who   
speaks the  truth to a multitude1       
regardless of consequences1 will        
probably share the  fate of ,socrates4  
99       99       99       99       99  
,the irony of ,plato sometimes veils    
from us the height of idealism to  which
 he soars4 ,when declaring truths which 
the many will not receive1  he puts on  
an armour which cannot be pierced by    
them4 ,the weapons of  ridicule are     
taken out of their hands and the laugh  
is turned against  themselves4 ,the     
disguises which ,socrates assumes are   
like the parables  of the ,new          
,testament1 or the oracles of the       

,delphian ,god2 they half  conceal1 half
 reveal1 his meaning4 ,the more he is in
 earnest1 the more  ironical he becomes2
 and he is never more in earnest or more
 ironical  than in the ,gorgias4 ,he    
hardly troubles himself to answer       
seriously the  objections of ,gorgias   
and ,polus1 and therefore he sometimes  
appears to  be careless of the ordinary 
requirements of logic4 ,yet in the      
highest  sense he is always logical and 
consistent with himself4 ,the form of   
the  argument may be paradoxical2 the   
substance is an appeal to the higher    
reason4 ,he is uttering truths before   
they can be understood1 as in all  ages 
the words of philosophers1 when they are
 first uttered1 have found  the world   
unprepared for them4 ,a further         
misunderstanding arises out of  the     
wildness of his humour2 he is supposed  
not only by ,callicles1 but  by the rest
 of mankind1 to be jesting when he is   
profoundly serious4 ,at  length he makes
 even ,polus 7p4 #dfh7 in earnest4      

,finally1 he drops the  argument1 and   
heedless any longer of the forms of     
dialectic1 he loses  himself in a sort  
of triumph1 while at the same time he   
retaliates upon  his adversaries4 ,from 
this confusion of jest and earnest1 we  
may now  return to the ideal truth1 and 
draw out in a simple form the main      
theses  of the dialogue4    ,sidenote3  
,worse to do than to suffer injustice4  
,first ,thesis3--        ,it is a       
greater evil to do than to suffer       
injustice4    ,compare the ,new         
,testament--        #8,it is better to  
suffer for well doing than for evil     
doing4'--#a ,pet4      iii4 #ag4    ,and
 the ,sermon on the ,mount--            
#8,blessed are they that are persecuted 
for righteousness'      sake4'--,matt4  
v4 #aj4    ,the words of ,socrates are  
more abstract than the words of ,christ1
 but  they equally imply that the only  
real evil is moral evil4 ,the righteous 
may suffer or die1 but they have their  
reward2 and even if they had no  reward1

 would be happier than the wicked4 ,the 
world1 represented by  ,polus1 is ready1
 when they are asked1 to acknowledge    
that injustice  is dishonourable1 and   
for their own sakes men are willing to  
punish  the offender 7cp4 ,rep4 ii4 #cfj
 ,d74 ,but they are not equally willing 
to  acknowledge that injustice1 even if 
successful1 is essentially evil1 and    
has the nature of disease and death4    
,especially when crimes are committed   
on the great scale--the crimes of       
tyrants1 ancient or modern--after a     
while1 seeing that they cannot be       
undone1 and have become a part of       
history1 mankind are disposed to forgive
 them1 not from any magnanimity  or     
charity1 but because their feelings are 
blunted by time1 and #8to  forgive is   
convenient to them4' ,the tangle of good
 and evil can no longer  be unravelled2 
and although they know that the end     
cannot justify the  means1 they feel    
also that good has often come out of    
evil4 ,but ,socrates  would have us pass

 the same judgment on the tyrant now and
 always2 though  he is surrounded by his
 satellites1 and has the applauses of   
,europe and  ,asia ringing in his ears2 
though he is the civilizer or liberator 
of  half a continent1 he is1 and always 
will be1 the most miserable of men4     
,the greatest consequences for good or  
for evil cannot alter a hair's  breadth 
the morality of actions which are right 
or wrong in themselves4  ,this is the   
standard which ,socrates holds up to us4
 ,because politics1 and  perhaps human  
life generally1 are of a mixed nature we
 must not allow our  principles to sink 
to the level of our practice4           
,sidenote3 ,better to suffer for wrong  
doing than not to suffer4    ,and so of 
private individuals--to them1 too1 the  
world occasionally speaks  of the       
consequences of their actions3--if they 
are lovers of pleasure1  they will ruin 
their health2 if they are false or      
dishonest1 they will  lose their        
character4 ,but ,socrates would speak to

 them1 not of what will  be1 but of what
 is--of the present consequence of      
lowering and degrading  the soul4 ,and  
all higher natures1 or perhaps all men  
everywhere1 if they  were not tempted by
 interest or passion1 would agree with  
him--they would  rather be the victims  
than the perpetrators of an act of      
treachery or  of tyranny4 ,reason tells 
them that death comes sooner or later to
 all1  and is not so great an evil as an
 unworthy life1 or rather1 if rightly   
regarded1 not an evil at all1 but to a  
good man the greatest good4 ,for in  all
 of us there are slumbering ideals of   
truth and right1 which may at  any time 
awaken and develop a new life in us4    
,second ,thesis3--        ,it is better 
to suffer for wrong doing than not to   
suffer4    ,there might have been a     
condition of human life in which the    
penalty  followed at once1 and was      
proportioned to the offence4 ,moral evil
 would  then be scarcely distinguishable
 from physical2 mankind would avoid     

vice as they avoid pain or death4 ,but  
nature1 with a view of deepening  and   
enlarging our characters1 has for the   
most part hidden from us the            
consequences of our actions1 and we can 
only foresee them by an effort of       
reflection4 ,to awaken in us this habit 
of reflection is the business of  early 
education1 which is continued in maturer
 years by observation and  experience4  
,the spoilt child is in later life said 
to be unfortunate--he  had better have  
suffered when he was young1 and been    
saved from suffering  afterwards4 ,but  
is not the sovereign equally unfortunate
 whose education  and manner of life are
 always concealing from him the         
consequences of his  own actions1 until 
at length they are revealed to him in   
some terrible  downfall1 which may1     
perhaps1 have been caused not by his own
 fault8  ,another illustration is       
afforded by the pauper and criminal     
classes1 who  scarcely reflect at all1  
except on the means by which they can   

compass  their immediate ends4 ,we pity 
them1 and make allowances for them2 but 
we do not consider that the same        
principle applies to human actions      
generally4 ,not to have been found out  
in some dishonesty or folly1  regarded  
from a moral or religious point of view1
 is the greatest of  misfortunes4 ,the  
success of our evil doings is a proof   
that the gods have  ceased to strive    
with us1 and have given us over to      
ourselves4 ,there is  nothing to remind 
us of our sins1 and therefore nothing to
 correct them4  ,like our sorrows1 they 
are healed by time2        #8,while rank
 corruption1 mining all within1         
,infects unseen4'    ,the #8accustomed  
irony' of ,socrates adds a corollary to 
the  argument3--#8,would you punish your
 enemy1 you should allow him to escape  
unpunished'--this is the true           
retaliation4 7,compare the obscure verse
 of  ,proverbs1 xxv4 #ba1 #bb1          
#8,therefore if thine enemy hunger1 feed
 him1' etc41  quoted in ,romans xii4    

#bj47    ,sidenote3 ,better to suffer   
for wrong doing than not to suffer4     
,men are not in the habit of dwelling   
upon the dark side of their own  lives3 
they do not easily see themselves as    
others see them4 ,they are  very kind   
and very blind to their own faults2 the 
rhetoric of self-love  is always        
pleading with them on their own behalf4 
,adopting a similar  figure of speech1  
,socrates would have them use rhetoric1 
not in defence  but in accusation of    
themselves4 ,as they are guided by      
feeling rather  than by reason1 to their
 feelings the appeal must be made4 ,they
 must  speak to themselves2 they must   
argue with themselves2 they must paint  
in  eloquent words the character of     
their own evil deeds4 ,to any suffering 
which they have deserved1 they must     
persuade themselves to submit4 ,under   
the figure there lurks a real thought1  
which1 expressed in another form1       
admits of an easy application to        
ourselves4 ,for do not we too accuse as 

well as excuse ourselves8 ,and we call  
to our aid the rhetoric of prayer  and  
preaching1 which the mind silently      
employs while the struggle between  the 
better and the worse is going on within 
us4 ,and sometimes we are  too hard upon
 ourselves1 because we want to restore  
the balance which  self-love has        
overthrown or disturbed2 and then again 
we may hear a voice  as of a parent     
consoling us4 ,in religious diaries a   
sort of drama is  often enacted by the  
consciences of men #8accusing or else   
excusing them4'  ,for all our life long 
we are talking with ourselves3--,what is
 thought but  speech 7,soph4 #bfc ,e78  
,what is feeling but rhetoric8 ,and if  
rhetoric is  used on one side only we   
shall be always in danger of being      
deceived4 ,and  so the words of         
,socrates1 which at first sounded       
paradoxical1 come home  to the          
experience of all of us4    ,third      
,thesis3--        ,we do not what we    
will1 but what we wish4    ,sidenote3   

,we do not what we will1 but what we    
wish4    ,socrates would teach us a     
lesson which we are slow to learn--that 
good  intentions1 and even benevolent   
actions1 when they are not prompted by  
wisdom1 are of no value4 ,we believe    
something to be for our good which  we  
afterwards find out not to be for our   
good4 ,the consequences may be          
inevitable1 for they may follow an      
invariable law1 yet they may often be   
the very opposite of what is expected by
 us4 ,when we increase pauperism  by    
almsgiving2 when we tie up property     
without regard to changes of            
circumstances2 when we say hastily what 
we deliberately disapprove2  when we do 
in a moment of passion what upon        
reflection we regret2 when  from any    
want of self-control we give another an 
advantage over us--we  are doing not    
what we will1 but what we wish4 ,all    
actions of which the  consequences are  
not weighed and foreseen1 are of this   
impotent and  paralytic sort2 and the   

author of them has #8the least possible 
power'  while seeming to have the       
greatest4 ,for he is actually bringing  
about  the reverse of what he intended4 
,and yet the book of nature is open  to 
him1 in which he who runs may read if he
 will exercise ordinary  attention2     
every day offers him experiences of his 
own and of other  men's characters1 and 
he passes them unheeded by4 ,the        
contemplation  of the consequences of   
actions1 and the ignorance of men in    
regard  to them1 seems to have led      
,socrates to his famous                 
thesis3--#8,virtue is  knowledge2' which
 is not so much an error or paradox as a
 half truth1  seen first in the twilight
 of ethical philosophy1 but also the    
half of  the truth which is especially  
needed in the present age4 ,for as the  
world has grown older men have been too 
apt to imagine a right and wrong  apart 
from consequences2 while a few1 on the  
other hand1 have sought  to resolve them
 wholly into their consequences4 ,but   

,socrates1 or ,plato  for him1 neither  
divides nor identifies them2 though the 
time has not  yet arrived either for    
utilitarian or transcendental systems of
 moral  philosophy1 he recognizes the   
two elements which seem to lie at the   
basis  of morality#bi4    ,sidenote3 ,we
 ought to be1 not to seem4    ,fourth   
,thesis3--        ,to be and not to seem
 is the end of life4    ,the ,greek in  
the age of ,plato admitted praise to be 
one of the chief  incentives to moral   
virtue1 and to most men the opinion of  
their fellows  is a leading principle of
 action4 ,hence a certain element of    
seeming  enters into all things2 all or 
almost all desire to appear better than 
they are1 that they may win the esteem  
or admiration of others4 ,a man  of     
ability can easily feign the language of
 piety or virtue2 and there  is an      
unconscious as well as a conscious      
hypocrisy which1 according  to          
,socrates1 is the worst of the two4     
,again1 there is the sophistry  of      

classes and professions4 ,there are the 
different opinions about  themselves and
 one another which prevail in different 
ranks of society4  ,there is the bias   
given to the mind by the study of one   
department of  human knowledge to the   
exclusion of the rest2 and stronger far 
the  prejudice engendered by a pecuniary
 or party interest in certain tenets4   
,there is the sophistry of law1 the     
sophistry of medicine1 the sophistry  of
 politics1 the sophistry of theology4   
,all of these disguises wear  the       
appearance of the truth2 some of them   
are very ancient1 and we do  not easily 
disengage ourselves from them2 for we   
have inherited them1  and they have     
become a part of us4 ,the sophistry of  
an ancient ,greek  sophist is nothing   
compared with the sophistry of a        
religious order1 or  of a church in     
which during many ages falsehood has    
been accumulating1  and everything has  
been said on one side1 and nothing on   
the other4  ,the conventions and customs

 which we observe in conversation1 and  
the  opposition of our interests when we
 have dealings with one another 7#8the  
buyer saith1 it is nought--it is        
nought1' etc471 are always obscuring    
our sense of truth and right4 ,the      
sophistry of human nature is far more   
subtle than the deceit of any one man4  
,few persons speak freely from  their   
own natures1 and scarcely any one dares 
to think for himself3 most  of us       
imperceptibly fall into the opinions of 
those around us1 which  we partly help  
to make4 ,a man who would shake himself 
loose from them1  requires great force  
of mind2 he hardly knows where to begin 
in the  search after truth4 ,on every   
side he is met by the world1 which is   
not  an abstraction of theologians1 but 
the most real of all things1 being      
another name for ourselves when regarded
 collectively and subjected to  the     
influences of society4    ,sidenote3    
,the true and the false statesman4      
,then comes ,socrates1 impressed as no  

other man ever was1 with the  unreality 
and untruthfulness of popular opinion1  
and tells mankind that  they must be and
 not seem4 ,how are they to be8 ,at any 
rate they must have  the spirit and     
desire to be4 ,if they are ignorant1    
they must acknowledge  their ignorance  
to themselves2 if they are conscious of 
doing evil1 they  must learn to do well2
 if they are weak1 and have nothing in  
them which  they can call themselves1   
they must acquire firmness and          
consistency2  if they are indifferent1  
they must begin to take an interest in  
the  great questions which surround     
them4 ,they must try to be what they    
would  fain appear in the eyes of their 
fellow-men4 ,a single individual cannot 
easily change public opinion2 but he can
 be true and innocent1 simple  and      
independent2 he can know what he does1  
and what he does not know2  and though  
not without an effort1 he can form a    
judgment of his own1 at  least in common
 matters4 ,in his most secret actions he

 can show the same  high principle 7cp4 
,rep4 viii4 #eed ,d7 which he shows when
 supported and  watched by public       
opinion4 ,and on some fitting occasion1 
on some question  of humanity or truth  
or right1 even an ordinary man1 from the
 natural  rectitude of his disposition1 
may be found to take up arms against a  
whole tribe of politicians and lawyers1 
and be too much for them4    ,who is the
 true and who the false statesman8--    
,the true statesman is he who brings    
order out of disorder2 who first        
organizes and then administers the      
government of his own country2 and      
having made a nation1 seeks to reconcile
 the national interests with  those of  
,europe and of mankind4 ,he is not a    
mere theorist1 nor yet a  dealer in     
expedients2 the whole and the parts grow
 together in his mind2  while the head  
is conceiving1 the hand is executing4   
,although obliged  to descend to the    
world1 he is not of the world4 ,his     
thoughts are fixed  not on power or     

riches or extension of territory1 but on
 an ideal state1  in which all the      
citizens have an equal chance of health 
and life1 and  the highest education is 
within the reach of all1 and the moral  
and  intellectual qualities of every    
individual are freely developed1 and    
#8the  idea of good' is the animating   
principle of the whole4 ,not the        
attainment  of freedom alone1 or of     
order alone1 but how to unite freedom   
with order  is the problem which he has 
to solve4    ,sidenote3 ,the true and   
the false statesman4    ,the statesman  
who places before himself these lofty   
aims has undertaken a  task which will  
call forth all his powers4 ,he must     
control himself before  he can control  
others2 he must know mankind before he  
can manage them4  ,he has no private    
likes or dislikes2 he does not conceal  
personal enmity  under the disguise of  
moral or political principle3 such      
meannesses1  into which men too often   
fall unintentionally1 are absorbed in   

the  consciousness of his mission1 and  
in his love for his country and for     
mankind4 ,he will sometimes ask himself 
what the next generation will say  of   
him2 not because he is careful of       
posthumous fame1 but because he  knows  
that the result of his life as a whole  
will then be more fairly  judged4 ,he   
will take time for the execution of his 
plans2 not hurrying  them on when the   
mind of a nation is unprepared for them2
 but like the  ,ruler of the ,universe  
,himself1 working in the appointed time1
 for he  knows that human life1 #8if not
 long in comparison with eternity'      
7,rep4  vi4 #dih ,d71 is sufficient for 
the fulfilment of many great purposes4  
,he  knows1 too1 that the work will be  
still going on when he is no longer     
here2 and he will sometimes1 especially 
when his powers are failing1  think of  
that other #8city of which the pattern  
is in heaven' 7,rep4 ix4  #eib ,b74     
,the false politician is the serving-man
 of the state4 ,in order to govern  men 

he becomes like them2 their #8minds are 
married in conjunction2' they  #8bear   
themselves' like vulgar and tyrannical  
masters1 and he is their  obedient      
servant4 ,the true politician1 if he    
would rule men1 must make  them like    
himself2 he must #8educate his party'   
until they cease to be a  party2 he must
 breathe into them the spirit which will
 hereafter give  form to their          
institutions4 ,politics with him are not
 a mechanism for  seeming what he is    
not1 or for carrying out the will of the
 majority4  ,himself a representative   
man1 he is the representative not of the
 lower  but of the higher elements of   
the nation4 ,there is a better 7as well 
as  a worse7 public opinion of which he 
seeks to lay hold2 as there is also  a  
deeper current of human affairs in which
 he is borne up when the waves  nearer  
the shore are threatening him4 ,he      
acknowledges that he cannot  take the   
world by force--two or three moves on   
the political chessboard  are all that  

he can foresee--two or three weeks or   
months are granted to  him in which he  
can provide against a coming struggle4  
,but he knows also  that there are      
permanent principles of politics which  
are always tending  to the well-being of
 states--better administration1 better  
education1  the reconciliation of       
conflicting elements1 increased security
 against  external enemies4 ,these are  
not #8of to-day or yesterday1' but are  
the  same in all times1 and under all   
forms of government4 ,then when the     
storm  descends and the winds blow1     
though he knows not beforehand the hour 
of  danger1 the pilot1 not like ,plato's
 captain in the ,republic1 half-blind   
and deaf1 but with penetrating eye and  
quick ear1 is ready to take  command of 
the ship and guide her into port4       
,sidenote3 ,the true and the false      
statesman4    ,the false politician asks
 not what is true1 but what is the      
opinion of  the world--not what is      
right1 but what is expedient4 ,the only 

measures of  which he approves are the  
measures which will pass4 ,he has no    
intention  of fighting an uphill battle2
 he keeps the roadway of politics4 ,he  
is  unwilling to incur the persecution  
and enmity which political convictions  
would entail upon him4 ,he begins with  
popularity1 and in fair weather  sails  
gallantly along4 ,but unpopularity soon 
follows him4 ,for men expect  their     
leaders to be better and wiser than     
themselves3 to be their guides  in      
danger1 their saviours in extremity2    
they do not really desire them  to obey 
all the ignorant impulses of the popular
 mind2 and if they fail  them in a      
crisis they are disappointed4 ,then1 as 
,socrates says1 the cry  of ingratitude 
is heard1 which is most unreasonable2   
for the people1 who  have been taught no
 better1 have done what might be        
expected of them1 and  their statesmen  
have received justice at their hands4   
,the true statesman is aware that he    
must adapt himself to times and         

circumstances4 ,he must have allies if  
he is to fight against the world2  he   
must enlighten public opinion2 he must  
accustom his followers to  act together4
 ,although he is not the mere executor  
of the will of the  majority1 he must   
win over the majority to himself4 ,he is
 their leader  and not their follower1  
but in order to lead he must also       
follow4 ,he  will neither exaggerate nor
 undervalue the power of a statesman1   
neither  adopting the #8laissez faire'  
nor the #8paternal government'          
principle2  but he will1 whether he is  
dealing with children in politics1 or   
with  full-grown men1 seek to do for the
 people what the government can do  for 
them1 and what1 from imperfect education
 or deficient powers of  combination1   
they cannot do for themselves4 ,he knows
 that if he does  too much for them they
 will do nothing2 and that if he does   
nothing for  them they will in some     
states of society be utterly helpless4  
,for the  many cannot exist without the 

few2 if the material force of a country 
is  from below1 wisdom and experience   
are from above4 ,it is not a small part 
of human evils which kings and          
governments make or cure4 ,the statesman
  is well aware that a great purpose    
carried out consistently during many    
years will at last be executed4 ,he is  
playing for a stake which may be  partly
 determined by some accident1 and       
therefore he will allow largely  for the
 unknown element of politics4 ,but the  
game being one in which  chance and     
skill are combined1 if he plays long    
enough he is certain of  victory4 ,he   
will not be always consistent1 for the  
world is changing2 and  though he       
depends upon the support of a party1 he 
will remember that he  is the minister  
of the whole4 ,he lives not for the     
present1 but for the  future1 and he is 
not at all sure that he will be         
appreciated either now  or then4 ,for he
 may have the existing order of society 
against him1 and  may not be remembered 

by a distant posterity4    ,sidenote3   
,the true and the false statesman4      
,there are always discontented idealists
 in politics who1 like ,socrates in  the
 ,gorgias1 find fault with all statesmen
 past as well as present1 not  excepting
 the greatest names of history4 ,mankind
 have an uneasy feeling  that they ought
 to be better governed than they are4   
,just as the actual  philosopher falls  
short of the one wise man1 so does the  
actual statesman  fall short of the     
ideal4 ,and so partly from vanity and   
egotism1 but  partly also from a true   
sense of the faults of eminent men1 a   
temper of  dissatisfaction and criticism
 springs up among those who are ready   
enough  to acknowledge the inferiority  
of their own powers4 ,no matter whether 
a  statesman makes high professions or  
none at all--they are reduced sooner  or
 later to the same level4 ,and sometimes
 the more unscrupulous man is  better   
esteemed than the more conscientious1   
because he has not equally  deceived    

expectations4 ,such sentiments may be   
unjust1 but they are widely  spread2 we 
constantly find them recurring in       
reviews and newspapers1 and  still      
oftener in private conversation4    ,we 
may further observe that the art of     
government1 while in some  respects     
tending to improve1 has in others a     
tendency to degenerate1 as  institutions
 become more popular4 ,governing for the
 people cannot easily  be combined with 
governing by the people3 the interests  
of classes are  too strong for the ideas
 of the statesman who takes a           
comprehensive view  of the whole4       
,according to ,socrates the true        
governor will find ruin or  death       
staring him in the face1 and will only  
be induced to govern from  the fear of  
being governed by a worse man than      
himself 7,rep4 i4 #cdg ,c74  ,and in    
modern times1 though the world has grown
 milder1 and the terrible  consequences 
which ,plato foretells no longer await  
an ,english statesman1  any one who is  

not actuated by a blind ambition will   
only undertake from  a sense of duty a  
work in which he is most likely to fail2
 and even if he  succeed1 will rarely be
 rewarded by the gratitude of his own   
generation4    ,sidenote3 ,the true and 
the false statesman4    ,socrates1 who  
is not a politician at all1 tells us    
that he is the only  real politician of 
his time4 ,let us illustrate the meaning
 of his words  by applying them to the  
history of our own country4 ,he would   
have said  that not ,pitt or ,fox1 or   
,canning or ,sir ,r4 ,peel1 are the real
 politicians  of their time1 but ,locke1
 ,hume1 ,adam ,smith1 ,bentham1         
,ricardo4 ,these  during the greater    
part of their lives occupied an         
inconsiderable space  in the eyes of the
 public4 ,they were private persons2    
nevertheless  they sowed in the minds of
 men seeds which in the next generation 
have  become an irresistible power4     
#8,herein is that saying true1 ,one     
soweth  and another reapeth4' ,we may   

imagine with ,plato an ideal statesman  
in  whom practice and speculation are   
perfectly harmonized2 for there is  no  
necessary opposition between them4 ,but 
experience shows that they  are commonly
 divorced--the ordinary politician is   
the interpreter or  executor of the     
thoughts of others1 and hardly ever     
brings to the birth  a new political    
conception4 ,one or two only in modern  
times1 like the  ,italian statesman     
,cavour1 have created the world in which
 they moved4  ,the philosopher is       
naturally unfitted for political life2  
his great  ideas are not understood by  
the many2 he is a thousand miles away   
from  the questions of the day4 ,yet    
perhaps the lives of thinkers1 as they  
are  stiller and deeper1 are also       
happier than the lives of those who are 
more  in the public eye4 ,they have the 
promise of the future1 though they are  
regarded as dreamers and visionaries by 
their own contemporaries4 ,and  when    
they are no longer here1 those who would

 have been ashamed of them  during their
 lives claim kindred with them1 and are 
proud to be called by  their names4     
7,cp4 ,thucyd4 vi4 #af47    ,sidenote3  
,the true office of the poet4    ,who is
 the true poet8    ,plato expels the    
poets from his ,republic because they   
are allied to  sense2 because they      
stimulate the emotions2 because they are
 thrice  removed from the ideal truth4  
,and in a similar spirit he declares in 
the ,gorgias that the stately muse of   
tragedy is a votary of pleasure  and not
 of truth4 ,in modern times we almost   
ridicule the idea of poetry  admitting  
of a moral4 ,the poet and the prophet1  
or preacher1 in primitive  antiquity are
 one and the same2 but in later ages    
they seem to fall  apart4 ,the great art
 of novel writing1 that peculiar        
creation of our  own and the last       
century1 which1 together with the sister
 art of review  writing1 threatens to   
absorb all literature1 has even less of 
seriousness  in her composition4 ,do we 

not often hear the novel writer censured
 for  attempting to convey a lesson to  
the minds of his readers8    ,yet the   
true office of a poet or writer of      
fiction is not merely to give           
amusement1 or to be the expression of   
the feelings of mankind1 good  or bad1  
or even to increase our knowledge of    
human nature4 ,there have  been poets in
 modern times1 such as ,goethe or       
,wordsworth1 who have not  forgotten    
their high vocation of teachers2 and the
 two greatest of the  ,greek dramatists 
owe their sublimity to their ethical    
character4 ,the  noblest truths1 sung of
 in the purest and sweetest language1   
are still  the proper material of       
poetry4 ,the poet clothes them with     
beauty1 and  has a power of making them 
enter into the hearts and memories of   
men4 ,he  has not only to speak of      
themes above the level of ordinary life1
 but  to speak of them in a deeper and  
tenderer way than they are ordinarily   
felt1 so as to awaken the feeling of    

them in others4 ,the old he makes  young
 again2 the familiar principle he       
invests with a new dignity2 he  finds a 
noble expression for the commonplaces of
 morality and politics4  ,he uses the   
things of sense so as to indicate what  
is beyond2 he raises  us through earth  
to heaven4 ,he expresses what the better
 part of us  would fain say1 and the    
half-conscious feeling is strengthened  
by the  expression4 ,he is his own      
critic1 for the spirit of poetry and of 
criticism are not divided in him4 ,his  
mission is not to disguise men from     
themselves1 but to reveal to them their 
own nature1 and make them better        
acquainted with the world around them4  
,true poetry is the remembrance  of     
youth1 of love1 the embodiment in words 
of the happiest and holiest  moments of 
life1 of the noblest thoughts of man1 of
 the greatest deeds of  the past4 ,the  
poet of the future may return to his    
greater calling of the  prophet or      
teacher2 indeed1 we hardly know what may

 not be effected for  the human race by 
a better use of the poetical and        
imaginative faculty4  ,the              
reconciliation of poetry1 as of         
religion1 with truth1 may still be      
possible4 ,neither is the element of    
pleasure to be excluded4 ,for when we   
substitute a higher pleasure for a lower
 we raise men in the scale of           
existence4 ,might not the novelist1 too1
 make an ideal1 or rather many  ideals  
of social life1 better than a thousand  
sermons8 ,plato1 like the  ,puritans1 is
 too much afraid of poetic and artistic 
influences4 ,but he  is not without a   
true sense of the noble purposes to     
which art may be  applied 7,rep4 iii4   
#dja74    ,sidenote3 ,the true office of
 the poet4    ,modern poetry is often a 
sort of plaything1 or1 in ,plato's      
language1 a  flattery1 a sophistry1 or  
sham1 in which1 without any serious     
purpose1  the poet lends wings to his   
fancy and exhibits his gifts of language
 and  metre4 ,such an one seeks to      

gratify the taste of his readers2 he has
 the  #8savoir faire1' or trick of      
writing1 but he has not the higher      
spirit  of poetry4 ,he has no conception
 that true art should bring order out of
  disorder 7#ejd ,a72 that it should    
make provision for the soul's highest   
interest 7#eja ,c72 that it should be   
pursued only with a view to #8the       
improvement of the citizens' 7#ejb1     
#ejc74 ,he ministers to the weaker side 
of human nature 7,rep4 x4 #fjc-fje72 he 
idealizes the sensual2 he sings  the    
strain of love in the latest fashion2   
instead of raising men above  themselves
 he brings them back to the #8tyranny of
 the many masters1' from  which all his 
life long a good man has been praying to
 be delivered4  ,and often1 forgetful of
 measure and order1 he will express not 
that  which is truest1 but that which is
 strongest4 ,instead of a great and     
nobly-executed subject1 perfect in every
 part1 some fancy of a heated  brain is 
worked out with the strangest           

incongruity4 ,he is not the master  of  
his words1 but his words--perhaps       
borrowed from another--the faded        
reflection of some ,french or ,german or
 ,italian writer1 have the better of    
him4 ,though we are not going to banish 
the poets1 how can we suppose that  such
 utterances have any healing or         
life-giving influence on the minds of   
men8    ,sidenote3 ,the triumph of right
 and truth4    #8,let us hear the       
conclusion of the whole matter3' ,art   
then must be true1  and politics must be
 true1 and the life of man must be true 
and not a  seeming or sham4 ,in all of  
them order has to be brought out of     
disorder1  truth out of error and       
falsehood4 ,this is what we mean by the 
greatest  improvement of man4 ,and so1  
having considered in what way #8we can  
best  spend the appointed time1 we leave
 the result with ,god' 7#eab ,e74 ,plato
  does not say that ,god will order all 
things for the best 7cp4 ,phaedo1  #ig  
,c71 but he indirectly implies that the 

evils of this life will be  corrected in
 another4 ,and as we are very far from  
the best imaginable  world at present1  
,plato here1 as in the ,phaedo and      
,republic1 supposes a  purgatory or     
place of education for mankind in       
general1 and for a very  few a ,tartarus
 or hell4 ,the myth which terminates the
 dialogue is not the  revelation1 but   
rather1 like all similar descriptions1  
whether in the  ,bible or ,plato1 the   
veil of another life4 ,for no visible   
thing can reveal  the invisible4 ,of    
this ,plato1 unlike some commentators on
 ,scripture1  is fully aware4 ,neither  
will he dogmatize about the manner in   
which we  are #8born again' 7,rep4 vi4  
#dih ,d74 ,only he is prepared to       
maintain the  ultimate triumph of truth 
and right1 and declares that no one1 not
 even  the wisest of the ,greeks1 can   
affirm any other doctrine without being 
ridiculous4           99       99       
99       99       99    ,sidenote3      
,virtue indifferent to reward4    ,there

 is a further paradox of ethics1 in     
which pleasure and pain are held  to be 
indifferent1 and virtue at the time of  
action and without regard to            
consequences is happiness4 ,from this   
elevation or exaggeration of feeling    
,plato seems to shrink3 he leaves it to 
the ,stoics in a later generation  to   
maintain that when impaled or on the    
rack the philosopher may be happy  7cp4 
,rep4 ii4 #cfa ff474 ,it is observable  
that in the ,republic he raises  this   
question1 but it is not really          
discussed2 the veil of the ideal  state1
 the shadow of another life1 are allowed
 to descend upon it and  it passes out  
of sight4 ,the martyr or sufferer in the
 cause of right or  truth is often      
supposed to die in raptures1 having his 
eye fixed on a  city which is in heaven4
 ,but if there were no future1 might he 
not still  be happy in the performance  
of an action which was attended only by 
a  painful death8 ,he himself may be    
ready to thank ,god that he was thought 

worthy to do ,him the least service1    
without looking for a reward2 the  joys 
of another life may not have been       
present to his mind at all4 ,do we      
suppose that the mediaeval saint1 ,st4  
,bernard1 ,st4 ,francis1 ,st4 ,catharine
  of ,sienna1 or the ,catholic priest   
who lately devoted himself to death by  
a lingering disease that he might solace
 and help others1 was thinking  of the  
#8sweets' of heaven8 ,no2 the work was  
already heaven to him and  enough4 ,much
 less will the dying patriot be dreaming
 of the praises of  man or of an        
immortality of fame3 the sense of duty1 
of right1 and trust  in ,god will be    
sufficient1 and as far as the mind can  
reach1 in that  hour4 ,if he were       
certain that there were no life to come1
 he would not  have wished to speak or  
act otherwise than he did in the cause  
of truth  or of humanity4 ,neither1 on  
the other hand1 will he suppose that    
,god  has forsaken him or that the      
future is to be a mere blank to him4    

,the  greatest act of faith1 the only   
faith which cannot pass away1 is his    
who has not known1 but yet has believed4
 ,a very few among the sons of  men have
 made themselves independent of         
circumstances1 past1 present1  or to    
come4 ,he who has attained to such a    
temper of mind has already  present with
 him eternal life2 he needs no arguments
 to convince him  of immortality2 he has
 in him already a principle stronger    
than death4  ,he who serves man without 
the thought of reward is deemed to be a 
more  faithful servant than he who works
 for hire4 ,may not the service of      
,god1 which is the more disinterested1  
be in like manner the higher8 ,and      
although only a very few in the course  
of the world's history--,christ  himself
 being one of them--have attained to    
such a noble conception of ,god  and of 
the human soul1 yet the ideal of them   
may be present to us1 and  the          
remembrance of them be an example to us1
 and their lives may shed a  light on   

many dark places both of philosophy and 
theology4      ,the ,myths of ,plato4   
,sidenote3 ,the myths of ,plato4    ,the
 myths of ,plato are a phenomenon unique
 in literature4 ,there are four  longer 
ones3 these occur in the ,phaedrus      
7#bdd-bef71 ,phaedo 7#aaj-aae71         
,gorgias 7#ebc-ebg71 and ,republic 7x4  
#fad-fba74 ,that in the ,republic is    
the most elaborate and finished of them4
 ,three of these greater myths1  namely 
those contained in the ,phaedo1 the     
,gorgias and the ,republic1  relate to  
the destiny of human souls in a future  
life4 ,the magnificent  myth in the     
,phaedrus treats of the immortality1 or 
rather the eternity  of the soul1 in    
which is included a former as well as a 
future state  of existence4 ,to these   
may be added1 7#a7 the myth1 or rather  
fable1  occurring in the ,statesman     
7#bfh-bgd71 in which the life of        
innocence is  contrasted with the       
ordinary life of man and the            
consciousness of evil3  7#b7 the legend 

of the ,island of ,atlantis1 an         
imaginary history1 which  is a fragment 
only1 commenced in the ,timaeus 7#ba-bf7
 and continued in  the ,critias3 7#c7   
the much less artistic fiction of the   
foundation of  the ,cretan colony which 
is introduced in the preface to the     
,laws 7iii4  #gjb71 but soon falls into 
the background3 7#d7 the beautiful but  
rather  artificial tale of ,prometheus  
and ,epimetheus narrated in his         
rhetorical  manner by ,protagoras in the
 dialogue called after him 7#cbj-cbh73  
7#e7 the  speech at the beginning of the
 ,phaedrus 7#bca-bcd71 which is a parody
 of  the orator ,lysias2 the rival      
speech of ,socrates and the recantation 
of  it 7#bcg-bda74 ,to these may be     
added 7#f7 the tale of the grasshoppers1
  and 7#g7 the tale of ,thamus and of   
,theuth1 both in the ,phaedrus 7#bei and
  #bgd-e73 7#h7 the parable of the ,cave
 7,rep4 vii4 ad init471 in which  the   
previous argument is recapitulated1 and 
the nature and degrees  of knowledge    

having been previously set forth in the 
abstract are  represented in a picture3 
7#i7 the fiction of the earth-born men  
7,rep4  iii4 #dad2 cp4 ,laws ii4 #ffd71 
in which by the adaptation of an old    
tradition ,plato makes a new beginning  
for his society3 7#aj7 the myth of      
,aristophanes respecting the division of
 the sexes1 ,sym4 #ahi3 7#aa7 the       
parable of the noble captain1 the pilot1
 and the mutinous sailors 7,rep4  vi4   
#dhh71 in which is represented the      
relation of the better part of  the     
world1 and of the philosopher1 to the   
mob of politicians3 7#ab7 the  ironical 
tale of the pilot who plies between     
,athens and ,aegina charging  only a    
small payment for saving men from death1
 the reason being that  he is uncertain 
whether to live or die is better for    
them 7,gorg4 #eaa73  7#ac7 the treatment
 of freemen and citizens by physicians  
and of slaves  by their apprentices1--a 
somewhat laboured figure of speech      
intended to  illustrate the two         

different ways in which the laws speak  
to men 7,laws  iv4 #gbj74 ,there also   
occur in ,plato continuous images2 some 
of them  extend over several pages1     
appearing and reappearing at intervals3 
such  as the bees stinging and stingless
 7paupers and thieves7 in the ,eighth   
,book of the ,republic 7#eed71 who are  
generated in the transition from        
timocracy to oligarchy3 the sun1 which  
is to the visible world what the  idea  
of good is to the intellectual1 in the  
,sixth ,book of the ,republic  7#ejh-i73
 the composite animal1 having the form  
of a man1 but containing  under a human 
skin a lion and a many-headed monster   
7,rep4 ix4 #ehh-i73  the great beast    
7vi4 #dic71 i4 e4 the populace3 and the 
wild beast within  us1 meaning the      
passions which are always liable to     
break out 7ix4 #ega73  the animated     
comparisons of the degradation of       
philosophy by the arts to  the          
dishonoured maiden 7vi4 #die-f71 and of 
the tyrant to the parricide1  who       

#8beats his father1 having first taken  
away his arms' 7viii4 #efi73  the dog1  
who is your only philosopher 7ii4 #cgf  
,b73 the grotesque and  rather paltry   
image of the argument wandering about   
without a head 7,laws  vi4 #geb71 which 
is repeated1 not improved1 from the     
,gorgias 7#eji ,d73 the  argument       
personified as veiling her face 7,rep4  
vi4 #ejc ,a71 as engaged in  a chase    
7iv4 #dbg ,c71 as breaking upon us in a 
first1 second and third  wave 7v4 #deg  
,c1 #dgb ,a1 #dgc ,c73--on these figures
 of speech the changes are  rung many   
times over4 ,it is observable that      
nearly all these parables or  continuous
 images are found in the ,republic2 that
 which occurs in the  ,theaetetus 7#adi 
ff471 of the midwifery of ,socrates1 is 
perhaps the only  exception4 ,to make   
the list complete1 the mathematical     
figure of the  number of the state      
7,rep4 viii4 #edf71 or the numerical    
interval which  separates king from     
tyrant 7ix4 #ehg-h71 should not be      

forgotten4    ,sidenote3 ,the myths of  
,plato4    ,the myth in the ,gorgias is 
one of those descriptions of another    
life  which1 like the ,sixth ,aeneid of 
,virgil1 appear to contain reminiscences
  of the mysteries4 ,it is a vision of  
the rewards and punishments which  await
 good and bad men after death4 ,it      
supposes the body to continue1  and to  
be in another world what it has become  
in this4 ,it includes a  ,paradiso1     
,purgatorio1 and ,inferno1 like the     
sister myths of the ,phaedo  and the    
,republic4 ,the ,inferno is reserved for
 great criminals only4 ,the  argument of
 the dialogue is frequently referred to1
 and the meaning  breaks through so as  
rather to destroy the liveliness and    
consistency  of the picture4 ,the       
structure of the fiction is very slight1
 the chief  point or moral being that in
 the judgments of another world there is
  no possibility of concealment3 ,zeus  
has taken from men the power of         
foreseeing death1 and brings together   

the souls both of them and their  judges
 naked and undisguised at the           
judgment-seat4 ,both are exposed to     
view1 stripped of the veils and clothes 
which might prevent them from  seeing   
into or being seen by one another4      
,sidenote3 ,the myths of ,plato4    ,the
 myth of the ,phaedo is of the same     
type1 but it is more cosmological1  and 
also more poetical4 ,the beautiful and  
ingenious fancy occurs to ,plato  that  
the upper atmosphere is an earth and    
heaven in one1 a glorified  earth1      
fairer and purer than that in which we  
dwell4 ,as the fishes live  in the      
ocean1 mankind are living in a lower    
sphere1 out of which they  put their    
heads for a moment or two and behold a  
world beyond4 ,the earth  which we      
inhabit is a sediment of the coarser    
particles which drop from  the world    
above1 and is to that heavenly earth    
what the desert and the  shores of the  
ocean are to us4 ,a part of the myth    
consists of description  of the interior

 of the earth1 which gives the          
opportunity of introducing  several     
mythological names and of providing     
places of torment for the  wicked4      
,there is no clear distinction of soul  
and body2 the spirits  beneath the earth
 are spoken of as souls only1 yet they  
retain a sort  of shadowy form when they
 cry for mercy on the shores of the     
lake2 and  the philosopher alone is said
 to have got rid of the body4 ,all the  
three  myths in ,plato which relate to  
the world below have a place for        
repentant  sinners1 as well as other    
homes or places for the very good and   
very bad4  ,it is a natural reflection  
which is made by ,plato elsewhere1 that 
the two  extremes of human character are
 rarely met with1 and that the          
generality  of mankind are between them4
 ,hence a place must be found for them4 
,in  the myth of the ,phaedo they are   
carried down the river ,acheron to the  
,acherusian lake1 where they dwell1 and 
are purified of their evil deeds1  and  

receive the rewards of their good4      
,there are also incurable sinners1  who 
are cast into ,tartarus1 there to remain
 as the penalty of atrocious  crimes2   
these suffer everlastingly4 ,and there  
is another class of hardly  curable     
sinners who are allowed from time to    
time to approach the shores  of the     
,acherusian lake1 where they cry to     
their victims for mercy2 which  if they 
obtain they come out into the lake and  
cease from their torments4    ,neither  
this1 nor any of the three greater myths
 of ,plato1 nor perhaps  any allegory or
 parable relating to the unseen world1  
is consistent  with itself4 ,the        
language of philosophy mingles with that
 of mythology2  abstract ideas are      
transformed into persons1 figures of    
speech into  realities4 ,these myths may
 be compared with the ,pilgrim's        
,progress of  ,bunyan1 in which         
discussions of theology are mixed up    
with the incidents  of travel1 and      
mythological personages are associated  

with human beings3  they are also       
garnished with names and phrases taken  
out of ,homer1 and  with other fragments
 of ,greek tradition4    ,sidenote3 ,the
 myths of ,plato4    ,the myth of the   
,republic is more subtle and also more  
consistent than  either of the two      
others4 ,it has a greater verisimilitude
 than they have1  and is full of touches
 which recall the experiences of human  
life4 ,it  will be noticed by an        
attentive reader that the twelve days   
during which  ,er lay in a trance after 
he was slain coincide with the time     
passed by  the spirits in their         
pilgrimage4 ,it is a curious            
observation1 not often  made1 that good 
men who have lived in a well-governed   
city 7shall we say  in a religious and  
respectable society87 are more likely to
 make mistakes  in their choice of life 
than those who have had more experience 
of the  world and of evil4 ,it is a more
 familiar remark that we constantly     
blame  others when we have only         

ourselves to blame2 and the philosopher 
must  acknowledge1 however reluctantly1 
that there is an element of chance in   
human life with which it is sometimes   
impossible for man to cope4 ,that  men  
drink more of the waters of             
forgetfulness than is good for them is a
  poetical description of a familiar    
truth4 ,we have many of us known men    
who1 like ,odysseus1 have wearied of    
ambition and have only desired rest4    
,we should like to know what became of  
the infants #8dying almost as soon  as  
they were born' 7x4 #fae ,b71 but ,plato
 only raises1 without satisfying1  our  
curiosity4 ,the two companies of souls1 
ascending and descending at  either     
chasm of heaven and earth1 and          
conversing when they come out into  the 
meadow1 the majestic figures of the     
judges sitting in heaven1 the  voice    
heard by ,ardiaeus1 are features of the 
great allegory which have an            
indescribable grandeur and power4 ,the  
remark already made respecting the      

inconsistency of the two other myths    
must be extended also to this3 it is  at
 once an orrery1 or model of the        
heavens1 and a picture of the ,day of   
,judgment4    ,sidenote3 ,the myth in   
the ,phaedrus4    ,the three myths are  
unlike anything else in ,plato4 ,there  
is an ,oriental1  or rather an ,egyptian
 element in them1 and they have an      
affinity to  the mysteries and to the   
,orphic modes of worship4 ,to a certain 
extent  they are un-,greek2 at any rate 
there is hardly anything like them in   
other ,greek writings which have a      
serious purpose2 in spirit they are     
mediaeval4 ,they are akin to what may be
 termed the underground religion  in all
 ages and countries4 ,they are presented
 in the most lively and  graphic manner1
 but they are never insisted on as true2
 it is only  affirmed that nothing      
better can be said about a future life4 
,plato seems  to make use of them when  
he has reached the limits of human      
knowledge2  or1 to borrow an expression 

of his own1 when he is standing on the  
outside of the intellectual world4 ,they
 are very simple in style2 a few        
touches bring the picture home to the   
mind1 and make it present to us4  ,they 
have also a kind of authority gained by 
the employment of sacred and  familiar  
names1 just as mere fragments of the    
words of ,scripture1 put  together in   
any form and applied to any subject1    
have a power of their  own4 ,they are a 
substitute for poetry and mythology2 and
 they are also a  reform of mythology4  
,the moral of them may be summed up in a
 word or two3  ,after death the         
,judgment2 and #8there is some better   
thing remaining for  the good than for  
the evil4'    ,all literature gathers   
into itself many elements of the past3  
for  example1 the tale of the earth-born
 men in the ,republic appears at  first 
sight to be an extravagant fancy1 but it
 is restored to propriety  when we      
remember that it is based on a legendary
 belief4 ,the art of  making stories of 

ghosts and apparitions credible is said 
to consist  in the manner of telling    
them4 ,the effect is gained by many     
literary  and conversational devices1   
such as the previous raising of         
curiosity1  the mention of little       
circumstances1 simplicity1              
picturesqueness1 the  naturalness of the
 occasion1 and the like4 ,this art is   
possessed by ,plato  in a degree which  
has never been equalled4    ,the myth in
 the ,phaedrus is even greater than the 
myths which have been  already          
described1 but is of a different        
character4 ,it treats of a former       
rather than of a future life4 ,it       
represents the conflict of reason  aided
 by passion or righteous indignation on 
the one hand1 and of the  animal lusts  
and instincts on the other4 ,the soul of
 man has followed  the company of some  
god1 and seen truth in the form of the  
universal  before it was born in this   
world4 ,our present life is the result  
of the  struggle which was then carried 

on4 ,this world is relative to a former 
world1 as it is often projected into a  
future4 ,we ask the question1 ,where    
were men before birth8 as we likewise   
enquire1 ,what will become of them      
after death8 ,the first question is     
unfamiliar to us1 and therefore seems   
to be unnatural2 but if we survey the   
whole human race1 it has been as        
influential and as widely spread as the 
other4 ,in the ,phaedrus it is  really a
 figure of speech in which the          
#8spiritual combat' of this life  is    
represented4 ,the majesty and power of  
the whole passage--especially of  what  
may be called the theme or proem        
7beginning #8,the mind through all  her 
being is immortal'7--can only be        
rendered very inadequately in another   
language4    ,sidenote3 ,the myth in the
 ,statesman4    ,the myth in the        
,statesman relates to a former cycle of 
existence1 in  which men were born of   
the earth1 and by the reversal of the   
earth's  motion had their lives reversed

 and were restored to youth and beauty3 
the dead came to life1 the old grew     
middle-aged1 and the middle-aged  young2
 the youth became a child1 the child an 
infant1 the infant vanished  into the   
earth4 ,the connection between the      
reversal of the earth's motion  and the 
reversal of human life is of course     
verbal only1 yet ,plato1 like           
theologians in other ages1 argues from  
the consistency of the tale to its      
truth4 ,the new order of the world was  
immediately under the government  of    
,god2 it was a state of innocence in    
which men had neither wants nor  cares1 
in which the earth brought forth all    
things spontaneously1 and ,god  was to  
man what man now is to the animals4     
,there were no great estates1  or       
families1 or private possessions1 nor   
any traditions of the past1  because men
 were all born out of the earth4 ,this  
is what ,plato calls the  #8reign of    
,cronos2' and in like manner he connects
 the reversal of the  earth's motion    

with some legend of which he himself was
 probably the  inventor4    ,the        
question is then asked1 under which of  
these two cycles of existence  was man  
the happier1--under that of ,cronos1    
which was a state of  innocence1 or that
 of ,zeus1 which is our ordinary life8  
,for a while ,plato  balances the two   
sides of the serious controversy1 which 
he has suggested  in a figure4 ,the     
answer depends on another question3     
,what use did the  children of ,cronos  
make of their time8 ,they had boundless 
leisure and the  faculty of discoursing1
 not only with one another1 but with the
 animals4  ,did they employ these       
advantages with a view to philosophy1   
gathering  from every nature some       
addition to their store of knowledge8   
or1 ,did  they pass their time in eating
 and drinking and telling stories to one
  another and to the beasts8--in either 
case there would be no difficulty in    
answering4 ,but then1 as ,plato rather  
mischievously adds1 #8,nobody knows     

what they did1' and therefore the doubt 
must remain undetermined4    ,sidenote3 
,transition in ,plato from the abstract 
to the concrete4    ,to the first there 
succeeds a second epoch4 ,after another 
natural  convulsion1 in which the order 
of the world and of human life is once  
more reversed1 ,god withdraws his       
guiding hand1 and man is left to the    
government of himself4 ,the world begins
 again1 and arts and laws are  slowly   
and painfully invented4 ,a secular age  
succeeds to a theocratical4  ,in this   
fanciful tale ,plato has dropped1 or    
almost dropped1 the garb of  mythology4 
,he suggests several curious and        
important thoughts1 such as  the        
possibility of a state of innocence1 the
 existence of a world without           
traditions1 and the difference between  
human and divine government4 ,he  has   
also carried a step further his         
speculations concerning the abolition   
of the family and of property1 which he 
supposes to have no place among  the    

children of ,cronos any more than in the
 ideal state4           99       99     
99       99       99    ,it is          
characteristic of ,plato and of his age 
to pass from the abstract to  the       
concrete1 from poetry to reality4       
,language is the expression of the      
seen1 and also of the unseen1 and moves 
in a region between them4 ,a great      
writer knows how to strike both these   
chords1 sometimes remaining within  the 
sphere of the visible1 and then again   
comprehending a wider range  and soaring
 to the abstract and universal4 ,even in
 the same sentence he  may employ both  
modes of speech not improperly or       
inharmoniously4 ,it is  useless to      
criticise the broken metaphors of       
,plato1 if the effect of the  whole is  
to create a picture not such as can be  
painted on canvas1 but  which is full of
 life and meaning to the reader4 ,a poem
 may be contained  in a word or two1    
which may call up not one but many      
latent images2 or  half reveal to us by 

a sudden flash the thoughts of many     
hearts4 ,often  the rapid transition    
from one image to another is pleasing to
 us3 on the  other hand1 any single     
figure of speech if too often repeated1 
or worked  out too much at length1      
becomes prosy and monotonous4 ,in       
theology and  philosophy we necessarily 
include both #8the moral law within and 
the  starry heaven above1' and pass from
 one to the other 7cp4 for examples     
,psalm xviii4 #a-be1 xix4 #a-i1 etc474  
,whether such a use of language is      
puerile or noble depends upon the genius
 of the writer or speaker1 and  the     
familiarity of the associations         
employed4    ,sidenote3 ,the myths not  
written1 but spoken words4    ,in the   
myths and parables of ,plato the ease   
and grace of conversation  is not       
forgotten3 they are spoken1 not written 
words1 stories which  are told to a     
living audience1 and so well told that  
we are more than  half-inclined to      
believe them 7cp4 ,phaedrus #bgd74 ,as  

in conversation  too1 the striking image
 or figure of speech is not forgotten1  
but is  quickly caught up1 and alluded  
to again and again2 as it would still be
  in our own day in a genial and        
sympathetic society4 ,the descriptions  
of  ,plato have a greater life and      
reality than is to be found in any      
modern  writing4 ,this is due to their  
homeliness and simplicity4 ,plato can do
  with words just as he pleases2 to him 
they are indeed #8more plastic  than    
wax' 7,rep4 ix4 #ehh ,d74 ,we are in the
 habit of opposing speech and  writing1 
poetry and prose4 ,but he has discovered
 a use of language in  which they are   
united2 which gives a fitting expression
 to the highest  truths2 and in which   
the trifles of courtesy and the         
familiarities of  daily life are not    
overlooked4      ,,gorgias4    ,,persons
 ,,of ,,the ,,dialogue4    ,,callicles4 
,,gorgias4 ,,socrates4 ,,polus4         
,,chaerephon4    ,,scene3--,the house of
 ,callicles4    ,sidenote3 ,gorgias4    

,callicles4 ,the wise man1 as the       
proverb says1 is late for a      fray1  
but not for a feast4                    
,steph4 #ddg        ,socrates4 ,and are 
we late for a feast8        ,cal4 ,yes1 
and a delightful feast2 for ,gorgias has
 just been      exhibiting to us many   
fine things4        ,soc4 ,it is not my 
fault1 ,callicles2 our friend           
,chaerephon      is to blame2 for he    
would keep us loitering in the ,agora4  
,chaerephon4 ,never mind1 ,socrates2 the
 misfortune of      which ,i have been  
the cause ,i will also repair2 for      
,gorgias      is a friend of mine1 and  
,i will make him give the exhibition    
again either now1 or1 if you prefer1 at 
some other time4        ,cal4 ,what is  
the matter1 ,chaerephon--does ,socrates 
want      to hear ,gorgias8             
,chaer4 ,yes1 that was our intention in 
coming4        ,cal4 ,come into my      
house1 then2 for ,gorgias is staying    
with me1 and he shall exhibit to you4   
,soc4 ,very good1 ,callicles2 but will  

he answer our questions8      for ,i    
want to hear from him what is the nature
 of his      art1 and what it is which  
he professes and teaches2 he may1       
as you ,chaerephon suggest1 defer the   
exhibition to some      other time4     
,cal4 ,there is nothing like asking him1
 ,socrates2 and indeed      to answer   
questions is a part of his exhibition1  
for he      was saying only just now1   
that any one in my house might      put 
any question to him1 and that he would  
answer4    ,sidenote3 ,gorgias is ready 
to answer all comers4        ,soc4 ,how 
fortunate6 will you ask him1            
,chaerephon--8        ,chaer4 ,what     
shall ,i ask him8        ,soc4 ,ask him 
who he is4        ,chaer4 ,what do you  
mean8        ,soc4 ,i mean such a       
question as would elicit from him1 if he
      had been a maker of shoes1 the    
answer that he is a cobbler4      ,do   
you understand8        ,chaer4 ,i       
understand1 and will ask him3 ,tell me1 
,gorgias1      is our friend ,callicles 

right in saying that you undertake to   
answer any questions which you are      
asked8        ,gorgias4 ,quite right1   
,chaerephon3 ,i was saying as much      
only just now2 and ,i may add1 that many
 years have elapsed         #ddh        
since any one has asked me a new one4   
,chaer4 ,then you must be very ready1   
,gorgias4        ,gor4 ,of that1        
,chaerephon1 you can make trial4        
,sidenote3 ,polus offers to take the    
place of ,gorgias in the argument4      
,polus4 ,yes1 indeed1 and if you like1  
,chaerephon1 you may      make trial of 
me too1 for ,i think that ,gorgias1 who 
has been      talking a long time1 is   
tired4        ,chaer4 ,and do you1      
,polus1 think that you can answer       
better than ,gorgias8        ,pol4 ,what
 does that matter if ,i answer well     
enough for      you8        ,chaer4 ,not
 at all3--and you shall answer if you   
like4        ,pol4 ,ask3--              
,chaer4 ,my question is this3 ,if       
,gorgias had the skill of his           

brother ,herodicus1 what ought we to    
call him8 ,ought he      not to have the
 name which is given to his brother8    
,pol4 ,certainly4        ,chaer4 ,then  
we should be right in calling him a     
physician8        ,pol4 ,yes4           
,sidenote3 ,the question is asked1      
#8,what is ,gorgias8'        ,chaer4    
,and if he had the skill of ,aristophon 
the son of      ,aglaophon1 or of his   
brother ,polygnotus1 what ought we to   
call him8        ,pol4 ,clearly1 a      
painter4        ,chaer4 ,but now what   
shall we call him--what is the art in   
which he is skilled8    ,sidenote3      
,gorgias supersedes ,polus4             
,sidenote3 ,answer3--,gorgias is one of 
the best proficients in the noblest     
art4        ,pol4 ,o ,chaerephon1 there 
are many arts among mankind      which  
are experimental1 and have their origin 
in experience1      for experience makes
 the days of men to proceed according   
to art1 and inexperience according to   
chance1 and different      persons in   

different ways are proficient in        
different arts1 and      the best       
persons in the best arts4 ,and our      
friend ,gorgias is      one of the best1
 and the art in which he is a proficient
 is the      noblest4        ,soc4      
,polus has been taught how to make a    
capital speech1      ,gorgias2 but he is
 not fulfilling the promise which he    
made      to ,chaerephon4        ,gor4  
,what do you mean1 ,socrates8           
,soc4 ,i mean that he has not exactly   
answered the question      which he was 
asked4        ,gor4 ,then why not ask   
him yourself8        ,soc4 ,but ,i would
 much rather ask you1 if you are        
disposed      to answer3 for ,i see1    
from the few words which ,polus has     
uttered1 that he has attended more to   
the art which is called      rhetoric   
than to dialectic4        ,pol4 ,what   
makes you say so1 ,socrates8            
,sidenote3 ,this is no answer4          
,soc4 ,because1 ,polus1 when ,chaerephon
 asked you what      was the art which  

,gorgias knows1 you praised it as if you
      were answering some one who found 
fault with it1 but you      never said  
what the art was4        ,pol4 ,why1 did
 ,i not say that it was the noblest of  
arts8        ,soc4 ,yes1 indeed1 but    
that was no answer to the question3     
nobody asked what was the quality1 but  
what was the nature1      of the art1   
and by what name we were to describe    
,gorgias4      ,and ,i would still beg  
you briefly and clearly1 as you         
#ddi      answered ,chaerephon when he  
asked you at first1 to say      what    
this art is1 and what we ought to call  
,gorgias3 ,or      rather1 ,gorgias1 let
 me turn to you1 and ask the same       
question1--what      are we to call you1
 and what is the art which you          
profess8    ,sidenote3                  
,better3--,gorgias is a rhetorician and 
a teacher of rhetoric4        ,gor4     
,rhetoric1 ,socrates1 is my art4        
,soc4 ,then ,i am to call you a         
rhetorician8        ,gor4 ,yes1         

,socrates1 and a good one too1 if you   
would call      me that which1 in       
,homeric language1 #8,i boast myself    
to be4'        ,soc4 ,i should wish to  
do so4        ,gor4 ,then pray do4      
,sidenote3 ,the admirable brevity of    
,gorgias4        ,soc4 ,and are we to   
say that you are able to make other     
men rhetoricians8        ,gor4 ,yes1    
that is exactly what ,i profess to make 
them1 not      only at ,athens1 but in  
all places4        ,soc4 ,and will you  
continue to ask and answer questions1   
,gorgias1 as we are at present doing1   
and reserve for another      occasion   
the longer mode of speech which ,polus  
was attempting8      ,will you keep your
 promise1 and answer shortly the        
questions which are asked of you8       
,gor4 ,some answers1 ,socrates1 are of  
necessity longer2 but      ,i will do my
 best to make them as short as possible2
 for a      part of my profession is    
that ,i can be as short as any one4     
,soc4 ,that is what is wanted1 ,gorgias2

 exhibit the shorter      method now1   
and the longer one at some other time4  
,gor4 ,well1 ,i will2 and you will      
certainly say1 that you      never heard
 a man use fewer words4        ,soc4    
,very good then2 as you profess to be a 
rhetorician1      and a maker of        
rhetoricians1 let me ask you1 with what 
is      rhetoric concerned3 ,i might ask
 with what is weaving concerned1        
and you would reply 7would you not871   
with the      making of garments8       
,gor4 ,yes4        ,soc4 ,and music is  
concerned with the composition of       
melodies8        ,gor4 ,it is4          
,soc4 ,by ,her1 ,gorgias1 ,i admire the 
surpassing brevity of      your answers4
        ,gor4 ,yes1 ,socrates1 ,i do    
think myself good at that4    ,sidenote3
 ,and rhetoric is concerned with        
discourse4        ,soc4 ,i am glad to   
hear it2 answer me in like manner about 
rhetoric3 with what is rhetoric         
concerned8        ,gor4 ,with discourse4
        ,soc4 ,what sort of discourse1  

,gorgias8--such discourse as      would 
teach the sick under what treatment they
 might get      well8        ,gor4 ,no4 
,soc4 ,then rhetoric does not treat of  
all kinds of discourse8        ,gor4    
,certainly not4        ,soc4 ,and yet   
rhetoric makes men able to speak8       
,gor4 ,yes4    ,sidenote3 ,how is       
rhetoric distinguished from more special
 arts8        ,soc4 ,and to understand  
that about which they speak8            
,gor4 ,of course4        ,soc4 ,but does
 not the art of medicine1 which we were 
just      now mentioning1 also make men 
able to understand and                  
#dej      speak about the sick8         
,gor4 ,certainly4        ,soc4 ,then    
medicine also treats of discourse8      
,gor4 ,yes4        ,soc4 ,of discourse  
concerning diseases8        ,gor4 ,just 
so4        ,soc4 ,and does not gymnastic
 also treat of discourse concerning     
the good or evil condition of the body8 
,gor4 ,very true4    ,sidenote3 ,but so 
are all the other arts4        ,soc4    

,and the same1 ,gorgias1 is true of the 
other arts3--all      of them treat of  
discourse concerning the subjects with  
which      they severally have to do4   
,gor4 ,clearly4        ,soc4 ,then why1 
if you call rhetoric the art which      
treats of      discourse1 and all the   
other arts treat of discourse1 do you   
not call them arts of rhetoric8         
,gor4 ,because1 ,socrates1 the knowledge
 of the other arts      has only to do  
with some sort of external action1 as of
 the      hand2 but there is no such    
action of the hand in rhetoric          
which works and takes effect only       
through the medium of      discourse4   
,and therefore ,i am justified in saying
 that rhetoric      treats of discourse4
        ,soc4 ,i am not sure whether ,i 
entirely understand you1 but      ,i    
dare say ,i shall soon know better2     
please to answer me a                   
question3--you would allow that there   
are arts8        ,gor4 ,yes4            
,soc4 ,as to the arts generally1 they   

are for the most part      concerned    
with doing1 and require little or no    
speaking2 in      painting1 and         
statuary1 and many other arts1 the work 
may      proceed in silence2 and of such
 arts ,i suppose you would      say that
 they do not come within the province of
 rhetoric4        ,gor4 ,you perfectly  
conceive my meaning1 ,socrates4         
,sidenote3 ,you mean to say that        
rhetoric belongs to that class of arts  
which is chiefly concerned with words4  
,sidenote3 ,rhetoric and arithmetic4    
,soc4 ,but there are other arts which   
work wholly through      the medium of  
language1 and require either no action  
or very      little1 as1 for example1   
the arts of arithmetic1 of calculation1 
of      geometry1 and of playing        
draughts2 in some of these speech       
is pretty nearly coextensive with       
action1 but in most of them      the    
verbal element is greater--they depend  
wholly on words      for their efficacy 
and power3 and ,i take your meaning to  

be that rhetoric is an art of this      
latter sort8        ,gor4 ,exactly4     
,sidenote3 ,and yet you would not call  
arithmetic rhetoric4        ,soc4 ,and  
yet ,i do not believe that you really   
mean to call      any of these arts     
rhetoric2 although the precise          
expression      which you used was1 that
 rhetoric is an art which works and     
takes effect only through the medium of 
discourse2 and an      adversary who    
wished to be captious might say1 #8,and 
so1      ,gorgias1 you call arithmetic  
rhetoric4' ,but ,i do not think         
that you really call arithmetic rhetoric
 any more than geometry      would be so
 called by you4                         
#dea        ,gor4 ,you are quite right1 
,socrates1 in your apprehension of      
my meaning4    ,sidenote3               
,illustrations4        ,soc4 ,well1     
then1 let me now have the rest of my    
answer3--seeing      that rhetoric is   
one of those arts which works mainly    
by the use of words1 and there are other

 arts which also use      words1 tell me
 what is that quality in words with     
which rhetoric      is                  
concerned3--,suppose that a person asks 
me about      some of the arts which ,i 
was mentioning just now2 he might       
say1 #8,socrates1 what is arithmetic8'  
and ,i should reply to      him1 as you 
replied to me1 that arithmetic is one of
 those arts      which take effect      
through words4 ,and then he would       
proceed      to ask3 #8,words about     
what8' and ,i should reply1      ,words 
about odd and even numbers1 and how many
 there are      of each4 ,and if he     
asked again3 #8,what is the art of      
calculation8'      ,i should say1 ,that 
also is one of the arts which is        
concerned wholly with words4 ,and if he 
further said1 #8,concerned      with    
what8' ,i should say1 like the clerks in
 the      assembly1 #8as aforesaid' of  
arithmetic1 but with a difference1      
the difference being that the art of    
calculation considers not      only the 

quantities of odd and even numbers1 but 
also their      numerical relations to  
themselves and to one another4 ,and     
suppose1 again1 ,i were to say that     
astronomy is only words--he      would  
ask1 #8,words about what1 ,socrates8'   
and ,i should      answer1 that         
astronomy tells us about the motions of 
the      stars and sun and moon1 and    
their relative swiftness4        ,gor4  
,you would be quite right1 ,socrates4   
,sidenote3 ,the old drinking song4      
,soc4 ,and now let us have from you1    
,gorgias1 the truth      about rhetoric3
 which you would admit 7would you not87 
to      be one of those arts which act  
always and fulfil all their      ends   
through the medium of words8            
,sidenote3 ,rhetoric has to do with     
words3 about the greatest and best of   
human things4        ,gor4 ,true4       
,soc4 ,words which do what8 ,i should   
ask4 ,to what      class of things do   
the words which rhetoric uses relate8   
,gor4 ,to the greatest1 ,socrates1 and  

the best of human      things4          
,soc4 ,that again1 ,gorgias1 is         
ambiguous2 ,i am still in the      dark3
 for which are the greatest and best of 
human things8      ,i dare say that you 
have heard men singing at feasts the old
      drinking song1 in which the       
singers enumerate the goods of          
life1 first health1 beauty next1        
thirdly1 as the writer of the      song 
says1 wealth honestly obtained4         
,gor4 ,yes1 ,i know the song2 but what  
is your drift8               #deb       
,sidenote3 ,but which are they8         
,sidenote3 ,gorgias is brought to the   
point4        ,soc4 ,i mean to say1 that
 the producers of those things          
which the author of the song praises1   
that is to say1 the      physician1 the 
trainer1 the money-maker1 will at once  
come      to you1 and first the         
physician will say3 #8,o ,socrates1     
,gorgias is deceiving you1 for my art is
 concerned with the      greatest good  
of men and not his4' ,and when ,i ask1  

,who      are you8 he will reply1 #8,i  
am a physician4' ,what do you      mean8
 ,i shall say4 ,do you mean that your   
art produces      the greatest good8    
#8,certainly1' he will answer1 #8for is 
not      health the greatest good8 ,what
 greater good can men      have1        
,socrates8' ,and after him the trainer  
will come and      say1 #8,i too1       
,socrates1 shall be greatly surprised if
 ,gorgias      can show more good of his
 art than ,i can show of mine4'      ,to
 him again ,i shall say1 ,who are you1  
honest friend1 and      what is your    
business8 #8,i am a trainer1' he will   
reply1 #8and      my business is to make
 men beautiful and strong in body4'     
,when ,i have done with the trainer1    
there arrives the      money-maker1 and 
he1 as ,i expect1 will utterly despise  
them      all4 #8,consider1 ,socrates1' 
he will say1 #8whether ,gorgias or      
any one else can produce any greater    
good than wealth4'      ,well1 you and  
,i say to him1 and are you a creator of 

wealth8 #8,yes1' he replies4 ,and who   
are you8 #8,a money-maker4'      ,and do
 you consider wealth to be the greatest 
good of man8 #8,of course1' will be his 
reply4 ,and we      shall rejoin3 ,yes2 
but our friend ,gorgias contends that   
his      art produces a greater good    
than yours4 ,and then he will      be   
sure to go on and ask1 #8,what good8    
,let ,gorgias      answer4' ,now ,i want
 you1 ,gorgias1 to imagine that this    
question is asked of you by them and by 
me2 ,what is that      which1 as you    
say1 is the greatest good of man1 and of
 which      you are the creator8 ,answer
 us4    ,sidenote3 ,freedom and power1  
and the word which gives them4          
,gor4 ,that good1 ,socrates1 which is   
truly the greatest1      being that     
which gives to men freedom in their own 
persons1      and to individuals the    
power of ruling over others in their    
several states4        ,soc4 ,and what  
would you consider this to be8          
,gor4 ,what is there greater than the   

word which persuades      the judges in 
the courts1 or the senators in the      
council1 or the citizens in the         
assembly1 or at any other      political
 meeting8--if you have the power of     
uttering this      word1 you will have  
the physician your slave1 and the       
trainer      your slave1 and the        
money-maker of whom you talk will be    
found to gather treasures1 not for      
himself1 but for you who      are able  
to speak and to persuade the multitude4 
,soc4 ,now ,i think1 ,gorgias1 that you 
have very accurately      explained what
 you conceive to be the art of rhetoric2
 and      you mean to say1 if ,i am not 
mistaken1 that rhetoric is the          
#dec      artificer of persuasion1      
having this and no other business1      
and that this is her crown and end4 ,do 
you know any      other effect of       
rhetoric over and above that of         
producing      persuasion8    ,sidenote3
 ,rhetoric is the art of persuading1    
says ,gorgias4        ,gor4 ,no3 the    

definition seems to me very fair1       
,socrates2      for persuasion is the   
chief end of rhetoric4        ,soc4     
,then hear me1 ,gorgias1 for ,i am quite
 sure that if      there ever was a man 
who entered on the discussion of a      
matter from a pure love of knowing the  
truth1 ,i am such      a one1 and ,i    
should say the same of you4        ,gor4
 ,what is coming1 ,socrates8            
,sidenote3 ,socrates insists on taking  
#8one step at a time4'        ,soc4 ,i  
will tell you3 ,i am very well aware    
that ,i do not      know what1 according
 to you1 is the exact nature1 or what   
are the topics of that persuasion of    
which you speak1 and      which is given
 by rhetoric2 although ,i have a        
suspicion      about both the one and   
the other4 ,and ,i am going to ask--what
      is this power of persuasion which 
is given by rhetoric1      and about    
what8 ,but why1 if ,i have a suspicion1 
do ,i ask      instead of telling you8  
,not for your sake1 but in order that   

the argument may proceed in such a      
manner as is most      likely to set    
forth the truth4 ,and ,i would have you 
observe1      that ,i am right in asking
 this further question3 ,if ,i asked1   
#8,what sort of a painter is ,zeuxis8'  
and you said1 #8,the      painter of    
figures1' should ,i not be right in     
asking1 #8,what      kind of figures1   
and where do you find them8'            
,gor4 ,certainly4        ,soc4 ,and the 
reason for asking this second question  
would be1 that there are other painters 
besides1 who paint      many other      
figures8        ,gor4 ,true4            
,soc4 ,but if there had been no one but 
,zeuxis who painted      them1 then you 
would have answered very well8          
,gor4 ,quite so4    ,sidenote3 ,but so  
is arithmetic1 so is painting4          
,soc4 ,now ,i want to know about        
rhetoric in the same way2--is           
rhetoric the only art which brings      
persuasion1 or do      other arts have  
the same effect8 ,i mean to say--,does  

he      who teaches anything persuade   
men of that which he teaches      or    
not8        ,gor4 ,he persuades1        
,socrates1--there can be no mistake     
about that4        ,soc4 ,again1 if we  
take the arts of which we were just now 
speaking3--do not arithmetic and the    
arithmeticians teach us      the        
properties of number8        ,gor4      
,certainly4        ,soc4 ,and therefore 
persuade us of them8        ,gor4 ,yes4 
,soc4 ,then arithmetic as well as       
rhetoric is an artificer of             
persuasion8        ,gor4 ,clearly4      
,soc4 ,and if any one asks us what sort 
of persuasion1 and      about what1--we 
shall answer1 persuasion which teaches  
the      quantity of odd and even2 and  
we shall be able to show that      all  
the other arts of which we were just now
 speaking are          #ded             
artificers of persuasion1 and of what   
sort1 and about what4        ,gor4 ,very
 true4        ,soc4 ,then rhetoric is   
not the only artificer of persuasion8   

,gor4 ,true4    ,sidenote3 ,knowledge   
and belief4    ,sidenote3 ,of what      
persuasion is rhetoric the artificer8   
,soc4 ,seeing1 then1 that not only      
rhetoric works by persuasion1      but  
that other arts do the same1 as in the  
case of      the painter1 a question has
 arisen which is a very fair one3       
,of what persuasion is rhetoric the     
artificer1 and about what8--is      not 
that a fair way of putting the question8
        ,gor4 ,i think so4        ,soc4 
,then1 if you approve the question1     
,gorgias1 what is      the answer8      
,sidenote3 ,of persuasion in the courts 
and assemblies about the just and       
unjust4        ,gor4 ,i answer1         
,socrates1 that rhetoric is the art of  
persuasion      in courts of law and    
other assemblies1 as ,i was just        
now saying1 and about the just and      
unjust4        ,soc4 ,and that1         
,gorgias1 was what ,i was suspecting to 
be      your notion2 yet ,i would not   
have you wonder if by-and-by      ,i am 

found repeating a seemingly plain       
question2 for ,i ask      not in order  
to confute you1 but as ,i was saying    
that the      argument may proceed      
consecutively1 and that we may not      
get the habit of anticipating and       
suspecting the meaning of      one      
another's words2 ,i would have you      
develope your own      views in your own
 way1 whatever may be your hypothesis4  
,gor4 ,i think that you are quite right1
 ,socrates4        ,soc4 ,then let me   
raise another question2 there is such   
a thing as #8having learned'8           
,gor4 ,yes4        ,soc4 ,and there is  
also #8having believed'8        ,gor4   
,yes4    ,sidenote3 ,knowledge and      
belief are not the same things2 for     
there may be  a false belief1 but not a 
false knowledge4        ,soc4 ,and is   
the #8having learned' the same as       
#8having      believed1' and are        
learning and belief the same things8    
,gor4 ,in my judgment1 ,socrates1 they  
are not the same4        ,soc4 ,and your

 judgment is right1 as you may ascertain
 in      this way3--,if a person were to
 say to you1 #8,is there1      ,gorgias1
 a false belief as well as a true8'--you
 would reply1      if ,i am not         
mistaken1 that there is4        ,gor4   
,yes4        ,soc4 ,well1 but is there a
 false knowledge as well as a      true8
        ,gor4 ,no4        ,soc4 ,no1    
indeed2 and this again proves that      
knowledge      and belief differ4       
,gor4 ,very true4        ,soc4 ,and yet 
those who have learned as well as those 
who have believed are persuaded8        
,sidenote3 ,what do we really mean      
concerning rhetoric8        ,gor4 ,just 
so4        ,soc4 ,shall we then assume  
two sorts of persuasion1--one      which
 is the source of belief without        
knowledge1 as the other      is of      
knowledge8        ,gor4 ,by all means4  
,soc4 ,and which sort of persuasion does
 rhetoric create in      courts of law  
and other assemblies about the just and 
unjust1      the sort of persuasion     

which gives belief without knowledge1   
or that which gives knowledge8          
,gor4 ,clearly1 ,socrates1 that which   
only gives belief4            #dee      
,sidenote3 ,and rhetoric is only the    
creator of a belief1 but gives no       
instruction4        ,soc4 ,then         
rhetoric1 as would appear1 is the       
artificer of a      persuasion which    
creates belief about the just and       
unjust1      but gives no instruction   
about them8        ,gor4 ,true4         
,soc4 ,and the rhetorician does not     
instruct the courts of      law or other
 assemblies about things just and       
unjust1 but he      creates belief about
 them2 for no one can be supposed to    
instruct such a vast multitude about    
such high matters in a      short time8 
,gor4 ,certainly not4    ,sidenote3     
,neither is the rhetorician taken into  
counsel when anything  has to be done4  
,soc4 ,come1 then1 and let us see what  
we really mean about      rhetoric2 for 
,i do not know what my own meaning is as

 yet4      ,when the assembly meets to  
elect a physician or a shipwright       
or any other craftsman1 will the        
rhetorician be taken      into counsel8 
,surely not4 ,for at every election he  
ought      to be chosen who is most     
skilled2 and1 again1 when walls         
have to be built or harbours or docks to
 be constructed1 not      the           
rhetorician but the master workman will 
advise2 or when      generals have to be
 chosen and an order of battle arranged1
      or a position taken1 then the     
military will advise and not the        
rhetoricians3 what do you say1 ,gorgias8
 ,since you profess      to be a        
rhetorician and a maker of rhetoricians1
 ,i cannot do      better than learn the
 nature of your art from you4 ,and here 
let me assure you that ,i have your     
interest in view as well      as my own4
 ,for likely enough some one or other of
 the      young men present might desire
 to become your pupil1 and in      fact 
,i see some1 and a good many too1 who   

have this wish1      but they would be  
too modest to question you4 ,and        
therefore      when you are interrogated
 by me1 ,i would have you      imagine  
that you are interrogated by them4      
#8,what is the      use of coming to    
you1 ,gorgias8' they will say--#8about  
what      will you teach us to advise   
the state8--about the just and          
unjust only1 or about those other things
 also which ,socrates      has just     
mentioned8' ,how will you answer them8  
,sidenote3 ,gorgias and his brother     
,herodicus4    ,sidenote3 ,but1 says    
,gorgias1 he will persuade people to do 
it4        ,gor4 ,i like your way of    
leading us on1 ,socrates1 and ,i will   
endeavour to reveal to you the whole    
nature of rhetoric4      ,you must have 
heard1 ,i think1 that the docks and the 
walls      of the ,athenians and the    
plan of the harbour were devised      in
 accordance with the counsels1 partly of
 ,themistocles1 and      partly of      
,pericles1 and not at the suggestion of 

the builders4        ,soc4 ,such is the 
tradition1 ,gorgias1 about              
,themistocles2      and ,i myself heard 
the speech of ,pericles when he advised 
us about the middle wall4        ,gor4  
,and you will observe1 ,socrates1 that  
when a decision        #def      has to 
be given in such matters the            
rhetoricians are the      advisers2 they
 are the men who win their point4       
,soc4 ,i had that in my admiring mind1  
,gorgias1 when ,i      asked what is the
 nature of rhetoric1 which always       
appears      to me1 when ,i look at the 
matter in this way1 to be a marvel      
of greatness4    ,sidenote3 ,the        
rhetorician more than a match for a man 
of any other  profession4    ,sidenote3 
,the apology of ,gorgias4    ,sidenote3 
,his pupils may make a bad use of his   
instructions1 but he is  not to be      
blamed for this4        ,gor4 ,a marvel1
 indeed1 ,socrates1 if you only knew how
      rhetoric comprehends and holds    
under her sway all the      inferior    

arts4 ,let me offer you a striking      
example of this4      ,on several       
occasions ,i have been with my brother  
,herodicus      or some other physician 
to see one of his patients1 who         
would not allow the physician to give   
him medicine1 or      apply the knife or
 hot iron to him2 and ,i have persuaded 
him to do for me what he would not do   
for the physician      just by the use  
of rhetoric4 ,and ,i say that if a      
rhetorician      and a physician were to
 go to any city1 and had there to       
argue in the ,ecclesia or any other     
assembly as to which of      them should
 be elected state-physician1 the        
physician would      have no chance2 but
 he who could speak would be chosen if  
he wished2 and in a contest with a man  
of any other profession      the        
rhetorician more than any one would have
 the      power of getting himself      
chosen1 for he can speak more           
persuasively to the multitude than any  
of them1 and on      any subject4 ,such 

is the nature and power of the art      
of rhetoric6 ,and yet1 ,socrates1       
rhetoric should be used      like any   
other competitive art1 not against      
everybody1--the      rhetorician ought  
not to abuse his strength any more than 
a pugilist or pancratiast or other      
master of fence2--because      he has   
powers which are more than a match      
either for      friend or enemy1 he     
ought not therefore to strike1 stab1 or 
slay his friends4 ,suppose a man to have
 been trained in      the palestra and  
to be a skilful boxer1--he in the       
fulness of      his strength goes and   
strikes his father or mother or one of  
his familiars or friends2 but that is no
 reason why the trainers      or        
fencing-masters should be held in       
detestation or banished      from the   
city2--surely not4 ,for they taught     
their art for a      good purpose1 to be
 used against enemies and evil-doers1 in
      self-defence not in aggression1   
and others have perverted      their    

instructions1 and turned to a bad use   
their own strength     #deg      and    
skill4 ,but not on this account are the 
teachers bad1      neither is the art in
 fault1 or bad in itself2 ,i should     
rather      say that those who make a   
bad use of the art are to blame4        
,and the same argument holds good of    
rhetoric2 for the      rhetorician can  
speak against all men and upon any      
subject1--in      short1 he can persuade
 the multitude better than      any     
other man of anything which he pleases1 
but he should      not therefore seek to
 defraud the physician or any other     
artist of his reputation merely because 
he has the power2 he      ought to use  
rhetoric fairly1 as he would also use   
his athletic      powers4 ,and if after 
having become a rhetorician he makes    
a bad use of his strength and skill1 his
 instructor surely      ought not on    
that account to be held in detestation  
or      banished4 ,for he was intended  
by his teacher to make      a good use  

of his instructions1 but he abuses them4
 ,and      therefore he is the person   
who ought to be held in detestation1    
banished1 and put to death1 and not his 
instructor4    ,sidenote3 ,if ,gorgias1 
like ,socrates1 is one of those who     
rejoice in  being refuted1 he would like
 to cross-examine him2 if not1 not4     
,sidenote3 ,the inconsistency of        
,gorgias4        ,soc4 ,you1 ,gorgias1  
like myself1 have had great experience  
of disputations1 and you must have      
observed1 ,i think1 that      they do   
not always terminate in mutual          
edification1 or in the      definition  
by either party of the subjects which   
they are      discussing2 but           
disagreements are apt to arise--somebody
      says that another has not spoken  
truly or clearly2 and then      they get
 into a passion and begin to quarrel1   
both parties      conceiving that their 
opponents are arguing from personal     
feeling only and jealousy of themselves1
 not from any      interest in the      

question at issue4 ,and sometimes they  
will      go on abusing one another     
until the company at last are quite     
vexed at themselves for ever listening  
to such fellows4 ,why      do ,i say    
this8 ,why1 because ,i cannot help      
feeling that you      are now saying    
what is not quite consistent or         
accordant with      what you were saying
 at first about rhetoric4 ,and ,i am    
afraid to point this out to you1 lest   
you should think that ,i      have some 
animosity against you1 and that ,i      
speak1 not for      the sake of         
discovering the truth1 but from jealousy
 of you4      ,now if you are one of my 
sort1 ,i should like to cross-examine   
you1 but if not ,i will let you alone4  
,and what is my sort8         #deh      
you will ask4 ,i am one of those who are
 very willing to be      refuted if ,i  
say anything which is not true1 and very
 willing      to refute any one else who
 says what is not true1 and quite as    
ready to be refuted as to refute2 for ,i

 hold that this is the      greater gain
 of the two1 just as the gain is greater
 of being      cured of a very great    
evil than of curing another4 ,for ,i    
imagine that there is no evil which a   
man can endure so great      as an      
erroneous opinion about the matters of  
which we are      speaking2 and if you  
claim to be one of my sort1 let us have 
the discussion out1 but if you would    
rather have done1 no      matter2--let  
us make an end of it4        ,gor4 ,i   
should say1 ,socrates1 that ,i am quite 
the man whom      you indicate2 but1    
perhaps1 we ought to consider the       
audience1      for1 before you came1 ,i 
had already given a long exhibition1    
and if we proceed the argument may run  
on to a great length4      ,and         
therefore ,i think that we should       
consider whether we      may not be     
detaining some part of the company when 
they      are wanting to do something   
else4    ,sidenote3 ,delight of the     
audience at the prospect of an argument4

        ,chaer4 ,you hear the audience  
cheering1 ,gorgias and      ,socrates1  
which shows their desire to listen to   
you2 and for      myself1 ,heaven forbid
 that ,i should have any business on    
hand which would take me away from a    
discussion so      interesting and so   
ably maintained4        ,cal4 ,by the   
gods1 ,chaerephon1 although ,i have been
 present      at many discussions1 ,i   
doubt whether ,i was ever so much       
delighted before1 and therefore if you  
go on discoursing all      day ,i shall 
be the better pleased4        ,soc4 ,i  
may truly say1 ,callicles1 that ,i am   
willing1 if      ,gorgias is4           
,sidenote3 ,the rhetorician need only   
know appearance4        ,gor4 ,after all
 this1 ,socrates1 ,i should be disgraced
 if ,i      refused1 especially as ,i   
have promised to answer all comers2     
in accordance with the wishes of the    
company1 then1 do you      begin1 and   
ask of me any question which you like4  
,soc4 ,let me tell you then1 ,gorgias1  

what surprises me in      your words2   
though ,i dare say that you may be      
right1 and ,i      may have             
misunderstood your meaning4 ,you say    
that you      can make any man1 who will
 learn of you1 a rhetorician8           
,gor4 ,yes4        ,soc4 ,do you mean   
that you will teach him to gain the ears
      of the multitude on any subject1  
and this not by instruction      but by 
persuasion8                             
#dei        ,gor4 ,quite so4            
,sidenote3 ,the rhetorician has greater 
powers of persuasion with the mob  than 
e4 g4 the physician4        ,soc4 ,you  
were saying1 in fact1 that the          
rhetorician will      have greater      
powers of persuasion than the physician 
even      in a matter of health8        
,gor4 ,yes1 with the multitude1--that   
is4        ,soc4 ,you mean to say1 with 
the ignorant2 for with those      who   
know he cannot be supposed to have      
greater powers of      persuasion4      
,gor4 ,very true4    ,sidenote3 ,the    

more ignorant therefore will have more  
power than he who  knows4        ,soc4  
,but if he is to have more power of     
persuasion than      the physician1 he  
will have greater power than he who     
knows8        ,gor4 ,certainly4         
,soc4 ,although he is not a             
physician3--is he8        ,gor4 ,no4    
,soc4 ,and he who is not a physician    
must1 obviously1 be      ignorant of    
what the physician knows4        ,gor4  
,clearly4        ,soc4 ,then1 when the  
rhetorician is more persuasive than     
the physician1 the ignorant is more     
persuasive with the      ignorant than  
he who has knowledge8--is not that the  
inference8        ,gor4 ,in the case    
supposed3--yes4        ,soc4 ,and the   
same holds of the relation of rhetoric  
to all      the other arts2 the         
rhetorician need not know the truth     
about      things2 he has only to       
discover some way of persuading      the
 ignorant that he has more knowledge    
than those who      know8    ,sidenote3 

,the false analogy of the arts4         
,gor4 ,yes1 ,socrates1 and is not this a
 great comfort8--not      to have       
learned the other arts1 but the art of  
rhetoric only1      and yet to be in no 
way inferior to the professors of       
them8    ,sidenote3 ,and is the         
rhetorician as ignorant of good and     
evil1 just and  unjust1 as about special
 arts2 or will ,gorgias teach him these 
things  first8        ,soc4 ,whether the
 rhetorician is or is not inferior on   
this      account is a question which we
 will hereafter examine if the          
enquiry is likely to be of any service  
to us2 but ,i would      rather begin by
 asking1 whether he is or is not as     
ignorant of      the just and unjust1   
base and honourable1 good and evil1 as  
he is of medicine and the other arts2 ,i
 mean to say1 does      he really know  
anything of what is good and evil1 base 
or      honourable1 just or unjust in   
them2 or has he only a way      with the
 ignorant of persuading them that he not

 knowing is      to be esteemed to know 
more about these things than some       
one else who knows8 ,or must the pupil  
know these things      and come to you  
knowing them before he can acquire the  
art      of rhetoric8 ,if he is         
ignorant1 you who are the teacher of    
rhetoric will not teach him--it is not  
your business2 but      you will make   
him seem to the multitude to know them1 
when he does not know them2 and seem to 
be a good man1      when he is not4 ,or 
will you be unable to teach him rhetoric
        #dfj      at all1 unless he     
knows the truth of these things first8  
,what      is to be said about all this8
 ,by heaven1 ,gorgias1 ,i wish that     
you would reveal to me the power of     
rhetoric1 as you were      saying that  
you would4    ,sidenote3 ,he must be    
taught4        ,gor4 ,well1 ,socrates1  
,i suppose that if the pupil does chance
      not to know them1 he will have to 
learn of me these things as      well4  
,soc4 ,say no more1 for there you are   

right2 and so he      whom you make a   
rhetorician must either know the nature 
of the just and unjust already1 or he   
must be taught by      you4        ,gor4
 ,certainly4        ,soc4 ,well1 and is 
not he who has learned carpentering a   
carpenter8        ,gor4 ,yes4           
,soc4 ,and he who has learned music a   
musician8        ,gor4 ,yes4            
,soc4 ,and he who has learned medicine  
is a physician1 in      like manner8 ,he
 who has learned anything whatever is   
that which his knowledge makes him4     
,gor4 ,certainly4    ,sidenote3 ,the    
inconsistency of ,gorgias pointed out4  
,soc4 ,and in the same way1 he who has  
learned what is just      is just8      
,gor4 ,to be sure4    ,sidenote3 ,he who
 has learned what is just1 is admitted  
to be just and to  act justly4 ,but if  
so1 the rhetorician1 having learned what
 is just1 must  act justly1 and can     
never therefore make an ill use of      
rhetoric4        ,soc4 ,and he who is   
just may be supposed to do what is      

just8        ,gor4 ,yes4        ,soc4   
,and must not#cj the just man always    
desire to do what      is just8         
,gor4 ,that is clearly the inference4   
,soc4 ,surely1 then1 the just man will  
never consent to do      injustice8     
,gor4 ,certainly not4        ,soc4 ,and 
according to the argument the           
rhetorician must      be a just man8    
,gor4 ,yes4        ,soc4 ,and will      
therefore never be willing to do        
injustice8        ,gor4 ,clearly not4   
,soc4 ,but do you remember saying just  
now that the trainer      is not to be  
accused or banished if the pugilist     
makes a wrong      use of his pugilistic
 art2 and in like manner1 if the        
rhetorician      makes a bad and unjust 
use of his rhetoric1 that is not to be  
laid to the charge of his teacher1 who  
is not to be banished1      but the     
wrong-doer himself who made a bad use of
 his rhetoric--he      is to be         
banished--was not that said8            
,gor4 ,yes1 it was4        ,soc4 ,but   

now we are affirming that the aforesaid 
rhetorician      will never have done   
injustice at all8        ,gor4 ,true4   
,soc4 ,and at the very outset1 ,gorgias1
 it was said that      rhetoric treated 
of discourse1 not like arithmetic about 
odd      and even1 but about just and   
unjust8 ,was not this said8        ,gor4
 ,yes4    ,sidenote3 ,a change in the   
parts4        ,soc4 ,i was thinking at  
the time1 when ,i heard you saying      
so1 that rhetoric1 which is always      
discoursing about justice1      could   
not possibly be an unjust thing4 ,but   
when you added1      shortly afterwards1
 that the rhetorician might make a bad  
use      of rhetoric ,i noted with      
surprise the inconsistency into which   
#dfa      you had fallen2 and ,i said1  
that if you thought1 as ,i did1 that    
there was a gain in being refuted1 there
 would be an advantage      in going on 
with the question1 but if not1 ,i would 
leave off4      ,and in the course of   
our investigations1 as you will see     

yourself1      the rhetorician has been 
acknowledged to be incapable      of    
making an unjust use of rhetoric1 or of 
willingness to do      injustice4 ,by   
the dog1 ,gorgias1 there will be a great
 deal of      discussion1 before we get 
at the truth of all this4    ,sidenote3 
,the paradoxes of ,socrates arouse the  
ire of ,polus4        ,polus4 ,and do   
even you1 ,socrates1 seriously believe  
what      you are now saying about      
rhetoric8 ,what6 because ,gorgias       
was ashamed to deny that the rhetorician
 knew the just and      the honourable  
and the good1 and admitted that to any  
one      who came to him ignorant of    
them he could teach them1      and then 
out of this admission there arose a     
contradiction--the      thing which you 
so dearly love1 and to which not he1 but
      you1 brought the argument by your 
captious questions--do      you         
seriously believe that there is any     
truth in all this8 ,for      will any   
one ever acknowledge that he does not   

know1 or      cannot teach1 the nature  
of justice8 ,the truth is1 that there   
is great want of manners in bringing the
 argument to such a      pass4          
,sidenote3 ,socrates is willing enough  
to receive his correction1 if he  will  
only be brief4        ,soc4 ,illustrious
 ,polus1 the reason why we provide      
ourselves      with friends and children
 is1 that when we get old and           
stumble1 a younger generation may be at 
hand to set us on      our legs again in
 our words and in our actions3 and now1 
if ,i      and ,gorgias are stumbling1  
here are you who should raise us        
up2 and ,i for my part engage to retract
 any error into which      you may think
 that ,i have fallen--upon one          
condition3        ,pol4 ,what condition8
        ,soc4 ,that you contract1       
,polus1 the prolixity of speech in      
which you indulged at first4            
,sidenote3 #8,am ,i to be deprived of   
speech in a free state8'        ,pol4   
,what6 do you mean that ,i may not use  

as many      words as ,i please8        
,sidenote3 #8,am ,i to be compelled to  
listen8'    ,sidenote3 ,socrates asks   
instead of answering4        ,soc4 ,only
 to think1 my friend1 that having come  
on a visit      to ,athens1 which is the
 most free-spoken state in ,hellas1 you 
when you got there1 and you alone1      
should be deprived of the      power of 
speech--that would be hard indeed4 ,but 
then consider      my case3--shall not  
,i be very hardly used1 if1 when you    
are making a long oration1 and refusing 
to answer what you      are asked1 ,i am
 compelled to stay and listen to you1   
and may       #dfb      not go away8 ,i 
say rather1 if you have a real interest 
in the      argument1 or1 to repeat my  
former expression1 have any      desire 
to set it on its legs1 take back any    
statement which you      please2 and in 
your turn ask and answer1 like myself   
and      ,gorgias--refute and be        
refuted3 for ,i suppose that you would  
claim to know what ,gorgias knows--would

 you not8        ,pol4 ,yes4            
,soc4 ,and you1 like him1 invite any one
 to ask you about      anything which he
 pleases1 and you will know how to      
answer      him8        ,pol4 ,to be    
sure4        ,soc4 ,and now1 which will 
you do1 ask or answer8        ,pol4 ,i  
will ask2 and do you answer me1         
,socrates1 the same      question which 
,gorgias1 as you suppose1 is unable to  
answer3      ,what is rhetoric8         
,soc4 ,do you mean what sort of an art8 
,pol4 ,yes4    ,sidenote3 ,socrates in  
his answer contrives to give ,polus a   
lesson4        ,soc4 ,to say the truth1 
,polus1 it is not an art at all1 in my  
opinion4        ,pol4 ,then what1 in    
your opinion1 is rhetoric8        ,soc4 
,a thing which1 as ,i was lately reading
 in a book of      yours1 you say       
created art4        ,pol4 ,what thing8  
,soc4 ,i should say a sort of           
experience4        ,pol4 ,does rhetoric 
seem to you to be an experience8        
,soc4 ,that is my view1 but you may be  

of another mind4        ,pol4 ,an       
experience in what8        ,soc4 ,an    
experience in producing a sort of       
delight and      gratification4         
,pol4 ,and if able to gratify others1   
must not rhetoric be      a fine thing8 
,soc4 ,what are you saying1 ,polus8 ,why
 do you ask me      whether rhetoric is 
a fine thing or not1 when ,i have not as
      yet told you what rhetoric is8    
,pol4 ,did ,i not hear you say that     
rhetoric was a sort of      experience8 
,soc4 ,will you1 who are so desirous to 
gratify others1 afford      a slight    
gratification to me8        ,pol4 ,i    
will4        ,soc4 ,will you ask me1    
what sort of an art is cookery8         
,pol4 ,what sort of an art is cookery8  
,sidenote3 ,once more1 #8,what is       
rhetoric8'        ,soc4 ,not an art at  
all1 ,polus4        ,pol4 ,what then8   
,soc4 ,i should say an experience4      
,pol4 ,in what8 ,i wish that you would  
explain to me4    ,sidenote3 ,he puts   
rhetoric and cookery in the same class2 

and that class  is flattery4            
,soc4 ,an experience in producing a sort
 of delight and      gratification1     
,polus4        ,pol4 ,then are cookery  
and rhetoric the same8        ,soc4 ,no1
 they are only different parts of the   
same profession4        ,pol4 ,of what  
profession8        ,soc4 ,i am afraid   
that the truth may seem discourteous2   
and ,i hesitate to answer1 lest ,gorgias
 should imagine that      ,i am making  
fun of his own profession4 ,for whether 
or      no this is that art of rhetoric 
which ,gorgias practises ,i             
#dfc      really cannot tell3--from what
 he was just now saying1      nothing   
appeared of what he thought of his art1 
but the      rhetoric which ,i mean is a
 part of a not very creditable          
whole4        ,gor4 ,a part of what1    
,socrates8 ,say what you mean1 and      
never mind me4        ,soc4 ,in my      
opinion then1 ,gorgias1 the whole of    
which      rhetoric is a part is not an 
art at all1 but the habit of a      bold

 and ready wit1 which knows how to      
manage mankind3      this habit ,i sum  
up under the word #8flattery'2 and it   
appears      to me to have many other   
parts1 one of which is cookery1         
which may seem to be an art1 but1 as ,i 
maintain1 is only an      experience or 
routine and not an art3--another part is
      rhetoric1 and the art of attiring 
and sophistry are two      others3 thus 
there are four branches1 and four       
different      things answering to them4
 ,and ,polus may ask1 if he likes1      
for he has not as yet been informed1    
what part of flattery      is rhetoric3 
he did not see that ,i had not yet      
answered him      when he proceeded to  
ask a further question3 ,whether ,i     
do not think rhetoric a fine thing8 ,but
 ,i shall not tell him      whether     
rhetoric is a fine thing or not1 until  
,i have first      answered1 #8,what is 
rhetoric8' ,for that would not be       
right1 ,polus2 but ,i shall be happy to 
answer1 if you will      ask me1 ,what  

part of flattery is rhetoric8           
,pol4 ,i will ask1 and do you answer8   
,what part of flattery      is rhetoric8
    ,sidenote3 ,shams and flatteries4   
,sidenote3 ,rhetoric is the shadow of a 
part of politics4        ,soc4 ,will you
 understand my answer8 ,rhetoric1       
according      to my view1 is the ghost 
or counterfeit of a part of             
politics4        ,pol4 ,and noble or    
ignoble8        ,soc4 ,ignoble1 ,i      
should say1 if ,i am compelled to       
answer1      for ,i call what is bad    
ignoble3--though ,i doubt whether       
you understand what ,i was saying       
before4        ,gor4 ,indeed1 ,socrates1
 ,i cannot say that ,i understand       
myself4        ,soc4 ,i do not wonder1  
,gorgias2 for ,i have not as yet        
explained myself1 and our friend ,polus1
 colt by name and      colt by nature1  
is apt to run away#ca4    ,sidenote3    
#8,but what in the world does this      
mean8'        ,gor4 ,never mind him1 but
 explain to me what you mean      by    

saying that rhetoric is the counterfeit 
of a part of politics4        ,soc4 ,i  
will try1 then1 to explain my notion of 
rhetoric1 and      if ,i am mistaken1 my
 friend ,polus shall refute me4 ,we may 
#dfd      assume the existence of bodies
 and of souls8        ,gor4 ,of course4 
,sidenote3 ,returning to first          
principles1 ,socrates assumes the       
existence  of souls and bodies which may
 or may not be in a good condition1 real
 or  apparent4        ,soc4 ,you would  
further admit that there is a good      
condition      of either of them8       
,gor4 ,yes4        ,soc4 ,which         
condition may not be really good1 but   
good      only in appearance8 ,i mean to
 say1 that there are many      persons  
who appear to be in good health1 and    
whom only      a physician or trainer   
will discern at first sight not to be in
      good health4        ,gor4 ,true4  
,soc4 ,and this applies not only to the 
body1 but also to the      soul3 in     
either there may be that which gives the

 appearance      of health and not the  
reality8        ,gor4 ,yes1 certainly4  
,sidenote3 ,to the soul corresponds the 
art of politics which has two  parts1   
legislation and justice1 and to the body
 corresponds another  nameless art of   
training which has two parts1 medicine  
and gymnastic2 and  these four have four
 shams corresponding to them4           
,sidenote3 ,rhetoric and ,sophistic4    
,soc4 ,and now ,i will endeavour to     
explain to you more      clearly what ,i
 mean3 ,the soul and body being two1    
have      two arts corresponding to     
them3 there is the art of politics      
attending on the soul2 and another art  
attending on the      body1 of which ,i 
know no single name1 but which may be   
described as having two divisions1 one  
of them gymnastic1      and the other   
medicine4 ,and in politics there is a   
legislative      part1 which answers to 
gymnastic1 as justice does to medicine2 
and the two parts run into one another1 
justice having to do      with the same 

subject as legislation1 and medicine    
with the      same subject as gymnastic1
 but with a difference4 ,now1           
seeing that there are these four arts1  
two attending on the      body and two  
on the soul for their highest good2     
flattery      knowing1 or rather        
guessing their natures1 has distributed 
herself into four shams or simulations  
of them2 she puts      on the likeness  
of some one or other of them1 and       
pretends      to be that which she      
simulates1 and having no regard for     
men's highest interests1 is ever making 
pleasure the bait of      the unwary1   
and deceiving them into the belief that 
she is      of the highest value to     
them4 ,cookery simulates the disguise   
of medicine1 and pretends to know what  
food is the      best for the body2 and 
if the physician and the cook had       
to enter into a competition in which    
children were the      judges1 or men   
who had no more sense than children1 as 
to which of them best understands the   

goodness or badness      of food1 the   
physician would be starved to death4 ,a 
flattery      ,i deem this to be and of 
an ignoble sort1 ,polus1 for to you     
#dfe      ,i am now addressing myself1  
because it aims at pleasure      without
 any thought of the best4 ,an art ,i do 
not call it1 but      only an           
experience1 because it is unable to     
explain or to give      a reason of the 
nature of its own applications4 ,and ,i 
do not      call any irrational thing an
 art2 but if you dispute my words1      
,i am prepared to argue in defence of   
them4        ,cookery1 then1 ,i maintain
 to be a flattery which takes the       
form of medicine2 and tiring1 in like   
manner1 is a flattery      which takes  
the form of gymnastic1 and is knavish1  
false1      ignoble1 illiberal1 working 
deceitfully by the help of lines1 and   
colours1 and enamels1 and garments1 and 
making men affect      a spurious beauty
 to the neglect of the true beauty which
 is      given by gymnastic4            

,sidenote3 ,the shams are cooking1      
dressing up1 sophistry1 rhetoric4       
,sidenote3 ,hard words pass between     
,polus and ,socrates4    ,sidenote3     
,socrates excuses himself for the length
 at which he has  spoken4        ,i     
would rather not be tedious1 and        
therefore ,i will only      say1 after  
the manner of the geometricians1 7for ,i
 think that      by this time you will  
be able to follow17        as tiring 3  
gymnastic 33 cookery 3 medicine2        
or rather1        as tiring 3 gymnastic 
33 sophistry 3 legislation2        and  
as cookery 3 medicine 33 rhetoric 3     
justice4        ,and this1 ,i say1 is   
the natural difference between the      
rhetorician      and the sophist1 but by
 reason of their near connection1       
they are apt to be jumbled up together1 
neither do they      know what to make  
of themselves1 nor do other men know    
what to make of them4 ,for if the body  
presided over itself1      and were not 
under the guidance of the soul1 and the 

soul      did not discern and           
discriminate between cookery and        
medicine1 but the body was made the     
judge of them1 and      the rule of     
judgment was the bodily delight which   
was given      by them1 then the word of
 ,anaxagoras1 that word with which      
you1 friend ,polus1 are so well         
acquainted1 would prevail far and       
wide3 #8,chaos' would come again1 and   
cookery1 health1 and      medicine would
 mingle in an indiscriminate mass4 ,and 
now      ,i have told you my notion of  
rhetoric1 which is1 in relation to      
the soul1 what cookery is to the body4  
,i may have been      inconsistent in   
making a long speech1 when ,i would not 
allow you to discourse at length4 ,but  
,i think that ,i may be      excused1   
because you did not understand me1 and  
could      make no use of my answer when
 ,i spoke shortly1 and therefore      ,i
 had to enter into an explanation4 ,and 
if ,i show an               #dff        
equal inability to make use of yours1 ,i

 hope that you will      speak at equal 
length2 but if ,i am able to understand 
you1      let me have the benefit of    
your brevity1 as is only fair3 ,and     
now you may do what you please with my  
answer4        ,pol4 ,what do you mean8 
do you think that rhetoric is           
flattery8        ,soc4 ,nay1 ,i said a  
part of flattery2 if at your age1       
,polus1      you cannot remember1 what  
will you do by-and-by1 when      you get
 older8        ,pol4 ,and are the good  
rhetoricians meanly regarded in         
states1 under the idea that they are    
flatterers8        ,soc4 ,is that a     
question or the beginning of a speech8  
,pol4 ,i am asking a question4          
,soc4 ,then my answer is1 that they are 
not regarded at all4    ,sidenote3      
,polus cannot be made to understand that
 rhetoricians have no  real power in a  
state1 because they do not do what they 
ultimately will1  but only what they    
think best4        ,pol4 ,how not       
regarded8 ,have they not very great     

power in states8        ,soc4 ,not if   
you mean to say that power is a good to 
the      possessor4    ,sidenote3 ,polus
 is greatly irritated by ,socrates4     
,pol4 ,and that is what ,i do mean to   
say4        ,soc4 ,then1 if so1 ,i think
 that they have the least power of      
all the citizens4        ,pol4 ,what6   
are they not like tyrants8 ,they kill   
and      despoil and exile any one whom 
they please4        ,soc4 ,by the dog1  
,polus1 ,i cannot make out at each      
deliverance      of yours1 whether you  
are giving an opinion of your      own1 
or asking a question of me4        ,pol4
 ,i am asking a question of you4        
,soc4 ,yes1 my friend1 but you ask two  
questions at once4        ,pol4 ,how two
 questions8        ,soc4 ,why1 did you  
not say just now that the rhetoricians  
are like tyrants1 and that they kill and
 despoil or exile any      one whom they
 please8        ,pol4 ,i did4           
,soc4 ,well then1 ,i say to you that    
here are two questions      in one1 and 

,i will answer both of them4 ,and ,i    
tell you1      ,polus1 that rhetoricians
 and tyrants have the least possible    
power in states1 as ,i was just now     
saying2 for they do      literally      
nothing which they will1 but only what  
they think      best4        ,pol4 ,and 
is not that a great power8        ,soc4 
,polus has already said the reverse4    
,pol4 ,said the reverse6 nay1 that is   
what ,i assert4        ,soc4 ,no1 by the
 great--what do you call him8--not you1 
for you say that great power is a good  
to him who has the      power4          
,pol4 ,i do4        ,soc4 ,and would you
 maintain that if a fool does what he   
thinks best1 this is a good1 and would  
you call this great      power8         
,pol4 ,i should not4    ,sidenote3 ,for 
a fool and a flatterer cannot know what 
is good4        ,soc4 ,then you must    
prove that the rhetorician is not a     
fool1 and that rhetoric is an art and   
not a flattery--and so        #dfg      
you will have refuted me2 but if you    

leave me unrefuted1      why1 the       
rhetoricians who do what they think best
 in states1      and the tyrants1 will  
have nothing upon which to congratulate 
themselves1 if1 as you say1 power be    
indeed a good1 admitting      at the    
same time that what is done without     
sense is an evil4        ,pol4 ,yes2 ,i 
admit that4    ,sidenote3 ,what men will
 is not what they think best4           
,soc4 ,how then can the rhetoricians or 
the tyrants have      great power in    
states1 unless ,polus can refute        
,socrates1 and      prove to him that   
they do as they will8        ,pol4 ,this
 fellow--        ,soc4 ,i say that they 
do not do as they will2--now refute     
me4        ,pol4 ,why1 have you not     
already said that they do as they       
think best8        ,soc4 ,and ,i say so 
still4        ,pol4 ,then surely they do
 as they will8        ,soc4 ,i deny it4 
,pol4 ,but they do what they think best8
        ,soc4 ,aye4        ,pol4 ,that1 
,socrates1 is monstrous and absurd4     

,soc4 ,good words1 good ,polus1 as ,i   
may say in your own      peculiar style2
 but if you have any questions to ask of
      me1 either prove that ,i am in    
error or give the answer      yourself4 
,pol4 ,very well1 ,i am willing to      
answer that ,i may know      what you   
mean4        ,soc4 ,do men appear to you
 to will that which they do1 or      to 
will that further end for the sake of   
which they do a      thing8 when they   
take medicine1 for example1 at the      
bidding      of a physician1 do they    
will the drinking of the medicine       
which is painful1 or the health for the 
sake of which they      drink8          
,pol4 ,clearly1 the health4        ,soc4
 ,and when men go on a voyage or engage 
in business1      they do not will that 
which they are doing at the time2 for   
who would desire to take the risk of a  
voyage or the trouble      of           
business8--,but they will1 to have the  
wealth for the sake      of which they  
go on a voyage4        ,pol4 ,certainly4

    ,sidenote3 ,a man cannot will unless
 he knows the ultimate good for the     
sake of which he acts4        ,soc4 ,and
 is not this universally true8 ,if a man
 does      something for the sake of    
something else1 he wills not that       
which he does1 but that for the sake of 
which he does it4        ,pol4 ,yes4    
,soc4 ,and are not all things either    
good or evil1 or intermediate      and  
indifferent8        ,pol4 ,to be sure1  
,socrates4    ,sidenote3 ,good is the   
end of human action4        ,soc4       
,wisdom and health and wealth and the   
like you      would call goods1 and     
their opposites evils8        ,pol4 ,i  
should4        ,soc4 ,and the things    
which are neither good nor evil1 and    
#dfh      which partake sometimes of the
 nature of good and at other      times 
of evil1 or of neither1 are such as     
sitting1 walking1      running1 sailing2
 or1 again1 wood1 stones1 and the       
like3--these      are the things which  
you call neither good nor evil8         

,pol4 ,exactly so4        ,soc4 ,are    
these indifferent things done for the   
sake of the      good1 or the good for  
the sake of the indifferent8            
,pol4 ,clearly1 the indifferent for the 
sake of the good4        ,soc4 ,when we 
walk we walk for the sake of the good1  
and      under the idea that it is      
better to walk1 and when we stand       
we stand equally for the sake of the    
good8        ,pol4 ,yes4        ,soc4   
,and when we kill a man we kill him or  
exile him or      despoil him of his    
goods1 because1 as we think1 it will    
conduce      to our good8        ,pol4  
,certainly4        ,soc4 ,men who do any
 of these things do them for the sake   
of the good8        ,pol4 ,yes4         
,soc4 ,and did we not admit that in     
doing something for the      sake of    
something else1 we do not will those    
things which we      do1 but that other 
thing for the sake of which we do them8 
,pol4 ,most true4        ,soc4 ,then we 
do not will simply to kill a man or to  

exile      him or to despoil him of his 
goods1 but we will to do that      which
 conduces to our good1 and if the act is
 not conducive      to our good we do   
not will it2 for we will1 as you say1   
that      which is our good1 but that   
which is neither good nor evil1 or      
simply evil1 we do not will4 ,why are   
you silent1 ,polus8      ,am ,i not     
right8        ,pol4 ,you are right4     
,soc4 ,hence we may infer1 that if any  
one1 whether he be      a tyrant or a   
rhetorician1 kills another or exiles    
another or      deprives him of his     
property1 under the idea that the act is
      for his own interests when really 
not for his own interests1 he      may  
be said to do what seems best to him8   
,sidenote3 ,will is the correlative of  
good4        ,pol4 ,yes4    ,sidenote3  
,no man does what he wills who does what
 is evil4        ,soc4 ,but does he do  
what he wills if he does what is evil8  
,why do you not answer8        ,pol4    
,well1 ,i suppose not4        ,soc4     

,then if great power is a good as you   
allow1 will such      a one have great  
power in a state8        ,pol4 ,he will 
not4        ,soc4 ,then ,i was right in 
saying that a man may do what      seems
 good to him in a state1 and not have   
great power1 and      not do what he    
wills8        ,pol4 ,as though you1     
,socrates1 would not like to have the   
power of doing what seemed good to you  
in the state1 rather      than not2 you 
would not be jealous when you saw any   
one      killing or despoiling or       
imprisoning whom he pleased1      ,oh1  
no6        ,soc4 ,justly or unjustly1 do
 you mean8                              
#dfi        ,pol4 ,in either case is he 
not equally to be envied8        ,soc4  
,forbear1 ,polus6        ,pol4 ,why     
#8forbear'8        ,soc4 ,because you   
ought not to envy wretches who are not  
to be envied1 but only to pity them4    
,pol4 ,and are those of whom ,i spoke   
wretches8        ,soc4 ,yes1 certainly  
they are4    ,sidenote3 ,he who makes a 

bad use of power is not to be envied1   
but  pitied4        ,pol4 ,and so you   
think that he who slays any one whom he 
pleases1 and justly slays him1 is       
pitiable and wretched8        ,soc4 ,no1
 ,i do not say that of him3 but neither 
do ,i think      that he is to be       
envied4        ,pol4 ,were you not      
saying just now that he is wretched8    
,soc4 ,yes1 my friend1 if he killed     
another unjustly1 in which      case he 
is also to be pitied2 and he is not to  
be envied if he      killed him justly4 
,pol4 ,at any rate you will allow that  
he who is unjustly put      to death is 
wretched1 and to be pitied8        ,soc4
 ,not so much1 ,polus1 as he who kills  
him1 and not so      much as he who is  
justly killed4        ,pol4 ,how can    
that be1 ,socrates8        ,soc4 ,that  
may very well be1 inasmuch as doing     
injustice is      the greatest of evils4
        ,pol4 ,but is it the greatest8  
,is not suffering injustice a           
greater evil8    ,sidenote3 ,a paradox4 

,soc4 ,certainly not4        ,pol4 ,then
 would you rather suffer than do        
injustice8    ,sidenote3 ,better to     
suffer than to do injustice4            
,soc4 ,i should not like either1 but if 
,i must choose between      them1 ,i    
would rather suffer than do4            
,pol4 ,then you would not wish to be a  
tyrant8        ,soc4 ,not if you mean by
 tyranny what ,i mean4        ,pol4 ,i  
mean1 as ,i said before1 the power of   
doing whatever      seems good to you in
 a state1 killing1 banishing1 doing in  
all      things as you like4            
,sidenote3 ,a tyrant has no real power  
any more than a man who runs out  into  
the ,agora carrying a dagger4           
,soc4 ,well then1 illustrious friend1   
when ,i have said my      say1 do you   
reply to me4 ,suppose that ,i go into a 
crowded      ,agora1 and take a dagger  
under my arm4 ,polus1 ,i say to         
you1 ,i have just acquired rare power1  
and become a tyrant2      for if ,i     
think that any of these men whom you see

 ought to      be put to death1 the man 
whom ,i have a mind to kill is as       
good as dead2 and if ,i am disposed to  
break his head or      tear his garment1
 he will have his head broken or his    
garment      torn in an instant4 ,such  
is my great power in this city4         
,and if you do not believe me1 and ,i   
show you the dagger1      you would     
probably reply3 ,socrates1 in that sort 
of way any      one may have great      
power--he may burn any house which he   
pleases1 and the docks and triremes of  
the ,athenians1 and all      their other
 vessels1 whether public or private--but
 can you      believe that this mere    
doing as you think best is great        
power8        ,pol4 ,certainly not such 
doing as this4        ,soc4 ,but can you
 tell me why you disapprove of such a   
#dgj      power8        ,pol4 ,i can4   
,soc4 ,why then8        ,pol4 ,why1     
because he who did as you say would be  
certain      to be punished4            
,soc4 ,and punishment is an evil8       

,pol4 ,certainly4        ,soc4 ,and you 
would admit once more1 my good sir1 that
      great power is a benefit to a man 
if his actions turn out to his          
advantage1 and that this is the meaning 
of great power2 and      if not1 then   
his power is an evil and is no power4   
,but let us      look at the matter in  
another way3--do we not acknowledge     
that the things of which we were        
speaking1 the infliction of      death1 
and exile1 and the deprivation of       
property are sometimes      a good and  
sometimes not a good8    ,sidenote3 ,is 
,archelaus happy8        ,pol4          
,certainly4    ,sidenote3 ,even what we 
commonly call the evils of life may be  
goods in  disguise4        ,soc4 ,about 
that you and ,i may be supposed to      
agree8        ,pol4 ,yes4        ,soc4  
,tell me1 then1 when do you say that    
they are good      and when that they   
are evil--what principle do you lay     
down8        ,pol4 ,i would rather1     
,socrates1 that you should answer as    

well as ask that question4        ,soc4 
,well1 ,polus1 since you would rather   
have the answer      from me1 ,i say    
that they are good when they are just1  
and      evil when they are unjust4     
,pol4 ,you are hard of refutation1      
,socrates1 but might not a      child   
refute that statement8        ,soc4     
,then ,i shall be very grateful to the  
child1 and equally      grateful to you 
if you will refute me and deliver me    
from my      foolishness4 ,and ,i hope  
that refute me you will1 and not        
weary of doing good to a friend4        
,pol4 ,yes1 ,socrates1 and ,i need not  
go far or appeal to      antiquity2     
events which happened only a few days   
ago are      enough to refute you1 and  
to prove that many men who do      wrong
 are happy4        ,soc4 ,what events8  
,pol4 ,you see1 ,i presume1 that        
,archelaus the son of ,perdiccas      is
 now the ruler of ,macedonia8           
,soc4 ,at any rate ,i hear that he is4  
,pol4 ,and do you think that he is happy

 or miserable8        ,soc4 ,i cannot   
say1 ,polus1 for ,i have never had any  
acquaintance      with him4        ,pol4
 ,and cannot you tell at once1 and      
without having an      acquaintance with
 him1 whether a man is happy8           
,soc4 ,most certainly not4    ,sidenote3
 ,is the great king happy8        ,pol4 
,then clearly1 ,socrates1 you would say 
that you      did not even know whether 
the great king was a happy      man8    
,soc4 ,and ,i should speak the truth2   
for ,i do not know how      he stands in
 the matter of education and justice4   
,pol4 ,what6 and does all happiness     
consist in this8    ,sidenote3          
,certainly not1 if he is wicked4        
,soc4 ,yes1 indeed1 ,polus1 that is my  
doctrine2 the men and      women who are
 gentle and good are also happy1 as ,i  
maintain1      and the unjust and evil  
are miserable4        ,pol4 ,then1      
according to your doctrine1 the said    
,archelaus        #dga      is          
miserable8        ,soc4 ,yes1 my friend1

 if he is wicked4    ,sidenote3 ,polus  
attempts to prove the happiness of the  
unjust by the  story of ,archelaus1 who 
has lately by many crimes gained the    
throne of  ,macedonia4        ,pol4     
,that he is wicked ,i cannot deny2 for  
he had no title      at all to the      
throne which he now occupies1 he being  
only the      son of a woman who was the
 slave of ,alcetas the brother of       
,perdiccas2 he himself therefore in     
strict right was the slave      of      
,alcetas2 and if he had meant to do     
rightly he would have      remained his 
slave1 and then1 according to your      
doctrine1      he would have been happy4
 ,but now he is unspeakably             
miserable1 for he has been guilty of the
 greatest crimes3 in      the first     
place he invited his uncle and master1  
,alcetas1 to      come to him1 under the
 pretence that he would restore to      
him the throne which ,perdiccas had     
usurped1 and after      entertaining him
 and his son ,alexander1 who was his own

      cousin1 and nearly of an age with 
him1 and making them      drunk1 he     
threw them into a waggon and carried    
them off by      night1 and slew them1  
and got both of them out of the way2    
and when he had done all this wickedness
 he never discovered      that he was   
the most miserable of all men1 and was  
very far from repenting3 shall ,i tell  
you how he showed his      remorse8 he  
had a younger brother1 a child of seven 
years      old1 who was the legitimate  
son of ,perdiccas1 and to him      of   
right the kingdom belonged2 ,archelaus1 
however1 had no      mind to bring him  
up as he ought and restore the kingdom  
to      him2 that was not his notion of 
happiness2 but not long      afterwards 
he threw him into a well and drowned    
him1 and      declared to his mother    
,cleopatra that he had fallen in while  
running after a goose1 and had been     
killed4 ,and now as he      is the      
greatest criminal of all the            
,macedonians1 he may be      supposed to

 be the most miserable and not the      
happiest      of them1 and ,i dare say  
that there are many ,athenians1 and     
you would be at the head of them1 who   
would rather be any      other          
,macedonian than ,archelaus6            
,sidenote3 ,socrates sees no force in   
such arguments4    ,sidenote3 ,socrates 
alone in his opinion4        ,soc4 ,i   
praised you at first1 ,polus1 for being 
a rhetorician      rather than a        
reasoner4 ,and this1 as ,i suppose1 is  
the sort      of argument with which you
 fancy that a child might refute        
me1 and by which ,i stand refuted when  
,i say that the unjust      man is not  
happy4 ,but1 my good friend1 where is   
the      refutation8 ,i cannot admit a  
word which you have been      saying4   
,pol4 ,that is because you will not2 for
 you surely must      think as ,i do4   
,sidenote3 ,the multitude of witnesses  
are nothing to him4    ,sidenote3 ,he   
must convince his opponent and himself  
by argument4        ,soc4 ,not so1 my   

simple friend1 but because you will     
refute      me after the manner which   
rhetoricians practise in courts of      
law4 ,for there the one party think that
 they refute the      other when they   
bring forward a number of witnesses of  
good repute in proof of their           
allegations1 and their adversary        
has only a single one or none at all4   
,but this kind of proof       #dgb      
is of no value where truth is the aim2 a
 man may often be      sworn down by a  
multitude of false witnesses who have a 
great air of respectability4 ,and in    
this argument nearly      every one1    
,athenian and stranger alike1 would be  
on your      side1 if you should bring  
witnesses in disproof of my             
statement2--you      may1 if you will1  
summon ,nicias the son of               
,niceratus1 and let his brothers1 who   
gave the row of tripods      which stand
 in the precincts of ,dionysus1 come    
with him2 or      you may summon        
,aristocrates1 the son of ,scellius1 who

 is      the giver of that famous       
offering which is at ,delphi2 summon1   
if you will1 the whole house of         
,pericles1 or any other great           
,athenian family whom you choose2--they 
will all agree with      you3 ,i only am
 left alone and cannot agree1 for you do
 not      convince me2 although you     
produce many false witnesses            
against me1 in the hope of depriving me 
of my inheritance1      which is the    
truth4 ,but ,i consider that nothing    
worth speaking      of will have been   
effected by me unless ,i make you the   
one      witness of my words2 nor by    
you1 unless you make me the one         
witness of yours2 no matter about the   
rest of the world4 ,for      there are  
two ways of refutation1 one which is    
yours and that      of the world in     
general2 but mine is of another         
sort--let us      compare them1 and see 
in what they differ4 ,for1 indeed1 we   
are at issue about matters which to know
 is honourable      and not to know     

disgraceful2 to know or not to know     
happiness and misery--that is the chief 
of them4 ,and what      knowledge can be
 nobler8 or what ignorance more         
disgraceful      than this8 ,and        
therefore ,i will begin by asking       
you whether you do not think that a man 
who is unjust      and doing injustice  
can be happy1 seeing that you think     
,archelaus unjust1 and yet happy8 ,may  
,i assume this to be      your opinion8 
,sidenote3 ,a greater paradox than the  
last2        ,pol4 ,certainly4          
,sidenote3 ,according to ,polus the     
unjust man may be happy if he is        
unpunished3 ,socrates maintains that he 
is more happy1 or less unhappy1 if  he  
meets with retribution4        ,soc4    
,but ,i say that this is an             
impossibility--here is one      point   
about which we are at issue3--very good4
 ,and do you      mean to say also that 
if he meets with retribution and        
punishment      he will still be happy8 
,pol4 ,certainly not2 in that case he   

will be most miserable4        ,soc4 ,on
 the other hand1 if the unjust be not   
punished1 then1      according to you1  
he will be happy8        ,pol4 ,yes4    
,soc4 ,but in my opinion1 ,polus1 the   
unjust or doer of unjust      actions is
 miserable in any case1--more miserable1
 however1 if      he be not punished and
 does not meet with retribution1 and    
less miserable if he be punished and    
meets with retribution at      the hands
 of gods and men4                       
#dgc        ,pol4 ,you are maintaining a
 strange doctrine1 ,socrates4           
,soc4 ,i shall try to make you agree    
with me1 ,o my friend1      for as a    
friend ,i regard you4 ,then these are   
the points at      issue between us--are
 they not8 ,i was saying that to do is  
worse than to suffer injustice8         
,pol4 ,exactly so4        ,soc4 ,and you
 said the opposite8        ,pol4 ,yes4  
,soc4 ,i said also that the wicked are  
miserable1 and you refuted      me8     
,pol4 ,by ,zeus ,i did4        ,soc4 ,in

 your own opinion1 ,polus4        ,pol4 
,yes1 and ,i rather suspect that ,i was 
in the right4        ,soc4 ,you further 
said that the wrong-doer is happy if he 
be unpunished8        ,pol4 ,certainly4 
,soc4 ,and ,i affirm that he is most    
miserable1 and that those      who are  
punished are less miserable--are you    
going to refute      this proposition   
also8        ,pol4 ,a proposition which 
is harder of refutation than the        
other1 ,socrates4        ,soc4 ,say     
rather1 ,polus1 impossible2 for who can 
refute the      truth8    ,sidenote3    
which ,polus begins by laughing at2     
,sidenote3 ,what nonsense6 ,do you mean 
that the man who expires among  tortures
 is happier than the successful tyrant8 
,pol4 ,what do you mean8 ,if a man is   
detected in an      unjust attempt to   
make himself a tyrant1 and when detected
      is racked1 mutilated1 has his eyes
 burned out1 and after having      had  
all sorts of great injuries inflicted on
 him1 and having      seen his wife and 

children suffer the like1 is at last    
impaled      or tarred and burned alive1
 will he be happier than if he          
escape and become a tyrant1 and continue
 all through life      doing what he    
likes and holding the reins of          
government1 the      envy and admiration
 both of citizens and strangers8 ,is    
that      the paradox which1 as you say1
 cannot be refuted8        ,soc4 ,there 
again1 noble ,polus1 you are raising    
hobgoblins      instead of refuting me2 
just now you were calling witnesses     
against me4 ,but please to refresh my   
memory a little2 did      you say--#8in 
an unjust attempt to make himself a     
tyrant'8        ,pol4 ,yes1 ,i did4     
,sidenote3 ,neither is to be called     
happy if both are wicked4        ,soc4  
,then ,i say that neither of them will  
be happier than      the other1--neither
 he who unjustly acquires a tyranny1 nor
      he who suffers in the attempt1 for
 of two miserables one      cannot be   
the happier1 but that he who escapes and

 becomes      a tyrant is the more      
miserable of the two4 ,do you laugh1    
,polus8 ,well1 this is a new kind of    
refutation1--when any      one says     
anything1 instead of refuting him to    
laugh at him4    ,sidenote3 ,why refute 
what nobody believes8 ,ask the company4 
,pol4 ,but do you not think1 ,socrates1 
that you have been      sufficiently    
refuted1 when you say that which no     
human being      will allow8 ,ask the   
company4    ,sidenote3 ,socrates never  
could count heads4 ,this is his         
description of  one of the noblest      
actions of his life4    ,sidenote3 ,say 
rather1 why affirm what every body      
knows8        ,soc4 ,o ,polus1 ,i am not
 a public man1 and only last year1      
when my tribe were serving as ,prytanes1
 and it became my      duty as their    
president to take the votes1 there was a
 laugh at      me1 because ,i was unable
 to take them4 ,and as ,i failed        
#dgd      then1 you must not ask me to  
count the suffrages of the      company 

now2 but if1 as ,i was saying1 you have 
no better      argument than numbers1   
let me have a turn1 and do you      make
 trial of the sort of proof which1 as ,i
 think1 is required2      for ,i shall  
produce one witness only of the truth of
 my words1      and he is the person    
with whom ,i am arguing2 his suffrage ,i
      know how to take2 but with the    
many ,i have nothing to do1      and do 
not even address myself to them4 ,may ,i
 ask then      whether you will answer  
in turn and have your words put to      
the proof8 ,for ,i certainly think that 
,i and you and every      man do really 
believe1 that to do is a greater evil   
than to      suffer injustice3 and not  
to be punished than to be punished4     
,sidenote3 but ends by acknowledging the
 truth of it4        ,pol4 ,and ,i      
should say neither ,i1 nor any man3     
would you      yourself1 for example1   
suffer rather than do injustice8        
,soc4 ,yes1 and you1 too2 ,i or any man 
would4        ,pol4 ,quite the reverse2 

neither you1 nor ,i1 nor any man4       
,soc4 ,but will you answer8        ,pol4
 ,to be sure1 ,i will2 for ,i am curious
 to hear what you      can have to say4 
,sidenote3 ,polus1 while denying that to
 do injustice is worse than to  suffer1 
acknowledges it to be more disgraceful4 
,hence the shipwreck of  his argument4  
,soc4 ,tell me1 then1 and you will know1
 and let us suppose      that ,i am     
beginning at the beginning3 which of the
 two1      ,polus1 in your opinion1 is  
the worst8--to do injustice or to       
suffer8        ,pol4 ,i should say that 
suffering was worst4        ,soc4 ,and  
which is the greater disgrace8--,answer4
        ,pol4 ,to do4        ,soc4 ,and 
the greater disgrace is the greater     
evil8        ,pol4 ,certainly not4      
,soc4 ,i understand you to say1 if ,i am
 not mistaken1 that      the honourable 
is not the same as the good1 or the     
disgraceful      as the evil8           
,pol4 ,certainly not4        ,soc4 ,let 
me ask a question of you3 ,when you     

speak of      beautiful things1 such as 
bodies1 colours1 figures1 sounds1       
institutions1 do you not call them      
beautiful in reference to      some     
standard3 bodies1 for example1 are      
beautiful in proportion      as they are
 useful1 or as the sight of them gives  
pleasure      to the spectators2 can you
 give any other account of personal     
beauty8        ,pol4 ,i cannot4         
,soc4 ,and you would say of figures or  
colours generally      that they were   
beautiful1 either by reason of the      
pleasure      which they give1 or of    
their use1 or of both8        ,pol4     
,yes1 ,i should4        ,soc4 ,and you  
would call sounds and music beautiful   
for      the same reason8        ,pol4  
,i should4        ,soc4 ,laws and       
institutions also have no beauty in them
      except in so far as they are      
useful or pleasant or both8        ,pol4
 ,i think not4                          
#dge        ,soc4 ,and may not the same 
be said of the beauty of knowledge8     

,sidenote3 ,the standard of utility4    
,pol4 ,to be sure1 ,socrates2 and ,i    
very much approve of      your measuring
 beauty by the standard of pleasure and 
utility4    ,sidenote3 ,all things may  
be measured by the standard of pleasure 
and  utility or of pain and evil4       
,soc4 ,and deformity or disgrace may be 
equally measured      by the opposite   
standard of pain and evil8        ,pol4 
,certainly4        ,soc4 ,then when of  
two beautiful things one exceeds in     
beauty1 the measure of the excess is to 
be taken in one or      both of these2  
that is to say1 in pleasure or utility  
or both8        ,pol4 ,very true4       
,soc4 ,and of two deformed things1 that 
which exceeds in      deformity or      
disgrace1 exceeds either in pain or     
evil--must it      not be so8           
,pol4 ,yes4        ,soc4 ,but then      
again1 what was the observation which   
you      just now made1 about doing and 
suffering wrong8 ,did you      not say1 
that suffering wrong was more evil1 and 

doing wrong      more disgraceful8      
,pol4 ,i did4    ,sidenote3 ,if to do   
is1 as ,polus admits1 more disgraceful  
than to endure  wrong1 it must also be  
more evil4        ,soc4 ,then1 if doing 
wrong is more disgraceful than          
suffering1      the more disgraceful    
must be more painful and must           
exceed in pain or in evil or both3 does 
not that also follow8        ,pol4 ,of  
course4        ,soc4 ,first1 then1 let  
us consider whether the doing of        
injustice      exceeds the suffering in 
the consequent pain3 ,do the            
injurers suffer more than the injured8  
,pol4 ,no1 ,socrates2 certainly not4    
,soc4 ,then they do not exceed in pain8 
,pol4 ,no4        ,soc4 ,but if not in  
pain1 then not in both8        ,pol4    
,certainly not4        ,soc4 ,then they 
can only exceed in the other8           
,pol4 ,yes4        ,soc4 ,that is to    
say1 in evil8        ,pol4 ,true4       
,soc4 ,then doing injustice will have an
 excess of evil1 and      will therefore

 be a greater evil than suffering       
injustice8        ,pol4 ,clearly4       
,soc4 ,but have not you and the world   
already agreed that      to do injustice
 is more disgraceful than to suffer8    
,sidenote3 ,the two sorts of refutation4
        ,pol4 ,yes4        ,soc4 ,and   
that is now discovered to be more evil8 
,pol4 ,true4        ,soc4 ,and would you
 prefer a greater evil or a greater     
dishonour      to a less one8 ,answer1  
,polus1 and fear not2 for you      will 
come to no harm if you nobly resign     
yourself into the      healing hand of  
the argument as to a physician without  
shrinking1 and either say #8,yes' or    
#8,no' to me4        ,pol4 ,i should say
 #8,no4'        ,soc4 ,would any other  
man prefer a greater to a less evil8    
,pol4 ,no1 not according to this way of 
putting the case1      ,socrates4       
,sidenote3 ,polus is refuted out of his 
own mouth4        ,soc4 ,then ,i said   
truly1 ,polus1 that neither you1 nor ,i1
 nor      any man1 would rather do than 

suffer injustice2 for to do injustice   
is the greater evil of the two4         
,pol4 ,that is the conclusion4          
,sidenote3 ,the next question3 ,is it   
better for the guilty to suffer or  not 
to suffer punishment8        ,soc4 ,you 
see1 ,polus1 when you compare the two   
kinds of      refutations1 how unlike   
they are4 ,all men1 with the exception  
of myself1 are of your way of thinking2 
but your single      assent and witness 
are enough for me1--,i have no need of  
any        #dgf      other2 ,i take your
 suffrage1 and am regardless of the     
rest4      ,enough of this1 and now let 
us proceed to the next question2        
which is1 ,whether the greatest of evils
 to a guilty man      is to suffer      
punishment1 as you supposed1 or whether 
to      escape punishment is not a      
greater evil1 as ,i supposed4           
,consider3--,you would say that to      
suffer punishment is      another name  
for being justly corrected when you do  
wrong8        ,pol4 ,i should4          

,soc4 ,and would you not allow that all 
just things are      honourable in so   
far as they are just8 ,please to        
reflect1 and      tell me your opinion4 
,pol4 ,yes1 ,socrates1 ,i think that    
they are4        ,soc4 ,consider        
again3--,where there is an agent1 must  
there not also be a patient8            
,pol4 ,i should say so4        ,soc4    
,and will not the patient suffer that   
which the agent      does1 and will not 
the suffering have the quality of the   
action8 ,i mean1 for example1 that if a 
man strikes1 there      must be         
something which is stricken8            
,pol4 ,yes4    ,sidenote3               
,correspondence of suffering and action4
        ,soc4 ,and if the striker       
strikes violently or quickly1 that      
which is struck will be struck violently
 or quickly8        ,pol4 ,true4        
,soc4 ,and the suffering to him who is  
stricken is of the      same nature as  
the act of him who strikes8        ,pol4
 ,yes4        ,soc4 ,and if a man burns1

 there is something which is            
burned8        ,pol4 ,certainly4        
,soc4 ,and if he burns in excess or so  
as to cause pain1 the      thing burned 
will be burned in the same way8         
,pol4 ,truly4        ,soc4 ,and if he   
cuts1 the same argument holds--there    
will      be something cut8        ,pol4
 ,yes4        ,soc4 ,and if the cutting 
be great or deep or such as will        
cause pain1 the cut will be of the same 
nature8        ,pol4 ,that is evident4  
,sidenote3 ,since the affection of the  
patient answers to the act of the       
agent1 it follows that he who is        
punished justly suffers justly1 and     
therefore honourably1 and is delivered  
from the greatest of all evils1  the    
evil of the soul1 which1 being the most 
disgraceful1 is also the most  painful  
or hurtful4        ,soc4 ,then you would
 agree generally to the universal       
proposition      which ,i was just now  
asserting3 that the affection of        
the patient answers to the act of the   

agent8        ,pol4 ,i agree4           
,soc4 ,then1 as this is admitted1 let me
 ask whether being      punished is     
suffering or acting8        ,pol4       
,suffering1 ,socrates2 there can be no  
doubt of that4        ,soc4 ,and        
suffering implies an agent8        ,pol4
 ,certainly1 ,socrates2 and he is the   
punisher4        ,soc4 ,and he who      
punishes rightly1 punishes justly8      
,pol4 ,yes4        ,soc4 ,and therefore 
he acts justly8        ,pol4 ,justly4   
,soc4 ,then he who is punished and      
suffers retribution1      suffers       
justly8        ,pol4 ,that is evident4  
,soc4 ,and that which is just has been  
admitted to be      honourable8         
,pol4 ,certainly4        ,soc4 ,then the
 punisher does what is honourable1 and  
the      punished suffers what is       
honourable8        ,pol4 ,true4         
,sidenote3 ,sophistry of ,socrates4     
,soc4 ,and if what is honourable1 then  
what is good1 for the      honourable is
 either pleasant or useful8             

#dgg        ,pol4 ,certainly4           
,soc4 ,then he who is punished suffers  
what is good8        ,pol4 ,that is     
true4        ,soc4 ,then he is          
benefited8        ,pol4 ,yes4           
,soc4 ,do ,i understand you to mean what
 ,i mean by the      term #8benefited'8 
,i mean1 that if he be justly punished  
his soul is improved4        ,pol4      
,surely4        ,soc4 ,then he who is   
punished is delivered from the evil     
of his soul8        ,pol4 ,yes4         
,soc4 ,and is he not then delivered from
 the greatest evil8      ,look at the   
matter in this way3--,in respect of a   
man's      estate1 do you see any       
greater evil than poverty8        ,pol4 
,there is no greater evil4        ,soc4 
,again1 in a man's bodily frame1 you    
would say that      the evil is weakness
 and disease and deformity8        ,pol4
 ,i should4        ,soc4 ,and do you not
 imagine that the soul likewise has     
some evil of her own8        ,pol4 ,of  
course4        ,soc4 ,and this you would

 call injustice and ignorance and       
cowardice1 and the like8        ,pol4   
,certainly4        ,soc4 ,so then1 in   
mind1 body1 and estate1 which are three1
      you have pointed out three        
corresponding evils--injustice1         
disease1 poverty8        ,pol4 ,true4   
,soc4 ,and which of the evils is the    
most disgraceful8--,is      not the most
 disgraceful of them injustice1 and in  
general the      evil of the soul8      
,pol4 ,by far the most4        ,soc4    
,and if the most disgraceful1 then also 
the worst8        ,pol4 ,what do you    
mean1 ,socrates8        ,soc4 ,i mean to
 say1 that what is most disgraceful has 
been      already admitted to be most   
painful or hurtful1 or both4            
,pol4 ,certainly4    ,sidenote3 ,analogy
 of soul and body4        ,soc4 ,and now
 injustice and all evil in the soul has 
been      admitted by us to be most     
disgraceful8        ,pol4 ,it has been  
admitted4        ,soc4 ,and most        
disgraceful either because most painful 

and      causing excessive pain1 or most
 hurtful1 or both8        ,pol4         
,certainly4        ,soc4 ,and therefore 
to be unjust and intemperate1 and       
cowardly and ignorant1 is more painful  
than to be poor and      sick8          
,sidenote3 ,polus stumbles at the notion
 which he has already admitted1  that   
the evil of the soul is more painful    
than that of the body4        ,pol4     
,nay1 ,socrates2 the painfulness does   
not appear to      me to follow from    
your premises4        ,soc4 ,then1 if1  
as you would argue1 not more painful1   
the      evil of the soul is of all     
evils the most disgraceful2 and the     
excess of disgrace must be caused by    
some preternatural      greatness1 or   
extraordinary hurtfulness of the evil4  
,pol4 ,clearly4        ,soc4 ,and that  
which exceeds most in hurtfulness will  
be      the greatest of evils8          
,pol4 ,yes4        ,soc4 ,then injustice
 and intemperance1 and in general the   
depravity of the soul1 are the greatest 

of evils8        ,pol4 ,that is evident4
        ,soc4 ,now1 what art is there   
which delivers us from      poverty8    
,does not the art of making money8      
,pol4 ,yes4        ,soc4 ,and what art  
frees us from disease8 ,does not the    
art of medicine8        ,pol4 ,very     
true4        ,soc4 ,and what from vice  
and injustice8 ,if you are not          
#dgh      able to answer at once1 ask   
yourself whither we go with the         
sick1 and to whom we take them4         
,pol4 ,to the physicians1 ,socrates4    
,soc4 ,and to whom do we go with the    
unjust and intemperate8        ,pol4 ,to
 the judges1 you mean4        ,soc4     
--,who are to punish them8        ,pol4 
,yes4        ,soc4 ,and do not those who
 rightly punish others1 punish      them
 in accordance with a certain rule of   
justice8        ,pol4 ,clearly4         
,sidenote3 ,the judge and the physician4
        ,soc4 ,then the art of          
money-making frees a man from           
poverty2 medicine from disease2 and     

justice from intemperance      and      
injustice8        ,pol4 ,that is        
evident4        ,soc4 ,which1 then1 is  
the best of these three8        ,pol4   
,will you enumerate them8        ,soc4  
,money-making1 medicine1 and justice4   
,pol4 ,justice1 ,socrates1 far excels   
the two others4        ,soc4 ,and       
justice1 if the best1 gives the greatest
 pleasure or      advantage or both8    
,pol4 ,yes4        ,soc4 ,but is the    
being healed a pleasant thing1 and are  
those who are being healed pleased8     
,pol4 ,i think not4        ,soc4 ,a     
useful thing1 then8        ,pol4 ,yes4  
,sidenote3 ,punishment is the           
deliverance from evil1 and he who is    
punished1 like him who is healed1 is    
happier than he who is not punished  or 
not healed4        ,soc4 ,yes1 because  
the patient is delivered from a great   
evil2 and this is the advantage of      
enduring the pain--that      you get    
well8        ,pol4 ,certainly4          
,soc4 ,and would he be the happier man  

in his bodily condition1      who is    
healed1 or who never was out of health8 
,pol4 ,clearly he who was never out of  
health4        ,soc4 ,yes2 for happiness
 surely does not consist in being       
delivered from evils1 but in never      
having had them4        ,pol4 ,true4    
,soc4 ,and suppose the case of two      
persons who have some      evil in their
 bodies1 and that one of them is healed 
and      delivered from evil1 and       
another is not healed1 but retains      
the evil--which of them is the most     
miserable8        ,pol4 ,clearly he who 
is not healed4        ,soc4 ,and was not
 punishment said by us to be a          
deliverance      from the greatest of   
evils1 which is vice8        ,pol4      
,true4        ,soc4 ,and justice        
punishes us1 and makes us more just1 and
      is the medicine of our vice8      
,pol4 ,true4    ,sidenote3 ,happiest of 
all is he who is just2 happy in the     
second degree  he who is delivered from 
injustice by punishment1 most deluded   

and most  unhappy of all he who lives   
on1 enjoying the fruit of his crimes4   
,soc4 ,he1 then1 has the first place in 
the scale of happiness      who has     
never had vice in his soul2 for this has
 been shown      to be the greatest of  
evils4    ,sidenote3 ,the escape from   
punishment an evil4        ,pol4        
,clearly4        ,soc4 ,and he has the  
second place1 who is delivered from     
vice8        ,pol4 ,true4        ,soc4  
,that is to say1 he who receives        
admonition and      rebuke and          
punishment8        ,pol4 ,yes4          
,soc4 ,then he lives worst1 who1 having 
been unjust1 has no      deliverance    
from injustice8        ,pol4 ,certainly4
        ,soc4 ,that is1 he lives worst  
who commits the greatest            #dgi
      crimes1 and who1 being the most   
unjust of men1 succeeds in      escaping
 rebuke or correction or punishment2 and
 this1 as      you say1 has been        
accomplished by ,archelaus and other    
tyrants and rhetoricians and            

potentates#cb8        ,pol4 ,true4      
,soc4 ,may not their way of proceeding1 
my friend1 be compared      to the      
conduct of a person who is afflicted    
with the      worst of diseases and yet 
contrives not to pay the penalty to     
the physician for his sins against his  
constitution1 and will      not be      
cured1 because1 like a child1 he is     
afraid of the pain of      being burned 
or cut3--,is not that a parallel case8  
,pol4 ,yes1 truly4        ,soc4 ,he     
would seem as if he did not know the    
nature of      health and bodily vigour2
 and if we are right1 ,polus1 in our    
previous conclusions1 they are in a like
 case who strive to      evade justice1 
which they see to be painful1 but are   
blind to      the advantage which ensues
 from it1 not knowing how far      more 
miserable a companion a diseased soul is
 than a      diseased body2 a soul1 ,i  
say1 which is corrupt and unrighteous   
and unholy4 ,and hence they do all that 
they      can to avoid punishment and to

 avoid being released from      the     
greatest of evils2 they provide         
themselves with money      and friends1 
and cultivate to the utmost their powers
 of      persuasion4 ,but if we1 ,polus1
 are right1 do you see what             
follows1 or shall we draw out the       
consequences in form8        ,pol4 ,if  
you please4        ,soc4 ,is it not a   
fact that injustice1 and the doing of   
injustice1      is the greatest of      
evils8    ,sidenote3 ,the case of       
,archelaus regarded in a new light4     
,pol4 ,that is quite clear4        ,soc4
 ,and further1 that to suffer punishment
 is the way to      be released from    
this evil8        ,pol4 ,true4          
,soc4 ,and not to suffer1 is to         
perpetuate the evil8        ,pol4 ,yes4 
,soc4 ,to do wrong1 then1 is second only
 in the scale of      evils2 but to do  
wrong and not to be punished1 is first  
and      greatest of all8        ,pol4  
,that is true4    ,sidenote3 ,archelaus 
then is more miserable than his victims4

        ,soc4 ,well1 and was not this   
the point in dispute1 my      friend8   
,you deemed ,archelaus happy1 because he
 was a      very great criminal and     
unpunished3 ,i1 on the other hand1      
maintained that he or any other who like
 him has done      wrong and has not    
been punished1 is1 and ought to be1 the 
most miserable of all men2 and that the 
doer of injustice is      more miserable
 than the sufferer2 and he who escapes  
punishment1 more miserable than he who  
suffers4--,was not      that what ,i    
said8        ,pol4 ,yes4        ,soc4   
,and it has been proved to be true8     
,pol4 ,certainly4        ,soc4 ,well1   
,polus1 but if this is true1 where is   
the great use    #dhj      of rhetoric8 
,if we admit what has been just now     
said1      every man ought in every way 
to guard himself against      doing     
wrong1 for he will thereby suffer great 
evil8        ,pol4 ,true4    ,sidenote3 
,injustice1 if not removed1 will become 
the cancer of the soul4        ,soc4    

,and if he1 or any one about whom he    
cares1 does      wrong1 he ought of his 
own accord to go where he will be       
immediately punished2 he will run to the
 judge1 as he would      to the         
physician1 in order that the disease of 
injustice may      not be rendered      
chronic and become the incurable cancer 
of      the soul2 must we not allow this
 consequence1 ,polus1 if our      former
 admissions are to stand3--is any other 
inference      consistent with them8    
,pol4 ,to that1 ,socrates1 there can be 
but one answer4    ,sidenote3 ,the only 
use of rhetoric is that it enables a man
 to expose  his own injustice and to    
petition for speedy punishment4         
,sidenote3 ,of what use then is         
rhetoric8        ,soc4 ,then rhetoric is
 of no use to us1 ,polus1 in helping a  
man to excuse his own injustice1 or that
 of his parents or      friends1 or     
children or country2 but may be of use  
to any      one who holds that instead  
of excusing he ought to accuse--himself 

above all1 and in the next degree his   
family or any of      his friends who   
may be doing wrong2 he should bring to  
light the iniquity and not conceal it1  
that so the wrong-doer      may suffer  
and be made whole2 and he should even   
force      himself and others not to    
shrink1 but with closed eyes like       
brave men to let the physician operate  
with knife or searing      iron1 not    
regarding the pain1 in the hope of      
attaining the      good and the         
honourable2 let him who has done things 
worthy of stripes1 allow himself to be  
scourged1 if of bonds1      to be bound1
 if of a fine1 to be fined1 if of exile1
 to be exiled1      if of death1 to die1
 himself being the first to accuse      
himself      and his own relations1 and 
using rhetoric to this end1 that        
his and their unjust actions may be made
 manifest1 and that      they themselves
 may be delivered from injustice1 which 
is      the greatest evil4 ,then1       
,polus1 rhetoric would indeed be        

useful4 ,do you say #8,yes' or #8,no' to
 that8        ,pol4 ,to me1 ,socrates1  
what you are saying appears very        
strange1 though probably in agreement   
with your premises4        ,soc4 ,is not
 this the conclusion1 if the premises   
are not disproven8        ,pol4 ,yes2 it
 certainly is4    ,sidenote3 ,a slighter
 and secondary use of rhetoric in       
self-defence  against an enemy1 or in   
preventing the punishment of an enemy4  
,soc4 ,and from the opposite point of   
view1 if indeed it be      our duty to  
harm another1 whether an enemy or       
not--,i      except the case of         
self-defence--then ,i have to be upon my
      guard--but if my enemy injures a  
third person1 then in              #dha 
every sort of way1 by word as well as   
deed1 ,i should try to      prevent his 
being punished1 or appearing before the 
judge2      and if he appears1 ,i should
 contrive that he should escape1        
and not suffer punishment3 if he has    
stolen a sum of money1      let him keep

 what he has stolen and spend it on him 
and his1      regardless of religion and
 justice2 and if he have done           
things worthy of death1 let him not die1
 but rather be immortal      in his     
wickedness2 or1 if this is not possible1
 let him      at any rate be allowed to 
live as long as he can4 ,for such       
purposes1 ,polus1 rhetoric may be       
useful1 but is of small if of      any  
use to him who is not intending to      
commit injustice2 at      least1 there  
was no such use discovered by us in the 
previous      discussion4        ,cal4  
,tell me1 ,chaerephon1 is ,socrates in  
earnest1 or is he      joking8          
,sidenote3 ,is ,socrates in earnest8    
,sidenote3 ,callicles asks in amazement 
whether ,socrates really means what  he 
says4        ,chaer4 ,i should say1     
,callicles1 that he is in most profound 
earnest2 but you may as well ask him4   
,cal4 ,by the gods1 and ,i will4 ,tell  
me1 ,socrates1 are you      in earnest1 
or only in jest8 ,for if you are in     

earnest1 and      what you say is true1 
is not the whole of human life turned   
upside down2 and are we not doing1 as   
would appear1 in      everything the    
opposite of what we ought to be doing8  
,sidenote3 ,i am only repeating the     
words of philosophy1 whose lover ,i am4 
,for as you love the ,athenian people   
and their namesake ,demus1 so ,i have   
two loves1 philosophy and ,alcibiades4  
,sidenote3 ,the son of ,cleinias is     
inconstant1 but philosophy is ever the  
same3 she it is whom you have to refute3
 ,i am only her mouth-piece4            
,soc4 ,o ,callicles1 if there were not  
some community of feelings      among   
mankind1 however varying in different   
persons--,i      mean to say1 if every  
man's feelings were peculiar to himself 
and were not shared by the rest of his  
species--,i do not      see how we could
 ever communicate our impressions to one
      another4 ,i make this remark      
because ,i perceive that you      and ,i
 have a common feeling4 ,for we are     

lovers both1 and      both of us have   
two loves apiece3--,i am the lover of   
,alcibiades1      the son of ,cleinias1 
and of philosophy2 and you of      the  
,athenian ,demus1 and of ,demus the son 
of ,pyrilampes4      ,now1 ,i observe   
that you1 with all your cleverness1 do  
not      venture to contradict your     
favourite in any word or opinion      of
 his2 but as he changes you change1     
backwards and forwards4      ,when the  
,athenian ,demus denies anything that   
you are saying in the assembly1 you go  
over to his opinion2      and you do the
 same with ,demus1 the fair young son of
      ,pyrilampes4 ,for you have not the
 power to resist the words      and     
ideas of your loves2 and if a person    
were to express      surprise at the    
strangeness of what you say from time to
 time      when under their influence1  
you would probably reply to             
#dhb      him1 if you were honest1 that 
you cannot help saying what      your   
loves say unless they are prevented2 and

 that you can      only be silent when  
they are4 ,now you must understand      
that my words are an echo too1 and      
therefore you need not      wonder at   
me2 but if you want to silence me1      
silence philosophy1      who is my love1
 for she is always telling me what ,i   
am now telling you1 my friend2 neither  
is she capricious like      my other    
love1 for the son of ,cleinias says one 
thing to-day      and another thing     
to-morrow1 but philosophy is always     
true4      ,she is the teacher at whose 
words you are now wondering1      and   
you have heard her yourself4 ,her you   
must refute1 and      either show1 as ,i
 was saying1 that to do injustice and to
 escape      punishment is not the worst
 of all evils2 or1 if you leave her     
word unrefuted1 by the dog the god of   
,egypt1 ,i declare1 ,o      ,callicles1 
that ,callicles will never be at one    
with himself1 but      that his whole   
life will be a discord4 ,and yet1 my    
friend1 ,i      would rather that my    

lyre should be inharmonious1 and that   
there should be no music in the chorus  
which ,i provided2      aye1 or that the
 whole world should be at odds with me1 
and      oppose me1 rather than that ,i 
myself should be at odds with           
myself1 and contradict myself4          
,sidenote3 ,polus and ,callicles4       
,sidenote3 ,polus was vanquished because
 he refused to take a bold line4        
,sidenote3 ,callicles would return to   
the rule of nature in the lower  sense  
of the term4    ,sidenote3 ,convention  
was only introduced by the weak majority
 in order  to protect themselves against
 the few strong4    ,sidenote3 ,a man of
 courage would easily break down the    
guards of  convention4    ,sidenote3    
,convention and nature4    ,sidenote3 ,a
 little philosophy not a bad thing in   
youth4        ,cal4 ,o ,socrates1 you   
are a regular declaimer1 and seem to    
be running riot in the argument4 ,and   
now you are declaiming      in this way 
because ,polus has fallen into the same 

error himself of which he accused       
,gorgias3--for he said      that when   
,gorgias was asked by you1 whether1 if  
some one      came to him who wanted to 
learn rhetoric1 and did not      know   
justice1 he would teach him justice1    
,gorgias in his      modesty replied    
that he would1 because he thought that  
mankind      in general would be        
displeased if he answered #8,no2'       
and then in consequence of this         
admission1 ,gorgias was      compelled  
to contradict himself1 that being just  
the sort of      thing in which you     
delight4 ,whereupon ,polus laughed at   
you1 deservedly1 as ,i think2 but now he
 has himself fallen      into the same  
trap4 ,i cannot say very much for his   
wit      when he conceded to you that to
 do is more dishonourable      than to  
suffer injustice1 for this was the      
admission which      led to his being   
entangled by you2 and because he was    
too modest to say what he thought1 he   
had his mouth      stopped4 ,for the    

truth is1 ,socrates1 that you1 who      
pretend      to be engaged in the       
pursuit of truth1 are appealing now to  
the popular and vulgar notions of right1
 which are not natural1      but only   
conventional4 ,convention and nature are
 generally      at variance with one    
another3 and hence1 if a person is too  
modest to say what he thinks1 he is     
compelled to contradict        #dhc     
himself2 and you1 in your ingenuity     
perceiving the advantage      to be     
thereby gained1 slyly ask of him who is 
arguing conventionally      a question  
which is to be determined by the rule   
of nature2 and if he is talking of the  
rule of nature1 you slip      away to   
custom3 as1 for instance1 you did in    
this very discussion      about doing   
and suffering injustice4 ,when ,polus   
was speaking of the conventionally      
dishonourable1 you      assailed him    
from the point of view of nature2 for by
 the rule      of nature1 to suffer     
injustice is the greater disgrace       

because      the greater evil2 but      
conventionally1 to do evil is the more  
disgraceful4 ,for the suffering of      
injustice is not the part of      a man1
 but of a slave1 who indeed had better  
die than live2      since when he is    
wronged and trampled upon1 he is unable 
to help himself1 or any other about whom
 he cares4 ,the      reason1 as ,i      
conceive1 is that the makers of laws are
 the      majority who are weak2 and    
they make laws and distribute           
praises and censures with a view to     
themselves and to their      own        
interests2 and they terrify the stronger
 sort of men1 and      those who are    
able to get the better of them1 in order
 that      they may not get the better  
of them2 and they say1 that             
dishonesty is shameful and unjust2      
meaning1 by the word      injustice1 the
 desire of a man to have more than his  
neighbours2      for knowing their own  
inferiority1 ,i suspect that they       
are too glad of equality4 ,and therefore

 the endeavour to      have more than   
the many1 is conventionally said to be  
shameful      and unjust1 and is called 
injustice#cc1 whereas nature herself    
intimates that it is just for the better
 to have more than the      worse1 the  
more powerful than the weaker2 and in   
many      ways she shows1 among men as  
well as among animals1 and      indeed  
among whole cities and races1 that      
justice consists in      the superior   
ruling over and having more than the    
inferior4      ,for on what principle of
 justice did ,xerxes invade ,hellas1    
or his father the ,scythians8 7not to   
speak of numberless      other          
examples74 ,nay1 but these are the men  
who act      according to nature2 yes1  
by ,heaven1 and according to the        
law of nature3 not1 perhaps1 according  
to that artificial law1      which we   
invent and impose upon our fellows1 of  
whom we      take the best and strongest
 from their youth upwards1 and      tame
 them like young lions1--charming them  

with the sound           #dhd      of   
the voice1 and saying to them1 that with
 equality they must      be content1 and
 that the equal is the honourable and   
the just4      ,but if there were a man 
who had sufficient force1 he would      
shake off and break through1 and escape 
from all this2 he      would trample    
under foot all our formulas and spells  
and      charms1 and all our laws which 
are against nature3 the slave      would
 rise in rebellion and be lord over us1 
and the light of      natural justice   
would shine forth4 ,and this ,i take to 
be the      sentiment of ,pindar1 when  
he says in his poem1 that    ,sidenote3 
,might is right4          #8,law is the 
king of all1 of mortals as well as of   
immortals2'        this1 as he says1    
,sidenote3 ,pindar4          #8,makes   
might to be right1 doing violence with  
highest        hand2 as ,i infer from   
the deeds of ,heracles1 for without     
buying them--#8#cd        --,i do not   
remember the exact words1 but the       

meaning is1      that without buying    
them1 and without their being given to  
him1 he carried off the oxen of ,geryon1
 according to the law      of natural   
right1 and that the oxen and other      
possessions of      the weaker and      
inferior properly belong to the stronger
 and      superior4 ,and this is true1  
as you may ascertain1 if you will       
leave philosophy and go on to higher    
things3 for philosophy1      ,socrates1 
if pursued in moderation and at the     
proper age1 is      an elegant          
accomplishment1 but too much philosophy 
is the      ruin of human life4 ,even if
 a man has good parts1 still1 if he     
carries philosophy into later life1 he  
is necessarily ignorant      of all     
those things which a gentleman and a    
person of honour      ought to know2 he 
is inexperienced in the laws of the     
,state1      and in the language which  
ought to be used in the dealings      of
 man with man1 whether private or       
public1 and utterly      ignorant of the

 pleasures and desires of mankind and of
 human      character in general4 ,and  
people of this sort1 when they          
betake themselves to politics or        
business1 are as ridiculous as      ,i  
imagine the politicians to be1 when they
 make their appearance      in the arena
 of philosophy4 ,for1 as ,euripides     
says1    ,sidenote3 ,euripides4         
,sidenote3 ,philosophy not to be carried
 too far4    ,sidenote3 ,but the study  
should not be continued into later life4
          #8,every man shines in that   
and pursues that1 and devotes        the
 greatest portion of the day to that in 
which he most        excels#ce1'        
but anything in which he is inferior1 he
 avoids and depreciates1   #dhe      and
 praises the opposite from partiality to
 himself1 and      because he thinks    
that he will thus praise himself4 ,the  
true      principle is to unite them4   
,philosophy1 as a part of education1    
is an excellent thing1 and there is no  
disgrace to a man while      he is young

 in pursuing such a study2 but when he  
is more      advanced in years1 the     
thing becomes ridiculous1 and ,i feel   
towards philosophers as ,i do towards   
those who lisp and      imitate         
children4 ,for ,i love to see a little  
child1 who is not      of an age to     
speak plainly1 lisping at his play2     
there is an      appearance of grace and
 freedom in his utterance1 which is     
natural to his childish years4 ,but when
 ,i hear some small      creature       
carefully articulating its words1 ,i am 
offended2 the      sound is             
disagreeable1 and has to my ears the    
twang of slavery4      ,so when ,i hear 
a man lisping1 or see him playing like a
      child1 his behaviour appears to me
 ridiculous and unmanly      and worthy 
of stripes4 ,and ,i have the same       
feeling about      students of          
philosophy2 when ,i see a youth thus    
engaged1--the      study appears to me  
to be in character1 and becoming a      
man of a liberal education1 and him who 

neglects philosophy      ,i regard as an
 inferior man1 who will never aspire to 
anything      great or noble4 ,but if ,i
 see him continuing the study in        
later life1 and not leaving off1 ,i     
should like to beat him1      ,socrates2
 for1 as ,i was saying1 such a one1 even
 though he      have good natural parts1
 becomes effeminate4 ,he flies from     
the busy centre and the market-place1 in
 which1 as the poet      says1 men      
become distinguished2 he creeps into a  
corner for      the rest of his life1   
and talks in a whisper with three or    
four      admiring youths1 but never    
speaks out like a freeman in a          
satisfactory manner4 ,now ,i1 ,socrates1
 am very well inclined      towards you1
 and my feeling may be compared with    
that of      ,zethus towards ,amphion1  
in the play of ,euripides1 whom ,i      
was mentioning just now3 for ,i am      
disposed to say to you      much what   
,zethus said to his brother1 that you1  
,socrates1 are      careless about the  

things of which you ought to be careful2
      and that you                      
#dhf          #8,who have a soul so     
noble1 are remarkable for a puerile     
exterior2        ,neither in a court of 
justice could you state a case1 or give 
any          reason or proof1        ,or
 offer valiant counsel on another's     
behalf4'        ,and you must not be    
offended1 my dear ,socrates1 for ,i am  
speaking out of good-will towards you1  
if ,i ask whether you      are not      
ashamed of being thus defenceless2 which
 ,i affirm      to be the condition not 
of you only but of all those who will   
carry the study of philosophy too far4  
,for suppose that      some one were to 
take you1 or any one of your sort1 off  
to      prison1 declaring that you had  
done wrong when you had      done no    
wrong1 you must allow that you would not
 know      what to do3--there you would 
stand giddy and gaping1 and      not    
having a word to say2 and when you went 
up before the      ,court1 even if the  

accuser were a poor creature and not    
good      for much1 you would die if he 
were disposed to claim the      penalty 
of death4 ,and yet1 ,socrates1 what is  
the value of    ,sidenote3 ,callicles   
makes an appeal to the poets4           
#8,an art which converts a man of sense 
into a fool1'        who is helpless1   
and has no power to save either himself 
or      others1 when he is in the       
greatest danger and is going to be      
despoiled by his enemies of all his     
goods1 and has to live1      simply     
deprived of his rights of               
citizenship8--he being a      man who1  
if ,i may use the expression1 may be    
boxed on the      ears with impunity4   
,then1 my good friend1 take my advice1  
and refute no more3          #8,learn   
the philosophy of business1 and acquire 
the reputation of           wisdom4     
,but leave to others these niceties1'   
whether they are to be described as     
follies or absurdities3          #8,for 
they will only        ,give you poverty 

for the inmate of your dwelling4'       
,cease1 then1 emulating these paltry    
splitters of words1 and      emulate    
only the man of substance and honour1   
who is well      to do4    ,sidenote3   
,callicles the desired touchstone of    
,socrates4        ,soc4 ,if my soul1    
,callicles1 were made of gold1 should ,i
 not      rejoice to discover one of    
those stones with which they test       
gold1 and the very best possible one to 
which ,i might bring      my soul2 and  
if the stone and ,i agreed in approving 
of her      training1 then ,i should    
know that ,i was in a satisfactory      
state1 and that no other test was needed
 by me4        ,cal4 ,what is your      
meaning1 ,socrates8        ,soc4 ,i will
 tell you2 ,i think that ,i have found  
in you the      desired touchstone4     
,cal4 ,why8    ,sidenote3 ,the gain of  
having an adversary like ,callicles4    
,sidenote3 ,other men have not the      
knowledge or frankness or good-will     
which is required2 and they are too     

modest4 ,his sincerity is shown by his  
consistency4    ,sidenote3 ,but still he
 would ask1 ,what ,callicles means by   
the superior8        ,soc4 ,because ,i  
am sure that if you agree with me in any
      of the opinions which my soul     
forms1 ,i have at last found the        
truth indeed4 ,for ,i consider that if a
 man is to make a      complete trial of
 the good or evil of the soul1 he ought 
to        #dhg      have three          
qualities--knowledge1 good-will1        
outspokenness1      which are all       
possessed by you4 ,many whom ,i meet are
 unable      to make trial of me1       
because they are not wise as you are2   
others are wise1 but they will not tell 
me the truth1 because      they have not
 the same interest in me which you have2
      and these two strangers1 ,gorgias 
and ,polus1 are undoubtedly      wise   
men and my very good friends1 but they  
are not outspoken      enough1 and they 
are too modest4 ,why1 their      modesty
 is so great that they are driven to    

contradict themselves1      first one   
and then the other of them1 in the face 
of      a large company1 on matters of  
the highest moment4 ,but      you have  
all the qualities in which these others 
are deficient1      having received an  
excellent education2 to this many       
,athenians      can testify4 ,and you   
are my friend4 ,shall ,i tell you       
why ,i think so8 ,i know that you1      
,callicles1 and ,tisander of            
,aphidnae1 and ,andron the son of       
,androtion1 and ,nausicydes      of the 
deme of ,cholarges1 studied together3   
there were four      of you1 and ,i once
 heard you advising with one another as 
to the extent to which the pursuit of   
philosophy should be      carried1 and1 
as ,i know1 you came to the conclusion  
that the      study should not be pushed
 too much into detail4 ,you were        
cautioning one another not to be        
overwise2 you were afraid      that too 
much wisdom might unconsciously to      
yourselves be      the ruin of you4 ,and

 now when ,i hear you giving the same   
advice to me which you then gave to your
 most intimate      friends1 ,i have a  
sufficient evidence of your real        
good-will      to me4 ,and of the       
frankness of your nature and freedom    
from modesty ,i am assured by yourself1 
and the assurance      is confirmed by  
your last speech4 ,well then1 the       
inference      in the present case      
clearly is1 that if you agree with me in
      an argument about any point1 that 
point will have been      sufficiently  
tested by us1 and will not require to be
 submitted      to any further test4    
,for you could not have agreed with     
me1 either from lack of knowledge or    
from superfluity of      modesty1 nor   
yet from a desire to deceive me1 for you
 are      my friend1 as you tell me     
yourself4 ,and therefore when you       
and ,i are agreed1 the result will be   
the attainment of perfect      truth4   
,now there is no nobler enquiry1        
,callicles1 than that      which you    

censure me for making1--,what ought the 
character      of a man to be1 and what 
his pursuits1 and how far is he to      
go1 both in maturer years and in youth8 
,for be assured      that if ,i err in  
my own conduct ,i do not err            
intentionally1        #dhh      but from
 ignorance4 ,do not then desist from    
advising me1      now that you have     
begun1 until ,i have learned clearly    
what      this is which ,i am to        
practise1 and how ,i may acquire it4    
,and if you find me assenting to your   
words1 and hereafter      not doing that
 to which ,i assented1 call me #8dolt1' 
and deem      me unworthy of receiving  
further instruction4 ,once more1        
then1 tell me what you and ,pindar mean 
by natural justice3      ,do you not    
mean that the superior should take the  
property      of the inferior by force2 
that the better should rule the         
worse1 the noble have more than the     
mean8 ,am ,i not      right in my       
recollection8    ,sidenote3 ,callicles  

is drawn into a contradiction4          
,cal4 ,yes2 that is what ,i was saying1 
and so ,i still aver4        ,soc4 ,and 
do you mean by the better the same as   
the      superior8 for ,i could not make
 out what you were saying      at the   
time--whether you meant by the superior 
the stronger1      and that the weaker  
must obey the stronger1 as you seemed   
to imply when you said that great cities
 attack small ones      in accordance   
with natural right1 because they are    
superior      and stronger1 as though   
the superior and stronger and better    
were the same2 or whether the better may
 be also the inferior      and weaker1  
and the superior the worse1 or whether  
better is to be defined in the same way 
as superior3--this is      the point    
which ,i want to have cleared up4 ,are  
the superior      and better and        
stronger the same or different8         
,cal4 ,i say unequivocally that they are
 the same4    ,sidenote3 ,he means the  
better and stronger1 and therefore the  

many who  make the laws1 which are noble
 because they are made by the better4   
,soc4 ,then the many are by nature      
superior to the one1      against whom1 
as you were saying1 they make the laws8 
,cal4 ,certainly4        ,soc4 ,then the
 laws of the many are the laws of the   
superior8        ,cal4 ,very true4      
,soc4 ,then they are the laws of the    
better2 for the superior      class are 
far better1 as you were saying8         
,cal4 ,yes4        ,soc4 ,and since they
 are superior1 the laws which are made  
by them are by nature good8        ,cal4
 ,yes4    ,sidenote3 ,and the many are  
also of opinion that to do is more      
disgraceful than to suffer injustice4   
,soc4 ,and are not the many of opinion1 
as you were lately      saying1 that    
justice is equality1 and that to do is  
more           #dhi      disgraceful    
than to suffer injustice8--is that so or
 not8 ,answer1      ,callicles1 and let 
no modesty be found to come in the      
way#cf2      do the many think1 or do   

they not think thus8--,i must beg       
of you to answer1 in order that if you  
agree with me ,i may      fortify myself
 by the assent of so competent an       
authority4    ,sidenote3 ,he flounders  
impatiently4        ,cal4 ,yes2 the     
opinion of the many is what you say4    
,soc4 ,then not only custom but nature  
also affirms that      to do is more    
disgraceful than to suffer injustice1   
and that      justice is equality2 so   
that you seem to have been wrong      in
 your former assertion1 when accusing me
 you said that      nature and custom   
are opposed1 and that ,i1 knowing this1 
was dishonestly playing between them1   
appealing to custom      when the       
argument is about nature1 and to nature 
when the      argument is about custom8 
,sidenote3 #8,of course ,i don't mean   
the mob4'        ,cal4 ,this man will   
never cease talking nonsense4 ,at       
your age1 ,socrates1 are you not ashamed
 to be catching at      words and       
chuckling over some verbal slip8 do you 

not      see--have ,i not told you      
already1 that by superior ,i mean       
better3 do you imagine me to say1 that  
if a rabble of slaves      and          
nondescripts1 who are of no use except  
perhaps for      their physical         
strength1 get together1 their ipsissima 
verba      are laws8        ,soc4 ,ho6  
my philosopher1 is that your line8      
,cal4 ,certainly4        ,soc4 ,i was   
thinking1 ,callicles1 that something of 
the kind      must have been in your    
mind1 and that is why ,i repeated       
the question1--,what is the superior8 ,i
 wanted to know      clearly what you   
meant2 for you surely do not think that 
two men are better than one1 or that    
your slaves are better      than you    
because they are stronger8 ,then please 
to begin      again1 and tell me who the
 better are1 if they are not the        
stronger2 and ,i will ask you1 great    
,sir1 to be a little milder      in your
 instructions1 or ,i shall have to run  
away from you4        ,cal4 ,you are    

ironical4    ,sidenote3 ,then once      
more1--,who are the better8        ,soc4
 ,no1 by the hero ,zethus1 ,callicles1  
by whose aid you      were just now     
saying 7#dhf ,a7 many ironical things   
against      me1 ,i am not3--tell me1   
then1 whom you mean by the better8      
,cal4 ,i mean the more excellent4       
,soc4 ,do you not see that you are      
yourself using words      which have no 
meaning and that you are explaining     
nothing8--will      you tell me whether 
you mean by the better and      superior
 the wiser1 or if not1 whom8            
,sidenote3 ,callicles grows more and    
more exasperated4        ,cal4 ,most    
assuredly1 ,i do mean the wiser4        
#dij    ,sidenote3 ,the wiser3 the one  
wise among ten thousand fools1--he ought
 to  rule4        ,soc4 ,then according 
to you1 one wise man may often      be  
superior to ten thousand fools1 and he  
ought to rule      them1 and they ought 
to be his subjects1 and he ought to     
have more than they should4 ,this is    

what ,i believe that      you mean 7and 
you must not suppose that ,i am         
word-catching71      if you allow that  
the one is superior to the ten          
thousand8        ,cal4 ,yes2 that is    
what ,i mean1 and that is what ,i       
conceive      to be natural             
justice--that the better and wiser      
should rule      and have more than the 
inferior4    ,sidenote3 ,but this is    
contrary to the analogy of the other    
arts4        ,soc4 ,stop there1 and let 
me ask you what you would say      in   
this case3 ,let us suppose that we are  
all together as we      are now2 there  
are several of us1 and we have a large  
common store of meats and drinks1 and   
there are all sorts      of persons in  
our company having various degrees of   
strength      and weakness1 and one of  
us1 being a physician1 is wiser in      
the matter of food than all the rest1   
and he is probably      stronger than   
some and not so strong as others of     
us--will      he not1 being wiser1 be   

also better than we are1 and our        
superior in this matter of food8        
,cal4 ,certainly4        ,soc4 ,either1 
then1 he will have a larger share of the
 meats      and drinks1 because he is   
better1 or he will have the distribution
      of all of them by reason of his   
authority1 but he will not      expend  
or make use of a larger share of them on
 his own      person1 or if he does1 he 
will be punished2--his share will       
exceed that of some1 and be less than   
that of others1 and if      he be the   
weakest of all1 he being the best of all
 will have      the smallest share of   
all1 ,callicles3--am ,i not right1 my   
friend8    ,sidenote3 ,callicles is     
disgusted at the commonplace parallels  
of  ,socrates4        ,cal4 ,you talk   
about meats and drinks and physicians   
and      other nonsense2 ,i am not      
speaking of them4        ,soc4 ,well1   
but do you admit that the wiser is the  
better8      ,answer #8,yes' or #8,no4' 
,cal4 ,yes4        ,soc4 ,and ought not 

the better to have a larger share8      
,cal4 ,not of meats and drinks4         
,sidenote3 ,socrates grows more and more
 ironical4        ,soc4 ,i understand3  
then1 perhaps1 of coats the skilfullest 
weaver ought to have the largest coat1  
and the greatest      number of them1   
and go about clothed in the best and    
finest      of them8        ,cal4 ,fudge
 about coats6        ,soc4 ,then the    
skilfullest and best in making shoes    
ought      to have the advantage in     
shoes2 the shoemaker1 clearly1          
should walk about in the largest shoes1 
and have the greatest      number of    
them8        ,cal4 ,fudge about shoes6  
,what nonsense are you talking8         
,soc4 ,or1 if this is not your meaning1 
perhaps you would      say that the wise
 and good and true husbandman should    
actually have a larger share of seeds1  
and have as much seed      as possible  
for his own land8        ,cal4 ,how you 
go on1 always talking in the same way1  
,socrates6        ,soc4 ,yes1           

,callicles1 and also about the same     
things4             #dia        ,cal4   
,yes1 by the ,gods1 you are literally   
always talking of      cobblers and     
fullers and cooks and doctors1 as if    
this had to      do with our argument4  
,soc4 ,but why will you not tell me in  
what a man must be      superior and    
wiser in order to claim a larger share2 
will you      neither accept a          
suggestion1 nor offer one8        ,cal4 
,i have already told you4 ,in the first 
place1 ,i mean      by superiors not    
cobblers or cooks1 but wise politicians 
who      understand the administration  
of a state1 and who are not      only   
wise1 but also valiant and able to carry
 out their      designs1 and not the men
 to faint from want of soul4            
,sidenote3 ,socrates is accused of      
always saying the same things3 he       
accuses ,callicles of never saying the  
same about the same4        ,soc4 ,see  
now1 most excellent ,callicles1 how     
different my      charge against you is 

from that which you bring against me1   
for you reproach me with always saying  
the same2 but ,i reproach      you with 
never saying the same about the same    
things1 for at one time you were        
defining the better and the             
superior to be the stronger1 then again 
as the wiser1 and now      you bring    
forward a new notion2 the superior and  
the better      are now declared by you 
to be the more courageous3 ,i wish1     
my good friend1 that you would tell me1 
once for all1 whom      you affirm to be
 the better and superior1 and in what   
they      are better8    ,sidenote3 ,the
 delights of successful wickedness4     
,cal4 ,i have already told you that ,i  
mean those who are      wise and        
courageous in the administration of a   
state--they      ought to be the rulers 
of their states1 and justice consists in
      their having more than their      
subjects4        ,soc4 ,but whether     
rulers or subjects will they or will    
they      not have more than themselves1

 my friend8        ,cal4 ,what do you   
mean8        ,soc4 ,i mean that every   
man is his own ruler2 but perhaps       
you think that there is no necessity for
 him to rule himself2      he is only   
required to rule others8        ,cal4   
,what do you mean by his #8ruling over  
himself'8        ,soc4 ,a simple thing  
enough2 just what is commonly said1     
that a man should be temperate and      
master of himself1 and      ruler of his
 own pleasures and passions4            
,cal4 ,what innocence6 you mean those   
fools1--the temperate8        ,soc4     
,certainly3--any one may know that to be
 my      meaning4    ,sidenote3         
,callicles reasserts his doctrine that  
the esteem in which  virtue and justice 
are held is due only to men's fear for  
themselves4 ,no  man who has the power  
to enjoy himself practises self-control4
    ,sidenote3 ,the soul of the         
ignorant4        ,cal4 ,quite so1       
,socrates2 and they are really fools1   
for how      can a man be happy who is  

the servant of anything8 ,on      the   
contrary1 ,i plainly assert1 that he who
 would truly live      ought to allow   
his desires to wax to the uttermost1 and
 not to      chastise them2 but when    
they have grown to their greatest       
he should have courage and intelligence 
to minister to             #dib         
them and to satisfy all his longings4   
,and this ,i affirm to be      natural  
justice and nobility4 ,to this however  
the many cannot      attain2 and they   
blame the strong man because they are   
ashamed of their own weakness1 which    
they desire to conceal1      and hence  
they say that intemperance is base4 ,as 
,i      have remarked already1 they     
enslave the nobler natures1 and         
being unable to satisfy their pleasures1
 they praise temperance      and justice
 out of their own cowardice4 ,for if a  
man      had been originally the son of 
a king1 or had a nature      capable of 
acquiring an empire or a tyranny or     
sovereignty1      what could be more    

truly base or evil than temperance--to a
      man like him1 ,i say1 who might   
freely be enjoying every      good1 and 
has no one to stand in his way1 and yet 
has      admitted custom and reason and 
the opinion of other men to      be     
lords over him8--must not he be in a    
miserable plight      whom the          
reputation of justice and temperance    
hinders from      giving more to his    
friends than to his enemies1 even though
      he be a ruler in his city8 ,nay1  
,socrates1 for you profess to      be a 
votary of the truth1 and the truth is   
this3--that luxury      and intemperance
 and licence1 if they be provided with  
means1 are virtue and happiness--all the
 rest is a mere      bauble1 agreements 
contrary to nature1 foolish talk of men1
      nothing worth#cg4        ,soc4    
,there is a noble freedom1 ,callicles1  
in your way of      approaching the     
argument2 for what you say is what the  
rest of the world think1 but do not like
 to say4 ,and ,i must      beg of you to

 persevere1 that the true rule of human 
life may      become manifest4 ,tell me1
 then3--you say1 do you not1 that       
in the rightly-developed man the        
passions ought not to be                
controlled1 but that we should let them 
grow to the utmost      and somehow or  
other satisfy them1 and that this is    
virtue8        ,cal4 ,yes2 ,i do4       
,soc4 ,then those who want nothing are  
not truly said to      be happy8        
,sidenote3 ,to live without pleasure or 
passion is to be dead4    ,sidenote3    
,no2 the true death1 as ,pythagorean    
philosophy tells us1 is to  pour water  
out of a vessel full of holes into a    
colander full of holes4    ,sidenote3   
,the sound and leaky vessels4           
,cal4 ,no indeed1 for then stones and   
dead men would be      the happiest of  
all4        ,soc4 ,but surely life      
according to your view is an awful      
thing2 and indeed ,i think that         
,euripides may have been      right in  
saying1          #8,who knows if life be

 not death and death life2'        and  
that we are very likely dead2 ,i have   
heard a philosopher       #dic      say 
that at this moment we are actually     
dead1 and that the      body 77 is our  
tomb 7#ch71 and that the part of the    
soul      which is the seat of the      
desires is liable to be tossed about by 
words and blown up and down2 and some   
ingenious person1      probably a       
,sicilian or an ,italian1 playing with  
the word1      invented a tale in which 
he called the soul--because of its      
believing and make-believe nature--a    
vessel#ci1 and the ignorant      he     
called the uninitiated or leaky1 and the
 place in      the souls of the         
uninitiated in which the desires are    
seated1      being the intemperate and  
incontinent part1 he compared to      a 
vessel full of holes1 because it can    
never be satisfied4 ,he      is not of  
your way of thinking1 ,callicles1 for he
 declares1 that      of all the souls in
 ,hades1 meaning the invisible world 771

      these uninitiated or leaky persons
 are the most miserable1      and that  
they pour water into a vessel which is  
full of holes      out of a colander    
which is similarly perforated4 ,the     
colander1      as my informer assures   
me1 is the soul1 and the soul      which
 he compares to a colander is the soul  
of the ignorant1      which is likewise 
full of holes1 and therefore            
incontinent1      owing to a bad memory 
and want of faith4 ,these notions       
are strange enough1 but they show the   
principle which1 if ,i      can1 ,i     
would fain prove to you2 that you should
 change your      mind1 and1 instead of 
the intemperate and insatiate life1     
choose      that which is orderly and   
sufficient and has a due provision      
for daily needs4 ,do ,i make any        
impression on you1 and are      you     
coming over to the opinion that the     
orderly are happier      than the       
intemperate8 ,or do ,i fail to persuade 
you1 and1      however many tales ,i    

rehearse to you1 do you continue of     
the same opinion still8        ,cal4    
,the latter1 ,socrates1 is more like the
 truth4    ,sidenote3 ,the temperate man
 is the sound1 the intemperate the leaky
  vessel4        ,soc4 ,well1 ,i will   
tell you another image1 which comes out 
of the same school3--,let me request you
 to consider how      far you would     
accept this as an account of the two    
lives of      the temperate and         
intemperate in a figure3--,there are two
      men1 both of whom have a number of
 casks2 the one man      has his casks  
sound and full1 one of wine1 another of 
honey1      and a third of milk1 besides
 others filled with other liquids1      
and the streams which fill them are few 
and scanty1 and he      can only obtain 
them with a great deal of toil and      
difficulty2      but when his casks are 
once filled he has no need to feed      
them any more1 and has no further       
trouble with them or care      about    
them4 ,the other1 in like manner1 can   

procure streams1      though not without
 difficulty2 but his vessels are leaky  
and      unsound1 and night and day he  
is compelled to be filling      them1   
and if he pauses for a moment1 he is in 
an agony of          #did      pain4    
,such are their respective lives3--,and 
now would you      say that the life of 
the intemperate is happier than that of 
the temperate8 ,do ,i not convince you  
that the opposite is      the truth8    
,sidenote3 ,the life of desire and      
pleasure is not to be compared to a     
full vessel1 but to an ever-running     
stream4        ,cal4 ,you do not        
convince me1 ,socrates1 for the one who 
has filled himself has no longer any    
pleasure left2 and this1      as ,i was 
just now saying1 is the life of a stone3
 he has      neither joy nor sorrow     
after he is once filled2 but the        
pleasure      depends on the            
superabundance of the influx4           
,sidenote3 ,callicles no longer a test1 
,soc4 ,but the more you pour in1 the    

greater the waste2 and      the holes   
must be large for the liquid to escape4 
,cal4 ,certainly4        ,soc4 ,the life
 which you are now depicting is not that
 of a      dead man1 or of a stone1 but 
of a cormorant2 you mean that      he is
 to be hungering and eating8            
,cal4 ,yes4        ,soc4 ,and he is to  
be thirsting and drinking8        ,cal4 
,yes1 that is what ,i mean2 he is to    
have all his desires      about him1 and
 to be able to live happily in the      
gratification      of them4        ,soc4
 ,capital1 excellent2 go on as you have 
begun1 and      have no shame2 ,i1 too1 
must disencumber myself of shame3       
and first1 will you tell me whether you 
include itching and      scratching1    
provided you have enough of them and    
pass your      life in scratching1 in   
your notion of happiness8        ,cal4  
,what a strange being you are1          
,socrates6 a regular      mob-orator4   
,soc4 ,that was the reason1 ,callicles1 
why ,i scared ,polus      and ,gorgias1 

until they were too modest to say what  
they      thought2 but you will not be  
too modest and will not be      scared1 
for you are a brave man4 ,and now1      
answer my      question4        ,cal4 ,i
 answer1 that even the scratcher would  
live pleasantly4        ,soc4 ,and if   
pleasantly1 then also happily8          
,cal4 ,to be sure4        ,soc4 ,but    
what if the itching is not confined to  
the head8      ,shall ,i pursue the     
question8 ,and here1 ,callicles1 ,i     
would      have you consider how you    
would reply if consequences are         
pressed upon you1 especially if in the  
last resort you are      asked1 whether 
the life of a catamite is not terrible1 
foul1      miserable8 ,or would you     
venture to say1 that they too are       
happy1 if they only get enough of what  
they want8    ,sidenote3 ,callicles     
professes a virtuous indignation at the 
very mention  of the consequences of his
 own doctrine4        ,cal4 ,are you not
 ashamed1 ,socrates1 of introducing such

      topics into the argument8         
,soc4 ,well1 my fine friend1 but am ,i  
the introducer of these      topics1 or 
he who says without any qualification   
that all who      feel pleasure in      
whatever manner are happy1 and who      
admits      of no distinction between   
good and bad pleasures8 ,and ,i         
#die      would still ask1 whether you  
say that pleasure and good are      the 
same1 or whether there is some pleasure 
which is not a      good8    ,sidenote3 
because he will not say what he thinks4 
,cal4 ,well1 then1 for the sake of      
consistency1 ,i will say that      they 
are the same4        ,soc4 ,you are     
breaking the original agreement1        
,callicles1      and will no longer be a
 satisfactory companion in the search   
after truth1 if you say what is contrary
 to your real opinion4        ,cal4     
,why1 that is what you are doing too1   
,socrates4        ,soc4 ,then we are    
both doing wrong4 ,still1 my dear       
friend1      ,i would ask you to        

consider whether pleasure1 from whatever
      source derived1 is the good2 for1 
if this be true1 then the               
disagreeable consequences which have    
been darkly intimated      must follow1 
and many others4        ,cal4 ,that1    
,socrates1 is only your opinion4        
,soc4 ,and do you1 ,callicles1 seriously
 maintain what you      are saying8     
,cal4 ,indeed ,i do4        ,soc4 ,then1
 as you are in earnest1 shall we proceed
 with      the argument8        ,cal4   
,by all means#dj4    ,sidenote3         
,callicles1 having admitted that        
pleasure and good are the  same1 is led 
to make the further admission that      
pleasure and knowledge  and courage are 
different4        ,soc4 ,well1 if you   
are willing to proceed1 determine this  
question for me3--,there is something1  
,i presume1 which you      would call   
knowledge8        ,cal4 ,there is4      
,soc4 ,and were you not saying just now1
 that some courage      implied         
knowledge8        ,cal4 ,i was4         

,soc4 ,and you were speaking of courage 
and knowledge as      two things        
different from one another8        ,cal4
 ,certainly ,i was4        ,soc4 ,and   
would you say that pleasure and         
knowledge are      the same1 or not the 
same8        ,cal4 ,not the same1 ,o man
 of wisdom4        ,soc4 ,and would you 
say that courage differed from          
pleasure8        ,cal4 ,certainly4      
,soc4 ,well1 then1 let us remember that 
,callicles1 the ,acharnian1      says   
that pleasure and good are the same2 but
 that      knowledge and courage are not
 the same1 either with one      another1
 or with the good4    ,sidenote3 ,the   
law of contradiction4        ,cal4 ,and 
what does our friend ,socrates1 of      
,foxton1 say--does      he assent to    
this1 or not8        ,soc4 ,he does not 
assent2 neither will ,callicles1 when he
      sees himself truly4 ,you will     
admit1 ,i suppose1 that good and        
evil fortune are opposed to each other8 
,cal4 ,yes4        ,soc4 ,and if they   

are opposed to each other1 then1 like   
health and disease1 they exclude one    
another2 a man cannot      have them    
both1 or be without them both1 at the   
same time8        ,cal4 ,what do you    
mean8        ,soc4 ,take the case of any
 bodily affection3--a man may      have 
the complaint in his eyes which is      
called ophthalmia8        ,cal4 ,to be  
sure4                                   
#dif        ,soc4 ,but he surely cannot 
have the same eyes well and      sound  
at the same time8        ,cal4          
,certainly not4        ,soc4 ,and when  
he has got rid of his ophthalmia1 has he
 got      rid of the health of his eyes 
too8 ,is the final result1 that he      
gets rid of them both together8         
,cal4 ,certainly not4        ,soc4 ,that
 would surely be marvellous and absurd8 
,cal4 ,very4    ,sidenote3 ,a man may   
have good and evil by turns1 but not at 
the same  time4        ,soc4 ,i suppose 
that he is affected by them1 and gets   
rid of      them in turns8        ,cal4 

,yes4        ,soc4 ,and he may have     
strength and weakness in the same       
way1 by fits8        ,cal4 ,yes4        
,soc4 ,or swiftness and slowness8       
,cal4 ,certainly4        ,soc4 ,and does
 he have and not have good and          
happiness1      and their opposites1    
evil and misery1 in a similar           
alternation#da8        ,cal4 ,certainly 
he has4        ,soc4 ,if then there be  
anything which a man has and has        
not at the same time1 clearly that      
cannot be good and evil--do      we     
agree8 ,please not to answer without    
consideration4    ,sidenote3 ,the law of
 contradiction4        ,cal4 ,i entirely
 agree4        ,soc4 ,go back now to our
 former admissions4--,did you say       
that to hunger1 ,i mean the mere state  
of hunger1 was pleasant      or painful8
        ,cal4 ,i said painful1 but that 
to eat when you are hungry is           
pleasant4        ,soc4 ,i know2 but     
still the actual hunger is painful3 am  
,i      not right8        ,cal4 ,yes4   

,soc4 ,and thirst1 too1 is painful8     
,cal4 ,yes1 very4        ,soc4 ,need ,i 
adduce any more instances1 or would you 
agree that all wants or desires are     
painful8        ,cal4 ,i agree1 and     
therefore you need not adduce any more  
instances4        ,soc4 ,very good4 ,and
 you would admit that to drink1 when    
you are thirsty1 is pleasant8           
,cal4 ,yes4        ,soc4 ,and in the    
sentence which you have just uttered1   
the      word #8thirsty' implies pain8  
,cal4 ,yes4        ,soc4 ,and the word  
#8drinking' is expressive of pleasure1  
and of the satisfaction of the want8    
,cal4 ,yes4        ,soc4 ,there is      
pleasure in drinking8        ,cal4      
,certainly4        ,soc4 ,when you are  
thirsty8        ,cal4 ,yes4        ,soc4
 ,and in pain8        ,cal4 ,yes4       
,sidenote3 ,but he may have pleasure and
 pain at the same time4        ,soc4 ,do
 you see the inference3--that pleasure  
and pain are      simultaneous1 when you
 say that being thirsty1 you drink8     

,for are they not simultaneous1 and do  
they not affect at the      same time   
the same part1 whether of the soul or   
the body8--which      of them is        
affected cannot be supposed to be of any
      consequence3 ,is not this true8   
,cal4 ,it is4        ,soc4 ,you said    
also1 that no man could have good and   
evil      fortune at the same time8     
,cal4 ,yes1 ,i did4    ,sidenote3 ,the  
dialectical process        ,soc4 ,but   
you admitted1 that when in pain a man   
might also        #dig      have        
pleasure8        ,cal4 ,clearly4        
,sidenote3 ,therefore pleasure and pain 
are not the same as good and evil4      
,soc4 ,then pleasure is not the same as 
good fortune1 or      pain the same as  
evil fortune1 and therefore the good is 
not      the same as the pleasant8      
,cal4 ,i wish ,i knew1 ,socrates1 what  
your quibbling means4        ,soc4 ,you 
know1 ,callicles1 but you affect not to 
know4        ,cal4 ,well1 get on1 and   
don't keep fooling3 then you will       

know what a wiseacre you are in your    
admonition of me4        ,soc4 ,does not
 a man cease from his thirst and from   
his      pleasure in drinking at the    
same time8        ,cal4 ,i do not       
understand what you are saying4         
,gor4 ,nay1 ,callicles1 answer1 if only 
for our sakes2--we      should like to  
hear the argument out4        ,cal4     
,yes1 ,gorgias1 but ,i must complain of 
the habitual      trifling of ,socrates2
 he is always arguing about little and  
unworthy questions4        ,gor4 ,what  
matter8 ,your reputation1 ,callicles1 is
 not at      stake4 ,let ,socrates argue
 in his own fashion4        ,cal4 ,well1
 then1 ,socrates1 you shall ask these   
little peddling      questions1 since   
,gorgias wishes to have them4           
,soc4 ,i envy you1 ,callicles1 for      
having been initiated into      the     
great mysteries before you were         
initiated into the lesser4      ,i      
thought that this was not allowable4    
,but to return to our                   

argument3--,does not a man cease from   
thirsting and from      the pleasure of 
drinking at the same moment8            
,cal4 ,true4        ,soc4 ,and if he is 
hungry1 or has any other desire1 does he
      not cease from the desire and the 
pleasure at the same      moment8       
,cal4 ,very true4        ,soc4 ,then he 
ceases from pain and pleasure at the    
same      moment8        ,cal4 ,yes4    
,soc4 ,but he does not cease from good  
and evil at the same      moment1 as you
 have admitted3--do you still adhere to 
what      you said8        ,cal4 ,yes1  
,i do2 but what is the inference8       
,sidenote3 to the man of the world is   
foolishness4    ,sidenote3 ,another     
point of view4        ,soc4 ,why1 my    
friend1 the inference is that the good  
is not      the same as the pleasant1 or
 the evil the same as the painful2      
there is a cessation of pleasure and    
pain at the same moment2      but not of
 good and evil1 for they are different4 
,how then      can pleasure be the same 

as good1 or pain as evil8 ,and ,i       
would have you look at the matter in    
another light1 which      could hardly1 
,i think1 have been considered by you   
when you      identified them3 ,are not 
the good good because they have         
good present with them1 as the beautiful
 are those who have      beauty present 
with them8        ,cal4 ,yes4           
,soc4 ,and do you call the fools and    
cowards good men8      ,for you were    
saying just now that the courageous and 
the      wise are the good--would you   
not say so8        ,cal4 ,certainly4    
,soc4 ,and did you never see a foolish  
child rejoicing8        ,cal4 ,yes1 ,i  
have4        ,soc4 ,and a foolish man   
too8        ,cal4 ,yes1 certainly2 but  
what is your drift8        ,soc4        
,nothing particular1 if you will only   
answer4                #dih        ,cal4
 ,yes1 ,i have4        ,soc4 ,and did   
you ever see a sensible man rejoicing or
      sorrowing8        ,cal4 ,yes4     
,soc4 ,which rejoice and sorrow         

most--the wise or the      foolish8     
,cal4 ,they are much upon a par1 ,i     
think1 in that respect4        ,soc4    
,enough3 ,and did you ever see a coward 
in battle8        ,cal4 ,to be sure4    
,soc4 ,and which rejoiced most at the   
departure of the      enemy1 the coward 
or the brave8        ,cal4 ,i should say
 #8most' of both2 or at any rate1 they  
rejoiced      about equally4            
,soc4 ,no matter2 then the cowards1 and 
not only the brave1      rejoice8       
,cal4 ,greatly4        ,soc4 ,and the   
foolish2 so it would seem8        ,cal4 
,yes4        ,soc4 ,and are only the    
cowards pained at the approach of       
their enemies1 or are the brave also    
pained8        ,cal4 ,both are pained4  
,sidenote3 ,a far-fetched argument1     
,soc4 ,and are they equally pained8     
,cal4 ,i should imagine that the cowards
 are more pained4        ,soc4 ,and are 
they not better pleased at the enemy's  
departure8        ,cal4 ,i dare say4    
,sidenote3 ,good is in proportion to    

pleasure1 and the bad are often as  much
 or more pleased than the good4         
,soc4 ,then are the foolish and the wise
 and the cowards      and the brave all 
pleased and pained1 as you were saying1 
in      nearly equal degree2 but are the
 cowards more pleased and      pained   
than the brave8        ,cal4 ,yes4      
,soc4 ,but surely the wise and brave are
 the good1 and the      foolish and the 
cowardly are the bad8        ,cal4 ,yes4
        ,soc4 ,then the good and the bad
 are pleased and pained in      a nearly
 equal degree8        ,cal4 ,yes4       
,soc4 ,then are the good and bad good   
and bad in a nearly      equal degree1  
or have the bad the advantage both in   
good      and evil8 i4 e4 in having more
 pleasure and more pain4        ,cal4 ,i
 really do not know what you mean4      
,soc4 ,why1 do you not remember saying  
that the good were      good because    
good was present with them1 and the evil
      because evil2 and that pleasures  
were goods and pains      evils8        

,cal4 ,yes1 ,i remember4        ,soc4   
,and are not these pleasures or goods   
present to those      who rejoice--if   
they do rejoice8        ,cal4           
,certainly4        ,soc4 ,then those who
 rejoice are good when goods are        
present with them8        ,cal4 ,yes4   
,soc4 ,and those who are in pain have   
evil or sorrow present      with them8  
,cal4 ,yes4        ,soc4 ,and would you 
still say that the evil are evil by     
reason      of the presence of evil8    
,cal4 ,i should4        ,soc4 ,then     
those who rejoice are good1 and those   
who are      in pain evil8        ,cal4 
,yes4    ,sidenote3 of which ,callicles 
fails to see the drift4        ,soc4    
,the degrees of good and evil vary with 
the degrees      of pleasure and of     
pain8        ,cal4 ,yes4        ,soc4   
,have the wise man and the fool1 the    
brave and the      coward1 joy and pain 
in nearly equal degrees8 or would you   
say that the coward has more8           
,cal4 ,i should say that he has4        

,soc4 ,help me then to draw out the     
conclusion which      follows from our  
admissions2 for it is good to repeat and
      review what is good twice and     
thrice over1 as they say4               
#dii      ,both the wise man and the    
brave man we allow to be good8          
,cal4 ,yes4        ,soc4 ,and the       
foolish man and the coward to be evil8  
,cal4 ,certainly4        ,soc4 ,and he  
who has joy is good8        ,cal4 ,yes4 
,soc4 ,and he who is in pain is evil8   
,cal4 ,certainly4        ,soc4 ,the good
 and evil both have joy and pain1 but1  
perhaps1      the evil has more of them8
        ,cal4 ,yes4    ,sidenote3       
,therefore the bad man is as good as the
 good1 or perhaps even  better4         
,soc4 ,then must we not infer1 that the 
bad man is as good      and bad as the  
good1 or1 perhaps1 even better8--is not 
this a      further inference which     
follows equally with the preceding      
from the assertion that the good and the
 pleasant are the      same3--can this  

be denied1 ,callicles8        ,cal4 ,i  
have been listening and making          
admissions to you1      ,socrates2 and  
,i remark that if a person grants you   
anything      in play1 you1 like a      
child1 want to keep hold and will not   
give      it back4 ,but do you really   
suppose that ,i or any other      human 
being denies that some pleasures are    
good and others      bad8    ,sidenote3 
,socrates begins again with some obvious
 truisms4        ,soc4 ,alas1           
,callicles1 how unfair you are6 you     
certainly treat      me as if ,i were a 
child1 sometimes saying one thing1 and  
then      another1 as if you were       
meaning to deceive me4 ,and yet ,i      
thought at first that you were my       
friend1 and would not have      deceived
 me if you could have helped4 ,but ,i   
see that ,i was      mistaken2 and now  
,i suppose that ,i must make the best   
of a bad business1 as they said of old1 
and take what ,i      can get out of    
you4--,well1 then1 as ,i understand you 

to      say1 ,i may assume that some    
pleasures are good and others      evil8
    ,sidenote3 ,the unfairness of       
,callicles who1 when beaten1            
,cal4 ,yes4        ,soc4 ,the beneficial
 are good1 and the hurtful are evil8    
,cal4 ,to be sure4        ,soc4 ,and the
 beneficial are those which do some     
good1 and      the hurtful are those    
which do some evil8        ,cal4 ,yes4  
,soc4 ,take1 for example1 the bodily    
pleasures of eating and      drinking1  
which we were just now mentioning--you  
mean to      say that those which       
promote health1 or any other bodily     
excellence1      are good1 and their    
opposites evil8        ,cal4 ,certainly4
        ,soc4 ,and in the same way there
 are good pains and there      are evil 
pains8        ,cal4 ,to be sure4        
,soc4 ,and ought we not to choose and   
use the good      pleasures and pains8  
,cal4 ,certainly4        ,soc4 ,but not 
the evil8        ,cal4 ,clearly4        
,soc4 ,because1 if you remember1 ,polus 

and ,i have agreed      that all our    
actions are to be done for the sake of  
the good2--and      will you agree with 
us in saying1 that the good is the      
end of all our actions1 and that all our
 actions are to be done      for the    
sake of the good1 and not the good for  
the sake of         #ejj                
them8--will you add a third vote to our 
two8        ,cal4 ,i will4        ,soc4 
,then pleasure1 like everything else1 is
 to be sought      for the sake of that 
which is good1 and not that which is    
good      for the sake of pleasure8     
,cal4 ,to be sure4        ,soc4 ,but can
 every man choose what pleasures are    
good      and what are evil1 or must he 
have art or knowledge of them      in   
detail8        ,cal4 ,he must have art4 
,sidenote3 pretends that his answers are
 not serious4        ,soc4 ,let me now  
remind you of what ,i was saying to     
,gorgias and ,polus2 ,i was saying1 as  
you will not have forgotten1      that  
there were some processes which aim only

 at      pleasure1 and know nothing of a
 better and worse1 and there      are   
other processes which know good and     
evil4 ,and ,i      considered that      
cookery1 which ,i do not call an art1   
but only      an experience1 was of the 
former class1 which is concerned        
with pleasure1 and that the art of      
medicine was of the class      which is 
concerned with the good4 ,and now1 by   
the god of      friendship1 ,i must beg 
you1 ,callicles1 not to jest1 or to     
imagine that ,i am jesting with you2 do 
not answer at      random and contrary  
to your real opinion2--for you will     
observe      that we are arguing about  
the way of human life2 and to      a man
 who has any sense at all1 what question
 can be more      serious than          
this8--whether he should follow after   
that way      of life to which you      
exhort me1 and act what you call the    
manly part of speaking in the assembly1 
and cultivating      rhetoric1 and      
engaging in public affairs1 according to

 the      principles now in vogue2 or   
whether he should pursue the      life  
of philosophy2--and in what the latter  
way differs from      the former4 ,but  
perhaps we had better first try to      
distinguish      them1 as ,i did before1
 and when we have come to      an       
agreement that they are distinct1 we may
 proceed to consider      in what they  
differ from one another1 and which of   
them we should choose4 ,perhaps1        
however1 you do not      even now       
understand what ,i mean8        ,cal4   
,no1 ,i do not4        ,soc4 ,then ,i   
will explain myself more clearly3 seeing
 that      you and ,i have agreed that  
there is such a thing as good1      and 
that there is such a thing as pleasure1 
and that pleasure      is not the same  
as good1 and that the pursuit and       
process of      acquisition of the one1 
that is pleasure1 is different from the 
pursuit and process of acquisition of   
the other1 which is      good--,i wish  
that you would tell me whether you agree

      with me thus far or not--do you   
agree8        ,cal4 ,i do4    ,sidenote3
 ,socrates repeats his distinction      
between true arts and  flatteries or    
shams1 to which ,callicles pretends to  
give assent4    ,sidenote3 ,callicles   
grows more and more        ,soc4 ,then  
,i will proceed1 and ask whether you    
also agree      with me1 and whether you
 think that ,i spoke the truth when     
#eja      ,i further said to ,gorgias   
and ,polus that cookery in my           
opinion is only an experience1 and not  
an art at all2 and      that whereas    
medicine is an art1 and attends to the  
nature and      constitution of the     
patient1 and has principles of action   
and      reason in each case1 cookery in
 attending upon pleasure      never     
regards either the nature or reason of  
that pleasure to      which she devotes 
herself1 but goes straight to her end1  
nor      ever considers or calculates   
anything1 but works by experience       
and routine1 and just preserves the     

recollection of what she      has       
usually done when producing pleasure4   
,and first1 ,i      would have you      
consider whether ,i have proved what ,i 
was      saying1 and then whether there 
are not other similar processes         
which have to do with the soul--some of 
them processes      of art1 making a    
provision for the soul's highest        
interest--others despising the interest1
 and1 as in the      previous case1     
considering only the pleasure of the    
soul1      and how this may be acquired1
 but not considering what      pleasures
 are good or bad1 and having no other   
aim but to      afford gratification1   
whether good or bad4 ,in my opinion1    
,callicles1 there are such processes1   
and this is the sort of      thing which
 ,i term flattery1 whether concerned    
with the      body or the soul1 or      
whenever employed with a view to        
pleasure and without any consideration  
of good and evil4      ,and now ,i wish 
that you would tell me whether you agree

      with us in this notion1 or whether
 you differ4        ,cal4 ,i do not     
differ2 on the contrary1 ,i agree2 for  
in that      way ,i shall soonest bring 
the argument to an end1 and shall       
oblige my friend ,gorgias4        ,soc4 
,and is this notion true of one soul1 or
 of two or      more8        ,cal4      
,equally true of two or more4           
,soc4 ,then a man may delight a whole   
assembly1 and yet      have no regard   
for their true interests8        ,cal4  
,yes4    ,sidenote3 ,there are arts     
which delight mankind but which never   
consider  the soul's higher interest4   
,soc4 ,can you tell me the pursuits     
which delight mankind--or      rather1  
if you would prefer1 let me ask1 and do 
you      answer1 which of them belong to
 the pleasurable class1 and      which  
of them not8 ,in the first place1 what  
say you of flute-playing8      ,does not
 that appear to be an art which seeks   
only pleasure1 ,callicles1 and thinks of
 nothing else8        ,cal4 ,i assent4  

,soc4 ,and is not the same true of all  
similar arts1 as1 for      example1 the 
art of playing the lyre at festivals8   
,cal4 ,yes4        ,soc4 ,and what do   
you say of the choral art and of        
dithyrambic      poetry8--are not they  
of the same nature8 ,do you      imagine
 that ,cinesias the son of ,meles cares 
about what      will tend to the moral  
improvement of his hearers1 or about    
#ejb      what will give pleasure to the
 multitude8    ,sidenote3 impatient of  
the argument4        ,cal4 ,there can be
 no mistake about ,cinesias1 ,socrates4 
,soc4 ,and what do you say of his       
father1 ,meles the harp-player8         
,did he perform with any view to the    
good of his      hearers8 ,could he be  
said to regard even their pleasure8     
,for his singing was an infliction to   
his audience4 ,and of      harp-playing 
and dithyrambic poetry in general1 what 
would      you say8 ,have they not been 
invented wholly for the sake      of    
pleasure8        ,cal4 ,that is my      

notion of them4        ,soc4 ,and as for
 the ,muse of ,tragedy1 that solemn and 
august personage--what are her          
aspirations8 ,is all her      aim and   
desire only to give pleasure to the     
spectators1 or      does she fight      
against them and refuse to speak of     
their      pleasant vices1 and willingly
 proclaim in word and song      truths  
welcome and unwelcome8--which in your   
judgment      is her character8         
,cal4 ,there can be no doubt1 ,socrates1
 that ,tragedy has      her face turned 
towards pleasure and the gratification  
of the      audience4        ,soc4 ,and 
is not that the sort of thing1          
,callicles1 which we      were just now 
describing as flattery8        ,cal4    
,quite true4        ,soc4 ,well now1    
suppose that we strip all poetry of song
      and rhythm and metre1 there will  
remain speech#db8        ,cal4 ,to be   
sure4        ,soc4 ,and this speech is  
addressed to a crowd of people8         
,cal4 ,yes4        ,soc4 ,then poetry is

 a sort of rhetoric8        ,cal4 ,true4
        ,soc4 ,and do not the poets in  
the theatres seem to you to      be     
rhetoricians8        ,cal4 ,yes4        
,sidenote3 ,poetry is of the nature of  
flattery4        ,soc4 ,then now we have
 discovered a sort of rhetoric          
which is addressed to a crowd of men1   
women1 and children1      freemen and   
slaves4 ,and this is not much to our    
taste1 for      we have described it as 
having the nature of flattery4          
,sidenote3 ,the two sorts of rhetoric4  
,cal4 ,quite true4    ,sidenote3        
,oratory1 too1 as practised regards the 
interest of the speaker  rather than the
 good of the people4        ,soc4 ,very 
good4 ,and what do you say of that other
      rhetoric which addresses the      
,athenian assembly and the              
assemblies of freemen in other states8  
,do the rhetoricians      appear to you 
always to aim at what is best1 and do   
they      seek to improve the citizens  
by their speeches1 or are they      too1

 like the rest of mankind1 bent upon    
giving them pleasure1      forgetting   
the public good in the thought of their 
own      interest1 playing with the     
people as with children1 and trying     
to amuse them1 but never considering    
whether they are      better or worse   
for this8        ,cal4 ,i must          
distinguish4 ,there are some who have a 
real          #ejc      care of the     
public in what they say1 while others   
are such as      you describe4          
,sidenote3 ,there might be a higher     
style of oratory2 and ,callicles thinks 
that such really existed in the great   
days of old1 the days of ,miltiades  and
 ,themistocles and ,pericles4           
,soc4 ,i am contented with the admission
 that rhetoric is of      two sorts2    
one1 which is mere flattery and         
disgraceful declamation2      the other1
 which is noble and aims at the         
training and improvement of the souls of
 the citizens1 and      strives to say  
what is best1 whether welcome or        

unwelcome1      to the audience2 but    
have you ever known such a rhetoric2    
or if you have1 and can point out any   
rhetorician who is of      this stamp1  
who is he8        ,cal4 ,but1 indeed1 ,i
 am afraid that ,i cannot tell you of   
any      such among the orators who are 
at present living4        ,soc4 ,well1  
then1 can you mention any one of a      
former      generation1 who may be said 
to have improved the ,athenians1        
who found them worse and made them      
better1 from the day      that he began 
to make speeches8 for1 indeed1 ,i do not
 know      of such a man4        ,cal4  
,what6 did you never hear that          
,themistocles was a      good man1 and  
,cimon and ,miltiades and ,pericles1 who
 is      just lately dead1 and whom you 
heard yourself8    ,sidenote3 ,yet even 
these famous men had no ideal or        
standard4        ,soc4 ,yes1 ,callicles1
 they were good men1 if1 as you said at 
first1 true virtue consists only in the 
satisfaction of our own      desires and

 those of others2 but if not1 and if1 as
 we were      afterwards compelled to   
acknowledge1 the satisfaction of        
some desires makes us better1 and of    
others1 worse1 and we      ought to     
gratify the one and not the other1 and  
there is an      art in distinguishing  
them1--can you tell me of any of these  
statesmen who did distinguish them8     
,sidenote3 ,the good man1 like the good 
artist1 a lover of order4        ,cal4  
,no1 indeed1 ,i cannot4    ,sidenote3   
,some standard needed other than a man's
 interest4        ,soc4 ,yet1 surely1   
,callicles1 if you look you will find   
such      a one4 ,suppose that we just  
calmly consider whether any      of     
these was such as ,i have described4    
,will not the good      man1 who says   
whatever he says with a view to the     
best1      speak with a reference to    
some standard and not at random2        
just as all other artists1 whether the  
painter1 the builder1 the               
shipwright1 or any other look all of    

them to their own work1      and do not 
select and apply at random what they    
apply1 but      strive to give a        
definite form to it8 ,the artist        
disposes all      things in order1 and  
compels the one part to harmonize and   
#ejd      accord with the other part1   
until he has constructed a regular      
and systematic whole2 and this is true  
of all artists1 and in      the same way
 the trainers and physicians1 of whom we
 spoke      before1 give order and      
regularity to the body3 do you deny     
this8        ,cal4 ,no2 ,i am ready to  
admit it4    ,sidenote3 ,order is good1 
disorder evil1 in a ship1 in a human    
body1 in a  human soul4        ,soc4    
,then the house in which order and      
regularity prevail      is good2 that in
 which there is disorder1 evil8         
,cal4 ,yes4        ,soc4 ,and the same  
is true of a ship8        ,cal4 ,yes4   
,soc4 ,and the same may be said of the  
human body8        ,cal4 ,yes4          
,soc4 ,and what would you say of the    

soul8 ,will the good      soul be that  
in which disorder is prevalent1 or that 
in which      there is harmony and      
order8        ,cal4 ,the latter follows 
from our previous admissions4           
,soc4 ,what is the name which is given  
to the effect of      harmony and order 
in the body8        ,cal4 ,i suppose    
that you mean health and strength8      
,soc4 ,yes1 ,i do2 and what is the name 
which you      would give to the effect 
of harmony and order in the      soul8  
,try and discover a name for this as    
well as for the      other4        ,cal4
 ,why not give the name yourself1       
,socrates8        ,soc4 ,well1 if you   
had rather that ,i should1 ,i will2 and 
you shall say whether you agree with me1
 and if not1 you      shall refute and  
answer me4 #8,healthy1' as ,i conceive1 
is the      name which is given to the  
regular order of the body1      whence  
comes health and every other bodily     
excellence3 is      that true or not8   
,sidenote3 ,callicles again turns       

restive4        ,cal4 ,true4            
,sidenote3 ,from order and law spring   
temperance and justice4        ,soc4    
,and #8lawful' and #8law' are the names 
which are      given to the regular     
order and action of the soul1 and these 
make men lawful and orderly3--and so we 
have temperance      and justice3 have  
we not8        ,cal4 ,granted4          
,sidenote3 ,the true rhetorician will   
seek to implant these virtues1 to       
implant justice and take away injustice4
        ,soc4 ,and will not the true    
rhetorician who is honest and           
understands his art have his eye fixed  
upon these1 in all the      words which 
he addresses to the souls of men1 and in
 all his      actions1 both in what he  
gives and in what he takes away8        
,will not his aim be to implant justice 
in the souls of his      citizens and   
take away injustice1 to implant         
temperance and      take away           
intemperance1 to implant every virtue   
and take      away every vice8 ,do you  

not agree8        ,cal4 ,i agree4       
,soc4 ,for what use is there1           
,callicles1 in giving to the body       
of a sick man who is in a bad state of  
health a quantity of      the most      
delightful food or drink or any other   
pleasant      thing1 which may be really
 as bad for him as if you gave him      
#eje      nothing1 or even worse if     
rightly estimated4 ,is not that         
true8        ,cal4 ,i will not say ,no  
to it4    ,sidenote3 ,the body of the   
sick and the soul of the wicked must be 
chastised and improved4        ,soc4    
,for in my opinion there is no profit in
 a man's life if      his body is in an 
evil plight--in that case his life also 
is evil3      am ,i not right8          
,cal4 ,yes4        ,soc4 ,when a man is 
in health the physicians will generally 
allow him to eat when he is hungry and  
drink when he      is thirsty1 and to   
satisfy his desires as he likes1 but    
when he      is sick they hardly suffer 
him to satisfy his desires at all3      

even you will admit that8        ,cal4  
,yes4        ,soc4 ,and does not the    
same argument hold of the soul1      my 
good sir8 ,while she is in a bad state  
and is senseless      and intemperate   
and unjust and unholy1 her desires ought
 to      be controlled1 and she ought to
 be prevented from doing      anything  
which does not tend to her own          
improvement4        ,cal4 ,yes4         
,sidenote3 ,then #8,one man must do for 
two4'        ,soc4 ,such treatment will 
be better for the soul herself8         
,cal4 ,to be sure4        ,soc4 ,and to 
restrain her from her appetites is to   
chastise      her8        ,cal4 ,yes4   
,soc4 ,then restraint or chastisement is
 better for the soul      than          
intemperance or the absence of control1 
which you      were just now preferring8
        ,cal4 ,i do not understand you1 
,socrates1 and ,i wish that      you    
would ask some one who does4            
,sidenote3 ,callicles does not wish to  
be improved4        ,soc4 ,here is a    

gentleman who cannot endure to be       
improved      or to subject himself to  
that very chastisement of      which the
 argument speaks6        ,cal4 ,i do not
 heed a word of what you are saying1 and
      have only answered hitherto out of
 civility to ,gorgias4        ,soc4     
,what are we to do1 then8 ,shall we     
break off in the      middle8           
,cal4 ,you shall judge for yourself4    
,soc4 ,well1 but people say that #8a    
tale should have a head      and not    
break off in the middle1' and ,i should 
not like to      have the argument going
 about without a head#dc2 please        
then to go on a little longer1 and put  
the head on4        ,cal4 ,how          
tyrannical you are1 ,socrates6 ,i wish  
that you      and your argument would   
rest1 or that you would get some        
one else to argue with you4        ,soc4
 ,but who else is willing8--,i want to  
finish the      argument4        ,cal4  
,cannot you finish without my help1     
either talking      straight on1 or     

questioning and answering yourself8     
,sidenote3 ,recapitulation of the       
argument4        ,soc4 ,must ,i then say
 with ,epicharmus1 #8,two men spoke     
before1 but now one shall be enough'8 ,i
 suppose that there      is absolutely  
no help4 ,and if ,i am to carry on the  
enquiry      by myself1 ,i will first of
 all remark that not only ,i but all of 
us should have an ambition to know what 
is true and what is      false in this  
matter1 for the discovery of the truth  
is a common      good4 ,and now ,i will 
proceed to argue according to      my   
own notion4 ,but if any of you think    
that ,i arrive at            #ejf       
conclusions which are untrue you must   
interpose and refute      me1 for ,i do 
not speak from any knowledge of what ,i 
am      saying1 ,i am an enquirer like  
yourselves1 and therefore1 if      my   
opponent says anything which is of      
force1 ,i shall be the      first to    
agree with him4 ,i am speaking on the   
supposition      that the argument ought

 to be completed2 but if you think      
otherwise let us leave off and go our   
ways4        ,gor4 ,i think1 ,socrates1 
that we should not go our ways          
until you have completed the argument2  
and this appears to      me to be the   
wish of the rest of the company2 ,i     
myself      should very much like to    
hear what more you have to say4         
,soc4 ,i too1 ,gorgias1 should have     
liked to continue the      argument with
 ,callicles1 and then ,i might have     
given him an      #8,amphion' in return 
for his #8,zethus'#dd2 but since you1   
,callicles1      are unwilling to       
continue1 ,i hope that you will listen1 
and interrupt me if ,i seem to you to be
 in error4 ,and if you      refute me1  
,i shall not be angry with you as you   
are with me1      but ,i shall inscribe 
you as the greatest of benefactors on   
the      tablets of my soul4            
,cal4 ,my good fellow1 never mind me1   
but get on4    ,sidenote3 ,the pleasant 
not the same as the good1 and is to be  

sought  only for the sake of the good3  
and we are good when good is present in 
us1 and good is the effect of order and 
truth and art4        ,soc4 ,listen to  
me1 then1 while ,i recapitulate the     
argument3--,is      the pleasant the    
same as the good8 ,not the same4        
,callicles and ,i are agreed about that4
 ,and is the pleasant      to be pursued
 for the sake of the good8 or the good  
for the      sake of the pleasant8 ,the 
pleasant is to be pursued for the       
sake of the good4 ,and that is pleasant 
at the presence of      which we are    
pleased1 and that is good at the        
presence of      which we are good8 ,to 
be sure4 ,and we are good1 and all      
good things whatever are good when some 
virtue is present      in us or them8   
,that1 ,callicles1 is my conviction4    
,but the      virtue of each thing1     
whether body or soul1 instrument or     
creature1 when given to them in the best
 way comes to them      not by chance   
but as the result of the order and truth

 and      art which are imparted to     
them3 ,am ,i not right8 ,i maintain     
that ,i am4 ,and is not the virtue of   
each thing dependent on      order or   
arrangement8 ,yes1 ,i say4 ,and that    
which makes      a thing good is the    
proper order inhering in each thing8    
,such is my view4 ,and is not the soul  
which has an order of      her own      
better than that which has no order8    
,certainly4      ,and the soul which has
 order is orderly8 ,of course4 ,and     
that which is orderly is temperate8     
,assuredly4 ,and the             #ejg   
temperate soul is good8 ,no other answer
 can ,i give1 ,callicles      dear2 have
 you any8    ,sidenote3 ,the            
intercommunion of the virtues4          
,cal4 ,go on1 my good fellow4           
,soc4 ,then ,i shall proceed to add1    
that if the temperate      soul is the  
good soul1 the soul which is in the     
opposite      condition1 that is1 the   
foolish and intemperate1 is the bad     
soul4      ,very true4    ,sidenote3    

,the temperate soul is the good soul1   
just in relation to men1  and holy in   
relation to gods1 and is therefore      
happy2 and the intemperate  is the      
reverse of all this4    ,sidenote3 ,if  
it be admitted that virtue is happiness 
and vice misery1  then what ,socrates   
said about the use of rhetoric in       
self-accusation  turns out to be true4  
,sidenote3 ,geometry in both worlds4    
,and will not the temperate man do what 
is proper1 both in      relation to the 
gods and to men2--for he would not be   
temperate      if he did not8 ,certainly
 he will do what is proper4      ,in his
 relation to other men he will do what  
is just2 and in      his relation to the
 gods he will do what is holy2 and he   
who      does what is just and holy must
 be just and holy8 ,very      true4 ,and
 must he not be courageous8 for the duty
 of a      temperate man is not to      
follow or to avoid what he ought not1   
but what he ought1 whether things or men
 or pleasures or      pains1 and        

patiently to endure when he ought2 and  
therefore1      ,callicles1 the         
temperate man1 being1 as we have        
described1      also just and courageous
 and holy1 cannot be other than      a  
perfectly good man1 nor can the good man
 do otherwise      than well and        
perfectly whatever he does2 and he who  
does      well must of necessity be     
happy and blessed1 and the evil      man
 who does evil1 miserable3 now this     
latter is he whom      you were         
applauding--the intemperate who is the  
opposite of      the temperate4 ,such is
 my position1 and these things ,i       
affirm to be true4 ,and if they are     
true1 then ,i further affirm      that  
he who desires to be happy must pursue  
and practise      temperance and run    
away from intemperance as fast as his   
legs will carry him3 he had better order
 his life so as not to      need        
punishment2 but if either he or any of  
his friends1      whether private       
individual or city1 are in need of      

punishment1      then justice must be   
done and he must suffer punishment1 if  
he would be happy4 ,this appears to me  
to be the aim which      a man ought to 
have1 and towards which he ought to     
direct      all the energies both of    
himself and of the state1 acting so     
that he may have temperance and justice 
present with him      and be happy1 not 
suffering his lusts to be unrestrained1 
and      in the never-ending desire to  
satisfy them leading a robber's         
life4 ,such a one is the friend neither 
of ,god nor man1 for      he is         
incapable of communion1 and he who is   
incapable of      communion is also     
incapable of friendship4 ,and           
philosophers      tell us1 ,callicles1  
that communion and friendship      and  
orderliness and temperance and justice  
bind together           #ejh      heaven
 and earth and gods and men1 and that   
this universe is      therefore called  
,cosmos or order1 not disorder or       
misrule1      my friend4 ,but although  

you are a philosopher you seem to       
me never to have observed that          
geometrical equality is      mighty1    
both among gods and men2 you think that 
you ought      to cultivate inequality  
or excess1 and do not care about        
geometry4--,well1 then1 either the      
principle that the happy      are made  
happy by the possession of justice and  
temperance1      and the miserable      
miserable by the possession of vice1    
must      be refuted1 or1 if it is      
granted1 what will be the consequences8 
,all the consequences which ,i drew     
before1 ,callicles1 and      about which
 you asked me whether ,i was in earnest 
when ,i      said that a man ought to   
accuse himself and his son and his      
friend if he did anything wrong1 and    
that to this end he      should use his 
rhetoric--all those consequences are    
true4      ,and that which you thought  
that ,polus was led to admit out      of
 modesty is true1 viz4 that1 to do      
injustice1 if more disgraceful      than

 to suffer1 is in that degree worse2 and
 the other      position1 which1        
according to ,polus1 ,gorgias admitted  
out of      modesty1 that he who would  
truly be a rhetorician ought to      be 
just and have a knowledge of justice1   
has also turned out      to be true4    
,sidenote3 ,the paradoxes are proven4   
,sidenote3 ,the greatest evil to do     
injustice1 but there is a greater       
still1 not to be punished for doing     
injustice4        ,and now1 these things
 being as we have said1 let us          
proceed in the next place to consider   
whether you are right      in throwing  
in my teeth that ,i am unable to help   
myself      or any of my friends or     
kinsmen1 or to save them in the         
extremity of danger1 and that ,i am in  
the power of another      like an outlaw
 to whom any one may do what he         
likes1--he      may box my ears1 which  
was a brave saying of yours2 or         
take away my goods or banish me1 or even
 do his worst and      kill me2 a       

condition which1 as you say1 is the     
height of      disgrace4 ,my answer to  
you is one which has been already       
often repeated1 but may as well be      
repeated once more4 ,i      tell you1   
,callicles1 that to be boxed on the ears
 wrongfully is      not the worst evil  
which can befall a man1 nor to have my  
purse or my body cut open1 but that to  
smite and slay me      and mine         
wrongfully is far more disgraceful and  
more evil2      aye1 and to despoil and 
enslave and pillage1 or in any way at   
all to wrong me and mine1 is far more   
disgraceful and evil to      the doer of
 the wrong than to me who am the        
sufferer4      ,these truths1 which have
 been already set forth as ,i state     
#eji      them in the previous          
discussion1 would seem now to have      
been fixed and riveted by us1 if ,i may 
use an expression      which is         
certainly bold1 in words which are like 
bonds of      iron and adamant2 and     
unless you or some other still more     

enterprising hero shall break them1     
there is no possibility of      denying 
what ,i say4 ,for my position has always
 been1 that      ,i myself am ignorant  
how these things are1 but that ,i have  
never met any one who could say         
otherwise1 any more than      you can1  
and not appear ridiculous4 ,this is my  
position      still1 and if what ,i am  
saying is true1 and injustice is the    
greatest of evils to the doer of        
injustice1 and yet there is if          
possible a greater than this greatest of
 evils#de1 in an unjust      man not    
suffering retribution1 what is that     
defence of which      the want will make
 a man truly ridiculous8 ,must not the  
defence be one which will avert the     
greatest of human evils8      ,and will 
not the worst of all defences be that   
with which      a man is unable to      
defend himself or his family or his     
friends8--and next will come that which 
is unable to avert      the next        
greatest evil2 thirdly that which is    

unable to avert      the third greatest 
evil2 and so of other evils4 ,as is the 
greatness of evil so is the honour of   
being able to avert them      in their  
several degrees1 and the disgrace of not
 being able to      avert them4 ,am ,i  
not right1 ,callicles8        ,cal4     
,yes1 quite right4        ,soc4 ,seeing 
then that there are these two evils1 the
 doing      injustice and the suffering 
injustice--and we affirm that to do     
injustice is a greater1 and to suffer   
injustice a lesser evil--by      what   
devices can a man succeed in obtaining  
the two      advantages1 the one of not 
doing and the other of not suffering    
injustice8 must he have the power1 or   
only the will to      obtain them8 ,i   
mean to ask whether a man will escape   
injustice      if he has only the will  
to escape1 or must he have      provided
 himself with the power8        ,cal4   
,he must have provided himself with the 
power2 that      is clear4    ,sidenote3
 ,the tyrant and his satellites4        

,soc4 ,and what do you say of doing     
injustice8 ,is the will      only       
sufficient1 and will that prevent him   
from doing injustice1      or must he   
have provided himself with power and    
art2 and      if he have not studied and
 practised1 will he be unjust still8    
,surely you might say1 ,callicles1      
whether you think that ,polus      and  
,i were right in admitting the          
conclusion that no one      does wrong  
voluntarily1 but that all do wrong      
against their      will8        ,cal4   
,granted1 ,socrates1 if you will only   
have done4              #eaj            
,soc4 ,then1 as would appear1 power and 
art have to be provided      in order   
that we may do no injustice8            
,cal4 ,certainly4        ,soc4 ,and what
 art will protect us from suffering     
injustice1      if not wholly1 yet as   
far as possible8 ,i want to know whether
      you agree with me2 for ,i think   
that such an art is the art of      one 
who is either a ruler or even tyrant    

himself1 or the equal      and companion
 of the ruling power4        ,cal4 ,well
 said1 ,socrates2 and please to observe 
how      ready ,i am to praise you when 
you talk sense4        ,soc4 ,think and 
tell me whether you would approve of    
another      view of mine3 ,to me every 
man appears to be most      the friend  
of him who is most like to him--like to 
like1 as      ancient sages say3 ,would 
you not agree to this8        ,cal4 ,i  
should4    ,sidenote3 ,the tyrant       
naturally hates both his superiors and  
inferiors3  he likes only those who     
resemble him in character4        ,soc4 
,but when the tyrant is rude and        
uneducated1 he may      be expected to  
fear any one who is his superior in     
virtue1 and      will never be able to  
be perfectly friendly with him4         
,cal4 ,that is true4        ,soc4       
,neither will he be the friend of any   
one who is greatly      his inferior1   
for the tyrant will despise him1 and    
will never      seriously regard him as 

a friend4        ,cal4 ,that again is   
true4        ,soc4 ,then the only friend
 worth mentioning1 whom the      tyrant 
can have1 will be one who is of the same
 character1 and      has the same likes 
and dislikes1 and is at the same time   
willing to be subject and subservient to
 him2 he is the man      who will have  
power in the state1 and no one will     
injure him      with impunity3--is not  
that so8        ,cal4 ,yes4             
,sidenote3 ,the bad man will kill the   
good4        ,soc4 ,and if a young man  
begins to ask how he may become         
great and formidable1 this would seem to
 be the way--he      will accustom      
himself1 from his youth upward1 to feel 
sorrow and joy on the same occasions as 
his master1 and will      contrive to be
 as like him as possible8        ,cal4  
,yes4    ,sidenote3 ,and the way to be a
 great man and not to suffer injury is  
to  become like him4 ,and there can be  
no greater evil to him than this4       
,soc4 ,and in this way he will have     

accomplished1 as you      and your      
friends would say1 the end of becoming a
 great man      and not suffering       
injury8        ,cal4 ,very true4        
,soc4 ,but will he also escape from     
doing injury8 ,must not      the very   
opposite be true1 if he is to be like   
the tyrant in his      injustice1 and to
 have influence with him8 ,will he not  
#eaa      rather contrive to do as much 
wrong as possible1 and not be           
punished8        ,cal4 ,true4           
,soc4 ,and by the imitation of his      
master and by the power      which he   
thus acquires will not his soul become  
bad and      corrupted1 and will not    
this be the greatest evil to him8       
,cal4 ,you always contrive somehow or   
other1 ,socrates1 to      invert        
everything3 do you not know that he who 
imitates the      tyrant will1 if he has
 a mind1 kill him who does not imitate  
him and take away his goods8            
,sidenote3 ,but how provoking that the  
bad man should slay the good6           

,soc4 ,excellent ,callicles1 ,i am not  
deaf1 and ,i have heard      that a     
great many times from you and from      
,polus and from      nearly every man in
 the city1 but ,i wish that you would   
hear      me too4 ,i dare say that he   
will kill him if he has a mind--the     
bad man will kill the good and true4    
,cal4 ,and is not that just the         
provoking thing8    ,sidenote3 ,nay1 but
 we should not always study the arts    
which save us  from death2--the art of  
swimming1 the art of the pilot1 c4      
,soc4 ,nay1 not to a man of sense1 as   
the argument shows3 do      you think   
that all our cares should be directed to
 prolonging      life to the uttermost1 
and to the study of those arts which    
secure us from danger always2 like that 
art of rhetoric      which saves men in 
courts of law1 and which you advise me  
to cultivate8        ,cal4 ,yes1 truly1 
and very good advice too4        ,soc4  
,well1 my friend1 but what do you think 
of swimming2      is that an art of any 

great pretensions8        ,cal4 ,no1    
indeed4        ,soc4 ,and yet surely    
swimming saves a man from death1        
and there are occasions on which he must
 know how to swim4    ,sidenote3 ,who   
can say whether to be saved             
,sidenote3 ,the pilot demands a very    
moderate payment as the fare of  a      
passenger from ,athens to ,aegina1      
because he is not certain whether       
salvation from death be a good or an    
evil4        ,and if you despise the    
swimmers1 ,i will tell you of another   
and greater art1 the art of the pilot1  
who not only saves the      souls of    
men1 but also their bodies and          
properties from the      extremity of   
danger1 just like rhetoric4 ,yet his art
 is modest      and unpresuming3 it has 
no airs or pretences of doing anything  
extraordinary1 and1 in return for the   
same salvation      which is given by   
the pleader1 demands only two obols1 if 
he      brings us from ,aegina to       
,athens1 or for the longer voyage       

from ,pontus or ,egypt1 at the utmost   
two drachmae1 when he      has saved1 as
 ,i was just now saying1 the passenger  
and his      wife and children and      
goods1 and safely disembarked them at   
the ,piraeus1--this is the payment which
 he asks in return for      so great a  
boon2 and he who is the master of the   
art1 and has      done all this1 gets   
out and walks about on the sea-shore by 
his ship in an unassuming way4 ,for he  
is able to reflect and      is aware    
that he cannot tell which of his        
fellow-passengers he      has benefited1
 and which of them he has injured in not
 allowing      them to be drowned4 ,he  
knows that they are just the      same  
when he has disembarked them as when    
they embarked1           #eab      and  
not a whit better either in their bodies
 or in their souls2      and he         
considers that if a man who is afflicted
 by great and      incurable bodily     
diseases is only to be pitied for having
      escaped1 and is in no way         

benefited by him in having been         
saved from drowning1 much less he who   
has great and incurable      diseases1  
not of the body1 but of the soul1 which 
is the      more valuable part of him2  
neither is life worth having nor      of
 any profit to the bad man1 whether he  
be delivered from      the sea1 or the  
law-courts1 or any other devourer2--and 
so he      reflects that such a one had 
better not live1 for he cannot      live
 well#df4    ,sidenote3 from death be   
good or evil8    ,sidenote3 ,the        
engineer1 too3--how much better than the
 pleader6    ,sidenote3 ,he too is      
another of your saviours3 but you       
despise him1  whereas you ought to      
esteem him highly4    ,sidenote3 ,i want
 you to consider whether you can        
possibly become great  among the people 
unless you become like them4        ,and
 this is the reason why the pilot1      
although he is our      saviour1 is not 
usually conceited1 any more than the    
engineer1      who is not at all behind 

either the general1 or the pilot1 or    
any one else1 in his saving power1 for  
he sometimes saves      whole cities4   
,is there any comparison between him and
 the      pleader8 ,and if he were to   
talk1 ,callicles1 in your grandiose     
style1 he would bury you under a        
mountain of words1 declaring      and   
insisting that we ought all of us to be 
engine-makers1      and that no other   
profession is worth thinking about2     
he would have plenty to say4            
,nevertheless you despise him      and  
his art1 and sneeringly call him an     
engine-maker1 and      you will not     
allow your daughters to marry his son1  
or marry      your son to his daughters4
 ,and yet1 on your principle1 what      
justice or reason is there in your      
refusal8 ,what right have      you to   
despise the engine-maker1 and the others
 whom ,i was      just now mentioning8  
,i know that you will say1 #8,i am      
better1 and better born4' ,but if the   
better is not what ,i say1      and     

virtue consists only in a man saving    
himself and his1      whatever may be   
his character1 then your censure of the 
engine-maker1 and of the physician1 and 
of the other arts of      salvation1 is 
ridiculous4 ,o my friend6 ,i want you to
 see that      the noble and the good   
may possibly be something different     
from saving and being saved3--,may not  
he who is truly a      man cease to care
 about living a certain time8--he knows1
 as      women say1 that no man can     
escape fate1 and therefore he is        
not fond of life2 he leaves all that    
with ,god1 and considers      in what   
way he can best spend his appointed     
term2--whether      by assimilating     
himself to the constitution under which 
he      lives1 as you at this moment    
have to consider how you may            
#eac      become as like as possible to 
the ,athenian people1 if you      mean  
to be in their good graces1 and to have 
power in the      state2 whereas ,i want
 you to think and see whether this is   

for the interest of either of us2--,i   
would not have us risk      that which  
is dearest on the acquisition of this   
power1 like      the ,thessalian        
enchantresses1 who1 as they say1 bring  
down      the moon from heaven at the   
risk of their own perdition4      ,but  
if you suppose that any man will show   
you the art of      becoming great in   
the city1 and yet not conforming        
yourself      to the ways of the city1  
whether for better or worse1 then ,i    
can only say that you are mistaken1     
,callicles2 for he who      would       
deserve to be the true natural friend of
 the ,athenian      ,demus1 aye1 or of  
,pyrilampes' darling who is called after
      them1 must be by nature like them1
 and not an imitator only4      ,he1    
then1 who will make you most like them1 
will make you      as you desire1 a     
statesman and orator3 for every man is  
pleased when he is spoken to in his own 
language and spirit1      and dislikes  
any other4 ,but perhaps you1 sweet      

,callicles1      may be of another mind4
 ,what do you say8    ,sidenote3        
,callicles inclines for an instant to   
the ,gospel of ,socrates1  but the love 
of the world and of popularity overcomes
 him4    ,sidenote3 ,reiteration4       
,cal4 ,somehow or other your words1     
,socrates1 always      appear to me to  
be good words2 and yet1 like the rest of
 the      world1 ,i am not quite        
convinced by them#dg4        ,soc4 ,the 
reason is1 ,callicles1 that the love of 
,demus which      abides in your soul is
 an adversary to me2 but ,i dare say    
that      if we recur to these same     
matters1 and consider them more         
thoroughly1 you may be convinced for all
 that4 ,please1 then1      to remember  
that there are two processes of training
 all      things1 including body and    
soul2 in the one1 as we said1 we        
treat them with a view to pleasure1 and 
in the other with a      view to the    
highest good1 and then we do not indulge
 but      resist them3 was not that the 

distinction which we drew8    ,sidenote3
 ,two processes of training3 one having 
a view to pleasure1 the  other to good4 
,cal4 ,very true4        ,soc4 ,and the 
one which had pleasure in view was just 
a      vulgar flattery3--was not that   
another of our conclusions8        ,cal4
 ,be it so1 if you will have it4        
,soc4 ,and the other had in view the    
greatest improvement      of that which 
was ministered to1 whether body or soul8
        ,cal4 ,quite true4    ,sidenote3
 ,and we must train our citizens with a 
view to their good2 and1  as in other   
arts1 we must show that we can be       
trusted to improve them4        ,soc4   
,and must we not have the same end in   
view in the      treatment of our city  
and citizens8 ,must we not try and      
make them as good as possible8 ,for we  
have already discovered      that there 
is no use in imparting to them any other
                #ead      good1 unless  
the mind of those who are to have the   
good1      whether money1 or office1 or 

any other sort of power1 be      gentle 
and good4 ,shall we say that8           
,cal4 ,yes1 certainly1 if you like4     
,soc4 ,well1 then1 if you and ,i1       
,callicles1 were intending#dh to        
set about some public business1 and were
 advising one another      to undertake 
buildings1 such as walls1 docks or      
temples of the      largest size1 ought 
we not to examine ourselves1 first1 as  
to      whether we know or do not know  
the art of building1 and      who taught
 us8--would not that be necessary1      
,callicles8        ,cal4 ,true4         
,soc4 ,in the second place1 we should   
have to consider      whether we had    
ever constructed any private house1     
either of      our own or for our       
friends1 and whether this building of   
ours      was a success or not2 and if  
upon consideration we found      that we
 had had good and eminent masters1 and  
had been      successful in constructing
 many fine buildings1 not only with     
their assistance1 but without them1 by  

our own unaided skill--in      that case
 prudence would not dissuade us from    
proceeding      to the construction of  
public works4 ,but if we had no         
master to show1 and only a number of    
worthless buildings or      none at all1
 then1 surely1 it would be ridiculous in
 us to      attempt public works1 or to 
advise one another to undertake         
them4 ,is not this true8    ,sidenote3  
,the silence of ,callicles4        ,cal4
 ,certainly4        ,soc4 ,and does not 
the same hold in all other cases8 ,if   
you and ,i were physicians1 and were    
advising one another      that we were  
competent to practise as                
state-physicians1      should ,i not ask
 about you1 and would you not ask about 
me1 ,well1 but how about ,socrates      
himself1 has he good      health8 and   
was any one else ever known to be cured 
by      him1 whether slave or freeman8  
,and ,i should make the      same       
enquiries about you4 ,and if we arrived 
at the conclusion      that no one1     

whether citizen or stranger1 man or     
woman1 had ever been any the better for 
the medical skill      of either of us1 
then1 by ,heaven1 ,callicles1 what an   
absurdity      to think that we or any  
human being should be so silly as to    
set up as state-physicians and advise   
others like ourselves to      do the    
same1 without having first practised in 
private1      whether successfully or   
not1 and acquired experience of the     
art6 ,is not this1 as they say1 to begin
 with the big jar      when you are     
learning the potter's art2 which is a   
foolish      thing8        ,cal4 ,true4 
#eae    ,sidenote3 ,and now1 ,callicles1
 what are you who are a public character
  doing for the improvement of the      
citizens8        ,soc4 ,and now1 my     
friend1 as you are already beginning to 
be a public character1 and are          
admonishing and reproaching      me for 
not being one1 suppose that we ask a few
 questions      of one another4 ,tell   
me1 then1 ,callicles1 how about making  

any of the citizens better8 ,was there  
ever a man who was      once vicious1 or
 unjust1 or intemperate1 or foolish1 and
 became      by the help of ,callicles  
good and noble8 ,was there ever         
such a man1 whether citizen or stranger1
 slave or freeman8      ,tell me1       
,callicles1 if a person were to ask     
these questions      of you1 what would 
you answer8 ,whom would you say         
that you had improved by your           
conversation8 ,there may      have been 
good deeds of this sort which were done 
by you      as a private person1 before 
you came forward in public4      ,why   
will you not answer8    ,sidenote3      
,pericles a bad political shepherd4     
,sidenote3 ,callicles makes no answer4  
,cal4 ,you are contentious1 ,socrates4  
,sidenote3 ,or how did ,pericles and the
 great of old benefit the citizens8     
,soc4 ,nay1 ,i ask you1 not from a love 
of contention1 but      because ,i      
really want to know in what way you     
think that      affairs should be       

administered among us--whether1 when you
      come to the administration of     
them1 you have any other aim      but   
the improvement of the citizens8 ,have  
we not already      admitted many times 
over that such is the duty of a public  
man8 ,nay1 we have surely said so2 for  
if you will not      answer for yourself
 ,i must answer for you4 ,but if this is
      what the good man ought to effect 
for the benefit of his own      state1  
allow me to recall to you the names of  
those whom      you were just now       
mentioning1 ,pericles1 and ,cimon1 and  
,miltiades1 and ,themistocles1 and ask  
whether you still think      that they  
were good citizens4        ,cal4 ,i do4 
,soc4 ,but if they were good1 then      
clearly each of them      must have made
 the citizens better instead of worse8  
,cal4 ,yes4        ,soc4 ,and1          
therefore1 when ,pericles first began to
 speak in      the assembly1 the        
,athenians were not so good as when he  
spoke last8        ,cal4 ,very likely4  

,soc4 ,nay1 my friend1 #8likely' is not 
the word2 for if he      was a good     
citizen1 the inference is certain4      
,cal4 ,and what difference does that    
make8    ,sidenote3 ,pericles corrupted 
them by giving them pay4        ,soc4   
,none2 only ,i should like further to   
know whether      the ,athenians are    
supposed to have been made better by    
,pericles1 or1 on the contrary1 to have 
been corrupted by him2      for ,i hear 
that he was the first who gave the      
people pay1      and made them idle and 
cowardly1 and encouraged them in        
the love of talk and of money4          
,cal4 ,you heard that1 ,socrates1 from  
the laconising set      who bruise their
 ears4    ,sidenote3 ,he made them worse
 instead of better1 for they all but put
 him  to death4    ,sidenote3 ,for he   
taught the citizens only to kick and    
butt4        ,soc4 ,but what ,i am going
 to tell you now is not mere            
hearsay1 but well known both to you and 
me3 that at first1      ,pericles was   

glorious and his character unimpeached  
by any      verdict of the              
,athenians--this was during the time    
when             #eaf      they were not
 so good--yet afterwards1 when they had 
been      made good and gentle by him1  
at the very end of his life      they   
convicted him of theft1 and almost put  
him to death1      clearly under the    
notion that he was a malefactor4        
,cal4 ,well1 but how does that prove    
,pericles' badness8        ,soc4 ,why1  
surely1 you would say that he was a bad 
manager of asses or horses or oxen1 who 
had received them      originally       
neither kicking nor butting nor biting  
him1 and      implanted in them all     
these savage tricks8 ,would he not      
be a bad manager of any animals who     
received them gentle1      and made them
 fiercer than they were when he received
      them8 ,what do you say8           
,cal4 ,i will do you the favour of      
saying #8yes4'        ,soc4 ,and will   
you also do me the favour of saying     

whether      man is an animal8          
,cal4 ,certainly he is4        ,soc4    
,and was not ,pericles a shepherd of    
men8        ,cal4 ,yes4        ,soc4    
,and if he was a good political         
shepherd1 ought not      the animals who
 were his subjects1 as we were just now 
acknowledging1 to have become more just1
 and not more      unjust8        ,cal4 
,quite true4        ,soc4 ,and are not  
just men gentle1 as ,homer says8--or    
are you of another mind8        ,cal4 ,i
 agree4        ,soc4 ,and yet he really 
did make them more savage than      he  
received them1 and their savageness was 
shown towards      himself2 which he    
must have been very far from desiring4  
,cal4 ,do you want me to agree with you8
        ,soc4 ,yes1 if ,i seem to you to
 speak the truth4        ,cal4 ,granted 
then4        ,soc4 ,and if they were    
more savage1 must they not have         
been more unjust and inferior8          
,cal4 ,granted again4        ,soc4 ,then
 upon this view1 ,pericles was not a    

good statesman8        ,cal4 ,that is1  
upon your view4    ,sidenote3 ,cimon was
 ostracised2 ,themistocles was exiled2  
,miltiades was  nearly thrown from the  
rock4    ,sidenote3 ,the old argument   
repeated1 with illustrations taken from 
common life4        ,soc4 ,nay1 the view
 is yours1 after what you have admitted4
      ,take the case of ,cimon again4   
,did not the very persons      whom he  
was serving ostracize him1 in order that
 they might      not hear his voice for 
ten years8 and they did just the same   
to ,themistocles1 adding the penalty of 
exile2 and they voted      that         
,miltiades1 the hero of ,marathon1      
should be thrown into      the pit of   
death1 and he was only saved by the     
,prytanis4      ,and yet1 if they had   
been really good men1 as you say1 these 
things would never have happened to     
them4 ,for the good      charioteers are
 not those who at first keep their      
place1 and      then1 when they have    
broken-in their horses1 and themselves  

become better charioteers1 are thrown   
out--that is not the      way either in 
charioteering or in any                 
profession4--,what do      you think8   
,cal4 ,i should think not4    ,sidenote3
 ,the older statesmen no better than the
 existing ones4        ,soc4 ,well1 but 
if so1 the truth is as ,i have said     
already1       #eag      that in the    
,athenian ,state no one has ever shown  
himself to      be a good statesman--you
 admitted that this was true of      our
 present statesmen1 but not true of     
former ones1 and you      preferred them
 to the others2 yet they have turned out
      to be no better than our present  
ones2 and therefore1 if      they were  
rhetoricians1 they did not use the true 
art of      rhetoric or of flattery1 or 
they would not have fallen out      of  
favour4        ,cal4 ,but surely1       
,socrates1 no living man ever came near 
any one of them in his performances4    
,sidenote3 ,the older statesmen not able
 really to elevate the state to a       

higher level1 but more capable of       
gratifying its desires4    ,sidenote3   
,you might as well say that the cook or 
the baker is a good  trainer as that    
they were great statesmen4    ,sidenote3
 ,the statesman-like the ,sophist2      
neither has any right to  accuse their  
followers of wronging them2 they should 
have taught them  better4    ,sidenote3 
,nonsense about the cry of ingratitude  
which        ,soc4 ,o1 my dear friend1  
,i say nothing against them regarded    
as the serving-men of the ,state2 and ,i
 do think that      they were certainly 
more serviceable than those who are     
living now1 and better able to gratify  
the wishes of the ,state2      but as to
 transforming those desires and not     
allowing them      to have their way1   
and using the powers which they had1    
whether of persuasion or of force1 in   
the improvement of      their           
fellow-citizens1 which is the prime     
object of the truly      good citizen1  
,i do not see that in these respects    

they were a      whit superior to our   
present statesmen1 although ,i do admit 
that they were more clever at providing 
ships and walls and      docks1 and all 
that4 ,you and ,i have a ridiculous way1
 for      during the whole time that we 
are arguing1 we are always      going   
round and round to the same point1 and  
constantly      misunderstanding one    
another4 ,if ,i am not mistaken1 you    
have admitted and acknowledged more than
 once1 that there      are two kinds of 
operations which have to do with the    
body1      and two which have to do with
 the soul3 one of the two is            
ministerial1 and if our bodies are      
hungry provides food for      them1 and 
if they are thirsty gives them drink1 or
 if they are      cold supplies them    
with garments1 blankets1 shoes1 and all 
that they crave4 ,i use the same images 
as before intentionally1      in order  
that you may understand me the better4  
,the purveyor of the articles may       
provide them either wholesale      or   

retail1 or he may be the maker of any of
 them1--the      baker1 or the cook1 or 
the weaver1 or the shoemaker1 or the    
currier2 and in so doing1 being such as 
he is1 he is naturally      supposed by 
himself and every one to minister to the
 body4      ,for none of them know that 
there is another art--an art of         
gymnastic and medicine which is the true
 minister of the      body1 and ought to
 be the mistress of all the rest1 and to
      use their results according to the
 knowledge which she has      and they  
have not1 of the real good or bad       
effects of meats      and drinks on the 
body4 ,all other arts which have to do  
#eah      with the body are servile and 
menial and illiberal2 and      gymnastic
 and medicine are1 as they ought to be1 
their      mistresses4 ,now1 when ,i say
 that all this is equally true of       
the soul1 you seem at first to know and 
understand and      assent to my words1 
and then a little while afterwards you  
come repeating1 ,has not the ,state had 

good and noble      citizens8 and when  
,i ask you who they are1 you reply1     
seemingly quite in earnest1 as if ,i had
 asked1 ,who are or      have been good 
trainers8--and you had replied1         
,thearion1      the baker1 ,mithoecus1  
who wrote the ,sicilian cookery-book1   
,sarambus1 the vintner3 these are       
ministers of the body1      first-rate  
in their art2 for the first makes       
admirable loaves1      the second       
excellent dishes1 and the third capital 
wine2--to      me these appear to be the
 exact parallel of the statesmen        
whom you mention4 ,now you would not be 
altogether      pleased if ,i said to   
you1 ,my friend1 you know nothing of    
gymnastics2 those of whom you are       
speaking to me are only      the        
ministers and purveyors of luxury1 who  
have no good or      noble notions of   
their art1 and may very likely be       
filling and      fattening men's bodies 
and gaining their approval1 although    
the result is that they lose their      

original flesh in the long      run1 and
 become thinner than they were before2  
and yet      they1 in their simplicity1 
will not attribute their diseases and   
loss of flesh to their entertainers2 but
 when in after years      the unhealthy 
surfeit brings the attendant penalty of 
disease1      he who happens to be near 
them at the time1 and offers them       
advice1 is accused and blamed by them1  
and if they could they      would do him
 some harm2 while they proceed to       
eulogize      the men who have been the 
real authors of the mischief4      ,and 
that1 ,callicles1 is just what you are  
now doing4 ,you      praise the men who 
feasted the citizens and satisfied their
      desires1 and people say that they 
have made the city great1      not      
seeing that the swollen and ulcerated   
condition of the      ,state is to be   
attributed to these elder statesmen2 for
 they      have filled the city full of 
harbours and docks and walls and        
revenues and all that1 and have left no 

room for justice and      temperance4   
,and when the crisis of the disorder    
comes1             #eai      the people 
will blame the advisers of the hour1 and
 applaud      ,themistocles and ,cimon  
and ,pericles1 who are the real         
authors of their calamities2 and if you 
are not careful they      may assail you
 and my friend ,alcibiades1 when they   
are      losing not only their new      
acquisitions1 but also their original   
possessions2 not that you are the       
authors of these misfortunes      of    
theirs1 although you may perhaps be     
accessories to them4      ,a great piece
 of work is always being made1 as ,i see
 and      am told1 now as of old1 about 
our statesmen4 ,when the      ,state    
treats any of them as malefactors1 ,i   
observe that there      is a great      
uproar and indignation at the supposed  
wrong      which is done to them2       
#8after all their many services to the  
,state1 that they should unjustly       
perish1'--so the tale runs4      ,but   

the cry is all a lie2 for no statesman  
ever could be unjustly      put to death
 by the city of which he is the head4   
,the      case of the professed         
statesman is1 ,i believe1 very much like
      that of the professed sophist2 for
 the sophists1 although they      are   
wise men1 are nevertheless guilty of a  
strange piece of      folly2 professing 
to be teachers of virtue1 they will     
often      accuse their disciples of    
wronging them1 and defrauding      them 
of their pay1 and showing no gratitude  
for their services4      ,yet what can  
be more absurd than that men who have   
become      just and good1 and whose    
injustice has been taken      away from 
them1 and who have had justice implanted
 in      them by their teachers1 should 
act unjustly by reason of the           
injustice which is not in them8 ,can    
anything be more      irrational1 my    
friend1 than this8 ,you1 ,callicles1    
compel me      to be a mob-orator1      
because you will not answer4            

,sidenote3 is shown to statesmen at     
,athens4        ,cal4 ,and you are the  
man who cannot speak unless there       
is some one to answer8        ,soc4 ,i  
suppose that ,i can2 just now1 at any   
rate1 the      speeches which ,i am     
making are long enough because you      
refuse to answer me4 ,but ,i adjure you 
by the god of      friendship1 my good  
sir1 do tell me whether there does      
not appear to you to be a great         
inconsistency in saying      that you   
have made a man good1 and then blaming  
him for      being bad8        ,cal4    
,yes1 it appears so to me4        ,soc4 
,do you never hear our professors of    
education speaking      #ebj      in    
this inconsistent manner8        ,cal4  
,yes1 but why talk of men who are good  
for nothing8    ,sidenote3 ,sophistry is
 much superior to rhetoric4        ,soc4
 ,i would rather say1 why talk of men   
who profess to      be rulers1 and      
declare that they are devoted to the    
improvement      of the city1 and       

nevertheless upon occasion declaim      
against the utter vileness of the       
city3--do you think that      there is  
any difference between one and the      
other8 ,my      good friend1 the sophist
 and the rhetorician1 as ,i was saying  
to ,polus1 are the same1 or nearly the  
same2 but you ignorantly      fancy that
 rhetoric is a perfect thing1 and       
sophistry a thing to      be despised2  
whereas the truth is1 that sophistry is 
as much      superior to rhetoric as    
legislation is to the practice of law1  
or      gymnastic to medicine4 ,the     
orators and sophists1 as ,i am          
inclined to think1 are the only class   
who cannot complain of      the mischief
 ensuing to themselves from that which  
they      teach others1 without in the  
same breath accusing themselves      of 
having done no good to those whom they  
profess to      benefit4 ,is not this a 
fact8        ,cal4 ,certainly it is4    
,sidenote3 ,he who teaches honesty ought
 to teach his pupils to pay him  for the

 lesson4    ,sidenote3 ,the physician of
 the state        ,soc4 ,if they were   
right in saying that they make men      
better1 then they are the only class who
 can afford to leave      their         
remuneration to those who have been     
benefited by      them4 ,whereas if a   
man has been benefited in any other     
way1 if1 for example1 he has been taught
 to run by a trainer1      he might     
possibly defraud him of his pay1 if the 
trainer left      the matter to him1 and
 made no agreement with him that he     
should receive money as soon as he had  
given him the      utmost speed2 for not
 because of any deficiency of speed do  
men act unjustly1 but by reason of      
injustice4        ,cal4 ,very true4     
,soc4 ,and he who removes injustice can 
be in no danger      of being treated   
unjustly3 he alone can safely leave the 
honorarium to his pupils1 if he be      
really able to make them      good--am  
,i not right#di8        ,cal4 ,yes4     
,soc4 ,then we have found the reason why

 there is no dishonour      in a man    
receiving pay who is called in to advise
      about building or any other art8  
,cal4 ,yes1 we have found the reason4   
,soc4 ,but when the point is1 how a man 
may become best      himself1 and best  
govern his family and state1 then to say
      that you will give no advice      
gratis is held to be dishonourable8     
,cal4 ,true4        ,soc4 ,and why8     
,because only such benefits call forth a
      desire to requite them1 and there 
is evidence that a benefit      has been
 conferred when the benefactor receives 
a return2      otherwise not4 ,is this  
true8        ,cal4 ,it is4    ,sidenote3
 ,callicles advises ,socrates to be the 
servant of the state1 and  not run the  
risk of popular enmity4        ,soc4    
,then to which service of the ,state do 
you invite      me8 determine for me4   
,am ,i to be the physician of the       
#eba      ,state who will strive and    
struggle to make the ,athenians as      
good as possible2 or am ,i to be the    

servant and flatterer of      the       
,state8 ,speak out1 my good friend1     
freely and fairly as      you did at    
first and ought to do again1 and tell me
 your      entire mind4        ,cal4 ,i 
say then that you should be the servant 
of the      ,state4    ,sidenote3 and   
the flatterer of the state4        ,soc4
 ,the flatterer8 well1 sir1 that is a   
noble invitation4        ,cal4 ,the     
,mysian1 ,socrates1 or what you please4 
,for if      you refuse1 the            
consequences will be--        ,soc4 ,do 
not repeat the old story--that he who   
likes will      kill me and get my      
money2 for then ,i shall have to repeat 
the old answer1 that he will be a bad   
man and will kill the      good1 and    
that the money will be of no use to him1
 but that      he will wrongly use that 
which he wrongly took1 and if           
wrongly1 basely1 and if basely1         
hurtfully4        ,cal4 ,how confident  
you are1 ,socrates1 that you will never 
come to harm6 you seem to think that you

 are living in      another country1 and
 can never be brought into a court of   
justice1 as you very likely may be      
brought by some miserable      and mean 
person4    ,sidenote3 ,socrates has no  
fear of popular enmity1 but is quite    
aware  that he will incur it1 because he
 is the only true politician of his     
time1 and he has no defence against men 
such as his opponents3 that is  to say1 
he has the defence of truth1 but not    
such a defence as men  ordinarily       
produce4        ,soc4 ,then ,i must     
indeed be a fool1 ,callicles1 if ,i do  
not      know that in the ,athenian     
,state any man may suffer anything4     
,and if ,i am brought to trial and incur
 the dangers      of which you speak1 he
 will be a villain who brings me to     
trial--of that ,i am very sure1 for no  
good man would accuse      the innocent4
 ,nor shall ,i be surprised if ,i am put
 to death4      ,shall ,i tell you why  
,i anticipate this8        ,cal4 ,by all
 means4        ,soc4 ,i think that ,i am

 the only or almost the only            
,athenian living who practises the true 
art of politics2 ,i am      the only    
politician of my time4 ,now1 seeing that
 when ,i      speak my words are not    
uttered with any view of gaining        
favour1 and that ,i look to what is best
 and not to what is      most pleasant1 
having no mind to use those arts and    
graces      which you recommend1 ,i     
shall have nothing to say in the        
justice court4 ,and you might argue with
 me1 as ,i was      arguing with        
,polus3--,i shall be tried just as a    
physician      would be tried in a court
 of little boys at the indictment of    
the cook4 ,what would he reply under    
such circumstances1      if some one    
were to accuse him1 saying1 #8,o my     
boys1 many      evil things has this man
 done to you3 he is the death of        
you1 especially of the younger ones     
among you1 cutting and      burning and 
starving and suffocating you1 until you 
know           #ebb      not what to do2

 he gives you the bitterest potions1 and
      compels you to hunger and thirst4 
,how unlike the variety      of meats   
and sweets on which ,i feasted you6'    
,what do      you suppose that the      
physician would be able to reply when   
he found himself in such a predicament8 
,if he told the      truth he could only
 say1 #8,all these evil things1 my boys1
 ,i      did for your health1' and then 
would there not just be a      clamour  
among a jury like that8 ,how they would 
cry out6        ,cal4 ,i dare say4      
,soc4 ,would he not be utterly at a loss
 for a reply8    ,sidenote3 ,the myth4  
,cal4 ,he certainly would4        ,soc4 
,and ,i too shall be treated in the same
 way1 as ,i well      know1 if ,i am    
brought before the court4 ,for ,i shall 
not      be able to rehearse to the     
people the pleasures which ,i have      
procured for them1 and which1 although  
,i am not disposed      to envy either  
the procurers or enjoyers of them1 are  
deemed      by them to be benefits and  

advantages4 ,and if any one says        
that ,i corrupt young men1 and perplex  
their minds1 or that      ,i speak evil 
of old men1 and use bitter words towards
 them1      whether in private or       
public1 it is useless for me to reply1  
as      ,i truly might3--#8,all this ,i 
do for the sake of justice1 and         
with a view to your interest1 my judges1
 and to nothing else4'      ,and        
therefore there is no saying what may   
happen to me4        ,cal4 ,and do you  
think1 ,socrates1 that a man who is thus
      defenceless is in a good position8
        ,soc4 ,yes1 ,callicles1 if he   
have that defence1 which as you         
have often acknowledged he should       
have--if he be his own      defence1 and
 have never said or done anything wrong1
 either      in respect of gods or men2 
and this has been repeatedly            
acknowledged      by us to be the best  
sort of defence4 ,and if any      one   
could convict me of inability to defend 
myself or others      after this sort1  

,i should blush for shame1 whether ,i   
was convicted      before many1 or      
before a few1 or by myself alone2 and   
if ,i died from want of ability to do   
so1 that would indeed grieve      me4   
,but if ,i died because ,i have no      
powers of flattery or      rhetoric1 ,i 
am very sure that you would not find me 
repining      at death4 ,for no man who 
is not an utter fool and coward      is 
afraid of death itself1 but he is afraid
 of doing wrong4      ,for to go to the 
world below having one's soul full of   
injustice      is the last and worst of 
all evils4 ,and in proof of      what ,i
 say1 if you have no objection1 ,i      
should like to tell you      a story4   
,cal4 ,very well1 proceed2 and then we  
shall have done4    ,sidenote3 ,the     
philosopher has no reason to dread      
death1 as ,socrates will  prove by a    
relation of what happens in the world   
below4    ,sidenote3 ,before the days of
 ,zeus1 the judgments of another world  
too  much resembled the judgments of    

this4    ,sidenote3 ,zeus takes measures
 for the correction and improvement of  
them4    ,sidenote3 ,the souls of the   
departed4        ,soc4 ,listen1 then1 as
 story-tellers say1 to a very pretty    
#ebc      tale1 which ,i dare say that  
you may be disposed to regard as      a 
fable only1 but which1 as ,i believe1 is
 a true tale1 for ,i      mean to speak 
the truth4 ,homer tells us#ej1 how ,zeus
 and      ,poseidon and ,pluto divided  
the empire which they inherited         
from their father4 ,now in the days of  
,cronos there existed      a law        
respecting the destiny of man1 which has
 always been1      and still continues  
to be in ,heaven1--that he who has lived
      all his life in justice and       
holiness shall go1 when he is dead1     
to the ,islands of the ,blessed1 and    
dwell there in perfect      happiness   
out of the reach of evil2 but that he   
who has lived      unjustly and         
impiously shall go to the house of      
vengeance      and punishment1 which is 

called ,tartarus4 ,and in the time      
of ,cronos1 and even quite lately in the
 reign of ,zeus1 the      judgment was  
given on the very day on which the men  
were      to die2 the judges were alive1
 and the men were alive2 and      the   
consequence was that the judgments were 
not well given4      ,then ,pluto and   
the authorities from the ,islands of the
      ,blessed came to ,zeus1 and said  
that the souls found their      way to  
the wrong places4 ,zeus said3 #8,i shall
 put a stop to      this2 the judgments 
are not well given1 because the persons 
who are judged have their clothes on1   
for they are alive2 and      there are  
many who1 having evil souls1 are        
apparelled in fair      bodies1 or      
encased in wealth or rank1 and1 when the
 day of      judgment arrives1 numerous 
witnesses come forward and      testify 
on their behalf that they have lived    
righteously4 ,the      judges are awed  
by them1 and they themselves too have   
their      clothes on when judging2     

their eyes and ears and their whole     
bodies are interposed as a veil before  
their own souls4 ,all      this is a    
hindrance to them2 there are the clothes
 of the      judges and the clothes of  
the judged4--,what is to be done8       
,i will tell you3--,in the first place1 
,i will deprive men of      the         
foreknowledge of death1 which they      
possess at present3      this power     
which they have ,prometheus has already 
received      my orders to take from    
them3 in the second place1 they shall   
be entirely stripped before they are    
judged1 for they shall be      judged   
when they are dead2 and the judge too   
shall be naked1      that is to say1    
dead--he with his naked soul shall      
pierce      into the other naked souls2 
and they shall die suddenly      and be 
deprived of all their kindred1 and leave
 their brave      attire strewn upon the
 earth--conducted in this manner1 the   
judgment will be just4 ,i knew all about
 the matter before      any of you1 and 

therefore ,i have made my sons judges2  
two      from ,asia1 ,minos and         
,rhadamanthus1 and one from ,europe1    
,aeacus4 ,and these1 when they are dead1
 shall give judgment         #ebd       
in the meadow at the parting of the     
ways1 whence the      two roads lead1   
one to the ,islands of the ,blessed1 and
 the      other to ,tartarus4           
,rhadamanthus shall judge those who     
come from ,asia1 and ,aeacus those who  
come from ,europe4      ,and to ,minos  
,i shall give the primacy1 and he shall 
hold      a court of appeal1 in case    
either of the two others are in any     
doubt3--then the judgment respecting the
 last journey of      men will be as    
just as possible4'    ,sidenote3 ,as the
 body is1 so is the soul after death2   
they both retain  the traces of what    
they were in life1 and they are punished
 accordingly4        ,from this tale1   
,callicles1 which ,i have heard and     
believe1      ,i draw the following     
inferences3--,death1 if ,i am right1 is 

in      the first place the separation  
from one another of two things1         
soul and body2 nothing else4 ,and after 
they are separated      they retain     
their several natures1 as in life2 the  
body keeps      the same habit1 and the 
results of treatment or accident are    
distinctly visible in it3 for example1  
he who by nature or      training or    
both1 was a tall man while he was alive1
 will      remain as he was1 after he is
 dead2 and the fat man will      remain 
fat2 and so on2 and the dead man1 who in
 life had a      fancy to have flowing  
hair1 will have flowing hair4 ,and if he
      was marked with the whip and had  
the prints of the scourge1      or of   
wounds in him when he was alive1 you    
might see the      same in the dead     
body2 and if his limbs were broken or   
mis-shapen      when he was alive1 the  
same appearance would be      visible in
 the dead4 ,and in a word1 whatever was 
the habit      of the body during life  
would be distinguishable after death1   

either perfectly1 or in a great measure 
and for a certain time4      ,and ,i    
should imagine that this is equally true
 of the soul1      ,callicles2 when a   
man is stripped of the body1 all the    
natural      or acquired affections of  
the soul are laid open to view4--,and   
when they come to the judge1 as those   
from ,asia come      to ,rhadamanthus1  
he places them near him and inspects    
them quite impartially1 not knowing     
whose the soul is3 perhaps      he may  
lay hands on the soul of the great king1
 or of      some other king or          
potentate1 who has no soundness in him1 
but his soul is marked with the whip1   
and is full of the prints      and scars
 of perjuries and crimes with which each
 action has      stained him1 and he is 
all crooked with falsehood and          
imposture1   #ebe      and has no       
straightness1 because he has lived      
without      truth4 ,him ,rhadamanthus  
beholds1 full of all deformity      and 
disproportion1 which is caused by       

licence and luxury      and insolence   
and incontinence1 and despatches him    
ignominiously      to his prison1 and   
there he undergoes the punishment       
which he deserves4    ,sidenote3 ,the   
,homeric heroes in the world below4     
,sidenote3 ,the proper office of        
punishment is either to improve or to   
deter4    ,sidenote3 ,the meaner sort of
 men are incapable of great crimes4     
,sidenote3 ,great men have sometimes    
been good men2 but power is apt to      
corrupt them4        ,now the proper    
office of punishment is twofold3 he who 
is rightly punished ought either to     
become better and profit      by it1 or 
he ought to be made an example to his   
fellows1 that      they may see what he 
suffers1 and fear and become better4    
,those who are improved when they are   
punished by gods      and men1 are those
 whose sins are curable2 and they are   
improved1 as in this world so also in   
another1 by pain and      suffering2 for
 there is no other way in which they can

 be      delivered from their evil4 ,but
 they who have been guilty of      the  
worst crimes1 and are incurable by      
reason of their crimes1      are made   
examples2 for1 as they are incurable1   
the time has      passed at which they  
can receive any benefit4 ,they get no   
good themselves1 but others get good    
when they behold them      enduring for 
ever the most terrible and painful and  
fearful      sufferings as the penalty  
of their sins--there they are1 hanging  
up as examples1 in the prison-house of  
the world below1      a spectacle and a 
warning to all unrighteous men who come 
thither4 ,and among them1 as ,i         
confidently affirm1 will be      found  
,archelaus1 if ,polus truly reports of  
him1 and any other      tyrant who is   
like him4 ,of these fearful examples1   
most1 as      ,i believe1 are taken from
 the class of tyrants and kings and     
potentates and public men1 for they are 
the authors of the      greatest and    
most impious crimes1 because they have  

the      power4 ,and ,homer witnesses to
 the truth of this2 for they      are   
always kings and potentates whom he has 
described as      suffering everlasting 
punishment in the world below3 such     
were ,tantalus and ,sisyphus and        
,tityus4 ,but no one ever      described
 ,thersites1 or any private person who  
was a villain1      as suffering        
everlasting punishment1 or as incurable4
 ,for to      commit the worst crimes1  
as ,i am inclined to think1 was not     
in his power1 and he was happier than   
those who had the      power4 ,no1      
,callicles1 the very bad men come from  
the               #ebf      class of    
those who have power#ea4 ,and yet in    
that very class      there may arise    
good men1 and worthy of all admiration  
they      are1 for where there is great 
power to do wrong1 to live and      to  
die justly is a hard thing1 and greatly 
to be praised1 and      few there are   
who attain to this4 ,such good and true 
men1      however1 there have been1 and 

will be again1 at ,athens and      in   
other states1 who have fulfilled their  
trust righteously2 and      there is one
 who is quite famous all over ,hellas1  
,aristeides1      the son of            
,lysimachus4 ,but1 in general1 great men
 are also      bad1 my friend4          
,sidenote3 ,the spiritual combat4       
,sidenote3 ,the impartiality of the     
judges in another world4        ,as ,i  
was saying1 ,rhadamanthus1 when he gets 
a soul of      the bad kind1 knows      
nothing about him1 neither who he is1   
nor who his parents are2 he knows only  
that he has got hold      of a villain2 
and seeing this1 he stamps him as       
curable or incurable1      and sends him
 away to ,tartarus1 whither he goes     
and receives his proper recompense4 ,or1
 again1 he looks      with admiration on
 the soul of some just one who has lived
      in holiness and truth2 he may have
 been a private man or      not2 and ,i 
should say1 ,callicles1 that he is most 
likely to      have been a philosopher  

who has done his own work1 and      not 
troubled himself with the doings of     
other men in his lifetime2      him     
,rhadamanthus sends to the ,islands of  
the ,blessed4      ,aeacus does the     
same2 and they both have sceptres1 and  
judge2 but ,minos alone has a golden    
sceptre and is seated      looking on1  
as ,odysseus in ,homer#eb declares that 
he saw      him3          #8,holding a  
sceptre of gold1 and giving laws to the 
dead4'        ,now ,i1 ,callicles1 am   
persuaded of the truth of these things1 
and ,i consider how ,i shall present my 
soul whole and      undefiled before the
 judge in that day4 ,renouncing the     
honours at which the world aims1 ,i     
desire only to know the      truth1 and 
to live as well as ,i can1 and1 when ,i 
die1 to die as      well as ,i can4     
,and1 to the utmost of my power1 ,i     
exhort all      other men to do the     
same4 ,and1 in return for your          
exhortation      of me1 ,i exhort you   
also to take part in the great combat1  

which is the combat of life1 and greater
 than every other      earthly conflict4
 ,and ,i retort your reproach of me1 and
 say1      that you will not be able to 
help yourself when the day of      trial
 and judgment1 of which ,i was speaking1
 comes upon      you2 you will go before
 the judge1 the son of ,aegina1 and1    
when he has got you in his grip and is  
carrying you off1 you       #ebg        
will gape and your head will swim round1
 just as mine would      in the courts  
of this world1 and very likely some one 
will      shamefully box you on the     
ears1 and put upon you any sort of      
insult4    ,sidenote3 ,the better path4 
,perhaps this may appear to you to be   
only an old wife's tale1      which you 
will contemn4 ,and there might be reason
 in your      contemning such tales1 if 
by searching we could find out anything 
better or truer3 but now you see that   
you and ,polus      and ,gorgias1 who   
are the three wisest of the ,greeks of  
our      day1 are not able to show that 

we ought to live any life which         
does not profit in another world as well
 as in this4 ,and of      all that has  
been said1 nothing remains unshaken but 
the      saying1 that to do injustice is
 more to be avoided than to suffer      
injustice1 and that the reality and not 
the appearance of virtue      is to be  
followed above all things1 as well in   
public as in      private life2 and that
 when any one has been wrong in         
anything1      he is to be chastised1   
and that the next best thing to a       
man being just is that he should become 
just1 and be chastised      and         
punished2 also that he should avoid all 
flattery of himself      as well as of  
others1 of the few or of the many3 and  
rhetoric and any other art should be    
used by him1 and all his      actions   
should be done always1 with a view to   
justice4        ,follow me then1 and ,i 
will lead you where you will be         
happy in life and after death1 as the   
argument shows4 ,and      never mind if 

some one despises you as a fool1 and    
insults      you1 if he has a mind2 let 
him strike you1 by ,zeus1 and do        
you be of good cheer1 and do not mind   
the insulting blow1 for      you will   
never come to any harm in the practice  
of virtue1 if      you are a really good
 and true man4 ,when we have practised  
virtue together1 we will apply ourselves
 to politics1 if      that seems        
desirable1 or we will advise about      
whatever else      may seem good to us1 
for we shall be better able to judge    
then4 ,in our present condition we ought
 not to give ourselves      airs1 for   
even on the most important subjects we  
are      always changing our minds2 so  
utterly stupid are we6 ,let      us1    
then1 take the argument as our guide1   
which has revealed      to us that the  
best way of life is to practise justice 
and every      virtue in life and death4
 ,this way let us go2 and in this       
exhort all men to follow1 not in the way
 to which you trust      and in which   

you exhort me to follow you2 for that   
way1 ,callicles1      is nothing worth4 
,,footnotes    #bi ,compare the         
following3 #8,now1 and for us1 it is a  
time to ,hellenize  and to praise       
knowing2 for we have ,hebraized too much
 and have overvalued  doing4 ,but the   
habits and discipline received from     
,hebraism remain for  our race an       
eternal possession4 ,and as humanity is 
constituted1 one must  never assign them
 the second rank to-day without being   
ready to restore  them to the first     
to-morrow4' ,sir ,william ,w4 ,hunter1  
,preface to ,orissa4    #cj ,omitting   
the words     and  in next clause4      
#ca ,there is an untranslatable play on 
the name #8,polus1' which means #8a     
colt4'    #cb ,cp4 ,rep4 ix4 #egi1 #ehj4
    #cc ,cp4 ,rep4 ii4 #cei4    #cd     
,fragm4 ,incert4 #aea 7,bckh74    #ce   
,antiope1 fragm4 #bj 7,dindorf74    #cf 
,cp4 what is said of ,gorgias by        
,callicles at p4 #dhb4    #cg ,cp4 ,rep4
 i4 #cdh4    #ch ,cp4 ,phaedr4 #bej ,c4 

#ci ,an untranslateable pun1--       4  
#dj ,or1 #8,i am in profound earnest4'  
#da ,cp4 ,rep4 iv4 #dcf4    #db ,cp4    
,rep4 iii4 #cib foll4    #dc ,cp4 ,laws 
vi4 #geb ,a4    #dd p4 #dhe4    #de ,cp4
 ,republic1 #i4 #egh ff4    #df ,cp4    
,rep4 iii4 #djg ,e4    #dg ,cp4 ,symp4  
#baf2 #a ,alcib4 #ace4    #dh ,reading  
with the majority of ,,mss4 4    #di    
,cp4 ,protag4 #cbh4    #ej ,il4 xv4 #ahg
 foll4    #ea ,cp4 ,rep4 x4 #fae ,e4    
#eb ,odyss4 xi4 #efi4                   
,,appendix ,i4      ,sidenote3          
,,appendix ,i4    ,it seems impossible  
to separate by any exact line the       
genuine writings  of ,plato from the    
spurious4 ,the only external evidence to
 them which  is of much value is that of
 ,aristotle2 for the ,alexandrian       
catalogues  of a century later include  
manifest forgeries4 ,even the value of  
the  ,aristotelian authority is a good  
deal impaired by the uncertainty        
concerning the date and authorship of   
the writings which are ascribed to  him4

 ,and several of the citations of       
,aristotle omit the name of ,plato1  and
 some of them omit the name of the      
dialogue from which they are  taken4    
,prior1 however1 to the enquiry about   
the writings of a particular  author1   
general considerations which equally    
affect all evidence to the  genuineness 
of ancient writings are the following3  
,shorter works are more  likely to have 
been forged1 or to have received an     
erroneous designation1  than longer     
ones2 and some kinds of composition1    
such as epistles or  panegyrical        
orations1 are more liable to suspicion  
than others2 those1  again1 which have a
 taste of sophistry in them1 or the ring
 of a later  age1 or the slighter       
character of a rhetorical exercise1 or  
in which a  motive or some affinity to  
spurious writings can be detected1 or   
which  seem to have originated in a name
 or statement really occurring in  some 
classical author1 are also of doubtful  
credit2 while there is no  instance of  

any ancient writing proved to be a      
forgery1 which combines  excellence with
 length4 ,a really great and original   
writer would have no  object in         
fathering his works on ,plato2 and to   
the forger or imitator1  the #8literary 
hack' of ,alexandria and ,athens1 the   
,gods did not grant  originality or     
genius4 ,further1 in attempting to      
balance the evidence for  and against a 
,platonic dialogue1 we must not forget  
that the form of the  ,platonic writing 
was common to several of his            
contemporaries4 ,aeschines1  ,euclid1   
,phaedo1 ,antisthenes1 and in the next  
generation ,aristotle1 are  all said to 
have composed dialogues2 and mistakes of
 names are very  likely to have         
occurred4 ,greek literature in the third
 century before  ,christ was almost as  
voluminous as our own1 and without the  
safeguards of  regular publication1 or  
printing1 or binding1 or even of        
distinct titles4  ,an unknown writing   
was naturally attributed to a known     

writer whose works  bore the same       
character2 and the name once appended   
easily obtained  authority4 ,a tendency 
may also be observed to blend the works 
and  opinions of the master with those  
of his scholars4 ,to a later ,platonist1
  the difference between ,plato and his 
imitators was not so perceptible as  to 
ourselves4 ,the ,memorabilia of         
,xenophon and the ,dialogues of ,plato  
are  but a part of a considerable       
,socratic literature which has passed   
away4  ,and we must consider how we     
should regard the question of the       
genuineness  of a particular writing1 if
 this lost literature had been preserved
 to us4    ,sidenote3 ,criteria of      
genuineness4    ,these considerations   
lead us to adopt the following criteria 
of  genuineness3 7#a7 ,that is most     
certainly ,plato's which ,aristotle     
attributes to him by name1 which 7#b7 is
 of considerable length1 of 7#c7  great 
excellence1 and also 7#d7 in harmony    
with the general spirit of  the         

,platonic writings4 ,but the testimony  
of ,aristotle cannot always be          
distinguished from that of a later age  
7see above72 and has various  degrees of
 importance4 ,those writings which he   
cites without mentioning  ,plato1 under 
their own names1 e4 g4 the ,hippias1 the
 ,funeral ,oration1 the  ,phaedo1 etc41 
have an inferior degree of evidence in  
their favour4 ,they  may have been      
supposed by him to be the writings of   
another1 although in  the case of really
 great works1 e4 g4 the ,phaedo1 this is
 not credible2  those again which are   
quoted but not named1 are still more    
defective  in their external            
credentials4 ,there may be also a       
possibility that  ,aristotle was        
mistaken1 or may have confused the      
master and his scholars  in the case of 
a short writing2 but this is            
inconceivable about a more  important   
work1 e4 g4 the ,laws1 especially when  
we remember that he was  living at      
,athens1 and a frequenter of the groves 

of the ,academy1 during  the last twenty
 years of ,plato's life4 ,nor must we   
forget that in all his  numerous        
citations from the ,platonic writings he
 never attributes any  passage found in 
the extant dialogues to any one but     
,plato4 ,and lastly1  we may remark that
 one or two great writings1 such as the 
,parmenides and  the ,politicus1 which  
are wholly devoid of ,aristotelian 7#a7 
credentials  may be fairly attributed to
 ,plato1 on the ground of 7#b7 length1  
7#c7  excellence1 and 7#d7 accordance   
with the general spirit of his writings4
  ,indeed the greater part of the       
evidence for the genuineness of ancient 
,greek authors may be summed up under   
two heads only3 7#a7 excellence2 and    
7#b7 uniformity of tradition--a kind of 
evidence1 which though in many  cases   
sufficient1 is of inferior value4       
,sidenote3 ,inferior works not          
necessarily spurious4    ,proceeding    
upon these principles we appear to      
arrive at the conclusion  that          

nineteen-twentieths of all the writings 
which have ever been  ascribed to       
,plato1 are undoubtedly genuine4 ,there 
is another portion of  them1 including  
the ,epistles1 the ,epinomis1 the       
dialogues rejected by  the ancients     
themselves1 namely1 the ,axiochus1 ,de  
justo1 ,de virtute1  ,demodocus1        
,sisyphus1 ,eryxias1 which on grounds1  
both of internal and  external evidence1
 we are able with equal certainty to    
reject4 ,but there  still remains a     
small portion of which we are unable to 
affirm either  that they are genuine or 
spurious4 ,they may have been written in
 youth1  or possibly like the works of  
some painters1 may be partly or wholly  
the compositions of pupils2 or they may 
have been the writings of some          
contemporary transferred by accident to 
the more celebrated name of  ,plato1 or 
of some ,platonist in the next          
generation who aspired to imitate  his  
master4 ,not that on grounds either of  
language or philosophy we  should       

lightly reject them4 ,some difference of
 style1 or inferiority of  execution1 or
 inconsistency of thought1 can hardly be
 considered decisive  of their spurious 
character4 ,for who always does justice 
to himself1  or who writes with equal   
care at all times8 ,certainly not       
,plato1 who  exhibits the greatest      
differences in dramatic power1 in the   
formation of  sentences1 and in the use 
of words1 if his earlier writings are   
compared  with his later ones1 say the  
,protagoras or ,phaedrus with the ,laws4
 ,or who  can be expected to think in   
the same manner during a period of      
authorship  extending over above fifty  
years1 in an age of great intellectual  
activity1 as well as of political and   
literary transition8 ,certainly not     
,plato1 whose earlier writings are      
separated from his later ones by as     
wide an interval of philosophical       
speculation as that which separates his 
later writings from ,aristotle4         
,sidenote3 ,the ,lesser ,hippias4       

,the dialogues which have been          
translated in the first ,appendix1 and  
which  appear to have the next claim to 
genuineness among the ,platonic         
writings1  are the ,lesser ,hippias1 the
 ,menexenus or ,funeral ,oration1 the   
,first  ,alcibiades4 ,of these1 the     
,lesser ,hippias and the ,funeral       
,oration are  cited by ,aristotle2 the  
first in the ,metaphysics1 iv4 #bi1 #e1 
the latter  in the ,rhetoric1 iii4 #ad1 
#aa4 ,neither of them are expressly     
attributed to  ,plato1 but in his       
citation of both of them he seems to be 
referring to  passages in the extant    
dialogues4 ,from the mention of         
#8,hippias' in the  singular by         
,aristotle1 we may perhaps infer that he
 was unacquainted with  a second        
dialogue bearing the same name4         
,moreover1 the mere existence  of a     
,greater and ,lesser ,hippias1 and of a 
,first and ,second ,alcibiades1  does to
 a certain extent throw a doubt upon    
both of them4 ,though a very  clever and

 ingenious work1 the ,lesser ,hippias   
does not appear to contain  anything    
beyond the power of an imitator1 who was
 also a careful student  of the earlier 
,platonic writings1 to invent4 ,the     
motive or leading  thought of the       
dialogue may be detected in ,xen4 ,mem4 
iv4 #b1 #ba1 and  there is no similar   
instance of a #8motive' which is taken  
from ,xenophon  in an undoubted dialogue
 of ,plato4 ,on the other hand1 the     
upholders of  the genuineness of the    
dialogue will find in the ,hippias a    
true ,socratic  spirit2 they will       
compare the ,ion as being akin both in  
subject and  treatment2 they will urge  
the authority of ,aristotle2 and they   
will  detect in the treatment of the    
,sophist1 in the satirical reasoning    
upon ,homer1 in the reductio ad absurdum
 of the doctrine that vice is           
ignorance1 traces of a ,platonic        
authorship4 ,in reference to the last   
point we are doubtful1 as in some of the
 other dialogues1 whether the  author is

 asserting or overthrowing the paradox  
of ,socrates1 or merely  following the  
argument #8whither the wind blows4'     
,that no conclusion  is arrived at is   
also in accordance with the character of
 the earlier  dialogues4 ,the           
resemblances or imitations of the       
,gorgias1 ,protagoras1  and ,euthydemus1
 which have been observed in the        
,hippias1 cannot with  certainty be     
adduced on either side of the argument4 
,on the whole1 more  may be said in     
favour of the genuineness of the        
,hippias than against it4    ,sidenote3 
,menexenus3 ,alcibiades ,i4    ,the     
,menexenus or ,funeral ,oration is cited
 by ,aristotle1 and is  interesting as  
supplying an example of the manner in   
which the orators  praised #8the        
,athenians among the ,athenians1'       
falsifying persons and  dates1 and      
casting a veil over the gloomier events 
of ,athenian history4  ,it exhibits an  
acquaintance with the funeral oration of
 ,thucydides1 and  was1 perhaps1        

intended to rival that great work4 ,if  
genuine1 the proper  place of the       
,menexenus would be at the end of the   
,phaedrus4 ,the satirical  opening and  
the concluding words bear a great       
resemblance to the earlier  dialogues2  
the oration itself is professedly a     
mimetic work1 like the  speeches in the 
,phaedrus1 and cannot therefore be      
tested by a comparison  of the other    
writings of ,plato4 ,the funeral oration
 of ,pericles is  expressly mentioned in
 the ,phaedrus1 and this may have       
suggested the  subject1 in the same     
manner that the ,cleitophon appears to  
be suggested  by the slight mention of  
,cleitophon and his attachment to       
,thrasymachus  in the ,republic1 cp4    
#dfe ,a2 and the ,theages by the mention
 of ,theages  in the ,apology and       
,republic2 or as the ,second ,alcibiades
 seems to be  founded upon the text of  
,xenophon1 ,mem4 i4 #c1 #a4 ,a similar  
taste for  parody appears not only in   
the ,phaedrus1 but in the ,protagoras1  

in the  ,symposium1 and to a certain    
extent in the ,parmenides4    ,to these 
two doubtful writings of ,plato ,i have 
added the ,first  ,alcibiades1 which1 of
 all the disputed dialogues of ,plato1  
has the  greatest merit1 and is somewhat
 longer than any other of them1 though  
not  verified by the testimony of       
,aristotle1 and in many respects at     
variance  with the ,symposium in the    
description of the relations of         
,socrates and  ,alcibiades4 ,like the   
,lesser ,hippias and the ,menexenus1 it 
is to be  compared to the earlier       
writings of ,plato4 ,the motive of the  
piece may1  perhaps1 be found in that   
passage of the ,symposium in which      
,alcibiades  describes himself as       
self-convicted by the words of ,socrates
 7#baf ,b1 ,c74  ,for the disparaging   
manner in which ,schleiermacher has     
spoken of this  dialogue there seems to 
be no sufficient foundation4 ,at the    
same time1  the lesson imparted is      
simple1 and the irony more transparent  

than in  the undoubted dialogues of     
,plato4 ,we know1 too1 that ,alcibiades 
was a  favourite thesis1 and that at    
least five or six dialogues bearing this
  name passed current in antiquity1 and 
are attributed to contemporaries of     
,socrates and ,plato4 7#a7 ,in the      
entire absence of real external evidence
  7for the catalogues of the            
,alexandrian librarians cannot be       
regarded  as trustworthy72 and 7#b7 in  
the absence of the highest marks either 
of  poetical or philosophical           
excellence2 and 7#c7 considering that we
 have  express testimony to the         
existence of contemporary writings      
bearing  the name of ,alcibiades1 we are
 compelled to suspend our judgment on   
the  genuineness of the extant dialogue4
    ,sidenote3 ,various degrees of      
genuineness4    ,neither at this point1 
nor at any other1 do we propose to draw 
an  absolute line of demarcation between
 genuine and spurious writings of       
,plato4 ,they fade off imperceptibly    

from one class to another4 ,there may   
have been degrees of genuineness in the 
dialogues themselves1 as there  are     
certainly degrees of evidence by which  
they are supported4 ,the  traditions of 
the oral discourses both of ,socrates   
and ,plato may have  formed the basis of
 semi-,platonic writings2 some of them  
may be of the  same mixed character     
which is apparent in ,aristotle and     
,hippocrates1  although the form of them
 is different4 ,but the writings of     
,plato1 unlike  the writings of         
,aristotle1 seem never to have been     
confused with the  writings of his      
disciples3 this was probably due to     
their definite form1  and to their      
inimitable excellence4 ,the three       
dialogues which we have  offered in the 
,appendix to the criticism of the reader
 may be partly  spurious and partly     
genuine2 they may be altogether         
spurious2--that is an  alternative which
 must be frankly admitted4 ,nor can we  
maintain of some  other dialogues1 such 

as the ,parmenides1 and the ,sophist1   
and ,politicus1  that no considerable   
objection can be urged against them1    
though greatly  over-balanced by the    
weight 7chiefly7 of internal evidence in
 their  favour4 ,nor1 on the other hand1
 can we exclude a bare possibility that 
some dialogues which are usually        
rejected1 such as the ,greater ,hippias 
and the ,cleitophon1 may be genuine4    
,the nature and object of these         
semi-,platonic writings require more    
careful study and more comparison of    
them with one another1 and with forged  
writings in general1 than they  have yet
 received1 before we can finally decide 
on their character4 ,we do  not consider
 them all as genuine until they can be  
proved to be spurious1  as is often     
maintained and still more often implied 
in this and similar  discussions2 but   
should say of some of them1 that their  
genuineness is  neither proven nor      
disproven until further evidence about  
them can be  adduced4 ,and we are as    

confident that the ,epistles are        
spurious1 as that  the ,republic1 the   
,timaeus1 and the ,laws are genuine4    
,sidenote3 ,the doubtful works neither  
numerous nor important4    ,on the      
whole1 not a twentieth part of the      
writings which pass under  the name of  
,plato1 if we exclude the works rejected
 by the ancients  themselves and two or 
three other plausible inventions1 can be
 fairly  doubted by those who are       
willing to allow that a considerable    
change and  growth may have taken place 
in his philosophy 7see above74 ,that    
twentieth  debatable portion scarcely in
 any degree affects our judgment of     
,plato1  either as a thinker or a       
writer1 and though suggesting some      
interesting  questions to the scholar   
and critic1 is of little importance to  
the  general reader4          ,,lesser  
,,hippias4      ,,introduction4         
,sidenote3 ,lesser ,hippias4            
,sidenote3 ,,introduction4    ,the      
,lesser ,hippias may be compared with   

the earlier dialogues of ,plato1  in    
which the contrast of ,socrates and the 
,sophists is most strongly  exhibited4  
,hippias1 like ,protagoras and ,gorgias1
 though civil1 is vain  and boastful3 he
 knows all things2 he can make anything1
 including his  own clothes2 he is a    
manufacturer of poems and declamations1 
and also  of seal-rings1 shoes1         
strigils2 his girdle1 which he has woven
 himself1  is of a finer than ,persian  
quality4 ,he is a vainer1 lighter nature
  than the two great ,sophists 7cp4     
,protag4 #cad1 #ccg71 but of the same   
character with them1 and equally        
impatient of the short cut-and-thrust   
method of ,socrates1 whom he endeavours 
to draw into a long oration4 ,at  last1 
he gets tired of being defeated at every
 point by ,socrates1 and is  with       
difficulty induced to proceed 7compare  
,thrasymachus1 ,protagoras1  ,callicles1
 and others1 to whom the same reluctance
 is ascribed74    ,sidenote3 ,analysis  
#cgb-cgf4        ,hippias like          

,protagoras has common sense on his     
side1    ,steph4 -#cfc      when he     
argues1 citing passages of the ,iliad in
 support of his view1      that ,homer  
intended ,achilles to be the bravest1   
,odysseus the wisest      of the        
,greeks4 ,but he is easily overthrown by
 the superior      dialectics of        
,socrates1 who pretends to show that    
,achilles is not      true to his word1 
and that no similar inconsistency is to 
be found #cfi      in ,odysseus4        
,hippias replies that ,achilles         
unintentionally1 but      ,odysseus     
intentionally1 speaks falsehood4 ,but is
 it better to do   #cgj      wrong      
intentionally or unintentionally8       
,socrates1 relying on the      analogy  
of the arts1 maintains the former1      
,hippias the latter of the      two     
alternatives4444 ,all this is quite     
conceived in the spirit of -#cgb        
,plato1 who is very far from making     
,socrates always argue on the side      
of truth4 ,the over-reasoning on ,homer1

 which is of course satirical1      is  
also in the spirit of ,plato4 ,poetry   
turned logic is even more               
ridiculous than #8rhetoric turned       
logic1' and equally fallacious4         
,there were reasoners in ancient as well
 as in modern times1 who      could     
never receive the natural impression of 
,homer1 or of any      other book which 
they read4 ,the argument of ,socrates1  
in which      he picks out the apparent 
inconsistencies and discrepancies in the
      speech and actions of ,achilles1  
and the final paradox1 #8that he        
who is true is also false1' reminds us  
of the interpretation by      ,socrates 
of ,simonides in the ,protagoras1 and of
 similar reasonings      in the first   
book of the ,republic4 ,the             
discrepancies which      ,socrates      
discovers in the words of ,achilles are 
perhaps as great      as those          
discovered by some of the modern        
separatists of the      -#cgf           
,homeric poems4444        ,at last1     

,socrates having caught ,hippias in the 
toils of the      voluntary and         
involuntary1 is obliged to confess that 
he is wandering      about in the same  
labyrinth2 he makes the reflection on   
himself which others would make upon him
 7cp4 ,protagoras1 sub      fin474 ,he  
does not wonder that he should be in a  
difficulty1 but      he wonders at      
,hippias1 and he becomes sensible of the
 gravity of      the situation1 when    
ordinary men like himself can no longer 
go to      the wise and be taught by    
them4           99       99       99    
99       99    ,sidenote3               
,,introduction4    ,sidenote3 ,the      
,dialogue probably genuine4    ,it may  
be remarked as bearing on the           
genuineness of this dialogue3 7#a7  that
 the manners of the speakers are less   
subtle and refined than in  the other   
dialogues of ,plato2 7#b7 that the      
sophistry of ,socrates is  more palpable
 and unblushing1 and also more          
unmeaning2 7#c7 that many  turns of     

thought and style are found in it which 
appear also in the  other               
dialogues3--whether resemblances of this
 kind tell in favour of or  against the 
genuineness of an ancient writing1 is an
 important question  which will have to 
be answered differently in different    
cases4 ,for that  a writer may repeat   
himself is as true as that a forger may 
imitate2  and ,plato elsewhere1 either  
of set purpose or from forgetfulness1 is
  full of repetitions4 ,the parallelisms
 of the ,lesser ,hippias1 as already    
remarked1 are not of the kind which     
necessarily imply that the dialogue  is 
the work of a forger4 ,the parallelisms 
of the ,greater ,hippias with  the other
 dialogues1 and the allusion to the     
,lesser #bhe1 #bhf ,a1 ,b  7where       
,hippias sketches the programme of his  
next lecture1 and invites  ,socrates to 
attend and bring any friends with him   
who may be competent  judges71 are more 
than suspicious3--they are of a very    
poor sort1 such  as we cannot suppose to

 have been due to ,plato himself4 ,the  
,greater  ,hippias more resembles the   
,euthydemus than any other dialogue2 but
 is  immeasurably inferior to it4 ,the  
,lesser ,hippias seems to have more     
merit  than the ,greater1 and to be more
 ,platonic in spirit4 ,the character of 
,hippias is the same in both dialogues1 
but his vanity and boasting are  even   
more exaggerated in the ,greater        
,hippias4 ,his art of memory is         
specially mentioned in both4 ,he is an  
inferior type of the same species  as   
,hippodamus of ,miletus 7,arist4 ,pol4  
,,ii4 #h1  #a74 ,some passages in which 
the ,lesser ,hippias may be             
advantageously compared with the        
undoubtedly  genuine dialogues of ,plato
 are the following3--,less4 ,hipp4 #cfi 
,b3 cp4  ,rep4 vi4 #dhg 7,socrates'     
cunning in argument73  ib4 ,d1 ,e3 cp4  
,laches  #ahh 7,socrates' feeling about 
arguments73  #cgb ,b1 ,c3 cp4 ,rep4 i4  
#cch  ,b 7,socrates not unthankful73    
#cgc ,b3 cp4 ,rep4 i4 #cdj ,d 7,socrates

  dishonest in argument74    ,the       
,lesser ,hippias1 though inferior to the
 other dialogues1 may be  reasonably    
believed to have been written by ,plato1
 on the ground 7#a7  of considerable    
excellence2 7#b7 of uniform tradition   
beginning with  ,aristotle and his      
school4 ,that the dialogue falls below  
the standard of  ,plato's other works1  
or that he has attributed to ,socrates  
an unmeaning  paradox 7perhaps with the 
view of showing that he could beat the  
,sophists  at their own weapons2 or that
 he could #8make the worse appear the   
better  cause'2 or merely as a          
dialectical experiment7--are not        
sufficient reasons  for doubting the    
genuineness of the work4      ,,lesser  
,,hippias4    ,,persons ,,of ,,the      
,,dialogue4    ,,eudicus1 ,,socrates1   
,,hippias4    ,sidenote3 ,lesser        
,hippias4        ,eudicus4 ,why are you 
silent1 ,socrates1 after the            
,steph4 #cfc      magnificent display   
which ,hippias has been making8 ,why do 

you not either refute his words1 if he  
seems to you to have      been wrong in 
any point1 or join with us in commending
      him8 ,there is the more reason why
 you should speak1      because we are  
now alone1 and the audience is confined 
to      those who may fairly claim to   
take part in a philosophical            
discussion4    ,sidenote3 ,the ,iliad of
 ,homer a finer work than the ,odyssey1 
because  ,achilles1 the hero of the     
poem1 is greater than ,odysseus4        
,socrates4 ,i should greatly like1      
,eudicus1 to ask ,hippias      the      
meaning of what he was saying just now  
about ,homer4      ,i have heard your   
father1 ,apemantus1 declare that the    
,iliad      of ,homer is a finer poem   
than the ,odyssey in the same           
degree that ,achilles was a better man  
than ,odysseus2      ,odysseus1 he would
 say1 is the central figure of the one  
poem      and ,achilles of the other4   
,now1 ,i should like to know1 if        
,hippias has no objection to tell me1   

what he thinks about      these two     
heroes1 and which of them he maintains  
to be the      better2 he has already   
told us in the course of his exhibition 
many things of various kinds about      
,homer and divers other      poets4     
,eud4 ,i am sure that ,hippias will be  
delighted to answer      anything which 
you would like to ask2 tell me1         
,hippias1 if      ,socrates asks you a  
question1 will you answer him8          
,hippias4 ,indeed1 ,eudicus1 ,i should  
be strangely inconsistent      if ,i    
refused to answer ,socrates1 when at    
each ,olympic      festival1 as ,i went 
up from my house at ,elis to the temple 
of      ,olympia1 where all the         
,hellenes were assembled1 ,i continually
      professed my willingness to       
perform any of the      exhibitions     
which ,i had prepared1 and to answer any
      questions which any one had to    
ask4    ,sidenote3 ,achilles and        
,odysseus4        ,soc4 ,truly1         
,hippias1 you are to be congratulated1  

if at          #cfd      every ,olympic 
festival you have such an encouraging   
opinion      of your own wisdom when you
 go up to the temple4 ,i doubt          
whether any muscular hero would be so   
fearless and confident      in offering 
his body to the combat at ,olympia1 as  
you      are in offering your mind4     
,hip4 ,and with good reason1 ,socrates2 
for since the day      when ,i first    
entered the lists at ,olympia ,i have   
never found      any man who was my     
superior in anything#ec4        ,soc4   
,what an ornament1 ,hippias1 will the   
reputation of      your wisdom be to the
 city of ,elis and to your parents6     
,but to return3 what say you of         
,odysseus and ,achilles8      ,which is 
the better of the two8 and in what      
particular does      either surpass the 
other8 ,for when you were exhibiting    
and there was company in the room1      
though ,i could not      follow you1 ,i 
did not like to ask what you meant1     
because a      crowd of people were     

present1 and ,i was afraid that the     
question might interrupt your           
exhibition4 ,but now that      there are
 not so many of us1 and my friend       
,eudicus bids me      ask1 ,i wish you  
would tell me what you were saying about
      these two heroes1 so that ,i may  
clearly understand2 how      did you    
distinguish them8    ,sidenote3         
,achilles the bravest1 ,nestor the      
wisest1 and ,odysseus the  wiliest of   
the ,greeks at ,troy4        ,hip4 ,i   
shall have much pleasure1 ,socrates1 in 
explaining      to you more clearly than
 ,i could in public my views about      
these and also about other heroes4 ,i   
say that ,homer      intended ,achilles 
to be the bravest of the men who went to
      ,troy1 ,nestor the wisest1 and    
,odysseus the wiliest4        ,soc4 ,o  
rare ,hippias1 will you be so good as   
not to      laugh1 if ,i find a         
difficulty in following you1 and repeat 
my      questions several times over8   
,please to answer me kindly      and    

gently4        ,hip4 ,i should be       
greatly ashamed of myself1 ,socrates1   
if ,i1 who teach others and take money  
of them1 could not1      when ,i was    
asked by you1 answer in a civil and     
agreeable      manner4    ,sidenote3    
,the courtesy of ,hippias4        ,soc4 
,thank you3 the fact is1 that ,i seemed 
to understand      what you meant when  
you said that the poet intended         
,achilles to be the bravest of men1 and 
also that he intended      ,nestor to be
 the wisest2 but when you said that he  
meant      ,odysseus to be the wiliest1 
,i must confess that ,i could not       
understand what you were saying4 ,will  
you tell me1 and      then ,i shall     
perhaps understand you better2 has not  
,homer      made ,achilles wily8        
,hip4 ,certainly not1 ,socrates2 he is  
the most straight-forward      of       
mankind1 and when ,homer introduces them
      talking with one another in the   
passage called the ,prayers1            
,achilles is supposed by the poet to say

 to ,odysseus3--          #8,son of     
,laertes1 sprung from heaven1 crafty    
,odysseus1 ,i will     #cfe        speak
 out plainly the word which ,i intend to
 carry out in        act1 and which     
will1 ,i believe1 be accomplished4 ,for 
,i hate        him like the gates of    
death who thinks one thing and says     
another4 ,but ,i will speak that which  
shall be accomplished4'        ,now1 in 
these verses he clearly indicates the   
character of      the two men2 he shows 
,achilles to be true and simple1 and    
,odysseus to be wily and false2 for he  
supposes ,achilles to      be addressing
 ,odysseus in these lines4    ,sidenote3
 ,wily means false3 ,and the false have 
the power of deceiving  mankind2 they   
are prudent and knowing and wise1 and   
have the ability to  speak falsely4     
,soc4 ,now1 ,hippias1 ,i think that ,i  
understand your      meaning2 when you  
say that ,odysseus is wily1 you clearly 
mean that he is false8        ,hip4     
,exactly so1 ,socrates2 it is the       

character of ,odysseus1      as he is   
represented by ,homer in many passages  
both of      the ,iliad and ,odyssey4   
,soc4 ,and ,homer must be presumed to   
have meant that      the true man is not
 the same as the false8        ,hip4 ,of
 course1 ,socrates4        ,soc4 ,and is
 that your own opinion1 ,hippias8       
,hip4 ,certainly2 how can ,i have any   
other8        ,soc4 ,well1 then1 as     
there is no possibility of asking       
,homer what he meant in these verses of 
his1 let us leave      him2 but as you  
show a willingness to take up his cause1
      and your opinion agrees with what 
you declare to be his1      will you    
answer on behalf of yourself and him8   
,hip4 ,i will2 ask shortly anything     
which you like4        ,soc4 ,do you say
 that the false1 like the sick1 have no 
power to do things1 or that they have   
the power to do things8    ,sidenote3   
,true and ,false4        ,hip4 ,i should
 say that they have power to do many    
things1      and in particular to       

deceive mankind4        ,soc4 ,then1    
according to you1 they are both powerful
 and      wily1 are they not8           
,hip4 ,yes4        ,soc4 ,and are they  
wily1 and do they deceive by reason of  
their simplicity and folly1 or by reason
 of their cunning and      a certain    
sort of prudence8        ,hip4 ,by      
reason of their cunning and prudence1   
most      certainly4        ,soc4 ,then 
they are prudent1 ,i suppose8           
,hip4 ,so they are--very4        ,soc4  
,and if they are prudent1 do they know  
or do they not      know what they do8  
,hip4 ,of course1 they know very well2  
and that is why      they do mischief to
 others4        ,soc4 ,and having this  
knowledge1 are they ignorant1 or are    
they wise8        ,hip4 ,wise1          
certainly2 at least1 in so far as they  
can      deceive4        ,soc4 ,stop1   
and let us recall to mind what you are  
saying2        #cff      are you not    
saying that the false are powerful and  
prudent      and knowing and wise in    

those things about which they are       
false8        ,hip4 ,to be sure4        
,soc4 ,and the true differ from the     
false--the true and the      false are  
the very opposite of each other8        
,hip4 ,that is my view4        ,soc4    
,then1 according to your view1 it would 
seem that      the false are to be      
ranked in the class of the powerful and 
wise8        ,hip4 ,assuredly4          
,soc4 ,and when you say that the false  
are powerful and      wise in so far as 
they are false1 do you mean that they   
have      or have not the power of      
uttering their falsehoods if they       
like8        ,hip4 ,i mean to say that  
they have the power4        ,soc4 ,in a 
word1 then1 the false are they who are  
wise and      have the power to speak   
falsely8        ,hip4 ,yes4             
,sidenote3 ,true and ,false4            
,soc4 ,then a man who has not the power 
of speaking      falsely and is ignorant
 cannot be false8        ,hip4 ,you are 
right4        ,soc4 ,and every man has  

power who does that which he      wishes
 at the time when he wishes4 ,i am not  
speaking of      any special case in    
which he is prevented by disease or     
something of that sort1 but ,i am       
speaking generally1 as ,i      might say
 of you1 that you are able to write my  
name when      you like4 ,would you not 
call a man able who could do that8      
,hip4 ,yes4        ,soc4 ,and tell me1  
,hippias1 are you not a skilful         
calculator      and arithmetician8      
,hip4 ,yes1 ,socrates1 assuredly ,i am4 
,soc4 ,and if some one were to ask you  
what is the sum of      #c multiplied by
 #gjj1 you would tell him the true      
answer in      a moment1 if you pleased8
        ,hip4 ,certainly ,i should4     
,soc4 ,is not that because you are the  
wisest and ablest of      men in these  
matters8        ,hip4 ,yes4        ,soc4
 ,and being as you are the wisest and   
ablest of men      in these matters of  
calculation1 are you not also the best8 
,hip4 ,to be sure1 ,socrates1 ,i am the 

best4        ,soc4 ,and therefore you   
would be the most able to tell the      
truth about these matters1 would you    
not8        ,hip4 ,yes1 ,i should4      
,sidenote3 ,they must truly know that   
about which they falsely speak or  they 
will fall into the error of speaking the
 truth by mistake4        ,soc4 ,and    
could you speak falsehoods about them   
equally      well8 ,i must beg1         
,hippias1 that you will answer me with  
the same frankness and magnanimity which
 has hitherto      characterized you4   
,if a person were to ask you what is the
      sum of #c multiplied by #gjj1     
would not you be the best and      most 
consistent teller of a falsehood1 having
 always the      power of speaking      
falsely as you have of speaking truly1  
about these same matters1 if you wanted 
to tell a falsehood1      and not to    
answer truly8 ,would the ignorant man be
                 #cfg      better able  
to tell a falsehood in matters of       
calculation than      you would be1 if  

you chose8 ,might he not sometimes      
stumble upon the truth1 when he wanted  
to tell a lie1 because      he did not  
know1 whereas you who are the wise man1 
if you      wanted to tell a lie would  
always and consistently lie8            
,sidenote3 ,true is false and false is  
true4        ,hip4 ,yes2 there you are  
quite right4        ,soc4 ,does the     
false man tell lies about other things1 
but      not about number1 or when he is
 making a calculation8        ,hip4 ,to 
be sure2 he would tell as many lies     
about number      as about other things4
        ,soc4 ,then may we further      
assume1 ,hippias1 that there are        
men who are false about calculation and 
number8        ,hip4 ,yes4        ,soc4 
,who can they be8 ,for you have already 
admitted      that he who is false must 
have the ability to be false3 you       
said1 as you will remember1 that he who 
is unable to be false      will not be  
false8        ,hip4 ,yes1 ,i remember2  
it was so said4        ,soc4 ,and were  

you not yourself just now shown to be   
best      able to speak falsely about   
calculation8        ,hip4 ,yes2 that was
 another thing which was said4          
,soc4 ,and are you not likewise said to 
speak truly about      calculation8     
,hip4 ,certainly4        ,soc4 ,then the
 same person is able to speak both      
falsely      and truly about            
calculation8 ,and that person is he who 
is      good at calculation--the        
arithmetician8        ,hip4 ,yes4       
,soc4 ,who1 then1 ,hippias1 is          
discovered to be false at calculation8  
,is he not the good man8 ,for the good  
man is      the able man1 and he is the 
true man4        ,hip4 ,that is evident4
    ,sidenote3 ,therefore the same man  
must be true if he is to be truly       
false1 in astronomy1 in geometry1 and in
 all the sciences4        ,soc4 ,do you 
not see1 then1 that the same man is     
false and      also true about the same 
matters8 ,and the true man is      not a
 whit better than the false2 for indeed 

he is the same      with him and not the
 very opposite1 as you were just now    
imagining4        ,hip4 ,not in that    
instance1 clearly4        ,soc4 ,shall  
we examine other instances8        ,hip4
 ,certainly1 if you are disposed4       
,soc4 ,are you not also skilled in      
geometry8        ,hip4 ,i am4           
,soc4 ,well1 and does not the same hold 
in that science      also8 ,is not the  
same person best able to speak falsely  
or      to sneak truly about diagrams2  
and he is--the geometrician8            
,sidenote3 ,the admirable versatility of
 ,hippias4        ,hip4 ,yes4           
,soc4 ,he and no one else is good at it8
        ,hip4 ,yes1 he and no one else4 
,soc4 ,then the good and wise geometer  
has this double      power in the       
highest degree2 and if there be a man   
who is      false about diagrams the    
good man will be he1 for he is able     
to be false2 whereas the bad is unable1 
and for this reason is      not false1  
as has been admitted4        ,hip4      

,true4        ,soc4 ,once more--let us  
examine a third case2 that of the       
astronomer1 in whose art1 again1 you1   
,hippias1 profess to be      a still    
greater proficient than in the          
preceding--do you not8        ,hip4     
,yes1 ,i am4                            
#cfh        ,soc4 ,and does not the same
 hold of astronomy8        ,hip4 ,true1 
,socrates4        ,soc4 ,and in         
astronomy1 too1 if any man be able to   
speak      falsely he will be the good  
astronomer1 but he who is not      able 
will not speak falsely1 for he has no   
knowledge4        ,hip4 ,clearly not4   
,soc4 ,then in astronomy also1 the same 
man will be true      and false8        
,hip4 ,it would seem so4    ,sidenote3  
,socrates is always weaving the meshes  
of an argument4    ,sidenote3 ,socrates 
compliments ,hippias on his skill in    
engraving gems1  in making clothes and  
shoes and the finest fabrics1 in writing
 poetry  and prose of the most varied   
kind1 and on the art of memory which he 

has  invented4        ,soc4 ,and now1   
,hippias1 consider the question at large
      about all the sciences1 and see   
whether the same principle      does not
 always hold4 ,i know that in most arts 
you are the      wisest of men1 as ,i   
have heard you boasting in the agora at 
the tables of the money-changers1 when  
you were setting      forth the great   
and enviable stores of your wisdom2 and 
you      said that upon one occasion1   
when you went to the ,olympic           
games1 all that you had on your person  
was made by yourself4      ,you began   
with your ring1 which was of your own   
workmanship1 and you said that you could
 engrave rings2      and you had another
 seal which was also of your own        
workmanship1      and a strigil and an  
oil flask1 which you had made           
yourself2 you said also that you had    
made the shoes which      you had on    
your feet1 and the cloak and the short  
tunic2 but      what appeared to us all 
most extraordinary and a proof of       

singular art1 was the girdle of your    
tunic1 which1 you said1      was as fine
 as the most costly ,persian fabric1 and
 of your      own weaving2 moreover1 you
 told us that you had brought      with 
you poems1 epic1 tragic1 and            
dithyrambic1 as well as      prose      
writings of the most various kinds2 and 
you said that      your skill was also  
pre-eminent in the arts which ,i was    
just      now mentioning1 and in the    
true principles of rhythm and           
harmony and of orthography2 and if ,i   
remember rightly1      there were a     
great many other accomplishments in     
which you      excelled4 ,i have        
forgotten to mention your art of memory1
      which you regard as your special  
glory1 and ,i dare say that ,i      have
 forgotten many other things2 but1 as ,i
 was saying1 only      look to your own 
arts--and there are plenty of them--and 
to      those of others2 and tell me1   
having regard to the admissions         
which you and ,i have made1 whether you 

discover any      department of art or  
any description of wisdom or cunning1   
whichever name you use1 in which the    
true and false are      different and   
not the same3 tell me1 if you can1 of   
any4 ,but       #cfi      you cannot4   
,hip4 ,not without consideration1       
,socrates4        ,soc4 ,nor will       
consideration help you1 ,hippias1 as ,i 
believe2 but then if ,i am right1       
remember what the consequence      will 
be4    ,sidenote3 ,yet he who knows and 
remembers all things can call to mind no
  instance in which the false is not    
also true1 although he was saying just  
now that ,achilles is true and ,odysseus
 false4        ,hip4 ,i do not know what
 you mean1 ,socrates4        ,soc4 ,i   
suppose that you are not using your art 
of memory1      doubtless because you   
think that such an accomplishment is    
not needed on the present occasion4 ,i  
will therefore remind      you of what  
you were saying3 were you not saying    
that      ,achilles was a true man1 and 

,odysseus false and wily8        ,hip4  
,i was4        ,soc4 ,and now do you    
perceive that the same person has       
turned out to be false as well as true8 
,if ,odysseus is false      he is also  
true1 and if ,achilles is true he is    
also false1 and so      the two men are 
not opposed to one another1 but they are
      alike4    ,sidenote3 ,the         
perverted ingenuity of ,socrates4       
,hip4 ,o ,socrates1 you are always      
weaving the meshes of an      argument1 
selecting the most difficult point1 and 
fastening      upon details instead of  
grappling with the matter in hand as a  
whole4 ,come now1 and ,i will           
demonstrate to you1 if you will         
allow me1 by many satisfactory proofs1  
that ,homer has made      ,achilles a   
better man than ,odysseus1 and a        
truthful man too2      and that he has  
made the other crafty1 and a teller of  
many      untruths1 and inferior to     
,achilles4 ,and then1 if you please1    
you shall make a speech on the other    

side1 in order to prove      that       
,odysseus is the better man2 and this   
may be compared      to mine1 and then  
the company will know which of us is the
      better speaker4    ,sidenote3     
,socrates pays ,hippias the compliment  
which he always pays to  a wise man1 of 
attending to him4 ,he proves by example 
that ,achilles1 the  true man1 is always
 uttering falsehoods1 ,odysseus1 the    
false man1 never4        ,soc4 ,o       
,hippias1 ,i do not doubt that you are  
wiser than ,i      am4 ,but ,i have a   
way1 when anybody else says anything1 of
      giving close attention to him1    
especially if the speaker appears       
to me to be a wise man4 ,having a desire
 to understand1 ,i      question him1   
and ,i examine and analyse and put      
together      what he says1 in order    
that ,i may understand2 but if the      
speaker appears to me to be a poor hand1
 ,i do not interrogate      him1 or     
trouble myself about him1 and you may   
know by this      who they are whom ,i  

deem to be wise men1 for you will see   
that when ,i am talking with a wise man1
 ,i am very attentive      to what he   
says2 and ,i ask questions of him1 in   
order that ,i      may learn1 and be    
improved by him4 ,and ,i could not help 
remarking while you were speaking1 that 
when you recited      the verses in     
which ,achilles1 as you argued1 attacks 
,odysseus      as a deceiver1 that you  
must be strangely mistaken1 because     
,odysseus1 the man of wiles1 is never   
found to tell a lie2 but      ,achilles 
is found to be wily on your own showing4
 ,at any           #cgj      rate he    
speaks falsely2 for first he utters     
these words1 which      you just now    
repeated1--          #8,he is hateful to
 me even as the gates of death who      
thinks one thing and says another3'--   
,and then he says1 a little while       
afterwards1 he will not be              
persuaded by ,odysseus and ,agamemnon1  
neither will he      remain at ,troy2   
but1 says he1--          #8,to-morrow1  

when ,i have offered sacrifices to ,zeus
 and        all the ,gods1 having loaded
 my ships well1 ,i will drag        them
 down into the deep2 and then you shall 
see1 if you        have a mind1 and if  
such things are a care to you1 early    
in the morning my ships sailing over the
 fishy ,hellespont1        and my men   
eagerly plying the oar2 and1 if the     
illustrious        shaker of the earth  
gives me a good voyage1 on the third    
day ,i shall reach the fertile ,phthia4'
        ,and before that1 when he was   
reviling ,agamemnon1 he      said1--    
#8,and now to ,phthia ,i will go1 since 
to return home in the        beaked     
ships is far better1 nor am ,i inclined 
to stay here        in dishonour and    
amass wealth and riches for you4'       
,but although on that occasion1 in the  
presence of the whole      army1 he     
spoke after this fashion1 and on the    
other occasion      to his companions1  
he appears never to have made any       
preparation      or attempt to draw down

 the ships1 as if he had the      least 
intention of sailing home2 so nobly     
regardless was he      of the truth4    
,now ,i1 ,hippias1 originally asked you 
the      question1 because ,i was in    
doubt as to which of the two      heroes
 was intended by the poet to be the     
best1 and because      ,i thought that  
both of them were the best1 and that it 
would      be difficult to decide which 
was the better of them1 not only      in
 respect of truth and falsehood1 but of 
virtue generally1 for      even in this 
matter of speaking the truth they are   
much upon      a par4    ,sidenote3     
,aye1 but the falsehood of ,achilles is 
accidental2 that of  ,odysseus          
intentional4    ,sidenote3 ,to err      
intentionally is better than            
,hip4 ,there you are wrong1 ,socrates2  
for in so far as      ,achilles speaks  
falsely1 the falsehood is obviously     
unintentional4      ,he is compelled    
against his will to remain and          
rescue the army in their misfortune4    

,but when ,odysseus      speaks falsely 
he is voluntarily and intentionally     
false4        ,soc4 ,you1 sweet         
,hippias1 like ,odysseus1 are a deceiver
      yourself4        ,hip4 ,certainly 
not1 ,socrates2 what makes you say so8  
#cga        ,soc4 ,because you say that 
,achilles does not speak falsely        
from design1 when he is not only a      
deceiver1 but besides      being a      
braggart1 in ,homer's description of him
 is so cunning1      and so far superior
 to ,odysseus in lying and pretending1  
that he dares to contradict himself1 and
 ,odysseus does not      find him out2  
at any rate he does not appear to say   
anything      to him which would imply  
that he perceived his falsehood4        
,hip4 ,what do you mean1 ,socrates8     
,soc4 ,did you not observe that         
afterwards1 when he is      speaking to 
,odysseus1 he says that he will sail    
away with the      early dawn2 but to   
,ajax he tells quite a different story8 
,hip4 ,where is that8        ,soc4      

,where he says1--          #8,i will not
 think about bloody war until the son of
 warlike        ,priam1 illustrious     
,hector1 comes to the tents and ships of
        the ,myrmidons1 slaughtering the
 ,argives1 and burning the        ships 
with fire2 and about my tent and dark   
ship1 ,i suspect        that ,hector1   
although eager for the battle1 will     
nevertheless        stay his hand4'     
,now1 do you really think1 ,hippias1    
that the son of ,thetis1      who had   
been the pupil of the sage ,cheiron1 had
 such a bad      memory1 or would have  
carried the art of lying to such an     
extent      7when he had been assailing 
liars in the most violent      terms    
only the instant before7 as to say to   
,odysseus that he      would sail away1 
and to ,ajax that he would remain1 and  
that he      was not rather practising  
upon the simplicity of ,odysseus1       
whom he regarded as an ancient1 and     
thinking that he would      get the     
better of him by his own cunning and    

falsehood8    ,sidenote3 to err         
voluntarily4        ,hip4 ,no1 ,i do not
 agree with you1 ,socrates2 but ,i      
believe      that ,achilles is induced  
to say one thing to ,ajax1 and another  
to ,odysseus in the innocence of his    
heart1 whereas ,odysseus1      whether  
he speaks falsely or truly1 speaks      
always with a      purpose4             
,sidenote3 ,that proves ,odysseus to be 
better than ,achilles4        ,soc4     
,then ,odysseus would appear after all  
to be better      than ,achilles8       
,hip4 ,certainly not1 ,socrates4        
,soc4 ,why1 were not the voluntary liars
 only just now      shown to be better  
than the involuntary8        ,hip4 ,and 
how1 ,socrates1 can those who           
intentionally err1      and voluntarily 
and designedly commit iniquities1 be    
better      than those who err and do   
wrong involuntarily8 ,surely            
#cgb      there is a great excuse to be 
made for a man telling a falsehood1     
or doing an injury or any sort of harm  

to another in      ignorance4 ,and the  
laws are obviously far more severe on   
those who lie or do evil1 voluntarily1  
than on those who do      evil          
involuntarily4    ,sidenote3 ,hippias   
grows impatient4    ,sidenote3 ,socrates
 is convinced of his own ignorance      
because he never  agrees with wise men4 
,but he is willing to learn1 and he     
desires to be  cured by ,hippias of his 
ignorance in as few words as possible4  
,soc4 ,you see1 ,hippias1 as ,i have    
already told you1 how      pertinacious 
,i am in asking questions of wise men4  
,and ,i      think that this is the only
 good point about me1 for ,i am full    
of defects1 and always getting wrong in 
some way or other4      ,my deficiency  
is proved to me by the fact that when ,i
 meet      one of you who are famous for
 wisdom1 and to whose wisdom      all   
the ,hellenes are witnesses1 ,i am found
 out to know      nothing4 ,for speaking
 generally1 ,i hardly ever have the     
same opinion about anything which you   

have1 and what proof      of ignorance  
can be greater than to differ from wise 
men8      ,but ,i have one singular good
 quality1 which is my salvation2      ,i
 am not ashamed to learn1 and ,i ask and
 enquire1 and      am very grateful to  
those who answer me1 and never fail to  
give them my grateful thanks2 and when  
,i learn a thing ,i      never deny my  
teacher1 or pretend that the lesson is a
 discovery      of my own2 but ,i praise
 his wisdom1 and proclaim      what ,i  
have learned from him4 ,and now ,i      
cannot agree in      what you are       
saying1 but ,i strongly disagree4 ,well1
 ,i know      that this is my own fault1
 and is a defect in my character1       
but ,i will not pretend to be more than 
,i am2 and my opinion1      ,hippias1 is
 the very contrary of what you are      
saying4 ,for ,i      maintain that those
 who hurt or injure mankind1 and speak  
falsely and deceive1 and err            
voluntarily1 are better far than        
those who do wrong involuntarily4       

,sometimes1 however1 ,i      am of the  
opposite opinion2 for ,i am all abroad  
in my      ideas about this matter1 a   
condition obviously occasioned by       
ignorance4 ,and just now ,i happen to be
 in a crisis of my      disorder at     
which those who err voluntarily appear  
to me      better than those who err    
involuntarily4 ,my present state of     
mind is due to our previous argument1   
which inclines me to      believe that  
in general those who do wrong           
involuntarily are      worse than those 
who do wrong voluntarily1 and therefore 
,i      hope that you will be good to   
me1 and not refuse to heal me2      for 
you will do me a much greater benefit if
 you cure my soul      of ignorance1    
than you would if you were to cure my   
body of      disease4 ,i must1 however1 
tell you beforehand1 that if you        
#cgc      make a long oration to me you 
will not cure me1 for ,i shall      not 
be able to follow you2 but if you will  
answer me1 as you      did just now1 you

 will do me a great deal of good1 and ,i
 do      not think that you will be any 
the worse yourself4 ,and ,i      have   
some claim upon you also1 ,o son of     
,apemantus1 for      you incited me to  
converse with ,hippias2 and now1 if     
,hippias      will not answer me1 you   
must entreat him on my behalf4          
,eud4 ,but ,i do not think1 ,socrates1  
that ,hippias will      require any     
entreaty of mine2 for he has already    
said that he      will refuse to answer 
no man4--,did you not say so1 ,hippias8 
,hip4 ,yes1 ,i did2 but then1 ,eudicus1 
,socrates is always      troublesome in 
an argument1 and appears to be          
dishonest#ed4        ,soc4 ,excellent   
,hippias1 ,i do not do so intentionally 
7if ,i      did1 it would show me to be 
a wise man and a master of wiles1       
as you would argue71 but                
unintentionally1 and therefore you      
must pardon me2 for1 as you say1 he who 
is unintentionally      dishonest should
 be pardoned4    ,sidenote3 ,the analogy

 of bodily exercises4        ,eud4 ,yes1
 ,hippias1 do as he says2 and for our   
sake1 and      also that you may not    
belie your profession1 answer whatever  
,socrates asks you4        ,hip4 ,i will
 answer1 as you request me2 and do you  
ask      whatever you like4             
,sidenote3 ,socrates by citation of     
instances not #8in pari materia'  proves
 that it is better to do evil           
intentionally3 e4 g4 in running1 in     
wrestling1 in the action of the body1 in
 singing1 in the use of the feet1  eyes1
 ears1 of instruments4        ,soc4 ,i  
am very desirous1 ,hippias1 of examining
 this question1      as to which are the
 better--those who err voluntarily or   
involuntarily8 ,and if you will answer  
me1 ,i think that ,i can      put you in
 the way of approaching the subject3    
,you would      admit1 would you not1   
that there are good runners8            
,hip4 ,yes4        ,soc4 ,and there are 
bad runners8        ,hip4 ,yes4         
,soc4 ,and he who runs well is a good   

runner1 and he who      runs ill is a   
bad runner8        ,hip4 ,very true4    
,soc4 ,and he who runs slowly runs ill1 
and he who runs      quickly runs well8 
,hip4 ,yes4        ,soc4 ,then in a     
race1 and in running1 swiftness is a    
good1      and slowness is an evil      
quality8        ,hip4 ,to be sure4      
,soc4 ,which of the two then is a better
 runner8 ,he who      runs slowly       
voluntarily1 or he who runs slowly      
involuntarily8        ,hip4 ,he who runs
 slowly voluntarily4        ,soc4 ,and  
is not running a species of doing8      
,hip4 ,certainly4        ,soc4 ,and if a
 species of doing1 a species of action8 
,hip4 ,yes4        ,soc4 ,then he who   
runs badly does a bad and dishonourable 
action in a race8        ,hip4 ,yes2 a  
bad action1 certainly4        ,soc4 ,and
 he who runs slowly runs badly8         
,hip4 ,yes4        ,soc4 ,then the good 
runner does this bad and disgraceful    
action voluntarily1 and the bad         
involuntarily8        ,hip4 ,that is to 

be inferred4        ,soc4 ,then he who  
involuntarily does evil actions1 is     
worse      in a race than he who does   
them voluntarily8        ,hip4 ,yes1 in 
a race4    ,sidenote3 ,the analogy of   
the human faculties1        ,soc4 ,well2
 but at a wrestling match--which is the 
better          #cgd      wrestler1 he  
who falls voluntarily or involuntarily8 
,hip4 ,he who falls voluntarily1        
doubtless4        ,soc4 ,and is it worse
 or more dishonourable at a wrestling   
match1 to fall1 or to throw another8    
,hip4 ,to fall4        ,soc4 ,then1 at a
 wrestling match1 he who voluntarily    
does      base and dishonourable actions
 is a better wrestler than he      who  
does them involuntarily8        ,hip4   
,that appears to be the truth4          
,soc4 ,and what would you say of any    
other bodily exercise--is      not he   
who is better made able to do both that 
which is      strong and that which is  
weak--that which is fair and that       
which is foul8--so that when he does bad

 actions with the      body1 he who is  
better made does them voluntarily1 and  
he      who is worse made does them     
involuntarily4        ,hip4 ,yes1 that  
appears to be true about strength4      
,soc4 ,and what do you say about grace1 
,hippias8 ,is not      he who is better 
made able to assume evil and disgraceful
      figures and postures voluntarily1 
as he who is worse made      assumes    
them involuntarily8        ,hip4 ,true4 
,soc4 ,then voluntary ungracefulness    
comes from excellence      of the bodily
 frame1 and involuntary from the defect 
of the      bodily frame8        ,hip4  
,true4        ,soc4 ,and what would you 
say of an unmusical voice2      would   
you prefer the voice which is           
voluntarily or involuntarily      out of
 tune8        ,hip4 ,that which is      
voluntarily out of tune4        ,soc4   
,the involuntary is the worse of the    
two8        ,hip4 ,yes4        ,soc4    
,and would you choose to possess goods  
or evils8        ,hip4 ,goods4          

,soc4 ,and would you rather have feet   
which are voluntarily      or           
involuntarily lame8        ,hip4 ,feet  
which are voluntarily lame4        ,soc4
 ,but is not lameness a defect or       
deformity8        ,hip4 ,yes4           
,soc4 ,and is not blinking a defect in  
the eyes8    ,sidenote3 of implements1  
arts1 etc41 confirms the view of        
,socrates4        ,hip4 ,yes4           
,soc4 ,and would you rather always have 
eyes with which      you might          
voluntarily blink and not see1 or with  
which you      might involuntarily      
blink8        ,hip4 ,i would rather have
 eyes which voluntarily blink4          
,soc4 ,then in your own case you deem   
that which voluntarily      acts ill1   
better than that which involuntarily    
acts      ill8        ,hip4 ,yes1       
certainly1 in cases such as you mention4
        ,soc4 ,and does not the same    
hold of ears1 nostrils1      mouth1 and 
of all the senses--those which          
involuntarily      act ill are not to be

 desired1 as being defective2 and those 
which voluntarily act ill are to be     
desired as being good8        ,hip4 ,i  
agree4        ,soc4 ,and what would you 
say of instruments2--which are      the 
better sort of instruments to have to do
 with8--those      with which a man acts
 ill voluntarily or involuntarily8 ,for 
example1 had a man better have a rudder 
with which he will      steer ill1      
voluntarily or involuntarily8           
,hip4 ,he had better have a rudder with 
which he will      steer ill            
voluntarily4        ,soc4 ,and does not 
the same hold of the bow and the lyre1  
the flute and all other things8         
,hip4 ,very true4        ,soc4 ,and     
would you rather have a horse of such a 
temper      that you may ride him ill   
voluntarily or involuntarily8           
,sidenote3 ,it is true also of animals1 
in the practice of archery1 of          
medicine1 in the characters of slaves4  
,hip4 ,i would rather have a horse which
 ,i could ride ill          #cge        

voluntarily4        ,soc4 ,that would be
 the better horse8        ,hip4 ,yes4   
,soc4 ,then with a horse of better      
temper1 vicious actions      would be   
produced voluntarily2 and with a horse  
of bad      temper involuntarily8       
,hip4 ,certainly4        ,soc4 ,and that
 would be true of a dog1 or of any other
      animal8        ,hip4 ,yes4        
,soc4 ,and is it better to possess the  
mind of an archer who      voluntarily  
or involuntarily misses the mark8       
,hip4 ,of him who voluntarily misses4   
,sidenote3 ,hippias cannot agree with   
,socrates1        ,soc4 ,this would be  
the better mind for the purposes of     
archery8        ,hip4 ,yes4        ,soc4
 ,then the mind which involuntarily errs
 is worse than      the mind which errs 
voluntarily8        ,hip4 ,yes1         
certainly1 in the use of the bow4       
,soc4 ,and what would you say of the art
 of medicine2--has      not the mind    
which voluntarily works harm to the     
body1      more of the healing art8     

,hip4 ,yes4        ,soc4 ,then in the   
art of medicine the voluntary is better 
than the involuntary8        ,hip4 ,yes4
        ,soc4 ,well1 and in lute-playing
 and in flute-playing1 and in      all  
arts and sciences1 is not that mind the 
better which      voluntarily does what 
is evil and dishonourable1 and goes     
wrong1 and is not the worse that which  
does so involuntarily8        ,hip4     
,that is evident4        ,soc4 ,and what
 would you say of the characters of     
slaves8      ,should we not prefer to   
have those who voluntarily do      wrong
 and make mistakes1 and are they not    
better in their      mistakes than those
 who commit them involuntarily8         
,hip4 ,yes4        ,soc4 ,and should we 
not desire to have our own minds in     
the best state possible8        ,hip4   
,yes4        ,soc4 ,and will our minds  
be better if they do wrong and      make
 mistakes voluntarily or involuntarily8 
,sidenote3 ,hippias revolts at the      
conclusion4        ,hip4 ,o1 ,socrates1 

it would be a monstrous thing to say    
that those who do wrong voluntarily are 
better than those      who do wrong     
involuntarily6        ,soc4 ,and yet    
that appears to be the only inference4  
,hip4 ,i do not think so4    ,sidenote3 
,socrates recapitulates the argument4   
,soc4 ,but ,i imagined1 ,hippias1 that  
you did4 ,please to      answer once    
more3 ,is not justice a power1 or       
knowledge1 or      both8 ,must not      
justice1 at all events1 be one of these8
        ,hip4 ,yes4        ,soc4 ,but if
 justice is a power of the soul1 then   
the soul      which has the greater     
power is also the more just2 for that   
which has the greater power1 my good    
friend1 has been      proved by us to be
 the better4    ,sidenote3 nor ,socrates
 with himself4        ,hip4 ,yes1 that  
has been proved4        ,soc4 ,and if   
justice is knowledge1 then the wiser    
will be      the juster soul1 and the   
more ignorant the more unjust8          
,hip4 ,yes4        ,soc4 ,but if justice

 be power as well as knowledge--then    
will not the soul which has both        
knowledge and power be      the more    
just1 and that which is the more        
ignorant be the      more unjust8 ,must 
it not be so8        ,hip4 ,clearly4    
,soc4 ,and is not the soul which has the
 greater power and      wisdom also     
better1 and better able to do both good 
and evil      in every action8          
,hip4 ,certainly4        ,soc4 ,the     
soul1 then1 which acts ill1 acts        
voluntarily by         #cgf      power  
and art--and these either one or both of
 them are      elements of justice8     
,hip4 ,that seems to be true4           
,soc4 ,and to do injustice is to do ill1
 and not to do injustice      is to do  
well8        ,hip4 ,yes4        ,soc4   
,and will not the better and abler soul 
when it      does wrong1 do wrong       
voluntarily1 and the bad soul           
involuntarily8        ,hip4 ,clearly4   
,soc4 ,and the good man is he who has   
the good soul1 and      the bad man is  

he who has the bad8        ,hip4 ,yes4  
,soc4 ,then the good man will           
voluntarily do wrong1 and      the bad  
man involuntarily1 if the good man is he
 who has the      good soul8            
,hip4 ,which he certainly has4          
,sidenote3 ,hippias1 who has admitted   
the previous deductions1 rebels at  the 
final one4 ,socrates is himself         
dissatisfied4 ,what remains if ,socrates
  and a wiser than ,socrates are alike  
in doubt8        ,soc4 ,then1 ,hippias1 
he who voluntarily does wrong and       
disgraceful things1 if there be such a  
man1 will be the good      man8         
,hip4 ,there ,i cannot agree with you4  
,sidenote3 ,socrates thinks the matter  
serious4        ,soc4 ,nor can ,i agree 
with myself1 ,hippias2 and yet that     
seems to be the conclusion which1 as far
 as we can see at      present1 must    
follow from our argument4 ,as ,i was    
saying      before1 ,i am all abroad1   
and being in perplexity am always       
changing my opinion4 ,now1 that ,i or   

any ordinary man      should wander in  
perplexity is not surprising2 but if you
      wise men also wander1 and we      
cannot come to you and rest      from   
our wandering1 the matter begins to be  
serious both to      us and to you4     
,,footnotes    #ec ,cp4 ,gorgias #ddh   
,a4    #ed ,cp4 ,gorgias #dii1 #eje2    
,rep4 vi4 #dhg4          ,,alcibiades   
,i4      ,,introduction4    ,sidenote3  
,alcibiades ,i4    ,the ,first          
,alcibiades is a conversation between   
,socrates and ,alcibiades4  ,socrates is
 represented in the character which he  
attributes to himself  in the ,apology  
of a know-nothing who detects the       
conceit of knowledge in  others4 ,the   
two have met already in the ,protagoras 
and in the ,symposium2  in the latter   
dialogue1 as in this1 the relation      
between them is that  of a lover and his
 beloved4 ,but the narrative of their   
loves is told  differently in different 
places2 for in the ,symposium           
,alcibiades is  depicted as the         

impassioned but rejected lover2 here1 as
 coldly receiving  the advances of      
,socrates1 who1 for the best of         
purposes1 lies in wait for  the aspiring
 and ambitious youth4    ,sidenote3     
,,analysis4        ,alcibiades1 who is  
described as a very young man1 is       
,steph4 #ajc      about to enter on     
public life1 having an inordinate       
opinion of      himself1 and an         
extravagant ambition4 ,socrates1 #8who  
knows what is      in man1' astonishes  
him by a revelation of his designs4 ,but
 has   -#ajf      he the knowledge which
 is necessary for carrying them out8 ,he
 is      going to persuade the          
,athenians--about what8 ,not about any  
#ajg      particular art1 but about     
politics--when to fight and when to make
      peace4 ,now1 men should fight and 
make peace on just grounds1      and    
therefore the question of justice and   
injustice must enter into      peace and
 war2 and he who advises the ,athenians 
must know         -#aji      the        

difference between them4 ,does          
,alcibiades know8 ,if he      does1 he  
must either have been taught by some    
master1 or he      must have discovered 
the nature of them himself4 ,if he has  
had      a master1 ,socrates would like 
to be informed who he is1 that he       
may go and learn of him also4           
,alcibiades admits that he has          
#aaj      never learned4 ,then has he   
enquired for himself8 ,he may      have1
 if he was ever aware of a time when he 
was ignorant4 ,but      he never was    
ignorant2 for when he played with other 
boys at dice1      he charged them with 
cheating1 and this implied a knowledge  
of      just and unjust4 ,according to  
his own explanation1 he had learned     
of the multitude4 ,why1 he asks1 should 
he not learn of them the      nature of 
justice1 as he has learned the ,greek   
language of them8      ,to this         
,socrates answers1 that they can teach  
,greek1 but they      #aaa      cannot  
teach justice2 for they are agreed about

 the one1 but they      are not agreed  
about the other3 and therefore          
,alcibiades1 who      #aab      has     
admitted that if he knows he must either
 have learned from      a master or have
 discovered for himself the nature of   
justice1 is      convicted out of his   
own mouth4                              
#aac    ,sidenote3 ,analysis #aaj-abf4  
,alcibiades rejoins1 that the ,athenians
 debate not about what is      just1 but
 about what is expedient2 and he asserts
 that the two      principles of justice
 and expediency are opposed4 ,socrates1 
by a   #aad      series of questions1   
compels him to admit that the just and  
the      expedient coincide4 ,alcibiades
 is thus reduced to the humiliating     
-#aag      conclusion that he knows     
nothing of politics1 even if1 as he     
says1      they are concerned with the  
expedient4        ,however1 he is no    
worse than other ,athenian statesmen2   
and      he will not need training1 for 
others are as ignorant as he is4        

,he is reminded that he has to contend1 
not only with his own      countrymen1  
but with their enemies--with the        
,spartan kings and     -#abj      with  
the great king of ,persia2 and he can   
only attain this higher      aim of     
ambition by the assistance of ,socrates4
 ,not that ,socrates      himself       
professes to have attained the truth1   
but the questions      which he asks    
bring others to a knowledge of          
themselves1 and      this is the first  
step in the practice of virtue4         
,the dialogue continues3--,we wish to   
become as good as              -#abd    
possible4 ,but to be good in what8      
,alcibiades replies--#8,good in         
transacting business4' ,but what        
business8 #8,the business of the        
#abe      most intelligent men at       
,athens4' ,the cobbler is intelligent in
      shoemaking1 and is therefore good 
in that2 he is not intelligent1      and
 therefore not good1 in weaving4 ,is he 
good in the sense      which ,alcibiades

 means1 who is also bad8 #8,i mean1'    
replies      ,alcibiades1 #8the man who 
is able to command in the city4' ,but to
      command what--horses or men8 and  
if men1 under what circumstances8       
#8,i mean to say1 that he is able to    
command men living      in social and   
political relations4' ,and what is their
 aim8 #8,the      better preservation of
 the city4' ,but when is a city better8 
#abf      #8,when there is unanimity1   
such as exists between husband and      
wife4' ,then1 when husbands and wives   
perform their own             #abg      
special duties1 there can be no         
unanimity between them2 nor can      a  
city be well ordered when each citizen  
does his own work only4                 
,alcibiades1 having stated first that   
goodness consists in the      unanimity 
of the citizens1 and then in each of    
them doing his      own separate work1  
is brought to the required point of     
self-contradiction1 leading him to      
confess his own ignorance4      #abh    

,sidenote3 ,analysis #abg-ace4          
,but he is not too old to learn1 and may
 still arrive at the truth1      if he  
is willing to be cross-examined by      
,socrates4 ,he must know    #abi        
himself2 that is to say1 not his body1  
or the things of the body1      but his 
mind1 or truer self4 ,the physician     
knows the body1 and      the tradesman  
knows his own business1 but they do not 
necessarily      know themselves4       
,self-knowledge can be obtained only    
by looking into the mind and virtue of  
the soul1 which is the     -#acb        
diviner part of a man1 as we see our own
 image in another's eye4      ,and if we
 do not know ourselves1 we cannot know  
what belongs      to ourselves or       
belongs to others1 and are unfit to take
 a part in      political affairs4 ,both
 for the sake of the individual and of  
the -#acd      state1 we ought to aim at
 justice and temperance1 not at wealth  
or      power4 ,the evil and unjust     
should have no power1--they should      

be the slaves of better men than        
themselves4 ,none but the          #ace 
virtuous are deserving of freedom4      
,and are you1 ,alcibiades1 a freeman8   
#8,i feel that ,i am not2 but      ,i   
hope1 ,socrates1 that by your aid ,i may
 become free1 and from      this day    
forward ,i will never leave you4'       
99       99       99       99       99  
,sidenote3 ,,introduction4    ,the      
,alcibiades has several points of       
resemblance to the undoubted  dialogues 
of ,plato4 ,the process of interrogation
 is of the same kind  with that which   
,socrates practises upon the youthful   
,cleinias in the  ,euthydemus2 and he   
characteristically attributes to        
,alcibiades the  answers which he has   
elicited from him4 ,the definition of   
good is  narrowed by successive         
questions1 and virtue is shown to be    
identical  with knowledge4 ,here1 as    
elsewhere1 ,socrates awakens the        
consciousness  not of sin but of        
ignorance4 ,self-humiliation is the     

first step to  knowledge1 even of the   
commonest things4 ,no man knows how     
ignorant he  is1 and no man can arrive  
at virtue and wisdom who has not once in
 his  life1 at least1 been convicted of 
error4 ,the process by which the soul is
  elevated is not unlike that which     
religious writers describe under the    
name of #8conversion1' if we substitute 
the sense of ignorance for the          
consciousness of sin4    ,sidenote3     
,genuineness of the dialogue4    ,in    
some respects the dialogue differs from 
any other ,platonic  composition4 ,the  
aim is more directly ethical and        
hortatory2 the process  by which the    
antagonist is undermined is simpler than
 in other ,platonic  writings1 and the  
conclusion more decided4 ,there is a    
good deal of  humour in the manner in   
which the pride of ,alcibiades1 and of  
the ,greeks  generally1 is supposed to  
be taken down by the ,spartan and       
,persian  queens2 and the dialogue has  
considerable dialectical merit4 ,but we 

have  a difficulty in supposing that the
 same writer1 who has given so profound 
and complex a notion of the characters  
both of ,alcibiades and ,socrates  in   
the ,symposium1 should have treated them
 in so thin and superficial a  manner in
 the ,alcibiades1 or that he would have 
ascribed to the ironical  ,socrates the 
rather unmeaning boast that ,alcibiades 
could not attain the  objects of his    
ambition without his help 7#aje ,d      
foll472 or that he should  have imagined
 that a mighty nature like his could    
have been reformed by  a few not very   
conclusive words of ,socrates4 ,for the 
arguments by which  ,alcibiades is      
reformed are not convincing2 the writer 
of the dialogue1  whoever he was1       
arrives at his idealism by crooked and  
tortuous paths1 in  which many pitfalls 
are concealed4 ,the anachronism of      
making ,alcibiades  about twenty years  
old during the life of his uncle1       
,pericles1 may be  noted2 and the       
repetition of the favourite observation1

 which occurs  also in the ,laches and  
,protagoras1 that great ,athenian       
statesmen1 like  ,pericles1 failed in   
the education of their sons4 ,there is  
none of the  undoubted dialogues of     
,plato in which there is so little      
dramatic  verisimilitude4               
,,alcibiades ,i4    ,,persons ,,of ,,the
 ,,dialogue4    ,,alcibiades1           
,,socrates4    ,sidenote3 ,alcibiades   
,i4    ,sidenote3 ,the pride of         
,alcibiades has been too much for his   
lovers4        ,socrates4 ,i dare say   
that you may be surprised to find1      
,steph4 #ajc      ,o son of ,cleinias1  
that ,i1 who am your first lover1 not   
having      spoken to you for many      
years1 when the rest of the world       
were wearying you with their attentions1
 am the last of your      lovers who    
still speaks to you4 ,the cause of my   
silence has      been that ,i was       
hindered by a power more than human1 of 
which ,i will some day explain to you   
the nature2 this impediment      has now

 been removed2 ,i therefore here present
      myself before you1 and ,i greatly 
hope that no similar      hindrance will
 again occur4 ,meanwhile1 ,i have       
observed      that your pride has been  
too much for the pride of your          
admirers2 they were numerous and        
high-spirited1 but they      have all   
run away1 overpowered by your superior  
force of      character2 not one of them
 remains4 ,and ,i want you to           
#ajd      understand the reason why you 
have been too much for      them4 ,you  
think that you have no need of them or  
of any      other man1 for you have     
great possessions and lack nothing1     
beginning with the body1 and ending with
 the soul4 ,in the      first place1 you
 say to yourself that you are the       
fairest and      tallest of the         
citizens1 and this every one who has    
eyes may      see to be true2 in the    
second place1 that you are among the    
noblest of them1 highly connected both  
on the father's and      the mother's   

side1 and sprung from one of the most   
distinguished      families in your own 
state1 which is the greatest in         
,hellas1 and having many friends and    
kinsmen of the best      sort1 who can  
assist you when in need2 and there is   
one      potent relative1 who is more to
 you than all the rest1 ,pericles       
the son of ,xanthippus1 whom your father
 left guardian of      you1 and of your 
brother1 and who can do as he pleases   
not only in this city1 but in all       
,hellas1 and among many and      mighty 
barbarous nations4 ,moreover1 you are   
rich2 but ,i      must say that you     
value yourself least of all upon your   
possessions4 ,and all these things have 
lifted you up2 you      have overcome   
your lovers1 and they have acknowledged 
that      you were too much for them4   
,have you not remarked their            
absence8 ,and now ,i know that you      
wonder why ,i1 unlike      the rest of  
them1 have not gone away1 and what can  
be my      motive in remaining4         

,sidenote3 ,the extravagant aspiration  
,alcibiades4 ,perhaps1 ,socrates1 you   
are not aware that ,i was      just     
going to ask you the very same          
question--,what do you      want8 ,and  
what is your motive in annoying me1 and 
always1 wherever ,i am1 making a point  
of coming#ee8 ,i do      really wonder  
what you mean1 and should greatly like  
to      know4        ,soc4 ,then if1 as 
you say1 you desire to know1 ,i suppose 
that      you will be willing to hear1  
and ,i may consider myself to be        
speaking to an auditor who will remain1 
and will not run      away8        ,al4 
,certainly1 let me hear4        ,soc4   
,you had better be careful1 for ,i may  
very likely be as      unwilling to end 
as ,i have hitherto been to begin4      
,al4 ,proceed1 my good man1 and ,i will 
listen4    ,sidenote3 ,alcibiades a     
lover1 not of pleasure1 but of ambition2
 and he  requires the help of ,socrates 
for the accomplishment of his designs4  
,sidenote3 ,and this is the reason why  

,socrates has clung to him2 he is       
hoping when ,alcibiades has become the  
ruler of ,athens to rule over him4      
,sidenote3 in which ,alcibiades         
indulges4        ,soc4 ,i will proceed2 
and1 although no lover likes to speak   
with one who has no feeling of love in  
him#ef1 ,i will make an      effort1 and
 tell you what ,i meant3 ,my love1      
,alcibiades1 which      #aje      ,i    
hardly like to confess1 would long ago  
have passed away1 as      ,i flatter    
myself1 if ,i saw you loving your good  
things1 or      thinking that you ought 
to pass life in the enjoyment of them4  
,but ,i shall reveal other thoughts of  
yours1 which you keep to      yourself2 
whereby you will know that ,i have      
always had my      eye on you4 ,suppose 
that at this moment some ,god came      
to you and said3 ,alcibiades1 will you  
live as you are1 or die      in an      
instant if you are forbidden to make any
 further acquisition8--,i      verily   
believe that you would choose death4    

,and ,i will tell you the hope in which 
you are at present      living3 ,before 
many days have elapsed1 you think that  
you      will come before the ,athenian 
assembly1 and will prove to      them   
that you are more worthy of honour than 
,pericles1 or      any other man that   
ever lived1 and having proved this1 you 
will have the greatest power in the     
state4 ,when you have      gained the   
greatest power among us1 you will go on 
to other      ,hellenic states1 and not 
only to ,hellenes1 but to all the       
barbarians      who inhabit the same    
continent with us4 ,and if the      ,god
 were then to say to you again3 ,here in
 ,europe is to be      your seat of     
empire1 and you must not cross over into
 ,asia or      meddle with ,asiatic     
affairs1 ,i do not believe that you     
would      choose to live upon these    
terms2 but the world1 as ,i may say1    
must be filled with your power and      
name--no man less than      ,cyrus and  
,xerxes is of any account with you4     

,such ,i know      to be your hopes--,i 
am not guessing only--and very likely   
you1 who know that ,i am speaking the   
truth1 will reply1 ,well1               
,socrates1 but what have my hopes to do 
with the explanation      which you     
promised of your unwillingness to leave 
me8      ,and that is what ,i am now    
going to tell you1 sweet son      of    
,cleinias and ,dinomach4 ,the           
explanation is1 that all      these     
designs of yours cannot be accomplished 
by you      without my help2 so great is
 the power which ,i believe      myself 
to have over you and your concerns2 and 
this      ,i conceive to be the reason  
why the ,god has hitherto forbidden     
me to converse with you1 and ,i have    
been long      expecting his permission4
 ,for1 as you hope to prove your        
own great value to the state1 and having
 proved it1 to attain      at once to   
absolute power1 so do ,i indulge a hope 
that ,i shall      have the supreme     
power over you1 if ,i am able to prove  

my      own great value to you1 and to  
show you that neither      guardian1 nor
 kinsman1 nor any one is able to deliver
 into      your hands the power which   
you desire1 but ,i only1 ,god      being
 my helper4 ,when you were young#eg and 
your hopes      were not yet matured1 ,i
 should have wasted my time1 and        
therefore1 as ,i conceive1 the ,god     
forbade me to converse with      #ajf   
you2 but now1 having his permission1 ,i 
will speak1 for now      you will listen
 to me4    ,sidenote3 ,alcibiades does  
not deny the impeachment4    ,sidenote3 
,the qualifications of ,alcibiades for  
statesmanship        ,al4 ,your silence1
 ,socrates1 was always a surprise to me4
      ,i never could understand why you 
followed me about1 and      now that you
 have begun to speak again1 ,i am still 
more      amazed4 ,whether ,i think all 
this or not1 is a matter about          
which you seem to have already made up  
your mind1 and      therefore my denial 
will have no effect upon you4 ,but      

granting1 if ,i must1 that you have     
perfectly divined my purposes1      why 
is your assistance necessary to the     
attainment of      them8 ,can you tell  
me why8        ,soc4 ,you want to know  
whether ,i can make a long speech1      
such as you are in the habit of hearing2
 but that is not my      way4 ,i think1 
however1 that ,i can prove to you the   
truth of      what ,i am saying1 if you 
will grant me one little favour4        
,al4 ,yes1 if the favour which you mean 
be not a troublesome      one4          
,soc4 ,will you be troubled at having   
questions to answer8    ,sidenote3      
,alcibiades is willing to answer        
questions4        ,al4 ,not at all4     
,soc4 ,then please to answer4           
,al4 ,ask me4        ,soc4 ,have you not
 the intention which ,i attribute to    
you8        ,al4 ,i will grant anything 
you like1 in the hope of hearing        
what more you have to say4        ,soc4 
,you do1 then1 mean1 as ,i was saying1  
to come forward      in a little while  

in the character of an adviser of the   
,athenians8 ,and suppose that when you  
are ascending the      bema1 ,i pull you
 by the sleeve and say1 ,alcibiades1 you
 are      getting up to advise the      
,athenians--do you know the matter      
about which they are going to           
deliberate1 better than they8--,how     
would you answer8    ,sidenote3 ,he is  
going to advise the ,athenians about    
matters which he  knows better than     
they4        ,al4 ,i should reply1 that 
,i was going to advise them about a     
matter which ,i do know better than     
they4        ,soc4 ,then you are a good 
adviser about the things which      you 
know8        ,al4 ,certainly4           
,soc4 ,and do you know anything but what
 you have learned      of others1 or    
found out yourself8        ,al4 ,that is
 all4        ,soc4 ,and would you have  
ever learned or discovered anything1    
if you had not been willing either to   
learn of others or      to examine      
yourself8        ,al4 ,i should not4    

,sidenote3 are tested by ,socrates4     
,soc4 ,and would you have been willing  
to learn or to      examine what you    
supposed that you knew8        ,al4     
,certainly not4        ,soc4 ,then there
 was a time when you thought that you   
did      not know what you are now      
supposed to know8        ,al4           
,certainly4    ,sidenote3 ,but when did 
he ever learn about these matters8      
,soc4 ,i think that ,i know tolerably   
well the extent of your                 
acquirements2 and you must tell me if ,i
 forget any of them3      according to  
my recollection1 you learned the arts of
 writing1      of playing on the lyre1  
and of wrestling2 the flute you never   
would learn2 this is the sum of your    
accomplishments1 unless      there were 
some which you acquired in secret2 and  
,i think      that secrecy was hardly   
possible1 as you could not have come    
out of your door1 either by day or      
night1 without my seeing      you4      
,al4 ,yes1 that was the whole of my     

schooling4        ,soc4 ,and are you    
going to get up in the ,athenian        
assembly1       #ajg      and give them 
advice about writing8        ,al4 ,no1  
indeed4        ,soc4 ,or about the touch
 of the lyre8        ,al4 ,certainly    
not4        ,soc4 ,and they are not in  
the habit of deliberating about         
wrestling1 in the assembly8        ,al4 
,hardly4        ,soc4 ,then what are the
 deliberations in which you propose     
to advise them8 ,surely not about       
building8        ,al4 ,no4        ,soc4 
,for the builder will advise better than
 you will about      that8        ,al4  
,he will4        ,soc4 ,nor about       
divination8        ,al4 ,no4            
,soc4 ,about that again the diviner will
 advise better than      you will8      
,al4 ,true4        ,soc4 ,whether he be 
little or great1 good or ill-looking1   
noble or ignoble--makes no difference4  
,al4 ,certainly not4        ,soc4 ,a man
 is a good adviser about anything1 not  
because      he has riches1 but because 

he has knowledge8    ,sidenote3 ,the    
cross-examination of        ,al4        
,assuredly4        ,soc4 ,whether their 
counsellor is rich or poor1 is not a    
matter which will make any difference to
 the ,athenians when      they are      
deliberating about the health of the    
citizens2 they      only require that he
 should be a physician4        ,al4 ,of 
course4        ,soc4 ,then what will be 
the subject of deliberation about       
which you will be justified in getting  
up and advising them8        ,al4 ,about
 their own concerns1 ,socrates4         
,soc4 ,you mean about shipbuilding1 for 
example1 when the      question is what 
sort of ships they ought to build8      
,al4 ,no1 ,i should not advise them     
about that4        ,soc4 ,i suppose1    
because you do not understand           
shipbuilding3--is      that the reason8 
,al4 ,it is4        ,soc4 ,then about   
what concerns of theirs will you advise 
them8    ,sidenote3 ,he will advise them
 about war and peace1 and with whom they

  had better go to war1 and when and how
 long4        ,al4 ,about war1          
,socrates1 or about peace1 or about any 
other concerns of the state4            
,soc4 ,you mean1 when they deliberate   
with whom they      ought to make peace1
 and with whom they ought to go to      
war1 and in what manner8        ,al4    
,yes4        ,soc4 ,and they ought to go
 to war with those against whom      it 
is better to go to war8        ,al4     
,yes4        ,soc4 ,and when it is      
better8        ,al4 ,certainly4         
,soc4 ,and for as long a time as is     
better8        ,al4 ,yes4        ,soc4  
,but suppose the ,athenians to          
deliberate with whom      they ought to 
close in wrestling1 and whom they should
      grasp by the hand1 would you1 or  
the master of gymnastics1      be a     
better adviser of them8        ,al4     
,clearly1 the master of gymnastics4     
,soc4 ,and can you tell me on what      
grounds the master of      gymnastics   
would decide1 with whom they ought or   

ought not      to close1 and when and   
how8 ,to take an instance3 ,would       
he not say that they should wrestle with
 those against whom      it is best to  
wrestle8    ,sidenote3 ,alcibiades is   
continued4        ,al4 ,yes4            
,soc4 ,and as much as is best8          
#ajh        ,al4 ,certainly4            
,soc4 ,and at such times as are best8   
,al4 ,yes4        ,soc4 ,again2 you     
sometimes accompany the lyre with the   
song and dance8        ,al4 ,yes4       
,soc4 ,when it is well to do so8        
,al4 ,yes4        ,soc4 ,and as much as 
is well8        ,al4 ,just so4          
,soc4 ,and as you speak of an excellence
 or art of the best      in wrestling1  
and of an excellence in playing the     
lyre1 ,i wish      you would tell me    
what this latter is2--the excellence of 
wrestling ,i call gymnastic1 and ,i want
 to know what you call      the other4  
,al4 ,i do not understand you4          
,soc4 ,then try to do as ,i do2 for the 
answer which ,i gave      is universally

 right1 and when ,i say right1 ,i mean  
according      to rule4        ,al4     
,yes4        ,soc4 ,and was not the art 
of which ,i spoke gymnastic8        ,al4
 ,certainly4        ,soc4 ,and ,i called
 the excellence in wrestling gymnastic8 
,al4 ,you did4        ,soc4 ,and ,i was 
right8        ,al4 ,i think that you    
were4    ,sidenote3 ,alcibiades should  
learn to argue nicely4        ,soc4     
,well1 now1--for you should learn to    
argue prettily--let      me ask you in  
return to tell me1 first1 what is that  
art of      which playing and singing1  
and stepping properly in the dance1     
are parts1--what is the name of the     
whole8 ,i think that by      this time  
you must be able to tell4        ,al4   
,indeed ,i cannot4        ,soc4 ,then   
let me put the matter in another way3   
what      do you call the ,goddesses who
 are the patronesses of      art8       
,al4 ,the ,muses do you mean1 ,socrates8
        ,soc4 ,yes1 ,i do2 and what is  
the name of the art which is      called

 after them8    ,sidenote3 ,what is the 
better8        ,al4 ,i suppose that you 
mean music4    ,sidenote3 ,what is the  
meaning of #8the better1' #8the more    
excellent4'        ,soc4 ,yes1 that is  
my meaning2 and what is the excellence  
of the art of music1 as ,i told you     
truly that the excellence of            
wrestling was gymnastic--what is the    
excellence of music--to      be what8   
,al4 ,to be musical1 ,i suppose4        
,soc4 ,very good2 and now please to tell
 me what is the      excellence of war  
and peace2 as the more musical was the  
more excellent1 or the more gymnastical 
was the more excellent1      tell me1   
what name do you give to the more       
excellent in      war and peace8        
,al4 ,but ,i really cannot tell you4    
,sidenote3 ,the term better1 when       
applied to food1 means more wholesome4  
,soc4 ,but if you were offering advice  
to another and said      to him--,this  
food is better than that1 at this time  
and in this      quantity1 and he said  

to you--,what do you mean1 ,alcibiades1 
by the word #8better'8 you would have no
 difficulty in replying      that you   
meant #8more wholesome1' although you do
 not      profess to be a physician3 and
 when the subject is one of      which  
you profess to have knowledge1 and about
 which you      are ready to get up and 
advise as if you knew1 are you not      
ashamed1 when you are asked1 not to be  
able to answer the      question8 ,is it
 not disgraceful8                       
#aji        ,al4 ,very4        ,soc4    
,well1 then1 consider and try to explain
 what is the      meaning of #8better1' 
in the matter of making peace and going 
to war with those against whom you ought
 to go to war8 ,to      what does the   
word refer8        ,al4 ,i am thinking1 
and ,i cannot tell4        ,soc4 ,but   
you surely know what are the charges    
which we      bring against one another1
 when we arrive at the point of         
making war1 and what name we give them8 
,al4 ,yes1 certainly2 we say that deceit

 or violence has been      employed1 or 
that we have been defrauded4            
,soc4 ,and how does this happen8 ,will  
you tell me how8      ,for there may be 
a difference in the manner4        ,al4 
,do you mean by #8how1' ,socrates1      
whether we suffered      these things   
justly or unjustly8        ,soc4        
,exactly4        ,al4 ,there can be no  
greater difference than between just    
and unjust4    ,sidenote3 ,what is the  
better8        ,soc4 ,and would you     
advise the ,athenians to go to war with 
the just or with the unjust8        ,al4
 ,that is an awkward question2 for      
certainly1 even if a      person did    
intend to go to war with the just1 he   
would not      admit that they were     
just4        ,soc4 ,he would not go to  
war1 because it would be      unlawful8 
,al4 ,neither lawful nor honourable4    
,soc4 ,then you1 too1 would address them
 on principles of      justice8         
,al4 ,certainly4    ,sidenote3 ,in going
 to war or not going to war1 the better 

is the more  just4        ,soc4 ,what1  
then1 is justice but that better1 of    
which ,i spoke1      in going to war or 
not going to war with those against whom
      we ought or ought not1 and when we
 ought or ought not to      go to war8  
,al4 ,clearly4        ,soc4 ,but how is 
this1 friend ,alcibiades8 ,have you     
forgotten      that you do not know     
this1 or have you been to the           
schoolmaster without my knowledge1 and  
has he taught you      to discern the   
just from the unjust8 ,who is he8 ,i    
wish      you would tell me1 that ,i may
 go and learn of him--you shall         
introduce me4        ,al4 ,you are      
mocking1 ,socrates4    ,sidenote3 ,but  
where did ,alcibiades acquire this      
notion of just and  unjust8        ,soc4
 ,no1 indeed2 ,i most solemnly declare  
to you by ,zeus1      who is the ,god of
 our common friendship1 and whom ,i     
never      will forswear1 that ,i am    
not2 tell me1 then1 who this instructor 
is1 if he exists4        ,al4 ,but1     

perhaps1 he does not exist2 may ,i not  
have      acquired the knowledge of just
 and unjust in some other way8          
,soc4 ,yes2 if you have discovered them4
        ,al4 ,but do you not think that 
,i could discover them8        ,soc4 ,i 
am sure that you might1 if you enquired 
about      them4        ,al4 ,and do you
 not think that ,i would enquire8       
,soc4 ,yes2 if you thought that you did 
not know them4        ,al4 ,and was     
there not a time when ,i did so think8  
,soc4 ,very good2 and can you tell me   
how long it is      since you thought   
that you did not know the nature of the 
#aaj      just and the unjust8 ,what do 
you say to a year ago8      ,were you   
then in a state of conscious ignorance  
and enquiry8      or did you think that 
you knew8 ,and please to answer         
truly1 that our discussion may not be in
 vain4    ,sidenote3 ,the nature of just
 and unjust4        ,al4 ,well1 ,i      
thought that ,i knew4        ,soc4 ,and 
two years ago1 and three years ago1 and 

four      years ago1 you knew all the   
same8        ,al4 ,i did4        ,soc4  
,and more than four years ago you were a
 child--were      you not8        ,al4  
,yes4        ,soc4 ,and then ,i am quite
 sure that you thought you knew4        
,al4 ,why are you so sure8    ,sidenote3
 ,he always had them4        ,soc4      
,because ,i often heard you when a      
child1 in your      teacher's house1 or 
elsewhere1 playing at dice or some other
      game with the boys1 not hesitating
 at all about the nature of      the    
just and unjust2 but very               
confident--crying and shouting      that
 one of the boys was a rogue and a      
cheat1 and had been      cheating4 ,is  
it not true8        ,al4 ,but what was  
,i to do1 ,socrates1 when anybody       
cheated      me8        ,soc4 ,and how  
can you say1 #8,what was ,i to do'8 if  
at the      time you did not know       
whether you were wronged or not8        
,al4 ,to be sure ,i knew2 ,i was quite  
aware that ,i was being      cheated4   

,soc4 ,then you suppose yourself even   
when a child to have      known the     
nature of just and unjust8        ,al4  
,certainly2 and ,i did know then4       
,soc4 ,and when did you discover        
them--not1 surely1 at the      time when
 you thought that you knew them8        
,al4 ,certainly not4        ,soc4 ,and  
when did you think that you were        
ignorant--if      you consider1 you will
 find that there never was such a time8 
,al4 ,really1 ,socrates1 ,i cannot say4 
,soc4 ,then you did not learn them by   
discovering them8        ,al4 ,clearly  
not4        ,soc4 ,but just before you  
said that you did not know them by      
learning2 now1 if you have neither      
discovered nor learned      them1 how   
and whence do you come to know them8    
,al4 ,i suppose that ,i was mistaken in 
saying that ,i knew      them through my
 own discovery of them2 whereas1 in     
truth1      ,i learned them in the same 
way that other people learn4            
,sidenote3 ,could the many have taught  

the principles of justice8        ,soc4 
,so you said before1 and ,i must again  
ask1 of whom8      ,do tell me4         
,al4 ,of the many4    ,sidenote3 ,he    
learned them of the many1 as he learned 
,greek2--of those who  knew it4         
,soc4 ,do you take refuge in them8 ,i   
cannot say much for      your teachers4 
,al4 ,why1 are they not able to teach8  
,soc4 ,they could not teach you how to  
play at draughts1      which you would  
acknowledge 7would you not7 to be a much
      smaller matter than justice8      
,al4 ,yes4        ,soc4 ,and can they   
teach the better who are unable to teach
      the worse8        ,al4 ,i think   
that they can2 at any rate1 they can    
teach many      far better things than  
to play at draughts4        ,soc4 ,what 
things8                                 
#aaa        ,al4 ,why1 for example1 ,i  
learned to speak ,greek of them1        
and ,i cannot say who was my teacher1 or
 to whom ,i am to      attribute my     
knowledge of ,greek1 if not to those    

good-for-nothing      teachers1 as you  
call them4        ,soc4 ,why1 yes1 my   
friend2 and the many are good enough    
teachers of ,greek1 and some of their   
instructions in that line      may be   
justly praised4        ,al4 ,why is     
that8        ,soc4 ,why1 because they   
have the qualities which good           
teachers ought to have4        ,al4     
,what qualities8        ,soc4 ,why1 you 
know that knowledge is the first        
qualification      of any teacher8      
,al4 ,certainly4        ,soc4 ,and if   
they know1 they must agree together and 
not      differ8        ,al4 ,yes4      
,soc4 ,and would you say that they knew 
the things about      which they differ8
        ,al4 ,no4        ,soc4 ,then how
 can they teach them8        ,al4 ,they 
cannot4    ,sidenote3 ,yes3 the many can
 teach things about which they are      
agreed4        ,soc4 ,well1 but do you  
imagine that the many would differ      
about the nature of wood and stone8 are 
they not agreed if      you ask them    

what they are8 and do they not run to   
fetch      the same thing1 when they    
want a piece of wood or a stone8        
,and so in similar cases1 which ,i      
suspect to be pretty nearly      all    
that you mean by speaking ,greek4       
,sidenote3 ,that wars are caused by     
differences about just        ,al4      
,true4        ,soc4 ,these1 as we were  
saying1 are matters about which         
they are agreed with one another and    
with themselves2 both      individuals  
and states use the same words about     
them2 they      do not use some one word
 and some another4        ,al4 ,they do 
not4        ,soc4 ,then they may be     
expected to be good teachers of         
these things8        ,al4 ,yes4         
,soc4 ,and if we want to instruct any   
one in them1 we shall      be right in  
sending him to be taught by our friends 
the      many8        ,al4 ,very true4  
,soc4 ,but if we wanted further to know 
not only which      are men and which   
are horses1 but which men or horses     

have powers of running1 would the many  
still be able to      inform us8        
,al4 ,certainly not4        ,soc4 ,and  
you have a sufficient proof that they do
 not know      these things and are not 
the best teachers of them1 inasmuch     
as they are never agreed about them8    
,al4 ,yes4    ,sidenote3 ,but could the 
many teach things about which they are  
disagreed8        ,soc4 ,and suppose    
that we wanted to know not only what    
men are like1 but what healthy or       
diseased men are like--would      the   
many be able to teach us8        ,al4   
,they would not4        ,soc4 ,and you  
would have a proof that they were bad   
teachers of these matters1 if you saw   
them at variance8        ,al4 ,i should4
    ,sidenote3 ,and one of these things 
is justice4        ,soc4 ,well1 but are 
the many agreed with themselves1 or     
with one another1 about the justice or  
injustice of men and        #aab        
things8        ,al4 ,assuredly not1     
,socrates4        ,soc4 ,there is no    

subject about which they are more at    
variance8        ,al4 ,none4            
,sidenote3 and unjust proved out of     
,homer4        ,soc4 ,i do not suppose  
that you ever saw or heard of men       
quarrelling over the principles of      
health and disease to such      an      
extent as to go to war and kill one     
another for the sake of      them8      
,sidenote3 ,did not a question of       
justice cause the war between the       
,trojans and ,achaeans1 and between the 
,athenians ,lacedaemonians8        ,al4 
,no indeed4        ,soc4 ,but of the    
quarrels about justice and injustice1   
even      if you have never seen them1  
you have certainly heard from      many 
people1 including ,homer2 for you have  
heard of the      ,iliad and ,odyssey8  
,al4 ,to be sure1 ,socrates4            
,soc4 ,a difference of just and unjust  
is the argument of and      those poems8
        ,al4 ,true4        ,soc4 ,which 
difference caused all the wars and      
deaths of      ,trojans and ,achaeans1  

and the deaths of the suitors of        
,penelope in their quarrel with         
,odysseus4        ,al4 ,very true4      
,soc4 ,and when the ,athenians and      
,lacedaemonians and      ,boeotians fell
 at ,tanagra1 and afterwards in the     
battle of      ,coronea1 at which your  
father ,cleinias met his end1 the       
question was one of justice--this was   
the sole cause of the      battles1 and 
of their deaths4        ,al4 ,very true4
    ,sidenote3 ,and yet they did not    
know what they were fighting about8     
,soc4 ,but can they be said to          
understand that about which      they   
are quarrelling to the death8           
,al4 ,clearly not4        ,soc4 ,and yet
 those whom you thus allow to be        
ignorant      are the teachers to whom  
you are appealing4        ,al4 ,very    
true4        ,soc4 ,but how are you ever
 likely to know the nature of           
justice and injustice1 about which you  
are so perplexed1 if      you have      
neither learned them of others nor      

discovered them      yourself8          
,al4 ,from what you say1 ,i suppose not4
        ,soc4 ,see1 again1 how          
inaccurately you speak1 ,alcibiades6    
,al4 ,in what respect8        ,soc4 ,in 
saying that ,i say so4        ,al4 ,why1
 did you not say that ,i know nothing of
 the just      and unjust8        ,soc4 
,no2 ,i did not4        ,al4 ,did ,i1   
then8    ,sidenote3 ,is it ,socrates or 
,alcibiades        ,soc4 ,yes4          
,al4 ,how was that8        ,soc4 ,let me
 explain4 ,suppose ,i were to ask you   
which      is the greater number1 two or
 one2 you would reply #8two'8           
,al4 ,i should4        ,soc4 ,and by how
 much greater8        ,al4 ,by one4     
,soc4 ,which of us now says that two is 
more than one8        ,al4 ,i do4       
,soc4 ,did not ,i ask1 and you answer   
the question8        ,al4 ,yes4         
,soc4 ,then who is speaking8 ,i who put 
the question1 or            #aac        
you who answer me8        ,al4 ,i am4   
,sidenote3 ,the answerer1 not the       

questioner1 has been drawing these      
inferences4        ,soc4 ,or suppose    
that ,i ask and you tell me the letters 
which make up the name ,socrates1 which 
of us is the      speaker8        ,al4  
,i am4        ,soc4 ,now let us put the 
case generally3 whenever there is      a
 question and answer1 who is the        
speaker1--the questioner      or the    
answerer8        ,al4 ,i should say1    
,socrates1 that the answerer was the    
speaker4        ,soc4 ,and have ,i not  
been the questioner all through8        
,al4 ,yes4        ,soc4 ,and you the    
answerer8        ,al4 ,just so4         
,soc4 ,which of us1 then1 was the       
speaker8        ,al4 ,the inference is1 
,socrates1 that ,i was the speaker4     
,soc4 ,did not some one say that        
,alcibiades1 the fair son of            
,cleinias1 not understanding about just 
and unjust1 but thinking      that he   
did understand1 was going to the        
assembly to      advise the ,athenians  
about what he did not know8 ,was        

not that said8        ,al4 ,very true4  
,sidenote3 ,how can you teach what you  
do not know8        ,soc4 ,then1        
,alcibiades1 the result may be expressed
 in the      language of ,euripides4 ,i 
think that you have heard all this      
#8from yourself1 and not from me'2 nor  
did ,i say this1 which      you         
erroneously attribute to me1 but you    
yourself1 and what      you said was    
very true4 ,for indeed1 my dear fellow1 
the      design which you meditate of   
teaching what you do not      know1 and 
have not taken any pains to learn1 is   
downright      insanity4    ,sidenote3  
who is the real speaker8    ,sidenote3  
,but the expedient1 not the just1 is the
 subject about which  men commonly      
debate4        ,al4 ,but1 ,socrates1 ,i 
think that the ,athenians and the rest  
of the ,hellenes do not often advise as 
to the more just or      unjust2 for    
they see no difficulty in them1 and     
therefore they      leave them1 and     
consider which course of action will be 

most expedient2 for there is a          
difference between justice      and     
expediency4 ,many persons have done     
great wrong and      profited by their  
injustice2 others have done rightly and 
come to no good4        ,soc4 ,well1 but
 granting that the just and the         
expedient are      ever so much opposed1
 you surely do not imagine that you     
know what is expedient for mankind1 or  
why a thing is      expedient8          
,sidenote3 ,alcibiades insists that he  
will not have the old argument over     
again4        ,al4 ,why not1            
,socrates8--,but ,i am not going to be  
asked again from whom ,i learned1 or    
when ,i made the      discovery4        
,soc4 ,what a way you have6 ,when you   
make a mistake      which might be      
refuted by a previous argument1 you     
insist on      having a new and         
different refutation2 the old argument  
is a      worn-out garment which you    
will no longer put on1 but some      one
 must produce another which is clean and

 new4 ,now ,i             #aad          
shall disregard this move of yours1 and 
shall ask over      again1--,where did  
you learn and how do you know the nature
 of      the expedient1 and who is your 
teacher8 ,all this ,i comprehend      in
 a single question1 and now you will    
manifestly be      in the old           
difficulty1 and will not be able to show
 that you      know the expedient1      
either because you learned or because   
you discovered it yourself4 ,but1 as ,i 
perceive that you are      dainty1 and  
dislike the taste of a stale argument1  
,i will      enquire no further into    
your knowledge of what is expedient     
or what is not expedient for the        
,athenian people1 and simply            
request you to say why you do not       
explain whether justice      and        
expediency are the same or different8   
,and if you like      you may examine me
 as ,i have examined you1 or1 if you    
would rather1 you may carry on the      
discussion by yourself4        ,al4 ,but

 ,i am not certain1 ,socrates1 whether  
,i shall be      able to discuss the    
matter with you4        ,soc4 ,then     
imagine1 my dear fellow1 that ,i am the 
demus      and the ecclesia2 for in the 
ecclesia1 too1 you will have to         
persuade men individually4    ,sidenote3
 ,is the just the same        ,al4 ,yes4
        ,soc4 ,and is not the same      
person able to persuade one individual  
singly and many individuals of the      
things which he      knows8 ,the        
grammarian1 for example1 can persuade   
one      and he can persuade many about 
letters4        ,al4 ,true4        ,soc4
 ,and about number1 will not the same   
person persuade      one and persuade   
many8        ,al4 ,yes4        ,soc4    
,and this will be he who knows number1  
or the arithmetician8        ,al4 ,quite
 true4    ,sidenote3 ,he who can        
persuade many can persuade one4         
,alcibiades should  therefore be able to
 persuade ,socrates4        ,soc4 ,and  
cannot you persuade one man about that  

of which      you can persuade many8    
,al4 ,i suppose so4        ,soc4 ,and   
that of which you can persuade either is
 clearly      what you know8        ,al4
 ,yes4        ,soc4 ,and the only       
difference between one who argues as    
we are doing1 and the orator who is     
addressing an assembly1      is that the
 one seeks to persuade a number1 and the
 other an      individual1 of the same  
things4        ,al4 ,i suppose so4      
,soc4 ,well1 then1 since the same person
 who can persuade      a multitude can  
persuade individuals1 try conclusions   
upon      me1 and prove to me that the  
just is not always expedient4           
,al4 ,you take liberties1 ,socrates4    
,soc4 ,i shall take the liberty of      
proving to you the opposite      of that
 which you will not prove to me4        
,al4 ,proceed4        ,soc4 ,answer my  
questions--that is all4        ,al4     
,nay1 ,i should like you to be the      
speaker4        ,soc4 ,what1 do you not 
wish to be persuaded8        ,al4       

,certainly ,i do4        ,soc4 ,and can 
you be persuaded better than out of your
      own mouth8        ,al4 ,i think   
not4        ,soc4 ,then you shall       
answer2 and if you do not hear the      
words1 that the just is the expedient1  
coming from your own      lips1 never   
believe another man again4    ,sidenote3
 as the expedient or not8        ,al4 ,i
 won't2 but answer ,i will1 for ,i do   
not see how ,i can      come to any     
harm4    ,sidenote3 ,a man may do what  
is expedient and not just1 but he cannot
 do  what is honourable and not just and
 good4        ,soc4 ,a true prophecy6   
,let me begin then by enquiring of      
#aae      you whether you allow that the
 just is sometimes expedient      and   
sometimes not8        ,al4 ,yes4        
,soc4 ,and sometimes honourable and     
sometimes not8        ,al4 ,what do you 
mean8        ,soc4 ,i am asking if you  
ever knew any one who did what      was 
dishonourable and yet just8        ,al4 
,never4        ,soc4 ,all just things   

are honourable8        ,al4 ,yes4       
,soc4 ,and are honourable things        
sometimes good and sometimes      not   
good1 or are they always good8          
,al4 ,i rather think1 ,socrates1 that   
some honourable things      are evil4   
,soc4 ,and are some dishonourable things
 good8        ,al4 ,yes4        ,soc4   
,you mean in such a case as the         
following3--,in time      of war1 men   
have been wounded or have died in       
rescuing a      companion or kinsman1   
when others who have neglected the      
duty of rescuing them have escaped in   
safety8        ,al4 ,true4        ,soc4 
,and to rescue another under such       
circumstances is      honourable1 in    
respect of the attempt to save those    
whom we      ought to save2 and this is 
courage8        ,al4 ,true4        ,soc4
 ,but evil in respect of death and      
wounds8        ,al4 ,yes4        ,soc4  
,and the courage which is shown in the  
rescue is one      thing1 and the death 
another8        ,al4 ,certainly4        

,soc4 ,then the rescue of one's friends 
is honourable in one      point of view1
 but evil in another8        ,al4 ,true4
        ,soc4 ,and if honourable1 then  
also good3 ,will you consider      now  
whether ,i may not be right1 for you    
were acknowledging      that the courage
 which is shown in the rescue is        
honourable8      ,now is this courage   
good or evil8 ,look at the matter       
thus3 which would you rather choose1    
good or evil8    ,sidenote3 ,the        
comparative eligibility of goods4       
,al4 ,good4        ,soc4 ,and the       
greatest goods you would be most ready  
to      choose1 and would least like to 
be deprived of them8        ,al4        
,certainly4        ,soc4 ,what would you
 say of courage8 ,at what price         
would you be willing to be deprived of  
courage8        ,al4 ,i would rather die
 than be a coward4        ,soc4 ,then   
you think that cowardice is the worst of
 evils8        ,al4 ,i do4        ,soc4 
,as bad as death1 ,i suppose8           

,al4 ,yes4        ,soc4 ,and life and   
courage are the extreme opposites of    
death and cowardice8        ,al4 ,yes4  
,soc4 ,and they are what you would most 
desire to have1      and their opposites
 you would least desire8        ,al4    
,yes4        ,soc4 ,is this because you 
think life and courage the best1        
and death and cowardice the worst8      
,al4 ,yes4        ,soc4 ,and you would  
term the rescue of a friend in battle   
honourable1 in as much as courage does a
 good work8        ,al4 ,i should4      
,sidenote3 ,but good may contain an     
element of evil4 ,good and evil are to  
be judged of by their consequences4     
,soc4 ,but evil because of the death    
which ensues8        ,al4 ,yes4         
,soc4 ,might we not describe their      
different effects as follows3--,you     
may call either of them evil in respect 
of the evil      which is the result1   
and good in respect of the good which is
      the result of either of them8     
#aaf        ,al4 ,yes4        ,soc4 ,and

 they are honourable in so far as they  
are good1      and dishonourable in so  
far as they are evil8        ,al4 ,true4
        ,soc4 ,then when you say that   
the rescue of a friend in      battle is
 honourable and yet evil1 that is       
equivalent to saying      that the      
rescue is good and yet evil8        ,al4
 ,i believe that you are right1         
,socrates4    ,sidenote3 ,the           
honourable1 the good1 the expedient1 all
 one4        ,soc4 ,nothing honourable1 
regarded as honourable1 is evil2        
nor anything base1 regarded as base1    
good4        ,al4 ,clearly not4         
,sidenote3 ,the honourable is identified
 with the good1 and the good is  the    
expedient1 and therefore the just which 
is the honourable is also the           
expedient4 ,all this has been proved by 
,alcibiades himself4        ,soc4 ,look 
at the matter yet once more in a further
 light3      he who acts honourably acts
 well8        ,al4 ,yes4        ,soc4   
,and he who acts well is happy8         

,al4 ,of course4        ,soc4 ,and the  
happy are those who obtain good8        
,al4 ,true4        ,soc4 ,and they      
obtain good by acting well and          
honourably8        ,al4 ,yes4           
,soc4 ,then acting well is a good8      
,al4 ,certainly4        ,soc4 ,and      
happiness is a good8        ,al4 ,yes4  
,soc4 ,then the good and the honourable 
are again identified4        ,al4       
,manifestly4        ,soc4 ,then1 if the 
argument holds1 what we find to be      
honourable we shall also find to be     
good8        ,al4 ,certainly4           
,soc4 ,and is the good expedient or not8
        ,al4 ,expedient4        ,soc4   
,do you remember our admissions about   
the just8        ,al4 ,yes2 if ,i am not
 mistaken1 we said that those who       
acted justly must also act honourably4  
,soc4 ,and the honourable is the good8  
,al4 ,yes4        ,soc4 ,and the good is
 expedient8        ,al4 ,yes4           
,soc4 ,then1 ,alcibiades1 the just is   
expedient8        ,al4 ,i should infer  

so4        ,soc4 ,and all this ,i prove 
out of your own mouth1 for ,i ask       
and you answer8        ,al4 ,i must     
acknowledge it to be true4        ,soc4 
,and having acknowledged that the just  
is the same      as the expedient1 are  
you not 7let me ask7 prepared to        
ridicule any one who1 pretending to     
understand the principles      of       
justice and injustice1 gets up to advise
 the noble      ,athenians or the       
ignoble ,peparethians1 that the just may
 be      the evil8    ,sidenote3 ,the   
conceit of knowledge    ,sidenote3 ,yet 
he still finds himself in a perplexity1 
and this is because  he thinks that he  
knows1 but if he knew that he were      
ignorant he would be  in no perplexity4 
,al4 ,i solemnly declare1 ,socrates1    
that ,i do not know what ,i      am     
saying4 ,verily1 ,i am in a strange     
state1 for when you      put questions  
to me ,i am of different minds in       
successive      instants4        ,soc4  
,and are you not aware of the nature of 

this perplexity1      my friend8        
,al4 ,indeed ,i am not4        ,soc4 ,do
 you suppose that if some one were to   
ask you      whether you have two eyes  
or three1 or two hands or four1      or 
anything of that sort1 you would then be
 of different      minds in successive  
instants8        ,al4 ,i begin to       
distrust myself1 but still ,i do not    
suppose       #aag      that ,i should4 
,soc4 ,you would feel no doubt2 and for 
this reason--because      you would     
know8        ,al4 ,i suppose so4        
,soc4 ,and the reason why you           
involuntarily contradict      yourself  
is clearly that you are ignorant8       
,al4 ,very likely4        ,soc4 ,and if 
you are perplexed in answering about    
just      and unjust1 honourable and    
dishonourable1 good and evil1           
expedient and inexpedient1 the reason is
 that you are      ignorant of them1 and
 therefore in perplexity4 ,is not that  
clear8        ,al4 ,i agree4            
,soc4 ,but is this always the case1 and 

is a man necessarily      perplexed     
about that of which he has no knowledge8
        ,al4 ,certainly he is4          
,soc4 ,and do you know how to ascend    
into heaven8        ,al4 ,certainly not4
        ,soc4 ,and in this case1 too1 is
 your judgment perplexed8        ,al4   
,no4        ,soc4 ,do you see the reason
 why1 or shall ,i tell you8        ,al4 
,tell me4        ,soc4 ,the reason is1  
that you not only do not know1 my       
friend1 but you do not think that you   
know4        ,al4 ,there again2 what do 
you mean8    ,sidenote3 and the         
consciousness of ignorance4        ,soc4
 ,ask yourself2 are you in any          
perplexity about things      of which   
you are ignorant8 ,you know1 for        
example1 that      you know nothing     
about the preparation of food4          
,al4 ,very true4        ,soc4 ,and do   
you think and perplex yourself about the
      preparation of food3 or do you    
leave that to some one who              
understands the art8        ,al4 ,the   

latter4        ,soc4 ,or if you were on 
a voyage1 would you bewilder            
yourself by considering whether the     
rudder is to be drawn      inwards or   
outwards1 or do you leave that to the   
pilot1 and      do nothing8        ,al4 
,it would be the concern of the pilot4  
,soc4 ,then you are not perplexed about 
what you do not      know1 if you know  
that you do not know it8        ,al4 ,i 
imagine not4    ,sidenote3 ,the people  
who make mistakes are neither those who 
know1 nor  those who do not know1 but   
those who think that they know and do   
not  know4        ,soc4 ,do you not see1
 then1 that mistakes in life and        
practice are likewise to be attributed  
to the ignorance which      has conceit 
of knowledge8        ,al4 ,once more1   
what do you mean8        ,soc4 ,i       
suppose that we begin to act when we    
think that we      know what we are     
doing8        ,al4 ,yes4        ,soc4   
,but when people think that they do not 
know1 they      entrust their business  

to others8        ,al4 ,yes4            
,soc4 ,and so there is a class of       
ignorant persons who do      not make   
mistakes in life1 because they trust    
others about      things of which they  
are ignorant8        ,al4 ,true4        
,soc4 ,who1 then1 are the persons who   
make mistakes8      ,they cannot1 of    
course1 be those who know8        ,al4  
,certainly not4        ,soc4 ,but if    
neither those who know1 nor those who   
know      that they do not know1 make   
mistakes1 there remain those            
#aah      only who do not know and think
 that they know4        ,al4 ,yes1 only 
those4        ,soc4 ,then this is       
ignorance of the disgraceful sort which 
is      mischievous8        ,al4 ,yes4  
,sidenote3 ,pericles and the            
philosophers4        ,soc4 ,and most    
mischievous and most disgraceful when   
having to do with the greatest matters8 
,al4 ,by far4        ,soc4 ,and can     
there be any matters greater than the   
just1      the honourable1 the good1 and

 the expedient8        ,al4 ,there      
cannot be4        ,soc4 ,and these1 as  
you were saying1 are what perplex you8  
,al4 ,yes4        ,soc4 ,but if you are 
perplexed1 then1 as the previous        
argument      has shown1 you are not    
only ignorant of the greatest           
matters1 but being ignorant you fancy   
that you know      them8        ,al4 ,i 
fear that you are right4    ,sidenote3  
,and you1 like other statesmen1 rush    
into politics without  being trained4   
,pericles1 alone of them all1 associated
 with the  philosophers4        ,soc4   
,and now see what has happened to you1  
,alcibiades6      ,i hardly like to     
speak of your evil case1 but as we are  
alone      ,i will3 ,my good friend1 you
 are wedded to ignorance of the         
most disgraceful kind1 and of this you  
are convicted1 not by      me1 but out  
of your own mouth and by your own       
argument2      wherefore also you rush  
into politics before you are educated4  
,neither is your case to be deemed      

singular4 ,for ,i might say      the    
same of almost all our statesmen1 with  
the exception1      perhaps1 of your    
guardian1 ,pericles4        ,al4 ,yes1  
,socrates2 and ,pericles is said not to 
have got      his wisdom by the light of
 nature1 but to have associated         
with several of the philosophers2 with  
,pythocleides1 for      example1 and    
with ,anaxagoras1 and now in advanced   
life      with ,damon1 in the hope of   
gaining wisdom4        ,soc4 ,very good2
 but did you ever know a man wise in    
anything who was unable to impart his   
particular wisdom8      ,for example1 he
 who taught you letters was not only    
wise1      but he made you and any      
others whom he liked wise4        ,al4  
,yes4        ,soc4 ,and you1 whom he    
taught1 can do the same8        ,al4    
,true4        ,soc4 ,and in like manner 
the harper and gymnastic-master8        
,al4 ,certainly4        ,soc4 ,when a   
person is enabled to impart knowledge to
      another1 he thereby gives an      

excellent proof of his own              
understanding of any matter4        ,al4
 ,i agree4    ,sidenote3 ,the higher    
standard4        ,soc4 ,well1 and did   
,pericles make any one wise2 did he     
begin by making his sons wise8          
,al4 ,but1 ,socrates1 if the two sons of
 ,pericles were simpletons1      what   
has that to do with the matter8         
,sidenote3 ,and even he could not teach 
his own sons1 or your brother           
,cleinias1 nor did any one ever grow    
wiser in his society4        ,soc4      
,well1 but did he make your brother1    
,cleinias1 wise8        ,al4 ,cleinias  
is a madman2 there is no use in talking 
of      him4        ,soc4 ,but if       
,cleinias is a madman and the two sons  
of      ,pericles were simpletons1 what 
reason can be given why he      neglects
 you1 and lets you be as you are8       
,al4 ,i believe that ,i am to blame for 
not listening to him4        ,soc4 ,but 
did you ever hear of any other ,athenian
 or      foreigner1 bond or free1 who   

was deemed to have grown      wiser in  
the society of ,pericles1--as ,i might  
cite ,pythodorus1      #aai      the son
 of ,isolochus1 and ,callias1 the son of
 ,calliades1 who      have grown wiser  
in the society of ,zeno1 for which      
privilege      they have each of them   
paid him the sum of a hundred           
minae#eh to the increase of their wisdom
 and fame4        ,al4 ,i certainly     
never did hear of any one4        ,soc4 
,well1 and in reference to your own     
case1 do you      mean to remain as you 
are1 or will you take some pains        
about yourself8    ,sidenote3 ,but if   
other statesmen are uneducated1 what    
need has  ,alcibiades of education8     
,al4 ,with your aid1 ,socrates1 ,i will4
 ,and indeed1 when ,i      hear you     
speak1 the truth of what you are saying 
strikes      home to me1 and ,i agree   
with you1 for our statesmen1 all but    
a few1 do appear to be quite uneducated4
        ,soc4 ,what is the inference8   
,al4 ,why1 that if they were educated   

they would be trained      athletes1 and
 he who means to rival them ought to    
have      knowledge and experience when 
he attacks them2 but now1      as they  
have become politicians without any     
special training1      why should ,i    
have the trouble of learning and        
practising8      ,for ,i know well that 
by the light of nature ,i shall get the 
better of them4    ,sidenote3 ,the lover
 is pained at hearing from the lips of  
,alcibiades        ,soc4 ,my dear       
friend1 what a sentiment6 ,and how      
unworthy      of your noble form and    
your high estate6        ,al4 ,what do  
you mean1 ,socrates2 why do you say so8 
,soc4 ,i am grieved when ,i think of our
 mutual love4        ,al4 ,at what8     
,sidenote3 ,the ,spartan kings4         
,sidenote3 so unworthy a sentiment4 ,he 
should have a higher ambition than      
this4        ,soc4 ,at your fancying    
that the contest on which you are       
entering is with people here4           
,al4 ,why1 what others are there8       

,soc4 ,is that a question which a       
magnanimous soul should      ask8       
,al4 ,do you mean to say that the       
contest is not with these8        ,soc4 
,and suppose that you were going to     
steer a ship into      action1 would you
 only aim at being the best pilot on    
board8      ,would you not1 while       
acknowledging that you must possess     
this degree of excellence1 rather look  
to your antagonists1      and not1 as   
you are now doing1 to your fellow       
combatants8      ,you ought to be so far
 above these latter1 that they will not 
even dare to be your rivals2 and1 being 
regarded by you as      inferiors1 will 
do battle for you against the enemy2    
this is      the kind of superiority    
which you must establish over them1 if  
you mean to accomplish any noble action 
really worthy of      yourself and of   
the state4        ,al4 ,that would      
certainly be my aim4        ,soc4       
,verily1 then1 you have good reason to  
be satisfied1 if      you are better    

than the soldiers2 and you need not1    
when      you are their superior and    
have your thoughts and actions          
fixed upon them1 look away to the       
generals of the enemy4        ,al4 ,of  
whom are you speaking1 ,socrates8       
,sidenote3 ,his rivals should be the    
,spartan and ,persian kings1 not any    
chance persons4        ,soc4 ,why1 you  
surely know that our city goes to war   
#abj      now and then with the         
,lacedaemonians and with the great      
king8        ,al4 ,true enough4         
,soc4 ,and if you meant to be the ruler 
of this city1 would      you not be     
right in considering that the           
,lacedaemonian and      ,persian king   
were your true rivals8        ,al4 ,i   
believe that you are right4             
,sidenote3 ,the greatness of the royal  
family of ,persia4        ,soc4 ,oh no1 
my friend1 ,i am quite wrong1 and ,i    
think that      you ought rather to turn
 your attention to ,midias the          
quail-breeder      and others like him1 

who manage our politics2 in      whom1  
as the women would remark1 you may still
 see the      slaves' cut of hair1      
cropping out in their minds as well as  
on their pates2 and they come with their
 barbarous lingo to      flatter us and 
not to rule us4 ,to these1 ,i say1 you  
should      look1 and then you need not 
trouble yourself about your own         
fitness to contend in such a noble      
arena3 there is no reason      why you  
should either learn what has to be      
learned1 or      practise what has to be
 practised1 and only when thoroughly    
prepared enter on a political career4   
,al4 ,there1 ,i think1 ,socrates1 that  
you are right2 ,i do not      suppose1  
however1 that the ,spartan generals or  
the great      king are really different
 from anybody else4        ,soc4 ,but1  
my dear friend1 do consider what you are
 saying4        ,al4 ,what am ,i to     
consider8        ,soc4 ,in the first    
place1 will you be more likely to take  
care      of yourself1 if you are in a  

wholesome fear and dread of them1       
or if you are not8        ,al4 ,clearly1
 if ,i have such a fear of them4        
,soc4 ,and do you think that you will   
sustain any injury if      you take care
 of yourself8        ,al4 ,no1 ,i shall 
be greatly benefited4        ,soc4 ,and 
this is one very important respect in   
which that      notion of yours is bad4 
,al4 ,true4        ,soc4 ,in the next   
place1 consider that what you say is    
probably false4        ,al4 ,how so8    
,soc4 ,let me ask you whether better    
natures are likely to      be found in  
noble races or not in noble races8      
,al4 ,clearly in noble races4           
,soc4 ,are not those who are well born  
and well bred most      likely to be    
perfect in virtue8        ,al4          
,certainly4    ,sidenote3 ,we too have  
our pride of birth1 but how inferior are
 we to  those who are descended from    
,zeus through a line of kings6          
,soc4 ,then let us compare our          
antecedents with those of      the      

,lacedaemonian and ,persian kings2 are  
they inferior to      us in descent8    
,have we not heard that the former are  
sprung from ,heracles1 and the latter   
from ,achaemenes1 and      that the race
 of ,heracles and the race of           
,achaemenes go      back to ,perseus1   
son of ,zeus8        ,al4 ,why1 so does 
mine go back to ,eurysaces1 and he to   
#aba      ,zeus6    ,sidenote3 ,the     
education of the ,persian princes4      
,sidenote3 ,the wealth and dignity of   
the ,spartan kings is great1 but it  is 
as nothing compared with that of the    
,persians4        ,soc4 ,and mine1 noble
 ,alcibiades1 to ,daedalus1 and he      
to ,hephaestus1 son of ,zeus4 ,but1 for 
all that1 we are far      inferior to   
them4 ,for they are descended #8from    
,zeus1'      through a line of          
kings--either kings of ,argos and       
,lacedaemon1      or kings of ,persia1 a
 country which the descendants      of  
,achaemenes have always possessed1      
besides being at      various times     

sovereigns of ,asia1 as they now are2   
whereas1      we and our fathers were   
but private persons4 ,how ridiculous    
would you be thought if you were to make
 a display of your      ancestors and of
 ,salamis the island of ,eurysaces1 or  
of      ,aegina1 the habitation of the  
still more ancient ,aeacus1      before 
,artaxerxes1 son of ,xerxes4 ,you should
 consider      how inferior we are to   
them both in the derivation of our      
birth and in other particulars4 ,did you
 never observe how      great is the    
property of the ,spartan kings8 ,and    
their      wives are under the          
guardianship of the ,ephori1 who are    
public officers and watch over them1 in 
order to preserve as      far as        
possible the purity of the ,heracleid   
blood4 ,still      greater is the       
difference among the ,persians2 for no  
one      entertains a suspicion that the
 father of a prince of ,persia      can 
be any one but the king4 ,such is the   
awe which invests      the person of the

 queen1 that any other guard is         
needless4      ,and when the heir of the
 kingdom is born1 all the subjects      
of the king feast2 and the day of his   
birth is for ever afterwards      kept  
as a holiday and time of sacrifice by   
all ,asia2      whereas1 when you and ,i
 were born1 ,alcibiades1 as the         
comic poet says1 the neighbours hardly  
knew of the important      event4 ,after
 the birth of the royal child1 he is    
tended1 not by a good-for-nothing       
woman-nurse1 but by the      best of the
 royal eunuchs1 who are charged with the
 care of      him1 and especially with  
the fashioning and right formation      
of his limbs1 in order that he may be as
 shapely as possible2      which being  
their calling1 they are held in great   
honour4    ,sidenote3 ,the birth of the 
,persian princes is a world-famous      
event1 and  the utmost pains is taken   
with their education1 which is entrusted
 to  great and noble persons4           
,sidenote3 ,the wealth of the ,spartans4

    ,sidenote3 ,when ,alcibiades was    
born nobody knew or cared1 and his      
education was handed over to a worn-out 
slave of his guardian's4    ,sidenote3  
,the great inferiority of ,alcibiades4  
,sidenote3 ,the country called the      
#8queen's girdle1' the #8queen's veil1' 
and the like4    ,sidenote3 ,the queen  
of ,persia or of ,sparta1 if they heard 
that a youth  of twenty1 without        
resources and without education1 was    
going to attack  their son or husband1  
would deem him mad4        ,and when the
 young prince is seven years old he is  
put      upon a horse and taken to the  
riding-masters1 and begins to      go   
out hunting4 ,and at fourteen years of  
age he is handed      over to the royal 
schoolmasters1 as they are termed3 these
      are four chosen men1 reputed to be
 the best among the      ,persians of a 
certain age2 and one of them is the     
wisest1      another the justest1 a     
third the most temperate1 and a fourth  
the most valiant4 ,the first instructs  

him in the magianism      of ,zoroaster1
 the son of ,oromasus1 which is the     
worship of         #abb      the ,gods1 
and teaches him also the duties of his  
royal office2      the second1 who is   
the justest1 teaches him always to speak
      the truth2 the third1 or most     
temperate1 forbids him to allow      any
 pleasure to be lord over him1 that he  
may be accustomed      to be a freeman  
and king indeed1--lord of himself first1
 and      not a slave2 the most valiant 
trains him to be bold and      fearless1
 telling him that if he fears he is to  
deem himself a      slave2 whereas      
,pericles gave you1 ,alcibiades1 for a  
tutor      ,zopyrus the ,thracian1 a    
slave of his who was past all other     
work4 ,i might enlarge on the nurture   
and education of      your rivals1 but  
that would be tedious2 and what ,i have 
said      is a sufficient sample of what
 remains to be said4 ,i have      only  
to remark1 by way of contrast1 that no  
one cares about      your birth or      

nurture or education1 or1 ,i may say1   
about that      of any other ,athenian1 
unless he has a lover who looks after   
him4 ,and if you cast an eye on the     
wealth1 the luxury1 the      garments   
with their flowing trains1 the          
anointings with      myrrh1 the         
multitudes of attendants1 and all the   
other      bravery of the ,persians1 you
 will be ashamed when you      discern  
your own inferiority2 or if you look at 
the temperance      and orderliness and 
ease and grace and magnanimity      and 
courage and endurance and love of toil  
and desire of      glory and ambition of
 the ,lacedaemonians--in all these      
respects you will see that you are but a
 child in comparison      of them4 ,even
 in the matter of wealth1 if you value  
yourself      upon that1 ,i must reveal 
to you how you stand2 for if you        
form an estimate of the wealth of the   
,lacedaemonians1 you      will see that 
our possessions fall far short of       
theirs4 ,for no      one here can       

compete with them either in the extent  
and      fertility of their own and the 
,messenian territory1 or in the         
number of their slaves1 and especially  
of the ,helots1 or of      their horses1
 or of the animals which feed on the    
,messenian      pastures4 ,but ,i have  
said enough of this3 and as to gold     
and silver1 there is more of them in    
,lacedaemon than in all      the rest of
 ,hellas1 for during many generations   
gold has      been always flowing in to 
them from the whole ,hellenic           
world1 and often from the barbarian     
also1 and never going      out1 as in   
the fable of ,aesop the fox1 said to the
 lion1 #8,the      #abc      prints of  
the feet of those going in are distinct 
enough2' but      who ever saw the trace
 of money going out of ,lacedaemon8     
and therefore you may safely infer that 
the inhabitants are      the richest of 
the ,hellenes in gold and silver1 and   
that their      kings are the richest of
 them1 for they have a larger share of  

these things1 and they have also a      
tribute paid to them which      is very 
considerable4 ,yet the ,spartan wealth1 
though great      in comparison of the  
wealth of the other ,hellenes1 is as    
nothing in comparison of that of the    
,persians and their      kings4 ,why1 ,i
 have been informed by a credible person
      who went up to the king at ,susa1 
that he passed through a      large     
tract of excellent land1 extending for  
nearly a day's      journey1 which the  
people of the country called the queen's
      girdle1 and another1 which they   
called her veil2 and several      other 
fair and fertile districts1 which were  
reserved for the      adornment of the  
queen1 and are named after her several  
habiliments4 ,now1 ,i cannot help       
thinking to myself1 ,what      if some  
one were to go to ,amestris1 the wife of
 ,xerxes and      mother of ,artaxerxes1
 and say to her1 ,there is a certain    
,dinomach1 whose whole wardrobe is not  
worth fifty minae--and      that will be

 more than the value--and she has a son 
who is possessed of a three-hundred acre
 patch at ,erchiae1      and he has a   
mind to go to war with your son--would  
she      not wonder to what this        
,alcibiades trusts for success in the   
conflict8 #8,he must rely1' she would   
say to herself1 #8upon      his training
 and wisdom--these are the things which 
,hellenes value4' ,and if she heard that
 this ,alcibiades who      is making the
 attempt is not as yet twenty years old1
 and is      wholly uneducated1 and when
 his lover tells him that he      ought 
to get education and training first1 and
 then go and      fight the king1 he    
refuses1 and says that he is well enough
 as      he is1 would she not be amazed1
 and ask1 #8,on what1 then1      does   
the youth rely8' ,and if we replied3 ,he
 relies on his      beauty1 and stature1
 and birth1 and mental endowments1 she  
would think that we were mad1           
,alcibiades1 when she compared      the 
advantages which you possess with those 

of her      own people4 ,and ,i believe 
that even ,lampido1 the daughter        
#abd      of ,leotychides1 the wife of  
,archidamus and mother of ,agis1        
all of whom were kings1 would have the  
same feeling2 if1 in      your present  
uneducated state1 you were to turn your 
thoughts      against her son1 she too  
would be equally astonished4 ,but       
how disgraceful1 that we should not have
 as high a notion of      what is       
required in us as our enemies' wives and
 mothers      have of the qualities     
which are required in their assailants6 
,o my friend1 be persuaded by me1 and   
hear the ,delphian      inscription1    
#8,know thyself'--not the men whom you  
think1      but these kings are our     
rivals1 and we can only overcome        
them by pains and skill4 ,and if you    
fail in the required      qualities1 you
 will fail also in becoming renowned    
among      ,hellenes and ,barbarians1   
which you seem to desire more      than 
any other man ever desired anything4    

,sidenote3 ,the necessity of education4 
,al4 ,i entirely believe you2 but what  
are the sort of pains      which are    
required1 ,socrates1--can you tell me8  
,sidenote3 ,i too need education2 and   
,god1 who is my guardian1 inspires me   
with the belief that ,i shall bring you 
to honour4        ,soc4 ,yes1 ,i can2   
but we must take counsel together       
concerning      the manner in which both
 of us may be most      improved4 ,for  
what ,i am telling you of the necessity 
of      education applies to myself as  
well as to you2 and there      is only  
one point in which ,i have an advantage 
over you4        ,al4 ,what is that8    
,soc4 ,i have a guardian who is better  
and wiser than your      guardian1      
,pericles4        ,al4 ,who is he1      
,socrates8        ,soc4 ,god1           
,alcibiades1 who up to this day has not 
allowed      me to converse with you2   
and he inspires in me the faith         
that ,i am especially designed to bring 
you to honour4        ,al4 ,you are     

jesting1 ,socrates4        ,soc4        
,perhaps2 at any rate1 ,i am right in   
saying that all      men greatly need   
pains and care1 and you and ,i above all
      men4        ,al4 ,you are not far 
wrong about me4        ,soc4 ,and       
certainly not about myself4        ,al4 
,but what can we do8        ,soc4 ,there
 must be no hesitation or cowardice1 my 
friend4        ,al4 ,that would not     
become us1 ,socrates4    ,sidenote3 ,we 
must take counsel together1 7not about  
equestrian or naval  affairs71 but      
,soc4 ,no1 indeed1 and we ought to take 
counsel together3      for do we not    
wish to be as good as possible8         
,al4 ,we do4        ,soc4 ,in what sort 
of virtue8        ,al4 ,plainly1 in the 
virtue of good men4        ,soc4 ,who   
are good in what8        ,al4 ,those1   
clearly1 who are good in the management 
of      affairs4        ,soc4 ,what sort
 of affairs8 ,equestrian affairs8       
,al4 ,certainly not4    ,sidenote3      
,goodness and wisdom identified4        

,soc4 ,you mean that about them we      
should have recourse      to horsemen8  
,al4 ,yes4        ,soc4 ,well2 naval    
affairs8        ,al4 ,no4        ,soc4  
,you mean that we should have recourse  
to sailors      about them8        ,al4 
,yes4        ,soc4 ,then what affairs8  
,and who do them8    ,sidenote3 about   
the things which occupy the minds of    
wise men4        ,al4 ,the affairs which
 occupy ,athenian gentlemen4            
#abe        ,soc4 ,and when you speak of
 gentlemen1 do you mean the      wise or
 the unwise8        ,al4 ,the wise4     
,soc4 ,and a man is good in respect of  
that in which he is      wise8          
,al4 ,yes4        ,soc4 ,and evil in    
respect of that in which he is unwise8  
,al4 ,certainly4        ,soc4 ,the      
shoemaker1 for example1 is wise in      
respect of the      making of shoes8    
,al4 ,yes4        ,soc4 ,then he is good
 in that8        ,al4 ,he is4           
,soc4 ,but in respect of the making of  
garments he is unwise8        ,al4 ,yes4

        ,soc4 ,then in that he is bad8  
,al4 ,yes4        ,soc4 ,then upon this 
view of the matter the same man is      
good and also bad8        ,al4 ,true4   
,soc4 ,but would you say that the good  
are the same as the      bad8           
,al4 ,certainly not4        ,soc4 ,then 
whom do you call the good8    ,sidenote3
 ,and the wise are those who take       
counsel for the better order  and       
,al4 ,i mean by the good those who are  
able to rule in the      city4          
,soc4 ,not1 surely1 over horses8        
,al4 ,certainly not4        ,soc4 ,but  
over men8    ,sidenote3 improvement of  
the city4    ,sidenote3 ,the analogy of 
other employments4        ,al4 ,yes4    
,soc4 ,when they are sick8        ,al4  
,no4        ,soc4 ,or on a voyage8      
,al4 ,no4        ,soc4 ,or reaping the  
harvest8        ,al4 ,no4        ,soc4  
,when they are doing something or       
nothing8        ,al4 ,when they are     
doing something1 ,i should say4         
,soc4 ,i wish that you would explain to 

me what this something      is4         
,al4 ,when they are having dealings with
 one another1 and      using one        
another's services1 as we citizens do in
 our daily      life4    ,sidenote3     
,illustrations4        ,soc4 ,those of  
whom you speak are ruling over men who  
are using the services of other men8    
,al4 ,yes4        ,soc4 ,are they ruling
 over the signal-men who give the       
time to the rowers8        ,al4 ,no2    
they are not4        ,soc4 ,that would  
be the office of the pilot8        ,al4 
,yes4        ,soc4 ,but1 perhaps you    
mean that they rule over flute-players  
who lead the singers and use the        
services of the      dancers8           
,al4 ,certainly not4        ,soc4 ,that 
would be the business of the teacher of 
the      chorus8        ,al4 ,yes4      
,soc4 ,then what is the meaning of being
 able to rule over      men who use     
other men8        ,al4 ,i mean that they
 rule over men who have common          
rights of citizenship1 and dealings with

 one another4        ,soc4 ,and what    
sort of an art is this8 ,suppose that ,i
 ask      you again1 as ,i did just now1
 ,what art makes men know      how to   
rule over their fellow-sailors1--how    
would you      answer8        ,al4 ,the 
art of the pilot4        ,soc4 ,and1 if 
,i may recur to another old instance1   
what art      enables them to rule over 
their fellow-singers8    ,sidenote3 ,how
 is a state improved8        ,al4 ,the  
art of the teacher of the chorus1 which 
you were      just now mentioning4      
,soc4 ,and what do you call the art of  
fellow-citizens8        ,al4 ,i should  
say1 good counsel1 ,socrates4           
,soc4 ,and is the art of the pilot evil 
counsel8        ,al4 ,no4        ,soc4  
,but good counsel8        ,al4 ,yes1    
that is what ,i should say1--good       
counsel1 of which       #abf      the   
aim is the preservation of the voyagers4
        ,soc4 ,true4 ,and what is the   
aim of that other good counsel      of  
which you speak8        ,al4 ,the aim is

 the better order and preservation of   
the city4        ,soc4 ,and what is that
 of which the absence or presence       
improves and preserves the order of the 
city8 ,suppose you      were to ask me1 
what is that of which the presence or   
absence      improves or preserves the  
order of the body8 ,i should      reply1
 the presence of health and the absence 
of disease4      ,you would say the     
same8        ,al4 ,yes4        ,soc4    
,and if you were to ask me the same     
question about      the eyes1 ,i should 
reply in the same way1 #8the presence of
      sight and the absence of          
blindness2' or about the ears1 ,i       
should reply1 that they were improved   
and were in better      case1 when      
deafness was absent1 and hearing was    
present in      them4        ,al4 ,true4
    ,sidenote3 ,and this improvement is 
given by friendship and agreement1  such
 as exists between the members of a     
family1 however they may differ  in     
their qualities and accomplishments4    

,soc4 ,and what would you say of a      
state8 ,what is that by      the        
presence or absence of which the state  
is improved and      better managed and 
ordered8        ,al4 ,i should say1     
,socrates3--the presence of friendship  
and      the absence of hatred and      
division4        ,soc4 ,and do you mean 
by friendship agreement or disagreement8
        ,al4 ,agreement4        ,soc4   
,what art makes cities agree about      
numbers8        ,al4 ,arithmetic4       
,soc4 ,and private individuals8         
,al4 ,the same4        ,soc4 ,and what  
art makes each individual agree with    
himself8    ,sidenote3 ,the art of      
measure4        ,al4 ,the same4         
,soc4 ,and what art makes each of us    
agree with himself      about the       
comparative length of the span and of   
the cubit8      ,does not the art of    
measure8        ,al4 ,yes4        ,soc4 
,individuals are agreed with one another
 about this2      and states1 equally8  
,al4 ,yes4        ,soc4 ,and the same   

holds of the balance8        ,al4 ,true4
        ,soc4 ,but what is the other    
agreement of which you speak1      and  
about what8 what art can give that      
agreement8 ,and      does that which    
gives it to the state give it also to   
the individual1      so as to make him  
consistent with himself and with        
another8        ,al4 ,i should suppose  
so4        ,soc4 ,but what is the nature
 of the agreement8--answer1      and    
faint not4        ,al4 ,i mean to say   
that there should be such friendship and
      agreement as exists between an    
affectionate father and mother      and 
their son1 or between brothers1 or      
between husband and      wife4          
,soc4 ,but can a man1 ,alcibiades1 agree
 with a woman about      the spinning of
 wool1 which she understands and he does
 not8        ,al4 ,no1 truly4           
,soc4 ,nor has he any need1 for spinning
 is a female      accomplishment4       
,al4 ,yes4        ,soc4 ,and would a    
woman agree with a man about the        

#abg      science of arms1 which she has
 never learned8        ,al4 ,certainly  
not4        ,soc4 ,i suppose that the   
use of arms would be regarded by        
you as a male accomplishment8           
,al4 ,it would4        ,soc4 ,then1 upon
 your view1 women and men have two sorts
      of knowledge8        ,al4         
,certainly4        ,soc4 ,then in their 
knowledge there is no agreement of      
women and men8        ,al4 ,there is    
not4    ,sidenote3 ,apparent antagonism 
of friendship and justice4        ,soc4 
,nor can there be friendship1 if        
friendship is agreement8        ,al4    
,plainly not4        ,soc4 ,then women  
are not loved by men when they do their 
own work8        ,al4 ,i suppose not4   
,soc4 ,nor men by women when they do    
their own work8        ,al4 ,no4        
,sidenote3 ,if everybody is doing his   
own business1 how can this promote      
friendship8 ,and yet when individuals   
are doing each his own work1 they  are  
doing what is just4        ,soc4 ,nor   

are states well administered1 when      
individuals do      their own work8     
,al4 ,i should rather think1 ,socrates1 
that the reverse is the      truth#ei4  
,soc4 ,what6 do you mean to say that    
states are well administered      when  
friendship is absent1 the presence of   
which1      as we were saying1 alone    
secures their good order8        ,al4   
,but ,i should say that there is        
friendship among them1      for this    
very reason1 that the two parties       
respectively do their      own work4    
,soc4 ,that was not what you were saying
 before2 and what      do you mean now  
by affirming that friendship exists when
      there is no agreement8 ,how can   
there be agreement about      matters   
which the one party knows1 and of which 
the other is      in ignorance8         
,al4 ,impossible4        ,soc4 ,and when
 individuals are doing their own work1  
are      they doing what is just or     
unjust8        ,al4 ,what is just1      
certainly4        ,soc4 ,and when       

individuals do what is just in the      
state1 is      there no friendship among
 them8        ,al4 ,i suppose that there
 must be1 ,socrates4        ,soc4 ,then 
what do you mean by this friendship or  
agreement      about which we must be   
wise and discreet in order that      we 
may be good men8 ,i cannot make out     
where it exists or      among whom2     
according to you1 the same persons may  
sometimes      have it1 and sometimes   
not4        ,al4 ,but1 indeed1          
,socrates1 ,i do not know what ,i am    
saying2      and ,i have long been1     
unconsciously to myself1 in a most      
disgraceful state4        ,soc4         
,nevertheless1 cheer up2 at fifty1 if   
you had discovered      your deficiency1
 you would have been too old1 and the   
time      for taking care of yourself   
would have passed away1 but yours       
is just the age at which the discovery  
should be made4    ,sidenote3           
,alcibiades is puzzled4        ,al4 ,and
 what should he do1 ,socrates1 who would

 make the      discovery8    ,sidenote3 
,the way to clear up difficulties is to 
answer questions4  ,alcibiades is       
willing to have recourse to this method 
of improvement4        ,soc4 ,answer    
questions1 ,alcibiades2 and that is a   
process      which1 by the grace of     
,god1 if ,i may put any faith in my     
oracle1 will be very improving to both  
of us4        ,al4 ,if ,i can be        
improved by answering1 ,i will answer4  
,soc4 ,and first of all1 that we may not
 peradventure be           #abh         
deceived by appearances1 fancying1      
perhaps1 that we are      taking care of
 ourselves when we are not1 what is the 
meaning      of a man taking care of    
himself8 and when does he take          
care8 ,does he take care of himself when
 he takes care of      what belongs to  
him8        ,al4 ,i should think so4    
,soc4 ,when does a man take care of his 
feet8 ,does he      not take care of    
them when he takes care of that which   
belongs to his feet8        ,al4 ,i do  

not understand4        ,soc4 ,let me    
take the hand as an illustration2 does  
not a      ring belong to the finger1   
and to the finger only8        ,al4     
,yes4        ,soc4 ,and the shoe in like
 manner to the foot8        ,al4 ,yes4  
,soc4 ,and when we take care of our     
shoes1 do we not take      care of our  
feet8        ,al4 ,i do not comprehend1 
,socrates4        ,soc4 ,but you would  
admit1 ,alcibiades1 that to take proper 
care of a thing is a correct expression8
        ,al4 ,yes4        ,soc4 ,and    
taking proper care means improving8     
,al4 ,yes4        ,soc4 ,and what is the
 art which improves our shoes8          
,al4 ,shoemaking4        ,soc4 ,then by 
shoemaking we take care of our shoes8   
,al4 ,yes4        ,soc4 ,and do we by   
shoemaking take care of our feet1 or by 
some other art which improves the feet8 
,al4 ,by some other art4    ,sidenote3  
,he is learning by examples4            
,soc4 ,and the same art improves the    
feet which improves      the rest of the

 body8        ,al4 ,very true4          
,soc4 ,which is gymnastic8        ,al4  
,certainly4        ,soc4 ,then by       
gymnastic we take care of our feet1 and 
by      shoemaking of that which belongs
 to our feet8        ,al4 ,very true4   
,soc4 ,and by gymnastic we take care of 
our hands1 and by      the art of       
graving rings of that which belongs to  
our hands8        ,al4 ,yes4            
,soc4 ,and by gymnastic we take care of 
the body1 and by      the art of weaving
 and the other arts we take care of the 
things of the body8        ,al4         
,clearly4    ,sidenote3 ,it has been    
shown by examples that a man does not   
take care of  himself1 when he only     
takes care of what belongs to him4      
,soc4 ,then the art which takes care of 
each thing is different      from that  
which takes care of the belongings of   
each      thing8        ,al4 ,true4     
,soc4 ,then in taking care of what      
belongs to you1 you do      not take    
care of yourself8        ,al4 ,certainly

 not4        ,soc4 ,for the art which   
takes care of our belongings appears    
not to be the same as that which takes  
care of ourselves8        ,al4 ,clearly 
not4        ,soc4 ,and now let me ask   
you what is the art with which we       
take care of ourselves8        ,al4 ,i  
cannot say4        ,soc4 ,at any rate1  
thus much has been admitted1 that the   
art      is not one which makes any of  
our possessions1 but which      makes   
ourselves better8        ,al4 ,true4    
,soc4 ,but should we ever have known    
what art makes a shoe      better1 if we
 did not know a shoe8        ,al4       
,impossible4        ,soc4 ,nor should we
 know what art makes a ring better1 if  
we did not know a ring8        ,al4     
,that is true4    ,sidenote3 ,a man must
 know himself before he can improve     
himself or know  what belongs to him4   
,soc4 ,and can we ever know what art    
makes a man better1           #abi      
if we do not know what we are ourselves8
    ,sidenote3 ,the knowledge of self4  

,al4 ,impossible4        ,soc4 ,and is  
self-knowledge such an easy thing1 and  
was he      to be lightly esteemed who  
inscribed the text on the temple at     
,delphi8 ,or is self-knowledge a        
difficult thing1 which few      are able
 to attain8        ,al4 ,at times ,i    
fancy1 ,socrates1 that anybody can know 
himself2 at other times the task appears
 to be very difficult4        ,soc4 ,but
 whether easy or difficult1 ,alcibiades1
 still there is      no other way2      
knowing what we are1 we shall know how  
to      take care of ourselves1 and if  
we are ignorant we shall not      know4 
,al4 ,that is true4        ,soc4 ,well1 
then1 let us see in what way the        
self-existent      can be discovered by 
us2 that will give us a chance of       
discovering      our own existence1     
which otherwise we can never      know4 
,al4 ,you say truly4        ,soc4 ,come1
 now1 ,i beseech you1 tell me with whom 
you      are conversing8--with whom but 
with me8        ,al4 ,yes4        ,soc4 

,as ,i am1 with you8        ,al4 ,yes4  
,soc4 ,that is to say1 ,i1 ,socrates1 am
 talking8        ,al4 ,yes4        ,soc4
 ,and ,alcibiades is my hearer8         
,al4 ,yes4        ,soc4 ,and ,i in      
talking use words8        ,al4          
,certainly4        ,soc4 ,and talking   
and using words have1 ,i suppose1 the   
same meaning8        ,al4 ,to be sure4  
,soc4 ,and the user is not the same as  
the thing which he      uses8           
,al4 ,what do you mean8        ,soc4 ,i 
will explain2 the shoemaker1 for        
example1 uses a      square tool1 and a 
circular tool1 and other tools for      
cutting8        ,al4 ,yes4        ,soc4 
,but the tool is not the same as the    
cutter and user of      the tool8       
,al4 ,of course not4    ,sidenote3 ,more
 analogies and examples4        ,soc4   
,and in the same way the instrument of  
the harper is      to be distinguished  
from the harper himself8        ,al4 ,it
 is4        ,soc4 ,now the question     
which ,i asked was whether you          

conceive the user to be always different
 from that which he      uses8          
,al4 ,i do4        ,soc4 ,then what     
shall we say of the shoemaker8 ,does he 
cut with his tools only or with his     
hands8        ,al4 ,with his hands as   
well4        ,soc4 ,he uses his hands   
too8        ,al4 ,yes4        ,soc4 ,and
 does he use his eyes in cutting        
leather8        ,al4 ,he does4          
,sidenote3 ,he is distinct from what he 
uses2 and therefore distinct from  his  
own body4        ,soc4 ,and we admit    
that the user is not the same with the  
things which he uses8        ,al4 ,yes4 
,soc4 ,then the shoemaker and the harper
 are to be distinguished      from the  
hands and feet which they use8          
,al4 ,clearly4        ,soc4 ,and does   
not a man use the whole body8           
,al4 ,certainly4        ,soc4 ,and that 
which uses is different from that which 
is      used8        ,al4 ,true4        
,soc4 ,then a man is not the same as his
 own body8        ,al4 ,that is the     

inference4        ,soc4 ,what is he1    
then8        ,al4 ,i cannot say4        
,soc4 ,nay1 you can say that he is the  
user of the body4        ,al4 ,yes4     
,soc4 ,and the user of the body is the  
soul8                       #acj        
,al4 ,yes1 the soul4        ,soc4 ,and  
the soul rules8        ,al4 ,yes4       
,soc4 ,let me make an assertion which   
will1 ,i think1 be universally          
admitted4        ,al4 ,what is it8      
,sidenote3 ,but he must be one of three 
things3--,soul1 body1 or the union of   
the two4 ,what is the ruling principle  
in him8 ,clearly the soul4        ,soc4 
,that man is one of three things4       
,al4 ,what are they8    ,sidenote3 ,the 
true self or being of a man4            
,soc4 ,soul1 body1 or both together     
forming a whole4        ,al4 ,certainly4
        ,soc4 ,but did we not say that  
the actual ruling principle of      the 
body is man8        ,al4 ,yes1 we did4  
,soc4 ,and does the body rule over      
itself8        ,al4 ,certainly not4     

,soc4 ,it is subject1 as we were saying8
        ,al4 ,yes4        ,soc4 ,then   
that is not the principle which we are  
seeking8        ,al4 ,it would seem not4
        ,soc4 ,but may we say that the  
union of the two rules over      the    
body1 and consequently that this is man8
        ,al4 ,very likely4        ,soc4 
,the most unlikely of all things2 for if
 one of the      members is subject1 the
 two united cannot possibly rule4       
,al4 ,true4        ,soc4 ,but since     
neither the body1 nor the union of the  
two1      is man1 either man has no real
 existence1 or the soul is man8         
,al4 ,just so4        ,soc4 ,is anything
 more required to prove that the soul is
      man8        ,al4 ,certainly not2  
the proof is1 ,i think1 quite           
sufficient4    ,sidenote3 ,there remains
 a question of absolute existence1 which
 has not  been considered by us1 or     
rather is being considered by us when we
 speak  of the soul4        ,soc4 ,and  
if the proof1 although not perfect1 be  

sufficient1      we shall be            
satisfied2--more precise proof will be  
supplied      when we have discovered   
that which we were led to omit1         
from a fear that the enquiry would be   
too much protracted4        ,al4 ,what  
was that8        ,soc4 ,what ,i meant1  
when ,i said that absolute existence    
must be first considered2 but now1      
instead of absolute existence1      we  
have been considering the nature of     
individual      existence1 and this may1
 perhaps1 be sufficient2 for surely     
there is nothing which may be called    
more properly ourselves      than the   
soul8        ,al4 ,there is nothing4    
,sidenote3 ,you and ,i are talking soul 
to soul4        ,soc4 ,then we may truly
 conceive that you and ,i are conversing
      with one another1 soul to soul8   
,al4 ,very true4    ,sidenote3 ,the man 
and his belongings4        ,soc4 ,and   
that is just what ,i was saying         
before--that      ,i1 ,socrates1 am not 
arguing or talking with the face of     

,alcibiades1 but with the real          
,alcibiades2 or in other words1         
with his soul4        ,al4 ,true4       
,soc4 ,then he who bids a man know      
himself1 would have      him know his   
soul8        ,al4 ,that appears to be   
true4    ,sidenote3 ,but if the soul is 
the man1 he who knows only the arts     
which  concern man does not know        
himself4        ,soc4 ,he whose         
knowledge only extends to the body1     
#aca      knows the things of a man1 and
 not the man himself8        ,al4 ,that 
is true4        ,soc4 ,then neither the 
physician regarded as a physician1      
nor the trainer regarded as a trainer1  
knows himself8        ,al4 ,he does not4
        ,soc4 ,the husbandmen and the   
other craftsmen are very      far from  
knowing themselves1 for they would seem 
not      even to know their own         
belongings8 ,when regarded in           
relation to the arts which they practise
 they are even further      removed from
 self-knowledge1 for they only know the 

belongings      of the body1 which      
minister to the body4        ,al4 ,that 
is true4        ,soc4 ,then if          
temperance is the knowledge of self1 in 
respect      of his art none of them is 
temperate8        ,al4 ,i agree4        
,soc4 ,and this is the reason why their 
arts are accounted      vulgar1 and are 
not such as a good man would practise8  
,al4 ,quite true4        ,soc4 ,again1  
he who cherishes his body cherishes not 
himself1      but what belongs to him8  
,al4 ,that is true4        ,soc4 ,but he
 who cherishes his money1 cherishes     
neither himself      nor his belongings1
 but is in a stage yet further removed  
from himself8        ,al4 ,i agree4     
,soc4 ,then the money-maker has really  
ceased to be occupied      with his own 
concerns8        ,al4 ,true4            
,sidenote3 ,the lover of the soul is the
 true lover4        ,soc4 ,and if any   
one has fallen in love with the person  
of      ,alcibiades1 he loves not       
,alcibiades1 but the belongings of      

,alcibiades8        ,al4 ,true4         
,soc4 ,but he who loves your soul is the
 true lover8    ,sidenote3 ,socrates1   
the only true lover of ,alcibiades4     
,al4 ,that is the necessary inference4  
,soc4 ,the lover of the body goes away  
when the flower of      youth fades8    
,al4 ,true4    ,sidenote3 ,he only      
remains and goes not away1 so long as   
the soul of his  beloved follows after  
virtue4        ,soc4 ,but he who loves  
the soul goes not away1 as long as      
the soul follows after virtue8          
,al4 ,yes4        ,soc4 ,and ,i am the  
lover who goes not away1 but remains    
with you1 when you are no longer young  
and the rest are gone8        ,al4 ,yes1
 ,socrates2 and therein you do well1 and
 ,i hope      that you will remain4     
,soc4 ,then you must try to look your   
best4        ,al4 ,i will4        ,soc4 
,the fact is1 that there is only one    
lover of ,alcibiades      the son of    
,cleinias2 there neither is nor ever has
 been seemingly      any other2 and he  

is his darling1--,socrates1 the son of  
,sophroniscus and ,phaenarete4          
,al4 ,true4        ,soc4 ,and did you   
not say1 that if ,i had not spoken      
first1      you were on the point of    
coming to me1 and enquiring why ,i      
only remained8        ,al4 ,that is     
true4    ,sidenote3 ,and ,socrates will 
never desert ,alcibiades so long as he  
is not  spoiled by the ,athenian people4
        ,soc4 ,the reason was that ,i   
loved you for your own sake1            
whereas other men love what belongs to  
you2 and your      beauty1 which is not 
you1 is fading away1 just as your true  
#acb      self is beginning to bloom4   
,and ,i will never desert you1 if       
you are not spoiled and deformed by the 
,athenian people2      for the danger   
which ,i most fear is that you will     
become a      lover of the people and   
will be spoiled by them4 ,many a        
noble ,athenian has been ruined in this 
way4 ,for the demus      of the         
great-hearted ,erechtheus is of a fair  

countenance1 but      you should see him
 naked2 wherefore observe the caution   
which ,i give you4        ,al4 ,what    
caution8        ,soc4 ,practise         
yourself1 sweet friend1 in learning what
 you      ought to know1 before you     
enter on politics2 and then you         
will have an antidote which will keep   
you out of harm's way4        ,al4 ,good
 advice1 ,socrates1 but ,i wish that you
 would explain      to me in what way ,i
 am to take care of myself4        ,soc4
 ,have we not made an advance8 for we   
are at any      rate tolerably well     
agreed as to what we are1 and there is  
no      longer any danger1 as we once   
feared1 that we might be      taking    
care not of ourselves1 but of something 
which is not      ourselves4            
,sidenote3 ,how is a man to take care of
 himself8        ,al4 ,that is true4    
,soc4 ,and the next step will be to take
 care of the soul1 and      look to     
that8        ,al4 ,certainly4           
,soc4 ,leaving the care of our bodies   

and of our properties      to others8   
,al4 ,very good4    ,sidenote3 ,he who  
would take care of himself must first of
 all know  himself4        ,soc4 ,but   
how can we have a perfect knowledge of  
the      things of the soul8--,for if we
 know them1 then ,i suppose      we     
shall know ourselves4 ,can we really be 
ignorant of the      excellent meaning  
of the ,delphian inscription1 of which  
we      were just now speaking8         
,al4 ,what have you in your thoughts1   
,socrates8        ,soc4 ,i will tell you
 what ,i suspect to be the meaning and  
lesson of that inscription4 ,let me take
 an illustration from      sight1 which 
,i imagine to be the only one suitable  
to my      purpose4        ,al4 ,what do
 you mean8    ,sidenote3 ,the eye which 
would see itself must look into the     
pupil of  another1 which is the divinest
 part of the eye1 and will then behold  
itself4        ,soc4 ,consider2 if some 
one were to say to the eye1 #8,see      
thyself1' as you might say to a man1    

#8,know thyself1' what is      the      
nature and meaning of this precept8     
,would not his      meaning be3--,that  
the eye should look at that in which it 
would see itself8        ,al4 ,clearly4 
,soc4 ,and what are the objects in      
looking at which we see      ourselves8 
,al4 ,clearly1 ,socrates1 in looking at 
mirrors and the like4        ,soc4 ,very
 true2 and is there not something of the
 nature      of a mirror in our own     
eyes8        ,al4 ,certainly4           
,soc4 ,did you ever observe that the    
face of the person      looking into the
 eye of another is reflected as in a    
mirror2      and in the visual organ    
which is over against him1 and which    
#acc      is called the pupil1 there is 
a sort of image of the person           
looking8        ,al4 ,that is quite     
true4    ,sidenote3 ,the argument       
recapitulated with some corrections4    
,soc4 ,then the eye1 looking at another 
eye1 and at that in      the eye which  
is most perfect1 and which is the       

instrument of      vision1 will there   
see itself8        ,al4 ,that is        
evident4        ,soc4 ,but looking at   
anything else either in man or in the   
world1 and not to what resembles this1  
it will not see itself8        ,al4     
,very true4        ,soc4 ,then if the   
eye is to see itself1 it must look at   
the eye1      and at that part of the   
eye where sight which is the virtue of  
the eye resides8        ,al4 ,true4     
,sidenote3 ,and the soul which would    
know herself must look especially at    
that part of herself in which she       
resembles the divine4        ,soc4 ,and 
if the soul1 my dear ,alcibiades1 is    
ever to know      herself1 must she not 
look at the soul2 and especially at that
      part of the soul in which her     
virtue resides1 and to any other        
which is like this8        ,al4 ,i      
agree1 ,socrates4        ,soc4 ,and do  
we know of any part of our souls more   
divine      than that which has to do   
with wisdom and knowledge8        ,al4  

,there is none4        ,soc4 ,then this 
is that part of the soul which resembles
 the      divine2 and he who looks at   
this and at the whole class of          
things divine1 will be most likely to   
know himself8        ,al4 ,clearly4     
,soc4 ,and self-knowledge we agree to be
 wisdom8        ,al4 ,true4        ,soc4
 ,but if we have no self-knowledge and  
no wisdom1 can      we ever know our own
 good and evil8        ,al4 ,how can we1
 ,socrates8        ,soc4 ,you mean1 that
 if you did not know ,alcibiades1 there 
would be no possibility of your knowing 
that what belonged      to ,alcibiades  
was really his8        ,al4 ,it would be
 quite impossible4    ,sidenote3 ,he who
 knows not himself and his belongings1  
will not know  others and their         
belongings1 and therefore he will not   
know the affairs  of states4            
,soc4 ,nor should we know that we were  
the persons to      whom anything       
belonged1 if we did not know ourselves8 
,al4 ,how could we8        ,soc4 ,and if

 we did not know our own belongings1    
neither      should we know the         
belongings of our belongings8           
,al4 ,clearly not4        ,soc4 ,then we
 were not altogether right in           
acknowledging      just now that a man  
may know what belongs to him and yet    
not know himself2 nay1 rather he cannot 
even know the belongings      of his    
belongings2 for the discernment of the  
things      of self1 and of the things  
which belong to the things of self1     
appear all to be the business of the    
same man1 and of the      same art4     
,sidenote3 ,happiness without virtue    
impossible4        ,al4 ,so much may be 
supposed4        ,soc4 ,and he who knows
 not the things which belong to         
himself1 will in like manner be ignorant
 of the things which      belong to     
others8        ,al4 ,very true4         
,soc4 ,and if he knows not the affairs  
of others1 he will not      know the    
affairs of states8        ,al4          
,certainly not4        ,soc4 ,then such 

a man can never be a statesman8         
,al4 ,he cannot4        ,soc4 ,nor an   
economist8        ,al4 ,he cannot4      
,soc4 ,he will not know what he is      
doing8                          #acd    
,al4 ,he will not4        ,soc4 ,and    
will not he who is ignorant fall into   
error8        ,al4 ,assuredly4          
,sidenote3 ,and1 if he knows not what he
 is doing1 he will be miserable  and    
will make others miserable4        ,soc4
 ,and if he falls into error will he not
 fail both in his      public and       
private capacity8        ,al4 ,yes1     
indeed4        ,soc4 ,and failing1 will 
he not be miserable8        ,al4 ,very4 
,soc4 ,and what will become of those for
 whom he is      acting8        ,al4    
,they will be miserable also4           
,soc4 ,then he who is not wise and good 
cannot be happy8        ,al4 ,he cannot4
        ,soc4 ,the bad1 then1 are       
miserable8        ,al4 ,yes1 very4      
,soc4 ,and if so1 not he who has riches1
 but he who has      wisdom1 is         

delivered from his misery8        ,al4  
,clearly4        ,soc4 ,cities1 then1 if
 they are to be happy1 do not want      
walls1 or triremes1 or docks1 or        
numbers1 or size1 ,alcibiades1          
without virtue#fj8    ,sidenote3 ,the   
divine mirror4        ,al4 ,indeed they 
do not4    ,sidenote3 ,he must give the 
citizens wisdom and justice1 and he     
cannot  give what he has not got4       
,soc4 ,and you must give the citizens   
virtue1 if you mean to      administer  
their affairs rightly or nobly8         
,al4 ,certainly4        ,soc4 ,but can a
 man give that which he has not8        
,al4 ,impossible4        ,soc4 ,then you
 or any one who means to govern and     
superintend1 not only himself and the   
things of himself1 but      the state   
and the things of the state1 must in the
 first place      acquire virtue4       
,al4 ,that is true4        ,soc4 ,you   
have not therefore to obtain power or   
authority1      in order to enable you  
to do what you wish for yourself and    

the state1 but justice and wisdom4      
,al4 ,clearly4    ,sidenote3 ,if he acts
 wisely and justly he will act according
 to the will  of ,god4        ,soc4 ,you
 and the state1 if you act wisely and   
justly1 will      act according to the  
will of ,god8        ,al4 ,certainly4   
,soc4 ,as ,i was saying before1 you will
 look only at what is      bright and   
divine1 and act with a view to them8    
,al4 ,yes4    ,sidenote3 ,in the mirror 
of the divine he will see his own good  
and will  act rightly and be happy4     
,soc4 ,in that mirror you will see and  
know yourselves and      your own good8 
,al4 ,yes4        ,soc4 ,and so you will
 act rightly and well8        ,al4 ,yes4
        ,soc4 ,in which case1 ,i will be
 security for your happiness4           
,al4 ,i accept the security4            
,soc4 ,but if you act unrighteously1    
your eye will turn to      the dark and 
godless1 and being in darkness and      
ignorance      of yourselves1 you will  
probably do deeds of darkness4          

,al4 ,very possibly4        ,soc4 ,for  
if a man1 my dear ,alcibiades1 has the  
power to      do what he likes1 but has 
no understanding1 what is likely to     
be the result1 either to him as an      
individual or to the state--for  #ace   
example1 if he be sick and is able to do
 what he likes1      not having the mind
 of a physician--having moreover        
tyrannical      power1 and no one daring
 to reprove him1 what will      happen  
to him8 ,will he not be likely to have  
his constitution      ruined8           
,sidenote3 ,the conversion of           
,alcibiades4        ,al4 ,that is true4 
,soc4 ,or again1 in a ship1 if a man    
having the power to do      what he     
likes1 has no intelligence or skill in  
navigation1 do      you see what will   
happen to him and to his fellow-sailors8
        ,al4 ,yes2 ,i see that they will
 all perish4        ,soc4 ,and in like  
manner1 in a state1 and where there is  
any power and authority which is wanting
 in virtue1 will not      misfortune1 in

 like manner1 ensue8        ,al4        
,certainly4    ,sidenote3 ,not power1   
but virtue1 should be the aim both of   
individuals  and of states3 and he only 
is a freeman who has virtue4            
,soc4 ,not tyrannical power1 then1 my   
good ,alcibiades1      should be the aim
 either of individuals or states1 if    
they      would be happy1 but virtue4   
,al4 ,that is true4        ,soc4 ,and   
before they have virtue1 to be commanded
 by a      superior is better for men as
 well as for children#fa8        ,al4   
,that is evident4        ,soc4 ,and that
 which is better is also nobler8        
,al4 ,true4        ,soc4 ,and what is   
nobler is more becoming8        ,al4    
,certainly4        ,soc4 ,then to the   
bad man slavery is more becoming1       
because better8        ,al4 ,true4      
,soc4 ,then vice is only suited to a    
slave8        ,al4 ,yes4        ,soc4   
,and virtue to a freeman8        ,al4   
,yes4        ,soc4 ,and1 ,o my friend1  
is not the condition of a slave to      

be avoided8        ,al4 ,certainly1     
,socrates4        ,soc4 ,and are you now
 conscious of your own state8 ,and      
do you know whether you are a freeman or
 not8        ,al4 ,i think that ,i am   
very conscious indeed of my own         
state4        ,soc4 ,and do you know how
 to escape out of a state which      ,i 
do not even like to name to my beauty8  
,al4 ,yes1 ,i do4        ,soc4 ,how8    
,al4 ,by your help1 ,socrates4          
,sidenote3 ,the power of the state may  
be too much for us4        ,soc4 ,that  
is not well said1 ,alcibiades4          
,al4 ,what ought ,i to have said8       
,soc4 ,by the help of ,god4        ,al4 
,i agree2 and ,i further say1 that our  
relations are      likely to be         
reversed4 ,from this day forward1 ,i    
must and      will follow you as you    
have followed me2 ,i will be the        
disciple1 and you shall be my master4   
,soc4 ,o that is rare6 ,my love breeds  
another love3 and      so like the stork
 ,i shall be cherished by the bird whom 

,i      have hatched4        ,al4       
,strange1 but true2 and henceforward ,i 
shall begin to      think about justice4
        ,soc4 ,and ,i hope that you will
 persist2 although ,i have      fears1  
not because ,i doubt you2 but ,i see the
 power of the      state1 which may be  
too much for both of us4                
,,footnotes    #ee ,cp4 ,symp4 #bac ,c4 
#ef ,cp4 ,symp4 #bag ,e ff4    #eg ,cp4 
,symp4 #aha ,e4    #eh ,about #djf4     
#ei ,cp4 ,rep4 i4 #ccb foll4    #fj ,cp4
 ,arist4 ,pol4 vii4 #a4  #e4    #fa ,cp4
 ,arist4 ,pol4 i4 #e4  #g4              
,,menexenus4      ,,introduction4       
,sidenote3 ,menexenus4    ,sidenote3    
,,introduction4    ,the ,menexenus has  
more the character of a rhetorical      
exercise than any  other of the         
,platonic works4 ,the writer seems to   
have wished to emulate  ,thucydides1 and
 the far slighter work of ,lysias4 ,in  
his rivalry with the  latter1 to whom in
 the ,phaedrus ,plato shows a strong    
antipathy1 he is  entirely successful1  

but he is not equal to ,thucydides4 ,the
 ,menexenus1  though not without real   
,hellenic interest1 falls very far short
 of the  rugged grandeur and political  
insight of the great historian4 ,the    
fiction  of the speech having been      
invented by ,aspasia is well sustained1 
and is  in the manner of ,plato1        
notwithstanding the anachronism which   
puts into  her mouth an allusion to the 
peace of ,antalcidas1 an event occurring
  forty years after the date of the     
supposed oration4 ,but ,plato1 like     
,shakespeare1 is careless of such       
anachronisms1 which are not supposed to 
strike the mind of the reader4 ,the     
effect produced by these grandiloquent  
orations on ,socrates1 who does not     
recover after having heard one of them  
for three days and more1 is truly       
,platonic4    ,such discourses1 if we   
may form a judgment from the three which
 are  extant 7for the so-called ,funeral
 ,oration of ,demosthenes is a bad and  
spurious imitation of ,thucydides and   

,lysias71 conformed to a regular  type4 
,they began with ,gods and ancestors1   
and the legendary history of  ,athens1  
to which succeeded an almost equally    
fictitious account of later  times4 ,the
 ,persian war usually formed the centre 
of the narrative2 in the  age of        
,isocrates and ,demosthenes the         
,athenians were still living on the     
glories of ,marathon and ,salamis4 ,the 
,menexenus veils in panegyric the  weak 
places of ,athenian history4 ,the war of
 ,athens and ,boeotia is a war  of      
liberation2 the ,athenians gave back the
 ,spartans taken at ,sphacteria  out of 
kindness--indeed1 the only fault of the 
city was too great kindness  to their   
enemies1 who were more honoured than the
 friends of others  7cp4 ,thucyd4 ii4   
#da1 which seems to contain the germ of 
the idea72 we  democrats are the        
aristocracy of virtue1 and the like4    
,these are the  platitudes and          
falsehoods in which history is          
disguised4 ,the taking of  ,athens is   

hardly mentioned4    ,sidenote3 ,the    
authenticity of the ,dialogue4    ,the  
author of the ,menexenus1 whether ,plato
 or not1 is evidently intending  to     
ridicule the practice1 and at the same  
time to show that he can beat  the      
rhetoricians in their own line1 as in   
the ,phaedrus he may be supposed  to    
offer an example of what ,lysias might  
have said1 and of how much  better he   
might have written in his own style4    
,the orators had recourse  to their     
favourite loci communes1 one of which1  
as we find in ,lysias1  was the         
shortness of the time allowed them for  
preparation4 ,but ,socrates  points out 
that they had them always ready for     
delivery1 and that there  was no        
difficulty in improvising any number of 
such orations4 ,to praise  the          
,athenians among the ,athenians was     
easy1--to praise them among the         
,lacedaemonians would have been a much  
more difficult task4 ,socrates  himself 
has turned rhetorician1 having learned  

of a woman1 ,aspasia1 the  mistress of  
,pericles2 and any one whose teachers   
had been far inferior to  his own--say1 
one who had learned from ,antiphon the  
,rhamnusian--would be  quite equal to   
the task of praising men to themselves4 
,when we remember  that ,antiphon is    
described by ,thucydides as the best    
pleader of his day1  the satire on him  
and on the whole tribe of rhetoricians  
is transparent4    ,the ironical        
assumption of ,socrates1 that he must be
 a good orator  because he had learnt of
 ,aspasia1 is not coarse1 as            
,schleiermacher  supposes1 but is rather
 to be regarded as fanciful4 ,nor can we
 say that  the offer of ,socrates to    
dance naked out of love for ,menexenus1 
is any  more un-,platonic than the      
threat of physical force which ,phaedrus
 uses  towards ,socrates 7#bhf ,c74 ,nor
 is there any real vulgarity in the fear
  which ,socrates expresses that he will
 get a beating from his mistress1       
,aspasia3 this is the natural           

exaggeration of what might be expected  
from  an imperious woman4 ,socrates is  
not to be taken seriously in all that   
he says1 and ,plato1 both in the        
,symposium and elsewhere1 is not slow to
  admit a sort of ,aristophanic humour4 
,how a great original genius like       
,plato might or might not have written1 
what was his conception of humour1  or  
what limits he would have prescribed to 
himself1 if any1 in drawing  the picture
 of the ,silenus ,socrates1 are problems
 which no critical  instinct can        
determine4    ,sidenote3 ,the           
authenticity of the ,dialogue4    ,on   
the other hand1 the dialogue has several
 ,platonic traits1 whether  original or 
imitated may be uncertain4 ,socrates1   
when he departs from  his character of a
 #8know nothing' and delivers a speech1 
generally  pretends that what he is     
speaking is not his own composition4    
,thus in  the ,cratylus he is run away  
with 7#daj ,e72 in the ,phaedrus he has 
heard  somebody say something 7#bce     

,c7--is inspired by the genius loci     
7#bch ,d72  in the ,symposium he derives
 his wisdom from ,diotima of ,mantinea1 
and the  like4 ,but he does not impose  
on ,menexenus by his dissimulation4     
,without  violating the character of    
,socrates1 ,plato1 who knows so well how
 to give  a hint1 or some one writing in
 his name1 intimates clearly enough that
  the speech in the ,menexenus like that
 in the ,phaedrus is to be attributed   
to ,socrates4 ,the address of the dead  
to the living at the end of the  oration
 may also be compared to the numerous   
addresses of the same kind  which occur 
in ,plato1 in whom the dramatic element 
is always tending to  prevail over the  
rhetorical4 ,the remark has been often  
made1 that in the  ,funeral ,oration of 
,thucydides there is no allusion to the 
existence of  the dead4 ,but in the     
,menexenus a future state is clearly1   
although not  strongly1 asserted4       
,whether the ,menexenus is a genuine    
writing of ,plato1 or an imitation      

only1 remains uncertain4 ,in either     
case1 the thoughts are partly borrowed  
from the ,funeral ,oration of           
,thucydides2 and the fact that they are 
so1 is  not in favour of the genuineness
 of the work4 ,internal evidence seems  
to  leave the question of authorship in 
doubt4 ,there are merits and there are  
defects which might lead to either      
conclusion4 ,the form of the greater    
part of the work makes the enquiry      
difficult2 the introduction and the     
finale certainly wear the look either of
 ,plato or of an extremely skilful      
imitator4 ,the excellence of the forgery
 may be fairly adduced as an  argument  
that it is not a forgery at all4 ,in    
this uncertainty the express  testimony 
of ,aristotle1 who quotes1 in the       
,rhetoric1#fb the well-known  words1    
#8,it is easy to praise the ,athenians  
among the ,athenians1' from the         
,funeral ,oration1 may perhaps turn the 
balance in its favour4 ,it must be      
remembered also that the work was famous

 in antiquity1 and is included in  the  
,alexandrian catalogues of ,platonic    
writings4      ,,menexenus4    ,,persons
 ,,of ,,the ,,dialogue4    ,,socrates   
and ,,menexenus4    ,sidenote3          
,menexenus4        ,socrates4 ,whence   
come you1 ,menexenus8 ,are you from     
the ,agora8                             
,steph4 #bcd        ,menexenus4 ,yes1   
,socrates2 ,i have been at the ,council4
        ,soc4 ,and what might you be    
doing at the ,council8 ,and      yet ,i 
need hardly ask1 for ,i see that you1   
believing yourself      to have arrived 
at the end of education and of          
philosophy1      and to have had enough 
of them1 are mounting upwards      to   
things higher still1 and1 though rather 
young for the post1      are intending  
to govern us elder men1 like the rest of
 your      family1 which has always     
provided some one who kindly      took  
care of us4        ,men4 ,yes1          
,socrates1 ,i shall be ready to hold    
office1 if you      allow and advise    

that ,i should1 but not if you think    
otherwise4      ,i went to the council  
chamber because ,i heard that      the  
,council was about to choose some one   
who was to speak      over the dead4    
,for you know that there is to be a     
public      funeral8        ,soc4 ,yes1 
,i know4 ,and whom did they choose8     
,men4 ,no one2 they delayed the election
 until to-morrow1      but ,i believe   
that either ,archinus or ,dion will be  
chosen4    ,sidenote3 ,the gain of dying
 in battle4    ,sidenote3 ,the effect   
upon ,socrates of panegyrical oratory4  
,sidenote3 ,easy to praise ,athenians   
among ,peloponnesians4        ,soc4 ,o  
,menexenus6 death in battle is certainly
 in many      respects a noble thing4   
,the dead man gets a fine and costly    
funeral1 although he may have been poor1
 and an elaborate      speech is made   
over him by a wise man who has long ago 
prepared what he has to say1 although he
 who is praised may      not have been  
good for much4 ,the speakers praise him 

for      what he has done and for what  
he has not done--that is the      beauty
 of them--and they steal away our souls 
with their      embellished words2 in   
every conceivable form they praise      
#bce      the city2 and they praise     
those who died in war1 and all our      
ancestors who went before us2 and they  
praise ourselves      also who are still
 alive1 until ,i feel quite elevated by 
their      laudations1 and ,i stand     
listening to their words1 ,menexenus1   
and become enchanted by them1 and all in
 a moment ,i      imagine myself to have
 become a greater and nobler and        
finer man than ,i was before4 ,and if1  
as often happens1 there      are any    
foreigners who accompany me to the      
speech1 ,i      become suddenly         
conscious of having a sort of triumph   
over      them1 and they seem to        
experience a corresponding feeling      
of admiration at me1 and at the         
greatness of the city1 which            
appears to them1 when they are under the

 influence of the      speaker1 more    
wonderful than ever4 ,this consciousness
 of      dignity lasts me more than     
three days1 and not until the fourth    
or fifth day do ,i come to my senses and
 know where ,i am2      in the meantime 
,i have been living in the ,islands of  
the ,blest4      ,such is the art of our
 rhetoricians1 and in such manner does  
the sound of their words keep ringing in
 my ears4    ,sidenote3 ,socrates always
 making fun of the rhetoricians4        
,men4 ,you are always making fun of the 
rhetoricians1      ,socrates2 this time1
 however1 ,i am inclined to think that  
the      speaker who is chosen will not 
have much to say1 for he has      been  
called upon to speak at a moment's      
notice1 and he will      be compelled   
almost to improvise4        ,soc4 ,but  
why1 my friend1 should he not have      
plenty to      say8 ,every rhetorician  
has speeches ready made2 nor is         
there any difficulty in improvising that
 sort of stuff4 ,had      the orator to 

praise ,athenians among ,peloponnesians1
 or      ,peloponnesians among          
,athenians1 he would be a good          
rhetorician who could succeed and gain  
credit4 ,but there is      no difficulty
 in a man's winning applause when he is 
contending      for fame among the      
persons whom he is praising4            
,men4 ,do you think not1 ,socrates8     
,soc4 ,certainly #8not4'    ,sidenote3  
,could ,socrates himself make a funeral 
oration8        ,men4 ,do you think that
 you could speak yourself if there      
should be a necessity1 and if the       
,council were to choose you8            
,soc4 ,that ,i should be able to speak  
is no great wonder1      ,menexenus1    
considering that ,i have an excellent   
mistress in      the art of             
rhetoric1--she who has made so many good
      speakers1 and one who was the best
 among all the ,hellenes--,pericles1    
the son of ,xanthippus4    ,sidenote3   
,aspasia the teacher both of ,pericles  
and of ,socrates4        ,men4 ,and who 

is she8 ,i suppose that you mean        
,aspasia4    ,sidenote3 ,yes2 for he is 
a pupil of ,aspasia4        ,soc4 ,yes1 
,i do2 and besides her ,i had ,connus1  
the son of      ,metrobius1 as a master1
 and he was my master in music1 as      
#bcf      she was in rhetoric4 ,no      
wonder that a man who has      received 
such an education should be a finished  
speaker2      even the pupil of very    
inferior masters1 say1 for example1 one 
who had learned music of ,lamprus1 and  
rhetoric of ,antiphon      the          
,rhamnusian1 might make a figure if he  
were to praise      the ,athenians among
 the ,athenians4        ,men4 ,and what 
would you be able to say if you had to  
speak8    ,sidenote3 ,the funeral       
oration composed by ,aspasia4           
,soc4 ,of my own wit1 most likely       
nothing2 but yesterday      ,i heard    
,aspasia composing a funeral oration    
about these      very dead4 ,for she had
 been told1 as you were saying1 that    
the ,athenians were going to choose a   

speaker1 and she      repeated to me the
 sort of speech which he should deliver1
      partly improvising and partly from
 previous thought1 putting      together
 fragments of the funeral oration which 
,pericles      spoke1 but which1 as ,i  
believe1 she composed4        ,men4 ,and
 can you remember what ,aspasia said8   
,soc4 ,i ought to be able1 for she      
taught me1 and she was      ready to    
strike me because ,i was always         
forgetting4        ,men4 ,then why will 
you not rehearse what she said8         
,soc4 ,because ,i am afraid that my     
mistress may be angry      with me if ,i
 publish her speech4        ,men4 ,nay1 
,socrates1 let us have the speech1      
whether      ,aspasia's or any one      
else's1 no matter4 ,i hope that you will
      oblige me4        ,soc4 ,but ,i am
 afraid that you will laugh at me if ,i 
continue      the games of youth in old 
age4        ,men4 ,far otherwise1       
,socrates2 let us by all means have     
the speech4        ,soc4 ,truly ,i have 

such a disposition to oblige you1 that  
if      you bid me dance naked ,i should
 not like to refuse1 since we      are  
alone4 ,listen then3 ,if ,i remember    
rightly1 she began      as follows1 with
 the mention of the dead#fc3--          
,sidenote3 ,the panegyric on the dead4  
,there is a tribute of deeds and of     
words4 ,the departed      have already  
had the first1 when going forth on their
 destined      journey they were        
attended on their way by the state and  
by      their friends2 the tribute of   
words remains to be given to      them1 
as is meet and by law ordained4 ,for    
noble words are      a memorial and a   
crown of noble actions1 which are given 
to      the doers of them by the        
hearers4 ,a word is needed which        
will duly praise the dead and gently    
admonish the living1      exhorting the 
brethren and descendants of the departed
 to      imitate their virtue1 and      
consoling their fathers and mothers     
and the survivors1 if any1 who may      

chance to be alive of the       #bcg    
previous generation4 ,what sort of a    
word will this be1 and      how shall we
 rightly begin the praises of these     
brave men8      ,in their life they     
rejoiced their own friends with their   
valour1 and their death they gave in    
exchange for the      salvation of the  
living4 ,and ,i think that we should    
praise      them in the order in which  
nature made them good1 for they         
were good because they were sprung from 
good fathers4      ,wherefore let us    
first of all praise the goodness of     
their      birth2 secondly1 their       
nurture and education2 and then let     
us set forth how noble their actions    
were1 and how worthy      of the        
education which they had received4      
,sidenote3 ,the departed were the       
children of the soil2 and their country 
is dear to the ,gods1 who contended for 
the possession of her4        ,and first
 as to their birth4 ,their ancestors    
were not      strangers1 nor are these  

their descendants sojourners only1      
whose fathers have come from another    
country2 but they are      the children 
of the soil1 dwelling and living in     
their own      land4 ,and the country   
which brought them up is not like       
other countries1 a stepmother to her    
children1 but their own      true       
mother2 she bore them and nourished them
 and received      them1 and in her     
bosom they now repose4 ,it is meet      
and right1 therefore1 that we should    
begin by praising the      land which is
 their mother1 and that will be a way of
 praising      their noble birth4       
,sidenote3 ,the pre-eminence of ,attica4
    ,sidenote3 ,she first brought forth 
man1 and proved her true motherhood by  
providing food for her own offspring4   
,sidenote3 ,the ,gods were the rulers of
 primitive men1 and gave them arts4     
,the country is worthy to be praised1   
not only by us1 but      by all mankind2
 first1 and above all1 as being dear to 
the      ,gods4 ,this is proved by the  

strife and contention of the      ,gods 
respecting her4 ,and ought not the      
country which the      ,gods praise to  
be praised by all mankind8 ,the second  
praise which may be fairly claimed by   
her1 is that at the      time when the  
whole earth was sending forth and       
creating      diverse animals1 tame and 
wild1 she our mother was free and       
pure from savage monsters1 and out of   
all animals selected      and brought   
forth man1 who is superior to the rest  
in understanding1      and alone has    
justice and religion4 ,and a great      
proof that she brought forth the common 
ancestors of us and      of the         
departed1 is that she provided the means
 of support      for her offspring4 ,for
 as a woman proves her motherhood       
by giving milk to her young ones 7and   
she who has no      fountain of milk is 
not a mother71 so did this our land     
prove      that she was the mother of   
men1 for in those days she alone        
and first of all brought forth wheat and

 barley for human      food1 which is   
the best and noblest sustenance for man1
            #bch      whom she regarded 
as her true offspring4 ,and these are   
truer proofs of motherhood in a country 
than in a woman1      for the woman in  
her conception and generation is but the
      imitation of the earth1 and not   
the earth of the woman4 ,and      of the
 fruit of the earth she gave a plenteous
 supply1 not      only to her own1 but  
to others also2 and afterwards she made 
the olive to spring up to be a boon to  
her children1 and to      help them in  
their toils4 ,and when she had herself  
nursed      them and brought them up to 
manhood1 she gave them ,gods      to be 
their rulers and teachers1 whose names  
are well known1      and need not now be
 repeated4 ,they are the ,gods who first
      ordered our lives1 and instructed 
us in the arts for the supply      of   
our daily needs1 and taught us the      
acquisition and use of      arms for the
 defence of the country4    ,sidenote3  

,we have a good government1 which is    
sometimes called a  democracy1 but is   
really an aristocracy1 for the best rule
 with the  consent of the many4         
,sidenote3 ,the mythical glories of     
,athens4    ,sidenote3 ,the principle of
 our government is equality2 the only   
superiority is that of virtue and       
wisdom4        ,thus born into the world
 and thus educated1 the ancestors       
of the departed lived and made          
themselves a government1      which ,i  
ought briefly to commemorate4 ,for      
government is      the nurture of man1  
and the government of good men is good1 
and of bad men bad4 ,and ,i must show   
that our ancestors      were trained    
under a good government1 and for this   
reason      they were good1 and our     
contemporaries are also good1 among     
whom our departed friends are to be     
reckoned4 ,then as      now1 and indeed 
always1 from that time to this1 speaking
      generally1 our government was an  
aristocracy--a form of      government  

which receives various names1 according 
to the      fancies of men1 and is      
sometimes called democracy1 but is      
really an aristocracy or government of  
the best which has the      approval of 
the many4 ,for kings we have always had1
 first      hereditary and then elected1
 and authority is mostly in the         
hands of the people1 who dispense       
offices and power to those      who     
appear to be most deserving of them4    
,neither is a man      rejected from    
weakness or poverty or obscurity of     
origin1 nor      honoured by reason of  
the opposite1 as in other states1 but   
there is one principle--he who appears  
to be wise and good      is a governor  
and ruler4 ,the basis of this our       
government is      equality of birth2   
for other states are made up of all     
sorts and      unequal conditions of    
men1 and therefore their governments    
are unequal2 there are tyrannies and    
there are oligarchies1      in which the
 one party are slaves and the other     

masters4      ,but we and our citizens  
are brethren1 the children all of one   
#bci      mother1 and we do not think it
 right to be one another's      masters 
or servants2 but the natural equality of
 birth compels      us to seek for legal
 equality1 and to recognize no          
superiority      except in the          
reputation of virtue and wisdom4        
,sidenote3 ,the greatness of ,persia4   
,sidenote3 ,the battle of ,marathon4    
,sidenote3 ,yet at ,marathon the army of
 ,darius was overcome by the  ,athenians
 almost single-handed4    ,sidenote3    
,salamis1 ,artemisium1 and ,plataea4    
,sidenote3 ,the men of ,marathon should 
have the first place3 those who         
followed in the war were their          
disciples1 except the men who defeated  
the  ,persians at ,salamis and first    
made proof of them at sea2 these have   
the  second place4    ,sidenote3 ,and   
the third place is to be assigned to    
those who fought at  ,plataea4          
,sidenote3 ,eurymedon2 ,cyprus2 ,egypt4 

,and so their and our fathers1 and      
these1 too1 our brethren1      being    
nobly born and having been brought up in
 all freedom1      did both in their    
public and private capacity many noble  
deeds      famous over the whole world4 
,they were the deeds of men      who    
thought that they ought to fight both   
against ,hellenes      for the sake of  
,hellenes on behalf of freedom1 and     
against      barbarians in the common   
interest of ,hellas4 ,time would        
fail me to tell of their defence of     
their country against the      invasion 
of ,eumolpus and the ,amazons1 or of    
their defence      of the ,argives      
against the ,cadmeians1 or of the       
,heracleids      against the ,argives2  
besides1 the poets have already declared
      in song to all mankind their      
glory1 and therefore any commemoration  
of their deeds in prose which we might  
attempt      would hold a second place4 
,they already have their reward1        
and ,i say no more of them2 but there   

are other worthy deeds      of which no 
poet has worthily sung1 and which are   
still wooing      the poet's muse4 ,of  
these ,i am bound to make honourable    
mention1 and shall invoke others to sing
 of them also in lyric      and other   
strains1 in a manner becoming the       
actors4 ,and      first ,i will tell how
 the ,persians1 lords of ,asia1 were    
enslaving      ,europe1 and how the     
children of this land1 who were our     
fathers1 held them back4 ,of these ,i   
will speak first1 and      praise their 
valour1 as is meet and fitting4 ,he who 
would      rightly estimate them should 
place himself in thought at that        
time1 when the whole of ,asia was       
subject to the third king of            
,persia4 ,the first king1 ,cyrus1 by his
 valour freed the      ,persians1 who   
were his countrymen1 and subjected the  
,medes1      who were their lords1 and  
he ruled over the rest of ,asia1 as     
far as ,egypt2 and after him came his   
son1 who ruled all the      accessible  

part of ,egypt and ,libya2 the third    
king was      ,darius1 who extended the 
land boundaries of the empire to        
,scythia1 and with his fleet held the   
sea and the islands4 ,none     #bdj     
presumed to be his equal2 the minds of  
all men were enthralled      by him--so 
many and mighty and warlike nations     
had the power of ,persia subdued4 ,now  
,darius had a quarrel      against us   
and the ,eretrians1 because1 as he said1
 we had      conspired against ,sardis1 
and he sent #ejj1jjj men in transports  
and vessels of war1 and #cjj ships1 and 
,datis as commander1      telling him to
 bring the ,eretrians and ,athenians to 
the king1 if he wished to keep his head 
on his shoulders4 ,he      sailed       
against the ,eretrians1 who were reputed
 to be amongst      the noblest and most
 warlike of the ,hellenes of that day1  
and      they were numerous1 but he     
conquered them all in three days2       
and when he had conquered them1 in order
 that no one might      escape1 he      

searched the whole country after this   
manner3 his      soldiers1 coming to the
 borders of ,eretria and spreading from 
sea to sea1 joined hands and passed     
through the whole country1      in order
 that they might be able to tell the    
king that no one      had escaped them4 
,and from ,eretria they went to         
,marathon      with a like intention1   
expecting to bind the ,athenians in the 
same yoke of necessity in which they had
 bound the ,eretrians4      ,having     
effected one-half of their purpose1 they
 were in the      act of attempting the 
other1 and none of the ,hellenes dared  
to assist either the ,eretrians or the  
,athenians1 except the                  
,lacedaemonians1 and they arrived a day 
too late for the      battle2 but the   
rest were panic-stricken and kept quiet1
 too      happy in having escaped for a 
time4 ,he who has present to      his   
mind that conflict will know what manner
 of men they      were who received the 
onset of the barbarians at ,marathon1   

and chastened the pride of the whole of 
,asia1 and by the      victory which    
they gained over the barbarians first   
taught      other men that the power of 
the ,persians was not invincible1       
but that hosts of men and the multitude 
of riches alike yield      to valour4   
,and ,i assert that those men are the   
fathers not      only of ourselves1 but 
of our liberties and of the liberties of
      all who are on the continent1 for 
that was the action to which      the   
,hellenes looked back when they ventured
 to fight for      their own safety in  
the battles which ensued3 they became   
disciples of the men of ,marathon4 ,to  
them1 therefore1 ,i      assign in my   
speech the first place1 and the second  
to those       #bda      who fought and 
conquered in the sea fights at ,salamis 
and      ,artemisium2 for of them1 too1 
one might have many things to           
say--of the assaults which they endured 
by sea and land1 and      how they      
repelled them4 ,i will mention only that

 act of      theirs which appears to me 
to be the noblest1 and which            
followed that of ,marathon and came     
nearest to it2 for the      men of      
,marathon only showed the ,hellenes that
 it was      possible to ward off the   
barbarians by land1 the many by the     
few2 but there was no proof that they   
could be defeated by      ships1 and at 
sea the ,persians retained the          
reputation of being      invincible in  
numbers and wealth and skill and        
strength4      ,this is the glory of the
 men who fought at sea1 that they       
dispelled the second terror which had   
hitherto possessed the      ,hellenes1  
and so made the fear of numbers1 whether
 of ships      or men1 to cease among   
them4 ,and so the soldiers of ,marathon 
and the sailors of ,salamis became the  
schoolmasters of      ,hellas2 the one  
teaching and habituating the ,hellenes  
not      to fear the barbarians at sea1 
and the others not to fear them      by 
land4 ,third in order1 for the number   

and valour of the      combatants1 and  
third in the salvation of ,hellas1 ,i   
place the      battle of ,plataea4 ,and 
now the ,lacedaemonians as well as      
the ,athenians took part in the         
struggle2 they were all united      in  
this greatest and most terrible conflict
 of all2 wherefore      their virtues   
will be celebrated in times to come1 as 
they are      now celebrated by us4 ,but
 at a later period many ,hellenic       
tribes were still on the side of the    
barbarians1 and there was      a report 
that the great king was going to make a 
new attempt      upon the ,hellenes1 and
 therefore justice requires that we     
should also make mention of those who   
crowned the previous      work of our   
salvation1 and drove and purged away all
 barbarians      from the sea4 ,these   
were the men who fought      by sea at  
the river ,eurymedon1 and who went on   
the expedition      to ,cyprus1 and who 
sailed to ,egypt and divers      other  
places2 and they should be gratefully   

remembered by      us1 because they     
compelled the king in fear for himself  
to      look to his own safety instead  
of plotting the destruction of          
,hellas4    ,sidenote3 ,wars and        
expeditions of the ,athenians4          
,sidenote3 ,tanagra2 ,oenophyta4        
,sidenote3 ,sphacteria4    ,sidenote3   
,the ,sicilian expedition4    ,sidenote3
 ,victories and reverses of the         
,athenians4    ,sidenote3 ,cyzicus4     
,sidenote3 ,hellas betrayed to the      
,persian4    ,sidenote3 ,arginusae4     
,sidenote3 ,the taking of the city is   
obscurely intimated4        ,and so the 
war against the barbarians was fought   
out to            #bdb      the end by  
the whole city on their own behalf1 and 
on behalf      of their countrymen4     
,there was peace1 and our city was held 
in honour2 and then1 as prosperity makes
 men jealous1 there      succeeded a    
jealousy of her1 and jealousy begat     
envy1 and so      she became engaged    
against her will in a war with the      

,hellenes4 ,on the breaking out of war1 
our citizens met the                    
,lacedaemonians at ,tanagra1 and fought 
for the freedom of      the ,boeotians2 
the issue was doubtful1 and was decided 
by      the engagement which followed4  
,for when the ,lacedaemonians      had  
gone on their way1 leaving the          
,boeotians1 whom      they were aiding1 
on the third day after the battle of    
,tanagra1      our countrymen conquered 
at ,oenophyta1 and righteously          
restored those who had been             
unrighteously exiled4 ,and they         
were the first after the ,persian war   
who fought on behalf of      liberty in 
aid of ,hellenes against ,hellenes2 they
 were brave      men1 and freed those   
whom they aided1 and were the first too 
who were honourably interred in this    
sepulchre by the state4      ,afterwards
 there was a mighty war1 in which all   
the ,hellenes      joined1 and          
devastated our country1 which was very  
ungrateful      of them2 and our        

countrymen1 after defeating them in a   
naval      engagement and taking their  
leaders1 the ,spartans1 at ,sphagia1    
when they might have destroyed them1    
spared their lives1 and      gave them  
back1 and made peace1 considering that  
they should      war with their         
fellow-countrymen only until they gained
 a      victory over them1 and not      
because of the private anger of the     
state destroy the common interest of    
,hellas2 but that with      barbarians  
they should war to the death4 ,worthy of
 praise      are they also who waged    
this war1 and are here interred2 for    
they proved1 if any one doubted the     
superior prowess of the      ,athenians 
in the former war with the barbarians1  
that their      doubts had no           
foundation--showing by their victory in 
the      civil war with ,hellas1 in     
which they subdued the other chief      
state of the ,hellenes1 that they could 
conquer single-handed      those with   
whom they had been allied in the war    

against the      barbarians4 ,after the 
peace there followed a third war1 which 
was of a terrible and desperate nature1 
and in this many brave      men who are 
here interred lost their lives--many of 
them had      won victories in ,sicily1 
whither they had gone over the seas     
#bdc      to fight for the liberties of 
the ,leontines1 to whom they were       
bound by oaths2 but1 owing to the       
distance1 the city was      unable to   
help them1 and they lost heart and came 
to misfortune2      of whom their very  
enemies give a higher praise for        
temperance      and valour than friends 
do of most other men4 ,many      also   
fell in naval engagements at the        
,hellespont1 after having      in one   
day taken all the ships of the enemy1   
and defeated      them in other naval   
engagements4 ,and what ,i call the      
terrible and desperate nature of the    
war1 is that the other      ,hellenes1  
in their extreme animosity towards the  
city1 should      have entered into     

negotiations with their bitterest enemy1
 the      king of ,persia1 whom they1   
together with us1 had expelled2--him1   
without us1 they again brought back1    
barbarian against      ,hellenes1 and   
all the hosts1 both of ,hellenes and    
barbarians1      were united against    
,athens4 ,and then shone forth the power
      and valour of our city4 ,her      
enemies had supposed that she      was  
exhausted by the war1 and our ships were
 blockaded at      ,mitylene4 ,but the  
citizens themselves embarked1 and came  
to the rescue with sixty other ships1   
and their valour was      confessed of  
all men1 for they conquered their       
enemies and      delivered their        
friends4 ,and yet by some evil fortune  
they      were left to perish at sea1   
and therefore are#fd not interred here4 
,ever to be remembered and honoured are 
they1 for by their      valour not only 
that sea-fight was won for us1 but the  
entire      war was decided by them1 and
 through them the city gained      the  

reputation of being invincible1 even    
though attacked by      all mankind4    
,and that reputation was a true one1 for
 the      defeat which came upon us was 
our own doing4 ,we were      never      
conquered by others1 and to this day we 
are still      unconquered by them2 but 
we were our own conquerors1 and         
received defeat at our own hands4       
,afterwards there was      quiet and    
peace abroad1 but there sprang up war at
 home2      and1 if men are destined to 
have civil war1 no one could have       
desired that his city should take the   
disorder in a milder form4    ,sidenote3
 ,the great reconciliation of kindred4  
,sidenote3 ,an ,athenian version of the 
history of ,hellas4    ,sidenote3       
,change in the relation of the          
,athenians 7#a7 to the other  ,hellenes2
 7#b7 to the ,persian king4        ,how 
joyful and natural was the              
reconciliation of those who      came   
from the ,piraeus and those who came    
from the city2      with what moderation

 did they order the war against the     
tyrants in ,eleusis1 and in a manner how
 unlike what the other      ,hellenes   
expected6 ,and the reason of this       
gentleness was           #bdd      the  
veritable tie of blood1 which created   
among them a friendship      as of      
kinsmen1 faithful not in word only1 but 
in deed4      ,and we ought also to     
remember those who then fell by one     
another's hands1 and on such occasions  
as these to reconcile      them with    
sacrifices and prayers1 praying to those
 who have      power over them1 that    
they may be reconciled even as we are   
reconciled4 ,for they did not attack one
 another out of      malice or enmity1  
but they were unfortunate4 ,and that    
such      was the fact we ourselves are 
witnesses1 who are of the same      race
 with them1 and have mutually received  
and granted forgiveness      of what we 
have done and suffered4 ,after this     
there      was perfect peace1 and the   
city had rest2 and her feeling was      

that she forgave the barbarians1 who had
 severely suffered at      her hands and
 severely retaliated1 but that she was  
indignant      at the ingratitude of the
 ,hellenes1 when she remembered how     
they had received good from her and     
returned evil1 having      made common  
cause with the barbarians1 depriving her
 of the      ships which had once been  
their salvation1 and dismantling        
our walls1 which had preserved their own
 from falling4 ,she      thought that   
she would no longer defend the          
,hellenes1 when      enslaved either by 
one another or by the barbarians1 and   
did      accordingly4 ,this was our     
feeling1 while the ,lacedaemonians      
were thinking that we who were the      
champions of liberty had      fallen1   
and that their business was to subject  
the remaining      ,hellenes4 ,and why  
should ,i say more8 for the events of   
which ,i am speaking happened not long  
ago and we can all      of us remember  
how the chief peoples of ,hellas1       

,argives and      ,boeotians and        
,corinthians1 came to feel the need of  
us1 and1      what is the greatest      
miracle of all1 the ,persian king       
himself      was driven to such         
extremity as to come round to the       
opinion1      that from this city1 of   
which he was the destroyer1 and from    
no other1 his salvation would proceed4  
,sidenote3 ,the end of the war4         
,and if a person desired to bring a     
deserved accusation      against our    
city1 he would find only one charge     
which he      could justly urge--that   
she was too compassionate and too       
favourable to the weaker side4 ,and in  
this instance she was      not able to  
hold out or keep her resolution of      
refusing aid to      her injurers when  
they were being enslaved1 but she was   
#bde      softened1 and did in fact send
 out aid1 and delivered the             
,hellenes from slavery1 and they were   
free until they afterwards      enslaved
 themselves4 ,whereas1 to the great king

 she      refused to give the assistance
 of the state1 for she could not        
forget the trophies of ,marathon and    
,salamis and ,plataea2      but she     
allowed exiles and volunteers to assist 
him1 and they      were his salvation4  
,and she herself1 when she was          
compelled1      entered into the war1   
and built walls and ships1 and          
fought with the ,lacedaemonians on      
behalf of the ,parians4      ,now the   
king fearing this city and wanting to   
stand aloof1      when he saw the       
,lacedaemonians growing weary of the war
      at sea1 asked of us1 as the price 
of his alliance with us and      the    
other allies1 to give up the ,hellenes  
in ,asia1 whom      the ,lacedaemonians 
had previously handed over to him1 he   
thinking that we should refuse1 and that
 then he might have      a pretence for 
withdrawing from us4 ,about the other   
allies he      was mistaken1 for the    
,corinthians and ,argives and           
,boeotians1      and the other states1  

were quite willing to let them go1 and  
swore and covenanted1 that1 if he would 
pay them money1      they would make    
over to him the ,hellenes of the        
continent1      and we alone refused to 
give them up and swear4 ,such was       
the natural nobility of this city1 so   
sound and healthy was      the spirit of
 freedom among us1 and the instinctive  
dislike of      the barbarian1 because  
we are pure ,hellenes1 having no        
admixture of barbarism in us4 ,for we   
are not like many      others1          
descendants of ,pelops or ,cadmus or    
,egyptus or      ,danaus1 who are by    
nature barbarians1 and yet pass for     
,hellenes1 and dwell in the midst of us2
 but we are pure      ,hellenes1        
uncontaminated by any foreign element1  
and      therefore the hatred of the    
foreigner has passed unadulterated      
into the life-blood of the city4 ,and   
so1 notwithstanding      our noble      
sentiments1 we were again isolated1     
because we      were unwilling to be    

guilty of the base and unholy act of    
giving up ,hellenes to barbarians4 ,and 
we were in the      same case as when we
 were subdued before2 but1 by the       
favour of ,heaven1 we managed better1   
for we ended the war      without the   
loss of our ships or walls or colonies2 
the      enemy was only too glad to be  
quit of us4 ,yet in this war      we    
lost many brave men1 such as were those 
who fell owing      to the ruggedness of
 the ground at the battle of ,corinth1  
or      by treason at ,lechaeum4 ,brave 
men1 too1 were those who      delivered 
the ,persian king1 and drove the        
,lacedaemonians      from the sea4 ,i   
remind you of them1 and you must        
#bdf      celebrate them together with  
me1 and do honour to their              
memories4    ,sidenote3 ,address of the 
departed to their sons4        ,such    
were the actions of the men who are here
 interred1      and of others who have  
died on behalf of their country2        
many and glorious things ,i have spoken 

of them1 and there      are yet many    
more and more glorious things remaining 
to      be told--many days and nights   
would not suffice to tell of      them4 
,let them not be forgotten1 and let     
every man remind      their descendants 
that they also are soldiers who must not
      desert the ranks of their         
ancestors1 or from cowardice fall       
behind4 ,even as ,i exhort you this day1
 and in all future      time1 whenever  
,i meet with any of you1 shall continue 
to      remind and exhort you1 ,o ye    
sons of heroes1 that you strive      to 
be the bravest of men4 ,and ,i think    
that ,i ought now to      repeat what   
your fathers desired to have said to you
 who      are their survivors1 when they
 went out to battle1 in case            
anything happened to them4 ,i will tell 
you what ,i heard      them say1 and    
what1 if they had only speech1 they     
would      fain be saying1 judging from 
what they then said4 ,and you      must 
imagine that you hear them saying what  

,i now repeat      to you3--            
#8,sons1 the event proves that your     
fathers were brave men2      for we     
might have lived dishonourably1 but have
 preferred      to die honourably rather
 than bring you and your children       
into disgrace1 and rather than dishonour
 our own fathers      and forefathers2  
considering that life is not life to one
 who      is a dishonour to his race1   
and that to such a one neither      men 
nor ,gods are friendly1 either while he 
is on the earth      or after death in  
the world below4 ,remember our words1   
then1 and whatever is your aim let      
virtue be the condition of      the     
attainment of your aim1 and know that   
without this all      possessions and   
pursuits are dishonourable and evil4    
,for      neither does wealth bring     
honour to the owner1 if he be a         
coward2 of such a one the wealth belongs
 to another1 and      not to himself4   
,nor does beauty and strength of body1  
when dwelling in a base and cowardly    

man1 appear comely1      but the reverse
 of comely1 making the possessor more   
conspicuous1      and manifesting forth 
his cowardice4 ,and all      knowledge1 
when separated from justice and virtue1 
is seen      to be cunning and not      
wisdom2 wherefore make this your        
first and last and constant and         
all-absorbing aim1 to exceed1      #bdg 
if possible1 not only us but all your   
ancestors in virtue2 and      know that 
to excel you in virtue only brings us   
shame1 but      that to be excelled by  
you is a source of happiness to us4     
,and we shall most likely be defeated1  
and you will most      likely be victors
 in the contest1 if you learn so to     
order      your lives as not to abuse or
 waste the reputation of your           
ancestors1 knowing that to a man who has
 any self-respect1      nothing is more 
dishonourable than to be honoured1 not  
for his own sake1 but on account of the 
reputation of his      ancestors4 ,the  
honour of parents is a fair and noble   

treasure to their posterity1 but to have
 the use of a treasure      of wealth   
and honour1 and to leave none to your   
successors1      because you have       
neither money nor reputation of your    
own1      is alike base and             
dishonourable4 ,and if you follow our   
precepts you will be received by us as  
friends1 when the      hour of destiny  
brings you hither2 but if you neglect   
our      words and are disgraced in your
 lives1 no one will welcome      or     
receive you4 ,this is the message which 
is to be delivered      to our children4
    ,sidenote3 ,consolation of parents4 
#8,some of us have fathers and mothers  
still living1 and we      would urge    
them1 if1 as is likely1 we shall die1 to
 bear the      calamity as lightly as   
possible1 and not to condole with one   
another2 for they have sorrows enough1  
and will not need      any one to stir  
them up4 ,while we gently heal their    
wounds1 let us remind them that the     
,gods have heard the      chief part of 

their prayers2 for they prayed1 not that
 their      children might live for     
ever1 but that they might be brave      
and renowned4 ,and this1 which is the   
greatest good1 they      have attained4 
,a mortal man cannot expect to have     
everything      in his own life turning 
out according to his will2 and          
they1 if they bear their misfortunes    
bravely1 will be truly      deemed brave
 fathers of the brave4 ,but if they give
 way to      their sorrows1 either they 
will be suspected of not being our      
parents1 or we of not being such as our 
panegyrists declare4      ,let not      
either of the two alternatives happen1  
but rather let      them be our chief   
and true panegyrists1 who show in their 
lives that they are true men1 and had   
men for their sons4    ,sidenote3 ,the  
state the protector both of parents and 
orphans4        ,of old the saying1     
8,nothing too much10 appeared to be1 and
      really was1 well said4 ,for he    
whose happiness rests with himself1     

if possible1 wholly1 and if not1 as far 
as is possible1--who        #bdh      is
 not hanging in suspense on other men1  
or changing      with the vicissitude of
 their fortune1--has his life ordered   
for      the best4 ,he is the temperate 
and valiant and wise2 and      when his 
riches come and go1 when his children   
are given      and taken away1 he will  
remember the proverb--8,neither         
rejoicing overmuch nor grieving         
overmuch10 for he relies      upon      
himself4 ,and such we would have our    
parents to be--that      is our word and
 wish1 and as such we now offer         
ourselves1      neither lamenting       
overmuch1 nor fearing overmuch1 if      
we are to die at this time4 ,and we     
entreat our fathers and      mothers to 
retain these feelings throughout their  
future life1      and to be assured that
 they will not please us by sorrowing   
and lamenting over us4 ,but1 if the dead
 have any knowledge      of the living1 
they will displease us most by making   

themselves miserable and by taking their
 misfortunes too      much to heart1 and
 they will please us best if they bear  
their      loss lightly and temperately4
 ,for our life will have the            
noblest end which is vouchsafed to man1 
and should be      glorified rather than
 lamented4 ,and if they will direct     
their      minds to the care and nurture
 of our wives and children1      they   
will soonest forget their misfortunes1  
and live in a better      and nobler    
way1 and be dearer to us4        #8,this
 is all that we have to say to our      
families3 and to the      state we would
 say--,take care of our parents and of  
our      sons3 let her worthily cherish 
the old age of our parents1 and         
bring up our sons in the right way4 ,but
 we know that she      will of her own  
accord take care of them1 and does not  
need      any exhortation of ours4'     
,this1 ,o ye children and parents of the
 dead1 is the message      which they   
bid us deliver to you1 and which ,i do  

deliver      with the utmost            
seriousness4 ,and in their name ,i      
beseech      you1 the children1 to      
imitate your fathers1 and you1 parents1 
to be of good cheer about yourselves2   
for we will nourish      your age1 and  
take care of you both publicly and      
privately in      any place in which one
 of us may meet one of you who are      
the parents of the dead4 ,and the care  
of you which the city      shows1 you   
know yourselves2 for she has made       
provision by      law concerning the    
parents and children of those who die in
      war2 the highest authority is     
specially entrusted with the            
#bdi      duty of watching over them    
above all other citizens1 and they      
will see that your fathers and mothers  
have no wrong done      to them4 ,the   
city herself shares in the education of 
the      children1 desiring as far as it
 is possible that their orphanhood      
may not be felt by them2 while they are 
children she is      a parent to them1  

and when they have arrived at man's     
estate      she sends them to their     
several duties1 in full armour clad2    
and bringing freshly to their minds the 
ways of their fathers1      she places  
in their hands the instruments of their 
fathers'      virtues2 for the sake of  
the omen1 she would have them      from 
the first begin to rule over their own  
houses arrayed in      the strength and 
arms of their fathers4 ,and as for the  
dead1      she never ceases honouring   
them1 celebrating in common for      all
 rites which become the property of     
each2 and in addition      to this1     
holding gymnastic and equestrian        
contests1 and      musical festivals of 
every sort4 ,she is to the dead in the  
place of a son and heir1 and to their   
sons in the place of a      father1 and 
to their parents and elder kindred in   
the place of      a guardian--ever and  
always caring for them4 ,considering    
this1 you ought to bear your calamity   
the more gently2 for      thus you will 

be most endeared to the dead and to the 
living1      and your sorrows will heal 
and be healed4 ,and now do you      and 
all1 having lamented the dead in common 
according to      the law1 go your ways4
    ,sidenote3 #8,aspasia must not be   
told of this speech4'        ,you have  
heard1 ,menexenus1 the oration of       
,aspasia the      ,milesian4            
,sidenote3 ,this speech1 ,socrates1 was 
not composed by ,aspasia1 but by        
yourself4        ,men4 ,truly1          
,socrates1 ,i marvel that ,aspasia1 who 
is only      a woman1 should be able to 
compose such a speech2 she      must be 
a rare one4        ,soc4 ,well1 if you  
are incredulous1 you may come with me   
and hear her4        ,men4 ,i have often
 met ,aspasia1 ,socrates1 and know what 
she is like4        ,soc4 ,well1 and do 
you not admire her1 and are you not     
grateful for her speech8        ,men4   
,yes1 ,socrates1 ,i am very grateful to 
her or to      him who told you1 and    
still more to you who have told      me4

    ,sidenote3 ,menexenus promises to   
keep the secret4        ,soc4 ,very     
good4 ,but you must take care not to    
tell of me1      and then at some future
 time ,i will repeat to you many other  
excellent political speeches of hers4   
,men4 ,fear not2 only let me hear them1 
and ,i will keep      the secret4       
,soc4 ,then ,i will keep my promise4    
,,footnotes    #fb i4 #i1 #cj2 iii4 #ad1
 #aa4    #fc ,thucyd4 ii4 #ce-df4    #fd
 ,reading  1 or taking  before  with 4  
,,appendix ,,ii4      ,sidenote3        
,,appendix ,,ii4    ,the two dialogues  
which are translated in the second      
appendix are not  mentioned by          
,aristotle1 or by any early authority1  
and have no claim  to be ascribed to    
,plato4 ,they are examples of ,platonic 
dialogues to  be assigned probably to   
the second or third generation after    
,plato1  when his writings were well    
known at ,athens and ,alexandria4 ,they 
exhibit considerable originality1 and   
are remarkable for containing  several  

thoughts of the sort which we suppose to
 be modern rather than  ancient1 and    
which therefore have a peculiar interest
 for us4 ,the ,second  ,alcibiades shows
 that the difficulties about prayer     
which have perplexed  ,christian        
theologians were not unknown among the  
followers of ,plato4 ,the  ,eryxias was 
doubted by the ancients themselves3 yet 
it may claim the  distinction of being1 
among all ,greek or ,roman writings1 the
 one which  anticipates in the most     
striking manner the modern science of   
political  economy and gives an abstract
 form to some of its principal          
doctrines4    ,for the translation of   
these two dialogues ,i am indebted to my
 friend and  secretary1 ,mr4 ,knight4   
99       99       99       99       99  
,sidenote3 ,characteristics1 c4    ,that
 the ,dialogue which goes by the name of
 the ,second ,alcibiades is a  genuine  
writing of ,plato will not be maintained
 by any modern critic1  and was hardly  
believed by the ancients themselves4    

,the dialectic is  poor and weak4 ,there
 is no power over language1 or beauty of
 style2 and  there is a certain         
abruptness and  in the conversation1    
which  is very un-,platonic4 ,the best  
passage is probably that about the      
poets1  p4 #adg3--the remark that the   
poet1 who is of a reserved disposition1 
is  uncommonly difficult to understand1 
and the ridiculous interpretation  of   
,homer1 are entirely in the spirit of   
,plato 7cp4 ,protag4 #cci foll42  ,ion  
#ecd2 ,apol4 #bb ,d74 ,the characters   
are ill-drawn4 ,socrates assumes  the   
#8superior person' and preaches too     
much1 while ,alcibiades is stupid  and  
heavy-in-hand4 ,there are traces of     
,stoic influence in the general  tone   
and phraseology of the ,dialogue 7cp4   
#ach ,b1     444  3 #aci ,c1    7 and   
the writer seems to have been           
acquainted with the #8,laws' of ,plato  
7cp4 ,laws #c4 #fhg1 #fhh2 #g4 #hja2    
#aa4 #ica ,b74 ,an incident from the    
,symposium 7#bac ,e7 is rather clumsily 

introduced 7#aea ,a71 and two somewhat  
hackneyed quotations 7,symp4 #agd ,d1   
,gorg4 #dhd ,e7 recur at #adj ,a and    
#adf ,a4 ,the reference to the death of 
,archelaus as having occurred #8quite   
lately' 7#ada ,d7 is only a fiction1    
probably suggested by the ,gorgias1 #dgj
 ,d1 where the story of ,archelaus  is  
told1 and a similar phrase occurs1--    
1 444 ,there are several passages which 
are either corrupt or  extremely        
ill-expressed 7see pp4 #add1 #ade1 #adf1
 #adg1 #aej74 ,but there is a  modern   
interest in the subject of the dialogue2
 and it is a good example  of a short   
spurious work1 which may be attributed  
to the second or third  century before  
,christ4          ,,alcibiades ,,ii4    
,,persons ,,of ,,the ,,dialogue4        
,,socrates and ,,alcibiades4            
,sidenote3 ,alcibiades ,,ii4            
,soc4 ,are you going1 ,alcibiades1 to   
offer prayer to      ,zeus8             
,steph4 #ach        ,al4 ,yes1          
,socrates1 ,i am4        ,soc4 ,you seem

 to be troubled and to cast your eyes on
 the      ground1 as though you were    
thinking about something4        ,al4   
,of what do you suppose that ,i am      
thinking8        ,soc4 ,of the greatest 
of all things1 as ,i believe4 ,tell me1 
do you not suppose that the ,gods       
sometimes partly grant      and partly  
reject the requests which we make in    
public and      private1 and favour some
 persons and not others8        ,al4    
,certainly4    ,sidenote3 ,the danger of
 a prayer which is ill-advised4         
,soc4 ,do you not imagine1 then1 that a 
man ought to be      very careful1 lest 
perchance without knowing it he implore 
great evils for himself1 deeming that he
 is asking for good1      especially if 
the ,gods are in the mood to grant      
whatever he      may request8 ,there is 
the story of ,oedipus1 for instance1    
who prayed that his children might      
divide their inheritance      between   
them by the sword3 he did not1 as he    
might have      done1 beg that his      

present evils might be averted1 but     
called      down new ones4 ,and was not 
his prayer accomplished1 and      did   
not many and terrible evils thence      
arise1 upon which      ,i need not      
dilate8        ,al4 ,yes1 ,socrates1 but
 you are speaking of a madman3          
surely you do not think that any one in 
his senses would      venture to make   
such a prayer8        ,soc4 ,madness1   
then1 you consider to be the opposite of
      discretion8        ,al4 ,of       
course4    ,sidenote3 ,do opposites     
admit of intermediates8        ,soc4    
,and some men seem to you to be         
discreet1 and others      the contrary8 
,al4 ,they do4        ,soc4 ,well1 then1
 let us discuss who these are4 ,we      
acknowledge      that some are discreet1
 some foolish1 and that      some are   
mad8        ,al4 ,yes4        ,soc4 ,and
 again1 there are some who are in       
health8        ,al4 ,there are4         
,soc4 ,while others are ailing8         
,al4 ,yes4                              

#aci        ,soc4 ,and they are not the 
same8        ,al4 ,certainly not4       
,soc4 ,nor are there any who are in     
neither state8        ,al4 ,no4         
,soc4 ,a man must either be sick or be  
well8        ,al4 ,that is my opinion4  
,sidenote3 ,alcibiades first denies and 
afterwards admits        ,soc4 ,very    
good3 and do you think the same about   
discretion      and want of discretion8 
,al4 ,how do you mean8        ,soc4 ,do 
you believe that a man must be either in
 or out of      his senses2 or is there 
some third or intermediate condition1   
in which he is neither one nor the      
other8        ,al4 ,decidedly not4      
,soc4 ,he must be either sane or insane8
        ,al4 ,so ,i suppose4            
,soc4 ,did you not acknowledge that     
madness was the      opposite of        
discretion8        ,al4 ,yes4           
,soc4 ,and that there is no third or    
middle term between      discretion and 
indiscretion8        ,al4 ,true4        
,soc4 ,and there cannot be two opposites

 to one thing8        ,al4 ,there       
cannot4        ,soc4 ,then madness and  
want of sense are the same8        ,al4 
,that appears to be the case4           
,sidenote3 ,some elementary questions of
 logic4        ,soc4 ,we shall be in the
 right1 therefore1 ,alcibiades1 if we   
say that all who are senseless are mad4 
,for example1 if      among persons of  
your own age or older than yourself     
there      are some who are             
senseless1--as there certainly          
are1--they are      mad4 ,for tell me1  
by heaven1 do you not think that in the 
city the wise are few1 while the        
foolish1 whom you call mad1      are    
many8        ,al4 ,i do4    ,sidenote3  
that differences of kind do not exclude 
differences of degree4        ,soc4 ,but
 how could we live in safety with so    
many crazy      people8 ,should we not  
long since have paid the penalty at     
their hands1 and have been struck and   
beaten and endured      every other form
 of ill-usage which madmen are wont to  

inflict8 ,consider1 my dear friend3 may 
it not be quite      otherwise8         
,al4 ,why1 ,socrates1 how is that       
possible8 ,i must have      been        
mistaken4        ,soc4 ,so it seems to  
me4 ,but perhaps we may consider        
the matter thus3--        ,al4 ,how8    
,soc4 ,i will tell you4 ,we think that  
some are sick2 do we      not8          
,al4 ,yes4    ,sidenote3 ,the sick may  
have many kinds of sickness2 so there   
are  different kinds of want of sense4  
,soc4 ,and must every sick person either
 have the gout1 or      be in a fever1  
or suffer from ophthalmia8 ,or do you   
believe      that a man may labour under
 some other disease1 even      although 
he has none of these complaints8        
,surely1 they are      not the only     
maladies which exist8        ,al4       
,certainly not4        ,soc4 ,and is    
every kind of ophthalmia a disease8     
,al4 ,yes4        ,soc4 ,and every      
disease ophthalmia8        ,al4 ,surely 
not4 ,but ,i scarcely understand what ,i

 mean      myself4        ,soc4         
,perhaps1 if you give me your best      
attention1 #8two of        #adj      us'
 looking together1 we may find what we  
seek4        ,al4 ,i am attending1      
,socrates1 to the best of my power4     
,soc4 ,we are agreed1 then1 that every  
form of ophthalmia is      a disease1   
but not every disease ophthalmia8       
,al4 ,we are4        ,soc4 ,and so far  
we seem to be right4 ,for every one who 
suffers from a fever is sick2 but the   
sick1 ,i conceive1 do not      all have 
fever or gout or ophthalmia1 although   
each of these is      a disease1 which1 
according to those whom we call         
physicians1      may require a different
 treatment4 ,they are not all alike1    
nor do they produce the same result1 but
 each has its own      effect1 and yet  
they are all diseases4 ,may we not take 
an      illustration from the artizans8 
,sidenote3 ,illustrations of genera and 
species4        ,al4 ,certainly4        
,soc4 ,there are cobblers and carpenters

 and sculptors and      others of all   
sorts and kinds1 whom we need not stop  
to      enumerate4 ,all have their      
distinct employments and all are        
workmen1 although they are not all of   
them cobblers or carpenters      or     
sculptors4        ,al4 ,no1 indeed4     
,soc4 ,and in like manner men differ in 
regard to want of      sense4 ,those who
 are most out of their wits we call     
#8madmen1'      while we term those who 
are less far gone #8stupid' or          
#8idiotic1' or1 if we prefer gentler    
language1 describe them as              
#8romantic' or #8simple-minded1' or1    
again1 as #8innocent' or                
#8inexperienced' or #8foolish4' ,you may
 even find other      names1 if you seek
 for them2 but by all of them lack of   
sense      is intended4 ,they only      
differ as one art appeared to us to     
differ from another or one disease from 
another4 ,or what is      your opinion8 
,al4 ,i agree with you4        ,soc4    
,then let us return to the point at     

which we digressed4      ,we said at    
first that we should have to consider   
who were the wise and who the foolish4  
,for we acknowledged      that there are
 these two classes8 ,did we not8        
,al4 ,to be sure4        ,soc4 ,and you 
regard those as sensible who know what  
ought to be done or said8        ,al4   
,yes4        ,soc4 ,the senseless are   
those who do not know this8        ,al4 
,true4        ,soc4 ,the latter will say
 or do what they ought not without      
their own knowledge8        ,al4        
,exactly4    ,sidenote3 ,men often1 like
 ,oedipus1 pray unadvisedly4            
,sidenote3 ,the desire for good is      
sometimes really evil4        ,soc4     
,oedipus1 as ,i was saying1 ,alcibiades1
 was a person of       #ada      this   
sort4 ,and even now-a-days you will find
 many who      have offered inauspicious
 prayers1 although1 unlike him1         
they were not in anger nor thought that 
they were asking      evil4 ,he neither 
sought1 nor supposed that he sought for 

good1 but others have had quite the     
contrary notion4 ,i believe      that if
 the ,god whom you are about to consult 
should      appear to you1 and1 in      
anticipation of your request1 enquired  
whether you would be contented to become
 tyrant of ,athens1      and if this    
seemed in your eyes a small and mean    
thing1      should add to it the        
dominion of all ,hellas2 and seeing that
      even then you would not be        
satisfied unless you were ruler      of 
the whole of ,europe1 should promise1   
not only that1 but1 if      you so      
desired1 should proclaim to all mankind 
in one and      the same day that       
,alcibiades1 son of ,cleinias1 was      
tyrant3--in      such a case1 ,i        
imagine1 you would depart full of joy1  
as one      who had obtained the        
greatest of goods4        ,al4 ,and not 
only ,i1 ,socrates1 but any one else who
 should      meet with such luck4       
,soc4 ,yet you would not accept the     
dominion and lordship      of all the   

,hellenes and all the barbarians in     
exchange for      your life8        ,al4
 ,certainly not3 for then what use could
 ,i make of      them8        ,soc4 ,and
 would you accept them if you were      
likely to use      them to a bad and    
mischievous end8        ,al4 ,i would   
not4    ,sidenote3 ,archelaus and his   
beloved4    ,sidenote3 ,men never refuse
 the goods of fortune1 however great the
 evils  which may attend them4          
,sidenote3 ,the blindness of humanity4  
,soc4 ,you see that it is not safe for a
 man either rashly to      accept       
whatever is offered him1 or himself to  
request a thing1      if he is likely to
 suffer thereby or immediately to lose  
his life4      ,and yet we could tell of
 many who1 having long desired and      
diligently laboured to obtain a tyranny1
 thinking that thus      they would     
procure an advantage1 have nevertheless 
fallen      victims to designing        
enemies4 ,you must have heard of        
what happened only the other day1 how   

,archelaus of      ,macedonia was slain 
by his beloved#fe1 whose love for the   
tyranny was not less than that of       
,archelaus for him4 ,the                
tyrannicide expected by his crime to    
become tyrant and      afterwards to    
have a happy life2 but when he had held 
the      tyranny three or four days1 he 
was in his turn conspired      against  
and slain4 ,or look at certain of our   
own citizens1--and      of their actions
 we have been not hearers1 but          
eyewitnesses1--who      have desired to 
obtain military command3 of      those  
who have gained their object1 some are  
even to this day      #adb      exiles  
from the city1 while others have lost   
their lives4 ,and      even they who    
seem to have fared best1 have not only  
gone      through many perils and       
terrors during their office1 but after  
their return home they have been beset  
by informers worse      than they once  
were by their foes1 insomuch that       
several of      them have wished that   

they had remained in a private station  
rather than have had the glories of     
command4 ,if1 indeed1 such      perils  
and terrors were of profit to the       
commonwealth1 there      would be reason
 in undergoing them2 but the very       
contrary is      the case4 ,again1 you  
will find persons who have prayed for   
offspring1 and when their prayers were  
heard1 have fallen      into the        
greatest pains and sufferings4 ,for some
 have      begotten children who were   
utterly bad1 and have therefore         
passed all their days in misery1 while  
the parents of good      children have  
undergone the misfortune of losing them1
 and      have been so little happier   
than the others that they would         
have preferred never to have had        
children rather than to      have had   
them and lost them4 ,and yet1 although  
these and      the like examples are    
manifest and known of all1 it is rare to
      find any one who has refused what 
has been offered him1 or1      if he    

were likely to gain aught by prayer1 has
 refrained from      making his         
petition4 ,the mass of mankind would not
 decline      to accept a tyranny1 or   
the command of an army1 or any      of  
the numerous things which cause more    
harm than good3      but rather1 if they
 had them not1 would have prayed to     
obtain      them4 ,and often in a short 
space of time they change their         
tone1 and wish their old prayers unsaid4
 ,wherefore also ,i      suspect that   
men are entirely wrong when they blame  
the      gods as the authors of the ills
 which befall them#ff3 #8their own      
presumption1' or folly 7whichever is the
 right word7--          #8,has brought  
these unmeasured woes upon them#fg4'    
,he must have been a wise poet1         
,alcibiades1 who1 seeing as ,i          
believe1 his friends foolishly praying  
for and doing things      which would   
not really profit them1 offered up a    
common      prayer in behalf of them    
all3--          #8,king ,zeus1 grant us 

good whether prayed for or unsought by  
us2  #adc        ,but that which we ask 
amiss1 do thou avert#fh4'    ,sidenote3 
,some ignorance is better than some     
knowledge4        ,in my opinion1 ,i    
say1 the poet spoke both well and       
prudently2      but if you have anything
 to say in answer to him1      speak    
out4        ,al4 ,it is difficult1      
,socrates1 to oppose what has been well 
said4 ,and ,i perceive how many are the 
ills of which ignorance      is the     
cause1 since1 as would appear1 through  
ignorance we not only do1 but what is   
worse1 pray for the      greatest evils4
 ,no man would imagine that he would do 
so2      he would rather suppose that he
 was quite capable of praying      for  
what was best3 to call down evil seems  
more like a curse      than a prayer4   
,soc4 ,but perhaps1 my good friend1 some
 one who is wiser      than either you  
or ,i will say that we have no right to 
blame      ignorance thus rashly1 unless
 we can add what ignorance we      mean 

and of what1 and also to whom and how it
 is respectively      a good or an evil8
        ,al4 ,how do you mean8 ,can     
ignorance possibly be better      than  
knowledge for any person in any         
conceivable case8        ,soc4 ,so ,i   
believe3--you do not think so8          
,al4 ,certainly not4    ,sidenote3      
,orestes and ,alcmaeon4        ,soc4    
,and yet surely ,i may not suppose that 
you would      ever wish to act towards 
your mother as they say that            
,orestes and ,alcmaeon and others have  
done towards their      parent4         
,al4 ,good words1 ,socrates1 prithee4   
,sidenote3 ,ignorance of the best is    
bad3 ignorance of the bad good4         
,soc4 ,you ought not to bid him use     
auspicious words1 who      says that you
 would not be willing to commit so      
horrible a      deed1 but rather him who
 affirms the contrary1 if the act       
appear to you unfit even to be          
mentioned4 ,or do you think      that   
,orestes1 had he been in his senses and 

knew what was      best for him to do1  
would ever have dared to venture on such
      a crime8        ,al4 ,certainly   
not4        ,soc4 ,nor would any one    
else1 ,i fancy8        ,al4 ,no4        
,soc4 ,that ignorance is bad then1 it   
would appear1 which is      of the best 
and does not know what is best8         
,al4 ,so ,i think1 at least4            
,soc4 ,and both to the person who is    
ignorant and everybody      else8       
,sidenote3 ,cases in which ignorance may
 be an advantage4        ,al4 ,yes4     
,soc4 ,let us take another case4        
,suppose that you were      suddenly to 
get into your head that it would be a   
good thing       #add      to kill      
,pericles1 your kinsman and guardian1   
and were to      seize a sword and1     
going to the doors of his house1 were to
      enquire if he were at home1       
meaning to slay only him and no      one
 else3--the servants reply1 #8,yes'3    
7,mind1 ,i do not mean      that you    
would really do such a thing2 but there 

is nothing1      you think1 to prevent a
 man who is ignorant of the best1       
having occasionally the whim that what  
is worst is best8        ,al4 ,no47     
,sidenote3 ,a man might be prevented    
from committing murder by ignorance  of 
the person whom he was going to murder4 
,soc4--,if1 then1 you went indoors1 and 
seeing him1 did not      know him1 but  
thought that he was some one else1 would
 you      venture to slay him8          
,al4 ,most decidedly not #fi;it seems to
 me#fi4        ,soc4 ,for you designed  
to kill1 not the first who offered1     
but ,pericles himself8        ,al4      
,certainly4        ,soc4 ,and if you    
made many attempts1 and each time failed
      to recognize ,pericles1 you would 
never attack him8        ,al4 ,never4   
,soc4 ,well1 but if ,orestes in like    
manner had not known      his mother1 do
 you think that he would ever have laid 
hands      upon her8        ,al4 ,no4   
,soc4 ,he did not intend to slay the    
first woman he came      across1 nor any

 one else's mother1 but only his own8   
,al4 ,true4        ,soc4 ,ignorance1    
then1 is better for those who are in    
such      a frame of mind1 and have such
 ideas8        ,al4 ,obviously4         
,soc4 ,you acknowledge that for some    
persons in certain      cases the       
ignorance of some things is a good and  
not an evil1      as you formerly       
supposed8        ,al4 ,i do4            
,soc4 #gj;,and there is still another   
case which will also      perhaps appear
 strange to you1 if you will consider   
it8#gj        ,al4 ,what is that1       
,socrates8    ,sidenote3 ,the knowledge 
of the best4    ,sidenote3 ,all         
knowledge if unaccompanied by a         
knowledge of the best is  hurtful4      
,soc4 ,it may be1 in short1 that the    
possession of all the      sciences1 if 
unaccompanied by the knowledge of the   
best1 will      more often than not     
injure the possessor4 ,consider the     
matter thus3--,must we not1 when we     
intend either to do or      say         

anything1 suppose that we know or ought 
to know that      which we propose so   
confidently to do or say8        ,al4   
,yes1 in my opinion4        ,soc4 ,we   
may take the orators for an example1 who
 from      time to time advise us about 
war and peace1 or the building          
#ade      of walls and the construction 
of harbours1 whether they               
understand the business in hand1 or only
 think that they do4      ,whatever the 
city1 in a word1 does to another city1  
or in the      management of her own    
affairs1 all happens by the counsel     
of the orators4        ,al4 ,true4      
,soc4 ,but now see what follows1 if ,i  
can #gamake it clear to      you#ga4    
,you would distinguish the wise from the
 foolish8        ,al4 ,yes4        ,soc4
 ,the many are foolish1 the few wise8   
,al4 ,certainly4        ,soc4 ,and you  
use both the terms1 #8wise' and         
#8foolish1' in      reference to        
something8        ,al4 ,i do4           
,sidenote3 ,examples4        ,soc4      

,would you call a person wise who can   
give advice1      but does not know     
whether or when it is better to carry   
out      the advice8        ,al4        
,decidedly not4        ,soc4 ,nor again1
 ,i suppose1 a person who knows the art 
of      war1 but does not know whether  
it is better to go to war or      for   
how long8        ,al4 ,no4        ,soc4 
,nor1 once more1 a person who knows how 
to kill      another or to take away his
 property or to drive him from      his 
native land1 but not when it is better  
to do so or for      whom it is better8 
,al4 ,certainly not4        ,soc4 ,but  
he who understands anything of the kind 
and      has at the same time the       
knowledge of the best course of         
action3--and the best and the useful are
 surely the same8--    ,sidenote3       
,cleverness in the arts not wisdom4     
,al4 ,yes4        ,soc4--,such an one1  
,i say1 we should call wise and a useful
      adviser both of himself and of the
 city4 ,what do you think8        ,al4  

,i agree4        ,soc4 ,and if any one  
knows how to ride or to shoot with      
the bow or to box or to wrestle1 or to  
engage in any other      sort of contest
 or to do anything whatever which is in 
the      nature of an art1--what do you 
call him who knows what is      best    
according to that art8 ,do you not speak
 of one who      knows what is best in  
riding as a good rider8        ,al4     
,yes4        ,soc4 ,and in a similar way
 you speak of a good boxer or      a    
good flute-player or a good performer in
 any other art8        ,al4 ,true4      
,soc4 ,but is it necessary that the man 
who is clever in any      of these arts 
should be wise also in general8 ,or is  
there      a difference between the     
clever artist and the wise man8         
,al4 ,all the difference in the world4  
,sidenote3 ,a state would be bad which  
was composed only of skilful  artists   
and clever politicians1 but where no one
 had the knowledge of the  best4        
,soc4 ,and what sort of a state do you  

think that would be      which was      
composed of good archers and            
flute-players and      athletes and     
masters in other arts1 and besides them 
of      those others about whom we      
spoke1 who knew how to go to      war   
and how to kill1 as well as of orators  
puffed up with      political pride but 
in which not one of them all had this   
knowledge of the best1 and there was no 
one who could tell      when it was     
better to apply any of these arts or in 
regard to      #adf      whom8          
,al4 ,i should call such a state bad1   
,socrates4        ,soc4 ,you certainly  
would when you saw each of them         
rivalling the other and esteeming that  
of the greatest importance      in the  
state1          #8,wherein he himself   
most excelled#gb4'        --,i mean that
 which was best in any art1 while he was
      entirely ignorant of what was best
 for himself and for the      state1    
because1 as ,i think1 he trusts to      
opinion which is      devoid of         

intelligence4 ,in such a case should we 
not be      right if we said that the   
state would be full of anarchy and      
lawlessness8    ,sidenote3 ,true        
knowledge a knowledge of the best4      
,al4 ,decidedly4        ,soc4 ,but ought
 we not then1 think you1 either to fancy
      that we know or really to know1   
what we confidently propose      to do  
or say8        ,al4 ,yes4        ,soc4  
,and if a person does that which he     
knows or supposes      that he knows1   
and the result is beneficial1 he will   
act      advantageously both for himself
 and for the state8        ,al4 ,true4  
,soc4 ,and if he do the contrary1 both  
he and the state will      suffer8      
,al4 ,yes4        ,soc4 ,well1 and are  
you of the same mind as before8         
,al4 ,i am4        ,soc4 ,but were you  
not saying that you would call the      
many unwise and the few wise8           
,al4 ,i was4        ,soc4 ,and have we  
not come back to our old assertion that 
the many fail to obtain the best because

 they trust to opinion      which is    
devoid of intelligence8        ,al4     
,that is the case4        ,soc4 ,it is  
good1 then1 for the many1 if they       
particularly      desire to do that     
which they know or suppose that they    
know1 neither to know nor to suppose    
that they know1 in      cases where if  
they carry out their ideas in action    
they will      be losers rather than    
gainers8        ,al4 ,what you say is   
very true4        ,soc4 ,do you not see 
that ,i was really speaking the truth   
when ,i affirmed that the possession of 
any other kind of      knowledge was    
more likely to injure than to benefit   
the      possessor1 unless he had also  
the knowledge of the best8        ,al4  
,i do now1 if ,i did not before1        
,socrates4    ,sidenote3 ,the soul      
requires this knowledge of the best     
before she sets  sail on the voyage of  
life4    ,sidenote3 ,the meaning of the 
poets4        ,soc4 ,the state or the   
soul1 therefore1 which wishes to have   

a right existence must hold firmly to   
this knowledge1 just as      the sick   
man clings to the physician1 or the     
passenger      depends for safety on the
 pilot4 ,and if the soul does not set   
#adg      sail until she have obtained  
this she will be all the safer in       
the voyage through life4 ,but when she  
rushes in pursuit of      wealth or     
bodily strength or anything else1 not   
having the      knowledge of the best1  
so much the more is she likely to       
meet with misfortune4 ,and he who has   
the love of learning#gc1      and is    
skilful in many arts1 and does not      
possess the knowledge      of the best1 
but is under some other guidance1 will  
make1 as he deserves1 a sorry           
voyage3--he will1 ,i believe1      hurry
 through the brief space of human life1 
pilotless in      mid-ocean1 and the    
words will apply to him in which the    
poet      blamed his enemy3--           
#8444 ,full many a thing he knew2       
,but knew them all badly#gd4'           

,al4 ,how in the world1 ,socrates1 do   
the words of the poet      apply to him8
 ,they seem to me to have no bearing on 
the      point whatever4    ,sidenote3  
,the poets spoke in riddles a hidden    
truth4        ,soc4 ,quite the contrary1
 my sweet friend3 only the poet is      
talking in riddles after the fashion of 
his tribe4 ,for all      poetry has by  
nature an enigmatical character1 and it 
is by      no means everybody who can   
interpret it4 ,and if1 moreover1        
the spirit of poetry happen to seize on 
a man who is of      a begrudging temper
 and does not care to manifest his      
wisdom but keeps it to himself as far as
 he can1 it does      indeed require an 
almost superhuman wisdom to discover    
what the poet would be at4 ,you surely  
do not suppose that      ,homer1 the    
wisest and most divine of poets1 was    
unaware of      the impossibility of    
knowing a thing badly3 for it was no    
less      a person than he who said of  
,margites that #8he knew many           

things1 but knew them all badly4' ,the  
solution of the riddle      is this1 ,i 
imagine3--,by #8badly' ,homer meant     
#8bad' and      #8knew' stands for #8to 
know4' ,put the words together2--the    
metre will suffer1 but the poet's       
meaning is clear2--#8,margites      knew
 all these things1 but it was bad for   
him to know them4'      ,and1 obviously1
 if it was bad for him to know so many  
things1 he must have been a             
good-for-nothing1 unless the            
argument has played us false4           
,al4 ,but ,i do not think that it has1  
,socrates3 at least1 if      the        
argument is fallacious1 it would be     
difficult for me to find      another   
which ,i could trust4        ,soc4 ,and 
you are right in thinking so4           
,al4 ,well1 that is my opinion4         
,sidenote3 ,the prayer of the           
,lacedaemonians4    ,sidenote3          
,alcibiades is too unstable to be able  
to trust his own  prayers4        ,soc4 
,but tell me1 by ,heaven3--you must see 

now the      nature and greatness of the
 difficulty in which you1 like          
others1 have your part4 ,for you change 
about in all      directions1 and never 
come to rest anywhere3 what you once    
most strongly inclined to suppose1 you  
put aside again and      quite alter    
your mind4 ,if the ,god to whose shrine 
you are          #adh      going should 
appear at this moment1 and ask before   
you      made your prayer1 #8,whether   
you would desire to have one      of the
 things which we mentioned at first1 or 
whether he      should leave you to make
 your own request3'--what in either     
case1 think you1 would be the best way  
to take advantage of      the           
opportunity8        ,al4 ,indeed1       
,socrates1 ,i could not answer you      
without      consideration4 ,it seems to
 me to be a wild thing#ge to make       
such a request2 a man must be very      
careful lest he pray for      evil under
 the idea that he is asking for good1   
when shortly      after he may have to  

recall his prayer1 and1 as you were     
saying1 demand the opposite of what he  
at first requested4        ,soc4 ,and   
was not the poet whose words ,i         
originally      quoted wiser than we    
are1 when he bade us pray ,god to       
defend us from evil even though we asked
 for it8        ,al4 ,i believe that you
 are right4        ,soc4 ,the           
,lacedaemonians1 too1 whether from      
admiration      of the poet or because  
they have discovered the idea for       
themselves1 are wont to offer the prayer
 alike in public and      private1 that 
the ,gods will give unto them the       
beautiful as      well as the good3--no 
one is likely to hear them make any     
further petition4 ,and yet up to the    
present time they have      not been    
less fortunate than other men2 or if    
they have      sometimes met with       
misfortune1 the fault has not been due  
to      their prayer4 ,for surely1 as ,i
 conceive1 the ,gods have      power    
either to grant our requests1 or to send

 us the contrary      of what we ask4   
,sidenote3 ,the silent prayer of the    
,lacedaemonians better than all the     
offerings of the other ,hellenes4       
,and now ,i will relate to you a story  
which ,i have heard      from certain of
 our elders4 ,it chanced that when the  
,athenians and ,lacedaemonians were at  
war1 our city lost      every battle by 
land and sea and never gained a victory4
    ,sidenote3 ,the word of the ,oracle 
,the ,athenians being annoyed and       
perplexed how to find      a remedy for 
their troubles1 decided to send and     
enquire at      the shrine of ,ammon4   
,their envoys were also to ask1         
#8,why the ,gods always granted the     
victory to the ,lacedaemonians8'        
#8,we1' 7they were to say17 #8offer them
 more      and finer sacrifices than any
 other ,hellenic state1 and adorn       
their temples with gifts1 as nobody else
 does2 moreover1 we      make the most  
solemn and costly processions to them   
every      year1 and spend more money in

 their service than all the      rest of
 the ,hellenes put together4 ,but the   
,lacedaemonians          #adi      take 
no thought of such matters1 and pay so  
little respect to      the ,gods that   
they have a habit of sacrificing        
blemished      animals to them1 and in  
various ways are less zealous than      
we are1 although their wealth is quite  
equal to ours4' ,when      they had thus
 spoken1 and had made their request to  
know      what remedy they could find   
against the evils which troubled        
them1 the prophet made no direct        
answer1--clearly because      he was not
 allowed by the ,god to do so2--but he  
summoned      them to him and said3     
#8,thus saith ,ammon to the ,athenians3 
8,the silent worship of the             
,lacedaemonians pleaseth me      better 
than all the offerings of the other     
,hellenes40' ,such      were the words  
of the ,god1 and nothing more4 ,he seems
      to have meant by #8silent worship'
 the prayer of the      ,lacedaemonians1

 which is indeed widely different from  
the      usual requests of the          
,hellenes4 ,for they either bring to    
the altar bulls with gilded horns or    
make offerings to the      ,gods1 and   
beg at random for what they need1 good  
or bad4      ,when1 therefore1 the ,gods
 hear them using words of ill      omen 
they reject these costly processions and
 sacrifices of      theirs4 ,and we     
ought1 ,i think1 to be very careful and 
consider      well what we should say   
and what leave unsaid4      ,homer1 too1
 will furnish us with similar stories4  
,for he      tells us how the ,trojans  
in making their encampment1             
#8,offered up whole hecatombs to the    
immortals1'        and how the #8sweet  
savour' was borne #8to the heavens by   
the winds2          #8,but the blessed  
,gods were averse and received it not4  
,for exceedingly did they hate the holy 
,ilium1        ,both ,priam and the     
people of the spear-skilled king4'      
,so that it was in vain for them to     

sacrifice and offer gifts1      seeing  
that they were hateful to the ,gods1 who
 are not1 like      vile usurers1 to be 
gained over by bribes4 ,and it is       
foolish      for us to boast that we are
 superior to the ,lacedaemonians      by
 reason of our much worship4 ,the idea  
is inconceivable      that the ,gods    
have regard1 not to the justice and     
purity of        #aej      our souls1   
but to costly processions and           
sacrifices1 which men      may celebrate
 year after year1 although they have    
committed      innumerable crimes       
against the ,gods or against their      
fellow-men      or the state4 ,for the  
,gods1 as ,ammon and his prophet        
declare1 are no receivers of gifts1 and 
they scorn such unworthy      service4  
,wherefore also it would seem that      
wisdom      and justice are especially  
honoured both by the ,gods and by       
men of sense2 and they are the wisest   
and most just who      know how to speak
 and act towards ,gods and men4 ,but    

,i should like to hear what your opinion
 is about these      matters4           
,sidenote3 about the ,athenians and the 
,lacedaemonians4        ,al4 ,i agree1  
,socrates1 with you and with the ,god1  
whom1      indeed1 it would be          
unbecoming for me to oppose4            
,soc4 ,do you not remember saying that  
you were in great      perplexity1 lest 
perchance you should ask for evil1      
supposing      that you were asking for 
good8        ,al4 ,i do4    ,sidenote3  
,alcibiades cannot tell whether he is   
asking for good or evil4  #8,therefore  
let his words be few4'        ,soc4 ,you
 see1 then1 that there is a risk in your
 approaching      the ,god in prayer1   
lest haply he should refuse      your   
sacrifice when he hears the blasphemy   
which you utter1      and make you      
partake of other evils as well4 ,the    
wisest      plan1 therefore1 seems to me
 that you should keep silence2      for 
your #8highmindedness'--to use the      
mildest term which      men apply to    

folly--will most likely prevent you from
 using      the prayer of the           
,lacedaemonians4 ,you had better wait   
until we find out how we should behave  
towards the ,gods      and towards men4 
,al4 ,and how long must ,i wait1        
,socrates1 and who will be      my      
teacher8 ,i should be very glad to see  
the man4        ,soc4 ,it is he who     
takes an especial interest in you4 ,but 
first of all1 ,i think1 the darkness    
must be taken away in      which your   
soul is now enveloped1 just as ,athene  
in ,homer      removes the mist from the
 eyes of ,diomede that          #8,he   
may distinguish between ,god and mortal 
man4'        ,afterwards the means may  
be given to you whereby you      may    
distinguish between good and evil4 ,at  
present1 ,i fear1      this is beyond   
your power4    ,sidenote3 ,alcibiades   
and his teacher4        ,al4 ,only let  
my instructor take away the impediment1 
whether it pleases him to call it mist  
or anything else6 ,i      care not who  

he is2 but ,i am resolved to disobey    
none of      his commands1 if ,i am     
likely to be the better for them4       
,soc4 ,and surely he has a wondrous care
 for you4                  #aea         
,al4 ,it seems to be altogether         
advisable to put off the      sacrifice 
until he is found4        ,soc4 ,you are
 right3 that will be safer than running 
such      a tremendous risk4        ,al4
 ,but how shall we manage1              
,socrates8--,at any rate      ,i will   
set this crown of mine upon your head1  
as you have      given me such excellent
 advice1 and to the ,gods we will       
offer crowns and perform the other      
customary rites when      ,i see that   
day approaching3 nor will it be long    
hence1 if      they so will4            
,soc4 ,i accept your gift1 and shall be 
ready and willing to      receive       
whatever else you may proffer4          
,euripides makes      ,creon say in the 
play1 when he beholds ,tiresias with his
      crown and hears that he has gained

 it by his skill as the                 
first-fruits of the spoil3--            
#8,an auspicious omen ,i deem thy       
victor's wreath3        ,for well thou  
knowest that wave and storm oppress     
us#gf4'        ,and so ,i count your    
gift to be a token of good-fortune2 for 
,i am in no less stress than ,creon1 and
 would fain carry off      the victory  
over your lovers4      ,,footnotes      
#fe ,cp4 ,aristotle1 ,pol4 v4 #aj1  #ag4
    #ff ,cp4 ,rep4 x4 #fai ,c4    #fg   
,hom4 ,odyss4 i4 #cb4    #fh ,the author
 of these lines1 which are probably of  
,pythagorean origin1  is unknown4 ,they 
are found also in the ,anthology 7,anth4
 ,pal4 #aj4 #ajh74    #fi ,these words  
are omitted in several ,,mss4    #gj    
,the reading is here uncertain4    #ga  
,some words appear to have dropped out  
here4    #gb ,euripides1 ,antiope1 fr4  
#bj 7,dindorf74    #gc ,or1 reading 1   
#8abundant learning4'    #gd ,a fragment
 from the pseudo-,homeric poem1         
#8,margites4'    #ge ,the ,homeric word 

is said to be here employed in allusion 
to  the quotation from the #8,margites' 
which ,socrates has just made2 but it is
  not used in the sense which it has in 
,homer4    #gf ,phoeniss4 #hfe1 #hff4   
,,eryxias4      ,,introduction4         
,sidenote3 ,eryxias4    ,much cannot be 
said in praise of the style or          
conception of the ,eryxias4  ,it is     
frequently obscure2 like the exercise of
 a student1 it is full of  small        
imitations of ,plato3--,phaeax returning
 from an expedition to ,sicily  7cp4    
,socrates in the ,charmides from the    
army at ,potidaea71 the figure of  the  
game at draughts1 #cie ,b1 borrowed from
 ,rep4 vi4 #dhg1 etc4 ,it has also  in  
many passages the ring of sophistry4 ,on
 the other hand1 the rather  unhandsome 
treatment which is exhibited towards    
,prodicus is quite unlike  the urbanity 
of ,plato4    ,yet there are some points
 in the argument which are deserving of 
attention4 7#a7 ,that wealth depends    
upon the need of it or demand for  it1  

is the first anticipation in an abstract
 form of one of the great  principles of
 modern political economy1 and the      
nearest approach to it  to be found in  
an ancient writer4 7#b7 ,the resolution 
of wealth into its  simplest implements 
going on to infinity is a subtle and    
refined thought4  7#c7 ,that wealth is  
relative to circumstances is a sound    
conception4  7#d7 ,that the arts and    
sciences which receive payment are      
likewise to  be comprehended under the  
notion of wealth1 also touches a        
question of  modern political economy4  
7#e7 ,the distinction of post hoc and   
propter  hoc1 often lost sight of in    
modern as well as in ancient times4     
,these  metaphysical conceptions and    
distinctions show considerable power of 
thought in the writer1 whatever we may  
think of his merits as an imitator  of  
,plato4      ,,eryxias4    ,,persons    
,,of ,,the ,,dialogue4    ,,socrates4   
,,eryxias4 ,,erasistratus4 ,,critias4   
,,scene3--,the portico of a temple of   

,zeus4    ,sidenote3 ,eryxias4          
,it happened by chance that ,eryxias the
 ,steirian was walking      with me in  
the ,portico of ,zeus the ,deliverer1   
when there  ,steph4 #cib      came up to
 us ,critias and ,erasistratus1 the     
latter the son of      ,phaeax1 who was 
the nephew of ,erasistratus4 ,now       
,erasistratus      had just arrived from
 ,sicily and that part of the world4    
,as they approached1 he said1 ,hail1    
,socrates6        ,soc4 ,the same to    
you1 ,i said2 have you any good news    
from ,sicily to tell us8        ,eras4  
,most excellent4 ,but1 if you please1   
let us first sit      down2 for ,i am   
tired with my yesterday's journey from  
,megara4        ,soc4 ,gladly1 if that  
is your desire4    ,sidenote3 ,the      
nature of wealth4    ,sidenote3 ,the    
troublesome ,sicilians4        ,eras4   
,what would you wish to hear first8 he  
said4 ,what      the ,sicilians are     
doing1 or how they are disposed towards 
our      city8 ,to my mind1 they are    

very like wasps3 so long as      you    
only cause them a little annoyance they 
are quite unmanageable2      you must   
destroy their nests if you wish to get  
the better of them4 ,and in a similar   
way1 the ,syracusans1      unless we set
 to work in earnest1 and go against them
 with a      great expedition1 will     
never submit to our rule4 ,the petty    
injuries which we at present inflict    
merely irritate them      enough to make
 them utterly intractable4 ,and now they
      have sent ambassadors to ,athens1 
and intend1 ,i suspect1 to      play us 
some trick4--,while we were talking1 the
 ,syracusan      envoys chanced to go   
by1 and ,erasistratus1 pointing to one  
of them1 said to me1 ,that1 ,socrates1  
is the richest man in      all ,italy   
and ,sicily4 ,for who has larger estates
 or more      land at his disposal to   
cultivate if he please8 ,and they       
are of a quality1 too1 finer than any   
other land in ,hellas4      ,moreover1  
he has all the things which go to make  

up      wealth1 slaves and horses       
innumerable1 gold and silver            
without end4        ,i saw that he was  
inclined to expatiate on the riches of  
the      man2 so ,i asked him1 ,well1   
,erasistratus1 and what sort of         
character does he bear in ,sicily8      
,sidenote3 ,the wicked millionaire4     
,eras4 ,he is esteemed to be1 and really
 is1 the wickedest of      #cic      all
 the ,sicilians and ,italians1 and even 
more wicked than he      is rich2       
indeed1 if you were to ask any ,sicilian
 whom he      thought to be the worst   
and the richest of mankind1 you         
would never hear any one else named4    
,soc4 ,i reflected that we were         
speaking1 not of trivial matters1       
but about wealth and virtue1 which are  
deemed to be of the      greatest       
moment1 and ,i asked ,erasistratus whom 
he considered      the wealthier1--he   
who was the possessor of a talent       
of silver or he who had a field worth   
two talents8        ,eras4 ,the owner of

 the field4        ,soc4 ,and on the    
same principle he who had robes and     
bedding and such things which are of    
greater value to him      than to a     
stranger would be richer than the       
stranger8        ,eras4 ,true4          
,soc4 ,and if any one gave you a choice1
 which of these      would you prefer8  
,eras4 ,that which was most valuable4   
,sidenote3 ,wealth consists of things   
which are valuable4        ,soc4 ,in    
which way do you think you would be the 
richer8        ,eras4 ,by choosing as ,i
 said4        ,soc4 ,and he appears to  
you to be the richest who has      goods
 of the greatest value8        ,eras4   
,he does4    ,sidenote3 ,is wisdom the  
most valuable of all things8            
,soc4 ,and are not the healthy richer   
than the sick1 since      health is a   
possession more valuable than riches to 
the sick8      ,surely there is no one  
who would not prefer to be poor and     
well1 rather than to have all the ,king 
of ,persia's wealth and      to be ill4 

,and this proves that men set health    
above wealth1      else they would never
 choose the one in preference to the    
other4        ,eras4 ,true4        ,soc4
 ,and if anything appeared to be more   
valuable than      health1 he would be  
the richest who possessed it8           
,eras4 ,he would4        ,soc4 ,suppose 
that some one came to us at this moment 
and were to ask1 ,well1 ,socrates and   
,eryxias and ,erasistratus1      can you
 tell me what is of the greatest value  
to men8      ,is it not that of which   
the possession will best enable a man   
to advise how his own and his friends'  
affairs should be                       
administered8--,what will be our reply8 
,eras4 ,i should say1 ,socrates1 that   
happiness was the most      precious of 
human possessions4        ,soc4 ,not a  
bad answer4 ,but do we not deem those   
men      who are most prosperous to be  
the happiest8        ,eras4 ,that is my 
opinion4        ,soc4 ,and are they not 
most prosperous who commit the          

fewest errors in respect either of      
themselves or of other      men8        
,eras4 ,certainly4        ,soc4 ,and    
they who know what is evil and what is  
good2 what should be done and what      
should be left undone2--these           
behave the most wisely and make the     
fewest                         #cid     
mistakes8        ,erasistratus agreed to
 this4        ,soc4 ,then the wisest and
 those who do best and the most         
fortunate and the richest would appear  
to be all one and      the same1 if     
wisdom is really the most valuable of   
our      possessions8    ,sidenote3 ,of 
what use would wisdom be1 if a man had  
not the necessaries  of life8           
,yes1 said ,eryxias1 interposing1 but   
what use would it be if      a man had  
the wisdom of ,nestor and wanted the    
necessaries      of life1 food and drink
 and clothes and the like8 ,where       
would be the advantage of wisdom then8  
,or how could he      be the richest of 
men who might even have to go begging1  

because he had not wherewithal to live8 
,sidenote3 ,comparative claims of wisdom
 and of riches4        ,i thought that  
what ,eryxias was saying had some       
weight1      and ,i replied1 ,would the 
wise man really suffer in this way1     
if he were so ill-provided2 whereas if  
he had the house of      ,polytion1 and 
the house were full of gold and silver1 
he      would lack nothing8             
,eryx4 ,yes2 for then he might dispose  
of his property and      obtain in      
exchange what he needed1 or he might    
sell it for      money with which he    
could supply his wants and in a moment  
procure abundance of everything4        
,sidenote3 ,the wisdom of ,nestor better
 and even more saleable than the  house 
of ,polytion4    ,sidenote3 ,and in the 
arts is not wisdom better than riches8  
,soc4 ,true1 if he could find some one  
who preferred such a      house to the  
wisdom of ,nestor4 ,but if there are    
persons      who set great store by     
wisdom like ,nestor's and the advantages

      accruing from it1 to sell these1  
if he were so disposed1      would be   
easier still4 ,or is a house a most     
useful and      necessary possession1   
and does it make a great difference in  
the comfort of life to have a mansion   
like ,polytion's instead      of living 
in a shabby little cottage1 whereas     
wisdom is of small      use and it is of
 no importance whether a man is wise or 
ignorant about the highest matters8 ,or 
is wisdom despised      of men and can  
find no buyers1 although cypress wood   
and      marble of ,pentelicus are      
eagerly bought by numerous purchasers8  
,surely the prudent pilot or the skilful
 physician1      or the artist of any   
kind who is proficient in his art1 is   
more      worth than the things which   
are especially reckoned among           
riches2 and he who can advise well and  
prudently for himself      and others is
 able also to sell the product of his   
art1 if he so      desire4              
,eryxias looked askance1 as if he had   

received some unfair          #cie      
treatment1 and said1 ,i believe1        
,socrates1 that if you were      forced 
to speak the truth1 you would declare   
that you were      richer than ,callias 
the son of ,hipponicus4 ,and yet1       
although      you claimed to be wiser   
about things of real importance1 you    
would not any the more be richer than   
he4    ,sidenote3 ,eryxias is supposed  
to reply that arguments can prove       
anything  and convince no one4          
,sidenote3 ,the triangular argument of  
,socrates1 ,eryxias1 ,critias4        ,i
 dare say1 ,eryxias1 ,i said1 that you  
may regard these arguments      of ours 
as a kind of game2 you think that they  
have      no relation to facts1 but are 
like the pieces in the game of          
draughts which the player can move in   
such a way that his      opponents are  
unable to make any countermove#gg4 ,and 
perhaps1      too1 as regards riches you
 are of opinion that while      facts   
remain the same1 there are arguments1 no

 matter      whether true or false1     
which enable the user of them to prove  
that the wisest and the richest are one 
and the same1 although      he is in the
 wrong and his opponents are in the     
right4      ,there would be nothing     
strange in this2 it would be as if      
two persons were to dispute about       
letters1 one declaring that      the    
word ,socrates began with an ,s1 the    
other that it began with      an ,a1 and
 the latter could gain the victory over 
the former4    ,sidenote3 ,eryxias      
disclaims the answer which is attributed
 to him4        ,eryxias glanced at the 
audience1 laughing and blushing at      
once1 as if he had had nothing to do    
with what had just been      said1 and  
replied1--,no1 indeed1 ,socrates1 ,i    
never supposed      that our arguments  
should be of a kind which would never   
convince any one of those here present  
or be of advantage to       them4 ,for  
what man of sense could ever be         
persuaded that      the wisest and the  

richest are the same8 ,the truth is that
      we are discussing the subject of  
riches1 and my notion is that      we   
should argue respecting the honest and  
dishonest means      of acquiring them1 
and1 generally1 whether they are a good 
thing or a bad4    ,sidenote3 ,the      
argument is renewed from a fresh point  
of view4 ,eryxias  declares riches to be
 a good2 ,critias maintains that they   
are sometimes  an evil4        ,very    
good1 ,i said1 and ,i am obliged to you 
for the hint3      in future we will be 
more careful4 ,but why do not you       
yourself1      as you introduced the    
argument1 and do not think that      the
 former discussion touched the point at 
issue1 tell us      whether you consider
 riches to be a good or an evil8        
,i am of opinion1 he said1 that they are
 a good4 ,he was      about to add      
something more1 when ,critias           
interrupted him3--,do      you really   
suppose so1 ,eryxias8        ,certainly1
 replied ,eryxias2 ,i should be mad if  

,i did not3      and ,i do not fancy    
that you would find any one else of a   
contrary      opinion4        ,and ,i1  
retorted ,critias1 should say that there
 is no one      whom ,i could not compel
 to admit that riches are bad for       
some men4 ,but surely1 if they were a   
good1 they could not          #cif      
appear bad for any one8    ,sidenote3   
,the irony of ,socrates4    ,sidenote3  
,socrates encourages the two disputants 
to follow up the  argument4        ,here
 ,i interposed and said to them3 ,if you
 two were      having an argument about 
equitation and what was the best        
way of riding1 supposing that ,i knew   
the art myself1 ,i should      try to   
bring you to an agreement4 ,for ,i      
should be ashamed      if ,i were       
present and did not do what ,i could to 
prevent      your difference4 ,and ,i   
should do the same if you were          
quarrelling about any other art and were
 likely1 unless you      agreed on the  
point in dispute1 to part as enemies    

instead of      as friends4 ,but now1   
when we are contending about a thing    
of which the usefulness continues during
 the whole of life1      and it makes an
 enormous difference whether we are to  
regard it as beneficial or not1--a      
thing1 too1 which is esteemed      of   
the highest importance by the           
,hellenes3--7for parents1      as soon  
as their children are1 as they think1   
come to years of      discretion1 urge  
them to consider how wealth may be      
acquired1      since by riches the value
 of a man is judged73--,when1      ,i   
say1 we are thus in earnest1 and you1   
who agree in      other respects1 fall  
to disputing about a matter of such     
moment1 that is1 about wealth1 and not  
merely whether      it is black or      
white1 light or heavy1 but whether it is
 a      good or an evil1 whereby1       
although you are now the dearest      of
 friends and kinsmen1 the most bitter   
hatred may arise      betwixt you1 ,i   
must hinder your dissension to the best 

of my      power4 ,if ,i could1 ,i would
 tell you the truth1 and so put an      
end to the dispute2 but as ,i cannot do 
this1 and each of you      supposes that
 you can bring the other to an          
agreement1 ,i am      prepared1 as far  
as my capacity admits1 to help you in   
solving      the question4 ,please1     
therefore1 ,critias1 try to make us     
accept the doctrines which you yourself 
entertain4        ,crit4 ,i should like 
to follow up the argument1 and will ask 
,eryxias whether he thinks that there   
are just and unjust      men8           
,eryx4 ,most decidedly4        ,crit4   
,and does injustice seem to you an evil 
or a good8        ,eryx4 ,an evil4      
,crit4 ,do you consider that he who     
bribes his neighbour's      wife and    
commits adultery with her1 acts justly  
or unjustly1      and this although both
 the state and the laws forbid8         
,eryx4 ,unjustly4    ,sidenote3 ,wealth 
may furnish the opportunity of crime4   
,crit4 ,and if the wicked man has wealth

 and is willing to         #cig         
spend it1 he will carry out his evil    
purposes8 whereas he      who is short  
of means cannot do what he fain would1  
and      therefore does not sin8 ,in    
such a case1 surely1 it is better       
that a person should not be wealthy1 if 
his poverty prevents      the           
accomplishment of his desires1 and his  
desires are evil8      ,or1 again1      
should you call sickness a good or an   
evil8        ,eryx4 ,an evil4           
,crit4 ,well1 and do you think that some
 men are intemperate8    ,sidenote3 ,the
 argument of ,critias4        ,eryx4    
,yes4        ,crit4 ,then1 if it is     
better for his health that the          
intemperate      man should refrain from
 meat and drink and other pleasant      
things1 but he cannot owing to his      
intemperance1 will it not      also be  
better that he should be too poor to    
gratify his lust      rather than that  
he should have a superabundance of      
means8      ,for thus he will not be    

able to sin1 although he desire never   
so much4    ,sidenote3 ,eryxias takes   
offence at ,critias1 whose argument1 as 
,socrates  pretends1 is only the        
repetition of which one had been used by
 ,prodicus  of ,ceos on the day before1 
and had been refuted by an impertinent  
youth4        ,critias appeared to be   
arguing so admirably that ,eryxias1     
if he had not been ashamed of the       
bystanders1 would      probably have got
 up and struck him4 ,for he thought that
      he had been robbed of a great     
possession when it became      obvious  
to him that he had been wrong in his    
former opinion      about wealth4 ,i    
observed his vexation1 and feared that  
they      would proceed to abuse and    
quarrelling3 so ,i said1--,i heard      
that very argument used in the ,lyceum  
yesterday by a wise      man1 ,prodicus 
of ,ceos2 but the audience thought that 
he      was talking mere nonsense1 and  
no one could be persuaded      that he  
was speaking the truth4 ,and when at    

last a certain      talkative young     
gentleman came in1 and1 taking his seat1
      began to laugh and jeer at        
,prodicus1 tormenting him and           
demanding an explanation of his         
argument1 he gained the ear      of the 
audience far more than ,prodicus4       
,can you repeat the discourse to us8    
said ,erasistratus4        ,soc4 ,if ,i 
can only remember it1 ,i will4 ,the     
youth began      by asking ,prodicus1   
,in what way did he think that riches   
were a good and in what an evil8        
,prodicus answered1 as      you did just
 now1 that they were a good to good men 
and to      those who knew in what way  
they should be employed1 while      to  
the bad and the ignorant they were an   
evil4 ,the same is      true1 he went on
 to say1 of all other things2 men make  
them      to be what they are           
themselves4 ,the saying of ,archilochus 
is true3--          #8,men's thoughts   
correspond to the things which they meet
 with4'        ,well1 then1 replied the 

youth1 if any one makes me wise in      
#cih      that wisdom whereby good men  
become wise1 he must also      make     
everything else good to me4 ,not that he
 concerns      himself at all with these
 other things1 but he has converted     
my ignorance into wisdom4 ,if1 for      
example1 a person teach      me grammar 
or music1 he will at the same time teach
 me all      that relates to grammar or 
music1 and so when he makes me          
good1 he makes things good to me4       
,sidenote3 ,prodicus corrected4         
,prodicus did not altogether agree3     
still he consented to      what was     
said4        ,and do you think1 said the
 youth1 that doing good things      is  
like building a house1--the work of     
human agency2 or do      things remain  
what they were at first1 good or bad1   
for all      time8        ,prodicus     
began to suspect1 ,i fancy1 the         
direction which the      argument was   
likely to take1 and did not wish to be  
put down      by a mere stripling before

 all those present3--7if they two       
had been alone1 he would not have       
minded73--so he      answered1 cleverly 
enough3 ,i think that doing good things 
is a work of human agency4        ,and  
is virtue in your opinion1 ,prodicus1   
innate or acquired      by instruction8 
,the latter1 said ,prodicus4            
,then you would consider him a simpleton
 who supposed      that he could obtain 
by praying to the ,gods the knowledge   
of grammar or music or any other art1   
which he must either      learn from    
another or find out for himself8        
,prodicus agreed to this also4          
,and when you pray to the ,gods that you
 may do well and      receive good1 you 
mean by your prayer nothing else than   
that you desire to become good and      
wise3--if1 at least1      things are    
good to the good and wise and evil to   
the evil4      ,but in that case1 if    
virtue is acquired by instruction1 it   
would      appear that you only pray to 
be taught what you do not      know4    

,hereupon ,i said to ,prodicus that it  
was no misfortune to      him if he had 
been proved to be in error in supposing 
that      the ,gods immediately granted 
to us whatever we asked3--if1      ,i   
added1 whenever you go up to the        
,acropolis you earnestly      entreat   
the ,gods to grant you good things1     
although you      know not whether they 
can yield your request1 it is as though 
you went to the doors of the grammarian 
and begged him1      although you had   
never made a study of the art1 to give  
you      a knowledge of grammar which   
would enable you forthwith      to do   
the business of a grammarian4           
,sidenote3 ,what constitutes wealth8    
,sidenote3 ,prodicus is desired to leave
 the gymnasium because he is  disturbing
 the minds of youth4        ,while ,i   
was speaking1 ,prodicus was preparing to
 retaliate      upon his youthful       
assailant1 intending to employ the      
argument      #cii      of which you    
have just made use2 for he was annoyed  

to have it supposed that he offered a   
vain prayer to the ,gods4      ,but the 
master of the gymnasium came to him and 
begged      him to leave because he was 
teaching the youths doctrines      which
 were unsuited to them1 and therefore   
bad for them4        ,i have told you   
this because ,i want you to understand  
how men are circumstanced in regard to  
philosophy4 ,had      ,prodicus been    
present and said what you have said1 the
      audience would have thought him   
raving1 and he would      have been     
ejected from the gymnasium4 ,but you    
have      argued so excellently well    
that you have not only persuaded        
your hearers1 but have brought your     
opponent to an agreement4      ,for just
 as in the law courts1 if two witnesses 
testify      to the same fact1 one of   
whom seems to be an honest fellow       
and the other a rogue1 the testimony of 
the rogue often has      the contrary   
effect on the judges' minds to what he  
intended1      while the same evidence  

if given by the honest man at once      
strikes them as perfectly true4 ,and    
probably the audience      have         
something of the same feeling about     
yourself and ,prodicus2      they think 
him a ,sophist and a braggart1 and      
regard      you as a gentleman of       
courtesy and worth4 ,for they do not    
pay attention to the argument so much as
 to the character of      the speaker4  
,sidenote3 ,socrates jesting professes  
to be in earnest4        ,but truly1    
,socrates1 said ,erasistratus1 though   
you may be      joking1 ,critias does   
seem to me to be saying something       
which is of weight4        ,soc4 ,i am  
in profound earnest1 ,i assure you4 ,but
 why1      as you have begun your       
argument so prettily1 do you not go     
on with the rest8 ,there is still       
something lacking1 now      you have    
agreed that wealth is a good to some and
 an evil      to others4 ,it remains to 
enquire what constitutes wealth2        
for unless you know this1 you cannot    

possibly come to an      understanding  
as to whether it is a good or an evil4  
,i am      ready to assist you in the   
enquiry to the utmost of my power3      
but first let him who affirms that      
riches are a good1 tell us      what1 in
 his opinion1 is wealth4        ,eras4  
,indeed1 ,socrates1 ,i have no notion   
about wealth      beyond that which men 
commonly have4 ,i suppose that          
wealth is a quantity of money#gh2 and   
this1 ,i imagine1 would      also be    
,critias' definition4    ,sidenote3     
,different kinds of money4    ,sidenote3
 ,what is money8 ,it is observed that   
different kinds of money  pass current  
in different countries1--,carthage1     
,lacedaemon1 ,ethiopia1  ,scythia4      
,soc4 ,then now we have to consider1    
,what is money8 ,or      else later on  
we shall be found to differ about the   
question4      ,for instance1 the       
,carthaginians use money of this sort4  
,something which is about the size of a 
stater is tied up in a      #djj        

small piece of leather3 what it is1 no  
one knows but the makers4      ,a seal  
is next set upon the leather1 which then
 passes into      circulation1 and he   
who has the largest number of such      
pieces is esteemed the richest and best 
off4 ,and yet if any one      among us  
had a mass of such coins he would be no 
wealthier      than if he had so many   
pebbles from the mountain4 ,at          
,lacedaemon1 again1 they use iron by    
weight which has been      rendered     
useless3 and he who has the greatest    
mass of such      iron is thought to be 
the richest1 although elsewhere it has  
no value4 ,in ,ethiopia engraved stones 
are employed1 of      which a           
,lacedaemonian could make no use4 ,once 
more1      among the ,nomad ,scythians a
 man who owned the house of             
,polytion would not be thought richer   
than one who possessed      ,mount      
,lycabettus among ourselves4 ,and       
clearly those things      cannot all be 
regarded as possessions2 for in some    

cases the      possessors would appear  
none the richer thereby3 but1 as ,i     
was saying1 some one of them is thought 
in one place to be      money1 and the  
possessors of it are the wealthy1       
whereas in      some other place it is  
not money1 and the ownership of it      
does not confer wealth2 just as the     
standard of morals varies1      and what
 is honourable to some men is           
dishonourable to      others4 ,and if we
 wish to enquire why a house is valuable
 to      us but not to the ,scythians1  
or why the ,carthaginians value         
leather which is worthless to us1 or the
 ,lacedaemonians find      wealth in    
iron and we do not1 can we not get an   
answer in      some such way as this3   
,would an ,athenian1 who had a          
thousand talents weight of the stones   
which lie about in the      ,agora and  
which we do not employ for any purpose1 
be      thought to be any the richer8   
,eras4 ,he certainly would not appear so
 to me4        ,soc4 ,but if he         

possessed a thousand talents weight of  
some      precious stone1 we should say 
that he was very rich8        ,eras4 ,of
 course4    ,sidenote3 ,wealth must be  
useful4        ,soc4 ,the reason is that
 the one is useless and the other       
useful8        ,eras4 ,yes4        ,soc4
 ,and in the same way among the         
,scythians a house      has no value    
because they have no use for a house1   
nor      would a ,scythian set so much  
store on the finest house in      the   
world as on a leather coat1 because he  
could use the      one and not the      
other4 ,or again1 the ,carthaginian     
coinage      is not wealth in our eyes1 
for we could not employ it1 as we       
can silver1 to procure what we need1 and
 therefore it is of no      use to us4  
,eras4 ,true4    ,sidenote3 ,wealth is  
useful1 but other things are useful     
besides wealth4        ,soc4 ,what is   
useful to us1 then1 is wealth1 and what 
is      useless to us is not wealth8    
,but how do you mean1 ,socrates8 said   

,eryxias1 interrupting4      ,do we not 
employ in our intercourse with one      
another               #dja      speech  
and violence 787 and various other      
things8 ,these      are useful and yet  
they are not wealth4        ,soc4       
,clearly we have not yet answered the   
question1      ,what is wealth8 ,that   
wealth must be useful1 to be wealth     
at all1--thus much is acknowledged by   
every one4 ,but what      particular    
thing is wealth1 if not all things8 ,let
 us pursue      the argument in another 
way2 and then we may perhaps      find  
what we are seeking4 ,what is the use of
 wealth1      and for what purpose has  
the possession of riches been           
invented1--in the sense1 ,i mean1 in    
which drugs have been      discovered   
for the cure of disease8 ,perhaps in    
this way we      may throw some light on
 the question4 ,it appears to be clear  
that whatever constitutes wealth must be
 useful1 and that      wealth is one    
class of useful things2 and now we have 

to      enquire1 ,what is the use of    
those useful things which constitute    
wealth8 ,for all things probably may be 
said to be      useful which we use in  
production1 just as all things which    
have life are animals1 but there is a   
special kind of animal      which we    
call #8man4' ,now if any one were to ask
 us1 ,what      is that of which1 if we 
were rid1 we should not want medicine   
and the instruments of medicine1 we     
might reply that this      would be the 
case if disease were absent from our    
bodies      and either never came to    
them at all or went away again as       
soon as it appeared2 and we may         
therefore conclude that      medicine is
 the science which is useful for getting
 rid of      disease4 ,but if we are    
further asked1 ,what is that from       
which1 if we were free1 we should have  
no need of wealth8      can we give an  
answer8 ,if we have none1 suppose that  
we      restate the question thus3--,if 
a man could live without food      or   

drink1 and yet suffer neither hunger nor
 thirst1 would he      want either money
 or anything else in order to supply his
      needs8    ,sidenote3 ,wealth is   
what is wanted3        ,eryx4 ,he would 
not4    ,sidenote3 ,if the body had no  
wants or feelings there would be no need
 of  money4        ,soc4 ,and does not  
this apply in other cases8 ,if we did   
not want for the service of the body the
 things of which we      now stand in   
need1 and heat and cold and the other   
bodily      sensations were unperceived 
by us1 there would be no use in         
this so-called wealth1 if no one1 that  
is1 had any necessity for      those    
things which now make us wish for wealth
 in order      that we may satisfy the  
desires and needs of the body in        
respect of our various wants4 ,and      
therefore if the possession      of     
wealth is useful in ministering to our  
bodily wants1 and      bodily wants were
 unknown to us1 we should not need      
wealth1 and possibly there would be no  

such thing as      wealth4        ,eryx4
 ,clearly not4        ,soc4 ,then our   
conclusion is1 as would appear1 that    
wealth      is what is useful to this   
end8        ,eryxias once1 more gave his
 assent1 but the small argument         
considerably troubled him4        ,soc4 
,and what is your opinion about another 
question3--,would      #djb      you say
 that the same thing can be at one time 
useful      and at another useless for  
the production of the same result8      
,eryx4 ,i cannot say more than that if  
we require the same      thing to       
produce the same result1 then it seems  
to me to be      useful2 if not1 not4   
,soc4 ,then if without the aid of fire  
we could make a brazen      statue1 we  
should not want fire for that purpose2  
and if we      did not want it1 it would
 be useless to us8 ,and the argument    
applies equally in other cases4         
,eryx4 ,clearly4        ,soc4 ,and      
therefore conditions which are not      
required for      the existence of a    

thing are not useful for the production 
of it8        ,eryx4 ,of course not4    
,sidenote3 and when ceasing to be wanted
 ceases to be wealth4        ,soc4 ,and 
if without gold or silver or anything   
else which      we do not use directly  
for the body in the way that we do      
food and drink and bedding and          
houses1--if without these we      could 
satisfy the wants of the body1 they     
would be of no use      to us for that  
purpose8        ,eryx4 ,they would not4 
,soc4 ,they would no longer be regarded 
as wealth1 because      they are        
useless1 whereas that would be wealth   
which enabled      us to obtain what was
 useful to us8        ,eryx4 ,o         
,socrates1 you will never be able to    
persuade me      that gold and silver   
and similar things are not wealth4 ,but 
,i am very strongly of opinion that     
things which are useless      to us are 
not wealth1 and that the money which is 
useful for      this purpose is of the  
greatest use2 not that these things     

are not useful towards life1 if by them 
we can procure      wealth4             
,sidenote3 ,the arts too are wealth1 for
 by them the needs of life are          
satisfied4        ,soc4 ,and how would  
you answer another question8 ,there     
are persons1 are there not1 who teach   
music and grammar      and other arts   
for pay1 and thus procure those things  
of      which they stand in need8       
,eryx4 ,there are4        ,soc4 ,and    
these men by the arts which they        
profess1 and in      exchange for them1 
obtain the necessities of life just as  
we do      by means of gold and silver8 
,eryx4 ,true4        ,soc4 ,then if they
 procure by this means what they want   
for the purposes of life1 that art will 
be useful towards life8      ,for do we 
not say that silver is useful because it
 enables us      to supply our bodily   
needs8        ,eryx4 ,we do4            
,soc4 ,then if these arts are reckoned  
among things useful1      the arts are  
wealth for the same reason as gold and  

silver are1      for1 clearly1 the      
possession of them gives wealth4 ,yet a 
little      while ago we found it       
difficult to accept the argument which  
proved that the wisest are the          
wealthiest4 ,but now there              
#djc      seems no escape from this     
conclusion4 ,suppose that we      are   
asked1 #8,is a horse useful to          
everybody8' will not our      reply be1 
#8,no1 but only to those who know how to
 use a      horse8'        ,eryx4       
,certainly4    ,sidenote3 ,wealth is    
wealth when we know how to use it4      
,soc4 ,and so1 too1 physic is not useful
 to every one1 but      only to him who 
knows how to use it8        ,eryx4      
,true4        ,soc4 ,and the same is the
 case with everything else8             
,eryx4 ,yes4        ,soc4 ,then gold and
 silver and all the other elements      
which are supposed to make up wealth are
 only useful to the      person who     
knows how to use them8        ,eryx4    
,exactly4        ,soc4 ,and were we not 

saving before that it was the business  
of a good man and a gentleman to know   
where and how      anything should be   
used8        ,eryx4 ,yes4    ,sidenote3 
,the good only know how to use things4  
,soc4 ,the good and gentle1 therefore1  
will alone have profit      from these  
things1 supposing at least that they    
know how to      use them4 ,but if so1  
to them only will they seem to be       
wealth4 ,it appears1 however1 that where
 a person is ignorant      of riding1   
and has horses which are useless to him1
 if some      one teaches him that art1 
he makes him also richer1 for what      
was before useless has now become useful
 to him1 and in      giving him         
knowledge he has also conferred riches  
upon      him4        ,eryx4 ,that is   
the case4        ,soc4 ,yet ,i dare be  
sworn that ,critias will not be moved a 
whit by the argument4        ,crit4 ,no1
 by heaven4 ,i should be a madman if ,i 
were4 ,but      why do you not finish   
the argument which proves that gold     

and silver and other things which seem  
to be wealth are not      real wealth8  
,for ,i have been exceedingly delighted 
to hear      the discourses which you   
have just been holding4        ,soc4 ,my
 argument1 ,critias 7,i said71 appears  
to have given      you the same kind of 
pleasure which you might have derived   
from some rhapsode's recitation of      
,homer2 for you do not      believe a   
word of what has been said4 ,but come   
now1 give      me an answer to this     
question4 ,are not certain things useful
      to the builder when he is building
 a house8        ,crit4 ,they are4      
,sidenote3 ,the elements of wealth are  
infinite4        ,soc4 ,and would you   
say that those things are useful which  
are employed in house building1--stones 
and bricks and      beams and the like1 
and also the instruments with which the 
builder built the house1 the beams and  
stones which they      provided1 and    
again the instruments by which these    
were      obtained8        ,crit4 ,it   

seems to me that they are all useful for
 building4        ,soc4 ,and is it not  
true of every art1 that not only the    
materials but the instruments by which  
we procure them and      without which  
the work could not go on1 are useful for
      that art8        ,crit4           
,certainly4        ,soc4 ,and further1  
the instruments by which the instruments
      are procured1 and so on1 going    
back from stage to stage ad        #djd 
infinitum1--are not all these1 in your  
opinion1 necessary in      order to     
carry out the work8        ,crit4 ,we   
may fairly suppose such to be the case4 
,sidenote3 ,a sophism4 ,gold and silver 
would be useless if they were not       
needed to obtain food3 and things cannot
 be at one time useless1 at  another    
time useful1 in the same actions4       
,soc4 ,and if a man has food and drink  
and clothes and the      other things   
which are useful to the body1 would he  
need      gold or silver or any other   
means by which he could procure         

that which he now has8        ,crit4 ,i 
do not think so4        ,soc4 ,then you 
consider that a man never wants any of  
these things for the use of the body8   
,crit4 ,certainly not4        ,soc4 ,and
 if they appear useless to this end1    
ought they not      always to appear    
useless8 ,for we have already laid down 
the principle that things cannot be at  
one time useful and      another time   
not1 in the same process4        ,crit4 
,but in that respect your argument and  
mine are the      same4 ,for you        
maintain if they are useful to a certain
 end1      they can never become        
useless2 whereas ,i say that in order   
to accomplish some results bad things   
are needed1 and good      for others4   
,soc4 ,but can a bad thing be used to   
carry out a good      purpose8          
,crit4 ,i should say not4        ,soc4  
,and we call those actions good which a 
man does for      the sake of virtue8   
,crit4 ,yes4        ,soc4 ,but can a man
 learn any kind of knowledge which is   

imparted by word of mouth if he is      
wholly deprived of      the sense of    
hearing8    ,sidenote3 ,good ends may be
 attained by bad means4        ,crit4   
,certainly not1 ,i think4        ,soc4  
,and will not hearing be useful for     
virtue1 if virtue is      taught by     
hearing and we use the sense of hearing 
in giving      instruction8             
,crit4 ,yes4    ,sidenote3 ,there are   
indirect means towards ends4            
,soc4 ,and since medicine frees the sick
 man from his      disease1 that art too
 may sometimes appear useful in the     
acquisition of virtue1 e4 g4 when       
hearing is procured by the      aid of  
medicine4        ,crit4 ,very likely4   
,soc4 ,but if1 again1 we obtain by      
wealth the aid of medicine1      shall  
we not regard wealth as useful for      
virtue8        ,crit4 ,true4            
,soc4 ,and also the instruments by which
 wealth is procured8        ,crit4      
,certainly4    ,sidenote3 ,wealth may be
 gained discreditably1 but spent in the 

acquisition of virtue4        ,soc4     
,then you think that a man may gain     
wealth by bad      and disgraceful      
means1 and1 having obtained the aid of  
medicine      which enables him to      
acquire the power of hearing1 may       
use that very faculty for the           
acquisition of virtue8        ,crit4    
,yes1 ,i do4        ,soc4 ,but can that 
which is evil be useful for virtue8     
,crit4 ,no4        ,soc4 ,it is not     
therefore necessary that the means by   
which      we obtain what is useful for 
a certain object should always be       
useful for the same object3 for it seems
 that bad actions may      sometimes    
serve good purposes8 ,the matter will be
 still            #dje      plainer if  
we look at it in this way3--,if things  
are useful      towards the several ends
 for which they exist1 which ends       
would not come into existence without   
them1 how would you      regard them8   
,can ignorance1 for instance1 be useful 
for      knowledge1 or disease for      

health1 or vice for virtue8             
,crit4 ,never4        ,soc4 ,and yet we 
have already agreed--have we not8--that 
there can be no knowledge where there   
has not previously      been ignorance1 
nor health where there has not been     
disease1      nor virtue where there has
 not been vice8        ,crit4 ,i think  
that we have4    ,sidenote3 ,difference 
between causes and antecedents4         
,soc4 ,but then it would seem that the  
antecedents without      which a thing  
cannot exist are not necessarily useful 
to it4    ,sidenote3 ,is he who needs   
most or who needs least the happier8    
,otherwise ignorance would appear useful
 for knowledge1      disease for health1
 and vice for virtue4        ,critias   
still showed great reluctance to accept 
any argument      which went to prove   
that all these things were useless4     
,i saw that it was as difficult to      
persuade him as 7according to      the  
proverb7 it is to boil a stone1 so ,i   
said3 ,let us bid      #8good-bye' to   

the discussion1 since we cannot agree   
whether      these things are useful and
 a part of wealth or not4 ,but      what
 shall we say to another question3      
,which is the      happier and better   
man1--he who requires the greatest      
quantity      of necessaries for body   
and diet1 or he who requires only       
the fewest and least8 ,the answer will  
perhaps become more      obvious if we  
suppose some one1 comparing the man     
himself      at different times1 to     
consider whether his condition is better
      when he is sick or when he is     
well8        ,crit4 ,that is not a      
question which needs much consideration4
    ,sidenote3 ,health is a better      
condition than disease2 and it needs    
less4        ,soc4 ,probably1 ,i said1  
every one can understand that           
health is a better condition than       
disease4 ,but when have we      the     
greatest and the most various needs1    
when we are sick or      when we are    
well8        ,crit4 ,when we are sick4  

,soc4 ,and when we are in the worst     
state we have the      greatest and most
 especial need and desire of bodily     
pleasures8        ,crit4 ,true4         
,sidenote3 ,so he is best off who has   
fewest desires4        ,soc4 ,and seeing
 that a man is best off when he is least
 in      need of such things1 does not  
the same reasoning apply to      the    
case of any two persons1 of whom one has
 many and      great wants and desires1 
and the other few and moderate8         
,for instance1 some men are gamblers1   
some drunkards1 and      some gluttons3 
and gambling and the love of drink and  
greediness are all desires8             
,crit4 ,certainly4        ,soc4 ,but    
desires are only the lack of something3 
and      those who have the greatest    
desires are in a worse condition        
than those who have none or very slight 
ones8        ,crit4 ,certainly ,i       
consider that those who have such       
#djf      wants are bad1 and that the   
greater their wants the worse      they 

are4        ,soc4 ,and do we think it   
possible that a thing should be         
useful for a purpose unless we have need
 of it for that      purpose8           
,sidenote3 ,the richest are those who   
are most in want4        ,crit4 ,no4    
,soc4 ,then if these things are useful  
for supplying the      needs of the     
body1 we must want them for that        
purpose8        ,crit4 ,that is my      
opinion4        ,soc4 ,and he to whom   
the greatest number of things are       
useful for his purpose1 will also want  
the greatest number of      means of    
accomplishing it1 supposing that we     
necessarily feel      the want of all   
useful things8        ,crit4 ,it seems  
so4        ,soc4 ,the argument proves   
then that he who has great      riches  
has likewise need of many things for the
 supply of the      wants of the body2  
for wealth appears useful towards that  
end4 ,and the richest must be in the    
worst condition1 since      they seem to
 be most in want of such things4        

,,footnotes    #gg ,cp4 ,rep4 vi4 #dhg4 
#gh ,cp4 ,arist4 ,pol4 i4 #i1  #aj1 #ad4
          ,transcriber's ,notes      ,p4
 #adg4 #8opinons' changed to            
#8opinions'4    ,p4 #bdj4 #8,odyssee'   
changed to #8,odyssey'4    ,p4 #bef4    
#8,simmais' changed to #8,simmias'4     
,p4 #eed4 #8,teiresias' changed to      
#8,tiresias'4    ,p4 #efj4              
#8,erisastratus' changed to             
#8,erasistratus'4    ,p4 #efj4 ,added   
,soc4 voice to paragraph4    ,corrected 
various punctuation4    ,several missing
 ,stephanus page numbers added1 by      
comparison with the       ,,uk printing4